

**After the 'Peace Processes': Foreign Donor Assistance and the Political Economy of
Marginalization in Palestine and El Salvador**

by

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Dedication

For his years of encouragement and unwavering support, for his endless optimism and unforgettable gregarious laugh, for instilling in me the conviction that no challenge is insurmountable, and for raising me and my siblings to believe that we will leave our mark on the world, I dedicate this dissertation to my late father-Ahmad Jamal.

His model has always served as an inspiration. As a teen peddler in the streets of Saó Pablo, and later as an entrepreneur in California, he worked relentlessly to ensure that his children would be spared the travails of immigrants in foreign lands. How disappointed he would have been to know that although his children went on to grace North America's top academic institutions, they too were not spared from the politics of race, and the indecency of 'civilized patriarchies.'

I wish you were still here to see the completion of my PhD... Because I am at a loss for words, Kahlil Gibran will have to suffice: "Farewell to you, and to the youth I spent with you."

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Abstract

Under what circumstances does foreign donor assistance during war-to-peace transitions contribute to the strengthening of civil society and the deepening of democracy? I answer this question through a comparative study of civil society development in the Palestinian territories and El Salvador, where I conducted 130 interviews with directors of donor agencies, grassroots activists, and directors of NGOs. Divergent civil society developments in the Palestinian territories and El Salvador after the signing of peace accords in the early 1990s present a real puzzle given the pre-accord similarities in civil society organization between the two cases. Both the Palestinian territories and El Salvador had a legacy of rich, vibrant grassroots organization and civil society activity during their protracted conflicts. In both settings, grassroots organizations have played central roles in non-violent resistance, consciousness-raising, and the provision of community services. Moreover, after the initiation of the peace processes in both the Palestinian territories and El Salvador, foreign donors provided substantial assistance to civil society groups. However, their civil society developmental paths diverged sharply during the war-to-peace transition. In the Palestinian territories, existing civil society organizations have engaged less actively with their previous grassroots constituencies since the start of the war-to-peace transition, and the number of grassroots-based civil society organizations has decreased. Moreover, many of these organizations have been limited in their access to institutions that engage the state. In El Salvador, the re-constitution of civil society has led to its broad access to institutions that engage the state and to higher levels of grassroots inclusion in the political transformation process.

I argue that these divergent outcomes in the Palestinian territories and El Salvador reflect the differential effects that foreign assistance has on civil society after more or less inclusive political settlements. I find that in cases like the Palestinian territories, where the political settlement excludes important socio-political groups, foreign donor assistance is less likely to contribute to the strengthening of civil society or the deepening of democracy. Rather, foreign donor assistance to civil society is more likely to exacerbate political polarization and weaken civil society by further privileging those select groups already favored by the terms of the non-inclusive settlement. Conversely, after more inclusive political settlements like in El Salvador, foreign donor assistance can play a more constructive role in developing civil society and contributing to the deepening of democracy by encouraging grassroots organization, and expanding access to political institutions that engage the state.

Résumé

Dans quelles circonstances, durant les transitions de guerre à la paix, l'aide de donateurs étrangers contribue-t-elle au renforcement de la société civile et l'approfondissement de la démocratie? Je réponds à cette question à travers une analyse comparée du développement de la société civile depuis les accords de paix des débuts 1990 dans les territoires Palestiniens et le Salvador, où j'ai réalisé 130 entrevues avec les directeurs d'agences donatrices étrangères, des organismes de base, et directeurs d'ONGs. Des divergences dans le développement de la société civile dans les deux cas présentent un paradoxe étant donné les similarités dans l'organisation de la société civile avant les accords de paix. Aussi bien les territoires Palestiniens que le Salvador ont connu une riche histoire d'organisation de base vibrantes et de sociétés civiles actives pendant les longs conflits. Dans les deux contextes, les organisations de base ont joué des rôles clefs dans la résistance non-violente, la conscientisation et la distribution de services communautaires. De plus, les donateurs étrangers ont fourni des aides substantives aux groupes de sociétés civiles dans les deux pays suivant le début des processus de paix. Cependant, les voies que le développement des sociétés civiles a adoptées durant les transitions de guerre en paix présentent des divergences considérables. Dans les territoires Palestiniens, les organismes de société civile existantes ont interagi moins activement avec leurs anciens constituants de base dès le début de la transition, et le nombre d'organismes de société civile liées à base a diminué. De plus, de nombreux organismes ont vu des limites à leurs accès aux institutions qui engagent l'état. La reconstitution de la société civile au Salvador a entraîné un plus grand

accès aux institutions engageant l'état et une plus importante inclusion des mouvements de bases dans le processus de transformation politique.

Je soutiens que ces différents résultats dans les territoires Palestiniens et au Salvador reflètent le fait que les effets de l'aide étrangère sur la société civile dépendent du degré d'inclusion des accords politiques. La recherche révèle que dans les cas comme les territoires Palestiniens, où les accords politiques exclus d'importants groupes socio-politiques, l'aide de donateurs étrangers a moins tendance à renforcer la société civile ou à approfondir la démocratie. Au contraire, il est plus probable que l'aide de donateurs étrangers accentue la polarisation politique et affaiblie la société civile en privilégiant d'avantage les quelques groupes déjà favorisés par les termes de l'accord non-inclusif. Par contraste, dans des cas d'accords plus inclusifs, comme le Salvador, l'aide de donateurs étrangers peu jouer un rôle plus constructif dans le développement de la société civile et peu contribuer à l'approfondissement de la démocratie en encourageant les organismes de bases et en élargissant l'accès aux institutions politiques qui engagent l'état.

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Preface

Little did I know at the time that events on that rainy February day would shape the research agenda of my future PhD. During the winter of 1997, I was working as a journalist and researcher in Jerusalem. As part of my daily routine, I would park my car on Highway 1, the 1950 armistice line separating East and West Jerusalem, and then walk to my morning job in West Jerusalem. At noon, I would return to my car and proceed to my full-time job in East Jerusalem. On that damp Tuesday morning, however, I returned to Highway 1, only to realize that my car was no longer there. Two bystanders informed me that two young Arab men had driven away with my car.

I assumed that the rational way to proceed was to go to the nearest police station, which happened to be in West Jerusalem, the predominantly Israeli side of the city. The officer on duty patiently listened to me, and informed me that most likely, I would never see the car again - 32,000 cars are stolen in Israel per year. Dissatisfied with his response, I proceeded to the nearest Palestinian Authority police station in Abu Dis. There I filed a report for a stolen car. The officers on duty put out an alert to all personnel guarding Palestinian-Authority checkpoints near Jerusalem; the alert was to look out for a gray Subaru, with an Israeli/foreign license plate, owned by an Arab-American with a US passport.

By late afternoon, I had heard from no one. I returned to Highway 1, in hope of finding the car or evidence that would lead me to it. The car was still nowhere to be found. Across the street there was a crowd of Palestinian laborers waiting for transport to their jobs across the Green line. I approached them and asked if anyone knew any of the

car thieves in the area, and explained that my car had been stolen the previous day. I offered a US\$200.00 award to anyone who could help me find the car, and I returned home without my mother's car that evening.

Early the next morning, I received a call from one of the men I had spoken to the previous day; he informed me that he had found the car, and that I should proceed to meet him alone near a large sign by the entrance to a remote village. He specifically instructed me not to call the Israeli or Palestinian police, and to be discreet about the meeting place. Cautious of what awaited me, I told him that I would have to bring my fiancée with me. He reluctantly agreed. I was not engaged to be married, but felt more comfortable taking a male friend to the meeting. Mohammed was the first person I met that morning in Jerusalem, and he agreed to accompany me.

Shortly thereafter, we arrived at the meeting point, and three vans approached. The man I had spoken to jumped out of one of the vans, and entered the backseat of our car. After a few awkward moments, we proceeded to pick up my car. Mohammed and the young man, who by coincidence knew each other, exchanged news about family members. We arrived at a remote house on top of hill, with a number of cars parked in front. Inside the house, a group of men awaited. Since Mohammed knew some of the men, they did not ask for an award, and refused to take the US\$200.00 I had initially offered. Instead, we drank tea with mint, and exchanged information about common acquaintances.

The men informed me that I was very lucky, because the owner of the "chop-shop" to which my car was sent was committed to a 'nationalist policy,' and would only buy stolen cars previously owned by Israelis. Since my case was one of mistaken

identity, I would get my car back. To ensure that there were no hard feelings, they suggested that I should meet with the car thieves and the owner of the car shop, and that they should apologize to me.

Mohammed knew an old woman in the village, so we agreed to meet the car thieves at her house. She made us a lentil soup, and we patiently waited for the car thieves. I was perplexed to say the least, and trying to absorb all that happened in the past two days. Coming from the comforts of a Ramallah-suburb, I was even more perplexed to realize that there were villages in the West Bank that did not have continuous access to electricity. Here I was in a village that had not been touched by any post-Oslo development projects, or even promises of any development or reconstruction projects. The West Bank central region of Jerusalem-Ramallah seemed more developed during the 1970s and 1980s than this village did in 1997.

The car thieves arrived. They entered the room and timidly offered their apologies, explaining that I had been mistaken for an Israeli. Mohammed and I countered that mistaken identity did not make stealing any more legitimate. The owner of the chop shop laughed, and explained that was their only means of continuing their nationalist resistance against Israeli occupation. Prior to the Oslo Accords, they were all political activists, affiliated with one of the major leftist political factions. The owner of the chop shop had spent five years in jail between the ages of 13 and 20 for grassroots political organizing. The other thieves shared similar backgrounds.

After the 1993 Oslo Accords, they found themselves abandoned by the political leadership, and marginal and irrelevant to the development promises of the new era. One of the few options available to former political activists, with little education, was to join

the Palestinian police force. For former members of a political faction that opposed the peace accords, this option did not seem enticing. With no practical skills to facilitate their integration into the post-Oslo landscape, they were cognizant that they had no easy way to get ahead. They, therefore, opted for car theft. To remain true to their nationalist commitments, they pledged not to steal cars from Palestinians, or Israelis who opposed the occupation. After some cordial exchanges, I left the village with my stripped car. This encounter with the car thieves and its political ramifications would occupy my thought for months to come.

I became increasingly cognizant of the dubious nature of economic and political developments of the post-Oslo era. The convening of the first elections of the Palestinian Authority in January 1996 was a euphoric moment for most who were concerned with the prospects for peace and stability in the region. Even those who were skeptical about the nature of the Oslo Accords and the durability of the interim agreements that paved the way for elections were cautiously supportive. Optimism slowly gave way to dismay as many began to realize that the lives of the majority of Palestinians remained unaltered, or totally untouched by the promises of the “war-to-peace” transition. The peace process, and the peace-building initiatives associated with it, remained a mere backdrop for many Palestinians.

In order to buttress support for the peace accords, the international community provided the Palestinian Authority, as well as Palestinian NGOs, attractive aid packages. Much of the assistance to the Palestinian Authority was earmarked for budget support, and institutional development. A substantial portion of assistance was also allocated to various organizations, especially service delivery organizations, professionalized

women's organizations, and human rights and civic education NGOs. The focus of much of this support was the central regions of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The impact of this assistance was uneven, and only a fraction of Palestinian society was aware or had access to the developments that were taking place, especially at the societal level.

Consequently, the beginning of the war-to-peace transition created a situation in which the benefits were uneven and many Palestinians were further marginalized from the economic, political and social transformations that defined the transition. This marginalization (further exacerbated by rapidly deteriorating socio-economic conditions) was not limited to the opposition political organizations that deliberately chose to distance themselves from this new transition reality or were incapable of adapting. Rather, this 'marginalization' was also notable among those previously active sectors, especially grassroots organizations that felt and understood that a successful transition required systematic effort and diligence to transform the social and political landscape. These same individuals found themselves in 'disarticulated spaces,' incapable of effectively organizing or contributing to the political life of the state-in-making.

These observations led me to examine the plight of previously active grassroots sectors in other cases of war-to-peace transitions. In other cases, like El Salvador for example, previously active grassroots sectors continued to be involved in the political life and development of the country even after the transition. Although, many of the former grassroots-based organizations professionalized and became formal NGOs, there was concerted effort among NGO leaders to maintain a relationship with former grassroots constituencies. Hence, the nature of emergent civil society organizations in El Salvador differed markedly from those in Palestine with respect to their ability to incorporate and

forge horizontal linkages with other sectors of society, especially grassroots constituencies.

Three principal questions emerged from these observations. First, what factors contribute to these divergent patterns of political marginalization, and thus divergent civil society trajectories? More specifically: Why do cases that have had a similar legacy of a vibrant civil society, and active grassroots organizations end up with radically different patterns of political inclusion and marginalization after the onset of a transition? Second, how do these different civil society trajectories impact the deepening of democracy? Moreover, under what circumstances is foreign donor assistance to civil society more likely to contribute to the strengthening of civil society, the generation of social capital, and the deepening of democracy?

Chapter 1

Civil Society, Foreign Donor Assistance, and the Deepening of Democracy

Introduction

During war-to-peace transitions, under what circumstances does foreign donor assistance to civil society contribute to the strengthening of civil society and the deepening of democracy?¹ I answer this question through a comparative study of civil society development in the Palestinian territories and El Salvador. I define civil society in its broadest and most instrumental sense as the arena of political activity that embraces those political or social collectivities that interact with the state, demanding greater inclusion in political structures.²

Divergent civil society outcomes in Palestine and El Salvador following the signing of the peace accords present a real puzzle given the pre-accord similarities in civil society organization between the two cases. Both of these cases have legacies of rich and vibrant grassroots organization and civil society activity during their protracted conflicts. Moreover, extensive grassroots mobilization by the different political factions in each context was a key political strategy from the late 1970s until the late 1980s. In both settings, such organizations played central roles in the non-violent aspects of resistance,

¹ A number of scholars have adopted the term “deepening of democracy” as a substitute for the formerly used term “democratic consolidation.” These scholars contend that the term “democratic consolidation” implies that democracies will ultimately arrive at an ideal consolidated state, against which all democracies should be measured. Accordingly, some of these scholars have adopted the term “deepening of democracy” as a more accurate description of the democratic development process, with the implication that democratization does not have an ultimate destination, but rather that is an ongoing process. For more on this discussion, refer to Felipe Aguero and Jeffrey Stack, eds., *Fault Lines of Democracy in Post-Transition Latin America* (Coral Gables: North-South Press Center, 1998), and Kenneth Roberts, *Deepening Democracy: The Modern Left and Social Movements in Chile and Peru* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988).

² In a following section, I provide a detailed discussion of civil society, and how I use the term in this dissertation.

consciousness-raising, and the provision of community services. Civil society groups in both contexts also received extensive post-settlement foreign donor assistance; however, they exhibited different abilities to remain intact after the war-to-peace transition. In El Salvador, the re/constitution³ of civil society during the war-to-peace transition guaranteed higher levels of grassroots political inclusion in the larger macro-political transformations, as well as access to institutions that engage the state. Conversely, in Palestine, not only has there been a marked decrease in grassroots organizations, but the development of civil society since the war-to-peace transition has also been less inclusive of previously active grassroots constituencies.

Furthermore, civil society has assumed very different forms of organization in these cases, thus qualitatively differing in how it affects the deepening of democracy in each society. In Palestine, civil society has become increasingly elitist, characterized by professionalized NGOs, often run by a single individual, or, in the best of cases, by a small group of individuals. In the absence of political parties, civil society organizations often serve as political platforms for political figures. The vertical organization of Palestinian civil society emphasizes vertical linkages between various civil society organizations and the state or grassroots committees. In El Salvador, on the other hand, the organization of civil society has focused on the inclusion of grassroots constituencies and has emphasized horizontal linkages between civil society organizations and grassroots constituencies.

³ I use re/constitution to refer to the comprehensive re/organization of civil society which may involve the marginalization of certain actors and the privileging of others. The state, elected officials, and society and civil society leaders may also play a role in the re/constitution of civil society. Foreign donor assistance may also play a role by privileging certain actors and different forms of civil society organization.

I hypothesize that the nature of the political settlement during a war-to-peace transition conditions the impact of foreign donor assistance on civil society. By “political settlement” I mean the underlying political agreement in a society that defines the key players and frames the relations between different political groups. In the context of war-to-peace transitions, political settlements refer specifically to the peace accords between the various parties. I argue that the divergent outcomes in Palestine and El Salvador reflect the different effects that foreign aid has on civil society after more or less inclusive political settlements during a war-to-peace transition. My comparative examination indicates that in politically polarized contexts in which the underlying political settlement is not an inclusive one, the promotion of civil society by foreign donors does not contribute to the strengthening of civil society and the deepening of democracy. Rather, foreign donor assistance under such circumstances is more likely to exacerbate political polarization, resulting in higher levels of political marginalization,⁴ thereby weakening civil society. In these contexts, foreign donors are more likely to promote groups supporting (and thus already favored by) the contested settlement, heightening existing tensions between included and excluded groups. Moreover, because the transition process is less straightforward for opposition groups, individual leaders might choose to abandon their grassroots constituencies as a way of portraying greater political autonomy, thus putting them in a better position to access foreign donor funding.

⁴ Since civil society institutions are often re/constituted during war-to-peace transitions, I focus on how this process of institutionalization may embrace particular segments of society and marginalize others, and, specifically, how dominant groups (with the help of foreign donor assistance) re/constitute civil society in a way that incorporates only certain sectors of the population.

Conversely, in contexts with more politically inclusive settlements, foreign donor assistance is less likely to weaken civil society and more likely to play a constructive role. During more inclusive war-to-peace transitions, the various groups are more likely to incorporate their grassroots constituencies in the transition process. Because the transition is a more straightforward process for these groups, there are fewer incentives for leaders to abandon their grassroots constituencies. In general, these groups are often in a better position to access foreign donor funding. Moreover, foreign donor-funded projects and programs are more likely to include all parties without giving primacy to some groups over others, thereby promoting increased horizontal linkages between groups, and ultimately contributing to the strengthening of civil society and the deepening of democracy. In short, post-transition foreign aid to civil society acts to exacerbate the initial effects of inclusive or exclusive political settlements.

This research contests existing scholarship on the impact of foreign donor assistance on civil society. In general, scholars have put forth three alternative arguments. Many have argued that foreign donor assistance to civil society plays a constructive role in strengthening organizations, and hence in strengthening the quality of civil society. Higher amounts of foreign aid to civil society result in higher returns, and, consequently, in a stronger civil society.⁵ Others have argued that the impact of foreign donor assistance on civil society depends upon the historical and political-cultural legacy

⁵ For example, see Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers, eds., *Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion* (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000), and Larry Diamond, "Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors, Instruments, and Issues," in *Democracy's Victories and Crises*, ed. Axel Hadenius (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 311–370, and Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1998).

of civil society organization in a given context.⁶ According to these explanations, foreign donor assistance will adversely affect civil society where civil society organization has been historically weak. Conversely, foreign donor assistance to civil society will have a more positive impact where civil society organization has been historically strong. Finally, some scholars hypothesize that foreign donor assistance will ultimately have a negative impact on civil society.⁷

In this study, I employ the ‘structured-focused comparison’ methodological approach to determine how foreign donor assistance has affected civil society in Palestine and El Salvador. I focused my research on developments in the women’s sector of civil society in each of these cases. I conducted 130 interviews, in Spanish and English in El Salvador and in Arabic and English in the Palestinian territories. I assess the quality of civil society in each case by examining the extent to which “civil society organizations” are able to incorporate and forge horizontal linkages, either with grassroots constituencies or with other civil society organizations. I gauge the extent to which these organizations engage the state and different sectors of society by examining the types of donor-funded projects that these organizations implement and the nature of the subsequent relationships between these organizations and the relevant constituencies.

⁶ For example, see Allison Van Rooy, *Civil Society and the Aid Industry* (London: Earthscan, 1998), 198, and Ottaway and Carothers, eds., *Funding Virtue*, 115.

⁷ See for example, Sarah L. Henderson, *Building Democracy in Contemporary Russia: Western Support for Grassroots Organizations* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2003), Sarah L. Henderson, “Selling Civil Society: Western Aid and the Nongovernmental Organization Sector in Russia,” *Comparative Political Studies* 35, no. 2 (March 2002): 139-167, Michael Edwards and David Hulme, eds., *NGOs, States and Donors: Too Close for Comfort?* (London: Macmillan and New York: St Martin’s Press, 1997), Michael Edwards and David Hulme, eds., *Beyond the Magic Bullet: NGO Performance and Accountability in the Post-Cold War World* (West Hartford, Conn.: Kumarian Press, 1996), and Jude Howell and Jenny Pearce, *Civil Society and Development: A Critical Exploration* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002). I elaborate on the explanation in a following section of this chapter.

The implications of this study are particularly significant if one considers the magnitude and timeliness of the subject matter. Societies with weak civil societies in which political marginalization is rampant are more prone to a number of societal ailments, including decreased societal consensus, frustrated prospects for the deepening of democracy, and increased challenges to economic development. Simply put, weak civil society with high levels of political marginalization is bad for its own sake; all citizens should have access to political participation. Scholars generally concur that an effective civil society, understood as an inclusive one with low levels of political marginalization that allows all sectors of society to participate, contributes to the deepening of democracy.⁸ For an effective civil society to emerge, citizens should feel that they have equal opportunities to create and participate in civil society. Conversely, a weak civil society is more likely to be non-inclusive and not allow citizens to participate equally. A non-inclusive, weak civil society with high levels of political marginalization will adversely affect prospects for the deepening of democracy.⁹

Civil society serves as a mechanism to interact with the state and demand citizenship rights; a well-functioning civil society that has access to broad sectors of the

⁸ See for example, Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), and Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

⁹ In her influential critique, Terry Karl, among others, has argued that “pacted transitions” tend to be more exclusionary, and, therefore, more likely to impede democratization. She elaborates, “Regardless of which strategic option is chosen [related to pacts], the net effect of these options is the same: the nature and parameters of the initial democracy that results is markedly circumscribed.” For more on this, refer to “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America,” *Comparative Politics* 23, no. 1 (October, 1990): 1-21, Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave of Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992), 276; Karl and Schmitter, “Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe,” *International Social Science Journal*, 128 (May 1991): 269-284, Frances Hagopian, “Democracy by Undemocratic Means: Elites, Political Parties and Regime Transition in Brazil,” *Comparative Political Studies* 23, no. 2 (1990): 147-170

population facilitates this endeavor. This is crucial for a well-functioning democracy, because all full citizens must have equal opportunities to formulate their preferences, signify preferences to citizens and to the state, and have their preferences equally considered by the state.¹⁰ A weak civil society, on the other hand, implies citizens' decreased capacity to demand citizenship rights.¹¹ In a political context in which civil society is weak, citizenship rights are limited in scope. During war-to-peace transitions, decreased societal consensus makes the implementation of peace accords more tenuous. A weak civil society may also thwart or hinder economic development.

During war-to-peace transitions, a sense of political inclusion, as opposed to political marginalization, is vital for the creation of the kind of societal consensus¹² needed to support the implementation of peace accords. I use the term 'societal consensus' to refer to the minimal acceptance of existing political settlements. Political inclusion will create a sense of political efficacy and a belief that one can shape political outcomes; such a belief will temper frustration with peace accords. Political marginalization, on the other hand, will contribute to the framing of political outcomes in zero-sum terms. If a significant portion of the population feels alienated or marginalized from political developments in society, they are less likely to support a given political

¹⁰ For more on this, see Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971), 2–3.

¹¹ For more on this discussion, also refer to Augusto Varas, "Democratization in Latin America: A Citizen Responsibility," in Agüero and Stack, eds., *Fault Lines of Democracy in Post-Transition Latin America*, 145–167.

¹² Here I am not referring to societal consensus as understood by Dankwart Rustow. Rustow uses the term to refer to a sense of unified national identity. For more on Rustow's conception, refer to Dankwart A. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," *Comparative Politics* 2, no. 3 (April 1970): 337–363.

settlement. Such circumstances increase the likelihood of renewed conflict or warfare, and the resurfacing of previous cleavages.

A strong civil society may also contribute to economic development in a given society. A number of studies have empirically corroborated the relationship between an efficient civil society and higher rates of economic development.¹³ Other studies go beyond this point and specifically emphasize that not only is strong civil society important for economic development, but that grassroots political participation in economic development projects guarantees higher success rates for the given projects.¹⁴

In recent years, the dramatic increase in the amounts of funding from bilateral and multilateral donors to the promotion of democracy, especially under the rubric of civil society development, made necessary the scholarly examination of the impact of this assistance.¹⁵ Between 1991 and 1998, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) funding to civil society initiatives alone increased from US\$56.1 million to US\$181.7 million.¹⁶ Understanding how this assistance might actually weaken

¹³ Peter Evans, for example, emphasizes the need for the state and strong civil society to work together and produce the needed synergy for economic development. Peter Evans, ed., *State-Society Synergy: Government and Social Capital in Development* (Berkeley: University of California International and Area Studies Digital Collection, Research Series #94, 1997). Putnam argues that social trust is needed to facilitate economic transactions, *Making Democracy Work*, 152-162.

¹⁴ For example, refer to Michael Cernea, *NGOs and Local Development* (Washington DC: World Bank, 1988), cited in Edwards and Hulme, eds., *NGOs, States, and Donors: Too Close for Comfort*.

¹⁵ In relation to the specific context of the Middle East, refer to Sheila Carapico, "Foreign Aid for Promoting Democracy in the Arab World," *Middle East Journal*, 56, no. 3 (Summer 2002); 379-395. Imco Brouwer, "Weak Democracy and Civil Society Promotion: The Cases of Egypt and Palestine," in Funding Virtue, eds. Ottaway and Carothers, 21-48; and Mustafa Kamel Al-Sayyid, "A Clash of Values: US Civil Society Aid and Islam in Egypt," in Ottaway and Carothers, eds., *Funding Virtue*, 49-73.

¹⁶ Much of this assistance goes to seminars or training sessions on democracy, human rights, and women's rights, as well as lobbying and networking. For more on this discussion, refer to Omar G. Encarnación, "Beyond Civil Society: Promoting Democracy after September 11," *Orbis* 47, no. 3 (Summer 2003): 705-720.

civil society and impede the deepening of democracy is among the most critical questions of our time.

Literature Review

Western Donor Assistance, Civil Society and the Deepening of Democracy

Until the end of the Cold War, the idea that external actors could promote democracy was under-appreciated in the democratization literature.¹⁷ Two central developments in the post-Cold War era elevated the significance of external actors in the explanatory equation. The first development was the emergence of a post-Cold War liberal consensus that ‘free-market democracy’ was the only acceptable form of political regime.¹⁸ This consensus ensured that where democracy was weak or nonexistent, external intervention to promote democracy was not only acceptable, but in fact desirable. The second development related to the plethora of war-to-peace transitions that ensued. The end of the Cold War prompted the international community to turn its attention to bringing peace to conflict-ravaged, Cold War playgrounds.¹⁹

Since then, the notion that international actors could promote democracy, particularly through foreign donor assistance, became widely accepted. Developments in the scholarly literature followed suit, supporting the idea that external actors, including

¹⁷ The under-appreciation of external actors in promoting democracy prior to the end of the Cold War could be attributed to the nature of the first batch of democratic transitions in Southern Europe and Latin America. Subsequent transitions in Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe made it imperative that scholars address the international dimensions of democratization. For more on this, see Phillipe Schmitter and Imco Brower, *Conceptualizing, Researching and Evaluating Democracy Promotion and Protection*, EUI Working Paper SPS No. 99/9 (Florence: Department of Political and Social Sciences, European University Institute, 1999), 7.

¹⁸ Ibid., 5.

¹⁹ For more on the subject, refer to Anthony Lake, ed., *After the Wars* (New Brunswick and Oxford: Transaction Publishers, 1990): 3–8.

foreign donors, could play a critical role in the promotion of democracy.²⁰ Accordingly, since the 1990s, foreign donors have disbursed a significant amount of funding to developing countries under the rubric of “civil society development,” or “democracy assistance” in the hopes of empowering marginalized groups, including women.²¹

In general, scholars have differed regarding their assessment of the impact of this assistance on the development of civil society. Although scholars generally concur that the availability of Western foreign donor assistance has served as an incentive for many grassroots organizations to institutionalize and professionalize, especially after political transitions,²² they differ regarding the longer-term impact of such assistance on civil society. The influx of foreign funding to organizations often requires that these organizations become more ‘professionalized.’²³ Advocates of foreign-funded civil society promotion argue that the steady flow of assistance has prolonged the life of the relevant organizations, since they are no longer dependent on the vagary of voluntarism. The steady flow of assistance has ensured that some members of these organizations are paid, thus making them bound and committed to these organizations. Moreover, because

²⁰ Diamond, “Promoting Democracy in the 1990s;” Geoffrey Pridham ed., *Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe* (London, Washington: Leicester University Press, 1994); Laurence Whitehead, *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), Peter Schraeder, ed., *Exporting Democracy: Rhetoric vs. Reality* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002).

²¹ For more on the role of foreign aid in promoting democracy, refer to Shraeder, ed., *Exporting Democracy*, Mick Moore and Mark Robinson, “Can Foreign Aid Be Used to Promote Good Government in Developing Countries?,” *Ethics and International Affairs* 8 (1994): 141–158. Steven Hook, *National Interest and Foreign Aid* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995); Ottaway and Carothers, eds., *Funding Virtue*.

²² Here, I am referring to both democratic transitions, and the more general war-to-peace transitions. As I explain in a following section, both categories of transitions involve a large number of external actors, including foreign donors.

²³ For more on the requirements and impact of professionalization, refer to Lisa Markowitz and Karen W. Tice, “Paradoxes of Professionalization: Parallel Dilemmas in Women’s Organizations in the Americas,” *Gender and Society* 16, no. 6 (December 2002): 941–958.

of the resources and equipment amassed by these organizations, they have been better able to interact and network with foreign organizations,²⁴ as well as lobby and network domestically. In turn, these developments have had a positive impact on the development of civil society organizations, and hence on civil society in general.²⁵

More critical evaluations, however, indicate that the impact has not always been positive, especially in terms of generating social capital and contributing to the deepening of democracy. Among the most obvious outcomes of NGO professionalization are a loss of autonomy, a focus on short-term goals as opposed to longer-term developmental goals, questionable sustainability, and a distancing from grassroots constituencies, including previously active ones. The distancing of professionalized NGOs from grassroots constituencies has perhaps been the most problematic for the strengthening of civil society. Foreign donors play a pivotal role in the 'professionalization process.' Donors often require that NGOs professionalize so that they are better able to keep detailed financial records and submit regular evaluation reports to their funders. This process includes a host of organizational changes, such as increased specialization, hierarchies of pay, more formal channels of communication and decision-making, and often a greater need for better-educated, English-speaking employees. Consequently, professionalization results in more elitist NGOs.

Because of reliance on foreign donor assistance, many of these organizations become less autonomous and less able to set their own project-priorities.²⁶ The

²⁴ See for example, Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*.

²⁵ See for example, Ottaway and Carothers, eds., *Funding Virtue*; and Diamond, "Promoting Democracy in the 1990s."

²⁶ See for example, Teresa Caldeira, "Justice and Individual Rights: Challenges for Women's Movements and Democratization in Brazil," in *Women and Democracy: Latin America and Central and*

relationship is not one of classical dependency, in which the professionalized NGOs have no say in their fate; rather, NGOs learn to 'play the game,' to meet donor priorities in order to maintain the influx of funding from foreign donor agencies. To receive the required assistance for NGO sustainability, NGOs cater to the project priorities of the donors. In many ways, the NGOs themselves become like the donors who fund them, especially in terms of the particular techniques they adopt and their definitions of achievement.²⁷ NGO survival requires that NGOs be able to play/function by the guidelines and requirements of the donors who fund them. Because of the very nature of donor-funded activity, such as producing quantifiable outputs and meeting deadlines within funding cycles, the focus invariably shifts towards meeting short-term goals, thereby compromising longer-term developmental goals.

This process of civil society professionalization may result in the emergence of a new NGO elite. The creation of this new elite class impacts local forms of political organizing in three fundamental ways. First, this entails the atomization of civil society since the people who move to the NGO sector are usually former leaders of grassroots movements. This leaves formerly active grassroots without leadership, thereby undermining previous forms of local collective organizing. Second, by privileging the leaders of these groups, or those 'more qualified' to partake in these NGOs, social schisms between those who often have a Western education, are proficient in English, and are familiar with Western standards of NGO activity, and those who are not are

Eastern Europe, eds. Jane S. Jacquette and Sharon W. Wolchik (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998): 75–101. Also of relevance is Jane S. Jacquette, ed., *The Women's Movement in Latin America: Participation and Democracy* (Boulder, San Francisco and Oxford: Westview Press, 1994); Ottaway and Carothers, eds., *Funding Virtue*.

²⁷ Edwards and Hulme, eds., *NGOs, States, and Donors: Too Close for Comfort?*, 8.

exacerbated. The NGOs serve as a lucrative alternative for the urban elite,²⁸ particularly insofar as Western funded NGOs provide salaries that are often 3-6 times higher than the local standard.²⁹ Despite the need for skilled workers in other sectors, the discrepancy in salaries reserves the most talented and skilled workers for the Western-funded NGO sector, and not for the public sector, civil service, local political parties, or local grassroots organizations. As Ottaway and Chung explain, "...potential funding is luring activists away from other institutions and into the world of NGOs, thus threatening organizational diversity and potentially undermining forms of political activity that may be more suited to a country's specific circumstances."³⁰

Another unintended consequence of NGO professionalization is a distancing from grassroots constituencies. Since professionalized NGOs are now accountable to their donors rather than the grassroots constituencies they are supposed to serve, they do not maintain extensive contact with grassroots constituencies.³¹ The emergence of an NGO elite exacerbates such social schisms, thus contributing to further distancing. The availability of Western funding enables NGOs to emerge and function without any local support.³² These NGOs often have little access to their former grassroots constituencies, and when they do, they provide little room for former grassroots activists to grow and

²⁸ Van Rooy, *Civil Society and the Aid Industry*, 51.

²⁹ This is based on my own experience of working in the Palestinian NGO sector from 1996 to 1997.

³⁰ Marina Ottaway and Theresa Chung, "Toward a New Paradigm: Debating Democracy Assistance," *Journal of Democracy* 10, no. 4 (1999): 107-108.

³¹ See for example, Valerie Sperling, *Organizing Women in Contemporary Russia: Engendering Transition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), Ottaway and Chung, "Toward a New Paradigm: Debating Democracy Assistance," 107, or Henderson, "Selling Civil Society," 144.

³² Ottaway and Chung, "Toward a New Paradigm: Debating Democracy Assistance," 21

develop. Bebbington and Riddell go so far as to argue that "...the concentration of donor support among development NGOs in the South has sometimes led to a weakened civil society and has resulted in a disempowering of popular organizations."³³

In general, scholars examining the negative impact of foreign donor assistance on civil society, especially in terms of distancing from grassroots constituencies and the resulting political marginalization, have attempted to explain these dynamics from two different angles. For the most part, authors have simply explained this distancing as the natural outcome of NGO professionalization.³⁴ To a lesser degree, others have blamed it on particular cultural and historical characteristics within a given society.³⁵ Related to the second approach, some scholars have also focused on the variation in foreign donor assistance and civil society promotion programs.

The first group of scholars agree that the very nature of NGO professionalization results in distancing from the grassroots level, and that, as a result, the newly re/constituted civil society politically marginalizes these constituencies. This process of distancing and marginalizing is an unintended outcome of 'new ways of organizing.' Henderson, for example, explains that the relationship between NGOs and foreign donors results in vertical interactions, not horizontal linkages, between different organizations or constituencies in civil society. For example, the mandate of these NGOs shifts from

³³ Edwards and Hulme, eds., *NGOs, States, and Donors: Too Close for Comfort?* 111.

³⁴ Among those who have argued that NGO distancing from grassroots constituencies, or political marginalization of previously active grassroots constituencies within civil society is simply a natural outcome of NGO professionalization, and reliance on Western donor assistance are: Sarah L. Henderson, *Building Democracy in Contemporary Russia*; Edwards and Hulme, eds., *NGOs, States, and Donors: Too Close for Comfort?*; Howell and Pearce, *Civil Society and Development*; Anthony Bebbington and Roger Riddell, "The Direct Funding of Southern NGOs by Donors," *Journal of International Development* 7, no. 6 (1995): 879–893, and Ottaway and Chung, "Toward a New Paradigm: Debating Democracy Assistance."

³⁵ Van Rooy, *Civil Society and the Aid Industry*, 198, and Ottaway and Carothers, eds., *Funding Virtue*, 11.

assisting in the organization and mobilization of grassroots constituencies to providing them with certain services, including civic education about democratization and human rights. These redirected NGOs do not, and cannot adequately forge horizontal linkages with different sectors of civil society, including other professionalized NGOs or grassroots constituencies; therefore, they do not generate the social capital necessary for the strengthening of civil society and the deepening of democracy.³⁶

This explanation, however, fails to explain why the outcomes of NGO professionalization and the introduction of Western foreign donor assistance may vary in different contexts. More specifically, why does NGO professionalization result in distancing from the grassroots and the political marginalization of these constituencies in some contexts, while resulting in less political marginalization in others?³⁷ For example, in some contexts, the process of NGO professionalization may incorporate grassroots constituencies from the onset, while in others, grassroots constituencies do not figure prominently in the professionalization process. Moreover, these explanations do not shed any light on why donor-driven civil society initiatives may contribute to democratization in certain contexts and not in others.

Two alternative sets of competing explanations have attempted to explain this variation. The first centers on political culture; the second focuses on the different programs and projects that donors implement. According to the political cultural explanations, different societies adopt different approaches to organizing civil society.

³⁶ For more on this, see Henderson, "Selling Civil Society," and Henderson, *Building Democracy in Contemporary Russia*.

³⁷ As I argue in this dissertation, NGO professionalization in El Salvador resulted in far less political marginalization than in Palestine.

Societies with a strong legacy of grassroots organization will continue this tradition, regardless of the type and quantity of foreign donor assistance they receive. The impact of foreign donor assistance on civil society, in terms of the generation of social capital and the deepening of democracy, is therefore conditioned by the given cultural context, and not by the nature of foreign donor assistance and its role in NGO professionalization. For example, based on an analysis of four case studies, Peru, Kenya, Hungary, and Sri Lanka, Alison Van Rooy concludes that the specific historical and cultural setting of a society will ultimately shape the nature of its civil society organization. She explains, “The message is that the nature and purpose of organizing differs by culture and history in each of the four countries, but all share the act of collective organizing.”³⁸ This, however, does not explain why, in some cases, societies that have had a rich legacy of grassroots political organizing are not able to continue in that tradition following the introduction of foreign donor assistance. More specifically, this approach does not explain why newly established or newly professionalized NGOs are in some cases less able to incorporate and interact with grassroots constituencies, especially when grassroots organizing was significant in that society during previous periods.

One can logically counter that the variation in outcomes can simply be attributed to the implementation of different programs and projects. Although this explanation does, at face value, seem plausible, it does not explain why certain types of projects and programs are more prevalent in some contexts than in others. For example, why will an overwhelming majority of foreign donors promote programs and projects that involve interaction with grassroots constituencies in some contexts, while, in others, the overwhelming number of programs and projects might involve civic education through

³⁸ Van Rooy, *Civil Society and the Aid Industry*, 198.

the media or lobbying? Based on the different types of projects and programs that foreign donor agencies promote, and domestic NGOs later adopt and implement, certain patterns of political incorporation and marginalization will result at the level of civil society.

Democratic Transitions and Political Settlements

The democratic transitions literature perhaps best addresses the issue of political settlements, its relationship to political marginalization, and its negative impact on civil society. More specifically, this body of literature addresses how certain political settlements can result in the political marginalization of certain groups. One can easily extend this discussion to the realm of civil society during war-to-peace transitions. Of the four different 'modes of transition' from autocratic rule to democracy—pact, imposition, reform, and revolution³⁹—pacts, or what O'Donnell and Schmitter define as "...an explicit, but not always publicly explicated or justified, agreement among a select set of actors which seeks to redefine rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the 'vital interests' of those entering into it..."⁴⁰ come closest to political settlements, or more specifically peace accords during war-to-peace transitions. Ultimately, these pacts play a pivotal role in defining the rules of the democratic transition and in establishing which actors are the most relevant and central and which are more dispensable, or should be marginalized. Similarly, during war-to-peace transitions, political settlements also play a pivotal role in defining the most relevant and least

³⁹ Karl and Schmitter, "Modes of Transition in Latin America."

⁴⁰ Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1986), 37.

relevant actors. Despite the similarities, ‘pacted’ transitions and war-to-peace transitions are distinguished by the scope of the transition, and the centrality of external actors in promoting and pushing through war-to-peace transitions in the post-Cold War era.

Transitions theorists, like O’Donnell and Schmitter, generally agree that ‘pacted’ transitions ensure the most stable and successful transitions to democracy.⁴¹ Although stability characterizes these transitions, scholars generally concur that the exclusive arrangements of pacts ultimately marginalize certain groups and sectors of the population, thus affecting the quality of the emergent democracy,⁴² regardless of whether it is a natural outcome of pact-making⁴³ or a necessary development for stability.⁴⁴ For example, Karl explains, “In essence, they are anti-democratic mechanisms, bargained by

⁴¹ Among the scholars who share this view are: O’Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, 39; Bao Zhang, “Corporatism, Totalitarianism, and Transition to Democracy,” *Comparative Political Studies* 27 (April, 1994): 108-136; and Giuseppe Di Palma, *To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions* (Berkeley: Berkeley University Press, 1990), chap. 4. These transitions ensure that the rules of democratic politics are acceptable to the largest proportion of the elite population. For more on this, refer to Doh C. Shin, “On the Third Wave of Democratization: A Synthesis and Evaluation of Recent Theory and Research,” *World Politics* 47 (October, 1994): 135–170. Moreover, according to O’Donnell and Schmitter, the most stable pacts will involve compromises among newly emergent parties. Such pacts will require: 1) the limiting of the agenda of policy choice; 2) the proportional sharing of benefits; and 3) the restriction of the participation of outsiders in decision-making. “In exchange,” they explain, “they [the leaders of a spectrum of elected competitive parties] agree to forgo appeals to military intervention and efforts at mass mobilization.” *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, 52.

⁴² Among the authors who share the view that problematic exclusion as a result of pacted transitions may impede democratic consolidation or affect the quality of the emergent democracy are: J. Samuel Valenzuela, “Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings,” in *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective*, eds. Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O’Donnell and J. Samuel Valenzuela (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 57–104; Frances Hagopian, “The Compromised Consolidation: The Political Class in the Brazilian Transition,” in *Issues in Democratic Consolidation*, 243–293.

⁴³ Karl, “The Dilemmas of Democratization,” 12, and O’Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, 55.

⁴⁴ O’Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, 51. Others have made a similar argument as it pertains to market transitions and civil society. See, for example Thomas M. Callaghy, “Civil Society, Democracy, and Economic Change in Africa: A Dissenting Opinion About Resurgent Societies,” in *Civil Society and the State in Africa*, eds. John W. Harbeson, Donald Rothchild, and Naomi Chazan (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers), 244-245.

elites, which seek to create a deliberate socio-economic and political contract that demobilizes emerging mass actors while delineating the extent to which all actors can participate or wield power in the future.”⁴⁵ Similarly, during war-to-peace transitions, exclusivist political settlements will ultimately have an adverse affect on the quality of civil society.

Cases of war-to-peace transitions, however, as opposed to ordinary democratic transitions, are a unique category. First, a past of protracted, often violent conflicts often characterize these transitions. Second, these transitions are broader in scope and embody a number of overlapping and multi-dimensional transitions. Third, the political settlements that underpin these societies may be more recent, highlighting underlying dynamics in a more illuminating way than in ordinary democratic transitions. Fourth, external actors play key and central roles in these transitions.

The most distinguishing feature of these transitions is that these societies are emerging from protracted, often violent conflicts; this factor has considerable implications for understanding the nature of these transitions. Deep division and unresolved conflicts are often defining character of these societies. In many instances, the underlying problems that led to the conflict still linger. The peace accords might have addressed the grievances of only certain sectors of the population; by extension, the fairness of the peace accords and their success in addressing the most pressing needs of the population are also at issue. The extent to which the peace accords are inclusive of all sectors of the population will have tremendous implications for the transition to democracy. Also crucial is whether the accords are based on the dictates of human rights

⁴⁵ Karl, “The Dilemmas of Democratization,” 11–12. (See footnote 42 for authors who share this view).

or on power politics. For example, do the peace accords adequately attempt to redress infringements of the populations' human rights, or do they simply reflect the power of one party to the conflict?

Second, war-to-peace transitions are broader in scope than ordinary transitions to democracy. Reconstruction and rehabilitation are important aspects of these transitions; since the end of the Cold War, democratic and market transitions have also been central components. During times of war, "old" institutions may have been virtually destroyed by the conflict. In these cases, the democratic transition simultaneously accompanies the creation of political institutions, both the rules and laws that regulate the system, as well as the physical institutions that bridge state and society. These physical institutions include but are not limited to legislative councils, municipalities, and financial institutions that might have been destroyed or rendered obsolete during the conflict. The establishment of these institutions must also accommodate the peace accords or political settlements more generally. The institutionalization process is broader and more comprehensive than in normal transitions to democracy.

Third, the recent nature of political settlements in these societies elucidates the underlying power configurations⁴⁶ that shape the contours of civil society and state-society relations more generally. The terms of the democratic transition, as Haggard and Kaufman⁴⁷ call it, will also reflect and embody the political settlements defined by the

⁴⁶ By "power configurations," I am referring to structural conditions, such as the nature of political settlements, and the material support for certain groups or individuals that come to define the nature of elite competition.

⁴⁷ By terms of the democratic transition, Haggard and Kaufman are referring to: "...both the formal constitutional rules and the informal understandings that govern political contestation in the new democratic system. These terms include military prerogatives, rights of participation in political life, and the design of representative and decision-making institutions." For more on this, refer to Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, "The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions," *Comparative Politics*, 29, no. 3

peace accords. These emergent institutions will define which actors are central, and which are more dispensable, as dictated by the political settlement more broadly defined. This more lucid depiction of underlying power configurations may highlight the same dynamics in other transition situations in which the political settlements are not as recent, thereby obscuring issues of power.

Fourth, the role of external actors is also more central in the case of war-to-peace transitions, and in the democratic transitions they encompass. The new international order guaranteed that external intervention would play an unprecedented role in politically re-engineering these societies; this type of assistance came to be known as peace-building.⁴⁸ External actors, either as third-party mediators or as international donors, play important roles in crafting the political settlements to ‘resolve’ these conflicts, as well as aiding the state-building process that follows.⁴⁹ As third-party mediators, they are involved in the brokering of the peace accords, which often reflect and accommodate their own interests, including geo-strategic ones. As foreign donors, they play a pivotal role in aiding reconstruction and rehabilitation, economic development, and political institutionalization of these societies. Foreign donor agendas

(April 1997), 270–271. In relation to the terms of the democratic transition, we can emphasize those institutions that shape and define relations between the state and civil society. These institutions will also reflect issues of domination and power as embodied by the political settlements.

⁴⁸ The term “peace-building” came into widespread usage after Boutros Boutros-Ghali announced his “Agenda for Peace” in 1992. Boutros-Ghali conceived of peace-building as: “...rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife; and building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war.” For more on this, refer to Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping*, Document A/47/277 S/241111, 17 June 1992 (New York: Department of Public Information, United Nations) 1992. <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html>.

⁴⁹ The term “state-building” has been used in a number of ways. In *The Sources of Social Power: A History of Power from the Beginnings to A.D. 1760* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), Michael Mann used the term in its classical Weberian sense to refer to the differentiation of government functions from social institutions, and the rationalization of state institutions.

often reflect their interests in buttressing the peace accords in a war-to-peace transition context, as well as the promotion of the 'post-Cold War liberal order.' By 'post-Cold War liberal order,' I am referring to the development of Western liberal-modeled democracy, with a focus on civil rights and a lesser regard for economic and social rights. This concept also presupposes that the very process of democratization should be more Western in its cultural orientation. Hence, foreign donors are more willing to fund groups that are more liberal and Western in their orientation than more traditional, non-Western groups.⁵⁰ During the 1990s alone, the international donor community pledged more than US \$100 billion in aid to various countries emerging from war.⁵¹

The post-Cold War liberal consensus guaranteed that a democratic transition would be an integral component of these war-to-peace transitions. Therefore, external actors are directly involved in promoting democracy in these societies.⁵² The promotion

⁵⁰ Related to this concept, James M. Scott elaborates, "Different elements of the German and US foundations also support different political parties with different agendas. Through these variations, together the foundations succeed in promoting a reasonably balanced concept of liberal democracy and market economics. Nevertheless, the overall conception is Western, and foundations support those falling in line with this broad image." Quoted from James M. Scott, "Political Foundations and Think Tanks," in *Exporting Democracy*, 196. Roland Paris takes this point further and argues that liberal internationalism as a paradigm, which focuses on markets and democracy has not been an effective model in promoting peace. For more on this refer to Roland Paris, "Peace-Building and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism," *International Security* 22, no. 2 (Fall, 1997): 54-89.

⁵¹ For a more detailed discussion of donor participation in war-to-peace transition situations, refer to Shepard Forman and Stewart Patrick, ed., *Good Intentions: Pledges of Aid for Post-Conflict Recovery* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000).

⁵² According to Schmitter and Brower, "democracy promotion" refers to efforts to liberalize, democratize, or consolidate regimes by "...re-writing their constitutions, designing their electoral systems, teaching their party members how to campaign, helping civil society organizations to lobby, socializing individuals to "proper" civic values and behavior, and encouraging trade unions, business and professional associations, and state agencies to set up forms of (good) governance." For more on democracy promotion, refer to Schmitter and Brower, *Conceptualizing, Researching and Evaluating Democracy Promotion and Protection*, 9.

of democracy includes the creation of the necessary institutions,⁵³ both formal and informal,⁵⁴ as well as supporting the development of civil society. This has been the case in contexts ranging from Lebanon to Nicaragua to South Africa.

The Concept of Civil Society

Following the demise of the Soviet Union and the former Eastern bloc, “civil society” has undergone a certain renaissance,⁵⁵ becoming the academic buzzword of the 1990s. As a rediscovered arena of political activity capable of confronting authoritarianism and, later, of furthering the neo-liberal agenda, the term has come to mean everything to everyone, thus rendering it analytically problematic. The ambiguous, often inconsistent relationship between normative ideals and empirically grounded theorizing has clouded meaningful conceptualization of the term. A specific delineation of how I use the concept will help bring order to the cacophony.

⁵³ I use Guillermo O'Donnell's definition of institutions: "...a regularized pattern of interactions that is known, practiced, and accepted (if not necessarily approved) by actors who expect to continue interacting under the rules sanctioned and backed by that pattern" in "Delegative Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 5, no. 1 (1994): 55-69.

⁵⁴ As O'Donnell explains, formal institutions include: Congress, the judiciary, and political parties. Informal institutions might include those factors that are responsible for the formation and representation of collective interests and identities. *Delegative Democracy*, 57.

⁵⁵ Most modern conceptions of civil society owe their intellectual heritage to both Gramsci and/or de Tocqueville. In relation to communist and or authoritarian rule, most civil society theorists and activists adopted Gramscian conceptions of civil society. Civil society was conceived as a political arena to counter hegemonic power structures. In relation to existing democracies, civil society theorists have been more likely to adopt Tocquevillian conceptions in which trust and interest representation are maximized. These examples are illustrative of the dialectical relationship between theory and context, or more specifically, how theoretical concepts are context- dependent and a product of interaction between that context and theoretical abstraction. Civil society, understood as a realm of political activity in opposition to the state, played a central role in mobilizing against the authoritarian regimes associated with Communist rule and other authoritarian regimes. Since then, the predominant conception of civil society has been that it is a realm of political participation, not only separate, but in opposition to the state. World Bank variants have emphasized the role of civil society in service provision, thus alleviating demands on the state.

Despite the numerous definitions and conceptions employed by scholars, civil society theorists agree that civil society “...is a sphere of activity in which private persons first constitute a public.”⁵⁶ In the broadest sense of the word, the term addresses the conditions of citizenship in a given polity, both the virtue and dispositions of individual citizens, as well as a descriptive category for an arena of political participation.⁵⁷ Disagreements regarding how civil society should be conceptualized have, for the most part, revolved around three axes of contention: the relationship between civil society and the state; the function this public sphere arena should serve; and the legitimate formations that may constitute civil society.

I use civil society in its broadest and most instrumental sense in that it specifically applies to those political or social collectivities that interact with the state, demanding greater political inclusion into national political structures. Although civil society is an arena of activity that relates to and interacts with the state, it is a distinct arena of activity separate from the state.⁵⁸ As Diamond explains, “...civil society organizations seek from

⁵⁶ This concept draws from Habermas. See for example, Kenneth Baynes, “A Critical Theory Perspective on Civil Society and the State,” in *Civil Society and Government*, eds. Nancy L. Rosenblum and Robert C. Post (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002): 123–145.

⁵⁷ See for example, Virginia A. Hodgkinson and Michael W. Foley, eds. *The Civil Society Reader* (Hanover and London: University Press of New England, Tufts University), vii.

⁵⁸ Civil society theorists did not always recognize this distinction between state and civil society. Early civil society theorists such as Hume, Rousseau, and Kant, for example, did not view civil society as distinct from the state, but as coterminous with the state. To be a member of civil society was to be a citizen of a state, and to act in accordance with its laws. The essence of civil society was “civility”—the willingness of citizens to abide by the state and society’s rules. Although Ferguson suggests that society may need to be defended from political powers, Paine articulated the first clear distinction between civil society and the state. According to Paine, “...the power of the state must be restricted in favor of civil society...The state is deemed a necessary evil and civil society an unqualified good.” Accordingly, Paine counsels that civil society should resist states. See John Keene, ed., *Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives* (London, New York: Verso Press, 1988), 44–45. Later, de Tocqueville (in *De la Democratie en Amerique, 1835–40*) addressed state despotism as it pertained to democratic regimes; this type of despotism was more dangerous because it was shrouded in subtlety. To address this problem, Tocqueville suggested that political power must be divided among various arenas. The works of Gramsci

the state concessions, benefits, policy changes, relief, redress, or accountability.”⁵⁹ In line with this dichotomy, many civil society theorists concur that civil society is also distinct and autonomous from political society (meaning the arena of political parties).⁶⁰ Although the autonomy of civil society is an important criterion, the relationship between civil society and political society is not necessarily one of separation. In many instances, and quite commonly during war-to-peace transitions, many civil society organizations are borne out of political society. The emergence of civil society organizations does not take place in an apolitical vacuum; rather, when political society is incapacitated and not able to deliver, civil society itself becomes the arena of political activity. Conversely, strong, well organized, and representative political parties, may push civil society to the sidelines, or render it irrelevant.

Perhaps the greatest area of ambiguity relating to civil society centers on the function that this arena should serve. For classical civil society theorists, such as Aristotle and Rousseau, the indistinguishable arenas of state and civil society both contributed to the governing of social conflict and the protection of all citizens.⁶¹ As the distinction between civil society and the state became more pronounced, the primary

blurred this distinction in which civil society came to represent an arena of contest between those forces wanting to reassert hegemonic power and control and those forces wanting to counter and undermine it.

⁵⁹ Larry Diamond, “Towards Democratic Consolidation,” in *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*, eds. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press), 229.

⁶⁰ Diamond, “Towards Democratic Consolidation,” 230. Or more specifically, as explained by Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* “...that arena in which the polity specifically arranges itself to contest the legitimate right to exercise control over public power and the state apparatus,” 8.

⁶¹ For an elaborate discussion regarding the theoretical evolution of the relationship between the state and civil society and the function of civil society, refer to Keene, ed., *Civil Society and the State*, and Hodgkinson and Foley, eds., *The Civil Society Reader*.

concern of 18th century civil society theorists revolved around the negative implications associated with the concentration of political power. To counter state power, civil society theorists, such as Paine and de Tocqueville, concurred that this arena could and should play an important role in mediating interests between the state and society, and in countering state despotism (Hegel, in *Philosophy of Right* perhaps stood out in this regard). Since the 1990s, many civil society theorists have specifically re-conceptualized the term as an instrument to further the promotion of neo-liberal ideals, namely the promotion of free market democracy.⁶²

In general, civil society contributes to democracy in four central ways: 1) it counters state power; 2) it facilitates political participation and helps in the aggregation and representation of interests; 3) it serves as a political arena that can play a central role in the development of some of the necessary attributes for democratic development; and 4) more broadly, it plays an important role in furthering struggles for citizenship rights. These categories are not mutually exclusive, and are often over-lapping.

The first is perhaps the most general and encompassing of the functional attributes of civil society. Most civil society theorists agree that civil society can play an important role in countering state power. Organs of civil society can also play a critical role in

⁶² A detailed discussion regarding the contributions of civil society to economic development is beyond the scope of this analytical framework. Worthy of mention, however, is that, historically, several civil society theorists have addressed economic relations as central to the realm of civil society. Dating back to Hegel, and later to Marx and Engels, civil society theorists have explored the relationship between economic relations or development and the emergence of civil society. Perhaps most simplistically, Marx and Engels reduced civil society to an arena of economic relations dominated by the bourgeoisie. In more contemporary variants, scholars argue that civil society can play an important role in economic development. Civil society generates the needed social trust to facilitate economic transactions. In more neo-liberal theorizing about civil society and economic relations (best represented by World Bank proponents of this approach) civil society contributes to the economic development of generating economic growth and functioning as a replacement for waning state services. For a more contemporary discussion of the impact of democracy on economic development, refer to Juliet Johnson, "In Pursuit of a Prosperous International System," in *Exporting Democracy*.

monitoring elections, reforming the electoral system, and enhancing government accountability.⁶³

A well-functioning civil society encourages political participation. Civil society facilitates citizen interaction, thus contributing to the aggregation and organization of their various interests. Civil society provides citizens with the necessary organs and institutions for the dissemination of information and the representation of their interests. Moreover, civil society provides a strong foundation for democracy when it is able to promote the participation of different social sectors at the local level. As Diamond explains, “It is at the local level that the historically marginalized are most likely able to affect public policy and to develop a sense of efficacy, as well as actual political skills.”⁶⁴

Civil society also helps in the development of some of the necessary skills for democratic participation, such as advocacy, contestation, and political organizing. These opportunities may contribute to the development and emergence of new leaders. Civil society can also play an important role in generating the needed social trust⁶⁵ to “make democracy work.”⁶⁶ Whether one conceives of social capital more abstractly as social trust and the norms of reciprocity, or more materially as access to the resources and

⁶³ Diamond, “Towards Democratic Consolidation,” 230–234. Moreover, Diamond outlines how the democratization of civil society contributes to democratic development more generally.

⁶⁴ Diamond, “Towards Democratic Consolidation,” 231–232.

⁶⁵ According to Tocqueville, “...forms of civil association such as scientific and literary circles, schools, publishers, inns, manufacturing enterprises, religious organizations, municipal associations, and independent households are crucial barriers against both political despotism and social unfreedom and inequality.” By participating in these associations, individuals become less selfish and less fixated on their own goals, and realize that in order to obtain the support of others, they must also be willing to offer their support (Keene, 61). Ideas pertaining to civil society and the generation of social trust were later popularized by the neo-Tocquevillians, Putnam being a case in point.

⁶⁶ As explained by Putnam in his seminal work, *Making Democracy Work*.

networks that facilitate civic engagement,⁶⁷ it is necessary for the deepening of democracy. More broadly, civil society contributes to democratization by serving as the arena for the expansion of citizenship rights. The breadth of citizenship rights in a society is a useful indicator for gauging the quality of democracy in a given polity.⁶⁸

It is important to stress that both form and function are important for identifying civil society. In general, civil society includes all social collectivities that exist between the family and the state.⁶⁹ Some civil society theorists have included everything from families to political parties in their definition of civil society; this formulation, however, is problematic for a number of reasons. In relation to families, for example, this formulation does not specify how civil society differs from society more generally, nor does it capture the role that civil society should play in a given polity. I established earlier that civil society includes those social collectivities that seek to influence policy and broader political processes, whilst simultaneously demanding greater political inclusion into national political structures. Accordingly, political parties should also be excluded from this conception of civil society, since their *raison d'être* is not solely to influence or shape policy, but also to capture state power.

⁶⁷ For more on this discussion, refer to Bob Edwards, Michael W. Foley, and Mario Diani, "Social Capital Reconsidered," in *Beyond Tocqueville: Civil Society and the Social Capital Debate in Comparative Perspective*, eds. Bob Edwards, Michael W. Foley, and Mario Diani (Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 2001), 279–280.

⁶⁸ For more on this discussion, also refer to Varas, "Democratization in Latin America: A Citizen Responsibility."

⁶⁹ According to Hegel's conception, civil society includes everything that exists between the state and the family. For more on the different conceptions of civil society, refer to Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992).

The relationship between civil society and NGOs is of particular relevance to this project.⁷⁰ NGOs that seek to influence state policy or demand greater inclusion in national political structures are ‘civil society organizations.’ These civil society organizations, however, differ in their contributions to the strengthening of civil society and the deepening of democracy. A key factor determining the extent to which different NGOs contribute to the strengthening of civil society and to the deepening of democracy is the degree to which these organizations are rooted in society, and are able to incorporate and forge horizontal linkages with grassroots constituencies.⁷¹ NGOs that are more rooted in society, and are able to forge horizontal linkages and incorporate different constituencies are generally more effective, and therefore more likely to strengthen civil society. These NGOs have an increased ability to dialogue with individuals and groups, and therefore are in a better position to aggregate their demands and relay them to the state.

“Facilitating organizations” and “service providers” are categories of NGOs that are more difficult to typologize. “Facilitating organizations” stimulate the growth or development of civil society by helping people organize themselves. It is a mistake to base the assessment of “facilitating organizations” on the mandate of those organizations. Rather, these NGOs should be able to help organize various constituencies, drawing on

⁷⁰ The concept of the NGO is just as elusive as that of civil society. Scholars and practitioners have used it in a myriad of ways, stripping it of its analytic utility. For the purpose of this research project, I define nongovernmental organizations as: “...not of government, and also not for profit...they are independent organizations that receive outside funding to support either staff, programs, or both.” Carrie A. Meyer, *The Economics and Politics of NGOs in Latin America* (Westport, Conn. and London: Praeger Publishers, 1999), 2.

⁷¹ I use grassroots constituencies to refer to the various types of primary grassroots organizations. According to Thomas Carroll, a primary grassroots organization is “...the smallest aggregation of individuals or households that regularly engage in some joint development activity as an expression of collective interest.” For more on this discussion, refer to Thomas Carroll, *Intermediary NGOs: The Supporting Link in Grassroots Development* (West Hartford, Conn.: Kumarian Press, 1992), 11.

their needs and demands, and not the agendas of foreign donors or external actors. A similarly ambiguous category of NGOs is service providers. Based on this conception of civil society, unless a service-provider NGO is simultaneously concerned with influencing and shaping broader political processes, including state policies, it should not be considered as part of civil society.

Civil society is context-dependent; for an effective civil society to emerge, enabling circumstances should obtain.⁷² The level of political institutionalization in a society, specifically the level of institutionalization at the legislative and local government levels, will have a significant impact on the performance of civil society.⁷³ These institutions provide the natural connecting channels between civil society and the state. In contexts in which these political institutions are weak or absent, the performance of civil society will suffer, as civil society building will take place in a 'disarticulated space' between state and society. Government institutions should exist and be able to absorb civil society demands. Moreover, well-developed institutions of local government will provide more political openings for local participation, and thus facilitate the

⁷² This idea is not new; a number of scholars, including Tarrow, Foley and Edwards, and Berman, have attacked the over-emphasis on civil society as well as Putnam's emphasis on social capital. In a cogent critique of Putnam, Sydney Tarrow explains, "The absence of civic capacity is the by-product of politics, state-building, and social structure...the causes are structural...policy-makers who attack the lack of social capital by encouraging association would be attacking the symptoms and not the causes of the problem," quoted from Sydney Tarrow, "Making Social Science Work Across Space and Time: A Critical Reflection on Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work," *The American Political Science Review* 90, no. 2 (June, 1996): 389–397, Foley and Edwards make a similar argument, though also focusing on the role of political parties in establishing the various associations in Michael W. Foley and Bob Edwards, "The Paradox of Civil Society," *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 3 (July, 1996): 38–52. Similarly, Sheri Berman has argued that to determine the nature of the impact of civil society on democratic development, "...we need to marry an analysis of societal and cultural factors to the study of political institutions..." quoted from Sheri Berman, "Civil Society and Political Institutionalization," *American Behavioral Scientist* 40, no. 5 (March/April, 1997): 562–574.

⁷³ In addition, the level of legal institutionalization will affect the performance of civil society. The rule of law and an enabling legal framework will encourage civil society organization and activity, and facilitate its development and performance.

emergence of an effective civil society.⁷⁴ A more representative legislative body will also provide civil society with more institutional openings.

