RAGE AGAINST THE GROWTH MACHINE:
Investigating urban growth machine fragility and citizen resistance to major development projects in Berlin and Montreal

A supervised research project prepared by
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Abstract:

Through the analysis of three cases, the attempted development of a former airport in Berlin and a casino mega project and large condominium development on former industrial lands in Montreal, this study examines the possibility of increasing urban growth coalition fragility and the implications for urban growth machine theory. Since its first articulation by Harvey Molotch in 1976, the "city as a growth machine" has been a foundational idea of urban governance and urban political economy. A new wave of scholarship has suggested that urban growth coalitions, groups of place-bound elites with an interest in land use intensification who tend to dominate local political processes may be growing increasingly fragile. The cases examined in this study, two of growth coalition failure, and one of major concessions instead reflect a more nuanced idea that powerful counter-coalitions and contextual factors allowed community groups to prevent development. In both cities well-organized oppositions, with histories of activism, invoking ideas around the "right to the city", operating in contexts with strong municipal political party systems, seemed to be more important factors than the fragility of individual growth-coalitions.

Résumé:

Par l'analyse de trois cas : la tentative de développement d'un ancien aéroport de Berlin, un projet de méga casino et un grand développement en copropriété sur d'anciens terrains industriels à Montréal, cette étude examine la possibilité que les coalitions de croissance urbaine soient de plus en plus fragiles et les implications de cette augmentation pour la théorie de machine de croissance urbaine. Depuis sa première formulation par Harvey Molotch en 1976 la ville de « machine à croissance » a été l'idée fondamentale de la gouvernance urbaine et de l'économie politique urbaine. Une nouvelle vague de recherche a suggéré que les coalitions de croissance urbaine, les groupes d'élites liés au lieu qui s'intéressent à l'intensification de l'utilisation des terres et qui ont tendance à dominer les processus politiques locaux deviennent de plus en plus fragiles. Les cas examinés dans cette étude, deux étant des échecs de la coalition de la croissance et l'une ayant fait l'objet de grandes concessions, reflètent plutôt une idée plus nuancée selon laquelle des contre-coalitions puissantes et des facteurs contextuels ont permis aux groupes communautaires de prévenir le développement. Dans les deux villes, des oppositions bien organisées, avec des histoires d'activisme, invoquant des idées autour du «droit à la ville», opérant dans des contextes de systèmes de partis politiques municipaux forts, semblaient être des facteurs plus importants que la fragilité des coalitions de croissance individuelles.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Typically, urban growth coalitions win. Oriented to the intensification of land use, urban growth coalitions—or urban growth machines—frequently consist of local development businesses, municipal politicians and government, as well as a variety of other actors (such as sports teams, unions and small businesses) interested in pursuing urban growth (Molotch, 1976). Despite resistance, across countless cities, major developments have been pushed through with the justification that 'growth is good', in large part because of place-bound elites with a vested interest in land use intensification being disproportionately involved in and in turn holding much of the power in local politics and governance.

There is some evidence this may be changing. Even when united urban growth coalitions push for development, recent scholarship notes several examples of failure (Darrah-Okike, 2017; Lauermann, 2016; Lauermann & Vogelpohl, 2017). This shift may reflect an increasing fragility of urban growth coalitions. Ultimately, any challenge to the dominance of urban growth coalitions could have major ramifications for municipal governance and shift policy orientation from a narrow pro-growth orientation. Through examining three cases, two of growth coalition failure (Tempelhof Field and Loto-Quebec's casino project), and one of a major concession (the Bâtiment 7/CN Yards project), the robustness of urban growth coalitions as well as the applicability of recent updates to urban growth machine theory will be investigated.

The first case concerns the proposed redevelopment of Tempelhof Field, a former inner-city airport in Berlin, Germany. Resistance to its redevelopment emerged as the government planned its closure and solicited alternative plans for the usage of the site. Following its closure as a functional airport, the government opened the site to the public

as a park. As the governing coalition and its partners solidified redevelopment plans, which included affordable housing, a new national public library as well as commercial space, resistance intensified based on maintaining its use as a public space and park. This resistance culminated in opponents to the development using a legal mechanism, the Volksentscheid (similar to a referendum) to pass a law banning development on the site.

The first of the two Montreal case studies is Loto-Quebec's proposal to move and expand Montreal's casino from its then (and current) location on an island close to Montreal to a plot of land adjacent to the City's downtown core known as the Peel Basin. The project would have significantly expanded on the size of the existing Casino; project proponents argued it would have significant economic benefits, both for Montreal and the neighbourhood where it was to be located. While the business community supported the project, government support was tentative. After the release of a provincial report mandating citizen consultations before a final decision would be taken, one of the projects two major partners backed out (Cirque du Soleil) and Loto-Quebec abandoned the project. There was vocal criticism of the proposed project, primarily from the neighbourhood of Pointe-Saint Charles (PSC), where neighbourhood community organizations argued moving the Casino there would increase gentrification pressures and negatively impact the health of PSC residents.

The second Montreal case was the development of the former CN Rail Yards. This plot of land, formerly railyards and workshops, was directly adjacent to the Peel Basin site and was within the Pointe-Saint Charles neighbourhood. The developer, Groupe Mach proposed a relatively straightforward albeit large condominium development project for the site. The campaigns and maneuvering were geographically localized, primarily occurring in one neighbourhood though playing into broader debates on progress and

requiring responses from different scales of government. Ultimately, citizen groups (almost entirely the same individuals and organizations that resisted the Loto-Quebec project), in partnership with local government officials obtained significant concessions on affordable housing and the provision of community space. This community space, a former administrative and storage building known as Bâtiment 7 was the focus of much of the media and community organizing attention.

As first articulated by Harvey Molotch in 1976, increasing land values, or 'growth' is the shared priority of the majority of local place-bound elites. This is a shared priority because, for various reasons, local decisions impact the 'bottom line' of their businesses, which incentivises their participation in local governance. The result of this system of incentivization means that growth often drives the agenda of urban governance. According to Logan and Molotch (2007), development in advance of "exchange values" of land, the value one gets from trading or selling land, increased through land use intensification, directly threatens citizens' "use values", the value an individual gets from use of land (i.e. shelter or enjoyment of a park) and is the foundation of conflict between local pro-growth elites and anti-development activists. These three cases illustrate examples where citizens, fighting for the "use values" of sites in their cities were able to halt land use intensification or obtain major concessions to improve "use values" despite entrenched systems of incentives favouring land use intensification. Importantly, these three cases raise important questions for differences in how these growth machines function in the cities of Berlin and Montreal and how citizens were able to resist their pressures.

While Logan and Molotch (2007) were relatively doubtful of the ability of citizens' groups to resist the urban growth machine, they did identify several factors which made it more

likely. Molotch (1976) argued the emergence of a "counter coalition" able to challenge a pro-growth coalition was likely to be made up of middle-class groups with a history of activism. More recent scholarship has argued that the greatest determinant for community success in resisting development, is the presence of a fragile growth machine, and the ability to capitalize on this fragility (Darrah-Okike, 2017; Lauermann & Vogelpohl, 2017). By examining the relative strengths and weaknesses of both Berlin and Montreal's urban growth coalitions as well as the counter-coalitions that emerged, these theorizations will be tested.

Ultimately, the results of this study show it is difficult to gauge the level of growth machine fragility, or opponent strength that was necessary to oppose development projects or achieve major concessions successfully. This study did find that there were several commonalities between the successful resistance movements in Berlin and Montreal. The most important appeared to be the strength of these 'counter-coalitions' or citizens' movements which in both cities were well organized, and had a core of motivated activists. Both cities additionally, have a long history of social activism, and in all three cases, opponents to the development projects invoked ideas around who has the 'right to the city' while proposing alternative plans. As well, both Berlin and Montreal have strong municipal party systems which likely allowed more effective lobbying on behalf of citizens groups. This study also suggests that updates to growth machine theory, arguing growth machine fragility is increasing, do not necessarily map well on to different contexts.

Overview of Study

Through examining these cases together, one in which a united growth coalition failed to achieve a development, one in which a fractured urban growth coalition failed to achieve

a development, and one in which a more fragmented coalition made major concessions, the possibility of increasing growth coalition fragility will be explored. The comparative nature of this study allows us to not only place each case into perspective but allows us to explore the causes and effects of these failures or partial successes (Tilly, 1984). The conflicts over these sites, both former sites of major transportation infrastructure, seen for their prime development potential illuminate changing tactics and potentially changing possibilities of success for citizen resistance.

The objective of this research is: firstly, to determine what caused the failure of Berlin's and Montreal's development proponents in the Tempelhof and Loto-Quebec cases and why the proponents of development in Montreal's Bâtiment 7/CN Railyards case provided major concessions and, secondly, to determine if this is indicative of increasing growth coalition fragility in either city, and finally to examine how closely these failures and concessions adhere to growth machine theory both as originally conceived by Logan and Molotch, as well as, recent updates. . To this end, five chapters will follow a literature review; an outline of the methodology; discussion of the proposed development plans; analysis; and conclusions and recommendations.

The second chapter is a detailed literature review delving into growth machine theory and urban regime theory. Key tenets identified will be the theory's origins; the actors involved in typical urban growth coalitions and; the transferability of urban growth machine theory—a notably U.S. centric theory—to other jurisdictions. This chapter also examines the evolution of community resistance to urban growth machines, and an increasing volume of literature suggesting urban growth coalitions are growing increasingly fragile.

Chapter three provides an overview of the methodology that has informed the research. Extensive media scans, as well as publicly available documents and reports were used to examine the Tempelhof, Loto-Quebec and Bâtiment 7/CN Railyards projects, providing insight into the actors, arguments and contexts in which each of these developments took place. Additionally, semi-structured interviews with key informants were conducted to further understand the outcomes of these projects.

Chapter four discusses the proposed plans and relies on media, primary sources (policy documents, media releases and others), and interviews to explore the development plans and community responses.   This section will include visual representations of the proposals, and identify the key actors and narrative arguments of both development proponents and opponents, tracing the evolution of the arguments and their coverage in the media over the course of the conflicts. This chapter will also detail the results of each of these development plans.

The fifth chapter analyses the development projects using urban growth machine theory to understand how the development conflicts played out and evaluating how each project contributes to the evolution of growth machine theory. One of the major implications is that while all three cases fit into various aspects that suggest weakening urban growth coalitions, the main underlying trend is the strength of the resistance movements and the tactics they utilized. In analysing this finding against growth machine literature, the conditions that led development failure or major concessions seem to fit most accurately Molotch (1976)'s conceptions of when resistance would be successful, and only partially fit into updated theoretical conceptions of growth machine fragility as advanced by other scholars.

The final chapter concludes with what conditions seem to be most indicative of the successful resistance to major development projects by communities. The chapter also summarizes what the case studies imply for urban growth machine theory and presents future avenues of research to pursue.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
An Introduction to Urban Growth Machine Theory

"I feel like they were as surprised as anybody that the casino project…when the casino backed down. I don't think anyone thought it was going to be that easy" (Personal interview, March 13, 2017). When a major development project fails often the most natural response is surprise. Most European and North American cities have been shaped by these projects, which typically are sold to citizens based on arguments they will encourage economic rejuvenation, create jobs, and other benefits that tend to never materialize to the degree they were promised. When resistance does happen, these protestors are often unsuccessful and dismissed by the political and business classes as preventing progress. Since its first articulation in by Harvey Molotch in 1976 urban growth machine theory has been a foundational lens to understand local government and political economy. As such, urban growth machine theory has been challenged, debated, and expanded numerous times. In order to better understand the shifts that may be occurring within growth machine theory, this literature review will first introduce the theory and closely related offshoots, discuss its transferability to contexts outside of its American origins, and trace the evolution of the discussion of resistance to the growth machine and its possible increasing fragility.

A wide range of scholarship in urban studies has identified the centrality of land development to urban politics. Arguably the most influential idea in this scholarship has been the "growth machine". First identified by Molotch in 1976, the core concept is the opinion that land-use intensification (increasing land values, or 'growth') is a shared priority of the majority of place-bound urban elites. As argued by Logan and Molotch (2007) p. 62 "The people who use their time and money to participate in local affairs are the ones who – in vast disproportion to their representation – have the most to lose or

gain from land use decisions". Local-elites are not universally inclined towards land-use intensification, instead it is because those who invest time and resources to participate in local politics are. Their bottom lines are impacted by the number of residents, nearby land uses, or economic opportunities their localities can provide. This accordingly allows consensus among those who participate. Non-place-bound elites, those for whom local government does not drive their economic success, are instead more invested at lobbying at other scales that do, such as the national level. Accordingly, those motivated and able to use their resources to participate in local governance are typically those disproportionately invested in local growth. This often leads to growth dominating the agenda of urban governance. While these elites may differ in other opinions or on how best to accomplish growth, this shared goal means that the agenda of urban governance is often dominated by its pursuit and serves as the main point of consensus among urban elites (Logan & Molotch, 2007). Local government is seen as one means to achieve this growth. According to Logan and Molotch (2007), development in the advance of "exchange values" of land, the value one gets from trading or selling land, directly threatens citizens' "use values", the value an individual gets from use of land (i.e. shelter or enjoyment of a park) and is the foundation of conflict between local pro-growth elites and anti-development activists.

Local governments have become further influenced to a pro-growth orientation by the shift in urban governments from managerial functions to entrepreneurial roles. City and local governments were traditionally focused on management of services, such as trash removal and water sanitation. Over the course the second half of the 20th century many local governments reoriented themselves to attracting mobile businesses and capital to improve their local economies (Harvey, 1989). This need to attract capital and business (or risk falling behind) is often used as justification for significant public investment or

encouraging private investment by insuring the risk with public funds or support. To secure growth this means that local urban growth coalitions compete against other localities, as well as any possible local resistance motivated by the use values of the areas slated for development (Logan & Molotch, 2007). The increasing pressure for local governments to attract economic growth is in turn used to justify public expenditure in support of the land use intensification and development goals of local urban growth coalitions.

In their theorization of the urban growth machine Logan and Molotch (2007) identify many of the typical members of urban growth coalitions. The most integral are local business people, especially those involved in real estate and development, and local politicians. Local politicians are enticed to work closely with this group for two main reasons. Firstly, in the North American context, local governments are highly dependent on property tax revenues. Land use intensification and increases in land values provide local governments more tax revenues. Secondly, place-bound local business people provide the majority of campaign donations which local politicians rely on to get elected. Accordingly, these two main groups are likely to work closely together to facilitate land use intensification. Other actors incentivised to lobby local government in the name of growth traditionally include the local media. Increased local growth allows for increased circulation and increased profits. While identified as playing an important role in controlling the narratives around development, and in turn the developments successful completion (Boyle, 1999) the impacts of shifts within the media landscape on the success of urban growth coalitions remains under investigated in academic research (Gibson, 2004). Other growth coalition supporters usually include unions (who can be swayed in the name of jobs through growth for their members) and small business owners who feel any growth will result in more business and may include local sports teams and

universities who have a vested interest in the growth of their localities (Logan & Molotch, 2007).

Alongside urban regime theory (discussed below), urban growth machine theory remains predominant for interpreting local growth politics despite the shifts of the past forty years (Cox, 2017); the two "represent the two most important analytical frameworks through which urban development has been analyzed within US political science" (Brenner 2009:123). A major factor in this is the fact that the systems which have given rise to urban growth machines, including local government revenue dependence and a lack of activist national state, have largely remained the same (Wachsmuth, 2017). Despite this predominance in the field, urban growth theory's applicability in other contexts, as well as its continued strength, have been called into question.

There are two theoretical concepts crucial to understanding the contemporary functioning of urban growth machines: urban regime theory and urban entrepreneurialism. Urban regime analysis argues that "Although politics is not a process irrevocably closed to any group, meaningful political influence rests on the ability to meet important threshold tests" (Stone, 2005) p. 313. The two main thresholds to be included in a regime as identified by Stone (2005) and Stoker (1995) p. 60 are: possessing strategic knowledge of the landscape of individuals and organizations with social capital and an ability to act upon that knowledge (i.e. call in favours or broker deals); and control of resources, be they political (i.e. ability to motivate voters), monetary or other. This creates limitations and organizational costs to obtaining power. Additionally, the system is reinforcing as the high transaction means established relationships hold great value in facilitating goals and inherently discourages participants in the governing regime from discarding them (Stone, 1993). Importantly Stone (2005) notes that even the formal levers

of government represent part of what dictates public policy, and political operates rely on partners outside the government to be effective in implementing policy and programmatic goals. This contrasts with previous analytical approaches, such as pluralism as advanced by Dahl (1961) who theorized a far more fluid arrangement, in terms of participants and agenda setting. Urban regime analysis, as articulated by Stone (2005), reinforces the power structures of urban settings and illuminates how urban growth coalitions are able to function. While individual urban regimes have been shown to have diverse sets of goals, rather than a single focus on land use intensification Stone's work provides insight into how power is obtained and managed in local contexts.

With his 1989 work David Harvey articulated the change in the orientation of local governments from management of services, towards the need to attract jobs and economic growth. He called this new phase 'urban entrepreneurialism'. While as Molotch (1976) originally identified, urban growth coalitions had always been interested in growth, the movement towards urban entrepreneurialism reflected a decrease in the resources available to local governments and an increasing competition within urban systems as changes to the structure of the economy made capital and jobs more mobile (Harvey, 1989). To obtain growth, local governments have tended to take on increasing levels of risk in partnership with private sector firms, typically through public-private partnerships. This increase in public-private partnerships facilitated moving discussions behind closed doors and evades many of the checks and balances of typical democratic systems (Short, 1999). Frequently, major sports events or infrastructures such as stadiums are justified with the need to put their locality on the map and attract capital. Richard Florida (2005)'s influential 'creative class' argument—which suggested that cities had to invest in cultural amenities to attract increasingly mobile workforces—signalled a diversification of

strategies of entrepreneurialism, one taken up readily by urban growth coalitions (MacLeod & Jones, 2011).

Urban growth machines typically justify development and attempt to bypass resistance by invoking the argument of "value-free growth" (Logan & Molotch, 2007). The basic tenant of the idea is selling any development on the merits that growth is inherently good and has value regardless of specific form (Logan & Molotch, 2007). As Boyle (1999) argues, it attempts to deemphasize the connection between growth and exchange values, painting growth as a broad public good. This allows growth coalitions to ask for sacrifices (Troutman, 2004), to entice labour unions to support their projects (Logan & Molotch, 2007), and to sell ideas beyond the immediate interested or conflicting parties (Logan & Molotch, 2007). Value-free growth tends to be most effectively invoked during difficult economic times and less effective when there is not a pressing need for job creation (Troutman, 2004). Kimelberg (2011) p. 83 in her study of real estate and development professionals in the United States found these professionals largely view that "success or failure" was dictated by the extent they could navigate relationships with key actors and recognize the interests that each had in the development process." This speaks to the invoking of the value-free growth argument as a mechanism to line up all actors behind growth. In selling growth, growth machines have become extremely creative tying specific development projects into universalizing concepts such as civic pride and selling them as matters of absolute necessity (Boyle, 1999).

