INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

Bell & Howell Information and Learning
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA
800-521-0600

Between Two Roaring Worlds: Personal Identity in Jame's Joyce's *Ulysses*

Thesis submitted for completion of partial requirements for the degree Master of Arts, McGill University, Montreal, 20 October, 1995.

Gerald Michael Butts: 8902133

Supervisor: Dr. Joseph Ronsley

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank, first and foremost, Professor Joseph Ronsley for having confidence in both the viability of this project and my ability to complete it. More important, he went above and beyond the call in agreeing to supervise this paper, even after he had retired from teaching. Without his wealth of knowledge about *Ulysses* and all things Joycean, I certainly would not have been able to undertake this thesis at McGill. I also want to thank Professors Kenneth Borris and Christopher Heppner for instilling in me the necessity of disciplined commitment in the production of any serious literary criticism, and for exemplifying open minded but rigorous scholarship. Finally, I owe an unrepayable debt of gratitude to V.L.S. and J.A.H. for conversations which both directly and indirectly challenged my assumptions and shaped my thinking about this topic. I take full responsibility for any mistakes which remain in this study.

I am a part of all that I have met
Yet all experience is an arch wherethro'
Gleams that untravell'd world, whose margin fades
Forever and forever when I move.

--Ulysses
Alfred, Lord Tennyson

Introduction

When I first encountered James Joyce's *Ulysses*, at the age of sixteen, I was predictably unprepared for the book. Its shifts in narrative voice, extensive use of stream of consciousness, and ostensible disorder make the book a daunting task for the first time reader. Fortunately, my age allowed me to consign my lack of understanding to naïveté, rather than, as did many early critics, to authorial deficiencies. In addition to my ignorance regarding *Ulysses* itself, I was completely unaware of the extensive critical debates surrounding its myriad aspects, from the supposed "communion" between Stephen and Bloom in "Ithaca" to the fact that the very edition I was reading (the Gabler text) was the source of considerable controversy in the Joycean community.

Having experienced frustrations common to many readers of the book, I can understand why so many readers "give up" on *Ulysses*. Obviously, I was drawn back to the book, but by neither its encyclopaedic nature, nor the various games it plays with literary traditions, nor any other "technical" aspect of the author's virtuosity; I was, of course, ignorant to these features. Rather, I found -- and continue to find -- *Ulysses* an extremely compelling work of art because of the manner in which it seems to be energized with "warm fullblooded life," in the words of Bloom. The impressive extent to which Joyce has successfully created ostensibly real human beings is both remarkable and often remarked upon. Less well documented are the underlying philosophical assumptions which inform Joyce's meticulous method of characterization. The present study of Ulysses aims to uncover these assumptions.

In subsequent years, through successive readings of the book, I have approached an understanding of much of the book that first perplexed me; much of that accumulated knowledge finds its way into this paper. Nonetheless, I see this study as a logical outgrowth of that first reading; it is an attempt to understand not only the human beings within *Ulysses*, but the conception of *being* which underwrites them. I have chosen to discuss Joyce's conception of human identity with the views of David Hume and Jean-Paul Sartre for reasons which are far from arbitrary.

Between the Scottish smile and the Gallic yawp.

Sartre and Hume are often seen to represent antithetical philosophical arguments concerning the formation of the self. In simplified terms, Sartre argues that the individual has full control over his environment and thus must accept responsibility for whomever or whatever he becomes; the human being is doomed to be free. Hume on the other hand, argues that since he cannot discover through rational inquiry any agency through which the self is unified, then the idea of a consistent personal identity is a myth; it is an optimistic myth but a myth nonetheless. Though I am interested in the logical construction of these arguments, their teleological thrust is much more important to the present project. In other words, the moral and ethical ramifications of the arguments are here given precedence over what they have to say about "being-in-itself" (Sartre 24-31). As a tool for interpretation of the characters in *Ulysses*, I hope to show that this method yields great dividends of understanding.

David Hume's account of personal identity in the first book of *The Treatise of Human Nature* is succinct and straightforward. At the basis of his critique is the Lockean qualification that an idea -- in this case an idea of self -- must be "clear and intelligible" (251). Hume

claims that such an idea of self cannot possibly exist because it presupposes a constancy of a single impression that could give rise to such an idea throughout the life of the subject (251). Since the human agent can experience a widely variegated range of emotions, sensations and impressions, none of these can be said to be fully representative of a coherent identity, since their temporal existences are mutually exclusive; thus it cannot be said that a sense of self is created by any simple impression.

Hume then uses this argument as a foundation from which to attack the process of self-examination, and to claim the discontinuity of identity. In the process of attempting to determine the relationship between such diverse sensations and identity, he argues that during the process of self examination, one cannot experience an impression of self that is separate from simpler sensations:

> [w]hen I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I can never catch *myself* at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. When my perceptions are remov'd for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I sensible of *myself*, and may truly be said not to exist (252).

It quickly becomes apparent that, for Hume, identity is inextricably linked to the subject's ability to perceive and receive sensory impressions; so much to the extent that if this ability is removed, or even for a short time suspended, the self ceases to exist in any meaningful sense. The lack of a consistent sensation (of self) which supports all subsequent sensations leads Hume to his famous remark that the human agent is "nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in perpetual flux and movement" (252). Since there is no identity between the objects of

perception, there cannot be, according to Hume, a constant identity inherent to the self that frames them.

Hume then enters upon a discussion of the imagination's role in assimilating sensation into an overarching pattern of identity. He claims this imaginative capacity is "the cause of confusion and mistake" (254) insofar as it misleads the perceiving agent into thinking there is a constant identity. Instead the succession of sensations impressed upon the perceiver should be seen simply as related objects rather than evidence of an enduring self. In this sense, identity is an imagined entity which exists only as a convenient solution to a philosophical conundrum; it is a "fiction" created to inextricably fuse together objects that are inherently separable. For Hume, if personal identity can be spoken of in any meaningful context, it is only through the association of ideas in the imagination, caused by the same principle of association that gives rise to the idea of cause and effect. The most startling aspect of this argument is the passive role which the imagination appears to play in the process of association. The imagination provides common ground, so to speak, so that "distant perceptions [can] influence each other" (261), but if an identity is created, it is under the aegis of those sensations alone. The human agent is thus completely at the mercy of sensation, and the relationship between them.

Finally, Hume briefly discusses the role of memory, an important area in the context of the following discussion of *Ulysses*, in the creation of personal identity. Memory, for Hume, "does not so much produce as discover personal identity, by shewing us the relation of cause and effect among our different perceptions" (262). Since each sensation experienced by a given individual cannot be simultaneously called to consciousness, memory cannot be said to create the identity; it is only when a current sensation gives rise to the memory of a previous,

similar one that identity between the objects, and consistency in the subject, is perceived. Also, memory works as "a sort of retrospective arrangement" whereby relations between past actions are properly perceived as an association of cause and effect. Thus the human agent can perceive what made him what he is, but has little wilful control over the process.

According to David Hume, personal identity, if it exists at all, is a very fragile construct. The philosopher's emphasis on sensation in the creation of identity leads to the ultimate conclusion -- though he does not discuss it -- that the differing intensities of sensation accord them a related degree of importance in the formation of self. In this sense, an overwhelming experience can effect a substantial transformation, either positive or negative, in the subject. Thus the identity lacks the reliability which comes through consistency and coherence. Moreover, responsibility for action is called into question at this point since human beings are at the mercy of their environment to such a severe degree. If one cannot be held responsible for the creation of oneself, i.e., the moral and ethical standards which shape action, then one is ultimately absolved from responsibility for the actions which ensue.

Jean-Paul Sartre's notion of identity is as extended as Hume's is concise. The structure and stages of his argumentation are, however, not important here. I do not intend to outline the entirety of Sartre's arguments concerning the self and its relation to the general concept of being, as they are developed in his opus: *Being and Nothingness*. Rather, the conclusions at which Sartre arrives are the most important aspects for framing the following discussion of *Ulysses*. What follows then is a synopsis of Sartre's thoughts as they appear in *Being and Nothingness* and *Existentialism is a Humanism*.

The most basic and well known premise of Sartre's thought on the self is the argument that in the human subject "*existence* comes before *essence*" (*EH* 348). In this respect, man is separated from all other "things of the world" (*B&N* 60) because the foundation of his being is an existence which dictates no code to follow, no constrictions on his ability to conceive himself: he is in a radical sense free. In fact, as Sartre argues, this freedom is inextricably intertwined with his existence:

> Human freedom precedes essence in man and makes it possible; the essence of the human being is suspended in his freedom. What we call freedom is impossible to distinguish from the *being* of "human reality." Man does not exist *first* in order to be free *subsequently*; there is no difference between the being of a man and his *being-free* (*B&N* 60).

Already it is apparent how widely Sartre diverges from Hume regarding the self. Instead of being subject to invading perceptions that form the identity, for Sartre, the human agent is the master of these perceptions. Man holds the inherent power to create -- and to subsequently change -- his essence through an act of will, generated by his irrevocable state of freedom.

For Sartre, this freedom is effected though a complex process whereby the human agent establishes a "negation" or "nothingness" between himself and his environment. In this way he distances himself from the environment so that he can perceive and judge as if he were not inextricably tied to it. Sartre explains: "[i]t is essential... that the questioner have the permanent possibility of dissociating from the causal series which produces being... [he] must be able to effect in relation to the questioned a sort of nihilating withdrawl, he is not subject to the causal order of the world; he detaches himself from Being" (58). Man continually realizes his own freedom in such acts. In contrast to Hume, Sartre argues that the world of phenomena

plays little part in the formation of identity, since the perceiving subject can insulate himself from it and thus define his relationship to it.

As is implicit in the foundation of his theory of personal identity, Sartre insists upon the existence of such an identity as an *a priori* concept. Like Hume, he believes that identity is an extremely malleable and transformable entity, but unlike Hume, Sartre believes that the driving and sustaining force behind all personal change comes from within rather than without. Through freedom of choice, man creates himself, and Sartre insists that he be able to retain the integrity of and responsibility for his creation.

The ramifications of Sartre's theory are thus opposite to those of Hume's. For the former, the human agent retains complete responsibility for his actions, judgements and even his identity. There can be no question, then, that he retains the ethical or moral responsibility for the effects of his actions. Similarly, his existential position is his own responsibility since he possesses the innate and inalienable ability to change it.

However, I believe, if this is not too hubristic a statement, that both Sartre's and Hume's arguments are in need of extensive qualification, and I further believe that *Ulysses* accomplishes this task. In fact, these two notions of human identity can be examined as another of the seemingly endless manifestations of Scylla & Charybdis in the book. Hume, a proponent of the fragmented, disunified self that exists at the mercy of all experience represents Charybdis, the whirlpool. Sartre with his insistence upon a radical sense of individualism whereby the self is master of all experience, can easily be interpreted as the rock-like, all devouring Scylla. Joyce, as with other manifestations of the dilemma, successfully navigates the middle course in *Ulysses*.

Much has been written about Joyce's debts to Aristotle, Aquinas, Bruno and other thinkers. But little exists that addresses his interest in Hume, who, according to Ellmann, he certainly read (*Consciousness* 113). Even without Ellmann's assistance, however, it is obvious that "Wandering Rocks" is in a certain sense a playful response to Hume's famous attack upon causality in the *Treatise of Human Nature*. The characters in *Ulysses*, especially Leopold Bloom and Stephen Dedalus, also respond to another chapter of that tract: "Of Personal Identity."

Sartre, on the other hand, presents a theoretical problem. For obvious chronological reasons, Joyce could not have read *Being and Nothingness*.[1] Nonetheless, I believe that Sartre is an interesting touchstone from which to examine *Ulysses* for two basic reasons. First, and most important, Stephen Dedalus in both his absurdity and intense desire for sincerity -- Sartrian "authenticity" -- anticipates the existentialist heroes of Jean Genet and Sartre himself; it is almost certain that Joyce influenced these writers. In James Joyce's comic vision, however, the existentialist hero, for all his personal integrity, is finally a monomaniacal sort of fool. It is a "phase" for Stephen Dedalus; one which he must grow beyond if, in the words of J. Mitchell Morse, "he is ever to be a serious artist rather than an arty dilletant" (30).

I have chosen Sartre also because I believe his thought to be an outgrowth of the same environment in which *Ulysses* was expanded immensely in scope and matured into a masterpiece in Joyce's hands. Michael Groden has written that *Ulysses* as we now know it was created in Paris and Trieste between 1918 and 1922 (59-63). In this respect, it is

---

[1] Though Sartre certainly read *Ulysses*. See *Being and Nothingness*, Part IV, Chapter I: "Freedom": pg. 588, where he [mis]quotes from "Calypso" (4.512-513).

interesting to read the book not only as a generator of the culture of the age but as a response to the prevailing cultural and philosophical attitudes of the times. Though it is safe to say that existentialism is not simply "the unhappy reactions of France to the Occupation and post-war stress" (*B & N Intro*) that early critics claimed it to be, it was not created in a vacuum. Its debts to previous writers and thinkers such as Soren Kierkegaard and Fyodor Dostoevsky are well known, so much to the extent that the former is now sometimes called the "father of existentialism." My contention is simply that Joyce was the product of a similar tradition, the Romantic, and of the same intellectual environment, but he responded to the questions raised by these forces in a radically different manner.

"A hocuspocus of conflicting evidence that candidly you couldn't remotely..."
(*Ulysses* 16.1109-1110)

In the past fifteen years Joyce criticism has followed the leads of such important critics as Karen Lawrence, Cheryl Herr and Marilyn French in focus. These scholars have concentrated primarily on the narrative and stylistic innovations of *Ulysses*[2], claiming that too much attention has been paid to the manner in which the characters reveal the meaning of the book.[3] The basic argument of these studies has been that the book is naturally indeterminate. Though French hangs on to the final, overarching meaning of the book as a revelation of Bloom's *caritas* (42), Lawrence disputes even this fact: "*Ulysses* is deliberately antirevelatory,

---

[2] See Bonnie Kime Scott. "Introduction to Character and Contemporary Theory." James Joyce: The Augmented Ninth. Bernard Benstock, ed. Syracuse: SUP, 1988.

[3] French, Marilyn. The Book as World: James Joyce's *Ulysses*. Camebridge: Harvard University Press, 1976; Herr, Cheryl. Joyce's Anatomy of Culture. Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1986; and Lawrence, Karen. The Odyssey of Style in Joyce's *Ulysses*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981.

a book that ultimately subverts the notion of an "ideal reader" who arrives at a single truth" (7). In this sense, *Ulysses* is not one book but many books, the plots of which can be read successively or concurrently, without contradiction.

Lawrence argues that the failure of early critics to take seriously the stylistic innovations of the second half of the book is a result of an unrequited and unwarranted expectation from these scholars[4] for traditional novelistic elements of plot. Thus, it becomes easy to "dismiss" *Ulysses* from "Oxen" to "Penelope" (with "Aelous" perhaps thrown in), and the entirety of *Finnegan's Wake* on the grounds that they fail to sustain the intense depiction of the human condition which is so vivid in the early chapters of the book. This approach has been further justified indirectly by "genetic" studies such as Michael Groden's *Ulysses* in Progress which claims: "after 1919 Joyce was no longer writing a novel based primarily on human actions" (21).

At first glance, it would thus appear that I am taking a more "traditional" critical approach to the book. However, I agree with Lawrence insofar as I believe that "one cannot see through the various styles of the text to an ultimate Platonic pattern of meaning" (9). Nonetheless, I think that too much of an attempt is being made to turn *Ulysses* into one of the seeming millions of fictions about fiction, to turn Joyce into an artist "writing about writing." I am extremely weary of such attempts to "postmodernize" -- if such a term may be permitted -- Joyce's masterpiece. What I try to accomplish in this essay is to claim that the "indeterminacies" of plot in the book are more properly read as indeterminacies of character,

---

[4] See especially S.L. Goldberg's famous dismissal of "Oxen of the Sun" in his The Classical Temper: A Study of James Joyce's *Ulysses*. London: Chatto & Windus, 1961.

and that the many "loose ends" (Do Molly and Bloom reconcile? Will Stephen make a return visit to Eccles Street? to name only the obvious) are generated by a deliberately "open" portrait of human identity. Karen Lawrence has shrewdly perceived that the "dead ends" of the book's plot are more properly read as "possibilities" (7); I want to argue that they are more properly read as possibilities of identity.

"possibilities of the possible as possible"
(*Ulysses* 9.349-350)

What I mean by the term "possibility" needs clarification. When I claim that Joyce posits in *Ulysses* a theory of identity which is based on possibility, I mean that his characters are deliberately ineffable to the extent that they cannot be formulaically defined. One of the most obvious difficulties of the novel is the manner in which Stephen Dedalus and Leopold Bloom can have so much in common, yet be completely different characters. This has been explained in many ways: the essence of their thought is identical, but the methodology they use in order to arrive at conclusions is opposite; Bloom is an uneducated version of Stephen, etc. The point I make is that these definitions are to a certain extent helpful, but are ultimately pointless. The magic of Joyce's creation lies precisely in the notion that an undereducated, intelligent, reasonable man *can* arrive at observations of the human condition that are as profound (if not more so) as an erudite, though inexperienced young prig. In much the same manner Bloom, in an important sense can *be* Odysseus, Severin, Aheusereus, etc. As James Maddox has noted, the identity of any of Joyce's main characters is "knowable from a thousand perspectives," but also "eternally mysterious, noumenous" (12).

The problem created by this definition of identity is one of how this vacillation, or more properly, valence of character is controlled. This principle is crucial and involves much of the work below. However, for now it is enough to say that if Stephen Dedalus and Leopold Bloom cannot master their environment to the extent that they willfully decide which of their experiences influence their identities and which will not, they retain ultimate control over how these influences are assimilated, and most importantly, how their identities are expressed. I read Stephen Dedalus as a man who, in *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, assumes one stiffly dogmatic and inelastic self-conception after another; even the guise of freedom inherent in Stephen's vision of himself as an artist has been petrified by his autocratic and naive aesthetic musings. This situation comes to a head in the opening episodes of *Ulysses*, where Stephen finds himself in a position of existential crisis. Though he shows signs, in "Scylla and Charybdis" and "Proteus" that he possesses some answers to his own problems, these problems are far from solved by the end of the book. Joyce's turn away from the "epiphany" as a vehicle for individual self-awareness and transformation ensures as much. The authors' uncompromising "realism" concerning the human condition precluded the use, in *Ulysses*, of the epiphanic moments so prevalent in *Dubliners* and *A Portrait*. The epiphanies represent a method of individual change which is too simple, both artistically to create, and metaphysically to believe.

Leopold Bloom, on the other hand, is the hero of *Ulysses* because of the manner in which he approaches experience. Unlike Stephen, who must assimilate particular experiences into a preconceived theory of "experience," Bloom's development operates by a value structure and behavioural ethic founded through a combination of innate common sense and

empiricism. This is not to say that Bloom conforms to Hume's view of identity. On the contrary, his discriminating, omnipresent and subtle faculty of judgement stands as a convincing *QED* argument against a decentralized identity. Bloom is not a weak man, and to consider him so, as some critics have done, on the basis of his unwillingness to be dictatorial about his views, is to agree with the "Cyclops" narrator and the Citizen. Rather, Bloom's heroicism lies precisely in his ability to undergo a process whereby he creates, recognizes and sustains possibilities of action which, when they are so common to his manner of observing his existential predicament, become possibilities of being.

In a study which argues the importance -- if not the exclusivity -- of experience's role in shaping the self, it follows that there should be a concentrated discussion of the nature of experience and its parameters. The realism of *Ulysses* radically surpasses mimesis to the point where the diagetic world of the book supplants the outside world. Joyce's vision of the world, in *Ulysses*, is one which sets the outer limits of possibility within which the self can operate and develop. It determines the "greatest possible interval" which separates the fundamental and the dominant "which. Is the greatest possible ellipse. Consistent with. The ultimate return" (*U* 15.2105-2106, 2111-2112). But these determiners are set by Joyce. If there is an aspect of the aesthetic in *A Portrait* incorporated into the architecture of *Ulysses*, it is that of the artist God. Joyce observed and studied the world around him with a ferocious intensity, and the results of that study, to his fortieth year, are made explicit in *Ulysses*. In this sense, I agree with John Paul Riquelme that impersonality in *Ulysses* is a myth (131). There can be no doubt that the picture presented of Dublin is at turns subtle and explicit, but it always reflects the vision of the man who wrote the book.

I underline this point not because I wish to agree or disagree with Joyce's portrait of the world in *Ulysses*; rather it is important because it illustrates the extreme complexity of the author's realistic vision. *Ulysses'* realism is based partly on mimesis, but more important is the manner in which the book mimics the *processes* of the world as the author saw them. The radical interrelatedness of the book's component parts creates the sense that it operates in the same manner as the world. The primacy of coincidence, luck (good or bad) and a seemingly mystical relationship between characters are all components of this vision. As has been argued by Marilyn French, Joyce's endeavour was to create a self-contained world in *Ulysses*. Though this argument is qualified in important respects below, a key to understanding Joyce's conception of the self lies encased in his method of realism, and the egocentricity (in the positional sense of the term) inherent in it.

The discussion of the world of *Ulysses* (Chapter 3) focuses on "Oxen of the Sun" and "Circe" because of the special manner in which this world comes to life in these chapters. These chapters, especially the latter, represent in radical fashion the environmental element of the dialectic that creates the self. "Circe," as I read it, is not an exposé of the unconscious, but a revelation or, to use Karen Lawrence's apt term, an hypostatization, in elemental form of the identities of Bloom and Stephen. Moreover, it represents both the manner in which two identities can mingle and the manner in which the individual identity is created.

Ultimately, it is the aim of this study to trace these processes. The purpose of the philosophical framework for this discussion is foundational; Hume and Sartre provide a framework for analysis from a discipline which has traditionally been clearer about its ideas of metaphysics than has literature. Nonetheless, it is the strength -- and perhaps advantage -- of

literature that it is not philosophical argument, except *ad demonstradum*. If it is the role of the philosopher to posit a theoretical argument about the make-up of personal identity, it is the duty of the artist to demonstrate the creation of an individual, and Joyce's *Ulysses* presents the quintessential twentieth century demonstration of personal identity.

Chapter 1: Stephen Dedalus

The Stephen of *A Portrait*

When Stephen Dedalus, in *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, declares: "I will not serve that in which I no longer believe" (247), he naively establishes himself as the archimedian point from which he will make all future judgements: about art, the Roman Catholic Church, his country, his family, and, most solipsistically, his own identity. While the partially ironic narrator of *A Portrait* gradually permits us to perceive the young man's folly, Stephen appears ignorant of his own fault. The following brief reading of *A Portrait* serves to document the emergence of this characterization of Stephen, in order to better understand his status in *Ulysses*.

Joyce's *Portrait* traces the creation of Stephen Dedalus's individuality, his identity. The author accomplishes this task not through meticulous detail, as had originally been attempted in the discarded *Stephen Hero*, but impressionistically. I mean by this term that Joyce seeks in *A Portrait* to convey an overarching *sense* of who Stephen is, and how he has become this way, without dissecting the minutiae of his actions or thoughts as if he were vivified mechanistically, like a clock. Thomas Petruso explains the method in this way:

> While the five chapters [of *A Portrait*] follow chronological stages of Stephen's life, recovering memories (the pandybat incident, being pushed in the ditch) as well as symbolic networks (water, birds, cows, etc.) and theme words organize the material into an atemporal gestalt that identifies Stephen. [Joyce] reach[es] beyond what the character does to show how -- or what -- he is, which is obviously a more slippery position (62).

As in *Ulysses* where Joyce isolates a single day in order to distil the essence of Leopold Bloom, *A Portrait* attempts to magnify "movements" in Stephen's life as an expression of his identity. Though these movements cannot be wholly separated, it is a useful generalization to say that the novel documents Stephen's attraction to, submersion in, and finally his individuation from traditional institutions and values. We first read of Stephen as "a nicens little boy named baby tuckoo" who lives in a "very good time" (7). He is a boy who, like any other child his age, is immersed in the family environment. He seems comfortable there, though he prefers his mother slightly over his father.[5] This idyllic description is followed closely by the introduction of the first divisive issue that Stephen experiences: Irish politics. As we know from Richard Ellmann's biography (*JJ* 31-34), the Parnell affair had a long lasting effect on James Joyce, and here we see its encroachment upon the childhood of Stephen Dedalus. This event, coupled with the concurrent appearance of Dante Riordan (representing the church), provides a brief view of the forces that will shape Stephen's life, until the "epiphany" on the strand reveals to him his artistic destiny.

Over the course of the novel Stephen goes through cycles of extreme piety, followed by licentiousness; to use a not altogether inappropriate cloacal metaphor, Stephen undergoes

---

[5] It is interesting to note that the basis of this judgement is purely sensual: "His mother had a nicer smell than his father," (7) and that the observation follows associatively from the boy's thoughts of the oilsheet's smell after wetting the bed. The implication is that the infant identity may be the pure innocence described by the Romantic poets, but that he is also imperiled by an extreme susceptibility to experience. The child, with only an inchoate faculty of judgement seems at first to be a depiction of Hume's theory of identity. Nonetheless, Stephen does display a minor capacity for judgement which, in this case turns out to be uncannily correct. Of course, as we learn later, Simon Dedalus's smell (i.e. of alcohol) is a more highly charged and sinister trait than it appears here to be.

processes of digestion and expulsion. All of these movements are failed attempts by Stephen to immerse himself in something that is totally "other" to the extent that he loses all sense of self. This ultimately leads him to the position briefly outlined above; whereby having ostensibly exhausted the limited possibilities available to him in his immediate environment, Stephen Dedalus decides to embark on a course of self-definition which attempts to exclude all exterior, shaping forces. It is ultimately a movement toward paralysis.

