

**Six Degrees of Revolution:
Political Networks, Diffusion Mechanisms and Mobilization in
Collective Action Against Competitive Authoritarian Regimes**

Spyridon Demetrius KOTSOVILIS
Department of Political Science
McGill University, Montreal

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ABSTRACT

This research rests on the nexus between domestic and transnational social movements, mobilization theories and regime transitions. Specifically, this dissertation studies recent episodes of democratization-related mass protests and mobilizations against competitive authoritarian regimes from a networks perspective. In it I postulate that different ways in which political groups organize and diffuse information, behavior and human and material resources affect their mobilizational capabilities, and thus their chances at success in their goals. This theoretical proposition of structure and dynamics of diffusion is empirically tested by looking at four in-depth cases in Serbia (1996-7, 2000) and Ukraine (2000-1, 2004), via a mixed methodological approach centered on the study of networks. Based on a combination of qualitative and quantitative work (extensive field interviews, archival research tracing the protests, design and execution of respondent-driven sampling survey, mapping and formal network analysis, comparison and computer simulations), my results suggest that specific configurations of networks-what the study terms *composite* ones-are better-suited for political groups and movements seeking to mobilize. Often neglected and seldom proven in conjunction with opposition groups, the same holds true for regimes and their counter-mobilization potential. In other words, the findings indicate that how one and their political opponents are connected matters in how they diffuse their resources and coordinate their action before and during mobilization. My conclusion also points to that the corollaries of this study in extra-legal contests to protect the legality of elections extend beyond the space of the color revolutions, to protesting against competitive authoritarian regimes and to promoting democratic practice all around the globe, both during and outside regular election cycles.

RESUMÉ

Les protestations sociales et les « révolutions électorales » sont des actions collectives qui se caractérisent par des processus de mobilisation. Ces événements politiques complexes sont fréquemment à l'origine de résultats inattendus comme le déclenchement de la participation en masse qui provoque une action décisive. La diffusion d'information et l'appel à l'action collective sont des facteurs clés dans ce processus qui sont facilités par des connections au réseau d'activistes. L'étude systématique de ces mécanismes peut contribuer à repérer le point de basculement de l'action collective. Celle-ci est souvent atteinte lorsque des événements à plus petite échelle sont liés et déclenchent soudainement des retombées de grande envergure. De récentes recherches et la mise au point de nouveaux outils méthodologiques permettent d'étudier comment les propriétés statiques et dynamiques de ces réseaux peuvent affecter, freiner ou amplifier la diffusion de ces facteurs. Ce projet étudie les processus de diffusion d'information et d'appel à l'action collective au cours de récentes révolutions électorales en Serbie et Ukraine. De plus, il examine les propriétés des réseaux d'activistes et de leurs adversaires, et observe l'effet cascade des interactions parmi et entre les acteurs et ces événements.

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“...But in the end [Bolotnikov’s 1606-7] rising was doomed to fail, for the vague myths which united its adherents in a loose coalition were no substitute for an effective organization and a coherent revolutionary program.” [...]

On the Pugachev revolt:” ...there [was no] effective coordination among the scattered rebel detachments [...] Beyond all this, disappointing response in the towns and the lack of a constructive program”

Avrich, Paul. Russian Rebels 1600-1800 (1976).

“In those days the youth met secretly and, because the bad news kept increasing in the capital, they took the decision to get out into the streets and squares with the only thing remaining to them: a hand’s length of space beneath the open shirt, with the black hair and the sun’s little cross. Where state and power were held by Spring.

And because the day was near when the Nation celebrated the other Rising, they chose that day for the Exodus. And they went out early into the sunlight, with their fearlessness unfurled wide as a flag, the young men with the swollen feet whom they called tramps. And many men were following behind, and women, and wounded with the bandages and the crutches. Where suddenly you could see in their visage so many lines, their faces so lined that you might think many days had gone by within a short hour.

Such an audacity, however, that when its news was learned by the Others, they were exceedingly disturbed. And thrice taking stock with their eyes of their possessions, they took the decision to get out into the streets and squares with the only thing remaining to them: an arms’ length of fire beneath the irons, with the black gun barrels and the teeth of the sun. Where neither shoot nor blossom ever shed a tear. And they fired at random, their eyelids shut in despair. And Spring kept overpowering them.

As if there were no other road on the entire earth for Spring to take, except this one ...”

Odysseas Elytis, Τό Άξιον Έστί (Worthy It Is) (1959).

PROLOGUE

Consider the following scenario: young Ukrainians are fed up with what they perceive as an egregious government cover-up, obvious deception and blatant disregard for the law. Students decide on a protest to last as long as it takes to force the president to political and legal accountability and begin gathering in Independence Square. The tents go up. Defying the bitter cold, students are ready to risk their university careers and plan marches. These facts apply to central Kyiv, but this is not the celebrated season of 'Orange' in 2004. Instead it is the bleak winter of 2000-2001, and a few months later the *Ukraine Without Kuchma* protest that marked it is ingloriously over.

Why? Time and again, in interviews with individuals with inside knowledge and experience from these protests and campaigns, the theme they kept repeating was that the 2000-1 events never broke outside a small circle, never diffused widely enough to make an impact. Participants and students of the 2000-1 protest are unequivocal about where blame is to be allocated: *'the level of organization... Ukraine Without Kuchma failed before the violence started because of no development'*¹; *'We just couldn't mobilize them [the people]'*²; *'Ukraine Without Kuchma didn't get much popular support because it had no organization structure behind it'*³; *'action without preparation... subjectively, not a prepared action. It happened spontaneously by people unsatisfied with the regime...there was no network at all, just a collection of disaffected protesters with little organization and planning.'*⁴

In contrast, 2004 witnessed organizations that were better equipped and designed to embark on a course that would produce an impact in Ukrainian society. Among them, was *Black Pora*, a dynamic youth opposition group which spearheaded the struggle against the regime: it engaged in early agitprop action, it enabled opposition

¹ O.S. interviewed by the author, Kyiv 2007.

² Dmytro Potekhin of the Znayu campaign, interviewed by the author, Kyiv 2007.

³ Mihailo Winnicki, Professor at Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, interviewed by the author, Kyiv, 2007.

⁴ Sergei Taran, of the Kyiv-based Institute of Mass Information and coordinator for Media and Mass Communications in Yellow Pora.

activities on both local and national levels, it empowered regional initiatives, it facilitated critical contacts beyond Ukraine's borders, and helped set the pace for other organizations and volunteers to follow suit. At the same time, such a coordinated, yet spread-out organization and effort baffled the authorities and their coercive apparatus which were largely unable to meet their challenge, despite their resources. Organization and structure were paramount: *"That made the role of the regime very hard, to fight a movement that emerges from bottom-up and no structure"*⁵ For the government-backed candidate of the 2004 Ukrainian Presidential elections, Victor Yanukovich, his counter-campaign came very late to produce any effect. Criticism includes the campaign's misestimating of the mobilization potential of the opposition, poor mobilization of its own supporters and problems with its information center when it was finally launched: *'The other side simply 'didn't know what to do with people. They copied Pora. It was a pity to see all Yanukovich people come to Kyiv and don't knowing what to do...'*⁶ Instead, the real opponent of the opposition was the coercive apparatus of President Kuchma's regime, which allegedly abused its power in support of its patron, and may have been involved in a gruesome case of silencing an inquisitive reported, Georgiy Gongadze in 2000. But Black *Pora* managed to persevere, to a great extent 'thanks to its organization network.'⁷

The success of the Black *Pora* followed that of the Serbian youth opposition group *Otpor* which set the example, from its founding in late 1998 until the fraudulent Serbian Presidential elections of 2000 that witnessed mass protests and the eventual ousting of Slobodan Milosevic. *Otpor* itself came in the heels of an earlier movement that involved students against the Yugoslav regime in 1996-7: *'We learned from the mistakes of lack of structure and their consequences for coordination.'*⁸ It should not be very surprising that both the Black *Pora* and *Otpor* organizations shared similarities in organization and tactics, since Serbian veteran activists visited Ukraine and met with Ukrainian volunteers for training purposes, in the years leading up to the Ukrainian

⁵ Professor Yevgen Dykyi of Kyiv-Mohyla and a top Yellow *Pora* activist, interviewed by the author, Kyiv, 2007.

⁶ Sergei Taran, interviewed by the author, Kyiv, 2007.

⁷ H.P., Black *Pora* activist interviewed by the author, Kyiv 2007.

⁸ I.M., interviewed by the author, Boston 2008.

Presidential elections of 2004. Ukrainian activists emulated the *Otpor* model of a leaderless, multi-purpose, diffused organization, modifying it and fitting it to the demands of the Ukrainian political, social and physical landscape; in other words, they focused on the network. This is also the focus of this study.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

For many behind the former Iron Curtain who missed the 1989 and 1991 chances to reset their calendars to a new era, the first half of the first decade of the 21st century provided another major opportunity. Irrespective of whether the collapse of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and Soviet Union constitutes a third or a fourth wave of democracy, the political events that marked the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century were nothing short of seismic. From that perspective, the collective action and resulting democratizing revolutions that took place in countries like FR Yugoslavia⁹ in 2000, Georgia in 2003 Ukraine in 2004 and even Kyrgyzstan in 2005 were the most serious after-tremors of the original earthquake. Authoritarian leaders of states that had survived the first shock of the demise of the great Soviet champion of totalitarian utopian ideology, desperately, if coyly, tried to hold on to power-by allowing for elections which they fully expected to win by any means possible-only to be swept away by civic protests of thousands, sometimes hundreds of thousands of mobilized people. These events are collectively labeled the 'color revolutions' and find themselves at the centre of this study. But, the reader must keep in mind that the themes investigated here are not exclusive or unique to this region. These shocks (re)set¹⁰ the tone of civic protest and, even by osmosis, reverberated beyond the post-Communist universe to other non-democratic corners of the world where fraudulent elections and regime conduct were challenged-like the examples of Lebanon (2005), Kuwait (2005), Myanmar

⁹ FR (Federal Republic of) Yugoslavia (1992 to 2003) refers to the truncated 'successor' state to the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (minus four of its original republics since Tito's time), with Slobodan Milosevic continuing at the helm until the Presidential elections of autumn 2000. In 2003, FR Yugoslavia devolved into the 'State Union between Serbia and Montenegro' until Montenegro's successful Independence referendum in mid-2006, which effectively completed the dissolution process violently begun fifteen years earlier.

¹⁰ It is not argued here that the philosophy behind these protest techniques was new, but that it was effectively reintroduced and applied in an authoritarian political context. The spirit of non-violent civil disobedience can be traced, at least back to Thoreau, Tolstoy, Gandhi and the 1930 Salt March, and then to Martin Luther King Jr. and the Civil Rights movement in the 1960's Southern United States. (For a fascinating account of the latter, see McAdam, D. *Freedom Summer*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).

(2007), Maldives (2008), Iran (2009), and more recently, Tunisia (2010-1), Egypt (2011), Libya (2012) and Syria (2012).

Questions of this study and the general argument

The speed with which protests unfolded, the size of the crowds involved that caught even optimistic opposition members by surprise, and these events' decisive political effect in nullifying electoral fraud make them all the more intriguing. But, why did, in the aforementioned cases in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, opposition mobilizations against authoritarian regimes succeed¹¹ and why did those in other cases, from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan to Moldova and Uzbekistan, not to mention earlier cases in Serbia and Ukraine themselves, fail? In addition how did successful ones materialize-that is, unfolded and propagated-reaching and activating thousands of supporters, increasing the probability of a bandwagon effect, where the initial numbers of tens of people protesting out on the streets against illiberal regimes eventually cascaded into thousands and more? These are the twin questions that form the crux of this investigation.

A great number of variables are associated with transition from authoritarianism especially in the post-Communist galaxy of cases. They include institutional/political legacy (Kitschelt 1995, 1999; Fish 1998, 2005); opportunity (Tucker 2006, 2007); political culture and ethnic identity (Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2006; Way 2007); geography (Kopstein and Reilly 2000; Pevehouse 2002; Vachudova 2001 and 2006); development (Przeworski 1997); regime characteristics (Levitsky and Way 2010) mode (Beissinger 2007) and nature (Stepan and Chenonweth 2008) of protest. However, they apply selectively to the set of the complex events surrounding the recent revolutions. While heavily burdened by the institutional legacies of Soviet

¹¹ Success is defined in terms of a stated objective that is met as a result of directly related action over a set period of time. For example, a protest geared to reverse a suspicious electoral outcome, is deemed successful, if mobilization takes place and, as a result the contested electoral outcome is indeed annulled and stays so; in some cases, this could mean the realization of immediate goals that involve primarily procedural rather than long-term substantive objectives (that necessarily take more time and depend to some degree to the opening up of the democratization process initiated by ensuring free and fair electoral processes). In contrast, pairing color revolutions with maximalist goals have often met with criticism (see Tudoroiu 2007, Kalandadze and Orenstein 2009). Criteria for success as well as their definition for this study are delineated in the hypothesis section.

Communism, Georgia still fared better than Belarus, despite the latter's geographical proximity to Europe; same with a less developed Kyrgyzstan over oil-rich Azerbaijan. And under the same blanket of anti-Russian ethnic identity, Ukrainian anti-government protests did much better in 2004 than in 2000-1. At the same time mobilization outcomes seem to play a ubiquitous role in all cases. In the 'Bulldozer' (FR Yugoslavia, 2000), 'Rose' (Georgia 2003), 'Orange' (Ukraine, 2004), and 'Tulip' (Kyrgyzstan, 2005) ones, the opposition mobilized successfully, while the incumbent machinery did not. In Azerbaijan (2003, 2005) and Belarus (2006, 2010) the reverse took place, while in Armenia (1996, 2003-4) both sides mobilized, with authoritarian display of force carrying the day. The above examples allude to the potential significance of mobilizing structures *and* agents that promote communication, coordination and commitment within and among potential actors.¹² Further, they point at the importance of connectivity properties of both mobilizing structures (organizations) and mobilizing agents (actors) before and during these electoral contests.¹³

Ways of connecting affects the organizational operations of both the democratic opposition groups and the authoritarian incumbents, in, respectively, launching or countering mass movements during elections carefully managed by authoritarian regimes. For example, in the case of the run up to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's 2000 presidential elections, the particular ways in which the mainly Serbian youth movement *Otpor* ("*Resistance!*") operated and spread were decisive in its success of arousing public awareness against President Milosevic's regime; they also demonstrated the lowered cost of peaceful opposition for ordinary citizens to participate in. *Otpor* displayed connectivity aspects that organizationally and operationally allowed the group flexibility, safety and optimal efficiency. Examples include (i) the lack of a single national leader, (ii) the multiple bases spread out across the country for better localized interaction, (iii) the impossibility of arresting all participants, (iv) the role of emerging communication technology (internet and cell-

¹² McAdam, D., Tarrow, S. and Tilly, C. 2001. *Dynamics of Contention*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 16. To that one must add *contingency*, as will be discussed later in this thesis.

¹³ Or other focal points of contention.

phone text messaging), as well as (v) extensive external links and their effect (material and organizational support by Non-Governmental Organizations, individual actors and foreign governments that helped diffuse technical, moral and financial assistance). Albeit in a smaller scale, similar organizational, *relational* features, like a collective leadership and domestic and transnational links can be detected in the operations of the civil resistance group *Kmara* (“*Enough!*”) in Georgia’s ‘Rose’ Revolution’ in 2003, following a falsified Parliamentary election. Local groups and their connections also played an important part in the 2005 Kyrgyz mobilization after elections believed to be rigged that eventually ousted President Akayev. Most striking and famous in the pantheon of color revolutions was the ‘Orange’ one in Ukraine, surrounding the contested presidential elections of 2004. The opposition youth group [Black] *Pora* (“*It’s Time!*”)-and to a smaller degree a parallel group confusingly also calling itself [Yellow] *Pora*-consciously adopted and modified *Otpor* techniques to fit a Ukrainian setting. Black *Pora* succeeded in creating a leaderless, technology-savvy group of young activists and volunteers with trans-national links, comprising of regionally spread-out, semi-independent units with the goal of diffusing the message of fair voting, alerting and mobilizing citizens in the event of suspected electoral fraud, and inducing them, in turn, to get involved in the civic process. In Russia, ‘despite their mobilization, movements against the Second Chechen War were ineffective, principally due to the movement’s internal weaknesses...’¹⁴ At the same time, connectivity properties were also critical for the authoritarian regimes that tried to thwart such election-centered protests. The level of efficiency of coercive responses by regimes to curtail opposition activities early and effectively [low in the cases of Yugoslavia (2000), Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), Kyrgyzstan (2005) and high in the cases of the Azerbaijan (2003) and Belarus (2006, 2010) presidential elections, or Azerbaijan’s Parliamentary one (2005)-as well as during opposition protests in 2011] played a part in deciding the outcome of such contests.

¹⁴ Lyall, J. M. 2006. Pocket Protests: Rhetorical Coercion and the Micropolitics of Collective Action in Semiauthoritarian Regimes. *World Politics* 58, (378-412), 379.

The above examples illustrate that, how an organizations' members are connected and how they go on diffusing their resources and achieving their objectives- from communicating information, to coordinating between themselves, to recruiting and mobilizing enough actors necessary- has an impact in a contested election protest movement. This study will demonstrate that the twin questions set earlier can be answered by exploring the nature and properties of this organizing, that is, *network* properties, as well as their level of significance to the outcome of a contest between authoritarian regimes and democratizing oppositions.

The logic of the argument to be developed here is based on the premise that transition from authoritarian practices is linked to *combined* mobilization outcomes during a window of opportunity. Such a window is usually afforded by the setting of elections that semi-authoritarian regimes allow, in an attempt to claim the mantle of democratic legitimacy as political oxygen to prolong their mandate. During such 'managed' election campaigns, incumbents mobilize their political machinery, which includes not only party, but, importantly also state resources- particularly a coercive apparatus- to ensure the desired result. Oppositions attempt to raise political awareness across a usually under-educated, misinformed or intimidated electoral body, to prevent electoral rigging, and to agitate the greater population to demonstrate against falsified results and the leadership that engineered them; all this, against a backdrop of possible harassment and repression by the regime. A successful outcome- in the minimalist sense of terminating illiberal practices that violate the democratic right to freely run for office and to accurately tally the vote- is more likely when two mobilization outputs combine: (i) a successful one, by democratic-minded opposition and, especially, civic protest groups that arouse and maximize mass protest capabilities, and (ii) an unsuccessful, one by authorities and their coercive apparatus that fail to stop it. For an opposition, mobilization is feasible when social, political or civic groups launch, organize and spread their message and resources effectively.¹⁵ A

¹⁵ 'Social, political or civic' echoes existing types of contention into *institutional* and *unconventional*-or, *contained*-as in by previously established actors- and *transgressive*-as in the episodic, collective interaction of actors (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001, 4-7).

culminating result of these processes is the recruitment and activation of more protesters and the excitation and inducement of large-scale public participation to manifest their discontent with the regime. In authoritarian societies, the difference between private and public preferences (the phenomenon known as ‘preference falsification’)¹⁶ renders the level of societal discontent difficult to estimate; the same may hold true for the degree of repression such a regime is willing and capable to apply to coerce and contain opposition to it. By way of educating the public about its rights and publicly protesting a regime’s abuses, organized opposition activist groups serve to energize an otherwise lethargic or apathetic electorate. They utilize old and foster new social ties among individual citizens, effectively combining strong and weak ties, with the result of raising political awareness. Such activists arouse and awaken civic sensitivity, and help bring together-and unite-previously isolated, disaffected individuals for a common political purpose; in a sense, they help connect the dots. Further, they test the operational capability and political will of the authorities to use violence against its enemies. Sustained operations by opposition organizations demonstrate a lowered cost for protesting, which, in turn, lowers the protest threshold for individuals. A reduced threshold makes it easier for one to join a demonstration-as a hitherto private or ‘hidden’ disapproval of the regime becomes public-and can facilitate a mobilizational cascade that can result in huge numbers of public protesters. Ultimately, larger crowds lend rational legitimacy to opposition goals and pressure authorities to the point where opposition demands can be met only by acquiescence and compromise, or by repression and violence. The empirical reality of recent protest cases in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and beyond¹⁷ yields the lesson that early containment, cooptation and control of opposition by authorities could present the best chance authoritarians have in preventing electoral surprises at the ballot box. Efficient organization, coordination and collaboration of party machinery and state

¹⁶ See Kuran, T. 1991. Now or Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolutions of 1989. *World Politics* 44, 7-48.

¹⁷ Cases range from Serbia (2000), to Bolivia and Georgia (2003), to Spain, Venezuela and Ukraine (2004), to Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon (2005), Belarus, Kuwait and Mexico (2006), Kenya and Myanmar (2007), Maldives (2008), and more recently to Moldova and Iran (2009), as well as Tunisia and Egypt (2010, 2011), and Libya and Syria (2012).

apparatus-in other words, aspects of connectivity-are thus, important elements for such a successful endeavor.

Significance of the study

How can one accurately assess the efficiency, robustness and overall capacity for mobilization by way of how one's organization, or social group are connected? An important aspect of this study is its recognition that all social, political and civic organizations are, in essence, *networks* (of people and the links-or, social ties-between them).¹⁸ This also holds true not only for a democratic opposition, but also for an authoritarian state's political and especially coercive apparatus. Across time, through space and via populations they diffuse human, material and informational (including signals, orders and behavior) resources critical for mobilization. Therefore, to examine diffusion performances, networks can be adopted as the unit of analysis.

Recent advances in the study of complexity have begun to systematically examine networks and their properties, offering opportunities for new and exciting *relational* research: by allowing for the observation and analysis of the systemic effects of individual agents and their dynamic interactions, it brings the global/macro and local/micro levels within the same analytical perspective, and it bridges structure with agency, while adding the hitherto neglected component of contingency. The availability of new methodological and analytical tools that is igniting interest in a networks perspective in Political Science also coincides with the emerging importance of social networks and networking in real life, in general, and politics, in particular. In the United States, for example, the cases of U.S. presidential campaigns--starting with the pioneering online funding campaign of Governor Dean in 2004, and following the candidacy of President Obama, whose two million member website, by the end of 2008, was responsible for over 200,000 offline events, and spawning 35,000 volunteer

¹⁸ It is recognized that 'underground networks play a crucial role in the recruitment of dissidents in totalitarian [authoritarian] states and in the revolutionary overthrow of such states (Opp and Gern, 1993)'. In such cases, given that open recruitment is impossible in totalitarian states, recruitment must, of necessity, operate via informal ties.' In Crossley, N. 2007. Social Networks and Extraparliamentary Politics. *Sociology Compass* (1, 1:222-236), 229-30.

groups¹⁹--offer empirical examples that invite new research approaches. Equally intriguing are the network effects in recent mobilizations, and counter-mobilizations, surrounding elections and mass protests in other democratic (e.g. Spain, Mexico) and authoritarian countries in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and beyond (e.g. the 'Arab Spring' in Tunisia and Egypt). This explosion of network research makes the present study and its focus on networks a pertinent one.

More specifically, this thesis sets to examine contentious political action through the lens of networks. It aims to demonstrate that different types of incumbent and opposition networks with their own set of connectivity properties account for different ways in which individuals in groups organize, persevere (often under adverse conditions-in the case of opposition networks) and perform. All these are components of two types of diffusion, *simple*-in the case of spreading information-and *complex*-in the case of spreading behavior. In turn, these properties can affect the outcomes of their organization-namely, how successful they are in efficiently mobilizing both their own members, and the general public (subsequently facilitating or impeding the likelihood of crowd cascades), upon which the outcome of a protest against an authoritarian government and its practices rests. It is important to emphasize that the outcome of this contestation between the regime and its opponents depends on the *combined* effects of their mobilization efforts. That is, it depends on how both sides diffuse resources to optimize their mobilization chances.

Hence, the essence of the argument presented here is the following: the manner in which an opposition group and its regime rival (typified by its coercive apparatus) connect and are connected affects how they perform before and during staged elections when the regime's power is contested and its survival challenged. Their mobilization performances depend on their particular diffusion mechanisms. In turn, diffusion mechanisms depend on specific relational topologies within these groups. Formally analyzing them as networks allows for the assessing their diffusion

¹⁹ Vargas, J. A. 2008. 'Obama Raised Half a Billion Online.' *The Washington Post* (November 20), in Collins, Kevin W. Social Network Structure and Peer-to-Peer Political Mobilization: Evidence from Social Network Surveys. Conference paper, MPSA 2009 annual meeting, 1.

capabilities and the predicting of their mobilization performance. In other words, how is one connected matters, and, properties of networks have tangible political consequences.

The most efficient way to diffuse resources is by *both* simple and complex diffusion. Correspondingly, the optimal configuration of a network consists of a combination *both* of strong and weak ties that contribute to successful (i) defense against catastrophic attacks, and (ii) propagation of diverse resources through that network and beyond, through growth. This type of successful resource propagation, resilience and evolution is termed by this study *composite* diffusion and the *network* a *composite* one. Matched against a rival network with predominantly or exclusively weak or strong ties, the composite one displays more resilience and efficiency in its mobilizing capacity and output. When both adversarial networks are composite, they are both very likely to succeed in mobilizing. In the case of contentious political action, a prolonged confrontation is a likely outcome.

Organization of the study

The following chapters closely observe the sequence of the above argument. Chapter II provides literature reviews of works on recent examples of contentious collective action against competitive authoritarian regimes-the color revolutions-and on the theory of contentious politics, social movements and social mobilization from a collective and an individual perspective. It highlights the complexity surrounding these phenomena and the need for a different approach to capture the mechanism of their dynamic nature, and proposes the concept of composite diffusion. In turn, diffusion is best approached by focusing on networks. Chapter III presents the methodology of the study, beginning with a brief introduction of networks both as a broad concept- that links agency, structure and contingency, with formal properties that can be systematically measured by metrics, and as a unit of analysis that can better explore these complex events. It continues with a smaller literature review on the study of networks in Political Science, and then it proceeds with specific hypotheses that link

network properties to types of networks to diffusion outputs to mobilizational performance. The concept of composite networks is introduced in this section. Then, the research design and execution method are presented, including a discussion on appropriate tools for collecting data, related techniques and case selection rationale. Chapters IV and V examine four in-depth case studies and offer empirical examples of successful or, otherwise democratizing collective action in FR Yugoslavia and Ukraine. Chapter IV is devoted to FR Yugoslavia, and addresses the 1997-7 case of protests in Serbia, following the tampering with municipal elections by Slobodan Milosevic's government, and the 2000 case of the rigged presidential elections. Chapter V presents two cases from Ukraine: the 2000-1 protest '*Ukraine Without Kuchma*', a social mobilization against Ukrainian President Kuchma, following the murder of Ukrainian journalist Georgiy Gongadze, and the 'Orange Revolution'-the mobilizing events surrounding the 2004 Presidential election and the efforts to falsify its results. Both chapters begin with summaries of the cases, and proceed to trace and map the organizations involved through primary data collected from surveys and interviews conducted during extensive fieldwork and secondary sources. Chapter VI presents the data from mapping these organizations and discusses the results from network analysis based on this information. To illustrate the central role of networks and their typologies, it also examines two cases in greater detail. Chapter VII concludes with a summary of the argument and related findings, as well as with discussions on its strengths and weaknesses, and on the empirical and theoretical implications of this study, including possible ramifications for future collective action against competitive authoritarianism.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEWS

This chapter focuses on the ‘fourth wave’ of transitions from authoritarianism and examines the main features of these democratizing revolutions. Traditionally, pro-democratic oppositions hitherto received the lion’s share of scholarly interest, but recent attention to the authoritarian incumbent regimes adds to a more complete picture of the forces and factors surrounding these events. Moreover, such ‘events’ can be approached as processes of collective action with elaborate mechanisms that could offer clues as to the interplay between structure, agency and contingency. The chapter proceeds with reviewing mobilization theories from a collective and individual level perspective, and introduces the idea that all three could be ‘reconciled’ through the meso-level study of networks.

COLLECTIVE ACTION AGAINST COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES: THE COLOR REVOLUTIONS AND REGIME CHANGE STUDIES

Background: The study of ‘transitology’

For almost half a century, the study of transitions from authoritarian rule²⁰ has engaged scholars with the goal of thoroughly investigating the causes and features of regime change and the prospect of uncovering general patterns and laws (a nomothetic enterprise). Like most scholarly inquiries, ‘transitology’ itself has closely mirrored events, from its structuralist antecedents in modernization theory (Lipset, Huntington)²¹ in the 1960’s, to its ‘launching’ in the 1970’s (Rustow 1970) and 1980’s with the study of

²⁰ Prior to delving into the subject of ‘transitology’ and of the ‘democratizing’ or ‘electoral’ Color Revolutions, a note on the nomenclature of the central theme of the study of electoral regime change: Pleas for conceptual clarity (e.g. Munk 2001) have not halted the proliferation of democracy’s adjectives. Democracy’s definitional repertoire has expanded to include terms like ‘qualified’, ‘semi-’, ‘façade’, ‘weak’, ‘formal’, ‘electoral’, ‘virtual’, ‘partial’, ‘illiberal’, ‘managed’ and ‘manufactured’ (Carothers, 2002). To the above, one can now add ‘stealth authoritarianism’, ‘hybrid regime’, and ‘competitive, or, electoral authoritarianism’. But at least recent studies (Hale 2005; Way 2006; Bunce 2006, Levitsky and Way, 2010) use the term ‘regime change election process’ rather than ‘democratic transition’—a step up the Sartorial ladder of generality, which prevents further conceptual obfuscation.

²¹ For a comprehensive review of democratization studies between 1960 and 1990, see Lipset, S.M.1994. The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited, *American Sociological Review*, 59 (Feb:1-22).

the 'Third Wave' of the role of agency and democratization in Southern Europe and Latin America (O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986; and later, Gunther, Diamantouros and Puhle 1995).²² With the fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of the USSR in the 1990's, the sub-discipline entered a new and exciting phase of study (Linz and Stepan 1996²³; Przeworski and Limongi 1997²⁴). Along with a new kaleidoscope of cases, the end of the Cold War brought about a hot debate: Were the Eastern European and post-Soviet transitions part of the 'Third Wave' (and therefore comparable) or, *sui generis* (due to their simultaneous political, economic and sometimes state-building transformations)? Following heated exchanges (Karl and Schmitter vs. Bunce 1995)²⁵, some compromise was struck methodologically about the comparability of recent cases with the rest of the set by way of a similar conceptual toolbox (the approach of first comparing post-Communist cases among themselves and then with cases from the original Third Wave using similar definitions and criteria). But the goal of generating general theory remained distant. The assertion that the Eastern European and post-Soviet transition cases form a distinct 'Fourth Wave' (McFaul 2002; Bunce 2003; Bunce, McFaul and Stoner-Weiss 2009)²⁶ was significantly boosted by a second round (or, second crest of this latest wave) of post-Communist regime transitions that followed in the heels of the transformative Slovakian (1998) and Croatian (1999) elections: Serbia in 2000, Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004, and Kyrgyzstan in 2005. Their main feature, mass mobilization in support of democratic elections, brought forth an element usually downplayed by the transitology literature. Hence, these so-called color revolutions have prompted a new, rich and rigorous round of study of the effects of such democratic

²² For example, see O'Donnell, G. 1996. Illusions about Consolidation. *Journal of Democracy*, 7, 2, (34-51), 35.

²³ Linz, J. and Stepan, A. 1996. Towards Consolidated Democracies. *Journal of Democracy* 7, 2: 14-33, and also by the same authors, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

²⁴ Przeworski, A. and Limongi, F. P. 1997. Modernization: Theories and Facts. *World Politics* 49:2. Also see Boix, C. and Stokes, S. 2003. Endogenous Democratization. *World Politics* 55:4.

²⁵ Bunce, V. 1995. Should Transitologists Be Grounded? *Slavic Review* 54:1, 111-127; Schmitter P. and Karl, T.L. 1995. From an Iron Curtain to a Paper Curtain: Grounding Transitologists or Students of Post communism? *Slavic Review* 54:4, 965-978; Bunce, V. 1995. Paper Curtains and Paper Tigers. *Slavic Review* 54:4, 979-987.

²⁶ McFaul, M. 2002. The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World. *World Politics* 54. Bunce, V. 2003. Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lessons from the Post communist Experience. *World Politics* 55, 2, 167-192; Valerie, Bunce, Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss (eds.). 2009. *Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Postcommunist World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

mobilization (Beissinger, 2002, 2005, 2007) and related civil resistance (Roberts and Garton Ash 2009).²⁷ The study of these recent events reveals some distinctive features about them that can illuminate the nature of, and further advance the exploration of transitions.

Main features

Scholars such as Beissinger (2007)²⁸, Black (2005)²⁹, McFaul (2005)³⁰ and Way (2005, 2006, 2008)³¹ have come up with a number of features that characterize the color revolutions. They include (i) a semi-autocratic regime, with an unpopular incumbent and its divided elites and security forces that permits some political space by way of allowing (ii) elections, to sustain legitimacy and power; (iii) a united, well-funded and well-organized youthful opposition ready for electoral battle, with extended domestic and trans-national links, capable of (iv) monitoring the voting; (v) peacefully demonstrating electoral fraud; and (vi) mobilizing huge masses for non-violent protesting'; finally, (vii) independent media to publicize the fraud and the resulting popular protests.³² This list is echoed by Roberts and Garton Ash on their broader study of civil resistance, of which the color revolutions are a subset: for them, at least on the side of opponents of authoritarian regimes, what is required are perceptive strategy, imaginative leadership, organization, population support and press coverage.³³ The following sub-section unpacks the above to explore these events' empirical and theoretical implications-both in the specific, practical warnings provided

²⁷ Beissinger, M. R. 2002. *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

²⁸ Beissinger, M. R. 2007. Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions. *Perspectives on Politics* 5.

²⁹ Black, D. 2005. The Tipping Point in Ukraine's Orange Revolution. Postcommunist States and Societies: Transnational and National Politics. (Maxwell School of Syracuse University: Conference paper).

³⁰ McFaul, M. 2005. Transitions from Postcommunism. *Journal of Democracy* 16.

³¹ See Way, L. 2005. Authoritarian State-Building and the Sources of Regime Competitiveness in the Fourth Wave: The Cases of Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. *World Politics* 57. Also, Way, L. A. (2006) Pigs, Wolves and the Evolution of Post-Soviet Competitive Authoritarianism, 1992-2005. CDDRL (Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA), and by the same author, (2008) The Real Causes of the Color Revolutions. *Journal of Democracy* 19.

³² Beissinger, 2007, 261. Also, see the edited volume resulting from a special conference at Oxford, by Roberts, A. and Garton Ash, T. (eds.) 2009. *Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

³³ Roberts, A. and Garton Ash, T. (eds.) 2009. *Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present*, conclusion.

for actors in semi-authoritarian states' future elections, and in the general lessons for the study of transitions.

The Regime: Types and degrees of authoritarianism

Much ground has been covered since the 1960s, when the only distinction drawn was between totalitarianism and authoritarianism. Still, the vast majority of color revolution studies have hitherto engaged in examining only the opposition forces; recent attention to the study of authoritarian capabilities points to the need to take account both of opposition and incumbents to explain the outcomes of democratizing events. The past decade has witnessed an explosion of interest in the study of authoritarianism. Geddes (1999)³⁴ examines personalist, military and single-party regimes, Diamond (2002)³⁵ adds 'hybrid regimes', Ottaway (2003)³⁶ explores post-Cold War 'semi-authoritarian' types, Levitsky and Way (2002, 2005, 2010)³⁷ looks at competitive authoritarianism and Hadenius and Teorell (2007)³⁸ further expand the list of electoral (no/single/limited multi-party) and non-electoral (monarchy, rebel, theocracy, transitional, etc.) authoritarian regimes. The latter find that from 1977 to 2003, 77% of transitions from authoritarianism resulted in another authoritarian regime. They also point out that the majority of transitions from limited multi-party regimes result in democracy. Findings like these have intensified interest in works that turn more systematically to the study of the features and evolution (or, more often, decay and breakdown) of *competitive authoritarians*.

³⁴ Geddes, B. 1999. What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years? *Annual Review of Political Science* 2, 115-144.

³⁵ Diamond, L. and Plattner, M. (eds.) 2002, *Democracy After Communism* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press.

³⁶ For example, she focuses on traits like limits on the transfer of power, weak institutionalization, reform disconnect and limits to civil society, leading to types of semi-authoritarian regimes either in equilibrium, in decay, or under dynamic transition. See Ottaway, M. 2003. *Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism*, (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), 17-23.

³⁷ Levitsky, S. and Way, L. A, 2002. The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism. *Journal of Democracy* 13, 51-65; 2005. *International Linkage and Democratization. Journal of Democracy* 16, 3:20-34; and *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

³⁸ Hadenius, A. and Teorell, J. 2007. Pathways from Authoritarianism. *Journal of Democracy* 18, 143-156.

Competitive authoritarianism

Competitive authoritarian regimes are 'civilian, non-democratic ones in which democratic institutions exist and permit meaningful competition for power, but in which the political playing field is so tilted in favour of incumbents that the regime cannot be labelled democratic.'³⁹ Recently, scholars have focused on structural aspects of competitive authoritarianism.⁴⁰ These include (i) state power and its coercive capacities, (ii) formal/informal-elite/party organizations, (iii) degree of control of the national economy and resources, (iv) individual political skills, and (v) on weak linkages with the West⁴¹; all of which atrophy domestic democratic opposition forces (Way 2005, 2006, 2008; Way and Levitsky 2005⁴², 2010⁴³; Grzymala-Busse 2008⁴⁴). More specifically, this line of argument illustrates that the success of authoritarian states in countering the transnational and domestic flow of resources necessary for opposition organization towards democratic revolutions depends on domestic sources of stability- an important and neglected dimension.⁴⁵ Among them are coercive capacity and regime cohesion. In turn, these include the intensity of the coercion and the scope of the State's reach-e.g. in the infrastructure needed to conduct surveillance, or the coordination required to intimidate, harass opposition and commit electoral fraud.

A regime's coercive capacity has empirically been found to have a strong negative impact on the likelihood of a country's democratization.⁴⁶ The most effective devices for sustaining such regimes are theorized to be a regime's armed forces, and

³⁹ Levitsky, S. and Way, L. A. 2002, 51-65.

⁴⁰ Revolutions scholars have, naturally, addressed explicitly (e.g. Gurr's coercive balance) or implicitly (e.g. Skocpol's army defeat in an international conflict) a state's coercive capabilities (see Goldstone et al., 1991, 19), but it is the extension of these considerations to the study of mass democratizing mobilization and/or authoritarian regime stability that is recent, and to a degree, novel.

⁴¹ More recent scholarship (Krastev 2011) argues against the point of authoritarian regime stability being threatened from strong linkages to liberal democratic countries (i.e. openness of their borders), but again, turns attention to studying the authoritarian incumbents.

⁴² Levitsky, S. and Way, L. A. 2005. International Linkage and Democratization. *Journal of Democracy* 16, 3.

⁴³ Levitsky, S. and Way, L.A. 2010, 10-12.

⁴⁴ Grzymala-Busse, A. 2008. Beyond Clientelism: Incumbent State Capture and State Formation. *Comparative Political Studies* 41, no. 4-5.

⁴⁵ Kuran's 1991 work hints at this, by mentioning the 'vulnerability' of such regimes; but he doesn't elaborate. Kuran, T. Now or Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989, (*World Politics* 44, 1:7-48), 33.

⁴⁶ Especially if the regime is autocratic. Albertus, M. and Menaldo, V. Coercive Capacity and the Prospects for Democratization. *Comparative Politics* (44, 2:151-169), 153.

the military 'a good proxy for internal repression.'⁴⁷ Findings indicate that 'the marginal effect of increasing the size of the military by 1 percent at its average value is a 4 percent reduction in the probability of a democratic transition'.⁴⁸ Additional predictors of military-related coercive capacity effectiveness against democratization include levels of professionalism and internal organizational culture, which ultimately allude to a military's closeness of identification with the regime.⁴⁹ In other words, loyalty is important, characterized in ties between brass and regime.⁵⁰ The same goes for other security forces (include paramilitary forces as well as police and internal security organizations) which should be part of the discussion authoritarian coercive capability.⁵¹ Overall, the capacity of a competitive authoritarian state to survive in the face of crises-that is, its durability⁵²-is characterized by a single, institutional party and state, by state discretionary control of economic resources, and by an effective coercive apparatus.⁵³ Of these, a coercive apparatus loyal to the regime is paramount, especially during contentious collective action against it by opposition. Still, it is significant to note that these factors-both repressive and infrastructural-depend on organization. They also depend on the level of compliance within the state apparatus,

⁴⁷ Albertus and Menaldo operationalize coercive capacity as military size per 100 inhabitants. There are some scholars who argue for the military's autonomous 'corporate prerogatives' (e.g. Geddes 2003), but it is argued that even if so, their fate is ultimately linked to a regime's survival, therefore necessitating an alignment of goals. Ibid,153-154.

⁴⁸ Ibid, 163.

⁴⁹ McLauchlin, T. 2010. Loyalty Strategies and Military Defection in Rebellion. *Comparative Politics* (42, 3:333-350), 336-340.

⁵⁰ An interesting issue is whether ethnic loyalties trump local cleavages (McLauchlin 2010), or, not (Kalyvas 2008) in importance when it comes to defections in rebellions and civil wars. As McLauchlin notes (see 2010, 339) there may be a complementarity of these two approaches, as they differ in temporality and scope. In a similar vein, by itself, a contentious mass mobilization to protest electoral fraud is not (at least, yet-until the regime decides how to respond, and its coercive apparatus decides whether to follow its orders or not) a rebellion or a civil war. More importantly, both local and ethnic affinities are characterized by ties, grouped as social. Local friendships For example, even membership to an ethnic group connotes belonging to the same set (or, network) of similarly-characterized individuals.

⁵¹ These may or may not be part of the military forces. For example, Syria's intelligence agency *Mukhabarat* (see Agha, H. and Malley, R. 2011. The Arab Counterrevolution. *The New York Review of Books*, September 29) in essence consists at least three independent branches-military, air force and general intelligence directorate.

⁵² Survival can be distinguished between durability (the capacity to survive crises) and longevity (which can be enjoyed by weak regimes that are simply do not challenged). Remark by Anna Grzymala-Busse, quoted by Way, L. 2011. Some Thoughts on Authoritarian Durability in the Middle East. Online blog post (February 21), available at http://themonkeycage.org/blog/2011/02/21/some_thoughts_on_authoritarian/

⁵³ Way 2009 argues that it has to be extensive and well-funded. However, good funding may not be as important as loyalty. See Way, L.A. 2009. A Reply to My Critics. *Journal of Democracy* 20,1:90-97, and by the same author, 2008, The Real Causes of the Color Revolutions. *Journal of Democracy* 19,3. On the same topic, Silitski correctly further differentiates state capacity between repressive and infrastructural. See Silitski, V. 2009. What Are We Trying to Explain? *Journal of Democracy* 20, 1:86-89.

which, in turn is related not necessarily on fiscal health (as argued by Way 2006),⁵⁴ but certainly on personal and ideological *ties* among ruling elites.⁵⁵

Internationally, authoritarian ability to remain in power depends on two factors: On Western (or other) leverage, that is, 'a government's vulnerability to external democratizing pressure', and on linkage, i.e. the 'density of ties and cross-border flows between states and the West and western-dominated multilateral institutions (Levitsky and Way 2002, 2005).⁵⁶ While not addressed by Levitsky and Way, to the later factor must be added the ties and cross border flows not only involving the West, but also countervailing powers (e.g. the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, one of its goals being to avert foreign influence in the former Soviet-and neighbouring-authoritarian political space).⁵⁷

Besides providing clues to why some electoral protests failed, or, did not occur- e.g. in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus and Moldova (Alieva 2006⁵⁸; Way 2006), the study of competitive authoritarianism also points to reasons why other cases were successful. For example, while opposition forces did lack effective organization and coordination skills in the Belarus 2006 elections (which resulted in failing to mobilize more than 15,000-20,000 people),⁵⁹ Lukashenko's pro-active, oppressive tactics cannot be discounted from the equation. In this example, the opposition was organizationally weak, while the authoritarian state strong. At the same time, the abortive opposition mobilization in Armenia in 1996 and again in 2003-4, as well as in Azerbaijan (2003, 2005), despite their massive volumes, represent flip-side side cases of the same

⁵⁴ In Way, 2006, 12-17. However, it is interesting to note that, *contra* Way's argument on fiscal health and related authoritarian regime support for security and bureaucracy apparatus, substantial salary increases by authoritarians before contested elections (e.g. generous pay raises offered by Milosevic in 2000) failed to ensure strict loyalty and discipline in the face of opposition protests. Also in Levitsky and Way (2010).

⁵⁵ Levitsky and Way (2010) highlight the endurance of elite (and military) ties fostered through revolutionary struggle. Weaker bonds invite regime 'counterbalancing' tactics (dividing the military), which could have consequences when armed forces are asked to defend it during contentious collective action. For this tactic, see Belkin, A. and Schofer, E. 2005. Coup Risk, Counterbalancing and International Conflict. *Security Studies* 14, 1:140-177.

⁵⁶ Levitsky, S. and Way, L. A., 2005, 21.

⁵⁷ "We hope the outside world will accept the social system and path to development independently chosen by our members and observers and respect the domestic and foreign policies adopted by the SCO participants in line with their national conditions." [emphasis added] Chinese president Hu Jintao, quoted in Dilip, H. 'Shanghai Surprise'. *The Guardian*, June 16, 2006.

⁵⁸ Alieva, L. 2006. Azerbaijan's Frustrating Elections. *Journal of Democracy* 17, 147-160.

⁵⁹ For Belarus, see Silitski, V., 2005, Preempting Democracy: The Case of Belarus. *Journal of Democracy* 16, 83-97, and by the same author (2006) Belarus: Learning from Defeat. *Journal of Democracy* 17, 138-152.

example. Here, again, despite larger numbers of protesters, it is implied that structural aspects, like overall political organization (regime) or lack thereof (opposition) made the difference. Perhaps the authoritarian regime need not necessarily be violent, just well-organized and prepared to face its challenges. Efficient tactics also play a part. These include coordinated, long-term planned co-optation and pro-regime organizations mirroring the opposition, like the creation of pro-Putin youth groups in Russia, or the adoption of similar political marketing techniques, like the 'progressive' slogans and orange color used in President Nazarbayev's re-election campaign in Kazakhstan (2005).⁶⁰

Ultimately, a great number of factors related to a competitive authoritarian regime's survival are 'relational' (e.g. coordination infrastructure necessary for harassment, or, personal ties among regime elites)—a key element for the purposes of this study.⁶¹ Consequently, the strength or weakness of state capacity-and its organizational features-especially as far as coercive apparatus is concerned also must be taken into account when considering the outcome of mass protest around elections. A divided, uncoordinated, reactive state apparatus, as the cases of Georgia and Ukraine demonstrate, provides an opening for a skilful opposition to advance its goals.

Elections

Elections under authoritarian rule are often as important for the regime as they are for the opposition (and indeed, in a macro level, for the state as a whole⁶²). For the opposition, besides affording a chance (however flawed or genuine) to contest power through institutionalized means, elections also aggregate private information about the ruler's performance and provide an opportunity for coordination 'a public signal for

⁶⁰ See OSCE/Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights-Elections documents on Kazakhstan online at <http://www.osce.org/odihr-elections/16471.html>

⁶¹ Interestingly, Kitschelt's work (1999) on the structure of state bureaucracy and means of compliance determining the mode of transition alludes to connectivity properties of these organizations. Ottaway's classification of semi-authoritarian regimes (2003) also hints at relational properties when referring to the different rate of decay for some regimes (implying internal dynamics, which as we will see later in this study can depend on network topology).

⁶² See Slater, D. 2008. Can Leviathan be Democratic? Competitive Elections, Robust Mass Politics, and State Infrastructural Power. *Studies in Comparative International Development* 43, 3-4: 252-72; also his *Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

coordinating rebellion [especially] in the event elections are ...blatantly rigged (Fearon 2004).⁶³ Leaders of authoritarian regimes 'risk' calling elections which can possibly affect their hold on power, because, according to Gandhi and Lust-Okar (2009), they intend to use them as tools towards three possible goals: (i) co-opting elites (Boix and Svobik 2008) and party members (thus becoming a mechanism for 'spreading the spoils of office'), as well as trying to build mass support for the regime (Magaloni 2006); (ii) co-opting the opposition, either by 'identifying bases of support and opposition strongholds' (Magaloni 2006), and/or by 'reducing the likelihood of violent removal from office' (Acemoglu and Robinson 2005); (iii) providing legitimacy (Schedler 2009) to the regime.⁶⁴ This last point merits closer attention, especially in the universe of post-Communist cases. Max Weber's ghost lingers on, as the ubiquity of elections hints at their symbolic power to bestow real or apparent legitimacy upon a regime. With Soviet Communism's implosion, the disappearance of ideologically conferred legitimacy [compounded by external and domestic crises (e.g. ethnic war) or poor economic performance] added to post-Communist regimes' need to anchor their claim to rule elsewhere. A few full autocrats have clung on to charismatic⁶⁵ or, dynastic legitimacy (and its post-Communist ideological mutations)⁶⁶, often by capitalizing on victorious violent conflict (Way 2008). However, the vast majority of 'milder' authoritarians have turned towards the semblance of legal/rational authority via carefully managed electoral processes (Thompson and Kuntz 2004), striving to become 'popular autocrats' (Dimitrov 2009).⁶⁷ Scholars agree that more theorizing is needed on this topic,

⁶³ Fearon, J. D. 2004. Coordinating on Democracy. Unpublished presentation, Princeton University, Dept. of Economics Seminar, 4.

⁶⁴ Gandhi, J. and Lust-Okar, E. 2009. Elections Under Authoritarianism. *Annual Rev. of Political Science* 12:403–22.

⁶⁵ For example, see Saparmurat Niyazov, the former leader and self-styled 'Turkmenbashi' (father of Turkmenistan).

⁶⁶ E.g. Aliyev father to son succession in Azerbaijan, or the ill-fated marriage between Kazakh president's daughter Aliya Nazarbayev to Kyrgyzstan former president's son, Aydar Akayev.

⁶⁷ See Dimitrov, M.K. Popular Autocrats. *Journal of Democracy* 20, 1: 78-81.

It is interesting here to note that both the relational-dialectic aspect of legitimacy (for example, a regime does not possess it unless citizens acknowledge it, by offering willing cooperation without the threat of coercion or surveillance) and its definition are related to electoral processes under such regimes. See Chen, C. 2005. Institutional Legitimacy of an Authoritarian State: China in the Mirror of Eastern Europe. *Problems of Post-Communism* 52, 3-13; and Schedler, A. 2009. Electoral Authoritarianism (in Landman, T. and Robinson, N. *The SAGE Handbook of Comparative Politics*. London: SAGE Publications Ltd.).

especially to investigate whether and how legitimacy affects the collapse of these regimes.⁶⁸

Generally, color revolution cases have illustrated four main points about ballot voting: Firstly, elections have become important occasions, for democratic and authoritarian regimes alike (Tucker 2006⁶⁹); authoritarians use them as tools to consolidate and manage their hold of power, whereas opposition sees an opening and a vehicle to change the status quo. Secondly, in the event authoritarians attempt to manage them and rig their results in their favour, elections provide a focal point of discontent for the electorate-a point that can aggregate and publicize private information about the regime's approval, as well as help with coordination efforts. Indeed, as frequent and regular events, elections allow for advance planning, lower cost of mass participation (thus, higher cost for state repression) and ready-made mobilization of discontented citizens (Tucker 2006; Thompson and Kuntz 2004).⁷⁰ The symbolic element of denying a voter's choice at the ballot box magnifies the regime's shortcomings and misdemeanours, adding a spark to the volatile mix: In the words of a Ukrainian voter in 2004, 'A very personal thing [was] stolen from us, our right to vote.'⁷¹ A corollary of the above is that electoral fraud is a potent precondition for a democratizing revolution. Thirdly, as a consequence of the first two points, elections in authoritarian settings also begin much earlier than the day of voting. Given their ritualistic and symbolic status, opposition groups now start planning to challenge electoral results far earlier than when the ballot boxes appear. An opposition memo shows the planning ahead for the upcoming electoral battle, more than a year before the 2004 Ukrainian elections: "The election would be a game without rules, unprecedented competition of informational, organizational financial and administrative resources for the regime. We need allies and at least 500,000

⁶⁸Saxonberg, S. 2003. Beyond the Transitology-Area Studies Debate. *Problems of Post-Communism* 50, 3-16.

⁶⁹ Tucker, J. A. 2007. Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and the "2nd Wave" of Post-Communist Democratic Revolutions. *Perspectives on Politics* 5, 537-553.

⁷⁰ In Stolen Elections: the Case of the Serbian October (*Journal of Democracy* 15, 4, 159-172), Thompson, M. R. and Kuntz, P. (2004) build on the social mobilization literature, especially as developed by McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001).

⁷¹ Slivka, A. Orange Alert. The New York Times Magazine, January 1, 2004, in Kuzio, T., 2006, Civil Society, Youth and Societal Mobilization in Democratic Revolutions, (*Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 39,365-386), 366.

supporters.”⁷² Hence, anticipated fraud forces the opposition’s advance preparations with pre-packaged techniques, counter-moves and rehearsed strategies for proving and protesting electoral rigging. The incumbents can also prepare in advance—crudely (by curtailing the freedom of the media and opposition activities, or by planning to falsify the results), or in more sophisticated ways (parallel civil society creation). The crux of the matter is, then, that all sides work both around and before elections, either to challenge them or to blunt potential challenges. Finally, whether as necessary precursor to genuine democratic change, or, an electoralist façade for competitive authoritarians, the color revolutions demonstrated that ultimately elections have become established as a ‘global norm’ (Bunce and Wolchik 2006).⁷³

The Opposition

Among the main features of oppositions to authoritarians during color revolutions are non-violence, political unity, good organizational skills and the power of crowds and youthful members.

The paradox of using extra-legal means to protect the legality of the electoral process (McFaul 2005) is mitigated by an opposition’s adherence to the principle of peaceful protest. While not all scholars agree (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita 2010), non-violence is largely considered an important factor for neutralizing a security apparatus’ coercive advantage, highlighting for the authorities the rising cost of employing violence, and signalling the ‘benign’ nature of the movement (McFaul 2005; Binnendijk and Marovic 2006; Kuzio 2006; Fairbanks 2007; Stepan and Chenonweth 2008).⁷⁴

Unity of political opposition and its leadership is also very important, as it allows for a united front against the regime. The Serbian 1996-7 municipal and Belarusian 2006 presidential elections, where political divisions and personal ambitions impeded the campaigns against Milosevic and Lukashenko’s parties, are cases in point of how

⁷² *Our Ukraine*—internal memo, April 2003, in Binnendijk, A. L., and Marovic, I. 2006. Power and Persuasion: Nonviolent Strategies to Influence State Security Forces in Serbia (2000) and Ukraine. *Communist and Post communist Studies* 39, 411-429, pp. 413-414.

⁷³ Bunce, V. and Wolchik, S. 2006. International Diffusion and Post-communist Electoral Revolutions. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 39:3.

⁷⁴ Fairbanks, C. H. 2007. Revolution Reconsidered. *Journal of Democracy* 18, 42-57.

fragmented or brittle oppositions can be easily manipulated or outmanoeuvred by incumbents, and subsequently defeated. Virtually all scholars studying the color revolutions acknowledge at least some importance in the role of opposition members and their organization play--preparing prior to, activating during and mobilizing past the election event. The opposition structure is usually domestically diffused and dispersed (Thompson and Kuntz, 2004), with extensive trans-national links (Bunce 2006; Bunce and Wolchik 2009; Way 2006). It entails a robust communications network (Beissinger 2007); it is diversified in its roles and pro-actively expansive in its relations with the regime's potential defectors—for example in the apparent diversification between Yellow and Black *Pora* during the 2004 Ukrainian elections (Kuzio 2006). Early training of a core group of volunteers is also essential, as are both experience (trans-national allies) and funding (trans-national and domestic-Sundstrom 2005).⁷⁵ Discipline, logistics and coordination become critical during elections, as does the support of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's) carrying out parallel vote counts.

It is not an accident that the anthem song of the Orange Revolution was titled *Razom nas bahato, Nas ne podolaty!* ('Together we are many, we cannot be defeated').⁷⁶ Indeed--contrary to Lichbach's point that one can only mobilize 5% of the population at a time⁷⁷--the size of mobilized crowds can be important for the opposition both practically-to achieve its goals (De Nardo 1985; Fearon 2004; Binnendijk and Marovic 2006; Tucker 2006), and symbolically- to evoke and claim popular democratic legitimacy. Practically, a crowd of hundreds of thousands is extremely difficult to police and control (witness Milosevic's outnumbered forces in October 2000). According to Fearon, 'expected costs of protesting generally decrease with the number of protesters. Indeed, if so many protest that it becomes fairly safe, it

⁷⁵ Sundstrom, L. 2005. Foreign Assistance, International Norms, and Civil Society Development: Lessons from the Russian Campaign. *International Organization* 59, 2: 419-49.

⁷⁶ Wilson, A. 2005. *Ukraine's Orange Revolution*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 129.

⁷⁷ Lichbach's fine-tuning (Lichbach and Zucherman, 1997, 143) of this assertion--that even without a critical mass, a coup could succeed or that an unorganized mass could fail, points to the critical role mobilizational means play towards a successful outcome. In their countering the above argument in favour of also paying attention to the additional importance of the unorganized crowd, Oliver (1989) and Kuran (1991, 1995) also highlight the impact of relational capabilities, exemplified by networks (for example, see Kuran, 1991, 25). Lohmann's findings (1994, 89) disagree with the importance of the role of political organization in favour of spontaneous coordination of participation in mass protests, but this also points to the significance of personal networks and social embeddedness.

may actually be fulfilling or fun to join in [as in] ...the Orange Revolution in Ukraine.’⁷⁸ Privileging, instead, at least equally an explanation of incumbent strength –or weakness, Way (2006) disagrees with the importance bestowed on opposition crowd numbers.⁷⁹ Indeed, large numbers alone may not guarantee victory; but they are an important prerequisite. The comment by the mayor of Kyiv to opposition organizers at the time of the Orange Revolution sums it up best: ‘If you bring out 100,000, I am with you, we’ll take power in one day. If it’ll be 99,000 I won’t be with you.’⁸⁰

A less controversial assertion, on the role of younger people, has also been seen as pivotal in these recent events. They assisted with organizing the mobilization of crowds, provided logistical support, and formed the first wave of protest (Kuzio 2006). Moreover, these revolutions were both driven by and marketed for younger generations (the ‘coolness’ effect, complete with t-shirts, music concerts, and actual and virtual/cyber-happenings, like street theatre or blogs).⁸¹ The generational gap is also evident in other areas, like opposition members’ level of education (many university students—Beissinger 2007) and articulation. Expanding on this last point, in most color revolution cases, the generational contrast both in ‘software’ (political discourse) and ‘hardware’ (equipment) was painfully obvious and sharp. Where opposition often employed counter-culture techniques, like black humour and shock-value street performances, to demonstrate the regime’s shortcomings, authorities used antiquated, Soviet-sounding nomenclature and idioms to ‘denounce’ protesters. For example, protesters were often labelled ‘fascists’, or ‘agents of American imperialism’, etc.-claims that were quickly neutralized with humorous, ironic fast counter-responses by the opposition further exposing the hopeless outdated nature (and effectiveness) of authoritarians’ political discourse.⁸²

⁷⁸ Fearon, 2004, 14.

⁷⁹ Way, 2006, 8.

⁸⁰ Ibid, p. 125. Also in D’Anieri, P. 2006. Explaining the Success and Failure of Post-communist Revolutions. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 39:3, 334.

⁸¹ *Otpor* and *Black Pora* members, interviewed by the author, Fall 2007.

⁸² In Ukraine, when opposition members were accused as being aided by the CIA (by way of being provided American—manufactured boots), soon afterwards they began handing out boots with ‘Made in USA’ written on them, and circulating humorous songs about the accusation. (Kuzio, 2006, 380).

The regimes' forces were also technologically challenged, seemingly always a step behind the opposition, which made extensive use of modern information and communications technology (ICT)—known as 'liberation technology' (Diamond 2010) - and used it to gain a comparative advantage.⁸³ Such tools included cell phones and SMS (Small Message Service) messaging in Serbia, and the internet in Georgia and Ukraine (Kuzio 2006).⁸⁴ The latter greatly facilitated the spread of information during pre-election public relations warfare waged with the regime and ensured optimal coordination leading up to mass mobilization. The use of more advanced and specifically social network media in subsequent democratizing mobilizations has recently brought more attention to the role of technology in precipitating, facilitating and enabling such events. While this debate is just beginning in earnest (see Meier 2009; Morozov 2011), nonetheless, it is plain that at least the cell (or, *mobile*) phone has become literally a revolutionary (or, *mobilizational*) device, as was in the case of Ukrainian Black *Pora* in 2004.⁸⁵

Finally, related to communications and information, in general, it is also important to note the presence of independent media during such elections. By refusing to broadcast falsified election results, and reporting on opposition activities and mass mobilization, media in Kyiv and Belgrade significantly contributed to the contesting of attempted monopoly of information by the authorities. They may have also aided in the safeguarding of opposition gatherings, by covering them live and keeping their audience alert to any moves by the regime to obstruct or disperse them.

⁸³ According to Diamond, 'any form of ICT that 'can expand political, social, and economic freedom...ultimately empower[s] individuals, facilitate[s] independent communication and mobilization, and strengthen[s] an emergent civil society.' (Diamond, L. Liberation Technology. *Journal of Democracy* 21, 3, 70). See also, Howard, P. N. (2010). *The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. This issue and the debate around it are touched upon more in the conclusion of this study.

⁸⁴ During field trip research in Belgrade in 2007, the author was acquainted with a quite popular apocryphal story about an instance when Milosevic's police raided a civic group's offices in mid-2000: While searching the group's office and seizing their computer equipment, a group of middle age police officers demanded from the personnel present to "tell them where the internet was, so they could confiscate it."

⁸⁵ Corwin, J.A. 2005. 'Russia: FSB Hoping to Put Revolution on Hold?' *RFE/RL* (May 2). Again, Morozov disagrees (see Baumann, M. 2009. 'A Political Revolution Goes Viral...Not So Fast.' *Information Today* 26, 9), but Meier's ongoing research (2009 data) seems to validate the proposition of the importance of cell phones for civil resistance.

Empirical lessons and policy implications

Prospective oppositions: Emulating previous successes

Works by Beissinger (2007, 2009) and Bunce and Wolchik (2006, 2009)⁸⁶ point to the importance of international diffusion of these electoral revolutions; a number of studies have documented how the pilot program of election monitoring in Slovakia in 1998 evolved into a revolutionary package in Serbia in 2000, and how it subsequently migrated to Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine in 2004 (Forbrig and Demes 2007).⁸⁷ In the transitology literature, diffusion refers to an 'electoral model of democratization that was developed and applied in a cluster of states, and then embraced and implemented thereafter by opposition groups and everyday citizens when elections were held in other states in the region' (Bunce and Wolchik 2006). An exportable, modular revolution ('action based in significant part of prior successful examples of others'-- Beissinger 2007) involves the transfer of past experience, and is exemplified in the trans-national flow of ideas, information and people as they negotiate the particularities of each case. This transfer occurs at the nexus among international democracy and human rights promoters (international NGO's and individual actors), regional exporters, or middlepersons, and local/domestic opposition; it targets the monitoring of forthcoming elections, the energizing of the electorate and its alerting and mobilization in the event of electoral fraud (Beissinger 2007).⁸⁸ Developed trans-national networks of communication are thus an important element in the aforementioned diffusion process, which, upon importation, is emulated domestically according to the size, dedication and geographical spread of the opposition movement

⁸⁶ See Beissinger, M. R. 2009. An Interrelated Wave. *Journal of Democracy* 20, 1:74-77, and his 2007 Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions. *Perspectives on Politics* 5:251-276. Also, Bunce, V. J. & Wolchik, S. L. 2009. Post-communist Ambiguities. *Journal of Democracy* 20,3: 93-107, and 2009. Getting Real About "Real Causes." *Journal of Democracy* 20, 1:69-73, and their 2006 work, International Diffusion and Post Communist Electoral Revolutions. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 39,3:283-304.

⁸⁷ Forbrig, J. and Demes, P. (eds.). 2007. *Reclaiming Democracy: Civil Society and Electoral Change in Central and Eastern Europe*. Washington, DC: The German Marshall Fund of the United States.

⁸⁸ Democratization and democracy could be seen as a norm. According to Constructivist International Relations theories, norm propagation takes place in three stages, involving emergence, cascading, and internalization. During the first one the actors are transnational 'norm entrepreneurs' with an organizational platform who, through persuasion (use of expertise and information) attempt to change the behavior of other actors and help mobilize them towards further change. It is these actors that attempt to facilitate modular revolutions.

(Bunce and Wolchik 2006). More precisely, Beissinger holds that domestically this modular process depends on constitutional constraints and seven pre-existing structural conditions: (i) Election type, (ii) Openness of system, (iii) Level of education in population, (iv) Protest tradition and ability to mobilize, (v) Strong regional divisions between government and opposition, (vi) Security forces divisions, (vii) Trans-national NGO's.⁸⁹ A number of the above include diverse organizational elements pivotal to a political opposition's ability to band effectively, spread its message efficiently and mobilize the public successfully to contest electoral fraud. Yet, this literature remains sufficiently vague on these properties and the mechanisms involved that together affect the outcome of an electoral revolution. An aim of this study is to properly address them.

Competitive authoritarian incumbents: preventing similar occurrences in the future

Authoritarian regimes and their leaders are also avid students of the lessons of the color revolutions. For incumbents who insist on election shows that must allow a modicum of opposition participation, their responses range from constraint to cooptation of the latter by the former. Often a combination of responses-sequentially, or in tandem-are applied by the regime.




Figure 1: Possible Responses by Authorities to Non-institutional Political Challenges
 Modified from Schock, K. 2005. *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press), 31.

⁸⁹ Beissinger, 2007, 264-8.

Prominent among regime responses is coercion. Primarily it manifests in the form of physical violence ordered by leaders of a regime (one of the lessons learned in Lukashenko's Belarus and Aliyev's Azerbaijan- its early and broad application) and of restriction of civic personal freedoms; also, in the form of curtailing of the flow of information, ideas, funds and expertise that, in the case of democratization efforts would permit the international (and domestic) diffusion of modular electoral revolution; finally, through countering of oppositional domestic civil society with similar state-sponsored organizations.⁹⁰ Besides violence, the modern authoritarian version of a Weberian state's definition has involved a monopoly of information. The crudest measure is to try and insulate one's country from outside influences (Gershman and Allen 2006; Silitski 2006).⁹¹ Less autocratic and/or more sophisticated regimes resort to regulating the flow and dissemination of information-especially electronic, with a variety of internet controls (Deibert and Rohozinski 2010; MacKinnon 2011)⁹²-and restricting foreign NGO activities. For example, China maintains tight media control (Chen 2005), while Russia has clamped down on its own independent media as well as on foreign NGO's (Gershman and Allen 2006; Stoner-Weiss and McFaul 2008).⁹³

Soft repression and hard manipulation represent more astute coercive ways to defend against electoral revolutions (Krastev 2011). Russia offers an example in the Kremlin's use of political technologists, with roles ranging from policy analysis, to political provocation, to 'black PR' operations, to 'creative vote tabulation' (Wilson 2005; Krastev 2006). For example, Russian political technologists helped create an anti-Orange department in Ukraine 2004 (a case of what can be termed a 'reverse', or,

⁹⁰ Davenport refers to this collectively as the 'law of coercive responsiveness'. In Davenport, C. 2007. State Repression and Political Order. *Annu. Rev. Poli. Sci.* (10:1-23), 7.

⁹¹ Gershman, C. A., Michael. 2006. New Threats to Freedom: The Assault on Democracy Assistance. *Journal of Democracy* 17, 36-51, and Silitski, V. 2006. Belarus: Learning from Defeat. *Journal of Democracy* 17, 138-152.

⁹² For Russia, see Deibert, R. J. and Rohozinski, R. "Control and Subversion in Russian Cyberspace," in Deibert, R.J., Palfrey, J.G., Rohozinski, R. and Zittrain, J. (eds.). 2010. *Access Controlled: The Shaping of Power, Rights, and Rule in Cyberspace*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 15-34. For China, see MacKinnon, R. 2011. "China's 'Networked' Authoritarianism." *Journal of Democracy* Volume 22, Number 2 (April).

⁹³ Among the foreign NGO's suspended by Russia are the International Republican Institute (IRI), the National Democratic Institute (NDI), and also Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the American Bar Association and Doctors Without Borders. Quoted in 'Russia Suspends Scores of NGO's.' *The New York Times*, October 19, 2006.

‘negative’ diffusion’ of authoritarian manipulation of elections and other democratic processes), and advocated the promulgation of strict, anti-NGO laws to the Kremlin.⁹⁴ Further, the creation of domestic parallel government-organized NGO’s (GONGO’s) has been aimed at undermining the earlier monopoly of youth protest power that opposition movements elsewhere seemed to possess.⁹⁵ Sloppy (and floppy) efforts like the anti-*Pora* group *Dosyt’* (‘Enough’) launched by the incumbent leadership during the 2004 Ukrainian presidential campaign (Kuzio 2006), have given way to more sophisticated and highly organized groups, like the Russian groups ‘Walking Together’ and *Nashi* (‘Ours’) that claim a non-negligible part of civil society.⁹⁶

International dimensions

Oppositions in the color revolutions received important information, technical know-how and critical funding from trans-national NGO’s (also termed ‘moral financiers’-Sundstrom 2005). Discussion earlier in this chapter of international diffusion of an electoral model points at the importance of trans-national links. Levitsky and Way (2002, 2005) and Way (2006) have been taking closer looks at the role of economic, political, social and informational linkages (density of ties and cross-border flows of people, capital, services and information—a concept akin to Nye’s ‘Soft Power’ in International Relations⁹⁷) between post-Communist states and the West, as one potential predictor of external pressure towards democratization. It is highly symbolic and quite appropriate as a metaphor that the initial meeting between trans-national pro-democracy NGO’s and domestic Slovak opposition members before the 1998 Slovak elections took place at an airport (Bunce and Wolchik 2006).

⁹⁴ Krastev, I. 2006. Democracy’s ‘Doubles. *Journal of Democracy* 17, 52-62. Also, see Wilson, A. *Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, and, Stoner-Weiss, Kathryn and McFaul, Michael. 2008. The Myth of the Authoritarian Model: How Putin’s Crackdown Holds Russia Back, in *Foreign Affairs* 87, 1 (January/February).

⁹⁵ For example, see Belarus, where, in a mid-2006 speech, Lukashenko “urged the state to ‘engage with civil society’, clearly meaning groups and organizations created and supported by officialdom” (quoted in Silitski, 2006). This could be a worrisome development, as the very definition of civil society has been a mediating role between citizens and the state.

⁹⁶ On the topic of imitating, adopting and co-opting opposition techniques, Kazakhstan president’s 2005 ‘color coded’ election campaign also merits mention.

⁹⁷ Or, more generally, the concept of linkage can be seen as a modern variant of the complex interdependence notion of the transnational flow of people and information

Another international dimension is Western leverage (Pevehouse 2002; Vachudova 2001, 2005; Way 2006).⁹⁸ It is often associated with economic incentives and conditional terms of acceptance (conditionality) to Western institutions like the European Union. Conditionality levels vary from source to source, and so do results. Low conditionality (typical of NGO's) produces small effects; moderate (e.g. IMF and the World Bank) yields mixed ones; high conditionality (like NATO and the European Union) can create potentially transformative effects.⁹⁹ Geographic proximity and openness (measured in: number of television sets per thousand households, newspaper circulation per thousand people; outgoing international communications; international tourists, foreign direct investment as per cent of GDP; international trade as share of GDP-reflects awareness of external ideas) to the West play an important role in both linkage and leverage issues (Kopstein and Reilly 2000).¹⁰⁰ Nonetheless, Western leverage may be mitigated by competing regional powers (Herd 2005)¹⁰¹ or Western interests (Way 2006). The same applies for non-Western linkage and leverage, exerted primarily by Russia in its attempt to countervail external influence. Examples include its geo-political alliances (like its role in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization¹⁰²), its ambitious global telecommunications program (e.g. the RT-I global satellite broadcast, which is the Russian equivalent to CNN International), and its strategic strengthening of economic and regional ties with neighboring countries [such as Russian efforts to create a 'dense web of commercial ties' with an politically ambivalent, ethnically divided Ukraine (Stent 2008)].¹⁰³ Indeed, *Realpolitik* exigencies

⁹⁸ Pevehouse, J. C. 2002. Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and Democratization. *International Organization* 56,3:515-549; also, see Vachudova, M. A. 2001. The Leverage of International Institutions on Democratizing States: Eastern Europe and the European Union (EUI Working Paper, <http://cadmus.iue.it/dspace/handle/1814/1742>)

⁹⁹ An example is Ukraine's participation in the NATO Partnership for Peace program; it can be credited with injecting enough professionalism in enough Ukrainian officers to resist the temptation and/or call for intervention in the 2004 disputed elections.

¹⁰⁰ Kopstein, J. R. and Reilly, D. A. 2000. Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation of the Postcommunist World. *World Politics* 53, 1-37.

¹⁰¹ Herd, G. P. 2005. Colorful Revolutions and the CIS: 'Manufactured' versus 'Managed' Democracy? *Problems of Post-Communism* 52, 3-18.

¹⁰² It is not surprising that, with its members being China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and observers Belarus, and Iran, one of Shanghai Cooperation Organization recent stated goals is "collective defence against the spread of unwanted political and economic influence on the region."

