State Identity, Foreign Policy, and Systemic Norm Diffusion: Towards Humanitarian Intervention

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Abstract

This dissertation explores the complex relationship between state identity, foreign policy, and systemic norm diffusion. Based on an empirical examination of the international military response to the humanitarian crises associated with the Yugoslav wars of secession (1991-1995), Somali civil war and famine (1991-1993), Rwandan genocide (1994), and Zairian refugee crisis (1996), I contend that a state's foreign policy is primarily a product of its international identity. The country case studies (Canada, France, and the United States) are not merely isolated narratives. Drawing on the logic of 'system effects' analysis, with its emphasis on the role of feedback and indirect effects, I then situate each state within the larger systemic narrative, highlighting the systemic normative consequences of each state's policy choices. In addition to demonstrating that states from outside the great power club can exert significant international normative influence (a heretofore unexplored phenomenon), the study paints a much clearer picture than presently exists about the possibilities for, and limits to, ethical normative evolution in world politics.

Abstrait

Cette dissertation examine les relations complexes entre identité de l'état, la politique étrangère et la diffusion des normes au niveau systémique. Utilisant une approche empirique associée à la guerre de sécession en Yougoslavie (1991-1995), à la guerre civile et à la famine en Somalie (1991-1993), le génocide au Rwanda (1994), et la crise des réfugiés au Zaïre (1996), j'argumente que la politique étrangère d'un état est le produit de son identité internationale. Les études de cas de pays (le Canada, la France, les États Unis) ne sont pas des cas isolés. Utilisant la logique de l'analyse des 'effets systématique,' avec l'étude du rôle du 'feedback' et les effets indirects, je situe ensuite chaque état dans l'étude systémique, mettant l'accent sur les conséquences normatives des choix fait par chaque état. De plus, en montrant que les états en dehors du groupe des grandes puissances peuvent exercer de l'influence normative internationale importante (un phénomène jusqu'à maintenant non-examiné), l'étude montre une image plus claire qui existe au présent sur les possibilités pour, et les limites sur, l'évolution éthique et normative dans la politique internationale.

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Chapter One

State Identity, Foreign Policy, and Systemic Norm Diffusion

Why do similarly situated states often display different responses to the same external stimulus? In what ways do individual state policies influence the properties of the international system? Although these questions have long been central to the study of international relations (IR), neither has received very much attention in the burgeoning body of literature dealing with the specific dynamics of norm diffusion.[1] The issue of cross-national variation in norm compliance has only just begun to receive serious consideration,[2] while the relationship between national policy choice and systemic normative development has been almost completely ignored.[3] Despite

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[1] There is now a voluminous literature associated with this research agenda. Among the more prominent works are Audie Klotz, *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995); Peter J. Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); idem, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks In International Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); and Daniel C. Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

[2] See Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe," *International Studies Quarterly* 43:1 (March 1999), 83-114; and Amy Gurowitz, *Mobilizing International Norms: Domestic Actors, Immigrants, and the State* (Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell University, 1999). Atypical amongst the initial wave of norm research for its concern with this issue is Klotz, *Norms in International Relations*.

[3] In general, norm researchers appear to have conceded this line of inquiry to realism. A notable exception is John Ruggie's discussion of the relationship between American liberalism and the

all of the informative work done by ideational scholars over the last decade, then, crucial aspects of the norm diffusion process remain to be elucidated.

To address both questions I examine the phenomenon of military humanitarian intervention. Until fairly recently there were few, if any, examples of a state or group of states having deployed military force for the primary purpose of protecting the lives and/or welfare of the citizens of another state.[4] During the 1990s, however, there were at least two interventions (Yugoslavia 1992-1995 and Somalia 1992-1993) and one planned intervention (Zaire 1996) that strongly challenge the conventional wisdom that states will only use military force when it is in their own material self-interest to do so. That said, given the international community's failure to do anything meaningful in response to a number of equally awful humanitarian crises that occurred over roughly the same time period (the Rwandan genocide and conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone stand out), it would be extraordinarily premature to declare the existence of a *robust* norm of military humanitarian intervention.[5] At best, the empirical record is indicative of an *emergent* norm.[6]

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character of the post-Second World War international order. See "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution," in Ruggie, ed., *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 3-47, 24-31.

[4] Michael Walzer finds no clear-cut cases into the mid-1970s. See *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument With Historical Illustrations* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 101-102.

[5] Under a robust normative regime, states would view intervention as a duty to be carried out in most, if not all, applicable and suitable situations, rather than as a policy to be adhered to on a selective basis. This is not to say that actual behavior should necessarily be taken as the primary indicator either of the existence or absence of a norm. As Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie point out, "No single counterfactual occurrence refutes a norm. Not even many such occurrences necessarily do." "International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State," *International Organization* 40:4 (Autumn 1986), 753-775, 767.

[6] Since it cannot be said with any measure of confidence that this 'norm' will ever develop into anything beyond what it is now, 'emergent' may even be too strong an adjective. Indeterminacy is thus very much the watchword when it comes to the future of military humanitarian intervention.

Counterintuitive it may be, but the fact that the pattern of behavior in question barely rises to the level of commitment and consistency that most people would expect to see in a norm is actually a theoretical boon insofar as the study of the norm diffusion process is concerned. As researchers in both the natural and social sciences have long recognized, one cannot draw authoritative conclusions about any complex phenomenon based solely on the examination of purely 'successful' cases (i.e., robust norms in the case of norm-based research).[7] Hence, far from standing as the dissertation's methodological weak point, the checkered history of military humanitarian intervention throughout the early 1990s offers extremely fertile ground on which to base an inquiry into the fundamentals of norm diffusion and, by extension, the dynamics of both continuity and change in world politics.[8]

Towards Humanitarian Intervention: The Puzzle

Upon the outbreak of hostilities in the secessionist Yugoslav republics of Slovenia and Croatia in June 1991, the international community expressed little interest in any role other than that of diplomatic mediation. Once it became clear that the Croatian conflict was unlikely to be swiftly resolved, however, a small group of states began to ask whether more could not be done to rein in the violence. After a period of lengthy debate throughout the fall of 1991, the solution arrived upon was the dispatch of a

[7] For further discussion of this point as it relates to the study of norms see Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, "Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise," in Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security*, 451-497, 485.

[8] Owing to the dearth of empirical material related to most of the instances of non-intervention (Liberia and Sierra Leone were rarely even discussed as potential venues for intervention), only those crises that ultimately resulted in some type of intervention or planned intervention are examined in this study (Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Zaire; with Rwanda included to set up the Zaire case).

United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping force. Advocates of the plan believed an international military presence would help reinforce any workable ceasefire agreement that mediators might be able to broker (numerous truces had fallen by the wayside since the previous summer). In March 1992 the first 'blue berets' arrived in the region. As they soon discovered, staying above the fray would not be easy.

The situation became even more complex after fighting erupted in Bosnia the following month. With civilian areas increasingly coming under direct attack, the international community's commitment to humanitarian principles was put to the test. U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali preached caution, arguing that any further expansion in the size and scope of the U.N. operation would place too heavy a burden on U.N. resources. But again the 'new interventionists' won the debate. By July, U.N. soldiers were taking up positions around the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo. So began the slide towards humanitarian intervention. From the escort of humanitarian relief convoys to the military engagement of Serb forces, each succeeding crisis over the next three years would draw the international community deeper into the conflict.

Against this backdrop came the 1992 Somali famine. As Somalia's civil war intensified it became increasingly difficult for the few aid organizations operating there to get humanitarian relief supplies into the hands of those most in need. Failing drastic action, several hundred thousand people would almost certainly perish. Again the U.N. decided to send peacekeepers into the breach. As in the Balkans, the Somali environment was not particularly inviting. In fact, the situation was so bad that only a small number of the thirty-five hundred troops the U.N. had committed to the

operation could even be deployed. For months the mission remained stalled. Meanwhile, the number of dead continued to mount. Ultimately, it took the introduction of a massive American-led multinational contingent to stabilize the situation and restore Somalia's food distribution network. Under pressure from Boutros-Ghali to address the underlying causes of the famine, U.N. forces then turned their attention towards 'nation-building.' The Secretary-General's ambitious plan was nothing less than a prescription for war. In the end, however, it was a war in which the United States (U.S.) and most other countries wanted no part. With the famine gone from the world's television screens, Somalia no longer seemed worth the effort. For a mission that had begun so promisingly, it was a shockingly ignominious conclusion.

Although the international community could certainly have done more in both Bosnia and Somalia, the fact that these operations were undertaken at all was in itself a significant development. For years the West's rhetorical commitment to human rights had far exceeded its practical dedication. The missions to Bosnia and Somalia visibly narrowed that gap and, in doing so, raised hopes about a new standard in world politics. Unfortunately it did not take very long for whatever expectations had been built up to come crashing down. During the spring of 1994, more than eight hundred thousand civilians were butchered in the small African country of Rwanda. To the horror of those who believed in the refrain 'never again,' the world did nothing. Suddenly military humanitarian intervention was not so popular. By the time the international community grasped the scope of the tragedy, changed course, and sent military forces into the country, the genocidal rampage was all but over.

While very little could ever be done to meaningfully redress the failure of outside states to stop the Rwandan slaughter, an opportunity for partial redemption did subsequently arise. Following the overthrow of Rwanda's genocidal Hutu regime in the summer of 1994, more than a million Rwandan Hutus fled to neighboring Zaire. By the fall of 1996, the camps in which the refugees were living had become the scene of increasing violence. Another humanitarian catastrophe appeared imminent. Almost immediately the international community readied a military coalition for deployment. The zeal with which the intervention force was organized stood in sharp contrast to the apathy that marked the international community's response to the Rwandan genocide. Ironically, this time around no military intervention was needed. The crisis was diffused diplomatically, thereby eliminating the need for a large-scale military operation.

Collectively, these cases offer strong empirical support for the assertion that a new normative standard governing the humanitarian obligations of the international community began to emerge during the first half of the 1990s. Unlike most documented cases of norm diffusion, however, this case does not seem to offer a clearly identifiable 'norm entrepreneur' (i.e., an actor that consistently drove international policy forward towards intervention).[9] Despite being at the forefront of the early debate over humanitarian intervention, Médecins Sans Frontières exerted relatively little influence over the actual formulation of international policy between 1991 and 1996. The same is true of the United Nations in its capacity as an

[9] On the concept of norm entrepreneurs see Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52:4 (Autumn 1998), 887-917, 895-901. I discuss this issue in greater detail below.

independent actor (the U.N. Secretariat and several of the organization's organs can function relatively autonomously).

As the evidence presented in chapter two will demonstrate, the slide towards humanitarian intervention was very much a state-driven process. There existed, nevertheless, a considerable amount of interstate discord over the most appropriate way to proceed in each of the aforementioned theaters. For many of the most enthusiastic interveners, such as Canada, the thought of actually using force against any of the aggressors was simply anathema. Support for that option usually came from the U.S., which was somewhat paradoxical to say the least since few countries were more generally averse towards the idea of military humanitarian intervention than was the United States. Whether in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, or Zaire, the U.S. was a consistent latecomer to the international community's peacemaking efforts. In between these extremes fell France. While never as principally committed to the concept of humanitarian intervention as Canada, through its determined support for the Yugoslav intervention, in particular, France arguably did more for the advancement of the cause than any other state. Two questions logically follow. First, why did three relatively similarly situated states (i.e., three industrialized democracies with little, if anything, at stake in the target countries) pursue such disparate policies in response to the humanitarian abuses being perpetrated?[10] Second, by what dynamic did these policies interact to produce the normative transformation noted above?

[10] The criteria by which these countries were selected for analysis are discussed below.

The Argument

Given that the first research question quite explicitly falls within the purview of comparative foreign policy analysis and the second is more directly related to systemic theorizing, it might appear on first consideration that answering these questions would require two separate theoretical frameworks. By utilizing the same variable to explain both the pattern of cross-national policy variation and the process of systemic norm diffusion, however, I am able to offer a much more parsimonious explanation than might normally be thought possible. The result is a unified theory of foreign policy and systemic change.

State Identity and Foreign Policy

As the point of departure, I contend that the observed pattern of cross-national policy variation is best explained by reference to national variations in state identity.[11] According to Ronald Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter Katzenstein, "The term [identity] comes from social psychology, where it refers to the images of individuality and distinctiveness ('selfhood') held and projected by an actor and formed (and modified over time) through relations with significant 'others.' Thus the term (by convention) references mutually constructed and evolving images of self and other."[12] A state's identity, by extension, is formed through the state's interaction with and in relation to its own distinct set of significant 'others.' Out of this intersubjective

[11] For a similarly structured argument see Gurowitz, *Mobilizing International Norms*. A briefer version of Gurowitz's argument can be found in "Explaining the Uneven Effects of International Norms: The Role of State Identity," Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, 1999.

[12] Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," in Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security*, 33-75, 59.

process flow a variable number of nationally/territorially bounded conceptions of nationhood and statehood.[13] Of primary interest here are those conceptions relating to a state's fundamental orientation towards, and role in, the international system, or what I refer to as a state's international identity.

As Christian Reus-Smit notes, identities "...provide actors with primary reasons for action," both in a *purposive* and *justificatory* sense. In addition to "...informing an actor's goals as well as the strategies they formulate to achieve them," identities also "...provide the basis on which action can be rationalized."[14] Understood as such, a state's identity is the basis of its interests. Explains Wendt, "Actors do not have a 'portfolio' of interests that they carry around independent of social context; instead, they define their interests in the process of defining situations."[15] Add Jepperson et al., "Actors often cannot decide what their interests are until they know what they are representing – 'who they are' – which in turn depends on their social relationships."[16] The key to understanding a state's foreign policy thus resides in its identity.[17] A précis of the country case studies should help to illustrate the argument.

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[13] This extrapolation combines elements from Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett, "Introduction: Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East," in Telhami and Barnett, eds., *Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 1-25, 8; Ted Hopf, *Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 3-10; and Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," 59.

[14] Christian Reus-Smit, "The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions," *International Organization* 51:4 (Autumn 1997), 555-589, 565.

[15] Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46:2 (Spring 1992), 391-425, 398.

[16] Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," 60.

[17] Among the many recent studies that employ a similar explanatory logic are Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security*; Mlada Bukovansky, "American Identity and Neutral Rights from Independence to the War of 1812," *International Organization* 51:2 (Spring 1997), 209-243; Thomas U. Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Marc Lynch, *State Interests and Public Spheres: The International*

Canada's response to the various wars and humanitarian crises under examination was primarily determined by its conception of itself as the world's leading liberal internationalist state, an orientation that owes much to Canada's near perfect record of participation in United Nations sponsored peacekeeping operations since the inception of that activity in 1948. Indeed, the association between Canada and peacekeeping is so strong that the latter has long been regarded as the principal material manifestation of the country's international identity. That Canada would not contribute to the international community's efforts in Croatia, Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, or Zaire was thus simply out of the question so long as the international response to those crises was framed within the context of peacekeeping; an approach, not surprisingly, that Canada did much to promote in the first place. Peacekeeping, or some variant thereof, was, after all, the logical next step up from doing nothing. 'Canada the peacekeeper' was thereby easily transformed into 'Canada the intervener.' Whenever the international military effort threatened to veer away from peacekeeping towards a more aggressive posture, however, Canada began to exhibit serious reservations about further participation. At virtually every turn Canada's peacekeeping identity worked its effects on Canadian policy.

France's international identity exerted a similar degree of influence. Although clearly no longer a great power of the first order, France's self-image very much remains that of a front rank state. It would not be overstating the case, in fact, to say

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Politics of Jordan's Identity (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); John S. Duffield, "Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism," *International Organization* 53:4 (Autumn 1999), 765-803; Hopf, *Social Construction of International Politics*; Henry R. Nau, *At Home Abroad: Identity and Power in American Foreign Policy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002); and the articles in Telhami and Barnett, *Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East.*

that France considers its great power status to be the definitive measure of its nationhood. Consistent with this identity, France tends to place a high value on foreign policy initiatives that it believes will enhance its international prestige. Unlike the United States, France cannot afford to take its international standing for granted. As much as humanitarianism provided the context for French action in the cases at hand, then, France's motivations were never entirely, or even primarily, altruistic. The Yugoslav situation was essentially looked upon as an opportunity to push forward French designs regarding the construction of a common European foreign and security policy, the centerpiece in France's post-Cold War foreign policy program. In Rwanda and Zaire, policy was largely dictated by France's desire to protect its valuable sphere of influence in French-speaking Africa.[18] The prestige motive was perhaps most evident in Somalia, where France did not show the slightest inclination towards intervention until after the United States entered the picture. While France could never hope to equal the American effort in Somalia, the message it intended to convey by participating was crystal clear: France was more than just a regional power.

In contrast to Canada and France, the United States possesses not one but two core international identities. Rooted in the belief that the U.S. is and always has been a beacon of moral leadership in the world, a pronounced idealist current has permeated American foreign policy ever since the country's founding. That idealism has spawned two very different offspring, however. Originally, American idealism was synonymous with the policy of political isolation, a strategic orientation that in

[18] The rationale for including this case, which quite clearly involves a material interest, is discussed below.

time would become a touchstone in its own right. Inspired by the providential rhetoric that animated the American Revolution, American idealism, meanwhile, would also spawn an internationalist face, the most recent expression of which has been the United States' activist foreign policy of the post-Second World War era. The history of American foreign policy is thus very much the story of a country torn between two conflicting values: one that discourages foreign adventure, another that draws the country outward.

The pattern of American policy in the cases under examination here was just another manifestation of this antagonism. Born largely of its isolationist impulse, the United States' first instinct was to categorically reject the idea of involving itself with the international community's various peacekeeping/peacemaking and humanitarian relief efforts. That policy could not be sustained, however. Usually alone amongst the Western powers in absenting itself from any responsibility for addressing the humanitarian crises in question, the U.S. began to appear delinquent with respect to its international leadership duties. Fearing the damage that would cause to American credibility, the U.S. found itself virtually compelled to consider intervention. At that point the dictates of American military doctrine usually took over. The U.S. thus tended to shift from eschewing the use of force altogether to advocating the use of overwhelming force in rather short order.

A few points require further elaboration. The first concerns the process of identity formation. Although the purpose of this study is not to develop a theory thereof, the argument does rely on a particular understanding of the process by which a state's international identity is formed. To assert that identities are socially

constructed is, in effect, to say that it should be possible to identify the formative events (wars, revolutions, etc.) and political processes (i.e., how those events were originally interpreted and reinterpreted over time) by which a given identity arose. The emphasis on politics serves as an important corrective to any tendency towards historical determinism. As Katzenstein notes in his study of Japanese national security norms, "Rather than invoke history as the autonomous creator of particular aspects of culture, we should be able to point to political processes by which norms are contested and contingent, politically made and unmade in history."[19] France's storied pre-Second World War history as a great power, in this sense, is only relevant to present-day discussions of French identity in light of the way in which France's postwar leaders, especially Charles de Gaulle, used that history to justify their claims, both internationally and domestically, to a special role for France in the new international order. Had France not recovered its place as a front rank state following the war (a not altogether improbable scenario), this particular dimension of its history would be no more significant to contemporary French identity than Sweden's stint as a great power in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is to its modern international identity.

While the connection between a state's identity and its foreign policy behavior should be relatively unambiguous, it does not automatically follow that a particular identity will generate a *specific* behavior.[20] As Michael Barnett points out, "Identity...does not cause action but rather makes some action legitimate and

[19] Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security*, 2.
[20] See Gurowitz, *Mobilizing International Norms*, 42.

intelligible and others not so."[21] The decision to campaign for the deployment of a multinational military force to Croatia beginning in the fall of 1991, for instance, was just one of several options that Canada's liberal internationalist identity made possible. That Canada should have done nothing in response to the deteriorating security environment in the Yugoslav republic would have been inconsistent with its identity, but military intervention need not have been its favored response. Diplomatic condemnation of the warring factions or the imposition of a comprehensive sanctions regime could just as easily have satisfied Canada's liberal internationalist sensitivities.

The relationship between identity and policy may not always be so indeterminate, however. Generally speaking, the more institutionalized an identity, the narrower the range of policy options available to decision makers; witness the United States where the existence of a relatively well defined and rigorous set of criteria governing the use of force has introduced a fairly strong measure of predictability into discussions about the actual policy impact of American neo-isolationist sentiment.[22] The strictures of contemporary American military doctrine, especially the requirement that the U.S. always err on the side of caution by applying overwhelming force, not only dramatically reduce the probability of American involvement in the type of military operations under consideration here, but virtually guarantee that if or when the U.S. does intervene somewhere, it will do so in accordance with its general war fighting principles. The effects of institutionalization

[21] Michael Barnett, "The Israeli Identity and the Peace Process: Re/creating the Un/thinkable," in Telhami and Barnett, *Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East*, 58-87, 63.
[22] See Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security*; and Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism* for further discussion of the importance of formal and informal institutions.

are also evident in the Canadian case. Although not formally codified as such, owing to a variety of factors, peacekeeping has effectively become the tangible representation of Canadian liberal internationalism. Most of the aforementioned indeterminacy regarding the policy impact of Canadian liberal internationalism is accordingly eliminated by the existence of a time-tested template for dealing with conflicts in which Canada does not have a material stake.

State Identity and Systemic Norm Diffusion

Accounting for the pattern of systemic norm diffusion in this case merely requires extending the scope of the analysis to include consideration of the 'system effects' of each state's policy choices.[23] References to the 'international system' have become so commonplace in the field of international relations that it sometimes seems as if little thought is actually given to what it means to conceptualize the international political order as a 'system.' As such, a definition may prove helpful. In the words of Robert Jervis, "We are dealing with a system when (a) a set of units or elements is interconnected so that changes in some elements or their relations produce changes in other parts of the system, and (b) the entire system exhibits properties and behaviors that are different from those of the parts."[24] A systems approach is thus predicated on the assumption that action within a system will transform the system itself, the implication being that standard linear explanatory models (i.e., theories that posit a

[23] For a wide-ranging discussion of system effects see Robert Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). Additional empirical applications can be found in Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis, eds., *Coping With Complexity in the International System* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997).
[24] Jervis, *System Effects*, 6.

direct causal pathway between actions and outcomes) are unlikely to be adequate for understanding the complex dynamics that drive systems.

Viewing the question at hand through the lens of a systems approach suggests there may be some explanatory value in considering the *indirect* consequences of individual state policies. As the preceding synopsis of the country case studies makes clear, neither Canada, France, nor the United States made policy in a vacuum; each was sensitive to changes in the systemic environment brought about through the actions of other states. The closer the international community moved towards the use of force, the greater were Canada's reservations about continuing to participate in operations it believed should be conducted along standard peacekeeping lines. France's systemic sensitivity was revealed every time another state made a proposal that threatened to significantly alter the direction of international policy. Without exception such proposals either resulted in France modifying its own policies accordingly, in anticipation that doing so would preserve its image as a front rank state, or producing a counterproposal that would work to its benefit in that regard. Likewise, with every move towards intervention by the international community, the more difficult it became for the U.S. to remain on the sidelines.

Feedback played an extremely important role in this process. As Jervis explains,

> In many cases, actors take a limited move that turns out to set in motion forces that call for further moves in the same direction; they often begin a small-scale endeavor in the belief that it is worth a minor effort only to find that their actions have changed them and their environments in a way that requires greater involvement; desired flexibility is lost as commitments grow as others respond to them; temporary expedients develop into longer-term arrangements as interests prove to be more malleable and the course of events more

> difficult to control than people believe. Looking back, actors and observers may see the results as inevitable, just as we assume that a river running through a deep canyon had to be located there. While this is indeed sometimes the case, when conditions are unsettled and the initial move changes the actors and their environment, the final outcome, which at the end is bolstered by many supporting elements, may have been only one among many that were initially possible.[25]

A more fitting description of the dynamics at work in this case would be difficult to find. Having committed themselves to policing the uneasy truce in Croatia, many states saw no reason why they should not do something similar for Bosnia once hostilities erupted there. That the Bosnian situation was infinitely more complex and volatile seemed not to matter, especially to countries like Canada and France, both of whom had been early and enthusiastic advocates of the idea that peacekeeping should not necessarily wait on the establishment of a formal ceasefire agreement. The fact that the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo was home to the Croatian mission's operational command center no doubt compounded the anxiety felt by many states over how to proceed. In the eyes of the world, the U.N. was already involved in Bosnia.

Seemingly overnight the international community had embraced a new and revolutionary philosophy. Rather than just focus on resolving conflicts from the outside, the U.N. would now also aim to manage them from the inside. In so doing, the international community set itself on a path from which it could not easily depart. What two thousand soldiers were incapable of accomplishing, perhaps five thousand could, or so the collective thinking went. If Bosnia's warring factions would not allow the safe passage of humanitarian relief, then U.N. forces would have to accompany the relief convoys to their destinations. With every new challenge came a seemingly unavoidable new mission. Surrounded by chaos and a rapidly expanding

[25] Ibid., 165.

humanitarian catastrophe, the U.N. could not now abandon Bosnia to its fate. And if Bosnia, why not Somalia? First there were five hundred soldiers, then thirty-five hundred, and eventually thirty thousand. Along the way, peacekeeping became peacemaking and the foundation for a new normative standard was laid.

This system effects approach represents a significant departure from the more common norm 'life cycle' model of systemic norm diffusion. As elaborated by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, the distinguishing feature of the norm 'life cycle' model, at least in comparison to the approach adopted here, is its emphasis on the importance of specific 'norm entrepreneurs' during the stage of 'norm emergence.' Note Finnemore and Sikkink, "Norms do not appear out of thin air; they are actively built by agents having strong notions about appropriate or desirable behavior in their community."[26] While that may generally be true, approaching the present case from the perspective of the norm 'life cycle' model would not be particularly helpful.[27] As the discussion thus far has shown, the observed evolution in international policy was not the product of some sort of altruistic, empathic, or ideational campaign by one or more committed actors. There was no state level equivalent to Médecins Sans Frontières. Neither Canada, France, nor any other country at the forefront of the campaign to send peacekeepers to Croatia and Bosnia, or Somalia for that matter, believed that doing so would fundamentally change how the international community would be expected to deal with the humanitarian

[26] Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 896.

[27] Although Finnemore and Sikkink deal exclusively with non-state actors in their discussion of norm entrepreneurs, there is no theoretical reason why a state or even group of states should not be able to fulfill the same role. My critique of the norm 'life cycle' model thus has nothing to do with the fact that this model has, up till now, been exclusively used to explain the role of non-state actors in international politics.

consequences of war and civil disorder. Waging war on behalf of human rights was the furthest thing from anyone's mind in 1991 and 1992. More than any other feature, it is the disconnect between intentions and outcomes that distinguishes the pattern of norm diffusion in this case.

Methodological Issues

Three factors determined the choice of cases. First, it was imperative to select states that were relatively similarly situated in relation to the target countries (Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Zaire). Second, it was essential to have variation on the primary dependent variable (i.e., state policy on military humanitarian intervention). Third, each state selected had to have been involved in some way with the international response to the three humanitarian crises being examined. The field of candidates was thus effectively limited to a relatively small number of states (Canada, the United States, and a few European countries). Out of this group, the logical choices for further study were the two North American states and France.[28] In addition to having pursued fairly distinct policies in the face of pressure for intervention, it was these three countries that arguably had the greatest impact on the development of international policy as it pertained to military humanitarian intervention.

[28] Any situational differences that existed between Canada, France, and the United States with respect to Yugoslavia and Somalia were marginal. The same is true of Canada and the United States in relation to Rwanda and Zaire. The only clear situational outlier amongst the nine cases is France vis-à-vis Rwanda and Zaire. When recognized as such, however, the inclusion of this case actually adds significant probative value to the analysis.

The strength of the state identity-foreign policy relationship is measured through a joint analysis of behavior and rhetoric (i.e., the policies pursued by each state and the justifications employed in their defense). Interestingly, neither indicator would be particularly reliable on its own. An analysis of behavior alone would suggest that the most significant difference between Canada, France, and the United States merely concerned the timing and variety of their responses, not their motivations or objectives. Conversely, an exclusive focus on justifications would likely overdetermine the findings in the direction of the humanitarian motive. Only when rhetoric is matched to behavior is it possible to identify the true substance of each state's approach towards military humanitarian intervention.

Finally, in order to avoid the fatal error of tautologically deriving identity from behavior, the historical time frame examined for the purpose of establishing each state's international identity is limited to the years preceding the onset of the Yugoslav crisis. None of the documentation or evidence cited in the empirical sections of the country case studies thus has any analytical bearing on the determination of Canadian, French, and American identity.

Alternative Explanations

Given the connection I posit between the two main research questions, any alternative theory that operates at only one level-of-analysis would appear to be structurally handicapped. After all, systemic theories do not usually claim explanatory capability at the level of foreign policy, and second-image theorizing is not generally thought to

be very useful for explaining systemic outcomes.[29] Fortunately, a simple solution presents itself. By empirically disaggregating the two dimensions of the study (chapter two presents the systemic story, chapters three through five focus on foreign policy), the most powerful counterarguments at each level are given the opportunity to prove their mettle on their own ground. In considering domestic level alternative explanations, however, it is essential to keep in mind the importance of theoretical generalizability. The state identity framework is intended to be universally applicable. So too, therefore, must any explanation that wishes to be considered a viable alternative.

One intuitively appealing domestic level explanation that quite clearly fails the test of generalizability, for example, is the bureaucratic politics paradigm.[30] While such an approach might be able to provide a plausible explanation for the pattern of American policy (the paradigm was originally developed to explain the American decision-making process), its utility for understanding the Canadian or French decision-making process is highly questionable. With respect to Canada, empirical studies have demonstrated that a bureaucratic politics approach is only moderately beneficial for understanding how policy is formulated in a parliamentary system.[31] As for its applicability to France, I will defer to Stanley Hoffmann. "There is no need for

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[29] A notable exception to the latter is Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).

[30] The most complete statement of the bureaucratic politics paradigm remains Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1971).

[31] See Kim Richard Nossal, "Allison Through the (Ottawa) Looking Glass: Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy in a Parliamentary System," *Canadian Public Administration* 22:4 (Winter 1979), 610-626; and Michael Atkinson and Kim Richard Nossal, "Bureaucratic Politics and the New Fighter Aircraft Decisions," *Canadian Public Administration* 24:4 (Winter 1981), 531-562.

complex theories of decision, for Graham Allison's models II and III here," notes Hoffmann. "French foreign and defense policy is the president's domain."[32]

Surprisingly, there is but one domestic level approach that satisfies the all-important criterion of generalizability. The state identity framework obviously does not accord a prominent role to individual decision-makers. To the extent that individuals matter, they are really no more than secondary players in the policy-making process. Ultimately, the parameters of permissible action are established by a state's identity. One possibility that must be considered, nevertheless, is that some individual preferences of consequence may not be explicable within the context of the various identities described herein, the implication of which would be that the state identity argument is fundamentally flawed. Whatever its utility in the present circumstance, the primary appeal of an individual-centered approach is its ease of measurability. If idiosyncratic factors matter in any way, there should be clear-cut evidence of significant *intrastate* policy variation coterminous with changes in political leadership. Since Canada, France, and the United States all experienced a change in government during the time period in question, it should be fairly easy to accord this approach a fair hearing.

On the systemic side of the ledger there are two plausible alternative explanations. As expressed by Robert Gilpin, the neorealist understanding of how the properties of an international system are established is rather straightforward:

> ...actors enter social relations and create social structures in order to advance particular sets of political, economic, or other types of interests. Because the interests of some of the actors may conflict with

[32] Stanley Hoffmann "French Dilemmas and Strategies in the New Europe," in Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., *After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 127-147, 132.

> those of other actors, the particular interests that are most favored by these social arrangements tend to reflect the relative powers of the actors involved. That is, although social systems impose restraints on the behavior of all actors, the behaviors rewarded and punished by the system will coincide, at least initially, with the interests of the most powerful members of the social system.[33]

Kenneth Waltz is even more succinct. "Concern with international politics as a system requires concentration on the states that make the most difference," says Waltz.[34] The crucial point of agreement between Gilpin and Waltz is that power and norms usually co-vary. Neorealism thus offers a fairly limited conceptualization of the social dimension of international politics, for any 'socialization' that does occur is likely to be just an extension of the systemic or regional hegemon's values.[35] Lesser powers and non-state actors are peripheral to the process. In accordance with this perspective, the neorealist explanation for the rise of military humanitarian intervention would focus on the role played by the United States in setting the international standard for other states to follow.

The second alternative systemic explanation focuses on the role of international institutions. Whereas neorealism views interstate cooperation (norm propagation being a type of cooperation) as being rooted in power politics, neoliberalism (liberal institutionalism) accentuates the positive role that institutions can have with respect to the co-adjustment of conflicting interests.[36] According to

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[33] Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 9.

[34] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 73.

[35] See G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power," *International Organization* 44:3 (Summer 1990), 283-315.

[36] On neoliberalism in general see Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). On the issue of co-adjustment in particular see Lisa L. Martin, *Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 27-31.

neoliberals, not only can institutions provide a mechanism to facilitate cooperation, they can also create incentives for states to do so. As such, neoliberalism tends to be far more optimistic than neorealism with respect to the prospect for international cooperation in the absence of hegemonic leadership. In the case at hand, institutionalists would look beyond the United States and direct our attention towards bodies such as the United Nations, the European Community/Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in order to account for the development of international policy on military humanitarian intervention.

Theoretical Implications

Scholars working on the dynamics of norm diffusion have thus far focused most of their attention on the entrepreneurial role of transnational organizations and non-state actors.[37] While the field as a whole has certainly benefited from the move beyond state-centrism, there is much that remains to be said about the role played by states in the norm diffusion process, especially that of so-called middle powers and small states. As evidenced by this case and others (the campaign to ban anti-personnel landmines and the creation of the International Criminal Court come to mind as being roughly similar), the agenda setting power of such states can be extremely consequential. It was not inevitable that the Yugoslav wars of secession would precipitate a significant relaxation in the principle of non-intervention. Had Canada,

[37] See Klotz, *Norms in International Relations*; Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society*; Richard Price, "Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines," *International Organization* 52:3 (Summer 1998), 613-44; Keck and Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*; and Ann Marie Clark, *Diplomacy of Conscience: Amnesty International and Changing Human Rights Norms* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

France, and all of the other countries that originally supported the idea of intervention in Croatia and Bosnia adopted the same line as that of the United States during the first year of the Yugoslav crisis, the normative transformation discussed here would, at minimum, have been greatly delayed. Moreover, as influential as the news media was in making the Bosnian conflict, Somali famine, and Zaire refugee crisis issues of primary concern for the world at large (the celebrated 'CNN effect'), the U.S. would in all likelihood have been able to resist calls for intervention had most everyone else, especially its key allies, done the same. That no other state of any significance was interested in taking action to stop the Rwandan genocide undoubtedly made it much easier for the U.S. to hold firm in its stance against intervention. All of this suggests that IR scholars need to think more imaginatively about the ways in which power manifests itself in the contemporary international system. Evidently, a state need not necessarily be able to dictate outcomes in order to shape the direction of international policy.

On a slightly more abstract level, the rise of constructivism has sparked a spirited debate about how states determine the substance of their foreign policies. For 'rationalist' theories like neorealism and neoliberalism, what states want is not in question (usually some combination of power, security and wealth). Constructivists, on the other hand, believe that what states want – whether it be power, security, wealth or something else – can only be determined by looking at the endogenous dimension of preference formation. It is a point further reinforced in this dissertation, particularly by the Canadian and French case studies. The 'national interest' in both countries has clearly been defined in light of what are considered to be the unique

aspects of each state's social, political and historical experience. Of course, the same is true of even the United States; it is just not as readily accepted or acknowledged. Hence, while it may indeed be correct to assert that there are certain imperatives associated with systemic anarchy, it is a serious mistake to assume that every state will react in the same way to whatever systemic pressures arise. Moreover, what may appear to be anomalous behavior from a systemic standpoint can often be accounted for by reference to state-level political processes. When taken together, these findings have important implications for the ongoing debate over the so-called rationalist-constructivist divide.[38] In particular, they suggest that a more sophisticated approach to rational choice theory than the one presently employed by most IR scholars would sweep away much of this artificial division. As Finnemore and Sikkink point out, there is absolutely no reason why the utilities of actors must be specified in material, as opposed to social or ideational, terms.[39]

A key debate within the constructivist camp is also addressed. Theoretically, constructivism stresses the mutual constitution of agents and structures.[40] Yet most empirical applications have privileged the latter.[41] Norm diffusion has thus been

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[38] See Jeffrey T. Checkel, "International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the Rationalist-Constructivist Divide," *European Journal of International Relations* 3:4 (December 1997), 473-495; Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, "International Organization and the Study of World Politics," *International Organization* 52:4 (Autumn 1998), 645-685; John Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge," *International Organization* 52:4 (Autumn 1998), 855-885; Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change;" Miles Kahler, "Rationality in International Relations," *International Organization* 52:4 (Autumn 1998), 919-941; James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders," *International Organization* 52:4 (Autumn 1998), 943-969; and Robert Jervis, "Realism in the Study of World Politics," *International Organization* 52:4 (Autumn 1998), 971-991.

[39] Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 910.

[40] See Alexander Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory," *International Organization* 41:3 (Summer 1987), 335-370.

[41] Structure-oriented studies include Klotz, *Norms in International Relations*; Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society*; and Keck and Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*.

primarily depicted as a top-down or outside-in process, with states essentially treated as passive entities (non-state actors or transnational organizations do all the work). As Jeffrey Checkel notes, this effectively reduces "...one unit of analysis – agents (states, decision makers) – to the other – structures (norms). One result of this reduction is a failure to explore how norms arise in the first place (and the role of agency and power in this process), and how, through interactions with particular agents, norms change over time."[42] The emphasis I place on the role of states in the norm diffusion process and the weight I attribute to feedback should go some distance towards rectifying this imbalance. In the terminology of constructivism, this dissertation envisions states as both 'norm-makers' and 'norm-takers.'[43]

Finally, this study stands to make a significant contribution to the debate about the influence of ethical principles on state behavior. Throughout the Cold War, the vast majority of IR scholars shunned anything that resembled normative theorizing, preferring instead to take a more detached view of the political world. Unfortunately, amidst all of the wise counsel to avoid describing what the world *ought* to look like,[44] the field of international relations set aside an extremely important question: what role, if any, does morality *actually* play in world politics? Over the last ten years, however, several well-crafted studies have not only taken up this question, but have also convincingly demonstrated that moral considerations

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[42] Jeffrey T. Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory," *World Politics* 50:2 (January 1998), 324-348, 340.

[43] The terminology is from Checkel, "Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe," 85.

[44] The argument is most forcefully made in E.H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939* (London: Macmillan, 1946); and Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man Versus Power Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946).

often do influence foreign policy decision-making.[45] Still, the *extent* to which states can be considered 'other-regarding' entities, as opposed to just 'self-regarding,' remains very much an open question given the limited number of hard cases that have been examined.[46] To cite but one example, if there really is a substantive moral prohibition against the use of nuclear weapons, should it not have some influence on what an atomic power would do in the face of either a looming conventional military defeat on its own soil or a nuclear attack against any of its primary assets, whether at home or abroad? From what is known about the military strategies of the world's few nuclear weapons possessing states, every one of them would almost certainly respond to such an attack with a nuclear retaliatory strike of their own.[47] This should lead to some justified skepticism about the power of the 'nuclear taboo,' for no meaningful norm should be set aside that easily.