I want to stress here that this reading of *A Portrait* takes for granted a radical fracture between the identities of the author and the protagonist. Though it may be safe to say that James Joyce was once a young man who much resembled Stephen Dedalus, by the time he wrote *A Portrait*, he was a substantially more mature individual; the existence of the novel itself corroborates this argument. This point is crucial because I wish to follow the claims of critics such as Robert Kiely, who claim that the novel is at once a portrait of an individual's total immersion in "selfhood" -- in the Blakean sense of the term -- and of the possibilities of escaping that trap. Kiely writes:

> The movement in *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*... is not merely away from family, friends and social institutions; it is also a movement toward the death of the ego, and... the possible birth of an artist freed from preoccupation with self (8).

This movement may be present in *A Portrait*, but it is certainly not generated by Stephen's awareness of his own position. This theory of artistic consciousness is noticeable in the novel because of its absence from the characterization, and its presence in the narrator. Stephen may theorize about authorial impersonality in his famous (and famously misunderstood) depiction of the artist as "the God of creation... within or behind or beyond or above his handiwork,

invisible, refined out of existence, indifferent, paring his fingernails" (215); however, as Kiely has again noticed, he "is never so arrogant, pedantic, and pretentious -- so trapped in himself -- as when he is theorizing about self-detachment" (9).

This situation points to a gap between the narrative point of view, established through the *style indirect-libre* mode of narration, and the protagonist's claims and actions, a gap that prevents the careful reader from taking what Stephen says or does at face value. Though I do not agree with Kenner's (1956) assessment of the narrator as so viciously ironic that the entire novel is something of a joke at Stephen's expense, I believe that this gap is important because it allows the novel as a whole to point subtly toward the existential position that Stephen must stake out, without leading him down the garden path to a fairy tale ending.

Stephen embarks on this journey when he is sent to Clongowes for school as a very young boy ("half past six"). This movement completes the first cycle of the attraction-immersion-rejection structure of *A Portrait* with a separation from the first institution to affect any person's development: the family. Stephen predictably feels out of place at the Jesuit college and attempts to habituate himself in his new environment. In the process, he discovers the tool that will eventually become his constant solace and source of escape: language. Stephen's fascination with language is introduced when "a fellow" says to Simon Moonan: "We all know why you speak. You are McGlade's suck" (11). This sets Stephen on an early version of the linguistic meditations that become so characteristic of him:

> Suck was a queer word. The fellow called Simon Moonan that name because Simon Moonan used to tie the prefect's false sleeves behind his back and the prefect used to let on to be angry. But the sound was ugly. Once he had washed his hands in the Wicklow Hotel and his father pulled the stopper up by the chain after and

> the dirty water went down through the hole in the basin. And when it had all gone down slowly the hole in the basin made a sound like that: suck. Only louder (11).

This attempt at explanation, along with the examination of "cold and hot" which follows it (11-12), points to language as a crucial factor in the formation of Stephen's identity. Stephen appropriates words as he learns them, making them inseparable from his own experience and blurring the line between their existence as concepts and the experiences or objects that they represent. In deconstructionist terms, the young man's understanding of language fuses the "signifier" and "signified" into one entity. More important for the purposes of this study, however, is the fact that these words are fused by Stephen with *his own* experiences. Thus we can see that even at this stage Stephen defines the world around him in terms of himself.

In an interesting, if somewhat eccentric essay, Jeanne McKnight highlights the role which language plays in the formation of Stephen's identity. She sees the development of the artist persona as a desire to express one's self in the fullest manner possible:

> Expression is Stephen's way of bringing himself into the world, and in the metaphor of expression are linked the ideas of speaking (language), asserting one's identity (being "born"), and pressing out (excreting) all the beauty which is inside (432).

In the case of Stephen, expression becomes a method of self-definition *against* external factors, a manner in which he can "ward off things that are not him by means of his word-magic" (McKnight 431). The relationship between language and identity in Joyce is for McKnight so strong that the creation of the language of *Finnegans Wake* becomes an elaborate affirmation of self (431). McKnight further argues, perhaps absurdly, that Stephen's visions of hell in *A*

Portrait relate to constipation because this signifies an inability to parturiate artistically; thus an inability to express one's identity (433)[6].

The dangers of this notion of identity are obvious. If one's identity is determined through an appropriation of concepts through the medium of language, a process which S.L. Goldberg correctly calls "an activity that ends in a kind of possession" (73), then expression becomes imperative, whether it be formally artistic (as in the case of Stephen), or informally communicative (as in the case of Bloom). A failure to complete this process leads to an inability to conceive of the world as other than part or an extension of one's self, an extreme version of narcissism. It quickly becomes apparent in *A Portrait* that Stephen falls into precisely this trap. Whether the words he uses are those of Aquinas, Newman or Father Arnall, he immediately makes those words his own. In the case of Father Arnall's sermon, he interprets them as if they were spoken directly to him.

Some critics such as Cheryl Herr, in her influential *Joyce's Anatomy of Culture* describe the movement of *A Portrait* in opposite terms. Herr sees the novel as a history of "the subjecting" of Stephen (25). It is a description of his submission to and final release from social institutions. However, as the above discussion of the relationship between language and identity partially points out, Stephen relentlessly attempts to take control of the factors shaping him. It would seem quite incongruous with Herr's interpretation that the young Stephen would not accept his punishment from Father Dolan; instead, he uses his own conception of right and

---

[6] One might notice here that Bloom has absolutely no problem excreting in *Ulysses*.

wrong to judge his position, and goes to Father Conmee (50-56)[7]. Thus, the first movement of *A Portrait* ends with a rejection of blind authority. It is a rejection that displays the characteristic rigidity of Stephen's identity already beginning to come together. Accordingly, the chapter ends with an image of satiation, as Stephen again "translates" into words the phenomena surrounding him:

> The fellows were practising long shies and bowing lobs and slow twisters. In the soft grey silence he could hear the bump of the balls: and from here and from there through the quiet air the sound of the cricket bats: pick, pack, pock, puck: like drops of water in a fountain falling softly in the brimming bowl (59).

Satisfied with his treatment of the situation, the most "poetic" passage of the first chapter is filtered through Stephen's consciousness. This act of expression, however, is ironic because though it signifies the release pointed to by critics such as Goldberg and McKnight, the substance of the expression itself is an image of overflow. The image suggests that though Stephen's self-referential method of interpreting experience may have resulted in the correct decision this time, the method itself is flawed.

The process of possession outlined by Goldberg becomes in the second chapter of *A Portrait*, predictably, an issue of control. After the somewhat absurd occasion when Stephen is beaten by the other boys for defending Byron (81-82), he senses (and seems to encourage) a growing stance of isolation from the "Life" he will affirm at the end of the novel. He considers the demands of his family and friends that he serve, either his church or country:

> And it was the din of all these hollowsounding voices that made him

---

[7] It is interesting to note that Stephen does not consider his father's injunction "never to peach on a fellow" to extend to the priest.

> halt irresolutely in the pursuit of phantoms. He gave them ear for a time but he was happy only when he was far from them, beyond their call, alone or in the company of phantasmal comrades (84).

It is interesting here that the voices of the real people in his life are "hollowsounding", while the "phantasmal comrades," the dead artists with whom he communicates through the medium of language, are his preferred companions. He prefers their companionship because he can control and direct their presence in a manner in which he cannot control real, living human beings: the very manifestation of the Sartrian "other." This argument is further substantiated, immediately in the novel, when he cannot face his family or the Jesuits after the play (85-86). He runs off, ostensibly in search of "some further adventure," but he is really attempting an escape from an inexplicably anxiety ridden situation over which he can exercise no control. After he experiences a simple phenomenon, one which he can name and thus master ("That is horse piss and rotted straw" (86)), Stephen returns, calmly.

That it is the immediacy and simplicity of concrete experience that calms Stephen should be a hint to him that this type of experience is what his developing artistic intellect requires, but the remainder of the chapter traces his increasing isolation from experience: both of phenomena and of others. It also documents his growing paranoia and obsession with controlling his environment. Notice, for instance, the manner in which he uses his thirty three pounds to enforce order upon, and thus exert control over, his home-life (96-99). During the trip to Cork with his father, Stephen is fascinated by the "terror of sleep" (87), which indicates a fear of losing consciousness or control. He combats this fear in an interesting manner: through nonsense language which he makes fit the rhythm of the train (87). Stephen is again

using language to establish a comfort zone between himself and his environment, in order to control it.

Perhaps the best illustration of this process occurs when he reads the word *foetus* cut in the desk in his father's old classroom. Simon has been trying to rouse his son's interest all morning with stories of his youth and local history, with little or no success. This is because Stephen, who is becoming increasingly narcissistic, does not care for experiences that are not his own and is becoming increasingly disillusioned with his father. When he reads the word on the desk, it arouses his imagination because it excludes everyone but himself, and he attempts to seize that experience as his own. However, the vision he conjures soon takes on a life of its own: "The sudden legend startled his blood: he seemed to feel the absent students of the college about him and *to shrink from their company*" (89, emphasis added). Stephen has here intended to create an insular, private imaginative space, but the vision itself appears to implore him to reach outside himself; this is a feat he cannot presently accomplish, so he shrinks from the vision itself.

This narcissism is solidified when the vision of the schoolboys merges with his "recent monstrous reveries" (90). These reveries, of course, imply the "crime" of Onanism, a narcissistic crime that Bloom will commit (and in a certain sense transpose) in *Ulysses*. But for Stephen, in *A Portrait*, these thoughts imply nothing but an extreme and dangerous self-involvement that he fails to recognize. These thoughts and experiences arise for him "out of mere words" (90): his own words. When they grow to take on a life of their own, he can no longer control them and they terrify him. At this point, Stephen is in the precarious position where he can neither reach outside himself to "encounter experience," even for the first time,

nor can he achieve the artistic distance or release from images created by his own imagination. Because the only thing Stephen is interested in creating at this point is himself, he cannot let go of his creation:

> His very brain was sick and powerless. He could scarcely interpret the letters of the signboards of the shops. By his monstrous way of life he seemed to have put himself beyond the limits of reality. Nothing moved or spoke to him from the real world unless he heard in it an echo of the infuriated cries within him (*Portrait* 92).

The situation only gets worse. When Stephen realizes that he cannot force himself out of his own predicament[8], he attempts to bring others into it. He is completely unable to identify with the "other": "He wanted to sin with another *of his kind*, to force another being to sin with him and exult with her in her sin" (99, emphasis added). The "dark presence" he feels weighing upon him comes from within rather than without, and it leads him to his first encounter with a prostitute, described in terms which echo the conclusion of the first chapter; it is an image of satiation (101), however "beastly."

This repetition, which will again occur at the end of the third chapter with Stephen's reception of communion, signifies a misdirected search on the part of the young man. This is one of the divergences between author and protagonist mentioned above. The repetition of a false image of fulfilment, points to a questioning or re-examination of method. Stephen is unsatisfied by the church, Ireland, and riotous sexual behaviour each for the same reason: he attempts to shake his overwhelming consciousness of himself through a dissolution of his

---

[8] "He had not gone one step nearer the lives he had sought to approach nor bridged the restless shame and rancour that decided him from mother and brother and sister. He felt that he was hardly of the one blood with them but stood to them rather in the mystical kinship of fosterage, fosterchild and fosterbrother" (*Portrait* 98).

identity in institutions. This self-consciousness is so omnipresent and severe, however, that he ends up interpreting his surroundings as simply extensions of himself, or worse, discarding those elements of his experience which cannot be completely assimilated into his own vision of himself. This understandably leads to the heroic posturing of the latter part of the novel. Stephen, having failed to find something outside himself with which he can *completely* identify, decides that he can identify with nothing, and ultimately stands as an satirical caricature of the Sartrian existentialist hero: a self-defining and self-created individual.

The key to understanding this characterization lies in the recognition that Stephen *wills* his attraction-submersion-repulsion cycle in each case. This is where I part ways with critics such as Herr and various Marxist critics[9], who make the Humean argument that Stephen, in *A Portrait*, is shaped by the inhuman machine that is turn of the century Ireland. It is perhaps the ultimate irony of the novel that Stephen accuses Ireland's "nets" (203) of trying to entrap his soul when he has himself willed this entrapment, only to reject it when he has found that it does not suit his conception of himself. He ultimately trades the definition of his identity in terms of the rigid edicts of an institution for an equally, if not more severely, rigid self-definition of his identity. This is the paradoxical position where Stephen, the "horrible example of free thought" (*U* 1.625-626), finds himself in *Ulysses*. It is a position that is succinctly illustrated by an examination of his infamous "aesthetic theory."

In preparation for both his artistic and eventual physical departure, Stephen requires a workable definition of his relationship to his environment and himself. He endeavours to

---

[9] Hawthorn, Jeremy. "*Ulysses*, Modernism and Marxist Criticism." Critical Essays on James Joyce's *Ulysses*. Boston: GK Hall & Co, 1989. (264-276).

accomplish this task through an aesthetic discussion with Lynch. What quickly becomes apparent is that, in his first flight, Stephen will much more closely resemble Icarus than Daedalus, because of the egomaniacal nature of his character at this point.[10] The discussion begins in a predictably hubristic fashion, with Stephen claiming: "Aristotle has not defined pity and terror. I have. I say..." (204, author's ellipsis). Stephen then uses his "dagger definition" to determine that a story relating the death of a woman who was travelling with her "mother whom she had not seem for many years" is not tragic. Stephen argues: "The reporter called it a tragic death. It is not. It is remote from terror and pity *according to the terms of my definition*" (205, emphasis added). The story *is* of course tragic, if only in a pedestrian manner that Stephen will not acknowledge, but the irony again runs deeper than this; it goes beyond the realm of aesthetics to underline the central problem inherent in his orientation toward his environment and himself. As S.L. Goldberg has argued, "[t]he [aesthetic] theory in *A Portrait* serves not so much to illuminate the nature of art as the nature of Stephen Dedalus" (43).

Stephen is demanding that events be subject to interpretation through the same type of rigid definition that he has allegedly disavowed as a constraint upon his own freedom. Far from the author who would allow subject matter to dictate, even create its own interpretive

---

[10] It is interesting in this context that, just before he begins the aesthetic discussion with Lynch, he argues to Davin both that: "This race and this life and this country produced me... I shall express myself as I am," and, on the same page: "You talk to me of nationality, language, religion. I shall try to fly those nets" (203). The first of these would seem to indicate that Stephen's monomania is not as pointed as I suggest, but it is simply an instance where Stephen uses his environment as a tactical advantage to win an argument with Davin. The truer statement of his feelings on the subject concludes with the second statement quoted. Stephen seems undisturbed that these two statements contradict.

style[11], he forces upon it definitions to which it must conform in order to be thought worthy of treatment. This becomes explicitly apparent when Stephen generalizes about the role of the artist:

> We are right, he said, and the others are wrong. To speak of these things and to try to understand their nature and, having understood it, to try slowly and humbly and constantly to press out again, from the gross earth or what it brings forth, from sound and shape and colour which are the prison gates of our soul, an image of the beauty we have come to understand--that is art (206).

There is very little about this definition that is "humble." Stephen is saying that the artist must first define for himself what art and beauty are, and *then* search for them in the world without. He obtains his theory through contrast to and complement with other writers on aesthetics, such as Aquinas, Aristotle and Lessing, rather than through immediate experience. In his favour, Stephen admits that he is missing a theory of artistic production. He ironically states that, in order to formulate such a theory, he requires "a new terminology and a new personal experience" (209). He does not realize that this "experience" will come from somewhere other than more aesthetic philosophy.

Many critics have pointed out that the end of Stephen's aesthetic theory, where he claims that the artist must become fluid in the work of art ("refined out of existence"), necessarily presupposes a great act of self-knowledge. If he does not possess this intimate knowledge of himself, it is then impossible for him to invest his creation with life, since, as Goldberg argues, the artist's "world is finally his own self" (39). I think that a more general

---

[11] I am alluding to the claim that Joyce made throughout the composition of *Ulysses*, justifying the diversity of styles in the book.

statement is closer to the truth, and alleviates the danger of solipsism so inherent in such a notion. The artist, for Joyce, needs to develop not an ontological knowledge of his own identity, but a sound conception of how personal identity is universally formed. There is no question that Stephen Dedalus, at the end of *A Portrait* is engaged in a mining excavation of his own identity; it is not until *Ulysses* that he begins to see the process of identity formation as critically important to the creative process.

The questions regarding the self's relation to its environment and itself are ultimately left unanswered by *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*. At the end of the novel, Stephen is a paper thin character, because of what James Maddox calls "the merely literary nature of Stephen's self-created identity" (4). He stands as a serious, anticipatory critique of Sartre's existentialist hero; he has yet to realize the important role his environment has already played in creating him. Though he realizes what must be done, when he claims to "go to encounter for the millionth time the reality of experience" (253), Stephen is as of yet unequipped to transform that experience into art. Joyce does not permit his protagonist the solace of the answers he seems to have gathered for himself. In this sense the novel is a sort of "negative" portrait of Stephen Dedalus. He is left to learn more from what he has not yet discovered than from the knowledge he has accrued. He is allowed to attempt his physical escape from the environment he cannot mentally reject; like Milton's Satan, his hell is within him. Joyce carefully reveals that his failure is inevitable, since it is sewn together with his chosen method of flight, as were Icarus's wings of wax.

"He kills his mother but he can't wear grey trousers."
(*Ulysses* 1.122)

At the opening of *Ulysses*, it is apparent that Stephen's flight, anticipated at the close of *A Portrait*, has thus far failed. As a result, the Stephen Dedalus of *Ulysses*, is a more sombre, self-effacing and self-conscious character than the young man of the previous novel[12]. Thomas Petruso describes the change in Stephen as "a matter of heightened reflexivity. Stephen has bumped up against the world of others and [has been] thrown back onto a somewhat obsessive cognizance of the distance separating him from the completion of his artistic mission" (64): Stephen is in other words trapped in a satanic type of selfhood. The growth of his fear and paranoia in *Ulysses* is a direct result of his inability to assume a posture which opens the self up this "world of others," of experience; a posture which is effortlessly, unconsciously effected by Leopold Bloom.

It has often been remarked that, in his schema for the "Telemachia," Joyce wrote that Stephen is not in possession of a body. This is indicated through the absence of a corresponding "organ" for each of the opening three chapters. This omission implies that, at most, the Stephen of the "Telemachia" is half a person; a fact of which he becomes at least partially aware in the "Proteus" episode. In Humean terms, the sensory experience involved in the creation of the self is symbolically unavailable to Stephen. In fact, the first two chapters of *Ulysses* can be seen to represent a sort of "be careful what you wish for" movement

---

[12] Stephen's change of character could, of course, also be attributed to the enhanced knowledge which the reader gains of him through the stream-of-consciousness technique. However, I believe this interpretation unnecessarily devalues the potential for development displayed by Stephen in *Ulysses*.

whereby Stephen is granted the isolation he craves at the end of *A Portrait*, only to be left alone to re-attach himself to the world in "Proteus." James Maddox, in his excellent *Joyce's Ulysses and the Assault upon Character*, describes Stephen in these terms:

> The attempt of the young Joyce - like the attempt of the Stephen of *A Portrait* - was to remove all extended definitions of himself, so that he could stand free, self-defined, like the Nietzschean *Ubermensch*. His dilemma came to be that of the Stephen of *Ulysses*, who has cut away at all of his own supports and now laments "If I had land under my feet" [*U* 3.327, (46)].

Moreover, as Bernard Benstock has noted, Stephen is accompanied during the first two episodes of the book by a "friend" who threatens to destroy whatever sense of self remains for him. For Benstock Buck Mulligan is "indicative of Stephen's fear of being absorbed, compromised or displaced" (*Con/Text* 43). Mulligan's role in this regard is most obvious in Stephen's characterization of him as "Usurper" (2.744). However, it is also manifest in a manner which is at once more sinister and humorous throughout "Telemachus."

Through the first pages of *Ulysses*, it is not Stephen but Mulligan who is at centre stage. In contrast to *A Portrait*, which was completely dominated by Stephen's perspective, *Ulysses* insouciantly ignores him until he is called upon by another character, when Mulligan exclaims: "Come up, Kinch! Come up, you fearful Jesuit!" (1.8). Thus, at least temporarily, Mulligan usurps Stephen's place as the narrator's focal point, and therefore robs Stephen of his structural role as protagonist in the book. But more importantly, Mulligan usurps Stephen's place thematically in "Telemachus." It is mentioned above that *A Portrait* can be read as Stephen's inexperienced and often melodramatic struggle to free himself from the forces of his environment which necessarily influence the development of his identity. We

saw that these forces were primarily represented, respectively, by Stephen's family, church, country and, more positively, his chosen vocation as an artist. In the short nineteen pages of "Telemachus," Mulligan succeeds in either usurping Stephen's role as a combatant against these forces, mocking the struggle itself, or as is most characteristic of him, he accomplishes both at the same time.

The first and most obvious action indicative of this process is Mulligan's jocose chanting of the opening of the Latin mass: "*Introibo ad altere Dei*" (I enter unto the altar of God) (1.5). Mulligan mocks Stephen's role as the "priest of the eternal imagination" even as he takes from him his role as a rebel and blasphemer. Mulligan then quickly proceeds to ape the nexus of Stephen's aesthetic theory when he parodies the transubstantiation of the eucharist. Instead of being the priest, Stephen assumes the demeaning role of the altar-boy at Buck's behest: "Thanks, old chap, he [Buck] cried briskly. That will do nicely. Switch off the current, will you?" (1.28-29). Stephen's slight servitude here acts as a comic counter-point to his declarations both in *A Portrait*: "I will not serve that in which I no longer believe" and in *Ulysses*: "*Non Servium.*"[13]

Mulligan immediately touches upon another of Stephen's sources of pride and struggle when he says 'gaily': "The mockery of it...your absurd name, an ancient Greek!" (1.34). In *A Portrait* Stephen's name serves as the impetus for the epiphany concerning his knowledge of his "true identity" as an artist. If irony is already implicit when his friends on the beach call his name in the earlier novel, it is made explicit here. In context, Mulligan is not only

---

[13] It is a counter-point which Stephen seems to recognize, see *U* 1.310-312: "I am another now and yet the same. A servant too. A servant of a servant."

exposing Stephen's name as absurd in itself; rather, he is implying that the name of the "great artificer" is sorely inapplicable to Stephen in his present state. The reason why this incident is much more cutting than its counterpart in *A Portrait* is that, to a certain degree, Mulligan is correct. The name *is* absurd upon a young man who is in a position where nothing "more... than capful of light odes can call [his] genius father" (14.1118-19). Mulligan is beginning to punch holes in the frail, unstable identity which Stephen has constructed for himself.

Buck also mocks Stephen's painful and embittered, but self-imposed exile from his country. First, he both savages and panders wistfully to Haines, the foppish, stage Englishman who occupies the Martello Tower along with Stephen and Buck. In this respect Mulligan represents the half-hearted, ineffectual rebellion against English culture so common, as Stephen sees it, in Ireland. Buck is incapable of making a moral or ethical stand, and this willingness to compromise is to Stephen's unequivocal intellect nothing more than an act of simony. Nonetheless, Buck then ironically eclipses Stephen in the admiration of the milk woman, whom the latter envisions as a synecdoche for all of Ireland:

> -Are you a medical student, sir? the old woman asked.
> -I am ma'am, Buck Mulligan answered.
> -Look at that now, she said.
> Stephen listened in scornful silence. She bows her head to a voice that speaks to her loudly, her bonesetter, her medicineman: me she slights. To the voice that will shrive and oil for the grave all there is of her but her woman's unclean loins (*U* 1.415-21).

Stephen's reaction makes apparent what is implicit throughout *A Portrait*: his rejection of and exile from Ireland has much more to do with his love than his hate for the country. He sees Ireland, especially typified by the artistic community, as its own worst enemy. The "revival"

artists, centred around Yeats and AE, represent for Stephen an exercise in inauthenticity[14]; they are the epitome of the "beautiful, ineffectual dreamer." For Stephen, as for Joyce, an art which is Irish for Ireland's sake is simply bad art. The return to the "faeryland" of ancient Irish mythology as a means to construct a modern Irish culture is for Stephen the perfect example of the artist shirking his responsibilities, to both his culture and his craft.

Stephen Dedalus, however, is not yet the mature James Joyce, as two generations of critics have taken pains to illustrate. There is a part of Stephen which yearns for the immediate gratification given so graciously by his country to Mulligan. Moreover, he has felt for himself the attraction of an art concerned with "only the ethereal" (*U* 15.3437), as is evidenced by his villanelle in *A Portrait* and the vampire poem of "Proteus." Though Joyce could distance himself so much from this threat that he could recreate even his enemy, Dedalus has not yet reached this point, nor anywhere near it, which is why Mulligan poses a real threat to Stephen's identity. Buck Mulligan is not, as Helene Cixous has argued, Stephen's "anti-self" (*Exile* 98). If this were the case, Stephen would have no trouble defining himself against Buck. Rather, Mulligan is a slight but crucial perversion of Stephen's vision of an ideal self. Mulligan, like Stephen, is able to assume the roles or personae which Stephen's Shakespeare theory appears to claim as essential to the act of creation. But unlike Stephen, Mulligan does not seem to worry about not having a consistent self to which he can return, and from which excursions into these roles are generated.

---

[14] It is interesting in this context that Joyce once remarked that Wilde's *Picture of Dorian Gray* would have been a much better novel had the author been more forthcoming about his homosexuality (*JJ* 241).

James Maddox takes this argument one step further when he asserts that Mulligan not only threatens to absorb Stephen's identity, but that Mulligan's "mercurial" behaviour mocks Stephen's basic conception of identity, that the self retains continuity, even though it exists only in the world of flux. Mulligan's role playing represents "a continuous creation of selves which denies the existence of any enduring, subsistent self" (23). Thus Mulligan, rather than being an anti-Stephen, appears to be Stephen extended *ad absurdum*. Compare, for instance, Mulligan's statement in "Telemachus": "Do I contradict myself? Very well then, I contradict myself" (*U* 1.517), with Stephen's famous declaration in "Scylla and Charybdis": "A man of genius makes no mistakes. His errors are volitional and are the portals of discovery" (*U* 9.228-229). For Stephen, the path to self-realization is the incorporation of alien experience into the self with an eye to eventual expression of both in artistic form, whereas for Mulligan, each individual role is experienced for the sake of the experience itself; there is no consistent self into which the reality of experience can be absorbed, and therefore in him Humean empiricism becomes its own teleology.

