SOKOTO-EMIRATE RELATIONS, 1804-1903:

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Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

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October, 1973

ABSTRAIT

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Titre de thèse:

Une analyse des relations entre Sokoto et ses

émirats de 1804 à 1903.

Département:

L'institut des études islamiques, l'université

de McGill.

Degré:

M.A.

cette thèse a pour but de préciser la nature des relations entre Sokoto et les émirats dans le dix-neuvième siècle. Elle a trait en particulièr à la question de l'autorité de Sokoto, c'est-à-dire, son abilité d'influencer et de diriger les affaires des émirats. La façon de procédor a consisté en l'examination de certies droits que possédait Sokoto; et qui plaçaient Sokoto dans une position supérieure vis-à-vis les émirats. En éclaireissant les points forts et les faiblesses de la position de Sokoto, cet oeuvre va estayer de clarifier le problème de l'autorité pour faire mieux comprendre le processus gouvernemental dans le califat de Sokoto.

ABSTRACT

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Title of Themis: Sokoto-Emirate Relations, 1804-1903: An Analysis.

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This thesis is concerned with ascertaining the nature of Sokoto-Emirate relations in the nineteenth century, and pays particular attention to the question of Sokoto's authority, or its ability to influence and determine the direction of emirate affairs over which it supposedly had dominion. The methodology employed to achieve such an end has been the examination, in as far as was possible, of certain prerogatives which Sokoto possessed and which placed it in its ascendant position vis-a-vis its subordinate emirate components. By elucidating the strengths and weaknesses of Sokoto's position and defining the limitations on its power to influence and control certain aspects of emirate affairs, this investigation attempts to place the problem of authority in a clearer perspective and provide a better understanding of governmental processes and procedures in the Sokoto Caliphate.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to extend words of thanks to all those who, in one way or other, helped in the formulation and execution of this thesis. Unfortunately, limitations of space permit me only to mention but a few personally. First of all, I am particularly indebted to Professor A.M. Abu Hakima for his constant guidance and invaluable suggestions and criticisms during the course of the thesis. I am also extremely grateful to Mr. M.S. Zahradeen for his assistance with regard to Hausa technical terms and proper names, and for his many useful insights into the history of nineteenth-century Northern Nigeria.

TRANSLITERATION AND ABBREVIATIONS

Hausa terms, the <u>Gaskiya</u> system has been utilized (for the armicized equivalents of proper names, consult table in Appendices). Otherwise, with a couple of exceptions, the Institute of Islamic Studies' transliteration system has been employed throughout. Such exceptions are the use of the anglicized form of certain Arabic terms (e.g. Caliph for <u>Khalifah</u>, Vizier for <u>Mazir</u>, and emir for <u>amir</u>), and the retention of authors' transliteration systems when passages are directly quoted.

During the course of this thesis certain journals and reference works have been abbreviated as follows:

BEOAS - Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies.

JAS - Journal of the African Society.

JUSN - Journal of the Mistorical Society of Nigeria.

ET - Encyclopedia of Islam, New Edition.

At times, certain English. Arabic, and Hausa terms are followed by parenthisized remarks, initiated by either 'A' or 'H', the former denoting that Arabic translation or equivalent is following, and the latter, the Hausa.

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INTRODUCTION

The Fulani jihad. instigated by Usman dan Fodio in 1804, resulted in the establishment of a form of political organization that had never previously existed in Hausaland - the Caliphate. This framework not only included emirates in regions that possessed a prior acquaintance with Islam and a relatively sophisticated system of government, such as the pre-Fulani Hausa States and territories detached from the Bornu empire, but also emirates carved out of primarily paganized regions that had previously possessed only rudimentary forms of political organization.

The intention of this dissertation is to examine and analyze the nature of the relationship that existed between Sokoto, representing the apex of the Fulani polity under the office of Caliph, and the various emirate components that comprised the Caliphate.

In essence, Sokoto's suzerainty over the emirates was reflected by three major prerogatives that it possessed: (1) its power over the appointment and deposition of emirs and certain other high-ranking officials in the emirates; (2) its right of arbitration in interand intra-emirate disputes; and (3) Sokoto's power to exact tribute (H. Gaisua, Gandu), military levies

(A. maddad), and regular journeys of fealty from the constituent members of the Caliphate.

action between Sokoto and the emirates, these enumerated powers are utilized as a basis with which to conduct such a study. The more important and controversial appointment, deposition, and arbitration issues, together with changes and fluctuations in tribute, military levies, and submission visits, are depicted and analyzed to provide an effective measure or barometer of the extent and effectiveness of Sokoto's power and control over its emirates, considered both regionally and over the lifespan of the Caliphate.

Theoretically, Sokoto's suzerainty extended over Gwandu and its subordinate emirates of Gurma, Yauri, Nupe. Ilorin, Pateggi, Lafiagi, Agaie, and Lapai. In practice, however, Usman dan Fodio's administrative division of the Fulani empire between his brother, Abdullahi, and his son, Muhammadu Bello, created two separate political bodies, even though the paramount position of Sokoto was always recognized by Gwandu. This study, therefore, is only concerned with that part of the Fulani empire directly within Sokoto's juridiction; the emirates

of Katsina, Kano, Zaria, Kazaure, Daura, Kontagora, Hadejia, Katagum, Missau, Jema'are, Gombe, Muri, Bauchi, and Adamawa (Yola).

The histories of the Sokoto emirates are, however, far from complete, especially with regard to aspects under consideration in this dissertation (e.g. appointments, dismissals, disputes). As a result, it has become necessary to delete certain emirates from consideration (Kontagora, Kazaure, Bauchi, Daura, and Jema'are). Regardless of these deficiencies, however, there still exists sufficient material available to provide a more than satisfactory study of the dynamics of Sokoto-emirate relations.

The first chapter of the thesis is concerned with the 'static' characteristics of Sokoto's relations with its subordinate emirates, and involves a brief study of the political and administrative apparatus established by Sokoto to control and supervise its emirate components.

Because appointment, deposition, and arbitration issues are often inextricably interwoven, it is necessary to consider such aspects together rather than as separate entities. The second chapter, therefore, considers the more important appointment, deposition, and arbitration

incidents in the emirates of Katsina, Kano, and Zaria, which represent those emirates that arose from the pre-Fulani Hausa States. These states are also representative of those emirates over which Sokoto exerted a fairly considerable derree of influence and control. A similar modus operandi is employed in the following chapter, which is concerned with those emirates located in the north-east of the Sokoto Caliphate and which were created out of the 'ermitories captured from the Bornu empire (Katagum, Hadelia, and Missau), and those emirates situated in the east and south-east of the Caliphate and constructed from primarily pagan areas (Adamawa, Gombe, and Muri). These emirates, as distinct from those emirates examined in the previous chapter, are generally representative of states which possessed a relatively greater degree of independence from Sokoto.

Finally, in the fourth chapter, the question of tribute, submission visits, and military levies is examined, but, in this regard, all the emirates under the Sokoto hegemony are considered together.

^{1.} cf. B.J. Dudley, Parties and Politics in Northern .

Nigeria (London: 1968), p. 55; R.A. Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria 1804-1906 (London: 1001), pp. 70-94.

Chapter I

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOKOTO'S EXTERNAL POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS

The political and administrative machinery constructed by Sokoto to control and supervise its emirates was in a continuous state of development and refinement throughout the nineteenth century. Usman dan Fodio, essentially disinterested in governmental problems, nevertheless provided the community with the barest essentials of Muslim political organization. Relying on offices condoned by medieval Muslim jurists, and rejecting many of the pre-Fulani Hausa titled positions, he supplied the rudiments on which later developments were based. So long as the nascent community was involved first in selfpreservation and then in rapid expansion, these limited and ill-defined offices sufficed. However, it was left to Muhammadu Bello (1817-37), the real architect of the political and administrative system, and Aliyu Babba (1842-59) to provide the Sokoto empire with the machinery of government that was to last in its essence throughout the remainder of the Caliphate, and, with various modifications, through much of the colonial period. Bello synthesized the nebulous and rudimentary government, implemented by Usman and by now clearly ill-suited to the needs of the essentially consolidated empire, with aspects of the traditional Hausa system that would not conflict with the original raison d'etre of the jihad, namely, among others, the abolition of forms of government that were contrary to the Sharl ah. Bello's initiatives, however, were

organization in metropolitan Sokoto. It was left to Aliyu Babba to refine Bello's designs so as to include the imperial network in addition to the Sokoto hinterland.

Usman dan Fodio's Kitab al-Farq, one of the major political treatises for the Fulani mujahidun, laid out the basic framework of government. Based on late $^{
m C}$ Abbasid sources for the SharT $^{
m C}$ ah, it decried the behaviour and government of the Hausa kingdoms and called for the creation of ministers of government who would guide the community within the Sharfcah. Besides the office of khallfah, which he considered to be obligatory upon the ummah, he demanded the establishment of umara! in each of the provinces, the wazīr, the qadī, the chief of police (A. wall al-shurtah), the tax collector (A. sact) and the imam. During his own lifetime, Usman made every effort to comply with the theory that he had espoused, and it appears that, with minor exceptions, no other offices of state were created, at least not within metropolitan Sokoto. According to Johnston,

Shehu had always set his face against courts, hierarchies, and titles, all of which he regarded as earthly vanities, and so during his lifetime the machinery through which the Sultanate was administered and the Empire governed remained rudimentary.

Prior to the fall of Alkalawa, that witnessed the defeat of the Gobirawa Hausa and the firm establishment of the Sokoto <u>mujāhidūn</u>, little effort had been made to create an effective apparatus to supervise the various <u>nuwwār/emirs</u> that had been appointed by Sokoto. Whilst, in the early years of the <u>jihād</u> (1804-8), Sokoto had been overly concerned with its own survival, the various emirs had acted in almost complete independence and isolation from Sokoto. Alkalawa's capture in 1808-9, however, relieved much of the pressure from self-preservation, and provided Usman with the opportunity to establish a more organized administrative system.

The direction that his initiatives took was the administrative division of the Caliphate between his brother. Abdullahi, and son, Muhammadu Bello, both of whom had been his chief helpers, or Viziers, until this time. The division, whose date it seems is uncertain, gave Guandu and the West to Abdullahi and the East, centred on Sokoto town, to Bello. Within Bello's portfolio lay responsibility for the supervision of the emirates of Katsina, Kano, Daura, Bauchi, Gombe, Katagum, Bornu, Zaria, Hadejia, and Adamawa.

At the accession of Muhammadu Bello as Sarkin Musulmi (A. AmTr al Mu'minTn) in 1817, Usman's rudimentary

framework had lost its usefulness, and a more sophisticated system had become necessary to cope with the growing problems of government. Bello's reforms, however, did not have an immediate effect on the apparatus of imperial affairs. Rather, his contribution lay in the improved administration of metropolitan Sokoto. Yet, it was the pattern of rovernment which he established for Sokoto's domestic front that was later adopted by the Caliph Aliya Babba to look after Sokoto's external affairs (i.e. the emirates that comprised the caliphate). Under Bello, emirate affairs were still entrusted in their entirety to the office of the Vizierate and its household. No other officer of state had, as yet, responsibility in this direction.

To meet the needs of a more complex system of covernment, Bello relied heavily on the traditional pre-fulani Hausa political organization. To assist him in government, Bello adopted the pre-Fulani offices of Galadima, Ubandoma, Magajin Rafi and Magajin Gari.

Together, with the Vizier, Alkali (A. qādī) and Amīr al-Jaysh, positions which had been instituted by Usman dan Fodio, they formed an informal Council of State on which the Caliph occasionally relied for advice and counsel. For territorial administration, Bello adopted other titled offices, such as Sarkin Sudan,

Sarkin Zamfara, and Sarkin Kebbi, and placed them in strategic ribats and on fiels throughout Sokoto province

To control and supervise these resident fiefholders he utilized the kofa system, and the court ministers he had created, the <u>Ubandoma</u>, <u>Galadima</u>, <u>Magajin Rafi</u> and and <u>Magajin Gari</u>, were given the necessary tasks of supervision. These ministers comprised the <u>kofa</u>, the "door" or link between the Caliph at the apex of the system and the fiefholders. Their functions were essentially political and administrative in nature. In their political capacity, they were expected to inform the Caliph of events and affairs within the fiefs over which they had charge, and to relay instructions from the Caliph to the respective fiefholders. In regard to their administrative functions, they were obliged to collect and check the tribute and tax from the fiefs which constituted their aphere of authority. As Johnston explains,

In the districts it gave the vassal a friend at Court whom he could consult and on whose influence he could rely. At headquarters it provided the Sultan with a source of information and advice on each of his fiefs, and an officer of state to whom all matters of routine could safely be delegated.

The Caliph Aliyu Babba (1842-59) was responsible for bringing about the regularization of emirate super14 vision . As a result, the responsibilities of the

Vizier were curtailed by divesting him of some of his emirates and transferring them to other state officials The Magajin Raff was given responsibility for the emirates of Bauchl , the Galadima for Katsina, Daura and Kazaure emirates 17, whilst the Ubandoma was given charge of Kontagora 13 , an emirate that came into existence in 1859. Sarkin Rabah, a new titled position created in the 1840's with responsibility for one of the ribats in the Sokoto hinterland19, was provided with supervisory powers over Muri emfrate²⁰. The Vizier, however, still retained the bulk of the emirates within his portfolio, being left in charge of Kano, Zaria, Adamawa, Gomber Hadelia, Katagum, Missau and Jema'are 21. In addition, the Vizier also retained the power of general supervision over the eastern emirates not directly under his charge 22. In effect, the kofa system, initially adopted by Muhammadu Bello for domestic purposes, was also made the basis of government in Sokoto's dealings with) the emirates under its supervision. As Last further explains,

The Caliph relied for the supervision of the Emirs on his councillors....Although the councillors held office longer than the Caliphs...and, as sons or nephews of earlier councillors, were educated to their work, the tone of the administration depended on the personality of the Amir al-mu minin: his decision was absolute, and the councillors were only his agents.

· To aid in the effective execution of his burdensome tasks, the Vizier delegated many of his responsibilities to his household officials, all of whom, it appears, were relatives. The most senior of the officials of the Vizieral household, the deputy Vizier and generally next in line for the Vizierate, was the Dangaladima 24. His official responsibilities included the role of intermediary between the Vizier and the Emir of Kano²⁵. The next most important offices were filled by the Sarkin Fada, responsible for Zaria²⁶, and then by the Wali, the intermediary to Combe emirate?7. Other more distant relatives filled the positions as intermediaries to the remaining cmirates and, like the offices of Dangaladima, Sarkin Fada and Wali, were hereditary within the families of the initial title-holders. The Magaji was given responsibility for Katagum?, the Sarkin Rafi for Hade jia? , the Galadima for Missau 30, and the Wombai for Adamawa 31. Although the Vizieral household officials were an integral part of the machinery of government, their importance must not be over-emphasized. According to Last ". Though these officials as representatives of the Vizier had some latitude of action, and on occasions formed an advisory council to the vizier, much of the administration was done through letters, leaving the Vizier's officials as simple messengers."32

The Galadima, with the emirates of Katsina, Kazaure and Daura within his jurisdiction, was the second most important Sokoto official with regard to emirate affairs after the Vizier. As a result, he, too, delegated responsibility for supervision to other officials, usually from his own household. As Hull explains, the Galadima "rarely visited Katsina and delegated responsibilities to his eldest son, who carried the title Dan Maliki. The latter spent several months each year in Katsina and saw to it that Sokoto's share of the revenue was collected and safely transferred to the treasury of the Sarkin Musulmi". 33°

Sokoto for its dealings with the emirates functioned in a similar manner to the way in which it operated in metropolitan Sokoto. The court official responsible for an emirate performed similar tasks to those he conducted in his supervision of some local fief or ribat. He kept the Caliph informed of developments in the emirate, relayed any caliphal messages or orders to the emir, collected tribute that was owed Sokoto, made sure that the emir and his entourage made their regular visits of obeisance, and that the necessary troops were supplied for military activity in the Caliph's service. For those

state officials who possessed more than one emirate to supervise, delegation of authority was usually necessary. The intermediary (H. jekada) of the minister commonly resided several months annually in the emirate, usually at the emir's expense, and performed the functions that usually accrued to the court official, the kofa representative.

FOOTNOTES

- 1. M. Hiskett, "Kitab al-Farq: A work on the Habe Kingdoms Attributed to "Uthman dan Fodio", BSOAS, XXIII (1960), p. 578. cf. idem, "An Islamic Tradition of Reform in the Western Sudan from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century", BSOAS, XXV (1962), p. 592.
 - 2. Hiskett, "Kitab al-Farq", pp. 566-570.
 - 3. M. Last, The Sokoto Caliphate (London: 1967), p. 57. cf. H.A.S. Jonnston, The Fulani Empire of Sokoto (London: 1967), p. 93. Apart from the officials cited by Usman in Kitab al-Farq, Johnston's list includes a Treasurer (H. Ma'aji), a Captain-General (H. Sarkin Yaki) and a constable (H. Yari).
- 4. Johnston, Sokoto, p. 93.
- 5. cf. Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, p. 40.
- 6. S.J. Hogben, An Introduction to the History of the Islamic States of Northern Nigeria (Ibadan: 1967), p. 204; E.J. Arnett, Gazetteer of Sokoto Province (London: 1972), p. 30; M.G. Smith, "Historical and Cultural" Conditions of Political Corruption among the Hausa", Comparative Studies in Society and History, 6(1964), p. 173; M. Hiskett, Tazyin al-Waraqat (Ibadan: 1963), p. 16; W.E.N. Kensdale, "Gwandu", EI2, all maintain that the administrative separation occurred immediately after the capture Alkalawa in 1808-9. On the other hand, Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, p. 41; Adeleye, Northern Nigeria, p. 40; E.W. Bovill, The Golden Trade of the Moors (London: 1968), p. 235; J.O. Humwick, "The Nine-teenth Century Jihads", in J.F.A. Ajayi and I. Espie (eds.), A Thousand Years of West African History (New York: 1972), p. 276, place the date of division at 1812.

cf. A. Mischlich, "Contributions to the History of the Hausa states", JAS, 4(16), 1905, p. 400, who states that it was 1817.

- 7. Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, p. 44. Last also includes
 Zamfara in his list. However, since Zamfara constituted one part of metropolitan Sokoto, (Johnston, Sokoto,
 p. 126), it has not been included as an emirate external to Sokoto.
- 8. Last, The Sokoto-Caliphate, p. 153.
- 9. Arnett, Sokoto, p. 31; Johnston, Sokoto, p. 126.
- 10. Johnston, Sokoto, p. 127; Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, p. 102. The Vizier, Galadima, Magajin Rafi and Magajin Gari, along with certain territorial leaders, also constituted the caliphal electoral council (Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, pp. 97-98).
- 11. Johnston, Sokoto, p. 127-128; Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, pp. 100-102.
- 12. Johnstoh, <u>Sokoto</u>, p. 128.
- 13. Ibid., pp. 128-129.
- 14. Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, pp. 100, 156. cf. Adeleye, Northern Nigeria, pp. 48-9.
- 15. Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, pp. 156, 158.
- 16. Johnston, Sokoto, p. 176; Hogben and Kirk-Greene, The Emirates of Northern Nigeria (London: 1966), p. 408n.

 It is interesting to note that Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, p. 91, states that the office of Magajin Wafi was not instituted until c. 1878; yet Arnett, Sokoto, p. 31, and Johnston, Sokoto, p. 126, both maintain that the position was created by Muhammadu Bello.

17. Johnston, Sokoto, p. 176; Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, p. 100; Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 408n.; K.M. Panikkar, The Serpent and the Crescent (Bombay: 1963), p. 299; R.W. Hull, The Impact of the Fulani Jihad on Interstate Relations in the Central Sudan Katsina Emirate: A Case Study", in D.F. McCall'& N.R. Bennett (eds.), Aspects of West African Islam, vol. 5, Boston University Papers on Africa (Boston: 1971), p. 93. It is interesting to note that both A.F. Mockler-Ferryman (British Nigeria (London: 1902). pp. 156-157) and P.-L. Monteil, ("The Empire of Sokoto under Abd al-Rahman", p. 316, in T. Hodgkin (ed.), Nigerian Perspectives (London: 1960)), whilst agreeing that Kazaure and Katsina fell within the purview of the Galadima, assert that Daura, along with Zamfara, fell within the jurisdiction of an official called the Sarkin Saffara. Since I have been unable to confirm or trace this title elsewhere, and since Zamfara was the concern of the Galadima In domestic Sokoto (cf. Kirk-Greene, Barth's Travels in Nigeria (London: 1962), p. 234; Panikkar, Serpent, p. 299), I have concluded that this was either another title for the Galadima or, perhaps, an official within the Galadima's household. It is quite possible that Kazaure may only have entered the portfolio of the Galadima towards the end of the nineteenth century (cf. Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 473).

