The Strategic Versus the Neo-Ideological Model: What Explains Mass Killing?

Liam Palcu-Johnston

Department of Political Science

February 2023

A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of

Master of Arts in Political Science

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

Abstract

My thesis explores what causes government elites/leaders to commit mass killing by building on, refining, and challenging assumptions of the strategic model. The model argues that mass killing is a rational top-down instrumental policy utilized by leaders to combat threats to their power. Consequently, mass killing is strongly correlated with elite power being challenged, such as assassinations, wars, and coups. Although this model has the most academic support, it has three notable limitations: the domination-vulnerability paradox, the leap of imagination issue, and the disparity problem.

To address these limitations, I utilize research that explores psychological and ideological factors that impact how elites determine their strategic interests, establish an outgroup in its entirety as a significant threat, and justify extreme behaviour. I conclude that although ideologies on their own do not explain mass killing, the interactive relationship between threats to elite power and exclusionary beliefs does.

To test my theory I use logistic regression and rare-events logit models with panel data that compiles information on 158 countries between 1955 and 2011. I examine the interactive relationship between exclusionary beliefs and different types of threats to elite power. Additionally, I control for the potential effects of government military strength, regime type, media freedom, the post-cold war period, previous instances of mass killing, population size, gross domestic product per capita, and ethnic fractionalization. I discover that the interaction between threats to elite interest and exclusionary beliefs does not increase the probability of mass violence, suggesting that these ideologies do not significantly influence how leaders interpret challenges to their power. However, I find that exclusionary beliefs and symmetrical war rather

than guerrilla warfare are strongly associated with mass killing, which challenges certain fundamental assumptions of the strategic model.

Résumé

Ma thèse a pour objectif de cerner les raisons qui incitent les élites/leaders gouvernementaux à perpétrer des massacres en s'appuyant sur les hypothèses du modèle stratégique, en cherchant à les affiner et à les soumettre à rude épreuve. Le modèle stipule que le massacre fait partie d'une politique instrumentale descendante rationnelle utilisée par les dirigeants pour combattre les menaces à leur pouvoir. Par conséquent, les massacres présentent une forte corrélation avec la remise en cause du pouvoir des élites, comme les assassinats, les guerres et les coups d'État. Si cette théorie jouit du plus grand soutien académique, elle présente trois limites notables : le paradoxe domination-vulnérabilité, la problématique du saut dans l'imagination et la question de la disparité.

En vue de combler ces lacunes, je m'appuie sur des recherches qui explorent les facteurs psychologiques et idéologiques ayant un impact sur le processus par lequel les élites définissent leurs intérêts stratégiques, établissent un groupe externe dans sa globalité à titre de menace importante, et justifient un comportement extrême. Je conclus que, bien que les idéologies en elles-mêmes ne parviennent pas à expliquer les massacres, la relation interactive entre les menaces pour le pouvoir des élites et les croyances d'exclusion le permet.

Dans cette optique, je fais appel à des modèles de régression logistique et de logit à événements rares à partir de données de panel qui compilent des informations sur 158 pays entre 1955 et 2011. J'examine la relation interactive existant entre les croyances d'exclusion et différents types de menaces pour le pouvoir des élites. Par ailleurs, je prends en compte les effets potentiels de la puissance militaire du gouvernement, du type de régime, de la liberté des médias, de la période d'après-guerre froide, des précédents massacres, de la taille de la population, du produit intérieur brut par habitant et de la segmentation ethnique. Je découvre que l'interaction

entre les menaces pour les intérêts de l'élite et les croyances d'exclusion ne donne pas lieu à une hausse de la probabilité de violence de masse, ce qui suggère que ces idéologies n'influencent pas de manière significative la façon dont les dirigeants interprètent les défis à leur pouvoir. En revanche, je constate que les croyances d'exclusion et la guerre symétrique plutôt que la guérilla apparaissent fortement associées aux massacres, ce qui remet en cause certaines hypothèses fondamentales du modèle stratégique.

Acknowledgements

I want to express my gratitude to those who have helped me throughout my graduate studies. Thank you, Dr. Krzysztof Pelc—my supervisor—for your patience, thoughtful answers, and guidance. Not only have I learned a tremendous amount about how to conduct in-depth research and data science, but I have also gained considerably more knowledge about how political violence transpires. Thank you, Dr. Jennifer Welsh, for your thorough and thoughtful insights and criticisms. Your input considerably improved my work and made me think more deeply about the questions I was approaching. Finally, I would like to thank my beautiful fiancée and wonderful parents for their love and support.

The Strategic Versus the Neo-Ideological Model: What Explains Mass Killing?

On November 13, 1960, a civil war began in Guatemala due to a failed coup where right-wing anti-communists supported by the United States (U.S.) fought four leftist guerrilla groups until 1996 (Ball et al., 1999; CEH & Rothenberg, 2012, Chapter 9). The state implemented an aggressive counterinsurgency campaign throughout the 1960s and early 1970s that did not cause many civilian casualties (Naimark, 2017, p. 106; Valentino, 2004, p. 207). However, there was an escalation of indiscriminate violence in the mid-to-late-1970s which led to the attempted systematic elimination of the Mayan outgroup (Brett, 2016, p. 30; CEH & Rothenberg, 2012, pp. xxx–xxxi, 20, 69; Esparza et al., 2010, pp. 87–88; Kiernan, 2007, p. 636). An outgroup is defined as an identity—often based on politics, language, socioeconomic status, ethnicity, religion, race, or geography—that is established, shared, recognized, and socially constructed amongst individuals and differs from the fundamental identity of an ingroup (Berreby, 2008; Chandra, 2006; Fisher, 2011; Moshman, 2007; Sapolsky, 2017; Ulfelder & Valentino, 2008, p. 5). The systematic elimination of Mayans began in 1981 under President Fernando Romeo Lucas García and intensified substantially when Efraín Ríos Montt came into power in March 1982. The mass killing ended in 1983 after he was removed from power and resulted in the deaths of nearly 200,000 Mayans. The state deemed the insurgents (e.g., Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres) as substantially threatening the nation and determined it needed to eliminate Mayans to guarantee victory because they provided food, shelter, funds, and intelligence to guerrillas (Brett, 2016, p. 30; CEH & Rothenberg, 2012, pp. xxx–xxxi, 20, 69; Esparza et al., 2010, pp. 87–88; Kiernan, 2007, p. 636).

To provide a parallel, Nicaragua's history is very similar to Guatemala's, but the state did not attempt to systematically eliminate a vulnerable outgroup during its civil war against the

Sandinista National Liberation Front. Like Guatemala, Nicaragua experienced Spanish colonization, a history of governments violently repressing the working class, an agriculture-based economy with periods of instability and mass poverty which helped produce civilian support for leftist organizations, the presence of American-backed right-wing military dictatorships, and governments carrying out aggressive counterinsurgency campaigns against left-wing movements primarily throughout the 1960s and 1970s (Jonas, 1991; Naimark, 2017; Staten, 2010).

Comparing these cases raises the question: what causes elites/leaders[1] to commit state-sponsored mass killings? Mass killing—also referred to as mass violence, mass murder, and mass slaughter—occurs when leaders, including their agents, attempt to eliminate an outgroup either directly or indirectly by methods such as executions, bombings, gassings, shootings, forced labour, intentional starvation, exposure to disease, and blockades to medical supplies (Ulfelder & Valentino, 2008, pp. 1–7; Valentino, 2004, pp. 10–16). The victims of mass violence are unarmed non-combatants that do not participate in any military organization and are not an immediate threat to the population or elites. This definition of non-combatants includes individuals simply associating with military actors or providing nonviolent aid in the form of shelter, food, money, and other non-military related supplies or participating in nonviolent political activities (Straus, 2015a, 2016; Ulfelder, 2013; Ulfelder & Valentino, 2008, p. 5; Valentino, 2004).

[1] Elites/leaders can be heads of state in addition to cabinet-level officials, political parties, other government officials, and militaries including state-sanctioned paramilitaries and self-defense militias. They are generally a relatively small group of individuals who control significant territory and central resources. Often, these actors have lots of influence over civilians and can authorize, legitimize, or condone policy decisions (Straus, 2015a, 2016; Valentino, 2004).

Mass killing is not an irrational process, random, or caused by ancient hatred between groups; instead, it primarily occurs when elites attack groups that threaten their interests like power, policies that benefit their ideology/identity, or military objectives.[2] Yet, it is unclear which factors compel leaders to execute mass murder since it is uncommon and there is no scholarly consensus about the motives that drive this atrocity (Anderton et al., 2017; Balcells & Stanton, 2021; Balch-Lindsay et al., 2004; Esteban et al., 2015; Finkel & Straus, 2012; Harff, 2003, 2012; Hong & Kim, 2019; Krain, 1997; Krcmaric, 2018; Melson, 1992; Midlarsky, 2005, 2011; Semelin, 2007; Shaw, 2003; Straus, 2010, 2012a, 2012b, 2015a, 2015b, 2016; Ulfelder, 2013; Ulfelder & Valentino, 2008; Valentino, 2004, 2014; Weitz, 2003). Thus, my research plans to improve academic knowledge about what variables motivate elites to perpetrate mass violence when facing threats to their interests rather than using lower levels of repression or nonviolent methods. This research question aims to be both a general and narrow inquiry into the causes of mass violence, wherein I establish the primary variables that increase the likelihood of mass slaughter and investigate why and how these variables provoke elites to use extreme methods. My thesis is structured as follows:

- A literature review investigating the different perspectives that offer insight into my topic of interest, establish their limitations, and highlight the most supported one. I determine that the strategic model has the most evidence and therefore use it as the basis of my theory.

[2] It should be noted that identity and ideology are not interests in themselves. They are frameworks that shape an actor's interests. For example, being a conservative or a liberal is not an interest, but the policies that benefit this group and their ideology are interests.

- A theory utilizing information from the literature review that helps explain the decision amongst leaders to carry out mass violence while also accepting and challenging fundamental assumptions of the strategic model.
- A research design section explaining the data and statistical methods I use to test my hypotheses.
- A findings segment discussing my results by utilizing regressions and graphs, explaining how these results both refute and support literature on the topic of mass killing, describing how they contribute to academic debates on the causes and process of political violence, illustrating what these findings entail for future research to help further scholarly understanding of mass slaughter, and clarifying the overall weaknesses of my study.
- A conclusion portion summarizing my thesis' content and highlighting my research's normative and academic implications.

Literature Review, Puzzles, and Contributions

Academics advance four competing explanations for why elites perpetrate mass slaughter: the psychological, structural, ideological, and strategic models. These perspectives have strengths and weaknesses that shape how I will answer my research question and provide an opportunity to improve scholarly understanding about the origins of mass violence.

Psychological Model: Staring Into the Abyss

The psychological model argues that cognitive biases and heuristics (e.g., fundamental attribution error) intensify intergroup tensions, hostility, fears, and ingroup favouritism during periods of political instability. Consequently, elites use overly aggressive tactics to achieve their aims (Chirot & McCauley, 2010; Dutton, 2007; Haslam et al., 2008; Midlarsky, 2005, 2011; Roth, 2010; Staub, 2000, 2006, 2010, 2011; Waller, 2007). For example, Midlarsky (2005) claims that genocide[3] ensues when leaders know about past regimes or other comparable countries massacring outgroups with minor costs, perceive an outgroup as a threat to their interests, and view it as contributing to the loss of socioeconomic space—specifically, an increase in territorial loss, economic instability, ingroup battlefield casualties, or a decrease in the ingroup's population (Chapter 3 & 5).

Decreased socioeconomic space produces two simultaneous consequences, especially when leaders suffer perceived territorial loss. First, elite insecurity intensifies, resulting in leaders using disproportionate violence to combat an alleged threat. The more considerable the threat to elite interest, the more likely leaders will murder outgroup members who are believed to have some connection to the enemy (Midlarsky, 2005, pp. 83–103). Second, leaders become

[3] Genocide refers to elites attempting to intentionally, completely, and permanently annihilate non-combatants belonging to an ethnic, religious, or racial outgroup from a specific territory (Midlarsky, 2005, p. 21, pp. 22-39).

more risk acceptant. The costs of using violence against non-combatants do not appear as severe to elites when they experience loss and will therefore employ riskier and more aggressive policies to preserve their power against a scapegoated outgroup. Put succinctly, leaders know that targeting civilians is a risky strategy with severe costs but will accept the ramifications when suffering a decrease in power due to the loss aversion bias (Midlarsky, 2005, pp. 103–107).

Both consequences lead perpetrators to believe that killing outgroup members who may or may not be associated with the enemy can decrease the risk of loss (Midlarsky, 2005, p. 107). The combination of loss compensation and altruistic punishment[4] escalates this violence to genocide. When elites become less powerful, they will compensate for losses by attempting to wipe out a defenseless outgroup that is blamed for previous traumas or the ingroup's vulnerability. Altruistic punishment explains why ingroup members continue to participate in genocide despite the severe implications to their rational interests (Midlarsky, 2005, pp. 107–110).

Even though this model has a substantial amount of support, it is limited on its own in the context of achieving the fundamental aim of my research: to further academic knowledge about what variables provide generalizable answers to the causes of mass killing. Emotions, biases, and heuristics can and do hinder rational decision-making by preventing humans from selecting optimal choices—especially in times of crisis (Chirot & McCauley, 2010; Dutton, 2007; Huddy, 2013; Kahneman, 2013; Kahneman & Renshon, 2017; Sapolsky, 2017; Staub, 2010; Waller,

[4] Altruistic punishment is an evolutionary/psychological phenomenon where individuals knowingly and willingly inflict punishment against others who violate moral norms of the ingroup despite the disciplinary action hurting the punishers' own well-being. Where there is an established norm that eliminating the outgroup is vital for preserving the ingroup or achieving a socially valued goal, the consequences of genocide may be deemed as worthwhile and necessary (Midlarsky, 2005, pp. 107-110).

2007). Nevertheless, few academics in political science have utilized behavioural economics and other psychological theories to understand mass violence in quantitative research, although many have acknowledged the need for it (Anderton, 2014, pp. 130–132). There are also concerns about the external validity of these theories because it is difficult to know whether the findings from psychological laboratory experiments apply to complex military situations where many variables are uncontrolled. Additionally, it can be challenging to create quantitative measures for psychological concepts and apply them to observational studies (Finkel & Straus, 2012, pp. 62–65; Valentino, 2014, p. 98). In essence, despite this school of thought being ideal for examining the in-depth processes of how mass killing transpires in particular cases and having a significant amount of support, it is underdeveloped for quantitative research which creates problems when trying to achieve my primary research aim (i.e., making generalizable claims about mass slaughter onsets).