¹⁰³ Stent, A. E. 2008. Restoration and Revolution in Putin's Foreign Policy. *Europe-Asia Studies* 60, 1089-1106.

of the post-Cold War era must not be ignored. The US has often balanced its liberal democracy-promotion policy (Monten 2005)¹⁰⁴ with its realist global energy (e.g. in Azerbaijan) and security (i.e. the war on terror and Central Asian bases¹⁰⁵) concerns. On the other hand, the Kremlin perceives democratic inroads made in former Soviet Republics as a Western threat to its predominance in its sphere of influence (the so-called 'near-abroad') and the regime's own security.¹⁰⁶ Such considerations often trump the efforts for the propagation of democracy as an international norm, and complicate the picture of democracy's international diffusion and domestic development.

Theoretical lessons and their broader impact on the study of electoral revolutions

Debating causes

The above review of features and implications teases out most of the perspectives and arguments on what may be plausible causes of the color revolutions. A 2009 scholarly debate on their 'real' causes echoes the usual causal suspects, present in the study of regime transition since the 1960's: Structure and agency.¹⁰⁷ On one side, a structural argument supports the explanatory primacy of regime weakness or strength (Way 2009), treating the color revolutions as 'cases of authoritarian failure rather than democratization.'¹⁰⁸ While Way allows for 'contingency and agency to play a role', he argues that 'more impersonal structural variables [related to the strength of the incumbent state and party and the low degree of linkages with the West¹⁰⁹] are

¹⁰⁴ Monten, J. 2005. The Roots of the Bush Doctrine. *International Security* 29, 4: 112-156.

¹⁰⁵ See for example, the US policy of trying to maintain open and operational its Manas airbase in Kyrgyzstan. The February 2009 rapprochement between Bishkek and Moscow, an example of Russian leverage, put its future operation in serious jeopardy-despite an agreement later the same year that would still allow limited US use of the base (Schwartz, M. 'Kyrgyzstan Allows Limited Access.' *The New York Times*, June 23, 2009).

¹⁰⁶ Under this light, the Kremlin has viewed Western-oriented Georgian President Saakashvili (and his agenda of seeking admission to NATO and the EU) with suspicion since his advent to power during the 2003 Georgian 'Rose Revolution'. Tensions have been high ever since, culminating in the summer 2008 Russo-Georgian war in S. Ossetia.

¹⁰⁷ With political culture (and identity) also receiving some mention (e.g. see Brzezinski, Z. 'The Primacy of History and Culture' in Diamond, L. and Plattner, M. (eds.).2002. *Democracy After Communism* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press).

¹⁰⁸ Way, 2009, 91.

¹⁰⁹ Oil wealth is also included in these structural variables. Such states are described as 'rentier' ones. See Beblawi, H. The Rentier State in the Arab World, in Beblawi, H. and Luciani, G. (eds.).1987. *The Rentier State* (New York, NY: Croom

critical in explaining the failure of authoritarian governments.’¹¹⁰ For him, it is precisely these variables *ex ante* that mostly determine agency and contingency—i.e. the relative importance and likelihood of protest: ‘In short, weak state capacity increases the odds that a variety of contingent factors will result in authoritarian breakdown.’¹¹¹ But this ‘variety of contingent factors’ needs to be present, active and pressing, otherwise even weak authoritarian regimes can remain in power, unchallenged. Hence, a structural argument that ‘highlights some of the features that help undermine or stabilize authoritarian regimes [...while a significant contribution] is only half an argument’.¹¹² On the other side, thus, a case is made for the role of opposition practices, pointing to the equal importance of contingency (and the agency-or, agencies¹¹³-that intentionally or otherwise brings it forth). The key aspect of this argument focuses on an electoral diffusion model, ‘a distinctive, unprecedented set of activities’¹¹⁴ that are consciously designed to maximize prospects for opposition victory at the polls’ (Beissinger 2009; Bunce and Wolchik 2009a, 2009b). This model triggers and/or augments and sustains the political organization and voter-turnout necessary for the opposition to have any chance of contesting authoritarian elections, and translates citizen anger against the regime into electoral support for its democratic opponents, especially upon suspicion of electoral fraud.¹¹⁵ The result is often unexpected, massive protests—themselves depending on social bases, organizational networks, resources, and available protest repertoires--which play a ‘critical role in the outcome of events’ and are eventually emulated across borders. In short, the trans-national and domestic diffusion of the electoral model as well as opposition

Helm) and Ross, M. L. 2001. Does Oil Hinder Democracy? *World Politics* 53, 3:325-361. They are also classified as ‘petro-authoritarian’ (see Walker, C. and Goehring, J. 2008. Nations in Transit report, at freedomhouse.eu).

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid, 94.

¹¹² Beissinger, 2009, 74. D’Anieri (2006) also emphasizes the importance of ‘critical mass’.

¹¹³ For a critical theorist approach that also points out the lack of scholarly attention to the effects of collective agency, see Zharebkin, 2008.

¹¹⁴ These include (i) orchestrating large-scale voter registration and turn-out drives, (ii) forming (forcing) a united opposition, (iii) NGO links, (iv) a nation-wide ambitious campaigning, (v) extensive use of rallies, rock concerts, street theater and alternative media, (vi) pressure exerted upon regimes to improve the quality of electoral procedures, and their transparency (Bunce and Wolchik, 2009a, 70). A commitment to non-violence is also part of this model.

¹¹⁵ While electoral fraud is a catalyst, it need not necessarily be the only one for mass mobilization in favor of an opposition (for example, see the Lebanese 2005 ‘Cedar Revolution’ triggered not by suspected fraudulent elections, but the assassination of Prime minister Rafik Hariri.

organization and mobilization matter because, ultimately, the larger the resulting protest gets (a threshold of ‘critical mass’ is reached), the greater the ability to avoid repression becomes, to disrupt state operations and to force defections from a regime.¹¹⁶ Beissinger also points out that ‘for the most part, revolutions come as a surprise to participants and observers alike—and this [is] true of the color revolutions as well. Their unexpected nature is a result of the importance to revolutionary outcomes of opposition mobilization (not just authoritarian defections), the dangers involved in openly opposing authoritarian regimes (whether weak or strong) and the ways in which individual acts of opposition are related to one another (both within a state and across state borders).’¹¹⁷ This interplay between agency and contingency amidst an intensified, condensed, *verdichte*¹¹⁸ period of time—of ‘thickened history’¹¹⁹--and its repletion within and beyond borders, cannot be easily explained by structural exegeses alone.¹²⁰ At the same time, structure cannot be completely ignored, and opposition strength can only explain half of the story, authoritarian incumbent weakness providing the other half.¹²¹

This structure-contingency divide also highlights the role of agency. Viewing domestic structures--institutions and organizations--as well as international linkages--as the main determinants of authoritarian strength or weakness, and thus the chief culprits for democratic transition (or, according to its proponents, failure of authoritarian consolidation¹²²) could imply a diminished role for the actions (and their consequences) of domestic political agents and trans-national non-governmental actors. It is interesting that contingency re-introduces in a way, the significance of individual agency. The latter is not only limited to elites (Schmitter 1986; D’Anieri 2006)

¹¹⁶ Beissinger, 2009, 75-76.

¹¹⁷ Ibid, 77.

¹¹⁸ Garton Ash, T. The Stasi on Our Minds. *The New York Review of Books*, May 31, 2007.

¹¹⁹ Beissinger, M. 2002. *National Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 27.

¹²⁰ For example, Way explains the 2004 Orange mobilization in Ukraine through the tapping of popular nationalist anti-Russian sentiments in the west of the country.

¹²¹ Beissinger also acknowledges the significance of structure in determining outcomes. (Beissinger, 2009, 74).

¹²² As mentioned in the review above, the focus centers on the incumbent regimes—especially, domestically on their state capacity (a single, institutionalized party and state, with extensive, well-funded coercive apparatus, and discretionary control of the state economy), and internationally on their combined linkage and leverage effects (Levitsky and Way, 2010, 10-12).

(even if it includes not only opposition leaders, members and civil society volunteers, but also the regimes' authoritarian incumbents, their cadres, officers and other regime actors, like their 'political technologists'), but extends to 'ordinary' citizens, whose individual choices and actions at a micro-level are linked and then aggregated through collective action (and can help explain its sudden escalation). The issue of connected agents and the role of agency in mobilization will be further addressed later in this study.

Transitology and the future of the study of regime change: dynamics of contingency

To place the above in a greater perspective of the transitology literature, since the fall of the Berlin Wall a great number of mostly structural and agency variables have been associated with transition from authoritarianism in the post-Communist galaxy of cases. As mentioned earlier, they have included institutional and political legacies (Kitschelt 1995, 1999; Fish 1998, 2005; Roeder 2001; Hale 2005)¹²³; economic development (Przeworski); political culture and the salience of ethnic identity (Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2006; Way 2007, 2008); geography (Kopstein and Reilly 2000; Pevehouse 2002; Vachudova 2001, 2006); opportunity (Tucker 2006, 2007); regime strength or weakness (Way 2009; Levitsky and Way 2010), mode of protest (Beissinger 2007, 2009; Bunce and Wolchik 2009) and its nature (Stepan and Chenonweth 2008). Yet, while thorough and well-researched, alone the vast majority of the above mono-causal explanations apply selectively when it comes to the set of the events surrounding the recent color revolutions. For example, while heavily burdened by the institutional legacies of Soviet Communism, Georgia still fared better than Belarus, despite the latter's geographical proximity to Europe; same with a less developed Kyrgyzstan over oil-rich Azerbaijan. And under the same blanket of anti-Russian ethnic identity and similar degrees of regime strength, Ukrainian anti-government protests did much in 2004 than in 2000-1. In overwhelming proportion (again, Beissinger and Bunce

¹²³ Also see Johnson, J. 'Past Dependency or Path Contingency? Institutional Design in Post-Communist Financial Systems' in Ekiert, G. and Stephen Hanson, S. (eds.). 2003. *Capitalism and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

and Wolchik being notable exceptions), they also tell much more about the structural and agency preconditions for these events, than about the events themselves and their effects on the outcome--their stochastic trajectories, mutual effects and evolutionary dynamics once they begin. In that sense, such explanations can be described as too static and over-determined. Therefore, greater attention must be paid to democratizing mass mobilizations and the processes within them, combining structural, agency and contingency perspectives.

Bridging the structure-agency (and contingency) divide

To conclude, mass mobilizations against competitive authoritarian regimes-like the color revolutions-are dynamic events, the reverberations of which are still being felt. They are characterized by meticulously planned, carefully coordinated and expertly choreographed, non-violent protests around fraudulent elections. The elections themselves represent semi-authoritarian regimes' botched attempts at solidifying their power bases and manufacturing democratic legitimacy by turning to Pandora's Ballot Box. Their elaborate pre-planning energizes the electorate and mobilizes huge protesting crowds, culminating in huge mass protest rallies-themselves, a *sine qua non* for achieving their goal of overturning 'stolen' elections. To paraphrase Lenin's maxim, this type of democratic popular revolution is 'the power of crowds and cell-phones.'

In addition, these culminating, 'swarming' events display elements of spontaneity that often surprise with their speed of propagation and sheer volume even their most optimistic champions. Structures (e.g., regime strength, resources, political opportunities), identities (e.g. anti-Russian feelings among 'Orange' Western Ukrainians) and institutions continue to provide credible but partial explanations for the actions of both the oppositions (Way 2006; Darden 2007) and incumbents (Hale 2005, 2009; Way 2006 and 2008; Levitsky and Way 2010). Actors, both in front and

behind the scenes (D'Anieri 2006)¹²⁴ remain important in explaining these events. Besides authoritarians and opposition elites, activists ('democratic entrepreneurs') with domestic and transnational links to other actors also hold pieces of the explanatory puzzle, both in the outcomes of single cases and in 'exporting', emulating and 'custom-fitting' these modular processes in other countries according to their own structural parameters. Agency is also present in the cumulative effects of coalescing individual behavior, manifested by the contingent actions and reactions of opposition crowds. This contingency is also paramount for determining outcomes (Lyall 2006; Beissinger 2007 and 2009; Bunce and Wolchik 2009).

The above make evident that for a comprehensive study of collective actions like the color revolutions all three-structure, agency and contingency-need to be considered, their divide bridged. To use a chess analogy, the size of the board, as well as the predetermined value and power of the pieces matters for the game, as does the availability and quality of the pieces possessed by each side. The outcome of the game is decided by how the available pieces deploy, interact and advance on the chessboard grid, in relation to one another and those of the opposite side. Thus, initial positions and number, as well as individual strength and capabilities of pieces are important, but to understand a game's outcome, one must also study its plays-that is it's how the games of the opposing sides unfold based on the evolving configuration of their pieces; in other words, the game's dynamic process. As Bunce and Wolchik note, 'put simply, structure, agency and process are all important.'¹²⁵ Efforts at such a synthesis call for the use of multiple perspectives and methods to the studying regime transition.¹²⁶ A multi-faceted approach to such questions would help to more systematically reveal the dynamics behind such event-centered processes-a notion that is as popular in the

¹²⁴D'Anieri (2006) offers an example of the role of elites is negotiating with security forces and the *ancien regime* to avert violence, as does Chivers, C.J. in How Top Spies in Ukraine Changed the Nation's Path (*The New York Times*, January 27, 2005). Both present is interesting evidence that the Third Wave element of 'negotiated pacting' is still-at least partially-present in these Fourth Wave transitions.

¹²⁵ Bunce and Wolchik, 2009a, 70.

¹²⁶ In particular, the study of contingency requires, along with large-N studies, the examination of the effects of the micro-foundations of these events (and their effect upon subsequent events) to help uncover more about causes and mechanisms behind these processes--both critical steps towards theory-building (Carothers, 2002, 2007; King, 2004). For example, how does the spatial and temporal aggregation of individual agent behavior account for mass events?

literature as it is still obscure (neither clarified nor expanded upon, like in Saxonberg and Linde 2003; Way and Levitsky 2005).

Redefining theoretical terms and conceptual frameworks: electoral revolutions as processes

Since Chalmers Johnson's work on 'social system (dis)equilibrium theory' (1966) and Barrington Moore's study on 'bourgeois revolution' (1966), classical definitions have ranged from minimalist-'a major, rapid, social and political transformation' (Skocpol, 1979)-to maximalist ones-'a socio-political phenomenon that involves the discrediting of the old order, mass movements and massive demonstrations, ideological fervour and violence (Giddens 1989; Fairbanks 2007; Tudoroiu 2007)-and from social psychology and individuals (Gurr 1970) to economic classes and structure (Tilly 1978) to resources, demographics and elites (Goldstone 1991).

So, are events clustered together under the color label, really revolutions? Serbia and Ukraine seem to fit the first three of the above 'revolutionary' descriptors in various degrees. Some scholars insist that Georgia better qualifies as a popular coup d'état, and Kyrgyzstan as a series of popular unrests; others resist the term 'revolution' altogether, in favour of 'failed authoritarian regime consolidation' (Way 2008). Still, all cases lack the features of ideology and widespread violence (Kyrgyzstan being a partial exception). In fact, besides a debatable common thread of distaste of corruption (Tucker 2007), especially for Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine, their only abstractly ideological underpinnings are their distinct lack of violence and protest against falsification of electoral processes, as they also tend to revolve around mobilizations during contested elections allegedly tampered by insecure authoritarian regimes. Hence, their dynamic element differentiates them from being simply 'authoritarian turnovers due to weak regimes (Way 2009). Instead, as Beissinger notes, the mobilization of hundreds of thousands of people, which was critical to bringing about regime change, is what makes these events revolutions rather than authoritarian

regime collapses.¹²⁷ Towards a definition of these events, Bunce and Wolchik (2006) provide a quite comprehensive definition of what they term an 'electoral revolution': 'an attempt by opposition leaders and citizens to use elections sometimes in combination with political protests, to defeat illiberal incumbents or their anointed successors; to bring liberal oppositions in power; and to shift their regimes in a decidedly more democratic direction.'

Elements of the above (concerted mobilizational action of opposition and citizens, during elections and protests-themselves limited in time and space) highlight the dynamic process qualities of an electoral revolution. Indeed, revolutions in general are viewed as processes with dynamic properties. In Goldstone's words, 'structural conditions may set the stage for conflict, but the shape and outcome of that struggle is often determined only in the course of the revolutionary conflict itself.'¹²⁸ In other words, action by actors is at least as important as structure, and their interplay yields contingent results that drive revolutionary outcomes. The color revolutions fit within this framework of an electoral revolution-as a process and as an 'emergent' phenomenon.¹²⁹ Goldstone concludes: 'Future theories of revolution will have to feature separate models for the conditions of state failure, the conditions of particular kinds and magnitudes of mobilization, and the determinants of various ranges of revolutionary outcomes, each of which may be the result of contingent outcomes of prior stages in the revolution's unfolding.'¹³⁰ He also remarks that rational choice and network analyses 'have provided some guide in this dynamic.' This study continues down this path of network analysis, but aspires to propose a combined model, at least for kinds and magnitudes of mobilizations that accounts both for structure, agency and contingency to study the processes of the contentious political action like the events surrounding electoral revolutions.

¹²⁷ Beissinger, 2009, 75.

¹²⁸ Goldstone, J. A. 2001. Towards a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory. *Annual Review of Political Science* 4, 151.

¹²⁹ Ibid, 174.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

THE STUDY OF PROCESSES AND MECHANISMS IN COLLECTIVE ACTION

Contentious Politics from a theoretical perspective

Broadly defined, 'at its most general, the study of contentious politics includes all situations in which actors make collective claims on other actors, claims which if realized would affect the actors' interests, when some government is somehow party to the claims. In these terms, wars, revolutions, rebellions, (most) social movements, industrial conflict, feuds, riots, banditry, shaming ceremonies, and many more forms of collective struggle usually qualify as contentious politics...'¹³¹

Democratizing Revolutions like the ones in Serbia and Ukraine are examples of contentious politics, a topic thoroughly addressed by the literature of social movements and mobilization. Work on contentious politics aims to explain the phenomenon of social movements and the processes and mechanisms of social mobilization; while it has been rigorous, this theoretical approach and results are often obfuscating, at least partly due to the complexity of their subjects. Greater clarity can be achieved by focusing on mechanisms-a focus that hints at the important role that a networks perspective can play in their study. Further, a 'process' explains the salient features of episodes, helping to explore causalities. It is a combination of mechanisms, and mechanisms 'open up black boxes' further enabling the understanding of causes and effects.¹³² They can be environmental, cognitive or relational (Tilly 2001). Mobilization and diffusion are such mechanisms, and play a central role to this study. The following sections review the study of collective action through the lens of contentious politics, focusing on groups and individuals before introducing and untangling the concept of diffusion and an argument for its study via a network perspective.

¹³¹ McAdam, D., Tarrow, S. and Tilly, C. Toward an Integrated Perspective on Social Movements and Revolution. [In Lichbach, M. I. and Zuckerman, A. S. (eds.) *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture and Structure*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997], 143.

¹³² See Demetriou, C. 2009. The Realist Approach to Explanatory Mechanisms in Social Science Mechanisms. *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 39, 3: 440-462.

Mobilization and the 'Collectivity' (group level)

Occupying the middle ground between isolated events and political parties, often in the grey area between extra-legal and institutionalized political conflict,¹³³ a social movement is commonly defined as 'a collectivity acting with some continuity to promote or resist a change in the society or organization of which it is a part. As a collectivity, a movement is a group with indefinite and shifting membership and with leadership whose position is determined more by informal response of adherents than by formal procedures for legitimizing authority.'¹³⁴ Since its beginnings in the mid-1960s to capture and explain the civil rights movement in the United States, the study of social movements has advanced in many directions, focusing on the triptych mobilization-actors-trajectories, in an effort to explain 'how people who do not make contentious claims begin to do so, what sort of actors engage in contention, and what are possible outcomes and their impacts.'¹³⁵ It has done so by looking at collective behavior and mobilization theories, political processes and new social movements.¹³⁶

Developing their 'Resource Mobilization Theory', McCarthy and Zald focus on collective actors and their organization-organizational bases, resource accumulation and collective coordination-as means of success for a social movement and as a solution to collective action problems and political mobilization posed by Mancur Olson and his 'free rider' paradox.¹³⁷ According to them, a Social Movement is a 'set of opinions and beliefs which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society.'¹³⁸ At the same time, a countermovement is 'a set of opinions and beliefs in a population opposed to a social movement.'¹³⁹ That population can also be a regime's bureaucracy, or its coercive

¹³³ Specifically, a Social Movement is differentiated from ad hoc, isolated episodes and institutionalized parties by way of scope, dimension and length of campaign. See Marwell and Oliver, 1984; Turner and Killian, 1987, in Diani, M. 'The Concept of Social Movement.' *Sociological Review* (40:1-25, 1992), 16.

¹³⁴ Turner, R. and Killian, L. *Collective Behaviour*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1987, 223.

¹³⁵ McAdam, D., Tarrow, S. and Tilly, C., 2001, 28.

¹³⁶ Diani, 1992, 3.

¹³⁷ Ibid, pp. 3-5. Also, in McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly in Lichbach and Zucherman, pp. 145-150, and McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001, 15.

¹³⁸ McCarthy, J.D. and Zald, M.N. Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory. *American Journal of Sociology* (82, 1212-41, 1977), 1217-18.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

apparatus. Indeed, in addressing mobilization issues, the side of the authoritarian regime is often neglected; the regime also has to either pre-empt or counter-mobilize against movements threatening its grip on power. With work previously focused on containing or policing protests in Western democratic settings and the effects of democracy on 'pacifying the state' [e.g. della Porta and Reiter (eds.) 1998; Koopman 2005; Davenport 2007], studies on political repression and political and human rights (for example, Gurr's MAR project) have also been flourishing (with a number of them previously addressing the phenomenon in general--e.g. Davenport 2000, 2007; Franco 2000; Boudreau 2001; Tilly 2003; Brockett 2005--or focusing more on Latin American, African or Southeast Asian colonial cases). Yet, despite their volume, they remain largely indefinite on the causality beyond the repression-mobilization correlation. More recent works have begun to pay more specific attention to the capacity of the authoritarian regime and how it may hinder or fuel resistance (Francisco 2004; Davenport, Johnston and Mueller 2005; Levitsky and Way 2010).¹⁴⁰ Hence, it is important to note that similar factors that increase a social movement's success, can also apply to the chances of a counter-movement-a point that is important for this study and which will be elaborated later in this study.

Back to social movements, Tilly approached the phenomenon as 'a broader political processes, where excluded interests try to get access to the established polity.'¹⁴¹ His definition allowed for 'a sustained series of interactions between power holders and persons successfully claiming to speak on behalf of a constituency lacking formal representation, in the course of which those persons make publicly visible demands for changes in the distribution of exercise of power, and back those demands with public demonstrations of support.'¹⁴² Thus, 'social movements are an organized, sustained, self-conscious challenge which implies shared identity among participants.'¹⁴³ Finally, scholarship on 'new social movements' focused on political

¹⁴⁰ See earlier discussion on competitive authoritarian regimes.

¹⁴¹ Diani, 1992, 5.

¹⁴² Tilly, C. Social Movements and National Politics (in Bright, C. and Harding, S. (eds.) *State Making and Social Movements: Essays in History and Theory*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984), 306.

¹⁴³ Ibid, 304.

culture and the construction and 'framing' of new collective identities through collective action (Tilly 1995; Traugott 1995).¹⁴⁴ Melucci saw social movements as collective phenomena, characteristic of the dimension of solidarity, conflict (and thus, opposition to an adversary who lays claims on the same goods or values), and incompatibility with the structure of an existing system.¹⁴⁵ Similarly, for Touraine, 'the social movement is the organized collective behaviour of a class actor struggling against his class adversary for the social control of historicity [(the overall system of meaning which sets dominant rules in a given society)] in a concrete community.'¹⁴⁶

The above emphasize 'networks and informal interactions, shared beliefs and solidarity, collective action on conflictual issues, and action which displays largely outside the institutional sphere and the routine procedures of social life.'¹⁴⁷ In all, they represent (i) structural (interests and capacities of whole collectivities and their organizational properties), (ii) rationalist (choices made by individuals based on previously defined interests, resources and situational constraints) and (iii) cultural (the causal power of norms, values and ideas that ideologies or communities bestow to individuals) analyses.¹⁴⁸ As we shall see later in this thesis, a networks approach permeates all three.¹⁴⁹

Social Movements, Processes and Mechanisms

In an effort to comprehend the dynamic aspects of episodes of contention, few other scholarly teams have theorized as extensively and as thoroughly about Social Movements as McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly. Through their work, they attempted a synthesis-mainly structural-cultural-towards capturing the dynamic effect of such episodes-to which mobilization is an integral part. Their perspective focuses on the combination of causal mechanisms that yield social processes, like mobilization and

¹⁴⁴ See Traugott, M. (ed.) 1995. *Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.

¹⁴⁵ Melucci, A. *Nomads of the Present*. London: Hutchinson Radius, 1989, 29 (in Diani, 6-7).

¹⁴⁶ Touraine, A. (*The Voice and the Eye: An Analysis of Social Movements*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, p.81) in Diani, 5-6.

¹⁴⁷ Diani, 1992, 7.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid; also, McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, 2001, 21-22.

¹⁴⁹ For example, Emirbayer and Goodwin's work on network analysis, culture and agency (1994), points to that that even cultural construction of collective action is invariably a network (In Lichback and Zucherman, ch. 6).

political identity formation.¹⁵⁰ Over the decades, this process approach has produced the following agenda:

- (i) Social change processes initiate a process of change, triggering changes in the political, cultural and economic environments,
- (ii) Political opportunities and constraints confront a given challenger,
- (iii) Forms of organization (formal as well as informal) offer insurgents sites for initial mobilization. A large body of evidence finds organizational strength correlated with challengers' ability to gain access and win concessions (Gamson 1990),
- (iv) Framing (a collective process of interpretation, attribution and social construction) mediates between opportunity and action,
- (v) Repertoires of contention offer the means by which people engage in contentious collective action.¹⁵¹

As inclusive as it reads-encompassing concepts as diverse as structure of organizations and cultural frames of meaning and self-categorization-the above describe a chain of static conditions. To try and capture the dynamic aspect of the phenomenon, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly transform the above list into the following model:

- (i) Opportunities depend on the kind of collective attribution, hitherto limited to framing,
- (ii) Mobilizing structures can be preexisting or created in the course of contention but in any case need to be appropriated as vehicles of struggle,
- (iii) Entire episodes, their actors, and their actions are interactively framed by participants, their opponents, the press, and important third parties,
- (iv) Innovative action gains attention and contributes to shared uncertainty among all parties to an emergent conflict,
- (v) Mobilization occurs throughout an episode of contention. The interaction among the mechanisms in the model is both continual and recursive, and mobilization can be understood, in part, as a function of their interaction.¹⁵²

¹⁵⁰ McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001, 24.

¹⁵¹ Ibid, 41. See also Tarrow, S. *Power in Movement*, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

The latter list represents their ‘attempt to shift emphasis from individual movement organizations, to the social movement sector, including interest groups and political parties, from organization to the analysis of contentious collective action, and to political processes and movement mobilization.’¹⁵³ Yet, even from their perspective, the importance of organization in the form of networks remains in their discussion, especially on mobilization and mobilizing structures. These structures are ‘collective vehicles, both formal and informal, through which people come together and engage in collective action.’

More generally, ‘social processes consist of sequences and combinations of causal mechanisms. To explain contentious politics is to identify its recurrent mechanisms, the ways they combine, in what sequence they recur, and why different combinations and sequences, starting from different initial conditions, produce varying effects on the large scale [...] mobilization is not an isolated process: It intersects with other mechanisms and processes-such as creation and transformation of actors, their certification or decertification, repression, radicalization, and the diffusion of contention to new sites and actors in complex trajectories of contention.’¹⁵⁴ This highlights the fact that the study of mobilizing structures ‘has also been enriched by the cultural turn in social and historical sciences... a particular intersection between culture and mobilization that has been explored through the concept of repertoires of contention (Tilly, 1995). Culture and community settings matter [...] in encouraging system-critical framings as prerequisites for collective action.’ But, as the authors note, ‘even this hinges on the strength of communities and of the social networks within them: “[...] they can become effective mobilizing structures because they can draw on shared beliefs and worldviews that motivate and legitimate protest activity.”¹⁵⁵ While to arrive to action, opportunity and organization ‘require the framing processes of shared meanings of situations, these processes also depend on structure. Specifically,

¹⁵² Ibid, 45.

¹⁵³ Ibid, 155-6. See also, McAdam, D. and Snow, D. A. (eds.) *Social Movements: Readings*. Roxbury Pub. Co., 1997.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid, 13.

¹⁵⁵ McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly in Lichbach and Zucherman, 156-7.

they ‘need stable structural settings for system attribution (the social-psychological mechanism by which social grievances are perceived).’

Hence, in summarizing McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly’s elaborate theorizing and ambitious attempt towards a dynamic model of social movements and resulting mobilization, episodes of contention involve two or more processes, and mobilization is one of them (other examples being identity shift, polarization, etc.).¹⁵⁶ Mechanisms that interact with mobilization include (i) environmental (e.g. resource depletion), (ii) cognitive (individual and collective perceptions) and (iii) relational (connections among people, groups and interpersonal networks) ones¹⁵⁷, and this interaction forms ‘...a continuum; [... at the same time such] processes can be frequently recurring causal chains, sequences, and combinations of mechanisms. Note that these can apply to counter-movements. While pioneering, their resulting model is highly convoluted, often unclear and neglectful of the specificities of how such processes involve, affect and are affected by the individual.

Mobilization and the Individual (actor level and rational agency)

As highlighted above, focusing on processes initiated by societal collectivities (social communities and groups) and their planning can help explain salient features of episodes and explore causalities (Tilly 2001). Processes are a combination of mechanisms, one of which is mobilization. Be they environmental, cognitive or relational, any one of these mechanisms involve social connections, ties and relations. But, to truly capture the dynamic element of mobilization that can also elucidate the contingency effects that often elude and surprise mobilization planners and scholars alike, one must also examine the individual, the purposes of the actors involved (something that classic macro-structural approaches ‘from above’ do not do). While ‘exploring the macro’, Lichbach (1995) advises to ‘deepen the micro’. Works on Rational Choice theory focus on agency and individual calculations, and a central

¹⁵⁶ McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001, 27.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid, 25-26. Note their slight shift from their earlier methodological individualism.

question in such mobilization studies is ‘why mobilize under risk?’ (and incur related costs?)-again, focusing on Olson’s ahistorical, deductivist collective action problem.

Thresholds of participation

In a sense, this is a threshold problem of necessary participation levels for collective action to occur. Schelling’s 1971 segregated neighbourhoods study investigated tipping equilibria models of residential flight in a linear fashion. His work (1978) is among the first ones to mention of the concept of ‘critical mass’. Granovetter’s 1983 study of thresholds was the first to focus on the potentially non-linear effects of slight changes to overall collective behaviour (albeit assuming these changes increased monotonically, and focusing on the importance of extremist early risers to excite the general population), followed by Oliver and Marwell’s work on critical mass (unitary collective decision and action) that would be picked up and disaggregated by, among others, Kuran (1991) and Lohmann (1994).

Kuran offers an intriguing rational choice explanation of revolutionary mobilization bandwagon in the case the 1989 Eastern European revolutions. He examines the collective effects of individual actor behavior based on the discrepancy between privately and publicly held preferences about a regime, and the fluctuation between costs for joining opposition and preference falsification. In authoritarian societies, individuals’ preferences may vary, displaying one set publicly (e.g. compliance and satisfaction with the regime, for fear of reprisals) and another privately (e.g. dissatisfaction and discontent). Kuran postulated that initially random, even slight increases in the number of people showing their private colors in public (‘the power of small events’)¹⁵⁸ will make ‘publicizing’ one’s private preferences less costly, and thus, encourage others to display their ‘true preferences’ publicly, exceeding a threshold and thus, facilitating a cascade.

¹⁵⁸ Kuran, T. 1995. *Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 73.

Lohmann also examines mass protests from the perspective of informational cascades.¹⁵⁹ She focuses on the fluctuating cost and size of initial political actions against a regime as signals, and the repercussions of their reception by a general public for potential mass participation that can, by mobilizing, topple the incumbent.¹⁶⁰ In contrast to Kuran, Lohmann's model concentrates on fluctuations of protest sizes and strength of signals, on the role played by moderates' turnout levels, and on unorganized (spontaneous) aggregated individual action towards the effectiveness of mobilization. The above can be understood as an iterated global game theoretical model where a huge number of individual participants receive signals and adjust potential payoffs from participating or abstaining, accordingly, studied also by Chong (1991).¹⁶¹ Somewhat similar in terms of this 'learning' process are stochastic, evolutionary models (originally studied by Rapoport 1957; Axelrod 1997, and more recently Lustick 2004-addressed in the next chapter).

Along with Kuran, Lohmann and earlier works, such as De Nardo's (1985)¹⁶², Lichbach (1995, 1996) explores this question, attempting to synthesize approaches. In 'The Rebel's Dilemma' he proposes a combination of at least two of the 'solution' clusters below for participants to reach a threshold in order to mobilize. They include (i) lowering participation costs for individuals, (ii) fostering common values and knowledge, (iii) cooperating among distinct groups and, (iv) centering on group leadership features. More specifically, his solutions gravitate around the following poles:

¹⁵⁹ It is fascinating to note that informational (and in general, mobilizational) cascading is similar to a network 'burst' encountered when information is transmitted in neural networks, triggering simultaneous activity in nearly all electrodes. In Eckmann, J.-P., Feinerman, O., Moses, E., Soriano, J. and Tlusty, T. 2007. The Physics of Living Neural Networks. *Physics Reports* (449, 1-3:54-76), 61. A tantalizing conjecture, within reach of proof given the new science of networks would be that the mechanism is the same.

¹⁶⁰ Lohmann, S. The Dynamic of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989-91, (*World Politics* 47: 42-101), 49. A tantalizing conjecture would be that the mechanism is the same.

¹⁶¹ Hardin (1971) has been credited as the first to frame a collective action problem in game theoretical terms. See Chong, D. 1991. *Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement*, (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press), 6.

¹⁶² De Nardo advocates individual participation in contentious mobilization if the personal utility of being part of it is greater to the disutility of repression. (De Nardo, 1985, 195) His model contains some account of the interplay between opposition and regime, as the latter has the capability, through offering concessions and reforms, of—in Hirschman's famous terms- acknowledging 'voice' to avoid 'exit'. But it remains mechanistic in its emphasis in 'sheer power in numbers' (in Lohmann, 1994, 86).

- (i) Market¹⁶³ (increase of benefits, lowering of costs, increase of resources, improvement of the productivity of tactics, reduction of the supply of the public good, increase of the probability of winning and of making a difference, use of incomplete information, increase of risk-taking and of team competition between enemies, restriction of exit, change of the type of public good)
- (ii) Community¹⁶⁴ (common knowledge-increase of mutual expectations, building of a bandwagon, creation of common values to overcome self-interest through civil society)
- (iii) Contract¹⁶⁵ (formal and informal organizations, social and political origins)
- (iv) Hierarchy¹⁶⁶ (location of agents and patrons, reorganization and decentralization to become efficacious, increase of team competition among allies, imposition of monitor and enforcement of agreements)

		Deliberation	
		Unplanned Order	Planned Order
Ontology	Spontaneous Order	Market	Contract
	Contingent Order	Community	Hierarchy

Figure 2: Solutions to the Collective Action Problem
 From Lichbach, M. I. 1996. *The Cooperator's Dilemma*
 (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press), 21.

While Lichbach favors a market solution that focuses on individual rational choice, he argues that any two or more of the above four can be combined. As will be demonstrated later in this study, the above prescriptions fit well within a network analytical framework. What is further relevant for the present study is that his work also addresses more explicitly regime 'solutions' to counter mobilization. In particular, dimensions of the latter two (specific contracts and particular hierarchies) are seen by

¹⁶³ Lichbach, 1995, 35-108.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid, 111-124.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid, 129-158.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid, see discussion in 167-241.

him as appropriate approaches to planned order.¹⁶⁷ Indeed, from a regime perspective, a regime's institutions (and their explicit or implied contracts) and hierarchies (political and bureaucratic) are necessary to ensure cooperation in general, and as such are susceptible to thresholds too. In the case of authoritarian regimes, these would be thresholds not only of mobilization (counter-mobilization against democratizing oppositions, to be exact), but also of defection. To counter opposition mobilization, an authoritarian regime needs cabal of associates, bureaucrats and an army that can suppress domestic dissent, minimize regime defections, and forestall foreign (inter- and trans-national) intervention (Wintrobe 1998; Way 2006; Way and Levitsky 2010; Francisco 2010). Numbers of associates and levels of army loyalty falling below a certain floor (what can be termed a 'negative threshold') could render the regime imminently vulnerable to the mobilization of the opposition. A notable point that will be very useful for this study is that hierarchies are themselves networks, except that they typically lack the 'capacity of lower-level units to have relationships with multiple higher-level centers as well as lateral links with units at the same organizational level.'¹⁶⁸ Thus, as will be shown in later chapters, a network framework can incorporate the 'counter' part of the mobilization equation as well.

Challenges for social movement theories: Unifying structure, agency and contingency

The above attempt to bring forth some amount of synthesis to the study of political contention, social movements and revolutionary processes and mechanisms highlights the differences between structural and rational choice views that call for comprehensive approaches inclusive of rationalist, methodologically individualistic perspectives necessary for meaningful comparisons.¹⁶⁹ A combined model could, thus

¹⁶⁷ Lichbach, M. I. 1996. *The Cooperator's Dilemma*. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press), 20.

¹⁶⁸ Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, M. and Jones, C. 2008. Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks: Why al-Qaida May Be Less Threatening Than Many Think. *International Security* (33, 2, 7-44), 12.

¹⁶⁹ Another issue 'arises from the fact that the core of the current theoretical corpus of work on contentious politics focuses on Western reform movements, while specialists outside the domain of recent Western democratic experience (e.g. students of [...] China, Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, or Eastern Europe) have often borrowed the ideas and apparatus of social movement specialists but have not established a genuine dialogue with analysts of contemporary Western European and North American movements...As a result, scholars of Western democratic and Third World movements frequently use different vocabularies, sometimes lapsing into interpretive particularism and

go a long way to increase the ability to understand and explain these phenomena. One way of such a combination involves a network 'meso' perspective that both 'accounts for the macro *and* deepens the micro', thereby unifying structuralist/culturalist and rationalist approaches to explore mobilization and diffusion. Before turning to this approach, a brief examination of the concept and mechanism of diffusion and its role for mobilization (and counter-mobilization) is in order.

Mobilization processes: The mechanism of diffusion

Mobilization depends on the mechanism of diffusion. In the relevant literature on electoral, modular revolutions, diffusion has come to mean the development and then emulation (or export/import) of a democratic electoral model to educate voters, monitor voting and energize supporters of democratic practices (Bunce and Wolchik, Beissinger). Interestingly, Bunce and Wolchik define the diffusion of an electoral model not as a mechanism, but as 'a process wherein new ideas, institutions, policies, models or repertoires of behavior spread geographically from a core site to other sites, whether within a given state (as when the movement of new policies invented in one political subunit spreads to other subunits within a federal polity) or across states (as the spread, for example, of public sector downsizing or non-governmental organizations.' While they speak of diffusion more as a frequently occurring 'Tillyan' combination of mechanisms, rather than as a mechanism itself, still, as we shall see below, their reference to the concept of spread is paramount for capturing the essence of diffusion.¹⁷⁰ At the same time, they do not define diffusion in greater depth—an omission in their otherwise important contribution.

As mentioned earlier on the lessons for prospective oppositions and authoritarian incumbents, diffusion does not necessarily confine itself to a

some time imagining that they are theorizing broadly when their empirical bases vastly exclude parts of the globe.' Further, this gap extends to differing focuses, with social movement scholars emphasizing 'origins, social bases, and organization and dynamics of the phenomena they study, but usually neglect their outcomes, whereas analysts of revolution love origins and outcomes but often neglect organization and dynamics, and sometimes even agency.' In McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly in Lichbach and Zucherman, 151.

¹⁷⁰ Bunce and Wolchik, 2006, 286. For Tilly, himself, mechanisms are classes of events that change relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways, over a variety of situations.' (Tilly, 2001, 26).

transnational electoral model; it potentially also involves the spread of techniques to counter such a model (what this study has labeled ‘reverse’, or, ‘authoritarian diffusion’). Besides the distinction between diffusing (i) a ‘democratizing’ electoral model and (ii) methods to counter it, further disambiguation is necessary. No less important, yet often overshadowed by its more studied trans-national sibling, is domestic diffusion. The traffic of information, material and human resources within a country, organization or group is not only critical for alerting, educating and mobilizing domestic populations whose participation in the culminating mobilizations can tip the scales in the struggle against an authoritarian regime, but also a *sine qua non* for hopeful oppositions, for their struggle is ultimately local. As with the distinction above, domestic diffusion is not confined to aspiring democrats, but is present in the calculus and actions of authoritarian incumbents, both in their structures-as Way (2009) and Way and Levitsky (2010) point out-and agency. More abstractly, but importantly for this study’s purposes, diffusion can, generally, be defined as the mechanism of gradual spread over time of any kind of signals-knowledge, opinions, behavior (Vega-Redondo 2007). Even more concisely, it can be stated that diffusion involves the transfer of resources (be them human, material, informational) over time and across space.¹⁷¹ The above hint at the importance of this mechanism for mobilization processes related to electoral revolutions and other contentious politics.

At this point, a small but essential elucidation must be made between diffusion and contagion, especially as the two are often conflated, or used in the social sciences literature interchangeably without exploring them conceptually in detail.¹⁷² Contagion is defined as ‘the spreading of a quality or quantity between individuals in a population’¹⁷³ and consists of two classes: infectious diseases and social contagion.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷¹ In the seminal work by Rogers (1995) on diffusion of innovation, different patterns of diffusion are identified, and these different patterns produce different flows. In essence, these ‘patterns’ are network configurations, and this study will treat them as such. Building on Rogers, Van de Ven et al. (1999) describe diffusion as a non-linear, dynamic system that is situated between stability and predictability and stochastic randomness—further evidence that the study of diffusion can account for contingency in the Color revolutions examined here.

¹⁷² For example, neither Bunce and Wolchik (2006, 2009) nor Beissinger (2007, 2009) adequately unpack what they mean by diffusion. Also see Strang and Soule (1998) and Macy and Willer (2002). Rogers (1995, 2003) and Oliver and Myers (2003) are notable exceptions.

¹⁷³ Dodds, P. S. 2010. Overview of Complex Networks. The Santa Fe Institute, notes.

Within these two, we find two types of contagion-simple and complex.¹⁷⁵ The former involves mere contact between a source and a target, like the dissemination of information with a wide reach. The latter affects social behavior (Axelrod 1997), the target modifying or changing their behavior as a result of this contact. Typically, to produce effects such contact has to come from multiple sources (Centola 2009), but it could also originate from a single source with a signal repeated through time. In a sense, simple contagion can be described as more of a passive, or transitory condition for a target (the target receives one piece of information and may take related action once as a result of it), whereas complex contagion involves a more active, or more temporally sustained state (e.g. repeated or redundant contact with source produces a more permanent change in the target's behavior).¹⁷⁶ Put differently, simple contagion requires a low threshold before the 'activation' of a target, whereas complex a higher one. At the same time, contagion causes the set of 'activated' individuals to expand. A *composite diffusion*, including both simple and complex contagion, can be defined as 'a mechanism of gradual spread over time, across space, between people and through populations, of resources and signals like knowledge, opinions and behavior.' As such, it incorporates both types of contagion (source to target) and related cascading effects (source to target and its derivative influence to third persons by way of demonstration effects). Moreover, it results in the expansion not only through time and space, but across agency/units (in the case of social contagion, across individuals-'between

¹⁷⁴ It is not a coincidence, then, that social contagion is often discussed in relation to epidemiology (note the expression in social media that something has 'gone viral', and that social scientists employ survey methods similar to those used epidemiologists to investigate infections spread via social behavior).

¹⁷⁵ For example, in Mathematical Epidemiology, the most common models [SIR (Susceptible-Infected-Recovered) and SIS (Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible)] could be said to represent these two types. In Boccaletti, S., Latora, V., Moreno, Y., Chavez, M. and Hwang, D.-U. 2006. Complex Networks: Structure and Dynamics. (Physics Reports 424, 175 – 308), 251. Another way of describing the two types in the epidemiological class is to note that the transmission of viruses, like HIV, often require repeated exposure through sexual practices before infection. However, viruses like the common cold one (rhinovirus) require less invasive (more simple) contact, and even viruses like HIV can be transmitted more quickly, e.g. through contaminated needles. That means that the spread of infections can also be through simple contagion. The implications of the above are that both the nature and, most importantly, the means of spread are the determinants of the type of contagion.

¹⁷⁶ Somewhat similarly, Dodds makes a sub-distinction between already initiated individuals as passive or active ones, the former ones displaying passive signals or behavior (e.g. fashion), while the latter active ones (e.g. political messages). If an uninitiated individual is denoted by the value 0, passive ones would already have a value of 1 and active ones of 2. One conjecture could be that such a differentiation coincides with strength of ties. But, the more conventional approach used in the study of cascades (Centola, Hassanpour) is a binary one (0 for uninitiated and 1 for initiated). Interestingly enough, this mirrors the possible outputs [1/0, AND/OR] of logical gates in electronic circuits.

people'). That is, diffusion also diffuses itself.¹⁷⁷ These clarifications will be important later in this study.

Diffusion's significance for electoral mobilization/counter-mobilizations is evident in both structural ('community') and individual ('market') levels, by way of:

- (i) Groups efficiently planning, communicating and visibly (in Fearon's terms, 'observably') manifesting dissent, thereby lowering individual protest cost thresholds / Security forces effectively intercepting, limiting and visibly suppressing dissent, thereby raising individual protest participation cost thresholds,¹⁷⁸
- (ii) Group monitoring regime members before and during suspected electoral fraud/ Security forces intimidating regime opponents as they prepare for, and during election watch, and monitoring own ranks to minimize defections,¹⁷⁹
- (iii) Activation of group members, affiliates and volunteers, as well as ordinary individual citizens in large numbers (coordination power, recruiting and helping trigger bandwaggoning effects). In the case of the regime, this translates into activation and recruitment of relevant state bureaucracies and security apparatus towards perpetrating fraud and countering by a variety of repressive means opposition mobilization.¹⁸⁰

Dimensions of diffusion

Following the above definitions (and continuing their interpretation for contentious political action during contested elections), it is important to further unpack conceptually two aspects of the diffusion mechanism:

- (a) *What* is being diffused, and by whom:
 - (i) Actors (individually, or as aggregated parts of a collectivity): this includes activists, election monitors and ordinary citizens by opposition and/or civil society

¹⁷⁷ Lake and Wong (2006) differentiate between diffusion through a network, and network formation. This study considers spread and growth to be intricately connected, and incorporates them both in the comprehensive definition of diffusion that incorporates simple and complex contagion-thereby capturing the evolution of a network.

¹⁷⁸ On these 'market' solutions to the collective action problem, see Kuran (1991); Hardin (1995); Fearon (2004).

¹⁷⁹ See Stephan and Chenonweth (2008).

¹⁸⁰ See Lichbach (1995, 1996).

groups; also, fraud-perpetrating state bureaucrats and security forces by authoritarian regimes,

(ii) Knowledge (signals and information in general), resources and behavior: this entails the transmission, for example, of a democratic opposition's 'electoral model' (e.g. activist know-how, as well as material, like leaflets or stickers) towards planning and coordinating activities-behavior and attitude which can be adopted by new recruits; also, of measures and counter-measures by the authoritarian regime (e.g. like blueprints and funds to orchestrate and perpetrate electoral fraud, 'black PR'/'political technology', orders and weapons for the intimidation and suppression of opposition activities);¹⁸¹ finally, of signals of the fluctuating cost of protest (for both prospective protesters) and its suppression (for security forces)

(b) *How* is/are the above diffused to whom¹⁸²:

(i) Temporally--the 'rate', (what this study calls 'flow') of diffusion, which is important for opposition non-violent protest to work¹⁸³ (and regime security forces to contain them), and for the induction of 'tidal', threshold effects (thereby attempting to account for contingency effects),

(ii) Spatially (through space)-what is hereby termed the 'spread' of diffusion, which widens or localizes a mobilization, and disperses or concentrates lines of deployable security forces.¹⁸⁴ Given the scope of this study of democratizing, electoral mobilizations and related counter-mobilizations, while accounting for both, it focuses primarily¹⁸⁵ on *how* diffusion unfolds.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸¹ See Wilson (2005b).

¹⁸² As we will see later, in the study of networks, what can be labeled 'proactive agency' (the 'by whom', as opposed to 'reactive agency'-to whom) is also important for temporal and spatial diffusion.

¹⁸³ For the relation of time of non-violent protest to time of protest, see Stepan and Chenoweth (2008).

¹⁸⁴ For fascinating commentary on the spatial effects of mobilization, see Scott (1998), and Francisco (2010b).

¹⁸⁵ This is, in part, due to the controversial counter-intuitive suggestion by recent work in network studies that, compared to texture, content can be irrelevant (see previous page's footnoted comment on nature and means of contagions).

¹⁸⁶ Of course, 'what' is being diffused also matters. For example, one could expect sympathetic behavior to spread more easily than sociopathic one (in accordance with a society's norms). However, evidence from cases of terrorism (e.g. Asal and Rethemeyer 2008, find that 'a connected, even benign ideologically terrorist organization will kill more if connected to other groups'), or societal breakdown (e.g. during civil wars or revolutions and their totalitarian aftermath) indicate otherwise (as illustrated by behavior of denouncement or collusion with authorities resulting in the harming of others). This echoes the same way in which social capital can be virtuous, but also can lead to 'bowling with Hitler'. This metaphor is further apt because trust permits coordination, which takes place through diffusion). A

The spatial-temporal mode of diffusion, as a combination of simple and complex contagion, affects whether and how thresholds of participation (crucial for both contagion and cascading)¹⁸⁷ are achieved. For example, simple contagion is effectively achieved by Granovetter's weak ties, but for complex contagion stronger ties are needed (Centola and Macy 2007; Siegel 2009). The question of diffusion through ties for mobilization purposes turns the study's attention to networks.

Networks: A 'meso' level approach for the study of mobilization and diffusion

Since the early work of Granovetter (1973, 1978), developed networks of communication are increasingly considered an important element in the diffusion process (McAdam 1995; Bunce and Wolchik 2006; Beissinger 2007¹⁸⁸). Earlier studies (Strang and Soule 1998) point that the channels along which practices flow can help explain why practices diffuse at different rates and via different pathways in different settings.¹⁸⁹ Yet, the social mobilization literature remains sufficiently vague on these properties and mechanisms involved (i.e. how they might assist or impede the flow and spread of information through them) that together might yield an outcome of an electoral revolution.

By use of the concept of networks, a commonly acceptable definition of a social movement could emerge, consisting of 'a network of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in a political or cultural

similar argument can be made from epidemiology-different viruses spread differently-some are airborne while others require repeated contact (rate) with the bloodstream. Even in these cases, however, mode (spatiality) is paramount: a contained common cold rhinovirus is equally easy to avoid as its contained (and much more virulent) H1N1 subtype Influenza one.

The 'by whom' part (agency) remains important also for temporal and spatial diffusion (even in viral infections, agency is required). Herein the study of networks helps bridge the structure-agency divide (for a discussion of how networks help link levels of analysis, see Siegel 2011)

¹⁸⁷ This distinction is made by Collins (2009).

¹⁸⁸ More precisely, Beissinger holds that domestically this modular process depends on constitutional constraints and pre-existing structural conditions-election type, system openness, population education level, protest tradition and ability to mobilize, strong regional divisions between government and opposition, security forces divisions, trans-national NGO's. (Beissinger, 2007, 264-8) A number of the above include organizational elements that are pivotal to a group's ability to diffuse information and mobilize successfully.

¹⁸⁹ Strang, D. and Soule, S. A. Diffusion in Organizations and Social Movements. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 24:265-90, 1998.

conflict, on the basis of a shared, collective identity'¹⁹⁰ and including the common theme of social agents, their ties and interactions among them. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly themselves, '...treat social interaction, social ties, communication and conversation not merely as expressions of structure, rationality, consciousness or culture but as active sites of creation and change. We have come to think of interpersonal networks, interpersonal communication, and various forms of continuous negotiation-including the negotiation of identities-as figuring centrally in the dynamics of contention.'¹⁹¹

As such, networks are paramount in exploring mobilization and its dynamics. That is, for organizational structures promote the circulation of essential resources for aggregated individual (utility calculation and resulting) action (information, expertise, material resources), and serve as the transmitters of broader systems of meaning, thereby contributing both to the creation of preconditions for mobilization and the provision of the proper settings for the elaboration of specific world-views and life-styles.¹⁹²

In other words, throughout the range of contentious political processes, like electoral revolutions, one can find the underlying concept of networks as social ties-defined as the individuals, connections and relations between them-to be ubiquitous, ranging from formal and informal organizations, mechanisms of mobilization and relational interactions. It is noteworthy that all mobilization theories and revolution studies from Tilly to McAdam to Gurr to Skocpol to Lichbach to Lohmann contain relational aspects. As channels through which individuals and groups are linked, and along which practices flow in organizations and social movements (part of diffusion), networks can be critical, both in structural and individual rational processes through which this transmission occurs.¹⁹³ Put differently, networks can elucidate the global

¹⁹⁰ Diani, 1992, 13.

¹⁹¹ Ibid, 21.

¹⁹² For example, 'culture and community settings matter ...in encouraging system-critical framings as prerequisites for collective action. This hinges on the strength of communities and of the social networks within them.' In McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly in Lichbach and Zucherman, p. 156. Also see Diani, 1992, 8.

¹⁹³ Strang, D. and Soule, S. A., 1998, Diffusion in Organizations and Social Movements: From Hybrid Corn to Poison Pills. *Annual Review of Sociology* 24:265-90, 265.

effects of bottom-up processes of local interactions, for, ‘without examining the sum of the microfoundations of emergent properties, path-dependent, self-organizing process can erroneously be attributed to institutions that are globally coordinated (e.g. formal organizations, etc.)’.¹⁹⁴ It is this broader concept of networks that forms the unit of analysis in this examination of contentious collective action, to which the study now turns.

From social movements’ collectivities and rational individuals to social ties and networks

Social ties are crucial for collective action, and social movements can be viewed as networks linking a multiplicity of individual actors. According to Diani and McAdam, “Social movements resemble strings of more or less connected events, scattered across time and space [...] they consist of groups and organizations, with various levels of formalization, linked in patterns of interaction which run from the fairly centralized to the totally decentralized, from the cooperative to the explicitly hostile. Persons promoting and/or supporting their actions do so not as atomized individuals, possibly with similar values or social traits, but as actors *linked to each other* [emphasis added] through complex webs of exchanges... Social movements are in other words, complex and highly heterogeneous network structures.”¹⁹⁵

While this concept is not new *per se*, recently there exists ‘interest in the relationship between social movements as networks linking a multiplicity of actors...’¹⁹⁶ This interest is augmented by the explosion of studies in complexity that ‘allows a more penetrating and systematic look at the roles and function of complex interactions, hitherto impossible to account for, or compute. As a result, social network analysis has moved ‘from metaphor to substance.’¹⁹⁷ Beginning with Granovetter, his work critiques

¹⁹⁴ Here, I am borrowing and paraphrasing from Macy and Willer, who make this very point but for Agent-Based Modelling’s contribution to the study of emergent structures and social order. Macy and Willer, 148.

¹⁹⁵ Diani, M. Introduction: Social Movements, Contentious Actions and Social Networks: ‘From Metaphor to Substance?’ in Diani, M. and McAdam, D. (eds.) *Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, 1.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

the Olsonian mechanistic economic logic to collective action that offers an individualistic 'utilitarian, undersocialized conception of human action', calling for 'more emphasis on personal relations and structures [or networks]...' ¹⁹⁸ Indeed, contrary to Olson's assumptions, "interdependence and coordination [as well as their iterative nature] can change individual decisions even without private incentives, ¹⁹⁹ and that many collective goods can, in fact, be provided by a small number of individuals making large contributions through an appropriate technology." ²⁰⁰ Hence, Granovetter (1973, 1978) focuses instead on the 'strength of weak ties' and the role of iterative interactions and social ties--low-density network of acquaintances versus high-density friendships towards accessing information and market opportunities; that is, he shifts attention to networks and their properties. ²⁰¹ Transplanting this line of argument to political organization, political sociology studies have moved to investigate a variety of topics from a relational perspective, including the process of individual recruitment (Opp 1989; McAdam and Fernandez 1990; Tindall, 2000), the structural organization of networks (Oliver and Marwell 1988, 2001), formal modeling by Oliver, 1993; Heckathorn 1996), coalition-building (Diani 1990), organizations and protest (Osa 2001, 2003) and the influences of network 'multiplexity' and dynamics on mobilization (Gould 1991, 1993; Mische and White 1998). The latest generation of scholarship has made steps beyond a simply descriptive relationship 'between the social networks of some kind and the development of collective action', implying-and often explicitly posing-a more general set of questions: 'How do networks matter?' And 'what types of networks do affect and what type of participation?' ²⁰²

¹⁹⁸ Granovetter, M. 1985. Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness. *American Journal of Sociology* 91, 3: 481-510, 490, quoted in Kinsella, D. 2004. Mapping the Small Arms Trade: Insights from Social Network Analysis. Paper delivered at the ISA annual convention, 7.

¹⁹⁹ Naturally, if an opposition group successfully involves in early, risky activity against an authoritarian regime (which as we will see later in this study is more probably when it has strong ties), so as to demonstrate a reduced cost of declaring a dissident preference and participating in dissident activities, is offering positive selective incentives that can alleviate collective action dilemmas.

²⁰⁰ Oliver, 1993, 274.

²⁰¹ Even Olson's argument on the size of groups (the larger the group, the less probable the collective action, since smaller groups can better generate norms and mechanisms of participation) is really one about network properties, and thus, best addressed relationally. In Crossley, N. 2007. Social Networks and Extraparliamentary Politics. *Sociology Compass* 1, 1: 222-236, 231.

²⁰² Ibid. 2-3.

Overall, this renewed interest in network concepts and social movements is summarized by Diani (2003) in three clusters of different intellectual contexts and levels of analysis:

- (i) A renewed interest in the 'meso-level' of social analysis and the relation between structure and agency.
- (ii) The resurgence of interest in 'social mechanisms'. They can account for many political processes, 'most of which have had been overlooked so far by mainstream social movement research, such as democratization (Tilly 2001, McAdam et al. 2001).'
- (iii) The consolidation of social network analysis as a distinct field in social science.²⁰³

A broader comprehension of networks includes not only individuals and organizations, but also relations between collectivities. The majority of recent focus falls on the question how individual behaviour is affected by participation in networks. 'Social movements exist inasmuch as individuals can be convinced to become personally involved in collective action and be offered the opportunities to do so on a sustained basis. Social movement participants are linked by social ties that are both private (personal friends, relatives, colleagues, etc.) and public (membership in organizations, political parties, etc.) before collective action develops.'²⁰⁴ Indirect ties also matter. They include joint involvement in events without face-to-face interaction (e.g. part of the same 'culture', ideology, and, more recently, media-both mass and electronic).

The importance of social ties is evident in their role in activating mechanisms-diffusion and the related cascading thresholds-which in turn affect the chances and forms of mobilization. Networks are 'essential to both the diffusion of insurgency across geographic space and in the recruiting and mobilizing of individual

²⁰³ Diani, 2003, 4.

²⁰⁴ Ibid, 5-9

participants.²⁰⁵ They 'may provide opportunities for action through the circulation of information about on-going activities, existing organizations, people to contact, and a reduction of the practical costs attached to participation.' They may also be the source of reciprocal social pressure on prospective participants-conditionals to induce them to take part in action.²⁰⁶ For instance, networks, in general, and position in them, in particular are both important for individuals to communicate their participation thresholds.²⁰⁷ Examples include the work by Passy (2003), who distinguishes between (i) socialization functions of social networks-their ability to create an initial disposition to participate-(ii) structural-connection functions-their capacity to generate practical opportunities for involvement, and (iii) decision-shaping functions-their power to affect the ultimate decision to take part or not in action. Another interesting socio-historical work by Anheir (2003) explores the role of individual in promoting collective action and organizational growth, by examining the role of single members of the Nazi party in German towns in the interwar period. Individuals matter greatly in recruiting and connecting individuals to a cause.

Besides individuals, organizations form the other major link in social movement networks. Direct ties between organizations include the exchange of information and pooling of mobilization resources. Scholars have looked at linkages between organizations and their effects (McAdam 1982; Bearman and Everet 1993).²⁰⁸ For example, Oliver and Myers (2000, 2003) explore diffusion ('transmission of some innovation between people') mechanisms, focusing on: (i) the flow of information, (ii) the flow of influence, and the (iii) construction of joint action.²⁰⁹ This is the sum of processes that occur through network ties (network effects).

Squeezed between the individual and the collection of collectives, the final level in which networks matter is their own structure and properties. Individual networks can contribute to organizational formation, and their study also allows the examination

²⁰⁵ Dixon, M. and Roscigno, V. J., 2003, Status, Networks, and Social Movement Participation: The Case of Striking Workers. *American Journal of Sociology* 108, 6 (May 2003): 1292-1327, 1321.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ Chwe, M. S. 1999. Structure and Strategy in Collective Action. *American Journal of Sociology* 105: 128-56, 56.

²⁰⁸ Diani, 2003, 9-10. McAdam focuses on black churches and colleges' role towards mobilization for civil rights.

²⁰⁹ Ibid, 174.

of how members interact; this approach can provide insight into the organization's participatory rather than professional nature.²¹⁰ This approach focuses on network structure as an explanatory variable, based on earlier network theory; it states that differently structured networks will have different properties; hence, different types of networks will facilitate collective action differently (Laumann and Pappi 1976;²¹¹ Gould 1991;²¹² Osa 2003). Specifically, Gould's (1993) conclusion is that 'properties of networks should vary widely in their effects on collective action outcomes depending on the structural positions of those who volunteer. In addition, regardless of volunteer location, network density and size are predicted to exhibit strikingly non-linear relations with contributions to collective goods.'²¹³ Pivotal in this approach is the study of '...the mechanisms by which individual agency [...] is rooted through norms, efficacy concerns and social structures to produce macro-outcomes that neither the actors themselves nor the social scientists who study them are likely to predict.'²¹⁴ The above touches on the non-linearity and complexity of the phenomenon of mass mobilization, but works in Gould's line of inquiry still form the exception rather than the norm.

In reviewing relevant scholarship in Sociology, Osa's work on intra- and inter-organizational networks in authoritarian settings (1997, 2000, 2003, 2007, 2008) also deserves mention, for its thematic relevance to this study. Osa (2003) focuses on Communist Poland between the 1960s and 1980s, to explore how the connections between informal networks in civil society acted as alternative sources of resources under conditions of repression. They not only operated as micro-mobilization contexts, but also provided the basic infrastructure for civil society. Her work poses the critical question, 'what networks are likely to facilitate and sustain movement emergence under conditions of constrain?' Her broad thesis is that 'in Leninist regimes [...] networks must substitute both for organizations and media. [...] They provide channels

²¹⁰ Ibid, 9.

²¹¹ Laumann, E. O. and Pappi, F. (1976) *Networks of Collective Action*. New York, NY: Academic Press.

²¹² Gould, R. V. (1991) Multiple Networks and Mobilization in the Paris Commune, 1871. *American Sociological Review* 56, 716:29.

²¹³ Gould, R. V. Collective Action and Network Structure (1993). *American Sociological Review* 58, 182-96, 195.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

through which uncensored information circulates. [...] They also use social contacts for raising money, locating and sharing the material resources necessary for mobilization. [...] As networks expand, the risks of illicit association become shared and the individual risk incurred in oppositional activities is reduced. [...] As they expand and take on a more oppositional identity, they begin to substitute for public sphere.²¹⁵ Osa touches on the question of network properties and their effect, but the prowess of her conclusions is diminished by the methodological approach and related tools at her disposal: “Network 4 exhibited several advantages over the 1960s networks: First, its center was a triad [...] this is a *more stable* [emphasis added] structure than if a single, dominant organization served as broker to the network. Second, the domain was organized in such a way as to make rapid growth likely.” This is an important finding, but while Osa calculates some network metrics (mean degree centrality, and network centralization), she neither fully answers the questions posed in a more systematic way, nor pushes her insights into formal, generalize-able conclusions. For example, what does ‘more stable’ mean? She states that “a much more complex picture [...] not center-periphery, but broader network with multiple loci” emerges; yet, she does not venture beyond this descriptive, informal stage.²¹⁶ That means that her approach is missing both a formal consideration of internal dynamic aspects of their properties (how their topology helps them evolve), as well as an analysis of and comparison of the dynamics between rival organizations. Moreover, she examines largely the interconnections between groups, not individuals. Overall, this is a Sociometric study—a precursor to the more rigorous and systematic network analysis.²¹⁷ Her more recent work (2007) ponders the idea that “...differing institutional bases of governance in democratic and non-democratic states create different constraints and opportunities

²¹⁵ Osa, M. Networks in Opposition: Linking Organizations Through Activists in the Polish People’s Republic. In Diani, 2003, 78. Also, see Osa, M. *Solidarity and Contention: Networks of Polish Opposition*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press-Social Movements, Protest, and Contention Series, 2003.

²¹⁶ Ibid, 93-98.

²¹⁷ For example, ‘Sociometry examines different measures of node centrality to quantify the social importance of a given individual in a network.’ In Boccaletti et al., 2006, 251.

for mobilization.”²¹⁸ According to this view, social networks in non-democracies are critical in providing opportunities for mobilization and not just in facilitating protest recruitment or diffusing strategies and repertoires of contention. Social networks in this context are utilized more heavily for critical mobilization functions: communication, resource generation and coalition formation.”²¹⁹ Again, while this is an important claim, it remains theoretical and does proceed with delving into formal properties of networks, or, at least offering a comprehensive model. As a result, ‘it is still unclear how social ties and the organizational embeddedness of protest participants differ across mobilizations and the ways that these differences may contribute to movement outcomes’.²²⁰

Overall, as far as research in Political and Organizational Sociology is concerned, according to Diani and McAdam, ‘it is much rarer that the overall configuration of networks linking individual activists is assessed in order to evaluate the potential for collective action in a given collectivity.’²²¹ That is so, for has often been hard or unfeasible to collect detailed or sufficient data about a population of individual activists. One solution to this has been to simulate data (Oliver and Marwell 2001); another, to be followed by this study, would be to collect information pertinent to investigating mobilization networks and to deduce their properties, by making use of advances in networks’ theories that have uncovered specific patterns governing contagion processes in specific networks.

To conclude, individuals and ties between them are critical in diffusion and mass mobilization. The goal of this work is to identify and explore the robust mechanisms within episodes of collective action against competitive authoritarian regimes, like the color revolutions, which, according to Tilly (2001) can both, explain

²¹⁸ “A Long, Hard Slog: Political Opportunities, Social Networks, and the Mobilization of Dissent in Non-Democracies” (with Kurt Schock). In Patrick G. Coy (ed). *Research on Social Movements, Conflict, and Change*. [27: 123-154 (May 2007). Oxford: Elsevier, 2007], 140. Also, Corduneanu-Huci, C. and Osa, M. “Running Uphill: Political Opportunity in Non-Democracies,” With a new Methodological Addendum, New Frontiers in Sasaki, M. (ed.) *Comparative Sociology*. Brill Academic Publ., 2008.

²¹⁹ Osa and Schock, 2007, 139.

²²⁰ Fisher, D. R. 2008. On Social Networks and Social Protest: Understanding the Organizational Embeddedness of Large-Scale Protest Events. (ISERP Working Paper 08-01. New York, NY: Columbia University Institute for Social and Economic Research and Policy), 3.

²²¹ Diani, 2003, 8.

salient features of such cases (or significant differences among them), and search for recurrent concatenations, towards uncovering causal explanations. In addition, a more formal study of the mechanism of diffusion-as a combination of simple and complex contagion and cascading effects-can help towards a more comprehensive understanding of the complexity of revolutionary processes in general, accounting for both structure and agency, as well as for contingency--the effects upon effect that such mechanisms have during temporally condensed episodes of political contention. Towards these goals, the next step consists of turning to the theoretical concept, empirical breadth and mathematical properties of networks, so that the proper foundations and hypotheses for the present study can be established.

Summary

This chapter reviewed a number of literatures, beginning with Transitology and the fourth wave of democratization. Specifically, it looked at the color revolutions, including their features and related debates (e.g. on their 'real causes'). Most scholars tend to favor either agency or structure (with Beissinger 2009; Bunce and Wolchik 2009 being the exceptions) and this debate highlights the need to shift from episodes to often neglected-processes—that could bridge this 'great divide', especially when it comes to the study of (electoral) revolutions—itsself both a process and an emergent phenomenon (Goldstone 2001). A subsequent literature review focused on the theoretical underpinnings of social movements and social mobilization, where a number of theorists have begun looking at social movements as complex network structures. The review examined both collective and individual levels of analysis (including works by Tilly, Tarrow, McAdam, Lichbach, Kuran, etc.), especially with respect to their solutions to Olson's collective action dilemma of individual participation in collective processes. These approaches are pertinent to the study of contentious collective action towards electoral revolutions, not only for democratic oppositions-their organization, foreign links, innovation tactics and general mobilization (McFaul 2005, 2006; Beissinger 2007; Bunce and Wolchick 2009)-but also (directly or indirectly) for competitive authoritarian regimes-and their cabal of associates, bureaucrats, army, suppress collective dissent, fend off foreign intervention (Lichbach 1995; Way 2006, 2008, 2009; Levitsky and Way 2010).

More generally, a number of these mobilization facets depend on the mechanism of *composite diffusion*, which was defined as 'the spread over time, across space, between people and through populations of resources, knowledge, opinions and behavior-a spread which includes simple and complex contagion and cascading effects.' This is an important mechanism with respect to the process of mobilization towards electoral revolution, because of its effects on (a) organizing and visibly manifesting dissent (lowering protest cost thresholds that can activate more protest participation by demonstration), (b) monitoring regime (vis a vis electoral fraud), (c) transmitting

signals-including an 'electoral model' (e.g. Kuran 1991; Hardin 1995; Fearon 2004; Bunce and Wolchik 2009), and (d) mobilizing numbers (facilitating cascading, or, bandwagoning effects). These are affected by temporal and spatial parameters which are important for inducing 'tidal', threshold effects (Beissinger 2002; Watts 2002), and for non-violent protest to work (Stepan and Chenoweth 2008), as well as for facilitating a more widespread mobilization, and for forcing the dispersing-and inevitable thinning-of lines of deployable security forces (Francisco 2010). Hence, rate and spread determine the pattern produced by diffusion (Rogers 1995), while different patterns affect flows differently. In essence, these 'patterns' are network configurations, and invite the study of electoral mass mobilizations from a networks topology and related behavior approach.

The critical role of networks (people and ties between them) in diffusion processes is not new *per se* (McAdam 1996; Diani 2003), but new advances in the study of complex networks and the laws and patterns that govern them can better elucidate mechanisms of the cumulative effects of individual interactions within political episodes, like ordinary electoral mobilizations (e.g. 'turnout cascades in US elections', Fowler 2005). In turn, a networks framework could "explain salient features of episodes (or significant differences among them), [...] search for recurrent concatenations" (Tilly 2001), and, thereby contribute towards arriving at more comprehensive causal explanations of the complex social phenomenon of contentious mass mobilizations.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY: NETWORKS AS TOOLS AND UNITS OF ANALYSIS, HYPOTHESES, CASES AND RESEARCH DESIGN

This chapter develops a networks approach to the study of complex systems and dynamic processes, including social ones-like mass mobilizations. Political scientists' interest in networks has been fairly recent, but, attention is also beginning to turn to dynamic effects of networks on complex social processes. Network structure and topology affect a network's performance, so their identification and measurement is essential; the concept and metrics of networks are introduced, and subsequently linked to collective action outcomes. Their operationalization and contextualization to the study of electoral mass protests also informs the hypotheses proposed by this thesis. Then, the chapter proceeds with a presentation of, and justification for the empirical cases selected, as well as with a discussion of the pluralist methodological regime devised to collect relevant network data from a variety of complementary sources. Particular attention is paid to Respondent-Driven Sampling techniques, which are employed to collect a sizeable part of the data, as well as to the method of their translation into code for network analysis.

NETWORKS

A common denominator of complexity, dynamic systems and mass mobilization

The previous chapter established the importance of social ties for collective action, and proposed that social movements can be viewed as networks linking a multiplicity of interacting individual actors and their experiences. The section below complements this discussion by emphasizing the complex nature of such collective action-one that also necessitates the use of networks to study it.