The internal characteristics of civil society will also determine how effective that civil society will be. A more dense and plural civil society that is inclusive of broad sectors of society will better contribute to the deepening of democracy because citizens of all walks of life, not only the elite, are afforded greater opportunities to participate in civic life. For civil society to contribute to the deepening of democracy, civil society organizations should be able to forge horizontal linkages with other civil society organizations and with grassroots constituencies. As Putnam stipulates, it is horizontal networks of civic engagement that generate the social capital needed for democratization, as opposed to vertical linkages.⁷⁵ Vertical linkages are hierarchical and not likely to stimulate citizen participation or engagement. Moreover, a well-organized civil society contributes to the better organization of interests, and therefore to the growth of cooperative networks and the better representation of these interests. The internal democratic character of civil society is also a good indication of the extent to which relevant organizations can disseminate information about democratic values and practices. Civil society organizations that serve as personal platforms or do not abide by democratic principles within their own structures are less likely to contribute to the deepening of democracy.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ For more on this refer to Gerd Schönwälder, *Linking Civil Society and the State: Urban Popular Movements, the Left, and Local Government in Peru* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), chapter 2.

⁷⁵ Putnam, *Making Democracy Work*, 176.

⁷⁶ Diamond, "Towards Democratic Consolidation," 234–236.

The Argument

I hypothesize that the impact of foreign donor assistance on civil society during war-to-peace transitions depends upon the nature of the political settlement. The political settlements that shape political relations in these societies will strongly affect subsequent patterns of organization at the level of civil society, thus affecting the generation of social capital and the deepening of democracy. More specifically, I argue that the relative inclusiveness of a political settlement will reproduce itself in civil society, with foreign aid to civil society exacerbating more or less inclusive political settlements. Hence, in contexts with more inclusive political settlements, foreign aid to civil society will play a more constructive role and contribute to the strengthening of civil society and the deepening of democracy. Conversely, in contexts with politically less inclusive settlements which exclude major political groups, foreign donor assistance to civil society is more likely to exacerbate polarization, thereby adversely affecting civil society as well as the deepening of democracy. By giving primacy to groups already included in a political settlement, foreign donor assistance exacerbates pre-existing tensions between ‘the included’ and ‘the excluded’ in a political settlement.

My dependent variable is the quality of the emergent civil society in these two contexts, paying particular attention to its level of inclusion and marginalization,⁷⁷ level

⁷⁷ The term “marginalization” has been used in a myriad of ways, often pejorative, denoting some sort of exclusion from broader society. Most commonly, the term has been used to refer to residents of squatter settlements, the unemployed or underemployed, ethnic and racial minorities, and deviants. In her seminal work on marginalization, *The Myth of Marginality: Urban Poverty and Politics in Rio de Janeiro*, Janice Perlman debunked several myths pertaining to those who live in squatter settlements. Most importantly, she cogently demonstrated that conceptions of marginality should be broadened to address the structural factors that give rise to conditions of marginality. Moreover, she empirically corroborated that shantytown dwellers are not economically, politically, and socially marginal because of attitudinal factors such as low motivation and parochialism, but are rather marginal in terms of their exclusion, exploitation, and stigmatization. As she explains, “The *favelados* (Brazilian term for those who live in squatter settlements) then, are not marginal to the national economy; they are integrated into it on terms detrimental

of horizontal organization, level of co-operation, and its ability to make representative demands on the state. I assess the quality of civil society in these two contexts by examining different patterns of interaction of the women's sectors in Palestine and El Salvador. First, I examine the capacity of the women's sector in each of the respective cases to engage the state. I am particularly interested in the accessibility of the state, including local government, to different sectors of the women's sector. Second, I examine patterns of interactions between the different professionalized NGOs of the women's sector, and between professionalized women's NGOs and other professionalized NGOs. Third, and most importantly, I examine the capacity of the women's sector in each of these respective cases to engage the grassroots.

My key independent variable is political settlements. For the purpose of this research project, the political settlements specifically refer to the peace accords that were signed in these two cases of war-to-peace transition—the 1991 Madrid Peace Accords and the 1993 Oslo Accords in the Palestinian case, and the 1992 Chapultepec Accords in El Salvador. In non war-to-peace transitions, political settlements are more broadly understood as political agreements that define political relations in a given society. I am particularly interested in the level of inclusion of the political settlements; more specifically, are they supported and endorsed by all political groups or tendencies, or are they more restrictive and narrow in terms of the groups that support and endorse them? Of my two cases, the Chapultepec Accords are more inclusive in nature, since all major

to them,” Janice Perlman, *Myth of Marginality: Urban Poverty and Politics in Rio de Janeiro* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1976), 161. Similarly, later works on marginalized communities, such as *Rituals of Marginality* by Carlos Vélaz-Ibanez, argue, “The causes of marginalization and the factors preventing such populations from becoming “demarginalized” lie outside and not within these populations. Many of the reasons lie within the Mexican social structure” *Rituals of Marginality: Politics, Processes, and Cultural Exchange in Central Urban Mexico, 1969–1974* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 18–21.

political groups in El Salvador, from both the left and the right, supported these accords. Conversely, in the case of the Madrid and Oslo Accords, only *Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastini* (the Palestinian National Liberation Movement, *Fateh*), the leadership party of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was the main signatory, with support from the Palestinian Democratic Union (FIDA- a splinter party of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine), and to a lesser extent, from the Palestinian People's Party (PPP). Important political groups in the Palestinian context, including the various Islamist groups and the more radical left, did not support or endorse the peace accords, rendering them more exclusive in nature.

During war-to-peace transitions, political settlements to a large extent determine the nature and level of political institutionalization in these societies, especially in relation to legislative bodies and local government. In a more inclusive settlement in which all major political groups are involved, the legislative body and the related electoral laws are likely to be more representative. Conversely, in more exclusive political settlements, dominant groups have a greater propensity to design legislative bodies and related electoral laws to exclude those groups that are not party to the political settlement. Moreover, dominant groups might restrict the ability of opposition groups to promulgate laws. The level of institutionalization at the level of local government is likely to reflect these same considerations. In general, societies undergoing war-to-peace transitions are likely to have weak government structures, particularly at the local level. In more inclusive political settlements, in which only insignificant actors, if any at all, oppose a given peace accord, the institutionalization of local government is a more straightforward process. In the context of non-inclusive political settlements, local

government elections might allow an opposition group to prevail at this level of government, which might challenge the settlement. Therefore, dominant groups might postpone elections to a more opportune moment, in which the victory of an opposition group would not threaten the implementation of the relevant political settlements. Similarly, dominant groups might also design local government election laws to discourage or prevent opposition groups from prevailing at this level of government.

The level of political institutionalization will determine the ability of different groups in civil society to interact with the state. In contexts with politically non-inclusive settlements, dominant groups are more likely to restrict political institutionalization at these two levels, either through the creation of restrictive electoral laws, or by not convening elections. This results in a weak political institutional framework, and a ‘disarticulated space,’ between the state and society. Moreover, when dominant groups do allow for political institutionalization, foreign donors are likely not to support these institutions, further obstructing the ‘articulation of these spaces.’ Societal groups, especially those affiliated with opposition groups, therefore have less access and opportunity to interact with and make demands on the state. Conversely, in contexts with more politically inclusive settlements, political institutionalization at these two levels is likely to be more representative and accessible to different groups in society. This results in a more ‘articulated space’ that provides societal groups with more access and opportunity to interact with and make demands on the state.

My key intervening variable is the role of foreign donor assistance, especially of Western origin, in shaping different civil society outcomes. Foreign donor assistance does not affect civil society in an apolitical vacuum; to assume so is to assume that

foreign donor assistance itself is apolitical, and that the generation of social capital and strengthening of civil society are not context-dependent.

In post-Cold War, war-to-peace transitions, external actors, specifically foreign donors, play a central role in the re/constitution of civil society. The two simultaneous goals of foreign donors—the buttressing of political settlements, and the promotion of the ‘post-Cold War liberal order’—govern the re/constitution process. By ‘post-Cold War liberal order,’ I am referring to the development of Western liberal-modeled democracy, with a focus on civil rights and a lesser regard for economic and social rights. This concept also presupposes that the very process of democratization should be more Western in its cultural orientation. Hence, foreign donors are more willing to fund groups that are more liberal and Western in their orientation than more traditional, non-Western groups.⁷⁸ Foreign donor assistance plays a pivotal role in exacerbating polarization during war-to-peace transitions by promoting only those actors that are already included in or party to the political settlement and are able to promote the ‘post-Cold War liberal order.’ Through the promotion of certain programs and projects, foreign donor assistance plays a role in mediating relations between those who are included in a political settlement and those who are not, giving primacy to those who are already included in a political settlement. Foreign donors are thus likely to create or reinforce hierarchical relationships among the different groups in civil society.

⁷⁸ Related to this concept, James M. Scott elaborates, “Different elements of the German and US foundations also support different political parties with different agendas. Through these variations, together the foundations succeed in promoting a reasonably balanced concept of liberal democracy and market economics. Nevertheless, the overall conception is Western, and foundations support those falling in line with this broad image.” Quoted from Scott, “Political Foundations and Think Tanks,” in *Exporting Democracy*, 196.

Moreover, in contexts with politically exclusive settlements, foreign donor-promoted civil society building takes place in more ‘disarticulated spaces.’ Foreign donors’ unwillingness to support these institutions exacerbates the disarticulation of these spaces. Under these circumstances, civil society organizations are more constrained by the institutional setting, since they are limited in terms of both their access to the state and their ability to make demands on it. Moreover, donor-funded projects and programs are less likely to involve components that require co-operation or interaction with legislative and local levels of government. Conversely, in politically inclusive settlements in which all major political groups are involved, dominant groups are more likely to design or endorse more inclusive political institutionalization at both levels. Thus, foreign donor-promoted civil society building takes place in more ‘articulated spaces.’ Donor-funded programs and projects are more likely to involve co-operation or interaction with legislative and local levels of government, further articulating these spaces, and allowing for the emergence of a more effective civil society.

My discussion thus far pre-supposes an inherent link between civil society and political society. Much of the literature on civil society disregards the crucial point that much of civil society during transitions—democratic transitions or war-to-peace transitions more generally—is often borne out of political society. According to most accepted Western liberal understandings regarding the demarcation between political society and civil society, political society represents those forces that seek to capture state power, and civil society represents those forces that seek to influence and make demands on the state. Implicit in this conception is the idea that certain actors are wed to one realm or another, frozen in time and space, seeking either to capture state power or to

shape it. One can more accurately describe the interactions between these two realms as forever shifting sites of contest, as individuals move from one site to another. In developing, as well as developed countries, those aspiring to capture state power often begin their political activity as civil society activists in the hopes of amassing supporters and then running for elections. These dynamics are reversible: members of parliament or other elected officials may become civil society activists, hoping to mobilize and prepare for the next timely opportunity to re-enter competition in political society. This is even truer in societies in which funding for campaigning, and for political parties more generally is not readily available.⁷⁹ In such instances, what we understand as civil society becomes a realm of political activity involved in ‘capturing’ foreign funding to facilitate the development of political parties. Because of the politicized nature of civil society, foreign donors are inclined to fund some actors over others, depending on their own political and social preferences.

Since the initiation of the peace accords in Palestine and El Salvador, developments in civil society point to the decisive relationship between civil society and political society. The different factions of the PLO and the FMLN played important roles in transforming existing grassroots committees into professionalized NGOs,⁸⁰ and in initiating and formulating the strategies that would establish many future professionalized NGOs. This was only possible because foreign donors made certain forms of assistance available. As I will demonstrate in the following chapters, the existing political

⁷⁹ See for example, Vickie Langohr, “Too Much Civil Society, Too Little Politics: Egypt and Liberalizing Arab Regimes,” *Comparative Politics* 36, no. 2 (June, 2004): 181-205.

⁸⁰ I distinguish between grassroots committees and professionalized NGOs, in that the latter have a higher degree of institutionalization and rely on foreign donor assistance. Moreover, by definition, grassroots committees rely on grassroots constituencies for legitimacy; that is not necessarily the case for professionalized NGOs.

settlements shaped the impact of foreign donor assistance on the Palestinian and Salvadoran women's sectors.

In such situations, a number of patterns emerge. If a group is supportive of a political process and can promote the 'post-Cold War liberal' agenda of foreign donors, it will be an important actor, both in political society and in the newly re/constituted civil society. If a group is opposed to a political process but can support and promote the 'post-Cold War liberal' agenda of foreign donors, foreign donor agencies will promote its leaders as civil society actors, but only as individuals who have distanced themselves from their former political constituencies. These individuals are likely to create professionalized NGOs with little contact with their former grassroots constituencies. If foreign donors consider a group to be opposed or irrelevant to a political process, they will marginalize this group in the re/constitution of civil society by denying it access to foreign funding. Opposition groups are also likely to be marginalized in political society. Similarly, if foreign donors consider a group to be opposed to or not supportive of the 'post-Cold War liberal order,' they will marginalize this group in the re/constitution of civil society by denying it access to foreign donor funding.

When NGO professionalization becomes prevalent in terms of civil society development, formerly affiliated opposition leaders are less likely to include their constituencies in the professionalization process. These newly professionalized NGOs are less able to incorporate and forge the horizontal linkages with grassroots constituencies necessary for generating social capital.⁸¹ Social capital here means,

⁸¹ According to Robert Putnam, horizontal networks of civic engagement generate the social capital needed for democratization, as opposed to vertical linkages. As he explains, "Horizontal networks bring together individuals or groups as agents that are equal in status and power. Others are 'vertical,' linking unequal agents in asymmetric relations of hierarchy and dependence [as embodied in patron-client

“Stocks of social capital, such as trust, norms, and networks, tend to be reinforcing and cumulative. Virtuous circles result in social equilibria with high levels of co-operation, trust, reciprocity, civic engagement, and collective well-being.”⁸² However, I stress the material dimension of this definition, focusing on access to resources and networks that facilitate civic engagement. According to Edwards, Foley, and Diani, social capital is context-dependent, because all individuals or groups do not have equal access to resources. They further explain, “...the use of social capital depends upon specific networks embedded within the broader system of stratification; that is how and why different networks provide access to richer or poorer stores of resources.”⁸³ Although a level of trust is necessary for citizens to engage in political participation, a conception of social capital that solely focuses on trust provides little insight into the “actual mechanisms by which social relations facilitate or block individual and collective access to resources.”⁸⁴ Such a conception of social capital is especially relevant to this study, which examines the manner and extent to which citizens have access to the newly re/constituted civil society and are, in turn, better able to interact with the state at both the legislative and local government levels.

Similarly, in exclusive contexts, donor-funded projects and programs are likely to create hierarchical relationships between those who are supporters of political settlements

relationships]...A vertical network, no matter how dense and no matter how important to its participants, cannot sustain social trust and co-operation. In the real world, of course, almost all networks are mixes of the horizontal and the vertical...Nonetheless, the basic contrast between horizontal and vertical linkages, between the ‘web-like’ and ‘may-pole-like,’ is reasonably clear.” For more on this discussion, refer to Putnam’s seminal work, *Making Democracy Work*, 173–176.

⁸² Putnam, *Making Democracy Work*, 177.

⁸³ Edwards, Foley, and Diani, “Social Capital Reconsidered,” 279.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 280.

and in a better position to promote the ‘post-Cold War liberal order’ and those who are not, by making donor assistance more readily available to the former groups. The hierarchical, vertical relationship exacerbates the pre-existing tension and animosity between the various groups, resulting in increased polarization and decreased co-operation in civil society, thereby adversely affecting civil society.

These dynamics, however, differ in political contexts in which the political settlement is an inclusive one. In these contexts, donors are less concerned that former opposition leaders or groups might strengthen themselves by amassing support bases through their grassroots constituencies. Foreign donor assistance programs and projects are therefore more likely to encourage interaction with grassroots constituencies. NGO professionalization often requires that professionalized organizations maintain contact with grassroots constituencies, and that NGO interactions emphasize horizontal linkages. During more inclusive war-to-peace transitions, foreign donor-funded civil society building is more likely to result in the development of a more inclusive civil society with more horizontal linkages, thus more effectively contributing to the deepening of democracy. In cases in which the political settlement’s degree of exclusion lies somewhere between these two extremes, foreign donor funding might help development of civil society, yielding more or less positive returns in terms of the generation of social capital and the deepening of democracy.

Methodology

In this section, I begin with a discussion of the methodological approach I employ. I then discuss how I gathered the data and information, and how I measure the

variables. Finally, I justify my selection of the Palestinian territories and El Salvador as case studies, as well as my focus on women's groups.

In this dissertation, I employ the 'structured focused comparison' methodological approach to examine the factors that shape different civil society outcomes in the Palestinian territories and El Salvador. The 'structured focused comparison' requires the collection of data on the same variables across units. This approach "emphasizes discipline in the way one collects data...as a way of systematizing the information in descriptive case studies in such a way that it could conceivably be used for descriptive or causal inference."⁸⁵ This method allows for a more effective determination of different outcomes by isolating certain variables. In this case, the impact of political settlements is my key independent variable, and the defining role of foreign donor assistance in the re/constitution of civil society is my intervening variable in both Palestine and El Salvador. In keeping with the requirements for structured focused comparison, I collected data on the same variables across cases.⁸⁶ For my fieldwork, I spent four months in Palestine, between 6 June 2001 and 1 October 2001, and four months in El Salvador, between 15 February 2002 and 15 June 2002. I conducted 130 semi-structured and open-ended interviews with donors, directors of NGOs, and other relevant actors in Palestine and El Salvador. I also collected relevant primary and secondary materials, such as newspaper articles, reports, and books in Arabic, English, and Spanish.

My dependent variable is the quality of the emergent civil society in these two contexts, paying particular attention to its ability to make representative demands on the

⁸⁵ Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sydney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 47.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 45.

state, its level of inclusion and marginalization, and its level of horizontal organization and co-operation. I assess the quality of civil society in these two contexts by examining patterns of interaction in the Palestinian and Salvadoran women's sector. First, I examine the capacity of the women's sectors in each of the respective cases to engage the state. Of specific concern is the degree of success of different women's groups in making demands on the state. I am particularly interested in the accessibility of the state, including the legislative council and local government, to the different groups of the women's sector. I then examine patterns of horizontal linkages between the professionalized women's NGOs, and between these NGOs and the grassroots constituencies. I pay particular attention to the degree of competition and co-operation between the different professionalized NGOs, and the degree of meaningful incorporation of the grassroots.

Political settlements are my key independent variable. Political settlements refer specifically to the peace accords in these two cases of war-to-peace transition: the 1991 Madrid peace accords and the 1993 Oslo Accords in the Palestinian case, and the 1992 Chapultepec peace accords in El Salvador. Of particular concern is the degree of inclusion of these accords, and the extent to which different political groups or tendencies support or endorse them. The Chapultepec accords were more inclusive since all major political groups, from both the left and the right, in El Salvador supported them. The Madrid and Oslo Accords, on the other hand, were more non-inclusive. *Fateh*, the leadership party of the PLO, was the main signatory. The accords were supported by FIDA and the PPP, but opposed by important groups, such as the various Islamist groups and the more radical left, thus rendering them more non-inclusive in nature.

During war-to-peace transitions, political settlements also determine the nature of political institutionalization in these societies, especially at the legislative and local government levels. In relation to the level of political institutionalization, I specifically examine electoral laws, availability of resources to opposition groups, and whether or not elections have been convened. I am also interested in whether or not different communities, including opposition-affiliated grassroots constituencies, have access to these levels of government.

Foreign donor assistance is my key intervening variable.⁸⁷ In these cases, most of the funding received by civil society organizations is from foreign sources, especially Western sources. To determine the extent to which the political settlements shape the impact of foreign donor assistance on civil society, I questioned directors of foreign donor agencies regarding the types of groups and organizations they were willing to fund, and whether this depended upon the groups' political position vis-à-vis the peace accords. I also questioned them regarding the nature of their programs, as well as their program priorities, structure, and goals. I conducted 18 semi-structured and open-ended interviews in El Salvador and 19 in Palestine with the directors of foreign donor agencies that specifically funded programs relating to women, democracy promotion, or civil society building. To acquire a more specific understanding of the impact of foreign

⁸⁷ For the most part, donor aid programs are regarded as unique; therefore, they are not thought to lend themselves well to comparative analysis. Among the notable exceptions in this regard are the earlier pioneering work of R.D. McKinlay, "The Aid Relationship: A Foreign Policy Model and Interpretation of the Distribution of Official Bilateral Economic Aid of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, 1960–1970," *Comparative Political Studies* 11, no. 4 (January, 1979): 411–453; Hook, *National Interest and Foreign Aid*; Alain Noël and Jean-Philippe Thérien, "From Domestic to International Justice: The Welfare State and Foreign Aid," *International Organization* 49, no. 3 (Summer 1995): 523–53; Schraeder, ed., *Exporting Democracy*; and Peter J. Schraeder, Steven W. Hook, and Bruce Taylor, "Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A Comparison of American, Japanese, French and Swedish Aid Flows," *World Politics* 50, no. 2 (1998): 294–323. For a more in-depth discussion of the dearth of comparative analysis among donors, also refer to Schraeder, Hook; Taylor, "Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle."

donor assistance on the respective women's sectors, I questioned the various directors and project managers of the women's organizations regarding their donors, the donors' programmatic priorities, and the nature of their relations with their donors. To achieve a more comprehensive understanding of the impact of foreign donor activity in these two contexts, I also collected official donor flow data to Palestine and El Salvador from 1991 to 2001, as well as secondary literature pertaining to the role and impact of foreign donor activity in these two contexts.

In selecting my interviewees, I first compiled a list of the foreign donor agencies that are active in each context. In Palestine, I acquired a copy of the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA) annual yearbook, which includes a list of all foreign donor agencies active in the Palestinian territories and a description of the program areas in which these agencies are active. Initially, my main priority was to interview and examine state or state-sponsored foreign donor agencies in order to determine whether these funding agencies were more particular regarding the types of groups and organizations they were willing to fund. My final list of foreign donor interviewees met these criteria. To ensure that I did not leave out any significant donors in the areas related to women, democracy promotion, and civil society building, I crosschecked my list with the matrix of donor flows to the Palestinian Authority (PA), compiled by the Ministry of Planning and International Co-operation (MOPIC). I also crosschecked this list with a number of individuals who were familiar with the activities of foreign donor agencies in the Palestinian territories. When a given state operated through affiliated foundations or non-governmental organizations, rather than state-sponsored donor agencies, I added those organizations to my list. My final list included

– 19 foreign donor agencies, including non-governmental organizations, foundations, and state-sponsored donor agencies.

Information regarding foreign donor agencies operating in El Salvador was not as readily available. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) compiled a list of donor flows to the country between 1992 and 1997. Like the list compiled by the MOPIC, this list did not include all funding made available directly to NGOs. Personal contacts who work for foreign donor agencies or for non-governmental organizations in El Salvador provided me with contact information for the foreign donors operating in the country. After compiling an extensive list of foreign donor agencies, I contacted these agencies, inquiring about whether or not they funded women-related programs, democracy promotion, or civil society building. In El Salvador, the fact that many foreign donor agencies operating in the country are not based in El Salvador, but in neighboring Nicaragua or another Central American country complicated the situation. My final list consisted of 18 foreign donor agencies based in El Salvador, and a small number of foreign agencies based outside of El Salvador.

One of the biggest challenges of my research was the compilation of symmetric donor flow information in Palestine and El Salvador, a task that was made more difficult by the fact that the same foreign donors were not always active in both contexts. In order to construct a more symmetric portrayal of foreign donor activity in both contexts, I therefore chose to focus more closely on USAID's project priorities related to their democracy and governance programs in both contexts. The comparison of USAID activities allowed me to determine which groups in each case were eligible to receive funding from USAID, the extent to which grassroots constituencies benefited from this

– funding, and the manner in which the projects promoted by USAID shaped interactions with other civil society organizations and state institutions. To enhance symmetry in the quantitative data, I rely on donor flow data compiled by the OECD, since the methodologies of data compilation and organization are more likely to be similar in the two contexts.⁸⁸

In total, I conducted 37 semi-structured and open-ended interviews with directors of the foreign aid agencies. In both places, I often conducted these interviews in English, since English is the working language of most foreign donor agencies. In El Salvador, however, I also conducted a number of interviews in Spanish, since Salvadoran staff operate many of the smaller donor agencies. In my interviews with directors or program managers of foreign donor agencies, I inquired about the donor's programmatic priorities, their geo-strategic considerations and aid activity in the given region relative to other regions, their goals, and their understandings of such concepts as democracy and civil society. In asking such questions, it was important to distinguish between the personal opinions of the directors or program managers of aid agencies and the official positions of the given agency. To prevent the conflation of personal opinions and official agency opinions, I always asked my interviewees to specify whether the given discussion was the official agency policy. Therefore, I cite many of the quotes in this text as personal attributions, rather than official agency positions. During these interviews, I also

⁸⁸ Despite my extensive attempts to paint a comprehensive and accurate picture of donor activity in the two contexts, there is no foolproof guarantee of the accuracy of UNDP and OECD. In some instances, foreign donor agencies do not report their exact disbursements to these organizations. This is especially the case in relation to donor agency funding, or solidarity funding to non-governmental organizations. Nevertheless, this important issue demands study. The best one can do is examine the data provided by multiple sources, and be cognizant of the possible limitations of the data under examination.

attempted to access summaries of donor flows for the period between 1991 and 2001, as well as other documentation regarding their aid activities.

Case Justification

My cases are Palestine and El Salvador from 1991 to 2001.⁸⁹ Despite numerous similarities between these two cases, especially in terms of their legacy of grassroots organization and political inclusion during their respective conflicts, Palestine and El Salvador exhibited markedly different trajectories in civil society organization after the onset of the war-to-peace transition. In El Salvador, the re-constitution of civil society that ensued guaranteed a continuation of grassroots political inclusion and mechanisms to engage the state. In Palestine, the re/constitution of civil society, and most foreign donor civil society promotion initiatives hardly sought to incorporate grassroots constituencies. The historic similarities in terms of grassroots mobilization and organization during the respective conflicts are perhaps the greatest and most important justification for conducting a comparative study of the two cases. Both Palestine and El Salvador experienced protracted conflicts characterized by massive economic inequality between the warring parties, requiring that grassroots mobilization and organization also address the basic material and economic needs of disadvantaged constituencies. In both cases, political factions played critical roles in mobilizing and organizing grassroots

⁸⁹ To ensure the comparability of my cases, I end my research in Palestine on 1 October 2001, before the escalation of *Al-Aqsa Intifada* and Israel's reinvasion of Area A. Until October, 2001, many NGOs and other civil society organizations were still implementing "normal" projects and programs, in addition to some emergency ones. Following the escalation of *Al-Aqsa Intifada* in October 2001, the strict imposition of curfews and the intensification of bombing raids on Area A seriously challenged and interfered with the work of NGOs and other civil society organizations, bringing much of their work to a standstill, and causing them to focus almost entirely on emergency relief and international lobbying projects. Therefore, in examining developments between 1991 and 2001, my research focuses on the changes that preceded the outbreak of *Al-Aqsa Intifada*.

constituencies during the 1970s and the 1980s. In 1991, both societies began undergoing a war-to-peace transition, during which external actors played important roles in providing diplomatic support and propelling the peace accords forward. Moreover, in both cases, foreign donor agencies played important roles in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of these countries, in the provision of relief and economic assistance, and in the ensuing efforts to promote democracy, including donor-promoted civil society building. Both cases also suffer from weak state structures and general societal insecurity. In Palestine, the heightening of Israel's closure policies⁹⁰ and the eruption of *Al-Aqsa Intifada* have dealt an enormous blow to the economy of the Palestinian territories.⁹¹ In El Salvador, societal insecurity is characterized by increased levels of crime and the continued impoverishment of the majority of the population.

Admittedly, the use of Palestine in a comparative case study does present challenges, particularly as it relates to Palestine's status as a "quasi-state structure." Although Palestine is not a full-fledged state, it is important to bear in mind that the international community has historically recognized Palestine as a state, and has treated it

⁹⁰ United Nations Special Coordinator's Office (UNSCO) differentiates between three different categories of closures: general closure, comprehensive closure, and internal closure. The first category of general closures was effected in March 1993, and involves the obstruction of free travel between the Israel and East Jerusalem and the West Bank and Gaza Strip without travel permits. In the second category of comprehensive closures all travel permits become obsolete, and mobility is completely halted between these areas. And with the third category of internal closures, all travel is halted between Areas A, and Areas B and C of the West Bank. For a more detailed discussion of Israel's closure policies, refer to: United National Special Coordinators Office, the Economic and Social Monitoring Unit, "Economic and Social Conditions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Quarterly Report, (Quarterly Reports between 1996 and 2001) and United Nations Special Coordinators Office, *The Impact on the Palestinian Economy of the Recent Confrontations, Mobility Restrictions and Border Closures* (30 September 2001).

⁹¹ For more on economic changes in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, refer to Stanley Fischer, Patricia Alonso-Gamo, and Ulric Erickson von Allmen, "Economic Developments in the West Bank and Gaza Since Oslo," *The Economic Journal* 111 (June 2001): 254-275, and Sara Roy "Palestinian Society and Economy: The Continued Denial of Possibility," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 30, no. 4 (Summer 2001): 5-20, and Ishac Diwan and Radwan Shaban, eds., *Development under Adversity: The Palestinian Economy in Transition* (Ramallah: Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute and Washington, DC: World Bank, 1999).

as such. The PLO has had observer status in the United Nations since 1975 and, since its inception in 1965, Palestinians have perceived the PLO as a quasi-state governmental structure in exile. Moreover, the Palestinian territories do fulfill the minimum requirements of statehood. If we conceive of the state in classical Weberian terms as, “A compulsory political organization with continuous operations, and an administrative staff that [successfully] upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its orders,”⁹² Palestine meets these criteria. There are three important components to this definition: the monopoly over the use of violence, the institutionalization of the state, and the issue of territoriality. In the Palestinian case, the Palestinian Authority is recognized, both domestically and internationally, as having a monopoly over the legitimate use of force in the territories of Area A. Moreover, the Palestinian Authority is an institutionalized political organization that carries out the functions of a state, such as tax extraction, etc., in the ‘non-contiguous’ geographic area of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.⁹³

⁹² Quoted from H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946).

⁹³ The continuation of Israel’s military occupation policies certainly complicates this picture; most notably, Israel’s continued aggression against the residents of the Palestinian territories has seriously undermined the PA’s monopoly over the use of force. Similarly, Israel’s continued settlement growth, as well as its imposition of “closure policies” and travel restrictions on the Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, including PA officials, has seriously called into question the “viability of territoriality” in the Palestinian context. It is therefore important to recognize that the very concept of “stateness” is not only in question and challenged in the Palestinian context, but similarly challenged, albeit for different reasons, in other contexts. For example, the inability of many states to penetrate and effectively control all of their territories, the inability of many states to exact taxes from their citizens, or the questionable sovereignty of other states because of skewed power relations in the international system, should also be seen as limitations to “stateness.” The limitations of Palestinian “stateness” are therefore part of a broader, less exceptional phenomenon of our times. Joel Migdal’s conception of the state is particularly relevant to this discussion. He provides an expanded definition of the state that may better accommodate the particularities of the Palestinian case. According to Migdal, “The state is a field of power marked by the use and threat of violence, and shaped by 1) the image of a coherent, controlling organization in a territory, which is a representation of the people bounded by that territory, and 2) the actual practices of its multiple parts.” Joel Migdal, *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001), 15-16. The

Why the Women's Sectors?

To study these divergent outcomes in civil society, I focus on the women's sector in these cases as a representative sector. With their constellation of women's committees, NGOs, and gender-related programs and projects, the women's movements serve as an ideal sector for examining the impact of foreign donor assistance on Palestinian and Salvadoran civil society for reasons related to methodological elegance, significance in terms of civil society development and the interest of Western foreign donors, and generalizability.

Historically, the women's sectors in both Palestine and El Salvador have shared similar trajectories of development. In both cases, the women's movements emerged as part of broader processes of mobilization. In the Salvadoran context, these processes were related to the mobilization of the leftist parties; in Palestine, they were related to the mobilization of the nationalist factions affiliated with the PLO and the Palestinian Communist Party. In the late 1970s, activists established women's organizations in both contexts, culminating in organized mass mobilization in the early 1980s and continuing throughout the decade. During the 1980s, the women's organizations in both contexts relied predominantly on solidarity funding, or funding funneled through the *Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional* (FMLN) or the PLO in the respective cases. With the initiation of the peace processes in both Palestine and El Salvador in the early 1990s, Western funding became more readily available, serving as an impetus for many of these

concept of 'image' implies that much is dependent on perception. Hence, what is important is the image of an integrated whole, rather than the actual physical territorial boundaries, or geographic contiguity between all territories that comprise the 'state.' Although Palestine does not have set territorial boundaries, geographic contiguity, or international recognition as a sovereign political entity, it is nonetheless treated as a 'state' by the international community and perceived as a state by the population who inhabit the territory. More generally, Palestinians have perceived the PLO as a quasi-state governmental structure in exile for decades.

organizations to professionalize and institutionalize. The similarities in temporality and sectoral organization provide for a methodologically elegant comparison between the two cross-regional cases.

Both the organization and the 'rootedness' of this sector of civil society, as well as the obvious unmet needs of Palestinian and Salvadoran women, have made this an attractive sector for foreign donors. In both cases, this has historically been one of the most integral and developed sectors of civil society. By the early 1980s, all major factions of the PLO and of the FMLN had adopted a policy of mass mobilization and had established their own volunteer grassroots structures, which included labor unions, agriculture unions, health unions, student groups, women's groups, and various other professional unions. Among these organizations, the women's sectors in both cases were perhaps the most successful in incorporating women in large numbers as well as addressing their needs. The women's sectors also produced a number of leaders who went on to become major actors in the national political lives of both the Palestinian territories and El Salvador.⁹⁴

Since the initiation of the peace accords in Palestine and El Salvador, these two cases have attracted considerable amounts of foreign donor assistance. The obvious needs of women in both societies, including their under-representation in government bodies and the high level of organization of this sector, have made this an important area of focus for Western donors. Despite the advances that Palestinian and Salvadoran women have made over the years, including the presence of a number of women in some of the highest ranks of leadership in both countries, the status of women remains

⁹⁴ In the Salvadoran context, Nidia Diaz and Irma Maya are two of the women who come to mind; in the Palestinian context, Zahira Kamal and Rabiha Diab are key players.

disappointing. According to the Palestinian Bureau of Statistics, enrolment levels of males at the secondary school level are 53.7 percent compared to 50.9 percent for females.⁹⁵ As of 1995, adult literacy for women was 77.1 percent, compared to 91.4 percent for men, and the percentage of women over the age of 15 in the labor force was 14.9 percent.⁹⁶ Although these standards are significantly higher than in other countries in the Arab world, there remains considerable room for improvement. As of 1996, the wage gap between men and women was estimated at 66 percent.⁹⁷ Although women comprise 46 percent of those employed in lower positions of the Palestinian Authority, women in the higher positions only comprise 14 percent of the total employment pool at that level.⁹⁸ As of 1996, women comprised a mere 8.7 percent of those in legislative or higher administrative positions.⁹⁹ Moreover, 19.7 percent of women still do not receive any prenatal care, and 80.3 percent do not receive any post-natal care.¹⁰⁰

Similar discrepancies between males and females are evident in El Salvador. As of 2004, women headed 31 percent of Salvadoran families, and 39 percent of those that live below the poverty line.¹⁰¹ Since the signing of the peace accords, the total

⁹⁵ From the Executive Summary of *Women and Men in Palestine: Trends and Statistics*, by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), 1998, 7.

⁹⁶ From <http://www.palwatc.org/stat1.html>, Women's Affairs Technical Committee, 1999.

⁹⁷ From *The Labor Force Survey* by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), 1996.

⁹⁸ *Decision Making Positions of Women and Men in Six Palestinian Ministries* (Jerusalem: Women's Studies Center—The Research Unit 1999), 9.

⁹⁹ *The Labor Force Survey* by PCBS, 1996.

¹⁰⁰ *The Women and Men in Palestine: Trends in Palestine*, Executive Summary, by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), 1998, 8.

¹⁰¹ For more indicators on the status of women in Salvadoran society, refer to <http://www.womenwarpeace.org/elsalvador/elsalvador.htm>.

contribution of Salvadoran women to the formal economy has increased, although they still earn significantly less in the labor market. Salvadoran women with 13 years of education earn 73 percent of what a Salvadoran male with the same education earns.¹⁰² In 2001, female adult literacy was 76.6 percent, compared to 81.9 percent for males.¹⁰³

The high level of organization of the women's sectors in these two cases has provided foreign donors with a more accessible entry point into Salvadoran and Palestinian civil society and greater promise in terms of social change and democratic development and deepening.¹⁰⁴ An evaluation of foreign donor activity and specific donor-funded projects and programs indicates that foreign donors gave high priority to gender-related issues, along with civic education, democratization more generally, and the environment. Western foreign donors could use various women's organizations for both consciousness-raising and the distribution of economic and social benefits.

I conducted a number of semi-structured and open-ended interviews with activists and directors of NGOs in the women's movements in the political centers: 29 in Palestine, and 16 in El Salvador. In both cases, I focused on the women's organizations in the political centers of the Palestinian territories and El Salvador. My initial plan was to conduct research in all districts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and all departments

¹⁰² From Programa de la Naciones para el Desarrollo (PNUD), 2001, webpage: <http://www.pnud.org.sv/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=99&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0>.

¹⁰³ From El Salvador Human Development Report, 2001, webpage: http://www.undorg/hdr2003/indicator/cty_f_SLV.html.

¹⁰⁴ As of 1998, 145 NGOs in the West Bank and Gaza Strip provided services to women. Information from Sari Hanafi and Linda Tabar, *Donors, International Organizations and Local NGOs: The Emergence of the Palestinian Globalized Elite*, (Jerusalem: Institute of Jerusalem Studies, and Ramallah: Muwatin- the Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy, 2005).

of El Salvador. Upon arriving in Palestine, however, I realized that the severity of Israel's closure policies would prevent me from traveling freely or securely to various locations in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip. As a result, I decided to focus my research on the Jerusalem-Ramallah access area. To guarantee that my findings in the Ramallah-Jerusalem access area were representative of development in the women's sector in other geographic locations in Palestine, I conducted five additional semi-structured interviews with female activists in the Gaza Strip and Hebron. Consequently, to ensure symmetry, I focused my research in El Salvador on its corresponding political center, San Salvador.

In Palestine, I conducted most of my interviews in Arabic, and in El Salvador, I conducted most my interviews in Spanish, with the help of an assistant. My interviews focused on the goals behind the founding of the organizations; the nature of their programs and projects and the changes they have undergone; their patterns of interactions with different constituencies; their donors; and their relationship with them.

I also conducted six semi-structured, open-ended interviews with the initial founders of the four women's committees in Palestine, and with all the directors or gender desk officers of the eight newly professionalized NGOs in the Jerusalem-Ramallah access area. To further examine the emerging dynamics between these sectors of the women's movement, I conducted 20 interviews with organizers in the women's committees who were responsible for coordinating women's activities in neighboring villages or in other locations in the West Bank, including the director of the General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW). I selected women who had been active in the women's movement during the 1980s, and could therefore compare and contrast the

current state of the women's movement with that of the period prior to the initiation of the peace accords.

In El Salvador, I focused on the different components of the women's sector centered in San Salvador. In total, I conducted 16 semi-structured, open-ended interviews with the directors of the newly professionalized NGOs and with the directors of the former FMLN grassroots-based women's organizations. In order to acquire information regarding the activities of the women's organizations during the civil war, I made sure to interview individuals who had been active in the given organization during that period.¹⁰⁵

To ensure that the phenomena I am examining are not limited to the women's sectors, I also conducted a number of interviews with directors of human rights or civic education NGOs in both Palestine and El Salvador. In Palestine, I conducted 19 interviews with directors or program coordinators of human rights and civic education NGOs;¹⁰⁶ in El Salvador, I conducted four interviews with directors of human rights and civic education NGOs. Additionally, in Palestine, I conducted six interviews with political leaders who were previously involved in grassroots organizing during the 1980s. I also had discussions and open-ended interviews with relevant experts or political analysts in both contexts—ten in Palestine and four in El Salvador.

¹⁰⁵ In the Salvadoran case, I did not conduct interviews with the grassroots organizers, or *promotoras*, themselves. The nature of the programs and projects implemented by the NGOs proved sufficient for my demonstration of the manner in which more inclusive political settlements and less politically motivated foreign donor assistance facilitate the inclusion of grassroots constituencies in the re/constitution of civil society.

¹⁰⁶ Because I conducted my fieldwork in Palestine first, I was significantly more experimental in my methods than I was in El Salvador, where I had a much clearer sense of what was required to gather the necessary information.

Organization of the Dissertation

There are six chapters in this dissertation. In the following chapter, I examine my independent variable, the nature of the political settlements or peace accords, in each of these cases. I demonstrate how the level of inclusiveness of the political settlement affected the transformation of civil society. This includes a discussion of the history of the two conflicts as well as the emergence of the various political organizations, focusing on the involvement of the political organizations in grassroots mobilization and their subsequent transformation after the signing of the peace accords. In the third chapter, I discuss my intervening variable, foreign donor assistance to the respective cases, focusing on the variation in the structure of assistance to the two cases and the subsequent variation in impact on civil society. In the fourth and fifth chapters, I evaluate the impact of the respective political settlements and the role of foreign donor assistance on the women's sectors of civil society in Palestine and El Salvador. Finally, in chapter six, the conclusion, I elaborate on the policy implications of this study, focusing on how civil society outcomes are intrinsically linked to broader political developments. I also discuss possible directions of research that emerge from this study, including a closer examination of how groups, marginalized in the re/constitution of civil society, proceed to negotiate their exclusion.

Chapter 2

The Defining Role of Political Settlements: Political Mobilization and Grassroots Organization in Transition

In this chapter, I discuss the evolution of associational life in Palestine and El Salvador. I focus on how the political settlements -- the 1991 and 1993 Madrid and Oslo Accords, and the 1992 Chapultepec Accords -- eventually shaped the nature of associational life in the Palestinian and Salvadoran contexts respectively. In both cases, the political organizations played a critical role in establishing the myriad of associations and organizations that would form the basis of a future civil society in each of these contexts. The eventual political settlements, especially their respective degree of inclusion, invariably affected the emergent nature of civil society in both Palestine and El Salvador.

In the Palestinian case, promotion of the non-inclusive political settlement required that certain political groups, and by extension organizations or individuals who were loosely affiliated with these political groups, be given primacy over others depending on their political position, perceived or otherwise, vis-à-vis the political settlement. More specifically, foreign donors were able to give primacy to some groups over others through the skewed allocation of resources. The PA in its capacity as broker of the peace accords was also able to give primacy to some groups by providing them with preferential access to institutional openings, by institutionalizing legislative and local government to minimize the opposition's chances of prevailing at these levels of government, and by restricting the oppositions groups' ability to promulgate laws in the

legislative council. The constrained institutionalization of the Palestinian legislative council and local government resulted in the creation of 'disarticulated spaces' between the state and society. Foreign donors played a pivotal role in mediating relations between different actors and institutions, and in promoting and perpetuating civil society development in these 'disarticulated spaces.' In contrast, because the opposition groups in the Salvadoran case were all party to the accords, they all adopted, more or less, the same strategies and incorporated their grassroots constituencies in the transition from the onset. Moreover, because of the more inclusive nature of the peace accords, the brokers of the political settlement did not have to impose or create the same constraints in the institutionalization of legislative or local government. Conversely, all groups had access to the same resources and the same institutional opening at both the legislative and local levels of government. Therefore, foreign donors were able to promote civil society in more 'articulated spaces,' and thus further articulate these spaces.

I begin this chapter with an examination of the Palestinian case. I briefly discuss the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the emergence of the Palestinian nationalist movement. I focus on the role that the various political organizations played in establishing the various associations, unions, and grassroots movements. I then discuss how the Madrid peace process, and the Oslo Accords impacted associational life, and how foreign donor assistance mediated these processes. In the second part of the chapter, I provide a parallel discussion of these issues in relation to the Salvadoran case. As in the Palestinian case, I begin this section with a very brief discussion of the background of the conflict and the start of the civil war in El Salvador, also focusing on the role of various political organizations in mass mobilization. I then discuss how the more inclusive nature of the

political settlement did not have the same adverse effect on associational life in the Salvadoran context. Moreover, since foreign donor assistance was not as discriminatory, it also did not contribute to the heightening of tensions and animosities between the different groups, thereby adversely affecting civil society.

Palestine

Mobilization of the Palestinian nationalist movement, and much of the associational life that grew out of this movement was initially in response to Zionist colonial settlement in Palestine, and later to Israel's military occupation in the WBGS. The Arab-Israeli conflict is rooted in a century long struggle between Zionist aspirations to establish an exclusivist Jewish state in historic Palestine, and Palestinian nationalist aspirations to establish a state within that territory, and later to safeguard the return of Palestinian refugees to their homes. The involvement of colonial powers, and the inconsistent and often contradictory promises made to the various parties provided fertile grounds for an intractable and protracted conflict.

Following the end of WWII, and the fall of the British Empire, the British turned over the issue of Palestine to the United Nations in 1947. That same year, the United Nations General Assembly passed the partition plan, UN General Resolution 181. The Palestinians and other Arab parties challenged the legal competence of the UN's decision to partition historic Palestine. According to this partition, Israel would include 499,000 Jews and 438,000 Palestinians and the Palestinian state would include 818,000 Palestinians and 10,000 Jews. Jerusalem was designated as a *corpus separatum* administered by the United Nations. The Jewish state would comprise 55 percent of

historic Palestine, and the Palestinian state would be comprised of the remaining 45 percent.¹

The terms of the partition were never implemented. The British ended their mandate on 15 May, 1948 and the Zionist movement declared statehood that same day. Full-fledged war broke out between the new state and the Arab parties. By the time of the signing of the 1949 armistice, Israel controlled 78 percent of historic Palestine. 750,000 Palestinians had become refugees, dispersed in the WBGS, and in other countries, predominately Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Kuwait and Lebanon. The remainder of Palestine came under Egyptian and Jordanian control: the Gaza Strip came under Egyptian administration, and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem came under Jordanian administration. In 1950, Jordan annexed the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

In 1967, misleading information from the Soviet Union indicating that the Israelis were mobilizing for an attack against its Arab neighbors provoked the Egyptians and Syrians to begin mobilizing their armies. Israel pre-empted by attacking Egypt and Syria and the war broke-out in June 1967. By the end of the war, Israel conquered and occupied the remaining 22 percent of Palestine—the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank including East Jerusalem, the Syrian Golan Heights, and the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula. Moreover, 300,000 more Palestinians had become refugees in neighboring Arab countries. Subsequently, Israel imposed a military administration to govern the Palestinian residents of the occupied WBGS. The two parties signed peace accords in 1993.

¹ For more on the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, refer to Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, ed., *The Transformation of Palestine: Essays on the Origin and Development of the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1971); Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*. 3rd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); Mark Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994).

The Rise of the Palestinian Nationalist Movement and Mass Movement Mobilization

The political organizations which emerged out of the Palestinian nationalist movement would later find the associations and organizations that would lay the groundwork for a future civil society in the WBGS. During the early part of the century, most notably as embodied by the 1936 uprising, Palestinians living in mandate Palestine initiated resistance to colonial designs. Following the 1948 war, the struggle for Palestinian independence assumed an Arab character, involving neighboring nation-states. By the early 1960s, and certainly following the 1967 war, the struggle for historic Palestine assumed an increasingly Palestinian character involving diasporic Palestinians themselves. Ironically, it was Palestinian students, studying and living in neighboring Arab countries, who questioned the commitments of other Arab leaders and cast into doubt the ability of these states to liberate historic Palestine. Later it was these students, including Yasir Arafat, Khalil Wazir, and Mahmoud Abbas, who took over the PLO.

The 1948 Arab defeat was a catalyst for the creation of a number of disparate organizations founded to rally for Palestinian rights. Beginning in the early 1960s, Palestinian students founded a number of organizations throughout the Arab world. Historically, two different streams dominated the Palestinian nationalist movement, the *Harakat al-Qawmiyyin al-'Arab* (Arab Nationalist Movement- ANM) and *Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastini* (Palestinian National Liberation Movement), which is better known by its reverse acronym, *Fateh*. Many of the Palestinian guerrilla and political organizations that emerged in the 1960s, and thereafter, owe their roots to one of these political strands. The former stream conceived the liberation of Palestine as part of a broader process involving the social transformation of the Arab world. *Fateh*, on the

other hand, solely focused on the liberation of Palestine, and advocated armed struggle, independent of Arab states. These groups would come to adopt different strategies in relation to the preparation and political training of their members, and in relation to mass movement mobilization. Although the leftist groups would first embark on mass movement mobilization, their selectivity in accepting membership would restrain their mass movement endeavors. *Fateh*, on the other hand, as a non-ideological party placed little emphasis on membership training, and recruited members with much more ease. *Fateh* eventually emerged as the largest and strongest of Palestinian political factions, and is the current-day leadership party of the PA and the PLO.

Meanwhile in 1964, during the first Arab summit, the various Arab countries reached a consensus calling for the establishment of the PLO. The Arab delegates attending the summit chose Ahmad Shuqueiri, a trusted diplomat who had served in the foreign services of Syria, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab League to lead the newly founded organization.² Different Palestinian groups, such as *Fateh*, the ANM, and other youth groups in the region reluctantly lent their support to the organization. Many of the Palestinian groups feared that Shuqueiri's PLO was merely an instrument for reactionary Arab regimes

Although, the leadership invited the various groups fighting for the liberation of Palestine to sit on the executive of the PLO, tensions continued to rise between Shuqueiri and other Palestinian groups, including *Fateh*. Not only was Shuqueiri too close to Arab regimes, especially the Egyptian regime, but also his autocratic management style further

² Helena Cobban, *The Palestine Liberation Organization: People, Power, and Politics* (London, New York, New Rochelle, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 29.

alienated potential allies.³ By December 1967, *Fateh*, as well as members of his own executive committee, called for the resignation of Shuqueiri. Shuqueiri subsequently resigned, and an interim acting chairperson took over.

The defeat of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria during the Six Day 1967 war severely undermined the legitimacy of these states in the eyes of the Arab public, further eroding any notions that they would ultimately play a key role in the liberation of Palestine. From the early 1960s, *Fateh* cautioned against a full-blown war between Israel and its Arab neighbors, predicting Arab defeat. Instead, the ascending movement advocated that only guerrilla warfare could weaken the Israeli state; *Fateh* matched its political preaching with a record of sustained guerrilla activities against Israel. Slowly, *Fateh* emerged as the uncontested leader of the Palestinian cause.⁴

The 1967 Arab defeat also spawned a number of Palestinian guerrilla organizations. The ANM's Palestinian branch, along with three other small guerrilla organizations founded the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). In 1968, the Palestine Front for the Liberation of Palestine- General Command broke away from

³ William B. Quandt, Fuad Jabber, and Ann Mosley Lesch, *The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1973), 68.

⁴ In the late 1960s and early 1970s, most of these political organizations conceived of "liberation struggle" in strictly military terms. Most notably, for *Fateh*, armed struggle was central to its political program. As Sayigh explains, "...*Fateh* founders saw 'revolutionary violence' as a catalytic agent, that could break through resignation of the refugees...The practice of 'armed struggle' was also the only path towards national unity, and in the absence of a guiding ideology, the only way in which experienced cadres could develop," quoted from Yezid Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement 1949-1993* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 91. *Fateh* did not adhere to any ideology, but rather upheld a nationalist stance; its non-adherence to an ideology was/is partly responsible for its ability to gain such broad support among the Palestinian masses. Accordingly, *Fateh* also avoided defining the social content of the society it wanted to create. More specifically, *Fateh's* leadership argued that the future ideology of the Palestinian state would emerge/crystallize from the liberation struggle. Although *Fateh* initially called for one democratic, secular state for Christians, Jews, and Muslims, after 1974, *Fateh* advocated a two-state solution. For more on this, refer to Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State*.

the PFLP. Then in 1969, another group splintered from the PFLP, and called itself the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (now called the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, DFLP).⁵ These groups were predominately leftist in their orientation and would come to be *Fateh's* major opposition.⁶ *Fateh*, the PFPL, and DFLP would come to represent the largest Palestinian political factions in the PLO, and play an important role in mass mobilization in the occupied territories, amassing substantial followings.

Communist Party activities in the Palestinian territories date back to the early 1920s, but the Party became increasingly active in the late 1960s and early 1970s.⁷ The West Bank Communists were firmly committed to mass mobilization and non-violent

⁵ Cobban, *The Palestine Liberation Organization*, 42. Activists would find a number of new Palestinian political organizations over the next two decades, although many of these would remain small splinter factions and not play a central role in the occupied territories. These organizations include the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (an extremist, leftist-*Ba'ath* organization that split from *Fateh* in 1969), the Palestinian Liberation Front (split from the Popular Front for the Liberation Front-General Command in 1977 and adopted a pro-Iraq stance, and later sought refuge in Iraq after the Achille Lauro blunder in 1985. The leader of the organization, Mohammed Zeidan (Abu Abbas) died in American custody in Iraq in 2003, the Arab Liberation Front (an Iraqi-sponsored leftist military faction founded in 1969 by the Iraqi Ba'ath Party), and the Popular Liberation War Pioneers, Sa'iqa (founded in 1968 and was Syrian-backed and controlled the Ba'athists in 1968).

⁶ The leftist groups, including the Communist Party, were more sophisticated in their ideological theorizing. By 1968, the DFLP, soon followed by the PFLP, began its transformation from a Pan-Arabist organization to a Marxist-Leninist organization. These organizations were concerned with the fundamental social and political change in Palestinian society, as well as throughout the Arab world. Both groups also initially called for the creation of one secular democratic state in which Christians, Jews, and Muslims would enjoy the same political rights. In the early 1970s, the DFLP began to entertain the idea of creating a bi-national state that would represent the Palestinian and Jewish communities, and later called for a sovereign state in the WBGS. The PCP, on the other hand, limited its struggle to ending Israeli occupation of the WBGS, and the establishment of an independent state in that territory. Both groups applied class analysis to define the goals of the Palestinian movement, and envisioned that the future Palestinian state would be run according to Marxist-Leninist principles. For more on this discussion, refer to Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch, *The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism*, 107.

⁷ For example, in 1925 the Communists founded the Palestinian Arab Workers Society, and in 1930 they held the first labor movement congress in Haifa. Baruch Kimmerling and Joel Migdal, *The Palestinian People: A History* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2003), 53.

protest.⁸ In 1969, they reactivated the General Federation of Labor Unions, and later played a leadership role in the founding of the voluntary work programs among university and high school students.⁹ In 1982, the West Bank communists founded the PCP, despite protests of the Jordanian Communist Party.¹⁰ In 1987, the PCP joined the PLO.

Although the initial record of *Fateh's* military operations was quite humble indeed, the high losses that they were able to inflict on the Israeli military during the *Karameh* battle of 1968, further reinforced the strength of the organization.¹¹ The growth of the guerrilla organization imposed its own logic on the structure of the PLO. By the fourth Palestine National Council (PNC) meeting in 1969, it was a foregone conclusion that *Fateh*, because of the seats allotted to it, and the support it enjoyed from independents, would be able to elect the leader of its choice to head the PLO. During that meeting, the delegates elected Yasir Arafat as chairperson of the organization.

In the 1980s, activists in the WBGS founded a number of political organizations that would come to play a significant role in Palestinian contemporary politics, and amass a significant following in the occupied territories. In the mid-1980s, Islamic Jihad splintered from the Muslim Brotherhood, and established itself as a separate organization. Most notably, the Islamists founded the *Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya* (Islamic

⁸ Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State*, 168.

⁹ Ibid., 476.

¹⁰ The Jordanian Communist Party was active in the West Bank, and a separate PCP was active in the Gaza Strip. Unlike, other Palestinian factions, the Communist Party made no effort to participate militarily, and initially opposed joining the PLO on grounds that such an action would serve the national struggle at the expense of the class struggle. In the initial years, Jewish and Palestinian Communists worked within the same Communist organizations.

¹¹ Cobban, *The Palestine Liberation Organization*, 44.

Resistance Movement, *Hamas*), in 1988, shortly after the outbreak of the *Intifada*. Then following the initiation of the Madrid peace process, a schism emerged in the DFLP between those who supported the peace process and those who opposed it. Subsequently, supporters of the Madrid peace process broke away from the DFLP, and founded FIDA.

Because of the different level of commitment to ideology and social programs, these various groups placed different levels of emphasis on the centrality and importance related to the political training of its members, and subsequent mass mobilization. Because *Fateh* focused almost solely on the military dimensions of the struggle, and because the organization was growing at such a rapid pace, especially after the *Karameh* battle, it placed very little emphasis on the political training of its members and cadres. The leftist parties on the other hand, were much more keen to develop ‘political consciousness,’ as well as a firm grounding in leftist ideological thought amongst their members. Accordingly, members of the Communist Party, the DFLP, and the PFLP had to undergo rigid ideological and political training. The PFLP, for example, was one of the first parties to institute a formal program of political training, which involved four-month courses.¹² Because of the different approach of each of these groups to membership and political training of their membership, these groups would come to conceive and adopt different relationships with the occupied territories, and their members and supporters who live there.

¹² Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch, *The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism*, 86.

The Nationalist Movement, Civic Traditions, and Associational Life in Palestine

Historically, Palestinian NGOs, including volunteer committees, unions, and professional organizations have played a significant role in Palestinian society. In the absence of a full-fledged state, limited local government structures, and weak social service institutions, the various political organizations in the WBGS perceived the founding of mass organizations and more professional NGOs, and other social institutions more broadly defined, as laying the groundwork for a future civil society, and as part of the state-building process. The politicization of Palestinian mass movements and NGOs, is similar to the politicization of many mass movements and NGOs elsewhere. NGOs have played a crucial role in the mobilization of Palestinian society, the provision of social services, and in the interest representation of the various constituencies. By 1993, Palestinian NGOs accounted for 60 percent of primary health care services, 49 percent of secondary and tertiary health care, 100 percent disability care, 100 percent of pre-school programs, and a large proportion of tertiary education, agricultural extension, welfare, housing, and other services in the WBGS.¹³

In general, three different phases of associational activity can be identified in the Palestinian context. Associations and civic organizations in the Palestinian territories date back to the mandate period. During this period, a number of charity organizations were established. The second phase began in the late 1960s, and continued throughout the 1980s. During this phase, associational and union activity increased dramatically

¹³ Joachim Zaucker, Andrew Griffel, and Peter Gubser, "Toward Middle East Peace and Development: International Assistance to Palestinians and the Role of NGOs during the Transition to Civil Society," *Interaction Occasional Paper* (Washington, December 1995), 17. For more on NGOs in Palestine in the pre-Oslo period, refer to John Clark and Barbara Balaj, "The West Bank and Gaza in Transition: The Role of NGOs in the Peace Process," (Washington DC: World Bank, 1994).

after 1967, growing most rapidly after 1978.¹⁴ The rise of associations during this period extended to grassroots-based organizations, including charitable societies and cooperatives,¹⁵ professional associations and syndicates, and Islamist groups, including *Zakat* committees.¹⁶ One of the political factions of the PLO instigated much of the associational activity during this period, especially after 1978. The third phase began in the late 1980s, and continues to the present; during this phase many NGOs began to access Western foreign donor funding and to professionalize and institutionalize their operations.

During the 1920s, Palestinians from the urban upper-middle class, or middle class, established a number of charity organizations. Additionally, different sectors of Palestinian society, including the Communists initiated efforts to organize the working class.¹⁷ Despite the various efforts of groups and individuals to establish some institutions during this time period, these organizations were urban-based, and did not extend to all sectors of society.

The decisive shift in terms of associational activity in the WBGS took place in

¹⁴ For an in-depth discussion of the development of Palestinian associational life after 1967, refer to Muhammed Muslih, "Palestinian Civil Society," *The Middle East Journal* 47, no. 2 (Spring, 1993): 258-274.

¹⁵ The cooperatives engaged in the production and marketing of olive oil production, agricultural produce, handicrafts, and embroidered items.

¹⁶ *Zakat*, or mandatory alms-giving is one of the five pillars of Islam. According to this principle, each Muslim is obligated annually to give a certain percentage of his/her wealth, to be re/distributed to the less advantaged. *Zakat* committees were active throughout the West Bank, and were monitored by the *al-Waqf*, the Endowment for Religious Affairs. Since, the PA was established, the *Zakat* committees are under PA government oversight. For more on the *Zakat* committees, refer to Nathan Brown, *Palestinian Politics after Oslo: Resuming Arab Palestine* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 159-161.

¹⁷ Kimmerling and Migdal, *The Palestinian People: A History*, 291. Although some activity continued under Jordanian rule, trade unions had declined from 40 in 1957 to 16 in 1961. For more on this topic, refer to Musa Budeiri, *The Palestinian Communist Party, 1919-1948: Arab and Jew in the Struggle for Internationalism* (London: Ithaca Press, 1979).

1972. The PLO's defeat in Jordan in 1970 culminated in the Palestine National Council's 1972 decisions to shift the locus of attention to the occupied territories, and to incorporate masses into the struggle.¹⁸ Hence, at the tenth session of the PNC, the members passed resolutions calling for new trade union and welfare organizations that could mobilize the public in the territories under the auspices of the PLO.¹⁹ Although the Communist Party had long focused its energies on the organization and mobilization of Palestinians in the territories, the DFLP was the first of the PLO factions to stress the importance of mass organization in the occupied territories in 1972.²⁰

In 1973, the Palestine National Council also founded the Palestine National Front (PNF) as a coordinating mechanism in the occupied territories. Much of the leadership of the PNF came from the Communist Party, as well as from other factions, and labor unions, professional associations, women's groups etc. As the popularity of the PNF grew, so did the suspicions of the PLO. Because of the organized nature of the Communist Party, and the strong base of support it enjoyed in the WBGS, the PLO was worried that it would not be able to control the new organization. In a strange collusion of events, the PLO's reluctant support for the organization and Israel's harsh response to the organization resulted in its decline and eventual disappearance.²¹

¹⁸ Interview with Omar Assaf, DFLP politburo member, and former grassroots leader, Ramallah, 22 July 2001.

¹⁹ Kimmerling and Migdal, *The Palestinian People: A History*, 286.

²⁰ As Sayigh explains, "It was the DFLP that embarked on the most serious changes in operational methods and aims in the occupied territories in this period, in contrast to Fateh and the DFLP...Starting in autumn 1977, the DFLP resolved to lead its new strategy by constructing a Leninist party in the occupied territories...The party branch in the WBGS was intended to be largely autonomous, however, with a locally-based leadership and "the full freedom to devise its tactics and daily tasks in the struggle, in the framework of the general policy that unites the [DFLP] and its action on the Palestinian level as a whole," in *Armed Struggle and the Search for State*, 474–475.

²¹ Kimmerling and Migdal, *The Palestinian People: A History*, 279.

Although, the PLO emphasized the importance of political actions in the WBGS, as early as 1972, the political organizations did not take concrete action until 1978 and 1979.²² In 1976, the DFLP underwent a formal shift from a sole focus on military action to a greater emphasis on mass participation.²³ Following the example of the Communist Party, which pioneered in its mass mobilization efforts in the WBGS since the early 1970s, the leftist factions of the PLO followed suit in the latter part of the 1970s. Accompanying these developments, an alternative strategy was also emerging that involved supporting grassroots efforts in the WBGS.²⁴

A number of factors coalesced to instigate this change. Most notably, the idea began to take root that Israeli military occupation would not be ending any time soon. The increasing realization that only the Palestinians themselves could improve their daily living conditions, and not outside benevolent actors accompanied this idea. More concretely, in 1978, Israel and Egypt signed the Camp David peace accords, which included arrangements for the autonomy of the WBGS. The PLO along with other Arab countries opposed these agreements, especially those components related to autonomy. To avoid 'strategic marginalization,' the PLO acknowledged the necessity for a systematic mobilization campaign in the occupied territories.²⁵ A more organized presence of groups affiliated with the PLO would minimize chances that external actors, most notably other Arab countries, such as Egypt and Jordan, would come to determine

²² For more on this discussion, refer to Kimmerling and Migdal, *The Palestinian People: A History*, 279.

²³ Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State*, 474.

²⁴ Kimmerling and Migdal, *The Palestinian People: A History*, 278.