Structural Model: Absolute Power Corrupts Absolutely

The structural model asserts that autocratic regimes rely on mass violence when confronting political upheaval because, unlike democracies or quasi-democracies, there are no institutional constraints to check and balance unilateral action like democratic voting (Carey & Colaresi, 2008; Finkel & Straus, 2012; Harff, 2003; Rummel, 1995, 2017; Straus, 2010, 2016; Valentino, 2014). For instance, Rummel (1995, 2017) discovers that there is a linear relationship between power and democide[5]—the higher the concentration of power amongst elites the more

[5] Democide refers to "the intentional government killing of unarmed person or people" (Rummel, 2017, p. 36). Meaning, that democide includes mass forms of violence like politicide or genocide but is not limited to the systematic elimination of a group due to their ethnicity, religion, race, or political identity (Rummel, 1995, pp. 3-4; Rummel, 2017, p. 31, p. 36). Rummel (2017) uses this definition largely to avoid contentious academic debates about what constitutes a genocide or politicide and encompasses all large forms of violence against vulnerable civilians (pp. 31-42).

probable it is that democide will occur. Thus, when democratic regimes face threats to their power they are unlikely to resort to violence, while totalitarian regimes consistently utilize coercive policies to retain or obtain power (Rummel, 1995, 2017). When democratic regimes engage in mass violence, it tends to be in foreign nations where they can secretly and unilaterally carry out this tactic as they are less bound by liberal constraints (Rummel, 1995, pp. 4-6; Rummel, 2017, pp. 1-27). There are two aspects of a regime that prevent mass murder from taking place:

Cross-Pressures

Societies where power is diffuse generate independent groups that compete for societal control and that have different interests like unions, corporations, bureaucratic agencies, churches, political parties, and media outlets. Ergo, these groups constantly stifle the power of others (Rummel, 1995, pp. 4-6; Rummel, 2017, pp. 22-27). For mass murder to ensue, there must be a dominant interest within the state and uniform control of the various government sectors. Even with this concentration of power, opponents can expose the state's violent actions to the public if it does not control information consumption. Thus, democratic systems, which are based on creating a system of checks and balances and freedom of expression, decrease the likelihood of mass violence (Rummel, 1995, pp. 4-6; Rummel, 2017, pp. 22-27).

Political Culture

Government structures influence an elite's decision to use strategic violence because they shape society's meanings, values, and norms. On the one hand, democratic systems diffuse power concentration and encourage intergroup compromise by instilling practices of debate, protest, mediation, conflict resolution, negotiation, and tolerance (Rummel, 1995, pp. 4-6; Rummel, 2017, pp. 22-27). On the other hand, totalitarian regimes impose particular beliefs and

solutions onto society regardless of the opposition and therefore must control all aspects of society to keep their power. Furthermore, power concentration inflames intergroup tension by generating a culture of constant fear that opposing groups are attempting to overthrow the status quo government (Rummel, 1995, pp. 4-6; Rummel, 2017, pp. 22-27).

This school has the least support because a substantial amount of counterevidence shows that power concentration does not impact the probability of mass atrocities (Anderton & Carter, 2015; Esteban et al., 2015; Krain, 1997; Tago & Wayman, 2010). However, elites' analysis on whether to use mass violence or not seems to be influenced by the military's structure, the government system, and the strength of military or paramilitary personnel (Bohmelt et al., 2016; Carey & Colaresi, 2008; Clayton & Thomson, 2016; Harff, 2003; Koren, 2017; Straus, 2016; Uzonyi, 2020).

Ideological Model: Beliefs Underpin the Impetus for Violent Action

The ideological model posits that understanding the causes of mass violence requires an analysis of the leaders' ideology because it shapes their beliefs, goals, decisions to protect self-interests, assessment of which group is an enemy, and response to armed threats (Bulutgil, 2017; Dumitru & Johnson, 2011; Hong & Kim, 2019; Kiernan, 2007; Kim, 2018; Leader Maynard, 2014, 2015, 2018, 2019, 2022b; Oncioiu, 2016; Pion-Berlin, 1988; Scharpf, 2018; Semelin, 2007; Straus, 2010, 2012b, pp. 548–550, 2015a, 2015b; Verdeja, 2012b; Weitz, 2003). For example, communist mass murders were caused by elites drastically trying to transform society by suddenly and forcibly dispossessing millions of civilians, which generated a backlash from various groups such as the Kulaks. The elites identified these defectors as dangerous bourgeois reactionaries who needed to be eradicated in order to produce a communist utopia.

Understanding why these leaders wanted collectivization and to perpetrate extreme actions involves acquiring knowledge of their Marxist perspective (Valentino, 2004, Chapter 4).

Kim (2018), a proponent of this school, maintains that leaders with radical revolutionary ideologies—particularly those with exclusionary beliefs and a propensity to use violent military strategies—are more likely to commit mass violence than elites without these belief systems (pp. 291-298, 303-312). He refers to revolutionary leaders as people who actively transform and reject the state's prevailing economic, political, and social system by toppling the dominant institutions of the country (Kim, 2018, p. 291). When confronted with a threat, these ideological belief systems shape elites' cost-benefit analysis on the utility of mass violence when deciding what military strategies to use (Kim, 2018, pp. 291-298, 303-312). There are four primary reasons for why elites with revolutionary ideologies are more likely to carry out mass murder than those without them:

Strong Ideological Commitment

Revolutionaries attempting to radically transform society frequently create environments that produce disgruntled outgroups. Consequently, these outgroups will consistently be scapegoated for society's condition and, by extension, counterrevolutionary movements will often form. Leaders fearful of reverting to the previous system when they were subordinate may justify using violent military policies and place these outgroups outside the universe of moral obligation (Kim, 2018, pp. 292-293).

Risk Tolerance

Revolutionaries revolting and consolidating state power must be risk tolerant because successful rebellions require the opportunistic use of aggressive military action against the status quo government which has more access to resources and power (Kim, 2018, pp. 293-294).

Successful Experiences With Violence

Revolutionary leaders consistently rely on violence when confronting future threats because they have often effectively gained power and defeated adversaries by using coercive strategies (Kim, 2018, pp. 293-294).

Mobilization Capacity and Ideological Cohesion

The same abilities necessary for revolutionaries to overthrow the state are required to perpetrate mass murder. For revolutionaries to defeat the status quo government, they need to have the ability to effectively mobilize, organize, coordinate, and ideologically unite military personnel and citizens. Once in power, elites greatly increase ideological cohesion by purging the opposition to ensure compliance within major societal institutions (Kim, 2018, pp. 294-295). For mass slaughter to occur, leaders must be able to coordinate troops and citizens to identify, access, and massacre the vulnerable outgroup (Kim, 2018, pp. 294-295).

This model's limitation and, by extension, the first puzzle explored in this paper is as follows: academics agree that ideology can be vital in understanding mass killing, yet perpetrators of this atrocity have subscribed to all types of ideologies. Therefore, it is unclear what specific beliefs significantly increase the probability of mass slaughter. Put differently, one may believe that ideologies based on communism, fascism, racism, bigotry, nationalism, and ingroup superiority cause mass violence; however, these types of beliefs have been prominent in other societies throughout history without resulting in mass slaughter while this atrocity has occurred where these kinds of beliefs were not evident (Naimark, 2017; Parsons & Totten, 2009; Straus, 2016, pp. 57–71; Valentino, 2014, pp. 96–98).

Strategic Model: The Disturbing Rationality of Mass Slaughter

The strategic model contends that mass killing is a rational instrumental top-down policy employed by leaders to combat the opposition, primarily during armed conflict (Balcells & Stanton, 2021; Balch-Lindsay et al., 2004; Kalyvas, 2006; Krain, 1997; Krcmaric, 2018; Schwartz & Straus, 2018, pp. 222–235; Straus, 2012b; Uzonyi, 2015, 2016, 2018, 2020, 2021a, 2021b; Valentino, 2014, pp. 93–96). Most academics agree that military threats to elite power (e.g., war) have a causal relationship with mass violence. Supporters of this school assert that this relationship can be explained by elites strategically targeting civilians to acquire or preserve power against those attempting to overthrow the current regime. In other words, mass killing is contingent upon leaders' power, their interests, and strategic conditions like access to external support, armed conflict type, and relative oppositional strength. Leaders inspect the environmental conditions and use mass violence when they believe that it most effectively achieves their strategic aims (Anderton et al., 2017; Anderton & Carter, 2015; Balcells & Stanton, 2021; Balch-Lindsay et al., 2004; Finkel & Straus, 2012; Hanania & Uzonyi, 2017; Harff, 2003, 2012; Hong & Kim, 2019; Kalyvas, 2006; Krain, 1997, 2000; Krcmaric, 2018; Melson, 1992; Midlarsky, 2005, 2011; Schwartz & Straus, 2018, pp. 222–235; Semelin, 2007; Shaw, 2003; Straus, 2010, 2012a, 2012b, 2015a, 2015b, 2016; Ulfelder, 2013; Ulfelder & Valentino, 2008; Uzonyi, 2015, 2016, 2018, 2020, 2021a, 2021b; Valentino, 2004, 2014; Weitz, 2003). Valentino (2004), a notable academic who holds this position, makes six fundamental arguments:

- Understanding mass killing requires studying elites' goals and strategies—not broad social/political factors—because the perpetrators are relatively small, powerful groups

who do not need most civilians' active support or participation to commit violence (Valentino, 2004, pp. 66–90).

- Elites employ mass violence as a self-interested instrumental tactic to effectively achieve their goal(s) (Valentino, 2004, pp. 66–90).
- Leaders will frequently associate an outgroup as a threat when there is a major increase in its members supporting the opposition and the adversary is highly active where the outgroup resides (Valentino, 2004, pp. 196–233).
- Mass murder is most common during guerrilla wars. In guerrilla wars, citizens become essential to insurgents for defeating the state because civilians provide rebels with food, money, shelter, recruits, and intelligence. Therefore, states are incentivized to eliminate citizens to decrease the chances of insurgent victory (Valentino, 2004, pp. 196–233).
- Leaders are rational actors that choose the most optimal strategies to win wars and accomplish their aims. Often, elites choose mass slaughter during instability with limited information and with misguided perceptions of the conflict. Perpetrators initially use less violent methods but when these tactics fail or are too costly, they desperately resort to more extreme policies to maintain power (Valentino, 2004, pp. 196–233).
- Previous discrimination and ideology including racism and nationalism will usually not explain how and why an outgroup became victimized and believed to be a threat (Valentino, 2004, pp. 196–233).

There are three limitations of this model that are fundamental for mass killing to transpire and show that significant threats to elite power are insufficient to explain why mass violence occurs. The first two limitations are articulated by Straus (2015a) and are referred to respectively as the domination-vulnerability paradox and the leap of imagination issue. The former describes

the fact that mass violence tends to be an act of desperation to maintain power or achieve fundamental interests. Leaders must paradoxically believe that despite having the capacity to systematically eliminate an outgroup, this vulnerable group poses a substantial threat to their security, interests, and identity (Malešević, 2017, p. 232; Straus, 2015a, pp. 56–57). The latter means that mass murder requires a leap of imagination, in that, elites target civilians who do not directly threaten the state. Perpetrators define the outgroup in its entirety as a threat resulting in an excessive amount of violence to ensure state interest (Dutton, 2007; Straus, 2015a, p. 56). Straus (2015a) is not asserting that mass killing is an inherently irrational process, what he is stating is that proponents of the strategic model focus strictly on material factors to explain this atrocity which is insufficient (e.g., military strength, civil war types, etc.) (pp. 55-59). Essentially, elites experience extremely similar military conditions yet have vastly different responses to and interpretations of those circumstances (Straus, 2015a, pp. 55-59). It logically follows that ideational factors—such as the perpetrators' ideology, cultural norms, and psychology—likely influence whether leaders interpret security threats as significant and the strategies used to combat these military challenges. The third limitation of this model is the disparity problem which points out that even though there is a strong relationship between threats to elite power and mass violence, military threats happen far more than mass murder does (Straus, 2012b, 2016; Valentino, 2014).

The second puzzle is that most academics agree mass killing is primarily a top-down, self-interested strategy employed to preserve or gain power despite this tactic being risky and having limited evidence to support its effectiveness. It is unclear which factors push leaders to knowingly choose this costly strategy. Specifically, mass violence can substantially hurt elite interest and decrease the chances of a military victory by creating substantial financial costs,

harming state status, increasing the likelihood of foreign intervention, stopping external aid, and generating widespread domestic support for the opposition. Thus, there are likely different causes other than strategic self-interest that escalate the perceived need for elites to use this tactic (Finkel & Straus, 2012, pp. 56–67; Krcmaric, 2018, pp. 18–31; Leader Maynard, 2022b; Straus, 2012b, pp. 544–560, 2015a, pp. 17–33; Valentino, 2014, pp. 96–98).

Based on the four models' limitations, my academic contribution is to further scholarly understanding of the causes of mass murder by building on the strategic model, which has the most consistent academic support (Balcells & Stanton, 2021, pp. 45–69; Valentino, 2014, pp. 89–103). I will adopt Valentino's (2004) first four assumptions because they are near consensus in the literature and excellently summarize the strategic model's foundational points; but the last two assumptions are much more controversial as there is a growing body of literature challenging these assertions. Ergo, I plan on adapting this perspective's more controversial elements by integrating the other schools' fundamental findings to address his argument's limitations. I will alter the strategic model's rationality assumption by utilizing psychological research as, in times of crisis, humans usually rely on biases and heuristics to inform their decision making which tends to result in deviations from the predictions of rational-choice theory (Berreby, 2008; Huddy, 2013; Kahneman, 2013; Kahneman & Renshon, 2017; Sapolsky, 2017). Additionally, the strategic model does not consider how ideologies can manifest themselves into extreme behaviour even though ideology does appear to matter in explaining mass violence as described previously (Straus, 2015a, pp. 17-53). Thus, I am assuming that elites' beliefs and the ideology they promote or instill within society influence their strategic interests, decision-making process, threat perception, and how they construct an outgroup (Bulutgil, 2017; Kim, 2018; Kupchan, 2010; Pion-Berlin, 1988; Verdeja, 2012b). Leaders can

and often promote an ideological position because it aligns with their self-interests; regardless, belief systems still influence elites' cost-benefit analysis when choosing strategies to fight off threats to their power. This assumption will be explained fully in the following section.

Neo-Ideological Model: Theory and Hypotheses

I argue that psychological and strategic factors tip the balance in favour of elites with exclusionary beliefs committing mass violence when confronting major armed threats. Although exclusionary beliefs and threats to elite power individually have a strong relationship with mass violence, the interaction between these variables theoretically has more explanatory power. When these beliefs become entrenched within a community, they psychologically and strategically impact the likelihood of elites associating an outgroup with a prevailing threat, which substantially increases the probability of mass killing. Psychological influences refer to cognitive biases and heuristics, mainly, ingroup bias and motivated reasoning/confirmation bias. These psychological influences act within the confines of elites' ideological belief system resulting in exclusionary ideas (i.e., an outgroup is immoral and dangerous) becoming extreme, generalized to all outgroup members, and reaffirmed or exaggerated when leaders interpret events and evidence to assess threat severity. Elites that do not possess an exclusionary ideology may have underlying beliefs that become reaffirmed and extreme when confronting military opposition due to these psychological factors, but do not map onto a necessary condition for mass killing to transpire—they must believe that a vulnerable outgroup is a significant threat to their interest(s). Strategic influences refer to how elites that promote exclusionary beliefs force the outgroup to become an adversary, hurt their ability to make concessions to an outgroup, and provide opportunities to blame poor societal conditions on the outgroup as a means of preserving or acquiring power. The subsequent paragraphs discuss the specific types of threats I expect to consistently provoke elites to carry out mass violence and then explain why leaders possessing exclusionary beliefs further increase the likelihood of this strategy when confronting threats. The common threads that tie the different schools of thought together are that leaders act to obtain or

retain power and utilize mass slaughter when they believe the outgroup is a considerable threat to their interest(s). The types of threats most commonly believed to have an association with mass killing are wars, coup d'états, and assassinations against leaders and symbolic personalities (Balch-Lindsay et al., 2004; Kalyvas, 2006; Krain, 1997; Krcmaric, 2018; Shaw, 2003; Straus, 2010, 2012a, 2012b, 2015b, 2016; Ulfelder & Valentino, 2008; Uzonyi, 2016, 2021a; Valentino, 2014).