Human experience is marked by its embeddedness in physical and social environments that are complex. Complexity is defined by the large (and increasing) number of *linked* [emphasis added] actors and their relationships, especially as they adapt/ react/evolve to the patterns they create, their emergent properties, non-

linearity and ‘threshold behavior.’²²² A fundamental aspect of complex adaptive systems is that localized interactions can create local events (individual incidents on a local scale) and small perturbations, which can, nonetheless have global dynamic effects. Manifestations of this complexity throughout nature abound. One example is illustrated by a Statistical Physics study on self-organized criticality on the spread of wildfires, in which Pueyo (2006) provides a model that shows how localized conditions in particular configurations and their fluctuations (noise) can push a system into an added burning state that emerges and expands rapidly.²²³ Others can be found in Mathematical Biology research on the transition of ecosystems, where works by Brock, Carpenter and Scheffer (2008), Chisholm and Filotas (2009), Chisholm and Pacala (2011) study of the variance of a complex ecosystem’s components and their configuration in search for clues of its rapid transition based on increased ‘local noise’.²²⁴ Further examples of the dynamic effects of the interplay between topology and local properties²²⁵, is offered by evidence that a number of brain diseases are the result of ‘an abnormal and, some times, abrupt synchronization of a large number of neural populations, so that the investigation on the network mechanisms involved in the generation, maintenance and propagation of the epileptic disorders is an issue nowadays at the forefront of neuroscience’.²²⁶

The above examples illustrate the dynamic nature of complex systems, not just in their intra-communication and rapid transfer of signals through them, but, as we will also see later in this section, also in their growth-the change of ties between actors in a network over time as a function of its structure and new links actors form.²²⁷ More abstractly, a changing network can be interpreted as a Markov (chain) process. That is,

²²² McGrath, Krackhardt, Blythe, 2003; Boccaletti et al, 2006; Homer-Dixon, 2010.

²²³ Pueyo, S. 2007. Self-Organised Criticality and the Response of Wildland Fires to Climate Change. *Climatic Change* 82, 1-2.

²²⁴ It would be intriguing to explore if approaches like these could also offer insights in the mechanism and causes of sudden shifts in dynamic social systems, where local conditions cause large-scale events (see concluding chapter).

²²⁵ Author’s notes, Santa Fe Institute lectures on complexity, summer 2007.

²²⁶ Synchronization phenomena are very relevant also in Sociology to gather a better understanding of the mechanisms underlying the formation of social collective behaviors, as the sudden emergence of new habits, fashions or leading opinions.” Boccaletti et al., 179.

²²⁷ Snijders, T.A.B., van de Bunt, G. G., and Steglich, C.E.G. 2010. Introduction to Stochastic Actor-based Models for Network Dynamics. *Social Networks* (32, 44–60), 46.

for any point in time, the existing state of the network determines probabilistically its further evolution.²²⁸ This stochastic evolution depends on its topology and can easily upset its equilibrium at any state. In a sense, this dimension of networks-and related properties- allows for a snapshot of 'contingency'.²²⁹

The popular contestation of a competitive authoritarian regime's electoral (or other) misconduct by extra-legal means, that threatens to push a polity to the brink, is itself a case of a complex social system: an unstable equilibrium, that displays both predictability (in the electoral procedures, existing rules and set laws), and unpredictability (in the effects of a wide range of aggregate individual behaviors occurring with varying probabilities during civil protest, and, even, of the potential responses to it)-what Beissinger, Snijders and others call 'contingency'. The interconnectedness, interaction and volume, and volatility of links between individual actors are important factors in the (often geometric) progression to this critical societal state. To understand the dynamics of such complex systems, it is 'integral' to understand networks, their structures and their interactions (Webb and Bodin 2008). Indeed, complex systems themselves 'can be viewed as complex networks of physical or abstract interactions', a premise that allows for mathematical and numerical analysis²³⁰ of their static and dynamic properties. Hence, a network framework could be extremely helpful in contributing to the understanding also the dynamics of contentious events and related diffusion mechanisms, as well as bridging the structure-agency-contingency divide, as discussed in the previous chapter. But, before networks and their properties can be properly applied to the complex collective behavior system that is mobilization against an authoritarian regime, a short introduction and explanation of such network properties, as well as a discussion of their relevance is necessary.

²²⁸ T.A.B. Snijders, The Statistical Evaluation of Social Network Dynamics. In Sobel, M. and Becker, M. (eds.) 2001. *Sociological Methodology*. London: Blackwell.

²²⁹ This is another reason why a networks framework is important, especially because what 'scholarship exists on collective action is either on games or equilibrium studies'. In Hassanpour, N. 2010. Dynamic Models of Mobilization in Political Networks. *Proceedings of 2010 Political Networks Conference*, Duke University.

²³⁰ Dodds, P. S. 2010. Overview of Complex Networks. Presentation at the Santa Fe Institute, NM, (June 8-9), lecture 1, 13.

To begin with, structures are an important property of complex networks. For example, “tightly connected groups of nodes in a social network represent individuals belonging to social communities [...] consequently, finding the communities within a network is a powerful tool for understanding the functioning of the network, as well as for identifying a hierarchy of connections within a complex architecture.”²³¹ According to Norberg and Cumming (2008), ‘localized interactions are the basis of the general concept of networks. Unless all nodes interact equally with all other nodes, some degree of localization takes place.’ The degree and quality of this localization is captured by the topology of a network, i.e. the configuration and related strength and dynamics of the links that connect the nodes.²³² Finally, the behavior of different nodes (how to reach other nodes through the network) also fundamentally determines system performance. This ‘adaptive and dynamical wiring [is] a peculiarity of those networks that are themselves dynamical entities. As mentioned earlier, this means that network topology is very important; it is not fixed, or grown, once forever. Instead it is allowed to evolve and adapt over time, driven by some external action, or by the action of the internal elements [the nodes/actors of the network, themselves], or following specific predetermined evolving rules [like with cellular automata].’²³³ The first two account for both exogenous and endogenous factors affecting social network behavior. Hence, to understand networks, one can focus on their topology which affects its emergent properties, dynamics of network assembly and the effects of their configuration on some measure of performance of the network.²³⁴ Towards this, network metrics are an essential component. What follows is a brief introduction to the concept of networks, its metrics and insights from recent research on network topology and its role in static and dynamic processes like its robustness or the flow of information through it.

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² Crossley, N. 2007. Social Networks and Extraparliamentary Politics. *Sociology Compass* (1, 1: 222-236), 229.

²³³ Dodds, 2010.

²³⁴ Norberg, J. and Cumming, G. S. (eds.) 2008. *Complexity Theory for a Sustainable Future*. New York: Columbia University Press, 5.

Networks as a conceptual and analytical framework

The study of connecting points and lines, known in Mathematics as Graph Theory, began with Euler (and his famous solution in 1735 to the problem of the seven bridges of Königsberg), and received its first systematic investigation by König in the 1930's;²³⁵ it has expanded ever since as an important part of Combinatorics.²³⁶ Networks are graphs, formally defined as “a set of items, [...] vertices or [...] nodes, with connections between them called edges”²³⁷ or, as ‘any set or sets of ties between any set or sets of nodes’ (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2010-with a focus both on connections and those connected by them).²³⁸ A network can be represented by a graph G , consisting of a nonempty set of elements (vertices, V) and a list of unordered pairs of these elements (edges, E) (Wilson and Watkins 1990).




Figure 3: Elementary Network Components

Moreover, a graph G can be represented by an adjacency (or, connectivity) matrix A , a $N \times N$ square matrix that fully describes the links of each of its nodes with all other nodes of the graph.²³⁹ The same holds for networks. In general, networks are

²³⁵ Gardner, M. 1984, *The Sixth Book of Mathematical Games from Scientific American*. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press) 91, in Wolfram Mathematica, at <http://mathworld.wolfram.com/>

²³⁶ From Biggs, N. L.; Lloyd, E. K.; and Wilson, R. J., 1976, *Graph Theory 1736-1936*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

²³⁷ Newman, M. E. J., 2003, The Structure and Function of Complex Networks. SIAM (Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics) Review 45, 167-256, (arXiv:cond-mat/0303516v1 [cond-mat.stat-mech]), 2.

²³⁸ For a much more abstruse, yet edifying definition, one turns to Umberto Eco: ‘...The best image of a net is provided by the vegetable metaphor of the rhizome suggested by Deleuze and Guattari (1976) [...] a rhizome is not a calque but an open chart which can be connected with something else in all of its dimensions; it is dismountable, reversible and susceptible to continual modifications [...] the rhizome is multi-dimensionally complicated [...] its structure changes through the time; moreover, in a structure in which every node can be connected with every other node [...] As Rosenstiehl (1971, 1980) suggests, a labyrinth of this kind is a myopic algorithm [...] every local description of the net is a hypothesis, subject to falsification, about its further course.’ In Eco, U. 1984. *Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press), 82-83.

²³⁹ Boccalleti et al., 181.

about links, from a system of rivers, to power grids, to neural networks, to the body's circulatory system (physical networks), to flight traffic, to food webs, to the Internet, to biochemical networks (interaction networks), to clans, friendships and organizations (social networks).²⁴⁰ In the Social Sciences, human (social) networks essentially constitute social structures that indicate the connection of, relationships and flows between people, i.e. the way in which people organize in groups, communicate, interact and exchange information and coordinate for action.²⁴¹ Consequently, networks have been defined with a structural focus, as 'continuing series of transactions to which participants attach shared understandings, memories, forecasts, rights, and obligations.'²⁴² Yet, they can also be explained as 'a group of actors and the relationships or interactions that link them' (Kinsella 2004)-a definition granting attention to agency as well.

Recently, substantial emphasis has been placed on 'new' social network analysis, with the focus shifting from individual node properties to consideration of large-scale statistical ones of the entire graphs themselves.²⁴³ A social network analyst might have asked, "Which single vertex in this network would prove most crucial to the network's connectivity if it were removed?" Nowadays, 'one could reasonably ask a question like, "What percentage of vertices need to be removed to substantially affect network connectivity in some given way?"'²⁴⁴ In other words, the 'difference between network analysis and standard ways of analyzing behavioral processes is the development and use of concepts and indicators that identify associations among units rather than solely focusing on the attributes of the units.'²⁴⁵ This is made possible by the existence of larger data and the ability to access and analyze them more fastidiously and expeditiously than before. As a result, theories can be derived and

²⁴⁰ Vega-Redondo, F., 2007, *Complex Social Networks*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2-5. Also, Dodds, P. S. 2010. Overview of Complex Networks. The Santa Fe Institute. Available at <http://www.uvm.edu/~pdodds/>

²⁴¹ Hill, R., Dunbar, R., 2002. Social Network Size in Humans. *Human Nature*. 14, 1, 53-72; Boccaletti et al., 2006, 190.

²⁴² Tilly, 1998, 456.

²⁴³ Newman, 2003, 2

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ Wasserman and Faust 1994, 4; also in Hafner-Burton, E. M., Kahler, M. and Montgomery, A. H. 2009. Network Analysis for International Relations (*International Organization* 63, 5 59-92), 562.

informed with a much more measurable reality that yield generalized laws that all networks obey.²⁴⁶

As it has recently developed, the body of 'new' network theory has multiple aims. First, it tries to 'find statistical properties, such as path lengths and degree distributions, that characterize the structure and behaviour of network systems, and to suggest appropriate ways to measure these properties. Second, it creates models of networks that can help provide a better understanding of the meaning of these properties-how they came to be as they are, and how they interact with one another. Finally, it aspires to predict what the behaviour of networked systems will be on the basis of measured structural properties and the local rules governing individual vertices. How, for example will network structure affect [...] the dynamics of social or biological systems?'²⁴⁷

This last point highlights the relevance of recent focus on network studies for the issues explored in this thesis: Network theory offers "...a framework for analysis based on a set of assumptions and tools that can be applied to an assortment of behaviors. It is grounded in three principles: nodes and their behaviors are mutually dependent, not autonomous; ties between nodes are channels for the transmission of resources; and persistent patterns of association among nodes create structures that can define, enable, or restrict the behavior of nodes."²⁴⁸ Beyond this basic framework, network analysis allows for the 'calculation of structural properties, such as centrality of nodes, groups, or the entire network' (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2010); in turn, these properties can also offer clues about the dynamic behavior of that network, especially their robustness, efficiency and growth (evolution). That is because the evolution of a network depends on its topology and organizational structure within

²⁴⁶ Dodds, P. S. 2010. Overview of Complex Networks,1, 18.

²⁴⁷ The goals are taken from Newman, 2003,2.

²⁴⁸ Hafner-Burton E.-M., Montgomery, A. H. 2010. Centrality in Politics: How Networks Confer Power. (Political Networks Paper Archive, Southern Illinois University Carbondale), 9.

which it is embedded.²⁴⁹ Recently derived network metrics are useful in determining clustering levels, connectivity distributions, network resilience, community structure and navigation properties of complex networks that are pertinent to this study.

Network metrics

In a rudimentary way, one can distinguish between quantitative and qualitative metrics (measures) of networks. Quantitatively, the very basic characteristics of networks are the number of their vertices, or, nodes, (denoting the order, n , of the graph) and the number of their edges (M , its size).²⁵⁰ Vertices can be used to represent people, organizations, computer terminals, etc. while edges, some predefined relationship between connected elements, like friendship, alliance, etc. Edges may be weighted 'to reflect differences among interactions, such as quality, frequency or the level of intimacy. More generally, these properties are often thought of as corresponding to the strength of interactions.'²⁵¹ Another basic characteristic is the degree (or, connectivity) k_i of a node i is the number of edges incident with the node.

Variations in the position (connectedness), connectivity and density of vertices and edges amount for the qualitative properties of networks, associated with a series of metrics. Topologically, the degree distribution $P(k)$ of a graph G (defined as the 'probability that a node chosen uniformly at random has degree k , or, equivalently, as the fraction of nodes in the graph having degree k '²⁵² yields three types-exponential (random, displaying a *Poisson* distribution), potential (scale-free-displaying a power law distribution), or, a combination of the first two.

²⁴⁹ It is also important to note that 'average network measures remain stable over time, but bridges facilitating information diffusion are unstable.' In Kossinets, G. and Watts, D. J. 2006. Empirical Analysis of an Evolving Social Network. *Science* 311, (January 6), 88-90.

²⁵⁰ The following discussion of network properties relies on Watts, D. J., 1999, *Small Worlds: The Dynamics of Networks Between Order and Randomness*. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Newman, M. E. J., 2003, *The Structure and Function of Complex Networks*. SIAM (Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics) Review 45, 167-256; and Monge, P. R. and Contractor, N. S., 2003. *Theories of Communication Networks*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

²⁵¹ Webb, C. and Bodin, O. A Network Perspective on Modularity in Robust Systems. In Norberg, J. and Cumming, G. S. (eds.) *Complexity Theory for a Sustainable Future*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008, 88.

²⁵² Note that random networks exhibit a Poisson distribution, whereas scale-free ones a power-law tail with an exponent γ taking a value between 2 and 3. In Boccaletti et al., 2006, 177-8; also, in Rosas-Casals, M., Valverde, S. and Sole, R. V. 2006. Topological Vulnerability of the European Power Grid under Errors and Attacks. Santa Fe Institute occ. Paper 2006-11-041, 5.




Figure 4: Scale-Free and Random-Exponential Distributions

Networks are also characterized by the property of centrality, in (i) *degree* k the number of edges incident with a given vertex, v —in other words, the number of connections possessed by a node compared to other nodes, or, one’s number of ties in a network); (ii) *closeness* (how close a node is to other nodes); (iii) ‘*betweenness*’ (how many pathways—and, if the edges are weighted, how costly it is to-run through a specific node; and, (iv) *eigenvector centrality*—or, *keystone* in Ecology— (the node with the stronger effect in a network, usually based on number of connections and location).²⁵³ Connectivity-wise, the most basic property is the *characteristic path length* $L(G)$, the typical shortest distance, $d_{(i,j)}$ between every node and every other node, and, the distribution sequence $A_{j(v)}$ for the graph (the functional form of which indicates the rate at which information spreads through it). In terms of density, the *clustering coefficient* γ_v of Γ_v (the extent to which vertices adjacent to any other vertex v are adjacent to each other²⁵⁴—an indication of level of ‘cliqueness’) is an important metric.²⁵⁵ The above, together with modularity, Q , (ranging from -1 to 1, which measures the degree of correlation between the probability of having an edge joining two sites and the fact that

²⁵³ For example, Google’s Page Rank is a modification of this metric. See Bryan, K., and Leise, T. 2006. The \$25,000,000,000 Eigenvector. The Linear Algebra Behind Google. *SIAM (Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics) Review* 48, 3, 569-81.

²⁵⁴ Clustering (referred in the Sociology literature as Network Density) is also termed Network Transitivity, indicating the presence of a heightened number of triangles in a network. Newman, 2003,11.

²⁵⁵ Watts, 1999, 33.

the sites belong to the same community²⁵⁶) can provide information about flows in a network and the characteristics of its *efficiency* (how fast and how far a signal is spread) and *robustness*²⁵⁷ (i.e. ‘vulnerability to defragmentation, or, ability to withstand removal of nodes or edges without fragmenting into disconnected components’²⁵⁸).

The network as a unit of analysis

As demonstrated above, topological analysis of networks can now capture the static and dynamic features of a system, like the communication patterns and interactions of a multitude of linked individuals as well as their whole network itself. Recent studies have shown that all networks follow the same rules; at the same time, network effects contingent across types of networks.²⁵⁹ That means that, different types of networks can account for different types of network effects and some configurations will yield advantages, while others disadvantages.²⁶⁰ For example, with respect to human networks, they can (i) allow for efficient communication and information processing; (ii) they may possess the capacity to expand in an open-ended way, and be more adaptable; (iii) their adaptability level could also mean more resilience-when local disconnections occur, bypassing links form more easily²⁶¹; finally, (iv) their particular structure can allow the ‘promotion of rapid transfers of information [which] allows learning quickly about new events, opportunities and threats.’²⁶² On the other hand, their particular configurations (i) can sometimes impede the wider spread of information; or, (ii) they may lack focus and strategy that could come with centralized leadership; moreover, (iii) if they grow large, they might require more efforts to

²⁵⁶ Boccaletti et al., 2006, 281.

²⁵⁷ Another standard definition involves the ability of a system to continue to operate correctly across a wide range of operational conditions, and to fail gracefully outside that range. In Gribble, S. D. 2001. Robustness in Complex Systems. Proceedings, 8th Workshop on hot Topics in Operating Systems. Washington, DC: IEEE Computer Society. At the same time, confusingly, some works use the term ‘network efficiency’ to describe ‘robustness’ (see Boccaletti et al. 2006, 214). This study distinguishes between the two.

²⁵⁸ Watts, 1999, 94.

²⁵⁹ Huckfeldt, R. 2009. Interdependence, Density Dependence, and Networks in Politics. *American Politics Research* (37, 5: 921-950), 943.

²⁶⁰ This list is borrowed from Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, M. and Jones, C. 2008. Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks: Why al-Qaida May Be Less Threatening Than Many Think. *International Security* (33, 2, 7-44), 13-16.

²⁶¹ Watts, 2003, 285-6.

²⁶² Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones, 2008, 13-16.

coordinate and/or maintain a single purpose; (iv) in the end, particular configurations may also be susceptible to security vulnerabilities. If different types of networks and their properties yield different effects, it would then be beneficial to use them as a unit of analysis themselves. Explicitly or otherwise, such a line of research has emerged in the field of Political Science.

Network research in Political Science

Antecedents

Often in tandem with more abstract graph theory topics of pure Mathematics, networks have been known entities in the social sciences.²⁶³ Indeed, many sociologists [Moreno 1938; White 1970 and 1976; Barnes 1971; Granovetter 1973]²⁶⁴, and more recently Watts (1999, 2003, 2004) will attest that Social Network Analysis is not new *per se*; mathematicians, themselves have been formally exploring them since the 1950's [e.g. Rapoport 1953 and 1957; Erdos and Renyi 1959 and 1960]. Their works are characteristic of typical social network studies addressing 'issues of centrality (which individuals are best connected to others or have most influence) and connectivity (whether and how individuals are connected to one another through the network.'²⁶⁵ In particular, Rapoport's work (1957) introduced the idea of a link between network properties, like degree distribution, and the spread of information.

Yet, despite early works like Key (1949), and Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955), political scientists had until recently been tentative in their adoption of such methodological tools to their research. Notable exceptions can be found (mostly)²⁶⁶ in the sub-field of American Politics, studying voter behavior and coordination (Huckfeldt 1982; Cook

²⁶³ Newman, 2003, 2.

²⁶⁴ Ward, M. D., Stovel, K. and Sacks, A. 2011. Network Analysis and Political Science. (*Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.* 14:245-64), 246.

²⁶⁵ Newman, 2003, 2.

²⁶⁶ While not explicitly dealing with networks, their properties and methodologies, in the sub-field of International Relations, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) display a related conceptual focus on diffusion and cascade dynamics of international norms. Naturally, due to conceptual-if distant- affinity, Nye's and Keohane's 'Complex Interdependence' (1977) also comes to mind as one of the earliest ventures of International Relations theory into the concept of relational complexity (to be followed, twenty years later, by Jervis's explicit first address of complexity and interconnectedness in the international system). More recent network-related work in International Relations includes Lake and Wong (2008), Hafner-Burton et al (2008), Kahler [(ed.) 2009] and Maoz (2011).

1983; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; and also Olstrom 1999; Walker 2000; Cook and Hardin 2001; McClurg 2003; Fowler 2005).²⁶⁷ Overall, one notices a gradual emphasis on individual actors' bilateral exchanges of information, moving the study away from their intrinsic preferences to an iterated game-like longer pattern of their relation, adding a layer of complexity to the analysis. Indirect, yet pertinent efforts to discuss networks' effects include Tsebelis' original (for addressing spatiality)²⁶⁸ -but limited in scope- formal work on 'veto players' (2002), Jervis' daring first general address of complexity in world affairs and the systemic, network effects of interconnectedness (*System Effects*, 1997), as well as Axelrod's collection of essays on complex collective behavior towards the diffusion of norms (1997).²⁶⁹

More directly, yet in a parallel vein –since their conceptual approach ran somewhat contrary to the logic of network studies' subsequent focus²⁷⁰-Lustick along with his colleagues also studied network configurations, advancing an innovative, reductionist approach to explore the dynamic effects of iterated interactions and aggregate individual behavior.²⁷¹ Using Agent-Based Modeling²⁷² Lustick (2002, 2004), and Lustick and Miodownik (2006, 2009) simulate random counter-factual distributions of cellular automata agents (occupants of a cell on a matrix) and, based on a number of predetermined rules of behaviour, observe their interactions--how their influence on

²⁶⁷ Huckfeldt, R. and Sprague J., 1995. *Citizens, Politics, and Social Communication: Information and Influence in an Election Campaign*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

²⁶⁸ Even within the recent wave of advances in the study of networks, spatial networks and the study of geographical embeddedness of actors is novel and understudied (Boccaletti, 2006, 178). A notable exception is Francisco's *Collective Action Theory and Empirical Evidence* (2010).

²⁶⁹ To the list, one could tentatively add Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), who, despite a very theoretical discussion on the propagation of norms, do refer, in absolutely non-technical terms-to thresholds and norm 'cascading'.

²⁷⁰ Lustick et al generated random distributions of agents and ran simulations of their interactions hoping to arrive at spatial landscapes indicating various modes of interaction and connections between individual agents, with the aim of retracing their simulations results back to the original simulation parameters. In a sense, they were looking for network arrangements, and then trying to extrapolate these configurational properties-an ingenious, but ultimately impractical approach in its ability-ironically, given its thousands of simulated landscapes-to only produce limited results in terms of what one can theorize about the findings.

²⁷¹ Similar innovative research has been conducted by Cederman and the GROWlab in ETH Zurich.

²⁷² Agent-Based Modeling is a computer-assisted methodology that 'allows researchers to design and analyze and investigate formal models realized as artificial worlds inhabited by agents that interact with each other following prescribed simple rules.' Lustick, I. S. and Miodownik, D. 2009. Abstractions, Ensembles, and Virtualizations: The Titration of Complexity in Agent-Based Modeling. *Comparative Politics* 41, 2: 223-244, 223. For more on 'Generative Social Science', see Epstein, 2007.

neighbouring cells grew, or, waned over time.²⁷³ This work focuses mostly on ethnic mobilization and secession and part of it explored Kuran's revolutionary cascading concept through the role of martyrs in triggering social mobilization.²⁷⁴ Interestingly, their 2006 results found that the "size of networks for the more mobilized strata have a particularly powerful influence on propensities toward political cascades" and that, "at the population level, even under general conditions that are more conducive for tips [i.e. a greater 'radius' of agent influence] some configurations of initial conditions can prevent tips or even strong cascades (for reasons that still lie beneath the analytic horizon)."²⁷⁵ The importance of these results lay in showing (a) that effects of aggregate individual interaction were based on iterations during which agents' affinities varied (unlike Axelrod's 1997 assumption of a constant propensity to affiliate with others), (b) that network size mattered for engaged activists, and (c) that the nature of cascading was non-monotonic-illustrating mobilization does not simply increase beyond a given threshold (an improvement of Kuran's model). As for the 'analytic horizon' they stated was beyond them, it would only take a few more years to be reached (and would be explained by studies like Onnela et al. 2007, whose communication network simulations would show that network configuration-the volume and connectivity of strong and weak ties-can affect cascading).²⁷⁶

Recent Advances

Lustick's work stood on the cusp of the emergence of the 'new' science of networks in Political Science, serving as a link between early approaches and the new era ushered in by new tools, methods and their possibilities for expansive research.

²⁷³ A novel and intelligent stochastic diagnostic tool, it nonetheless, exhibited a few methodological problems, such as a uniform concept of time turns, limited dimensions and parameters of spatiality (variations of square grids), a myopic and autonomous agency, punctuated equilibria, (author's private correspondence with Ian Lustick, 2002-3) as well as necessary 'limits to the amount of complexity useful to include in their study.' (Lustick and Miodownik, 2009, 224)

²⁷⁴ Lustick, I.S., Miodownik, D. and Schilde, K.E. 2006. Beyond Martyrdom: The Crucial Role of Early Adapters and Early Majority Individuals in the Generation of Mass Political Cascades. Presented at the annual American Political Science Association meeting. Also, Lustick, I. S. and Miodownik, D. Everyone I Know Is Doing It: Tipping, Political Cascades, and Individual Zones of Knowledge. Presented at the annual American Political Science Association meeting.

²⁷⁵ Their results were based on 100 spatial configurations, 300 time interactions per landscape, repeated with varied ranges of agent influence. Ibid.

²⁷⁶ See discussion and related diagram earlier in this chapter.

Within the past decade, complexity, the application of which-with the exception of economics²⁷⁷-was originally confined to the natural sciences, has also taken off in the field of Political Science. Recent advances, spearheaded by the seminal works of Strogatz and Watts (1998)²⁷⁸, Strogatz (2001, 2003)²⁷⁹, Watts (1999, 2003)²⁸⁰, Barabasi (2002, 2006)²⁸¹, Newman (2003, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2009)²⁸² and Centola (2007, 2009, 2010)²⁸³ have provided political scientists with a panoply of new tools, methods and resulting insights, and have triggered a surge in new and exciting works that begin to cross purposes-e.g. Fowler (2005, 2007, 2008, 2009), Nickerson (2007, 2008), McClurg (2004, 2010).²⁸⁴ These go beyond the 'traditional' network analyses to examine phenomena from a networks perspective, amass and disentangle large data to view the 'big picture', uncover common patterns of network behavior and arrive at often surprising, controversial results-e.g. the demonstration of social contagion effects in physical health, and even happiness (Christakis and Fowler 2007, 2009, 2010).²⁸⁵

The study of political networks, their specific properties and their mutual effects-especially in political behavior-is even more recent, beginning with Huckfeldt and

²⁷⁷ The Santa Fe Institute, NM, founded in 1984 to study the 'science of complexity' in a multidisciplinary fashion played a pivotal role.

²⁷⁸ Watts, D.J. and Strogatz, S.H. (1998). "Collective Dynamics of 'Small-World' Networks." *Nature* 393 (6684): 409–10.

²⁷⁹ Strogatz, S. (2003). *Sync: The Emerging Science of Spontaneous Order*. Hyperion; and Strogatz, S. (2001). *Nonlinear Dynamics and Chaos: With Applications to Physics, Biology, Chemistry, and Engineering*. New York: Perseus Books Group.

²⁸⁰ Watts, D. "Networks, Dynamics, and the Small-World Phenomenon." *American Journal of Sociology*, 1999, 105, 2, 493-527; Watts, D. (1999). *Six Degrees: The Science of a Connected Age*. Norton; Watts, D. (2003). *Small Worlds: The Dynamics of Networks Between Order and Randomness*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

²⁸¹ Barabasi, A.-L. (2002) *Linked: The New Science of Networks*. Cambridge, MA: Perseus.

²⁸² Watts, D., Newman, M. and Barabasi, A.-L. 2006. *The Structure and Dynamics of Networks*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

²⁸³ Centola, D. 2009. Failure in Complex Social Networks. *Journal of Mathematical Sociology* 33:64-68, and Centola, D. 2010. The Spread of Behaviour in an Online Social Network Experiment. *Science* 329:1194-1197.

²⁸⁴ McClurg, S. 2004. Indirect Mobilization: The Social Consequences of Party Contacts in an Election Campaign. *American Politics Research* 32,4; Nickerson, D. 2008. Is Voting Contagious? Evidence from Two Field Experiments. *American Political Science Review*. 102,1:49-57; Fowler, J. 2005. Dynamic Responsiveness in the U.S. Senate. *American Journal of Political Science* 49,2:299–312; Fowler, J. 2005. Second Order Free Rider Problem Solved? *Nature* 437; doi:10.1038/nature0420 (September 22); Christakis N. A. and Fowler, J. 2007. The Spread of Obesity in a Large Social Network Over 32 Years. *New England Journal of Medicine* 357,4: 370–379 (July 26); Christakis N. A. and Fowler, J. 2008. The Collective Dynamics of Smoking in a Large Social Network. *New England Journal of Medicine* 358,21:2249–58 (May 22); Fowler, J. and Schreiber D. 2008. Biology, Politics, and the Emerging Science of Human Nature. *Science* 322 (5903):912–914 (November 7); Christakis N. A. and Fowler, J. 2009. Social Network Visualization in Epidemiology. *Norwegian Journal of Epidemiology* 19, 1:5–16.

²⁸⁵ For a recent 'manifesto' of the role of Complex Systems, Networks and Social Science, see Lazer, D., Pentland, A., Adamic L., Aral S., Barabasi A.-L., Brewer D., Christakis N., Contractor N., Fowler J., Gutmann M., Jebara T., King G., Macy M., Roy D., and Van Alstyne M. 2009. Computational Social Science. *Science* 323 (5915), 721-723.

Sprague (1995), Rolfe (2005), Fowler (2005), Lake and Wong (2008), Kotsovilis (2008, 2009), Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones (2008), Hafner-Burton, Kahler and Montgomery (2009), Siegel (2009, 2011) and Hassanpour (2010). Fowler examines the spread of voting behavior in the US, but focuses on a single network type and its parameters (average network size, path length, clustering/density). Kotsovilis proposes a comprehensive approach that uses rigorous network theory research to explain contentious collective action outcomes, and specifically theorizes on the link between the role of network robustness and mobilization. While he significantly also introduces empirical data from youth mobilization groups in the Ukrainian 2004 election campaign, his 2008 analysis is limited to few parameters, his results preliminary and lacking a comparative perspective. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones's examination of illicit networks is much more theoretical, and, while it lays out their advantages and disadvantages with respect to empirical properties (e.g. communications, adaptability, resilience), it does not associate them to any operationalize-able network parameter. On the contrary, Hafner-Burton, Kahler and Montgomery provide tangible measures of network properties, and propose an ambitious agenda for future research. But their work only addresses simple, hypothetical scenarios from International Relations, and (echoing Tsebelis) aims to examine power distributions and their changes based on connectivity and spatiality.²⁸⁶ While they also focus on international affairs, in addressing the emergence of norms and power specifically in relation to network properties ('quantity and quality of connections') Lake and Wong, importantly, attempt to connect rigorous network analysis research and politics. Yet, while they do consider the flow of information through networks ('a political model of diffusion in networks') as a causal factor for the propagation of human rights norms, their explanation remains empirically descriptive, without applying the tools of network theory to rigorous data analysis. Siegel's work is a highly systematic attempt to present a unified framework for the thorough study of political phenomena through network analysis. More significantly, he does so in the subject of collective action, postulating, independently of Kotsovilis'

²⁸⁶ More recent work by Hafner-Burton and Montgomery (2010) advances this approach further.

similar thesis, that different types of networks affect participation outcomes, specifically examining a selection of stylized network architectures and models them to argue that social network structure affects collective action.²⁸⁷ His insight rests on the notion that certain network structure metrics-notably size, the prevalence of strong and weak ties, and the presence of elites in specific organizational configurations-affect collective action by way of how information and resources are spread. Siegel's work is the first formal application of network theories onto mass mobilization, but it depends heavily on models; he questions the feasibility of empirically measuring network properties, because deriving values for clustering and average path length require network data 'difficult to acquire, especially in risky situations, like mass protests') and offers instead only a formal model.²⁸⁸ Importantly, while Siegel quotes the caveat in Fowler's 2005 study on voting turnout, that "no one knows the true average path length for a typical political discussion network"), he does concede that it could be possible to identify the nonlinear impact of average path length, that is, how could this metric affect the possibility of cascading.²⁸⁹ In other words, it could be feasible to demonstrate the effect that structural attributes of a network have on its efficiency of transmitting a resource (e.g. information) across its grid. His formal model hypothesizes outcomes tested on a priori designed set of (three and then four) networks-the typology of which is representative of commonly observed social structures. Siegel's work an important step towards focusing on network architecture, but also has some drawbacks, in offering a non-detailed, abstract approach, which looks mostly at the endogeneity of the mobilizing structure, without factoring in external stimuli or, for example, the structure and effects of rival, counter-mobilizing networks. Finally, Hassanpour (2010) reviews the literature on tipping points and provides a decidedly sophisticated, ahistorical formal model of cascades as rolling equilibria based on the cumulative effect of continuous appraisals of individual thresholds. His examination of archetypical classes of network formations, like star- and ring-shaped, finds that full connectivity may not be the

²⁸⁷ Siegel, D. 2009. Social Networks and Collective Action. *American Journal of Political Science*, 53, 1.

²⁸⁸ Ibid, 130-131.

²⁸⁹ Fowler, J., 2005. Turnout in a Small World. In Zuckerman, A. (ed). *The Social Logic of Politics*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.

optimal configuration. However, contrary to his modeling assumption, in real cases updating need not be synchronous (or occur at all), while at the same time the global level of participation need not be invisible, especially in social networks. More general, as it is a theoretical model, he emphasizes the need for future work that would include, among others, more historical information and more general classes of networks that could be achieved by empirical studies and experiments.

Overall, between them, the above works focus on particular aspects of network theory and its potential application to politics, either through theoretical exploration of empirical cases, or analysis of actual data or formal models, seldom unifying them under a single framework and research agenda for extensive theorizing and rigorous testing of empirical data. According to Siegel (2009), ‘despite the commonality of social, political and economic networks’ empirical importance “we still know little about how the structure of these networks affects aggregate political outcomes.”²⁹⁰ This is a lacuna that the present study aims to address.

To recapitulate: how entities are connected-i.e. networks and their configurations-matters. Both the particular architecture of a network (e.g. clustering) and its dynamic behavior (robustness under varying conditions)-affects collective behavior-how the network’s contents are spread, conveyed and exchanged. Put in the context of aggregate political action, network properties affect a group’s, or, an organization’s efforts to diffuse resources, thus having a dramatic impact on its goal of mobilizing (or, counter-mobilizing) mass support. As a result, different network topologies produce different effects. For the purposes of this study, the network as a unit of analysis with specific metrics can be used to explore mechanisms like diffusion and processes like mobilization, specifically during contentious collective action. The following section explores what network-specific hypotheses can be posed, and how network metrics relate to them.

²⁹⁰ Siegel, 2009, 122.

HYPOTHESES

Metrics useful for the study of composite diffusion

How do network properties relate to diffusion patterns? Further, why does this matter for mobilization? The network performance of both youth opposition groups and the regime's coercive security apparatus as they confront each other is important for the outcome of this contestation. One endeavors to energize and mobilize a sizeable mass of citizens who can join in opposing the regime; the other strives to stifle opposition before it spreads. What is transmitted through them and by them (diffused, in the forms of simple and complex contagion) are resources (human recruits, activism-related material, funds, etc.) and signals, including behavior (e.g. activism, mode and severity of repression) and information (like participation and repression costs, repression orders). Transmission and growth, characterized by a network's efficiency and robustness, affect mobilization and counter-mobilization alike: if activist behavior and membership spread enough, a mobilizational cascade is more probable; if repressive orders are carried out without refusals (defections) the above spread can be contained before it evolves into a serious threat to the regime. Actors within these rival networks are represented by nodes and their social relationships, ties and interactions by the edges that link them. Nodes, edges and the whole network have properties through which they can be analyzed. Among them, the measures of degree distribution, path length, centrality, clustering and modularity are significant to determine a network's abovementioned functions.

Degree distribution is important for a network's robustness²⁹¹-i.e. its ability to avoid (i) malfunctioning when a fraction of its constituents is damaged, and (ii) cascading failures (an avalanche of breakdowns);²⁹² both impede the spread of signals, that is, they affect diffusion. This damage can be random (arbitrary deletion of a part of its nodes or edges), or, deliberate (a targeted 'attack' on specific nodes). In terms of

²⁹¹ Robustness can be distinguished between static (node removal) and dynamic (cascading failures and congestion) types, the former being able to be analytically treated, the second relying on numerical simulations. Yet, both are similar in spirit, In Boccaletti et al, 2006, 213.

²⁹² Newman, 2003, 167.

network class, simple hierarchies (where vertices divide into groups that further subdivide, and so on...over multiple scales)²⁹³ are characteristically fragile to this type of node and edge deletion (especially at the top-what could be termed ‘decapitation’). Random networks display similar responses to random and targeted failures. At the same time, scale-free networks are relatively robust to random failures, but sensitive to selective removals of nodes (especially well connected ones, or, ‘hubs’-which they display much more prominently than random networks), as well as to cascading failures.²⁹⁴ Results of a simulation by Centola (2009) indicate that when complex contagion is involved, scale-free networks perform worse than random ones (figure 5).




Figure 5: Robustness of Random-Exponential vs. Scale-Free Networks in Complex Diffusion
 S indicates size of cascades, whereas f the fraction of nodes removed.
 Table drawn from Centola, D. 2009. Failure in Complex Social Networks.
 Journal of Mathematical Sociology 33:64-68.

Based on the above, it is important to note three interrelated points: first, that removal of nodes affects the dynamic behavior of networks: changes balance of flows, leads to global redistribution of loads, all over the network, and could trigger a cascade of overload failures, the same way it could trigger a mobilizational cascade. Put more generally, positive or negative signals could cascade-and at a particular rate-through a particular network based on its configuration.²⁹⁵ Second, there is a certain trade-off

²⁹³ In Clauset, A., Moore, C. and Newman, M.E.J. 2008. Hierarchical Structure and the Prediction of Missing Links in Networks. *Nature* 453 (May 1).

²⁹⁴ Rosas-Casals et al., 2006, 9-13.

²⁹⁵ Matter, A. E. and Lai, Y.-C. 2002. Cascade-based Attacks on Complex Networks. *Physical Review E* 66, 065102.

between efficiency and robustness. Third, only simple or only complex contagions are more easily halted when nodes are removed.

Path length translates into the ability of some signal (including behavior) to spread through a network from enclaves to wider network, and depends on network structure. In terms of centrality measures, degree centrality identifies which actor is in contact with the most actors; closeness centrality, who is the most proximate to other actors; betweenness centrality, who is best situated to control flows of resources (like a valve)-a high value indicates weak ties; eigenvector centrality, who is close to peripheral actors (therefore being a hub among them) and to central actors (being a bridge). The clustering coefficient and density metrics are even more pertinent for deriving the properties of a network related to its efficiency for social reinforcement behavior as well as for cascading (and cascading failures). Clustering coefficient measures the degree to which an individual's local networks overlap.²⁹⁶ Recent research (Centola, Eguiluz and Macy 2007; Centola 2010) has shown that behavior spreads farther and faster across clustered-lattice networks, than across random networks.²⁹⁷ Higher clustering and higher local network density translates into stronger ties and repeated or reinforced emission (and reception) of signals (or, in network research, 'hits'). This has been shown to help with initial stages of diffusion (an initial, activated, dense core recruiting and 'activating'-or, again in the jargon of network research, 'flipping' hitherto uninitiated, or 'inactive' individuals-especially if they require more than one signals to convert to the cause).²⁹⁸ Hence, high density and clustering at the core of a network is a necessary condition for diffusion.²⁹⁹ At the same time, if a higher local density is an indication of a small, tight group of nodes, it could prevent signals from spreading outside it (Fowler

²⁹⁶ Siegel, 2009. 130.

²⁹⁷ In an online social network experiment, network topologies with high clustering were more effective for spreading behavior (behavior reached 54% vs. 38% for networks with lower clustering). In Centola, D. 2010. The Spread of Behaviour in an Online Social Network Experiment. *Science* 329:1194-1197. See also Centola, D. Eguiluz, V. M. and Macy, M. W. 2007. Cascade Dynamics of Complex Propagation. *Physica A* 374:449-456.

²⁹⁸ In Whitney, D. E. 2010. Dynamic Theory of Cascades on Finite Clustered Random Networks With a Threshold Rule. *Phys. Rev. E* (82, 066110. DOI:10.1103/PhysRevE.82.066110), 066110-7. Also, in Whitney, D. E. 2009. Cascades of Rumors and Information in Highly Connected Networks with Thresholds. Paper delivered at the Second International Symposium on Engineering Systems MIT, Cambridge, MA (June 15-17). Finally, also in Gleeson, J. P. 2008. Cascades on Correlated and Modular Random Networks. *Physical Review E* 77, 046117. DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevE.77.046117.

²⁹⁹ Hassanpour (2010) concurs, noting that 'diffusion of activism starts from small number of -whom he calls-radicals, then spreads through society.'

2005). This is confirmed by recent studies of the role of ties in a communications network (Onnela et al. 2007-figure 6), where it was shown that solely strong or solely weak ties could be less efficient in transmitting a signal further, with diffusion leveling out after a rapid start before it would pick up again.




Figure 6: Communications Network Study Results: Configuration can hamper Cascading
 In Onnela, J.-P., Saramäki, J., Hyvönen, J., Szabó, G., Lazer, D., Kaski, K., Kertész, J., and Barabási, A.-L. 2007. Structure and Tie Strengths in Mobile Communication Networks. *PNAS* 104, 18 (7332-7336).

From the above can be deduced that a more efficient network should exhibit domains of both strong and weak ties. The former are paramount for initial activation (or, 'early rise')³⁰⁰, when behavior is risky and costly³⁰¹, while the latter are important for spreading signals beyond the original circle (or, when the threshold for 'flipping' is low, or has later been lowered-often by the actions of the core of the group; these are the 'late risers'). Equally important, they typically correspond to complex (strong ties) and simple (weak ties) contagion, respectively, and are both important for composite diffusion mechanisms within and across populations.

Finally, other metrics of a network's topology useful for this study include a network's diameter (the largest distance between any pair of actors) and its modularity levels (a metric of detecting and characterizing community structure and membership- greater cohesion indicated by a positive value; in essence, a measure of the existence of sets of connected individuals that work together to achieve a function).³⁰²

³⁰⁰ Siegel, 2009, 130.

³⁰¹ Siegel calls them 'rabble-rousers.' Ibid, 132.

³⁰² Karrer, B., Levina, E. and Newman, M.E.J. 2008. Robustness of Community Structure in Networks. *Physical Review E* 77, 046119. Also, in Boccaletti et al., 2006, 190; and in Newman, 2006, 8577.

The following table illustrates processes and related measures. Between them, centrality and particularly clustering (behavior influence, social media) measures help capture a vast number of social interactions present in diffusion mechanisms.

	TRANSFER	SERIAL	PARALLEL
WALKS	Money exchange	Emotional Support	Behavior Influence
TRAILS	Book	Gossip	Social Media broadcast
PATHS	Mooch	Viral Infection	Internet Name Server
GEODESICS	Package Delivery	Mitotic Reproduction	(no process)

Centrality Measures
Clustering Measures

Table 1: Processes and Adequacy of Measures
Modified from Borgatti (2005) and Putzke (2008).³⁰³

Towards a workable hypothesis: *composite networks*

What type or combination of ties is optimal for a group or an organization to efficiently diffuse both simple information and complex behavior that are essential for their mobilization success? Strong (distinguished by high degree centrality, modularity and clustering coefficient values) or, weak (displaying high betweenness centrality, low modularity and clustering coefficient) ones? Since Granovetter's research, the 'strength of weak ties' has been pointed out, while more recent research has uncovered some 'weakness of strong ties' when it comes to the efficiency of diffusion. However, weak ties do not sustain initial costly activity-which is necessary for dissident opposition protest or movement to launch and begin recruiting (or, in the case of a coercive apparatus, for a violent repression to swiftly apply); strong ties do. For example, as

³⁰³ Modified from Putzke, J. 2008. Introduction to Social Network Analysis. (COIN Seminar, Dept. of Information Systems and Information Management, University of Cologne, 1- 91),76-79, and Borgatti, S.P. 2005. Centrality and Network Flow (Social Networks 27), 55-71.

described by McAdam (1986), a smaller, dense core was crucial during the first stages of organizing and launching peace marches during the Civil Rights Movement.³⁰⁴ The importance of an initial core has also been described in Political Science literature, both for the color revolutions (Bunce and Wolchik 2006; and Sundstrom 2005-mentioned earlier in this study) and for US electoral campaigns and voter turnout (Holbrook and McClurg 2005).³⁰⁵ Tantalizingly, it has also been shown to be the case also in neural networks.³⁰⁶ Typically, strong ties exist between friends who share similar traits, like demographics and ideology-what in network studies is called ‘homophily’ (a ‘birds of a feather fly together’ concept).³⁰⁷ They are also characterized by trust, which allows for inter-personal reliability and coordination that are necessary for ‘early riser’ activism, or violent repression.

In the case of the opposition, beyond the crucial early activism, simpler message spreading is also important for a protest’s growth. For that part of the mechanism, weaker ties help diffusion reach further, and faster. Consequently, in launching a protest an opposition group that consists of close, committed friends (strong ties) will be more successful than a loose conglomeration of acquaintances. However, to continue to grow beyond its starting point, it will need to break out of its tight circle of friends, to reach, educate a greater population and to recruit new affiliates. Here is where weaker ties ‘bridging’ or branching out beyond the initial clique are important. Hence, for composite diffusion that includes complex and simple contagions, a network topology characterized solely by strong or solely by weak ties can be problematic for launching or for expanding; the optimal topology should include both strong and weak ties.

³⁰⁴ Also noted by Siegel (2009).

³⁰⁵ For the effectiveness of partisan mobilization, see Holbrook, T. M. and McClurg, S. D. 2005. The Mobilization of Core Supporters: Campaigns, Turnout and Electoral Composition in United States Presidential Elections. *American Journal of Political Science* 49, 4 (October), 689-703.

³⁰⁶ This minimum size if initially activated, or, ‘flipped’ nodes is called a ‘quorum’, and the phenomenon, quorum percolation. Percolation can be distinguished between site (node) and bond (edge) and is also studied in Statistical Physics. In Cohen, O., Keselman, A., Moses, E., Rodriguez Martinez, M., Soriano J. and Tlusty, T. 2010. Quorum Percolation in Living Neural Networks *EPL* (Europhysics Letters) 89, 1.

³⁰⁷ As Christakis and Fowler (2008) note, homophily, strong interpersonal affect can improve diffusion of behaviours. Discussions by Levitsky and Way (2010) and McLaughlin (2010) on ties that may bind members of an authoritarian regime’s coercive apparatus also hint at this.

In the case of a regime's coercive apparatus network, the traditional structure of a hierarchical organization is characterized mostly by weaker ties.³⁰⁸ Costly behavior, like the exercise of violence against protesters, is typically initiated by tightly clustered cliques with stronger ties, more often special units or paramilitary groups.³⁰⁹ They can set the level of the repression's intensity early on, and an example that can then trickle down the weaker ties of the whole force, whose participation, or at least allegiance is also needed. Hence, also for a regime's coercive apparatus, a combination of both strong and weak ties is more efficient.

Besides efficiency, robustness is paramount for a network's performance, if it is to continue functioning even when a fraction of its nodes or edges is removed, randomly or deliberately. What type of network would exhibit greater robustness? Random attacks are survived with less probability of catastrophic failure by scale-free, denser, highly modular networks. Under targeted attack, however, it is random-exponential networks that are found to be more robust. Conversely, scale-free networks are more vulnerable and prone to failure. For an opposition group, a 'targeted' attack against would be the incapacitating (arresting, or, worse) by the authorities of its leader(s) and/or activists critical for their network's main strategic and operational functions. Hierarchical structures are particularly vulnerable to this type of deliberate targeting.³¹⁰ For a coercive apparatus, random or specific deletion of a fraction of its network would translate to force members defecting (node removal-or, site percolation), or refusing to obey orders to use violence and maintaining some kind of neutrality (edge removal-or bond percolation, which would have similar debilitating effects for the network's function). Therefore, for optimal protection against both random and targeted 'attacks', a network would have to be situated somewhere in-between the random-exponential – scale-free continuum; that is, it would have to

³⁰⁸ Without intra-level connectivity, hierarchy does a poor job in spreading participation. Siegel, 2009, 134.

³⁰⁹ Even, when regular security forces are rotated, specifically to avoid cases where local familiarity creates sympathy for protesters, their subunits are clusters within the overall formation.

³¹⁰ As, for example, Belarusian opposition leadership painfully learned both in protests surrounding the 2006 and 2010 presidential campaigns. This included opposition presidential candidates Alexander Milinkevich and Alexander Kozulin in 2006, and Vladimir Neklyayev in 2010.

display a moderate combination of clustering coefficient and average path length values and a non–power-law degree distribution.

In general, it appears there is a trade-off between efficiency and robustness: higher connectivity, especially among highly connected nodes, helps diffuse faster and wider (Centola 2009), but can make the network fail if targeted for removal; lower, and while the network survives, it does not fare well with transmission. Solely strong, or, solely weak ties adversely affect efficiency. Therefore, for an optimized composite diffusion, a network would need to be both adequately efficient and sufficiently robust: it would have to include a combination of both strong and weak ties, suitable for different contagion modes, and to parameterize between a random and a scale-free one for greater resilience. The study calls such a network, a composite one.




Figure 7a: ‘Composite’ Network

The term ‘composite’ network is borrowed from molecular biology, where it is defined as, ‘any network which includes at least two different types of interactions, or, equivalently, which combines at least two network types...’³¹¹




Figure 7b: ‘Composite’ Network Diffusion

³¹¹ Schächter, V. 2007. Heterogeneous Molecular Networks in Kepes, F. (ed) Biological Networks: Complex Systems and Interdisciplinary Science, vol. 3 (London: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.), 201.

At the same time, any single type network that is characterized solely or predominantly either by strong or weak ties is, for the purposes of this study, deemed a 'simple' one.³¹² A simple type more readily impedes the function of a network, fast collapsing in cases of small disruption (weak ties), or, not getting off the ground after initial launch (strong ties).³¹³ This is true for both spatial and relational levels of organization.

To recapitulate: by way of its structure and dynamics, a composite network optimizes composite diffusion-it is better suited than a simple network in spreading resources through the network, as well as in expanding it, and defending it against attacks. As a result it has a better mobilization capability, especially when these two types of networks (composite and simple) enter into competition.

Hypothesis (General)

This study follows a multi-disciplinary research model, delineated by a sequence of logical steps that combine macro theories with micro foundations via a meso level of network analysis. This approach is echoed by a number of scholars across disciplines, who also seek to examine the global effects of local interactions: for example, by Zenk, Stadtfeld and Windhager (2010), who describe the general research philosophy as beginning by examining 'social theories, centering the focus on theoretical mechanism as hypotheses, then involving graph theoretical notation, followed by modeling and [/or] testing on empirical data, which ultimately validates or not hypotheses',³¹⁴ or, by Macy and Willer (2002), who, test macro sociological theories (even though via virtual experiments) by manipulating structural factors like network topology, social stratification, or spatial mobility.³¹⁵

³¹² Naturally, this does not mean that it would be simple in composition or topology, but, that it is not entail different structures for differentiated interactions.

³¹³ For example, if there exist only one main artery for the transmission of information, it is easy to see that its blockage can have severe effects in the message getting across.

³¹⁴ Zenk, L., Stadtfeld, C., and Windhager, F. 2010. How to Analyze Dynamic Network Patterns of High Performing Teams. *Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences* (2, 6418–22), 6420.

³¹⁵ Macy, M.W. and Willer, R. 2002. From Factors to Actors: Computational Sociology and Agent-Based Modeling. *Annual Review of Sociology* 28:143-166),143.

Having examined the relevant theoretical literatures on electoral revolutions, social mobilization and networks, and the related mechanism of diffusion, this study moves to postulate its hypotheses. In general, it suggests that the topological properties of a network (esp. path length, clustering) and its resulting dynamic behavior (e.g. robustness under varying conditions of stress) have significant implications for its diffusion mechanism, which in turn affects its mobilization performance. The optimal configuration of a network towards successful (i) defense against catastrophic attacks, (ii) propagation of resources through that network and beyond, (iii) propagation of the network itself consists of a combination of strong and weak ties. This type of successful propagation is termed *composite diffusion* and the network, a composite one. Matched against a network of predominantly only weak or strong ties, the composite one displays more efficiency in its mobilizing capacity and output. Against a rival composite network, the contest is more balanced, which, in extra-institutional political struggles can mean a prolonged (and violent) confrontation.

Extended to the study of contentious collective action against authoritarian regimes opposition organizations combining both strong and weak ties will fare better (remain connected, continue to transmit information) in conditions of uncertainty and challenge (repression) to their network than will other types. The same will hold true for the regime's coercive apparatus, and its ability to mobilize to thwart rising dissent before it spreads. Thus, counter-mobilization efforts by an incumbent organization will fare worse (e.g. easier defections, break of the chain of command) if their network displays reduced robustness under stress, that is, if it is predominantly characterized either only by weak ties, or only by strong ones.³¹⁶

³¹⁶ As suggested by Aven (2011), it is expected that competitive authoritarian networks will have lower connectivity, in general. Specifically, Aven finds that 'corrupt networks have lower connectivity, fewer reciprocal relations and share less communication.' His work builds on earlier research by Baker and Faulkner (1993), who analyzed the structure of corrupt networks. In Aven, B. L., 2011. The Effects of Corruption on Organizational Networks and Individual Behavior. *Political Networks Paper Archive, Southern Illinois University Carbondale*, 7. Naturally, differences exist between such networks. Note, for example, how the more complex topology of the *Camorra*, Napoli's organized crime, makes it much harder for the police to uproot than the *Mafia*, its hierarchical Sicilian counterpart.

Consequently, with regards to a clash between opposition and authoritarian political networks, the present work also hypothesizes that the outcome depends on their *combined mobilization outputs*. In other words, *both* the opposition and the regime networks' mobilizational performances with respect to composite diffusion need to be accounted for. This is feasible by analyzing their network properties and determining whether their type (composite, or, simple), and it could also assist in the prediction of future contestation outcomes.

Therefore, the main hypothesis of this study is as follows:

Over time, across space, between people and through populations, a composite political network diffuses resources, knowledge, opinions and behavior more efficiently and robustly than a simple network, resulting in superior mobilizational capacity that, compared and combined with its simple network rival, affects the outcome of contentious political action in its favor.

Hypotheses in Detail

Rephrasing the above statement, it can be stated that, for composite diffusion, composite networks outperforms simple ones. Applying the general hypothesis to contentious political action, the contestation between differing types of rival organizations, yield the following four detailed hypotheses:

Hypothesis a: Composite Opposition Network + Simple Regime Network → only Opposition optimizes mobilization → Opposition prevails: fraudulent results overturned, authoritarian Regime removed ('Transition')³¹⁷

³¹⁷ Criteria for success mirror those introduced by Stepan and Chenoweth (2008). They include opposition stated objectives met as a result of mobilization within a certain period [Stepan and Chenoweth suggest a period of two years from beginning to end of campaign, this two-year threshold 'accounting for necessary logistical or operational delays in bringing about the outcome'], and (ii) the opposition's campaign mandatorily having a 'discernible effect on the outcome.' (Stepan and Chenoweth, 2008, 17). An important caveat must be added to criterion (i), namely, that these achieved objectives should also not be reversed within a reasonable period of time (again a similar threshold of two years could be applied). Therefore, the first criterion for success specifies the opposition's meeting its objectives within a certain brief period, and these objectives not be reversed again, within a certain period, annulling the goals and contribution of the opposition. Finally, these authors differentiate between full success and limited success, the

A composite opposition organization (with a core of strong tie activists and an expanding periphery of recruits) will be more easily adaptable to change and stress. Domestically, it will be more immune to ‘leadership decapitation’ strikes, escaping easy eradication or neutralization, and will be more efficient to spread its message across the wider population. Internationally, it will also be more capable to forge critical links with sympathizers. As a result, it will be able to maximize its mobilization potential.³¹⁸ A simple regime coercive apparatus network, displaying a hierarchy customary for military and security organizations will collapse more easily even if relatively few of its officers refuse to carry out commands for counter-revolutionary mobilization. Officers in a hierarchy would be more apparent negotiation targets by the opposition. The resulting combination is an increased likelihood for a mobilized opposition and a non-mobilized regime security apparatus that favors the opposition.

Hypothesis b: Simple Opposition Network + Simple Regime Network → Neither Opposition nor Regime optimizes mobilization → Regime prevails: electoral results stand, Regime remains in power (‘Status Quo Ante’)

A simple network opposition will be vulnerable to government crackdown, and its decapitation—even by equally simple counter-mobilization efforts—can cripple it. The result is no overall mobilization for either camp—the opposition because of lack of leadership, the incumbent regime because it does not need to. With an un-mobilized opposition, even a weak regime can, therefore, survive (as noted in a discussion earlier in this study on the distinction between longevity and durability of an authoritarian regime).

latter failing to meet stated objectives, obtaining instead ‘significant concessions.’ The present study adopts a binary ‘success-failure’ mode, given that stated objectives are not met.

³¹⁸ Note that the dependent variable here is mobilization success, which does not include mobilization size alone; a critical mass that can potentially tip a political cascade threshold is important, but success ultimately also depends on the mobilization outcome for the regime and its coercive apparatus.

Hypothesis c: *Simple Opposition Network + Composite Regime Network → Only Regime mobilizes effectively → electoral results stand, Regime stays in power. Opposition suppressed (Repression).*

A simple network opposition will be vulnerable, especially against a composite coercive apparatus—one that, in addition of customary regular forces, includes politicized special security or paramilitary forces for repression/vigilantism. The result is effective mobilization for violence on the part of the incumbent regime's forces, which can overwhelm an opposition movement early and effectively. Going through more filters down a regular, weak-tie, hierarchical command structure, an order for engaging in violent repression would statistically increase the chances of eventually not being carried out. With what would be a 'short path between command and trigger'—i.e. a more direct link to command (often directly responsible to the regime's leadership—this shorter command path frequently connoting and forging loyalty), special and paramilitary forces will be more prone to abusing their coercive capabilities and carrying out repressive acts of high intensity.³¹⁹ Violent repression, carried with speed and intensity will signal the increasingly high costs of protesting to prospective dissidents and can prevent a protest's spread, both in population space and in time.³²⁰ A secondary effect is containing defections, which statistically increase when protest grows and no violence is absent.³²¹

Hypothesis d: *Composite Opposition Network + Composite Regime Network → Both Opposition and Regime mobilize → contestation outcome uncertain (stalemate) and heightened probability of conflict ('Violence').*

³¹⁹ It is not argued that regular units (characterized by weaker ties, especially when recruited through conscription) would not engage in violence, but they would be more likely to be sanctioned by redundant corrective mechanisms embedded in such a hierarchy. In other words, within hierarchies are embedded rules of conduct. On the contrary, a closely-knit unit (where strong ties are fostered) with fewer intermediaries between trigger-pulling soldier, unit leader and regime leader could arguably be susceptible to fewer restrictions and reservations with respect to excessively violent conduct. It is no accident that the worse atrocities in combat are often perpetrated by irregular or paramilitary, or 'elite' Special Forces. Here, the argument for professionalization of armed forces (especially commanding officers) diminishing the level of such transgressions is relevant.


³²⁰ As Stepan and Chenoweth (2008, 24) note, the longer an opposition protest takes, the less likely it will be ultimately successful.

³²¹ Ibid, 22.

Both opposition and incumbent forces are efficient in recruiting and amassing resources, or in applying violent repressive tactics, and robust enough to absorb 'strikes' or defections, respectively. Both optimize their mobilization capabilities, and, as a result, the likelihood of violent conformation increases.

At the same time, the null hypothesis, H_0 posits that composite and simple networks produce the same mobilizational performance towards a mobilization outcome, while more generally, it indicates that networks play no role in mobilization success.

Schematically, the general and detailed hypotheses are represented in the following three figures and tables. The first diagram shows the general hypothesis linking mobilization capability to composite diffusion performance:



NETWORK COMBINATION and MOBILIZATION OUTCOMES
(S: Simple, C: Composite; 0: No Mobilization, 1: Mobilization)

S reg + S opp = 0 reg + 0 opp → Status Quo Ante
S reg + C opp = 0 reg + 1 opp → Transition
C reg + S opp = 1 reg + 0 opp → Repression
C reg + C opp = 1 reg + 1 opp → Civil Conflict

Figure 8: General Hypothesis and Permutations

More specifically, the general hypothesis yields four permutations depicted in the following 2x2 table:

	Opposition Simple	Opposition Composite
Regime Comp	Repression	Violence
Regime Simple	Status Quo	Transition

Table 2: General Hypothesis

Finally, applied to contentious action revolving around the challenge of fraudulent elections and the leadership that engineered them, the general hypothesis translates into four detailed ones (plus a null hypothesis):

HYP.	TYPE OF NETWORK		CONTESTATION OUTCOME
	Opposition	Regime	
<i>a</i>	Composite	Simple	Civil society wins: electoral outcome reversed, leadership removed
<i>b</i>	Simple	Simple	Regime survives: election result/leadership stands
<i>c</i>	Simple	Composite	Regime prevails: election result stands, opposition reduced
<i>d</i>	Composite	Composite	Civil violence erupts: election outcome uncertain
<i>0</i>			No effect in mobilization and related outcome

Table 3: Detailed Hypotheses *a*, *b*, *c*, *d* and *0*

CASES

While Slovakia (1998) and Croatia (1999) can legitimately be credited as pilot cases where robust civil society engaged in pro-active monitoring elections to prevent electoral fraud, Serbia (2000) provides the first reactive example, involving hundreds of thousands of protesters throughout the country. Hence, as the first successful case of the color revolutions, the mass mobilization surrounding the 2000 Serbian presidential elections is chosen for this study. In 2004, the Ukraine Presidential election provided the occasion for the most celebrated 'Orange Revolution' with millions of Ukrainians taking to the streets across the country to demand the reversal of fraudulent presidential election results; as such, it is also selected as a case to be examined. The fact that these two countries had experienced earlier instances of election rigging and/or had witnessed mobilization attempts to hold the incumbents accountable with poor, or at best mixed results is convenient, as these additional two examples (Serbia in 1996-7, Ukraine in 2000-1) complete a quartet of cases, allowing for easier, more comparable and more reliable inter-temporal, cross-case examination. Thus, this study examines four cases in total and studies their within-case variation:

(i) the Serbian *Zajedno*-student protests of 1996-7; (ii) the *Otpor* spearheaded mobilization around the presidential elections of 2000; (iii) the 'Ukraine Without Kuchma' protests of 2000-2001, and (iv) the 'Orange Revolution' of 2004.

Detailed summaries of these four cases are provided in the beginning of the following two empirical chapters.

Why a detailed look at events?

The four cases are presented in extensive detail. This is a conscious choice in this study for a variety of reasons. Prominent among them is the context that a rich, qualitative description can provide to a strictly quantitative approach, especially in complementing a necessarily finite-boundary dataset. Siegel (2011) remarks that 'qualitative scholarship holds significant information on context [...] and this can elicit network type [...] individual-level information on network ties can be used to develop

and test aggregate-level hypotheses on the effect of network structure.³²² For example, interviews as part of a detailed case examination can help get a broader picture of a network, or help clarify who might be the leader of a network, whether a network is insular, etc. In this study, interviews on both the 1996-7 Serbian (students) and 2004 Ukrainian (Yellow *Pora*) cases, helped point to a definite leaderships which introduces a hidden hierarchy in the network-all the more, given that the quantitative data for that network are limited. Also, a number of interviewees helped provide information that allowed for a spatial mapping of regional branches of their networks. This dimension is even more important when no primary data is available at all-given the impenetrability of security and paramilitary force networks for primary information collection; a detailed description of the case coupled with second-hand evidence yields enough clues that can help reconstruct a meaningful picture of a network.

Another main reason for a detailed presentation of a case is that it helps refute plausible alternative hypotheses that may otherwise be difficult to invalidate. For example, in the *Otpor* protest case leading up to the 2000 mobilization that toppled Yugoslav President Milosevic, it is a common belief by the literature that the 1999 NATO bombings played a significant part in eroding his popularity and accelerated his downfall by alienating some of his electoral base.³²³ Yet, as one of the *Otpor* founders can attest, this is not how *Otpor* or their contacts saw it.

Similarly, a thorough look at a case helps identifying and controlling for other variables that could otherwise reasonably challenge the study's thesis on the central role of networks. For example, detailing the existence of a record of social protest in Yugoslavia, the salience of ethnic identity in Ukraine, and a track of turbulent parliamentarianism and related political upheaval for Yugoslavia and Ukraine, demonstrates their presence during both successful and unsuccessful cases examined. For all the above reasons, the selected case studies are presented in sufficient depth.³²⁴

³²² In Siegel D. A. 2011. Social Networks in Comparative Perspective. *PS: Political Science & Politics*.

³²³ See Jansen, S. 2001. The Streets of Beograd. Urban Space & Protest Identities in Serbia. *Political Geography* 20:35-55.

³²⁴ Perhaps the adage by Luigi Pirandello, a famous Italian Nobel laureate play writer, says it best: '*facts are like sacks; they don't stand unless you put something in them.*'

RESEARCH DESIGN AND EXECUTION

Field research: survey design and data collection

Field research is crucial for an in-depth investigation of these four cases. As Siegel (2009) notes, to analyze real networks, detailed data are required and it can be difficult to acquire, especially if they do or have involved clandestine or risky activity. Hence, the field research for this study seeks data (primary, secondary) from a variety of sources in order to map and reconstruct the networks of the organizations involved in these mobilization cases. The result was a combination of obtrusive (direct questioning by the researcher)-whenever possible-and unobtrusive (archival research) methods.³²⁵

In his body of work widely considered as authoritative for network data and measurements, Marsden (1990) suggests the use of (i) surveys and questionnaires, (ii) archival research and the (iii) consultation of other data sources, like diaries, experiments, etc. as the most important sources of network data.³²⁶ Hence, borrowing from Sociology methods, this study modifies existing measurement techniques to develop a survey that can help to map networks. Data from such surveys are also complemented by other research to help reconstruct networks when mapping is unfeasible.

First among the steps in this phase of the research would be the onsite collection of primary-or, obtrusive-(interviews of key participants in these democratizing struggles, and surveys) and secondary-or, unobtrusive-(archival research, and the collection of articles, books, lists and printed information pertinent to the cases) qualitative relevant material. For the purpose of this study, this took place during field research in Serbia and Ukraine, during the fall and winter 2007, to meet with major actors from Belgrade and environs, as well as Kyiv and Lviv. Additional information was obtained the following summer in Boston, Massachusetts, during an advanced seminar on non-violent protest at the Fletcher School of Diplomacy, Tufts University that played host to a number of

³²⁵ Fowler, J. H., Heaney, M. T., Nickerson, D. W., Padgett, J. F. and Sinclair, B. 2009, 18-20.

³²⁶ Marsden, P. V. 1990. Network Data and Measurements. *Annual Review of Sociology* (16:435-53), 441-46. This set of network data collection techniques is reconfirmed by Fowler et al., 2009, 8; and by Ward, Stovel and Sacks, 2011, 255.

key Serbian opposition group members. Finally, more information, to enrich already collected datasets and for accuracy and reliability purposes ('test-retest', to measure the stability of responses³²⁷ and examine the corroboration of ties³²⁸), was collected via email from Serbian and Ukrainian sources in 2010 and 2011.

For the interviews, a snow-balling sampling method was modified, to devise a method that best estimates 'hidden' populations and structures, creating a personal data set which was converted into matrices and networks.

Estimating 'hidden' populations: Respondent-Driven Sampling

How to estimate the type of the *Otpor, Ukraine Without Kuchma*, or, *Black Pora* opposition networks? This study modifies and makes use a Respondent-Driven Sampling process (Heckathorn 1997, 2002; Salganik and Heckathorn 2004)³²⁹ that best samples and estimates populations and structures that are 'hidden'. The first approaches that come to mind are standard and targeted or time-space sampling. But, 'standard sampling and estimation techniques require the researchers to select sample members with a known probability of selection [... That means that they] must have a sampling frame, a list of all members in the population. However, for many populations of interest such a list does not exist.'³³⁰ This can be because of (i) the small size of the target population, and/or (ii) the difficulty of locating such members (e.g. because of the sensitive nature of their behavior).

Such populations are called 'hidden' and participants in some social movements (in environments of various degrees of repression) fall in this category, *Otpor, Ukraine Without Kuchma* and *Black Pora* being no exceptions. As for targeted and time-space sampling, their treatment of members of a population as discrete units, fails to make

³²⁷ Marsden, 1990, 448-49.

³²⁸ For a directed network. In Fowler, J. H., Heaney, M. T., Nickerson, D. W., Padgett, J. F. and Sinclair, B. 2009, 22.

³²⁹ Heckathorn, D.D. 1997. Respondent-Driven Sampling: A New Approach to the Study of Hidden Populations. *Social Problems* 44:174-199; also, Heckathorn, D.D. 2002. Respondent-Driven Sampling II: Deriving Valid Population Estimates from Chain-Referral Samples of Hidden Populations. *Social Problems* 49:11-34; Salganik, M.J. and Heckathorn, D.D. 2004. Sampling and Estimation in Hidden Populations Using Respondent-Drive Sampling. *Sociological Methodology* 34:193-239.

³³⁰ Salganik and Heckathorn, 2004, 194.

use of the important fact that such populations are ‘made of real people connected in a network of relationships.’³³¹

A different approach that better captures the network perspective is chain-referral sampling (originally known as snow-ball sampling, with variations like random-walk or link tracing). Respondents are not chosen from a random sample, but from the network of individuals already sampled. The researcher identifies a number of initial ‘seeds’; they will serve as the first respondents, who, besides providing their own data, also recommend others from their circle to be sampled. In essence, they provide the next wave of respondents, who then repeat the procedure, recruiting others, so on and so forth until the researcher obtains a desired sample size. Such methods ‘have proven to be effective ways at penetrating hidden populations.’³³²




Figure 9: Schematic Example of Recruitment Chain for Large RDS Study

In Volz, E. and Heckathorn, D.D. 2008. Probability Based Estimation Theory for Respondent-Driven Sampling. *Journal of Official Statistics* 24, 1 (79-97), 81. Marked in red is the initial seed.

As with most methods, Respondent-Driven Sampling does not come free of debate over its estimating capacity. For example, some criticism has been leveled by Goel and Salganik (2010), who test a CDC HIV survey and argue that it could miss or overestimate sub-clusters, given a potential high variance of estimates.³³³ But, the data used do not necessarily concern a hidden population (e.g. if their disease was not drug-

³³¹ Ibid, 196.

³³² Ibid. Also see Spreen, M. 1992. Rare Populations, Hidden Populations, and Link-Tracing Designs: What and Why? *Bulletin of Sociological Methodology* 36, 1 (September), 34-58.

³³³ Goel, S. and Salganik, M. J. 2010. Assessing Respondent-driven Sampling. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Science (PNAS)*, (107,15: 6743–6747), 6744.

related), and Further, the focus on HIV could add additional biases, as respondents and their subsequent references could anticipate advantageous medical attention as a result of references. It is certainly plausible that in other cases without controls as in the CDC study-or, in general where a subtle difference distinguishes mostly simple and complex contagion-Respondent-Driven Sampling could perform better. Recent work (Salganik and Heckathorn 2004; Heckathorn 2007; Volz and Heckathorn 2008) has demonstrated the generating of unbiased estimates for a variety of samples, and according to Huckfeldt, the early pioneer of network studies in the field of Political Science, “without underestimating the presence of biases in communication, snowball surveys have demonstrated that individuals are generally quite accurate in their perceptions regarding the political characteristics of other members of their network. In this way, the snowball surveys serve as validation studies for these of perceptual measures.”³³⁴

Overall, Respondent-Driven Sampling is reliable to address issues of biased estimations that can be a main problem of chain-referral sampling, especially since it collects a sample not from a sampling frame but from the social network of existing members of the sample. As a result, it is chosen as the most acceptable method for this study.³³⁵

Collecting the samples

For the purposes of this study, a modified RDS survey entails the following steps: One begins by selecting an initial ‘seed’ (interviewee) based on pre-existing contact with the study population. This forms wave 0 of the sample. The Wave 0 interviewee is asked to,

(i) Identify as many persons (a minimum of ten links) he or she has been associated with in the target group,

³³⁴ Huckfeldt, R. 2009. Interdependence, Density Dependence, and Networks in Politics. *American Politics Research* (37, 5: 921-950), 939.

³³⁵ Its focus on the network core also minimizes concern for overestimating sub-clusters (Arcenaux and Nickerson 2009). For more on this, see concluding chapter.

- (ii) Provide an assessment of closeness to the individuals named, ranging from 1 to 3 (1 being an acquaintance to 3 being a close friend)³³⁶, and,
- (iii) Recruit a new participant to repeat the above procedure.