²⁵ Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State*, 464–465.

the fate of the Palestinians. The PLO's eviction from Lebanon in 1982 also increased Palestinian resolve to establish institutions in the occupied territories.²⁶

In line with the earlier work of the Communist Party, the secular leftist factions of the PLO, later followed by *Fateh*, adopted this policy of mass mobilization.²⁷ By the early 1980s, all factions of the PLO had established their own volunteer grassroots structures throughout the WBGS. These organizations included labor unions, agriculture unions, health unions, student groups, women's groups and various other professional unions and syndicates.²⁸ These groups were volunteer-based, and in line with the PLO's *sumoud* policy (policy of steadfastness), they stressed self-help and a continuation of national resistance, and more hands-on participatory development.²⁹ These groups also served to defend the interests of the various constituencies, including women's groups, labor unions, and professional syndicates. The various political organizations did not have an umbrella organization that embodied all its mass-based organizations. Rather, these associations, unions, and grassroots organizations were disparate and issue-oriented.³⁰

²⁶ Brown, *Palestinian Politics after Oslo*, 148–149.

²⁷ For more on this, see Reema Hamami, "Palestinian NGOs Since Oslo: From NGO Politics to Social Movements?" *Middle East Report* 214 (Spring 2002), 30.

²⁸ For more on the establishment of mass organizations in the WBGS, refer to Lisa Taraki, "Mass Organizations in the West Bank," in *Occupation: Israel Over Palestine*, ed., Naseer Aruri (Belmont, Mass.: AAUG Press, 1989).

²⁹ Joost Hiltermann provides a detailed discussion regarding the Palestinian women's and labor movements in *Behind the Intifada: Labor and Women's Movement in the Occupied Territories* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).

³⁰ As I will explain in the following section, this situation is in contrast to the Salvadoran case, in which each political organization had an umbrella organization that coordinated the activities of all affiliated mass-based organizations.

Civic organizing in the WBGS never stressed the military or armed dimension of resistance to Israel. Few, if any of the individuals involved in the grassroots organizations, were actively involved in armed resistance against the occupying power. In time, the Palestinian population began recognizing the establishment of grassroots organizations as the new standard mode of socio-political organizing. They also began identifying this grassroots expression as proof of the strength of the political factions, and as a reaffirmation of their presence on the ground.

Associational and union activity that took place after 1975 often reflected factional competition between the various Palestinian factions due to its more politicized nature, especially between *Fateh* and the Communist Party.³¹ This activity, especially related to grassroots organizing, was part of a broader effort on the part of leftist political organizations to mobilize the Palestinian population of the WBGS. Competition was not only about who would control these associations unions, but also about who would distribute the funds from various Arab states because of decisions reached in the Baghdad Conference of 1979.³²

As a result of the Iranian Revolution, Islamist associations, unions, and organizations also became more prevalent in the Palestinian territories, especially the Gaza Strip, in the early 1980s. Much of the activity of Islamist organizations focused on social-cultural issues, and community development. As Roy explains, Islamist institutions play an important and very visible role in the provision of services in areas

³¹ The most illustrative representation of factional competition between the various factions is the struggle to control the General Federation of Trade Unions. In 1981, a split occurred, and two separate General Federations of Trade Unions emerged—one sponsored by *Fateh* in Ramallah, and another sponsored by the leftist groups in Nablus. For more on this split, refer to Muslih, "Palestinian Civil Society," 263–264.

³² Kimmerling and Migdal, *The Palestinian People: A History*, 291.

related to relief and charity work, pre-school and primary education, rehabilitation of physically and mentally challenged persons, primary and tertiary health care, women's income-generating activities, literacy training, the care of orphans, and youth and sports activities.³³ It is important to note that these organizations differ vastly in the extent to which they are linked to one of the Islamist political organizations.

Though these organizations were affiliated with the political factions, for the most part, they maintained a degree of autonomy.³⁴ Because of the sheer distance between the members and supporters of the factions in the occupied territories, and their leadership in exile, most Palestinian factions accorded a flexible degree of autonomy to its associations, unions, and affiliated committees in the WBGS. There was substantial overlap in the political factions in the WBGS. Despite the overlap in membership, there tended to be a lot of disagreement between the factions and grassroots organizations. Leaders in the grassroots organizations, especially in the labor unions, played key roles and maintained that 'they were the ones who really knew what was happening.'³⁵ Therefore, the leadership of the factions in exile did not control these associations, unions, and other mass-based organizations, though there was more interaction with the respective leaderships in the occupied territories. In general, these groups were more or less autonomous and capable of functioning without the directives of a party; this point

³³ For more on this discussion, refer to Sara Roy, "The Transformation of Islamic NGOs in Palestine," *Middle East Report* 14 (Spring 2000), 7.

³⁴ This point is subject to debate. The organizations affiliated with the PCP [later renamed the PPP], the DFLP, and the PFLP had Marxist-Leninist structures organized on the basis of democratic-centralism. Though these organizations were autonomous from the "outside" factions, they were probably much closer to the respective political faction in the occupied territories. The organizations, however, did have close contacts with the grassroots, which allowed for a lot of input from these constituencies.

³⁵ Interview with labor union activist affiliated with FIDA, Ramallah, 1 August, 2001.

would have important implications for the extent to which these formations would shape the nature of the future emergent civil society.

Intifada, 1987–1993

The grassroots committees reached their zenith during the first *Intifada* between 1987 and 1993. Within the first weeks of the *Intifada*, the grassroots committees had organized an array of local popular committees (*lijan sha'biyeh*) throughout the occupied territories.³⁶ These local popular committees were responsible for sustaining and strengthening the uprising. The degree of popular participation of this *Intifada* was unprecedented compared to earlier uprisings. Mass involvement in non-violent forms of resistance was a radical departure from the earlier period in which only armed struggle was recognized as a legitimate form of armed resistance. Moreover, the *Intifada* represented a shift in the locus of power from the PLO to the people under occupation in the WBGS. As Mustafa Barghouti explains, “It is worth noting that while popular/mass-based activities have proved a success, it is difficult to envisage the development of a genuine popular movement without the democratic principles being applied and practiced. It is precisely these democratic principles that impart to our popular movement its special characteristics...each of these committees has some sort of democratically elected leadership.”³⁷ The potential to build on these local forms of socio-political organization were immense, especially in terms of the deepening of democracy.

³⁶ Glenn Robinson, *Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997), 94. For more on this topic, refer specifically to “Popular Committees in the *Intifada*,” chapter 5 of this book.

³⁷ Quoted from Mustafa Barghouti, “Popular/Mass Movement in the Community,” *Journal of Refugee Studies* 2, no. 1 (1989): 128. For more on this topic, also refer to Eileen Kuttub, “Community

Beginning in the mid-1980s, but most notably after the initiation of the Madrid peace process in 1991, many of these volunteer committees, unions, and professional organizations began to seek Western foreign donor funding. In the mid-1980s, the Communist Party affiliated organizations and committees pioneered in their quest for Western foreign donor assistance. The increased reliance on Western foreign donor funding required the professionalization of these organizations, and the consequent distancing of these organizations from their grassroots constituencies as they became accountable to their donors instead.

The Madrid and Oslo Accords

On 13 September, 1993, the PLO and the state of Israel signed the historic Oslo Accords. *Fateh*, as the leadership party, negotiated these agreements on behalf of the PLO. Although, these accords were only meant to serve as interim agreements, and were non-binding, they did not meet minimal Palestinian nationalist aspirations. As a result, many of the Palestinian political organizations, such as the Communist Party, the DFLP, the PFLP, and the Islamist groups did not support or endorse the peace accords. Ultimately, the Oslo peace process and initiatives related to the peace process would enjoy narrow support in Palestinian circles, and would marginalize important sectors of Palestinian civil society, and society more broadly defined. The non-inclusionary nature of the peace accords would come to have an adverse effect on the development of civil society.

Development under Occupation: An Alternative Strategy,” *Journal of Refugee Studies* 2, no. 1 (1989): 131-138.

Three factors decisively propelled the PLO to begin negotiations with Israel at a less than opportune time, when conditions were not in favor of the Palestinian bargaining position: 1) the PLO's military defeat in Lebanon; 2) international geopolitical changes, specifically the demise of the Soviet Bloc in the early 1990s; and 3) the PLO's near bankruptcy after it was estranged by Egypt and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf following the Gulf War of 1991. By the end of the summer of 1982, Israel had destroyed the PLO in Beirut—not only its military potential, but also the entirety of its administrative and political apparatus in Lebanon.³⁸ The PLO's military defeat in Lebanon and its expulsion to Tunisia thereafter made clear that a military solution to the conflict was not the most feasible of options available to the Palestinian leadership. Then in 1988, during the PNC's 19th session, the PLO made two momentous decisions that would forever alter the Arab-Israeli conflict: a renunciation and rejection of armed struggle and a willingness to 'directly' negotiate with Israel on the basis of UN resolutions 242³⁹ and 338⁴⁰. The shift in international public opinion and the new

³⁸ For the Palestinians, the roughly one square-mile area in the center of Beirut was the closest they ever had to a political, intellectual, financial, administrative capital since 1948. For more on this refer to Rashid Khalidi, *Under Siege: PLO Decision-Making During the 1982 War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 99. In essence, the PLO had become a kind of 'embryonic government' for the refugees, providing ordinary services and employment opportunities beyond those of a military liberation organization. This virtual state apparatus included: administrative, craft, industrial, medical, and social sector. For more on the PLO's quasi-governmental institutionalization, refer to Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State*, and Julie M. Peteet, *Gender in Crisis: Women and the Palestinian Resistance Movement* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 1-37. For more on the PLO in Lebanon, refer to Emile F. Sahliyah, *The PLO After the Lebanon War* (Boulder: Westview Press Inc., 1986).

³⁹ UN Resolution 242 proposes the idea of 'land for peace.' The resolution stipulates: "Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty; territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and its right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force; guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area; achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; and guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones," quoted from *The Palestine Question: Documents Adopted by the United Nations and Other International Organizations and Conferences* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1984).

urgency that the international public assigned to the conflict obliged the United States to turn its attentions to the region. With the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, many Arab regimes, Syria in the forefront, lost the economic, political, and diplomatic support they had previously received from the Soviets. Effectively, this was the end of an era for a Middle East that previously had been one of the Cold War's most active playing fields.

Iraqi defeat in the Gulf War of 1991 asserted the United States as an uncontested hegemonic power in the region.⁴¹ As Peretz summarizes: "The end of Soviet anti-Western instigation, the deep divisions within the Arab world, and the establishment of US hegemony created an environment conducive to new initiatives in US policy in the Middle East"⁴² Moreover, the PLO's ill-fated decision to support Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait cost the PLO US \$120 million in annual donations from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Confiscation of Palestinian deposits in Kuwaiti banks brought the PLO's losses to about US \$10 billion. Furthermore, as punishment for Arafat's solidarity with Saddam Hussein, 400,000 Palestinians who worked in the Gulf were summarily expelled. These financial losses completely undermined the organization's ability to sustain itself.⁴³

⁴⁰ Resolution 338 of the UN Security Council of 22 October, 1973 "Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy; calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after cease-fire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all its parts; and decides that, immediately and concurrently with cease-fire, negotiations shall start between the parties the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East," quoted from Ibid.

⁴¹ For more on the United States involvement in the Middle East, refer to Don Peretz, "US Middle East Policy in the 1990s," in *The Middle East and the Peace Process: The Impact of the Oslo Accords*, ed., Robert Freedman (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1998).

⁴² Ibid., 349.

⁴³ For more on the PLO's losses after the Gulf War, see Phyllis Bennis and Michel Moushabek, *Beyond the Storm: A Gulf War Crisis Reader* (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1991).

In the aftermath of the Gulf War, President Bush senior announced to Congress that in addition to the removal of Saddam Hussein from power, he would pursue new strategic goals in the region, including a just settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Then Secretary of State James Baker maintained that the Madrid Conference was a necessary part of President Bush's 'new world order' after the fall of Communism.⁴⁴

At the Madrid peace conference, the Palestinians attended not as an independent delegation under the auspices of the PLO, but as part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. The conference set in motion bilateral negotiations between Israel and its neighboring countries, including the Palestinians. Simultaneously accompanying the ten rounds of negotiations between Israel and the PLO in Washington DC, was a second track of negotiations: Israel and the PLO were secretly negotiating in Oslo. The fourteen meetings in Oslo culminated in the 13 September, 1993 signing of the Declaration of Principles (DOP).⁴⁵ The DOP was not a peace treaty, but rather an agenda for negotiations covering a five-year 'interim period', which would lead to a permanent settlement. The agreements therefore outlined the principles that would govern relations between Israel and the PLO for the five-year period. These agreements were non-binding, and stipulated that 'nothing in the interim would prejudice the outcome of final status negotiations.' After the first two years, final status issues would begin on the most critical issues related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, most notably, Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, the status of Jerusalem, the fate of Palestinian refugees, water

⁴⁴ For more on this, see Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin, *The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict*, 6th ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 2001).

⁴⁵ The Declaration of Principles (DOP) and the agreements to follow are collectively known as the "Oslo Accords."

rights, borders, and security arrangements. In many ways, the DOP resembled previous proposals relating to Palestinian autonomy, for the notable exception of the PLO's participation. The DOP did not guarantee the minimal Palestinian nationalist aspirations, and therefore did not gain the support of many Palestinian political groups, as well as sectors of Palestinian society.

The main provisions of the DOP included the establishment of a 'Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority' for Palestinians residing in the WBGS, and that Israel's military occupation was to end within 5 years from the signing of the Interim Agreements. The DOP also stipulated that a permanent settlement would be based on UN security resolutions 242 and 338. Within the first two months of the DOP's 'coming into force,' the Israeli military would commence redeployment from Gaza and Jericho, and would be replaced by a Palestinian police force responsible for Palestinian 'internal security and public order.' At a later point Israel would redeploy from major Palestinian population centers- Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin, Qalqilya, Tulkarem, and Bethlehem.⁴⁶ Once the Israeli military redeployment from any area was complete, the Israeli government would transfer the civil powers for education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism to the PA. Within a short amount of time after Israeli military redeploy from the main population centers, Palestinians in the WBGS would hold elections for a Palestinian Legislative Council that would assume

⁴⁶ The WBGS would be divided into three distinct areas—A, B, and C—each consisting of different security and civil power arrangements. Area A would consist of approximately 17.2 percent of the West Bank. In this area, the PA would be responsible for internal security, and have wide civil powers. Israeli checkpoints would surround each of these areas. Area B would consist of 23.8 percent of the West Bank, over which the PA would have civil control, and Israel would maintain overall security control. Area C would consist of 59 percent of the territory; in this area, Israel would be responsible for both civil and military affairs, effectively under full Israeli control. For more on this, refer to the PLO Negotiations Affairs Department website: <http://www.nad-plo.org>.

responsibility for these five powers. In the interim, Israel would control borders. Finally, the agreement called for the establishment of a joint Israeli-Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee to carry out economic development programs for the WBGS.⁴⁷

A series of agreements that effectively outlined the nature of implementation followed the DOP; among the most important of these agreements are the Paris Protocol,⁴⁸ Gaza-Jericho Agreements,⁴⁹ the Oslo II Agreements,⁵⁰ and the Protocol concerning redeployment from Hebron.⁵¹

Supporters of the DOP pointed out that the agreements de facto included Israel's formal recognition of the PLO, and allowed the Palestinian's to administer their own affairs. Critics rightly pointed out that the Palestinians had not received any guarantees for a future independent, sovereign, viable state, as well as no guarantees for a halt to Israeli settlement expansion in the occupied territories. The DOP also failed to address Israel's illegal claim to the 'occupied territories;' rather the DOP identified the territories

⁴⁷ For a detailed discussion of the agreements, or the actual texts of the agreements themselves, refer to PLO Negotiation Affairs Department website, <http://www.nad-plo.org>.

⁴⁸ The two parties signed the Paris Protocol in April, 1994; this agreement outlined the economic arrangements between the two parties, including issues related to the customs union, import tariffs, trade taxes, import licensing regulations, and trade standards. For more on the Paris Protocol, refer to Emma Murphy, "Stacking the Deck: Economics of the Israeli-PLO Accords," *Middle East Report* 25, nos. 3 & 4 (May-June/July-August, 1995): 35-38.

⁴⁹ In May 1994, the two parties signed the Gaza-Jericho First Agreements, or what are also known as the Cairo Agreements; these agreements gave the Palestinians autonomy in Gaza and the West Bank town of Jericho.

⁵⁰ In September 1995, the two parties signed the Oslo II Agreements, also known as the Taba Agreements. The Oslo II Agreements fully detailed the interim arrangements between the two parties during the next five years, including the establishment of the PA, and the transfer of certain powers to the PA.

⁵¹ In January 1997, the two parties signed the Protocol concerning redeployment from Hebron which outlines the nature of Israeli withdrawal from this Palestinian town. These agreements exclusively defined the relationship between the two parties during the extended interim period. Other agreements signed between the two parties include The Wye River Memorandum, Protocol Concerning Safe Passage between the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, and the Trilateral Statement on the Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David.

as 'disputed territories. One of the most damning critiques of the PLO was that it allowed itself to be 'transformed' from a liberation movement, to a small town government in the occupied territories,' in the words of Yezid Sayigh.⁵²

The DOP enjoyed minimal support from the Palestinian population, even among moderates. On 3 September, 1993, Arafat convened the PLO executive committee in hopes of ratifying the DOP. Some of the most prominent members of the PLO, such as Mahmoud Darwish and Shafiq al-Hout, resigned and a number of members abstained. The cabinet resolution in favor of the DOP passed by only one vote, compared to 61 in favor, and 50 opposed in the Israeli Knesset.⁵³ Prominent Palestinian intellectuals, as well as political groups such as *Hamas*, Islamic Jihad, and the leftist PFLP, and DFLP opposed the DOP. Even former PLO negotiators, most notably Haidar Abdel Shafi,⁵⁴ and to a lesser extent Hanan Ashrawi, were vocal in their opposition to Oslo.

The Post-Oslo Era

Despite the limitations of the peace accords, and the number of impediments, such as Israel's continued settlement expansion, Israel's closure policies,⁵⁵ and the outbreak of *al-Aqsa Intifada* in 2000, which have hindered the implementation of the accords, the accords still define the nature of political relations between Israel and the PA, and between the different Palestinian groups themselves. In general, three political

⁵² Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State*, 659.

⁵³ Cheryl A. Rubenberg, *The Palestinians: In Search of a Just Peace* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 57.

⁵⁴ In 1994, Haider Abdel Shafi led a 1994 petition campaign against the Oslo Accords and then was involved in the establishment of a movement that opposed the direction of the Oslo Accords. For more on this refer to Glenn Robinson, *Building a Palestinian State*, 175.

⁵⁵ For more on Israel's closure policies, refer to footnote 91 in chapter one of this dissertation.

tendencies have emerged in relation to the Oslo accords: *Fateh*, the Opposition, and the Moderate Opposition. These tendencies include the pertinent political organizations, as well as the loosely affiliated individual and groups. This loose affiliation can simply result because the founder of an organization was a member of the political organization, or is sympathetic to the political position of a certain political organization, or simply because of a common label, such as Islamist. Moreover, the major players involved, have maintained the same political positions vis-à-vis the accords, albeit with minor shifts in tone or degree at various times. Each of these tendencies has adopted a different strategy in relation to the peace accords; the strategy adopted by these groups was often conditioned by their ability to access Western foreign donor funding. Because of the interests of Western foreign donors, especially state-sponsored donors, they were more likely to fund groups that support the peace accords, and are in a better position to promote what I refer to as a 'post-Cold War liberal order.' Groups and individuals who were in a favorable position to promote a 'post-Cold War liberal order' were more Western in their social orientation, and supportive of the ideals of liberal democracy.⁵⁶ The availability of Western foreign donor assistance, hence, played, and continues to play, a critical role in mediating relations between these different groups.

Members and groups affiliated with *Fateh*, the leadership party of the PA and the broker of the Oslo Accords, are the staunchest supporters of the Oslo peace process. Although, groups and individuals affiliated with *Fateh* are eligible to receive foreign donor funding, some of these groups have not sought Western foreign funding because of

⁵⁶ It is important to note that the Palestinian leftist political organizations, PPP and FIDA, have not articulated a clear position in relation to the organization of economic life in Palestine, or on the social welfare system, and place more emphasis on civil rights than upon social and economic rights. In general, these groups have embraced free-market economics, including a two-tiered health care system.

— their steady flow of funding from *Fateh* and the PLO. After the Oslo accords, *Fateh* was better able to consolidate its financial base in the territories, and therefore enlarge its clientelistic networks, including those involving their affiliated volunteer and grassroots organizations. As the governing body of the PA, all groups affiliated with *Fateh*, have sought to expand their grassroots bases, so as to maintain *Fateh's* primacy in Palestinian society.

Another tendency to emerge was the Opposition; the Opposition includes groups and individuals of both Islamist and Leftist affinities. The Islamists include Islamic Jihad and *Hamas*, as well as groups and individuals, who are not affiliated with these groups, but who would characterize themselves as Islamist. The Leftist Opposition tendency included the more radical groups, namely the DFLP and the PFLP, as well as groups and individuals directly and indirectly, perceived or otherwise, affiliated with these organizations.⁵⁷ Often, the level of affiliation with these political organizations is limited to the political affiliation or the former political affiliation of the founders of the respective group or grassroots organization. Groups associated with this tendency adopted a clear position against the Oslo Accords. Groups and individuals in this tendency refused to run candidates in the Palestinian Legislative Council elections, fearing that these elections served to legitimize the Oslo Accords.⁵⁸ Conversely, however, they have been willing to participate in local government elections.

⁵⁷ For more on the post-Oslo political system, particularly in relation to the Palestinian groups, refer to Jamil Hilal, "The Effect of the Oslo Agreements on the Palestinian Political System," in *After Oslo: New Realities and New Problems*, eds., George Giacaman and Dag Jorund (London, Chicago: Pluto Press, 1998), 121–145. Also refer to Azmi Bishara, *Musahameh fi Naqd al Mujtama' al-Madani* [A Contribution to the Critique of Civil Society], (Ramallah: Muwatin- The Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy, 1996).

⁵⁸ Although these individuals and groups did not run candidates in the elections, in most cases, they did vote.

In general, these groups were not in a position to receive Western foreign funding because many of their founders, and some of their members, were in opposition to the peace accords. Western foreign donors did not want to fund these groups for fear that they might undermine the peace accords. In the case of groups affiliated with the Islamist tendency, foreign donors did not want to fund them because they also were not in a position to promote the 'post-Cold War liberal order,' especially in relation to its pro-Western social orientation. Despite the apolitical nature of many of these Islamist groups, and the extensive networks and beneficial services they provided to various constituencies in Palestinian society, foreign donors feared that they might be more strongly connected to more political Islamist groups, and that they were too anti-Western in their social outlook. Similarly, although the leftist groups that fell under the purview of the Opposition were in a position to promote the 'post-Cold War liberal order,' they were not eligible to receive funding from Western foreign donors because of their opposition to the peace accords.

Individuals formerly associated with the more leftist groups of the Opposition were able to access Western foreign funding if they no longer displayed any ties with any political groups associated with the Opposition, including any strong ties to grassroots constituencies; such a display might indicate that these individuals are still important political players affiliated with the actual political organizations. Therefore, when individuals such as Riad al-Malki, and Waleed Salem, former leaders of the PFLP, established the Palestinian Center for the Dissemination of Democracy and Community Development: PANORAMA, they did so without incorporating any previously active grassroots constituencies.

The Moderate Opposition involved those groups and individuals who did not necessarily support the peace accords, but were willing to adopt a wait and see approach. Similar to groups and individuals who were part of the Opposition, these groups were in a favorable position to promote a 'post-Cold War liberal order' because of their more Western social orientation, and their willingness to support the ideals of liberal democracy. These individuals and groups were willing and eager to partake in the legislative and local elections, both in terms of voting and running candidates, and in filling key positions in hopes of influencing certain outcomes related to the accords. The Moderate Opposition tendency is most closely associated with the PCP, later renamed the PPP, the Palestinian Democratic Union (FIDA), a splinter faction of the DFLP that supported the Oslo Accords, and subsequently broke away from the DFLP. These groups and individuals were in an ideal position to promote a 'post-Cold War liberal order' given their more Western outlook. Because individuals and groups within this tendency also did not adamantly oppose the Oslo Accords, especially in the case of FIDA, they were in a good position to receive Western foreign donor assistance.

In the post-Madrid era, groups and individuals within this tendency adopted NGO professionalization as a way to obtain foreign donor assistance. NGO professionalization seemed to be a suitable strategy for the political cadre of the PPP; this strategy provided the cadre with the opportunity to receive a means of living, and to remain politically relevant actors without being wed to the Oslo Accords. Because these individuals and groups did not adamantly oppose the Oslo Accords, they were able to institutionalize and professionalize their organizations, maintaining their grassroots constituencies, and still receive foreign donor assistance. Among the former leaders of the PPP who were able to

professionalize their organizations and maintain their grassroots constituencies are Ismail Dueik, head of the Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees (PARC), and Amal Khreisheh, head of the Palestinian Working Women's Society for Development (PWWSD), and to a lesser extent, Mustafa Barghouti, head of the Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees (UPMRC), to name but a few. Later, prominent members of the DFLP established new professionalized organizations, including the Women's Study Center, and Legal Aid and Counseling for Women. Most of the DFLP members who were involved in the founding of these organizations, later broke off and joined FIDA, the new splinter organization of the DFLP. Because the founders of these organizations formerly affiliated themselves with the opposition, and because of the tenuous nature of the split in the organization, these new NGOs did not incorporate or maintain their grassroots constituencies. Initially, foreign donors would have been more reticent to fund an NGO that was headed by members or former members of the DFLP (an Opposition group), who maintain a strong relationship with their former grassroots constituencies. Subsequently, after the schism in the DFLP, FIDA (the new Moderate Opposition group) also was not able to garner the same support among its former grassroots base.

The Professionalization of Politics in Palestine

Beginning in the mid-1980s, but most notably after the initiation of the Madrid peace process in 1991, the various NGOs began seeking out Western foreign donor assistance. The exclusivist nature of the Madrid peace process and the Oslo Accords, caused increasing polarization among these associations, unions, and organizations between those who supported or did not oppose the peace process, and therefore were

– eligible to receive foreign donor assistance, and those who opposed the peace process, and were not eligible to receive foreign donor assistance. Consequently, the organizations and members affiliated with the Opposition became the recipients of services or training sessions from those organizations affiliated with the pro-peace accords or non-opposition groups; this merely exacerbated existing polarization. In some cases, this political chasm also over-lapped along social divisions between those who are more Western-oriented and English speaking, and those who are not. The increased polarization among the various associations, unions, and organizations has resulted in increased tension, animosity, and mistrust among the various groups. Most notably, Palestinian civil society became more elitist in nature, addressing the needs of a narrower population base, and devoid of the principles of voluntarism that were so central to previous modes of socio-political organizing. Marwan Barghouti elaborates, “The spirit of voluntarism was gone...The PA left people disappointed, and the left turned to NGOs.”⁵⁹ The combination of these factors negatively impacted the development of Palestinian civil society.

As Western foreign donor assistance became more readily available to the WBGS after 1991, many of these NGOs became dependant on this source of funding. Accompanying this reliance on Western foreign donor assistance were new standards for NGO accounting and professionalization. As I discuss in more detail in the following chapter, although there might have been a decrease in overall funding to NGOs in the WBGS, the structure of this aid shifted from being more Arab and solidarity-based in character, to being from state-sponsored bilateral donors. The increased reliance on

⁵⁹ Marwan Barghouti, Palestinian Legislative Council Member, and Head of *Fateh* in the West Bank, Ramallah, 24 July, 2001.

Western foreign donor assistance would come to have a significant impact on associational life, as well as the quality of the emergent civil society in Palestine in the next decades.⁶⁰

Increased reliance on Western foreign donor assistance, as opposed to reliance on membership fees and voluntarism meant that NGOs were no longer accountable to the constituencies they served, but rather to the donors who fund them. In order to access this funding, local NGOs had to adopt the project and program priorities of foreign donors. Therefore, the program and project priorities of the emergent professionalized NGOs began to shift from self-help initiatives and other programs reflecting the needs of the membership base to advocacy, human rights monitoring, democracy training, and gender. Professionalized NGOs engaged in activities as diverse as medical relief, agricultural relief, and women's empowerment adopted these program priorities. According to the Palestinian Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS), NGOs in the WBGS increased by one-third in the post-Oslo era.⁶¹ By 2001, one Palestinian organization estimated that there were 20 Democracy and Civic Education professionalized NGOs, and 18 Human Rights professionalized NGOs.⁶² These figures are especially significant if one considers that the projected total population of the WBGS

⁶⁰ For more on the impact of foreign donor assistance on Palestinian civil society, refer to Reema Hamami, "NGOs: The Professionalization of Politics," *Race & Class* 37, no. 2 (1995): 51-63.

⁶¹ Yasser Shalabi and Na'eem al-Said, *Al-Ta'adad: al-Munthamat Ghair al-Hukumiyeh al-Filastiniyeh fi al-Dafah wa Quita' Gazah* [Survey: Non-Governmental Organizations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip] (Ramallah: Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute- MAS, September, 2001).

⁶² Waleed Salem, *Al-Munthamat al-Mujtama'iyeh al-Tatawu'iyeh wa al-Sulta al-Wataniyeh al-Filastaniyeh: Nahw I'laqua Takamuliyeh* [Volunteer Social Organizations and the Palestinian Authority: Towards a Comprehensive Overview] (Jerusalem and Ramallah: Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute- MAS, June 1999), 258-259.

in 2005 was less than 3.7 million.⁶³ Even more significant, however, is how disconnected these NGOs are from the general Palestinian population. Despite the prevalence of these professionalized organizations, few Palestinians outside of elite circles have ever heard of them, or have contact with them. According to one Jerusalem and Media Communication (JMCC) public opinion poll, only 19.2 percent of those polled are members of any type of organization,⁶⁴ and only 0.4 percent are members or participate in the activities of a human rights organization.⁶⁵

Many of these new professionalized NGOs serve as political platforms for their directors. Accordingly, many of these organizations are known by the name of their directors, as opposed to the actual name of the organization. Among the Palestinian elite who established professionalized organizations are Hanan Ashrawi,⁶⁶ Mustafa Barghouti,⁶⁷ Ghassan Khatib,⁶⁸ and Ziad Abu Amar.⁶⁹ One commentator aptly noted: “Palestine is probably the only place where you give up your job as a minister in order to

⁶³ Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, www.pcbs.org.

⁶⁴ Among the members of any association or organization, the largest percentage (25.7) were members of athletic clubs and organizations. Based on Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC) Public Opinion Poll No. 32-Part Two, *On Palestinian Attitudes Towards Politics*, Question 23, August, 1999.

⁶⁵ Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC) Public Opinion Poll No. 32-Part Two, *On Palestinian Attitudes Towards Politics*, Question 22, August, 1999.

⁶⁶ Hanan Ashrawi is a PLC member, and a former cabinet minister. She established MIFTAH-Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy, a human rights and democracy promotion organization.

⁶⁷ Mustafa Barghouti is Director of the UPMRC, Director of the HDIP, and Member of the General Secretariat of the PPP.

⁶⁸ Ghassan Khatib is Director of the JMCC, and Executive Committee Member of the PPP.

⁶⁹ Ziad Abu Amar is a member of the Palestinian Legislative Council, and a sitting cabinet minister as of December 2005. He founded the Palestinian Council for Foreign Relations.

establish an NGO” -- most likely referring to Hanan Ashrawi.⁷⁰ Because these individuals can rely on their professionalized organizations for publicity, as well as financial support in the form of salaries, they are likely to abandon their political parties. Mustafa Barghouti’s example perhaps best illustrates this point. Mustafa Barghouti left the PPP, and at one point was the director of three professionalized NGOs.⁷¹ In the last presidential election, Barghouti was Abbas’ main political contender.

Foreign donors are not oblivious to these dynamics in Palestinian society. One director of a foreign donor agency stated that Western foreign donors were willing to fund professionalized NGOs that served as personal platforms for their directors in hopes that an alternative leadership to the PLO would emerge from the NGO sector. Ghassan Khatib adds, “...there was the idea that NGOs can replace political parties. Although NGOs may help in the promotion of democracy, only the political parties can play a real role in putting democracy into practice and pushing for pluralism. Civil society is only efficacious in the context of a well functioning and vibrant political society.”⁷² Mustafa Barghouti, for example, is pretty straightforward regarding the opposition nature of his work; he explains, “To work on social issues, you have to be in the opposition.”⁷³ These NGOs increasingly assumed an oppositional character in relation the PA and the Oslo

⁷⁰ Salah Abdel Shafi, *Civil Society and Political Elites in Palestine and the Role of International Donors: A Palestinian View* (Lisboa: EuroMeSCo papers, July 2004).

⁷¹ Urban myth maintains that Mustafa Barghouti is one a few Palestinian NGO directors who does not have to solicit Western foreign donor funding since they often approach him.

⁷² Per interview with Ghassan Khatib, Director of the JMCC, and Executive Committee Member of the PPP, Jerusalem, 5 August, 2001.

⁷³ Interview with Mustafa Barghouti, Director of the UPMRC, Director of the HDIP, and Member of the General Secretariat of the PPP, Ramallah, 24 July, 2001.

Accords. The directors of these professionalized NGOs do not dismiss the Oslo Accords outright, but maintain a wait and see approach.

Legislative and Local Government Development and the Creation of Institutional Openings

After the onset of the Madrid peace process, but most notably after the signing of the Oslo Accords, a number of new opportunities and challenges presented themselves to the various Palestinian political actors. The new opportunities and challenges transpired in a constrained process of government-related institutional development, propelling civil society development in ‘disarticulated spaces.’ To ensure its political primacy in Palestinian society, *Fateh* imposed constraints on the emergent institutional settings, most notably in relation to the Palestinian Legislative Council and local government to ensure that the Opposition and Moderate Opposition do not prevail at these levels of government.⁷⁴ In many ways, *Fateh*’s need to ensure its political predominance was directly related to the exclusivist nature of the Oslo Accords. *Fateh* as the governing

⁷⁴ The PA also tried to control opposition groups in civil society, especially in relation to NGOs, by imposing a stringent NGO Law, though with far less success. Previously, the exiting NGO law was a combination of Ottoman, British mandate, Jordanian, Gazan, and Israeli law. Once the PA was established, it demanded that all NGOs register with the PA. The NGOs worried that such a move would invite more PA direct control, further curtailing NGO autonomy. The PA responded by drafting an NGO law similar in content to the Egyptian NGO law. The Palestinian NGO community considered this law too intrusive, not yielding enough autonomy to NGOs. According to this draft of the NGO law, NGOs would have to receive PA approval before receiving funding from donors, and register with the Ministry of Interior to receive approval for their operations. Bowing to pressure from the Palestinian NGO community, as well as from foreign donors, the PA agreed to redraft the NGO law. The new NGO law was similar to the first, with a few important modifications: NGOs would no longer require approval for their operations, and they would have to report funding to the PA, but not seek their approval. After substantial discussion and debates between the NGO community, the PA executive, and the PLC promulgated the law without incorporating many of the cabinet’s recommendations and amendments. Ultimately, both the PA and the NGO community considered the new NGO law a victory. Although NGOs were still required to register with the Ministry of Interior, they were not required to seek permission for operations from the PA, nor request approval for their funding. The NGO community proudly conceded that the Palestinian NGO law was the most “progressive” in the Arab world. Similarly, the PA executive was satisfied, since the NGOs were required to register with the Ministry of Interior. For more on this issue, refer to Brown, *Palestinian Politics After Oslo*, 155.

party of the PA, and the Oslo Accords as the birthmother of this 'statelet' became carefully intertwined, depending on the same lifeline, each requiring the survival of the other to persist in existence. Similarly, the groups affiliated with the Opposition, including the Moderate Opposition, adopted different strategies to maneuver their protest to the Oslo accords and *Fateh*-imposed constraints. As I will explain in more detail in the following section, the constraints *Fateh* created in relation to each of these sites of power, as well as the responses of the various political groups, imposed important limitations on the quality and efficacy of Palestinian civil society. In effect, this meant that civil society groups and actors would have fewer institutional openings to access the state, and fewer advocates who were in positions of power.

On the one hand, the greater sense of optimism because of the prospects for 'peace,' the availability of more resources, and the new openings in the institutional setting all coalesced to provide the various political actors enhanced opportunities for political participation. As part of the Oslo accords, Palestinians would have the opportunity to hold Legislative Council elections in the WBGS, and to hold elections for local government. However, because of the exclusivist nature of the peace accords, and because it possessed the power to do, *Fateh* crafted mechanisms and strategies to ensure its predominance in relation to each of these sites of power.

At the level of the Palestinian Legislative Council, *Fateh* imposed constraints which limited the representative nature of this body. In turn, the limitations of this body constrained civil society's ability to interact with it; a more representative body would have provided the different civil society actors with greater openings and opportunities to interact and make demands on the state. From the onset, the structure of the electoral law

discouraged party competition.⁷⁵ Moreover, more than half of the seats of the legislative council were to be elected at the district level; the election law divided the WBGS into 16 districts in which the winning party takes all the seats allotted to the district. The system provided smaller parties such as FIDA and the PPP—groups affiliated with the Moderate Opposition -- less opportunity to win seats in the Legislative Council.⁷⁶ The Opposition also demanded that the electoral commission change the electoral law so that the WBGS be treated as a single constituency with proportional representation as opposed to the majority-take all district system. The Opposition's discontent with the electoral system surely was another reason they did not run candidates in the election.⁷⁷

Similarly, the limited nature of local government structures in the WBGS, also constrained, and continue to constrain, the efficacy and full potential of Palestinian civil society. In the case of local government elections, it is more difficult for *Fateh* to determine outcomes, especially since the units of each municipal area were demarcated prior to the Oslo accords.⁷⁸ One tool at the disposal of the PA, however, is the timing of the election, that is, for the PA to hold local level elections when *Fateh* is in a better position to win the election. Based on this logic, the PA has delayed the holding of full-scale local level elections. In early 1997, the PA appointed its 'transition' mayors for the

⁷⁵ Brown, *Palestinian Politics After Oslo*, 145.

⁷⁶ In the 1996 elections, Fateh won 30.9 percent of the votes, and 56.8 percent of the seats, and Independents won 57.51 percent of the votes, and 39.7 percent of the seats. For more on the Palestinian electoral system, refer to Arjan Fassed, "On the Palestinian Road to Elections: The System," *The Electronic Intifada*, 24 November, 2004. This paper can be accessed from <http://electronicIntifada.net/v2/printer3349.shtml> and *Institutional Design and Prospects for Palestinian Democratic Transition* (Nablus: Center for Palestine Research and Studies, 1999).

⁷⁷ Ibid. Prior to the 2006 legislative elections, President Mahmoud Abbas modified the electoral law so that 66 legislative seats are elected by a national proportional list system.

⁷⁸ Jordan and Egypt established local government structures in the WBGS. These structures were further weakened under Israeli military rule. Israel suspended municipal elections in the WBGS after 1976. During the 1976 election, Israel was dismayed following the election of a number of pro-PLO candidates.

interim period until the elections; most of these mayors were either members of *Fateh*, or supporters of the party. Subsequently, in the interim period during the next eight years, the PA did not hold municipal elections, further weakening existing local government structures. In the wake of President Yasir Arafat's death, the PA decided to hold presidential, legislative, and municipal elections, however, they decided to hold the local government elections in four phases. The phased-nature of the elections would allow the PA to ensure that the opposition does not triumph at this level of government. In the event that the election results showed a victory for opposition parties, the PA could halt the latter phases of municipal elections. The PA held the first round of municipal elections in December, 2005, a second round in February, 2005, a third round in May 2005, part of the fourth round in December 2004, and plans to hold the remaining elections of the fourth round at some point in the near future. In the first phases of municipal elections, *Hamas* showed a strong showing, calling into question *Fateh's* guaranteed victory. In the event that the Opposition does prevail at this level of government, foreign donors are unlikely to promote programs to promote citizen participation at this level of government, thus further obstructing the articulation of spaces between society and the state. The absence of fully functioning and representative local government structures further circumscribes the work of Palestinian civil society, since the various constituent parts of civil society cannot interact with this level of government. One should not underestimate the significance of this limitation, since historically it is at this level of government that the poor and marginalized have often been able to achieve citizenship gains.

In this section, I illustrated how the Palestinian national movement played a

critical role in the founding of Palestinian associational life, and how the Oslo accords, and the relationship of each political group vis-à-vis the Oslo Accords, shaped the re/constitution of civil society. I also briefly indicated how foreign donor assistance has played an important role in the re/constitution of civil society, by providing some groups with opportunities to further institutionalize and professionalize, but not others. In the latter part of this section, I demonstrated how the Oslo Accords presented a number of new opportunities and constraints to Palestinian civil society. Because of the exclusivist nature of the Oslo Accords, and the limited support they enjoyed in Palestinian society, the PA has attempted to guarantee its primacy in a number of political arenas by restricting the prevalence of the opposition. In turn, this has had a negative impact on Palestinian civil society, since these collectivities have more limited opportunities to interact with the state. Hence, much of foreign donor civil society promotion has taken place in ‘disarticulated spaces,’ and has further perpetuated this disarticulation, thus limiting the effectiveness of civil society.

El Salvador

The Salvadoran case shares a number of similarities with the Palestinian case, especially in relation to how the political organizations played a significant role in establishing the various grassroots organizations and associations. In both cases, grassroots organizing was critical for the survival of the respective movements. Similarly, in the Salvadoran case also, the war-to-peace transition ushered in opportunities for the re-constitution of civil society, including these organizational forms that were becoming more autonomous from their political factions. However, unlike the

Palestinian case, the Salvadoran peace accords, were much more inclusive of all the major political actors in El Salvador, and therefore enjoyed higher levels of support from all sectors of Salvadoran society. Although foreign aid to civil society in El Salvador also played an important role in the re-constitution of civil society, post-war aid to civil society was not as politicized as in the Palestinian case and therefore did not have the same marginalizing impact. Moreover, because of the more inclusive nature of the peace accords, no one group needed to safeguard its primacy in order to guarantee the survival of the peace accords. Hence, parties to the peace accords placed fewer constraints on the development of parliament and local government. As a result of the more representative nature of parliament, and better functioning local government, the emergent civil society in El Salvador had more opportunities to interact and to access the state, especially at the level of local government. Therefore, the process of building and strengthening civil society by foreign donors has taken place in more ‘articulated spaces.’

In the following section, I begin with a very brief discussion of the Salvadoran conflict. I then discuss the emergence of the FMLN and its various factions, and then turn my attention to the evolution of associational life in El Salvador. Throughout, I demonstrate how the associational trajectory of development is comparable to the Palestinian case. In the last part of this section, I discuss the basic tenants of the Salvadoran peace accords, and how the more inclusive nature of the peace accords, did not present the same challenges to the emergent civil society in El Salvador.

Background to the Conflict

El Salvador's century-long conflict is historically rooted in the massive socio-economic inequality, resulting in the concentration of land ownership in the hands of a very small minority (14 families more exactly). El Salvador's reliance on the monocultivation of coffee and the concentration of capital in one sector of the economy, made the country susceptible to any external shocks that might affect export. Patterns of social unrest and brutal government repression reproduced themselves in the coming decades, fueling the start of the civil war in 1980.⁷⁹

As a result of the economic recession of the 1920s, international coffee prices crashed, and social unrest ensued. Rising rural unemployment fueled strikes and protests in the rural areas. Although, members of the Salvadoran oligarchy ruled the country directly until 1931, they were incapable of controlling the unrest. Pío Romero Bosque tried to quell unrest by holding democratic elections. Arturo Araujo of the Labor Party won those elections. The situation continued to deteriorate, and the dissatisfied groups overthrew him in a coup in 1931. Shortly, thereafter, General Hernandez Martínez, vice-president and minister of defense, carried out the *matanza* (the massacre or slaughter) against the popular insurrection led by the Communist leader, Farabundo Martí. By the end of the *matanza*, over 30,000 *campesinos* had lost their lives. In many ways, the armed conflict that erupted in the 1980s originated in the 1932 *matanza*; the magnitude of

⁷⁹ For a succinct discussion of the roots of socio-economic inequality and unrest in El Salvador, refer to Liisa North, *Bitter Grounds: Roots of Revolt in El Salvador* (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1981); Tommie Sue Montgomery, *Revolution in El Salvador: Origins and Evolution* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982); Enrique Baloyra, *El Salvador in Transition* (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 5–14; Jeffrey Paige, *Coffee and Power: Revolution and the Rise of Democracy in Central America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997).

the conflict at the time shaped the repressive nature of subsequent government regimes that had little tolerance for dissent.

The military and oligarchy continued to prosper, as the majority of the population was further impoverished. The mechanization of agriculture after WWII, and the introduction of export crops such as cotton and sugar cane put further pressure on cultivable land and reduced employment opportunities for Salvadoran *campesinos*. By the 1970s, the majority rural population did not have access to land, or employment opportunities. The military that defended the interests of the oligarchy left little room for democratic participation. The ruling parties supported by the oligarchy, prevented reformist political parties such as the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats from electoral victory and access to the government in the 1972 and 1977 elections. The military regime exiled political leaders, and persecuted and dismantled their grassroots organizations.⁸⁰ The dearth of political openings, the mounting repression, and the deterioration of socio-economic conditions propelled people to affiliate, in ever-increasing numbers, with the emerging revolutionary organizations. Center and more radical opposition groups became more radicalized and began to advocate armed revolutionary struggle as the only solution to end repression in the country. The fraudulent elections of 1977 further exacerbated the conflict, convincing the opposition that they should employ more forceful means.⁸¹ 1979 was a turning point. A group of reform-minded military men overthrew the regime and installed a joint civilian-military

⁸⁰ Román Mayorga Quiroz, "Introduction," in Tommie Sue Montgomery, *Revolution in El Salvador*, 4.

⁸¹ Kees Biekart, *El Salvador: NGO Country Profile* (Oegstgeest: Gemeenschappelijk Overleg Medefinanciering, 1999), 14.

– junta composed of center-left opposition leaders. The conservative wing of the military persisted in its wave of terror, and internal disputes among the junta members arose. By January 1980, most left-of-center members of the junta had resigned. By late 1981, the thrice-reconstituted junta had moved to the right-of-center, headed by José Napoleón Duarte.⁸²

Meanwhile, a more leftist branch of the Christian Democrats, and two small Social Democratic parties formed the *Frente Democrático Revolucionario* (Revolutionary Democratic Front- FDR). By the end of 1980, over 15,000 had been killed, along with most of the leadership of the FDR, and most of the mass movements had gone underground. In January of 1981, the FMLN launched the ‘general offensive,’ that marked the official beginning of the civil war. Four days later, the FMLN and the FDR joined forces and created the Political-Diplomatic Commission.

The US-backed Salvadoran establishment tried to defeat the FDR-FMLN through different means: The *Partido Demócrata Cristiano* (Christian Democratic Party- PDC) tried to resolve the conflict with the help of US-sponsored programs and reform,⁸³ and the armed forces with the help of US military support aimed to destroy the FMLN. As the international community called for peace negotiations to resolve the conflict, the US and Duarte insisted on presidential and legislative elections to legitimize his government.

⁸² North, *Bitter Grounds: Roots of Revolt in El Salvador*, 81.

⁸³ Equizábal further explains, “The civilian-military Christian Democratic junta they [members of the junta] formed maintained the reformist programs of the its predecessors: agrarian reform, right of association for rural workers, nationalization of foreign commerce...It abandoned efforts to incorporate the political-revolutionary organizations in the reform process and adopted, thanks to massive aid by the United States, a more traditional counterinsurgency strategy to repress the civilian population mobilized by the guerrilla organizations.” For more on this discussion, refer to Cristina Equizábal, “Parties, Programs, and Politics in El Salvador,” in *Political Parties and Democracy in Central America*, eds. Louis W. Goodman, William M. Les Grandes, and Jonathan Mendelson (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1992), 137.

Duarte managed to win the 1984 presidential elections, and to stay in power until 1989, after which the more right-wing *Alianza Republicana Nacionalista* (Republican Nationalist Alliance-ARENA) came to power. The election of Duarte, however, provided activists with new opportunities to re-establish associations and organizations dismantled in the late 1970s and early 1980s. By 1989, the armed forces and the FMLN reached a military stalemate.

The Rise of the Organized Opposition and Mass Movement Mobilization in El Salvador

In this section, I do not discuss the founding of all political parties in El Salvador;⁸⁴ rather, I focus on those that would come to play a critical role in mass movement mobilization in El Salvador, and later in the establishment of NGOs, effectively laying the groundwork for a future civil society in El Salvador. I specifically discuss, albeit briefly, the emergence of the political-military organizations and the role of the Catholic Church.

Although El Salvador has a long history of struggle against socio-economic inequality, it was not until 1932 that the struggle assumed ideological overtones—the Marxism-Leninism of the *Partido Comunista de El Salvador* (Communist Party of El Salvador- PSC).⁸⁵ After 1932, the Salvadoran government outlawed the PSC. In 1960,

⁸⁴ The military institutionalized its political participation through the creation of various political parties—*Partido de Reconciliación Nacional* (Party of National Reconciliation), and the *Partido Revolucionario de Unificación Democrática* (Party of Revolutionary Democratic Unification) in 1961. In 1981, right wing constituents who wanted to ensure their own socio-economic standing in El Salvador, and to guarantee the capitalist development of the country founded ARENA. For more on right-wing political parties, refer to Tommie Sue Montgomery, “Constructing Democracy in El Salvador,” *Current History*. 96, no. 61 (February 1997), 64, and Equizábal, “Parties, Programs, and Politics in El Salvador,” 135–160. Also, for a succinct discussion regarding the political parties in El Salvador from the 1960s to the 1980s, refer to Enrique Baloyra, *El Salvador in Transition*, 50–51.

⁸⁵ Montgomery, *Revolution in El Salvador*, 119.

well-to-do middle class professionals founded the PDC. The PDC was anti-Communist and upheld social Christian principles.⁸⁶ By 1972, the PDC had amassed a substantial following, and had become one of the key targets of government repression.⁸⁷ Duarte, one of the leaders of the PDC, and the presidential candidate of the National Opposition Union won the 1972 election; subsequently, the ruling regime captured Duarte and deported him to Guatemala. After the 1979 junta, the more left-leaning contingents of the PDC broke away and established the *Movimiento Popular Social Cristiano* (Popular Social Christian Movement- MPSC).⁸⁸

In the late 1960's a debate arose in the PSC regarding legitimate means of struggle and whether or not the party should adopt armed struggle. By 1969, disagreement within the party resulted in proponents of armed struggle breaking away from the party and establishing the first of the military-political organizations—the *Fuerzas Populares de Liberación* (Popular Forces of Liberation, FPL). Meanwhile, in 1972, a second party emerged from the PCS, the *Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo* (Revolutionary Army of People, ERP); its constituents extended to the Young Communists, youth from the Christian Democratic Party, and radicalized sectors of the Salvadoran bourgeoisie.⁸⁹ Both the ERP and the FPL advocated armed struggle against the repressive regime; though the FPL upheld a political-military strategy, the ERP

⁸⁶ During this period, the *Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario* (National Revolutionary Movement, MNR) grew out of a study group that met from 1956 to 1958. The MNR's platform was very intellectualized and abstract, and therefore never amassed the following to develop into a strong political party. Guillermo Ungo headed the MNR. For more on the MNR, refer to Enrique Baloyra, *El Salvador in Transition*, 46.

⁸⁷ North, *Bitter Grounds: Roots of Revolt in El Salvador*, 73.

⁸⁸ Montgomery, *Revolution in El Salvador*, 133.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 121.

focused solely on military means. By the mid-1970s, another schism emerged in the ERP regarding the need to accompany military struggle with a political program. Due to these tactical disagreements and the murder of Roque Dalton⁹⁰ by Villaboso and his faction, Dalton's followers led by Ernesto Jovel, left the ERP and established the *Resistencia Nacional* (National Resistance, RN) in May 1975. Villaboso and his followers retained the ERP label.⁹¹ Then in 1976, regional activists founded the Trotskyist *Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores Centroamericanos* (Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers, PRTC) in Costa Rica. The PRTC's conception was more regional in scope, though it maintained separate national units.⁹² The PCS turned into a political-military organization in 1979 following the massacre in Plaza Libertad in 1977, and the events surrounding the coup in 1979; it too came to the conclusion that the situation required armed struggle.⁹³

In January of 1980, the popular organizations affiliated with the political-military organizations united and created the *Coordinadora Revolucionaria de las Masas* (Revolutionary Co-ordinating Council of the Masses- CRM). In April 1980, the CRM united with the *Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario* (National Revolutionary Movement, MNR), the MPSC, and a coalition of professionals and technicians, small business organizations, the National University, six unions and union federations, and a

⁹⁰ Roque Dalton was El Salvador's national poet. He toed a moderate line, insisting that the party adopt political, as well as military strategies. Consequently, the hardliners in the ERP charged him with treason, tried him in absentia, and condemned him to death. In May 1975, extremists in the ERP killed Dalton. For a more detailed discussion regarding the break in the ERP, refer to Montgomery, *Revolution in El Salvador*, 121–122, and Michael Radu, "The Structure of the Salvadoran Left," *Orbis* 28 (Winter 1985): 676.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Montgomery, *Revolution in El Salvador*, 122.

student association, with the UCA and the Catholic Church as observers, and formed the FDR.⁹⁴ The FDR became the official umbrella organization of all leftist and center-leftist forces in the country. In October of 1980, despite the differences in strategy and organizational principles, the five political-military organizations united and formed the FMLN. In early 1981, the FDR and the FMLN created the Political Diplomatic Commission that would represent these bodies in the international arena.⁹⁵ By late 1981, coordinating mechanisms between the FDR and FMLN, one of the most organized opposition coalitions in El Salvador's history, were fully in place.⁹⁶ The FDR-FMLN unified a broad and heterogeneous constituency encompassing radical Christians, Marxists, and Social Democrats.⁹⁷

The Opposition, Civic Traditions, and Associational Life in El Salvador

In general, the civil society literature tends to ignore the politicized background of grassroots organizations and NGOs, especially in transition contexts. Even after the organizations sever their ties with their mother political organizations, they are still 'politically-tinged' by virtue of the historical legacy of the organization and the individuals who they embody. Recognition of the politicized nature of various grassroots organizations and NGOs is necessary, especially if one aspires to understand how

⁹⁴ Ibid., 133.

⁹⁵ North, *Bitter Grounds: Roots of Revolt in El Salvador*, 92.

⁹⁶ For more on the creation of the FDR-FMLN, also refer to Radu, "The Structure of the Salvadoran Left," 682–684.

⁹⁷ The programs of the FDR-FMLN included a non-aligned foreign policy, the maintenance of a pluralistic political framework, the establishment of a mixed economy, and agrarian reform involving the redistribution of productive property and the generation of employment.

emergent political settlements will affect associational life and the re/constitution of civil society. As in the Palestinian case, the various political-military organizations founded many of these organizations, especially the mass-based organizations in the late 1960s and the 1970s. In the Salvadoran case, the Catholic Church also played an important role in the mobilization and organization of many of these communities.⁹⁸ For both the political-military organizations and the Catholic Church, grassroots mobilization was a key strategy in gaining support and in mobilizing against the regime. Salvadoran mass organizations included women's groups, trade unions, *campesino* groups, and students groups.⁹⁹ These organizations would also come to play an important role in civil society.

Moreover, similar to the Palestinian case, civic associations, including both popular grassroots organizations and more professionalized organizations in El Salvador have played a significant role in the organization of different sectors of society, and in the provision of services to these various sectors. In general, there have been three distinct phases in the associational life of El Salvador. In the first phase, which dates back to the 1930s, many of the organizations founded in El Salvador were charity associations, as well as a number of union organizations. By the late 1960s, and throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, these organizations predominately affiliated with the broader opposition movement, either with the PSC, the Christian communities, or later with one of the

⁹⁸ Although the Catholic Church and the political-military organizations played a prominent role in the founding of mass-based organizations, the Christian Democratic Party (CDP) was also involved in such efforts, albeit to a lesser degree. The CDP, for example, was instrumental in the founding of *Federación Cristiana de Campesinos Salvadoreños* (Christian Federation of Salvadoran Farm Workers-FECCAS).

⁹⁹ When needed, these mass movements could organize protests with over 100,000 people.

parties of the FMLN.¹⁰⁰ Then by the mid-1980s, to the present, many of these organizations began to professionalize, and rely on foreign donor assistance.

In the late 1960s, the Salvadoran Church, influenced by liberation theology,¹⁰¹ underwent a massive transformation, emerging as a radicalized force in Salvadoran politics; this transformation would have momentous consequences for Salvadoran political life in the 1970s. The Catholic Church in El Salvador¹⁰² came to be known as the *Iglesia Popular* (Popular Church).¹⁰³ At the parish level, priests initiated the mass popular organizations, or *Comunidades Cristianas de Base* (Christian base communities). The Christian base communities initially consisted of small groups organized by the parishes that would meet to discuss social issues and possible community strategies to address some of these daily challenges.¹⁰⁴ The result was an explosion of pastoral

¹⁰⁰ These groups participated in a broad opposition front led by Duarte in the 1972 presidential election. Following the fraud of the 1972 elections, the rank and file of the PDC joined revolutionary parties affiliated with three different revolutionary armed forces. The locus of political organizing also began to shift to the rural areas. For a detailed discussion regarding associational life and the emergence of popular movements in El Salvador, refer to Mario Lungo Uclés, *El Salvador in the Eighties: Counterinsurgency and Revolution* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996), 137–176.

¹⁰¹ Liberation theology developed in the 1960s as a Christian Socialist philosophy which maintains that it is the obligation of the Catholic Church to adopt the causes of the oppressed, and to strive for social and economic justice, especially in the Third World. In 1968, Latin American bishops met in Medellín, Colombia, and adopted these principles which later became known as the Medellín documents. The documents condemned poverty, the oppressive ruling elites, and called for agrarian reforms. Moreover, the documents proposed programs based on the method of Paulo Freire's "education for liberation" "... which were designed to promote a new sense of community action for change among the poor" Quoted from Marilyn Thomson, *Women of El Salvador: The Price of Freedom* (London: Zed Books, 1986), 47.

¹⁰² There was a division within the Catholic Church of El Salvador, as elsewhere. One group within the Church adopted the principles that emerged at Medellín, and another group within the Church rejected these reforms and proceeded as though Medellín had never occurred.

¹⁰³ As Montgomery explains, "...the tens of thousands of people, most of them poor, who came to believe that liberation is not only someone one achieves at death, but also something which, with God's blessing, one can struggle for and possibly achieve during one's lifetime," from *Revolution in El Salvador*, 99.

¹⁰⁴ The Christian communities in El Salvador, were most active during Mñs. Romero's tenure as Archbishop of San Salvador (1977 to 1980).

activity, leading to the establishment of hundreds of Christian base communities. Although priests or nuns led the initial courses, the groups were encouraged to develop their own leadership. According to some estimates, the Church trained over 15,000 leaders during the 1970s.¹⁰⁵ The Catholic Church also played an important role in forging alliances with other opposition movements. Most notably, along with other organizations, the Catholic Church in El Salvador played a critical role in the founding of the first mass-based organization, *Frente de Acción Popular Unificada* (United Popular Action Front, FAPU) in Suchitoto in 1974. By 1977, *campesinos* constituted most the rank-and-file and much of the leadership of the mass movements, including the Christian base communities.

Meanwhile, the political-military organizations embarked on mass-movement mobilization in the mid-1970s. Among the political-military organizations, the RN -- then only a tendency in the ERP and not an independent organization -- was the first to initiate a popular movement mobilization. In 1974, the RN began working with the *campesinos* of Suchitoto, and quietly helped in the establishment of FAPU with Christian community activists. FAPU had two factions, one oriented towards the RN and the other towards the FPL. By 1975, the organization split, and activist founded a new organization oriented towards the FPL was created, the *Blocque Popular Revolcianario* (Popular Revolutionary Bloc- BPR). In 1978, ERP sympathizers founded the third of the popular organizations, *Ligas Populares 28 de Febrero* (28 February Popular Leagues, LP-28 1978). Finally in 1979, the PRTC spawned the *Movimiento de Liberación Popular* (Popular Liberation Movement- MLP). The PSC had created the *Unión Democrática Nacionalista* (Nationalist Democratic Union- UDN) in 1967. The PSC also

¹⁰⁵ Montgomery, *Revolution in El Salvador*, 103.

historically played a leading role in the teacher, student, and labor organizations. Although, the UDN was not a formal mass-organization, it increasingly played the same role in Salvadoran society. By 1979, all of the political-military organizations had founded grassroots organizations.

Each FMLN group established a 'wartime chain of command:' each FMLN faction controlled a given territory, with its mass-based organizations, and other affiliated NGOs.¹⁰⁶ In general, popular mass movements engaged in consciousness raising, mass demonstrations, community organizing, and cooperative economic enterprises. The sectors affiliated with these mass-based movements included rural workers, teachers, students, women, re-populated and war displaced persons.¹⁰⁷ Despite the shared goals among the mass-based organizations and the level of coordination between these groups, important differences and disagreements did exist. Most notably, FAPU and the BPR differed regarding strategies, tactics, and the constituencies on which to focus.¹⁰⁸ Despite some competition between the groups, competition was relatively minimal because each of these groups was most active in the zones controlled by the respective political-military organization.

The degree to which the mass movements were autonomous is debatable. Foley, for example, argues that although there was considerable variation among the mass

¹⁰⁶ Michael W. Foley, "Laying the Groundwork: The Struggle for Civil Society in El Salvador," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 31, no. 1 (Spring, 1996), 82.

¹⁰⁷ For a typology of these sectors and types and levels of organizations, refer to Mario Lungo Uclés, "Building an Alternative: The Formation of a Popular Project," in *The New Politics of Survival: Grassroots Movements in Central America*, ed. Minoir Sinclair (New York: Ecumenical Program on Central American and the Caribbean, Monthly Review Press, 1995), 163.

¹⁰⁸ For a more detailed discussion of the differences among the mass-based organizations, refer to Montgomery, *Revolution in El Salvador*, 125–130.

movements, “The logic of organization, especially once communities were re-established in what were still combat zones, was ‘vertical,’ approximating a ‘war communism’ in which community decision-making , though founded on participatory principles, was subordinated to the exigencies of the war effort.”¹⁰⁹ Mario Lungo Uclés, for example argues that:

An autonomous relationship does not mean complete separation, however, and it is this mutually influencing relationship between the popular movement and the FMLN which impedes atomization and fragmentation of the popular movement’s demands.... Presently, the problems arising out of a vertical decision-making structure within the popular movement are more frequently due to leadership styles of popular movement leaders from the old school....”¹¹⁰

He adds that in the latter part of the 1980s, there was growing autonomy of the mass movements from the FMLN because as the FMLN expanded its military influence from the ‘controlled zones’ to the ‘expansion zones,’ it loosened its control on organizations in the ‘controlled zones.’ The FMLN also recognized that more autonomy served the mass-based organizations well.¹¹¹ Although, the degree to which these mass movements were autonomous is debatable, a sole focus on autonomy as the measure of associational efficacy obfuscates the real determinants of citizen participation and empowerment.

The grassroots movements became increasingly radicalized, most notably in 1980, following two large marches that resulted in massacres, most of these organizations went underground. Consequently, the configuration of the mass organizations changed in the early 1980s, as most of the popular movement went into exile or became

¹⁰⁹ For more on this, refer to Foley, “Laying the Groundwork: The Struggle for Civil Society in El Salvador,” 76.

¹¹⁰ Uclés, “Building an Alternative: The Formation of a Popular Project,” 172.

¹¹¹ For more on this discussion, refer to Uclés, “Building an Alternative: The Formation of a Popular Project,” 171.

clandestine.¹¹² In many ways, the formation of the FMLN and the outbreak of the civil war were directly related to this cycle of repression and radicalization.¹¹³ Almost all the early leaders and cadres of the guerrilla groups emerged from the popular movements.¹¹⁴ In the latter part of the 1980s, because of the decreased repression and the legalization of associational activity, those organizations repressed in the early 1980s, re-emerged with new names and with different leaders after 1984. Moreover, with the help of European private aid agencies, both secular and church-related grassroots leaders founded a few hundred popular organizations, organizing workers, peasants, students, and displaced persons, and women; effectively these efforts laid the foundation for rebuilding civil society in the latter part of the 1980s.¹¹⁵ As the war deepened, the various groups established NGOs throughout the country, carrying out functions once carried out by the state—health, education, housing, and other services. As the Salvadoran civil war drew to a close in 1989, over 400 mass-based popular organizations existed in the country.¹¹⁶ Meanwhile, pro-government groups also established worker and *campesino* organizations supported by US aid programs. NGOs also became polarized, mirroring the polarization between the government and the opposition political organizations.

¹¹² For more on transformations in the popular movements in El Salvador in the 1980s, refer to Mario Lungo Uclés, “Redefining Democracy in El Salvador: New Spaces and New Practices for the 1990s,” in *Latin America Faces the Twenty-First Century: Reconstructing a Social Justice Agenda*, eds., Susanne Jonas and Edward McCaughan (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 142–157.