Civil war tends to increase the likelihood of mass violence more so than the other threats to elite power since it is a major armed challenge to the existing regime within the confines of the governments' territorial jurisdiction. In other words, civil wars almost always threaten to overthrow the current regime unlike interstate war, coups, and assassinations. Additionally, during civil war, elites command military personnel that can use violence against civilians with little consequences—as it is hard for external actors to stop leaders from repressing its citizens (Balch-Lindsay et al., 2004; Kalyvas, 2006; Krain, 1997; Krcmaric, 2018; Naimark, 2017; Parsons & Totten, 2009; Shaw, 2003; Straus, 2010, 2012a, 2012b, 2015b, 2016; Ulfelder & Valentino, 2008; Uzonyi, 2016, 2021a; Valentino, 2014).

Hypothesis One

Elites confronting threats to their power—specifically war, coup d'états, and assassinations—have a higher probability of committing mass violence than leaders that are not facing challenges to their power.

Hypothesis Two

Civil war increases the likelihood of mass violence more than interstate wars, coup d'états, and assassinations.

Theoretically, guerrilla warfare increases the probability of mass violence more than assassinations, coups, interstate war, and other forms of civil war. Guerrilla wars are asymmetric military conflicts with no clearly defined areas of battle, meaning that, insurgents fight the government indirectly and both sides have armed forces scattered throughout the population. Accordingly, both parties attempt to win over civilians' loyalty in contested locations to identify and eliminate the opposition (Balcells & Kalyvas, 2010, 2014; Balch-Lindsay et al., 2004; Kalyvas, 2006; Krcmaric, 2018; Valentino, 2004). Often states struggle to gain intelligence on and to defeat guerrillas because of their hit-and-run fighting style, untraceable forms of communication, and significant local support which increases their resources (e.g., intelligence, food, shelter, and military personnel) and ability to hide from the government. Ergo, the state will eliminate civilian groups due to its persistent struggle to defeat rebels and the fact that guerrillas rely on civilians for supplies (Balch-Lindsay et al., 2004, pp. 377-379, 383-387; Valentino, 2004, pp. 196–233).

Hypothesis Three

State elites engaged in guerrilla warfare are more likely to commit mass slaughter than government leaders not involved in irregular war.

Hypothesis Four

Guerrilla warfare will increase the likelihood of mass violence more than assassinations, coups, interstate war, and other types of civil war.

Threats to elite interest alone are insufficient for explaining mass murder onsets due to the domination-vulnerability paradox, the leap of imagination issue, and the disparity problem. For mass violence to transpire, it requires a process of elites consciously or unconsciously manipulating security threats to create intergroup animosity and fear by connecting a vulnerable

outgroup to those threats (Hong & Kim, 2019; Leader Maynard, 2022a, 2022b; Semelin, 2007; Straus, 2015a; Weitz, 2003). Ideology is vital in constructing intergroup identities and environments that either make elites believe or strategically incentivize them to link the outgroup's identity with a perceived substantial threat (Hong & Kim, 2019; Leader Maynard, 2022a, 2022b; Semelin, 2007; Straus, 2015a; Weitz, 2003). By ideology, I do not mean rigid, consistent, fixed, and monolithic belief systems with no variation in how strongly members accept these beliefs. Alternatively, I am referring to:

> …distinctive political worldviews of individuals, groups, and organizations, that provide sets of interpretive and evaluative ideas for guiding political thought and action…Rather than being limited to 'special' political goals, ideologies are broad interpretive and evaluative frameworks, which offer purportedly factual narratives and beliefs about the world as well as underlying preferences, values, and ideals. 'To study ideology', in other words, 'is to focus on systems of ideas which couple understandings of how the world works with ethical, moral, and normative principles that guide personal and collective action.' (Leader Maynard, 2022b, p. 34; footnotes removed)

Different ideologies entail distinct types of logic and therefore produce diverse structural and internal pressures on individual and group behaviour. In other words, the specific beliefs that are entrenched within a group mould what elites perceive to be true and how society is formed (e.g., governmental structure, social norms, and values). Leaders' decisions are influenced by what they deem to be fact and environmental conditions. It logically follows that specific beliefs partially determine whether elites perceive an outgroup to be a threat and their reaction to that assessment. To elaborate, Leader Maynard (2022b) highlights that ideology shapes behaviour through an internal and structural process (pp. 40-51). Regarding the former, leaders can be

strongly attached to and firmly believe in the fundamental ideas of an ideology; thus, their goals, strategies, and interests are shaped by an ideological framework (Brett, 2016; Kruglanski et al., 2020; Leader Maynard, 2022b, pp. 42-45; Monroe, 2008; Moshman, 2007; Oncioiu, 2016; Pion-Berlin, 1988; Verdeja, 2012a, 2012b). As articulated in the literature review, when examining almost any mass killing—such as the Holocaust or the Great Leap Forward—it is nearly impossible to understand how elites framed enemies, the groups targeted (e.g., Jews or bourgeoise), and the rationale behind their policy decisions like collectivization or ethnic cleansing without understanding what belief systems these leaders adopted and advocated for. Moreover, some elites are not committed to an ideology's foundational beliefs but adopt, follow, and endorse them because of their strong identification with an ingroup (Brett, 2016; Bulutgil, 2017; Leader Maynard, 2022b; Naimark, 2017; Parsons & Totten, 2009; Scharpf, 2018; Semelin, 2007; Valentino, 2004). Scharpf's (2018) research on Argentina's Dirty War resulting in the mass slaughter of 30,000 civilians illustrates this point. He noted that officers controlling military units were far more likely to commit mass murder when sharing the elite's ideological framework because they identified the same threat as the leaders and agreed with the coercive strategies to defeat it. Officers that did not subscribe to the same belief system consistently utilized less violence (Scharpf, 2018, p. 206, pp. 209-219). Regarding the latter, ideological frameworks take a life of their own in influencing the behaviour of groups by embedding themselves within a community and shaping the shared culture, myths, values, ethics, beliefs, norms, morals, courses of conduct, institutions, rules, networks of civic engagement, and the state's role (Adler & Barnett, 1998; Berreby, 2008; Cohen & Nisbett, 1996; Hopf, 2002; Leader Maynard, 2022b, pp. 45-51; Phillips, 2011; Putnam et al., 1994; Reus-Smit, 1999; Sapolsky, 2017; Steinberg, 1990; Straus, 2015a). Leaders conform to an ideological framework without

necessarily believing in it because of social expectations from societal influences such as ingroup norms, peer pressure, authority figures, and governmental, occupational, or social roles. Additionally, elites may not buy into an ideology but strategically create and work within the framework because it provides the best opportunity to achieve their interest(s). Essentially, leaders often formulate ideologies that portray an outgroup as a threat in order to gain power. The process of continuously villainizing outgroups seems to consistently enable extreme behaviour (Leader Maynard, 2022b, pp. 45-51; Semelin, 2007). For example, Slobodan Milošević—the primary orchestrator of mass killings in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina—gained power by opportunistically changing his position from a communist party leader to a zealous Serbian nationalist and capitalizing on the social and economic instability of Yugoslavia. Once in power, he continuously conducted nationalist rallies; removed those he deemed too moderate in the army, police, and media; manipulated the state-run media to exaggerate and produce false claims about Serbs being attacked by Muslims and Croats; and established strong connections with the Orthodox Church to support his nationalist rhetoric, goals, and actions (Hoare, 2010; Mennecke, 2012; Semelin, 2007; Weitz, 2003).

Although it is clear that ideology impacts the likelihood of leaders constructing a vulnerable outgroup as a threat, it is unclear what specific beliefs drive this process (Hong & Kim, 2019; Leader Maynard, 2022b; Semelin, 2007; Straus, 2015a; Weitz, 2003). A growing body of literature supports the idea that exclusionary beliefs have a relationship with mass murder (Bulutgil, 2017; Harff, 2003; Kim, 2018; Nyseth Brehm, 2017; Scharpf, 2018; Semelin, 2007; Straus, 2015a; Weitz, 2003). Exclusionary beliefs refer to ideas that an outgroup's and ingroup's identity are antithetical. Therefore, the outgroup is the elite's enemy, a threat, and is not entitled to the same rights as the ingroup. These ideas consistently appear to be promoted by

leaders that perpetrate mass violence and can be entrenched in all types of belief systems like communism, liberalism, fascism, nationalism, and conservatism (Harff, 2003; Kim, 2018; Leader Maynard, 2022b; Straus, 2015a).

Hypothesis Five

Elites with exclusionary beliefs are more likely to commit mass killings than those without exclusionary beliefs.

However, elites with exclusionary beliefs are more common than mass killing onsets; it logically follows that these ideologies are inadequate for entirely explaining this atrocity's occurrence. Straus (2015a) notes that exclusionary ideologies are vital in how leaders perceive, frame, and react to security threats. Therefore, examining the interaction between exclusionary beliefs and threats to elite interest may provide more explanatory power than the variables have on their own. For example, Hong and Kim (2019) find that while elites possessing exclusionary beliefs or territorial threats[6] do not individually increase the likelihood of mass violence, the interaction between these variables does have a positive, statistically significant relationship with mass violence.

Based on my research I conclude that there are three primary reasons the interaction between exclusionary beliefs and threats to elite power substantially increase the likelihood of mass killing.

Security Threats Increase the Salience of Elites' Exclusionary Beliefs

First, exclusionary beliefs—mainly, ideas that the outgroup is an inherent threat to the ingroup's identity—become entrenched amongst leaders when encountering military opposition.

[6] Territorial threats refer to militarized interstate conflicts or state officials making sovereignty claims that is already controlled by another nation (Hong & Kim, 2019, pp. 535–537).

The interaction between these ideas and threats seems to satisfy a necessary condition for mass slaughter to transpire: elites view a defenseless outgroup as a substantial danger to their interest(s) (Leader Maynard, 2022b; Semelin, 2007; Straus, 2015a; Uzonyi, 2016; Valentino, 2004). There is a psychological process where political instability increases the salience of fundamental beliefs in addition to ingroup identification, black-and-white thinking, the exaggeration of intergroup differences, and reliance on cognitive biases and heuristics like stereotypes of an outgroup. In other words, existential threats strengthen people's ideological and cultural beliefs (Beber et al., 2014; Berreby, 2008; Bilali & Vollhardt, 2019; Elcheroth et al., 2008; Kruglanski et al., 2020; McDoom, 2012; Midlarsky, 2005, 2011; Routledge & Vess, 2019; Semelin, 2007; Staub, 2010; Steinberg, 1990). For example, Abdollahi et al. (2006) conducted a series of experiments examining how fear of death influenced advocacy for policy positions and political extremism. The experimenters induced death anxiety for subjects who were a part of a treatment group composed of conservatives and liberals during low general approval for America's War on Terror, specifically, the Iraq war. The results showed that support for American anti-terrorism policies increased for the former but not for the latter even though death exposure increases liberals' support for left-wing policies like same-sex marriage, redistributive policies, and reproductive rights (Abdollahi et al., 2006; Bonacossa et al., 2011). These findings extend to those with exclusionary beliefs, as illustrated by de Rooij et al. (2015) who examine the relationship between intergroup threat and prejudice (i.e., beliefs that outgroups threaten society's security and culture). They note that prejudicial attitudes increased amongst White Britons against Black British and Eastern European groups after the 2011 riot in England. Although these prejudicial beliefs were alleviated a year after the riot, it was found that priming the memory of these riots raised previous prejudicial views (de Rooij et al., 2015). Accordingly,

leaders experiencing security threats become more entrenched in their exclusionary beliefs that an outgroup is the ingroup's enemy, which increases their willingness to use extreme methods (Beber et al., 2014; Berreby, 2008; Bilali & Vollhardt, 2019; Carlson et al., 2020; Chirot & McCauley, 2010; Dutton, 2007; Elcheroth et al., 2008; Gilmore et al., 2022; Greenberg et al., 1989; Greenberg et al., 1990; Greenberg et al., 2015; Hong & Kim, 2019; Kruglanski et al., 2020; Malešević, 2017; McDoom, 2012; Rost, 2013; Routledge & Vess, 2019; Sapolsky, 2017; Semelin, 2007; Staub, 2010; Ulfelder & Valentino, 2008; Waller, 2007; Weitz, 2003). For instance, Abdollahi et al. (2006) found that inducing death anxiety substantially raised Iranian support for violence against U.S. citizens by encouraging or joining martyrdom missions. Abdollahi et al. (2006) also discovered boosting death anxiety amongst Americans increased their support for radical military tactics (e.g., nuclear arms) against enemy outgroups like North Korea and their willingness to risk thousands of innocent civilian lives to destroy Osama Bin Laden. In other words, existential threats cause humans to decrease their focus on the individual outgroup members and increase their focus on negative generalizations about the outgroup's identity. If a group's identity is perceived as a vital threat to one's existence, then by extension, one must eradicate that identity to protect oneself. This logic entails taking major risks to ensure the ingroup's security and eliminating all those who possess that identity, including children and the elderly (Midlarsky, 2005, 2011; Semelin, 2007; Weitz, 2003).

In summary, threats to elite power increase the intensity of certain psychological phenomena which act within the confines of an ideology (e.g., the entrenchment of fundamental beliefs, ingroup identification, black-and-white thinking, and the overstatement of intergroup differences). Consequently, when groups confront military threats, different beliefs become radical depending on their ideologies. It follows that elites holding an exclusionary belief that

particular outgroups are enemies/threats will result in that idea becoming extreme when confronting military opposition, which is a necessary condition for mass killing to transpire. However, leaders without an exclusionary belief system may become more entrenched in their ideology when facing military adversaries but are far less likely to believe that a vulnerable outgroup is an extreme threat to them.

Elites With Exclusionary Beliefs Scapegoat Outgroups for Unstable Conditions

Second, elites who promote exclusionary beliefs have the incentive to opportunistically scapegoat outgroups for unstable environmental conditions in order to attain or maintain power which often leads to the violent removal of adversaries (Bulutgil, 2015, 2017; Leader Maynard, 2014, 2018, 2019; Naimark, 2017; Parsons & Totten, 2009; Scharpf, 2018; Semelin, 2007; Staub, 2010; Weitz, 2003).[7] For instance, Indonesia in the 1960s was at the crux of a polarized Cold War environment, economic recession, and internal political tension between the anti-communist military headed by Suharto, left-nationalist president Sukarno, and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). On October 1, 1965, a failed coup caused the death and kidnapping of six army generals and one aide. Despite there being no clear evidence which political faction was behind the attack, Suharto used this event as an opportunity to blame his largest rival—The PKI (i.e., the biggest communist party outside the Soviet Bloc and China). As a result, the event

[7] This claim is based on my observation from various historical cases of mass killing (e.g., mass violence in Rwanda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Guatemala, Argentina's Dirty War, Indonesia, Myanmar, Nazi Germany, and the Ottoman Empire). When an outgroup is societally discriminated against, there appears to be an easy ability for elites to blame the poor conditions or political instability on it to avert blame and to justify strategic violence (Brett, 2016; Bulutgil, 2015; CEH & Rothenberg, 2012; Chirot & McCauley, 2010; Cribb, 2001; Dutton, 2007; Dwyer & Ryan, 2015; Esparza et al., 2010; Garrard-Burnett, 2009; Hoare, 2010; Ibrahim, 2016; Jonas, 1991; Kiernan, 2007; Kiernan & Zucker, 2021; Lewis, 2015; Malešević, 2017; McGregor et al., 2018; Melvin, 2018; Melvin & Pohlman, 2018; Midlarsky, 2005, 2011; Moshman, 2007; Naimark, 2017; Parsons & Totten, 2009; Scharpf, 2018; Schirmer, 2010; Schwartz & Straus, 2018; Semelin, 2007; Staub, 2010; Straus, 2015b; Valentino, 2004; Waller, 2007; Weitz, 2003).

enabled Suharto's regime to establish de facto martial law and to eliminate 500,000 actual and alleged leftists (Cribb, 2001; McGregor et al., 2018; Melvin, 2018; Melvin & Pohlman, 2018).

