

PHILO AND THE HAGGADA AS TREATED IN MODERN SCHOLARSHIP  
1875-1975

BY  
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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies  
and Research in partial fulfilment of the requirements for  
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Dept. of Classics  
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Montreal

October 1980

ABSTRACT

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This dissertation traces the research done by a number of modern scholars on the relationship between Philo and the Palestinian Haggada. The interpretation proceeds by analyzing Philo's writings and midrashic texts and considering the works of modern scholarship pertinent to the subject.

The introduction outlines the main problems, the plan of the dissertation, a classification of Philo's treatises and the central events in his life. The origin, development, and different methods of the Judaic Midrash comprise the subject of chapter one. Each of the following chapters presents a scholar and his opinions on Philonic problems. The most significant issues considered are: the degree and nature of influence, perhaps mutual, between Palestinian Haggada and Philonic exegesis; techniques of Philonic exegesis; Philo as philosopher; Philo and mystery religion; coherence in Philo's writings; Philo's knowledge of Hebrew; the proportions of Judaism and Hellenism in Philo.

The purpose of the conclusion is twofold: 1) to sum up and compare the scholarly views presented in the previous chapters; 2) to state my conclusions on Philo as a biblical exegete and to identify his position in Western thought.

## RÉSUMÉ

### PHILON ET L'HAGGADA PRÉSENTÉES EN ÉRUDITION MODERNE

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Cette dissertation trace la recherche accomplie par un nombre de savants modernes sur le sujet de la relation entre Philon et l'Haggada palestinienne. L'interprétation continue par l'analyse des oeuvres de Philon et des textes du Midrash et la considération des écritures d'érudition moderne, qui ont rapport au sujet.

L'introduction indique les problèmes principaux, le plan de la dissertation, une classification des oeuvres de Philon et les événements centraux de sa vie. Le premier chapitre contient l'origine, le développement, et les méthodes différentes du Midrash Judaïque. Les chapitres suivants présentent chaque érudit et ses opinions sur les problèmes philoniques. Les sujets les plus importants qu'on considère sont: la nature et le degré d'influence, peut-être mutuelle, entre l'Haggada palestinienne et l'interprétation philonique; les techniques de l'exégèse de Philon; Philon comme philosophe; Philon et la religion du mystère; la cohérence dans les oeuvres de Philon; la connaissance de Philon de l'hébreu; les proportions du Judaïsme et d'Hellénisme en Philon.

Le but de la conclusion est double: 1) résumer et comparer les attitudes des savants présentées dans les chapitres antécédents; 2) affirmer mes conclusions sur Philon comme un exégète biblique et identifier sa position dans la pensée occidentale.

## PREFACE

I am grateful to my teachers who accorded me help before and while I was researching the subject of my dissertation.

I owe an incalculable debt to the inspired teaching of Professor P.F. McCullagh, and to the encouragement of the late Professor C.D. Gordon.

The substance as well as the form of the thesis has been modified in the light of the painstaking and penetrating criticisms received from Professor George Johnston. I record my debt to him with gratitude.

Bilhah Wardy



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## INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this dissertation is to consider and assess some of the more significant scholarly opinions on Philo of Alexandria and his biblical interpretations in the light of the Haggada.

There can be no doubt that Philo was a profoundly religious Jew whose writings for the most part form an exposition of the Pentateuch and yet he was also deeply influenced by Greek philosophy and literature. It has been a matter of debate therefore among scholars to what extent his work contains Jewish and Greek elements. Was he more influenced by Greek categories of thought than by the exegetical tradition developed in Judaism?

Another possibility, which is most challenging, is that he represents a synthesis of Jewish religion and Greek philosophy. In short, the question is whether Philo, the foremost representative of Hellenistic Judaism, was more Greek or Jewish in his mind and spirit?<sup>1</sup>

Specific information about Philo's life is exceedingly scanty. The approximate dates of his birth and death are 25 B.C. and A.D. 40 to 50.<sup>2</sup> His lifetime, therefore, spanned a period of great religious and ideological changes, overlapping that of the Judaeen sages and biblical interpreters, Hillel the Elder and Rabban Johanan ben Zakkai, as well as Jesus and Paul.

He lived in Alexandria at a time when that city was the chief center of Hellenistic culture. Philo reveals in his writings that



since his childhood he had had a special desire for knowledge, and that he always wanted to lead a quiet life of meditation, an aim he evidently achieved in large measure.<sup>3</sup>

During the last three centuries before Christ and the first two centuries of the common era, the Jewish community of Alexandria was the most important Jewish, cultural center outside Judaea. Its Jewish population outnumbered the Jewish population of Judaea. There were close contacts between Jewish monotheism and Hellenistic philosophy and between them both and other religions and cults of the Middle East. As to the first, Philo is by no means the only witness. The translation of the Pentateuch in the second century B.C., known as the Septuagint, had provided a corner-stone for the development of Jewish Alexandrian literature. The surviving literature, for example, the Third Book of the Maccabees, the Letter of Aristeas, the fragmentary tragedy, the Exodus, by the tragedian Ezekiel and the fragments of the philosopher Aristobulus are testimony to the literary activity in Greek of the Jewish, Alexandrian community.<sup>4</sup> Philo was the most important writer of this Graeco-Jewish group. It is universally agreed that his Greek knowledge was both broad and penetrating. He quotes accurately more than fifty classical authors.

The only significant historical detail of Philo's life that is known is the fact that as an old man he was the head of a delegation sent to Rome in the winter of A.D. 39 to the emperor Caligula. Two delegations, a Greek and a Jewish, journeyed to Rome to lay the state of the Jewish community before the emperor. The head of

the Greek delegation, Apion, pointed out to Caligula that the Jews were the only nation in his Empire who did not honour him as a god and did not erect his statue in their temple and synagogues. Philo, the leader of the Jewish delegation, was not allowed to speak. In the Legatio ad Gaium 182 Philo described himself as a man who has the experience and carefulness gained by age and education. This statement and the fact that Philo wrote the Legatio after his return to Alexandria suggest the approximate date of his death, that is probably soon after A.D. 40.

He belonged to a noble and wealthy family which had the means to offer him a good education and later a life dedicated to study and meditation. The Jews in Alexandria and other Mediterranean cities did not isolate themselves from Greek culture and usually afforded their sons a Greek education. Some indeed chose the Greek way of life. This is true also for Philo, for passages in his writings prove that he attended dinners, theater performances, and contests in the arena.<sup>5</sup>

It seems clear that Philo's religious education combined with the Greek cultural milieu of Alexandria directed his interests especially to the philosophical tradition of Hellenism. Hence his treatise On the Contemplative Life, for example, shows a deeply Hellenized man but also a very loyal Jew who believed that revelation, and not philosophy, leads one to true knowledge.

In his commentaries on the Pentateuch Philo, as we shall see, used Greek philosophical and allegorical methods. This type of interpretation had been begun by Jewish exegetes before him;

nevertheless Philo's work shows an originality, range and unity of its own. He achieved in some measure a synthesis of Jewish doctrine and Greek philosophy, and this influenced later thinkers, Christian even more strongly than Jewish. Indeed, medieval Jewish writers appear not to have known him. Azariah di Rossi, a Jewish scholar of the sixteenth century, was the first to mention Philo. In the last two centuries, however, Jewish scholarship on Philo has developed to a considerable degree.

The following chapters of the dissertation will describe the different approaches of some leading Philonic scholars during the last century to the problem of Philo as biblical exegete and as Hellenistic philosopher.

Philo's writings may be divided into four categories;<sup>6</sup>

The first group contains his non-biblical writings. They are not numerous and are the only Philonic writings which are not interpretations of the Bible. The principal works in this category are:

1) On the Contemplative Life, which describes an ascetic community of Egyptian Jews who had a center on the shore of lake Mareotis. There are controversies over this treatise. Some scholars have denied the existence of Jewish monastic communities and have held that Philo was not the author of this treatise, but its authenticity was established in 1895 by the English scholar, F.C. Conybeare.

2) That every good man is free is most probably a work of Philo's youth. It contains a great number of Stoic paradoxes. Its illustrations are taken from Greek literature and only seldom from Scripture. This treatise also contains a description of the community of the Essenes.

3) Against Flaccus. Flaccus Avilius was governor of Alexandria and Egypt c. A.D. 32. He was recalled in disgrace by the emperor Gaius Caligula c. 39, though the reason is not clear, and was later put to death. Flaccus had not protected Alexandria's Jews in the pogrom of 38, but had contributed to their suffering. Philo used the example of Flaccus as an object lesson respecting the fate that awaited anyone who was foolhardy enough to harm Jews. In this treatise Philo also gives some valuable information about the political rights and the demography of the Alexandrian Jewish community.

4) On the Embassy to Gaius. The Legatio must have been written after Caligula's death and the accession to the throne by Claudius (in A.D. 41). It tells that after his accession Caligula became demented. He imagined himself as a god and decreed that his image be set up in places of worship, including the synagogues in Alexandria. The Alexandrian community sent a deputation to Gaius to protest the defilement of their houses of worship and the violation of their rights. Philo, as noted above, was the leader of this deputation. The Legatio covers in part the difficulties of the Alexandrian community and then deals bitterly with the arrogance of Caligula.

The second category of Philo's writings contains the Questions and Answers to Genesis and Exodus. In form, the work consists of asking a brief question about the meaning of a biblical verse or passage, and this is immediately followed by an answer. Philo's literal explanation is very brief but he often adds an elaborate allegorical interpretation. Throughout his writings Philo uses the

allegorical method extensively to introduce changes, meditations and Greek philosophical ideas into Scripture.

Material from Leviticus, Numbers and Deuteronomy is found in abundance in different treatises of Philo. Whether he wrote similar treatises on the other books of the Pentateuch is still an open question.

The third category of Philo's writings is called the Allegory of the Laws. There are several treatises, e.g. the Allegory of the Laws in three parts, the Cherubim, About the Giants, About Agriculture, About Sobriety, About the Confusion of Languages. Each work appears with its own name and begins with a quotation of a biblical passage. The treatises give the allegorical meaning of words, phrases and sentences. It is here especially that we see Philo's prolixity and his frequent digressions.

The fourth category is known as the Exposition of the Law. Here again Philo uses the allegorical method frequently. The content of the treatises is bound to the title and expounds different topics of the Bible, but without beginning with a quotation of a biblical passage.

The following chapters will consider the theories of different scholars on Philo's method of exegesis as compared with that of the Haggada.

In the final chapter I shall sum up and evaluate the opinions of these scholars and summarize my own views.

# INTRODUCTION

## FOOTNOTES

- 1 S.Sandmel, Philo's Place in Judaism: A Study of Conceptions of Abraham in Jewish Literature, augmented ed. (New York: Ktav Publishing House, 1971), pp. 11ff.
- 2 H.Leisegang, "Philon", in Real-Encyclopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft, vol. 20,1, pp.1-50.
- 3 H.Lewy, Philo, ed. Bergman (Oxford: East and West Library, 1946), pp.8-10.
- 4 V.Tcherikover, Hellenistic Civilization and the Jews, tr. S.Applebaum (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1959); pp.340-356. For a detailed description of Alexandrian Jewish literature see J.Guttman, The Beginnings of Jewish-Hellenistic Literature, (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 1958), in Hebrew.
- 5 Philo, De specialibus legibus, 4, 82-83, tr. Colson, vol.8, p.59; De fuga, 31-32; Colson, vol. 5, p.27; Quod omnis probus liber sit, 26, 141, ed. Colson, vol. 9, p.25.
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## CHAPTER ONE

### HAGGADA

#### I

The biblical exegesis originated by Scholars in Judaea is known by the name "Oral Law" ( *halakha* ). It was developed during several centuries, branching out and becoming more complex. The name of one part of the Oral Law, the Midrash, derived from the verbal root darash, which had first a biblical meaning "to demand" or "to seek" and this led on to its rabbinical meaning "to study", "to investigate", "to interpret".

In the Bible this term is found in several places, e.g. II Chronicles, 13:22; 24:27; Leviticus, 10:16; Nehemia, 8:1-9; Ezra, 7:10. Other post biblical derivatives of darash are Beth-Midrash (house of study), Drasha (sermon).

M.D.Herr in the Encyclopedia Judaica describes Midrash as a particular genre of rabbinic literature, an anthology of biblical exegesis and homilies, a commentary on the past, present and future of Israel.<sup>1</sup>

But R.Bloch gives a more comprehensive definition:

Le terme midrash désigne une exégèse qui, dépassant le simple sens littéral, essaye de pénétrer dans l'esprit de l'Écriture, de scruter le texte plus profondément et d'en tirer interprétations qui ne sont pas immédiatement évidentes.<sup>2</sup>

The exact origin of the Midrash and the names of its first creators are debated questions. We know that when some of the

Babylonian exiles returned to Judaea about 530 B.C. their spiritual leader was Ezra, a priest and scribe.<sup>3</sup> He was determined to make the laws of the Bible the foundation of the new state of Judaea. In Ezra 7:10 we read, "For Ezra had prepared his heart to seek the law of the Lord, and to do it and to teach statutes and judgments in Israel." (עֶזְרָא הָיָה מִתְעַדֵּן לְבָבוֹ לְדַלֵּק אֶת הַתּוֹרָה וּלְעָשׂוּהָ וּלְלַמֵּד חֻקִּים וּמִשְׁפָּטִים בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל) This verse is important for the understanding of Midrash. "To seek the law of the Lord" could have meant already to interpret the Law.

During the following centuries, as life became ever more complicated, there was naturally a demand for more explicit and detailed rules than those given in the Bible. This demand was met by different Sages who developed the Oral Law.

According to an old orthodox tradition, Moses received on Mount Sinai not only the Torah ("the Written Law") but also the Torah shebe-al-pe ("the Oral Law").<sup>4</sup>

The Midrash was transmitted orally for several generations. Maimonides, for instance, in the introduction to his commentary on Jewish laws The Strong Hand (דַּבְּרֵי חַיִּים 3'2), states that from Moses to Rabbi Judah ha-Nasi no academy offered a written code to its students.<sup>5</sup>

The reasons for oral transmission included 1) the belief that only the Bible should be written, since laws written later would diminish its sanctity; 2) the argument that unwritten rules would remain flexible, and 3) the conviction that oral interpretation links teachers and students more closely together. "When a pupil



sits before his master who is engaged with him in studying Jewish law, the teacher recognizes the student's inclination, knows what is understood by him and what not... How can this be done when the law is written?"<sup>6</sup>

The Oral Law was ultimately put into written form in such books as the Mishnah, the Tosephta and the Talmud. The Mishnah is a repository of laws collected at different times both before and after the destruction of the Temple in A.D. 70. New interpretations and amendments were initially transmitted orally. The written version was redacted by Judah ha-Nasi near the end of the second century A.D. It became and has remained authoritative. It is a commonplace in Jewish lore that "Judah the Prince redacted the Mishnah". Mishnah plus Gemarah equals Talmud, which was current in two recensions, the "Babylonian" and the "Jerusalem". The Babylonian Talmud reached its final form and was written down about A.D. 500.

Midrash is also a part of the Oral Law. There are different classifications of Midrash. The oldest distinction was between Midrash Halaka and Midrash Haggada. The different Midrashim contain both Halaka and Haggada. Halaka from the root haloch (הלך), to go, to walk meant originally a way of life, then figuratively the teaching which one follows, the statute by which one is guided, the categorical religious law. Haggada from the root to tell (ס'ג), includes all scriptural interpretation that is non-legal, that is to say, narratives, embellishment of biblical themes, legends, historical references.

Throughout the time of haggadic compilations Judaea was the meeting ground of different religions and cultures. During the same

period the Jews of Judaea went through a most difficult time in their history(second century B.C. to third century A.D.). At this point the Haggada became a wonderful instrument of consolation and encouragement. The Haggada, furthermore, possesses a salient characteristic of great literature, namely humor. The Jewish people often needed the ability to laugh and to laugh at themselves, and this we see sometimes in the Haggada. In telling haggadoth the Sages transformed the Jewish festivals and also ordinary days into days of light and joy.

## II

The Oral Law grew in the academies of Judaea and in Jewish centers of the Diaspora at the hands of several generations of learned men. The earliest teachers were known as "Scribes" ("Soferim"), later they were called "Interpreters" (Tannaim) and were cited in the Mishnah and the halakic Midrash. The "Teachers" ("Amoraim") are those who are mentioned in the Gemarah.

The Oral Law was a necessity, because manners and customs in the countries of the Gentiles required Jews to adapt their traditional regulations and ways, both ethical and religious. But all such adaptations had to be based firmly on the written Law, the Torah.

Another reason for explicit and more detailed legislation lay in the obscure nature of many biblical passages. The belief persisted that literally everything could be found in the Torah, provided one persisted in its study. In this way the innovations called for by the changing conditions of life, would become explicit.

Thus in the Mishnah, Aboth 5,25 we find the saying, "turn it (the book) and turn it (again) since everything is in it" (פְּתוּ וּפְתוּ כִּי כֻלָּהּ בָּהֶן). This verse expresses the fundamental principle of the Oral Law.

We may consider here one example.

The sanctity of the Sabbath is often stated in the Bible. "On this day all work is forbidden."<sup>7</sup> The biblical rules proved to be too obscure, however, and lacking in detail for the interpreters during the Second Commonwealth. The Tannaim, in their elaboration of the scriptural principle, added explicit details of what was allowed and what was forbidden on the Sabbath.

Philo also expressed the belief that the Pentateuchal laws are everlasting: "His laws alone firm, unmoved, unshaken, as it were, stamped with the seals of nature itself, remain secure from the day when they were written until now, and we may hope that they will remain for all future ages as immortal, as long as the sun and the moon and the whole heaven and universe exist."<sup>8</sup>

The Oral Law because of its abundance and intricacy was compared to a great sea. In post-talmudic times a wealth of literature arose and still today continues to grow around the Oral Law.

During the Second Commonwealth not everybody recognized the authority of the Oral Law, e.g. the party of the Sadducees rejected it. On the other hand, the Pharisees found support for their exegesis in the Bible itself. Deuteronomy 17:8-9, "If there arise a matter too hard for you in judgement...then you shall arise and go up unto the place which the Lord your God shall choose. And you shall come to the priests and Levites, and to the judge that shall be in those days...and they shall declare to you the sentence of

judgement". The Sages interpreted the phrase, "that shall be in those days", as the judge of one's own time whose ruling would be regarded as equally binding with those of the Torah itself.

It is characteristic for the midrashic interpreters to regard the biblical narratives from their own point of view and so the Midrash also contains descriptions of life and historical references contemporaneous with the exegetes. Narratives were often added to the discussion of a given verse.

The halakic Midrashim are the Mekilta of Rabbi Ishmael to Exodus, the Mekilta of Rabbi Simeon b. Johai to Exodus, Sifra to Leviticus and Sifra to Numbers and Deuteronomy. These texts contain also non-halakic comments and passages based on non-legal portions of the Bible. The most important haggadic Midrashim are Bereshith Rabba, Midrash Rabba, the Midrashim to the five Scrolls (Megilloth) Shir ha-Shirim Rabba, Midrash Ruth, Midrash Kohelet, Midrash Megillat Esther, and Midrash Ekah Rabbati.

Two more terms should be defined, since they were extensively used in midrashic literature. They are peshat (פֶּשֶׁט) or literal exegesis and drash (דְּרַשׁ) which used metaphor, allegory and other rhetorical devices. In peshat the modern reader may feel more at home, because it shows a fine linguistic sense and an acute insight into the biblical text. The drash was used to complement the peshat and not to replace it. Philo uses drash extensively but warns his readers not to belittle the importance of the peshat. Yet it is drash that shows an exegete at his best. It gives the Midrash a right to be considered indeed as creative literature.

## III

The most important haggadic compilation Bereshith Rabba concerns Genesis. Its first editor was probably a scholar called Hoshaiiah who lived in Judaea in the third century A.D. It contains mostly Haggada, since Genesis (in the beginning) contains many narratives and very few laws. According to J. Theodor and L. Zunz, Bereshith Rabba reached final form about the sixth century A.D.<sup>9</sup> The designation Rabba was later applied to the other Midrashim of the Pentateuch; Shemoth Rabba (Exodus), Debarim Rabba (Deuteronomy) etc. and also to the Midrashim to the five Scrolls.

While Bereshith Rabba is a purely haggadic Midrash the Makhlitha is a good example of a tannaitic Midrash which contains both halakic and haggadic material.

The Midrashim to the five Scrolls illustrate the creative power of the Sages' imagination in a most noteworthy way. Among them, Ecclesiastes Rabba and Song of Songs Rabba allow us to see how the exegetes struggled because of their hesitations about including these in the Canon of the Bible. It is known that some of the Sages were afraid that the teaching of Ecclesiastes would cause religious laxity and sectarianism.<sup>10</sup> Doubts about the Song of Songs were even stronger. Little Midrash peshat is available about this book, which is essentially a collection of love songs. There is a tradition that only by allegorization was the Song of Songs admitted into the Canon. Rabbi Akiba, who lived in the second century of the common era, was the chief defender of the book and said that "the whole world does not possess the value that the Song of

Songs does!..it is "the holiest of the holy" (שִׁיר הַשִּׁירִים) allegorical interpretation preserved this book by interpreting its theme not as earthly love but as God's love for Israel and Israel's devotion to God. Later this book and its Midrash became "the most beloved, the greatest of Songs" for Israel.<sup>11</sup>

The various Midrashim offer many detailed stories about the biblical heroes and attain the quality of literature. Some of these haggadic narratives can be classed as fairy-tales or anecdotes meant to attract those who came to listen to the Drasha, the sermon, e.g. Bereshith Rabba 58:3.

Besides expressing the ideas and feelings of the Sages, the Haggada contains many remnants of folklore. The methods of the Haggadists-and this is important for the examination of Philo's exegesis-also resemble the exegetical methods of Greek orators and grammarians, e.g. in the abundant use of parables and allegories.<sup>12</sup>

The Haggada does not as a rule relate war stories. For instance, it is abundant in detailed stories about Moses' life but it has nothing about his war exploits corresponding to what is described by Josephus.<sup>13</sup> There are no stories of gruesome cruelty in the Haggada, nothing similar to Thyestes' reconciliation feast.

The Haggada often concentrates different periods of time into a very short space of time. For example, the many events of the sixth day of creation-the creation of man, God's order to Adam to abstain from the fruit of the tree of knowledge, Adam's sin and his exile from the Garden of Eden, the birth of Cain and Abel, the first murder, all this happens on the sixth day of creation according to the haggadic version.<sup>14</sup> The Haggada also brings

together heroes from different biblical periods, e.g. Samuel who is said to have written the books about himself and also the book of Judges and Ruth; Jacob quotes from the book of Psalms.

There are some stylistic resemblances between the haggadic homilies and Greek rhetoric. Both use dialogue, antithesis and dramatic devices. The Haggada paid attention, like the Greek interpreters of Homer, to every stylistic irregularity, even to every additional or missing letter. In Genesis 25:24 it is said that Rebecca gave birth to twins. In the Hebrew text "וַיִּלְדְּ" (twins) the letter Aleph is missing and the haggadic author saw here a sign that one of the twins, Esau, would become an evil man.<sup>15</sup>

Because the aim of the Haggada was to console, encourage and entertain and not to establish laws, the most unexpected interpretations of the Bible were permitted.<sup>16</sup>

#### IV

In modern times it was recognized that the Haggada's purpose was not merely entertainment; it was rather ethical teaching. There is a remarkable difference between the biblical and the haggadic narratives. The Haggada tends more towards the imaginative, the miraculous, the unrealistic. Scholars like L.Zunz (1832) and W.Bacher (1914) recognized and wrote about the great value of the haggadic literature.<sup>17</sup>

For many generations—from the fifth century B.C. to the beginning of the poems and prayers of the Middle Ages, i.e. for almost 1000 years, the Haggada represents the literature of the Jewish people. I.Baer (1955) writes that from the point of view of literature the Haggada is as great as the Bible. One of his

interesting ideas is that the Tannaim appeared as a result of the meeting between the biblical prophetic literature and Greek philosophy. He saw a similarity between the ideals of the Sages of Judaea and those of Plato.<sup>18</sup>

The value assigned to haggadic literature has varied greatly throughout the centuries. The rationalist Maimonides saw in the Haggada a wrong method in the search for truth. The great German poet Heinrich Heine acknowledged the special charm of the Haggada and compared it to an imaginary garden of the east. Michael Sachs believed that the Haggada is a continuation of the poetry of the prophets.<sup>19</sup>

According to the modern Hebrew poet H.N. Bialik, it is difficult to conceive the vast content of the Haggada. It contains the dreams and ideas of the Jewish people and their leaders throughout many centuries; thoughts about the universe and their country, about historical events and leaders, man and his world, the wisdom of life, this age and the age to come and so forth, until it is difficult to find a human emotion or thought which is not dealt with in the Haggada.<sup>20</sup> Bialik and Rawnitzki collected haggadoth from the Midrashim and the Talmud, translated the Aramaic parts into Hebrew, and arranged them according to subject. Their Sefer ha-Aggada, 1956, which has made it possible for the layman to approach haggadic literature, became very popular among Hebrew readers.

L. Ginzberg (1968), another authority and collector of haggadoth,<sup>21</sup> considers that the scribes succeeded where the prophets had failed. Through the scribes the teaching proclaimed in the schools of the prophets became the common property of the whole people.<sup>22</sup>



A typical Haggada is the following: It is written, "God spoke face to face" (פָּנֵי אֵל לְפָנֵי מֹשֶׁה). The drash explains the double use of the word "Panim" (face) as four faces. God showed to Israel four faces-an angry face for the Bible, a serious face for the Mishnah, a welcoming face for the Talmud, and a laughing face for the Haggada.<sup>23</sup>

The view of I. Heinemann may fittingly conclude this chapter. He writes that the man who possesses not only a gift for research, but also imagination and humor will understand the Sages' approach to the Bible and their creation, The Haggada.<sup>24</sup>

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## CHAPTER TWO

### CARL SIEGFRIED

#### I

What is the relationship between Philonic exegesis and Palestinian Midrash? Did Philo use Greek methods in his allegorical interpretation or was he mainly influenced by the Palestinian method of exegesis? This question was often asked by Philonic scholars of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

I propose to present first the answers of Carl Siegfried in his book Philo von Alexandria als Ausleger des Alten Testaments, 1875.

C. Siegfried, a German Protestant theologian, was born at Magdeburg, 1830, and died at Jena in 1903. He was educated at the universities of Halle and Bonn. He taught at different high schools and also at a theological seminary at Magdeburg till 1875. His book on Philo as an interpreter of the Old Testament became one of the standard works on the subject and was highly valued by theologians and classicists. It may have contributed to Siegfried's call to Jena to be professor of Old Testament Theology there. Besides teaching, Siegfried was continuously occupied with writing and reviewing. Among his other books are Spinoza als Kritiker und Ausleger des Alten Testaments, Lehrbuch der Neuhebräischen Sprache und Literatur (in collaboration with H. L. Strack, Siegfried contributing the grammatical part), Die Historische und Theologische Betrachtung des Alten Testaments. He contributed the commentaries

on Ecclesiastes, The Song of Solomon, Ezra, Nehemiah and Esther to Nowack's Handkommentar zum Alten Testament.

In addition to these, Siegfried wrote a large number of articles on the Old Testament, exegesis, Judaism and Hellenism. In his approach to the Old Testament he was an adherent of the historical-critical school of Wellhausen.

## II

The introduction to Siegfried's book on Philo summed up the development of Judaism during the period he was studying. It began with the destruction of the first Temple and ended with the last century before the common era.<sup>1</sup> He also describes in these pages how the Jewish community in Alexandria was influenced by Hellenistic culture, allegorical interpretation and its development by Hellenistic writers, paying special attention to specific Jewish writers and to Philo. He concludes his introduction with this interesting simile: "The allegory of Philo like a mighty basin takes in all the smaller brooks of the Alexandrian exegesis, so as to pour its waters out again into many streams and channels that branch out into the later biblical Jewish and Christian exegesis"<sup>2</sup>

(Wie Philo's Allegoristik wie ein gewaltiges Becken alle kleineren Bäche der alexandrinischen Schriftauslegung in sich aufnimmt, um alsdann ihre Gewässer wieder in viel verzweigten Strömen und Canälen in die spätere Bibelauslegung des Judentums und Christentums zu ergießen.)

In the first part of the book Philo's Greek and Jewish education is discussed.

According to Siegfried, Philo had a thorough Greek education

and used in his writings not the Hellenistic-Alexandrian dialect but the language of the classical Greek writers. He quotes Gottleber,

"These who, equipped with an appropriate knowledge of the Greek language, applied themselves to his (Philo's) reading and almost achieved a familiarity with him, know sufficiently that Philo is a writer most eager for Greek refinement<sup>3</sup>

(Philonem esse scriptorem elegantiae Graecae studiosissimum satis ii norunt qui idonea Graecae linguae scientia instructi se ad eius lectionem contulerunt et quasi familiaritatem cum eo contraxerunt.)

Ancient writers too had written about the similarity between Philo's diction and that of Plato<sup>4</sup> and some later scholars defended the view that Philo's style was greatly influenced by Plato.<sup>5</sup> Using Ast, Lexicon Platonicum, Siegfried presented five pages of almost identical phrases in Plato and Philo in order to prove the close linguistic relationship between them.<sup>6</sup> Next, he cited examples of identical phrases in Philo and Aristotle, and of phrases which Philo borrowed from Homer, Hesiod, and the Attic orators. There are also stylistic similarities between Philo and the later writer Plutarch.<sup>7</sup> His conclusion was that Philo knew Greek much better than he knew Hebrew. He quoted Philo, who spoke about the Greek language τὴν ἡμετέραν συνέκλειον (De congressu quarendae eruditionis gratia 44).

Siegfried praised Philo's vivid and imaginative descriptions, but criticized the artificial character of his language and his rhetorical flights. He compared the simplicity of the biblical narratives with Philo's loquacity in De Josepho 40-49, where Joseph delivers a long, moralistical oration to Potiphar's wife before he

makes a hurried exit. Siegfried humorously criticized Moses' speech before the Midianite shepherds in the De vita Mosi 54-57:

"Moses talks the Midianite shepherds away from the well by a lecture from which in the end even the most courageous would have run away"

(Moses schwatzt die midianitischen Hirten mit einem Vortrage vom Brunnen weg, vor welchem auch der Tapferste zuletzt davon gelaufen wäre)

Thus Philo was influenced by Plato, Aristotle, Stoic philosophers and the Neo-Pythagoreans, so that one can say that Greek philosophy ruled his Weltanschauung.