If one really wants to explain the complex relationship between morality and behavior, it is imperative that the focus be placed on situations in which the essence of the moral principle in question runs headlong into an opposing instrumental consideration; otherwise, the extent to which moral considerations impinge on

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[45] Among the more prominent works are Robert W. McElroy, *Morality and American Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); David Halloran Lumsdaine, *Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime, 1949-1989* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Klotz, *Norms in International Relations*; Richard Price, *The Chemical Weapons Taboo* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997); idem, "Reversing the Gun Sights"; Keck and Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*; and Nina Tannenwald, "The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use," *International Organization* 53:3 (Summer 1999), 433-468.

[46] A hard case would be one in which there are explicit costs associated with adherence to the moral principle in question. In this select group I would place only McElroy, *Morality and American Foreign Policy* (particularly the case of U.S. famine relief to Russia in 1921); and Klotz, *Norms in International Relations*.

[47] The fact that the U.S. did not use nuclear weapons during the Korean or Vietnam wars cannot be taken as conclusive evidence that a morally grounded nuclear taboo exists, regardless of what decision-makers might have said, simply because the stakes for the U.S. were not that high. For the counterargument see Tannenwald, "The Nuclear Taboo."

general policymaking will remain ambiguous. With military humanitarian intervention, no such ambiguity arises, for the intrinsic economic and human costs associated with this type of activity (as with any military operation) mean that a state's decision to support intervention can never be simply explained away on the basis of it being a costless commitment.[48] Just how far states are willing to go in defense of the great mass of humanity that lie beyond their own borders is thus brought clearly into view by the subject of military humanitarian intervention.

Plan of the Dissertation

Chapter two details the international community's diplomatic and military response to the various humanitarian crises. In addition to providing a single systemic point of reference for each of the country case studies, the evidence presented will conclusively demonstrate that a significant normative evolution did occur during the time period in question. The evidence will also show that both neorealism and institutionalism offer a thoroughly inadequate rendering of the normative dynamics at work in these cases. With the systemic side of the story in place and the theoretical puzzle firmly established, the stage is then set for the country case studies.

Each of the case studies (chapters three through five) follows the same basic plan. First, I explore the development of each state's international identity. I then move on to discuss the specific policies pursued by each state in response to the humanitarian crises in question. Although these empirical sections add a significant

[48] Michael Desch mistakenly characterizes military humanitarian intervention as a costless activity by overlooking both of these elements. See "Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies," *International Security* 23:1 (Summer 1998), 140-170, 159-160.

amount of detail to the sometimes fairly general accounts of Canadian, French, and American policy that are presented in chapter two, they are not meant to serve as comprehensive histories of Canadian, French, and American policy towards the various crises. Their primary purpose, rather, is to explore why each state pursued the approach it did. At times, then, long tracts of repetitive empirical review can be safely ignored without sacrificing anything that is integral to the story. From the summer of 1993 onwards, for instance, American policy vis-à-vis Bosnia essentially remained the same. The analytical value to be gained by continuing to discuss that policy once the basis for it has been established would thus be marginal, at best. The same is true of Canadian and French policy towards Somalia. After the point at which both countries decided to sign up for the American-led humanitarian relief mission, there is really nothing more worth mentioning. The case studies conclude with an assessment of the explanatory power of the state identity framework.

In addition to revisiting some of the theoretical implications of the study, the concluding chapter discusses the direction of Canadian, French and American policy in the years since the Zaire crisis.

Chapter Two

Towards Humanitarian Intervention

This chapter reviews the international community's response to the Yugoslav wars of secession (1991-1995), Somali civil war and famine (1991-1993), Rwandan genocide (1994), and impending humanitarian crisis in the refugee camps along the Rwanda-Zaire border (1996). Besides establishing the historical record that will be used to frame the country case studies, the evidence presented will support two conclusions. First, and most importantly, it will reveal that there was a significant transformation in both international attitudes and policy with respect to the issue of military humanitarian intervention during the time period under consideration. Second, it will show that neither neorealist nor institutionalist theory can account for the pattern of norm diffusion as described. Much of the impetus for the balance of the inquiry is thus provided by the historical data and theoretical analysis presented herein.

The Yugoslav Wars of Secession

The Slovenian and Croatian Conflicts, 1991-1992

Yugoslavia's slide towards fragmentation and war began in the late 1980s, when long dormant ultra-nationalist forces reared their heads in an effort to undo the multiethnic compromise that had prevailed there since the end of the Second World War. On 25

June 1991 the political drama culminated with separate declarations of independence by the Croatian and Slovenian parliaments.[1] The Yugoslav federal government in Belgrade responded by ordering army and police units to take control of important posts along the Slovenian border. Fighting immediately erupted between Slovenian militia units and the Yugoslav National Army.[2] In Croatia, a number of intense clashes ensued between the Croatian police and Serb citizens.[3]

Although a return to the Yugoslav fold appeared highly unlikely, diplomatic recognition of the breakaway republics was put on hold due to Western concerns about the potential precedent that such a move might establish.[4] To many observers, Yugoslavia's problems were but a microcosm of the Soviet Union's. A number of European states (Britain, France and Spain) also had an eye on their own secessionist-minded minority populations. As French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas declared, "...tomorrow, what we have done for Yugoslavia would be applied to other cases."[5] It would be some time before the international community realized that by advocating the status quo in Yugoslavia it had essentially given Belgrade a green light to use force in order to preserve its territorial integrity.[6]

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[1] Chuck Sudetic, "2 Yugoslav States Vote Independence to Press Demands," *New York Times*, 26 June 1991, A1.
[2] John Tagliabue, "Yugoslavia Tries to Oust Militias," *New York Times*, 27 June 1991, A1; and idem, "Yugoslav Army Uses Force in Breakaway Republic: Slovenia Reports 100 Wounded or Killed," *ibid.*, 28 June 1991, A1.
[3] Tony Smith, "Yugoslav Jets Roar Over Slovenia," *Globe and Mail* (Toronto), 27 June 1991, A1.
[4] AFP Reuter, "Les pays de la CEE ne reconnaîtront pas l'indépendence de la Slovénie et de la Croatie," *Le Monde* (Paris), 25 June 1991, 4; and David Binder, "U.S. Deplores Moves," *New York Times*, 26 June 1991, A7.
[5] Quoted in Alan Riding, "Fear of Separation Pushes Europe to Press Yugoslav Unity," *New York Times*, 7 July 1991, A6.
[6] This issue is discussed more fully in Laura Silber and Allan Little, *The Death of Yugoslavia* (London: Penguin Books, 1995), 175.

Once Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence, the United States effectively washed its hands of the issue. The European Community (E.C.) was thereby presented with a perfect opportunity to diplomatically reassert itself after having taken a back seat to the Americans in the recent Gulf War against Iraq.[7] Eager to capitalize on the situation, the E.C. immediately dispatched a diplomatic mission to Belgrade. In a now infamous quote, Luxembourg's Foreign Minister Jacques Poos declared, "This is the hour of Europe. It is not the hour of the Americans."[8] Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis reinforced the reversal of roles, noting, "Washington is being kept informed but not being consulted."[9] E.C. unity was more apparent than real, however. Austria, Denmark, Germany, and Italy immediately found themselves in a heated dispute with Britain and France over how soon and under what conditions recognition might be granted.[10]

To everyone's relief the Slovenian war was brought to a conclusion after just two weeks.[11] But Slovenia had experienced a veritable 'velvet divorce' compared to what would follow in the other secessionist republics. In Croatia, where the Serb minority represented a much larger share of the population, hundreds of people were killed in the first few weeks of fighting alone.[12] To complement the E.C.'s diplomatic

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[7] A good analysis of how the desire to construct a common foreign policy drove early European diplomacy on Yugoslavia is Spyros Economides and Paul Taylor, "Former Yugoslavia," in James Mayall, ed., *The New Interventionism 1991-1994: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 59-93.

[8] Quoted in Alan Riding, "Europeans Send High-Level Team," *New York Times*, 29 June 1991, A4.

[9] Quoted in Alan Riding, "A Toothless Europe," *New York Times*, 4 July 1991, A7.

[10] Alan Riding, "Europeans War on Yugoslav Split," *New York Times*, 26 June 1991, A7; idem, "European Community Freezes Arms Sales and Aid," *ibid.*, 6 July 1991, A4; and Lenard J. Cohen, *Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 215-216.

[11] Chuck Sudetic, "A Wary Slovenia Accepts Europe Backed Accord," *New York Times*, 11 July 1991, A6.

[12] Stephen Engelberg, "Up to 80 Reported Dead in Croatia Strife," *New York Times*, 3 August 1991, A3; and idem, "Yugoslav Fighting Flares as Truce Plan is Approved," *ibid.*, 4 August 1991, A6.

efforts, France suggested that a peacekeeping force under the direction of the Western European Union be deployed. The proposal met with a mixed response. Britain, among others, argued that an external military presence was out of step with the situation on the ground.[13] Lacking a consensus, the military option was put on hold.

After another month of generally unsuccessful diplomacy, the idea of deploying an armed force was raised again, this time by the Netherlands. Although the Dutch proposal was widely lauded, Britain remained skeptical and again vetoed the plan.[14] Said Britain's Foreign Office spokesman, "We're interested in peacekeeping not peacemaking."[15] With this decision, the E.C. had run out of time. At the urging of Canada and France, the issue was brought before the United Nations.[16] Before signing off on a peacekeeping force, though, as both Canada and France had suggested, the Security Council first wanted to explore other options. In a move the United States would later come to regret, the Council placed an embargo on weapons sales to Yugoslavia.[17]

By November it was clear that diplomatic efforts alone would not resolve the Croatian war. Abandoning its previous intransigence, Britain decided to join France

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[13] AFP Reuter, "Les Européens s'interrogent sur l'envoi d'une force d'intervention," *Le Monde*, 3 August 1991, 4; "A Balkan Tragedy," *Economist*, 3 August 1991, 45; "Not 1914, But Not 1991 Either," *ibid.*, 10 August 1991, 37; and Steven Greenhouse, "Europeans Press for Yugoslav Settlement," *New York Times*, 7 August 1991, A3.

[14] Jan Willem Honig, "The Netherlands and Military Intervention," in Lawrence Freedman, ed., *Military Intervention in European Conflicts* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994), 142-153, 142; Trevor C. Salmon, "Testing Times for European Political Cooperation: The Gulf and Yugoslavia, 1990-1992," *International Affairs* 68:2 (April 1992), 233-253, 251; and Alan Riding, "Europeans Retreat on a Peace Force for Croatia," *New York Times*, 20 September 1991, A6.

[15] Quoted in Alan Riding, "European Force is Proposed for Croatia," *New York Times*, 17 September 1991, A3.

[16] "Paris et Bonn proposent l'envoi d'une force européenne d'interposition en Yugoslavie," *Le Monde*, 20 September 1991, 1; Serge Marti, "La France demande que les Nations unies soient saisies 'sans délai'," *ibid.*, 21 September 1991, 3; and "Mulroney Disagrees With Hurd," *Globe and Mail*, 21 September 1991, A11.

[17] U.N. S/RES/713 (25 September 1991).

and Belgium in an effort to get Security Council approval for a U.N. force (Belgium held one of the Council's rotating seats).[18] After discussing the idea for about two weeks, the Security Council conditionally pledged ten thousand soldiers.[19] Given U.N. mediator Cyrus Vance's insistence that a firm ceasefire agreement was a prerequisite to any troop deployment, just how soon the 'blue berets' might depart was anyone's guess (since the outbreak of hostilities, ceasefires had come and gone on an almost weekly basis).[20] The situation was further complicated by the large number of Third World states that remained steadfastly opposed to tinkering with the non-intervention principle. If the conflict was a civil war, as most everyone seemed to agree, the proper role for outside states was far from clear. To the predominantly Western states that intended to participate in the operation, such legal 'technicalities' were a non-issue. Of much greater concern to them was how the soldiers would be deployed. U.N. peacekeeping missions had traditionally been dispatched to regions in which two sides could be separated along clearly demarcated lines. No such boundaries existed in Croatia, meaning that U.N. troops would most likely be located both in and around the areas of conflict.[21]

Meanwhile, it was becoming clear that the Croatian conflict might not be the only Balkan war. On 20 December 1991 Bosnia and Herzegovina applied to the E.C.

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[18] Paul Lewis, "Three European Nations Propose U.N. Peace Force for Yugoslavia," *New York Times*, 14 November 1991, A1.
[19] Paul Lewis, "U.N. is Offering to Send a Force to Yugoslavia," *New York Times*, 28 November 1991, A1.
[20] Paul Koring, "Vance Sends Tough Message to Both Sides in Yugoslavia," *Globe and Mail*, 2 December 1991, A11.
[21] Paul Lewis, "U.N. is Offering to Send a Force to Yugoslavia," *New York Times*, 28 November 1991, A5.

for recognition.[22] Three days later Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic appealed to the U.N. Security Council to send preventive peacekeeping forces.[23] Fears of war were certainly well founded given the large minority Serb population that resided in the republic. When asked what would happen if war erupted, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic presciently replied, "Two or three hundred thousand people would die, cities would be destroyed and then we would still have to sit down and negotiate the same things."[24]

Ominous warnings aside, Bosnian developments hardly registered on the international radar screen. During the winter of 1992, attention was primarily focused on Croatia, where sporadic fighting continued to threaten the deployment of U.N. soldiers.[25] Surprisingly, newly appointed U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali did not share Vance's opinion on the importance of having a ceasefire in place in advance of deployment. Apparently Boutros-Ghali thought it unlikely that the U.N. would actually become a partisan in the conflict. As the Secretary-General saw it, the more probable outcome of early deployment would be a strengthening of the truce and, by extension, a boost for the upcoming peace talks in Brussels.[26] The Security

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[22] Chuck Sudetic, "Yugoslav Breakup Gains Momentum," *New York Times*, 21 December 1991, A3. The parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina originally declared independence on 15 October. Although this move provoked the walkout of 73 Serb representatives, it did not immediately spark a wave of violence. See David Binder, "4th Independence Move," *ibid.*, 16 October 1991, A10.
[23] "Bosnia Appeals to U.N.," *New York Times*, 24 December 1991, A3.
[24] Quoted in "And So To Bosnia?" *Economist*, 4 January 1992, 43.
[25] Chuck Sudetic, "New Yugoslav Clashes Threaten to Keep U.N. Out," *New York Times*, 19 January 1992, A14.
[26] Paul Lewis, "U.N. Council Favors Peace Force for Yugoslavia," *New York Times*, 14 February 1992, A1.

Council agreed and on 21 February 1992 voted unanimously to send peacekeepers to Croatia.[27]

Peacekeeping Without Peace

On 14 March 1992 U.N. forces began arriving in Bosnia and Croatia (the U.N. had decided to run the Croatian operation out of the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo).[28] Their presence did little to rein in the warring sides. Over the next few weeks Croatia witnessed a renewal of violence, while Bosnia slowly moved towards civil war.[29] In a desperate attempt to pressure the recalcitrant Bosnian Serb leadership into accepting Bosnia's existing territorial integrity, the international community decided to grant diplomatic recognition to the embattled republic.[30] The decision to postpone recognition of Slovenia and Croatia the previous June was now widely seen as having been a mistake. By taking the opposite track in Bosnia, the West believed it was applying the 'lessons of history.' The gesture had virtually no influence on the situation other than to implicate Serbia proper in an interstate war.

International diplomacy subsequently took on a new sense of urgency. The E.C.'s diplomatic liaison, Lord Peter Carrington, even talked about getting tough with all sides, particularly Serbia, threatening Belgrade with "consequences which will be

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[27] U.N. S/RES/743 (21 February 1992); Paul Lewis, "U.N. Votes to Send Force to Yugoslavia," *New York Times*, 22 February 1992, A3; and John F. Burns, "Many in Yugoslavia Fear U.N.'s Effort Could Fail," *ibid.*, 23 February 1992, A12.

[28] John F. Burns, "U.N. Peacekeeping Force Moves Into Yugoslavia," *New York Times*, 15 March 1992, A6.

[29] Chuck Sudetic, "Serbs Attack Muslim Slavs and Croats in Bosnia," *New York Times*, 4 April 1992, A3; and idem, "Bosnia Calls Up Guard and Reserve," *ibid.*, 5 April 1992, A3.

[30] Alan Riding, "Europe Nods to Bosnia, Not Macedonia," *New York Times*, 7 April, 1992, A3; David Binder, "U.S. Recognizes 3 Yugoslav Republics as Independent," *New York Times*, 8 April 1992, A10; and Philippe Lemaître, "Les douzes reconnaissent l'indépendance de la Bosnie-Herzégovine et ajournent leur décision sur la Macédoine," *Le Monde*, 8 April 1992, 3.

very painful" if it did not cease its involvement in the Bosnian conflict.[31] The threat of forceful action was ridiculous considering the international community could not even agree on whether to send a significant peacekeeping contingent to reinforce what was essentially an administrative operation. Echoing the American line, Boutros-Ghali maintained that another peacekeeping operation was just not financially feasible. Britain, meanwhile, was sounding a cautious tone from within the E.C., harkening back to its earlier argument about the distinction between peacekeeping and peacemaking.[32]

The Secretary-General's position hardened considerably after having been presented with an assessment of the situation by the U.N. Deputy Under-Secretary for Peacekeeping, Marrack Goulding. In a report to the Security Council on 13 May, Boutros-Ghali suggested that conditions in Bosnia made the deployment of another peacekeeping force an unwise course of action. The Secretary-General questioned the Croatian mission as well, writing, "Developments since the Security Council approved the plan for the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Croatia have raised new doubts about the practicality of that operation." He went on to recommend that perhaps it would be best if the Europeans deployed a force and left the U.N. out of it.[33] According to one report, Boutros-Ghali's comments led to disbelief in most

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[31] Quoted in John F. Burns, "Bosnia Factions Sign New Truce Accord," *New York Times*, 24 April 1992, A10.

[32] Craig R. Whitney, "Unity on Balkans Eludes Europeans," *New York Times*, 25 April 1992, A3; Yves Heller, "La Serbie et le Monténégro créent une fédération," *Le Monde*, 25 April 1992, 1; AFP Reuter, "L'ONU appelle au respect de la trêve en Bosnie-Herzégovine," *ibid.*, 26-27 April 1992, 3; and Reuter, "La France, l'Allemagne et la Pologne demandent au Conseil de sécurité de revoir sa position," *ibid.*, 26-27 April 1992, 3.

[33] Quoted in Paul Lewis, "U.N. Rules Out A Force to Halt Bosnia Fighting," *New York Times*, 14 May 1992, A1 and A12; Also James Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 91-92.

Western capitals, where the Secretary-General was seen to have given "a weak-kneed green light to the killers."[34] In an effort to limit the damage, the Security Council adopted a resolution asking Boutros-Ghali to continue the U.N.'s peace efforts, especially in Bosnia. The Council also rejected outright the suggestion that peacekeepers be withdrawn from Croatia.[35] Despite the rhetorical commitment, the meager U.N. force in Sarajevo was hardly capable of doing very much to protect the embattled city. As intense fighting raged in the Bosnian capital, a large portion of the force was even temporarily evacuated.[36] Noted a U.N. official, "About all we've been able to accomplish in Bosnia is to keep from getting any of our people killed. To consider anything else there right now is impossible."[37]

Not surprisingly, the display of impotence sparked a backlash. Bosnian Foreign Minister Haris Silajdzic called the world's inaction a "disgrace for humanity" and raised the specter of 'ethnic cleansing' for the first time.[38] And it wasn't just the Bosnian Muslims who were taking issue with international policy. In a complaint being heard ever more often, an Arab diplomat charged,

> These are people [Bosnian Muslims] who represent the largest group in a country whose independence has been recognized by the United States and the European Community. But they are Muslims, and their rights are being trampled on by people who are Christians, so the United States and Europe make a lot of noise, but they do nothing.[39]

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[34] Leslie Gelb, "We Are Innocent," *New York Times*, 18 May 1992, A17.
[35] Paul Lewis, "Security Council Adopts Measure to Pursue Peace Efforts in Bosnia," *New York Times*, 16 May 1992, A3; and Afsané Bassir Pour, "Le Conseil de sécurité retient la possibilité d'envoyer des 'casques bleus' en Bosnie-Herzégovine," *Le Monde*, 17-18 May 1992, 3.
[36] CP, "Fighting Forces U.N. Workers to Quit Sarajevo for Belgrade," *Globe and Mail*, 14 May 1992, A12.
[37] Quoted in John F. Burns, "As Cannons Roar, U.N. Leaves Bosnia," *New York Times*, 17 May 1992, A10.
[38] Quoted in Barbara Crossette, "Bosnian, in U.S. to Seek Aid, Assails Inaction," *New York Times*, 20 May 1992, A5.
[39] Quoted in John F. Burns, "Pessimism Is Overshadowing Hope in Effort to End Yugoslav Fighting," *New York Times*, 12 May 1992, A10.

Although long-standing Western policy towards Indonesia and the Sudan cast doubt on the insinuation that the West would act if the situation were reversed, the widespread perception that the West was guilty of hypocrisy would significantly influence international policy in the months ahead.

For nearly a year the United States had deferred to Europe on Yugoslavia under the pretext that American involvement was both unnecessary and unwanted. Against the backdrop of the brutal Bosnian war, American policy now simply appeared indifferent. To reclaim the moral high ground the U.S. suggested that the U.N. impose economic sanctions against the rump Yugoslav federation (comprised of Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Macedonia at this point).[40] Within days of the American call to action the Security Council imposed a total economic embargo.[41]

The sanctions debate revealed deep divisions between the United States and its European allies. Quipped a senior American official, "These people [Europeans] could not organize a three-car motorcade if their lives depended on it." Another high-ranking American even singled out France as the main obstacle to a more effective and coordinated Western approach. Although France had been more active on the diplomatic and military front than perhaps any other state during the first year of the Yugoslav crisis, it had fervently resisted the imposition of economic sanctions. Of course, Europe tended to see the matter somewhat differently. Responded a French spokesperson, "The Europeans were the ones who proposed the United Nations

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[40] Barbara Crossette, "Baker Puts Pressure on Europeans For U.N. Penalties Against Serbs," *New York Times*, 25 May 1992, A1.

[41] Paul Lewis, "U.S. Seeks U.N. Ban On Yugoslav Trade Over Bosnia Strife," *New York Times*, 29 May 1992, A1; Afsané Bassir Pour, "Les Nations unies vont décréter un embargo commercial total et immédiat à l'encontre de Belgrade," *Le Monde*, 30 May 1992, 3; and U.N. S/RES/757 (30 May 1992).

observers and the fourteen thousand man peacekeeping force. France has two thousand men on the ground in Yugoslavia with their lives on the line. Where are the Americans?"[42] It was a question for which the U.S. did not have a good answer. "No one [in the U.S.] is pushing the military option very hard at this point," admitted a Pentagon official.[43]

By June the humanitarian crisis in and around Sarajevo had grown dire. Under pressure to do something constructive, the Security Council authorized the dispatch of eleven hundred soldiers to the theater. The force's primary mission would be to reopen and secure the Sarajevo airport (gaining control of the airport and its access routes was deemed essential for the movement of relief supplies).[44] Canada and France agreed to supply the troops.[45] A short time later the Security Council crossed into uncharted territory by threatening the use of force if the Serbs did not cease their attacks on Sarajevo and surrender full control of the airport.[46] While no state yet possessed the political will or even had the military capabilities in place to follow through on such a threat, the Council's warning was the first indication that the world would not simply watch the conflict play itself out.

On 28 June, just two days after the Security Council issued its warning, French President François Mitterand arrived at the Sarajevo airport. After receiving

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[42] Both officials quoted in Thomas L. Friedman, "Strain Among Allies," *New York Times*, 30 May 1992, A3.
[43] Quoted in Eric Schmitt, "Reluctant to Use Force, U.S. is Assessing Sanctions," *New York Times*, 1 June 1992, A8.
[44] Frank J. Prial, "U.N. Council Acts on Bosnia Airport," *New York Times*, 9 June 1992, A11.
[45] Afsané Bassir Pour, "Le Conseil de sécurité a décidé l'envoi d'un millier de 'casques bleus' pour protéger l'aéroport de Sarajevo," *Le Monde*, 10 June 1992, 4; and Jeff Sallot, "Canada Set to Send Soldiers to Sarajevo," *Globe and Mail*, 11 June 1992, A1.
[46] Paul Lewis, "Serbs Told To End Siege of Sarajevo or Risk U.N. Force," *New York Times*, 27 June 1992, A1 and A5.

assurances from Mitterand that the airport would not be made available to Bosnian Muslim forces, the Serbs agreed to turn control of the facility over to the United Nations. In addition to convincing the Serbs to tone down their assault and relinquish control of the airport, Mitterand hoped his surprise visit would send Washington the unmistakably clear message that Europe was capable of independent action. Yet Mitterand's trip hardly reinforced European unity. Despite the fact that his flight to Sarajevo had originated in Lisbon, where the E.C. had just concluded a series of meetings, Mitterand curiously did not reveal his intentions to any of his counterparts.[47]

Ethnic War and the Western Conscience

The situation in Sarajevo went from bad to worse in July. Carrying their strangulation policy to the extreme, Serb forces cut off the city's water supply and destroyed its electrical grid. The attack prompted Bosnian Vice President Ejup Ganic to ask, "How much more of this must there be before the West realizes what is involved here and takes some action to help us?"[48] In response, the Security Council decided to deploy another five hundred soldiers.[49] The criteria by which peacekeeping operations were usually established seemed not even to be of major concern anymore, for it was plainly evident that these new troops would be heading into an environment that was

[47] Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will*, 94-95; Roger Cohen, "Mitterand Leaves for Sarajevo, Hoping to Shock His Serbian Ally," *New York Times*, 28 June 1992, A6; John F. Burns, "Mitterand Flies Into Sarajevo; Shells Temper 'Message of Hope'," *ibid.*, 29 June 1992, A1 and A6; and Dominique Le Guilledoux, "Six heures dans la capitale bosniaque," *Le Monde*, 30 June 1992, 3.
[48] Quoted in John F. Burns, "Power and Water Lost in Sarajevo as Attacks Mount," *New York Times*, 14 July 1992, A1.
[49] Seth Faison, "As Fighting Widens, U.N. Orders Buildup of Troops in Bosnia," *New York Times*, 14 July 1992, A8.

extremely unstable. Moreover, the possibility of remaining neutral was doubtful given the situation on the ground.

By the summer of 1992 two enormous humanitarian crises were unfolding: Bosnia and the Somali famine. The fact that the latter had been virtually ignored by the international community riled the Secretary-General. In a closed session of the Security Council on 23 July, Boutros-Ghali reportedly referred to Bosnia as "The war of the rich." To the Secretary-General, the Bosnian mission was a financial strain on the U.N., was outside proper U.N. control, and had simply been given too much attention.[50] He also likened the situation to "a kind of Vietnam for the United Nations,"[51] adding, "If we continue to get involved in Yugoslavia, this will be at the expense of the other activity of the house. At a certain time, we must say, 'Stop'."[52] Boutros-Ghali's misgivings aside, the U.N. became even more involved in Bosnia throughout August and September. In addition to expanding the size of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), the Security Council authorized the use of all necessary means to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid.[53]

At this point the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) became the primary external military actor. In early September NATO approved the deployment of five to seven thousand troops.[54] As an alternative to contributing personnel, the

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[50] Seth Faison, "U.N. Chief Mired in Dispute With Security Council," *New York Times*, 24 July 1992, A3.
[51] Quoted in Cohen, *Broken Bonds*, 242.
[52] Quoted in Patrick E. Tyler, "U.N. Chief's Dispute With Council Boils Over," *New York Times*, 3 August 1992, A9.
[53] U.N. S/RES/769 (7 August 1992); U.N. S/RES/770 (13 August 1992); and U.N. S/RES/776 (14 September 1992).
[54] Paul Lewis, "U.N. Will Add NATO Troops to Bosnia Force," *New York Times*, 11 September 1992, A1 and A10; Serge Marti, "M. Boutros-Ghali recommande l'envoi d'environ 7000 'casques bleus' supplémentaires," *Le Monde*, 12 September 1992, 3; and Shaun Gregory, *French Defence Policy into the Twenty-First Century* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 63.

Americans offered to help patrol the proposed no-fly zone. U.S. President George Bush even indicated that he would support the use of force in response to any violations of the flight ban.[55] However, it was still much too early for most states to consider using force in such a manner. On 9 October the Security Council voted a flight-ban over Bosnia, but without enforcement provisions.[56]

By late 1992 it had become apparent that such measures were completely inadequate. Admiral Jacques Lanxade, the French Chief of Staff of Armed Forces, suggested the West had only two choices: use some measure of force or withdraw.[57] Although Lanxade's comments did not represent his country's official position, by early 1993 the French government had begun to suggest various ways in which the international force could reassert itself.[58] In just nine months the international debate over what was to be done in Bosnia had been radically transformed. Merely watching the conflict unfold was no longer a sustainable policy.

1993: The Year of Western Ambivalence

As 1993 began it was still hoped that a negotiated settlement between the warring parties could be achieved. The Vance-Owen peace plan thus became the center of attention.[59] American reluctance to endorse the ethnic division of Bosnia effectively

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[55] Michael R. Gordon, "Bush Would Use Force to Ban Serbs' War Flights," *New York Times*, 3 October 1992, A1 and A5.
[56] U.N. S/RES/781 (9 October 1992).
[57] "Ou l'on emploi de la force ou l'on se retire," *Le Monde*, 11 December 1992, 5.
[58] Claire Tréan, "La France demande que Sarajevo soit sous protection de l'ONU," *Le Monde*, 1 January 1993, 1; Jean-Pierre Langelier, "Une diplomatie convulsive," *ibid.*, 12 January 1993, 1 and 4; "M. Joxe: la France 'est prête à aller avec d'autres' exécuter les missions de l'ONU," *ibid.*, 13 January 1993, 3; Jacques Isnard, "La France cherche à mieux protéger ses 'casques bleus' dans l'ex-Yougoslavie," *ibid.*, 27 January 1993, 1 and 3; and "Des missiles antiaériens pour les 'casques bleus' français de Bihac," *ibid.*, 30 January 1993, 4.
[59] "If It Sticks, They Will Call It Peace," *Economist*, 16 January 1993, 47.

destroyed any hope that the plan would be accepted, however. Said E.C. diplomatic liaison Lord David Owen in reference to U.S. President Bill Clinton's half-hearted support for the negotiations, "We have this Administration briefing the press in a way that could not but stiffen those Muslims who want to continue the war."[60] The debate over who bore the brunt of responsibility for the conflict's continuation did nothing to change the facts on the ground, of course. In the face of mounting pressure to do something, Clinton announced that the U.S. would begin to airdrop relief supplies into isolated areas of Bosnia.[61] The reaction of French Foreign Minister Dumas was less than gracious. "It's a good thing the Americans have joined the Europeans in an affair that interests the whole world. Bravo! The Americans have come to lend a hand. But let's not forget what the Europeans are doing," said Dumas.[62]

March and April 1993 marked an important turning point in international policy, as there were a couple of moves that suggested a growing toughness from the West. First, U.N. commander General Philippe Morillon announced that he would stay in the Muslim town of Srebrenica, which was under heavy assault from Serb forces, until the safety of its residents had been assured. Declared Morillon, "We have to avoid a major tragedy here. I will stay here among these people until the day that their survival is assured."[63] After a nine-day stalemate the Serbs partially capitulated by allowing a relief convoy to enter the city.

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[60] David Owen, *Balkan Odyssey* (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1995), 105.
[61] William J. Clinton, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States 1993* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1994), 206; and "America Drops In," *Economist*, 27 February 1993, 51.
[62] Quoted in Stephen Kinzer, "Much Bosnian Aid Missed Its Target," *New York Times*, 2 March 1993, A9.
[63] Quoted in John F. Burns, "U.N. General to Stay in Bosnian Town," *New York Times*, 17 March 1993, A3.

As the world would later learn, Morillon was acting on his own initiative and, much to their consternation, not according to direction from his superiors in New York.[64] As such, it was unclear whether Morillon's stand at Srebrenica signaled a more aggressive and systematic defense of civilians. That said, Morillon's stunt did seem to spur the international community towards doing something about the humanitarian plight in areas beyond Sarajevo. In mid-April the Security Council declared Srebrenica a safe-area.[65] An agreement was then reached that saw Serb forces withdraw from around Srebrenica in return for certain guarantees from the United Nations. Within days a contingent of Canadian soldiers entered the city to protect the population.[66] Encouraged by the apparent success of the new approach, the Security Council subsequently designated Bihac, Gorazde, Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Zepa as safe-areas as well.[67] The other major development of this period was the decision to enforce the no-fly zone. After Serb planes bombed two Muslim villages, the U.S., Britain and France agreed on a new NATO directive that would have their aircraft shoot down any violators.[68] By the end of the month a U.N. resolution was passed to endorse the new policy.[69]

But the U.S. now wanted to go well beyond simple enforcement of the no-fly zone. Intent on shifting the balance-of-power on the ground, the Clinton

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[64] Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 140.
[65] U.N. S/RES/819 (16 April 1993).
[66] Paul Lewis, "U.N. Agrees to Declare Bosnian Town a Safe Haven," *New York Times*, 17 April 1993, A4; John F. Burns, "U.N. Says Enclave is 'Saved'; Bosnians Call it 'Surrender'," *ibid.*, 19 April 1993, A14; and Paul Koring, "Protect Town, Canadians Told," *Globe and Mail*, 23 April 1993, A1 and A2.
[67] U.N. S/RES/824 (6 May 1993).
[68] Paul Lewis, "U.N. Moving to Toughen Yugoslav Flight Ban," *New York Times*, 19 March 1993, A11.
[69] U.N. S/RES/816 (31 March 1993).

Administration began advocating the use of air strikes. Actually bombing Serb ground positions was a much more aggressive policy than UNPROFOR's contributing states were willing to accept, however. Noted Lord Owen, "It will be very difficult for the Europeans to take American suggestions of military action seriously until your forces are also on the ground as peacekeepers."[70] At the same time as it was arguing for a more robust military approach, the U.S. also began discussing the idea of lifting the U.N. embargo against weapons sales to the region. By the spring of 1993 it had become clear that the Bosnian Muslims were severely disadvantaged by the present arrangement. Regardless, the American proposal found virtually no constituency in any other country. France, in fact, indicated that it would veto any attempt to have the Security Council lift the embargo. Said a senior French official, "We are not going to accept an Afghanistan on the border of Italy."[71] Despite the strong protests it encountered on both fronts, 'lift and strike' became the mainstay of American policy for the next two years.

As the situation in Bosnia deteriorated throughout the spring of 1993, the major Western players continued to go in different directions. With U.N. troops more frequently coming under direct attack, France started campaigning for a modification in UNPROFOR's rules of engagement. Under the U.N. resolution that authorized the mission, UNPROFOR had to abide by standard peacekeeping procedures. The use of force was therefore only permitted in self-defense. France believed that these restrictions were now out of step with the situation on the ground and wanted

[70] Quoted in Craig R. Whitney, "A View From the Fence," *New York Times*, 28 April 1993, A11.
[71] Quoted in Elaine Sciolino, "Allies Still Resist Christopher on Call to Arm the Bosnians," *New York Times*, 4 May 1993, A18.

UNPROFOR soldiers to be given more clearly delineated war-making powers. Much to its surprise, the U.S. came out in opposition to tinkering with UNPROFOR's mandate.[72] Apparently the U.S. feared that if its allies became bogged down in a real war, the U.S. would end up having to intervene in order to get them out. How the American preference for offensive air strikes would have been less of a provocation is of course difficult to see.

Attempting to understand the Clinton Administration's policy towards Bosnia according to the dictates of logic would be a futile exercise, however, for it was patently clear that U.S. policy could change on a whim. After seeming to give the Bosnian war the highest priority throughout the first half of 1993, American allies were suddenly shocked to hear U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher declare, "Bosnia involves our humanitarian concerns, but it does not involve our vital interests in survival."[73] Although Christopher's statement reflected the reality of the situation, the subtext of his comments seemed to be that the United States would revert to a more hands-off policy in the future.

Meanwhile, Serb forces continued to conduct themselves wisely, backing off just enough whenever force was threatened to avoid incurring reprisals. It was a strategy that befuddled the West. Noted the *Economist*, "When the history books come to be written, Radovan Karadzic...may earn a reputation as the man who conducted the longest, bloodiest and most successful filibuster ever."[74] The peace

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[72] Claire Tréan, "Les occidentaux débattent des moyens d'arrêter la guerre en Bosnie," *Le Monde*, 9-10 May 1993, 1 and 3; and Elaine Sciolino, "U.S. and France Are Split on Role of U.N. in Bosnia," *New York Times*, 25 May 1993, A7.

[73] Quoted in Steven A. Holmes, "Backing Away Again, Christopher Says Bosnia Is Not a Vital Interest," *New York Times*, 4 June 1993, A12.

[74] "Filibuster Here, Terror There," *Economist*, 27 March 1993, 56.

process thus reassumed its prominence in the fall of 1993. For the time being, the West would offer the Bosnian Muslims nothing more.[75]

In late December 1993 a group of Canadian soldiers was briefly taken hostage by the Serbs and forced to undergo a mock execution.[76] The incident prompted several countries to seriously consider withdrawing their troops. After a year-and-a-half of operating in an extremely difficult and increasingly hostile environment, many states began to wonder what else could be done. Previous threats to withdraw had been regarded as negotiating tactics designed to force the Bosnian Muslims to the peace table or to encourage more direct American involvement. But there now seemed to be a greater sense of urgency surrounding the subject. Two factors worked against a general Western pullout, however. First, no NATO country wanted to abandon its alliance partners. The desire to act collectively thus diminished the possibility that one or two countries would unilaterally withdraw and trigger the start of a slow Western disengagement. Second, Western states could not possibly withdraw without undermining whatever credibility they possessed on the issue of human rights.