Hypothesis Six

Elites with exclusionary beliefs are more likely to carry out mass killings when confronted with threats to their power—such as wars, coups, and assassinations—than leaders without exclusionary beliefs.

Elites With Exclusionary Beliefs Link Outgroups to Security Threats

Third, elites that promote exclusionary beliefs are more likely to connect a vulnerable outgroup to a security threat. Leaders with these ideas tend to continuously villainize outgroup members and hold negative perceptions about them. Thus, they more often believe that the outgroup is a threat and works with the enemy, which rationalizes mass violence. Put differently, these leaders lack the incentive to improve intergroup relations since they are skeptical about the outgroups' intentions, attain power through villainizing outgroups, and are prone to ingroup bias and confirmation bias/motivated reasoning (Bulutgil, 2015, 2017; Moshman, 2007; Pion-Berlin, 1988; Scharpf, 2018; Semelin, 2007; Staub, 2010; Verdeja, 2012b; Weitz, 2003).

Group identification and belief systems can distort the recollection or interpretations of intergroup disputes and shape strategies to deal with an outgroup. Human reliance on cognitive biases and heuristics that create these distortions substantially increases when experiencing major episodes of stress like a military conflict (Berreby, 2008; Bilali et al., 2012; Bilewicz et al., 2017; Huddy, 2013; Maynard Leader, 2022a; Midlarsky, 2011; Moshman, 2007; Pion-Berlin, 1988; Ross & Sahdra, 2007; Routledge & Vess, 2019; Sapolsky, 2017; Semelin, 2007; Staub, 2000, 2006, 2010, 2011). For example, Ross and Sahdra (2007) examined Hindu and Sikh recollections of intergroup violence. The study found that ingroup members recalled significantly

more events when they were victimized rather than being perpetrators of violence or hatred against the ingroup. Additionally, ingroup members had more intense reactions to episodes of being victimized (e.g., anger, hatred, and disgust), felt less desire to forget about these incidences, and thought more frequently about them than outgroup members and those nominally identified with the ingroup. The intensity of these feelings and frequency of recalling these events increased substantially when members highly identified with the ingroup (Ross & Sahdra, 2007, pp. 384-390).

Pion-Berlin's (1988) research on the Dirty War in Argentina highlights how exclusionary ideology and ingroup identity can distort the way elites choose strategies and assess events. He determined that when military elites evaluated strategies to fight off insurgents, they "practiced selective vision, magnifying those components of the [National Security] doctrine they liked and losing sight of the rest" (p. 383). Leaders perceived the subversives to be a broad range of left-leaning groups that were considered "terrorists, guerrillas, antinationalist, nihilistic, economically delinquent, antireligious, antigovernment, social democrats, human rights groups, and solidarity organizations" (Pion-Berlin, 1988, p. 401; citations and footnotes removed). Leaders felt that the enemy was morally bankrupt, untrustworthy, and a substantial threat to state interests; therefore, negotiation and compromise were impossible. Despite the state almost wholly defeating insurgents by 1976, elites increased their use of coercive tactics. In other words, Argentina's military officials examined the National Security Doctrine—the basis of their counterinsurgency policy—and focused strictly on the dimensions that emphasized using violence over other psychological, social, and economic strategies to combat insurgents. Military violence was employed over the other methods even though there was evidence that the non-

violent approaches were more effective in combating rebels and the guerrillas were no longer a substantial threat (Pion-Berlin, 1988).

In essence, ingroup bias and motivated reasoning/confirmation bias act within the framework of an ideology, and human reliance on them significantly increases when leaders confront threats to their power. Thus, these psychological processes produce different behaviours to reaffirm group identity/beliefs depending on the ideology (e.g., a conservative and liberal will accept different information to confirm their political positions). Elites holding exclusionary ideologies are more likely to psychologically distort information that depicts an outgroup as a major threat that collaborates with armed adversaries as it reaffirms their current beliefs—which substantially raises the probability of mass slaughter. If elites gain power through villainizing an outgroup, it is irrelevant whether they genuinely believe it or not because these tactics force the outgroup to become an adversary (Bulutgil, 2015, 2017; Moshman, 2007; Pion-Berlin, 1988; Scharpf, 2018; Semelin, 2007; Staub, 2010; Straus, 2015a; Verdeja, 2012b; Weitz, 2003). Leaders without these ideologies may confront the same armed challenges but are far less likely to associate a vulnerable outgroup with a threat because it does not conform to their ideological beliefs.

My point is illustrated through Bulutgil's (2017) research, where she analyzed the Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Ottoman Empires and their treatment of different vulnerable outgroups during World War I (WWI)—precisely the Italians, Muslims in the South Caucasus, and Armenians. All these cases had circumstances that substantially increased the chance of ethnic mass violence such as the empires fighting multifront wars and segments of the population collaborating with the empires' adversaries during WWI (Bulutgil, 2017, pp. 169–172). Despite these similarities, only the Ottomans carried out genocide and mass deportations resulting in the

death of 500,000 to 1,500,000 Armenians (Bulutgil, 2017, pp. 179, 195). Bulutgil (2017) notes that what largely determined whether leaders utilized mass killing over other tactics was whether the elites gained power through mobilizing ethnic cleavages over non-ethnic ones before the war and whether they had a major influence over the state during the war. In other words, when elites attain power through mobilizing ethnic cleavages, they are reluctant to form alliances with vulnerable outgroups during war because they are more likely to accept evidence showing that the outgroup is a threat than to accept counterevidence. Furthermore, it is against leaders' interests to offer territorial concessions as their influence was developed through villainizing outgroups and by protecting the state's territorial integrity (pp. 198-201).

In the case of the Armenian Genocide, the Ottoman Empire had exclusionary beliefs causing the subjugation of ethnic groups but was unwilling to utilize substantial targeted violence until the Armenians had a strategic relationship with Russia (Valentino, 2004, pp. 162–163). The Russians threatened to militarily intervene if Turkey did not give the Armenians more autonomy resulting in the Ottomans establishing the European Administration of Turkish Armenia, which humiliated the Turkish ultra-nationalist leaders. During WWI, the Turks assumed the Armenians were loyal to the Russians, based partly on the event described above, and therefore a threat to the empire's survival and territorial independence, even though many Armenians enlisted into the Turkish army (Valentino, 2004, pp. 162–163). The erratic state attacks on Armenians devolved into genocide in 1914-15 after the Turks experienced a series of military defeats. The Russians were able to overturn the Turkish invasion at Sarikamis to Anatolia, an area with a large Armenian population. Some Armenian guerrillas and villages fought the Ottomans to support the Russians, while others did so for self-defense. The Turks felt that this was significantly damaging their chances of military victory and had a mistaken belief

that there was a coordinated Armenian uprising against them (Valentino, 2004, pp. 163–164). Fundamentally, the combination of military assaults, the Ottoman Empire collapsing, and a strong belief that the Armenian population at large was working with Russia motivated the Ottomans to eliminate this outgroup despite the risks (Adalian, 2009; Bulutgil, 2017; Midlarsky, 2005; Valentino, 2004, pp. 162–164).

Based on the information presented in my third argument, I expect the interaction between specific types of threats to elite power and exclusionary beliefs to trigger mass killing onsets more so than other security threats. Mainly, threats that include the civilian population—such as guerrilla warfare—will raise the probability of elites associating the outgroup with a prevailing threat, leading to mass murder.

Hypothesis Seven

When experiencing guerrilla war, elites with exclusionary beliefs are more likely to perpetrate mass violence than facing other types of security threats.

Research Design

My research design is an observational study utilizing a large-n statistical analysis with panel data. To test my hypotheses, I will conduct a country-year logistic regression analysis of mass killing onsets with clustered standard errors. The data set I compiled documents information on 158 countries from 1955 to 2011. To address issues of bias due to the onset of mass violence occurring in less than 1% of the country-year sample, I will also use the rare events logit model as a robustness check (King & Zeng, 2001). The independent variables will be lagged by one year to establish the sequence of causality.

Dependent Variable: Mass Killing

To measure mass killing, I use the binary variable from the Targeted Mass Killing data set which has the most comprehensive information on this strategy. Butcher et al. (2019) assert that a mass killing happens when organized armed forces have organizational or stated intent to eliminate a political, ethnic, or religious outgroup and kill at least 1,000 civilians belonging to that group. An episode begins when elite forces intentionally kill at least 25 outgroup members in a year and ends when the number of outgroup fatalities drops below 25 within a given year (pp. 2-3, p. 6). Note that the 1,000 civilian death threshold is arbitrary but is standard practice within the political violence literature (Butcher et al., 2019; Butcher et al., 2020). To ensure the estimate coefficients encapsulate the average effect of mass killing onsets rather than both the outbreak and duration of these atrocities, country years with ongoing mass violence are excluded from the sample (Kim, 2018, pp. 298–299).

Independent Variables

Exclusionary Ideology

The exclusionary beliefs binary variable used in my models comes from Harff's (2003) research. She documents whether leaders of the state possessed "a belief system that identifies some overriding purpose or principle that justifies efforts to restrict, persecute, or eliminate certain categories of people" (p. 63) for all independent countries between 1955 and 2000. A regime is considered exclusionary if it was:

- Marxist-Leninist state that did not tolerate any liberal democratic or capitalistic bourgeoisie beliefs and identities, such as East Germany, Laos, Vietnam, and North Korea (Harff, 2003, p. 63)
- An Islamic state based on an extreme interpretation of Sharia law that did not permit and severely punished any other expressions of religion or non-religion like Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan (Harff, 2003, p. 63)
- A secular nationalist state that excluded religious movements, political participation, and rights (e.g., Turkey, Egypt, and Algeria) (Harff, 2003, p. 63)
- An anti-Communist state that viewed citizens supporting socialist policies as immoral and an inherent threat to the country, such as Taiwan and South Korea in the 1980s and Indonesia in the 1960s (Harff, 2003, p. 63; Naimark, 2017, pp. 104-122)
- An ethnonationalist state that viewed ethnic outgroups as inherently inferior like Iraq, South Africa during Apartheid, Serbia, and Bhutan (Harff, 2003, p. 63)

Monty G. Marshall at the Political Instability Task Force (now the Center for Systemic Peace) updated this variable to 2018 and used more modern historical information to ensure the previous and current values were coded correctly.

Civil War

To encapsulate the effect of civil war, guerrilla warfare, and other types of intrastate conflict, I use data from Balcells and Kalyvas (2010, 2014). They document information on 147 civil wars between 1944 and 2011, which refers to armed internal military and political contests between the state and rebels that resulted in at least 1,000 battle-related deaths (pp. 1394-1398). Additionally, the authors determine whether a conflict was a:

Guerrilla War.

Asymmetric military disputes where rebels operate in rural regions, coordinate in small, lightly armed units, and can hurt, harass, and challenge the state but only through indirect attacks (Balcells & Kalyvas, 2010, p. 418).

Conventional War.

Symmetric military clashes where the battles take place in clearly defined areas. Both sides have access to advanced, heavy weaponry (e.g., field artillery) and complete control of separate territories (Balcells & Kalyvas, 2010, p. 419).

Symmetric Nonconventional War.

Symmetric military confrontations where both sides have limited access to advanced and heavy military weapons, but there are still clearly delineated battle regions (Balcells & Kalyvas, 2010, p. 419).

I made three binary variables from this information which indicate if a state participated in a civil war, a guerrilla war, or a conventional/symmetric nonconventional war (referred to as symmetric war from this point onwards).

Interstate War

I created a binary variable that determines whether a state participated in an interstate war between 1946 and 2020, utilizing data from Uppsala Conflict Data Program and the Peace Research Institute Oslo (UCDP/PRIO). An interstate war refers to a military dispute between two or more states where the conflict results in at least 1,000 battle-related deaths. The war starts when 25 combatants are killed in a year and ends when the battle-related deaths fall below 25 within a given year (Pettersson, 2021, p. 5).

Assassinations and Coups

Banks and Kenneth's (2022a) research provides data on both coups and assassinations that occurred in 217 countries between 1919 and 2016. They define the former as: "extraconstitutional or forced changes in the top government elite and/or its effective control of the nation's power structure in a given year…Unsuccessful coups are not counted" (Banks & Kenneth, 2022c, para. 3). The latter refers to "any politically motivated murder or attempted murder of a high government official or politician" (Banks & Kenneth, 2022b, para. 2).

Control Variables

To increase the validity of my findings, I will control for the following variables that represent alternative explanations to my theory:

Military Strength

As pointed out by Uzonyi (2016), mass murder often requires a strong and capable military to carry out the logistics of this atrocity such as identifying, gathering, and executing outgroup members. A state with a large military should theoretically be more efficient at committing mass violence than countries with a small military. Thus, I measure military strength via the Correlates of War project, which provides information on the number of military

personnel per capita under state control between 1816 and 2016 (Bremer et al., 1972; Enterline & Greig, 2021, pp. 11–16). I take the natural log of this variable when running my logistic regression models.

Governmental Structure

To account for Rummel's (1995, 2017) arguments about power concentration influencing elites' decision to commit mass murder, I use an ordinal variable from the Polity V data set which documents information on all countries between 1800 and 2018. The variable is on a 20-point scale, where -10 equals a strongly autocratic government and 10 equals a strongly democratic state (Gurr & Marshall, 2020).

Media Freedom

A growing number of studies note that elites may be more hesitant to carry out extreme forms of violence when the public and other states have access to information exposing their actions. Put simply, when no one knows about a state committing an atrocity, it dramatically decreases the downside of mass murder as a strategy (Anderton & Carter, 2015; DeMeritt, 2015; Krcmaric, 2019; Stanton, 2016). A way to measure how probable it is that these atrocities will be exposed is by examining how much freedom the media has within a country. To control for this concern, I use data from Van Belle and Whitten-Woodring (2015). They designed an ordinal

variable on a three-point scale that determines whether 196 countries had 1. free,[8] 2. imperfectly free,[9] or 3. not free[10] media between 1948 and 2014 (Van Belle & Whitten-Woodring, 2015).

Post-Cold War Period

Anderton and Carter (2015) note that the costs of committing mass killings during the Cold War were less than in the post-Cold War period because of the major increase in both anti-atrocity institutions like the International Criminal Court and United Nations peacekeeping operations (p. 13). Thus, I coded a binary variable where one equals all years between 1947 and 1991 and zero equates to all years after 1991.

Previous Instances of Mass Killing

There are potential issues of temporal dependence, in that, the likelihood of mass murder could be dependent on the government's previous experiences with mass violence. To address this concern, I create a variable of years, years squared, and years cubed since a state last carried out a mass killing (Anderton & Carter, 2015, p. 13; Kim, 2018, p. 302; Uzonyi, 2018, p. 482).

Standard Practice Variables

The last series of control country-year variables are standard practice in the political violence literature, they include population, gross domestic product per capita (GDPpc), and ethnic fractionalization (Anderton et al., 2017; Anderton & Carter, 2015; Balch-Lindsay et al.,

---

[8] The authors assert that the media is free within a country when: "criticism of government and government officials is a common and normal part of the political dialogue in the mediated public sphere" (Van Belle & Whitten-Woodring, 2015, p. 180).

[9] Van Belle and Whitten-Woodring (2015) state that media is only imperfectly free when: "social, legal, or economic costs related to the criticism of government or government officials limits public criticism, but investigative journalism and criticism of major policy failings can and does occur" (p. 180).

[10] The authors determine that a country does not have free media when: "it is not possible to safely criticize government or government officials" (Van Belle & Whitten-Woodring, 2015, p. 180).