This dichotomy does not, however, by any means make them opposites. On the contrary, Stephen, the "bullockbefriending bard" (*U* 2.431) is aware that he is capable of drifting toward Mulligan's solipsism, and the increasing irony with which he perceives this situation is one of the most optimistic aspects of Stephen's character in *Ulysses*; they both set sail from the same port. In fact, Mulligan's repeated attempts to render meaningless Stephen's differentiations between them intensify his status as a threat to Stephen's identity. Perhaps the best manifestation of this argument in "Telemachus" is their argument over the death of Stephen's mother, and Stephen's following interior monologue.

Stephen is characteristically brooding over his mother's death and is presently thinking of what he believes to be Mulligan's insulting reaction to it. When he first attempts to remind Mulligan of what the latter had said on the occasion, Mulligan offers a curious reply:

> --Do you remember the first day I went to your house after my mother's death?
>
> Buck Mulligan frowned quickly and said:
>
> --What? Where? I can't remember anything. I remember only ideas and sensations? Why? What happened in the name of God? (*U* 1.189-193)

It is difficult not to hear echoes of Hume in Mulligan's declaration. If Hume is correct concerning the formation of the self, then there *is* nothing to remember but ideas and sensations, bereft of any moral or ethical value. Mulligan's excuse for not showing more respect for the death of Stephen's mother takes shape as a scientific explanation of human death, which he believes will appeal to Stephen, a fellow atheist. Nonetheless, his explanation is no more placating to Stephen than is Bloom's explanation of thunder and lightening in "Oxen of the Sun." When Mulligan sees that Stephen remains embittered, he lashes out at him:

> You wouldn't kneel down to pray for your own mother when she asked you. Why? Because you have the cursed Jesuit strain in you, only its injected the wrong way... You crossed her last wish in death and yet you sulk with me because I don't whine like some hired mute from Lalouette's" (*U* 1.207-9, 212-14).

Stephen's decision not to pray at his mother's bedside is not, as Mulligan seems to argue, an immoral or amoral one[15]. Rather, it is an intensely moral action precisely because of

---

[15] I believe that I owe this observation to Hugh Kenner, though I am unable to locate the precise source.

Stephen's resolute unwillingness to compromise his integrity. However, this integrity is not anchored, as many critics have assumed, by atheism. Stephen's integrity as an individual is defined by a virtue which is at face value much more simplistic than philosophical scepticism about the existence of a deity; it is sincerity.[16] But in Joyce's hands it becomes, not surprisingly, much more complex.

Stephen's decision not to pray for his mother is a more severe version of his refusal to do his Easter duty in *A Portrait*. It is unimportant to him whether or not the eucharist is "actually" transubstantiated during mass; neither is he "objectively" certain that no God exists. He does not *believe* in these and, somewhat narcissistically, that is enough for him. If Stephen can be read as a existentialist hero, it is precisely because of this trait. But Joyce is careful to indicate a subtle contradiction in Stephen's position regarding his mother's death. Experience, for Stephen, is an important formative factor with regards to the self, as indicated by his vow at the end of *A Portrait*. Stephen determines through experience the veracity, or lack thereof, of the church's dogma. He determines that the church is a tool for imprisonment of his soul rather than its release; this is the reason why he declines the offer to join the Jesuit order. Once he has made these value judgements, they become a staple of his identity and he turns against them for no reason. Nonetheless, this principle should lead him to a position where further experience augments and changes his identity, but Stephen fails to recognize the

---

[16] In fact, I think there is a considerable argument to be made that, whatever can be said of the religious beliefs of his creator, Stephen Dedalus is no atheist. Though he may not believe in the God of the Roman Church, he certainly seems to believe in a presence which vivifies the world and emanates from beyond humanity. Whether this presence is best characterized as a close kin of Yeats's *anima mundi*, or of Giordano Bruno's "world-soul" is debatable, but that it exists for Stephen is, I believe indisputable.

manner in which his self has been formed. This nescience is one the most highly charged themes in *Ulysses*. Many critics have commented that Stephen's problem is that he lacks self-knowledge; I do not think that this is quite correct. Stephen's main difficulty is that he fails to understand the manner in which his, or any identity is formed.

Ironically, if anyone is treating the situation in an immoral (perhaps amoral) manner, it is Mulligan. Mulligan, who is self-avowedly "as hyperborean as [Stephen]" (*U* 1.92), would be more than willing to readily compromise this position were he faced with Stephen's dilemma:

> --You could have knelt down, damn it, Kinch, when your dying mother asked you, Buck Mulligan said... to think of your mother begging you with her last breath to kneel down and pray for her. And you refused. There is something sinister in you...
> (*U* 1.91-94, Joyce's ellipsis).

The indication here is that an individuality of Nietzschean (or, for that matter, Sartrian) intensity is for Mulligan nothing more than a pose, with all the importance of a parlour game. Mulligan's explanation of his reaction to Mrs. Dedalus's death in medical terms becomes very important in this light. Mulligan, like Dostoevsky's Ivan Karamazov, interprets the "death of God" to mean "everything is permitted". In the absence of a coherent moral or ethical force personified in God, one can sacrifice one's personal moral beliefs for the sake of expediency. Stephen reacts to religious scepticism in the opposite manner; for him the absence of a central moral authority means that this authority must be relocated in the self. Out of necessity, the self becomes the generator of moral and ethical judgements which, in turn reinforces the original substance of personal identity. Thus, any compromise of the personal identity which

one constructs for oneself becomes a secular act of simony. That this is an extremely untenable and solipsistic existentialist position for Stephen to occupy need not be stated.

The death of May Dedalus need not, however, be filtered through Buck Mulligan's reaction in order for one to see the deep impact which it has had on Stephen and on his conception of both himself and the notion of identity in general. Marylu Hill sees Stephen's relationship with his mother as crucial in this regard:

> At the heart of it [Stephen's search for identity] is Stephen's relationship with his mother, both the real mother that nurtured him and is now dead, and an imagined symbolic mother who is the product of Stephen's fearful and anxious consciousness... his selfhood derives simultaneously from the unconditional affirmation which his real mother gave him and from his active struggle against all that his imagined mother stands for -- an all encompassing fertility linked to nature which signals death to Stephen (329).

While I think Hill overstates the point, I agree with her in an important respect. Stephen's mother connects him not to any "all encompassing fertility," but simply to the world which is other to him. May Dedalus represents for Stephen a forming force upon his identity over which he can assert no control: "Who chose this face for me? This dogsbody to rid of vermin. It asks me too" (*U* 1.136-137). This passage of course invokes a being capable of much more elaborate orchestral movements than Mrs. Dedalus, but in an equally resonant sense it implicates both of Stephen's parents. Thus, his mother's death strikes a chord in him because it offers Stephen the freedom from the obvious environmental ties that he has desired since the close of *A Portrait*.

Marylu Hill further argues that Stephen wishes to see his mother as an extension of himself, and that this desire is frustrated by her death: "The fact of it [May's death] causes

Stephen's crisis of identity by forcing him to recognize his selfhood insofar as her death is contrary to his desire" (332). However, Hill then claims that Stephen constructs the "ghoulish mother" out of his imagination in order to "blame her for threatening his identity and attempting to engulf him" (334). I read this process as operating in the opposite direction. First, I think that Hill implies that Stephen's creation is a conscious act of his will, but it seems more appropriate to interpret the recurrence of his dead mother as a demand from his identity to come to terms with who he is and how he was made. Rather than reading Stephen as seeing his mother as an extension of himself, I believe that his mother is part of his identity, a part with which he has not yet come to terms. Thus, Stephen's situation in the "Telemachia" is an ironic one because, as argued above, he has finally been presented with the opportunity to free himself from his familial environment. When his mother was alive, however, he never could accept her, or the world she represents, as part of his identity. The Stephen of *A Portrait* "kinetically" denies his mother's hold. Now that she is dead, he must begin the painful process of first recognizing her influence on his identity, then distancing himself from her influence.

This process begins ever so obliquely in "Telemachus." When Stephen is briefly left alone atop the tower, he remembers rooting through his mother's personal items after her death:

> *Her* secrets: old featherfans, tasselled dancecards, powdered with musk, a gaud of amber beads in *her* locked drawer. A birdcage hung in the sunny window of *her* house when *she* was a girl. *She* heard old Royce sing in the pantomime of *Turko the Terrible* and laughed with others when he sang:
>
> I am the boy

That can enjoy
Invisibility
(*U* 1.255-262, emphasis added on pronouns).

Notice the temporal, spatial and poetic distance Stephen sets between himself and his subject. Temporally, Stephen sets the scene before his birth, offering himself the "objective" distance he claims is so important in *A Portrait*. The time indicated by his characterization of "her" (notice that she is not once "mother" in this passage) precludes any spatial inclusion of Stephen in the scene: there can be no "we." Moreover, the poetic language of the passage, at turns rich and facile, creates the aesthetic distance that Stephen deems important. Nonetheless, the "phantasmal mirth" (*U* 1.263) dissolves for Stephen because he cannot sustain this distance; the poem fragment is obviously self-referential, as is the subsequent recitation of the line from Yeats's "Who Goes with Fergus?" (*U* 1.264).

This self-referential image initiates a sequence of memories which proceeds through a vision of his mother in her matronly function to Stephen's final vision of her, which will recur with increased intensity in "Circe," as his tormentor:

> In a dream, silently, she had come to him... Her glazing eyes staring out of death, to shake and bend my soul. *On me alone.* The ghostcandle to light her agony. Ghostly light on the tortured face. Her hoarse loud breath rattling in horror, while all prayed on their knees. Her eyes on me to strike me down...
>
> Ghoul! Chewer of corpses!
>
> No, mother! Let me be and let me live! (1.270, 273-275,278-279).

The aesthetic distance between Stephen and his vision has collapsed. Instead of being the young girl of the prior vision, with an at least partially independent existence, May Dedalus now becomes a ghost whose only purpose is to terrorize her son. Many critics have

interpreted the final two lines of this passage as spoken by Stephen; however, their horizontal rather than vertical spatial relationship seems to indicate that they represent a sort of imaginary dialogue between Stephen and his mother. Moreover there is no logical reason why Mrs. Dedalus would be characterized as a "[c]hewer of corpses." Rather it is Stephen who is being characterized as such, and the final line is his response to that identification. It is as if this image represents the darker side of the one Stephen describes in "Oxen of the Sun": "You have spoken of the past and its phantoms, Stephen said. Why think of them? If I call them into life across the waters of the Lethe will not the poor ghosts troop to my call? I... am lord and giver of their life" (14.1112-1116). This critical revision is important because it reverses a common interpretation of the relationship between Stephen and his mother's ghost: it is now Stephen that drags her back into the world. He haunts his mother rather than she him.

It must be stated here that this "ghostwoman with ashes on her breath" (3.46-47) is no more Stephen's mother than is Ivan Karamazov's devil the "real" Satan. Rather, she is a projection of a deeply rooted element of his own identity that he has not accepted: Stephen is "all in all" of what is in his imagination. In this sense, the ghost of May Dedalus is a synecdoche for her son's struggle to understand the self. She is an extremely complex and powerful symbol in which is conflated nation ("old sow who eats her farrow"), church and family, three of four principal defining factors of Stephen's identity. Finally, in the passage quoted above, she becomes the subject of the fourth: his art. Robert Kiely writes:

> The young artist's effort to rid himself of his mother's ghost is not merely a matter of repudiating her religion. What is more important is that the obsessive guilt, the flood of pity, the horror of Physical decay can enter uncontrollably into his mind, mocking his aesthetic detachment and his ability to manage

> his own imagination..."No, mother. Let me be and let me live" is the artist's agonized cry to let him get on with his work of creating new forms out of dead material, without regard for his own private emotions and inhibitions (52, 56).

Until Stephen can accomplish this task he will be powerless to create, though it involves more than his coming to terms with his mother's death. He must first come to terms with her life, her existence both apart from and inextricably intertwined with his. As Marylu Hill concludes: "The recognition that the mother has an identity in her own right accordingly places Stephen on the road toward an identity which, while admitting similarities to both mother and father, does not wholly rely on either for its verity" (341). This is the stance Stephen must take before the entire world of experience, the world of "what you damn well have to see" (*U* 9.86), which is at once other and essential to the formation of the self. His potential approach toward this stance is indicated in "Proteus." It is necessary, however first to briefly examine "Nestor," as it elucidates the more fluid, cultural influences upon Stephen's identity.

"Fabled by the daughters of memory."
(*Ulysses* 2.7)

If Buck Mulligan represents a vulgar portrait of Stephen's immediately possible self, then the Dalkey school-boys and Garret Deasy pervert his past and potential future manifestations. The chapter also introduces in the first meaningful manner the device which for Joyce connects all tenses of the self: memory. As was shown above, the memory could not, for Hume, be the force which connects present, past and future identities because it cannot call to consciousness the entire self at once. For Joyce, this demand is absurd since to be presently conscious of the entire self is to stop the development of the identity so that it can

be perceived. This view is discounted metaphorically in "Nausicaa," when Bloom refuses to define himself by leaving the sentence in the sand without an object. For Joyce the absence of "total recall" does not preclude a coherent self because the act of remembering is for him, as for Proust, a creative act as well. Joyce was fond of complaining that he had no imagination, but his memory was his imagination, and in the fusion of these two faculties rests one of the principal generators of personal identity.

In "Nestor" memory is introduced in a seemingly trite manner, as Stephen's students practice rote memorization of their lessons[17]. The concept quickly accumulates power in Stephen's mind, however. He transforms the Battle of Asculum, in a manner which mimics the movement of the entire book, into any battle, anywhere, and in the process introduces the concept of memory which expands beyond the personal. "*Another victory like that and we are done for*" is a "phrase the world had remembered." This concept is much more important in the context of the discussion of "Circe" and "Oxen of the Sun"; for now it is enough to note that Giordano Bruno's idea of a "world-soul", an idea which greatly resembles Yeats's *anima mundi*, is embedded early in the book.

Aside from the introduction of memory, there are two aspects of the "Nestor" episode that are important to the present study. The first of these is the manner in which Stephen interacts with his young pupil, Cyril Sargent. Initially, this encounter seems to indicate that Stephen has not progressed much since *A Portrait*. He is unable to muster much sympathy for Sargant until he conceives of the boy in his own image: "Like him was I, these sloping

---

[17] Perhaps a little ironically also, since they do not do it very well.

shoulders, this gracelessness. My childhood bends beside me" (2.168-169). But the difference here is that this identification with Sargant is brought on by the recognition of a force that lies outside of either of them; a force that in Joyce's maternal mythology is totally alien to both of them: *"Amor matris*: subjective and objective genitive" (2.164-165). This recognition is important because it indicates for perhaps the first time in Stephen an acknowledgement of an interconnectedness of individuals which does not solely rely on his identification of himself as a measuring stick for all others. The motivation for this identification comes from a force that is totally other, one over which he cannot possibly exercise control. This, in turn, shows a growing maturity in Stephen that many critics are unwilling to identify.

The second important element of the chapter for our purposes is, of course, Stephen's meeting with Garrett Deasy, the Headmaster of the Dalkey School. Mr. Deasy, like Buck Mulligan, presents Stephen with a possible manifestation of himself, though he is a much less obvious alternative than is Mulligan. Deasy assumes that Stephen is a Fenian (2.272) and his confident, insouciant introduction of the traditional Christian view of history (2.380), indicates that he believes Stephen to be a Roman Catholic. Deasy thus presents Stephen with the opportunity to debunk these views, which he has long ridiculed to himself and others; yet Stephen does so only obliquely, if at all. This illustrates both Stephen's growing awareness of the role which such things as nation and religion have had on the formation of his identity, and his residual discomfort with this awareness.

Aside from the obvious rejection of Catholicism and Fenianism which both men share, there is a more important and disturbing underlying similarity. Deasy's view of world history

("All human history moves toward one great goal, the manifestation of God" (2.380-381)) bears a striking resemblance to Stephen's drunken idea of personal history or development ("Damn that fellow's noise in the street.[18] Self which it itself was ineluctably preconditioned to become" (15.2119-2121)). Much more will be later said about Stephen's remarks, but it is enough for now to notice that there is an implication by identification here that the faith of both men is misleading. Whereas in *A Portrait* Stephen leaned too far in the direction of Sartre, identifying with the self that is in total command of its environment, he here appears to be identifying with Deasy's notion that the human in "human history" can be removed; so that the progression and development of both humankind in general and specific individuals proceeds without interference from human agency.

The partially endearing, self-satisfied posture of the older man is also reminiscent of the youthful, self-indulgent arrogance of the Stephen of *A Portrait*. This similarity is indicated through the pedantic, "Mulliganesque" aphorisms each uses to respond to his coadjutor. If as Suzette Henke has noted, "Deasy spouts meaningless aphorisms like an automaton declaring the content of its memory chamber" (47), so does Stephen. History may be for Deasy a march toward one great goal, but for Stephen it is "a nightmare from which [he is] trying to awake" (2.377). Both men are at this point manifestations of the "know-it-all" at differing stages of

---

[18] The two statements are further associated by this phrase, which of course echoes Stephen's response to Deasy's of God. Stephen claims, after hearing the boys playing hockey:

> --That is God.
>
> Hooray! Ay! Whrrwhee!
>
> --What? Mr Deasy asked.
>
> --A shout in the street, Stephen answered, shrugging his shoulders (2.383-386).

development. While Stephen's intellectual acumen is certainly more pronounced than the older man's, the latter represents one possible later incarnation of the former: "Is this old wisdom?" Stephen thinks as he speaks with Deasy (2.376).

The first two episodes of *Ulysses*, then, present Stephen Dedalus with *negative* possible manifestations of himself, and urge him to define himself against these characters. Mulligan and Deasy are much more complex characters in this regard than were Stephen's friends in *A Portrait* because they resemble him in surprising and, for Stephen, uncomfortable ways. Stephen still does not understand the manner in which personal identity is created, but he can no longer engage in a wholesale rejection of the forces which he simply *does not wish* to shape his identity; because he is beginning to recognize, through his identification with others, that they have already done so.[19] Finally, as if to add insult to injury, Joyce puts in the mouth of one of his most unlikely characters, as Shakespeare does with Polonius, one of the few true kernels of wisdom in the episode -- and for Stephen one of its most important lessons: "Who knows? [Mr Deasy] said. To learn one must be humble. But life is the great teacher" (2.406-407)[20].

---

[19] I say this even as I recognize that there are indications, in "Nestor," that Stephen retains the pose of *A Portrait*: "The same room and hour, the same wisdom: and I the same. Three times now. Three nooses round me here. Well? I can break them in this instant if I will" (2.233-235). But even this defiant passage shows signs of a growing awareness on Stephen's part. This passage takes place as a dialogue with himself, and the self-confidence of the rejoinder is undercut; as if Stephen were appealing to an already tired cliché in response to a question he cannot yet answer correctly.

[20] Stephen seems to take this lesson seriously. In "Wandering Rocks", as he wanders out of the Freeman's Journal office, he thinks to himself: "Dublin. I have much, much to learn" (7.915).

This pattern of using unlikely storehouses as repositories of wisdom indicates symbolically that Stephen must examine everything in life for his art. Instead of the communion with the ghostly shadows of *A Portrait*, Stephen must begin to seek out knowledge from that which is immediately accessible to him. Stephen gravitates toward this conclusion, though not directly, throughout *Ulysses*. In "Proteus", Stephen happens upon this path, not coincidentally, as he begins to put his own house in order.

"Looking for something lost in a past life."
***(Ulysses* 3.333)**

Obviously, the motif of transformation informs the third episode of *Ulysses*. One of the most important variants upon this theme, one with which Stephen is acutely concerned, is personal change. More specifically, the problem that "Proteus" makes apparent, as Elliott B. Gose Jr. has pointed out, is the more general problem of philosophical relativism[21]: "Despite the fine phrases which Bergson and Joyce employ to describe the changing states of the individual, the notion itself is potentially a threat. If all is change, what is dependable?" (xiii). As this statement makes clear, the true concern then is the same one that Stephen struggles with in *A Portrait*, and that was raised as a possible objection to both Hume's and Sartre's theories of identity: control. In other words, is there an organizing centre around which experiences, manifestations of character, vacillations of belief, etc. coalesce? If so, how much

---

[21] This problem is of course doubly underscored in the specific case of the artist, who must depend upon negative capability in order to create. The artist must therefore strike an even more precarious balance between coherence and disintegration of identity, because (s)he must not only have the power to experience, but also to judge the artistic value of that experience. As Stephen's direct address of himself in "Proteus" indicates, these are quite discrete capacities (see below).

control is this capacity, or "core identity", able to exercise upon these various states or modalities of being?

"Proteus," even if it does not answer all of these questions directly, it at least begins to tackle the some of the problems that they cause. The first and most important of these is the problem of coherence. At least one critic, J. Mitchell Morse, argues that the sea-god Proteus does not provide an apt example of a being who possesses a coherent identity. He argues:

> The essential thing about the ever-living Proteus is that he doesn't imitate fire, water, animals, etc., but is and by turns *manifests himself as* fire, water, animals, etc. He is all nature, potent, latent, through changing forms he manifests the rolling, heaving, neverchanging, everchanging all" (*Hart & Hayman* 29).

Proteus is thus according to Morse the consummate artist; the being that Stephen should correctly summon at this crucial stage in his artistic development. The problem with this reading is that Proteus is, I believe, ultimately at odds with the conception of the artist -- and of stable human identity -- that Joyce is trying to evoke. Proteus is too much a romantic symbol of the artist for Joyce to endorse wholeheartedly. The soul may indeed be in a manner all that is, "form of forms," but only *in a manner*. Joyce may have retained Aristotle's view that the soul, and thus the individual, is able to participate in all manners of experience, but if for no other reason than because of this capacity for multiplicity, the individual identity cannot *become* what he beholds, as Goldberg argues (73); since this implies the dissolution[22] of the force which generates the identification in the first place. Joyce all too easily recognized the

---

[22] Or, at least, it implies an extreme simplification of the soul. For an account of this view, see Theoharris Constance Theoharris's Joyce's Ulysses: An Anatomy of the Soul. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988. (ch.1).

inherent narcissism in this view of identity. Belief in the infinite capacity of the self to contain all experience ultimately leads to a negation of the need for real experience. This is the dangerous ground upon which Stephen walks in *A Portrait*, and which leads, as in the case of Shelley's "Alastor" poet, to a complete dissolution of the self.

This point is best illustrated in the "Proteus" episode when Stephen comically imagines a telephone line connecting humanity throughout history. Walking along Sandymount strand, Stephen sees two women whom he imagines are midwives, and begins to think of his own birth:

> Creation from nothing. What has she in the bag? A misbirth with a trailing navelcord, hushed in ruddy wool. The cords of all link back, strandentwining cable of all flesh. That is why mystic monks. *Will you be as gods?* Gaze in your *omphalos*. Hello! Kinch here. Put me on to Edenville. Aleph, alpha: nought, nought, one (3.35-40, emphasis added).

The emphasized passage in the above quotation is ironic; most obviously because gods do not have navels. Stephen is ridiculing precisely the type of artistic self-worship described above. There is however a more subtle irony at play here. As we know from *A Portrait*, the most important capacity in which individuals may resemble gods, for Joyce, is in their ability to create. The Judeo-Christian God does not need a navel, does not need to be connected to the world because He can create *ex nihilo*, out of Himself. The artist, on the other hand, must first experience in order to create, since the self can only reproduce or identify with that which it has encountered in the world without (Theoharris 6). The traditional, narcissistic connotation of the phrase "navel gazing" implies that the individual can use the same *creative process* as that of a god, and Stephen is surely poking fun at this myth. The appearance of the

first letters of the Hebrew and Greek alphabets at the beginning of God's "phone number" accentuate this fact in a more humorous manner, as it implies that one can bypass the people standing between oneself and God in order to learn His method of creation. The opposite is true.

As is always the case, though, Joyce's irony is double edged. The cable connecting all flesh is also a reminder of the intrinsic interconnectedness of humanity, which cannot be bypassed. In this sense, the image that Stephen conjures seems itself to nudge him gently in the correct direction. That he acknowledges this encouragement is implicit in another of the images he conceives, that of the changeling:

> Galleys of the Loclanns ran here to beach, in quest of prey, their bloodbeaked prows riding low on a molten pewter surf. Dane vikings, torcs of tomahawks on their breasts when Malachai wore the collar of Gold. A school of turtlehide whales stranded in hot noon, spouting, hobbling in the shadows. Then from the starving cagework city a horde of jerkined dwarfs, my people, with flayers' knives, running, scaling, hacking in green blubbery whalemeat. Famine, plague and slaughters. Their blood is in me, their lusts my waves. I moved among them on the frozen Liffey, *that I*, a changeling, among the spluttering resin fires. I spoke to no-one: none to me (3.300-309).

Stephen is here far from the rigidly self-defined character of *A Portrait*. He is beginning to realize the truth of the comment to which he paid lip-service in the former novel, that his race and country have produced him (*P* 203). He is awakening to the troublesome notion that there are influences upon his identity which are beyond his control. This is not to say, however, that either Joyce or Stephen is a social determinist, as Herr claims. Rather, the cultural and historical realities of the situation into which both are born create the spectrum of possible identities which they can assume for themselves. This is the "that I" of which Stephen speaks;

he walks among his ancestors like a ghost because he is already potentially present, created in and by the people who created his environmental reality. The image of the changeling maintains his feelings of alienation and displacement from this culture, but the important element is the recognition that he cannot escape it.