Obtrusive network search methods ask respondents either to list their contacts in an open-ended question, or to identify contacts from a pre-prepared list of possible ones. This study opts for the former method of open-ended questioning, both for practical reasons (full knowledge about such network were either hidden/privileged, or, often, non-existent), and because they would be less susceptible to false reports (Brewer 2000),³³⁷ or, to fixed-choice related data missing (a contact not on the list) (Kossinets 2006).³³⁸

An important point is that sample members must be members of the target population, that is, the names of friends and acquaintances provided must be relevant to the group studied. Therefore, extensive research prior to initiating an RDS survey is imperative, for identifying and selecting relevant initial seed(s) is crucial. The result is a process of collecting data of alternating nodes and edges (that is, individuals and their connections) through the depth of a network that eventually yields enough information to determine its structure, i.e. its type. As Salganik and Heckathorn remark, “the original design’s relatively simplicity and robustness and has already been used successfully” in a number of studies (e.g., Semaan, Lauby and Liebman 2002).³³⁹ Consequently, it is used in the present study to explore, map and identify the networks examined.

Converting data into networks

The next step is to translate, or, convert the data collected during fieldwork research into specific networks and their particular properties. To do so this study uses the collected information from opposition key actors with the twin objective to (i) map

³³⁶ This assessment bypasses binary responses (1=tie, 0=no tie) and, helps reduce a possible bias of reporting only strong ties Butts 2003, quoted by Heaney in Fowler et al.,2009, 20.

³³⁷ Ibid.

³³⁸ Ibid, 19.

³³⁹ Salganik and Heckathorn, 2004, 208.

and then (ii) identify the types of their respective ‘revolutionary’ [*Zajedno*-students (Serbia 1996-7), *Otpor* (Serbia, 2000); Ukraine Without Kuchma (Ukraine 2000-1), *Black Pora* (Ukraine, 2004)] networks. In discussing one of the basic tenets of graph theory, Watts notes that ‘most computations of graph properties are accomplished by way of either an adjacency matrix or adjacency list. The adjacency matrix $M(G)$ is the $n \times n$ matrix in which $M_{i,j}$ is the number of edges joining the vertices i and j .³⁴⁰ The lists of individuals, their connections and subsequent references and their own links ad continuum are coded and converted to an adjacency matrix. Then, through the use of computer programs (*Gephi*), this matrix is converted into a network, and its particular properties plotted.

The following example of a hypothetical network ‘HN’ illustrates this procedure: Let’s assume an RDS survey yields responses from X number of respondents. Each of them is asked to provide a list of names of individuals with whom they are connected. The result is X lists with N number of names. The two tables below show hypothetical responses from hypothetical responders X_1 (being the first to be contacted, this is the initial seed) and X_2 :

Matthew Peters (Respondent X_1)	Jeanne McTerry (Respondent X_2)
John Smith	Monique Dupont
Mary Connor	John Smith
Martha Nichols	Michael Sanders
Jacques Watson	George Fulbright
Nicholas Peters	Mary Connor
Jeanne McTerry*	Matthew Peters
Allison Jacobs	

Table 4: Example of Hypothetical Responders and their Responses

In this case, ‘Matthew’ (respondent X_1) reports seven contacts and recommends one of them (‘Jeanne’-asterisked name) as the next prospective respondent (X_2).³⁴¹ Note that

³⁴⁰ Watts, 1999, 26. In the un-weighted case, all entries are either 1 or 0. In this study, weights attached to links slightly differentiate the entry model.

³⁴¹ NB. Names are fictional and do not correspond to any actual person.

some of the names reported by the two respondents are the same-an indication that these individuals are known to both responders. The recommended person agrees to the survey and provides her own list of six contacts. The chain repeats until exhaustion or until an adequate number of responses is reached. Then, for reasons of both maintaining anonymity (some respondents may not wish their name disclosed on such a list) and efficiency in deriving the tables and coding them for analysis by software, all the names in all lists are codified by assigning a personal number to them. For example, the abovementioned lists by respondents X_1 and X_2 are transformed as follows:

1	7
2	9
3	2
4	10
5	11
6	3
7*	1
8	

Table 5: Codified Respondent Lists (example)

Next, all the codified entries are tabulated into an adjacency table:

1	7	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	X_n
2	9											$N1_{X_n}$
3	2											$N2_{X_n}$
4	10											$N..._{X_n}$
5	11											
6	3											
7	12											
8												NN_{X_n}

Table 6: Adjacency Table (example)

This adjacency table is then translated into an adjacency matrix. A value of 1 is entered when a respondent has reported a link between them. In the above hypothetical case,

‘Matthew’ (#1) has listen ‘Jeanne’ (#7)], so in #1’s row, hence, the value under column for respondent #7 will be 1. When an individual has not reported another as a contact, a value of 0 is entered. Using the same example, one notices that ‘Jeanne’ (#7) does not include ‘Allison’ (#8) in her list; therefore, in the row corresponding to respondent #7, under the column corresponding to respondent #8 a value of 0 is entered. The above process describes a directed network (where links are ‘directed’ from one respondent to another). For an undirected network (one that holding that once one respondent has reported a link, it suffices to establish a connection between two individuals), a value of 1 is added both for the box with coordinates X_a, X_b and the one with X_b, X_a .

Respondents ($X_{1...n}$)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	...	X_n
1		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
2														
3														
4														
5														
6														
7	1	1	1	0	0	0		0	1	1	1	0	0	0
8														
9														
10														
11														
12														
...														
X_n														

**Table 7: Adjacency Matrix for Hypothetical Network ‘HN’ (directed):
Filling Out Values for Respondents #1 and #7**

Weighted links typically indicate the intensity of a link. To assess such weakness or strength of ties, respondents can be asked not only to provide a list of names of

individuals with whom they share a link, but to indicate the level of this link. For the purpose of this study, weights range from 1 (acquaintance) to 3 (close friend, defined as having contact at least twice a week for the period examined). Using the previous example, the lists of responders X_1 and X_2 look as follows:

Matthew Peters (Respondent X_1)	Jeanne McTerry (Respondent X_2)
John Smith 3	Monique Dupont 3
Mary Connor 2	John Smith 1
Martha Nichols 1	Michael Sanders 2
Jacques Watson 1	George Fulbright 1
Nicholas Peters 1	Mary Connor 2
Jeanne McTerry* 3	Matthew Peters 1
Allison Jacobs 1	

Table 8: Hypothetical Responders and their Responses (weighted)

The resulting adjacency matrix reflects the weights of these ties:

Respondents ($X_{1...n}$)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	...	X_n
1		3	2	1	1	1	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
2														
3														
4														
5														
6														
7	1	1	3	0	0	0		0	3	2	1	0	0	0
8														
9														
10														
11														
12														
...														
X_n														

**Table 9: Adjacency Matrix for Hypothetical Network 'HN' (directed) with Weights:
Filling Out Weighted Values for Respondents #1 and #7**

Eventually, the adjacency matrices are filled out with 1s and 0s, (or, if weighted, with their corresponding weights—in this study, from 1 to 3) and, following their codification in files readable by software analysis, together with square matrices they are consequently translated into networks for analysis by a social network analysis software. For the purposes of this study's case, the social network analysis used is *Gephi 0.81*³⁴². In particular, each respondent's list is coded for its nodes and, if applicable, individual weights and direction. The final step of this process yields the resulting network's visualization (layout) and properties (statistics).³⁴³

As for the incumbent networks—mainly the regime coercive apparatus—very little such direct data was available for the Serbian (1996-7, 2000) and Ukrainian (2000-1, 2004) cases studied here. The near-universal reluctance of individuals belonging to groups and units associated with the incumbents that were approached to be interviewed presented a problem, as too few of the officers sought provided information sufficient enough for formal analysis. Hence, in these cases, an unobtrusive³⁴⁴ method was employed: secondary or indirect information (archival onsite research, organizational charts of security forces and military units and the collection of articles, books, lists and printed information pertinent to the cases) was sought to reconstruct the structure of the forces the regime relied upon to counter the opposition in these four cases.

Comparisons

The main objectives of this step are twofold: First, to ascertain, whether this study's findings—based on real, empirical different outcomes—are supported by the

³⁴² A number of excellent software (e.g. Pajek, UCINET, NetMiner, Plotonic, InFlow and Cuttlefish) exists for rigorous and comprehensive network analysis, and the list keeps growing. For this study, Gephi was chosen for its versatility and extent of analysis, testing for many metrics and providing lucid network visualizations than many its competitors. Initially, the study began using Pajek; then, it was conducted using Gephi 0.7 until a newer version (0.81) appeared; all calculations and simulations were, thus, redone using Gephi 0.81.

³⁴³ See Adamic, L., Adar, E. 2005. How to Search a Social Network. *Social Networks* 27, 187–203.

³⁴⁴ Fowler, J. H., Heaney, M. T., Nickerson, D. W., Padgett, J. F. and Sinclair, B. 2009, 18-19.

formal literature; second, whether such a methodological application and related tools can be transferable to, and generalize-able in other cases.

This study examines thoroughly four cases of extra-institutional contest sparked by electoral fraud and charts the cores of the rival networks involved. The resulting networks' structure and topology, their emergent properties, and dynamics of assembly, are analyzed to assess their capacity for information exchange, and their robustness to catastrophic failures like arrest by the police, or security forces defection. This converted quantitative data are enriched and complemented by qualitative material from the series of interviews conducted by the author with key and ordinary participants in the case studies. The analysis takes the form of a double comparison-a formal and empirical one. The first takes place across different types of networks-*composite* and *simple* ones-each with their different formal properties yielding different outcomes. The second is a comparison across actual cases that, despite a common trigger and a common locus (two cases from Serbia and two from Ukraine-to control for as many variables as possible) produce different empirical outcomes (one failure and one success each) to reveal within-case variation.

Summary

The full benefits of networks' analytical as well as potentially predictive prowess as well as its cross-disciplinary nature have only recently begun to emerge. Their study presents exciting opportunities for studying complex phenomena. Researchers are beginning to point out that the structure of networks has implications for collective dynamics that affect mechanisms like contagion. Collective action and related mass mobilization-also a complex social phenomenon-can be studied by way of networks, for, besides agency (nodes) and structure (their ties, or, edges), the topology of networks affects their dynamic behavior and stochastic evolution (traversal, interaction and growth) which helps capture contingency effects in events like the color revolutions.³⁴⁵

This is what the present study engages in: the examination of the main agents for and against mass mobilizations against competitive authoritarian regimes-youth opposition groups and incumbent authoritarian regimes (their coercive apparatus)-from a network perspective. It focuses on four cases, Serbia 1996-7 and 2000, and Ukraine 200-1 and 2004. It devises a rigorous, pluralistic research design to collect quantitative and qualitative data that can help map the rival networks engaging in these contestations. It hypothesizes that their networks yield specific properties which affect composite diffusion outcomes that, in turn, are critical for mobilization and counter-mobilization processes. One of this study's novelties lays with analyzing the opposition and regime network effects and their outcomes in *combined* fashion, unlike most studies of the color revolutions. It postulates that the overall outcome of such contentious events depends on a joint assessment of their networks' properties. Methodologically, in contrast to the overwhelming majority of complex network analyses that utilize simulated, modeled data, this study relies on actual, empirical data, and proposes a variety of research methods for their collection. Wherever possible, a modified respondent-driven sampling is used. The resulting datasets are complemented by interviews, archival research and computer simulations towards the conduct of meaningful comparisons.

³⁴⁵ Snijders, T.A.B. Notes from his 2008 Oxford lectures on the dynamics of social networks.

CHAPTER FOUR
CASE STUDIES I AND II
A TALE OF TWO PROTESTS: SERBIA 1996-7 AND 2000

That the decade ushered in by its violent dissolution would prove chaotic for the ghost of what remained from the former Federative Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, is almost certainly an understatement. Within a period of ten years (1991-2000), the people and the lands that inherited the 'Yugoslav' mantle were plunged (and plunged their neighbours) into everything from constitutional deadlocks, secessions, civil wars, ethnic cleansings and war crimes, hyperinflation and economic devastation, the criminalization of society, NATO bombings, social unrest, protests and electoral frauds. The extent of the calamities in such a short time span makes it all the more surprising for the pessimistic student of Balkan politics that the decade's end in late 2000 would be filled with as much hope and optimism, as its beginning was filled with despair and desolation.

Milosevic's Yugoslavia

In order to better understand the protests of 1996-7 and 2000, it is important to briefly examine the social, political and even constitutional context within which they would eventually emerge. After successive secessions by four of its six former constituent republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia), the former South Slav socialist confederation transformed in 1992 into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. On April 27, 1992 the new constitution of FR Yugoslavia was adopted, incidentally, without any public debate or majority of the final SFRY parliamentary session deputy votes. According to a local historian, it was "adopted illegally, without a quorum, by the dead legislature of a dead state."³⁴⁶ The same malaise of hyper-constitutionalism that plagued Socialist Yugoslavia's political existence is also evident in this document with

³⁴⁶ Cagorovic, N. Conflict Constitutions in Serbia and Montenegro. *Transition*, 3, 4, (March 1997), 28, quoted by Lukic, R. From Yugoslavia to the Union of Serbia and Montenegro, in Ramet, S. and Pavlakovic, V. (eds.) *Serbia since 1989: Politics and Society under Milosevic and After*. (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2005), 58.

its excess of articles describing often vague and contradicting principles.³⁴⁷ December 20th of the same year, federal and republican parliamentary and presidential elections were held in Serbia; Milosevic was re-elected and his reign over the formerly Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia began anew.

This 'rump' Yugoslavia consisted of Serbia -and its provinces, among them the once autonomous Kosovo and Vojvodina- and Montenegro. Reflecting the composition of the Serb-Montenegrin alliance during the late SFR Yugoslav years (and its four votes in the Yugoslav Federal Presidency Council), this Yugoslavia was politically dominated by Serbia under the helm of Slobodan Milosevic, a Communist technocrat-turned-ethnic political entrepreneur who served as Serbia's (1987-97) and FR Yugoslavia's (1997-2000) President.³⁴⁸ Under his leadership, the new country's fortunes went from bad to worse, with fratricidal wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-95), ethnic cleansing and the NATO bombing in Kosovo (1998-99), which produced an estimate of two million of casualties (including dead, injured and displaced people). Financially bankrupted³⁴⁹, infra-structurally damaged, diplomatically isolated and territorially shrunk, FR Yugoslavia was run as Milosevic's personal fiefdom, with economic corruption, judicial partiality³⁵⁰, political semi-opaqueness and ethnic fear-mongering being its main ingredients. True to its customary Communist exceptionalism, post-Cold War Yugoslavia was also a peculiar political mix, of a criminalized, competitive authoritarian, quasi-federal state with a power-hungry leader, eager to charm as he

³⁴⁷ Ibid, 57-58.

³⁴⁸ On Milosevic's deleterious transformation from a communist technocrat into an ethnic entrepreneur and nationalist mobilizer during his late 1980's tenure, among a plethora of books, see Cohen, L. J. *Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995), Saideman, S. *The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy and International Conflict* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2001), Vladislavljjevic, N. *Serbia's Antibureaucratic Revolution: Milosevic, the Fall of Communism and Nationalist Mobilization* (London: Palgrave, 2008), Woodward, S. L. *Socialist Unemployment: The Political Economy of Yugoslavia, 1945-1990* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1995), and by the same author, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995).

³⁴⁹ At its highest point, in December 1993, hyperinflation in Milosevic's Yugoslavia reached a record-high 363,000,000,000,000%, or, $3.63 \times 10^{14}\%$ (!). Vejvoda, I. Civil Society Versus Slobodan Milosevic: Serbia, 1991-2000, (In Roberts, A. and Garton Ash, T. (eds.). 2009. *Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-Violent Action from Gandhi to the Present*. Oxford: Oxford University Press), 295.

³⁵⁰ A trivial, yet, telling example is the statement by Serbian Justice Minister, Dragoljub Jankovic, when asked to comment on the removal of three judges who had disapproved on the rough handling of two OTPOR members by employees at Marko Milosevic's (son of Slobodan) Belgrade night club: '*The state pays the judges. They cannot work against the state.*' In Cohen, L. J. *Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milosevic*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000, 404.

was to coerce, manipulating equally friends and foes, institutions (including elections) and information. Milosevic's control of important media-especially Radio-Television Serbia (RTS) and its three channels covering the whole of Serbia was indeed critical for 'appropriating political symbols, indoctrinating (especially the rural) masses and using them to mobilize political support';³⁵¹ the television medium had been skilfully manipulated by Milosevic since his infamous 1987 'intervention' in Kosovo, to the live televised SFRY Federal council meeting and the League of Communist Parties of Yugoslavia, to the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, to Dayton and beyond. In short, even more important than controlling and unleashing his coercive security apparatus upon his population, domination of the media was the main key for Milosevic maintaining power. It was, in Timothy Garton Ash's words, both a '*demokratura*' and a '*teledictatorship*'³⁵² - anodyne and deceptively open enough a regime on the surface, but devastating-as invasive-in its actual consequences to the fabric of Serbian (and other neighbouring, former Yugoslav societies). Thus, despite appearances of democratic openness (and the plethora of 'free but unfair' elections, during his tenure)³⁵³, in vain did a fragmented political opposition tried to effectively resist and successfully counter Milosevic's political alchemies, manoeuvres, machinations and combination of intimidation, cooptation and rewards that helped sustain him in power throughout the nineties.

A profusion of opposition parties

But it was not for lack of trying. Between mid-1990, the time of the first multi-party elections, until early 2000, parties (and personalities) opposed to Milosevic on various levels (municipal, republican, federal) tried to counter him, usually through coalition formation. For one, there were plenty of opportunities, at least on paper: In

³⁵¹ Pavlakovic, V. Serbia Transformed? Political Dynamics in the Milosevic Era and After. In Ramet, S. and Pavlakovic, V. (eds.) *Serbia since 1989*, 20.

³⁵² Garton Ash, T. The Last Revolution. *New York Review of Books*, 47, 18, November 16, 2000.

³⁵³ The phrase 'free but unfair' elections borrowed from Serbia's Embattled Opposition. ICG Balkans Report 94, May 30, 2000, 3.

the 1990's, citizens of Serbia went to the polls no less than eighteen times.³⁵⁴ Opposition coalitions formed no less than nine times.³⁵⁵ Formed in mid-1990, the *Associated Opposition of Serbia*, with six members (DF, DS, LP, NRP, SPO, SSSP) lasted for six months. The *United Serbian Democratic Opposition*, counting four member parties (DF, ND-MS, SLS SPO) remained united for three months in May 1991. The *Democratic Movement of Serbia* of May 1992 with five parties under its umbrella (DSS, ND-MS, SLS, SPO, SSS) endured for eighteen months, while the *Democratic Coalition* and its eight members (DS, DSS, GSS, ND-MS, SD, SLS, SPO, SSS) in May 1992 survived for less than two weeks. *Democratic Movement of Serbia* redux, with three parties (GSS, ND, SPO) only managed three months of opposition action from November 1993 to early 1994, while the *Democratic Alliance* of December 1995 and its four parties (DS, DSS, SLS, SNS), stayed together for four. The *Zajedno* (Together) coalition of four main opposition parties (DS, DSS, GSS, SPO) endured for little more than five months, beginning in November 1996, while the tripartite *Alliance for Change* (DHSS, DS, GSS) lived for a long eighteen months. The one with the most longevity (three years) was the *Democratic Opposition of Serbia*, originally formed in January 2000 with eighteen opposition parties under its aegis (ASNS, DA, DC, DHSS, DS, DSS, GSS, LS, LSV, ND, NS, PDS, RDSV, SD, SDP, SDU, SVM, VK).³⁵⁶ These coalitions lasted for an average nine months, and were more often than not haunted by diverse goals and tactics, internal fractiousness and personal rivalries: "The authoritarian nature of the Milosevic regime can partly explain why it survived for as long as it did, but the inability of the opposition

³⁵⁴ I.e. parliamentary elections of 1990, 1992, 1993, 1997, 2000; presidential ones of 1992, 1997 (thrice) and 2000; provincial ones in 1992, 1996, 2000; municipal in 1992, 1996, 2000; and, the referenda of 1992, 1998. Data from Thomas, R. 1999. *The Politics of Serbia in the '90s*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

³⁵⁵ Spoerri, M. Uniting the Opposition in the Run-Up to Electoral Revolution: Lessons from Serbia 1990-2000. Paper presented at the ASN annual convention, April 2008, 4.

³⁵⁶ From this alphabet soup of parties, among the most important (in term of electoral support and political clout) were DS (Democratic Party and its leader Zoran Djindjic), SPO (Serbian Renewal Movement and Vuc Draskovic), DSS (Democratic Party of Serbia and Vojislav Kostunica), GSS (Civic Alliance of Serbia of Vesna Pesic) and NPR (National Radical Party-not to be confused with the much more influential Serbian Radical Party, headed by the ultra-nationalist, Hague-imprisoned Vojislav Seselj). Distinguished among non-coalition major political players were Milosevic's SPS (Socialist Party of Serbia) and his wife's, Mirjana Markovic, JUL (Yugoslav United Left). If the list seems long, note that currently (2009) the number of registered parties in Serbia is 446. Election information and data obtained by the author in person, from CeSID (*Centar za Slobodne Izbore i Demokratiju*-Center for Free Elections and Democracy) in Belgrade, Serbia.

Additional information from <http://www.drzavnauprava.gov.rs/pages/registar.php?mode=active> and <http://www.parties-and-elections.de/serbia2.html>

to find common ground or offer a viable political alternative completes the picture. The conflicting personalities and egos of the main leaders of the opposition –Djindjic, Draskovic, Kostunica-resulted in repeated failures to build unified coalitions or even consolidate victories over Milosevic, such as in the aftermath of the demonstrations in early 1997...[Besides, he] was willing to use coercion against domestic opponents. Moreover, most Serbs saw the opposition leaders as just another group of power-hungry individuals not much different from Milosevic. The growth of *Otpor*, a student organization group founded in October 1998, provided the necessary impetus for the opposition to mount a unified stand against Milosevic...”³⁵⁷

A legacy of social protest

Nor was it for lack of protesting. Stemming from a rich history of social protest [including, among others, Belgrade in early 1968, the ‘Croatian Spring’ of 1970, the Albanian protests in 1981, as well as the mass rallies in Novi Sad, Belgrade and Titograd (present-day Podgorica) in 1988 and 1989], the decade of the 90’s for FR Yugoslavia was riddled by a series of episodes of social discontent.³⁵⁸ They ranged from the first dynamic but doomed mass protest in 1990 to the culminating huge rallies that succeeded in peacefully toppling Milosevic in 2000. Indeed, June 1990 witnessed the first 70,000-strong joint opposition protest rally (spearheaded by the SPO, which demanded the resignation of major state-puppet television executives); the following March, street violence erupted after opposition demonstration was attacked by police, and army tanks interfered.³⁵⁹ This demonstration also failed because the parties failed to obtain support beyond their narrow political constituents.³⁶⁰ Students also protested vividly in these two years, once in tandem, and once with the opposition.³⁶¹ In June

³⁵⁷ Pavlakovic, V. Serbia Transformed? Political Dynamics in the Milosevic Era and After. In Ramet, S. and Pavlakovic, V. (eds.) *Serbia since 1989*, 25.

³⁵⁸ Author interview with Sociology professor M. Lazic, Belgrade, September 2007.

³⁵⁹ Glenny, M. 1993. *The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War*. New York, NY: Penguin Books, 51-58.

³⁶⁰ Lazic, M. The Emergence of a Democratic Order in Serbia. (In Lazic, M. (ed.) *Winter of Discontent: Protest in Belgrade*. Budapest: Central European University Press, 1999), 13.

³⁶¹ *Ibid*, 3, 11-12. Also, see Nikolayenko, O. The Learning Curve: Student Protests in Serbia, 1991-2000. Paper presented at the 11th annual graduate workshop at the Kokkalis Program for South-Eastern and East-Central Europe,

1993, one of the main opposition leader, SPO's Vuk Draskovic and his wife, were arrested and beaten by the police after disturbances outside the federal parliament. The following two years witnessed dramatic events-the deepening involvement of Serbia in the war in Bosnia, the Croatian blitzkrieg in Krajina, and the Dayton accord-the impact of which (e.g. economic and monetary collapse, huge influx of refugees, international isolation) contributed to the dampening of protest spirit.

1996-7 and 2000: case studies

But in March 1996, Belgrade again became the site of protest, and an opposition parties' major rally earlier in that year would lay the foundations for the *Zajedno* coalition and its cycle of political demonstrations. Whereas *Zajedno* was defeated in the federal elections by a Red (and eventually, Brown) coalition,³⁶² the electoral picture of the municipal contests of the same November yielded a different picture. The coalition claimed victory in most cities and towns across the country only to see the authorities attempt to nullify the results-action which sparked a reaction of increasingly populous daily marches and mass protests by citizens and students in Belgrade and elsewhere in Serbia. In December 1996, Socialists and Yugoslav United Left organized counter-demonstrations (especially in Belgrade) to provoke violent confrontation, and in early February 1997, police violently intervened to disperse *Zajedno* gatherings in Belgrade, before a deal was reached later the same month, confirming its municipal victories. Parallel student protests in Belgrade carried into March, until their demands for university reform were considered. One of the results would be the DS's Zoran Djindjic election as the mayor of Belgrade-that is until (following elections boycotted by most liberal democratic opposition parties) September of the same year, when the coalition's implosion cost him his office.

Harvard University, February 12-13, 2009, at

<http://www.hks.harvard.edu/kokkalis/gsw/2009/Leadership/Nikolayenko%20Paper.pdf>

³⁶² In the November 3rd, 1996 elections for the federal parliament (of 138 seats-108 to 114 of which were contested in Serbia), the left coalition (SPS, JUL, ND) received 45% (64 seats), the Radical Party 19% (16 seats), and *Zajedno* 23.8 (22 seats) of the vote in Serbia. Data from CeSID, and Cohen, L. J. *Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milosevic*, 250-1.

Political instability and social protest continued hand-in-hand: In October 1997, presidential elections were declared invalid due to low turnout,³⁶³ and early in January 1998 violence broke out in the capital of Montenegro, as organized opponents attempted to prevent the public inauguration of Montenegro's president Milo Djukanovic.³⁶⁴ Initially muted due to the 1998-99 confrontation by the regime and NATO over Kosovo, the protest spirit again picked up, especially with the founding of the opposition youth group *Otpor* in October 1998. In the course of the two years that followed, *Otpor* conducted a vast number of public actions and civic protests, and is widely credited for pressuring a hitherto fragmented political opposition to unite ahead of the next electoral battle, and for energizing an otherwise timid and apathetic electorate.³⁶⁵ Furthermore, *Otpor* activities, in conjunction with work done by domestic NGOs, attracted, recruited and eventually helped mobilize and sustain large crowds, which were crucial for the presidential election showdown of late 2000 on three counts: they convinced (i) the public that opposition to Milosevic is possible (ii) the opposition that it must unite, (iii) the electorate that electoral victory is tangible, and (iii) the regime's elites that the game is up. It is to the two major cases sketched above that this chapter now turns: the 1996-7 *Zajedno*-student and the 2000 *Otpor* one.

³⁶³ This trend would continue with two failed presidential elections in late 2002.

³⁶⁴ Based on chronology in Thomas, R. *The Politics of Serbia in the 90s*, ix-xiv.

An earlier protégé of Milosevic, from 1996 onwards (while Montenegro's Prime Minister) Montenegrin President (1998-2002) Djukanovic fell out with his Serbian counterpart over Serbia's domination of the remaining two republic Yugoslav Federation. The latter would embark on a course-adopted by Montenegrin leadership-of political distancing from Belgrade (with boycotting federal elections, etc.), that culminated with the transformation of FR Yugoslavia into the Serbia-Montenegro confederation (2002) and, eventually, Montenegrin independence (2006).

³⁶⁵ 'Yugoslavia's Presidential Election: The Serbian Peoples' Moment of Truth.' ICG Balkans Report No 102, September 19, 2000, 7.

PYRRHIC VICTORY: THE 1996-97 *ZAJEDNO* CIVIC-STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS

Zajedno forms

Following the signing of the Dayton accord in November 1995 which effectively terminated the war in Bosnia and signalled the end of most international sanctions, 1996 appeared a year of promise and renewal for government and opposition alike in FR Yugoslavia. Milosevic hoped to recast himself as a world statesman who had helped stabilize the region after four years of horrific civil strife (notwithstanding the fact that he, himself had been largely responsible for this destabilization). Anticipating an election call, the major opposition leaders also saw an opportunity to challenge what they considered his disastrous record and to turn the page for the country. A multi-opposition party rally in Belgrade on March 9³⁶⁶ set the tone and gave some hope that, after years of mutual distrust and undermining, the opposition might finally unite. Despite their deep programmatic differences and deeper personal antipathies, the main figures of the fragmented democratic opposition scene, Vuc Draskovic of the Serbian Renewal Movement, Zoran Djindjic of the Democratic Party and Vesna Pesic of the Civic Alliance of Serbia (to be joined later by Vojislav Kostunica and his Democratic Party of Serbia, or, DSS) finally agreed to come together in September 1996 and form *Zajedno* ('Together').³⁶⁷ This latest attempt in a series of opposition coalitions, aimed to face off with Milosevic in both federal and municipal elections scheduled for early November. Whatever euphoria this agreement produced, however, was short-lived. The abrupt (and suspicious) withdrawal of the opposition's star candidate Dragoslav Avramovic³⁶⁸ from the head of its ticket, less than a month before the elections bore an ill omen for the coalition's electoral fortunes. Other signs also foretold trouble for *Zajedno*: The few incidents of police intimidation (a journalist was arrested and beaten up, bus workers on strike were forcibly expelled from a Belgrade location and their

³⁶⁶ Thomas also discusses a 10,000-strong *Zajedno* rally in March 1996, in SPS-stronghold city of Niš. In Thomas, R., *The Politics of Serbia in the '90s*, 271.

³⁶⁷ Ibid, 277.

³⁶⁸ He was the former head of Yugoslavia's National Bank, credited with helping stabilize national finances, and whose candidacy had been a compromise between strong and divergent political egos.

union chairman-a *Zajedno* candidate-arrested) indicated that the regime would not go down without a fight. Worse, the exclusion of *Zajedno* representatives from local election committees, which left the tallying exclusively in Milosevic's people's hands³⁶⁹ showed it was willing to be pro-active about leaving the elections to chance.

Indeed, the federal leg of the dual elections on November 3, proved this foreboding correct, as the 'left coalition' of the Socialist Party of Serbia, Yugoslav United Left and New Democracy emerged victorious in the polls. Municipal election results producing no clear majority for any side, a second round was scheduled for November 17. The reasons for the defeat on the federal level included the following: (i) the purposeful, strategic redesigning of electoral districts by the government to pair huge rural areas—peasants being traditionally pro-Milosevic—with urban centers, to nullify the latter's pro-opposition voting effect; (ii) the abstaining of Kosovo Albanians, which left the overwhelmingly pro-regime Serbs deliver all the province seats to the Socialist Party; (iii) the opposition's complete lack of "...control of the electoral process in numerous places, which provided sufficient opportunity for electoral fraud"; as well as its (iv) "insufficient organization, shortage of resources, absence in remote places and lack of access to the main media."³⁷⁰

Election results annulled, civil protests begin

At the same time, many of the above factors were minimized during the municipal run-off, especially in larger urban centers where an educated middle class was much more sympathetic to the opposition, and where, despite its internal fractiousness, *Zajedno* had a more visible presence, better organization and get-out-the-vote mobilization potential. As a result, according to local council polls taken by the opposition, on the November 17 second round of municipal elections across Serbia, fifteen of its eighteen major cities and towns voted for *Zajedno* candidates.³⁷¹

³⁶⁹ Ibid, 281.

³⁷⁰ Lazic, M. The Emergence of a Democratic Order in Serbia. In Lazic, M. (ed.) *Protest in Belgrade*, 13.

³⁷¹ Overall, the opposition carried 34 municipalities (the largest, most urban ones), compared to 144 ones (overwhelmingly rural and less populous) won by Milosevic's SPS.

The regime's reaction was swift as it was blunt: It simply refused to accept defeat. Following the Socialist Party's questioning of the 'regularity of the election process and results in numerous constituencies across the province' on November 18, within the following two days, the elections commission made clear its intention of annulling the election results.³⁷² But in its bluntness, it was also callous and arrogant, assuming its actions would be passively accepted. As a result, what begun in Belgrade on November 17 as a celebration of opposition victory, was transformed in the city of Nis on November 19 into the first reaction against annulment, and then moved back to Belgrade on the 21 with a 20,000-strong peaceful demonstration rally and protest walk.³⁷³ Eventually this reaction would become a daily routine consisting of two parts. The first consisted of a citizens' '*setnje*', a festive 'promenade' with whistling, kitchen kettle-banging and chanting.³⁷⁴ Coordinating by word of mouth or telephone, marchers would meet their family and friends at a designated place every evening at 7:30 to begin their 'walk' and/or 'noise-making'-their 'obligation' as one put it.³⁷⁵ Symbolically, in Belgrade, the promenade would often terminate outside the RTS-Radio Television Serbia-buildings. The second was an opposition-organized rally on some specific location. On November 24, *Zajedno's* Belgrade victories were declared null and a special third round of elections was proposed. But the opposition refused to comply and appealed to protesters to carry on.³⁷⁶

Protest: students join in

While declaring their neutrality, and only wanting the 'expressed will of the citizens respected', students from the University of Belgrade also began a parallel

³⁷² Bogdanovic, M., Milovanovic, L. and Shrestha, M. Chronology of the Protest, *Ibid*, 211. Also, 'Serbia Annuls Local Victory by Opposition.' *The New York Times*, November 25, 1996.

³⁷³ *Ibid*. According to accounts, all three-Djindjic, Pesic and Draskovic-initially found themselves unprepared and surprised at these spontaneous demonstrations, as they did not believe the coalition would do as well electorally. Kesic, O. An Airplane with Eighteen Pilots, in Ramet, S. and Pavlakovic, V. (eds.) *Serbia since 1989*, 100.

³⁷⁴ Vejvoda, I. 'Civil Society versus Slobodan Milosevic: Serbia, 1991-2000', (in Roberts, A. and Garton Ash, T. (eds.) *Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-Violent Action from Gandhi to the Present.*), 301.

³⁷⁵ Gordana S., Belgrade citizen interviewed by the author, Belgrade 2007. The reason for beginning at exactly 7:30 pm was because the RTS news bulletin was starting at the same time.

³⁷⁶ Naegele, J. 'Serbia: Mounting Mass Mobilization makes Mockery of Milosevic Misrule.' In *RFE/RL*, Nov. 9, 1996.

protest the following day.³⁷⁷ Much more imaginative than the political opposition's gatherings climaxing into dry speeches, their protest was inspired by a long-standing street theatre opposition culture in Serbia and (for example the unfurling of a 100-metre long black cloth in the streets of Belgrade in 1993 to commemorate the war dead) and included impromptu happenings, carnival-like atmosphere and humour. It '...drew yet more references from the surreal antics of Monty Python³⁷⁸ and the more unorthodox demonstrations during the overthrow of Communism in other Eastern European countries, like Estonia's 'Singing Revolution'³⁷⁹ or Lithuania's 'laugh-in' protests, when citizens in the capital Vilnius directed synchronized cackles at occupying Soviet troops."³⁸⁰ Soon after the Belgrade ones, student solidarity protests also sprang up in Nis, and in the month to follow university bodies in Novi Sad, Pristina and a few others elsewhere across Serbia and Montenegro also initiated smaller, similar protests. Students intended to keep their protests separate from opposition ones for strategic and ideological reasons. As one member of the student protest committee admitted, "it's better not to support the opposition right now because the government will say that the students are being manipulated by politicians." At the same time, another stated that, "we are fighting for democratic rights. We don't support the opposition but we don't support the ones who won the elections in an illegal way. We simply want the will of the people to be respected."³⁸¹

Indeed, many of the leaders and participants in the student protests were also dissatisfied with the established centrist and moderate opposition parties...³⁸² and this dissatisfaction was shared beyond the students.³⁸³ It is characteristic that about a third (30.3%) of those 'photographed' in a political profile of the 1996-7 protest participants,

³⁷⁷ Ibid, 212.

³⁷⁸ See Radinovic, K. Leteci Cirkus Madjionicara Pocetnkia, in Cupic, C. (ed) *Duh Vadrine: Kultura Protesta* (Gradanski i Studentski Protest 96-97.) Beograd: Cigoja Stampa, 1998.

³⁷⁹ Beissinger, M. R. People Power Tactics in the Baltic States, 1987-91, (in Roberts, A. and Garton Ash, T. (eds.) *Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-Violent Action from Gandhi to the Present*), 234-35.

³⁸⁰ Collin, M. *This is Serbia Calling; Rock'n'Roll Radio and Belgrade's Underground Resistance*. Updated 2nd edition. London: Serpent's Tail, 2004, 105.

³⁸¹ Petar Kosanovic quoted in McKinsey, K. 'Serbia: Student Protesters Stay Clear of Opposition.' In RFERL, Dec.9, 1996.

³⁸² Cohen, L. J. *Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milosevic* (2nd ed.). Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002, 252-3.

³⁸³ According to B-92 radio station's Julia Glyn-Picket, 'One mistake that everyone made was to give the opposition the benefit of the doubt.' In Collin, *This is Serbia Calling*, 129.

were not affiliated at all with *Zajedno* and/or other parties and their more limited, pragmatic goals.³⁸⁴ The latter's leaders had not ruled out, at least initially, 'pacting' solutions, much to the chagrin of students and activists who, through their mobilization efforts sought the goal of as complete and as clean a break from the *ancient regime*, culminating in a vaguely formulated 'complete transformation' of Serbian politics. For example, in a late 1996 interview to a foreign magazine, Djindjic was quoted as saying that, 'it would be easier to restore the economy together with Milosevic because you would not have to overthrow the regime, you could reform it from within. But he has been deaf to all our offers on our side and now it is too late for him.'³⁸⁵

The cracks in the apparent alliance between students and the political opposition became more visible when Draskovic called one of the student leaders an 'idiot' for claiming the student wing of the protest was not self-motivated.³⁸⁶ Yet, despite their disagreements, bickering and lesser coordination, opposition party members and students still went out on the streets to protest together with disaffected voters, pensioners and other ordinary citizens. As for the students, in particular, their own protests would inevitably also become part of the greater movement to oppose the annulling of the election results and the regime itself, with both positive (appearance of a unified anti-Milosevic front and its inspirational effect) and negative (a tarnished image, through their perceived co-optation by the opposition coalition) results.³⁸⁷ Regardless of intentions, the students' overall presence (accounting for 21% of participants in the whole protest)³⁸⁸ *was symbolic and significant, for, when they 'joined the civil protests, a movement was formed whose breadth apparently surprised even the opposition parties.'*³⁸⁹ Recognizing the potential importance of a student dimension, a parallel 'independent student movement' was being set up by the regime.

³⁸⁴ Pro-*Zajedno* supporters were polled at 38.4% of the sample of protesters. Babovic, M. Potential for an Active Society (in Lazic, M. (ed.), *Protest in Belgrade*), 42.

³⁸⁵ *Die Welt*, in German Newspaper News Service. Quoted by Cohen, L.J., *Serpent in the Bosom*, p. 253.

³⁸⁶ *Ibid*, 256-7.

³⁸⁷ Collin, M. *The Time of the Rebels*. London: Serpent's Tail, 2007, 15. Also, in McKinsey, K., 'Serbia: Protesters Detest Milosevic, Lukewarm about Opposition.' In RFE/RL, December 9, 1996.

³⁸⁸ Babovic, M., in Lazic, M. (ed.) *Protest in Belgrade*, 39.

³⁸⁹ Lazic, M. The Emergence of a Democratic Order in Serbia. In Lazic, M. (ed.) *Protest in Belgrade*, 19. He reiterated as much in interviews with the author (Belgrade, September 2007).




Figure 10: Zajedno-Student Loci of Protest, 1996-1997

The vast majority of protests occurred in Belgrade.

Source: author field research

Overall, it is accepted that the student and activist dimensions of the protests 'spawned a new and young anti-regime leadership group, or counter-elite, which clearly wished to bring about the collapse of the existing regime and a fundamental shift in the direction of Serbian political life.'³⁹⁰

Protest: collision course

Indeed, when, on November 27, the third round of elections was held, the opposition not only abstained, but for the first time, through a speech by Vuc Draskovic, echoed the students and expanded its demands in asking for Milosevic's resignation. On November 29, Belgrade students also upped the ante by adding to their wide list of demands a more concrete one-the resignation of the openly pro-regime rector and student vice-rector of the university. As tangential as the demands by the established opposition and the students were, they came out to the streets together, united by their degrees of opposition to their common foe. By November 30, the crowds of Belgrade citizens were estimated at between 100,000 to 200,000. Frustration seemed to mount, and in some marches against the RTS building, eggs and stones were hurled at its windows, despite the organizers' appeals for calm.³⁹¹

Initially the regime had tried to ignore the protests, counting on deteriorating weather to deter their prolongation and a 'total media blockade' to 'insulate the core areas of SPS support in the countryside from the subversive events taking place in urban Serbia.'³⁹² Unable to disregard them any longer, while still hesitant to use violence, it moved on to action. On December 1st, the president [speaker] of the Serbian Parliament labelled the protests, *"destructive, violent and marked by everything that characterizes pro-Fascist groups and ideologies [...] the worse of this is their [Zajedno] manipulation of the children. We*

³⁹⁰ Cohen, L.J. *Serpent in the Bosom*, 253.

³⁹¹ Collin, M. *This is Serbia Calling*, 111.

³⁹² Thomas, R. *Serbia Under Milosevic: Politics in the 1990s*, 290. The typical attitude was 'We do not report it, ergo it does not exist.' Quoted in Collin, M. *This is Serbia Calling*, 110.

had an opportunity to see a scenario of this kind in Kosovo, as well as throughout our history--remember when Hitler came to power."³⁹³

Incendiary statements like the above were followed by the first waves of arrests (by December 2nd the official tally was 32 protesters arrested, 4 sentenced) and by the (at least temporary) suppression of independent media, like Radio B-92³⁹⁴ (December 3rd) and Radio *Indeks* in Belgrade, and BUM 93 in Pozarevac (Milosevic's birthplace and political stronghold).³⁹⁵ Protesters reacted, and on December 5th, the first effigy of Milosevic in prison clothes made its debut in the Belgrade opposition demonstrations, telegraphing the scope--or at least, the long term desired end-result--of its demands.³⁹⁶ By mid-December, *Zajedno* claimed that pro-opposition protests were held daily in no less than 29 cities across Serbia. Around that time, counter-demonstrations began to appear in no less than ten. Whilst there is little evidence to doubt their local origin--after all, they were held in smaller cities where Milosevic enjoyed both the population's sympathies and the monopoly of information (RTS)--the larger, more urban 'spontaneous' counter-rallies were old-school Socialist affairs--sporadic pre-choreographed public events organized by the government, who bussed in Belgrade significant numbers of out-of-town supporters to manifest their support for the regime. The one planned for December 24 as a parallel demonstration against an opposition rally was seen as a critical show of support for the regime. 10,000 busses were allegedly provided by the Socialist Party, and while 'the SPS information service claim[ed] this party [wa]s not organizing the rally [...] almost all its municipal branches

³⁹³ Lazic, M. (ed), *Protest in Belgrade*, 214.

³⁹⁴ Radio B-92 was also deemed an important independent medium because in November 1995 it had established *Opennet*, the first internet service provider in Serbia, and was using it ever since as a window to the world, bypassing state-controlled media 'managed' reports, especially when shut down. It is estimated that by the end of 1996, about 10,000 Serbians had access to the internet; a humble start, yet a start. According to some student in Belgrade, '...if they shut down the Belgrade server we can directly modem the information overseas. To stop that they will need to shut down every telephone in Serbia--which is impossible.' And, 'this was the first test of whether global electronic interaction could undermine a dictatorship' (In Collin, *This is Serbia Calling*, 113-4). B-92 would repeatedly become a target of the authorities including during the 2000 campaign.

³⁹⁵ Ibid, 214-5. In terms of media suppression, an interesting exception of the prevailing climate was the resignation of the Information Minister, Aleksandar Tijanac on December 5, allegedly for disagreeing with the pressure exerted to independent media. Meanwhile, the total blackout of the protests from television stations was abandoned by state-controlled television stations, only to be replaced by a 'concerted effort to discredit the protesters.' In Thomas, R. *Serbia Under Milosevic*, 293.

³⁹⁶ Dejan Bulatovic, the effigy-carrier was later arrested, imprisoned and reportedly tortured by the authorities. Ibid, 216-7.

receive[d] applications for free transport to Belgrade.³⁹⁷ As the two rallies were to be held very close to one another (*Republika* Square for the 200-250,000 people-strong opposition rally, the neighbouring *Terazije* Square for the 40-60,000 of pro-government forces), this was very dangerous tactic by the ruling regime, tantamount to-almost certainly, deliberately-bringing fire close to a fuse.³⁹⁸ Undeniably, the episodes of violence and shootings that took place among the two sides (a total of one dead and 58 wounded) formed the perfect excuse for the Interior Ministry to ban 'disruptive' protests in the streets (pedestrian roads excluded), allowing only student protest walks, until December 28 (when they were themselves also prohibited).³⁹⁹ But even these measures did not forestall a massive opposition rally on the 31 of December (about 200,000 to 300,000 people), which demonstrated the persistent nature of the protesters and the enduring power of their demands. Successive mass rallies in Belgrade (especially in Orthodox Christmas and New Year's Eve, on January 6 and 13 respectively) and smaller in a few other Serbian cities, as well as mounting diplomatic pressure from the European Union and the OSCE (which had provided a mission to investigate the allegations and had just come up with a damning report for the regime) indicated to an increasingly uncomfortable Serbian government that this issue would not dissipate easily.

The Regime: containment

Yet, before considering any compromise, Milosevic's government tried its forceful hand once more, both in rhetoric-by way of lambasting the opposition in the state-run media-and in action.⁴⁰⁰ While it abstained from organizing further parallel mass protests that could ignite into clashes, it intensified the formal banning of

³⁹⁷ Allegations by a *Zajedno* member during a protest rally, quoting confidential information from a closed SPS meeting. Ibid, 220.

³⁹⁸ Significantly, the RTS reported only the pro-government 'For Serbia' rally, blatantly overestimating its size as close to 500,000. Ibid, 221.

³⁹⁹ Perlez, J. 'Defying Milosevic, Thousands March in Serbian Capital.' *The New York Times*, Dec 27, 1996.

⁴⁰⁰ The regime continuously used the media under its control to try to discredit and attack *Zajedno* and the protesters associated with it, and would not refrain from this practice, even after it attempted a strategic compromise. For example, see Milosevic wife, Mirjana (Mira) Markovic's offensive comments in the newspaper *Borba*: "the opposition wants only to seize power and behaves like 'diseased animals'". In *RFERL*, February 20, 1997. For an interesting portrait of her, see Tanner, M. 'Mirjana Markovic: The Balkans' Own Lady Macbeth.' *The Independent*, April 8, 2001.

protests, which were coupled with the cordoning-off by the police, of the pedestrian downtown streets where the University of Belgrade is located. This was an attempt to box-in the student protests and cut-off citizen protesters supply from the greater city, in the hope they would fizzle out. Its main success was to produce tense daily stand-offs between police forces and university students, as well as greater violence with citizens beyond the security perimeter (as citizens invited by the students to 'cordon the police cordon' were met with violence by security forces). Such events, with police resorting to coercive means to contain and demoralize protesters, replayed in a small number of locations elsewhere in Serbia-most notably in Kragujevac. In all, violent police action (ranging from forcefully dispersing the crowds to beatings) took place on December 27, January 20, 23 and the 25, before the police cordon was finally withdrawn on the 27.⁴⁰¹ But it was repeated on February 2, when police used tear gas and water jets to brutally dissolve two opposition rallies (resulting in the beating, among others, of one of the opposition leaders, Vesna Pesic) and to break into the Faculty of Philosophy, violating the university sanctuary. These continued clashes between protesters and police the following day drew more negative comments by the international community⁴⁰² and amplified the pressure on the regime to resolve the crisis between a protest-fatigued opposition and a government seen to rely increasingly on its violent coercive apparatus.

The Regime: compromise

On February 4, in what would be later recognized as a shrewd plan to regain full control, Milosevic finally appeared to be giving in. Purportedly out of concern for maintaining Yugoslavia's good international relations, he suggested a special law (*lex specialis*) to acknowledge the opposition's municipal victories and relieve the pressure

⁴⁰¹ 'Police Attacks Groups of Marchers in Belgrade.' *The New York Times*, January 26, 1997.

⁴⁰² It is interesting, however, to note that, in the spirit of stabilizing the state and allowing for a national government to begin working, the international community was far less sympathetic to calls for rejecting the results of another flawed election, in nearby Bosnia-Herzegovina also in the Fall of 1996. O'Connor, M. 'Bosnia Election Results Certified by West Despite Fraud Charges.' In *The New York Times*, September 30, 1996.

from his regime.⁴⁰³ By proposing this special law, Milosevic thus retained the appearance of being above the fray, his image as ultimate arbiter in Yugoslav politics unscathed. Further, the *specialis* nature of the law suggested this solution as a one-time fix, without implications about institutional reform. A protesting side, afraid of its demonstrations running out of steam,⁴⁰⁴ and divided in motives and goals, was thus tempted to opt for this smaller-scale victory, rather than reject it and push for more sweeping changes.⁴⁰⁵ Most importantly, as Milosevic was aware of the protest's ultimate goal, his removal, this move allowed him both to quell and contain the widespread protests, and to gain crucial political time in order to outmanoeuvre his opponents.

With the proposed law voted in on February 13, by the 15 the *Zajedno* and citizens coalition protest was over. Djindjic became mayor of Belgrade a week later, and many *Zajedno* candidates also assumed municipal offices across Serbia soon after. A dissatisfied student protest continued until March 7, 1997 (certified on March 19 and celebrated on March 20), when the University of Belgrade's rector and vice-rector resigned to satisfy the minimum of student demands. The students were convinced to end their own cycle of protests, but with the chant '*Slobo* [Milosevic], *you are next*.'⁴⁰⁶ All in all, the whole affair span between 88 (civilian protests, including citizens' daily walks and protest marches) and 120 (student protests) days, with organized groups from some factory workers briefly joining in on December 11, 1996 to give it an aura of a cross-section, cross-class movement against the regime⁴⁰⁷ (which, as a largely urban middle-class protest was all it could hope for). Yet, despite '*Zajedno*'s' apparent victory, intra-coalition relations that were often described as less than amicable, were

⁴⁰³ Hedges, C. 'Serbian President Accepts Victory by his Opponents' in *The New York Times*, February 5, 1997. Also, Cohen, L.J. *Serpent in the Bosom*, 259.

⁴⁰⁴ While a hardened core of protesters remained undeterred, by February 1997, the overall numbers of protesters in Belgrade had declined. In Thomas, R. *Serbia Under Milosevic*, 312.

⁴⁰⁵ Hedges, C. 'Milosevic's Enemies Find Serbian City Hall is Hardly a Stronghold.' *The New York Times*, February 7, 1997.

⁴⁰⁶ Bogdanovic, M., Milovanovic, L. and Shrestha, M. Chronology of the Protest, [In Lazic, M. (ed.) *Protest in Belgrade*], 227-29.

⁴⁰⁷ *International Herald Tribune*, 12 December 1996, 2, (in Jeffries, I. 1996. The Former Yugoslavia at the Turn of the 21st c. in *A Guide to Economies in Transition*. London: Routledge, 81).

deteriorated steadily.⁴⁰⁸ Following intensifying internal quarrelling and regime proposals for 'cooperation', ironically for its name, the 'Together' opposition coalition came apart.⁴⁰⁹

The Regime: cooptation

With Milosevic's move from the Serbian to the Federal Yugoslav office of the Presidency, elections (dual Serbian presidential and parliamentary ones) were called for September 1997. Numerous *Zajedno* coalition partners (DSS, GSS, Democratic Party, SLS, SNS) had agreed to boycott future elections, unless new strict OSCE-proposed rules for transparency were observed. But Draskovic's SPO had not been part of this deal, and exploiting this lack of opposition accord, Milosevic invited him to talks and enticed his party's participation to the elections, thereby effectively splitting the coalition. Indeed, 'the differing responses of the opposition parties to an announcement of new elections were symptomatic of the general fragmentation which now characterized the opposition political scene.'⁴¹⁰ By summer's end, formerly united DS and SPO supporters were pitted against one another in skirmishes during separate opposition rallies⁴¹¹, heralding in the disintegration of the opposition.⁴¹² The election results asserted this reversal of fortunes, giving the 'Left Coalition' backed by Milosevic the plurality of the votes, and triggering a bitter clash between Djindjic and Draskovic. The latter's party tabled an allegedly irregular motion on September 30 in the municipal assembly, to remove the former as mayor of Belgrade, and was promptly supported by Milosevic's Socialists and the Radical party. When that same evening 15,000 protesters gathered to protest this turn of events, they were beaten, including Djindjic himself, by large

⁴⁰⁸ 'A disparate grouping of liberals and Serb nationalists, who freely admit entering a temporary marriage of convenience in an attempt to break the left-wing monolith.' Borger, J. *The Guardian*, November 2, 1996, 2, quoted in Jeffries, I. *The Former Yugoslavia at the Turn of the 21st c.*

⁴⁰⁹ Borcanin, N. 'Serbia: Opposition Zajedno Movement in Disarray.' In *RFE/RL*, May 9, 1997.

⁴¹⁰ Thomas, *The Politics of Serbia in the '90's*, 344.

⁴¹¹ In one of them in Kraljevo, Djindjic himself was interrupted by SPO supporters throwing eggs at him; similar incidents took place in Belgrade. Ibid. 347.

⁴¹² The disintegration of Zajedno played not only on the leadership, but on the local levels, where, unlike the clash of personalities and personal philosophies, the conflict between opposition partners 'related to the distribution of offices...' and their translation into 'substantial economic benefits.' Lazic, M. *The Emergence of a Democratic Order in Serbia*. In Lazic (ed.) *Protest in Belgrade*, 22-23.

numbers of riot police.⁴¹³ Another attempt at a peaceful rally the following day was also met by violence by the regime, and protest quickly dwindled.

Aftermath

By October 1997, *Zajedno*'s most political and symbolic achievements had been reversed. Despite his SPS failing to win outright majorities in the September 1997 elections, Milosevic's power was substantially restored on the local level and sustained on the republican and federal ones; where it was not, opposition-run municipalities were punished.⁴¹⁴ Moreover, he had also scored a psychological victory, as he succeeded in establishing and asserting a more authoritarian mode of governing. By summer's end, his regime had begun closing down fifty five local radio and television stations.⁴¹⁵ Combined with an increased use of interior ministry resources-including violent deployment of riot police-for political purposes, the above contributed to his tightening grip to power. At the same time, his liberal opposition imploded, leaving the field to the far Right and Vojislav Seselj's Radicals.⁴¹⁶ They also got a taste of Milosevic's tactics, during the runoff in late December of the Presidential elections against SPS candidate Milan Milutinovic; their election observers in a number of polling stations were reportedly beaten by SPS supporters and the police. Massive electoral fraud by the regime was alleged, especially in Kosovo, but despite its acknowledgement by independent observers, the results stood, and there was little support gathered to protest them.⁴¹⁷ The year that had started with great promise for the liberal opponents of the regime was coming to an end with the future of any opposition looking quite bleak.

⁴¹³ Ibid, 353.

⁴¹⁴ For example, the budget of the city of Nis was reduced (much more drastically than in other cities) without explanation once the *Zajedno*-backed candidate took was restored to office. 'Budget cuts [were] not the only tool in the regime's arsenal of dirty tricks. In the winter of [1999] 2000 none of the opposition-controlled cities in Serbia would received any heating oil for their schools, hospitals and homes.' Seierstad, A. *With their Backs to the Wall: Portraits from Serbia* (Kartvedt, S., transl.) London: Virago Press, 2005, p. 203.

⁴¹⁵ LeBor, A. *Milosevic, A Biography*. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), 272.

⁴¹⁶ In the turbulent and fluid context of Serbian politics, the ultra-nationalist Seselj would later accept a deputy-prime minister position in Milosevic's government of national unity (1998-2000). Indicted as an alleged war criminal, he surrendered to the ICTY in 2003, his trial still (early 2010) ongoing.

⁴¹⁷ Specifically, police-brutality incidents were reported at the polling stations in Klina, Pec and Orahovac. (Nincic, R. Radikalna Kradja. In *Vreme*, January 3, 1998), quoted in Thomas, *The Politics of Serbia* in the '90's, 392.

Were the 1996-7 protests successful?

A comprehensive answer to this question may not be as straight-forward as it first appears to be. Technically, the protests managed to secure the immediate demands of reversing the decision by the regime to annul election results that had favored opposition candidates. However, not all protesters had the same demands, and regarding the student and broader goals of this mobilization (and reasons for many ordinary citizens to join), i.e. to bring about the resignation of Milosevic, this aim remained disappointingly unfulfilled.⁴¹⁸

Moreover, the movement remained largely urban-the protests limited mostly to Belgrade affairs (the slogan 'Belgrade is the World' connoting the main locus of protest, ironically hinted at the weakness of coordinating and sustaining action across Serbia), and did not involve other sectors (but briefly) or other regions (save a few notable exceptions) of the country. In terms of the student component, despite notable efforts by a few other student bodies (notably from Nis) to get involved, they were in their vast majority localized to Belgrade faculties, with variable demands, messy tactics and some internal strife. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the Serbian collective conscience-to the extent that one can refer to such a notion-and political historiography of these series of events, the 1996-7 protests have registered as a failure. At the very most, they can be viewed as mixed ones.⁴¹⁹ It was in reality a short-term truce between a conglomeration of different protesters and differing demands gaining a temporary reprieve (by way of the pacifying *lex specialis*-disguised as a capitulation) from the grip of a shrewd, manipulative regime. Milosevic emerged

⁴¹⁸ A sociological survey on the protests could give some idea of the range of protesters demands and motives. Among the responses of those surveyed (n=181), most important protest demands were recognition of electoral results (56.5%), the resignation of Milosevic (25.4%), democratization of society (21.8%), change of regime (18%) and media freedom (17.2%). Motives for joining the protest were a desire for justice and free elections (59.6%), overthrow of communism (23.8%) construction of a society similar to those in Western Europe (23.2%), and the overthrow of Milosevic's personal rule (17.8%). In terms of combined demands, 41.8% of the roughly 200 respondents asked explicitly wanted the resignation of Milosevic. Cvejic, S. General character of the protest and Prospects. In Lazic, M. (ed.), *Protest in Belgrade*, 62-3, 66. Accounting for all the above responses one can roughly estimate that the removal of the regime was demanded by between four and five out of ten protesters. In Cvejic, S. General character of the protest and Prospects. In Lazic, M. (ed.), *Protest in Belgrade*, 62-63.

⁴¹⁹ Cohen, L.J. *Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milosevic*, 252.

unscathed enough (not to mention confident, judging from the ease with which he sanctioned violence to contain the final protests on September 30) to regain political initiative and control that would, soon after, plunge the country into more crises. As a result, 'a deep and weighty hopelessness set in; a depression of overwhelming finality-a feeling that people had tried to change things...but they had failed and that now nothing would ever change. According to a prominent Serbian singer participating in the protests, 'We gave our very best for a while but didn't get anything in return. We felt used and desperate, and most of us don't feel we can trust anybody now.'⁴²⁰

⁴²⁰ Oliver Nektarijevic, quoted in Collin, *This is Serbia Calling*, 131.

THE PROTEST CHOICE OF A NEW GENERATION: *OTPOR* AND THE 2000 ELECTION

Having survived the 1996-97 *Zajedno* mass protests scare, Milosevic emerged in 1998 scathed but alive, his hold to power-however tenuous such power can be for an authoritarian who must rely at least partially on coercive means to maintain their ends-seemingly unassailable. It is not infrequent in political history, that such near-death political experiences by authoritarians invite hubris, all too often followed by nemesis.

Background: The Kosovo debacle

The beginning of the political demise of Slobodan Milosevic can be traced to the place where his ascent began: Kosovo. By 1998, completely disillusioned by Serbian intransigence to their earlier demands for greater autonomy, the Albanian majority seemed ready to provide the next act in the unfolding drama of FSR Yugoslavia's disintegration. Emboldened by Belgrade's apparent concessions towards Bosnia and Croatia in the recent Dayton agreement, radicalized by political instability in neighbouring Albania proper and by a prevailing populist irredentism, and fuelled by a buoyant illicit goods and arms smuggling trade, a sizeable number of Kosovo Albanians decided armed struggle was the path towards realizing the goal of independence. The self-styled guerrilla Kosovo's Liberation Army (UCK) had been formed and (often initiating and) involved in sectarian violence since 1996, but by early 1998 its attacks intensified, prompting a typically heavy-handed Serbian response that escalated the crisis. During the same summer, heavily armed police and special units tried to weed out UCK fighters from Kosovo Albanian villages, but their indiscriminate violence triggered a mass exodus of Albanian refugees. Belgrade's actions in turn forced NATO to threaten to intervene, arguably to prevent massacres and ethnic cleansing aiming to purge Serbia's cradle from Albanians. Despite last-minute attempts, like the Rambouillet conference in early 1999, a divided Kosovo Albanian delegation and defiant Serbs, taking a queue from Milosevic failed to reach an agreement. To put an end to the increasingly horrific violence from both sides, and the ensuing large-scale

ethnic cleansing operations by the Serbian forces in late March NATO conducted a sustained bombing campaign that continued until early June, when Milosevic conceded to the alliance's terms of evacuating his forces from Kosovo, turning it into a UN protectorate.⁴²¹ Milosevic still tried to claim victory – after all, he did thrive in periods of crises; *'We did not give up Kosovo'*, he stated in a broadcasted speech soon after-and benefited, at least briefly, in terms of domestic popularity from the 'rally-behind-the-flag' phenomenon.⁴²²

The question of degree of eroding effects of the NATO bombing notwithstanding,⁴²³ the politics of 'victorious capitulation' could only take him so far. Despite Milosevic's boasts and embarking into an ambitious (if dubious)⁴²⁴ program of reconstruction, the country remained internationally isolated, with significant parts of its infrastructure shattered and its economy in shambles. Further, his indictment, in late May 1999, in the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague, for war crimes in Kosovo, provided an opening to the international community to design a policy of assistance to opposition to Milosevic.⁴²⁵ According to a senior British diplomat, *"We could say the world is not against Serbs, and that Milosevic was the only thing stopping normal relations."*⁴²⁶

⁴²¹ LeBor, A. *Milosevic, A Biography*, 290-93.

⁴²² A week after the war, a whopping 46% of respondents in an opinion poll conducted by Serbian magazine *NIN* seemed to take Milosevic on his word that he had emerged victorious from the conflict (*NIN*, no 2529, June 17, 1999). While this popularity began to evaporate and the majority of those subsequently asked in opinion polls thought the ruling party at least partially responsible for the country's economic woes, a solid 21% still gave its staunch support to Milosevic. Reported by *BETA*, June 21, 1999. Both opinion polls cited in Cohen, L. J. *Serpent in the Bosom*, 368 and 371, respectively.

⁴²³ While scholars routinely mention NATO bombings as a critical factor in bringing down Milosevic, many of his domestic opponents (with a perhaps understandable modicum of bias) disagree. Srdja Popovic, one of *Otpor's* co-founders, argues that the NATO bombing *"helped [Milosevic] to survive for more than a year [on the] one hand, and it slowed the process of getting Serbia back to Europe and to the world on the other. So the damage was double. Not to mention the massive damages of material resources, and human victims, which were absolutely senseless. Because that bombing solved nothing, absolutely nothing."*

At <http://www.aforcemorepowerful.org/films/bdd/story/Otpor/srdja-popovic.php>. Indeed, popular resentment towards NATO countries remained high after the bombing. *ICG Balkans Report 99 (Serbia: The Milosevic Regime on the Eve of the September Elections)*. ICG Balkans Report No 99, Belgrade/Washington/Brussels (August 17, 2000), 20.

⁴²⁴ For example, during a ceremony on May 29, Milosevic exalted the new bridge at Novi Sad as an unsurpassed engineering feat, completed in just 100 days. As a matter of fact, as a series of pre-fabricated blocks requiring only assembly, the bridge existed in storage for decades, build under Tito for fear of a Soviet attack. In *ICG Balkans Report No 99*, 14.

⁴²⁵ Cohen, L. J. *Serpent in the Bosom*, 372.

⁴²⁶ Interviewed by LeBor in November 2000. In LeBor, A. (2004), 296.

An ever-divided, ineffectual opposition

Nonetheless, the domestic opposition of established political parties at first did not fare well, displaying the same fatal traits of conflicting inflated egos, in-fighting and mutual mistrust that debilitated its chances during the *Zajedno* period. In particular, the feud between nationalist Draskovic and liberal-minded Djindjic (who had been seen by many as a traitor, due to his links with the 'West') continued, their differences in style and content of opposition politics evident even in their disagreement about initiating new street rallies (Djindjic favouring them, Draskovic opposing them). As a result, early post-bombing parallel anti-government rallies fell short of capitalizing on the momentum built to present a unified alternative to Milosevic. It therefore comes as no surprise that, for established opposition political parties, the period after the Kosovo bombings until the end of 1999 can be judged overall as a political failure. An example is opposition's bickering around the culminating mass anti-government rally called by Djindjic, Draskovic and the leader of the Serbian Orthodox Church for Belgrade in mid-August. This event was trying to build on a series of earlier gatherings (e.g. a 20,000-strong in Kragujevac on July 17, or a 25,000-strong in Nis on July 24, the sizes of which failed to meet the opposition's expectations) and to galvanize support against Milosevic, whom Draskovic had called on August 11th to resign.⁴²⁷ But, two days before the planned joint appearance, the latter pulled out of it, only to unexpectedly address the crowd at the day of the rally on August 19th and-amidst its jeering-offer his criticism of other opposition forces. An observer close to Draskovic's circle put it best: "There can be hundreds of meetings like this, but there is not a critical mass. People come and get it off their chests, and then they go home more quietly...Serbia has 178 parties and every party leader is an egomaniac. We have been very unlucky in both our Government and our opposition."⁴²⁸ Naturally the regime reveled at the picture of an opposition in disarray, but did not leave matters entirely on Draskovic, Djindjic and the other quarrelling leaders' hands, using force (late September) to disperse even dwindling demonstrating crowds. Thus, 'passivity, fear, and a struggle for survival were

⁴²⁷ International Herald Tribune, 19 July, 1999, 4.

⁴²⁸ 'Key Opposition Leader Joins Rally Asking Milosevic to Resign.' *The New York Times*, July 18, 1999.

the predominant emotions in the population. Much of the citizenry was cynical regarding the utility of predominant activism, or too fatigued and fearful of challenging the regime. This situation and Milosevic's control of his technology of domination prevented the opposition from gaining any substantial momentum.⁴²⁹ Consequently, the population remained disillusioned with both regime and opposition, longing but fearful of, as well as incapable for change. And here is where the role of the youth group *Otpor* becomes important.

'Otpor Stoko!' (*Resist, you idiot!*)⁴³⁰

The case of *Otpor* (*'Resistance'*) dates to its founding on October 10, 1998. Initially established as a university group to protest Milosevic's repressive University law (aimed at restricting the autonomy of academics, by giving the regime control over administration, new appointments, renewed contracts and tenure)⁴³¹, it soon transformed into a youth opposition organization dedicated to alert and prepare Serbian society for an impending political confrontation with Milosevic. Its action plan had initially multiple axes: To shake up public apathy, to awaken social resistance, to encourage and recruit members, while, at the same time, discredit, ridicule and delegitimize Milosevic; to help inform and mobilize voters (especially the half million voters eligible to vote for the first time in 2000); finally, to induce the coalescing of liberal political parties, so that the democratic opposition united and remained thus. With its striking visual symbol of a clenched fist, *Otpor* aspired to be a new type of Serbian movement: leaderless, decentralized, non-violent, direct action-oriented, both media-literate and media-savvy. Its lack of visible leadership and cellular structure implied a strategy of evading regime repression. 'Each local branch could carry out autonomous action, so if neutralized, others could carry on the mission. It was a strategy adopted partly out of fear that public faces could be targeted and eliminated,

⁴²⁹ Cohen, *Serpent in the Bosom*, 372.

⁴³⁰ The first slogan of *Otpor*, appearing on graffiti across Belgrade.

⁴³¹ A similar law concerning the media was also promulgated by the regime.

legally or otherwise.’⁴³² Its non-violence creed-part of its strategy for asymmetric conflict strongly influenced by the writings of Gene Sharp and his nearly 200 methods of non-violent action-aimed at neutralizing the hardware superiority of the regime.⁴³³ Its philosophy of action contrasted the traditional opposition callisthenics in rhetorical excess, and included deliberately provocative, often humorous, choreographed public events, like protests, street theatre and crowd-involving ‘happenings’ on both national and local issues. In the words of an *Otpor* activist, ‘*Dictatorships don’t like humour*’⁴³⁴ It was, in the words of another activist, a ‘demonstrative exercise’ approach with the goal of getting people involved:

*‘We liked toying with the extreme Left and Right, to have ironical distance built. I liked not to deal with them straight forward but culturally. That way, I am proud of engaging many people, in a non-political party way.’*⁴³⁵

Culture-especially music-was quite important. In its ‘search for a musical culture appropriate to the changed [post SFR Yugoslav] social order and appealing to its rural and semi-rural bases of support, the new nationalist elites [had] turned to neo-folk and its modern hybrid ‘turbo-folk’, which were heavily promoted by state-controlled media’⁴³⁶ Closely associated with the regime...musical tastes [thus] became an important signifier, not only of the distinction between urban and peasant culture, but also of orientation towards the regime...’⁴³⁷ As an early *Otpor* member said, ‘*It wasn’t about politics anymore; it was about culture.*’⁴³⁸ Indeed, although-as another veteran *Otpor* activist put it-‘*none of us were into folk*’, its choice of music in public

⁴³² Collin, *The Time of the Rebels*, 15.

⁴³³ See Sharp, G. *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*. Boston: P. Sargent Publisher, 1973; also, Sharp, G. *From Dictatorship to Democracy*. Cambridge, MA: Originally from Committee for the Restoration of Democracy in Burma (1994); 3rd edition by Albert Einstein Institute, 2008.

⁴³⁴ *Otpor* activist, Marco Mandic, interview with the author, Belgrade, October 2007.

⁴³⁵ *Otpor* activist and its PR director (1998-2000) Milja Jovanovic [no relation to Ceda Jovanovic], interviewed by the author, Belgrade, September 2007.

⁴³⁶ Neo-folk refers to the genre of newly composed folk music, defined by the use of styles and structures borrowed from various folk forms combined with pop instrumentations and arrangements. It is distinguished from authentic folk music, in which performers seek to reproduce music from folk traditions, and from ‘turbofolk’, in which instrumentation and arrangements borrowed from commercial dance and disco music dominate while a few folk elements remain. Gordy, E. D. 1999. *The Culture of Power in Serbia*. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 104-5.

⁴³⁷ Ibid.

⁴³⁸ *Otpor* activist, Marco Mandic, interview with the author, Belgrade, October 2007.

events was not simply a matter of personal musical taste. It responded with American music reflecting a culture of protest, individuality and non-conformism: From *Cure*, *The Smiths*, *New Order* and *Joy Division* to techno, *Sonic Youth*, *Nine Inch Nails*, *Nirvana* and *Rage Against the Machine*. “More like ‘Race Against the Regime’” laughs *Otpor* early activist and head of its PR section, Milja Jovanovic: ‘We constantly wanted shock value.’⁴³⁹

This non-violent public theatre action was coupled with innovative marketing tactics to attract media attention:⁴⁴⁰ all at once, it guaranteed bypassing, provoking and using the state-controlled media to redefine the context and content of the political discourse.⁴⁴¹ It also meant to capture the attention and reach, inspire and challenge the imagination of an apathetic and timid populace across Serbia.⁴⁴² Soon, the *Otpor* headquarters were flooded by volunteers, who upon receiving their ‘basic training’ of essential principles of non-violence and direct action, as well as publicity material with the *Otpor* ‘brand’ and slogans to distribute, returned back to their cities and towns to spread the message and expand the network by recruiting new members. Equally important, foreign support also began pouring in.⁴⁴³ Contributing towards the technical (e.g. computer hardware) and financial resources necessary (e.g. to attend the Halvey seminars, or for all this propaganda to be printed out and disseminated), external funding by a series of foreign NGO’s complemented the logistics of *Otpor* operations. With a rapidly growing reservoir of members and ample funding, it was finally ready to seriously take on Milosevic.

⁴³⁹ Interview with the author, Belgrade, September 2007.

⁴⁴⁰ One example was the street event where *Otpor* offered passers by cardboard telescopes to watch a falling star named ‘Slobotea’; when they peeked into the paper tube, a picture of Milosevic appeared (In Lebor, *Milosevic*, 303).

⁴⁴¹ Based on Sharp’s teachings and related guest seminars given in Budapest by retired US Army colonel, Robert Helvey, *Otpor* members were taught to focus on indentifying ‘the regime’s pillars of support-the military, the police, the education system and so on-and find out where they were most vulnerable, then design their propaganda and campaigns towards targeting them.’ In Collin, *This is Serbia Calling*, 33.

⁴⁴² Author interviews with senior *Otpor* members, Belgrade 2007.

⁴⁴³ There is a lot of speculation about the identities and extent of support provided by foreign NGOs, and equivocation in many responses of interviewed *Otpor* members themselves. The consensus among most publicized accounts of a donors list include IRI, USAID, AID, National Endowment for Democracy, Freedom House, and the German Marshall Fund. Foreign governments also provided political and financial assistance; ostensibly, according to one source, they also helped DOS with prearranged clandestine deals with the police, Yugoslav army and police forces to ‘block the response mechanism’ of Milosevic’s regime when mobilization time came. (In LeBor, A. *Milosevic*, 299).