2004; Harff, 2003, 2012; Hong & Kim, 2019; Kim, 2018; Krain, 1997; Ulfelder, 2013; Ulfelder & Valentino, 2008; Uzonyi, 2016, 2021a). Both GDPpc and population will be measured using information from the Varieties of Democracy data set, which documents population and GDPpc for all countries between 1789 and 2019 (Coppedge et al., 2022a, pp. 361-362, 2022b; Krusell et al., 2022). Due to the fact these variables are highly skewed, I will take their natural log. The Historical Index of Ethnic Fractionalization data set supplies a measure for the degree of ethnic fractionalization within 165 countries between 1945 and 2013 (Drazanova, 2019).

Table One

Descriptive Statistics

	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Mass Killing	10041	0.006	0.080	0.000	1.000
Civil War	8754	0.115	0.319	0.000	1.000
Guerrilla War	8754	0.077	0.267	0.000	1.000
Symmetric War	8754	0.039	0.193	0.000	1.000
Interstate War	10090	0.095	0.293	0.000	1.000
Coup	8932	0.029	0.167	0.000	1.000
Assassination	9284	0.092	0.290	0.000	1.000
Exclusionary Ideology	9019	0.213	0.409	0.000	1.000
Polity Score	9658	0.730	7.380	-10.000	10.000
Ethnic Fractionalization	8628	0.422	0.272	0.000	0.890
Media Freedom Score	9042	2.319	0.826	1.000	3.000
Post-Cold War	10262	0.483	0.500	0.000	1.000
Ln(Military Forces)	9310	3.635	1.773	0.000	8.666
Ln(GDPpc)	9994	1.692	1.139	-1.252	5.054
Ln(Population)	9994	6.826	1.547	2.573	11.907
Years since Mass Killing	10262	27.528	20.042	0.000	74.000

Note. There are 158 countries being examined between 1955 and 2011 when I remove missing data. The total observations in the data set are 6929. All the covariates are lagged except for the post-cold war period and years since last mass killing variables.

Results, Scholarly Discussion, and Limitations

The results disprove my overarching theory, but certain findings challenge some of the fundamental assumptions of the strategic model. The rare-events (RE) logit models reaffirm rather than disprove my findings and therefore are not discussed at length. In the following paragraphs, I will present regression tables, odds ratios, and predicted probability plots to highlight any significant findings. Information that does not provide exciting insights or test my theory will be excluded and put in the appendix.

Table Two

Effects of Security Threats on Mass Killing, Logit and Rare-Events Logit Estimates

	Logit Model 1	Logit Model 2	RE Model 1	RE Model 2
Civil War	1.101** (0.409)		1.093** (0.408)	
Guerrilla War		0.748+ (0.444)		0.749+ (0.442)
Symmetric War		1.525* (0.606)		1.541* (0.605)
Interstate War	0.440 (0.442)	0.584 (0.394)	0.436 (0.441)	0.578 (0.393)
Coup	0.556 (0.545)	0.586 (0.545)	0.636 (0.544)	0.667 (0.544)
Assassination	1.004* (0.412)	1.022* (0.419)	1.008* (0.411)	1.023* (0.418)
Exclusionary Ideology	0.694* (0.352)	0.727* (0.349)	0.689* (0.351)	0.721* (0.349)
Polity Score	0.00699 (0.0318)	0.00741 (0.0316)	0.00915 (0.0317)	0.00960 (0.0315)
Media Freedom Score	0.739* (0.370)	0.714* (0.351)	0.673+ (0.369)	0.647+ (0.351)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.00584 (0.596)	-0.0274 (0.591)	-0.0220 (0.595)	-0.0400 (0.589)
Post-Cold War	-0.828* (0.387)	-1.020+ (0.526)	-0.788* (0.386)	-0.974+ (0.525)
Ln(GDPpc)	-0.740** (0.251)	-0.815** (0.249)	-0.720** (0.250)	-0.793** (0.249)
Ln(Population)	0.318* (0.157)	0.347* (0.159)	0.314* (0.157)	0.342* (0.159)

	Logit Model 1	Logit Model 2	RE Model 1	RE Model 2
Ln(Military Forces)	-0.0482 (0.145)	-0.0370 (0.142)	-0.0482 (0.145)	-0.0357 (0.142)
Constant	-8.310** (1.440)	-8.472** (1.391)	-7.974** (1.436)	-8.127** (1.387)
N	6936	6936	6936	6936

Note. Standard errors are in the parentheses. The previous instance since last mass killing variables have been removed to save space. The first two columns are logistic regression models and the last two are rare-events logistic regression models.

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

The table above provides information that tests my first five hypotheses. As shown in the first model, hypothesis one is only partially met because only civil war and assassinations are statistically significant with p-values less than 0.05. The coefficients for these variables are positive, meaning that when a state experiences either of these threats, the log of odds increases. However, international wars and coups do not appear to have a relationship with state-sponsored mass slaughter. Hypothesis two is supported due to the fact that civil war has a larger coefficient than the other types of threats. The plot below provides odds ratios to measure the strength of association between the independent variables and mass violence onsets. The odds ratio for civil war is 3.01 while for assassination, coups, and international wars it is 2.73, 1.74, and 1.55. Put differently, when I control the covariates at a fixed value, it is 3.01 times more likely that a state will perpetrate mass slaughter when it is in civil war versus not being in intrastate conflict.

Figure One

Measuring the Strength of Association Between Threats to Elite Power and Mass Killing



When examining the second model of Table Two, the results do not support my fourth and fifth hypotheses. Although guerrilla warfare has a nearly significant relationship with mass killing, symmetric warfare has a stronger association with this brutal tactic. The former has an odds ratio of 4.59, while the latter has an odds ratio of 2.11. This finding challenges the strategic model's assumption that guerrilla war incentivizes elites to use mass violence as a military strategy to defeat rebels and also supports Krcmaric's (2018) research. He asserts that conventional wars have clearly delineated battle areas, each side controls a section of territory, and portions of the population live close to and belong to insurgent or government-controlled districts. Consequently, elites involved in these conflicts can use mass murder with substantial strategic benefits and minimal consequences, as they can weaken insurgents' military strength by quickly identifying and eliminating civilians that economically aid rebels (Krcmaric, 2018, pp. 19-26). Moreover, states are not worried about civilian defection because they do not rely on

citizens for intelligence to identify guerrillas, and civilians will live nearby and have a strong allegiance to either the insurgents or the government (Krcmaric, 2018, pp. 19-26). During guerrilla warfare, the key to victory is for the state to access crucial intelligence like finding the insurgents' secret hideouts and overall strategy. For governments to gain this intelligence, it requires winning the hearts and minds of the public; hence, they must be much more cautious about committing mass violence (Krcmaric, 2018, pp. 19-26).

Another way to interpret this result is that the structure of the civil war may not matter as much as the rebels' strength. Symmetric warfare is a military dispute where the state and insurgents are evenly matched. Thus, the potential reason for why this variable has a stronger relationship with mass killing than guerrilla war is that elites are utilizing mass violence in response to powerful rebels. The fact that symmetric warfare has a more robust association than irregular war contributes to another growing debate within the strategic school of thought. One side argues that vulnerability prompts combatants to use mass slaughter. If leaders are weak relative to their opposition, they will desperately resort to eliminating the adversaries' central source of support (Anderton & Carter, 2015; Harff, 2003; Ulfelder & Valentino, 2008; Wood, 2010). The other side contends that powerful elites employ mass violence because it destroys their opposition with minimal risk of civilian and rival retaliation (Asal et al., 2019; de la Calle, 2017; Fortna, 2015; Krain, 2000; Stanton, 2016; Uzonyi, 2015; Vargas, 2016). An interesting research paper to help settle this debate could examine how mass violence relates to different dimensions of rebel strength such as insurgent mobilization capacity and access to weaponry.

With these insights in mind, it seems vital for future research to explore how different types of civil war and rebel strength influence the likelihood of mass murder. Even though the strategic model's position is supported, very few quantitative studies examine the different forms

of civil war and how it impacts elites' decision to perpetrate different types of violence (Balch-Lindsay et al., 2004; Kalyvas, 2006; Krcmaric, 2018). Moreover, this provides an opportunity for qualitative researchers to conduct in-depth analysis by comparing and investigating how different types of civil war, levels of rebel strength, and other forms of security threats influence elites' strategic decisions to commit mass violence. This form of research can greatly improve academic knowledge about the potential causal mechanisms that evoke this atrocity.

The exclusionary beliefs variables in Table Two have positive coefficients that are statistically significant with a p-value less than 0.05. Thus, I can reject the fifth null hypothesis. Simply put, it is about two times more likely that a mass killing will transpire when elites possess exclusionary beliefs as opposed to when they do not have them. This finding disputes another assumption of the strategic model that threat is inherently a more important predictor of mass violence than ideology. Various studies have been finding more and more (as shown in the literature review and theory section) that ideology does matter in explaining how and why mass violence transpires (Bulutgil, 2017; Dumitru & Johnson, 2011; Hong & Kim, 2019; Kiernan, 2007; Kim, 2018; Leader Maynard, 2014, 2015, 2018, 2019, 2022a, 2022b; Oncioiu, 2016; Pion-Berlin, 1988; Scharpf, 2018; Semelin, 2007; Straus, 2010, 2012b, pp. 548–550, 2015a, 2015b; Verdeja, 2012b; Weitz, 2003). Another critical scholarly inquiry to help settle this dispute between the proponents of the ideological and strategic model would be to create a variable that focuses on how leaders frame outgroups as major security threats rather than on broad exclusionary ideologies. This variable could help refine the specific elements of an ideological belief system that increase the likelihood of mass violence. For example, Leader Maynard's (2022b) research highlights that a central cause of mass violence are hardline atrocity-justifying ideologies. Leaders who perpetrate this type of atrocity have an apocalyptic narrative that an

outgroup is an inherent threat; ergo, it is morally and strategically beneficial to eradicate the outgroup. In other words, this ideology suggests that mass murder is warranted because it is an act of self-defense, punishes transgressors, and is tactically advantageous or patriotic. Like exclusionary beliefs, these ideas can be integrated into various ideologies and are more aligned with the evidence that elites carry out mass violence in response to major threats (Leader Maynard, 2022b, pp. 1-27, 94-133).

Figure Two

Predicted Probabilities of Mass Killing When Elites Experience Threats to Their Power



The plots above estimate the predicted probabilities of mass killing onsets when elites confront threats to their power. The different types of threats and exclusionary beliefs will be set to one, and the rest of the covariates will be set to their median values. It should be noted that guerrilla warfare is put to zero when calculating the predicted probabilities of symmetric warfare and vice versa. The first and fifth plot indicate that when a state does not experience a civil war or an assassination the probability that a mass killing will happen is four percent. When a state is challenged with either of these threats, the probability that leaders commit this atrocity rises to

11 percent. The second plot shows that the predicted probability increases by five percent when a state is involved in a guerrilla war versus when it is not in one. The third plot highlights the predicted probability that elites perpetrate mass slaughter increases from five percent to 19 percent when a government is actively involved in a symmetric war as opposed to when it is not involved in one. The crucial insight is that symmetric warfare has the highest likelihood of provoking leaders to use this atrocity. It implies that either the specific structure of the warfare incentivizes leaders to utilize this tactic during conflict or that the government is using it as a last resort in response to relatively powerful rebels. Finally, the fourth and sixth graphs exhibit that when a state is not involved in an interstate war or a coup, the probability of mass violence happening within a given state for the former is eight percent and seven percent for the latter. The probability of mass killing increases to 11 percent when elites experience either of these threats to their power.

Table Three

Effects of Threats and Exclusionary Ideology on Mass Killing, Logit Estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Exclusionary Id. x Civil War	-0.0632 (0.629)					
Exclusionary Id. x Guerrilla War		0.430 (0.747)				
Exclusionary Id. x Symmetric War			-0.340 (0.966)			
Exclusionary Id. x Interstate War				0.558 (0.724)		
Exclusionary Id. x Assassination					0.415 (0.637)	
Exclusionary Id. x Coup						0.992 (1.040)
Civil War	1.129* (0.482)			1.091** (0.404)	1.101** (0.405)	1.107** (0.408)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Guerrilla War		0.546	0.746^{+}			
		(0.507)	(0.440)			
Symmetric War		1.536**	1.620**			
		(0.595)	(0.566)			
Interstate War	0.442	0.573	0.578	0.182	0.434	0.434
	(0.436)	(0.405)	(0.399)	(0.482)	(0.440)	(0.439)
Coup	0.552	0.613	0.588	0.561	0.576	0.236
	(0.557)	(0.552)	(0.545)	(0.547)	(0.545)	(0.729)
Assassination	1.003*	1.028*	1.021*	1.017*	0.838^{+}	1.025*
	(0.411)	(0.419)	(0.421)	(0.410)	(0.465)	(0.424)
Exclusionary Ideology	0.727	0.567	0.770*	0.487	0.572	0.603^{+}
	(0.460)	(0.450)	(0.372)	(0.480)	(0.410)	(0.360)
Polity Score	0.00697	0.00710	0.00659	0.00539	0.00519	0.00445
	(0.0318)	(0.0319)	(0.0317)	(0.0324)	(0.0311)	(0.0324)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.00171	-0.0699	-0.00673	-0.0724	-0.0158	0.00431
	(0.590)	(0.580)	(0.599)	(0.594)	(0.602)	(0.597)
Media	0.738*	0.720*	0.709*	0.712*	0.730*	0.732*
	(0.373)	(0.353)	(0.349)	(0.362)	(0.368)	(0.372)
Post-Cold War	-0.827*	-1.039*	-1.012^{+}	-0.837*	-0.834*	-0.819*
	(0.388)	(0.523)	(0.534)	(0.390)	(0.391)	(0.390)
Ln(Military Forces)	-0.0497	-0.0313	-0.0369	-0.0398	-0.0361	-0.0426
	(0.146)	(0.147)	(0.144)	(0.147)	(0.151)	(0.144)
Ln(GDPpc)	-0.741**	-0.801**	-0.807**	-0.741**	-0.743**	-0.752**
	(0.251)	(0.256)	(0.254)	(0.251)	(0.254)	(0.254)
Ln(Population)	0.318*	0.347*	0.344*	0.318*	0.316*	0.324*
	(0.157)	(0.162)	(0.162)	(0.156)	(0.160)	(0.156)
Constant	-8.318**	-8.449**	-8.458**	-8.197**	-8.250**	-8.343**
	(1.437)	(1.396)	(1.389)	(1.440)	(1.448)	(1.453)
N	6936	6936	6936	6936	6936	6936

Note. Standard errors are in the parentheses. The previous instance since last mass killing variables have been removed from the table. All the models are logistic regression models rather than rare-events logistic regression models.

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

The table above tests my sixth and seventh hypotheses. The results show that I am unable to reject these null hypotheses as none of the interaction terms are statistically significant. The rare-events logit models did not change the results and therefore are put in Appendix A to save space. This finding ultimately challenges my theory and, by extension, modern proponents of the

ideological school of thought (Hong & Kim, 2019; Leader Maynard, 2014, 2018, 2019, 2022b; Semelin, 2007; Straus, 2015a; Weitz, 2003). In essence, exclusionary beliefs matter in predicting the onset of mass slaughter, but they do not significantly influence how elites interpret threats. As mentioned above, it could be useful to look at different elements of an ideology to further explore how it contributes to the likelihood of mass killing, but that would require the creation of new and improved data sets. Specifically, having more precise measures of ideology and its different dimensions.

Below I present predicted probability plots to ensure that the coefficient estimates for the interaction terms are interpretable. When calculating the predicted probability of mass slaughter, the different types of threats are set to one and the rest of the covariates will be set to their median values. Although the results are not statistically significant, the graphs below do show that the interaction between threat and exclusionary beliefs has a positive relationship with mass murder. For example, the first plot demonstrates the probability that elites without exclusionary beliefs will perpetrate mass violence when there is no civil war is one percent and raises to five percent when there is civil war. However, the probability that elites with exclusionary ideologies commit mass violence is three percent when there is no civil war and increases to nine percent when there is a civil war.