The Turn to Force

On 5 February 1994 the Markala central market in Sarajevo was hit with a mortar shell. Sixty-eight people were killed and more than one hundred wounded.[77] The

[75] Elaine Sciolino, "U.S. Offers Aid to Bosnia, But No Plan to End War," *New York Times*, 1 December 1993, A8.
[76] Chuck Sudetic, "Canadian Troops Report Ordeal in Serbian Hands," *New York Times*, 28 December 1993, A6.
[77] John Kifner, "66 Die as Shell Wrecks Sarajevo Market," *New York Times*, 6 February 1994, A1.

attack marked another major turning point for the international community. Said French Foreign Affairs Minister Alain Juppé, "What patience remained in Western capitals has disappeared as a result of this attack."[78] Four days later NATO issued an ultimatum demanding the Serbs withdraw their heavy weapons from around Sarajevo or face air strikes (NATO had just endorsed a new policy that would permit the use of air strikes on a selective basis). Serb forces were given ten days to respond.[79] Ultimately, the Serbs withdrew just enough equipment to avoid an attack. It soon became clear that further Serb transgressions would not simply be greeted by threats of military action, however. When four Serb planes violated the no-fly zone later in the month, all were shot down without warning.[80] And after a period of relative tranquility in the war throughout March, British troops destroyed a Serb bunker in an intense firefight that lasted several hours.[81]

In April 1994 the Serbs began concentrating their attacks on the Muslim enclave of Gorazde. The immediate international reaction was so weak that the shift to a tougher stance appeared to have been only temporary.[82] U.S. Secretary of Defence William Perry even said that NATO and the U.S. would not take action to prevent Gorazde's fall.[83] Feeling invulnerable, the Serbs stepped up their assault. But

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[78] Quoted in Roger Cohen, "NATO to Hold Emergency Talks on Sarajevo Attack," *New York Times*, 7 February 1994, A9.
[79] Roger Cohen, "NATO Gives Serbs a 10-Day Deadline to Withdraw Guns," *New York Times*, 10 February 1994, A1; Alain Frachon and Claire Tréan, "Washington et Paris veulent que l'OTAN lance un ultimatum aux Serbes," *Le Monde*, 10 February 1994, 3; and "The West Cries Enough," *Economist*, 12 February 1994, 43.
[80] Michael R. Gordon, "NATO Craft Down 4 Serb Warplanes Attacking Bosnia," *New York Times*, 1 March 1994, A1; and "A Glimmer in Bosnia," *Economist*, 5 March 1994, 51.
[81] Chuck Sudetic, "U.N. Troops Wreck Bosnian Serb Site," *New York Times*, 27 March 1994, A16.
[82] A more detailed account of the events at Gorazde can be found in Burg and Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, 146-154.
[83] Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Rules Out Using Force to Save Muslim Town," *New York Times*, 4 April 1994, A1.

Perry's comments unleashed such a firestorm of controversy that NATO was virtually compelled to act. Air strikes were subsequently carried out against Serb positions around the town. The attack was the first of its kind since the conflict had begun.[84] Little by little the coercive nature of international policy was intensifying.[85]

Over the next couple of months UNPROFOR found itself inexorably being dragged into combat situations. In two separate battles, one in Tuzla and the other in Gorazde, U.N. forces engaged Serb soldiers in heavy exchanges of fire. The Tuzla battle was the most intense clash to date. In an hours long engagement, eight Danish tanks fired seventy-two shells at Serb positions, killing nine Serb soldiers in the process. During the Gorazde firefight, British forces managed to kill three Serb soldiers. Neither the British nor the Danes suffered any casualties.[86] As the war intensified during the summer of 1994, however, there was little indication that anything significant (i.e., systematic in terms of military strategy) would be done to stop the punishing Serb offensive.

In fairness, it should be pointed out that NATO never had free rein to conduct military operations. A clear hierarchy of authority existed by which every military decision was subject to U.N. oversight. According to the agreed-upon procedure, which came to be known as the dual-key arrangement, NATO was only permitted to launch air strikes after two conditions were met. First, a formal request for air support

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[84] Chuck Sudetic, "2 NATO Jets Bomb the Serbs Besieging a Bosnian Haven; U.S. Warns of More Strikes," *New York Times*, 11 April 1994, A1.

[85] Philippe Lemaitre, "Les douze endorsent le 'plan d'action' français," *Le Monde*, 20 April 1994, 3; Paul Koring, "NATO Poised to Act on Bosnia," *Globe and Mail*, 21 April 1994, A1; and Craig R. Whitney, "NATO Warns Serbs to Cease Attacks or Face Bombings," *New York Times*, 23 April 1994, A1.

[86] Roger Cohen, "U.N. Says Its Forces Clashed With Serb Fighters in Gorazde," *New York Times*, 1 May 1994, A14; idem, "12 Serbs Dead in Two Fights With the U.N.," *ibid.*, 2 May 1994, A7; and Joel Brand, "U.N. Sends in Tanks to Destroy Serb Guns," *Times* (London), 2 May 1994, 9.

had to be made by the U.N. military commander on the ground. Second, the U.N. had to approve the request. In effect, this gave Yasushi Akashi, the senior U.N. official in Bosnia, a veto over air strikes. And Akashi did not hesitate to use it. On numerous occasions air strikes were called off after Akashi decided they were unwarranted. Akashi was apparently incapable of getting beyond the notion that the U.N. could be effective in any capacity other than as a completely neutral peacekeeper.

A new twist was added to the conflict in November 1994 when Serb forces began launching air strikes from inside Serbian held territory in Croatia. The attacks threatened to drag Croatia proper back into the fighting and turn what had become a localized conflict into a wider Balkan war once again (there had been very little fighting in Croatia since the summer of 1992). Acting swiftly, planes from the U.S., Britain, France and the Netherlands destroyed the airfield's runways and anti-aircraft defenses.[87] The same group of countries then bombed three Serb missile sites around the safe-area of Bihac.[88] As was now almost customary, another round of hostage taking by the Serbs followed. Seemingly eager to make the most of a bad situation, Boutros-Ghali suggested that it was time for the international force to quit Bosnia.[89] Several of the most prominent troop-contributing states echoed the sentiment. In a not so vague reference to the United States, Juppé criticized the "...governments that want to give us lessons when they have not lifted a little finger to put even one man

[87] Roger Cohen, "NATO, Expanding Bosnia Role, Strikes a Serbian Base in Croatia," *New York Times*, 22 November 1994, A1.
[88] Roger Cohen, "NATO Jets Hit Missiles as Serbs Gain in Bosnia," *New York Times*, 24 November 1994, A1; and Paul Koring, "NATO Jets Blast Serb Positions," *Globe and Mail*, 24 November 1994, A1.
[89] AP, Reuter and CP, "U.N. Chief Threatens to Quit Bosnia," *Globe and Mail*, 1 December 1994, A1.

on the ground."[90] 1994 thus drew to a close in much the same way as it had begun. As with every previous crisis, however, the ultimate result was not withdrawal but an even larger troop presence on the ground. Every humiliation only seemed to stiffen the backbone of the West.[91]

The Final Act

After a brief respite following the negotiation of a four-month ceasefire in late 1994,[92] the Bosnian war returned with a vengeance in the spring of 1995. By the end of March heavy fighting had again erupted around Bihac, Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Zepa. The worst fears of the previous fall were then realized when Croatian troops rejoined the battle by invading Serb-held territory in Croatia.[93] With the situation spiraling out of control and the withdrawal of UNPROFOR seeming ever more likely, NATO, largely at the behest of the United States, decided to re-enter the fray once again. In its largest attack to date, alliance planes struck a variety of targets, including a large arms depot near the Serb headquarters in Pale. The Serbs countered by seizing hundreds of U.N. peacekeepers.[94] The same scenario had played out so many times

[90] Quoted in Roger Cohen, "France Seeking Plan for Ending Bosnia Mission," *New York Times*, 8 December 1994, A1. Also AFP Reuter, "Le retrait des 'casques bleus' pourrait être 'plus rapide que prévu', déclare Alain Juppé," *Le Monde*, 8 December 1994, 3; and Florence Hartmann et Claire Tréan, "Bosnie: rester ou partir?" *ibid.*, 9 December 1994, 1.

[91] Laurent Zecchini, "Paris et Washington souhaitent le maintien des 'casques bleus' en Bosnie," *Le Monde*, 14 December 1994, 3.

[92] Stephen Kinzer, "Bosnian Muslims and Serbs Agree to Four-Month Truce," *New York Times*, 1 January 1995, A8.

[93] Roger Cohen, "Bosnian Army on the Attack, Breaking Truce," *New York Times*, 21 March 1995, A1; and idem, "Croatia Hits Area Rebel Serbs Hold, Crossing U.N. Lines," *ibid.*, 2 May 1995, A1.

[94] Roger Cohen, "NATO Jets Bomb Arms Depot at Bosnian Serb Headquarters," *New York Times*, 26 May 1995, A1; idem, "After a 2D Strike From NATO, Serbs Detain U.N. Troops," *ibid.*, 27 May 1995, A1; and Remy Ourdan, "L'OTAN riposte par de nouveaux raids aériens à un massacre commis par les Serbes de Bosnie," *Le Monde*, 27 May 1995, 1.

that it was almost incomprehensible that air strikes were undertaken while U.N. forces remained in areas highly vulnerable to Serb pressure.

In response to the crisis, France demanded that fundamental changes be made to the UNPROFOR operation, the most important of which were the relocation of all U.N. troops into more defensible positions and the deployment of a heavily armed rapid reaction force (between four and five thousand additional soldiers). Britain and the Netherlands quickly endorsed the plan and indicated that they too would contribute extra manpower and equipment.[95] The peacekeeping charade had finally come to an end. But a new fissure now threatened Western unity. Until June 1995 all of the countries with troops on the ground in Bosnia had attempted to stay as close to the principles of peacekeeping as possible. The decision by Britain, France and the Netherlands to deploy a rapid reaction force with robust rules of engagement dramatically ruptured this consensus.[96] One could be forgiven for dismissing the rapid reaction force as little more than bluster, however. Because of the still-functioning dual-key arrangement and continuing Franco-American discord over the type of response that should accompany any attack on the safe-areas, the Serbs were able to overrun both Srebrenica and Zepa in July without provoking any military response from the West.[97]

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[95] Craig R. Whitney, "France Demands Reinforcements," *New York Times*, 29 May 1995, A1 and A5; Remy Ourdan, "Les occidentaux envoient des renforts en Bosnie tout en cherchant à négocier avec Belgrade," *Le Monde*, 30 May 1995, 1; Jacques Isnard, "Une force de réaction rapide de 4000 hommes," *ibid.*, 1 June 1995, 2; and John Darnton, "Britain and France to Send More Troops," *New York Times*, 1 June 1995, A12.

[96] "A Balkan Quagmire Beckons," *Economist*, 3 June 1995, 41.

[97] AP, "Serbian Artillery Bombards Another Bosnian 'Safe Area'," *New York Times*, 7 July 1995, A10; "Ebbing Force," *Economist*, 8 July 1995, 44; Chris Hedges, "Bosnian Serbs Overrun Town Portected by U.N.," *New York Times*, 12 July 1995, A1; idem, "Bosnian Serbs Open Drive On a 2nd U.N. 'Safe Area'," *ibid.*, 14 July 1995, A8; "Les Serbes de Bosnie réclament le retrait des casque bleus de

After days of intense internal negotiations about how to proceed in the wake of these developments, NATO decided to issue an ultimatum concerning the next most vulnerable safe-area. Secretary of State Christopher laid down the conditions. "The Bosnian Serb leaders are now on notice that an attack against Gorazde will be met by substantial and decisive air power. There will be no more pinprick strikes," said Christopher.[98] Ten days later the pledge was extended to cover the remaining three safe-areas as well, with the alliance further stipulating that any response would not necessarily be confined to the immediate area of conflict.[99] As a final piece of administrative business, NATO and the U.N. agreed to modify the dual-key arrangement. Under the new procedure, U.N. civilian officials would no longer hold a veto over the decisions of military commanders.

Since NATO's previous threats had never amounted to very much, it was far from obvious that the alliance now meant business. The Serbs duly tested NATO's resolve once more. On 28 August another mortar shell was lobbed into the Markala market in downtown Sarajevo. The attack killed thirty-seven people and wounded close to one hundred. Two days later and without warning a massive series of air strikes was launched against Serb targets throughout Bosnia, including surface-to-air missile sites, artillery batteries, ammunition depots, and command and control centers. The rapid reaction force in Sarajevo simultaneously unleashed a heavy bombardment on Serb ammunition depots and heavy weapons in the hills around the

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Srebrenica," *Le Monde*, 12 July 1995, 3; and "Les Serbes profitent des hésitations occidentales pour poursuivre leur offensive en Bosnie," *ibid.*, 16-17 July 1995, 1.

[98] Quoted in John Darnton, "Accord in London," *New York Times*, 22 July 1995, A1.

[99] Craig R. Whitney, "Allies Extending Shield to Protect All Bosnia Havens," *New York Times*, 2 August 1995, A1; and "U.N. Warns Serbs on Threats to Enclaves," *ibid.*, 18 August 1995, A4.

city.[100] According to French President Jacques Chirac, the international community was no longer interested in minor Serb concessions on the placement of heavy weapons around the Bosnian capital. The objective now was to permanently break the siege of Sarajevo.[101]

After a brief suspension of the air campaign failed to induce the Serbs to withdraw their forces from around the city, NATO stepped up its attack, destroying key bridges, communication centers, and an elaborate system of air defenses in Serb controlled northwest Bosnia.[102] On 14 September the Serbs finally buckled and agreed to remove their heavy weapons from around Sarajevo, thereby allowing all supply routes to be reopened. In the span of just a few of weeks, NATO's air and artillery campaign, combined with the renewed Croat offensive, had dramatically changed the balance-of-power on the ground (the Serbs now controlled only about half of Bosnia's territory, down from the nearly seventy percent they held earlier in the year).[103] For the first time in more than three years, the Serbs were ready to negotiate seriously. All sides subsequently declared a ceasefire and agreed to hold intensive peace talks.[104] On 21 November, after more than four years of war, the

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[100] Roger Cohen, "NATO Jets Attack Serbian Positions Around Sarajevo," *New York Times*, 30 August 1995, A1 and A8; idem, "NATO Presses Bosnia Bombing, Vowing to Make Sarajevo Safe," *ibid.*, 31 August 1995, A1; Stacy Sullivan, Michael Evans and James Bone, "Aircraft and Artillery Blast Serbs in Allies' Fiercest Onslaught," *Times*, 31 August 1995, 1; Claire Tréan and Jacques Isnard, "Les occidentaux répliquent au carnage de Sarajevo par un bombardement massif des positions serbes," *Le Monde*, 31 August 1995, 1; and "NATO Declares War on the Bosnian Serbs," *Economist*, 2 September 1995, 41.

[101] Michael Evans, Eve-Ann Prentice and Susan Bell, "NATO Aircraft Renew Attack on the Serbs," *Times*, 1 September 1995, 1.

[102] Roger Cohen, "NATO Resumes Bombardment of Serbs," *New York Times*, 6 September 1995, A1; Elaine Sciolino, "NATO Raids Against Serbs Are Increased," *ibid.*, 8 September 1995, A14; and Eric Schmitt, "NATO Shifts Focus of Its Air Attacks on Bosnian Serbs," *ibid.*, 11 September 1995, A1.

[103] Roger Cohen, "Bosnia Serbs Agree to Pull Back Heavy Artillery From Sarajevo," *New York Times*, 15 September 1995, A1; and "An End in Sight, At Last," *Economist*, 23 September 1995, 43.

[104] "Endgame At Last?" *Economist*, 7 October 1995, 56; and Kit R. Roane, "Bosnia Cease-Fire Goes Into Effect as Pact is Signed," *New York Times*, 12 October 1995, A1.

Dayton Peace Accords were signed.[105] Within weeks NATO soldiers (ultimately numbering about fifty thousand) began arriving in Bosnia to police the ceasefire.

Somalia

War, Famine and International Apathy

By the time the world took notice of Somalia in the summer of 1992, the situation there was already quite serious.[106] For much of 1991 Somalia's civil war had been in abeyance, but its resumption in November of that year brought an intensified ferocity. The raw numbers tell a horrific story. Nearly one thousand people were reported killed in the Somali capital of Mogadishu alone in just the first ten days of fighting.[107] Close to two months would pass before the U.N. Security Council took action, at which point arms shipments to the country were banned and the flow of humanitarian aid increased.[108]

On this occasion the U.N.'s slow response was the product of more than Western indifference. A good part of the blame lay with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), a body perpetually suspicious of external interference in African affairs.[109] As far as the OAU was concerned, nothing good had ever come to Africa by way of the 'international community.' It thus did everything possible to keep Somalia off the Security Council's agenda. Eventually, the enormity of the crisis

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[105] "Peace At Last, At Least For Now," *Economist*, 25 November 1995, 23.
[106] A brief review of the political events that sparked the civil war can be found in John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995), chapter one.
[107] "Hundreds Slain in 5th Day of Strife in Somalia," *New York Times*, 22 November 1991, A9; and Jane Perlez, "Somali Capital a Grisly Battlefield as Civilians Die in Clan Warfare," *ibid.*, 29 November 1991, A12.
[108] U.N. S/RES/733 (23 January 1992).
[109] Hirsch and Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope*, 17.

eroded the OAU's resistance to the idea of international intervention. The situation was so bad, in fact, that African representatives at the U.N. soon found themselves actually leading the campaign for a stronger international response. Most significantly, they did so by invoking the Yugoslav precedent. Asserted Nigerian Foreign Minister Ike Nwachukwu, "Africa must receive the same qualitative and quantitative attention paid to other regions."[110] Facing intense pressure to do something, the Security Council decided to create a technical mission to explore the possibility of sending a U.N. force to the country.[111] One month later the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) was established. Under the UNOSOM plan, fifty unarmed observers would be immediately dispatched, with five hundred peacekeepers to potentially follow.[112]

By the time of their arrival in late July, the scale of the problem had far surpassed the unarmed observers' capabilities.[113] Dismayed by the lack of attention Somalia was receiving in Western capitals, Boutros-Ghali sent a strongly worded letter to the Security Council. Wrote the Secretary-General, "The United Nations must adapt its involvement in Somalia. Its efforts need to be enlarged so that it can help bring about an effective ceasefire throughout the country." Added Mohammed Sahnoun, the U.N. special envoy to Somalia, "Why can't we have the United Nations airlift operations the way they do in Sarajevo to avoid kids dying?"[114] The campaign

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[110] Quoted in Paul Lewis, "Security Council Weighs Role in Somali Civil War," *New York Times*, 18 March 1992, A9.
[111] U.N. S/RES/746 (17 March 1992).
[112] U.N. S/RES/751 (24 April 1992).
[113] Jane Perlez, "U.N. Observer Unit to Go to Somalia," *New York Times*, 20 July 1992.
[114] Boutros-Ghali and Sahnoun cited in Seth Faison, "U.N. Head Proposes Expanded Efforts For Somalia Relief," *New York Times*, 25 July 1992, A1.

to embarrass the West into doing more worked. On 27 July the Security Council approved a more substantive airlift.[115]

Merely delivering additional food and medicine to Somalia was no guarantee that the famine would be alleviated. Because it made the looting of aid convoys even more profitable, an increase in aid tended to make distribution more difficult. To do the job effectively, the U.N. would have to protect the relief convoys. After weeks of delicate negotiations with Somalia's warlords, Sahnoun finally secured an agreement to this effect. The arrangement called for the deployment of five hundred Pakistani 'blue berets.'[116] Convinced the force was not nearly strong enough, Boutros-Ghali immediately began lobbying for an additional three thousand soldiers. With Somalia quickly becoming the number one international news story, the Security Council promptly consented.[117] Unfortunately, as is so often the case with the U.N., words did not necessarily amount to action. Three months after its passage, none of the additional forces authorized by Resolution 775 had even departed for Somalia. Belgian and Canadian soldiers stood ready to go, but were prevented from doing so by the U.N.'s inability to arrange for their security. As of November, then, the only U.N. soldiers in Somalia were the five hundred Pakistani peacekeepers that had arrived in mid-September.[118]

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[115] U.N. S/RES/767 (27 July 1992).
[116] Jane Perlez, "Somali Warlord Agrees to Allow U.N. to Protect Its Relief Supplies," *New York Times*, 13 August 1992, A1.
[117] "U.N. Chief Asks a Force of 3,500 for Somalia," *New York Times*, 26 August 1992, A5; and U.N. S/RES/775 (28 August 1992).
[118] Jane Perlez, "Armed U.N. Troops Arrive in Somalia," *New York Times*, 15 September 1992, A10; and "The Squeezing of Sahnoun," *Economist*, 7 November 1992, 50.

Operation Restore Hope

By the fall of 1992 the Somali famine had reached epic proportions. Western states suddenly found themselves virtually compelled to act. All eyes subsequently turned towards the United States, the only country capable of addressing the problem in any meaningful way. After carefully reviewing the situation with his military advisors, President Bush notified the United Nations that the U.S. was prepared to send a force of up to thirty thousand soldiers to Somalia to help with the delivery of relief supplies.[119] Following a week of logistical planning and diplomatic consultations, the Secretary-General and the Security Council agreed to endorse the proposal. On 3 December 1992 the U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) was formally authorized.[120]

Although UNITAF did occasionally resort to the use of force against pockets of Somali resistance, Operation Restore Hope generally went smoothly. The U.S. and U.N. found themselves in sharp disagreement as the mission progressed, however. The United States maintained that American troops were in Somalia to merely restore a basic modicum of order. Once this was accomplished, control would be handed back to the United Nations, which would then implement and oversee a more traditional peacekeeping and peacebuilding operation. Boutros-Ghali, meanwhile, wanted the United States to adopt a more comprehensive approach. In the Secretary-General's opinion, everything the United States and the international community had done would be for naught unless Somalia's warlords and clans were disarmed and

[119] David Binder, "Bush Ready to Send Troops to Protect Somalia Food," *New York Times*, 26 November 1992, A1 and A10.
[120] U.N. S/RES/794 (3 December 1992).

permanently removed from the political scene. Ultimately, Boutros-Ghali was unable to get the U.S. to buy into a more expansive undertaking. UNITAF was thus duly replaced by UNOSOM II at the end of April 1993.[121]

The Descent into War

Of the four thousand U.S. soldiers that remained in Somalia after the transition to UNOSOM II, most were assigned tasks related to logistical support.[122] As Boutros-Ghali had feared, it did not take long for the situation to deteriorate. Almost immediately upon the Americans' departure, clan leader Mohammed Farah Aidid began to reestablish a military presence in Mogadishu. For Aidid, UNOSOM II had only one purpose: the curtailment of his political power. As such, it was imperative that the U.N. be driven out of Somalia. To this end, on 5 June Aidid's forces ambushed a U.N. patrol. When the dust settled, twenty-four Pakistani soldiers lay dead.[123] Shocked by the attack's sheer barbarity and worried about the implications for other peacekeeping operations, the Security Council immediately passed a resolution calling for the arrest and punishment of those responsible.[124] The U.N.'s military role would have to be expanded once again. Said an American official, "We've been challenged. The U.N. has no other options."[125]

Beginning on 11 June and continuing for almost a week, U.S. aircraft, supported by non-American ground forces (Italian, Moroccan, and Pakistani), led

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[121] U.N. S/RES/814 (26 March 1993).
[122] Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Plans to Leave Troops to Back U.N. Somalia Unit," *New York Times*, 30 April 1993, A10.
[123] AP, "26 U.N. Troops Reported dead in Somali Combat," *New York Times*, 6 June 1993, A6.
[124] U.N. S/RES/837 (6 June 1993).
[125] Quoted in Donatella Lorch, "Tension Growing in Somali Capital," *New York Times*, 9 June 1993, A13.

attacks on Aidid's compounds throughout Mogadishu.[126] Aidid would prove to be a much more elusive figure than the U.N. had anticipated, however. Moreover, his military strength was considerable, as evidenced by the fierce battles in which Aidid's forces continually engaged U.N. troops. In one of the more serious encounters, three Italian soldiers were killed and twenty wounded.[127] The incident prompted Italy, which was now the third largest troop provider, to threaten withdrawal. From the Italian perspective, the U.S. had wrongly turned the relief mission into a combat operation.[128] As far as the U.N. and U.S. were concerned, it was naïve to think that the U.N. could or should remain neutral when it was the Somalis who had first attacked U.N. forces. Noted a U.N. official, "This is not a humanitarian relief operation gone wrong. The humanitarian relief operation went well and it is over. We're into a new phase now."[129]

Just how much the mission had changed became clear when the U.S. dispatched four hundred elite Special Forces soldiers to the theater in late August. Although the unit did succeed in capturing a number of high-ranking clan members during its first few weeks of operations, its primary target (Aidid) remained at large.[130] Under intense pressure to produce more tangible results, the Special Forces embarked on their most daring mission to date. Based on an intelligence report that

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[126] Donatella Lorch, "U.S. Aircraft Again Attack Somali Faction's Arms Sites," *New York Times*, 15 June 1993, A12; and idem, "U.N. Attack in Mogadishu Follows Hours of Bombing by U.S.," *ibid.*, 18 June 1993, A1.
[127] AP, "3 U.N. Soldiers Die in Somali Ambush," *New York Times*, 3 July 1993, A3.
[128] Alan Cowell, "Italy, In U.N. Rift, Threatens Recall of Somalia Troops," *New York Times*, 16 July 1993, A1.
[129] Quoted in Donatella Lorch, "Somali Showdown," *New York Times*, 11 August 1993, A2.
[130] Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Troops Fire on Somalis; Death Toll May Reach 100," *New York Times*, 10 September 1993; Donatella Lorch, "U.S. Troops Arrest Somali Warlord's Top Aide," *ibid.*, 22 September 1993, A5; and Reuters, "3 Killed as U.S. Chopper is Shot Down in Somalia," *ibid.*, 25 September 1993, A2.

many of Aidid's key advisors would be gathered for a meeting at a central Mogadishu hotel, a late afternoon raid was scheduled. The first stage of the operation (the arrest of those attending the meeting) went fairly well. The situation quickly deteriorated, however, once two of the assault team's helicopters were shot down over the target site. In the all-night battle that followed, eighteen U.S. soldiers were killed and about eighty wounded. Somali casualties were estimated at between five hundred and one thousand killed, with similar numbers wounded.

By any tangible measure the Americans had gotten the better of the fight. In addition to the incredibly lopsided casualty ratio, a large number of Aidid's key people had been captured. Yet it was the Somalis who had really won. Televised images of dead U.S. soldiers being mutilated and dragged through the streets of Mogadishu sent convulsions through the United States. There was now no question that the U.S. would withdraw. Within days President Clinton announced that all American troops would leave Somalia inside of six months. Despite a momentary increase in troop strength, the nature of the mission from that point on was very different, as Clinton called off the hunt for Aidid and halted the campaign to disarm the warring factions.[131]

With American military power eliminated from the equation, the U.N. mission would be forced to drastically change. It thus came as no surprise when the U.N. also abandoned the search for Aidid.[132] All the same, it was somewhat shocking to see just

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[131] Thomas L. Friedman, "Clinton Sending More Troops to Somalia: A Firm Deadline for a Pullout Will be Set," *New York Times*, 7 October 1993, A1; and Douglas Jehl, "U.S. Shifts Troops to Defensive Role in Somalia Mission," *ibid.*, 20 October 1993, A1.

[132] U.N. S/RES/885 (16 November 1993); and Paul Lewis, "Search for Aidid Officially Ended," *New York Times*, 17 November 1993, A3.

how readily both the U.N. and U.S. reversed course and accepted Aidid as a fundamental player in the Somali political process. In December 1993 an American plane even transported Aidid to peace talks in neighboring Ethiopia. Evidently, the operative word now was peacebuilding. It remained unclear when the United Nations departed Somalia in March 1995 as to whether these efforts could be considered a success.

Rwanda and Zaire

Genocide and International Indifference

On 6 April 1994 a plane carrying the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi was shot down as it approached the Kigali airport in Rwanda. The leaders were returning from peace talks with other African leaders in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.[133] Within hours of the incident, radical Rwandan Hutu militias began butchering Tutsis and moderate Hutus.[134] By the middle of April more than one hundred thousand people were dead (the final death toll would exceed eight hundred thousand). As the slaughter continued unabated throughout April, the international community stood by and watched. At one point the U.N. Security Council even voted to reduce the already meager number of troops the U.N. had stationed in Rwanda.[135]

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[133] Paul Lewis, "2 Africa Leaders Die, U.N. Says; Rocket May Have Downed Plane," *New York Times*, 7 April 1994, A1.

[134] William E. Schmidt, "Troops Rampage in Rwanda; Dead Said to Include Premier," *New York Times*, 8 April 1994, A1; and idem, "Terror Convulses Rwandan Capital as Tribes Battle," *ibid.*, 9 April 1994, A1.

[135] Paul Lewis, "Security Council Votes to Cut Rwanda Peacekeeping Force," *New York Times*, 22 April 1994, A1. For a more detailed account of the international response during this period see Gérard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 273-276.

Only after close to a month had passed did the Security Council begin to reconsider its hands-off approach. Yet precipitous action would not soon be forthcoming. Due to American intransigence about the scope of the proposed operation (the U.S. wanted to limit the mission to delivering humanitarian relief into Kigali), the dispatch of an intervention force was delayed indefinitely.[136] That the United States had no intention of even participating in the operation infuriated African states. As the debate raged over how best to resolve the impasse, the killing continued.

Opération Turquoise

The first sign of resolute action did not come until mid-June when France offered to lead an intervention force. Declared French Foreign Affairs Minister Alain Juppé, "If massacres continue and if the ceasefire is not respected, I say today that France, along with its main European and African partners, is prepared to launch a ground intervention to protect groups threatened with extinction."[137] Because of France's political connections to the Hutu forces responsible for carrying out the genocide, the idea found far less support than France had hoped. Senegal, in fact, was the only other country to express any interest in the French proposal.[138] The reaction of Belgian Defense Minister Leo Delcroix was typical of that expressed throughout Europe and

[136] Paul Lewis, "U.S. Opposes Plan for U.N. Force in Rwanda," *New York Times*, 12 May 1994, A9; and idem, "U.N. Backs Troops for Rwanda But Terms Ban Any Action Soon," *ibid.*, 17 May 1994, A1.
[137] Quoted in Reuters, "France May Move In to End Rwanda Killing," *New York Times*, 16 June 1994, A12. Also Marie-Pierre Subtil, "La France pourrait prendre l'initiative d'une intervention au Rwanda," *Le Monde*, 17 June 1994, 1.
[138] Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, *The International Dimension of Genocide in Rwanda* (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 81-82.

Africa. "France took sides much more than our country and that's why the French initiative should be looked at with the necessary caution," said Delcroix.[139] Particularly suspect was the timing of the proposal, since it came just as the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF - Tutsi rebels) was beginning to make major gains in its battle with the Hutu government. Ultimately, and in spite of the widespread misgivings, the Security Council gave its blessing to the French operation. After having done nothing for more than two months and with no other option currently on the table, the U.N. could hardly do otherwise.[140]

French forces conducted themselves rather well during the initial stages of Operation Turquoise. Among the first beneficiaries of the French intervention was a group of eight thousand Tutsis, which came as a great surprise to nearly everyone concerned. Even more unexpected was the French attempt to disarm several Hutu militias.[141] Doubts about France's impartiality quickly emerged, however, once French paratroopers set up their lines so as to block the advancement of RPF soldiers towards the few remaining Hutu-controlled areas (these sectors included not just innocent civilians but also many of the radical Hutu militiamen responsible for the genocide). The commander of French forces even issued a warning to the Tutsi rebels. Said Colonel Didier Thibaut, "If the RPF comes here and threatens the

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[139] Quoted in Alan Riding, "France Seeks Partners for Rwandan Venture," *New York Times*, 17 June 1994, A8. Also AFP Reuter, "Le secrétaire général de l'ONU soutient la proposition de M. Juppé," *Le Monde*, 19-20 June 1994, 4.

[140] Afsané Bassir Pour and Alain Frachon, "Le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU à approuvé de justesse la résolution présentée par la France," *Le Monde*, 24 June 1994, 5.

[141] Marlise Simons, "French Soldiers in Rwanda Report Finding Mass Graves," *New York Times*, 25 June 1994, A5; and Reuters, "French Paratroopers Disarm Rwanda Militias, Saying They Are Allies of Neither Tribe," *ibid.*, 26 June 1994, A10.

population, we will open fire against them without any hesitation."[142] Fortunately, cooler heads prevailed on the political front. President Mitterand hastily backed away from the pursuit of any overt role in the war, wisely taking notice of the fact that the local balance-of-power had permanently shifted.[143] A short while later France informed the Security Council that it would soon be withdrawing and turning control over to the U.N.[144] Meanwhile, fearing Tutsi reprisals, thousands of Hutus began pouring into neighboring Zaire. Among them were many of the government officials and soldiers responsible for the genocide.[145]

Zaire 1996

By November 1996 Zaire's refugee camps were home to more than one million Rwandan Hutus. In addition to being extremely unsanitary, the camps had become the scene of increasing violence, much of it perpetrated by the many displaced Hutu militiamen who, for all intents and purposes, were the governing authority within the camps. In the absence of a major international effort, another large-scale loss of human life seemed likely. As before, France was first off the mark in proposing a military intervention.[146] For the most part, however, the French call to arms fell on

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[142] Quoted in Raymond Bonner, "French Establish a Base in Rwanda to Block Rebels," *New York Times*, 5 July 1994, A1.
[143] Jacques Isnard, "Le dispositif 'Turquoise' passé de l'humanitaire au sécuritaire," *Le Monde*, 6 July 1994, 3; and Raymond Bonner, "France Backs Away From Battle in Rwanda," *New York Times*, 6 July 1994, A6.
[144] AFP, "Balladur et Juppé, à l'ONU, tentent d'accélérer le déploiement des 'casque bleus'," *Le Monde*, 12 July 1994, 5; and Paul Lewis, "France Calls Rwanda Mission a Success; Asks for U.N. Force," *New York Times*, 12 July 1994, A8.
[145] Raymond Bonner, "Rwandan Refugees Flood Zaire as Rebel Forces Gain," *New York Times*, 15 July 1994, A1.
[146] AFP Reuter, "Les combats dans l'est du Zaire entraînent le pays dans le chaos," *Le Monde*, 2 November 1996, 1.

deaf ears.[147] Appalled by the international community's general indifference, Boutros-Ghali made an impassioned plea for some type of military response. "Now we are confronted by a new genocide – I will call it a genocide by starvation. So we must act, and we must act immediately," said the Secretary-General.[148] Another U.N. diplomat implored, "Have we learnt nothing from the catastrophes of the past few years?"[149] In the case of the United States, the answer appeared to be no.

Just when it seemed the American stance would prevail (thanks to its Security Council veto), a Canadian initiative broke the impasse. Unlike the French proposal, the Canadian plan required the U.S. to only supply logistical support (airlifting foreign troops and securing the airport).[150] After a couple of days of intense lobbying by Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, the U.S. finally agreed to take part.[151] With U.S. support ensured, the Security Council unanimously authorized the use of "all necessary means" to save the refugees.[152] If everything went according to plan, the operation would be up and running within days. As the *Economist* noted, "...the humanitarian imperative once again is dragging in the armies of the rich, even before their screens have been filled with images of disease and death among the 1m-plus refugees in Eastern Zaire."[153]

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[147] Steven Erlanger, "U.S. May Send Troops to Zaire to Aid Those Fleeing Fighting," *New York Times*, 6 November 1996, A8; and "La communauté internationale prépare une intervention limitée au Zaire," *Le Monde*, 7 November 1996, 7.
[148] Quoted in Anne McIlroy, "U.S. Not Ready to Back Zaire Force," *Globe and Mail*, 9 November 1996, A16.
[149] Quoted in Afsané Bassir Pour, "La France a du mal à convaincre l'ONU de l'urgence d'une intervention au Zaire," *Le Monde*, 8 November 1996, 7.
[150] Jeff Sallot, "Canada Offers to Lead Aid Force," *Globe and Mail*, 12 November 1996, A1; and Barbara Crossette, "Canada Proposes Zaire Aid Force," *New York Times*, 13 November 1996, A1.
[151] Alison Mitchell, "Clinton Offers U.S. Troops to Help Refugees in Zaire," *New York Times*, 14 November 1996, A1.
[152] U.N. S/RES/1080 (15 November 1996); and Paul Knox, "U.N. Authorizes Zaire Rescue Force," *Globe and Mail*, 16 November 1996, A1.
[153] "The World Makes Up Its Mind(s) About Zaire," *Economist*, 16 November 1996, 39.

The unexpected then happened just as the force was readying to depart. Zairian rebels routed the Hutu gangs and sent the masses heading back to Rwanda. At that point, the Rwandan government decided that military intervention was no longer necessary and withdrew its support for the operation.[154] In light of the changed circumstances, the U.S. also began to reconsider its commitment. Said Defense Secretary William Perry, "We are not the salvation army. It is possible that our plan and that of our allies will be modified in light of recent developments."[155] In the end, a large and mostly non-military international humanitarian relief operation was undertaken.

Analysis

Assessing Normative Evolution

To conclude that a more precipitous international response towards each of these humanitarian crises would have prevented a great deal of human suffering is to state the obvious. Had Serb aggression in Bosnia in the spring of 1992 been met with the kind of response that came in the summer of 1995, it is unlikely that there would ever have been a protracted Bosnian war. Certainly hundreds of thousands of lives would have been saved in Somalia had the world not waited until December 1992 to meaningfully address the problem of inadequately protected food distribution

[154] James C. McKinley Jr., "Hundreds of Thousands of Exiles Pour Back Toward Rwanda," *New York Times*, 16 November 1996, A1 and A6; Dominique Le Guilledoux, "Les Hutus réfugies dans les camps du Zaire regagnent massivement le Rwanda," *Le Monde*, 17-18 November 1996, 1 and 2; Afsané Bassir Pour, "L'ONU vote à l'unanimité l'envoi de la force multinationale," *ibid.*, 17-18 November 1996, 1; and "The Great Escape," *Economist*, 23 November 1996, 45.

[155] Quoted in Dominique Le Guilledoux, "Le reflux des réfugies hutus remet en question les objectifs de l'intervention au Zaire," *Le Monde*, 19 November 1996, 3.

networks. As for Rwanda, it is now widely acknowledged that a force of just five to ten thousand soldiers could have prevented that country's terrible genocide. To judge the outcome of these cases as anything but evidence of collective failure on the part of the international community would thus appear to be an exercise in denial. That said, normative change rarely comes about abruptly in the international political realm. With this caveat in mind, what else might be said about the events in question?

The Yugoslav case is particularly intriguing. Initially, the international community had absolutely no intention of militarily intervening in Croatia. By the fall of 1991, however, that sentiment had given way to a newfound humanitarian zeal, the ultimate result of which was the dispatch of U.N. peacekeepers to both Croatia and Bosnia. At first, most states were wary about any action that strayed too far from the traditional practice of peacekeeping. Nevertheless, it wasn't long before more vigorous military measures were adopted. Beginning in the summer of 1992 and continuing for the next two years, the international community experimented with everything from the forced delivery of humanitarian relief to the military enforcement of the no-fly zone, the creation of safe-areas, and the threat of air strikes. When NATO issued its ten-day ultimatum to Serb forces after the Markala market massacre in February 1994, it did so against the backdrop of almost two years of growing impatience with the Serbian war strategy of targeting civilians. While the West had not yet embraced the idea of humanitarian war, it had definitely abandoned any pretence of acting as an impartial observer, rhetoric notwithstanding. Hence, dramatic and decisive as the events of August and September 1995 were, the slide towards

military humanitarian intervention can actually be traced back to the summer of 1991 when the idea of intervention first found its way onto the international agenda.

A similar evolution is evident in the Somali case. Over the relatively short time span of one year, three distinct international policies can be identified. During the first stage (November 1991 to July 1992), the Somali civil war and famine was essentially ignored. Then came the idea for some sort of second-generation peacekeeping mission akin to the one in Bosnia (August to November 1992). Finally, when this approach proved ineffective, a sizeable multinational force primed for combat was deployed (from December 1992 on). As disappointing as the final outcome in Somalia was, the fact that the international community had managed to mobilize a military intervention to bring one of the worst famines of the twentieth century to an end was a watershed development in world politics. Observed the *Economist* at the time, "...the immediate operation is humanitarian, without any ulterior, or political, motive; no outside power stands to gain any conceivable advantage."[156]

Difficult as it is to find any redeeming value in the international community's response to the Rwandan genocide, Rwanda's enduring impact on international sensibilities was profound. The heightened level of concern and activity that many states displayed in response to the emerging crisis in the refugee camps of Zaire was a direct result of the feelings of shame and guilt associated with having done nothing in Rwanda. Outside states had to be dragged into Yugoslavia and Somalia. Zaire,

[156] "When the Coaxing Had to Stop," *Economist*, 5 December 1992, 16.

conversely, represented the first instance in which the international community tried to head off an impending humanitarian disaster.