Another crucial element of this image is its source: the physical landscape. Stephen's attention to the tangible realities of his immediate surroundings offers an encouraging interpretation of his growing awareness of his relationship to the world. There is a sense in this passage that the ghosts of the past remain palpable inhabitors of the landscape of the present. Their existences become fused with the land in an apposite process to the one that made them individuals in the first place. Stephen's picture of them as inextricable from the world which they inhabit signals, at the very least to the reader, the relationship between that world and the formation of every individual, including the one that provides the image.

The multiplicity of forces at play in this view of the formation of personal identity makes the question of constancy ever more urgent. Stephen, finally able (or at least willing) to risk the flux of experience in a true sense, risks the opposite danger to the one of rigidity found in *A Portrait*; he risks the dissolution of his identity. In fact, it must be granted that a great deal of the episode's force is derived from an exploration that attempts to determine whether an holistic personal identity exists to be dissolved. When Stephen thinks, at the beginning of the episode, "[s]ignatures of all things I am here to read" (3.2), he is trying to locate in the flux of experience a modicum of stability. What quickly becomes apparent about

his musings is that the theories of apprehension which he ponders[23] involve speculation not only about the mutability of experience, but also about the active role of the subject in the basic perceiving subject-perceived object relationship.

The most informing of these theories is Aristotle's. To paraphrase his thoughts in *De Anima*, Aristotle sees apprehension as a process whereby the perceiver is mutated by the object perceived. Briefly, the soul of the observer contains within it the capacity to apprehend all experience; when perception occurs, the subject and object become one and the subject takes away from the experience an actualization of what was already within. T.C. Theoharris explains:

> Sensation, as Aristotle defines it, is an activity in which the sensing body is acted upon by a motion that alters it. The sense organs have the potential to receive impressions, but that potential can only be actualized by an object outside the soul... Before sensation the sense organ and its object are unlike each other. During sensation they have an identical form... sense and the sensible, the soul and an object external to it, unite in an act of sensation (4-5).

The objects perceived are then stored in the imagination, to be presented to the "rational soul, where the process of a living creature's identification with other existing things is perfected in the soul's highest function - thought" (6). Leaving aside for the moment the objection to this view of the soul, as *tabula rasa*, stated above, we can see that in this theory that the only course of development for a human being is to open oneself up to perception; since the soul cannot produce sensation in isolation (Theoharris 4) and sensation is the pure form of experience. Stephen is beginning to recognize truly what he declared aphoristically at the end

---

[23] Chiefly Aristotle's *De Anima* and Berkeley's *Theory of Vision*.

of *A Portrait*: that he needs to encounter experience over and over in order to render it sensible to his creative faculties.

If Aristotle offers Stephen human participation in how he perceives, Bishop Berkeley extends this to human participation in creating the perspective from which he sees. Stephen "paraphrases" his thoughts on vision in the following way: "The good bishop of Cloyne took the veil of the temple out of his shovel hat... Flat I see, then think distance, near, far, flat I see, east, back" (3.416, 418-419). Berkeley argues that the eye sees everything in a two dimensional perspective (flat) and that the brain "thinks" the spatial relationship between the objects in any field of vision. Metaphorically, this theory links with Aristotle's insofar as the subject perceives (or creates) relationships between objects, whether it be immediately during perception or after they are stored in the imagination. Irrespective of the specific example, Joyce's point is clear: the individual, once open to experience, actively participates in it to the extent that both he and the objects of his perception are transformed and/or reprojected. The complexity of the problem of constancy under all of this change is now apparent.

It is not surprising that Stephen's search for this element of constancy in himself proceeds concurrently with his discovery of the depth of mutability inherent in the world of perception. The point of the episode is that the self must retain its essential individuating substance at the same time that it exists in the turbulence of change, and develops itself. In fact, Stephen discovers this constancy paradoxically, when he apparently cleaves off several of his past "selves" for examination. As is stated above, the comparison, contrast and judgement involved in all experience -- including retrospective experience of oneself -- necessarily

presupposes an identity which both participates in those experiences (in order to know and remember them) and stands apart from them (in order to rearrange and judge them).

Stephen's memories are immediately arresting because of the manner in which he addresses himself in his former manifestations: in the second person. In the first of these, he recalls previous searches for "beauty", after concluding his imaginary dialogue with his uncle's family:

> Houses of decay, mine, his, and all. You told the Clongowes gentry you had an uncle a judge and an uncle in the army. Come out of them, Stephen. Beauty is not there. Nor in the stagnant bay of Marsh's library where you read the fading prophecies of Joachim Abbas. For whom? (3.105-109).

It might be stated that this passage simply indicates Stephen is beginning to learn from his past experiences and mistakes (which is in itself an uncommon feat for him), but much more is at play here. Stephen has formerly dissociated himself from his past, as he did each time he transformed himself in *A Portrait*. The difference is that Stephen is here retaining his overarching identity, as an artist, even as he ridicules past manners in which he attempted to assert that identity. The actual definition (as artist) is relatively unimportant in the context of this discussion; the point is that he has assembled for himself an identity onto which he can hold. More important, it is an elastic identity insofar as its properties and characteristics change while it remains essentially and substantially the same: it is allotropic[24].

This interpretation is further substantiated in the important passage where Stephen ridicules his cataloguing of "epiphanies written on green oval leaves, deeply deep, copies to be

---

[24] This is John Paul Riquelme's precise term, which according to the *Oxford English Dictionary* means a "variation of physical properties without a change in substance."

sent if you died to all the great libraries of the world, including Alexandria" (3.141-143). This passage is a crucial one for several reasons. First, the rejection of the epiphany as a foundational means of expression indicates a concurrent desire on the part of Stephen (and, I believe, Joyce[25]) to document in a more scrupulous and realistic manner the process of self-actualization. Already in the last story of *Dubliners*, "The Dead," Joyce is moving away from the sudden, intense moment of self-realization of the earlier stories in favour of a more extended treatment of the forces that create the moment itself. The result is a descriptive movement that is, somewhat paradoxically, both more detailed and evocative. Marilyn French has characterized this shift aptly: "Joyce's realism [in *Ulysses*] is uncompromising: life is like that: the small choices we make define us almost without our awareness, so that the large ones are made before we reach them" (81).

Stephen's endeavour to reach backward and "observe" or judge the forces that have created him is indicative of this process, and at cross purposes to the notion of epiphany, which underlines exclusively the intensity of the present moment itself. Critics from S.L. Goldberg through James Maddox and Suzette Henke have steadfastly retained the importance of the epiphany in *Ulysses*[26], but if their position is examined more closely, it often becomes

---

[25] This observation may in fact be more applicable in this instance to author than protagonist. If we are to take for granted that Stephen is at least a fictional analogue for Joyce, he has yet to write the stories of *Dubliners*, the work of Joyce's in which the "epiphany" features most prominently.

[26] Though a full treatment of this subject is impossible here, it seems to me as if this group (to which can be added, Helene Cixous, a particular exemplar) tend to lend too much credence to the "self-definitive" aspects of Stephen and his quest for self-knowledge. Since each epiphany changes the subject,[t]he development of the soul is thus the sequence of epiphanies that it discovers" (Goldberg 74). Thus, self-knowledge is of the utmost importance. Though

apparent that what they are calling an "epiphany" is much closer to common perception than the naive theory of objectification propounded by the Stephen Dedalus of *Stephen Hero*. Rather, Joyce implies that the *quidditas* of most objects of perception are much more mundane than the term epiphany would suggest. Stephen's ridicule of the concept is based on this fact; epiphanic moments make personal transformation, and the act of describing it, too simple. Instead of relying on the future occurrence of such a quasi-religious moment as the vision of the bird-girl in *A Portrait* for assurance of his identity, Stephen must now submit himself to the world of flux and uncertainty in order to discover it. That this world extends backward to reveal the past manifestations of the self lays bare the extent to which the idea of a consistent self is imperiled by experience. Yet, the fact that there is a current manifestation of that identity to direct the extension and judge the resulting findings is a strong testimony to the endurance of the individual self.

When Stephen mocks epiphanies, he is once more mocking a past manifestation of his identity at the same time as he retains its essence; again the inherently allotropic nature of the self is exhibited. Thus, it is a comic event when, near the end of the episode he "pins down" Proteus ("Put a pin in that chap, will you?" 3.399). Stephen is here really pinning down himself, in a less than magisterial reaffirmation of his identity as an artist; that his poem leaves much to be desired is indicative of his continuing struggle to fully assume this identity. The

---

this is certainly not the case for Goldberg, when some of these critics discover that the extreme self-consciousness of Stephen is not to be found in Bloom, they are often left in the uncomfortable position of arguing, explicitly or implicitly, that either Stephen is the hero of the book, or it has no hero at all.

act becomes a synecdoche for the battle to ascertain solidity or dependability under flux: he must search in the world without for fulfilment of the self within.

I do not, however, want to promote an overly optimistic reading of Stephen in "Proteus." It is indeed questionable whether his most significant acts of understanding appear so to him. There is moreover much in the chapter to substantiate the claims of critics who see Stephen as the same self-satisfied prig of *A Portrait*[27]; but I think these to be excessively harsh readings. It is true that the poem he writes is ultimately a failure as a work of art, but even the reason for it's failure is an important lesson for Stephen. It fails largely because its author attempts to speak convincingly in a female voice; it is an act of negative capability that he cannot presently perform. Contained in this minor set-back, however, is an indication of the avenue to eventual success. As Thomas Petruso argues: "Joyce seems to imply that Stephen needs something that can only come from outside, from being taken out of himself, as in a love relationship" (48). Stephen also seems to be arriving at a vague awareness of this fact: "Touch me. Soft eyes. Soft soft soft hand. I am lonely here. O, touch me soon, now. What is the word known to all men?" (3.434-435). Again his inexperience in such matters is indicated in the puerile language he uses to express himself. It is as if the emotive element of his identity has been left uneducated by the erudition of his intellect.

"A hesitating soul takes arms against a sea of troubles" (*Ulysses* 9.3-4)

The "Proteus" episode is as much a watershed as Joyce's mature method of characterization will allow. The elements of Stephen's existential dilemma coalesce to the

---

[27] See especially 3.452: "As I am. As I am. All or not at all."

point where his position, problem and its possible solutions become apparent, at least to the reader. The episode is pregnant with the substance of the "not self" that Stephen must experience, the world that is [t]here all the time without you: and ever shall be" (3.28). However, it is not until the "Scylla and Charybdis" episode that Stephen begins to put these elements together. He has been forced, in the "Telemachia," to define himself negatively and positively, against Mulligan and Deasy and for himself, in terms of his historical and cultural reality. In "Scylla" he affirms most explicitly the continuity of that self.

When considering the money he owes to AE, with whom he is presently arguing his "Shakespeare theory", Stephen whimsically considers the possibility that physical science has absolved him of his debt: "Five months. Molecules all change. I am other I now. Other I got pound" (9.205-206). But he quickly reconsiders this idea and reverses it:

> But I, entelechy, form of forms, am I by memory because under everchanging forms.
> I that sinned and prayed and fasted.
> A child Conmee saved from pandies.
> I, I and I. I.
> A.E.I.O.U. (9.208-213).

That Stephen's thought ends in a joke should not be taken as an emasculation of the argument's power[28]. Stephen realizes clearly that his memory (*pace* Hume) unifies his identity as he surveys past actions and recognizes his responsibility for those actions. The "I, I and I. I" is almost arithmetical in its notation, indicating that there is a constant strain which identifies all manifestations with the present. Since his soul, the "form of forms," remains

---

[28] If anything, it shows Stephen gravitating toward the "jocoserious" manner of Joyce's mature writing.

ever present under differing perceptions of objects with which he identifies, he is a constant entity. Once again, Theoharris explains the process:

> Philosophy gets the better of biology in this game, as Stephen admits that his soul, the form of all forms that his physical and mental existence might take, remains constant throughout all such changes. The evidence of this constant identity is memory, the soul's power to recognize and retain permanent actuality, the entelechy by which an individual life acquires and assimilates constantly various new physical and mental existences (24).

The soul thus appears, contrary to another of Theoharris's claims (6), to have an inherent essence of its own, which underlies all identifications with exterior objects of perception. This may not be true for Aristotle, but it is for Joyce. If it were not the case the individual would be at the mercy of experience, unable to transform it though the prism of his own identity. Possibility comes into play at this point, when it is recognized that the self offers not so much an autocratic method of interpreting experience (which we have seen is Stephen's weakness in *A Portrait*); rather as it becomes more defined through prior judgements, it operates as a range which sets the outer limits of *possible* interpretations for future experience. This is the true meaning of French's statement (see above 25); the soul forms its consistency through repeated encounters with experience so that future judgements become natural outgrowths of previous ones: "the self which it itself was ineluctably preconditioned to become." To use an appropriate analogy from theology, though the self may grow substantially, it remains in essence the same.

Obviously, this consistency points to acceptance of a wide range of experience, especially for the artist, as an imperative. If he is to avoid the pitfalls of a narrowly defined identity, and thus a small range of possible interpretations of experience, he must allow the

self to grow through an engagement with differing elements of its environment, and not become submerged in one. In this way, the affirmation of a consistent self leads naturally to Stephen's biographical argument concerning Shakespeare, which displays a marked increase in skill over his diatribes in *A Portrait*. In contrast to his peripatetic musings in the former novel, Stephen is surrounded by "experts" in the National Library in "Scylla and Charybdis." The recitation of his eagerly anticipated "Shakespeare theory" forms the substance of the episode, and is perhaps his brightest moment in the book, because it displays an accretion of ideas that together make up his most encouraging intellectual and artistic leap forward. Stephen's basic argument begins as a polemic against those who would identify Shakespeare with Prince Hamlet. He argues that the playwright is better associated with King Hamlet's ghost, and Stephen supplies some dubious though interesting biographical evidence to prove his point. The theory, however, becomes more important as it is extended into an elaborate argument that a wide scope of experience is necessary if the artist is to create. This argument holds many important and complex ramifications for the character development of Stephen Dedalus.

The first of these ramifications is perhaps the most obvious. Stephen's argument that the artist is "all in all" is in a sense a manifesto arguing for the embrace of all experience and a demand that he effect an escape from selfhood: "A man of genius makes no mistakes. His errors are volitional and are the portals of discovery" (9.228-229). It must be understood that if these errors are to be considered volitional, it is only retrospectively so. Stephen's theory of artistic production goes beyond mimesis toward reprojection. Once experience has been assimilated into the identity of the artist, he can then look backward "in a sort of retrospective

arrangement" (as Stephen has begun to do in "Proteus") and express his experience in different light. The possible forms that may be taken by these reprojections are in turn regulated by the identity which has been given shape by such encounters.

The second ramification has to do with a more general orientation toward the world of experience. Implicit in the episode is not only the solution to *what* Stephen must do, but also *how* he must do it. Before the theory is even voiced to the reader, its relevance is denied by George Russell and John Eglinton. Russell argues:

> --All these questions are purely academic, Russell oracled out of his shadow. I mean, whether Hamlet is Shakespeare or James I or Essex. Clergymen's discussion of the historicity of Jesus. Art has to reveal to us ideas, formless spiritual essences... All the rest is the speculation of schoolboys for schoolboys (9.46-49, 53).

Stephen, who has in the past been given to such reification, counters the argument silently by mocking it: "This verily is that. I am the fire upon the altar. I am the sacrificial butter" (9.63-64). AE's Platonic theory of art and more generally, perception, is representative at its base. More specifically, AE is arguing for an artistic vision based on the Platonic dichotomy between forms and particulars, that the objects of physical perception are particularized versions of an ideal form that exists beyond this world. Following this line, AE is vocalizing the popular belief of the mystic circle in turn of the century Dublin that any object, intensely regarded, can give access to the world of forms. This view is *anathema* to Stephen because it severs the artist from the world of experience, freeing him to "interpret" that world without any grounding in fact.

Stephen counters this view explicitly by bringing Aristotle into the debate, stating somewhat obliquely that the philosopher "would find Hamlet's musings about the afterlife of

his princely soul... as shallow as Plato's" (9.76-78). The point Stephen is making is that the soul for Aristotle is not a transcendent, immortal substance, but an animator of the body and intellect in life.[29] It follows then that the soul thus defined presupposes a fully enclosed, self-sufficient world that discloses to the careful observer all that can be known; the world does not operate as a massive system of symbols whose "true" meaning is imposed from without. If there is "meaning" in the physical objects of the world, it either exists inherently in those objects or is created by the perceiver. Again the imperative is toward the acceptance of external experience as the fullest, most sincere method of living.

Though these observations illustrate the changes Stephen must make in order to realize his artistic identity, Joyce appears to argue that simple "acceptance" of experience is not enough. This is the "how" element of the question. The Shakespeare of Stephen's theory craves new experience and wrests from himself that experience in order to reproject it in art, and thus better understand both it and himself. Joyce implies that the activating factor of this desire is intellectual quicksand: love. Richard Ellmann[30], as well as many others, have argued that Joyce was reluctant to use the word because he understood all too well how quickly it degenerates into meaninglessness. Critics seem to have either followed the author's lead[31], or

---

[29] See Theoharris: "Aristotle's soul is not a permanent religious entity bestowed on human beings by God... [it is] the organizing form of organic nature" (10).

[30] See Ellmann's introduction to the Gabler *Ulysses:* xii.

[31] See French's use of the Latin word *caritas*, the meaning of which is extremely similar to the Thomistic definition of love as defined by Stephen in "Scylla."

proven his point[32]. For Joyce, love invigorates life with a passion that demands the transcendence of selfhood, as is apparent in Stephen's mental quotation of Saint Thomas Aquinas[33]: "Do you know what you are talking about? Love, yes. Word known to all men. *Amor vero aliquid alicui bonum vult unde et ea quae concupiscimus...*" (9.429-431, author's ellipsis). This quotation from St. Thomas's definition of true versus self-love indicates the manner in which Stephen must conduct his turn toward experience. It indicates a severance from selfhood in the sense that one not only desires but wills (*vero*) good for another person. Self-love is a desire for possession of something that is not already part of the self. It is an important distinction because it illustrates that self-love need not only be conventional vanity, but it also includes a turn outward for the sole reason of possession, which is precisely the mistake Stephen has been making to this point.

Stephen's discussion of Shakespeare makes clear that for him the bard never consciously understood this lesson but refracted it through his art, and remained "untaught by the wisdom he has written or by the laws he has revealed" (9.477-478). Stephen clearly intends to learn from what Shakespeare could not. It is however apparent that Stephen needs to do more than theorize about love; he must experience it. Perhaps the most encouraging element of the episode is that he realizes this as well. Though his biographical speculation about Shakespeare contains a vast amount of pain and torment for the poet, Stephen can still

---

[32] See Cixous, Helene. The Exile of James Joyce.

[33] I realize that the inclusion of this passage in the Gabler edition is the source of much controversy. My interest in it is not however on the answer to the question "What is the word known to all men?" which should regardless be obvious to any sensitive reader of the book. My focus is on the actual definition that Stephen presents.

ask eagerly, in a less languid tone than in "Proteus": And my turn? When? Come! (9.261-262). Stephen's acknowledged helplessness to effect this task for himself, and his sincere loneliness are paradoxically concrete indicators of his potential to mature. This evocation of potential or possibility, as Joyce surely realized, is a much more powerful and difficult image to conjure than conclusive proof of Stephen's imminent greatness as an artist. Like Shakespeare, Stephen is ignorantly creating the book of himself, through which he is currently walking, but which he has yet to write.

Before turning our attention to the first figure of *Ulysses*, we can conclude the following from the previous discussion of Stephen. Stephen Dedalus is in the process of learning what Leopold Bloom seldom questions: the self is a consistent entity which cannot dream away the experience that shapes it. If one turns away from that experience, the only alternative is the satanic version of selfhood, or solipsism. The world becomes increasingly an extension of the self until the identity loses all substance. This outcome is avoided by an invigoration of the self, created by what is best described as the Thomistic notion of love (or French's *caritas*) which demands the acceptance of experience on the basis of the desire for self transcendence. This transcendence involves a purely secular *ek stasis* whereby the world is perceived by the individual as a self contained organism, which retains its mystery. Thus the environment is circumscribed and is the only exit from selfhood, supplanting the quasi-religious ideal world of mysticism, or the religious "next" world of Christianity. The tension between individual and environment created by this realization properly ends in a desire not to possess but to experience fully that environment.

The manner in which identity and the environment interact, moreover, is according to Joyce extremely complex. The self operates not so much as an interpreter or translator of experience as much as its director: a prism through which its possible interpretations are refracted. In turn, a variegated range of experience pushes the limits of the self as it stretches the individual's capacity to judge the *quidditas* of any given perception. As judgements accumulate, the self takes shape so that responsibility for past action becomes dependability in future action, so that at any given moment "that which I was is that which I am and that which in possibility I may come to be" (9.382-383). Though possibilities, of action as well as of being, may appear to become increasingly circumscribed through time, the individual can keep the range open through a correspondingly expanded range of experience.

Stephen is beginning to understand these lessons. Though he will again neglect them in "Oxen of the Sun," "Circe" and apparently most of his off-stage activities throughout the day, Joyce is pointing to a model of individual development which takes verity rather than didacticism as its highest goal. When Joyce wrote during the composition of *Ulysses* that Stephen "has a shape that cannot be changed," he did not mean, as so many critics aver, that he was trapped forever in the selfhood that was his fate in *A Portrait*. Rather, Joyce was indicating that Stephen could not be believably or realistically transformed -- quite literally in this case -- overnight. Since this option was closed by his own convictions concerning realism, Joyce turned instead to an ideology of character -- to use Derrick Attridge's phrase in a different sense than he meant it -- that is satisfied by the existence of potential and possibility. Like the God he grew up with, Joyce endows his creatures with free will.

Finally, by painting such a complex picture of personal identity, Joyce avoids the

teleological pratfalls of both Sartre and Hume. As for the latter, Joyce would probably agree that Hume "could no longer reason with him," but this would be no insult to the author. The logical extensions which Hume employs to conclude his argument create a sense of false closure that would be *anathema* to the very core of Joyce's slippery conception of the self. For him, concrete, "dagger definitions", for all their polemical advantages, can be equated with stagnancy, as they fail to include the most invigorating and animating aspects of the human condition. Their circumscribed nature necessarily precludes such inclusion.

The relationship between the theories of Joyce and Jean-Paul Sartre is a much trickier one, as they seem to have much more in common. Sartre also created a picture of the individual whereby he must claim ultimate responsibility for his actions. In order to do so, the philosopher insisted upon a more imperial, autocratic notion of the self than did Joyce. Joyce in fact seems to warn against such a notion of the self: Sartre's existentialist hero resembles much more closely the Stephen of *A Portrait* than he does Bloom. Moreover, his notion of the self being constantly and *wilfully* defined against others appears to exclude the genuine communion between individuals that Joyce insists, through Molly and Leopold Bloom's memories, must exist.

Chapter II -- Leopold Bloom.

"Is he a jew or a gentile or a holy Roman or a swaddler or what the hell is he?"
(*Ulysses* 12.1631-1632)

We noted in the previous chapter that the basis of Joyce's notion of personal identity can be surmised negatively by observing Stephen Dedalus. Leopold Bloom figures as the young man's positive reflection, "reduced" to the status of a common man. In place of Stephen's theorising about artistic apprehension, gestation and expression, we are presented with Leopold Bloom's modest but intelligent observations of the world around him. Contrary to Stephen, who is trying to formulate a conceptual framework through which he can interpret the world, Bloom freelances his way to an immediate engagement with it. This important distinction is implied during the reader's first encounter of Bloom, as the narrator describes his idiosyncratic eating habits:

> Mr Leopold Bloom ate with relish the inner organs of beasts and fowls. He liked thick giblet soup, nutty gizzards, a stuffed roast heart, liverslices fried with crustcrumbs, fried hencods roes'. Most of all he liked grilled mutton kidneys which gave to his palate a fine tang of faintly scented urine (4.1-5).

These creatures of the Earth represent Bloom's attraction to and fascination with the corporeal world. The theme of consumption which structures this introduction to the modern Odysseus further indicates his willingness to take within himself all details of experience. Whereas Stephen was led inside his own mind by external stimulation as he surveyed the landscape from the Martello tower, Bloom is drawn outside -- both physically and metaphysically -- by the "gentle summer morning everywhere" (4.8). Bloom's orientation is outward.

This is not, however, to say that Bloom's faculty of judgement is arrested or suspended by sensation; he is not a human analogue of Pavlov's dog. Though his stream of consciousness "follows the lines of reality very closely" (*Exile* 683), Bloom almost exclusively attempts to discover the underlying reason for his attraction to stimuli: "Cup of tea soon. Good. Mouth dry" (4.14); "More interesting if you understood what it was all about" (5.423-424). The turn outward is further indicated when he makes a humorous attempt at negative capability, as he tries to put himself in the position of the house cat. He observes the cat "curiously" and "kindly" in an indication of his openness toward and acceptance of experience. Bloom tries to understand the nature (or signature) of the cat when he muses upon her temperament (4.21-23). He is again attempting to understand the other, the "not-self" and consequently arrives at a speculation concerning himself, through the medium of the cat.

The substance of his thoughts may pale in comparison to the depth of Stephen's deliberations, but the primary emphasis is here on structure: form is given precedence over content. Bloom does not consciously think through his method of observation; it is for him a natural process. It is not created *ex nihilo* and then actively implemented; rather it is discovered through constant application or exercise. This method may lead more often to "Bloomisms" (to use Richard Ellmann's term) than "deeply deep" thoughts, but the selflessness implied by such a posture toward experience is precisely what Stephen lacks. It's inclusion in Bloom's character points to the fact that Joyce is attempting to deal with a problem which far surpasses the activation of Stephen's creative capacities. He is implying that if the individual fails engage himself with his environment, and allow that environment to influence his personal development, than he cannot possibly arrive at even the most elemental

understanding of either. Stephen's repeated attempts to intellectualize experience place him at a remove from direct encounter with the life which, as he explains in "Scylla and Charybdis," is the artist's only viable material for his art. Robert Kiely implies that Bloom's act of wiping himself with the "Tidbits" story at the end of "Calypso" is in effect a corrective: to both the phoniness of the story and Stephen's severely cerebral impulses. Kiely writes: "Beaufoy's shit-smeared story... is the unmistakable emblem of fiction being rubbed in the stuff of human nature" (196). Joyce, of course, endorses this statement metafictionally by including Bloom's defecation in *Ulysses* in the first place[34].