Figure Three

Predicted Probabilities of Mass Killing When Elites Experience Threats to Their Power and Hold Exclusionary Ideologies



Even though the evidence of this study does not support the sixth and seventh hypotheses, it is possible that my theory only applies to certain contexts. The studies and historical cases I draw from to help formulate my theory often are based in highly politically unstable environments such as war. Elites in these environments would possess exclusionary beliefs and then experience some challenge to their power like a coup or assassination, which led to mass violence (Bulutgil, 2017; Cribb, 2001; Dutton, 2007; Jonas, 1991; Midlarsky, 2005, 2011; Parsons & Totten, 2009; Semelin, 2007; Straus, 2015a; Weitz, 2003). For example, during the Guatemalan civil war, government leaders continually perpetuated an exclusionary system where the ethnic Ladinos were at the top and the working-class Mayans were at the bottom of the hierarchy. Targeted violence against Mayans substantially increased when there were major challenges to elite power such as opposing rebel forces gaining Mayan support, taking over territory, and assassinating José Luis Arenas[11] (Ball et al., 1999; Brett, 2016; CEH &

[11] José Luis Arenas was a prominent anti-communist activist and landowner in Guatemala who

Rothenberg, 2012; Esparza et al., 2010; Garrard-Burnett, 2009; Jonas, 1991; Kiernan, 2007; Schirmer, 2010; Schwartz & Straus, 2018; Straus, 2015b; Vela Castañeda, 2016). A way to test this proposition would be by compiling a data set where the unit of analysis is armed military disputes between states and insurgents; then see if the interaction between exclusionary beliefs and particular types of threats like increases in rebel strength, territorial loss, assassinations, coups, and so on substantially raises the probability of mass violence.

A final important finding to discuss is the potential reason why interstate wars, coups, and guerrilla wars did not have a statistically significant relationship with mass killing. Elites may not have a delayed response to these threats but, instead, may aggressively and immediately react to them. For example, the genocide in Cambodia transpired soon after the Khmer Rouge took power in 1975 as an opportunity to eliminate any opposition threatening the new elites' authority (Kiernan, 2009; Straus, 2015b, p. 12). This perspective is supported by Krain's (2000) research. He argues that after strong post-revolutionary groups overthrow the state, they will perpetrate mass slaughter because it is an effective strategy that eradicates future and current adversaries without having to sacrifice their self-interest by trading assets, rights, or powers to their opposition in exchange for compliance/security (Krain, 2000, pp. 11-27, 171-185).

I investigated this perspective by replicating the second table's regression results but used non-lagged instead of lagged independent variables. The results presented below show that coups, interstate wars, and irregular wars strongly correlate with mass killing onsets. However, these estimates should be taken with caution as they could be subject to reverse causality, meaning that mass murder may increase the likelihood of coups, interstate wars, and guerrilla

---

was known for his worker subjugation (Brett, 2016; CEH & Rothenberg, 2012; Garrard-Burnett, 2009).

warfare rather than the other way around. To thoroughly test this perspective, it would require more fine-grained data that can examine the chronological nature of how fast states respond to these threats beyond just yearly observations. Additionally, qualitative scholars can approach this question by using methods such as process tracing to see whether and how these military threats influence the speed at which elites decide to carry out mass violence.

Table Four

Effects of Security Threats on Mass Killing, Logit and Rare-Events Logit Estimates, Non-Lagged Independent Variables

	Logit Model 1	Logit Model 2	RE Model 1	RE Model 2
Civil War	2.109** (0.505)		2.062** (0.504)	
Guerrilla War		1.361** (0.510)		1.323** (0.508)
Symmetric War		2.778** (0.489)		2.706** (0.488)
Interstate War	1.293* (0.522)	1.502* (0.584)	1.251* (0.520)	1.454* (0.583)
Coup	1.472** (0.495)	1.405** (0.494)	1.466** (0.493)	1.397** (0.492)
Assassination	0.712* (0.342)	0.844* (0.348)	0.717* (0.341)	0.851* (0.347)
Exclusionary Ideology	1.274** (0.422)	1.396** (0.410)	1.241** (0.421)	1.356** (0.409)
Polity Score	-0.0176 (0.0388)	-0.0195 (0.0357)	-0.0152 (0.0388)	-0.0173 (0.0356)
Media	-0.0143 (0.432)	-0.117 (0.413)	-0.0369 (0.431)	-0.141 (0.412)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.905 (0.808)	-0.950 (0.822)	-0.899 (0.806)	-0.933 (0.820)
Post-Cold War	-0.575 (0.419)	-1.129+ (0.594)	-0.540 (0.418)	-1.079+ (0.593)
Ln(GDPpc)	-0.783** (0.253)	-0.961** (0.233)	-0.755** (0.253)	-0.925** (0.232)
Ln(Population)	0.265 (0.214)	0.388* (0.190)	0.261 (0.214)	0.381* (0.190)

	Logit Model 1	Logit Model 2	RE Model 1	RE Model 2
Ln(Military Forces)	-0.113 (0.159)	-0.0959 (0.152)	-0.113 (0.158)	-0.0943 (0.152)
Constant	-6.791** (2.009)	-7.341** (1.888)	-6.514** (2.004)	-7.033** (1.883)
N	6941	6941	6941	6941

Note. Standard errors are in the parentheses. The previous instance since last mass killing variables have been removed to save space. The first two columns are logistic regression models and the last two are rare-events logistic regression models.

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

My study does have a series of limitations that should be mentioned when assessing the results. As described previously, there are very few instances of mass slaughter in comparison to the total number of observations. Although I attempted to alleviate this concern by using a rare-events logit model, including more instances of mass killing onsets in the analysis would improve the estimates' preciseness and my confidence in the estimates. Moreover, the authors that formulated my dependent variable and various covariates used in this study have a partially arbitrary criterion (Balcells & Kalyvas, 2014; Butcher et al., 2019; Pettersson, 2021). For example, a mass murder occurs when at least 1,000 targeted outgroup members are killed is entirely arbitrary. This threshold could easily be 10,000, 50,000, or 100,000 (Butcher et al., 2019). Almost all studies that examine the causes of mass violence fail to use variables that measure precisely the numbers of civilians killed within a given episode of mass killing (Anderton & Carter, 2015; Balch-Lindsay et al., 2004; Carey & Colaresi, 2008; Harff, 2003, 2012; Hong & Kim, 2019; Kim, 2018; Krain, 1997; Krcmaric, 2018; Uzonyi, 2015, 2016, 2018, 2020, 2021a, 2021b). For future research, it would be beneficial for authors to examine the relationship between threats to elite power or ideology and the expected number of civilian deaths of a targeted outgroup like Kim's (2010) study. Calculating these estimates would provide

more knowledge about the magnitude that these variables of interest have on mass murder. Finally, although psychological research was central in formulating my theory, I did not directly test any particular psychological concepts. The utility of the psychological model is that it helped bridge the theoretical gap between ideology and threats to elite power. The literature is fairly clear that ideology on its own cannot explain mass violence, but particular belief systems like exclusionary ideologies in certain contexts can become extreme and distort how elites assess situations (Leader Maynard, 2022b; Straus, 2015a). Examining psychological research was vital in clarifying how and why ideological extremism occurs, what factors increase risk-taking behaviour, how these ideas influence the way leaders interpret political events, and how beliefs become generalized to an entire outgroup (Beber et al., 2014; Berreby, 2008; Bilali & Vollhardt, 2019; Chirot & McCauley, 2010; Dutton, 2007; Haslam et al., 2008; Midlarsky, 2005, 2011; Roth, 2010; Routledge & Vess, 2019; Sapolsky, 2017; Semelin, 2007; Staub, 2000, 2006, 2010, 2011). Finding measures for these psychological concepts and applying them to an observational study was simply beyond the scope of my capabilities but is something I hope to do in future research.

Conclusion and Research Implications

My research aimed to explore and further academic understanding of what causes elites to commit state-sponsored mass killings. I accomplished this goal by conducting a literature review and utilizing insights from different perspectives to create a theory that challenges and builds upon the strategic model. To reiterate, the strategic model argues that mass killing is a top-down, strategic, and instrumental policy utilized by leaders to counter perceived threats to their power (Balcells & Stanton, 2021; Balch-Lindsay et al., 2004; Kalyvas, 2006; Krain, 1997; Krcmaric, 2018; Schwartz & Straus, 2018, pp. 222–235; Straus, 2012b; Uzonyi, 2015, 2016, 2018, 2020, 2021a, 2021b; Valentino, 2014, pp. 93–96). My theory began by detailing the threats that have consistently provoked elites to perpetrate mass slaughter, including wars, assassinations, and coups. I hypothesized that civil war should increase the likelihood of mass violence more so than interstate wars, assassinations, and coups because it is an armed threat that almost always threatens to topple the status quo regime. Also, during these wars, government military personnel can often use violence with little consequences—as it is challenging for external actors to prevent leaders from repressing its citizens (Balch-Lindsay et al., 2004; Kalyvas, 2006; Krain, 1997; Krcmaric, 2018; Naimark, 2017; Parsons & Totten, 2009; Shaw, 2003; Straus, 2010, 2012a, 2012b, 2015b, 2016; Ulfelder & Valentino, 2008; Uzonyi, 2016, 2021a; Valentino, 2014).

Theoretically, the type of civil war I expected to increase the probability of mass slaughter more than assassinations, coups, and interstate war was guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla wars are asymmetric battles with no clearly defined areas of military conflict and both sides have military forces scattered throughout the population. These characteristics incentivize mass indiscriminate violence against the population as insurgents rely on civilians for food, shelter,

funds, and intelligence to defeat the state. Thus, government actors eliminate civilians to weaken the rebels and thereby ensure victory (Balch-Lindsay et al., 2004; Valentino, 2004). However, threats to elite power are insufficient to explain the causes of mass murder because of the disparity problem, the domination-vulnerability paradox, and the leap of imagination issue (Straus, 2015a; Valentino, 2014). To address these limitations, I examined research on ideology and psychology impacting how leaders determine their strategic interests, establish an outgroup in its entirety as a threat, and justify extreme behaviour. I concluded that although ideologies in isolation do not explain mass violence, the interactive relationship between exclusionary beliefs and threats to elite power does for three reasons.

First, exclusionary beliefs—specifically, ideas that the outgroup is an inherent threat to the ingroup's identity—become extremely entrenched and intense amongst leaders when they confront threats to their power. The interaction between these beliefs and threats appears to fulfill a necessary condition for mass violence to occur, that elites must perceive a vulnerable outgroup as a substantial danger to their interest(s) (Leader Maynard, 2022b; Semelin, 2007; Straus, 2015a; Uzonyi, 2016; Valentino, 2004).

Second, leaders who promote exclusionary beliefs have the incentive to opportunistically blame outgroups for unstable environmental conditions as a means of gaining or maintaining power which can lead to the violent removal of adversaries (Bulutgil, 2015, 2017; Leader Maynard, 2014, 2018, 2019; Naimark, 2017; Parsons & Totten, 2009; Scharpf, 2018; Semelin, 2007; Weitz, 2003).

Third, the combination of exclusionary beliefs and threats to elite power increases the probability of mass slaughter because leaders endorsing these ideas are more likely to link an outgroup to a security threat. Elites with these beliefs consistently and continuously villainize

outgroup members and have negative views about them. Consequently, they more often perceive the outgroup as a threat to their interests that works with the enemy, which rationalizes mass killing. Put differently, these leaders do not have the incentive to improve intergroup relations since they are cynical of the outgroup's intent, gain power through disparaging the outgroup, and are susceptible to ingroup bias and confirmation bias/motivated reasoning (Bulutgil, 2015, 2017; Moshman, 2007; Pion-Berlin, 1988; Scharpf, 2018; Semelin, 2007; Staub, 2010; Verdeja, 2012b; Weitz, 2003).

Based on the argument made above, I also concluded that the interaction between guerrilla warfare and exclusionary beliefs would provoke mass killing onsets more than other security threats. Due to guerrilla warfare actively involving civilians, elites are more likely to associate an outgroup with a dangerous threat.

To test this theory, I used logistic regression models with panel data that compiles information on 158 countries between 1955 and 2011 with lagged independent variables and excluded ongoing mass killings from the data set to ensure I encapsulated the average of mass killing onsets and not the duration of the event. As a robustness check, I also ran a series of rare-event logistic regression models to address the fact that mass violence occurs in less than 1% of the country-year sample (King & Zeng, 2001). The variables used in my analysis measure exclusionary ideologies, assassinations, coups, and civil, guerrilla, symmetric, and interstate wars. Additionally, the potential effects of government military strength, regime type, the post-cold war period, previous years since mass killing, media freedom, population size, GDPpc, and ethnic fractionalization were controlled for. The results of my study are as follows:

- Civil war and assassinations have a positive statistically significant relationship with mass violence, while interstate wars and coups do not.

- Civil wars have a stronger association with mass slaughter than interstate wars, assassinations, and coups.
- Symmetric warfare has a stronger and more significant relationship with mass murder than guerrilla war; the former appears to provoke this strategy more than the latter. A potential reason for this finding is that elites are incentivized to use mass killings during symmetric warfare because the state can weaken the opposition's military power by efficiently eliminating civilians who economically aid rebels and it can employ this strategy without concern for civilian defection (Krcmaric, 2018). Another possible explanation is that leaders commit mass slaughter as a desperate response to powerful rebels rather than using it strategically during a symmetric war.
- Exclusionary beliefs have a positive and consistent association with mass slaughter onsets.
- The interaction between threats to elite interest and exclusionary beliefs does not increase the probability of mass violence, suggesting that these ideologies do not significantly influence how leaders interpret challenges to their power.
- Guerrilla wars, coups, and interstate wars only have a statistically significant relationship with mass killing when they are not lagged. This result could be due to reverse causality or because mass violence is an immediate reaction to these perceived threats.

The implications and contributions of my findings/research are twofold. First, this study contributes to a series of debates about the causes of mass violence. It is unclear how fast or whether threats such as coups, irregular warfare, and interstate war provoke elites to use this strategy. There ought to be future studies that utilize more fine-grade data and in-depth qualitative methods to understand how quickly mass violence tends to erupt when leaders

confront challenges to their power. Additionally, few quantitative studies examine how different forms of civil war influence leaders' decision to perpetrate mass killing—despite many assuming that a robust relationship exists between guerrilla war and this violent strategy (Balch-Lindsay et al., 2004; Kalyvas, 2006; Krcmaric, 2018). I found that symmetric civil war appears to have a stronger association with mass slaughter than irregular war. To grow academic understanding of the causes of mass killing there need to be more qualitative and quantitative studies that thoroughly investigate and compare how different forms of civil war, level of rebel strength, and other types of threats impact elites' decision to carry out this atrocity. Finally, there is a growing debate between the strategic and modern proponents of the ideological model (Leader Maynard, 2014; Straus, 2015a, 2016; Valentino, 2014; Verdeja, 2012b). This study found that exclusionary beliefs do matter in predicting mass violence onsets, but the interaction between threats and these ideologies does not appear to be significant. To further scholarly understanding of ideologies' role in mass murder, it would be useful to create a more detailed data set that documents different dimensions of elites' belief systems like whether it is a hardline atrocity-justifying ideology. Second, my study provides insight into growing societal concern and debate about the impacts of elite political strategies and beliefs influencing the likelihood of violent repression in democratic systems. In democracies, political elites are incentivized to mobilize cleavages by villainizing outgroups, which consistently helps gain votes and influence. This approach often leads to intergroup conflict and polarization but not necessarily to severe forms of violence against civilians (Balch-Lindsay et al., 2004; Bale et al., 2010; Bekafigo et al., 2019; Betz & Meret, 2009; de Rooij et al., 2015; Elkins & Sides, 2007; Ford & Jennings, 2020; Harell et al., 2017; Joppke, 2007; Mann, 2004; Posner, 2004; Scott, 2009; Urbinati, 2019; Wilkinson, 2004). My research examines potential conditions for when democratic systems can lead to violent

forms of repression both within the nation and outside of it. Although exclusionary ideologies cannot entirely explain the occurrence of mass killing, elites that promote these ideas are more likely to commit this atrocity than those who do not espouse these ideas. Further exploring the different dimensions of ideology could be useful in seeing what conditions increase the likelihood of mass violence and what can potentially prevent it.