Collectively, these cases offer compelling evidence of a profound normative change in international politics. In the span of just a few years, military humanitarian intervention went from being a subject almost exclusively discussed within the realm of ideal political theory to reality. Along the way, the international community radically altered the balance-of-power between the rights of states and the rights of people. And while it is still much too early to state with any measure of confidence where military humanitarian intervention may be headed in the future, there is little sense in ignoring the already important normative transformation that has taken place.

Testing Systemic Theories

At first glance, neorealism's focus on hegemonic leadership appears to square well with the role that the United States played in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia. On closer examination, however, neorealism is found to be severely wanting. That American military power was the decisive factor in the ultimate resolution of the Bosnian War and Somali famine is beyond dispute. But this is really just a matter of norm implementation, not structural normative influence. Realists, no doubt, would contend that implementation is what counts, since norms are simply inconsequential unless they are enforced.[157] Practically speaking there is an element of truth in this

[157] This seems to be the argument of Stephen Krasner, who says of the development of human rights regimes over the last two hundred years, "Only when powerful states enforced principles and norms were international human rights regimes consequential." See "Sovereignty, Regimes, and Human Rights," in Volker Rittberger, ed., *Regime Theory and International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 139-167; 141.

position. From a theoretical standpoint, though, process is everything. To suggest otherwise amounts to endorsing the view that it matters not how one is able to explain a particular outcome.[158] With respect to the case at hand, then, it is easy to see where neorealism comes up short, for the leadership role that is central to the neorealist position is conspicuously absent if one considers American policy in its totality. Save for the December 1992 period in Somalia and periodic moments during the Bosnian war, the U.S. consistently lagged behind most of its Western allies on the issue of using military force for humanitarian purposes. Neorealism thus offers a rather weak interpretation of the normative dynamics at work in the cases at hand.

The institutionalist explanation is similarly deficient. True, the U.N., NATO and the E.C./E.U. were all involved in the diplomatic efforts that surrounded the international response to the different crises and wars in question. Still, this is far from satisfactory evidence by which to confirm the institutionalist argument. To accomplish this, one must be able to demonstrate that the relevant institution(s) actually played some part in structuring the eventual outcome. In other words, there should be evidence that the international response would have been appreciably different in the absence of these institutions; that is, even greater interstate discord and a slower transformation, if any at all, in the international approach towards intervention.

Unfortunately for institutionalist theory, the most generous reading of the evidence does not suggest that the outcome would have been much different in a

[158] As Paul Schroeder observes, "A theory, to be valid, needs not merely to predict a general outcome, but to explain its development and etiology..." See "Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory," *International Security* 19:1 (Summer 1994), 108-148, 140.

world without any of these institutions. While unquestionably the hub of diplomatic activity during each crisis and war, the United Nations was, for all intents and purposes, epiphenomenal. Except for a fleeting moment in the summer of 1992 when the organization took center stage in advocating deeper international involvement with the Somali crisis, the U.N. exerted virtually no influence over the direction of international policy. In effect, only when states wanted it to be so was the U.N. at all consequential. As for the E.C./E.U., it is difficult to judge its performance as being anything but completely irrelevant. Despite all of the talk about building a common foreign and security policy and early efforts to deal collectively with the wars in Slovenia and Croatia, the level of discord between major European states could hardly have been any worse. The result: by early 1992 the E.C. ceased to be a consequential actor in the whole affair.

Of the three institutions in question, only NATO appears to have made any difference. That said, it would be patently incorrect to claim that international involvement in the former Yugoslavia was precipitated or evolved in the way it did because of NATO, for NATO only became a factor long after the Western powers found themselves immersed in the conflict. And its impact at that point was rather limited (primarily organizational), since NATO had little to do with determining what military intervention would actually look like. NATO's significance in the grand scheme of norm diffusion was thus not particularly consequential.

As the next three chapters will demonstrate, the nature of the process is far from inexplicable. Once the concept of state identity is brought into the picture, the

policy trajectory both of individual states and the international community takes on a very predictable form.

Chapter Three

Canada

While the entire world must grapple with the realities of American power, no state finds itself in quite the same position as Canada. In addition to having to cope with American military and economic power, Canada must also wrestle with American cultural power in a manner not well understood by any country that is fortuitous enough to be separated from the U.S. by language and/or geography. What it means to be Canadian in a country constantly bombarded with American television, movies, music, magazines, and news is not always clear. What is more, all of this plays out against the backdrop of Canada's own political problems. By no means has the Canadian experience yet yielded a state bereft of fissiparous forces. Regional and linguistic disputes continue to menace the construction of a politically and socially unified country.

In light of these factors, it should not come as much of a surprise to learn that Canada suffers from an acute 'identity crisis.' Yet there is at least one realm in which Canadian identity is rather well defined. When it comes to matters of international affairs, Canadians strongly subscribe to the view that their country occupies a special place in the international system. Canada, quite simply, sees itself as the world's

leading liberal internationalist state.[1] A 1992 survey, for example, found that 90 percent of Canadians "...see their country as a world leader in terms of its efforts to promote peace and security."[2] No activity has done more to reinforce this belief than Canada's near perfect record of participation in United Nations sponsored peacekeeping operations. The association between Canada and peacekeeping is so strong, in fact, that peacekeeping has come to be seen as the principal material manifestation of the country's international identity. When the 1988 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to U.N. peacekeeping forces in recognition of their years of service, Canadians the country over hailed the decision as tantamount to the Nobel committee having singled out Canada for the award. As a prominent Canadian historian notes, peacekeeping is "...the sine qua non of Canadian nationalism."[3]

I contend that Canadian policy in the cases at hand is best understood as a product of this identity, the effects of which, moreover, reverberated throughout the international system. As an early advocate of military intervention in Croatia, Bosnia, Somalia, and Zaire, Canada played an important role in structuring the international community's approach towards humanitarian intervention. At key points in time when support for intervention was either nonexistent or very weak, Canada stepped forward to push the idea of 'second-generation' peacekeeping, the notion that U.N. soldiers should not only monitor ceasefires, but also serve as a constructive force in

[1] The fact that one could compile a litany of statistical data to prove otherwise is of little consequence. When the issue is identity politics, perception, even if constructed on a bedrock of myth, is all that really matters.

[2] Angus E. Reid and Margaret M. Burns, *Canada and the World: An International Perspective on Canada and Canadians* (Toronto: Angus Reid Group, 1992), 88.

[3] J.L. Granatstein, "Peacekeeping: Did Canada Make a Difference? And What Difference Did Peacekeeping Make to Canada?" in John English and Norman Hillmer, eds. *Making a Difference? Canada's Foreign Policy in a Changing World Order* (Toronto: Lester Publishing, 1992), 222-236; 232.

the search for peace (something between peacekeeping and peacemaking). Canada's fidelity to the guiding principles of traditional peacekeeping (neutrality and restraint with respect to the use of force) persisted even after it became clear that such an approach would never resolve the disputes in question. As a result, Canada tended to recede into the background of international policy-making as time went by and more forceful options came under consideration. In virtually every respect, Canada's peacekeeping identity rose to the fore.

The chapter is divided into three parts. In the first section I explore the development of Canada's international identity, paying particular attention to the post-World War Two period and the rise of liberal internationalism as the dominant ideology of Canadian foreign policy. The second section discusses Canada's response to each of the humanitarian crises under examination. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the state identity approach.

State Identity and Canadian Foreign Policy

Identity in Formation

Canada's contemporary international identity began to take shape the moment that Britain's northernmost North American colonies declined to take part in the American Revolution. The decision to stay loyal to Britain had two effects. First, and most immediately, it forced the remaining British North American colonies to define the U.S. as a threat. For more than a century thereafter, the menace posed by the United States' belief in its own manifest destiny would hang over British North America like the sword of Damocles. Second, it virtually guaranteed that any future

independent Canadian state would, at least for a short while, remain tethered to Britain in matters of international affairs.[4]

For successive generations of post-Confederation English Canadians, participation in Britain's wars was simply a matter of imperial duty, the government's official policy notwithstanding.[5] To say that French Canadians, most of whom were fervently anti-British, held a different perspective on the matter would be an understatement. Thanks to events well beyond the control of Canada, the tensions produced by these opposing views would boil to the surface on three separate occasions between 1899 and 1945. Along the way, Canada's international identity would be transformed.

With war looming in South Africa as summer drew to a close in 1899, Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier's first instinct was to declare that Canada would play no part in the affair. "There is no menace to Canada," stated Laurier.[6] A French Canadian himself, Laurier well understood the prevailing sentiment inside Quebec. Once hostilities erupted in October, however, that position became completely untenable. Encouraged by a jingoistic press, English Canadians vociferously demanded that the government send a contingent of Canadian soldiers to aid the British. For Laurier, the political stakes were extremely high. The constitutional bargain between French and English Canadians was still very fragile. If the government were to align itself with one side at the other's expense, the result could be disastrous.

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[4] Since the remaining British North American colonies were bound to develop strong affinities towards all things British, it is likely that this would have been the case even had Canada received full independent diplomatic powers at the time of Confederation in 1867.

[5] Post-Confederation Canadian governments consistently rejected the idea of establishing a closer and more formal defense relationship with Britain.

[6] Quoted in Laurier L. Lapierre, *Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the Romance of Canada* (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing Co. Limited, 1996), 266.

Ultimately, Laurier struck what he considered to be a reasonable compromise. Parliament would not be asked to approve the dispatch of Canadian troops. Instead, an order in council would be issued whereby the government would merely equip and transport a wholly volunteer force of one thousand soldiers. To Laurier's French Canadian detractors, the order in council represented a distinction without a difference. That may well have been the case, but on this occasion Laurier was convinced that national unity was best served by leaning towards English Canada. Explained the prime minister to one of his Quebec colleagues, "Public feeling in the English provinces is too strong to be opposed. We cannot afford to challenge the sentiments of the country."[7]

By the time the war ended in May 1902, more than seven thousand Canadian volunteers had been sent to South Africa. The Canadians' record in combat had been impressive, earning them much praise from their British commanders.[8] Nevertheless, the war far from reinforced the bonds of Anglo-Canadian unity. By engendering a spirit of self-confidence among English Canadians, the Boer War actually fostered Canada's sense of independence. On the downside, the war left a bitter legacy between English and French Canadians. As far as French Canadian nationalists were concerned, Laurier's compromise was nothing less than a betrayal.

A little more than ten years later Canada was at war again, this time in Europe. Canada's experience in the First World War would totally eclipse its South African adventure. Of the roughly seven hundred fifty thousand Canadians who

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[7] Quoted in ibid., 268.
[8] W.G. Hardy, *From Sea Unto Sea: The Road to Nationhood, 1850-1910* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1960), 429.

would serve in uniform during the war (out of a population of only eight million), one third would be killed or wounded. A staggering one in every eight Canadians of military age would become a casualty.[9]

Canadian soldiers fought valiantly throughout the war. The pinnacle of their achievements was the battle for Vimy Ridge. Commencing on a wintry Easter weekend in April 1917, the difficult task of dislodging the well-entrenched German forces located there was bestowed on Canada. Led by all four divisions of the Canadian Corps, one hundred seventy thousand allied troops overran the seemingly impregnable German lines of defense within a matter of days.[10] Military historians have since grown fond of saying that Canada became a nation at Vimy Ridge. Certainly Canada's performance in the war bolstered its international stature. Canada's entry into the war in 1914 was essentially a formality. As a loyal member of the British Empire, there was never really any doubt that Canada would come to the aid of Britain in her time of need.[11] By the time the war was over, though, Canada's relationship with Britain had evolved into one of near equality. In recognition of its contribution to the war effort, Canada received a seat at both the Versailles peace conference and the League of Nations.

The war was anything but a completely unifying experience for the country, however. By pledging at the outset of the war that Canada would field an all-volunteer contingent, Conservative Prime Minister Robert Borden was able to

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[9] Ralph Allen, *Ordeal By Fire: Canada 1910-1945* (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 1961), 71.
[10] Ibid., 142-148.
[11] Because the threat to Britain was more direct in 1914 than it had been in 1899, opposition to Canadian participation in the war was much more muted than it had been with respect to the Boer War. See C.P. Stacey, *Canada and the Age of Conflict, Volume 1: 1867-1921* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), 172-177.

minimize French Canadian opposition. Henri Bourassa, the spiritual leader of Quebec's nationalists, even came out in support of the war during its early stages. Unfortunately for Borden, the spirit of camaraderie was short lived. As they did for nearly every country, Europe's killing fields produced a severe manpower shortage for the Canadian army. By the spring of 1917, Canada's well of volunteers had long since dried up. Unless drastic measures were taken, the country's war effort would grind to halt. Upon his return from Europe, where he had attended an Imperial War Conference and visited Canadian troops in the trenches of France, Borden announced the imposition of conscription. Aware of conscription's divisive potential, Borden offered the opposition Liberals the opportunity to form a coalition government for the remainder of the war. The gesture did nothing but unify English-speaking members of Parliament against their French-speaking colleagues and boost the popularity of virulent Quebec nationalists like Bourassa, who took full advantage of the affair to stoke the flames of racial division.[12] What was worse, conscription came far too late to have much impact on the situation it was intended to address. By the time the war ended in November 1918, only about twenty thousand men (from a recruitment campaign that yielded one hundred thousand soldiers) had found their way to the Western front.[13]

Despite having had its international stature enhanced by the war, Canada turned away from international affairs during the 1920s and 1930s. The conscription crisis had badly shaken the country. Before assuming any more international

[12] At the time, English and French Canadians were considered to be of different races.
[13] Desmond Morton, *A Military History of Canada* (Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1985), 158. On the politics surrounding the conscription debate see Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond, and John English, *Canada, 1900-1945* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 119-137.

responsibilities, Canada would first have to get its own house in order. As Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King cogently noted, "A country divided over language could not afford a strong foreign policy."[14] Prime minister for more than twelve years between 1921 and 1939, King would exert more influence over the direction of Canadian foreign policy during the interwar years than anyone else. In general, King held the League of Nations in low esteem. Ever the pragmatist and isolationist, the prime minister was particularly wary of the League's collective security provision, a clause he even lobbied to have removed from the organization's charter. Senator Raoul Dandurand, King's representative at Geneva, summed up Canada's attitude towards collective security in one memorable line. "We live in a fireproof house far from inflammable materials," declared Dandurand in 1924.[15] The liberal internationalist outlook that would distinguish Canadian foreign policy in the post-World War Two era was nowhere to be found during the 1920s and 1930s.

When Britain and France finally rose to Adolf Hitler's challenge and declared war on Germany in September 1939, no one could have predicted the enormity of the conflagration that would follow. On this occasion, however, Canada did not automatically follow Britain's lead. Anxious above all else to protect the gains Canada had wrested from Britain since the last war, King brought the matter before Parliament. That Parliament would do anything other than offer overwhelming support to Britain in her time of need was unthinkable. The prime minister's mantra of 'letting Parliament decide' was thus primarily symbolic in this particular case. By allowing more than a week to elapse between the British and Canadian declarations

[14] Quoted in Robert Bothwell, "The Canadian Isolationist Tradition," *International Journal* 54:1 (Winter 1998-9), 76-87; 79.

of war, King sent the unmistakable message that henceforth, Canadian foreign policy would be made in Canada.[16]

Canada played a much larger role in World War Two than it did during World War One. With most of Europe under Hitler's control by the summer of 1940 and American involvement still nearly two years away, Britain and her Commonwealth allies were essentially left to hold the line against Germany on their own. For Canada, that meant responsibility well out of proportion to the country's size, as was dramatically demonstrated during the Battle of the Atlantic in 1941. Whatever benefits may have accrued to Britain as a result of American President Franklin Roosevelt's 'everything short-of-war strategy,' the U.S., unlike Canada, could not claim that it was directly engaged in the war against fascism. And in time, that distinction would matter. Later generations of Canadians, more familiar with Canada's post-1945 foreign policy than with the period leading up to the war, would see Canadian internationalism at work in their country's swift response to the Axis powers' worldwide assault on democracy, an interpretation based in large measure on the observation that the isolationist U.S. was a latecomer to the cause.[17]

While Canadians born after World War Two may not have fully understood the factors that brought Canada into the war (or the one before it for that matter), they knew that Canada had contributed mightily to the allied victory. Canada's influence on the course of events was so pronounced, in fact, that despite experiencing another

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[15] Quoted in Allen, *Ordeal By Fire*, 242.

[16] See C.P. Stacey, *Canada and the Age of Conflict, Volume 2: 1921-1948, The Mackenzie King Era* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 237-269.

[17] Albeit flawed, the reasoning behind this conclusion is simple to explain. Canadians tend to categorize states as either isolationist or internationalist. Hence, if American non-participation in the war can be accounted for by reference to isolationist forces (which it was), then Canadian

national crisis over conscription, by the time the war was over Canada's conception of its role in the world had profoundly changed.

The Birth of Canadian Internationalism

It is often said that 'the law' is the guardian of the weak. That is every bit as true internationally as it is domestically. Long before World War Two ended, Canada had come to realize that a return to isolationism after the war was out of the question. The League's advocates had been right all along. Security could only be purchased at the price of cooperation with other states. The creation of a well-functioning international political and economic order thus became a priority for Canada even before the war's outcome was known.

Unfortunately for Canada, its vision for postwar order was not shared by the United States and Britain. Both American President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill were of the opinion that material power was the only currency that mattered in the international system. The surest path to a durable peace was accordingly seen to lie in the development of some sort of great power condominium. Canada, not surprisingly, was vehemently opposed to the idea that the future United Nations be nothing more than a modern-day Concert of Europe. Noted the prime minister, "...it was contrary to the conception for which this war was being fought."[18] Although Canada was quite willing to accede to an arrangement that accorded special privileges to the great powers, it was not prepared to accept that only

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participation, by default, must have been the result of internationalist forces (which it also was, but only to a degree).

[18] Quoted in James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada: Peacemaking and Deterrence* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 153.

the great powers should have a say in how the world was governed. Said King to a meeting of Commonwealth prime ministers in May 1944, "Just as we are prepared to recognize the great difference in power and responsibility between Canada and the Soviet Union, [so] we should expect some recognition of the considerable difference between Canada and Panama."[19] It was this type of reasoning that led Canada to promote what came to be known as the 'functional idea.' As James Eayrs explains, the functional idea,

> ...grew out of the assumption that the world was a more complicated place than a simple division of labour between the Great Powers, on the one hand, and all the rest, on the other, might indicate. The international institutions of that world ought to reflect its complexity in the arrangements to be made for admission to membership and leadership. More specifically, as Mackenzie King put it, 'those countries which have most to contribute to the maintenance of the peace of the world should be most frequently selected' for positions on the governing bodies of its international institutions.[20]

Whatever its merits, the functional idea found little support in Washington and London. For Roosevelt and Churchill, anything that threatened to reduce their own room for maneuver was simply unacceptable.

Despite its formal rejection by the U.S. and Britain, the functional principle would provide the foundation for Canadian foreign policy in the 1940s and 1950s. From its general approach towards the U.N. system to the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Canada made certain its voice was heard and presence felt on any issue that might affect its national interests. The high point for this diplomatic style came in 1956. In July of that year Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal. In cooperation with

[19] Quoted in ibid., 164.
[20] Ibid., 161.

Israel, Britain and France subsequently attacked Egypt in an effort to restore international control over the waterway. For Canada, the issue quickly became one of damage control. At the U.N., only Australia and New Zealand rose in support of the attack. The Commonwealth was in danger of being split along racial lines. More seriously, the Western alliance was at risk. The United States, furious about not having been informed of the assault, forcefully denounced the Anglo-French action. American President Dwight Eisenhower was so angry that he even refused to counter the Soviet threat to intervene. As a way out of the crisis, Canadian External Affairs Minister Lester Pearson proposed that a U.N. peacekeeping force be deployed to the region. The insertion of the force would allow Britain and France to withdraw in a somewhat dignified manner. As Blair Fraser notes, "The merit of Pearson's initiative was not its originality as an idea but its timeliness at a critical moment – that, plus the diplomatic skill by which he managed to get it accepted by all concerned."[21] For his efforts Pearson was subsequently awarded the 1957 Nobel Peace Prize.

That Canada's intervention at the U.N. and subsequent expedition to the Middle East would become the defining event in Canadian foreign policy for decades to come was anything but obvious in 1956. To the legions of Canadians that still considered themselves loyal subjects of the British Crown, including many in the ranks of the opposition Conservative party, the government's actions betrayed the country's heritage. And despite being a minority position, that sentiment would linger and ultimately play a part in the Liberals' downfall the following year. As of mid-1957, then, Canadians were left to wonder whether the Pearsonian moment in Canadian foreign policy was to be short lived.

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[21] Blair Fraser, *The Search for Identity: Canada, 1945-1967* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1967), 157.

After close to a quarter century in opposition, the Conservatives returned to power in 1957 under the leadership of John Diefenbaker. Cognizant of the high-esteem in which Pearson and the foreign policy approach that bore his name were held (both domestically and internationally),[22] Diefenbaker, despite having led the attack against Pearson during the Suez affair, had to be careful not to appear too hostile towards the legacy he inherited. In a speech to the U.N. General Assembly shortly after his election, the prime minister emphasized the continuity in approach that the world could expect from his government. "In the last few months there has been a change of government in our country, but I hasten to assure the Assembly at once that...this does not mean that there has been any change whatsoever in fundamental international principles or attitudes," said Diefenbaker.[23] True to his word, Diefenbaker kept Canadian foreign policy on the same internationalist path that his predecessors had laid out. But what of peacekeeping? For Diefenbaker, that was another matter entirely. As far as the prime minister was concerned, Pearson's Suez initiative was merely a one-time event that had in no way established a precedent for Canadian foreign policy. The prime minister would discover that few Canadians shared his reading of what had unfolded in 1956.

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[22] Pearson's international stature may have even exceeded his domestic reputation. Wrote U.S. Senator John F. Kennedy of Pearson in 1959, "In the diplomatic history of the free world since World War II the name of Lester Pearson has many entries. Still in full vigour as leader of the Opposition in Canada, Mr. Pearson's stature cannot be assessed for another decade. Yet already 'Mike' Pearson has been the chief architect of the Canadian foreign service, probably unequalled by any nation; he has been a brilliant ambassador and foreign secretary; he has been a central figure in the growth of the Atlantic Community and NATO, even while taking a leading role in the shaping of the United Nations." From Kennedy's review of Lester B. Pearson, *Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959), which first appeared in the 1 August 1959 issue of *Saturday Review*. Reprinted in *International Journal* 29:1 (Winter 1973-4), 67-70; 67.

[23] Quoted in Arthur E. Blanchette, ed. *Canadian Foreign Policy 1955-1965: Selected Speeches and Documents* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977), 30.

In the summer of 1960 the former Belgian colony of Congo erupted into civil war. At the U.N., where a peacekeeping mission was being hastily readied, the key issue was who would supply the requisite military capabilities. Almost instinctively, U.N. officials turned to Canada. Initially, Diefenbaker was reluctant to sign on to what looked like a potentially very difficult operation. However, the government's hesitancy soon gave way in the face of intense public pressure for Canadian participation.[24] In the span of just four years peacekeeping had become the signature by which most Canadians wanted to be known on the international stage. Notes Jack Granatstein, "Peacekeeping was the Canadian role, and the Canadian people demanded the right to play it."[25] With Pearson and the Liberals back in power by the spring of 1963, the entrenchment of Canada's peacekeeper identity seemed assured. From Cyprus to India and Pakistan, Canada continued to extend its peacekeeping commitments around the world.[26]

Canada the Peacekeeper

The arrival of Pierre Trudeau as prime minister in 1968 signaled a generational change in Canadian politics. For a while it appeared that it might also signal an abrupt change of direction in Canadian foreign policy. Rumblings of discontent with the 'helpful fixer' role for which Canada was increasingly becoming known had first

[24] Joseph T. Jockel, *Canada and International Peacekeeping* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1994), 12.
[25] J.L. Granatstein, "Canada and Peacekeeping: Image and Reality," in Granatstein, ed. *Canadian Foreign Policy: Historical Readings* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman,1993), 276-285; 280.
[26] A complete list of U.N. peacekeeping missions since 1947 and Canada's participation in them is available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/peacekeeping/missions-en.asp.

surfaced in the latter days of the Pearson government.[27] Under Trudeau, those concerns were brought into the open. Heavily laden with talk of the 'national interest', the Trudeau government's 1970 foreign policy review appeared to turn Canadian foreign policy on its head. Asserted the government,

> There is no natural, immutable or permanent role for Canada in today's world, no constant weight of influence. Roles and influence may result from pursuing certain policy objectives – and these spin offs can be of solid value to international relations – but they should not be made the aims of policy. To be liked and to be regarded as good fellows are not ends in themselves; they are a reflection of but not a substitute for policy.[28]

The accompanying review of defense policy released the following year was also much less enthusiastic about the traditional course.[29] If both reviews were an accurate measure of things to come, Canada was about to embark on a very different style of foreign policy.

Whatever changes the prime minister had in mind did not materialize, however. In fact, it was difficult to distinguish Trudeau's foreign policy from that of any his post-war predecessors, especially in the area of peacekeeping. During Trudeau's time in office, Canada's peacekeeping commitments (in terms of the number of soldiers deployed) reached levels not seen again until the 1990s. New missions were authorized for South Vietnam, Egypt and Israel, the Golan Heights, and Lebanon. Even more telling, as of the mid-1970s Canada was still the single largest national contributor to U.N. peacekeeping missions.[30] Rather than mark the

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[27] Denis Stairs, "Canada in the 1990s: Speak Loudly and Carry a Bent Twig," *Policy Options* 22:1 (January-February 2001), 43-49; 46.
[28] *Foreign Policy for Canadians* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970), 8.
[29] *Defence in the 70s* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1971).
[30] D.W. Middlemiss and J.J. Sokolsky, *Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants* (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1989), 36.

beginning of a new era in Canadian foreign policy, the Trudeau interlude actually consolidated Canada's peacekeeper identity.

A good part of Trudeau's support for peacekeeping can be traced to the fact that he considered it to be a useful instrument in the fight against Quebec separatism. With peacekeeping, Canada had finally found a military activity that appealed to both English and French Canadians. It was also during the Trudeau era that peacekeeping began to be seen as something by which to distinguish Canada from the United States. Continued participation in peacekeeping missions thus provided the government with a high-profile way to assert Canadian independence on the international stage.

By the 1980s it was simply taken-for-granted that Canada would always support U.N. peacekeeping operations. While there was much discussion of 'continentalism' (i.e., the development of closer ties with the United States) upon the return of the Conservatives to power in 1984, there was no indication that the government of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney was about to turn its back on the country's internationalist past. Declared the government in its first official policy statement, "It is in Canada's interest...that there be a general recommitment to the goals of the UN Charter, and an active effort by members to strengthen the UN system."[31] As for peacekeeping, the government made a point of noting, "This role will continue."[32] And it did. Under Mulroney in the 1980s, Canada maintained its record of significant participation in nearly every new U.N. peacekeeping operation,

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[31] *Competitiveness and Security: Directions for Canada's International Relations* (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1985), 41.

signing on for missions to the Sinai, Iran and Iraq, Central America, and Namibia. In both advocating and practicing "constructive internationalism," the Mulroney government was simultaneously acknowledging tradition and, as in the heyday of Pearson, recognizing where Canada's interests actually lay. As a 1986 parliamentary report noted, "Canadians feel very much at home in the area of international co-operation. Here is where Canada's traditions, efforts, and experience reside. Here is where Canadian opinion...first inclines. And here is where, as a middle power, Canada's national interest inevitably leads."[33]

Although the end of the Cold War left no state unaffected, its impact was anything but equally distributed. Most profoundly affected were the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies, where the Cold War's passing coincided with the termination of communist rule. Western Europe, which had been turned into an armed fortress during the Cold War, experienced a liberation of sorts as well. With the Iron Curtain gone, the project of uniting Europe could finally be pursued with full vigor. The relatively sudden cessation of more than forty years of hostility also ushered in a period of significant transition for the U.S. Amidst much talk of the 'peace dividend' that would accrue to the U.S. as a result of the Soviet Union's demise, the American military immediately entered a period of downsizing.

Canada was amongst those least affected by the end of the Cold War. In part, that was attributable to the comparatively small toll that the East-West rivalry had exacted on Canada. Except for the fifteen hundred casualties it suffered during the

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[32] *Canada's International Relations: Response of the Government of Canada to the Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons* (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1986), 13.

Korean War, Canada emerged from the Cold War relatively unscathed. Hence, other than the psychological relief associated with the diminished prospect of nuclear war, Canada was not seriously unburdened by the Cold War's passing. More significantly, the end of the Cold War did little to alter Canada's perception of its role in the world. Whether the post-Cold War world turned out to be unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar, Canada would still be a middle power with a large stake in international order. As a result, none of the philosophical debates that accompanied the end of the Cold War in the U.S. surfaced in Canada. While the West may have 'won' the Cold War, Canada was in no position to scale back its international commitments. The same motivations that lay behind Canadian diplomacy in the 1940s and 1950s thus remained intact as Canada entered the 1990s. And as Canada would soon discover, the practices established to cope with international conflict and disorder during the Cold War would be equally essential in the post-Cold War world.

Canada and Humanitarian Intervention

Yugoslavia

Canada responded very cautiously to the Slovenian and Croatian declarations of independence. Like most every other state, Canada believed it was important to maintain the unity of multiethnic and federal Yugoslavia.[34] It thus had no reservations about initially letting the status quo oriented European Community take the diplomatic lead in handling the situation. Canada did not remain in the shadows for very long, however. On 20 September 1991 Prime Minister Mulroney asked United

[33] *Independence and Internationalism: Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the*

Nations Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar to convene a special session of the Security Council. Mulroney wanted the Council to explore the possibility of sending a United Nations peacekeeping force to the region.[35] Convincing the rest of the international community to go along with the plan would not be easy. As noted in chapter two, the suggestion that peacekeepers should be sent into Yugoslavia was seen by many states as an affront to the principle of non-intervention. Speaking a few days later before the U.N. General Assembly, Minister of External Affairs Barbara McDougall dismissed such criticism, declaring it was time for the U.N. to "...open our horizons a bit on what peacekeeping and peacemaking means."[36] Despite the passionate plea, most states were simply not yet ready to embrace a radical reworking of peacekeeping. For the time being, peacekeepers would go nowhere unless a firm ceasefire agreement was already in place.

Five months after Canada first raised the idea, the U.N. Security Council formally authorized the creation of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). Canada's contribution to the force was set at twelve hundred soldiers.[37] In addition to giving the country a fairly high international profile (almost ten percent of the entire force would be Canadian), the sizeable troop contribution meant that Canada would be one of the few countries with enough military resources

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House of Commons on Canada's International Relations, 39.

[34] Dusan Stojanovic, "2 Yugoslav Republics Announce Split," *Globe and Mail*, 26 June 1991, A2.

[35] "Mulroney Disagrees With Hurd," *Globe and Mail*, 21 September 1991, A11.

[36] Quoted in CP, "U.N. Urged to Help End Bloodletting," *Globe and Mail*, 26 September 1991, A16. During a special debate in the House of Commons in November 1991, members of all three national parties argued that the international community should not even wait for a ceasefire agreement in Croatia, but dispatch a force immediately; a position that placed Canada at odds with most of its allies and the U.N. Secretariat. See *House of Commons Debates* (34th Parliament, 3rd Session), 18 November 1991, 4946-4986.

[37] Jeff Sallot, "Canada Contributing Peacekeepers to Yugoslavia," *Globe and Mail*, 22 February 1992, A1.

in the region to address the situation in Bosnia once the conflict there began to spiral out of control.

The ferocity and complexity of the Bosnian war would normally have ruled out the dispatch of a peacekeeping force. There was, after all, no foreseeable prospect of achieving a workable ceasefire arrangement between the warring factions. Moreover, there were no clearly demarcated boundaries between the Serbs, Muslims and Croats that would facilitate the introduction of a traditional peacekeeping operation. Containment of the conflict thus seemed to be the best option for the international community. But doing nothing, which is essentially what this policy entailed, was becoming an increasingly difficult course of action to sustain with the worldwide media lens focused squarely on the daily horror of life in Sarajevo.

Again Canada was among the first countries to react and, as before, peacekeeping was the preferred policy instrument. In a strongly worded statement that called on the U.N. to authorize the immediate dispatch of troops to open the Sarajevo airport so that humanitarian relief flights could safely land, the prime minister chided the international community for its impotence. Said Mulroney, "The U.N. and its member states must be prepared to intervene earlier and stronger in the future to prevent such disasters."[38] To Mulroney's advantage, the context had changed dramatically since the previous fall. Not only were U.N. forces already operating in the region, there was even a small contingent in Bosnia. An important perceptual line had thus been crossed. Although further Security Council resolutions

[38] Quoted in André Picard and Paul Koring, "P.M. Urges U.N. Sanctions," *Globe and Mail*, 25 May 1992, A1.

would be required, it was really just a question of how the U.N. mission in Bosnia would evolve.

The Canadian government never suffered from the delusion that Bosnia provided the most ideal circumstances for a peacekeeping operation. Rather, it simply thought that some type of modified peacekeeping force could be effective in significantly alleviating the humanitarian crisis associated with the war. As the war intensified, therefore, Canada's commitment increased accordingly. First came the transfer of eight hundred fifty soldiers from Croatia to Sarajevo in late June.[39] Then, at the largely inconsequential London Conference in late August 1992, McDougall announced that another twelve hundred soldiers would be sent to Yugoslavia. With almost twenty-five hundred peacekeepers on the ground, Canada temporarily became the second largest troop contributor behind France.[40]

Troop contributions quickly became a second-order question, however. The more important issue facing the international community concerned the role these troops would play. There was never any doubt where Canada stood. No matter what the reputational or political costs might be, Canada believed that UNPROFOR should remain fairly closely wedded to the principles and practices of traditional peacekeeping; otherwise, the international community would quickly find itself involved in a full-scale war. The debate over what to do about Serb military flights was but one early indication of the limited role Canada envisioned for outside military forces. After meeting with other foreign ministers to discuss the situation in

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[39] Jeff Sallot, "Canada Set to Send Soldiers to Sarajevo," *Globe and Mail*, 11 June 1992, A1.
[40] Paul Koring, "Leaders Shy Away From Using Force in Bosnia Conflict," *Globe and Mail*, 27 August 1992, A9.

late 1992, McDougall said Canada concurred with its allies that the no-fly zone established in October by the Security Council should not be enforced.[41]

Remaining neutral was easier said than done. UNPROFOR's mandate was extended to Bosnia with little appreciation for the fact that the Bosnian war was not simply a conflict between three armies. The targeting of civilians was, in fact, an integral part of Croatian and Serbian strategy. The international community's efforts to deliver relief supplies and protect civilian populations in contested areas thus made it an interested party to the conflict from the very outset. Had the balance between the various forces been more equal, UNPROFOR might have been able to sustain the illusion of impartiality. With Muslims being victimized far more often than any other group, however, it was unavoidable that UNPROFOR would end up taking on a more partisan role; a point brought home to Canada when one hundred fifty lightly armed Canadian soldiers found themselves precariously situated between Muslim civilians and Serb forces during the siege of Srebrenica in April 1993. Typical of its bravado, the U.N. ordered the badly outnumbered and outgunned force to defend the town. Canadian officials, alarmed at the prospect of Canadian soldiers being massacred, immediately qualified the order, suggesting instead that the continued presence of the Canadian soldiers should merely be taken as a indication of the seriousness with which the international community viewed the situation. In other words, Canada would not fight on behalf of Srebrenica.[42] Fortunately for both the troops and the residents of Srebrenica, the Serbs did not press their case on this occasion.

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[41] Paul Koring, "West Still Stymied on Bosnian Action," *Globe and Mail*, 17 December 1992, A12.
[42] Paul Koring, "Protect Town, Canadians Told," *Globe and Mail*, 23 April 1993, A1 and A2; and idem, "Paris Backs Canadian Call For Help in Srebrenica," *ibid.*, 24 April 1993, A10.