In one sense, however, Stephen's insularity is ironically encouraging. If he is afraid to experience the world without, it must be because he recognizes that such experience holds the capacity to change him. Since, as we saw in the above discussion of the "Proteus" episode, he is only beginning to submit himself to the world of flux, Stephen's faith that he will retain a constant identity is still in its embryonic stage of development. The young artist works so relentlessly to formulate a self-conception so that he can circumvent the natural process of becoming. As Philip Weinstein has astutely noted, Stephen "takes the cycle of becoming as a continuous insult" (263). That Bloom is without such a fear is doubly impressive since he is a much more versatile character than Stephen -- Joyce's interest in creating an "allround man" is well known. The central problem created by the author's desire for flexibility of character is that he must maintain the impression that Bloom is an individual in a realistic, holistic sense.

---

[34] That Bloom is totally oblivious to the symbolic meaning of this act is both characteristic of Joyce's method and crucial to its success, as will become apparent presently.

At least one critic, James Maddox, has pointed out that Bloom much resembles "Mercurial Malachai," Buck Mulligan, in his equivocative thought processes (41). As we have seen in the first chapter of this paper, Mulligan's devotion to role playing places in doubt the existence of a coherent self, other than a sort of Humean amalgam of past experience. The crucial difference between him and Bloom in this respect is that Mulligan plays the role for the sake of the role, whereas Bloom samples the differing, sometimes opposite elements of his environment by internalizing them; all the while he retains a sense of judgement (and thus self[35]) which is kept noticeably separate from the experience itself. In the Aristotelian terms upon which Stephen deliberates in "Proteus," Bloom is able to become "in a manner all that is," without completely compromising the integrity and consistency of his identity.

Some critics claim that this is precisely the posture that he fails to effect throughout the book; this of course renders any discussion of the "individual" who is Leopold Bloom ultimately futile, beside the point. Cheryl Herr goes so far as to celebrate this aspect of Bloom as one of Joyce's particularly perspicacious insights into the human condition. Herr argues:

> Throughout *Ulysses* we are never in touch with a stable character named Bloom but are given access to the cultural codings that change, sentence by sentence, thought by thought. The variety that is called "Bloom" is already a fissured discursive entity by the end of "Calypso" (155).

Hume finds a strange philosophical bed-fellow in Herr, who further argues that any discernible personal identity is wholly formed by socialization or, as she terms it, "subjectification" of individuals[36]. For Herr, the only depiction of an holistic self in *Ulysses* is the infantile

---

[35] See Chapter I, pg:

[36] See Herr 161: "Certainly Joyce works hard in *Ulysses* and *Finnegan's Wake* to undermine the notion that any character is a holistic self rather than a complex of cultural

"babby-face" of "Circe", who represents an elementary, insubstantial identity. Such an interpretation leaves Bloom completely, and I believe mistakenly, at the mercy of his environment.

Critics who have a particular bent for disparaging Bloom point to the "Lotus Eaters" episode as an example of Bloom's submission to his environment and subsequent loss of self. These critics argue that though he effectively, and quite humorously, critiques the most popular opiate in Dublin, the Church, he nonetheless falls for escapisms of a more personalized variety. These "drugs" include his sexually suggestive correspondence with Martha Clifford, his masturbatory thoughts (5.503-504), and, most often cited, his submersion in the bath as a type of Freudian longing for a return to the womb. If this last example is examined more closely, however, it reveals an opposite impulse; an impulse toward wilful acceptance of and openness toward experience. The passage is as follows:

> *He foresaw* his pale body in at full, naked, in a womb of warmth, oiled by scented melting soap, softly laved. He saw his trunk and limbs riprippled over and sustained, buoyed lightly upward, lemonyellow: his navel, bud of flesh: and saw the dark tangled hair of his bush floating, floating hair of the stream around the limp father of thousands, a languid floating flower (5.567-571, emphasis added).

The first aspect of note about this passage is that Bloom is not actually in the bath but only imagining himself to be. In this sense, it is casting forward of Bloom's will that sees him submerged in the water; he is in control of the image. At the same time, however, Bloom achieves a level of separation from the image that is, for instance, as of yet impossible for

---

codes..."

Stephen. Instead of shrinking from the completed picture, as Stephen does in the Cork classroom in *A Portrait*, Bloom revels in it.

The obvious objection to this interpretation is that though the passage does exemplify an exercise of Bloom's will, the specific act of will bends toward personal isolationism. This objection does not bear close textual scrutiny well. The verbs in the passage describing the action of his body (reclined, sustained, buoyed, floating), all imply a dependence upon his environment for support and definition. Moreover, the predominance of the past tense - in a future vision - indicates an element of desired and expected passivity. S.L. Goldberg sees Bloom's passivity in these terms:

> The physical and psychological relaxation, the temporary submergence, is less a moral evasion than a contemplative receptivity to *being*; Bloom's "wise passiveness" at the end, complementing his moral engagement with "the stream of life", seems to define the sense in which the lotus may be earned and eaten (125).

In other words, Bloom is not escaping his environment but awaiting its influence with a heightened sense of expectation.

Finally, and most important, the passage presents a latent possibility or potentiality, even in a moment when despair could be excused. Bloom has of course just discovered Blazes Boylan's letter to Molly, and correctly interpreted it as a presage of the imminent consummation of their affair. In this context, a certain amount of self-indulgent insularity on the part of Bloom can be expected. The contradictory image of a "limp father of thousands"[37]

---

[37] The image also interestingly parallels Stephen's description of Shakespeare in "Scylla and Charybdis" as a man who fathered his race but could not teach himself the lessons of his own wisdom (9.476-477, 9.866-868).

undercuts Bloom's despair, however. It is not until "Circe" that we are explicitly told of the complexity of Bloom's role in his wife's adultery, but this image forebodes that acceptance of partial responsibility. The limpness of Bloom's genitalia is a muted implication of his failure as a spouse, but the potential reclamation of his sexual role as a husband is also inherent to the image. In other words, Bloom is not trapped in an ineluctable position of powerlessness. The way out of this position is illustrated concurrently with the description of its cause.

One question raised by the above argument is whether Bloom recognizes his position, and potential escape from it. In the "Sirens" episode, he acknowledges the possibility of having another child with Molly, but in this passage it is deliberately unclear whether Bloom is describing himself or he is "sharing" an image with the narrator, which the later proceeds to describe. I prefer to think of it as a combination of both: Bloom's consciousness, in a process which Helene Cixous calls "osmosis" (*Exile* 701), and the narrator's (narrative's?) interpenetrate, and the image is the resulting accretion. It is noted above that the narrative of *Ulysses* serves as a sort of mimicked universe in which the characters exist; if this is true, then the commingling of narrative and character holds two very important implications for the present discussion. First, that the narrative itself is somehow "alive" or animated, and, second, that the process of narrative-character interpenetration can be taken to represent Joyce's transposed version of the Aristotelian fusion of soul and object. This is an aspect of *Ulysses* about which much is said in third chapter of this paper; for the present it is sufficient

to note that the process itself occurs long before the "Circe" episode, where Cixous describes it as dominant.[38]

"Let her speak. Look straight in her eyes. I believe you. Trust me."
(*Ulysses* 8.250)

Like the cloud that affects the moods and thoughts of Stephen and Bloom in "Telemachus" and "Calypso" respectively, in "Lestrygonians," Bloom's hunger makes him more acutely susceptible to the influence of basic -- or base -- impulses. One would then expect Bloom's stream of consciousness and actions to reflect a more simple stimulus-response pattern of motivation. Instead, the episode turns out to be one of the most startling displays of Bloom's natural, widely speculative and observational intelligence in all of *Ulysses*. Bloom accomplishes this feat by first acknowledging the cause of his craving's urgency; in doing so he makes it possible for himself to deliberate more freely upon his immediate environment. Again, Bloom, unlike Stephen, makes the effort to understand the effects of inescapable influences.

The effects of hunger upon Bloom are most fluidly expressed by four of the most carefully crafted sentences in the book. The passage mingles the imagery of sex and consumption to describe the influence of both on Bloom: "A warm human plumpness settled down on his brain. His brain yielded. Perfume of embraces all him assailed. With hungered flesh obscurely, he mutely craved to adore" (8.637-639). Bloom, as if the narrator were helping him to get his thoughts in order, comically responds that he: "Must eat... Feel better

---

[38] See also Cixous's flamboyant interpretation in: "At Circe's, or the Self-Opener." *Boundary*. Winter 1975. (3) 2: 387-397.

then" (8.641). His hunger does not, however, cause him to eat at the first restaurant he sees; rather he walks into the Burton, feels alienated by the paleolithically sensual eating habits of the diners there and continues his search. The point here is obvious, but carries more importance than its simplicity seems to permit.

Though he is extremely flexible in admitting influences upon his character, Bloom is also decisive in rejecting that which he judges unfavourable, or inapplicable to his self-conception. The "pallid suetfaced" men in the Burton lie firmly outside this conception: "Am I like that?" he asks as he surveys the dining room (8.662). The diners are slaves to their appetites in a manner in which Bloom is not; they wolf down their food mechanically and methodically, as if they were self contained organisms imbibing fuel: "stoking an engine" (8.930). Bloom's attitude toward his hunger is the same as his attitude toward all necessary influences upon his behaviour: if it must be done, it must be understood and then transformed imaginatively into something that can be enjoyed.

A more subtle and interesting manifestation of the influence of physical, ineluctable influences upon character in "Lestrygonians" is the manner in which the vast majority of Bloom's thoughts -- even those that have little to do with food directly -- are expressed in alimentary metaphors. A lyrical and moving example of this pervasion is his remembrance of his first sexual encounter with Molly on Howth Hill (8.896-918). The central symbol of the passage is the "seedcake" that Molly passes to Bloom's mouth from her "sticky gumjelly lips" during an intensely intimate moment (8.906, 909). Bloom is here taking the object of his immediate, elementary concern (nourishment) and fusing -- consciously or not -- with the object of more profound and troubling reflections (his marriage). The result is a deepened,

richer expression of his thoughts about the marriage. The immediate experience is thus assimilated into the larger pattern of Bloom's consciousness and helps him, through memory, to connect past and present experience to form a coherent self.

As for the substantive image itself, the seedcake symbolizes an entity that is already a formed substance (cake), yet it contains within it the possibility (seed) of growth and development: it is potentially allotropic. The joy of Bloom's reverie of youth establishes the possibility of positive growth extending temporally forward from the point of the daydream, but this optimism is pathetically tempered by the conclusion of the passage: "All yielding she tossed my hair. Kissed, she kissed me. Me. And me now" (8.914-916).

The final line of the passage leaves ambiguous whether Bloom is making a disjunctive or conjunctive comparison between his present and past position regarding his relationship with Molly. What is perfectly apparent, however, is that Bloom does not for a moment doubt the metaphysical constancy of his identity. He does not ask whether he is the same person now as then in an effort to abdicate responsibility for his present difficulty. On the contrary, as James Maddox has argued: "[t]hrough memory Bloom momentarily experiences the unity of self which Stephen describes in the next chapter ["Scylla & Charybdis]" (66). The result sways the ambiguity of the image toward the positive because of the recognition that, as they are both consistent human agents, the obstacle facing the Bloom's marriage *can* be overcome, since they must be responsible for the problem in the first place. This not to say that Molly and Leopold can return to or precisely recreate that moment in their relationship; rather Bloom's implicit faith in the constancy of identity implies that, if they desire it, they can correct the mistakes for which they are responsible and save their marriage.

"Words? Music? No: it's what's behind." (*Ulysses* 11.1194-1195)

Perhaps the most interesting example of immediate environmental influence upon identity in *Ulysses* takes place in the "Sirens" episode, in the form of a musical temptation. If Bloom is potentially sensitive to self-indulgence in other episodes, "Sirens" makes this possibility ever more acute as it is the pre-appointed time for Molly's liaison with Blazes Boylan, and he is surrounded by an entire group of people who are wallowing in self-pity. Bloom's position is made further precarious by the fact that he is free to likewise indulge himself if he so chooses. In the *Odyssey*, Homer's hero ties himself to the mast of his ship so he *cannot* respond to the fatal Siren's song, irrespective of how much he desires to do so. Joyce does not allow Bloom such an element of security; as in the transposition of the slaughter of the suitors in "Ithaca" and "Penelope," Joyce ensures that his hero's victory must be a more difficult, mental one, that is accomplished even though he is free tofail.

At the centre of the "Sirens" episode is the idea that music artificially simplifies the identities of its ardent listeners so that their individualities are broken down and they can achieve a sense of fusion or "oneness" with either the music itself or each other; it is a fusion that is false and thus dangerous. In this respect, the episode acts as Joyce's ultimate corrective of the Aristotelian idea of apprehension mentioned above. The soul or the self must be simplified in order to completely identify with any one sensation, since its composition is much more complex than the sensation. Frank Budgen, writing about "Circe," makes an argument to this effect that is also applicable to the present episode: "[t]he essence of the animal into man metamorphosis [in "Circe"] seems to be that a man becomes an animal when

he loses his many-sided human wholeness" (229). The same can be said for an individual who allows his identity to be reduced to one of its components only (i.e. sadness, grief, etc.) in order to respond to a musical temptation.

An important example of this process, as it is the only one in which Bloom can be said to take a substantial part, occurs when Simon Dedalus sings the aria from the opera *Martha*: "When first I saw that form endearing" (11.665-752). As Simon is singing, the common feelings of sadness among the people in the bar blurs the distinction between their identities as individuals: "Richie Poldy Lydia Lidwell... Gould Lidwell... Pat Bloom" (11.718, 720); even at this point, however, Bloom's thoughts remain individuated. The song initially reminds Bloom of Martha Clifford, to whom he is about to write, but, as is true for the way that Molly thinks of him in the book's final episode, thoughts of another woman quickly give way to thoughts of his wife. In this way he retains a separation from the crowd. He thinks of the first time they met at Mat Dillon's, when they played musical chairs and when he turned the pages of music for her as she sang: private memories that protect his integrity as an individual. As the song builds toward its final crescendo, however, Bloom's stream of consciousness is either drowned out or blended in with the narrative.

A long passage in a sustained pitch describes the aria's penultimate note[39], but as it is drawn out, its concrete meaning explodes until it is finally dissolved into "endlessnessnessness" (11.750), like a breaking wave. The lack of meaning in the end of the passage is what creates the vacuous portal through which three extremely dissimilar men,

---

[39] It is a passage that reads suspiciously like a parody of Stephen's vision of the "bird-girl" on the strand, in *A Portrait*.

Simon, Bloom and Lionel, can be synthesized in "Siopold" (11.752) simply because they share a similar sense of loss. In fact, it is questionable whether Bloom actually ever feels this union for himself. As far as is discernible, his thoughts disappear at 11.734 and do not return until 11.789, well after the "synthesis" is achieved. If Bloom's consciousness is being blended with narrative description of the song, this disappearance does not contradict the thesis that Bloom is indeed "consumed.[40]" It is much more likely, however, that synthesis is a narrative trick.

First, when Bloom's stream of consciousness reappears, he seems rather too calm and detached for a man who has just been so powerfully moved. He coolly considers the relationship between the brothers-in-law, Simon and Richie (11.789-792). Second, if anyone is shaken up by the event, it is the narrator himself, as he repeats his description of Boylan's entrance into the Ormond, correcting himself half the way through it by realizing and stating quickly that Boylan is passing the monuments of Sir John Gray and Admiral Nelson (11.761-762). The implication is that it is the narrator who was overcome by the song and he effects the false synthesis, not Bloom.

---

[40] The richness and multiplicity of possible meanings created through the ambiguity achieved in these passages is quite remarkable. For example, the word "Consumed" (11.752) alone can be interpreted in at least four different ways. It could plausibly originate from the narrator, as either an objective observation, or an expression of something in which he too is participating. It could also come from Bloom, and be either a simple observational comment or an admission. I believe the second to be most likely, but each is possible. As Bernard Benstock has noted: "The unreliability of language is Joyce's forte in *Ulysses* , the reader's quicksand" (*Con/Texts* 73).

This interpretation is substantiated by Bloom's subsequent debunking of the mythology surrounding music[41]. As he is discussing the song from *Martha* with Richie Goulding, who judges it the "[g]randest number in the whole opera" (11.828), Bloom thinks to himself:

> Numbers it is. All music when you come to think... Vibrations those chords are. One plus two plus six is seven. Do anything you like with figures juggling. Always find out this equal to that[42]... Musemathematics. And you think you're listening to the ethereal. But suppose you said it like: Martha, seven times nine minus x is thirtyfive thousand. Fall quite flat (11.830-836).

Music is thus a trick of sorts, and no genuine communion between people can be elicited or created by it. Bloom's triumph here is the same as in "Lotus Eaters," he sees the reality of experience rather than its facade: he reads its signature. Bloom would never express himself in these terms, but his accomplishment is to see into the *quidditas* of things, their nature or essence. In "Sirens" and elsewhere this ability separates him from the overwhelming majority of Dubliners, who do approximate a Humean notion of identity, as they seem to be no more "bundles of sensations." But this is not to say that Bloom sees *past* or *through* sensory experience to a *noumenal* level of meaning; rather he looks more deeply into the experiences themselves, and discovers an essence that is internally present. As S.L. Goldberg writes of Bloom:

> He perceives and feels more than his fellows, he judges further and more truly, and he triumphs ... Throughout the book he is

---

[41] It should also be noted that Bloom's thoughts on this subject come *after* the symbolic analogue of the rope tying Odysseus to the mast, the rubber band that Bloom twirls around his fingers, has snapped (11.811).

[42] Notice the similarity between this idea of music and Stephen's opinion regarding AE's Platonic view of poetry in "Scylla and Charybdis" (9.60-71).

> constantly sampling the attitudes of his fellows, his mind imaginatively informing itself with its object in acts of understanding (117, 125).

These "acts of understanding" create Leopold Bloom in the most meaningful sense. In turn, each time he accomplishes such an act he expresses, affirms and reinforces his identity. Stanley Fish once wrote that, for Milton, "being *is* an action" (165), and the same can be said of Joyce, if we are to take his hero as his representative -- as I believe we can -- in this important sense[43].

Bloom: "the distinguished phenomenologist."
(*Ulysses* 12.1821-1822)

The controlling centre of the "Cyclops" episode is Bloom's first physical confrontation with the forces Joyce describes in *Dubliners* as paralysing Dublin. In "Cyclops," the manner in which these forces achieve and sustain paralysis is through a mistaken, categorical conception of identity which is primarily based on prejudice, bigotry or xenophobia. If Joyce makes no other point with Leopold Bloom, he at least illustrates that such categorical definitions are profoundly mistaken. Bloom, who is Irish, Jewish, Catholic, Protestant, atheist, etc. resists this type of definition and is therefore feared and despised by the Cylopean barflies at Barney Kiernan's.

The "Thersites" or "I" narrator substantiates this interpretation of the chapter as he symbolically transposes the eye of Homer's Cyclops into a meaning which conveys a narrow sense of vision and judgement, caused by a severe egocentricity or monomania that verges on

---

[43] Action is of course meant here in the fullest sense, including imaginative empathy with others.

solipsism. The "citizen" is the logical extension of this view; incapable of achieving a basic understanding of the complexities of individual identity, he reduces everyone he sees to categories. Before Bloom even enters the pub, the citizen notices him through the window and exclaims: "What's that bloody freemason doing... prowling up and down outside?" (12.300-301). Thersites is also suspicious of Bloom, as his entrance to the bar is described: he "slopes in with his cod's eye on the dog" (12.410).

Once Bloom reluctantly enters the pub, the conversation begins in a direction toward inevitable confrontation. It becomes readily apparent that Bloom's inclusive, stereoscopic vision is the principal source of irritation with his coadjutors. In one of the funniest passages in the episode, perhaps in all of *Ulysses*, Thersites explains his idea of Bloom:

> And of course Bloom had to have his say too about if a fellow had a rower's heart violent exercise was bad. I declare to my antimacassar if you took up a straw from the bloody floor and to Bloom: *Look at, Bloom. Do you see that straw? That's a straw.* Declare to my aunt he'd talk about it for an hour so he would and talk steady (12.891-896).

Frank Budgen wrote of Bloom's position in the "Cyclops" episode that "the one-eyed man might be king in the realm of the blind, but the two-eyed man is nothing but a nuisance in the kingdom of the one-eyed" (148). This is not to say that Bloom only sees, judges or deliberates more fully than the barflies. Rather more important is the fact that in a tangible sense his *is* more fully than are they: being is an action.

It becomes apparent here that *Ulysses* again points to the danger involved in simplifying identity. The citizen practices a sort of reverse reification when judging others, a

simplification through abstraction. This point is illustrated as the group discusses the madness of Denis Breen:

> --Still, says Bloom, on account of the poor woman, I mean his wife.
> --Pity about her, says the citizen. Or any other woman who marries a half and half.
> --How half and half? Says Bloom. Do you mean he...
> --Half and half I mean, says the citizen. A fellow that's neither fish nor flesh... A pishogue if you know what that is (12.1051-1059).

The citizen's conception of a consistent identity is a type of negative, sinister reflection of Stephen's: allegiance to and definition from a single cause. We have seen how this is impossible, and if it were possible it would signify a loss of humanity consistent with the human-animal metamorphosis in the "Circe" episode. Bloom faces this categorizing definitional force throughout *Ulysses* and beyond, whether it is Mulligan implying that he is a homosexual, the citizen calling him a Jew, or critics arguing that he is an exemplar of the "new womanly man[44]. In the Cyclops episode, and elsewhere in *Ulysses* this simplification is a symptom of the character's inability to arrive at a fuller understanding of identity, one which recognizes the individual as a *ding-an-sich*, a thing in itself.

---

[44] I obviously haven't the space to wade into this rather complex critical debate here. Let me say, however, that the effort of feminist critics such as Suzette Henke to underscore the so-called "feminine" characteristics of Bloom represents an unfortunate misuse of a book that could be used much more effectively to illustrate the deeper concerns of feminist theory. As I have been arguing, *Ulysses* lays bare the poverty of such categories as masculine, feminine, Jew, Christian, etc. as definitive indicators of personal identity. The most complete individual in the book often displays the traditional characteristics of each of these categories, without belonging wholly to any one of them. This inclusive capacity ultimately moves toward a shattering of the viability of any and all such categories, and thus possesses a demotic quality that is imperative to socially minded criticism.

The ultimate poverty of categorical definitions of identity is ironically substantiated by the barflies themselves. Richard Ellmann points out that the hostility *among* the Cyclopeans, as well as their xenophobia, was not lost on Joyce (*Liffey* 112). We discover over the course of the "Cyclops" episode that the nationalistic Citizen is also a less than compassionate property speculator, who has taken advantage of evicted tenants in rural Ireland (12.1311-1316). Such hypocrisy is underscored by Bloom, who points out that the citizen is advocating the advent of an Irish nation based on the violence and hatred for which he condemns the English: "But, says Bloom, isn't discipline the same everywhere. I mean wouldn't it be the same here if you put force against force" (12.1360-1361). The citizen is implicitly advocating a conception of identity that he himself cannot uphold.

All of these elements coalesce in Bloom's final defence, which under the guise of a defence of the Jews, really amounts to a defence of himself, and the conception of individual identity that he represents. When the citizen pushes Bloom to a point where he uncharacteristically "loses his cool," he responds:

> --And I belong to a race too, says Bloom, that is hated and persecuted. Also now. *This very moment. This very instant...*
> --Are you talking about the new Jerusalem? says the citizen.
> --I'm talking about injustice, says Bloom (12.1467-1468, 1473-1474, ellipsis and emphasis added).

The notion of injustice to which Bloom appeals transcends national or racial boundaries. Accordingly, it cannot be understood by the citizen who thus characteristically attempts to reduce it to his level, by associating it with something he knows and thinks he can understand. David Hayman cleverly notes that Bloom's exclamation has even less to do with Bloom's

association with a category such as the Jewish community than with a personal injustice that is being presently inflicted upon him at 7 Eccles Street (*Hart & Hayman* 257).

This confrontation puts Bloom in a circumstance where he must positively describe an alternative conception of existence to the narrow-minded one being extolled by the barflies. Obviously, this is a more difficult and slippery enterprise than simply attacking a system in which he does not believe. Bloom reluctantly responds:

> --Right, says John Wyse. Stand up to it [injustice] then like men...
> --But it's no use, says he. Force, hatred, history, all that. That's not life for men and women, insult and hatred[45]. And everybody knows that it's the very opposite of that that is really life.
> --What? says Alf.
> --Love, says Bloom. I mean the opposite of hatred. I must go now...
> (12.1475, 1481-1485).

Ulysses-Bloom vanquishes the Cyclops-citizen by isolating the latter's false method of judgement. Since the citizen can see in only one manner, Bloom's imposition of a stereoscopic vision confuses, angers and ultimately discredits him. By supplanting the citizen's conceptual framework for judgement, Bloom symbolically blinds the Cyclops. Bloom's victory causes the fusion of the religious and local imagery used by the episode's parallel narrators; his "jocoserious" apotheosis follows, and he becomes, to borrow a phrase from Blake, "The Human Form Divine."