References

Abdollahi, A., Cohen, F., Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., & Weise, D. (2006). Mortality salience, martyrdom, and military might: The great Satan versus the Axis of Evil. *Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin*, *32*(4), 525–537. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167205282157

Adalian, R. P. (2009). The Armenian Genocide. In W. S. Parsons & S. Totten (Eds.), *Century of genocide: Critical essays and eyewitness accounts* (3rd ed., pp. 53–90). Routledge.

Adler, E., & Barnett, M. N. (1998). *Security communities*. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511598661

Anderton, C. H. (2014). A research agenda for the economic study of genocide: Signposts from the field of conflict economics. *Journal of Genocide Research*, *16*(1), 113–138. https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2014.878118

Anderton, C. H., Brauer, J., & Butcher, C. R. (2017). Mass killing. In *The Wiley Handbook of Violence and Aggression* (pp. 1–13). John Wiley & Sons, https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119057574.whbva009

Anderton, C. H., & Carter, J. R. (2015). A new look at weak state conditions and genocide risk. *Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy*, *21*(1), 1–36. https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2014-0008

Asal, V., Phillip, B. J., Rethemeyer, R. K., Simonelli, C., & Young, J. K. (2019). Carrots, sticks, and insurgent targeting of civilians. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *63*(7), 1710–35. https://doi-org.proxy3.library.mcgill.ca/10.1177/00220027187897

Balcells, L., & Kalyvas, S. N. (2010). International system and technologies of rebellion: How the end of the cold war shaped internal conflict. *American Political Science Review*, *104*(3), 415–429. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055410000286

Balcells, L., & Kalyvas, S. N. (2014). Does warfare matter? Severity, duration, and outcomes of civil wars. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *58*(8), 1390–1418. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002714547903

Balcells, L., & Stanton, J. A. (2021). Violence against civilians during armed conflict: Moving beyond the macro- and micro-level divide. *Annual Review of Political Science*, *24*(1), 45–69. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-041719-102229

Balch-Lindsay, D., Huth, P., & Valentino, B. (2004). "Draining the sea": Mass killing and guerrilla warfare. *International Organization*, *58*(2), 375–407. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818304582061

Bale, T., Green-Pedersen, C., Krouwel, A., Luther, K. R., & Sitter, N. (2010). If you can't beat them, join them? Explaining social democratic responses to the challenge from the populist radical right in Western Europe. *Political Studies*, *58*(3), 410–426. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2009.00783.x

Ball, P., Kobrak, P., & Spirer, H. F. (1999). *State violence in Guatemala, 1960-1996: A quantitative reflection*. American Association for the Advancement of Science.

Banks, A. S., & Kenneth, W. A. (2022a). *Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive*. Databanks International's Cross-National Time-Series (CNTS) Data Archive. https://www.cntsdata.com/

Banks, A. S., & Kenneth, W. A. (2022b). *Domestic conflict event data*. Databanks International's Cross-National Time-Series (CNTS) Data Archive. https://www.cntsdata.com/domconflict/c1svs

Banks, A. S., & Kenneth, W. A. (2022c). *Political data*. Databanks International's Cross-National Time-Series (CNTS) Data Archive. https://www.cntsdata.com/political-data-definitions/c8i

Beber, B., Roessler, P., & Scacco, A. (2014). Intergroup violence and political attitudes: Evidence from a dividing Sudan. *The Journal of Politics*, *76*(3), 649–665. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1017/s0022381614000103

Bekafigo, M. A., Eiler, B. A., Noguchi, K., Ramsey, K. L., & Stepanova, E. V. (2019). The effect of group polarization on opposition to Donald Trump. *Political Psychology*, *40*(5), 1163–1178. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12584

Berreby, D. (2008). *Us and them: The science of identity*. University of Chicago Press.

Betz, H.-G., & Meret, S. (2009). Revisiting Lepanto: The political mobilization against Islam in contemporary Western Europe. *Patterns of Prejudice*, *43*(3–4), 313–334. https://doi.org/10.1080/00313220903109235

Bilali, R., Dasgupta, N., & Tropp, L. R. (2012). Attributions of responsibility and perceived harm in the aftermath of mass violence. *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, 18(21), 21–39. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0026671

Bilali, R., & Vollhardt, J. R. (2019). Victim and perpetrator groups' divergent perspectives on collective violence: Implications for intergroup relations. *Political Psychology*, *40*(S1), 75–108. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12570

Bilewicz, M., Imhoff, R., Stefaniak, A., & Witkowska, M. (2017). The lay historian explains intergroup behavior: Examining the role of identification and cognitive structuring in ethnocentric historical attributions. *Memory Studies*, 10(3), 310– 322. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1750698017701614

Bohmelt, T., Pilster, U., & Tago, A. (2016). The differentiation of security forces and the onset of genocidal violence. *Armed Forces & Society*, 42(1), pp. 26-50. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X14559515

Bonacossa, A., Castano, E., Humphrey, N., Leidner, B., Nikkah, J., Perrulli, R., & Spencer, B. (2011). Ideology, fear of death, and death anxiety. *Political Psychology*, *32*(4), 601–621. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2011.00822.x

Bremer, S., David, S. J., & Stuckey, J. (1972). Capability distribution, uncertainty, and major power war, 1820-1965. In B. M. Russet (Ed.), *Peace, War, and Numbers, 1820-1965* (pp. 19–48). Sage.

Brett, R. (2016). *The origins and dynamics of genocide: Political violence in Guatemala*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Bulutgil, H. Z. (2015). Social cleavages, wartime experience, and ethnic cleansing in Europe. *Journal of Peace Research, 52*(5), 577–590. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343315588339

Bulutgil, H. Z. (2017). Ethnic cleansing and its alternatives in wartime: A comparison of the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian empires. *International Security*, *41*(4), 169–201. https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-abstract/41/4/169/12161/Ethnic-Cleansing-and-Its-Alternatives-in-Wartime-A

Butcher, C., Goldsmith, B. E., & Nanlohy, S. (2019). *Targeted mass killing data set codebook.* Australian National University.

Butcher, C., Goldsmith, B. E., Nanlohy, S., Sowmya, A., & Muchlinski, D. (2020). Introducing the targeted mass killing data set for the study and forecasting of mass atrocities. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *64*(7–8), 1524–1547. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002719896405

Carey, S. C., & Colaresi, M. (2008). To kill or to protect: Security forces, domestic institutions, and genocide. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *52*(1), 39–67. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002707310427

Carlson, D., Hadzic, D., & Tavits, M. (2020). How exposure to violence affects ethnic voting. *British Journal of Political Science*, 50(1), 345-362. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123417000448

CEH., & Rothenberg, D. (2012). *Memory of silence: The Guatemalan Truth Commission Report* (1st ed). Palgrave Macmillan.

Chandra, K. (2006). What is ethnic identity and does it matter? *Annual Review of Political Science*, *9*(1), 397–424. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.9.062404.170715

Chirot, D., & McCauley, C. R. (2010). *Why not kill them all?: The logic and prevention of mass political murder*. Princeton University Press.

Clayton, G., & Thomson, A. (2016). Civilianizing civil conflict: Civilian defense militias and the logic of violence in intrastate conflict. *International Studies Quarterly*, *60*(3), 499–510. https://academic.oup.com/isq/article/60/3/499/2469859

Cohen, D., & Nisbett, R. E. (1996). *Culture of honor: The psychology of violence in the South*. Westview Press.

Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Knutsen, C. H., Lindberg, S. I., Teorell, J., Altman, D., ... & Ziblatt, D. (2022a). V-dem codebook v11. Varieties of Democracy (V-dem) Project. *V-Dem Institute.*

Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Knutsen, C. H., Lindberg, S. I., Teorell, J., Altman, D., ... & Ziblatt, D. (2022b). V-dem [country–year/country–date] dataset v10. varieties of democracy (v-dem) project. *V-Dem Institute*.

Cribb, R. (2001). Genocide in Indonesia, 1965-1966. *Journal of Genocide Research*, *3*(2), 219–239. https://doi.org/10.1080/713677655

de la Calle L. (2017). Compliance versus constraints: A theory of rebel targeting in civil war. *Journal of Peace Resolution*, 54(3), 27–41. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343316686823

de Rooij, E. A., Goodwin, M. J., & Pickup, M. (2015). Threat, prejudice and the impact of the riots in England. *Social Science Research, 51*, 369–383. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2014.09.003

DeMeritt, J. H. R. (2015). Delegating death: Military intervention and government killing. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *59*(3), 428–454. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002713515406

Drazanova, L. (2019). *Historical index of ethnic fractionalization dataset (HIEF)* [Data set]. Harvard Dataverse. https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/4JQRCL

Dumitru, D., & Johnson, C. (2011). Constructing interethnic conflict and cooperation: Why some people harmed Jews and others helped them during the Holocaust in Romania. *World Politics*, *63*(1), 1–42. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887110000274

Dutton, D. G. (2007). *The psychology of genocide, massacres, and extreme violence: Why "normal" people come to commit atrocities*. Praeger Security International

Dwyer, P. G., & Ryan, L. (Eds.). (2015). *Theatres of violence: Massacre, mass killing, and atrocity throughout history* (1st ed.). Berghahn Books.

Elcheroth, G., Fasel, R., & Spini, D. (2008). The impact of group norms and generalization of risks across groups on judgments of war behavior. *Political Psychology, 29*(6), 919–941. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2008.00673.x

Elkins, Z., & Sides, J. (2007). Can institutions build unity in multiethnic states?. *American Political Science Review, 101*(4), 693–708. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055407070505

Enterline, A. J., & Greig, M. J. (2021). *Correlates of War Project: National material capabilities (NMC) data documentation*. Correlates of War Projects.

Esparza, M., Feierstein, D., & Huttenbach, H. R. (2010). *State violence and genocide in Latin America: The Cold War years*. Routledge.

Esteban, J., Morelli, M., & Rohner, D. (2015). Strategic mass killings. *Journal of Political Economy*, *123*(5), 1087–1132. https://doi.org/10.1086/682584

Finkel, E., & Straus, S. (2012). Macro, meso, and micro research on genocide: Gains, shortcomings, and future areas of inquiry. *Genocide Studies and Prevention*. https://doi.org/10.1353/gsp.2012.0008

Fisher, R. J. (2011). Intergroup conflict, theories of. In *The encyclopedia of peace psychology*. John Wiley & Sons. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470672532.wbepp137

Ford, R., & Jennings, W. (2020). The changing cleavage politics of Western Europe. *Annual Review of Political Science, 23*(1), 295–314. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-052217-104957

Fortna, V. P. (2015). Do terrorists win? Rebels' use of terrorism and civil war outcomes. *International Organization*, 69(1), 519–556. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24758312

Garrard-Burnett, V. (2009). *Terror in the land of the holy spirit: Guatemala under general Efrain Rios Montt, 1982-1983*. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195379648.001.0001

Gilmore, J., Melcher, N., Rowling, C. M., & Sheets, P. (2022). Us and them: The role of group identity in explaining cultural resonance and framing effects. *Mass Communication and Society*, 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1080/15205436.2022.2026399

Greenberg, J., Kirkland, S., Lyon, D., Pyszczynski, T., Rosenblatt, A., Solomon, S., & Veeder, M. (1990). Evidence for terror management theory II: The effects of mortality salience on reactions to those who threaten or bolster the cultural worldview. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 58(2), 308–318. https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.58.2.308

Greenberg, J., Lyon, D., Pyszczynski, T., Rosenblatt, A., & Solomon, S. (1989). Evidence for terror management theory: I. The effects of mortality salience on reactions to those who violate or uphold cultural values. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *57*(4), 681–690. https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.57.4.681

Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T. A., & Solomon, S. (2015). *The worm at the core: On the role of death in life* (1st ed.). Random House.

Gurr, T. R., & Marshall, M. G. (2020). *POLITY5: Political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800-2018*. Center for Systemic Peace. http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p5manualv2018.pdf

Hanania, R., & Uzonyi, G. (2017). Government-sponsored mass killing and civil war reoccurrence. *International Studies Quarterly*, *61*(3), 677–689. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqx050

Harell, A., Iyengar, S., & Soroka, S. (2017). Locus of Control and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom. *Political Psychology*, *38*(2), 245–260. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12338

Harff, B. (2003). No lessons learned from the Holocaust? Assessing risks of genocide and political mass murder since 1955. *American Political Science Review*, *97*(1), 57–73. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055403000522

Harff, B. (2012). Assessing risks of genocide and politicide: A global watch list for 2012. In *Peace and Conflict 2012*. Routledge.

Haslam, S. A., Rath, R., & Reicher, S. (2008). Making a virtue of evil: A five-step social identity model of the development of collective hate. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, *2*(3), 1313–1344. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9004.2008.00113.x

Hoare, M. A. (2010). Genocide in the former Yugoslavia before and after communism. *Europe-Asia Studies*, *62*(7), 1193–1214. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20787620

Hong, M. H., & Kim, N. K. (2019). How do external territorial threats affect mass killing? *Journal of Peace Research*, *56*(4), 529–544. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318821707

Hopf, T. (2002). *Social construction of international politics: Identities & foreign policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999*. Cornell University Press.

Huddy, L. (2013). *The Oxford handbook of political psychology* (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press.

Ibrahim, A. (2016). *The Rohingyas: Inside Myanmar's hidden genocide*. Hurst & Company.

Jonas, S. (1991). *The battle for Guatemala: Rebels, death squads, and U.S. power*. Westview Press.

Joppke, C. (2007). Transformation of immigrant integration: Civic integration and antidiscrimination in the Netherlands, France, and Germany. *World Politics*, *59*(2), 243–273. https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2007.0022

Kahneman, D. (2013). *Thinking, fast and slow*. Anchor Canada.

Kahneman, D., & Renshon, J. (2017). Hawkish biases and the interdisciplinary study of conflict decision-making. In S. A. Yetiv & P. James (Eds.), *Advancing Interdisciplinary Approaches to International Relations* (pp. 51–81). Springer International.

Kalyvas, S. N. (2006). *The logic of violence in civil war*. Cambridge University Press.

Kiernan, B. (2007). *Blood and soil: A world history of genocide and extermination from Sparta to Darfur*. Yale University Press.

Kiernan, B. (2009). The Cambodian Genocide,1975-1979. In *Centuries of genocide: Critical essays and eyewitness accounts* (4th ed.). Routledge.

Kiernan, B., & Zucker, E. M. (2021). *Political violence in Southeast Asia since 1945: Case studies from six countries*. Routledge.