Springing into action

While the established political parties' opposition-organized mass protest, especially during the fall and winter of 1999, proved ineffectual and feeble, *Otpor* -with its fresh approach to politics that kept emphasizing its recognizable logo and distinct group image, its disciplined message, provocative political marketing campaign style and grass root involvement-took initiatives to energize the public in a variety of ways. For example, a striking public action it undertook involved lots of *Otpor* members lined up, eyes banded, hands tied, in a queue, splashed in buckets of red paint symbolizing blood. *'The image was extreme, it made all the headlines. We went for visual effect. To achieve what? An ironic dialectic, to 'dramatize the feeling of being trapped.'*⁴⁴⁴ Another example, was during the summer of 1999, when, while political parties continued their bitter squabbling in public, the numbers in their rallies fizzling out, *Otpor* instead held in Nis a public birthday party for Slobodan Milosevic, 'accepting such gifts as prison coveralls and a one-way ticket to The Hague.'⁴⁴⁵ This was followed in October by a rock concert and frequent street activities aimed to keep the spirit of protest alive. One of its most impressionable *coup de theatre* included a mass gathering in Belgrade's *Republica Square* to 'celebrate' the Orthodox New Year (January 13) 2000. Specifically, *Otpor* circulated rumors of a surprise appearance by a 'mystery' famous artist, raising the expectations of the would-be gatherers. Instead, when the clock struck midnight the huge crowd was treated to a stark projection on a large screen of photographs of Milosevic's victims in black-and-white, their names narrated somberly;⁴⁴⁶ then, they were send off home early, admonished to think about change in the year to come, as up to that time nothing had changed and there was nothing to celebrate.⁴⁴⁷ More examples of such public actions throughout the year 2000 included:

⁴⁴⁴ *Otpor* member and its PR head (1998-2000), Milja Jovanovic, interview with the author, Belgrade, Sept. 2007.

⁴⁴⁵ In http://www.canvasopedia.org/legacy/content/serbian_case/nvc-serbia.htm

⁴⁴⁶ Unbeknownst at the time, the narrator recruited by *Otpor* members was a university Drama lecturer called Boris Tadic, later to become President of Serbia-Montenegro (2004-6) and of Serbia (2006-present). In Collin, *The Time of the Rebels*, 28.

⁴⁴⁷ Having missed them during the 2007 Serbia research field trips, I first met Srdja Popovic, Ivan Marovic and Slobodan Djinoic, pivotal founding members of *Otpor*, a year later on a cruise boat off Boston's harbor. In June 2008, we participated in a conference sponsored by Tufts' Fletcher School of Diplomacy and the International Centre for Non-violent Conflict, and, as usually the case in meetings between Serbs and Greeks, the atmosphere was cordial and

the first *Otpor* national congress—a parody of a totalitarian rally—on the same day SPS held its own convention; an impressively simultaneous posting (completed within one hour) of 60,000 anti-regime posters in 67 cities and towns across Serbia, to commemorate the anniversary of the NATO bombings (March 29); a country-wide ‘surrender action’ of turning over to police their membership lists, following a politician’s assassination blamed on *Otpor* by the government (May 13); a demonstration and parody of state news (July 17); another Milosevic birthday party with irony-filled ‘happy birthday’ festivities all across Serbia (August 8).⁴⁴⁸

Besides these staged, choreographed and coordinated public events, *Otpor* also succeeded in distributing on a regular basis hundreds of thousands of leaflets, posters, stickers with its logo and its striking anti-Milosevic messages through a network of volunteer members that had sprung all across Serbia. Covering the whole of the country gave the impression of a ubiquitous organization, the well-oiled machinery of which was checking the regime and could mobilize people rapidly and efficiently. And this was not far from the truth: while estimates vary, a safe approximation of the number of nation-wide *Otpor* volunteers by the Fall of 2000 is at least 45-50,000—a critical mass of people that could help mobilize great numbers in an election campaign.

relaxed; soon we were conversing as if we were friends for years. At the time, we listened to the music coming out from the cruise boat’s speakers, and both Srdja and I recognized U2’s song from Wim Wenders’ film *‘Far Away, So Close’* (the sequel to *‘Wings of Desire’* that includes a cameo appearance by Michael Gorbachev as a benevolent angel of change). I realized that Srdja was (also) a U2 fan, and, as I brought to mind an older U2 song (*‘New Year’s Day’*, from their 1983 *War* album), it suddenly hit me that U2’s lyrics *‘Nothing changes on New Year’s Day’* was quite likely one of *Otpor*’s main inspirations for the event that surprised Belgrade citizens expecting a party on the Serbian Orthodox New Year. It is entirely befitting that the original U2 song was itself inspired by the Polish Solidarity movement:

“All is quiet on New Year’s Day...Nothing changes on New Year’s Day...Under a blood-red sky/A crowd has gathered in black and white/Arms entwined, the chosen few/The newspaper says, says/Say it’s true, it’s true.../And we can break through/Though torn in two/We can be one.”

Naturally, the Solidarity movement itself—both its theoretical underpinnings (by Leszek Kolakowski on self-organization and civil society) and its empirical action (from 1980 to 1989)—served as one of the major inspirations to *Otpor*. The above ‘U2 hypothesis’ seems to fit with what Milja Jovanovic, one of the early creative brains of *Otpor*, who also designed the fist logo, told me back in Belgrade. *‘Ten of us had a brainstorming session before the New Year. We were very comfortable with each other, knowing we had full freedom to do anything and get away with it. The first idea was to involve a pop singer, Djordje Belasevic. ‘How about a coffin? He comes out of it?’ said one. The image stuck. We shouldn’t celebrate because there was nothing to be happy about. Nothing had changed. Instead we decided on projecting names of people killed during the Milosevic years, in white letters on a black background screen. They included Albanian, Hungarian names, as well. We tried all nationalities.’* [Interview with author, Belgrade 2007]

⁴⁴⁸ From Centre for Applied Non-Violent Action & Strategies (CANVAS), [a Belgrade-based network of mostly *Otpor* veteran-activists dedicated to supporting non-violent democratic struggles worldwide], during author’s research trip.

Finally, *Otpor* managed to have an impact on the narcissism of minor, or otherwise, differences between the leaders of the democratic opposition parties. Fearing a repeat of the *Zajedno* coalition implosion that allowed Milosevic's municipal-level power to be restored, *Otpor* also actively lobbied and pressured most major opposition parties to cooperate more closely. It was arguably a quite significant, if (or, precisely because) an outside force in inducing, in May 2000, the formation of DOS (*Democratic Opposition of Serbia*), an 18-party opposition coalition which began to coalesce in January 2000, and which had produced a joint declaration for elections (April 14). It is no accident that in a rally that month, all party leaders on the stage were urged to "hold up an *Otpor* flag and raise their fists...an *Otpor* member threatened that thousands of youths would demonstrate under the window of any one of them who betrayed the public by perpetuating their long-running internecine squabbles... [According to Ivan Marovic] '*we had to pressure them to remain united because we knew that if we relied on their reason and common sense nothing would happen...*'⁴⁴⁹

On the whole, in a relatively short period of time *Otpor* nation-wide daily activities, constant taunting of the regime and efforts to encourage active and concerted opposition to it began jolting out of its apathetic state a wide public audience. It also effectively demonstrated a lowered popular threshold for open defiance of the regime, and challenged its near-monopoly of information; as a result, it increasingly became a target of the authorities. With over 1,200 arrests of its members by June 2000,⁴⁵⁰ it became evident that it had captured Milosevic's attention and it was no longer just viewed as a nuisance but as a serious threat ahead of any future elections.⁴⁵¹

⁴⁴⁹ Collin, *The Time of the Rebels*, 41.

⁴⁵⁰ Serbia: The Milosevic Regime on the Eve of the September Elections. *ICG Balkans Report No 99*, Belgrade/Washington/Brussels, August 17, 2000, 2.

⁴⁵¹ According to the FR Yugoslav constitution, Milosevic had to call new elections three months before the end of his term in mid-2001.




Figure 12: *Otpor* Network by Region, 1998-2000

Source: author field research

The regime's response

Indeed, as soon as *Otpor*'s traction, especially with previously unmotivated, undecided voters became apparent, efforts at its countering became more concentrated, beginning with constant discrediting and demonization by state media. This priority reflected the great reliance of the regime on the effects of propaganda. Despite a majority of the population "being aware they were being subjected to [it]...they had adopted the basic 'truths' advocated by it, anyway... [There was also a] concern among people that if they challenge the accepted 'truths' too vigorously, they may cross the line dividing 'us' from 'them', the 'traitors and enemies.'" ⁴⁵² Epithets and descriptors like the latter ones, became popular in RTS and the state-controlled press' daily characterizations of the 'so-called democratic opposition': *Otpor* members were 'pro-NATO traitors', 'stooges', 'drug addicts', 'terrorists', 'CIA instruments', a 'fascist organization', ⁴⁵³ *Ustashe* ⁴⁵⁴ and 'deranged persons known for criminal acts'. ⁴⁵⁵ Soon, a black publicity campaign commenced against *Otpor*, with posters either portraying them as 'Madeline [Albright] Youths' (a uniform-clad 'Aryan' holding a modified Nazi flag with the *Otpor* fist in lieu of the swastika), or showing the iconic *Otpor* logo with dollar bills clinched in its fist and the slogan '*Bina narod a ne NATO*' (people choose, not NATO). But the regime's retro-communist propaganda mentality rendered itself an easy target. To the above, *Otpor* reacted immediately with a literally and figuratively street-smart poster counter-campaign, proclaiming both '*Resistance (Otpor)-Because I love Serbia*'. ⁴⁵⁶) and '*Narod bira a ne Mira*' (People choose, not Mira [Markovic, Milosevic's wife]). According to an *Otpor* activist involved with its advertising team, '*their thinking mode was really Stalin-time style propaganda. One of their mottos was a fund drive, 'Give a dinar for settlement', to which our advertizing team immediately met*

⁴⁵² ICG Balkans Report No 99, p. 20.

⁴⁵³ Ibid, 1.

⁴⁵⁴ Croatian Fascists, who persecuted Serbs during World War II. In *ICG Balkans Report* No 102, 7.

⁴⁵⁵ *Politika* (Serbian newspaper), May 8, 2000. On occasion, *Otpor* sympathizers were called 'enemies of the people', a communist accusation reminiscent of Pravda's articles in Soviet times labeling someone an 'enemy of the people'. In the latter case, such proclamations were tantamount to a death sentence, and it is no exaggeration to assume that similar *Otpor* characterizations aimed to at least agitate fanatic pro-regime readers into action against the opposition. With a circulation of 200,000 *Politika* was the most popular newspaper. The regime also controlled *Vecernje Novosti*, favorite among lower-middle class and rural readers, also across Serbia with an equally strong circulation.

⁴⁵⁶ Collin, *The Time of the Rebels*, 34-35.

to address; we countered it by the slogan 'give a dinar for retirement' [meaning Milosevic] to be printed on posters and made the theme of a street activity in Belgrade. There, we took a barrel with Milosevic's face and [passers-by could] throw in it a dinar for the chance to kick it/the face. Long queues were formed until the police came and the 'street performer' was arrested. It was repeated in other towns. People also were arrested there.⁴⁵⁷

Coupled with propaganda, the regime resorted to the use of violence against youth protesters and student activists by special police forces, regular police arrests and sporadic secret police 'informational talks' with suspected *Otpor* apprehended members. For example, in May, masked squads invaded and interrupted a student meeting at Belgrade's School of Architecture, beating students up; the following day checkpoints were established in many faculties to deny protesters entry into the universities' sanctuary.⁴⁵⁸ Yet, the regime's general heavy-handedness backfired badly. First, this time there was no apparent *Otpor* leadership to 'decapitate' or center to block so as to cripple the organization; each arrest of apparent leader prompted new events which embarrassed the authorities. Second, arresting rank and file members also frustrated the police, because of the sheer number of members nationwide and the 'noise' created. Those arrested had received training to give standardized vague, humorous responses to such questionings, while the mechanism of *Otpor* rapidly alerted local and national opposition forces and NGOs, and mobilized (often sending information by cell phone text messages) media, relatives, neighbours and legal teams to show up outside their places of detention and demand *habeas corpus* rights and the detainees' immediate release. The results bore more negative publicity for the regime and more positive one for *Otpor*; the crackdown was being used as a recruiting tool.⁴⁵⁹ An *Otpor* activist describes how he joined:

⁴⁵⁷ Another example was the typical election color poster with a *gros plan* photo of Milosevic, which cash-strapped *Otpor* quickly and cleverly high-jacked, by simply printing small black-and-white 'Gotov Je!' stickers and sticking them on the forehead of Milosevic's photo. *Otpor* activist, Nenad Belshevic, interview with author, Belgrade, 2007.

⁴⁵⁸ *ICG Balkans Report* No. 99, 3. Even within university walls, the JUL-sponsored KUL (Committee of the University's Left) student organization monitored fellow students' activities and tried to sabotage a series of protest activities, denouncing *Otpor* members as 'NATO servants' and traitors. *Ibid*, 13.

⁴⁵⁹ Collin, *The Time of the Rebels*, 42.

*"It was like in the movies. I was in the living room, watching news, about how bad this group was and what strange tactics they used against the regime. Something clicked. I told myself: 'Tomorrow morning you will go to Otpor office to join.'*⁴⁶⁰

A similar example of how it used publicity in its advantage involves a deliberately leaked *Otpor* rumour that propaganda leaflets were being delivered to its main Belgrade offices. When police raided them, with the invited television cameras rolling to capture the activists red-handed, they discovered the boxes were all empty—an *Otpor* hoax that invited ridicule for the police and more popularity for the group. According to a police officer, 'the movement spread very quickly...and its courage caused panic in the police.'⁴⁶¹

Overall, the regime's nervousness was reflected by its manifold response—typical in an authoritarian state. Besides apprehending *Otpor* 'suspects', it also included extensive takeovers, or, harassment of media outlets',⁴⁶² sporadic 'violence to put down street protesters...'⁴⁶³ and direct (police repression) as well as indirect (through state-controlled press) intimidation of *Otpor* and political opposition leaders'.⁴⁶⁴ The resulting climate of fear and uncertainty was compounded by a series of high profile assassinations of politicians and journalists—at the time believed (and later confirmed) to be carried out, or at least sanctioned, by the regime.⁴⁶⁵

⁴⁶⁰ *Otpor* member, Nenad Belshевич, interview with the author, Belgrade, September 2007.

⁴⁶¹ In Cohen, R. Who Really Brought Down Milosevic? *The New York Times*, November 26, 2000.

By June 2000, as part of Milosevic's attempts to consolidate his police force, police-issued official identification was replaced with new id's including 'a text authorizing the bearer to request identification documents, apprehend and take into custody any person, and enter premises and conduct searches without a court order.' In *ICG Balkan Report* No. 99, 9.

⁴⁶² A public information law enacted around the NATO crisis in late 1998 was invoked to curb and suffocate independent media by way of exorbitant fines (in Erlanger, S. 'Milosevic Mounts an Election-Year Crackdown on His Critics.' *The New York Times*, February 21, 2000). In May 2000 the regime stepped up its efforts to control independent media sources by taking over Studio B TV and Radio B-92 (also by Erlanger, S. 'Opposition in Disarray as Belgrade Cracks Down.' *The New York Times*, May 26, 2000. In Pavlakovic, V. *Serbia Transformed? Political Dynamics in the Milosevic Era and After*. In Ramet and Pavlakovic, *Serbia since 1989*, 50. Also, see Collin, M. *This is Serbia Calling*, 269-70.

⁴⁶³ Gordy, E. *Serbia's Bulldozer Revolution: Conditions and Prospects*. *Southeast European Politics* 1, 2 (December 2000), p. 81, in Ramet, S. and Pavlakovic, V. (eds.) *Serbia since 1989*, Ibid.

⁴⁶⁴ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Newline (31 March 2000) online, quoted in Ramet, S. and Pavlakovic, V. (eds.) *Serbia since 1989*, Ibid.

⁴⁶⁵ Neither was a climate of fear and uncertainty new in Belgrade, nor were political assassinations before (e.g. the murders, in April and October, 1997, of Deputy Minister of the Interior, Stojicic and JUL General Secretary, Todorovich, respectively; of Slavko Curuvija (of the anti-regime newspaper '*Dnevni Telegram*' and the first editor who had given a front page to *Otpor's* cause) on Easter Day, April 1999; of Milosevic's mentor and later rival, former

Milosevic's final response to the brewing atmosphere of crisis and open dispute of his authority was political.⁴⁶⁶ In a surprise tactical move designed to deny his opponents adequate preparation and coordination time, in July he suddenly changed the constitution to allow for popular election of the Yugoslav president, hitherto elected by the parliament, and called for early elections.⁴⁶⁷ Promising 'Peace, Reconstruction and Continuity',⁴⁶⁸ he declared solemnly, '*It's me or NATO*', the answer to be decided on September 24th.⁴⁶⁹

Election battle lines drawn

Rather than divide or, boycott the elections-as Montenegro's President and Milosevic political foe declared he would do-the democratic opposition decided to contest them united. Under public (and *Otpor*) pressure and weary of late *Zajedno's* spectre (and spectacle), by August 6, DOS agreed on a single candidate, the (relatively, compared to the political landscape to his right) moderately nationalist DSS leader, Vojislav Kostunica.⁴⁷⁰ His selection was based on the premise that he was untainted by corruption, he was not a former Communist, and that he did not hold pro-Western positions; he, thus, appeared more likely to beat Milosevic at the polls. Most importantly, his soft nationalist appeal (during Western-style campaigning across the country, partially to circumvent state-control media's unfavourable coverage of his run) gave him traction with rural voters away from Serbia's urban centers, where Milosevic's political strength had migrated.⁴⁷¹ Thus, by the time of the election, the

Serbian president Ivan Stambolic, on August, 2000; and of the apparent assassination attempt against Vuc Draskovic in Fall 1999) and after (Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic assassination in March 2003).

⁴⁶⁶ On the crisis atmosphere, in a tip of the hat to Structuralist theories of Revolution, note that during the summer of 2000, Serbia experienced one of its most serious droughts which drastically reduced crops.

⁴⁶⁷ Pavlakovic, V. Serbia Transformed? Political Dynamics in the Milosevic Era and After. In Ramet, S. and Pavlakovic, V. (eds.) *Serbia since 1989*, 26.

⁴⁶⁸ ICG Balkans Report 102, 2.

⁴⁶⁹ Judah, T. 'The Crumbling of the Milosevic Fortress.' *The New York Times*, September 26, 2000.

⁴⁷⁰ For a critical assessment of Kostunica's nationalism, see Cigar, N. *Vojislav Kostunica and Serbia*. London: Saqi Books/The Bosnian Institute, 2001.

⁴⁷¹ Note that most of the election was fought in Serbia; in Montenegro, its president Djukanovic had called for a boycott against Serbian domination of FR Yugoslavia's politics, and indeed, the September 24, 2000 election turnout was only about 25% in Montenegro, contrasted to Serbia's more than 78%. In Ramet, S and Pavlakovic, V. (eds.) *Serbia since 1989*, 28. For a comprehensive review of Serbian-Montenegrin relations during the FRY years, see Lukic, R. From the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the Union of Serbia and Montenegro (Ibid).

above had opened up for him a significant lead over the incumbent, and provided the confidence that he could well be FR Yugoslavia's next president. Failing to come to an agreement, Draskovic's SPO party decided to run its own presidential candidate and did not participate in the DOS coalition. While participating in the government, Sezelj's SRS Radicals also fielded their own candidate, but as polls suggested their impact would not be great, as the race centered on Milosevic and Kostunica.

Meanwhile, the snap presidential election call also failed to catch *Otpor* and civil society groups unprepared.⁴⁷² Instead, they agreed on and embarked on a dual-task campaign (anti-Milosevic publicity operations, and 'get-out-the-vote' drive). According to an *Otpor* activist,

*"We see it as our task to get as many people as possible out to vote, because 80% of the population is willing, is actually asking for a change of this regime. And even though they are not all oriented towards the opposition, they know they are not supporting the regime of Slobodan Milosevic either... Otpor is particularly targeting the some 500,000 young people who have not voted in previous elections, many because they were not yet eighteen, others because they felt alienated from the system."*⁴⁷³

Besides public actions, extensive distribution of literature, and door-to-door visits, in association with DOS, *Otpor* organized the 'Rock the Vote' program of over 40 concerts, aimed to attract, entertain, educate and excite young, first-time voters.⁴⁷⁴ In tandem with these activities, a vast number of NGOs -mostly under the 'Izlaz (Exit) 2000' coalition umbrella-that were anxious to avoid a repeat of the 1996 municipal elections vote-stealing and annulment-prepared to set up parallel voting tabulation stations to monitor the vote.⁴⁷⁵ By having awoken its awareness and aroused the public, and by

⁴⁷² As a matter of fact, *Otpor* sympathizers within the regime had anonymously tipped the youth organization off via email a week before this plan was announced. This early warning allowed *Otpor* to have ready 60 tons of election-related material ready for public distribution by the day of Milosevic's surprise election call. In Cohen, R. 'Who Really Brought Down Milosevic?' *The New York Times*, November 22, 2000.

⁴⁷³ Milan Samardzic, quoted in Naegele, J. 'Yugoslavia: Otpor Launches Get out the Vote Campaign.' In *RFE/RL*, July 7, 2000.

⁴⁷⁴ *ICG Balkans Report* No 102, 19 September 2000, 22.

⁴⁷⁵ Following the examples of Slovakia (OK '98), Croatia (GLASS '99) civic campaigns, the Izlaz 2000 effort to build and sustain a broad NGO and international community donors coalition was initiated by the Bratislava Process. See Demes, P., Forbrig, J. and Shepherd, R. (eds.) *Reclaiming Democracy: Civil Society and Electoral Change in Central and Eastern Europe*. Washington DC: The German Marshall Fund, 2007.

having cultivated a nationwide network of volunteers ready to help, *Otpor* paved the way to an electoral contest that would prove difficult for Milosevic to manipulate. Even Kostunica, 'hardly known as a charismatic politician, [took] a cue from *Otpor* in attempting to break down people's fear of speaking out' denouncing openly the regime not only for its policies, but also its tactics and integrity concerning the coming elections.⁴⁷⁶ Ultimately, on Election Day an estimated more than 30,000 volunteers (many of them *Otpor*) showed up to monitor 10,000 polls.⁴⁷⁷ *Otpor* also defined the agenda of the whole campaign. Coming up with the slogan '*Gotov Je!*' ('*He is finished!*'), myriads of simple yet slick (and very popular) stickers and posters in black-and-white flooded Serbia and set the tone of the elections: a referendum on Milosevic, its conclusion foregone.

In the face of this concerted effort, the regime's crackdown intensified,⁴⁷⁸ and by the day of the elections, over 2,000 of *Otpor* activists had been arrested, its central and many local offices, as well as those of CeSid and other NGOs raided.⁴⁷⁹ But it was too late. Such arrests and police over-reaction only succeeded in bringing out more *Otpor* sympathizers, and sway public opinion in favour of the youth organization and its goals.⁴⁸⁰ 'Once parents saw that children like theirs were being busted for wearing a t-shirt with a fist logo, and noticed that these neighbourhood youths were probably not clandestine agents of the CIA, they began to question Milosevic, then turn against

⁴⁷⁶ ICG Balkans Report No 102, 19 September 2000, 22.

⁴⁷⁷ Interview with CANVAS members, Belgrade 2007.

⁴⁷⁸ In late August, a new 'defence doctrine' to 'prevent and eliminate internal crises and deterring potential foes' was announced by the Chief of the General Staff, General Pavkovic. (In ICG Balkans Report No 102,14). On September 17, Pavkovic warned that '*army troops will prevent any attempt by street protesters to seize power after the elections.*' BETA news agency quoted by BBC News (September 17, 2000). Yet, a less than a week later, he stated that the Yugoslav armed forces would accept Kostunica as president if he were to win the September 24 elections. 'Yugoslavia: Military Accepts Opposition Candidate.' In RFE/RL, September 9, 2000.

⁴⁷⁹ Besides *Otpor* and NGO members arrested, the leader of the small Civic Alliance party was also apprehended. On number of those arrested, see '*Organizing Demonstrations Outside of Police Stations After Arrests of Activists.*' In Canvasopedia at http://www.canvasopedia.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=435:organizing-demonstrations-outside-of-police-stations-after-arrests-of-activists&catid=231:articles&Itemid=32 Some *Otpor* members, like its self-styled 'marketing director' Ivan Andric, put the number of arrests higher at 6,000. (From <http://www.aforcemorepowerful.org/films/bdd/story/Otpor/ivan-andric.php>)

⁴⁸⁰ An iconic example of civil political conflict is a family with divided loyalties, such as the Popovic (no relation to Srdja) one profiled in Cohen's November 2000 New York Times article (cf. above) with one brother being a police officer, the other an *Otpor* member. In 1996 the parents had voted for Milosevic. 'Dragica [the mother] thought they would vote for Milosevic again-until they saw what happened to their son [arrested] in the local police station...'

him.’⁴⁸¹ Nor did his late charm offensive (of lowering food prices by 15% and embarking on a housing construction program for the young-aimed to entice young couples away from the protests, and to keep police and soldiers loyal) seem to work.⁴⁸² Already trailing Kostunica in opinion polls,⁴⁸³ by the time of the election the tide had turned irreversibly against Milosevic.

From Election Day to Judgement Day

On September 24, approximately 2.5 million voters went to the polls. Mindful of the regime’s past electoral alchemies, to pre-empt official announcements that could try to establish an improbable pro-Milosevic result as a fact, election monitors announced their estimates of a clear and decisive Kostunica victory. Estimates varied between 51.3 to 54.6% for Kostunica over approx. 35 to 37.1 % for Milosevic.⁴⁸⁴ Nervously, the government first claimed Milosevic had won outright; then, that no candidate had received an absolute majority of the votes and that he was ahead; finally, that Kostunica was in the lead, but that nonetheless a run-off election would be required on October 8th. This travesty made it clear for all to see: electoral results had been falsified.⁴⁸⁵ *‘When we began recording packages of votes from penal and correctional institutions’,* said N. Dinic, a Nis district court magistrate, *‘the security guards prevented us from seeing the ballot papers, saying they were acting on orders from the president of the Commission.’* Three hours after the polls closed, he resigned in protest from the Federal Election Commission.

Now it was DOS’s turn to act: it refused to accept a second turn (SPO and SRS also agreed), called for a general strike, and-against foreign advice-warned Milosevic to

⁴⁸¹ Collin, *The Time of the Rebels*, 44-45.

⁴⁸² ICG Balkans Report No 102, 13.

⁴⁸³ *Agence-France Presse* report, September 10, 2000.

⁴⁸⁴ *Blic* (Belgrade), September 27, 2000; also *The New York Times*, October 6, 2000, p. A14. In Ramet, S. and Pavlakovic, V. (eds.) *Serbia since 1989*, 50. Seselj’s SRS and Draskovic’s SPO candidates came a distant third and fourth with 5.9 and 2.9% respectively (data from CeSid).

⁴⁸⁵ Bujosevic, D. and Radovanovic, 2003. I. *The Fall of Milosevic: The October 5th Revolution*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 5.

respect the results and peacefully surrender power by October 5th.⁴⁸⁶ A September 27 rally drew 300,000 DOS supporters, while on the 29th, about 13,000 coal miners from Kolubara (50 km away from Belgrade, providing 50% of the country's electrical power supply) were persuaded to go on strike-a crippling blow to Milosevic's efforts to contain the opposition's appeals. When Milosevic sent riot police to enforce production at the mine, declaring Kolubara 'Serbia's Gdansk',⁴⁸⁷ miners called out for solidarity and 20,000 protesters from nearby towns-a mobilization assisted by *Otpor* activists-arrived to render their support to the sounds of *Otpor*'s mantra 'Gotov Je!'⁴⁸⁸ Army and police units-clearly unhappy with their orders-were called to restore the mine to work, but to no avail. One police commander said: *"I'm fed up with this. After this, I'm throwing my hat away and going home. The police in Serbia are more democratic than you think."* Another addressed the miners: *"This is a mess. Don't worry, everything will be all right."*⁴⁸⁹ On the morning of October 4, despite ordered otherwise, Vladimir Ilic, deputy commander of the Police brigade from Belgrade, refused to fire on striking miners at Kolubara. Later the same day, Colonel Bosko Buha, the commander of the Police Brigade, talked with the miners, and at 4pm, protesters were allowed to break through a police cordon beyond the mine.⁴⁹⁰

The final showdown took place on October 5th in the federal capital. Following the work done by *Otpor* to mobilize the public (including the distribution of thousands of stickers and leaflets declaring 'Blockade!', 'Barricade!' and 'No Pasarán!'), the final push was in the politicians' control, and DOS called Serbians to coalesce to Belgrade and demand Milosevic's resignation. It also 'assembled armed 'task forces' of former policemen and soldiers'⁴⁹¹ in case of violence by the regime's security apparatus.⁴⁹²

⁴⁸⁶ Erlanger, S. 'Civil Disobedience is Planned to Try and Force Milosevic Out.' *The New York Times*, September 29, 2000. Nevertheless, on September 26, DOS also voted to meet his force with force, if it came to that: *'If he fires, we will fire'*. Ibid, 176-80.

⁴⁸⁷ Collin, M. This is Serbia Calling, 218.

⁴⁸⁸ In Marinkovic, D. Strike at Kolubara: A Case Study. *South East Europe Review for Labor and Social Affairs* (SEER), 3, 2003: 41-71.

⁴⁸⁹ Erlanger, S. 'Serbian Strikers Joined by 20,000 Face Down Police'. *The New York Times*, Oct. 5, 2000.

⁴⁹⁰ Bujosevic, D. and Radovanovic, I. *The Fall of Milosevic: The October 5th Revolution*. Chronology of events, 176-80.

⁴⁹¹ Collin, *The Time of the Rebels*, 54.

⁴⁹² The situation en route to, and in the capital was extremely tense. A number of Serbian citizens, not affiliated with DOS (or *Otpor*, which stood by its basic tenet of non-violence) interviewed by the author (2007) admitted to carrying

People from all Serbia travelled to the capital by any means possible, including truck and bulldozer drivers who would use their equipments to clear any obstacles placed by the police or the army.⁴⁹³ Having been approached by the opposition (and by way of informal ties that local politicians and volunteers had cultivated with mid-level army personnel), the army units guarding the roads remained passive and neither disobeyed nor obeyed official orders, effectively allowing traffic through.⁴⁹⁴ As a result, by mid-day, the Belgrade was swarmed by people, estimated at more than a million people, outside the parliament, shouting '*Gotov Je!*' Similar deals were struck between Zoran Djindjic, by then one of DOS's main leaders, and two senior special and police forces officer, to avert an attack against the gathered masses.⁴⁹⁵

Other opposition members had independently reached similar understandings with the police guarding the building that they would defect, and once the DOS-

whatever weapons they had at home to Belgrade. One interviewee stated they and seven neighbors formed an impromptu group with concealed weapons and travelled to the parliament to 'protect it from Milosevic's thugs.'

⁴⁹³ 'I took a convoy of hundreds of vehicles from Nis-cars, lorries, tractors. Along the way others joined in. On the road north, to Belgrade, we met people from Vranje, Leskovac, Pirot and Kragujevac...We were too many to stop, too many to be afraid of anything...' Nis mayor, Z. Zivkovic, quoted in Seierstad, A. *With their Backs to the Wall: Portraits from Serbia*, 214.

⁴⁹⁴ In cases where the police refused to let the protesters' convoys pass, they were simply brushed aside. One telling episode involved protesters ordered by a police chief at a road block to turn back. 'Then one of them approached the police chief at the roadblock and, without a word, slapped him twice across the face as he instructed him to move. In a telling illustration of how psychological power had shifted from the regime to the opposition, the police moved out of the way.' In Erlanger, S. and Cohen, R. 'From a Summons to a Slap: How the Fight in Yugoslavia Was Won.' *The New York Times*, October 15 2000.

⁴⁹⁵ Every 'pacting' involves some moral compromise [in the words of Ernst Gellner, 'it is the price of the velvet' in these velvet revolutions (see homonymous chapter in Gellner, E. *Encounters with Nationalism*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1994)], but, while critical, one of these deals proved, alas, a Faustian one. Djindjic's after hours meeting at the Ministry of the Interior was short and smooth :

'We have been ordered to use the Wasps and the Hornets,' the senior police officer told him.

"And?" asked Djindjic.

"And we're not going to obey it."

Still, an earlier meeting between him and the notorious chief of the Red Berets (JSO –Special Operations Unit), Milorad 'Legija' Ulemek, was much more tense:

"It's going to be a mess", said Legija. "The orders are extreme."

Djindjic was calm. "All right. What should we do?"

"Don't fire at the police. Don't charge the barracks." Legija was curt.

"All right," promised Djindjic, "we wont."

"Your word?"

"My word."

(In Bujosevic, D. and Radovanovic, I. *The Fall of Milosevic: The October 5th Revolution*, pp. 27-8). This agreement could also be tacitly interpreted as some quid pro quo of Legija not obeying Milosevic's orders and a later victorious DOS not going after him and his paramilitaries. When Djindjic, later as Prime Minister of Serbia tried to bring them to justice, 'Legija' appear to have been instrumental in his assassination in 2003.

designated 3pm deadline for Milosevic to reply (he had not) passed, a group of protesters comprised of former soldiers and *Otpor* members decided to take action, coming face to face with an armed riot police force assigned to protect the parliament.⁴⁹⁶ Someone shouted, *'come on, fuck it! They can't kill us all. Let's go!'* shouted someone from that group, and they attempted a first charge of the federal parliament building.⁴⁹⁷ The riot police responded briefly with tear gas and a few live rounds. Pushed back, some began to turn away, only to hear *Otpor's* Stanko Lazendic, swear at them:

'Fuck you! You haven't come all this way to run away now. Get back!' People were crawling around him. A cartridge landed at his feet. He kicked it off and walked off... *'side entrance. Let's go!'* he shouted. People began climbing down from the window above the door... The crowd rushed to the door. *'Here folks!'* he shouted, *'here's the entrance!'*⁴⁹⁸

Refusing to use further violence, policemen stepped aside to let them through. A larger crowd behind the first group followed, storming the building, where proof of fraud in the guise of boxes containing fake voting ballots was discovered.⁴⁹⁹ Another part of the protesters impulsively charged the RTS headquarters nearby, setting a fire and compounding its executive officer to make a live television plea to Milosevic to resign.⁵⁰⁰ Police forces on the scene refused to obey headquarters' orders to 'take further actions', and when the Special Operations Unit, ordered on the scene, arrived

⁴⁹⁶ Coordinating the police defection was Cacak's (100km north of Belgrade) mayor Velimir Ilic, a former SPO member who had parted ways with Draskovic and instead, led 10,000 volunteers from his region to the capital: *"I was fed up with these long meetings, where there's just talking and nothing happens and Milosevic stays in power. I wanted to do something. At a rally here the day before, I told the crowd, 'It's victory or death.' We were fed up living in a Milosevic state. We were sick of watching state Radio Television Serbia, and we swore we would march to RTS even if we got killed."* In Gall, C. 'Showdown in Yugoslavia: Friends in Need; How Small Town Turned Out for Kostunica at a Key Time.' *The New York Times*, October 8, 2000.

⁴⁹⁷ Bujosevic, D. and Radovanovic, I. *The Fall of Milosevic: The October 5th Revolution*, 86.

⁴⁹⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 90-91.

⁴⁹⁹ In the lower house assembly room, a police unit decided not to fight. They called their superior officer and asked permission to leave the building. "They were told to use all possible means to fight back [...]" But then the unit commander took off his side arm, and the others followed. "They put down their weapons and riot gear and left the building. In Erlanger and Cohen, *The New York Times*, October 15, 2000.

⁵⁰⁰ See the epilogue of this study for an anecdotal episode related to the fire at the RTS.

an hour later, the troops just saluted the crowds and left.⁵⁰¹ Both potent symbols of the regime were now in opposition hands.

In vain was Milosevic's chief of staff Nebojsa Pavkovic ordered to send in the army to retake the city from the protesters. When he and Secret Police chief Radovan Markovic considered such a plan, they were deterred by the unforeseen levels of violence that could be unleashed and its overall futility.⁵⁰² General Pavkovic was a Milosevic loyalist. But he knew many army officers would not follow orders to fire on the people.

*'Ultimately, even Pavkovic understood that there are certain limits in this kind of scenario. If you have a million people on the streets, all over Belgrade and Serbia, then the army cannot do anything. There is a threshold, a critical mass.'*⁵⁰³

So, 'he told Milosevic that if he ordered out the tanks, the next picture he would see would be of protesters on top of the tanks giving a flower to a crying soldier.'⁵⁰⁴ Subsequently, there was no reaction; the game was up. "With the army inactive, the Belgrade police collapsed. About 5:30 p.m., the commanders decided they could not fight the inevitable, and by 7 p.m., the order came over the police radio: *'Give up. He's finished.'*"⁵⁰⁵ By 11:30 pm, president-elect Kostunica, who earlier had begun his address to the hundreds of thousands-strong crowd with the phrase *"Good Evening, dear liberated Serbia!"* spoke to the nation from the 'new RTS'.⁵⁰⁶ Milosevic conceded in a televised message the following day and thus ended his reign of power, to be followed half a year later by his arrest and subsequent extradition to the ICTY in The Hague (where he had been indicted since May 1999).⁵⁰⁷

⁵⁰¹ Bujosevic, D. and Radovanovic, I. *The Fall of Milosevic: The October 5th Revolution*, 176-80.

⁵⁰² Sell, L. *Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002, 349-50.

⁵⁰³ Braca Grubacic (publisher of the VIP newsletter on politics, with former ties to Milosevic), quoted in LeBor, *Milosevic*, 311.

⁵⁰⁴ In Erlanger and Cohen, *The New York Times*, October 15, 2000.

⁵⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁶ Erlanger, S. 'Yugoslavs Claim Belgrade for New Leader.' *The New York Times*, October 6, 2000.

⁵⁰⁷ See ICTY's website, at <http://www.icty.org/sections/TheCases/KeyFigures#concdetails>

Aftermath

On November 1st, FR Yugoslavia was panegyrically admitted back into the United Nations,⁵⁰⁸ and -despite being plagued by infrastructural, financial and political (as many of the *ancient regime's* civil and security service remained in position) problems-its democratic transition spearheaded by *Otpor* and officially inaugurated by the events of the two weeks following the September elections begun. The Serbian Parliamentary elections held in late December witnessed DOS score a decisive victory that all but eclipsed the JUL, humiliated the SPS and brought to power Zoran Djindjic as Serbia's Prime Minister.⁵⁰⁹ Around the same time, the head of the State Security Service, Rade Markovic was indicted by the Serbian Ministry of the Interior for 'endangering Serbia's security, jeopardizing the safety of the public, and issuing personal threats.'⁵¹⁰ In what appeared one of the symbolic moves to mark the real end of the Milosevic regime, he resigned and was arrested in early 2001, soon to be followed by others, including Milosevic himself. Aspiring to a new era of democratic and transparent governance, in the summer of 2001 the new Serbian government declassified the first 50,000 files (divided under 'Terrorists', 'Extremists' and 'Internal Enemies') kept on dissidents, opposition leaders and other 'threats' to Milosevic's regime during his reign.⁵¹¹ It was to be a hopeful start. Yet, the citizens of FR Yugoslavia, then Union of Serbia and Montenegro, then Serbia faced daunting tasks ahead. In the decade that followed the euphoric events of October 5, 2000, the processes of (i) economic reconstruction (plagued by the oligopolistic legacies and practices of a criminalized state), (ii) democratic transition (marred by high profile assassinations, like that of Djindjic in 2003, and the rise of the ultra-nationalist Right) and (iii) nation-building (shaken by Montenegro's 2006 and Kosovo's 2008 declarations of independence) would take painfully long to get under way.⁵¹² Still, as an *Otpor*

⁵⁰⁸ 'A Different Yugoslavia, 8 Years Later Takes its Seat at the UN.' *The New York Times*, November 2, 2000.

⁵⁰⁹ Erlanger, S. 'Voters in Serbia Erase the Remains of Milosevic's Rule.' *The New York Times*, December 24, 2000.

⁵¹⁰ Including a direct involvement in the death of Slavko Curuvija and other prominent dissidents. *BBC news*, February 25, 2001.

⁵¹¹ Peric Zimonjic, V. 'Secret Police Files Released to the Public.' In Inter Press Service English News Wire, June 12, 2001.

⁵¹² 'Yugoslavia is Cheered but Faces Cheerless Times.' *The New York Times*, November 13, 2000.

activist put it, *'after October 5, 2000 we earned the ability and opportunity to make mistakes. I feel proud and satisfied. Serbia did a good thing.'*⁵¹³ On the tenth anniversary of the overthrow of Milosevic, then Serbian president-and secret narrator at the *Otpor* 2000 New Year 'celebration'-Boris Tadic agreed: *"Ten years after the formation of Otpor, which had a major role in the democratization of Serbia, when these young people took great risks to life itself, fighting for Democratic values, we can say that they succeeded."*⁵¹⁴

⁵¹³ Milja Jovanovic, interview with the author, Belgrade, September 2007.

⁵¹⁴ E.R. (staff reporter) 'Tadic: Otpor had an Important Role in the Reform of Serbia.' *BLIC* (Serbian Magazine), November 14, 2008.

CHAPTER FIVE

CASE STUDIES III & IV

FROM TO BLEAK TO BLACK (PORA) TO ORANGE: UKRAINE 2000-1 AND 2004

From the temporal vantage point of its birth on August 24, 1991, it is difficult to imagine many a nascent country beginning its life on the international scene with as debilitating a historical and political legacy as Ukraine. Having experienced-in the 20th c. alone-two murderous world wars, a revolution, counter-revolution and civil war, territorial dismemberments, a brutal totalitarianism, an induced punitive Great Famine⁵¹⁵, an unspeakable Holocaust,⁵¹⁶ a prolonged armed insurrection and a devastating nuclear accident, in the wake of its Soviet patron state's demise the newly independent country faced a Herculean task of overcoming the traumas, divisions and effects of its recent past to create a viable, functioning modern state. The years of the 'lost' decade or so that followed, marked by a hectic, frequently haphazard, often unwilling multiple transition from late Soviet authoritarianism were to prove bleak, turbulent and disquieting. Ukraine experienced tumultuous international relations and domestic ethnic divisions, 'muddled' economic reforms and crippling early hyperinflation, endemic corruption, electoral fraud and a political repression as (often but not always) light as it was unbearable. Yet, it somehow endured to provide the most celebrated case of a color electoral revolution.

Post-Soviet Ukraine: the first decade

The first years of Ukrainian independence were as confusing as the rapid succession of events in 1990-91 that had precipitated it in the first place. In these two

⁵¹⁵ I opt for Tony Judt's description in his *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2005). On debating the nature and status of the 'Holodomor' see Davies, R.W. and Wheatcroft, S. G. (2004) *The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture, 1931-1933*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, and, Graziosi, A.(2004-5) The Soviet 1931-1933 Famines and the Ukrainian *Holodomor*: Is a New Interpretation Possible, and What Would Its Consequences Be? *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*. 27, 1-4. Also, for the aftermath, see Kozlov, V.A.(2002) *Mass Uprisings in the USSR: Protest and Rebellion in the Post-Stalin Years*. (translated and edited by McClarnard MacKinnon, E.), Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

⁵¹⁶ The above receive great attention in Timothy Snyder's recent (2010) *Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin*. New York, NY: Basic Books.

years, Ukraine gained a parliament, a non-communist legal opposition, and a declaration of Ukrainian Sovereignty (March and July 1990, respectively), which culminated in a parliamentary vote proclaiming independence (and the banning of the Communist Party-both in August 1991) and a national plebiscite (December 1st of the same year) that overwhelmingly (with over 90% support) certified it. Leonid Kravchuk, the last chairman of the Soviet Republic's parliament (a former Ideology Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, UCP)- along with most from the old guard- transformed almost overnight into a Ukrainian nationalist politician, and leapt forward: First, to extinguish any hope that a reformed USSR could go on existing-- by undermining a referendum on the preservation of the Soviet Union, and then by rejecting along with Russia and Belarus Gorbachev's proposal for a new Union treaty in late December 1991⁵¹⁷--and second, to lead the young country.⁵¹⁸

The enormity of a multiple transition

Post-Soviet Union Ukraine was-to borrow Wilson's title phrase-in many ways, an 'unexpected nation', arriving at independence 'as much as by accident as [by] design',⁵¹⁹ already burdened by a set of heavy legacies, including the following: An formerly totalitarian, failed authoritarian political system complete with outdated institutions and antiquated Communist bureaucracy; a defunct command-economy system;⁵²⁰ the borders and regions of the former Ukrainian SSR and within them an amalgam of different people, cultures and orientations (from the fervently pro-Ukrainian, formerly Habsburg and Polish Galicia, to the still highly 'Sovietized' industrial

⁵¹⁷ Birch, S. *Elections and Democratization in Ukraine*. London: Macmillan Press, 2000, 72-73.

⁵¹⁸ This was the '*grand bargain*', whereby national Communist elites were allowed to stay in power, if they backed independence. Wilson, A. *The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation* (3rd ed.). New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 2009, 176.

⁵¹⁹ *Ibid*, 172

⁵²⁰ Despite its relatively small level of debt (US\$ 10 billion), in 1991 Ukraine SSRS had the second largest debt/GDP in the USSR (7.8%), which while miniscule compared to e.g. countries in Latin America at the time, was one of the troubling statistics as to the future country's transition. An early 1990s Deutsche Bank report (in)famously forecasted a bright economic future for Ukraine based on its resources, ignoring its infrastructure and capacity. For pre-Independence economic indicators, see Wertman, P. A. The External Financial Position of the Former Soviet Union: From Riches to Rags? in Kaufman, R. F. and Hardt, J. P. (eds.) *The Former Soviet Union in Transition*-Joined Economic Committee, United States Congress. Washington, D.C.: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), p. 402. Also see Osipian, A. *Economic Growth-Human Capital Nexus in Post-Independent Ukraine, 1989-2009*. MPRA paper 7731; Vanderbilt University (2008), Unpublished.

Donbas, to the zealously Russophile-and until 1954 an autonomous Russian republic-rural populations of Crimea)⁵²¹—an almost schizophrenic result of equal mix historical fate and Soviet (and before it, Tsarist) ‘Russification’ planning.⁵²²

The urgent need to forge a national identity (the so-called ‘nationalizing state’) that could balance between cultural, religious and ethnic population cleavages⁵²³ preoccupied the young country’s president, who, focusing on the above tasks, proved unable to handle the economic part of this already Herculean -at least-‘triple (i.e. the simultaneous political, economic and state-building) transition’ from Communism with success.⁵²⁴ Consequently, in light of the prioritized objectives of state- and nation-building, systematic and methodical economic, political and social reforms seriously lagged behind⁵²⁵ And in the first years of independence, Ukraine experienced a severe, protracted economic recession and a crippling hyperinflation (1992-5); even the (customarily more optimistic) official statistics showed a real GDP decline by 68%, industrial input by 52 % and capital investment by 74%.⁵²⁶ Add an anemic governmental capacity (plagued by Soviet legacies of an overlapping, inefficient bureaucracy, a centralized, hierarchical system of decision-making and powerless ministries) and a complex semi-presidential byzantine political system (of a president, a

⁵²¹ In 1989, the ethnic composition of Ukraine was officially 73% Ukrainian and 22% Russian. In Wilson, A. *Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation*, 148.

⁵²² That was in the central, southern and eastern parts. In what is now western Ukraine, before World War II under a Polish administration, a similar (albeit with variations in intensity, and not as murderous as the undeclared state of war between Ukrainian nationalists and the Soviets between 1945 until the 1950s) campaign of ‘Polonization’ was under way. Subtelny, O. *Ukraine: A History* (4th ed.). Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009, 428-30. Also, in Wilson, A. *Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation*, 129, and 147-151.

⁵²³ For a survey of cleavages between different Ukrainian regions, see: Katchanovski, I. *Cleft Countries: Regional Political Divisions and Cultures in Post-Soviet Ukraine and Moldova*. Stuttgart: Ibidem-Verlag, 2006; Popson, N. Regionalism and Nation-Building in a Divided Society. In Kuzio, T. and D’Anieri, P. (eds.) *Dilemmas of State-Led Nation Building in Ukraine*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002; Malanchuk, O. Regional Comparisons in Contemporary Ukraine. Paper presented at the annual ASN convention, Columbia University, New York, April 10-12, 2008.

⁵²⁴ D’Anieri, Kravchuk and Kuzio further dissect the state-building component into ‘questions of identity and the social and cultural definition of the political community’ (effectively distinguishing between state- and nation-building), thereby describing the post-Soviet Ukrainian one as a -highly complex and fraught with difficulties-‘*Quadruple transition*’. D’Anieri, P., Kravchuk, R., Kuzio, T. *Politics and Society in Ukraine*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999, 4-6.

⁵²⁵ On state- and nation-building processes, see Smith, G. Law, V., Wilson, A. Bohr, A. and Allworth, E. 1998. *Nation-building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: The Politics of National Identities*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Kolsto, P. 2000. Political Construction Sites: *Nation-building in Russia and the Post-Soviet States*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

⁵²⁶ Prizel, I. Ukraine Between Proto-Democracy and ‘Soft’ Authoritarianism. In Dawisha, K. and Parrott, B. (eds.) *Democratic Changes and Authoritarian Reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 348. Also, in D’Anieri, Kravchuk and Kuzio, *Politics and Society in Ukraine*, 92, 171.

prime minister and of a parliament packed with 'reformed', 'born-again democrat' communists--and later on, by business clan members), and this mixture all but guaranteed turbulent times ahead.⁵²⁷ Despite the need for bold leadership and innovative government practices necessary to manage the acuteness of the crisis that Ukraine faced, Kravchuk's often confused, indecisive politics, 'remained wedded to a very Soviet style of politics-clientelism, government as compromise between elites, divide and rule, the *kompromat* of opponents and an aversion of to viewing either the state or political parties as arenas of public accountability rather than a battleground for personal or group interests...'⁵²⁸ As a result, a continuously declining economy and related social dislocation precipitated early presidential elections in mid-1994.

Leonid vs. Leonid

Pitted in the second, final round of these midsummer elections, against the once UCP Ideology Secretary incumbent president--was the once communist-era missile factory director, Leonid Kuchma.⁵²⁹ The fact that the presidency would be wrestled among (and stay within) former communist *nomenklatura*, plus discouraging results from a pan-Ukrainian pre-election poll on the level of trust citizens had on their politicians and institutions, (with president Kravchuk topping the negative charts--trusted by 34% of those asked, as opposed to 59% who did not) left little doubt on the substance, style and public appeal level of the two political contestants.⁵³⁰ At the same time, highlighting both the vested importance in and distracting power of Ukrainian nation-building, this first post-Soviet contested presidential election focused not on the dismal economy--after all, Kuchma had a part in it, as briefly Kravchuk's prime minister in late 1992--but on matters of culture, ethnicity and national allegiance. Over-

⁵²⁷ D'Anieri, Kravchuk and Kuzio, *Politics and Society in Ukraine*, 98.

⁵²⁸ Ibid, p.183. Also in Aslund, A. Left Behind: Ukraine's Uncertain Transformation. *The National Interest* 73, Fall 2003.

⁵²⁹ Having come third with 13% of the vote in the first round, Socialist Oleksandr Moroz was eliminated from the race. Birch, S. *Elections and Democratization in Ukraine*, 96.

⁵³⁰ Others did not fare much better. Speaker Pluyshch was approved by 33% of respondents (vs. 58%), local power leaders by 34% (vs. 54%), trade unions by 31% (vs. 43%), political parties by 28% (whereas 46% had no trust in them). Only the Army's reputation appeared salvaged, as it obtained a 69% level of trust vs. 20%. Survey (n=1,799) conducted by the Democratic Initiatives Poll (February-March 1994). Cited in Kubicek, P. *Unbroken Ties: the State, Interest Associations, and Corporatism in Post-Soviet Ukraine*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2000, 46.

accentuating regional differences, (and setting a perilous precedent for future campaigns) Kravchuk portrayed himself as a Ukrainian patriot, whereas Kuchma appeared as a non-nationalist, Russophile (at least in terms of economic ties) candidate.⁵³¹ Ultimately, the incumbent (45%) was edged in the polls by the 'red director' (52%), and Kuchma's presidential reign began.⁵³²

Post-Communist competitive authoritarianism, Kuchma-style

Once in office, Kuchma focused on an economic stabilization plan, including monetary and tax reforms⁵³³, the mixed result of which reduced social programs and depressed wages, exasperating emerged societal and sectoral inequalities and prolonging negative growth. He also promoted the establishment of financial-industrial groups (FIGs-modeled after their Russian counterparts), which eventually further complicated economic development and domestic political struggle.⁵³⁴ During this early period in Kuchma's tenure, political battles were also fought; they included the question of Ukraine's reorientation towards the West, the struggle for power within and between executive, legislative and regional branches of government, and the debate over a new constitution (1996-following a protracted constitutional battle between the president and parliament over the 'Law on Power'). While a *prima facie* compromise that established a president-parliamentary system balancing between these two branches, it served to maintain a strong presidential position, and ultimately solidify a vertical structure of political power. Especially legislation passed in 1997

⁵³¹ Kuzio, T. *Ukraine Under Kuchma: Political Reform, Economic Transformation and Security Policy in Independent Ukraine*. New York: St Martin's Press, 1997, 42-43.

⁵³² Birch, S. *Elections and Democratization in Ukraine*, pp. 95-96. For a scenario with some similarities in the 1994 electoral contest between incumbent Kebich and challenger Lukashenka in Belarus, see Way, L. *Deer in Headlights: Authoritarian Skill and regime Trajectories after the Cold War*. Paper for the 4th Annual Danyliw Research Seminar in Contemporary Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, October 23-25, 2008, at http://www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/pdf/P_Danyliw08_Way.pdf. The similarities between Lukashenka and Kuchma authoritarian style would become more pronounced following the latter's re-election.

⁵³³ The State Collection Agency would be later used as a tool for political intimidation and submission. See Way, L. A. The Sources and Dynamics of Competitive Authoritarianism. *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 20, 1, March 2004, and Whitmore, S. State and Institution Building Under Kuchma. *Problems of Post-Communism* 52, 5, Sept.-Oct. 2005.

⁵³⁴ D'Anieri, Kravchuk and Kuzio, *Politics and Society in Ukraine*, pp. 196-98. For the economically and politically deleterious role of private banks and FIGs, see Johnson, J. *A Fistful of Rubles: The Rise and Fall of the Russian Banking System*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000.

effectively subjected the executive powers of even village, settlement and city council chairs to the president's authority⁵³⁵--creating conditions reminiscent of a Soviet-style of governing.

Other echoes from the recent past included an increasing pressure to non-state run, independent media, beginning with unfair competitive advantages awarded by the president to state-run news media, in the form of tax exemptions. Equally ominously, the corrupt ethos of soviet political elite conduct reverberated within the president's office walls, as a culture of bribes, kick-backs and side-dealings fusing with state conduct became the order of the day. Kuchma's appointment of the organized-crime connected 'oligarch' Pavlo Lazarenko as his third prime minister in 1996, and the US\$ 3.7 million business bribe the latter paid the former, is a case in point.⁵³⁶ The first fruits yielded by early post-Soviet Ukrainian political system came with a distinctly foul taste, ill-boding for Ukraine's protracted transition from Communism.

Smaller-scale privatization had timidly begun since independence, but variably picked up in 1994-6, (a declared 'strategic goal' for 1996)⁵³⁷, 1998 and beyond. As obfuscating, obscurantist and objectionable large-scale privatizations took off later in the decade, they eventually led to the concentration of extreme wealth and resources to the hands of a few 'oligarchs', with consequences both for the economy and politics of Ukraine.⁵³⁸ These represented regional business interests (or, 'clans'), the stakes of which interjected both with often opaque sources of capital, and with high office politics (presidential, as well as parliamentary-via the creation of their own political parties), courts and the media in the land.⁵³⁹ Besides them, smaller business interests followed similar corrupt practices, lesser only in scale.

⁵³⁵ D'Anieri, Kravchuk and Kuzio, *Politics and Society in Ukraine*, 128-31.

⁵³⁶ Lazarenko was dismissed in mid-1997, only to be later arrested in Switzerland and then in the US, but the damage to (or, revelation of) Kuchma's image was already done. Wilson, A. *Ukraine's Orange Revolution*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005, 39-40.

⁵³⁷ Kuzio, T. *Ukraine Under Kuchma*, 162.

⁵³⁸ For example, Victor Pinchuk, an oligarch worth US\$ 1.3 billion was the President's son-in-law, and Kuchma's chief of staff, Victor Medvedchuk's assets were valued at US\$ 800 million.

⁵³⁹ E.g. Medvedchuk was alleged to have 'bought up most of Ukraine's courts.' Ibid. See also, Karatnycky, A. Ukraine's Orange Revolution. *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2005.

It should not be surprising, therefore that when Kuchma came up for reelection in 1999 against the Communist candidate Symonenko (in an election that Western monitoring bodies recognize neither as fair nor as free⁵⁴⁰) '*a nexus of state officials and businessmen [with a vested interest in him ...] ensured his campaign had vast financial and media resources at its disposal.*'⁵⁴¹ Adding to the equation the abuse of state resources and mechanisms to procure votes and the curtailing of independent media resulted in a victory (56% over 38%) for Kuchma, but one which came at a price. Gradually Ukraine slipped into semi-authoritarian mode, morphing into what has been called, among other things, an 'informal autocracy', and a 'competitive authoritarian', 'patronal presidentialist', 'neo-patrimonial', 'blackmail state'.⁵⁴² It consisted of a power-hungry president eager to subjugate the legislative branch (e.g. by the 2000 constitutional referendum), of a political leadership deeply involved in corruption, and of an extensive state surveillance apparatus, which through the sinister input of the above, turned blackmail into a regular practice to ensure political loyalty to the regime. It is, therefore, not too great an exaggeration to describe this period, as one of '*Independence without freedom.*'⁵⁴³

A plethora of parties and a tumultuous parliamentarianism

Ukraine's late Communist, and early post-Communist political scene was flooded by an alphabet soup of political parties, some of them present at (and since) creation. The 1990-91 parliament included the Rukh, URP, DPU, UCRP, UCDP, SIU, PDRU, SDPU, USDPU, PPU, CPU, SPU, and PtPU parties, promising an intense

⁵⁴⁰ Further tainting this election was the fact that his more substantial opponent, Oleksandr Moroz, had been prevented from reaching the second round, by way of rule manipulation and, allegedly, fraud. Whitmore, B. Profile: Socialist Party of Ukraine's Oleksandr Moroz, *RFE/RL*, Mar. 24, 2006 at <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1067050.html>

⁵⁴¹ Whitmore, S. *State-Building in Ukraine: The Ukrainian Parliament, 1990-2003*. London:RutledgeCurzon, 2004, 43-44.

⁵⁴² See Darden, K. Blackmail as a Tool of State Domination: Ukraine Under Kuchma. *East European Constitutional Review*, 67, Spring/Summer 2001; Levitsky, S. and Way, L. A. The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism. *Journal of Democracy* 13, 2, (April 2002); van Zon, H. Political Culture and Neo-Patrimonialism Under Leonid Kuchma. *Problems of Post-Communism* 52, 2, Sept.-Oct. 2005; Hale, H. Democracy or Autocracy on the March? The Colored Revolutions as Normal Dynamics of Patronal Presidentialism. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 39, 3, September 2006.

⁵⁴³ Yushchynko, cited in a post-election speech: '*We were independent for fourteen years, but not free.*' Feifer, G. Unloved but Unbowed, Ukraine's Victor Yushchynko Leaves Office, *RFE/RL*, Feb. 24, 2010 at www.rferl.org/content/Unloved_But_Unbowed_Ukraines_Viktor_Yushchenko_Leaves_Office/1967436.html

parliamentary life once Ukraine became independent.⁵⁴⁴ The first post-Communist years were marked by a ‘chaotic, directionless character’-a result of ‘Soviet institutional and personal legacies [...] a poorly defined constitutional framework [...] weak institutions’ that produced in the *Verkhovna Rada* polarization, internal fragmentations, and, only too often, deadlocks.⁵⁴⁵ During the first post-Soviet elections in 1994, a new CPU (reconstructed, after its ban since Independence was lifted in 1993), the CCU, CDP, CUN, IBR, LPU and UNA as well as many independent deputies also made their parliamentary debut⁵⁴⁶ but the *Rada*’s politically fractured composition did not change. Kuchma’s assertive, ‘super-presidentialist’ post-election agenda (especially its constitutional parts) promised an intensified inter-branch conflict, which played out during 1995-6, with the president often confronting and often manipulating fluid, ephemeral parliamentary majorities, and clashing with the parliamentary Left (Communists, Socialist-Peasant block and progressive Socialists).

In 1998, following an acerbic campaign under an uncertain new electoral law, the results also introduced, among the 31 parties represented in that parliament, a combined SelPU/SPU, and the ‘new’ NDP, *Hromada*, PZU, SDPU(o) and APU parties, but outright parliamentary majority for neither Left nor Right).⁵⁴⁷ Most of these parties were admittedly weak, suffering from suffocating party member loyalty requirements (stifling individual freedom), personalized leadership (thus, remaining less bureaucratized or institutionalized, having few or no local branches, focusing on personalities rather than issues, and being more prone to corrupt practices⁵⁴⁸) and lack of an adequate electoral law framework that could produce popular momentum, foster

⁵⁴⁴ Arel, D. The Parliamentary Blocks in the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet: Who and What Do they Represent? *Journal of Soviet Nationalities*, 1, 4, Winter 1990-91.

⁵⁴⁵ Whitmore, S. State-Building in Ukraine: The Ukrainian Parliament, 1990-2003, 33-34.

⁵⁴⁶ Prizel, I. Ukraine Between Proto-Democracy and ‘Soft’ Authoritarianism, 352-54. The above does not include other contestants that ranged from the serious (e.g. Organization of Soldiers’ Mothers, Union of Ukrainian Officers) to the whimsical (e.g. the PPL-Beer Lovers’ Party). In Kuzio, *Ukraine Under Kuchma*, 16.

⁵⁴⁷ 50% of seats were allocated to parties crossing a 4% threshold across Ukraine, while the other 50% were awarded to first-past-the-post single constituencies contests. The latter provision all but ensured that wealthy entrepreneurs could spend their way into the parliamentary corridors of power. In Whitmore, S. *State-Building in Ukraine: The Ukrainian Parliament*, 1990-2003, 41-2.

⁵⁴⁸ For example, Lazarenko ‘effectively bought the *Hromada* (Community) Party in 1996.’ Other parties were joined by oligarchs, or, as in the case of the SDPU (o) or ‘Green’ PZU Party, provided cover for industrialists and financiers. In Whitmore, S. *State-Building in Ukraine: The Ukrainian Parliament*, 1990-2003, 41.

inter-party cooperation and forestall voter apathy.⁵⁴⁹ Worse, they allowed a power-hungry president maneuvering political space, which he eagerly claimed.

A background of social protest

Genuine (as opposed to the regular, state-sponsored and staged) demonstrations in Ukraine were not uncommon even before the end of the Soviet Union. An unintended consequence of Gorbachev's permissive *Glasnost* spirit was the emergence of proto-nationalist ones in the Western Ukrainian city of Lviv by 1988, where they attracted over 50,000 protesters; the following year similar protests appeared in Kyiv.⁵⁵⁰ In January 1990, *Rukh* (the-at the time- amalgamated Popular Movement for Restructuring in Ukraine) sponsored a 450 km human chain that linked Kyiv to Lviv via 300,000 individuals⁵⁵¹, and in October of the same year, significant public support of up to 100,000 was gathered by students who staged a hunger-strike and raised tents in Kyiv's central October Revolution square (later renamed, '*Maidan*'), to voice their protest against the dominance of the Communist party and in favor of Ukrainian independence. The latter action spawned a mini tent-city outside the parliament, and was partially successful, precipitating the resignation of the head of the prime minister, Vitali Masol.⁵⁵² But, despite Ukrainians' distinct '*preference for tents over tanks*'⁵⁵³, during the first decade of independence no tents (as well as no tanks) appeared, as a demobilized public grew gradually disillusioned, pessimistic and apolitical. Central square make-shift camps would have to wait for their dramatic reappearances until after the millennium.

⁵⁴⁹ D'Anieri, Kravchuk and Kuzio, *Politics and Society in Ukraine*, 150-51.

⁵⁵⁰ Subtelny, O. *Ukraine: A History*, 2009, 535-36.

⁵⁵¹ This human chain was quite possibly inspired by an earlier Baltic one. Also interestingly, this event got logistical support from the Ukrainian communist government, and did not extend further East. Prizel, I. *Ukraine Between Proto-Democracy and 'Soft' Authoritarianism*, 338.

⁵⁵² Bojcun, M. The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections of March-April 1994. *Europe-Asia Studies* 47, 2, 1995, 229-30.

⁵⁵³ Donii, O. Ikhnim Tankon na Nash Namet. *Ukrainian Pravda*, December 4, 2004, quoted in Wilson, A. Ukraine's 'Orange Revolution' of 2004: the Paradoxes of Negotiation, In Roberts and Garton Ash (eds.) *Civil Resistance and Power Politics*, 336.

2000-1 and 2004: case studies

In late 2000, following the disappearance and murder of an opposition journalist, a political scandal erupted directly implicating President Leonid Kuchma. The resulting *Ukraine Without Kuchma* grass-root protest that endured until its violent dissolution in March 2001 forms the first of two cases examined in this chapter. Despite its failure, in many ways it served as the precursor to the Orange Revolution, marking the first post-independence, open, popular-albeit haphazard- mobilization against a regime and its apparatus, one which at times appeared to threaten to prematurely terminate Kuchma's second presidential tenure. As many Ukraine scholars and interviewees for this research put it, 'without *Ukraine Without Kuchma* there would be no Orange Revolution.'⁵⁵⁴ The second case explored in this chapter involves the most celebrated of the color revolutions, that is, the mass democratizing mobilization and reversal of electoral fraud following two falsified presidential election rounds in late 2004. It also focuses on the contrasting interplay between grass root organizations, professional politicians and the regime and its apparatus. In particular, it looks at competing organizations' mechanisms (especially at that of the important and often underappreciated youth activist group 'Black Pora') --their structure, organization and mobilizational capabilities and practices--as they confronted each other during this unprecedented electoral contest. 'Black Pora' was instrumental in attracting, recruiting, involving, educating and mobilizing crowds ahead and during the elections, as well as in monitoring the electoral process and helping document electoral fraud—functions so crucial that were copied by other organizations ('Yellow Pora') and appropriated by the opposition candidate's party (Yushchenko's *Nasha Ukraina*).

⁵⁵⁴ For example, Wilson calls the 2001 protest as a 'dress rehearsal for 2004'. Many of the 2004 organizers and participants believe the same, for example, stating that '*Ukraine Without Kuchma* was the foundation of the Orange Revolution...' Dykyi, M. interviewed by the author, Kyiv Mohyla Academy, Kyiv, Ukraine, 2007.

BAPTISM BY FIRE: THE 2000-1 UKRAINE WITHOUT KUCHMA PROTEST

As Leonid Kuchma's second term began sliding more into authoritarianism, whatever little euphoria might have been generated by his re-election in November 1999 had all but evaporated a year later. By November 2000, Ukrainians appeared even more thoroughly disillusioned with their government and public officials; a country-wide poll revealed deep public distrust in civic and political institutions. It is telling that government at all levels received the lowest scores: the national government was trusted only by 11% of respondents (vs. 48%), local councils also by 11% (but with a 50% disapproval), local state administrators by 9% (49% distrusted them), and, lastly, the parliament with a dismal 6% (vs. 53%). In terms of politicians, President Kuchma was trustworthy for 14% of those polled (49% did not trust him), Prime Minister Yushchenko's numbers were 23% and 31% respectively, whereas Communist Party leader, Symonenko's numbers were 21% (trusted) vs. 42% (mistrust), Socialist Party leader Moroz's 9%/43%, Progressive Socialist party leader Vitrenko's 8%/55%, Popular Rukh of Ukraine leader Udovenko's 7%/46% and finally, Fatherland party Yulia Tymoshenko's 6% for versus 52% against.⁵⁵⁵ The above (as well as the scores in the teens % of trust received by the Police, the Courts and Trade Unions) did not reflect well on the workings neither of the political system, nor, to an extent, to society at large. Something felt 'rotten in the state of Denmark', that is, at the top of Ukraine's political hierarchy.

The curious case of Georgiy Gongadze's disappearance

One of the worrisome trends in Ukrainian society was the high physical vulnerability of opposition voices. Since independence, there had been a number of cases involving suspicious deaths, outright assassinations and serious attacks, most of

⁵⁵⁵ Joint public survey conducted by Socis and the Democratic Initiative Fund (n=1200 individuals across Ukraine). In terms of those deemed most trustworthy, the Church emerged as the most trusted institution (45% expressed trust in it, versus 16% who did not), followed by the Army (33% vs. 20%), mass media (24% vs. 18%), police (16% vs. 43%), courts (14% vs. 33%) and trade unions (12% vs. 33%). In 'Ukrainians Distrust their Course and Helmsmen'. *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, December 12, 2000.

which's trail quickly went cold, or were never fully or properly resolved. Examples include the disappearance of activist Michailo Boychishyn (1992), the killing by bomb of *Slava Sevastopola's* editor-in-chief, Vladimir Ivanov (1995), the assassination by poisoning of publisher and NGO leader Viktor Felix (1995), the attack and beating of deputy-editor of independent weekly *95 Kvartal* Aleksander Anishchenko (1997), the murder of former Ukraine National Bank head Vadim Hetman (1998), the traffic accident death of former Presidential candidate Vycheslav Chornovil (1999), the abduction and severe beating of opposition journalist Oleksiy Podolisky, and the alleged attempt on the life of Presidential candidate Natalya Vitrenko (1999).⁵⁵⁶ Most of them remained either unresolved or under-investigated—the authorities' proceedings shrouded in secrecy, giving a perception of, at best bureaucratic red tape and investigational incompetence, and at worse, of obstructionist intent. As grave as all of the above were, 'none came to symbolize the intersection of crime and politics [...] as much as the death of Mr. Gongadze.'⁵⁵⁷

31-year old Georgiy Gongadze was a freelance, 'muckracking' journalist and the founder and editor of the internet newspaper, *Ukrainska Pravda* (Ukrainian Truth)—an investigative-style newsletter that was critical of Kuchma and his government, focusing on the pervasiveness of corruption in the political system. During an interview, he publicly confronted Kuchma on the latter's permissive attitude to the flight of his former Prime Minister Lazarenko, accused of gross embezzlement of public funds.⁵⁵⁸ On the evening of September 16th, he went missing; a decapitated, deliberately

⁵⁵⁶ See Krushelnicky, A. Journalist's Case Highlights Lack of Transparency. *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, December 8, 2000. Also, in *Investigating Corruption in Ukraine: A Case Study of Internet Journalist Georgy Gongadze*, World Bank Institute report, pp. 11-12, at <http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/18403/gongadze.pdf>

Also, Mangold, T. Killing the Story. (BBC documentary, April 2001), transcript available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/static/audio_video/programmes/correspondent/transcripts/1932609.txt

⁵⁵⁷ Myers, S.L. A Headless Body Haunts the Ex-Leaders of Ukraine. *The New York Times*, February 3, 2005, at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/03/international/europe/03ukraine.html?_r=1

⁵⁵⁸ Tyler, P. E. A Grisly Mystery in Ukraine Leads to a Government Crisis. *The New York Times*, January 30, 2001 at <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/30/world/a-grisly-mystery-in-ukraine-leads-to-a-government-crisis.html?scp=31&sq=Gongadze&st=cse&pagewanted=1>

disfigured body full of bruises, signs of strangulation and burns, that seemed to match his was found on November 2nd in a forest 150 km south of Kyiv.⁵⁵⁹

Secret recordings surface

On November 28, 2000, the leader of the opposition Socialist Party, former parliament speaker and past presidential candidate Oleksandr Moroz called a press conference, and to the audience's surprise played an excerpt from an audio tape destined to rattle Ukraine's political scene.⁵⁶⁰ This was a selection from secret recordings made-as revealed later-by Mykola Melnychenko, an ex-KGB and former Security Service officer with electronic surveillance training, who used to work in the service of the Ukrainian president's protection. Its contents included private conversations, allegedly between President Kuchma, his chief of staff, Volodymyr Lytvyn and the Interior Minister, Yuri Kravchenko.⁵⁶¹ When asked during an interview, Melnychenko explained his reasons for engaging in this wiretapping:

"...I began to make the recording, or more precisely, the documentation of [conversations of] the president of Ukraine after I had witnessed, during the performance of my duties, President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma giving a criminal order, and only after I had learned that this order was fulfilled, I began to document subsequent events...President Leonid Kuchma gave orders to State Tax Administrator head [Mykola] Azarov, Interior Minister Kravchenko, Security Service chief [Leonid] Derkach. These orders were intended to destroy the media that were not controlled by the regime and remained in opposition to Kuchma...He also gave orders to stifle the BBC

⁵⁵⁹ *Investigating Corruption in Ukraine: A Case Study of Internet Journalist Georgy Gongadze*, World Bank Institute report, p. 23, at <http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/18403/gongadze.pdf> Delays in efforts to identify the remains complicated the case and exasperated-even agitated-those hoping for a quick resolution to the question of the corps' identity. The quest to match the body to Gongadze would, itself, turn into a long, macabre story, which included its theft from a Kyiv morgue, reappearance of its fragments, and a negative DNA test (of a questionable, potentially tainted or altered sample) by an independent lab in March 2001. See Cockburn, P. Headless Corpse in Ukraine Still a Mystery as DNA Tests Queried. *The Independent*, March 23, 2001, at <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/headless-corpse-in-ukraine-still-a-mystery-as-dna-tests-queried-688590.html>

⁵⁶⁰ "I felt like washing my hands after I heard them [...] They never talk about running the country: only about whom they planned to fire, put in jail, have followed or kidnapped. I felt ashamed for my own government." Oleksandr Moroz, on the taped conversations, interviewed by P. Cockburn in 'Kuchma May Face Impeachment for Theft and Bribery.' *The Independent*, February 13, 2001.