Although it was now virtually impossible to maintain the fiction that UNPROFOR was no more than a peacekeeping force, peacekeeping remained the template for Canada. The policy generated considerable friction with the United States once the Clinton Administration began promoting the idea of air strikes. In reference to American Senator Joseph Biden (one of the most vocal advocates for air strikes), Mulroney said, "Senator Biden should be asked exactly how many ground troops he would recommend that the United States deploy to the former Yugoslavia." The prime minister went on to politely remind the U.S. that, "If there is going to be a change in United Nations policy it requires a new resolution of the Security Council."[43]

The change of government from the Conservatives to the Liberals in the fall of 1993 coincided with a significant deterioration in the relationship between UNPROFOR and the Bosnian-Serb army. With Serb forces openly threatening the safety of peacekeepers, many contributing states began to see the Bosnian state of affairs as simply hopeless and well beyond their capacity to manage. Nowhere was this feeling more pronounced than in Canada, especially after Canadian soldiers underwent a mock execution at the hands of Serb forces just before Christmas. For the first time Canadians seemed to become aware of the fact that this mission was unlike any peacekeeping operation that Canada had ever previously undertaken. That Canada would always 'be there' was no longer a certainty according to the new prime

[43] Quoted in Paul Koring, "PM Opposes Bosnia Air Strike," *Globe and Mail*, 12 May 1993, A1 and A2.

minister. Observed Jean Chrétien, "It's costing us a lot of money. And for others just to have the luxury of speeches, ...we just don't like it."[44]

Despite ultimately backing away from the idea of unilateral withdrawal,[45] it was fast becoming clear that Canada was moving in the opposite direction as the rest of its allies. At a gathering of NATO member states in January 1994, Canada was one of only two countries (the other being Greece) to categorically oppose the use of air strikes. Chrétien defended his government's stance by arguing that such action would almost surely lead to Serbian reprisals and an uncontrollable spiral towards war between the international community and Serb forces. As Foreign Minister André Ouellet phrased it, "We certainly do not want our soldiers to be involved in combat activities."[46] The prime minister went even further, saying that Canada would veto any attempt by NATO to launch air strikes. "If you ask me today do we need air strikes, I would say no. If we say it is not in our interests and not in the interests of the security of our troops, then it is not going to happen," said Chrétien.[47]

Back in Ottawa a special debate was held in the House of Commons on the subject of whether Canada's troop commitment should be extended beyond the end of March. In general, Parliament expressed broad support for the mission. Almost every member who spoke cited Canada's historic role as a peacekeeping country as the foremost reason for extending the mandate. Opposition leader Lucien Bouchard of the separatist Bloc Québecois party provided what was perhaps the most cogent reason for remaining. "After setting an example of commitment and compassion, we would

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[44] Quoted in Jeff Sallot, "Canadians May Leave Bosnia," *Globe and Mail*, 5 January 1994, A1 and A5.
[45] Paul Koring, "No Solo Exit From Bosnia, PM Hints," *Globe and Mail*, 7 January 1994, A1.
[46] Quoted in Paul Koring, "Canada Pressed to Back Air Strikes," *Globe and Mail*, 11 January 1994, A1 and A2.

then set an example of disengagement and indifference. It is to be feared that others would follow in our footsteps in this second option as they did in the first one," said Bouchard. Interestingly, although there was some support for withdrawal, no member actually advocated doing so based on what would normally be construed as a conventional national interest argument. Rather, it was a question of protecting individuals who had been sent to Bosnia to act as peacekeepers, not combat soldiers.[48]

Despite deciding to stay the course,[49] Canada continued to flirt with the idea of withdrawal. Complained Chrétien, "If we have to be in this war situation forever, we want to know, because our troops are there for a very clear purpose – to maintain the peace." In a clear reference to Rwanda, the prime minister added, "...if the peacekeeping process is not taken up, then some peacekeeping nations may pull out because they believe they can get a better return for their peacekeeping efforts elsewhere."[50] Ultimately, Canada chose to stay, although its commitment was clearly on the wane. By the fall of 1994 the number of Canadian soldiers in Bosnia had been reduced by twenty percent from the previous year.[51]

Canada's deteriorating relationship with its NATO allies spoke volumes about the extent of its ambivalence. After NATO planes struck several Serb targets inside Croatia in late 1994, a Foreign Affairs spokesman said, "We regret that NATO and

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[47] Quoted in Paul Koring, "Canada Stands Firm in Bosnia," *Globe and Mail*, 12 January 1994, A1.
[48] *House of Commons Debates* (35th Parliament, 1st Session) 25 January 1994, 263-292 and 305-378. The Bouchard quote is from page 271.
[49] Jeff Sallot, "'Peacekeepers' Stay Extended," *Globe and Mail*, 11 March 1994, A4.
[50] Quoted in Murray Campbell, "Chrétien Threatens to Pull Out of Bosnia," *Globe and Mail*, 10 June 1994, A1 and A12.
[51] Paul Koring, "Canada Refuses to Join Sarajevo Aid Plan," *Globe and Mail*, 3 September 1994, A10; Jeff Sallot, "Ottawa May Cut Forces in Bosnia," *ibid.*, 21 September 1994, A1; and idem, "Balkan Force May Be Cut, Ouellet Hints," *ibid.*, 22 September 1994, A4.

the U.N. had to resort to the use of air power."[52] Minister of Defence David Collenette added, "We are not there to support any one side."[53] Neither comment proved successful in sparing Canada the indignity of having its soldiers taken hostage yet again. Although the Chrétien Government had never refrained from publicly chastising the U.S., its response on this occasion was particularly harsh. In a lengthy diatribe against the problems that had beset the U.N. operation in Bosnia, the prime minister charged, "The Americans want to control everything and fight down to the last Canadian...soldier."[54] All of this suggested that Canada would not object if the other members of UNPROFOR decided to pull up stakes and leave. Yet this was anything but the case. While the U.N., U.S., and France publicly ruminated about whether or not UNPROFOR should be shut down, Canada actually argued in favor of staying on. Said Collenette, "...we believe the United Nations can still fulfill its mandate."[55] When queried as to why Canada was again so keen on the mission, Ouellet pithily responded, "We are not a carbon copy of the Americans."[56]

In reality, Canada's change of attitude was primarily attributable to the perception that things were settling down between the warring factions. As the relative calm of the winter truce slipped away and drew NATO back into the fray, however, Canada's new found enthusiasm quickly evaporated. The French suggestion that UNPROFOR troops be redeployed to more defensible positions (i.e., outside

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[52] Quoted in Paul Koring, "NATO Jets Hit Serb-Held Airfield," *Globe and Mail*, 22 November 1994, A1.
[53] Quoted in Jeff Sallot, "Ottawa Urges Neutrality in Bosnia," *Globe and Mail*, 25 November 1994, A1.
[54] Quoted in Martine Jacot and Jean-Pierre Langellier, "Jean Chrétien: 'Les casques bleus de Bosnie sont devenus une Croix-Rouge armée'," *Le Monde*, 1 December 1994, 6.
[55] Quoted in Richard Mackie, "Troops Pulling Out, U.N. Chief Says," *Globe and Mail*, 8 December 1994, A20.

Serb-controlled areas where they could not be taken hostage) and bolstered by reinforcements with heavy weapons was greeted coolly by Canada. Chief of Defence Staff General John de Chastelain expressed fears that such actions would give the impression that the U.N. was taking sides. Said de Chastelain, "One of the reasons we have been so effective is there is no perception of bias by any of the three parties."[57] Just how far Canada was willing to go to preserve the perception of neutrality was revealed when Ouellet even endorsed sending the captive soldiers back into Serb-controlled areas once they were released.[58] The fact that Canada had managed to marginalize itself through its timidity did not seem to bother the prime minister. Sounding like he had been listening to the American debate, Chrétien described the Bosnian war as "...more a European problem" anyway.[59]

The luster was clearly gone from what had once been regarded as a path breaking and noble undertaking. Canada's leading newspaper, the *Globe and Mail*, unleashed a scathing editorial. "Canada's position on Bosnia boils down to this: Rule out any external military pressure on the Bosnian Serbs and remain in Bosnia as humanitarian observers to a war that will unfold as it will. This is a morally and strategically barren vision." The piece went on to call Canadian policy "...a national embarrassment," and summed up by observing, "...we ask politely that the Serbs release our men so that our men can watch the Serbs get on with their 'cleansing.' Shame."[60]

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[56] Quoted in Jeff Sallot, "Canada Inclined to Stay in Bosnia, Sources Believe," *Globe and Mail*, 21 December 1994, A5.
[57] Quoted in Jeff Sallot, "No Backing Away, Collenette Says," *Globe and Mail*, 29 May 1995, A10.
[58] Paul Koring, "Bosnian Serbs, Peacekeepers Near War," *Globe and Mail*, 31 May 1995, A1 and A10.
[59] Quoted in AP, Reuters and Staff, "108 U.N. Hostages Freed by U.N.," *Globe and Mail*, 7 June 1995, A8.
[60] "Canada's Bosnian Dishonour," *Globe and Mail*, 2 June 1995, A14.

The dramatic events of July (the Serb assault on Srebrenica and Zepa) revealed Canadian policy for what it had become. While France, Britain, the U.S., and other states made preparations for the forceful defense of the remaining safe areas, Canada contemplated leaving. In Ouellet's words, "We're there to save people and there to serve under U.N. peacekeeping missions. If there is no more U.N. peacekeeping, Canadians will not be there."[61] Events soon proved this to be no idle threat. After Croat forces routed the Serbs in Croatia, effectively bringing that conflict to an end, Canada decided against reassigning its eight hundred soldiers stationed there to Bosnia. Instead, they would return home at the earliest possible date.[62] Given this mindset, it was hardly surprising that the decisive NATO air and artillery assault in late August and early September 1995 was conducted without any contribution from Canada.

Canada originally sent its soldiers to the former Yugoslavia to serve as peacekeepers in an operation that was supposed to diverge only slightly from the traditional conceptualization of that practice. As it turned out, the international community essentially became a party to the conflict itself. Canada resisted the transition in every way. Anything beyond peacekeeping/humanitarian relief assistance was simply more than it was willing to consider. It was somewhat ironic, therefore, that just when it appeared as though Bosnia was finally ripe for a more conventional peacekeeping mission (after the Dayton Peace Accords were signed in November 1995), Canada suggested that it might not participate. Apparently, neither

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[61] Quoted in Tu Thanh Ha, "Canada Cautious as U.N. Powers Meet," *Globe and Mail*, 21 July 1995, A10.

[62] AP and Reuters, "U.N. to Pull Troops Out of Croatia," *Globe and Mail*, 11 August 1995, A7; and Jeff Sallot, "Canada to Bring Troops Home Early," *ibid.*, 16 August 1995, A1.

Chrétien nor Ouellet considered the proposed mission to be peacekeeping. Said Ouellet, "Canada has never hesitated in the past. But this is not the same."[63] Only after intense pressure from its NATO allies did Canada sign on to the operation.[64]

Somalia

As noted in the previous chapter, the situation in Somalia was allowed to deteriorate to an almost unmanageable degree before the international community finally took action in the summer of 1992. Heaping praise on any particular country for its response to the famine would not, as such, be really appropriate. That said, once the United Nations decided to adopt a military approach similar to the one being employed in Bosnia, only a handful of countries actually stepped up to logistically support the plan. As is often the case, international action was predicated on the goodwill of just a small minority of states. And Canada was among them, contributing seven hundred fifty soldiers to the initial humanitarian relief operation.[65]

It was not until the U.S. offered to lead a much more forceful military operation in late November that their deployment even became a possibility. Canada held serious reservations about the American proposal. Canada's preference was for the operation to be conducted as a peacekeeping/humanitarian relief mission, an approach that differed markedly with the American emphasis on overwhelming force

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[63] Quoted in Madelaine Drohan, "Bosnia Plan Signals NATO's Renewed Sense of Purpose," *Globe and Mail*, 6 December 1995, A16. Also Reuters, "Milosovic Forces Assent to Deal," *ibid.*, 24 November 1995, A14; and Jeff Sallot, "Moral Obligation Seen in Bosnia," *ibid.*, 5 December 1995, A1; and.

[64] Jeff Sallot, "Canada Commits Force of 1,000 to Bosnia Mission," *Globe and Mail*, 7 December 1995, A1 and A6.

[65] AP, Reuter and CP, "U.N. Troops to Guard Somalian Food Aid," *Globe and Mail*, 13 August 1992, A10; and AP and Reuter, "Armed Bandits Raid Somali Port, Steal Food, Fuel," *Globe and Mail*, 29 August 1992, A13.

and robust rules of engagement. Questions subsequently arose about the suitability of Canadian troops for the task. There was also some concern that the humanitarian objective might get overlooked with so much attention focused on the military component. Sitting out what portended to be the most significant international humanitarian mission ever undertaken was not an option, however. Said McDougall, "We will be there in one form or another, but it's very difficult to say what form that will be until we know what the position of the U.N. is going to be."[66] Canada's hesitancy gave way to decisiveness once the American plan received the Security Council's blessing, an act that both enhanced the American proposal's legitimacy and allayed Canada's fears about the mission's direction. In the wake of that decision, Canada announced that it would send a contingent of nine hundred soldiers to participate in the multinational force.[67]

In a special debate in the House of Commons shortly thereafter, McDougall acknowledged that the mission went beyond traditional peacekeeping, but suggested that Canada had a duty to participate. Explained McDougall, "When this government originally decided to contribute seven hundred and fifty peacekeepers to UNOSOM we felt not only that such a contribution was consistent with our peacekeeping tradition, but that it would be constructive in helping to relieve the misery in Somalia." Added Associate Minister of National Defence Mary Collins, "As one of

[66] Quoted in Geoffrey York, "Ottawa Delays Sending Soldiers to Somalia," *Globe and Mail*, 3 December 1992, A2.
[67] Graham Fraser, "Canadians Set to Help Somalia," *Globe and Mail*, 5 December 1992, A1.

the founding members of the United Nations, Canada has a unique responsibility to support the U.N. at this critical point in its history."[68]

Canadian troops departed Somalia long before all of the problems associated with UNOSOM II developed. As a result, Somalia did not enter the Canadian lexicon, as it did in the United States, as a synonym for internationalism gone awry.[69] Rather, the intervention was seen to positively exemplify just what was possible if the international community made a serious effort to work together in solving such problems.

Rwanda and Zaire

Canada never seriously considered sending soldiers into Rwanda to stop the murderous rampage that took place there in the spring of 1994. As far as the Chrétien Government was concerned, Rwanda was simply an unsuitable environment at that time for international intervention, especially of the peacekeeping variety. When the United Nations did finally authorize the deployment of fifty-five hundred troops in early June, however, Canada dutifully agreed to contribute about three hundred fifty soldiers to the operation.[70] Again the peacekeeping imperative had risen to the fore. Explained Ouellet to the House of Commons, "We believe that we must participate as part of the United Nations' peacekeeping forces."[71]

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[68] *House of Commons Debates* (34th Parliament, 3rd Session) 7 December 1992, 14,771-14,803. The McDougall quote is from page 14,773; the Collins quote is from page 14,784.
[69] A firestorm of controversy would later envelop the intervention when it became public that a Somali man was tortured and killed by Canadian soldiers during the mission.
[70] Jeff Sallot, "Canadians Prepare for Rwanda," *Globe and Mail*, 2 June 1994, A1; and idem, "Cabinet Backs Larger Role in Rwanda," *ibid.*, 22 June 1994, A2.
[71] *House of Commons Debates* (35th Parliament, 1st Session) 21 June 1994, 5660.

The impotence of the United Nations vis-à-vis the Rwandan genocide had important ramifications for Canadian foreign policy. In large measure, the U.N.'s failure in Rwanda was perceived to be Canada's as well. Uncomfortable with the cognitive dissonance this injected into the Canadian psyche, the Chrétien government set out to rectify the situation. In September 1994 Ouellet went to the U.N. General Assembly and called for the creation of a U.N. standing army.[72] Had such a force existed, Ouellet argued, the U.N. would not have found itself held hostage to the United States. Within a year the proposal for a rapid reaction force had received official government sanction.[73]

Having staked so much of its credibility on preventing a replay of the events in Rwanda, it was not surprising that Canada's response to the November 1996 refugee crisis was much swifter. Once it became clear that there was little international support for the initial French proposal, Canada stepped in with what turned out to be a workable compromise for everyone concerned. Canada's offer to lead the international force into Central Africa had two primary benefits. First, it alleviated the fear held by some states (including Rwanda and Zaire) that the mission would have an ulterior political objective. Second, it did not require the United States to commit ground troops in any particularly significant capacity. This responsibility would fall to Canada's fifteen hundred soldiers and the troops from other countries participating in the ten thousand-person force.[74] Having lambasted the Liberals for their policy in Bosnia, the *Globe and Mail* now applauded the prime minister's

[72] "Canada Proposes U.N. Army," *Globe and Mail*, 30 September 1994, A1.
[73] *Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations.*
[74] Jeff Sallot, "Canada Offers to Lead Aid Force," *Globe and Mail*, 12 November 1996, A1; and Jeff Sallot and Paul Knox, "Canada Pushes U.S. for Support," *ibid.*, 13 November 1996, A1 and A12.

efforts. Said the Globe, "Mr. Chrétien's proposal marks a renewal of the internationalism that Canada long championed as donor, peacekeeper and broker."[75] After the crisis had passed, the prime minister described his motivation:

> We acted because two world wars and forty years of peacekeeping have taught us that the world cannot turn its back on turmoil and disaster. We acted because deeply ingrained in our very being as Canadians is a very clear and basic understanding that we are citizens of the world, that we take that citizenship very seriously, and that when it is time to stand up and be counted, Canada is there.[76]

Yugoslavia and Somalia had cast doubt on where Canada's peacekeeping tradition was headed. Zaire seemed to rejuvenate the country's commitment to the practice.

Analysis

The consistency of Canadian policy in the cases at hand is striking even by the standards of the state identity framework. Whether in Croatia, Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, or Zaire, peacekeeping provided the sole template for action. For the most part, Canada's reaction to the wars in Croatia and Bosnia set the tone for everything else that followed. Canada was willing to commit troops to quasi-peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia, but not much else. In Bosnia, no country except perhaps Greece was more reluctant than Canada to see UNPROFOR veer away from its original mandate. Air strikes were anathema until the very end. Canada even objected to the joint British, Dutch, and French campaign to reinforce the U.N. operation in Bosnia with heavy weapons and elite soldiers.

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[75] "Containing the Crisis in Central Africa," *Globe and Mail*, 13 November 1996, A14.
[76] *House of Commons Debates* (35th Parliament, 2nd Session) 18 November 1996, 6380.

The same narrow parameters applied in Somalia. As long as the Somali mission remained defined as a peacekeeping operation (from August to November 1992), Canada's enthusiasm for intervention never waned. As soon as the United States began talking about robust rules of engagement and peace enforcement, Canada began to have second thoughts. Only after the U.S. plan received the U.N.'s blessing, an act that dramatically enhanced the operation's legitimacy in Canadian eyes, did the Mulroney government commit Canadian soldiers.

As for the planned foray into the refugee camps of Zaire in November 1996, Canada envisioned that operation as just another 'second-generation' peacekeeping mission. Moreover, with a Canadian general in command, the Chrétien government could be fairly confident that 'mission creep' would not enter into the picture. For the first time, Canada would retain some measure of control over the long-term direction of international policy, something that had eluded it in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia.

The only instance in which Canadian policy *appears* to have been out of step with the expectations of the state identity theory is Rwanda. In sharp contrast to its behavior elsewhere, Canada never stepped forward to suggest that peacekeepers be sent into the midst of the Rwandan genocide. True, Canadian peacekeepers ultimately went to Rwanda, but not because of any special Canadian initiative. They also arrived much too late to have any impact. That said, given the incredible level of violence during the early weeks of the Rwandan genocide, the Chrétien government's argument that Rwanda did not come close to being a suitable environment for the deployment of peacekeepers has some basis in fact. To go down the path towards

intervention in Rwanda during the spring of 1994, the Chrétien government would have had to identify an entirely new logic for the use of Canadian soldiers. As such, the fact that Canada took no action on Rwanda is not really inconsistent with the state identity argument.

What, then, of the role played by individual decision-makers? It has been suggested that Canadian policy under Prime Minister Mulroney was distinct.[77] While it may well have been laudable, there is scant evidence to support the view that Mulroney took Canadian foreign policy into uncharted territory. That Mulroney was one of the first world leaders to advocate a loosening of the restrictions on intervention is beyond dispute. However, this position was never translated into a new Canadian philosophy with respect to the use of force; witness Yugoslavia from 1991 to 1993. The one time that Canadian troops faced a serious challenge during Mulroney's tenure as prime minister (Srebrenica, April 1993), the government all but admitted it had no intention of resorting to the use of force to protect Bosnian Muslim civilians. What is more, at no point in time did the Mulroney government ever promote offensive military measures. How such a policy could ever be considered pioneering, either by Canadian or world standards, is mystifying.

The Mulroney government's policy towards Somalia adds further weight to the argument. When Canada agreed to participate in the first United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), it did so under the belief that it would be run in much the same way as the ongoing mission in Bosnia; that is, as a hybrid peacekeeping/humanitarian relief effort. Perhaps the most telling piece of evidence

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[77] Nicholas Gammer, *From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking: Canada's Response to the Yugoslav Crisis* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001).

concerns what Mulroney did not do. During the three-month interregnum between its initial decision to participate in UNOSOM and the American proposal to lead a more forceful intervention (during which Somalia's warlords effectively held the U.N. at bay), the Mulroney government not once suggested that the United Nations reconsider its approach. In the opinion of Mulroney and his key ministers, anything that strayed too far from the traditional practice of peacekeeping was simply unacceptable. It was hardly surprising, therefore, that Canada reacted somewhat coolly upon first hearing of the U.S. plan. Once the U.N. approved the U.S. proposal, however, the Mulroney government felt it had little choice but to join in; otherwise, Canada's internationalist reputation would be dealt a serious blow. Interestingly, the reasons given by the Mulroney government for its ambivalence towards the American plan were virtually identical to those later voiced by the Chrétien government with respect to the evolving direction of international policy in Bosnia.

In dispelling the 'Mulroney as linchpin' thesis, one inevitably arrives at a much less negative view of the role played by Prime Minister Chrétien. As the evidence demonstrates, the Chrétien government took an extremely cautious approach towards the Bosnian war. To the prime minister's critics, the contrast with Mulroney could not have been starker. However, missing from such an assessment is recognition of the fact that Mulroney never had to confront the same challenges as Chrétien. The Serb strategy of taking U.N. peacekeepers hostage only began in late 1993, close to six months after Mulroney had left office. And while it is impossible to definitively say what Mulroney would have done if faced with the same set of circumstances (counterfactuals are notoriously difficult to measure), given his

position towards the Clinton Administration's 'lift and strike' proposal, it seems highly unlikely that Mulroney would have acted any differently than his successor. In the end, whatever differences in policy might be attributable to idiosyncratic factors, the reality is that Mulroney was not about to embrace humanitarian war any more than Chrétien was about to abandon peacekeeping.

Out of this continuity flowed profound international changes, however. Through its early advocacy for intervention in Croatia, Bosnia, and Somalia, as well as its high profile lobbying campaign for the deployment of an international force to Zaire, Canada played a critical role in shaping the international normative structure surrounding humanitarian intervention in the early 1990s. The link between Canadian policy and the eventual approach adopted by the international community towards the Zaire crisis is fairly obvious and needs little additional elaboration. Suffice it to say that without the Canadian initiative (compromise), it is difficult to see how the U.N. would have been able to overcome, at least in the short term, the diplomatic impasse created through the combination of American intransigence and African suspicion.

The Yugoslav case is infinitely more complex. To note that Canada played only a marginal role in the formulation of international policy during the last year-and-a-half of the Bosnian conflict misses the point entirely, since had it not been for the efforts of Canada and several other states, it is doubtful whether the international community would have even been involved with the conflict in former Yugoslavia. If every Western state had taken the same position as that adopted by the United States throughout the conflict, there would never have been any peacekeeping/humanitarian relief mission. And without that mission there is essentially no practical shift away

from the sovereignty principle. The post-1991 relaxation in the norm of non-intervention is too often treated as if it were inevitable, when the reality was anything but. What is more, without the initial peacekeeping operation, there would have been no foundation on which to base further escalation. Not inconsequentially, it also had the effect of establishing a precedent for international action on Somalia.

By simply expanding its horizons on what peacekeeping meant, Canada helped set in motion a process that ultimately redefined the nature of contemporary world politics. Perhaps something else would have been done to deal with the humanitarian tragedy brought on by Yugoslavia's breakup had the international community decided against intervention in the fall of 1991 and again in the spring of 1992. At the end of the day, however, one can only speculate about alternative responses. What *is* known for certain is that Canada, through its advocacy for peacekeeping, was able to exercise considerable influence on the direction of international policy vis-à-vis the issue of military humanitarian intervention at a point in time when humanitarian intervention was still just an idea.

Chapter Four

France

The military pageantry that accompanies Paris' Bastille Day parade speaks volumes about the nature of French identity. Besides standing as a powerful testament to the place of the French armed forces in French society,[1] the parade signifies the importance France attaches to its armed forces as perhaps *the* symbol of the country's independence and international standing. Although certainly atypical for a twenty-first century European liberal democratic state, the fact that the French armed forces occupy such a significant position is hardly surprising in view of France's history as one of the modern states system's first and most enduring great powers, a status that has forever been synonymous with a state's ability to compete militarily with any other country in the world.

The time has long since passed of course when France ranked among the world's premier military powers (since 1940 at least, if not earlier). Nevertheless, France's self-image very much remains that of a great power, and rightly so to a certain extent. As one of only five countries with a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, the acknowledged leader of *la Francophonie*, a pillar of the ever-expanding European Union, and an important military power by dint of its

[1] France's compulsory military service requirement is thought to build allegiance to the state and promote good citizenship.

nuclear weapons capabilities, France's influence and stature on the world stage remains quite pronounced. If ever there was a country that embodied the idea that being a great power is as much a function of attitude and conviction as it is of material capabilities, however, it is France. Insofar as generations of French politicians and intellectuals have been concerned, the notion that France could ever be anything less than a great power is simply inconceivable. As France's most celebrated soldier and statesman of the twentieth century Charles de Gaulle once observed, "Any large-scale human edifice will be arbitrary and ephemeral if the seal of France is not affixed to it."[2] Imbued with such a strong sense of self-righteousness and national purpose, France has not only come to regard its position atop the hierarchy of states with the world's other great powers as natural, but the definitive measure of its nationhood as well. The result has been a foreign policy largely dominated by the pursuit of grandeur.

I argue that French policy towards the humanitarian crises in question exhibited the same overriding concern for status and influence that has marked virtually every aspect of French foreign policy since the end of the Second World War. Whether it was dealing with the wars in the former Yugoslavia or any of the crises in Africa, France's first consideration, almost without exception, was how to best protect or promote its own interests, be they tangible or intangible (i.e., prestige). As narrowly self-interested as French policy usually was, though, its influence on the systemic normative environment was probably greater than that of any other country. Like Canada, France was instrumental in spurring the international community

[2] Quoted in Mort Rosenblum, *Mission To Civilize: The French Way* (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986), 4.

towards intervention in both Croatia and Bosnia. France's Yugoslav policy was anything but a carbon copy of Canada's, however. Whereas Canada gradually faded from the scene as the Bosnian war intensified, France remained at the forefront of the international diplomatic and military effort throughout the crisis. France was thereby able to exert considerable influence over the direction of international policy. Indeed, French preferences frequently set the standard for international policy. The 1996 Zaire refugee crisis saw France play a similar role. In that case, France's early and persistent advocacy for intervention virtually compelled the international community to focus on a situation that might otherwise have gone unnoticed.

The chapter proceeds in the same manner as chapter three. I first explore the evolution of France's international identity. As with most studies that examine the relationship between French identity and French foreign policy, the influence of de Gaulle receives particular consideration. I then review French policy vis-à-vis each of the humanitarian crises in question. Because France was essentially a bystander to events in Somalia prior to joining the American-led humanitarian relief mission in December 1992, the discussion of French policy towards Somalia is inevitably rather brief. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the state identity approach.

State Identity and French Foreign Policy

The Foundations of French Identity

When assessing the influence of historical forces on France's contemporary international identity, two aspects of the French experience stand out. The first is France's history as one of the world's most significant political actors over the last

one thousand years. Long before the modern states system had come into being, France had established itself as a great power (i.e., an actor capable of decisively influencing the course of international events). Whether the subject is European political development in the first half of the millennium or the high-stakes game of interstate rivalry during the latter half, France's contributions cannot be ignored. The second is France's more recently acquired role as the world's self-appointed apostle of Enlightenment ideals. Largely a derivative of the French Revolution, this facet of the French experience has provided the foundation for French exceptionalism in the international arena for more than two hundred years. Like the United States, France's legacy is not just that of a great power, but that of a great power with a universal mission.

Certainly the most distinctive aspect of France's history as a great power is the length of time that France was able to maintain its place amongst the select group of states that have ever laid claim to that designation. France's run as a bona fide great power arguably began during the reign of Philip Augustus in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries and extended right up until the eve of the Second World War. Of all the states that have vied for power and influence on the European continent and beyond since the beginning of the second millennium A.D., only England/Britain can match that record.

The key to France's staying power was its resiliency. Similar to its cross-Channel rival, France would become known for its ability to rebound from major political and military setbacks. The War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714) may have dealt a fatal blow to France's drive for hegemony in Europe, but it did not come

close to removing France from the first tier of world powers. Indeed, France would remain the single most formidable military power on the continent for another one hundred fifty years. Within a generation of signing the humiliating Treaty of Paris in 1763, which brought the Seven Years' War to a close, France was again threatening to overturn the established order in Europe. Ultimately, it would take a coalition of Austria, Britain, Prussia, and Russia to bring Napoleon to heel. France even managed to recover from its defeat in the 1870-1871 Franco-Prussian War. Henceforth, however, French greatness would manifest itself primarily through empire. Between 1880 and 1900 territory in Africa and Asia was brought under French control at a dizzying pace. By the turn of the century only Britain possessed a larger colonial empire.[3] France's victory in the Great War merely enhanced its legend. A Pyrrhic victory it may have been, but at least France was still in the game, or could claim to be, which was more than could be said for Austria-Hungary, Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and Russia.

This cycle of decline and renewal had a profound impact on French foreign policy. Having recovered from so many setbacks in the past, France had long since come to expect that it always would. Any downturn in French fortunes, no matter how serious, was regarded as nothing more than a temporary state of affairs. As detailed in the next section, this was the logic that would chiefly animate French foreign policy after the Second World War.

An important byproduct of France's experience as a great power was the effect it had on French attitudes regarding the conduct of international affairs. As with most great powers from the classical balance-of-power era, France would develop a

[3] J.F.V. Keiger, *France and the World Since 1870* (London: Arnold, 2001), 201.

strong and lasting affinity for the methods of *realpolitik*. Not even the First World War, a conflict that left approximately five million Frenchmen dead or wounded (an incredible twenty-five percent of the male population aged twenty in 1914 were killed) and utterly devastated ten of the country's most industrialized departments,[4] could dislodge the power politics mentality. Remarked Premier Georges Clemenceau to American President Woodrow Wilson during the Paris Peace Conference, "...we too came into the world with the noble instincts and the lofty aspirations which you express so often and so eloquently. We have become what we are because we have been shaped by the rough hand of the world in which we have to live and we have survived only because we are a tough bunch."[5] That sentiment and, more importantly, the type of strategy it dictated would continue to shape French foreign policy well into the post-World War Two era.

The other enduring theme in French foreign policy over the last two hundred years has been the belief that France possesses a special *mission civilisatrice* (civilizing mission). Ever since the French Revolution and the promulgation of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, France has enthusiastically carried the torch for the political ideals borne of the Age of Enlightenment. As the National Assembly's Colonial Committee declared in 1792, "...today it is neither with the cross nor with the sword that we establish ourselves with new people. It is by respect for their rights and views that we will gain their heart; ...this will be a new form of

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[4] Gordon Wright, *France in Modern Times: From the Enlightenment to the Present*, 5th Ed. (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1995), 306; and James F. McMillan, *Twentieth-Century France: Politics and Society 1898-1991* (London: Edward Arnold, 1992), 79-80.

[5] Quoted in Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World* (New York: Random House, 2002), 23.

conquest."[6] While the reality of French imperialism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was certainly much less benign than what the Colonial Committee had envisioned, or professed at any rate, it became widely accepted that French imperialism was infinitely more beneficial than that of any other country. In the words of the nineteenth century socialist leader Louis Blanc, "England has set foot in no country without setting up her counting-houses. France has nowhere passed without leaving the perfume of her spirituality."[7] The notion that no other state but France could truly transcend the artificial boundaries that divided the world's peoples would do much to encourage the sense of exceptionalism that has permeated French foreign policy to the present day.

France Reborn

In retrospect it is amazing that the Second World War did not completely destroy any French claim to great power status. In bowing before the German onslaught after little more than a month of fighting, France effectively became a footnote in the greatest and most significant armed struggle the world had ever seen. Following its surrender, France was more often likened to Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands (all of whom had quickly fallen under Hitler's yoke as well) than it was to its traditional great power associates. And then there was the stain of Vichy. While France was certainly not the only vanquished country to actively collaborate with their Nazi overlords, the enthusiasm with which Vichy France embraced Nazi Germany's racist

[6] Quoted in Jeremy Black, *From Louis XIV to Napoleon: The Fate of a Great Power* (London: UCL Press, 1999), 213.
[7] Quoted in Robert Tombs, *France 1814-1914* (London: Longman, 1996), 201.

mantra would stand as a permanent blemish on France's reputation. For the country that had given the world the motto 'Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité,' the Vichy interlude represented nothing less than a complete abandonment and betrayal of national ideals. As much as post-Liberation France would try to forget the four inglorious years of national collaboration, the record spoke for itself. In addition to the one hundred thousand French men and women who lost their lives fighting the Vichy regime and Nazi occupation, only three hundred thousand people would be officially recognized after the war as veterans of the Resistance. Observes James McMillan, "...this suggests that only a maximum of 2 per cent of the French adult population can be deemed to have been 'in the Resistance' – a figure strikingly at odds with the myth of *la France résistante* developed at the Liberation."[8]

That France was able to recover from the humiliation of June 1940 and the disgrace of Vichy was primarily due to the efforts of Charles de Gaulle. A relative unknown outside of military circles at the time of France's surrender, de Gaulle quickly emerged as the de facto leader of the Resistance movement. To de Gaulle the Vichy regime was thoroughly illegitimate, not least because it had turned France into a mere vassal of Nazi Germany. Whatever noble arguments Vichy's supporters might offer in their own defense, de Gaulle was of the opinion that the regime did nothing to

[8] McMillan, *Twentieth-Century France*, 149. It should be acknowledged that an intense debate has grown up around this issue. Argues Jean-Pierre Azéma, "There seems little doubt that up to and including the spring of 1944, members of the Resistance remained a minority. But were they just a tiny minority, as is so often claimed? I do not think so. It is my opinion that one should attempt to make a new estimate of the number of people who, in one way or another, at some time or other, helped those who were totally committed rebels. Many members of the Resistance have testified to the fact that, when on the run, they would knock at the first door they came to and be taken in and hidden by strangers who ran a heavy risk in doing so. All these unknown individuals also played their part in the Resistance, even if they did not carry a stamped card. Without them the official Resistance could never have taken root." Jean-Pierre Azéma, *From Munich to the Liberation, 1938-1944*, Translated by Janet Lloyd (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 103.

protect France's real interests.[9] Hence, until such time as a truly sovereign government could be reestablished, the war should continue.

For the next four years de Gaulle did everything he could to keep alive the idea of an independent France. The cumulative effect of those efforts, which ranged from de Gaulle's spirited radio broadcasts to his shrewd diplomatic maneuvering vis-à-vis Britain and the United States, was the creation of the sense that de Gaulle actually personified the French state. Certainly that is how de Gaulle came to perceive himself. Upon his triumphant entry into a liberated Paris on 25 August 1944, de Gaulle, who by this point was not only the acknowledged leader of the French armed forces but also president of France's provisional government, immediately headed for the Ministry of War, the place from which he had been forced to flee in June 1940. The symbolism was unmistakable. As de Gaulle later wrote of his attitude and actions on that day, "Nothing is lacking except the state. My task is to replace it. That is why the first thing I did was install myself there."[10] Perhaps even more symbolic was what de Gaulle chose not to do. In keeping with his view that the Third Republic had never ceased to exist, de Gaulle resisted pressure to proclaim a new republic.[11] Politics could wait. More important now was the complete restoration of French power and prestige. As de Gaulle said the next day to members of the Resistance, "Thanks to you, France will have a more glorious place in the world. Now hard work is needed, everything must once again be set in order..."[12]

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[9] McMillan, *Twentieth-Century France*, 146.
[10] Quoted in Azéma, *From Munich to the Liberation*, 207.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Quoted in Ibid.

An important part of de Gaulle's plan for setting everything in order had been ongoing since the invasion of Normandy two months earlier. On de Gaulle's insistence, Britain and the U.S. had been forced to concede a prominent role to the Free French forces in the military campaign to liberate France. De Gaulle would not stand to have the story of France's liberation be a story of rescue by the Anglo-Saxons. De Gaulle was not about to rest at liberation either. Eager to see France's prewar international position fully restored, de Gaulle threw all available French forces into the final fight against Germany. Domestically, de Gaulle's strategy produced the desired effect almost immediately. By the end of 1944, sixty-four percent of the French population believed that France had already recovered its place among the great powers.[13] Swaying international perceptions would prove to be much more difficult, as evidenced by France's exclusion from the all-important 1945 Yalta and Potsdam conferences. Whatever satisfaction France derived from being awarded its own zone of occupation in Germany and a permanent seat on the new United Nations Security Council was not enough to remove the sting of humiliation from having been absent during the critical negotiations held to discuss the postwar European settlement.

Frustrated by the intensity of parliamentary resistance to his proposals for constitutional reorganization, de Gaulle resigned as head of the provisional government in January 1946. He would not return to the center of French politics for another twelve years. Although far from obvious at the time, de Gaulle's departure would work to his advantage in the long run. The euphoria of liberation had served to

[13] Jean-Pierre Rioux, *The Fourth Republic, 1944-1958*, Translated by Godfrey Rogers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 10.

mask the ugly reality of French decline. Eventually, however, some difficult decisions would have to be made. By leaving when he did, de Gaulle passed that responsibility on to his successors.

No development would wreak more havoc with France's efforts to recover its former glory than the onset of the Cold War. The familiar multipolar world in which France had operated for centuries was suddenly a relic of the past. Gone with it was much of France's room for maneuver. With its economy still in tatters more than two years after the war had ended,[14] France was effectively forced to accept American financial aid. As historian Jean-Pierre Rioux argues, "The position of France in the Cold War's Western camp was thus less a result of deliberate choice than of the need to seize the only means of economic survival being offered to her."[15] Having entered the American orbit economically, it was almost inevitable that some measure of military integration would follow. Neither France nor any other European state in the late 1940s could as yet hope to defend itself against the Soviet menace without American support. For a country as fiercely independent as France, the decision to join NATO represented an even greater indignity than did its acceptance of Marshall Plan aid. A great power, after all, was supposed to be able to at least defend itself against external aggression.

Against this backdrop of dependency, the French Empire took on renewed symbolic importance. Observes J.F.V. Keiger, "Just as the humiliation of defeat in 1870 motivated a scramble for empire, so the trauma of 1940 imposed its retention."[16]

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[14] In August 1947, for example, France's daily bread ration had to be reduced to just two hundred grams, an amount well below what it had been even at the worst point of the war. Ibid., 114.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Keiger, *France and the World Since 1870*, 207.

Unfortunately for France, its 'greatness through empire' strategy would set it in clear opposition to one of the most powerful political and social movements of the twentieth century: decolonization. The outcome was a series of costly wars of national liberation that France was destined to lose. Among the many victims of these conflicts was the Fourth Republic itself. Unable to resolve the situation in Algeria to the satisfaction of French colonists and radical elements within the armed forces, the government of Premier Pierre Pflimlin was toppled in May 1958 amidst the threat of a military coup (on 24 May paratroopers actually took control of Corsica in preparation for an assault on Paris).[17] France's savior would again be Charles de Gaulle.

A Certain Idea of France

The Fifth Republic provided France with the constitution that de Gaulle had long advocated. Among its key features were a much more circumscribed role for the National Assembly and a strengthened presidency.[18] De Gaulle, who would occupy the latter office for the next eleven years, would take full advantage of those new powers to impress his own vision, his "certain idea of France," onto the French body politic. To de Gaulle it was self-evident that "France is not really herself unless she is in the first rank; that only vast enterprises are capable of counterbalancing the ferments of disintegration inherent in her people. ...In short...France cannot be France without *grandeur*."[19]

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[17] Roger Price, *A Concise History of France* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 316-317.
[18] Wright, *France in Modern Times*, 412.
[19] Quoted in Edward A. Kolodziej, *French International Policy Under de Gaulle and Pompidou: The Politics of Grandeur* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), 27. On the domestic purposes of de

Central to de Gaulle's understanding of France's role in the world was his belief in the primacy of the nation state, a conviction that led him to view all ideological and political divisions as subordinate to the national interest.[20] As de Gaulle explained in a 1965 press conference,

> Once a nation has been created – its fundamental geographical, ethnic, economic, social and moral dimensions laid down and its linkages established with foreign influences and ambitions – there exists a general interest which transcends internal diversities and forms a set of conditions that are vital to its action – and to its existence. The recognition of this fact consolidates its unity and it is the extent to which the State does, or does not, conform to it that determines whether its political actions succeed or fail.[21]

According to Serge Berstein, "The concept of the primacy of the nation-state is fundamental. It explains de Gaulle's distrust of all constructions that sought to replace it, be they based on a supranationalism that he rejected or on an alliance system in which the freedom of manoeuvre of individual nations was restricted by a dominant partner."[22] Here then lies the essence of de Gaulle's critique of the various ministries that governed France during the Fourth Republic and, indeed, the Fourth Republic itself. In de Gaulle's mind, France's Fourth Republic leaders simply had not done enough to protect the country's sovereignty (the most fundamental of all its interests) and freedom of action in international affairs.[23]

Gaulle's foreign policy see Philip G. Cerny, *The Politics of Grandeur: Ideological Aspects of de Gaulle's Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).