Kim, D., (2010). What makes state leaders brutal? Examining grievances and mass killing during civil war. *Civil Wars*, 12(3), pp. 237–260. https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2010.509557

Kim, N. K. (2018). Revolutionary leaders and mass killing. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *62*(2), 289–317. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002716653658

King, G., & Zeng, L. (2001). Explaining rare events in international relations. *International Organization*, *55*(3), 693–715. https://doi.org/10.1162/00208180152507597

Koren, O. (2017). Means to an end: Pro-government militias as a predictive indicator of strategic mass killing. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, *34*(5), 461–484. https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894215600385

Krain, M. (1997). State-sponsored mass murder: The onset and severity of genocides and politicides. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *41*(3), 331–360. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002797041003001

Krain, M. (2000). *Repression and accommodation in post-revolutionary states*. Martin's Press.

Krcmaric, D. (2018). Varieties of civil war and mass killing: Reassessing the relationship between guerrilla warfare and civilian victimization. *Journal of Peace Research*, *55*(1), 18–31. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343317715060

Krcmaric, D. (2019). Information, secrecy, and civilian targeting. *International Studies Quarterly*, *63*(2), 322–333. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqz014

Kruglanski, A., Molinario, E., Jasko, K., & Webber, D. (2020). Ideologies that justify political violence. *Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences*, *34*, 107–111. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2020.01.004

Krusell, J., Marquardt, K. L., Medzihorsky, J., Miri, F., Pemstein, D., Tzelgov, E., von Romer, J., & Wang, Y. (2022). The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data. *V-Dem Institute.*

Kupchan, C. (2010). *How enemies become friends: The sources of stable peace*. Princeton University Press.

Leader Maynard, J. (2014). Rethinking the role of ideology in mass atrocities. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *26*(5), 821–841. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2013.796934

Leader Maynard, J. (2015). Preventing mass atrocities: Ideological strategies and interventions. *Politics and Governance*, *3*(3), 67–84. https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v3i3.320

Leader Maynard, J. (2018). Theorizing ideological diversity in mass violence. In T. Williams & S. Buckley-Zistel (Eds.), *Perpetrators and perpetration of mass violence: Action, motivations and dynamics* (1st ed., pp. 58–79). Routledge.

Leader Maynard, J. (2019). Evil, genocide, and mass atrocities. In T. Nys & S. de Wijze (Eds.), *The Routledge handbook of the philosophy of evil* (1st ed., pp. 342–359). Routledge.

Leader Maynard, J. (2022a). Ideologies, identities, and speech in atrocities. In B. Holá, H. Nyseth Nzitatira, & M. Weerdesteijn (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of atrocity crimes* (pp. 210–234). Oxford University Press.

Leader Maynard, J. (2022b). *Ideology and mass killing: The radicalized security politics of genocides and deadly atrocities*. Oxford University Press.

Lewis, D. K. (2015). *The history of Argentina* (2nd ed.). Greenwood Publishing Group.

Malešević, S. (2017). *The rise of organised brutality: A historical sociology of violence* (1st ed.). Cambridge University Press.

Mann, M. (2004). *The dark side of democracy: Explaining ethnic cleansing*. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511817274

McDoom, O. S. (2012). The psychology of threat in intergroup conflict: Emotions, rationality, and opportunity in the Rwandan genocide. *International Security, 37*(2), 119–155. https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00100

McGregor, K. E., Melvin, J., & Pohlman, A. (2018). *The Indonesian genocide of 1965: Causes, dynamics and legacies*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Melson, R. (1992). *Revolution and genocide: On the origins of the Armenian genocide and the Holocaust*. University of Chicago Press.

Melvin, J. (2018). The road to genocide: Indonesian military planning to seize state power prior to October 1 1965. In K. McGregor, J. Melvin, & A. Pohlman (Eds.), *The Indonesian genocide of 1965: Causes, dynamics and legacies* (pp. 51–69). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71455-4_3

Melvin, J., & Pohlman, A. (2018). A case for genocide: Indonesia, 1965–1966. In K. McGregor, J. Melvin, & A. Pohlman (Eds.), *The Indonesian genocide of 1965: Causes, dynamics and legacies* (pp. 27–47). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71455-4_2

Mennecke, M. (2012). Violence in the former Yugoslavia: Bosnia Herzegovina. In *Centuries of genocide: Essays and eyewitness accounts* (4th ed.). Routledge.

Midlarsky, M. I. (2005). *The killing trap: Genocide in the twentieth century*. Cambridge University Press.

Midlarsky, M. I. (2011). *Origins of political extremism: Mass violence in the twentieth century and beyond*. Cambridge University Press.

Monroe, K. R. (2008). Cracking the code of genocide: The moral psychology of rescuers, bystanders, and Nazis during the Holocaust. *Political Psychology*, *29*(5), 699–736. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2008.00661.x

Moshman, D. (2007). Us and them: Identity and genocide. *Identity*, *7*(2), 115–135. https://doi.org/10.1080/15283480701326034

Naimark, N. M. (2017). *Genocide: A world history*. Oxford University Press.

Nyseth Brehm, H. (2017). Re-examining risk factors of genocide. *Journal of Genocide Research*, *19*(1), 61–87. https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2016.1213485

Oncioiu, D. (2016). Ethnic nationalism and genocide: Constructing “the other” in Romania and Serbia. In U. Ü. Üngör (Ed.), *Genocide, new perspectives on its causes, courses and consequences* (pp. 27–47). Amsterdam University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9789048518654

Parsons, W. S., & Totten, S. (2009). *Centuries of genocide: Critical essays and eyewitness accounts* (4th ed.). Routledge.

Pettersson, T. (2021). *UCDP/PRIO armed conflict dataset codebook version 21.1*. https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/ucdpprio/ucdp-prio-acd-211.pdf

Phillips, A. (2011). *War, religion and empire: The transformation of international orders*. Cambridge University Press.

Pion-Berlin, D. (1988). The national security doctrine, military threat perception, and the “dirty war” in Argentina. *Comparative Political Studies*, *21*(3), 382–407. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414088021003004

Posner, D. N. (2004). The political salience of cultural difference: Why Chewas and Tumbukas are allies in Zambia and adversaries in Malawi. *The American Political Science Review, 98*(4), 529–545. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055404041334

Putnam, R. D., Leonardi, R., & Nanetti, R. (1994). *Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy*. Princeton University Press.

Reus-Smit, C. (1999). *The moral purpose of the state: Culture, social identity, and institutional rationality in international relations*. Princeton University Press.

Ross, M., & Sahdra, B. (2007). Group identification and historical memory. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 33(3), 384–395. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167206296103

Rost, N. (2013). Will it happen again? On the possibility of forecasting the risk of genocide. *Journal of Genocide Research, 15*(1), 41–67. https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2012.759398

Roth, P. A. (2010). *Social psychology and genocide*. The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies. http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199232116.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199232116-e-11

Routledge, C., & Vess, M. (Eds.). (2019). *Handbook of terror management theory*. Academic Press.

Rummel, R. J. (1995). Democracy, power, genocide, and mass murder. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 39(1), 3–26. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002795039001001

Rummel, R. J. (2017). *Death by government*. Routledge. https://doi-org.proxy3.library.mcgill.ca/10.4324/9780203793756

Sapolsky, R. M. (2017). *Behave: The biology of humans at our best and worst*. Penguin Press.

Scharpf, A. (2018). Ideology and state terror: How officer beliefs shaped repression during Argentina's 'Dirty War.' *Journal of Peace Research*, *55*(2), 206–221. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343317748346

Schirmer, J. (2010). The Guatemalan military project: A violence called democracy. In *The Guatemalan Military Project*. University of Pennsylvania Press.

Schwartz, R. A., & Straus, S. (2018). What drives violence against civilians in civil war? Evidence from Guatemala's conflict archives. *Journal of Peace Research*, *55*(2), 222–235. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343317749272

Scott, J. W. (2009). *The politics of the veil*. Princeton University Press.

Semelin, J. (2007). *Purify and destroy: The political uses of massacre and genocide*. Columbia University Press.

Shaw, M. (2003). *War and genocide: Organised killing in modern society* (1st ed.). Polity.

Stanton, J. A. (2016). *Violence and restraint in civil war: Civilian targeting in the shadow of international law*. Cambridge University Press.

Staten, C. L. (2010). *The history of Nicaragua*. Greenwood.

Staub, E. (2000). Genocide and mass killing: Origins, prevention, healing and reconciliation. *Political Psychology, 21*(2), 367–382. https://doi.org/10.1111/0162-895X.00193

Staub, E. (2006). Reconciliation after genocide, mass killing, or intractable conflict: Understanding the roots of violence, psychological recovery, and steps toward a general theory. *Political Psychology, 27*(6), 867–894. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2006.00541.x

Staub, E. (2010). *Overcoming evil: Genocide, violent conflict, and terrorism*. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195382044.001.0001

Staub, E. (2011). Genocide and mass killing: Origins and prevention. In *The encyclopedia of peace psychology*. John Wiley & Sons. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470672532.wbepp120

Steinberg, J. (1990). *All or nothing: The Axis and the Holocaust 1941 - 1943*. Routledge.

Straus, S. (2010). *Political science and genocide*. The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199232116.013.0009

Straus, S. (2012a). Retreating from the brink: Theorizing mass violence and the dynamics of restraint. *Perspectives on Politics, 10*(2), 343–362. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592712000709

Straus, S. (2012b). “Destroy them to save us”: Theories of genocide and the logics of political violence. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 24*(4), 544–560. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2012.700611

Straus, S. (2015a). *Making and unmaking nations: War, leadership, and genocide in modern Africa.* Cornell University Press.

Straus, S. (2015b). Triggers of mass atrocities. *Politics and Governance, 3*(3), 5–15. https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v3i3.375

Straus, S. (2016). *Fundamentals of genocide and mass atrocity prevention*. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.

Tago, A., & Wayman, F. W. (2010). Explaining the onset of mass killing, 1949—87. *Journal of Peace Research*, 47(1), 3–13. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343309342944

Ulfelder, J. (2013). *Multimodel ensemble for forecasting onsets of state-sponsored mass killing*. Social Science Research Network. https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2303048

Ulfelder, J., & Valentino, B. (2008). *Assessing risks of state-sponsored mass killing*. Social Science Research Network. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1703426

Urbinati, N. (2019). Political theory of populism. *Annual Review of Political Science, 22*(1), 111–127. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-050317-070753

Uzonyi, G. (2015). Civil war victory and the onset of genocide and politicide. *International Interactions, 41*(2), 365–391. https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2014.932786

Uzonyi, G. (2016). Domestic unrest, genocide and politicide. *Political Studies, 64*(2), 315–334. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12181

Uzonyi, G. (2018). Interstate rivalry, genocide, and politicide. *Journal of Peace Research, 55*(4), 476–490. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343317741186

Uzonyi, G. (2020). Bureaucratic quality and the severity of genocide and politicide. *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, 13*(2), 125–142. https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2019.1650387

Uzonyi, G. (2021a). State failure, genocide and politicide reconsidered. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 13691481211044654. https://doi.org/10.1177/13691481211044654

Uzonyi, G. (2021b). An informational theory of genocide and politicide during civil war. *Comparative Political Studies*, https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140211047411

Valentino, B. (2004). *Final solutions: Mass killing and genocide in the twentieth century*. Cornell University Press.

Valentino, B. (2014). Why we kill: The political science of political violence against civilians. *Annual Review of Political Science, 17*, 89–103. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-082112-141937

Van Belle, D., & Whitten-Woodring, J. (2015). The correlates of media freedom: An introduction of the global media freedom dataset. *Political Science Research and Methods, 5*(1), 179–188. https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2015.68

Vela Castañeda, M. E. (2016). Perpetrators: Specialization, willingness, group pressure and incentives. Lessons from the Guatemalan acts of genocide. *Journal of Genocide Research, 18*(2–3), 225–244. https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2016.1186948

Vargas, F, J. (2016). Strategic atrocities: Civilians under crossfire—theory and evidence from Colombia. In Anderton, C. H., & Brauer, J. (Eds.). *Economic aspects of genocides, other mass atrocities, and their prevention (428-451)*. Oxford University Press.

Verdeja, E. (2012a). On situating the study of genocide within political violence. *Genocide Studies and Prevention, 7*(1), 81–88. https://doi.org/10.3138/gsp.7.1.81

Verdeja, E. (2012b). The political science of genocide: Outlines of an emerging research agenda. *Perspectives on Politics*, *10*(2), 307–321. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592712000680

Waller, J. (2007). *Becoming evil: How ordinary people commit genocide and mass killing* (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press.

Weitz, E. D. (2003). *A century of genocide: Utopias of race and nation*. Princeton University Press.

Wilkinson, S. (2004). *Votes and violence electoral competition and ethnic riots in India*. Cambridge University Press.

Wood, R. M. (2010). Rebel capability and strategic violence against civilians. *Journal of Peace Research*, 47(1), 601–614. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20798929

Appendix A

Table Five

Effects of Threats and Exclusionary Ideology on Mass Killing, Rare-Events Logit Estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Exclusionary Id. x Civil War	-0.0772 (0.627)					
Exclusionary Id. x Guerrilla War		0.388 (0.745)				
Exclusionary Id. x Symmetric War			-0.181 (0.963)			
Exclusionary Id. x Interstate War				0.508 (0.722)		
Exclusionary Id. x Assassination					0.425 (0.636)	
Exclusionary Id. x Coup						1.033 (1.037)
Civil War	1.128* (0.481)			1.084** (0.403)	1.091** (0.404)	1.097** (0.407)
Guerrilla War		0.580 (0.506)	0.747^{+} (0.439)			
Symmetric War		1.553** (0.594)	1.644** (0.565)			
Interstate War	0.438 (0.435)	0.567 (0.404)	0.572 (0.398)	0.215 (0.481)	0.430 (0.439)	0.431 (0.438)
Coup	0.630 (0.556)	0.692 (0.551)	0.670 (0.544)	0.640 (0.545)	0.656 (0.544)	0.377 (0.727)
Assassination	1.005* (0.410)	1.028* (0.418)	1.021* (0.420)	1.021* (0.409)	0.856^{+} (0.464)	1.029* (0.423)
Exclusionary Ideology	0.732 (0.459)	0.576 (0.448)	0.761* (0.371)	0.497 (0.478)	0.567 (0.409)	0.599^{+} (0.359)
Polity Score	0.00918 (0.0317)	0.00932 (0.0318)	0.00883 (0.0316)	0.00758 (0.0324)	0.00733 (0.0310)	0.00650 (0.0323)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.0125 (0.588)	-0.0817 (0.578)	-0.0190 (0.598)	-0.0859 (0.593)	-0.0319 (0.601)	-0.0133 (0.595)
Media Freedom Score	0.670^{+} (0.372)	0.652^{+} (0.352)	0.642^{+} (0.348)	0.646^{+} (0.361)	0.664^{+} (0.367)	0.666^{+} (0.371)
Post-Cold War	-0.785* (0.387)	-0.991^{+} (0.522)	-0.965^{+} (0.533)	-0.795* (0.389)	-0.792* (0.390)	-0.777* (0.389)
Ln(Military Forces)	-0.0499 (0.146)	-0.0309 (0.147)	-0.0352 (0.143)	-0.0400 (0.146)	-0.0362 (0.150)	-0.0426 (0.144)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Ln(GDPpc)	-0.721** (0.250)	-0.779** (0.255)	-0.785** (0.253)	-0.719** (0.250)	-0.721** (0.253)	-0.731** (0.253)
Ln(Population)	0.314* (0.157)	0.342* (0.161)	0.339* (0.161)	0.313* (0.156)	0.312* (0.159)	0.321* (0.155)
Constant	-7.969** (1.434)	-8.097** (1.392)	-8.111** (1.385)	-7.854** (1.436)	-7.912** (1.445)	-8.008** (1.449)
N	6936	6936	6936	6936	6936	6936

Note. Standard errors are in the parentheses. The previous instance since last mass killing variables have been removed from the table. All the models are rare-events logistic regression models rather than logistic regression models.

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$