- 18. Johnston. Sokoto, p. 176; Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, p. 100.
- 19. Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, p. 100.
- 20. J.M. Fremantle, Gazetteer of Muri Province (London: 1972), p. 17; Hogben & Kirk-Greene; Emirates, p. 408n.; Johnston, Sokoto, p. 176; Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, p. 100.

 H. Barth, Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa (London: 1965), vol.3; p. 117n., maintains that. while he was travelling through the Sokoto Caliphate in the early 1850's, the Vizier was responsible for the emirate of Hammaruwa (Muri). Therefore, it should be safe to conclude that this emirate was probably transferred to the charge of the Sarkin Rabah in the last years of Aliyu Babba's reign.

- Adeleye. Northern Niceria, pp. 48-40, exclude demaiare from the Hat of emirates within the ... Vister's portfolio. gf. Johnston. Bokoto, pp. 175-176, who does include this emirate within the Vister's ever of responsibility. Furthermore, Barth. Travels, vol. 5, p. 1170... mentions that the Vister had sufficiely over Sambo-Le, then emiss of Jema's ne in the early 1850's.
- 12. Adeleye, Northern Migeria, p. 49.
- 23, Last. The Boketo Caliphate, p. 99.
- M. 1614., p. 186. er. Johnston, Wokoto, p. 176.
- W. Lant, The Bokoto Caliphate, p. 186.
- This office, therefore, came into existence some the between 1817 and 1800, the period of tenure of tidadota visionals.
- The Sokoto Caliphate, p. 188, states that only one Wall was ever appointed, some time in the Visionic of Bukhari (1886-1903).

 Of V.N. Low, The Border States: A Political History of Three Northead Nigorian Emerates, ca. 1800-1902, impublished Th.D. threis (U.U.L.A.: 1907), p. 710, who mentions that Sulaimann was turbanned as emir of Gombo by the Walin Sokoto (Wali) in 1861.
- 28. Lant. The Sokoto Caliphate, p. 188.

 C. Jow. Border States, p. 268. gives the title of Sokolote representative (kofa) to Katagum as Magajin Wazirin Sokoto.
- Fo. Lant. The Sokoto Caliphate, p. 188; Low, Border States, p. 299.
 - 50. Lant. The Sokoto Caliphate, p. 188.

- 31. <u>Ihid</u>.
- 32. <u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 188-9.
- 33. Hull, "Katsina", p. 93.
 of. Hogben & Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 170.

Chapter II

APPOINTMENTS, DEPOSITIONS, AND ARBÍTRATIONS (1):

THE EMIRATES OF KATSINA, KANO, AND ZARIA

(THE HAUSA EMIRATES)

KATSINA

Initially, Sokoto Found it necessary to grant three flags for the conquest of Hausa Katsina. The lieutenants (A. nuwwab) selected by Sokoto to lead the jihad represented the leadership of the three most powerful and influential Fulant groups resident in Katsina: Umaru Dumyawa, chief of the Sullibawa Fulani in the north and northwest; Umaru Dallaji from a poor but influential scholar/pastoralist Fulani clan centred at Yandoto in south-central Katsina; and Na Alhaji (succeeded in the course of the jihad by his son Mamman Dikko), another pious scholar from a Fulani group in the west-central region of Ketsina. During the course of the jihad, and in order to expedite a more speedy conclusion to the hostilities, it became necessary to appoint further flagboarers. One further major flag was conferred, in addition to several minor ones, granted, in the main, to an assortment of petty Fulani leaders, especially in the south of Katsina where Hausa resistance was strong.

In the period 1807-1812, following the successful completion of the jihad, Katsina possessed no single leader: rather, the emirate was administered as three separate political entities. Each of the three major nuwwab - Umaru Dallaji, Umaru Dumyawa, and Mamman Dikko -

had partitioned Katsina along the lines of their personal conquests, and had proceeded to rule their respective divisions independently of each other.4

The danger to Fulani supremacy in Katsina threatened by such divided leadership, especially from the stillnctive Hausa diehards, moved Muhammadu Bello, now the
Vizier responsible for the East, to terminate such a state
of affairs in 1812. The leadership impasse was broken
with the appointment of Umaru Dallaji as the first emir
of Katsina. To prevent serious opposition from the other
nuwwāb passed over by such an appointment, Filo created
what, in effect, were mini-emirates within the emirate of
Katsina. Although each of these lieutenants were expected
to accept the local leadership of the Katsina emir, they
were, nevertheless, granted considerable privileges, and
were made responsible for their actions directly to the
Sokoto Caliph. As Hull explains,

...each received an aristocratic title and was assured that he and his successors would forever be among the kingmakers of Katsina and that he would be installed and deposed not by the emir but by the Sarkin Musulmi through his personal representative, the Galadiman Sokoto. Moreover, they were extended the privilege of control over revenue collection in their fiefs, and their tax bill was henceforth stated separately from that of the Emir.

The position of the Katsina emir was further weakened by Sokoto's interference into the judicial and military spheres of Katsina's administration, spheres that were usually the exclusive preserve of the emir. The Alkali (A, gadT), the head of the judiciary, was only to be appointed and dismissed by Sokoto. Furthermore, since the Alkali and his judicial network were provided by Sokoto with independent means of support (in the form of fiefs scattered throughout Katsina, , they were able to conduct their affairs independently of the Katsina emir and other potential pressure groups. The preregative to appoint the supreme military commander was similarly usurped by Sokoto, and was awarded by the Caliph to one of his flagbearers 10 who had been accorded extraordinary concessions, and was thus directly responsible to Sokoto. The effect of these appointments was to divorce both the military and judicial spheres of government from the emir, and yest them in officials who were entirely dependent on Sokoto.

From Sokoto's standpoint, the new arrangement was undoubtedly welcomed. It left the Emir in a weak enough position to prevent him from challenging the hegemony of the Sarkin Musulmi; and the special relationship worked out with the major fiefholders gave the Sarkin Musulmi a degree of control over administration in the Emirate. It

The effectiveness of the 'Sokoto Plan' as a means of controlling Katsina politics became evident in the

events that resulted in the deposition of the second Katsina emir. Sidiku, in 1844. 12 Following the defeat of the Hausa exiles of Maradi. 13 Sidiku attempted to expand and broaden his power base by annexing those territories in Katsina that had supported the Maradi Hausa in the war. His ruthlessness, coupled with the fact that his annexations were in areas of Katsina that constituted the fiefs of the major fiefholders, 15 caused considerable consternation amongst both the territorial magnates in Katsina and the Caliph, Aliyu Babba. Katsina's electoral council. an organ that was composed of these fiefholders. demanded that Sokoto replace Sidiku with a new emir. 16 Sokoto, realizing the danger to its continued preeminence in the emirate posed by Sidiku and his centralizing policy, quickly complied to these demands. Sidiku was promptly dismissed from the emirship and was replaced by his elder brother. Muhamman Bello.

The Sidiku incident clearly indicated the futility and relative uselessness of the Katsina emir's position. Any expansionary policy pursued by the Katsina emirs would be met with vigorous opposition from the fiefholders and the Sokoto Caliph, both of whom would have much to lose by such a policy. Without the necessary military authority, which remained in the hands of one of these fiefholders and, ultimately, Sokoto, effective action by the emir was

extremely difficult.

During the remainder of the nineteenth century, no further dismissals of Katsina's subsequent emirs 17 occurred, a factor that is probably indicative of the smooth-running relations between Sokoto and the emirate of Katsina, a relationship that reflected one of overlord and vassal. The dynamics of Sokoto-Katsina relations in the nineteenth century are aptly summarized by Hull, who states that

For Katsina, the connection with its overlord, Soloto, was a mixed blessing. Shaikh CUthman and his son and successor, Muhammad Belo, had imposed on the Emirate an effective system of checks and balances. The powers of the successive Katsina emirs were circumscribed not only by the ultimate authority, the Sarkin Musulmi, but through those aristocrats who received their commissions directly from Sokoto. This situation produced a condition of dependence and helped to ensure continuing loyalty and cordial relations between the two states. Successive emirs of Katsina also received their commissions of office from the Sarkin Musulmi, who lent legitimacy and strength to their positions vis-à-vis certain titled local aristocrats. By the same token, however, those latter officials cherished their own connection, or special relationship, with Sokoto and used it as a shield against attempts by emirs to whittle away their authority and prerogatives. 18

Because of intense rivalries between the leading nuwwab in Katsina, Sokoto was successful in imposing on the Katsina Fulani a political and administrative settlement that obviously favoured Sokoto to the detriment of a

strong Katsina. On the one hand, the imposition of the 'Sokoto formula' no doubt benefited the stability of Katsina. The volatile situation induced by the rivalries between the major jihad lieutenants was sufficiently brought under control by Sokoto. Such a settlement did, however, possess certain disadvantages and drawbacks for the Katsina Fulani. Geographic Katsina no longer became an effective and viable political unit. Rather, the emirate became, in actual fact, a confederation of smaller political units, whose leaders owed allegiance directly to the Sokoto Caliph. Central leadership in Katsina, centred ', in the office of emir, became no more than one of a primus inter pares. 19 As Johnston explains, "This solution had the effect of circumscribing the power of the Emirs of Katsina and consequently their rule never became as autocratic as those of some of the other Emirs"20. In the realm of Sokoto-Katsina relations the result of such a formula was the almost complete dominance of Sokoto in Katsina affairs. Sokoto held the whip hand, and Katsina had to be content with no more, than a subservient role.

When news of the jihad in Gobir reached the Kano Fulani, 'he leaders' of the various territorial Fulani groups selected Dan Zabuwa of the Danejawa as their leader and representative in the mission whose objective was to secure, a flag from the Shehu with which to conduct the Kano Jihad. 21 The flag and sanction were obtained, but Dan Zabuwa was not given the overall military leadership which he desired. According to Gowers, "... no single leader was appointed by the Shehu, and the revolt was consequently carried out by a series of more or less independent and unco-ordinated enterprises, which extended over a year." The Shehu did, not confer the supreme military command on Dan Zabuwa, ostensibly at least, because he feared that rivalries and dissensions would break out amongst the other Fulani clan leaders if such an honour was accorded him. 23 Instead, at a meeting of Fulani leafers called by the Shehu and presided over by Muhammadu Bello at Birnin Gada (Zamfara) in c. 1805-6, the leadership of Kano was conferred upon Sulaimanu of the Mundubawa (or Modibawa), a pious scholar. 24

The information surrounding this incident suggests that Sulaimanu's appointment was an attempt by Sokoto to gain solid control over Kano, an important state by

virtue of its far-reaching commercial connections, right from the jihād's inception. His relative social insignificance would have made control by Sokoto that more realizable. As a minor figure in Kano Fulani society²⁵, he would have need to depend on Sokoto to lend authority and provide backing to his position as an effective counterweight to the Fulani 'aristocrats' passed over by such an appointment. Furthermore, his concern with scholarly pursuits, rather than day-to-day administration and governmental affairs²⁶, would have made it improbable that Kano-could be welded into a position strong enough to counter Sokoto's influence.

Whilst the jihad was being waged in Kano, Sulaimanu's overall leadership was accepted by the other Fulani leaders, but as soon as hostilities were concluded they took steps to have Sulaimanu ousted from his prominent position, and one of their number selected as emir of Kano in his stead. A deputation, representing the leadership of the five most influential Fulani groups in Kano, arrived in Gwandu in c. 1808-9 to effect such a move 27. As Johnston explains,

...the attempt failed because Shehu confirmed Bello's earlier choice and invested the unsophisticated and relatively youthful Sulimanu with the insignia of an Emir. To consolidate his authority still further he also gave him a daughter in marriage.

Ushan's reaffirmation of Sulaimanu as emir or kano ula not solve the leadership problem. The following year

in an incident that clearly demonstrated Sulaimanu's dependence on Sokoto (as was no doubt intended), Sulaimanu was compelled to seek Sokoto's help and backing to quell a serious quarrel that had arisen between himself and Muhammadu Dabo²⁰, leader of the Dambazawa Fulani and one of the five principal leaders in Kano that had earlier attempted to have Sulaimanu dismissed from his office.

On the death of Sulaimanu in 1819, the leadership problem again became acute. Rather than selecting the senior member of the ruling family to succeed as cmir (as was the usual practice in most emirates), the Sokoto Caliph, Muhammadu Bello, instead appointed Ibrahim Dabo, leader of the Sullubawa Fulani and one of the principal Fulani groups that had opposed Sulaimanu's appointment. The designation of Ibrahim Dabo as succeeding Kano emir did not necessarily reflect a capituation by Sokoto to the demands of the five major number that one of their number be appointed emir. During Sulaimanu's stormy tenure in office, Mallam Jemo, then leader of the Sullubawa, had acted as Sulaimanu's chief councillor and friend. Upon Jemo's death, this position had then been taken over by his nephew and the new leader of the Sullubawa, Ibrahim Dabo. 30 Because of the Sullubawa's close association with Sulaimanu's administration, the choice of Dabo was no doubt seen by Bello as a continuation of the state of affairs in Kano³¹, and continued Sokoto control over the emirate as had been the case when Sulaimanu had been emir.

The second Kano emir, Ibrahim Dabo, quickly embarked upon a policy of strengthening his position visà-vis both the major Fulani groups in Kano emirate and Sokoto. By 1822/his position in Kano proper was essentially unchallenged following a period of successful consolidation 32. The only serious opposition to Ibrahim's centralizing policy came from a privileged fietholder located on the northern extremities of Kano emirate, Dan Tunku who, because of his services in the Hausaland jihad 32, had been granted a flag by the Shehu and had been given a personal fief created from the emirates of Kano, Katsina, and Daura 34. Dan Tunku's position was similar to that enjoyed by the major nuwwab and fiefholders in Katsina emirate. Like them, he paid homage directly to Sokoto, who possessed the right to appoint and dismiss Kazaure's 5 chiefs, but Kazaure had to acknowledge the leadership of the Kano emir in internal matters 36. Whilst Sulaimanu was emir of Kano this arrangement proved to be satisfactory. The lack of strong central control, generally characteristic of his emirship, worked to the

advantage of Dan Tunku who was able to pursue a relatively independent course of action. The accession of Ibrahim Dabe brought improved administration and increased central control, and Kano-Kazaure relations became severely aggravated. Dan Tunku rejected Dabots demands for personal allegiance and the Kano emir replaced Dan Tunku as chief of the Kazaure territory by a loyal vassal from the Dambazawa Fulani group? (. Dan Tunku refused to be ousted from his position, and there followed five years of protracted, intermittent, and inconclusive warfare (1819-24). The failure of either party to achieve its goal - independence for one, strong control for the other - necessitated a call for arbitration. The matter was submitted to the Sokoto Caliph who, whilst acting in his capacity as the ultimate court-of appeal within the Fulani polity, was asked to render a decision with regard to the dispute. According to Johnston, " Bello found in favour of Dan Tunku and reaffirmed his independence of the Emir of Kano. Kazaure was thereby recognized as a separate Emirate and its boundaries were demarcated ". 30 No doubt Ibrahim Dabo's intrusion into the process of dismissing Kazaure's chiefs, a prerogative that belonged exclusively to Sokoto by virtue of the initial agreement between Dan Tunku and the Shehu, formed one of the main reasons for Sokoto's decision to grant Kazaure independence of Kano. Ibrahim Dabo, however, did possess grounds for such an intrusion. The special arrangement accorded Dan Tunku by the Shehu, although ill-defined 29 did demand that the Kazaure chief submit to the local leadership of the Kano emir. His refusal to give personal

that usually resulted in deposition from office, Ibrahim

Dabo, however, attempted to oust Dan Tunku without any reference to Sokoto. This independent course of action, coupled with Ibrahim Dabo's increased influence and authority which could have possibly posed a danger to future relations between Kano and Sokoto (in the sense of threatening the dominant position enjoyed by Sokoto under Sulaimanu's emirship), were propable factors that goaded Sokoto into granting Kazaure its emirate status, by detaching Kazaure territory from Kanots aphere of influence, Sokoto placed a check on the increasingly independent-minded Kano emir by effective
ly tessening the zone of his authority.

Tablie is mentioned shoul the appointments of Kano's following two quirs, Haman (18/6-66) and Abdullahi (1865-66). However, it appears that it was customary for the Kano electional council, composed of the Kano clan leaders of the fautomatic following for the haders of possible candidates to Hokoto for the latter's final decision. All As a result, Hokoto was abla to exert considerable influence in the determination of Kano's emirs. In view of this, therefore, the slevation of both Usman and Abdullahi to the emirship was probably the direct result of Bokoto's influence in the appointment process. In other words, both were flokoto's candidates for the emirship, and both owed their appointments to Bokoto.

Sokoto's preponderant influence in the determination of Kano's emirs was clearly exemplified in the appointment of Muhammadu Bello (1863-93) as successor to Abdullahi. In the list of four candidates submitted to Sokoto for consideration by the Kano electoral body, the two most serious contenders for the emirship were Yusuf, the son of Abdullahi, and Muhammadu Bello, the brother of the late emir^{1/5}.

Apparently, the Sokoto Caliph favoured Yusuf for the emirablic (and who was apparently also the Kano choice 11), but was dissuaded from designating him emir by the Sokoto Vizier, who personally disliked Yusuf . Instead, Mahammadu Bello was appointed emir of Kano to succeed Abdullani, a designation that was accepted without opposition by the Kano Fulani.

Even though Sokoto exerted a fair degree of influence and control over the appointments of Kano's emirs, there were limits to such control. According to Adeleye.

While the lesser instruments of law enforcement like the Umara' and their officials were duty-bound to discharge the authority delegated to them by the Caliph, the Caliph, as the supreme instrument of the enforcement of the law, was equally duty-bound to keep within the limits imposed on him by the law. If he was unjust or flouted usages sanctioned by custom, he risked forfeiting the obedience of his subjects, 40

The Caliph's appointment of Tukur as emir of Kano in 1893 to Succeed Muhammadu Bello constituted one such action considered unjust by the Kano populace, many of whom refused

to render continued obedience to Sokoto. This designation, one where the Caliph clearly overstepped the limits of his authority to manipulate the selection of Kano's emirs, resulted in the Kano Civil War (1893-5), an incident that did much to damage Sokoto's authority, both within Kano and the emirates generally.

Following the death of the emir Muhammadu Bello in 1093. Kano' electoral council informed the Sokoto Vizier, then present in Kano, that their preference for emir was Yusuf, the son of the previous emir, Abdullahi. Furthermore, they warned the Vizier that should Yusuf be bypassed again for the emirship, hostilities would likely break out in Kano. This information was relayed by the Vizier to the Caliph Audurrahman, who discarded their request and, instead, appointed Tukur, Muhammadu Bello's son, to succeed as emir. There has been much speculation as to why the Caliph selected Tukur over Yusuf, especially in the light of the warning given by the electoral body and in view of Yusuf's earlier rejection in 1883 when his uncle, Muhammadu Bello, had been made emir. Last contends that

One issue was probably Sokoto's control; another was whether or not the somewhat forceful sons ... of a previous Emir, CAbdullani, should take over the Emirate. The Caliph had refused to appoint one of them partly for personal reasons and partly, presumably, because he would have even less control over Kano unless he had as Emir a man who would depend on Sokoto for support against the ubiquitous sons of CAbdullani.

The turbanning of Tukur as emir caused Yusuf to raise the flag of revolt. As a result, the <u>Sarkin Musulmi</u>, Abdurrahman, ordered the various emirates to boycott Yusuf in his struggle with Tukur. ⁵¹ In this regard the emirs aquiesced, and expressed verbal support for the Caliph's actions. ⁵² The emirs sympathies, however, generally lay with Yusuf and his cause, and, because of this, Yusuf made overtures to many of them for military aid. ⁵³ Such support, however, was never forthcoming. As Adeleye so aptly explains.