¹¹³ Kevin Murray and Tom Barry, *Inside El Salvador* (Albuquerque: Resource Center Press, 1995), 171.

¹¹⁴ Uclés, “Building an Alternative: The Formation of a Popular Project,” 169.

¹¹⁵ Kees Biekart, *The Politics of Civil Society Building: European Private Aid Agencies and Democratic Transitions in Central America* (Utrecht and Amsterdam: International Books and Transnational Institute, 1999), 199.

¹¹⁶ Uclés, “Building an Alternative: The Formation of a Popular Project,” 159.

Peace Accords in El Salvador

By 1989, the Salvadoran government and the FMLN had reached a military stalemate. Several factors contributed to the government and FMLN's realization that there would be no victor to this war, and that only negotiations could achieve a resolution to the conflict.¹¹⁷ In general, three factors influenced the shift in the two parties: 1) declining US support for the Salvadoran government; 2) a reassertion of FMLN military competence; 3) and the end of the Cold War and loss of Soviet support for the FMLN.

The US could no longer justify its unconditional support for El Salvador. The army's human rights abuses, including the slaying of the Jesuit priests and the army's bombing of poor neighborhoods were blatant abuses that the US could no longer tolerate, especially in the face of congressional dismay. The Bush administration was no longer in a position to request renewed aid for El Salvador given congressional dismay. Moreover, the prevalence of the Left in El Salvador no longer constituted the same geo-strategic threat to the US, especially after its invasion of Panama in 1989, and the victory of Violetta Barrios de Chamorro in 1990 in Nicaragua.¹¹⁸ The 11 November, 1989, FMLN military offensive also reminded all parties involved that a negotiated settlement would result in the most logical resolution of the conflict. Both sides realized that they had reached a stalemate: the government realized that it would not be able to militarily wipe out the FMLN, and the FMLN realized that it did not have the needed support in the

¹¹⁷ For more on the factors leading to the peace accords in El Salvador, refer to Joseph G. Sullivan, "How Peace Came to El Salvador," *Orbis* 38 (Winter 1994), 83-98; Terry Lynn Karl, "El Salvador's Negotiated Revolution," *Foreign Affairs* 71, no. 2 (1992), 147-64; David Holiday and William Stanley, "Building the Peace: Preliminary Lessons from El Salvador," *Journal of International Affairs*. 46, no. 2 (Winter, 1993): 415-438.

¹¹⁸ Elizabeth Wood, "The Peace Accord and Postwar Reconstruction," in *Economic Policy for Building Peace: The Lessons of El Salvador*, ed., James Boyce (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), 79.

urban areas to launch and sustain a mass uprising. Meanwhile, El Salvador's wealthy elite began to push for negotiations because there was increasing fear that the army would no longer be able to protect their homes. The collapse of Communism in many parts of the world forced leftist leaders to rethink their strategies. Consequently, the FMLN backed away from its previous position that it would only take part in democratic elections if the government guaranteed them power-sharing arrangements. By April 1990, the government of El Salvador and the FMLN began negotiating broad political issues, followed by a cease-fire agreement that went into effect on 1 February, 1992.

The peace accords in El Salvador are differentiated from the Oslo accords in that they enjoyed broad support from Salvadoran political groups, and society at large. The two main parties to the conflict sat at the negotiating table, and the smaller parties participated on the side in the Inter-Party Commission. After twelve years of civil war, the stalemated civil war came to an end with no clear victors. On 16 January, 1992, the government of El Salvador and the FMLN signed peace agreements in Chapultepec, Mexico; the conclusion of the war known as the 'negotiated revolution.'¹¹⁹ By then, 75,000 people had been killed, one-fourth of the population had been displaced, and the economy was in complete shambles. The agreements signed at Chapultepec concluded six separate sets of agreements reached over the two preceding years.¹²⁰ The first two sets of agreements, the Geneva and the Caracas Accords of April and May, 1990, concerned procedural matters. In July 1990, the two parties concluded the San José

¹¹⁹ This term was popularized by Terry Lynne Karl in "El Salvador's Negotiated Revolution."

¹²⁰ The term "Salvadoran peace accords," therefore refers to these collective agreements. Discussion of various peace accords from Holiday and Stanley, "Building the Peace: Preliminary Lessons from El Salvador," 415.

Accord on Human Rights, followed by the Mexico Accord on constitutional reforms in April 1991. Finally, in September 1991, the two parties concluded the New York accord concerning a series of the basic understandings, that would be elaborated on in the final Chapultepec Accord.

Although the peace accords clearly institutionalized the democratic rules of the game, the socio-economic aspects of the agreements were far less concrete.¹²¹ In regard to the institutionalization of the democratic practices, the peace accords stipulated reform of the armed forces, accountability for past human rights violations, the founding of a new police force, and restrictions on the arbitrary exercise of state power. The peace agreements also legalized the FMLN as an official political party. In contrast, the agreement's agenda of socio-economic reform was limited to land transfer to ex-combatants and civilian supporters of the FMLN,¹²² the creation of channels for the flow of external aid to communities in the former conflict zones, and the drafting of a National Reconstruction Plan (NRP).¹²³ According to Boyce, two principle reasons account for the focus on political, as opposed to economic goals. First, the FMLN made an explicit decision to pursue political goals that would make democratic politics possible. Second, and more importantly, the government refused to discuss any modification of its

¹²¹ For a detailed discussion of the peace accords in El Salvador, refer to Patricia Weiss Fagen, "El Salvador: Lessons in Peace Consolidation," in *Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas*, ed., Tom Farer (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 213–237, and Holiday and Stanley, "Building the Peace: Preliminary Lessons from El Salvador."

¹²² As I discuss in the following chapter, most socio-economic programs of the NRP targeted the FMLN and its supporters, neglecting the majority of El Salvador's impoverished population.

¹²³ Elizabeth Wood and Alexander Segovia, "Macroeconomic Policy and the Salvadoran Peace Accords," *World Development*, 23, no. 12 (1995): 2087.

economic policy.¹²⁴ The Accords did not address several key economic issues.¹²⁵ Most notably, the Accords did not even broach the topic of agrarian reform legislation, wage increase, or legalization of union organizing. These omissions were significant given that socio-economic inequalities have been key underlying factors in El Salvador's troubled history.

The peace accords provided a detailed agenda for the dissolution of the security services, as well as the gradual demobilization of the FMLN. In addition to the narrowing of the military's mandate, the accords also included the dissolution of the civil defense patrols, the regulation of private security forces, the institutional separation of intelligence services from the Ministry of Defense, the suspension of forced conscription, and the restructuring of reserve services. The accords also mandated the establishment of the new civilian police force under the Ministry of the Interior, completely separate from the armed forces chain of command.

In relation to human rights violations, the peace agreement established an Ad Hoc Commission. This body would be responsible for investigating the human rights records of the officer corps of the armed forces, and to make necessary recommendations, which could include their dismissal. The accords reaffirmed the commitment of both the FMLN

¹²⁴ Ibid., 2079.

¹²⁵ The provisions in the peace accords that addressed socio-economic inequalities in the country did little to alter the structural causes of this inequality. For example, per the peace accords, land redistribution was limited to some land transfer that required ex-combatants to purchase the land. Most land transfers would take place in the ex-conflictive zones, and therefore would not threaten the political and economic base of ARENA in the coffee areas. The land transfer also necessitated the agreement of the landlord. Again this was an area where there was much ambiguity and little detail regarding the amount of land to be transferred and to whom. The peace accords also addressed socio-economic inequalities by including provisions related to housing, micro-enterprise assistance, and poverty alleviation programs to ex-combatants. For more on the economic components of the accords, refer to Wood and Segovia, "Macroeconomic Policy and the Salvadoran Peace Accords." For a more detailed discussion of this, refer to James Boyce, "Adjustment Towards Peace: An Introduction," *World Development*. 23, no. 12 (1995): 2067-2077.

and the government to the existing Truth Commission. Responsibilities would exclude prosecution, and would be limited to the investigation of past abuses of both sides, and the issuing of recommendations to prevent future abuses. The peace accords also reformed the constitution in relation to the selection of the Supreme Court magistrates. The goal behind this move was to break the traditional dominance of the judicial system by the ruling party. The accords also established a new Supreme Electoral Tribunal to supervise voter registration and elections.

In general, the example of El Salvador serves as a successful model of war-to-peace transition, especially in relation to the institutionalization of the democratic process. There was, however, far less progress in the implementation of the socio-economic components of the agreements, especially in relation to land reform, and the re-integration of ex-combatants.

Post-Peace Accord Era

One of the main distinguishing features of the Salvadoran peace accords, in contrast to the Oslo Accords is the level of national support they enjoyed. Unlike the Palestinian case, all parties to the conflict supported the Salvadoran peace negotiations. Hence, the war-to-peace transition in El Salvador did not create the types of disjunctures that emerged in the Palestinian war-to-peace transition. The more inclusive transition allowed many of these NGOs to maintain contact with and incorporate their grassroots bases in the transition process.¹²⁶ The consensus positions of the various political parties

¹²⁶ ARENA initially tried to undermine FMLN affiliated NGOs by enacting a strict NGO law, but international donors opposed the law and forced the government to draft a more liberal NGO law. According to Montgomery, "The NGO law in its original incarnation, so outraged all national and international NGOs that the latter threatened to leave the country en masse, taking their millions of dollars

in El Salvador reproduced themselves in the affiliated organizations. The transition afforded the various associations and NGOs the same resources and opportunities. Although USAID initially attempted to exclude the FMLN affiliated opposition NGOs from the NRP, other donors, especially Canadian donors, and European private aid agencies supported the opposition NGOs. Hence, opposition NGOs did not face the same marginalization process as Palestinian opposition-affiliated NGOs. Moreover, the more inclusive nature of the peace accords, did not breed the same institutional deficiencies in the legislative and local levels of government.

By the early 1990s, although there was a decline in mass movement activity, there was substantial variation among the different sectors.¹²⁷ In general, many popular movement activists were disillusioned after the signing of the peace accords, especially since the accords did not improve socio-economic conditions for the majority of El Salvador's poor. Moreover, the unified front of the opposition also began to break down. Many popular movement organizations were simply incapable of making a transition to accommodate the new political situation, especially because of their lack of technical capacity and experience in implementing development projects.¹²⁸ In general, the women's movement fared better than other sectors in the transition period.

with them...The government backed down and rewrote the law, and ARENA and its allies approved it." Quoted from Montgomery "Constructing Democracy in El Salvador," 64.

¹²⁷ For a discussion of the variation among the sectors, refer to Murray and Barry, *Inside El Salvador*, 169–200.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 155.

The Professionalization of Politics in El Salvador

Similar to the Palestinian case, there also was considerable NGO professionalization following the signing of the peace accords. In El Salvador, however, many of the new professionalized NGOs still focused on production-related or economic development-related activities. Many foreign donors would only support NGOs that maintained grassroots bases; therefore, many of these NGOs professionalized incorporating their grassroots constituencies in the process. Moreover, the institutional setting in relation to the parliament and local government provided NGOs, and civil society more specifically, with more institutional openings to interact with the state. Since the mid-1980s, but especially after the signing of the peace accords, the number of officially registered, more professionalized NGOs in El Salvador has increased considerably. Some estimates indicate that this number increased from 20 registered NGOs in 1979, to 30 in 1983,¹²⁹ and to over 1,300 in 1998.¹³⁰

As I explain in more detail in the following chapter, although there has been a considerable increase of funding to Salvadoran NGOs, these amounts are still relatively low compared to other developing contexts. The majority of funding to NGOs comes from European private aid agencies. According to the University of Central America (UCA) survey, the majority of NGOs still work in 'production-related' areas. Most

¹²⁹ Victor Gonzalez, *Las Organizaciones No Gubernamentales (ONGs): Una Nueva Expresión de la Sociedad Civil Salvadoreña [Non-Governmental Organizations: A New Expression of Salvadoran Civil Society]* (San Salvador: Programa Regional de Investigación sobre El Salvador [Regional Program on Research in El Salvador], 1992), 54.

¹³⁰ This list includes 189 development NGOs, called Private Development Organizations in El Salvador. Another list compiled by UCA indicates that 37 NGOs were involved in education and training; 25 in rural development; 21 in environment; 15 in health; 12 in organizational development; 11 in gender issues; 9 in business development; and 8 in policy research. Listed in Biekart, *El Salvador: NGO Country Profile*, 1999.

Salvadoran NGOs are relatively small in size, and on average they have a staff of 27 people. In general, multilateral donors only work with production-oriented NGOs — 66 percent have a relationship with UNDP, 60 percent with USAID, and 46 percent with the Inter-American Development Bank.

Since the end of the war, opposition-affiliated NGOs have had to make the transition from ‘opposition NGOs’ to ‘development NGOs;’ the transition has not always been easy.¹³¹ In general, opposition-affiliated NGOs have also shown great capacity to follow the agendas of foreign donors.¹³² Unlike the Palestinian case, foreign donors have been more interested in production-related programs, or economic development-related programs, as opposed to the promotion of certain leaders in the NGO sector. Moreover, in addition to development or production-related activities, 75 percent of these NGOs work in the area of *incidencia política* (political advocacy) at the municipal level, and not the national level.¹³³ Although political advocacy projects are also popular with Palestinian NGOs, the institutional limitations, especially at the level of local government, severely undermine the full potential of this work.

Legislative and Local Government Development and the Creation of Institutional Openings

The more inclusive nature of the Salvadoran peace accords also translated itself in the political arena. Now that the FMLN has also entered the formal political arena, its

¹³¹ For more on the difficulty of transition, refer to Martha Thompson, “Transition in El Salvador: A Multi-layered Process,” *Development in Practice*, 7, no. 4 (November, 1997).

¹³² Biekart, *El Salvador: NGO Country Profile*, 1999, 81.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 53–57.

affiliated groups have developed access to the legislative assembly and the municipal councils. Moreover, because of the more inclusive nature of the peace accords, the electoral system was not designed to exclude any parties from the election process (at least relative to the Palestinian case). From the onset, the FMLN entered elections as a unified party. Even after the RN and ERP broke away from the FMLN, they still supported the peace accords, and fully participated in the elections. Similarly, all parties involved -- including foreign donors, the FMLN and the government -- have pushed for the development of municipal governments, though perhaps motivated by different goals. The government, however, did try to push through a stringent NGO law that was not accepted by both Salvadoran NGOs and the international donor community.

Since the peace accords, there have been a number of presidential and legislative assembly elections. Although ARENA has won all presidential elections since the signing of the accords, the FMLN and other political parties have made important electoral gains in the legislative assembly. In effect, these gains translate to greater access to formerly affiliated opposition groups. In the last election, for example, the FMLN won 34 percent of seats in the legislative assembly, followed by 32 percent by ARENA, 13 percent by the National Conciliation Party, and 7.3 percent by the Christian Democratic Party.¹³⁴ Although the party system in El Salvador is not without its criticism, the nature of the political settlement in El Salvador has facilitated the strengthening of the party system.

¹³⁴ For more on the election results in El Salvador, refer to <http://www.electionworld.org/elsalvador.htm>. For more on the different political parties in El Salvador in the post-war period, refer to Rubén Zamora, *El Salvador: Heridas que no Cierran, Los Partidos Políticos en la Post-Guerra (Wounds that Will Not Close: The Political Parties in the Post-War Period)* (San Salvador: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales [Latin American Faculty for the Social Sciences]- FLACSO El Salvador, 1998).

In El Salvador, all parties involved have supported the strengthening and development of local government.¹³⁵ At this level of government, especially in municipalities governed by the FLMN, important initiatives have been implemented which have narrowed the gap between the electorate and the government.¹³⁶ USAID and the rightwing groups in El Salvador initially pushed for the strengthening of local government so as to facilitate decentralization and lessen the burdens of the state. The promotion of local government by USAID is not new. In 1986, USAID, with the support of the Duarte regime, established the *Municipios en Acción* (Municipalities in Action- MEA) initiative to finance infrastructure projects through local government rather than government ministries. MEA, however, became tainted and shared a historical connection with the *Comision Nacional de Restauration de Areas* (National Commission for Restoration of Areas- CONARA), counterinsurgency efforts. Following the end of the war, the FMLN negotiated with USAID and the *Secretariate de la Reconstruccion Nacionál* (National Reconstruction Secretariat- SRN) to ensure the participation of the opposition in local government. The negotiations resulted in two mechanisms to ensure participation of the local opposition: "...expanded municipal assemblies which include local NGOs; and municipal reconstruction committees meant to enable opposition input

¹³⁵ For more on the development of local government in El Salvador, refer to Ricardo Cordova Macías and Victor Orellana, *Cultura Política, Gobierno Local y Descentralización: El Salvador [Political Culture, Local Government and Decentralization: El Salvador]* (San Salvador: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales [Latin American Faculty for the Social Sciences]- FLACSO, 2001); Ernesto Galdámez, *Perfilando el Municipio Como Promotor de Desarrollo Económico y Social [Profiling the Municipality as Promoter of Economic and Social Development]* (San Salvador: Fundación Nacional para el Desarrollo [Foundation for National Development]- FUNDE, 1997); and Alberto Enriquez Villacorta, *Propuesta Para el Impulso de un Proceso de Descentralización en El Salvador [Proposal for Instigating the Decentralization Process in El Salvador]* (San Salvador: Fundación Nacional para el Desarrollo [Foundation for National Development]- FUNDE, 1998).

¹³⁶ Biekart, *El Salvador: NGO Country Profile*, 52.

in priorities.”¹³⁷ Both European donors and the FMLN have become strong proponents of local government initiatives, especially after the FMLN prevailed at this level of government in the 1997 elections.

In contrast to the Palestinian case, the institutionalization of these sites of power -- the legislative assembly and local government -- has taken place in a much more coherent fashion, fully incorporating the opposition into this process. Western donors have played an important role in pushing for the full incorporation of the FMLN and opposition groups at the local government level. They have also played an important role in promoting a liberal NGO law. In turn, civil society groups, including formerly affiliated opposition civil society groups, have greater institutional openings and access to the state. Because of the more inclusive political settlement, the process of state institutionalization, has resulted in the development and institutionalization of a more ‘articulated space’ between the state and civil society, allowing for the more effective participation of civil society. Moreover, the types of programs that foreign donor promote further articulate these spaces.

In the next chapter, I discuss foreign donor assistance to Palestine and El Salvador. I provide background information regarding the nature of foreign donor assistance to both societies, focusing on the changing structure of aid during the respective war-to-peace transitions. In particular, I focus on how the political settlement and the resultant political institutional setting shaped and was shaped by the nature of foreign donor assistance to each society.

¹³⁷ Keven Murray et al. *Rescuing Reconstruction: The Debate on Post-War Economic Recovery in El Salvador* (Cambridge and San Salvador: Hemisphere Initiatives, 1994), 22.

Chapter 3

Foreign Donor Assistance to Palestine and El Salvador

Palestine and El Salvador have received substantial amounts of foreign donor assistance, both during their respective conflicts, and since the initiation of the peace accords. Both cases were politically significant to particular foreign donors during these historical periods. In both cases, Western foreign donors have played a critical role in shaping political outcomes. More specifically, foreign donors have directly affected civil society in both contexts by virtue of whom they chose to support, the institutional mechanisms through which they funneled the assistance, and the types of projects and programs they chose to promote.

In what follows, I provide a more detailed examination of foreign assistance to Palestine and El Salvador. Although I am interested in how the geo-strategic interests of particular donors influence their funding priorities and levels, I am also interested in how foreign donors adapt and structure their programmatic priorities and prioritize certain institutional mechanisms so as to achieve particular political outcomes. For example, why will donors focus on certain programmatic priorities such as human rights training in some contexts, while preferring to support economic development projects in others? Moreover, why are donors more likely to fund professionalized NGOs in some contexts, and government institutions in others?

In general, the nature of the political settlement in a given society will shape a donor's political goals affecting which actors and political institutions donors will choose

to support.¹ Moreover, the nature of the political settlement will result in a certain political institutional context that will also shape and be shaped by donor involvement. In the context of more inclusive political settlements, such as El Salvador, donors will be less politically discriminatory regarding whom they choose to support. Moreover, because of the more articulated space between society and the state, foreign donor funding to civil society is more likely to promote programs that encourage more regular interaction between the state and civil society, thus further articulating these spaces. Conversely, in contexts with less inclusive political contexts, especially those that are geo-strategically important to a larger number of states, such as Palestine, state-sponsored donors are likely to provide higher amounts of assistance, develop more elaborate coordination mechanisms, and more carefully attempt to shape political outcomes, by promoting certain actors and discourses over others.

Although, during the war and the initial years of the war-to-peace transition, there also was considerable competition and selectivity among donors in El Salvador, this situation was redressed by the more inclusive nature of the political settlement in which all parties endorsed the peace accords. Despite high polarization in Salvadoran society during the war, most, if not all political groups and their affiliated bodies, had access to Western foreign donor funding: USAID supported more right-wing elements in Salvadoran civil society, and solidarity groups and European private aid agencies supported more left-wing elements. This distinction decreased in the latter part of the 1990s following USAID's change in policies and personnel in San Salvador, which resulted in a greater willingness to support all sectors of Salvadoran society. In Palestine

¹ For more on the political nature of aid in the two contexts, refer to Martin Beck, "External Dimension of Authoritarian Rule in Palestine," *Journal of International Relations and Development* 3, no. 1 (2000): 47-66, and Foley, "Laying the Groundwork: The Struggle for Civil Society in El Salvador."

Western donors, despite their differences, have been more homogenous regarding the kind of Palestine they want to create. In general, because of the non-inclusive nature of the political settlement, Western foreign donors, therefore, have remained selective regarding which groups they choose to fund, further exacerbating existing polarization.

I begin this chapter with a comparative discussion of foreign donor assistance to Palestine and El Salvador during their respective conflicts. I then discuss patterns of aid to the two cases, and the types of coordinating mechanisms and channels put in place by foreign donors during their respective war-to-peace transitions. I specifically show how the greater geo-strategic importance of the Palestinian case to many states, and the more sensitive, non-inclusive nature of the political settlement, resulted in the allocation of higher amounts of funding. The larger scale of the donor effort in the Palestinian context required more complex mechanisms which provided donors with greater control over the process. I then discuss foreign donor sectoral priorities and funding to NGOs in each context, paying particular attention to how the nature of the political settlement, and the resultant political institutional setting shaped these priorities.

This chapter draws on interviews and primary documents from both Palestine and El Salvador, as well as on secondary source materials. I base my cross-regional comparison of programmatic priorities on my interviews with the directors or program officers of the relevant donor agencies, as well as on primary source materials from the given donor agency. To validate my findings, I also employ data from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

Pre-Settlement Foreign Donor Assistance to Palestine and El Salvador: 1970 -1991

Historically, both Palestine and El Salvador have received substantial amounts of foreign assistance from various parties. During the earlier periods of their conflicts, much of this aid was oriented towards relief, becoming more political in the 1980s as the conflicts became consolidated. Donor aid was increasingly used to promote political goals, which meant supporting the groups that advanced these goals. In the Palestinian territories, Arab states and regional Arab and Islamic organizations played an important role in promoting the PLO and its affiliated organizations, especially the leadership party of the PLO, *Fateh*. In El Salvador, on the other hand, USAID funded the right-wing Salvadoran government and the economic elite and actively marginalized the Salvadoran opposition which was supported financially by solidarity groups, and European aid agencies.

Foreign Donor Assistance to Palestine: 1970- 1991

Foreign donor assistance to the Palestinian territories can be traced back to 1948, following *Al-Nakbah*.² In general, one can identify four different phases of foreign donor activity to the Palestinian territories. Between 1948 and 1967, funding to the Palestinian territories was relief-oriented in nature, predominately from United Nations Relief Works Agency (UNRWA), and a number of Western relief organizations. Following the 1967 war and to the early 1980s, funding to the Palestinian territories was predominately from other Arab countries and regional organizations, and from the PLO. In 1975, the United States also began a program of development assistance to the WBGS. The third phase of

² Palestinians refer to the 1948 Arab-Israeli war as *Al-Nakhbah*, literally translated as ‘the catastrophe’ to refer to the mass displacement of the Palestinian people during that war.

funding to the Palestinian territories began in the early 1980s, especially after the 1982 massacres of *Sabra* and *Shatilla* and continued until the late 1980s. During this period, Palestinians and other Arabs in the diaspora established various charity organizations to funnel funding to the WBGS, as well as to Palestinian refugees living in other parts of the world. Moreover, after the start of the *Intifada* in 1987, there was an increase in Western solidarity funding, as well as UN multilateral funding. The fourth phase of foreign donor activity began after the start of the Madrid peace process, and heightened after the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993. During this period, foreign donors introduced official bilateral funding to Palestine, making it the highest per capita recipient of Western foreign aid in the world.

Historically, the foreign donors who were active in Palestine, as in other parts of the Middle East, were religious organizations, such as the American Friends Services Committee (the Quakers), Catholic Relief Services, Near East Council of Churches, and CARE International.³ In 1952, UNRWA also became involved in the region; though it was more of a coordinating agency which distributed funding from different donors, including the United States, than an actual donor. These donor organizations were predominately relief-oriented and focused on the refugees who were displaced during the war.

Following the 1948 war, but especially after the 1967 war, Arab countries and the Arab League became the main donors to the Palestinian territories. After 1974, a three to six percent income tax was imposed on Palestinians residing and working in the various

³ Benoît Challand, "Benevolent Actors? International Donors and Civil Society Support for Palestinian NGOs." Paper presented at the Sixth Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting of the Mediterranean Program of the Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute, Montecatini Terme, March 2005.

Gulf countries; this was then given to the PLO's Palestinian National Fund.⁴ A substantial amount of this funding was then diverted to the WBGS. A number of Arab and Islamic regional organizations also began sending funding to the occupied territories; these organizations included: The Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD based in Kuwait), the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries' (OPEC) Fund for International Development, the Arab Gulf Program for UN Development Organizations (AGFUNDU, based in Riyadh), and the Islamic Development Bank.⁵ Nakhleh estimates that donors disbursed between US\$80 million and US\$120 million through these organizations during 1977 and 1992.⁶

In the aftermath of the October 1973 war, the United States introduced a US\$100 million Middle East Special Requirements Fund (MESRF) "...whose objective was to identify 'targets of opportunity' which would encourage a resolution to the Middle East conflict..." and promote an Arab-Israeli rapprochement.⁷ In 1975, USAID allocated one percent, or \$1 million of the total fund to the WBGS. An unprecedented feature of the program was its bilateral American-Arab character.⁸ The funds were monitored by the Department of State, and channeled through one Palestinian organization and the five

⁴ Cobban, *The Palestinian Liberation Organization*, 45.

⁵ Names of regional organizations are taken directly from Challand, "Benevolent Actors?," 7. Challand references Khalil Nakhleh, *Developing Palestine: Political Aid in a Non-Sovereign Context*, 2002 mimeo, and Khalil Nakhleh, *The Myth of Palestinian Development: Political Aid and Sustainable Deceit* (Jerusalem: Institute of Jerusalem Studies, and Ramallah: Muwatin- the Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy).

⁶ Khalil Nakhleh, *Developing Palestine: Political Aid in a Non-Sovereign Context*, referenced in Challand, "Benevolent Actors?" 7.

⁷ Sara Roy, "Development Under Occupation?: The Political Economy of USAID to the West Bank and Gaza Strip," *Arab Studies Quarterly*, 13, nos. 3 & 4 (Summer/Fall 1991), 67.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 67.

American Private Volunteer Organizations (PVOs) that were active in the Occupied Territories. The American PVOs, some dating back to 1948, were: the American Near East Refugee Aid (ANERA), American Mideast Education and Training Services (AMIDEAST), Catholic Relief Services, Save the Children Federation (SCF), and Co-operative Development Program.⁹ Although this assistance was supposed to remain independent of Israeli government control, ultimately the Israeli government had to approve all projects. The US assistance program to the WBGS required that the PVOs submit their projects to the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, which were then channeled to the Office of the Coordinator of the Occupied Territories in the Ministry of Defense which had the final say on project implementation.¹⁰

In 1978, the Arab League created the “Jordanian-Palestinian Joint Committee for the Support of the Steadfastness of the Palestinian People in the Occupied Homeland.”¹¹ The purpose of this fund was to alleviate the daily hardship of Palestinians by providing them with better access to basic services such as water and electricity, to build educational, health and social service institutions, to build houses, to support local municipalities, and to provide economic support to disadvantaged families. This fund disbursed between US\$417 million to US\$463 million to the occupied territories during this period.¹²

⁹ Ibid., 72.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Sara Roy, *The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of De-Development*, 2nd edition (Washington DC: Institute of Palestine Studies, 2001), 151, referenced in Challand, “Benevolent Actors?”

¹² Challand, “Benevolent Actors,?” 6.

Remittances from Palestinians in the diaspora also became more readily available, as did donations from charity foundations, especially after the 1982 *Sabra* and *Shatilla* massacres in Lebanon. In 1983, a group of wealthy Palestinians founded the Welfare Association, or what came to be known as *Al-Ta'awun*¹³ -- one of the most notable organizations founded during this period. Other charity organizations established during this period were the Jerusalem Fund and the United Palestine Appeal (UPA) in the United States, the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF), and Medical Aid for Palestine (MAP) in Canada and UK.

In 1983, US Secretary of State George Schulz announced a 'reinvigorated' assistance program for the WBGS, dubbed the 'quality of life initiative.' As with previous USAID initiatives, all programs had to be approved by Israeli authorities. As official USAID policy shifted towards longer-term economic development, as opposed to mere welfare projects, tensions heightened between American PVOs and the Israeli government. Despite these tensions, US assistance to the occupied territories increased in the 1980s from US\$6.5 million in 1983 to US\$22 million in 1989.¹⁴

In 1986, King Hussein of Jordan announced the five-year development plan for the occupied territories; the objective of the plan was to provide and improve the quality of economic and social services to the residents of the WBGS. Like the USAID funded projects, Israel would also have to approve all projects that would receive funding under this plan. Jordan's five-year development plan was brought to a halt in July 1988; eight months after the start of the *Intifada*, King Hussein severed his ties to the occupied territories, which also meant an end to the development plan.

¹³ In Arabic *al-ta'awun* means co-operation.

¹⁴ Roy, "Development Under Occupation?," 69.

With the onset of the *Intifada* in 1987, there was a substantial increase in funding from Palestinian individuals and groups in the diaspora, as well as from solidarity organizations, many of them European in origin. In 1986, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) also began operations in the WBGS.

The character of funding to the WBGS was dramatically altered after 1989. Funding associated with the Baghdad summit was discontinued.¹⁵ Then, following the PLO's stance in support of Saddam Hussein's 1991 invasion of Kuwait, both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia discontinued their funding to the PLO, US\$47 million and US\$85 million respectively.¹⁶ This halting of funds dealt a debilitating blow to the PLO, seriously putting into question whether or not it could continue to exist. Subsequently, as the Madrid peace process got underway, funding from Western donors, especially from state-sponsored organizations, became more available to the occupied territories. In 1992, Western donors disbursed US\$173.9 million to the WBGS; this amount increased to US\$262.8 million by 1993.¹⁷ Western parties therefore became the main donors to the WBGS, supplanting the Arab countries and regional organizations which had previously been the primary donors.¹⁸ The change in the profile of donors meant less funding

¹⁵ After the signing of the Camp David agreements between Egypt and Israel in 1978, Arab countries held the Baghdad Summit to protest the agreements. During that meeting, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other oil-producing countries pledged to financially assist Jordan, Syria, and the PLO.

¹⁶ Referenced from Rex Brynen, *A Very Political Economy: Peacebuilding and Foreign Aid in the West Bank and Gaza Strip* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000), 47.

¹⁷ United Nations Development Program (UNDP), *1993 Compendium of External Assistance to the Occupied Palestinian Territories* (Jerusalem: UNDP, July 1993), and United Nations Development Program (UNDP), *1994 Compendium of External Assistance to the Occupied Palestinian Territories* (Jerusalem: UNDP, July 1994).

¹⁸ According to the United Nations Development Program *1993 Compendium of External Assistance to the Occupied Territories* (Jerusalem: United Nations Development Program, 1993), bilateral and multilateral assistance to the WBGS was US\$173.9 million.

directly to the PLO and its affiliated groups, and greater involvement state-representative donor agencies in the occupied territories.

Foreign Donor Assistance to El Salvador: 1970- 1991

Since the late 1970s, El Salvador has been a significant recipient of foreign donor assistance. Foreign donor assistance played an important role in sustaining the various parties to the conflict. Most notably, during the civil war, El Salvador was the third largest recipient of foreign aid from USAID following Egypt and Israel. The Salvadoran opposition, on the other hand, predominately received bilateral foreign donor assistance from a number of European countries, American and European solidarity groups, and European private aid agencies. After the end of the Cold War, Central America was no longer geo-strategically important for the Cold War adversaries. Many foreign donors, therefore, decreased their funding to El Salvador.

Between 1970 and 1979, El Salvador received approximately US\$330.52 million in Official Development Assistance (ODA),¹⁹ and US\$3.34 billion during 1980 and 1990, in addition to military assistance. US assistance to El Salvador represented the bulk of this assistance, 88 percent of the total official funding of the US\$1.337 billion given to the country between 1984 and 1987, and 70 percent of the total US\$1.396 billion between 1988 and 1991.²⁰ During El Salvador's civil war, US assistance to El Salvador played a

¹⁹ Based on OECD data: Destination of Official Development Assistance and Official Aid Disbursements (Table 2a, Column 206).

²⁰ Herman Rosa and Michael Foley, "El Salvador," in *Good Intentions*, 115.

critical role in sustaining the Salvadoran government, and in promoting right-wing groups and organizations.²¹

During the 1980s, the US also funneled funding through local municipalities and a number of more right wing-oriented, Salvadoran NGOs.²² In 1986, the US initiated the MEA program; the goal of this program was to pacify rural areas, and to incorporate displaced persons into rural civic action programs coordinated by the army.²³ Meanwhile, USAID also funded organizations like *Fundación Salvadoreña para el Desarrollo Económico y Social* (Salvadoran Foundation for Economic and Social Development- FUSADES). FUSADES was created by a group of Salvadoran businessmen in 1983,²⁴ quickly becoming one of the most influential right-wing think tanks in El Salvador. During the 1980s, FUSADES received US\$150 million over a ten-year period.²⁵ The foundation promoted non-traditional exports and investment, and became recognized as the main drafter of the structural adjustment plan that served as the basis for the ARENA's economic program in 1989.²⁶ The organization, along with USAID, also helped create a number of right-wing organizations.²⁷ As Foley explains:

“...the very configuration of the NGOs spun off by FUSADES, under the tutelage of USAID, bespeaks a concept of civil society in which economic elites play the

²¹ Ibid.

²² For more on USAID's role in creating a new model of development, including these right-wing organizations, refer to Segovia, “The War Economy of the 1980s,” in *Economic Policy for Building Peace: The Lessons of El Salvador*, ed., James Boyce (Boulder, CO, and London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), 41-2, and Foley, “Laying the Groundwork: The Struggle for Civil Society in El Salvador,” 79-83.

²³ Biekart, *El Salvador: NGO Country Profile*, 33.

²⁴ Foley, “Laying the Groundwork: The Struggle for Civil Society in El Salvador,” 71.

²⁵ Biekart, *El Salvador: NGO Country Profile*, 34.

²⁶ Foley, “Laying the Groundwork: the Struggle for Civil Society in El Salvador,” 71.

²⁷ Ibid., 72.

leading role...the NGOs created under USAID auspices draw on business elites almost exclusively for their board members and executive personnel. Not only do these arrangements make use of considerable talent and influence of these individuals, but they also reinforce their social and political position...Board members give elites access to politicians and US officials, as well as control over considerable sums of money with which USAID has chosen to endow the new institutions.’²⁸

One group of its mini-foundations became known as *Project Fortas*; the goal of these mini-foundations was to carry out social services in the rural areas. A local coffee baron headed each of these foundations, with the participation of a few wealthy property owners or business people in the area. With the help of USAID, right-wing groups established other organizations such as the Industrial Foundation for Prevention of Occupational Hazard, Habitat Foundation, and the Business Foundation for Educational Development. Such initiatives helped maintain the status quo and strengthened old alliances between USAID and El Salvador’s oligarchy.

The solidarity groups and European aid agencies which channeled funds to opposition groups began to organize their aid more systematically as the conflict persisted. In the early 1980s, a small group of churches and older NGOs came together to form an ecumenical consortium called *Díaconia* to manage relief and support for refugees.²⁹ The Dutch Co-financing Agencies, (CFA’s)--Bilance, Humanistisch Instituut voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (International Humanist Institute for Co-operation with Developing Countries- HIVOS), Interkerkelijke Organisatie voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (Dutch Interchurch Organization for Development Co-operation- ICCO), and Oxfam- Netherlands (NOVIB) were the main funders of *Díaconia*

²⁸ Ibid., 84.

²⁹ *Díaconia* should not be confused with *DIAKONIA* World Federation, or *Diakonia*, the Swedish funding agency. For more on *Díaconia*, refer to Foley, “Laying the Groundwork: the Struggle for Civil Society in El Salvador,” 74 and 76.

throughout the war.³⁰ By 1985, because of increased levels of foreign donor assistance, the FMLN had founded a number of mass organizations that could also carry out the same functions as DÍAKONIA. The new organizations were often community-based, and dedicated to providing services -- developmental, educational, and health-related -- to refugees. According to Foley, these NGOs served as local counterparts to international organizations, often European in origin.³¹ They played a critical role in channeling material goods and funds to these communities. Among the donors who funded these NGOs were: solidarity organizations in the United States and Canada, governments including Canada, the Netherlands, Belgium, and the UK, and NGOs like DÍAKONIA (Sweden), and Medecins Sans Frontiers (Doctors Without Borders).³² In particular, the FPL was successful at acquiring funding through solidarity networks in the United States, as well as in Europe. Although the ERP was more successful at raising funds in Europe compared to the United States, it still was not as successful as the FPL.³³

Funding patterns to the various parties in El Salvador underscore the inherently political nature of foreign donor assistance. Although foreign donors were selective regarding which parties they would fund, the polarization among donors, which also mirrored the same polarization in society, ensured that all groups and organizations

³⁰ Biekart, *El Salvador: NGO Country Profile*, 60.

³¹ Foley, "Laying the Groundwork: the Struggle for Civil Society in El Salvador," 75, and Biekart, *The Politics of Civil Society Building*.

³² Foley, "Laying the Groundwork: the Struggle for Civil Society in El Salvador," footnote 13, 96.

³³ Per discussion with Katharine Andrade Eekhoff, Researcher, FLACSO, San Salvador, in English, 15 May, 2002. For a discussion regarding funding patterns to the FPL and the ERP, also refer to footnote 20 in: Elisabeth Wood, *The Resurgence of Civil Society in Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 185-86. According to Wood, three factors distinguished the FPL from the ERP in terms of its success at fundraising: a less militaristic reputation than the ERP, a strategic emphasis on building international solidarity networks, and a closer relationship with progressive elements of the Catholic Church.

would receive funding and support and would remain important players in the political landscape.

Foreign Donor Assistance to Palestine and El Salvador During the War-to-Peace Transition

The start of the peace processes in both El Salvador and Palestine led to an increase in bilateral aid flows. Although the structure of foreign donor assistance changed significantly after the initiation of the peace accords in both cases, especially in terms of who the donors were, foreign donors continued to play an important role in buttressing particular political groups and tendencies. Foreign donor involvement extended to civil society and the re-constitution of this arena to reflect the new political settlement in each context. In Palestine, the non-inclusive nature of the peace accords resulted in higher amounts of funding, and more concerted and politically motivated foreign donor involvement. More funding to the Palestinian territories also meant more funding to civil society, and a greater opportunity to promote certain actors over others, exacerbating existing polarization because of the non-inclusive political settlement. Moreover, because of the Islamic tradition of the Middle East, Western foreign donors more actively pursued the promotion of a 'post-Cold War liberal order,' promoting the ideals of a market democracy and more Western-oriented social values. In El Salvador, the more inclusive nature of the peace accords resulted in a lessening of politically motivated donor involvement. Therefore, foreign donors, including USAID after 1994, became less politically selective regarding whom they chose to fund, not actively marginalizing groups because of their political backgrounds or former affiliations.

In general, the post-war, foreign donor involvement in El Salvador was a much smaller operation than that in the Palestinian territories, involving less complex coordinating mechanisms, and less funding. The presence of donor agencies, as well as field staff in the Palestinian territories was far more pervasive than in El Salvador. In Palestine, most bilateral donors maintained field offices in the West Bank, operating either out of their consulates in East Jerusalem, or their resident or representative offices in Ramallah. Multilateral organizations also maintained resident missions in the territories. In the case of El Salvador, few bilateral donors maintained offices in El Salvador, and often operated from Nicaragua where most donor agencies or consulates were and are still based. Most notably, following the end of the war in El Salvador, donors like the World Bank did not have a resident office in the country. The difference in the scope of operations illustrates foreign donors' more significant geo-strategic considerations for the Palestinian territories.

In the rest of the chapter, I discuss the general involvement of Western donors in Palestine and El Salvador. I specifically apply this discussion to the women's sector of each case in the following two chapters. I begin this section with a general discussion of foreign donor assistance to Palestine and El Salvador during their respective war-to-peace transition, illustrating how donors' assessment of the greater geo-strategic importance of Palestine led to their greater involvement, higher amounts of assistance, and more complex coordinating mechanisms. This also meant foreign donors gave higher amounts of funding to civil society, especially to professionalized NGOs.

Foreign donor commitments and allocations to the Palestinian territories were among the highest in the world in per capita terms. Commitments to the WBGS had

reached US\$4.2 billion by 1998, for the period between 1994 and 1998. Commitments to El Salvador, on the other hand, for the period between 1992 and 1997 were US\$2.47 billion. In per capita terms, the WBGS received US\$1,200 per capita (based on a total population of 3.5 million) for the four-year period, compared to El Salvador that received US\$380 per capita (based on a total population of 6.5 million) for the five year period. Of these total commitments, loans represented approximately 40 percent of allocations to El Salvador. Conversely, in the Palestinian case, loans represented a mere 4.7 percent between 1994 and 1998. This is especially significant given that Palestine does not qualify as a lower income country, and therefore is not eligible for development funding from states like the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland which reserve their development funding for lower income countries. For each of these states, special provisions were made to allow funding to the WBGS.³⁴

In many of my interviews in the WBGS, directors of donor agencies or program officers fairly acknowledged the greater geo-strategic importance of the Middle East as compared to Latin America after the end of the Cold War. This was especially the case for USAID and one of the German foundations that perceived the promotion of the peace accords and the development of the WBGS as necessary for Israel's stability.³⁵ This also was the case for some European donors who considered the Middle East as part of 'their backyard,' and that a more stable Middle East meant fewer immigrants and refugee

³⁴ Per interviews with Birgitta Tazelaar, Netherlands Representative Office, Ramallah, 25 July, 2001, Peter Borg, Acting Deputy of the Norway Representative Office to the PA, Jerusalem, 17 July, 2001, Anne Brenzelius, Swedish International Co-operation Development Agency (SIDA), Eva-Lotta Gustafsson., Consulate of Sweden, Jerusalem, 13 September, 2001, and Fritz Frolich, Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation, Jerusalem, 11 September, 2003.

³⁵ Per interviews with Martha Myers, USAID, Jerusalem, 14 September, 2001, and a representative from one of the German foundations who requested that I not directly cite him.

asylum seekers to their own countries.³⁶ This is quite evident in the discrepancy between what the EU gives to the WBGS and what it gives to El Salvador. With the end of the Cold War, El Salvador was no longer as geo-strategically important for many donors, especially the United States. Moreover, because of the end of the war-to-peace transition, many foreign donors decreased their funding to El Salvador, and many predict funding will continue to decrease.³⁷

Following the signing of the Oslo peace accords in 1993, representatives from over forty-three countries met in October of that year in Washington DC to pledge support to the WBGS. During that meeting, donors pledged a total of US\$2.49 billion for the period 1994 and 1996, of which US\$2.3 was committed to actual programs and projects in the WBGS. By 1992, donor commitments had increased to US\$4.2 billion, and by 2001, the amount of total pledges to the WBGS had increased to US\$6.9 billion, of which US\$5.16 billion was committed to programs and projects for the period between 1993 and 2001.³⁸ Approximately, 23.9 percent of this total amount was from multilateral organizations.³⁹ Of total commitments between 1993 and 2001, US\$817.9 million (15.8 percent) were in the form of loans.⁴⁰ By 2001, donors had disbursed US\$459.93 million in loans, with the largest contributors being the World Bank and the European Investment

³⁶ For example, per interview with Birgitta Tazelaar, Netherlands Representative Office, Ramallah, 25 July, 2001.

³⁷ See for example: Richard Grant and Jan Nijman eds., *The Global Crisis in Foreign Aid* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1998).

³⁸ MOPIC's 2001 First and Second Quarterly Monitoring Report of Donor Assistance (Ramallah: Ministry of Planning, 30 June, 2001).

³⁹ Ibid., Commitments and disbursements made by NGOs are not included in MOPIC's matrices.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

Bank (EIB); disbursing 45 percent, and 22.2 percent respectively of the total loan. As of June 2001, donors had disbursed US\$3.4 billion, or 65 percent of total commitments.

From the onset, both the US and the EU vied for greater influence in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and the related peace-building initiatives. During the first Consultative Group (CG)⁴¹ meeting in 1993, the European Union (EU) -- including the European Investment Bank and other EU member bilateral donors -- was clearly the largest contributor to the donor effort to Palestine. The total EU and EIB contribution amounted to 19.8 percent of total commitments (excluding EU states' bilateral contributions). The United States was the second largest contributor committing the equivalent of 10 percent of the total aid effort, followed by Japan, Norway and the Netherlands, contributing 9 percent, 6 percent, and 4.9 percent respectively to the total aid effort. During this period, the EU repeatedly demanded or required that its financial contribution to peace building efforts be matched in terms of their political and diplomatic clout and ability to influence the peace process, often causing friction between the EU and the United States. Despite some of the political differences and competition between the EU and the US, these two parties have funded the same types of civil society groups- large, non-opposition professionalized NGOs that are in a position to promote the 'post-Cold War liberal order.'⁴² In this case, 'competition' and increasing amounts of

⁴¹ The Consultative Group (CG) is common to many aid-recipient countries as a mechanism for aid mobilization and high level discussion between the recipient and its multilateral and bilateral aid partners. Often the World Bank administers the CG in partner countries.

⁴² For example, between 1996 and 1999, both the EU through its MEDA Democracy Program and USAID through its Democracy and Governance Program, predominately supported non-opposition large, NGOs. For example, between 1994 and 2000, USAID provided US\$27 million to eight Palestinian NGOs, in addition to US\$9 million for the strengthening of the Palestinian legislative council. Similarly, between 1996 and 1999, the EU provided the bulk of its funding to non-opposition, NGOs, in addition to some assistance to the media and university research centers. In 1999, of the total EURO 2.02 million budget of the MEDA Democracy program, the EU allocated EURO 657,455 to the Program Secretariat at the Birzeit

funding have further exacerbated the tension between the Opposition and the Moderate Opposition civil society organizations.

In 2000 and 2001 donors committed approximately US\$524 million to the WBGS; although these aid commitments were below the annual average of US\$645 million for the period between 1994 and 2001, they were still comparable to previous years, such as US\$535 million in 1996 and 1997. The major changes that took place during this period had much less to do with the amount of commitments, and more to do with the configuration of major donors. During this period, there also was a slight increase in the percentage of loans. By 2001, although the EU and EIB were still major contributors (with commitments totaling US\$740.9 million, 14.34 percent of total commitments, excluding bilateral contributions), its contributions were more closely matched by the United States. By 2001, the US had become the single largest donor to the WBGS, with commitments totaling US\$987 million (19 percent of total commitments) for the period between 1994 and 2001. In sum, the US' contributions of aid to the WBGS had increased 287 fold, from US\$1 million in 1975, to US\$287.9 million in 2001. The United States' commitments were followed by the contributions of: Japan US\$509.9 million (9.9 percent of total commitments), Germany US\$381 million (7.4 percent of total commitments), the World Bank US\$319.6 million (6.2 percent), Norway US\$242.5 million (4.7 percent of total commitments), and Saudi Arabia, Spain and Italy. As the US took a more prominent role in the aid effort, the contributions of Norway and Netherlands decreased substantially. Arab countries, most notably Saudi

University's Institute of Law, and disbursed the remaining amount to five non-opposition, professionalized human rights organizations. Per interviews with Martha Myers, USAID, Jerusalem, 14 September, 2001, and Sylvie Fouet, European Commission (EC), 1 August, 2001, and Khader Muslih, MEDA Team WBGS, Technical Assistance to the EC Representative Office, 7 August, 2001.

Arabia, also increased their commitments. In general, however, although the Arab contribution was smaller in dollar terms, in most instances the commitments represented a higher percent of GDP in comparison to their Western counterparts.⁴³

With the outbreak of *Al-Aqsa Intifada* in October 2001, official bilateral assistance to the WBGS decreased drastically, from US\$711 million in 2000, to US\$408 million in 2001.⁴⁴ Donors countered this decrease in official bilateral assistance by increasing emergency funding to accommodate the deteriorating political situation. By 2001, contributions from Arab countries alone totaled US\$381.5 million.⁴⁵ Although, the amount of aggregate donor flows remained constant in 2001, many of the programs and projects being implemented were either halted or altered to accommodate the emergency situation, especially after the re-invasion of Areas A (areas that were fully under the control of the PA) by the Israeli military in late October 2001. Donors allocated much of the emergency assistance to the WBGS to the PA for budget support or employment generation projects, or to disadvantaged populations in the form of food, financial aid. Western foreign donors often chose Moderate Opposition NGOs as conduits to disburse this emergency funding, further enhancing their profiles in Palestinian civil society.

As in Palestine, aid to El Salvador was initially politicized, promoting certain groups over others during the first years after the signing of the peace accords. However, unlike in Palestine, aid to El Salvador subsequently became less politicized and selective, especially after the change in USAID personnel in El Salvador in 1994. The new

⁴³ Rex Brynen, Hisham Awartani, and Clare Woodcraft, "The Palestinian Territories," in *Good Intentions*, 210.

⁴⁴ Based on MOPIC's 2001 First and Second Quarterly Monitoring Report of Donor Assistance (Ramallah: Ministry of Planning, 30 June, 2001).

⁴⁵ Ibid.

personnel were more politically neutral, US involvement in El Salvador during the civil war had not shaped their political views.⁴⁶ After 1997, following what many considered to be the end of the war-to-peace transition in El Salvador, the structure of aid to El Salvador fundamentally changed. With the end of the Cold War and the end of the war-to-peace transition, many bilateral donors no longer considered El Salvador an important priority. In general, there was a substantial decrease in net flows to El Salvador, including a decrease in concessional lending.⁴⁷ Meanwhile donors, especially the World Bank, substantially increased non-concessional lending to El Salvador. Most notably, US funding decreased from an average of US\$142.83 million per year between 1992 and 1997 to US\$44.22 million between 1998 and 2001.⁴⁸

As the peace accords became imminent in El Salvador, the international community, led by the United States, rallied to support El Salvador's war-to-peace transition. The US's 1989 invasion of Panama and the 1990 victory of Violeta Barrios de Chamorro in Nicaragua had already presaged the extinction of threats to the US before the Cold War formally ended.⁴⁹ Moreover, the US could no longer justify its support for the Salvadoran military given its blatant human rights violations, most notably the slaying of the Jesuit priests and the army's bombing of poor neighborhoods in El Salvador. In March 1992, two months after the signing of the Salvadoran peace accords,

⁴⁶ See for example, Fagen, "El Salvador: Lessons in Peace Consolidation."

⁴⁷ Concessional loans differ from non-concessional loans in that the former are considered part of development aid, and are often extended at below market terms.

⁴⁸ Based on OECD data: Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Destination of Official Development Assistance and Official Aid Disbursements (Table 2a, Column 206). Although funding to El Salvador increased following the earthquake, it quickly fell back to pre-earthquake levels by 2002.

⁴⁹ For more on this discussion, refer to Karl, "El Salvador's Negotiated Revolution."

the CG met in Washington DC.⁵⁰ In general, the international community was forthcoming in its support of El Salvador's war-to-peace transition. Between 1992 and 1997, the international community committed US\$2.47 billion to El Salvador,⁵¹ of which US\$1.09 billion was from bilateral resources, US\$1.33 billion was from multilateral sources, and US\$55.3 million was from NGOs.⁵² Thirty-one percent of total funding made available to the country was from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), 17.26 percent by the United States, 9.51 percent by the Central American Bank for Economic Integration, and 9.44 percent by the World Bank.⁵³ Although the United State's share of foreign aid disbursements had dropped to 46 percent between 1992 and 1995, the United States still accounted for 71 percent of all grants, making it El Salvador's biggest donor of grants until 1995. In addition to the United States, the International Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank, EC, Germany, and Japan were major donors to El Salvador.⁵⁴ In many instances, international donors disbursed more

⁵⁰ James Boyce, "External Assistance and the Peace Process in El Salvador," *World Development* 23, no. 12 (1995): 2101-2116.

⁵¹ Commitments represent a donor's financial obligations that are allocated to specific programs and/or projects based on signed protocols, memoranda, and agreements between a recipient and a donor country or agency. A pledge on the other hand represents an initial indication of a donor's intention to provide financial aid for a specified period. Definitions provides Annex I, Terms and Definitions, MOPIC's 2001 First and Second Quarterly Monitoring Report of Donor Assistance (Ramallah: Ministry of Planning, 30 June, 2001).

⁵² UNDP/PNUD, *Technical and Financial Co-operation with El Salvador, as Reported by Donors/ Cooperación Técnica y Financiera para El Salvador, Según Información Proporcionada por los Cooperantes 1992-1997* (El Salvador: UNDP, July, 1997), Introduction. According to the UNDP, this information is not always complete, but based on the amounts reported by the donors themselves. In some instances, donors did not respond to UNDP's request to update their figures. UNDP estimates are higher than disbursements documented by OECD. A number of factors might account for this discrepancy: 1) In some instances, donors did not respond to UNDP's request to update their figures; 2) 1997 UNDP figures reflect commitments, or what UNDP refers to as approved budgets, and not actual disbursements; and 3) Not all NGOs and multilaterals report their funding to the OECD.

⁵³ UNDP/PNUD, *Technical and Financial Co-operation with El Salvador, as Reported by Donors*.

⁵⁴ Funding amounts from EC and Germany are determined on total project costs, and not from direct data from the donors themselves, Boyce, "External Assistance and the Peace Process in El Salvador," 2102.

than they had initially pledged. Moreover, gaps between pledges and disbursements were more or less insignificant.

Loans to El Salvador represented 40 percent of total peace-related programs in the post-war period.⁵⁵ By 1992, El Salvador's debt had risen to US\$2.34 billion, with US loans representing 34 percent of the total. Although loans represented a significant portion of aid to El Salvador, the initial debt forgiveness by the United States in 1992 helped stabilize the economic situation. The government of El Salvador and the United States signed an agreement that year to reduce bilateral debt to US\$464 million. By 1994, however, an increase in multilateral lending raised the country's total debt to US\$2.497 billion.⁵⁶

From 1998, disbursements to El Salvador almost halved. On average net disbursements to El Salvador between 1992 and 1997 averaged US\$331.27 million/year,⁵⁷ of which 32 percent⁵⁸ were in the form of concessional loans. Additionally, El Salvador received US\$779.67 million in non-concessional loans during that period.⁵⁹ Between 1998 and 2001, net disbursements to El Salvador averaged US\$195.57/year,⁶⁰ of which 24.7 percent were in the form of concessional loans.⁶¹

⁵⁵ Ibid., 2105.

⁵⁶ Rosa and Foley, "El Salvador," footnote 8, p. 152. Between 1991 and 1997, the World Bank lent US\$451.1 million to El Salvador, along with the IDB that lent US\$1.4 billion for the period between 1990 and 1997.

⁵⁷ Based on OECD data (DAC): Destination of Official Development Assistance and Official Aid-Disbursements (Table 2a, Column 206).

⁵⁸ Ibid., (Table 2a, Column 204).

⁵⁹ Ibid., (Table 2b, Columns 202 (export credits) and 204 (other lending) combined).

⁶⁰ Ibid., (Table 2a, Column 206).

⁶¹ Ibid., (Table 2a, Column 204).

Meanwhile, during this same four-year period, El Salvador received US\$814.7 million in non-concessional loans.⁶² Less aid to El Salvador also meant less foreign donor involvement in determining political outcomes, including in the realm of civil society.

Coordinating Mechanism and Channels

In the Palestinian territories and El Salvador, donors and the recipient governments established channels and mechanisms to coordinate the aid effort. In both contexts, these mechanisms promoted certain actors, giving them greater ownership over the reconstruction process. In the Palestinian territories, the uncertainty of the political situation because of the non-inclusive political settlement, and the higher amounts of assistance required more complex and centralized coordinating mechanisms which allowed for more foreign donor involvement, and greater opportunity to shape political outcomes. The centralized coordinating mechanisms ensured that there was greater consensus among donors regarding which actors they would promote.⁶³ Moreover, although some argue that these mechanisms were too complex to be effective,⁶⁴ certain measures were taken by foreign donors to address political and economic impediments to the implementation of the peace accords and foreign donor operations. In El Salvador, the coordination mechanisms were less complex and foreign donor efforts were more disbursed. The less centralized coordinating mechanisms meant that different donors

⁶² Ibid., (Table 2b, Columns 202 (export credits) and 204 (other lending) combined).

⁶³ More problematically, the coordinating mechanisms put Israel on an equal footing with the Palestinians.

⁶⁴ For more on this discussion, refer to Adel Zagha and Manal Jamal, *Mortgaging Self-Reliance: Foreign Aid and Development in Palestine*, Phase II Report (Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC) Jerusalem, November, 1997), 15.

could promote different actors. For example, in its first incarnations, the coordinating mechanisms in El Salvador excluded the FLMN. As a result, many pro-FLMN donors simply chose to bypass the more right-wing, government controlled mechanisms and channeled their funding through the more neutral UNDP. Polarization among donors decreased after the first couple of years after the signing of the peace accords, as different foreign donors became more willing to fund different parties. This discussion is significant because it demonstrates how political goals affect the design of institutional mechanisms and channels for aid.

In the Palestinian territories, the Western donors established a complex structure to coordinate the aid effort. This more complex structure provided donors with a greater opportunity for more political involvement. From the onset, the donor community created two main bodies: the CG and the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC), the principal coordination mechanism on policy, political matters related to the donor development effort, as well as on the economic aspects of the 1993 Declaration of Principles.⁶⁵ In 1994, the AHLC created the Local Aid Coordination Committee (LACC) which reports back to the World Bank, the United Nations Special Coordinator's Office to the Occupied Territories (UNSCO), and Norway, and the Joint Liaison Committee (JLC) which reviews the budgetary performance of the PA, and monitors the implementation of the Tripartite Action Plan (TAP).⁶⁶ Additionally, the LACC created

⁶⁵ For a more detailed discussion on donor coordinating mechanism in the WBGS, refer to Zagha and Jamal, *Mortgaging Self-Reliance*, 10-12.

⁶⁶ The Tripartite Action Plan on Revenues, Expenditures, and Donor Funding for the Palestinian Authority (TAP) was signed in Paris at the April 1995 AHLC meeting. The TAP specifically addresses the balancing of the PA's recurrent budget, the reduction of impediments to free travel, and ways to expedite donor disbursements.

twelve Sector Working Groups (SWGs);⁶⁷ for each SWG, a UN agency serves as a secretariat, a donor serves as a shepherd, and the relevant PA ministry serves as the gavel holder. In light of the deteriorating political situation, the foreign donor community created two additional bodies: the Task Force on Project Implementation (TFPI), to serve as a representative forum for the donor community to engage in dialogue with the Israeli government regarding Israeli impediments to project implementation and freedom of movement,⁶⁸ and the Humanitarian and Emergency Policy Group (HEPG), to address the relevant policy options available to the donor community in light of the emergency situation that transpired after the start of *Al-Aqsa Intifada*.⁶⁹

On the Palestinian side, the PA, along with the donor community, initially founded the Palestinian Economic Council for Reconstruction and Development (PECDAR) as the counterpart to the World Bank. Since PECDAR's inception in 1994, its mandate has undergone a number of changes; it now works more specifically in the area of infrastructural reconstruction, serving as an implementing agency. The Ministry of Planning and International Co-operation (MOPIC) is the key coordinator of foreign donor assistance on the Palestinian side.

⁶⁷ The twelve sector working groups were: Agriculture, Education, Employment Generation, Environment, Health, Infrastructure, Institution Building, Police, Private Sector, Public Finance, Tourism, and Refugees.

⁶⁸ The donor community established this body in 1997. For a more detailed discussion, refer to International Assistance to the Palestinian People: LACC, 2003. Website- http://www.lacc.ps/Donor_Coordination/tfpi/.

⁶⁹ The donor community established this body in 2001. For a more detailed discussion, refer to International Assistance to the Palestinian People: LACC, 2003. Website- http://www.lacc.ps/Donor_Coordination/hepg.

Among the criticisms regarding aid coordination to the Palestinian territories, is that it has systematically undermined the role of Palestinians in the overall process, giving greater control to donors. As Dr. Samir Abdallah⁷⁰ cogently explains:

The role of the Palestinians has generally been undermined in the overall donor effort...mechanisms have been designed in such a way so that full control is given to donors. When the AHLIC was established, there was a lot of competition regarding the steering committee membership, and consequently, the World Bank became the body's secretariat. Then when the CG was established, Israel became a member partner along with the PLO and the donors, on equal footing with the Palestinians. Then in the SWGs, the designated PA body is playing the role of gavel-holder, but the groups are actually led by a particular UN agency as secretariat and a donor as shepherd.⁷¹

In general, the structure has minimized the input of the Palestinians, and bolstered the role of the key donors. Despite the complexity of the structure and the many donors involved, they more or less share the same political views in relation to the peace process.

In El Salvador, the post-war donor coordination structures were not as centralized as those in Palestine. From the onset, a struggle ensued between the government of El Salvador and USAID on the one hand, and the FMLN and the European donors on the other regarding which channels and organizing mechanisms donors should use to implement the NRP, as well as to disburse aid to the FMLN ex-conflict zones. The divergent political positions of donors made it more likely that all groups or organizations affiliated with the different political groups would receive some sort of funding. Although this situation was later rectified as different donors, including USAID, became more willing to fund different parties, both the initial lack of consensus among donors,

⁷⁰ Dr. Samir Abdallah was the former director of the Economic Policy and Project Selection Department at PEC DAR.

⁷¹ Quote taken from Zagha and Jamal, *Mortgaging Self-Reliance*, 15.

and the subsequent more inclusive approach of donors towards different groups, ensured that no group was deprived of foreign funding because of its political background.

Initially, the Salvadoran government and USAID insisted that the Secretariat for National Reconstruction (SNR), CONARA, a counterinsurgency development agency, should coordinate aid efforts related to the NRP. On the other hand, the FMLN and a number of donors felt that the UNDP should coordinate the aid effort.⁷² Until 1993, a number of European countries boycotted the Secretariat and channeled funds through UNDP, leaving USAID as the principal donor to the Secretariat. Although, during the initial years after the signing of the peace accords, post-war reconstruction remained in the purview of the government, including municipalities, ultimately, some funding was channeled through the UNDP, namely from some European countries and other UN agencies.

Similarly, the two parties initially disagreed over which bodies should distribute the aid, especially to the ex-conflict zones. The Salvadoran government and USAID believed that aid should be channeled through the government, minimizing any possible power-sharing with the FMLN,⁷³ or possibility that the FMLN would be strengthened in any part of the country. Other donors, especially state-sponsored European donors, maintained that aid to the ex-conflict zones should be channeled through non-governmental organizations that were familiar with and had previously worked in those areas. A number of donor countries, most notably the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Canada, and Spain, chose to bypass the Salvadoran government and relevant

⁷² Rosa and Foley, "El Salvador," 139. According to this publication, however, it is not clear how UNDP is defining the sector of economic development.

⁷³ Boyce, "External Assistance and the Peace Process in El Salvador," 2107.

parties. According to UNDP's 1997 report, these countries channeled as much as 60-75 percent of their total funding through NGOs, multilateral projects, or their own agencies, in contrast to the US, EU, and Germany which delivered approximately 90 percent of their total funding through the government.⁷⁴ Although in the first couple of years after the signing of the peace accords, the NRP channeled less funding through the opposition NGOs, these NGOs still received substantial funding from solidarity groups and European donors.⁷⁵ Murray estimates that between 1992 and 1993, the total amount of funding channeled by opposition NGOs to ex-conflict zones was approximately US\$30 million.⁷⁶

In general, there also was little coordination between those managing the peace process, and those involved with the international financial institutions and implementing economic reforms. Alvaro de Soto and Graciana del Castillo referred to the dichotomy as the "two-track process"⁷⁷ in which the international financial institutions had little regard for how their policies would impact the peace process. For example, to expedite the disbursement of funding, and to ensure that the government had greater control of the funding being received, the Salvadoran government requested that foreign donor

⁷⁴ Rosa and Foley, "El Salvador," 147.