The immediate ridicule of Bloom's position by the "mythological" narrator should not, I believe, be taken as Joyce's revocation of the position itself. Richard Ellmann has repeatedly warned that Joyce was obsessed by a well justified fear of sentimentality. Bloom's position

---

[45] Note the similarity between this and Stephen's defence of the Jews in "Nestor," a similarity David Hayman has also noted (*ibid* 250).

stands not because of its statement, but because of it's actualization, which we have seen since he entered the book. These are the "acts of understanding" to which Goldberg refers. As argued above, love for Joyce was less an emotion and more an orientation toward being: a desiring openness toward, acceptance and affirmation of the world. The realization of these qualities create Bloom and make him the hero of *Ulysses*. Stephen has fumbled around, but not yet realized this posture. As Phillip M. Weinstein has argued: "In his [Joyce's] own experience, in his *Portrait* of that experience, he found his freedom (personal and artistic) through the range of reprojective stances toward necessities that (he saw in retrospect) could not be escaped. His creative direction is homeward... Stephen is the second figure of *Ulysses* because he is still on the way out" (278). Bloom's most important act of understanding on 16 June 1904 has yet, however, to be discussed: the "injustice" that is being done to him "at this very moment." How Bloom deals with Molly's adultery is as complex as it is important and, with regard to the present discussion of Joyce's conception of the self, revealing.

"Are you not happy in your home you poor little naughty boy?"
(*Ulysses* 5.246-247)

The above, brief allusion to Molly's adultery provides a segue into perhaps the most important element of the present discussion regarding Bloom. I want to argue that Molly represents, *via* Bloom, both the concrete manifestation of a substructure for personal identity that lies outside the self, and the dangers of including such a substructure in one's self-definition. Like Stephen's artistic vocation, Bloom's relationship with Molly - and its secondary definitions of him as husband, father, provider, etc. -- acts as a tether beyond which he cannot travel without becoming someone palpably different. In this sense, 16 June 1904 is

no ordinary day for Leopold Bloom because, more than his marriage, his *identity* is being threatened by Molly's affair with Blazes Boylan. The "home" of the above quote represents something deeper than 7 Eccles Street.

It is commonplace to the point of being cliché to note the frequency with which Molly Bloom appears in her husbands thoughts. Explanations as to why she so frequently appears, however, are much less common. Molly is so often the subject and referent of Bloom's reflections for reasons which go far beyond simple, constant interaction as husband and wife. Bloom has *internalized* Molly to the point where she has become inextricably linked to his faculties of judgement and memory, the faculties which we have seen allow a human agent, in Joyce's view, to construct and discover a coherent self.

There are literally dozens of examples in *Ulysses* of Bloom beginning his thoughts at an unrelated point and eventually winding his way back to Molly. In this way, he undertakes Odysseus's voyage back to Penelope over and over, throughout the book. Whether it be the house cat in the "Calypso" episode (4.40-50), Simon Dedalus in "Hades" (6.74-81), Josie Breen in "Lestrygonians" (8.265-268) or Kitty O'Shea in "Eumaeus" (16.1379-1426), what each shares in Molly is a denominator so common that it points to the demonstrable fact that Molly has, perhaps mysteriously, become a part of Bloom's identity. Moreover, even a quick reading of the "Penelope" episode indicates that he occupies a similarly important place in her conception of herself.[46] Robert Kiely describes their marriage in these terms:

> The Blooms' marriage appears to have nearly everything wrong

---

[46] The final lines of *Ulysses* are of course the most famous example of this process in the episode.

> with it, except that both appear to take comfort from it and will it into surviving through their intense awareness of and involvement in one another's being and modes of expression. They are unlikely, outlandish collaborators in the preparation of one another's texts, but they are collaborators nonetheless (102).

Kiely, though he may slightly overstate the difficulties in the marriage, appears to believe that it will survive simply *because* they are so intertwined in each other's identity, but there is a very real possibility that the marriage does not survive, irrespective of whether they get a divorce. The marriage contract between the Blooms is much more metaphysical than legal.

The strategic narrative recurrence to both of their memories of their first sexual encounter on Howth Hill indicates that it was at this moment that such a contract was signed; a metaphysical penetration seems to have accompanied a physical one[47]. An intense act of sympathy or understanding underwrites this event for both of the Blooms. Molly becomes for Poldy a reification of the act of understanding that initially made her his, and thus becomes the foundation of so many of his judgements. The original act which permitted the reification is now being violated, amounting to nothing less than a compromise of identity, especially for Leopold, since his identity, as we have seen, is organized, created and identified by such acts. The somewhat troubling irony of *Ulysses* is that the Bloom's marriage is in trouble largely because of Poldy's inability to be for his wife the person he once was, and still is for the reader and the characters in the rest of the book.

Molly's contribution to the marriage's precarious state is obviously her affair with Boylan. Bloom's is much more complicated. His refusal to have complete sexual intercourse

---

[47] This argument appears to me to be the true meaning of the argument, in the "Oxen of the Sun" episode, about true sex being without prophylaxis.

with Molly is symptomatic of the problem – perhaps Molly would say that it *is* the problem. The exact source of Bloom's perplexity is important within the present context; because, from a Sartrian point of view, Bloom is, as we see in the "Nausicaa" episode, capable of having sex with Molly, and is thus responsible for their marital problems. Their sexual difficulties originated, however, in an event over which Bloom had no control – though he appears to blame himself for it: the death of their infant son, Rudy.

Bloom's conception of himself as a failure in the traditional male role of producing a son is essentially an identity crisis in the sense that he considers it a flaw in himself. The advent of the crisis has been avoided by a concurrent avoidance of a full sexual relationship with Molly, the act that caused the dilemma in the first place. Molly's adulterous affair with Boylan, however, brings the crisis to a head, and provides, to borrow David Hayman's phrase, much of the "psychic energy" for the "Circe" episode (*Hart & Hayman* 252). Bloom may be extremely adept at internalizing experience, judging its nature, and finally assimilating that judgement into his identity, but the death of Rudy has taken him ten years to judge properly, and he only begins to do so in *Ulysses*. Before "Circe," Bloom has done a lot of mental house-cleaning: he has formulated, at least for the reader, a complex paradigm of interaction between self and other, and he has come to terms with and asserted his alien identity in a hostile atmosphere. In the "Circe" episode, Bloom faces the most radical "assault," to use James Maddox's term, upon the constancy of his identity in all of *Ulysses*.

"The Court of Conscience is now open."
(*Ulysses* 15.1629)

Because Molly is such a substantial and fundamental element of Bloom's identity, the breakup of their marriage holds an apocalyptic potential for him. The "Circe" episode represents the advent of that apocalypse to a large degree. Bloom's alleged "participation" in Molly's adultery is dissected and examined as if under a microscope. More generally "Circe" can be read as an explosion of Bloom's identity, and its subsequent hypostatization in its constituent parts. Cheryl Herr has interpreted this process as the ultimate revelation of the inconsistency of identity caused by excessive reliance on culture and environment for definition. Herr argues:

> [P]art of the madness which *Ulysses* exposes for us is our inability to discuss the Circean personnae without implicitly reifying them into supposedly stable characters who populate the rest of *Ulysses*... [w]e still fall back on a single name when we talk about him [Bloom] and thus seem to be arguing, despite statements to the contrary, that Bloom is an ontological essence rather than the character(s) found under the designation Bloom... What takes place in "Circe" is thus a Joycean pantomime which plays out the confusing implications of how culture not only determines gender traits but also shapes concepts of selfhood (152).

I have no quarrel with the feminist argument concerning the socialization of gender, but I believe that Herr goes too far when she posits such a fragmented, Humean view of identity. In fact, it seems that rather the reverse is true. We are unable to talk about the consistency of identity without subjecting it to a trial by its elements. As Robert Kiely has noted: "Bloom's dreamlike fantasies are deeply rooted in his own life, his family and race, the particularities of the day he has just passed; thus they place him *in* humanity, not apart from it" (195). This does not mean, however, that he is a creature of his environment in the deterministic sense

implied by Cheryl Herr. Rather, the movement in "Circe" is toward the freedom for Bloom to reclaim the consistent identity he has been denying in his marriage. "Circe" documents, symbolically, the assimilation of immediate experience, in the form of the day's "particularities" into the overarching structure of personal identity of which I have been writing.

Hugh Kenner's seminal essay on "Circe" (*Hart & Hayman* 341-362) challenged the thesis that followed Joyce's *schema* in calling the surreal sequences in the episode "hallucinations." Kenner convincingly argues that such a term is inappropriate due to the frequency with which the confines of character are seemingly violated in the episode, such as when "Molly" exclaims: "Nebrakada! Femininum! (15.319), words read by Stephen at the bookstall in "Wandering Rocks." This is a "problem" dealt with in detail in the following chapter; I simply want to make the point here that Kenner's argument has become so influential that it seems to have eclipsed textual proof that the hypostatizations[48] involve a specific character's unconscious in important ways[49]. For example, when Ellen Bloom says "Sacred Hart of Mary," it is more likely Bloom's mistake than hers (15.290), and Gerty MacDowell sounds suspiciously like Martha Clifford (15.384-385). Similarly, it is unlikely that Tom and Sam Bohee would forget the words to "Someone's in the *kitchen* with Dina" (15.424) -- but it would be characteristic of Bloom; it is also unmistakable that Bloom's conversation with Josie Breen (especially 15.563-582) is a man's conversation with himself.

---

[48] I am following Karen Lawrence's lead and using the apt word she suggests should replace hallucination when discussing the episode.

[49] See Andrew Gibson's introductory essay in European Joyce Studies: Reading Joyce's "Circe". Fritz Senn, General Editor. Amsterdam: Redopi Editions, 1994.

Though not exclusively, each character's unconscious, especially Bloom's, participates in the hypostatizations.

This is not to say that the phantasmagoric elements of the episode are generated by a specific character, in this case Bloom -- there can be no doubt as to who ultimately is responsible for this generation. Rather, the hypostatizations *express* Bloom, or more properly stated, elements of Bloom's identity. Phillip Weinstein has argued that in "Circe": "[e]xhausted, Bloom begins to lapse into his latent selves" (283). The declension of Bloom's name by "The Watch" (15.677) symbolizes this dissection process; "Circe" presents Bloom in all his possible, narrowly defined selves. For example, when Bloom is scolded by his "father", as he attempts to enter the brothel (15.253-262), it is Bloom's cultural, Jewish identity that is challenging for pre-eminent control over his actions, and Rudolph is the expression of this part of his identity. Much the same argument can be made that it is his civic identity -- for lack of a better term -- that is being put on trial. The roles played by Molly in her appearances in Nighttown are more complex, since her involvement in Bloom's identity is correlatively complex.

Molly is involved in almost all of the "temptations" in the "Circe" episode. By this I mean that Bloom is, in a sense, tempted to relax the "many sided human wholeness" that Budgen explains. If he were to give into any of the specific fantasies, such a loss would result, but as S.L. Goldberg explains, "Bloom is unable to acquiesce in *any* of his fantasies" (135). This is because none adequately expresses Bloom's identity individually. In fact it could be said that the Joycean transposition of the Homeric "moly" that protects Odysseus from Circe's charms *is* this consistent identity. Bloom needs no external protection because he

embodies it. In the first temptation of his sexual identity, Bloom is mocked and accused of perversion by the likes of Mrs. Yelverton Berry and Mrs. Bellingham, creatures that Bloom's unconscious is likely to create. When he realizes that the course of events is going too far, Bloom attempts to halt them by claiming: "All these people. I meant only the spanking idea" (15.1095). This is the beginning of the many trials Bloom will endure in "Circe"; trials which ultimately amount to a test of the stability of his identity. "All of these people" are contained within Bloom, and they are made manifest in order to assault the constancy of identity that keeps them at bay.

Before Bloom can deal directly with Molly's adultery, the traumatic events of the day must be assimilated into his identity. An important example of this process is the heroic delusion that occurs between Zoe's "Go on. Make a stump speech out of it" (15.1353) and "Talk away till you're black in the face" (15.1958). This hypostatization deals most extensively with the more general feelings of alienation and displacement experienced by Bloom in Dublin. Much like the concept of epiphany, heroism offers an easy way out of personal difficulty; it is then not surprising that such heroics are derided and rejected as an avenue of escape from such difficulty. In fact, it is the idea of escape or transcendence itself that is ultimately debunked in this section of the episode. In this hypostatization, many of Bloom's "political" ideas for the improvement of Dublin life are expressed, from the expansion of the Dublin tram system (15.1367) to the emasculation of "capitalistic lusts" (15.1395), for which he is promptly given the title "the world's greatest reformer" (15.1459). His physical appearance and mental capacities are then praised to the point where there is no other choice but to crown him Leopold the First (15.1475). This ascension continues until

Bloom becomes a sort of Philosopher-King of Ireland, answering even the most quotidian of questions for his subjects. Finally, he makes a series of throne speeches proclaiming the "new Bloomusalem" (15.1544) and a "free lay church in a free lay state" (15.1693).

Obviously, Bloom's identity cannot realistically sustain this sort of grandeur, and the "*novo Hibernia* of the future" begins to collapse all around him. The citizen would not praise him and all of Dublin will never worship him; again Joyce does not permit his hero this type of romantic escapism. When Bloom is set afire, and the "Daughters of Erin" recite themes from the episodes in which Bloom has thus far appeared, he is brought back to the identity we have seen carefully constructed throughout the novel. The implication is clearly that this more ordinary self will suffice for the trials he must endure. The Bloom that is burned is not the Bloom of the previous episodes but the one that has taken shape over the last several hundred lines. The fire purges these heroic delusions until the more consistent, familiar Bloom remains. The difference is that this self has now confronted and internalized its most recent experiences and made sense of them in the larger context of identity. Though his feelings of alienation will never be completely, magically assuaged, the self he has developed to be as a result of these is being implicitly endorsed.

Bloom's experiences over the course of 16 June, 1904 are played back in "Circe" in an extended, dramatized fashion. Ultimately, this is a dramatization of their unconscious assimilation into his enduring identity. This may take the form of a jury that is made up of all the individuals who have made him feel like an outsider on this day (15.1139) or an hermaphrodytic individual, Bella/Bello Cohen, who conjures to "reality" the worst that he has imagined about his wife's adultery. As these events are being replayed, they become

intertwined with deeper memories and characteristics of Bloom that go unexpressed, except to the reader through stream of consciousness, throughout the day. As Fritz Senn argues: "[w]hat Bloom imagines earlier, a 'lifetime in a night', seems to have taken place... everything is present and in present tense. The episode turns everything inside out, makes it plainly visible and audible, pushes it to the surface, it *expresses*" (*Gibson* 68, 74). The result is a type of cathartic expression of the days' events in conjunction with the past; a movement that jars together past and present, and fuses them in a more enduring form.

Bloom's acceptance of Molly's adultery is for reasons mentioned above the most important of these events. This process begins with his humiliation at the hands of Bella/Bello. Far from being a positive revelation of Bloom as the "new womanly man," Bloom's degradation is an attempt at emasculation in the more general sense of the term: Bello tries to usurp his identity, and ultimately his humanity completely. The tendency Bloom so prominently displays toward servitude over the course of this particular hypostatization is in reality a bastardization -- consistent with "vision stretched to the breaking point" motif of the episode -- of the compassionate, open posture toward the other that I have been documenting throughout this chapter. The following passage is typical of this transposition:

BELLO

> (*stands up*) No more hot and cold. What you longed for has come to pass. Henceforth you are unmanned and mine in earnest, a thing under the yoke. Now for your punishment frock. You will shed your male garments, you understand, Ruby Cohen? and don the shot silk luxuriously rustling over head and shoulders. And quickly too (15.2964-2968).

Bello's implies since Bloom has in the past willingly relinquished meaningless emblems of household power, he desires complete servitude. Having had this posture questioned by Molly's adultery, it's centrality in his identity is also tested by assault. It is obvious from this perspective why Bloom exclaims about the experience: "O, it's hell itself" (15.2908).

The hell that Bloom endures is a mirror image of the orthodox one that Joyce knew so well. The Roman Catholic hell is reserved for those who have sinned so deeply that they have, like Satan, become sin; sin has become the defining element of their soul or, in a more secular context, identity. An attempt is being made here to purge Bloom of the acts that have led to his identifying sympathetic openness and compassion, which in the "transcendent sense" that "Circe" makes (Kenner in *Hart and Hayman* 355), have become sins. As Bello tells Bloom: "The sins of your past are rising against you. Many. Hundreds" (15.3026).

One of the "sins of the past" that rises against Bloom declares that he was once given to writing "pencilled messages offering his nuptial partner to all strongmembered males" (15.3035-3036). These offerings represent nothing more than an uncharitable interpretation of Bloom's compassionate acceptance of his wife's individuality and freedom. The messages are "pencilled" because they are oblique; they are the manifestation of a hyperbolic interpretation of Bloom. Nonetheless, Bloom's sins escalate until his ultimate punishment is read by Bello:

BELLO

> (*sarcastically*) I wouldn't hurt your feelings for the world but there is a man of brawn in possession there (Eccles Street). The tables are turned, my gay young fellow! He is something of a fullgrown outdoor man... He shot his bolt, I can tell you. Foot to foot, knee to knee, belly to belly, bubs to breast. He's no eunuch. A shock of red hair he has sticking out of him behind like a furzebush. Wait for nine months, my lad. Holy ginger, it's kicking and coughing up and down in

her guts already! *That makes you wild, don't it? Touches the spot?* (15.3135-3144, emphasis added).

There can be no doubt that Bloom has left himself open to such a usurpation of his role as husband, but the comic absurdity of this imagery clearly points to a correlative ridiculousness in the idea that supports it. If Molly is to be taken from Bloom in any meaningful sense, it would not be by a man like Boylan -- Joyce's constant ridicule of the type of testosterone charged hero that Boylan represents assures as much. The demonstration of Boylan's "masculine" prowess does not argue that Bloom should be more like him; rather it indicates that Bloom should return to being, for Molly, more like Bloom.

This is the very centre of Bloom's identity crisis as it is manifest in the "Circe" episode. Bello isolates Bloom's failure to impregnate Molly as the symbol of this crisis. Bloom has failed to have full intercourse -- in the "Oxen of the Sun" sense -- and has thus failed to effect for Molly the deepest of the "acts of understanding" that identify him; in a palpable sense, he ceased to *be* himself for his wife: "Moll! I forgot! Forgive! Moll... We... Still..." (15.3151). Bloom so intensely identifies such acts and thus himself with Molly, that the possibility of losing her as both the object of further acts of understanding and a grounding for such acts of which she is not the object is terrifying to him. In this sense, "Circe" displays the danger of excessive reliance on an external grounding of identity. Accordingly, the remainder of the episode displays Bloom regaining control not over his marriage or his wife, but over himself.

Bloom's rejection of the nymph lays the final groundwork for his direct confrontation with Molly's adultery. After his trouser button snaps, Bloom "coldly" declares: "You have

broken the spell. The last straw. If there were only the ethereal where would you all be, postulants and novices. Shy but willing like an ass pissing" (15.3449-3451)[50]. Escapism in the form of esoteric romanticism is here summarily rejected. The implication is that Bloom must begin to deal as conclusively with the "facts" of his own life in a direct manner. We have seen that, in essence, dealing with the facts of one's life, the environment in which one exists, means a struggle with the internalization of such factors through which identity is created. All day he has been avoiding thoughts of a seminally influential factor upon his identity: Molly's adultery. Bloom's triumph over the nymph condemns this avoidance and points him toward a direct battle with the affair.

This ordeal takes the form of an hypostatization in which Bloom acts as a whoremaster who arranges Molly's affair with Boylan. It is apparent at this point that this event is not a Freudian dramatization of Bloom's true hidden desires. It is rather an exaggerated expression of what he fears he has already done. "The mirror up to nature" (15.3820) is in this respect a cracked looking glass indeed. It is difficult to believe that the events in "Circe" should be taken literally. Rather, this direct confrontation represents Bloom's unconscious internalization of his role in Molly's adultery. It is an act of understanding characteristic to Bloom, and it *does* purge him, but not in the manner usually interpreted.

Critics sympathetic to the Bloom's plight argue that "Circe" purges Bloom so that they can set their marriage in order, while those who are convinced of the marriage's ultimate demise use the episode to show that Bloom has changed very little and may never come to

---

[50] Note that Stephen's "what you damn well have to see" remark reflects a similar opinion regarding the relevence of the concrete.

terms with his Molly's infidelity. The latter argument seems, for reasons explained above, patently unsatisfactory. I would also amend the former in a subtle but important way: the episode purges Bloom so that he can regain -- if only unconsciously -- the posture of openness and understanding that identifies him, and so that he can understand the specific act that created the bond with Molly in the first place. In Bello's threats there is a symbolically important undercurrent of permanence: "No, Leopold Bloom, all is changed by woman's will since you slept horizontal in Sleepy Hollow your night of twenty years"; "Your epitaph is written. You are down and out and don't forget it, old bean" (15.3153-3154; 3199-3200). This element of certainty implies the existence of a deterministic identity that Bloom is powerless to change; that somehow Bloom's essence is such that his current position in relation to his wife was inevitable. As we have seen, Bloom's identity is characterised and animated by the opposite tendency: an openness that demands for its development the existence of possibility. "Circe" moves toward the destruction of this type of determinism, reestablishing an element of possibility which is more consistent with Bloom's identity.

This possibility includes but is not exclusive to the reestablishment of a deep marital bond with Molly. Though I think this to be the likely outcome, it is important to note that the movement of "Circe" is toward a position for Bloom from where such a reunion is *possible*. He is freed to assume the identity which he has heretofore associated with Molly, but which in fact precedes her. In this sense, any future reunion is more meaningful because it would involve another act in which they both freely desire to participate, like their first love making session on Howth Hill. The paradox is that in freeing himself from excessive dependence on

Molly for the definition and development of his identity, Bloom puts himself in the position where he can truly attempt to reestablish their more important metaphysical bond.

This freedom is established by Bloom's internalization of Molly's adultery, but it is confirmed by the aid he offers Stephen at the end of the episode. This event becomes an addendum to -- not a replacement for -- the love making on Howth. As he did on that day, Bloom here realizes his identity in what S.L. Goldberg calls "virtuous action" (186). The resulting vision of Rudy has often been interpreted as a revelation of the symbolic father-son relationship between Bloom and Stephen, but it is much more complex. Rudy appears after an act by Bloom which is analogous to one which would create another Rudy. In this sense, Bloom reaffirms his *potential* as a parent. Moreover, he affirms his own nature, and the vision points him toward an important manner in which this potential could be realized: in a free reestablishment of a sexual bond with Molly.

"Good old Bloom! There's nobody like him after all."
(*Ulysses* 15.1727)

Bloom emerges from the maelstrom of "Circe" reconstituted. To a certain degree, the extent to which he *consciously* recognizes his implicit recognition and assertion of himself is irrelevant. I would not go so far as to claim, as Suzette Henke does, that the novel "happens to us [the readers] and not to them [the characters]" but it is important to note that Bloom is participating in symbolic and referential structures that go beyond his wildest comprehension. Nonetheless, to claim that Bloom is not a "changed" character after "Circe" is to tread on thin critical ice. His increased confidence in "Eumaeus," though often checked by Stephen's arrogance, is unmistakeable. In fact, it may be said that he overasserts his reclaimed identity

by being intrusively helpful to Stephen. Whatever the case, claims that Bloom is still trying to avert the crisis with Molly by acting as her pimp are surely unfounded. It is difficult to conceive of the labourious purgation of "Circe" occurring for nothing.

By the time of "Ithaca" the stability and constancy of identity has been shown able to withstand constant questioning and assault. It may, like the water Bloom appreciates (17.183-228), have the potential to take on numerous outward forms, but the essential identity endures. "Ithaca," like the "Cyclops" episode displays the poverty of totally identifying a human being with any of his constituent parts or successive manifestations. As S.L. Goldberg notes:

> For its [the vivisection of Bloom and Stephen in Ithaca] effect is again like that of pervading irony of the whole work, not to demolish Bloom and Stephen into scattered, fragmentary "facts", but rather to show their ultimate invulnerability to this view of them... Thus "Ithaca" is like the final test of human life: it survives its own cold pride of intellect (190).

For example, it can safely be said that Bloom and Stephen represent "scientific" and "artistic" temperaments, respectively; however to do so robs them of the invigorating force which individuates and humanizes them. They stand the test of stultifying definition, of epistemology.

Bloom achieves, by the end of "Ithaca" a well balanced stasis. Bloom has taken into account the "irreparability of the past" (17.975), the "painful character of the ultimate functions of separate existence" (17.997-998), and weighed them along side the fact that he has "as a competent keyless citizen... proceeded energetically from the unknown to the known through the incertitude of the void" (17.1019-1020). In righting the balance, Bloom achieves a paradoxical miracle. There would appear to be nothing miraculous about a reclamation of an

identity based on a rudimentary conception of humanistic virtue, but the fact that such a stance leaves him open to the assaults of his environment -- and that he endures them all -- illustrates the radical revision of heroism in *Ulysses*. If one can remain human in the sense of the demanding definition of identity that Joyce puts forth, and project that identity outward, a realistic heroism is achieved.

"Which? Finish. You can't": Stephen in "Circe." (*Ulysses* 15.2109)

For all the promise shown by Stephen in the earlier episodes of *Ulysses*, "Circe" displays that he has thus far failed to transfer his realizations from the realm of thought to that of being. He stumbles roaring drunk into Nighttown, as hedonistic and megalomaniacal as ever, in search of a prostitute. In contrast to the manner in which the hypostatizations operate for Bloom, the ultimate surfacing of Stephen's mother, in what Hugh Kenner calls the "only genuine hallucination in the chapter" (*Hart & Hayman* 352) indicates that he cannot internally synthesize the disparate elements of his identity. Stephen appears to be still tantalized by the postures of *A Portrait*, in which he throws himself completely into a pre-conceived self-conception.

As mentioned above, May Dedalus represents for Stephen a relationship to identity forming forces beyond his control. These include everything from family environment to eugenics to religion. Stephen resists these links so adamantly that they are forced out of his mind to confront him, synthesized in an apparition that *has* been subject to environmental effects:

> *(Stephen's mother, emaciated, rises stark through the floor, in leper grey with a wreath of faded orangeblossoms and a torn bridal veil,*

> *her face worn and noseless, green with gravemould. Her hair is scant and lank. She fixes her bluecircled hollow eyesockets on Stephen and opens her toothless mouth uttering a silent word* (15.4158-4162).

Stephen acts in character as his first utterance to his mother's ghost is an indication of continued self-absorption: "They say I killed you, mother... Cancer did it not I. Destiny" (15.4186-4187). Stephen's attempt to abdicate responsibility for his mother's death is both indicative of his larger attempt at self-definition and opposite to Bloom's acceptance of partial responsibility for Molly's adultery. Stephen still adheres to a solipsistically defined, impermeable self-definition.

Stephen becomes even more petulant when he demands from his mother: "Tell me the word, mother, if you know now. The word known to all men" (15.4192-4193). What he fails to realize is that his mother's response (15.4195-4198) articulates the word, love, in the only manner she knows. Her invective that he repent, along with the reminder of her care for him when he was a child articulates in concrete terms the love that Stephen has heretofore failed both to recognize and to realize in his life. When Stephen is not told the word in the terms he desires, he reverts to the satanic character of *A Portrait*. Contrary to seeing this reversion as the absurd and ineffectual manoeuvre that it surely is, Helene Cixous argues that the breaking of the lampshade is an extremely positive act:

> Having destroyed his objective connections with reality, Stephen reestablishes a world which is similar to the world he has left, but which begins at his word. This recovery is made by meaning, by language, and by writing, and the result is not a dissolution of objective reality, but clearly a disappearance of the difference between reality and the self; the self can thus enter into a very close contact with the world, yet with the benefits of reflection and decision" (*Exile* 687).

Stephen's breaking of the lampshade does not activate this process, nor does it "shatter the foundations of a nightmare history" (Henke 199-200). On the contrary, the existential position described here by Cixous is the one from which Stephen, as Bloom's example clearly illustrates, must struggle to escape. The appearance of May Dedalus represents the heights of solipsism because it is effected by an imposition of the self onto the environment. She appears in "reality" because the tension created by the existence of her referents in Stephen's unconscious cannot be contained by his identity. If anything is close to "destruction" in this exchange, it is Stephen's identity.

Constantine Theoharris has argued that in *Ulysses* Stephen's soul is "perilously close to extinction" (119). Nowhere is he closer than during this exchange. Stephen, confronting an image that is really an element of himself, asserts himself against himself. In doing so he risks the dissolution of his identity in the course of the struggle. Bernard Benstock has noted that at the point of the confrontation, Stephen "is a compendium of past selves" (142). All of these manifestations are struggling for preeminence, as they do in Bloom. Contrary to Bloom, however, Stephen -- for all his conscious confidence in the stability of his identity -- cannot connect these manifestations of self through the perception of an underlying constancy. May Dedalus represents for Stephen all necessary influences he has yet to accept and thus will not serve. In this regard, as Marilyn French has argued, "[w]hat Stephen will not "serve" is the human condition itself" (70).

Nonetheless, there is a conclusion that does not necessarily lead to Stephen's demise or insanity. At the moment of his collapse, Bloom begins to assert himself actively as a support

for Stephen.[51] The timing of this event in so meticulously crafted an episode as "Circe" is crucial. Stephen has extended his identity to the greatest possible ellipse consistent with the ultimate return. Bloom's presence is a manifestation of the direction and posture that he must effect, an identity he must assume. Bloom's possible effect on Stephen is intertwined with the larger issue of environmental influence upon identity, and is the subject of the final chapter of this paper.

---

[51] *Nothung* of course means "needful."

Chapter III -- The World of *Ulysses*

**"There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy" (*Hamlet* I, iv).**

In the "Scylla and Charybdis," episode, Stephen wonders about the logical "inconsistencies" of *Hamlet*; because King Hamlet was killed in his sleep, there can be no rational explanation as to how he could have knowledge of either the method used or the killer's identity. Yet, in the play's first act (scene iv), he imparts both to his son. Stephen explains:

> But those who are done to death in sleep cannot know the manner of their quell unless their Creator endow their souls with that knowledge in the life to come. The poisoning and the beast with two backs that urged it King Hamlet's ghost could not know of were he not endowed with knowledge by his creator (9.467-471).

Like many textual threads, this principle faintly reverberates through *Ulysses*, almost forgotten, until the "Circe" episode produces events suspiciously similar to the one described above. In a seemingly ostentatious disregard for the confines of personal identity, characters -- or their derivative forms -- express knowledge gathered by other characters over the course of book, and speak in narrative idioms from past episodes in which they did not even appear. The explanation for these events is similar to the one offered by Stephen in regard to *Hamlet*. The subtle but important difference is that in *Ulysses*, it is more properly stated that the characters are endowed with such knowledge not by their creator, but by the creation which surrounds and sustains them.

It is argued above that *Ulysses* recreates a world that is invigorated, given life. This fact radically affects the way any characters' interaction with their environment may be

interpreted, and sheds light on many of the book's narrative idiosyncrasies. If the book (environment) itself is vivified, then the characters' relationship with the ostensibly inanimate objects within it is a dialectical experience in which the objects speak back; the book becomes an immense character. At the heart of this vision of the world is the instinctive, *a priori*, assertion that there is component of mysticism and spirituality sewn into the fabric of existence.* This idea bears resemblance to both W.B. Yeats's *anima mundi* and Giordano Bruno's[52] "world soul", but it's application in *Ulysses* is uniquely Joycean. Craig Carver explains Joyce's conception as "an imponderable "medium" or "universal agent" which is beyond the plane of our normal, physical senses, yet permeates the material world... [It interested Joyce particularly because] it constituted the cosmic memory, [so] that the images of all beings were forever preserved" (202, 203).

In essence, this theory implies that there are presences, human though spiritual, embedded in the objects of perception; presences that are accessible to both the conscious mind (as when Stephen feels the presence of his ancestors on Sandymount strand) and the unconscious mind (such as Stephen's dream at the end of "Proteus" which uncannily forecasts the advent of Bloom). As Stephen reflects at the end of the "Proteus" episode: "God becomes man becomes fish becomes barnacle goose becomes featherbed mountain. Dead breaths I living breathe, tread dead dust, devour a urinous offal from the dead" (3.477-480). In *Ulysses* this inter-connectedness is extended to reflect a similar relationship *between* the living,

---

[52] See Constantine Theoharris's chapter on Joyce and Bruno in his Joyce's *Ulysses*: An Anatomy of the Soul. The resemblance of Joyce's conception to that of Yeats will presently become self-evident.

resulting in an introduction of an inescapable imperative that the self engage in a dialogue with it's environment in order to develop.

Though this theory seems at face value quasi-religious, it must be noted that it is unequivocally imminent rather than transcendent. More important, it is created by human agency and therefore seals the world in a radically, if paradoxically, humanistic fashion. Marilyn French explains this idea in the context of the "Circe" episode:

> The coincidences and correspondences in this chapter, like those in the rest of the novel, suggest the existence of a larger pattern in which all small lives are contained. But the larger pattern has no metaphysical significance, indicates no transcendent purpose; it is earth-bound, pointing to the ubiquity and similarity of human needs, constrictions, shame, guilt and secrecy (195).

This immanence is manifest in its fullest form in "Circe", but in order to ensure that it cannot be discarded as an anomalous characteristic of the "transformational magic" (*Con/Texts*) which permeates that episode, it is useful to illustrate -- in addition to the examples above from "Proteus" -- its more subtle manifestations throughout *Ulysses*. The first of these is contained in what Hugh Kenner has christened the "Uncle Charles principle" (*Joyce's Voices*).

The "Uncle Charles principle" is the title Kenner gives to the Joycean interpretation of *style indirect-libre* whereby a particular narrative description assumes the idiom of the character whose actions it is describing -- as in Stephen's Uncle Charles's trip to the jakes in *A Portrait*. Kenner's argument thus reveals an intense process of interaction between narrative (environment) and character (identity): the individual influences the environment that expresses him. *Ulysses* adds to this process by illustrating its operation in the opposite direction: environmental influence on character. Marilyn French has shown this principle at work in

"Proteus": "Joyce is insisting upon the connectedness of external and internal reality even as Stephen questions it. What we see is that each shift in scene is accompanied by a shift in subject" (74). This directional influence is further underscored by the fact that different characters have similar experiences when surrounded by the same physical environment. For instance, it is no coincidence that both Stephen and Bloom have their thought darkened by the same cloud, in "Telemachus" and "Calypso" respectively; nor is it a coincidence that similar thoughts are entertained by both men on Sandymount Strand.

This narrative-character interpenetration works in a more general sense as well. Bernard Benstock has argued that the ostensibly objective narration of the book's first six episodes is considerably tempered by the influence of the characters on the narrative idiom (*Con/Texts* Ch. 1). The "young" narrative of the "Telemachus" episode, typified by the absurd overuse of adverbs when characters' tones of speech are described, results from the immediate influence of the characters' immaturity or naïveté on their environment. In turn, the narrative accentuates the juvenile pretension of Mulligan and Stephen by describing them in their own terms. The same reciprocal influence can be detected in the first three episodes in which Bloom appears. For instance, the narrative sentence fragment "[m]ade him feel a bit peckish" (4.8-9) introduces Bloom's idiom even before his characteristic stream of consciousness is revealed. As Benstock has noted: "[w]hat masquerades as open and objective narration is often unmasked as the play between observable phenomena and the limited consciousness of the subjective character" (38). I would take this argument a step further to suggest that the extensive "consciousness" of the environment influences the expression and development of character in a manner that often works without the character's awareness.

This appears to be one of the most ubiquitous manifestations of "metempsychosis" in *Ulysses*: the characters participate in mythological patterns which are omnipresent in the environment they inhabit, but of which they are often, especially in Bloom's case, totally oblivious. From this perspective, it can be argued that the mythological structure of the book presents the characters with vast possibilities of identity. Richard Ellmann argues that this development is inextricably linked to the maturation process, whereby the human agent develops his or her identity: "To mature is to become archetypal, to recognize one's place in the roll of entrepreneurs of the spirit. Oddly enough, the more Stephen... is individualized, the more he slips into his myth" (16). It is noted above that the identity works consciously as a prism through which all seemingly objective phenomena are filtered and judged. This argument can now be extended to include the unconscious operation of the identity which is formed through such judgements, in allegiance with such mythological archetypes as Ellmann describes. To take a simple instance, Bloom's choice to wander around Dublin edges his mythological identity toward kinship with Odysseus, and away from, for example, Agamemnon, who returns home directly after the battle of Troy. Such analogies trigger the animation of the "collective memory" which then reinforces the identification.

Critics who concentrate primarily on the narrative innovations of *Ulysses* often recognize only half of this dialectical engagement between character and environment. For example Karen Lawrence has interpreted the narrative "youth" of the "Telemachus" episode as "a quality of the narrative itself rather than a quality of a particular character" (45). Such a view leads ultimately to the conclusion that environment is totally alien to the individuals who inhabit it; to use Karl Barth's description of the relationship between God and humanity, the

environment to these critics is *totalitere alitere*, or "totally other." From this assumption it is then a small step to assert that alien consciousness behind the narrative is hostile to the characters. As Marilyn French[53] argues: "[w]hether the narrator is contemptuous, impersonal or indifferent, he is always malevolent towards the tiny, foolish, and disgusting creature, man; he is at worst a *dio boia* or hangman god, at best a *deus absconditus*" (6).

Aside from the fact that such an argument is completely inconsistent with the thesis that such a transcendent consciousness is eradicated from *Ulysses*, it is problematic because it fails to acknowledge the many pregnant instances in the book where the narrative seems consciously to assist the characters. In "Scylla and Charybdis," for example, the narrative deflates the arguments of Stephen's coadjutors through comic descriptions of their tone of speech: "the auric egg of Russell warn[s] occultly" of the dangers of love songs (9.103-104), and when advocating Platonic philosophy, he "oracle[s] out of his shadow" (9.46-47). Similarly, John Eglinton "shift[s] his spare body" when disagreeing with Stephen's thesis regarding the importance of the artist's life to artistic creation (9.151-152), and the breadth of his intellectual acumen is questioned when he becomes "John Eclecticon" (9.1070). Most poignant, however, is the fact that Stephen's argument regarding the integral relationship between Shakespeare's life and art is augmented by the narrative shift to dramatic form, which makes the "life" of the characters in the episode the subject of a "play", and helps prove Stephen's point. The narrative seems to encourage Stephen's deliberations, adding an element of optimism to the relationship between self and environment which is an unfriendly

---

[53] Karen Lawrence appears to agree with this argument (67).

amendment to French's argument. The implication is that when the character's judgement approaches the *quidditas* or essence of its object, the object itself springs to life in order to attract further investigation.

This process can also be seen at work in the "Lestrygonians" episode, when Bloom is remembering the beginning of his sexual relationship with Molly. As we have seen, this memory is particularly important in the context of a discussion of identity in *Ulysses*. As Bloom is remembering the scene on Howth Hill, his stream of consciousness appears to merge with the narrative:

> Glowing wine on his palate lingered. Crushing in the winepress grapes of Burgundy. Sun's heat it is. *Seems to a secret touch telling me memory.* Touched his sense moistened remembered. Hidden under wild ferns on Howth below us bay sleeping: sky. No sound. The sky. The bay purple by the Lion's head. Green by Drumleck. Yellowgreen towards Sutton. Fields of undersea, the lines faint brown in grass, *buried cities* (8.897-903, emphasis added).

Immediate sensory perception (the taste of wine) triggers the personal memory of the day on Howth, which soon melds into the collective memory, recalling "buried cities." This passage is a rare example of the coming to consciousness of a principle that works symbolically throughout *Ulysses*. The intensity of the memory offers Bloom access to a perception of the extreme inter-relatedness of "the living and the dead." The blurring of the boundary between individual identity and environment, personal and collective consciousness is indicated by the increased commingling of his stream of consciousness with the narration. Like Stephen, Bloom is urged toward a deeper understanding of the inter-penetrating relationship between environment and self. His posture of openness toward experience allows him to be permeated

by the world, and the constancy of his identity permits him to judge deeply the phenomena of that world without worrying about losing all sense of self.

Perhaps this process is further indicative of the effect Bloom is to have on Stephen. (People, of course, constitute other people's environmental reality at least as much as the landscape or inanimate objects.) If their brief sojourn together is read optimistically, their "communion" can be interpreted in precisely this ineffable sense. Though it may be true that Bloom communicates no "golden words of wisdom to Stephen", and he does not solve all of the young man's considerable problems, Stephen, whether he knows it or not, may have *experienced* Bloom in a much more meaningful sense.. After all, Bloom's act of kindness toward Stephen is the only one he has experienced in some time, and Stephen's question, regarding the reason why restaurant chairs are always mounted on tables at the end of the evening represents his first and only honest admission of ignorance in the entire book. Again, Joyce's method is evocative; he creates an environment within which a communion between the two men is possible without proffering conclusive proof that it takes place.

These examples are not, however, intended to indicate that self and environment always affect a harmonious relationship in *Ulysses*. In fact, the "Lestrygonians" and "Scylla and Charybdis" episodes mark the end of such peaceful co-existence and mutual cooperation. "Wandering Rocks" begins the gradual erosion of this relationship, as the narrative becomes increasingly autocratic and domineering over its inhabitants, until it almost completely dominates the atmosphere of "Oxen of the Sun." In "Circe" the "turbulence" caused by this increased agitation explodes and exposes the mechanics of the relationship between self and environment, sending each off to work at cross purposes through "Eumaeus" and "Ithaca,"

until they are finally reintegrated through Molly's intuitive understanding of the relationship in "Penelope."

Though a convincing argument can be made that the characters' humanity breaks through all narrative "tricks" within *Ulysses*, there can be no doubt that, from "Wandering Rocks" through "Oxen of the Sun" the narrative appears to become increasingly territorial, forcing the characters to express themselves on its terms. In "Wandering Rocks" the continuity of time itself is fractured as the character's actions are presented in seemingly unrelated fragments, forcing a correlative fracture in the surface consistency of the identities of these characters. If no dependable sense of time exists for the memory to look back across, it cannot possibly perceive the unification of self. In "Sirens" the characters' descriptions are filtered through musical conceits and tropes which induce the impression that the environment is dominating the definition of their identities. In "Cyclops," this is taken a step further when we are for the first time since his appearance in "Calypso," denied access to Bloom's thoughts. We are thus obliged to define Bloom through and against the people that surround him, and by means of the exaggerated descriptions of the telescopic or mythological narrator. In "Nausicaa" Bloom is comically described in the idiom of popular romance novels until, as if to allow us a final glimpse of the "real" Bloom before the final assault, the narrative permits us to see one of the longest uninterrupted instances of stream of consciousness in *Ulysses*[54].

In "Oxen of the Sun" this process is brought to its logical conclusion. The characters are here not only dominated by their environment, but by multiple environments, expressed as

---

[54] This part of the episode is remarked upon in greater detail in the conclusion to this paper. See below: pg.126.

the development of English prose. In the process their identities are blurred, as Bernard Benstock notes:

> The precise individuation of characters, a commonplace and fixed certainty in the real world, no longer pertains in the flux of interstellar metamorphoses, as Martha and Molly merge as lost, Martha and Milly as letter writers, Bridie and Milly as young virgins on the brink of sexuality (85).

This breakdown of personal identity occurs because the narrative in the episode insists on *totally* identifying the characters with their mythological or historical analogues. Thus Bloom becomes "sir Leopold... the goodliest guest that ever sat in a scholar's hall" in the narrative idiom of Mallory's *Morte d'Arthur* (14.181-182), "Mr. Cautious Calmer" in the style of Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress* (14.469), and he is rebuked as "his own and his only enjoyer" in prose reminiscent of Junius's satires (14.914-915). Similarly, Stephen becomes "young boastherd (14.429), "Mr Coadjutor Deacon Dedalus" (14.1004-1005) and Mr S. Dedalus (Div[initatus] Scep[ticus]). Initially it appears as if this process of historical projection supports the arguments of such critics as Cheryl Herr, Karen Lawrence and Thomas Brook[55]: that the expression of identity is ineluctably dependent upon environmental context.

Their are several problems with this thesis, however, which are revealed upon closer scrutiny of the "Oxen of the Sun" episode. First, Lawrence claims that Bloom's speech in the episode "purports to be a direct transcription" (130). It does not. In fact, *nothing* in the episode purports to be a direct transcription of dialogue, since the tell-tale dashes are absent,

---

[55] See Brook's essay in *Benstock*: "Formal Re-creation: Re-reading and Re-joycing the Re-writings of *Ulysses*." (277-292): "If the reader tries to translate each chapter he is creating a new book" (285).

save only the song and poetry fragments, spoken by Lynch (14.649-650) and Costello (14.317; 405-407). Though it is surely true that Joyce wrote "Oxen" directly in the different styles[56], this does not support the thesis that the character's expressions are not in fact translated. In fact, the ideas expressed in the episode are certainly consistent with the characters expressing them. It is not difficult to conceive of either Stephen's pretensions about his artistic ability, or Lynch's deflation of his ego (14.1110-1123). Moreover, it is inconsistent to insist that the episode "actually" occurs, that these people meet in the maternity hospital, and also to claim that they actually speak in such dialects. The thesis that the narrative is animated vitiates this uncomfortable contradiction.

If the narrative itself is perceived as a character in *Ulysses* it is easy to see how such a translation could occur. It is the logical culmination of the progression of narrative pre-eminence begun in "Wandering Rocks." The result is a process of character definition that is strangely Cyclopean[57] in essence, but the direction of the defining force is reversed. In the "Cyclops" episode, we saw how the characters choose to define themselves categorically, and that this position is untenable. In "Oxen" this categorization comes directly from the environment imposed on character through the narrative styles. Thus the "heroic" elements of Bloom's character are accentuated by the Mallory narration, the Jewish elements by the Anglo-Saxon prose style. Lawrence has concluded on the basis of this evidence that "Joyce is at

---

[56] See Groden: 44.

[57] This is of course assuming that each style is taken separately. If they are viewed together, the result is, as Scholes argues, an "enrich[ment of] our experience of the characters presented or the events narrated" (*Benstock* 249). Perhaps a manifestation of the *nacheinander* and *nebeneinander* to which Stephen alludes in "Proteus".

pains to show that style confers a role on character" (131), but this is only partially true. As Robert Scholes has argued: "each voice must narrate an appropriate segment" (248). The facets of each character reduce the number of styles that can be used to describe them, since the traits attributed to Bloom in "Oxen" -- though comically extended -- were present before the episode.

Far from being an endorsement (*pace* Herr) of the idea that environment dominates the development of individual identity to the point where the concept of individuation itself is questioned, "Oxen" offers a paradigmatic explication of the relationship between self and environment. The characters in "Oxen" influence their environment to the extent that the styles chosen to describe them must be appropriate; however, once contained within that environment the characters' identities are "stretched" by it through an extension of their constituent parts. This "stretching" can show the subject in a positive (as in the underscoring of Bloom's heroics) or negative (as in the highlighting of his refusal to have sex with Molly) light.

In this sense, the concentration upon narrative innovation from "Wandering Rocks" to "Oxen of the Sun" can be seen as the completion of the dialectic between self and environment. Like the Stephen of *A Portrait* the narrative wanders off and tries to define itself on its own terms, only to recognize in "Oxen of the Sun" that personal identity is what it "damn well has to see." Identity is an almost immovable object that environment can influence, help develop and stretch, but beyond which it cannot travel. James Maddox reads this process as an "assault upon character," a test conducted to display the endurance and consistency of personal identity. It is more properly read as a test of the strength of the

reciprocal relationship between self and environment which forms personal identity in the first place. Bloom may endure as an individuated entity, at least until the nightmarish fade out at the end of "Oxen", but he does so, as argued in Chapter II of this paper, by either consciously or unconsciously perceiving and embodying the relationship between self and environment, even as the narrative itself appears questions its veracity.

"What now is will then morrow as was be past yester."
(*Ulysses* 15.2409-2410)

"Circe" dramatizes the identity-environment inter-penetration that I have been examining throughout this paper. It has been noted above that Joyce develops through *Ulysses* an idea similar to that of Yeats's *anima mundi*, whereby thoughts and actions, once brought into existence cannot be contained within the confines of their generator. As Bernard Benstock has noted: "words have their independent existences as they are being transmitted and appropriated" (5). These words are spoken back in the "Circe" episode, as if the collective memory of the book, what Karen Lawrence calls the "dream of the text," were being emptied; in the process the integrity of personal identity appears to be blithely violated. For example, an hypostatization involving Bloom recalls John Taylor's courtroom speech, which was recited in the *Freeman* office while Bloom was not present. Bloom, like King Hamlet's ghost, appears to display familiarity with an event that he cannot possibly know occurred. This type of conundrum appears again and again in "Circe" without any rational explanation. There is, however, a supra-rational explanation for such events in the episode, indicated by the following exchange:

BLOOM

That voice is the voice of Esau.

SECOND WATCH

(blesses himself) How is that possible?

FIRST WATCH

It is not in the penny catechism.

PADDY DIGNAM

By metempsychosis. Spooks.

This passage implies that Paddy Dignam, literally disinherited through death, is participating in the mythological disinheritance of Esau, through "metempsychosis." Joyce's version of the "transmigration of souls" represents a spiritualism that supplants the Catholicism which permeates Dublin; thus it is not found a Catholic book of worship. This spiritualism implies that archetypes such as Esau have independent existences, and as successive individuals participate in the characteristics which made their predecessors archetypes, it lends a richness to the identities of the former.

The imperative here is of course on the fact that in order to develop this richness, the individual must approach experience openly, and accept such permeating influences without the fear of having their own identity dissolved. The more immediate examples of identity disruption in the episode are indicative of this process. Their appearance is important because it not only reinforces the claim that individuals are able to participate in grandiose, mythological patterns of identity, but that they also participate in more localized and imminent patterns, which are accessible to their more immediate, living community. The development of these patterns of identity is in turn influenced by the participation of individuals in them. In

this respect, the critically controversial violations of personal identity in "Circe" become far less arresting since they are seen not as the realistic depiction of a particularized incident, but as a symbolic *representation* of the ubiquitously interactive relationship between identity and environment, and among the identities of separate individuals.

The process is typified in "Circe" by a mixing of the more distant past with both the days' events and those presently occurring. The first hypostatization in which Bloom fully participates (15.677-1276) offers an example of this process. Bloom is being "tried" for sexual licentiousness and perversion, among other things. Mary Driscoll, the Bloom's old housekeeper, is called upon to testify against him in front of a jury consisting of the people whom have alienated Bloom throughout the day, and the entire event is inspired by Bloom's confrontation with "the Watch." The result is a combination of events that isolates and extends one of Bloom's (perhaps everyone's) characteristics, sexual unorthodoxy, to a ridiculous degree. More important, these events are taken from both the narrative memory and from Bloom's, creating the overall impression of fluidity between self and environment; even those elements of the environment which Bloom did not directly experience. The hypostatization represents a complex process of association whereby an element of Bloom's present identity is referred to past manifestations in order to examine whether an element of continuity can be discerned between them; a continuity that reveals an enduring self.

The assault is made more complex by the acknowledgement that only one aspect of Bloom's identity is being tested. The entire self cannot be conjured because the environment in which it is defined cannot offer an experience so variegated that it allows for the simultaneous incarnation of all possible expressions of the self. It is only through experiences

that are temporally and spatially separated that the self can achieve a consistency, by offering substantially similar responses to all events. For Bloom, these responses proceed from an innate sense of good judgement, which is tempered by an equally innate sense of sympathy. This is the type of judgement that Bloom is refused in his first trial. His accusers attempt to force upon him a conception of identity based only upon supposed manifestations of his sexual appetites. Bloom's references to manifestations of his character realized through non-sexual experiences[58] then become an attempt to defend the consistency of his identity against charges of fragmentation.

In essence, Bloom is appealing to the breadth of experience to which any individual must respond, the interval which is the greatest possible ellipse, as a defence against charges of inconsistency. These experiences are the only arena in which the self can be expressed and developed. This is not to say, however, that individuals do not possess a personal identity; though many critics approach this position when they argue that "Circe" is an explication of the "oneness" of all individuals through time and space. Edward Gose, Jr. presents a case which[59] typifies this view:

> I would prefer to conclude that "Circe" most clearly defines Joyce's belief that magic and mystery underlie the universe; that the "borders of our memory" may "shift and become part of the universal memory [cf. *Hayman* 63-64]; that when our limited conscious selves relax their defensive ego-control, then roads parallel and contrary merge, then the underlying being becomes one (64).

---

[58] For example: "There is a medium in all things. Play cricket" (15.878), and "The friend of man. Trained by kindness" (15.697), are Bloom's responses to, respectively, Mary Driscoll's and the watch's attempts to define him narrowly.

[59] It is a position shared by Karen Lawrence, Suzette Henke, Marilyn French and Daniel Ferrer, to name a few.

This argument overstates the point considerably. In the process, it eradicates the possible existence of any meaningful notion of individuation in the concept of identity which underwrites *Ulysses*. "The medium in all things" is the enduring self, the "ultimate return" from all possible manifestations in experience, and all associations with mythological or local patterns of identity. There is a vast and important difference between a conception of identity which sees all things as inter-related and one which sees all things as one. The former implies an atemporal ontology which eliminates the possibility of development in the realm of either identity or environment. In other words, it implies that that which is, always has been, and always will be.

Joyce's notion of identity, as it is manifest in *Ulysses*, allows for much more play than does such a pseudo-deterministic theory. In order for the self to be able to develop in any substantial sense, it must exist in a realm of many possible manifestations. *Ulysses* moves toward an expansion of these possibilities rather than a reduction. As has been noted in Chapter II, seemingly insignificant decisions lead one toward larger these larger patterns of identity, and these smaller decisions, whether conscious or unconscious are generated by an individuated faculty of judgement. This does not mean that once arrived the individual is overwhelmed by the larger pattern: that is the pitfall of Stephen Dedalus in *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*. Rather, as Richard Ellmann has argued: "[w]henever resemblances become especially close, Joyce warns us that he is working with near-identities, not perfect ones, approximating each other at some remove, as a left glove resembles a right" (58). According to this paradigm, *Ulysses* posits a theory of identity whereby its relationship with

its environment is mutually enriching and developing. If individuation is removed from this process then much of the book has been spent whistling in the dark.

Robert Scholes writes that "[a]s his career progressed, [Joyce] accepted less and less willingly the notion of characters bounded by their own skins, and of actions that take place at one location in space-time, and then are lost forever" (246). This results of this conviction are most ubiquitously manifest in *Finnegans Wake*, but are also present in surprising ways in "Circe." The complex symbolic associations of Stephen and Bloom offer the most encouraging evidence in support Stephen's positive development as an artist, but it is by no means conclusive. Joyce stopped short of concretizing the destinies of his characters because the conception of identity that he develops through them in *Ulysses* does not permit such determinism. Their identities are determined neither by their environment nor by an heroic, romantic act of will, but only through a posture which admits experience, a sense of judgement which evaluates it, and faith in an unconscious capacity to assimilate it.

Conclusion

"But there is one thing he'll never do."
(*Ulysses* 8.985)

In the "Lestrygonians" episode, Nosey Flynn claims that Bloom will never sign his name to anything: "Nothing in black and white" (8.988). Bloom is given the chance to prove him wrong at the end of "Nausicaa," but he can only write "I..AM. A." in the sand with a stick. More than an intended message to Gerty MacDowell, this unfinished utterance is one of the most highly charged symbols in *Ulysses*. Critics have leapt on the interpretive possibilities presented by Bloom's unwillingness to finish the sentence to claim everything from: "[Bloom] fails to go beyond the vapid assertion... to an affirmation of personal identity. Once again, Joyce challenges us to fill in the blank" (Henke 169), to John Z. Bennett's assertion that the message is better left incomplete (Benstock 89). It is closer to the truth, however, to say that the sentence *cannot* be completed.

The incomplete message represents the futility of self-definition in the sense that, if Bloom finishes the sentence, he assists the attempts of the Citizen and "Thersites" to define him categorically. The notion of identity that is manifest in *Ulysses*, as I have been documenting, revolts against such a possibility. The difference Bloom affirms on Sandymount Strand is the difference between "I am a cuckold" and "I was cuckolded;" it is the ability to experience without having any specific experience overcome the self. The long stream of consciousness narration that precedes Bloom's writing substantiates this interpretation, as it represents Bloom's conscious attempt to come to terms with the events of the day; a process

which mirrors their unconscious assimilation into his identity in "Circe." Bloom resolutely refuses to have any of the events, even his wife's adultery, change him fundamentally.[60]

Over the course of 16 June, 1904 Bloom has withstood an enormous number of assaults on his identity, from within and without. Whether it be the attempt at categorization by the Citizen, absorption by his environment in "Oxen of the Sun," or meticulous dissection in "Ithaca," Bloom remains more than the sum of his parts. His identity, though it cannot be named, certainly exists, reflected in his sense of judgement, conviction and action. Though he may seem extremely flexible, the constant strain which strings together Bloom's thoughts, memories and actions creates the overwhelming impression of a coherent identity. It is perhaps a paradox -- and a clichéd one at that -- that we know more *about* Bloom than we do any fictional character but do not know *him*, but it is more properly stated that we cannot "pin him down" or characterize him. It does not mean that we can say, with David Hume, that personal identity is nothing but a jumble of perceptions and sensations which forms no coherent pattern or mode of being.

That is not to say that there are not characters in *Ulysses* who eerily personify Hume's notion of identity. Buck Mulligan can be counted in this camp, as can the "Sirens" barmaids and barflies, who seem totally overcome by sensation or emotion. *Ulysses* appears to be thus implying that any individual is free to cultivate a coherent self, or to "barter it away in an act of simony" (Maddox 9). Leopold Bloom stands as a testimony to the fact that such coherence

---

[60] Note (13.1276-1277) where Bloom decides that he will not accompany Molly on the singing tour, thus leaving her free -- as he does on 16 June, 1904 -- to continue the affair with Boylan.

is possible. This coherence is not, however, created by an imperial proclamation of individual will, as Sartre often argues. There can be no doubt that in *Ulysses*, as in Sartre, the individual retains ultimate responsibility for their actions, and in a palpable sense, their identity. However, in *Ulysses* the identity works in conjunction with experience to the extent that it creates a realm of possible interpretations of sensation or perception. These possibilities are in turn tempered by the notion of *quidditas* or essence of things, which restricts possible interpretation: this cannot verily be that. In this reciprocal, prismatic, interpretive relationship between self and other, a coherent self is formed and cultivated.

Implicit in Jean-Paul Satre's argument about identity is the idea that the self can also be *changed* by a monumental act of will. Joyce's earliest conception of epiphany seems obliquely to ally him with Sartre in the sense that it agrees with the possibility of such change. Joyce went to great lengths, however, in *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* in order to show the dangers of a romantic conception of self, which determines the method of fulfilment from within, and then seeks to find the substance with which to enact this conception in the world without. In *Ulysses* these autocratic proclamations dissipate, though they do not disappear from Stephen's character. The epiphany implies that if such revolutionary change is to occur, its method must be discovered through experience rather than created *in vitro*.

Finally, in *Ulysses* even the possibility of such change is fundamentally questioned in favour of a much more gradual personal development. One of the most important and compelling testimonies to the consistency of identity in the book is the implicit argument that the self is cultivated from one experience to the next. Past manifestations of the self thus cannot be discarded since they affect in complex, often unconscious ways the creation of the

present one. In this sense, the identity is a compendium of past selves, discovered through memory. As James Maddox has argued: "The soul is mysterious, unknowable; it is the task of the artist to mold his words around that central identity, to give as clearly as possible its contours and movements" (11). These "words" in *Ulysses* take the form of the character's past, present and possible future experiences, and their reflective judgements concerning those experiences. It is only when they are taken together do they express the character's being and help him mark the middle ground between "death traps of prefabrication and formlessness" (Kiely 20). Irreducible and resistant to categorical definition, the identity is an animating presence. Bloom is the hero of *Ulysses* because of the extent to which he cultivates and expresses this presence.

Works Consulted

Battaglia, Rosemarie A. "Joyce, Stephen, Bloom." Notes on Modern Irish Literature. 2 (1990): 25-8.

Bell, Robert H. Jocoserious Joyce: The Fate of Folly in *Ulysses*. Ithica: Conell UP, 1991.

Benstock, Bernard. Narrative Con/Texts in *Ulysses*. Urbana: U of Illinois Press, 1991.

---, ed. Critical Essays on James Joyce's *Ulysses*. Boston: G.K. Hall & Co, 1989.

---. ed. The Augmented Ninth: Proceedings of the Ninth International James Joyce Symposium. Syracuse: SUP, 1988.

Birt, Robert E. "The Prospects for Community in the Later Sartre." International Philosophical Quarterly. 29 (1989): 139-48.

Bogumil, Mary-Louise. "Joyce's Use of Synaesthesis: The Intra and Inter-Episodic Recurrence of Sensory Impressions in *Ulysses*." Dissertation Abstracts International. 49.10 (1989), 3031A.

Bosinelli, Rose Maria Bolletieri et al., eds. The Languages of Joyce: Selected Papers from the 11th International James Joyce Symposium. Philadelphia: Benjamins, 1992.

Bosley, Richard. "Do Mencius and Hume Make the Same Ethical Mistake?" Philosophy East and West. 38 (1988): 3-18.

Brivic, Sheldon R. "Time, Sexuality and Identity in Joyce's *Ulysses*." JJQ. 7 (Fall, 1969): 30-51.

---. "The Veil of Signs: Perceptionas Language in James Joyce's *Ulysses*." ELH 57 (1990): 737-55.

Brooks, D.H.M. "Strawson, Hume and the Unity of Consciousness." Mind. 94 (1985): 583-6.

Brown, Charlotte. "Is Hume an Internalist?" Journal of the History of Philosophy. 26 (1988): 69-87.

Budgen, Frank. James Joyce and the Making of *Ulysses*. Rev Ed. London: OUP, 1972.

Carver, Craig. "James Joyce and the Theory of Magic." JJQ. 15 (1978): 201-214.

Castle, Gregory. "'I Am Almosting It'; History, Nature and the Will to Power in *Proteus*." JJQ. 29.2 (1992): 281-96.

Charme, Stuart L. Vulgarity and Authenticity: Dimensions of Otherness in the World of Jean-Paul Sartre. Boston: UMass P, 1991.

Chazan, Pauline. "Pride, Virtue and Self-Hood: A Reconstruction of Hume." Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 22 (1992): 45-64.

Cixous, Helene. The Exile of James Joyce. Trans. Sally A.J. Purcell. New York: David Lewis, 1982.

---. "At Circe's, or the Self-Opener." Boundary. 3 (Winter 1975): 387-97.

Clarke, John. "Joyce and the Blakean Vision." Criticism. 5 (Spring, 1963): 173-80.

Copeland, R.A. and G.W. Turner. "The Nature of Joyce's Parody in *Ithica*." MLR. 64 (October, 1969): 759-63.

Costello, Peter. James Joyce: The Years of Growth. London: Kyle Cathie, 1992.

Creel, Richard E. "Atheism and Freedom: A Response to Sartre and Baier." Religious Studies. 20 (1984): 281-91.

Crossman, Robert. "Who was M'Intosh?" JJQ. 7 (Winter 1968): 128-36.

Damrosch, Leopold. Fictions of Reality in the Age of Hume and Johnson. Madison: UWisc. P, 1989.

Davenport, Gary. "Joyce's Self-Consciousness." Southern Review. 27.4 (1991): 756-70.

Dervin, Daniel. "Bloom Again? Questions of Aggression and Pychoanalytic Reconstruction in James Joyce's *Ulysses*." American Imago. 47.3-4 (1990) 249-69.

Dilman, Ilham. "Sartre and our Identity as Individuals." Philosophy. 29 (1991): 245-64.

Ellis, Robert Richmond. The Tragic Pursuit of Being: Unamuno and Sartre. Birmingham: UAlabama P, 1988.

Ellmann, Richard. "The Backgrounds of *Ulysses*." Kenyon Review. 16 (Summer, 1954): 337-86.

---, The Consciousness of Joyce. Toronto: OUP, 1977.

---, James Joyce. Oxford: OUP, 1959.

---, "James Joyce's *Ulysses*." Inventario. 17.1 (1962): 22-33.

---, ed. Letters of James Joyce. vols. II-III. New York: Viking, 1966.

---, ed. Selected Letters of James Joyce. New York: Viking, 1975.

---, "*Ulysses* and the Divine Nobody." Yale Review. 47 (Autum, 1957): 56-71.

---, "*Ulysses* and the Odyssey." English Studies. 43 (October, 1962): 423-6.

---. *Ulysses* on the Liffey. New York: OUP, 1972.

Elwood, Brian D. "The Problem of the Self in the Later Nishida and in Sartre." Philosophy East and West. 44 (April 1994): 303-316.

Ferreira, M. Jamie. "Hume and the Imagination: Sympathy and 'the Other'." International Philosophical Quarterly. 34 (1994): 38-57.

Fish, Stanley. "Things and Actions Indifferent: The Temptation of Plot in *Paradise Regained.*" Milton Studies. 17 (1983): 163-85.

French, Marylin. The Book as World: James Joyce's *Ulysses*. Cambridge: HUP, 1976.

Freud, Sigmund. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. Gen. ed. and trans. James Strachey. 24 vols. London: The Hogarth Press, 1953-74.

Froula, Christine. "History's Nightmare, Fiction's Dream: Joyce and the Psychohistory of *Ulysses*." JJQ. 28.4 (1991): 873-78.

Frumkin, Robert. "*Ulysses*: Stephen's Parable of the Plums." Colby Quarterly. 28.1 (1992): 5-18.

Galperin, William H. "The Defeat of the Suitors: Homer and Joyce Once More." JJQ. 20.4 (1983): 455-9.

Geckel, G.L. "Stephen Dedalus as Lapwing: A Symbolic Center of *Ulysses*." JJQ. 6 (Winter, 1968): 104-14.

Gifford, Don with Robert J. Seidman. *Ulysses* Annotated. Rev & Expanded Ed. Berkeley: UCP, 1988.

Gilbert, Stuart. James Joyce's *Ulysses*: A Study. New York: Knopf, 1930.

Giles, James E. "The No-Self Theory: Hume, Buddhism and Personal Identity." Philosophy East and West. 43 (1993): 175-200.

Gill, Richard. "The Corporal Works of Mercy as Moral Pattern in *Ulysses*." TCL. 9 (1963): 17-21.

Gillie, Christopher. Character in English Literature. London: Chatto & Windus, 1965.

Girard, Rene. Desire, Deceit and the Novel: Self and Other in Literary Structure. Baltimore: JHUP, 1965.

Glasheen, Adaline. "Another Face for *Proteus*." JJR. 1 (1957): 3-8.

Goldberg, S.L. The Classical Temper:A Study of James Joyce's *Ulysses*. London: Chatto & Windus, 1961.

Goldthorpe, Rhiannon. Sartre, Literature and Theory. Cambridge: CUP, 1984.

Gose, Jr. Elliott B. The Transformation Process in Joyce's *Ulysses*. Toronto: UTP, 1980.

Groden, Michael. *Ulysses* in Progress. Princeton: PUP, 1977.

Hart, Clive and David Hayman, eds. James Joyce's *Ulysses*: Critical Essays. Berkeley: UCP, 1974.

Hayman, David. *Ulysses*: The Mechanics of Meaning. New ed. Madison: U of Wisconson Press, 1982.

Heininger, Joseph C. "Stephen Dedalus in Paris: Tracing the Fall of Icarus in *Ulysses*." JJQ 23 (1986): 435-46.

Henke, Suzette. Joyce's Moraculous Sindbook. Columbus: Ohio State UP, 1978.

"Joyce's New Womanly Man: Sexual Signatures of Androgynous Transformation in *Ulysses*." Joycean Occasions: Essays from the Milwakee James Joyce Conference. eds. Janet E. Dunleavy et al. Newark: U of Delaware P, 1991. pgs. 15-32.

Herr, Cheryl. Joyce's Anatomy of Culture. Urbana: U of Illinois Press, 1986.

Hill, Marylu. "' Amor Matris': Mother and Self in the Telemaciad Episode of *Ulysses*. TCL. 39 (1993): 329-43.

Houston, John-Porter. Joyce and Prose: An Exploration of the Language of *Ulysses*. Lewisburg: Bucknell UP, 1989.

Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. 2nd rev ed. P.N. Niddetch ed. Oxford: Clarendon, 1978.

Joyce, James. Dubliners, ed. Robert Scholes. London: Penguin, 1967.

---, Exiles. New York: Penguin, 1973.

---, Finnegan's Wake. London: Penguin, 1982.

---, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man. London: Penguin, 1976.

---, Stephen Hero. London: Jonanthan Cape, 1969.

---. Ulysses. ed. H.W. Gabler et al. London: Penguin, 1986.

Kenner, Hugh. Ulysses. Rev Ed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1987.

---. Joyce's Voices. London: Faber, 1978.

Kiely, Robert. Beyond Egotism: The Fiction of James Joyce, Virginia Woolf and D.H. Lawrence. Cambridge: HarvardU P, 1980.

Killham, John. "Ineluctable Modality in Joyce's *Ulysses*." UTQ. 34 (1965): 269-89.

Kimball, Jean. "A Jungian Scenario for *Ulysses*." Comparative Lit Studies. 19.2 (1982): 195-207.

---, "Autobiography as Epic: Freud's Three Time Scheme in *Ulysses*." TSLL. 31.4 (1989): 475-96.

---. "Love and Death in *Ulysses*: 'Word Known to All Men'." JJQ 27 (1987): 143-60.

King, Debra W. "Just Can't Find the Words: How Expression is Achieved." Philosophy and Rhetoric. 24.1 (1991): 54-72.

Krysinski, Wladimir. "Subjectivities in *Ulysses* and Before." Social Discourse. 2.1-2 (1989): 3-12.

Kuen, Robert E. "Mr. Bloom and Mr. Joyce: A Note on Heroism in *Ulysses*." Wisconsin Studies in Contemporary Literature. 4 (1963): 209-15.

Law, Jules-David. "'Pity They Can't See Themselves': Assessing the 'Subject' of Pornography in *Nausicaa*." JJQ. 27.2 (1990): 219-39.

Lawrence, Karen. The Odyssey of Style in Joyce's *Ulysses*. Princeton: PUP, 1981.

Levitt, Morton P. "The Radical Consistency of Point of View in *Ulysses*: A Traditional Reading." JJQ 26 (1988): 67-88.

Losey, Jay. "Joyce's 'New Realism' in *Ulysses*." NMIL. 2 (1990): 19-24.

Loux, Ann Kimble. "'Am I a Father? If I Were?' A Trinitarian Analysis of the Growth of Stephen Dedalus in *Ulysses*." JJQ 22 (1985): 281-96.

Loxterman, Alan S. "Everyman His Own God: From *Ulysses* to *Finnegan's Wake*." James Joyce's Finnegan's Wake. ed. John Harty. New York: Garland, 1991.

Maddox, James H., Jr. Joyce's *Ulysses* and the Assault Upon Character. Brunswick: Rutgers UP, 1978.

Major, David. "The Satirizing Superpowers: Stephen Dedalus and Zarathustra." Colby Quarterly. 28.2 (1992): 115-22.

Mrkovic, Vida E. The Changing Face: Disintegration of Personality in the 20th Century Novel. London: Feffer & Simons Inc, 1970.

Mason, Ellsworth. "James Joyce: Moralist." TCL. 1 (January, 1956): 196-206.

McKnight, Jeanne. "Unlocking the Word-Hoard: Madness, Identity and Creativity in

James Joyce." JJQ. 14 (1977): 420-35.

Miller, Izchak. "Husserl and Sartre on the Self." Monist. 69 (1986): 534-45.

Miller, Nicholas A. "Beyond Recognition: Reading the Unconscious in the *Ithica* Episode of *Ulysses*." JJQ. 30 (1993): 209-18.

Min, Taeun. "Subjectivity, Language and Society in Joyce's *Dubliners, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* and *Ulysses*." Dissertation Abstracts International. No. DA9129858. 52.5 (1991).

Nadel, Ira. "Joyce and Expressionism." Journal of Modern Literature. 16.1 (1989): 141-160.

---. "*Circe*: Textual Method and Textual Meaning." Studies in the Novel. 22.2 (1990): 163-78.

Norton, David Fate. David Hume: Common Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician. Princeton: PUP, 1982.

O'Neill, William. "The Rout of the Suitors, The Making of an Artist: The Meaning of Parallel and Parody in *Ulysses*." Midwest Quarterly. 27 (1986): 401-21.

Osteen, Mark. "The Intertextual Economy in *Scylla & Charybdis*." JJQ. 28.1 (1990): 197-208.

Pappin, Joseph L., III. "Tradition and Radical Individualism: Burke and Sartre in Dialogue." Modern Age. 36 (1994): 286-93.

Petruso, Thomas F. Life Made Real: Character in the Novel Since Proust and Joyce. Ann Arbour: UMP, 1991.

Prescott, Joseph. "The Characterization of Leopold Bloom." Literature and Psychology.

9 (1959): 3-4.

---. "The Characterization of Stephen Dedalus." *Litterature Moderne*. 9 (1959): 145-63.

Rader, Ralph W. "Why Stephen's Hand Hurts: Joyce as Narcissus in *Ulysses*." JJQ. 26.3 (1989): 440-445.

Reynolds, Mary T. James Joyce: A Collection of Critical Essays. Eaglewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1993.

Riquelme, John Paul. Teller and Tale in Joyce's Fiction: Oscillating Perspectives. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1983.

Russell, H.K. "The Incarnation in *Ulysses*." Modern Fiction Studies. 4 (1958): 53-61.

Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness. trans. and introd. Hazel E. Barnes. New York: Washington Square Press, 1966.

Shechner, Mark. Joyce in Nighttown: A Psychoanalytic Inquiry into *Ulysses*. Berkeley: U of California Press, 1974.

Schrand, Thomas G. "Authority and Cathechesis: Narrative and Knowledge in *Ulysses*." JJQ. 28.1 (1990): 209-220.

Schwarz, Daniel. "Character and Characterization: An Inquiry." Journal of Narrative Technique. 19.1 (1989): 85-105.

Segall, Jeffrey. "Thirteen Ways of Looking at an Ad-Canvasser: Bloom and the Politics of Joyce Criticism." Joyce Studies Annual. 2 (1991): 245-51.

Seitz, Brian. "The Identity of the Subject, After Sartre: An Identity Marked by the Denial of Identity." Philosophy Today. 35 (1991): 362-71.

Senn, Fritz. "Sequential Close-Ups in Joyce's Ulysses." Modes of Narrative: Approaches

to American, Canadian and British Fiction. eds. Nischik, Reingard and Barbara Korte. Wurzburg: Konigshausen & Neumann, 1990. pgs. 252-264.

---. gen. ed. European Joyce Studies 3: Reading Joyce's "Circe". Amsterdam: Redopi Editions, 1994.

Shanahan, Dennis M. "The Eucharistic Aestheics of the Passion: The Testament of Blood in *Ulysses*." JJQ. 27.2 (1990): 373-86.

Staley, Thomas F. and Benard Benstock, eds. Approaches to *Ulysses*: Ten Essays. Pittsburgh: U of Pittsburgh P, 1970.

Steinberg, Erwin R. "*Lestrygonians*: A Pale *Proteus*?" Modern Fiction Studies. 15 (1969): 73-86.

---, "The *Proteus* Episode: Signature of Stephen Dedalus." JJQ. 5 (1968): 187-98.

---. "Reading Leopold Bloom/1904 in 1989." JJQ. 26.3 (1989): 397-416.

Summerhayes, Don. "Joyce's *Ulysses* and Whitman's 'Self': A Query." WSCL. 4 (1963): 216-24.

Taylor, A.E. Elements of Metaphysics. London: Methuen & Co., 1903.

Taylor, Charles. Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1988.

Theoharis, Theoharis Constantine. Joyce's Ulysses: An Anatomy of the Soul. Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1988.

Theunissen, Michael. The Other: Studies in the Social Ontology of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Buber. Boston: MIT P, 1984.

Thornton, Weldon. Allusions in *Ulysses*. Chapel Hill: UNCP, 1968.

Tomm, Winifred A. "Autonomy and Interrelatedness: Spinoza, Hume and Vasubandhu." Zygon. 22 (1987): 459-78.

Tracy, Robert. "Leopold Bloom Fourfold: A Hungarian-Hebraic-Hellenic-Hibernian-Hero." Mass Review. 6 (1965): 523-38.

Tripathi, Vanashree. "Bi-Polar Self Reflexivity and Illusions of Transcendence in Joyce's *Ulysses*." Aligarh Journal of English Studies. 14.2 (1989): 189-201.

Tweedie, Gordon, "'Common Sense': James to Joyce and the Pragmatic L. Bloom." JJQ. 26.3 (1989): 351-66.

Weinstein, Phillip M. The Semantics of Desire: Changing Models of Idenity From Dickens to Joyce. Princeton: PUP, 1984.

Williams, Andrew P. "Hero Bloom: The Development of Character in the *Calypso* Chapter of Joyce's *Ulysses*." Midwest Quarterly. 33 (1992): 420-9.

Williams, Trevor. "Demystifying the Power and the Given: the *Telemachus* Episode of *Ulysses*. TCL. 37 (1991): 38-53.

Wollaeger, Mark A. "Bloom's Coronation and the Subjection of the Subject." JJQ. 28.4 (1991): 799-808.

White, John. "*Ulysses*: The Metaphysical Dimension and Grand Design." MFS. 15 (1969): 27-34.

Zacchi, Romana. "Quoting Words and Worlds: Discourse Strategies in Ulysses." JJQ. 27.1 (1989): 101-9.