In describing Philo's Jewish education, Siegfried tried to clarify the problem-did Philo know Hebrew? He cited opinions of several Philonic scholars: Some thought that Philo knew no Hebrew at all; others were convinced that Philo used the original biblical text and knew Hebrew well; finally, a third group thought that Philo used a Greek translation of the Hebrew Bible that is no longer extant. It was superior to the Septuagint.

Siegfried argued that Philo was ignorant of the Hebrew language in the modern sense, that is to say, he had no knowledge of Hebrew grammar or orthography.<sup>9</sup> According to Siegfried, Philo did not use the Hebrew biblical text. The reason for the etymological mistakes in Philo's writings becomes clear, if one realizes that he used as the foundation of his biblical writings the Septuagint with its sometimes faulty translations.<sup>10</sup> Alexandrian Jews believed that the Septuagint was an exact translation of the Hebrew text and Philo himself in De vita Mosi 2, 40-41 has this to say about the translators of the Bible into Greek: "...speak of them not as translators, but as priests and prophets" (οὐχ ἑρμηνεὺς ἐκείνους, ἀλλ' ἱεροφάντας καὶ προφῆτας προσαγορεύοντες).



This is the language that Philo employed about Moses himself, so that he would see no difference between the Hebrew text and its Greek translation. Both were equal in holiness. This makes the hypothesis much more probable that he used the Greek text, written in the language he knew best.

Moreover, Siegfried held that Philo knew the oral tradition of Palestine although he was not well versed in the Halaka. Besides the Bible, however, Philo used traditions of the historical, Palestinian Haggada; cf. De vita Mosi 1,4

"I shall tell the story of Moses as I have learned it, both from the sacred books, the wonderful monuments of his wisdom which he has left behind him, and from some of the elders of the nation"

τὸ παρὰ τὸν ἄνδρα μνηύσω μαθὼν αὐτὰ καὶ βιβλῶν  
τῶν ἱερῶν, ὡς θαυμάσια μνημεῖα τῆς αὐτοῦ  
σοφίας ἀπολέλουτε, καὶ παρὰ τινῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ  
ἔθνους πρεσβυτέρων).

Siegfried thought that the words, "the elders of the nation", referred to the Palestinian Sages and their exegesis, especially the Haggada. But this is dubious. I do not think that we can in any way be certain, for the elders might just as well be exegetes from Alexandria...

Siegfried found in Philo numerous traits of the Palestinian Midrash but could not definitely decide who was influenced by whom. At times Siegfried stated that Philo was definitely influenced by the Palestinian Haggada, but he also presented the possibility that it might have been the other way round. Palestinian haggadoth which may possibly have been influenced by Philo's interpretations include Bereshith Rabba c,8 and De opificio mundi 74-75.<sup>11</sup>

Siegfried analysed examples from Philo and also from the Haggada and found similar features in content though not in form.<sup>12</sup>

He also emphasized, and this is characteristic for Siegfried, the obvious Stoic influence on Philo. The Stoic ethical principle that man should live by the rules of nature was widely accepted by the Hellenized Jews of Alexandria. They modified this principle by the explanation that the laws of the Tora are the most important laws of nature.<sup>13</sup>

### III

In his chapter on the allegorical exegesis of Philo Siegfried tried to establish two facts: first, Philo was a great admirer of Greek philosophy and second, Philo was a profoundly religious Jew. Philo felt no paradox here, because of his belief that the Bible was the real basis of Greek culture. Allegory had existed before Philo but, according to Siegfried, he had created a special method based on certain rules. Here we have to remember that for Philo as well as for Judaeoan exegetes the Bible remained the source not only of religious creeds but of all truth. Philo tried to show that even Greek philosophy was an outgrowth of the Bible. Siegfried proceeded to explain the hermeneutical rules used by Philo and to illustrate them by numerous examples.<sup>14</sup>

Passages of the Old Testament were explained both literally and allegorically. For example, Philo described the lives of the three patriarchs literally but often added some allegorical features to the stories. Often he ended his literal explanation by

"κατὰ λόγον" (Legum allegoriae II,16) which reminds one of the Midrash "לכל דבר" ("This is its simple" (explanation)). Sometimes Philo found the literal meaning of a biblical passage meaningless and he proceeded to explain it allegorically. As a rule he rated the allegorical exegesis more valuable than the literal one. He also gave, wherever possible, both the literal and the allegorical meanings. But the deeper meaning was to be found only in allegory. For instance, the three patriarchs are literally only men, but in the allegory they become "types of the soul" *τρόποι ψυχῆς*. Moses in sober fact killed the Egyptian, but allegorically he destroyed base desire (Legum allegoriae III,12). Such allegorical exegesis is not good for everyone, only for a few initiates (De Abrahamo II,2a).

Siegfried taught that Philo used specific hermeneutical rules for his allegorical exegesis. Here the obvious questions arise—How did Philo come by these allegorical rules? Did he inherit them from an Alexandrian Exegetical School? Did he learn them from Palestinian Sages? Did he create some himself?

According to Siegfried, Philo inherited some rules from former Alexandrian exegetes, but in the majority these were the exegetical rules of the Judaeo Haggada intermingled with those of the Stoics.<sup>15</sup> Philo also created exegetical rules of his own and formed his peculiar allegorical method out of these rules of different origin. Those special rules had to be employed, a) when the literal meaning is meaningless, b) when one wishes to bring out the deeper meaning of the biblical text.

Thus, if the literal meaning is unworthy when applied to God allegory must be used. This rule was taken from the Stoics and

applied by Philo to the Bible. For example, the biblical story says that Adam hid from God, whereas (wrote Philo) we know that nothing can be hidden from Him (Legum allegoriae III,2).

Another of Philo's rules is that a passage which cannot easily be understood literally should be explained allegorically. This was a favorite device of the Stoics in discussing the Homeric poems. Philo made the point that it is not credible that Jacob, who had a great many servants, would send his most beloved son Joseph to see how his brothers were and to check if they were taking proper care of the flocks (Quod deterius potiori insidiari solet I,194). Again, Hannah speaks (I Sam.2:5) about her seven sons, though she had only one (Quod deus immutabilis sit I,274). In all these cases allegory should be applied. An ingenious allegory is required also to clear up the contradiction when Abraham is named Jacob's father and not his grandfather (Genesis 28:13): "I am the Lord God of Abraham thy father". Philo explains this allegorically: Jacob who advances by practice ( $\alpha\sigma\kappa\eta\gamma\epsilon\iota$ ) is closer to Abraham who reaches the truth by learning ( $\mu\alpha\theta\eta\gamma\epsilon\iota$ ) than to his real father Isaac who learned from no teacher ( $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\lambda\omicron\upsilon\varsigma\delta\epsilon\chi\kappa\tau\omicron\varsigma$ ) and knew God by his natural intuition ( $\phi\upsilon\varsigma\epsilon\iota$ ). Similarly, in Genesis 16:8 the angel cannot ask Hagar whence she comes and whither she goes, because as an angel he knew it already! It is not true that, according to I Chronicles 7:14, Moses wanted to write only a historical genealogy. And finally it is not possible that the whole universe was created in six days (Legum allegoriae I,2).

To prefer the allegorical to the literal meaning was sometimes demanded by the allegorical form of a passage, according to Philo,

only so can we understand that there exists a "tree" of knowledge and a "tree" of life, since they never really existed (De opificio mundi, 54). Another example is the "talking serpent" (De agricultura, 22). A rule from the Midrash, used also by Philo, was that the exegete should interpret allegorically a verse which contains the same word twice. Bereshith Rabba c., 39 explains Genesis 12:1, "Get thee out of thy country" (מִמְּדִנְךָ מִלְּבָרָא). The Hebrew has two identical words, although their meaning is different and the second מֵלְבָרָא (lecha) is not necessary. One explanation is that Abraham would emigrate twice. Allegory is also to be used where there seems to be a superfluous word: cf. the Midrash, Bereshith Rabba c. 16, which explains the repetition in Genesis 2:17, וְיָדָעַתְּ כִּי יוֹם הַהוּא מוֹתְךָ וְמוֹת אִתְּךָ (not tamut) as meaning not only will Adam and Eve die, all their descendants too will die. In the same way, superfluous particles, adverbial clauses etc. could be explained.

According to Siegfried, allegorical exegesis was also applied when narratives are repeated. To see in every repetition a deeper meaning is a rule used both by the Midrash and by Philo (De congressu quarendae eruditionis gratia 14). Thus, in Genesis 32:4, "And Jacob sent messengers to Esau, his brother", "his brother" is known to be Esau, but Scripture wants us to understand that Esau, although he was a sinner, nevertheless remained Jacob's brother (Bereshith Rabba c. 75).

Another need for allegory would arise when a passage was repeated with a verbal change. Both Philo and the Midrash linked words from different passages and then explained the new formation of words allegorically. The Midrash in Bereshith Rabba c. 65 denies

that Jacob really lied to his blind father. The verse is, "I Esau your first born son" (  $\rho\alpha\iota\sigma\alpha\ \iota\beta\alpha\ \iota\omega\iota\kappa$  ) (Genesis 27:19). The Midrash separated "I" (  $\iota\omega\iota\kappa$  ) from the next two words and translated: "Jacob answered his father, it is I (Jacob), but Esau is your first born son".

Philo paid special attention to the use of synonyms and explained why the Bible used one particular word and not another. The same rule is followed in the Midrash. Shemoth Rabba c.24 asks why in Genesis 13:9.11 the word  $\iota\omega\iota\kappa$  and not its synonym  $\iota\beta\alpha\ \iota\omega\iota\kappa$  was used. Philo explained that in Genesis 3:24 we find  $\epsilon\chi\epsilon\beta\alpha\lambda\epsilon$  and in verse 23  $\epsilon\chi\epsilon\pi\epsilon\sigma\tau\epsilon\iota\lambda\epsilon$ , because the one who is sent away may come back, but one who is sent away by God must always run. Scripture, said Philo, points out in this way that a man who is not too deeply sunken in sin may come back to a good way of life (De cherubim 1).

One of the allegorical rules is that a play on words should be explained allegorically,  $\epsilon\gamma\kappa\rho\upsilon\phi\iota\alpha\varsigma\ \pi\alpha\upsilon\epsilon\iota\lambda\iota$  (Genesis 18:6) is explained by Philo (De sacrificiis Abelis et Caini 15) as a word combination which teaches the reader who understands allegory to guard the holy Word and not to reveal its special meaning in public.

An allegorical meaning may be deducted from adverbs and prepositions. In the case of Genesis 1:27  $\kappa\alpha\iota\ \epsilon\upsilon\kappa\acute{o}\nu\alpha$  ("in the image"), the preposition  $\kappa\alpha\iota$  is introduced to teach that man is not a semblance of God Himself, but was created in the semblance of the divine Logos who alone is the true likeness of God (Quis rerum divinarum heres 48). Even from parts of a word one may deduce an allegorical meaning: De somniis I, 35 explains the  $\epsilon\iota\alpha$  in  $\delta\iota\alpha\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\kappa\omicron\varsigma$  as a special emphasis which means very very brilliant (Genesis 31:10).

Another hermeneutical rule permits the exegete to change a word slightly and so get an allegorical meaning. This rule, according to Siegfried, is also found in the Midrash. A striking and unusual expression is a hint to seek a deeper meaning in Deuteronomy 21:20. The word οὗτος expresses that parents may have other understanding sons. Also in Genesis 17:18 ἰσμαήλ οὗτος expresses the wish that this Ishmael who obeys God should live, since there are so many who do not pay attention to the holy Word (De mutatione nominum 37).

Other rules that show the need for allegorical interpretation are the number of words and the tenses of verbs. In Genesis 1:26 the plural form of the verb ποιήσωμεν "let us make" means that God was helped by others in the creation of man. This was necessary since God could not endow man with whatever evil exists in him (De opificio mundi 24). Genesis 11:7 "Let us go down" συγχέωμεν means that it was angels who went down to scatter the builders of the tower, because God cannot engage in any evil (De confusione linguarum 36). The gender of words if different from the normal usage can lead to an allegorical meaning. Philo explained Genesis 3:15, where the masculine αὐτός is used instead of the feminine αὐτή, by saying that the masculine refers to νοῦς and so the verse acquires a new sense: "The mind shall guard your chief and principal doctrine" (ὁ νοῦς σωτηρήσει τὸ κεφάλαιον καὶ ἡγεμονικὸν δόγμα) (Leg. allegoriae III, 67). The Midrash, too, often reads a special sense into a passage which contains a confusion of grammatical genders. For example, in Bereshith Rabba "Juda went into exile", (בְּרֵשִׁית רַבָּה) the verb גָּלָה (galta) is the feminine

and so grammatically wrong. The Midrash concludes from this mistake that Juda was as weak as a woman when he went into exile (Bereshith Rabba c.15).

The presence of the definite article is another sign that an allegorical interpretation is required. *ὁ μὲν κατ' ἐξοχήν ἄνθρωπος ὁρθῶς μεμνῆσται* ("He who is a man in the special sense is mentioned with the article"). By "The man in the special sense" Philo meant the spiritual man. Without the article it would mean a man who is not understanding (De fuga 14). *Θεός* with the article is God Himself, without the article the Logos (De somniis I,39).

The absence of a word may also lead to an allegorical explanation and so does any other omission. When Philo commented on man's first sin and punishment (Genesis 3:9f.), he noticed that both Adam and Eve were allowed to speak and defend themselves, but the serpent was condemned without a hearing. Philo's lesson from the omission is that a defence is granted to everybody (Deut. 19:17) but not to the serpent, who is nothing but evil, nothing but *ἡ δόνη* (lust) (Legum allegoriae III,21).

The symbolism of certain numbers is explained allegorically both by the Midrash and by Philo and also by the Stoics and the Pythagoreans. Many numbers are allegorically explained, e.g. the number one is God's number, because God is all by Himself. He is unique and nothing in the universe resembles Him (Leg. alleg. II,1). The wonderful qualities of the number seven are described in De opificio mundi, 30-43. Ten is the number of perfection- the ten Commandments (De decalogo 5ff.).



There exist also symbolical meanings of things, of all kinds of animals, of plants and stones. Philo often found similarities between a certain thing and an idea and took this as a basis for allegorical interpretation. For instance, animals being without reason become the symbols of desires (Leg. allegoriae II, 4).

The symbolism of names is often found in Philo and in the Midrash. The etymological Midrash is already seen in the Bible, especially in Genesis. The reason for this is the belief that God has put his secret aims in names. Philo, too, believed that a name contains a deeper meaning (De cherubim 17). In this matter, Siegfried thought that Philo was influenced both by the Midrash and by Greek philosophy. We have examples in Philo where Greek and Hebrew etymologies appear together. He even explains the name Moses in Egyptian and in Hebrew. In De vita Mosis I, 4 the name Moses comes from the Egyptian word μωϋς meaning water, but in De mutatione nominum 22 it is derived from the Hebrew מֹשֶׁה ("Mosh"). Exodus 2:10 reads וַתִּקְרָא שְׁמֹה מֹשֶׁה "And she called his name Moshe and she said, because I drew him out of the water". So Philo deduced his Hebrew name Mosh( מֹשֶׁה) from the word Meshitihu (מִשְׁחִיתוּהוּ) to draw out. Siegfried concluded that Philo used for his allegories a variety of sources, traditional Hebrew and Greek, and that he also borrowed a great deal from the methods of the Stoics.

#### IV

Siegfried differed from other scholars, in the view that there

was a definite mutual influence between Philo and the Midrash. He listed numerous examples to show the similarity between Philo's allegories and those of the haggadoth. His is a very controversial view and I shall come back to it later.

One example may be noted here to show Philo's allegory was at times very close to the Stoics'. The story is from the Odyssey where it is related that while Odysseus was away for many years, his wife Penelope with the help of her maidens took charge of her husband's possessions. Then the suitors appeared but they had no success in persuading Penelope to forget her husband. With the maidens it was different—they succumbed easily. In the Stoic allegory of the story, the maidens symbolize the encyclical studies and Penelope is true wisdom. A similar allegory is found in Philo. The marriage of Abraham and Sarah was childless. Sarah proposed to Abraham that he mate with Hagar, her Egyptian maid. In this way Sarah helped Abraham to beget an heir. In Philo's allegory of this story Abraham is on his way to knowledge, he progresses through learning. Hagar represents the encyclical studies. The man in his progress has first to master the encyclical studies and only after that can he proceed to a union with Sarah, who allegorically is true wisdom. The Philonic and the Stoic allegories are both concerned with the distinction between the "encyclical" studies of the gymnasia and true wisdom.

I do not believe that the Palestinian Sages would have accepted Philo's philosophical explanations of the biblical narratives and laws. It is true that the Palestinian Midrash has some allegorical explanations which resemble those of Philo. For example, the proof that God created the first man as male and female is seen by Philo

in Genesis 1:27 and explained in two of his treatises De opificio mundi 24 and Legum allegoriarum II,4. The same explanation is found in the Midrash Bereshith Rabba c.,8. "When God created the first man, He created him male and female". The notion of man as bisexual appears in Plato's Symposium and he probably borrowed it from Plato. It is very difficult, I think, to know how the notion of a bisexual or androgynous man as he is called in the Midrash, reached Judaea. Palestinian exegetes could not have taken it directly from Plato, because no Greek philosopher is mentioned in all the Talmudic literature. More than that, in the entire Greek vocabulary embodied in the Midrash, Mishnah and Talmud there is not a single technical philosophical term. One tentative possibility remains, that this allegorical interpretation of the first man reached the Midrash through Philo.

Greek culture and philosophy reached Judaea in different ways. In the second century A.D. different midrashic traditions and haggadoth describe Tannaim who were well versed in Greek philosophy. In the Jerusalem Talmud, Chagiga 14 there are several haggadoth about Elisha ben Abuya or Acher, a close friend of R.Akiba. Siegfried compares him to Philo. Like Philo Acher did not believe in a national God and, again like Philo, he believed in an interpreter between God and the world (the Philonic Logos). Even R.Akiba, the famous teacher of Halakah, wanted to know and was greatly tempted by Greek philosophy. Only after the Revolt of Bar Kochba in A.D.135 and the complete devastation of Judaea, did the leaders of the people, advise the few who were left to withdraw from foreign culture and try to strengthen themselves within their own beliefs and

habits. But for some one hundred and fifty years Greek philosophy and Jewish religion had been allowed to interpenetrate even in Judaea. The question remains-in that time of Grace was Philo also accepted in Judaea? and, if so, was there any dialogue between the Tannaim and Philo of Alexandria with his allegorical exegesis and his new notions of God?

One of the most interesting parts of Siegfried's book deals with Philo's understanding of God. He argued that Philo's notion of God was greatly influenced by Greek philosophy and only partially by the Bible.<sup>16</sup>

God, according to Philo, is not like the sky or the universe or man. He describes God as incorporeal (*ἀσώματος*) (De specialibus legibus II, 30, 176). God is without qualities or attributes (*ἄπροσος*), he is unnamable (*ἄκατονόμαστος*) and in every way incomprehensible (*ἄκατάληπτος*) (De posteritate Caini 169; De somniis I, 11, 67; Quod Deus immutabilis sit 13, 62). The Ideas in Plato have some likeness to Philo's God. They are incorporeal (Sophist 246B) incomprehensible (Timaeus 52A) and unchangeable (Republic II, 382E).

There is one place in the Bible where we are told that man cannot understand God and all His attributes: Exodus 33:17ff. and especially verse 20, "You cannot see my face, for no man shall see me and live". These words are said to Moses, who in the Old Testament is the man closest to God and who requested the privilege of seeing and understanding God.

Yet in the Bible there is no God without qualities. On the contrary, God is described with definite attributes. The biblical

God is not free of emotions, He is moved by jealousy, by remorse. God is certainly not nameless, He revealed Himself under a definite and holy name. Given these facts, it is obvious that the Bible did not serve as a foundation for Philo's perception of God.<sup>17</sup> Philo's explanations of the nature of God are primarily Platonic. In the Bible God goes and comes and there are references to His eyes and ears (Quod Deus immutabilis sit 12), mouth and nose (Legum allegorise I, 13; I, 50). Philo explained these anthropomorphisms by his allegories, giving them a different meaning.

I believe that Philo presented a God without attributes, because he wanted to emphasize the utter difference between God and matter and demonstrate that there could not be any link between them. Philo said that the nature of God is simple and pure, while all creatures are complex beings, partly spiritual and partly material. Philo must have found it especially difficult to reconcile the namelessness of his God with the different names of God mentioned in the Bible. Siegfried argued that he was helped here by his deficient knowledge of Hebrew. In order to clarify Philo's notions of God it is necessary to consider the translations of God's names in the Septuagint and also the Jewish traditions concerning them. The Septuagint translates the Hebrew Elohim as Theos, (God) and the Hebrew יהוה as Kyrios, (Lord). The term Theos is understood by Philo as a designation of the creative power, θεογονική δύναμις (De mutatione nominum 4, 29; De Abraham 24, 121; De confusione linguarum 27, 137). The term Kyrios in the Septuagint translates the Hebrew יהוה or Adonai, which is the spoken substitute for the Tetragrammaton. Philo understood that Kyrios indicates authority or

the "royal power",  $\delta\upsilon\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma\ \beta\alpha\varsigma\iota\lambda\iota\kappa\eta$  (De Abrahamo 24,121).

In my opinion, Philo took the two names of God and their meaning from Jewish traditions. Furthermore, he also understood the name  $\text{א/ד}$  as the distinctive, ineffable name of God.

Siegfried added another explanation and a third, supreme name of God. He stated that Philo understood that  $\text{ὁ ὢν}$  or  $\text{τὸ ὢν}$ , (Being) Exodus 3:14-15 was the real name of God and above all other names.  $\text{ὁ ὢν}$  is situated above Kyrios and Theos, which do not designate God's name but only His first two powers. Siegfried also inferred from De mutatione nominum 2,12 that Philo understood the name  $\text{א/ד}$  to mean the same as the name "He that is" ( $\text{ὁ ὢν}$ ). He also stated that Philo had no knowledge of the fact that the Hebrew  $\text{א/ד}$  is translated in the Septuagint as  $\text{ὁ κύριος}$  (Lord).<sup>18</sup>

The Midrash itself saw an antithesis between the two names of God: Elohim represents justice ( $\text{א/ד אלהים}$ ) and Jahweh pity, grace ( $\text{יהוה רחמים}$ ). This tradition became known and accepted in Judaism during the following centuries.

Philo accepted this difference between Elohim and Jahweh, but because he had little knowledge of Hebrew his notions became confused. Philo believed that the Tetragrammaton is untranslatable (De vita Mosae III,14 II,155) and he usually wrote  $\text{ὁ ὢν}$  instead, without recognizing that the Septuagint translated it by Kyrios.

And so the conclusion must be that Philo's notion of God is composed mostly of Platonic elements and to a far less degree of Jewish principles.

According to Siegfried, Philo more than any other Jewish writer destroyed Judaism's *Gottesseinheit* (Unity of God). Philo's

God was no longer the living God of Israel, but an abstract concept. He created the world not by Himself but with the help of the Logos. "The allegorical defence destroyed the subject of its protection more thoroughly than the fiercest attack of the freethinkers could have done it". (Die allegoristische Verteidigung richtete den Gegenstand ihres Schutzes völliger zu Grunde, als es der grimmigste Angriff der Freigeister vermocht hätte.).<sup>19</sup>

## V

The most important factor in the assessment of Siegfried's book is that the author was a true scholar, well versed in both the Greek and Judaic cultures. This is obvious on every page of the book which abounds in pertinent examples from the midrashic literature, Greek philosophy and the writings of Philo. Siegfried's judgements and conclusions are not always correct and I shall return to them.

Although this is a book with a full scholarly apparatus, it is nevertheless a very readable book. Whenever he can the author leaves the dry presentation of problems, arguments and quotations, and introduces simile and metaphor. In other words, its descriptions are alive and interesting.

Although it was published in 1875, modern scholars still quote and refer to it. Siegfried thought that Philo had worked out a method of allegory based on special hermeneutical rules and he devoted a considerable part of his book to formulate and explain these rules and illustrate them by passages from Philo's works.

Before Siegfried got down to single rules he remarked that they are a mixture of the Midoth, the hermeneutical rules of the Midrash, the hermeneutical principles of the Stoics and also some original Philonic rules.<sup>20</sup> In this way, stated Siegfried, Philo created for his allegorical exegesis, ein festgeschlossenes System("a firmly closed system").

It is difficult to believe that Philo created his allegory with the help of such systematic rules. Philo certainly was endowed with imagination and creativity and these faculties must have formed his allegory above any strict principles or rules. Allegory for Philo was much more than a system of rules as formulated by Siegfried. His allegory is complex and structured and it is essential to understand its characteristics thoroughly, because through his allegory Philo expressed his Weltanschauung.

The principle that Scripture is not always to be taken literally and that it has to be interpreted came to Philo as a heritage of Judaism; his acquaintance with Greek philosophic literature led him to give a philosophic turn to the native Jewish allegorical method of interpretation. The example of the Greek allegorical method helped and influenced him greatly. In my opinion, it is important to remember that Philo's allegory was philosophical and that midrashic allegory was not.

Another argument of Siegfried with which I cannot agree is that the hermeneutical rules of the Haggada form part of Philo's hermeneutical allegorical method. Siegfried did not discuss or prove this statement and I do not believe that he could do so, because it goes beyond the evidence. Allegory is found in rabbinic



literature, but it is sporadic and much more concise than Philo's.

Rabbinic tradition ascribes to the Sage Hillel (who was an older contemporary of Philo) a set of seven rules for the interpretation of Scripture, and allegory is not among them. Hillel based his hermeneutical rules on the principle that one may search and study, but never depart too far from the plain meaning of the Bible's word. This is certainly not a characteristic trait of Philo's allegory.

An example of Hillel's rules is Gezera Shava ("Similar Decree") which means establishing a new law by analogy in the contents or the meaning of a word appearing in two different passages. Another rule is Kal Vechomer meaning "light and heavy", i.e., that we learn the easier from the more difficult. If the easier thing is prohibited, the more difficult one certainly is so. For example, a holiday is not so sacred a day as the Sabbath, therefore a task prohibited on a holiday is by inference most certainly prohibited on the Sabbath. Rabbi Eliezer, a later Sage, increased Hillel's seven rules to thirty-two. But these could be applied only to the Haggada and the more numerous rules came after Philo's time.

In the age after Hillel non-literal interpretation was abundant in Judaea, but allegory was not. Perhaps the rabbinic Sages disapproved of allegory as too extreme and too capricious.

Philo owes a partial debt to Stoic allegory, but I cannot see any relationship between the rules of Hillel and the rules of Philonic allegory, as formulated by Siegfried.

Another striking statement of Siegfried was that there existed a mutual influence between Philo and the Palestinian Midrash.

But he does not explain how this mutual influence could have developed.

The question is controversial, and several scholars have tried unsuccessfully to resolve it. What makes this problem even more difficult is that its solution requires to clear up some other difficulties: for example, did Philo know Hebrew and Aramaic, the languages of the Midrash? Several prominent Philonic scholars (Stein, Amir, Heinemann, Sandmel, Nikiprowetzky etc.) deny to Philo any knowledge of Hebrew or at the best a very limited one. If Philo did not know Hebrew and Aramaic, how could he be familiar with the Midrash and borrow its interpretations?

Besides Scripture, Philo also drew upon certain unwritten traditions. He refers to these traditions as ἀγγραφος νόμος, "the unwritten law", which is understood by some scholars as the Palestinian Oral Law.<sup>21</sup>

There is also a passage in De vita Mosia 1,4 which I have quoted above. In it Philo confessed that he had learned from the "elders of the nation". Siegfried interpreted these words as a reference to the Palestinian Sages. Can this interpretation be accepted? Can one agree that Alexandrian Jews knew and accepted the Oral Law, which was still then in the process of formation and was rejected even in Judaea itself (e.g. by the Sadducees)? The collections of the Midrash, the Mishnah and the Talmud were not made and written down until long after the time of Philo, but much of this material must already have existed in oral form by the time of Philo. Furthermore, we have seen in this chapter that there are some resemblances between Philo's explanations and different haggadoth.

What are the arguments which could make probable Siegfried's theory on the mutual influence between Philo and the Midrash ?

The first fact which might explain the resemblance between Philo's interpretations and the Haggada is that both Philo and the Palestinian exegetes used the same basic matter for their exegesis - the Bible. This fact alone could be responsible for some similarities. In addition, one should consider that the thought processes of the human mind may lead independently to similar results.

Some traditions of early Palestinian Judaism must have been brought with them by the Jews who first immigrated to Alexandria. Some traditions, even those which were not yet written down, may have been borrowed by Alexandrian Jews from their contemporaries in Palestine through the various channels of communication (e.g. pilgrimage to the Temple was often observed by Diaspora Jews; Philo too went up to Jerusalem and the Temple).

I cannot think of any other argument in favor of Siegfried's theory. In addition to the arguments brought against it, we have also the fact that nowhere in Talmudic literature is there any evidence that Philo and his work were known.

But then the link between Philo and the Palestinian Sages or a definite resemblance between Philonic and Palestinian exegesis is one of the key problems in Philonic scholarship and till today no acceptable solution has been found. The relationship between Alexandrian exegetes and Palestinian Sages is a problem that appears repeatedly in the writings of Philonic scholars. We shall come back to it and the various comments and proposed solutions as the review of other scholars continues.

CHAPTER TWOMODERN SCHOLARSHIP ON PHILONIC MIDRASHC. SIEGFRIEDFOOTNOTES

- 1 C.Siegfried, Philo von Alexandria als Ausleger des Alten Testaments(Jena: Verlag von H.Dufft, 1875), pp.1-28.
- 2 Ibid., p.27.
- 3 Ibid., p.31, footnote,2.
- 4 Ibid., p.31, footnote,3. See what Suidas says in connection with the well-known saying, ἡ Πλάτων φιλονοίησεν ἢ φίλων Πλατωνίησεν. τοσαύτη ἐστὶν ὁμοιότης τῆς τε διανοίας καὶ φράσεως τοῦ ἀνδρὸς πρὸς Πλάτωνα.
- 5 Ibid., p.32, footnote,1.
- 6 Ibid., pp.32-37.
- 7 Ibid., pp.37-45.
- 8 Ibid., p.132.
- 9 Ibid., p.144.
- 10 Ibid., p.143.