While it was easy to fight in support of the Caliph when his cause was decidedly just, the risk of rising in arms against his authority by allying with rebels against him (no matter how justified the rebellion) seems to have been considered too great to be worth taking. In this light only can the practical neutrality of most emirates in the Tukur affair be explained.

As a result, Yusuf looked to, and received support from, Gumel, Damagaram, and the Ningi, longtime enemies of the Sokoto Caliphate. 55

When Tukur was forced to seek refuge in Katsina following a serious military reversal at the hands of Aliyu Babba⁵⁶, the Caliph ordered the eastern emirs to support Tukur with military levies. This call for aid, however, was generally ignored by the emirs who cited a variety of excuses to avoid the general summons. 57 Before the Caliph could act upon this general disobedience, Tukur was suddenly captured and executed in 1895. The train of events immedia

ately following the war remains somewhat speculative. According to Adeleye, Aliyu Babba's messengers were received by the Caliph Abdurrahman, who accepted his apologies for his rebelliousness, granted him a full pardon, and installed him as the emir of Kano to succeed Tukur. 58 Smith contends that, since Kano was too important an emirate to be lost to the Caliphate, the Sokoto Caliph quickly pardoned Aliyu Babba and sent his Vizier to turban the successful rebel as the new Kano emir. In turn, Aliyu Babba reciprocated Sokoto's gestures of conciliation by establishing normal relations-with Sokoto and, although pursuing his own interests. "...regularly brought forces to assist the Sultan in the latter's wars ".59 Last mentions some kind of reconciliation between Kano and Sokoto, but also adds that Aliyu Babba reduced Kano's tribute to the imperial treasury in Sokoto. 60 Gowers, on the other hand, contends that the Kano populace refused to allow the Sokoto Vizier to enter Kano city to turban Aliyu Babba as emir, thus rejecting Sokoto's suzerainty. 61 The latter point of view is supported by Hogben and Kirk-Greene, who state further that Aliyu Babba did not perform the customary fealty journey to Sokoto until just before the British conquest of Kano in 1903.62

Be what may, Sokoto's authority over Kano emirate, and its prestige throughout the Caliphate, were certainly tarnished by the Caliph's handling of the entire incident, right from his initial appointment of Tukur over Yusuf until the conclusion of hostilities between the various warring parties. As Adeleye explains,

The failure of Sokoto to suppress Yūsur's revolt demonstrated the powerlessness of the Caliph to enforce a whim considered unpopular and unjust by the emirates. To succeed in Kano he needed active military aid from the emirates. This he failed to get. The Yūsur revolt succeeded because the Caliph's cause won no deep sympathies or support and by their do-nothing attitude or half-hearted military assistance at the best, the emirates tacitly supported Yūsuf.

unlike Katsina, where the position of the emir was made to resemble that of a primus inter pares vis-a-vis the major numb/fiefholders, no attempt was made by Sokoto to duplicate such a structure in Kano (except, perhaps, with the case of kazaure), even though similar pre-conditions, such as the existence of strong Fulani group rivalries, prevailed. Instead, Sokoto appointed an emir (Sulaimanu) who was both loyal and relatively incompetant administratively, thus making it highly improbable that Kano could have been welded into a position so as to challenge Sokoto and its attempt to effectively control the emirate. The subsequent appointment of Ibrahim Dabo was probably initially intended by Sokoto to result in continued Kano subservience to the caliphal power. Ibrahim Dabo

proved to be an extremely capable emir. He all but obliterated competition to the emirship from Fulani clans other than his own (the Sullubawa,), and successfully centralized the Kano administration into his own hands. An opportunity for Sokoto to check Ibrahim Dabo's growing authority was provided by the inability of the latter to deal with a crisis precipitated by the attempted defection of one of his " fiefholders. Dan Tunku of Kazaure. However, even though the extent of the Kano emir's authority was effectively reduced by the severance of Kazaure from his portfolio, Sokoto was never able to exert as much control over Kano as it displayed with regard to the emirate of Katsina. In part, this was a reflection of Ibrahim Dabo's successful efforts to improve the emir's position (it became, in effect, more autocratic), and to reduce much of the opposition to the emirship (especially from the other Fulani clans). As a result, the Kano emirs were generally always able to enjoy greater independence of Sokoto (relative to Katsina emirate), a condition which was primarily due to the fact that interference by Sokoto was less possible.

However, in the realm of the selection of Kano's emirs, Sokoto always displayed considerable influence. The regular practice, adopted by the Kano electoral council, of submitting several candidates to Sokoto for the latter's selection

gave Sokoto considerable latitude in determining the appointments of Kano's emirs (e.g. Muhammadu Bello, 1883). However, in its appointment of Tukur to the emirship in 1893. Sokoto overstepped the parameters of its authority. The result was the effective disappearance of any real authority exerted by Sokoto with regard to the selection of future emirs; henceforth, Sokoto had to be content with only nominal acceptance of its suzerainty by the Kano emirs. 64 However, it should be mentioned that had the Sokoto Caliph designated Yusuf instead of Tukur as emir (and thus avoided the civil war and ensuing loss of prestige). Sokoto would still probably have lost some of its influence in Kano emirate. Yusuf appears to have displayed a rather contemptuous attitude toward and general disregard for the caliphal authority in the past 65, and his appointment to the emirship may well have opened the door for Yusuf to remove completely all vestiges of Sokoto's influence and control in the emirate.66

ZARIA

Mallam Musa, a Mallawa Fulani of relative insignificance in Zaria⁶⁷, was awarded the flag of leadership in c. 180868 by the Shehu for the conquest of Hausa Zaria (Zazzau). Both his scholarly attributes and his military exploits in the Gobir jihad constituted the bases for his appointment as the Zaria jihad leader 69. This appointment, however, was met with much resentment from the leaders of the established Fulani clans in Zaria, and especially from Yamusa of the Bornawa Fulani, who appealed to the Shehu to at least be granted sanction and a flag for the conquest of southern Zaria. The Shehu dissuaded Yamusa from this request, and, instead, persuaded him to act as Musa's chief lieutenant 7 . Last states that " The appointment of Musa corresponded with the Shaikh's policy of giving emirates to individual learned men rather than to clan leaders whose dedication to the principles of the jihad might be compromised and whose appointment might have alienated other clans ".71

Because they displayed a united front following Musa's death in 1821, the Zaria Fulani were successful in their ability to influence the selection of the succeeding emir.

As a result, Zaria obtained an emir it desired, rather than

one which had been dictated to it from above (i.e. Sokoto), as had been the case with the appointment of Mallam Musa. Yamusa was the unanimous choice of Zaria's electoral body as the successor to the emirship of Zaria, a choice that clearly reflected the dominant position he had attained amongst the Zaria Fulani after serving so ably as Musa's chief lieutenant in the subjugation of Zaria. Sokoto accepted the fait accompli and recognized Yamusa as the ruler of Zaria, even though it made no attempt to turban him in his office. To

The succession problem created by the death of Yamusa in 1834 regained for Sokoto the initiative and authority to appoint Zaria's emirs, a prerogative it had temporarily lost in 1821 when it had quietly aquiesced to the demands of Zaria's electoral college. The re-emergence of Fulani clan rivalries, briefly suppressed in 1821, proved to be the instrument by which Sokoto was able to regain this initiative, an initiative which it did not relinquish until the 1890's.

Zaria's electoral council had no wish to nominate Yamusa's son, Hamada, as successor to the vacant emirship because it feared that his appointment would create a precedent of unilinealism, and thus aggravate clan tensions.

On the other hand, it had no desire to suggest Musa's son, Sidi Abdulkadiri, since it thought that he too would only exacerbate rivalries and tensions between the groups. The only remaining candidate that the electoral body could seriously consider was Abdulkarim of the Katsinawa Fulani group. However, to push this choice in the face of the opposition that it would necessarily create from both the Mallawa and the Bornswa (as supporters of Sidi Abdulkadiri and Hamada respectively), the backing and intervention of Sokoto was required. It therefore invited the Waziri Sokoto, as the official intermediary (kofa) between Zaria and Sokoto, to come to Zaria to install Abdulkarim as emir to succeed Yamusa 93. According to Smith, " By this decision ultimate powers of appointing the rulers of Zaria were thus transferred to the Sultan of Sokoto ... "7" Unlike Yamusa's designation which was conducted with minimal external influence from Sokoto, no future appointment to Zaria's emirship was made by Zaria's electoral body without at least obtaining Sokoto's sanction. Sokoto's appointment of Abdulkarim was also accompanied by other intrusions into Zaria's affairs. Zaria's authority over its vassal states was effectively reduced, its tribute to Sokoto was increased, and, from this time, the Sokoto Vizier demanded tribute for himself (H. bani, bani -'give me, give me'), in addition to that which Zaria normally supplied to the Caliph's treasury. 15

with Abdulkarim's death in 1046, the electoral body proposed to Sokoto that the Bornawa, Hamada, should be elevated to the emirship, a proposal which Sokoto accepted. Although Hamada died shortly thereafter, his reign was nevertheless characterized by an obvious attempt to liberate Zaria from Sokoto's increasing influence by providing the emirate with some semblance of autonomy. To minimize the Caliph's influence he refused to be turbanned in his office by Sokoto, and "... stressed his selection by the electors of Zazzau as the condition which legitimized his rule." His premature death robbed Zaria of a major driving force towards self-determination, and, instead, his exit gave Sokoto the opportunity to reassert its authority.

Again fearful to allow Sidi Abdulkadiri to become emir, the electors at Zaria recommended to Sokoto that Mommon Sani, Hamada's half-brother, be designated emir. It was felt that, since Hamada had ruled such a short time, the continuation of the emirship within the one dynasty (Bornawa) would not overly exacerbate clan jealousies. However, to prevent Sidi's opposition from becoming too vociferous, especially since he had previously been passed over for the emirship, the electoral college again needed the support of Sokoto to implement such a decision. 77 Sokoto accepted the recommendation, and the opportunity it ultimately provided to augment its influence over Zaria,

and the Waziri Sokoto was duly dispatched to turban Mommon Sani as Hamada's successor.

Upon the death of Mommon Sani in 1860, 78 the Zaria electors finally recommended Sidi Abdulkadiri for the vacant emirship, a recommendation to which Sokoto complied. His appointment, however, was primarily due to the absence of any serious contenders at that particular time. The main choices were Sidi Abdulkadiri and his brother Abubakar "... since the Bornawa were now ineligible due to successive appointments of Hamada and Mommon Sani to the throne, while the Katsinawa were weak and leaderless ".79 Following his selection as Zaria emir, Sidi embarked on an intensive and conspicuous programme to eliminate all vestiges of Zaria's dependence on, and subordination to Sokoto. Besides pursuing an independent course of action, 80 he refused to give the Sokoto Vizier his customary bani, bani, 81 and would not permit the Sokoto Vizier to enter Zaria city to turban him as the new emir. maintaining that he had inherited the office. As Smith explains. " If this was not a repudiation of allegiance to Sokoto, it was certainly a clear declaration of Zazzau's internal autonomy, and an equally clear denial of the Sultan's authority in future elections of Zaria's rulers ".82 In view of Sidi's moves towards autonomy, the Caliph was compelled to summon the Zaria emir to Sokoto to answer for his actions. Sidi went as ordered, and

was deposed, 83 the same year as his accession. 84 According to Last, "...the deposition...demonstrated the authority of Sokoto, which otherwise might be thought to have suffered from the continued success of Bukhari in Hadejia ".85

point his successor to the emirship without recourse to the Zaria electoral council which had traditionally supplied the recommendations. To fill the vacant position, the Caliph chose Abdusallami (Audusallami) from the Sulibama Fulani dynasty. Smith contends that

...Audusallami's selection was governed by two factors: Sokoto needed a weak king (sic) in Zaria through whom they could recover the influence lost to Sidi; secondly, in order to suppress the theory of dynastic succession and political autonomy expressed by Sidi, Sokoto wanted a king whose lineage had not yet held the throne. Audusallami fulfilled these conditions.

Furthermore, Sokoto took the opportunity to extend its influence over Zaria by demanding, and obtaining, a say in the distribution of certain offices beneath that of the emir. 87

In a meeting of the Zaria electors in 1863⁸⁸ to decide Abdusallami's successor, the Bornawa Abdullahi was recommended to Sokoto since he was the most qualified candidate at that time for the emirship. The recommendation was accepted by the Caliph, who then dispatched the Visier to turban the new emir, and to relay the Caliph's order that

the office of <u>Wombai</u> be filled by the Mallawa candidate, Abubakar, thus making him eligible for future consideration as emir. 89 As Sidi Abdulkadiri and Hamada had done before him, Abdullahi attempted to pursue a course of action independent of Sokoto. However, whilst on a fealty-journey to Sokoto in c. 1873, he was quickly deposed, ostensibly "...for disobeying the Caliph's order to withdraw from his attack on Keffi ".90

As it had done previously after the dismissal of Sidi Abdulkadiri in 1860, Sokoto bypassed Zaria's electoral body in choosing Abdullahi's successor, and its choice for the vacant emirship was the Mallawá, Abubakar, who had been the Wombai during Abdullahi's emirship. Sokoto qualified this appointment by instructing Abubakar to appoint the Katsinawa, Sambo, to the office of Wombai, which had been made vacant by his own elevation to the emirship.

By this appointment Sokoto sought to qualify Katsinawa candidates for the succession in order to maintain the tridynastic system. At the same time Sokoto wished to weaken the kingship at Zaria and to discourage further claims for autonomy. Ol

Following the death of Abubakar in c. 1874, the Bornawa Fulani, Abdullahi, was re-appointed emir of Zaria by the new Sokoto Caliph, Abubakar b. Bello, who felt that his previous removal from the emirship had been conducted "...without due

processes of the law ".92 With his re-appointment, Abdullahi was ordered to retain both the Mallawa Dan Galadima and the Katsinawa Wombai in their offices. 93 The decision to re-appoint Abdullahi, one which was made without the traditional recourse to the electoral body, had serious repercussions on Zaria's internal affairs. When Abdullahi attempted to recoup the property that had been confiscated from him at the time of his dismissal from the emirship in c. 1873, Ali, the brother of the late emir Abubakar, and one of the recipients of the confiscation, raised the flag of revolt. To resolve the impasse Abdullahi appealed to Sokoto, who directed the Kano emir to mediate the dispute. Eventually Ali was persuaded to abandon the revolt, a solution that was only achieved after Ali had been promised: (1) a pardon for his rebelliousness; (?) the emirship of Zaria after Abdullahi; and (3) that he did not have to return Abdullahi's concubines. Abdullahi, however, became increasingly annoyed at his inability to regain his lost property, and displayed his displeasure towards Sokoto by refusing to conduct the annual fealty-journey to Sokoto, even though he took care to forward the tribute.94 For a while this disobedient act was tolerated by Sokoto, but when the Caliph responsible for Abdullahi's reinstatement died, and was replaced by a figure who had earlier supported his deposition. 95 such a flagrant breach of allegiance was not tolerated. "On the grounds that his refusal to attend at the Sultan's court was tantamount to disloyalty, Abdullahi

was peremptorily summoned to Sokoto and for the second time deposed."

In accordance with the earlier agreement, the emirship of Zaria was then offered to Ali. But because Ali was already on his deathbed. The Sokoto Caliph instructed the Zaria electors to submit recommendations for the vacant emirship, including a candidate from each of the dynasties along with. its personal preference. 97 The candidates were, however, expected to appear in person in Sokoto, where the emir was to be turbanned, and on conditions laid down by the Caliph. Zaria's electoral body complied with these demands, and, upon its suggestion, the Katsinawa, Sambo, was appointed the Zaria emir. The conditions laid down by Sokoto upon this appointment demanded that the top-ranking offices of Wombai, Madaki, and Dan Galadima be filled by Sokoto's personal nominees. 98 But by reserving the 'right to designate its own candidates to these three important offices, Sokoto reduced the effectiveness of the Waria emir's role to govern, to such an extent that what essentially occurred was the collapse of the entire governmental process in Zaria. Following complaints about Sambo's inability to defend the state of Zaria in the race of inroads by the Ningi. Maradi, and Abuja, the Caliph was compelled to dismiss Sambo from the emirship. 99 As Smith explains.

Sambo's deposition was popular in Zaria; but his failure was ultimately due to the condi-

tions in which he had been appointed. He had been placed in charge of an administration dehiberately constructed by Sokoto so as to weaken the kingship and increase its own ascendancy. From his accession the king's administration was disunited and politically divided.

As it had done at the time of Sambo's accession, the Caliph again requested the Zaria electors to nominate candidates, and, from the list submitted, the Bornawa candidate, Yero, was designated emir of Zaria in 1890 to succeed Sambo. To prevent a repeat or the governmental failure that had occurred under Sambo, Sokoto released the offices of Madaki and Dan Galadima from its control, and permitted the emir to appoint whomsoever he wished to these positions. Sokoto, however, still retained the right to fill the office of Wombai. In this manner, Sokoto hoped to strengthen the authority and position of the Zaria emir, but not enough to challenge Sokoto's ascendancy in the emirate. 101

Following Yero's death in 1897 Zaria's electoral council, controlled by the Hausa Galadima, Sulaimanu, who hoped to rule Zaria emirate de facto if not de jure, submitted a series of candidates from whom Muhammadu, blind with age, deaf and dumb, was really the only candidate that could be selected. In view of Muhammadu's disabilities which would have made it impossible for him to rovern, the Galadima, as administrator of the capital and deputy emir, had much to

gain by such an appointment. No doubt Sokoto approved the choice of Muhammadu because, as de facto ruler, the Hausa Galadima would have required the support of Sokoto to maintain his position in view of the certain opposition that would come from the Fulani clans. As a result, Sokoto would have been in a good position to dictate certain policies, and further increase its influence over the emirate, in return. for its backing. Zaria's Fulani, realizing the nature of the Galadima's plans, buried their rivalries in support of Yero's son, Kwasau (Muhammadu Lawal). The Sokoto Vizier, who had come to Zaria to turban Muhammadu as emir, was forced to capitulate to the demands of the Fulani on the threat that force would be utilized, if necessary, to attain their goals (i.e. the elevation of Kwasau to the emirship). As a result, Kwasau was turbanned Yero's successor, rather than Muhammadu, the choice of both the Galadima and Sokoto. 102 Sokoto obtained some recompense from the fact that, although it had been compelled to cede to local Zaria pressures in the matter of the appointment to the vacant emirship, it was nevertheless successful in retaining its prerogative of filling the office of Wombai. 103

For much of the nineteenth century, Sokoto exerted considerable control over Zaria, not only with reference to the appointment and deposition of its emirs, but also with regard to certain other high-ranking offices beneath that of the emir (such as the <u>Wombai</u>, the <u>Madaki</u>, and the <u>Dan Galadima</u>). The

instrument through which it was able to effect such control and authority in Zaria was the existence of Fulani clan rivalries, the presence of which permitted Sokoto to increase its influence over the emirate throughout the century. To prevent any trend towards unilineal absolutism (and a possible challenge to Sokoto's ascendancy in the emirate). Sokoto rotated the emirahip between the various competing Fulani clans. Furthermore, Sokoto continually dictated to the Zaria emirs as to how certain senior positions within the Zaria politic were to be filled. In most cases, such high-ranking offices were filled by members of opposing Fulant groups. This not only had the effect of weakening the emirship still further (and its opportunity to threaten Sokoto's preeminence), but also of qualifying opposing Fulani clan members for future consideration by Sokoto for the emirship. In this respect, Sokoto aggravated Fulani clan rivalries in the emirate to suit its own ends, namely continued dominance over Zaria's affairs.

The succession crisis that resulted from the death of the cmir Yero in 1897 - as did the Kano crisis of 1893 before it - seriously impaired the prestige and authority of Sokoto. The accession of Kwasau, forced upon Sokoto by the Zaria Fulani who, for once, had laid aside their differences and united to effect Kwasau's appointment to the emirship (rather than Muhammadu, the tool of Sokoto and the Hausa

Galadima). brought to an end Sokoto's unchallenged dominance in the emirate, a dominance that had been made possible by the exploitation of Zaria's clan rivalries.

FOOTNOTES

- 1. At this stage, c. 1805-6, Sokoto did not yet exist. 'Sokoto' has been employed here to denote the central nuthority which, during the period 1804-1808, was continually on the move.
- 2. cf. Hull, "Katsina", pp. 88-9; Johnston, Sokoto, pp. 62-3;
 B.G. Hartin, "Muhammad Bello's Usul al-Siyasa", in D.F.
 McCall and N.R. Bennett (eds.), Aspects of West African
 Islam, vol. 5, Boston University Papers on Africa (Boston:
 1971), p. 63; Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 169.
- 3. See further Hull, "Katsina", p. 90.
- 4. Ibid., pp. 93-4.

 It is interesting to note that Hull is the only author to make mention of post-jihād problems in Katsina.

 Johnston. Sokoto, p. 63; W.F. Gowers, Gazetteer of Kano Province (London: 1972), p. 19: Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 170, merely state that Umaru Dallaji was appointed emir immediately after the defeat of the Katsina Hausa in c. 1806-7. Smith, "Corruption", p. 174, makes mention of leadership rivalties and disputes, but only for the jihād period (1805-7).
- 5. Hull. "Katsina", p. 94.
- 6. Smith, "Corruption", p. 174, mentions that his appointment was due to his scholarly background. On the other hand, Hull. "Katsina", p. 89, cites his earlier participation in the jihad in Gobir and his friendship with Bello as reasons for his appointment.
- 7. Johnston, Sokoto, p. 64.
- 8. Hull, "Katsina", p. 94.

 cf. Johnston, Sokoto, p. 64; Hogben and Kirk-Greene,
 Emirates, p. 169; M. Crowder, A Short History of Nigeria (New York: 1966), p. 101. Umaru Dumyawa was given
 the title of Sarkin Sullubawa, with responsibility for
 the north-east Katsina marches. Mamman Dikko was appointed warden of the western marches with the title of
 Yandakka. Hogben and Kirk-Greene cite the Maradi of Kurfi,
 the Dangi of Yantumaki, the Gatari of Umadau, the Dan
 Yabi of Muniya, and the Sarkin Fulani of Yan Rundau as
 titles of other privileged fietholders.
- 9. Hull "Katsina", p. 92.
- 10. Ibid., p. 94.

- 11. Ibid.
- 12, Sidiku, the second son of Umaru Dallaji, had been appointed the second emir of Katsina in 1835 by Sokoto in preference to his elder brother, Muhamman Bello, " on account of the former's learning and picty "(Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 170).
- 13. Following their defeat by the Fulani, the Katsina Hausa exiles had established themselves to the north of Fulani Katsina in Maradi. Their major preoccupation throughout the nineteenth century was the reconquest of Katsina from the Fulani.
- 14. Hull: "Kataina", p. 96.
- 15. The direction of Sidiku's annexations was the west, representing the fief of Na Alhaji's successors, and the northern districts around Ruma, directly within the jurisdiction of Umaru Dumyara's family. (See further Hull, "Katsina", p. 96; Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, pp. 170-1).
- 16. Hull, "Katsina", p. 96.

 of. Adeleye, Northern Nigeria, p. 81, who states that he was removed "... for charges of oppression levied against him by his subjects". Hogben and Kirk-Greene, p. 171.- attribute his deposition to the fact that "Sidiku had become so self-satisfied and oppressive ""."
- 17. Muhamman Bello-was succeeded by Ahmadu Rufa'i (1869), the third son of Umara Dallaji. His brief reign was followed by Ibrahim (1870-82), the son of Muhamman Bello.

 Musa (1882-87), the fourth son of Umaru Dallaji followed Ibrahim, whilst Musa was succeeded by Abubakar (1887-1904), the son of Ibrahim.
- 18. Hull. "Katsina", p. 100s
- 19. cf. Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 170; Hull, "Katsina", pp. 94, 190.
- 20. Johnston, Sokoto, p. 64. cf. Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 169.

- 21. Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 197; O. and C.L. Temple, Notes On The Tribes, Provinces, Emirates and States of the Northern Provinces of Nigeria (London: 1965), p. 467; H.F. Backwell, The Occupation of Hausaland 1900-1904 (London: 1969), p. 4, all cite 1804-5 as the date of this mission. cf. Gowers, Kano, p. 11, who places the date at c. 1807.
- 22. Gowers, Kano, p. 11.
- 23. Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Fmirates, p. 197; Gowers, Kano, p. 12.
- 24. M. Last, "A Solution to the Problems of Dynastic Chronology in 19th. Century Zaria and Kano", JHSN, III(1966), p. 464; Johnston, Sokoto, pp. 67-8; Crowder, Nigeria, p. 99. No other author makes mention of this particular meeting.
- 25. Last, "Chronology", p. 464, mentions that Sulaimanu was a seholar in the following of Dan Zabuwa. On the other hand, Gowers, Kano, p. 12, states that Sulaimanu was a servant of Dan Zabuwa.
- 26. cf. Johnston, Sokoto, p. 68.
- 27. Ibld.
- 28. Ibid.

 ct. Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 198; Gowers, Kano, p. 12; Temple, Notes, p. 468; Adeleye, Northern Nigeria, p. 57, all of whom refer to this particular meeting as that when Sulaimanu was first appointed.
- 29. Johnston, Sokoto, p. 68.
- 30. Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 198.
- 31. That Ibrahim Dabo was recommended to Bello by Sulaimanu (Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 198) lends credence to this belief.
- 32. See further Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 198.
- 33. Dan Tunku had defeated a coalition of Hausa forces from Katsina and Daura, and thus prevented them from aiding the Hausa Sarki (chief) of Kano in his attempt to put down the Fulani uprising. (Johnston, Sokoto, pp. 61,66). Furthermore, he also helped establish a Fulani regime in Daura (Ibid., p. 178).

- 34. Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 472; Temple, Notes, p. 481.
- 35. Being the name of Dan Tunku's fief.
- 36. Horben and Kirk-Greene, Fmirates, p. 472; Temple, Notes, p. 481; Johnston, Sokoto, p. 178.
- 37. Johnston, Sokoto, p. 179. cf. Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, pp. 472-3; Temple, Notes, p. 481.
- 38. Johnston, Sokoto, p. 179.
- 39. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 178.
- 10. J.N. Paden, The Influence of Religious Elites en Political Culture and Community Integration in Kano, Nigeria, unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Harvard: 1968), p. 486.
- 41. Adeleye, Northern Nigeria, p. 97.
- 42. cf. Adeleye, Northern Nigeria, p. 97.
- 43. Adeleye, Northern Nigeria, p. 97.
 - 144. Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 202.
 - 45. Adeleye, Northern Nigeria, p. 97. cf. Horben and kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 202.
 - 46. Adeleye, Northern Nigeria. p. 94.
 - 47. Johnston, Sokoto, p. 222; Adeleye, Northern Nigeria, p. 98.
- 48. Johnston, Sokoto, p. 222.
- 49. A variety of reasons have been cited to explain the selection of Tukur. One contention is that he was awarded the emirship because of the Caliph's gratitude to Tukur for saving the Sokoto forces from defeat before Argungu (Kebbi), in which he displayed outstanding bravery (Hoghen and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 203; Adeleye, Northern Nigeria, p. 99; Low, Border States, p. 309; Johnston, Sokoto, p. 222; Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, pp. 134-5). Last and Low (locations cited above) mention further that the Caliph had been bribed for several years by means of large gifts and tributes from the emir Muhammadu Bello, who had desired the emirship to be passed to his son Tukur. (cf. Adeleye,

- Northern Nigeria, p. 99). Gowers, Kano, p. 13, cites Tukur's promise to capture Ismaili, the Sarki of Argungu, as the prime reason for his appointment.
- 50. M. Last, "Aspects of Administration and Dissent in Hausaland, 1800-1968", Africa, XL (1970), p. 349n.
- 51. Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, p. 135; Adeleye, Northern Nigeria, p. 100.
- 52. Adeleye. Northern Nigeria, p. 100.
- 53. Low. Border States, pp. 311-2; Johnston, Sokoto, p. 223.
- 54. Adeleye. Northern Nigeria, p. 100.
- 55. Low, Border States, p. 309; Adeleye, Northern Nigeria, p. 101.
- 56. Yusuf's younger brother who succeeded to the leadership of the rebel forces following Yusuf's sudden death in 1804.
- 57. Johnston, Sokoto, p. 225; Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, pp. 203-4; Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, p. 136.

 cf. Adeleye, Northern Nigeria, p. 102, who maintains that the order of general summons was given by the Vizier.
- 58. Adeleye, Northern Nigeria, p. 102.
- 59. Smith, "Corruption", pp. 183-4.
- 60. Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, p. 136. Last does, however, state that the drop in tribute may have been caused by a possible shortage of revenue generally in Kano following the war.
- 61.Gowers, Kano, p. 14.
- 62. Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 204.
- 63. Adeleye, Northern Nigeria, p. 102. cf. Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, p. 136.
- 64. cf. Paden, Kano, p. 486.
- 65. See further Adeleye? Northern Nigeria, p. 97.
- 66. cf. Last, "Administration and Dissent", p. 349n.

- 67. It appears that he came to Zaria as a religious teacher only a few years prior to the Gobir jihad (M.G. Smith, Government in Zazzau 1800-1950 (London: 1960), p. 138; Johnston, Sokoto, p. 70.
- 68. Modern Scholarship has placed the date of this appointment at 1808 (H.F.C. Smith, "The Dynastic Chronology of Fulani Zaria", JHSN, II (1961), p. 280; Last, "Chronology", p. 465).

 cf. M.G. Smith, Zazzau, passim; Johnston, Sokoto, p. 70, both of whom place the date at 1804-5.
- 69. See further Last, "Chronology", p. 466.
- 70. M.G. Smith, Zazzau, p. 138. cf. Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 220.
- 71. Last, "Chronology", p. 466.
- 72. cf. M.G. Smith, Zazzau, p. 148.
- 73. cf. M.G. Smith, Zazzau, p. 151; Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 222.
- 74. M.G. Smith, Zazzau, p. 151.
- 75. See further Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 223; M.G. Smith, Zazzau, p. 154.
- 76. M.G. Smith, Zazzau, p. 155.
- 77. Ibid., pp. 155-6.
- 78. Ibid., p. 159; E.J. Arnett, Gazetteer of Zaria Province (London: 1972), p. 10, both give 1860 as the date of death of Mommon Sani. Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 224, give the date 1853.
- 79. M.G. Smith, Zazzau, p. 159.
- 80. Contrary to customary practice, Sidi did not appoint anyone from his own clan, the Mallawa, to high office. Furthermore, he reduced the status of a vassal state to that of a fief in order to broaden his own power base, and created the office of Vizier in Zaria, "... to show Sokoto that the government of Zaria had an equal and independent status " (M.G. Smith, Zazzau, p. 163). For further details, consult M.G. Smith, Zazzau, pp. 150-63.

- 82. Ibid., p. 164.
- 83. Ostensibly "...for acts of misgovernment and insubordination" (Adeleye, Northern Nigeria, p. 80).
- 84. Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 236, places the date of deposition at 1855; Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, p. 160, cites 1854 as the dismissal date; Adeleye, Northern Nigeria, p. 80, gives 1855.
- 85. Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, p. 160.
- 86. M.G. Smith, Zazzau, p. 167. cf. Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, pp. 224-5.
- 87. M.G. Smith, Zazzau, p. 167.
- 88. 1857 is given as the date of death for Abdusallami by Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 225.
- 80. M.G. Smith, Zazzau, p. 169.
- 90. Adeleye, Northern Nigeria, p. 80.

 Because Zaria's vassal state, Keffi, had been late in sending its tribute to Zaria, Abdullahi had deemed it necessary to attack the state to exact the overdue amount. On appeals from the Keffi chief, Sokoto had thrice ordered Abdullahi to abstain from attacking Keffi, but he ignored these orders, stating that "... Zaria's dealings with its vassals were not Sokoto's affair " (M.G. Smith, Zazzau, p. 171). Adeleye gives 1870 as the date of this deposition, as does Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, p. 165.

 Cf. Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, pp. 225-6, who cite 1871 as the dismissal date, whereas M.G. Smith, Zazzau, p. 171, gives 1873.
- 91. M.G. Smith, Zazzau, p. 172.
- 92. Adeleye, Northern Nigeria, p. 80.
- 93. M.G. Smith, Zazzau, p. 176.
- 94. For details surrounding the issues of Abdullahi's reappointment, his clash with Ali, and his deposition, consult M.G. Smith, Zazzau, pp. 174-8; Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, pp. 220-7.

- Oh, Hoghen and Kirk-Greene, Emiraled, p. 2071 M.G. Smith. Sangar, p. 178.
- Ob. Hopkon and Kirk-drame, Emigater, p. 197.
 Curlonaly, this second dismissant of Abduliahi is unrecorded by either Last or Adeleye, Adeleye, Northern
 Miceria, p. 30, records only that Abduliahi died in
 The H.a. Smith, Pagan, p. 1781 Arnett, Zaria, p. 111
 dobuston, Mokoto, p. 170, all otte 1881 as The year
 of dependition.
 of, No ben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 1271 who
- 97. Hoghen and Rickedreene, Eminates, p. 1971 M.G. Amith.
- of, M.G. Smith, Zarkan, p. 170. . of, Hopbon and Kirk-Grooms, Emirates, pp. 197-8.
- 100, For the althation leading to Sambola deposition, see that, Smith, Marsan, pp. 179-27; Hoghen and Kirk-Greene, Mainten, pp. 177-0,
- too, hid. Saith, Lagran, p. 187.
- 101. 1<u>61d</u>.. p. 188.
- 10%, or, 11.0. Smith, Sarran, pp. 195-4; Hoghen and Kirks, Greene, Bulledon, D. 250.
- 10%, M.G. Smith, Jangan, p. 196,

Chapter III

APPOINTMENTS, DEPOSITIONS, AND ARBITRATIONS (2):

THE EMIRATES OF KATAGUM, HADEJIA,

MISSAU, ADAMAWA, GOMBE, AND MURI

(THE EASTERN EMIRATES)

KATAOUM

In 1807 Sekete conferred upon Mallam Ibrahim Zaki, an ex-pupil of the Shehu Usman dan Podio and leader of the westers Fulani in Bornu, who had been engaged some time in a hostile confrontation with the Bornu authorities, a flag and a commission to launch the jinad in the Shira and Tashena regions of the Bornu empire, regions which, following their conquest and consolidation, were to constitute the emirate of Katagum, Zaki's designation as Sokoto's naith for Katagum followed upon similar appointments to other Bornu-based Fulani leaders - Umaru for Hadejia (c. 1805) and Gwani Mukhtar for Bornu East (c. 1806) - all of whom Journeyed to Sokoto ito solicit and receive their commissions.

information surrounding the appointment of Sulaimanu (Liman Adandaya) to succeed Ibranim Zaki as emir upon the latter's death in 1814 remains obscure, but it appears that Sokoto merely ratified Katagum's choice for successor. Apparently, Sulaimanu, the younger brother of Zaki, "... was the only candidate whose name was submitted by the Katagum authorities for consideration by the sultan." Two years later however, in a move that ostensibly looked as though, it had been initiated by Sokoto, the Caliph took it upon nimself to depose Sulaimanu from the Katagum emirship "owing to his in-

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ability to rule." The apparent cause for his dismissal from office had been two nerious revolts that had occurred in Katarum whilst Sulmimanu and his entourage were visiting Someoto. Following the suppression of the second revolt, and whilst the emir Sulmimanu was still at Sokoto, the Sokoto Vizier, then in Katagum city. "...announced at a public gather-ling the Sultan's decision to replace him (Sulmimanu) with Dan Kauwa, whom he thereupon invested as emir". Dan Kauwa, the nepnew of Ibrahim Zaki, was by far the most important and influential Fulant leader in Katagum at that time by right of his position as Zaki's chief lieutenant in the Katagum Jihād.

quent appointment of Dan Kauwa suggest that sokoto had played a dominant role in the entire incident. Two factors, nowever, indicate that Sokoto may well have been playing a scene that had been initiated and directed by local Katagum interest groups. In the first place, Sulaimanu's dismissal, followed by Dan Kauwa's designation without recourse to any local Katagum body, generated little opposition, thus implying that other parties may well have had consivance in the proceedings. Secondly, since Sulaimanu was absent from Katagum during the troubles he could have hardly been held responsible for them. Admittedly, the mascent emirate of Katagum was barely consolidated at this time. thus, his very absence may well have been the cause of his dismissal. On the other hand, Sulaimanu was

performing a duty that was obligatory upon all emirs, namely the performance of the annual realty-Journey to Sokoto.

In the relection of the next three Katagum emirs - Abdurrahman (1846-51), Kadir (1851-08), and Mamman Haji (1868-96) - Sokoto wielded relatively little influence. Its role was essentially limited to one of passive acceptance and confirmation of the candidate recommended to it by the Katagum electoral body.

At the death of Dan Kauwa in 1846, the Katagum electoral body, meeting for the tirst time, nominated only one person for the vacant emirship: Ibrahim Zaki's son, Abdurranman¹¹ who, as Sarkin Shira¹² during Dan Kauwa's emirship, was the most eligible candidate for the emirship. However, since the Katagum electoral council referred their nomination to Sokoto for approval, a precedent was created whereby it was expected that all future nominations proposed by Katagum's electoral council would be forwarded to Sokoto for ultimate confirmation and approval.¹³

At Abdurranman's death in 1851, the Katagum electoral council submitted four names to Sokoto for consideration, two being the sons of Ibrahim Zaki (Ismaila, Yusufa), one the son of Abdurranman (Ahmadu Jatau), and one of Dan Kauwa (Kadir). 14 As Low explains,

In an apparent effort to avoid a potential imbalance of power (or at worst a civil war) between the two royal houses of the Lawanawa, waziri Hamji is said to have written Sarkin Gadau Kadr's name above the other three in the council letter addressed to the Sultan, and, in his, own private message to Wazirin BoRoto, to have stated explicitly his preference for Kadr. Both of these practices were followed by the Waziri of Katagum during the remainder of the century. 15

In selecting the emir to succeed Kadir upon his death in 1868, the electoral council again submitted four names for consideration, three being the sons of Dan Kauwa (Haji, Alharsan and Abubakar), whilst the fourth was Ahmadu Jatau, con of Abdurrahman; and one of the nominees at the time of Kadir's selection. As he had done previously, the Katagum Vizier informed Sokoto that Haji was his personal preference as the new emir, even though the electoral council had been sharply divided with regard to Kadir's successor. Although the Caliph also fayoured Haji, the Sokoto Vizier preferred Alhassan 16 and took steps to expedite his appointment to the emirship. His endeavor, however, was thwarted when his letter appointing Alhassan was apprehended on route by the emir of Kano: 17 When the Caliph was informed of his Vizier's action he dispatched his own personal representative, rather than the Magajin Wazirin, the regular intermediary to Katagum, to turban Haji as the new Katagum emir. 18

Following the death of Haji in 1896, Sokoto moved away from its previous role of passivity in the selection process

and attempted to place its own personal preference in the emirable. Possibly in an attempt to profit from the division that existed in Katagum's electoral council over the choice of Haji's successor ? . Sokoto rejected the Katagum Vizier's personal choice of Abdulkadiri from amongst the four candidates submitted to Sokoto , in favour of Abubakar, another of the submitted nominees. However, when the Magajin Wazirin arrived in Katagum to relay the Caliph's decision and to install Abubakar as Hall's successor, the Katagum populace reacted with general disorder. 21 how states that "Probably-mindful of events which had followed on similar circomstances at Kano three years before, the Sultan dispatched his Waziri in person with orders to have Abdulkadir turbanned as emir instead...". ?? This appointment, or capitulation to public opinion in Katagum, was qualified by Sokoto's demand that Usman be installed as Sarkin Shira (and hence heirapparent) and Abubakar in the next most important office of Sarkin Azare. 23 These subsidiary appointments were a clear indication to all that, although it had been denied authority In Abdulkadiri's selection. Sokoto was to have more influence in determining Katagum's future emirs.

Not long after this appointment debacle, Sokoto obtained an opportunity to divest Abdulkadiri of the Katagum emirship. Acting on complaints levied by the four most senior chiefs in Katagum that Abdulkadiri and his son, Muhammadu, had

acted oppressively, the Caliph ordered Abdulkadiri to come to Bokoko, Monring diamissál from office if he went to Bokoto, Abdulkadiri instead dispatched a large gift offering accompanied by a substitute to explain his case. When he refused to go following a second summons, the Caliph ordered the Katagum provincial chiefn to "...ignorg Abdulkadir and until further notice to regard Yariman Chinada Muhammadu haffa an the Wakili (representative of) the Sultan in Katagum."4 Another factor that may have contributed to his disminual may have been a Abdilkadiri's inability to prevent trade between Haussland and Bornu panalng through his emirate. 25 In any event, Sokotots removal of Abdulkadiri and appointment of Millammadu Baffa an interim leader appear to have been well received in Katagum. for "with few exceptions...the resident fietherders agreed." " However, whatever capital Sokoto may have gained by Abdul-Endiries ! deposition! to increase its own influence over Katagum was soon lost when, suddenly, the Caliph rescinded his decision. Apparently for no other reason than the large gift, of booty he received from Abdulkadiri when the latter had defeated Sarkin Gamawa (who had attempted to profit from the leadership vacuum produced by the diamisaal of Abdulkadiri to take over the emirable for himself? B), the Callph " ... announced that Abdulkadir had been pardoned, and should be reacknowledged Emir by all the disaident Sarakuna". For

Within the context of mir appointments, Sokoto's influence over Katagum emirate was generally minimal. In most emir appointments Sokoto was restricted to simple confirmation of the choices put forward by the Katagum electoral body: Sulaimanu in 1814, Abdurrahman in 1846, Kadir in 1851, and Haji in 1868. Only following Haji's death in 1896 aid Sokoto attempt to assert any kind of authority in determining succession to the emirship, but was soon compelled to relinquish its own nominee (Abubakar) in favour of the Katagum choice (Abdulkadiri). That Sokoto was able to fill the next two offices below the emirship with its own candidates at this time was, perhaps, indicative of its growing authority. When considered in toto, however, Sokoto's authority, with regard to its ability to decide the succession to the Katagum emirship, must be considered as somewhat circumscribed.

The extent of Sokbto's authority with regard to the dismissals of Katagum's emirs was not that much greater than was its influence over appointments. Abdulkadiri's temporary dismissal from the emirship was brought about by Sokoto in response to a demand by the principal Katagum chiefs for his removal, whereas Sulaimanu's deposition in 1816, whilst appearing to have been engineered by Sokoto, was, nevertheless, again probably enacted in response to local demands.

HADEJIA

Upon receiving news of the Shehu's jihad in Hausaland, Umaru, then leader of the Fulani in the Hadejia region 20, dispatched his brother Sambo Digimsa to "...seek authority from Shaikh Usuman to conquer Auyo and its half-dozen or so neighboring petty Habe dependencies. Sambo returned with a flag, certain other insignia of office, and a commission designating Umaru the Shaikh's lieutenant (A. na'ibun) in the jihad against all local liabe sarekuna" 31 When Umaru died shortly thereafter (c. 1808), the flag and the emirship (which had not been granted Umaru) 32 were conferred by Sokoto_upon Sambo Digimsa, a decision that no doubt reflected the dominant position that Sambo had enjoyed as Umaru's chief lieutenant in the Hadejia jihad. Neither of Hadejia's first two sarakuna (chiefs) --Umaru and Sambo Digimsa -- had engaged in scholarly pursuits prior to the jihad; rather, both had been nomadic Fulani leaders whose knowledge of Islam, let alone adherence to the Shehu's reform ideas, was, it seems, somewhat suspect. 33 As such, their appointments represented departures from Sokoto's usual practice of appointing scholars to the emirships of those states that fell within the Sokoto polity.

In c. 1845 Sambo abdicated and, with the approval of the Caliph Aliyu Babba, turbanned his son Garko as Hadejia's next emir. Furthermore, he elevated another son, Abdulkadiri, to the

office of Chiroma, an indication that he was to succeed Garko as emir. As was intended, Abdulkadiri succeeded to the emirship upon Garko's death in 1847, but when he died a few months later, Sambo reassumed the emirship until his own death in 1848. Whilst Sokoto may have lacked any degree of influence beyond that of confirmation of Hadejia's appointments during Sambo's lifetime, it did attempt to rectify the deficiency once Sambo had departed the political arena. Instead of confirming Sambo's choice — as had been its earlier practice — of Ahmadu for emir, Sokoto took advantage of his departure to turban its own candidate, Buhari, another of Sambo's sons, as Hadejia's new emir. Low states that

According to a contemporary chronicler and intimate of the Sokoto court, Buhari's claim to the succession was supported by Sultan Aliyu's Waziri, who despite Sambo's implied wish, preferred Buhari in virtue of the latter's having sent him over the years a number of valuable presents. In the event, Sultan Aliyu sanctioned the selection of Buhari, and he was duly installed at Hadejia by the Waziri.

It was in response to charges levelled by both his fellow emirs³⁶ and the Hadejia populace³⁷, that Sokoto summoned Buhari in c. 1851 to reply to the allegations, a move that obviously intended his removal from office. His continual refusal to obey Sokoto's summons³⁸ ultimately resulted in an armed expedition, comprised of contingents from Kano and Katagum under the leadership of the Sokoto Vizier, being dispatched to Hadejia to effect a forcible dismissal of Buhari from the emirship. In the face of this military initiative, Buhari vacated Hadejia, where-

upon the Sokoto Vizier officially proclaimed Buhari's deposition from the emirship and appointed his brother, Anmadu, emir in his place. The following year (c. 1852), however, Buhari reentered the Caliphate, defeated a combined force sent against him, executed the emir Anmadu and reclaimed Hadejia emirate for himself. 39 He had now "...openly defied the Sultan and repudiated Hadejia's allegiance to Sokoto...".40

To replace Ahmadu, Sokoto turbanned another of Sambo's sons, Tukur, as Hadejia's new emir. However, although the <u>de</u> <u>jure</u> emir, Tukur never challenged Bunari for <u>de facto</u> control of Hadejia, being content rather to remain in nearby Katagum and Jema'are emirates whilst Buhari was alive. ⁴¹ Sokoto made one more attempt to defeat Buhari and reintegrate Hadejia with the Caliphate, but a combined force, composed of levies from nearly every emirate, was decisively defeated in 1853 by Buhari who, for the next ten years, was free to conduct his affairs in complete independence of Sokoto. ⁴³

to his son, Umaru, who was proclaimed emir by his father's chief slaves. 44 According to Low, "On account of the break-away from Sokoto, Sultan Ahmadu Atiku was not officially notified of Buhari's death, nor was he involved in the selection or turbanning or Umaru; but he sent a congratulatory message, and Hadejia returned to the Caliphate ".45 Umaru's appoint-

ment, however, although accepted as a fait accompli by Sokoto. was challenged by Bunari's two brothers, Haru and Chiroma Serkio (Sarkiyo), who made every attempt to undermine Umaru's position. 40 Their efforts proved ultimately successful for in 1865 Haru convinced the Hadejia court that Umaru should be deposed because he had "... displayed public evidence of mental derangement".47 Although the court recognized Haru as Umaru's successor, Haru was unwilling to assume the emirship until his position had been ratified by Sokoto. This was clearly a wise decision on Haru's part considering the fact That Umaru's deposition had been engineered without Sokoto's sanction, and any usurpation of the emirship would likely have been met with strenuous objections from Sokoto and possible military intervention. In a move designed to solve the succession problem, Sokoto instructed Haru "... to bring all the Hadejia manyasarakuna to an impending conference of all the emirs".48 Tukur also attended this conference with his entourage, but his bid for the emirship was rejected by the Caliph because of the cowardice he had displayed when he had refused to contend with Buhari for physical control of Hadejia following the former's earlier appointment to the emirship on Ahmadu's death in c. 1852. Instead, the Hadejia emirate was awarded to Haru, and his son, Muhammadu, was appointed Sarkin Marña. 49 Low mentions that Haru was appointed the new Hadejia emir because of the loyalty he had displayed towards Sokoto after he had ousted Umaru but had refused to take the emirship without the Caliphis authority.

Furthermore, Muhammadu was given the important office of Sarkin Marna because the Caliph wished "... to ensure that on Haru's death ... there would follow a short, politically undisturbed interregnum, and the accession of another obedient and experienced ruler". 50

upon Haru's death in 1885, the emirship of Hadejia passed to Muhammadu (1885-1906), but his appointment was not secured without some difficulty. Throughout Haru's reign Muhammadu had had to contend with the aspirations of his brother, Abubakar, who ignoring the special honour accorded his brother Muhammadu by the Caliph, had continually jockeyed with him for position with regard to the upcoming succession. Even though he held seniority over Abubakar, and held the added advantage of being Sokoto's nominee for the emirship, it was necessary for Muhammadu to seize the royal palace prior to Abubakar before the emirship was finally secure within his grasp. 51

As exemplified, Sokoto's influence over Hadejia's appointments and depositions was rather restricted, and, like Katagum, its role was essentially limited to one of confirmation of local decisions. Unlike most other emirates, Hadejia possessed no formal electoral council to decide succession to the emirship, the lack of which was attributable, in part, to the absence of a well-defined, hierarchical system of central administration in Hadejia during the nineteenth century. 52 In

the early part, the succession in Hadejia was dominated by the personality of Sambo Digimsa, the true founding father of the emirate, and, until his death in 1848, Sokoto's influence was restricted to ultimate confirmation of his decisions with regard to the emirship: his own abdication and designation of Garko in 1845, the appointment of Abdulkadiri in 1847, and his own subsequent reinstatement the same year. His death, however, opened the way for Sokoto to designate its own candidate (Buhari) rather than Sambo's choice (Ahmadu), a move no doubt facilitated by the absence of a strong local figure.

Buhari's de jure dismissal from Hade, lia's emirship was a direct result of complaints levied to the Caliph, and did not constitute a move initiated by Sokoto. That Buhari was successful in his defection from the Caliphate (and subsequent independence of Sokoto) there can be no doubt. Yet the entire Buhari incident should not be over-exaggerated in its importance as an argument to demonstrate a collapse in Sokoto's authority to command obedience from alts emirs generally. As Adelege so aptly explains,

The revolt is significant...not only because it failed (it failed in the sense that it persisted as the revolt of one man rather than that of an emirate. It did not become a popular movement within the Caliphate against the Caliph.) but even more so because the isolation of Bukharī and the combination of other emirates against him demonstrated the cohesion of the Caliphate. The Bukharī rebellion shows further that as long as the Caliph exercised his authority justly he was assured of the unanimous support of his emirs.

Sokoto did manage to attain some initiative in the selection process following the deposition of Umaru in 1865 in the appointments of Haru and Muhammadu. Yet this influence should not be over-estimated. Since, both were popular choices in Hadejia, Sokoto's role was little more than one of confirmation.

MISSAU

The creation of Missau emirate in c. 1831 resulted directly from an arbitration decision handed down by the Sokoto Caliph, Muhammadu Belfo, in answer to an inter-emirate dispute between the emirs, Yakubu of Bauchi and Dan Kauwa of Katagum. The cause of the altereation had been the Hube town of Missau which had been captured by them Jointly in 1827, and to which each claimed possession. The Caliph, however, decided that noither emir involved in the dispute should take possession of the town in question. Instead, he awarded it to Gwani Mukhtar's son, Mamman Manga, who became Missau's first emir with the title of Barkin Bornu. 55

Mamman Mangais considerable following (which was located in many of the emirates that formed the eastern frontier of the Sokoto Caliphate), 56 Muhammadu Bello also granted the Missau emir and his successors certain extra-territorial rights over his people located outside Missau emirate. Whilst the emirs of these emirates 57 were

invested by Sokoto with ultimate rights over allocation of farm and grazing lands within each town's preclinate, adjudication of all disputes arising from this, and collection of taxes on the use of such lands (together with zakat and craft taxes), Missau retained full authority over the appointment and deposition of local chiefs, provision of public works and military defense, and other forms of taxation, including kudin jini (fines derived from the settlements of disputes which involved physical injury), kudin gado (or rabon gado: death duttes), and -- what had become fur the most profitable of all sources of revenue amphy the Fellate Bornu -- Jangali, or cattle tithe.

A paucity of infarmation exists surrounding the appointments of Missauls, emirs and so an evaluation of Cokoto's influence in this context becomes extremely difficult. From what we know, all Misaau's emira were installed in their offices by nome Nokoto official, whether the Nokoto Vizier or the Jakada. 59 Thorogeno, it can be parely assumed that all appointments were made with at least the confirmation and knowledge of the Sekete Calipha. One deposition is recorded, that of the emir Uaman in 1862, but the exact cause of his dismissal remains somewhat speculative. 60 What is cortain is that his removal from office was precipitated by an appeal from the Missau populate to the Caliph, requesting his deposition. According to Freemantle, "They (the Missau people) sent to Barkin Musselmi to depose Usuman through Aliu Galadima Wazirin Sokoto, and Sokoto Jokada. This was done, and Sali, the best known of the Messau chiefs, succeeded, "[1]

It appears that there was only one instance where Sokoto, through its own initiative, exerted some authority over Missau, and the instrument that it utilized to effect such a move was the cancellation of Missau's extra-territorial privileges in c. 1886. Such a decision was precipitated by Mamman Manga's refusal to perform the annual fealty-journey to Sokoto⁶², a

refunal that was conditioned by Mamman Manga's fear that he would be deponed if he went. 63 Instead, he dispatched his younger brother an Minnau's omissary to Sokoto. The Caliph refused to accept this substitution, and informed the emirs of those emirates in which Missau possessed extra-territorial rights and privileges that they were free to exercise such rights themselves. 64 Eventually Mamman Manga reconciled himnelf with Bokoto, and Missau's extra-territorial privileges were restored. It is difficult, however, to measure the role and effectiveness that the cancellation of Missau's prerogatives had in foreing the recalcitrant emir to seek amends with the Caliph. Freemantle contends that Katagum was the only emirate to obey the Caliphia order to assume control over Misgguis privileges, 65 whereas Low states that Kano, Hadejia and Katagum all took control of Missau's extra-territorial rights following the Caliphia edict, Bauchi being the only emirate to ababedn. 66 Considering the fact that Missauls, concensions conatituted fairly lucrative revenue sources, it would be plausible to regard Low's contention as the more accurate. As such. the loss of considerable revenue caused by the cancellation of its extra-territorial privileges was no doubt a prime factor in compelling the Missau emir to seek the Caliph's pardon. 57

During Mamman Manga's emirship (1886-1900) Sokoto was twice called upon to render decisions in disputes that had arisen between Missau on the one hand, and the emirates of

Katagum and Combe on the other. With regard to the Missauz Katarum diaputo (c. 1895), the cause had been the refusal of a Minnau chief in Katagum, the Markin Isawa, to nubmit to Mamman Hanga following the latter's pardon by the Caliph and the restoration of Missau's privileges. Because of the serious fighting that followed between Missau (supported by Kano) and Katagum forces, Sokoto moved to terminate the altereation, and Issued an order to Haji, emir of Katagum, that he withdraw from the dispute between the Sarkin Inswa and his overlord, the Minsau emir. 68 The accord incident, the Missau-Gombo dispute (r. 1898-1900) was the result of Mamman-Mangain interference into the internal affairs of Combo emirate in which the Masau emir sided with the Gombe Chladima in his revolt against Imaru, the emir of Gembe. When Sokoto was asked to arbitrate the dispute, it ordered Manga to refrain from his activities; and commanded the Combe emir to grant his Galadima a pardon for his rebelliousness. As was the case in the Katagum-Missau disputa. Sokoto was promptly oboyed. Manga immediately withdrew and the Galadima was reconciled with the Gombe emir, Umaru. 69

The special arrangement created by Sokoto for Missau emirate -- the grant of extra-territorial rights in certain neighboring emirates -- clearly provided Sokoto with a relatively powerful waepon with which to manipulate Missau affairs. As such, any independent course of action taken by the Missau emirs, and which was not acceptable to Sokoto, could relatively

easily be checked by the threat of cancellation of such privileges, privileges that most emirs (in emirates where such rights were located) would have been only too happy to obtain for themselves. Such was the case when Mamman Manga attempted to steer a course unacceptable to Sokoto, and where the cancellation of Missau's special concessions appears to have been a major factor in forcing the recalcitrant emir to make amends with Sokoto. Although it is not possible to provide a more comprehensive evaluation of Sokoto's influence over Missau (due to the lack of material surrounding the appointment of Missau's emirs), it can still safely be surmised that Sokoto's authority in Missau emirate was stronger than in other castern emirates, where such a peculiar formula (i.e. extra-territorial concessions) was not evident.

ADAMAWA (YOLA)

Fulani to throw off the pagan yoke" 10, a desire fanned by news of the Shehu's jinād in Hausaland, Adama "... persuaded the various clans to combine and follow the crusading example of Sokoto". This proposal was accepted and a delegation, consisting of the local Fulani leaders, was dispatched in c. 1800 to Sokoto to secure the Shenu's sanction for a jihād in what was later to constitute Adamawa (or Yola) emirate. Usman dan Fodio conferred the flag upon the wolarbe clan chief, Ardo Boronga, who had been nominated leader for the forthcoming jihād by the delegates in the deputation to Sokoto. In return, "the grant of the flag and the commission which it signified were conditional upon the sending of a yearly deputation to Sokoto with a regular quota of slaves". 72

Before the delegation returned to Adamawa the Shehu was called upon the divest Ardo Boronga of the leadership in the Adamawa jihid when Adama reported to him that the Fulani chief, having secured the flag, had no intention of performing the required annual fealty-journey. Instead, the leadership was conferred upon Adama, a member of the small Fulani Ba clan, an ex-pupil of the Shehu, and the leading spiritualist in the delegation. His appointment, however, was challenged by the leaders of the more powerful Fulani clans like the Wolarbe and

the Jillaga, and it became necessary for the Shehu to intervene in order to uphold the authority of Adama. The Furthermore, the Shehu also provided Adama with detachments of Sokoto Fulani and Hausa troops with which to wase the <u>Jihād</u> in Adamawa, The a move no doubt conditioned by a desire on the part of Usman dan Fodio to strengthen Adama's hand against the other more populous and powerful local Fulani, clans.

Centrifugal tendencies became evident during Adama's emirship when Sokoto was twice called upon th answer regional demands for independence of Adama at Yola. In the first instance, Jidda, the governor of Rei, attempted to convince two minor governors in Yola to withdraw their allegiance from Adama and to acknowledge him as their suzerain. Furthermore, he dispatched a deputation to Sokoto " ... with a large present of slaves and a request for the recognition of his independence of Yola". 76 This application for independent status was rejected by the Caliph who upheld the authority of Adama as Sokoto's sole representative in the Adamawa region by demanding that Jidda return his allegiance to the Yola emir. Although the order was promptly obeyed, the incident was soon followed by a civil war between Adama and Jidda, the result of which was the de facto independence of Rei, "the successive chiefs of which nevertheless continued to recognize the spiritual leadership of the Emirs of Yola and to furnish in normal years nearly the whole of the annual tribute payable by Yola to

Hokoto"." Rol's bid for independence was followed by a similar attempt by Ardo Amadu, the governor of Chamba, in 1842.
Instand of upholding the authority of Adama, as it had done
previously when Jidda had demanded sovereignty for Rei, the
Sokoto Coliph Atiku granted the Chamba governor a separate flag
of office, a decision that was accepted without resistance by
Adama who then, it soums, prepared to abdicate his office. 78
The death of the Caliph Atiku, however, coupled with pleas
from his vanual chiefs to remain in office, induced Adama to
summen the recalcitrant governor of Chamba who, seeing that he
now lacked Sokoto support and that the Fulani were united behind Adama, did public obelsance to the emir Adama, and then

With regard to the appointment of Adamawa's omirs, Sokoto's role was as limited as it had been in the emirates of Katagum and Hadejia. Even though Adama had generally demonant rated considerable loyalty and subservience to Sokoto during his emirship, he never ceded Sokoto the prerogative of deciding the succession to Adamawa's emirship. Adama's successors as emirs of Yola-- Lawal (1848-72), Umaru Sanda (1872-90), and Zubairu (1890-1901) -- were all sons of Adama, whose succession to the emirship had been decided by Adama prior to his death. 80

Only once was this succession order challenged when, following the death of Lawal in 1872, another of Adama's

that he lacked sufficient support in Adamawa to succeed as a condidate, he appealed to Sokoto to uphold his claim. Sokoto favoured pamidu over the alternate choice of Umaru Sanda, and relayed the recommendation to the Yola Fulani who, however, rejected the candidacy of Hamidu and Sokoto's authority to decide succession to the mirahip in Adamawa. As Adeleye explains,

The local electors set aside the Caliphis recommondation but apparently averted strained relations with Sokoto by explaining the grounds of their action to the Caliph -- that succession in Adamawa had been fixed by Modibo Adam in his line in the order of Lawal, Cumar Sanda and Zubeir.

Possibly because to had been desired authority in the selection process following Lawal's death, Sokoto decided against the emir Sanda in the intra-emirate dispute that was referred to the Caliph for arbitration. The cause of the dispute had been a domand by the then provincial governor of Rei for the return of territory that had been confiscated earlier by Adama at the time of the civil war between the Yola emir and Sidda, the governor of Rei at that time. When the case was referred to Sokoto, the Caliph ordered the confiscated territories to be returned to the governor of Rei "... in return for presents of 1,000 slaves to Sanda, 1,000 slaves to Sokoto, and loo slaves to the Yerima Tya of Yola."

Mokoto's impotence in the selection process of Yola's emirs was clearly demonstrated when, following the death of

Sanda in 1800; the succession passed to his brother Zubairu, a candidate that Sokto did not approve of, yet whose elevation to the emirship it was apparently unable to prevent. According to Kirk-Greene, "It was...said that the Sultan of Sokoto had been so displeased by the accession of the epileptic Zubeiru that he had sent, for his coronation, a black gown and turban instead of the white ones traditional for a royal investiture". 83

It would appear that initially Sokoto's authority over Adamawa emirate was quite considerable, an ascendancy no doubt attributable to the plety and the relatively vulnerable posi-. tion or its first emir, Adama. Adama's weak position vis-d-vis the most powerful Fulani leaders of Yola necessitated his reliance on Sokote for support for his position against their. challenges to his authority. In this regard, Sokoto's influence was demonstrated on two occasions during Adama's emirship. In the first case, it chose to support Adama by rejecting Rei's appeal for independence and successfully ordering its governor to return his allegiance to the Yola emir. In the second instance, the decision (independence for the governor of Chamba) went against Adama, but it was initially obeyed without protest by the emir. From this point, however, Sokoto's authority appears to wane. Firstly, Adama successfully reasserted his authority over the recalcitrant governor of Chamba upon the death, of the latter's benefactor, the Caliph Atiku. Then he fixed the order of succession to the Adamawa emirship amongst three of

of his sons, Lawal, Umaru Sanda and Zubairu, and thus relegated Sokoto to a somewhat background position in this regard. Sokoto made only one attempt to challenge this succession order (when it supported Hamidu over Umaru Sanda in 1872), but Its attempt to reassert its tarnished authority ultimately failed in the face of strong Yola opposition to Sokoto's interference.

COMBE

On the strong recommendation of Yakuhu⁸⁴, the future emir of auchi (1°c/1-45), the Shehu Usman dan Fodio designated Buba Yero, his one-time disciple, as Sokoto's nā'ib for the Gongola basin region, a region that was later to constitute the emirate of Gombe. This appointment (c. 1804), one of the first conferred by the Shehu, was qualified with the stipulation that he was not to launch the Gombe jihād until so ordered by the Shehu. Buba Yero, however, did not abide by these instructions and initiated the jihād to the éast Gongola soon after his arrival back in Gombe. The Shehu reacted to this breach of the original agreement by ordering Buba Yero to withdraw from his areas of conquest, which were then transferred to the juris-diction of Adama, the emir of Adamaya (Yola). 85

In 1841 Buba Yero abdicated in favour of his eldest son, Sulminanu (Sule), who had held the position of Yerima (and hence helf-apparent) during his father's emirship. From all evidence, Sokoto's role in the transfer of the emirship from father to son seems to have been limited to one of post facto confirmation. The Caliph merely dispatched the Walin Sokoto, Gombe's official intermediary (jekada) with Sokoto, to turban Sulminanu as emir. 86 In contrast to this was Sokoto's dismissal of Sulminanu and his subsequent re-appointment some three years later in c. 1844, both being conducted without the con-

nivance of the Gombe populace. The incident was precipitated when Sulaimanu withneld the annual tribute that was due Sokoto, an action that resulted in the Caliph issuing a summons to Sulaimanu to come to Sokoto. But Sulaimanu, correctly reading the summons as a move to dismiss him from his office, refused to acquiesce to the Caliph's demand. The Caliph then dispatched a letter to the Gombe people notifying them that Sokoto no longer considered Sulaimanu to be the de jure emir of Gombe. The Gombe officials, out of deference to the Sokoto proclamation (and out of fear of the consequences should such an edict be ignored), pressured Sulaimanu to acquiesce to the summons and meet with the Caliph. 87 As Low explains, "Unable to marsnal adequate support from his officials, the Emir finally went to Sokoto, where he distinguished himself in battle with Sarkin Gobir and was forgiven his dereliction by the Sultan". 88

When Sulaimanu died shortly thereafter on his return to Gombe from his meeting with the Caliph, Sokoto made the subsequent appointment of Muhammadu Kwairanga to succeed his brother as Gombe's emir without recourse to nominations or approval from any official body in Gombe. The Caliph's designation, however, was not met with any overt opposition, principly because Kwairanga's claim to the emirship, vis-à-vis the claims of the other candidates (especially from his elder brother, Mallam Buba), was by far the strongest by virtue of his distinguished record in the Gombe jihad and because he

had held the all important office of Yemima under Sulaimanu, a position to which he had been elevated by his father, Buba Yero, upon the latter's abdication from the emirship in 1841.

In the succession of Kwairanga's four sons to the emirship of Gombe -- Zailani (1882-88), Hassan (1888-95), Tukur
(1895-98) and Umaru (1898-1922) -- Sokoto exerted minimal influence. Rather, effective control in deciding the succession to the Gombe emirship was now wielded by the local Gombe electoral body, a body composed of the most senior central administrative officials in Gombe. 90

This electoral council, congregating for the first time at Kwairanga's death in loo?, elected Zailani, the Yerima during his father's emirship, to succeed Muhammadu Kwairanga as Gombe's emir. Tukur, Kwairanga's favourite son⁹¹, then resident in Sokoto at the time of Kwairanga's death, solicited the Caliph for support in his own personal bid for the emiration ship. The Caliph approved the choice of Tukur, but when Tukur arrived back in Gombe armed with the Caliph's official letter appointing him emir, he round that the electoral council's nominee, Zailani, had already assumed control of the emirship and had appointed his brother Hassan to the office of the Yerima. 92 According to Low, "Tukur was persuaded to accept this fait accompli, and informed the Sultan that in view or Zailani's seniority in age and political rank he should be accorded

first claim to the office. Wazirin Sokoto then sent a formal announcement to Gombe Abba of the Sultan's choice of Zailani".93

In Gombe's subsequent emirship appointments no further friction between Sokoto and Gombe is recorded. Sokoto appears to have receded into the background, its role being merely to turban the local Gombe nominee to the emirship. Since Zailani was killed in battle 94 and an immediate successor to the emirship was necessary, there was no time for an official meeting of the electoral body to deliberate a worthy successor. Instead, the Walin Sokoto immediately turbanned Hassan, the Yerima and therefore Zailani's choice for the emirship, as the new Gombe emir on the field of battle. 95 on Hassan's death in 1895, the electoral council selected Tukur, the Yerima during during Hassan's emirship, and he was duly turbanned to his office by Sokoto's representative to Gombe, the Walin Sokoto.90 Finally, at a meeting of the electoral body to decide Tukur's successor in 1898, the manya-sarakuna selected Umaru, the ex-Yerima, over another brother, the Yerima Jalo.97

With regard to the appointments of its emirs Gombe's relations with Sokoto were, in most instances, markedly similar to those of the other eastern emirates. To a great extent it controlled such appointments, Sokoto's position being essentially one of confirmation and legalization. In all-cases but one (when Sokoto attempted to influence the succession by

appointing its own candidate, Tukur, in 1882, but failed in its endeavor), it simply turbanned the nominee of either the preceding emir (Hassan, 1888), or of the Gombe electoral council (Zailani, 1882; Tukur, 1895; Umaru, 1898).

Only one deposition was recorded (Sulaimanu, 1844), and in this case Sokoto seems to have wielded quite some influence for, unlike most emir dismissals conducted by Sokoto in the eastern emirates, it removed Sulaimanu from the emirship through its own initiative rather than as a result of some local appeal.

MURI

Prior to is creation as an emirate in 1833, Muri constituted the southern regions of Combe emirate. It was declared politically separate from Combe emirate by the Caliph. Muhammadu Bello, in response to an appeal for independence by the dominant Fulani group in Muri, the Fulanin Kiri, following the execution of Hamman Ruwa 98 and his eldest son, Bose, by the Gombe emir, Buba Yero, ostensibly "...on the pretext that they were scheming for the secession of Muri from Gombe".99 Much speculation, however, exists as to the true grounds for the execution of Hamman Ruwa and Bose, both ostensibly loyal vassals of the Gombe emir. As a result, a fairly considerable divergence of opinion has been produced. Hogben and Kirk-Greene relate that Buba Yero desired Gombe's succession for his son, Kwairanga, but feared that, on his death, "...the people would choose Hamman Ruwa, the natural heir". 100 Adeleye, on the other hand, attributes the executions to "...the ambition of Buba Yero to Maintain Muri's succession in his own direct line"101, whilst Low speculates that Hamman Ruwa was seeking the Gombe succession for his son, Bose. 102 Be what may, the Caliph judged that Buba Yero was the guilty party and granted the deputation of Fulanin Kiri a flag 103 to mark Muri's independence of Gombe. Sokoto conferred the emirship of Muri upon Hamman, the eldester surviving son of Hamman Ruwa, but Hamman was soon compelled to relinquish the emirship to his younger brother, Ibrahim, on

account of the public opinion in favour of the latter. 104

Material surrounding subsequent appointments to Muri's emirship is unfortunately brief. Ibrahim was deposed briefly in 1836 for insanity, during which his brother, Hamman (Sokoto's original appointee), acted as regent. When Ibrahim regained his sanity a while later he was permitted to resume the emirship but, when he was again afflicted with insanity in 1848, he was removed from his office for good and Hamman was turbanned in his place as the new emir. 105 The Muri Fulani became disillusioned with Hamman as their emir in 1861 and requested that Sokoto depose him and replace him with his rival, Hamadu, the son of Bose. 106 According to Fremantle, "Two reasons are given for his deposal, one, that he was mad and cared for nothing but pleasure and the company of his wives, and the other, that the Fulani were annoyed at his behaviour at Gassol, Sarkin Raba, the Sokoto envoy ('Jekadu') opportunately arrived and gave his sanction to the appointment of Hamadu."107 On the death of Hamadu in 1869, Sokoto intervened in the appointment. process and "...directed that Abubakar, a son of Hamman Ruwa, should be appointed emir". 108 The Muri populace rejected Sokoto's candidate and demanded that Hamman's son, Burba, be turbanned the new emir, 109 a demand to which Sokoto acquiesced. Burba also went insane and had to be removed from the emirship in 1873, 110 and Abubakar, Sokoto's original nominee to succeed Hamadu in 1869, was turbanned the new emir to succeed him.

When Abubakar died seven months later, the emirship passed to his son, Muhammadu Nya (1873-96), who, in turn, was succeeded by his son, Hassan (1897-1903).

From all evidence it appears that Sokoto possessed little influence in both the appointments and dismissals of Muri's
emirs. The successful rejection of Sokoto's nominee for Muri's
first emir (Hamman) by the Murl populace in favour of its own
candidate (Ibrahim) attests to the weakness of Sokoto's position with regard to controlling the succession to the emirship. In all cases, Sokoto had to be content merely in turbanning Muri's nominees for the emirship. Only on one occasion
did Sokoto challenge Muri's right to select its own emirs. In
that instance, however, its choice for the emirship (Abubakar)
was successfully rejected in favour of the locally-picked candidate (Burba).

Four depositions for three emirs are recorded, but none appear to have been engineered by Sokoto without the connivance of the Muri people; rather, each was conducted by Sokoto following local Muri initiatives.

FOOTNOTES

- 1. Low, Border States; p. 158.
- 2. L. Brenner, The Shehus of Kukawa: A History of the Al-Kanemi Dynasty of Bornu, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis (Columbia: 1908), p. 34.
- 3. For further information regarding the confrontation between the Fulani and the Bornu authorities, consult Brenner,

 Bornu, pp. 28ff.; Y. Urvoy, Histoire de l'Empire du

 Bornou (Paris: 1949), pp. 98-9; Johnston, Sokoto, pp. 76-7.
- 4. Urvoy, Bornou, p. 100.
- 5. Low, Border States, p. 162.
- o. Hogben, Northern Nigeria, p. 259.

 cf. J.M. Fremantle, "A History of the Region Comprising the Katagum Division of Kano Province", JAS, X(1911), p. 315.
- 7. The first was led by an important Fulani chief who was aided in his endeavour by the emir of Hadejia. The second, and the more serious of the revolts, was instigated by Tushim, a Habe (pagan Hausa) chief. For further details, consult! Low, Border States, pp. 162-3; Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 476.
- 8. Low, Border States, p. 163.
- 9. cf. Low, Border States, pp. 163-4.
- 10. cf. Low, Border States, p. 164.
- 11. Low, Border States, p. 259.
- 12. The importance of this office is recognized by Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 478, who state that the Sarkin Shira was "...recognized as the most important subordinate office in the emirate -- indeed, in some respects it seems almost to have formed a separate unit."
- 13. Low, Border States, p. 259.
- 14. <u>Ibid</u>., pp. 263-4.
- 15. Told., p. 264.

- 16. Possibly because he was married to a sister of Alhassan (Low, Border States, p. 268).
- 17. Low, Border States, p. 268, mentions that the emir of Kanola daughter was married to Haji. Hence the Kano emir's vested interest in Haji may have been the reason for the apprehension of the Sokoto Vizier's letter.
- 18. For further details surrounding Haji's appointment, consult Low, Border States, pp. 267-8.
- 19. The electoral body was evenly divided between Abdulkadiri and Abubakar, four (the Waziri, Alkali, Makama and Madaki) favouring the former, and four (the Galadima, Liman, Wombai and Maidala) the latter (Low, Border States, p. 283).

 cf. Fremantle, "Katagum", X, p. 420.
- 20. (1) Abubakar, son of Dan Kauwa and brother of the recently-deceased emir, Haji; (2) Abdulkadiri, son of Haji and the Sarkin Shira; (3) Muhammadu Baffa, grandson of Dan Kauwa; and (4) Usman, the son of Abdurrahman (Low, Border States, pp. 283-4.)
- 21. For further details surrounding the incidents leading to Abdulkadiri's appointment, consult Low, Border States, pp. 287-4.
- 22. Low, Border States, p. 284.
- 23. Ibid., pp. 284-5; J.M. Fremantle, "Katagum", X, pp. 420-1; Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 480.
- 24. Low, Border States, p. 288.

 cf. Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Fmirates, pp. 480-1.

 For further information concerning the events leading to Abdulkadiri's 'dismissal', consult Low, Border States, pp. 285-5; Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 480.
- P5. To prevent Rabeh from obtaining arms and supplies from Hausaland that could be used in a possible attack upon the Sokoto Caliphate, the Caliph had ordered the Katagum emir to seal off all trade with Bornu (cf. Low, Border States, pp. 285-7; Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 480.
- 26. Low, Border States, p. 288.
- 27. Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 481; Low, Border States, p. 291.

- 28. cf. Low, Border States, pp. 288-91; Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Fmirates, p. 481.
- 29. Low, Border States, p. 291.
- 30. In c. 1800 Umaru had obtained the title of Sarkin Fulanin Hadejia from the then chief of Hadejia (Brenner, Bornu, p. 29; Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 485.)
- 31. Low, Border States, p. 189.
- 32. Adeleye, Northern Nigeria, p. 30.
- 33. cf. Low, Border States, p. 190.
- 34. See further Low, Border States, p. 192; Gowers, Kano, p. 22; Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 485.
- 35. Low, Border States, p. 193.
 cf. Adeleye, Northern Nigeria, pp. 61, 95.
- 36. Buhari, with armed help from the Shehu of Bornu, had conducted regular raiding expeditions into the territories of his brother emirs (Low, Border States, pp. 194-7; Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 488).
- 37. Adeleye, Northern Nigeria, p. 61. Although Adeleye does not claborate the nature of the complaints there can be no doubt that he is referring to Nalara's assassination. Nalara, Buhari's cousin and one of the prime contenders for the emirship at the death of Sambo, was executed on orders from Buhari when he feared that Nalara would develop into too dangerous a rival. For further details, consult Low, Border States, p. 197; Fremantle, "Katagum", X, p. 404; Johnston, Sokoto, p. 181.
- 38. After first rejecting the summons to go to Sokoto, Buhari had then refused to meet the Sokoto Vizier in Katagum city, after the latter location had been chosen as an alternate site to conduct the 'consultations'.
- 39. For further details surrounding Buhari's deposition, consult Low, Border States, pp. 198ff.; Johnston, Sokoto, p. 182.
- 40. Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 488.
- 41. Fremantle, "Katagum", X, p. 405; Gowers, Kano, p. 22.
- 42. Low, Border States, pp. 201-3.

- 43. Johnston, Sokoto, p. 183; Low, Border States, p. 203.
 - 44. Low, Border States, p. 208.
 - 45. Ibid., pp. 253-9.

 Cf. Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, p. 160, who contends that Hadejia only returned to the Caliphate after Haru had successfully ousted Buhari's son, Umaru, from the emirable (1865).
 - 46. cf. Low, Rorder States, pp. 295ff.
 - 47. Low, Border States, p. 298.
 - 48. Tbid., p. 300.
 - 49. For further details surrounding Haru's appointment, see Low, Border States, pp. 299-301.
 - 50. Border States, p. 301.
 - 51. cf. Low, Border States, pp. 305-7.
 - 52. cf. Low, Border States, pp. 190-1.
 - 53. Adeleye, Northern Nigeria, p. 95. Statements within parantheses constitute Adeleye's qualifying footnote.
- of Missau resulting from a dispute between Katagum and the emir of Gombe, Buba Yero (rather than Bauchi).
 - 55. In c. 1806, Gwani Mukhtar had been granted a flag and commission for the conquest of Bornu East by the Shehu Usman dan Fodio. However, both he and his son, Mamman Manga (who had taken over the leadership upon his father's death), had failed to take Bornu following repeated attempts. At the time of this incident (c. 1831), Mamman Manga was established with a part of his following in the emirate of Bauchi.

 For further information surrounding this incident, consult Fremantle, "Katagum", X, p. 399; Johnston, Sokoto, p. 79; Backwell, Hausaland, p. 5; Temple, Notes, p. 470; Low, Border States, p. 173.
 - of. J.M. Fremantle, "Katagum", X, p. 400, who states that it was only following the creation of Missau emirate that towns containing Manga's followers were established in surrounding emirates.

58.-Low, Border States, p. 278.

cf. Fremantle, "Katagum", X, p. 400. According to Fremantle, the Missau emirs had total jurisdiction over these towns except that "...the settlers were to pay kurdin kassa and zakka to the heads of the provinces concerned."

- 59. Adeleye, Northern Nigeria, p. 81.
- 60. Fremantle, "Katagum", X, p. 409, states that Usman was deposed because he had refused to fight Buhari. Adeleye, Northern Nigeria, p. 81, mainatins that Usman was removed from the emirship "...for arbitrary dismissal of several office-holders to the great annoyance of the Missau people". cf. Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 498, who state that Missau historians maintain that Sale (Sali) usurped the throne when Usman was away fighting for Sokoto.
- 61. Fremantle, "Katagum", X, p. 409.
- 62. Adeleye, Northern Nigeria, p. 91; Low, Border States, p. 279.

 cf. Fremantle, "Katagum", X, p. 418, who contends that Mamman Manga was issued a special summons to come to Sokoto to account for his actions.
- 63. It appears that Manga had many reasons to fear deposition.
 According to Low, Border States, p. 279, "Manga had
 quickly shown signs of becoming another Buhari: he quarrelled with the Sultan's representative after his installation over what presents should be given to Sokoto, expropriated without proper warrant the estates of many of
 his subjects, and appeared in general to be moving toward
 open rebellion."
- 64. Low, Border States, p. 279; Fremantle, "Katagum", X, pp. 418-
- 65. Fremantle, "Katagum", X, p. 419.
- 66. Low, Border States, pp. 280-1.

- 67. That Manga was worried about the loss of revenue there can be no doubt. He wrote the emir of Bauchi asking for his intervention with the emirs of Kano, Hadejia and Katagum, who "...were seizing his main source of state revenue." (Low, Border States, p. 280)
- 68. Adeleye, Northern Nigeria, pp. 91-2.
 cf. Low, Border States, pp. 281-2; Fremantle, "Katagum",
 X, p. 419, both of whom say that it was the emir of Kano
 who compelled the Katagum emir to relinquish his support
 of the Sarkin Isawa. Furthermore, neither make mention
 of any part being played by Sokoto in the dispute.
- 69. Adeleye, Northern Nigeria, pp. 92-3. cf. Low, Border States, pp. 256-8.
- 70. C.O. Migeod, Gazetteer of Yola Province (London: 1972), p. 13.
- 71. A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, Adamena Past and Present (London: 1958), p. 129.
- 72. Ibid.
 cf. Migeod, Yola, p. 13; Johnston, Sokoto, p. 83.
- 73. Kirk-Greene, Adamewa, p. 129. cf. Migeod, Yola, p. 13; Backwell, Hausaland, p.6.
- 74. Adeleye, Northern Nigeria, p. 31.
- 75. Migeod, Yola, p. 14; Kirk-Greene, Adamawa, p. 130; C. Vicars Boyle, "Historical Notes on the Yola Pulanis", JAS, X (1910), pp. 75-6.
- 76. Kirk-Greene, Adamawa, p. 134.
- 77. Ibid., p. 135.
 cf. Migeod, Yola, p. 18.
- 78. In actual fact, Adama prepared to retire on the pilgrimage to Mecca, a move that was tantamount to abdication, considering the length of time it required to conduct such an expedition.
- 79. For further details surrounding the incident, consult Migeod, Yola, pp. 14-15; Kirk-Greene, Adamssa, pp. 135-6.
- 80. R.M. East, Stories of Old Adamswa (Lagos: 1967), p. 85; Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Extrates, p. 439.

- 81. Adeleye, Northern Nigeria, p. 61.

 of. Kirk-Greene, Adamaia, p. 140; Migood, Yola, pp. 1970, both of whom do not mention any rejection by the Yola
 Fulant of the Caliph's recommendation. They state that
 Sanda yas designated emir by the Caliph when Hamida,
 Sokoto's original, choice, died before he was turbanned
 emir.
- SR. Higgod, Yola, p. 20.
- 83. Kirk-Greene, Adamawa, p. 144.
- 84 Mogben and Kirk-Greens, Emirates, p. 466.
- 85. For further details, consult Low. Border States, pp. 1259; Hoghen and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, pp. 405-7. Hoghen
 et al. place the date of the early campaigns at 1798,
 Whereas F.B. Gall, Gasetteer of Bauchi Province (London:
 1972), p. 13, cites c. 1804 As the date. Bince Buba Yero
 was not granted his flag until c. 1804 (Backwell, Hauseland, p. 6), it would appear that Hoghen and Kirk-Greene's
 dating is erroneous.
- 86. cf. low, Border States, p. 210.
- 87. Low, Border States, p. 215.
- 28. Thid.

 of. Hoghen and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 468, who mention an entirely different story. According to them, "Sule's followers grow tired of his continual campaigning and when they complained to Sokoto the Sultan summoned the Emir of Gombe to warn him to pay more attention to his capital of Combe Aba. On his way home Sule died in Kano in 1844."
- 89. Low, Border States, p. 216.
- 90. Ivid, p. 227.
- 91. Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 469.
- 92, Low, Border States, p. 228.
- 93. Ibid.
- . 94. Against Mallam Jibril at Bormi, in 1888.

- 95. Low, Border States, p. 234.
- 96. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 254.
- 97. Ibid., pp. 255-6.
- 98. Governor of liuri territory (Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 447), and leader of the Fulanin Kiri (Low, Border States, p. 126). Since Buba Yero was chief of the Fulanin Janafulu (Low, Border States, p. 126; cf. Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 447n.), Hamman Ruwa could not have been Buba Yero's brother, until recently a widely held belief.
- 99. Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 447.
 cf. Temple, Notes, p. 449; F.H. Ruxton, "Notes on the Tribes of the Muri Province", JAS, VII (1908), p. 375.
- 100. Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 447. See also Kirk-Greene, Adamawa; p. 154; Johnston, Sokoto, p. 180.
- 101. Adeleye, Northern Nigeria, p. 56. See also J.M. Fremantle, Gazetteer of Muri Province (London: 1972), p. 17.
- 102. Low, Border States, p. 140.
- 103. cf. Ruxton, "Muri", p. 375; Temple, Notes, p. 500, both of whom mention that the first emir of Muri received a turban as a sign of office, but did not obtain a flag as was customary.
- 104. Fremantle, Muri, p. 17; Kirk-Greene, Adamawa, p. 154.
- 105. Fremantle, Muri, p. 17; Kirk-Greene, Adamawa, p. 154.
- 106. Kirk-Greene, Adamawa, pp. 154-6; Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, pp. 447-9.
- 107. Fremantle, Muri, p. 17; cf. Kirk-Greene, Adamawa, p. 155.

 Hamman's behaviour as Gassol that so angered the Muri
 Fulani was his unwillingness to punish his nephew Hamadu,
 the chief of Gassol, after the latter had attacked and
 wounded him.
 - 108. Kirk-Greene, Adamawa, p. 156. Sec also Fremantle, Muri, p. 18.
 - 109. Kirk-Greene, Adamawa, p. 156.
 - 110. Fremantle, Muri, pp. 18, 20.

Chapter IV

FEALTY-JOURNEYS, MILITARY LEVIES, AND TRIBUTE

Besides the aspects previously discussed — the right to appoint and dismiss the emirs in the emirates that comprised the Sokoto Caliphate, and the power to arbitrate in inter- and intra-emirate disputes — Sokoto's theoretical ascendancy over the emirates was further in evidence by the presence of certain additional prerogatives that it possessed. The emirs were expected to express their subservience to the caliphal power in Sokoto by the regular fulfillment or execution of three major obligations: (1) the remittance of tribute to the imperial treasury, commonly referred to as "well-known and covenanted gifts" (A. al-Hadāyā al-maclūmat al-machūdat); (2) the performance of annual fealty-journeys to the caliphal court; and (3) the furnishment of military levies upon request. These obligations were, in fact, usually closely inter-connected.

If in good health and free of serious threat of invasion from the dar al-harb, an emir was ... expected to appear, after the autumn harvest, at a conference of all the emirs held annually in the Sokoto area, accompanied by his own chief warrior/administrative officials. It was on this occasion that he brought the required gifts and took part, with his entourage, in whatever campaigns the Sultan had projected that year. Such royal assemblies provided the emirs a chance for renewal in person of their religious and political vows of homage (H. chaffa) to the Sultan, who then conferred on them a much-coveted blessing in his capacity of imam and Commander of the Faithful.²

In an analysis of these factors (submission visits, military levies, and tribute) two distinct phases can be discerned. The first phase, from the inception of the Sokoto polity in 1804 until the death of the Caliph Mulazu in 1881, was generally

representative of strong central control over the emirate components, whilst the second phase, from the accession of the Caliph Umaru in 1881 until the eclipse of the Sokoto Caliphate as an independent political organ in 1903, witnessed a gradual but noticeable decline in Sokoto's authority.

From all evidence available it appears that the first phase witnessed few exceptions when the annual submission visit to Sokoto was not dutifully performed by the various emirs. Only one breach of this obligation is recorded, that of the emir Abdullahi of Zaria, a breach that ultimately led to his dismissal from the emirship in c. 1881. It would appear further that those emirs whose emirates were located far from the caliphal court were probably exempted from making annual pilgrimages to Sokoto because of the great geographical distances involved. For example, Adama of Adamawa (Yola), whose emirship spanned 42 years, made only 11 fealty-journeys to Sokoto.4 Again, there were some instances when Sokoto granted special dispensations of non-attendance to certain emirs for one reason orother, such as age, ill-health, etc. In this context, the emir of Hadejia, Haru, was granted an exemption in 1865 from making further journeys to Sokoto by the Caliph because of his age. Instead, the Caliph asked that his eldest son, Muhammadu, perform this obligation in his place.5

The furnishment of military contingents went hand in hand with the performance of the annual fealty-journeys. These levies, under the command of their representative emirs, were employed by the Caliph as he saw fit. Although information surrounding the Caliphs' campaigns is somewhat scarce, what seems to be certain is that such contingents were utilised by Sokoto practically every year at the time of the submission visits. Beyond this regular annual furnishment, the first phase also witnessed several instances where the Sokoto Caliphs issued special summonses for military contingents to meet some emergency or other. The Caliph huhammadu Bello (1817-37) made three such demands, 7 the Caliphs Atiku (1877-42) and Aliyu Babba (1842-59) twice ordered their emirs to supply forces in similar circumstances, and the Caliph Abubakar Atiku (1873-77) made one such request for martial aid. To all such sommonses the emirs appear to have readily complied.

that the obligation of the annual fealty-journeys to Sokoto markedly degenerated. Instead, submission visits became biennial and triennial events. 10 As a result, autumn campaigning in the service of the Caliph, traditionally performed in conjunction with the fealty-journey, practically ceased. 11 In order to obtain the necessary military manpower with which to fight their enemies, the Caliphs Umaru (1881-91) and Abdurrahman (1891-1901/2) found it necessary to resort more and more to issuing general summonses to the eastern emers whenever the situation

arose. It is recorded that Umaru summoned the emirs every year of his reign and launched expeditions (generally unsuccessfully) against his onemies at Sabon Birni, Argungu and Madarumfa, 12 whereas Abdurrahman made demands for military aid on five occasions. 13 It is interesting to note that, whereas previously the emirs had generally commanded their own military contingents in person, it appears that, during this phase, they slowly abandoned such a practice and, instead, entrusted the commanda of their forces to their sons or senior officials. For example, when the Caliph Abdurrahman summoned the emirs for a campaign against Argungu in c. 1892, only the omirs of Bauchi and Katsina appeared in person to lead their troops. The Kano and Adamawa a contingents were led by the emiral sons, whilst the force from Zaria was commanded by the Madaki. 14 Coupled with the growing absence of the emirs on the Caliphs! campaigns was a general unwillingness on the part of these conscripted levies to fight on the Caliphs' behalf. Such a lack of pugnacity may well have been a contributing factor to the number of unsuccessful campaings waged by Umaru. It is recorded that to the summons of c. 1892 (the Argunga campaign) the emirs had sent contingents only with reluctance 15 and, as Last contends, when it came time to meet the enemy in battle, only the Kano force showed any interest in fighting. The other forces refrained from exerting themselves in the conflict because they expected that no share of the booty would be given to them. 16 This general reductance to serve the Caliph militarily reached a head in c. 1895 when

the omirs refused to respond to the summons issued by Abdurrahman that they dispatch troops to the aid of the beleaguered
emir of Kano, Tukur, who was engaged in a struggle with the
rebel, Aliyu Babba.

Tribute, on the other hand, tended to increase steadily throughout the nineteenth century, and certainly offset much of the weakening of authority Sokoto experienced by the degeneration of the other two obligations, the annual fealty-journeys and their associated furnishment of military levies.

Under Usman dan Fodio (1804-17), Muhammadu Bello (1817-37) and Atiku (1837-42), the tribute paid by the emirates to Sokoto was no doubt relatively small and insignificant, and probably resembled a gift or present rather than a burdensome obligation. In this regard Last is probably correct when he states:

Only tax surplus to the needs of the province need be sent to the capital: consequently the revenue sent was somewhat of a voluntary contribution. Non-payment, however, was a sign that relations were broken; the size of the contribution was of little importance, reflecting the status of the giver, not of the cift itself.

Curiously, Smith maintains that Bello refused to accept the bute from the emirates "... ruling that each should be content with his own." Such a contention, however, is not supported by Clapperton, an English traveller-explorer to Northern Migeria in the 1820's, who reported that tribute was being sent to

Sokoto by Kano, Adamawa, Bauchi, Zaria, Hadejia, Katagum and Katsina, 19 or by the same author elsewhere where he states that the first two emire of Zaria, Mallam Musa (1808-21) and Yamusa (1821-24), both sent tribute to Sokoto. 20 Although there are few figures to illustrate Last's contention, his view is, nevertheless, generally supported by Hogben and Kirk-Greene who, with reference to Katsina emirate, maintain that "Formerly an annual tribute used to be paid to the Galadima of Sokoto representing, the Sarkin Musulmi. This was originally of small value; it was accepted as a present and a portion was remitted to the donors does provide some foundation for Smith's misplaced contention. However, what becomes clear is that tribute, however small it may have been, was certainly always expected annually by Sokoto from the emirates under its supervision.

The semi-voluntary basis of tribute payment, generally characteristic of the Caliphates of Usman, Bello and Atiku, was superceded by a more organized and onerous system instituted by the Caliph Aliyu Babba (1842-59), under whom Sokoto's demands for revenue rose sharply. 22 To meet Sokoto's requirements, the various emiss found it necessary to widen the base of revenue within their emirates and, in consequence, Aliyu's caliphate witnessed a general systematization of occupational taxes in most of the emirates. 23 As a result of Aliyu's exhortations, the revenue acquired by Sokoto through tribute from the emirates.

ates increased sharply. 24

As noted previously, the accession of the Caliph Umaru in 1881 saw the gradual abandonment of the annual fealty-journey and autumn campaigning. It also ushered in a period of further demands by Sokoto for more tribute from the emirates. Under Umaru, a Caliph who, apparently, did not share the 'austerity of some of the previous Caliphs. 25 most of the emirs were called upon to remit considerably more tribute to Sokoto than they had done in the past. 26 Such demands appear to have been met by a majority of the emirs who, besides paying the additional tribute demanded by Sokoto. 27 had also voluntarily increased the value of their presents which they dispatched to Sokoto, an increase conditioned by their growing absence from the annual submission visit and autumn campaigning. 25 In some cases Umaru's demands for more tribute became oppressive and certainly contributed to a worsenin of Sokoto-emirate relations. With regard to Katsina emirate, Hogben and Kirk-Greene mention that "... the tribute had become a levy extracted from unwilling payers; an imposition that quickly destroyed the close personal relations that had carlier existed between Katsina and Sokoto. 129

Barth calculated that the total value of revenue due Sokoto from tribute sent by the emirates in the 1850's amounted to c. £20,000. Tugard, citing figures in the late 1890's, placed the value of tribute at c. £25,000. Lugard's figure,

however, probably represents an amount lower than that which usually accrued to Sokoto in the last two decades of the nineteenth century because Kano emirate, following the civil war (1593-5), reduced the amount of tribute that it sent to Sokoto. 32 Since Kano's tribute was the principal source of revenue for Sokoto throughout the nineteenth century. 33 such a cutback in tribute may well have distorted the rigures quite considerably. However, even taking this into account, it appears that Sokoto's tribute did not increase as much, or was as widespread, as some authors have suggested. Certainly not all the emirates seem to have acquiresced to the pressures of Sokoto for more tribute. Adamawa emirate, for example, was sending the same tribute to Sokoto in the 1890's as it had done in the 1850's 34 Furthermore, Kontagora emirate, which seems to have had a special relationship with Sokoto, paid no tribute whatever to the immerial treasury.35

FOOTNOTES

- 1. Adeleye Northern Nigeria, p. 84. cf. Lest, The Socoto Caliphate, p. 105.
- 2. Low, Border States, pp. 48-9.
- 3. For example, the emirs of Zaria regularly performed the annual fealty-journey to Sokoto (M.G. Smith, Zazzau, p. 76), as did the emirs of Katagum up until 1881 (Fremantle, "Katagum", X, p. 416; cf. Low, Border States, p. 271), whilst Sambo Digimsa, the emir of Hadejia (1808-45, 1848) is purported to have performed this obligation annually throughout his emirship (Low, Border States, p. 191).
- 4. Johnston, Sokoto, p. 178; Kirk-Greene, Adamawa, p. 136; Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 437.

 cf. Vicars-Boyle, "Yola", p. 82, who contends that Adama
 only made 9 journeys to Sokoto.
- 5. Low, Border States, p. 301.
- 6. Apparently the Caliph Bello, often accompanied by the emirs, made expeditions against his enemies practically every year of his reigh (E.J. Arnett, "History of Sokoto", p. 31. in idem, The Rise of the Sokoto Fulani (Kano: 1922)), the Caliph Atiku made yearly expeditions (Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, p. 82), whilst Aliyu Babba is said to have conducted 20 campaigns in a reign of 17 years (Ibid., p. 85).
- 7. In c. 1826, Bello ordered the eastern emirs to mobilize their forces to meet the danger posed by the invasion of the Caliphate from the east by al-Kanemi of Bornu (see further Johnston, Sokoto, pp. 119ff.). In c. 1835, he twice summoned the emirs, the first to meet the threat posed by the Katsinawa, Gobirawa and Tuaregs, a campaign in which the majority of the emirs were present (Ibid., pp. 130-1), whilst in the second instance, Bello ordered the emirs of Kano, Hadejia, Katagum, Missau and Jema'are to send contingents to attack Abdullahi, a Habe exile of Shira, operating in Katagum (see further, Low, Border States, pp. 174-6.
- 8. The Caliph Atiku summoned the eastern emirs in c. 1840 to assist him in an expedition against the Gobirawa and Katsinawa (Johnston, Sokoto, p. 147), and again in c. 1841-2 for a campaign against Tsibiri, the capital of the Gobirawa (Ibid., p. 148; Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, p. 82), an expedition which was attended by all the eastern emirs, except Yaqubu of Bauchi, who, because of his advanced years, had sent his son in his place (Last, The Sokoto

Caliphate, p. 82).
The Caliph Aliyu Babba, faced with the Buhari revolt, summoned forces from the emirates of Kano, Katagum, Missau and Jema'are in c. 1852 (Low, Border States, p. 200), and the following year summoned contingents from practically every emirate (Ibid., p. 201; Fremantle, "Katagum", pp. 406-7).

- 9. The Caliph summoned the eastern emirs for an expedition against the Katsinawa and Gobirawa (Arnett, "History of Sokoto", p. 34, in idem, The Rise of the Sokoto Fulani).
- 10. Low, Border States, p. 48n. In actual fact, Low states that the annual visits "... were reduced to bi- and triannual events". It is obvious that the author intends to mean bi- and triennial events.

 cf. Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, p. 124; Fremantle, "Katagum", p. 418. Umaru Sanda, the emir of Adamawa from 1872 to 1890, is purported to have made only two fealty-journeys to Sokoto (Vicars Boyle, "Yola", p. 86).
- 11. Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, p. 124.
- 12. Arnett, Sokoto, p. 34; Arnett, "History of Sokoto", p. 34, in idem, The Rise of the Sokoto Fulani; Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 407.

 cf. Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, 1. 124, who mentions that Umaru conducted only three expeditions, in c. 1881, c. 1886, and c. 1889.
- 13. Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, p. 129.
- 14. Johnston, Sokoto, p. 220. cf. Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, p. 129, who maintains that all the eastern emirs were present at this campaign.
- 15. Johnston, Sokoto, p. 220.
- 16. Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, p. 129.
- 17. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 105. <u>cf.</u> Johnston, <u>Sokoto</u>, p. 176.
- 18. M.G. Smith, "Corruption", p. 174.
- 19. H. Clapperton, Journal of a Second Expedition (London: 1966), p. 216.
- 20, M.G. Smith, Zazzau, p. 146.

- 21. Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 173.
- 22. For example, it was during Aliyu Babba's Caliphate that demands were made on Zaria for it to increase its share of tribute to Sokoto (M.G. Smith, Zazzau, p. 154). Furthermore, Barth, a German traveller-explorer to Northern Rigeria in the 1850's, mentions that pressure was being exerted by Sokoto on Katsina to increase its annual tribute to the imperial treasury (Kirk-Greene, Barth's Travels in Nigeria, p. 241).
- 23. M.G. Smith, "Corruption", p. 177. cf. idem. Zazzau, p. 157.
- 24. M.G. Smith, "Corruption", p. 177.
- 25. Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, p. 125.
- 26. Ibid.; Fremantle, "Katagum", p. 418.
- 27. For example, Kano emirate, during the emirship of Muhammadu Bello, was ordered to increase its share of the tribute due to Sokoto in c. 1886-93 by 5 million cowries, a figure that represented an increase in tribute of approximately 33% (see further Adeleye, Northern Nigeria, p. 85n.).
- 28. Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, p. 124; Low, Border States, p. 48n.
- 29. Hogben and Kirk-Greene, Emirates, p. 173.
- 30. Barth, <u>Travels</u>, vol. 3, p. 117.
- 31. F.D. Lugard, "Memo. No. 5 -- Taxation", in Northern Nigerian Lands Committee (London: 1910), p. 114.
- 32. In the early 1890's, Kano's tribute amounted to 100 horses, 15,000 gowns, 10,000 turbans and a variety of miscellaneous articles (Johnston, Sokoto, p. 176; C.H. Robinson, Hausaland (London: 1896), p. 105; C.K. Heek, The Northern Tribes of Nigeria (London: 1971), vol. 1, p. 298). After the civil war, Kano reduced it to 100 horses and 1,000 gowns (Johnston, Sokoto, p. 176). Such a reduction clearly indicates a considerable cutback.
- 33. cf. Clapperton, Journal of a Second Expedition, pp. 215-6; Lugard, "Memo", p. 114.
- per annum (Johnston, Sokoto, p. 176; Robinson, Hausaland,

p. 105; Meck, Northern Tribes, vol. 1, p. 298), a figure which is identical to that given in the 1850's (A.G.B. and H.J. Fisher, Slavery and Muslim Society in Africa (London: 1970), p. 151).

cf. J.C. Anenc, International Boundaries of Nigeria 1885-1760 (London: 1970), p. 205, and Hockler-Ferryman, British Migeria, p. 161, both of whom cite 10,000 slaves as Adamawa's annual tribute.

35. Lugard, "Memo", p. 127.

CONCLUSIÓN

The purpose of this disertation has been to examine and analyze Sokoto's relations with its emirate components. The scope has been restricted to an analysis of certain prerogatives that Schoto possessed, prerogatives that were established by Sokoto at the Caliphate's inception and which represented aspects of its ascendancy over the emirates. A restriction of this type has, of course, limited the comprehensiveness of such a study since other points of interaction between the Caliphai authority and the emirates have been deleted from consideration. Regardless of the narrow perspective which has been utilized in this study with which to view Sokoto-emirate relations, this study does, nevertheless, reveal several important facts about the nature of the relationship that existed between Sokoto and its constituent emirates.

The preceding analysis suggests that Sokoto's authority over its emirates was to some extent dependent upon the depree of inter-clan rivalry (in the sense of competition for the emirship) that existed within the emirates. In Zaria, Sokoto managed to attain an ascendancy unparallelled in any other emirate. Such an ascendancy was achieved through the effective exploitation of Fulani clan rivalries which were strongest and most evident in this particular emirate. It rotated the emirate ship between the competing dynasties and thus prevented any trend towards absolutism from ever developing that could have challenged Sokoto's dominant position in the emirate. By claim-

ing, and obtaining, the prerogative to fill certain high-ranking offices with its own appointees, it both maintained (by weakening 'he emirchip still further) and perpetuated (by qualifying others for 'he emirship in the future) this ascendancy. Sokoto also exerted considerable influence over the emirate of Katsina. But, unlike in Zaria, it established the emirship in only one of the emirate's Fulani lineages. To achieve its dominant position it created a decentralized, or federalist-type, structure whereby each major Fulani clan leader was made responsible directly to Sokoto rather than to the Katsina emir, with the result that the emirship was considerably emasculated. Like their counterparts in Zaria, these privileged Fulani clan leaders, who were also responsible for selecting Katsina's emirs, acted as an effective counterweight to the emirs for they prevented, these emirs from autocratizing the emirship to the detriment of their own (and hence Sokoto's) positions, In Kano emirate, however. Sokoto's influence was never as extensive as it was in Zaria and Katsina. This lessened authority, following an initial period of strong ascendancy (c. 1805-19), was attributable in part to the second Kano emir, Ibrahim Dabo, who eliminated competition for the emirchip outside that of his own lineage and thus removed the very factor on which Sokoto depended for the maintenance and augmentation of its authority, namely the exploitation of inter-clan rivalry. Instead, Sokoto attempted to exploit intra-clan rivalry in an effort to augment its diminished authority over the emirate. For a while it again exerted

considerable influence over Kano when, during the emirships of Muhammadu Bello (1883-93) and his son Tukur (1893-95), it successfully played off two segments of the ruling clan, and forced these two emirs (whose claims to the emirship were relatively weak) to rely on Sokoto for support to their positions against the stronger claims of Abdullahi's immediate lineage. In return for this support Sokoto was able to elicit considerable concessions from the Kano emirs. Such ascendancy, however, was shortlived and, with the exception of appointments to the emirship in which it nearly always displayed a relatively greater degree of authority. Sokoto's influence over Kano emirate was generally limited.

In the eastern emirates, on the other hand, a different demographic picture prevailed. With the exception of Adamawa emirate, only one Fulani group competed for the emirship in each of these states. Interference by Sokoto, therefore, along the same lines as it displayed in the Hausa emirates (i.e. the exploitation of inter-clan rivalries) was not possible. As a result. Sokoto exerted considerably less influence over the affairs of these emirates, especially in regards to the appointment and depositions of their emirs. With regard to appointments to the emirships, Sokoto's role was restricted in most instances to mere contimuation of nominees referred to it by local electoral bodies. In essence, therefore, it simply placed a cloak of legality over, or rubber-stamped, decisions that were made by the emfrates themselves without reference to any exter-

nal body (i.e. Sokoto). In the context of emir dismissals, Sokoto acted in response to local complaints levied against their emirs, rather than as moves initiated by it. Furthermore, following the removal of emirs from their offices, Sokoto never looked beyond the deposed emirs immediate lineages for successors. Instead, it either turbanned the most influential relatives of the dismissed emirs to the vacant positions, or else confirmed the appointees of the electoral councils in the emirates concerned. Such behaviour indicates that Sokoto was clearly limited in its ability to influence any appointment to the eastern emirships. It simply lacked the means by which it could control the succession.

The period 1881-1305 witnessed a marked degeneration in the fulfillment of two obligations which each emir was expected to observe regularly, namely the performance of the annual fealty-journey and its associated counterpart, the furnishment of military levies. To counteract the loss of influence from this quarter, Sokoto attempted to augment its own authority elsewhere. As such, it purposely attempted to pursue a much more active role in the internal affairs of its emirates than it had displayed in the past. Such increased interference was especially evident in the realm of emir appointments. The appointments of Muharmadu Bello (1983) and Tukur (1893) to the Kano emirship were concerted efforts on the part of Sokoto to further its own ascendancy over Kano emirate. By both appointments it twice rejected the randidacy of the locally-favoured Yusuf, who more

than once had demonstrated his independence in his dealings with the caliphal power. Ultimately Sokoto failed to maintain its influence over the emirate; Aliyu Babba's successful revolt against the Sokoto appointee did much to damage Sokoto's prestime and authority. JIn Katagum emirate. Sokoto unsuccessfully attempted to fill the vacant emirship in 1896 with its own candidate when it directed the Katagum populace to accept Abubakar rather than Abdulkadiri, the choice of Katagum's Vizier and electoral body. This intrusion into the selection process of Ketagum's emirs represented a radical departure from Sokoto's usual policy which, until that time, had simply been one of turbanning Katagum's nominees to the emirship. Although thwarted from its Intention of influencing the appointment to the emirship, it was, nevertheless, successful in filling two senior offices beneath the emirship with its own nominees. Likewise. in the emirate of Zaria Sokoto's increased intrusion into its internal affairs was felt. Its demands that Sambo (c. 1881-90) If ill three senior offices with Sokoto appointees so weakened the Zaria administration and the office of emir that it became necessary for Sokoto to remove Sambo from the emirship when his position became untenable and to strengthen the Zaria emirship. Again, at Yero's death in 1897, Sokoto sought to increase its control over the emirate by calling for the appointment of a seriously physically-handicapped individual who, because of his afflictions would be forced to hand over power to his Hausa deputy, who, in turn, would have to rely heavily on Sokoto for

support in dealing with the other Fulani clans in Zaria. This was considered too great an intrusion by the Zaria Fulani who rejected Sokoto's right to select Zaria's emirs by forcing the Caliph's representative, the Sokoto Vizier, to turban their own candidate. Kwasau, instead.

A measure of any political entity's effectiveness to rule, or be authoritative, is its ability to use force, or the threat of force, to maintain its position vis-à-vis its constituent, supordinate elements. Sokoto possessed no standing army which it could mobilize, or on which it could rely, in support of its position in its dealings with the various emirates. Rather, whether to deal with external enemies or internal problems (such as recalcitrant emirs), Sokoto was dependent for military support upon the various emirs who were obliged to furnish contingents on demand. The result of this was that, at such times, Sokoto was capable of commanding considerable forces. 6 This factor, the ability to draw upon such a vast reservoir of armed support, was certainly one factor that worked to Sokoto's advantage in its relations with the emirs. It no doubt acted as a deterrent to emirs who contemplated pursuing independent policies, and often compelled many an emir to follow a policy of compliance with Sokoto's wishes on the threat that such a force could and would be mobilized against them if the situation demanded. 7 On the other hand. Sokoto's reliance on the emirates for the furnishment of military forces to uphold

its authority also constituted a source of weakness, for it made the Caliphs overly dependent upon the good graces of the emirs. At how he instances were rare where emirs refused to respect to such a amonses for military support such cases were, nonetheless, not inknown. It was at times like these that Sokoto's authority was most brought into question. In one sense, it could be argued that the emirs acted as a loosely-knith interest proun. If the Caliphs' actions were considered by them to be just for necessary for the defence of their mutual interests, then Sokoto was assured of continued military support from the emirs. If, however, Sokoto's policies constituted serious threats to their self-interests, then such support was likely to be more difficult to elicit.

Another determinant of Sokoto's authority and influence over its emirates was the esteem or regard with which the Caliphs were held by the various emirs. Sokoto's first two Caliphs. Usman dan Fodio and Muhammadu Bello, the former as instigator of the Fulani jihād and reform movement and the latter as the principal architect of the Sokoto polity, appear to have been held in high regard by the emirs, and it was during their caliphates that Sokoto's authority attained its apogee. During this period (1001-37) little friction between Sokoto and its emirates is recorded, and most decisions handed down by Sokoto with reference to emirate affairs were accepted, it seems, with little opposition by the parties concerned.

of Aliyu Babba (1842-59), Succeeding Caliphs were men of lesser ability and prestige whose relations with the emirates did much to contribute to a state of steady decline in Sokoto's authority and prestige vis-à-vis its emirates, a decline that reached a nadir during the caliphates of Umaru (1881-91) and Abdurrahman (1901-1901/2). This deterioration was influenced to a certain extent by a series of intrusions conducted by Sokoto into emirate affairs, particularly with regard to emirship appointments 1?, each of which was considered to be unwarranted interference by the Caliphs into areas of responsibility adjudged to be outside Sokoto's jurisdiction, and which gradually eroded Sokoto's influence from the high level that it attained in the early period to a point where Sokoto found it difficult to command any authority whatever beyond that which accrued to it as spiritual leader of the Muslim community in that region, a position the Caliphs claimed by virtue of their descent from Usman dan Fodio.

- 1. Missau emirate presented an exceptional case. Because of its curious administrative organization (i.e. the presence of certain extraterritorial privileges) it was always vulnerable to control by Sokoto on the threat that such lucrative rights would be cancelled if it did not. Such a situation occurred in c. 1886 when the Caliph cancelled these concessions because of the Missau emir's (Mamman Manga) independent policies and refusal to come to Sokoto.
- ?. Buhari (Hadejia, c. 1851); Umaru (Hadejia, c. 1865); Usman (Missau, 1862); Ibrahim (Muri, 1848); Hamman (Muri, 1861); and Burba (Muri, 1873). The removal of Sulaimanu from Katagum's emirship in 1816 constitutes the only case at variance. But even Sulaimanu's dismissal could be argued as having arisen out of local demands for his removal (see-furtner, Katagum, Chapter 3).
- 3. e.g. Dan Kauwa (Katagum, 1816); Muhammadu Kwairanga (Gombe, 1844).
- 4. e.g. Haru (Hadejfa, c. 1065): Hamadu (Muri, 1861).
- 5. Such a view is also held by Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, p. 174, who states that "The loosening of ties, which had begun before Cumar, was compensated by Sokoto's greater interference in the domestic politics of the emirates, as, for example, in Zaria where the continual imbalance and rivalry of the tri-dynastic system had begun to require an outside stabiliser. In Kano, too, the new Emir, Muhammadu Bello o. ibrahim, proved most amenable to Sokoto wishes."
- h. The army sent by the Caliph Aliyu Babba in c. 1053 to deal with Buhari of Hadejia consisted of 20,000 horse alone, consisting of levies from practically every emirate in the Caliphate (Low, Border States, p. 201).
- 7. e.g. Sulaimanu (Gombe, 1844); Sidi Abdulkadiri (Zaria, 1860); and Haru (Hadejia. c. 1865).
- 8. e.g. the emirs' rerusal to send troops to the aid of Tukur in his struggle with Aliyu Babba after they had been so ordered by the Caliph (c. 1895).

- 9. For example, the emirs readily complied with summonses in c. 1853 to deal with Buhari who, following his own deposition from Hadejia's emirship, had not only usurped the emirship after he had killed the new emir, but was regularly conducting raiding expeditions in the territories of the eastern emirates.
- 10. For example, the emirs no doubt saw in Tukur's appointment to the Kano emirship in 1893 a threat to their own positions. Their refusal, therefore, to supply troops in support of Tukur in c. 1895 can be seen as not only a display of solidarity with the claims of the house of Yusuf, whom they felt had been cheated out of the emirship, but also as an attempt to end, or show disapproval of, the Caliph's ingreased interference into emirate affairs.
- il. For example, three major inter- and intra-emirate disputes were referred to Sokoto for arbitration during this period, and, in all cases, Sokoto's decisions were adhered to by the relevant parties. In c. 1824 Kazaure was severed from Kano and constituted into a separate emirate, Missau emirate was created in c. 1831 arising out of the dispute between Katagum and Bauchi emirates, and Muri was granted independent status of Gombe in 1833 after its governor, Hamman Ruwa, was judged to have been unjustly executed by Buba Yero, the emir of Gombe. Certain emirship appointments provide further examples of Sokoto's ascendancy in this period, especially initial appointments to various emirates, such as Sulaimanu (Kano, c. 1805) and Mallam Musa (Zaria, 1808).
- 12. For example, the Adamawa emirship appointment, 1872 (when Sokoto backed the candidacy of Hamidu over Umaru Sanda, the local nominee); Muri, 1873 (Abubakar over Burba); Gombe, 1882 (Tukur over Zailani); Kano, 1893 (Tukur over Yusuf); and Katagum, 1896 (Abubakar over Abdulkadiri).

APPENDICES

(1) Usman dan Fodio
(1804-17)

(2) Muhammadu Bello
(1817-37.)

(3) Abubakar Atiku
(1837-42)
(1807-73)

(4) Aliyu Babba
(1942-50)

(6) Aliyu Karami
(1866-7)

(8) Abubakar Atiku
na Pabah
(1873-77)

(10) Umaru
(1881-91)

(11) Usman dan Fodio
(1804-17)


(1837-42)
(1837-42)
(1837-73)

(1837-73)

(1902-3)


124

Appendix 2(b) Kataina Emirato




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
Appendix 2(c) Kano Emirate




Appendix 2(d) Zaria Emirate



Appendix 2(e) Katagum Fmirate




Appendix ?(f) Hadejia Amirate




^{*} Tukur, another of Sambo's sons, was the <u>de jure</u> emir during Buharl's second tenure as Hadejia's chief.


Appendix 2(g) Missau Fmirate




Appendix 2(h) Adamawa (Yola) Emirate




Appendix 2(1) Combe Emirate





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Appendix 3
Emirate Supervision - The Kofa System



. Appendix 4

Hausa/Fulani - Arabic Proper Names Conversion Tables

Conversion Tables	
Hausa/Fulani	Arabic
Hami du .	CAbd al-HamTd
Abdulkarim	cAbd al-Karīm
Abdullahi,	CAbd Allah
Abdulkadiri	CAhd al-Radir
Abdurrahman	。 CAbd al-Rahman
Abdusallami, /	· . CAbd al-Salam
Abubakar	Abu Bakr
Ahmadu, Amadu	Ahmad
Ali, Aliyu	CAIT
Buhari	Bukhārī
Haji, Alhaji	al-सृद्धिगु
Hassan, Alhassan	Hasan ·
Ibrahim	Ibrāhīm
Tsmaila	Ismā ^C Il
Muhammadu, Muhamman, Mamman, Hamman, Hamada, Hamadu	Muhammad
Musa	Mupa
Kadir	Qadir
Sulaimanu	Sulayman
Attahi ru	al-Tanir
Umaru	^C Umar
Usman	, ^c Uthmān
Yusuf (-a,-u)	Yasuf
Zubai ru	Zubayr

Appendix 5

of Hausa, Fulani and Arabic terms and titles.

- Alkali.

 Judge. (Equivalent to the Arabic, al-Qadī).
- Ardo.

 A Fulani title, often conferred upon a clan head.
- Bani, Bani.

 Ilterally, 'give me, give me'. Also used to describe the compulsory tribute payments made by the Emirs of Zaria to the Sekoto Viziers, payments which were made in addition to the normal tribute supplied by Zaria to the Sokoto treasury.
- A Bornu title and official position, adopted by the Hausa and Fulani, and normally conferred upon members of the ruling families, especially the heir-apparent (e.g. Hadejia emirate).
- Dangaladima.

 A titled office whose functions varied from emirate to emirate. In Sokoto, this position was filled by the intergradiary to Kano emirate.
- Gaisua, Gaisuwa.

 Literally, 'greetings', but also used to mean gifts (often compulsory) given by subordinates to superiors, and tribute.
- Galadima.

 A Bornu titled position adopted throughout Hausaland, but whose functions varied from emirate to emirate. In Sokoto, the Galadima was the second most important administrative official after the Vazier.
- Tax; tribute, household compound.
- Generally used by the Fulani to describe all non-Fulanis, but also used to mean non-Muslim Hausa peoples as opposed to Muslim Hausas.
- Jekada.

 Messanger who acted as the intermediary between an absent fief-holder or kofa representative, usually resident in the sapital and the flef or emirate.

- Literally, 'doorway' or 'doorhole', but also used to mean an intermediary between one person and another more influential or powerful.
- Yordin Vecce.

 A goldral tax on the farming community, sometimes equated with the kharaj.
- Madaki, Madawaki.

 An important titled official position, whose functions varied from emirate to emirate. However, it was usually conferred upon the head of the cavalry.
- Magaji.

 A Hausa title. In Sokoto the Magaji was the jekada to the emirate of Kathgum
- Magajin Gari.

 An official position found in Sokoto, Kano and Katsina.

 Usually means 'mayor' (hence Magajin Gari Kano = mayor of Kano city).
- Magajin Rafi.

 A titled position. In Sokotu this official was the kofato Bauchi emirate.
- Mallam.

 Teacher. A courtesy title conferred by the Hausa upon any man of learning (equivalent to the Arabic, mu'allim).
- Manya-sarakuna.

 Important chiefs.
- Na'ib, pl. Nuwwab.

 Representative, agent, delegate, deputy, lieutenant.
- Ribat.
 A fortified location.
- Sarki(n), pl. Sarakuna.

 Emir, chief (of) (e.g. Sarkin Shira = chief of Shira;

 Sarkin Isawa = chief of Isawa.).
- Literally meaning 'chief of the palace'. In most cases this titled position performed such functions, but in Sokoto this office was filled by a member of the Vizieral Household responsible for the supervision of Zaria emirate.
- Sarkin Musulmi.

 Literally, 'chief of the Muslims'. Title accorded the Sokoto Caliphs (equivalent to the Arabic, Amir al-Mu'minin).

- Sarkin Rafi.

 A titled office. In Sokoto, this position was filled by the Jekada to Hadejia emirate.
- Hausa/Kenuri equivalent for the Arabic, Shaykh. In the Seketo Caliphate, this title was reserved for Usman dan Fodio.
- A Hausa titled position. In Sokoto, the Ubandoma was the official intermediary to Kontagora emirate.
- Mall.

 An official position which, in Sokoto, had responsibility for the supervision of Gombe emirate.
- Waziri.
 Vizier (equivalent to the Arabic, WazTr).
- A titled position. In Sokoto, the Wombai was the jekada to Adamawa emirate.
- Zakka.

 Islamic tithe (equivalent to the Arabic, zakāt).

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