⁷⁵ By November 1993, the NRP had assigned US\$41.15 million to Salvadoran NGOs (36 percent of its total allocations). Of this total, opposition NGOs received approximately 0.62 percent. In contrast to the opposition NGOs, US-based NGOs and Salesian NGOs received 27.06 percent, and 52.49 percent of total NGO allocations respectively. The Salvadoran government and USAID claimed that the opposition NGOs were not excluded on political grounds, but rather that many of these NGOs were not institutionally capable of carrying out certain tasks, and that when the NRP began to be implemented, most opposition-affiliated NGOs were not legally licensed, Murray et. al. *Rescuing Reconstruction*, 15-17. For more on this topic, also see, Foley, "Laying the Groundwork: the Struggle for Civil Society in El Salvador," 77.

⁷⁶ Murray et. al., *Rescuing Reconstruction*, 18.

⁷⁷ Discussed in Rosa and Foley, "El Salvador," 136. For more on this discussion, refer to original article, Alvaro de Soto and Graciana del Castillo, "Obstacles to Peacebuilding," *Foreign Policy* 94 (Spring, 1994): 69-74.

assistance be channeled through the World Bank's second structural adjustment loan program (SAL II). The government's rationalization was that they had little power to re-assign previously ear-marked funding to other priority sectors, and that funds were being disbursed at too slow a pace. The World Bank strongly supported the position of the Salvadoran government. The Scandinavian countries, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, adamantly opposed such a move on the grounds that the purpose of aid was to support peace and reconciliation. These countries requested that peace conditionality be included in the SAL II.⁷⁸ Ultimately, none of these issues was incorporated into the SAL II, and although the government was provided with greater flexibility, there were no new pledges in 1993; with the exception of Germany, all donors simply reaffirmed their previous pledges. The polarization among donors was later redressed by the more inclusive nature of the peace accords which better enabled donors to unify their goals, and support all groups in society.

Foreign Donor Sectoral Priorities

In both contexts, foreign donor program selectivity was guided by their different political considerations. Although foreign donors were reluctant to fund those sectors that they considered politically contentious, the level of uniformity among donors significantly affected the impact on these sectors. In Palestine, because of the greater uniformity among Western foreign donors, especially regarding which recipients or sectors they perceived as politically contentious, these sectors were under-funded by all

⁷⁸ Among their conditions were that some funds be earmarked for Peace Accord related programs such as the transfer of land and the building of democratic institutions, the modernization of the public sector, including the creation of an appropriate role for the military in a democratic and peaceful society, and the increasing of tax revenues.

Western donors. In El Salvador, on the other hand, foreign donors were less uniform about which sectors they perceived as politically contentious, therefore increasing the likelihood that all sectors would receive some funding.

In both contexts, foreign donors were careful not to fund contentious sectors. In El Salvador, this initially included land transfers and the re-integration of ex-combatants, and in the WBGS, this extended to the productive sector, especially in relation to agriculture. In El Salvador, however, because of the initial polarization among donors, there was less consensus regarding which sectors were contentious, and therefore no sector was marginalized by all donors. For example, two program areas that were critical to the implementation of the peace accords, the creation of a civilian police force, separate and distinct from the armed forces, and the transfer of land to former combatants⁷⁹ were under-funded by non-US foreign donors according to Boyce. Nonetheless, the US was willing to fund these sectors. Other donors were willing to fund other contentious sectors such as the re-insertion of ex-combatants into civilian life. In particular, a number of middle powers made important contributions towards peace-related programs; most notably the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Canada, and Spain. Although these countries' total share of funding to El Salvador constituted a small percentage of funding to El Salvador, they made substantial contributions to under-funded programs such as the Human Rights Ombudsman's Office, resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons, and agricultural and micro-industrial development projects in the ex-conflict zones, and also contributed significantly to

⁷⁹ Graciana Del Castillo, "Post-Conflict Reconstruction and the Challenge of International Organizations: The Case of El Salvador," *World Development* 29, no. 12 (2001): 1975.

democracy-building and re-insertion activities.⁸⁰ In Palestine, because of the more sensitive political settlement, donors tended to be more uniform in avoiding certain sectors; for example, almost all donors under-funded the agriculture sector.

In general, commitments to the productive sectors in El Salvador, especially in relation to agriculture, were higher than those to Palestine. Between 1992 and 2001, foreign donors committed US\$125.25 million to the Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing sector, and US\$52.01 million to the Industry, Mining, and Construction sector in El Salvador, compared to US\$61.5 million, and US\$42.33 million to the same sectors in Palestine.⁸¹ In the Palestinian territories, the agriculture sector aptly represented the most overlooked, and under-funded of sectors. Tom Nue, the Director of American Near East Refugee Aid explains his dismay: "This is extremely puzzling since the activities carried out in agriculture over the years, many of which are not high technology innovations, can be disseminated and encouraged using existing state of knowledge, and available land and water resources."⁸² Although this sector clearly had and has a lot of potential in terms both of employment creation, and of contributing to the productivity of the economy, it was not, and has not been, the most politically expedient either for the PA or for foreign donors. Given the precarious nature of a non-inclusive political context, the agriculture sector could not fulfill the most pressing imperatives for the PA such as budget support, emergency employment creation, and selective institution building. For donors, the agriculture sector did not provide the visibility and expediency that most

⁸⁰ Rosa and Foley, "El Salvador," 147.

⁸¹ Based on OECD Data for El Salvador and the PA for the Period between 1992 and 2001: Creditor Reporting System (CRS)/Aid Activities-Commitments- All Details: 1973 and 2004.

⁸² Quote taken from Zagha and Jamal, *Mortgaging Self-Reliance*, 30.

donors seek and appreciate. Moreover, developments in the agriculture sector, especially those involving water and irrigation, and land reclamation, were more likely to ignite political tensions with Israeli authorities.

In both cases, infrastructure related projects and programs, including those related to post-war reconstruction and the promotion of the private sector, received the largest sums of funding from the international donor community. In the Palestinian context, between 1992 and 2001, donors committed the highest amounts of funding to the Water Supply and Sanitation sector, followed by the Government and Civil Society sector, and Other Social Infrastructure and Services sectors,⁸³ each receiving US\$733.3 million, US\$297.7 million, and US\$258.59 million respectively.⁸⁴ The productive sector, encompassing agriculture and industry, was the least funded of the four broad sectors identified by MOPIC.⁸⁵ In El Salvador, between 1992 and 1997, donors committed the

⁸³ According to MOPIC's 2001 First and Second Quarterly Monitoring Report of Donor Assistance (Ramallah: Ministry of Planning, 30 June, 2001), approximately 73 percent of total commitments were disbursed to the three categories: public investment (US\$1.28 billion), technical assistance (US\$702 million), and PA budgetary assistance/ support (\$480 million). The remaining 27 percent of total commitments were disbursed to equipment, in kind, private investment, employment generation, and other/various. Both technical assistance and budgetary assistance categories received approximately 35 percent of total donor disbursements. There have been many criticisms of technical assistance schemes in the WBGS. Often, those providing the technical assistance are foreigners, who do not speak Arabic, and have little understanding of the actual context. This situation is exacerbated by the fact that they are paid ten to forty times the salary that an ordinary Palestinian would receive for the same job. In general, the level of commitment and disbursement to technical assistance projects and programs has been exceptionally high compared to other cases of war-to-peace transition, especially lower income cases of war-to-peace transition. There are several types of technical assistance; training being the most common. In the Palestinian case, this has included vocational training, reintegration programs for Palestinian detainees, rule of law assistance project training, skills training, democracy training workshops, human rights training, female empowerment training, gender sensitivity training, management training, co-existence training etc... The actual impact of most technical assistance programs is difficult to ascertain.

⁸⁴ Based on OECD Data for the PA for the period 1992 and 2001: CRS/Aid Activities-Commitments- All Details: 1973 and 2004.

⁸⁵ Based on MOPIC's 2001 First and Second Quarterly Monitoring Report According to MOPIC's categories, the Infrastructure sector includes: Energy, Environment, Housing, Solid Waste, Telecommunications, Transportation, and Water & Sanitation; the Productive Sector includes: Agriculture, Industrial Development, Private Sector Development, and Tourism & Cultural Resources; the Social Sector includes: Children & Youth, Detainees & Returnees, Education, Health, Humanitarian Assistance, Women,

highest amounts of funding to: the Transport and Storage sector,⁸⁶ Other Social Infrastructure and Social Services sector,⁸⁷ and Government and Civil Society sector,⁸⁸ which received US\$693.4 million, US\$281 million, and US\$199 million respectively during that period.⁸⁹ Between 1998 and 2001, Education, and Other Social Infrastructure and Services⁹⁰ were the highest funded sectors, followed by Transport and Storage.⁹¹

and Human & Social Development, and the Institution Building sector includes: Police, Institution Building, Legal Affairs, and Democracy Development. MOPIC figures do not represent all allocations to technical assistance since often these allocations were included under different sectors allocation. For example, gender awareness training might be included under the Women's sector, not specifying the technical assistance, or training component involved.

⁸⁶ OECD's sector 'Transport and Storage' includes projects and programs related to: transport policy and administrative management, road transportation, rail transportation, water transport, air transport, storage, and education and training in transport and storage. Based on the OECD list of Creditor Reporting System (CRS) purpose codes, 2002.

⁸⁷ OECD's sector 'Other Social Infrastructure and Services' includes projects and programs related to: employment policy and administrative management, housing policy and administrative management, low-cost housing, social/welfare services, general government services, settlement (land settlement/compensation and resettlement of displaced persons), reconstruction relief (multisectoral social programs after emergency or conflict), culture and recreation, narcotics control, statistical capacity building, and research/scientific institutions. Source as above..

⁸⁸ OECD's sector 'Government and Civil Society' includes projects and programs related to: economic and development policy/planning, public sector financial management, legal and judicial development, government administration, strengthening civil society, post-conflict peace-building (UN), elections, human rights, demobilization, free flow of information, and land mine clearance. Source as above.

⁸⁹ Based on the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS): CRS/Aid Activities- Commitments- All details: 1973 and 2004. Note that data included in the CRS is not complete, nor fully accounts for all amounts reported to DAC; member countries sometimes do not report all their projects to the CRS whereas they report the aggregate amount to the DAC. According to correspondence with representatives at the OECD, the percentage ratio of CRS/DAC coverage is as follows: 94 percent in 1991, 94 percent in 1992, 40 percent in 1993, 85 percent in 1994, 88 percent in 1995, 90 percent in 1996, 77 percent in 1997, 87 percent in 1998, 86 percent in 1999, 87 percent in 2000, and 93 percent in 2001. The main gaps in the CRS concern Japan, which does not report technical co-operation activities, and the European Commission, which reports European Development Fund and European Investment Bank projects, but not activities financed through the Commission Budget. Based on email correspondence with Sophie Lhéritier on 14 April, 2004. Despite these shortcomings in aggregate reporting, DAC/CRS has established qualitative standards for aid transfers, and maintains this data allowing for cross-national statistical analysis and comparison.

⁹⁰ OECD's sector 'Other Social Infrastructure and Services' includes projects and programs related to: Employment Policy and Administrative Management; Housing Policy and Administrative Management; Low-Cost Housing; Social/ Welfare Services; General Government Services; Settlement; Reconstruction Relief (Multisectoral social programs after emergency or conflict), Culture and Recreation; Narcotics Control; Statistical Capacity Building, and Research/scientific institutions (when sector cannot be identified). Source as above.

Although funding to Government and Civil Society⁹² had decreased after the 1995 and 1996 peak funding of US\$132.69 million (combined for those two years), it still remained a priority sector between 1998 and 2001 receiving US\$62.09 million in total commitments.⁹³

Funding to Local Government, Civil Society, and NGOs in Palestine and El Salvador

Between 1992 and 2001, donors committed almost the same amount of funding to the Government and Civil Society sector in both contexts (US\$262.07 million in El Salvador and US\$297.7 million in the Palestinian territories). Despite the similarity in this amount, funding to the sub-sectors within this category reaffirms my argument regarding the relative strengthening of government institutions, especially local government in inclusive versus non-inclusive political contexts. Within the sub-sector of Government Administration, which includes local government and decentralization, El Salvador received US\$219.15 million, compared to US\$122.43 million in the WBGS.⁹⁴ In the Palestinian context, under the sub-sector of Government and Civil Society, the lion's share of funding, approximately US\$122.43 million went to Government

⁹¹ OECD's sector 'Transport and Storage' includes programs and programs related to: transport policy and administrative management, road transport, rail transport, water transport, air transport, storage, and education and training in transport and storage. Source as above.

⁹² OECD's sector 'Government and Civil Society' includes projects and programs related to: Economic and Development Policy/Planning; Public Sector Financial Management; Legal and Judicial Development; Government Administration, Strengthening Civil Society, Post-Conflict Peace-Building (UN); Elections; Human Rights; and Free Flow of Information. Based on the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) Description of 'Government and Civil Society,' 2002. Source as above.

⁹³ Based on OECD data: CRS/Aid Activities-Commitments-All Details: 1973 and 2004.

⁹⁴ For a detailed discussion regarding funding to 'Government and Civil Society' sector, and its subsector 'Strengthening Civil Society' in Palestine and El Salvador for the period between 1992 and 2001, refer to OECD, 'Government and Civil Society': CRS/Aid Activities-Commitments- All Details: 1973 and 2004.

Administration, followed by US\$64.67 million to Strengthening Civil Society, US\$61.53 million to Economic and development policy/Planning, and US\$50.72 million to Human Rights. Conversely, in the Salvadoran context, among the sub-sectors of Government and Civil Society, donors allocated the lion's share of funding (approximately US\$219.15 million) to Government Administration.⁹⁵ Economic and Development Policy/Planning,⁹⁶ and Strengthening Civil Society received US\$96.42 million, and US\$42.3 million respectively. This point is significant because given the historical particularities of the Palestinian case, and the weak or non-existent state institutions, there was dire need for programs related to government administration, and the strengthening of government institutions, including local government. However, in the Palestinian non-inclusive political settlement context, the promotion of state institutions, especially at the local government level, could provide an opening that might allow the opposition to prevail at this level of government, thus undermining the political settlement.

The impact of 'Government Administration' funding, especially in developing local government and decentralization is a significant dimension of recent developments in the Salvadoran context. One can even be as bold as to say that the trend of decentralization in many developing countries today cannot be fully understood without seriously considering the role played by foreign donors. Among donor promoted programs related to decentralization are the channeling of services and the organization

⁹⁵ OECD's subsector 'Government Administration' includes projects and programs related to: Systems of government including parliament, local government, decentralization; civil service and civil service reform. Based on Creditor Reporting System (CRS) Description of 'Government and Civil Society,' 2002.

⁹⁶ OECD's subsector of 'Economic and Development/Policy/Planning' includes projects and programs related to: Macro-economic, fiscal and monetary policy and planning; social planning; economic and social analysis and forecasting; structural reforms; development planning; organizational development; support to ministries involved in aid coordination; other ministries and government departments when sectors cannot be specified. Source as above.

of economic projects through local governments, the promotion of civic education, and lobbying at this level. Although a discussion regarding the exact impact and assessment of decentralization in El Salvador is beyond the scope of this dissertation, what is important to note is how foreign donors played a critical role in shaping decentralization agendas in developing countries such as El Salvador. Moreover, these types of programs illustrate how donors promote certain civil society development activities, depending on the ‘articulated’ or ‘disarticulated’ space between society and the state.

Foreign donors committed higher amounts of funding to professionalized NGOs in the Palestinian territories than in El Salvador. In non-inclusive political settlement contexts, like the WBGS, foreign donors can play a more direct role in shaping political outcomes by promoting certain civil society actors or organizations which do not oppose the peace accords, or can contribute to the promotion of the ‘post-Cold War liberal order.’ According to OECD data, foreign donors committed US\$64.67 million to Strengthening Civil Society in Palestine, compared to US\$42.3 million in El Salvador.⁹⁷ Similarly, in the Human Rights subsector⁹⁸ which is more likely to involve funding to professionalized NGOs, donors committed US\$50.72 million to the WBGS, compared to US\$6.77 million to El Salvador. Secondary data regarding funding patterns to the NGO sector in these two cases, corroborate these findings. In the WBGS, the NGO sector

⁹⁷ For a detailed discussion regarding funding to ‘Government and Civil Society’ sector, and its subsector ‘Strengthening Civil Society’ in Palestine and El Salvador for the period 1992 and 2001, refer to OECD, ‘Government and Civil Society’: CRS/Aid Activities-Commitments- All Details: 1973 and 2004.

⁹⁸ OECD’s subsector “Human Rights” includes programs and projects related to: Monitoring of human rights performance, support for national and regional human rights bodies; protection of ethnic, religious and cultural minorities [other than in connection with peace-building].

received a low of US\$20-50 million a year, compared to US\$25-30 million a year in El Salvador.⁹⁹

Despite complaints from the NGO sector regarding the diversion of NGO funding to the PA, official funding to Palestinian NGOs remained substantially high, especially in comparison to other cases of war-to-peace transition.¹⁰⁰ According to MOPIC data, between 1994 and 2001 US\$402.9 million was committed to the NGO sector (representing 8 percent of total commitments), and US\$320.8 million (representing 9 percent of total commitments) was actually disbursed.¹⁰¹ A number of sources concur that funding to the NGO sector decreased in the early 1990s, further declining after the signing of the Oslo peace accords.¹⁰² MOPIC, for example, estimates that funding to the NGO sector fell from over US\$94 million in 1994, to US\$45-50 million per year between 1995 and 1998, to US\$20-50 million per year between 1999 and 2001.¹⁰³

⁹⁹ I discuss these averages in more detail in a following section. It is important to note, however, that the average amount of funding to Palestinian NGOs was consistently higher between 1994 and 2000, but declined after the start of *Al-Aqsa Intifada* in 2000. The amount I cite above is the average for the period 1999 and 2001.

¹⁰⁰ Although there has been an overall decrease in funding to NGOs during this period, there was an increase in overall bilateral and multilateral funding to Palestinian NGOs. For more on this, refer to Sari Hanafi, *Profile of Donor Assistance to Palestinian NGOs: Survey and Database*, Report submitted to the Welfare Association (Jerusalem: Welfare Association, 1999).

¹⁰¹ Based on MOPIC's 2001 First and Second Quarterly Monitoring Report.

¹⁰² According to Clark and Balaj, Palestinian NGOs received between US\$140 and US\$220 million per year during the early 1990s (most likely before the start of the Gulf War). For more on this, refer to John D. Clark and Barbara S. Balaj, *NGOs in the West Bank and Gaza Strip*, February, 1996.

¹⁰³ Based on MOPIC's 2001 First and Second Quarterly Monitoring Report. As in the Salvadoran case, these estimates are not entirely accurate because many donors, especially solidarity groups, non-state affiliated or representative foundations, and smaller donor organizations, do not report their funding to either MOPIC or to the OECD, particularly in relation to funding to domestic NGOs. Other estimates, however, corroborate these findings; according to Hanafi and Tabar, for example, WBGS NGOs received an average of US\$33.5 million per year for the period between 1995 and 1998. Based on Sari Hanafi and Linda Tabar, *Donors, International Organizations, and Local NGOs: The Emergence of the Palestinian Globalized Elite* (Ramallah: Muwatin- the Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy, and Jerusalem: The Institute of Jerusalem Studies, 2005). Moreover, according to Hanafi's survey, the largest contributor to Palestinian NGOs, for the period between 1995 and 1998, was the United States, whose contributions

Notwithstanding this net decrease in funding to the NGO sector in the post-1993 period, the number of NGOs in the WBGS increased by a third during this period. According to more conservative estimates, the number of local NGOs in the WBGS increased from 617 NGOs in the late 1980s, to 926 NGOs after 1993.¹⁰⁴ Less conservative estimates put the number of NGOs in the WBGS at between 1,200 and 1,500 in the post-Oslo period; this figure includes unions, co-operatives, and youth clubs.¹⁰⁵

The World Bank also created an NGO trust fund, the first of its kind, worth US\$14.9 million, for the WBGS. The goal of this fund was/is twofold: 1) to provide services for the poor and disadvantaged; and 2) to develop the NGO sector. The focus of these programs would be provision of care for the handicapped, the economic re-integration of former-detainees, pre-school education programs, women's health, micro-enterprise credit schemes and agricultural extension work. The remaining US\$4.5 million were allocated to technical assistance training for proposal writing and capacity-building included training in financial and organizational management, and

represented 21.8 percent of all funding to NGOs. The US was followed by Germany (13.2 percent), Sweden (9.2 percent), the Netherlands (6.2 percent), Norway (5.1 percent), France (4.9 percent), and Spain (4.8 percent). For more on this, refer to Sari Hanafi, *Profile of Donor Assistance to Palestinian NGOs: Survey and Database*, Report submitted to the Welfare Association (Jerusalem: Welfare Association, 1999). As in the Salvadoran case, contributions from private organizations are not necessarily included in these figures.

¹⁰⁴ Shalabi and al-Said, "*Ta'dad: al-Munthamat Ghair H'kumiyeh al-Filastaniyeh fi al-Dhafa al-Gharbiyeh wa Quita' Ghaza* [Survey: Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip].

¹⁰⁵ Birzeit Development Center estimates that there are 1141 NGO in the WBGS. Zauker and Griffin estimate that there are over 1,200. In Denis J. Sullivan, "NGOs in Palestine: Agents of Development and Foundation of Civil Society, *Journal of Palestine Studies* 25, no. 3 (Spring, 1996), 93-100, he points to The Palestinian Center for Microprojects Development which puts the figure at 1,200-1,500. According to BESAN Development Center, by 2001, 575 development NGOs were operating in the WBGS.

fundraising.¹⁰⁶ The World Bank chose the Welfare Association, a pro-*Fateh* institution to administer the fund. The World Bank's rationale was that a pro-PA institution would face fewer challenges from the PA. Such an organization would also better ensure that this aid would not support those organizations that did not support the Oslo Accords.

Although foreign aid has contributed to the increase in Salvadoran NGOs from 20 in 1979, and 31 in 1983,¹⁰⁷ to over 1,300 registered civil associations in 1998,¹⁰⁸ official funding to Salvadoran NGOs has generally been consistently low. Although data regarding total funding to the Salvadoran NGO sector is difficult to come by, one study estimates that the annual turnover of the entire 'social development' sector of NGOs was approximately US\$25-30 million.¹⁰⁹ A 1995 survey of Salvadoran NGOs indicates that

¹⁰⁶ For a more detailed discussion of this topic, refer to World Bank discussion paper, *The NGO Trust Fund for the West Bank and Gaza Strip* (Washington DC: World Bank, 1997).

¹⁰⁷ Victor Gonzalez, *Las Organizaciones No Gubernamentales (ONG's)*, 54.

¹⁰⁸ This list includes 189 development NGOs, or Private Development Organizations as they are called in El Salvador. Another list compiled by UCA indicates that 37 NGOs were involved in education and training; 25 rural development; 21 environment; 15 health; 12 organizational development; 11 gender issues; 9 business development; and 8 policy research. Listed in Biekart, *El Salvador: NGO Country Profile*, 53-54.

¹⁰⁹ Guido Béjar and Stefan Roggenbuck, eds., *Sociedad Participativa en El Salvador* (San Salvador: UCA and Fundación Konrad Adenauer, 1995) referenced in Biekart, *El Salvador: NGO Country Profile*, 54. These estimates are corroborated by OECD data which estimates that official funding to NGOs remained quite insignificant in El Salvador, with total commitments of US\$25.24 million, between 1992 and 2001, and US\$102,310.00 for the period 1997 and 2000. According to this data 1992 was the exception in which US\$25 million was committed to the NGO sector, most likely involving USAID committed to *FUSADES* and its affiliated Project Fortas NGOs, later re-channeled to GOES. Although OECD sector allocations are incomplete, these allocations corroborate existing information/data regarding the low levels of official funding that is channeled or allocated to Salvadoran NGOs. In contrast, much the funding allocated to NGOs is from solidarity or private organizations, and not reported to the OECD. The quantities of solidarity funding received by Salvadoran NGOs, however, cannot be exactly determined. Per my interviews with directors of NGOs and with project managers in a number of solidarity organizations and private foundations, it is safe to assume that these amounts are often smaller than the allocations made by bilateral donors, or official NGOs whose funding is reported under bilateral commitments and disbursements.

the average budget of a Salvadoran NGO was US\$300,000.00, of which two-thirds was allocated to development projects.¹¹⁰

In El Salvador, much of the funding to NGOs has been from private aid agencies, as opposed to state-sponsored donors. In general, state-sponsored donors are more likely to uphold the political considerations of their respective states, as opposed to private aid agencies which are more likely to focus on developmental issues.¹¹¹ Among the very active aid agencies in El Salvador that channel their funding through NGOs are the Dutch CFA's-- Bilance, HIVOS, ICCO, and NOVIB -- and other German, British, and Scandinavian private aid agencies.¹¹² Some estimates indicate that El Salvador receives approximately US\$30 million in private aid flows per year to NGOs, of which Dutch CFAs accounts for 20 percent of this total.¹¹³ This situation contrasts to the Palestinian territories in which NGOs also received substantial amounts of more political funding from state-sponsored donors agencies. As I illustrate in the following section, state-sponsored donors, such as USAID, were more likely to fund professionalized NGOs in the Palestinian territories than in El Salvador.

A comparison of USAID activities in its program area on Democracy and Governance in the Palestinian and Salvadoran contexts illustrates how foreign donors are likely to alter their general programs and target different recipients so as to further their

¹¹⁰ Béjar and Roggenbuck, eds. *Sociedad Participativa en El Salvador*, referenced in Biekart, *El Salvador: NGO Country Profile*, 54.

¹¹¹ Francisco Alvarez Solís and Pauline Martin, "The Role of Salvadoran NGOs in Post-War Reconstruction," *Development in Practice* 2, no. 2 (1992): 51-60.

¹¹² Biekart, *El Salvador: NGO Country Profile*, 82.

¹¹³ Similar to other donors, the priorities of the Dutch CFAs shifted from political survival to income-generating activities, with a new criterion focused on gender and the environment in the post-war period. For more on this, refer to Biekart, *El Salvador: NGO Country Profile*, 82.

political goals. Moreover, it also demonstrates how donors are circumscribed by an existing institutional setting. In the Palestinian context, although USAID was interested in strengthening the legislative council, it has also focused on promoting certain NGOs, especially during the first six years of the program. In the Salvadoran context, USAID was more interested in strengthening government institutions, including those at the local level. In fact, USAID allocated only a small percentage of its democracy and governance funding to NGOs. In general, USAID also allocated higher amounts of funding to the Democracy and Governance program in the Palestinian territories than in El Salvador, which meant more funding to Palestinian NGOs, and a greater discrepancy between the *Fateh* and Moderate Opposition haves and the Opposition have nots in civil society.¹¹⁴

USAID established the Democracy and Governance program in the Palestinian territories in 1994. The program included three different components. The first component involved a US\$27 million grant for the period between 1994 and 2000, to develop an ‘effective civil society.’ In actual terms, this meant funding for eight Palestinian NGOs that were involved in advocacy, education, citizen participation, opinion polling, policy analysis, and women’s issues. These NGOs were large professionalized NGOs, headed by affiliates of *Fateh* or of the Moderate Opposition.¹¹⁵ The second component involved a US\$9 million grant to strengthen the elected Palestinian Legislative Council to help fulfill its legislative and constituency

¹¹⁴ For example, between 2000 and 2002, the Democracy and Governance program in El Salvador had a US\$14.96 million budget, compared to US\$40.49 million in the Palestinian territories. For more on this, refer to the websites: http://www.usaid.gov/locations/latin_american_caribbean/country/program_profiles/elsalvador and http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asia_near_east/countries/wbgaza_brief.htm.

¹¹⁵ In the West Bank, these professionalized NGOs were: the Women’s Affairs Technical Committees (WATC), PWWSO, Arab Thought Forum, Civic Forum, PASSIA, and PANORAMA.

responsibilities; USAID funneled much of this funding through Western implementing agencies, namely the Agricultural Rural Development (ARD). The third component was a five-year program which began in 2001, and involved a US\$33 million grant for a program called TAMKEEN.¹¹⁶ TAMKEEN is specifically responsible for assisting a wider variety and larger number of NGOs, especially in service delivery, in more remote geographic locations.¹¹⁷ In El Salvador, the Democracy and Governance program has involved five program activities, which are: judicial training and implementation of new criminal and penal codes; strengthening municipal governments; working with legislatures to establish constituent outreach offices; expanding the use of mediation centers and other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms; and collaboration with NGOs to encourage greater participation in public policy formulation.¹¹⁸ Of these program areas, USAID allocated 35 percent of the total budget to strengthening municipal governments.¹¹⁹

These different approaches had different impacts on civil society. In the Palestinian territories, because of the non-inclusive settlements and the resultant institutional setting, USAID could contribute to the shaping of political outcomes by promoting certain actors in civil society through certain professionalized NGOs. Although USAID funding played a role in strengthening selected NGOs, it ultimately

¹¹⁶ Tamkeen means 'empowerment' in Arabic.

¹¹⁷ TAMKEEN provides funding to approximately 106 NGOs. Per interview with Martha Myers, Director of Democracy and Governance, USAID, Jerusalem, 14 September, 2001, and website http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asia_near_east/countries/wbgaza_brief.htm.

¹¹⁸ The first three program areas were in effect in 2002, and the latter two were established more recently. Per interview with Mauricio Herrera Coella, Director of Democracy and Governance, USAID, San Salvador, 22 April, 2002, and website http://www.usaid.gov/locations/latin_american_caribbean/country/program_profiles/elsalvador.

¹¹⁹ I was not able to obtain information regarding the exact amounts of funding that USAID allocated to each of these program areas either from the official I interviewed or from their website.

contributed to the polarization between the have and have-nots in civil society, which also coincided with the non-opposition and opposition NGOs. Moreover, for fear that opposition groups might gain a hold in local government, USAID did not allocate any funding to the strengthening of local government. In El Salvador, because of the more inclusive nature of the political settlement, USAID was able to focus on the development and strengthening of government institutions, including local government without worrying that unwanted opposition would prevail at this level. Therefore, USAID allocated a considerable amount of its Democracy and Governance budget to the strengthening of municipalities. Moreover, as I will demonstrate in a following chapter on the Salvadoran women's sector, foreign donor civil society promotion programs often institutionalized regular patterns of interaction between NGOs and government institutions. Foreign donor initiatives to strengthen civil society therefore took place in a more articulated place allowing for greater interaction between civil society organizations and the relevant state and local government institutions, thus further articulating these spaces.

In the following two chapters, I discuss how the terms of the political settlement in each context shaped the impact of foreign donor assistance on the women's sector. In the chapter on the Palestinian women's sector, I illustrate how in the non-inclusive political context, foreign donor assistance contributed to the creation of hierarchies which exacerbated polarization between the different women's groups, by privileging non-opposition professionalized NGOs, over other groups that were more rooted in society. Moreover, because of the resultant limited institutional setting, donors often did not promote programs which required regular interactions between civil society groups and

government institutions, but focused overwhelmingly on different training programs. In the chapter on the Salvadoran women's sector, I discuss how in the context of a more inclusive political settlement, foreign donor assistance did not exacerbate political polarization by privileging certain groups over others, although donors tended to favor organizations with grassroots constituencies. Moreover, because of the more 'articulated spaces' which resulted from the political settlement, foreign donors were more likely to promote programs which involved regular patterns of interaction between the different civil society organizations and government institutions, especially local government.

Chapter 4

The Palestinian Women's Sector, Foreign Donor Assistance and the Development of Civil Society

In this chapter, I assess how Western foreign donor assistance has affected the Palestinian women's sector of civil society. In particular, I demonstrate how the level of inclusion of the political settlement, in this case the Oslo Accords, has shaped the impact of this assistance on the women's sector. Because of the non-inclusive nature of the political settlement, assistance from foreign donors has not affected all groups of the women's sector similarly. Rather, foreign donor support for the formalization, institutionalization, and professionalization of the women's sector has taken place in a fragmented manner, and a bifurcated sector of civil society has developed. On the one hand, a pro-Oslo, Western-funded, Western-modeled and professionalized circuit of women's organizations has emerged alongside the *Fateh*-affiliated grassroots women's committees, which have consolidated a clientelistic relationship with the PA. On the other hand, groups of grassroots women's committees and women's organizations that are not supported by the West and do not support the Oslo peace accords attempt to maintain and carve out a space for themselves, bound to the professionalized organizations for resources, and restricted in their access to the PA. Throughout this process of re-constitution, foreign donor assistance has played a pivotal role in mediating relations between these different constituent parts of the women's sector.

The politically grounded processes through which these organizations came into existence, the overall political institutional setting, and the types of projects and programs

promoted by foreign donors, do not necessarily contribute to the strengthening of civil society. Although the Palestinian women's sector of civil society is now represented by a number of strong and professionalized organizations that are active in international networks, and are more successful in lobbying both domestically and internationally, its contributions to the deepening of democracy are dubious. While some professionalized organizations might be in a better position to demand women's rights, the inability of these organizations to engage and incorporate mass constituencies, and forge horizontal links, has resulted in the marginalization of previously active women

This chapter does not address the gendered dimensions of Palestinian civil society and the related challenges to women's struggles. An impressive number of articles and books have been written on the subject.¹ Rather, my concern is to explore how the terms of the Oslo Accords shaped the decision of different constituent parts of civil society to organize and re/constitute themselves.² Moreover, I examine the circumstances under which foreign donor assistance to the women's sector contributes to the strengthening of civil society and the deepening of democracy. In particular, I assess this sector's potential contribution to the strengthening of civil society and the deepening of democracy by examining the ability of its constituent parts to forge horizontal linkages and incorporate different sectors of the population. I also assess the ability of its different

¹ See for example Reema Hamami and Penny Johnson, "Equality with a Difference: Gender and Citizenship in Transitional Palestine," *Social Politics* 6, no. 3 (Fall 1999): 314-343; Rabab Abdulhadi, "The Palestinian Women's Autonomous Movement: Emergence, Dynamics, and Challenges," *Gender and Society* 12, no. 6 (December, 1998): 649-673; Amal Jamal, "Engendering State-Building: The Women's Movement and Gender-Regime in Palestine," *Middle East Journal* 55, no. 2 (Spring 2001): 256-276; and Penny Johnson and Eileen Kuttub, "Where Have All the Women (and Men) Gone? Reflections on Gender and the Second Intifada," *Feminist Review* 69 (Winter 2001): 21-43.

² I am interested in this issue because how different civil society groups decide to organize themselves has a direct bearing on citizen participation and the development of social capital.

constituent parts to access and engage institutions of the state, especially legislative and local levels of government.

There are three sections in this chapter. In the first part of the chapter, I provide a historical overview of the Palestinian women's sector, focusing on the pre-Madrid period. I discuss the emergence of the Palestinian's women's movement, paying particular attention to the emergence of the Palestinian women's committees in the late 1970s.³ Throughout this section, I highlight the strength of the movement, especially in terms of recruiting female members from all walks of Palestinian life, and in genuinely involving them in the activities of the movement. The successful development trajectory of the Palestinian women's movement during that period laid the foundations for a future strong and effective sector of civil society that could contribute to the deepening of democracy. In the second part of the chapter, I discuss the changes that took place in the women's sector of civil society in the post-Madrid Oslo Accord period, focusing on the impact of the political settlement and increased level of foreign donor assistance. I specifically demonstrate how the non-inclusive nature of the Madrid and Oslo Accords and the mediating role of foreign donor assistance adversely affected some of the gains made by the sector during the previous period. In the third and final section of this chapter, I examine how patterns of interaction between the various components of the women's sector have affected the development of civil society and the deepening of democracy. I also provide illustrations of the types of interaction that have resulted because of certain foreign donor-funded projects and programs.

³ For a detailed discussion of the Palestinian women's committees that emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s, refer to Hiltermann, *Behind the Intifada: Labor and Women's Movements in the Occupied Territories*.

Background to the Palestinian Women's Movement

The Palestinian women's movement dates back to the 1920s, during which a number of women's societies were established. Over the years, the women's movement metamorphosed from a number of charitable societies into an integral component of nationalist resistance, and later to a community of strong institutionalized feminist organizations. The capacity of the Palestinian women's movement to incorporate women from all walks of life, and to involve them genuinely in the decision-making of their respective committees, established the basis for an effective civil society. However, the non-inclusive political settlement and the mediating role of foreign donor assistance adversely affected these previous gains by privileging certain groups of the women's sector over others in terms of access to both resources and institutions. This unequal access resulted in the creation of hierarchies in the women's sector, which exacerbated existing polarization.

In 1921, the first Palestinian Women's Union was established.⁴ During that year, the union founded the General Palestinian Women's Congress in Jerusalem.⁵ After the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, these women's groups organized and provided shelters, collected resources from the community, and ran kitchens and first aid clinics for less privileged individuals. At that time, much of the politicization and mobilization in Palestinian society took place within the 60 or so charitable societies that existed. Most of these organizations focused on providing relief, and strategies of self-

⁴ For more on the history of the Palestinian women's movement, see Ellen Fleischman, "The Emergence of the Palestinian Women's Movement, 1929-1939," *The Journal of Palestine Studies* 29, no. 3 (Spring 2000): 16-32, and Ellen Fleischman, *The Nation and its "New" Women: The Palestinian Women's Movement-1920-1948*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).

⁵ G. Al-Khalili, *Palestinian Women and the Revolution* (Acre, Israel: Dar al-Aswar, 1977) cited in Rabab Abdulhadi, "The Palestinian Women's Autonomous Movement."

help were absent from their programs. In 1965, 139 female delegates convened and established the General Union of Palestinian Women, a mass-based organization affiliated with the PLO. After 1967, these societies expanded their purview from traditional welfare functions, to place greater emphasis on education, health and vocational training. These organizations were predominately run by middle-class Palestinian women and were located in the Palestinian urban centers, and therefore inaccessible to the majority of Palestinian women who lived in the rural areas.⁶

The PLO's defeat in Jordan in 1970 culminated in the Palestine National Council's 1972 decisions to shift the locus of activity to the occupied territories, and to incorporate the masses into the struggle.⁷ In sync with the developments that were taking place in the broader national movement, female members of the various political organizations also established women's committees that would aid and facilitate mass mobilization. In 1978, female cadres from the DFLP founded the first women's committee, the Women's Working Committee (WCC). The goal of the committee was to lend support to the national movement by involving women in resistance activities against the Israeli occupation, and to empower and involve them in improving their daily living conditions. Though the founders were politically affiliated, the organization was not supposed to be partisan and was open to all women, regardless of their political affiliations. By the early 1980s, there were increasing schisms in the organization. The female leaders from other political factions worried that the leaders of the WCC would

⁶ Tamar Mayer, *Women and the Israeli Occupation: The Politics of Change* (London and New York: Routledge University Press, 1994).

⁷ Interview with Omar Assaf, DFLP politburo member, and former grassroots leader, Ramallah, 22 July 2001.

later recruit some of the members to the DFLP. As a result, cadres from other political factions established their own women's committees.⁸

By 1981, the women's group began to splinter along factional lines.⁹ In March 1981, women affiliated with the PCP founded the Union of Palestinian Working Women's Committees (UPWWC) with branches throughout the WBGS. Later that year, women affiliated with PFLP established the Union of Palestinian Women's Committees (UPWC). In 1982, women affiliated with Fateh founded the Women's Committee for Social Work (WCSW). In 1989, the WCC was renamed the Federation of Palestinian Women's Action Committees (FPWAC).¹⁰ Competition ensued among these different committees, especially in terms of recruiting membership.

The women who were involved in establishing the women's committees were relatively young, educated, and activists in their own right. Many of them were also political cadres in their respective political factions. In *Land Before Honor*, Kitty Warnock articulately describes this new generation of activists: "Like the national movement as a whole, these women wanted a radically new approach to work among women--an approach geared to development rather than charity, to empowerment rather than dependency, to mass mobilization and democracy rather than oligarchic leadership."¹¹ These women were committed to articulating women's issues both in relation to and separate from the broader national movement.

⁸ Interview with Siham Barghouti (one of the founding members of the WCC, later renamed the FPWAC, and later splintered to FPWAC-FIDA), Ramallah, 12 July, 2001.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Hiltermann, *Behind the Intifada*, 134.

¹¹ Kitty Warnock, *Land Before Honor: Palestinian Women in The Occupied Territories* (NYC, Monthly Review Press, 1990), 17.

Goals

Beginning with the founding of the women's committees in 1979, and throughout the 1980s, all the women's committees shared the same goals, though the WCSW was not as progressive as the others, and did not espouse an agenda of societal transformation. The WCSW was affiliated with *Fateh*, the more mainstream faction which is less concerned with social change. For the most part, the various women's committees had two main goals: to enhance the status of women by empowering them to improve their daily living conditions, and to lend support to the broader national struggle. The founders of the committees were also interested in addressing women's issues in Palestinian society at large.

Among the primary goals of these women was to address the needs of working women and of women in rural areas and to establish self-help and productive ventures for women, eventually leading them to become economically independent. There was also a special focus on literacy campaigns for women. Most of my interviewees talked about the increasing realization that women's lives needed to be improved. Each committee wanted to increase support for its political faction, and eventually to recruit more members to it. In turn, by strengthening women's role in the national movement, they would be able to realize women's full potential in Palestinian society. The UPWWC, the UPWC, and the FPWAC, however, tended to be more willing to address socially contentious issues relating to the status of women, such as early marriage or polygamy, and were more willing to promote non-traditional notions regarding the role of women, such as employment outside the home. The general tactic of the executive of these committees was to address women's immediate practical needs, and to increase their

economic, political and social consciousness, while providing them with greater economic opportunities.

Organization, Membership and Decision-Making

In the pre-Madrid and Oslo period, the most important and uncontested achievements of the Palestinian women's committees were their ability to recruit large numbers of women from different sectors of Palestinian society, including remote villages, and to involve them effectively in decision-making structures.¹² These committees had radical democratic structures, in which the members were directly involved in choosing their leaders and the types of projects and programs that they implemented. The ability of the various women's committees to forge horizontal links with grassroots constituencies, and directly involve them in decision-making, laid the groundwork for an effective civil society that could contribute to deepening of democracy in Palestinian society.

By the mid-1980s, all four women's committees had amassed a substantial following, with a visible presence in terms of projects and activities in the public realm. Despite the fact that exact membership of these committees is difficult to verify, all four committees claimed to have a membership base in the thousands, covering most geographic locations of the West Bank and later in the Gaza Strip. By 1986, the

¹² Another important accomplishment of these committees is the long-term impact on individual activists. According to a longitudinal study by Frances Hasso, participation in the women's movement resulted in the creation of a 'feminist generation.' For more on this, refer to: Hasso, "Feminist Generations? The Long-Term Impact of Social Movement Involvement on Palestinian Women's Lives," *American Journal of Sociology* 107, no. 3 (November, 2001): 586-611.

members of the FPWCA claimed to have over 5,000 members.¹³ At the height of the *Intifada* at the end of the 1980s, one organizer claimed that their membership had reached 15,000 individuals.¹⁴ More importantly, there was a high level of participation, as exemplified through the daily activities of the *Intifada* such as sit-ins, marches, and neighborhood committee meetings. The UPWC claimed to have about 5,000 members up until 1994.¹⁵ By 1990, the membership of the WCSW had reached 12,000.¹⁶

The official policy of these committees, especially those in the leftist-leaning organizations, was to recruit members from all geographic locations, especially the rural areas; women in these areas were considered the most in need of organizational support. One entry strategy into the villages was to establish nursery schools and kindergartens.¹⁷ Other activists initiated collective recruitment drives in which organizers would meet with women in a village. A representative from the steering committee of an organization would visit an area and help set up a committee. The women would discuss some of the activities they wanted to initiate and then they would hold an election. Although each individual committee was responsible for its own local projects, it was

¹³ Interview with Siham Barghouti (one of the founding members of the WCC, later renamed the FPWAC, and splintered to FPWAC-FIDA), Ramallah, 12 July 2001. According to Hiltermann's findings, the FPWAC also had 5,000 members by 1986, *Behind the Intifada*, 141.

¹⁴ Interview with Nihaya Mohammed (one of the founding members of the WCC, later renamed the FPWAC), Ramallah, 29 July, 2001.

¹⁵ Interview with Maha Nassar (one of the founding members of the UPWC), Ramallah, 21 July, 2001. According to Hiltermann's findings in 1985, the UPWC had 1,450 members, *Behind the Intifada*, 141.

¹⁶ Interview with Member 1 (executive committee member of the WCSW), Ramallah, 14 July, 2001. According to Hiltermann's findings, the WCSW had between 3,000 and 4,000 members in 1985, *Behind the Intifada*, 141.

¹⁷ Interview with Member 1 (executive committee member of the WCSW), Ramallah, 14 July, 2001.

also part of a nationwide network in which it participated by electing a representative to a regional committee, which in turn elected a national executive and steering committee. The women in the village would continue to meet on a regular basis, and organizers would visit the respective location every three to four months

Most of the women I spoke to discussed the consensus decision-making approach used in the various locations. When women were not able to reach a decision by consensus, they would often vote on the particular issue. One grassroots coordinator explained, “We used to meet with women in the villages every two weeks. We would put together a needs-assessment list based on what the women wanted. Then we would vote to prioritize what they wanted to see accomplished.”¹⁸ Though the respective political faction might have had some general suggestions regarding the types of programs being implemented, the women also had a direct say in the projects and programs that were being carried out. Another grassroots women’s committee organizer explained, “When we met, the women told us what they wanted. There was a lot of autonomy in decision-making and in choosing events.”¹⁹ As Hilterman explains, “The power of the base units ensures representation from the bottom up, as well as lively discussion of all matters affecting women and the committee across membership ranks.”²⁰ More importantly, the political faction knew that increasing membership in these women’s committees was

¹⁸ Interview with Member 2 (FPWAC-FIDA coordinator). Ramallah, 12 August, 2005.

¹⁹ Interview with Member 2 (FPWAC coordinator), Ramallah, 6 August, 2001; she also stressed this in her interview.

²⁰ Hiltermann, *Behind the Intifada*, 146. Hiltermann adds, “The WCSW differs in this respect. Identifying with the mainstream current in the Palestinian national movement, the WCSW has never aspired to organize the masses but rather to gain the masses’ support through charisma and patronage,” 146.

contingent on satisfying the women's demands and needs.²¹ Hence, ideas and initiatives flowed both ways between the local committees and the executive. The various committees were careful to involve local women from the committees, in expressing their own needs and priorities, and in establishing and running committees in the various localities.

Although there was some competition and political disagreement among the different women's committees,²² there was a degree of co-operation.²³ In 1984, the women's committees set up a mechanism to facilitate informal coordination. In particular, there was coordination in the programs related to consciousness-raising, and in the activities to protest against Israeli occupation.²⁴ The lack of overt and acrimonious competition between the different women's committees facilitated their ability to recruit members in such high numbers. The committees' successful mobilization, in terms of both the numbers and the nature of involvement, set the groundwork for an effective civil society.

Programs

The specific programs and activities tended to vary from one region to another, especially between the rural and urban areas. The main objective was to involve women in the community in choosing and running these programs, and not to create a kind of

²¹ Interview with Member 1 (executive committee member of the WCSW), Ramallah, 14 July, 2001.

²² The political differences concerned the broader national question.

²³ Hiltermann for example, explains: "Factionalism did raise its head in the women's movement, however, there are four committees rather than a single unified one... the absence of bitter competition has made for a greater degree of co-operation and coordination...", from *Behind the Intifada*, 127.

²⁴ For example, the women tended to coordinate their sit-ins, hunger strikes, and demonstrations.

dependency where services were provided from above.²⁵ By establishing various committees in different areas, the women in each area were able to address concerns that were specific to their location. For example, women in the urban areas were more likely to be part of the urban workforce, and therefore their immediate concerns tended to revolve around the improvement of working conditions.²⁶ On the other hand, women in the rural areas were less likely to be formally employed, and more interested in acquiring the skills that would enable them to find employment outside the home. For the most part, however, many of the programs in both the rural and urban areas dealt with women's practical needs such as literacy classes, health education, small-scale vocational training, the provision of childcare, and the establishment of ventures, such as co-operatives, for producing goods.²⁷

Consciousness-raising was central to the activities of the women's committees in both the rural and urban areas. The members usually chose the committees' topics for the consciousness-raising programs. Literacy classes were more common in rural areas, especially among older members who had not received a primary education. Health-related issues were also very popular and these included family planning, pre-natal and

²⁵ Interviews with Siham Barghouti (one of the founding members of the WCC, later renamed the FPWAC, and later splintered to FPWAC-FIDA), Ramallah, 12 July, 2001; Maha Nassar (one of the founding members of the UPWC), Ramallah, 21 July 2001; Zahira Kamal (one of the founding members of the WCC, later renamed the FPWAC, and later splintered to the FPWAC-FIDA), Ramallah, 19 August 2001; Member 1 (executive committee member of the WCSW), Ramallah, 14 July 2001; and Nuha Barghouti (one of the founding members of the UPWWC), Ramallah, 12 July, 2001.

²⁶ Per interview with Siham Barghouti, (one of the founding members of the WCC, later renamed the FPWAC, and later splintered to FPWAC-FIDA), Ramallah, 12 July, 2001. The FPWAC, in particular, was heavily involved in organizing female laborers.

²⁷ All the people I interviewed from the women's committees discussed these types of programs and projects.

post-natal care, and preventive medical treatment for children, such as the importance of immunization.

All the committees were involved in productive ventures, especially co-operatives. Some of the goods produced in the co-operatives were: baby food, engraved brass, embroidered clothes or linens, hand woven rugs, knitted sweaters, concentrated fruit juices, frozen vegetables and bakery products. Members of the FPWAC even established a carpentry factory. At one point, the UPWC managed 90 co-operatives in the Ramallah area alone.²⁸ Most of the committees also took part in the organization of annual cultural bazaars. These had two goals: to promote women's productive capacity²⁹ and to increase reliance on Palestinian domestic goods in place of Israeli and other foreign imports.³⁰

To facilitate women's integration into the public sphere, the committees also established nursery schools and kindergartens. By the late 1980s, the FPWAC managed 30-35 nursery schools and kindergartens,³¹ the UPWC managed 86 nursery schools and kindergartens, and the WCSW managed 50 kindergartens³² throughout the WBGS.

²⁸ Interview with Maha Nassar (one of the founding members of the UPWC), Ramallah, 21 July, 2001. According to Hiltermann's findings in 1985, the UPWC had 1,450 members, *Behind the Intifada*, 141.

²⁹ Among the items produced by women were dairy products such as yogurt and cheese, sweets and desserts, olives and other pickled vegetables, and embroidered crafts.

³⁰ Interview with Siham Barghouti, (one of the founding members of the WCC, later renamed the FPWAC, and later splintered to FPWAC-FIDA), 12 July, 2001.

³¹ Interview with Siham Barghouti (one of the founding members of the WCC, later renamed the FPWAC, and splintered to the FPWAC-FIDA), Ramallah, 12 July 2001. According to Hiltermann's findings, the FPWAC also had 5,000 members by 1986, *Behind the Intifada*, 141.

³² Interview with Member 1 (executive committee member of the WCSW), Ramallah, 14 July, 2001.

Along with Islamist institutions, the women's committees were among the main providers of nursery schools and kindergartens in the WBGS.

The types of program and the related goals espoused by the women's committees played an important role in the empowerment of these women. By providing these women with the forum to identify their immediate needs and to develop the programs to address them, these women acquired the skills they needed to aggregate their interests, to advocate their preferences, and to organize themselves. These skills are critical for the development of an effective civil society that can contribute to the deepening of democracy.

Resources and Funding to the Palestinian Women's Committees

The various committees supported their activities primarily through membership fees, small income-generating activities, or occasional seed money from solidarity organizations or foreign donors. Because all the committees had more or less the same access to resources, especially through their membership fees, they operated on an equal playing field. The funding discrepancies between the different committees were not significant. Moreover, few, if any, of the activists were paid for their involvement in the women's movement; the fact that members did not expect monetary compensation in return for their involvement ensured that the spirit of voluntarism was the driving force behind civic and political participation.

The committees created a number of income-generating activities and programs, including co-operatives. They all hosted annual bazaars and earned profits from some of the products they sold. The UPWC hosted occasional fundraising dinners, and also sold

agendas/planners for profit. Some of the women's committees also ran co-operatives in the hope they would generate income for some of the women involved. In most cases, however, the co-operatives were not very successful or economically viable.

The women's committees also received minimal funding from various sources, including Western foreign donors, often in the form of seed money for specific projects. During the mid-1980s, for example, the UPWC received seed funding to help in the establishment of a baby food production facility.³³ Until 1992, the FPWAC received some funding from NOVIB for the salaries of kindergarten and nursery school teachers, and for teacher training.³⁴ During the 1980s, FPWAC also received funding from al-Najdeh North America, a Palestinian women's organization based in the US.³⁵ In some instances, the women's committees received funding from their respective political factions; this was especially the case for the WCSW. Dynamics between the different women's committees and their members, however, began to sour once certain committees and certain members began to receive preferential treatment in terms of access to both higher amounts of foreign funding and to political institutions.

³³ Funding was from a Swiss NGO.

³⁴ Per interviews with Nihaya Mohammed (one of the founding members of the WCC, later renamed the FPWAC), Ramallah, 29 July, 2001, and Member 2 (FPWAC coordinator), Ramallah, 6 August, 2001

³⁵ Ibid.

Intifada, 1987-1993

The women's movement reached its zenith during the *Intifada* that commenced in 1987.³⁶ Within the first weeks of the *Intifada*, the mass-based grassroots committees had organized an array of local administrative committees. Compared to earlier uprisings, the degree of popular participation in this *Intifada* was unprecedented. In many ways, the locus of power had shifted from the PLO to the people under occupation. Mass involvement in non-violent forms of resistance was a radical departure from the earlier period in which only armed struggle was recognized as a legitimate form of resistance.

All the women I interviewed who were politically active during that period highlighted how pivotal the role of women was during the previous *Intifada*. Much of this was explained with a lot of nostalgia for the past, especially for the sense of voluntarism that no longer seems to exist in Palestinian society. The women in the committees were directly involved in the daily activities of the *Intifada*. Among these tasks were: the mobilization of others; the setting up units to collect and store food; the creation of popular education committees in the various neighborhoods, and the formation of committees to create local manufactured goods to substitute for Israeli-made products. These activities were in addition to more overt forms of collective action such

³⁶ For more on the role of women during the 1987 to 1993 *intifada*, refer to Hiltermann, *Behind the Intifada*; Rita Giacaman and Penny Johnson, "Building Barricades and Breaking Barriers," in *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation*, eds., Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin (Boston: A MERIP Book by South End Press, 1989); Cheryl Rubenberg, *Palestinian Women: Patriarchy and Resistance in the West Bank* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001); Simona Sharoni, *Gender and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: the Politics of Women's Resistance* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1995); Phillipa Strum, *The Women are Marching: the Second Sex and the Palestinian Revolution* (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 1992); and Mayer, *Women and the Israeli Occupation*.

as protest marches and sit-ins.³⁷ It was this particular feature of the *Intifada*--the widespread participation of women--that, perhaps more than anything else, dramatizes the extent to which Palestinian society had itself been 'shaken up.'³⁸

Discussion of the problems and shortcomings that arose during the *Intifada* is beyond the scope of this chapter. The predominate mode of social and political organization, in this case the creation of grassroots committees in society, allowed for the participation and empowerment of broad sectors of society.³⁹ The women's committees were successful in assisting these women in their day-to-day lives, as well as in encouraging collective action among the women. Recruitment and the preservation of voluntary membership were contingent on genuine incorporation and inclusion.

The Re-constitution of Civil Society and the Transformation of the Women's Sector in the Post-Madrid, Post-Oslo Period

In the following section, I discuss the transformation of the women's committees, in the post-Madrid, post-Oslo period.⁴⁰ I systematically demonstrate how the impact of foreign donor assistance on this re-constituted sector of civil society was conditioned by

³⁷ Committees were established throughout the WBGS to patrol neighborhoods during the night. In the event that settlers attacked a particular neighborhood or village, these committees were responsible for alerting residents of the neighborhood or village to a possible attack.

³⁸ Mayer, *Women and the Israeli Occupation*, 44.

³⁹ For more on the creation and participation of neighborhood committees during the *Intifada*, refer to Robinson, "Popular Committees in the Intifada," Chapter 5 in *Building a Palestinian State*.

⁴⁰ For a discussion of changes in the Palestinian women's movement, and emerging relations between the grassroots women's committees and the professionalized NGOs, refer to Islah Jad, "*Al-Utur Al-Nasawiyeh wa Al-Munathamat Al-Nasawiyeh Al-Ghair Hkumiyeh* [The Women's Committees and the Women's NGOs]" in *Al-Harakah Al-Nisaiyeh Al-Falastiniyeh: Ishkaliyat Al-Tahawul Al-Dimocrati wa Al-Istratejiyeh Mustaqubaliyeh* [The Palestinian Women's Movement: Problematics in Democratic Transformation and Future Strategies]" (Ramallah: Muwatin- the Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy, 2000), 69-82.

the level of inclusion dictated by the political settlement. Although the women's sector is now represented by a number of strong professionalized organizations, it is in a weaker position to contribute to the deepening of democracy. Furthermore, only those groups that were supportive of the political settlement were able to access the funding needed to professionalize their organizations. Moreover, because of the non-inclusive nature of the political settlement, groups do not have the same access to political institutions.

Foreign donor assistance to the women's sector and to civil society more generally has exacerbated political polarization and weakened civil society by further privileging those select groups already favored by the settlement. Because the political settlement excluded important socio-political groups, and only certain groups had access to foreign donor assistance, not all groups were able to institutionalize and professionalize their organizations. Consequently, three different tendencies in the women's movement also emerged: *Fateh*, the Opposition, and the Moderate Opposition.⁴¹ Each has developed a different relationship to grassroots constituencies. Moreover, new hierarchies have emerged in the women's sector that privilege the professionalized NGOs, in terms of access to foreign donor assistance and to political institutions, and the *Fateh* committees in terms of access to political institutions.

Through the professionalized NGOs, foreign donors have established new programmatic priorities for the Palestinian women's sector, emphasizing consciousness-raising, training, workshops, advocacy, lobbying and legislation. The women's committees which are not in favor of the Oslo agreement are the recipients of these services. The vertical relationship between the professionalized NGOs and the recipients

⁴¹ I explain each of these tendencies in detail in the following section.

of these services coincides with political affiliations. An overall feeling of resentment by previously active women, or women who are still active in the women's grassroots committees but have less access to the professionalized NGOs, has also come to sour relations between the different groups in the women's sector. In general, the women's sector is in a weaker position to incorporate and forge horizontal linkages with its former grassroots constituencies; a necessary criterion for the strengthening of civil society. In what follows, I begin with a discussion of foreign donor assistance to the women's sector in the post-Madrid, and Oslo period; I then discuss the changes that have taken place in the women's committees.

Foreign Donor Assistance to the Palestinian Women's Sector in the Post-Madrid Period

Although exact information regarding the specific amounts of funding to the Palestinian women's sector is difficult to obtain, one can discern important trends from information provided by donor agencies, professionalized women's NGOs, members of the women's committees, and MOPIC. In general, the women's sector has been a high priority for many foreign donors. Foreign donors have been more willing to fund groups or organizations which support the Oslo Accords, and are in a position to promote the 'post-Cold War liberal order,' thus further privileging those groups. Because of the political imperatives, larger state-sponsored donor agencies have supported more professionalized NGOs, regardless of whether these NGOs are rooted in society and have grassroots constituencies.⁴² In contrast, smaller foreign donor agencies have been more likely to fund smaller, less institutionalized and professionalized NGOs with grassroots

⁴² Much of my discussion regarding foreign donor assistance and its impact on civil society is in relation to the larger state sponsored donors..

constituencies. In the next section of this chapter, I demonstrate in more detail how these different trends impacted the re/constitution of the women's sector of civil society. I illustrate how in the context of non-inclusive political settlements, Western foreign donors have played a direct role in shaping political outcomes, by privileging some groups over others, and exacerbating polarization between different groups in civil society. In turn, these dynamics have adversely impacted the quality of the emergent civil society.

Information regarding the exact amounts of foreign donor assistance to the Palestinian women's sector is difficult to obtain. Directors of foreign donor agencies differed in terms of their willingness to provide detailed information about their recipients. Similarly, directors and program managers of the professional NGOs were often reluctant to provide detailed information regarding their donors, or the exact amounts of funding they received. I also was not able to obtain exact information for the entire period under consideration, 1991 to 2001, because the directors of the different women's organizations and the various donors were often only willing to discuss their current partners. Despite these limitations, through my interviews with directors of various donor agencies, and directors of NGOs, as well as my access to various reports tracking donor assistance to the Palestinian territories, I was able to put together a comprehensive picture regarding the donors who fund the women's sector, and the types of organizations and programs they fund.⁴³

⁴³ Among the foreign donors who fund the women's sector are: the Canada Fund, Diakonia, the EU, Friedrich Naumann Foundation, Heinrich Böell Foundation, the Netherlands Representative Office, the Norwegian Representative Office, Save the Children, the Swedish Representative Office, UNDP, United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), USAID, and World University Service.

In general, this has been a well-funded sector of Palestinian civil society.⁴⁴ According to MOPIC, US\$19.943 million was committed to the women's sector between 1994 and 2000. Although, this figure does not include all funding committed to the sector, especially to the professionalized NGOs,⁴⁵ it is relatively higher than commitments to other sectors. According to MOPIC, for example, donors committed US\$15.457 million to the children's and youth sector, US\$19.068 million to private sector development, and US\$3.768 million to the telecommunications sector for the same period.⁴⁶

The provision of funding to the Palestinian territories by foreign donors was contingent on some level of support for the peace accords, or non-opposition more exactly. Some of the representatives from the foreign donor agencies explained that although they do not inquire about the political or ideological positions of their recipients, they do expect them to share their values, especially in terms of democracy and human

⁴⁴ Since the beginning of the Oslo peace accords, there have been extensive efforts to coordinate foreign donor activity, maintaining accurate donor pledges, disbursements, and the nature of projects and recipients involved, including the implementing agencies. Despite the extensive efforts dedicated to this task, the sector allocations are not always clear, and exact funding to professionalized NGOs is not always included in the MOPIC matrix. For example, although commitments to the women's sector amounted to US\$19.943 million between 1994 and 2000, this amount also included funding to the PA institutions and to development organizations. Moreover, commitments to the Human Rights and Civil Society sector (which amounted to US\$18.719 million between 1998 and 2001), also included funding to women's NGOs for civic education and human rights training. Unfortunately, the project breakdown of funds allocated to the overall sector was not included in MOPIC's 2001 First and Second Quarterly Monitoring Report.

⁴⁵ Professionalized NGOs in the women's sector received a high percentage of this funding. For example, according to the MOPIC's 2001 First and Second Quarterly Monitoring Report, between 1994 and 1998, foreign donors committed US\$697,000 to one professionalized NGO, the Women's Affairs Technical Committees (WATC), compared to US\$10.234 million committed to the whole women's sector during that same period.

⁴⁶ Based on MOPIC's 2001 First and Second Quarterly Monitoring Report.

rights, including women's rights.⁴⁷ This point supports my earlier argument regarding donors requiring their recipients to be in a position to promote the post-Cold War liberal order. Other donors pointed out that although there was no written policy regarding recipients having to support the Oslo Accords, those who oppose the Oslo Accords, especially Islamists do not approach them for funding.⁴⁸ A number of the representatives further explained that funding to Palestine itself is very political, since it is a middle income country and does not qualify for the amounts of assistance it receives.⁴⁹ Rather, the various state-sponsored donor agencies are heavily involved because of the need to support the peace process, and therefore the selectivity regarding who receives the funding.

In the Palestinian territories, because foreign donors were often motivated by the immediate political consideration of supporting the implementation of peace accords, other concerns such as economic development or the potential contribution of this aid to the deepening of democracy were not pressing for foreign donors. Relative to other cases, there seemed to be a greater willingness among foreign donors to support professionalized NGOs⁵⁰ that were not rooted in society, or did not have grassroots

⁴⁷ For example, representatives from the Netherlands Representative Office, the Representative Office of Finland, the Consulate of Sweden, DÍAKONIA, the European Commission, and the Heinrich Böll Foundation expressed this concern.

⁴⁸ Per interviews with representative from USAID on 14 September, 2001, and representative from the Freidrich Naumann Foundation on 14 September, 2001.