[20] Alfred Grosser, *French Foreign Policy Under de Gaulle*, Translated by Lois Ames Pattison (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1967), 17.

[21] Quoted in Serge Berstein, *The Republic of de Gaulle, 1958-1969*, Translated by Peter Morris (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 154.

[22] Ibid.

[23] It is important to note that de Gaulle's assessment of the Fourth Republic is generally viewed as being overly harsh. As Philip Gordon writes, "The Fourth Republic was not the incompetent, lackey regime depicted by de Gaulle but was similarly resentful of the policies of the Atlantic Alliance and, like de Gaulle, sought to use what leverage it could to assert France's role in the world. ...the insistence on including "Algerian departments" in the protected zone of the 1949 NATO treaty; the proposals and demands of various French governments for tripartite (with Britain and the United

Setting things aright first entailed addressing the increasingly debilitating colonial issue. Recollected de Gaulle in his memoirs, "On my return to government I was determined to liberate France from the costs – costs which no longer had any corresponding benefits – imposed on it by the empire."[24] De Gaulle was not yet ready to contemplate just letting the colonies go their own way, however. They remained far too valuable as a field of action to allow that to happen. Moreover, like many of his compatriots, de Gaulle took immense pride in France's colonial achievement.[25] As a symbol of French prestige, the empire stood second to none. De Gaulle's solution to the colonial challenge was to replace the uncompromising hierarchical structure of the Fourth Republic's French Union with the much more flexible French Community. The colonies would be given a choice between outright independence and limited self-government; the catch being that in opting for the former, a colony would be choosing to sever all ties with France, including access to financial aid.[26] Although most of the colonies initially accepted Community membership, the Community as it was originally designed quickly succumbed to nationalist pressures. By the end of 1961 all of France's African colonies had acceded to full independence (Algeria, which was not a colony but an overseas department, gained its independence the

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States) direction of the alliance; the constant insistence on military superiority in continental Europe, especially over a reconstructing Germany; the efforts, regardless of cost, to maintain overseas colonies and influence abroad; and, finally, the decisions taken toward the creation of a national nuclear program and strategic nuclear force were all areas in which France refused to accept lightly the developing status quo as directed by Washington. Admittedly, the French Fourth Republic was far from able to execute the stubbornly independent policy propagated by de Gaulle, and its tolerance for subordination was certainly much greater than the General's. But the impression that French leaders during these years had forgotten France's grand past and former world role and were now happily indentured to the United States and NATO is no more than a rather superficial, and sometimes convenient, myth." Philip H. Gordon, *A Certain Idea of France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 4-5.

[24] Quoted in Berstein, *The Republic of de Gaulle*, 156.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid., 157-158.

following year).[27] Rather than fight this natural evolution, de Gaulle wisely adjusted French policy accordingly. In June 1960 the constitution was amended to allow a Community member to "...become independent without thereby ceasing to belong to the Community."[28]

In no way did decolonization mean the end of empire. Through a series of bilateral cooperation agreements covering everything from military and economic assistance to projects in support of Franco-African cultural engagement, France was able to preserve its favored position in relation to its former colonies. Indeed, the newly independent states of sub-Saharan Africa soon came to be regarded as a French sphere of influence. The era of neocolonialism had arrived.

While de Gaulle astutely recognized the necessity of reducing France's colonial costs and in time came to appreciate the benefits of informal empire, he never regarded his success on this front as contributing in any significant way to his primary objective of reestablishing France as a major world power. That could only be done by addressing the nature of France's relationship with the United States, particularly within the context of the Atlantic alliance. At the time of its creation in 1949, de Gaulle reluctantly accepted French membership in NATO as a necessity. By 1958 he had come to see the issue from a different perspective. In de Gaulle's opinion, the nuclear balance between the two superpowers made it extremely unlikely that either the U.S. or the Soviet Union would risk a direct nuclear strike on the other's territory. As such, there was good reason to question the strength of the United States' commitment to European defense. Would the U.S. really trade New

[27] Keiger, *France and the World Since 1870*, 210.
[28] Quoted in Berstein, *The Republic of de Gaulle*, 159.

York for Paris in the event of a Soviet move on Western Europe? Convinced the answer was no (an inference subsequently bolstered by the American shift away from the doctrine of massive retaliation), de Gaulle concluded that the American 'nuclear umbrella' was all but worthless. He accordingly deemed it imperative that France acquire its own nuclear deterrent and gradually extricate itself from NATO's integrated military command structure.[29]

De Gaulle's quest for autonomy vis-à-vis the U.S. was a product of his more general dissatisfaction with what he saw as the increasingly rigid division of the world into two hierarchically structured blocs. Being the keen disciple of *realpolitik* that he was, de Gaulle considered bipolarity a dangerous abnormality. That France was effectively marginalized in a bipolar system troubled de Gaulle even more. Under de Gaulle's leadership France subsequently became much more vociferous in its opposition to any arrangement that threatened to perpetuate its formal subordination to the United States. While de Gaulle had no interest in pursuing a policy of neutrality, he strongly believed that France should adopt a more independent line in the East-West conflict. So followed a series of policy initiatives, such as recognition of the People's Republic of China in 1964 and criticism of American policy in Vietnam, that were intended to clearly distinguish France from its trans-Atlantic ally. As significant as these moves were, the linchpin in de Gaulle's strategy for reasserting French power and influence was Europe. Although de Gaulle harbored a visceral dislike of the supranationalist vision of European integration predominant among Europe's political elite, he well understood the value of 'Europe' as a political tool. France's material weakness in comparison to the two superpowers

[29] Ibid., 160-163.

was an unalterable fact of life. Acting on its own or operating within the present structure, France could never hope to challenge American primacy. De Gaulle's plan was to use the machinery of an independent Europe (i.e., one free of American and Soviet influence) as a catalyst for French action.

Despite all of de Gaulle's efforts, France's international position did not dramatically change during his eleven years in office. The tight bipolar structure of the 1950s may have begun to wane by the end of the 1960s, but France very much remained a second tier power within the Western camp. "Yet," notes James McMillan, "in his way de Gaulle did make France once again some kind of serious force in the world arena, a power not to be despised or ignored but recognized for the extra dimension she added to world diplomacy."[30] Adds Serge Berstein, "It is obvious that the president of the French Republic played the role of stimulant in international relations, and it is not an exaggeration to see the 1960s as the age of de Gaulle."[31]

France After de Gaulle

De Gaulle's successor Georges Pompidou adhered to the Gaullist line in nearly every respect. The only issue of any significance on which Pompidou broke with his predecessor concerned the direction of European integration. During the 1960s de Gaulle had twice vetoed British entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) on the grounds that Britain's close ties to the United States would undermine European independence. Pompidou reversed this policy. For "unreconstructed Gaullists," Pompidou's decision to support Britain's application to join the Common

[30] McMillan, *Twentieth-Century France*, 167.
[31] Berstein, *The Republic of de Gaulle*, 183.

Market represented a dangerous betrayal of Gaullist principles.[32] To the more forward-looking and pragmatic Pompidou, British membership in the EEC was entirely consistent with the precepts of Gaullism. With West Germany growing ever more powerful and independent, Pompidou thought it wise to introduce Britain as a counterweight.[33] Hence, far from repudiating his predecessor's legacy, Pompidou's European strategy represented an exercise in *realpolitik* straight out of the Gaullist textbook.

The presidency of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (1974-1981) was marked by a similar pattern of continuity and change; continuity on Gaullist fundamentals, yet divergence with respect to some of the policies chosen in pursuit of those objectives. In order to better reflect its own defense requirements, for instance, Giscard d'Estaing initiated a controversial adjustment in France's military relationship with NATO. Since withdrawing from NATO's integrated military command in 1966, French defense policy had rested entirely on the strategy of massive nuclear retaliation. Giscard d'Estaing abandoned that approach in favor of the doctrine of 'flexible response.' Although France's formal relationship with NATO would remain unchanged (an important concession to doctrinaire Gaullists), in so doing Giscard d'Estaing effectively reintegrated France into NATO's military planning structure.

Like Pompidou's shift on British membership in the Common Market, the force of circumstance dictated the change in nuclear strategy. Under de Gaulle and Pompidou, French defense policy had been premised on the illusory notion that

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[32] Kolodziej, *French International Policy Under de Gaulle and Pompidou*, 407.
[33] Serge Berstein and Jean-Pierre Rioux, *The Pompidou Years, 1969-1974*, Translated by Christopher Woodall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 25-26.

France need only be concerned with direct threats to French territory (*sanctuarisation*). Recognizing the very real threat that a Soviet invasion of Western Europe would pose to France, Giscard d'Estaing embraced the concept of *sanctuarisation élargie*. France would still be considered an inviolable sanctuary, but in a much broader context than before. According to the 1976 Defense Program Law, the French armed forces were henceforth committed to "participating in the defense of Europe."[34] While this strategy may not have had the same visceral appeal as de Gaulle's emphasis on complete independence, it was certainly more in tune with the realities of the contemporary security environment; and in Giscard d'Estaing's understanding of Gaullist priorities, France's real security interests were eminently more important than anything else.

Fidelity to the Gaullist template would be the hallmark of François Mitterand's foreign policy as well. That a Socialist president who had once described the institutions of the Fifth Republic as a 'permanent coup d'état' could be labeled a Gaullist in any regard is stark testimony to the political appeal of de Gaulle's foreign policy program. Indeed, as a precondition to just being viewed as a legitimate presidential candidate, Mitterand had been essentially compelled to abandon his opposition to the militarily questionable yet highly symbolic French nuclear force (*force de frappe*).[35] Once in office, however, Mitterand displayed a more independent streak, most notably in his support for the European deployment of a new generation

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[34] J.R. Frears, *France in the Giscard Presidency* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981), 89-90; and McMillan, *Twentieth-Century France*, 199.

[35] Stanley Hoffmann, "Mitterand's Foreign Policy, or Gaullism by an other Name," in George Ross, Stanley Hoffmann, and Sylvia Malzacher, eds., *The Mitterand Experiment: Continuity and Change in Modern France* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), 294-305; 295.

of American intermediate range missiles. On the surface, Mitterand's advocacy of a policy that could do nothing but strengthen West Germany's relationship with the United States appeared to contradict everything that de Gaulle had stood for. Yet as Stanley Hoffmann notes, "In so far as maintaining a balance of power capable of deterring Moscow was always a Gaullist principle, Mitterand's startling Atlanticist innovations cannot be seen as a fundamental break with Gaullism."[36]

A similar conclusion can be drawn about Mitterand's approach to European integration, the essence of which was an acceptance of the very federalist model that de Gaulle had so vigorously campaigned against throughout his political career. As Ronald Tiersky explains, by the 1980s France no longer feared that European integration would somehow damage its prestige or threaten its territorial integrity. The challenge now came from globalization and its more insidious cousin, Americanization. For Mitterand, further integration was thus necessary "...to create a European power capable of balancing the United States and other world powers in the 'multipolar world' that France wanted." Concludes Tiersky, "...Mitterand's federalist inclinations regarding the long-term future of European integration arose out of French patriotism, from an absolutely traditional, in a sense gaullien, idea of national interest."[37]

Europe would become even more important to France with the passing of the Cold War. For all of its criticism of bipolarity, the division of the world into two rival blocs had in fact provided France with a significant amount of leeway to carve out a

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[36] Ibid., 299.
[37] Ronald Tiersky, *François Mitterand: The Last French President* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 162.

distinct niche for itself on the international stage. According to Gaullist orthodoxy, France spoke not just for itself, but for Europe and much of the developing/non-aligned world as well. Situated at the farthest reaches of Western Europe with its security ultimately guaranteed by NATO and the American nuclear umbrella, France could afford to pursue a relatively independent line on a wide range of issues. The end of the Cold War dramatically upset that balance. Almost overnight the greatest restraint on American power disappeared. So too did a key part of the political arrangement that had kept Germany in check since the Second World War. To maintain its international rank, France would have to be creative. That was hardly a new challenge, however. For the past half century, if not longer, France had relied on deft political maneuvering to preserve its position at or near the front ranks of the international power hierarchy. The post-Cold War world merely demanded that France utilize those skills in new ways.

France and Humanitarian Intervention

Yugoslavia

The potential disintegration of Yugoslavia was viewed with much trepidation in France, as it was in most Western countries. In addition to believing that such an outcome would likely spark a wave of violence across the multiethnic state and perhaps even the entire Balkan region, there was great concern that an acrimonious split would have serious repercussions with respect to the issue of minority secession. From France's perspective, then, the initially cautious response of the E.C. was just

what the situation called for.[38] As soon as it became clear that this strategy was not working, however, France began to explore other options, including the deployment of some type of European intervention force under the aegis of the Western European Union.[39]

After nearly two months of ultimately unsuccessful intra-Community campaigning, France decided to bring the intervention idea before the U.N. Security Council. Said Mitterand, "The U.N. can and must bring her authority to bear. She can mandate or support action by the E.C., that would give us more force."[40] Since the E.C. had not yet reached a consensus on how to proceed, the president's overture was greeted with a healthy dose of skepticism. The *Economist*, in what was a typical reaction, suggested that the initiative was probably, "...less in the interests of Yugoslavia than to bolster its [France's] campaign for Europe to do its own thing in defence."[41] It was an impression that France did not seem inclined to dispel. Appearing before the National Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee on 3 October, European Affairs Minister Elisabeth Guigou discussed the proposed intervention force almost entirely within the context of developing an integrated European defense identity.[42]

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[38] AFP, Reuter, "Les pays de la CEE ne reconnaîtront pas l'indépendence de la Slovénie et de la Croatie," *Le Monde*, 25 June 1991, 4.
[39] *La Politique Étrangère de la France: Textes et Documents*, July-August 1991 (Paris: Ministère des Affaires Étrangères), 49.
[40] Cited in Serge Marti, "La France demande que les Nations unies soient saisies 'sans délai'," *Le Monde*, 21 September 1991, 3. Also "Paris et Bonn proposent l'envoi d'une force européenne d'interposition en Yugoslavie," *ibid.*, 20 September 1991, 1; "Le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies est saisi de la crise yugoslave," *ibid.*, 21 September 1991, 1; and *La Politique Étrangère de la France*, September-October 1991, 53 and 62.
[41] "Into Yugoslavia," *Economist*, 21 September 1991, 17.
[42] *La Politique Étrangère de la France*, September-October 1991, 95. All of the talk came to a head on 16 October when France and Germany announced their intention to create an independent European defense force. See "MM. Mitterand et Kohl proposent de renforcer les responsabilités européennes en matière de défense," *Le Monde*, 17 October 1991, 1.

Whatever its motive(s), France turned out to be one of the most enthusiastic supporters of UNPROFOR. From its early advocacy for intervention in Croatia, to its key role in getting UNPROFOR's mandate extended to Bosnia, to its sizeable troop contributions, France made its presence known at every turn.[43] And much to France's delight, it all stood in sharp contrast to the role being played by the United States, whose most significant contribution during the first year of the crisis was its agitation for economic sanctions. It was a division of labor that just seemed to reinforce the French argument that Europe required its own security architecture. Mitterand even went so far as to suggest that had a fully operational European military force existed, France and Europe would have been able to handle the situation by themselves.[44]

Although Franco-American relations had been strained since October 1991 when France first announced its intention to pursue the development of an independent European defense force, it was the sanctions debate that really exacerbated trans-Atlantic tensions. As far as the U.S. was concerned, France's reluctance to endorse a comprehensive sanctions regime against the rump Yugoslav republic was proof that French policy lacked substance.[45] Not surprisingly, the allegation provoked a sharp rebuke from France. In its view, the American sanctions campaign was just a self-serving attempt to grab headlines and deflect criticism onto

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[43] *La Politique Étrangère de la France*, March-April 1992, 3; AFP and Reuter, "L'ONU appelle au respect de la trêve en Bosnie-Herzégovine," *Le Monde*, 26-27 April 1992, 3; Reuter, "La France, l'Allemagne et la Pologne demandent au Conseil de sécurité de revoir sa position," *ibid.*, 26-27 April 1992, 3; Philippe Lemaître, "M. Roland Dumas propose de nouvelles actions de la Communauté et de l'ONU," *Le Monde*, 3-4 May 1992, 5; Afsané Bassir Pour, "Le Conseil de sécurité a décidé l'envoi d'un millier de 'casques bleus' pour protéger l'aéroport de Sarajevo," *Le Monde*, 10 June 1992; and AFP and Reuter, "L'opposition accorde un sursis au president Milosevic," *ibid.*, 18 June 1992, 5.

[44] *La Politique Étrangère de la France*, May-June 1992, 73.

[45] Afsané Bassir Pour, "Le Conseil de sécurité adresse une mise en garde à Belgrade," *Le Monde*, 23 May 1992, 5; and AFP and Reuter, "L'ONU se prepare à imposer un embargo commercial à la Serbie et au Monténégro," *ibid.*, 28 May 1992, 3.

others. Countered Guigou, "We are the only ones who've taken humanitarian action. It's always easy to criticize those who are already doing something."[46]

For France, the whole episode amounted to nothing more than the latest American ploy to exercise costless leadership. As French international affairs analyst Dominique Moïsi put it, "The Americans are dismissing the role the Europeans played on Yugoslavia because in their hearts the Americans still refuse to move from leadership to partnership in Europe."[47] Added a senior French official, "We cannot accept that world diplomacy should be a one-man show."[48] There was more to the dispute than just differing conceptions over the United States' proper role in European affairs, however. French displeasure with the U.S. really stemmed from the fact that the sanctions debate placed France on the defensive regarding its close relationship with the Serbs, who by this point had been designated the main aggressor in the conflict for their punishing bombardment of Sarajevo.

Mitterand's surprise visit to Bosnia in late June 1992 did little to rehabilitate France's image with its allies. On arriving at the Sarajevo airport, Mitterand said that he hoped his visit would "...seize the world's conscience toward helping endangered people."[49] While the president's daring escapade did succeed in getting the Serbs to hand control of the airport over to the U.N., it also exposed the hollow nature of France's commitment to concert diplomacy and, more importantly, European

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[46] Cited in Philippe Lemaître, "Les douze pourraient arrêter des sanctions économiques contre la Serbie," *Le Monde.*, 26 May 1992, 4.
[47] Quoted in Thomas L. Friedman, "Strain Among Allies," *New York Times*, 30 May 1992, A3.
[48] Quoted in Roger Cohen, "U.S.-French Relations Turn Icy After Cold War," *New York Times*, 2 July 1992, A10.
[49] Quoted in John F. Burns, "Mitterand Flies Into Sarajevo; Shells Temper 'Message of Hope'," *New York Times*, 29 June 1992, A6. Also Dominique Le Guilledoux, "Six heures dans la capitale bosniaque," *Le Monde*, 30 June 1992, 3.

solidarity. The international backlash was so intense that Mitterand even found himself the target of internal criticism for the potential damage he had done to France's foreign policy. Mitterand's old rival Giscard d'Estaing captured the prevailing sentiment within France. "We cannot at one and the same time declare that we want a common foreign policy in Europe, and then undertake such isolated action without even telling our partners."[50] The Elysée remained unrepentant. The president, explained Mitterand's spokesman, "...acted in the name of a Europe that has yet to build and affirm a foreign and defense policy."[51]

Despite the criticism, France pressed ahead with its campaign to strengthen UNPROFOR, all the while remaining wedded to the idea that UNPROFOR stay above of the fray.[52] Like Canada, France considered its soldiers to be engaged in nothing more than a hybrid peacekeeping/humanitarian relief mission.[53] Hence, any deviation from the time-honored peacekeeping principle of strict neutrality was to be avoided at all costs. Adhering to this principle was of course easier said than done, as evidenced by France's suggestion that military personnel accompany the relief convoys, a move that was sure to aggravate UNPROFOR's relationship with the Serbs.[54]

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[50] Quoted in Roger Cohen, "Mitterand Trip Welcomed Only In Paris and Sarajevo," *New York Times*, 29 June 1992, A6.
[51] Quoted in "Le PS s'inquiète de 'l'indifférence' et de 'l'impuissance' des nations," *Le Monde*, 1 July 1992, 6.
[52] *La Politique Étrangère de la France*, July-August 1992, 7; "La France envoie des helicopters à Sarajevo," *Le Monde*, 10 July 1992, 5; and "Un accord de cessez-le-feu en Bosnie-Herzégovine a été signé, Deux 'casques bleus' français ont été tués en Croatie," *ibid.*, 19-20 July 1992, 3.
[53] "'Il faut que la conscience universelle se révolte' declare M. Bérégovoy," *Le Monde*, 8 August 1992, 5; and AFP, Reuter and AP, "La situation en Bosnie-Herzégovine," *ibid.*, 11 August 1992, 3.
[54] *La Politique Étrangère de la France*, July-August 1992, 82.

The international community was again forced to consider new measures after Serb forces embarked upon a renewed offensive in November 1992. For France, the primary challenge was to find a policy that brought more pressure to bear on the Serbs without completely crossing the threshold into open combat. The idea of using air strikes to destroy Serb artillery positions was thus categorically rejected. As a less provocative alternative, Mitterand suggested that the no-fly zone over Bosnia be militarily enforced.[55] The president also proposed that the U.N. declare Sarajevo a safe-haven.[56] While neither idea was immediately implemented, both would be adopted by the spring of 1993.

Although France had approved every change in UNPROFOR's posture, the increasing militarization of the mission was a constant source of concern. Said Mitterand, "We greatly prefer a diplomatic solution and conciliation arising out of the authority of the negotiators."[57] The tone being emitted by the incoming Clinton Administration (rejection of Vance-Owen, 'lift and strike') suggested that this might soon become a much more difficult outcome to achieve, however. The Bush Administration's hands-off approach to the conflict had presented few real problems for France. In fact, if anything, it played into France's hands. That all changed as of the winter of 1993. With the arrival of the Clinton Administration, France had to concern itself with containing American policy. To this effect, the United Nations subsequently became the focal point of French diplomacy. In an interview conducted

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[55] "Hard Line From France," *New York Times*, 15 December 1992, A3; Afsané Bassir Pour, "Paris demande à l'ONU d'agir contre l'aviation serbe," *Le Monde*, 16 December 1992, 1; and Alan Riding, "French Oppose Air Strikes," *New York Times*, 17 December 1992, A22.

[56] Claire Tréan, "La France demande que Sarajevo soit sous protection de l'ONU," *Le Monde*, 1 January 1993, 1.

[57] Quoted in "Français et Américains ont rapproché leurs positions," *Le Monde*, 5 January 1993, 5.

shortly after Clinton's inauguration, Mitterand indicated that France would support whatever action the U.N. Security Council deemed necessary, knowing full well of course that the U.N. could do nothing without French approval.[58]

For nearly two years the main point of contention between France and the United States had been the latter's decision to essentially opt out of the international effort to deal with the Yugoslav crisis. With Clinton, the preeminent issue became who should control policy and decision-making pertaining to military action in Bosnia. France was vehement that the United Nations be the ultimate authority, with NATO in a clearly subservient role.[59] Not surprisingly, the U.S. held the exact opposite viewpoint. The dispute was front and center during the Security Council's deliberations over the military enforcement of the no-fly zone. Since NATO was the only organization capable of coordinating such a complex operation, it appeared as though the American position was bound to prevail. However, whatever influence the United States stood to gain through such an arrangement was ultimately nullified by the fact that the United Nations was given final authority over all NATO actions.[60]

After having spent the better part of 1993 arguing against the American call for air strikes, France changed course in January 1994 and endorsed the limited use of air power. The United States was less than impressed by the move, coming as it did just as NATO began an important heads-of-state summit to discuss the alliance's proposed eastward expansion. As far as the Clinton Administration was concerned,

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[58] *La Politique Étrangère de la France*, January-February 1993, 106.
[59] *La Politique Étrangère de la France*, November-December 1992, 251.
[60] Afsané Bassir Pour, "L'usage de la force pourrait être autorisé par l'ONU pour empêcher le survol de la Bosnie," *Le Monde*, 20 March 1993, 3; U.N. S/RES/816 (31 March 1993); and Shaun Gregory, *French Defence Policy into the Twenty-First Century* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 63.

Mitterand was merely looking to upstage the U.S.[61] What the U.S. failed to grasp was that the situation on the ground in Bosnia had changed dramatically since the previous summer. With Serb attacks on U.N. positions increasing, air strikes were the logical next step in terms of policy evolution. For France, though, air strikes were to be a weapon of last resort. After NATO planes struck Serb targets around Gorazde in mid-April 1994, Foreign Affairs Minister Alain Juppé emphatically ruled out the possibility of stepping up the campaign.[62] And so did the debate over air strikes continue throughout 1994.

The return of the Bosnian war in the spring of 1995 coincided with the election of a new French government under the leadership of Jacques Chirac. Chirac initiated a more proactive policy in Bosnia almost immediately, the highlight of which was the decision to deploy the heavily armed rapid reaction force.[63] For Chirac, Bosnia had become a test of French honor. That French soldiers could be attacked and taken hostage without consequence was simply intolerable.[64]

Chirac continued to press the case for a more robust international posture throughout June and into July. Just how far Chirac was willing to go became clear when he declared that whether through negotiation or by force, the siege of Sarajevo had to be broken.[65] The world had long since grown accustomed to such bold assertions. And as developments in Srebrenica would soon attest, nothing Chirac said

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[61] Douglas Jehl, "In NATO Talks, Bosnia Sets Off a Sharp Debate," *New York Times*, 11 January 1994, A1 and A8; and Claire Tréan, "Les Occidentaux veulent tenter une action sur Tuzla et Srebrenica," *Le Monde*, 13 January 1994, 5.
[62] *La Politique Étrangère de la France*, March-April 1994, 184.
[63] Jacques Isnard, "Une force de réaction rapide de 4000 hommes," *Le Monde*, 1 June 1995, 2.
[64] Jacques Isnard, "Paris et Londres veulent échapper aux loudeurs de l'ONU en Bosnie," *Le Monde*, 3 June 1995, 3.
[65] Claire Tréan, "M. Chirac se dit détermine à désenclaver Sarajevo," *Le Monde*, 7 July 1995, 1.

seemed to have the slightest influence on international policy. Nevertheless, Chirac kept up the pressure. In the wake of the U.N. debacle at Srebrenica he announced, "France is ready to use all possible means to reestablish the security zone of Srebrenica, because if not we must realize that other enclaves could be the object of the same action."[66] With no other state particularly keen on the idea, however, Chirac was left to acknowledge, "For the moment we are alone. Alone we cannot act, we do not have the mandate and we do not have the means."[67] France would remain alone as Zepa was overrun.

It was not until the massive air and artillery assault of August and September 1995 that Chirac's 'diplomacy of guilt' paid off. The fact that the U.S. garnered most of the credit for the tough new stance did not sit well with Chirac. Complained the president in an interview with *Le Point*, "No country has done more than France in the search for peace in the former Yugoslavia. It's because France took the initiative in creating the rapid reaction force that the military posture of the U.N. changed."[68] If nothing else, Chirac believed, the historical record should at least reflect the true division of labor in Bosnia.

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[66] Quoted in "La France est prete à participer à une operation militaire sur l'enclave," *Le Monde*, 13 July 1995, 2.
[67] Quoted in "Le chef de l'État se fixe pour objectif de renforcer la cohesion nationale," *Le Monde*, 16-17 July1995, 2.
[68] Quoted in *La Politique Étrangère de la France*, September-October 1995, 3.

Somalia

The Somali civil war and famine never appeared on France's political radar prior to December 1992.[69] French policy changed dramatically, however, once it became clear that there would be a major international effort to address the crisis. After U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali recommended the Security Council endorse the U.S. offer to lead a large multinational contingent into Somalia, France declared that it too would send a sizeable military force (twenty-one hundred soldiers) to the famine-stricken country.[70] For most countries, the Somali intervention was a case of pure humanitarianism. Not so for France. In a rather blunt admission, Foreign Affairs Minister Dumas emphasized that France was participating primarily because it did not want to let one nation (the United States), under the pretext of being stronger than everyone else, assume the role of global policeman.[71] France may not have been capable of matching the U.S. soldier for soldier, but its status as the second-largest troop contributor to the Unified Task Force certainly distinguished it internationally, which was all that really mattered to the French government.

Rwanda and Zaire

To describe French policy during the first two months of the Rwandan genocide as merely callous would be far too generous given the nature of France's intimate and longstanding relationship with Rwanda's governing Hutus. For France, the decision

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[69] The situation in Somalia was almost never mentioned by any foreign policy official from the summer of 1992 until late November. See *La Politique Étrangère de la France*, July-August 1992, September-October 1992, and November-December 1992.
[70] "2120 soldats français sur le terrain," *Le Monde*, 9 December 1992, 3.
[71] AFP, Reuter, "L'intervention internationale en Somalie," *Le Monde*, 8 December 1992, 3.

to stand aside while Hutu forces cut down hundreds of thousands of Tutsis was nothing less than a calculated geo-political strategy. When pressed in a mid-April 1994 interview as to whether France should be doing more to rein in the killing, Foreign Affairs Minister Alain Juppé dismissively asked, "Can France police the entire world? Does she have the means and the responsibility for the whole planet to keep people from killing one another?"[72] If the answer to these questions was ever in doubt, France clarified exactly where it stood by voting along with the rest of the Security Council on 21 April to reduce the U.N. military presence in Rwanda by 90 percent.[73]

For the next two months France did little but mouth meaningless platitudes. Then, seemingly out of nowhere, came Juppé's mid-June announcement that France was willing to lead a multilateral intervention force into Rwanda to stop the killing.[74] When the idea of sending a large U.N. force into Rwanda had first come up in late May, Juppé indicated that France would not participate without the consent of both Hutus and Tutsis.[75] Now, just two weeks later, France was saying that it would lead such a mission regardless of whether or not the Tutsis acquiesced. The French appeal to humanitarian sentiment bordered on the absurd given France's record over the previous two months. Moreover, by mid-June the pace of the killing had noticeably slowed. Why, then, did France decide on intervention at this particular juncture? For

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[72] Quoted in *La Politique Étrangère de la France*, March-April 1994, 186.
[73] Gérard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 275-276.
[74] Marie-Pierre Subtil, "La France pourrait prendre l'initiative d'une intervention au Rwanda," *Le Monde*, 17 juin 1994, 1; idem, "Mille à deux mille soldats français pourraient participer à l'opération humanitaire," *ibid.*, 19-20 juin 1994, 4; AFP, "Une prémière operation-test," *ibid.*, 24 juin 1994, 6; and *La Politique Étrangère de la France*, May-June 1994, 270-272.
[75] *La Politique Étrangère de la France*, May-June 1994, 172.

the answer one need look no further than the changing fortunes of the favored Hutu, who by this point were on the verge of being driven from power, an outcome that would have gravely imperiled France's influence in the region.

Much to France's credit, its troops did achieve some genuine humanitarian successes during 'Operation Turquoise.'[76] Still, any doubts that may have remained as to France's neutrality were firmly put to rest when many of the Hutu militiamen responsible for the genocide were allowed to escape behind French lines. In the end, 'Operation Turquoise' stood as a testament to the triumph of French reasons of state. Acknowledged Prime Minister Édouard Balladur, "France sees itself as a world power. This is its ambition and its honor and I wish for it to preserve this ambition. And its main field of action is Africa, where it has an important role to play because of longstanding tradition – especially in French-speaking Africa."[77]

As noted in chapter two, France's attempt to mobilize an international intervention in response to the emerging humanitarian crisis in the refugee camps of Zaire in November 1996 largely came to naught. The French proposal ran into stiff opposition on two fronts. First, despite the evident urgency of the situation, the U.S. was adamant that it would neither participate in nor support another large-scale U.N. military operation. Second, neither the Tutsi-controlled Rwandan government nor their brethren in Eastern Zaire were very keen on the idea of another 'Operation Turquoise.' Explained Anastase Gasana, Rwanda's Minister of Foreign Affairs, "We do not trust military intervention in Africa under the cover of being humanitarian. We

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[76] Marlise Simons, "French Soldiers in Rwanda Report Finding Mass Graves," *New York Times*, 25 June 1994, A5; and Reuters, "French Paratroopers Disarm Rwanda Militias, Saying They Are Allies of Neither Tribe," *ibid.*, 26 June 1994, A10.
[77] Quoted in Marlise Simons, "France's Rwanda Connection," *New York Times*, 3 July 1994, A6.

know the price we had to pay for the supposedly humanitarian 'Operation Turquoise,' which was, in fact, an operation that offered a gracious cover to those who committed genocide."[78]

France's options for dealing with the U.S. were rather limited. The most it could do was keep the issue in the spotlight and hope that the resulting media attention would compel the Americans to change course. Winning over its African critics would be even more difficult. Between its past behavior and its continued involvement in the region's affairs, hardly anyone believed that France was acting solely out of humanitarian concern for the refugees. That its plan appeared suspect did nothing but create more doubts. By announcing its intention to reinstall the refugees back into the squalid camps along the Rwanda-Zaire border, France conveyed the impression that it was more interested in protecting the Hutu militiamen ensconced in the camps than it was in addressing the underlying problems that led to the crisis in the first place.[79]

With so many factors working against it, France had no other choice but to cloak its proposal in the guise of multilateralism. In an obvious attempt to change the parameters of the debate, Foreign Affairs Minister Hervé de Charette declared, "France is ready to engage under the strict condition that there is European, African, and American participation."[80] He later added, "We do not wish to be a French force.

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[78] Quoted in "La communauté internationale prépare une intervention limitée au Zaire," *Le Monde*, 7 November 1996, 7. Also Afsané Bassir Pour, "Washington freine toujours l'envoi d'une force multinationale au Zaire," *ibid.*, 10 and 11 November 1996, 2; and AFP Reuter, "Les rebelles tutsis posent leurs conditions a une intervention humanitaire," *ibid.*, 12 November 1996, 2.

[79] Afsané Bassir Pour, "L'ONU devrait rapidement voter l'envoi d'une force au Zaire," *Le Monde*, 13 November 1996, 4.

[80] Quoted in "La France est prete a participer a une intervention humanitaire au Zaire," *Le Monde*, 6 November 1996, 5.

This must be an international action under the responsibility and the guide of the U.N."[81] In all likelihood, nothing that France could say or do was ever going to be enough to overcome the legacy of 'Operation Turquoise' or the perception that France possessed ulterior motives. Regardless, the pace of events soon eclipsed French diplomacy. Operating without any of France's political baggage, Canada was quickly able to rally international support for its own intervention proposal, leaving France to uncomfortably assume the role of follower in a region in which it was accustomed to being the primary power broker.

Analysis

The preceding cases tell a compelling story about the relationship between French identity and French foreign policy. No matter the circumstance, France's main concern was usually how best to bolster its own international standing or protect its interests. Although France was far from indifferent towards the humanitarian consequences that attended Yugoslavia's disintegration, humanitarianism was rarely ever more than a second order consideration for French decision-makers. As appropriate and desirable as it may have been from a humanitarian standpoint, the initial French proposal for the deployment of an international military force under the direction of the W.E.U. clearly had much more to do with France's interest in seeing the European Community develop its own foreign policy and defense identity than it did with France's concern for the humanitarian situation inside Croatia. Whenever

[81] Quoted in Afsané Bassir Pour, "La France a du mal à convaincre l'ONU de l'urgence d'une intervention au Zaire," *Le Monde*, 8 November 1996, 7.

Mitterand, Dumas, or any other senior French official spoke of the matter, they invariably chose to emphasize how the insertion of such a force would serve the broader goal of European integration. Meanwhile, the humanitarian crisis itself would often go unmentioned, a pattern that would repeat itself time and again over the next four years.

For France, the 'internationalization' of the Yugoslav crisis under the aegis of the U.N. Security Council after September 1991 created both opportunities and constraints. As one of the Council's permanent members, France was subsequently able to guarantee that no major change in policy was implemented without its consent. The comparison with Canada on this point is striking. Although certainly France's equal during the first year-and-a-half of the crisis in promoting and supporting the intervention option, Canada never had much say over the actual direction of international policy, a handicap that gradually forced Canada to the margins of the diplomatic and military effort.

Despite enjoying more control over the course of events than most states, France was far from immune to the system effects dynamic. Once the Mitterand government decided that it would use the Yugoslav situation as a vehicle for the promotion of the common foreign and security policy initiative, the crisis was effectively transformed into a test of French power and influence. Henceforth, each and every foreign military and diplomatic proposal that threatened to upset the French plan of action assumed the aura of a direct challenge to France's standing. Doing whatever was necessary to maintain its leadership position subsequently became France's number one priority. At times, that entailed doing nothing more than

blocking proposed changes to UNPROFOR's mandate, increasing its troop contribution, or threatening to withdraw in order to expose the substantive difference between its own policy and that of the United States. France could not always afford to be so passive, however. As inconsistent and hypocritical as American policy often was, the Clinton Administration's campaign for a much more aggressive military approach had the effect of dramatically transforming the nature of the debate over the use of force. Countries like Canada and France, who had chosen to focus on containing the conflict and dampening its impact on civilians, were made to appear cowardly and indecisive as a result of their reluctance to endorse the American plan for a bombing campaign against Serb forces. Although extremely wary of crossing the line that divided peacekeeping from peacemaking, France felt it had no other choice but to respond to the American challenge by steadily increasing the level of coercion it was willing to use. To stay the course with traditional peacekeeping, as did Canada, would have amounted to an admission of French weakness. Every such move of course had a pronounced effect on the systemic normative context. Wherever France went, the international community was usually forced to follow. At least in terms of the Yugoslav case, then, France very much functioned as the hub of the 'action-reaction' dynamic that is central to the system effects conceptualization of the norm diffusion process.

Notwithstanding its less than altruistic motives, France must ultimately be judged as having contributed mightily to both the humanitarian relief effort and the military campaign against Serb aggression in the former Yugoslavia. The French search for grandeur in Central Africa produced a markedly less beneficial outcome.

At no time during the Rwandan genocide did France consider subordinating its political interests to humanitarian concerns. Not until it had become clear that its Hutu client was on the brink of being defeated did France show any inclination towards intervening. The notion that France intervened out of concern for the well being of the Rwandan people is thus plainly false. In fact, by the time France made it known that it would proceed with a unilateral intervention if need be, the Rwandan genocide was all but over. The only unresolved issue of any consequence at that point was whether the rebel Tutsis would actually succeed in driving the genocidal Hutu regime from power.

France's response to the looming humanitarian catastrophe in the refugee camps of Zaire two years later was no less political. On this occasion, however, France's political agenda was best served by a policy of engagement, much like it had been in the former Yugoslavia. The extent to which French policy vis-à-vis the Zaire crisis should be described in humanitarian terms at all is thus highly debatable. That said, had it not been for the diplomatic efforts of France, the international community would almost certainly not have become involved in the Zaire crisis when it did.