Several writers have researched and developed ideas around the growth machine's control of the narrative as an essential element of their ability to dictate the agenda and institute their plans (Logan & Molotch, 2007; Short, 1999). This ability to dominate the agenda has become increasingly important for local elites both for external competition

with other urban areas and for selling projects within their own localities. Narrative of control has been identified as particularity important to large-scale urban development projects (Boyle, 1999; Loftman & Nevin, 1996; Swyngedouw, Moulaert, & Rodriguez., 2002). In more critical interpretations, such projects are typically represented in terms of efforts made by local elites to refashion collective emotion and consciousness within cities in order to legitimate political projects that function primarily in their interests. (Boyle, 1999) p. 55. Typically, these projects are oriented to major redevelopments of former brownfields with new cultural, commerce, or sport amenities economies (Swyngedouw et al., 2002). Examples such as Barcelona's or Baltimore's waterfront redevelopment projects, or the Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao, are frequently invoked as justification for substantial public expenditures. Growth proponents' ability to create a one-sided narrative contributes to the usual success of these projects (Cain, 2014; Kirkpatrick & Smith, 2011; Kulcsar & Domokos, 2005).

Urban growth machine theory: how does it map on to non-American contexts?

The origins of growth machine theory are directly rooted in Molotch (1976)'s observations of postwar American cities (Jonas & Wilson, 1999). The context-specific origins of this theory, and uneven results of its application elsewhere have created disagreements within the literature regarding the extent of its transferability (Cox, 2017; Jonas & Wilson, 1999). Scholars have broadly argued the more similar institutional and structural factors are with the U.S., specifically around the lack of central government driven property intervention, and the reliance on property taxes, the increasing likelihood of seeing American type growth machines (Brenner, 2009; Cox, 2017; Gotham, 2000). These disagreements over its transferability have not stopped researchers from applying the theory to contexts from China (Zhang, 2014) to Italy (Vicari & Molotch, 1990) to Israel (Kirby & Abu-Rass, 1999) to

post-socialist Hungary (Kulcsar & Domokos, 2005) among others. The justification for these cross national studies are supported by Brenner (2009)'s p. 122 argument that "Growth machines must be understood as national politico-institutional constructs rather than as internally generated products of purely "urban" or "local" mobilizations". As such, regardless of the presence of the atypical American style 'city as a growth machine', the theory has proven itself useful as a lens to examine local politics in other contexts.

Jonas and Wilson (1999) p. 14 argue that the defining features of American cities are the decentralization of powers and political system that encourages the development of land for private profit. Jessop, Peck, and Tickell (1999) p.145 identify four key features that are most likely to be present where American style growth machines emerge: local governments having taxation powers, depending primarily on local tax revenues, and having control over land use policies; local governments being relatively autonomous from other tiers; weak party organization; and no explicitly "anti-growth" political party. While Brenner (2009) p. 127-129 also subscribes to an exceptionalism of the American environment as particularly conducive to urban growth coalitions, he identifies five key factors: the institutionalized power of private capital, reflecting the comparative power of the 'rentier class' to make decisions regarding land uses, capital investment, and job location; the devolved power structures of American federalism, which provides states and municipalities substantial power to differentiate and attract mobile labour and capital; the heavy reliance of municipalities on locally collected revenues, which he notes have been declining over the 20th century; the reliance of municipalities on private capital markets as a source of lending; and the fragmentation of metropolitan areas into multiple governmental units. As with the general transferability of urban growth theory, Short (1999) argues that boosterism and narrative control strategies are more common in the United States than Europe.

Little work has been done on the explicit transferability of urban growth machine theory, and urban regime theory to the Canadian context (Gill, 2000; Surborg, VanWynsberghe, & Wyly, 2008). The lack of specific attention seems most likely due to the large-scale similarities of urban systems between Canada and the United States. In addition, these similarities include a frequently fragmented governance structure in individual metropolitan areas and a lack of strong intervention or coordination by higher levels of government. These factors are generally more extreme in the United States, with more municipal fragmentation and less coordination from higher levels of government, but this is not universally true. This changes from local context to context, with some governments (notably Ontario) being more willing to intervene directly in local growth policies.

"Cities in Western Europe are decidedly not growth machines in the way that Molotch has described for the USA, and they never were" (Cox, 2017) p. 398. One aspect of institutional difference between Western European and the United States identified by multiple scholars was the fact that typically Western European states are more willing to intervene in local property markets and local policies (Cox, 2017; Harding, 1994; Strom, 1996). Writing in 1996, Strom identifies this as a reason that there is less competition and less adherence to urban entrepreneurialism in Western Europe. Part of this is likely due to European states taking a more formal role in urban issues decreasing inter-urban competition within their nation states (Logan & Molotch, 2007). This idea was partially challenged by Neil Brenner (2004) who argued that instead of decreasing inter-urban competition, European states' intervention in local policy has the expressed goal of increasing the competitiveness of their cities (usually a select chosen few) at the national scale. Regardless this national level intervention means that place-bound actors are more

likely to have to lobby at different scales, possibly decreasing their overall clout at any individual level.

While there is more state-level intervention in development politics, European cities have undergone many of the same transformations as their American counterparts. Both in terms of moving towards state neoliberalism and urban entrepreneurialism. These forces remain less powerful in the Western European context as many of the states, and the European Union itself, remain more potent regulatory agents and more engaged in redistribution to reduce spatial inequalities than the federal governments of the United States or Canada (Cox, 2017; Leitner & Sheppard, 1999). Additionally, Brenner (2009) identifies multiple factors such as political parties generally more suspicious of private capital than in the United States. This attitude is also highlighted by Cox (2017) in differentiating Western Europe from the American context.

Like the United States, Germany has a federated system of government but has significantly different power and revenue sharing models and many other substantial institutional differences exist. Compared to in the U.S., Germany has a far higher degree of revenue sharing between states and urban areas (Jessop et al., 1999; Strom, 1996). Additionally, it has been theorized that the stronger role of the German federal state, and its comparatively higher levels of cooperation with state and municipal governments, means local governments are less dependent on public-private partnerships than their North American counterparts (Cox, 2017; Vogelpohl & Buchholz, 2017). This provides a higher degree of policy insulation from private sector urban elites (Vogelpohl & Buchholz, 2017). Despite this comparatively higher policy insulation, starting in the early 1990s, local governments in urban areas across Germany began moving towards more entrepreneurial

stances, for example with respect to issues such as unemployment and economic decline (Strom, 1995)

In East Germany there was not a capitalist class of landowning elites (Kulcsar & Domokos, 2005). Accordingly, Kulcsar and Domokos (2005) argue that in post-Socialist states both elites and potential opposition groups are weaker. Using the case of Hungary, they argue that this leads to growth being seen as less contentious, and facilitates pro-growth decision making (Kulcsar & Domokos, 2005). Considering the economic difficulties faced by former East German states, it seems plausible that arguments surrounding 'value-free growth' and jobs would have held significant sway, possibly higher than in their counterparts in former West Germany.

Berlin is atypical within the German context due to its nature as a city-state (along with Bremen and Hamburg). This provides Berlin with greater power, coordination, and revenue opportunities than a typical German local government. While Berlin has a borough system, these local governments can be overridden on any issue by the state government (Strom, 1996). Strom (1996) claims that growth machine and urban regime theories are a helpful tool in illuminating aspects of Berlin's urban politics which are frequently overlooked by the domestic literature. She argues that Berlin's experience has been shaped by patterns of federal support, the weak organization of private sector interests. Strom (1996) suggests that both the (unsuccessful) bid for the 2000 Summer Olympics and the sale of Potsdamer Platz did not showcase the emergence of a strong growth regime. Instead the actors involved seemed tenuous and a strong opposition emerged to both.

As a city that received significant public support (from both former German governments) and as a city without a local private sector elite for the eastern half, it seems logical that a strong private sector elite would not have formed as early as 1996. Accordingly, it is probably that since then, Berlin's urban growth coalition would have undergone major shifts, likely strengthening as new and powerful place-bound elites established themselves. Regardless of this possible strengthening of Berlin's growth coalition, vocal opposition to many major development projects has been consistent and with the exception of the Olympic bid, largely unsuccessful.

Resistance to the Urban Growth Machine

According to growth machine theory, the foundational conflict of urban politics is between growth coalition members attempting to maximize the exchange value of urban land, and residents attempting to protect the use values of urban land. To this end, both groups, identified by Jonas and Wilson (1999) broadly as 'rentiers' and 'residents', attempt to lobby different orders of government to purse their interests. Rentiers push to use the resources of the state for further development, while residents advocate for limits through formal legal mechanisms such as zoning (Jonas & Wilson, 1999).

Much of the literature on growth machine resistance focuses on the highly visible debates surrounding public funding of sports stadiums (Cain, 2014; Delaney & Eckstein, 2007) and major sporting events such as the Olympics (Burbank, Heying, & Andranovich, 2000; Lauermann, 2016; Lauermann & Vogelpohl, 2017; Surborg et al., 2008). This focus on major sports events and stadiums may be due to their high visibility, and the fact that they are frequently, if often unsuccessfully challenged. Other common topics include how development controls (primarily in suburban jurisdictions) have challenged the success of developments, and in turn, the success of localized pro-growth coalitions (Fischel, 2017;

Phelps, 2012). Less has been written on the relationship between urban growth machine theory and alternative challenges, but such literature exists, for example with respect to citizen resistance to the Stuttgart 21 Train Station mega project (Novy & Peters, 2013) or a large-scale Hawaiian resort community (Darrah-Okike, 2017). Additionally, as noted by Brenner (2009), much of the focus has been on resistance at the local level, ignoring the fact that quite often legal challenges and battles over specific developments, are conducted at different levels of government.

In his initial theorization of the growth machine, Molotch (1976) saw the possibility of an emerging "counter coalition" with the power and ability to challenge the dominance of pro-growth coalitions. Molotch (1976) p. 327 identified middle class groups, with a history of activism opposing a relatively weak growth coalition as the conditions in which this "counter coalition" would most likely succeed. This was in contrast to low socio-economic or ethnic minority communities which were expected to have weaker institutions defending their interests or these communities resources were more likely to be diffused in broader struggles (Logan, Whaley, & Crowder, 1997). Logan and Molotch (2007) seemed to become increasingly doubtful about the ability of 'counter-coalitions' to resist the growth machine, stating "Only under rather extraordinary circumstances is this consensus [for growth] endangered" (p.51). Since its initial articulation, there has been consistent debate on if the growth machine is weakening, or failing, or 'on hold' because of contemporary factors (Bennett, McCourt, Nyden, & Squires, 1988; Delaney & Eckstein, 2007; Logan & Molotch, 2007; Molotch, 1976; Molotch & Logan, 1984; Purcell, 2000). The debate seems to be emerging yet again with scholarship directly focused on investigating weakening urban growth coalitions (Darrah-Okike, 2017; Fischel, 2017; Lauermann & Vogelpohl, 2017).

Various reasons for increasing growth machine weakness have been articulated: A suburbanization, where governments cater to 'home voters' instead of a coalition of elites, therefore because of 'home voters' co-opting the local government (instead of rentiers), they are able to institute zoning and growth controls which (Been, Madar, & McDonnell, 2014; Fischel, 2017; MacLeod, 2011; Phelps, 2012); a rescaling whereby decisions are being made at an order of government that bypasses local elites, creating different value propositions for each local coalition (Molotch & Logan, 1984; Purcell, 2000; Wachsmuth, 2017b); or signal diverging interests between local actors and non-locally tied capital (Kirkpatrick & Smith, 2011); transformations of local economies whereby there are less place-based corporations and workforces (Lauermann & Vogelpohl, 2017; Purcell, 2000); or in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) a declining capacity of local government to enact pro-growth coalition policies (Kirkpatrick & Smith, 2011; Schindler, 2016).

In her 2011 investigation Kimelberg found real estate professionals, part of the rentier group of land interested local business, identified four key factors that threatened the success of their proposed developments: politicians' interests in getting re-elected; the professional views and interests of economic development staff; zoning rules, regulation and enforcement; and resistance from local communities (Kimelberg, 2011). The first three of these factors arguably represent internal divisions about how and where development should be directed and do not challenge the concept of the inherent value of growth itself. The forth factor—resistance from local community groups—likely depends on the type of resistance: piecemeal resistance or generalized antigrowth sentiment, as articulated by Burbank et al. (2000). Kimelberg notes that real estate professionals raised concerns about the lack of unified vision because of the heterogeneity of community groups (2011) p. 91, again likely more accurately identifying divergence is as to where development should occur and not challenging its inherent desirability. Overall Kimelberg

(2011) p. 93-4 argued that those within urban growth coalitions claim that things are less coordinated and less growth-oriented than Molotch (1976)'s theory may suggest.

Burbank et al. (2000) have identified two types of resistance, a general anti-growth movement and a resistance on a project to project basis. They argue that conflicts invoking threats to use values are typically fought on a wider scale, usually that of the entire city, and have greater potential for the success of anti-growth advocates than piecemeal resistance. One example they site as illustrative of this is San Francisco's proposition M which capped office space, limiting further development (Burbank et al., 2000). The other form of typical resistance identified is that of piecemeal resistance which Burbank et al. (2000) characterize as inherently reactive, as there needs to be an initial project to resist. They characterize piecemeal resistance as highly local (usually within the immediate proximity of the proposed development). Typical resistance strategies falling into this category include trying to make the location unattractive to encourage developers to implement their project elsewhere or to use disruption as leverage to negotiate community benefit, such as affordable housing or a reduced project (Burbank et al., 2000).These types of contestation of growth can broadly be reduced to the two types identified by Brenner (2009)p. 123, as groups invoking arguments of use-values or NIMBYist movements.

Recent scholarship has argued that the greatest determinant for community success in resisting development, is the presence of a fragile growth machine, and the ability to capitalize on this fragility (Darrah-Okike, 2017; Lauermann & Vogelpohl, 2017). Factors for groups to capitalize on this fragility have been identified as their utilizing a broad argument to organize around (such as 'right to the city') (Darrah-Okike, 2017; Fischel, 2017), and activating legal mechanisms to delay or stall the process (Darrah-Okike, 2017;

Fischel, 2017). Fischel (2017) argues that this broad argument for organizing resistance does not have to represent what may be the true interest in opposing development. In his example, suburban homeowners invoke the idea of protecting the environment, but are primarily interested in maintaining home values (Fischel, 2017) p. 21. Other success factors that have been identified include linkages between the group resisting development and existing activist organizations (Burbank et al., 2000), which typically include neighbourhood organizations and environmental groups (Burbank et al., 2000; Scheider & Teske, 1993).

Evaluating the latest scholarship focused on urban growth machine weakness or fragility reveals several different theoretical directions. Lauermann and Vogelpohl (2017) argue that growth coalition fragility is the most important factor in recent Olympic bids of Boston and Hamburg. This argument contrasts earlier assertions within the scholarship that the strength of the resistance movements was the most important factor determining growth machine success (Clark & Goetz, 1994). They define fragility within growth coalitions as a "lack of resilience within a growth coalition, linked to contested notions of growth and shifting allegiances within the coalitions" p. 1888. These fractures are often reveled by strong oppositional movements or other disruptions to a growth agenda. To further future scholarship and identification of fragile growth machines Lauermann and Vogelpohl (2017) develop a framework utilizing four metrics: challenged notions of growth; changing composition of the actors in urban growth coalitions; the triggering of several fractures simultaneously and; the potential for re-establishment p. 1890-1891.

Darrah-Okike (2017) in her examination of a major real estate development project in Hawaii, found that institutions at other scales could be used to block development, that locations more in demand (especially because of tourism) can leverage these

geographies, and local anti-development activists can take advantage of global events (the Great Financial Crisis in this case) to halt development. Unlike Lauermann and Vogelpohl (2017) she is less focused on the possible implications for other jurisdictions. Ultimately, she concludes her case illustrates that social movements can successfully oppose local growth machines.

Fischel (2017) argues that homeowners subvert rentiers as those in control of local politics. This group, interested in preserving home values, uses broad arguments (such as being pro-environment) to justify their anti-development attitudes and actions. Broadly, Fischel supports the assertion that those most successful in resisting development are middle and high-income groups.

All three of these cases may just be new examples of temporary fragility within their respective urban growth coalitions. This temporary fragility may be overcome through an influx of non-local capital (Harding, 1994; Molotch & Logan, 1984) or a wavering of economic growth (Troutman, 2004). A period of economic contraction or uncertainty is in turn used as justification of the necessity of growth through development to create jobs; economic downturns accordingly serve to increase the viability of the 'value-free growth argument' (Troutman, 2004). The ability of growth coalitions to overcome this temporary fragility, is likely due to the fact that they have a systematic advantage of resources and connections (Warner & Molotch, 1995). For example, Delaney and Eckstein (2007) compare the local urban growth coalitions and stadium construction in Cincinnati and Minneapolis. At the time of their writing, local elites had been successful in acquiring major public support and financing for stadium construction in Cincinnati but not Minneapolis. They argued that this was due to a weakness in Minneapolis's pro-growth coalition of elites. Despite this, Minneapolis ultimately received major public financial

support for the construction of two stadiums. What this suggests, is that the weakness in the case of Minneapolis's growth coalition was temporary, or that even as a 'weak' growth coalition they were ultimately able to achieve their goals because of systemic advantages. As such, the cases in Boston, Hamburg, and Hawaii may just be examples of temporary fragility and not indicative of any long-term trends. A further examination of case studies in Berlin and Montreal will provide additional insight.

Most literature arguing for increasing growth machine weakness uses the examples of failed mega-projects (Darrah-Okike, 2017; Delaney & Eckstein, 2007; Lauermann & Vogelpohl, 2017). Research on major concessions granted by pro-growth coalitions is far more limited (Cain, 2014). This is possibly because, as Cain (2014) argues, concessions (specifically through Community Benefit Agreements) may challenge value-free growth, but do not substantially alter the results or how growth machines function (Cain, 2014). Bornstein (2010) argues that those involved with planning mega projects have become inclined to provide concessions, occasionally even substantial ones. While potentially beneficial to both sides, the long-term impacts have, specifically around delivering benefits and being enforced, been underexplored (Buchanan, 2010).

In writing about the possibility of community benefits from mega-projects, Bornstein (2010) p. 206 argues that "the emergence of alliances between community groups and decision makers can shift the terrain, encouraging – or even forcing – developers into discussions". This represents a realm of possibility, where community resistance movements can focus on 'flipping' decision makers from within the growth coalition, to resisting growth. This would reflect piecemeal resistance though, and would be unlikely to challenge the systematic advantage of municipal or other governments in pursuing growth.

Conclusion: Tracing the evolution of urban growth machine theory

This chapter traced the origins of urban growth machine theory and its foundational standpoints, including its relationship with other urban governance theories notably regime theory and urban entrepreneurialism. The core of urban growth machine theory is the idea of place-bound elites lobbying and partnering with local government to encourage growth and development. While conflicts arise within this coalition as to where growth should occur, fundamentally all partners are unified around the general encouragement of land use intensification.

This chapter also evaluated the scholarship regarding the use of urban growth machine theory for comparative studies, and its transferability to other jurisdictions, including Western Europe broadly and Canada and Germany specifically. While American cities tend to most closely resemble 'growth machines' the theory provides useful context to understanding urban politics and political economy more broadly. Literature suggests for a variety of factors Western European cities are comparatively less growth focused than their American and Canadian counterparts.

As noted throughout the literature, urban political conflicts over development typically occur between growth coalition members attempting to maximize the exchange value of urban land, and residents attempting to protect the use values of urban land. Much of the earlier scholarship focused on the potential success of anti-growth advocates being based on the strength of their movements, but highlighted that their success was unlikely. The literature has noted a decrease in the strength of many growth coalitions for a variety of reasons, including rescaling of governance, the co-opting of government by 'home

voters', the transformation of economies generally weakening the power of place-bound elites, and macroeconomic events such as the GFC.