⁴⁹ These foreign donor agencies include CIDA, the Swedish Representative Office, the Netherlands Representative Office, the Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation, the Freidrich Naumann Foundation, and the Freidrich Ebert Foundation.

⁵⁰ It is important to note that only those groups that did not oppose the peace accords were able to receive the needed funding to further institutionalize and professionalize their organizations, thus making them more eligible for future funding.

bases.⁵¹ A number of my interviewees from donor agencies told me that they were cognizant that they were supporting professionalized NGOs that served as political platforms for certain individuals. These representatives, however, explained that they were interested in promoting certain discourses in Palestinian society, especially in relation to the peace accords, democratic process ideas, and consciousness-raising regarding the status of women.⁵² More importantly, these organizations had to be able to deliver certain services such as civic education to constituencies; projects that do not require these organizations to maintain a long-term relationship with the recipients. As one director of a donor agency explained, “[Sometimes] it is more important to promote an idea or an agenda, than have a grassroots constituency.”⁵³ A number of directors of donor agencies also explained that professionalized NGOs can play an important role in developing future leaders.⁵⁴ As one director of a donor agency explained, “NGOs provide room for the emergence of future leaders.”⁵⁵ Hence, according to these representatives, professionalized NGOs did not need to have grassroots constituencies, or be able to forge horizontal linkages.

⁵¹ This point is significant, especially when compared to other countries, such as El Salvador in which donors funding the women’s movement almost always gave preference to NGOs that were grassroots-based. I will elaborate on this point in the following chapter

⁵² Per interview with representatives from USAID on 14 September, 2001, the Freidrich Naumann Foundation on 14 September, 2001, and the Freidrich Ebert Foundation on 18 September, 2001, and the Netherlands Representative Office, 25 July, 2001.

⁵³ Per interview with Mathes Buhbe, Director of the Freidrich Ebert Foundation, 18 September, 2001.

⁵⁴ Per interviews with directors from USAID on 14 September 2001, the Freidrich Naumann Foundation on 14 September, 2001, the Freidrich Ebert Foundation on 14 September, 2001, and DÍAKONIA on 16 August, 2001.

⁵⁵ Per interview with Joachim Paul, Director of the Freidrich Naumann Foundation, Jerusalem, 14 September, 2001.

The profile of USAID's funding to the Palestinian women's sector is revealing of many of these trends. Between 1994 and 2000, USAID was one of the main donors to the Women's Affairs Technical Committees (WATC) and the PWWSD⁵⁶ The WATC and PWWSD are professionalized organizations that emerged from the women's committees.⁵⁷ Although, the PWWSD does have a grassroots-base of approximately 300 registered members, neither NGO is as rooted in society as are other grassroots-based organizations, or as the women's committees. Both organizations were founded by individuals who are well known in the Palestinian political scene and are not in opposition to the Oslo Accords. Both the WATC and the PWWSD are active in providing workshops and training seminars on civic literacy, democratization, and women's rights. The relationship that has ensued between these organizations and the recipients of these training sessions resulted in a more hierarchical, vertical relationship between the two parties that has not necessarily been conducive to the strengthening of civil society.

The pattern of USAID's funding contrasts with smaller donor agencies, such as Canada Fund, which have been more likely to support smaller, grassroots-based community projects and organizations, and to be less stringent regarding the political background and credentials of their recipients. The majority of Canada Fund's recipients were small community initiatives, in marginal or remote areas, especially refugee camps.

⁵⁶ USAID has also helped establish a non-profit, micro-finance institution, the Palestine Credit and Development organization (FATEN) which as of 2005 has provided US\$11 million in loans to women. I will later discuss how the institutional setting in the Palestinian context has not allowed for the development of micro-finance programs which require coordination with local government, and how this contrasts with the more comprehensive local development programs that include more interaction with local government to ensure greater sustainability.

⁵⁷ I will discuss the founding of these organizations in the next section of this chapter.

As of 2001, among Canada Fund's recipients in the women's sector have been: the Women's Center in Jalazone Camp, Women's Center in Al-Amal Camp, Qualandia Refugee Camp Co-op, and the Women's Center in Bureij Camp.⁵⁸

The more general funding patterns to the WATC and the PWWSD further illustrate these dynamics, especially concerning bilateral donors' preference for funding professionalized NGOs which do not oppose the Oslo Accords. Most of the donor agencies that fund both of these organizations include larger bilateral or state-sponsored donor agencies.⁵⁹ In 2001, the donors to the WATC were: the EU, the Norwegian Representative Office, USAID, the Canada Fund, the Freidrich Ebert Foundation, an Italian organization, and *Diakonia*. With the exception of the Italian organization and *Diakonia*, all the donors listed are either state-sponsored donor agencies, or the state-affiliated foundations that work with NGOs (when their representative offices only work with bilateral partners, and do not work with NGOs). The member states of the first three donors listed have also been heavily involved in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, at one point or another.⁶⁰ Funding to the PWWSD fits a similar profile; among the donors of PWWSD in 2001 were: the EU, the Netherlands Representative Office, and USAID.

The nature of the political settlement in Palestine shaped the impact of donor assistance on civil society. Because of the non-inclusive political settlement, foreign

⁵⁸ Canada's portfolio as the gavel holder for Refugee Affairs, in relation to peace negotiations, might also explain Canada's greater willingness or inclination to fund community projects in refugee camps.

⁵⁹ The larger organizations often provide more generous donor packages to their recipients, with more detailed accounting and follow-up procedures. In general, it was the larger, bilateral donors that were at the heart of women's discontent regarding the impact of donors on the women's sector.

⁶⁰ The United States is the main sponsor of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Norway mediated the Oslo peace accords and maintains a vested interest in furthering the peace process, and the EU has also played an important mediating role, and is the largest contributor of foreign donor assistance to the Palestinian territories.

donors were keen to support those groups or individuals who supported the peace accords and were in a position to promote the 'post-Cold War liberal order', regardless of the extent to which these professionalized NGOs were firmly rooted in society, or whether they had grassroots constituencies. By privileging some groups over others, foreign donors exacerbated political polarization between different groups in civil society. Moreover, by privileging professionalized NGOs over other types of organizations, foreign donors play a direct role in shaping the nature of the emergent civil society. In the following section, I will illustrate in detail how the political settlement shaped the impact of donor assistance on the women's sector of civil society.

The Women's Committees in the Post-Madrid Period

In the post-Madrid period, three different tendencies emerged from the older women's committees: 1) The mainstream *Fateh* tendency and its clientelistic networks; 2) the Opposition- including the leftist and the Islamist tendencies; and 3) the Moderate Opposition that adopted NGO professionalization as an approach.⁶¹ Following the initiation of the Madrid Peace Process in 1991, many of the leaders and organizers of these committees began to feel that the programs of the committees needed to accommodate the new political situation and what they hoped was the burgeoning peace process. Issues pertaining to legislation, vocalizing support or opposition to the accords, and co-operation with the PA all came to the fore. The post-Oslo reality and the new demands of 'state-building' dictated new priorities for these organizations. A number of factors shaped and influenced the strategies and decisions taken by various leaders of the

⁶¹ I discuss these tendencies in detail in the following section.

committees. For the most part, the decisions and strategies adopted by various organizers of the grassroots committees were influenced by their respective factional and individual political positions vis-à-vis the Oslo Accords and their ability to promote the 'post-Cold War liberal order,' and whether or not they would be able to access Western foreign donor assistance.

In the following section, I discuss the emergence of the three tendencies, and the changes in their programs and membership. Moreover, I discuss how these changes have been shaped by the committees' different position vis-à-vis the Madrid peace process and Oslo Accords, and their ability to promote a post-Cold War liberal order. I also discuss the pivotal role Western foreign donor assistance played in mediating relations between these different tendencies.

1. *Fateh* and its Clientelistic Networks

Fateh, the leadership party of the PA and the broker of the Oslo Accords, has historically maintained its support base through clientelistic networks and payments to its members. After the Oslo Accords, *Fateh* was able to expand its financial base in the WBGS, and therefore enlarge its clientelistic network; these dynamics also applied to the WCSW.⁶² The WCSW adopted a new strategy of heightened mobilization that often involved payment to members. Several women indicated that the various regional committees received funding from the General assembly of WCSW or from *Fateh* directly. They were also very open about their clientelistic networks. As one WCSW coordinator explained, "We helped a lot of members of the WCSW gain employment in

⁶² Per interview with Member 4 (WCSW coordinator), 22 July 2001.

the PA ministries and public schools. Rabiha or Nuha (leaders of the WCSW and prominent members of *Fateh*), would send letters to the various ministries or public schools on behalf of these women, requesting that employment opportunities be made available.”⁶³ Another organizer explained, “We were able to have a lot of our committee members appointed in the different ministries...I see this as an achievement.”⁶⁴

In 1993, the GUPW was re-activated in the WBGS, as an umbrella grassroots women’s organization. Female activists had initially founded the GUPW under the auspices of the PLO in 1965 as an umbrella organization for all Palestinian women’s organizations. In 1967, the Israeli authorities outlawed the union in the occupied territories which resulted in the general secretariat of the organization moving its base abroad. By 2001, organizers were trying to re-activate the organization as the umbrella grassroots women’s organization, in which members from all the women’s committees and professionalized women’s NGOs were represented. Although, activists in the women’s movement today recognize the GUPW as a legitimate umbrella organization, they are wary that *Fateh*, the ruling party of the PA, controls the organization.

Programmatic Changes

Many of the programs of the WCSW are a continuation of earlier programs for consciousness raising and skills training, with a greater focus on issues relevant to civic education. As one organizer explained, “We used to focus more on social issues at a popular level, and now we focus more on legal and educational issues related to civil

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Per interview with Member 1 (executive committee member of the WCSW), Ramallah, 14 July, 2001.

society, democracy, and elections.⁶⁵ Since the WCSW now has access to more resources from *Fateh*, it has been able to formalize its operations by setting up offices in various locations. In some areas, the WCSW has also been able to establish computer training centers.⁶⁶

Changes in Membership of the WCSW

Organizers from the WCSW explained that their committees have retained a large membership base since the beginning of the Oslo process and the return of the PLO's leadership. Some of the activists explained that since the WCSW now pays its members, the organization has been able to bolster and maintain its membership, although they were not able to give exact numbers.⁶⁷ Other organizers, however, did admit that their membership is still falling, despite the funding they receive from *Fateh*.⁶⁸ According to some organizers, the WCSW still runs between 68 and 80 kindergartens in the WBGS.⁶⁹

Funding to the Fateh-Affiliated Women's Groups

Because of its financial support from *Fateh*, the WCSW has not needed to turn to foreign donors for assistance. Similarly, although the GUPW had not fully developed programs as of August, 2001, it continued to receive a modest monthly stipend from the

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Per interview with Member 4 (WCSW coordinator), 22 July 2001.

⁶⁷ Per interview with Member 4 (WCSW coordinator), Ramallah, 22 July, 2001, Member 2 (executive committee member of the WCSW), Ramallah, 19 July, 2001.

⁶⁸ Per interviews with Member 1 (executive committee member of the WCSW), Ramallah, 14 July, 2001, and Member 3 (WCSW coordinator), Jerusalem, 20 August, 2001.

⁶⁹ Interviews with Member 1 (executive committee member of the WCSW), Ramallah, 14 July, 2001, and Member 2 (executive committee member of the WCSW), Ramallah, 19 July, 2001.

PLO for recurrent costs.⁷⁰ The GUPW also managed to access funding from the Welfare Association.⁷¹ By 2001, the WCSW had fared much better than the other women's committees. Although it may have experienced a decrease in membership, it has maintained a strong membership base compared to other grassroots women's committees, and it is still quite active. When I visited some of the WCSW offices in the Ramallah area, there was usually considerable activity relative to other grassroots women's committees. In general, the WCSW is distinguished from other committees in its clientelistic networks, its ability to provide employment for some of its members and its access to the PA more generally.

2. The Opposition

The Opposition tendency includes groups and individuals of both leftist and Islamist affinities. The leftist stream of the Opposition tendency includes groups and individuals affiliated, loosely or otherwise, with the radical left of the PLO- namely the DFLP and the PFLP. The Islamist affinity includes groups that are affiliated with Islamist organizations, as well as individuals and groups that simply identify or characterize themselves as Islamist. From the onset, the DFLP and the PFLP opposed the Oslo Accords. Not only were these leftist opposition factions excluded from the formation of the PA, but they were incapable of effecting a coherent transition strategy,

⁷⁰ Per interview with Reema Tarazi (President of the General Union of Palestinian Women, West Bank Branch), Ramallah, 14 August, 2001.

⁷¹ The Welfare Association is one of the main administrators of the World Bank NGO Project, and its members have historically been identified as members or supporters of *Fateh*.

especially in terms of defining a clear relationship with their grassroots organizations.⁷² The situation was worse for the DFLP which splintered into two political factions in 1990. Meanwhile, Islamists continued to establish organizations throughout the WBGS, including charity organizations and grassroots organizations. In general, Islamist groups varied in their relationships to the political Islamist organizations. Moreover, they also varied in their willingness to engage political issues, and in their political positions vis-à-vis the Oslo Accords.

Accordingly, the DFLP's affiliated women's committee, the FPWAC, and the PFLP's affiliated women's committee, the UPWC, distanced themselves from the Oslo Accords, and reinvigorated their committees' programs and activities. As *Al-Aqsa Intifada* escalated in 2001, and the failure and uncertainty of the Oslo Accords became more evident, the UPWWC also decided to adopt a similar policy that focused on the reinvigoration of its grassroots constituencies, though their distancing from the Oslo Accords was not as flagrant or straightforward.

Meanwhile, women in the Ramallah area established two Islamist organizations, *Al-Huda* and *Al-Khansa'* in 1997. From their inception both *Al-Huda* and *Al-Khansa'* were modeled after the grassroots women's committees, though both claim to have no affiliation with any political group. The goal of these organizations was to increase women's participation in society in an Islamist way, and to counter misconceptions regarding Islam, especially tribally based notions that perpetuate women's exclusion

⁷² For more on the post-Oslo political system, refer to Hilal, "The Effect of the Oslo Agreements on the Palestinian Political System." Also refer to Bishara, *Musahameh fi Naqd al Mujtama' al-Madani* [A Contribution to the Critique of Civil Society].

from the public realm.⁷³ Neither *Al-Huda* nor *Al-Khansa'* articulated a clear political position vis-à-vis the Oslo Accords.

Programmatic Changes

In general, some of the programmatic changes in the committees have involved an enhanced focus on women's rights; on advocacy, legislation and lobbying pertaining to women's rights; and in particular on civic education and democracy. Although (hypothetically) committees in each geographic location can choose their own programs, those activities that are popular with the professionalized NGOs have also become popular with the women's committees. The availability of resources and the readiness on the part of the professionalized NGOs to coordinate around these issues has facilitated the work of the committees in these areas, especially since they now have less funding. These types of programs include: leadership training and development, civic education, and in some areas computer literacy, small business administration, and individual relief services. In general, issue-areas that are popular with donors have been adopted by professionalized NGOs, and hence workshops relating to these themes are also quite common.

Al-Huda and *Al-Khansa'* focus on educational and employment-generation programs. The educational programs usually include structured discussions and lectures by various experts. The women in the organization decide on the topics of their weekly discussions and lectures, which include lectures on women's role in society, early

⁷³ According to Maysoun Ahmad al-Ramahi, *Al-Khansa'* has a membership of approximately 120 women. Per interview with Maysoun Ahmad al-Ramahi (Director of *Al-Khansa'*), Ramallah, 16 September, 2001.

marriage, women's rights, and women and Islam more generally.⁷⁴ Founders of these organizations were also keen to provide employment for women in economic need. Women who are employed by *Al-Khansa'* either work in the organization's kitchen, or are commissioned to embroider certain articles; the foods produced in the kitchen and the embroidered articles are marketed, and profits are used to subsidize the organization's expenses, and pay salaries to these women. During the summer of 2001, *Al-Khansa'* employed three women in the organization's kitchen, and 30 women in various villages were commissioned to embroider different articles that were later sold by the organization. The organization also helps other women market the items they produce. *Al-Khansa'* also has a gym to which all its members have access.

Many of the programs of the grassroots committees increasingly address the emergency needs of women and families that have arisen since *Al-Aqsa Intifada*. For example, some of the committees help female heads of households find employment, and in the case of financial hardship, coordinate funding to students to help in their educational expenses. The committees of the FPWAC also try to coordinate counseling services for women and their families who have been affected by the *Intifada*. Some of the women's committees have revived the idea of neighborhood committees. In Ramallah, for example, the FPWAC had established 20 neighborhood committees as of July 2001. Members of these committees learn first aid, what to do in the case of a bombing, and generally attempt to fortify existing support networks.

⁷⁴ Worthy of mention is that unlike other activists of professionalized NGOs, the *Al-Khansa'* director I spoke to, Maysoun Ahmad al-Ramahi, was not at all versed in the NGO discourse of issues pertaining to civil society and democratization.

Changes in Membership of the FWAAC, UPWC, and the UPWWC

The three women's committees have experienced a decrease in their membership. This is most evident in their decreased visibility in the public realm, especially in terms of project implementation. After the signing of the Oslo Accords, the idea took root that Israeli military occupation would soon end. Moreover, with the initial promise of an improved economic situation and more employment opportunities, as well as of higher paying jobs with the professionalized NGOs, the idea of voluntarism began to wane. As one organizer explained, "Many of our cadre became interested in their personal lives and the possibility of new economic opportunities, and the idea of volunteer work was no longer accepted."⁷⁵ Others stressed that many of the members ended their volunteer work with the committees because of their disappointment with the overall political and social situation.⁷⁶ All the organizers from the FPWAC, UPWC and UPWWC confirmed that there had been a dramatic decrease in membership after the Oslo Accords, though most of them were not willing to provide the actual number of their new membership.⁷⁷ An organizer of the FPWAC estimated that it had a current membership of approximately 1000 members.⁷⁸ Since the start of *Al-Aqsa Intifada*, most of these committees have tried to re-activate their membership bases; this has proven very difficult given the level of

⁷⁵ Member 3 (executive committee member of the UPWC), Ramallah, 24 July, 2001.

⁷⁶ Per interviews with Member 3 (executive committee member of the UPWC), Ramallah, 24 July, 2001, Member 1 (UPWC coordinator), Hebron, 20 August, 2001, and Member 8 (WCSW kindergarten supervisor) and Member 9 (WCSW coordinator), Ramallah, 24 July, 2001.

⁷⁷ Per interviews Siham Barghouti, (one of the founding members of the WCC, later renamed the FPWAC, and later splintered to FPWAC-FIDA), Ramallah, 12 July, 2001, Interview with Nuha Barghouti (one of the founding members of the UPWWC), Ramallah, 12 July 2001, and Maha Nassar (one of the founding members of the UPWC), Ramallah, 21 July 2001.

⁷⁸ Per interview with Siham Barghouti, (one of the founding members of the WCC, later renamed the FPWAC, and later splintered to FPWAC-FIDA), Ramallah, 12 July, 2001.

apathy and disappointment in Palestinian society. This situation is exacerbated by Israel's imposition of travel restrictions between different geographic locations, which makes committee coordination more difficult.⁷⁹

Funding to the Opposition Women's Groups

The FPWAC and the UPWC have experienced substantial financial problems since 1993; decreased membership in these grassroots committees has meant decreased membership fees, and thus less revenues for the committees.⁸⁰ Many of these committees have had to close their offices and nursery schools in various locations.⁸¹ These grassroots committees also could not turn to their affiliated political factions for financial support, because the political factions themselves were also undergoing financial crisis.⁸² Not only did the DFLP and the PFLP lose their funding from the PLO because of their

⁷⁹ After the signing of the Oslo Accords, a closure system was put in place restricting travel between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and Israel. Moreover, Palestinian residents of the WBGS were no longer allowed to enter the Jerusalem without special travel permits. After the start of *Al-Aqsa Intifada* in 2001, travel was further restricted between different parts of the West Bank and different parts of the Gaza Strip. For more on Israel's closure policies, refer to UNSCO Closure Update Summary: "The Impact on the Palestinian Economy of Confrontation, Border Closures and Mobility Restrictions," 1 October, 2000- 30 September, 2001.

⁸⁰ Per interviews with Member 1 (UPWC coordinator), Hebron, 20 August, 2001, Member 1 (FPWAC coordinator), Ramallah, 5 August, 2001. The grassroots coordinators were more candid about the financial problems of the committees than were the leaders of the committees.

⁸¹ The FPWAC, for example, had to close most of its offices. Per interviews with Member 2 (FPWAC coordinator) Ramallah, 6 August, 2001, and Member 1 (FPWAC coordinator), Ramallah, 5 August, 2001. The UPWC, for example, runs only 15 nursery schools and kindergartens with a deficit, compared to 30 in 1987. Per interview with Member 3 (executive committee member of the UPWC), Ramallah, 24 July, 2001. Similarly, the UPWWC has had to close down half of its kindergartens. Per interview with Nuha Barghouti (founding member of the UPWWC), Ramallah, 12 July, 2001.

⁸² Per interview with Member 1 (UPWC coordinator), Hebron, 20 August, 2001, Ali Jaradat (politburo member of the PFLP and editor of *Al-Hadaf*), Ramallah, 18 July, 2001, and Omar Assaf (former grassroots leaders and politburo member of the DFLP), Ramallah, 22 July 2001.

opposition to the Oslo Accords, but they also lost their funding from the former Soviet Union and other Socialist bloc countries.⁸³

The FPWAC and the UPWC were not in the best position to receive foreign donor assistance; although the women's committees espoused social views that were more western-oriented, and were in a position to promote a 'post-Cold War liberal order,' they were affiliated with political factions that opposed the Oslo Accords.⁸⁴ Many foreign donors, especially state-sponsored donor agencies, were not willing to support organizations that did not support the Oslo Accords.⁸⁵ The UPWWC was regarded more favorably by donors since its affiliated PPP was not as adamant in its opposition to the Oslo Accords; with the help of foreign donor assistance, the Ramallah committee of the UPWWC broke away and became the Palestinian Working Women's Society for Development (PWSSD).⁸⁶ Other members, however, were reluctant to professionalize the committees because they did not want foreign donors to influence their programs. A number of foreign donor agencies also refused to fund these committees because they

⁸³ Per interviews with Omar Assaf (former grassroots leader and politburo member of the DFLP), Ramallah, 22 July 2001, and Ali Jaradat (politburo member of the PFLP and editor of *Al-Hadaf*), Ramallah, 18 July, 2001. Other political leaders who were involved in grassroots organizing explained that they have been able to overcome these financial constraints by turning to foreign donors. Per interviews with Mustafa Barghouti, Director of the UPMRC, Director of the HDIP, and Member of the General Secretariat of the PPP, Ramallah, 24 July, 2001, and Mohammed Aruri (former grassroots leader, member of the executive committee of the Palestinian General Federation of Trade Unions, and politburo member of FIDA), Ramallah, 1 August, 2001.

⁸⁴ Maha Nassar (one of the founding members of the UPWC), Ramallah, 21 July, 2001, addressed this point at some length during the interview.

⁸⁵ I discussed this issue at some length in the previous section on funding to the women's movement in the post-Oslo period.

⁸⁶ I will discuss the founding of this organization at more length in the following section.

lacked the required levels of institutionalization and professionalization to receive foreign donor funding.⁸⁷

Neither *Al-Khansa'* nor *Al-Huda* has been able to access any foreign donor funding. Although these organizations are not affiliated with any political group, and do not necessarily articulate a political position that is anti-Oslo, they are labeled as politically Islamist and therefore not in a position to support the 'post-Cold War liberal order.' According to the elected director of *Al-Khansa'*, "We have approached certain Western foreign donors with a proposal, but I felt that our *hijab* (headscarf) dissuaded them. They immediately turned down the proposal. We also met with the Welfare Association, but they needed us to be members of their organization for two consecutive years prior to receiving funding. We will try to approach them again in two years."⁸⁸ These groups therefore cannot attract foreign donor funding, and must rely on membership fees, and community donations to sustain their activities. The members of *Al-Khansa'* pay the equivalent of 40JDS per year, equivalent to US\$56.00 a year, in membership fees.

Foreign donors have addressed the lack of institutionalization and professionalization among the women's committees by funding the establishment of new professionalized organizations headed by pro-Oslo individuals, that would serve as conduits between the women's committees and the foreign donors. As I will explain in

⁸⁷ Martha Myers from USAID, for example, discussed this at some length in her interview, Jerusalem, 14 September, 2001. Member 2 discussed this from the perspective of the women's committees. She explained, "We are not professional enough to fulfill donor criteria: They ask for three years of previous accounting records, and that the organization has a formal administrator. We cannot always fulfill such criteria," per interview with Member 2, (FPWAC coordinator), Ramallah, 6 August, 2001.

⁸⁸ Interview with Maysoun Ahmad al-Ramahi, (Director of *Al-Khansa'*), Ramallah, 16 September, 2001.

more detail in the following section, the political and social schisms between the directors and board members of the new professional women's organizations and the committees, and the hierarchical and vertical relations between the two constituencies have not been the most conducive to the development of the social capital needed for the deepening of democracy. Moreover, the newly established professionalized organizations have not been able to create the needed horizontal linkages with grassroots constituencies that are crucial for the strengthening of civil society.

3. The Moderate Opposition and its Professionalization Schemes

FIDA (the group that split from the DFLP) and the PPP supported the Madrid and Oslo Accords. These organizations were also more Western-oriented in their social outlook, and in a position to promote the 'post-Cold War liberal order.' Their members, therefore, were better able to access Western foreign donor assistance. Both these political organizations adopted NGO professionalization as an official policy to facilitate their political transition in the post-Madrid era. NGO professionalization would provide these factions and their leaders with an opportunity to obtain foreign donor funding, and thus an opportunity to remain involved in the political life of Palestine, without being wed to the Oslo Accords.⁸⁹ 'Democratization' of Palestinian society became the rallying call of the leftist Moderate Opposition after the Oslo Accords. Many of the cadre who established professionalized organizations addressed issues pertaining to human rights, the status of women, and civic education.

⁸⁹ Professionalized NGOs also provide employment for former grassroots leaders and in general serve as an important employment sector for the Palestinian economy.

The fraction within the FPWAC which supported the peace accords and was loosely affiliated with FIDA spearheaded the process of establishing professionalized NGOs within the women's sector. The initial policy of the UPWWC was also to establish professionalized NGOs but by 2001, the committee decided that they should also reinvigorate their grassroots committees. Many of the women who went on to establish professional organizations were among those who were critical of the Oslo Accords, yet more willing to adopt a wait-and-see approach.

Although cadre from both the PPP and FIDA went on to establish professional organizations with the help of foreign donor assistance, the PPP stands out in its adoption of professionalization as a post-Madrid political strategy. Members of the UPWWC in Ramallah took over the Ramallah membership base and established a professional women's NGO in the Jerusalem-Ramallah area, the Palestinian Working Women's Society for Development (PWWSD).⁹⁰ This decision was taken against the will of other organizers of the UPWWC,⁹¹ and of the PPP. In 1994, members of the UPWWC went on to establish the Jerusalem Center for Women. Other members of the UPWWC established gender desks in two prominent NGOs founded by members of the PPP, LAWE- Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment, a human rights organization, and PARC. In 1991, pro-FIDA cadres from the FPWAC, for example, established the Women's Center for Legal Aid and Counseling and the Women's Studies Center. In 2000, Hanan Ashrawi, the founder of MIFTAH- Palestinian

⁹⁰ Founders of the new professionalized NGO felt that they would only be able to fully develop a women's program and agenda that espoused a feminist sensitivity if they severed ties with the PPP, and fully institutionalized and professionalized.

⁹¹ Per interview with an organizer from the UPWWC, Ramallah, who asked not to be identified.

Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy- established a gender desk for the organization. In effect, these developments bifurcated the women's sector between an organized grassroots movement and a professionalized women's NGO sector.

Meanwhile, in 1992, a number of female cadre from *Fateh* and the Moderate Opposition organizations founded the WATC to assist the Palestinian negotiators prepare for negotiations with Israel. In preparation for peace negotiations, various groups and individuals established over 100 technical committees, of which none dealt with women's issues, and only five women were involved in the other technical committees.⁹² Whereas other technical committees received funding from the PLO, the WATC had to rely on funding from foreign donors. Subsequently, the WATC became an institutionalized and professionalized NGO. Unlike most of the other professionalized NGOs established during this period, this NGO was not established directly by a group belonging to the Moderate Opposition. The WATC now functions as one of the principal coordinating and advocacy mechanisms of the Palestinian women's movement, especially coordinating efforts between the various grassroots women's committees, as well as with the professionalized NGOs. Although, technically the WATC exists as a coalition of six different women's grassroots committees,⁹³ a number of women's study centers and human rights organizations, and some independent female activists, it is now controlled by pro-*Fateh* and *Fateh* members.

⁹² Per interview with Maha Khayat (director of the WATC), Ramallah, 9 July 2001.

⁹³ The six women's committees that coordinate through the WATC are affiliated with the *Fateh*, PFLP, the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF- was based in Iraq), FIDA, DFLP, and the People's Party.

Programs

Much of the work of the newly professional NGOs focuses on the provision of workshops, training sessions, educational lectures, and on the production of reports dealing with various topics. The Women's Study Center houses a feminist library, and commissions various reports on the status of women in Palestinian society. The Women's Center for Legal Aid and Counseling provides women with legal advice and counseling services. The PWSSD also provides counseling services to women, teenage support groups, and educational lectures dealing with labor rights, domestic violence, and decision-making. According to Amal Khreisheh, "...relatively speaking, the organization is still grassroots, but it is also more middle class."⁹⁴ The Women's Center for Legal Aid and Counseling, the Women's Studies Center, PWSSD, and the Jerusalem Center for Women all provide training sessions on female empowerment, decision-making, and advocacy. In 1986, PARC set up the Unit of Domestic Economies.⁹⁵ The center works in predominately marginal, rural areas. The Center provides training in agriculture, husbandry, and self-reliance schemes, including food production and skills training.⁹⁶ Although the mandate of the organization is to help in the economic empowerment of women in rural areas, the work of the Center has also recently turned to advocacy

⁹⁴ Interview with Amal Khreisheh, Ramallah, 28 July, 2001.

⁹⁵ In 1998, the name was changed to the Center for the Development of Women in Rural Areas. Since 2001, the new name of the organization has been the Rural Women's Development Society.

⁹⁶ The organization provides small project loans to individuals and groups (equivalent to US\$1000-3000), and also helps in the organization of credit and saving schemes in which a group collectively saves money, and then lends money to projects or individuals.

projects. In general, there has been considerable overlap and repetition of programs between the different organizations.⁹⁷

Membership

The majority of the founders did not incorporate their grassroots constituencies in the new institutionalized and professionalized structures of their organizations; the notable exceptions are the Ramallah branch of the UPWWC (which became the PWWSD), and PARC's gender unit.⁹⁸ According to Khreisheh, the PWWSD has approximately 300 registered members, and it provides employment for about 57 of them. The Women's Center for Legal Aid and Counseling, the Women's Studies Center, and the Jerusalem Center for Women all were established by cadres of political factions; the idea was that these organizations would serve the interests of women in general and the women's committees in particular. The FPWAC deliberately decided not to establish a direct relationship between these organizations and any grassroots constituency, so that the organizations would not be "politically labeled."⁹⁹

Funding to the Professionalized NGOs

The professionalized women's NGOs have received substantial amounts of foreign donor assistance in the post-Madrid period, including from state-sponsored donors. Among the different women's groups, the WATC has been one of the biggest

⁹⁷ I will discuss this point at more length in the following section.

⁹⁸ By 2003, PARC had 12,702 members, and fewer women in the gender unit.

⁹⁹ Per interview with Siham Barghouti, (one of the founding members of the WCC, later renamed the FPWAC, and later splintered to FPWAC-FIDA), Ramallah, 12 July, 2001 and Zahira Kamal, (one of the founding members of the WCC, later renamed the FPWAC, and later splintered to the FPWAC-FIDA), Ramallah, 19 August, 2001.

recipients of Western foreign donor funding. The availability of foreign donor assistance was contingent on some level of support for the Oslo Accords, and the ability to promote the 'post-Cold War liberal order.' Members of the Moderate Opposition were in a favorable position to access this funding because of their support for the peace accords, and their Western social orientations. The increased levels of funding to the Palestinian women's sector, however, have not necessarily strengthened this sector of civil society.

The Women's Sector and the Deepening of Democracy

Associational density by itself is not a useful indicator to gauge the quality of civil society, and its potential contribution to the deepening of democracy. Rather, the nature of interactions between the women's sector and the state, and between the different tendencies of the women's sector provides a more useful assessment of the quality of civil society. As I previously discussed, a more horizontally organized civil society in which its constituent parts incorporate and forge linkages with each other is more likely to contribute to the generation of social capital and the deepening of democracy. Also, a more 'articulated space' between society and the state in which representative, strong institutions exist to channel demands to the state allows for the effective functioning of civil society.

In the following section, I examine the levels and patterns of interaction between the women's sector and the state, at both the legislative and the local government level. I also examine the nature of horizontal linkages between the different tendencies of the women's sector, namely between the professionalized NGOs themselves, and between the NGOs and the grassroots. I show how donor assistance has impacted the pattern of

interactions between the different tendencies of the women's sector, and how these patterns have been more broadly shaped by the nature of the political settlement. I demonstrate how these tendencies are more limited in their opportunities to interact with the state, especially at the local government level, because of the 'disarticulated space' between the state and society. Moreover, I demonstrate how in the context of a non-inclusive settlement, the promotion of civil society by foreign donors further privileges the pro-Oslo tendencies of the women's sector, exacerbating resentment between the different tendencies, and adversely affecting the deepening of democracy.

Capacity to Engage the PA

An important criterion for the deepening of democracy is that citizens and citizen groups should be able to make demands on the state through various governmental structures, including legislative and local government bodies. In the Palestinian context, this is complicated by the fact that the legislative council is not fully representative of the Palestinian political spectrum, and is controlled by *Fateh*, and that local government is very weak. For fear that opposition groups would prevail at this level of government, the PA has postponed municipal elections numerous times; only in the past year, have there been elections for some municipalities, and in the remaining municipalities, *Fateh*-appointed mayors are still in power. Because of the non-inclusive terms of the political settlement, *Fateh*-affiliated women's groups have had the most consistent access to the PA through their clientelistic networks. Other groups have had to channel their demands through *Fateh*-controlled organizations, such as the WATC.

In general, the women's sector as a whole has been able to make some legislative gains through the WATC and the various gender units of some ministries.¹⁰⁰ These legislative priorities, however, often reflect the strategic priorities of donors and the pro-Oslo and Moderate Opposition elite of the women's sector, at the expense of the more practical needs of women from the different tendencies. The women's movement, through the WATC, has been able to attain key victories in terms of administrative regulations, including the drafting of the Palestinian Women's Charter. The Palestinian Women's Charter addresses issues of a woman's nationality and her right to travel or move freely. According to the charter, "[Legislation] must grant women her right to acquire, preserve, or change her nationality... Women should also be guaranteed the right to give citizenship to her husband and children, and be guaranteed the full freedom to move, travel and choose her place of residency."¹⁰¹ The WATC was also able to change regulations that allowed women to issue passports, either for themselves or for their children, or register children in their passports without the approval of a male guardian.¹⁰²

Although these are important legislative victories, they have little relevance to the majority of Palestinian women, especially those who do not have the means to travel. As one coordinator explained, "Many of our members are disappointed with the current programs [of the WATC]... We talk about lobbying, advocacy, and democracy, but this does not address many women's real problems which are related to the lack of work and

¹⁰⁰ With the help of international donor assistance, the women's movement also pushed for the establishment of a number of gender units or women's desks in the various Palestinian ministries.

¹⁰¹ *General Union of Palestinian Women*, 1994, p. 2, quoted from Hamami and Johnson, "Equality with a Difference," 326.

¹⁰² Hamami and Johnson, "Equality with a Difference," 326-327.

poverty.”¹⁰³ Another coordinator explained that even when the laws are relevant, the women in the villages have little knowledge about the work of the professionalized NGOs, and the legislation they are trying to pass. As she explains, “There now is a lot of work on inheritance laws and women’s rights, especially by the professionalized NGOs; the most pressing problems related to women and their rights to inheritance, however, are in the villages. Unfortunately, many of these professionalized NGOs have little, if any, contact with women in the villages. Moreover, many of the women in the villages have little knowledge about these professionalized NGOs.”¹⁰⁴ Many of the members of the WCSW--the *Fateh* women’s committee--however, do not have the same grievances since many of their practical concerns about employment and material help are met directly through *Fateh* or the PA.

Moreover, the women’s sector as a whole is limited in terms of its interactions at the local government level. As of 2001, local government structures were extremely weak, and all mayors were members or supporters of *Fateh*, appointed by the PA. Therefore, the level of activity at this level was extremely low, and there was little coordination or interaction between the different women’s tendencies and local government. Because of the nature of the ‘disarticulated space’ between the state and society, groups and individuals affiliated with the Opposition tendency of the women’s sector are one step removed from state institutions. These groups, for example, must channel their demands through a pro-*Fateh* body like the WATC, since they have few, if any advocates in the legislative council.

¹⁰³ Per interview with Member 3 (UPWA coordinator), Ramallah, 24 July, 2001.

¹⁰⁴ Per interview with Member 2 (FPWAC coordinator), Ramallah, 6 August, 2001.

Horizontal Linkages between the Professionalized NGOs and their Capacity to Engage One Another

In general, interactions between the newly professionalized women's NGOs, and other professionalized NGOs are characterized by competition over funding, mistrust, minimal co-operation and coordination, and a high degree of replication in programs and projects. Although the political settlement did not impact the nature of these interactions, foreign donor funding has played an important role in exacerbating these conditions, especially in relation to competition and the replication of programs.

Given that several of these organizations are competing over the same resources, the level of co-operation and coordination is not always optimal. Despite some attempts at coordination between the different women's groups, the level of project replication and repetition by the various professionalized women's NGOs is quite high. For example, in 2001, all of the five new women's NGOs and three gender desk in the Jerusalem-Ramallah access area provided educational training sessions: Six of the organizations provided training in the area of women's rights, human rights, and democracy; two organizations provided training sessions on female empowerment and decision-making; three provided counseling services; and three provided training sessions for women in the media, and gender sensitivity training for the media in general. Of these organizations, two officially trained social workers on how to deliver these different educational training sessions. The degree of replication and repetition among these professionalized NGOs is especially significant if one considers the size of the region under examination.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁵ The geographic size of the East Jerusalem and Ramallah access is approximately 64 sq. km.

When there is co-operation and coordination between the different professionalized NGOs, it is in relation to educational workshops and training programs. Often the WATC and the Women's Center for Legal Aid and Counseling provide other professionalized NGOs with the needed trainers for some of their educational programs. A level of informal coordination also takes place among the different organizations since many of the same women sit on the different boards of the various organizations. For example, Hanan Ashrawi, Zahira Kamal, and Islah Jad sit on a number of the boards of the professionalized, non-Islamist professionalized NGOs. These women, along with other board members, are veteran activists in the women's movement, who have become very active in the professionalized NGO scene since the Oslo Accords. In general, these women share the same social views and secular outlook, which facilitates their work together. These women's organizations also coordinate through various NGO networks- Palestinian Non-Governmental Organization Network (PNGO) being the most cited example.¹⁰⁶ Of the eight organizations under study, six belong to PNGO.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁶ PNGO was established in 1993 to help coordinate and protect the autonomy of various NGOs, especially in the face of greater PA infringements. As of June 2004, PNGO had 92 member organizations. The criteria for PNGO membership appear very objective: 1) an organization must be more than 2 years old; 2) the organization must share a similar vision related to the strengthening of civil society; 3) the organization must have regular audited financial reports; and 4) the director of the given organization should not have a position in the PA of general director or higher. However, from the onset, PNGO was very selective about its membership, focusing on larger, Western-oriented, secular leftist-leaning types of NGOs. As Nathan Brown explains, the organizations took on an elitist, leftist, and oppositional character. For more on this, refer to Brown, *Palestinian Politics After Oslo*. More grassroots-based, Islamist, or pro-PA NGOs were not included in PNGO. Two other non-governmental networks were also established in the PA era; the General Union of Palestinian Charitable Societies and another network affiliated with the Office of the PNA presidency. The former network was established for older charitable organizations, and the latter included more pro-Fateh, pro-PA types of organization that were dependent on their clientelistic ties with the PA for funding.

Although the initial goal of PNGO was simply to safe-guard the autonomy of these NGOs, ensuring that they still had access to Western funding without the meddling of the PA, the organization now plays a very political role, posturing as a quasi political party, an umbrella of several organizations led by the former leadership of the moderate opposition. Moreover, the network functions as a mouthpiece for all Palestinian civil society organizations; their funding reserves and access to western media outlets have facilitated this endeavor. To facilitate this task PNGO established a news clearinghouse called The Palestine Monitor: the Voice of Civil Society.

In general, the nature of the horizontal linkages between the foreign donor funded professionalized NGOs is most accurately characterized by rampant replication, considerable distrust, and minimal coordination. Foreign donors have not helped the situation; for example, they have not systematically required their recipients to co-operate and coordinate their operations. The weak nature of these horizontal linkages, in which co-operation is not encouraged, do not provide optimal conditions for the development of social capital needed for the strengthening of civil society and the deepening of democracy.

Horizontal Linkages between the Professionalized NGOs and the Grassroots

An examination of patterns of interaction between the pro-Oslo, Moderate Opposition NGOs and the grassroots committees, especially those in the Opposition tendency, illustrates how political settlements shape the impact of foreign donor assistance on civil society. In general, interactions between the grassroots, including the WCSW, FPWAC, UPWC, *al-Huda*, and *al-Khansa*,¹⁰⁷ and the professionalized NGO

Coordination in PNGO, however, is not without its problems, and is reflects the inevitability of dilemmas in group organizing; these collective action dilemmas also represent the problems that emerge in relation to coveted resources, such as donor funding. Although the directors of the women's NGOs were satisfied with their work in PNGO, a number also voiced their dismay regarding the disloyalty of a number of NGOs in relation to USAID funding. During the beginning of the al-aqsa intifada PNGO Network took the decision to request all Palestinian NGOs to "...halt their joint projects with the Israeli side...and joint projects funded by USAID, or any program which contained an approach to 'normalization'" (The demand was made in a press release issued by the General Assembly of the PNGO network on 23 October, 2000). According to the critical directors, a number of PNGO member organizations still received funding from USAID for projects that promoted the normalization of relations with Israel, despite the collective agreement. Because they felt 'betrayed' by those taking USAID money, they questioned the efficacy of the PNGO network. As one director explained, "PNGO as a unit is not trustworthy, because various organizations do not stick to collective decisions reached by the organization" (Interview with a director of a Palestinian women's NGO, Jerusalem, 4 August, 2001).

¹⁰⁷ The notable exception is WATC. At the time fieldwork was conducted, LAWE also belonged to PNGO, but this organization was involved in a corruption scandal and is no longer a member of PNGO.

sector have been limited to lectures, training sessions, and workshops; these interactions are often mediated through the WATC and the GUPW. Of the eight newly professionalized women's NGOs, only two work directly with grassroots constituencies—the PWWS, and PARC- Rural Women's Development project. Interactions between professionalized NGOs and WCSW, FPWAC, UPWC, *al-Huda*, and *al-Khansa'*, however, are not always the most conducive to the strengthening of civil society and the deepening of democracy, because the types of relations being forged between the professionalized NGOs and the grassroots are hierarchical and vertical in nature, and not horizontal and inclusive of women in the grassroots, especially those of the Opposition tendency. These schisms between the grassroots women's committees [excluding the WCSW] and the professionalized women's NGOs, including the WATC, also coincide along political lines. Moreover, the new structure of relations in which pro-Oslo, Moderate Opposition professionalized women's organizations, especially the WATC, receive most of the foreign funding has created new animosities and tensions between the different tendencies. The lectures, training sessions, and workshops often do not address women's most pressing needs, but rather reflect foreign donors' agendas.

WATC, Foreign Funding, and the Political Dimensions of the Emergent Schisms

According to the organizers from the grassroots committees, both the GUPW and the WATC are controlled by *Fateh*, the ruling party. As one member of the WCSW bluntly explained, "We [*Fateh*] dominate the WATC...it is our organization."¹⁰⁸ The WATC is perhaps the most political organization established in the post-Oslo period,

¹⁰⁸ Member 4 (WCSW coordinator), Ramallah, 22 July, 2001.

established specifically to enhance women's participation in the Oslo process. From the onset, the WATC was strongly supported by Western donors, especially state-sponsored donors such as USAID. Initially, only the women's committees that supported the peace process were part of the WATC, and the women's committees that opposed the peace process did not join the WATC until 1997. Despite the attempt to incorporate women from all political backgrounds, political tensions still exist. Although many of the women acknowledged that the WATC was more effective than other NGOs in reaching grassroots constituencies, they felt that the WATC exacerbated the schism between volunteer activists from the Opposition grassroots women's committees and the pro-Oslo, or Moderate Opposition salaried activists of the women's sector.

Ultimately, the creation of the WATC ensured that the grassroots women's committees would no longer be the direct recipients of foreign donor assistance. Since a pro-Oslo, professionalized NGO like the WATC now exists, foreign donors work through that organization instead. Most of the funding to the WATC is to support the running costs of the coordinating mechanism, as well as the salaries of the professional employees. Although the grassroots committees remain crucial for implementing many of these programs, and provide the necessary social conduits for reaching women in various locations, especially more remote villages, they do not receive the financial assistance they need to promote or sustain their work. Rather, individuals within these grassroots committees receive transportation costs and reimbursements for meals if they participate in WATC events. One organizer explained, "Although we receive training from the WATC, we receive nothing else."¹⁰⁹ Another organizer added, "They would not

¹⁰⁹ Per interview with Member 2 (FPWAC coordinator), Ramallah, 6 August, 2001.

be able to do their work without us...We are their link to the villages and to the grassroots.”¹¹⁰ In an attempt to convey this façade of representation, often only leaders of the grassroots committees are invited to events in the hope that these women will relay the contents of the events to their constituencies. In effect, the same women attend all the different events and lectures. On the part of donors, such a strategy ensures that although they might be promoting individuals who are affiliated with the Opposition, they are not promoting organizations. Although this might be the case, these funding patterns contribute to increased polarization in this sector, which adversely affects the quality of civil society.

Issues pertaining to funding have aggravated existing resentment among coordinators of the grassroots committees against the WATC, and the professionalized NGOs more generally. One grassroots coordinator explains how they [the grassroots committees] were willing to forgo funding from an organization to ensure that the WATC did not receive additional funding in their name. She explains, “Tamkeen¹¹¹ offered to support the women’s committees through WATC, but the committees did not accept because the money would not be distributed equally among the different women’s grassroots committees and the WATC.”¹¹² Another grassroots coordinator explained, “They expect us to volunteer while they get paid.”¹¹³ Many of the heads and coordinators of the grassroots committees continued to coordinate through the WATC because they

¹¹⁰ Per interview with Member 1 (FPWAC coordinator), Ramallah, 5 August, 2001.

¹¹¹ Tamkeen is a USAID funded project that is supposed to help develop civil society organizations .

¹¹² Per interview with Nuha Barghouti (one of the founding members of the UPWWC), Ramallah, 12 July 2001.

¹¹³ Member 1 (FPWAC coordinator), Ramallah, 5 August, 2001.

did not want to be excluded from developments that were taking place in the broader Palestinian women's movement.

Civil Society Promotion and the Transformation of Participants to Recipients

The WATC, the PWWSD, and the Women's Center for Legal Aid and Counseling, all funded by foreign donors, provide most of the workshops and training sessions in the Jerusalem-Ramallah area. Popular topics in these workshops include the role of civil society, civic education, domestic violence, women's rights and female empowerment. Training sessions include gender-sensitivity training, computer classes, and the promotion of women in the media but not work on the most pressing needs of Palestinian women. Although greater social consciousness about questions like gender relations or the media is necessary for societal transformation, the members of the women's committees have effectively been transformed from active political participants, involved in their own organization, to recipients of skills and services, in need of 'awareness-raising.'¹¹⁴ Related to this is a transformed approach to female empowerment; empowerment no longer entails political and social organization and increased economic independence and production, but rather 'consciousness-raising' and individual relief.

The different priorities of the Western donors pay scant regard to the actual living conditions of women in the Palestinian territories. A number of female activists

¹¹⁴ Though these are important issues to address in order to change societal norms concerning gender relations, the efficacy of workshop-style training sessions remains subject to debate. Many of the activists I interviewed believed that many of these workshops and training sessions were a waste of time. They continued to go to such activities because the lunches were often nice and they provided a good opportunity to socialize.

complained that the NGOs disproportionately focused on changing legislation and attitudes concerning women, with little regard for the actual economic situation in the occupied territories. According to these activists, women's priorities were related to their material needs, and lack of employment opportunities, and not their lack of knowledge of democratic governance and the rule of law. As one committee coordinator explained, "Most professionalized NGOs only focus on educational programs and lectures. Very few focus on the productive role of women, and when they do, they focus on embroidery and food production."¹¹⁵ Another coordinator explained, "The women who worked in Israel are still unemployed."¹¹⁶ According to most of the women from the committees, there needed to be greater emphasis on skills training which would enhance their employment opportunities. These types of programs, they argued, would yield the greatest returns in society, instead of training sessions and workshops that are not sustainable without donor support.¹¹⁷

A number of activists complained that one of the main problems with the newly established NGOs is that they began to address issues pertaining to women's rights in a vacuum, unable, and not necessarily willing, to address the broader economic and political issues. As one activist explained, "These NGOs began to work as if they existed in an independent Palestine."¹¹⁸ Another activist ironically referred to the establishment

¹¹⁵ Per interview with Member 1 (FPWAC-FIDA coordinator), Ramallah, 12 August, 2001.

¹¹⁶ From interview with Member 8 (WCSW coordinator) and Member 9 (WCSW coordinator), Ramallah, 24 July, 2001.

¹¹⁷ The notable exception to the professionalized NGOs seems to be PARC's gender desk. According to some of my interviewees, PARC has a number of programs focusing on the economic empowerment of its grassroots base.

¹¹⁸ Per interview with Nuha Barghouti (one of the founding members of the UPWWC), Ramallah, 12 July, 2001.

of a hotline for domestic abuse by one of these new professionalized NGOs: “Don’t these women or the donors who fund them understand that most of the villages in Palestine still don’t have phone lines, or running water for that matter.”¹¹⁹ Similarly, another coordinator explained, “There are so many lectures on domestic violence, but we still do not have any shelters for victims of domestic abuse.”¹²⁰ Another coordinator complained, “One set of WATC training sessions in Hebron cost approximately US\$4000.00; this money could have been more constructively used for more sustainable projects.”¹²¹ A number of coordinators indicated that although they had complained about the programs, little has actually changed. One organizer explained, “I feel much of this funding is for nothing. When we criticize these programs, the response is that the donors want this, or this is the donor’s plan.”¹²² Many of the activists shared the view that foreign donor funding could be put to better use.

A number of the coordinators felt that the professionalized NGOs were elitist and not in touch with the majority of Palestinian women. One organizer explained, “What was created was an elite sector with no relationship to a mass base....Donors chose these small institutions which cannot deliver.”¹²³ A founding member of the FPWAC, and a catalyst behind the founding of the Women’s Center for Legal Aid and the Women’s Studies Center acknowledges that these professionalized NGOs have not served their

¹¹⁹ Per interview with Nihaya Mohammed (one of the founding members of the WCC, later renamed the FPWAC), Ramallah, 29 July, 2001.

¹²⁰ Per interview with Member 3 (WCSW coordinator), Jerusalem, 20 August, 2001.

¹²¹ Per interview with Member 1 (UPWC coordinator), Hebron, 20 August, 2001.

¹²² Per interview with Member 1 (UPWC coordinator), Hebron, 20 August, 2001.

¹²³ Per interview with Nihaya Mohammed (one of the founding members of the WCC, later renamed the FPWAC), Ramallah, 29 July, 2001.

intended goals. She explained, “We did not anticipate that these NGOs would become so distant from the grassroots. An important link between the female political cadres who run these NGOs and the grassroots has been lost.”¹²⁴ Related to this issue, many women complained that the lectures and workshops targeted women with higher degrees of education. As one coordinator explained, “The WATC and other professionalized NGOs focus on a certain sector of women, often women who are more educated.”¹²⁵ A number of women also complained that when the professionalized NGOs did work in the villages, their lectures and workshops were often not suitable for women in the villages. One organizer worried that the language used by those giving the lectures and workshops was often too academic or theoretical, making it difficult for all women to grasp the key points. She added, “There is a more appropriate way to deliver this information...Most women are not willing to admit that there is something they do not understand.”¹²⁶ Some of the organizers also felt that these women were not always taken very seriously by those facilitating the workshops or lectures, and that their questions were often snubbed. One coordinator explained, “Even when the professionalized NGOs work in the villages, their approach is patronizing...when they offer assistance to the women, they sometimes say things like ‘we bought them’.”¹²⁷ Another organizer adds, “There should be some social etiquette, and they [the workshop facilitators] should not be condescending and patronizing in their style...All women should be made to feel that what they are saying is

¹²⁴ Zahira Kamal, (one of the founding members of the WCC, later renamed the FPWAC, and later splintered to the FPWAC-FIDA), Ramallah, 19 August, 2001.

¹²⁵ Per interview with Member 2 (FPWAC coordinator), Ramallah, 6 August, 2001.

¹²⁶ Per interview with Member 6 (WCSW coordinator), Ramallah, 22 July, 2001.

¹²⁷ Per interview with Member 9 (WCSW coordinator), Ramallah, 24 July, 2001.

important.”¹²⁸ The polarization between the professionalized NGOs and the more popular grassroots committees and their bases in the villages are exacerbated when they also coincide with political differences.

Many of the activists also felt that there were high levels of replication and repetition in the programs of the professionalized NGOs, with little follow-up to ensure that this ‘knowledge’ is being put to practical use. As one organizer explained, “There are a lot of workshops, training sessions, and conferences, but everything is left there.”¹²⁹ Similarly, another grassroots coordinator explained, “There are far too many events, workshops, and lectures...We need follow-up...But everyone just wants to give training sessions and lectures.”¹³⁰ Coordinators were simply frustrated. As one UPWC coordinator complained, “We are saturated with training sessions...that’s why the only programs I like involve transportation costs for students in need.”¹³¹ The disarticulated political institutional setting makes it more difficult for the professionalized NGOs to follow-up, and to ensure that newly acquired skills are being applied. The applications of skills, such as lobbying and civic education, are limited in a context in which local government is very weak, and the legislative council does not represent all groups in the political spectrum.

¹²⁸ Member 6 (WCSW coordinator), Ramallah, 22 July, 2001.

¹²⁹ Per interview with Nihaya Mohammed (one of the founding members of the WCC, later renamed the FPWAC), Ramallah, 29 July, 2001.

¹³⁰ Per interview with Member 1 (FPWAC coordinator), Ramallah, 5 August, 2001.

¹³¹ Per interview with Member 1 (UPWC coordinator), Hebron, 20 August, 2001.

Social Dimensions of the Emergent Schisms

In compliance with the demands of the professionalized NGOs, only certain women have been eligible for employment in these organizations. These women generally are more highly educated, often Western educated, they are fluent in English, and they possess exceptionally high administrative and organizational skills. Moreover, women who work in the professionalized NGOs tend to have had more exposure to Western societies, and therefore tended to hold more Western-oriented outlooks. Many women felt that social disparities in society were heightened by this newly created schism -- between those who can work in NGOs and are therefore eligible to earn high salaries, and those who cannot.

A majority of the women's committee organizers I spoke to were upset that other people now were paid for the same work that they have been doing for years. As one organizers explained, "These projects and programs are not sustainable, but they now provide salaries and funding to our former leadership."¹³² More importantly, nothing in the prevailing incentive structure reflects one's past political involvement or sacrifices. This situation is exacerbated by the relatively higher salaries of professionalized NGO staff--sometimes four to five higher than the average salary in the public sector. As one organizer explained, "It is shameful that the salaries of some of the directors of these NGOs are approximately US\$4000.00/month at a time when some Palestinian laborers cannot even earn enough money to buy food."¹³³ Many women expressed their dismay that the whole concept of volunteer participation no longer exists in Palestinian society-

¹³² Per interview with Member 1 (UPWC coordinator), Hebron, 20 August, 2001.

¹³³ Per interview with Nihaya Mohammed (one of the founding members of the WCC, later renamed the FPWAC), Ramallah, 29 July, 2001.

in part because of the work of the NGOs and because many *Fateh* activists are now on the payroll.¹³⁴

As a result of these changes, what has emerged is a bifurcated sector of civil society -- an institutionalized and professionalized foreign donor funded women's sector alongside, a grassroots-based women's sector. Although there is some coordination between the two sectors, there is also resentment against the paid employees of the professionalized NGOs. The degree of polarization is also exacerbated when these social schisms coincide with political divisions, which they often do because only certain organizations were able to professionalize.

An Illustration: Hierarchical, Vertical Organizing in the Making

Sanabel, a rural women's empowerment project established by the WATC in 1997,¹³⁵ illustrates how the terms of a political settlement shape the impact of foreign donors on civil society. In particular, *Al-Sanabel* project illustrates how foreign donor assistance can exacerbate polarization between different political tendencies. It also reflects the limits of building civil society in politically non-inclusive contexts, in which 'disarticulated spaces' result. The stated aim of the project is to:

“...support the strategic goals of women through helping them address their practical needs. Targeting twenty villages in Hebron and Gaza, the project involves selecting two women from each village and training them in empowerment skills so that they can lobby for their human rights and reach out to women of their village. A total of 400 women were reached with the aim of

¹³⁴ Member 4 (WCSW coordinator), Ramallah, 22 July, 2001.

¹³⁵ The project was funded by the Freidrich Ebert Foundation and the Netherlands Representative Office in 1997. Joyce Mertz and Freidrich Ebert also contributed to funding the project in 1998.

empowering them and raising their awareness of the concept of full citizenship in an attempt to improve their environment and daily conditions.”¹³⁶

The two women chosen for this project are often the designated coordinators of the established women’s committees, and are the link between the professionalized NGOs and women in the villages.

These types of projects establish hierarchical, vertical linkages between the professionalized NGOs and the women’s grassroots committees, which often also overlap along political lines. A level of tension already exists between women in the villages, especially those affiliated with the Opposition tendency, and the WATC, since many consider the WATC to be pro-Oslo and controlled by *Fateh*. This tension is exacerbated by the fact that members of the WATC are paid, in contrast to the Opposition-affiliated volunteers. Moreover, the very subject-matter of the project assumes that women in the villages have had no organizational experience or history in the particular region, or an awareness of their rights as citizens, or their ability to lobby. Often, the WATC also does not follow-up with the women who attend these workshops regarding whether or not they relayed this information to women in the villages.

In the context of ‘disarticulated spaces,’ the potential contribution of such projects to the deepening of democracy is also dubious. Even if these women want to lobby or demand certain rights, their only recourse is to make demands on the Palestinian legislative council, or the executive, especially because local government is weak or ineffective. The logistics of approaching members of the legislative council are quite difficult, especially since the council does not represent all groups and parties in the

¹³⁶ *Palestinian Women’s Network: Women’s Affairs Technical Committee* (Newsletter) 3, no. 1, (Autumn, 1998), 15.

political spectrum. Ultimately, the women who participate in these projects do not have increased access to resources or networks that facilitate citizen participation.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have illustrated how the political settlement in Palestine shaped the impact of foreign donor assistance on the women's sector of civil society. In examining patterns of interaction between the women's sector and the PA, I have demonstrated how groups, especially those not included in the settlement, have been more limited in their opportunities to interact with the legislative council and local government. Interactions with the state, have often been mediated through the pro-Oslo or Moderate Opposition professionalized NGOs, or through *Fateh's* clientelistic networks.

In my examination of patterns of horizontal interaction among professional women's NGOs, I have demonstrated how foreign donor funding can adversely affect the quality of civil society. Although some coordination takes place among the professionalized women's NGOs, co-operation and coordination are ultimately circumscribed by the fact that these organizations are competing over the same sources of funding. Moreover, the degree of program replication among NGOs reflects the project priorities of foreign donors, which are not always very well received by Palestinian women.

My examination of patterns of interaction between professionalized women's NGOs and the grassroots committees also illustrates how foreign donor assistance can exacerbate polarization by privileging those groups already included in the political

settlement, in terms of access to both resources, and political institutions. In the Palestinian women's sector, a hierarchical, vertical relationship has resulted between the Moderate Opposition professionalized NGOs, and the grassroots committees, especially those affiliated with the Opposition tendency. These patterns of interaction have not been conducive to the generation of social capital, the strengthening of civil society, and the deepening of democracy. In the next chapter, I examine how in the context of the more politically inclusive settlement reached in El Salvador, foreign donor assistance is less likely to weaken civil society, and more likely to play a constructive role.

Chapter 5

The Salvadoran Women's Sector, Foreign Donor Assistance and the Development of Civil Society

In this chapter, I examine developments in the Salvadoran women's sector since the peace accords became imminent in the late 1980s. In particular, I demonstrate how the more inclusive nature of the political settlement more positively shaped the impact of foreign donor assistance on this sector of civil society.¹ Because of the more inclusive nature of the political settlement in El Salvador, foreign donors did not discriminate against groups on the grounds of their political affiliation. Therefore, all groups were afforded more or less the same opportunities to access foreign donor funding and to professionalize their organizations. Moreover, many foreign donors promoted projects and programs that favored organizations with grassroots constituencies, therefore encouraging grassroots-based organizations to incorporate their membership in the professionalization process from the onset. The greater availability of foreign funding to all groups, and the kinds of projects and programs they promoted, allowed for the more coherent and systematic institutionalization and professionalization of the different women's organizations.

¹ As with my discussion of the Palestinian women's sector, this chapter does not address the gendered dimensions of Salvadoran civil society, and the challenges that women face in that context. An impressive number of works have addressed these issues. See for example: Ilja A. Luciak, "Gender Equality in the Salvadoran Transition," *Latin American Perspectives* 26, no. 2 (March, 1999): 43-67, Ilja A. Luciak, *After the Revolution: Gender and Democracy in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), Clara Murguialday, "Mujeres, Ciudadanía y Transición Democrática en El Salvador de Postguerra" (Women, Citizenship and Democratic Transition in Postwar El Salvador), *Estudios Centroamericanos* 52, nos. 581-582 (1997): 281-296, and Julia Denie Shayne, "Gendered Revolutionary Bridges: Women in the Salvadoran Resistance Movement (1979-1992)," *Latin American Perspectives* 26, no. 3 (May 1999): 85-102.

By encouraging interactions with the grassroots and the strengthening of horizontal linkages between the various groups, foreign donors have often played a more positive role in the development of civil society. Initially, foreign donors were keen to support grassroots organizations as a way of increasing support for the peace accords, and later as a way to facilitate development projects through broader access to different sectors of the population. Foreign-donor supported projects and programs have also often encouraged groups to work with the state, especially at the local government level.

Moreover, because of the more inclusive nature of the Salvadoran peace accords, there was less wariness about the re-establishment and institutionalization of local governance. Accordingly, foreign donors placed great emphasis on coordination between the different women's organization and their respective municipalities. This situation was markedly different in Palestine, where the re-constitution of civil society was taking place in what I call 'disarticulated spaces.' As I previously discussed, the signatories of the Oslo Accords, most notably *Fateh*, the ruling party of the PA, as well as foreign donor agencies were wary about pushing for the re-establishment of local government, for fear that *Hamas* or other groups who oppose the Oslo Accords would prevail at this level of government. Because of the wariness with which certain levels of governance were institutionalized, especially at the local level, the openings for interactions between various sectors of civil society and levels of government have remained more limited.

I structure this chapter similarly to the previous chapter on the Palestinian women's sector. In the first part, I provide a historical background to the Salvadoran women's movement. In the second section, I discuss transformations in the women's sector since the late 1980s, paying particular attention to how the nature of the peace

accords in El Salvador shaped the impact of foreign donor assistance. I begin with a discussion of the changing structure of aid to the women's sector in the post-war period. I then discuss how the greater availability of aid shaped the professionalization and institutionalization of the different women's organizations. In the final section, I assess the quality of this re-constituted sector of civil society and its potential contribution to the deepening of democracy by examining the ability of its constituent parts to access and engage with institutions of the state, especially the legislative and local levels of government. I also assess the ability of its constituent parts to forge horizontal linkages and incorporate different sectors of the population.