⁵⁶¹ Bransten, J. President Kuchma Implicated in Mystery Tape. *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, November 29, 2000.

*and Radio Liberty...He also gave orders to use judiciary and executive bodies in order to stifle countermeasures by those deputies who were trying to change something and fight...The president of Ukraine directly gave orders to Security Service chief Derkach to eavesdrop on all and everyone—namely, Moroz, Medvedchuk, Tymoshenko, and others... At the very beginning, Kuchma gave the following order to Derkach, Kravchenko and Azarov—Do not forgive anybody who is working against us. And there was a command to stifle, to destroy. [...] Kuchma telephoned [his] chief of staff [Volodymyr] Lytvyn and requested him what to do with Gongadze and how. Then, two or three minutes later, Lytvyn came to the president's office and they conferred there.'*⁵⁶²

In an interview with RFE/RL and New York Times, Melnychenko expanded on the reasons for his wiretapping these conversations, which included disgust over witnessing Kuchma receiving 'gifts' of millions of dollars in cash, and complaining upon hearing reports that businesses refused to pay protection 'krizha' (protection money). For Melnychenko, *'there is no greater criminal in the country than Kuchma. He has turned Ukraine into one big protection racket.'*⁵⁶³ Worse, during at least four of these dialogues, there appear a number of separate instances where an annoyed, obsessed and vindictive Leonid Kuchma complains about Gongadze, and orders his abduction:

I.Kuchma: *This Gongadze, yes?*

Derkach: *Yes, yes.*

Kuchma: *You can take care of him?*

Derkach: *The time of him to mouth off will come to an end. I will crush this fucker.*⁵⁶⁴

II.Kuchma: *Hello.*

Unknown: *Hello.*

Kuchma: *Give me this one, about "Ukrayinska Pravda"...(undecipherable). We will start to decide what to do with him. He has simply gone too far already.*

Unknown: *I need a case.*

Kuchma: *What?*

Unknown: *Send for the case? (undecipherable)*

Kuchma: *Good.*

Unknown: *The case.... We are simply making a copy.*

Kuchma: *No, I don't necessarily need the case.... "Ukrayinska Pravda," well, this is completely already, blyu, insolence. Bastard, blyu. The Georgian, Georgian.*

Unknown: *Gongadze?*

⁵⁶² 'Former Bodyguard Explains Eavesdropping on Kuchma.' *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 2, 47, December 19, 2000.

⁵⁶³ Krushelnysky, A. Ex-Bodyguard Says There is No Greater Criminal Than Kuchma. *RFE/RL*, February 27, 2001.

⁵⁶⁴ Wilson, A. *Ukraine's Orange Revolution*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005, 53.

Kuchma: *Gongadze. Who finances him?*

Unknown: *Well, he actively works with this, with Moroz, with [the website] "Grani"....*

Kuchma: *It's just, blya... there is some son-of-a-bitch, blya.... Deport him, blya, to Georgia and throw him out there -- fuck him. Drive him out to Georgia and throw him there. The Chechens should steal him and throw him.*

III.Kuchma: *So that I don't forget, there's this one Gongadze....*

Kravchenko: *I think I have [heard] this kind of surname.*

Kuchma: *Well, bastard, blya, of the final limit.*

Kravchenko: *Gongadze. He has already come our way somewhere....*

Kuchma: *What?*

Kravchenko: *He passed by somewhere. We'll look [for him].*

Kuchma: *That means that he constantly writes to some 'Ukrayinska some kind of pravda,' pushes it in the Internet, understand? Who finances him?*

Kravchenko: (indecipherable) *I have people....*

Kuchma: *But the main thing [is] he needs to be pushed back. Volodya says the Chechens should steal him and drive him to Chechnya to fuck for himself and ask for a ransom....*

IV.Kuchma: *This Gongadze.*

Kravchenko: *I, we're working on him. It means...*

Kuchma: *I'm telling you, drive him out, throw out. Give him to the Chechens. (Undecipherable)...and then a ransom.*

Kravchenko: *We'll think it over. We'll do it in such a way so that.*

Kuchma: *I mean, drive him out, undress him, blya, leave him without his pants, let him sit there.*⁵⁶⁵

Kravchenko: *We're studying the situation: where he walks, where he goes. We've got someone sitting there, surveillance. We have to study just a little bit. We'll do it. The team I have is a fighting one -- such eagles! -- they'll do everything that you want.*⁵⁶⁶

Besides a direct, repeated mention of (and involvement in) the Gongadze case, the alleged voice of Kuchma was heard discussing the abuse of state apparatus towards securing his reelection during the 1999 presidential elections, the solicitation and acceptance of bribes, the intricate involvement in corrupt business deals and the use of foul language.⁵⁶⁷ Reminiscent of another infamous wiretapping and tape scandal, the affair was immediately dubbed 'Kuchmagate' and many observers speculated on it leading down the same path towards presidential impeachment.

⁵⁶⁵ See Transcript: What Do Melnychenko's Tapes Say About Gongadze Case? *RFE/RL*, March 3, 2005 at <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1057789.html>. For the text of the audiotape see <http://www.brama.com/survey/messages/4163.html>

⁵⁶⁶ For this final quote, see partial transcript in Tyler, P. E. A Grisly Mystery in Ukraine Leads to a Government Crisis. *The New York Times*, January 30, 2001 at <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/30/world/a-grisly-mystery-in-ukraine-leads-to-a-government-crisis.html?scp=43&sq=Gongadze&st=cse&pagewanted=2>

For more excerpts of the Melnychenko Tapes, see World Bank Institute's report Investigating Corruption in Ukraine: A Case Study of Internet Journalist Georgy Gongadze, Appendix C, at <http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/18403/gongadze.pdf>

⁵⁶⁷ Darden, K. 2001, 68-69.

The government first reacted by declaring the tape inauthentic, and in a televised interview on December 6, 2000, Kuchma denied these allegations, accusing instead *'unnamed opponents of trying to plunge the country into crisis.'*⁵⁶⁸ Besides the interview and sporadic mentions, much of the government-controlled or regime-friendly press tried to avoid the topic. At the same time, authorities began conducting tests to identify the corpse, but their progress continued to be extremely slow, further diminishing their credibility on the case and raising more public suspicion over their perceived prejudice and bias.⁵⁶⁹ The burning questions of the identity and the motives behind those who had made Gongadze disappear, lingered on.

Protest: tents go up

'It [wa]s simple', according to Mychaylo Svystovych, head of a civil society NGO, a former parliamentarian and an acquaintance of the deceased (as well as a future activist during the Orange Revolution), who before the public breaking of the tapes was putting up posters in Kyiv *'asking 'Where is Georgiy Gongadze?':*

*'Ukraine had no proper opposition...and Kuchma felt he was kind of king. Very few people could say anything against him. His character is very particular, he always goes after little things and he always gets revenge. He takes any criticism with a great deal of pain. You could see it in the election campaign of 1999 when Georgiy was posing questions to Kuchma. His reaction was close to hysterical, even though the questions were absolutely normal... Georgiy was trusted. His words had weight because everyone knew he would not lie. That was the reason he was killed.'*⁵⁷⁰

The revelations from the tapes were shocking; a stunned public was ostensibly hearing its president use utterly un-presidential language towards absolutely un-presidential conduct—to abuse state powers to order harm done to the since-

⁵⁶⁸ Krushelnysky, A. Journalist's Case Highlights Lack of Transparency. *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, December 8, 2000.

⁵⁶⁹ Cockburn, P. 'Murder Tape' Threatens to Topple Ukrainian Leader. *The Independent*, February 7, 2001, at <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/murder-tape-threatens-to-topple-ukraine-leader-690546.html> According to a related RFE/RL report, in December 2001 *'the investigators drew derision after they announced there was still room for doubt about the corpse's identity because tests were only 99.6% certain that it was Gongadze's.'*

Krushelnysky, A. Anti-President Demonstrations Continue. *RFE/RL*, January 8, 2001.

⁵⁷⁰ Collin, M. *The Time of the Rebels*, 102.

disappeared journalist.⁵⁷¹ The recording also seemed to open a bigger can of worms for the regime. On December 14, new allegations against Kuchma surfaced by Melnychenko, including accusations that the President had also ordered the alleged Vitrenko attack, and masterminded the falsification of both the 1999 Presidential election and the 2000 constitutional referendum.⁵⁷²

Initial commotion towards organizing some response to these revelations began on December 2nd, but it crystallized on the 15th when about 500 people held a protest rally on Kyiv's central square, the Maidan. Their demands included an independent investigation into Gongadze's disappearance and the resignation of President Kuchma and his government's officials implicated in this case. Then, a spontaneous decision was made by some of those present: to use three of the tents-on the site to host their protest material-to set camp,⁵⁷³ to prevent being stopped from reclaiming the spot the next day should they leave overnight. This tent-raising effectively signaled the protestors' intent to make this manifestation civil dissent a lasting one. The crowd was politically diverse, ranging from Socialist to nationalist parties' supporters, but would come together under one slogan for a country free of its current corrupt leader.⁵⁷⁴ On the same day, during the official closing of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant 200km north of Kyiv, the self-styled '*Find Gongadze!*' Citizen Action Group of 30 people overshadowed the ceremony by distributing relevant leaflets, only to be attacked by civilian-clothed men at the scene, resulting in four injuries.⁵⁷⁵

If the government had hopes that the initial demonstrations on December 15 would be only a temporary, minor nuisance, they were quickly dispersed: The tent camp on the Maidan (Independence Square) began receiving new reinforcements daily

⁵⁷¹ In June 2004, the Independent revealed that the head of the Interior Ministry's surveillance team at the time had ordered Gongadze's surveillance and the destruction of documents related to it.

⁵⁷² Melnychenko also claimed that the Interior Ministry had a special task force which acted on Kuchma's orders to allegedly perpetrate these crimes. In President Charged with Bombing Opponent, Falsifying Votes. *RFE/RL Newswire*, December 15, 2000. Regarding the Vitrenko incident, it was wrapped in mystery, from beginning to end, when 'the whole affair was confirmed as a set-up.' In Wilson, A. *Ukraine's Orange Revolution*, 43.

⁵⁷³ Lynch, T. In *Their Own Words: On the Way to Orange Ukraine's Revolutionary Social Movement Year 2002*. Paper presented at the 2nd Annual Danyliw Research Seminar in Contemporary Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, October 14-16, 2006, (at http://www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/pdf/P_Lynch_Danyliw06.pdf), 10.

⁵⁷⁴ *RFE/RL Newswire*, December 15, 2000.

⁵⁷⁵ Anti-Kuchma Protesters at Chornobyl Ceremony Attacked. *Media Monitoring Agency*, December 18, 2000.

in the form of fresh protesters; four days later, over 5,000 protesters gathered again in central Kyiv to demand *‘Ukrayina bez Kuchmy!’*-a Ukraine without Kuchma’.

Parliamentarians from a variety of political forces marched with the protestors-some of them having arrived from far regions-from the Maidan to the Presidential Palace, cordoned off by police for the occasion.⁵⁷⁶ After the march, its impromptu leaders

(politicians) were (surprisingly) received by Kuchma, who ‘agreed to consider’ the resignation of interior minister Kravchenko, SBU chief Derkach, Presidential

Administrator chief Yuri Lytvyn and Yury Solovkov, the head of the customs service.⁵⁷⁷

Despite the president’s apparently appeasing response, the protestors would not be satisfied, their main demand remaining his own departure.⁵⁷⁸ Following the example of

the first few protest tents, more went up in late December on the Maidan Square,

contrasting the big Christmas tree nearby. They were covered by posters proclaiming

‘Gongadze, You Are With Us!’ and attracted about a hundred new protestors who set

up adjacent tents nearby. On December 21st, one of their leaders, Volodymyr Chemerys

was received by the parliament to explain the motives and rationale behind this

thriving protest: *“Gongadze’s disappearance was the drop that overfilled the cup of*

distrust in the authorities... The authorities want to conceal the truth about Gongadze’s

disappearance... Leonid Danylovych [Kuchma], you expect that an expert investigation

[of the Moroz tape] will prove your innocence. But there are no experts who could bring

*back the trust in you.”*⁵⁷⁹

Hence, despite a court of law ruling they couldn’t stay there during New Year celebrations, the protesters were clearly not going to go away permanently. Instead, they vowed to return after the winter holidays and remain put until their goal of seeing Kuchma out of power would be realized.

⁵⁷⁶ Demonstrators Want ‘Ukraine Without Kuchma’. *Eurasian Daily Monitor* quoting Interfax Agency report, December 20, 2000.

⁵⁷⁷ The name of Prosecutor-General Mychaylo Potebenko was later added to this list of demanded resignations, due to his obstructionism in the murder investigation.

⁵⁷⁸ At the same time, Kuchma’s response included a promise containing ominous signs of his future course of action-to ‘preserve the constitutional system, political stability and social tranquility’

Hyde, L. Protestors Unite Against Kuchma. *RFE/RL*, December 29, 2000.

⁵⁷⁹ ‘Ukrainian Parliament Urges Government to Speed Up Probe into Journalist’s Disappearance.’ *Eurasian Daily Monitor*, December 22, 2000.

'Ukraine Without Kuchma': an amalgam of participants and tactics

On January 10, 2001, protest dully resumed, tents reappeared in the Maidan and 100 people picketed the Parliament, demanding the Ukrainian president's resignation. By this time, it was obvious that they were successful at least in drawing the regime's attention: they were met by a counter-protest of equal number Kuchma supporters, allegedly recruited among '...students and budget sector employs.'⁵⁸⁰ Indeed, the government started taking notice; as the frail pro-Kuchma parliamentary majority fractured, and finding himself at an all-time low in the polls, the President began fearing worse for his office should this tellingly-named protest drag on. After first having blamed 'unspecified foreign secret services for creating a scandal over Gongadze's disappearance'⁵⁸¹, he then switched to typical Soviet-era discourse labeling the case of the missing journalist a '*ПРОВОКАЦІЯ*' (provocation) by domestic 'big money and professionals'.⁵⁸² The protesters were being cast in a light indicative of how they would be treated, irrespective of their composition and motives. On their side, demonstrators tried to give some structure to the hitherto self-admitted '*very grass-roots, very low level, very amateur*'⁵⁸³ approach: '*When we were asked by people visiting the tents 'what do you want to do', and heard that we want to change the system, they made a bewildered face and left.*'

Something more focused--articulating clear messages and goals, and organizing to pursue them--was needed. Hence, they adopted their often-chanted slogan as the name of the protest that attracted a quite diverse political-civic alliance—a collection of fifteen, mostly minor political groups; this main formation also tentatively and tenuously coexisted with the Lviv-based civic youth organization *Za Pravdu* (For Truth) that had attracted protesters under its auspices.⁵⁸⁴ The resulting *Ukraine Without*

⁵⁸⁰ Purported by Communist Party leader, Symonenko. In 'Anti-Presidential Protests Over Missing Journalist Resume in Kyiv.' *Eurasian Daily Monitor*, January 11, 2001.

⁵⁸¹ *RFE/RL Newslines*, December 4, 2000.

⁵⁸² L. Hyde, Kuchma Blames Disappearance Scandal in 'Provocation'. *RFE/RL*, December 22, 2000.

⁵⁸³ Wolodymyr Ishchenko, '*Ukraine Without Kuchma*' protester, interviewed by the author, Kyiv, October 2007.

⁵⁸⁴ Karatnycky, A. The Fall and Rise of Ukraine's Political Opposition: From Kuchmagate to the Orange Revolution. In Aslund, A. and McFaul, M. (eds.) *Revolution in Orange: The Orgins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough*. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006, 33.

*Kuchma coalition included, among others, the Socialist Party, the Communist Komsomol Youth, Yabloko, the Christian Democrats, the Sobor (Ukraine Republican) Party, the young Rukh as well as the extreme-right UNA-UNSO movement. Despite Kuchma calling it a red-brown one, it was really a 'rainbow' coalition of dissimilar people and parties with only one thing uniting them-their inability to suffer Kuchma's regime any longer. Indeed, many protesters seemed willing to temporarily gloss over the often extreme ideological differences found within their camp in order to unite against the common enemy. According to UNA-UNSO⁵⁸⁵ affiliate, 'We don't bother with divisions into Right and Left, as the authorities try to divide us. We reached the point when people simply thought this is a criminal government which can destroy us, and it's time to unite. We don't accept the Socialist ideology, but we are united not for something but against something, against Kuchma's criminal regime.'*⁵⁸⁶

A protester and early tent occupant identifying himself with an Anarchist-Leftist ideology echoed this sentiment of unity: *'It is true that the UNSO was a radical nationalist party, very famous in the 1990s. It has some fascist style...A common goal united us, it was not important that they were fascists...'*⁵⁸⁷ Another UNA-UNSO member mentioned how his personal reasons became general:

'...Georgiy was a very good acquaintance from 1991 when our organization was helping in Abkhazia. He was a military journalist there, and there is where and how we met. Georgiy was shooting 'Shadows of War' [a small documentary on the war] and I was fighting there. It was not an action sanctioned by the Ukrainian government, but I went

On the tentative relations between the western Ukrainian *Za Pravdu* and *'Ukraine Without Kuchma'*, an activist of the former from Lviv explains its origins and her reasons for becoming involved:

'ZaPravdu spread only in the Western part of the country because there was support there. 'Ukraine Without Kuchma' was organized by Lutsenko, a Socialist; so the West wasn't involved—we were afraid to be tarnished... In ZaPravdu, the people involved in it were authoritative, and from them came writers, poets... For me, it was the cultural elite; I was seventeen at the time, it was romantic, emotional...for the ideas. I would draw posters, signs, decorations. The appearance of ZaPravdu was just shifting of accents, from political to moral. But 'Ukraine Without Kuchma' was political from the beginning. Then, the politicians couldn't go in the shadow and let the movement spread...'

Olha, interviewed by the author, Kyiv, October 2007.

⁵⁸⁵ The Ukrainian National Assembly-Ukrainian National Self-Defense was a radical nationalist party, frequently accused of neo-fascist beliefs. It was believed to have been involved in the 1990s wars in Abkhazia and Chechnya before 1995, as well as having participated in the serious episodes surrounding the funeral of patriarch Wolodymyr in Kyiv. They were outlawed by Kuchma in 1997.

⁵⁸⁶ Anatoly Ivashenko quoted by Hyde, L. Protestors Unite Against Kuchma. *RFE/RL*, December 29, 2000.

⁵⁸⁷ Wolodymyr Ishchenko, interviewed by the author, Kyiv, Ukraine, October 2007.

*because deputies from Georgia had asked us for help. Later I was given the order [either of Vakhtang Gorgasal, or of the Order of Honor] by Shevardnadze. With Georgiy we were communicating regularly. I knew Myroslava [Gongadze's wife], we had relations with people who looked at life in the same way. I last saw him a month or two before he disappeared. I thought he had been kidnapped to be broken. When the body was found, I felt I had died too...I know the methods of the police, and I think that they couldn't restrain themselves from torture and violence. In 2000 Ukraine was a police state because police had all the power, patronized by Kuchma... When Gongadze was murdered, all of us went out to protest because of freedom of speech.'*⁵⁸⁸

A participating Socialist Party organizer, added, *'It was the last straw that brought us out on the streets. It [...] finally proved the criminality and rottenness of this regime. It was the final proof that we couldn't put up with it any longer.'*⁵⁸⁹

Many passers-by appeared sympathetic to the protesters' cause, and a number of their voiced concerns were reported, mainly that the regime did not allow television channels to broadcast any truth, and that it had instead impoverished its citizens while enriching itself and its cronies.⁵⁹⁰ Indeed, the protest suffered either from negative or no mass media coverage. To circumvent this 'media blockade', some of the protesters set up an information website ('Maidan.org.ua') to provide an uncensored news outlet: *'Unexpectedly for us, within a month the site became hugely popular. We started getting messages from government employees, from inside the police and the security services, giving us information...'*⁵⁹¹ This was one of their more innovative methods of getting the message out, and it attracted the authorities' attention which instructed the Security Services to *'improve activities directed against 'information aggression and specialist information-propagandistic operations'*-the first such case of the regime attempting to extent its censorship to cyberspace.⁵⁹² Besides the *Maidan* website, and aside from the main focus of their demonstrating, they resorted to the more

⁵⁸⁸ Igor 'X', interviewed by the author, Kyiv, Ukraine, October 2007.

⁵⁸⁹ Yevheny Filindash, quoted in Hyde, L. Protestors Unite Against Kuchma. *RFE/RL*, December 29, 2000.

⁵⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁹¹ Mychaylo Svystovych, quoted by Collin, in *The Time of the Rebels*, 103. Interviewee, Wolodymyr I. also volunteered with Maidan.org.ua translating and summarizing news bulletins and op-eds from abroad.

⁵⁹² Kuzio, T. The Internet and Media freedom in Ukraine. *Russia and Eurasia Review* 2, 14, July 8, 2003.

‘traditional’ ways of selling newspapers and distributing leaflets. Another idea was to also put special tents for students on *Hrechiatyk* Boulevard (the main street in Kyiv, adjacent to Maidan Square), which they did, *‘thinking this could be the start of youth mobilization.’*⁵⁹³ *Ukraine Without Kuchma* was trying to reach out to the greater public.




Figure 13: *Ukraine Without Kuchma* Loci of Protest

NB. These were not linked, and the vast majority of protests took place in Kyiv.
Source: author field research

Turbulence

The re-ignition of the Kyiv protests and re-establishment of Maidan tent city in January seemed to succeed in capturing some attention across the country. Tents began appearing in other large Ukrainian cities’ main squares, including the eastern Ukrainian city of Kharkiv. But, this momentum was cut short just on the evening of

⁵⁹³ Wolodymyr I., interview with the author, Kyiv, Ukraine, October 2007.

January 11th, when riot police violently intervened (by beating up and arresting 50 individuals) and city workers dismantled the encampment, providing an ominous foretaste of the future fate of Kyivan protesters.⁵⁹⁴ Still, by the month's end, approximately 1,000 protesters from the western city of Zhytomyr began a protest march with Kyiv as its final destination, in support of the anti-Kuchma alliance. Upon arriving in the capital, they united with the tent city occupants, and on February 6th, close to 10,000 people came out on the streets, picketing the Parliament and attempting to enter the Presidential Administration building, before being stopped by police. According to estimates, it was 'the largest since the 'pro-independence protests of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Protesters blocked traffic in several hours in Kyiv, set fire to portraits of Kuchma, and burned a two-meter effigy dressed in a stripped prisoner's uniform.'⁵⁹⁵ Anger against Kuchma was palpable, as one of them complained that, '*...Currently in our country there is a situation where anyone who displeases the regime can either disappear or-accidentally-be killed in a car crash.*'⁵⁹⁶ The same mood was echoed by other protesters, like march main organizer, Yuri Lutsenko: '*It is impossible to live in a country where they get rid of everybody who disagrees with Leonid Kuchma!*'⁵⁹⁷ Not everyone seemed to subscribe to such opinions, however; a counter protest has organized nearby, attracting a few hundred individuals.⁵⁹⁸

Meanwhile, the government's formal response was a mixture of damage control regarding the growing outcry about Gongadze (on February 5th it announced the formation of the Orwellian-sounding "*Council for the Prevention of the Disappearance of People*"⁵⁹⁹) and defiance in the face of the protests and the journalist and politicians supporting them. Back in January 19th, Kuchma had fired Yulia Tymoshenko from his cabinet, and pressure against media sympathetic to the opposition continued unabated-both directly (interference with broadcasts) and

⁵⁹⁴ Police Strike Protesters' Tent City. *RFE/RL*, January 12, 2001.

⁵⁹⁵ Krushelnicky, A. Anti-President Demonstrations Continue. *RFE/RL*, February 8, 2001.

⁵⁹⁶ Call For Kuchma to Step Down. *RFE/RL*, February 6, 2001.

⁵⁹⁷ Protesters in Kyiv Want President to Quit. *RFE/RL Newslines*, February 7, 2001.

⁵⁹⁸ Journalist sources estimated that some of the protesters on both sides were receiving payments. Call For Kuchma to Step Down. *RFE/RL*, February 6, 2001.

⁵⁹⁹ Ibid.

indirectly (violent incidents against journalists went up, while the pattern of their under-investigation by the authorities persisted). An increasingly oppressive atmosphere for free media prompted in early February the European Union to issue a statement expressing its concern over the 'continuing problematic environment for the media in Ukraine [...] stressing to the Ukrainian authorities 'the need to ensure a safe, secure and harassment-free environment for journalists to operate in'.⁶⁰⁰ As for the 'Ukraine without him', Kuchma appeared dismissive, his spokesman disparaging the protesters' claims based on the legitimacy of numbers: *'The president, who has been elected by the majority of the Ukrainian residents [sic], 16 million people will not yield to the resignation demand of 2,000'*.⁶⁰¹ Kuchma himself reiterated this logic of legitimacy by numbers, by commenting that, *'the 16 million votes cast for me in 1999 constitute the credit of trust on which I am leaning'*.⁶⁰² In his eyes, the size of his electoral mandate appeared as license to assert the unassailability of his position in more forceful ways.

Protest: Forum for National Salvation Civic Initiative forms, plot thickens

On February 9th, what had two months earlier began as a seemingly inconsequential quasi-impromptu protest of individuals shifted to another level-a coalescing, considerable political front- when opposition members agreed to set up 'Forum of National Salvation Civic Initiative'. Its stated main aim was to force Kuchma's resignation to transform the Ukrainian political system towards deeper and genuine democratic practices (more power to the parliament and greater freedom of the press).⁶⁰³ About 60 participating politicians represented all ideological walks of life- including Socialist Party leader Oleksandr Moroz, Sobor Party leader Anatoliy Matviyenko, Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party leader Stepan Hmara, the mayor

⁶⁰⁰ European Union Expresses Concern Over Media Freedom in Ukraine. *RFE/RL Newslines*, February 7, 2001.

⁶⁰¹ Presidential spokesman, Oleksandr Martynenko interview with *Echo Moskvy*, quoted in *RFL/RL Newslines*, February 7, 2001.

⁶⁰² Kuchma's statement (during meeting the Ukrainian delegation to the Council of Europe on February 5th) was quoted by Lawmaker, Serhiy Kurkin, during the latter's interview with *Interfax News Agency*, Ibid.

⁶⁰³ Its manifesto exclaimed its purpose of putting an 'end to the current criminal regime, assert the truth and the law, and to bring the country back onto the path of European development.' Civic Initiative to Deliver Ukraine from Kuchma? *RFE/RL*, February 13, 2001.

of the city of Cherkasy, 'Volodymyr Chemerys (one of the *Ukraine Without Kuchma* leaders), former Justice minister Serhiy Holovaty, and the recently dismissed deputy prime for energy issues Minister Yulia Tymoshenko (co-leader of the Fatherland Party, along with Oleksandr Turchynov).⁶⁰⁴

Much like its heterogeneous political composition, the protesters on the square were quite diverse, and it was this cacophony of ideologies-reflected onto frequently uncoordinated action- that revealed a potential vulnerability of the whole protest. The regime did not fail to notice it, and tried to exploit the underlying tension between communists, anarchists and ultra-nationalists in order to undermine the protesters' public image. On February 6th, members of a fake nationalist organization secretly funded by the SBU mixed with the protesting crowd and came to blows with communists, attracting wide negative publicity. Yet, refusing to be intimidated, the protesters continued. After a similar one a few days earlier, on February 11th, about 5,000 protesters marched in Kyiv, calling for Kuchma to resign. Banners held proclaimed Ukraine a '*Police State*', and '*Kuchma Kaput!*'⁶⁰⁵

Mixed messages: regime conciliation, protesters' fatigue?

On February 9th, Kuchma had argued that protests posed a threat to the national security and independence of Ukraine. Russian media quoted him as comparing 'opposition leaders to Lenin's and take not people but a herd of cattle to the streets.' As for protesters, he likened them to Hitler's 1923 aborted Munich Putsch, adding '*there is only one step from such national socialism to fascism.*'⁶⁰⁶ Yet, there were some signs of conciliation from the government, as Kuchma fired the head of the SBU, Leonid Derkach, the head of the state bodyguard service, Volodymyr Shepel, as well as encouraged Prosecutor General Mychaylo Potybenko to take an 'extended leave of absence', thereby apparently catering to some of the protesters' demands. As for the root of all his apparent evils, in a letter to the London Financial Times, he swore,

⁶⁰⁴ Krushelnysky, A. Politicians Form a New Anti-Kuchma Alliance. *RFE/RL*, February 12, 2001.

⁶⁰⁵ Marchers Press Ukrainian President to Step Down. *Reuters*, February 12, 2001.

⁶⁰⁶ Kuchma Warns Against Consequences of Protests. *RFE/RL*, February 11, 2001.

*'on the Bible or the constitution that I never made such an order to destroy a human being...'*⁶⁰⁷

The core of protesters remained unconvinced and on February 11, there was another march of about 5,000 in downtown Kyiv. Yet, mixed signs came from their ranks as well. Despite self-admittedly uncoordinated efforts to broaden the scope of the *Ukraine Without Kuchma* protest, their maximum numbers seemed to plateau bellow a desired critical mass: *'...By that time, our tents were up for a month. I was feeling that something was wrong: no breakthrough, no mass mobilization. We had 10,000-20,000 people but that is not enough...'*⁶⁰⁸

Reflective of that frustration was the number, by mid-February, of the 30 tents remaining in the Maidan from those originally set up in December. A similar sentiment was echoed by other partners of the campaign, revealing a darker side of the protest: *'...We were frustrated being able to mobilize only a comparatively small number of Ukrainian youth... It was managed the wrong way, because of the negative campaign, of the radical negative attitude towards the regime [...] Also, our organizing was wrong...we managed organizationally things the wrong way. [Because numbers were low] when I was working for the Freedom of Choice Coalition, I was asked by its leader Vladislav Kaskiv to bring 'professional' protesters and pay them...I declined...You can spend money to produce material, but can't pay people for standing on the street. For them it is turning into business. Turing politics into something wrong. It educates people in political cynicism. And this was a lesson on how not to mobilize people...But it doesn't mean all were paid. I don't want to know anything bad about the other organization in which I belonged that participated in the 2001 protests. I still keep its flag at home...'*⁶⁰⁹

Compounding this feeling of disappointment was a court's ruling against them, the following day: their continued stay on the square was deemed illegal, due to their

⁶⁰⁷ On another letter to the editor of the Times, on February 27th, Kuchma would again deny any allegations of involvement, assuring that his government is doing its best to resolve the case, and blaming the opposition against him for destabilizing Ukraine. Kuchma, L. Those Responsible for Journalist's Death Should Be Brought to Justice. *The Financial Times*, February 27, 2001.

⁶⁰⁸ Wolodymyr I., interviewed by the author, Kyiv, Ukraine, October 2007.

⁶⁰⁹ Anonymous major organizer participating in the 2001 campaign, interviewed by the author, Kyiv, Ukraine, 2007.

‘occupation of a historic site.’ Despite the protesters’ earnest wish to ignite other sources of anti-Kuchma demonstration throughout the country, outside observers at the time also seemed to share this increasing pessimism: The Forum for National Salvation’ was reported as ‘so far having failed to muster any significant support outside Kyiv.’⁶¹⁰ At the same time, Kuchma would be unwilling to take more chances.

Towards a showdown

Whatever equivocation the government appeared to display, by mid-month, transformed into a bellicose attitude, the general mood turning to the worse. In the eastern city of Dnepropetrovsk, also a site of a small anti-Kuchma protest, the police intervened to disperse the crowd and nine arrests were made. Then, on February 13, a stern, fear-mongering, joint declaration was issued by President Kuchma, Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko and Parliament speaker Ivan Plyushch. In it, they scorned the National Salvation Forum, labeled the protests a ‘Ukrainian kind of National Socialism’ (echoing a typical Soviet-era polemical discourse against fascist enemies), and warned that the demonstrations and protesters, who according to the letter sought to bring chaos and instability akin to civil war in Ukraine, would be dealt with severely.⁶¹¹

⁶¹⁰ Maksymiuk, J. Will Ukraine’s President Survive? *Eurasian Daily Monitor*, February 20, 2001.

⁶¹¹ Below is an excerpt from the “Address by President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma, Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Ivan Plyushch and Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko to the Ukrainian Nation, February 13, 2001” [Emphases added]: “...Since the absolute majority of the Ukrainian people do not respond to the provocative calls of the “professional revolutionaries”, they have nothing to do but appeal to the extremist forces, to the excited crowds using them as a ram and a means of intimidating common people with ominous analogies. *It’s enough to take a closer look at their symbols and slogans, attributes, used for theatrical political shows, to understand that we deal with a Ukrainian kind of national-socialism.* Recently a “forum of national salvation” has been created on unknown grounds and it was loudly introduced. Leaders of this multi-colored conglomerate having a grudge against their political defeats and failures are indeed seeking salvation. However, it is not salvation of the country and of the nation that they are looking for, but salvation of themselves from political bankruptcy and oblivion. And some of them seek salvation also from criminal liability. Each and everyone, dear fellow citizens, must understand that those peanut politicians, who have already burned the bridges behind them, have only one hope – *they want the sparkles of hostility, irreconcilability and exasperation to set fire to the entire society, to your homes and your destinies. Trying to revive the threat of a full-scale civil conflict,* which Ukraine has avoided at the most complicated stages of its coming into being, they hope that they will manage to stay afloat in a state of chaos, uncertainty, anarchy and disorder. Such “rescuers” are either blindfolded or they do not want to see to what trouble their reckless, imprudent actions may lead. [...] But at the same time one cannot but see that *the attempts to agitate disorderly crowds, to use openly provocative means, with the help of which they wish to deepen the rift in society, to push the authorities to forceful counteractions, pose a real threat to national security.* We should not forget lessons from history. *Let us recall that where were the roots of fascism.* We declare that in the interests of the people, society and the state, such attempts will be actively and

The following day, the Parliament speaker continued on the same tone, stating that the "*Ukraine Without Kuchma* movement that formed this winter was trying to 'set off mob rule' in the country, by using flagrant provocation and to compel the authorities to use force."⁶¹² Finally, on the 15th, Yulia Tymoshenko was arrested-on charges of illegal business transactions, tax evasion, corruption and bribery allegedly occurred during the 1990s when she was an energy oligarch.⁶¹³

Despite this turn of events (and the psychological blow that Yushchenko-a perceived future ally of the Forum for National Salvation had sided instead with Kuchma), demonstrators vowed to continue their course of action. The same day of Tymoshenko's arrest, 100 students of the *Za Pravdu* group decided to deliver a petition to the US embassy in Kyiv on the disappearance of Gongadze, while others protested outside the education ministry against its punitive measures for students participating in anti-Kuchma activities.⁶¹⁴ Ten days later, the biggest demonstration yet against the perceived complicity of Kuchma in the disappearance and death of Gongadze took place in Kyiv, when between 30,000 to 50,000 people escorted a mock-convicted, caged Kuchma effigy in parade. Independently planned mirror actions took place in close to twenty cities throughout Ukraine with about 40,000 attendants.⁶¹⁵ Some hope of the protest finally catching on beyond the capital and on a greater scale persisted, especially when, on February 26th, Ukraine's Communist party declared its intention to hold nationwide protests for a whole week starting March 12th, to 'tell people the truth about what is going on in the country, to rouse them for an *organized*, conscious

resolutely countered by all means envisaged by the law. There must be no illusions about that. *Anarchy, despotism and lawlessness will not pass!* "

Full text at <http://www.infoukes.com/ukremb/pr010213e10.shtml>

⁶¹² Tyler, P. E. In *Mid-Crisis, Ukraine President Lashes Out at Opposition*. The New York Times, February 15, 2001, at <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/15/world/in-mid-crisis-ukraine-president-lashes-out-at-opposition.html?scp=45&sq=Gongadze&st=cse&pagewanted=1>

⁶¹³ Slivka, A. Bitter Orange. *The New York Times Magazine*, January 1, 2006. On one of the Melnychenko tapes, Kuchma can be heard menacing against Tymoshenko:

Kuchma: *Yuliia must be destroyed.*

Azarov: *We are working on Yuliia. I have issued an order, she is not such a fool. She...*

Kuchma: *We need a criminal case against her and to put her ass in prison.*

In Wilson, A. *The Orange Revolution*, 49.

⁶¹⁴ Students Stage Rallies Over Missing Journalist. *RFE/RL*, February 16, 2001.

⁶¹⁵ Chemerys interview, quoted in Kudelia, S. *Mobilizing for Democratic Change: Societal Impact on Elite Bargaining in Ukraine 2000-4*. Paper presented at the 2nd Annual Danyliw Research Seminar in Contemporary Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, October 14-16, 2006, 38.

struggle for their human rights, [...and to] *correct the 'main mistake' of the 'Ukraine Without Kuchma' rallies by expanding anti-regime protests to include wider social strata.*' [Emphasis added].⁶¹⁶ On that very day, authorities declared that they positively identified Gongadze's body, hence tacitly confirming that he had been assassinated.

The regime: Crackdown!

Fearing that things were fast coming to a head, the authorities decided to react quickly. On March 1st, about 400 policemen surrounded the protesters' Kyiv tent city and, after forcefully evicting about 100 of them, pulled down the approximately 50 tents there at that time. Commenting on this turn of events, Ukrainian MP, Yuri Karmazin stated prophetically, *'this is the beginning of Kuchma's solution to this problem by force.'*⁶¹⁷ Indeed, the day of reckoning for *'Ukraine Without Kuchma'* was only eight days away.

On March 8, protestors again marched in Kyiv, this time against the incarceration of Yulia Tymoshenko. Then, on March 9th, the final showdown came. Intent on disrupting a flower-laying public ceremony in honor of Ukraine's national poet where Kuchma would be present, about 3,000 demonstrators descended on a central park in Kyiv. The president having moved up his short appearance gone, a good number of regular and riot police troops waited instead (a total of 2,000 police and 400 anti-riot squad members in downtown Kyiv).⁶¹⁸ When, attracting an even larger protest crowd, the action moved towards the Presidential Administration building, confusion ensued and violent clashes between demonstrators, agitators and the police erupted. A protester recalls: *'...There was chaos, I don't know how it started. It happened next to the Presidential administration building. Somebody threw a Molotov cocktail. It was a provocation. Then, a clash with protestors, particularly nationalist and security*

⁶¹⁶ Ukrainian Communists to Hold Anti-Government Protests in March. *RFE/RL*, February 26, 2001.

⁶¹⁷ Ukrainian Police Dismantle Tent City, Arrest Anti-Kuchma Protesters. *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, March 1, 2001.

⁶¹⁸ Ukrainian Police Clash With Anti-Kuchma Protesters. *Reuters*, March 9, 2001.

*guards/police—the Berkut special detachment. It crashed down the protest. The regime got legal reason to arrest people and use force against the protesters.*⁶¹⁹

Accounts vary, but by the end of the day the protest had been dispersed, at a cost of injuries on both sides, and about 100 demonstrators arrested. Meanwhile, *Za Pravdu*-affiliated students arriving from Lviv to join the protests were also detained at the train station.⁶²⁰ Overall, about ‘205 arrests were made, 50 serious sentences handed down [...with] 36 police allegedly hospitalized.’⁶²¹ A tattoo-covered, battle-hardened, radical member of the UNA-UNSO, who, as a result of his participation was imprisoned for three years, gives this account:

*‘...After the park, near the Presidential Administration building there was a fight with the police. As a result, no one was arrested but demonstrations moved on to Hreshyatyk blvd. But in the evening, arrests began, at offices, train station, etc. Over 200 people were arrested. Around 80% of them were members of UNA-UNSO. At that time, socialists and social democrats left; Only we stayed for more action. Then the next day, more than 500 people from our organization were arrested. Most of them were put in jail for between three and fifteen days. So, prosecutors read charges—that we were ‘trying to overthrow the government.’ Then, they charged us with organizing mass disorder. That is because they didn’t find any documents to confirm their first version...they had searched our offices in Kyiv and Lviv, Cherkasy, Rivne [...] There was no plan, but if Kuchma would act like Ceausescu, if blood would be spilled, there would be few days and he would be overthrown. But we didn’t have the numbers...’*⁶²²

As one *Za Pravdu* activist described it,

‘March 9, 2001 was a key date, a shift to violence—a provocation—and then the beginning of the end of the movement. When it was shown on television, those views sitting on the fence were turned off. In the 1990s violence was not being shown on television screens, our programs were sanitized, so people in 2001 were shocked to

⁶¹⁹ Dmytro, protester, interviewed by the author, Kyiv, October 2007.

⁶²⁰ Wilson, A. Ukraine’s ‘Orange Revolution’ of 2004: the Paradoxes of Negotiation, in Roberts and Garton Ash (eds.), 339.

⁶²¹ Ibid.

⁶²² ‘Ihor’, interviewed by the author, Kyiv, October 2007.

*watch it on their screens. Nobody would come to support it any more. Lack of organization and security of the protest was terrible. It was the end...*⁶²³

While the violence did play an important part, it was only a proximate cause, hinting at deeper problems. Indeed, as another protester from the Anarchist wing of the demonstrators summed it up, it was a symptom (and an attempted remedy, as the UNA-UNSO veteran indicated above) rather than a cause of the failure:

“We failed. ‘Ukraine Without Kuchma’ failed, and it did before violence started because there was no development. Society didn’t pay attention to us. Mass violence was meant as a breakthrough, but it also failed...”

This spelled the traumatic end of the *Ukraine Without Kuchma* protest, (events organized on the week following the bloody episodes gathered dwindling numbers of supporters) which sustained irreparable public damage in the eyes of potential sympathizers by the perception and the reality of an ill-organized, poorly mobilized, largely improvised, undisciplined movement, ultimately succumbing to extremism and violence.

Aftermath

Having weathered this serious challenge from bellow, and the related political storm, the regime was emboldened enough after the end of the *Ukraine Without Kuchma* protests to assert itself. It would do so over the remaining opposition forces who wanted to negotiate (Kuchma bluntly stated: *‘How can I negotiate with someone, who demands my resignation and brings 3,000 people on the streets? Should I spit into the souls of 16 million who voted for me?’*)⁶²⁴, and over the -no longer politically expedient-Yushchenko prime ministership (see later in the chapter). Hence, Kuchma went on ruling; dissidents and protesters largely withdrew from public view to regroup, assess the lessons from this failed campaign and rethink their approach and strategies

⁶²³ Olha, interviewed by the author, Kyiv, October 2007.

⁶²⁴ President Kuchma during an interview from Donetsk, responding to calls for negotiation with the Forum for National Salvation, quoted in Kudelia, S. Mobilizing for Democratic Change: Societal Impact on Elite Bargaining in Ukraine 2000-2004, 41.

for future confrontations; with a few exceptions, opposition politicians would follow suit; the public continued to remain, at least on the surface, passive.

Why didn't the 2000-1 protests succeed?

The revelations of the 'Melnychenko tapes' and the ensuing 'Kuchma-gate' scandal triggered Ukraine's most serious post-Independence political crisis and '*...set off a great public outcry, [...] once seemed capable of toppling the president. But [...] the protests have waned ...*'⁶²⁵ Indeed, despite its stark name, the message on the means by which Ukraine could be delivered from its scheming president was convoluted and unclear, failing to capitalize on the foundations of this many-admired effort at civil disobedience to energize and to attract more sympathizers. Intra- and inter-group coordination was lacking (and that includes the politicians behind the National Salvation Forum), which, among others, meant mismanaging the 'campaign' (or, not managing it at all), and missing opportunities to publicize positions, to recruit new members and to effectively evade and oppose whatever baits the regime set for the protesters. Alas, towards the end, it had even demoralized existing participants: '*By the end of February, at least some of the protest leaders were actually hoping that power-holders would disband tents by force, since the feelings of fatigue and disillusionment were becoming prevalent among protesters.*'⁶²⁶

Thus, in the end, *Ukraine Without Kuchma* did not succeed in its goal of holding Kuchma accountable. It failed, because it ultimately neither inspired nor mobilized the general public, both in Kyiv and nation-wide to join in. As one *Za Pravdu* activist admitted: '*We were ready but the people were not, and we couldn't mobilize them. People were criticizing the regime, but only in their kitchens. We couldn't find the key to their hearts...*'⁶²⁷

⁶²⁵ Wines, M. Ukraine Calls Newsman's Killing Nonpolitical; Skeptics Abound. *The New York Times*, May 17, 2001.

⁶²⁶ Organizer Mychaylo Svystovych interview, quoted by Kudelia, S. Mobilizing for Democratic Change: Societal Impact on Elite Bargaining in Ukraine 2000-2004. Paper presented at the 2nd Annual Danyliw Research Seminar in Contemporary Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, October 14-16, 2006, 38

⁶²⁷ Andriy Gusak, quoted in Collin, *The Time of the Rebels*, 104.

IT'S TIME! (*PORA!*): THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND THE ROAD TO THE ORANGE REVOLUTION

Despite the demise of the 2001 protest, subsequent events would prove there was a silver lining to be found amidst this failure. The whole affair seems to have managed a small breach in the wall of civic apathy that would eventually herald the advent of a new era in Ukrainian politics. A poll conducted two weeks after the end of *Ukraine Without Kuchma* found that, '65% of Ukrainians were either positive or neutral to the protest movement, while just 26% expressed a negative view of protesters, and 31% 'claimed that protest is the only possible way to get rid of Kuchma's regime.'⁶²⁸ By March 2001, the protesters and the tents in Maidan Square were gone, but the political and civic environment would soon become pregnant with possibilities.

Background: Topsy-turvy parliamentary politics and protests in the early 2000s

Victor Yushchenko, a reform-minded economist, had been appointed prime minister in late 1999 by a recently reelected Kuchma. The latter was eager to exploit and expend the former's talents and face recognition in IMF negotiations, while remaining in control. But, as often happens with such Machiavellian appointments, not everything went as Kuchma planned. Showing initiative, his prime minister started taking on the oligarchs, and began enacting agrarian (abolishing the collective farm system, thus depriving their forcible political patron of their political dependency) and middle-class and small business reforms (thereby gaining popularity). And, while he backed the president in cosigning the letter to denounce *Ukraine Without Kuchma*, soon after its violent crackdown and the re-arrest of Tymoshenko, he began to openly criticize the regime's heavy-handedness. Having almost meteorically risen to become a

⁶²⁸ Poll by *Sociopolis* (March 2001), quoted in Kudelia, S. *Mobilizing for Democratic Change*, 42.

threat to Kuchma, a no-confidence vote was engineered in April 2001 that removed Yushchenko from office.⁶²⁹

His dismissal sparked residual *Ukraine Without Kuchma* protests outside the *Rada*, where on that same day over 10,000 people demonstrated, shouting ‘*Shame, Shame, Kuchma Out!*’⁶³⁰ It also unofficially launched his political campaign against his former political patron and his regime. The umbrella spirit of the National Salvation Forum died a quiet death after Tymoshenko and Yushchenko disagreed over proposing a referendum to oust Kuchma, and proceeded down different political paths to contest the 2002 parliamentary elections. Yushchenko formed *Nasha Ukrayina* (‘Our Ukraine’), consisting of center and center-right, nationalist parties (ranging from ULP to the People’s Movement of Ukraine, to the splintered Rukhs to the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists), whereas Tymoshenko transformed the NSF into the *Yulia Tymoshenko Block* (BYuT) that amalgamated her old Fatherland, *Sobor*, URP, USDP and UCRP parties. The ensuing level and manner of politically institutionalizing this opposition drive resulted in absorbing and appropriating the energy and momentum accumulated by those hitherto mobilized protesters. Eventually *Our Ukraine* gained a plurality with about 23% of the vote (one marred by suspicion of regime interference-.e.g. the ‘de-registering’ of 219 candidates only a week before elections)⁶³¹, but its botched handling of their momentum resulted in pro-Kuchma backed officials and agendas claiming top spots in the new parliament.⁶³² Disappointed and disaffected, civil society groups and protesters would look elsewhere.

But not before the creation of the ‘*Rise Up!*’ protest movement (on September 16, 2002-the anniversary of Gongadze’s disappearance)⁶³³ which yielded a few sizeable demonstrations in five cities across Ukraine-culminating in a 30,000-strong Kyiv rally, in

⁶²⁹ It is noteworthy, however, that in a last-ditch effort to save his post, Yushchenko was temporarily ready to offer government posts to oligarch-led parliamentary parties. In Lynch, T. In *Their Own Words: On the Way to Orange Ukraine’s Revolutionary Social Movement Year 2002*, 17.

⁶³⁰ Ibid, 18.

⁶³¹ Kuzio, T. Dirty Election Tactics in Ukraine. *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 1, 4, May 5, 2004.

⁶³² See Birch, S. The Parliamentary Elections in Ukraine, March 2002. *Electoral Studies* 22, 3, September 2003 and Popova, M. Rule of Law and Elections in Ukraine: Judicial Independence During the 2002 Parliamentary Elections. Paper for W. G. Danyliw Annual Lecture at Center for Russian and East European Studies, University of Toronto (September 20, 2004).

⁶³³ Wilson, A. Ukraine’s ‘Orange Revolution’ of 2004: the Paradoxes of Negotiation, 339.

September 2002-and a 20,000-attended Kuchma mock-trial event also in the capital one month later.⁶³⁴ Nonetheless, even this effort-perhaps due to its origins and nature of motives (being the brainchild of BYuT, it was placed under the control of politicians)-did not succeed in producing prolonged social traction and lasting public appeal. '*It was an attempt to repeat Ukraine Without Kuchma*, [for example 500 tents had been set up to begin hosting protesters, but heavy rain, dampened spirits and the threat of riot police combined to dissuade them from encamping] *but it was an imitation...*'⁶³⁵ Where it succeeded was in provoking a regime-orchestrated television blackout of the Kyiv rally and a police intervention that removed the remaining tents and arrested 60 demonstrators.⁶³⁶ For those that still sustained any illusions after the '*Ukraine Without Kuchma*' crackdown, these steps left no doubts as to the ends to which it would be prepared to go to deny, negate and subdue any opposition against it. Sporadic protests would continue to little effect, as the general public seemed disappointed from the twin failures of protests and political opposition cooperation prospects.

Opposition politicians scrambled to react. During the *Our Ukraine* congress in March 2003, an increasingly likely presidential candidate Yushchenko proposed the creation of a civic association around the party, but it 'appeared too complicated to be an effective mobilization device.'⁶³⁷ Further debilitating to the above was his continued oscillating between negotiation, and, street confrontation as the optimal tactic to confront the regime. On her part, Tymoshenko began calling for her block to join forces with Yushchenko's, but hers and her party's low popularity numbers weakened any such initiative. At the same time, Kuchma's rule drifted further towards authoritarianism. It was punctuated by his efforts to further amend the constitution

⁶³⁴ It was thought to be among the first times that street performances and songs together with humorous plays were part of an anti-regime manifestation (in Wilson, A., *Ukraine's Orange Revolution: The Paradoxes of Negotiation*, 340), but the seeds had been planted during the *Ukraine Without Kuchma* campaign. 'According to Anatoliy Bondarenko (maidan.org.ua coordinator and future Black Pora founding member):

'We noticed that the feelings of the people were very low. It was tragic. They had no hope. So we decided that the actions should be done in a lot happier way...more energetically. We decided to use music and specific slogans. We spent some serious time creating them.'

Lynch, T. In *Their Own Words: On the Way to Orange Ukraine's Revolutionary Social Movement Year 2002*, 29.

⁶³⁵ Yevhen Zolotaryov, *Za Pravdu* member, quoted in *Ibid*, p. 23.

⁶³⁶ *Ibid*, 26.

⁶³⁷ *Ibid*.

(for parliament and president to be elected at the same year)--which would result in the prolongation of his own term in office, his continuing collusion with business interests, and a perpetuated illiberal attitude towards media and media-originating criticism.⁶³⁸ In the case of media containment, local and international investigative reports uncovered that, besides the self-censorship exercised by many Ukrainian journalists to avoid harassment, the emasculation of the press took place in the form of secret instructions (*temnyky*) on whether and how to cover which topics that the regime sent daily to major news organizations, including television stations.⁶³⁹ This approach to governing seemed to have been re-affirmed by Kuchma's appointment in late 2002 of Viktor Yanukovich (who enjoyed the backing and style of the Donetsk oligarch clan)⁶⁴⁰ as his latest prime minister, and increasingly likely successor-nominee. The stage was being set.

'If at first you don't succeed': Social activism 're-activated'

Disappointing results from the aforementioned numerous attempts at active social protest and at the ineffectiveness of political opposition to the regime got many seasoned activists as well as hitherto uninvolved, younger Ukrainians thinking on how to proceed next. According to one veteran of the 2001 campaign, *'...the case of 'Ukraine Without Kuchma', the protests of March 9th, and For Truth Committee, and Forum of National Salvation (headed by Tymoshenko) kept being in my mind. It was clear were doing things wrong and something else was needed. So we started working...'*⁶⁴¹ And start they did, often independently, from many directions with the goal of avoiding the mistakes of the recent past when the next opportunity to contest the regime would arise, during the presidential elections of 2004. Some activists began networking with acquaintances, especially the Lviv circle of protesters from 2001 to

⁶³⁸ Kutuev, P. All Quiet on the Ukrainian Front? *Russia and Eurasia Review* 2, 10, May 13, 2003.

⁶³⁹ See Human Rights Watch report 'Negotiating the News' (2003) at <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/ukraine0303/>. Also see Kuzio, T. Russians Run Censorship of Ukrainian Media. *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 1, 3, June 20, 2004. Temnykys were alleged to be the brainchild of the Ukrainian branch of a Russian 'political technology' firm, called 'Center for Effective Politics'. (Ibid).

⁶⁴⁰ Varfolomeyev, O. Kuchma's Men Line Up for Presidential Election. *Russia and Eurasia Review* 2, 12, June 10, 2003.

⁶⁴¹ Dmytro Potekhin, senior activist, interview with the author, Kyiv, October 2007.

rebuild the movement. Others, with connections abroad turned to foreign foundations and organizations interested in funding electoral education campaigns. Finally, others founded new civic groups based on new foundations.

Fissile materials

In early 2002, Oleh Kyriyenko was in contact with the director of the Dutch NGO 'Alfred Mozer' which was associated with the Social Democratic Party of Netherlands, and it is there, according to him, that the concept of transplanting organization seminars on leadership to Ukraine came up. A seminar would be organized in Lviv for the youth wings of political parties, on leadership. Another idea was inviting *Otpor* veterans to participate; then Kyriyenko proposed more seminars.⁶⁴²

*'I saw that Otpor could be mimicked. I went around, travelling by van to make former connections reconnect [he mentions 'student brotherhood' and Maidan.org.ua activists]. The activist community wasn't big. I went to Oblast centers to look for people interested. By contacts and word of trusted mouth, the first seminar took place at the end of 2002, beginning of 2003...'*⁶⁴³

Aware of what had happened elsewhere in post-Communist countries, as well as the political predicament of many in the same boat, besides the Serbian *Otpor*, they also invited speakers from the Belarusian youth activist group *Zubr* and the Georgian *Kmara* (on planning mode for the 'Rose Revolution' in Georgia). All in all, 23 seminars and interactive lectures by *Otpor*, *Zubr* and *Kmara* speakers took place, followed by discussions with participants, and more research by the organizers. Around September 2003 the first concrete plans began to arise. During a fishing trip in the autumn of 2003, a group of ten activists from the former Maidan.org.ua, and the student groups *Braska* and *Opirg Molodvi* concluded that:

⁶⁴² Among those that Kyriyenko made contact with were Srdja Popovic, Ivan Marovic, Sale Maric, Stanko Lazendic and Sinisa Sikman—many of whom had graduated from *Otpor* to the Center for Advanced Non-Violent Applied Studies (CANVAS) in Belgrade, created following the fall of Milosevic in 2000—explicitly to help promote peaceful resistance to authoritarians worldwide.

⁶⁴³ Oleh Kyriyenko, interviewed by the author, 2007.

*'...We should create something similar to Otpor. It should be trustworthy, capable, and all people involved should be unaffiliated and independent from money or politicians. We were adamant that people participating should not personally benefit from it.'*⁶⁴⁴

The *Otpor* experience was also attractive organizationally, for both reasons of principle and security: *'We also agreed that there should be no one leader. We should have a horizontal structure. We had seen how it worked in Otpor and wanted to mirror it; it was efficient, it didn't collapse. The threat of collapse was double: both by security forces shutting us down and from the personal ambitions of leaders stirring the organization on the wrong course. This structure allowed for more people to express themselves [...] this is what we wanted to do: a collective decision-making organization based on consensus that could make a difference in Ukraine.'*⁶⁴⁵ This new organization was envisioned to concentrate on students, because, 'they were catalysts of society, because they had no wives, children, jobs, they were least influenced by stereotypes... They were the first truly post-soviet generation.' It would also expand and use techniques hitherto almost unheard of in Ukrainian politics, including street actions, humour, guerrilla-style sticker and poster-sticking posters.

Thus, this new effort began. Some began seeking funds, while others began discussing with the core of the group that would then go out to 'awaken Ukrainians'. 'V' had been involved with *Za Pravdu* in the 2001 campaign and was one of the signatories of a daring open protest letter for the survival of Ukrainian Youth Intelligencia produced by church officials in the wake of Kuchma-gate. In October 2003, benefiting from contacts in the Ukrainian embassy in the United States, he got to attend a conference and visit Washington, DC and New York for two weeks. Besides activist employees within the Ukrainian embassy, he also came in touch with a zealous diaspora and the US-Ukrainian Foundation, run by a congressman's wife. From their part, the idea of developing and creating a voter-education campaign in Ukraine ahead of the 2004 elections was born there, and in January 2004,

⁶⁴⁴ Interview with the author, Kyiv 2007.

⁶⁴⁵ Ibid.

*'...we got the 'go-ahead'. Until mid-summer, all I was doing was focusing the strategy and meeting people. It was coalition-building. It was obvious from the very beginning that the regime would not give any opposition candidate a chance to win. For me, it was not about Yushchenko, but about opposition and fair election. Yushchenko had issued open letter in 2001, where he called us (all protesters) fascists. It was very strange to be called fascist. It was clear that ours could not be political campaign, because we didn't trust the opposition [i.e. politicians] 100%, because in 2001 they failed, Yushchenko called us fascists, and because we could see their inefficiencies...'*⁶⁴⁶

From different directions, by the spring of 2004, a number of activist forces were coming together. Kyriyenko helped to find funds-he says, mostly from Dutch, British foundations. Between March-September 2004 their activities peaked. The regime was not going to take this crescendo of activism sitting down. Between August and October 2004, there would be more than 300 arrests of Black *Pora* members throughout Ukraine. But, what was *Pora* and who was behind it?

What is Kuchmism? 'It's Time!' to find out

In April 2004, strange stickers appeared across Ukraine. They cryptically asked: '*What is Kuchmism?*' Ukrainians were puzzled about the question and its origin; soon enough they began receiving answers. In May 2004, Black *Pora*, symbolized by a sun rising from behind a triangle, launched their civic campaign to answer the question they posed, by focusing on the regime's past transgressions and future electoral offenses.⁶⁴⁷ Their color of choice was black, because they were printing black t-shirts, and because leaflets and stickers were cheaper in black and white. But, two weeks later, another *Pora* organization also appeared on the national scene. Its logo was different (a clock) and its color was yellow.

⁶⁴⁶ 'V', interview with the author 2007.

⁶⁴⁷ The answers which appeared in other stickers a few weeks later, included 'Kuchmism is poverty', 'Kuchmism is banditry', 'Kuchmism is corruption'. Wilson, *The Orange Revolution*, 74.

As for Kuchmism itself, a Black *Pora* activist explains the rationale behind this label: '*At that time, there was no understanding [knowledge] of who will be the [presidential] candidate of the regime. So, we made the term 'Kuchmism' to generalize the regime, so to include and cover whoever runs. The main idea was: 'Kuchmism' generalizes all negative issues of the regime, so that all can understand.*' A. K., interview with the author, Kyiv, 2007.

A tale of two *Poras*

Yellow *Pora* first appeared in late April 2004, in the protest action following the heavy-handed, blatant interference by pro-regime supporters in the Western Ukrainian city of Mukachevo's municipal elections. Since then, it rose to prominence, especially with the circles of Yushchenko's *Nasha Ukraina* party with which it maintained close contact and cooperated, especially as the 2004 Fall elections neared.⁶⁴⁸ According to a printed account by its charismatic, main leader, Vladislav Kaskiv and Yellow *Pora* associates, Iryna Chupryna and Yevhen Zolotariov, Yellow *Pora* overcame internal problems/intra-competition, absence of coordination and communication that were common between members of different civic movements. They were solved by NGO coalition, and information and communication technology, and Yellow *Pora*'s 'counter-action' was deemed effective, because of its easier fundraising, elaborate regional structure, use of decentralized management (despite also praising in their article the importance of central organization), and avoidance of the police. Again, according to the two authors, the organization structure of Yellow *Pora* was presumably built on a model of deliberately horizontal networks management. At the core was to be the Riys, a regional mobile group consisting of 10-15 volunteers each. 400 riys formed a network and acted in 78 *kusches* (territories), each with 500,000 people-tailored to local needs.⁶⁴⁹ Elsewhere in the same article, authors seemed to provide different data, noting that 'September 2004 marked the final consolidation of a stable network of 72 regional centers including about 150 mobile groups all over Ukraine'⁶⁵⁰). Whatever the exact figure, many activists and scholars familiar with the Ukrainian civil society scene had a problem with this picture of Yellow *Pora* being too good to be true.⁶⁵¹ Attempts to get Kaskiv's perspective on the record did not succeed, but in a conversation with Iryna

⁶⁴⁸ Apparently, their visibility grew so large that Yushchenko complained after one public rally that there were many more Yellow *Pora* flags than *Nasha Ukraina* ones.

⁶⁴⁹ Kaskiv, V., Chupryna, I. and Zolotariov, Y. It's Time! *Pora* and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, in Forbrig, J. and Demes, P. (eds). 2007. *Reclaiming Democracy: Civil Society and Electoral Change in Central and Eastern Europe*. Washington, DC: The German Marshall Fund), 135.

⁶⁵⁰ *Ibid*, 137.

⁶⁵¹ 'Yellow *Pora* was more traditional and hierarchical, and it paid the most important activists who were close to political life...' Polese, A. Ukraine 2004: Informal Networks, Transformation of Social Capital and Colored Revolutions. *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 25, 2-3, (June-September 2009): 255-277, 164.

Chupryna, she acknowledged some issues with the article and mentioned a rift between the two authors and a severance of contact between them.⁶⁵² Overall, numerous sources interviewed, both from Black *Pora* and independent ones, present the two *Poras* very differently. An activist familiar with both campaigns notes: *"Guys who later launched Yellow Pora were planning a different campaign-the 'Wave of Freedom' [...] Kaskiv announced in a press conference he was the one planning this campaign. Yellow Pora launched two weeks after Black Pora. It was misusing and/or misleading because it was not clear for people whether it was the same or different campaign."*⁶⁵³

Ultimately, the two *Poras* would continue to coexist in tandem. That, despite attempts made by activists like Dmitro Pothekin, according to whom, the two main reasons for this were (i) *'We were going to regions, talking to people, and it was unclear to them why there were two Poras'*, and (ii) *'for people who were mobilizing, it was very bad because you have to show power and unity.'* Indeed, the existence of two brands with the same name for a civic campaign posed serious problems for activists. It was particularly tricky in a Ukrainian political context because of some sort of déjà vu: the national democratic movement of the early 1990s (*Rukh*) failed because of internal clashes (after the death of Wyacheslav Chornovil, who was the presidential candidate in 1999). For many national democrats, they remembered the mess (many parties had the same name-*Rukh*; that was only 5-6 years before), because it was the same generation of voters. Hence, public knowledge of a conflict between the two *Poras* could deter in the ultimate goal of mobilizing people.⁶⁵⁴ Pothekin organized a meeting between Yellow and Black *Pora* representatives. Although publicly apolitical, the former had already formed a political coordination body with politicians from *Nasha Ukraina*. At the meeting, they discussed that Yellow and Black *Pora* should refrain from fighting each

⁶⁵² Chupryna, I. Interview with the author, Boston, summer 2008.

⁶⁵³ Name withheld, interview with the author, Ukraine 2007.

⁶⁵⁴ The following incident, recalled by two Black *Pora* interviewees to the author is illustrative of the above: *'Black Pora, would have a protest, and as soon as Yellow Pora found out about it, they would spread the information ('it was Pora, they wouldn't say which one'). In one case, Yellow Pora spread the wrong information, 'X time at Y place', and didn't even come to the place at the time they said. At Black Pora we had to find people and go there where Yellow Pora had said the protest would take place, so as not to 'lose face'. Our reputation was at stake.'*

other publicly, and agreed to develop a joined brand for the two campaigns (e.g. by merging the two logos). The next day, a new logo appeared. At forum of *Pora*, activists presented the new logo, but while Black *Pora* tried to follow this, Yellow *Pora* did not, preferring to stick to its own.

According to a very senior, seasoned activist with verified inside knowledge of both organizations, “*contrary to Black Pora (while they still had some leaders, they had a more horizontal structure), in Yellow Pora there was a vertical structure; it was a clear hierarchy.*”⁶⁵⁵ Yellow *Pora* had nothing but a Kyiv office. In reality, the plan was only on paper. There was no Yellow *Pora*, just Vlad Kaskiv. Several dozen organizations registered to his name, having funding of different sources. They were people, in the regions, he was talking to [...] *Only thing Vlad was doing well was networking with political parties and fundraisings. Most of the activities and the campaign were started by Black Pora. Activities were reported on Black Pora’s website, then copied and pasted in the Yellow Pora one.*” This activist continues: “*Actively, he was only in Mukachevo. There, he was involved. He did go to Odessa, and, yes, Kaskiv did personally place benches across Hreshatyk street during the Orange Revolution in the Fall. But all the rest was PR and spin-doctor. Contrary to Black Pora, he delivered more efficiently information to journalists. Black Pora was built on a security model-you couldn’t find them because [...] they don’t have one leader. With Black Pora, journalists talked every time to a different person. Black Pora covered 90% of regions. Kaskiv printed lots of flags and t-shirts. For people, it made no difference what flag to take, by then. Out of those kusches there was one or two [...] I personally saw it [...] At the beginning, I couldn’t believe it. Very disappointing. Lots of people went through these campaigns, hundreds of young Ukrainians became disillusioned with this management...*”⁶⁵⁶

On the other hand, activists with Yellow *Pora* expressed themselves positively on Kaskiv’s leadership skills and thought ‘*he was a good leader, full of energy, well-*

⁶⁵⁵ Activists close to Kaskiv seemed to confirm this: ‘*No one leader; formally not. [But] really, it was Kaskiv; and a coordination center of 12-16 people for all Ukraine.*’ Name withheld, interviewed by the author, Kyiv 2007. Nikolayenko (2009a) confirms this picture.

⁶⁵⁶ Senior activist who wishes to remain anonymous, interviewed by the author, Ukraine 2007.

*equipped to manage [Yellow] Pora.*⁶⁵⁷ Still, Black *Pora* ones objected to this style of management: *'Kaskiv was centralizing things around himself, in Kyiv, with the philosophy: 'show it on TV, people will see it, it will work.' But it was all an illusion, a mirage of a Yellow Pora network [...] When Kaskiv was designing the regional departments, he was saying to regions: 'write the projects and we'll lobby the sponsors.'* *But they weren't realized. All activity with regions by Yellow Pora, 'well, we'll send you 50, 100 kgs of stickers and you'll do it.'* *That was the only conversation about activities. If Black Pora was doing something, it was trying to involve people. They didn't just come to the office and do nothing. They wanted to raise civic consciousness, not just passively expose people to slogans.*⁶⁵⁸

Despite the criticism against it,⁶⁵⁹ it can be argued that Yellow *Pora* did play some role-especially during the rounds of voting and the Maidan; it also served to inspire a lot of volunteers under the *Pora* banner. At the same time, in the course leading up to the presidential elections-especially the closer one got to them- dozens if not hundreds of other civil society groups also mushroomed in Ukraine; their presence, too, contributed to the efforts to educate the electorate and monitor the electoral process.⁶⁶⁰ However, the evidence points to Black *Pora*'s genuine, spearheading activism and proven presence on the field as a much more significant factor in preparing the ground for this proliferation of civic action-even to the point of imitation.⁶⁶¹

Black Pora

The idea behind the original *Pora* (Black) was in the works by the end of 2003 and officially appeared symbolically during the switch to daylight savings time in Ukraine, in March 28/29, 2004 with the aforementioned Ukraine-wide (17 cities) sticker

⁶⁵⁷ D. S. interviewed by the author, Kyiv 2007.

⁶⁵⁸ N. H. interviewed by the author, 2007.

⁶⁵⁹ For example, another experienced civil society activist interviewed by the author alleges a past practice of payments for the recruitment of supporters. Yellow *Pora*'s ultimate choice to coordinate its activities with Yushchenko's camp, forfeiting its independence, as well as its post-election decision to transform itself into a partisan political party also put it at odds with the original *Pora* principles. All these further attested to a certain dissonance between its principles in theory and actual practice.

⁶⁶⁰ Still, a number of activists from different groups met by the author in Ukraine 2007 dispute the efficiency, transparency, or even the function of many such groups.

⁶⁶¹ Which, according to the famous Wilde adage, is, after all, 'the most sincere form of flattery.'

campaign.⁶⁶² It consisted mostly of students originally from Lviv and veterans of previous movements or campaigns-like *Opirg Molodvi (Young Resistance)*. This core of activists explicitly wanted to avoid the errors of the *Ukraine Without Kuchma* campaign, and also learn from successes like the Serbian case. According to one of them,

*“Ukraine Without Kuchma had a lot of problems with internal structure. It was unorganized. It was a hierarchical structure. Action of March 9th ...influenced more [the] movement as a whole. Firstly, it showed that demonstrators were weaker than the police. It had no result except those with negative position to this movement. Those who watched TV ...saw a group of idiots, not serious protesters. Also, they saw that the government system was very strong. They saw no reason to go against it... We had decided not to make mistakes again. We understood that we needed new principles of organization, to be completely new. Also, we saw what the Serbs had done, and what had just happened in Georgia...”*⁶⁶³

Based on the above, Black *Pora* came to stand for (i) a leaderless, horizontal organization structure with coordinators rotating regionally so that no one was irreplaceable, (ii) commitment to non-violent resistance, (iii) a decision-making process characterized by consensus, (iv) the acceptance of donations, as long as no strings were attached, (v) the prohibition of using the organization for the advancement of personal or political careers, and the unwritten ‘Musketeer’ one-‘One for all and all for one-never leave a *Pora* member alone’. Above all, ‘they understood that the government was going to falsify elections, and they didn’t want to let them do that.’

Within a span of ten months, this core group would grow to cover every Ukrainian oblast with many branches and members recruited daily for both positive and ‘black’ actions.⁶⁶⁴ The former included educating (in person and through leaflets) the population on voting procedures and rights, alerting them to the possibility of vote-

⁶⁶² Olha Salo, Black *Pora* founding circle member and designer of its logo, interviewed by the author, Kyiv 2007.

⁶⁶³ ‘We took the Serbian model, we took their structure and principles and modified it for Ukraine, using the number of regions. Modified it to Ukrainian standards. Also took our own ideas and implemented/modified them to Ukraine (from Serbia, Belarus, Georgia). We took the best things we thought would work in Ukraine. It wasn’t an automatism, a mechanical mixing. Serbs told us they could use the *Otpor* logo, but we said we don’t want it; we are in Ukraine, we’ll do it our own way. But we will use the Serbs’ experience.’ Founding member of Black *Pora*, interview by author.

⁶⁶⁴ Kuzio, T. 2006. Civil Society, Youth and Societal Mobilization in Democratic Revolutions. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 39 (365-386), 367.

rigging and training them how to monitor and report it; the latter, tarnishing the image of the regime's protégé candidate and ridiculing the pitfalls of the regime to the greatest number of people possible through a variety of coordinated activities, like provocative stickers' campaigns, street theatre and flash mob. One example was an activity titled 'Time to Clean', during which activists brought garbage to a local city council, to symbolize corruption and their desire to cleanse it. They played music, distributed leaflets about citizens' rights and invited passers by to contribute. Then, they cleaned up all the garbage and left.⁶⁶⁵ Another *'started with six people, quickly expanding to fifty. It was simple-going around in a circle. To join, one needed to put a hat on and walk in circle with us, while everybody had their hands behind their backs, to show they were like prisoners, all bounded together by their lack of freedom. Those who joined us would usually leave their contact information and would be seen again [...] The more people we reached, the more we recruited, the more information we would spread'*.⁶⁶⁶ Another activist notes: *'we had moral power, we were not afraid by ourselves to go around to squares in the city and do actions [...] 'if we don't do this thing, no one else will do it. We have to show people they can stand [up.]'*⁶⁶⁷

Besides street theatre ('actions'), these mobilizing efforts took place through the internet, via telephone and face-to-face recruitment during and after events.⁶⁶⁸ As the initial core of activists spread out, its flexible yet organized approach frequently produced synchronized multiple activities from multiple cells on the same day at the same location across 25 cities. The coordination was meant to impress and embolden citizens, as well as to evade and confuse authorities. 'Parties couldn't do it. We wanted

⁶⁶⁵ Outlined in internal *Black Pora Operational Document*, p. 11, obtained by the author.