Of all the cases examined, French policy towards Somalia probably offers the strongest evidence in support of the state identity argument. Prior to December 1992, France had shown absolutely no interest in doing anything about the Somali civil war and famine. As far as the Mitterand government was concerned, there was simply no reason to get involved. Somalia was neither a part of French Africa nor an important continental power. Then came the American offer to lead a large multinational humanitarian relief mission. For France, the American proposal changed everything.

Suddenly, the fact that there were no direct French interests at stake ceased to be important. As Dumas intimated, what mattered now was France's international reputation and position in the hierarchy of states.

While evidently extremely valuable as a source of empirical support for the state identity argument, the Somalia case offers a rather poor testing ground for the alternative proposition that individual preferences are ultimately more fundamental to the policy-making process. Given the absence of any variation in France's political leadership during the key time period in the crisis (July to December 1992), one can only speculate as to what France's reaction would have been had someone other than Mitterand occupied the Elysée or Dumas been in control at the Quai D'Orsay. Be that as it may, the fact that no one on the right of the political spectrum made an issue of the Mitterand government's policy, either before or after the American proposal, suggests that French policy would not have looked substantially different under another foreign policy team.

The Rwanda and Zaire cases tell much the same story. For both left and right (i.e., Mitterand, Balladur, and Juppé), non-intervention was indisputably the right policy to follow in response to the Rwandan genocide. Only when French interests dictated otherwise did that change. With Zaire, the circumstances just happened to be reversed. It would be wildly incorrect, therefore, to conclude that France's pursuit of a different policy on this occasion should be read as evidence of the influence of idiosyncratic factors on the policy-making process. Mitterand or Chirac, Balladur or Juppé, Juppé or de Charette, French policy would have been much the same.

The definitive test for this counterargument is of course the Yugoslav crisis, during which three distinct leadership phases can be identified. Mitterand dominated the first stage, which ran from the beginning of the crisis in the summer of 1991 until the spring of 1993. The second coincides with the two-year period of cohabitation that followed the French right's victory in the spring 1993 parliamentary elections. During this stage, Mitterand was forced to surrender some of his control over the direction of foreign policy to the new foreign minister, Alain Juppé. The third and final phase, from May 1995 on, belonged to Chirac.

The remarkable continuity in approach that marked the first two leadership phases suggests that idiosyncratic factors were of no great significance in determining French policy during the first four years of the crisis. Whatever Juppé's differences with Mitterand may have been, they did not manifest themselves in relation to this issue. That Chirac was singularly responsible for France's tougher posture during the last few months of the Bosnian conflict is beyond dispute. Whether Chirac's approach represented a significant break with the policies of the Mitterand era is another question entirely. By the time Chirac came into office, the U.S. was already signaling that it did not intend to let the war drag on indefinitely. Countering the American attempt to take over the international diplomatic and military effort thus figured prominently in Chirac's strategy, just as it always had for his predecessor. Save for the largely time sensitive details of their respective approaches, then, there is little by which to distinguish Mitterand and Chirac from one another. In the eyes of both, the Yugoslav crisis was the ultimate post-Cold War test of French power and influence, both within and beyond Europe.

Chapter Five

The United States

Although Americans may frequently inquire as to whether certain policies or practices accord with the principles of American identity, the elemental question of what it means to be an American is seldom raised, a fact that speaks to an incredibly well defined and deeply ingrained national consciousness. Concentrated around the complementary concepts of liberty and equality, the United States' national identity has long been beyond dispute. The United States' international identity is not nearly so straightforward. Firmly rooted in the belief that the U.S. is and always has been *the exemplar* of moral leadership in the world, a pronounced idealist current has permeated American foreign policy ever since the American Revolution. In the immediate post-revolutionary period, American idealism was synonymous with the policy of political isolation. The latter, in fact, was largely, albeit not entirely, a product of the former. Seeming to embody the true spirit of the Revolution, isolationism would eventually become a touchstone in its own right. Inspired by the providential rhetoric that animated the Revolution, American idealism, meanwhile, would also spawn an internationalist face. During the nineteenth century American internationalism would find expression in an expansionist agenda. In the twentieth century it would arouse an activist foreign policy. The history of American foreign

policy is thus very much the story of a country riven by two conflicting values: one that discourages foreign adventure, another that draws the country outward.

I maintain that American policy vis-à-vis the humanitarian crises in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Central Africa was just another manifestation of this antagonism. As the point of departure, I assert that the United States' general aversion towards military humanitarian intervention was largely a reflection of America's isolationist impulse, the contemporary articulation of which is most evident in the strictures of American military doctrine developed in the wake of the Vietnam War. Eventually of course the U.S. did become involved with the international community's peacekeeping/peacemaking and humanitarian relief efforts in each of these theaters. This too is explicable within the context of America's international identity. Since the end of the Second World War, American internationalism has been most prominently expressed through the institutional and rhetorical position of the United States as leader of the 'Western' or 'free' world; a historically unparalleled status that, in addition to ostensibly fulfilling the prophecy of American greatness put forth by the country's founders, has produced many tangible benefits. Whatever inclination exists towards isolationism in the U.S. thus tends to be moderated by the imperatives of American internationalism, just one of which is maintaining the country's valuable international leadership position. As much as it may have wanted to avoid intervention in the aforementioned cases, then, the U.S. had little choice but to give the idea serious consideration. To do otherwise while most of its Western allies were becoming ever more heavily involved and calling on the United States to do the same would have amounted to a surrender of American leadership. The U.S.

was anything but a purely passive actor in the process, however. As one might expect, the insertion of American power into the equation had a dramatic effect on the systemic normative environment. By placing so much emphasis on the overwhelming use of force, whether through the use of air power in Bosnia or via more traditional means in Somalia, the U.S. effectively transformed the international debate over humanitarian intervention from one dominated by talk of peacekeeping and containment to one more directly focused on peacemaking.

The chapter follows the same basic plan as the previous two. First, I examine the development of America's international identity, dating from the immediate post-Revolutionary period to the end of the Cold War. I then review the United States' response to each of the humanitarian crises under examination. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the state identity argument.

State Identity and American Foreign Policy

From the Farewell Address

The American Revolution was inspired by the idea that Britain's North American colonies could chart a better course by breaking with the corrupt and oppressive political regime of the old world. According to the Revolution's supporters, a system of government based on principles of individual liberty and popular sovereignty would free Americans from the immoral workings of the European model. As Thomas Paine proclaimed in his revolutionary pamphlet *Common Sense*, Americans

had it in their power to "...begin the world over again."[1] Nothing of the kind would be possible of course unless the American experiment could be protected against the hostile external forces that would surely seek to undermine it. Thus developed the policy of political isolation. As President George Washington so cogently declared upon the occasion of his departure from office, "The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations is in extending our commercial relations to have with them as little political connection as possible."[2]

At the time of Washington's Farewell Address there existed two very different American perspectives on foreign policy. The first, advanced most forcefully by Alexander Hamilton, was essentially realist. The second view, which would become indelibly linked with Thomas Jefferson, had its roots in the idealist camp. Despite their differences, both schools of thought counseled a policy of political isolation for the young republic.

In contemporary parlance, Alexander Hamilton was a classical realist. Philosophically grounded in his dim view of human nature ("men are ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious"),[3] Hamilton believed that conflict was one of life's immutable features, both for individuals and states alike. What was more, he considered republics to be just as susceptible to these forces as any other type of regime. As Michael Hunt notes, for Hamilton, "These hard truths in turn dictated that Americans recognize the dominant role of power, self-interest, and passion in

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[1] Thomas Paine, *Rights of Man, Common Sense and Other Political Writings* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 53.
[2] Quoted in Felix Gilbert, *To The Farewell Address: Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 145.
[3] Quoted in Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 23.

international affairs."[4] And self-interest decreed that America's first order of business was to secure what the Revolution had wrought. He thus concluded that it was imperative for the U.S. to avoid getting caught up in the European balance-of-power system. America was simply not strong enough to engage in that game and survive. As Felix Gilbert explains, Hamilton's ideas set him apart from the majority of his fellow revolutionaries,

> It may appear that Hamilton only restated the views with which, in 1776, the colonists had embarked on foreign policy – that America should have nothing to do with Europe. But if the bare conclusion was the same, it had been arrived at in a very different spirit, and it had widely divergent implications. Not the adoption of a "new policy" which would transform the face of the political world, but the fitting of the "old policy" to the American scene – this was the essence of Hamilton's program for American foreign policy.[5]

On balance, Washington was a disciple of the Hamiltonian perspective.[6] The notion that Washington intended his endorsement of isolationism to stand as an eternal guidepost to future generations of American leaders is thus inconsistent with what is known about the first president's foreign policy views. To Washington, isolationism was more of a strategy than a statement of principle. If or when circumstances changed, so too should American policy.

For Jefferson, the Hamiltonian approach was manifestly inconsistent with the high-minded republican principles that had driven the colonies to rebel. Neutrality was not simply about biding time; it was an expression of the national character.[7] In

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[4] Ibid., 24.
[5] Gilbert, *To The Farewell Address*, 114.
[6] Hamilton was so intimately involved in the drafting of the Farewell Address, in fact, that his claim to authorship with respect to several key points is quite strong.
[7] Jefferson would effectively abandon that opinion in his later years. In classic Hamiltonian fashion, Jefferson came out in support of Britain's 1823 proposal for a joint Anglo-American declaration warning against external interference in the Americas. Jefferson argued that British military support

Jefferson's opinion, the American Revolution signified a total break with Europe, including its ideas about the nature of international affairs and interstate relations. Jefferson was anything but inward looking, however. Judged against his revolutionary contemporaries, Jefferson stood out as perhaps the strongest believer in the metaphorical 'shot heard around the world' interpretation of the American Revolution. In fact, he probably did more than any other figure to promote that view. Predicted the always confident Jefferson of the Revolution's international implications, "This ball of liberty, I believe most piously, is now so well in motion that it will roll around the globe."[8]

During the heated political battles of the 1790s, it mattered greatly whether one subscribed to the Hamiltonian or Jeffersonian vision. Sensitive above all else to the potentially disastrous consequences of premature war with Britain, Hamilton deemed it essential that the United States reach some sort of political compromise with its bitter trans-Atlantic foe. Jay's Treaty eventually accomplished that task. Signed in 1794 and ratified by the U.S. Senate in 1795, Jay's Treaty helped avert another Anglo-American conflict by resolving, in Britain's favor according to most assessments, a number of contentious issues that had arisen since the end of the Revolutionary War.[9] The very idea of accommodation with Britain was abhorrent to Jefferson. Certain that the French Revolution and its associated wars were an

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was essential to the success of any such policy. President James Monroe ultimately concluded otherwise, of course.

[8] Quoted in Joseph J. Ellis, *Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary Generation* (New York: Vintage, 2002), 142.

[9] On the politics surrounding the negotiation of Jay's Treaty see Thomas A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People*, 8th Ed. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), 66-82.

extension of the American struggle against tyranny, Jefferson would have preferred to see the United States throw its weight behind France.[10]

Jefferson eventually abandoned that opinion in the latter half of the 1790s amidst increasing tension with France and his own disillusionment with France's degeneration into revolutionary dictatorship. As a result, by the time of Jefferson's election to the presidency in 1800, the practical divide between the Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian perspectives (i.e., their respective positions on the substance of American foreign policy) had largely dissipated. Over the course of the next century, in fact, Hamiltonian self-interest and Jeffersonian idealism would essentially operate in tandem as justification for the entire expansionist edifice of American foreign policy.

Jefferson's first inaugural address in 1801 is widely regarded as having been one of the most important speeches in American history. In a line that would be eternally remembered for its bold proclamation of America's historic mission, Jefferson declared the United States to be "the world's best hope." Echoing Washington and reflecting his own long-held belief in the moral rectitude of isolationism, Jefferson also counseled his compatriots to pursue, "Peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none."[11] With that turn of phrase, Washington and Jefferson were to be forever linked. In support of their own isolationist policies, future generations of anti-internationalist Americans

[10] Ellis, *Founding Brothers*, 142-143. It was just that outcome that the more sober minded Washington apparently feared. Washington's admonition against forming alliances thus must be read in the context of Jefferson's almost irrational support for revolutionary France.
[11] Thomas Jefferson, Inaugural Address, 4 March 1801, http://www.bartelby.com/124/pres16.html.

would routinely evoke the 'sage' advice of the two greatest icons of the revolutionary era.

Jefferson's inaugural address effectively set the course for the next one hundred years of American foreign policy, a period that would come to be known as the era of manifest destiny. Convinced of its own moral and political superiority, the U.S. set upon a historically unparalleled expansionist path in the 1800s, beginning with Jefferson's acquisition of the enormous Louisiana Territory in 1803.[12] President James Madison continued the expansionist drive with the seizure of West Florida from Spain in 1811. The United States' next acquisition was the Red River Basin, north of the Louisiana Territory, which came into American hands via a treaty with Britain in 1818. East Florida, which was also a Spanish possession, was added in 1819, along with Spain's rights to the Pacific coast. The drive for more land would reach its zenith in the 1840s, when Texas, the Oregon Country, and all or parts of what are now the states of Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah were brought under Washington's control. The Gadsden Purchase of 1853, which added a small slice of land along the Mexican border, rounded out the territorial boundaries of the continental United States. After a brief respite induced by the Civil War, the U.S. returned to the business of expansion in 1867 with the purchase of Alaska. For that prime piece of real estate, the U.S. paid Russia the bargain price of seven million dollars. America's century of expansion finally came

[12] The doubling of the American population every twenty-five years or so (a phenomenon known as the American 'multiplication table') was the 'practical' motor that drove American expansionism. With such a rapidly increasing population, American leaders considered territorial expansion vital to the country's economic progress. See Walter Lafeber, *The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad, 1750 to the Present*, 2nd Ed. (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1994), 12 and 42. Pages 52-58 cover the Louisiana Purchase.

to an end with the annexation of Hawaii in 1898 and the acquisition of the Alaskan panhandle in 1903.

American expansionism went hand in hand with American isolationism, a principle/policy that, at its core, stressed the importance of maintaining, if not increasing, the country's freedom of action (hence the early and persistent emphasis on neutral rights). Territorial expansion and the inevitable growth in American power that followed represented only one side of the American strategy for achieving that objective, however. Equally important was the campaign to carve out an American sphere of political and economic influence in the Western Hemisphere. That dimension of American foreign policy would find its fullest expression in the Monroe Doctrine. Proclaimed by President James Monroe in 1823, the Monroe Doctrine boldly asserted, "The American continents ... are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers." Warned Monroe, "...we should consider any attempt on their [the European powers] part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety."[13] If it had not been evident before, the Monroe Doctrine unequivocally declared the separation of the old and new worlds. That said, it would be some time before the United States was in any position to actually enforce the Monroe Doctrine. Prior to the end of the Civil War in 1865, the U.S. was simply not strong enough to dictate terms to any European power in search of territorial aggrandizement in the Americas.

[13] Quoted in Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., *Ideas, Ideals, and American Diplomacy: A History of Their Growth and Interaction* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966), 19.

When Spain moved to annex the Dominican Republic in 1861, for instance, the U.S. could do no more than remind Spain of the American position on such actions.[14]

America and the World: Part One

By the beginning of the twentieth century the United States had developed extensive worldwide interests, from Latin America, where the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine had elevated the U.S. to the *de facto* status of hemispheric policeman, to Asia, where the U.S. had established a foothold with its acquisition of the Philippines in the recently concluded Spanish-American War. The insecure republic of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was now one of the world's most powerful states. Be that as it may, the U.S. was hardly a traditional great power. Still transfixed by the idea of remaking the world in its own image, the U.S. continued to reject the European conceptualization of international affairs. In the minds of most Americans, the European balance-of-power system, with its shifting alliances, arms races, and colonial rivalries, symbolized everything that was wrong with international politics.[15] That conviction, combined with the fact that America had no direct stake in any of the issues that divided the European powers, kept the U.S. on the sidelines as Europe descended into war in the summer of 1914.

The American wartime assertion of neutral rights, which included the right to trade with any other state, was dismissed outright by Britain. Convinced that American manufactures were helping to sustain the German war effort, the British

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[14] Alexander DeConde, *A History of American Foreign Policy*, 2nd Ed. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), 263-264.
[15] Akira Iriye, *The Globalizing of America, 1913-1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 17.

navy quickly took to intercepting any American ship suspected of carrying 'contraband' cargo to Germany. The fact that the bulk of American munitions and other products actually went to Britain and her allies made little difference to Whitehall, which was intent on choking off all of Germany's lifelines. Although the British campaign seriously impeded the ability of American producers and shippers to carry on their business, the United States stopped well short of forcefully challenging the British blockade. A noted anglophile, President Woodrow Wilson was initially loath to take any action that might disadvantage democratic Britain vis-à-vis imperial Germany.

Faced with the prospect of defeat by starvation, Germany promptly concluded that it had no other choice but to unleash its U-boats against both Allied and neutral shipping. However, the sinking of the British passenger liner *Lusitania* in May 1915 and several other incidents of like nature led Germany to reconsider its strategy. The attacks, which killed more than one hundred thirty Americans (one hundred twenty-eight perished on the *Lusitania* alone), turned American public opinion decidedly against Germany. Fearful that the addition of American military and industrial power to the Allied cause would condemn the Central Powers to certain defeat, Berlin subsequently instructed its submarine commanders to take much greater care to avoid civilian losses. But the increasing effectiveness of Britain's blockade eventually forced Germany's hand. On 31 January 1917 Berlin announced that its submarines would pursue a campaign of unrestricted warfare against all enemy and neutral shipping which entered its self-declared war zone around the British Isles. Six weeks later, on 18 March, three American merchant ships were sunk. The United States

could no longer stand aside. On 2 April 1917 President Wilson asked Congress to declare war on Germany.[16]

Vanquishing Germany would turn out to be the easiest of Wilson's war aims to accomplish. For the price of American lives and treasure, Wilson wanted nothing less than a wholesale international political revolution. Jeffersonian idealism was about to be exported. Declared the president in laying out his postwar objectives before Congress, "There must be not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace."[17] Wilson's Fourteen Points program, which among other things called for the establishment of a permanent collective security organization, later to be named the League of Nations, eventually became the tangible face of that idealistic vision.

Thanks to Wilson's unwillingness to compromise and the near fanatical opposition of Republican Senators William Borah, Hiram Johnson, and Henry Cabot Lodge, American participation in Wilson's cherished League of Nations was not to be. Of the many arguments leveled against American membership in the League by its Republican detractors, none was more damaging than the accusation that it would severely compromise the country's independence and limit its freedom of action in international affairs. Recalling Washington, Jefferson, and Monroe, Wilson's critics successfully painted his scheme for postwar order as a reckless and radical departure from the country's time-tested policy of nonentanglement in European affairs.[18] To Wilson, for whom the League of Nations represented a completely logical extension

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[16] Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People*, 563-595; and Lafeber, *The American Age*, 284-297.
[17] Quoted in Lafeber, *The American Age*, 294.
[18] Iriye, *The Globalizing of America*, 69-70.

of Jeffersonian principles, the fact that Jefferson's words could be turned against the League was a source of immense irritation. As far as the president was concerned, regardless of how well entrenched American neutrality may have been, at the end of the day it was just a policy. In Wilson's considered opinion, the national purpose had always been to promote the cause of freedom in the world. Throughout the country's first century of existence, indeed until quite recently, neutrality had served that objective. Given the current situation, however, a new strategy was required. Much to the president's chagrin, the U.S. Senate was not yet ready to embark on the same crusade.

Although the Senate's rejection of the League of Nations would later be recognized as a defining moment in American and international politics, it did not appear to be all that significant in the immediate aftermath of the war. The postwar decade was a time of great prosperity for the United States, as well as a time of peace for most of the world, factors that made the League seem inconsequential and the American decision not to join appear irrelevant. The Senate's failure to ratify the Versailles Treaty (the League's Covenant was contained in the treaty) was of course merely the opening shot in what would turn out to be a rather intense campaign against any policy that seemed even remotely Wilsonian or contrary to the country's immediate self-interest. As David Kennedy points out, "In the postwar decade, Americans said ...no to the French security treaty, no to freer trade policies, no to pleas from France and Britain to forgive their wartime loans from the U.S. Treasury, and no to further unlimited immigration from Europe."[19] That there was a price to be

[19] David M. Kennedy, *Freedom From Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 386.

paid for choosing tradition and narrow self-interest over enlightened internationalism only became apparent after the onset of the Great Depression, the collapse of the Versailles settlement, the rise of fascism in Germany and Italy, and the emergence of Japanese militarism, all of which seriously affected American economic and security interests. Yet even then the United States could not be stirred to action. Adds Kennedy,

> Beginning in early 1935, American isolationism hardened from mere indifference to the outside world into studied, active repudiation of anything that smacked of international political or military engagement – or even, under some circumstances, economic engagement. Before the year 1935 was out, Congress codified isolationist sentiment into the first of five formal neutrality laws that aimed to insulate the United States from the war-storms then brewing across the globe from Europe to Asia.[20]

America and the World: Part Two

The tide of isolationist sentiment that swept the United States in the 1930s was so strong that even the usually internationalist-minded Franklin Roosevelt briefly succumbed to the isolationist mantra of 'America first.' Declared Roosevelt in his first inaugural address, "Our international trade relations, though vastly important, are in point of time and necessity secondary to the establishment of a sound national economy. I shall spare no effort to restore world trade by international economic readjustment, but the emergency at home cannot wait on that accomplishment."[21] The president's torpedoing of the 1933 London Economic Conference, which was convened in the hope of finding a replacement for the recently abandoned gold

[20] Ibid., 393-394.
[21] Franklin D. Roosevelt, Inaugural Address, 4 March 1933, http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres49.html.

standard, would come to symbolize Roosevelt's unabashedly nationalistic approach towards economic recovery during his first year in office.

Roosevelt's support for the tariff-reducing Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 marked the end of his brief flirtation with isolationist economic doctrine. Ever the practical politician, once Roosevelt realized that economic nationalism was no panacea for the ills of the Great Depression, he wasted little time in returning to the liberal orthodoxy of free trade.[22] Beyond the economic realm, however, Roosevelt was incapable of effecting much change in American foreign policy. For the vast majority of the president's compatriots, the appeal of isolationism would only be broken with Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941.

As Michael Hunt notes, the attack on Pearl Harbor removed "...the last obstacle to a renewal of the Wilsonian crusade."[23] The full weight of American power would henceforth be brought to bear in what would turn out to be a half-century long struggle, first against fascist and militarist tyranny and then communist oppression. That Roosevelt himself looked upon the Second World War as an opportunity to renew the Wilsonian crusade had been clear since the August 1941 release of the Atlantic Charter, a joint Anglo-American statement of war aims that was strikingly Wilsonian in tone. Among the objectives mentioned in the declaration were the self-determination of all peoples, the establishment of a more equitable international economic order, and the construction of a comprehensive and permanent international security system.[24] Out of these high-minded principles emerged the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and United Nations. This time around the U.S.

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[22] Lafeber, *The American Age*, 370-375.
[23] Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy*, 150.

would not shirk the responsibilities of power. But nor would it ignore the realities of power either. As the British discovered during the Bretton Woods negotiations, American officials were simply not interested in compromise. The post-war order was to conform to American principles and serve American interests above all else. Among other things, that meant there would be very few formal international obligations imposed upon the United States beyond those related to its role as chief creditor for the IMF and World Bank.

As the true intentions of post-war Soviet foreign policy began to emerge, however, the U.S. was forced to contemplate a much greater international role for itself. Two years after the war had ended, Europe's full economic recovery remained a long way off. The task of holding the line against the advance of communism thus inevitably fell to the United States. Declared President Harry Truman before Congress in March 1947,

> One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion. We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States. The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms.[25]

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[24] Iriye, *The Globalizing of America*, 187-188.

[25] Harry S. Truman, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress, 12 March 1947, http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/funddocs/truman.txt.

To that end, Truman asked Congress to appropriate four hundred million dollars in economic and military aid for Greece and Turkey, both of which were certain to 'go communist' failing American intervention.[26]

The virulent anti-communism of the Truman Doctrine would serve as the cornerstone of American foreign policy for the next forty years, justifying everything from the thirteen billion dollar Marshall Plan aid package for Western Europe, to the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to American involvement in the Korean and Vietnam Wars. While the economic and human costs incurred in waging the Cold War were certainly enormous, the United States also reaped many rewards from assuming the lion's share of the burden for Western security and international economic stability. Just as America's post-war planners had hoped, the international order constructed out of the ruins of the Second World War became not only a vehicle for the advancement of American military and economic interests, but a conduit by which to carry American values to the rest of the world. Leadership, the U.S. would discover, had its privileges.

The Legacy of Vietnam

Among its many consequences, the Vietnam War rekindled isolationist sentiment throughout the United States. With more than fifty-six thousand lives lost in the war, the American public's willingness to pay any price and bear any burden in defense of

[26] The Truman Administration had been fighting to get more economic aid for American allies in Europe since the end of the war, but had been stymied by the still very potent forces of isolationism. Only by pitching the issue as a life and death struggle against communism was Truman able to overcome this sentiment. For a more complete discussion of this debate see Stephen D. Krasner, "US Commercial and Monetary Policy: Unravelling the Paradox of External Strength and Internal Weakness," *International Organization* 31:4 (Autumn 1977), 635-671.

the cause of liberty beyond America's shores had come to an end.[27] As public opinion analysts Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro note, "The Vietnam War experience, taken as a whole, provoked a lingering public skepticism about the use of military force abroad, reluctance to spend more money on defense, resistance to foreign aid and foreign involvement more generally."[28]

The war even more profoundly affected the U.S. military. From the military's standpoint, the Vietnam War was waged in pursuit of ill-defined political and military objectives. The military also believed that too many restrictions had been placed on its tactics. Revisionist history it may well be, but as far as the American defense establishment was concerned, the military was never given a fair chance to win the war. In the wake of its experience in Vietnam the U.S. military thus began to rethink its mission, particularly with respect to the relationship between the use of force and America's general foreign policy goals.

The first attempt to enunciate new guidelines did not come until 1984, however; one year after two hundred forty-one U.S. servicemen lost their lives in a terrorist attack on their barracks in Beirut (American troops had been deployed to Lebanon in 1982 as part of a multinational peacekeeping force). In a speech laced with allusions to Vietnam and Lebanon, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger articulated six principles by which to assess the advisability of using military force. Heading Weinberger's list of conditions was the stipulation that U.S. troops should

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[27] In his inaugural address President John F. Kennedy had proclaimed, "Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty." John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address, 20 January 1961, http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres56.html.

[28] Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, *The Rational Republic: Fifty Years of Trends in America's Policy Preferences* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 334.

only be deployed in situations where either vital American national interests or the vital interests of America's allies were at stake. Although the concept of 'vital interests' was not defined, it was clearly implied that marginally beneficial missions like the one in Lebanon should definitely be ruled out in the future. Second, Weinberger argued that if force was used, it should be done so with sufficient strength for the clear purpose of winning. Gradualism was accordingly identified as the worst possible approach. Said Weinberger, "If we are unwilling to commit the forces or resources necessary to achieve our objectives, we should not commit them at all." Weinberger's third principle stressed the importance of having clearly defined political and military objectives. His fourth point emphasized the necessity of being able to adjust to new circumstances. If the costs entailed in carrying out a mission should ever come to exceed the mission's value, then the U.S. should not hesitate to terminate its commitment. Weinberger also highlighted the importance of having both Congressional and public support. The final principle noted that the use of force should be a last resort.[29]

Weinberger's speech provoked a strong rebuke from his opposite number at the State Department. The idea that the U.S. should establish a strict set of criteria governing the use of force made little sense to George Shultz, who thought doing so dangerously limited American options for combating the multifaceted challenges presented by the Cold War. Said Shultz, "For the world's leading democracy, the task is not only immediate self-preservation but our responsibility as a protector of international peace, on whom many other countries rely for their security." Against

[29] Caspar W. Weinberger, "The Uses of Military Power," Remarks prepared for delivery to the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., 28 November 1984. News Release, Office of Assistant

Weinberger's seemingly cold military calculations, Shultz passionately appealed to American principles and values: "The United States must be a tireless sentinel of freedom. We must confront aggression. We must defend what is dear to us. We must keep the flame of liberty burning forever, for all mankind."[30]

Much of the basis for Shultz's argument evaporated with the end of the Cold War. In the minds of most Americans, the battle for liberty was over. It was now time to enjoy the so-called 'peace dividend.' The Weinberger Doctrine, with its emphasis on avoiding non-essential military deployments, thus came to be seen as all the more relevant. While Weinberger's insistence that force be used solely in defense of vital American interests tended to draw the most attention, it was his second and third principles (the importance of using sufficient force and having clearly defined objectives) that really mattered to the military, for it was in these areas that the military believed it could exert the most influence.

The American invasion of Panama in 1989 and the Persian Gulf War of 1991 powerfully demonstrated the transformation in American military thinking and planning that followed Weinberger's speech. In both instances, the U.S. applied *overwhelming* force to achieve *clearly articulated* and *achievable* military objectives, a highly successful formula for waging modern war that would come to be known as the Powell Doctrine.[31] The Gulf War was regarded as such an unmitigated triumph that President George Bush even felt emboldened enough to declare that the U.S. had

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Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), No. 609-84.

[30] George Shultz, "The Ethics of Power," 9 December 1984 (Washington: United States Department of State, Current Policy No. 642).

[31] General Colin Powell was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the U.S. armed forces at the time of both campaigns, hence the label. Not incidentally, among the posts held by Powell prior to being named Chairman of the Joint Chiefs was a stint as Weinberger's principal military assistant from 1983 to 1986.

finally kicked the 'Vietnam syndrome,' the term used to describe the deep sense of malaise that had taken hold of the American military in the wake of its South East Asian defeat. At the end of the day, however, the U.S. had merely exchanged one legacy for another. Having experienced such success with the Powell Doctrine, the U.S. subsequently became fixated on abiding by its principles at all times, the practical effect of which was the institutionalization of a much more conservative policy on the use of force. The neo-isolationist thrust of the vital interests test was thus reinforced by the Powell Doctrine.

That said, by no means did the end of the Cold War precipitate a return to anything resembling the isolationist mindset and foreign policy posture of the 1930s. Self-interest alone demanded that the U.S. remain attentive to the outside world. As Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait in 1990 clearly demonstrated, a world free from the menace of Soviet communism was not necessarily a world in which American interests were immune from threat. The benefits of continued international engagement, which included having an enviable amount of influence over most international security and economic issues of note, were thus seen to far outweigh the costs. Maintaining American leadership in the world was accordingly defined as an essential prerequisite for protecting and advancing American interests.

The United States and Humanitarian Intervention

Yugoslavia

The United States was but a minor player during the early stages of the Yugoslav crisis. As Lawrence Freedman notes, the Bush Administration "...sensed that either

this was a small enough problem to be managed using the [European] Community's economic and political instruments, or else was such a can of worms that it should be grateful for an excuse to keep clear."[32] The president's public statements (or lack thereof) on the subject are particularly revealing in this regard. During the first six months of the conflict, President Bush rarely even mentioned the situation in the former Yugoslavia, and when he did it was usually some mundane comment about supporting the peace talks. As for the use of force, the idea of sending U.S. troops to participate in the Croatian peacekeeping mission was soundly rejected the one time it was brought up in a press conference. In Bush's opinion, peacekeeping was the responsibility of other countries.[33] With an election year on the horizon and the American foreign policy debate still squarely focused on the issue of how to make the most of the 'peace dividend,' clearly the last thing President Bush wanted to see was another military deployment.

Maintaining a comfortable distance from the conflict would prove to be difficult, however. After the outbreak of fighting in Bosnia, prominent American commentators began calling on the president to adopt a more aggressive policy.[34] To silence the growing chorus of criticism both at home and abroad, Secretary of State James Baker proposed the imposition of a comprehensive sanctions regime against Belgrade.[35] It was an astute political decision, for it not only momentarily put the

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[32] Lawrence Freedman, "Introduction," in Freedman, ed., *Military Intervention in European Conflicts* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994), 1-13; 7.
[33] George Bush, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1991* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1992), 814, 833, 917, 995, 1429-1432 for the president's rejection of U.S. troops for peacekeeping, and 1594.
[34] Leslie Gelb, "We Are Innocent," *New York Times*, 18 May 1992, A17; and William Safire, "Punish the Serbs," *ibid.*, 21 May 1992, A29.
[35] Barbara Crossette, "Baker Puts Pressure on Europeans For U.N. Penalties Against Serbs," *New York Times*, 25 May 1992, A1.

United States out in front of its European allies with respect to taking a tough line against the Serbs, it also gave the appearance of being proactive while actually limiting direct American involvement. The latter was to be avoided at all costs. Said Bush, "We will do what we should do, but I'm not going to go into the fact of using United States troops. We are not the world's policeman."[36] Senator Richard Lugar cogently captured the prevailing American mindset: "The Yugoslavia problem is a European responsibility and their forces have to be up front. It would be entirely backwards for the U.S. to be more concerned about European stability than the Europeans."[37]

While the issue of burden sharing with the Europeans and other U.N. members was a common theme among American politicians and commentators, the most important factor by far in shaping American policy was the memory of past American interventions gone awry. Time and again the president and other senior government officials harkened back to the lessons of Vietnam. When the issue of using force to open up relief corridors was raised in August 1992, Bush commented, "I do not want to see the United States bogged down in any way into some guerrilla warfare. We lived through that once." He later added, "...I don't care what the political pressures are, before one soldier or whatever it is, marine, is committed to battle, I'm going to know how that person gets out of there." And when questioned about possible similarities between Bosnia and Vietnam, the president replied, "I

[36] Quoted in Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Would Send Troops Only in a Relief Role," *New York Times*, 12 June 1992.
[37] Quoted in Eric Schmitt, "Bush Calls Allies On a Joint Effort to Help Sarajevo," *New York Times*, 29 June 1992, A1 and A6.

don't see any yet. And I'm determined there won't be any."[38] The desire to avoid entanglement was so strong that the Bush Administration even ruled out the possibility of using air strikes. Asked whether limited air strikes could be used to influence the situation on the ground, Joint Chiefs Chairman General Colin Powell answered, "As soon as they tell me it is limited, it means they do not care whether you achieve a result or not. As soon as they tell me 'surgical', I head for the bunker."[39] Throughout Bush's tenure as president American policy toward Yugoslavia never wavered from this basic script.

It was anticipated that American policy would change with the arrival of Bill Clinton as president in January 1993. During the presidential election campaign the previous fall, Clinton had frequently criticized Bush for his handling of the issue and pledged to take a tough stance with the Serbs if elected. As far as Clinton was concerned, Bush's policy was not only morally bankrupt, but also politically irresponsible. "If the United States doesn't act in situations like this, nothing will happen. A failure to do so would be to give up American leadership," said Clinton shortly after taking office.[40] Despite the new tone, Clinton quickly ruled out all possible forms of military action except air strikes. When asked to summarize his position after meeting French President Mitterand at the White House in early March, the president replied, "I restated the position of the administration...that we were

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[38] Bush, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1992-93* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1993), 1320 and 1327-1329.
[39] Quoted in Michael R. Gordon, "Powell Delivers a Resounding No on Using Limited Force in Bosnia," *New York Times*, 28 September 1992, A1 and A5.
[40] Quoted in Elizabeth Drew, *On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 146.

opposed to the introduction of American ground forces to try to mandate an agreement or to in any way engage in the present conflict."[41]

The idea of deploying air power against the Serbs was not well received on Capitol Hill, where the typical sentiment was that of Senator James Jeffords. "We're all scared to death of public reaction to things that have a Vietnam overtone," said Jeffords.[42] Since he had already stated that ground forces would never be sent to Bosnia, all of the talk about Bosnia becoming another Vietnam struck Clinton as somewhat odd. What Clinton did not seem to understand was that his approach appeared to imply a willingness to accept defeat. And in this respect the Vietnam analogy was apposite, for one of the primary lessons of Vietnam was that the United States should not resort to the use of force unless prepared to go the distance.[43] Congressional leaders emphasized the point in a meeting at the White House. Asked by Clinton whether there would be a politically acceptable way for the U.S. to withdraw if air strikes failed to achieve the desired result (i.e., Serb capitulation), Representative Lee Hamilton responded, "If you decide to go, you have to prevail. And if the steps you take are insufficient to achieve your objectives, then you have to increase the steps you take." Senator Richard Lugar, speaking on behalf of Senator

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[41] William J. Clinton, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1993* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1994), 259.

[42] Quoted in Clifford Kraus, "Many in Congress, Citing Vietnam, Oppose Attacks," *New York Times*, 28 April 1993, A10.

[43] In the opinion of most members of Congress and the military, of course, Clinton had also forgotten (or didn't know) the number one lesson of Vietnam: avoid involvement in politically insignificant conflicts. The military's perspective is covered in Michael R. Gordon, "NATO General is Reticent About Air Strikes in Bosnia," *New York Times*, 21 April 1993, A10.

Robert Dole and himself, framed the issue even more starkly. "We took a very strong position that the United States must not lose," said Lugar.[44]

Out of these consultations emerged the policy of 'lift and strike.' Whether Clinton truly believed that air strikes would be militarily decisive is difficult to say given his earlier line of questioning (the president surely wasn't considering air strikes as just the first stage of a broader American campaign). What does seem clear is that Clinton saw 'lift and strike' as the ideal 'political' solution (at least domestically), in that it conveyed a sense of leadership and engagement while actually limiting the exposure of American military personnel. As a senior White House official explained, "The basic strategy was, this thing is a no-winner, it's going to be a quagmire. Let's not make it our quagmire."[45]

For a brief moment in the summer of 1993 it appeared as though a new American policy might emerge (i.e., a more accommodating policy from the European/Canadian perspective). It soon became apparent, however, that the Clinton Administration was unwilling to consider anything other than air strikes.[46] The only difference this time around was that the White House seemed much more serious about convincing other NATO members to go along with its plan. At one point the U.S. even said that it would carry out air strikes regardless of whether its allies supported such action.[47] Ultimately, the prospect of fracturing NATO compelled the U.S. to back down on its threat to proceed unilaterally. The Clinton Administration,

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[44] Hamilton and Lugar quoted in Elaine Sciolino, "Clinton on Serbs: Pacing Shaky Ground," *New York Times*, 1 May 1993, A6.
[45] Quoted in Drew, *On the Edge*, 155.
[46] Ibid., 273-284.
[47] Stephen A. Holmes, "U.S. May Attack Serbs Even Without NATO," *New York Times*, 2 August 1993, A3.

which was quickly garnering a reputation for incompetence on matters of foreign policy, had learned another hard lesson: despite possessing unrivalled military power, the U.S. was not in a position to simply dictate policy to its allies. With this latest rebuff the United States again withdrew to the sidelines. As far as the Clinton Administration was concerned, it could do no more. If its allies were unwilling to consent to air strikes, so be it. But the onus to act was now on them, a position that would remain American policy for the next two years.