Berlin and Montreal's case studies will be evaluated using this theoretical lens of possible increasing growth coalition weakness. This will provide further contextualization of growth machine theory, both on its transferability from the original American origins, as well as on the possible increasing weakness or fragility of urban growth coalitions.

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this study is to explore if urban growth coalitions' ability to successfully encourage development is changing because of increased fragility and how this relates to existing urban growth machine theory. Using the theoretical lens of urban growth machines, this research examines how and why community groups were successful in either stopping developments or obtaining significant concessions. It identifies the key actors, their public arguments and contextual factors that influenced the outcomes. Through this, it attempts to gauge how much of the result may be attributed to divisions and fractures within Berlin and Montreal's urban growth coalitions respectively, and how much is due to other factors. To explore the potential trend of increasing fragility in Berlin and Montreal's urban growth coalitions, this study analyses primary documentation around the plans themselves, the arguments as conducted through the media and official statements by the actors involved, as well as key informant interviews. The study concludes with examining factors that allowed the community groups to be successful, with implications for growth machine and urban growth coalition theory moving forward, and potential avenues for future research.

The first stage of the research was an extensive media scan to determine the key issues and actors that were influential in the decision process. This included reading 47 articles ranging from 2007-2016 pertaining to the development of Tempelhof Field in Berlin and 52 articles from 2005-2018 pertaining to the Loto-Quebec and the Bâtiment 7/CN Rail Yards development projects in Montreal. Through this detailed media scan the key actors, their positions, and their core arguments were identified. Once these key actors and their positions were determined, information publicly available online was extensively explored.

The publicly available data from these sources, included press releases, official plans, publicly available social media comments and materials, a documentary on the Bâtiment 7/CN Rail Yards project, and consultation documents. These came from both governmental actors and formalized mandated processes such as official consolation exercises, and less formal projects and consultation exercises from community groups. Key documents within this category included the City of Montreal's consultation documents which contain extensive appendices of memorandums from interested parties; the results of the Tempelhof Field consultation; each developments' original plans and; related city planning and development documents. All translations based on these and other documents are the author's own.

Through both the media scan and analysis of other publicly available documents key informants were identified. After an Ethics Review granted through McGill University's Research Ethics Board Office (REB) twelve interviews were conducted with a total of thirteen individuals. These semi-structured interviews were conducted in person and lasted between 30 minutes and 90 minutes each. The interviews pertaining to the Tempelhof case in Berlin were conducted in June and July of 2017 whereas the interviews pertaining to the Montreal case study were conducted between March and May of 2018.

The purpose of these interviews was in part to determine the relationships between the different organizations, namely who was working with who, and how, to determine how these actors viewed those they were working with as well as those they were in conflict with. In addition, the narrative of arguments and perceptions of other groups' narratives were explored. Finally, questions were asked regarding if the project had changed the development milieu of the respective city. The results of these interviews expanded

greatly on the publicly available information and provided much of the core of the analysis.

These interviews were conducted with community organizations opposed to these developments, individuals associated with these groups, policy actors, and major figures within each city's growth coalitions. These types of organizations and key informants were identified based on the actors listed in the original conception of growth machine theory (Molotch, 1976). Most interviewees were identified through the scan of media and publicly available documents. Additional interviewees were identified through the snowball method.

Individuals interviewed included private developers involved with the projects, government staff, consultants, community organizers and activists and affiliated groups. While the majority chose to remain fully anonymous, two chose to identify their organization and one chose to publicly identify herself by name.

Role	Berlin	Montreal
Public sector planning professionals	2	0
Private sector planning professionals	2	3
Community/NGO representatives	4	2
Total interviews	8	5

The majority of important actors or representatives from the key organizations identified agreed to interviews, but some did not. This is partially due to the continued tensions around many of these issues and the busy nature of these actors. Many of these actors (such as politicians) had spoken extensively through the media or press releases. This provided insight into their answers to many of the questions posed to other interviewees.

There were several limitations to the methodology of this study. Both the Tempelhof and Bâtiment 7 cases were fresh in the minds of participants, but the Loto-Quebec project and its rejection occurred over ten years ago. For Montreal, this made finding individuals who could speak to both projects difficult. As previously mentioned, not all potential key-informants identified were interviewed. In both Berlin and Montreal, politicians were particularly challenging to interview. While publicly available statements, interviews, and documents somewhat made up for this lack of politicians, interviews with this group would have provided more insight into their motivations.

CHAPTER 4: THE PROPOSED PLANS FOR TEMPELHOF, THE PEEL BASIN AND THE FORMER CN RAILYARDS

This chapter presents the proposed developments and the conflicts that followed for Tempelhof Field in Berlin and Montreal's closely linked Loto-Quebec casino and Bâtiment 7/CN Yards projects. This chapter identifies the key proponents of each development and how they are representative or not representative of typical urban growth coalitions as described by Logan and Molotch (2007). Additionally, this chapter will identify the major arguments of both proponents and opponents of these projects and evaluate how well they fit into to traditional conceptions of urban boosterism and 'value-free growth'.

While there is some similarity in the scale of the Tempelhof Field project and Montreal's Loto-Quebec project, the Bâtiment 7/CN Yards project is more akin to a 'regular' albeit large condominium development. Despite this, both Montreal projects were largely opposed by the same individuals and organizations who employed similar arguments. Examining the arcs of these projects, who was present and who was not, how involved the urban growth coalition actors were, and what arguments they used, will allow reflection on the relative fragility of each growth coalition.

In the case of Berlin's Tempelhof Field, citizen groups were largely successful in preventing the development of the site because they were able to create a narrative that the project's proponents were untrustworthy. This enabled them to counter the purported benefits of the project as well as organize citizens behind their counterproposal. In both Montreal cases, citizens' groups mobilized a highly vocal opposition. This vocal opposition created political pressure to 'go slow' in the Loto-Quebec project, which ultimately induced one proponent whom the other deemed essential to drop out. These same opposition groups

also support community space in the case of the former CN Railyards, including the developer to hand over the keys for Bâtiment 7.

In the years leading up to the referendum to ban development on Tempelhof Field the population of Berlin increased substantially and the city experienced rapid economic growth. In 2013 approximately 50,000 people moved to Berlin (Fahmy & Urban, 2014; Thierfelder & Kabisch, 2015). In 2014, an additional 45,000 arrived (Amt fur Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg, 2016). This surge in residents (representing approximately 1.4% and 1.3% growth per year respectively) contributed to an increased demand for housing, which in turn influenced the increase in housing ownership and rental costs. The rapid rise of rental costs has been particularly hard felt. From January 2007 to September 2012 there was an increase in rent costs of 72.5%, with a yearly average increase of approximately 10% (Arandelovic & Bogunovich, 2014). While Berlin's historically low starting position can partially explain this, it is still a significant increase, especially considering the lower average income of Berliners (compared to residents of other German cities) (Arandelovic & Bogunovich, 2014). The issues for Berlin are compounded because most residents (approximately 85%) are renters (Fahmy & Urban, 2014). Schillerkiez, a neighbourhood adjacent to Tempelhof Field, went from being characterized by the media and government officials as crime-ridden to being seen as a highly sought over neighbourhood (Fahmy & Urban, 2014; Schönball, 2014). This increase in housing costs and issues around gentrification were prevalent throughout Berlin's media during this period.

The history of Tempelhof Field, and the proposal for the development of the site

Tempelhof Field is a former airport originally constructed in 1923. Prior to its use as an airport, the site was used as a recreational ground for nearby neighbourhoods and then as a training facility for the German army. It was Berlin's primary airport until the Second World War and


Figure 1: red shape denotes size and location of Tempelhof Field in Berlin

after was the site of an American airbase. During the Cold War, it was an essential link to defeat the Berlin blockade and keep two million West Berliners alive (D.S., 2012). Afterwards, it resumed its function as a passenger airport for smaller commercial planes, one of three airports serving Berlin. The site is over 300ha in size and is located within the ring formed by the commuter railway. This ring (known as the Ring Bahn) is the common demarcation of the inner city's boundaries. Since being opened to the public in 2010 the site has become very popular for recreation and helps nearby neighbourhoods manage heat-related stresses (Thierfelder & Kabisch, 2015).

The 2014 Volksentscheid, the referendum as to if Tempelhof Field would be developed, was not the first time the site's fate was publicly voted on. In 2008, in a separate referendum, Berliners voted on whether or not to keep the airport open (Blason &

Cummings, 2015). After the Second World War Tempelhof had increasingly become too small to handle both the types of airplanes landing there as well as increases in air traffic and by 1996 there were plans to close the airport. Finally, in 2008 the government decided to close the airport for good (Dannenberg & Follmann, 2015). Resistance to the government's decision was based on the supposed economic benefits of having a central city airport as well as the fact that its historical significance would be threatened by development (Dannenberg & Follmann, 2015). While a majority of those who voted were in favour of keeping the airport open, not a high enough percentage of the electorate voted and the airport was closed (Blason & Cummings, 2015). The future of the site seemed uncertain.

In 2009 the government of Berlin bought the former Tempelhof Airport site with the expressed intention of creating a new inner-city district, integrated with existing neighbouring districts (Arandelovic & Bogunovich, 2014). Essential project goals included paying for the land's initial purchase price as well as for the maintenance of the large terminal building (Schönball, 2014). Shortly afterwards, Berlin's Senate launched a design competition for a new site master plan to determine its future. While this was occurring, citizens began protesting the lack of public access to the unused site and in the summer of 2009 thousands of demonstrators tried to occupy the former airfield (Goldmann, 2011). Their main fear was that these lands would be sold to private investors to build expensive apartments, exacerbating the city's already increasingly problematic affordable housing issues (T. Mokosch, 2014). The goals of these protestors were supported by Berlin's Green and Left parties and opposed by the governing coalition led by Mayor Klaus Wowereit (Waleczek, 2009). These protests contributed to the government opening the site up to the public in May 2010 (Paul, 2014).

As a newly vacant and significant inner city site, Tempelhof was the subject of considerable speculation (Goldmann, 2011). Many saw the development of Tempelhof Field as a once in a lifetime opportunity due to its significant size, its inner city location, and how it became available during a period of economic growth (Tanja Mokosch, 2014). Importantly the land was publicly held, the majority initially by the federal government, who in turn sold it to Berlin. In 2011, after soliciting public feedback on design entries, the Berlin Senate Department for Urban Development and Environment announced the winner of a design competition to create a new master plan for the Tempelhof site. The design competition was a significant public relations challenge for the government of Berlin. Several proposed design alternatives were either outlandish, such as the proposal to turn the site into a 1,000m tall mountain (Jordana, 2009) or unpopular, such as transforming the area into a new red-light district (Paul, 2014). The public was able to vote on the design competition and provide some feedback, but the results of their input were unclear (Volkmann-Schluck, 2014). The founder of the winning firm publicly mused about making the next version of New York's High Line, how society needed new types of parks because it is now more individualistic. He called for retaining the park's flatness to "create a contemporary prairie for the urban cowboy" (Goldmann, 2011). This idea was unpopular and contributed to tarnishing the image of the Urban Development Department (Paul, 2014). This design competition can be seen within the growth machine strategy of creating a new urban identity and being inventive while still limiting the frame to not question if the project would occur but to allow input on small or aesthetic details (Boyle, 1999). This lack of substantial citizen contribution would become one of the core arguments of the project's opponents.

A coalition in favour of its development took shape. It included Berlin's governing Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) both part of the governing

coalition at the time, major business groups such as the Chamber of Commerce (IHK) and public housing companies, as well as housing industry advocates. In response, a small opposition movement developed, primarily under the banner of *100% Tempelhof*, which argued that maintaining the field as it was would preserve the important environmental benefits and unique nature of the field. After a period of internal deliberation, they initiated the Volksentscheid process that carried significant risk of failure. In its history in Berlin, the Volksentscheid had only been successful once out of twenty-four attempts. Accordingly, many within the group had major doubts this strategy would be successful (Schönball, 2014).

The plan advanced by the Berlin government, and voted on in the 2014 referendum, was known as Tempelhofer Freiheit (Tempelhof Freedom). It called for the development of the edges of the site with mixed residential, commercial, and institutional uses (See Figure 1). Construction was supposed to start in 2016 with 230ha of the 380 total for the site would have been left undeveloped

*Figure 2: Map of proposed Tempelhofer Freiheit masterplan*

(D. Fahmy, 2013). The total costs of the project would have been approximately 600 million Euros (Schönball, 2014). The city-owned landholding companies Degewo AG and Stand und Land Wohnbauten GmbH would have been tasked with building the project (Dalia Fahmy, 2013), and development was to occur over a series of phases. The first phase

highlighted in the proponent's campaign would have seen approximately 1,700 units of housing constructed. Half of these would be affordable, and the other half would be luxury construction to subsidize the affordable housing, the maintenance of the terminal building, and cost of acquiring the land from the Federal Government (Fahmy & Urban, 2014; Fahrun, 2014). City planners said there would be an additional 3,000 apartments in the following phase, the pricing of which had yet to be determined (Fahmy & Urban, 2014). Additionally, a newly constructed national library was planned for the site (ZLB on figure 1) at the cost of at least 270 million euros, as well as business developments, a school, and a new S-Bahn commuter rail station (Fahmy & Urban, 2014; Thurm, 2014)

Approximately a year before the referendum, polls showed that a majority of Berliners were in favour of building on the site (Fahrun, 2014). On May 25, 2014, 64.3 percent of voters (representing approximately 30% of those eligible) voted for *100% Tempelhof's* proposed law, banning development of the site. The proposed master plan had significantly more funding, and represented the ruling political parties, the largest businesses in Berlin, and the major housing organizations. How did they fail to achieve development? The vote against the development of Tempelhof Field serves as a potential example of the increasing fragility of Berlin's urban growth coalition.

The conflict over the proposed development of Tempelhof Field

Importantly, and shaping the conflict, the proposed development of Tempelhof Field was not the only large development project prevalent in the media at the time. Three megaprojects—the Berlin Brandenburg International Airport, the Stuttgart 21 project, and the Hamburg Concert House—were struggling with being significantly over budget. This was damaging to German political leadership, including to the then Mayor, Klaus

Wowereit (Kirschbaum, 2013). In particular, these projects raised doubt and criticism around the national library project, which many Berliners worried would quickly be burdened by cost overruns.

The conflict over the site's development coalesced around two main groups. The first group—the main proponents to develop the site—were Berlin's governing coalition consisting of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU), the major homebuilders association, the Association of Berlin-Brandenburg Residential Companies (BBU) (which represents public and private owners of approximately 650,000 or 40% of housing units in Berlin), and the Chamber of Commerce among others (Amjahid, 2014; Burkhardt & Hausmann, 2016; D. Fahmy, 2013). Opposition to the development project, led by *100% Tempelhof Field*, a citizens' group formed specifically for this purpose. *100% Tempelhof Field* group was eventually supported by the three main opposition parties in the Senate—the Greens, The Left, and the Pirate Party—as well as environmental organizations such as BUND Berlin.

The pro-growth coalition articulated their argument around three main points: firstly, there was a need for housing and the development was necessary for housing affordability; secondly, their project was 'the future'; and thirdly, their opponents were selfish and misguided.

The core argument of project proponents was that building housing on the Tempelhof site was necessary to maintain housing affordability. The narrative the project's proponents developed relied on the idea that a larger supply of apartments would make housing more affordable. This narrative was advanced both by the government and the main association of housing developers through media interviews, press releases, mail

outs, canvassers, and posters (Dalia Fahmy, 2013; Gris, 2014). They built on the argument by highlighting that half of the proposed housing was at social cost. Project proponents went as far as to specify the cost of these apartments would be so low that even those on the lowest form of social assistance would be able to afford these units. This idea was further reinforced by proponents arguments affordable housing was needed in the centre of the city instead of further afield and the project's opponents were effectively limiting the inner city to the rich (Dalia Fahmy, 2013; Fahrun & Richter, 2014). As a publicly owned and accessible site close to the inner city, Tempelhof Field was characterized as ideal and the only place where this scale of project could be completed (Senatsverwaltung-für-Stadtentwicklung-und-Wohnen, 2014).

The project proponents' slogan "Berlin statt Stillstand", translating to 'Berlin instead of standstill', was a clear example of how they attempted to influence public opinion. One press release used the slogan "100 Prozent Berlin statt 100 Prozent Stillstand! ('100% Berlin instead of 100% standstill') (Senatsverwaltung-für-Stadtentwicklung-und-Wohnen, 2014). Characterizing their actions as those of civic pride and the opposition as against progress is a familiar civic boosterism tactic. Throughout their campaign, the mayor and head of development characterized their project as 'the future' and Mayor Wowereit went as far as to call opponents 'supporters of yesterday' (Volkmann-Schluck, 2014). The motto attempted to convey the idea that development and newness have their own intrinsic value. One media commentator, supportive of the development, dismissed the *100% Tempelhof* group as being 'fanatical' and characterized the field as a 'windswept wasteland' (Gris, 2014). Wowerheit went as far suggest that to renounce housing on the site was to limit the city to those who could afford a penthouse on Alexanderplatz and that opposition to the project was selfish (Fahrun & Richter, 2014). He attempted to criticize his opponent's plan as an extreme example of NIMBYism, characterizing *100%*

Tempelhof's proposed law as so radical it even forbade benches and trees (Colomb, 2017; Thurm, 2014). This antagonism on behalf of the SPD was contrasted with the other governing coalition partner, the CDU, who took a more conciliatory approach (Amjahid, 2014). This lack of uniformity in their narrative provided opportunities for their opponents to criticize the coalition and additionally likely came off as defensive. Several interviewees noted this defensiveness was part of the reason the media started to pay more attention to the arguments of 100% Tempelhof.

'Berlin not standstill' was likely an ineffective slogan choice within the context of Berlin. Since the fall of the wall, Berlin's government has tried to invoke a contrast between the past and the future to increase public support for development (Colomb, 2013). As such, this slogan and narrative were not new. Much of the most prolific post-wall development, such as Potsdamer Platz is seen as controversial or poorly regarded (Diez, 2013). Developers were perceived to have been given favourable deals, such as when a large segment of the former wall was demolished for a luxury condominium building's access road. In conjunction with cost overruns and delays of contemporary megaprojects employing similar pro-development arguments, 'Berlin not standstill' was likely even less compelling.

Other elements of their argument were that there was that the masterplan as proposed by the Senate preserved open space. This space, characterized as enough for the current uses, was frequently noted to be larger than Berlin's major central city park, the Tiergarten (Fahmy & Urban, 2014; Senatsverwaltung-für-Stadtentwicklung-und-Wohnen, 2014). Noting this fact was an attempt by the governing coalition to counter the criticism that existing uses of the site would not be preserved.

There were two other important elements of the governing coalition's argument. The governing coalition also used the fact they were not going to be partnering or selling the land to private developers to bolster their argument that they would actually deliver affordable housing (Dalia Fahmy, 2013). Despite this argument, they left the option open to work with private developers in the future only committing to not work with them in the project's first phase (Dalia Fahmy, 2013). While usually a cursory element in their narrative, the economic 'loss' that would result from the site not being developed was often mentioned. One figure cited was $298 million Euros over 50 years as well as numerous (though unspecified) jobs (Thurm, 2014).

Among Berliners, the argument that there was an increasing need for affordable housing was a commonly held belief. Issues, including increasing housing costs (between 2007 and 2012 there as an average annual rent increase of 9.9%) and gentrification were frequently in the media cost (Arandelovic & Bogunovich, 2014). Policymakers took notice. Around the same time as the Tempelhof Field saga was unfolding, the city government introduced new or strengthened existing affordability policy measures. These included a ban on short-term rentals such as Airbnb (the law was passed in April 2014), and the Mietpreisbremse ('rent break law') aimed at providing strong protections from rent increases, which was introduced in June 2015 but had been part of the coalition talks following the 2013 elections (Böll, 2013; O'Sullivan, 2016; Russell, 2015).

Neighbourhoods nearby the proposed development site, especially the adjacent areas of Neukolln, had experienced substantial increases in housing cost since the closure of the airport in 2008. From the perspective of a growth machine argument, the project's purported benefits of tempering housing cost increases provided an easy way to argue that the Tempelhof project would have a broader societal benefit. Arguing the Tempelhof

project would result in reduced housing costs was likely the most effective way to get average residents of the German capital to support this narrative. This was a variation of the 'value-free growth' argument typically employed by growth machines to legitimize their projects. The idea of value-free growth is that development is a universal good that benefits the entire community (Logan & Molotch, 2007; Troutman, 2004). Specifically, it deemphasizes the increasing benefits for the growth coalition from increasing exchange values and instead tries to link growth with better lives for the majority (Boyle, 1999). Typically, urban growth coalition members argue that growth benefits the community through opportunities for residents, through the creation of jobs, and the expansion of the tax base (Troutman, 2004). In reference to Logan and Molotch's original work, Boyle (1999) argues: "By manufacturing a local consciousness that is not only receptive to inward investment but that regards investment as a virtue if not a matter of survival, rentiers create not only the appropriate physical infrastructure to attract capital but also the right cultural context for trouble-free investment"p.58. The narrative of affordable housing was a direct attempt by Berlin's urban growth coalition to create the cultural context to develop the site in the face of increasing resistance.

The proponents of Tempelhof Field adopted a specific variation of this narrative in relation to the problems most pressing in Berlin at the time. The context of when the project was proposed (in a time of rapid economic expansion) meant that argument for more jobs was unlikely to resonate as strongly as that for more affordable housing (Troutman, 2004). This is especially true because this value-free-growth argument regarding the creation of jobs had been heard before. The government and business community employed a 'job creation' argument linking real estate development projects and employment during economic hardship after the fall of the Berlin wall. The fact that the purported benefits failed to materialize during that period may have comparatively inoculated Berliners.

Instead, Tempelhof development proponents argued that the Tempelhofer Freiheit project would lower the cost of housing for the entire community and in turn this project would benefit all Berliners, especially its most disadvantaged residents.

Unfortunately for project proponents, the premise of their argument was challenged from two separate perspectives. During the early 2000s, in the depths of a financial crisis, Berlin sold approximately 150,000 units of public housing (Landler, 2006). In the two years leading up to the referendum, an additional 1500 units were sold (Kammer 2014). When the SPD suggested building 800 was essential to the provision of affordable housing. *100% Tempelhof* was able to conclusively point out the contradictions of the party's previous actions.

Additionally, there were debates as to if the project would cause gentrification or not. *100% Tempelhof* argued that the project would increase gentrification. They also persuasively argued that while affordable housing took up a large proportion of the Senate's narrative it was a comparatively small part of the plan. The new library building was budgeted between one third and one half of the 600 million entire project's budget. Additionally, much of the space was to be commercial developments, as shown in Figure 2. Finally, the project went unsupported or opposed by many of Berlin's affordable housing activist groups. The Berlin Tenant Association (Berliner Mieterverein) argued there wasn't enough social housing in the plan, especially with half of the buildings being reserved for non-housing uses and urged Berliners to vote no to both *100% Tempelhof*'s proposed law and the Senate's proposed masterplan (Sethmann, 2014). A representative of one of the major organizations supporting development suggested that failing to properly engage the Berlin Tenant Association was one of their campaign's most significant failures (Anonymous, in-person interview, June 2017). The lack of support by

the Berlin Tenant Association and other affordable housing groups likely further weakened the credibility of the senate's affordable housing narrative.

One narrative that seemed underutilized by the project's proponents was the environment. Germany has a strong history of environmental organization and activism. The master plan as proposed by the Senate said very little about the environmental impacts and benefits a project could bring. Likewise, little emphasis was placed on this element by spokespeople for the project. In suggesting ways, the campaign could have been improved, one Senate employee argued that if the project had a strong environmental component, such as an emphasis on energy efficiency, it could have been a strong selling point (Senate employee, in person interview, June 2017). The lack of emphasis on this point, as well as the opposition to the plan by the Green Party and BUND Berlin, allowed *100% Tempelhof* to monopolize the pro-environment narrative.

The main opposition to the Tempelhofer Freiheit project catalyzed around the citizens' group *100% Tempelhof*. The group was formed to oppose the field's development. The main tactic they used was Berlin's Volksentscheid (referendum) mechanism to introduce a new law to ban development of the field (Thierfelder & Kabisch, 2016). Since the introduction of the mechanism in 1995, there had been 24 uses, only five of which had made it to the voting stage (Gennies, 2014). Four out of these five failed to become law because they did not attract enough voters, including a 2008 referendum relating to the closure of Tempelhof Field as an operational airport. With only one previous vote having been successful, using this mechanism carried a significant risk of failure. *100% Tempelhof's* narrative concentrated on preventing development to preserve the site's unique and historical value and the purported environmental benefits it provided. Core to their argument was criticizing the Tempelhofer Freiheit project as lacking proper citizen

engagement, and highlighting both the flaws with the plan itself and the untrustworthiness of the project's proponents.

Essential to showcasing the unique value of the site was the language *100% Tempelhof* chose to use. In their media and presentations, they called the area a Wiesenmeer, which translates to meadow-sea (Gris, 2014; Paul, 2013, 2014). This resonated far more than when the site was simply referred to as a "field" and was picked up by the media as early as 2013 (Paul, 2013). Through spokespeople, the group made comparisons with other famous parks and pointed out that no one would argue to develop Central Park or the Tiergarten (Fahmy & Urban, 2014). The group argued that any development would ruin these unique qualities (Dalia Fahmy, 2013). *100% Tempelhof* also capitalized on the historical value of the site, expressing why it should be preserved. The historical significance was used to invoke the idea that future generations would regret having built on it (Fahmy & Urban, 2014). The campaign itself became a form of advertising; before 2010 access to the field had been limited. The significant media attention of the campaign encouraged Berliners to visit the site themselves which in turn, spokespeople for 100% Tempelhof argued, made them more likely to support a ban on the site's development (100% Spokesperson, in-person interview, June 2017). Additionally, in response to the Mayor's characterization of the group as 'behind the times' or 'of yesterday', they argued that it would be a place to remind future generations of freedom, countering the Mayor's comments while showcasing the importance of one of their core narrative ideas (Volkmann-Schluck, 2014).

BUND Berlin, a major environmental organization supporting *100% Tempelhof's* proposed, law publicly discussed how the field helps cool off neighbourhoods and combats the urban heat island effects (Heuser, 2014). The organization also emphasized

the flora and fauna's ecological significance (Heuser, 2014). These statements likely carried more credibility coming from the environmentally oriented BUND Berlin, instead of the citizen's initiative itself.

Finally, *100% Tempelhof* was critical of the project proponents for their lack of citizen engagement as well as their untrustworthiness. They characterized the planning process as a closed shop and were critical that the Mayor had no idea what people were using the site for (Müller-Kroll, 2014). Their criticism of the Mayor and the Berlin government was pointed: "We have a long history of distrust in Berlin between the Senate and the people. That's because politicians have a long history of saying one thing and doing something else" (Fahmy & Urban, 2014). They were able to highlight the previous sale of public housing, as well as elements of the plan unrelated to housing such as the library that earned the dubious nickname of Wowereit-Memorial Library (Wowereit Gedenkbibliothek) (Walter, 2011). Additionally, the Senate's argument that it was imperative to build on Tempelhof was directly challenged by BUND Berlin. BUND Berlin created a list of alternative development sites (BUND Berlin, 2014b). Showcasing alternatives were possible was another way in which public trust in the Senate's plan was eroded.

100% Tempelhof went further to say this was the beginning of forcing middle-class Berliners to the periphery of the city (Fahmy & Urban, 2014). The spatial fate of Berlin's middle class, specifically they would be forced out of the center of the City, was the same argument used by the Senate in criticizing antidevelopment attitudes. Additionally, rumours circulated among the opposition that the field would be developed with townhouses for high-income earners (Fahrun, 2014).

The pro-development side instead argued they were studying a law and did not entirely know what the mix of housing in the second phase would be. This left room for lack of trust within the public and for *100% Tempelhof* to fill this void. Over the course of the campaign developer proponents seemed to realize this, and in one instance, the Senate adopted *100% Tempelhof's* language. In a press release in March 2014, Senate spokespeople structured all of their arguments with the 100% prefix, for example, "100 percent quality of life" or "100 percent participation" (Senatsverwaltung-für-Stadtentwicklung-und-Wohnen, 2014). The press release specifically challenged many of *100% Tempelhof's* assertions but released only two months before the referendum seemed to have little impact. The citizens' initiative had largely successfully brought these issues to the forefront of the debate continually bringing the conversation back to contradictions in the actions of the project's proponents. These included the refusal of the Senate to sign into law a bill forbidding development on the remaining site, as well as maintaining criticism of the continuing lack of "true" participatory citizen consultation. In addition, *100% Tempelhof's* spokespeople were all volunteers and, according to one of them, looked very much the part (100% Spokesperson, personal interview, June 2017). The volunteer basis of *100% Tempelhof*, contrasted with the professionalism and paid nature of pro-development campaigners, and became yet another way for 100% to argue they were more authentic in their representations of the average Berlin resident.

Germany has a strong history regarding its environmental movement, and Berlin's citizens are known for having "a generally ecologically motivated lifestyle" (Thierfelder & Kabisch, 2016), p.121. Capitalizing on the purported positive environmental implications of leaving the site undeveloped was an effective way to gain support from the environmental constituency. As project proponents did not highlight possible environmental benefits from a partial development of the site, *100% Tempelhof* was able to largely monopolize

this constituency. This case is an interesting example of the ability of anti-growth advocates to create a more compelling narrative than that of their opponents despite a significant disparity in available resources.

The ability of growth advocates to legitimize and pass through their plans depends on the success of anti-growth opponents ability to create equally or more convincing rhetoric (Troutman, 2004). *100% Tempelhof*, with other groups, was effective in weaving this counter-narrative, illuminating why maintaining the site as it was would be beneficial and the faults in the plan. The group took advantage of the senate's relative silence on the issue between the initial public consultative efforts in 2012-13 and the months immediately leading up to the referendum (Interview with citizen engagement). Their plan, a law banning all development, was a concrete answer to what would occur on the field.

Thanks to their substantial efforts to shift the narrative and organize volunteers *100% Tempelhof* was successful in collecting enough signatures to hold a referendum on the fate of the site (Fahmy & Urban, 2014). In May of 2014, approximately 65% of those who voted chose to support the citizens' initiative and


Figure 3: Results of the 2014 Referendum on Tempelhof Field

maintain Tempelhof as it was. *100% Tempelhof's* proposed law won a majority of votes cast in every district in Berlin, receiving highest proportion of support in the neighbourhoods adjacent to the site see Figure 3 (Berlin-Landeswahlleiterin, 2014). The issue of building on the site has continued to be contentious. The Berlin Brandenburg Housing Association argued in 2015 that because of Berlin's continuing dramatic population increase and Syrian refugee crisis the debate should be reopened (Jürgens, 2015). Authorities constructed modular housing on the terminal building's apron, something that *100% Tempelhof* members breaks the intention of the law on passed in 2014 (Memarina, 2017). The lines drawn in 2014 continue to exist. The relationship between the Senate, its company Grun Berlin who manages the field, and many of the citizens' initiative campaigners live on in often contentious meetings of the field's coordination and planning group, in which all are active members. Ultimately, *100% Tempelhof* strategy of painting the Senate government as untrustworthy was successful. This strategy negated the Senate's main argument that the project would provide affordable housing and the characterization of the Senate as untrustworthy allowed *100% Tempelhof* to propose and gain acceptance for a well-defined plan to prevent the development of the site.

A community fights back: Montreal's mega-casino and Bâtiment 7/CN Yards developments

Montreal's two cases, the Loto-Quebec project, and the Bâtiment 7/CN Yards development had different developers and were at two different scales. These development projects were slated for different, albeit adjacent sites but the resistance to both was primarily conducted by the same Pointe-Saint Charles residents and community organizations. In both cases, developers attempted to build on large former


Figure 4: Location of proposed Loto-Quebec site (red) and former CN railyards (purple) in Montreal

industrial areas close to the downtown core. The Loto-Quebec project, an attempt to build a new mega-casino ultimately collapsed when a key partner left due to approval delays. The Bâtiment 7/CN Yards development was a fairly typical, if large condo development project, where the community leveraging government connections was able to obtain the transfer of Bâtiment 7 [building 7], a former administrative and storage building on the site for community use. While both can largely be seen as community victories in the face of development pressures, the story of how these victories came about is far murkier.

Unlike Tempelhof Field, resistance to both the Loto-Quebec and condo development on the former CN Railyards was primarily rooted in only one neighbourhood, Pointe-Saint-Charles. Pointe-Saint-Charles has seen rapid increases in housing costs and related issues of displacement and gentrification. One indicator, average household income, jumped

from approximately $38,000 in 2005 to approximately $50,000 in 2015 (Paquin, 2015). The income increases from 2001 to 2006 were among the highest on the Island of Montreal (Dubuc, 2010). While this could be due to natural income growth, it is suggestive that new residents with higher average incomes are moving into the neighbourhood. There have also been increases in housing costs. Homes at the turn of the millennium could be purchased for approximately $100,000 (Dubuc, 2010), but by 2015 the average had increased to over $340,000 (Paquin, 2015). This increase in costs is likely partially due to the neighbourhood being seen as a prime place not only to live in but to invest in as well. One article in a business and investment-oriented newspaper described the neighbourhood as the 'El Dorado' of property development (Dubuc, 2010). Despite this, and likely at least in part due to the high concentration of social housing in the area, renters in the borough pay the lowest rents of all neighbourhoods in the South West borough (Paquin, 2015).

Accordingly, in 2004, when Loto-Quebec proposed a major development project, where over one billion dollars would be invested to move Montreal's casino, and to construct a hotel and entertainment complex, there were fears among Pointe-Saint Charles residents that it would increase housing-cost pressures as well as trigger other negative effects for the neighbourhood. Building on the neighbourhood's history of social advocacy, residents organized, and in part because of this and related delays, one of the main backers ended up leaving the project. While a for-profit condo complex eventually was permitted on an adjacent site and construction has begun, developers of the site made major concessions to Pointe-Saint Charles residents, these concessions included a historical building on the site Bâtiment 7, which is set to become a community hub. The continuing conflicts over the development of the site serve as a potential example of the success of community organizations in receiving significant concessions.

The neighbourhood of what is now Pointe-Saint Charles began to grow significantly in the mid 19th century with the opening of the Grand Trunk Railway workshops and the nearby Lachine Canal (Ville de Montreal, 2015). Both were significant sources of employment and attracted workers who wanted to live nearby. In particular, many of the residents were recent arrivals from Ireland. Beforehand the neighbourhood had consisted mainly of farms owned and worked by various religious orders. While always predominantly working class, the fortunes of Pointe-Saint Charles began to shift following the Second World War. Replacement and closure of the Lachine Canal, closure of related industrial employers, freeway construction and suburbanization all greatly impacted the neighbourhood and by 1991 the population had fallen from a high of 30,000 in 1930 to 13,000 residents (Ville de Montreal, 2015). By the 1960s the neighbourhood had developed a reputation for social activism (Ville de Montreal, 2015). It was the first community in Montreal to formally establish a local autonomous health clinic (1968), and residents opened the first legal clinic in Quebec (1972), with services provided at low cost to those with few resources (Ville de Montreal, 2015).

As of 2015, the neighbourhood of Pointe-Saint Charles remains relatively disadvantaged, with a higher percentage of low-income residents (37%) compared to the 24.6% of the Island of Montreal (Sud-Ouest Borough, 2015; Centraide, 2014). Residents also tend to have lower educational attainment than Montreal as a whole (Centraide, 2014). Statistical data shows signs of possible gentrification. Between 2005 and 2010 there was a dramatic increase in average household income which jumped by 32% from $37,884 in 2005 to $50,146 in 2010 (Sud-Ouest Borough, 2015). Additionally, between 2011 and 2016 the population of the neighbourhood grew by 7.1% faster than the population growth of

Montreal's CMA (4.2%) and the population growth on the Island of Montreal (2.9%) (Paquin, 2018; Statistics-Canada, 2018). This population growth is highly unevenly distributed across the neighbourhood with growth concentrated in the sector of the neighbourhood closest to downtown Montreal and the Lachine Canal (Paquin, 2018). In contrast, the part of the neighbourhood furthest from downtown experienced population loss (Pacquin, 2018). While housing costs for renters remain lower than the Montreal average (likely due to the continued presence of social housing), housing costs for owners are higher (Sud-Ouest Borough, 2015). The increase in the number of housing units during this same period (an increase of 9.1% between 2011 and 2016) suggests that much of the population gain is from new, higher income residents, indicative of changing demographics in the neighbourhood (Pacquin, 2018).

In May 2004, Loto-Quebec announced their plan to move Montreal's Casino from the former Expo 67 site, an island relatively isolated from the rest of the city, to a former industrial site directly adjacent to downtown (Coulombe, 2006). This downtown adjacent site, known as the Peel Basin remains physically isolated by disused land from previous industrial activities and Montreal's harbour as well as separated from Pointe-Saint Charles by the former CN Railyards. In 2005, Loto-Quebec highlighted the fact that the site was located close to the 'tourist heart of the city', isolated from residential areas, and most importantly, was available (Bourgault-Côté, 2005). Previously there had been relatively little interest in the redevelopment of the site, in large part due to Montreal's comparative economic weakness in the preceding decades as well as developer focus on other sectors of downtown (such as the Quartier International). Additionally, Loto-Quebec already owned 4 hectares of the approximately 23-hectare site (Coulombe, 2006). The plan was to construct a $1.1 billion Casino and entertainment complex, which was variously described by promoters as "world class" and an "international calibre complex" (Radio-

Canada, 2005). More than just a casino, the proposed project was planned to have the second largest theatre in Montreal, a nightclub, a 300-room hotel, 3000 new parking spaces, an artists' wharf, a spa under a waterfall and a monorail (Bornstein, 2010; Bourgault-Côté, 2005).

As eventually proposed (and thoroughly discussed later in this chapter) the CN Railyards project was a typical, albeit large condominium development project on a former industrial site. While portrayed as highly contentious within the media, by the time the project went to the first public consultation sessions many compromises had been reached. Ultimately the project included a high percentage of affordable and social housing and transferred Bâtiment 7 and funds for its renovation to community groups.

Conflict over the proposed mega-casino

The project proponents consisted of Loto-Quebec, a public crown corporation mandated with administering casinos and lotteries and who would be putting forward the majority of the funding for the project, and their partner, the Cirque de Soleil, who would handle design decisions and bring attention to the project (Loto-Quebec, 2006). At the time when they decided not to pursue the project, they were still searching for further partners to finance the hotel, spa and nightclub (Bourgault-Côté, 2005). Additionally, the project was adamantly supported by Société du Harve, a publicly funded private corporation tasked with the development of the former industrial lands of Montreal's harbour (Bornstein, 2010). The Board of Trade of Metro Montreal and Tourism Montreal also lent their support to the project, arguing it was important for the economic future of the city (Bourgault-Côté, 2005). The project appeared to be broadly supported by the remaining business

community (Lévesque, 2006). Importantly missing from this project, however, was strong support from elected officials at any order of government.

Instead, the different orders of government involved, which included the borough, the central government of the City of Montreal, and the province, positioned themselves as neutral parties (Bourgault-Côté, 2005). As political pressure from community groups mounted, the Province's ruling Liberal Party, struck a committee to review the plan and make a recommendation (Hadekel, 2006). This provincial decision allowed the City to delay deciding if they would publicly support the project or not. Instead, the City argued they would wait for the provincial report, and, if the report recommended constructing the casino, the City would initiate citizen consultations (Carroll, 2006). The City of Montreal publicly argued that moving the casino could help revitalize the area, but that there were still unanswered questions regarding possible negative impacts for Pointe-Saint Charles (Carroll, 2006). While others have argued they were broadly supportive of the project (Lévesque, 2006), this position, as well as relying on the provincial decision, allowed the City to appear objective.

Opponents to the proposed project were primarily based in the Pointe-Saint Charles neighbourhood, and much of the resistance was driven by Action-Gardien, which one commentator described as the only strong critic of the project (Lévesque, 2006). Action-Gardien serves primarily as an advocacy organization for residents, as well as a discussion group with a regular membership of twenty-six Pointe-Saint Charles community organizations (Action-Gardien, 2015). Action-Gardien was founded in 1981 by community groups interested in pooling their power to affect urban planning and development decisions in their neighbourhood (Action-Gardien, 2018). They represent a wide variety of local social and advocacy organizations, including those fighting for affordable housing,

organizations advocating for individual and communal rights, and environmental organizations among others. Their first major fight was against plans for urban renewal, but the group has been involved in a variety of community organizing efforts since then. Through their relationship with various community organizations and individuals from the neighbourhood, they were able to mobilize an active opposition based around the ideas that the casino project would encourage gentrification and negatively impact the health of Pointe-Saint Charles residents.

The Casino Montreal project was part of a broader effort, spearheaded by the Société du Harve, business and governmental actors to redevelop Montreal's harbour area. The plans included other initiatives, such as the creation of a stadium on a nearby piece of land adjacent to the St. Lawrence River as well as the transformation of the nearby Bonaventure Expressway into an urban boulevard (Lévesque, 2006). The Casino Project was proposed during a time when Montreal was slowly emerging from an extended period of relative recession, and its urban coalition was attempting to create an image of a culturally innovative city (Hamel and Jouve (2008) 19). The Casino Montreal project was proposed after a significant round of spending on other real estate projects such as the Quartier Internationale, with $918 million spent (Hamel and Jouve, 2008) and was running concurrently with the Quartier des Spectacles project which by 2015 had $150 million of taxpayer investments (Loison and Fischler, 2016). The Casino project, with its partnership with Cirque du Soleil, was positioned within this mould, with coverage describing how 'hip' and akin to Steve Jobs the project's presentation was (Bourgault-Côté, 2005), and the power of the Cirque du Soleil brand (Loto-Quebec, 2006). Accordingly, it is possible that the government arms of Montreal's pro-development coalition were overextended either in financial or political capital terms, making them less willing to invest in the Casino Montreal project fully.

The provincial report on the casino project, written by and colloquially named after a senior provincial bureaucrat Guy *Coulombe*, effectively summarized the debate over the project into two principal positions. The first, pro-development argument was that the project would provide economic benefits for Montreal generally and spur the revitalization of the 'disadvantaged' Pointe-Saint Charles neighbourhood (Coulombe, 2006). The second, negative argument was there would be detrimental social and health outcomes for the nearby population, because of gentrification and gambling addictions (Coulombe, 2006). While the province highlighted these two arguments, the business community relied on many civic boosterism type arguments such as that the project was necessary because Montreal needed an international showcase project and or fell back on 'value-free' growth arguments to sell the project.

Loto-Quebec positioned the project as beneficial based on the employment and economic benefits the project would provide, arguing it would revitalize a former industrial area, be an economic catalyst and drive tourism to Montreal (Loto-Quebec, 2006). They claimed it would create an additional 6450 direct or indirect jobs (Bourgault-Côté, 2005). After the project began to receive pushback from neighbourhood based community activists and others, they also suggested they would engage in preferential hiring of Pointe-Saint Charles residents, and possibly construct some affordable housing units (Bourgault-Côté, 2005). Preferential hiring was announced a week before the release of the Province's Coulombe Report (Carroll, 2006). This late announcement of additional benefits led to community groups arguing Loto-Quebec was trying to "pull the wool over residents' eyes" (Carroll, 2006) and Loto-Quebec claiming such an announcement had nothing to do with the polarized debate (Carroll, 2006). This shift, from the inherent argument made previously that 'growth is good' to a more direct argument of tangible

benefits, suggests that Loto-Quebec understood they were struggling to win the battle around the narrative of the project. The late stage of the announcement gave credence to community groups arguing such promises could not be trusted. Loto-Quebec also claimed it would add 25 million in revenue per year for the province (Bourgault-Côté, 2005). Proponents also argued that the project was necessary to be competitive in the international casino market, to create a northern Las Vegas, and to increase tourist attendance (Bourgault-Côte, 2005). These arguments very much followed the idea this project was needed to put Montreal on the map and fit within traditional urban boosterism narratives.

Project proponents portrayed Point Saint Charles as a desperate neighbourhood in need of rejuvenation of which the casino project was the solution. This idea of rejuvenation seemed to be an opinion shared by the business community, which saw this project as a possible catalyst for future development in the area (Hadekel, 2006). Shortly after the project's failure, the then President of the Montreal Board of Trade argued that Montreal missed an "exceptional opportunity to launch the revival of a neighbourhood that greatly needed it"(Rocha, Lamey, & Delean, 2006). Additionally, when challenged with the necessity of the Pointe-Saint Charles site, project proponents argued there was no possible alternative site (Bourgault-Côté, 2005). It appeared these arguments were compelling, with a September 2005 poll commissioned by Loto-Quebec reporting that 57% of Pointe-Saint Charles residents were in favour of the project (Parkes, 2005).

Opposition to the Casino project argued it was unwanted in the neighbourhood for three main reasons, that it would increase crime, that it would negatively impact the health of nearby residents, and that it would increase housing costs (Coulombe, 2006; Parkes, 2005). These community organizations, led by Action-Gardien also argued publicly that the

developer was untrustworthy (Carroll, 2006). Eventually, organizations outside the neighbourhood including the Direction de la Sante Publique de Montreal (the City's public health department), argued regarding their would be adverse effects for nearby populations, amplifying the voice of Action-Gardien (Coulombe, 2006).

On March 9th, 2006 the provincial government released their report on the relocation of the Montreal Casino (Rocha et al., 2006). Within a day Cirque du Soleil had backed out, and Loto-Quebec had scuttled its plans to move to Point Saint-Charles (Rocha et al., 2006). Many commenters saw this a surprising result, having, by and large, expecting the casino project to be completed (Aubin, 2006)Personal interview, March 13, 2018). Cirque du Soleil argued that the lack of certainty about the project's eventual outcome after two years made the project no longer tenable (Rocha et al., 2006). Loto-Quebec backed out the same day, arguing the project was not feasible without Cirque du Soleil (Rocha et al., 2006). While largely favourable to the casino relocation, saying it fit into the City's planning objectives for the area, the Coulombe report questioned the project based on increasing completion within the North American casino industry, and possible negative public health effects (Coulombe, 2006). Ultimately, it recommended delaying the decision until public consultations had been conducted, and a final plan proposed (Coulombe, 2006). Aubin (2006) argues the failure of the project was not based on any level of government rejecting because of flaws or political pressure, but it was because one of the major project proponents was unwilling or unable to deal with delays. While government support may have been tentative, it does seem likely that after a period of consultation, with the enshrining of concessions already offered (affordable housing, employment for the neighbourhood) it would have been approved. Loto-Quebec saw Cirque du Soleil as integral and without them, what otherwise seemed like a likely albeit risky project collapsed. The project fit within the development plans of the Société du Harve, as well as

the orientation of the growth coalition towards repositioning Montreal as a centre of culture. Importantly because the Loto-Quebec project was a lynchpin, and was to be the most significant source of investment in the area, many of the Société du Harve's other projects (such as a stadium for the nearby technoparc) collapsed. These other projects depended on the construction of the new Casino to support improved transit access and other infrastructural improvements (OCPM, 2009a-b). Without Montreal's new casino, and with the eventual closure of the Société du Harve organization itself, many of these smaller projects were never realized or completed elsewhere in the city.

Point Saint Charles organization Action-Gardien, was unwilling to entertain the idea of the Montreal Casino on the site. This is despite the fact that the site was disconnected from Pointe-Saint Charles itself and even after Loto-Quebec tried to add incentives, such as affordable housing and preferential hiring. Loto-Quebec also seemed unwilling to compromise, stating there was no alternative plan to locating the casino on the site which in retrospect, as the Casino continues to operate at the original site, rings false. Leading up to the eventual cancellation there had been no substantial public consultation efforts. Those proposed by the provincial report would have been the first. Ultimately, Cirque de Soleil backing out of the project was a clear victory for community organizations, even if their impact on this outcome was unclear.

The Conflict over the development of Montreal's CN Railyards and Bâtiment 7

The argument over the redevelopment of the former CN Railyards often appeared one-sided. Community advocates argued more affordable housing and community space were needed whereas the developer seemed to say very little. Much of the media coverage was positive for the Pointe-Saint Charles community organizations, with one media commentator even suggesting the conflict was akin to that of David versus Goliath

(Fortier, 2017). Ultimately the community groups received significant concessions, both in terms of affordable housing, and the provision of one of the old administrative and storage buildings (Bâtiment 7) for community use. This result was not inevitable though.

In 2003 just before the conflict over the Loto-Quebec and Peel Basin site began, Alstom, a major French rail company, ceased operations on the site of the former Canadian National Railway workshops. The site, adjacent to, but without access from the proposed Montreal Casino's site on the Peel Basin had since the mid 19th century served as railway workshops. While the initial ideas for the site were linked to the Loto-Quebec project, such as using the land for a related fairground (Centre-Social-Autogéré-de-Pointe-Saint-Charles, 2011) eventually the land was sold to Groupe Mach, a property development firm, for the sum of one dollar plus decontamination costs (Ravensbergen, 2006b). The sale was immediately contentious within the community (Personal interviews March 13, March 26 and April 5). The developer, Vincent Chiara proposed opening a big box type retail centre, with one million feet of retail space, and 3000 new parking spaces in addition to several hundred housing units (Ravensbergen, 2006b).

Since the mid-19th century the former Canadian National (CN) rail yards have been a major industrial hub in Montreal, providing the infrastructure to service the rail industry (OCPM, 2009a-a). It was traditionally a site of significant employment for the mostly Scottish and Irish residents living in nearby neighbourhoods, including Point Saint-Charles (OCPM, 2009a-a). At its peak, CN employed approximately 1600 workers on the site (OCPM, 2009a-a). To service the trains, massive city-block sized workshops were built in addition to tracks and smaller support and storage buildings. By the mid-1990s, employment was about half of this peak and the site had been rented to French multinational GEC-Alstom

(OCPM, 2009a-a). And, when Alstom left in October of 2003, CN began to look for a buyer (OCPM, 2009a-a).

With Alstom gone, the site itself, over 3.7 million square feet (34.3 ha), was largely unused (Le-Sud-Ouest, 2013). The former CN railyards are located completely within the neighbourhood of Point Saint-Charles, traditionally known as one of the poorest in Montreal (Bundale, 2008b) and which, even with recent growth, remains relatively disadvantaged (Paquin, 2015). Despite the reputation as a disadvantaged area developers had been eying the site for years (Bundale, 2008b). Part of the desirability of the former C.N. rail yards was they were the largest developable section of land located nearby downtown Montreal (Ravensbergen, 2006b). By April 2004, the community of nearby residents began to organize based on rumors that a sale to a private property developer was imminent (OCPM, 2009a-a).

Groupe Mach's proposal was altered when in 2008, Montreal's suburban railway system operator, then known as the Agence métropolitaine de transport (AMT) [Metropolitan Transportation Agency], appropriated 40 percent of the property the developers had initially purchased (Bisson, 2008; OCPM, 2009a-b). Despite the payout Groupe Mach would receive, the development firm was resistant to the sale. Eventually, the Administrative Tribunal of Quebec forced a sale of the land for $5.4 million (Bisson, 2008). The creation of these jobs by the AMT proved popular within the Point Saint Charles community (Bisson, 2008) because the agency committed to maintaining some of their trains on site, in turn restoring some industrial jobs and in the eyes of many, maintaining the heritage of the area (OCPM, 2009a-b).

By 2009 the developer's plan had changed again. Groupe Mach, instead of developing a big box retail centre, planned to build 850 housing units, 25% of which would be social housing, with an additional 15% to 25%, classified as 'affordable' (OCPM, 2009b). The scale of the project was planned to fit within the neighbourhood and not exceed eight storeys, with the majority planned for between three and four storeys (OCPM, 2009b). While community groups were at this time advocating for acquiring Bâtiment 7 [building 7], an old and extremely large former office and storage building on the site as a community centre, it was not included in the developer's proposal (OCPM, 2009b). At the time the urban planning firm hired by Groupe Mach made the argument that it responded to the city's planning documents and goals, including the demand to offer more housing for families (Bonneau, 2009).

While the need for a community space on the site had been a topic of conversation since a 2007 public consultation exercise (L'Operation Populaire d'Amenagement [People's Planning Operation]) hosted by Action-Gardien, Bâtiment 7, over 90,000 square feet in size, was identified by community activists later on (Action-Gardien, 2012). Many ideas were put forward for what the space could contain, such as artists' studios, a daycare, a cinema, a market, a brewery and bike workshops (Action-Gardien, 2012). Leading up to and following the second consultation session in 2009 community organizations began to devote more of their energy and resources to obtaining community space in the form of Bâtiment 7, creating a new organization 7 a Nous, to manage the project (Comité-7-à-nous, 2009).

The idea to use Bâtiment 7 specifically originated from Caroline Andrieux, who, living across from the building, recognized its potential as a site of artists' studios (Personal interview, March 13, 2018; April 23, 2018). Acknowledging artists' studios alone wouldn't

be accepted in the neighbourhood, she contacted others largely within the Action-Gardien network, who in turn looked to create a plan for the building that could work with the broader community.

Overall, the early stages of development were acrimonious. Point Saint Charles residents demonstrated, lobbied local politicians and even organized to squat some of the buildings on site (Bundale, 2008a). Throughout the process accusations were made that the developer was not holding up his end of the bargain, through actions such as letting the buildings—including Bâtiment 7—decay or engaging in risky behaviours which contributed to a fire (Corriveau, 2009), and not abiding by the rules by allowing trucks servicing the site to do so out of the agreed upon hours and routes (Houde-Roy, 2013). Over the course of the project, citizen groups and the developer continued to argue regarding the details, even if significant concessions were agreed upon relatively early in the process. The developer and community groups argued regarding establishing the exact timeline for Groupe Mach transferring the building to the community, the specific financial aspects of the transfer of Bâtiment 7, namely if and how much money Groupe Mach would transfer to the community to support the building's conversion as well as the composition of housing on the site. The community consistently was advocating for a higher percentage of affordable and social housing than Groupe Mach was willing to provide.

Despite the tension, both reported in the media as well as by participants themselves, many of the aspects of the plans were tenable to both sides. Early on both agreed to have non-market-rate housing, albeit with disagreements concerning the percentage of total housing which would be non-market-rate. Both sides also saw the value in the creation of a community centre (Personal interview, March 13th, 2018)—the community because

of the potential value of space for them, and the developer because of the potential increase in property values, and because such a centre would provide a barrier between the industrial activities of AMT to the north and the housing development to the south (Personal interview, March 13th, 2018). Early on, the developer itself noted a willingness to engage in public consultations, which stands in contrast to both the Tempelhof and Loto-Quebec projects.

The leading project proponent was the development firm Groupe Mach, and the CEO of the organization Vincent Chiara. Groupe Mach is one of the largest developers in Quebec (Fortier, 2018). In the case of this site, they were preparing the property, in large part through decontamination of the soil, as well as through getting development approval. In turn, they would sell it to other developers who would construct the actual buildings. They worked with urban planning and architectural firm Cardinal-Hardy, as well as the developer Samcon, and a variety of smaller supporting firms (such as those who specialize in decontamination). The relatively small scale of the project, especially after the AMT purchase, meant any negative aspects did not appear to attract noticeable attention from many outside the neighbourhood. Only the Bâtiment 7/CN Yards project, a smaller piece of the project, seemed to attract widespread attention. Despite this Groupe Mach remained the primary recipient of criticism, as well as was the primary party negotiating with government officials and citizen groups.

In comparison with the Loto-Quebec development, the borough and city played a different role. While there was expressed community dissatisfaction that the city or borough had not outright purchased the land from CN instead of Groupe Mach, the borough quickly became seen as a community ally (Personal interview March 13, 2018; March 26, 2018). Part of this was the political change that occurred in 2009 with the

election of borough mayor Benoit Dorais. While before this the government had played a limited role, after his election the borough started to advocate for concessions, and began to facilitate communication between the two opposing sides. One interviewee described the situation as follows:

"Benoit was always, as well as the city councillors, other city councillors, were always entirely supportive of the process, doing whatever they could to help us, yet on the other hand, short of actually giving us money." (Personal interview, March 13th, 2018)

Ultimately the borough held the power to approve or deny the changes in zoning and the developers needed to be able to make a financial case for the redevelopment of the land. After the final approval, borough Mayor Dorais openly expressed admiration for the concessions that Action-Gardien received (Le-Sud-Ouest, 2013a). The central city government remained far more aloof from the process, and community activists argued their contribution was primarily technical advice (Personal interview, March 13, 2018). Otherwise, there is limited evidence of any direct involvement beyond hosting two consultations.

The groups in opposition to the Groupe Mach development were the same as those who opposed the casino project. One interviewee commented:

"[The casino project] was kind of legendary kind of thing and at that point kind of put the wind in the sails for the community organizations. Feeling like they had an opportunity to have more of an impact than maybe they thought. And I feel like they were as surprised as anybody that the casino project...when the casino backed down. I don't think anyone thought it was going to be that easy. And I think it was a bit of a surprise when that

happened and it really could have empowered these organizations. As a result, they became involved with the next big project—the CN Yards" (Personal interview, March 13th, 2018)

This involvement likely led to a slightly expanded alliance within the Pointe-Saint Charles community and the eventual forming of Bâtiment 7 a Nous. Bâtiment 7 a Nous was mainly made up of individuals from the same organizations which had resisted the casino project. This group took over the role as the primary opposition spokespeople from Action-Gardien as the conflict went on (Action-Gardien, 2012). Through a high degree of organizational capacity, sustained over a significant period of time, Action-Gardien and its offshoots have been able to obtain many of the factors as identified by Stone (1995) as being important in establishing an urban regime. While Action-Gardien has not been directly included in governance arrangements the strategic knowledge possessed by these actors, their ability to motivate a strong political consistency, and their high degree of social capital have all allowed them to be influential, especially at the borough level. In effect, the governance structure of Montreal, with sub-local units, has created a space for types these community scale urban regimes to form, something unlikely to be possible or significantly more difficult to scale to the city-wide level.

The developers did not invest many resources or much time to articulate a substantial argument in favour of the development beyond generic suggestions that the project would fit within Montreal's urban planning goals for housing mix and community space. Despite the media coverage, which portrayed the relationship between Groupe Mach and the Point Saint Charles community as a major battle, Groupe Mach seemed to largely concede the community's two primary demands. The first demand was to include some form of affordable or social housing on site, and the second was to contribute a building

or site for community use. Groupe Mach seemed to understand that to achieve zoning approval from the borough successfully, concessions on both these files would be needed. This was likely in large part due to the Borough Mayor's advocacy on behalf of community groups though after the failure of the Loto-Quebec project, there was likely more pressure to engage with community groups. While they would ultimately have a financial impact, both seemed acceptable. Additionally, it appeared Groupe Mach understood the limitations of what could be developed on this site namely that the Borough would not approve a project dramatically out of scale with the rest of the urban fabric of the neighbourhood. The final proposal contained elements at relatively the same scale as the rest of the area, with some slightly taller buildings proposed. Ultimately, while the relationship was contentious, Groupe Mach participated in several in-depth consultation processes hosted by Montreal's Office de consultation publique de Montreal (OCPM) and made changes in response to the community's demands.

The two core issues that Action-Gardien put forward in their 2009 memorandum were the need for the redevelopment to respond to resident needs and to respect the identity of the neighbourhood (Action-Gardien, 2009). They identified key needs as more social housing (advocating the project be 40% social housing and 100% affordable), employment opportunities, and a respect for the existing urban fabric and industrial heritage of the area (Action-Gardien, 2009). Action-Gardien also identified the need to include residents within the conversation both about the project specifically and direction of the neighbourhood more generally (Action-Gardien, 2009). These core tenants as proposed by Action-Gardien worked to alleviate community fears that the project would lead to increased gentrification, and broader community arguments about the need for space for social initiatives and programming. Within the framework of these stated goals, Action-Gardien was able to justify the community need for a community space like

Bâtiment 7 (OCPM, 2009b). If the social housing was included, they saw this instead as the possibility of the project reducing the speed and scale of what they saw as rapid gentrification(Action-Gardien, 2009).

The media keyed typically wrote about the story from two contradictory narratives. First, the story was portrayed as that of David versus Goliath, a small community organization taking on a major developer with clear 'good' and 'bad' sides. Contradictorily the media also argued that the Pointe-Saint Charles community organizations had too much power, that community activists were halting development. Often this narrative arc was extrapolated to suggests that their relative power was a symptom of an entire city-wide malaise, where Montreal would inevitably fall further behind other cities if these developments were not completed (Fortier, 2017; Personal Interview March 13, 2018). The positive media coverage of these groups' arguments as well as the Bâtiment 7/CN Yards project more generally suggests the community organizations and their arguments had at least some resonance outside the neighbourhood.

In 2012, in response to both citizen consultation sessions, Groupe Mach proposed a slightly modified version of their 2009 development proposal. Like their 2009 proposal, this updated version largely met the core orientations of the city's master plan and the Borough approved the necessary zoning changes (Cantin, Ouellet, Létourneau, & Gamboa, 2013). While over the previous year there had been some arguing about Bâtiment 7's price, as well as how much funding Groupe Mach would provide, an agreement was eventually reached between the developer and community groups to provide $1 million in renovation funds (Centre-Social-Autogéré-de-Pointe-Saint-Charles, 2011). This was far short of the estimated $10 million total cost of conversion and renovation of Bâtiment 7. In October 2012, Montreal's executive committee and

governing body recommended the project with the approval of the borough mayor (Ville-de-Montreal, 2012). Bâtiment 7 a Nous shifted resources from advocating for the handover of the building to raising funds and starting its rehabilitation. Even six years later, as Bâtiment 7 opened in May 2018, much of the site remains undeveloped, leading to speculation as to whether the developer intends to change their plans yet again (Personal Interview March 13, 2018).

Conclusion

Development pressures remain for the sites, both in Berlin and in Montreal. In 2015 Berlin's B.B.U (one of the main pro-development proponents) called for a debate regarding building new housing on Tempelhof Field, not even a full year after the referendum which banned construction (Jurgens, 2015). With the introduction of a new light rail line station (Lalonde, 2016), Peel Basin, the former site of the Montreal casino project will inevitably face heavy development pressure. While not yet in advanced stages, alternative development plans, such as the construction of a new major league baseball stadium, are already being discussed (Hinkson, 2017). As noted above, much of the former CN Railyards site remains undeveloped increasing speculation that the project could change once again. Both sites were identified in Montreal's current master plan as important opportunities for future development (Ville-de-Montreal, 2004).

One core difference between these two cases is the relative cohesion of the urban growth coalitions. In Berlin, virtually all the major urban growth machine actors as first conceptualized by Logan and Molotch (2007) most importantly including Berlin's government, were pushing the development project. In the case of the Montreal Casino project the government tried to appear neutral, and in a reversal, for the Bâtiment 7/CN Yards project, the borough appeared to favour the community groups. Additionally, while

predictably in favour of development, Montreal's chamber of commerce and other business organizations were not as supportive of the Loto-Quebec project as Berlin's were regarding Tempelhof, and, due to the CN Railyards project's lack of citywide impact were not particularly involved.

There are also significant differences in the scale of the projects. Both the Tempelhof and Casino Montreal projects were valued at over $750,000,000 in Canadian dollars and would likely qualify as megaprojects. In contrast, the Bâtiment 7/CN Yards project is far smaller and focused almost entirely on housing.

In comparison to the Berlin case, Montreal's Peel Basin site is still difficult to access and occupied by marginal commercial and industrial uses. It is not open to the public, nor do the few private businesses particularly inspire or create a space within citizen imaginaries. With the recent (May 2018) opening of Bâtiment 7, it remains to be seen how actively used by citizens this space becomes. The constituency built within the Berlin case seems to be an important aspect in the successful city-wide resistance to its development, as well as the continued resiliency to it remaining undeveloped. For both Montreal sites, it seems more likely that the community was able to achieve temporary reprieves, with significant areas of both sites likely to be developed in the medium term.

Overall many of the arguments used by each respective side were similar. Developers for both the respective megaprojects argued there was inherent value in growth. While one concentrated on the benefits that would be provided by the affordable housing (Tempelhof), the other concentrated on the economic benefits (Casino Montreal). This likely reflects the relative economic boom occurring in Berlin at the time, in comparison to the comparatively lacklustre economy in Montreal. Opponents effectively argued that

there was a lack of trust in both cases and made various smaller arguments that likely contributed to the inability of project proponents to push through.

Neither Tempelhof nor Groupe Mach designed projects that highlighted environmental sustainability. In personal interviews for both cases (June 14 2017; April 5, 2018) this was identified as a flaw and a potential selling point that was not capitalized on.

The differences in actors, arguments, scales, and outcomes make it difficult to conceive what impact the respective urban growth coalitions had. The following chapter will attempt to identify how increasing fragility of urban growth coalitions impacted the failure of the Tempelhof and Casino Montreal projects, and the major concession of Bâtiment 7.

CHAPTER 5: WHY WERE COMMUNITY GROUPS SUCCESSFUL IN RESISTING THE URBAN GROWTH MACHINE?

This chapter analyses the factors specific to Berlin and Montreal that impacted the three case studies. In concert with these contextual factors, this chapter evaluates the impact of each of these projects on the respective growth coalitions through the lens of urban growth machine theory. Additionally, it evaluates recent theoretical arguments which suggest an increasing fragility of urban growth coalitions, and what elements of the theory most accurately interact with these case studies.

The local matters: Contextual factors in Berlin and Montreal

There are some cultural contexts in Berlin, that while difficult to determine the extent of their influence, may have affected why the growth machine failed to develop Tempelhof Field. These include: the history of activism in Berlin, Berliners' affinity for temporary uses of urban voids (terrain vagues), and a general backlash against Berlin's governing parties and politicians. Impacting both Montreal case studies, Montreal generally, and the neighbourhood of Pointe-Saint Charles in particular, also have a strong history of citizen activism. Additionally, Montreal's Bâtiment 7/CN Railyards project was likely impacted by the project's timing coinciding with the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) and the devolution of significant municipal powers to a sub-tier of government. This devolution, in turn, facilitated the ability of neighbourhood-based community organizations to influence power over neighbourhood planning and zoning.

Berlin's DIY and activist culture, history of temporary uses, and dissatisfaction with the political status quo

Berlin has a particularly strong activist culture of do-it-yourself and interim uses (Thierfelder & Kabisch, 2016). In contemporary times, it is typical that protests against possible gentrification effects often accompany local development plans (Dalia Fahmy, 2013). To an extent, this should have prepared the Government of Berlin for the backlash the proposal to develop Tempelhof Field would incur. It is possible that the failure of earlier protests against development emboldened Berlin's government to the point where they assumed these would occur but not have a significant impact on the result.

Berlin has a unique history of prime vacant land open for development because of the twin legacies of the war and the Berlin wall (Dalia Fahmy, 2013). It also has a population noted to be skeptical of real estate developers (Dalia Fahmy, 2013). Accordingly, citizens' groups are well versed and have experience in opposing development matters. This activist tradition is a key element that Molotch (1976) identified as being a likely factor in the success of anti-growth movements (p. 327). Activists began protesting plans to develop the Tempelhof site when the plans were first raised in 2007 (Dalia Fahmy, 2013). The long-standing issues and lack of resolution gave citizen groups a catalyst to organize around, suggesting they were likely better organized than if the protests had only started in 2014. Furthermore, spokespeople from *100% Tempelhof* noted in an interview that communicating with other groups who had launched citizens' initiatives helped them better understand how to navigate the process (Interview with *100% Tempelhof* Spokespeople, June 23, 2017). Additionally, they communicated with other groups fighting to prevent the development of urban greenspaces which gave them a network of activists outside the immediate geographic proximity of Tempelhof field itself. This enabled them to activate city-wide networks and avoid local balkanization (Interview with 100% Tempelhof Spokespeople, June 23, 2017). *100% Tempelhof* therefore directly built

on the legacy of activists who came before it. Prior activism against development also would have created awareness in the general public, likely making them easier to motivate. As such, these factors likely influenced 100%'s ability to create a compelling counter-narrative and in turn, their success in preventing the development of Tempelhof Field itself.

The City of Berlin has a history of allowing for temporary uses of 'voids' or spaces that are lying fallow. The planning department has acknowledged the benefits of temporary uses, which can change public opinion of a site and provide a boost to possible future developments by increasing their value (Colomb, 2012). The planning department sees temporary uses as a stepping-stone before developments that provide higher rent and more formal uses for the land can be found (Colomb, 2012). As suggested by key informants, it is likely due in part to this reason, in concert with public demands, that the Tempelhof site was opened for public use in 2010 (Personal interview, June 14, 2017). Before this opening, it would have been unlikely that the Tempelhof site would have occupied a space in the minds of many contemporary Berliners. Fenced off and reserved for transportation and military purposes, the site would have had few visitors and not have been familiar to many before being opened to the public.

Berliners quickly populated the site with intermediate uses such as gardens and began using the site for recreation (T. Mokosch, 2014). What the City was unlikely to have anticipated were the benefits that this would provide to groups in opposition to the field's development. Colomb (2012) p.145 notes that "when temporary uses are repressed or threatened with displacement, forms of mobilization between temporary users, the neighbourhood, and sympathizers may emerge in opposition to the official redevelopment plan". This was confirmed in an interview with Elisabeth Meyer-

Renschhausen, an organizer of one of the garden projects, who stated: "we are not interested in being used by the administration to make a place funny and nice and then to sell it out for development" (Personal interview July 4, 2017). This was identified as a substantial factor in the impetus to look for a legal mechanism to maintain the gardens on the field (Personal interview Elisabeth Meyer Renschausen, July 4, 2017). In addition to resisting displacement, temporary users often end up feeling a sense of ownership and want to be engaged directly on the future of these sites (Colomb, 2012). This direct engagement did not occur in a meaningful way in the Tempelhof case. Accordingly, the City 's encouragement and allowance of the temporary use of the site likely backfired, creating a constituency interested in persevering these existing uses. Furthermore, as speculated by the spokespeople of *100% Tempelhof*, the campaign itself likely encouraged more Berliners to visit the site and experience it before they made a decision (*100% Tempelhof* Spokesperson, personal interview, June 2017). The personal experiences of Berliners at the site allowed for emotional attachments, as well as created space for habitual uses. Both would have influenced Berliners to favour keeping the site open.

One of the issues that emerged over the course of the campaign was the increasing dissatisfaction with then mayor Klaus Wowereit and his ruling SPD-CDU coalition. Known beyond Berlin for his oft-mentioned quote that the city was 'poor but sexy', by 2014 Wowereit had been in power for over ten years. As the referendum neared, dissatisfaction with Wowereit had risen sharply, and shortly before the vote a poll found that 71% of Berliners were dissatisfied with his work (Fahrun & Richter, 2014). He was closely associated with the Tempelhof development project and site, and accordingly, the latter became highly politicised in relation to individuals' personal dislike of the mayor and his previous policies. These previous policies included the sale of public housing, and close association with the already long-delayed international airport project (Colomb, 2017).

Wowereit acknowledged this and attempted to deflect criticism of himself personally from the outcome of the project, but the derisive moniker of 'Klaus Wowereit memorial library' for the national library element of the project suggests that this was not entirely effective (Fahrun & Richter, 2014).

This dissatisfaction with the political elite may have been compounded by the high degree of professionalism of the pro-development proponents. A spokesperson for *100% Tempelhof* suggested the contrast between those arguing for development wearing suits and being paid professionals versus the diversity and lack of professionalism of the citizen's initiative campaigners was a factor that helped get their message to resonate (100% Tempelhof Spokesperson, personal interview, June 2017). Ultimately, dissatisfaction among many with Wowereit and previous governing party policies likely contributed to the increasing fragility of the assembled growth coalition through other partners trying to distance themselves from the ruling SPD party.

Montreal's history of activism, building in the time of the GFC, and its powerful borough level of government

Like Berlin, Montreal has a long history of social and community activism in response to development projects (Bornstein, 2010; Hamel, 1991). The Pointe-Saint Charles neighbourhood, in particular, has been a traditional hub of activism and community organizing. Part of this is its history as a centre of manufacturing and Montreal's working class. Accordingly, deindustrialization and economic change after the Second World War significantly impacted the neighbourhood. Residents who felt ignored or underserviced by the government created Quebec's very first community health clinic, organized housing co-operatives and established a legal clinic (Lamont, 2016). Lamont (2016) argues that this reputation for social activism never waned and one of the Bâtiment 7 a Nous

spokespeople, Judith Cayer stated: "social mobilization is in the DNA of the district" (Champagne, 2017). This historical legacy of community activism likely contributed to the well-funded and organized community groups. In turn, the strength of these community organizations and their impact on the both Montreal cases was noted universally in the Montreal interviews (Personal interviews, March 13, 26, April 5, 23, May 25, 2018). As stated earlier, a historical legacy of activism was identified by Molotch (1976) as a key factor in predicting successful community resistance.

The Bâtiment 7/CN Railyards project was largely finalized during 2008-2009, coinciding with the Great Financial Crisis. Instead of any sustained fragility, the lack of significant development of the site was likely a move by the developer, Groupe Mach, to maintain a strong financial position while waiting for better economic prospects to develop the rest of the site. It provides justification as to why the developer so readily gave concessions to community organizations: to move through the approval process as quickly as possible. Additionally, the expropriation of part of the site by AMT provided a cash infusion where very little capital had previously been invested (Corriveau, 2009). This was in addition to the low original purchase price, and lack of remediation that would be necessary (Corriveau, 2009).

In the early 2000s, Montreal went through a series of municipal governance reforms. One result of these reforms was that Montreal gained a new sub-tier level of government, the borough (Tomàs, 2012). While in large part born out of a political compromise, Montreal's boroughs were delegated significant power to manage parks, services, and matters of urban planning and zoning (Tomàs, 2012). This concentration of power at a local scale meant that the opposition to the CN Railyards Condo project, which was largely confined to the Pointe-Saint-Charles neighbourhood, was still able to wield significant political

influence through the South West borough without building a city-wide movement. Their political influence was to the degree that the Mayor of Montreal's South West borough was mostly supportive of their efforts to gain concessions, and was able to leverage the developer's need for zoning changes to bargain effectively. Accordingly, when there is a division of powers to a sub-tier of government, it may facilitate the political power of neighbourhood-based groups.

Berlin and Montreal's local urban growth machines

In their foundational work, Logan and Molotch (2007) identify several principal actors in their growth machine model: local businesses (especially those involved in development) local politicians, and the media. This is in addition to several ancillary groups including sports teams, unions and, universities. Their reliance on property taxes for municipal finance, and on other growth machine actors for campaign contributions, means that local politicians are on the side of pro-growth (Logan & Molotch, 2007).

As the primary driver of the plan to develop Tempelhof Field, local government was fully engaged in this project. In addition, as explored in the previous chapter, major home building associations, public housing companies and local business entities were also publicly supportive of and engaged with the project.

One possible explanation as to why Berlin's growth machine was unable to develop the Tempelhof site successfully was its comparative weakness in contrast with typical North American model growth machines. Colomb (2013) notes the fact that the political actors are more likely to be internally divided within the European context. Additionally, most European municipalities are less dependent on property tax revenues which allows them to be less beholden to advocating growth to maintain or increase revenues (Cox, 2017).

This, in turn, suggests politicians and government are less dependent on development revenues and increases the possibility of division between these groups of actors. Despite the smaller potential gain in tax revenues (as compared to property tax dependant North American cities), Berlin's government was the main driver of the plan to development Tempelhof. This likely points to a broader concept where growth and development is understood by governments as a near universally sound policy goal, suggesting an embedded culture of urban entrepreneurialism.

Despite the government-led drive to develop Tempelhof Field, there was division among urban growth coalition members. In the month before the referendum, there were effectively three different groups running separate campaigns in support of the development of the field. The Aktionbunsess fur Tempelhofer Feld (Action Alliance for Tempelhof Field) represented the large homebuilding associations, the state sport alliance, unions, as well as the chambers of commerce and industry (Fahrun & Richter, 2014). The two main governing parties (The SPD and CDU) ran largely separate campaigns. One of the main issues creating division between the political parties was the construction of a new national library on the site. While it was a core priority for the SPD, the CDU had backed away from their support of its construction, especially as it became increasingly unpopular over the course of the campaign (Berliner-Morgenpost, 2014). The two main parties of the governing coalition (the SPD and CDU) used different messaging and responded to criticisms differently. Meanwhile, while there were disagreements and major divisions within the *100% Tempelhof* organization, they were able to mount a relatively unified campaign around their message (100% Tempelhof spokespeople, in-person interview, June 2017; Elisabeth-Meyer Renschhausen, in-person interview, July 4, 2017).

Logan and Molotch (2007) suggest their pro-growth nature typically unites political operatives across different political orientations. While all three opposition parties (the Greens, the Left and the Pirate Party) initially supported edge development of the Tempelhof site by 2014 all three were in favour of *100% Tempelhof* citizens' initiative (Zawatka-Gerlach, 2014). The Left and Green parties pointed at the lack of citizen engagement and the environmental concerns, which helped to bolster the claims of 100% Tempelhof. The Green party argued their support of the 100% Citizen's Initiative was an opportunity to restart the project and explicitly stated it was not the end to development on the site (as stated by 100% Tempelhof's law) impact (Zawatka-Gerlach, 2014). Despite this positioning, the Green Party's support still likely had a positive impact on the citizen's initiative. Die Linke, the leftist party, made a similar argument. On the day of the referendum, they published a piece where they made clear their support for the construction of affordable housing, just not under the context of this coalition (Die Linke, 2014). As both major opposition parties argued they might have supported the project in a different form and the development of affordable housing generally, this is more accurately an example of a difference among the growth coalition on how and where to direct development instead of a true crack in the coalition. As such, this case study might be a representative example of citizens taking advantage of internal disagreement among members the growth machine even if different outcomes were desired. More evidence for disagreement among the growth coalition members is provided by the fact that, since the fall of the Berlin Wall, Die Linke had frequently been part of Berlin's governing coalitions, and was not a perpetually marginalized opposition party. Accordingly, while there was a divergence in the narrative of the pro-growth coalition over this project, there was not political divergence around the idea that 'growth is good'. While opposition parties were willing to support 100% Tempelhof's ban on development for this site, it was likely seen as a politically advantageous and site-specific policy not a lasting verdict of the

parties' general attitudes towards growth and development. Despite this political divergence, those in power at the time were determinately in favour of the project.

Growth machine theory suggests that, due to their need to increase profit and circulation, most local media have a direct interest in increasing growth (Logan & Molotch, 2007). In Berlin, the local media has a history of supporting the boosterism activities of the local growth coalition (Colomb, 2013). Though a shift was noted over the course of the campaign, with 100% Tempelhof receiving increasingly favourable coverage (Personal interviews, June 19, 23, 2017), many within the traditional media of Berlin remained sympathetic to the development of the field (Fahey, 2015). Despite this, the opposition was able to provide a convincing narrative and halt the development of the site. This suggests a possible decreasing influence of traditional media as a major actor in affecting growth. This may have been in part due to the tactics of *100% Tempelhof,* who, due in part to a lack of funds and media connections, relied heavily on mobilizing large numbers of volunteers to engage people face-to-face. This would have allowed them to avoid reliance on potentially unsympathetic media. Media coverage of other contemporary events, including issues with local and national megaprojects, could have been damaging. This was especially true for actors such as Mayor Klaus Wowereit, the face of both the Tempelhof project as well as the Berlin Brandenberg International Airport, which by 2014 was already delayed and significantly over budget ("Berlin Airport Opening Delayed Yet Again," 2013).

While the housing builders' association was broadly supportive of the development of Tempelhof Field, it did not seem effective at mobilizing a consistency to support the project. It is possible local developers supported the project but, because they were not directly included in the first stage, did not throw their full support behind it. Another factor

may have been historical disagreement between the BBU and the SPD party. According to an interview with someone involved in Berlin's housing industry, the BBU was one of the first groups to sound the warning that Berlin was starting to grow again after several years of population loss (In person interview, June 19, 2017). The SPD party was critical of their call for building more housing. These two groups would both find themselves advocating for the Tempelhof project, though as noted earlier, as part of different campaigns. It is possible that this previous public disagreement hindered the coordination between the campaigns. Additionally, the governing coalition relied on the fact they were not including private developers in the first phase of the development of Tempelhof Field as a key element of their narrative. This was supposed to ensure an increasingly skeptical public would not identify the Tempelhof project with a for-profit motive. This might have influenced private developers to be less forceful in advocating for the project.

It is possible that the growth machine's ability to create a compelling narrative had weakened over time. Berlin, after the fall of The Wall, had many examples of development projects that were meant to spur growth or change the image of the city. While there was a boom in construction in the immediate aftermath of the wall, the demand for these projects was slow to materialize (Cochrane & Jonas, 1999). Accordingly, the arguments put forward by the pro-development proponents, especially around the social benefits, as well as vague connotations about the project being essential to the 'future', fell on ears that had been comparatively inoculated. These arguments, having been used for the previous twenty or so years, lost their effectiveness when Berliners saw the benefits did not materialize, or did not materialize to the degrees promised. Accordingly, the mobilization of *100% Tempelhof* managed to fill this gap in the narrative with a simple, and compelling message.

100% Tempelhof was able to highlight the contradictions of previous government policy, while effectively arguing for an alternative. In the case of Tempelhof Field, a significant check to the power of the urban growth coalition was the Volksentscheid mechanism. This forced the Senate to adopt a law banning development on Tempelhof Field. Ultimately, the government could have amended the law or could eventually change it, but the presence of a determined opposition group means it would come at a high cost of political capital the coalition at the time was unwilling to expend. Whereas in previous instances the pro-growth coalition may have been able to lean on strong support from industrial unions, Berlin's economy is now primarily service-based (OECD, 2010). Previously, Berlin's economy had been highly industrial. As Berlin shifted to a service-based economy the relative power of unions representing industrial workers declined. Mayor Wowereit was unpopular, and this unpopularity likely influenced the willingness of growth coalition members to commit full resources to the project. In addition, as noted previously, Berlin's economy was expanding. Often 'value-free' growth messaging, specifically around the necessity of growth for economic improvement is more effective in times of economic downturn (Troutman, 2004). As such, strong community opposition in the form of *100% Tempelhof* was ultimately able to take advantage of Berlin's urban growth coalition at a time where numerous structural and contextual factors weakened their ability to develop the field.

The comparatively high disunity and fragility within traditional growth machine actors impacted their ability to mobilize groups. The context of a history of activism and temporary uses meant that anti-development messages resonated more forcefully. As such, it suggests that Berlin's growth coalition lacked resiliency during this period—one of the main signifiers of 'growth coalition fragility' as articulated by Lauermann and Vogelpohl (2017).

Montreal's casino relocation project was broadly supported by what are considered the major players according to urban growth machine theory (Molotch, 1976). The exception was the explicit support of the municipal government itself. Major actors considered part of the growth machine who supported the project included Montreal's Board of Trade, Tourism Montreal (Bourgault-Côté, 2005), and many businesses and cultural organizations (Lévesque, 2006). While not explicitly coming out in support of the project, both the province and the City of Montreal seemed to support Loto-Quebec's efforts to move the Montreal casino to the Peel Basin site. In later post-mortem discussions both the mayor at the time (Gérald Tremblay) and one of his predecessors (Denis Coderre) argued about who was in more favour of the project (Normandin, 2015b). At the time, the president of the Société du Havre de Montréal, the public organization responsible for the development of the site and surrounding area, expressed disappointment, stating "The reason to build that complex was to spread out tourism and help out the waterfront, make it more livable for everyone. Now there is a big hole there. We can't just turn around and make another project. It's a major area" (Rocha et al., 2006).

While the Loto-Quebec project was publicly supported among most urban growth coalition actors, one possible reason for lack of strong by these same groups may have been a sense of fatigue. The Loto-Quebec project was proposed after a significant round of spending on other real estate and development projects such as the Quartier Internationale, with $918 million spent (Hamel & Jouve, 2008) and was running concurrently with the Quartier des Spectacles project which by 2015 had $150 million of taxpayer investments (Loison & Fischler, 2016). These projects were part of a broader effort by the existing growth coalition to reorient Montreal economy internationally (Hamel & Jouve, 2008; Loison & Fischler, 2016). While the rhetoric surrounding the

Casino's development continued this trend of international orientation, positioning it with typical boosterism arguments that it was a matter of civic pride and necessary for the city (Boyle, 1999) the sustained risk, possible fatigue and division of resources among pro-growth elites, as well as moderate pushback among community organizations likely made it less tenable.

According to Aubin (2006), the failure of the Loto-Quebec project was not due to any governmental actor quashing it based on flaws, but rather Cirque du Soleil backing out. Cirque's primary reason was due to the moderate delays that the Colomb report's citizen engagement would cause and as argued by former Mayor Tremblay 'hurt feelings' on behalf of Cirque's CEO (Normandin, 2015b). When the Cirque du Soleil backed out of the project, Loto-Quebec was unwilling to find another partner or develop the project on its own. Accordingly, the project collapsed.

At the time Loto-Quebec's CEO Lamarre was frustrated with the fact that he perceived the project's benefits, had been overshadowed by the debate on if the casino would help or harm Point Saint Charles residents stating "I thought we had this debate in Quebec many years ago and decided as a society that gambling was acceptable. I'm not a politician, so I don't have to decide. I can build my project or not" (Rocha et al., 2006). While the power of Pointe-Saint Charles organizations was downplayed by media commentators such as Aubin, comments such as these seem to suggest the community organizations of Pointe-Saint Charles made a difference through making it politically costly for either the local or provincial government to be fully behind this project.

The apparent strength of the Pointe-Saint Charles community groups, in large part led by Action-Gardien, is supported by the publicly voiced frustration of the business and

development community. In one example, the head of Quebec's business lobby argued that grassroots groups were "opposing improvements to the province's prosperity", were "professional protestors", that they exert too much public influence and were partially responsible for Loto-Quebec's decision to abandon the Casino project (CanadianPressNewsWire, 2006). Former Mayor Denis Coderre further validated the strength of the opposition movement by arguing that the failure had been a simple NIMBY issue, that the previous government had failed to deal with properly (Journet, 2015). Despite Coderre's opinion, the article's author concludes that the community was not strong enough to derail the project (Journet, 2015). Ultimately, it seems that divisions among Montreal's urban growth coalition was a necessary condition for the success of these community groups.

While it may be a type of growth coalition fragility, the evidence from this case study suggests that Montreal's coalition had possibly overextended itself due to ongoing mega-projects and had a reduced capacity to mobilize resources for this specific project. Montreal's urban growth coalition was unable or unwilling to expend the resources necessary to override or even engage in citizen consultations. This lack of commitment on behalf of the broader growth coalition, more than anything, likely implicates the fragility of this specific project which relied too heavily on one actor (Cirque du Soleil) who was inexperienced in development, and for whom this project was a departure from its core business of entertaining. When Cirque pulled out, developers had a difficult time reimagining the project with a different actor. A more resilient growth coalition may have been able to weather the delays and find another partner to fill the role slated for Cirque du Soleil. With a lack of forceful support from either the provincial or local government, the partial and likely overextended traditional urban growth machine actors were unable

to push through a project of this size in concert with other ongoing real estate and development projects.

While Montreal's central city government was generally supportive of the Casino-Montreal project, they played a small, neutral role in the Bâtiment 7/CN Rail Yards project. According to one person deeply involved in the Bâtiment 7 project (Interview, March 13, 2018), the City provided limited technical advice to community groups. The Borough, in contrast, played a far more active role in supporting the community's quest to gain concessions. Borough politicians acted as brokers, suggesting that a development agreement was not possible without community support for the project (Interview, March 13, 2018; Interview, March 26, 2018). Ultimately both the City and the Borough favoured growth and development of the site but were broadly sympathetic to community goals and created the conditions where a compromise was possible. Accordingly, the positions of both scales of municipal government still favoured growth and development but allowed for significant concessions based on community demands.

Due to the comparatively small-scale and local nature of the Bâtiment 7/CN Rail Yards project, many other key growth machine actors did not actively participate. The planned development, which in many respects represents a typical—if larger than average—development project for the city did not invite significant commentary from outside of the neighbourhood. Media mainly concentrated on the acrimonious relationship between the developer and community groups, and, in the later stages of the project, the community's desire for Bâtiment 7 and its rehabilitation.

One core argument to suggest that there has been a shift in the development milieu post the Bâtiment 7/CN Yards project is the City is more frequently demanding the inclusion

of affordable and social housing in development projects and developers are more regularly providing it (Personal interview March 13, 2018; April 5, 2018). Inclusionary housing has been on the City's radar at least since they introduced a strategy in 2005 which set a goal of new housing units to be 15% affordable and 15% social (Ville-de-Montreal, 2005). Rather than signalling the start of inclusionary zoning in Montreal because developers were worried about citizen resistance (such as in both the Loto-Quebec and Bâtiment 7/CN Yards projects), increasing numbers of projects with some affordable or social housing units likely reflects broader trends towards inclusionary zoning. Inclusionary zoning is increasingly widely seen as a way to obtain affordable housing without direct government provision (Schuetz, Meltzer, & Been, 2009). These are trends seen throughout North American cities (Schuetz et al., 2009). In addition, the City had leverage over Groupe Mach at the time, namely that they required a zoning change to be able to build housing. This need for a zoning change allowed the City to enter these negotiations in a stronger position and likely facilitated their ability to gain some affordable and social housing promises. Therefore, increased mandating of affordable and social housing in development does not seem like a symptom of growth coalition fragility in this case or the Montreal context more broadly.

Community victories in Berlin and Montreal: Is it due to fragile urban growth machines?

Urban growth machine theory has identified, many possible reasons for increasing growth coalition weakness or fragility. These reasons include the rise of homevoters co-opting government instead of rentiers (Been et al., 2014; Fischel, 2017; MacLeod, 2011; Phelps, 2012), a rescaling of government that bypasses local elites (Kirkpatrick & Smith, 2011; Molotch & Logan, 1984; Purcell, 2000; Wachsmuth, 2017b) transformations of local economies whereby there are less place-based corporations and workforces (Lauermann

& Vogelpohl, 2017; Purcell, 2000) or in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) a declining capacity of local government to enact pro-growth coalition policies (Kirkpatrick & Smith, 2011; Schindler, 2016). Outright, none of these cases deal with the bypassing of local elites or a declining capacity of local government in the wake of the GFC. Through the lens of the cases, the other potential explanations for the weakening of urban growth coalitions will be explored.

Ultimately, Berlin's growth coalition seemed largely unchanged from previous iterations and projects. What might have made a difference in expanding the fractures among the growth coalition is that the government drove this project, and within the governing coalition there were long standing divisions between its members. This fact could have reduced the forcefulness of private sector partners in pressing the issue. As well, the inconsistencies in the narrative of developing affordable housing and jobs with the past action of the coalition were on clear display. Despite these possible lines of fracture among the pro development coalition, over the course of the campaign, their alliance remained relatively intact. The relative unity of the urban growth coalition provides more support for the argument the failure of the Tempelhof project was because of the mobilization of a broad 'anti-growth' coalition from middle class, anti-elite, environmental, and leftist groups.

Throughout their campaign *100% Tempelhof* spokespeople argued they kept returning to the idea of asking Berliners "what kind of city they wanted to live in'. They invoked these 'right to the city' arguments to challenge the necessity of the Tempelhof development project, and projects like it more generally (Interview with 100% spokespeople, June 2017). These broad thematic issues were also utilized by Point Saint Charles activists who organized under the slogan "Who owns the point?"(Lamont, 2016).

In both cases, this broad rhetorical strategy was likely made more effective by the fact that oppositional groups provided a concrete alternative to the proposed developments. These concrete strategies were an outright ban in Berlin, or a project more responsive to community desires in Montreal.

In addition to invoking the idea of the right to the city, Berlin's *100% Tempelhof* group was able to make use of the legal mechanism of the Volksentscheid, which created a series of achievable goals for groups to mobilize towards, and a way to enforce their desired outcome. Overall, this suggests, while the Tempelhof case might be an example of a weak or weakening growth coalition, it does not precisely adhere to Lauermann and Vogelpohl (2017)'s theorization of factors that lead to growth coalition fragility. Instead, Darrah-Okike (2017)'s Hawaiian example gets at the core of what allowed 100% Tempelhof to be successful, namely a well-organized and broad opposition, invoking ideas around the 'right to the city' (even if called something different), as well as a legal mechanism that could be activated to halt the growth-coalition backed project. While these factors somewhat reflect ideas such as Lauermann and Vogelpohl (2017)'s unsteady notions of growth' they do not fully reflect a shift within the coalition or multiple triggered fractures, as conceived of as a condition of growth machine fragility by Lauermann and Vogelpohl (2017).

In the two Montreal cases, the growth coalitions were far more divided from the outset. Accordingly, neither the Loto-Quebec project nor the Bâtiment 7/CN Yards project provide the same depth of theoretical implications as the Tempelhof case, because in neither case were the usual actors as initially conceived by Molotch (1976) truly aligned. The lack of formal governmental support for either project is the clearest example of this fact.

Hamel and Jouve (2008) argue that Montreal's governing regime underwent a change within the 1980s as it rescaled to the regional level, and began to focus on attracting international capital. At the time of their writing, Hamel and Jouve (2008) argued that this regime was still driving Montreal's growth agenda. This regime covered the period of the Loto-Quebec project, and the start of the Bâtiment 7/CN Railyards project and both of these projects fit within this mould. Montreal's growth coalition and conceptions of growth (and more accurately that 'growth is good') appear to be stable during this period. However, as highlighted earlier, the introduction of a sub-municipal (borough) level of government with zoning powers may increase the ability of well-organized and motivated communities to resist development projects.

Jessop et al. (1999) p.145 identify weak party organization as a condition where typical American urban growth coalitions emerge. This state of weak party organization is not the case in Berlin and Montreal which both have strong municipal level political parties and party politics. In contrast to Berlin which is typical of Germany, only one other major city in Canada has political parties at the municipal level (Vancouver). Berlin's ruling parties supported the project, but the fact that the political parties existed likely facilitated them being tied to previous unpopular policies. The system of political parties likely had only a marginal impact on the outcome of the Loto-Quebec project, but after 2009 the ruling party of the South West borough was different from the ruling municipal party of the City of Montreal. Not constrained by governing the entire city, the Borough's political party was likely able to be more forceful advocates for the Bâtiment 7 project and the community groups of the neighbourhood.

While news coverage in both cities was generally quite favourable towards development (Bourgault-Côté, 2005; Gris, 2014), the role of the media in the debates over major urban development projects appears different than originally conceived of by Molotch (1976) and Logan and Molotch (2007). What became apparent in Berlin and both Montreal cases was the media's role in providing favourable coverage to citizens groups. Often these groups were portrayed as plucky underdogs fighting against well-resourced and wrongheaded opponents (Aubin, 2006; Fahey, 2015; Fortier, 2017). Gibson (2004) argues that, in a conflict over urban development in Seattle, local media privileged downtown business groups and other actors who would be considered members of the local urban growth coalition. While this question was not the direct focus of the study, positive media coverage in Montreal of the project was noted as playing a major role in the outcome Bâtiment 7/CN Yards project (Personal interview March 13, 2018). Additionally, the increasingly positive coverage for community groups over the course of the Tempelhof debate was a decisive factor in delivering the groups' arguments, to the detriments of the project's proponents (Personal interview June 19, 2017). It is apparent the media enjoys a good underdog story and appeared to accordingly suggest that the Bâtiment 7/CN Rail Yards project was more contentious than it was in reality. Within the literature, the urban growth coalition's ability to monopolize the public narrative is identified as one of the major elements contributing to their success (Cain, 2014; Kirkpatrick & Smith, 2011; Kulcsar & Domokos, 2005). In none of the three cases were development proponent able to create and monopolize a one-sided narrative. Therefore, these cases suggest the media's role is shifting in local growth politics. In concert with a possible weakening of the power of traditional media, these aspects may be influencing development outcomes.

In all three cases, a fundamental commonality is the strength of community resistance movements, and their respective abilities to leverage political influence. Within each case,

anti-development groups through popular organization used a legal mechanism (or employed political pressure to encourage the government to do so) that either allowed them to halt a project outright, delay it, or enabled them to negotiate for better terms. Accordingly, the sustained strength and organizational ability of community groups and a lack of willingness of growth coalitions to invest significant resources in overcoming them are likely the most significant factors in the successes of these community groups.

Are Growth Machines becoming increasingly fragile?

Much of post-war Berlin planning revolved around using mega-projects to fill various voids left from either the Second World War or the Berlin Wall. These projects included restoring central squares such as Potsdamer and Pariser Platz, rebuilding much of the infrastructure necessary as it once again became the capital of a united Germany, and more suburban large-scale projects such as Berlin's recently developed Adlershof, a technology and industrial park. Strom (1996) argues that despite the success of the Potsdamer Platz redevelopment, it is not indicative of a robust pro-growth regime. Instead, in concert with the unsuccessful bid for the 2000 Olympics, she argues that Berlin's regime seemed tenuous when faced with surprisingly strong opposition to both projects (Strom, 1996).

Only a few years before the Tempelhof Volksentscheid, there was a similar conflict over the Media Spree development project. An area along the Spree River populated primarily by temporary uses (including nightclubs and artists spaces) began to experience developer interest and was branded 'Media Spree' (Lanz, 2013). While opponents to the project were able to assemble a broad coalition under the banner of Media Spree Versenken [Sink Media Spree] and successfully launch and win a borough level

referendum campaign (Lanz, 2013). The government-initiated consultations which quickly fell apart. Citizens groups failed to stop the project which has led to substantial development and displacement of former uses (Lanz, 2013).

As mentioned earlier, before Tempelhof Field there had only been one successful use of the Volksentscheid [referendum] mechanism, and limited success in resisting major development projects. This previous lack of success would suggest that, until Tempelhof Field, Berlin's urban growth machine had been 'strong enough'. Since 2014 though, the mechanism has seemingly become increasingly popular, with more referenda initiated, or only halted after the underlying goals were accomplished. In addition, there has been a shift in Berlin's governing coalition. Roughly two and a half years after the Tempelhof Volksentscheid, in fall of 2016 Berlin elected a new government. The former politician in charge of urban development for much of the Tempelhof conflict, Michael Müller, is now Mayor, and the SPD's former coalition partner, the CDU is no longer in power. Instead, Müller rules with his previous opponents over the Tempelhof site, the Left and Green parties.

Lauermann and Vogelpohl (2017) acknowledge that growth coalition fragility might be temporary, depending on how such a coalition attempts to re-establish itself. In the aftermath of Tempelhof, multiple major development projects have been scrapped. One project, at Elisabeth-Aue, was supposed to result in 5,000 homes for 12,500 people on the outskirts of Berlin (Schönball, 2016). Various reasons for it remaining undeveloped have been suggested including political horse-trading, or a promise from a new governing coalition to have more citizen engagement (Schönball, 2016).

When its replacement opens, Berlin's Tegel airport was slated to close. Politicians and planners had already developed an extensive plan to transform the site from Berlin's main airport, into spaces for technology-oriented companies, housing, and a field similar to Tempelhof. As part of the agreement to build a new airport for Berlin, all existing airports (including Tegel and Tempelhof) were to close (Fahrun, 2018). As with Tempelhof, all parties who were members of the governing coalition were in agreement (Fahrun, 2018). As with Tempelhof, citizens challenged the government with the same Volksentscheid mechanism and successfully passed a law for it to remain open. While the validity of the law is currently being questioned, it remains to be seen if Tegel will remain open in the medium-term (Fahrun, 2018).

It appears that Berlin's growth coalition continues to be vulnerable to anti-development resistance, what is unknown is if this apparent weakness is temporary or indicative of broader trends. As noted within the scholarship, temporary fragility (though frequently not explicitly named as such) has been seen within growth coalitions before and has been reversed through an influx of non-local capital (Harding, 1994; Molotch & Logan, 1984) or an increase in the power of 'value-free' growth arguments during periods of economic downturn (Troutman, 2004). Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, Berlin's growth machine appears to have largely been successful, but when challenged by strong opposition to major events and projects (such as the Olympic Bid and Tempelhof) it has been unable to accomplish its goals. It remains to be seen if Berlin's growth coalition will eventually re-establish itself and to what extent. One significant difference may be the existence of the Volksentscheid legal mechanism, which provides a direct method for citizens to influence the development process.

Commentators have suggested both Montreal projects have had an impact on the city's development milieu. Key informants and Montreal's media explicitly argued the Bâtiment 7/CN Rail Yards project signalled a change in Montreal's development narratives, and that now real estate developers must consider social groups in major development projects. One commentator went further suggesting the city and province suffered from "Peel basin trauma" since the failure of the Casino project (Martineau (2010). Former Mayor Denis Coderre said on behalf of the city he felt shame that project had not been completed as planned (Journet, 2015). While this is strong rhetoric in the case of Montreal, it appears to be business as usual for Montreal's development sector.

At various points, while both Pointe-Saint Charles projects were being debated, the city engaged in significant redevelopment projects such as the Quartier des spectacles, the Quartier de l'innovation, and the redevelopment of Griffintown. Other projects in the region included the DIX 30 suburban shopping complex and a new sports stadium for the major league soccer team. There continues to be the construction of condominium development projects throughout Montreal—so much so that commentators are calling it a 'boom' (McConnon, 2017; The-Canadian-Press, 2017a, 2017b). One of the hotspots is along the Lachine Canal both in Griffintown and Point Saint Charles (The-Canadian-Press, 2017b). A new generation of mega-projects, including the $1.7 billion Royal-Mont Mall (CBC-News, 2015a) and a new $6.3 billion light rail line (Praet, 2018), appear poised to go ahead despite opposition. This context suggests that, in line with the arguments advanced earlier, the failure of the Loto-Quebec project and the major concessions provided to those that opposed the development of the CN Railyards was were not due to an increasing fragility in the growth coalition but rather a divergence of interests within the coalition on where best to develop. Furthermore, the strong anti-development

organizations of Pointe-Saint Charles likely had an impact, even if not enough of one to fully halt development or challenge the general principle of 'value-free growth'.

Accordingly, there does not look to have been a major shift within growth coalition outcomes in Montreal. Montreal developers seemed to have adapted to broader trends towards increased citizen consultation and the use of inclusionary zoning tools as a form of community compromise. The City's government appears to be satisfied with the status quo of achieving increased social benefits while still encouraging growth. While the possibility of the co-opting of borough-level governments by community groups is interesting and a possible trend, it needs to be explored outside of the South-West Borough where Pointe-Saint Charles is located. Montreal's new municipal government, led by Mayor Valerie Plante from the same party as the South West borough may suggest a change in the governing regime. Local business and media elites overwhelmingly backed her opponent and predecessor Denis Coderre (Hébert, 2017), while much of her platform was based on increasing the number of low-income housing units among other broadly progressive ideas (Isai, 2017).

From only three case studies it is challenging to make definite conclusions as to the question of whether urban growth coalitions are globally becoming more fragile. While some of Lauermann and Vogelpohl (2017)'s theorization on the process seems to accurately reflect what occurred, especially in the Tempelhof case, it seems less well suited as a broad analytical lens to make value judgments on whether growth coalition fragility is increasing.

Instead of an emerging shift of growth coalition fragility, the growth machine failure or concessions in all three cases could reflect increasingly powerful and resourceful counter-

coalitions, able to take advantage of momentary lapses in regime popularity, individual developer weakness, or a supportive political regime. In his initial theorization of the growth machine, after all, Molotch (1976) saw the possibility of an emerging "counter coalition" with the power and ability to challenge the dominance of pro-growth coalitions. Molotch (1976: 327) identified middle-class groups with a history of activism and mobilizing in the absence of a powerful growth coalition as more likely to succeed. These conditions were present in all three cases.

CHAPTER 6: KEY FINDINGS AND FUTURE RESEARCH ON URBAN GROWTH MACHINES

This chapter outlines the key findings of the study, and what implications they may have for future investigations into citizen resistance and growth machine theory. Additionally, this chapter showcases ways that urban governance arrangements and structures may be changing, suggesting that cities might be becoming less like "growth machines."

In the case of Berlin's Tempelhof field, citizens successfully used a referendum-like legal mechanism to ban development on the site. The proposed development was a series of apartments, commercial and industrial spaces, as well as a school and a new national library. The project, designed as a ring of housing, institutions and commercial buildings around the edge of the former airport, highlighted the affordable housing component and the planned conservation of green space in the centre. The leading development proponents were the coalition of Berlin's two governing parties, as well as a consortium of housing, business, and unions under the banner 'Aktionbunsess fur Tempelhofer Feld' [Action Alliance for Tempelhof Field]. Initially, many media commentators, as well as both the proponents thought they would face little resistance and easily succeed in developing the site. The City's need for affordable housing and general arguments about the need for progress became the core arguments of proponents. The citizen's group *100% Tempelhof* effectively pointed out the contradictions in previous housing policy, invoked broad ideas linked to the 'right to the city', and brought forward environmental arguments. With the political unpopularity of the governing coalition (primarily due to their length of time in office and accumulated missteps) the citizen's group was able to effectively collect the necessary signatures and votes required to prevent the site's development.

In Montreal, Loto-Quebec, partnering with Cirque du Soleil, proposed to move their off-island casino to a major former industrial site adjacent to downtown. The casino would have been expanded to include amenities such as a major hotel, a spa, and theatre as part of a larger entertainment complex. Loto-Quebec argued it was necessary to keep Montreal's casino competitive internationally and spoke to the jobs and economic opportunities it would create. Facing a determined local resistance from the adjacent Pointe-Saint Charles neighbourhood, the province recommended delaying the project for more in-depth citizen consultations. Unable or unwilling to face the delay, Cirque du Soleil dropped out, and Loto-Quebec followed almost immediately after.

While initially planned as a fairground to support the Loto-Quebec development, the former CN Railyards instead became part of a proposed condo development by Groupe Mach, a major development firm. While portrayed as a highly contentious conflict between a developer and the community groups of Pointe-Saint Charles many of the key aspects, including the provision of some affordable and social housing, as well as a community space, were agreed upon during an extensive citizen consultation effort. One of the main reasons for this was the South-West borough working closely with community groups. Accordingly, the developer ended up making significant concessions, and giving the community Bâtiment 7, a large building for use as a community hub.

Ultimately, the three cases illuminated conditions that were present in both cities, including strong citizen resistance movements and strong municipal political party systems. The cases also suggested a changing media role in local development politics and a lack of theoretical fit with recent scholarship surrounding growth machine weakness. Berlin's case emphasized the importance of legal mechanisms community

groups could use, and a divided growth machine. Montreal's cases seemed to suggest a distracted growth machine (and the relevance of this to success), as well as the possibility of a successful alliance with a sub-level of municipal government by anti-development advocates.

In their successful resistance to development projects, either through project failure or achieving concessions, Berlin and Montreal had several commonalities. The first, and likely the one with the most significant impact, was the strength of the resistance movements. In both of these cities, movements were well organized and had a core of motivated activists. These movements paired specific plans for the use of the sites—either a complete ban on development or increasing community amenities and social housing—with broadly thematic 'right to the city' rallying cries. They were able to build on local traditions of activism to mobilize large constituencies in favour of their projects. While *100% Tempelhof* built a city-wide movement and those advocating for Bâtiment 7 were primarily neighbourhood-based, both were able to accomplish their primary goals successfully. It is uncertain how much the strength of these resistance movements contributed to their respective outcomes, but it seems clear that their presence was a necessary if not sufficient condition for success.

Both Berlin and Montreal have strong municipal party systems. Arguably municipal parties create more accountability for policy, and, with a dedicated opposition party, divert focus from purely real estate and boosterism issues (Lightbody, 1999). Accordingly, the strong municipal party systems in Berlin and Montreal allow avenues for community groups to mount sustained political pressure, and, as seen in both cases, allow for citizens movements to work together with opposition parties to highlight the detrimental effects of development. This assumption is partially confirmed by Jessop et al. (1999), who argue

that a weak party organization is a condition for when powerful growth machines emerge. The cases in Berlin and Montreal suggest that party politics can act as a check on growth machines and arguments of value-free growth. One possible avenue of future investigation may be to examine the link between municipal party organization and urban growth coalition fragility across multiple contexts.

One finding from the cases is the seemingly changing role of local media in urban politics and local media's investment in promoting land use intensification. While local media was arguably initially favourable to development proponents in the Berlin and Loto-Quebec cases, it may be undergoing a shift. In Berlin, media coverage became increasingly favourable towards the *100% Tempelhof* citizens' initiative and likely played a major role both in driving Berliners to use the site and in promoting the group's argument. Regarding the Bâtiment 7/CN Railyards project, local media coverage tended to portray the conflict as more acrimonious than key-informant interviews suggest and frequently invoked metaphorical ideas such as 'David versus Goliath' which tended to favour community activists. While the level of influence this had on the outcomes of either case is unknown, local media's role in development conflicts seems to be changing from broadly pro-growth to more nuanced and receptive to community organizations. As much of local media has also undergone a structural reorganization with the decline of print journalism and related revenues, it remains to be seen what the level of impact media is having on these conflicts, and if they are playing their traditional pro-growth role as initially conceived.

The three cases analysed in this study were divergent in outcomes and contexts. It, therefore, makes it challenging to generalize. Accordingly, it is difficult to argue any of the recent theorizations around growth machine failure or weakness (such as Lauermann

and Vogelpohl (2017) or Darrah-Okike (2017) explain the outcomes of either the Berlin or Montreal cases. As noted above, there are some generally shared characteristics. Berlin and Montreal both had strong resident resistance movements and strong municipal party systems. But other differences do not fit. For example, Montreal's resistance movement was primarily organized by low-income residents in a low-income neighbourhood. Montreal's successful organization of low-income residents somewhat contradicts what the literature argues, which is that low-income groups have slim chances of success. In Berlin, many of the organizers and supporters of *100% Tempelhof* were middle class.

In addition to a strong, well-organized movement opposing the development of Tempelhof Field, and the presence of municipal parties, there were two other major contributing factors to *100% Tempelhof's* success. These were the presence of a legal mechanism citizens could use to pass legislation, and a growth coalition facing internal fractures and divisions among its members.

As noted previously, this referendum mechanism (or Volksentscheid) had a historically very low rate of success and required significant mobilization. A well-organized citizen opposition was a necessary condition for its success. The Volksentscheid did allow citizens to enforce their demands on a government that was very interested in developing Tempelhof Field.

In addition, Berlin's growth coalition was experiencing divisions for a variety of reasons. These included the fact that the project's leading proponent, Mayor Klaus Wowereit, was personally unpopular. Mayor Wowerit's unpopularity created a political situation in which the other main coalition partner, Berlin's CDU party, had an incentive to distance to not fully invest in the project. Also, it is likely that previous disagreements between the SPD,

led by Wowereit, and the main housing organization the BBU impacted their ability to work closely together, despite both being supportive of the project. Additionally, despite prior successes, the economic and political upheaval Berlin experienced in the latter half of the 20th century likely impacted the ability of Berlin's place-bound elites to build resiliency into their growth coalition.

While Montreal's growth coalition did not have the same fractures evident in Berlin, its attention, especially during the Loto-Quebec project, seemed divided. With multiple ongoing major real estate development projects underway in the city, the one that faced the most resistance at the time—and with a weak but essential development partner (Cirque du Soleil)— seemed the easiest to let go. As a comparatively small-scale project, the Bâtiment 7/CN Railyards project was unlikely ever to have been a major focus of growth coalition members.

With a highly localized resistance, the Bâtiment 7/CN Railyards project provides enlightenment into a relatively unique element of Montreal's governance structure. Each of Montreal's 19 boroughs has significant zoning and urban planning powers. While they cannot raise tax revenues independently of the municipality, the smaller scale of the borough, each with approximately 90,000 residents each (Ville-de-Montreal, 2016), allows neighbourhood-based organizations to have comparatively more influence on the political process of planning than if their lobbying capacity were diffused across the city.

Directions for future research

Within the urban governance literature, the importance of growth coalition actors controlling the narrative to ensure the success of their projects has frequently been noted

(Boyle, 1999; Loftman & Nevin, 1996; Swyngedouw et al., 2002). Local media, traditionally seen as a growth coalition actor, has tended to play a significant role in urban growth coalitions' ability to diffuse their chosen narrative. As the strength and circulation of local media changes, it remains to be seen how involved these groups are and how effective they are. In addition, as highlighted within Berlin's Tempelhof Field case study and Montreal's Bâtiment 7/CN Railyards project, media seemed quite receptive to growth opponents' arguments, and in the case of Bâtiment 7/CN Railyards frequently invoked narratives such as 'David versus Goliath' which appeared to favour citizens groups broadly. Future research could thus investigate both the role of media and its relative strength concerning urban growth machine theory.

As noted by Warner and Molotch (1995), much of the research conducted on urban growth machine theory and urban growth coalitions has focused on the groups resisting growth. While some research has emerged since then focusing more on growth coalition actors and their responses to structural economic shifts (Lauermann & Vogelpohl, 2017; Wachsmuth, 2017a), much of the research (including this SRP) focuses on case study based resistance. As noted in the Montreal media reports, commentators have identified shifts in development ('Peel Basin trauma'). Further investigation of perceptions of growth machine actors, investigating if and when they have seen shifts around how 'value-free' growth arguments are received, and if there have been changes in the development process, may better illuminate the medium-term impact of citizen resistance.

As advanced in the previous chapter, the borough level of government in Montreal, with its significant planning powers may have allowed community organizations to successfully partner with this level government, instead of government partnering with rentiers. Expanding this study across Montreal, to determine if other community groups have had

the same success, could provide insight into whether this phenomenon is unique to Montreal's South-West Borough. Additionally, comparisons could also be made with other jurisdictions with a similar devolution of municipal planning powers.

One of the commonalities in all three cases was the existence of a strong municipal party system. Jessop et al. (1999) hypothesized that the presence of municipal parties, especially those with anti-growth outlooks, is an important factor in the success of anti-development advocates. More investigation could determine if growth coalition fragility is increasing in jurisdictions with strong municipal party systems.

Conclusion

The scholarship has identified multiple shifts within urban governance and urban growth machine theory. Understanding how these changes are occurring, and how citizens groups are modifying their behaviours as they continue to challenge growth, is an important question for citizens, politicians and policymakers. While they have significant implications, the legacies of Berlin's Tempelhof Field and both Montreal projects remains to be seen. Both Berlin's Tempelhof Field and Montreal's Bâtiment 7 face continued challenges regarding management and development pressures. In Berlin, a contentious relationship between former project proponents and citizens groups exists as they try to work together to manage Tempelhof. These problems are in addition to the variety of commercialized activities, the difficulty in finding tenants for the former terminal building, and the contentious temporary housing of refugees on the site. Montreal's Bâtiment 7, not even half renovated, remains a financial risk to community groups who have become landlords themselves and are dependent on revenues and success of their tenants. It remains to be seen what will happen with the rest of the site or the adjacent Peel Basin,

which remains much as it was before the Loto-Quebec proposal. But, for the time being, the legacy of citizen resistance to growth is on display to anyone who cares to visit Berlin's Tempelhof Field or Montreal's Bâtiment 7.

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