Background to the Salvadoran Women's Movement

Three distinct periods characterize developments in the Salvadoran women's sector.² From the 1930s to the late 1960s, Salvadoran women founded a number of charitable organizations, as well as more political organizations. From the late 1960s to the mid-1980s, the existing political factions founded a number of affiliated mass-based women's organizations. During this period, the women's organizations were very successful in incorporating and mobilizing women in large numbers from all parts of El Salvador; this would set the groundwork for an effective civil society.³ The third period

² For a general discussion regarding the evolution of the Salvadoran women's movement, refer to Thomson, *Women of El Salvador*, Lynn Stephen, Serena Cosgrave, and Kelley Ready, *Aftermath: Women's Organizations in Postconflict El Salvador* -Working Paper No. 309 (Washington DC: Center for Development Information and Evaluation, U.S. Agency for International Development, October, 2000), and Cinzia Mirella Innocenti Gonzalez, "Evolucion Historica del Movimiento de Mujeres y del Movimiento Feminista en el Salvador Desde 1900 Hasta 1995," [Historical Evolution of the Women's Movement and the Feminist Movement in El Salvador from 1900 to 1995], MA Thesis in Sociology, (San Salvador: Universidad Centroamericana Jose Simeon Cañas-UCA, September 1997).

³ Women's participation in the opposition during this period, however, was not limited to the mass movements, but also extended to the guerrilla organizations. The women who founded, and often became

in the development of the Salvadoran women's movement began in the late 1980s to early 1990s, and continues to the present. During this period, the various Salvadoran mass-based women's organizations institutionalized and professionalized their organizations, often incorporating their grassroots bases. Because of the more inclusive nature of the political settlement, the different women's organizations, especially those with grassroots constituencies, were more or less afforded the same access to Western foreign donor assistance. Some women have also established a number of organizations with no grassroots constituencies. Although most of these organizations have become almost exclusively reliant on foreign donor assistance, the relative focus on grassroots incorporation has more positively impacted civil society.

1930s: The Organized Women's Sector Emerges

The organized Salvadoran women's sector dates back to the early 1930s, during which a number of support and charity organizations were established. During this period, women founded organizations such as the *Campesina* Women's Committees to participate in and lend support to the 1932 uprising led by Farabundo Martí. Other organizations established during this period were *Frente Democrático Feminino* (The Female Democratic Front) and *Asociación de Mujeres Democráticas de El Salvador*

leaders of these organizations were also often high ranking members of their respective political factions. Often, these women also had a guerrilla background; this is a key distinction from women in Palestine. Seldom did the founders of the Palestinian women's organizations have a military background, as was also the case for most of the founders of Palestinian civic organizations in the WBGS. Unlike in El Salvador, until 2000, the guerrilla resistance in Palestine was predominately organized outside the occupied territories, first in Jordan, then later in Lebanon and Tunis. As a result, Palestinian civic organizations, including the Palestinian women's committees and organizations, did not play a direct role in supporting the military resistance. Most of the Palestinian resistance in the occupied territories involved non-violent civil disobedience. Women represented 30 percent of the FMLN's combatants, and 40 percent of the total membership. Luciak, "Gender Equality in the Salvadoran Transition," 46.

(Association of Democratic Women of El Salvador).⁴ In 1945, the Feminist Tribunal emerged as an organ of the Association of Democratic Women in El Salvador. By 1947, the women who had participated in the strike were forced to hide their organizational activities for fear of retribution; these women formed *La Liga Feminina Salvadoreña* (The Salvadoran Women's League).⁵ The main functions of the League were charity-related such as founding orphanages, and improving the condition of female prisoners. The League also played an important role in demanding women's right to vote- a right that was finally obtained in 1950. Although the League was initially identified with women who opposed the oligarchy, over the years it assumed a more conservative stature, supporting the status quo.

In 1957, women established the *Fraternidad de Mujeres Salvadoreñas* (Fraternity of Salvadoran Women) which became one of the first organizations to attempt to incorporate women into the political opposition by addressing their specific needs. Although the organization accepted women from all political backgrounds, it was loosely affiliated with the Salvadoran Communist party. The organization produced a monthly magazine called *Fraternidad* (Fraternity), and also carried out a number of cultural, political, and social activities. In addition to providing secretarial and sewing classes, they also started a school for members' children. The group was also active in the protest movement that supported trade unionists and political prisoners.⁶ As Marilyn Thomson

⁴ Gonzalez, *Evolucion Historica del Movimiento de Mujeres y del Movimiento Feminista en el Salvador Desde 1900 Hasta 1995*, [Historical Evolution of the Women's Movement and the Feminist Movement in El Salvador from 1900 to 1995], MA thesis, 63.

⁵ The Fraternity was affiliated with the Salvadoran Communist Party.

⁶ For more on FMS, see Thomson, *Women of El Salvador*, 93-95.

explains, the Fraternity of Salvadoran Women would serve as a model for all women's organizations founded in the 1970s.⁷

The Emergence of the Mass-Based Women's Organizations

During the late 1960s and 1970s, the mass-based opposition organizations, known as the popular organizations, emerged in El Salvador. These groups were predominately affiliated with the broader opposition movement, either with the Christian communities, or with the PSC, and later with one of the factions of the FMLN. As Thomson explains, "While neither strictly a political party, nor a federation of trade unions, these popular organizations were enormously important in the mobilization of civilian protest against oligarchic rule."⁸ In sync with the developments of that period, activists also founded various mass-based women's organizations. In general, the mass mobilization of women occurred in three different stages. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Popular Church and other opposition groups organized different women's committees and groups, often targeting specific populations such as laborers. During the latter part of the 1970s and early 1980s, women's organizations emerged that were more closely affiliated with one of the existing political faction or parties; these included right wing organizations in San Salvador, as well opposition-affiliated women's organization that sought to mobilize and address the needs of women in the controlled zones.⁹ During the mid-1980s, a third

⁷ Ibid., 83.

⁸ Ibid., 4.

⁹ These were the zones that were controlled that were controlled by the FMLN during the war.

wave of women's organizations emerged; these organizations were also closely linked with one of the political factions, were better institutionalized, and based in San Salvador.

First Wave of Women's Mass-Based Organizations- Late 1960s-Early 1970s

During this period, the Popular Church, and the broader leftist opposition established a number of women's groups, or encouraged women to participate in non-women's groups, often targeting laborers. Of particular concern to the Salvadoran Popular Church was the promotion of women's equality. The Church leaders encouraged women in different communities to join *Comunidades Cristianas de Base* (Christian Base Communities) and self-help groups or trade unions.¹⁰ The *Comunidades Cristianas de Base* initially consisted of small groups organized by the parishes that would meet to discuss social issues and possible community strategies to address some of these daily challenges.¹¹ Women became active in a number of organizations established at that time, among the most notable of which were the *Federación Cristiana de Campesinos Salvadoreños* (Christian Federation of Salvadoran Farm Workers- FECCAS),¹² and *Comité de Madres y Familiares de Presos, Desaparecidos y Asesinados de El Salvador* "Monseñor Romero" (The Committee of Mothers and Relatives of the Disappeared,

¹⁰ Liberation theology developed in the 1960s as a Christian Socialist philosophy which maintains that it is the obligation of the Catholic Church to adopt the causes of the oppressed, and to strive for social and economic justice, especially in the Third World. In 1968, Latin American bishops met in Medellín, Colombia, and adopted these principles which later became known as the Medellín documents. The documents condemned poverty, the oppressive ruling elites, and called for agrarian reforms. Moreover, the documents proposed programs based on the method of Paulo Freire's 'education for liberation'... which were designed to promote a new sense of community action for change among the poor," Thomson, *Women of El Salvador*, 47.

¹¹ The Christian communities in El Salvador were most active during Mñs. Romero's tenure as Archbishop of San Salvador (1977 to 1980).

¹² FECCAS was not specifically a women's organization, but had a large number of female members.

Assassinated and Political Prisoners- COMADRES). COMADRES was established in 1977 by women who were looking for information about their relatives who had disappeared, were imprisoned, or killed—from both the army and the FMLN.¹³

During the late 1960s and 1970s, a number of the new women's organizations targeted specific populations, such as those in the labor force. Among the first of these organizations was *Asociación Nacional de Educadores Salvadoreños* (National Association of Salvadoran Teachers- ANDES) which was founded in 1968. Although this organization was not solely for women, approximately 90 percent of its membership was female.¹⁴ By the early 1980s, ANDES claimed to represent 20,000 of the 23,000 teachers in El Salvador, of whom only 10,000 were official members since open affiliation carried tremendous risks. In 1969, labor activists founded *Comité de Mujeres Sindicales* (Committee of Women Trade Unionists), followed by *Asociación de Mujeres Progresistas* (Association for Progressive Women of El Salvador- AMPES) in 1975. AMPES claimed direct continuity of the *Fraternidad*, and its leadership also concentrated on recruiting female workers in co-operation with the PSC trade unions. Since women comprise the majority of the work force in the markets in El Salvador, women also founded a number of organizations to represent them. In 1978, the FPL founded the Coordinating Committee of Market Women, "Luz Dilian Arévalo." The group organized market women on issues relating to their rights, and set up political meetings to denounce the government. In 1979, women also founded *Asociación de Usuarías y Trabajadoras*

¹³ Later, however, COMADRES became aligned with the RN faction of the FMLN. For more on COMADRES, see for example: Shayne, "Gendered Revolutionary Bridges," 90-93.

¹⁴ Thomson, *Women of El Salvador*, 72.

de los Mercados (Association of Market Workers), which specifically addressed market women's working conditions by campaigning against the corrupt market administration.

The organizing during this period concentrated on recruiting women to the unions and helping them organize around the conditions and terms of their work. Following the crackdown against and persecution of popular organizations in the late 1970s, many of these organizations went underground, and were re-established in the controlled zones in 1981.

Second Wave of Women's Mass Organizations: Late 1970s - Early 1980s

Many of the women's organizations that emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s were more political in nature, seeking to involve women in the revolutionary struggle by addressing their immediate needs. By the late 1970s, the various political divisions in the FDR were becoming crystallized; accordingly, the emerging mass-based organizations were often more clearly and directly affiliated with one of the FDR's member organizations, including the factions of the FMLN. As the Salvadoran civil war escalated, different guerrilla organizations of the FMLN controlled different regions; accordingly, the affiliated mass-based organizations became active in these regions. With the heightened persecution of the opposition movements, many of these organizations became clandestine and were no longer able to work openly in El Salvador. Unlike the previous generation of women's organizations, these groups did not target specific populations of women, but rather were concerned with broad mass mobilization. During this period, right-wing groups also founded a number of women's organizations.

Many of the political factions established women's groups in the controlled zones during this period. In 1978 and 1979, the FPL established *Asociación de Mujeres de El Salvador* (Association of Women of El Salvador- AMES). AMES was one of the largest women's associations and operated in Nicaragua and Honduras as well as in El Salvador. The PRTC and ERP founded women's organizations along the same lines. In 1982, 47 female combatants of the PRTC and members of the popular organizations founded *Asociación de Mujeres Salvadoreña* (Association of Salvadoran Women- ASMUSA). By 1984, persecution of opposition groups made it almost impossible to organize as ASMUSA in El Salvador, so PRTC members founded a new front organization, *Asociación Por Mejorar de la Mujer y el Niño* (Association for the Improvement of Women and Children).¹⁵ During that same year, members of the RN founded *Asociación de Mujeres Lili Milagro Ramírez* (Association of Women- Lili Milagro Ramírez) which targeted women in the FAPU.¹⁶

Following the seizure of power by the 1979 Junta, right-wing women's organizations appeared on the political scene. In particular, two right-wing women's organizations were founded during this period- the *Cruzada Pro Paz y Trabajo* (Crusade for Peace and Work), and the *Frente Femenino Salvadoreño* (Salvadoran Women's Front). The Crusade was a broad organization that united all women to the right of the Christian Democrats, while the Front was unofficially affiliated with the right-wing ARENA party.¹⁷ Although, these organizations were not as involved in mass

¹⁵ Per interview with Carmen Medina, (former coordinator in ASMUSA, and current member of MSM), San Salvador, 16 February, 2002.

¹⁶ The mass organization of the RN.

¹⁷ Thomson, *Women in El Salvador*, 87.

organization, they did launch a high profile media campaign supporting the government through inflammatory paid advertisements in daily newspapers.¹⁸

These groups, especially the left-wing political factions, played a pivotal role in organizing women in large numbers in the remotest parts of El Salvador. The level of organization during this period laid the groundwork for an effective civil society that could represent large segments of the population who would not otherwise be represented. Although right-wing groups did not compare to the left's extent of grassroots mobilization, their existence was indicative of the polarization that existed in Salvadoran society.¹⁹

Third Wave of Women's Mass-Based Organizations: 1985-1988

Following the election of Christian Democratic José-Napoleón Duarte in 1984, political openings in El Salvador increased; because US engagement required the appearance of democracy, open oppression therefore was less possible. Consequently, many of the political-military organizations of the FMLN and the Christian communities were able to operate more openly, and established their own women's mass-based organizations, many of them in San Salvador.²⁰

Most of the women's mass-based organizations that emerged during this period were founded between 1985 and 1988. The first of these was Organización de Mujeres Salvadoreñas (Organization of Salvadoran Women-ORMUSA) which was founded in

¹⁸ For more on this, refer to Murray and Barry, *Inside El Salvador*, 197-198.

¹⁹ For more on women affiliated or involved with ARENA, refer to Thomson, *Women of El Salvador*, 91-92.

²⁰ Some claim that the emergence of this 'third wave' of women's organizations was in part influenced by more favorable circumstances in the international context following the Decade of Women.

1985, and was affiliated with the *Movimiento Popular Sociale Christiano* (Popular Christian Social Movement- MPSC). In 1986, *Instituto de Investigación, Capacitación y Desarrollo de la Mujer 'Norma Guirola de Herrera'* (Institute of Research, Training, and Development of Women 'Norma Guirola de Herrera- IMU), and *Movimiento Salvadoreño de Mujeres* (Salvadoran Movement of Women- MSM) were founded. IMU was established by university women, and was/is affiliated with the PSC.²¹ MSM was created by the mid-ranking PRTC cadre and incorporated its previous organization, ASMUSA. That same year, the FPL founded *Asociación de Mujeres de las Zonas Marginales* (Association of Women of the Marginalized Zones) a group dedicated to assisting women in accessing public services, and in becoming economically independent.²² In 1987, a group called Christian Mothers, along with women's committees of the North of San Miguel and Morazan founded *Asociación para la Autodeterminación y el Desarrollo de Mujeres Salvadoreña* (Association for the Self-Determination and Development of Salvadoran Women- AMS); the organization became affiliated with the ERP.²³ Subsequently, in 1988, the Communist Party of El Salvador founded another women's organization, *Asociación Democrática de Mujeres* (Democratic Association of Women- ADEMUSA). During this period women also founded the first association for indigenous women in El Salvador, *Asociación de Mujeres Indígenas Salvadoreñas*.

²¹ For a detailed discussion of IMU, refer to Forrest D. Colburn, "Post-Cold War Feminism in El Salvador," *Dissent* 46, no. 1 (Winter 1993): 43-46.

²² Gonzalez, "Evolucion Historica del Movimiento de Mujeres y del Movimiento Feminista en el Salvador Desde 1900 Hasta 1995," [Historical Evolution of the Women's Movement and the Feminist Movement in El Salvador from 1900 to 1995], MA Thesis.

²³ Per interview with Yanera Argueta (one of the founding members and Director of AMS), San Salvador, 10 May, 2002.

In general, these organizations were more formal, and also in a better position to access foreign funding, especially from Western solidarity groups and foundations. Because of the high levels of repression from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s, many of these organizations worked in the FMLN controlled zones, and not in the capital city San Salvador. By 1985, however, the third wave of women's organizations were predominantly based in San Salvador.

Goals of the Second and Third Waves of Mass-Based Women's Organizations

In general, the FMLN's five factions shared the same goals in establishing the second and third waves of women's organizations; the main goals were to address women's basic needs, including literacy, to raise their awareness and consciousness, and to incorporate them into the struggle. As with the founding of other associations and organizations during this period, each respective political faction also sought to gain mass support. One of the main distinguishing features of the third wave of women's organizations was that they were more likely to incorporate feminist gender analysis into their work.²⁴ Moreover, the third wave of women's organizations differed from the previous waves in that they also sought to gain support of and mobilize women in the urban center, San Salvador, whilst continuing to work with their grassroots communities in the FMLN controlled zones.

²⁴ Per interview with Azucena Quintera (former coordinator of AMES in Nicaragua, and current coordinator in MAM), San Salvador, 13 May, 2002.

Organization, Membership, and Decision-Making in the Second and Third Waves of Mass-Based Women's Organizations

As with the Palestinian women's movement, the most important and uncontested accomplishment of these women's organizations was their ability to recruit and organize women in large numbers from the remotest parts of El Salvador. When the security situation permitted, there was an attempt to develop radical democratic structures in which the local community organizations elected their own representatives, and then the elected representatives would meet on a regular basis to coordinate the activities of the organization.²⁵ In most instances, however, much of the organizing was very discreet. As Carmen Medina explains, "Everything was dangerous, so the approach was very low profile. Even in the association, the meetings were not open."²⁶ For the most part, women in each community decided on their priorities when the situation allowed.

Although the membership of these organizations was in the thousands, exact numbers are difficult to come by given the clandestine nature of much of the work. In many cases, leaders did not keep official records of the exact membership. Some of the organizers, however, were able to provide rough estimates of their membership. For example, by 1982, AMES claimed to have approximately 8,000 members -- most of whom were members or supporters of the FPL.²⁷ Similarly, by March 1988, AMS

²⁵ For example, regarding ASMUSA's meetings and coordination, refer to Thomson, *Women of El Salvador*, 102.

²⁶ Per interview with Carmen Medina (former coordinator in ASMUSA, and current member of MSM), 8 May, 2002.

²⁷ Per interview with Azucena Quintiera (former AMES coordinator in Nicaragua, and current coordinator in MAM), San Salvador, 13 May, 2002.

claimed to have enrolled nearly 4,000 women in literacy and self-help training,²⁸ and by 1985, ORMUSA claimed to have 2,000 members.²⁹

The ability of these organizations to recruit and organize women in large numbers, and to involve them in decision-making (when the situation permitted), laid the groundwork for an effective civil society. This coincided with the opening of political space that accompanied the election of Christian Democratic Duarte; a space previously closed off following the failed FMLN offensive in 1981.

Programs

In general, the programs and projects of these organizations addressed women's practical needs, and tended to be similar in nature, sometimes distinguished by the particular needs of women in a given region. Yanera Argueta succinctly explains, "We [AMS] addressed three systematic demands: health services for women, literacy, and sustenance."³⁰ Many of the women's organizations also ran literacy classes, health workshops, and nurseries. The third wave of women's mass-based organizations was more likely to set up programs that went beyond practical gender interests, especially in the 1990s. The geographic delineation of territory between the different groups ensured that any replication of programs and projects was minimal.

Consciousness-raising was central to the programs of the various women's organizations. In addition to running literacy courses, they provided workshops on health

²⁸ From WomenWarPeace website, <http://www.womenwarpeace.org/elsalvador/elsalvador.htm>.

²⁹ Per interview with Jeanette Urquilla (one of the founding members, and current Director of ORMUSA), San Salvador, 30 May, 2002.

³⁰ Per interview with Yanera Argueta (one of the founding members, and Director of AMS), San Salvador, 10 May, 2002.

issues, such as first aid, hygiene, pre-natal health, and childcare. Some of the organizations also provided ideological and political training, as well as lectures and discussions on domestic violence. As Azucena Quintera explains, “A lot of the comrades beat up their wives, so we tried to address that problem.”³¹ ORMUSA, for example, organized consciousness-raising sessions and reflection groups in which the women discussed issues pertaining to labor, violence, and political participation.

Many of the organizations also focused on improving the material conditions of women by addressing their most basic needs, as well as providing material support to female combatants. As Jeanette Urquilla, explains, “The main concern of our members was not to die of hunger during the war.”³² Accordingly, various organizations, including the factions themselves, distributed food through the women’s organizations. Women in ASMUSA, for example, cultivated beans and corn in the various communities. The women’s organizations also attempted to improve the women’s economic situation by providing them with more opportunities for producing goods. ORMUSA, for example, had a clothing production center in one of the communities, and AMES provided sewing classes for its members. The female combatants were provided with boots, clothes, sanitary napkins, and spending money. Food was also provided for their children.³³

During the third wave, women’s organizations began applying more feminist analysis to their work. During the mid-1980s, for example, although AMES was not one

³¹ Per interview with Azucena Quintera (former coordinator of AMES in Nicaragua, and current coordinator in MAM), San Salvador, 13 May, 2002.

³² Per interview with Jeanette Urquilla (one of the founding members, and current Director of ORMUSA, San Salvador, 30 May, 2002.

³³ Per interview with Carmen Medina (former coordinator in ASMUSA, and current member in MSM), San Salvador, 8 May, 2002.

of the third wave of organizations, its members AMES began applying feminist analysis to their work. As Quintera further explains, “After the Decade of Women in 1985, we began to change and to actually incorporate a women’s perspective, also addressing women’s position in the party. We also began conducting research concerning the status of refugee women. The reaction was not good in the party...We were accused of being feminist.”³⁴ Female members of the FPL leadership also began demanding that the FMLN-FDR adopt a ‘Minimum Women’s Program.’

Funding to the Mass-Based Organizations

During the war, most of the funding to mass-based women’s organizations was predominantly from committees of the women’s organizations based abroad, from solidarity organizations, and from women’s organizations from other countries, especially those in Europe.³⁵ Most of the popular women’s organizations in El Salvador had committees or female members who were responsible for fundraising. For example, ASMUSA representatives fundraised in Nicaragua, Mexico, and Costa Rica.³⁶ Similarly, the FPL set up a committee to raise funds in Nicaragua and Mexico for their women’s groups and to organize solidarity work.³⁷ These organizations also received funding from abroad, especially from solidarity NGOs whose primary *raison d’être* was to fundraise or

³⁴ Azucena Quintera (former coordinator for AMES in Nicaragua, and current member of MAM), San Salvador, 13 May, 2002.

³⁵ Azucena Quintera, however, explained that in the early years of founding these organizations, the women sometimes resorted to less sophisticated means of fundraising. Among these means was stealing animals from large farms. Per interview with Azucena Quintera (former coordinator of AMES in Nicaragua, and current member of MAM), San Salvador, 13 May, 2002.

³⁶ Thomson, *Women of El Salvador*, 102.

³⁷ For example, in 1987, the FPL founded *Unión de Mujeres Melida Anaya Montes* (Union of Women Melida Anaya Montes) in Mexico.

lobby for the Salvadoran left. Among these solidarity NGOs were the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES) and the Salvadoran Humanitarian Aid, Research, and Education Foundation (SHARE Foundation).³⁸ These solidarity groups seldom distributed the funding directly to the women's organizations, but rather funneled it through their affiliated parties.³⁹ Besides the payment to female combatants, almost all women's work in the organization was voluntary, and therefore members were not paid for their work.

Among the important accomplishments of the different Salvadoran women's organizations was their ability to recruit women from all walks of life and locations, including the remotest parts of El Salvador, and to address their most basic needs, while involving them in decision-making when the situation allowed. Like the Palestinian women's committees during the 1980s, the Salvadoran women's organizations during this period succeeded in assisting these women in their day-to-day lives as well as encouraging them to collectively organize themselves. The success of the women's sector in terms of both numbers and in improving women's daily living conditions laid the groundwork for an effective civil society that could play an important role in the deepening of democracy in El Salvador.

³⁸ Both CISPES and SHARE are El Salvador solidarity NGOs based in the United States.

³⁹ Per interview with Carmen Medina (former coordinator in ASMUSA and current member of MSM), San Salvador, 8 May, 2002. For a discussion regarding the FMLN's mass organizations, refer to Chapter 2.

The Re-constitution of Civil Society and the Transformation of the Women's Sector in the Post-War Period

In this section, I discuss the transformations that took place in the Salvadoran women's sector in the period that led to the 1989 FMLN offensive, and in the post-war period. Throughout, I systematically demonstrate how the changes that took place were influenced by the inclusive nature of the political settlement in El Salvador, as well as by the type of foreign donor assistance that was made available to the Salvadoran women's sector.

In El Salvador, the more inclusive nature of the political settlement in which the major parties -- the government-dominated ARENA and the FMLN -- were representative forces, ensured that most groups were involved in shaping the emergent political landscape, as well as the contours of civil society. Although other groups, such as the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, did not sit at the negotiating table, they were part of the Inter-Party commission which endorsed the accords, and were not marginalized by the terms of the agreement. The situation differed markedly from that in Palestine where the non-inclusive nature of the political settlement marginalized important socio-economic groups in terms of access to both resources and institutions. Moreover, the decisions that were taken by the various political factions were not shaped by the sort of political and strategic considerations in relation to the peace accords that had constrained Palestinian groups. In El Salvador, the different groups agreed on accepting the negotiated settlement in 1992. In contrast, the imperative of Palestinian opposition groups to stay involved in politics while distancing themselves from the Oslo

Accords was not a strategic consideration for any of the Salvadoran parties, which uniformly supported the 1992 peace accords.

The 'inclusivity' of the Salvadoran peace accords meant that foreign donors were less likely to discriminate against any group or organization because of political considerations. Following the end of the Cold War, El Salvador was no longer as strategically important, especially to the United States, and therefore foreign donors were less concerned to promote what I call 'a post-Cold War liberal order.' Rather, foreign donors were more concerned with using these organizations as vehicles to improve the economic conditions of the impoverished population, including women, in the remotest parts of El Salvador. In this section, I will discuss the nature of foreign donor assistance that was made available to the women's sector during the war-to-peace transition and the post-war era, paying particular attention to how the nature of the foreign donor assistance differed from that made available to the Palestinian women's sector.

Foreign Donor Assistance to the Salvadoran Women's Sector in the Post-Accord Era

The nature of aid that donors made available to the Salvadoran women's sector was markedly different from the type of assistance that was made available to these in the previous period, as well as also from the type of aid that donors made available to the Palestinian women's sector.⁴⁰ As previously mentioned, foreign donor assistance to the Salvadoran's women's organizations was predominantly from solidarity groups. Increasingly, as the peace accords became more imminent, funding from foundations and state-sponsored donors also became more readily available, although to a lesser extent

⁴⁰ In El Salvador, I was not able to obtain detailed information regarding funding that was allocated to the women's sector.

than in the Palestinian case. In general, smaller donor operations were more common in El Salvador. These smaller operations afforded the women's organizations greater control over their allocations, as opposed to larger donor operations which are more likely to require more stringent accounting and administration.⁴¹ A number of the directors of women's organizations indicated that they try to focus on funding from solidarity groups and foundations, which are more flexible with project implementation and not as stringent in terms of accounting.⁴² In general however, foreign donor assistance is no longer as readily available as it was in the years immediately after the signing of the peace accords.

The list of foreign donor agencies that have funded MSM during the first twelve years of its operations is representative of the profile of foreign donors who fund other women's organizations in El Salvador. Among these groups is a number of solidarity groups, and to a lesser extent a number of state-sponsored donors, especially those which work through embassies. These foreign donors include solidarity groups and municipal assemblies such as: *Comité de Padova- Italia* (Committee of Padova- Italy), *Desarrollo y Paz- Canadá* (Development and Peace- Canada), *Pelupessi de Holanda* (Pelupessi of Holland), *Ayuntamiento de Gijón- España* (Municipal Assembly of Gijón- Spain), *Ayuntamiento de Cartagena- España* (Municipal Assembly of Cartagena- Spain), *Comité Oscar Romero- España* (Oscar Romero Committee- Spain), *Ursulinas de Jesús- España* (Ursulinas- Spain), and foundations and state-sponsored donors such as the Council for International Development, United Kingdom (CID, UK), *Cooperazione Internazionale*

⁴¹ See for example, Stephen, Cosgrave and Ready, *Aftermath*, 13.

⁴² Per interviews with Deysi Chayne (one of the founding members and current Director of IMU), San Salvador, 16 May, 2002, and Irma Maya (one of the founding members of MAM, and current FMLN deputy in the Legislative Assembly), San Salvador, 27 May, 2002.

Sud-Sud- Italia (South-South International Co-operation- Italy- CISS), HIVOS- Netherlands, the Global Fund for Women, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), *Embajada de los paises Bajos- Holanda* (Embassy of the Netherlands), *Fondo Ambiental de El Salvador* (Environmental Fund of El Salvador- FONAES), *Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo BID* (Inter-American Development Bank- IBD), *Embajada de Francia* (Embassy of France), and *Secretaría Técnica del Financiamiento Externo- El Salvador* (Technical Secretariat of External Finance- El Salvador).

MSM's list of donors is different from the profile of donors who fund women's organization in the Palestinian territories in that it is predominantly comprised of solidarity groups, municipal assemblies, or small foundations, as opposed to some of the high profile state-sponsored donors that tend to fund the larger Palestinian professionalized NGOs. The relatively high number of donors who fund MSM also suggests that these donors provide smaller grants to the organization.⁴³

Most, if not all, professionalized women's organizations did not receive funding directly from USAID. In general, USAID in El Salvador no longer works with NGOs. Rather, USAID channels funding to NGOs through implementing organizations such as Creative Associates International, Inc. (CREA International). For example, CREA funded a sexual and reproductive health project in Soyapongo for *Instituto de Estudios de Mujer "Norma Virginia Guirola de Herrera"* (Institute of Women's Studies "Norma Virginia de Herrera" – CEMUJER).⁴⁴

⁴³ Per interview with Carmen Medina (former coordinator in ASMUSA, and current member of MSM). According to Medina, although the Salvadoran women's movement is now very dependent on foreign donor assistance, the amounts are not large.

⁴⁴ According to CREA, this project was worth US\$6,000.00. The amount of funding allocated to this project relative to the amount of funding allocated to projects implemented by Palestinian professionalized NGOs is illustrative of the difference in scale.

According to many of the women I interviewed, foreign donor agencies were often keen to fund local development and economic development programs. A number of foreign donors also confirmed that poverty reduction and economic development was a high program priority for them.⁴⁵ This is in contrast to the Palestinian case in which workshops and training sessions relating to democracy and female empowerment were high programmatic priorities for foreign donors.

Although economic development is also a high priority for some of the women's organizations, some of the activists felt that their development priorities often differed from those of the donors. Another organizer added, "Sometimes their focus on economic development programs is not the same as ours. For example, one donor wants to fund educational programs regarding Free Trade for the Americas."⁴⁶ As Isabel Fabean explains, "Economic development is a high priority for many donors- they prefer micro-credit. Our priority is education, health, and violence prevention, but donors do not care much about these programs."⁴⁷ Another organizer explained, "Some donors did not want to fund our fight against violence...They like funding economic development programs."⁴⁸ As I will explain in more detail towards the end of the chapter, despite the different priorities of the different women's organizations and different foreign donors,

⁴⁵ In my interviews in El Salvador, directors from the following donor agencies indicated that economic development is among their main priorities: Agency of International Co-operation of Japan, Canadian Center for International Studies and Co-operation (CECI), Italian Co-operation, Creative Associates International, Inc. (CREA International), USAID, Heinrich Böell Foundation, EU, CIDA, and German Agency for Technical Co-operation (GTZ).

⁴⁶ Per interview with Deysi Chaine (one of the founding members and current Director of IMU), San Salvador, 16 May, 2002.

⁴⁷ Per interview with Isabel Fabean (MAM coordinator) in charge of local development and political advocacy program for MAM, San Salvador, 13 May, 2002.

⁴⁸ Per interview with Carmen Argueta (*Las Dignas* coordinator), San Salvador, 26 May, 2002.

they have made important strides in terms of institutionalizing relations with local governance.

The Salvadoran Women's Sector in the Post-Peace Accord Era

In general, two different tendencies in the women's movement began to emerge during this period. The first tendency involved the mass-based women's organizations that were affiliated with the FMLN. Although all women's organizations in this tendency claimed to have severed their ties with the former FMLN factions and to have become entirely autonomous, the different women's organizations do differ in their degree of actual autonomy from the FMLN. The second tendency of women's organizations to emerge in this period was of non-grassroots organizations which often were not affiliated to any political party.

As a negotiated settlement became more imminent, the various leaders of the FMLN began to devise strategies to accommodate the new political reality. Issues pertaining to elections, the re-integration of ex-combatants, and the status of the mass-based organizations, all came to the fore. For the most part, the leaders of the FMLN factions agreed that more institutionalized and professionalized NGOs would be in a better position to access foreign donor assistance. Consequently, all political factions of the FMLN decided that their respective women's organizations should recreate themselves as more institutionalized and professionalized organizations with official licensing. The decision adopted by the various factions calling for this change was

directly influenced by the greater availability of foreign donor assistance, including from state-sponsored donor agencies.⁴⁹

Among the most notable changes in the Salvadoran women's movement in the post-1989 period was that all the FMLN-affiliated mass-based women's organizations became more formal, professional and licensed organizations incorporating their grassroots constituencies in the process from the onset. Because of the uniform consensus of the various political leaders vis-à-vis the imminent political settlement in El Salvador, there was less variation in the strategies adopted by the various leaders and political factions. Unlike in the Palestinian territories, work with the grassroots-based communities persisted and remained a central organizing principle. This task was facilitated by the very demands of, and actual support received from, foreign donors. As I will discuss in more detail, the nature of the programs and projects promoted by the foreign donors required that priorities emerged focusing on gender-related issues, coordination with local government, and on economic empowerment. Most, if not all, of the women's organizations also pushed for the founding of *Instituto Salvadoreño para el Desarrollo de la Mujer* (Salvadoran Institute for Women's Development- ISDEMU).⁵⁰ A

⁴⁹ It is important to note that in the post-war period, the Salvadoran women's movement as a whole faced a number of challenges that are not relevant to the Palestinian women's movement, especially in relation to the distribution of land titles to former FMLN female combatants, and the re-integration of female ex-combatants into Salvadoran society. For more on this topic, refer to Luciak, "Gender Equality in the Salvadoran Transition," 43-67, and Luciak, *After the Revolution*.

⁵⁰ ISDEMU is not an organization but a government institution established in 1996 to ensure that the ministries are addressing women's interests. The institution provides technical assistance to the government, and provides training sessions to community leaders in relation to issues of gender and domestic violence.

broad-based coalition of women's groups that were also strongly tied to various grassroots constituencies emerged.⁵¹

As happened in the Palestinian territories, the professionalization of the Salvadoran women's movement contributed to the waning sense of voluntarism in Salvadoran society, as well as the emergence of hierarchies in the women's sector, between those who were now paid professional employees of the movement, and those who are the actual stakeholders.⁵² Moreover, because of the demands of professionalization, the distance between the head offices and the grassroots constituencies did expand,⁵³ although to a lesser degree than in the Palestinian case. Accordingly, the vertical and hierarchical relations that emerged in the Salvadoran women's movement did not coincide along political lines.⁵⁴ Also, the resentment that Palestinian organizers of the grassroots women's committees felt against their former leadership existed to a lesser degree in El Salvador since in most cases, the leaders of the organizations did not abandon their constituencies.⁵⁵

In general, employees of professionalized NGOs in El Salvador are not required to be Western trained and fluent in English, as they often are in professionalized Palestinian NGOs. Illustrative of this is that Spanish is the main language of operations

⁵¹ See for example, Michelle A. St-Germain, "*Mujeres '94: Democratic Transition and the Women's Movement in El Salvador*," *Women and Politics* 18, no. 2 (1997): 75-99.

⁵² See for example, Markowitz and Tice, "Paradoxes of Professionalization."

⁵³ Markowitz and Tice "Paradoxes of Professionalization," 949.

⁵⁴ Similarly, Markowitz and Tice argue that in other contexts, these schisms often coincide with ethnic, regional, and class differences, *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ Per correspondence with David Holiday on 19 September, 2005, he points out that although constituencies of women's organizations did not necessarily feel abandoned by these organizations, many individuals at the grassroots level have gradually felt abandoned by the FMLN leadership, as evidenced by periodic fissures and splits in their ranks.

in Salvadoran NGOs, and most, if not all, publications are produced in Spanish. This situation is markedly different from that in the Palestinian territories where English is often the main language of operation in the professionalized NGOs, and all reports and publications are produced or translated into English. Hence, the vertical relations that may have emerged in the re-constitution of Salvadoran civil society coincided less strongly with social schisms between the more Western-oriented directors and employees of the professionalized NGOs, and the former grassroots activists in the women's committees. Therefore, the resentment that former grassroots activists and current organizers in the women's committees voiced against directors of NGOs did not seem as pervasive in El Salvador.

Naturally, a war-to-peace transition entails the re-constitution of different sectors of civil society; inevitably, this process will impact future prospects for the development and deepening of democracy. In the following section, I discuss the processes through which these new organizations came into existence, and the emergence of these two different tendencies, focusing on changes in their programs and membership. I also discuss how foreign donor assistance mediated relations between these different tendencies of the women's sector, between the women's sector and the grassroots, and the state.

1. The Mass-Based Organizations in the Post-1989 Period

After 1989, all the existing FMLN women's mass organizations became officially registered, and further institutionalized and professionalized their organization in order to become more eligible for foreign donor funding. A number of new FMLN-affiliated

women's organizations were also established during this period. Although all these organizations were affiliated with the FMLN, and were founded with the support of the respective factions of the FMLN, there was a significant degree of variation among these organizations in terms of their actual autonomy from the FMLN.

During this period, each FMLN party supported the institutionalization and professionalization, and official registration of its mass-based women's organizations. In general, the key motivations for greater institutionalization and professionalization were greater opportunity to access foreign donor funding, new opportunities to reorganize existing organizations, and the need to secure a presence in the newly emergent civil society. In all cases, greater opportunity to access foreign donor funding was the most important motivation for changes in the post-1989 period. As Carmen Medina candidly explains, "When the war was winding down, all groups wanted to access foreign donor funding; the women's groups were no exception."⁵⁶ Others also emphasized that the domestic changes taking place were more conducive to better institutionalized NGOs. For example, Azucena Quintera explains regarding the founding of MAM: "After the peace accords, women returned to the cities and there was a new space for organizing...there was a systematic re-organization of society, and we needed to organize according to the new needs. There also was greater opportunity to put forth proposals to access funding from donors."⁵⁷ Irma Maya more succinctly explains: "The external

⁵⁶ Per interview with Carmen Medina (former coordinator in ASMUSA, and current member of MSM), San Salvador, 16 February, 2002.

⁵⁷ Per interview with Azucena Quintera (former coordinator of AMES in Nicaragua, and current coordinator in MAM), San Salvador, 13 May, 2002.

factor was the availability of funding, and the internal factor was the level of poverty.”⁵⁸ She adds, “Before the peace accords, we went through a reflective process. We felt that we were excluded by other women’s groups and also by the party.”⁵⁹ The professionalization or the founding of these organizations was also tied to the idea that the various women’s groups wanted to secure a position in the newly re-constituted civil society.

What is important to note about this process of institutionalization is that Salvadoran political groups, especially those on the left, were party to the peace accords, and therefore undergoing the same process of transformation in adapting to the new political reality. During this period: the PRTC-affiliated MSM became officially registered in 1988; the PSC-affiliated IMU became officially registered in 1994; the ERP-affiliated AMS became officially registered in 1991, and the Popular Christian Social Movement -affiliated ORMUSA became officially registered in 1990. Meanwhile, the RN founded a mass-based women’s organization, *Mujeres por la Dignidad y la Vida* (Women for Dignity and Life- *Las Dignas*) in 1990, and the FPL followed suit and founded *Movimiento de Mujeres ‘Mélida Anaya Montes’* (Melida Anaya Monte Women’s Movement- MAM) in 1992. Some of the political factions, such as the RN for example, supported the founding of the women’s organizations because they expected to receive a percentage of the funding that was received by the women’s organization.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ Per interview with Irma Maya (one of the founding members of MAM, and current FMLN deputy in the Legislative Assembly), San Salvador, 27 May, 2002.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Interview with Carmen Argueta (*Las Dignas* coordinator), San Salvador, 26 May, 2002.

Programmatic Changes

As a negotiated settlement became imminent, war related survival needs were no longer the most important goals for these organizations; other programmatic priorities also came to the fore. Among the new programmatic priorities of the professionalized NGOs were: coordination with local development programs, or what is more often called *Desarrollo Local* (local development), *Incidencia Politica* (political advocacy), and economic development, including micro-financing. Gender related issues, such as reproductive rights and women's health more generally, paternal child-care support, domestic violence, and the condition of female workers in the *maquilas*, also assumed a stronger presence in the program priorities of these organizations. As Yanera Argueta explains, "In general, during the war, our programs focused on basic necessities. Then in 1992, we began addressing women's practical needs, and in 1997 and 1998, we started incorporating a feminist agenda in our local development work."⁶¹ A number of organizations also began to incorporate more gender analysis in their programs. In recent years, disaster prevention has also become popular with foreign donors, and therefore with the women's mass-based organizations.

Of the women's organizations under examination, all had programs for *Incidencia Politica* (political advocacy) and *Desarrollo Local* (local development). The political participation programs involved training sessions that encourage women's involvement, and were accompanied by local development programs.⁶² Economic development

⁶¹ Yanera Argueta (one of the founding members, and Director of AMS), San Salvador, 10 May, 2002.

⁶² Local development programs tend to vary in their exact content, but include a level of coordination with local government. This level of coordination may involve regular meetings with local government officials, gender-sensitivity training sessions for individuals who work in the municipality, and work on local economic development issues, as well as other projects.

programs are still very high priorities for the mass-based women's NGOs in El Salvador. Of the women's NGOs I examined, all but the IMU had some form of economic development program. As of 2002, MAM had the most comprehensive economic development program that involved micro-financing, administrative training, and vocational training.⁶³ Similarly, MSM's economic development program involved support for home agricultural production, as well as a number of shrimp co-operatives.⁶⁴ ORMUSA's programs included support for women's agricultural and dairy production, as well as computer classes.⁶⁵ Although, AMS and *Las Dignas* did not organize productive ventures for women, they provided skills training in a number of areas: AMS provided technological training for women involved in agriculture,⁶⁶ and *Las Dignas* provided support to women training in non-traditional sectors.⁶⁷

Initially, *Las Dignas* played a central role in maintaining contact with its communities, and tried to channel resources to women in the former RN zones. Through the assistance of foreign donors, *Las Dignas* helped to organize small micro-finance projects such as bakeries, chicken farms, and *tiendas* (small shops). In 1994, *Las Dignas* re-evaluated the productivity of these micro-financed projects and concluded that given

⁶³ Per interview with Irma Maya (one of the founding members of MAM, and current FMLN deputy in the Legislative Assembly), San Salvador, 27 May, 2002.

⁶⁴ Per interview with Isabel de Gevara (one of the founding members and current President of MSM), 23 May, 2002.

⁶⁵ Per interview with Jeanette Urquilla, Director, ORMUSA, 30 May, 2002.

⁶⁶ Per interview with Yanera Argueta (one of the founding members and Director of AMS), San Salvador, 10 May, 2002.

⁶⁷ Per interview with Nora Hernandez (*Las Dignas* coordinator), San Salvador, 14 May, 2002.

their limited economies of scale, they were not successful ventures. In turn, *Las Dignas* turned its attention to training in non-traditional technical skills.⁶⁸

Many of these organizations also provide consciousness-raising workshops on women's rights and domestic violence. *Las Dignas* pioneered in organizing feminist consciousness workshops, through what they call *Escuela de Debate Feminista* (School for Feminist Debate). These workshops are often attended by members of other women's NGOs, and are open to anyone who is willing to pay the modest registration fee. Other organizations also provide workshops dealing with women's health, domestic violence, and women's rights, especially for those working in the *maquila* sector. A few of the organizations also provide counseling, especially for victims of domestic violence. Following the 2001 earthquake, foreign donors started promoting disaster prevention programs. In general, the programmatic priorities of the women's sector evolved from first addressing basic needs, to practical needs, to incorporating greater gender consciousness. Despite this evolution of programmatic priorities, all organizations still have programs that address women's practical needs.

Changes in Membership of the Mass-Based Organizations

As previously discussed, these organizations maintained contact with their former grassroots constituencies, and have continued to meet on a regular basis, though the regularity of these meetings has differed from one group to another. It is often difficult to ascertain the exact changes in membership given that many of these organizations did not maintain records during the war. In general, however, some of the organizers acknowledge that they are no longer in contact with as many women as they were during

⁶⁸ Ibid.

the war. Moreover, many of the organizers claim that they no longer maintain an official body of members and therefore do not require that the members of these committees be formal members of their respective organizations; instead, the role of these organizations is only to help coordinate committees for their local development programs.

Despite the different strategies of the various FMLN-founded women's organizations, grassroots constituencies remained central to their work. In contrast to the re-constitution process of the Palestinian women's sector, in which the grassroots women's committees were reduced to taking the role of an intermediary mechanism between the grassroots constituencies and the professionalized NGOs, each of the Salvadoran women's organizations professionalized, incorporating its membership in the process, and independently maintained direct contact with its communities. MAM and MSM perhaps have maintained contact with the largest number of women. As of 2002, MAM had an 85 member General Assembly, with work divided between nine departments. The organization also has 96 affiliated committees, each comprised of ten to twenty members; these members were not official members of MAM, but rather affiliates of MAM. MAM had roughly 1,800 affiliates, in addition to 352 women who were involved in the economic credit program.⁶⁹ Similarly, MSM had 150 delegate members in the General Assembly, and worked in eight *municipios* (municipalities) in 26 different communities. Isabel de Gevara of the MSM estimated that approximately 5,000 women participate in their national assembly.⁷⁰ AMS did not have an exact count of their affiliates although organizers indicated that it had 125 members in its General Assembly.

⁶⁹ Per interview with Isabel Fabean (MAM coordinator), San Salvador, 13 May, 2002.

⁷⁰ Per interview with Isabel de Gevara (one of the founding members and current President of MSM), San Salvador, 23 May, 2002.

Moreover, AMS claimed to reach an average of 2,500 women per year through pre-natal, post-natal, and reproductive health care programs.⁷¹ ORMUSA had 75 members in its General Assembly, and 300 affiliates.⁷² Even *Las Dignas*, whose General Assembly decided in 1994 that it is no longer a grassroots organization, worked in eleven *municipios* in its former communities, and had 450 affiliates involved in its local development programs.⁷³

Funding to Professionalized Mass-Based Organizations

After the signing of the peace accords, all the mass-based women's NGOs were in a relatively good position to access foreign donor funding, especially from foundations and solidarity groups, and increasingly from state-sponsored donors. All the organizations under examination were affiliated with political organizations that supported the peace accords, and therefore were involved in the re-constitution of the emergent civil society. The programmatic priorities of foreign donors included local development as well as economic development projects; these programs often required the recipients to work and maintain contact with grassroots constituencies. These organizations all maintained some sort of contact with their former grassroots constituencies, and therefore were in a good position to implement many of the foreign donor agendas that included local development and decentralization, and to serve as conduits in the implementation of economic development projects. Although, these

⁷¹ Per interview with Yanera Argueta (one of the founding members, and Director of AMS), San Salvador, 10 May, 2002.

⁷² Per interview with Jeanette Urquilla, Director, ORMUSA, 30 May, 2002.

⁷³ Per interviews with Sonia Baires (one of the founding member and current President of Board of *Las Dignas*), San Salvador, 23 May, 2002, and Carmen Argueta (*Las Dignas* coordinator), San Salvador, 26 May, 2002.

organizations were not necessarily better institutionalized than the Palestinian grassroots committees, they were in a better position to access funding from foreign donors.

Autonomy

In the process of institutionalizing and professionalizing the Salvadoran women's sector, the various mass-based women's organizations eventually attained greater levels of autonomy from the political factions which had established these organizations. The women's organizations, however, underwent different routes to 'autonomy' vis-à-vis their respective political factions prior to the merger. The various mass-based women's organizations also differed in their eventual degree of autonomy from the FMLN tendencies, and the extent of their affability with the FMLN.⁷⁴

Of the mass-based women's organizations, *Las Dignas* had the most vicious and badly publicized break with the RN in 1993. Although relations between *Las Dignas* and the RN were tense from as early as 1991, *Las Dignas* received some funding through the party until its split in 1993. After the break, the RN no longer funnelled resources to *Las Dignas*, and launched a public defamation campaign against the members of the women's organization, claiming that they were untrustworthy and that "they worked for the interests of the upper classes". The RN also targeted foreign donor agencies in the hope of dissuading them from funding *Las Dignas*.⁷⁵ The AMS also experienced a tense break from the ERP in 1991. At the time, women in AMS protested against Villaboso's

⁷⁴ Note that in 1995, the various factions of the FMLN merged into a unified body and dissolved their individual party structures; technically, therefore, the FMLN factions ceased to exist as factions, but survived as tendencies within a new FMLN. For more on this, see for example, Luciak, "Gender Equality in the Salvadoran Transition," 56.

⁷⁵ Per interview with Sonia Baires (one of the founding members and current President of the board of *Las Dignas*), San Salvador, 23 May, 2002.

undemocratic policies, women's lack of participation in the party's decision-making structures, and the unequal distribution of benefits to women following the guerrilla demobilization at the end of the war.⁷⁶ Subsequently, 78 women were expelled from the party; the expulsion served as a catalyst for demanding greater autonomy from the political party.

Other groups, such as MAM, MSM, ORMUSA and IMU had less tense breaks with their respective factions. As Irma Maya explains, "The reactions from the FPL were mixed; some felt that we did not respect the party. Others assumed that MAM was still one of their organizations since there was an overlap in membership and leadership."⁷⁷ Although some members of these tendencies were critical of the women's calls for greater autonomy, other party members were quite supportive.

The professionalized mass-based women's organizations also differ in their degree of autonomy from their former political factions, although this relationship may have changed over the years. As previously discussed, the professionalized mass-based women's organizations still predominantly work in the communities of their respective tendencies. Even at the time these organizations separated from their factions, many of the women who founded them remained active in the ranks of their factions, either as leaders, or as members at large.⁷⁸ Irma Maya further explains, "The 35 of us who established MAM, decided to work where the FPL was active; it was often difficult to

⁷⁶ Per interview with Yanera Argueta (one of the founding members and Director of AMS), San Salvador, 10 May, 2002.

⁷⁷ Per interview with Irma Maya (one of the founding members of MAM, and current FMLN deputy in the Legislative Assembly), San Salvador, 27 May, 2002.

⁷⁸ For a brief of discussion regarding the different approaches and strategies related to 'autonomy,' refer to Luciak, "Gender Equality in the Salvadoran Transition," 47-49.

establish where the FPL ended and where MAM began. At our first public constitution of MAM, there were 1,500 members. Now we laugh that all the women were members or supporters of the FPL.”⁷⁹ As of 2002, many of the women who ran these organizations were previous cadres in their factions, and still affiliated with the FMLN, “Our relationship is now personal and not official.” Isabel de Gevara explains.⁸⁰ Moreover, after the FMLN won the elections in some municipalities, many of the mass-based women’s organizations were keen to coordinate and strengthen their relationship with the municipalities in the regions of their operation. In many instances, however, these organizations also organize or work in communities with ARENA mayors. Naturally, because of the varying dynamics at play, the degree of affability between the mass-based organizations and the FMLN party may vary. For the most part, the women’s professionalized mass-based organizations are still considered supporters of the FMLN, and share many of the same ideological positions.⁸¹

It is important to note that many of the women I interviewed were keen to stress that their respective organization was autonomous, and their members had had heated debates with their political tendencies before the break. In a given organization, the women’s stories tended to vary regarding the degree of acrimony surrounding the break, suggesting possible retrospective exaggeration of a feminist-driven break. Perhaps some members wanted to exaggerate the feminist rationale for the break as a way to appear more suitable to donors.

⁷⁹ Per interview with Irma Maya (one of the founding members of MAM, and current FMLN deputy in the Legislative Assembly), San Salvador, 27 May, 2002.

⁸⁰ Per interview with Isabel de Gevara (one of the founding members and current President of MSM), San Salvador, 24 May, 2002.

⁸¹ My research findings are supported by works such as Stephen, Cosgrave and Ready, *Aftermath*.
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2. The New Non-Grassroots-Based Organizations

As the former FMLN affiliated women's mass-based organizations and ORMUSA entered into a new stage war-to-peace transition, organizing, other women founded a number of new unaffiliated, non-grassroots based organizations in San Salvador. Among the most notable of these organizations are: *Instituto de Estudios de Mujer "Norma Virginia Guirola de Herrera"* (Institute of Women's Studies "Norma Virginia de Herrera" - CEMUJER), Centro de Orientación Radial Para la Mujer Salvadoreña (Training Center for Salvadoran Women on Radio- CORAMS), *Flor de Piedra* (Flower of the Stone), and *Mujer Joven* (Young Women), *Iniciativa de Mujeres Cristianas* (Initiative of Christian Women), and *Grupo de Mujeres Universitarias* (Group of University Women). An ARENA-affiliated women's organization was also founded in 1992, but never became very active or very present in the Salvadoran women's sector.

Goals

The founders of the new non-grassroots-based organizations had the clear and distinct objective of being independent of any political party or tendency. Among the new groups founded in this period were CORAMS in 1988, CEMUJER in 1990, *Flor de Piedra* in 1994 and *Mujer Joven* in 1996. The founders of CORAMS established the organization to bring more light to gender issues, and to promote sustainable development.⁸² Alba America, on the other hand, founded CEMUJER, as a feminist organization that would specifically address issues pertaining to women's rights and

⁸² Per interview with Dina Sales (founder and Director of CORAMS), San Salvador, 21 May, 2002.

discrimination against women.⁸³ Founders of *Mujer Joven* established the organization to address the needs of younger women,⁸⁴ and founders of *Flor de Piedra* wanted to formalize the rights of sex workers. Some women also founded other organizations such as *Iniciativas de Mujeres Cristianas* and *Grupo de Mujeres Universitarias* to address the issues of certain female constituencies.

Programs

The programs of these various organizations are eclectic in nature, and vary from publishing in the mainstream press to lobbying on behalf of sex workers. Both CEMUJER and CORAMS are involved in communications; CORAMS provides training for women in the media, as well as in gender issues and in sustainable development, and CEMUJER works on the production of alternative radio, video, and audiovisual programs dealing with gender issues. CEMUJER also works on legal issues including the promotion of alternative understandings of the law as it affects marginalized groups, and provides legal counsel to women. *Flor de Piedra's* programs in 2002 centered on providing health and psychological services to sex workers. The organization also lobbies the various municipalities regarding re-zoning and the expelling of prostitutes from certain areas. By 2002, *Mujer Joven* no longer had any activities. Although, the members of the organization stopped meeting two years ago, Sophia Delgado continues to volunteer for the organization and write articles for *La Prensa Grafica*.⁸⁵

⁸³ Per interview with Alba America (founder and Director of CEMUJER), San Salvador, 23 May, 2002.

⁸⁴ Per interview with Sophia Delgado (Director of *Mujer Joven*), San Salvador, 3 June, 2002.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

Membership

These organizations do not have a membership base. *Flor de Piedra*, however, does have an assembly. Among these organizations, CEMUJER reaches the largest number of women, despite the fact that it does not have an official membership base. The organization provides legal counsel to women at 50 percent of cost, as well as counseling for victims of sexual abuse.

Funding to the Non-Grassroots Based Professionalized NGOs

Despite the innovative work proposed and carried out by some of these organizations, all complained that they had difficulty accessing foreign donor funding. In El Salvador, foreign donor agencies were much more willing to fund the FMLN affiliated organizations because of their contact with grassroots constituencies, as opposed to the newly created autonomous organizations which did not. In contrast, foreign donors operating in the Palestinian territories were keen to fund the newly professionalized NGOs regardless of whether or not they had grassroots constituencies, because they were primarily concerned with who the directors of these NGOs were.

Of the Salvadoran groups, CEMUJER has been most successful in accessing foreign donor funding from various UN bodies, foundations, or solidarity groups, such as United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Catalan Association for Lawyers, Rights and Democracy (Montreal, Quebec), Oxfam-Netherlands (NOVIB), and the Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation (NORAD) albeit in limited amounts. In part, this is related to CEMUJER's ability to reach a large number of women. Although CEMJUER has been able to access

funding from various solidarity groups and foundations, the organization was initially founded without any donor assistance. As Alba America explains, “My family supported me morally and financially; my father let me use the house. I then invited other women to join me...It was very difficult because we started during the war, without a political party. International donors did not trust us, and we did not receive assistance...It is still very difficult.”⁸⁶ Both CEMUJER and CORAMS have also had to rely on private funding, either from business or from an individual in the case of CORAMS.⁸⁷

Meanwhile, *Flor de Piedra* and *Mujer Joven* have had to limit their activities, or in the case *Mujer Joven*, simply halt its activities altogether, because of their inability to access funding.⁸⁸ As Sophia Delgado explains, “We were not able to receive any funding, and now we have no activities.”⁸⁹ *Flor de Piedra* initially received funding from the Lutheran World Federation, and also from HIVOS. In 1996, these organizations stopped funding the group, and since they have not been able to register the organization officially, they have not been able to access any type of funding. For a whole year, a customer of one of the members paid the organization’s rent. Various members of the organization have tried to generate income for *Flor de Piedra* by selling drinks in a make-shift *tienda*. The organizers, however, had to close down the operation because the

⁸⁶ Per interview with Alba America (founder and Director of CEMUJER), San Salvador, 23 May, 2002.

⁸⁷ Per interview with Dina Sales (founder and Director of CORAMS), San Salvador, 21 May, 2002.

⁸⁸ Per interviews with Sophia Delgado (Director of *Mujer Joven*), San Salvador, 3 June, 2002, and Isabel Ascenio (*Flor de Piedra* coordinator between 1997 and 2000), San Salvador, 6 June, 2002.

⁸⁹ Per interviews with Sophia Delgado (Director of *Mujer Joven*), San Salvador, 3 June, 2002.

law prohibits an NGO from owning a business. The organization now sells condoms.⁹⁰ Despite the various efforts and the constructive work carried out by these non-grassroots organizations, foreign donors have been more willing to fund organizations that have broader access to segments of the population, especially in the more remote communities.

The Salvadoran Women's Sector and the Deepening of Democracy

Although some Salvadoran women's organizations have experienced a decrease in membership, the Salvadoran women's sector as a whole is now represented by a number of strong, foreign donor-funded professionalized NGOs that often have access to grassroots constituencies. The strength of the Salvadoran women's sector, however, cannot simply be determined by the number of professionalized Salvadoran organizations that now exist. A more appropriate measure involves the nature of interactions between the women's sector and the state, and between different segments of the women's sector. A more horizontally organized women's sector, with broad access to society, that is able to engage the state constructively is in a better position to contribute to the generation of social capital and the deepening of democracy. The development of this sector of civil society has taken place in a more 'articulated space' relative to the Palestinian case, which has allowed for more regular patterns of interaction with the state, especially at the local government level. The more inclusive political settlement in El Salvador has provided the main political parties and their affiliated groups with relatively equal opportunities to shape the re-constituted civil society, and has facilitated the development of local government since there was no fear that a group that opposes the political

⁹⁰ Per interview with Isabel Ascenio, (*Flor de Piedra* coordinator between 1997 and 2000), San Salvador, 6 June, 2002.

settlement would prevail at this level of government. Moreover, the nature of foreign donor assistance to the women's sector, and the programmatic priorities of foreign donors in El Salvador have encouraged more regular patterns of interaction between these constituent parts of civil society and the state.

As in the previous chapter, I assess the quality of this emergent sector of civil society by examining the level and patterns of interaction between the different tendencies of the women's sector and the state, especially local government. I also examine the nature of horizontal linkages between the professionalized NGOs themselves, and between these NGOs and the grassroots. Of particular concern is whether or not these horizontal linkages promote co-operation between these different constituent parts of civil society, and whether they meaningfully incorporate grassroots constituencies. I also discuss how the more inclusive nature of the political settlement allowed foreign donors to play a more positive role. I conclude this section with an illustration of how foreign donor-funded civil society promotion in more articulated spaces is more likely to strengthen civil society and contribute to the deepening of democracy.

Capacity to Engage the State

An environment that facilitates citizens' abilities to make demands on the state through various governmental structures is an important criterion for the development of an effective civil society. Interactions between the Salvadoran women's sector and the state predominately take place through the various ministries, ISDEMU, and local government structures. In El Salvador the more representative legislative assembly, the

more institutionalized and developed structures of local government, and the types of projects foreign donor have promoted, have provided women with more direct access to the state, especially at the local government level.⁹¹ A number of women's organizations have also worked directly with specific ministries; for example, both ORMUSA and AMS coordinated directly with the Ministry of Health, often facilitating the work of the ministry by providing access to grassroots constituencies.

Many of the directors of the women's organizations I spoke to considered the founding of ISDEMU to be one of the major achievements of the women's sector. As Palestinian women had done with the WATC, the various Salvadoran women's organizations founded ISDEMU to represent women's interests in the implementation of the peace accords, and the formulation and implementation of national policies towards women. Unlike the WATC, however, ISDEMU does not serve as an intermediary body, but works with other professionalized NGOs as an equal partner. The various directors of the women's organization participate as members of the ISDEMU board; therefore, the women's organizations coordinate and implement the policies and programs of ISDEMU, and are not simply the recipients of its services. ISDEMU works in ten areas including work, family, violence, agriculture, local development and citizen participation, and health, and its programs include a national campaign against domestic violence, and training and technical assistance to various government bodies, especially related to domestic violence. In each of these areas, ISDEMU works with the relevant ministry or ministries in coordination with various NGOs or private groups.

⁹¹ Many of the organizations also have direct access to the legislative assembly and local government structures, and do not function through an intermediary body like the WATC.

The Salvadoran women's sector has made important legislative gains since the signing of the peace accords in 1992. Most notably, the women's sector pushed for the passing of legislation against domestic violence, and a reformed Family Code. With the support of other groups, *La Asociación de Madres Demandantes* (The Association of Mother's Seeking Child Support), an organization founded by *Las Dignas*, passed a series of laws relating to *cuota alimenticia* (child support payments).⁹² These laws include regulations requiring candidates to fulfill all child support obligations before assuming office. Through MAM's *Iniciativas Ciudadanas en Favor de las Mujeres* (MAM's Citizens' Initiative for Women), its multidisciplinary team -- which includes two legislative deputies⁹³-- has worked on legislative reform proposals, including labor laws in the free-trade zones. Individual organizations have had to work extensively with other groups in the women's sector to pass these laws.⁹⁴

In many ways, the women's success in implementing legislative reforms is attributed to the formation of a broad-based coalition, including women from across the political spectrum to push for women's demands.⁹⁵ As Michelle Saint Germain explains, "A difference in the Salvadoran case from other Latin American (or Eastern European) cases is the widespread adoption of a gender perspective by many diverse types of women's groups, from some women deputies elected to the national legislature to

⁹² For more on legislation passed by the women's movement, see Rae Lesser Blumberg, "Risky Business: What Happens to Gender Equality and Women's Rights in Post-Conflict Societies? Insights from NGO's in El Salvador," *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society* 15, no. 1 (September, 2001): 161-173.

⁹³ As of 2001, the two legislative deputies who were involved in the initiative were Laura Peña and Violeta Menjivar.

⁹⁴ For more on MAM's Citizens' Initiative for Women," refer to Stephen, Cosgrave, and Ready, *Aftermath*, 8-9.

⁹⁵ Saint-Germain, "*Mujeres* '94."

university women to communal and grass-roots groups.”⁹⁶ The women’s sector enjoys the support of women from different backgrounds; specifically, it is not only the intellectuals or elite leaders of the movement who advocate for the incorporation of women in democratization and national development, but women at the grassroots have also actively embraced such visions.⁹⁷

The various women’s organizations have also made important strides in terms of their work with local government. Not only has the number of female mayors and council members increased considerably in the post-war period, but various women’s organizations have more systematically pushed municipalities to incorporate gendered components in their local development plans.⁹⁸ Foreign donor assistance has played a pivotal role in encouraging women’s organizations to interact with local government. Local development programs promoted by foreign donors tend to differ, but usually include some level of coordination with local municipalities, regular meetings with municipal authorities, and the provision of meeting space. Although it is difficult to determine the extent to which the various women’s groups have been able to influence the policies of the various municipalities, the women’s sector has played an important role in establishing regular patterns of interaction with them.

Some are more critical of *desarrollo local* and argue that the impact of local development schemes should not be exaggerated. For example, Hector Dada-Hirezi, director of *Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales* (Latin American Faculty for the Social Sciences- FLACSO) explains, “...a systematic approach to the concept does

⁹⁶ Ibid., 86.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Stephen, Cosgrave, and Ready, *Aftermath*, 9.

not exist, and there is little consensus regarding what local development exactly is...There is also variation between the different municipalities, and the programs that donors promote...Therefore, one should not always assume that a focus on local development is going to yield positive outcomes.”⁹⁹ He further explains, “With an excessive focus on local development, mayors focus on the development of ‘their territory,’ disregarding the national picture.”¹⁰⁰ David Holiday also points out that “...although donors are more focused on local development, on the negative side, donors compete for model communities, such as Bajo Limpa and Suchitoto because they have very organized citizen structures and mayors.”¹⁰¹ In effect, donors are sometimes less likely to address poorly organized communities in their local development programs, despite the need. Isabel de Gevara further explains, “Although MSM has a local development program, the actual level of coordination between the MSM’s affiliated women’s groups and their respective municipalities is quite low. In general, we do not coordinate much with the municipalities -- the *compañeros* (comrades) in the mayor’s office sadly do not take advantage of resources and work with the different organizations.”¹⁰² It is important, therefore, not to romanticize local development programs, but to recognize the possible opportunities and limitations.