The American debate over Bosnia did not end with the ceasefire agreement between the three warring factions. Clinton had long maintained that U.S. soldiers would go to Bosnia in some sort of peacekeeping capacity if all sides agreed to a comprehensive peace plan (as they eventually did at Dayton). Given the intensity of American opposition towards such missions in the wake of Somalia, that commitment now appeared uncertain.[48] In order to sell the idea of American soldiers as peacekeepers, then, the Clinton Administration was forced to lay down a number of minimum conditions for American participation, chief among them being that the U.S. would not participate in an open-ended mission with a weak mandate, as had been the case with UNPROFOR. Clinton accordingly insisted that the operation conform to American preferences. This meant that NATO, not the United Nations, would exercise command and control. As such, there would be no 'dual-key' type arrangements that could interfere with the ability of American commanders to take

[48] Wayne Bert, *The Reluctant Superpower: United States' Policy in Bosnia, 1991-95* (New York: Palgrave, 1997), 89-90. The House of Representatives even voted to prevent money from being spent to send U.S. troops to Bosnia. H.R. 2606, 104th Congress, 1st Session. *Congressional Record* (17 November 1995), vol. 141, no. 183, H13248. Because Congress cannot prevent the President from invoking his prerogative to deploy American military forces (the best it can do is cut off funding after sixty days), the vote did not constitutionally tie President Clinton's hands. Nevertheless, a President

any military action deemed necessary. In addition to being very large (up to 60,000 soldiers), Clinton also insisted that the force be empowered with robust rules of engagement. Finally, he demanded that a one-year time limit be placed on its deployment.[49]

For Clinton, the United States was finally assuming its rightful leadership role, a point he repeatedly emphasized during his televised address to the nation. Said the president, "The people of Bosnia, our NATO allies, and people all around the world are now looking to America for leadership. So let us lead. That is our responsibility as Americans."[50]

Somalia

The United States' initial reaction to the Somali civil war was one of indifference. As far as the Bush Administration was concerned, there was absolutely no reason for the U.S. to get caught up in the messy affairs of a politically and economically peripheral state, a policy it extended to the entire United Nations thanks to its Security Council veto.[51] Although the U.S. would eventually relax its opposition to the idea of U.N. intervention, even going so far as to offer the use of its airlift capabilities for the humanitarian relief mission approved by the Security Council in July 1992, direct

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enters dangerous political territory when military operations are conducted without Congressional support. The House vote was not, therefore, inconsequential.

[49] Eric Schmitt, "Military Now Says Bosnia Peace Plan Will Work," *New York Times*, 27 November 1995, A1.

[50] Clinton, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1995* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1996), 1787.

[51] John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995), 38.

American military involvement remained out of the question.[52] That job would again be left to other countries.

As the scale of the famine widened during the fall, the Bush Administration found itself increasingly on the defensive, particularly internationally, with respect to its hands-off approach to the situation. Already under heavy criticism on the domestic front for having devoted too much of his presidency to international affairs, however, Bush was in no mood to contemplate another foreign adventure, especially in the midst of a tough election campaign. Asked during a candidate's debate about the possibility of deploying U.S. troops to Somalia, he replied, "I vowed something, because I learned something from Vietnam: I am not going to commit U.S. forces until I know what the mission is, until the military tell me that it can be completed, until I know how they can come out."[53] The truth of the matter was that no one in the Bush Administration had even bothered to inquire about the logistics of sending American soldiers to Somalia.

Among other things, the November election forced the president to contemplate his political legacy. With the American media spotlight now focused squarely on the Somali famine, Bush again turned his attention towards the international stage.[54] From the outset it was clear that the Bush Administration had no interest in just adding more muscle to the existing United Nations operation (UNOSOM). UNOSOM was a peacekeeping mission, and there was absolutely no inclination on the part of anyone in the White House or at the Pentagon to have the

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[52] Bush, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1992-93*, 1354 and 1360.
[53] Ibid., 1799.
[54] David Binder, "Bush Ready to Send Troops to Protect Somalia Food," *New York Times*, 26 November 1992, A1 and A10.

U.S. involved in peacekeeping. If the U.S. were to intervene in Somalia, it would be in accordance with American preferences.

The plan the White House took to the United Nations contained three non-negotiable conditions. First, the U.S. insisted that the mission be authorized by a Security Council resolution permitting the use of "all necessary means" (i.e., the same language the Security Council had employed in Resolution 678 to authorize the 1991 Gulf War). Second, it wanted all U.S. troops to remain under American command. Third, the force had to be large enough to handle all possible contingencies (preliminary estimates were calling for the deployment of up to thirty thousand soldiers).[55] As one American official fittingly observed, "This is the Desert Storm way of handling Somalia."[56] Comments like this provided ample fodder for those who believed that any operation so designed was not in keeping with the spirit of a humanitarian mission. Such criticism fell on deaf ears at the Pentagon, however. Said Powell, "We...wanted to put in a large enough force so that we could dominate the entire country and not just find ourselves trapped in a part or a single city." In accordance with this approach, the Joint Chiefs Chairman outlined robust rules of engagement. "We are not just going to ride shotgun, waiting for people to shoot at us and then shoot back." Instead, U.S. troops would operate "in a rather decisive way so there will be no question in the mind of any of the faction leaders in Somalia that we would have the ability to impose a stable situation, if it comes to that, without their cooperation." As far as the Pentagon was concerned, the international division of

[55] Michael R. Gordon, "Somali Aid Plan is Called Most Ambitious Option," *New York Times*, 28 November 1992, A6.
[56] Quoted in Clifford Krauss, "Washington Seeks Conditions on Plan for Somalia Force," *New York Times*, 27 November 1992, A1 and A15.

labor was clear. "The idea is that we will be the peacemaking force and then we'll turn it over to the U.N. peacekeepers," said a senior official.[57]

With so much attention being given to the military side of the story, the president chose to emphasize the humanitarian angle in his televised address to the nation, defending the decision to send U.S. troops abroad by stressing the need for American leadership. Said Bush,

> I want to emphasize that I understand the United States alone cannot right the world's wrongs. But we also know that some crises in the world cannot be resolved without American involvement, that American action is often necessary as a catalyst for broader involvement of the community of nations.[58]

Operation Restore Hope was never as straightforward as many political partisans would later suggest, for it was apparent from the moment that the marines first landed in Mogadishu that the Bush Administration's pledge to have all U.S. forces out of Somalia in just a few months was either completely disingenuous or based on a rather poor appreciation of just how dire the situation was throughout the country. With rival warlords essentially just biding their time until the Americans departed, Somalia remained a country on the precipice.

Knowing that an abrupt American withdrawal would almost certainly condemn the United Nations' post-famine reconstruction program to failure, the newly installed Clinton Administration reluctantly agreed to leave about four thousand American soldiers in Somalia, largely in a supporting role, after the

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[57] Powell and Pentagon official quoted in Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. is Sending Large Force as Warning to Somali Clans," *New York Times*, 5 December 1992, A5.
[58] Bush, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1992-93*, 2175.

transition to UNOSOM II took place.[59] That all changed, however, with the massacre of Pakistani peacekeepers in early June. In response to the killings, the U.S. again asserted its leadership, first in drafting and pushing through the tough Security Council resolution authorizing the arrest and punishment of those responsible for the ambush, then in seeing it implemented. The Clinton Administration believed that unless clan leader Mohammed Farah Aidid and his supporters were punished, both the U.N. and U.S. would pay dearly in terms of their long-term credibility.[60] From that point on the conflict with Aidid simply spiraled out of control,[61] eventually culminating in the disastrous raid of 3 October.

The sight of dead American soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu sent shockwaves through the United States. In Congress, leading members of both parties demanded the immediate withdrawal of all U.S. forces.[62] The reaction was much the same on the editorial pages of American newspapers.[63] With the Vietnam analogy sounding ever more relevant, the Clinton Administration decided to cut its losses. The search for Aidid was halted and a firm deadline for the

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[59] Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Plans to Leave Troops to Back U.N. Somalia Unit," *New York Times*, 30 April 1993, A10.

[60] See Drew, *On the Edge*, 319-320; and Hirsch and Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope*, 115-118.

[61] Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Troops Fire on Somalis; Death Toll May Reach 100," *New York Times*, 10 September 1993; Donatella Lorch, "U.S. Troops Arrest Somali Warlord's Top Aide," *ibid.*, 22 September 1993, A5; and Reuters, "3 Killed as U.S. Chopper is Shot Down in Somalia," *ibid.*, 25 September 1993, A2.

[62] For a sample of this debate see the *Congressional Record – Senate, 103rd Congress, 1st Session*, Vol 139, No. 132 (4 October 1993), S12876-S12880; *ibid.*, Vol. 139, No. 133 (5 October 1993), S13043-S13046; *Congressional Record – House, 103rd Congress, 1st Session*, Vol. 139, No. 134 (6 October 1993), H7454-7456; and *ibid.*, Vol. 139, No. 135 (7 October 1993), H7547—H7548.

[63] A sample of these views can be found in "Spell It Out to the U.N. on Somalia," *New York Times*, 6 October 1993, A20; "Somalia: Time to Get Out," *ibid.*, 8 October 1993, A34; Anna Quindlen, "We're Outta There," *ibid.*, 7 October 1993, A29; William Safire, "Depart With Honor," *ibid.*, 7 October 1993, A29; "Getting on the Somali Case," *Washington Post*, 6 October 1993, A18; and George F. Will, "...When to Fold," *Washington Post*, 8 October 1993, A27.

withdrawal of all American soldiers was announced.[64] Although the last group of U.S. troops would not be removed from Somalia until March 1994, for all intents and purposes the U.S. operation was finished.

Rwanda and Zaire

At no point in time did the U.S. ever give serious consideration to the idea of sending American soldiers to Rwanda. As far as the Clinton Administration was concerned, the situation in Rwanda was simply not in the United States' vital national interest, a concept that had taken on renewed appeal in the wake of the Somalia debacle the previous year. The U.S. even went so far as to use its Security Council veto to block the dispatch of a relatively small U.N. force to the country, a move reminiscent of American obstructionism during the first few months of the Somali war and famine. The White House defended its position by contending that the U.N. could not afford to finance another major peacekeeping operation,[65] all the while being careful to avoid describing the Hutu rampage as genocide.[66] Unfortunately, and in sharp contrast to the Somali crisis, the short timeframe of the Rwandan genocide provided little opportunity for American policy to evolve. By the time the U.S. acquiesced to the French intervention and follow-up peacekeeping operation, most of the killings had already been carried out.

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[64] Thomas L. Friedman, "Clinton Sending More Troops to Somalia: A Firm Deadline for a Pullout Will be Set," *New York Times*, 7 October 1993, A1; Clinton, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1993*, 1705; and Douglas Jehl, "U.S. Shifts Troops to Defensive Role in Somalia Mission," *New York Times*, 20 October 1993, A1.

[65] Paul Lewis, "U.S. Opposes Plan for U.N. Force in Rwanda," *New York Times*, 12 May 1994, A9.

[66] The Clinton Administration believed that using the word 'genocide' would bolster the political and moral case for military intervention. For a more extensive treatment of this issue see Samantha Power, *"A Problem From Hell": America and the Age of Genocide* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 358-364.

In many quarters (the U.N., Canada, and France to name just a few), the international community's failure to respond more quickly to the Rwandan genocide prompted both serious reflection and a renewed commitment to the principles enshrined in the 1948 Genocide Convention. Sadly, this was not the case in the United States.[67] The initial American response to the developing crisis in the refugee camps of Zaire was thus hardly surprising. When France first suggested that a multinational intervention force be sent to the region to forestall what portended to be another major humanitarian catastrophe, the U.S. again balked, indicating that its support in the Security Council was far from guaranteed. As was now virtually customary, the Americans had a few questions regarding the proposal. Was there a clear purpose? How big a force would be necessary? Was there an exit strategy?[68] As with Rwanda, the Clinton Administration stood in the way of precipitous action at a moment when every hour appeared crucial.

Whereas previous administrations had been haunted by the specter of Vietnam, the Clinton Administration was fixated on Somalia. Said a State Department spokesman of the U.S. position, "We did learn from Somalia. We learned some lessons. And one of them is that you have to be awfully certain when you go into something this big, ...getting in is fine and important, but you have to get out eventually."[69] By effectively addressing this and other key American concerns, the comparatively well-defined Canadian initiative succeeded where the French proposal

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[67] President Clinton only apologized for his administration's policy during the Rwandan genocide in 1998. Even then, however, he shied away from taking any responsibility for what occurred, offering the factually incorrect excuse that neither he nor anyone associated with his administration knew what was really happening in Rwanda between April and June 1994. Ibid., 386.

[68] Steven Erlanger, "U.S. May Send Troops to Zaire to Aid Those Fleeing Fighting," *New York Times*, 6 November 1996, A8.

had failed. First, the Canadian plan explicitly limited the U.S. role to the provision of logistical support, thereby minimizing the potential for 'mission creep.' Second, the plan stipulated that U.S. troops would be given extensive freedom of action. Although the United States had controlled every detail of the October 1993 assault on the Olympia Hotel in Mogadishu, it had become an article of faith in the U.S. that most of the blame for the disastrous raid lay with the United Nations. The U.S. subsequently vowed that never again would any American soldier be placed under U.N. command. To accommodate this position, Canada suggested that a separate American commander be seconded to the Canadian general heading up the mission, an arrangement that would allow the American contingent to operate according to rules of engagement that were much more robust than those permitted for the rest of the force. As a final piece of business, the exit strategy question was dealt with when the U.S. was guaranteed that a time limit of four months would be placed on the operation.[70] In making the case for U.S. involvement, Clinton again underlined the burdens of American leadership. Said Clinton, "The world's most powerful nation must not turn its back on so many desperate people and so many innocent children who are now at risk."[71]

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[69] Quoted in Barbara Crossette, "Canada Proposes Zaire Aid Force," *New York Times*, 13 November 1996, A8.
[70] Alison Mitchell, "Clinton Offers U.S. Troops to Help Refugees in Zaire," *New York Times*, 14 November 1996, A1 and A14.
[71] Quoted in "Remarks by President on Bosnia and Central Africa," *New York Times*, 16 November 1996, A7.

Analysis

Operating under the assumption that the conflicts and associated humanitarian crises in Croatia, Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Zaire posed no significant threat to American interests, the United States consistently tried to avoid entanglement with the various peacekeeping/peacemaking and humanitarian relief efforts undertaken by the international community in each theater. Still, time and again the U.S. discovered that it could not easily remain uninvolved, especially in those instances where its allies had committed themselves to some type of action. Even then, however, U.S. participation was structured so as to accord with the rather restrictive conditions of American military doctrine.

Consistent with the dictates of the vaunted principles of political realism, the United States placed very little value on the moral case for intervention in the former Yugoslavia. With no identifiable American material interests at stake, neither Bush nor Clinton was about to entertain the idea of deploying large numbers of American soldiers to what was considered to be a potential Vietnam-like situation. Thus in sharp contrast to Canada, France, and several other countries, the U.S. was simply incapable of incorporating the idea of 'second-generation' peacekeeping into its conception of the national interest. As Bush Administration officials were fond of saying, peacekeeping and related activities were the responsibility of other countries.

While the Bush Administration never wavered in its assessment that the international community's efforts in the former Yugoslavia amounted to little more than militarized social work, it soon realized that the United States could not ignore what was going on in Bosnia without seriously damaging American credibility on the

international stage. The challenge for the U.S. subsequently became how to preserve its international standing without incurring significant costs. The sanctions proposal of May 1992 is certainly best understood in this context, as was the Bush Administration's failed attempt to persuade its allies to endorse a tough no-fly zone resolution in October 1992. Even Clinton's 'lift and strike' proposal fits this profile, as it limited American military participation to a relatively risk-free activity. As the Clinton Administration eventually realized, 'lift and strike' was a political masterstroke, for regardless of whether or not it was accepted by the international community, 'lift and strike' had placed the U.S. in an almost unassailable position. If 'lift and strike' were accepted, the U.S. could claim credit for whatever success that followed. If rejected, the U.S. could stand pat and blame everyone else for the continuation of the conflict, just as it did between the summer of 1993 and the summer of 1995. With 'lift and strike' the Clinton Administration had discovered the 'holy grail' of American foreign policy, a strategy that struck a near perfect balance between the United States' internationalist and neo-isolationist identities.

Prior to December 1992, American policy towards Somalia was essentially a carbon copy of its approach towards the conflict in Bosnia. The decision to intervene in Somalia on such a massive scale is thus somewhat perplexing considering that the Bush Administration never contemplated doing so in Bosnia, where similar structural conditions prevailed (i.e., a growing humanitarian crisis that American military power could seemingly do a great deal to alleviate). Why, then, the different response?

Two factors worked in favor of American involvement in Somalia. First, it was generally believed that Somalia presented a much more conducive environment

for intervention than did Bosnia. While they may have had a wealth of battle experience, Somalia's ragtag militiamen were seen as a far less formidable fighting force than their Bosnian Serb counterparts. Moreover, fresh off its successful campaign in the Iraqi desert, the U.S. military was relatively comfortable with the idea of operating under similar conditions in Somalia. With its dense forests and rough terrain, Bosnia looked more like Vietnam. Second, with only a small and ineffective contingent of Pakistani peacekeepers on the ground in Mogadishu, neither the United Nations nor any other country was in a position to dictate terms to the United States, a fortuitous circumstance that allowed American military planners to design 'Operation Restore Hope' to fit perfectly with American preferences.[72] In terms of its suitability as a target for intervention, therefore, Somalia presented the legacy-conscious yet pragmatic Bush Administration with everything it could have wanted. The transition from international laggard to international leader thus went much more smoothly than in Bosnia. After the disastrous raid on the Olympia Hotel in October 1993, however, the U.S. could no longer argue that intervention in Somalia was a relatively costless endeavor. Not surprisingly, at that point the United States decided to bring its involvement with the U.N. mission in Somalia to an end.

Although it may not have been the primary instigator of international involvement in Bosnia or Somalia, the U.S. was still able to exert considerable influence over the direction of international policy in both theaters. For Canada, France, and most every other state involved with UNPROFOR, it was folly to believe

[72] This point is completely overlooked in Jon Western's analysis of the Bush Administration's policy towards Bosnia and Somalia. In fact, Western never even mentions how the ongoing and developing UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia limited American options for participation in that conflict. See

that the international community could simply impose a solution on the warring factions in Bosnia. UNPROFOR's mission was accordingly defined, at least initially, in terms of conflict management and humanitarian relief. Once the U.S. became engaged, however, the structure of the debate surrounding the international community's role in Bosnia began to change. UNPROFOR's contributing states suddenly found themselves searching for ways to counterbalance the American emphasis on force. In the process, UNPROFOR's military posture gradually drifted away from its original peacekeeping orientation.

A similar dynamic is evident in the evolution of international policy towards Somalia, where the U.S. decision to intervene on such a massive scale in late November 1992 drastically altered the systemic normative context for everyone else. Seemingly overnight Somalia became the *cause célèbre* for the international community. Countries that had been indifferent towards the Somali famine just days earlier, such as Britain and France, suddenly rushed to jump on the intervention bandwagon. The American initiative did more than just boost momentum for intervention, however. By placing so much emphasis on the robust use of force, the U.S. also changed the template for humanitarian intervention.

To the relief of the Clinton Administration, the American position on intervention in Rwanda was anything but exceptional. Until France announced its intention to intervene in mid-June 1994, there had been no serious movement towards intervention by any Western state. As a result, the U.S. was not subjected to the same

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"Sources of Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs, Information, and Advocacy in the U.S. Decisions on Somalia and Bosnia," *International Security* 26:4 (Spring 2002), 112-142.

type of systemic pressure that arose in both Bosnia and Somalia. If ever there was a case that proved apathy finds comfort in numbers it was Rwanda.

The U.S. looked to follow the same approach in response to the developing humanitarian crisis in Zaire's refugee camps. Unfortunately for the U.S., two of its closest allies were intent on heading off another humanitarian disaster. The U.S. thus came under intense bilateral and multilateral pressure to become involved. Further complicating the situation, both France and Canada identified American participation as crucial to the success of any operation. Had the U.S. continued its obstructionism under such circumstances, American credibility would have suffered a serious blow. Hence, the issue for Clinton rapidly evolved from whether the U.S. would participate at all to how the U.S. could contribute. There was never any thought of taking on the type of role that France and Canada envisioned for themselves, however. At best the United States would provide its airlift capabilities, thereby ensuring the success of the mission while not departing too significantly with its overriding desire to stay out of Zaire. As in Bosnia and Somalia, American policy was again forged amidst the tension between its two dominant international identities.

The switch from Bush to Clinton thus seems to have made little appreciable difference to the substance of American policy. Ever reluctant to intervene in strategically unimportant places, President Bush still found himself answering the call for American leadership in both Bosnia and Somalia. The supposedly neo-Wilsonian President Clinton, meanwhile, consistently rejected appeals for the deployment of American ground troops. As both presidents came to learn, the dictates of American identity could not be ignored.

Chapter Six

Conclusion

Prior to the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and the ensuing American-led global war on terrorism, the defining feature of the post-Cold War international order was arguably the prevalence of intrastate and ethnic conflict in previously stable parts of Africa, Asia, and Europe. This dissertation set out to explain two interrelated aspects of that phenomenon: the pattern of cross-national policy variation between outside (i.e., relatively disinterested) states in response to the humanitarian crises which accompanied many of these conflicts, and the effect of those policies on the systemic normative environment pertaining to the ethical responsibilities of the international community at large.

A review of the policies pursued by Canada, France, and the United States in response to the Yugoslav wars of secession, the Somali civil war and famine, Rwandan genocide, and Zairian refugee crisis clearly demonstrates that the observed pattern of cross-national policy variation is best explained by reference to national variations in state identity. The policies that flowed from these identities were then shown to have interacted and combined in such a way so as to have generated the emergent normative property discussed herein. Whether this emergent norm has since developed into something more substantive is one of the questions this chapter will

explore. Before addressing that and other practical matters, however, I first elaborate on some of the study's theoretical implications.

Theoretical Implications

The pattern of norm diffusion in this case, along with some other recent developments (the Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel landmines and the creation of the International Criminal Court), clearly contradicts the picture of middle power and small state impotence that has long dominated the academic study of international relations.[1] Judging by these three cases alone, the days when the international political agenda merely reflected the interests of the great powers now belong to a bygone era. Contemporary IR theorists unhappy with the realist caricature of world politics have not gone in search of a more inclusive state-centric theory of international relations, however. Instead, they have turned their attention towards transnational organizations and non-state actors. While the move beyond state-centrism is to be applauded for the breadth and depth it has added to IR theory, it has also left the impression, albeit unintentionally, that nothing more needs to be said about the role of states in international politics. The widespread conflation of state-centrism with realism has thus unfortunately allowed the nearly one hundred ninety countries in the world that do not possess great power credentials to slip through the cracks of IR theory. This dissertation represents a first step towards addressing that omission. The next step will be to integrate the insights of this study into a more

[1] The literature on small state-great power interaction within alliances is the exception to this general pattern. See Robert O. Keohane, "The Big Influence of Small Allies," *Foreign Policy* 2 (Spring 1971), 161-182; and Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

comprehensive theoretical framework, the key to which will be a clear delineation of the conditions necessary for a successful middle power/small state normative campaign.

As noted in the first chapter, the always-intense debate over the extent to which states can be considered responsive to ethical considerations in the formulation of their foreign policies has taken on new vigor in recent years. While this study offers compelling evidence in support of the proposition that many states are indeed concerned with more than just their own material well being, it also suggests that the ideal of a world of 'other regarding' states remains a long way off. The enthusiasm with which the international community usually spoke about humanitarian intervention was only rarely matched in practice. Certainly the deaths of more than four hundred soldiers should not be considered insignificant.[2] However, those deaths should not obscure just how reluctant most states were, and still are, to contemplate using force in defense of foreign civilians. When the stakes are very high, as they clearly are with military interventions of any kind, it seems that basic human rights considerations still come second to more traditional concerns.

Recent Developments

In May 2003 the U.N. Security Council authorized the temporary deployment of a multinational peacekeeping force to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), a country ravaged by civil war since 1998.[3] The fourteen hundred-member force was

[2] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Fatalities by Mission and Incident Type*, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/fatalities/fatal2.htm.
[3] Reuters, "U.N. Approves Troop Deployment in Congo," *New York Times*, 30 May 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/international/international-congo-democratic-un.html; and Daniel Leblanc, "UN

charged with the protection of civilians in and around the town of Bunia, where recent massacres had once again raised the specter of genocide. The deployment came in addition to the nearly five thousand U.N. troops already stationed in the country as part of a separate and more extensive mission to monitor a previous ceasefire agreement. Unlike the soldiers involved in that operation, however, those participating in the mission to Bunia were authorized to use force in defense of the local civilian population.

Besides reinforcing the contention that the international community has become much more responsive to the plight of war-affected civilians since the end of the Cold War, this mission vividly illustrates the continuities in French, Canadian, and American foreign policy. Eager as ever to maintain its high profile in the region, France stepped forward to provide more than half the total number of soldiers needed for the operation. Canada's contribution consisted of the temporary use of two transport planes and the deployment of a small number of soldiers to aid the French with logistical support. American involvement was limited to the provision of financial and non-military logistical assistance.

As much as this foray might seem to suggest that very little has changed over the last seven years, there have been several noteworthy developments. At the rhetorical level, Canadian foreign policy has been extremely proactive in the years since the Zaire crisis. Nearly a decade after it first raised the idea, Canada remains committed to the creation of a permanent U.N. rapid reaction force. As part of its ambitious human security agenda, Canada has also taken the lead in promoting a

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Authorizes Force in Congo," *Globe and Mail*, 31 May 2003, http://www.globeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20030530.ucongo0531/BNStory/International/.

formal reconsideration of the non-intervention principle. Speaking before the U.N. General Assembly in September 2000, Prime Minister Chrétien announced the establishment of an independent international commission on intervention and state sovereignty.[4] Released in December 2001, the commission's report bluntly states, "Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect."[5] The Canadian government has subsequently become the primary international advocate for this and the commission's other recommendations.[6]

Ultimately, though, actions speak louder than words, and by this measure Canada's recent contributions to global peace and security have not been particularly impressive. Other than the slightly more than twelve hundred soldiers currently deployed as part of the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia, Canada has less than three hundred troops assigned to U.N. sponsored missions worldwide.[7] While Canada's participation with SFOR is far from insignificant, the fact that Canada presently ranks only thirty-second in the world in terms of national contributions to U.N. peacekeeping operations belies the liberal internationalist image of the country

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[4] Jean Chrétien, "Address to the Plenary Session of the Millennium Summit of the United Nations," 7 September 2000, http://pm.gc.ca/default.asp?Language=E&Page=newsroom&Sub=Speeches&Doc=un_plenary.20000907_e.htm.

[5] *The Responsibility to Protect*, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, December 2001, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/iciss-ciise/report-en.asp.

[6] See Bill Graham, "Address to the 57th United Nations General Assembly," 12 September 2002, http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.asp?FileSpec=/Min_Pub_Docs/105443.htm&bPrint=False&Year=&ID=&Language=E.

[7] Department of National Defence, *Current Operations*, http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/operations/current_ops_e.asp.

that the Canadian government so ardently promotes.[8] Even when an expansive definition of peacekeeping is employed (i.e., one that includes the Bosnian operation) and the comparison is limited to industrialized states (i.e., states that do not get reimbursed for participating in peacekeeping operations), Canada still fares poorly. According to a new study by the Center for Global Development, only Switzerland, Japan, Sweden, and the United States contribute less than Canada to international peacekeeping operations.[9]

In light of this record and Canada's established reluctance to involve its own soldiers in ground combat for humanitarian objectives, one cannot help but question the strength of Canada's commitment to policy initiatives as grand as the creation of a standing U.N. army and the institutionalization of military humanitarian intervention.[10] If the latter project, in particular, is to amount to anything, Canada and the international community must seriously address the issue of what it means to wage humanitarian war. As the Bosnian experience revealed, the mere presence of thousands of U.N. peacekeepers is no guarantee against the commission of unspeakable atrocities. To be credible, the "international responsibility to protect" must ultimately be based on a willingness to use force. Lost amidst all of the post-UNOSOM II discussion about the perils of nation building has been one extremely

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[8] Ranking as of 30 April 2003. United Nations, *Contributions to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/April2003Countrysummary.pdf.

[9] The Center for Global Development, *Ranking the Rich*, http://www.cgdev.org/rankingtherich/peacekeeping.html.

[10] For further discussion of Canada's 'resources-rhetoric gap' (i.e., what Canada actually contributes to international peace and security versus what it likes to think it does or says it does) see Jean-François Rioux and Robin Hay, "Canadian Foreign Policy: From Internationalism to Isolationism?" *International Journal* 54:1 (Winter 1998-1999), 57-75; Kim Richard Nossal, "Pinchpenny Diplomacy: The Decline of 'Good International Citizenship' in Canadian Foreign Policy," *International Journal* 54:1 (Winter 1998-1999), 88-105; and Louis Delvoie, "Curious Ambiguities: Canada's International Security Policy," *Policy Options* 22:1 (January-February 2001), 36-42.

important point: arguably the primary reason the American-led intervention in Somalia was initially so successful in restoring some semblance of order to the country was its emphasis on overwhelming force. Somali militiamen knew better than to challenge heavily armed American soldiers backed up by helicopter gunships. Unfortunately, none of this appears to have registered with the Canadian government, which continues to starve the Canadian military of the funding necessary to transform the government's high-minded rhetoric into something more tangible. Hence, if there is another instance of ethnic cleansing/genocide or another civil war induced famine somewhere in the world in the near future, it is highly unlikely that Canada will be in a position to offer much more than words of condemnation and a token number of Canadian soldiers.

But what of Canada's relatively significant contribution to the NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999?[11] Does that not go some distance towards refuting the general thesis about Canadian foreign policy advanced here? The answer is no. Although NATO's military planners prepared a full range of options for military action in Kosovo, there was little appetite among NATO member states, Canada included, for any option that might either lead to a replay of the Bosnian experience (the U.S., in particular, did not want to have its hands tied by the presence of vulnerable ground forces) or expose NATO soldiers to undue risks.[12] The Alliance was thus confronted with a rather stark choice. As American General Hugh Shelton phrased it, "We (NATO) could do zero or we could carry out the NATO air power

[11] Canadian pilots flew approximately ten percent of all NATO air missions during 'Operation Allied Force'. Department of National Defence, *Contributions to Peace and International Security*, http://www.dnd.ca/site/about/peace_e.asp.

plan."[13] That left Canada in an extremely awkward diplomatic position, akin to the one it had faced when the U.N. endorsed the American intervention proposal for Somalia in 1992. Despite harboring considerable reservations about the plan put forth by the U.S. on that occasion, Canada quickly realized that it simply could not continue to claim it was the world's leading internationalist state while sitting out what portended to be perhaps the most significant multilateral humanitarian operation ever undertaken. The same liberal internationalist forces manifested themselves vis-à-vis Kosovo. Never mind that the NATO action circumvented the U.N., Canada could hardly decline to participate in an operation whose primary motivation (at least from the Canadian perspective) so perfectly meshed with the human security agenda that the government had been championing for the past three years under the tutelage of Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy.[14] Moreover, as much as 'Operation Allied Force' belongs in any discussion about the evolution of military humanitarian intervention, it should be seen for what it truly was: humanitarianism on the cheap. As Michael Ignatieff argues, in practically every respect 'Operation Allied Force' was a "virtual war;" a war waged in the name of human rights but without any depth of commitment.[15] That Canada participated in such a limited operation can scarcely be regarded as a radical departure from its traditional approach.

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[12] Only after it became clear that the air campaign might not succeed did the idea of using ground forces resurface.

[13] Quoted in John E. Peters, Stuart Johnson, Nora Bensahel, Timothy Liston, and Traci Williams, *European Contributions to Operation Allied Force: Implications for Transatlantic Cooperation* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), 15.

[14] A good overview of Canadian policy during the Kosovo campaign is Kim Richard Nossal and Stéphane Roussel, "Canada and the Kosovo War: The Happy Follower," in Pierre Martin and Mark R. Brawley, eds., *Alliance Politics, Kosovo, and NATO's War: Allied Force or Forced Allies?* (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 181-199.

[15] Michael Ignatieff, *Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond* (New York: Vintage, 2000).

In contrast to Canada, the discourse and practice of French foreign policy during the last few years have been remarkably consistent. As in the first half of the 1990s, the focus of France's efforts has remained on strengthening Europe's capacity to act independently of the United States in the military sphere. By the end of the Bosnian war of course that objective seemed as distant as ever. Rather than look upon its Yugoslav experience as evidence of the ineluctable futility of attempting to forge a common foreign and security policy (CFSP), however, the E.U. emerged from the conflict with a reinvigorated sense of purpose. The direct result of that revival was the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, an ambitious extension of the relatively skeletal CFSP framework first laid out in the Maastricht Treaty. Among other things, the Amsterdam Treaty strengthened the relationship between the Western European Union and the E.U. (a key French objective), established a High Representative for the CFSP (the first step towards giving the CFSP an independent political voice), and called upon member states to cooperate in the field of defense production. The treaty also designated "...humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking" (the so-called 'Petersberg tasks') as matters of vital concern.[16]

France immediately set to transforming the treaty's objectives into substantive policy gains, and by the fall of 1998 had achieved its first tangible success. In September of that year, Britain, France, Germany, and Italy formally established the Joint Armaments Cooperation Organization, an arrangement designed to facilitate the shared management of their arms acquisition programs.[17] Another Balkan war

[16] European Union, *Treaty of Amsterdam*, http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/amsterdam.html.
[17] Ministry of Defense Communiqué, 29 January 2001, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/europe/politique

dramatically laid bare the rather limited extent of the E.U.'s post-Amsterdam accomplishments, however. The Bosnian crisis seemed to suggest that Europe only needed to get its political act together. Kosovo demonstrated that Europe also had to become much more serious about closing the gap in high-technology military capabilities that had developed between itself and the United States.[18] The Kosovo campaign was especially instructive for France, who discovered that its military deficiencies bore political ramifications. Noted the French government's official post-conflict review, "A country that has cruise missiles retains control over how they are used, but...a country that does not have any can find itself excluded from part of the decision making process."[19]

'Operation Allied Force' also reconfirmed France's long held suspicions about the true nature of the relationship between the U.S. and NATO. Said the Defense Ministry's report, "The conclusion cannot be avoided that part of the military operations were conducted by the United States outside the strict framework of NATO and its procedures."[20] The lesson for France was clear: an equal voice for Europe would only come about through the CFSP. No doubt most satisfying to France was the fact that most of its European partners had arrived at the same conclusion. Even before the last bomb had fallen on Yugoslavia, the E.U. had decided that henceforth the Petersberg tasks would be placed at the center of the CFSP

/defense/Richard/290101.gb.html.

[18] Although the U.S. flew approximately two thirds of the total sorties during 'Operation Deliberate Force' in August and September 1995, the action was so brief and limited (only 3515 total sorties were flown, of which 2470 were strike sorties, and just over one thousand bombs and missiles dropped) that questions about the technology gap between the U.S. and its European allies never really surfaced. Figures taken from Federation of American Scientists, Military Analysis Network, "Operation Deliberate Force," http://www.fas.org/ man/dod-101/ops/deliberate_force.htm.

[19] Ministry of Defense, *Les Enseignements du Kosovo*, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/dossier/ d36/.

process. The Helsinki European Council meeting in December 1999 reaffirmed that policy and established a goal to create, by the year 2003, a rapid reaction force of up to sixty thousand troops capable of carrying out the full range of Petersberg tasks.[21] Within a year the broad outlines of the force had taken shape, with France's contribution set at 12,000 soldiers.[22] Proof of just how committed Europe is to achieving all of this became clear in June 2001 when French Defense Minister Alain Richard announced that France and seven of its European partners, along with Turkey, had formally agreed on the development and purchase of a new generation of transport aircraft.[23] The project, which is being carried out by the giant European aerospace consortium Airbus, represents the largest collaborative effort ever undertaken by E.U. member states and should go a long way towards placing Europe's strategic airlift capability on par with that of the United States.[24] European pronouncements about NATO's primacy aside, the CFSP process seems ever more likely to result in the establishment of a wholly European security architecture.[25] What effect that might have on French and European attitudes towards military humanitarian intervention remains to be seen. But if the E.U.'s recent decision to support the aforementioned U.N. mission in the Congo is any indication, a militarily

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[20] Ibid.

[21] European Union, *Common Foreign and Security Policy/European Security and Defence Policy*, http: //ue.eu.int/pesc/pres.asp?lang-en.

[22] Jacques Isnard, "La France Fournira 20% du corps européen de réaction rapide," *Le Monde*, 18 November 2000, http://www.lemonde.fr/article_impression/0,2322,118913,00.html; and Michael R. Gordon, "Europe Acts to Build Own Military Force," *New York Times*, 21 November 2000, http:// www.nytimes.com/2000/11/21/world/21EURO.html.

[23] Alain Richard, "Reply to a Question in the National Assembly," 26 June 2001, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/Europe/politique/defense/richard260601.gb.html.

[24] Alain Richard, "Closing Speech at the Symposium of the Association Diplomatie et Défense," 18 April 2001, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/europe/politique/defense/richard180401.gb.html.

[25] An excellent summary of the evolving relationship between NATO and the E.U. over the last decade is Robert E. Hunter, *The European Security and Defense Policy: NATO's Companion – or Competitor?* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002).

independent Europe might turn out to be one of the strongest forces for international peace and security that the world has yet seen.

As for the United States, it no longer even pretends to have any interest in military humanitarian intervention. The administration of President George W. Bush has consistently maintained that American military power will only be brought to bear in situations where vital American national interests are at stake.[26] While the Bush Administration's attitude might appear to represent a radical departure from the Clinton era, the difference is more apparent than real. Had NATO's credibility not been at stake, one can only wonder what the American response to the Kosovo crisis would have been. As it was, the U.S. again made it patently clear that it was generally unwilling to risk the lives of American soldiers for the sake of any humanitarian cause. Overall, then, not much has changed since the Clinton Administration first spelled out its position on the issue of American participation in multilateral peace operations. Released in the midst of the Rwandan genocide in May 1994, that policy statement tersely declared, "It is not U.S. policy to seek to expand either the number of U.N. peace operations or U.S. involvement in such operations."[27]

Despite the evident progress that has been made over the last decade, it is difficult not to be somewhat pessimistic about the long-term future of military humanitarian intervention. After discovering the horrors of the Holocaust, the international community pledged to never allow anything similar to ever happen again. The tangible expressions of that sentiment were the 1948 Universal

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[26] See the Bush Administration's national security strategy. The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html.
[27] The White House, *The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations*, May 1994, http://clinton5.nara.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/documents/NSCDoc1.html.

Declaration of Human Rights and International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. More than fifty years on, however, a robust normative regime remains elusive. *Effective* military intervention in defense of the defenseless is still the exception rather than the rule. The current U.N. operation in the DRC will probably require many thousands more soldiers if it is to succeed in bringing an end to the horrible violence that has gripped that country over the last five years. Unfortunately, intervention on that scale will probably only come about if the violence deteriorates into a clear case of mass genocide. While intervention at any point represents a significant step up from the pre-1990s practice of allowing conflict-induced humanitarian catastrophes to play themselves out, the international community will have to exhibit a much higher level of commitment before it is possible to speak of anything more substantial than an emergent norm of military humanitarian intervention.

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