⁶⁶⁶ Olha Salo, interviewed by the author, Kyiv 2007.

⁶⁶⁷ 'K', interviewed by the author, 2007.

⁶⁶⁸ According to Black Pora member, *'to coordinate, we had person-to-person communication, but also the internet and cell phones... The internet gave the opportunity to send instructions. We had one standard form [message]. We sent a mass email to a lot of people.'* [besides recruiting, popular sites like *kuchmizm.info* shared information and scheduling activities, as reported in *The Many Sites of Pora*-internal document obtained by the author]. *He continues: 'One cell phone had SMS message service that could send a text universally... In 2004 there was a new mobile phone operator, 'Juice'. It was cheap. At that time, the operating company had a special deal for new members. 'If you get the package, you don't pay between [other Juice] members' they said. We used it a lot, and joked that, without knowing it, this company was the sponsor of the revolution!'* Andriy Kohut, Black Pora activist, interviewed by the author, Kyiv, 2007.

to show we were different'.⁶⁶⁹ A clear reflection of Black Pora's ethics, goals and ethos was found in its bottom-up approach that favored and advanced a non-hierarchical, horizontal, leaderless organization. According to a core member of Black Pora, Andriy Kohut, *'this structure offered the advantage of security: if police arrested one of us, someone else could well carry on the work without disruption. The more people we had, the more safety existed for us. If there are two of us, we can get arrested; if there are a lot of us we cannot be stopped. You can't arrest all of Ukraine.'*⁶⁷⁰ Another Black Pora activist offers an illustration of this example:

*'We communicated most when someone was arrested. Information message was: 'X was arrested. Is held at Y address. Telephone of this Police Dept. is Z. Call it.'*⁶⁷¹ *Everyone who received that message should send it to everyone they could. Idea was to spread the SMS. They had to say they are deputies, NGO members, or, foreigners (we told them 'if you know any other language, use it'), ask if it is true that X is arrested, why is he or she held, when will he or she be released, when can we see them. We tried to exert psychological pressure. We also kept police phones busy so that after two hours of calling, police would simply let X go. If that didn't help, our local organization took action to bring protesters on site and protest. Our main purpose: If someone from the team is arrested, never let him/her alone. It was helpful for people in the regions because they knew if something happened to them they would have help. It was important to feel you have someone who stands by you, and if you confront them [the regime] you will be helped. Our connections made this easier. If a person knew at least one Pora person, he knew that all could come to their aid, that he would be fine, he would be safe... We could do this because we had contacts. People who we knew. Also, all in one time, because simultaneous action was more successful... government powers were not ready for this*

⁶⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁷⁰ Interviewed by the author, Kyiv, 2007.

⁶⁷¹ During that interview, this activist mentioned a case where he sent a text message, and soon after got the same SMS back not only from friends, but also from people whom he didn't know. Interestingly, the same type of SMS feedback loop was reported by Otpor activists, during the author's field research in Serbia. One of the Serbian interviewees said, that, once, with another friend from the Otpor core, they decided to conduct an experiment and send an SMS spreading information to see if and *how fast* (seven minutes, according to the interviewee) it would come back to them. Surely enough, it did, from multiple sources, some of which unknown to them. Both reports offer some anecdotal cell phone evidence that their personal networks were composite one (both strong and weak ties).

action; they didn't have time to figure it out.'

At the same time, according to Olha Salo, another core activist, '*Decentralization was also about being creative. The more people as coordinators, the more chance good ideas. Not only one person and his ideas.*' Overall, within this period, a total of 300 well-organized 'actions' took place all across Ukraine, urging Ukrainians to exercise their democratic rights without fear of the regime (against regime plans to 'demotivate' them)⁶⁷², and catalyzing hitherto uninvolved citizens to join, or volunteer with some other civic group in the face of the upcoming presidential elections.⁶⁷³




Figure 14: Ukraine-wide Civil Society Groups and Black Pora Network, 2003-4

Source: author field research

⁶⁷² Wilson, *The Orange Revolution*, 84.

⁶⁷³ These actions targeted either the elections (their mode of conduct and the regime's candidate) or social problems. Black Pora established different departments (planning, safety, creative, information, legal, etc.) to ensure that these activities were covered from every angle. For example, organizing for a single action involved naming (branding) it, creating slogans matching the themes they wanted to highlight, specifying the time and place of it, creating and following a scenario of what and how what to transpire, and arranging for the appropriate resources. Internal *Black Pora Operational Document*, p.6, obtained by the author.

Victor vs. Victor

The regime's choice for president, who would be constantly lampooned by Black *Pora*, was Kuchma's sitting Prime Minister, Victor Yanukovich. A relatively uninspiring choice with questionable credentials (his distributed curriculum vitae falsely listed one of his accomplishments as 'Professor'-itself notoriously misspelled with two 'ff's) and a criminal record (for petty theft and thuggery), Yanukovich's only apparent asset was his former governorship of Donetsk, a rich industrial region run by mighty local business interests. Having been judged by Kuchma as competent (and reliable) enough, he was promoted to the prime minister's office, where he brought along with him many of his former associates; they ended up occupying important spots, bringing under control a sizeable part of the state's administrative resources critical for an electoral campaign.⁶⁷⁴

Against him, at the official start of the election campaign in early July 2004 were pitted the veteran presidential candidate Communist Petro Symonenko, the Socialist Oleksandr Moroz, and, also unsurprisingly, the *Our Ukraine* (and YuTB-backed) Victor Yushchenko. The combined *Our Ukraine*-YuTB numbers polling around 32% guaranteed that Yushchenko would secure a place in the second round of the elections, facing either a Leftist candidate or Yanukovich. An energized Yushchenko began exhibiting a more combative style, directing his fire at the regime (and making more enemies within it), like in a speech during a 50,000-strong rally in Kyiv: *'The criminal government is to blame for all of this. Today citizens are not free in their own country, they are unprotected against the whims of the bureaucrats, tax inspectors, militia and the procurators.'*⁶⁷⁵

A dirty, yet spirited election campaign

Despite Kuchma's guarantees that the authorities would do 'everything they can to ensure the election is conducted in the most transparent and civilized way

⁶⁷⁴ Varfolomeyev, O. Kuchma's Men Line Up for Presidential Election. *Russia and Eurasia Review* 2, 12, June 10, 2003.

⁶⁷⁵ Quoted from Yushchenko's website (yushchenko.com.ua) in Kuzio, T. Opposition Divided Ahead of Ukrainian Presidential Elections. *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 1, 46, July 6, 2004.

possible'⁶⁷⁶ few seemed to be reassured by his words. Over the grass-root western NGO or OSCE style of monitoring, the regime displayed a preference for CIS-Interparliamentary Assembly observers (a parallel monitoring body that came with a 100% record of pronouncing elections as free and fair).⁶⁷⁷ Worse, the regime seemed to also prefer Soviet-era tactics of surveillance and intimidation of its opponents.

Yushchenko's campaign was hit by black PR, often portrayed as fascist⁶⁷⁸, and was routinely trailed by crews from the Ministry of the Interior -ostensibly for his protection-at one time discovered and caught by *Our Ukraine* supporters. Fears surfaced that the popular opposition candidate could be in danger, and in early Fall they materialized. Following a secret dinner with high officials from the security forces, SBU head Smeshko and his deputy Satsiuk, Yushchenko fell violently ill. A private clinic in Austria where he was rushed diagnosed dioxin poison that gradually disfigured his face. For a few weeks the campaign was suspended, but after a rigorous medication regime, Yushchenko was soon back on the campaign trail. Some pointed at the SBU; others alleged a sinister involvement by the Kremlin. It is important to note, that in the case of the SBU, according to Wilson's assessment, 'during the campaign, one faction in the SBU remained broadly neutral, while another actively helped the Yushchenko team, remaining in secret contact [...] Contrary to later reports that it defected to the opposition en masse, the SBU was obviously split at this time between professionals and recent political appointments by Kuchma and Medvedchuk. Smeshko embodied the split, as he was both.'⁶⁷⁹ Whoever was behind this attempt to temporarily or permanently incapacitate the opposition candidate, they failed. The plan backfired, Yushchenko's popularity continuing to climb as the elections approached.

Meanwhile, as Black *Pora's* activities intensified, so did police interference. The following incident, recalled by a senior Black *Pora* activist, is indicative of the rising

⁶⁷⁶ Kuchma's comments reported by Interfax-Ukraine, July 8, quoted in Kuzio, T. Is a Free Election Possible in Ukraine? *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 1, 50, July 12, 2004.

⁶⁷⁷ Kuzio, T. Is a Free Election Possible in Ukraine? *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 1, 50, July 12, 2004.

⁶⁷⁸ In the spirit of such attacks, late in the campaign, Yanukovich's wife would make an accusatory speech very reminiscent of those by Milosevic's wife, Mira.

⁶⁷⁹ Wilson, *The Orange Revolution*, 98. The significance of this split would reveal itself in late November 2004.

tension, as well as the cat-and-mouse game played by activists and the regime's coercive apparatus:

'In late September, I was in a regional meeting in Cherkasy. At that time, each member was followed openly by the police. We got used to being followed. We were worried when we were not followed. When walking towards the subway, a uniformed policeman asked for our documents. Next to the metro, we asked an old woman who was selling cigarettes directions for the bus stop. When we got outside and got on it, a policeman followed us on the bus and asked us to get out: 'that old woman says you stole money from her.' I said, 'let's go back and ask her!' We did and she denied having accused them, so I asked the policeman: 'Any more questions?' 'No' he replied. We went back to the bus and got on board. In the bus station following the one we boarded the bus, we were supposed to meet Pora friends. We got off the bus, met our friends, walked for 100 meters, and from both sides of the street, two cars surrounded us. Two civilian-clothed, thuggish-looking men came out; they were drunk. They began swearing at us and ordered us to get in the car. Among my friends who met us, was a deputy of the regional council. He put his hand in the jacket to reach for his deputy identity card, and the two thugs, thinking he had a gun, jumped on him. I understood that the thugs were professionals, that they had some training; they knew how to grab someone and how to throw them in the car. I calmed down, because I understood that it was the police. Then, a police car came. The Police took their cell phones, but I had two and I only gave one. When in the wagon-cage of the van, I took out my second cell phone and called, said I was arrested, so, [my contact] abandoned our arranged meeting place and spread the news of the arrest, instead. We were held in the 'X' regional department of police in Cherkasy for hours. When in the police department we were not afraid because we knew they were in the police. We were only afraid before because we didn't know who these two thugs were. In the police department after a few hours of stay, the main officer came-he was also a bit drunk-and started to apologize: 'it was a mistake, we were looking for two who looked a lot like you [...] Then, they dropped us off where we had been arrested. Police ran down the clock so that we wouldn't do [sic] our activity

*properly. We would have less time to talk to regional coordinators too much about affairs and planning. I wanted to see and meet our members in that city. Just to see people with whom we had communicated with before over the phone [they were travelling to meet those with whom they cooperated] I would talk to many over the phone and the internet, but I wanted a chance to meet them, face to face, it was important...'*⁶⁸⁰

Often the attempts at harassment and interference with *Pora's* activities were more blatant, like the police raid of its Kyiv offices, which allegedly discovered explosives, and the plans by the deputy procurator to arrest and frame *Pora* activists just before the elections-a plan which, interestingly, 'met with silent protest and open sabotage' by his [own] interlocutors.⁶⁸¹

Yet, Black *Pora's* efforts continued, including a well-coordinated civic education campaign across Ukraine, which was to culminate with a concerted plan to mobilize volunteers to monitor as many election polling stations nation-wide as they could on the day of the voting. This was a conscious effort designed to counter as effectively as possible the regime's own tactics to try to intimidate or bribe voters, to produce its own fake, or 'frequent' voters, as well as to stuff the ballot boxes with extra votes. On October 31st, Election Day, they put it into action. They weren't alone-other observers from Yellow *Pora*, other civic groups and even *Our Ukraine*-were active on that day. But, what arguably distinguished Black *Pora* apart were its organization, zeal and spirit of voluntarism. The example below is from an activist's team monitoring polling stations in Kyiv, called 'Operation Night Watch'⁶⁸²:

'Each car had a few [assigned] voting stations to go around. Dividing of the map was made by the team. We had two teams, we divided the map and had two sectors-one for the East and one for the West side. When the polling station department opened at 8 am, we drove to it. Usually three or four of us in the car: a driver; a person with a journalist's ID, and a person who knows the law. More is safer, better. We would 'go

⁶⁸⁰ Name withheld at the request of the interviewee, available by the author.

⁶⁸¹ Wilson, *The Orange Revolution*, 74.

⁶⁸² Oleh Kyriyenko, interview with the author, Athens, 2007.

around' the departments [polling stations]. As you'd go in there would be registration. I'd register as a journalist and then interview the station's committee about any irregularities. 'Is everything all right? Are all the ballot boxes stamped?' At that moment a difficult situation might arise. One could answer 'all is ok', or, say 'who are you? I don't want to answer, etc...' In case of irregularities, we would scare them by taking pictures of them. We could tape their conversations on a dictaphone. If you say 'your pictures will be in the press the following morning' they'd be scared. If any irregularity was found to have taken, or to be taking place, I would call the information center (we had set up an information center to report and check about irregularities), plus the staff centers (the two responsible for East and West Kyiv) [...] This Information Center got the information of whomever would call them (through stickers-"if you spot an irregularity, call this number"). There were ten phone numbers on the sticker. Five numbers corresponded to the Information Center lines, and another five to offices around Kyiv, equipped with internet connection, so they could disseminate them through the internet. If this information was provided by ordinary citizens (not observers), and it didn't get the regular office, it would go to the Information Center. If it didn't get the Information Center, called peripheral five lines, then they (at the peripheral offices) would contact observers (via cell phones) to go check the information/allegation out [...] There was strict coordination between person responsible for cars. You'd call this person 'we are team A and want to go to the voting station X. Is there anyone there yet?' Each car had a concrete/specific number of departments (polling stations). Coordinators made these and activists would come from one neighbourhood and they'd say 'oh, you are from Podil, you go there.' This was done in all cities. The local teams were important... we all assumed personal responsibility to guard the elections...'⁶⁸³

Following the inconclusive first round, which found Yushchenko in the lead with a plurality of the vote, a second, crucial one was held on November 21. Shortly before the latter, Yellow Pora decided to openly coordinate its activities with *Our Ukraine*. It is at this point that it claimed center stage; but, arguably, the road had been laboriously

⁶⁸³ Andriy Kohut, interviewed by the author, Kyiv 2007.

paved by Black *Pora*. Amidst a climate of suspicion and incredulity, on November 24, the Central Election Commission declared Yanukovich the winner, despite polling that indicated the opposite.⁶⁸⁴ The opposition refused to accept the official results, and the stage for the climaxing confrontation was set.⁶⁸⁵ A small tent city next to Kyiv Mohyla Academy was quickly dismantled and re-established at Kyiv's Independence Square. Within two days of the election, much to the opposition's surprise, the square had been swarmed by crowds numbering in the hundreds of thousands, effectively occupying it and setting up camp. Traffic was blocked, many more tents went up, and support in the form of food, blankets and medicine was donated by ordinary Ukrainians. Meanwhile, Ukrainians from all over the country began arriving to the capital to show their support. Both *Pora*'s played an important role in distributing this material and providing newcomers with lodging.⁶⁸⁶ Soon after, marches across Kyiv were organized and got under way. When they began, one of the opposition's tactics was to put young women in the front row; they would often offer flowers to the riot police, thereby reducing the risk the latter would respond with violence to such overtures.⁶⁸⁷ Other ways to minimize the potential for a clash was the tactic of avoidance altogether, often facilitated by leaks

⁶⁸⁴ For a detailed account of the implausible voting margins that Yanukovich achieved, especially in Eastern Ukraine, as well as for a meticulous account of the perpetration of the electronic fraud, see Wilson, *The Orange Revolution*, especially pages 1-6 and 114-116.

⁶⁸⁵ On the same day the results were 'validated', one of the more celebrated vignettes of the Orange Revolution took place live on television. It was the story of Natalya Dmitruk, the sign language's translator for the UT-1 TV news, who signed that the official results spoken by her co-anchor were lies that she could no longer support them. This episode is not only evidence of a Milosevic-style teledictatorship status in Ukrainian telecommunications at the time, but also a wonderfully apt symbolic manifestation of Kuran's notion of the gap between private and public preferences.

⁶⁸⁶ Yellow *Pora* was more visible with the tents in the square. Black *Pora* used its network to accommodate and place newcomers to Kyiv. For example, one activist's role was at the crucial communication center, answering the phones. She recalls: 'X calls with 'I have a place to sleep.' I would write the information down and depending on it, forward it to different Departments in the organization. At the peak of this information flow, there were three of us, registrars [working the phones]. Others would come, and we would divide them in groups of 10, 7, 5 and live/placed together by office. We would select one of them to be the liaison (to contact the office), and they could communicate information back and forth. That way, each person would also be informed on the next day's plans (by phone, or cell phone, or face to face).' Olha Salo, interviewed by the author, Kyiv 2007.

⁶⁸⁷ Naturally, this technique was not new, but had been tested by the most archetypal mass mobilization of them all: "...the demonstration planned for 20 May (1 Prairial) threatened to be massive and intimidating. The night before, crowds of people, many of them women, could be seen rushing about the streets of the Faubourgs Saint-Antoine and Saint-Marceau, the Rues Saint-Denis and Saint-Martin and throughout the Cite, urging people to join them the next day in a march upon the Convention, to stick slogans in their hats reading 'Bread and the Constitution of '93' and to let women march in the front as the Government's troops would never dare to open fire on them." Hibbert, C. 1982. *The French Revolution*. London: Penguin Books, pp.274-75.

from the security forces' side.⁶⁸⁸ Overall, a festive atmosphere prevailed in and around Independence square, which helped minimize the possibility of a violent confrontation; it also entertained those present, and drew more crowds. As a Black Pora activist reported, *'there was a danger that people in the Maidan would get depressed if there was nothing happening, no activity. So, we would do performances to cheer them up-like political theatre and singing groups.'*⁶⁸⁹ So, even though, 'Pora were not [prominent] on the stage in the Maidan, their tactics caught hold.'⁶⁹⁰

At the same time, the matter of the elections was referred to the Supreme Court. A very tense ten days passed while it deliberated, with protesters and police often at standoffs outside of blockaded government buildings. Despite the relative euphoria in the square, and the meager attempted response by the Yanukovich's election team (counter-demonstrations were small, unorganized and short-lived)⁶⁹¹ 'the first couple of these ten days it was very scary for us in Kyiv' says one interviewee who was afraid to go to Maidan, *'because the city was deaf. Something was going on, something was going to happen and you didn't know what it was. You couldn't get information, the trains were stopped. Anything, the worse could happen.'*⁶⁹² 'Make no mistake', a Pora (Yellow) activist, who stayed as security guard for two weeks' exclaimed: *'we were afraid that tanks would come to Maidan.'* The risk of real danger came from the regime's security apparatus, and the night of November 28 was particularly critical. Within a span of hours a command was allegedly given, then rescinded for the mobilization of 10,000 to 13,000 troops which had reportedly arrived at the capital to crackdown on the protesters. According to some accounts, the troops (an MVS 'BARS' *spetsnaz* unit) were from a distant region (Crimea), so as to avoid bonding with the mostly local crowds, and were not briefed on what situation and level

⁶⁸⁸ For example, 'a student brought friends from Sumy, and his father was a Berkut commander in Sumy. So, the commander would call his son 50 times a day and would say to his son: 'we are here, there are so many of us, these are our plans.' Y. Dykiy, KMA professor and protester, interviewed by the author, Kyiv 2007.

⁶⁸⁹ Olha Salo, interviewed by the author, Kyiv 2007.

⁶⁹⁰ Wilson, *The Orange Revolution*, 129.

⁶⁹¹ Collin, *The Time of the Rebels*, 142-3.

⁶⁹² O.S., interviewed by the author, Kyiv 2007.

of urgency they could be called to respond to.⁶⁹³ While this incident remains shrouded in mystery,⁶⁹⁴ it pointed to internal splits within, and rifts between the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU), the Interior Ministry, the Army and the regime's leadership.⁶⁹⁵ It must have also alerted the regime to the near certainty that it could no longer count on its coercive apparatus to reliably intervene on its behalf.⁶⁹⁶

Mobilizing for an extra round

On December 1, the Ukrainian parliament strongly criticized federalist proposals put forth by Yanukovich supporters in Severodonetsk. It also passed a no-confidence vote in his government, effectively signaling to him to step down; it was ignored. On December 3rd, the Supreme Court ruled the second round results invalid due to fraud that 'massively violated Ukrainian law', ordering an unprecedented third round to be held on December 26th. Under pressure, including that of international mediators like the Polish and Lithuanian presidents, the European Union's Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Russian *Duma* speaker, a compromise was finally reached. In a-disappointing for many-return to the transition paradigm of 'elite 'pacting', the incumbent and his protégé agreed to a impressively monitored third round (just foreign monitoring volunteers numbered over 12,500) that would inevitably result in their loss of power, in exchange for having this power trimmed down by the transfer of a part of it from the Presidency to the Parliament.⁶⁹⁷ The dice appeared to have been cast in Yushchenko's

⁶⁹³ 'It was obvious' stated a protester close to Yellow Pora, 'that this was done because these units had no ties to the city and were gullible to state propaganda, so they could more easily use force.' Y. Dykiy, KMA professor, interviewed by the author, Kyiv 2007. Also see Wilson, *The Orange Revolution*, 136-138; Chivers, C. J. 'How Top Spies in Ukraine Changed the Nation's Path.' *The New York Times* (January 27); and, Kuzio, T. Former Security Chief Reveals Details about Violence during Ukrainian Presidential Election. *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 2, 106 (May 31, 2005)-with reports from Zerkalo Nedeli/Tyzhnia and Ukrayinska Pravda.

⁶⁹⁴ For example, the commander of internal troops, Lt-Gen. Popkov maintains that the movement of these troops was merely an 'exercise' (Segodnya, December 16), while the head of the SBU's military counter-intelligence, Romanchenko insists it was not a drill (Segodnya, January 18). Both reported by Kuzio, T. Did Ukraine's Security Service really prevent Bloodshed during the Orange Revolution? In *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 2, 16. Whatever the truth, the distance between these two comments itself indicates a split between Ukraine's security forces.

⁶⁹⁵ Chivers, C. J. 'How Top Spies in Ukraine Changed the Nation's Path.' *The New York Times* (January 27). Kuzio (Eurasian Daily Monitor 2, 106) also credits the NATO partnership for Peace program that had fostered professionalism among Ukrainian officers.

⁶⁹⁶ Arel, D. 2005. The 'Orange Revolution': Analysis and Implications of the 2004 Presidential Election in Ukraine. Third Annual Stasiuk-Cambridge University Lecture on Contemporary Ukraine, 4.

⁶⁹⁷ Subtelny, O. *Ukraine: A History*, 638.

favor. Blockades of government buildings were ended, and polling station commissions across Ukraine were reconstituted to fairly represent all candidates, their lists and rules on absentee ballots tightened.⁶⁹⁸ Around the same time, a 'caravan of friendship' was organized by the opposition, including mostly Yellow *Pora members*; a convoy of cars travelled to the east and south of the country, aiming to dispel first-hand any misconceptions (based on state television propaganda) these regions may have had about events in the capital.⁶⁹⁹

The results of the run-off election awarded Yushchenko the presidency with 52% of the vote over Yanukovich's 44%. On January 10th, he was declared the winner and on January 23rd, 2005 he gave the oath in the *Rada* and publicly took office during a ceremony in Maidan Square, as tens of thousands of his supporters cheered on. This was the final chapter of the 'Orange Revolution' and of what had been by any standard a remarkable year in Ukrainian modern political history. As for the two *Poras*, the future could not have looked more different. While Black *Pora* activists decided to transform themselves into a civil society monitoring organization, the leadership of Yellow *Pora* decided to launch an ultimately unsuccessful political career. As these developments show the former remained more true to their founding principle than the latter.

Aftermath

Following such an unprecedented election and related course of events, the public's expectations were so unrealistically high, that once president, Yushchenko was bound to disappoint. Nonetheless, by the end of his term few imagined how pervasive this disenchantment would be. It came as a result not only of pre-existing pressing political problems and newly created constitutional constraints before he even assumed office; to a large extent, it also had to do with Yushchenko's non-confrontational, often

⁶⁹⁸ Wilson, *The Orange Revolution*, 150.

⁶⁹⁹ 'Our tour began from Evropaeska square and its final destination was Maidan square. In between, there were cities to be visited, a big detour! Kharkiv, Sumy, Poltava, Donetsk, Lugansk, Dniepropetrovsk, Odessa, Crimea, Cherkasy. Best meeting and the warmest we had was in Sumy. We needed to go to the East to show them what was happening in Maidan'. S. Y. interviewed by the author, Kyiv 2007.

irresolute style of governing, his wrestling with political foes, and his in-fighting with uneasy allies. An early indication of trouble was the perturbed relation with his over-ambitious first prime minister, Yulia Tymoshenko and her more populist agenda, for which she was fired in late 2005, seven months into her tenure. Public over-expectation and governmental under-deliverance combined to embolden a regrouping opposition, which in the spring of 2006 registered a strong enough parliamentary election performance to (after being bolstered by the unexpected support of Moroz's Socialist Party) see the once disgraced foe of the 'Orange Revolution' Victor Yanukovich become prime minister. Not surprisingly, the political 'cohabitation' between him and the president was extremely ill-suited, and following the latter's dismissal, new elections took place in the fall of 2007; they produced a plurality of combined 'Orange' forces in the parliament, and returned Tymoshenko to the prime minister's office. But relations with the president while on her second spell in office proved almost as dissonant as these of her predecessor's, and their perpetual friction contributed--along with numerous domestic (political) and international (e.g. frequent disputes with Russia over gas supplies and transit) crises—to her eventual defeat by a rebounding Yanukovich in the presidential elections of early 2010.⁷⁰⁰

Yet, in spite of this stunning reversal of political fortunes, and the many failures of the Yushchenko presidency—including the impunity of Kuchma and his election fraudsters, the insolubility of Gongadze's murder⁷⁰¹, the persistence of oligarch influence, the doggedness of corruption, the feebleness of economic performance and the uneasiness of Russian-Ukrainian relations--all was not lost, in terms of the spirit of the Orange Revolution, the public activism and societal mobilization behind them. Ukraine's politics remained turbulent after 2004, but in terms of electoral conduct (and there have been a few parliamentary and a presidential contest since), it has become much less thinkable to rig elections—at least on the scale and magnitude during

⁷⁰⁰ During the second round of the election between Yanukovich and Tymoshenko, outgoing President Yushchenko (himself humiliated with a single digit percentage of the vote of the first) refused to throw his 5.4% support to either candidate. Yanukovich ended up edging Tymoshenko by 48.9% to 45.4%.

⁷⁰¹ Ironically, it was during Yanukovich's presidency that former President Leonid Kuchma was charged on the Gongadze case (*RFE/RL*, March 22, 2011). Still, a lower court dismissed it in late 2011; an appeal is pending.

Kuchma's era. The Freedom House 'Freedom in the World' report that assesses countries annually on political rights and civil liberties, has since 2006 upgraded Ukraine's status from 'Partially Free' to 'Free'--the single Commonwealth of Independent States and --along with the Baltic Republics--only post-Soviet country to retain such a designation in 2010.

Despite a number of bothersome developments since Yanukovich's reappearance on front stage⁷⁰², the press in Ukraine also became freer as a result of the legacy of 2004. There can still be found attempts by those controlling national media to tilt the scales in their favor, and a number of privately-owned stations and press continue to be under oligarchic control, but the age of journalists reasonably fearing for their lives and of *temnyky* seems bygone. Again the annual Freedom House ratings for Freedom of the Press in Central Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, attest to this positive change (Ukraine has improved its status from Not Free before the 'Orange Revolution' to Partially Free).⁷⁰³

⁷⁰² For example, Channel 5 was denied an application for new frequencies, while the satellite channel B (one of two Ukrainian Opposition T.V. channels) was stripped of frequencies (*RFE/RL*, June 8, 2010). More recently, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty affiliate *Radio Melodiya* was stripped of 12 frequencies, which were awarded to a previously unknown radio station (*RFE/RL*, March 23, 2011).

⁷⁰³ Freedom House, Freedom of the Press historical data, at <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=274>

CHAPTER SIX

DATA RESULTS, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

The main question in this study posits whether the network performances of opposition groups and their rival competitive authoritarian regimes (via its coercive security apparatus) affect the outcome of their clash, following a trigger like electoral fraud or other serious criminal political offense. In their efforts to mobilize, both networks diffuse-resources (human recruits, funds, educational information, etc.) and transmit signals (e.g. activist behavior, calls for support when arrested, commands for repression, etc.). The above was defined as a composite diffusion: it combines both simple (e.g. mere contact between a source and a target, like the dissemination of information with a wide reach) and complex (behavior-affecting, or, ‘activating’ contact) contagion. Complex contagion enables zealous activists to take the first steps in challenging the regime when such risk is high, and special unit troops to be the first to open fire on protesters; simple contagion is important for the uninitiated citizen to come to the square, and the military or security officer to remain in his formation. The former type of contagion requires strong ties, the latter weak ones. A network that seeks to maximize its mobilization performance (optimizing the properties of *robustness* and *efficiency*) must be able to activate both types of ties, beginning necessarily with strong ties at its core. A network with these properties is termed a *composite* network. In contrast, networks characterized predominantly by one type of tie (either strong or weak) are defined as *simple*.

To answer the above question, this chapter presents the results from analyzing information collected on rival youth opposition and competitive authoritarian regime coercive apparatus networks from the four empirical cases examined in this study. These results are derived from primary data collected using Respondent-Driven-Sampling surveys as well as secondary, complementary sources. While inevitably partial, these data provide a meaningful topological picture of the networks in question-

especially as they focus on the core of the networks in question. The resulting measurements and visualizations help identify specific typologies of networks. In turn, they are put in context of their respective cases and-together with results from simulations-they are assessed against the hypotheses postulated in the methodology chapter. That is, based on the results, a double comparison is made: (i) of formal types of networks (*composite versus simple*); and (ii) of their equivalents in the four actual cases (two in Serbia: *Zajedno* 1996-7 vs. *Otpor* 2000; and two in Ukraine: *Ukraine Without Kuchma* in 2000-1 vs. *Black Pora* in 2004). The regimes' coercive apparatus did not vary significantly across time. In addition, alternative hypotheses are briefly discussed.

Finally, the chapter concludes with a deeper examination of two (especially the second) of the four selected cases. Doing so serves to link the metrics and network charts to the processes and performances they capture, and to demonstrate through a detailed narrative how the particular combinations of specific typologies of rival networks affect the outcome of contentious political action.

DATA RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

Opposition group primary data was collected from Respondent-Driven-Sampling surveys, resulting both in a visualization and metrics for the core portions of their networks.⁷⁰⁴ As discussed in the methodology section, it proved not possible to conduct an RDS survey for security forces of the authoritarian regimes examined. The regime coercive apparatus members approached during field research refused to be interviewed, let alone provide information about their professional ties during the contestation with the opposition in each case. Even if they had consented to speak and divulge information towards this the research, these were members of the regular forces; the special or paramilitary forces would be even harder to debrief.

⁷⁰⁴ See Appendix for adjacency lists. Given the size of full adjacency matrices (including a 182 x 182 table, with sub-cells for weights for one of the cases), they were tabulated in excel files and are available by the author. An illustration of a partial adjacency matrix for a subset of the data is provided in the detailed example section of this chapter.

Consequently, no metrics could be derived for the regimes' security apparatus. However, to at least be able to reconstruct their networks for an organizational picture that could still yield meaningful information about their formal connections, secondary data were collected. The results for the networks' cores researched are shown below.

With respect to the primary empirical data collected, random retesting of respondents was conducted after two years of initially collecting data to examine the reliability of their earlier responses; the overwhelming majority of the samples retested were found to be identical by at least 85%. Next, the metrics of the compiled datasets were computed with two key attributes in mind: connectivity robustness (the ability to withstand removal of nodes or edges without collapsing into disconnected components) and efficiency (range and speed of a *simple*-e.g. information-or *complex*-e.g. behavior-signal). Robustness is linked to a network's degree distribution: a scale-free one indicates a configuration that is more resilient to random removal of nodes, but less resilient to targeted ones-unlike a random distribution. Consequently, networks found between the scale-free – random exponential range would display a mixed configuration. Degree distribution also affects robustness. Random networks display similar responses to random and targeted removals of nodes. Scale-free ones are relatively robust to random, but sensitive to selective failures. Hierarchies are also characteristically fragile, particularly to targeted attacks. Clustering coefficient and density metrics are important for a network's efficiency: higher clustering and higher local network density values connote stronger ties, as does modularity-the degree of correlation between the probability of having an edge joining two sites and the fact that the sites belong to the same community. The above suggest the presence of strong ties in a network the modularity and clustering coefficient values of which are high; the presence of weak ties is signaled by a combination of low modularity and low clustering coefficient values. Results were calculated for both directed and undirected networks, as well as with and without weights. Directed networks require both nodes to report a link, but in the literature it is not uncommon for the existence of a link to assume tie reciprocity between two nodes (undirected). A safe approximation would be to take the

average value between the two. In term of weighted/unweighted, the difference is reported strength of tie, or a binary link (1) or no link (0) state. Despite the researcher's request, especially with the email parts of the survey, not all respondents provided weights, hence, for a uniform perspective datasets were analyzed also as unweighted. Then, to provide a benchmark for comparison so that specific metrics are situated within a range between low and high, random-exponential networks were generated with the same number of nodes, varying their wiring probability. This was done for a total of three wiring probabilities, for 100 simulations each. The values reported reflect random averages of these iterations.

Case I: Serbia, 1996-7

The table below provides the *Zajedno*-students network metrics:

	<i>Z stdnts directed</i>	<i>Z stdnts undirected</i>	Random directed	Random undirected	Random directed	Random undirected	Random directed	Random undirected
Nodes	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44
Edges	87	87	Pw:0.05	Pw:0.05	Pw:0.10	Pw:0.10	Pw:0.15	Pw:0.15
Average degree	1.977	3.818	1.00	1.00	2.205	2.205	2.273	2.273
Avwghted degree	2.023	3.909	1.00	1.00	2.205	2.205	2.273	2.273
Diameter	6	5	4	7	4	5	6	4
Graph density	0.046	0.089	0.023	0.047	0.051	0.103	0.064	0.129
Modularty	0.407	0.407	0.599	0.599	0.355	0.355	0.369	0.346
Avg.Clster Coefficnt	0.206	0.276	0.005	0.010	0.055	0.111	0.079	0.158
Average path length	2.408	2.84	1.671	3.487	2.003	2.534	2.146	2.371

Table 10: *Zajedno*-Students Network Metrics

Figure 15 displays a visual representation of the *Zajedno*-students and Yugoslav security apparatus networks:




Figure 15: *Zajedno*-Students (left) and Yugoslav Security Apparatus (right) Networks

As one of the initial *Otpor* members confided, '*Zajedno and the student action was in reality just a protest. Otpor was a movement.*'⁷⁰⁵ This phrase summarizes the *Zajedno*-student experience—at once exciting, electrifying, promising and largely improvised, poorly coordinated and ultimately limited. The sample for the student network does not render itself available for generalizing, but that reflects the overall low number of participants. In other words, the existence of few data points is not a function of not collecting an adequate number, but rather one of not a large number of them existing. Nonetheless, even from the statistics computed a high modularity level (0.407) is hinted, that together sub-graph clustering indicates the presence of cliques. Complemented by interviews, the picture of the student group network is a mostly simple one, including some hierarchical structure and a leader at the center. The implied topology suggests that it would be relatively easy to target this network (as the regime did with a sustained discrediting campaign that aimed to dissuade favorable opinions for the student group by the public). A simple regime coercive apparatus network was enough to limit a relatively simple student opposition one. The presence of a hierarchy in the student network also limited the contact between student leadership with the political opposition part of the *Zajedno-student* protest, often

⁷⁰⁵ Otpor member, interview with the author.

hampering communication and depending on a few filters of often bruised egos; the result was sub-optimal coordination. Interviews also report cliques, not fully shown here, that while allowing a spirited initial launch of the student protest, also kept the group from successfully bridging out beyond different Belgrade university faculties. Without spreading, the student protest eventually ran out of steam. The empirical reality of a localized source of protest, that allowed the regime to try to contain it with greater ease (as was the case with ‘cordonning’ the students and the violent clashes in January 1997) also attests to the disadvantage of this insularity.

Overall, then, a simple network for the students, was more readily contained and co-opted by the regime; the overall result was the continuation of the status quo ante with the leadership remaining in place, and the eventual overturning of the opposition gains (*Hypothesis b*).

Case II: Serbia, 2000

The table below provides the *Otpor* network metrics:

	<i>Otpor</i> directed	<i>Otpor</i> undirected	Random directed	Random undirected	Random directed	Random undirected	Random directed	Random undirected
Nodes	121	121	121	121	121	121	121	121
Edges	318	318	Pw:0.05	Pw:0.05	Pw:0.10	Pw:0.10	Pw:0.15	Pw:0.15
Average degree	2.628	4.826	3.058	3.058	6.149	6.149	9.066	9.066
Avweighted degree	2.645	4.860	3.058	3.058	6.149	6.149	9.066	9.066
Diameter	6	5	8	5	4	4	6	3
Graph density	0.022	0.040	0.025	0.051	0.051	0.102	0.076	0.151
Modularity	0.385	0.397	0.343	0.344	0.219	0.219	0.177	0.177
Av. Cluster. Coefficient	0.316	0.379	0.141	0.278	0.114	0.211	0.104	0.192
Average path length	2.42	2.668	2.784	2.825	2.344	2.146	2.073	1.902

Table 11: *Otpor* Network Metrics

Figure 16, below, displays the *core Otpor* and Yugoslav security apparatus (reconstructed) networks:




Figure 16: *Otpor* (left) and Yugoslav Security Apparatus (right) Networks

In contrast with its immediate predecessor, the 1998-2000 *Otpor* student opposition core network displayed and, mobilization-wise, benefited by a composite typology of both strong and weak ties. A high clustering coefficient (0.316) and modularity (0.385) values, combined with low density (0.022) and an average path length situating it between a random and a scale-free network, attest to this (figure 17- note that the distribution graph exhibits a combination of exponential and fat tail).




Figure 17: Degree distribution, *Otpor* core network

The topological features of this network render it well capable to engage in composite diffusion. Strong ties at its core allowed for initial high-risk activism that launched the movement. Weaker ties as it expanded, allowed for disseminating their message more effectively as well as recruiting new members. Its composite nature

without a clear, singular leadership also rendered it more robust to efforts by the regime to contain it. This is a case of a composite opposition network facing a mostly simple⁷⁰⁶ regime coercive apparatus, with the result being a fraudulent electoral outcome *permanently* reversed, the regime's leadership removed (*Hypothesis a*). To illustrate the combined role of different typologies of rival networks, a detailed analysis of the Serbian 2000 case follows later in this chapter.

Case III: Ukraine, 2000-1

The table below provides the *Ukraine Without Kuchma* network metrics:

	<i>UWK</i> directed	<i>UWK</i> undirected	Random directed	Random undirected	Random directed	Random undirected	Random directed	Random undirected
Nodes	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34
Edges	46	46	Pw:0.05	Pw:0.05	Pw:0.10	Pw:0.10	Pw:0.15	Pw:0.25
Average degree	1.353	1.353	0.706	0.706	1.50	1.5	2.529	2.529
Avweighted degree	1.353	1.353	0.706	0.706	1.5	1.5	2.529	2.529
Diameter	5	6	3	9	5	7	5	4
Graph density	0.041	0.071	0.021	0.043	0.045	0.091	0.077	0.122
Modularity	0.534	0.534	0.706	0.706	0.452	0.452	0.153	0.153
Av Cluster. Coefficient	0.045	0.053	0.034	0.069	0.038	0.076	0.078	0.156
Average path length	2.805	3.291	1.405	3.65	2.337	2.953	1.933	2.237

Table 12: Ukraine Without Kuchma Network Metrics

⁷⁰⁶ The exception in the otherwise weak tie hierarchical structure was a paramilitary unit characterized by strong ties. Multiple *Otpor* activists have confirmed during interviews that this was the only unit within the regime's coercive apparatus they were truly worried about. It was a worry shared by the political wing of the opposition, and Zoran Djindjic one of the most senior members of DOS felt compelled to negotiate directly with *Legija*, the notorious leader of this unit (see relevant footnote in chapter on the Serbia 2000 case).

Figure 18 displays a visual representation of the data for the *Ukraine Without Kuchma* and the Ukrainian security apparatus (reconstructed) networks:




Figure 18: *Ukraine Without Kuchma* (left) and Ukrainian Security Apparatus (right) Networks
 NB. Red-colored nodes in the *Ukraine Without Kuchma* network indicate a left-wing member, pink a Socialist, whereas dark grey-colored ones a right wing/nationalist

The *Ukraine Without Kuchma* case is a prime example of the pitfalls of a simple network. The sample collected is small, but as in the case of the *Zajedno*-students data points this is due to the small number of participants. Despite the small network size, this data and complementary interviews allow us to make certain inferences about the network structure. They yield a combined picture of a highly modular network (notice the different colors identifying diverse political affiliations with disparate overall political outlooks) with a higher average path length that is closer to scale-free range of values. Results show significantly high modularity value (0.534), while, at the same time, evidence from interviews and secondary sources indicate little sub-community overlap. The overall picture suggests a *simple* network configuration only of strong ties, more susceptible to targeted attacks, and more likely to fragment. Further, it impairs optimal coordination between sub-clusters, as well as efficient diffusion. As one interviewee pointed, '*Mobilization in 2001 was ad hoc. In 2004, it was planned, how to keep the people entertained, singers invited, etc. It was a good organization while it was going*

on. In 2001, it was not that well planned.⁷⁰⁷ Empirical facts confirm the implications of these metrics, namely difficulties in expanding beyond an initial circle and lesser robustness when confronted by a simple coercive apparatus.⁷⁰⁸ This confirms *Hypothesis b*, where as a result of Simple Opposition Network and a Simple Regime Network, the opposition fails to mobilize, and the regime prevails without a need for extensive mobilization.

Case IV: Ukraine, 2004

The table below provides the Black *Pora* network metrics:

	B <i>Pora</i> directed	B <i>Pora</i> undirected	Random directed	Random undirected	Random directed	Random undirected	Random directed	Random undirected
Nodes	182	182	182	182	182	182	182	182
Edges	615	615	Pw:0.05	Pw:0.05	Pw:0.10	Pw:0.10	Pw:0.15	Pw:0.25
Average degree	3.368	6.154	4.429	4.429	9.005	9.005	13.6	13.6
Avweighted degree	3.379	6.176	4.429	4.429	9.005	9.005	13.6	13.6
Diameter	5	5	8	5	7	3	5	3
Graph density	0.019	0.034	0.024	0.049	0.050	1.0	1.02	2.00
Modularity	0.340	0.349	0.298	0.298	0.192	0.192	0.147	0.147
Av Cluster. Coefficient	0.219	0.287	0.028	0.055	0.050	0.050	0.075	0.150
Average path length	2.529	3.013	2.810	2.615	2.284	2.045	2.01	1.86

Table 13: Black *Pora* Network Metrics

⁷⁰⁷ O. S. interviewed by the author, Fall 2007.

⁷⁰⁸ For the organizational structure of the Ukrainian forces, among other sources, see Petrov, O. 2007. Political and Budgetary Oversight of the Ukrainian Intelligence Community: Processes, Problems and Prospects for Reform. Naval Postgraduate College, unpublished Masters thesis.

Figure 19 displays the *core* Black *Pora* and the Ukrainian security apparatus (reconstructed) networks:




Figure 19: Black *Pora* (left) and Ukrainian Security Apparatus (right) Networks

Results of data for the Black *Pora* network suggest a composite network *par excellence*. It's modularity (0.340) and clustering coefficient (0.219) , together with a low density (0.019) and path length value situating its connectivity between random and scale-free classes (figure 20), indicates the presence of both strong- and weak-tie sub graph community structure, and, consequently, the capability for composite diffusion. Given that recurring elementary interaction patterns in complex networks 'carry significant information about their function and overall organization... a network's large-scale topological organization and its local sub-graph structure mutually define and predict each other.'⁷⁰⁹ Hence, as in the case of Black *Pora* data, the local structure observed by the data collected-especially since it includes a snapshot of the core of the group-more confidently reveals the global network's topological pattern. Such a composite typology

⁷⁰⁹ Vazquez, A., Dobrin, R., Sergi, D., Eckmann, J.-P., Oltvai, Z.N. and Barabasi, A.-L. 2004. The Topological Relationship Between the Large-Scale Attributes and Local Interaction Patterns of Complex Networks. *PNAS* 101, 52 (December), 17940-17945. Also see Jeong, H., Tombor, B.M. Albert, R., Oltvai, Z. N. and Barabasi, A.-L. 2000. The Large-Scale Organization of Metabolic Networks. *Nature* 407 (October 5), 651-654.

carries implications for the specific network's robustness and efficiency performance levels (both high).




Figure 20: Degree distribution, Black *Pora* core network

In contrast, information from interviews and secondary sources hints that its double, Yellow *Pora*, did not enjoy a similar structure, especially with a prominent, single leadership. At the same time, the regime's coercive apparatus manifests in a typical hierarchical fashion, which impeded its robustness against debilitating defections-particularly high profile, as was the case with the 28 November alleged mobilization scare-if one accepts the version that an order for troops to use force was issued by the regime's leadership. A combined picture of the two networks suggests the validation of *Hypothesis a*, where only the opposition optimizes its mobilization and prevails as a result.

DISCUSSION

Network analysis of the data collected from primary sources (RDS survey and interviews) along with secondary ones (extensive archival research) has revealed the types and formal properties of the rival networks in the cases under examination. Network configurations exhibiting both strong (at their core) and weak ties support *composite diffusion*; these are composite networks. Primarily strong-tie networks support solely complex contagion (and thus will fail to expand), while primarily weak-tie networks support solely simple contagion (and thus lack the core commitment and zeal required to launch a challenge). Overall, based on the combination of results from data, interviews and other, secondary sources, cases I and III confirm *Hypothesis b*, while cases II and IV, *Hypothesis a* (see table 14).

		Opposition network	
		Simple	Composite
Regime network	Composite	Outcome: <i>Repression</i>	Outcome: <i>Violence</i>
	Simple	Outcome: <i>Status Quo</i> CASE I <i>Zajedno</i> -students 1996-7 CASE III <i>Ukraine Without Kuchma</i> 2000-1	Outcome: <i>Transition</i> CASE II <i>Otpor</i> 2000 CASE IV <i>Black Pora</i> 2004

Table 14: Network typology and case outcomes

In particular, the results point to evidence-presence of both strong and weak ties-of composite network topology (and related composite diffusion) for *Otpor* and *Black Pora*. At their denser core, they are characterized by strong ties between founding members, but also exhibit weak ties as they expand outwards. This composition

suggests optimized conditions for both resilience (costly early action against the regime, which requires strong ties) and efficiency (subsequent spread of information and recruitment, better served by weak ties). The examination of all other networks, based on the basis of primary and secondary evidence and resulting metrics, indicates variations of simple networks-with only strong ties (see table 15).

	density	Modularity	Clustering Co
<i>Zajedno</i> students	S 0.046	S 0.407	S 0.206
<i>Otpor</i>	W 0.022	S 0.385	S 0.316
'UWK'	S 0.041	S 0.534	n/a 0.045*
Black <i>Pora</i>	W 0.019	S 0.349	S 0.219

*Sample too small for meaningful conclusion

Table 15: Metrics' values and their implications for the presence of strong (S) and weak (W) ties in the studied opposition networks.

High values for density, Modularity (community detection) and clustering coefficient (degree of clustering together) indicate strong ties; low values, respectively, weak ties. *Zajedno* students and 'UWK' have only strong ties, whereas, data for *Otpor* and Black *Pora* indicate also weak ties.

A thorough look at each of the four cases also refutes the null hypothesis, H_0 which posits that composite and simple networks produce the same mobilizational performance towards a mobilization outcome. In a broader sense, the null hypothesis implies that, besides no impact due to variation in topology, overall networks played no role in mobilization optimization and successful contestation outcome.

On the list of alternative hypotheses figure the nature (identity) and strength of grievances, mode of protest and response (violence), the state of the economy,

international reaction, internal and external aid and levels of involvement, and leadership. But, the debate on whether and how the salience of Ukrainian national identity changed within the span of three years separating the two Ukrainian cases remains inconclusive.⁷¹⁰ At the same time, a tangible measure of grievance strength-election results-indicate equally unfavorable views of Milosevic in the municipal elections of 1996 and the presidential ones of 2000. As for Kuchma, on the eve of the Gongadze scandal his polling numbers were very low, and his propensity for bending and breaking the law already evident (e.g. the 1996 appointment and bribe scandals, or, allegations about his 1999 reelection). While mode of protest and response (violence) are attractive alternative explanation candidates, the conclusions of the main study on the effects of non-violent protest (Stepan and Chenoweth 2008) present some problems; they are also contradicted by other scholars who suggest a positive effect for the presence of violence.⁷¹¹ And in the *Ukraine Without Kuchma* case-the most violent (by the opposition) of the four cases examined, protesters themselves admitted that this response came only *after* the protest had stalled. As for economic variables, they are not correlated to protest; while at the time of the protests, the Serbian economy was in a dire state, the Ukrainian one was not as dramatic.⁷¹²

In terms of international reaction, albeit lower, it was also present in the *Zajedno*-students case⁷¹³; at the same time, the international community was careful in its condemnations in 2000 in order not to undermine the opposition by appearing to champion it. In the Ukrainian cases, there was admittedly more international reaction in the 2004 case, but it came mostly after, not prior to mass mobilization by the opposition had occurred. Also, if the 1999 NATO operation against Yugoslavia is taken as an extreme case of intervention (related-if indirectly-to the embattled regime's political survival), its impact is debated: while it may have added to troop demoralization,

⁷¹⁰ Further, as Henry Hale points out, there are other cases, like Kazakhstan, where diverse ethnic identities have not led to mass mobilization towards democratizing revolutions.

⁷¹¹ According to a recent study, 'violence by a vanguard can affect mobilization and sometimes even spark spontaneous uprisings.' Bueno de Mesquita, E., 461.

⁷¹² I owe this point to Lucan A. Way.

⁷¹³ See Council of Europe, report on the 'Situation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia', document 7744, January 28, 1997, available at <http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc97/EDOC7744.htm>

Milosevic's popularity following the war rose, at least temporarily. And as *Otpor* founding members note, for them the war played no part whatsoever.⁷¹⁴ As far as external aid was concerned, while the successful cases received significantly much more aid (especially in the pair of Ukraine cases there is no comparison), arguably this was, to a great extent thanks to opposition members' relational capabilities (their networks). At the same time, domestic aid, especially in case IV, (after controlling for corruption)⁷¹⁵ flowed into both camps; the resources of the state (without even accounting for those of Yanukovich, which were also considerable) were vastly superior to Black *Pora*⁷¹⁶ (and comparable to Yushchenko's war chest).⁷¹⁷ Further, as researchers note, 'money is only part of the story: Connections were equally important and the alignment of Ukrainian organizations with their foreign counterparts was crucial to the development of new ideas and confrontation with alternative ideas.'⁷¹⁸ Regarding levels of involvement, a network perspective can claim credit in not only mobilizing but also *sustaining* large crowds. Finally, in terms of leadership, both the regime-their coercive security apparatus structure did not vary much- and the main protagonists in the youth group opposition were the same.

The above suggest that the most significant variation in these cases was network typology, hence their importance. Moreover, even if other factors were important, network structure would still be a necessary condition in explaining these outcomes. That is because even mobilizing manifestations of ethnic identities, establishing local and foreign NGO contacts and related funding, creating and maintaining military and intelligence contacts, managing leadership circles, and ultimately channeling different levels of public involvement depend on the efficiency and robustness of corresponding networks.

⁷¹⁴ See related discussion and footnote in Chapter IV, section 'The Kosovo Debacle'.

⁷¹⁵ Allegations of money-laundering and stealing practices were made by a number of interviewees in Ukraine.

⁷¹⁶ The author has been made privy to Black *Pora*'s financial budget, which, even assuming was not fully disclosed, is still inferior to Yanukovich's forces by a factor of ten.

⁷¹⁷ The 2004 contest having been called 'a fight between millionaires and billionaires' implies an overabundance of funds for and against the incumbent regime.

⁷¹⁸ Polese, 261.

NETWORK TYPES IN ACTION: SERBIA IN 1996-7 AND 2000-A DETAILED EXAMPLE

In 1996, a student-political opposition coalition launched a campaign against the competitive authoritarian regime of Slobodan Milosevic, aiming to redress electoral injustice and demanding his leave from power. This dissident action centered overwhelmingly in Belgrade, with the students playing an important part in it, before it achieved partial and temporary results, running out of steam. The type of student group network contributed to the ultimately disappointing outcome later the following year. The lead up to the 2000 presidential elections pitted *Otpor*, a different style of youth opposition group, against Milosevic's regime and its coercive apparatus. The specific topological properties of *Otpor*'s composite network allowed it to optimize its composite diffusion performance, realize its mobilization potential and prevail against a hierarchical, simple coercive apparatus. The following is a detailed analysis and discussion of the effects of specific network typologies. Designed to complement the earlier data results and analysis, this section forms part of what constitutes a first, rudimentary attempt at a *network analytic narrative*, aspiring to reflect and adapt to network analysis the rationale of analytic narrative scholarly approaches (e.g. Bates et al. 1998) that aim to elucidate formal analysis with detailed historical and comparative research.⁷¹⁹

SERBIA 1996-7

The student opposition network

A loosely held together political-student opposition coalition⁷²⁰ the *Zajedno-student* civic protests owed a great degree of their initial spirit (marches with whistles, humor and chanting) to student participation. Students also provided a focal point of

⁷¹⁹ Levi. M. 2002. Modeling Complex Historical Processes with Analytic Narratives. Paper available online at <http://www.yale.edu/probmeth/Levi.pdf>

⁷²⁰ The majority of political parties-affiliated supporters came from DS, DSS and SPO, which held widely divergent positions in numerous issues, thereby providing only a very narrow least common denominator for their sympathizers to coexist for long.

dissident action in Belgrade, where the most part of this contentious action took place against the regime.

The organizational background of the students' group structure had been traditional. At the downtown Belgrade campus of the university (Milosevic had decentralized the university, moving the political science and other suspected hotbeds of potential opposition activity out in the suburbs) there were ten departments, and it was them leading the student protest; each choose the people who would staff the committee, which then came together to direct the protest. An initial board of elected representatives was formed; then, students filled up the ranks. But, despite the (nominal) presence of a board, and student claims that their movement did not suffer from the typical Serbian *liderstvo* ('leadership syndrome), there did emerge a recognized leadership (especially in the person of Cedomir Jovanovic) to head the student protests:⁷²¹ 'He would roam the city addressing crowds from the back of his jeep. As a rule his arrival was greeted by welcoming cries and whistles from his fellow students, after which Jovanovic would set out the daily strategy for the student protest.'⁷²² His leadership assumed a close coordination effort with the university student board and presumably received regular input by and cooperation with supporting faculty, revealing a 'hierarchy in the network.'⁷²³ Visible leadership (customary for Yugoslav youth parties and organizations) posed a variety of advantages (the leader's popularity could attract people to the cause) but at the same time could trivialize it as well; many posters held by female protesters were not directed against Milosevic, but declared instead '*Mary me, Cedo!*'⁷²⁴ However, it also presented serious disadvantages in terms of network robustness which became apparent soon into the protests. From the side of the regime, Jovanovic was frequently targeted for arrest and a sustained smeared campaign ('drug addict' being the most potent and frequent of charges by state-controlled media against him). From the side of other student protesters, his contacts and later affiliation with

⁷²¹ Cohen, L.J. *Serpent in the Bosom*, 256, 258.

⁷²² Ibid, 258.

⁷²³ Author interview (Belgrade, September 2007) with Sociology professor Mladen Lazic, editor of the most complete account of the 1996-7 protests (*Winter of Discontent: Protest in Belgrade*. CEU Press, 1999) and actively involved in the university protests throughout the 1990s. However, there is reason to suspect 'attractiveness bias.'

⁷²⁴ Rowland, J. '*Brave New Kosovo*.' BBC News, June 30, 2001.

the formal political opposition (DS) fueled suspicions of collusion with the politicians who were corrupted or compromised. The above helped achieve a modicum of disruption of the student mobilizations and plans.

Both students and *Zajedno* protest organizers were also logistically weak. Both interviews and secondary sources attest that neither group expected such a large volume of citizens willing to partake in the protests, and neither was well prepared to handle them. Time and again, interviewees involved in the 1996-7 protests emphasized the point that the protests were *too* spontaneous: *"It was a massive, quick wave... There was simply no preparation. [Students] did not expect huge involvement, and they missed the opportunity; it was not successful."*⁷²⁵ Time and structure to prepare was needed, and in the beginning, *Zajedno* and its parallel pace did not allow for that.⁷²⁶ Still, even if they had expected such a turnout, according to Professor Lazic from Belgrade University, who monitored closely the events, *'many students did not have much memory and experience of older protests.'*⁷²⁷

The student modes of protest, involving some novelty, such as (literally) street theater (such as midnight performances of poignantly chosen Shakespearean plays, like *Macbeth*), humor and singing, whistle-blowing, etc. Students also tried a non-confrontational tactic, occasionally reaching out to the police, e.g. by handing them flowers. But it also included marches, which, while still technically peaceful, at times turned less civil-e.g. when protesters pelted the RTS with eggs. The latter provided excuses for the regime's propaganda against them.

Attention must also be drawn to the unclear scope of the protest campaign, that is, a lack of common goals and harmonization (despite alleged collusion) between and within (students themselves) protesting forces. The political opposition, for example, had set as a minimum, the reversal of the decision that annulled the November election

⁷²⁵ Author interview with Lazic, Belgrade, September 2007.

⁷²⁶ Towards the end of the protest, the paces (as well as pushing and pulling) had switched. According to Lazic, *'We [at the university] were keeping them [Zajedno] alive.'*

⁷²⁷ Ibid. This assertion is disputed, however, in Cohen, who cites a survey indicating a three quarters of students asked, stated previous protest experience. In Cohen, L.J. *Serpent in the Bosom*, 252.

results. This set goal put off a lot of potential protesters.⁷²⁸ But, fractions within *Zajedno* wanted to see Milosevic go, whereas others believed that even cooperating with the regime might be the best way to check it-or, advance their own power ambitions (e.g. the ambiguous example of SPO's Vuc Draskovic, who later in 1997 accepted a political offer by Milosevic, thereby *de facto* dissolving the *Zajedno* coalition). Equally confusing, students hardly had a unified-and unifying-message. For example, some student banners carried during protests displayed messages irrelevant to the protest, e.g. *'Ivana I love you'*, or, *'I'll have a better slogan tomorrow, I promise.'*⁷²⁹ Indeed, for some it was (at least, also) a social occasion, *"a chance to catch up with old friends, to see who was still in town, to not be alone in your apartment.* [According to one marcher] *'I never ever thought it was going to be a revolution-it wasn't focused in that way...it was about feeling good about yourself, doing something that made you feel better, about speaking out. Only a small percentage of people were out there because they supported the opposition most people were out for other reasons.'*⁷³⁰

For those who were protesting against the regime, especially in the student protest, their demands were, at the same time, either very particular, or very broad, or both. Some demanded nothing more than university autonomy and the removal of the University of Belgrade's rector; others, nothing less than the resignation and removal of Slobodan Milosevic; still others, both.⁷³¹ Hence, most students with their maximalist demands viewed *Zajedno's* general goals as too limited, and wanted to push the political opposition to demand more.⁷³² According to *Otpor* member, Milja Jovanovic, *'the politicians led people to believe they could make everything right by just walking through the streets, that they could change the remains of Communism which lasted for fifty*

⁷²⁸ *'I did not want to risk getting arrested or killed so that Nis got a new mayor.'* Dragan L., interview with the author, Belgrade, October 2007.

⁷²⁹ Collin, *This is Serbia Calling*, 106.

⁷³⁰ Ibid, 127.

⁷³¹ See sociological survey data of the 1996-7 protest [reported in Cvejic, S. General character of the protest and Prospects. In Lazic, M. (ed.), *Protest in Belgrade*, 62-66.

⁷³² Some 'felt that the politicians, who viewed the protests as rallies in support of their own party programs, were increasingly bleeding the fun out of the proceedings. [According to one protester,] *"The opposition leaders killed off the best action, insisting that the noisy local walks should end at the same old place, the Square, with the same boring speeches."* Others worried that the limited agenda of the protests-give us back our votes-was burying deeper disagreements with what would remain...' Ibid.

*years by walking for eighty days-but of course the regime is stronger than that.*⁷³³ The result was some friction and frustration, and an ensuing wave of protests tenuously and nervously held together with minimal organization resulting from an inefficient structure and centralized leadership. As a result, they splintered more easily when their different apparent objectives were dealt separately by the regime. Then, the different protest groups themselves, were dealt separately by the regime also-a typical 'divide and conquer' strategy; Milosevic had only little work to do to divide his opponents.⁷³⁴

The discussion on scope begs a related issue-that of range of the protests. Despite declarations to the contrary and a few activities in cities and towns outside Belgrade, this remained a largely urban, middle-class and student affair within the capital. *'The key was going outside of the capital.'*⁷³⁵ Many interviewees bemoaned the lack of involvement of sectors other than students, formal opposition parties and their members: *'All the students were local.'*⁷³⁶ 'While ordinary, unaffiliated citizens participated also (a good third-which also includes students-of those polled declared no affiliation with *Zajedno*), working classes-especially those in the state industry and agricultural sectors did not participate, thereby denying the movement a pan-Yugoslav character. Simply put, *'much more than anything else, without workers, Milosevic would not see defeat.'*⁷³⁷ As a result of their structure not branching out, students' poor diffusion performance produced additional problems: lack of wide exposure that could help spreading their message and recruit further. The overwhelming media attention they received-with the exception of radio stations like B92, Radio Index and a few local ones-that were later targeted by the regime) domestically was negative- a daily dose of propaganda by the state controlled television channels and newspapers covering all of Yugoslavia, which had the power to inform the opinions of many not directly present in

⁷³³ Collin, *This is Serbia Calling*, 130.

⁷³⁴ Milosevic's offer to Draskovic and his acceptance effectively split and spelled the end of the *Zajedno* coalition, most of which's electoral gains were wiped out in the late 1997 elections. As for the universities, a new Higher Education Law was passed, effectively limiting the autonomy of university professors. Out of a couple of thousands of faculty members at the University of Belgrade, only about 100 did not sign it-and risked losing their contracts.

⁷³⁵ Author interview with Miljenko Dereta, executive director of Civic Initiatives (a Serbian NGO founded in May 1996 to strengthen civil society and promote democracy and citizenship), Belgrade, September 2007.

⁷³⁶ Author interview with Lazic, Belgrade September 2007.

⁷³⁷ Ibid.

the protests, given they were local in Belgrade. An important correlation of the above was the lack of stamina and planning by the protesters and their protests.

Milosevic's regime and the *Zajedno*-students protests

After the Dayton Accord deal, and having stabilized the Yugoslav economy following the hyperinflation chaos of earlier years, by 1996 Milosevic felt he had renewed his political credibility (or, more accurately, tolerance) and that his international and domestic statesmanship status should be unassailable. No election at any level could interfere with his ambitious reconstruction program, while once more reinventing himself as the saviour of a Serb-dominated rump Yugoslavia in need of his guiding hand. Two of the reasons the regime was caught by surprise by the November 17, 1996 municipal election results, was because (i) it had relied on the earlier defeat of the opposition (which was insufficiently organized, experienced a shortage of resources, was absent in remote places and lacked sufficient access to the media)⁷³⁸, and (ii) on its own pro-active measures to make certain that not every *Zajedno* ballot would count-in other words, to steal the elections. Ensuring the hiring of polling stations staff favourably predisposed to the ruling party was one such provision. 'An effective technique...was to hire female poll workers with long acrylic nails under which they might hide a pen point that they could use to place a second mark on some opposition ballots' thereby invalidating them.⁷³⁹ Giving citizens employed by the state pre-marked ballots was another. Finally, blatantly inflating pro-regime candidate totals in local polling stations where the opposition did not have adequate representation (not a rare occurrence), thereby tallying up more than the number of names on the electoral lists, was another way to alter the election results.

Once apparent that the annulment of election results triggered successive waves of protests, the regime adopted a multipronged approach to containing, countering and the protests. It included (i) marshalling its powerful state-control media propaganda to its cause, first, by ignoring (hoping they dissipate) and then by vilifying (aiming to

⁷³⁸ Lazic, M. The Emergence of a Democratic Order in Serbia. In Lazic, M. (ed.), *Protest in Belgrade*, 18.

⁷³⁹ ICG Balkans Report No 102, 19.

discredit it by targeting their leaderships, while agitating its own supporters) the opposition and student protests. Another measure was (ii) organizing parallel rallies with supporters bussed in from across the country (a dangerous tactic, as over-zealous, state propaganda-prone, pro-SPS protesters from elsewhere had little affinity and much resentment for urbanite 'traitor' Belgraders), and subcontracting agitators who could instigate violent episodes between protest and counter-protest. Yet, 'the counter-ralliers' [sic] did not have an authentic character...for active orientation. Instead of consciousness it had an ideology, its objectives were not authentically formulated and the degree of commitment was obviously insufficient for internal mobilization, while the power it wielded did not derive so much from internal resources as from the outside. Therefore, the mobilization of counter-activists was [...] induced by the political elite, which is why it lacked the power and ability to maintain the level of the action after the take-off. That is precisely why the counter action lasted for only a few days.'⁷⁴⁰ Most importantly, related to agitation and violence was (iii) the use of police forces, purportedly above the fray, to separate the two sides and restore order. In truth, the role of police expanded to confront, intimidate and repress the opposition protesters on the street; the use of anti-riot unit forces meant a frequent resort to violence-levels neither too excessive to produce heavy casualties and fatalities or to tarnish Milosevic's self-perception as a democrat, nor too restrained to be ignored by those taking to street evening after evening. While the police accepted this role, the FR Yugoslav Army did not intervene, either because it refused or because it wasn't asked to. Reportedly, students from the University of Belgrade secured assurances from Gen. Chief of Staff M. Perisic that tanks would not be rolled out. It is unclear, however whether Milosevic himself wanted the army involved, or if any orders were given to be disobeyed.⁷⁴¹ Finally, the regime co-opted and compromised opposition politicians in the political arena, thereby gaining valuable time necessary for the protest momentum to fizzle out. Even the changing of the university's rector and vice-rector to 'meet student demands' could be taken as cooptation, given that the replacement was also sympathetic to the regime.

⁷⁴⁰ Babovic, M. In Lazic, M. (ed.), 55.

⁷⁴¹ Cohen, L.J. *Serpent in the Bosom*, 299.

To conclude, the simple type of the student network topology had a negative impact on their performance. It prevented them from expanding, which effectively debilitated their efforts to spread information and recruit beyond their circle. It also literally restricted its mobility when the regime surrounded them. Its clear hierarchy exposed the visible leader at the top to character attacks (thereby succeeding in dissuading some potential sympathizers from identifying with or joining with the group) as well as to the lure of political sirens (that eventually compromised his independence). Finally, its clique structure was also prone to fragmentation, which made it anodyne against the equally simple network of a tactical political opponent with time, besides a carrot and a stick, in his hands.

SERBIA 2000

The *Otpor* student opposition network

Conceptually, *Otpor* envisioned itself as a movement that ‘*bridges the tactical/immediate/local with the strategic/long-term/national and creates a movement culture (like a particular, distinctive corporate one) that sets the tone in society.*’⁷⁴² According to its philosophy, it had to link local struggles so as to ‘feed’ a national one, with leaders at every level operating on the same principle. The importance of network structure was, hence, clear from the beginning: ‘*The regime can abuse institutions to promote hollow ideas...we decided to be the people’s movement...We made a network for big cities. Then, it spread easily...*’⁷⁴³ (see figures 11 and 12, networks mapped by the author). *Otpor* grew its network by ‘first, identifying potential pockets of resistance. Then, it helped them so they could address the problem. Finally, it linked them to the national struggle. Linking local to national was part of its movement momentum-driven operational approach (a momentum-driven organization with a ‘*front-loaded strategy and the goal to unite and link local to national*’). This was feasible due to *Otpor*’s ‘unusual’, ‘fluid’ (to use some of its founding member’s descriptions) organizational composition.




Figure 21: *Otpor* Core Network Visualization

Node identification: Red=foreign NGOs contacts; Orange=Ukrainian youth opposition;
Green=opposition from other countries

⁷⁴² Marovic, I. during a seminar presentation with Doug McAdam, On Movements, attended by the author, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Boston, 2008.

⁷⁴³ *Otpor* activist Milja Jovanovic, interviewed by the author, Belgrade 2007, 2010.

It had a leaderless, ‘anarchic’, decentralized configuration and related decision-making process that began from a tight core characterized by strong ties and then spread out to diffuse its message. The initial group of students and activists that formed the 1998 core of *Otpor* had no designated leader, but reached decisions by consensus, after amicable debates on ideas, strategies and goals. In press conferences, spokespersons would always rotate so that no one would get (and be exposed to) constant publicity. This was the result of personal belief against the concept and practice of ‘*liderstvo*’ (leadership cult) and practical prophylaxis against regime repression and (physical or reputational) decapitation of the organization. The lessons from the recent past⁷⁴⁴ had been learned. According to an *Otpor* member,

*‘With Ceda [the 1996-7 student leader] they tried to discredit him in 1996-7 by saying he used drugs. Milosevic had gone after the leaders to try to compromise the protests. If there would be one leader, it would be easier to smear.’*⁷⁴⁵ *‘Even if the sheriff or the mayor is replaced’* adds one of *Otpor*’s founders, *‘the system survives.’*⁷⁴⁶ As another *Otpor* member explains,

*‘We were totally different from all other movements...We wanted fluidity, and also, didn’t want Milosevic’s police to target one person. [...] For us it was very different, we had no leader at all. Instead, two things mattered: different connections (relations between all kinds of people), and reliability, responsibility. That made a huge difference with other groups: first think who/what, then rank...It was a structure without leader. Many people initially shared different parts of the structure, e.g. marketing, press, international communication, etc. [...] we tried to avoid situation that if police arrested one (like a snake, if you cut its head) another opens. If you are there, you participate (it is a type of ‘upward mobility’). We knew who makes which moves, but it was open for different people to join...’*⁷⁴⁷

⁷⁴⁴ For example, the storming of the meeting at the School of Architecture by masked squads and the subsequent police blockade of many faculties (as they had successfully done in 1996-7), failed to find, let alone immobilize *Otpor* decentralized, collective leadership.

⁷⁴⁵ *Otpor* activist, Marco Mandic, interview with the author, Belgrade, 2007.

⁷⁴⁶ Ivan Marovic, interview with the author, 2008.

⁷⁴⁷ Interviews with core *Otpor* members (2007, 2008, 2010).

Figure 22 depicts computer simulations results performed to test the robustness of the *Otpor* network's core sample. Catastrophic network failure simulations combined both types of node removal (initially, random, then targeted) aiming to affect the network's dynamic behavior. Despite a significant loss of nodes, the network's connectivity was not critically damaged, including potentially important foreign contacts.




Figure 22: *Otpor* Core Network, Before and After
 ...simulated catastrophic failure
 (removal of up to 20% of nodes and their links, including central ones)

Further, the Belgrade branch of *Otpor* consciously divided itself in specialized teams with designated tasks, where members again decided collectively within each group, then coordinated among them to prepare and execute the decided actions—creating, in the process, ‘a real sense of community’ according to a veteran member. Finally, the capital city members ‘branched out’—spreading the *Otpor* message first to their relatives and friends (strong ties), then to others (weak ties) ‘simply’ seeking to emulate their actions across the country. Mushrooming local branches would then copy the same pattern of decision-making and operating, with Belgrade’s team playing only an auxiliary, or, supportive role—an example of composite diffusion, through which resources could be transmitted. Administratively, *Otpor* main sectors included

five geographical regions, with about fifty to sixty people (in rotation). From thereon, smaller branches grew, spreading and recruiting locally. Naturally, the branch in the capital also expanded (see figures 12a, b). Overall, during interviews with the author, many core *Otpor* members stressed that this composite configuration (or, texture) of the movement made it much easier to defend, expand and outreach:

*“This flexible structure allowed using sources of other organizations. Also, our openness diffused the effect of spies, as there was little to hide [and what was, like lists with members, was well hidden]. So, this was a good combination- connections plus, huge energy/synergy –which resulted from organization. What also helped was daily goals, good planning, smart people; all teams functioned perfectly (structurally).”*⁷⁴⁸

Another important characteristic of *Otpor* was its organization into specialized inter-cooperating divisions which together functioned as a modern marketing firm with a horizontal, non-hierarchical structure. Their task was creating, branding and publicizing the *Otpor* message; new members could join whichever division they wanted, including an increasingly well-connected international public relations (abroad) group; a press service (domestic) task force; a marketing service (charged with making posters and ensuring their visibility); a human resources team (recruiting and training people); an activity branch (which came up with concepts and then dealt with operational logistics, including scouting locations and getting the equipment necessary for street actions); a funds (accounting and fund raising) office [the only one with a comprehensive idea of what other divisions were doing].