Although the nature of the relationship and level of co-operation between the various municipalities and the women’s groups might differ from one case to another,

⁹⁹ Per discussion with Hector Dada-Hirezi (Director of FLACSO-El Salvador), San Salvador, 26 May, 2002.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Per interview with David Holiday (Director of CREA), San Salvador, 2 May, 2002.

¹⁰² Per interview with Isabel de Gevara (one of the founding members and current President of MSM), San Salvador, 23 May, 2002.

and despite the criticisms regarding the over-emphasis on local development, these women are now closer to local government, and in a better position to make demands on the state. Moreover, regular patterns of interaction ensure that sustained coordination between the women's organizations and the municipalities is more likely once the donor-funded projects have ended. This discussion illustrates how civil society development in more articulated spaces, allows for a range of development possibilities that would not be available otherwise.

Horizontal Linkages between the Professionalized NGOs and their Capacity to Engage One Another

Although competition between the different women's groups might exist since they sometimes seek the same sources of funding, competition is minimized by the long-standing relationships between different women's groups and certain donors. The delineated geographic distribution of territories among these groups also ensures less project replication in the same region. The more inclusive nature of the political settlement has also resulted in, more or less, equal distribution of resources between the grassroots-based organizations. Foreign donors, therefore, have not contributed to the production of hierarchies between the different organizations to the same extent they have in the Palestinian case. Various women's organizations have also established a number of coordinating mechanisms. Foreign donors have played a direct role in increasing levels of coordination between different women's groups by requiring them to participate in these coordinating mechanisms.

Many of these groups have had long-standing relationships with certain solidarity groups or donors that preceded the creation of the professionalized NGOs. Therefore, their access to certain funding sources has been more assured and has minimized competition with other organizations. Moreover, because of the geographic distribution of territories among groups, organizations can replicate programs since they do not work in the same regions.¹⁰³ As Foley explains, “The wartime chain of command- which assigned each FMLN party its own territory of operation, each territory its community organizations, and each organization its NGOs” is still more or less intact despite the professionalization and distancing from the various political parties.¹⁰⁴ Program replication in the same geographic area therefore has not been as pervasive as it was in the Palestinian case. Moreover, because of the more inclusive nature of the political settlement, there was more equal distribution of resources between the groups. Foreign donor funding therefore did not produce the same types of hierarchies, or exacerbate tension and resentment between the different groups.

CIDA’s funding to the women’s sector between 1999 and 2001 is illustrative of how foreign donor assistance need not exacerbate competition between the different organizations. Because of the more inclusive nature of the political settlement, CIDA did not outright exclude any grassroots-based women’s organization, but more or less treated the different organizations equally, not privileging certain organization over others. In 1999 and 2000, for example, CIDA funded CEMUJER, COM, MSM, and IMU for

¹⁰³ According to Katharine Andrade Eekhoff, for example, NOVIB and Belgian solidarity organizations have and continue to focus on ERP projects. On the other hand, US solidarity organizations tend to fund FPL projects. Per discussion with Katharine Andrade Eekhoff (Researcher, FLACSO- El Salvador), San Salvador, 15 May, 2002.

¹⁰⁴ Foley, “Laying the Groundwork: The Struggle for Civil Society in El Salvador,” 82.

programs on citizen participation and leadership training. In 2001, CIDA funded AMS, IMU, and ORMUSA for programs on citizen participation and leadership training with a focus on women's leadership in the reconstruction efforts. In 2000, CIDA also provided funding to *Las Dignas* for a program dealing with economic opportunities for women. CIDA has basically provided funding to all the major professionalized grassroots-based women's organizations, with the exception of MAM.¹⁰⁵ By funding different women's organizations for the Citizen Participation and Leadership Training Program, CIDA was able to reach a larger number of women in the communities.

Both during the war and after the peace accords, women created a number of organizing mechanisms to co-ordinate the different women's organizations. Although during the war a number of organizations were created in relation to the war front,¹⁰⁶ in the post-war period many of these organizing mechanisms were set up to address specific issues such as domestic violence, women's health, and elections. Among the most active networks created in the post-war period are: *Concertación Feminista Prudencia Ayala* (Prudencia Ayala Feminist Coalition), *Fora de Ciudadanas* (Women Citizens' Forum), *Red por la Salud de las Mujeres* (Network for Women's Health), *Red 25 Noviembre* (25

¹⁰⁵ The reason MAM did not receive funding from CIDA does not reflect political differences but is perhaps because MAM received funding from another donor for its citizen participation program.

¹⁰⁶ Many of these organizations were initiated by the FMLN. Among the first was the *Comité Unificado de Mujeres Salvadoreñas* (Unified Committee of Salvadoran Women- CUMS). Various members of the mass organizations in exile in Costa Rica first proposed the organization in 1981 to help in the coordination between women living in El Salvador and those living in other Latin American countries. In 1986, the FMLN ordered that all women affiliated with the FMLN come together and form the *Frente Unitario de Mujeres* (Women's National Front). The initiative was not successful. In 1987 FMLN proceeded to create another organizing structure, *Coordinadora Nacional de Mujeres Salvadoreñas* (National Coordinating Committee for Salvadoran Women- CONAMUS) for all women affiliated with the FMLN. CONAMUS represented members of a hospital workers' union, the women's committee of a teachers' union, an artists' and cultural workers' union, an organization for displaced persons, and a number of other committees. In recent years, the organization has been less active. *Coordinación de Organismos de Mujeres* (Coordination of Women's Organizations-COM) was founded in 1986, and by 1988 its members included CONAMUS, AMS, MSM, ADEMUSA, and ORMUSA.

November Network Against Violence Against Women), and *Mujeres '94* to name but a few. *Mujeres '94* was perhaps one of the most important coalition-building exercises of the Salvadoran women's sector. *Coordinación de Organismos de Mujeres* (Coordination of Women's Organizations- COM) initiated this effort to increase the participation of Salvadoran women in electoral politics, and to develop a women's political platform for the 1994 elections. Although women's presence in the 1994 elections was not extraordinary, the coalition brought the women's organizations into dialogue with national political parties.¹⁰⁷ In general, although these networks have not been equally effective, there has been concerted effort among the different women's groups to coordinate their work, especially pertaining to specific issues.

Foreign donors have attempted to strengthen these horizontal linkages by encouraging the women's organizations to participate in these networks. For example, Isabel de Gevara explains, "Most donors, especially European donors require that we be part of a network. Often the funding is distributed through the network, and then the funding is distributed equally among us. I do not think this is necessary."¹⁰⁸ These networks are sometimes distinguished from ordinary networks in that funding is distributed through them to the member organizations. Moreover, the equal distribution of funding to the member organizations ensures that less of a hierarchical relationship will develop between these organizations. Although, the efficacy of these networks might vary, foreign donors are playing a direct role in promoting some level of co-operation between these organizations.

¹⁰⁷ For more on this topic, refer to Saint Germain, "*Mujeres '94*," and Stephen Cosgrave and Ready, *Aftermath*, 4.

¹⁰⁸ Per interview with Isabel de Gevara (one of the founding members and current President of MSM), San Salvador, 23 May, 2002.

Horizontal Linkages between the Professionalized NGOs and the Grassroots

Because of the more inclusive nature of the political settlement, the promotion of civil society by foreign donors has encouraged the more systematic incorporation and mobilization of previously active grassroots sectors. In general, many of the formerly-affiliated professionalized women's organizations have maintained contact with their former grassroots constituencies. Foreign donors have been more forthcoming with aid to those organizations that have grassroots constituencies, relative to the non-grassroots based women's organizations. Hence, grassroots organizing has remained central to the organization of the women's sector.

As I previously discussed, because of the inclusive nature of the political settlement, many of the organizational mechanisms established during the war have remained intact. Isabel de Gevara explains, for example, "This is very similar to the structure of organization during the war... We have basically maintained our relationship with the grassroots."¹⁰⁹ In particular, these structures have facilitated local development programs.

Local development and economic development programs have been high program priorities for many foreign donor agencies. As of 2001, eleven of the seventeen donor agencies I examined in El Salvador, were involved in some aspect of local development programs.¹¹⁰ Professionalized organizations' access and regular interaction with

¹⁰⁹ Per interview with Isabel de Gevara (one of the founding member and current President of MSM, San Salvador, 23 May, 2002).

¹¹⁰ These donor agencies were: Technical and Scientific Co-operation in the Embassy of France, Italian Co-operation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Technical of Co-operation in the Embassy of Britain, CECI, Creative Associates International, Inc (CREA International), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), DIAKONIA, Heinrich Böell Foundation, GTZ, Freidrich Ebert Foundation, and the EU.

grassroots constituencies continues to facilitate the work of foreign donors in these program areas. Local development programs have encouraged the newly professionalized women's organizations to maintain and attempt to consolidate their relationship with grassroots constituencies. The fact that *Las Dignas* continued its role in grassroots organizing, despite its decision to stop doing so emphasizes how foreign donors can play an important role in promoting certain patterns of interaction between NGOs and other parties, including grassroots constituencies. Similarly, IMU was initially founded as a research and training institute, and not a mass-based organization, but now works with various grassroots constituencies.

Many of the workshops also involve the same issues as those covered in the Palestinian context, such as leadership training, civic education, and women's rights. In El Salvador, however, many donor programs also address women's production. As I previously mentioned, eleven of the seventeen donor agencies I examined considered economic development to be one of their program priority areas.¹¹¹ The more comprehensive nature of the programs, and the more 'articulated space' between civil society and the state has allowed for greater opportunity to apply the knowledge gained, and a greater likelihood that the work will be sustained once donor funding ends.

Many of the NGO organizers who have been involved in organizing local development initiatives also felt that this was an important area, where important gains can be achieved. As the director of IMU explains, "After the FMLN won some seats in the municipal elections in 1994, there was an opportunity for us to expand our work."¹¹²

¹¹¹ For a list of these donor agencies, refer to footnote 45.

¹¹² Per interview with Deysi Chaine (one of the founding members and current Director of IMU), San Salvador, 16 May, 2002.

Soina Baires, elaborates, “Local development is important because it is where civil society has more space to organize, and it is at this level that we can impact democratization; it is where you see more results. Donors are also interested in local development.”¹¹³ Similarly Jeanette Urquilla explains, “It is important for us to coordinate with the municipalities...in this process of democratization, and in this new economic context, municipal governments have an important role to play in developing these areas. They can also promote citizen participation.”¹¹⁴ These women felt that local development programs ensured that the women’s committees were able to make demands and seek support from the local municipality, thus contributing to the deepening of democracy.

An Illustration: Local Development and an Attempt at More Horizontal Organizing

Local development programs illustrate how, in the context of more inclusive political settlements and more articulated spaces, the promotion of civil society by foreign donors yields more positive outcomes. Most notably, these positive outcomes include outlets which facilitate civic engagement. The establishment of regular patterns of interaction between the committees and the municipality also better ensures the sustainability of the work once the funding is discontinued.

Local development programs take several forms, but often include some sort of regular pattern of interaction between the communities and the municipalities. Often, a

¹¹³ Per interview with Sonia Baires (one of the founding members and current President of board of *Las Dignas*), San Salvador, 23 May, 2002.

¹¹⁴ Per interview with Jeanette Urquilla (one of the founding members and current Director of ORMUSA), San Salvador, 30 May, 2002.

promotora (promoter or organizer) is the link between the community and the professionalized women's NGO. The community elects the *promotora* and she becomes a salaried employee of the NGO. The *promotora* meets with women in a community, as well as other *promotoras* at the NGO headquarters on a regular basis. These women form a committee, and then maintain contact with the local municipality.

Local development programs may include the formation of committees to interact with the municipality, as well as training for municipal employees. For example, in relation to MAM's local development programs, Isabel Fabean explains, "We carry out a diagnostic meeting with the women during which we ask about their needs. Then we arrange a meeting with the mayor, and decide on the program and how the mayors are going to help us... We administer and fund projects, and the municipality facilitates the process, and may also provide resources. In some cases, the municipality provides the physical space and the furniture, and pays the salary for one employee."¹¹⁵ Local development may also be conceived more broadly and include gender-sensitivity training for municipal employees in hopes that they will focus on gender concerns in their work with youth and health clinics. For example, Deysi Chaine explains, "We want mayors to become more gender conscious. Therefore, we have also created a group to involve municipal personnel in gender-training sessions. We have ten groups in different areas for training through municipalities. Municipalities also support us in implementing these projects. For example, they provide us the room for training."¹¹⁶ At the most basic level, the municipality provides these women with a meeting space. Members of the municipal

¹¹⁵ Per interview with Isabel Fabean (MAM coordinator), San Salvador, 13 May, 2002.

¹¹⁶ Per interview with Deysi Chaine (one of the founding members and current Director of IMU), San Salvador, 16 May, 2002.

council, or the mayor, meet with the women's committee regularly; the frequency varies from one municipal area to another. During these meetings, the women raise many of their concerns and demands to the municipal officials.

This organizing takes place in the previous communities of the respective political factions. As Sonia Baires explains, "Much of this work is in our [RN] old zones. We help in the creation of women's groups at the local level, and then we support their work and initiatives to co-operate with the municipalities."¹¹⁷ The continuation of work in the community where an established relationship already exists between the NGO and the community often ensures a higher level of trust between the parties. Many of the directors of the women's NGOs maintained that, although Political Participation and Local Development are new titles, these women's organizations have always had these types of programs but under different titles.

Although there are vertical aspects to the relationship between the professionalized NGOs and the committees, the pattern of regular interaction between the professionalized NGO, the committees, and the municipality also ensures a horizontal dimensions to the relationship. Moreover, women in the committees have control over the issues they want to address with the municipalities. The more articulated space also guarantees that women who participate in these projects have increased access to resources or networks through the municipalities; in turn this increased access facilitates citizen participation.

¹¹⁷ Per interview with Sonia Baires (one of the founding members and current President of the board of *Las Dignas*), San Salvador, 23 May, 2002.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have demonstrated how a more inclusive political settlement allows for more equal distribution of foreign funding, and expanded opportunities for different groups to engage institutions of the state. In particular, I have illustrated how in these contexts foreign donor funding can play a positive role in encouraging professionalized organization to participate in networks, incorporate grassroots constituencies, and promote horizontal linkages between the grassroots committees and the municipalities. Accordingly, foreign donors in El Salvador have also played an important role in capitalizing on the relationship between the various professionalized organizations and their former political communities. Hence, although civil society development in El Salvador has also become associated with NGO professionalization, grassroots organization and the ability of the various organizations to incorporate and forge horizontal linkages with different sectors of the population have remained central to the organization of civil society.

By no means is this an attempt to romanticize civil society development in El Salvador, and to overlook the increased factionalization in society, and the many weaknesses of the Salvadoran left. My goal, however, is to illustrate how a more inclusive political settlement allows for more equal distribution of foreign funding, and the development of more articulated spaces which may contribute more positively to the strengthening of civil society. Although there are vertical dimensions to civil society development in the Salvadoran context, the negative impact is diminished by the fact that the committees are incorporated into structures that facilitate their interaction with local government. These programs also are not one-shot deals in which there is no follow-up

with the participants. The focus on economic development projects also encourages more participation in these programs. Moreover, what vertical relationship exists does not coincide along political lines which may exacerbate polarization.

Chapter 6

Conclusion: The Deepening of Democracy in Non-inclusive Political Contexts

This dissertation engages a fundamental question in comparative politics: How and when can external actors contribute to the strengthening of civil society and the deepening of democracy? In particular, I explore why foreign donor assistance has had a more positive impact on civil society in El Salvador than in the Palestinian territories. In the WBGS, foreign donor assistance to civil society has focused overwhelmingly on professionalized NGOs without grassroots constituencies, contributing to the emergence of an elitist civil society. Conversely, in El Salvador foreign donor assistance has contributed to the expansion of grassroots citizen participation, including more numerous and fruitful interactions with the state.

I argue that these divergent outcomes in the Palestinian territories and El Salvador reflect the differential effects that foreign donor assistance has on civil society after more or less inclusive political settlements. I find that in cases like Palestine, where the political settlement excludes important socio-political groups, foreign donor assistance is less likely to contribute to the strengthening of civil society, the generation of social capital,¹ and the deepening of democracy. Rather, foreign donor assistance to civil society is more likely to exacerbate political polarization and weaken civil society by further privileging those select groups already favored by the non-inclusive settlement. Conversely, after more inclusive political settlements as in El Salvador, foreign donor

¹ As I previously discussed, social capital here is understood as access to resources, as well as networks that facilitate citizen participation.

assistance can play a more constructive role in developing civil society and contributing to the deepening of democracy by encouraging grassroots organization, and expanding access to political institutions to engage the state.

More specifically, in non-inclusive political contexts, like the Palestinian territories, the political settlement privileged some civil society groups over others, both in terms of access to political institutions, and in terms of resources from foreign donors. The PA institutionalized legislative government and deferred the institutionalization of local government, so as to minimize the probability that the opposition will prevail at these levels. The restricted nature of the Palestinian legislative council and local government resulted in the creation of 'disarticulated spaces' between the state and society, with more institutional access for those groups favored by the political settlement, either through formal channels, or through clientelistic networks. Meanwhile, foreign donor civil society promotion took place in these 'disarticulated spaces,' privileging those groups already favored by the exclusivist political settlement. In contrast, because all opposition groups in El Salvador were party to or supported the accords, they all adopted relatively similar strategies and incorporated their grassroots constituencies in the transition process from the outset. Moreover, because of the more inclusive nature of the peace accords, the brokers of the political settlement did not impose the same constraints on participation in legislative or local government. Rather, grassroots-based organizations were afforded similar resources and institutional access. Therefore, foreign donors were able to promote civil society in more 'articulated spaces,' which allowed for more interaction between civil society groups and the state.

In my examination of foreign donor assistance to each case, I argued that the geo-strategic importance of the Palestinian territories to many donors translated into higher amounts of assistance. In turn, this meant higher amounts of assistance to professionalized NGOs in civil society, further exacerbating the discrepancy between the haves in civil society (the pro-Oslo and Moderate Opposition groups in civil society), and the have-nots (the Opposition). Moreover, in the Palestinian territories, donors allocated less funding to the Government administration sector, especially in relation to local development and decentralization than in El Salvador. In part, higher local development assistance was a continuation of USAID's MEA program; in 1986, USAID established MEA in hopes of making local government more responsive to citizen demands, thereby minimizing chances that citizens would align themselves with the FMLN. At the end of the war in 1992, the municipal level offered distinct possibilities for involving the former opposing sides in activities to promote reconciliation.² The inclusive nature of the political settlement, however, allowed for the further strengthening of this level of government, presenting greater avenues for interaction with civil society and citizen participation.

In relation to USAID's democracy and governance programs in each context, my findings demonstrated how the political settlement shaped the respective institutional settings, and how this in turn influenced USAID's programs. Moreover, I demonstrated how donors will choose to support those political institutions that will further their own

² In particular, one of the main provisions of the 1986 municipal code was that the municipalities should hold four *cabildos abiertos* (open town meetings to which citizens were invited to voice their concerns and priorities). For more on USAID involvement in decentralization schemes, refer to Gary Hansen (Team Leader), Harry Blair, and Kimberly Ludwig, *Building Democratic Constituencies: USAID and Civil Society Programming After the First Decade* (Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development, Office of Democracy and Governance, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, April, 2002).

political goals, and facilitate their promotion of certain actors over others, especially in non-inclusive political contexts. Hence, in the Salvadoran context, the more inclusive political settlement facilitated the strengthening of all levels of government. USAID's programs, therefore, focused on the strengthening of government institutions, including the local level. In contrast, because of the more non-inclusive political settlement in the Palestinian context, both the PA and foreign donors have been more reluctant to strengthen local government institutions. USAID's programs, therefore, focused overwhelmingly on the development of CSOs, especially professionalized NGOs. My argument regarding how political settlements and the resultant institutional setting shapes donor involvement is supported by USAID's activities in other contexts. For example, although Mozambique has a highly centralized state and weak formal local institutions, because of the more inclusive nature of the political settlement, USAID adopted a more integrated strategy which endeavored to build the institutional capacities of both CSOs and government agencies at the national and local levels.³

I specifically examined these dynamics by evaluating developments in the women's sector in Palestine and El Salvador, focusing on the sector's interactions with the state, and its ability to forge horizontal linkages with professionalized NGOs, and to incorporate grassroots constituencies. I argued that the relative inclusiveness of the political settlement and the mediating role of foreign donor assistance shaped developments in the women's sector of civil society in the two cases. In the Palestinian territories, the non-inclusive political settlement led to a fragmented process of formalization, institutionalization, and professionalization of the Palestinian women's sector in which only pro-Oslo or Moderate Opposition women's groups could access the

³ Ibid., 18.

foreign donor assistance necessary to professionalize their organizations. Consequently, a bifurcated sector of civil society developed: On the one hand, a pro-Oslo Western-funded and Western-modeled circuit of women's professionalized organizations has emerged, alongside the *Fateh*-affiliated grassroots women's committees which have consolidated a clientelistic relationship with the PA. Meanwhile, non-pro-Oslo and non-Western funded grassroots women's committees and women's organizations attempt to carve out a space for themselves, while forced to rely on the professionalized women's organizations for services, and are restricted in their access to the state. The unequal access to resources and to the state resulted in a hierarchical relationship between these different groups of the women's sector. These emergent dynamics exacerbated political tensions and animosities which also coincided along political lines, and adversely affected the generation of social capital and the deepening of democracy. As I illustrated, women affiliated with Opposition women's committees were resentful of other female activist who were involved in professionalized NGOs and earned higher salaries. Many of these women were reluctant to co-ordinate with the professionalized NGOs or with women affiliated with the Moderate Opposition. Moreover, because of the 'disarticulated space' between society and the state, foreign donors tended to promote programs that focused on training and empowerment, but did not necessarily promote interactions between civil society and the state because of the circumscribed institutional setting. Most notably, although the PA appointed municipal councils in 1997, few foreign donors supported programs which promoted interactions between women's groups and local bodies. Rather, as I illustrated through the WATC's *Sanabel* program, many of the projects focused overwhelmingly on training, with minimal implementation components.

In El Salvador, the more inclusive nature of the peace accords allowed leaders of the women's organizations to adopt and implement strategies which included maintaining and incorporating their grassroots constituencies in the professionalization process of their organizations. Moreover, because foreign donors were not pre-occupied with promoting certain political groups over others, they were able to focus on more developmental goals, which often required that the women's organizations have grassroots constituencies. As I illustrated, foreign donors were more likely to fund organizations that had grassroots constituencies, and most, if not all the women's organizations under examination, had economic development components in their programs. The more inclusive political settlement, the strategies adopted by the different leaders of the FMLN, and the types of projects and programs promoted by foreign donors, put these organizations in a better position to strengthen the horizontal linkages between NGOs and grassroots constituencies, and to develop the inclusive types of organizations more conducive to strengthening of civil society and deepening of democracy. Moreover, because of the legacy of local development in El Salvador, and the facilitating environment of the more inclusive political settlement, foreign donors focused on the strengthening of local government institutions and the development of civil society in more 'articulated spaces' between the state and society.

By no means am I suggesting that donors should stop funding civil society in the Palestinian territories. Rather, I seek to illustrate how foreign donor assistance to civil society can have unanticipated consequences when the political settlement excludes and marginalizes certain constituencies. In contexts where civil society groups have unequal access to resources (in this case foreign donor assistance), and institutions to engage the

state (either because of election laws which limit opposition representation at the legislative level, or because of deferred municipal elections, or the unwillingness of donors to promote co-ordination with local government), civil society building will not yield the needed horizontal linkages and cooperative relations that contribute to the deepening of democracy. At the most basic level, this research project demonstrates how civil society developments cannot be understood without a keen appreciation for broader political developments.

Theoretical Implications of this Study

The findings in this research project have theoretical implications that extend beyond foreign donor assistance and its impact on civil society. These theoretical implications engage the nature of democratic development in non-inclusive political contexts, the rise of foreign funded NGOs as the primary opposition to governments, the faulty assumptions which guide most conceptions of civil society, and the misplaced importance placed on strategic as opposed to practical gender interests. Although these areas of inquiry demand further study, my findings present important insights.

Perhaps most fundamentally, this project presents important insights regarding democratic development in non-inclusive political contexts, in which the political settlements that define political relations do not enjoy overwhelming support, and certain groups are marginalized from the onset. Regardless of how democracy is conceived, or whether aspects related to contestation, participation, or accountability are emphasized, non-inclusive political contexts undermine the prospects for the emergent democracy. How institutions embrace different political and societal actors resonates with Skocpol's

idea of ‘the fit,’ which describes the relationship between organizational capacities of various groups or organizations and the opportunities afforded by political institutions. According to Skocpol, the creation of government institutions, political party systems, and electoral rules provides access and political inclusion to some groups, and denies access to other groups.⁴ Therefore, the degree of success of any politically active group is influenced by the relative opportunities afforded by political institutions.⁵ From the onset, the founding of these institutions privilege certain political groups, and this relationship is therefore institutionalized, creating a better ‘fit’ between certain groups and political institutions. The concept of ‘the fit’ is useful in the broader discussion of political inclusion and marginalization of various political and social sectors, especially since it identifies the centrality of political institutions in shaping future patterns of political involvement. In the case of war-to-peace transitions, ‘the fit’ is a product of the political settlement and is shaped by the involvement of external actors, in this case donors. It would be interesting to determine whether these patterns are stagnant, or likely to change under different circumstances.

My findings also illustrate how professionalized NGOs and their directors are emerging as important electoral opposition to the PA.⁶ The higher amounts of political funding to civil society in the Palestinian case, and the growth in the number of professionalized NGOs, have challenged the primacy of political parties as contenders for

⁴ Theda Skocpol, *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States* (Cambridge and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1992), 54.

⁵ For example, Skocpol argues that American political structures allow higher levels of leverage to social groups that can branch out to many local political districts.

⁶ Vickie Langhor has made similar observations about NGOs as opposition in Tunisia, Egypt and the Palestinian territories. For more on this discussion, refer to Langohr, “Too Much Civil Society, Too Little Politics.”

political power. Developments related to the upcoming Palestinian election are instructive: Salam Fayad, former Minister of Finance has put together a new independent list of intellectuals and leaders called the 'Third Way.' Among the notable figures who will be on this list are Hanan Ashrawi, Iyad Saraj, Abed Al-Quader Husseini, and Yasser Abed Rabo; both Hanan Ashrawi and Iyad Saraj are directors of professionalized organizations. Similarly, Mustafa Barghouti, the founder of a number of professionalized NGOs, has also created a new political group- Independent Palestine- that will be participating in the upcoming election. These findings have important implications for the study of democracy. If the directors of professionalized NGOs, as opposed to leaders of political parties, are emerging as important electoral contenders because of the resources they have, will this result in more elitist democracy, where election candidates are less grounded in society? Moreover, because these professionalized organizations rely on foreign funding, will foreign donors have a greater role in shaping domestic electoral politics?

Related to these concerns, these findings also question the dominant conceptions of civil society which perceive this sphere as distinct from political society, and associate its efficacy with its level of autonomy. As I demonstrated, the demarcation between civil society and political society is not so distinct, because individuals are often likely to move from one sphere to another. Recognition of these dynamics will shed light on those circumstances that weaken political society, or political parties more specifically. Similarly, the theoretical literature has erred in its over-emphasis on the autonomy of civil society. A more autonomous civil society does not connote a stronger one. As St-Germaine succinctly explains in relation to women's groups, "A women's group that

occupied the moral high ground but eschews political engagement may be more marginalized than subordinate women's 'wings' of political parties. Women need to find a balance between independence and autonomy while still finding a form that allows continued engagement with the state."⁷ Groups that emerge from political organizations, especially during war-to-peace transitions, can play a critical role in effectively involving grassroots constituencies in democratic decision-making structures, and in building the foundations for democracy.

My research findings also suggest that it might be necessary to re-consider the age-old wisdom revolving around the primacy of strategic gender interests⁸ in contrast to practical gender interests⁹ for improving the status of women. A sole focus on women's rights is likely not to affect the majority of women whose basic needs are not even met. The literature is correct to argue that women's strategic gender interests result in more positive outcomes in terms of expanding women's rights. Organizing around women's practical needs, however, whilst involving women from all walks of life and incorporating them in decision-making structures, might be more important for the long-term goals of strengthening civil society and the deepening of democracy.

Policy Prescriptions

A number of policy prescriptions also emerge from this dissertation, most notably related to the role of external actors in promoting democracy in non-inclusive political

⁷ Michelle St- Germaine, "*Mujeres '94*," 92-93.

⁸ Strategic gender interests revolve around the furthering of women's rights so as to improve their status in the long-term.

⁹ Practical gender interests revolve around women's immediate needs.

contexts, and to more constructive approaches to the generation of social capital and the strengthening of civil society. In light of the new Bush initiative to promote democracy and strengthen civil society in the Middle East, and the higher levels of foreign donor assistance allocated to this endeavor, related questions have assumed a greater primacy. Most importantly, foreign donors cannot assume that they can promote some civil society groups over others without generating unanticipated outcomes. The privileging of certain groups over others may adversely affect the promotion of democracy by obstructing the development of civil society. At the most basic level, it can exacerbate polarization and undermine the co-operation needed for the generation of social capital and the strengthening of civil society. Moreover, policy-makers should be careful about arbitrarily bunching together groups involved in broad tendencies, such as all Islamists or all Leftists, and rather be more nuanced in their categorization. They should avoid excluding or marginalizing important groups in the democratization process.

Moreover, certain kinds of initiatives and projects contribute more positively to the generation of social capital and the strengthening of civil society. In general, those projects that also include an economic component are more likely to contribute to the generation of social capital than isolated projects focusing on non-production related training. Projects with economic components create more trust among members, since members share the same goals, and must institutionalize their patterns of interactions to maximize outcomes. The positive impact on social capital and civil society does not derive from the role of civil society in downsizing the role of the state, but rather from the interactions that result among participants trying to better their material conditions.

Policy-makers therefore should include and focus on economic initiatives in their civil society development programs.

Similarly, policy makers should re-think the benefits of isolated projects and programs, in favor of more sustainable projects that can continue in the absence of foreign funding. For example, foreign donors should focus on more comprehensive local development programs that institutionalize regular patterns of interaction between civil society and local government. These types of programs are more likely to yield more enduring outcomes, in contrast to isolated programs that are not sustainable without donor funding. Policy makers should also re-consider the benefits of democracy, human rights, and gender training, or civic education more broadly. As I have illustrated, foreign donors expend considerable resources on such endeavors, only to yield minimal returns. Intuitively, the more appropriate place for civic education and related training programs are schools. Systematic incorporation of civic education into school curriculums would allow for natural follow-up, as well as sustainability once donors discontinue their assistance. Moreover, democracy promoters would reach far larger numbers of people through schools, in contrast to professionalized NGOs with indirect access to grassroots constituencies.

Future Research

Finally, this project raises a number of issues for further research. Perhaps the most important question to be addressed relates to the long-term prospects for the deepening of democracy in non-inclusive war-to-peace transitions. More precisely, what are the future prospects for the deepening of democracy in settings where political

settlements enjoy limited societal support from the onset? Can and do political institutions become more representative over time, regardless of the nature of the political settlement? If they do become more representative, what factors contribute to such changes?

In relation to the immediate future, how do groups that have been excluded from the re/constitution of civil society proceed to negotiate the nature of their exclusion? More specifically, and in the context of Middle East politics, how do groups that are not afforded the same resources or networking opportunities, as other civil society organizations react under such circumstances? Are such groups more likely to become radicalized, or will they pursue other means? Do different sources of funding affect the strategies that groups will adopt? Can foreign donor assistance play a more positive and moderating role in rectifying such situations?

Democracy promotion and civil society strengthening have become the mantra of many Western donor agencies. Often, however, policy-makers and practitioners have ignored or violated the most basic principles pertaining to democracy in pursuit of the 'post-Cold War liberal order.' Such developments have been heightened in recent years in light of Bush's Middle East democratization initiative. Only time will tell if such developments will undermine the indigenous initial stirrings of liberalization and democratization which began in the region in the 1980s.

Appendix of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ADEMUSA	<i>Asociación Democrática de Mujeres/</i> Democratic Association of Women
AGFUNDO	Arab Gulf Program for United Nations Development Organizations
AHLC	Ad-Hoc Liason Committee
AMES	<i>Asociación de Mujeres de El Salvador/</i> Association of Women of El Salvador
AMIDEAST	American Mideast Education and Training Services
AMPES	<i>Asociación de Mujeres Progresistas/</i> Association for the Progressive Women of El Salvador
AMS	<i>Asociación para la Autodeterminación y el Desarrollo de Mujeres Salvadoreña/</i> Association for the Self-Determination and Development of Salvadoran Women
AMS-LMR	<i>Asociación de Mujeres Lili Milagro Ramírez/</i> Association of Women-Lili Milagro Ramirez
ANDES	<i>Asociación Nacional de Educadores Salvadoreños/</i> National Association of Salvadoran Teachers
ANERA	American Near East Refugee Aid
ANM	Arab Nationalist Movement
ARENA	<i>Alianza Republicana Nacionalista/</i> Republican Nationalist Alliance
ASMUSA	<i>Asociación de Mujeres Salvadoreña/</i> Association of Salvadoran Women
BID	<i>Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo/</i> Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)
BPR	<i>Bloque Popular Revolcionario/</i> Popular Revolutionary Bloc
CECI	Canadian Center for International Studies and Co-operation

CEMUJER	<i>Instituto de Estudios de Mujer “Norma Virginia Guirola de Herrera/ Institute of Women’s Studies “Norma Viginia de Herrera</i>
CFA’s	Co-financing Agencies
CG	Consultative Group
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CID	Council for International Development
CISPES	Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador
CISS	<i>Cooperazione Internazionale Sud-Sud/ South-South International Co-operation</i>
COM	<i>Coordinación de Organismos de Mujeres/ Coordination of Women’s Organizations</i>
COMADRES	<i>Comité de Madres y Familiares de Presos, Desaparecidos y Asesinados de El Salvador “Monseñor Romero”/ The Committee of Mothers and Relatives of the Disappeared, Assassinated and Political Prisoners</i>
CONAMUS	<i>Coordinadora Nacional de Mujeres Salvadoreñas/ National Coordinating Committee for Salvadoran Women</i>
CONARA	<i>Comision Nacional de Restauration de Areas/ National Commission for the Restoration of Areas</i>
CORAMS	<i>Centro de Orientación Radial Para la Mujer Salvadoreña/ Training Center for Salvadoran Women on Radio</i>
CREA	Creative Associates International, Inc.
CRM	<i>Coordinadora Revolucionaria de las Masas/ Revolutionary Coordination of the Masses</i>
CRS	Creditor Reporting System
CUMS	<i>Comité Unificado de Mujeres Salvadoreñas/ Unified Committee of Salvadoran Women</i>
DAC	Development Assistance Committee

DFLP	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
DOP	Declaration of Principles
EC	European Commission
ERP	<i>Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo/</i> Revolutionary Army of People
EU	European Union
FAPU	<i>Frente de Acción Popular Unificada /</i> United Popular Action Front
<i>Fateh</i>	<i>Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastini/</i> Palestinian National Liberation Movement
FDR	<i>Frente Democrático Revolucionario/</i> Revolutionary Democratic Front
FECCAS	<i>Federación Cristiana de Campesinos Salvadoreños/</i> Christian Federation of Salvadoran Farm Workers
FIDA	Palestinian Democratic Union
FLACSO	<i>Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales/</i> Latinamerican Faculty for the Social Sciences
FMLN	<i>Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional/</i> Farabundo Marty for National Liberation
FONAES	<i>Fondo Ambiental de El Salvador/</i> Environmental Fund of El Salvador
FPL	<i>Fuerzas Populares de Liberación/</i> Popular Forces of Liberation
FPWAC	Federation of Palestinian Women's Action Committees
FPWAC-FIDA	Federation of Palestinian Women's Action Committees- Palestinian Democratic Union
FUNDE	<i>Fundación Nacional para el Desarrollo/</i> National Fund for Development
FUSADES	<i>Fundación Salvadoreña para el Desarrollo Económico y Social/</i> Salvadoran Foundation for Economic and Social Development
GTZ	German Agency for Technical Co-operation

GUPW	General Union of Palestinian Women
HDIP	Health Development and Information Project
HEPG	Humanitarian and Emergency Policy Group
HIVOS	<i>Humanistisch Instituut voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking/</i> International Humanist Institute for Co-operation with Developing Countries
HLF	Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development
ICCO	<i>Interkerkelijke Organisatie voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking/</i> Dutch Interchurch Organization for Development Co-operation
IMU	<i>Instituto de Investigación, Capacitación y Desarrollo de la Mujer 'Norma Guirola de Herrera'/</i> Institute of Research, Training, and Development of Women 'Norma Guirola de Herrera
ISDEMU	<i>Instituto Salvadoreño para el Desarrollo de la Mujer/</i> Salvadoran Institute for Women's Development
JLC	Joint Liaison Committee
JMCC	Jerusalem Media and Communication Center
LACC	Local Aid Coordination Committee
MAM	<i>Movimiento de Mujeres 'Mélida Anaya Montes'/</i> Melida Anaya Monte Women's Movement
MAP	Medical Aid for Palestine
MAS	Palestinian Economic Policy Research Institute
MEA	<i>Municipios en Acción/</i> Municipalities in Action
MESRF	Middle East Special Requirements Fund
MLP	<i>Movimiento de Liberación Popular/</i> Popular Liberation Movement
MNR	<i>Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario/</i> National Revolutionary Movement
MOPIC	Ministry of Planning and International Co-operation

MPSC	<i>Movimiento Popular Social Cristiano/</i> Popular Social Christian Movement
MSM	<i>Movimiento Salvadoreño de Mujeres/</i> Salvadoran Movement of Women
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation
NOVIB	Oxfam- Netherlands
NRP	National Reconstruction Plan
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
ORMUSA	<i>Organización de Mujeres Salvadoreñas/</i> Organization of Salvadoran Women
PA	Palestinian Authority
PARC	Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees
PASSIA	Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs
PCBS	Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
PCP	Palestinian Communist Party
PDC	<i>Partido Demócrata Cristiano/</i> Christian Democratic Party
PECDAR	Palestinian Economic Council for Reconstruction and Development
PFLP	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PLC	Palestinian Legislative Council
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PNC	Palestine National Council
PNF	Palestine National Front
PNGO	Palestinian Non-Governmental Organization Network

PNUD	<i>Programa de la Naciones para el Desarrollo/</i> United Nations Development Program
PPP	Palestinian People's Party
PRTC	<i>Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores Centroamericanos/</i> Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers
PSC	<i>Partido Comunista de El Salvador/</i> Communist Party of El Salvador
PVOs	Private Volunteer Organizations
PWWSD	Palestinian Working Women's Society for Development
RN	<i>Resistencia Nacional/</i> National Resistance
SCF	Save the Children Federation
SHARE	Salvadoran Humanitarian Aid, Research, and Education Foundation
SRN	<i>Secretariate de la Reconstruccion Naci6nal/</i> National Reconstruction Secretariate
SWGs	Sector Working Groups
TAP	Tripartite Action Plan
TFPI	Task Force on Project Implementation
UCA	University of Central America
UDN	<i>Unión Democrática Nacionalista/</i> Nationalist Democratic Union
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNICEF	United Nations Children Fund
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNRWA	United Nations Relief Works Agency
UNSCO	United Nations Special Coordinators Office
UPA	United Palestine Appeal
UPMRC	Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees

UPWC	Union of Palestinian Women's Committees
UPWWC	Union of Palestinian Working Women's Committees
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WATC	Women's Affairs Technical Committees
WBGS	West Bank and Gaza Strip
WCC	Women's Working Committee
WCSW	Women's Committee for Social Work

Appendix of Interviews

The following list of interviews is organized alphabetically, according to the interviewee's last name. In the case of grassroots activists in the Palestinian women's movement, I do not include the name of the interviewee, but simply refer to the interviewee as Member with a corresponding number if I interviewed more than one grassroots activist from the organization. Included in this listing is the name of the interviewee, his/her title and institutional affiliation, place, language, and date of the interview.

Interviews conducted in Palestine

Activists and Founders of Women's Organizations and Committees in Palestine

-Ahmad al-Ramahi, Maysoun. Director, *Al-Khansa*." Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic, on 11 September, 2001.

-Alayan, Thraya. Head of the Women's Program, LAWE-Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment. Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic, on 19 September, 2001.

-Al-Khayat, Maha. Director, Women's Affairs Technical Committees (WATC). Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic, on 9 July, 2001.

-Aweideh, Sama. Director, Women's Studies Center. Interviewed in Jerusalem, in Arabic, on 4 August, 2001.

-Badran, Amneh. Acting Director, Jerusalem Center for Women. Interviewed in Jerusalem, in Arabic, on 15 August, 2001.

-Barghouti, Nuha. Founding Member, and Member of the Executive Committee, Union of Palestinian Working Women's Committees (UPWWC). Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic, on 12 July, 2001.

-Barghouti, Siham. General Director of Agricultural Development in the Ministry of Local Government, and Founding Member of the Women's Work Committee (WCC), later renamed the Palestinian Federation of Women's Action Committees (FPWAC), and Director of Palestinian Federation of Women's Action Committee-Palestinian Democratic Union (FIDA). Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic, on 12 July, 2001.

-Diab, Rabiha. Founding Member, and President, Women's Committees for Social Work (WCSW). Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic, on 4 July, 2001.

-Hamad, Iktimal. Director of the Union of Palestinian Women's Committees (UPWC). Interviewed in Gaza, in Arabic, on 31 July, 2001.

-Kamal, Zahira. Director of Gender Desk in the Ministry of Planning and International Co-operation (MOPIC), and Founding Member of the Women's Work Committee (WCC), later renamed the Federation of Palestinian Women's Action Committees (FPWAC). Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic, on 19 August, 2001.

-Khreisheh, Amal. Director, the Palestinian Working Women's Society for Development (PWWSD). Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic and English, on 28 July, 2001.

-Member (1). Grassroots Coordinator, in charge of marketing embroidered items, Federation of Palestinian Women's Action Committees (FPWAC). Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic, on 5 August, 2001.

-Member (2). Supervisor of grassroots coordination in the Jerusalem area, Federation of Palestinian Women's Action Committees (FPWAC). Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic, on 6 August, 2001.

-Member (1). Social Worker, Federation of Palestinian Women's Action Committees-Palestinian Democratic Union (FPWAC-FIDA). Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic, on 10 August, 2001.

-Member (2). Grassroots Coordinator, Federation of Palestinian Women's Action Committees- Palestinian Democratic Union (FPWAC-FIDA). Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic, on 12 August, 2001.

-Member (3). Supervisor of grassroots coordination in Hebron, Federation of Women's Action Committee- Palestinian Democratic Union (FPWAC-FIDA). Member (4). Member of the Executive Committee of the Federation of Palestinian Women's Action Committee- Palestinian Democratic Union (FPWAC-FIDA). Interviewed in Hebron, in Arabic, on 20 August, 2001.

-Member (1). Supervisor of grassroots coordination in Hebron area, Union of Palestinian Women's Committees (UPWC). Interviewed in Hebron, in Arabic, on 20 August, 2001.

-Member (2). Member of Youth Committee, Union of Palestinian Women's Committees (UPWC). Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic, on 22 July, 2001.

-Member (3). Member of the Executive Committee and Grassroots Coordinator, Union of Palestinian Women's Committees (UPWC). Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic, on 24 July, 2001.

-Member (1). Member of the Executive Committee, Women's Committees for Social Work (WCSW). Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic, on 14 July, 2001.

- Member (2). Member of the Executive Committee and Treasurer, Women's Committees for Social Work (WCSW). Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic, on 19 July, 2001.
- Member (3). Grassroots Coordinator in the Jerusalem area, Women's Committees for Social Work (WCSW). Interviewed in Jerusalem, in Arabic, on 20 August, 2001.
- Member (4). Secretary of Salfeet area, Women's Committees for Social Work (WCSW). Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic, on 22 July, 2001.
- Member (5). Administrator, Women's Committees for Social Work (WCSW). Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic, 22 July, 2001 (DISCUSSION).
- Member (6). Supervisor of grassroots coordination in the Ramallah area, Women's Committees for Social Work (WCSW). Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic, on 22 July, 2001.
- Member (7). Grassroots Coordinator, Women's Committees for Social Work (WCSW). Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic, on 22 July, 2001.
- Member (8). Supervisor of all kindergartens in Jerusalem-Ramallah, Women's Committees for Social Work (WCSW). Member (9). Grassroots Coordinator in the Women's Committees for Social Work (WCSW). Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic, on 24 July, 2001.
- Mohammed, Nihaya. Founding Member, and Member of Executive Committee of the Federation of Palestinian Women's Action Committees (FPWAC). Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic, on 29 July, 2001.
- Naji, Basma. Head of Training and Education, Women's Department of the Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees (PARC). Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic, on 22 August, 2001.
- Nashashibi, Dima. Vice President, Legal Aid and Counseling for Women. Interviewed in Jerusalem, in Arabic, on 4 August, 2001.
- Nassar, Maha. Founding Member and Director, Union of Palestinian Women's Committees (UPWC). Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic, on 21 July, 2001.
- Quassem, May. Head of Gender Desk, MIFTAH- Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy. Interviewed in Jerusalem, in Arabic, on 7 August, 2001.
- Shaikh, Naimeh. Director, Women's Committees for Social Work (WCSW). Interviewed in Gaza, in Arabic, on 31 July, 2001.

-Tarazi, Reema. President, General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW), West Bank Branch. Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic and English, on 14 August, 2001.

Foreign Donor Agencies

-Almbaid, Mohammed. Senior CSO Specialist, *Tamkeen* (USAID-Funded Civil Society Project). Interviewed in Ramallah, in English, on 16 September, 2001.

-Blideli, Owe. Regional Representative, and Margoth Sonnebo, Program Manager, Diakonia. Interviewed in Jerusalem, in English, on 16 August, 2001.

-Borg, Peter. Acting Deputy Head, Norway Representative Office to the Palestinian Authority (PA). Interviewed in Jerusalem, in English, on 19 July, 2001.

-Brenzeli, Anne. Head of Swedish International Co-operation Development Agency (SIDA), and Eva-Lotta Gustafsson, Program Officer, Consulate of Sweden. Interviewed in Jerusalem, in English, on 13 September, 2001.

-Buhbe, Mathes. Resident Representative, Friedrich Ebert Foundation. Interviewed in Jerusalem, in English, on 18 September, 2001.

-Claudet, Sophie. Former NGO Project Coordinator, World Bank. Interviewed in Ramallah, in English, on 10 September, 2001.

-Fouet, Sylvie. Political Officer for Human Rights and Democracy Projects, European Commission. Interviewed in Jerusalem, in English, on 1 August, 2001.

-Fröhlich, Fritz. Deputy Head, Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation. Interviewed in Jerusalem, in English, on 11 September, 2001.

-Gerl, Peter. Head of Economic Co-operation, German Agency for Technical Co-operation (GTZ), Representative Office of Germany to the Palestinian Authority. Interviewed in Ramallah, phone interview in English, on 18 July, 2001.

-Malki, Ra'id. Senior Development Program Officer and Deputy Head of Aid, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic and English, on 25 September, 2001.

-Masud, Wafa. Project Coordinator, Hanns-Seidel Foundation. Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic, on 20 September, 2001.

-Muslih, Khader. Team Leader of Media and Human Rights, MEDA Team West Bank and Gaza Strip, Technical Assistance to the European Commission Representative Office. Interviewed in Jerusalem, in Arabic and English, on 7 August, 2001.

-Myers, Martha. Civil Society Project Manager, United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Interviewed in Jerusalem, in English, on 14 September, 2001.

-Paul, Joachim. Project Coordinator and Consultant, Freidrich Naumann Foundation. Interviewed in Jerusalem, in English, on 14 September, 2001.

-Quazzaz, Hadeel. Regional Program Coordinator, Heinrich Böell Foundation. Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic and English, on 20 September, 2001.

-Rotinen, Elja. Head, Representative Office of Finland to the Palestinian Authority (PA). Interviewed in Ramallah, in English, on 21 September, 2001.

-Shadid, Mohammed. Project Management Organization Director, Welfare Association Consortium for the Management of the Palestinian NGO Project. Interviewed in Jerusalem, in Arabic, on 20 June, 2001.

-Tazelaar, Birgitta. Second Secretary, Netherlands Representative Office to the Palestinian Authority (PA). Interviewed in Ramallah, in English, 25 July, 2001.

-Wright, Kristy. Director, Canada Fund. Interviewed in Ramallah, in English, on 24 July, 2001.

Human Rights and Civic Education NGOs

-Abu Awad, Aysheh. Program Coordinator, Palestinian Center for Peace. Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic, on 17 September, 2001.

-Abu Quteish, Ayyed. Program Coordinator, Defense Children International (DCI). Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic, on 20 September, 2001.

-Arafah, Abdul Rahman. President, Arab Thought Forum. Interviewed in Jerusalem, in Arabic, on 17 August, 2001.

-Barghouti, Hassan. Director, Democracy and Workers' Rights Center. Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic, on 9 September, 2001.

-Barghouti, Iyad. Director, Ramallah Center for Human Rights Studies. Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic, on 3 September, 2001.

-Batravi, Khalid. Board Member, Mandela Institute for Political Prisoners. Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic, on 5 September, 2001.

-Eid, Bassem. Director, Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group (PHRMG). Interviewed in Jerusalem, in Arabic, on 17 September, 2001.

-Ibrahim, Ruba. Director-European Affairs Department, MIFTAH- Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy. Interviewed in Jerusalem, in Arabic and English, on 24 September, 2001.

-Issa, Shawqui. Executive Director, LAWE-Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment. Interviewed in Jerusalem, in English, on 11 September, 2001.

-Jabarin, Sha'wan. Human Rights Officer and Program Coordinator, *Al-Haq* Human Rights Organization. Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic, on 21 August, 2001.

-Jaffal, Aref. Executive Director, Civic Forum Institute. Interviewed in Jerusalem, in Arabic, on 15 August, 2001.

-Jarrar, Khalida. Director, *Ad-Dameer* Association for Human Rights. Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic, on 21 August, 2001.

-Jayussi, May. Director, *Muwatin*-the Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy. Interviewed in Ramallah, in English, on 11 September, 2001.

-Mu'allem, Nasif. Director General, Palestinian Center for Peace and Democracy. Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic, on 14 August, 2001.

-Nusseibeh, Lucy. Director, Middle East Nonviolence and Democracy. Interviewed in Jerusalem, in English, on 10 September, 2001.

-Quadi, Iyad. Program Coordinator, Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA). Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic, on 8 September, 2001.

-Saif, Samir. Director, Palestinian Peace Information Center-*Al Jiser*. Interviewed in Ramallah in Arabic, on 4 September, 2001.

-Salem, Waleed. Program Director, Palestinian Center for the Dissemination of Democracy and Community Development: PANORAMA. Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic, on 22 August, 2001.

-Zeedani, Said. Director, Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens Rights (PICCR). Interviewed in Ramallah, in English, on 21 August, 2001.

Open-Ended Interviews and Discussions

-Ajlouni, Joyce. Program Representative, Jerusalem, Oxfam GB, and Founding Member of Association for International Development Agencies (AIDA). Interviewed in Jerusalem, in English, on 17 July, 2001 (DISCUSSION).

-Asfour, Hassan. Minister of State, Ministry of Non-Governmental Organizations. Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic, on 7 August, 2001.

-Barren, Paul. Program Coordinator, World Vision. Interviewed in Jerusalem, in English, on 2 July, 2001.

-Jebayle, Kamal. President, Union of Palestinian Charitable Organizations. Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic, on 14 July, 2001.

-Mansour, Mohammed [Abu Ala Mansour]. General Director, Interior Ministry Office in Ramallah, and Secretary of *Fateh* in the Ramallah-Bireh region. Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic, on 16 July, 2001.

-Nakhleh, Khalil. Team Member of Education, MEDA Team West Bank and Gaza Strip, Technical Assistance to the European Commission Representative Office. Interviewed in Jerusalem, in English, on 25 July, 2001.

-Nue, Tom. Director, American Near East Refugees Assistance (ANERA). Interviewed in Jerusalem, in English, on 5 July, 2001.

-Qubesh, Renad. Program Coordinator, Palestinian NGO Network (PNGO). Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic, on 27 June, 2001.

-Rantisi, Raja. Former Member in the Union of Palestinian Women's Work Committees (UPWWC). Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic, on 16 July, 2001 (DISCUSSION).

-Said, Nader. Director, Birzeit Development Center. Interviewed in Birzeit, in Arabic and English, on 30 June, 2001.

Political Leader and Former Grassroots Leaders

-Aruri, Mohammed. Member of the Executive Committee of the General Federation of Trade Unions, and Politburo Member of Palestinian Democratic Union (FIDA). Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic, on 1 August, 2001.

-Assaf, Omar. Former Grassroots Organizer, School teacher at Friends Boys School, and Politburo Member of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic, on 22 July, 2001.

-Barghouti, Marwan. Former Student Leader, Member of the Palestinian Legislative Council, Member of the Revolutionary Council of *Fateh*, and General Secretary of the Higher Committee of the West Bank, *Fateh*. Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic, on 24 July, 2001.

-Barghouti, Mustafa. Director of the Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees (UPMRC), Director of the Human Development Information Project (HDIP), Member of the General Secretariat of the Palestinian People's Party (PPP, formerly the Palestinian Communist Party). Interviewed in Ramallah, in English, on 24 July, 2001.

-Jaradat, Ali. Former Grassroots Organizer, Current Editor of *Al-Hadaf*, Head of Publicity in Central Committee, Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Interviewed in Ramallah, in Arabic, on 18 July, 2001.

-Khatib, Ghassan. Director of the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC), and Executive Committee Member of the Palestinian People's Party (PPP, formerly the Palestinian Communist Party). Interviewed in Jerusalem, in Arabic and English, on 5 August, 2001.

Interviews conducted in El Salvador

Activists and Founders of Women's Organizations in El Salvador

-America, Alba. Director, *Instituto de Estudios de La Mujer "Norma Virginia Guirola de Herrera,"* (Norma Virginia Guirola de Herrera Institute of Women's Studies-CEMUJER). Interviewed in San Salvador, in Spanish, on 23 May, 2002.

-Argueta, Yanera. Founding Member, and Director, *Asociacion para la Autodeterminación y el Desarrollo de Mujeres Salvadoreña* (Association for the Self-Determination and Development of Salvadoran Women- AMS). Interviewed in San Salvador, in Spanish, on 10 May, 2002.

-Ascenio, Isabel. Coordinator between 1997-2000, *Flor de Piedra* (Flower of the Stone). Interviewed in San Salvador, in Spanish, on 6 June, 2002.

-Baires, Sonia. President of Board, *Mujeres por la Dignidad y la Vida* (Women for Dignity and Life- *Las Dignas*). Interviewed in San Salvador, in Spanish, 23 May, 2002.

-Chaine, Deysi. Founding Member and current Director, *Instituto de Investigación, Capacitación y Desarrollo de la Mujer 'Norma Guirola de Herrera'* (Institute of Research, Training, and Development of Women 'Norma Guirola de Herrera- IMU). Interviewed in San Salvador, in Spanish, on 16 May, 2002.

-de Gevara, Isabel. President, *Movimiento Salvadoreño de Mujeres* (Salvadoran Movement of Women- MSM), and municipal council member of St. Marcos. Interviewed in San Salvador, in Spanish, on 23 May, 2002.

-Delgado, Sophia. Director, *Mujer Joven* (Young Women). Interviewed in San Salvador, on 3 June, 2002.

-Fabeán, Isabel. Coordinator of local development and political participation programs, *Movimiento de Mujeres 'Mélida Anaya Montes'* (Melida Anaya Monte Women's Movement- MAM). Interviewed in San Salvador, in Spanish, on 13 May, 2002.

-Hernandez, Nora. Secretary of Board of Directors and Coordinator of Economic Development Unit, *Mujeres por la Dignidad y la Vida* (Women for Dignity and Life- *Las Dignas*). Interviewed in San Salvador, in Spanish, on 14 May, 2002.

-Maya, Irma. Founding Member of *Movimiento de Mujeres 'Mélida Anaya Montes'* (Melida Anaya Monte Women's Movement- MAM) and Deputy Member of the Legislative Assembly. Interviewed in San Salvador, in Spanish, on 27 May, 2002.

-Medina, Carmen. Former Member of *Asociación de Mujeres Salvadoreña* (Association of Salvadoran Women- ASMUSA), and Founding Member of *Movimiento Salvadoreño de Mujeres* (Salvadoran Movement of Women- MSM), and Representative in El Salvador of International Development-England (CID-England). Interviewed in San Salvador, in English, on 16 February, 2002, and 8 May, 2002.

-Murcia, Ana. Director, *Mujeres por la Dignidad y la Vida* (Women for Dignity and Life- *Las Dignas*). Carmen Argueta, Psychologist and Coordinator of programs for the eradication of violence, *Mujeres por la Dignidad y la Vida* (Women for Dignity and Life- *Las Dignas*). Interviewed in San Salvador, in Spanish, on 26 May, 2002.

-Quintiera, Azusena. Former Coordinator in Nicaragua, *Asociación de Mujeres en El Salvador* (Association of Women in El Salvador- AMES), and Coordinator in *Movimiento de Mujeres 'Mélida Anaya Montes'* (Melida Anaya Monte Women's Movement- MAM). Interviewed in San Salvador, in Spanish, on 13 May, 2002.

-Sales, Dina. Director, *Centro de Orientación Radial Para la Mujer Salvadoreña* (Training Center for Salvadoran Women on Radio- CORAMS). Interviewed in San Salvador, in Spanish, on 21 May, 2002.

-Silva, Zoila. Executive Director, *Instituto Salvadoreño para el Desarrollo de la Mujer* (Salvadoran Institute for Women's Development- ISDEMU). Interviewed in San Salvador, in Spanish, on 11 June, 2002.

-Urquilla, Jeanette. Director, *Organización de Mujeres Salvadoreñas* (Organization of Salvadoran Women ORMUSA). Interviewed in San Salvador, in Spanish, on 30 May, 2002.

Foreign Donor Agencies

-Allen, Keith. Consul General and Deputy of Mission, Embassy of Britain. José Fermán Flores, Head of Technical Co-operation, Embassy of Britain. Interviewed in San Salvador, in English, on 30 April, 2002.

-Andrade, Oscar. Director of Humanitarian Assistance and Special Projects Unit, Oxfam America. Interviewed in San Salvador, in English, on 14 June, 2002.

-Barousse, Francois. Head of Technical and Scientific Co-operation, Embassy of France. Interviewed in San Salvador, in English, on 2 May, 2002.

-Barrero, Jorge. Program Director, Japanese Agency for International Co-operation. Interviewed in San Salvador, in English, on 21 May, 2002.

Bohnstedt, Bengt. Project Coordinator, German Agency for Technical Co-operation (GTZ). Interviewed in San Salvador, in English, on 12 June, 2002.

-Coello, Mauricio Herrera. Director General of Democracy and Governance, United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Interviewed in San Salvador, in English, on 22 April, 2002.

-Conti, Antonio. Director, Italian Co-operation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Interviewed in San Salvador, in English, on 3 May, 2002.

-Garza, Jorge. Director, Canada-El Salvador Development Fund (FODEC) of Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Interviewed in San Salvador, in English, on 12 April, 2002.

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Unstructured and Open-Ended Interviews and Discussions

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Appendix of Interview Questions

Interview Questions to Civic Education and Human Rights NGOs

1. When was this NGO established?
2. What was the goal of establishing this NGO?
3. What kind of organizational structure do you have? Do you have internal elections?
4. What sorts of activities and programs/projects do you carry out?
5. Who do you usually try to reach through these programs? Approximately, how many people do you reach through your programs?
6. Specifically, how is your relationship with the PA?
7. How successful do you think your organization has been? Do you think it has contributed to the democratization of Palestinian society in a noticeable way?
8. Democracy theorists believe that pluralism is an important feature of democracy. To what extent do you feel pluralism is important for democracy in this society?
9. Related to the last question, in your opinion, what are important characteristics of a vibrant democracy? How do you relate this to civil society?
10. How would you assess the state of Palestinian civil society today?
11. Do you coordinate with other Palestinian civil society organizations? If yes, which ones, and pertaining to what issues?
12. How is your relationship with the donors who fund these programs?
13. Who are your donors?
14. Have you ever felt that your understanding of democracy or civil society is different than that of the donors?
15. Generally, what types of programs do they like to fund? Do you agree with the efficacy of these types of programs?
16. What did the director of this NGO do before establishing this organization?

Interview Questions to Donors

1. What types of programs do you fund?
2. Why do you view these programs as important?
3. How do your donor assistance programs in the West Bank and Gaza Strip compare to your assistance to other regions? Do geo-strategic considerations play a role in the amount of funding and the types of programs/projects you support here?
4. Do you feel NGOs can carry out these functions better than the PA?
5. You have US\$2 million to allocate to certain programs...What is your process for soliciting proposals? Do you advertise?
6. Is there a negotiation process with the recipient regarding the nature of the program/project?
7. What are the criteria for allocating these funds?
8. Support for the peace process is important for peace building. How does this play into your decisions? How is this important? How is this relayed to the recipient?
9. Do you monitor the effectiveness of the programs? If so, how?
10. Do you fund democratization or gender programs?
11. Democratization theorists believe that pluralism is an important feature of democracy. To what extent do you feel it is important for democracy in this society?
12. How do you feel NGOs help in the democratization of Palestinian society?
13. More specifically, what are important characteristics of a vibrant democracy? How do you relate this to civil society?

Interview Questions to Grassroots Women's Committees

1. When was this organization established? (or this committee in the cases of the village groups?)
2. What was the goal of establishing this organization?
3. What were the programs like at the time?

4. Who was the membership base? What was the number of your membership base at the time?
5. What were some of the methods used for attracting members? What were the key interests and priorities of your members?
6. Why were they interested in these programs?
7. How have your programs changed over the years?
8. As a leader, do you feel that you had to change your programs in the post-Oslo period?
9. In your opinion, what are the factors that contributed to this change?
10. How have the interests and priorities of your membership changed over the years?
11. In general, what is your assessment of mass-based organizations today?
12. Do any of your programs aim at influencing the PA?
13. How would you describe your relationship with other women's committees, or with the recently established women's NGO's?
14. Do you receive any services from these NGOs?

Interview Questions to Political Leaders

1. Like other political factions, your faction has an array of grassroots organizations. What types of organizations do/did you establish?
2. When were the organizations established? What were the goals that motivated the founding of these grassroots organizations?
3. Did the goals of these organizations change over the years?
4. How important were these grassroots organizations to the party/faction in the past?
5. Did these organizations have a budget? Where did they receive funding from? How has this changed?
6. How did you recruit members? Were any services provided to the members?
7. In your opinion, what were the priorities of the members? Why did they join these organizations?

8. How did these priorities change over the years?
9. How independent were these organizations from the political factions? Were the grassroots or the actual members ever consulted in the decision-making process?
10. In your opinion, what have these grassroots organizations achieved?
11. Do you feel these organizations have contributed to the development of democracy or civil society in any way? How? (for clarification, how do you define civil society?)
12. In your opinion, what is the state of these grassroots organizations today?
13. What factors contributed to these changes?
14. How important do you feel these grassroots organizations are today?
15. In your opinion, what are the prospects for future mobilization, especially in light of the current situation?

Interview Questions to Women's NGOs

1. When was this NGO established?
2. What was the goal or motivation for establishing this NGO?
3. What is your current organizational structure?
4. What are some of your programs/ activities?
5. Do you provide any services? If so, what types of services do you provide?
6. To what extent have these programs/services changed over the years?
7. What sorts of factors have shaped or influenced these changes in program?
8. How does the organization decide on the types of programs it plans to adopt?
9. Who funds these programs?
10. How do you rate your relationship with the donors? Is there any variation among different donors?
11. Has donor conditionality affected your programs in any way? Or have you been autonomous in making these decisions?

12. Do you have any income generating programs, or is foreign assistance your only form of income?
13. Do you have meetings with any grassroots constituencies, especially women?
14. In your opinion, what has your organization achieved?
15. In your opinion, how has this organization contributed to women's issues, democracy, or civil society?
16. Are you a member of an NGO network? Has this helped your organization?
17. How would you describe or assess your relationship with the government?

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