- 11 Philo, De opificio mundi 74-75, διὰ τοῦτο ἐστὶ μόνος τῆς ἀνθρώπου γενέσεως φησὶν ὅτι εἶπεν ὁ θεὸς "τομήσωμεν" ὅτερ ἐρθέκινεν συμπαράσχηεν ἕτεροι ὥς ἂν συνέρχων.
- 12 Siegfried, Ibid., pp.148-156.
- 13 See The Fourth Book of the Maccabees, 5,24.
- 14 Siegfried, Ibid., pp.160-197.
- 15 Ibid., p.165.
- 16 Ibid., p.199.
- 17 Ibid., p.200.
- 18 Ibid., pp. 203; 213-214.
- 19 Ibid., p.159.
- 20 Ibid., p.165.
- 21 Ritter, B. Philo und die Halacha p.14.

## CHAPTER THREE

### L. TREITEL

#### I

Leopold Treitel was born in 1844 and died in 1932. He lived a long and quiet life dedicated to scholarship and research. He studied at the seminary for Rabbis in Breslau (then in Germany, now in Poland). This was a well known institute which counted among its alumni a number of renowned Rabbis and writers. Treitel's teachers were H. Grätz, the distinguished historian, and Z. Fränkel, the writer and commentator on the Mishnah and the Midrash. Besides acquiring a thorough grounding in Judaica, Treitel studied philosophy and Greek literature. The subject of his Ph.D. dissertation was Philo's philosophy and its forms of expression. Consequently, he came well equipped to his studies of Jewish Hellenism and Philo.

Treitel became a Rabbi and in this capacity the leader of Jewish communities in different small towns-Koschmin, Briesen, Karlsruhe and for his last twenty years in Laupheim.

In the preface to his Gesamte Theologie und Philosophie Philons von Alexandria Treitel names Siegfried, Cohn, Massebieau and Conybeare as the scholars who had guided and helped him in his research.

He wrote two books on Philo, Philonische Studien (1915) and Gesamte Theologie und Philosophie Philons von Alexandria (1923).

His books were well received and made him known for his scholarship and research into Judeo-Hellenistic writings and especially Philo.

## II

In his Philonische Studien Treitel pointed out the importance of Jewish-Hellenistic writings for a better understanding of developments in the Jewish and Christian philosophies and religions. For him the center of these writings was occupied by Philo of Alexandria. Treitel's main interest in Philo was his contribution to the philosophy of religion and, in particular, his share in transforming Judaism into a universal religion.

Treitel complained that so little was known about the Haggada. A beginning had been made in the great work by L. Zunz, Gettendienstliche Verträge der Juden, but he maintained that subsequent works continued to pay more attention to the Halaka. This fact may explain the general opinion of Protestant scholars like Schürer, Bousset, Pfeleiderer and Schultz, that Judaism was "nichts als eine Gesetzesreligion", a religion where the ethic was smothered by casuistic disputations.<sup>1</sup>

This is false, argued Treitel, although it is true that for centuries the Halaka and Shulkan Aruk (a code of laws) were the most important books for Judaism. Treitel tried to prove that most of the ethical principles of the Jewish religion are to be found in the Haggada, and that the Jewish people did not live a life under dem Joch des Gesetzes.<sup>2</sup>

He emphasized that already Azariah de Rossi, a Jewish scholar who lived in Italy in the sixteenth century, had stated that Philo was especially interested in the ethical principles of the Jewish religion and had tried to prove this in his book Meor Einayin

(The Light of the Eyes). After Zunz it was especially E. Fränkel who in his book Über den Einfluss der palästinensischen Exegese auf die alexandrinische Hermeneutik had pointed out the great role of the Haggada in Philo. Later came C. Siegfried and J. Freudenthal whose Hellenistische Studien was a treasurehouse for the student of Haggada. There is, wrote Treitel, an important difference between Siegfried and Freudenthal. Siegfried held that Philo borrowed many of his haggadoth from Judaea, while Freudenthal took the view that both in Judaea and in the Diaspora there existed several independent exegetical schools and that the Palestinian academies not only gave, but also received, haggadoth and exegetical rules from Alexandrian exegetes. Treitel himself argued that it was a mistake to deny Hellenistic Judaism its important place and influence on the later development of Judaism. It is true that Sages like R. Akiba, who in the second century A.D. was one of the greatest leaders of the Rabbis and of his people, succeeded in keeping the Halaka free from Hellenistic influence, but it was different with the Haggada.<sup>3</sup>

Some scholars went to the other extreme, taking the position that Hellenistic Judaism reached a higher stage of development than the Palestinian; e.g., Friedländer in Die Religiöse Bewegung im Judentum.

### III

After this discussion of different scholars who had written about the Haggada, Hellenistic Judaism or Philo, Treitel tried to reach a definite and all-encompassing definition of the Haggada.



He quoted several different authors but none satisfied him and he compared their definitions to "a big sack into which everything which is not Halaka is pushed in" (wie ein grosser Sack, in dem man alles hineinstopft, was nicht Halacha ist). For him it was the ethical element of the Haggada that has to be emphasized in its definition:

Haggada, in the widest sense of the word, is the ethic and the belief of Judaism. Since there is a sister relationship between religion and history, on the one hand, and between religion and poetry, on the other, the Haggada includes saga, legend and even historical material, as seen from the ethical viewpoint. It also contains fable, parable, and similar poetical forms.

(Agada ist die Ethik und der Glaube im Judentum, und das im weitesten Sinne, also dass nach dem Schwesterverhältnis, das zwischen Religion und Geschichte einerseits und zwischen Religion und Poesie andererseits besteht, die Agada ebenso Sage, Legende und selbst eigentlich Geschichtliches, letzteres von der ethischen Seite angesehen, wie auch Fabel, Parabel und was dergleichen Formen mehr sind, begreift).

Treitel agreed with Zunz that, while in the Halaka there are logic and memorization, in the Haggada the religious genius of the people had room to develop. Treitel did not agree with those who have found in Philo only allegorical midrash and not peshat. He believed that, although Philo preferred drash, he often used peshat.

If one compares De opificio mundi 3 "As the world is in harmony with the Law and the Law with the world" (ὡς καὶ τοῦ κόσμου τῷ νόμῳ καὶ τοῦ νόμου τῷ κόσμῳ συνῴνεται) with Bereshith Rabba c.1, "God used to look into the Tora and create the world" (כי סתם את כלל עולמו בראייה) It will be found that the quotation from De opificio mundi 3 is quite similar to the quotation from Bereshith Rabba c.1.

The Palestinian Midrash Bereshith Rabba is mystical in its presupposition that the Tora existed before the creation of the

world. But Philo found nothing mystical in this passage. He declared that the Tora is the law of the universe because it is the true law of nature.

Siegfried, who noticed a striking similarity between the De opificio mundi<sup>3</sup> and Bereshith Rabba c.1 proposed that Philo had borrowed his commentary from the Palestinian Midrash and mixed it with Stoic elements. According to Treitel, however,<sup>5</sup> Siegfried had failed to offer satisfactory proof. Treitel agreed with Freudenthal that the notion that certain things existed before the creation of the world e.g., chaos, water, the Tora, angels was of Hellenistic origin. He argued that it was only later that this notion was transmitted to Palestine through Philo's writings along with his explanation of Plato's ideas and of the Pythagorean theory of numbers. In Treitel's opinion Freudenthal's argument nullified Siegfried's reproach against Philo that "He performed a delicate trick, keeping his old Jewish prejudice and nevertheless speaking like a philosopher" (ein feines Kunststück, das er gemacht, indem er sein alt-jüdisches Vorurteil behalten und doch wie ein Philosoph geredet habe!).<sup>6</sup>

Treitel alluded to many interesting midrashic interpretations in Philo's Questions in Genesis and in Exodum and noted how fortunate it is that the Questions preserve some material on the lives of Isaac and Jacob, since the Exposition contains only the biographies of Abraham and Joseph.

## IV

A substantial part of Treitel's two books is devoted to examples of Philo's allegorical interpretation and comparisons with haggadoth from the Palestinian Midrash.

Thus one of the haggadoth in Questiones in Genesis 2,13 concerns Genesis 7:4-10: "God let Noah build his ark for seven days so that sinners should see, repent and avoid the flood's destruction". The same thought is expressed in Bereshith Rabba 32.

When he dealt with the question whether the three patriarchs were for Philo only symbols, embodying the laws of ethics, Treitel concluded that although Philo often treats them and their deeds in a purely allegorical way, there is no doubt that in De Abrahamo and De Josepho they appear as historical personalities.<sup>7</sup>

In Judaea as well as in Alexandria biblical interpreters discussed how Abraham, the first man to acquire the knowledge of one God, had made his way to God. In the Judaeen haggadoth it is common to find the belief that Abraham knew the true God through his own wrestling and thinking. One of them describes how for forty eight years Abraham struggled for a knowledge of the truth (Bereshith Rabba 30), while another says that he was only three years old when he knew God. Philo described in detail in De Abrahamo 69 ff. the gradual ascent of Abraham from paganism to monotheism. He started with the worship of the stars and planets, but rejected this when he saw how the sun sets and the moon and stars disappear at dawn. Then, turning inward and finding a Logos in himself, there came the revelation of the Divinity and finally the Theophany of God.

In this explanation there is considerable likeness, according to Treitel, between Philo and the Judean tradition (Bereshith Rabba 39).

Treitel made two mistakes here: first, in finding a similarity between Philo's allegorical interpretation of Abraham's life and the Judean haggadic view. Second, in greatly simplifying the definition of Philo's ideas of Logos, Theos and Kyrios (Word, God and Lord). Treitel seems to have misunderstood the meaning of these terms as Philo used them.

For Philo distinguished between the divine Logos and the earthly Logos. The former is the quality of pure thought and only a few select men come to understand and live according to it.

Abraham reached this highest stage through learning ( $\mu\alpha\theta\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ ); Isaac had natural intuition ( $\phi\upsilon\sigma\iota\kappa\iota\varsigma$ ); Jacob's way was practice ( $\pi\alpha\tau\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ ) De Abrahamo 52. Abraham did not just discover the Logos in himself, he reached perfection only by an arduous and very gradual ascent. He had to learn how to overcome perception based on the senses and successfully undertook "encyclical studies" (personified in Hagar), obtained "wisdom" (personified in Sarah) and only then, solely through the grace of God, did he become worthy of divine revelation.<sup>8</sup>

Philo thought that very few men reached this lofty stage of development. Moses was another-and yet any perceptive mortal possesses innate capacities which, with the help of the biblical laws, will enable him to reach understanding. These biblical laws are identical with the laws of nature as God has created them. The patriarchs, however, were the embodiment of natural law (nómos empsychos) and so attained the divine Logos before the biblical laws were given. A difference exists even among the patriarchs.

God Himself taught Abraham, while Jacob had only the help of the divine Logos.

Man knows God through His different Qualities or Powers as Kyrios and Theos (De mutations 7-15; 27-34). Kyrios is the ruling Power, Theos is the creating Power, but neither is God Himself.<sup>9</sup> A perceptive and virtuous man may see God as Theos or by reaching a higher stage as Kyrios, his innate qualities and way of life determining the stages of his development.

It must therefore be concluded that, basing his allegorical biographies of the patriarchs on such concepts as Logos, Kyrios and Theos, Philo followed a different interpretation from that of the Rabbis of Judaea. Furthermore, Philo's Abraham owes very little to the Abraham of any extracanonical writings. Philo's definitions of Theos and Kyrios cannot be based on the M.T. of Genesis 17:1 and he probably uses the terminology of the Septuagint.<sup>10</sup>

An example of Philo's belief that different individuals may see God in various ways is the story in Genesis 18 of the three strangers visiting Abraham. In De Abrahamo 144 Philo assessed this visit in terms of the patriarch's spiritual development which has now achieved the highest point humanly possible. His ability to be taught enables him to see God as one.

The variations between singular and plural in Genesis 18 demonstrate that the three and the one are the same. Abraham is able to see God as one, while Sarah and the servants who are at lower stages on the way to God see Him as three.<sup>11</sup> Abraham remained in the same state of wisdom from which he can ascend to the true vision of God.

This story of the three visitors appeared in slightly different

versions in many haggadoth, e.g., Bereshith Rabba 39; Jerusalem Talmud, Baba Mez. 86b but in my opinion there is no such similarity as Treitel suggested between Philo's interpretation and that of those haggadoth. Other examples which Treitel employed to illustrate likenesses between Philo and the Haggada include: Questiones in Genesis 4, 168-171 which comments on Genesis 25:30 and points out the marked difference between the two brothers, Jacob and Esau. Philo explained that Esau is appropriately called "Edom", which means "flame coloured" or "earthy", since he was intemperate and desired only material things. There is a similar haggadic interpretation in Bereshith Rabba c.63. Questiones in Genesis 4, 196, which interprets Genesis 27:1 to mean that the blindness of Isaac was only temporary, so that the better son might get his blessing. A similar point is made in Bereshith Rabba c.65 "why did Isaac's eyes become dark (blind), so that Jacob might take the blessings" (נ/אצאן אפס' פ'ל' קנל, ה' /י' /ה' כ' א' /).

In discussing the story of Moses before the burning bush (Exodus 3:2 ff.) Philo employed a special symbolism: The weak bush symbolizes the political weakness of Israel. The defence of the bush is in its thorns, the defence of Israel in its just laws (De vita Mosia 1, 63ff). In Midrash Shemoth Rabba 2 Rabbi Johanan also compares Israel to a thorny bush. People use thorny bushes as a fence and Israel serves as a fence for mankind. The fact that the bush is burning but not consumed symbolized for Philo that Israel, though often attacked, will endure.

Exodus 13:17 greatly interested the exegetes of Alexandria and Judaea. Why were the commandments given in the desert, and

especially, why had Israel to remain for forty years in the desert ? Philo in De decalogo 2 and Shemoth Rabba 26 give a very similar answer: Israel had to be thoroughly prepared and educated before she could enter the promised land.

V

Treitel continued in the same vein, assembling interpretations from Philo and haggadoth from Judaea to show their resemblances and to prove that the Haggada was a beautiful and enriching creation of the Jewish people, both in Judaea and in Alexandria. In his chapter, "Ursprung, Begriff und Umfang der allegorischen Schrifterklärung", Treitel declared that, although allegorical interpretation had existed before his time, Philo developed it to such an extent that he should be regarded as its main representative. <sup>12</sup>

If one asks to what purpose Philo used allegorical interpretation, Treitel replied that Philo did not see in allegory simply a means to explain away contrasts between Greek philosophy and the Scriptures. Here Treitel opposed the opinion of the scholars who had preceded him, J. Freudenthal, Hellenistische Studien and E. Zeller, Philons allegorische Schriftauslegung, both of whom believed that allegorical interpretation appears only when there is a contradiction or difficulty in the biblical text that needs to be resolved. Treitel argued that, if this was the main reason for Philo's allegory, a great part of it would remain inexplicable and superfluous. The basis for Philo's allegory was his mystical attitude to the biblical Word. In every word and in every particle of Scripture

Philo found a special purpose, so that he could not understand the content of the Bible as simple narratives. The Word of God must contain a hidden wisdom ( $\tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ ).

Treitel noted a similarity of structure in Philo's allegories and in the Judaic Midrash. Passages from different books of the Bible are brought together by Philo, who often digressed from a certain story to another because he found in it a similar theme or trait. A good example is Legum allegoriarum 2, 19, about the allegorical meaning of the story of the first man.

## VI

In dealing with the question of Philo's sources for allegory, Treitel denied categorically that Philo learned it from the Stoics or some other Greek philosophical schools. It is rather his conviction that Philo learned allegorical interpretation from other Alexandrian biblical interpreters, from Jews who started to replace the concrete pictures of the Bible with abstractions.

The reason for Philo's interpreting the Pentateuch allegorically-but seldom the Prophets-was according to Treitel, that in Philo's time it was only the Pentateuch that was read in synagogue worship.

Treitel occupies a rather important position among early Philonic scholars. He was interested in Philo as a philosopher of religion and in his contribution to the transformation of Judaism into a universal religion. Although Treitel repeatedly mentions the ideal of a universal religion he does not write about the means or the way that would lead Judaism to universality. Could it have



been by accepting Greek philosophical ideas ? But here is one of the faults in Treitel's conception of Philo. He reduces the Greek influence on Philo to a minimum. Philo was deeply steeped in Greek philosophy and each of his treatises shows Greek influence. To ignore that is to ignore the combination of Judaism and Hellenism which is most characteristic of Philo.

Unfortunately, Treitel dwelt mostly on the Jewish side of Philo's writings, especially on the similarity between Philo's exegesis and the Palestinian Haggada. He ignores the reality that Philo was well versed in Greek culture, that some of his books are influenced by Plato to a remarkable degree, for example, De opificio mundi compared to Timaeus. Furthermore, Treitel did not recognize any Stoic or other Greek influence in Philo's hermeneutical method. He argued that Philo did not use allegory to smooth away contradictions between Scripture and Greek philosophy, he employed it to find the hidden meaning in the holy Word. In my opinion and in that of many recent scholars, Greek influence on Philo's method of allegory is undeniable.

Treitel's view was that there was a mutual influence between the Palestinian academies and the Alexandrian exegetes. He introduced several haggadoth and compared them with Philo's interpretations of the same biblical text. In these instances there is a similarity, but this is not adequate to establish a close connection between Palestinian and Alexandrian exegetes. With a better case this might, however, be an interesting possibility. It may be that, while explaining the same text, both independently came to a similar interpretation. In some comparisons between Philo and

the Haggada Treitel saw a similarity which I cannot recognize, e.g., Philo's Abraham is different from Abraham in the Haggada.

Treitel had a deep appreciation for the Haggada, since it is rich in ethical and poetical elements. He looked for the same qualities in Philo and tried to prove in his two books that they indeed exist. Yet Treitel's ideas are sometimes lacking in sufficient argumentation therefore some of his basic ideas cannot be accepted. His books, however, are beautifully written, abundant in pertinent examples and gain in readability from the author's enthusiasm for Philo and the Haggada.

CHAPTER THREEL. TREITELFOOTNOTES

- 1 L.Treitel, Philonische Studien (Breslau:Verlag von M.und H. Marcus, 1915), p.85.
- 2 Ibid., p.86.
- 3 In the Mishnah, the authoritative version of Jewish legislation, laws are often introduced by "the Halaka according to R.Akiba".
- 4 L.Treitel, Ibid., p.88
- 5 Ibid., p.89.
- 6 L.Treitel, Gesamte Theologie und Philosophie Philons von Alexandria(Berlin: C.A.Schwetschke, 1923), p.53.
- 7 Ibid., p.96.
- 8 S.Sandmel, Philo's Place in Judaism (New York:Ktav, 1971), pp.101-104.
- 9 Ibid., pp.180-185.

- 10 In the M.T. Genesis 17:1 we have YHWH and El Shadai  
and in Philo Kyrios and Theos.
- 11 Sandmel, Ibid., pp. 119-123.
- 12 Treitel, Gesamte Theologie und Philosophie ...pp. 114-115.
- 13 Passages where Philo interprets the Prophets are, e.g.,  
Qued Deus immutabilis sit, 10 ff. on Samuel, 1, 2:5;  
De cherubin 49 on Jeremiah 3:4.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### E. STEIN

#### I

E. Stein was born in a small town in Eastern Galicia, Poland in 1895 and died in a concentration camp in 1943. He belonged to the large Jewish community in Poland, which underwent great hardship during and between the two world wars.

He studied at the universities of Krakow and Berlin, specializing in ancient history and in Greek and Latin literature. At the same time he studied Judaica at the Higher Institute for Jewish Learning Hehmat Israel in Berlin from which he graduated in 1929. Starting in 1928 at the Institute for Higher Jewish Studies in Warsaw, he taught Jewish history during the Hellenistic period, Midrash, and Jewish philosophy.

Stein's books and articles appeared in several languages, Hebrew, Polish, German, French. Both as author and educator he proved to be an outstanding classicist and a scholar in Judaica. He published a number of articles and books, among them three on Philo. In 1927 he published the pamphlet Judaism and Hellenism (Judaism i Hellenizm) in Polish.

After the Nazi conquest Stein lived for three years in the Ghetto in Warsaw. Even there he remained the enthusiastic teacher and creative writer. While Jews were transported in increasing numbers to their death, among them his wife and only son, he had the

peace of mind to translate the Greek poet Anacreon into Polish.

The diary published in Yiddish by H. Seidemann, one of the few to escape from Warsaw, describes Stein's activities in the Ghetto, the articles he published in the Gazetta Jidowska, the lectures he gave, how he refused to interrupt his teaching. His love for books, and endeavours to save some while he had to move from one place to the other adds to the picture of a courageous man and scholar.<sup>1</sup>

## II

E. Stein stated his opinions on Philo and the Haggada in his books Allegorische Exegese des Philo aus Alexandria (1929) and Philo und der Midrasch (1931).

In Philo und der Midrasch Stein analysed the characteristics of the Midrash in Philo and pointed out its relationship to the Midrash in Palestine.

He wrote that there is no doubt among scholars in the field of Hellenistic studies that Philo was the most important representative of the Jewish-Hellenistic Haggada. Stein mentioned the writings of Z. Fränkel, C. Siegfried and J. Freudenthal. He did, however, oppose their opinion that the Philonic Midrash had the Palestinian Midrash as its source. They had maintained that in its simple form the Midrash originated in Judaea, but that the allegorical or philosophical Haggada originated in Alexandria. According to Stein, this theory remains to be proven.

Later scholars, such as L. Cohn and I. Heinemann, who edited the German translation of Philo, or J. Theodor and Ch. Albeck, the editors of Midrash Bereshith Rabba, in citing parallels were more cautious about ascribing a midrash to either Philonic or Judaic origin.



Philo attributed every virtue to the ideal Adam and all evil to the earthly man, whereas the Judaic Midrash attributes all that is good in man to the time before his temptation and the evil to the time after his sin.

There are marked differences between the Judaic Midrash and Philo: for example, the Midrash pictures Adam as extraordinary as possible in his physical beauty and in his virtues, so that when he listens to Eve and sins, his fall is all the more pronounced. Philo, on the other hand, wrote very little about the fall and the punishment. But Philo and the Midrash agree that Adam was wise and see proof of it in his ability to name the animals (Genesis 2:20). According to Philo, the animals' names correspond exactly to their nature (De opificio mundi 149-150). The Midrash saw in the fact that Adam gave names to the animals a sign of his superiority to the angels, who could not do it (Bereshith Rabba 17,4).

Since Adam is, according to both Philo and the Judaic Midrash, the most important part of creation, the question arises why he was created last. Philo and the Midrash give a similar answer. It seems that Philo and the Baraita used here a common older source.<sup>3</sup> In Philo's allegory Adam is "Nous" and Eve perception (Legum allegoriarum 2,25); They lose every personal trait and become abstract notions. Both the Judaic Midrash and Philo try to explain Cain's sin and do it in similar fashion, namely that he sacrificed from the bad fruits of the earth and offered God as little as possible. In both Abel is described as stronger but trapped by Cain's tricky and sly words. In Philo, Cain appears as a sophist, fluent and clever with his words, Abel appears as a better man, but not fluent.





In the Midrash the patriarchs have the same value as the Tora, in that both were created on the sixth day of creation (Bereshith Rabba 1,4). Abraham reached perfection or knowledge of the true God by *מִדְּבָרִים* that is in stages, by searching and learning.

Stein believed that in his comments on Sarah Philo introduced a mystical tone, which is typical of him when he discusses the "Sacred Marriage" (*ἱερός γάμος*): cf. *De Abrahamo* 99-100. Sarah is greatly idealized both in Philo and in the Midrash, where she has a greater prophetic potentiality than Abraham<sup>5</sup> (Shemoth Rabba 1,1). "Abraham is less than Sarah in prophecy" (*אברהם פחות משרה בנבואה*).

There are fewer haggadoth about Isaac than about the other patriarchs. Philo uniformly interpreted him allegorically; that Isaac was named before his birth meant that his name was symbolic. The Midrash emphasized especially two events in Isaac's life, his sacrifice and his blessing of Jacob. Isaac became blind so that Jacob, the better man, would get his blessing. The inability to see was only temporary and after Jacob was blessed and fled Isaac recovered his sight (*Quaestiones in Genesis* 4, 196). This haggada, according to Stein, came originally from Palestine, "This haggada shows (betrays) a Palestinian origin. It is clear that such a haggada would rather originate in miracle-loving Palestine than in rationalistic Alexandria." (Diese Agada verrät einen palästinensischen Ursprung. Es ist schon an sich einleuchtend dass eine derartige Agada eher im wundersüchtigen Palästina entstehen konnte als im rationalistischen Alexandrien).<sup>6</sup>

In Philo's allegorical interpretation Isaac is the purest and most spiritual among the patriarchs. While Abraham reaches true

knowledge only slowly and through laborious and painstaking striving and learning, Isaac alone "receives from his father the real substance" (Τὰ γὰρ ὑπερκτὰ μόνος οὗτος παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς λαμβάνει) cf. De confusione linguarum 74. He does not know the temptations of sensuality and he is the only one among the patriarchs who does not go down to Egypt, the center of sensuality. Both in Philo and the Midrash he is a completely virtuous and happy man.

Jacob was the patriarch whose way to God was training and practice, ἄσκησις. Therefore in the second group of three Jacob is the least virtuous, practice standing below learning (Abraham) and natural knowledge (Isaac). He gets the name "Israel" only when he really understands God, and Philo explained the name as meaning that Jacob "saw God" (ὁρᾶν τὸν θεόν): cf. De mutatione nominum 81.

Esau is the antithesis of Jacob. The twin brothers cannot live together. Neither Philo nor the Midrash attempted to explain why these brothers coming from such perfect parents were so different.

In De Josepho Philo compared Joseph to the good shepherd who had the qualities to lead nations. The idea that a future leader learns as a shepherd what leadership means is found in the Midrash concerning both Moses and David (Shemoth Rabba 2,2). Philo singled out Joseph among Jacob's sons to write a book about him. When he described Joseph's life in Egypt and got to the scene between Joseph and Potiphar's wife, he stated that Joseph had to run away from her because he was very young and did not know yet how to overcome sensuality (Legum allegoriae 3,242). The Midrash embroidered the story even further, telling that Joseph would have sinned if

his father's picture had not appeared before him (Sota 36b). In the Midrash we have side by side good and bad opinions about Joseph. But in Philo there is this distinction: in the narrative Haggada, Philo makes Joseph appear without fault (De Josepho 5); in the allegorical Haggada he resembles his mother Rachel, who symbolizes sensuality. Philo explained the name Joseph as "addition" (πρόσθημα) from the Hebrew root Jasof (סוּף) to add, as somebody who incorporates superfluous, additional characteristics (De mutatione nominum 89).

Then, Stein compared Philo's description of Moses with some of the Moses' haggadoth in the Midrash. The child Moses is described by Philo as beautiful and as developing very quickly. (De vita Mosia 1, 19-22). In the Midrash, the description offers more details, saying that when Moses was born the whole house was full of light. Philo wrote in his preface to the De vita Mosia that he used the Bible and very old haggadoth about Moses (De vita Mosia 1,4). Philo described Moses' education and mentioned that among his teachers were some from Hellas (De vita Mosia 1,15). Not only his whole life, but also his death show the extraordinary qualities of Moses. In connection with his death Stein pointed out the difference between Philo and the Midrash.<sup>7</sup> In the Midrash Moses pleads before God that he should not die yet, but in Philo Moses, the greatest philosopher, could never have protested since he knew that death is only the separation of the soul from the body (De vita Mosia 2,288ff.). The Midrash and Philo believed that Moses himself wrote the last sentences of the Pentateuch, which describe his death. Philo lingered longer over the description and emphasized that Moses was possessed at that time by the ecstasy of prophecy, and in this spirit he predicted the future of the twelve tribes and also described

his own death and the people's mourning. Stein believed that the descriptions of Moses' death are similar in Philo and the Midrash, but also distinguished in the Philonic description the different tone of Hellenistic education. In the allegory Philo saw Moses as pure spirit, as symbolizing all the virtues; he is the perfect man, better than any who had preceded him. (Quod deterius potiori insidiari solet 132).

Stein continually compared the Judaic with the Philonic Haggada. We have seen that he found many similarities. At the same time he tried to find an answer to the question whether the narrative Haggada was sometimes developed into the allegorical Haggada.

In the narrative Haggada Philo was influenced by the stylistic devices of Greek biography and therefore his Haggada is better constructed and more unified. Stein showed that in contrast to Philo's well constructed biographical Haggada, the Midrash pictured mainly good personalities in the brightest colours and represented the bad as badly as possible. Another difference between Philonic and Judaic Haggada is that Philo was clearly influenced by Alexandrian rationalism and tried as much as he could to find rational features for his haggadic figures.

According to Stein, therefore, the most characteristic points of Philo's Haggada are a tendency towards rationalism and towards a systematic description.<sup>8</sup> The Midrashic and the Philonic Haggada often resemble each other in details; nevertheless, it is impossible to establish today which Haggada came first and served as a source for the other.

In the allegorical Haggada, which is more often found in Philo, we can see a more systematic structure. Stein believed that one

might suppose that the Hellenistic allegorical Haggada developed from the Judaic narrative Haggada.

Stein rightly stated that an allegorical explanation of an old myth or an ancient religion always has the tendency to establish a harmonic link between itself and newer opinions and beliefs.<sup>9</sup> He pointed out that the allegory must contain both the new and the old elements. Stein believed that allegory develops when there exists a respect for tradition together with spiritual progress, but the progress has not yet reached the critical-historical state. At this point Egyptians, Greeks, Romans, and Jews used allegory. The Jews had recourse to allegory to explain those parts of the Bible where God is described like a human being, the Greeks because their gods are described as men and often as less than man from the ethical point of view. Thus in both cases we have the same reason for allegory: namely the need to explain that divinity is not simply humanity writ large.

Jewish allegory, especially in Philo, is different from the Greek in several respects. Physical or cosmological allegory is very seldom used, but if used at all as, for example, in the theory of the Logos, it becomes strongly ethical. In Philonic allegory the history of the Bible becomes the history of spiritual progress.

Professor Stein proceeded to enquire how precisely Jewish allegory developed in Alexandria. There are only very few sources apart from Philo and, according to Stein, there was a need to defend the Bible against the attacks of the Greeks.

It is difficult to decide where Philo was influenced by his predecessors and unfortunately we cannot reconstruct the develop-

ment of Alexandrian allegory immediately before Philo: "In the further development of allegory immediately before Philo there is a lacuna, because in the form in which we meet it in Philo, allegory has reached already its culminating point." (In der weiteren Entwicklung der Allegorie unmittelbar vor Philo klappt eine Lücke, denn in der Form, wie sie uns bei Philo begegnet, hat die Allegorie bereits ihren Höhepunkt erreicht).<sup>10</sup>

Philo did not use symbols alone but transformed a whole biblical story by his allegorical explanations. For instance, man is made up of both pure mind and sensual perception. Man is able to climb through different steps to reach spiritual perfection. The six most important of these phases are faith (Enos), repentance (Enoch), justice (Noah), learning (Abraham), intuition (Isaac) and practice (Jacob).

Philo's belief that the Bible is the source of all wisdom and all theoretical knowledge resulted sometimes in contradictions in his different writings. We find in them theories derived from Plato, Plutarch and the Stoics.

Stein believed that Philo did not know Hebrew and he brought several arguments to support his opinion.<sup>11</sup> Philo did not know that  $\text{Κύριος}$  and  $\text{Θεός}$  in the Septuagint corresponded to the Hebrew  $\text{אֱלֹהִים}$  and  $\text{יְהוָה}$  (Elohim and Yahweh). He falsely derived  $\text{Θεός}$  from  $\text{τίθῃμι}$  and saw in Elohim the creative power  $\text{δύναμις ποιητική}$ . But Elohim, El are more correctly understood in the Midrash as the kingly power  $\text{δύναμις βασιλική}$ . This is important, because a true understanding of God's names is very important for Philo and the allegorists. Philo did not even understand that in Hebrew

Adam ( *αδამ* ) is both a proper name ( *Αδάμ* ) and a generic name, humanity ( *ἄνθρωπος* ).

According to Stein, it is clear that Philo knew only the Greek translation of the Bible and not the Hebrew original. He cited Philo's faulty etymological explanations from Philo's various books to prove that Philo lacked any knowledge of the Hebrew language. Philo's explanation of biblical names is naive, e.g., Leah is derived from *λεῖα*, clean. Siegfried called such mistakes an "unphilological understanding" (unphilologischer Geist), but Stein judged these mistakes as serious, since Philo believed that he had reached "the Soul of Scripture" through these explanations of names.

There are, however, etymologies in Philo which suggest a more exact knowledge of Hebrew. Nevertheless, Stein did not believe, as did Siegfried, that Philo might have known Hebrew but provided faulty etymologies because he employed a wrong philological method. Plato's *Cratylus* has numerous faulty etymologies—should one, therefore, conclude that Plato's knowledge of Greek was insufficient or that his philological method was wrong?

Philo used some very rare verbal roots and word combinations in his explanations of biblical names. Only a scholar who knew Hebrew well could have done so. The same man, however, could not have made such obvious mistakes in the majority of the explanations. Stein concluded that the few correct etymologies did not originate with Philo but came from another source. The Judaic Midrash might have used the same source, but independently, for Stein did not believe in a mutual philological influence between Philo and the Palestinian Midrash.



In the Talmud we often have the name *בֵּית* "place" meaning God and in Philo *τόπος* too has the same meaning. Stein believed that "the place" came to mean God first in the Septuagint, Exodus 24:10. In order to weaken the anthropomorphism, "They saw Israel's God", the Septuagint translates, "They saw the place on which Israel's God stood".

When Philo employed an allegorical explanation, it is difficult to know whether he had found it among his predecessors or if it was his own. Sometimes he emphasized that an allegorical explanation is his own, e.g., De cherubim 9 or De specialibus legibus 1,6. Philo never mentioned a Hebrew etymology in his own explanations and Stein saw in this fact additional proof that Philo knew only Greek. "Greek was for Philo not only his mother tongue, as he boasted, but also the only language which he knew". (Das Griechische war aber für Philo nicht nur die Muttersprache, wie er sich rühmt, sondern zugleich die einzige Sprache, die er kannte).<sup>12</sup>

Philo saw in the allegorical interpretation a special mystical talent, a kind of "seeing" that was not given to every man, and for this reason he was especially interested in two Jewish sects that existed in his days and probably some time before him. One sect, the Therapeutae, lived in the Egyptian desert; and the other was the Essenes of the Judean desert. Both practised allegorical exegesis of the Bible and predicted the future according to the secrets they found with its help.

In his De vita contemplativa Philo described the Therapeutae as a community of older people who had retired from the world. They sang special hymns and possessed old, traditional, allegorical writings. Philo praised them because they led their life

according to Moses' laws, and he scolded the extremists among allegorical interpreters, the spiritualists, who saw no more any sense in practicing the Law. Philo ironically called these "bodyless souls" (ἀσώματα ψυχαι) cf. De migratione Abrahami 16. He admired the Therapeutae, whom he believed to have found the purest form of monotheism. We have no means to know clearly what their allegory was. It seems that their writings were similar to Philo's Quaestiones in Genesim and In Exodum. Whether the Therapeutae used only a catechetical form or sometimes employed a whole structured speech is not known. Even the meaning of their name was unknown in Philo's days. He explained it from θεραπεύειν, to heal, because they knew how to heal the soul through struggling and freeing themselves from all the desires of the body.

The other group, the Essenes, according to Philo, also used allegorical interpretation. At the time of Stein's work, the information about them came from Philo (Quod omnis probus liber sit 12) and Josephus (Bellum Judaicum 2,8, 2-14). Now we can supplement this from the Qumran Scrolls which use pesharim, prophetic exegesis that bears some resemblance to allegory but is more directly concerned with history. In the De vita contemplativa Philo described the main difference between the two groups. The Therapeutae passed their life in isolated contemplation, while the Essenes also dealt in practical matters. This difference was explained by Stein as due to external circumstances. The Therapeutae got all their needs from the Alexandrian Jews, while the Essenes in Judaea had to work and to earn a livelihood.

Allegory, according to Stein, used different and conflicting methods. He found contradictions in the Philonic allegory.

W. Bousset in his book, Jüdisch-Christlicher Schulbetrieb in Alexandria und Rom, 1915 tried to explain the contradictions through finding in Philo different kinds of allegory, theological, profane, and mystical. Stein emphasized the extreme difficulty of establishing sources for the Philonic allegory and concluded that Bousset's arguments were not convincing.<sup>13</sup>

Stein found in Philo's writings both theological and secular allegories, based on different outlooks or Weltanschauungen. In his theological allegory Philo sought to persuade others to lead a life which is ascetical, mystical and contemplative. In his secular allegory there is a positive evaluation of concrete values, a "joie de vivre" and an assent to practical life. Philo discovered these two contrasting viewpoints in the Bible by means of allegory.<sup>14</sup> Stein argued that secular allegory developed in a Hellenistic milieu and mostly used analogy. Theological allegory very often used the etymology of names and looked for a special meaning in every word and syllable. The latter is more often used by Philo than the former. Yet the Hebrew etymology in Philo is mostly wrong, not only philologically, but because he started out from a wrong viewpoint. He did not begin with the original form of a word and derive from it a certain allegorical meaning. Rather, his first step was a certain thought, and then he tried to derive from the word a derivative that would prove his way of thinking. In other words, he tried to justify his own theories by the authority of the Bible.

Philo brought only a few original ideas into the theological allegory. Since he did not contribute much to the secular allegory, one might ask what is distinctively Philonic in his allegorical

exegesis. Stein compared him with Cicero.<sup>15</sup> Cicero was not a philosopher, he merely translated Greek philosophy into Latin and, although his treatises contain contradictions, his merit was that Greek philosophy became known through him to wider circles. From the same point of view, though he was not an original allegorist and his commentaries abound in misinterpretations, Philo's merit, according to Stein, was that through his writings allegorical exegesis was transmitted to following generations, especially in the Christian Church, as Origen and others show.

The two monographs Philo und der Midrasch and Allegorische Exegese des Philo aus Alexandria are a valuable addition to Philonic scholarship. Both deal mainly with allegory; its development by Philo, its characteristic traits. Other problems such as, Philo's knowledge of Hebrew, whether his exegesis used the M.T. text or the Septuagint are considered only briefly.

Stein thought that Philo's allegory was superior to the Palestinian Haggada both in content and in form.

Philo, under Greek influence, gave his allegory a systematic structure. Greek influence may also be seen in the rationalism of Philo's allegory. In content, however, Stein distinguishes an element which Philo did not learn from the Greeks, the ethical element. Philo looked in every story and allegory for the ethical purpose.

One agrees with Stein about the ethical and rationalistic elements in Philo's allegories. It is impossible, however, to recognize their systematic structure. Characteristic faults of Philo

the writer are his frequent digressions, his interweaving of different stories and allegories, while the Palestinian Haggada is extremely concise.

In effect, Stein believed that his allegory was Philo's greatest achievement and that only through allegorical exegesis did he influence the following generations, especially several of the Church Fathers.

Concerning the problem whether the Haggada originated in Judaea or Alexandria, Stein gave the recurrent answer that Philo followed a long line of allegorists; since his predecessors' writings are almost totally lost we shall never know how much Philo received and how much he created himself. Stein did not contribute much to the solution of this problem. He suggested that the simple, narrative Haggada originated in Judaea and the allegorical Haggada in Alexandria.

Stein's quotations from Philo and the Midrash are pertinent. He sometimes digressed to analyse an interesting, general point, for instance, when he stated that the main purpose of allegory is to serve as a link between an ancient religion and new, critical opinions.

Stein's two monographs do not help with general Philonic problems but they offer a good analysis of his allegorical method and in this way contribute to a better understanding of Philo.

CHAPTER FOURE. STEINFOOTNOTES

- 1 An excellent study of this scholar is found in J.M. Rosenthal, Studies and Texts in Jewish History, Literature and Religion, "M.(E) Stein" (Jerusalem: Rubin Mass, 1967) pp.676-703. (in Hebrew)
- 2 E.Stein, Philo und der Midrasch, (Giessen: Alfred Töppelmann, 1931), p.4.
- 3 Philo, De opificio mundi 78. Baraita Sanhedrin 38a. The Baraita is the generic name for all Tannaitic teachings not included in the Mishnah of Rabbi Jehuda.
- 4 Stein, Ibid., p.26.
- 5 Ibid., pp.27-30.
- 6 Ibid., p.33.
- 7 Ibid., p.56.
- 8 Ibid., p.51.

9 E.Stein, Allegorische Exegese des Philo aus Alexandria (Gies-  
sen: Alfred Töppelmann, 1929), p.1.

10 Ibid., p.18.

11 Ibid., pp.20-25.

12 Ibid., p.32.

13 Ibid., pp.19-20.

14 Ibid., p.49.

15 Ibid., p.61.

CHAPTRE FIVEJEAN PÉPIN

## I

J. Pépin is a contemporary Philonic scholar, who teaches at l'Ecole pratique des Hautes-Etudes in Paris. He belongs to a group of scholars in France (M.R. Arnaldez, M. Harl, J. Daniélou, V. Nikiprowetzky) whose interest in Philo resulted in an excellent translation of Philo's works into French and in numerous articles on Philonic problems.

Pépin has a special interest in allegory and, indeed, he is considered one of the foremost scholars on this subject. I have included in my dissertation his article "Rémarques sur la Théorie de l'Exégèse Allégorique chez Philon" since it deals specifically and at length with the allegorical exegesis of Philo.

This article, and not Pépin's book, Mythe et Allégorie (1958), is often referred to in modern Philonic scholarship. Nikiprowetzky, for instance, in his book Le Commentaire de L'Ecriture chez Philon D'Alexandrie referred to it about nine times.

Pépin's article on allegory and Philo is very informative. After a careful and detailed analysis, however, I found that the article's real value lies in Pépin's explanatory references to different Philonic scholars and their various views.

A student reading Pépin's article might, besides getting a better understanding of Philonic allegory, be induced by Pépin's



clear exposition to use his references as a guide to read some of the books referred to (Heinemann, Bréhier, Wolfson, Daniélou..) and become acquainted with Philonic scholarship.

## II

J. Pépin introduces his article by stating that Philo in his allegorical interpretation of the Bible surpassed all who preceded him.<sup>1</sup> He does not argue, however, that Philo was the creator of the allegorical method. Among Alexandrian Jews some exegetes had already used allegory and this is true also about biblical interpreters who were contemporaries of Philo. Philo himself speaks about them in De specialibus legibus 3,32,78, saying that he heard admirable men maintain that the greatest part of the Law has a symbolic value. It is true that Philo did not define those interpreters very clearly. Sometimes he called them "men of nature" (*φύσεως ἀνδρες*). Bousset thought it most probable that they belonged to a Jewish, Stoic school of thought, and Pépin agreed with Bousset.<sup>2</sup>

Pépin is rather vague about the origin of Philo's allegorical, ethical method. Several scholars before him had been more explicit. Bréhier, for example, ascribed to the Therapeutae a very important role in the creation of the allegorical method: "cette méthode n'est en effet que celle même des Thérapeutes."<sup>3</sup> Heinemann, however, in his excellent article on the Therapeutae noted that Philo could not have learned his allegorical method from these people, since their life was completely ruled by the literal Law.<sup>4</sup>

Philo's remarks about the ancient allegorical traditions of

the Therapeutae and the Essenes show, according to Pépin, that allegory was well known and practised in Alexandria, although Philo did not mention any author or work of a purely allegorical nature.

Aristobulus, the author of the letter to Aristaeas, and the author of The Wisdom of Solomon employed allegory. Philo also mentioned "allegorical rules" (*ἀλληγορῖαι νόμοι*) established and handed down by an ancient tradition.

Siegfried believed that he could distinguish precise allegorical rules in Philo's interpretations. Pépin, however, argues against Siegfried that for the present one cannot clearly distinguish and understand these hermeneutic rules. He supposed that there were general rules not peculiar to Philo, but applicable to every kind of allegory.

Pépin summed up a few points about Philo and allegory. It cannot be doubted that Philo appreciated the allegorical method of exegesis much more than the literal interpretation of the Bible. He regarded allegory both as a way and as a desirable aim. He understood allegory as the great mystery of the select, those who see the incorporeal realities, those who live more by their souls than by their bodies.<sup>5</sup> Only a few, Philo believed, are able after a long preparation really to understand and practise the allegorical method. He called these few a select élite, who prepare themselves as if for an initiation into a mystery.

### III

Pépin's understanding of Philo's relation to allegory as to

a mystery is right. But Pépin's opinion is not new. Scholars like Leisegang, Heinemann, and Goodenough have pointed out that Philo in his allegorical interpretations used the same terms as those used in Greek mysteries. Thus, when Moses speaks about the miracles of Sarah, Leah, Rebecca and Zipporah, there is a mystical meaning in these names. Philo said about himself that he belongs to the initiates of those mysteries. He alluded to them in many places of his writings, e.g., Legum allegoriarum 3,22,71; Quod Deus sit immutabilis 13,61; De migratione Abrahami 3,14; De vita Mosis 2,3,71. The preparation for the mystery of allegorical interpretation is long and difficult and it will not reveal itself to those who are not initiated. Philo also warned that one should not reveal the hidden meanings of Scripture to the mass of the people who are not capable of understanding them (Quaestiones in Genesin 4,8).

Pépin goes on to ask, what is this initiation? Is there any special secret act? These questions are most interesting, but Pépin's answer explains very little. Philo used to pray that God would find him worthy of the revelation. The instrument of this revelation is a sacred oracle which enables one to see the truth behind the literal meaning. In defence of Pépin one must remember that Philo never described the initiation into the mystery which enabled him to use allegory, and it is just possible that words like "mystery" and "initiation" are not to be taken literally at all!

According to Pépin, wherever the biblical texts offer both a literal and an allegorical interpretation, Philo prefers the allegorical. He even applies the same rule to the interpretation of the biblical laws, since the literal interpretation is only a body whose

soul is allegory (De vita contemplativa 19, 78; De migratione Abrahami 16,93).<sup>6</sup>

Philo made many comparisons to illustrate his view of the superiority of allegory and Pépin presented a selection of those. Does this mean that the literal interpretation has no value? Philo's answers are different in different texts. In some, the literal interpretation has the value of truth and allegory coexists with it for the select few. We see this in Quaestiones in Genesim and in Exodum or in De Josepho 22,125 where Philo gave first the literal meaning and followed it immediately with the allegorical. Sometimes he put both interpretations on the same level, e.g. in his Legum allegoriae 2,5,14 he commented on Genesis 2:19, when Adam gives the animals their names, that the literal and allegorical explanations both have the same value. One should also remember that Philo praises greatly the precise observance of the Law in De migratione Abrahami 16,89-93. He observed that no symbolic explanation sets one free from a precise fulfilment of the Law. He finished this statement with the remark, found later in Christian tradition, that as a healthy body frees the soul for its true work, so the right understanding of the literal form will lead to a true understanding of its symbolism.

Philo found passages in the Bible whose literal meaning is mythical, e.g. that woman was fashioned from man's rib. The Bible in this case uses myth to teach a lesson and Philo opposed its literal interpretation (Legum allegoriae 2,7,19). We see this notably when he commented at the beginning of De confusione linguarum that there are Alexandrian Jews so very assimilated that they read the Bible with "Greek eyes".<sup>7</sup> Philo pointed out emphatically that Moses,

the greatest prophet and legislator, did not use any myths in introducing his laws or in his narratives, as the legislators of other nations did. When Moses narrated the disobedience and punishment of Lot's wife, he did not relate a myth but a fact.

Although these comments by Philo are dispersed over his whole work and do not form a systematic presentation, his theory emerges clearly: Some narratives in the Bible have a mythical air, but because they are not real myths they must be understood allegorically. The literal sense, besides being sometimes mythical, can also be illogical, e.g. Exodus 2:3, the Israelites weep over the death of Pharaoh, their oppressor.

Philo confessed that occasionally he could not understand the literal sense, e.g. the statement in Genesis 4:16 that Cain fled from God's face. If Jews believe literally that God has a face, how can they defend their religion against the Epicureans or the Egyptians? The only salvation lies in an allegorical interpretation. More than that, to believe such tales literally is impiety.

Pépin asked how can one explain this inconsistency in Philo, that sometimes he found the literal sense completely illogical and at other times he enjoined his readers to respect it? Siegfried and Heinisch were aware of this fact, but did not try to explain it. Pépin himself suggested that there may have been a certain evolution in Philo's way of thinking and the period when he preferred allegory did not coincide with the time when he appreciated a literal exegesis.

The weak point of this hypothesis is that it is impossible to date Philo's commentaries to two different periods. In all his

various writings the literal and the allegorical interpretations are found side by side.

Wolfson, as we shall note in a later chapter, explained Philo's unsystematic use of the literal and allegorical methods on the basis of the kind of biblical material commented upon by Philo. Wolfson's opinion on this point seems logical. He argues that Philo divided the Pentateuch into two main parts, the legislative and the historical. The historical part was then subdivided between the story of creation until the punishment of Adam and Eve and all the other stories described as genealogical.<sup>8</sup> In the case of the creation story, Philo rejected the literal sense, retaining it only in the Quaestiones in Genesin. The real difficulty arises in the commentaries to the laws, for sometimes these are taken in a strictly literal way and sometimes allegorically.

Other contemporary scholars like G.Delling and R.M.Grant agree in general with Wolfson, although they divide the narrative material differently.<sup>9</sup> Pépin too saw that Wolfson's theory has advantages, but he did not think it possible to divide the narrative material so distinctly and to explain why Philo interpreted it by both methods. In fact, Pépin argued, there is no obviously systematic interpretative method in Philo.

L.Goppelt preferred another principle of division. Different Philonic treatises are linked to specific methods of interpretation. In the case of the different laws Goppelt discerned a clear system of interpretation. Even if Philo used allegory to explain the laws, he also explained their literal sense and admonished people that it has to be respected. According to Goppelt, in the narratives

excluding those that relate to the patriarchs, Philo always rejected the literal sense.<sup>10</sup>

Daniélou argued that Philo chose his expository method according to the public to whom he addressed his writings.<sup>11</sup> When Philo explained De specialibus legibus more literally, he is presenting Hebrew laws to the Greeks—his intention was that they should be as intelligible as possible to the Greeks. The Legum allegoriae were addressed to the Jewish community and may have been part of Philo's homilies in the synagogue. In this matter Pépin agreed completely with Daniélou.<sup>12</sup>

But this explanation, too, has its weak points; sometimes literal exegesis is found in the Legum allegoriae. It is questionable, too, whether Philo preferred allegorical interpretations for his Jewish public in the belief that they would be unacceptable to the Greeks. All such explanations can be only approximate, and there may be some truth in each of them.

#### IV

Pépin goes on to point out that Philo may often provide several allegorical explanations for a single biblical text. For example, in De somniis 1,23, 146, he offered a cosmological interpretation of Jacob's ladder as the air between earth and sky. But he did not stop there. He continued with an analogical interpretation according to which the earth and the sky represent human perception and intellect, and air is the intermediary which leads from perception to intellect, that is, to the human soul. Again, the same

object may receive diverse symbolical meanings: for example, the tree of life, the patriarchs, the sun. So there is some kind of unity in Philo, according to Pépin, and the means mentioned give his allegorical method more discipline and clarity. "This reduces in a notable manner the apparent anarchy of the Philonic allegory." (Ça réduit de notable façon l'anarchie apparente de l'allégorie philonienne.)<sup>13</sup>

Even when he interpreted a passage literally, Philo gave it several different meanings, by analysing it grammatically in different ways and by emphasizing a special word. For instance, after the original sin, God says to Adam, *Πού εἶ;* (Genesis 3:9). According to the stress and the punctuation that one puts on the first word, one can obtain three different meanings: affirmative-you are somewhere; exclamatory-where did you go!; interrogative-where are you? Similar, and even greater, diversity is displayed by Philo in his allegories. Thus in the story of Hagar he gave five symbolical meanings to the well in the desert, the intellect, the cycle of education, the inclination to evil, the inclination to good, and God the Creator and cited biblical texts to clarify every one of these five meanings (De fuga et invectione 32,177;37,202).

Wherever possible he clearly preferred an allegorical interpretation of the biblical text. Some texts, however, allow only a literal interpretation. Philo found in the text special signs (*σημεῖα*) which allowed him to use allegory. When, for instance, there are trees in paradise unlike terrestrial ones, trees which give life, immortality and the knowledge of good and evil, it is clear that allegory may be used (De plantatione 9,36). Another sign



that a text should be understood allegorically is that the text appeared to be paradoxical. So in Leviticus 13:9-17 one wound of leprosy makes a man impure, but by contrast, if leprosy has spread all over his body he is pure. Such arguments can be found in Philo's predecessors, e.g., in Aristobulus (fragment apud Eusebium.)

## V

Before Pépin concluded his study he brought one more example which shows most clearly when allegory is needed. This is the case when anthropomorphism is linked with God: e.g. when God "breathes" on Adam's face (Genesis 2:7). According to Philo, only allegory can explain this passage.

In different parts of his study and in its conclusion Pépin tried to prove that Philo avoided the literal and used the allegorical method whenever possible. This is seen especially in the Legum allegoriae, one of Philo's most significant treatises.

Pépin's main interest is symbolism and allegory. These are the subjects of his book and they determine those parts of Philo's works which Pépin most thoroughly researched. This is the reason both for the article's value and for its defects. His explanations of the allegorical method are interesting and the illustrations chosen from Philo appropriate; but Pépin almost totally ignores literal exegesis, although Philo used and respected it. Pépin finds it necessary to repeat several times the statement that Philo valued allegory above all. The article, therefore, gives a rather slanted impression.

Pépin cited several scholars who recognized the importance of allegory in Philo, but none who takes an opposite position.

Throughout the article Pépin raises interesting questions, but sometimes fails to answer them, e.g. of what did the initiation in- to the mystery of allegory consist?

One must therefore judge that Pépin's article contains too many general statements, especially since some are not or cannot be proven. One example is the statement that in allegory Philo surpassed all the writers who preceded him. This can be only a speculative hypothesis. Very little material from Philo's predecessors has survived that could substantiate Pépin's statement.

Nevertheless, this is a thorough and informative study on allegorical interpretation, a subject which is mandatory for an understanding of Philo.

CHAPTER FIVEJ. PEPINFOOTNOTES

- 1 J.Pépin, "Rémarques sur la Théorie de l'Exégèse Allégorique chez Philon", Philon d'Alexandrie, Acte du Colloque National, Lyon 11-16 Septembre, 1966 (Paris, 1967) p.131.
- 2 D.W.Bousset, Jüdisch-Christlicher Schulbetrieb in Alexandria und Rom (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1915), pp.8-9;14.
- 3 E.Bréhier, Les Idées Philosophiques et Religieuses de Philon d'Alexandrie (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J.Vrin, 1950), pp.54,60.
- 4 Real-Encyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft, "Therapeuten" by I.Heinemann, eds. Pauly, Wissowa und Kroll (Stuttgart, 1894 etc.), vol. 2, pp. 321-346.
- 5 Pépin, Ibid., pp.134-137.
- 6 Ibid., p.139.
- 7 Ibid., p.144.

- 8 H.A.Wolfson, Philo (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947),  
vol. 1, pp.117-131.
- 9 G.Delling, "Wunder-Allegorie-Mythus bei Philon von Alexandria",  
Gottes ist der Orient (Berlin: Festschrift für O.Eissfeldt, 1959), pp.723-727.
- 10 R.M.Grant, Miracle and Natural Law in Graeco-Roman and Early Christian Thought (Amsterdam: 1952), pp.185-187.
- 11 L.Goppelt, "Typos. Die Typologische Deutung des Alten Testaments im Neuen", Beiträge zur Förderung Christlicher Theologie, 2 Reihe 43 (Gütersloh:1939), pp.49-55.
- 12 J.Daniélou, Philon d'Alexandrie (Paris: 1958), pp.20-23; 85-95.
- 13 Pépin, Ibid., 154.
- 14 Ibid., p.157.

CHAPTER SIXJ. AMIR

## I

The name Amir is the Hebrew version of Neumark. J. Neumark was born in Germany. He studied philosophy at the University of Berlin where he received his Ph.D. in 1939. This was already during Hitler's regime and, as Dr. Amir has told the writer, neither he nor any of his friends believed that he would be able to receive his diploma. Indeed, he was the last Jew to receive a doctorate in Berlin. He also studied at Breslau, at the Seminary for Higher Jewish Studies, where he attained the status of Rabbi.

In Breslau he came to know the principal of the Seminary, I. Heinemann. Professor Heinemann, a great teacher of Judaism and Hellenism, encouraged Dr. Amir to continue with his studies on Philo, since his dissertation had been on Philo's philosophy. Both I. Heinemann and J. Amir soon had to leave and they met again in Jerusalem, where they continued their discussions. J. Amir has written articles on different Philonic problems. He is now a Professor of Hellenistic Studies at the University of Tel-Aviv.

## II

J. Amir has written a series of essays on Philonic problems such as, "Moses' presentation in Philo"; "The relationship between

the allegory of Philo and the allegory of Homer"; "Explanation of Hebrew names by Philo".

In his essay "Philo and the Bible" Amir wrote that Philo is... "the most complex personality known to us from antiquity"<sup>1</sup>. He proceeded to deal with the controversial topic of Philo's attitude to the Bible, a problem which, after numerous commentaries on Philo, still continues to occupy Philonic scholars, giving rise to dissension and being one of those questions which cannot be answered simply and definitely. Everything that Philo wrote, and the bulk of his work is considerable, is in relation to the Bible.

But what did the Bible really mean for Philo? Was the Bible his main source of inspiration or merely a book of reference through which he exposed his Greek philosophical and mystical ideas? Could it be, Amir asked, that Goodenough was right that Philo was a mystic, who explained his mystery religion in rabbinic-Hellenistic terms to an audience among whom mystery religions were much in vogue? Amir, like the other scholars discussed already in previous chapters, remarked on the fact that Philo quoted mostly from the Pentateuch and very rarely from the other books of the Bible. In the Loeb edition of Philo the index lists sixty-eight pages of references to the Tora and only six pages from the other biblical books. Philo might have known the Prophets and Writings, but he valued them much less than the Pentateuch. Since the Tora was the supreme authority for Philo, he gave Moses a special place among the biblical heroes.

Amir disagreed with Wolfson that Philo knew the Hebrew text of the Bible and gave examples of commentaries and word plays to argue that Philo used only the Septuagint.<sup>2</sup>

How far and in what way was the Bible sacred to Philo?

The Sages believed that the Tora was given by God to Moses, who added nothing by himself (Sanhedrin 99a) and, therefore, even the smallest part of it was sacred. Amir thought that Philo had a different viewpoint. "For Philo Moses is the author of the Pentateuch".<sup>3</sup> This is a clear contradiction of the rabbinic legend in Bereshith Rabba 8,8 where God dictates the Tora to Moses, who exclaims at the words, "Let us make man", "Lord of the world, why do you give a good argument to the heretics?" And God's answer is, "Write, and whoever wants to err, may err!" Moses had nothing to do with the wording of the Tora. Philo believed that the Bible's language is the personal expression of its human author when in a state of prophecy.

Philo was eager to present Moses as the greatest lawgiver of the world and as such he attributed to him the qualities of love for men, justice and goodness (De vita Mosi 2,11).

Philo saw Moses as another Plato who composed laws for an ideal community. Amir found Colson's translation in De vita Mosi 2,12 inaccurate, "his laws are most excellent and truly come from God". Amir would translate, "the laws are divine" ( $\alpha\iota\ \nu\epsilon\mu\omicron\iota\ \omega\varsigma\ \epsilon\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\iota\varsigma\ \theta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\omicron\varsigma$ ), understanding "divine" as the highest quality of a human being. According to Amir, only the Ten Commandments were given directly by God to the prophet, but Moses worked out the details. Philo saw no disrespect in this. He regarded the laws as divine in the sense that they could not have been conceived by man without divine inspiration (Quod omnis probus liber sit 80). Greek philosophers believed that God speaks within man, and not to him. Philo, too,

described Moses as inspired by God but also as a great philosopher who reached the summit of philosophy by his own reasoning.

Amir, in contradiction to Wolfson, did not see in Philo the "originator of the medieval doctrine of philosophy as the handmaid of Scripture", and he did not identify Sophia with Scripture. It is true that the Church Fathers interpreted Philo in this way, *Philosophia ancilla theologiae*.<sup>4</sup>

How did Philo interpret the Bible? The Rabbis tried to extract from every biblical word as many meanings as possible, whereas Philo acknowledged only two meanings, the literal and the allegorical. In this respect, too, Philo was influenced by his Greek education. Hellenistic theory assigned two tasks to the legislator, to find just laws and to see that society follows them. This only a philosopher could do, and his laws would have a plain meaning for the people and a deeper meaning for philosophers.

Amir quoted from Philo's *De vita contemplativa* 78 to show that Philo distinguished between two layers of the Bible. The literal meaning is the body, the allegorical meaning the soul of the Bible. Both are important, but the second is infinitely more so.

Philo ran into difficulties when he had to deal with the literal or allegorical meaning of the laws. He insisted on a literal fulfillment of the laws for the reason that man is body also and not only soul. Man does not live in a social vacuum (*De migratione Abrahami* 89-93). Nevertheless, here, too, he searched for an allegorical meaning which would express the truth about God. When Philo allegorized he did not play with images, but had a certain image in mind to which the biblical stories should conform. Moses, according to Philo, was the greatest philosopher since his teachings



were not mere speculations but a system of religion. This philosophy brings man nearer to understanding God.

What Philo said in De cherubin 27 about his personal involvement in allegory is interesting. "There is a higher thought than these. I heard it from a voice in my own soul, which often is God-possessed, and then divines where it does not know". Even if Philo's interpretations appear at times strange and far-fetched, his commitment to the Bible is real.

### III

Pride in Moses rose to a peak in the Alexandrian age and has never been equalled during the long history of the Jewish people. The Hellenistic Jews tried harder than any others to add details to Moses' portrait. They looked upon him as their central figure, and so did non-Jews. In the Graeco-Roman world he was known mainly as the "Lawgiver" of the Jews and was characterized by the good and bad traits which were thought to be characteristic of his people. In Hellenistic writings he appears as the creator of the Jews and as their ideal.<sup>5</sup>

In the few remnants of Jewish-Hellenistic writings that have come down to us, one can distinguish two purposes in the portrayal of Moses: one is rational, and the other irrational. The description of Moses' achievement as Pharaoh's general in Ethiopia and his diplomatic activities there has rational traits. The story, which describes his magical art as surpassing that of all Egyptian magicians, has obvious irrational traits. Stories of mystery and magic were told about Moses in the contemporary non-Jewish literature.

These traits are obvious in the work on Moses by Artapanos, a Jewish-Hellenistic writer, of which only a few fragments are extant.

Significantly, these writings were created at a time when Greek classical rationalism came to the East and then took on some supernatural, imaginative colouring.

Stories of Alexander the Great are the best example of this process. He passed from history to story and novel, from the image of a great general and leader to that of a god-like man.

The same wonderful traits are found in Moses in the remnants of a tragedy The Exodus from Egypt, written in Greek by a Jew Ezekiel and modelled after classical Greek tragedy. There Moses told his father-in-law Reueil a dream, in which he saw on the Mount of Sinai a throne that reached up into the sky. On the throne sat an old man with a crown and a sceptre who called Moses to approach, and when Moses did so, he was seated on the throne and obtained the sceptre. Reueil explained that the dream predicted that Moses would be a leader of men for many generations. In this dream there are supernatural hints which the tragedian preferred to leave as such. It is important for an understanding of Philo's Moses to keep in mind that the description of Moses in Hellenistic-Jewish writings is rather different from that in the Palestinian Midrash.<sup>6</sup>

A striking feature of Philo's writing is that he mentioned Moses on many different occasions. Wherever Philo quoted a verse or explained a biblical law, he wrote, "Moses said", "Moses commanded", "Moses told". The Sages who saw in Moses the great delegate of God, also related additional details about Moses, but in a different way, e.g. Makkoth 24,72 "Four stern laws did Moses give to his people,

and among them he remembered the fathers' sins on their sons" ( *אין פ'רש'ת' ל'א'ל'ה'ם* ). Nevertheless, this is also to be understood as a law given to Moses by God, while in Philo it is apparent that Moses is the author of the Bible. This becomes especially clear, wrote Amir, in the second book of the De vita Mosis where Moses is described as lawgiver, as priest, and as prophet.

Philo enumerated four qualities as absolutely necessary for a Lawgiver: love of mankind, love of justice, love of the good, and hatred of evil. Some lawgivers possessed only one of those qualities, and only Moses had them all.

Philo sometimes based the justice of certain laws on the qualities of Moses, the man who gave those laws. For example, in the case of a deliberate murderer and the law, "Take him from my altar to die", Philo explained that otherwise the revenger could kill him at the altar and his blood would mix with the blood of the holy sacrifice. Philo praised Moses who foresaw this possibility and therefore issued that special law.

Amir mentioned the possibility that the book De vita Mosis was written especially for a non-Jewish audience, and therefore Philo's description of Moses is different from that of the Sages. There is, however, a passage in Philo which contradicts such a supposition. In the Legatio ad Gaium, which was certainly addressed to non-Jews, Philo said that more than any other people the Jews observe their laws, because they believe them to be God-given and they respect them in every detail. Here Philo spoke like one of the Sages. But this is an exception. The Sages believed that every word in the Tora came from God to the people through Moses.

Philo did not believe that the Tora came from heaven, (מִן הַשָּׁמַיִם) but from Moses, while he was inspired by God. According to Amir, there can be no doubt that if some of Philo's explanations had reached the Palestinian Sages they would have completely opposed them. There are contradictions in the over-all image of Moses in Philo. Philo represented Moses as giving all the laws of the Bible, sometimes as the messenger of God, and Philo does not seem to have felt any uneasiness in the conflicting representations.

In two places in the Bible Moses is called "a god, Elohim": he was a god to Pharaoh and to his brother Aaron (Exodus 4:17; 7:1). These texts confused the Palestinian Sages, and they tried repeatedly to explain them. One explanation was that sometimes Elohim can mean judge, and so in the above two instances Onkelos translated it by "Rav" (רַב) rather than God.

According to Amir, Philo used only the Septuagint where Elohim is translated by Kyrios. This could be understood only as God. Philo appreciated the uniqueness of the expression Moses-Elohim, but apparently he was not confused. He explained Exodus 7:1 twelve times, in one of which he defined a sage as God's friend who, therefore, lives in perfect freedom. The lawgiver of the Jews was called the true lover of God and even Elohim. Philo added immediately that he could be a god only of people and not of the universe. Philo as a philosopher, might have enjoyed the phrase Moses-Elohim, Moses the godlike man, and he approved the extraordinary honour given to the greatest philosopher.

Amir goes on to discuss Moses as prophet. Philo saw in Moses not only a leader and lawgiver, but also a prophet. For those who

know the ancient great prophets this was the greatest honour that could be given him. The Midrash, too, calls him "Master of prophets" (ר' משה /13k). In De vita Mosis II,2 Philo described the attributes of a prophet. Moses, as a leader of people, had to know what might happen in the future. This is possible, since a prophet has the gift to enter into ecstasy and in this state he might predict future events. For example, Moses tells his people, "The Egyptians you saw today, you will never see again".

In the Bible Moses is close to God and according to the Hag-gada, he understood God better than any other mortal. According to Amir, Philo emphasized most the practical side of prophecy, the ability to foresee the future and act accordingly.

In De vita Mosis II, 188-191, he wrote, "...all things written in the sacred books are oracles delivered through him (Moses)... Of the divine utterances; some are spoken by God in His own Person with His prophet for interpreter, in some the revelation comes through question and answer, and others are spoken by Moses in his own person, when possessed by God and carried away out of himself". And also "God has given to him of His own power of foreknowledge and by this he will reveal future events". Philo pictured Moses as requesting audiences from God and conversing with Him about common cases that came up while Moses was leading the people in the desert.

#### IV

Amir asked whether Philo learned the notions of love and fear

from the Judaic Sages and their Midrash or did he accept them as developed by Greek philosophical schools. In the Hellenistic schools the ideal philosopher has freed himself from the base emotion of fear (φόβος).<sup>7</sup>

One of the main purposes of Epicureanism was to free people from the fear of the gods and of death.<sup>8</sup> The Stoic philosopher, too, strove from the very beginning to deliver himself from fear.

This was the philosophical viewpoint. But in political treatises e.g., Aristotle's Politics, legislators found it necessary to restrain the mob, and one of the best means was fear of the gods. Therefore, from the oldest codices of law, the Sumerian and Old-Babylonian, to the Hellenistic-Roman, monuments represented a god giving the holy laws to the legislator; the inscriptions warned that the transgressor would be judged and punished by god and man. In this sense, fear is evaluated as a social need. Only in Seneca do we find a beginning, a possibility to replace the fear of the gods by love. Seneca lived later than Philo, but Seneca might have used earlier Greek sources, especially Posidonius.<sup>9</sup> It may be, suggested Amir, that both Seneca and Philo used the same source. Seneca contrasted love and base fear, "Nobody loves those whom he fears" (nec quisquam amat quos timet). But there is only a little research material to answer this question. De Bovis in La Sagesse de Senèque, p.209 asked, whether one may conclude that Seneca encouraged the people to love their gods. He did in a way, but only superficially and in a few sentences.

In his 1924 monograph La Sibylle, T. Zielinsky stated that Judaism is a religion of fear, while Hellenism is one of love.

But U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff in Der Glaube der Hellenen, II, 356 said, "Let the people love their gods; the Greek does not love gods". Philo could, therefore, have found in the philosophies of his time the contrasting attitudes of love and fear towards the gods, the convictions that a philosopher must be free of fear, though fear was still useful for the mass of the people.

What was Philo's relationship to God? By what theory was he chiefly influenced? Greek philosophy or Judaic religion? In his book Quod Deus immutabilis sit, 60 Philo tried to explain the anthropomorphism of God in some places in the Bible. He began by considering that Moses was not only the greatest philosopher, but also a legislator and educator of a people, Numbers 8, 5, "As a man will educate his son" ( *וְכַדְּמוֹתָיו יִלְמְדֵהוּ* ). God is sometimes described like a man so as to bring them nearer to each other. Moses sometimes paints God in fearful colours for those who need restraint through fear (Quod Deus immutabilis sit, 52). In De somniis 1, 234 Philo tried through the Platonic notion of *λογος* to explain that if Moses sometimes portrayed God like a man, it is only man in general and not a certain individual, so that there still remains a great difference from the gods of the Greek myths. Philo also stated that fear has no objective basis at all: no real philosopher will suffer fear, and only occasionally will the legislator use fear to restrain the masses.

This idea, that Moses sometimes used fear to educate his people, is strange to the Sages of Judaea. According to Amir, there is also a difference between Philo and the Stoa, where the love for God remains a theory, an ideal standing apart from reality. Philo

belonged to a tradition in which love of God is not theoretical but real, and therefore, his words on this love are livelier and have a warmth of experience in them.

Amir argued that when Philo gives an allegorical interpretation to the two names of God he is close to the Sages. Philo explained *κύριος* as meaning that one of God's attributes is righteousness, severity. He appears as the Ruler, the Lord of the universe, but the name *θεός* designates the good, pity and kindness.

In many places Philo wrote about these two attributes of God. For instance, in De fuga et inveniione 97 he allegorized the six cities assigned by Moses as a refuge for murderers till their trial. They really mean the different phases through which a man seeking God passes. The highest step any mortal can reach is the Logos. The lower one named Theos, is Creation reached only by the few who understand that everything was created and that God, the Creator, has created all and wants men to be virtuous through love towards Him. On the lowest step man does what he must through fear of the Lord. This idea of understanding God's attributes through love rather than fear is repeated by Philo in several places.

In De Abrahamo 124 ff. Philo described the visit of the three to Abraham and gave this event an interpretation which the Sages surely would not have accepted. The three men are God and His two attributes. It seems to Abraham that there are three; but when he looks carefully he is convinced that all three are one and therefore, he speaks to Him as One. It is significant that Philo assumed that God has three attributes. He said that there are three kinds of ways to approach God; the best way is to get to know the Being, the *ὢς*, God Himself. One attribute is the appearance at His right,



the attribute of love and pity, and at the left, is the attribute of justice and ruling. The best among men go God's way for His sake and seek no reward.

The next step in Philo's knowledge of God's names and attributes is that in reality God has no name (De mutatione nominum 13ff). The two names Kyrios and Theos exist only for man's understanding and convenience. God is called Lord and Ruler by the sinners, and Adonai by those who progress continuously in His understanding. The few chosen ones, those who really understand Him, will call Him by both names Theos and Kyrios (פניק' 3).

Besides the numerous interpretations by Philo, there is one which, Amir believed, occupies an isolated position and did not originate with Philo but was a homily by another person. This homily was based not on the Greek but on the Hebrew biblical text. It may also be that the homily was preached in Alexandria by a Palestinian in Greek. This homily is found in Philo's treatise Quis rerum divinarum heres. The attribute of fear, lordship is mentioned, but instead of love Philo used security or confidence (Θαπρησία)<sup>10</sup>

Philo started his treatise Quis rerum divinarum heres with Genesis 15:1-3, pointing out that any other man on hearing the news would have been lost in wonder and silence, but Abraham dared to answer God (Quis rerum divinarum heres 3). This was possible because Abraham was a truly free man and completely devoted to the Lord. There follows a speech by Abraham, in which he expressed his humility and trust in God. Abraham showed that he was afraid but also that he trusted in the goodness of God. These two feelings fused into one. According to Amir, Philo in all his writings succeeded

in expressing only in a few passages what true religious feeling is, but he did so here and exceedingly well.<sup>11</sup>

There is a fundamental difference between the severity connected here with God and fear as understood by Hellenistic philosophers as a means to control the masses. This Hellenistic notion of fear is not characteristic of Philo, who regarded love as the highest form of approach to God. This long homily in Philo was adorned by him with rhetorical devices, but it is different from his usual discourses. Amir thought that Philo was here not on his own ground.

This passage in Philo becomes clearer when one reads Genesis 15:2 in Hebrew ( *אֲנִי וְיְהוָה* ), "My God and Lord what will You give me?". It is clear that originally this homily was based on both names of God, as they appear in the Hebrew Masoretic text, understanding Elohim as justice and Adonai as pity. Philo used only one name *Σεσφορά* and Amir concluded that the homily was not based on the Septuagint but on the Hebrew text. Philo quoted also another verse this time from Isaiah 50:4. It too begins in the Masoretic text with the same two divine names Adonai Elohim.

Amir saw here another proof that Philo only translated or paraphrased a Hebrew teacher and it may well be, as Heinemann remarked on Isaiah 66:1, that Philo took the verse from the prophets, who were only little known to him, and did not even remark that these verses came from Scripture.<sup>12</sup> In Quis rerum divinarum heres Philo, by interpreting the two names of God, taught how one may speak to God. The two names show severity combined with pity; therefore, one must be careful and humble, yet not afraid ( *אֲנִי וְיְהוָה* ). The same fundamental idea about the relation between God and man

is found in Jeremiah 1 and Amos 5:8.

Amir allowed his imagination to picture Philo listening in an Alexandrian synagogue to a Palestinian, preaching in Greek but basing his words on the Hebrew biblical text and on the Judaic tradition. Philo's religious feelings were aroused, as can be seen from the style of Quis rerum divinarum heres. But since Philo did not know Hebrew, he used the Septuagint when he wrote the treatise and, therefore, he mentioned only one of the divine names.

Amir summed up his discussion by saying that out of Philo's voluminous writings this treatise came closest to the religious feelings of modern man and allows one to see how true and deep Philo's own religious sentiments were.

# V

Amir dealt in his essays with special facets of the Philonic philosophy or tried to clarify important notions and problems. He has realized his purpose successfully. His presentation is clear and exact. His solutions and opinions are interesting.

Amir's best essay dealt with the figure of Moses and Philo's understanding of prophecy in the Bible. Amir accused Philo of completely misunderstanding biblical prophecy. It is true that Philo based his explanations on Moses alone.

We know that Philo commented mostly on the Pentateuch. In different treatises and principally in De vita Mosis II Philo wrote about the power of prophecy and to whom it may be given. Amir understood that Philo explained prophecy as mere divination. In my

opinion, Amir underestimated Philo in this regard. I shall deal with this problem in my concluding remarks on Amir.

CHAPTER SIXJ. AMIRFOOTNOTES

- 1 J.Amir, "Philo and the Bible", Studia Philonica, 2 (1973);  
1-8 (Chicago: The Philo Institute), p.1
- 2 Ibid., p.2.
- 3 Ibid., p.3.
- 4 Ibid., pp.4-5.
- 5 J.Amir, The Image of Moses in Philo, p.42 (In Hebrew).
- 6 Ibid., pp.43-44.
- 7 Fr.Pfister, Die Religion der Griechen und Römer (Bursians  
Jahresbericht, 1930).
- 8 A.J.Festugière, Epicure et ses dieux (Paris, 1946).
- 9 I.Heinemann, Posidonios' metaphysische Schriften (Breslau:  
M.und H. Marcus, 1921-1928), vol.2, p.189.

- 10 J.Amir, "Philo's Homilies on Fear and Love and their Relation to the Palestinian Midrashim". Zion, 30 (1965), 48-60 (In Hebrew), p.55.
- 11 Ibid., p.57.
- 12 Ibid., footnote 61.

CHAPTER SEVENE.R. GOODENOUGH

## I

E.R. Goodenough was born in 1893 in Brooklyn, New York. He received from Garrett Biblical Institute the bachelor's degree in theology in 1917. He continued his studies at Harvard and Oxford where he received the D.Phil. in 1923. Professor Goodenough started his teaching career as instructor in history at Yale and continued to teach at that university, where in 1934 he became Professor of the History of Religion. He retired from Yale in 1962 and dedicated himself to research and writing.

His first book, The Theology of Justin Martyr, 1923 was based on his doctoral dissertation. Almost all the rest of his scholarly work was devoted to the study of Hellenized Judaism. His following books were published: in 1929 the Jurisprudence of the Jewish Courts in Egypt; By Light, Light; The Mystic Gospel of Hellenistic Judaism, 1935; The Politics of Philo Judaeus, with a General Bibliography of Philo, 1938; An Introduction to Philo Judaeus, 1940 and the Jewish Symbols in the Greco-Roman Period, in thirteen volumes. The first volume of his last monumental work was published in 1953.

The great mass of archeological evidence in the Jewish Symbols necessitated a revision of previous notions of Hellenistic Judaism.

His great scholarly achievement was recognized by grants and honorary degrees from different universities. He was a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and an active participant in several scholarly organizations.

At Yale he gave generously of his time in teaching and counseling students. He died on March 20, 1965.

Professor Goodenough was a great historian whose thesis required a reconsideration of Hellenistic Judaism and of Christianity at its roots.

## II

In order to understand early Christianity, Goodenough undertook a thorough study of Hellenistic Judaism. He considered Philo the chief representative of this deviant Judaism. Goodenough published several books and articles on Philo.

In his first work on Philo, By Light, Light, The Mystic Gospel of Hellenistic Judaism, he described a mystic Judaism, organized in thiasoi (secret societies open only to initiates) which cultivated sacred rites, including sacred meals, and was very distinct from rabbinic Judaism. In this book he desired to state clearly the beliefs of Philo. He thought that Philo belonged to this mystic Judaism. The criticism of this book, and of Goodenough's firm belief in a Hellenistic Judaism, was general and biting.<sup>1</sup>

Goodenough continued stubbornly on his way. He published The Jurisprudence of the Jewish Courts in Egypt (1929) and The Politics of Philo Judaeus (1938).



One can see that Goodenough had engaged in a tremendous task, the study of Philo in addition to Hellenistic and rabbinic literature.

He presupposed that the bulk of the literature of Hellenistic Judaism had gradually been destroyed. In addition he could not bring forward sufficient proof for his thesis from Philo alone. The murals of Dura Europos led him to the various synagogue remains of the Roman period, and especially to their mosaics with their use of the signs of the zodiac.

In the murals he discovered the use of symbols such as the menorah, the fish, the rosette, and the like. These symbols expressed, according to Goodenough, a mystic religion, and he contended that they were not merely decorative. From these suppositions he embarked upon the enormous task of examining the surviving remains of Judaism in the last centuries preceding Christianity.

The result of this work was the thirteen great volumes of his Jewish Symbols in the Greco-Roman Period. This book, containing the non-literary remains, would complement the literary evidence for a Hellenistic Judaism which he had found in Philo.

In the fourth volume of the Symbols Goodenough gave an exposition of his intentions and methodology. The introduction to volume four is, I believe, most satisfying and clearly written.<sup>2</sup> Goodenough's accomplishments in Hellenistic Judaism, whether one agrees with him or not, are undoubtedly a monument to the untiring research and originality of a great scholar.

What was Goodenough's opinion on Philo and the Haggada? This is, indeed, most pertinent to the subject of this thesis. To illustrate Goodenough's opinion on Philo, we may cite his explanation

of such subjects as the patriarchs, their wives, and the Akkedah ("sacrifice of Isaac"). All his opinions are strongly coloured by his belief in the existence of an important branch of Judaism, Hellenistic Judaism, whose religion was institutionalized in a mystery cult. For instance, he wrote that, in this type of Judaism, the mother returns to her great importance, and that we find this also in Philo's allegorizations of the wives of the patriarchs, where each plays the role of Virtue or Sophia (Wisdom).<sup>3</sup>

### III

Goodenough was highly interested in the patriarchs and their wives. He understood them as mystic symbols, and believed them to be understood in the same sense by Philo "who had found the highest, the true mysticism not in the written Law but in the mystic salvation which...the patriarchs had brought to men". This conception is discussed at length in the early book By Light, Light.<sup>4</sup> He believed that the Rabbis only hinted at the "mystical" patriarchs of whom Philo spoke, but the Talmudic commentaries conspicuously lack Philo's mysticism. For example, Goodenough quoted a midrash from Midrash Rabba to Leviticus on the feast of the Tabernacles, when Israel stands before God with the palm branches and citrons. Several suggestions are made about what the "lulab", ("myrtle" and "willow") and "ethrog" represent. One midrashic interpretation is that the ethrog is Abraham who lived to a great age; the palm is Isaac bound to the altar; the myrtle is Jacob, who had many children; the willow is Joseph, who died before his brothers.<sup>5</sup>

Goodenough believed that the Jews in Egypt "without the slightest feeling of disloyalty" took over the mysticism of the Pythagorean Platonism of Alexandria. The Jews then claimed that the Greeks originally had taken it from them.<sup>6</sup> The stages by which mysticism developed in Egypt are not known. At some time Moses was equated with Orpheus and Hermes-Tat, possibly two centuries before Philo. In Philo the Jewish mystery was fully developed and it is only in terms of the mystery that he becomes intelligible.<sup>7</sup>

According to Goodenough, the patriarchs had been true Jews before the legislation of Sinai. They were νόμοι ἐμψυχολογούμενοι (the embodied laws), the Hierophants of the mystery. The true Jew got his mystic law through the mediation of the patriarchs and especially of Moses. The patriarchs and Moses were thus considered by Greek Judaism to be saviors of the Jews and proselytes.

Goodenough believed that the Philonic books Exposition of the Laws and the Life of Moses are essential for the understanding of Philo's mystery religion. The exposition of the mystic teaching was for Philo largely an exposition of the patriarchs' lives. Therefore, it is important to understand the significance of their individual lives as explained by Philo and understood by Goodenough.

Each patriarch had achieved the end of the mystery. The first triad of patriarchs is Enos, Enoch and Noah who represent a preliminary stage; Enos ἐλπίς (Hope), Enoch μετάνοια (Repentance), and Noah δικαιοσύνη (Justice, Righteousness). These three are treated by Philo as preliminary steps on the mystic ladder. Only through Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, the second triad, is the mystery fully developed. Abraham leaves Chaldea, as Jacob runs from Esau.

This represents their first step in running away from a life of dependence upon matter, from a life of passions and perceptions. The second step is a definite renunciation of the somatic life, that is in fact the killing of the body.<sup>8</sup>

Abraham's general spiritual development is not clear in all its stages since passages are missing from Philo's writings concerning Abraham, i.e. in the Quaestiones and in the Allegory. Nevertheless, Goodenough tried to reconstruct Abraham's mystic development, his experience of the "Royal Power", his marriage to Sarah or Virtue as yet sterile, his encyclical or preliminary studies, represented by Hagar, the changing of his name when he overcomes the last traces of sin, the birth of Isaac from Sarah or Virtue, his seeing the three Powers or angels and understanding that the three are One.<sup>9</sup>

Philo concluded his treatise De Abrahamo with the words, "this man fulfilled the divine law and all the divine commandments (Genesis 26:5), for he had been taught not by anything written but by the unwritten Nature...Such was the life of the man and founder of the Hebrew race. Some regard him as νόμιμος but the argument has shown that he was himself unwritten law" (νόμος καὶ δεσμὸς).<sup>10</sup> Abraham, too, has a merciful nature (χρῆς εὐφ) with permanent power to benefit men.

In the Quaestiones in Genesis Philo tells the story of Abraham by making a brief commentary on the biblical narrative verse by verse. Some sections of the Quaestiones are very important for Goodenough's thesis. Many sections, e.g. Abraham's leaving Chaldea, are missing, but the Quaestiones give us Philo's version of the

"Akkedah" the sacrifice of Abraham's son Isaac. Goodenough argued that this story, which is one of the most famous and splendidly written stories of the Bible, was interpreted by Philo to establish a cosmic worship on a Pythagorean foundation. After the sacrifice, at sunset, Abraham's bodily nature became less significant and the spirit of God took possession of him.<sup>11</sup> Abraham had now reached the stage of redeemer and intercessor for all nations before God. The third book of the Quaestiones in Genesin closes with a strong statement of the powers of the divine man to save not only himself and his friends, but also strangers, and to give them a share in his virtue and piety. Thus Abraham saves Lot at Sodom and prays for the preservation of the city.<sup>12</sup>

After the destruction of Sodom Abraham went to the "South" to live, which Philo understood as living in the country of virtues, that is Abraham now lived the contemplative life in full.<sup>13</sup> Full of days Abraham was added to his people, that is as Philo interpreted it, Abraham was added to the incorporeal substances.<sup>14</sup>

Goodenough thought that Philo, by following the story of Abraham line by line in his Quaestiones in Genesin, has not been as successful a writer as in the De Abrahamo. But, on the other hand, the Quaestiones give us an unprecedented wealth of details for Abraham's life, and so we understand better his role in the mystery religion as savior for men of all generations.<sup>15</sup>

Goodenough saw here not a Stoic influence but mostly a Neo-Pythagorean one, "So in Abraham are all the people of the world blessed ... he is a spark from which the dark souls of later generations can be kindled."<sup>16</sup>

The Exposition continued to expound the careers and characters of Isaac and Jacob. Unfortunately, these two treatises by Philo are lost, and we have not a single fragment of them. Isaac was developed by Philo as a still higher type of existence than Abraham, higher also than Jacob. Goodenough attempted a summary of the lost De Isaaco,<sup>17</sup>

According to Goodenough, Philo described the sacrificial scene with great feeling and power,<sup>18</sup> but in my view Philo's verbosity detracts a great deal from the classical conciseness and beauty of the biblical narrative in Genesis 22:1-19.

Goodenough thought that Philo represented Isaac as the miraculous son of god, which would be a close parallel to Christian doctrine about the birth of Jesus.<sup>19</sup> Consequently, he remarked that there exists a possibility that the compromising texts in Philo have disappeared in the Quaestiones and were probably suppressed by Christian copyists.<sup>20</sup>

Isaac is the highest among the patriarchs, since he reached the exalted state not by learning as Abraham did, or by experience, the way of Jacob, but as one "self-taught", τὸ αὐτο-διδάκτον καὶ ἀντομαθὴς γένος. ἡ ἀντομαθὴς σοφία.<sup>21</sup>

This is explained carefully by Philo and Goodenough.<sup>22</sup> Isaac does not go through any preliminary stages, but lives the "perfect" life from his early years. As "self-taught" he was born with the knowledge that saves.<sup>23</sup>

The treatise on Jacob, the third patriarch, is also lost but we have extensive passages about him in Philo's De somniis, Quaestiones in Genesin, De migratione Abrahami, Legum allegoriae.

Only one example need be cited: Jacob's dream on his flight to Laban after he managed to get Isaac's blessings. This dream is elaborately expounded in De somniis 1,2-188. In Philo it is an allegory full of devious ramifications. Philo saw in Jacob's dream a mystic experience, and this is when Jacob penetrated the lower cosmic mystery. Jacob, at this stage, did not have a full comprehension of God, but only understood dimly that there is a superior Deity.<sup>24</sup> In connection with this dream, Philo has a remarkable passage on God as light.<sup>25</sup>

In the dream Jacob sees a ladder with angels, which Philo interpreted as air reaching to the sky and upon it the angels of God; God's ambassadors who are "the eyes and ears of the great king".<sup>26</sup> The ladder also illustrates that at this stage Jacob is vacillating up and down between the higher and lower things.<sup>27</sup> Only after this vision does Jacob become the "See-er" "Israel" and the "son of Isaac", the greatest patriarch, according to Philo. This dream of Jacob, to which Philo has devoted almost a whole book of the Allegory, has told us a great deal about Philo's conception of Jacob. Philo described the different stages by which Jacob became ὁ θεωρῶν. The fullest description of Jacob's final stage, his vision of God, is in the De praemiis 43-46. This passage is especially important, since it might be a digest of the lost De Jacobo. In this passage God, like the sun, is perceived by His own light.

We do not know how Philo explained the angel, with whom Jacob wrestled, since the De Jacobo is lost and no allusion is made to the angel in the Allegory. It always was and has remained an obscure passage in the Bible, in the Midrash, and in Philo.

Philo stated that like their patriarch Jacob, the whole people of Israel deserved to be called the race "that sees God", i.e. Israel:<sup>28</sup>

These are the principal arguments which Goodenough used to show that Philo's writings form part of a mystical Hellenized Judaism.

#### IV

Since his doctoral dissertation Goodenough was preoccupied by a problem whose solution he found only after many years of research.

He saw as the unsolved problem of early Christianity its rapid Hellenization. According to Goodenough, it was logical that Hellenization should have affected Christianity only in the later part of the second century. While he was travelling in Europe in connection with his doctoral dissertation, he visited Rome and its catacombs, and there he saw early Christian mural art. The murals of the Old Testament scenes attracted his special attention. After studying them and the literature about their chronology he came to the conclusion that early Christian art was dependent upon an antecedent flourishing Jewish art, and that only by borrowing from Jewish art was Christian art able to flower in such a short period of time.

But nobody believed him. Everybody maintained that there was no Jewish pictorial art whatsoever.

Goodenough had to find proof and so he immersed himself in Philo, Josephus, and early rabbinic literature. In Rabbinics he



found only a negative answer, yet he continued his search unweariedly. Then came the Yale expedition to Dura Europos in 1932-1935, which discovered the synagogue with its Old Testament murals. Goodenough saw in these murals a proof of his theory about Hellenistic Judaism. This Hellenized Judaism would include manifestations of theology and an art such as that of Dura Europos, whose murals would be the precursors of those in the Roman catacombs.

He adopted to a degree the terminology of G.F. Moore, that there was a "normative" Judaism, and he understood it to imply the existence of a "non-normative" Judaism. Goodenough admitted that in normative or rabbinic Judaism there were definitive objections to pictorial art, but this was not so, he argued, in Hellenistic Judaism.

Goodenough considered Philo the chief representative of Hellenistic Judaism.

CHAPTER SEVENE.R. GOODENOUGHFOOTNOTES

- 1 G.Johnston, The Doctrine of the Church in the New Testament (Cambridge: University Press, 1943), pp.16-18. See also the following reviews: G.C.Richards in J.T.S. XXXVIII (1937), p.415ff.; A.D.Mock, Gnomon, March 1937; W.L.Knox, Judaism and Christianity, II 72; St. Paul and the Church of the Gentiles, IXf.; W.Gutbrod, Theologische Rundschau 1939, Xites Heft.
- 2 E.R.Goodenough, Jewish Symbols in the Greco-Roman Period, Bollington Series, 37 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1954), vol.4, pp.3-48.
- 3 Ibid., vol.4, p.58.
- 4 Goodenough, By Light, Light, The Mystic Gospel of Hellenistic Judaism, (Amsterdam: Philo Press, 1969), p.7.
- 5 Midrash Rabba to Leviticus, 30,10.
- 6 Goodenough, Ibid., pp.708.
- 7 Ibid., p.238.

- 8 Ibid., pp.238-240.
- 9 Philo, De Abrahamo 275f.
- 10 Philo, Quaestiones in Genesin 3,9; Goodenough, By Light, p.146.
- 11 Philo, Ibid., 53,54.
- 12 Ibid., 59.
- 13 Ibid., 3, 11.
- 14 Goodenough, By Light, p.150.
- 15 Ibid.,
- 16 Ibid., p.153.
- 17 Ibid., p.141 and Philo, De Abrahamo 201-202.
- 18 Goodenough, By Light, p.155.
- 19 Ibid., pp.155-156.
- 20 Philo, De ebrietate 60,94; De mutatione nominum 1,88, 255;  
De sobrietate 65; De somniis 1, 194; De migratione

Abrahami 101; Quod Deus sit immutabilis 4.

21 Goodenough, Ibid., pp.155-156.

22 Ibid., p.241.

23 Ibid., p.168; Philo, De migratione Abrahami 61-67.

24 Philo, De somniis 73-119.

25 Ibid., 140.

26 Ibid., 149-156.

27 Goodenough, Ibid., p.150; Philo, De somniis 1, 166-172.

28 Philo, Legatio ad Gaium 4-7.

CHAPTER EIGHTH.A. WOLFSON

## I

Harry Austryn Wolfson was born in Austryn, Russia, on November second, 1887 and died in 1974. He had lived in the U.S.A. since 1903 and received his A.B. in 1912, his A.M. in 1912 and his Ph.D. in 1915, all from Harvard University. He taught at Harvard for many years. In 1925 the Nathan Littauer Chair of Hebrew Literature and Philosophy was established at Harvard and Wolfson was its first incumbent. He held it until his retirement. He was a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, of the Medieval Academy of America, of the American Academy for Jewish Research, and of several other academic societies. He was also the recipient of several honorary degrees, awards and citations.

During his many years as educator, Professor Wolfson's students knew him as a demanding teacher and a philosopher who delighted in proposing and discussing philosophical problems with his students.

He wrote a great number of articles and the following books: Crescas' Critique of Aristotle, 1929; The Philosophy of Spinoza, 1934; Philo, 1947; The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, Vol. I, 1956; Religious Philosophy, 1961.

## II

Wolfson intended to write a multi-volume study of philosophy starting with Plato and finishing with Spinoza, to be entitled Structure and Growth of Philosophic Systems from Plato to Spinoza. Parts only have appeared and among them, Philo: Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity and Islam, published in 1947. This has been said to be the most important work on Philo during a period of twenty-five years.<sup>1</sup> Its reviewers either praised it highly or attacked it fiercely.<sup>2</sup>

Wolfson's book is outstanding in its clarity of thought and expression and systematic structure-qualities which are sadly lacking in Philo, upon which Wolfson did not enlarge.

Again and again Philonic scholars had asked what kind of man Philo was and what is his place in philosophy. The answers ranged between two extremes: a) He was one of the greatest philosophers; he was the founder of a philosophic system which ruled western philosophy for seventeen hundred years, "he built up a system of philosophy which is consistent, coherent, and free from contradictions, all of it based upon certain fundamental principles".<sup>3</sup> b) The other extreme maintained that Philo lacked originality. If it is true that he was a religious man, he was certainly no systematic philosopher; his only value is to serve as source material about other philosophers.<sup>4</sup>

According to Wolfson, Philo was the first to achieve the reconciliation of faith and reason. He was the first thinker to make philosophy a handmaid of religion, a tenet which dominated the

philosophy of the western world till Spinoza.<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, Wolfson claimed for Philo the place of father of medieval philosophy, Christian, Arabic and Jewish.

Wolfson's position is clear-Philo lived like a Pharisaic Jew, and Alexandrian Judaism was but a collateral branch of Pharisaic Judaism. Philo used the Hebrew biblical text and might also have checked the Septuagint when necessary. He followed closely the development of Palestinian, Pharisaic law and occasionally had recourse to an oral tradition beyond Pharisaic Judaism. Hence the differences in his interpretations from those of the Pharisaic law.

One should notice that Wolfson's estimate of Philo as philosopher has not been generally accepted by scholars. One of those who proved the weak points in Wolfson's over-enthusiastic view of Philo was Heinemann, who aptly argued that Philo was living in a Greek world and that his philosophy was mostly influenced by the Greeks. Heinemann maintained also that Philo did not know Hebrew or the Hebrew Oral Law.<sup>6</sup> Among the scholars represented in this dissertation four-Stein, Amir, Goodenough and Sandmel-did not think that Philo knew any Hebrew; Siegfried concluded that he knew some Hebrew, while Belkin and Wolfson were firmly convinced that Philo knew both the Hebrew language and the Palestinian Oral Law.

Samuel Sandmel in Philo's Place in Judaism insisted that "there is no compelling evidence that Philo himself knew Hebrew, even so his writings reflect some knowledge of it".<sup>7</sup> Wolfson for his part argued that Philo knew enough Hebrew to write his commentaries on the Massoretic Text of the Bible and to check on the Greek translations whenever he found it necessary. Sandmel replied that Philo

was indifferent to Hebrew. Wolfson thought that Philo was dependent on the Palestinian Haggada and even on the Halaka; Sandmel countered with the criticism that Wolfson's arguments on these points were invalid and that Philo was creative. He did not depend directly on rabbinic dicta.<sup>8</sup> Sandmel criticized Wolfson further for connecting the halakoth and the unwritten Law with Philo's "custom" (ἔθος) and his "unwritten laws" (ἄγραφοι νόμοι).<sup>9</sup> According to Sandmel, ἔθος here means customs approved by "men of old", that is, the patriarchs, not the elders who developed the rabbinical oral tradition.<sup>10</sup>

### III

Wolfson's position on the ever-recurrent problems, whether Philo knew the Oral Law and whether he was influenced by the Midrash, was that in Alexandria there happened what was often to be repeated later: an attempt was made to reconcile the extremes, a strongly traditional religion and a philosophy to which that religion was barely known. Furthermore, he maintained, reasonably enough, that although all Alexandrian Jews did not know Greek philosophy, most of them read the Septuagint. He added a typical Wolfsonian statement, namely that Alexandrian Judaism was of the same stock as Pharisaic Judaism and like it had been moulded by the Sophersim and the traditional Oral Law. Besides, Alexandrian Jews maintained strong ties with Jerusalem and were influenced by the cultural developments in Judaea.<sup>11</sup>

Judaism in Alexandria started upon its new career with an initial stock of oral traditions and an incipient method of scriptural interpretation, both of which it had brought from Palestine and continued to share in common with those who in Palestine subsequently became the Pharisees.<sup>12</sup>



Alexandrian Jews, as we noted earlier in this thesis, did not live in isolation from the Greeks. Some of them adopted the Greek allegorical method of interpretation for biblical exegesis. According to Wolfson, Philo's aim was to combine the traditional Pharisaic approach with allegorical Greek methods of interpretation.

Philo believed in the sanctity and the eternity of the Bible. This was an established principle in Judaism, cf. Sirach 24:9;7:1.<sup>13</sup> As for Philo's "unwritten law" (*ἄγραφος νόμος*), this referred to the Jewish Oral Law.<sup>14</sup>

Philo thought, according to Wolfson, that the Oral Law was just as authoritative as the Written Law. He used the same technical terms of the Oral Law as the Pharisees: for example, "elders", "laws" (halakoth), "commandments" (gezeroth). Philo's opinion should be emphasized, that he who obeys the unwritten laws is worthy of praise more than he who obeys the written laws. This opinion can be compared with an opinion about the Oral Law in the Jerusalem Talmud, Sanhedrin 11,6,30a, that "The words of the Scribes are to be appreciated more than the words of the Written Law".<sup>15</sup>

Wolfson went on to say: "...besides unwritten laws in the sense of customs based upon decrees, Philo speaks also of unwritten laws based upon the interpretation of the written laws". He suggested that Philo was referring in some passages to an interpretation of the biblical text which is midrashic and Philo defended the need for this:

But I hold that such matters are like condiments set as seasoning to the Holy Scriptures, for the edification of its readers, and that the inquirers are not to be held guilty of any far-fetched hair-splitting, but on the contrary of dereliction if they fail so to inquire. <sup>16</sup>

Wolfson pointed to Philo's demand for strict observance of all the written and unwritten laws. Although the literal meaning of Scripture had to be accepted, Philo, like the Rabbis, allowed some exceptions, e.g., the historical framework of the Book of Job and the resurrection of the dry bones in Ezekiel 37 were declared by some Rabbis to be parables. This position, shared by Philo, that the literal meaning of Scripture may be cautiously rejected and re-interpreted, is summed up in the rabbinical saying, "The Tora spoke in the language of men" (אדם - לא מלאך), Berakoth 31b.<sup>17</sup>

In regard to the laws of Plato and Aristotle, Wolfson emphasized Philo's view that the perfect law is contained in the Pentateuch, which was God-given and therefore eternal.<sup>18</sup> Philo insisted that changes in the Oral Law were not innovations but were made possible by the fact that they were implicit in the Written Law.

To sum it up, Wolfson's opinion, in distinction from that of most scholars in the field, was that Philo was in continuous communication with the Palestinian Sages, that he shared their respect for the Oral Law, and that sometimes he interpreted the Bible in a way similar to the Midrash.

So many are the problems treated by Wolfson in his two volumes, that it is difficult to select some for presentation. I shall treat now two major themes in Wolfson's book—Philo's knowledge of Hebrew and the allegorical interpretation of Scripture.

#### IV

Although it may be true that Philo at times used the Greek

text of the Bible, Wolfson maintained that "Still it is not to be inferred that Philo had no knowledge of Hebrew".<sup>19</sup> Philo naturally wrote in Greek, which was the first language for him as for most Alexandrian Jews, and the Septuagint was considered by Philo and the Jewish community as holy.

Wolfson proceeded to cite several pieces of evidence for his belief that Philo knew Hebrew. Some of his interpretations of biblical verses seem to be based on the original Hebrew text and not on the Septuagint. His etymologies of proper Hebrew names, though sometimes erroneous, show again his knowledge of Hebrew, because "only one who had a thorough knowledge of Hebrew could uncensciously make such errors... and deliberately allow himself to depart from the true meaning of words".<sup>20</sup> Such departures are also found in the etymologies of the Rabbis. Wolfson admitted that there is no positive evidence for Philo's knowledge of Hebrew, yet "the burden of proof is upon those who would deny that he possessed such a knowledge".<sup>21</sup>

In Wolfson's view the main problem is not whether Philo knew Hebrew but rather to what extent he knew it. His conclusion was that Philo did not know enough Hebrew to write his own books in that language, but he did know enough to read the Hebrew Bible.

Philo's use of the drash as allegorical method is treated extensively by Wolfson.<sup>22</sup> Everything in the Bible, names, dates, numbers, historical narratives, laws was interpreted by Philo allegorically. Of course, he used also the peshat or literal method, but with reservation. Generally, Philo followed the rule that no anthropomorphic expression is to be understood literally. As proof

of this rule, Philo quoted the verse, "God is not as man"<sup>23</sup>. Anthropomorphic expression was intended only "for the instruction of the many". The underlying meaning (*ὑποφωτισμός*) of a biblical text and the allegorical interpretation of it are dear only to "men who are capable of seeing". Allegory is also described by Philo as something "into which one has to be initiated".

In reading the story of the world's creation in Philo one is to see again the conflict in him between absolute faith and rationalism. For instance, regarding the text, "... and God finished His work on the sixth day,"<sup>24</sup> Philo explained that "six days" mean not a quantity of days but a perfect number.<sup>25</sup>

Philo accepted miracles because God can always change the nature of things. He gave examples of this power; one of them is the story of the first great sin and the fact that the serpent spoke with a human voice.<sup>26</sup> Only rarely did Philo hesitate to use miracles as an explanation of biblical narrative.

Genesis 37:13-14 provides an example of Philo's reasoning that an allegorical interpretation of scriptural narrative is sometimes needed. In that passage Jacob sent his most beloved son, Joseph, to see whether his brothers and the flocks were well. Philo commented that no reasonable person can accept this story literally, since Jacob, who had the wealth of a king, would send a servant with such a message, not his dearest son. Another example is the story (in Genesis) of the confusion of languages. Philo complained that "persons who cherish a dislike of the institutions of our fathers" find many similarities between this story and certain Greek myths. He believed that these Jewish critics of the Bible could be

answered more effectively by giving the story an allegorical interpretation.<sup>27</sup>

These examples show that Philo used allegory to explain away any incident in Scripture that seemed to him unreasonable or to have some similarity to Greek mythology. According to him, the biblical stories have an inner meaning and the myths do not, and this is the essential difference between scriptural narrative and mythology.<sup>28</sup>

Philo clearly preferred allegory or drash. We find frequently in his interpretation of Scripture the formula, "here we may leave the literal exposition and begin the allegorical".<sup>29</sup>

Wolfson emphasized Philo's attitude towards the biblical laws. Philo asked for an observance of the laws and rituals, e.g., the Sabbath, the great festivals, circumcision, the sanctity of the Temple, and the Ten Words.<sup>30</sup>

To sum up-according to Wolfson, Philo asked for a literal observance of the biblical laws, but he also interpreted them allegorically. The similarity between Philo's methods of interpretation and those of the Greek philosophers in their discussions of Homer and Hesiod is described. Greek allegory, according to Wolfson, started with Thales and was adopted by many other philosophers, among them Plato, whose Socrates said that the poets are inspired and that one has to look into their utterances for some hidden inner meaning.<sup>31</sup> Wolfson concluded that Philo and his predecessors were so ready to use the Greek allegorical method because Jewish tradition did not prohibit it. The best example of this freedom is the Midrash.

Wolfson spoke out against pedantic classification of allegory and said that "too much importance is attached by students of allegory to the kinds of things which allegorists read into texts... The allegorical method essentially means the interpretation of a text in terms of something else, irrespective of what that something else is".<sup>32</sup>

The Palestinian Rabbis, unlike Philo, had no acquaintance at that time with Greek literature, so that their biblical exegesis differed from the Greek. It was still allegorical, since they interpreted Scripture "in terms of something else"-such as their own experiences and wisdom, the necessities of changed conditions of life, and a greatly developed moral sense. The important thing is that by the time of Philo the principle was already established in Judaism that allegorical interpretation of Scripture was permissible. This principle came to Philo as part of his Jewish heritage and then his thorough Greek education gave his native allegorical hermeneutic a philosophic turn.

Wolfson believed that the same process took place many centuries later when the Palestinian type of Judaism came into contact once again with philosophy.

# V

Wolfson's book is characterized by its precise and logical presentation. He was a great scholar, a master of technical skill in philosophic terminology, and his ingenuity in relating different Philonic passages and reaching a conclusion resembles Talmudic methods.

His purpose was to show that Philo was one of the greatest philosophers, whose system of thought became the basis of all medieval philosophy.

On reading Wolfson, one can easily become spell-bound and ready to accept his conclusions. But on returning to Philo one looks in vain for the architectonic system found there by Wolfson. There is no doubt, however, that Wolfson himself was a systematic and disciplined thinker.

He contended that Philo was not a "mere dabbler in philosophy", but one of the greatest and most original thinkers who influenced European philosophy for seventeen centuries. This seems to me a very daring statement, made by no previous Philonic scholar.

It is difficult to take an intermediate position about Wolfson's book. Among those who accepted his thesis after his book's publication in 1947 were Jean Daniélou and Ralph Marcus, while Erwin R. Goodenough and Isaac Heinemann were highly critical.

From his analysis of Philo's thought and logic Wolfson argued that Philo arrived at the conclusion that philosophy is the hand-maid of theology. In fact, this medieval principle is not stated by Philo.

Wolfson's book must be admired for its great store of Talmudic parables and the author's superb knowledge of Christian, Arabic and Jewish medieval thought.

In his judgements about Philo, Wolfson seems to have been thoroughly convinced of his own conclusion and saw no need to bring in the opinions of other Philonic scholars. He gives an impression of being one-sided and uncompromising. For example, he declared

that Philo knew Hebrew and the Palestinian Oral Law. These two points have always been debatable and no generally accepted result has been reached. Wolfson's reaction was he did not have to prove Philo's knowledge of Hebrew; the burden of proof was on the opposite side. His argument is proud but not convincing. On the other hand, he provided a good explanation of Philo's method of exegesis.



CHAPTER EIGHTH.A. WOLFSONFOOTNOTES

- 1 L.H. Feldman, Studies in Judaica, Scholarship on Philo and Josephus (1937-1962) (New York: Jeshiva University, 1963), pp. 6-8.
- 2 For criticism for and against Wolfson's Philo, see G. Boas, Journal of the History of Ideas, 9 (1948), pp. 385-392; K. Bormann, "Die Ideen und Logoslehre Philons von Alexandrien: eine Auseinandersetzung mit H.A. Wolfson (Diss. Köln 1953); J. Daniélou, Theologische Studien und Kritiken, 9 (1948), pp. 578-589; E.R. Goodenough, Journal of Biblical Literature, 67 (1948), pp. 87-109; I. Heinemann, Theologische Zeitschrift, 6 (1950), pp. 99-116; R. Marcus, Review of Religion, 13 (1949), pp. 368-381.
- 3 Wolfson, Ibid., vol. 1, p. 98, 114; vol. 2, p. 457ff.
- 4 P. Wendland, Die hellenistisch-römische Kultur in ihren Beziehungen zum Judentum und Christentum (Tübingen: Handbuch zum Neuen Testament, 1912), vol. 1, p. 3.  
See also Schwartz who calls Philo "ein flacher

Schwätzer", E. Schwartz, Aporien im vierten Evangelium  
(Göttingen: Nachrichten von der königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften, 1908), p.537.

- 5 H.A.Wolfson, Philo, Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity and Islam, 2 Vols., 4 ed.  
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968),  
vol.1, p.156.
- 6 I.Heinemann, Philons griechische und jüdische Bildung (Breslau: Marcus Verlag, 1932), pp.137-154.
- 7 S.Sandmel, Philo's Place in Judaism: A Study of Conceptions of Abraham in Jewish Literature (New York: Ktav Publishing House, 1971), p.11 footnote, pp.12-13.
- 8 Ibid., pp.17-20.
- 9 Philo, De specialibus legibus, 4, 149-150.
- 10 Sandmel, Ibid., p.18.
- 11 Wolfson, Ibid., vol.1, p.56.
- 12 Ibid.,
- 13 Ibid., vol.1, p.188. See Philo, Quod Deus

immutabilis sit, 28, 133; De somniis, 1, 16, 102;  
De confusione linguarum, 5, 14; Quaestiones et solu-  
tiones in Genesin, 1, 8, 10; 2, 28, 58.

14 Wolfson, Ibid., vol.1, pp.188-190.

15 Ibid., vol.1, p.192.

16 Philo, De somniis, 2, 300-301.

17 Wolfson, Ibid., vol.1, pp.135-136.

18 Ibid., vol.1, p.140.

19 Ibid., vol.1, p.88.

20 Ibid., vol.1, p.89.

21 Ibid.

The question of Philo's knowledge of Hebrew still remains as debatable as ever. Among those who have written about this question are C. Siegfried, Philo als Ausleger des alten Testaments, pp.142-145; L. Cohn, Philos Werke, 1, p.29; I. Heinemann, Philos griechische und jüdische Bildung, p.7; I. Heinemann's review in Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums, 54 (1910), pp.506-507; E. Stein, Die allegorische Exegese des Philo aus Alexandria, pp.20-26;

R.Marcus' review in Jewish Studies in Memory of George A.Kohut, pp.469-470.

- 22 Wolfson, Ibid., vol.1, pp.115-138.
- 23 Numbers 23:19.
- 24 Genesis 2:2. In Hebrew "on the seventh day".
- 25 Philo, De opificio mundi, 13-14.
- 26 Philo, Quaestiones in Genesin, 1,32. This may reflect Plato's myth that in the golden age of Cronus beasts spoke: see Plato, Statesman, 272 B-C.
- 27 Philo, De confusione linguarum, 2-4.
- 28 Ibid., 190.
- 29 Philo, De Abrahamo, 119.
- 30 Wolfson, Ibid., vol.1, p.131.
- 31 Plato, Apology, 22B-C; Ion, 533D-534E; Protagoras, 342A-347A.
- 32 Wolfson, Ibid., vol.1, p.134.

CHAPTER NINES. SANDMEL

## I

S. Sandmel was an educator and a writer. He was born at Dayton, Ohio on September 23, 1911. He received his B.A. at the University of Missouri, his Rabbinate from Hebrew Union College in 1937 and his Ph.D. from Yale University in 1949. His doctoral thesis Abraham in Normative and Hellenistic Jewish Tradition was written under the supervision of E.R. Goodenough.

Before his studies at Yale, he served for several years as a chaplain in the U.S. Navy. He was Professor of Bible and Hellenistic Literature at Hebrew Union College, Cincinnati from 1952 and at the same institution he was Provost from 1957. In his last years he taught during the winter semesters at the University of Chicago.

Dr. Sandmel was a great educator who took a genuine interest in his students and did not spare himself in guiding and helping them. He had a wide knowledge of Judaism and Hellenism and he was blessed with the rare gift of ability to impart his knowledge to others.

He was a gifted and prolific writer. He wrote a number of short stories and a beautiful novel Alone on the Top of the Mountain, on Moses' struggle and loneliness. Most of his books dealt with Judaism, Early Christianity and Hellenism. These were

also the subjects of many essays and articles published in learned journals.

His most important books are Philo's Place in Judaism, 1956 (based on his doctoral dissertation); A Jewish Understanding of the New Testament, 1957; The Genius of Paul, 1958; The Hebrew Scriptures, 1963; Judaism and Christian Beginnings, 1978.

His writings are distinguished by felicity of style and profundity of thought. He died in Cincinnati, in the fall of 1979.

## II

Sandmel's main work on Philo, as we have noted, is Philo's Place in Judaism: A Study of Conceptions of Abraham in Jewish Literature.<sup>1</sup>

Besides this fundamental book Sandmel has written a number of essays which deal with Philonic problems and clarify them. For instance: "Philo's Environment and Philo's Exegesis"; "Parallelomania"; "The Confrontation of Greek and Jewish Ethics"; "Philo, De decalogo"; "Modern and Ancient Problems in Communication"; "Rabbinic Judaism, Hellenistic Judaism and Early Christianity"; "Philo and his Pupils: An Imaginary Dialogue"; "The Haggada within Scripture." Most of these essays have been collected in Two Living Traditions: Essays on Religion and the Bible.<sup>2</sup>

One may see from these results of his creativity that Sandmel's interests were varied, extending to Scripture and Early Christianity and that he devoted his time to Philonic studies.

Sandmel's position was that Philo's exegesis reflects the

ideas of Platonism, Pythagoreanism, and Stoicism. He argued that Philo used the Septuagint, although in a form different from the one we possess and that Philo's exegesis was "an allegorical interpretation which, far from being casual, is rather consistent, intricately worked out, and architectonic in structure".

By the words "architectonic in structure", Sandmel was describing Philo's allegory rather than his philosophical system. "The latter, whether one wants to assess it as mere eclecticism or instead as original and creative, is indeed random and scattered."<sup>3</sup> We may assume, therefore, that Sandmel chose a middle way among the opinions of such Philonic scholars as Reitzenstein, who debased Philo, Goodenough, who saw Philo primarily as a representative of Jewish-Hellenistic mysticism, and Wolfson, whom Sandmel praised for his lucid presentation of the philosophy of Philo but whom he criticized for his over-enthusiastic admiration for Philo.

Philo can be regarded and represented from different points of view-as philosopher and as mystic, in relation to Gnosticism and to rabbinic Judaism. One may ask the question Ginzberg put: "Was he a Jewish thinker with a Greek education, or a Greek philosopher with Jewish learning?"

Sandmel emphasized the controversial nature of Philo's writings.<sup>4</sup> He believed that, "For Philo, the Bible is not so much the history of the human race or of the Hebrews as it is the potential or actual religious experience of every man".<sup>5</sup>

Each person has the potential to move through the stages of knowledge represented by the first triad, Enos (hope), Enoch (repentance), and Noah (justice). Some will proceed through the stages

of the second triad, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob (i.e., through learning, natural endowment and experience) and achieve the knowledge of truth. In this pilgrimage everyone is encouraged and guided by the Bible. It is a difficult journey, progress being either permanently or temporarily halted, depending on one's personal qualities. People all go through Canaan, i.e. the vices of adolescence, they waver between material or spiritual things and "face the dilemma of whether the five senses and four passions, the nine kings of Genesis 14, will rule the progressive mind, or whether mind will rule them."<sup>6</sup> So training should comprise the encyclical studies, symbolized by Hagar, which are only a preliminary way to the strict discipline of Virtue (Sarah). Only after having prepared oneself in this way may one ascend to the vision of the divine, as Abraham saw his divine visitors in Genesis 18. This progressive ascent, according to Sandmel, is made possible by possessing the gifts of the three patriarchs, who can endow others with *ἐνθεὸς λόγος*. Then one will reach the highest step of the ladder on his own. The less gifted may be helped by Moses' laws, which begin in Exodus 20. He who lives according to these laws lives like the patriarchs. If he observes the laws, understanding them only literally, he is at the level of the "mystery of Aaron". If however he adds a true symbolical meaning, he is at the level of the "mystery of Moses". Moses himself is the allegory of the divine Logos, while Aaron bears to Moses the relationship which uttered speech, necessarily impure, bears to true reason, which is pure".<sup>7</sup> Thus, Philo explained and exhorted men and women to live the holy life and to travel on the "royal road" to perfection.<sup>8</sup>



Philo, according to Sandmel, may be considered a preacher "who made constant reference to philosophy". For he strove for the salvation of the soul from the prisonhouse of the body. But his teaching contained no fallen god, because Philo was a "staunch Jew". His writings contain no myths and very little narrative; there is no trace of that magic so characteristic of his age. "He is a God-intoxicated rationalist, and an austere, and sometimes modest, sometimes arrogant, illuminated man".<sup>9</sup>

### III

If next one asks, what was Philo's relation to Pharisaic Judaism Sandmel replied that the difference between him and the Palestinian Sages is essentially small. "He only put their doctrines into a Grecian dress, but clothes are after all, of no significance."<sup>10</sup>

Later Sandmel dealt with the problem of whether Philo was Hellenized, or rather how far modern scholars may judge the extent of his Hellenization. Sandmel emphasized that Philo was "a loyal Jew and that the philosophy or anything else which he used in his writings seemed to Philo either congruent with his Judaism or even derived from it".<sup>11</sup> He believed that Philo's dependence on rabbinic Judaism may fit roughly one of three patterns. In pattern A, rabbinic Judaism is the acknowledged leader in religious matters for Alexandrian Judaism and for Philo. Local, Egyptian-Jewish developments are insignificant, and communications between the Jewish community in Egypt and in Judaea are frequent. Hellenization is only superficial.

In pattern B, communication is at a minimum. Jewish Alexandria is culturally independent of Judaea. If there exist similarities between them, they are co-incidental or due to limited communication.

Pattern C subordinates neither rabbinic Judaism to Alexandrian, nor Alexandrian to Palestinian Judaism. There is limited communication between them, but each develops independently. Sandmel, avoiding the rigidity and extreme opinions held by some scholars advocating one scheme or another, suggested that none of the patterns completely excludes features from the others.

Sandmel's opinion was that Philo had no first-hand knowledge of Hebrew and he criticized Wolfson's extreme affirmative position as illogical.<sup>12</sup> "Philo gives abundant information about his Greek education, but none about his Hebrew education; to my mind the burden of proof would rest on the affirmers". Sandmel goes on to say that Philo was indifferent to Hebrew, and that his text was most probably the Septuagint, which was considered a holy book. The Alexandrian Jews commemorated the supposed anniversary of the Greek translation of the Bible with a special holiday.

According to Sandmel, scholars have generally followed Z. Fränkel in holding that Palestinian exegesis influenced the Alexandrian. Only a few scholars agree with Weinstein that it was Alexandria that influenced the Palestinian Haggada. Sandmel did not agree with Weinstein.<sup>13</sup> He also disagreed with David Daube, who asserted that rabbinic exegetical methods derived from Hellenistic rhetoric and were specifically influenced by Alexandrian exegesis. He agreed with Lieberman that there may have been direct Greek influence

within Judaea itself.<sup>14</sup> He reiterated the point that before Philo allegory was well known both among Gentile and Jewish Greeks, and that Philo probably derived the allegorical method from his Hellenistic background. On the other hand, allegory was employed by the rabbis and began in the Bible itself.<sup>15</sup>

Some eighteen times Philo mentioned the sources of his exegesis, but did so only vaguely. For example, he described the Therapeutae as possessing writings of the men of olden time who left many memorials of allegorical interpretation. Philo understood the "men of old" not as the elders of rabbinic oral tradition, but as the patriarchs who were themselves laws. Sandmel did not think that Philo had any exact knowledge of the Oral Law, the "Tora she be al pe".<sup>16</sup> In this he directly opposed Wolfson's belief in Philo's knowledge of the Oral Law, and stated that the parallelism which Wolfson found in Philo and the Sages was greatly overstated "...it is a sad fact that Wolfson sees Philo at every turn dependent on the rabbis".

Sandmel also noted the criticism of Wolfson's Philo made by Goodenough, who showed that the rabbinic authority which Wolfson treated as Philo's source actually came into existence long after Philo. On the other hand, Wolfson excluded as Philonic sources mystical traditions from a period later than Philo. According to Goodenough, both should be considered. Sandmel proceeded to discuss different scholarly views on the interdependence between Philo and the Sages and concluded that the main fact is that the "source common to Philo and the Rabbis was the Bible, and that the common source could yield relatively common deductions...Similarity between the Philonic and the rabbinic Halaka could thus easily be the

result simply of coincidence...Philo both receives and gives".<sup>17</sup>

#### IV

In the following two chapters of his book, Sandmel presented different conceptions about Abraham and clarified Abraham's position in Philo's works.

The biblical narrative about Abraham was generally allegorized by Philo. The story in Genesis 18 is a good example of his method (De Abrahamo 107-147). First, he summarized the story and then explained it allegorically. The visit of the three strangers to Abraham's tent was interpreted as a stage in Abraham's spiritual development. Abraham understood that the three are in reality one. Abraham had now reached the stage of the purified mind, which sees God as one (De Abrahamo 119-132).<sup>18</sup> Abraham's mystic capacity enabled him to recognize that two of the three men who appeared to him represent the two potencies of God, the beneficial power of pity and the punitive power of rulership.

Abraham acquired the knowledge of the true God by learning. God had endowed him with the virtues of learning and of pursuing his way constantly. When he had achieved the virtue of gladness, he was prepared to offer this joy to God. He followed God's command to sacrifice Isaac, i.e. his "joy" and asked no questions. Only in the Midrash and in later traditions did Abraham dare to question God about the sacrifice. In the Bible and in Philo God rewarded Abraham's absolute confidence and returned to him Isaac, the virtue of his joy.<sup>19</sup>

In his ascent to true knowledge Abraham became the friend of God and a prophet. As a prophet Abraham was worthy of the highest revelation of God, which is the sight of "To On" (Τὸ ὄν).

Abraham's path-way to God was difficult, but he overcame all temptations and finally entered into God's presence. God in His love met Abraham and revealed His true nature to him. (De Abrahamo 77-80).

God appears to men in different visions which depend on man's nature and his ability to acquire virtue. Philo distinguished three classes of men. The lowest class saw only the "Kyrios", the ruling Power. The intermediate class could see the "Theos", the creative or beneficial Power. The best class, to which Abraham belonged, received the vision of "To On" (De Abrahamo 122-125).<sup>20</sup>

Philo interpreted Genesis 17:22, "When God completed talking with him, he went up from Abraham", as signifying that Abraham had reached perfection. The biblical verse did not mean that God left Abraham, but that at this stage the learner had become independent of the teacher and was ready to proceed, helped by his own virtue (De mutatione nominum 270).

According to Sandmel, Philo exalted Abraham, but portrayed him in his own image.

The Greek cast of his thought is so germane to him that he truly believes that the religious and philosophical system which his thought inhabits, is a Jewish creation, stemming from Moses, and that Plato and other Greek worthies were latter-day imitators and plagiarists. Philo seems to believe this implicitly; his Hellenization is so thorough and so complete that undoubtedly he himself was unaware of how Greek his Judaism is.<sup>21</sup>

Sandmel's book Philo's Place in Judaism is a fundamental study of Philo. The book offers clarifying information on such problems as the relation between Philo and the Palestinian Sages, Philo's

exegetical methods, his understanding of the nature of God, his Jewish and Greek background. The central theme of the book is the spiritual development of Abraham towards a true knowledge of God.

In his evaluation of Philo, Sandmel did not express extreme opinions. He argued that the questions whether Philo knew Hebrew or was influenced by the Oral Law cannot receive a definite answer. Sandmel believed that Philo had a slight knowledge of Hebrew and that he used the Septuagint.

He praised Philo's allegory as well structured and did not agree with those who criticized Philo as unsystematic and unoriginal.

Sandmel likened Philo to a preacher who often refers to philosophy. This is indeed a very different opinion from Wolfson's. In spite of his complete Hellenization Philo was a staunch Jew who did not differ essentially from Pharisaic Jewry. Sandmel, however, did not think that some similar exegetical explanations in Philo and the Haggada prove a mutual influence. The Bible was a source common to Philo and the Rabbis and this fact may easily lead to common deductions.

For instance, the Rabbis and Philo agreed that Noah's righteousness was relative and lower than that of Abraham or Moses. This similar exegetical explanation only reflects that both studied the Bible closely and carefully. Since Genesis describes Noah as just "in his generations" both explained this as proof that Noah was just in his own time, but would not have been considered so in Moses' generation. Sandmel presented similar exegetical explanations to prove that most of them were the result of coincidence.

CHAPTER NINES. SANDMELFOOTNOTES

- 1 S.Sandmel, Philo's Place in Judaism: A Study of Conceptions of Abraham in Jewish Literature, Augmented Edition (New York: Ktav Publishing House, 1971).
- 2 S.Sandmel, Two Living Traditions Essays on Religion and the Bible (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1972).
- 3 S.Sandmel, "Philo's Environment and Philo's Exegesis", Journal of Bible and Religion, 22(1954), 248-253, p.248
- 4 S.Sandmel, Philo's Place in Judaism, pp.1-2.
- 5 Ibid., p.XX.
- 6 Ibid., p.XXII.
- 7 Ibid., p.XXIII.
- 8 See D.J.Pascher, Der Königsweg zu Wiedergeburt und Vergottung bei Philon von Alexandria (Paderborn: Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 1931), pp.7-10.

9 S.Sandmel, Philo's Place in Judaism, p.XXIV.

10 Ibid., p.XXV.

11 Ibid., p.5.

12 Ibid., p.11, See also footnote 21.

13 Ibid., p.14

14 See Lieberman, Greek in Jewish Palestine (New York: 1950). See also Lieberman, Hellenism in Jewish Palestine, Studies in the Literary Transmission, Beliefs and Manners of Palestine in the first Century B.C.E. to the fourth Century C.E. (New York: The Strock Publishing Fund, 1950) and especially the chapter, Rabbinic Interpretation of Scripture.

15 For allegories in the Bible see, Isaiah 5; Ezekiel 15:17.

16 S.Sandmel, Philo's Place in Judaism, p.19.

17 Ibid., p.25.

18 Ibid., pp. 121-122.



19 Ibid., pp.172-176.

20 Ibid., pp.180-181.

21 Ibid., p.198.

CHAPTER TENCONCLUSION

The purpose of this chapter is to compare and evaluate the opinions of the Philonic scholars represented in this dissertation. In the second part of this chapter I shall present my own opinion on the subject of Philo's exegesis.

## A

During the one hundred years, 1875-1975, the interest in Philo, his place in philosophy and his scriptural exegesis has increased remarkably. This has manifested itself in different ways. Institutes encouraging discussions, publication of scholarly papers and books on Philo, have been founded in such widely-spread places as Chicago, Vienna, Lyons. In Lyons, for example, a colloquium, "Colloque National sur Philon d'Alexandrie", took place in 1966 and brought together Philonic scholars from different parts of France, who discussed various aspects of Philo's works. The papers presented at these meetings and summaries of the main discussions were published in 1967 and form a most interesting book. In France a new and very good translation of Philo's works was started in 1961.

In 1971 the Philo Institute was founded at the Mc Cormick Theological Seminary in Chicago. This institute organizes regular meetings for its members and promotes research projects on Philo in

particular and on Hellenistic Judaism in general. Studia Philonica, the periodical published by the Philo Institute, has proved to be a very good instrument for publication of research, Philonic bibliography and reviews of recent books.

In some universities chairs for the study of Philo have been founded (e.g. The Hebrew University of Jerusalem), while in others courses are given within such departments as classics, philosophy and theology. All this is a definite sign of revival but the best proof is the increased number of books published during the twentieth century.

The subject of this dissertation is Philo's scriptural exegesis and his relationship to the Palestinian Haggada as it has been dealt with during a century of scholarship.

Carl Siegfried's book Philo von Alexandria als Ausleger des Alten Testaments assured him an important place in Philonic scholarship. Although several important books have been published since his book first appeared in 1875, it deserves consideration because it is well organized and deals with such frequently debated problems as Philo's rules of exegesis, whether Philo knew Hebrew and the Palestinian Oral Law, Philo's allegorical method etc.

The book is based on the thorough and exact scholarship of Siegfried, who seems to have been well versed in Greek and in Hebrew. It is also interesting and challenging because in some respects one cannot agree with Siegfried. Siegfried is more at home in the Greek than in the Hebrew sources. Though he was able to use the M.T. of the Bible, difficulty arose when he quoted from the Midrash or the Talmud.

About Philo's knowledge of Hebrew, Siegfried made the unclear and debatable statement that Philo knew Hebrew but not in the modern sense.<sup>1</sup> What did he mean by the words "not in the modern sense"? How could Philo living two thousand years ago possess such knowledge? If Philo had indeed had some knowledge of Hebrew, why did he not use the Hebrew Bible? According to Siegfried, he used only the Septuagint.<sup>2</sup> Jews have always read their Bible in Hebrew, whatever their colloquial tongue. So this debatable point that Philo knew Hebrew but used the Septuagint for his exegesis remained unresolved by Siegfried.

He thought that the Palestinian Midrash was influenced by Greek philosophy and myth, as well as by Philo's exegesis and philosophy. It is very difficult to prove this. It was certainly not so during the lifetime of Philo. Siegfried indeed did not attempt to prove it.<sup>3</sup>

He presented some parts of haggadoth from the Talmud Jerushalmi, Hagiga 14b. and 15. These haggadoth from the second century A.D. are centered on Elisha ben-Abuyah and the question whether Greek learning was permitted by the rabbis in Judaea.<sup>4</sup> These Tannaitic haggadoth are very concise, but they yield important facts about the Tannaim and their problems. Hagiga 14 may be considered here. "Our Rabbis taught: four entered a 'Pardes' (an orchard). They were ben-Azai, ben-Zomah, Acher and R.Akiba. Ben-Azai caught a glimpse and died; ben-Zomah caught a glimpse and was wounded; Acher cut down the plants; R.Akiba came out in peace". (Hagiga 14) *yl*)

A midrashic explanation of this haggada is as follows: the pardes, the orchard, symbolizes Greek philosophy and metaphysics; these studies are dangerous for the majority; among the four, only R. Akiba understood Greek philosophy and without suffering from doubts returned to the teaching of his people. Acher tried to change the laws.

A very interesting figure is Elisha ben-Abujah or Acher, who studied philosophy, forsook Jewish teachings and believed that the Jews would be better off without the Bible and the Oral Law. He preached his ideas in public, was excommunicated and was not mentioned by his name, but as Acher, "The other one". He became not only an apostate but a traitor. After Bar-Kochba's revolt he went over to the Romans and told them what the strength of the Jews was and how to finally defeat them. Consequently, the Romans forbade the teaching of Tora, the keeping of the Sabbath and other fundamental commandments. Mainly under the leadership of R. Akiba the people continued to practise their religion. Acher pointed out to the Romans who and where the leaders of this stubborn people were. Most rabbis were captured and killed. Among them was R. Akiba, the friend of many years of Elisha ben-Abujah. The haggada suggested that R. Akiba too entered the pardes, the domain of Greek knowledge. Only later when his people was persecuted, did he decree that the people should keep away from Greek philosophy, extreme allegory and foreign interpretations: "The man who reads the external books will not have any part in the future world".

הקדמה למדרש

והוא הלאה

Two criticisms must be levelled at Siegfried regarding the fragments of haggadoth from Hagiga 14b. and 15. First, the haggadoth are as short and as concise as possible, but Siegfried cites only three words, which meant that this haggada became unintelligible to Siegfried and to his readers.

Again, Siegfried discovered too much resemblance between ben-Abujah and Philo. It is true that both studied Greek philosophy, but ben-Abujah remained a very shadowy figure. He did not write nor do we know how far he progressed in Greek learning. What is most important is that he became an apostate and a traitor.<sup>5</sup> Philo was neither. He was a most loyal Jew, who strictly observed the biblical laws and who tried to defend his people before the Roman emperor.

Siegfried devoted forty pages (160-199) of his book to a reconstruction of the hermeneutical rules which Philo is supposed to have used in his allegorical method. The rules are easily understandable and are always based on examples from Philo and the Midrash. Yet it is not proved in any way that Philo really used the rules as reconstructed by Siegfried.

Siegfried pointed out that in the Septuagint the names of God, Elohim and  $\text{אלהים}$ , are translated as Theos and Kyrios. He added that "Philo, who did not suspect that Kyrios is a translation of the secretive Tetragrammaton..., "understood Theos and Kyrios as two powers of God and not as names of God.<sup>6</sup> According to Philo, Theos denotes the power of creativity and Kyrios the royal power or the power to rule the universe. The  $\text{אלהים}$  is untranslatable and in its stead he often used  $\text{הוא}$ , Being. Not that Philo took  $\text{אלהים}$  to mean the same as the name  $\text{הוא}$ , "He that is".

Furthermore, Siegfried presented no adequate proof that Philo did not know that Kyrios in the Septuagint was translated as the Tetragrammaton. In Philo's view the two biblical terms, Theos and Kyrios, have nothing to do with the essence of God, which is unknowable. They are connected with God's activities that are knowable. Theos alludes to God as Creator of the world, Kyrios to the ongoing divine activity in governing the world. God, however, is much more than Creator and Ruler. These are just two facets of the multi-faceted To On.

Siegfried held that Philo had had a great part in the rapprochement between Judaism and Hellenism and that his was a universal religion

...that Philo dissolved and transformed the particularism of Judaism especially by permeating it with Greek philosophy. To a certain degree, it would appear a matter of taste to regard this as a lucky or an unfortunate occurrence. One must point out from the historical point of view, that Philo introduced a powerful, creative ferment into these intertwined masses of Greek philosophy and Old-Testament exegesis, which took hold like a mighty stream in its many tributaries of a multitude of subjects and had the most persistent influence on the philosophically educated Paganism, Judaism and Christianity.<sup>7</sup>

Leopold Treitel occupies a modest place among the Philonic scholars of the early twentieth century. His two books are readable and sometimes express beautifully his comprehension of Philo and his admiration for the Palestinian Haggada. Treitel seems to have searched continuously in different writings, but especially in Philo and the Haggada, for ethical elements. His work gives the impression of a learned man who read a great deal, became enthusiastic about certain ideas and made notations from time to time about them. These comments were made for himself and perhaps for

a small circle of friends. One would like to know what impelled Treitel to rewrite his notes and publish them in book form, for his books have no scholarly apparatus.

It will be sufficient to compare Treitel's writings with Siegfried's. The latter's book is scholarly and well documented, the former's are not. Siegfried's range of thought was wide, comprising both Hellenism and Judaism, philosophy and religion, whereas Treitel minimized the Greek influence on Philo, and instead overemphasized the influence of the Palestinian Haggada.

Treitel was interested mainly in ethics and poetry. Having found them in Philo and the Haggada, he was content. It is undeniably true that these elements exist in Philo, but besides them there are other significant aspects, which Treitel overlooked. On the other hand, the very fact that besides the Midrash he studied Philo for many years is proof that Treitel persevered and preferred for his reading an author who is not easy and who demands great concentration.

Siegfried found a mixture of Greek philosophical ideas in the Midrash. Treitel disagreed, and underlined the idea that Palestinian and Alexandrian Judaism mutually influenced each other.

Treitel was aware of the mystical side of Philo and the Haggada. He did not agree with those scholars who judged Philo's allegorical interpretation as a way of smoothing away contradictions between Scripture and Greek philosophy. He argued that Philo's main reason for using allegory was his mystical nature. He denied any Stoic influence on Philo's allegorical method, in spite of obvious Stoic elements in Philo's work. All that Treitel recognized



was the influence of Alexandrian Jewish exegetes. This may be true, but Treitel did not consider that the Alexandrian interpreters were themselves influenced by Greek philosophy and hermeneutics. Treitel also declared that Philo had had a remarkable influence on the Palestinian exegetes. This opinion is shared by very few Philonic scholars.

Treitel came to Philo from the study of the Midrash and Talmud. He had a profound understanding of the beauty and ethical purposes of the Haggada, and it is on this basis that he repeatedly protested against the opinion that there was in Judaism nothing but dry laws, nothing but a casuistical "Gesetzesreligion".

He believed that Philo had contributed much to the universal characteristics of Judaism and that his philosophical ideas played an important role in the development of religion. On these points he agreed with Siegfried and emphasized the importance of Alexandria and the Diaspora in general for the development of the Jewish religion.

Treitel described Philo as the chief representative of allegorical interpretation of the Scriptures. He attributed to him powers of creativity and disagreed with Siegfried, who thought that Philo had borrowed many haggadoth from Judaea.

Treitel was correct however, when he suggested that in forming a picture of Philo's personal faith one must remember that the literal meaning was also important for him and that he strictly observed the commandments of his religion.

The main fault in Treitel's conception of Philo is that he

greatly reduced the Greek influence. There cannot be any doubt that Philo was deeply influenced by Greek philosophy, and to ignore that is to ignore the combination of Judaism and Hellenism which is so characteristic of Philo.

E. Stein's judgement of Philo is harsh. He denied Philo any originality of content or form. Stein conceded that Philo was creative in one respect, in the structure of his allegories. Philo learned from the Greeks how to construct his allegories. His style in allegorical composition was subsequently imitated by later writers.

In his study of Philonic allegory Stein argued against Siegfried's opinion that Philo followed some definite allegorical rules. He pointed out that in using allegory, Philo's main purpose was to find the hidden and true meaning of Scripture. This aim guided him and not some mechanical rules.

Stein was convinced that Philo knew no Hebrew and he cited Philo's false etymologies of biblical names as proof of his opinion. He did not deal with the problem of Philo's Hebrew knowledge at length. In his view Philo's lack of Hebrew was so evident that to bring further proof seemed superfluous. Stein stated this opinion in a firm way, rejecting any further discussion. In his absolute belief in his own opinion on Philo's lack of Hebrew knowledge Stein resembled the authoritative manner of a later Philonic scholar, H.A. Wolfson. Wolfson was so firmly convinced that Philo knew Hebrew that he refused to present any facts to support his opinion and declared that it was the duty of his opponents to look for arguments and proofs.

Stein was not the only scholar who denied Philo all knowledge of Hebrew. Z.Fränkell, I.Heinemann, E.R.Goodenough, H.Lewi, S.Sandmel, V.Nickiprowetzky were of the same opinion. Stein's judgement of Philo is more severe than that of most of these scholars, for in addition to his ignorance of Hebrew he thought Philo ignorant of important principles of Judaism. Stein's reasoning was that since Philo knew only Greek it is obviously useless to look in his writings for any influence of the Targum or the Midrash.

In my opinion, Stein's judgement is too harsh and not sufficiently documented. True, Philo's knowledge of Hebrew is problematical, but this ignorance does not detract from the values found in Philo's exegesis. Furthermore, Philo was influenced by the Palestinian Haggada: the similarities between some narrative haggadoth and Philonic interpretations point to such a possibility.

A passage in Die allegorische Exegese des Philo aus Alexandria, p.61 shows that Stein did not judge Philo correctly. Stein compared Philo with Cicero and both are found lacking in creativity and originality. Philo did not even understand his sources and, therefore, his writings abound in contradictions and incongruities. Just as Cicero was no philosopher, Philo was not an exegete of the Bible. His only merit was that by his writings he preserved the allegorical tradition. There is nothing original in Philo but his copia verborum.

This judgement is subjective and does not give Philo his due. It is true that Philo was influenced by Greek philosophy and literary techniques but he was also influenced by Judaic values,

by the Bible, for whose true meaning he searched all his life, by Palestinian exegesis. Philo did not misunderstand his varied sources, but blended Judaism and Hellenism in his writings.

Stein has a place in Philonic scholarship; his opinions though extremely anti-Philo, are clearly expressed and based on a thorough study of the Philonic writings.

His criticisms of Philo have their place in Philonic scholarship acting as a counterbalance to the high praises of other writers. It is for the benefit of Philo-students to study the opposing views of such scholars as Stein and Wolfson.

Jean Pépin was above all interested in Philo's allegorical method but in our judgement overemphasized in different ways the place of allegory in Philo.

Thus Pépin thought that Philo believed to such an extent in allegory, that he used the literal interpretation only very seldom and even then he followed the literal exegesis by the allegorical. This is not so, because in some treatises the literal method is used as the only explanation, especially in connection with biblical laws. It seems that Pépin was so eager to analyse the allegories that he simply overlooked the passages that contain literal interpretations. He also missed Philo's warning that allegory is only for the few select and not for the people at large. This élite was required to study and to prepare itself for a long period of time until it became initiated into the mystery of allegory. If one accepts this idea, the allegorical method is given a mystical character. Pépin did not explain how the preparation and initiation were to be accomplished. Neither did Philo. Pépin made far

too much of it. Words like, "initiation" and "mystery" were widely used in Philo's time and perhaps should not be understood literally.

Pépin suggested that there might have been a certain evolution in Philo's thinking and that there was a period when he rejected literal exegesis and used allegory only. This suggestion cannot be accepted, since very often the literal and the allegorical interpretations are found side by side.

Pépin quoted only from other scholars who agreed with him, and so his study is rather biased.

Pépin thought that in allegory Philo surpassed all the Jewish-Hellenistic writers who preceded him. But this can only be a hypothesis, since the few fragments which have survived cannot substantiate the theory.

Pépin believed that in Philo's writings allegory reached its highest development and that it is allegory which gives unity to Philo's treatises.

The article is informative and helpful for an understanding of allegory, the method which has to be studied for a thorough knowledge of Philo.

J. Amir is a faithful disciple of I. Heinemann and as such, he believed that Wolfson's view of a systematically worked out philosophy in Philo is unfounded. The logical and systematic presentation of philosophy is Wolfson's and not Philo's.

According to Amir, the Greek influence on Philo outweighed the Jewish. In this opinion, too, Amir agrees with Heinemann and opposes Wolfson.

Amir especially criticizes Philo's understanding of biblical prophecy. Philo discussed prophecy in connection with Moses and quoted Isaiah 15, 17, 19; Jeremiah 46-51; Ezekiel 25-32 only in passing.

In De vita Mosis 2, 1, 2-7; De praemiis 9, 53-56 he described Moses as king, lawgiver, priest, and prophet.

In my opinion, his concept of the power of prophecy is most interesting while Amir found that Philo's notion of prophecy is shallow.

Amir points out that Philo described Moses as soothsayer or a communicator of oracles. He emphasizes that the biblical prophets were not oracles or diviners. They were uncompromising men, fighting for an ideal of justice on every level of life. The first prophet was Moses, "The master of prophets", whose dream was to create a people of justice and mercy. But in De vita Mosis 2, 188-191 Philo described Moses as requesting audiences from God and conversing with Him about daily, common cases.

In my opinion, Amir criticized Philo too harshly. It is true that he explained only the prophecy of Moses. It is to be assumed, however, that if Philo had been more familiar with the books of the later prophets, his views of prophecy would have been different and more conclusive.

Philo divided prophecy into three classes. One type are those divine utterances spoken by God with the prophet Moses as interpreter; the second are the results of questions to God and His answers; the third are those spoken by Moses when he was possessed

by God and in ecstasy . God had given Moses the power of foreknowledge and the ability to reveal future events (such as, the splitting of the Red Sea, the fall of manna, the future of the twelve tribes).

An interesting point about Philo and prophecy is whether he was influenced by the notion of prophecy in Greek philosophy, e.g. Plato. Amir does not deal with this subject.

E.R. Goodenough studied Philo thoroughly and wrote several books about him. His aim was to find proof in Philo of the existence of a Hellenistic Judaism which believed in a mystery religion. Philo became for him the chief representative of this mystery cult. Goodenough cited Philo's description of the Therapeutae to illustrate his attraction to a mystic contemplative life. In emphasizing Philo's mystical inclinations, Goodenough seems to have forgotten that Philo himself never became a recluse, but had a very active life, was a prolific writer and participated in the political life of the Alexandrian Jewish community. Pascher in Der Königsweg zu Wiedergeburt und Vergottung bei Philo von Alexandria,<sup>8</sup> and Goodenough in his By Light, Light argue that Philo participated in a mystery cult. We do not know about that. Both Goodenough and Pascher, although fascinated by mystery religions and devoting years of research and writing to discover them, proved nothing definite about mystery cults and Philo.

Mystery cults were fashionable in the different parts of the Hellenistic kingdoms. The Hellenistic philosophical schools used stereotyped expressions of a mystical bent and in his voluminous

writings Philo sometimes used mystery phraseology. This does not prove at all that he was initiated into a Jewish mystery religion.

Emile Bréhier's outstanding book, Les Idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon d'Alexandrie makes extensive use of Orphic and Pythagorean terms to explain the ideas of Philo. According to Bréhier, Philo's ideas and his doctrine of moral progress were predominantly influenced by Jewish tenets.<sup>9</sup>

Goodenough's view about the proportion of Jewish and Greek influences on Philo gains from a comparison with Wolfson's views. In Wolfson's book, Philo, Philo appears as a devoted Jew who knows Hebrew and observes the Jewish laws. In By Light, Light Goodenough presents Philo as considerably more Greek than Jewish. Goodenough's thesis is that Philo's allegorization of the Bible was done under the influence of Orphic and other mysteries. Alexandrian Judaism was, maintained Goodenough, a mystery religion very far from halakic-centered Palestinian Judaism. But Philo's respect for the literal interpretation of the Bible and his failure to mention any special rites of initiation for proselytes argue against Goodenough's hypothesis.

Goodenough's book, The Politics of Philo Judaeus, is challenging and interesting. He presents the theory that De somniis was designed for Jews and De Josepho for Gentiles. In both treatises Goodenough detects concealed anti-Roman propaganda. It is difficult to agree with Goodenough that Philo was fanatically anti-Roman, remembering that his family was so close to the Romans.

Goodenough's monumental work, Jewish Symbols in the Greco-



Roman Period is important for Philonic studies. Here he states that the symbols represent a kind of allegorization through art of the sort that Philo attempted through philosophy. Again Philo is presented as very far from the Midrash-inspired Jew depicted by Wolfson.

Goodenough's books and theories are interesting. I cannot agree with his theory that Philo belonged to a mystery cult. How could so strict a monotheist as Philo have based his religious beliefs on polytheistic mystery religions?

The book Philo by H.A. Wolfson breaks new ground in the range of problems it treats and in the manner of treating them. Wolfson's study is a rehabilitation of Philo and at the same time a redefinition and clarification of concepts that are keys to the controversies of the Church Fathers and later to the problems of medieval philosophers.

Wolfson regarded it as one of the major ironies that scholars have commonly treated Philo "as a postscript to Greek philosophy". Wolfson appraised Philo as a great and original philosopher. He wrote: "Philo is the founder of a new school of philosophy, and from him it directly passes to the Gospel of St. John and the Church Fathers, from whom it passes on to Moslem and hence also to medieval Jewish philosophy. Philo is the direct or indirect source of this type of philosophy which continues uninterruptedly in its main assertions for well-nigh seventeen centuries, when at last it is openly challenged by Spinoza" (Philo II, 457).

This was Wolfson's thesis which is a radical revaluation of Philo, the philosopher. Avoiding the beaten ways, he threw an un-

precedented light on his subject. Philo was frequently regarded as tiresome, inconsistent, and unworthy of any serious philosophical consideration. Dr. W. Knox wrote that Philo is "but a compiler as is clear not only from his lack of original thought but from the slovenliness with which he incorporates his material" (Some Hellenistic Elements in Primitive Christianity, 1944 p. 34). This is a representative opinion, accepted by many scholars. In opposition to such views, Wolfson's study is a surprisingly new approach.

According to Wolfson, Philo ushered in a momentous change in the history of European thought. In his hands philosophy for the first time "places itself at the service of Scripture and is willing to take orders from it" (Philo II, 439). It is in the treatises of Philo that the philosophic interpretation of Scripture achieves its fullest development.

Wolfson pointed out how wide Philo's speculative range was and how it embraced many of the outstanding problems of his time: "man's knowledge of God's existence and God's nature, the existence of ideas, the origin of the world, the laws which govern it, the nature of the soul" (Philo I, 93). Wolfson argued that Philo's treatment of these problems was new and original, resulting in a highly coherent system of thought.

The demonstration of these new evaluations of Philo is learned and abundant. Wolfson handled the Greek sources in a thorough and original way. At every turn in his deployment of these sources some new insights are apparent. He was equally at home in the rabbinic sources. Yet it is not so much the amount and variety of

Wolfson's learning as the use he made of it that is the impressive thing. His is, indeed, a vast apparatus of scholarship yet it never gets out of control and never becomes an end in itself.

Wolfson was fully aware of the difficult problems which arise in connection with Philo's Jewish sources. He argued that Philo knew Hebrew, that he used the Massoretic text and was fully aware of the Oral Law developed in Judaea. In my opinion, his arguments that Philo lived like a Pharisaic Jew, knew Hebrew and the Oral Law, although stated in a very authoritative manner, are not convincing.

According to Wolfson, his book "is based chiefly upon a study of Philo's own writings in relation to his Greek and Scriptural sources" (Philo I, 93). He arrived at conclusions that placed Philo's relation to Greek philosophy in a new light. Philo used Stoic terms and expressions, but he was far more a critic than a follower of Stoicism. Wolfson's estimate of the Stoics was harsh, "the Stoics were great disseminators of knowledge which they borrowed from others" (Philo I, 111). Philo often agreed with Plato, nevertheless he was not a follower but an interpreter of Platonism, sometimes changing Platonic views.

On reading Philo's discussions of such problems, as, creation, his criticism of other theories of creation, the laws of nature, miracles, the human soul, immortality, freedom of will, the existence of God, one agrees with Wolfson that he was not a mere dabbler in philosophy, an eclectic with no ideas of his own but an original philosopher. The idea of God's unknowability did not come from Plato or Aristotle, but was original with Philo. The argument

that God is incorporeal and cannot be given a name is found in scattered fragments in Philo and was systematically reconstructed by Wolfson. The same argument reappears in Origen, and the Philonic terms nameless and indefinable were used of God by the Church Fathers.

S. Sandmel's book Philo's Place in Judaism is based on a thorough study of the Philonic corpus, proving that the author was competent to offer an independent assessment of Philo.

Sandmel did not regard Philo as a great philosopher, but as an apologist and a preacher. He considered Wolfson's Philo magnificent, nevertheless he successfully opposed Wolfson's opinion on such points as Philo's knowledge of Hebrew, communication between the Alexandrian Jewish community and the Palestinian, the rabbis' influence on Philo.

Sandmel argued that Philo was a staunch but highly Hellenized Jew. Philo did not know Hebrew; his debt to his Hellenistic background is far greater than his debt to the Palestinian Sages. He presented numerous exegetical examples which show that Philo's Bible was the Septuagint and not the Massoretic Text.

Sandmel found Wolfson's discussion of the Hebrew background of Philo uncompromising and lacking in convincing arguments.

Sandmel dealt with Philo's philosophy in only a scattered fashion and he enlarged on the exegetical part of Philo's treatises. On this part Sandmel's arguments are clear and convincing.

## B

At this stage it will be appropriate for me to present my own judgments regarding the following aspects of our subject:

- 1) Philo as exegete, rather than as philosopher.
- 2) Philo's exegetical methods-
  - a) in the Alexandrian milieu;
  - b) in relation to Judaeo rabbinical tradition;
  - c) in his own biblical interpretations.
- 3) Philo as Jew and as Greek.
- 4) "The royal road" (*ἡ βασιλικὴ ὁδός*) as a statement of Philo's aim in his work.

Philo as exegete, rather than as philosopher.

The importance of Philo lies in his exegesis rather than in his philosophy. His main characteristic is his deep religious belief, which was expressed in his special understanding of the Bible. Furthermore, in order to understand Philo one has to pay due regard to the two elements, the Jewish and the Greek, since both formed his characteristic way of thinking and were reflected in his exegesis. These two aspects form an entity in Philo's treatises and, although Greek philosophy may sometimes dominate, and the Jewish religion at other times, both lie at the core of Philo's writings and must be considered throughout. What the proportion of their influence on Philo was will be considered later in this chapter.

Almost all the thirty-eight Philonic treatises comment on the Bible only, four deal with special problems of philosophy (Probus, Aet., Provid., Alexander) and two of the four have references to the Bible. Three others (Flac., Leg., Cont.) deal with contemporary Jewish events in Alexandria. The rest (thirty-one) make up a commentary on the Pentateuch. In Philo's interpretations we can distinguish reminiscences of Platonism, Stoicism, and Pythagoreanism, but they are used only for the purpose of illustration or exposition. Philo's principal purpose was not to expound philosophy but to exhort his readers to live a holy life, or as he put it, "to travel on the royal road" and to reach perfection.

Beginning in the seventeenth century, scholars approached Philo in different ways-philosophical, psychological, theological-and the differences of opinion have multiplied with the years. In my opinion, to understand Philo one needs in the beginning only two main texts: 1) the Philonic writings and 2) the Bible. Only later does one need to turn to Plato, the Stoics, other Greek philosophers and to modern Philonic scholars. A study of Palestinian exegesis in the Midrash is also necessary, because both the Philonic writings and the Midrash contain exegesis of Scripture and there existed some links between them. With all his wide range of knowledge, Philo never presents ideas or theories for their own sake, but always to explain a scriptural passage with their help.

Philo was endowed with versatility and many-sidedness. He was a great and prolific writer, living in an important cultural center during a significant period of history. An understanding of Philo is not easily reached. It comes not by concentrating only on his Judaism or his mysticism, his Stoicism or his Platonism, or on any of the other aspects of the man, but on the man himself and what he wanted to say through his writings. In other words, every scholarly study of Philo which would reach a measure of adequacy should start not by explaining Philo through Plato, Plutarch, Posidonius or the mystery-religions, but through Philo himself. "Philon est d'abord Philon".<sup>10</sup>

Perhaps we may make one remark on Philo's style. Everybody agrees that Philo was influenced by Plato's philosophy and, as C. Siegfried proved, he borrowed many words and whole phrases from

Plato, yet his mode of writing gained nothing from the beautiful prose of Plato. Philo is meandering, very verbose, repetitive and ponderous. It takes time to get used to his way of expression, so that reading Philo is a laborious task until one becomes so interested in his ideas that one forgets his way of expressing them.

Scripture, despite its similarities to other books, was to Philo a unique book. All other books are man-made and their stories and teachings may be either true or false. Scripture is of divine origin and its stories and teachings are all true. This was Philo's unshakable belief, but he was aware of inconsistencies in the Bible. Among these was one that he especially tried to remove, namely the apparent inconsistency between the doctrine of a God who was invisible and the narrative of His epiphany to Israel at Mount Sinai. Philo tells in great detail how this revelation was not a physical appearance of God, how the "words" in which God "spoke" with His "voice" were not physical words.<sup>11</sup> He believed that while this was a miraculous event and one unlike ordinary human communication, the event still had actually taken place as a historical fact, and must not be explained away as fancy or dismissed as a fiction.

## II

### Philo's Exegetical Methods

Besides the revelation at Mount Sinai, Philo believed in a progressive revelation, a continuous communication of God's will to chosen individuals in order to enable them to interpret the



meaning of His will in Scripture, the Law revealed once upon a time at Sinai. The need for such interpretation was that the Law had been expressed in language, and so its teaching had often been obscured by the imperfections of language and changing conditions of life.

Those to whom the revealed Law was thus interpreted, who understood it and were to live by it day by day, were to search for its inner meaning. For Philo, like others, believed that there was a hidden meaning in Scripture which could not be successfully unearthed without the aid of God. That aid constituted a further revelation or a progressive revelation given in response to the enquiry and meditation of human reason. Philo, like the rabbis of Palestinian Judaism, believed that prophecy as such had ceased at the close of the Hebrew Scriptures, but he also believed that divine inspiration and the work of the Holy Spirit continued to function as a supernatural source of human knowledge; by which man might discover not new truths but the real meaning of the old truths. Philo's technique for expressing the hidden truth, which was to be found in the Bible, was allegory, to which we shall return.

In Philo's view reason is subordinate to faith. But Scripture, no less than philosophy, needs interpretation. Philo's principle here, like that of the rabbis, was that Scripture is not always to be taken literally. Because he had been versed in Greek philosophy, he gave his allegorical method of interpretation a philosophic turn. In the course of his biblical studies, Philo discoursed on many important problems and showed a wide speculative range: the origin of the world, its structure and the laws that govern it, the nature of the soul, problems of human knowledge, man's knowledge of

God's existence and God's nature, problems of human conduct, both individual and social. In the discussion of such issues Philo's demonstration and argumentation range far and wide. For example, the philological observations scattered throughout Philo's books would by themselves make up a notable contribution.

a) Biblical Exegesis in the Alexandrian milieu.

Philo's interpretation was based on the allegorical method of other Alexandrian exegetes. Jews immigrated to Alexandria very early. According to a doubtful tradition, Alexander the Great had welcomed them to his newly founded city, but it is certain that they came to Alexandria during the reign of Ptolemy I, the successor of Alexander in the fourth century B.C. During the following years, especially when Judaea was a part of the Ptolemaic kingdom, they must have come to the great city repeatedly until Alexandria contained the most numerous, cultured and wealthy Jewish community in the Diaspora.

Some of the questions that concern us in this dissertation are: what were the cultural and religious relations between Judaea and Alexandria? Who learned from whom? Who influenced whom?

One may assume that the first Jewish immigrants brought with them not only the Bible but some of the Oral Laws and narratives, the halakoth and haggadoth, which contained new interpretations and embellishments. During the fourth century B.C. midrashic exegesis was just beginning so that immigrants to Alexandria could not have taken much of it with them.

As the Alexandrian community developed, time and new circum-

stances made them forget the details of life in Judaea. Still, they built synagogues and continued to be Jews, but with a difference. In order to live like Jews they required biblical rules to be adjusted to their new circumstances. Probably, therefore, they created an Oral Law, a Midrash of their own. There were communications with Judaea, but conditions under the Romans were difficult and in Judaea revolt followed revolt. It may be that a part of the Judæan Midrash was brought somehow to Alexandria, although the similarities gleaned from Philo and the Palestinian Midrash are few and doubtful. The Alexandrian Jews, although greatly influenced by Hellenistic culture, wanted in the majority to continue to live according to the Tora. Their new regulations, like those in Judaea, were based on biblical laws. The differences between the Alexandrian and Palestinian Midrash must, of course, have been numerous. First, their Bible was the Septuagint, which differs in some details from the Hebrew text. Second, the educated among them had studied Greek philosophy and been deeply influenced by it. The best example is Philo himself. His interpretation of the Bible is a philosophical allegory, something that simply does not exist in the Palestinian Midrash.

In Judaea the Oral Law, the Midrash, was developed in several rabbinical Academies. Their methods are known. The Bible remained always the basis and from its verses they tried, by long discussions, to derive new rules that would fit the new circumstances of their life and also to embellish the biblical narratives with new details which had accumulated as legends and stories in the oral

tradition. But whatever they decreed, they tried to remember and respect the biblical spirit. There were often clashes of opinion among the Sages, it is true, and certain groups within the people e.g. the Sadducees, never recognized the authority of the Oral Law. The time had not come yet, it was to occur only in the late second century A.D. and to a greater extent later, that the laws from Judaea would become generally authoritative for the Jewish Diaspora. The Jerusalem Talmud, which existed separately and developed in its own way, and the Babylonian Talmud (redacted c. A.D. 500) are proof that there was creative activity in the Diaspora but also differences of opinion between Judaea and the Jewish communities in Alexandria, Babylon and Asia Minor.

This is how Philo described the gathering in an Alexandrian synagogue on the Sabbath: "And will you sit with your gathering and assemble with your regular company and read in security your holy books, expounding any obscure point and in leisurely comfort discussing at length your ancestral philosophy" (De somniis II, 127). Accordingly, the exposition of the sacred books had an important place in the synagogue service. Philo's interpretations reflect his participation in this expository activity of the synagogues.

The basis for Philo's exegesis is the Greek translation of the Bible, the Septuagint. He believed that the Septuagint is an exact and inspired translation of the Hebrew original, a revelation of the Sacred Writings to the Greek-speaking part of mankind. (De vita Mosis 2, 26-44).

Philo often departs from the Septuagint readings, hence P. Katz

rightly maintains that Philo's Bible was a different version of the Septuagint.<sup>12</sup>

Philo's expository works are based on the Pentateuch, although several other Septuagint books are used as part of the expositions. This predominance of the Pentateuch may reflect the reading practice in the Alexandrian synagogues where probably only the Pentateuchal books were used in the liturgy.<sup>13</sup>

Philo refers to the custom of Alexandrian Jews of occupying themselves every Sabbath with "the philosophy of their fathers" as well as with the "speculation about problems concerning nature" that is, problems of general philosophy, "in places of instruction". (ὁδοὺς καὶ λεία)<sup>14</sup> In another passage, after saying that the "places of instruction" are innumerable in every city, he goes on to define "philosophy" as dealing both with "duty to God" and "duty to men"; this can be understood as theology and ethics.<sup>15</sup> In still another passage he speaks of the interpretation of the Law to the people in the synagogue on the Sabbath "by some priest who is present or one of the elders".<sup>16</sup> In several places Philo indicates that he is drawing on sources outside the Bible itself. Of special interest is the passage in De vita Moysis I, 4 where he says that he has learned: "both from the sacred books (καὶ βιβλίον τῶν ἱερῶν), the wonderful monuments of his wisdom which he (Moses) has left behind him, and from some of the elders (παρὰ... πρεσβυτέρων) of the nation; for I always interwove (λείψανον) what was said (τὰ... λεγόμενα) with the things that were read (τοῖς ἀναγνώσκομένοις), and thus believed myself to have a closer knowledge than others of his life's history".

b) Philo's exegetical methods in relation to Judaeae rabbinical tradition.

Since Philo draws on different traditions, the question to be asked is whether he also depended on the Palestinian Haggada and Halaka. Previous chapters have shown how Philonic scholars differ in this respect. It is most probable, in my view, that there were active relationships between Alexandria and Palestine, and although both branches of Judaism were independent of each other, a mutual influence can reasonably be postulated.

It is also important to remember Philo's own visit to Jerusalem, his declaration that he received exegetical traditions from others, and his knowledge of conditions in Palestine.

Philo's preoccupations and aims were fundamentally Jewish; nevertheless, Philo was quite different from Hillel and Rabbi Johanan ben Zakkai. What made them all Jews was their Jewish loyalty, their devotion to Scripture, and their obedience to Jewish laws. What made them different from each other was first that they were individuals, and next that they lived in different environments. Certainly, they possessed many elements in common, but the differences are also of consequence. Philo, in my opinion, is best viewed as representing a relatively self-contained Jewish-Hellenism, not totally severed from Palestinian Judaism, yet clearly distinct from it. Philo alludes several times to the traditions of the "elders". These traditions were, I believe, the interpretations of the Bible by Alexandrian Jews, rabbis, priests, learned men who developed their own exegesis independent to a great degree of the Palestinian exegesis. The evidence for this opinion is 1) scattered

remarks by Philo, 2) the history of the well-developed Jewish communities in the Diaspora which created independent commentaries on the Bible especially at the beginning of the Christian era. After the destruction of the Temple in A.D. 70 and in particular after Bar-Kochba's revolt in A.D. 135 the Palestinian center shrank more and more and the center of learning moved to the Jewish communities in Babylon. In the last centuries B.C. something similar must have happened in Alexandria, a very important Jewish community. Its people read the Bible, held it holy, studied and interpreted it long before Philo's time. Unfortunately, the writings of these Hellenistic Jews were destroyed and we can reach few certain conclusions. I conclude tentatively that the biblical interpretation of Philo was independent of the Midrash, but still I am conscious of the fact that since the seventeenth century almost every Philonic scholar has struggled with the question of the mutual influence between Philo and the Midrash. No one has come to a generally accepted solution.

c) Philo's exegetical methods in his own biblical interpretations.

So, turning to Philo's treatises, we see that he distinguishes among the interpreters of the Bible in Alexandria three groups—the traditionalists or literalists, the allegorists and the extreme allegorists. These three did not, however, constitute sects. They merely represented a certain conflict of ideas. There is no trace of a struggle in Alexandria in any way comparable to what happened in Palestine during the lifetime of Philo between the Pharisees and the Sadducees, the stakes being control of the Temple and of the Sanhedrin.

Philo himself belonged to the allegorists. Though he used the traditional or literal method quite often, he employed allegory extensively. Sometimes he interpreted a passage both literally and allegorically. His main purpose was to discover meanings in Scripture in order to prove from them the frequently novel and profound insights that he wished to teach.

Allegory is described by Philo as something "which loves to hide itself" (De fuga 32, 179) and into which one has to be "initiated". The allegorical method essentially means the interpretation of a text in terms of something else. That something else may be book learning, philosophy, practical wisdom, etc. The Palestinian rabbis of that time had little or no acquaintance with Greek philosophy and consequently they did not interpret Scripture in philosophical terms. They interpreted it in terms of something else which they knew, their own wisdom, their practical experience, the necessities of changed conditions of life, their own meditations, the call of a moral conscience. The important thing is that by Philo's time the principle was already established in native Judaism that one may interpret Scripture allegorically. The rabbis interpreted anthropomorphic expressions allegorically, for example, when commenting on the verse, "and upon the likeness of the throne was a likeness as the appearance of a man upon it" (Ezekiel 1:26). The Midrash on this verse is a protest, "Great is the boldness of the prophets who describe God by the likeness of the creature". (Bereshith Rabba 27, 1). A general rule of the rabbis, whenever they had to reject the literal meaning of the text, was "The



Tora speaks according to the language of men".<sup>17</sup>

The historical narratives in the Bible were taken by the Sages ~~as facts~~, with two exceptions: the framework of the book of Job was declared to be a mere parable and so was the story of the resurrection of the dry bones in Ezekiel (Ezekiel 37).<sup>18</sup> All the biblical laws were taken literally by the Sages.

The allegorical method greatly helped Philo to interpret Scripture in his own way. It made it possible to explain away any narration or incident that seemed to him to run counter to reason or to have some similarity with Greek myths. Philo believed that all the laws should be observed literally, but not every statement in Scripture is a law. He finally came to the decision that all the laws are to be observed literally but some are to be interpreted allegorically.

This method of exegesis was known in Greek literature. The poems of Homer and Hesiod, for example, were loved by the people and revered by poets and even philosophers. Many Greek philosophers interpreted the stories of these poems allegorically and expressed in this way their own thoughts and principles. Thus Plato makes Socrates say that the poets are inspired and that one has to look in their utterances for some hidden, inner meaning (Apology 22, B-C; Ion 533 D-534 E).

Philo did not agree that Greek mythology contains deep philosophical truths which can be unveiled by allegory. The fact that he adopted the allegorical method so readily was facilitated by the Jewish tradition, which is visible in the Midrash, that a Jew

was not bound to take his Scripture literally. So one could interpret the lover and the beloved in the Song of Songs as symbols of God and Israel.<sup>19</sup>

Sometimes Philo and the Sages too give the same kind of reasons for allegorizing. Both may find a text to be unintelligible or unreasonable as written, e.g., the law about a king who "shall not multiply horses to himself" (Deuteronomy 17:16). Philo argued that this text is unreasonable, for "strength in cavalry is a great asset to a king in time of war" (De agricultura 18,85). For similar reasons the rabbis rejected the literal meaning and interpreted it, on the basis of the use of the singular in the expression "to himself", as applying only to horses for the king's personal stables, not to horses used in the cavalry (Sanhedrin 21b).

To sum up: Philo as a devout Jew had received Scripture as Divine Law (Tora), but it required interpretation. As part of his heritage he understood that texts could not always be taken literally; his acquaintance with Greek philosophy allowed him to give his allegorical method a philosophical turn. The example of Greek allegorists helped him and served him as a model.

Scripture for Philo contains revealed truths which philosophers had to search for and discover by reason. Divine revelation he conceived as infallible, while human reason is subject to error; therefore, whenever philosophy was at variance with Scripture, philosophy had to yield. This conception of the relation of philosophy to Scripture is expressed by Philo in many forms and also in his statement that philosophy is the handmaid of wisdom.

## III

Philo as Jew and as Greek.

Philo's basic religious ideas were Jewish and so were his loyalties, but his explanations of ideas and devotions were purely Greek. Thus in connection with Moses' life, when Philo explained the meaning of prophecy his exposition came from Plato, yet Hebrew prophecy is distinctively biblical.

Whether Philo was a Greek Jew or a Jewish Greek is a question that has been dealt with by almost all Philonic scholars. The considered judgement of this writer is that the resolution of this problem was and remains unrealizable. Philo's work from the religious and humanist point of view is so important, that the question whether he was more Greek than Jewish becomes secondary.

He was a Jew with a vast knowledge of Greek philosophy. He seems to have been at home in Greek literature, for he cites by name about fifty-three Greek writers. Most often he quotes and explains Plato. But he did not write any treatises on Plato or Aristotle or Pythagoras. He wrote about Abraham, Joseph and Moses. The Hellenization in him was a Hellenization of Judaism, not of some other religious tradition.

It may, however, be asked to what extent did Philo, though completely loyal to Judaism, borrow significant motifs from Greek thought. It is clear that the Greek philosophical tradition was absorbed by Philo to the maximum point. Did the Greek element remain only a veneer or did he reach a stage where his Weltanschau-

ung was as much Greek as Jewish, or was that impossible? These are interesting questions, and they send the student on a long and ramified research. The result is very often not a clear answer.

Philo knew the Pentateuch with such a familiarity that it seems as if he had memorized it. But the evidence suggests that he knew and used Hebrew very little. It is true that he reflects some knowledge of Hebrew in his explanations of the names of biblical personalities, sometimes correct and sometimes not. Possibly, this information came to him from a recorded body of data, e.g., lists of symbolical explanations of biblical names. The impression one receives from a careful study of his work as a whole is that he did not use the Hebrew text but only the Septuagint.

Some of the obvious elements in Philo's Hellenization can be listed.

His language was Greek, his Scripture was Greek, his knowledge of Greek philosophy profound. Greek too is his notion of Judaism. His Judaism has become a religion whereby man rises from this perceptible world to achieve immortality. The biblical laws, which were not ends in themselves, were a means to reach communion with God. Philo's conviction was that Scripture was not a mere history of times long past, but made possible a personal, contemporary experience. Anyone may overcome his senses and bad inclinations by following the guidance of Scripture. This is an important point in Philo's exegesis. He did not interpret for theoretical or scholarly reasons so much as to guide his students and readers to what he conceived as a better life. The clue to an understanding of

Philo is not philosophy but his religious convictions and intentions.

Philo's exegesis contains both Haggada and Halaka , but motifs common with the rabbinical exegesis are few. For instance, that Noah was righteous only in comparison with his own generation is found in both. There is not sufficient reason to deny the possibility of communication between Judaea and Alexandria as a result of which the common character of such items as Noah's character could be explained. In addition, Scripture itself could have yielded parallel conclusions. Haggadic narratives that are frequent in the Midrash never appear in Philo, nor does he present even one parable of the kind abundant in rabbinic literature.

Philo transmuted Judaism into a religion of salvation and communion with God. Furthermore, he taught that every man, Jew or Gentile, can lead the right life, depending only on readiness to obey the laws of Moses as the Law of God. A Gentile who abandoned polytheism, recognizing and worshipping the one God, would be equal to native Jews, and superior to those who, though native-born, do not live virtuously in observance of the divine Law (De virtute 219).

Isaac Heinemann, one of the best Philonic scholars, addressed the question whether Philo achieved a synthesis of Hellenism and Judaism. He wrote that, "The difficulty in building a bridge between Philo's Greek and Jewish education was caused by the fact that on both sides there were only incomplete bridgeheads." 20

With all due respect to Dr. Heinemann, I cannot agree with him that "die Brückenköpfe" were not complete. Philo's Greek education and his Jewish formation, his knowledge of both Scripture and Greek philosophy, were extensive and exceptionally profound.

In some respects Philo achieved a genuine blend of Hellenism and Judaism that almost became a synthesis.

It is a commonplace in scholarly discussion of Philo to ascribe to him a major reconciliation of Jewish revelation and Greek philosophical rationalism. Philo was a rationalist, but he believed in continuous divine revelation. He was convinced that only revelation can help one to know God and to understand the truth. He was, it is true, a very complex personality, which cannot easily be analyzed or characterized. As one who believed in divine revelation and the possibility of ecstasy he might be called a mystic. We must be content to leave it at that and not attempt to place him in a well-defined class.

There are two sides to Philo's achievement. One is his Hellenization of Judaism in that he presented Scripture in Greek categories of thought, the other is that he also Judaized Greek ideas. Philo's profound immersion in Hellenistic culture and his wide and accurate knowledge of Scripture made this double process possible.

Scholars have sharply criticized or highly praised Philo as philosopher. In my opinion his significance as philosopher has been overemphasized, because he was first an exegete of Scripture. He frequently used Greek philosophy but only as a means to explain Scripture. The Bible controls and determines the philosophy which he uses. He did not read Plato and the Stoics into Scripture; rather he altered facets of Platonism and Stoicism in order to clarify the biblical text. It is Scripture that was sacred for Philo, not Greek philosophy.

## IV.

"The Royal Road" (H. P. Lovecraft) as a statement of Philo's aim in his work.

The Law of Moses for Philo was the Word of God revealed to men by a man, who attained the highest point of perfection ever reached.

Philo was convinced that his essential duty was to be a commentator of the Bible. He endowed this function with a great dignity, since he understood that sometimes it approached prophecy.

Among the books of the Pentateuch it is Genesis on which he comments most. The element which binds Philo's ideas together and which he presents allegorically, is the narrative character of Genesis and to some extent other parts of the Pentateuch. We recall that the Pentateuch contains the creation of the world, the creation of Adam, the loss of Eden, the generations from Adam to Noah; the flood; the generations from Noah to Abraham; the patriarchs; Joseph; the Exodus and the Wilderness, with Moses leading his people to the sacred mountain, and the revelation there of the Laws. This story is allegorically something more than an account of the past; it describes also the contemporary, personal experience of every man. It is, indeed, the spiritual journey which each can make when he is guided by Scripture.

The effect of making the Bible so contemporaneous was to weaken it as history. Philo repeatedly seems to do this. For instance, he denied that Sarah and Hagar were historical persons; they served

only as symbols for encyclical studies (Hagar) and true virtue or wisdom (Sarah). Respecting Abraham's removal from Ur to Haran (Genesis 11:31), he wrote that one cannot possibly have any interest in the journey someone made a long time ago, unless it is a spiritual journey that anyone can make.

This pilgrimage required learning how to subdue the body, its senses and passions, and reach a stage where the soul, which is free of all evil, rules the body. Very few men, indeed, resembled the patriarchs or Moses and arrived at spiritual perfection on their own helped by their great innate gifts. Ordinary men reach different stages on this road to perfection by observing the biblical laws, which begin in Exodus 20 and continue throughout the Pentateuch.

There are two classes, those who observe the Law without really understanding it and those who fully know the allegorical meaning of the Law. Philo held that only the latter could learn to live like the patriarchs.

Jewish ethics rested on the premise that God had revealed the true way of life to Moses and his successors. Greek ethics, on the other hand, arose out of rational inquiry into the meaning of human life in the universe with a view of defining its laws, describing the nature of man and providing a reasonable statement of what man's conduct should be. Jews respected their ethical laws on the ground that God had revealed them, while Greeks proposed theirs on the basis that man's reason had disclosed them, Philo was fully aware of this basic difference and, although he used



Greek philosophical terms to explain Scripture, his belief in revelation and its necessary help in reaching truth came to him from his Jewish inheritance.

Philo believed that Scripture contains true wisdom, the best laws and the best constitution for man. He claimed also that all ideas and values, including those outside Judaism, must be referred back to Moses for their origin and authentic formulation. For Philo, the Bible was not so much the history of the human race or of the Hebrews. It had the capacity to foster and interpret the religious experience of every man. Philo used allegory under strong Greek influence, as a special instrument to transform Scripture from a history of the past into an account of the personal present experience. This was the most important message of Philo's exegesis.

He dealt with the particular laws of the Pentateuch only after he had described and explained the lives of the patriarchs, in each of whom he saw a "law incarnate and made vocal" (nomos empsychos kai logikos). The patriarchs lived in accordance with the eternal and unwritten law of nature. In a way Philo was solving here a scriptural problem, namely, the relationship of the patriarchs who lived before the age of Moses to the laws that Moses gave to Israel. The solution of the Sages was to regard the patriarchs as pre-Mosaic observers of the Tora. In this solution, the Law is the norm and the patriarchs are assumed to have reached it by divine providence and grace.

In Philo, on the other hand, the behaviour of the patriarchs was regarded as the norm and the Tora had to be brought into con-

formity with it. The patriarchs attained the eminence of being "incarnate laws" through the God-given endowments with which they were born. Thus Abraham had the capacity to observe and learn; Isaac was endowed with intuition and progressed on his road naturally without learning or struggle; Jacob progressed through the practice of virtue. In the following generations only a few exceptional men were able to follow the way of the patriarchs by innate ability alone.

Man having lost virtue, as Adam lost Eden, would have been damned were it not that he has a characteristic which distinguishes him from the animal, hope. This is represented in the biblical narrative by Enos (Genesis 4:26). The Septuagint, Genesis 2:26 reads, "this one hoped to call on the name of God". Hope, Philo believed, is the first step on the road to truth. Hope leads to repentance, the allegorical meaning of Enoch (Genesis 5:21-24) and repentance to tranquillity of mind, the allegorical meaning of Noah (Genesis 6:1-9, 28). Among the three preparatory stages peace of mind is the highest stage in men's advancement.

What was it that Abraham learned who left Ur where he worshipped the stars? While he was still in Ur, Philo says, he recognized that dependence on senses, in this case the sense of sight, is misleading. Men and women can follow Abraham's example and not depend in their search for truth on the senses alone. Later, Abraham wandered to Canaan where he continued to learn. He used introspection and when far advanced on his spiritual road he discovered within himself the Logos, the divine reason. Arguing by analogy, he concluded that there must be a divine Logos in the universe.

The divine Logos is for Philo one of the attributes of God, who exists apart from the universe. The divine Logos is the attribute of God which has contact with the universe.

Some men recognize God as Theos or Adonai, the creative power, others as Kyrios or Elohim, the power which rules the universe. At best men can recognize the Logos, for God Himself in His "pleroma" (fullness) is unknowable. Philo interpreted the three visitors of Genesis 18, who came to Abraham's tent, as Theos, Kyrios and Logos. Abraham understood this, and so the triple vision leads him to the knowledge of the One God. Now he has reached the highest point on the royal road of learning. He has seen the one God.

For the ordinary person it is possible to walk the royal road and reach different stages, depending on how faithfully and constantly he observes the Mosaic Laws.

Numerous passages in Philo describe man's development, man's struggle with himself, man's ability to overcome his weakness. They ring true in every age.

Throughout Philo's work one perceives man's deep need for religious experience, his ceaseless endeavour to find truth, the belief that he can find truth.

Philo's greatness lies in his approach to Scripture. He did not see in the Bible merely the story of a distant past or a collection of ancient laws. It was a living contemporaneous work whose eternal function is to show mankind the way to truth. Judaism was for Philo a universal religion and the Bible a guide for every man, whether Jew or Gentile.

CHAPTER TENCONCLUSIONFOOTNOTES

- 1 C.Siegfried, Philo von Alexandria, pp.144,145.
- 2 Ibid., p.143.
- 3 Ibid., pp.283-285.
- 4 Ibid., pp.212-213,285,287,288.
- 5 Only his nephew Tiberius Julius Alexander, who forsook his people, later became prefect of Egypt, and then advised Titus during the siege of Jerusalem, was an apostate.
- 6 Siegfried, Ibid., p.203.
- 7 Ibid., p.275.
- 8 J.Pascher, Η ΒΑΣΙΛΙΚΗ ΟΔΟΣ Der Königsweg zu Wiedergeburt und Vergottung bei Philon von Alexandria (Paderborn: Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Altertums, 1931).

- 9 E.Bréhier, Les Idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon d'Alexandrie (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J.Vrin, 1950), see especially book 2, ch. 2; book 3, ch.3; book 2, ch.3 and the conclusion.
- 10 V.Nikiprowetzky, Le Commentaire de l'Écriture chez Philon d'Alexandrie (Brill, Leiden: 1977) p.260.
- 11 Philo, De decalogo 9, 32f.
- 12 P.Katz, Philo's Bible. The Aberrant Text of Bible Quotations in Some Philonic Writings and its Place in the Textual History of the Greek Bible (Cambridge: 1950), pp.3-4; 103.
- 13 H.Thylen, "Der Stil der Jüdisch-Hellenistischen Homilie" FRLANT, 65 (N.F. 47), (Göttingen: 1955), 74.
- 14 Philo, De vita Mosie II 39, 216.
- 15 Philo, De specialibus legibus II, 15, 61-62.
- 16 Philo, Hypothetica 7, 13.
- 17 Berakoth 31b.

- 18 Baba Batra 15a and Sanhedrin 92b.
- 19 Canticles Rabba to Cant. 1-2ff.
- 20 I.Heinemann, Philons griechische und jüdische Bildung  
( M.and H.Marcus Verlag, Breslau: 1932), p.6.