*‘... Anyone with an idea could come forward...Some teams had twenty, ten, five, six, eleven people, and this is just in the capital. Small sub-groups often formed within teams, and local branches.’*⁷⁴⁹

Tactics were seldom limited to protests, but involved *coups de theatre* and other carefully planned public actions.⁷⁵⁰ This aimed to raise public awareness and morale, recruit new members, and put the regime on the defensive. Since the group’s

⁷⁴⁸ Otpor activist Nenad Belšević, interview with the author, Belgrade 2007, 2010.

⁷⁴⁹ Otpor member Nenad Belšević, interview with the author, Belgrade 2007.

⁷⁵⁰ According to an Otpor member involved in logistics, ‘60% of our action was planned. If fully spontaneous, then... Tiananmen Square.’ Sinisa Sikman, interviewed by the author, Belgrade 2007.

conception, “our message was one, and in essence it said: ‘You [Milosevic] *are incapable.*’ *We dissolve the fear. No fear for people means going to vote, which means victory.*”⁷⁵¹ Encapsulated in a single phrase, this message was as conceptually clear and attractive, as it was politically powerful: ‘*Gotov Je!*’ And it was publicized forcefully on a daily basis and on every scale, to lower the cost-and hence, threshold-of public opposition to the regime: ‘The signal thing they did that should never be lost is that they made it OK for Serbs to say publicly that the regime was not invincible, that many Serbs shared a sense that change could come.’⁷⁵² This was a high-risk activity, especially in its early stages, and required an initial core of activists linked by strong ties of friendship and mutual trust.

As the group expanded, the above developed skills were distributed by an extensive training program, including emerging local *Otpor* leaders.⁷⁵³ Indeed, recruiting and training volunteers and supporters was paramount for *Otpor*, and to optimize it, a vast interpersonal and spatial organization eventually emerged. By the time of the elections, it had spawned to 100-130 branches nation-wide (in contrast to *Zajedno*’s limited and largely unconnected breadth--see figures 10-12) and forged connections abroad. It ‘emerged’ because while originally based on principal connections among individuals and some planning, its scope widened organically to include auto-joining different neighborhoods in Belgrade and in other cities that went on to create their own cells.

In the beginning, “*we sought to meet outside, where there was chaos, noise...Then, we would decide in these conversations. We then contacted people across Serbia we knew [...] after Otpor was formed, we would go and meet with [potential new members] face to face. We got to know them personally; it was a matter of trust. So we all knew who was best for what role... [I was] In charge of distribution material, I contacted branches. We had people, then created local groups [on their own], of two-three people...We met on secret places, packed material in bags and posted them up at*

⁷⁵¹ Otpor activist Marco Mandic, interview with author, Belgrade 2007.

⁷⁵² James O’Brian, Clinton Administration Special Envoy to the Balkans, quoted in Rosenberg, T. 2011. ‘Revolution U.’ *Foreign Policy* (February 16).

⁷⁵³ Marovic, I. and Djinic, S. *The Lessons of OTPOR and Teaching Resistance* (presentation 2008).

*night to create an ‘Otpor neighborhood’. We did this for every single neighborhood, then delivered more to more cities, to a wide group of people we had never met. Those Otpor neighborhoods were self-organized [...it helped us] recruit even more, high school students, older people. People had the impression we were all over the place. There were sixteen bigger regions. Every coordinator had some cities. I communicated with the 16 and they with others, and more...”*⁷⁵⁴




Figure 23: Otpor Network Visualization (temporal):
Composite diffusion, from strong (core, t_1) to weak (t_2) to strong (t_3) ties,
and the beginning of ‘Otpor neighborhoods’ creation

The response was such that eventually ‘Otpor neighborhoods’ began to self-emerge. Here is how its self-emergence and activity was described by an ordinary Belgrade citizen, not formally affiliated with (i.e. member, or volunteer of) Otpor:

*‘A friend of mine made Otpor badges. I gave them secretly to people. They asked me whether I was afraid to wear it. I replied only if you are not afraid. If you do wear it, and show no fear, I will give it to you for nothing. In truth, I was afraid. But it was impossible to live like that, we were ashamed to live like that, with all the lies. So, I tucked in my children to bed at night and I sneaked out at 3am to put Otpor stickers on doors in our building, to old people’s apartment doors. Their logo was ‘Resist (Otpor) neighbor!’ Nobody took them off in my building. We were an Otpor neighborhood, we were no longer afraid.’*⁷⁵⁵ Private and public preferences began to converge.

Overall, Otpor’s expanding range encouraged and promoted individual expressions,

⁷⁵⁴ Otpor activist, interviewed by the author, Belgrade 2007.

⁷⁵⁵ Stane G., street vendor on Skadarlija street, interview with the author, Belgrade 2007.

as well as incorporated innovative additions to its main message all across Serbia; all the while, uniting and connecting vast numbers of people together, from friend to acquaintance to friend-from strong to weak ties to strong-and so on. Another *Otpor* activist describes how the network spread spatially:

*"We started with Belgrade. By the end of 1999, there were 4 more (West, East, Vojvodina and South). By February 2000, there were 70, and by the end of 2000, more than 100 cells. All of them communicated with each other and Belgrade. There were multiple connections... I would best describe it as a peer network, involving most of the 70 offices/cells, with an awareness that it was fluid and temporary...We taught volunteers from other regions how to build a network, to be totally open. We had one message for them: keep it simple. Then, it would start. Someone from one branch would have an idea, a symbol, a visual identity. Then, we would promote it through grass-level [sic] to friends – very grass root. Then, promote some more. Build a network of people who know people who know people..."*⁷⁵⁶

As far as recruiting was concerned, it often also took place during public actions. These spectacle-like activities raised the curiosity, admiration (for their defiance) and interest of passers, leading to their recruitment; they would be later called up and participate according to their desire and/or available time, and needs of the campaign.⁷⁵⁷ In turn, besides involving their own local circles of friends, newly recruited members publicized *Otpor*'s message through their own activities, and triggered the interest of others, thereby continuing this recruitment chain.

Ultimately, the *Otpor* network facilitated communication between activists (and volunteers, supporters and common citizens); it was conducted in a variety of ways. Activists spoke in the flesh, holding many face-to-face meetings, both in Belgrade and in the provinces. They also contacted each other by regular and mobile telephone (a good number had cell phones), assuming (and simply ignoring the high probability) that

⁷⁵⁶ *Otpor* activist, Milja Jovanovic, interview with the author, Belgrade 2007, 2010.

⁷⁵⁷ A volunteer from southern Serbia, who founded a branch of *Otpor* in his town, relates how he visited the *Otpor* main office in Dec. 1999. 'At the *Otpor* office there, he was closely questioned and then given flyers, leaflets, sprays, posters, *Otpor* T-shirts, \$130 and a cell phone. "I was happy. I felt like a revolutionary going home to spread the word." Cohen, R. *The New York Times*, Nov. 26, 2000.

office land lines were bugged (occasionally using it for fake 'leaks'). Not issued to everyone, still many in *Otpor* had mobile phones and used SMS to communicate between themselves. Cell phones became important tools of the network, for example to mobilize supporters when an activist was arrested. An *Otpor* member explained how it worked: *"We had a system: to immediately inform the office, call media, call people, call lawyers, call as many as possible, use our own phone tree, call the police to blockade their communication lines-pressure them. Usually, after only ten minutes, supporters would be outside of a police station demanding the release of an activist."*⁷⁵⁸

Otpor also used cell phones extensively to send mobilizing text messages to volunteers and supporters. The messages were often simple but clear: 'Come to... (location where the protest was taking place)'; 'Go out'; 'Come with car, stop in middle of street, start jam.'; 'Go to vote'. 'It was very important', a core *Otpor* member recalls. *'...We used SMS a lot. We had SMS lists. It was costly to send texts but we linked the phone to computers. So we would make a list of numbers (ours, from parties, then student organizations, wherever we could find one-once we got a list from someone who worked as an IT manager in a company) and hook it to the computer and it would send the same message to a massive number of phones. But if there was a problem, we could just send it to all we knew personally. If I had ten friends I gave them my phone, so between them, ten times ten equals a hundred. After everyone texts everyone else, at least 50,000 people will get a message. From that, we figured we will get 5,000 supporters.'*⁷⁵⁹ This tactic was passed on to the Ukrainians when he and other veteran members travelled there to give seminars in preparation for the 2004 presidential election campaign.⁷⁶⁰ But even those without cell phones who received the news were expected to transmit them, by ordinary telephone, word of mouth, etc. The goal was to inform as many of those they were connected to as possible, to support arrested activists, vote or show up to protest. Here was an example of both simple (information) and complex (behavior) diffusion in which *Otpor* engaged through a variety of weak

⁷⁵⁸ Sinisa Sikman, interviewed by the author, Belgrade 2007.

⁷⁵⁹ *"At other times, we just used the computer to create random numbers with the Belgrade prefix. It is quite possible even Milosevic received one of our messages!"* *Otpor* activist, Marko P., interviewed by the author, Belgrade 2007.

⁷⁶⁰ N. Belshevic, interview with the author, Belgrade 2007.

(e.g. SMS to acquaintances from parties, student organizations) and strong (e.g. SMS to friends, word of mouth) ties.

Finally, in another example of diffusion, *Otpor* cooperated with and contributed significantly to the functions of NGOs in the run-up to the elections. Specifically, once extensively spread, the *Otpor* network was used to funnel information and help raise electoral awareness. Close to the millennium, NGOs in Serbia had multiplied in number and specialization; a notable example was Civic Initiatives-a nonprofit organization for 'civil society civic education, promotion of democracy'. Its goal, according to its executive director, a former film and theater director, was *'to create a network of civic democratic organizations as a base for substantial long-term changes in Serbia. We wanted to find people, to recruit, to motivate, to implement... We cooperated actively with Otpor, in 'functionally linking regional groups. The approach was not to delegate, but to create favorable conditions...completely decentralized so that local capacity was used optimally, and that the state is prevented from easily closing you down...'*⁷⁶¹,

In 2000, it had three regional centers and established up to twenty local councils for civic education-important, but, unable to match *Otpor*'s 100-plus branches nationwide, it sought the latter's help. Overall, the NGO campaign that was sparked in 1999 under the 'Bratislava process' (in association with foreign NGOs, whose help was introduced to the domestic campaign, thus), evolved into the pro-election campaign IZLAZ ('Exit') 2000, which provided both an umbrella and an outlet for a variety of such organizations to help 'bring out the vote', as well as monitor the elections on election day. *Otpor*'s participation, both overt and covert was significant in motivating younger voters, as well as mobilizing the public to vote on Election Day. CeSID, another major NGO, undertook the bulk of conducting the training for election monitoring and planned to monitor the vote come election day, which it did, using the human networks mostly of *Otpor* as well as democratic opposition parties⁷⁶² to ensure that every polling station was covered.

⁷⁶¹ M. Dereta, executive director of Civic Initiatives, interview with the author, Belgrade, September 2007.

⁷⁶² Milja Jovanovic, interview with the author, Belgrade 2007.

The regime's coercive apparatus

To contain vocal opposition to his regime coming from *Otpor*, Milosevic relied on the state mechanism this included the state security and police forces under the Ministry of the Interior (*Ministarstvo Unutrasnjih Poslova*). Although under his orders, the army gradually distanced itself and eventually did not carry out threats to violently repress protesters, culminating on the day of the final opposition rally (October 5th, 2000) that signalled the end of the regime. At the same time, a number of special and forces that were tangential to the line of command reached individual deals with the regime's opponents. The following describes the branches (and their characteristics) of the state mechanism at the regime's disposal to secure its political perpetuation, as well as to their attitude to orders for the use of violence, vis a vis their position in the chain of command.




Figure 24: Reconstruction of Milosevic Regime's Coercive Apparatus Chain of Command⁷⁶³
NB. Milosevic node centered, in red

A major tool in Milosevic's arsenal was the Serbian State Security (*Sluzba Drzavne Bezbednosti*): By 1992, he had 'replaced everybody from the top-down, including the drivers and janitors. (!) The new cadres [...] were aware that not only their careers but their lives were literally tied to Milosevic's success, and they acted accordingly. [...] They knew they were not civil servants, that their only task had been

⁷⁶³ Given that attempts at collecting primary data did not materialize, archival research and a variety of related sources were used to obtain information for reconstructing the network; they included information from the Center for Security Policy in Belgrade, the FBIS-EEU 97, 98 and 99 reports.

to secure the regime and the rule of one man only, and therefore the enemy was wherever the next threat came from.⁷⁶⁴ The strength of the Security service was surveillance, with its technical capability rated as *'very high, including the ability to operate up to 150,000 devices.'*⁷⁶⁵ *Otpor* would neutralize this by being relatively quite transparent, or, otherwise very cautious in its telecommunications (as well as compartmentalization of information, often unknown even by its 'senior' members).

Further, there was the police: It was reorganized in the early 1990's, with former refugees from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina constituting its core force of about 100,000. Many had not been given citizenship, so as to be kept at the regime's mercy and its expectations for unwavering loyalty regardless of the legality of the task demanded. Yet, there were exceptions to this perceived allegiance, particularly among local recruits of the regular force-the most numerous.⁷⁶⁶ *Otpor* would utilize this to its advantage by way of its local branches with members who, when younger, literally shared the playground with the local police recruits and had strong ties: *'In small communities, towns, police knew the kids. It was uncomfortable to arrest them when orders were given.'*⁷⁶⁷ Another early *Otpor* member agrees: *"we saw the police also as victims. You don't fight victims. You are not against victims, there is no victim against victim. They were our brothers, neighbors. [Otpor] knew the police: In city with 30,000, everybody knows each other."*⁷⁶⁸ When they met at the interrogation room, officers had the opportunity to discover for themselves that those 'terrorists' vilified by official propaganda, were unarmed, non-violent young adults with a clear and, increasingly reasonable message. *'The policeman who arrested Marovic told him: I don't know why we picked you up'...The police was shocked. Why are we bothering with them?'*⁷⁶⁹ Ironically, these arrests helped 'soften' the police stance against them: *'[b]y the time elections were held...members of the Serbian police, except high ranking officers, knew more about Otpor, its goals and methods than ordinary citizens. Otpor, in turn, was*

⁷⁶⁴ ⁷⁶⁴ ICG Balkans Report No 102, 19 September 2000, 7.

⁷⁶⁵ Interview with Marco Mandic, Belgrade, Fall 2007.

⁷⁶⁶ ICG Balkans Report No 99, 8.

⁷⁶⁷ Milja Jovanovic, interview with the author, Belgrade 2007.

⁷⁶⁸ Sinisa Sikman, interview with the author, Belgrade 2007.

⁷⁶⁹ Ibid.

getting information about the mood in the police after each arrest and detention.⁷⁷⁰ As a result, dissent was skilfully diffused by opposition activists⁷⁷¹ within the ranks of the police and contributed in many cases to the lukewarm support the latter exhibited for action against the protesters, especially after the elections. The constant exposure of ordinary police members to the opposition message, that Milosevic was done, as well as the sheer number of those in the streets acted as powerful deterrents in determining the police's reaction to events.⁷⁷²

Indicative of the moral of both security branches, on multiple levels of command is the atmosphere in the Interior Ministry headquarters in Belgrade, when, late on October 4th special orders arrived to use extreme violence to forestall the culminating protest. This included the use of *Wasps* (rocket launchers) and *Hornets* (bazookas). '*They want us to kill them*' whispered the police officers at the Ministry of the Interior who received the telephone orders (by Police Minister V. Stojiljkovic through Police Chief L. Aleksic) at midnight on October 5th.⁷⁷³ 'But the chain of command had been broken. For having stated publicly that Milosevic had lost, and that it would be easier for him and the whole nation to step down, the (former) head of public security, General V. Djordjevic had been relieved of his command. Yet, his replacement, Stojiljkovic, had no authority with the troops.⁷⁷⁴ And even he, contacted his friends in [cities like] Uzice and Sabac warning them of the regime's callousness. He also gave his officers their orders. The opposition dispatched demonstrators to block police stations and military barracks. They were instructed against displaying any hostility; instead, give presents, kisses and flowers to soldiers.⁷⁷⁵

⁷⁷⁰ Binnendijk, A. L. and Marovic, I. Power and Persuasion: Nonviolent Strategies to Influence State Security Forces in Serbia (2000) and Ukraine (2004). *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 39, 2006, 421.

⁷⁷¹ As an activist said 'we know the educated police are on our side. Only the bullies are with Milosevic.' Cohen, R. *The New York Times* (November 26, 2000).

⁷⁷² Overall, there were about 3,650 policemen to secure buildings in Belgrade on October 5th-certainly not enough against the hundreds of thousands of protesters, especially as the latter had planned the nation-wide action with the intention of keeping local police units around the country busy and bogged down in their own regions, thus away and unable to reinforce the units in the capital. In Bujosevic, D. and Radovanovic, I. *The Fall of Milosevic: The October 5th Revolution*, 34.

⁷⁷³ Bujosevic, D. and Radovanovic, I. *The Fall of Milosevic: The October 5th Revolution*, 9.

⁷⁷⁴ *Ibid*, 24.

⁷⁷⁵ *Ibid*, 31.

According to R. Markovic, head of the State Security Service, who was also present in the room, when orders arrived, 'after the election, the awareness that Milosevic had lost had sunk into the policemen's minds. Whether it was 49-point-something-percent or 50 percent was irrelevant to these people. There was no disputing the fact that [the other candidate] Kostunica has won many more votes than Milosevic...The question in the minds of the police was whether to defend that 1 percent or .1 percent.'⁷⁷⁶ *'Kostunica has certainly won'* said one of the officers in the room, *'I voted for him!'*⁷⁷⁷ What Markovic was further unaware of, was that his lieutenant Legija (chief of Special Operation Units) was meeting with Djindjic. The latter had earlier proposed that the commander of the anti-terrorist units, Z. Trajkovic meets Kostunica to discuss a deal to avert violence by security forces, but news had leaked and Trajkovic had been hastily transferred 200 km away from Belgrade. Moreover, 'he didn't know that through special lines, the officers in the room with him were telling the men in the field not to fire. He did not know that Chief of Staff Gen. Pavkovic had decided not to act.'⁷⁷⁸

Others were still going through the motions to obey the regime. Police Minister Stojiljkovic was receiving orders from Milosevic and transmitted them. On the afternoon of October 5th, he ordered police pilots to board a helicopter and,

'Drop chemicals from the chopper to disperse the crowds' in front of the parliament. When dropped, by impact alone, these canisters would kill. *'Somebody wants a massacre'* one of the pilots thought on the way to the military airport. The two colonels who were supposed to fly the helicopter thought 'It was an amazing sight to see so many people', he said later. 'Who are we supposed to disperse? He asked himself. *'It's all over!'* So he radioed in headquarters: *'there is a heavy smoke cover here, we can't carry out our assignment.'* HQ insisted: *'go around again'*. He obeyed, went around. An hour later he was in front of his superiors; the conditions were

⁷⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷⁷ Ibid

⁷⁷⁸ ICG Balkans Report No 99, 8.

unsuitable, he reported. They seemed relieved he thought. ‘Good’, said one of the generals. ‘You may go’.⁷⁷⁹

Elsewhere, field officers also disobeyed orders to escalate violence,⁷⁸⁰ and even switched their support to the crowds. For example, Col. Bosko Buha (originally ordered to a coal mine close to Belgrade to subdue a major strike) and his entire brigade of 300 men (‘his brigade was one of the strongest police units, the kind you would like besides you if there was any mess’) defected. Later on the 6th, Minister Stojiljkovic proclaimed Buha a traitor and the Police Brigade a paramilitary group. But by then, such charges were not only meaningless, but even constituted a badge of honor.⁷⁸¹




Figure 25: Collapse of Milosevic Regime's Coercive Apparatus (reconstructed) Network

Top: commands issued, bottom: network collapse once refused (from above/below).

Node identification: Top=Milosevic; Purple=Officers ordered to resort to violence (Stojiljkovic, Aleksic, Pavkovic, Markovic, Djordjevic); Red=Col. Buha (defector)

⁷⁷⁹ Bujosevic, D. and Radovanovic, I. *The Fall of Milosevic: The October 5th Revolution*, 102-103.

⁷⁸⁰ For example, here is an exchange between headquarters and a field unit, on October 5th, 4:30 pm:

Avala 10 (police Belgrade station) to field officer: ‘Use chemicals! Now!’

Officer to Avala 10: ‘I am using them, but they are not reacting. They are not reacting to the tear gas!’ Ibid, 99.

⁷⁸¹ Ibid, 161.

As for the military, after the 1998 NATO bombing the top layer had been changed, but not its whole structure. Consequently, the regime could 'not count any more on the army as a reserve in case of civil unrest...' ⁷⁸² Further, appalled by Serbian irregular and regular forces in Kosovo prior to the 1999 showdown, many officers were disaffected by the regime and displayed (at the cost of official reprimand) their displeasure publicly, by refusing promotions, or by disagreeing-overtly, or otherwise-the regime, as with the examples of general Djordjevic and Trajkovic, mentioned above. Consequently, according to informed sources reporting on the state of the FR Yugoslav Army, by the Fall of 2000, '...it remained 'stratified' [emphasis added] in its relationship with the regime: The very top echelon installed by Milosevic [was] loyal [Milosevic was always afraid of an officers' coup, and relied on the security service and police instead], but though in command positions [did] not control the army directly [from mid-officers down to the corps of lower-ranking officers. See figure 25] [...The latter] bring from universities and other schools views and ideas generally supportive of the opposition and the democratic transformation of Serbian society. These changes in the army limit[ed] its value as a regime asset and could severely undercut any plans to keep it in reserve as an instrument of repression...' ⁷⁸³

Indeed, *Otpor* focused with success on the non-professional (more prone to defection) soldiers-reservists and their families-emphasizing the double message that while the former were patriotic and felt for the hardships reservists had gone through during a decade of crises and wars, the latter should be serving the people of Yugoslavia and not its corrupted and, after the elections in September 2000, illegitimate regime. Ultimately, despite lip service paid to the regime, the Army remained largely uninvolved and instead played a crucial role in extinguishing the regime's final attempt to remain in power at all cost, when Chief of Staff, Gen. Nebojsa Pavkovic refused to execute Milosevic's orders and brutally intervene to 'restore order'. Djindjic, himself, reported that Milosevic had ordered the shelling of buildings

⁷⁸² Ibid.

⁷⁸³ Ibid, 10.

where protesters were. Pavkovic's own account indicates intense pressure to intervene with deadly force:

'the police was reporting casualties on both sides, saying that they could not hold out and that it was a matter of urgency for the army to step in. I replied that the state was not under threat, that the constitutional order was not endangered and neither was the army. The orders I was receiving could not influence me to engage, or rather misuse the army by supporting either side or any person in an attempt to influence the electoral will of the citizens. I wasn't prepared to carry out these orders.' When the two men spoke again over the telephone, after it was all over and Kostunica had been sworn in, Milosevic expressed his complete surprise that the army didn't obey him. *'You didn't carry out a single one of my orders'*, Milosevic told him [Pavkovic] without raising his voice.⁷⁸⁴

Finally, there were paramilitary and/or special forces purportedly loyal to Milosevic. Numerous teams-potentially including criminal elements-answerable to commanders with near direct access to the leadership of the regime. Because of the latter, they would be least affected should the chain of command break. Hence, these units (like Legija's Red Berets) were the only ones *Otpor* members were seriously concerned about. As a number of interviewees confirmed with the author, *Otpor* tried to individually contact them to secure their neutrality when the final protest would take place on October 5, 2000.

To conclude, the composite type of *Otpor*'s network topology made a significant difference, in spreading information, in absorbing and surviving attacks, in connecting people, and in educating and mobilizing them to inform and mobilize others—a chain of activism eliciting mass participation. *Otpor*'s composite network kept spawning new branches through a variety of ties (figure 23); it allowed it to transmit its message more efficiently, avoid bottlenecks, remaining connected and reaching further destinations (people) by multiple paths. This also protected it from repression: it rendered it less

⁷⁸⁴ Ibid, 102-4.

prone to leadership decapitation or catastrophic failure (figure 22), and helped it to expand in ways that eventually made it impossible to stop it. As a veteran *Otpor* activist put it: *'that is one of our differences [with older protests of 1996-7] it was random, it did not have communication...people were not connected in any way. In Otpor everybody was connected. If eleven of us were arrested, the rest could finish the job. It was important to share info as much as you can with as many (people) as one can.'*⁷⁸⁵ In contrast, the network of the Milosevic regime's coercive apparatus was a simple, brittle hierarchy without the topological capability to survive network failure in the form of defections (figure 25) and counter-mobilize effectively. Matching these two types of networks against each other, as the case of Serbia 2000 illustrates, results in a *composite* one gaining a clear advantage over its *simple* rival that creates an almost irresistible mobilizational momentum.⁷⁸⁶

⁷⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁶ It is interesting to note that while the military did not follow orders for violent repression in both 1996-7 (to some degree) and 2000, in the former case this was characterized by passive abstentions, while the latter also by active defections. *Otpor* had succeeded in reaching and changing a lot of minds.

Conclusion

Information about a network's formal properties allows for the evaluation of the depth and the scope of its capabilities and provides an analytical framework towards forecasting its performance. Simple networks with only strong or only weak ties face a trade-off between robustness and efficiency, and cannot optimally diffuse both knowledge and behavior. As a result, they cannot fully engage in composite diffusion necessary for mobilization. On the contrary, composite networks combine strong and weak ties that provide both resilience and effectiveness in spreading over time not only signals but also influence. The latter allows composite networks to grow in size and evolve in complexity, maximizing their mobilization potential.

More importantly, mobilization outcomes depend on the *combined* topology-related performances of networks. That is, they depend on how both opposing networks obtain and diffuse resources, and withstand attacks to optimize their mobilization chances during contested elections. Juxtaposing the results of rival network data for cases I and III confirms that a simple opposition network versus a simple regime one yields regime surviving (*Hypothesis a*). Equally, the combination of the results of the data for rival networks in cases II and IV supports the proposition that pitting a composite opposition network against a simple regime one will end in electoral results reversed, leadership removed (*Hypothesis b*). *Hypotheses c* (simple opposition network vs. composite regime network yields repression) and *d* (composite opposition network against composite regime one produces violent conflict) are not tested in this study, but many candidate cases for related future research exist.

		Opposition	
		Simple	Composite
Regime	Composite	Outcome: <i>Repression</i> Examples: Iran 2009, Belarus 2010	Outcome: <i>Violence</i> Examples: Togo 2005, Cote d'Ivoire 2010-11
	Simple	Outcome: <i>Status Quo</i> CASE I <i>Zajedno</i> -students 1996-7 CASE III <i>Ukraine Without Kuchma</i> 2000-1	Outcome: <i>Transition</i> CASE II <i>Otpor</i> 2000 CASE IV <i>Black Pora</i> 2004

Table 16: Network typology and case outcomes (including additional examples)

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

Processes and mechanisms in regime transition: networks as a tool to capture and analyze mobilizational dynamics and outcomes

As noted early in this thesis, virtually all scholars of the color revolutions acknowledge the importance of opposition and its organization-preparing prior to, activating during and mobilizing past the election event.⁷⁸⁷ The same goes for incumbents and their reliance on organizational properties to counter similar movements. The opposition structure is usually domestically ‘diffused’ and ‘dispersed’ (Thompson and Kuntz 2004; Radnitz 2006), with extensive trans-national links (Bunce 2006; Way 2006), and youthful in composition (Bunce and Wolchik 2006; Nikolayenko 2007). It entails a ‘robust’ communications network (Beissinger 2007); it is ‘diversified in its roles’ and ‘pro-actively expansive’ in its relations with the regime’s potential defectors (Kuzio, 2006). Regimes too can be ‘internally divided’ (D’Anieri 2006; Way 2006, 2010) with or without proper resources and coercive capability. Discipline, logistics and coordination become critical during elections, as does the support of NGOs carrying out parallel vote counts. The size, and related ‘turnout cascade’ of mobilized crowds is believed by scholars (McClurg 2003; Fowler 2005) to be crucial for the opposition to achieve its goals (Binnendijk and Marovic 2006; Tucker 2006) and to evoke the concept of popular democratic legitimacy. Nothing portrays more dramatically the need for organizational planning ahead for the looming electoral battle, than an opposition memo dated more than a year before the 2004 Ukrainian elections: “The election would be a game without rules, unprecedented competition of informational, organizational financial and administrative resources for the regime. We

⁷⁸⁷ More generally, a relevant Freedom House comparative study demonstrates that “how a transition from authoritarianism occurs and the forces that are engaged in pressing the transition have significant impact on the success or failure of democratic reform.” 2005. *How Freedom is Won: From Civic Resistance to Durable Democracy*. New York, NY: Freedom House Research Study, 5, 19-24.

need allies and at least 500,000 supporters.”⁷⁸⁸ But what do these terms-‘diffusion’, ‘dispersion’, ‘robustness’, ‘coordination’, ‘internal divisions’, ‘dynamic effects’ etc.- actually mean and how do they translate into actual concepts and their effects on mobilization and counter-mobilization attempts? To elucidate the above beyond simple descriptions, a different conceptual approach and related analytical tools was needed.

From their own epistemological vantage point, Political Sociologists have also been examining the role that organizational structures (often at the expense of agency) and their effects play in such processes. For example, McAdam enumerates numerous facts about mobilization and the role of organizational structure (recruits to movements tend to know others involved; most social movements develop within established social settings, and these provide various resources-e.g. networks of trust, or, channels of communication-necessary to launch and sustain collective action; emerging movements tend to spread along established *links* of interaction). According to Diani and McAdam (2003), adding all the above variables to meaningfully theorize about mobilization can be a ‘dauntingly complex task’. Again, another examining angle would be welcome, especially if it could help reduce this convolution.

Finally, one more theoretical perspective from which organizing for, and engaging in collective societal action, has been studied involves the concept of diffusion. More general, social mobilization is akin to social contagion. Social contagion involves the aggregation of individual to collective decision-making and can be understood in such terms of simple and complex contagion, as decisions and information are transmitted from one individual to another in a disease-like fashion. One important element of this approach is the concept of information and how it is transferred, or transmitted. The type of links between individuals is paramount for the manner in and efficiency with which this exchange of information takes place. In fact, such links are near ubiquitous in the social sphere: through a composite diffusion of information, other resources and behavior, they can facilitate market transactions, foster trust and social cooperation, and serve as channels of learning (hence, potential

⁷⁸⁸ In Binnendijk and Marovic, 2006.

recruitment). The importance of the latter property in the study of political mobilization is amply illustrated in the intriguing explanation of revolutionary bandwagon in the case the 1989 Eastern European revolutions discussed, among others, by Kuran (1992) and Lohmann (1994). It is also a property that helps (re)introduce and add agency to the study of mobilization processes. Their approaches examine the collective effects of individual actor behavior based on the discrepancy between privately and publicly held preferences about a regime, and the fluctuation between costs for joining opposition and preference falsification. In authoritarian societies, individuals' preferences may vary, displaying one set publicly (e.g. compliance and satisfaction with the regime, for fear of reprisals) and another privately (e.g. dissatisfaction and discontent). Kuran and Lohmann postulate that initially random, even slight increases in the number of people showing their private colors in public will make 'publicizing' one's private preferences less costly, and thus, encourage others to display their 'true preferences' publicly, creating a cascade. In other words, small initial perturbations of a system could push it beyond a threshold after which mass participation was certain. Initial [and, as Kuran fails to account for, subsequent] communicating of these preferences depends on how such individuals are *linked*.

In discussing diffusion processes, Beissinger (2005, 2007) echoes this logic of preference falsification in the twin themes of electoral falsification and authoritarian regimes' false pretensions to popular support, and becomes increasingly more explicit in diagnosing the complexity of mobilization processes. In his works on nationalist mobilization and the collapse of the Soviet State (2002) and on modular revolutions (2007), Beissinger lists the diffusion of information (through the multiplicity of interactions within cycles of contention) as a factor in the non-linear, 'tidal effects' of subsequent nationalist mobilization waves in what he terms 'thickened history'—a condensed period of time during which events effect and succeed each other rapidly and unpredictably. Characteristically, he describes the role of the spread of information

during a mobilization as ‘knowledge affecting outcomes in progress’.⁷⁸⁹ In emphasizing the role of diffusion of information during a state of political turbulence (based on Tilly’s model), he also hints at the importance of networks as a framework through which such complex social processes can be analyzed. But, while he also notes that ‘the occasion for electoral mobilization provides democratic oppositions with an opportunity to create the kinds of networks necessary for carrying out large-scale protest mobilization and for confronting authoritarian regimes’, he elaborates little beyond this point, addressing this lacuna only partially in subsequent (2009) works. Overall, however, his emphasis on tidal effects is an important step to examine the ‘event’ and dynamics of mobilization itself, at an analytical junction where earlier macro-structural explanations and more recent approaches focusing on intentionality can meet. Put differently, to capture the dynamic aspects of both individual incidents and their global effects, a meso-level approach would be a critical next step.

In their quest to capture dynamic, complex effects, scholars like Diani and McAdam and Beissinger are not alone. King (2004) agrees that while structural conditions matter and ‘...might explain the onset of mobilization, they do not explain the fact of mobilization’, adding that ‘over time, the ‘causal role of event-specific processes’ [can grow] relative to the power of structural conditions.’ This ‘power of contingency’ (according to King, the issue of ‘how to operationalize fluidity’) is in reality an attempt to capture some of the dynamism of collective effects of seemingly random, isolated, micro-level events. Other scholars also concur that unexpected ‘emergent social patterns, like revolutions, cannot be understood without a bottom up dynamical model of the microfoundations at the relational level’ (Macy and Willer 2002). In other words, what they are getting at is networks, their topologies and related attributes, as parts of a complex adaptive system. These attributes include the individuality of components, their localized interactions, as well as their global effects. Similarly, Klochko and Ordeshook (2005) recognize the importance of networks, noting that, while ‘networks are themselves complex and require an array of concepts to

⁷⁸⁹ Beissinger, M. R. Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions. *Perspectives on Politics*, 5, 2, June 2007 (251-276).

describe [...] to the extent that a model of social processes—political, economic or otherwise- ignores these constructs, it circumvents a factor that most likely is critical to any adequate understanding of those processes.’ Indeed, networks not only combine agency and structure (Kahler 2009), but their stochastic evolution also captures contingency (Snijders 2008).”⁷⁹⁰

In other words, to understand these social processes, one ignores the role of complex networks at one’s peril. Yet, ‘despite the commonality of social, political and economic networks’ empirical importance, we still know little about how the structure of these networks affects aggregate political outcomes.”⁷⁹¹ A more systematic look at networks are therefore not only necessary, but urgent. This is the lacuna that this thesis has tried to address.

Summary of the thesis

Contentious collective political action, like the color revolutions, is a complex phenomenon, involving the interplay between structure, agency and contingency in time and space. In this type of political contest between democratizing opposition groups and competitive authoritarian regimes that culminates in contesting fraudulent electoral results by popular protest, both sides try to mobilize. This study postulates the fate of such actions depends heavily on the *combined* outcome of these mobilizations. Mobilizations are processes that include the mechanism of *composite diffusion*—the gradual spread over time, across space, between people and through populations, of resources and signals like knowledge, opinions and behavior. Further, it posits that opposing groups can be understood as networks of people and their ties, through which the mechanism of diffusion operates; the network itself becomes the unit of analysis. For opposition networks, this study focuses on youth protest groups that spearhead dissent and spread across the wider population signals of defiance and resistance to a competitive authoritarian regime. For authoritarian regime networks, it centers on its coercive apparatus. Despite its security/military nature, its employment

⁷⁹⁰ Snijders, T.A.B. 2008. Introduction to Networks, Oxford lectures slide presentation, Oxford University.

⁷⁹¹ Siegel D. A. 2009. Social Networks and Collective Action. *American Journal of Political Science* 53: 122–138, 122.

by the regime renders it a *de facto* political network too.⁷⁹² The new study of networks shows that networks obey general laws that link their properties to their function. Hence, the topology of networks can elucidate network behavior (levels of diffusion).⁷⁹³ In other words, the thesis explored how the spatial and temporal aggregation of individual agent behavior and its variability could account for the trajectories of these contentious political events.

Empirically, it has done so, by way of examining a number of cases. The cases included the democratizing ‘revolutions’ in Serbia (2000) and Ukraine (2004), as well as their ‘mirror’ ones—the *Zajedno*-student protest in Serbia (1996-7) and the *Ukraine Without Kuchma* movement (2000-1). The mechanisms involved are sensitive to initial conditions and a large number of diverse, autonomous, locally interacting components; they represent complex, volatile, ‘tidal’ processes during a ‘thickened’ period of political history. Methodologically, this research combined, modified and devised a number of methods towards a rich, pluralist approach. It began with the collection of qualitative material during field research from interviews of key participants in these democratizing struggles. These were used to map and identify key parts of the types of their respective dissident networks (*‘Zajedno students’*, *Otpor*, *Ukraine Without Kuchma*, *Black Pora*). To collect primary data about these networks, a Respondent-Driven Sampling method was modified to arrive at desired estimates of ‘hidden’ populations and structures, creating datasets which were respectively, converted into matrices and networks. Then, these networks’ specific topologies were analyzed to assess how the mechanism of composite diffusion performs through them (including their resilience to catastrophic failures like arrest by the police, or security forces defection).

Further, a double (formal and empirical) comparison was executed, with respect to (i) the different types of networks, and (ii) four empirical cases [Serbia: *Zajedno*-students (1996-7) and *Otpor* (2000); Ukraine: *Ukraine Without Kuchma* (2000-1), *Black*

⁷⁹² Hence the title of this dissertation.

⁷⁹³ These include positive or negative feedbacks’ that can culminate in tidal effects, by way of producing cascades or cascade failures. In Laguna, M.F., Abramson, G., Zanette, D. H. 2003. Vector Opinion Dynamics in a Model for Social Influence. *Physica A* 329, 459-472.

Pora and the Orange Revolution (2004)]. The main objective was to ascertain whether these real different outcomes are affected by the formal properties of different networks. Results suggest specific types of organizational networks (labeled 'composite' in this study) may be better-suited for groups and movements seeking to optimize their mobilization. The findings bear consequences for the prospect of opposition to authoritarian regimes in the region and beyond-as cases in Bolivia, Lebanon, Kuwait, Iran, Cote d' Ivoire, Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria demonstrate.

Major findings

Following the mapping and deriving of formal network properties of rival organizations in the four cases examined in this study, the results obtained confirmed that successful mobilizers were characterized by a composite network structure, with numerical values for a combined indicator measuring it gravitating close to the middle of the allotted range (its extremes signify either very strong or very weak ties, respectively). This particular structure is responsible for organizations engaging optimally in both complex contagion (strong ties), and simple contagion (weak ties). Both of these processes are necessary for a group's successful mobilization, as the literature surveyed in this study suggests.

More generally, the strongest and most important statement from the observations and analysis of the results evinces that how one is -and can- be connected affects their diffusion and related mobilization capabilities, and, consequently, their chances for mobilization success. For protesters, a composite network that includes both strong and weak connections combines the structural cohesion required for committed, risk-ridden initial protest action, with a later, looser, expansive grid of ties that can help both propagate the organization's message, and recruit new members. This composition also helps evade decapitating strikes against the organization. Conversely, an opposition network that is predominantly characterized either by strong ties, or by weak ones, can neither expand successfully beyond its initial, tight cliques, or is simply too dilute to engage in disciplined, concentrated, costly protest actions that

delegitimize the regime and crucially lower public protest thresholds. For authoritarian regimes and their incumbents, a composite network of both weak and strong ties is translated in a bureaucratic and (most importantly) security apparatus that, besides its regular units that are more prone to defection and refusal to carry out commands for violence, also includes para-state and paramilitary groups - usually answerable directly to their leadership. Strong ties within the coercive apparatus can bypass the weak-tied regular chain-of-command and more readily ignore even nominal rules of civil and military conduct with devastating consequences (e.g. vigilantism). The above notion of paramilitary groups being disproportionately responsible for extra-institutional state violence may not be a novel concept, but restating it in network terms and exploring it further provides an important systematic look into the mechanisms of authoritarian repression and coercion. Put succinctly, for authoritarians, besides their regular repressing troops and agencies, the shorter the distance between command and trigger, the better for their sinister purposes.

The above network configurations for opposition groups and authoritarian incumbents alike, yield permutations that affect their mobilization capabilities and eventually decides the eventual outcome of their contestation. Composite networks on both sides mean both discipline and flexibility for both sides to mobilize successfully in order to face their opponents. With both sides maximizing their potential, violent conflict looms large. When only one of the rivals displays this composite structure, they possess a decisive advantage over the other, and as the successful cases examined in this thesis demonstrate, they carry the day, either through achieving the desired regime transition (opposition), or by effectively repressing it (regime). Finally, when neither side is characterized by a diverse, composite network structure, it fails to mobilize, and the status quo prior to the contestation remains the most probable outcome.




Figure 26: Network Structure and Mobilization Outcomes

A composite network will optimize an organization's chances for mobilization. This figure depicts probable mobilizational outcomes based on the presence (yes) or absence (no) of composite network structure.

Contributions and Lacunae

The contributions of this study are threefold: conceptual, methodological and empirical. Conceptually, it clarifies and unpacks the definition and mechanism of diffusion as paramount in mobilization processes, which is often used but seldom expanded on in the regime change literature. Diffusion has been mentioned both in Sociology and the literature on social movements, as well as in Political Science with respect to the propagation of a transnational electoral model. Management studies have also looked into diffusion, and so have Statistical Physics and the science of networks. However, while they all describe different aspects of the same phenomenon, they have been talking past each other, as the diverse, multiple literature reviews presented here can attest. This study attempts to unify and formalize the study of diffusion, aggregating important but discipline-confined research in a trans-disciplinary fashion, while applying it to the context of contentious action. When it comes to the electoral model in Political Science, its dissemination includes a frequently neglected domestic component-how this package of information and resources expands not only across, but within countries. More particularly, diffusion as a mechanism for the spread of resources, signals and behaviors through space and across time involves both single

and complex contagion, and can be assessed by way of measuring specific metrics of the network through which it takes place.

Further, this study conceptually focuses on networks: it postulates the existence of 'composite networks' as the optimal topology for a mobilizing network that combines greater efficiency with robustness, and uses networks as a suitable analytical framework within and through which agency, structure and contingency can be bridged. As our attention and analytical tools become more attuned to the complexity and the need to include the dynamic aspects of processes and events in our studies, a networks' perspective could be ideally situated to capture macro and micro dimensions of mass mobilizations, while at the same time inviting a varied, rich methodological approach. This thesis has aspired towards such a direction in the scope, rigor and detail of its research. By the end of the first decade of the millennium, the Political Science discipline has increasingly moved to explore issues in the field from a network perspective, and the meso-level framework provided by a networks approach is promising (for example in attempts to address coordination and cooperation problems). Since 2008, the American Political Science Association has included a Networks section and research has started to expand. To critics who would dismiss such a perspective as the latest fad, one can answer that the best inoculation against such critique is a political science of networks, anchored equally in solid mathematical foundations (and in that, Statistical Mechanics and other related disciplines are to be thanked for their internment output of rigorous scientific research) as well as an open mind for grounded, empirically rich, methodologically pluralist and policy-relevant research on real and intriguing political questions. This thesis hopes to have made a modest contribution in this direction.

Methodologically, this research utilizes networks also as analytical tools by which to examine both static and dynamic aspects of diffusion behind contentious political mobilization processes. Network analysis of such phenomena has been undertaken before, but it has either unaccounted for the most recent advances in the study of complex networks, or -for a host of reasons- has not relied on empirical data to test

falsifiable hypotheses. The present study is the first such formal attempt at combining rigorous methodological tools of complex network analysis with specifically collected empirical data towards the study of contentious mass mobilization with networks as the units of analysis.⁷⁹⁴ The use of a network framework also contributes to the illustration for scholars who study collective action of the role networks can play in determining how important network structure is to participation in their particular case.⁷⁹⁵

Further, this research devises and employs mixed methods to collect these data. One of the main predicaments of social scientific inquiry has been one-dimensional research. Examples of this research approach have tilted heavily either in a qualitative (often ideographic, or heavily descriptive) -and thus suffering both in terms of rigorousness and generalized validity of its claims-or, in a quantitative (formal, nomothetic) direction-producing elegant mathematical models with little relation to empirical reality. Related debates in our discipline are well known and in no need of further address here, but it would suffice to note that in the past decade a consensus has emerged that successful Political Science -- that is, a field that aspires to scientifically investigate empirical political problems and propose falsifiable, observation-rich, policy-relevant engaging explanations -- should employ both quantitative and qualitative methods in a mixed approach. Such a methodological philosophy has been espoused by the present study, and the focus on networks facilitates this aim. A network approach—one that combines extensive field research with the design and execution of surveys, the conduct of personal interviews across time, the search of archives, the carrying out of computer analysis and simulations and network analytic narratives--encourages a bridging between quantitative and qualitative perspectives. The result is a pluralist methodology that aspired to venture beyond the descriptive phase of momentous socio-political events, by seeking explanations of complex mechanisms and proposing contours for a predictive model.⁷⁹⁶

⁷⁹⁴ I gratefully owe this remark to Doug McAdam, who suggested that the present study was 'pioneering'.

⁷⁹⁵ Siegel D. A. 2011. Social Networks in Comparative Perspective. *PS: Political Science & Politics* Posted at OpenSIUC. http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pn_wp/46 (2011),122.

⁷⁹⁶ Scholars have begun observing that the study of social networks can bridge this gap: 'they look at role of structure plays in their individual behavior (and thus aggregate) of interaction between actors [...] network analysis can not

Empirically, this study attempts a broad investigation linking diffusion mechanisms within mass mobilization democratizing events by way of mapping and/or reconstructing key parts of rival organizations, translating them into networks with formal, generalize-able properties and their effects. To the author's knowledge this is the first time the networks in the four cases examined in this thesis have been mapped. Policy-wise, the findings suggest to future democratizers seeking to emulate the successes of groups like *Otpor* and *Black Pora* that a composite network with multiple, diverse, strong and weak ties is key for success. It is no accident that veterans of these campaigns have been seeking to emulate their organizational experiences in other campaigns against competitive authoritarians. For worried autocrats, alas, the empirical implications could be dire: be prepared –organizationally and politically-to 'repress early and often'. Of course violence does not guarantee success (measured in the regime's immediate or long-term survival), but *being capable of and willing* to use it to contain and halt the opposition spread *early* would signal the high cost of dissent and minimize the impression and effects (i.e. avoid defections and cascading failures) that widening resistance may have on its own forces.⁷⁹⁷ Absence of its projection signals the regime's vulnerability (as Lohmann illustrates in the East Germany case)⁷⁹⁸ and allows valuable time for the initial, strong-ties core of a protest group to expand, recruiting and mobilizing beyond its tight circle. In other words, regrettably, capacity of repression at

only produce useful and novel insights...but also allow for productive collaboration between qualitative and quantitative scholars, taking advantage of the technologies and insights of each.' Ibid.

⁷⁹⁷ For example, the statistical analysis of a large dataset finds that 'coercive capacity has a strong negative impact on the likelihood of democratization.' In Albertus, M. and Menaldo, V. 2012. Coercive Capacity and the Prospects for Democratization. *Comparative Politics* 44, 2, (151-169), 166.

⁷⁹⁸ Especially if it depends on coercion which it demonstratively can no longer exercise. For example, on October 9, 1989, the regime's leadership had wished a forceful neutralization of the planned Leipzig demonstrations and clearly prepared for it: "...Secret Order No. 8/89 (decreed on Sept. 26 by the Chair of the National Defense Council, Erich Honecker) was still in force with no restrictions. With respect to the expected "riots," it clearly stated, "They are to be prevented from the start." And there was yet another clear instruction: "hostile actions should be prevented offensively [...]" According to later testimony from the riot police, officers had been told that morning that a peaceful outcome to the demonstrations was unlikely, and that they should prepare for possible acts of violence. Accordingly, they wore riot gear: helmets with visors and neck protection, shields, gas masks, truncheons, and so-called RKWs**; officers were armed with pistols, and dog teams were also deployed. On the courtyard of the VP*** District Authority, "munitioned up" armored trucks stood ready, huge steel giants with bulldozing capacity; the drivers were armed with submachine guns and sixty shots of ammunition apiece. (Wolfgang Schneider, "Oktoberrevolution 1989", in *Leipziger Demontagebuch*. Kiepenheuer Verlag: Leipzig, 1990, 7-8; reprinted in Kleßmann, C. and Wagner, G. (eds) 1993. *Das gesplante Land. Leben in Deutschland 1945-1990*. Munich:C.H. Beck, 438-40), in Lohmann, 1994, 71-78.

an early stage could increase the regime's chances.⁷⁹⁹ For that, both a long chain of command and a short distance between command and trigger are necessary, and a composite network optimizes this proposition. The network configuration of their organizational (coercive) capabilities can help describe the probable outcomes of such democratizing contestations, as much as that of their democratic rivals.

Another empirical contribution includes primary data collection. While complex network studies have begun producing elegant models based on simulated data, they run the risk of degeneracy, the phenomenon in which 'a seemingly reasonable model can actually be such a poor misspecification for an observed dataset as to render the observed data virtually impossible under the model;'⁸⁰⁰ experiments can have limited external validity.⁸⁰¹ At the same time, it is widely accepted that empirical testing of substantive theoretical arguments [on mobilization] has been underexplored.⁸⁰² Hence, a contribution of the present study lays in its network investigation collecting, translating and analyzing actual empirical data towards such an analysis from actual cases of clandestine political mobilization. The few studies that investigate political mobilization (e.g. Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Arceneaux and Nickerson 2009; Collins 2009) concern themselves with get-out-the-vote mobilization during regular political cycles in the United States. When they do use actual data, most of them come either from field experiments or from relatively dated existing datasets not originally collected for such purposes⁸⁰³ [works by Huckfeldt and, more recently, Fowler (2005) are notable exceptions. Still, Fowler's important 2005 sample is unweighted and examines lower risk political behavior⁸⁰⁴]. Unlike them, this research established a clear link between its

⁷⁹⁹ *Capacity* for (incl. command and control) and *will to*, must not be confused with *intensity of violence*, as higher levels could induce more preference falsification, increasing the likelihood of an opposition cascade, if and when it took place. In McLauchlin, 2010. Loyalty Strategies and Military Defection in Rebellion. *Comparative Politics* 42, 3 (April):333-350, 336.

⁸⁰⁰ Ward, Stovel and Sacks, 2011, 253. The importance of real world data versus modeling was also impressed on the author during a lecture on epidemiology at the Santa Fe Institute in 2007.

⁸⁰¹ Fowler, J. H., Heaney, M. T., Nickerson, D. W., Padgett, J. F. and Sinclair, B., 2009, 10.

⁸⁰² Siegel, 2009, 122.

⁸⁰³ For example, Collins examines the effect of social networks to peer mobilization by looking at empirical datasets from two surveys-the 2005 United States "Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy" survey, and the 1984 South Bend Election Study. In Collins, K.W. 2009. Social Network Structure and Peer-to-Peer Political Mobilization: Evidence from Social Network Surveys. Paper presented at the annual Midwest Political Science Association Meeting, 18-22.

⁸⁰⁴ These two points are owed to Collins, 2009.

research goal and collection of primary empirical data specific to the very episodes and events it focused on, for its network analysis. The vast majority of them were obtained by obtrusive methods-that is by directly questioning actors about their political networks.⁸⁰⁵ This contribution can be equally classified as a methodological one, as was seen above. As a final point, turning to the actual observations themselves and their implications, another empirical contribution of this work was the creation of a framework through which to study other contemporary cases of mass mobilization successes and failures in contentious political action.




Figure 27: Cases and Outcomes of Mobilization Efforts during Contentious Political Action

⁸⁰⁵ Two added advantages of query-and-respond, 'relational' type of primary data collection are (i) 'the encouragement of a mentality to learn from the data rather than trying to measure the data against oneself' and (ii) more robust explanations. In Fowler et al., 2009, 26-27.

In terms of lacunae, the fact that the networks for the regimes' coercive apparatus were reconstructed and provide a formal organizational structure can be an issue. While the above still yield important clues as to the topology of the network, they cannot fully substitute for actual empirical data to map them. Unless and until members of the security forces involved in these cases decide to provide relational information, this concern will inevitably remain unaddressed. The passage of time can work favourably in putting some distance between events and the participant, especially if they were involved in coercive activities.

Another potential issue with the study involves the sample size for the actual data it collected from its Respondent-Driven-Sampling and related generalizeability. Smaller N can produce a negative correlation between strength of effect and sample size (Gerber, Green and Nickerson 2001; Arceneaux and Nickerson 2008)-for example, by over- or under-reporting clusters. Yet, local subsections of a network can provide evidence of its overall organization and function (Vasquez et al. 2004; Jeong et al. 2000; Fowler and Smirnov 2005; Robins et al. 2004; Handcock and Gile 2010).⁸⁰⁶ This concern can be further mitigated if the core of a network is included in the sample, when it forms part of the hypothesis (as it does in this case, investigating the existence of strong ties). The rule of thumb indicates that sample size must be bigger than the square root of the total population targeted,⁸⁰⁷ so if a core population is examined, given that work on similar network size estimation suggests the average network consists between 290 and 750 individuals (Zheng, Salganik and Gelman 2009),⁸⁰⁸ the

⁸⁰⁶ Specifically, Robins et al. (2004) suggest that a global network structure can be modelled, via pseudo-likelihood estimation/Markov chain Monte Carlo, as an outcome of process occurring in local social neighbourhood. More recently, Handcock and Gile (2010) argue that even partial observations can allow inference of global populations. In fitting models 'compatible with an arbitrary set of network statistics for the complete network and use a method of inference that does not rely on equality between the structure of the full and sub-networks, they proceed to modify Rubin's *ignorability* (1976) into the concept of *amenability* applicable to networks. More research is welcome in this direction.

⁸⁰⁷ David, B. and Snijders, T. A. B. 2002. Estimating the Size of the Homeless Population in Budapest, Hungary. *Quality & Quantity* (36:291–303), 295.

⁸⁰⁸ Fowler, J. H., Heaney, M. T., Nickerson, D. W., Padgett, J. F. and Sinclair, B. 2009. Causality in Political Networks, (*Political Networks Paper Archive*, Southern Illinois University Carbondale), 6.

sizes in this study are representative.⁸⁰⁹ Naturally, this study can benefit from an expanded data pool to map respondents' networks in greater detail.

An additional lacuna might involve measurement error due to the self-reporting nature of the survey part of data collection. This research asked respondents to also rate their links in terms of intensity, and revisited some of them to obtain repeated readings for comparison reasons. However, despite clear definitions provided by the research, self-assessment is highly subjective (one's friend is another's acquaintance) and a number of those surveyed stated they were unsure on tie intensity levels. A successive survey would have to devise measures that could minimize respondents' subjectivities, providing a universally acceptable weigh by which to accurately obtain this additional information.

A final lacuna of this study is empirical, given its focus on cases within the realm of Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union. The methodological and research approach followed here would be further validated, its prescriptions generalize-able with the inclusion in the future of cases beyond the post-communist constellation of cases, and beyond the electoral cycle (as three of the four cases examined involved election as a trigger). Ready candidates include cases with other 'revolutions'-like the 'Cedar' one in Lebanon (2005), and the Saffron one in Myanmar (2007)- and other mass mobilizations, successful, or, otherwise-e.g. Bolivia (2002, 2005), Kenya (2008), Iran (2009), Cote d'Ivoire (2010-11). The recent eruption of the 'Arab Spring' in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Jordan, Syria and Libya also provides a fertile ground to extend the testing of this study's hypotheses (especially *hypothesis d* in the cases of Libya and Syria) and methodologies beyond its current scope. The links between veteran *Otpor* members with Egyptian activists offer enough similarities, so as to facilitate the translation of the present study's hypothesis and conceptual approach of mass democratizing mobilizations into a model that can explore these more recent events in the Middle East.⁸¹⁰

⁸⁰⁹ For example, successive interviewees put the number of core *Otpor* members at 500. At this level, the *Otpor* sample size collected in this study follows the rule of thumb cited above.

⁸¹⁰ *Otpor* veteran and CANVAS activist, correspondence with the author, May 2012. Also see Rosenberg, T. 2011. 'Revolution U.' *Foreign Policy* (February 16), and by the same author, 'Friends in Revolution.' *The New York Times* (July 12, 2011).

Avenues for future research

Empirically, methodologically and conceptually expanding the scope and depth of the current research are obvious steps for future research. While continued research on the color revolutions will allow further insights into their mechanisms, as mentioned in the previous section, emerging cases also call for a systematic, comparative investigation from a networks perspective. Such studies would need to focus both on their particular region and beyond, as well as explore within-case variation where possible (e.g. the failed mobilization of the ‘April 6, 2008’ Egyptian protest versus the successful one in Tahrir Square, two and a half years later).

Methodologically, while this study has examined networks in terms of their connectivity robustness, future work could also expand to investigating congestion robustness (when a network is clogged or bottlenecked). Dodds, Watts and Sabel (2003) have explored five classes of network typologies in a simulated experiment, and their algorithm can search for the property of ‘ultra-robustness’.⁸¹¹ Applying it to a set from actual data would require an expanded sample and could provide an even more comprehensive picture of composite diffusion performance.

Another future avenue of research would be to investigate how network-related mobilization capabilities and their outcomes correlate with thresholds of participation, the propensity for violence and time. Adding a time parameter to the participation vs. violence dimension of the hypothesis, allows for interesting observations. Simply by plotting cases across the x, y, z-axes, one can notice that the faster participation increases, the less violent the outcome. Figure 28 shows a preliminary plotting of a number of mobilization cases in according to these additional parameters (participation numbers in log).

⁸¹¹ Dodds, P.S., Watts, D. J. and Sabel, C.F. Information Exchange and the Robustness of Organizational Networks. *PNAS (Proceedings of National Academy of Sciences)*, (100: 12516-12521), 12520.




Figure 28: Participation, Time and Violence Parameters of Mobilization Cases

This line of research echoes the promise that intriguing trans-disciplinary future investigation holds. Prediction is considered the apex of the social scientific endeavor. It will be as interesting as it will be challenging to apply natural science terms, concepts and measures for dynamic systems-e.g. from Physics and chaos theory to Evolutionary Biology. For example, an intriguing challenge would be to establish if Lyapunov exponents (the exponential rates at which local trajectories diverge, indicating a system's sensitivity to initial conditions and its propensity to chaotic behavior) can be established for social systems.⁸¹² Other, no less challenging similar approaches would

⁸¹² For Lyapunov time, see Strogatz, S. H. 2003. *Sync: The Emerging Science of Spontaneous Order*. Hyperion; also, Ding, R. and Li, J. 2007. Nonlinear Finite-time Lyapunov Exponent and Predictability. *Physics Letters A* 364, 5 (7)

be to explore synchronization phenomena-similar to quorum percolation in neural networks-or, inquire whether a system's increasing variance of key parameters can be measured,⁸¹³ as a means to detect a decline in its resilience (defined as its ability to absorb perturbations while remaining in the current stable state), hence obtain some early warning of an increased risk of a rapid transition.⁸¹⁴

An important final point about future research involves not only causality but to an extent also ontology. This study has explored how different types of networks affect diffusion and mobilization outcomes; it has primarily focused on investigating mechanisms and their performance in relation to networks. An important question to be raised is how do specific types of networks emerge? Are they a result of institutional or cultural legacies and norms, shared common exposure, spread induction, or homophily? Or, are they self-emergent, and if so, under what conditions? Is social capital an important precondition, or a result of network emergence? Moreover, are networks ultimately maps of social capital and trust? These are chief questions future research will have to address. The significance of a network approach is beginning to be recognized for its merits not just towards understanding political behavior in terms of networks, but also towards comprehending network formation in terms of political behavior: "While well-executed designs and better methodological techniques continue to yield increasing evidence that interpersonal interaction has causal effects, there is no substitute for more detailed data [...] this will be the key to understanding how networks are formed, evolve, and cause political [and social] behavior."⁸¹⁵

May):396-400; finally, for Chaos Theory in general, see Wolfram, S. 2002. *A New Kind of Science*. Chicago, IL: Wolfram Media Inc.

⁸¹³ See Chisholm, R. and Filotas, E. 2009 Critical Slowing Down as an Indicator of Transitions in Two-Species Models. *Journal of Theoretical Biology* 257: 142-149; also, collection of essays in Norberg, J. and Cumming, G. S. (eds.) 2008. *Complexity Theory for a Sustainable Future*. New York: Columbia University Press.

⁸¹⁴ Litzow, M. A., Urban, J. D. and Laurel, B.J. 2008. Increased Spatial Variance Accompanies Reorganization of Two Continental Shelf Ecosystems. *Ecological Applications* 18, 6:1331-1337. Cederman's academic work with the CCSS lab at the ETH, and the empirical Crisis Mappers online crowdsourced event database are intriguing first steps in such temporal and spatial directions (also probed by Francisco 2010). Liberation technology and the debate over the role of social networks in political mobilizations add a cyber-spatial component also worth exploring.

⁸¹⁵ Sokhey, A. E. and Djupe, P. 2010. Interpersonal Networks and Democratic Politics. *Political Networks (Paper Archive)*, Southern Illinois University Carbondale, available at <http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pnwp/47>), 9.

EPILOGUE

During fieldwork research in Belgrade, I accidentally came to meet the person who on October 5th, 2000 set the RTS building on fire; it would be among the most memorable encounters during that first trip. Following an early evening interview with an *Otpor* member, I accepted their invitation to meet another activist, who in turn invited me at a café bar far from the city's busy downtown. Its owner, Goran Ilic, displayed the customary warm Balkan hospitality, even before he heard I was a Greek conducting research on Milosevic's political demise. He sat down with us, and after more than enough treated rounds of rakija, local slivovich and my own small bottle of ouzo (in my bag as a prospective gift for a postponed invitation with an official), he began to cry, before beginning, in broken English, to tell his story. He had worked as a waiter in more than fifteen countries all over Europe for years to send hard currency back home. He said he had returned because of his love of Serbia and because he saw that Milosevic needed to go. He said he couldn't stand it: *'he made all of us sick'*-he would wake up at night scared and crying, couldn't look at himself in the mirror, finding it unbearable to live in a place like this: *'when you are alone in the dark, and one eye cries and the other sees straight and is determined, then the revolution starts.'* He said he wanted to do something; he had a big sword and he often practiced with it, imagining he was a warrior fighting against Milosevic. On the day of the revolution, he heard on the 'free radio' [he means B92] that bulldozers were coming to the city. *'We have to destroy something'*, he thought. He decided to go down first to the square and then rushed to the RTS-Radio Television Serbia, Milosevic's information propaganda bastion. There were many people there and few policemen. One tried to stop him, but to no avail: *'This is my country, it is my day today, don't tell me anything. I am free, you have your orders, an open mind is our difference.'* He pointed at the officer's holstered pistol. *'This gun, I paid for it [through taxes]. It is my gun!'*

'Weren't you afraid?' I asked him.

'100,000 people have died this decade. What if one more dies? It is not important. I wanted to help finish everything. Everything had to finish, people had started smiling.' The policeman stood aside, letting him pass. Next to the door, there was a garbage container. He broke a window and having poured in the container gasoline he had siphoned off a car, he lit it and ushered it in. Then he left, telling his friends and himself, *'Just RTS. It is enough for a small dictator.'* Later, on the following night, someone called him and said, *'you are on CNN, they show the fire you set!'*

Suddenly, one of his friends leaned across the table and interjected, whispering to him in Serbian: *'don't trust him, don't tell him these things, he may be a foreign agent!'* But Goran would not listen to him: *'No, I want to say it!'* he almost shouted with tears in his eyes. *'I haven't told anyone. I want you to write it down! Write it down so my children and grand children will know that I did something important in my life. So that they know I was there when it happened. So that they know their grandfather was here.'*

'Write this,' his friend finally acquiesced, *'so, they don't think we are criminals. Good things can come out of Serbia.'* I promised them I would.

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APPENDIX

Mapping the core of the *Otpor* network

The success of any RDS type of mapping technique rests with careful preparatory research that aims to identify an initial seed, or seeds, central to the network under investigation, and one(s) that can help set the survey snowball into motion. For *Otpor*, after thorough examination of the literature on the organization, a number of key members were identified. Through a network of contacts, they were reached and interviewed, which got the ‘snowball’ rolling; gradually, a clear picture of the group’s initial core emerged. Below is a sample of the adjacency list for *Otpor*’s core network.

1	2	3	5	6	13	14		19	28	30		41	47	63	110
2	1	1	3	8	14	13	44	11	14	11	79	13	46	101	101
3	3	2	4	7	31	31	45	18	42	7	13	14	49	35	103
4	7	5	9	2	16	2	46	12	13	8	80	35	101	103	114
5	6	7	3	9	30	32	47	6	19	2	14	15	102	106	115
6	8	29	8	3	11	33	25	2	7	3	81	2	103	6	116
7	5	6	7	4	33	28	48	8	8	29	67	97	97	33	108
8	9	4	6	5	10	10	49	93	11	10	24	12	99	90	63
9	16	10	10	30	27	7	19	4	17	4	28	98	108	30	117
10	15	11	11	13	22	8	50	94	2	5	38	6	109	102	118
11	12	9	15	14	44	34	51	7	4	6	44	37	110	107	119
12	14	22	92	89	45	35	16	17	16	9	32	99	111	41	100
13	13	16	50	19	66	36	52	89	70	1	17	52	112	37	120
14	25	18	13	72	2	11	53	85	35	15	16	100	113	47	121
15	23	17	22	16	3	37	54	95	5	73	18	101		100	35
16	26	19	72		6	38	55	25	9	74	82	102		68	
17	24	25	12		21	19	56	96	1	75	83	103			
18	21	30	24		24	15	57	15		76	84	11			
19	27	15	21		15	39	58	3		77	19	104			
20	28	12	19		38	21	12	1		78	85	105			
21	19	20	1		41	24	9	30		22	25	30			
22			29		46	5	6				49	58			
23					35	40	59				86	66			
24					69	41	30				87	63			
					36	3	60				88				
					68	42	17				89				
					71	43	61				65				
					67	22	62				90				
					70	44	63				91				
						4	64				41				
							65				63				
							66								

Table 17: Sample Adjacency List (*Otpor* core members, 2009)

	1	2	3	5	6	13	14	19	28	30	41	47	63	110
1		1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
2	1		1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
3	1	1		1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
5	1	1	1		1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
6	1	1	1	1		1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0
13	1	1	0	1	1		1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0
14	1	1	0	0	1	1		0	1	1	1	0	0	0
19	1	1	1	1	1	0	1		1	1	0	0	0	0
28	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0		1	0	0	0	0
30	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0		1	0	1	0
41	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1		0	0	0
47	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0		1	0
63	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0		1
110	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	

Table 18a: Example of Condensed (i.e. not global) Adjacency Matrix (unweighted, undirected): *Otpor* Surveyed Members (2009 round)

	1	2	3	5	6	13	14	19	28	30	41	47	63	110
1		3	3	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
2	3		2	0	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	0	0	0
3	3	3		1	1	2	2	1	0	2	0	0	0	0
5	2	2	3		1	0	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
6	3	3	2	1		2	1	1	0	2	1	0	1	0
13	1	3	0	1	1		3	0	1	2	1	0	0	0
14	2	3	0	0	1	3		0	1	1	1	0	0	0
19	2	2	1	1	1	0	2		1	2	0	0	0	0
28	0	2	0	0	1	1	1	0		1	0	0	0	0
30	0	0	2	0	1	3	1	1	0		1	0	1	0
41	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	1		0	0	0
47	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0		2	0
63	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0		1
110	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	

Table 18b: Example of Condensed (i.e. not global) Adjacency Matrix (weighted, directed): *Otpor* Surveyed Members (2009 round)

Ukraine 2003-4: Black *Pora* adjacency list

1	24	32	14	11	9	66	33	35	5	90	36	72	10	111	7		34	56	74	41	30	73	8	79		6	
2	25	33	4	2	59	67	2	8	2	1	81	10	174	4	2	133	29	129	2	14	145	23	4	72	67	8	23
3	5	34	3	3	2	4	3	20	3	2	74	79	106	108	3	77	81	67	3	45	146	74	2	103	147	2	21
4	9	29	41	4	3	2	35	29	4	3	37	99	81	2	4	134	37	130	5	52	12	6	3	36	158	138	65
5	4	4	42	6	4	3	10	2	8	33	7	29	77	116	8	64	36	94	4	42	11	109	7	156	166	7	179
6	23	35	2	9	5	33	29	6	7	16	2	36	107	117	121	103	97	132	8	46	3	2	5	73	174	161	109
7	10	36	6	5	8	68	37	11	9	184	10	74	108	118	11	29	3	70	7	144	2	3	10	74	167	11	150
8	3	37	43	55	6	69	36	54	82	91	85	2	109	119	54	34	8	133	131	145	4	132	84	5	168	74	25
9	2	3	8	20	60	70	32	33	23	92	8	3	74	77	84	74	14	69	174	29	6	79	54	80	169	121	73
10	26	38	7	12	11	71	21	9	35	93	67	99	110	73	10	72	72	5	6	4	147	5	62	7	29	82	10
11	27	39	44	8	12	29	4	62	21	8	94	67	111	3	20	14	5	134	21	3	27	10	20	157	173	4	1
12	28	21	45	14	13	72	7	12	54	85	35	100	112	102	35	85	39	135	23	5	148	81	85	143	101	76	127
13	29	7	46	35	61	73	74	56	83	4	23	23	113	120	21	125	128	136	143	10	31	121	9	21	172	14	3
14	30		47	31	1	74	78	79	25	20	21	35	114	10	23	1	10	4	36	2	23	174	121	23	171	12	
15	31		48	25	62	9	73	80	30	35	5	101	115		79	126			103	9	8	8	25	10	170	33	
16	8		49	58	16	5	72	5	12	11	80	10	79		33	80			9	85	83	7	153	102	77	15	
17			50		15		75	23	84		95	102			36	68			79	21	150	4	124	81	159	13	
18			51		14		76	21	31		96	103			12	81			10	7	25	9	30	104		77	
19			52		31		77	34	150		34	104			13	15			29		151		35	160		177	
			53		64		23	10	10		97	80			62	127			80		152		21	162	64		
					65		3								25	122				5				163		178	
																30	67			9				164		31	
								4								60	73							165		5	
																32	6							132		9	

156	68	105	137	82		20	103		15		4	31	183														
9	138	5	25	3	13	6	180	121	2	85	82	146	4	9													
4	85	6	85	4	31	3	115	169	3	16	5	23	2	8													
2	154	10	139	2	85	4	6	72	5	175	3	5	7	89													
7	139	3	4	20	6	2	79	7	6	7	2	83	85														
6	155	2	68	12	57	5	23		161	8	11	145	5														
5		4	138	11	181	21	5		1	18	20	25	12														
85		106	140	10	182	22	10		17		6	150	86														
3		98	141	5	121	8	3		20		23	2	87														
			142	8		9	2		14		31	3	88														
			9	9		23	4		11		12		3														

Table 19: Ukraine 2003-4, Black *Pora* Adjacency List

INFORMED CONSENT form

Title of Research: "Beyond Equilibrium: Complex Network Analysis of the Mass Mobilizations behind the 'Bulldozer' and 'Color Revolutions' in Eastern Europe and former USSR."

Researcher: KOTSOVILIS, Spyridon.

PhD candidate, Department of Political Science, McGill University
855 Sherbrooke St. W., H3A 2T7, Montreal, CANADA.

Contact Information: Tel: (514) 288-9712 email: spyridon.Kotsovilis@mail.mcgill.ca

Supervisor: Prof. Juliet Johnson Tel: (514) 398-6120 email: juliet.johnson@mcgill.ca

Purpose of the research: To explain Eastern European/post Soviet mobilizations and their outcomes from a complex system perspective.

The study focuses on actors and their organizations as parts of networks through which mobilization and counter-mobilization takes place, in the case of contested elections. Through complex network related theories and methods, the study proposes that the combined effect of the static (initial structure) and dynamic, non-linear (evolution of this structure once social action is under way) organizational properties of a movement and its counter-movement is the deciding factor the outcome of such a contention.

This research represents the core phase of the writing of my PhD dissertation. Like all such works, the finished text will be available to the public.

In this interview, I will ask you a few questions /or permission to provide me with access to archival records in your organization, regarding its structure, properties and your role in it (e.g. total number of members, number of members before you joined the group, numbers of subsequent recruits, links to other organizations, number of friends abroad, ownership and use of cell phone and/or computer, etc.).

Your signature below serves to signify that you agree to participate in this study.

Your participation is entirely voluntary and you can choose to decline to answer any question or even to withdraw at any point from the project. Anything you say will only be attributed to you with your permission. My pledge to confidentiality also means that no other person or organization will have access to the interview materials, which, for purpose of subsequent scholarly publication or presentation can be edited and identities protected upon request.

I agree to be tape-recorded ____YES ____NO

Participant's signature _____

Participant's printed name _____

Researcher's signature _____

Location _____ Date _____

This questionnaire is part of a modified 'Respondent-Driven Sampling process' that best samples and estimates populations and structures that are not readily accessible.
Any information you provide is for academic research purposes only (see opposite page).

Below, please:

- List the names of at least ten (10) people you were connected to/associated with while in OTPOR/PORA between the time of its founding and the presidential elections.
- Provide an assessment of closeness to them, ranging from 1 to 3 (1=acquaintance; 2=friend-contact at least twice a week; 3=close friend)
- Give the contact information of at least another person from OTPOR/PORA to repeat the above procedure.

	Name	level of closeness
		from 1 (lowest) to 3 (highest)
1.	_____	_____
2.	_____	_____
3.	_____	_____
4.	_____	_____
5.	_____	_____
6.	_____	_____
7.	_____	_____
8.	_____	_____
9.	_____	_____
10.	_____	_____

Contact information of next person(s) to be interviewed:
