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Emotion in Buddhism: A Case Study of Āśvaghoṣa's Saundarananda

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August, 1999

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Ph.D.

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This thesis is dedicated to my father, who passed away towards the end of its completion. I would also like to give great thanks to the rest of my family - my mother, brother Sae and sister Lyra - who have supported me throughout this long process of graduate school.

In regards to the research itself, the one who deserves the greatest thanks is my advisor, Richard Hayes. He has spent many a long hour working with me throughout the entirety of my Ph.D., and has read through this manuscript a number of times, giving me helpful suggestions, checking over my translations etc. But, perhaps, most importantly, he has always been most generous with his time, both as an advisor and as a friend.

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Remarks on Diacritics, Italics and other Thesis Conventions

* All translations from Sanskrit texts are my own; all translations from Pali texts, except for one verse each from the *Sutta Nipāta* and the *Jātakas*, are not my own. When I received a great deal of help from the translator, this has been noted in the endnotes.

* When verses are quoted in a row (16.4-16.5), only one endnote has been used. When there was a gap within the quoted section (16.5, 16.8 etc.), then two or more endnotes were used.

* I have left full endnotes with author's name, publisher etc. intact for the literary review section in chapter four, even when the author and book has been mentioned previously.

* Two endnotes are given for a Pali or Sanskrit passages in places where I have used someone else's translation.

* As for the forms of the Sanskrit and Pali words, they appear only in their root forms. Also, if a Sanskrit or Pali compound word appears in the body of the work (i.e. not in a quotation), the components of the compound will be separated by a hyphen.

* All words/concepts from a Pali or Sanskrit text will be written in the language of the text referred to. For example, if I am referring to the Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimagga* in a particular sentence, then the concept of "afflictions" will be written as *kilesa* within that sentence. Yet, if I am referring to this very same concept within the *Saundarananda* of Aśvaghoṣa, it will be written as *kleśa*.

* Quotation marks have been used when the reference is to the word itself but not in cases when we are referring to the referent concept. For example, the word "emotion" versus the concept of emotion (without quotation marks in the latter case). Quotation marks have also been used when a certain word is stressed, for titles of articles within a commemorative book or journal, and for Sanskrit prefixes such as "vi" etc. (Quotation marks have deliberately not been used for any foreign words).

* Italics have been used for all foreign words and for titles of books or journals.

* Sometimes authors' full names have been used and sometimes only the last name is mentioned. This has been done for purposes of style.

* Verbal roots are marked by the "+" sign. For example, *kr* would be marked as follows: *kr+*.

Abstracts

English Version

The principal subject of this thesis is the place of emotion in Buddhist practice. Aśvaghoṣa's epic poem, the *Saundarananda*, has served as a case study. The bulk of the information in the preliminary chapters has been presented in order to provide a background to Aśvaghoṣa's thinking. In this regard, there are two principal streams of thinking that feed into Asvaghosa's work: the aesthetic and the Buddhist. A great part of this thesis has been devoted to the process of translating the concept of emotion into a corresponding concept in Aśvaghoṣa's *Saundarananda*. However, my primary motivating interests here have been the role of emotion in meditative attitude, and the place of emotion in the mind of the enlightened sage.

Résumé

Version Française

Le sujet principal de cette thèse est la place de l'émotion dans la pratique bouddhiste. Le poème épique d'Āśvaghoṣa, le *Saundarananda*, a servi d'étude de cas. L'essentiel de l'information contenue dans les chapitres préliminaires nous présente un arrière-plan de la pensée d'Āśvaghoṣa. À cet égard, deux grands courants de pensée nourrissent l'ouvrage d'Āśvaghoṣa: esthétique et le bouddhiste. La majeure partie de cette thèse se consacre à la traduction du concept d'émotion dans le sanskrit du *Saundarananda* d'Āśvaghoṣa. Cependant, mon premier intérêt demeure le rôle de l'émotion dans l'attitude méditative, et la place de l'émotion dans l'esprit du sage illuminé.

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Abbreviations for Texts Quoted (All titles in Sanskrit or Pali)

AN- Aṅguttara Nikāya

At - Atthasālinī of Buddhaghosa

Ba - Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva

Ca - Caraka Saṃhitā of Agniveśa

DhP – Dhammapada

DhS - Dhammasaṅgaṇi

DN - Dīgha Nikāya

Ja - Jātakas of Khuddaka Nikāya

MN - Majjhima Nikāya

NS - Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharata

Sau - Saundarananda of Aśvaghoṣa

SN - Saṃyutta Nikāya

SuN – Sutta Nipāta

Vis - Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosa

Chapter One: Introductory Remarks on the Choice of *Aśvaghoṣa's*

***Saundarananda* and Discussions in Method**

Preliminary Remarks

This thesis is a study of the phenomenon of emotion. My domain of inquiry is that of the mind or heart, a domain that is usually associated with psychological studies;¹ yet, my method, textual analysis, is that of a student of religion. A great portion of the thesis will occupy itself with the act of defining emotional vocabulary, such as “affect”, “emotion”, “feeling” etc., in English, and then fitting these definitions into the vocabulary of Classical Sanskrit. However, my primary interest remains the role of emotion in the mind of the Buddhist practitioner and enlightened sage. Thus, my thesis works in quite the opposite direction as many psychological studies of religion. Rather than analyzing religious phenomena, such as faith, meditative states and prayer, with modern empirical psychological methods,² it focusses upon psychological concepts, such as emotion, affect etc., and analyzes them within the context of religious practice.

Part of the value of this study rests in its attempt to examine frequently analyzed Buddhist concepts from a slightly different angle: the perspective of psychology. There are a number of authors who have already attempted this. However, there are not any, to my knowledge, who have devoted themselves solely to the concept of emotion in Buddhism; rather, most of the work on emotion has been done within the broader scope of Buddhist psychology in general.

This thesis differs from many other surveys of Buddhist psychology in two other ways. First of all, I have chosen one specific text to work with (albeit with some background material from other texts), the *Saundarananda* of Aśvaghoṣa, whereas other authors³ have attempted to analyze a much broader swathe of Buddhist material. Secondly, my analysis of the emotional concepts in the *Saundarananda* will begin with an introduction to Western psychological views of emotion in chapter two. This has been done in order to give the reader a clear notion of the concepts which are usually attached to the English word “emotion” in modern-day usage before these concepts are matched with certain Sanskrit concepts in later chapters. In contrast, in most works on Buddhist psychology, precise references to Western psychological views of emotion are often lacking.

While this thesis is not strictly a comparative one, neither does it seek to eschew all attempt at comparison. The mere act of studying an ancient text’s view of emotion in the context of our own language and culture today implies an attempt to establish a communicative link to that text as an object. In order to be successful, this link has to be firm enough in its foundation to bridge four gaps: the cultural, the linguistic, the religious/doctrinal and the temporal. Hence, this study has to apprehend the concept of emotion as it exists within the four following mediums: North American culture or Western culture as a whole⁴, the English language medium, the modern dogma of psychological studies and the 20th century. The concept of emotion as it exists within these four modern

mediums will be matched with a similar concept in the *Saundarananda*, with its four mediums being as follows: Indian culture, the Classical Sanskrit language, Indian Buddhist dogma and the 1st/2nd century C.E. In regards to the dogmatic medium chosen for the modern Western conception of emotion, the psychological viewpoint of emotion has been chosen because psychotherapy, the soteriological wing of psychology, has become one of the prevalent means of healing emotion in our Western society. According to Martin Gross, in his study the *Psychological Society*, more than seven million people engage in psychotherapy each year, spending over two billion dollars annually.⁵ Gross' study was conducted more than 20 years ago, in 1978. The numbers may even be greater now in 1999.

Thesis Statements and Basic Contents of Dissertation

This thesis has four questions as its motivating force, all of which center around emotion and its related concepts. Even though only the first two of these questions listed below will be thoroughly addressed, all of them are important to mention, as they represent the "psyche" of this entire thesis, with the last two symbolizing its unconscious aspect, and the first two, its conscious purposes.

The four questions of this thesis are as follows. 1) What would be the correct attitude in Buddhist meditation,⁶ and, more specifically, does this correct attitude contain an affective component as well, or is it merely a distancing from emotion from some place of non-emotivity? 2) Similarly, is the Buddhist sage

void of emotion altogether or distant from it, or, does even the enlightened sage possess affective processes? 3) How does Buddhism purport to heal emotional trauma, disorders, or mental unhealth in general?⁷ 4) And, in regards to the *Saundarananda* of Aśvaghoṣa specifically, given that the poetic medium in Indian aesthetic theory purports to appeal to and consequently elevate emotivity, yet the Buddhist message in the *Saundarananda* speaks against emotional excitement or agitation, does this paradoxical statement concerning emotivity reveal itself in the way Buddhist doctrine is expressed in the *Saundarananda*? Or, to put it more simply, do the vocabulary words used in the *Saundarananda* reflect influences from both streams of thinking, the aesthetic and the Buddhist?

As was mentioned above, out of these four questions, the first two have been chosen as the focus of this thesis; but even they will be answered only within the context of our chosen text, the *Saundarananda* of Aśvaghoṣa. In regards to the third question, it will be addressed only in an indirect fashion by laying some of the foundational structure for a meaningful response; however, I will not venture a full reply, as a full reply would require a survey of a greater swathe of Buddhist literature. Similarly, in regards to the fourth question, an in-depth answer would involve too much speculation beyond the actual words of Aśvaghoṣa, as he only directly addresses this question in the last two verses of the poem. Thus, only some tentative hypotheses will be put forth in regards to the fourth question, and even so, these assertions will not occupy a dominant place in the thesis.

This study proceeds by using the *Saundarananda* as its text of focus, yet supplements an analysis of its passages with background material from early Buddhism and early aesthetic theory as these are the two great streams of thought that feed into Aśvaghoṣa's work. The assertion of these two sides to Aśvaghoṣa, the aesthetic and the Buddhist, is based upon research which has already been done in the field of Aśvaghoṣa studies, especially that of B. C. Law, E. H. Johnston, B. Bhattacharya and R. R. Bohn.⁸ R. R. Bohn's dissertation focuses entirely on the *Saundarananda's* aesthetic aspect, and is particularly useful in this regard.

In order to answer the first two questions in some detail, this thesis centers itself around four foundational points: 1) introducing the emotive and psychological study of the *Saundarananda* by analyzing certain basic emotive and psychological concepts in early Buddhist and aesthetic theory (chapters 1-4); (2) laying the foundation for an emotive and psychological study of the *Saundarananda* by examining certain passages within the text itself (chapters 5-6); 3) establishing at least the possibility that Buddhism is not idealizing non-emotivity or non-affectivity by examining Aśvaghoṣa's portrayal of the Buddhist sage in the *Saundarananda* (chapters 5-7); 4) asserting the presence of affective states within the correct meditative attitude of Buddhism by examining Aśvaghoṣa's understanding of the concept of non-attachment or detachment (chapter 7).

Using the aforementioned schema as an outline, the eight chapters of this thesis have been organized as follows. Chapter one concerns itself with introducing the topic in general, the reason for the choice of Aśvaghoṣa's *Saundarananda*, and the basic methods of research. It also contains a brief introduction on aesthetic theory. Chapter two explicates a few foundational Western psychological definitions for the concept of emotion and other emotive vocabulary words. Chapter three presents several reasons for the plausibility of a psychological study in Buddhism by focussing on several concepts in the Pali Canon and its commentarial works. Chapter four presents a survey of some emotive vocabulary words in the Pali Canonical literature and also includes the bulk of my modern literary review material within the field of Buddhist psychology. More space is allotted to laying down the foundations for a psychological and emotive study of Aśvaghoṣa's Buddhist origins (in chapters three and four) than is allotted for the examination of the foundations for the psychological study of Aśvaghoṣa's aesthetic roots (contained in a portion of chapter one). This is because Aśvaghoṣa himself declares the Buddhist message to be his dominant concern.⁹ Chapter five establishes the plausibility of a psychological study within the context of the *Saundarananda* and begins a survey of the text's emotive vocabulary. It also discusses the emotive qualities of the enlightened sage as portrayed in the *Saundarananda*. Chapter six contains the bulk of our explanations concerning the translation of English emotive vocabulary into the Classical Sanskrit vocabulary of the *Saundarananda*. Chapter

seven is an examination of the concept of detachment or non-attachment in the *Saundarananda*, and attempts to prove that non-attachment itself can be seen as possessing affective processes. Chapter eight contains concluding remarks and observations for further research.

The literary review portion of the thesis takes place primarily in chapter four. It contains a review of previous modern authors on Buddhist views of emotion. A brief review of early Buddhist views based upon portions of the Pali Canon and its commentaries is also contained in chapters three and four. However, in addition, I have made references to previous authors' work throughout the thesis, as I have judged it to be more appropriate to mention other authors' works as a topic came up for discussion rather than group all of their ideas together in one section of the thesis, abstracted from their particular context.

Much of the material provided in chapters one through four has another purpose: to provide a cultural, linguistic, temporal and ideological context for the writings of Aśvaghoṣa. With this purpose in mind, most of the texts examined have been chosen because they were approximately from the same time period or earlier than the *Saundarananda*. An exception to this rule has been Buddhaghosa. Yet, although Buddhaghosa lived decidedly later than Aśvaghoṣa, his ideas are based firmly upon Canonical passages and on earlier, post-Canonical commentaries (or could even be translations of these commentaries).

Therefore, one could say that he represents a viewpoint which is actually more ancient than his own time period.

The choice of texts has been done in this fashion in order to produce a roughly contemporary measuring stick rather than to prove influence between the various texts examined. Through an examination of some contemporary texts in the introductory chapters, we hope to gain some understanding of the cultural and ideological context of Aśvaghoṣa's writings. What were the preceding and contemporary ways of thinking concerning psychology in general and emotion in particular? Did contemporary or preceding texts have a notion of psychological healing versus physical healing? These are some of the questions addressed in chapters one through four, but especially in chapters three and four.

As for the linguistic context, some of the linguistic nuances of the Sanskrit language are analyzed in our review of the different emotively-based vocabulary words in the *Saundarananda*. It is through the translation process of English emotional vocabulary words, which are defined in chapter two, into the Classical Sanskrit vocabulary of the *Saundarananda* that the reader will gain an appreciation of some of the linguistic difficulties. This translation process takes place primarily in chapters five through seven, but some preliminary remarks are made in the present chapter as well.

Reason for the Study of Emotion and Assumptions of this Thesis concerning Emotion

Emotivity has been chosen as a topic because it has been deemed to be the primary cause behind psychic or mental disease.¹⁰ "Disease" will be defined here in its broadest sense as any deviation from optimum health, from the slightest obsession to the most delusional patterns of thinking and feeling. It follows, then, that emotion can also be seen as the primary cause behind psychosomatic disease, yet this category of disease is, in part, outside of the province of this thesis and will thus only be covered cursorily.

One can think of the two principal evident components of psychic disease in two categories: affective and cognitive. (Volition is a possible third category of the psyche, but, for the purposes of simplification, it will not be discussed here. Please see chapter two for further information). Cognition can be briefly defined here as that mental process which involves thinking and all of its components, such as words, images etc. Affect can be briefly defined as the emotive tone or climate in which thought processes take place. Both affect and cognition will be examined in greater detail in chapter two.

Aberrant or delusional thinking patterns and the persistence of negative affective states, such as hatred, sorrow etc., come to mind as the principal evident aspects of psychic disease. They can be seen as its two primary symptoms, with aberrant behavior being a by-product of thinking and affective disorders.¹¹ A third possible principal symptom could be wildly vacillating affect, as is seen in bipolar or manic depression.¹² Yet, I have implicitly categorized emotive

vacillation in manic depression under negative affect even though this type of emotive vacillation also includes positive emotions in its “up” phase.

Both Buddhist texts and modern Western psychological texts speak of the above two symptoms of psychic disease, only within vastly different contexts, and, of course, with different languages and vocabularies.¹³ The primary means of addressing psychic illness within the context of Western psychology is psychotherapy, and, within psychiatry, a combination of psychotherapy and psychotropic drugs. The primary means for addressing psychic illness within the context of Buddhism is Buddhist meditation, coupled with moral action.

As was mentioned previously, my basic assertion here is that, of the two basic components of psychic disease, unhealthy cognitive patterns and unhealthy affective ones, unhealthy affect is the primary cause. What this means, more specifically, is that the first initiating cause of an aberrant pattern appearing in the behavior-thought-affectivity conglomerate is unresolved affect,¹⁴ not a certain judgement someone has made or the content of the thought someone has.

For example, a person may have a tendency to be afraid of crossing the street without a crosswalk. This can turn into a phobia when this reaction becomes automatic and rigid and will thus occur whenever he is confronted with the situation. Pretty soon, this person remains frozen for five to ten minutes before crossing a street without a crosswalk. And, soon thereafter, he begins to miss appointments and even important dates. Perhaps, one day, the situation gets so bad that the person turns to psychotherapy in order to rid himself of this

embarrassing problem. Now, what my theory is saying in relation to such a problem is that, in order to begin the process of ridding himself of this phobia, this person has to primarily examine the emotions which emerge during these crises situations. If he just examines his thought patterns, belief systems etc. (i.e. cognitive aspects), and attempts to change those, he will not succeed in changing the basic way he feels about the situation and therefore will not change the basis from which he is reacting.

This scenario and my hypothesis concerning its roots are, of course, a subject of debate in modern psychological circles. And, in taking this stance, I am not entirely ruling out the benefit of, for example, cognitive types of therapy, which focus more on attempting to change beliefs and judgements. Also, I do not purport to prove that emotivity is more important than cognition in the healing of psychic disease. This would involve a study of much greater scope than the present one, and would take us more deeply into both Western and Eastern views of emotion. Rather, what I am attempting to do here is to make the reader aware of an underlying supposition or assumption behind much of what I say here: the assumption that affective processes are the primary cause of psychic illness.¹⁵ This assumption is significant in regard to the reason for the choice of emotion as a topic; however, the assumption, in itself, will not be a principal subject for discussion.

Such a supposition is not new or original. For example, Freud also asserts this in his work on hysteria.¹⁶ However, Freud's assertion comes within the

context of a discussion on repressed emotion and how it affects the conscious from its place of residence, the unconscious. Jung also asserts that affective processes are the main factors in psychic conflict.¹⁷ In addition, there is evidence from modern research in the field of neurology which lends credence to the assumption here that emotive processes are the primary cause for psychic conflict. Joseph LeDoux, one of the leading researchers in emotive theory, tells us why emotions have more internal power than cognition at this point in our evolutionary history.

Understanding emotions in the human brain is clearly an important quest, as most mental disorders are emotional disorders....

While conscious control over emotions is weak, emotions can flood the consciousness. This is so because the wiring of the brain at this point in our evolutionary history is such that connections from the emotional systems to the cognitive systems are stronger than connections from the cognitive systems to the emotional systems....

Mental health is maintained by emotional hygiene, and mental problems, to a large extent, reflect a breakdown of emotional disorder. Emotions can have both useful and pathological consequences.¹⁸

In addition to statements from modern Western psychologists and neurologists, some modern Buddhist teachers have also expressed a special interest in the particularities of emotion and/or feeling as a mental category. Here, it is noteworthy that Buddhist teachers from vastly different Buddhist sects, such as the Dalai Lama of Tibetan Buddhism and Buddhādāsa from Thai Buddhism, have made specific remarks concerning emotivity. Also, some of their

comments seem to indicate that they see emotions or feelings as particularly powerful causes of psychic imbalance. (Please see the literary review portion of chapter four for a brief explanation of Buddhādāsa's and the Dalai Lama's viewpoints).

There are three other major assumptions behind the hypothesis of emotion as a primary cause for psychic disease. First of all, I am supposing that emotion is always the climate in which thought takes place: there is no such thing as emotionless thought (We also could not have thoughtless emotion, for that matter. And, the same could be said for volition, which will be labelled as the third mental force in chapter two). This observation is in accordance with modern neurological evidence, as many leading researchers see cognition and emotion as separate but interacting "mental functions."¹⁹ Second of all, I am supposing that there is never a time when a human being is entirely without any emotivity, or, by extension from the first hypothesis, without thought.

My third assumption concerns the nature of the psyche or mind. Here, I have made the assumption that there is such a thing as a "psyche". Mental processes will be defined as both of a separate nature and originating power, yet also, in a constant state of interaction with physiological processes. Here, I am advocating a viewpoint which is somewhere in between the Interactionist and Identity theories of mind and body in Western psychology.²⁰ (Please see my definition of "mind" in chapter two for more details).

If this stance was not taken here, then we could not even speak of psychic disease as a discrete process, but instead, would have to speak only of physiologically-originated disease. This would bring us outside of the realm of Buddhist philosophy and practice, as most Buddhist analyses speak of human affliction as having its source in mental states such as greed, hatred and delusion etc. Ancient Buddhism mentions physiological disease, such as maladies of the skin, stomach etc., only in passing. In ancient India, this type of disease was addressed primarily by *Āyurvedic* physicians. (Please see chapter three for more details on the interaction between *Āyurvedic* and Buddhist practices).

Reason for Aśvaghoṣa's Saundarananda as the Focal Point of Study

As was previously mentioned, the focal point of this study is the Buddhist poem *Saundarananda*, written by Aśvaghoṣa. The *Saundarananda* was written in classical Sanskrit circa the first or second century C.E.²¹ The *Saundarananda* or *Nanda the Fair* depicts the struggles of Nanda, Gautama the Buddha's younger half-brother. In the *Dictionary of Pali Proper Names*, Nanda is said to be the son of Suddhodana's other wife, Mahāpajāpatī, whereas the Buddha was the son of Māyā.²² There are also references to Nanda in the *Vinaya Piṭaka* and *Sutta Piṭaka*, and in Buddhaghosa's commentaries on the *Sutta Piṭaka*.²³ In fact, Buddhaghosa's commentary on the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, the *Manorathapūranī*, contains a story which fits the story line of the *Saundarananda* almost exactly. Yet, the focus of our study here is one particular work on the story of Nanda, Aśvaghoṣa's

Saundarananda, and not its precursors or near contemporaries from the Pali literary tradition. Also, this study does not attempt to create a link between the stories in Pali concerning Nanda and his corresponding depictions in *Aśvaghoṣa's Saundarananda*. The focus of this thesis is not the plot of the *Saundarananda* nor its characters, but rather, the psychological implications of its vocabulary.

One of the principal themes of *Aśvaghoṣa's Saundarananda* is Nanda's conflicts revolving around his desire to be with his wife, Sundarī, with whom he is very much in love, and his desire to follow in his older brother's footsteps and lead the life of a monk. These conflicts provide us with much fuel for the emotive vocabulary in the *Saundarananda*. (In this regard, please see the concept of *vikriyā* in chapter five).

The principal reason for the choice of *Aśvaghoṣa* and the *Saundarananda* in particular is rather complex. Indian poetic theory sees poetry and art in general as appealing directly to the emotions and elevating them to a pleasurable, more relishable state. This presentation of emotive life is present even in the earliest aesthetic text, the *Nāṭyaśāstra* of Bharata. In contrast, for the most part, Buddhism seems to be advocating the practice of being unmoved by emotion. Yet, *Aśvaghoṣa* is both a poet and a Buddhist. Does this mean that he has both themes in his work, and, if so, how does he resolve this paradox? The *Saundarananda* was originally chosen because of the possible paradox inherent in

the medium of Aśvaghoṣa's expression, namely poetry, and the content of his message, that of Buddhist renunciation.

Within this apparent conflict, a number of additional questions can be raised: namely, did Aśvaghoṣa view poetry in the same way that later Indian literary theorists did, i.e. as an aesthetic work appealing to human emotions? If the answer to the first question is "yes", then a second question might be: did Aśvaghoṣa see the goals of poetry and Buddhism as conflictual within his own writing?

In this thesis, we will not be able to answer these questions in their entirety, as Aśvaghoṣa only addresses them in the last two lines of the *Saundarananda*, and even within these last two lines, he offers very little information. Instead, what will be more important for the purposes of this thesis is the practical repercussions of these preliminary questions. For example, in order to correctly analyze some of the words utilized by Aśvaghoṣa, such as *bhāva*, *rasa* etc., we have to understand both early aesthetic thinking and early Buddhist thinking. Or, at the very least, we have to consider the range of meanings evoked by both streams of thinking before we decide upon a translation.

Thus, with this view in mind, we will undertake a brief analysis of both streams of thinking present in Aśvaghoṣa's *Saundarananda*, the aesthetic and the Buddhist. In this chapter, there will be a brief exposition of the *Nāṛyaśāstra*, and, in chapters three and four, a brief explication of certain psychological concepts in

the Pali Canon and its commentaries. In addition, *Bharata's* comments in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* will also serve to lay down some basic methodological principles of literary interpretation in general.

Bharata's Aesthetic Philosophy and Preliminary Comments on Method of Approach

Bharata is the earliest known aesthetic theoretician and also Indian literary theory's closest contemporary to Aśvaghoṣa. The dating of his principal work, the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, is a rather complicated matter, and will not be delved into in great detail here. Dates given for the text range as early as the 5th century B.C.E. and as late as the 3rd century C.E.²⁴ To make matters even more complicated, many scholars believe that the *Nāṭyaśāstra* is the work of many authors and not the work of one single man.²⁵ In any case, what is most important here for our study is that the dates given for the *Nāṭyaśāstra* make the text a rough contemporary to the works of Aśvaghoṣa. Thus, the *Nāṭyaśāstra* can serve as an adequate point of reference for the literary ideas of Aśvaghoṣa's time period.

Bharata wrote primarily about the theory of drama (*nāṭya*), but he gave the words of the play a primary place and called them the form or body (*tanu*) of drama. Also, he states clearly that the words in a drama should be written in poetry (*kāvya*) and created by an inspired poet (*kavi*).

vāci yatnas tu kartavyo nāṭyasyeṣaṃ tanuḥ smṛtā/
aṅganepathyasattvāni²⁶ vākyārthaṃ vyañjayanti hi // NS, 14.2 // ²⁷

Yet, great effort should be taken in regard to words, since it ("word") is known as the physical form/body (*tanu*) of drama (*nāṛya*). The gestures, attire and makeup as well as the gestures of mind (*sattva*) reveal the meaning of the words.²⁸

vāgaṅgamukharāgeṇa sattvenābhīnayena ca/
kaver antargataṃ bhāvaṃ bhāvayan bhāva ucyate //NS,7.2//²⁹

"Emotion" (*bhāva*) is said to be the bringing about/pervading of the inner emotion of the poet (*kavi*) through gestures of mind (*sattva*),³⁰ facial color, bodily gestures and speech.

In verse 7.2 above, Bharata makes another point which is significant for this thesis concerning the possibility of interpreting the poet's intentions. He tells us that the inner emotions (*antargata bhāva*) of the poet are interpretable through the medium of the different types of gestures of the actors. Manmohan Ghosh, in his translation of the *Nāṛyaśāstra*, interprets *bhāvayan* in the above verse as "causing to pervade" (the mind of the spectators). Thus, in interpreting this verse, we could say that it connects the inner emotion of the poet directly to the spectators through the medium of poetic words and the conduit of the actors.³¹ In addition, in another section of the *Nāṛyaśāstra*, Bharata also tells that, if the audience (*prekṣaka*) is sensitive or benevolent (*sumanasa*), they will feel the very sentiments of the original poet being aroused within themselves.

Here, with the assertion that the poet's inner emotions are indeed interpretable by a sensitive observer, Bharata is going beyond a mere explication of drama and is delving into poetic theory. The poetic theory he is expressing is significant for this study as a whole. His approach towards interpretation

justifies the method of analysis in this thesis (if I can be considered as a sensitive observer and interpreter), as this study basically represents my attempt to interpret Aśvaghoṣa's sentiments and/or intentions in the *Saundarananda*.

This approach is not only valid within the aesthetic tradition but also in the Buddhist one. For example, previous scholars in Buddhist studies, such as Donald Lopez, have also emphasized the importance of knowing the intention of the text within the context of the Buddhist tradition. In this regard, Lopez says the following:

It would be misleading, however, to see the hermeneutical concern with *upāya* as motivated purely by intersectorian polemic. It was motivated by a more difficult problem: what was the most exalted vision of the Buddha? To what final truth was he leading his disciples with his skillful methods?...

As I note in my essay, this concern with intention may very well run counter to modern trends in hermeneutics, but its centrality to the Buddhist interpretation of scripture is undeniable.³²

Most probably, the trend in modern hermeneutical tradition, which Lopez is referring to, is the tendency to question a reader's ability to understand the author's intentions, emotional make-up etc. through the mere reading of his work. This modern tendency is expressed by Michel Foucault in his work *What is an Author?*, in which Foucault describes the connection between the author and his work as an "enigmatic" one.³³ In contrast, in both the Indian aesthetic tradition and the Buddhist one, this enigmatic relationship does not exist; rather, there is a "truth" there, either in regards to the emotions (*bhāva*) of the poet, or, in

regards to the original intentions of the Buddha. Not only is this truth important to strive for and interpret, but it is capable of being interpreted.

Since both Buddhist philosophy and aesthetic philosophy have this idea within their traditions, and since these two streams are the primary ones which feed into Aśvaghoṣa's works, this approach seems justified here. In addition, there is another justification for the attempt to interpret the meaning and intention of Aśvaghoṣa in the *Saundarananda*. In his last two verses, Aśvaghoṣa explicitly states his entire intention for writing the poem: to communicate and spread the message of Buddhist liberation.

All of this being said, the central goal of this thesis is not to determine Aśvaghoṣa's intentions within his personal philosophy as whole; rather, it is basically to understand the message of one of his texts, the *Saundarananda*. An understanding of the entirety of Aśvaghoṣa's philosophy vis-à-vis each concept would require a much broader study of all of his works, and several studies have already been undertaken in this regard. Amongst these, B. C. Law's *Aśvaghoṣa*, E. H. Johnston's introductory chapter in the *Buddhacarita* and B. Bhattacharya's *A Critical Study of Aśvaghoṣa* are the most detailed in their exposition.³⁴

The Establishment of the Genre of Kāvya in Aśvaghoṣa's and Bharata's Writings

The word *kāvya* is usually translated as "poetry" by Western and Indian analysts of literary theory. Here, we will utilize this same translation, but with one qualification: the basis for this translation will come from Bharata's

understanding of *kāvya* and not the understanding of later theorists. This has been done in the attempt to find a base definition of *kāvya* which is at least a close contemporary to the time of Aśvaghoṣa. The explication of the term *kāvya* or poetry occupies a whole chapter in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, but, in the *Saundarananda*, it is explicated only in the last two verses. Yet, what is significant here is not the relative length of their explications concerning the genre of *kāvya*. Rather, it is the fact that both Bharata and Aśvaghoṣa explicitly mention the word *kāvya* as a genre of writing, and most importantly, that Aśvaghoṣa explicitly mentions *kāvya* as his chosen genre.

Aśvaghoṣa speaks of the behavior of poetry (*kāvya-upacāra*) and the rules of poetry (*kāvya-dharma*). He also associates the enjoyment of the senses with the medium of poetry and contrasts poetry's goal to that of Buddhist practice, which is characterized as a liberation from the senses. However, beyond this, Aśvaghoṣa does not offer any definition of what the genre of *kāvya* actually consists of. For this, we must turn to Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra*.

evaṃ caturvidhair vṛttair nānāchandaḥsamudbhavaiḥ/
kāvyabandhās tu kartavyāḥ satṭriṃśallakṣaṇānvitāḥ // NS,15.172 // ³⁵

Having their origins in the various metrical arrangements (*chandas*), i.e. meters (*vṛttas*) of a four-fold division (i.e. composed of four feet or *padas*, see NS, verse 14.37), poetic compositions (*kāvyabandha*) should be composed in this way with 36 characteristics.³⁶

chandohino na śabdo 'sti na chandaḥ śabdavarjitāḥ/
tasmāt tūbhayaśamyukte nāṭyasyoddyotake smṛte // NS,14.40 // ³⁷

Without meter (*chandas*), there is no correct expression (*śabda*); without correct expression, there is no meter. Thus, the illuminating aspect (*uddiyotaka*) of drama is known to be dependent upon both of them.

Thus, in summary, Bharata tells us that there are 36 ornamental characteristics of poetry. In verse 15.172, Bharata tells us that all of these characteristics have to be expressed in meter (*chandas*); otherwise, the expression is not a correct form of expression (*śabda*). Aśvaghoṣa, in the *Saundarananda*, conforms to all of these descriptions. He always writes in meter and employs many of the ornamental characteristics described by Bharata with great ease and force of style. Here, there are a few poetic features which Aśvaghoṣa employs that affect some of our interpretations and are therefore worthy of mention. Below, I have quoted passages related to three of these features, as understood by Bharata: embellishment/adornment/ ornament (*bhūṣaṇa*) ambiguity / doubt/hesitation (*saṁśaya*) and fancy / imagination (*abhiprāya*).

alaṅkārair guṇaiḥ caiva bahubhiḥ samalaṅkṛtam/
bhūṣaṇair iva vinyastais tadbhūṣaṇam iti smṛtam//NS, 16.6 // ³⁸

Bhūṣaṇa is known as that (characteristic of poetry) which adorns through many figures of speech (*alaṅkāra*) and qualities which are arranged as if they were ornaments.

aparijñātātattvārtham vākyaṁ yatra samāpyate/
anekatvād vicārāṇām sa saṁśaya iti smṛtaḥ//NS, 16.11 // ³⁹

A (poetic) sentence has been achieved when, through a variety of considerations (*vicāra*), there is a real meaning which has not been disclosed: This is what is known as deliberate ambiguity (*saṁśaya*).

abhūtapūrvo yo 'py arthaḥ sādṛśyāt parikalpitaḥ/
lokasya hṛdayagrāhī so 'bhiprāya iti smṛtaḥ//NS, 16.14//⁴⁰

"Fancy" (*abhiprāya*) is any (*api*) meaning that has not occurred before and, when imagined through resemblance, captures people's hearts.

The qualities of *bhūṣaṇa*, *saṁśaya* and *abhiprāya* give the reader an idea of what Bharata deemed to be the desirable effect of poetry: the communication of beauty through a myriad of embellishments, yet also through an intentional ambiguity and a projection of symbolic meaning beyond what is conveyed in the literal interpretation of the words. *Abhiprāya* conveys the notion that the poet creates through the imagination of the reader or the audience. *Samśaya* communicates the notion of doubt, but with reference to a planned doubt or ambiguity.

Samśaya is especially evident in our text, the *Saundarananda*. The most blatant case of this is in Aśvaghoṣa's free use of synonyms or near synonyms. For example, he uses 5-10 words which could mean "mind", "soul" or perhaps just "conception" or "thought", but never states clearly or precisely the discrete definitions for such terms. Surely, sometimes different synonyms are used to achieve the desired metrical effect, but I would also propose that much of the ambiguity created by Aśvaghoṣa is planned.

These are just a few of the poetic devices which are used by Aśvaghoṣa and mentioned by Bharata. Because the focus of this study is psychological and not literary, a more detailed explanation of poetic devices will not be undertaken.

The preceding explications were undertaken in order to give the reader a more exact understanding of the term *kāvya*, as explicated by Bharata. Henceforth, instead of focussing on the ornamental aspect of Bharata's explanation of *kāvya*, I will concentrate upon the emotive or psychological part of Bharata's poetic theory.

Another reason for this focus away from the technical aspects of literary theory is that there is already one extant study of Aśvaghoṣa's *Saundarananda* from this standpoint. This admirable study, by R. R. Bohn, contains an extensive analysis of the *alāṅkāras* and the aesthetically-produced emotions (*rasa*) in the *Saundarananda*.⁴¹ Bohn analyzes the *Saundarananda* from the standpoint of Bharata and later Indian theorists with reference to the Western poetic tradition as well.

The Psychology of Drama according to Bharata's Nāṭyaśāstra

Bharata's theory of the role of emotions in drama, centers around two concepts: *bhāva* (emotion) and *rasa* (aesthetically-produced emotion). These terms are also important for this study because they appear in the *Saundarananda*. There is a gigantic literature on these two concepts, yet I will explicate only the words of Bharata here and disregard later writers. In chapter seven of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, Bharata defines *bhāva*. Perhaps the most important point here is that Bharata explicates *bhāvita* (a participle derived from the same verbal root as *bhāva*) as being synonymous with *vyāpta*, or the fact of being "pervasive": thus, the word *bhāva* in Bharata's works has this implication.

loke 'pi ca siddham aho hyanena gandhena rasena vā sarvam eva bhāvitam iti.
Tac ca vyāptyartham//NS, Prose before 7.1//⁴²

For, even in daily usage, it is attested (*siddham*) that (there are expressions like) "everything is pervaded (*bhāvita*) by a (certain) smell or taste". And thus, the meaning (of *bhāvita*) is "pervaded" (*vyāpti*).

yo 'rtho hrdayasaṃvādī tasya bhāvo rasodbhavaḥ/
śarīraṃ vyāpyate tena śuṣkaṃ kāṣṭham ivāgninā//NS, 7.7//⁴³

That meaning (*artha*) (of the *kāvya*) which is harmonious with the heart has emotion (*bhāva*) as the source of aesthetically-produced emotion (*rasa*). The body is pervaded by emotion (*bhāva*), as a dry piece of wood is pervaded by fire.

In the second passage quoted above, *bhāva* is said to pervade the body.

This portrayal of *bhāva* is different than Bharata description of it in verse 6.34, quoted later in this section, in which he says that the *sthāyi-bhāvas* are relished mentally (*manasā*). Throughout chapter seven as well, he describes the *sthāyi-bhāvas* in a more mental fashion than a physical. Also, in verse 7.2 quoted above, *bhāva* was said to be an expression of the inner emotions (*antargata bhāva*) of the poet: *antargata* seems to imply an internality, or, the fact that these sentiments (*bhāva*) have a psychological origin. Yet, perhaps we cannot conclude that there is a uniform message in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, nor that its various messages are in contradiction. Also, although *bhāva* may sometimes be portrayed as a psychological concept and sometimes as a physical one, these two descriptions do not necessarily preclude one another.

Bharata states that there are 8 basic emotions in human beings. He calls these *sthāyi-bhāvas*. In addition, he explicates 33 transitory emotions (*vyabhicāri* or *sañcāri-bhāva*) and 8 temperamental emotions (*sāttvika bhāva*). The *vyabhicāri-bhāva* and *sāttvika bhāva* are like “attendants or disciples” (*parijana*) alongside the “king” (*svāmin*) of the *sthāyi-bhāva*.⁴⁴

The *sthāyi-bhāvas* are common to all human beings, but they only turn into *rasas* when they reside within a sensitive appreciator of drama (*sumanasa prekṣaka*), and, according to Bharata, only during the dramatic performance. This is why *rasa* has been called “an aesthetically-produced phenomenon”, as it cannot occur on its own outside of an aesthetic performance. Also, in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, the emotions (*bhāva*) which are communicated by the actors are said to be relished (*āsvadayati*) and this relishing or tasting of the emotions is called *rasa*.⁴⁵

yathā hi nānāvyañjanauṣadhidravyaśamyogād rasaniṣpattir bhavati yathā hi guḍāḍibhir dravyair vyañjanair oṣadhibhiś ca śāḍavādayo rasā nivartante (nirvartyante)⁴⁶ tathā nānābhāvopagatā api sthāyino bhāvā rasatvam āpnuvantīti/ (NS, 6.32-6.33, prose)⁴⁷

For, just as a taste occurs due to the combination of ingredients such as the various herbs and spices, (and) just as the tastes of sweetmeats etc. are produced by ingredients such as molasses and herbs and spices, similarly, the principal emotions (*bhāva*), along with the various other emotions (*bhāva*) (i.e. *vyabhicāri bhāva* etc.) culminate in aesthetically-produced emotion (*rasa*).

atrāha - rasa iti kaḥ padārthaḥ/ ucyate - āsvādyatvāt/ katham āsvādyate rasaḥ/ yathā hi nānāvyañjanasamskṛtam annaṁ bhuñjānā rasān āsvādayanti sumanasah puruṣa harṣādīṃś cādhigacchanti tathā nānābhāvābhinayavyaṇjītān

vāgaṅgasattvopetān sthāyibhāvān āsvādayanti sumanasah prekṣakāḥ harṣādīṃś
cādhigacchanti/ (NS, 6.32-6.33, prose)⁴⁸

Here, it may be asked: what is the entity called *rasa*? (I say that) it is called *rasa* because of its quality of being relishable (*āsvadyatvāt*). How is *rasa* relished? Indeed, just as noble-minded people relish tastes upon eating food seasoned with various spices and then feel joy (*harṣa*) etc., similarly, noble-minded onlookers relish the *sthāyi-bhāvas*, which are brought forth by verbal, physical and mental activities indicated by the gestures for the various emotions (*bhāvas*), and feel joy etc.

To summarize Bharata's views up to this point, *rasa* is the final outcome of the various emotions of the poet communicated in the poetic form and by the mental, physical and verbal gestures of the actors. It is a feeling of relishing, enjoying or reveling (*āsvad*) in the emotion. This final outcome or product of the aesthetic work occurs in the mind of the sensitive or intelligent spectator (*sumanasa prekṣaka*). Its basic foundation is the *sthāyi-bhāvas* communicated in the performance, but the *vyabhicāri-bhāvas* etc. contribute as well, just as the side dishes of a meal contribute to its overall effect.

yathā bahudravayutair vyañjanair bahubhir yutaṃ/
āsvādayanti bhuñjānā bhaktaṃ bhaktavido janāḥ//NS, 6.33//

bhāvābhinayasambaddhān sthāyibhāvāṃś tathā buddhāḥ/
āsvādayanti manasā tasmān nāṭyarasāḥ smṛtāḥ//NS, 6.34//⁴⁹

Just as people who are knowledgeable concerning food, relish the eating of food when it is combined with spices and many other ingredients, similarly wise people mentally relish the *sthāyi-bhāvas*, which are communicated by the gestures for the emotions. Thus, the dramatic *rasas* are known.

In the above passage, there are two additional ideas of import. First of all, in the second verse, the idea of mentally relishing is stressed, and hence, *rasa* is clearly portrayed as something psychological. Secondly, the fact that this relishing takes a certain amount of wisdom is also emphasized. The people that are capable of relishing emotion are called *buddha*, meaning “knowledgeable” or “wise”. In other passages, as was mentioned previously, the onlookers who relish the emotions are described as being *sumanas*, which literally signifies “good-minded”, but, in the context, can also mean “benevolent”, “gracious”, “agreeable”, “intelligent” or “empathetic”. These qualities seem to imply that only a person with a great amount of empathy or understanding can truly appreciate drama, which implies a certain necessary psychological makeup.

A Connection between Bharata and Aśvaghoṣa

Bharata sees the central goal of drama as the evoking of emotion and the relishing of it within the mind of the listener. The poetic words are thought of as the foundation of drama and therefore the foundation for this evoking of emotion.

How aware was Aśvaghoṣa of the aforesaid goals of poetry expressed by Bharata? And, if he was aware of such goals or thought of poetry in a similar way, how did he resolve the conflict between these goals and the renunciatory message of the *Saundarananda*?

Now that we have examined Bharata's work, can we even make a connection between Bharata and Aśvaghoṣa, especially given the lack of extensive writing by Aśvaghoṣa on literary or poetic theory? As was mentioned previously, the last two verses of Aśvaghoṣa's *Saundarananda* are the only ones which directly address these questions. And, in these verses, Aśvaghoṣa states his case clearly, leaving little room for doubt as to where his position is: poetry is only a sweet, agreeable medium or coating in which the bitter yet efficacious pill of Buddhist practice is encased.

ity eṣā vyupaśāntaye na rataye mokṣārthagarbhā kṛtiḥ
 śrotṛnām grahanārtham anyamanasām kāvyopacārāt kṛtā/
 yan mokṣāt kṛtam anyad atra hi mayā tat kāvyadharmāt kṛtam
 pātum tiktam iva uṣadham madhuyutam hr̥dyaṁ katham syāt // Sau, 18.63 //

This literary work, whose essence is the goal of liberation, has been made for the purpose of peacefulness and not pleasure. It has been created out of the rules of poetry so that listeners of other mind-sets (than liberation) could understand (the message).

For, that which has been created here apart from liberation has been composed by me due to the laws of poetry, just as a medicine which is astringent would be made sweet and agreeable, so that it could be ingested.

prāyeṇāloka lokam viṣayaratiparam mokṣāt pratihatam
 kāvyavyājena tattvam kathitam iha mayā mokṣaḥ param iti/
 tad buddhvā śāmikam yat tad avahitam ito grāhyam na lalitam/
 pāṁsubhyo dhātujebhyo niyatam upakaram⁵⁰ cāmikaram iti // Sau, 18.64 // ⁵¹

Upon noticing that usually people have reveling (*rati*) in sense objects as their highest goal, which is in opposition to liberation, I have related the truth here, with poetry as my artifice; for, liberation is the highest goal.

Thus, what one should be focussed upon (*avahita*) within this, having comprehended peacefulness, is apprehension not amusement. It is like a piece of gold which is strained away from particles of silt.

The two compound words listed above can be translated as the customary speech or style (*upacāra*) of *kāvya* and the rules or perhaps even teaching (*dharma*) of *kāvya*. Since the words *upacāra* and *dharma* have broad semantic ranges, Aśvaghoṣa could either be referring to technical poetic rules, such as meter, alliteration, metaphor, symbolic language etc., or, he could be referring to the overall spirit (*dharma*) or tendencies of poetic behavior (*upacāra*). .

In these verses, Aśvaghoṣa appears to be saying that poetry is frolicsome (*lalita*), with the goal of amusement (*rati*). Poetry's goal of *rati* seems to be equated with what is usually the highest goal of people in general: amusement of the senses (*viśaya-rati*). Yet, Aśvaghoṣa clearly states that *viśaya-rati* is counter to *mokṣa*. He compares the poetic medium to, for example, the sweet coating surrounding a bad-tasting pill, or a sweet juice that one would drink to make a bitter but efficacious medicine more palatable. Hence, poetry is an artifice or a disguise (*vyāja*), concealing his more nobler yet harsher message of Buddhist liberation (*mokṣa*) in a pleasing form.

Aśvaghoṣa agrees with Bharata that the effect of poetry is one of pleasure (*rati*), but he sees this effect as conflicting with the ultimate goal of Buddhist practice. He says that Buddhist liberation (*mokṣa*) is the "gold" which is to be strained away from the "silt" of the *kāvya* medium. In contrast, Bharata does not see a conflict between poetry as a medium and the religious path, for he states that the *Nāṭyaśāstra* is on par with the 4 *Vedas* and a path of ennoblement. Bharata sees *nāṭya* as wholly beneficial, whereas Aśvaghoṣa sees *kāvya* merely as

a necessary device for appealing to all types of listeners, especially those who would not ordinarily tend towards the religious mind-set.

Aśvaghoṣa states that his work aims primarily at peacefulness (*vyupaśānti*). One should grasp this peacefulness (*śamika* or *vyupaśānti*), and then attempt to apprehend the truth (*tattva*), which is *mokṣa*. When he says that *mokṣa* is the highest goal (*param*) perhaps he is allowing for some amusement (*rati*) that would come from the enjoyment of poetry as art, but, if so, this would only be a lesser goal.

One final question could be raised at this point: does this mean that, according to Aśvaghoṣa, there is no place for pleasure (*rati*) at all within the path of Buddhism? In response, here, Aśvaghoṣa makes a distinction between inner pleasure (*adhyātmā*) and pleasure of the senses (*viśaya-rati*).⁵² This question will be addressed more directly in chapter five.

Method of Approach

Regarding the method of research here, the basic approach has been textual. Passages in the *Saundarananda* have been examined in order to determine, first of all, a suitable translation for the word and concept of “emotion” (and “affect” etc.) in Sanskrit, and secondly, the presence of affect in Buddhist practice.

Now, there are many questions one can raise regarding this process of translation. It is a tricky one at best: for, there are some words and phrases that

are not so readily translatable. Why is this? What does it mean to say that a word or a phrase is not so readily translatable? Does this mean that a more roundabout way of expression is necessary in the receiving language in order to express a concept which was easily and directly expressed in the translated language? Or, does this mean that the represented concept is not at all translatable into the receiving language? If the latter is true, does this mean that a native speaker of the receiving language also does not (or did not) have the potential to understand such a concept?

This thesis takes the position that, in all probability, a native speaker within a receiving language would have the potential or capacity to understand a certain, difficult-to-translate concept; however, it might take a more roundabout way of expression to translate a certain concept.

Assuming what we have just said is true, one could then ask: why is it that one language can only express in a roundabout way what another expresses easily and directly? What implications does this have for the conceptual framework of the native speakers of each language? Does this mean that there is a difference in conceptual framework on a deeper level, i.e. on the level of potentiality to form and understand concepts? Or, does this mean, rather, that speakers of some languages have certain concepts more "in the front of their mind", or, readily available, whereas speakers of other languages may take a longer time to formulate these very same concepts?

This thesis takes the stand that, usually, the latter is true: differences in conceptual framework lie only on the level of everyday, readily available concepts and not on the deeper level of potentiality. For, in fact, without this stand, one would have to call into question the ultimate validity of translation work in its entirety, as one often meets with words or phrases which are difficult to translate. More often than not, I have found, at least with myself, that this is due to a lack of depth in my own understanding of one of the languages, and that the mystery becomes clearer when my understanding of the deficient language deepens.

There are many implications for these questions in regards to the translation process in my thesis. For example, if one examines excerpts from the Pali Canon, there is no single word which corresponds to the concept of emotion as it has been outlined in my review of modern Western psychological research in chapter two. Yet, does this mean that the authors of the Canon did not have any conception of emotion as a category? Certainly, they experienced joy, anger, sorrow etc. as we do. Would they then not have had some idea of this category of mental/physical experience?

This points to one of the deficiencies in the method I am using here: one cannot entirely know the mind of the authors who wrote these texts from a mere analysis of their words. Here, I do not think that I am contradicting what Bharata has already told us regarding the emotions of the poet. It may be true that a basic sentiment of the poet is communicated, but that is different from saying that we

can know the poet's or author's mind in its entirety. Perhaps this is what modern critics, such as Michel Foucault etc., are attempting to communicate.

Let us take one example in translation from Sanskrit into English in order to have a clearer understanding of the difficulties I am referring to. Let us take the word *apatrapā*, or positive shame or guilt.⁵³ In the *Saundarananda*, this word connotes a positive type of shame which comes into the mind in the presence of unwholesome (*akuśala*) tendencies of mind. Now, the idea of positive shame does not exist in one word in English, at least not in modern English. Thus, in order to translate *apatrapā* correctly, one has to add an adjective such as "positive" or "good" to the noun "shame" in order to seize the entire meaning of the word. Does this mean that we do not have such an idea within our conceptual capability: the idea of a positive kind of shame? Certainly, this is not true, for we are capable of conceiving such a thing. There are situations most of us could think of where a little bit of shame or guilt would be considered a good thing. Thus, what this difference in expression between the two languages seems to indicate is that the concept of positive shame may be more readily accessible or available for a native writer or speaker of Sanskrit, especially within the context of Buddhism.

However, on the contrary, one could also reasonably argue that such a concept does not exist within the mind of a modern English speaker in our particular North American context. Why is that? Because, it is true that, in our culture, the words "guilt" and "shame" have become so laden with negativity

that it may be difficult to extricate these words from a negative connotation, even with addition of positive adjectives such as “good” or “healthy”. Along the same lines, there may be words, such as, for example, “superego” or even the “unconscious” in Freudian thinking, which, in fact, are not translatable at all into ancient Indian psychological thinking.

There is another possible flaw within this textual method of study. The analysis of words through their contextual occurrence in the sentence with the aid of Sanskrit-English dictionaries and even Sanskrit-Sanskrit lexicons may or may not capture the original meaning that the author intended. It is inevitable that some nuances of meaning will be lost. The most obvious example of this loss of meaning comes when a word can have a number of different meanings, each which would change the entire sense of the passage. Since Aśvaghoṣa frequently evinces a marked tendency towards puns, this is an apt example within the context of our text.

An illustration of this problem can be seen with the word *vyasana*. *Vyasana* can mean “disaster/calamity” or “excessive passion/evil passion”, the second definition being more relevant to this study. There are a few cases when both principal definitions seem appropriate, but without knowing what Aśvaghoṣa truly intended and without the aid of a commentator,⁵⁴ a translation which excludes either meaning feels like guesswork.

A less difficult but still significant obstacle in the process of translation comes with the word “happiness” or *sukha*. Sometimes it is used negatively to

convey the type of happiness which results from enjoyment of the sense objects and other times it is used to portray the positive bliss of the sage. In most places, Aśvaghoṣa clarifies which type of *sukha* he is referring to, but, in a few passages, *sukha*'s meaning is ambiguous. (In fact, Aśvaghoṣa's double usage of *sukha* is in accordance with its usage in the Pali Canon and the canonical commentaries).⁵⁵

As was mentioned previously, the medium of poetry also presents another obstacle in interpretation. Aśvaghoṣa likes to use words in contexts where they can be interpreted in several different ways. For example, in regards to mentally-oriented vocabulary, it is often difficult to know whether the word *cetas* is being replaced by the word *adhyātmā* to add a syllable for metrical effect, just to substitute a synonymous word for aesthetic effect, or, to introduce a new concept.

The Basic Story Line of Aśvaghoṣa Saundarananda

The *Saundarananda* is the story of Buddha's younger half-brother, Nanda. In Aśvaghoṣa's version of the story, Nanda is depicted as a man who is very much devoted to the sensual life. He is married and in love with his wife Sundarī, yet, at the same time, he respects his older brother and the life of the Buddhist monk. One day, the Buddha comes to his palace door while Nanda is dallying with his wife, and Nanda, being completely enraptured with Sundarī, misses seeing him. Nanda feels quite guilty about this and goes off in search of

the Buddha. In the interaction with the Buddha which ensues, the Buddha convinces Nanda to join the Buddhist order.

The next few chapters are replete with beautiful verses about the internal struggles of both Sundarī and *Nanda* in their lovers' absence. It is here that Aśvaghoṣa displays his poetic talent and strays from the more doctrinaire approach of later chapters. His depictions of their grief are real and poignant and do not feel like just like straw man opponents of Buddhist doctrine. The tone of these passages seem to contradict the slightly anti-poetic argument presented in the last two verses of the *Saundarananda*: i.e., that the medium of poetry is used merely to add something sweet to the bitter medicine of Buddhist practice.

śokasya hartā śaraṇāgatānāṃ śokasya kartā pratigarvitānāṃ/
aśokam ālambya sa jātaśokaḥ priyāṃ priyāśokavanāṃ śuśoca // Sau, 7.5 //

He, who was the reliever of grief for those who came to him for refuge, who was the giver of suffering to those who were conceited, leaned against the Aśoka tree, suffering arising (within him), and cried (in longing) for his beloved, for whom the Aśoka tree was dear, and who was like a grove of delight for her lover.

priyāṃ priyāyāḥ pratanuṃ priyaṅguṃ niśāmya bhitāṃ iva niṣpatantīm/
sasmāra tām aśrumukhīm sabāṣpaḥ priyāṃ priyaṅguprasavāvadātām // Sau,
7.6 // ⁵⁶

Upon noticing a slender *Priyaṅgu* tree which was dear to his beloved, emerging (from the trees) as if frightened, with tears, he remembered his beloved, her face full of tears and pale as the flowers of the *Priyaṅgu*.

Much is lost in the translation of these verses. For example, in verse 7.5, the compound, *priya-śoka-vanā*, has two meanings in the Sanskrit, "she for whom

the grove of *Aśoka* trees was dear” and “she who was a grove of delight for her lover”. This verse demonstrates again a flaw in the process of translation, as, even if one argues successfully that meaning itself can be translated, often some beauty is inevitably lost. Also, another aspect of Aśvaghōṣa’s poetry is lost when it is not read aloud, as his skillful usage of alliteration or *yamaka* makes his poetry especially pleasing to the ear.

The images present in the verses are even more poignant when one knows exactly what the trees referred to actually look like, and how they are often used as images in Indian poetry. For example, the *Aśoka* tree is said to be a tree with bright red flowers. According to poetic convention, this tree sprouts flowers when it is kicked by a lady with jingling anklets. Also, the blossom of the *Aśoka* tree traditionally forms one of the five arrows of Cupid (*karpāṇya*) in Indian literature.⁵⁷

The earlier chapters of the *Saundarananda* depict the lovesick Nanda (and Sundarī), but, beginning in chapter 10, Nanda is brought to his senses by the Buddha. The Buddha does this by taking Nanda to paradise and allowing him to gaze upon the beautiful *Apsaras*. There, the Buddha tells him that the only way to reach heaven and obtain the *Apsaras* is to practice Buddhism. He does this to entice Nanda to forget about Sundarī and remain in the Buddhist order. The Buddha’s ploy works and Nanda promptly becomes infatuated with the *Apsaras*’ beauty, forgetting all about his wife. According to the text, the philosophy

behind this is the following: the Buddha is attempting to eliminate Nanda's desire by first heightening it.

In the following chapter, Nanda, with the help of Ānanda, realizes the error of practicing Buddhism in order to obtain something else. After Nanda realizes that practice of Buddhism should be done for its own sake, he is set rightly upon the Buddhist path. He eventually thanks the Buddha for his teachings, including the rather unorthodox teaching of enticing him into a state of infatuation for the *Apsaras*. The last few chapters are about Nanda's progression towards complete understanding and liberation, and his final attainment of *arhatship* (*arhattva*).

A Summary of Possible Original Contributions of this Thesis

- 1) This thesis purports to study the *Saundarananda* of Aśvaghoṣa from the point of view of psychology in general and emotivity in particular. To my knowledge, a study of this exact nature has not been undertaken with regard to either the *Saundarananda* as a text or Aśvaghoṣa as an author.

- 2) To my knowledge, a study of emotion which concentrates upon one text in Buddhism has not been undertaken before in a Western language. Other studies in Buddhist psychology have covered a much broader swathe of material and have not been exclusively devoted to the study of emotivity.

- 3) For the most part, previous studies in Buddhist psychology do not thoroughly ground their analyses of emotion in modern Western psychological views before they attempt a translation of the words “emotion”, “feeling” etc. This study gives the reader a foundational definition for each emotive vocabulary word in English, grounded in modern Western psychological theories, before proceeding to an analysis of corresponding concepts in Sanskrit or Pali.
- 4) Another important aspect of this study is that it delves into the topic of correct meditative attitude by examining the concept of detachment or non-attachment from the point of view of affect. To my knowledge, this exact type of analysis of non-attachment has not been undertaken in a Western language.
- 5) This thesis brings into question the viewpoint that the sage does not possess any emotive life, and uses the *Saundarananda* of Aśvaghoṣa as its foundational text of inquiry. Although this question has been raised before, it has not been raised with the *Saundarananda* as a base text.
- 6) Another important contribution of this thesis concerns Aśvaghoṣa studies in particular. The nature of the interaction between the two streams of thinking, Buddhist and aesthetic, which have come together to influence Aśvaghoṣa, has not commented upon in this manner. In this study, we explore the interaction

between the aesthetic and the Buddhist within the context of our analysis of words such as *bhāva*, *rasa* etc. The interplay between these two streams of thinking is of dual import, in that, not only does it affect the interpretation of the overall meaning of Aśvaghoṣa's poetic writings, but it may also be relevant for the search to place Aśvaghoṣa within a particular Buddhist sect. (However, in this thesis, I will not address the question of Aśvaghoṣa's sectarian leanings).

7) Another implicit question in this thesis is the relationship between emotion's role in artistic and religious practice. How is the emotional fervor of the artist and that which is subsequently evoked in artistic appreciators comparable to the heights of religious understanding experienced by the enlightened sage? This question is not directly answered here, as such a question would bring us too deeply into the thinking of commentators on the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, such as Abhinavagupta; however, the question is still raised implicitly as a topic of inquiry.

8) This thesis also makes a more general contribution to the field of Buddhist psychology by bringing together a certain amount of psychological passages, both from the *Saundarananda* and from the Pali Canon, and subjecting them to analysis.

9) In regards to mental healing, we begin to lay some of the groundwork for constructing a Buddhist view of mental health; however, because our text was limited in this regard, we were not able to thoroughly address such a question. Yet, to bring-up this issue may be this thesis' most important contribution, as the theoretical issue of emotional/mental healing in Buddhist practice has a very practical implication: namely, at what point should a Buddhist practitioner search for a psychiatrist, a psychologist or a doctor instead of seeking out a Buddhist master, or, instead of just continuing ahead with a more rigorous meditation practice?

Part of the motivation for this thesis grew out of this practical question. For, I often noticed that, in meditation practice, I often believed myself to be mindful of the breath, the bodily sensations etc. when, in fact, I was still being subtly driven by emotional outbursts or prevalent moods. I noticed this same phenomenon amongst my fellow meditators as well, of both Eastern and Western origins. It was often easy to convince ourselves that we had attained a state of mindfulness, only to realize later that it was actually covered by a thin veil of aversion or sadness. This seemed to happen particularly in cases where emotive problems were deep-rooted, such as in cases of people who were later diagnosed as clinically depressed etc.

These types of experiences inevitably led me to the following questions: if we postulate emotion as the principal cause of mental illness, then how would Buddhism purport to deal with emotional disorder, especially the severer types

that are often said to require anti-depressant drugs? This question should actually be one of immediate concern for both scholars and practitioners alike, as, in our modern Western society, many young people choose to ignore Western medicine and attempt to cure themselves only through the use of meditation etc.

Unfortunately, this thesis does not offer any solution to the choices that face young people (and older ones) concerning mental healing. But, by beginning a focussed examination of some ancient textual passages, I hope to offer more information on the facts of the ancient texts and thus perhaps aid people in making more informed choices.

Concluding Notes for Chapter One

The targetted audience for this thesis is primarily the scholars in my field; however, my hope is that at least a portion of this study will also be understandable and useful for anyone who is genuinely interested in Buddhist psychology, Buddhist practice and the phenomenon of emotion. Thus, some additional effort has been made to explicate certain concepts for the highly-motivated “lay” reader, and I hope that more technically knowledgeable readers will be patient with this process. Chapter two, which defines the prevalent Western psychological views of emotion, was constructed partly with this purpose in mind. Yet, this chapter will be useful for the specialist as well, for it provides a foundational knowledge of the prevalent Western psychological

conceptions surrounding the words “emotion” and other related emotive vocabulary words before we begin our process of translation.

In conclusion, in this introductory chapter, the parameters of this thesis project have been outlined. The domain has been defined as “psychological”. This is a term which will be further defined in relation to the prevalent conceptions of Western psychology in chapter two, and, in relation to Buddhist psychology in chapters three and four. The method for the thesis has been categorized as textual analysis. Here, I am following Bharata’s understanding of the interaction between author, text and reader, and Aśvaghoṣa’s own assertions about his intentions, and I am also taking into account the position of the Buddhist tradition in general.

Chapter 2: An Introduction to the Concept of Emotion in Western Psychology

Introductory Remarks

The purpose of the following chapter is to give the reader a foundational knowledge of the prevalent Western psychological conceptions of the term “emotion”. Based on this foundational knowledge, we will then come up with some working definitions for “emotion”, “affect” etc. and also some other psychological vocabulary words. In subsequent chapters of the thesis, we will then refer back use these working definitions when we encounter similar concepts in Buddhism. This manner of procedure has been designed in order to give the thesis a structure and a consistency with regard to emotive vocabulary words and their definitions in English; it is not meant to be restrictive or rigid.

This chapter is not meant to be an extensive survey of emotive studies in Western psychology;⁵⁸ rather, it is only a brief introduction to some of the concepts which are often attached to emotive terms. The difficulty of this chapter is that, within Western psychology, the field of emotive studies contains an enormous amount of research. If we were to take into account only the material which has been published within roughly the last 100 years, even a cursory review would take volumes.

Thus, a method had to be arrived upon that would give the reader a foundational base of knowledge in Western emotive studies, yet also not take the thesis too far afield. In the interests of simplicity, we have decided to divide Western psychological literature on emotivity into six categories,⁵⁹ and, even

within these categories, only the ideas that relate directly to this thesis will be reviewed. Also, some care will be taken not to go into great lengths on the various nuances within the philosophy of each individual thinker, although passing references have been unavoidable in certain cases.

The six categories schools of emotive thought that I have chosen are as follows: the psychoanalytic, the cognitive, the subjective, the volitional, the physiological and the behavioral. After I have reviewed the relevant questions raised by each stream of thought, I will put forth my working definitions for the various emotively-oriented vocabulary words and some basic words in the domain of psychology. In regards to the latter group of definitions, words such as “cognition”, “volition” etc. will only be defined cursorily, as they are non-emotive words and thus not the focus of this study.

Six Western Psychological Streams of Thought in Emotive Studies

The Physiological Viewpoint

The physiological viewpoint in Western psychology holds that what we subjectively view as mind is actually something objectively verifiable. In other words, our subjective thoughts, feelings etc. always have their neural correlates in brain processes, and, mind is nothing more or less than these brain processes.

This point of view is held towards emotion as well: the physiological processes which we, as lay observers, subjectively view as “accompanying” emotivity are seen as equivalent to emotive states. As Joseph LeDoux, a leading

neurologist in the field, states: "I view emotions as biological functions of the nervous system. I believe figuring out how emotions are represented in the brain can help us understand them."⁶⁰

The strict physicalist position of modern neuroscience presents the strongest counterargument to many of the viewpoints in this study. In contrast to modern neuroscience, this thesis asserts that two different types of processes comprise a human being: the mental and the physiological. The psyche, or mind, is both in a state of constant interaction with the physiological, and also, of a different nature, being immaterial and not material. Part of the reason this thesis uses an interactive view of mind and body as its working definition is that this view closely resembles the Buddhist one. Also, this point of view is close to the Western Interactionist understanding of mind and body. (Please see the definition of "mind" at the end of this chapter, and chapter three for Buddhaghosa's explication of mentality for more precise information).

The position of neuroscience also brings into question the very nature of unhealthiness as it is seen in this thesis and in Buddhism. For, if the mind is reducible to physiological processes, then so is mental disease, and therefore, there is no such thing as "mentally-originated" disease. This thesis runs counter to this proposition: it assumes the existence of mentally-originated disease. And, it asserts that affective processes are the primary motor or cause behind such types of disease.

The assertion that all disease is physiologically based has another implication for this thesis. If all disease is essentially physiological, then, would this not imply that only physiologically-based treatments such as antibiotics, psychotropic drugs etc. would be useful in treating all disease, including that kind of disease which is often called “mental” disease? What place does this purely physiological approach to disease allot for treatments such as Buddhist meditation and psychotherapy, which are immaterial⁶¹ or non-physiological in nature? If all disease is truly physiologically-originated, including so-called “mental” disease, then how can Buddhist meditation and psychotherapy hope to have any effect on “mental” unhealthiness? If they do have an effect, then how would this causal process of healing work? In other words, how could something immaterial like paying attention in a certain way, in the case of Buddhism, or, describing how one feels or thinks, in the case of psychotherapy, bring about a change in a physiological state? It is these kinds of questions which many Behaviorists, such as B. F. Skinner etc., pondered over.

The Behavioral Viewpoint

Behaviorism, or, the Behavioral Sciences, is a branch of psychology which, as its name connotes, focuses on human behavior in its analysis of phenomena such as emotion. Behaviorists often define behavior as observable learned human reactions which take place in reaction to environmental stimuli. Since thoughts, feelings, concepts, notions such as the unconscious and conscious etc. are

subjective and only internally observable, they are not considered to be within the province of psychology as a scientific endeavor.

B. F. Skinner stated that, in contrast to many interpretations of it, Behaviorism does not entirely deny the existence of inner states, but rather, its position is this: internal states, attitudes or feelings cannot be demonstrated as causes for behavior. Skinner's main objection to this postulated causality comes from the doubt that something mental, immaterial and entirely subjective could cause something physical.⁶² Because he deemed this causal connection to be doubtful or difficult to trace, feelings, thoughts etc. were brought into question as possible causes for behavior, and therefore, were not considered to be within the realm of a scientifically-based psychological inquiry. In this way, the Behaviorist viewpoint is similar to the physiological viewpoint stated above: neither the Behaviorist nor the strict physicalist viewpoint grant a reality to those phenomena which are not observable or verifiable. Skinner's comments below echo this resemblance.

The position can be stated as follows: what is felt or introspectively observed is not some nonphysical world of consciousness, mind or mental life but the observer's own body. This does not mean, as I shall show later, that introspection is a kind of physiological research, nor does it mean (and this is the heart of the argument) that what are felt or introspectively observed are the causes of behavior.⁶³

In contrast to the Behavioral Sciences, the causal connection between the immaterial world of thoughts, feelings (encompassed within *nāma* or mind) etc.

and the material one (*rūpa*) of the physiological is central to some of the underlying assumptions of this thesis and Buddhism. There are numerous places in the Pali Canon and elsewhere in Buddhist scriptures where Buddhist practice, specifically mindfulness training, is said to heal even physical diseases. Thus, in Buddhism, an immaterial method of healing, i.e. mindfulness, is sometimes asserted as a cure for a physical ailment. (Please see chapter three for specific instances of this).

In spite of the differences between Buddhism and Behavioral Science, there is one significant way in which the two disciplines intersect: both focus on changing rigid, negative behavioral patterns. And, in both Buddhism and Behavioral Science, changing unhealthy behavioral habits into healthy ones is considered to be therapeutic, in that this change can affect how one subjectively feels. The one difference here is that healthy behavior is subject to a certain moral code in Buddhism, whereas, in Behavioral therapy, there is not one set moral code which governs behavior. Instead, behavior is judged as “healthy” based upon the rules of society, an increased warmth in one’s human relations, and the subjective impressions of the patient.

Another important point in regard to Behavioral Science as it exists today is that it often combines cognitive therapeutic approaches with purely behavior-centered therapies. Thus, modern “Behaviorist” psychotherapies usually combine behavior modification with belief modification.⁶⁴

The Cognitive Viewpoint

Cognitive theories of emotion are concerned with judgements, appraisals, perceptions and evaluations etc. and the effect that these types of thought processes have on emotional reactions. According to modern cognitive theorists, it is one's judgement or appraisal of a situation that causes a particular emotional reaction. Modern cognitive theories usually involve a more complex definition of emotion, one that groups cognition with physiology, subjective feeling and behavior. Yet, nevertheless, they tend to see judgements or perceptions as the primary cause for one particular emotional response over another.

An example of a simple cognitive theory would be the following. If a person associates taking a plane with their previous past experiences in a beautiful vacation spot, their judgements and perceptions about plane travel will usually be positive. Because of this judgement, positive emotions such as joy and eagerness will arise whenever the person is confronted with the possibility of taking a plane flight. However, if a person has had frequent attacks of claustrophobia on plane rides and a couple of depressing vacations in a row, an entirely different emotional reaction, one of fear and apprehension, can be expected. In both cases, it is one's judgement of the situation which governs the particular emotional reaction. Also, cognitive theorists say that it is the person's judgement or perception of a particular situation which decides the direction of one's motivation in relation to it. In this way, cognition is sometimes seen as primary in motivational processes as well.

The cognitive viewpoint is important for our thesis in that cognitive theorists tend to take a position contrary to this thesis when it comes to psychic healing. In chapter one, we stated that one of the reasons why emotion was chosen as the topic of focus is its central role in the causation of psychic disease. However, according to cognitive therapists, cognitive factors such as judgements, perceptions etc. are more central to psychic disease than affect. This is why cognitive therapists focus upon helping a patient reevaluate cognitive structures such as judgements, beliefs etc.

The Subjective Viewpoint

The subjective portion of emotion refers to that part which is inwardly felt by the person, separate from the physiological sensations in the body. I refer here to a mental or a "spiritual" feeling, as William James called it.⁶⁵ It is not something measurable or verifiable because it is not of the body or the physiological entity. Therefore, it is not sensible or material; yet, it is tangible. It is because of its tangibility that it can be separated from thought. Thought, taken in and of itself, is being defined here as neither tangible nor sensible.

Most subjective theorists do not usually deny the existence of cognitive, behavioral or physiological accompaniments to subjective feeling. However, they see subjective feeling as the phenomenon which makes emotion unique and separable from other types of phenomena, such as thoughts, physiological sensations etc.⁶⁶

Some subjective theories of emotion also focus upon emotion as a sociological phenomenon. Joseph de Rivera is a psychologist who studies emotional climates within societies. He does not see emotion as a phenomenon which exists within a person, but between two people (or more), within the process of interaction. Thus, he speaks of emotional climates within societies and even between nations based upon the fundamental idea that emotion arises from interactions between people. De Rivera defines an emotional climate as follows:

...an objective phenomenon that can be palpably sensed - as when one enters a party or a city and feels an atmosphere of gaiety or depression, openness or fear... I have in mind, for example, the climate of fear which existed in Chile during the Pinochet regime...⁶⁷

De Rivera's theory is included here as a subjective theory because of its emphasis on the palpability or tangibility of emotion, versus its verifiability or measurability. It differs slightly from most subjective theories, as emotional climates in de Rivera's theory are internally felt but not internally produced; rather, they are produced through the process of interacting with another person.

The subjective approach to the study of emotion is important for this thesis because it sees the immaterial, subjective feeling aspect of affective processes as their defining factor. The immaterial aspect of emotion will be stressed in my own definition of "emotion", "affect" etc. at the end of this chapter, and consequently, the issue of immateriality will be briefly examined within the context of Buddhism. (Please see chapter three for more details).

The Conative or Volitional Viewpoint

There is some debate within modern psychological research as to whether or not volition is a separate process from cognition and affect.⁶⁸ As was explicated previously, some cognitive theorists tend to see volition as merely a subset of cognition, in that judgements govern one's motivation towards a certain plan of action.

A volitional view of emotion tends to see the motivational aspect of emotion as central, and its cognitive, subjective aspects etc. as secondary. This does not mean, however, that cognition, subjectivity etc. are entirely discarded in volitional views of emotion, but rather, that emotions are viewed primarily as adaptive reactions to the environment which motivate a person towards one plan of action or another. An example of a volition theory of emotion, from Robert Solomon, is quoted below.

Emotions are said to divide us from our interests and lead us astray; I argue that emotions create our interests and our purposes.⁶⁹

Thus, those who favor a volitional view of emotion would say that all emotions function in this way: to impulse or motivate one to correct or adapt to the situation.

In this thesis, volition (or motivational processes) will be defined as a distinct but interdependent process from cognition and emotivity within the realm of mind or psyche. (Please see the definition section of this chapter for

more details). And, because motivational processes are being viewed here as a different type of process from emotivity, more volitionally-oriented concepts in Buddhism, such as *samskāra*,⁷⁰ *rāga*, *trṣṇā* and *kāma*, will not be principal topics of inquiry.

The Psychoanalytic Viewpoint

This stream of thought on emotion is still based primarily on the early work of Sigmund Freud. The psychoanalytic view of emotion, as represented by Freud, is centered around an analysis of unhealthy emotivity or affect. In brief, Freud postulates that unhealthy affect comes about when an unacceptable emotion is repressed into the unconscious and not reintegrated back into conscious life. He asserts that this repressed emotive state exerts a harmful influence on conscious life from the unconscious until it is reintegrated into the conscious. For this kind of reintegration, he suggests the intervention of a trained psychoanalyst.

Even though the work of Freud and his followers has been very influential in Western psychology, especially with regard to the genesis of psychic disease from unconscious conflicts, the view of emotivity in this thesis will not be modeled upon Freudian understanding. This is primarily because Freudian notions, such as the “unconscious”, “conscious” etc., are quite difficult to fit into the Buddhist conceptual framework as a whole, and nearly impossible to translate into the vocabulary of the *Saundarananda*.⁷¹

However, as was mentioned in chapter one, the psychoanalytic understanding is important in this thesis, for, both Freud and Jung concur with the hypothesis that affect, more than cognitive or volitional processes, is the principal cause for psychic conflict. Their respective statements on this issue are significant and are therefore quoted below. Freud is quoted in the first two passages, and Jung in the third.

In the first place, it must be emphasized that Breuer's patient, in almost all her pathogenic situations, was obliged to *suppress* a powerful emotion instead of allowing its discharge in the appropriate signs of emotion, words or actions.⁷²

Almost all the symptoms had arisen in this way as residues - 'precipitates' they might be called - of emotional experiences. To these experiences, therefore, we later gave the name of 'psychical traumas', while the particular nature of the symptoms was explained by their relation to the traumatic scenes which were their cause.⁷³

This view is in agreement with already known psychological theories which maintain that the psychological situation at a given moment is nothing but the resultant of all the psychological events preceding it. Of these the most predominant are affective experiences, that is, the complexes, which for that reason have the greatest constellating power.⁷⁴

In the first passage Freud uses the interesting term of "residues", to signify left over, non-discharged emotion. This non-discharged emotion is said to rest in the unconscious and affect future psychic health. Many modern day psychotherapists still subscribe to the notion that one must fully experience an emotion in order to remain psychologically healthy, although the language of the unconscious and conscious is sometimes avoided in contemporary descriptions

of this psychic healing process. This process, and the central role of emotion therein, is described very precisely by Leslie Greenberg and Jeremy Safran in their book, *Emotion in Psychotherapy: Affect, Cognition and the Process of Change*.

Psychological problems are often the result of *blocking* or *avoiding* potentially adaptive emotional experience, and affective interventions, in many instances, are designed to overcome these resistances to emotion and to access underlying affective experience. The complete processing of a specific emotional experience leads to a shift in the nature of the emotional experience. This *shift* leads to the emergence of new adaptive responses to problematic situations.⁷⁵

The affective interventions that Greenberg and Safran are referring to are psychotherapeutic processes. Although the vocabulary they use carefully avoids the unconscious-oriented vocabulary of Freud, one cannot help but see the similarities between Greenberg's and Safran's modern version of psychotherapy and Freud's understanding of psychoanalysis, especially in regards to emotion. At the very least, both see a return to psychological health as involving a new understanding of emotional experience and the allowance of a "complete processing" of it, rather than a stunted, repressed one.

As was mentioned in chapter one, the process of returning to "psychological health", either as it is defined by psychotherapists or by scholars of Buddhism, was one of the principal motivational questions behind this thesis. While a detailed comparison of the Buddhist meditative process versus the psychotherapeutic one will not be a central preoccupation here, one observation is worthy of note. Both the psychotherapeutic and Buddhist meditative process

involve a correct seeing, or experiencing of things as they are, and this is the source of their healing power. This idea, in the context of Buddhism, will be explored more in chapter seven when we undertake an examination of correct meditative attitude, or, non-attachment.

A Brief Note on the Etymology of the Word "Emotion"

According to *Webster's New World Dictionary*, the English word "emotion" is related to the French word *émouvoir*, "to agitate" or "stir-up" and the Latin word *exmovere*.⁷⁶ *Exmovere* signifies movement out or away from. If these words do indeed indicate something about the connotations of the English word emotion in its modern usage,⁷⁷ then emotion would connote a state that moves or stirs-up a change in the state of mind/body. In fact, this is in accordance with some current physiological viewpoints and the earlier thinking of W. James: namely, that emotion is most easily defined, known and measured by the physiological changes that accompany it in the body. As was mentioned previously, many modern theorists, such as Joseph LeDoux, state that emotion is these physiological changes and nothing beyond them.

Along similar lines, Joseph de Rivera tells that the English word "emotion" is derived from the Latin word *emovere*, which means "to move out", in the sense of an "authoritative mass moving a resisting mass."⁷⁸ William Lyons states that the word "emotion" is derived from the Latin *movere*, "to move".⁷⁹ Thus, he says that "to be emotional is to be literally moved, in a bodily sense."⁷⁹

The important aspect of all of these proposed etymologies for the English word “emotion” is that the foundational concepts to which “emotion” is attached have their roots in ideas of movement or change. In fact, the concept of movement itself implies a change from a previous state of non-movement. This means that, if one examines its roots, the English word “emotion” connotes a change or disturbance in one’s previous state. The idea of change or movement will be significant for my upcoming definitions of emotive vocabulary words, and for my portrayal of the psychological make-up of the Buddhist sage. (For my analysis of the mental life of the Buddhist sage in the *Saundarananda*, please see chapter five).

Definitions of Emotively-Related Terms

Introductory Remarks

The following will be used as foundational for the rest of the thesis. Below, I outline definitions for the four principal emotively-related terms in this study: “emotion”, “feeling”, “affect” and “sensation”. Also, for the sake of clarification I present brief definitions for “mind”, “cognition”, “volition” etc., as these terms often enter into our discussions of emotive concepts. The most significant terms defined here are “affect” and “emotion”, as the distinction between these two terms will form the basis for my depiction of the emotive life of the sage in chapter five. “Feeling” and “sensation” are also terms of some

significance, particularly “feeling”, but to a slightly lesser extent than “emotion” and “affect”.

Up to this point in the thesis, emotively-oriented words have been used rather loosely: for example, previously, “affect” and “emotion” were used almost interchangeably. Henceforth, an attempt will be made to employ the terms explicated below according to their outlined definitions, particularly the emotively-related terms. This is done in order to preserve a measure of clarity and consistency rather than adhere to one rigid idea of each emotive term. There are, of course, always alternative ways of defining any of the terms outlined below.

In addition, an attempt has been made, with each term, to explicate it in such a way that its definition is somewhat compatible with both Western and Buddhist psychological theory. However, in certain places this was nearly impossible. For example, ancient Buddhists do not seem to have had as complex a notion of emotion as modern Western psychologists do, especially in the realm of physiology, the role of cognitive judgement within emotion etc.; yet, to leave cognition and physiology completely out of my definition for “emotion” would not be a fair representation of modern Western thinking on the subject. Thus, in each case, I have had to make some compromises.

Emotion

In this thesis, “emotion” will be thought of as the climate of thought. Thought or cognitive processes and volitional processes are seen as interacting with emotive ones under the rubric of mental processes as a whole. In addition, physiological processes are considered to be interdependent with, and, at the same time, distinct from this conglomerate of mental processes. (Please see my definition of “mind” below).

The phenomenon of emotion is explicated here as being delineated from other mental processes by a change in the subjective feeling of the person. In other words, the beginning and end of the subjective feeling of sadness marks the emotional complex of sadness’ arising and ceasing, as does the beginning and end of the subjective feeling of anger etc. This subjective feeling is being defined here as immaterial. (Please see the ensuing definitions for “material”, “immaterial” and “feeling”).

This change in subjective feeling is also always accompanied by a change in thought content, volitional direction, and physiological changes: thus, all of these processes are in a constant state of interaction and do not ever function discretely.⁸⁰ There are also behavioral changes involved; however, for the purposes of this thesis, behavior is being defined as a by-product of physiology, cognition, affect and volition, and not as a discrete phenomenon in itself. Hence, what I am saying is that the particular characteristic of emotion is subjective feeling; but, the other aspects of emotional phenomena, such as changes in

thought, motivation and physiology, are always present, so that the definition of emotion has to include these other things but cannot be reduced to them.

When we proceed to a translation of "emotion" into Buddhist vocabulary, especially within the context of the *Saundarananda*, we will focus primarily on emotion's tendency to be constantly in flux, and also, to a lesser extent, on the presence (or non-presence) of an immaterial component within it. However, the fact that emotion is always accompanied by thought, motivational and physiological changes will not be a primary area of concentration, as, judging from the aesthetic and Buddhist literature, this type of detailed analysis of emotion does not seem to have existed at that time in India.

Affect

The category of emotion is a subset of affect. The word "affect" will also be used here to signify emotions, a concept which always implies constant change, as well as emotive phenomena which are not in a constant state of moment-to-moment flux. Thus, the concept of affect includes long-standing or permanently negative moods, such as exist in unipolar⁸¹ depressions, and long-standing or permanently positive moods, such as the euphoric state of the creativity in an artist, and perhaps even the experience of *rasa* within the mind of the empathetic observer (*sumanasa preksaka*) etc.⁸² Here, the word "affect" has been used instead of the word "mood", as it is a more all-inclusive term which can encompass both emotions and moods.

Feeling

As has been noted above, feeling is that part of emotional processes which is immaterial and subjectively tangible. It is that portion of emotive processes which enables one to discern the presence of an emotion versus, for example, the presence of just a painful sensation in one's knee or arm.

The concept of feeling, as we are defining it here, is more nuanced than just basic pleasant, neutral or unpleasant hedonic tone. (Here, I am making an indirect reference to the Buddhist concept of *vedanā* and its three hedonic tones). What we are asserting here is that there is a separate subjective feeling for every emotion or affect. Thus, anger, bitterness, joy, nostalgia would all have subjective feelings with different nuances to them, as would long-standing, persistent negative or positive emotive states or affects. For example, the feeling attached to nostalgia would be slightly different from that attached to joy, as nostalgia would have a sad tone mixed in with a happy one, whereas joy would have a purely happy one.

Also, subjective feeling, which delineates emotive processes from other types of internal human processes, is being defined as immaterial. What do I mean by immaterial? Well, something immaterial is that which is not verifiable or measurable in itself. (Here, please see my definition for "materiality"). Physiological sensations which accompany this immaterial feeling may be measurable, but I am asserting that there is something above and beyond the physiological which is not measurable: this is subjective feeling.

How am I asserting such a thing? Well, the presence of something immaterial within us is being asserted based on a distinct type of tangibility. Through the method of introspection, one can discern the qualitative difference between physiological sensation and immaterial feeling. Both are tangible but immaterial feeling has a different “flavor” from corporeal feeling: hence, in order to differentiate the two, immaterial feeling can be thought of as “tangible” whereas material sensation can be understood as “sensible”.

Sensation

The word “sensation” will refer here to purely physiological feelings. Sensations can be attached to the material world of the body and internal organs etc., and stand in contrast to mental or psychic feelings, which are attached to the immaterial world of the mind. Sensations will also be described here in a more nuanced way than mere pleasant, neutral or unpleasant, as sensations are not just pleasant, painful etc. but also tingly, throbbing, dull, acute etc. (With the terms, “pleasant”, “neutral” and “unpleasant”, I am again making reference to the Buddhist understanding of *vedanā*. For more details, please see chapter four).

Related Vocabulary (in alphabetical order)

Introductory Remarks

The following definitions have been put forth just to give the reader an idea of where this thesis situates itself in relation to each concept. However, there

will not be a detailed attempt made within this thesis to match the following definitions with corresponding concepts in Buddhist psychology. Thus, this section can be considered to be one of very rough working definitions. One possible exception concerns the definition for mind. Because emotion, feeling etc. have been designated as mental, part of the task of chapters three and four is to examine some Buddhist notions of mentality.

Cognition

Cognition is roughly defined here as the name given for all of the processes in which thought is involved. How can we define thought? Thought, in itself, separate from its accompanying affects, volitions and physiological sensations, can be understood as absent of the tangibility of affective processes and the sensibility of physiological ones. The contents of thought itself will be defined as language and images. Thoughts themselves are being defined as part of a larger schema of organization or structure. What this means is that thoughts tend to be organized in mental groups, and these groups form concepts, beliefs etc.

Much more could be said here on the subject of cognition, but, since this thesis focuses primarily on emotive phenomena, a more detailed explanation of thought, concepts, etc. will not be undertaken here.

Disease/Unhealth/Disorder

In this thesis, I have tended to use words such as “disease”, “unhealth”, “disorder” etc. almost interchangeably. In fact, this is because I am defining “disease”, the central concept within this cluster of words, in a very broad fashion. In this study, I have tended to see disease as encompassing anything from minor obsessive behaviors, patterns of thought etc., at the lower end of the spectrum, to major delusional patterns of thinking, clinically treatable mood disorders etc., at the higher end of the spectrum. Thus, in a sense, my definition here is based upon assumptions that are closer to the Buddhist model of psychic unhealth than the Western one, as anything which prevents one from seeing the truth (*tattva*) with one hundred percent clarity is being classified under the category of disease or disorder.

In the process of composing this thesis, I have also not given a great deal of attention to the entire field of Transcultural Psychiatry, which attempts to bring into question Western classifications of psychic disease when they are imposed upon other non-Western cultures. However, the problem with applying some of the tenets of Transcultural Psychiatry here is that, in this thesis, we are not engaging a contemporary culture. Thus, it is difficult to gauge what exactly was considered to be bizarre or mentally-diseased behavior in ancient Indian culture and what was not.

Instinctual Drives: Hunger, Thirst etc.

These are defined as physiological processes, with volition as the dominant accompanying mental process. They are differentiated from, for example, emotive processes in that their principal component is not immaterial feeling but physical processes.

Materiality and Immateriality

Here, I will define the "material" as something which has mass and occupies space.⁶³ Materiality will also be defined here as that which is entirely measurable and verifiable. (Consequently, "immateriality" will be defined as materiality's antithesis).

In the context of this thesis, the ideas of immateriality and materiality are most important with regard to the treatment of mental disease. In this regard, a material treatment would be something like the use of psychotropic drugs, electric shock treatment etc., and an immaterial treatment would be something like Buddhist meditation or psychotherapy. Because the causal connection between such treatments as meditation or psychotherapy and the accompanying changes in the practitioner or patient is not entirely verifiable or measurable, these treatments have been labelled as "immaterial" in their approach.

Mind or Mentality

As with most of my other definitions, an attempt has been made here to propose a definition which is compatible with both Western psychology and Buddhist psychology. For, without such a definition, it would be too difficult to use the medium of English to write about Buddhist psychology, as there would be no common ground at all to express Buddhist concepts. For example, if I were to use the prevalent theory for mind in neurology, the Identity Theory,⁸⁴ which sees mind as equivalent to physiological processes within the brain and nervous system, this would be entirely incompatible with the early *Theravāda* Buddhist theory of mind. Early Buddhism did not have the same understanding of the brain nor of physiological processes in general.

In this thesis, I will use a theory of mind which is somewhere in between the Interactionist and the Identity theories in Western psychology.⁸⁵ Interactionist models, such as the one proposed by Popper and Eccles etc.,⁸⁶ are perhaps slightly closer to the Buddhist one explicated by Buddhaghosa and in the *Dhammasaṅgani* (see chapter three), as they allow for a distinction between mental and bodily processes. However, in many Interactionist theories, there is a measure of dualism maintained,⁸⁷ while Buddhaghosa adheres to a strict interdependence between mind and body. (Please see chapter three for more details on Buddhaghosa's understanding).

Thus, in our definition of "mind" here, "mind" will never be asserted as independent of body, but rather, as a discrete but constantly interactive set of

processes. By saying that the mind is in a constant state of interaction with the physiological, I mean to say that there is a complete interdependence between the two: activity in the mind is always accompanied by physiological activity (brain processes etc.) and vice-versa. In contrast, some more dualistic theories of mind and body assert some independence of mind from physiological processes.

In addition, because mental processes are being defined as a distinct type of process from the physiological or material, they can be defined as immaterial. By the saying that mind or mental processes are distinct or distinguishable, I mean to say that mind is an immaterial entity with an originating power or energy of its own, and not just an epiphenomenon of physiological processes present within the brain and other parts of the nervous system. As was mentioned previously, for our purposes here, this quality of the mental processes is most significant in relation to the understanding of disease, in that it allows for the possibility of mentally-originated disease.

Finally, there are two more important facets of our definition of mind. The mind's tangibility comes from its affective and volitional processes (not cognitive). Also, volition, cognition and affect will be thought of here as the mind's three defining processes.

Motivation/Volition

"Motivation" is defined here as synonymous with "volition". Words such as "desire" etc. can also be categorized as volitional or motivational in nature.

Motivation can be seen as a pulsion or drive towards action. As was mentioned above, it is defined here as a distinct but interdependent mental process, operating alongside emotive and cognitive processes. Motivation is also being defined as having a subjectively felt quality to it. What this means is that motivation, in its impulsive manifestation, can feel driven, hurried and almost painful, but, when volition is governed by calm, its tangible aspect is more pleasant. This division of motivation or volition into two types is important for this thesis, as both Pali Buddhism and Āśvaghoṣa's *Saundarananda* make this distinction. (Please see chapters three and five for more details on this matter).

Psyche

"Psyche" will be used synonymously with "mind". The equivalence made here is based on the modern usage outlined in *Webster's New World dictionary*.⁶⁸

Psychic or Mental Illness

"Psychic illness" is being used synonymously with "mental illness".

Psychic illness, be it purely psychological or psycho-somatic, is being defined here as an illness which originates in the mind or mental processes as opposed to physiological processes. Thus, as I have mentioned previously, I am positing two originating points of disease: the mental and the physiological. The viewpoint that the mind is a phenomenon with a separate originating power of its own

when it comes to mental disease is not an entirely anomalous one in modern Western psychology as many psychotherapists still adhere to this viewpoint.

Psychic or mental illness has some fairly universal characteristics. For example, in depressive illnesses the following symptoms are often described by patients: rigid thinking and emotive patterns, dominance of negative emotive states, a feeling of hopelessness and gloominess, and, a feeling of unstable emotivity (such as in manic depression). Many of these mental symptoms can also be applied to other mental illnesses, such as schizophrenia etc.

One of the implicit models for psychic disease in this thesis is the category of malady often called "mood disorder" in Western psychiatric terminology. In mood disorders, two extreme poles are commonly recognized: that of melancholia and mania. For sake of simplification here, melancholia can be thought of as a "down" state of mind and mania that of the "up" state of mind. Of course, in people with mood disorders, these poles represent extreme differences.

People who have primarily "down" states of mind which persist for a significant period of time, and are without periods of "up" states of mind interspersed, are said to suffer from depression. This type of depression is also called unipolar depression. Those people with both mania and melancholia intermingled together are said to suffer from bipolar disorder. Another name for bipolar disorder is manic depression.⁸⁹

Although mood disorders such as unipolar and bipolar illnesses are the most clear-cut cases of affectively caused maladies, mental illness in general is sometimes defined in an emotively centered fashion as a feeling of general unhappiness or distress. For example, in the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual IV (DSM-IV)*, published by the American Psychiatric Association, mental illness is associated with “present distress or disability or with a significant risk of suffering death, pain, disability, or an important loss of freedom.”⁹⁰

Psychology

“Psychology” will be defined here as any system of thought which treats illnesses that have their originating point in the psyche or mind. A second aspect of psychology is theoretical: psychology involves speculation on the nature of the psyche or mind.

By defining the term “psychology” in this way, this does not mean that I am overlooking its neurological, physiological component. The reader should keep in mind, however, that when the word “psychology” is specifically associated with the term “Western”, it includes the modern physiological research as well; yet, when it is applied to ancient Buddhism, it only implies volitional, affective and cognitive components of the psyche, without any consideration as to their physiological counterparts.

Concluding Remarks: Western Psychological Theories of Emotion

The above terms have been strictly defined in order to develop a basic foundation or structure upon which the translation (chapters 5-7) and explication processes (chapters 3-4) of this thesis could be based. What I have attempted to do in this chapter is build a bridge between the ancient Buddhist and modern Western worlds and provide an additional aid to the reader in interpreting this thesis.

One additional note is necessary here concerning the format of this chapter. While it is true that there are still some theorists who view emotion as purely behavioral or purely physiological, for the most part, modern psychological theories of emotion are multifaceted. They are many cognitive theorists, for example, who would allow for a physiological, subjective and behavioral part of emotion as well. Similarly, many physiological theorists, do not deny the role of cognition (although they may see these processes as based in the brain) or subjective evaluation etc. The same versatility would be true for the other two categories of theory, at least amongst the most recent theorists. In addition, there are few modern theorists who would attempt to assert that the processes of affect and cognition, or any of the above processes, are discrete. Most modern theorists tend to see internal processes as different in "flavor" but interconnected when it comes to their manner of occurrence.

Chapter 3: The Province for a Psychological Study of Buddhism

Introductory Remarks Concerning the Psychological Study of Buddhism

The present chapter concerns itself with establishing the possibilities for a psychological study of Buddhism using the definitions outlined in chapter two as foundational. To my mind, there are *five basic questions* which must be answered before we establish the nature of Buddhist practice as a psychological enterprise. The answers to these five questions will be spread out over the next two chapters.

The first preliminary question (and its subquestions) attempts to contextualize this psychological study: if Buddhism was the psychological “science” for its day and age, in that it addressed itself primarily towards illnesses or afflictions originating in the psyche, what would have been the physiologically-oriented “science”? How was physiological disease defined at that time and was it contrasted to mental disease?

In response to these questions, we have chosen to include a brief review of *Āyurvedic* practice, as represented in the *Caraka Saṃhitā*, as a point of comparison. *Āyurvedic* concepts are important in this thesis throughout, in that they appear in both the Pali Canon and in our text of focus, the *Saundarananda*, as well as in Bharata’s *Nāṭyaśāstra*. For example, in Bharata’s description of acting out death (*maraṇa*) on stage, Bharata says that a disequilibrium (*vaiṣamya*) in the humours (*doṣas*) is one source of sickness (*vyādhi*). In a previous passage, Bharata defines the word *vyādhi* as signifying that which has its origin or source in the mixing

together of the three humours, wind (*vāta*), bile (*pitta*) and phlegm (*kapha*).⁹¹ Thus, some understanding of *Āyurvedic* tenets are necessary for a clear picture of certain passages in all of the texts examined here in this thesis.

This being said, it is worthy of note that, Kenneth Zysk, a leading expert in ancient Indian medical traditions, remarks upon the similarities between early medical practices in Buddhist monasteries and early *Āyurvedic* practices and postulates a common origin.⁹² What this means is that, although we are labelling the humour theory etc. as *Āyurvedic* in this thesis, it could just as easily be labelled “Buddhist”, or it could predate both the earliest Buddhist and *Āyurvedic* texts.

The second preliminary question that we must address in this chapter is the existence of psyche or mind as an originating point for disease. I have explicated this as a basic characteristic of psychic disease in chapter two, yet, is this even a possible viewpoint within the spectrum of views advocated in Buddhism, particularly within the Buddhism of the Pali Canon?

The Buddhist doctrine of reincarnation posits a beginningless cycle of rebirth within a cyclical view of time. Thus, considering the ideas of beginninglessness and the cyclical in Buddhist doctrine, can we even posit an originating point of disease at all in the context of Buddhism? Also, considering the doctrine of strict interdependence of mind and body posited in early Buddhism and the mind-body’s place in the 12-fold chain of causation (*paṭicca-*

samuppāda), can we assert either mind or body as preceding the other in the causal process behind suffering?

The third and fourth questions will address Buddhist doctrine's fit within the rubric of "psychology" as we have defined it in chapter two. For, if we think of the word "psychology" as not only the theoretical study of the psyche but also as the study of the psyche for the purpose of healing its maladies, then a psychological study within the realm of ancient Buddhism would only be possible if Buddhism saw itself as addressing the ills of the psyche (third question) and if it possessed theorizing on the nature of mentality or psyche (fourth question). Thus, within the scope of the third and fourth questions, this chapter seeks to ascertain whether or not Buddhism, particularly early *Theravādin* Buddhism, possessed both of these aspects of psychology by asking the following additional questions: a) what is early Buddhism's speculation concerning mentality? ; b) is mentality associated with immateriality and contrasted to physicality so that the Buddhist definition of mind is at least a close approximation to our definition of mind in chapter two? c) does early Buddhism even possess the viewpoint that it addresses the ills of the psyche?

The last of the five questions referred to in the beginning of this chapter will be answered in the following chapter, chapter four. In chapter four, there will be an attempt to discover early *Theravādin* Buddhism's understanding of emotive concepts. Hence, the following question will be responded to: in early Buddhism, was there one word like "emotion" or "affect" which tended to

describe emotive processes as an interdependent but discrete group of mental processes operating alongside cognitive and volitional processes?

The majority of my remarks here, in chapters three and four, are centered around the textual evidence from the Pali Canon of the *Theravāda* tradition. In addition, Buddhaghosa's writings, particularly the *Visuddhimagga* and the *Atthasālinī* have been consulted. The passages from the Pali Canon are meant to serve as a brief literary review of the literature in Buddhism which preceded Aśvaghoṣa. Here, it should be noted that Buddhaghosa, whose date is usually assigned to the fifth century C.E.,⁹ most probably came after Aśvaghoṣa. However, his work is included here as ideas which were roughly contemporary to Aśvaghoṣa's for three reasons: a) Buddhaghosa's commentaries in Pali are commonly viewed as modelled upon (or even translations into Pali of) the more ancient Sinhalese commentaries on the Pali Canon; b) since Buddhaghosa bases most of his ideas on the Pali Canon, they can easily be said to have their roots in a time period much before that of Aśvaghoṣa; c) in addition, and perhaps most importantly, without Buddhaghosa, many of the concepts in the early Canonical materials are obscure: thus, it is necessary to include his works for the sake of clarification.

There were a number of reasons for my choice of the Pali Canon as the definitive opinion of Buddhism. First of all, I wanted to choose texts which were decidedly older than the *Saundarananda*, so that I could be sure that the concepts explored here were extant at its time of composition. According to most scholars,

Aśvaghoṣa's works are rather ancient, dating from circa the 1st or 2nd century C.E., so this meant that I would really have to choose a group of texts from well before the era of Christ in order to be assured that the ideas I was examining were in common circulation.

Another reason for the choice of the Pali Canon is the wide-spread acknowledgement of its validity as representing one of the first articulations of the Buddha's teaching. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, much of the material in the Pali Canon has been thoroughly studied and translated. This makes the material more readily accessible than some other early Buddhist works.

A Brief Overview of Āyurvedic Theory and Practice as Addressing Physical Illness

Here, some excerpts from the *Āyurvedic* corpus have been chosen as points of comparison with Buddhist ideas of healing. Within the corpus of *Āyurvedic* texts, I will only use material from the *Caraka Saṃhitā*. According to recent scholarly work, the *Caraka Saṃhitā* dates from circa 3rd or 2nd centuries BCE and is the oldest extant text devoted to *Āyurvedic* philosophy and medical therapeutic techniques.⁹⁴ Thus, the *Caraka Saṃhitā* was compiled shortly after the Pali Canon and definitely preceded the works of Aśvaghoṣa.

According to M. Monier-Williams' *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, the word *āyus*⁹⁵ can be translated as "life", "long life", "health" or "vital power". In verse 1.42 of the *Caraka Saṃhitā*, this word is defined as a combination of body (*śarīra*),

mind (*sattva*), sense organs (*indriya*) and soul (*ātmā*). The word *veda* can be thought of here as “knowledge”. Thus, a possible translation of *āyurveda* would be something like “knowledge concerning health, vigor or long life”. In his *Roots of Āyurveda*, D. Wujastyk translates the term as “the knowledge or science for longevity”.⁹⁶

The basic philosophical position of the *Āyurveda* is that mind, soul and body are one integrated whole. The implication is that the *Āyurveda* is not just a medical science in the strict physiological sense: it treats both the mental and physical aspects of a person. In this regard, the third aspect of the person, the soul (*ātmā*) is considered to be an observer (*draṣṭṛ*) and not a receptacle for disease.

śārīraṃ sattvasamjñam ca vyādhīnām āśrayo mataḥ/
tathā sukhānām, yogas tu sukhānām kāraṇam samah//Ca, 1.55//

The loci of diseases and as well as (*tathā*) healthy states (*sukha*) are considered to be what is called mind (*sattva*) and body (*śārīra*). However, equilibrated utilization (i.e. non-overutilization etc. of mental faculties etc.)⁹⁷ is the cause for states of happiness.

nirvikāraḥ paras tvātmā sattvabhūtaguṇendrayaiḥ/
caitanye kāraṇam nityo draṣṭā paśyati hi kriyāḥ//Ca, 1.56//

Yet, the soul (*ātmā*) stands apart (*para*) (and) does not change with the sense organs nor with the qualities of materiality (*bhūta*) nor mind (*sattva*). It is the cause of consciousness. It is the permanent observer, for it observes actions.

vāyuh pittaṃ kaphaścoktaḥ śārīro doṣasaṅgrahaḥ/
manasaḥ punar uddiṣṭo rajaś ca tam eva ca//Ca, 1.57//⁹⁸

The group of bodily “pathogenic factors” (or humours) (*doṣas*) are known as wind (*vāyu*), bile (*pitta*) and phlegm (*kapha*). The group of mental “pathogenic

factors" (*doṣa*) are indicated as passion (*rajas*) and mental sluggishness or darkness (*tamas*).

Thus, disease, according to the *Caraka Saṃhitā*, is related to the mind and the body. By its very nature, the soul (*paramātmā* or *ātmā*, the Supreme Soul)⁹⁹ is left untouched by such diseases. As was mentioned above, the pathogenic factors for disease in the body are wind (*vāyu* or *vāta*), bile or choler (*pitta*) and phlegm (*kapha* or *śleṣman*).¹⁰⁰ These three factors are called *doṣas*, and are usually translated by the term "humour" in English.¹⁰¹ Dominik Wujastyk gives us the following description of the three *doṣas* in the *Āyurvedic* context:

As Sanskrit texts make clear, a *doṣa* is a substance which flows or circulates within the body, bringing disease through excess or deficiency. The *vāta* or 'wind' *doṣa* is localized mainly in the large intestine, the *pitta*, 'bile' or 'choler' *doṣa* is localized mainly in the navel, and the *kapha* or 'phlegm' *doṣa* is localized mainly in the chest. All the *doṣas* have secondary locations too. If a *doṣa* remains in a peaceful state, then no diseases manifest, but if a *doṣa* builds up in one of its locations, or spreads to an area that is not its own, then illness can result.¹⁰²

There is some debate amongst *Āyurvedic* scholars concerning the translation of the term *doṣa*. Hartmut Scharfe, for example, has argued that *doṣa* has one meaning in the earliest strata of literature, i.e. in the Buddhist Pali sources and the *Caraka Saṃhitā*, and another in the later literature, i.e. the *Suśruta Saṃhitā* and later *Āyurvedic* texts. According to Scharfe, in the earlier literature, *doṣa* only stands for an inflamed state of a humour or other bodily substance

(*dhātu*), whereas, in the later literature, *doṣa* comes to be used to indicate the three humours in both their natural and inflamed state.¹⁰³

In summary, *Āyurvedic* “medicine” sees itself as treating both mental and physical maladies. In this sense, *Āyurvedic* medicine does not fit entirely under the rubric of a modern physiologically-based science, in that it admits to a mental and a psychic originating point of disease. The *Caraka’s* basic definition of disease itself is the following: disease (*vikāra*) is defined as a disequilibrium (*vaiṣamya*) and as suffering (*duḥkha*), whereas health is defined as happiness (*sukha*) and equilibrium (*prakṛti*).¹⁰⁴

In addition, *Āyurvedic* medicine recognizes a Supreme Soul (*paramātmā*), which is permanent and unborn, and an empirical soul (*puruṣa*) which is reborn.¹⁰⁵ The Supreme Soul is considered to be entirely non-physical, and, in fact, imperceptible (*acintya*) and unmanifest (*avyakta*).¹⁰⁶ Also, *Āyurveda* possesses a belief in reincarnation, which means that it sees this life as being in causal relation to previous ones, and it has a belief in the doctrine of *karma*, which manifests itself in the *Caraka Saṃhitā* as a category of disease called *karmaja*.¹⁰⁷

None of the above postulations, namely, reincarnation, *karma*, a Supreme Soul, a mental originating point of disease etc., are in accordance with the prevalent theories of modern medicine. However, this being said, there are two significant ways in which the *Āyurvedic* system of medicine, as it is portrayed by the *Caraka Saṃhitā*, can be seen as a physiologically-based system. First of all, there are more chapters in the *Caraka Saṃhitā* devoted to the treatment and

description of physical diseases than to mental ones. For example, there are chapters devoted to such things as swelling (*śothīya*), abdominal disease (*udariya*), leprosy and other skin diseases (*kuṣṭha*), urinary disorders (*prameha*) etc.¹⁰⁸ Second of all, although immaterial methods of treatment, such as prayer and correct moral conduct are accepted,¹⁰⁹ the majority of the treatments advocated are of a material nature, such as serums of animal origin, herbs of plant origin etc.¹¹⁰ Here, Wujastyk tells us that the *Āyurveda* uses “mainly animal and vegetable medicines,” and “teaches a broad range of therapies including diet, enemas, bloodletting etc.”¹¹¹

In these two ways, with regard to the nature of its treatments and foci of its treatments, the *Āyurvedic* system can be seen as a physiologically-based system of medicine. As we shall see in the ensuing sections, this stands only in partial contrast to Buddhism, as Buddhism, in places, sees itself as primarily addressing the mental aspect of disease, and, in others, sees itself as addressing all disease, physical and mental.

However, in a sense, these modern delineations do not entirely apply to the ancient Indian intellectual atmosphere. Rather, what seems to have been more the case is that psychological and physiological medicine-based treatments were practiced alongside one another, and often, both the mind and body were targetted as sources for a particular ailment.

Possibility for a Psychic Originating Point of Disease in Buddhism

In the previous section, the *Āyurveda* was established as primarily a physiologically-based medical system in spite of its differences with modern allopathic medicine. Now, we must consider the understanding of the Pali Canon and the appropriateness of the term “psychological” when applied to the Canon’s various streams of thought.

If we reflect upon the definition given for mental disease in chapter two, we may recall that mentally-originated disease was opposed to physiologically-originated disease. Thus, two points of origin for disease were presented. How does the Buddhist analysis fit into this understanding of disease? Does Buddhism postulate two originating points, or one? If one, where does Buddhism see disease as originating: in the mind or in the body? Or, does Buddhism even postulate an originating point at all?

Here, in responding to these questions, I am not attempting to prove that there was one, sole, dominant view within Buddhism as a whole or even within the Pali Canon. Rather, what I am attempting to do here is merely to prove that the mind as the origin of disease was, at the very least, a viewpoint that existed in the Pali Canon.

Yet, before we consider whether or not early *Theravādin* Buddhism postulated the psyche or mind as an originating point of disease, let us first consider the possibility that early Buddhism might not have postulated an originating point at all. It is important to consider this possibility. Perhaps the

origin of disease was considered to be beginningless. Perhaps early Buddhism saw mind and body as completely interdependent with neither being at first cause. Moreover, if we consider the doctrines of reincarnation, the idea of a beginningless origin for disease makes sense, as, in Buddhism, our present lives as human beings are considered to be the fruit of many previous ones.

Thus, it is evident that, at first glance, calling Buddhist practice “psychological”, at least in the way that I have defined “psychological” in chapter two, poses some of the same problems that we saw in our analysis of the *Āyurvedic* system and the attempt to label it “physiological”: both systems believe in such things as reincarnation, the beginningless origin of body and mind etc. These are beliefs which are not compatible either with the modern field of psychology or medical science. However, this being said, it may be necessary here to temporarily disregard this analysis in the face of one fact: Buddhist practice proceeds towards the accomplishment of healing by targetting such phenomena as unhealthy volitional impulses (desire for fame, money etc.), negative emotions (anger, jealousy etc.) and false beliefs (belief in permanence, self etc.). All of these fit under the rubric of what we have defined as mental. Thus, in spite of doctrines of interdependence, reincarnation etc., there is a definite focus of procedure in Buddhism that targets mental constituents or contents as the primary source of suffering.

In addition, in order to accomplish this, Buddhism primarily advocates immaterial methods such as meditation practices, moral action etc. The

prevalence of advocated immaterial methods in Buddhist practice stands in contrast to the basic method of approach in the *Caraka Saṃhitā* of the *Āyurveda*. As was mentioned previously, in the *Āyurveda*, although there is also some evidence of concern with mental maladies, the physical body was the primary target of treatment. Also, a physical means of treatments, such as herbs etc., was the central therapeutic method. Thus, if we compare the Buddhist method of treatment and its primary focus of treatment to those of the *Āyurveda*, as seen in the *Caraka Saṃhitā*, there is some justification for calling Buddhism a psychological practice in contrast to the physiological practice seen in the *Āyurveda*.

In addition, there is also textual evidence which demonstrates that there were at least some ancient Buddhists who saw the mind (*manas*, *citta* in the passages below) as the origin of disease and suffering. Below, there is a passage from the *Dhammapada*, a part of the Pali Canon's *Khuddaka Nikāya*. This passage states that all *dhamma*, which can also be translated as "mental states" in this context, are preceded by the nature of one's mind.

Manopubbaṅgamā dhammā manoseṭṭhā manomayā manasā ce paduṭṭhena
bhāsati vā karoti vā tato naṃ dukkham anveti cakkam va vahato padaṃ // DhP,
1.1//

Mind precedes all mental states. Mind is their chief; they are all mind-wrought. If with an impure mind a person speaks or acts, suffering follows him like the wheel that follows the foot of the ox.

Manopubbaṅgamā dhammā manoseṭṭhā manomayā manasā ce pasannena bhāsati
vā karoti vā tato naṃ sukham anveti chāyā va anapāyinī // DhP, 1.2//¹¹²

Mind precedes all mental states. Mind is their chief; they are all mind-wrought. If with a pure mind a person speaks or acts, happiness follows him like his never-departing shadow.¹¹³

These verses from the *Dhammapada* state clearly that one's purity or impurity of mind is the cause for happiness or suffering. The above ideas are also articulated in the *Āṅguttara Nikāya* i.11, in almost the exact same form. In addition, in *Āṅguttara* ii.177, the Buddha, in response to a certain monk's question, states the following concerning mind (*citta*).

cittena kho bhikkhu loko niyyati cittena parikissati cittassa uppannassa vasaṃ gacchatīti.¹¹⁴ (AN, ii.177)

Well, monk, the world is led by mind. By mind it is drawn along. When mind has arisen, it goes under its sway.¹¹⁵

Śāntideva, at a much later date, also expounded upon mind as the sole cause of suffering. Even though Śāntideva's writings are later than the Pali Canon and the *Saundarananda*, being dated circa the 7th century CE, his words are still significant in that they echo the same point of view that was expressed in the *Dhammapada*.

baddhaś cec cittamātaṅgaḥ smṛtirajjvā samantataḥ/
bhayaṃ astaṅgataṃ sarvaṃ kṛtsnaṃ kalyāṇaṃ āgataṃ // Ba, 5.3 //

If the elephant of the mind is bound on all sides by the rope of mindfulness (*smṛti*), all danger/fear subsides, (and) complete prosperity comes about.

vyāgrāḥ siṃhā gajā ṛkṣāḥ sarpāḥ sarve ca śatраваḥ/
sarve narakapālās ca ḍākinyo rākṣasās tathā// *Ba*, 5.4//

So too tigers, lions, elephants, bears, serpents, and all enemies, and all the guards of hell, ogresses as well as demons,

sarve baddhā bhavanty ete cittasyaikasaya bandhanāt/
cittasyaikasaya damanāt sarve dāntā bhavanti ca// *Ba*, 5.5 // ¹¹⁶

Through the controlling of the one mind, all these are controlled. Through the subduing of one mind, all (of these) are subdued.

Thus, *Śāntideva* states clearly that it is the subduing or controlling of the mind which terminates suffering. Mind is at cause. What seems to be stressed most in all of these writings is the general purity or impurity of one's mind. The *Dhammapada* picks up on this same point, but instead of impurity versus purity, it contrasts the trained or guarded mind versus the untrained or unguarded.

sududdasaṃ sunipuṇaṃ yattakāmanipatināṃ cittaṃ rakkhetha medhāvī cittaṃ
guttaṃ sukhāvahaṃ // *DhP*, 3.36//

The sagacious one may tend the mind, hard to be seen, extremely subtle, alighting wherever it wants. The tended mind brings ease.

dūraṅgamaṃ ekacaraṃ asarīraṃ guhasayaṃ ye cittaṃ saññāmessanti mokkhanti
mārabandhanā// *DhP*, 3.37// ¹¹⁷

They who will restrain the mind, far-ranging, roaming alone,
Incorporeal, lying ahiding - they are released from *Māra's* bonds. ¹¹⁸

The above passages highlight the importance of guarding or paying attention to the processes of the mind. The psychological act of paying attention

is stated to be the key factor for the release from evil (*Māra*) or the bonds of rebirth. Thus, it is the subduing of the mind that is being made equivalent to liberation here. In this regard, a modern Buddhist interpreter of the above passages from the *Dhammapada*, Tulku Thondop, tells us: “Mind is the key. By properly guiding and training our minds, we can experience the power of healing.”¹¹⁹

Thondop also quotes the *Shedgyud*, one of the Tantras of ancient Tibetan medicine, as saying: “the specific causes of sickness are that unenlightenment produces desire, hatred and ignorance, and they produce the ills of air, bile, and phlegm as a result.”¹²⁰ Thus, in the *Shedgyud*, the “psychological” ills of hatred, ignorance etc. are said to be the cause for the “physiological” ills of the three humours.

Also, in the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*, cultivation of the four foundations of mindfulness is said to dispel all suffering, lamentation etc. and lead to *nibbāna*.

And, in the *Majjhima Nikāya’s Mahāssapura Sutta*, a “purified, bright, unblemished mind” is said to be capable of destroying the *āsavas* or taints.¹²¹

Thus, again, it is the quality of mind which governs the curing or the persistence of disease and suffering.

In summary, the above textual passages clearly demonstrate that the viewpoint of the psyche or mind as the originating point for suffering or disease existed in ancient Pali Buddhism. Some passages also demonstrate that Buddhism saw a transformation of mind as the source for healing. Thus, there

seems to be sufficient evidence in the Pali Canon to say that the idea of the psyche as a cause for illness was at least present within the earliest strata of Buddhist literature. Now, we are ready to undertake a response to the third question posed at the beginning of this chapter: namely, does Buddhism see itself as addressing and/or capable of curing psychic disease? Again, psychic disease will be defined within the parameters given in chapter two.

Buddhism as a Healer of Physical or Psychic Disease or Both?

Introductory Remarks

The Canonical literature has three basic positions within it in regards to the healing of physical and mental disease: 1) Buddhist practice heals all suffering, including even physical maladies; 2) Buddhist practice can heal all mental maladies but cannot heal physically-based maladies; 3) Buddhist practice has some limits to its application even in the mental realm.

Buddhist Practice Heals all Sickness including Physical Maladies

In many passages within the Canon and its commentaries, Buddhist practice is said to heal all suffering or sickness, without mental or physical qualification. For example, the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* sees Buddhist practice, specifically meditation practice, as being capable of surmounting all sorrow and suffering, without qualification as to its physical or mental nature.

Ekāyano ayaṃ bhikkhave maggo sattānaṃ visuddhiyā sokapariddavānaṃ samatikkamāya dukkhadomanassānaṃ atthagamāya nāyassa adhigamāya nibbānassa sacchikiriyāya, yad idaṃ cattāro satipaṭṭhānā.¹²² (MN i.56)

Bhikkhus, this is the direct path for the purification of beings, for the surmounting of sorrow and lamentation, for the disappearance of pain and grief, for the attainment of the true way, for the realisation of Nibbāna - namely, the four foundations of mindfulness.¹²³

Some passages in the Pali Canon explicitly state that Buddhist practice addresses physical disease as well as mental maladies. For example, in the *Samyutta Nikāya*, a story is related concerning the healing of *Mahākassapa* etc. from physical illness. In this story, the method by which Buddhist practice heals is an immaterial one: cultivation or meditation upon (*bhāvita*) the seven limbs of enlightenment. In addition, systematic attention (*yoniso manasikāra*) is called the forerunner (*pubbaṅgama*) and preceding condition (*pubbanimitta*) to the seven limbs of enlightenment (*bojjhaṅga*).¹²⁴

tena kho pana samayena āyasmā Mahā-Kassapo pipphaliguhāyam viharati ābādhiko dukkhito bālhagilāno // Atha kho Bhagavā sāyaṇhasamayam paṭisallānā vuṭṭhito yenāyasmā Mahā-Kassapo tenupasaṅkami // ...

Now at that time the venerable Kassapa the Great was staying in Pepper Tree Grotto, and was sick, afflicted, stricken with a sore disease. Then the Exalted One, rising from his solitude in the eventide, went to visit the venerable Kassapa the Great...

Sattime Kassapa bojjhaṅgā mayā sammad akkhātā bhāvitā bahulikātā abhiññāya sambodhāya nibbānāya samvattanti //

Kassapa, these seven limbs of wisdom fully expounded by myself, when cultivated and made much of, conduce to full comprehension, to the wisdom, to liberation (*nibbāna*)....

Idam avoca Bhagavā // attamano āyasmā Mahā-Kassapo Bhagavato bhāsitaṃ abhinandi // vuṭṭhāhi ca āyasmā Mahā-Kassapo tamhā ābādhā // Tatha pahīno cāyasmato Mahā-Kassapassa so ābādhō¹²⁵ ahoṣi ti // (SN, v. 79-80)¹²⁶

Thus spake the Exalted One, and the venerable Kassapa the Great was delighted thereat, and took pleasure in what was said by the Exalted One. And the venerable Kassapa the Great rose up from that sickness. There and then that sickness forth venerable Kassapa the Great was abandoned.¹²⁷

In the pages that follow, the same type of story is recounted in regards to the sickness of Moggallāna and Cunda. From the two terms *ābādhika* (*ābādhika* is derived from the word *ābādhā*) and *gilāna* we can deduce that *Kassapa*, *Moggallāna* etc. are suffering from a physical illness and not a mental one.¹²⁸ In the *Vinaya Piṭaka*, there is an entire chapter of the *Mahāvagga* devoted to the use of medicines (*bhesajja*) to treat monks who are physically ill with things like the root (*mūla*) of ginger (*singivera*), garlic (*ativisā*) etc., and, in this chapter, *gilāna* is used to describe physical illness.¹²⁹ In addition, in the *Āṅguttara Nikāya* v. 218-219, *ābādhā* is the term used to signify diseases arising from *pitta*, *semha* and *vāta*.¹³⁰

Thus, we can conclude that it is very probable that the above passage from the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* is referring to a physical disease, and possibly one that it at least partly caused by a disturbance in the humours (*doṣa*). Furthermore, we can also conclude that Buddhist practice, more specifically, the contemplation or cultivation of the seven limbs of enlightenment, healed Kassapa.

Another passage, from the *Āṅguttara Nikāya*, does not entirely deny the efficacy of *Āyurvedic* practices of healing, such as purges (*virecana*) and emetics

(*vamana*), but does seem to imply that Buddhist practices are superior, in that they free one from rebirth, sorrow etc.

Tikicchakā bhikkhave virecanam denti pittasamuṭṭhānānam pi ābādhānam paṭighātāya semhasamuṭṭhānānam pi ābādhānam paṭighātāya vātasamuṭṭhānānam pi ābādhānam paṭighātāya. Atth'etaṃ bhikkhave virecanam, n'etaṃ natthi ti vadāmi. Tañ ca kho etaṃ bhikkhave virecanam sampajjati pi vipajjati pi. Ahañ ca kho bhikkhave ariyaṃ virecanam desissāmi, yaṃ virecanam sampajjati yeva no vipajjati; yaṃ virecanam āgama jātiddhammā sattā jātiyā parimuccanti, jarāddhammā sattā jarāya parimuccanti, maraṇadhammā sattā maraṇena parimuccanti, sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsadhammā sattā sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsehi parimuccanti.

Monks, administer a purge for checking sickness arising from bile, phlegm, for checking sickness arising from wind. This is a purge, monks, but not a wiping out, I declare. Now, monks, I will teach you the Ariyan purge, a purge which works and fails not; a purge by which beings subject to rebirth are released therefrom, by which beings subject to decay and death, subject to sorrow and lamentation, woe, dejection and despair are released therefrom.

Tikicchakā bhikkhave vamanam denti pittasamuṭṭhānānam pi ābādhānam paṭighātāya semhasamuṭṭhānānam pi ābādhānam paṭighātāya vātasamuṭṭhānānam pi ābādhānam paṭighātāya. Atth'etaṃ bhikkhave vamanam, n'etaṃ natthi ti vadāmi.¹³¹ (AN v.218-19)

Monks, administer an emetic for checking sickness arising from bile, phlegm, for checking sickness arising from wind. This is an emetic, monks, but not a wiping out, I declare....¹³²

The term *virecana* is used in physical healing practices performed by the famed physician, *Jīvaka Komārabhacca*, in the *Vinaya Piṭaka*.¹³³ In addition, purging or purgatives (*virecana*, Sanskrit) and vomiting or substances that cause vomiting (*vamana*, Sanskrit) are terms that are mentioned in the *Suśruta*,¹³⁴ an ancient *Āyurvedic* text which is usually dated slightly after the *Caraka Saṃhitā*.¹³⁵ Thus,

what the above passage implies that Buddhist practice is a complete “wiping-out”, or, something above and beyond *Āyurvedic* medicine. Similarly, in the *Dīgha Nikāya’s Brahmajāla Sutta*, there is a passage which states, in essence, that such things as giving emetics, purges etc. are “base arts” and that Buddhist doctrine is about more profound matters.¹³⁶

In summary, in this section, we have shown that, in the Pali Canon and its commentaries, the viewpoint that Buddhist practice cures all suffering, regardless of its physical and/or mental nature did exist. And, regarding the Canon’s specific comments on physical disease, the *Āyurvedic* understanding of humours and their disorders seems to represent at least part of the definition for the notion of “physical”.

Buddhist Practice Heals all Mental Maladies but not Physical Maladies

Because there is an entire chapter in the *Mahāvagga* portion of the *Vinaya Piṭaka* devoted to medicines and the treatment of various physical ailments of monks in the community, one can safely assume that physical disease was a recognized force and that Buddhist practice was not always seen as the best remedy for this sort of disease. Sometimes, physical disease is defined in *Āyurvedic* fashion, as being due to a disorder within the humours (*doṣas*), and thus, one can also safely assert that more physical, *Āyurvedic* notions of disease existed alongside more psychologically-oriented Buddhist ones in the early Buddhist communities.

In one place in the *Mahāvagga*, the Buddha is said to be suffering from “a disturbance in the humours (*doṣas*) of his body.”¹³⁷ Consequently, Ānanda seeks out Jīvaka Komārabhacca, who applies material means of healing such as purges (*virecana*) etc. Furthermore, in the *Sutta Piṭaka*, there also seems to have been a distinction made between Buddhist notions of causality and *Āyurvedic* ones.

Santi bho Gotama eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā evaṃvādino evaṃdiṭṭhino // Yam
kiñcāyam purisapuggalo paṭisaṃvedeti sukhaṃ vā dukkhaṃ vā
adukkhamasukhaṃ vā // sabbantaṃ pubbe katahetūti // idha pana bhavaṃ
Gotamo kim āhāti //

There are some recluses and brahmins, master Gotama, who say thus, who hold this view: Whatsoever pleasure or pain or neutral¹³⁸ state a human being experiences, all that is due to a previous act. Now what says master Gotama about this?

Pittasamuṭṭhānāni pi kho Sīvaka idhekaccāni vedayitāni uppajjanti // sāmam pi
kho etaṃ Sīvaka veditabbam yathā pittasamuṭṭhānāni pi idhekaccāni vedayitāni
uppajjanti // lokassa pi kho etaṃ Sīvaka¹³⁹ saccasammatam yathā
pittasamuṭṭhānāni pi idhekaccāni vedayitāni uppajjanti //

Now, Sīvaka, in this connection there are some sufferings originating from bile. You ought to by know by experience, Sīvaka, that this is so. And this fact, that sufferings originate from bile, is generally acknowledged, Sīvaka, by the world as true....

Semhasamuṭṭhānāni pi kho Sīvaka //
Vātasamuṭṭhānāni pi kho Sīvaka //
Sannipātikāni pi kho Sīvaka //
Utupariṇāmajāni pi kho Sīvaka //
Visamparihārajāni pi kho Sīvaka // ¹⁴⁰ (SN, iv.230)

Also, Sīvaka, in this connexion, (there are some sufferings) originating from phlegm, from wind, from the union of bodily humours, from changes of the seasons, from stress of untoward happenings....¹⁴¹

In addition to the admission of the humours, such as bile, phlegm and wind, as causal factors of suffering, the Buddha also admits to “changes of the seasons”, “stress of untoward happenings” etc. as possible causes. This confirms our assertion that, in the Pali Canon, disease was not always thought of as psychologically-caused. Thus, upon considering the above passage from the *Samyutta Nikāya* and the evidence presented from the *Vinaya Piṭaka*, can we then conclude that Buddhism saw itself as primarily addressing mental illness, and that another form of medicine, perhaps similar to that outlined in the *Caraka Saṃhitā*, was practiced alongside Buddhist meditation when a physically-caused illness arose? This seems to be the implication of certain portions of the Canon, although, as has been pointed out in the previous section, other portions contradict this stance.

We will conclude this section with another passage from the *Samyutta Nikāya*, which states clearly that Buddhist practice primarily heals mental suffering and not physical suffering.

Tatra bhikkhave ko viseso ko adhippāyoso kim nānākaraṇaṃ sutavato ariyasāvakaassa assutavatā puthujjanenāti / /

Now herein, brethren, what is the distinction between, what is the specific feature, what is the difference between the well-taught *Ariyan* disciple (*ariyasāvaka*) and the untaught manyfolk (*puthujjana*)....

assutavā bhikkhave puthujjano dukkhāya vedanāya putṭho samāno socati kilamati paridevati urratālikandati sammoham āpajjati / / so dve vedanā vediyati kāyikaṇ ca cetasikaṇ ca / /

The untaught manyfolk, brethren, being touched by feeling that is painful, weeps and wails, cries aloud, knocks the breast, falls into utter bewilderment. For he feels a twofold feeling, bodily and mental...

tassāyeva kho pana dukkhāya vedanāya puṭṭho sāmāno paṭighavā hoti / /

Touched by that painful feeling he feels repugnance for it...

sutavā ca kho bhikkhave ariyasāvako dukkhāya vedanāya puṭṭho sāmāno na socati na kilamati na paridevati na urattālikandati na sammoham āpajjati / / so ekaṃ vedanaṃ vediyati kāyikaṃ / / na cetasikaṃ / /

But, brethren, the well-taught *Ariyan* disciple, when touched by painful feeling, weeps not, wails not, cries not aloud, knocks not the breast, falls not into utter bewilderment. He feels but one feeling, the bodily, not the mental.

tassā yeva kho pana dukkhāya vedanāya paṭighavā na hoti / / ¹⁴² (SN, iv.208-209)

Moreover, he has no repugnance for painful feeling.¹⁴³

The difference between the untaught person and the Buddhist (the *Ariyan* disciple) in the above passage is that the Buddhist only feels bodily painful feeling (*vedanā*) and not mentally painful feeling (*vedanā*), whereas the untaught or untrained person feels both mental and physical pain. Later in the passage, a reason for the lack of mental pain within the Buddhist disciple is given. It is because the Buddhist disciple does not have any aversion (*paṭighavā*) to physical pain. Furthermore, as the passage below states, neither is the Buddhist disciple impulsed towards pleasant feeling, nor ignorant of neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling. These three characteristics, the lack of aversion (*paṭigha*), impulsion (*rāga*) and ignorance (*avijjā*), towards feelings (*vedanā*) allow the Buddhist monk to remain free of mental pain.

Buddhist Practice Heals Mental Maladies within Certain Limits

There is a third possible position within the Canonical literature concerning Buddhist practice's ability to heal illness or suffering: that is, Buddhist practice can heal the *kilesas*, *āsavas* etc. in all of their manifestations, but, mental illnesses, such as insanity (*ummattaka*) and epilepsy (*apamāra*), fall outside of its ability to heal. (Please see chapter four for a detailed explanation of the *kilesas*).

Since it is rather difficult to match modern terms such as “epilepsy” and “insanity” with ancient conceptions of *ummattaka* and *apamāra* respectively, I would like to make two qualifications here concerning the definition of mental disease and modern conceptions of epilepsy and insanity. First of all, in our definitions from chapter two, mental disease was classified as that type of disease which originates in the mind or psyche, and it was contrasted to physical disease, which was explicated as originating in physiological processes. Now, in regards to epilepsy, modern medicine has pinpointed its cause as physical, being the result of certain abnormalities either of the cerebral cortex or below the cortex.¹⁴⁴ However, in certain types of epilepsy, an epileptic attack can be preceded by emotionally traumatic experiences, thus leading certain researchers to postulate a subjective, immaterial factor as well.¹⁴⁵ Thus, in the sense that epilepsy has a physical cause, it does not fall within the rubric of our definition of psychic disease; however, because epileptic seizures are sometimes preceded by emotionally stressful situations, epilepsy could also be seen as a psychic

disease. In any case, epilepsy will be examined here with the above qualification concerning its definition as a mental disease.

In regards to the examination of insanity in this section, the reader should be aware that such a category is not generally in use in modern psychological circles. Insanity's closest modern approximation would be "psychosis".¹⁴⁶ The debate over the definition of insanity is, in fact, more predominant in the field of law, the idea being that "the insane, being irrational, are not always fully responsible for what they do."¹⁴⁷

In ancient India, of the traditions we have come across so far, the aesthetic, the Buddhist and the *Āyurvedic*, the *Āyurvedic* tradition offers the most detailed exposition of insanity (*ummattaka* in Pali, *unmāda* in Sanskrit) and epilepsy (*apamāra* in Pali, *apasmāra*, Sanskrit). In the *Caraka Saṃhitā*, an entire chapter each is devoted to the treatment and diagnosis of epilepsy and insanity.¹⁴⁸ Interestingly enough, in the *Caraka*, both diseases are seen as partially mentally caused, i.e. by the exaggerated presence of *rajas* and *tamas*, and partially physically caused, i.e. by the aggravation of the *doṣas*.¹⁴⁹

Within the rubric of Buddhism, the most telling references to epilepsy and insanity appear in the *Vinaya Piṭaka*. In the refrain-like passages at the end of many *Vinaya* rules, it is clearly stated that something is not an offense (*anāpatti*) if the person is insane or mad (*ummattaka*). This refrain even occurs after explications of actions that would clearly be prohibited otherwise, such as passages concerning the offense of lying with a woman, intentional emission of

semen, prevaricating speech, critical speech, destruction of vegetable growth etc.¹⁵⁰

Epilepsy (*apamāra*) is also mentioned in the *Vinaya Piṭaka*. People with epilepsy were, for the most part,¹⁵¹ not admitted into the Buddhist order. The Buddha supposedly called epilepsy a stumbling block (*antarāyika*) for Buddhist practice, and gave monks permission to question potential candidates for entry as to whether or not they had epilepsy.¹⁵²

What the stipulation concerning insanity may be implying is that there was a certain level of mental affliction which was considered outside the realm of moral responsibility and thus Buddhist law. Does this also imply that there is a certain level of mental illness that cannot be treated by Buddhist practices? Is this why those who were mad fell outside of the jurisdiction of Buddhist law? Can the same be said for epilepsy: was epilepsy considered to be a mental condition that was too severe for treatment with Buddhist practice? And finally, can we also conclude that the Buddhist community did not have compassion for epileptics etc. just because they were not admitted to the the Buddhist community (*saṅgha*)?

The answer to the last question is certainly “no, as, in the *Mahāvagga*, Buddhist monks were said to have cared for people afflicted with epilepsy;¹⁵³ however, the answer to the first three questions is elusive at best. To this author’s knowledge, there are not enough passages in the Canon which directly address the question of insanity and other mental illnesses. Also, as was alluded to

previously, it may be difficult or even impossible to match terms like *ummattaka* (*unmāda*) and *apamāra* (*apasmāra*) to modern notions of “insanity” and “epilepsy”. And, if we attempt to take the early *Āyurvedic* understanding of insanity and epilepsy and assert a similar understanding in Buddhism merely based upon the fact that other *Āyurvedic* concepts (such as the *doṣas* etc.) existed in the Canon, this would be not be an entirely justifiable either. For, even though the humour theory is clearly something the Pali Canon and the *Caraka Saṃhitā* had in common, there are many other *Āyurvedic* theories that the Canon does not even mention or would be strictly against. (Amongst these, for example, would be ideas such as a permanent soul).

Concluding Remarks

In conclusion, it is not necessary here for us to resolve all of the possible conflicts within the Pali Canon. We have already accomplished what we set-out to establish, namely, that early Buddhism did at least possess the idea that it addressed psychic suffering, and also, that it possessed the idea that the mind could serve as an originating point for disease. Thus, up to this point, there seems to be some province for the psychological study of Buddhism. Now, we must procede to the final question of this chapter which concerns Buddhist theories of mentality. This final question corresponds to question number four (out of five), outlined at the beginning of this chapter: namely, what were early *Theravādin* Buddhism’s speculations on the nature of the mind or psyche?

Buddhist Theorizing on the Psyche or Mind

Introductory Remarks concerning Buddhism's Definition of the Psyche

We have to now respond to the question posed at the beginning of this chapter concerning early Buddhist theorizing on the nature of mentality. Here, we must establish that Buddhism even had such a notion as a psyche as an entity with a separate originating power. Also, to make our definitions in chapter two viable, we have to establish Buddhism's understanding of the psyche or mind as being wholly immaterial.

By "immateriality", we are referring to the concept of *arūpa/arūpin* in Pali, and by "materiality", we are referring to *rūpa/rūpin*. These terms can also have a number of other meanings. For example, according to Y. Karunadasa, in his study, *The Buddhist Analysis of Matter*, *rūpa* can have two principal meanings in the Pali Canon: *rūpa* in the sense of matter or the material (versus the immaterial), and *rūpa* in the sense of what is visible. Two more infrequently seen meanings are *rūpa* in the sense of *rūpadhātu* (*rūpaloka* or *rupāvacara*) and *rūpa* in the sense of *rūpajjhāna* or the four absorptions (*jhāna*).¹⁵⁴ Similarly, *arūpa* can have a number of meanings, such as *arūpa* in the sense of the immaterial, *arūpadhātu* etc. However, here, we will only be focussing on the passages in which *rūpa/arūpa* (*rūpin/arūpin*)¹⁵⁵ connote materiality and immateriality.¹⁵⁶

Early Buddhist Theorizing on Mind or Psyche

One of the pivotal points for the definitions we have explicated in chapter two was the existence of the immaterial. The idea of the immaterial figured

centrally not only in the definition given for mind, but also in the definitions for feeling, emotion and affect. Thus, it is important here to establish the presence of this notion in Buddhism; otherwise, the notions of the terms in chapter two will not even be applicable to the Buddhist world view.

The distinction between materiality and immateriality in *Theravāda* Buddhism can be seen even in the Pali Canonical literature. As early as the *Sutta Piṭaka*, there is a distinction made between bodily and mental. Most of the examples of this distinction come from the *Suttas* which explicate dependent origination (*paṭicca samuppāda*). The idea of dependent origination (*paṭicca samuppāda*) refers to the 12-fold chain of causation, which is used as the standard explanation within the Pali Canon for a human being's tendency to remain ensconced within the cycle of rebirth (*saṃsāra*). The fourth link within *paṭicca samuppāda* is *nāma* (mind) and *rūpa* (body). *Nāma-rūpa*, which usually appears as a compound word, is said to be caused by consciousness (*viññāna*), which is in turn caused by *karmic* formations (*saṅkhāra*).

One of the earliest passages to outline the distinction between *nāma-rūpa* comes from the *Sammādiṭṭhi Sutta* in the *Majjhima Nikāya*. This passage is more significant than many others in the *Sutta Piṭaka* in regards to *nāma-rūpa* because it identifies some particular mental factors which define *nāma*.

Katamaṃ pan' āvuso nāmarūpaṃ....Vedanā saññā cetanā phasso manasikāro, idaṃ vuccat' āvuso nāmaṃ; cattāri ca mahābhūtāni catunnañ – ca mahābhūtānaṃ upādāya rūpaṃ, idaṃ vuccat' āvuso rūpaṃ; iti idaṃ ca nāmaṃ idaṃ ca rūpaṃ idaṃ vuccat' āvuso nāmarūpaṃ. (MN, i.53).¹⁵⁷

And what is mentality-materiality (*nāma-rūpa*)... Feeling, perception, volition, contact and attention - these are called mentality. The four great elements and the material form derived from the four great elements - these are called materiality. So this mentality and this materiality are what is called mentality-materiality.¹⁵⁸

The first two factors mentioned in this explanation, feeling (*vedanā*) and perception (*saññā*), are part of the five-fold schema of human personality in Buddhism called the five aggregates (*pañcakkhandhā*). This five-fold personality schema is present within the earliest stratum of *Theravāda* literature side-by-side with the *nāma-rūpa* explanation. The other three concepts mentioned are factors outside of the five aggregate schema.

Along similar lines, in the *Dīgha Nikāya's Mahānidāna Sutta*, a mental body, *nāma-kāya* and *rūpa-kāya*, physical body, are mentioned.¹⁵⁹ Here, the word *kāya* seems to signify a grouping of phenomena and not the actual physical body. Its usage here in Pali is much like the English usage of "body" in expressions such as a "body of water" or a "body of research".

If we consider the usage of the word *nāma-rūpa* in the *Mahānidāna Sutta* along with its usage in other passages from the *Sutta Piṭaka*, it seems fair to conclude that two separate categories were seen as composing human nature. However, it is still unclear exactly how the idea of *nāma-rūpa* relates to the doctrine of the five aggregates (*pañcakkhandhā*). One difference between the *nāma-rūpa* doctrine and the five aggregate theory is that, in the 12-fold schema of causation, two aggregates, *saṅkhāra* and *viññāna* are separated out from *nāma-*

rūpa, the 4th link in the chain, whereas in the five aggregate theory *saṅkhāra* and *viññāna* are an integral part of personhood, grouped with *rūpa*, *vedanā* and *saññā*.

In addition, to the lack of clarity regarding the interaction between the five aggregate and the concept of *nāma-rūpa*, it is still unclear how the early *Theravāda* Buddhism of the *Sutta Piṭaka* related the concepts of immateriality and materiality to mind and body. For a more precise explanation of this, we need to turn to the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka*.

In the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* in general and particularly in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, the aggregates are analyzed in terms of their relationship to mentality or mind (*nāma*) and physical body or materiality (*rūpa*). In the second passage below, from the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, mentality (*nāma*) is defined as the four *khandhas*, meaning *vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṅkhāra* and *viññāna*, and the uncompounded element (*asaṅkhata dhamma*), meaning *nibbāna*. In the first passage below, again from the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, the four *khandhas* and *nibbāna* are identified with the immaterial (*arūpin*) and the concept of materiality (*rūpin*) is defined in contrast to immateriality (*arūpin*). Materiality (*rūpin*) is defined as equivalent to the first aggregate, commonly known as *rūpa*.

katame dhammā rūpino? cattāro ca mahābhūtā catunnaṃ ca mahābhūtānaṃ upādāya rūpaṃ - ime dhammā rūpino. katame dhammā arūpino? vedanā kkhandho..viññānakkhandho, asaṅkhata dhātu - ime dhammā arūpino.¹⁶⁰ (DhS, 245)

What are the material dhammas? The four great elements and the materiality (*rūpa*) which is derived from them - these are the material dhammas. What are the immaterial dhammas? *Vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṅkhāra* and *viññānakkhandhas*, and the uncompounded element - these are the immaterial dhammas.¹⁶¹

tattha katamaṃ nāmaṃ? vedanākkhandho, saññākkhandho, saṅkhārakkhandho, viññānakhandho asaṅkhatā ca dhātu....

tattha katamaṃ rūpaṃ? cattāro ca mahābhūtā, catunnaṃ ca mahābhūtānaṃ upādāya rūpaṃ....¹⁶² (DhS, 284-285)

What is name? The four *khandhas* and the uncompounded element.
What is form? The four great phenomena and the form which is derived from them.¹⁶³

Since the four *khandhas* (i.e. *vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṅkhāra* and *viññāna*) are explicitly identified both with immateriality (*arūpin*) and mentality (*nāma*), we can safely conclude the following: mentality or mind (*nāma*) is also immaterial, being identified with the four immaterial aggregates.

In the *Visuddhimagga*, Buddhaghosa confirms this view of *nāma* and *rūpa* and makes it clear that there is nothing above and beyond these two components of personhood. This rules out the possibility that immateriality (*arūpin*) could actually be a different category from mentality (*nāma*) as well as the possibility that immateriality is a category which could include mentality but also be greater than it in breadth.

So evaṃ phassādīnaṃ vasena upaṭṭhite cattāro arūpino khandhe *nāman* ti, - tesam ārammaṇabhūtāni cattāri mahābhūtāni catunnaṃ ca mahābhūtāni upādāya rūpaṃ *rūpan* ti vavatthapeti....*nāmaṃ* ca *rūpaṃ* ca ti dvedhā vavatthapeti, *nāmarūpamattato uddham* añño satto vā puggalo vā devo vā Brahmā vā n'atthi ti niṭṭham gacchati.¹⁶⁴ (Vis, 593)

He defines the four immaterial aggregates that have thus become evident through contact, etc., as 'mentality'. And he defines their objects, namely, the

four primaries, and the materiality derived from the four primaries as 'materiality' ... and he concludes that over and above mere mentality-materiality there is nothing else that is a being or a person or a diety or a Brahma.¹⁶⁵

In the above quote, Buddhaghosa is using the pronoun "he" to refer to any *bhikkhu*. In his above explanation, Buddhaghosa follows the ideas in the passages already quoted from the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, as he also identifies the four aggregates of feeling (*vedanā*), perception (*saññā*), karmic activities (*saṅkhāra*) and consciousness (*viññāna*) with mentality (*nāma*).¹⁶⁶ In the passage below, again from the *Visuddhimagga*, Buddhaghosa expands upon the theoretical base outlined in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* by giving a detailed illustration of the interdependent relationship between mentality and materiality.

Yathā hi dvīsu naḷakalāpīsu aññamaññaṃ nissāya ṭhapitāsu ekā ekissā upatthambho hoti, ekissā patamānāya itarā pi patati, evaṃ eva pañca vokāra-bhave nāmarūpaṃ aññamaññaṃ nissāya pavattati... Yathā ca daṇḍabhihataṃ bheriṃ nissāya sadde pavattamāne aññā bherī añño saddo, bherisaddā asamissā, bherisadena suññā, saddo bheriyā suñño, evaṃ eva vatthudvārārammaṇa-sankhātaṃ rūpaṃ nissāya nāme pavattamāne aññaṃ rūpaṃ, aññaṃ nāmaṃ; nāmarūpā asamissā, nāma rūpena suññaṃ; rūpaṃ nāmena suññaṃ...

...For just as when two sheaves of reeds are propped one against the other, each one gives the other consolidating support, and when one falls the other falls, so too, in the five-constituent becoming mentality-materiality occurs as an interdependent state.....And just as when sound occurs having as its support a drum that is beaten by the stick, then the drum is one and the sound another, the drum and the sound are not mixed up together, the drum is void of the sound and the sound is void of the drum, so too, when mentality occurs having as its support the materiality called the physical basis, the door and the object, then the materiality is one and the mentality another, the mentality and materiality are not mixed up together, the mentality is void of the materiality and the materiality is void of the mentality.

Api c'ettha nāmaṃ nittejaṃ na sakena tejena pavattesu sakkoti, na khādati, na pivati...Rūpaṃ pi nittejaṃ, na sakena tejena pavattitum sakkoti, na hi tassa khāditukāmatā, nā pi pivitukāmatā... atha kho nāmaṃ nissāya rūpaṃ pavattati, rūpaṃ nissāya nāmaṃ pavattati....¹⁶⁷ (Vis, 595-596)

Furthermore, mentality has no efficient power (*teja*), it cannot occur by its own efficient power. For it does not eat....And materiality is without efficient power; it cannot occur by its own efficient power. For it has no desire to eat, drink... But rather it is when supported by materiality that mentality occurs and when supported by mentality that materiality occurs.¹⁶⁸

Within Buddhaghosa's illustration of the drum and the interdependence of mentality and materiality, another interesting feature of his understanding emerges: although mentality and materiality are interdependent, they are also considered to be distinguishable types of processes. As Buddhaghosa says, the drum (i.e. materiality) is void (*suññam*) of the sound (i.e. mentality), and the sound is void (*suññam*) of the drum: thus mentality and materiality are not "mixed-up" together but separate domains. However, there is not a strict dualism being postulated here, as mind and materiality are separate in nature but always interdependent. In this regard, Buddhaghosa tells us that neither of them have any "efficient power" (*nitteja*) without the other.

The fact that mentality and materiality are seen as distinguishable processes within personhood lends more credence to the assertion that Buddhist psychology could possibly posit some illnesses as solely mental in origin. For, if mental and bodily processes were so intermingled as to be inextricable from one another, then there would be no province for asserting that some maladies originate uniquely in the mind.

Here, the early *Theravādin* view of mind seems to be somewhere in between the Interactionist and Identity theories of mind and physiological processes in Western psychology. Because Buddhaghosa posits a complete interdependence, he does not maintain the dualism apparent in many Interactionist theories, such as, for example, Karl Popper's and John Eccles' etc.¹⁶⁹ And, because Buddhaghosa (and the *Dhammasaṅgāṇī*) posits mind (*nāma*) as a distinguishable entity or a discrete set of processes from bodily or material processes (*rūpa*), he goes against the modern Identity theory, which states that there is not any distinction between an entity called "mind" and physiological processes. (Please refer back to our definition of "mind" in chapter two)

Concluding Remarks regarding Nāma, Rūpa and Arūpa

In conclusion, from the above passages, it seems clear that internal human phenomena were classified into two separate categories: mentality (*nāma*), which was associated with the immaterial (*arūpa*), and physicality, which was associated with the material (*rūpa*). The beginnings of this theory go back to the *Sutta Piṭaka* and its clearest articulation comes in the writings of Buddhaghosa. Since we do not have the commentaries which bridged the gap between the time of Buddhaghosa and the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka*, it is difficult to say when such an articulation of mentality and materiality became popular. Thus, it is difficult to know if the explication of Buddhaghosa was at the time of our writer,

Aśvaghoṣa, but it is almost certain that the ideas in the *Dhammasaṅgani* were at least in circulation at the time of Aśvaghoṣa.

In any case, what is most important for this section of the thesis is to offer a measuring stick for Aśvaghoṣa's understanding of Buddhism through the examination of early *Theravāda* viewpoints. As was previously mentioned, the goal is not to assert influence or connections between the Pali Canon, the *Theravāda* sect etc. and Aśvaghoṣa.

A Note on Vocabulary associated with Mind

Many texts within the Buddhist tradition equate *citta*, or, mind, with *viññāna* and *manas*. This thesis will follow those Buddhist texts which make this equivalence for two reasons. First of all, Aśvaghoṣa seems to equate the various mentally-based vocabulary words without qualifying any distinctive nuances. Secondly, many of the texts which make this equivalence are central texts within the Buddhist tradition as a whole. In this list, are included the *Samyutta Nikāya*, the *Visuddhimagga* and the *Atthasālinī* of Buddhaghosa, the *Viṃśatikā* of Vasubandhu etc. In addition, the *Atthasālinī* makes *hadaya* (*hṛdaya*) an equivalent of *citta*, while the *Viṃśatikā* states that *vijñapti* is synonymous to *manas*, *viññāna* and *citta*.¹⁷⁰

Herbert Guenther and Jan Ergardt advocate another line of this thinking in regard to the issue of mind in Buddhism. Ergardt, in his book *Man and His Destiny, the Release of the Human Mind*, analyzes the word *citta* from the time

period of the *Majjhima Nikāya* to *Milindapañha*. In his study, he concludes that *citta* is a concept which represents the idea of a permanent base for mental liberation, and, in this sense, it is not lacking a permanent self. In contrast, he says, terms such as *manas* and *viññāna* are said to be not self (*anattā*), and therefore, cannot represent a permanent basis for enlightenment.¹⁷¹

H. Guenther seems to imply something similar, although he does not venture as far as Ergardt in establishing *citta* as a permanent base of enlightenment. Also, Guenther translates *citta* as “attitude” and not “mind”.¹⁷² Rhys Davids also grapples with cognitive vocabulary in detail. In regards to her work, what is most interesting is that she translates the word *citta* as “psyche”, and attempts to make a brief comparison to Aristotle’s notion of this term. In her, *Buddhist Psychology: An Inquiry into the Analysis and Theory of Mind in Pali Literature*, Davids also analyzes, in detail, other cognitive notions such as *manas*, *viññāna*, *nāma* etc. In this work, she attempts to make a differentiation between these terms, while at the same time acknowledging that certain scriptural passages from the tradition make *citta*, *viññāna* and *manas* synonymous.¹⁷³

Another mental vocabulary word of import is *cetasika*. In the Pali Canon and its commentaries, *cetasika* usually refers to anything related to the mind, but, within the theory of the five aggregates, it refers specifically to *vedanā*, *saññā* and *sankhāra*. In the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, this group of the three aggregates, which form the group of mental accompaniments, are sometimes referred to by the word *kāya*.¹⁷⁴ The word *cetasika* does not figure prominently in the *Saundarananda*, but

the idea of *kāya* does appear in one important verse. (Please see chapter five for further elaboration upon this particular verse).

In addition, this thesis has not delved into vocabulary words in early Buddhism such as *bhavanga*, *bhavangasota*, *viññānasota*, *bhavasota* etc. These words have been under investigation by scholars as possible Buddhist equivalents of the Freudian notion of the unconscious.¹⁷⁵ Yet, because Aśvaghoṣa does not even touch upon these concepts in the *Saundarananda*, they are not analyzed in this study.

A Brief Note on Volition in Canonical Passages

Volition and its related concepts such as desire etc. are not seen as wholly negative in the Pali Canon and its commentaries. In the *Dīgha Nikāya*'s *Mahānidāna Sutta*, desire (*taṇhā*) is said to be the cause for all seeking (*pariyesanā*). Ordinarily, in Buddhism, the concept of *taṇhā* is associated with seeking or lusting after sense objects in a negative way; however, the idea of seeking can also be associated with the search for the truth in Buddhism. As Robert Morrison tells us is in his *Three Cheers for Taṇhā*,¹⁷⁶ the *Ariyapariyesanā Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* outlines a noble type of search and an ignoble one. The noble search (*ariya pariyesanā*) is equated to the search for liberation or *nibbāna*. Along similar lines, in the *Visuddhimagga*, Buddhaghosa describes the desire for liberation as positive.¹⁷⁷

Thus, one trend within the ancient Buddhist scriptures is to see a desire for certain things as positive and others as negative: ancient Buddhism is not entirely anti-desire, and consequently, not entirely anti-volition. This might also imply that, in addition to certain objects of desire being acceptable and others being unacceptable, the actual subjectively felt quality of motivation itself may be different for a Buddhist sage versus an ordinary person. Yet, to my knowledge, this latter point has not expanded upon in the early *Theravādin* scriptures.

Concluding Remarks for Chapter 3

In summary, in this chapter, four out of the five questions listed at the beginning of the chapter have been addressed. The final, fifth question, will be addressed in the ensuing chapter. In response to the first question of this chapter, *Āyurvedic* medicine was posited as the ancient physiologically-based practice which was in a state of interaction with early Buddhism's primarily psychologically-based practices. However, it was also evident that categories such as "physiological" and "psychological", when translated directly without qualification from modern Western models, were not entirely applicable to early *Āyurvedic* and Buddhist ideas and practices. Nevertheless, with some qualifications, we have ended up by categorizing Buddhism as a practice which primarily targets psychological illness and the *Āyurveda* as a practice which primarily targets the physical.

In order to reach this conclusion, we had to establish that certain points of view were at least present in early Buddhism. This was especially important considering the fact that we were attempting to fit Buddhism into the psychologically-oriented definitions outlined in chapter two. Thus, in this chapter, we attempted to establish that the following points of view were in existence within the Pali Canon and its commentaries: that Buddhism saw the mind or psyche as an originating point for disease; that Buddhism possessed theories concerning the nature of mind; and, that Buddhism saw itself as at least, in part, addressing psychological ills, or, ills that have their origin in the mind.

All of these ideas were clearly established as existing in early Buddhism, although there were some points on which there was a disagreement, such as in the case of whether or not Buddhist practice addresses physical illness as well as mental. Yet, as was stated previously, our goal here was not prove that a psychological approach was the only viewpoint or even the dominant view in early Pali Buddhism, but rather, it was to establish the existence of this approach as one possible interpretation of Canonical passages.

Now, we are ready to pass onto the next chapter, chapter four. In this chapter, I will focus my analysis upon two of the principal emotively-related concepts in early Buddhism (*vedanā* and *kilesa*) in order to determine how closely they match up with the definitions of “feeling”, “emotion” etc. which were presented in chapter two. Most of the work in the ensuing chapter will also be based on the Pali Canon and its commentaries, and, in addition, this chapter will

include a literary review of modern research on the Buddhist understanding of emotion.

Chapter 4: A Review of Emotive Vocabulary from the Pali Canon and its Commentaries

Introductory Remarks

In this chapter, I seek to answer the fifth question which was originally posed in the beginning of the preceding chapter: namely, did ancient Pali Buddhism have an understanding of emotion as a discrete but interdependent mental process alongside cognitive and volitional processes? In other words, can we pinpoint one word in early Pali Buddhism, like “emotion” or “affect”, which tends to encompass the totality of emotive processes as a category? If so, would such a word bring us close to the definitions for “emotion” etc. outlined at the end of chapter two?

The search for a discrete concept to define emotive processes is not merely a theoretical one. It has practical applications for Buddhist practice and the possible limits of its application. What this could mean is that cognitive types of practices, such as pondering the correct viewpoints of reality or even conjuring up the image of the Buddha, might produce a certain degree of opening-up, but they may still not be able to entirely cure an illness which is primarily emotively generated, such as mania or melancholia. For emotively-driven illnesses, it could be that such a person would be better off practicing an emotionally-centered Buddhist practice, such as loving-kindness (*mettā*) meditation. (Or, it could be that, depending on the severity of their emotive illness, they may need to consult with a psychologist or a psychiatrist in addition to practicing Buddhism).

In Daniel Goleman's *Healing Emotions: Conversations with the Dalai Lama on Mindfulness, Emotions and Health*, the Dalai Lama is notably concerned with the distinction "between emotions and other cognitive activity"¹⁷⁸ in his dialogue with Western cognitive scientists. In this interview, he does not elaborate upon his own personal reasons for this, but, nevertheless, his interest does imply a possible significance for this distinction within the context of Buddhist practice.

Modern Literary Review of Translations for Emotion into Buddhist Vocabulary

Introductory Remarks

The following section comprises the central portion of my literary review material for the work of modern authors writing on the phenomenon of emotion in Buddhism. In addition, this chapter will continue the brief literary review of the ancient Pali sources, which was begun in the previous chapter.

The brief review of Canonical material here should not be considered, in any way, as an exhaustive study. Its purpose is much the same as the previous review of Western psychological material on emotion: to provide a stepping-stone to our upcoming translations of passages from the *Saundarananda*.

For the following modern literary review section, I will tend to use the full names of each author when he or she is first mentioned but not afterwards. In other places, the full name may also be mentioned for purposes of style. The date(s) next to the first mention of each person's name signifies the date of the primary work(s) from which I am drawing my generalizations. If the author has

more than two primary works on Buddhist psychology, only the dates from two principal works are listed. In addition, all concepts will be written in the Pali language in this chapter, except for the cases in which the author reviewed or the text quoted uses the Sanskrit equivalent.

Modern translations of emotive vocabulary, such as “emotion”, “affect” and “feeling”, center around two concepts in Buddhism: *vedanā* and *kilesa*. Therefore, this modern literary review portion of my thesis has been divided into two sections, using these two words as category headings. I have focussed on *vedanā* and *kilesa* in particular because they are the two concepts which come the closest to representing the categorical aspect of the words “emotion” and “affect” etc. There are certainly other words, such as *pīti*, *mettā*, *karuṇā* etc., which clearly indicate individual emotions; however, because our study attempts to focus on concepts in Buddhism that delineate or indicate emotive processes as a whole, these types of words have not been treated here. In addition, there are many more terms that could be investigated, such as *anusaya*, *āśava* etc., but, since the central focus of this thesis is the *Saundarananda* of Aśvaghōṣa and not the Pali Canonical material, a short sampling of Pali vocabulary was deemed more appropriate.

Modern Reflections on Vedana: Principal Literary Review Section

The concept of *vedanā* has been variously interpreted as “feeling”, “emotion” and even “sensation” by modern scholars. Caroline Rhys Davids

(1900, 1914)¹⁷⁹ was one of the pioneers in the field of Buddhist psychology.

Davids describes Buddhism as attempting to escape suffering and pursue happiness and thus labels Buddhism a hedonistic philosophy.¹⁸⁰ Hence, she translates the three-fold aspect of *vedanā* in the Canonical literature as painful, pleasurable and neutral, and, in accordance with her basic understanding of Buddhist practice, also refers to these three aspects as hedonistic.

Vedanā is a term of very general import, meaning sentience or reaction, bodily or mental, on contact or impression. Sensation is scarcely so loyal a rendering as feeling, for though *vedanā* is often qualified as 'born of the contact' in sense-activity, it is always defined generally as consisting of three species - pleasure (happiness), pain (ill) , and neutral feeling - a *hedonistic* aspect to which the term 'feeling' is alone adequate.¹⁸¹

In addition, Davids is against the translation of *vedanā* as "sensation", as she states that *vedanā* implies a subjective experience¹⁸² rather than an objectively verifiable physiological phenomenon such as the word "sensation" refers to. This is why she prefers to explicate *vedanā* as referring to the hedonic tone aspect of feeling: for, ideas of pleasure and pain involve some interpretation, if only at an unconscious level, and thus can be labelled as subjective.

It is worth of note that, later on in the history of Buddhist Studies, Padmasiri de Silva (1973, 1979), Amal Barua (1990) and Lama Anagarika Govinda (1976) also used this same idea of hedonic tone in their writings.¹⁸³ Govinda differs slightly from the other two authors, in that he explicates *vedanā* as representing the hedonic aspect of feeling and emotion, whereas the other two

authors only mention the idea of hedonic tone in regard to feeling.¹⁸⁴ However, in this expansion upon David's definition of *vedanā* as feeling, Govinda does not define exactly what he means by the term emotion.

Davids defines "emotion" as "a complex psychical phenomenon, implying a central psycho-physical origin and a widely diffused somatic resonance".¹⁸⁵ She gives the example of the word *pīti* or joy as a word which represents an emotion, and differentiates *pīti* from notions such as happiness or *sukha* which represent only the hedonic aspect of a feeling. Considering her definition of "emotion" given above, perhaps, Davids is implying that joy also has a somatic aspect, while happiness does not.

In accordance with Davids, de Silva states that the word *vedanā* is better translated as "feeling", yet, instead of comparing and contrasting the concepts of sensation and feeling in his search for a possible translation of *vedanā*, as Davids does, de Silva compares the notions of emotion and feeling in relation to the Buddhist concept of *vedanā*. Here, his base definition of "feeling" is slightly different than the definition which I have outlined in chapter two. "Feeling", for de Silva, represents "affective reactions to sensations" whereas he describes emotions as "basic affective processes."¹⁸⁶ He does not outline a separate definition for "affect", but instead, makes it synonymous to the concept of emotion.

In the English language, the word emotion, as accepted by most psychologists, is the term used to describe basic affective processes, feelings being generally

restricted to pleasantness and unpleasantness. In line with a recent psychological analysis, feelings may be considered as 'affective reactions to sensations'; it is also said that in feeling the reference is to the reaction on the subject, whereas in emotion, there are diverse types of relation to an object.

Emotion or an affect can be considered as a 'felt tendency towards an object' judged suitable, or away from an object judged unsuitable, reinforced by specific bodily changes according to the type of emotion. That emotions involve dispositions to act by way of approach or withdrawal is a quality of emotional phenomena that fits in well with the Buddhist analysis.¹⁸⁷

Thus, for de Silva, feelings can be labelled in two categories, unpleasant and pleasant, and are reactions to physiological sensations. In contrast, emotions are more complex affective reactions which involve a motivation to act in a certain way. In his analysis, the volitional element of emotions is serves to differentiate them from feelings, and feelings are portrayed as basic, visceral reactions to physical sensations.

Another reason for de Silva's reticence in translating *vedanā* as "emotion" is based upon a particular cognitively-based conception of the word "emotion" coming from Western psychological theory. De Silva defines the concept of emotion according to the cognitive understanding of the term, and thus, states that the phenomenon of emotion occurs only after an appraisal has been made of a particular situation or object. Of course, with a particular appraisal, comes a motivation towards what is beneficial and away from what is not beneficial.¹⁸⁸ In summary, for de Silva, an emotional reaction and the subsequent motivation it includes would come after the pleasant or unpleasant bare affective response at the level of *vedanā*.

If we consider the emotive definitions we outlined in chapter two, there are a number of contrasts worth noting between de Silva's thinking and our own. First of all, we have not defined feelings as being necessarily reactions to physiological sensations, but more in a relationship of interdependence with them, both being constituent parts of the occurring phenomenon of the emotional complex as a whole. In this way, we have not deemed physicality to be at first cause in the occurrence of emotions, but rather, in a state of constant interaction with the immaterial, subjective portion of emotivity and with the other portions of the emotive complex such as cognition etc. Along similar lines, we did not define cognitive appraisal as the first cause for a particular emotional reaction; instead, the issue of first cause between emotivity and cognition was considered to be too difficult to ascertain.

Also, in our definitions, feelings were said to be of a greater variety than just pleasant, unpleasant and neutral reactions. We asserted that there are as many nuances to feeling as there are emotional complexes: i.e. there is a specific joyful feeling, a specific nostalgic feeling etc. In addition, what differentiated "emotion" from "feeling" in chapter two was not the motivational element of emotions, although that element in itself is not denied, but rather, the fact that emotional complexes refer to the entire package of emotionality - cognition, conation (volition), sensation and feeling - whereas, feeling is just one part of the emotional complex.

In contrast to de Silva and Davids, Rune E. A. Johansson (1969, 1979)¹⁸⁹ debates between “sensation” and “feeling” for a translation of *vedanā* yet chooses “sensation”. He explicates feeling as a subjective reaction, “subjective” being implicitly defined as either pleasant or unpleasant in nature, while he defines sensation as possessing a category of neutrality. Thus, because Buddhism states that *vedanā* has a neutral (*adukkham-asukha*) category as well, for Johansson, “sensation” seems more appropriate.¹⁹⁰ Also, he states that *vedanā* is more like the sensation upon which subjective feeling is based rather than the subjective feeling itself, although he does also admit that, in certain places in the Canon, *vedanā* does seem to be referring to a subjective reaction.¹⁹¹

Although the translation “feeling” sometimes cannot be avoided when this aspect is obviously stressed, we will prefer “sensation” in this book, partly because the distinction between the information and the subjective reaction actually was made in the Pali scriptures, partly because we have to conform to the English usage.¹⁹²

Johansson also comments upon the presence or absence of emotions in *nibbāna*. He states that *nibbāna* is without emotions¹⁹³ but with “feeling-tone”.¹⁹⁴ Here, he has a specific definition for both feelings and emotion: he describes emotions as “a state of imbalance” and feelings as experiences of “pleasure or discomfort”.¹⁹⁵ Johansson says that emotions, as defined, create attachment, but, in contrast, a “purified citta” is calm, in that it is “unemotional and stable”.¹⁹⁶ However, at the same time, Johansson also asserts that *nibbāna* is described in an

emotional way at times, as being accompanied by “happiness, peace, security, calm, humility and kindness.”¹⁹⁷

In accordance with Johansson, Mathieu Boisvert (1995)¹⁹⁸ also translates *vedanā* as “sensation”, yet with some qualification. He bases this translation on one of the major classifications of *vedanā*, the 6-fold one present in *Majjhima Nikāya’s Chachakka Sutta*.¹⁹⁹ (This idea is also present in the *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, 4.231 etc.). This *Sutta* from the *Majjhima Nikāya* classifies all *vedanā* according to the sense from which they arise.²⁰⁰ Boisvert’s reasoning is that, since *vedanā* arises in 5 out of 6 cases with the contact of a physical organ with a sense object, it is primarily physically-based. This is why he chooses to translate the word *vedanā* with an English word that has physical connotations, such as “sensation”. Yet, Boisvert chooses the word “sensation” with one caveat: he does not mean “sensation” in the sense of an “anoetic sentience, or a bare experience devoid of personal inclinations.”²⁰¹ In this regard, Boisvert says that *vedanā* involves a subjective interpretation of pure sensation, at least, of “sensation” as we have defined in chapter 2 (not as Boisvert has defined it).

David J. Kalupahana (1987)²⁰² first translates *vedanā* as “sensation” or “feeling” but then equates this Buddhist concept to W. James’ view of emotion. Kalupahana’s final translation of “emotion/sensation” comes about in his “Emotions and the Foundations of Moral Life” chapter in his work, *The Principles of Buddhist Psychology*.²⁰³ Kalupahana sees James’ and the Buddhists’ view of emotion as representing the middle point between a strictly materialistic view,

such as we saw with the Behaviorist and the physiological stream of Western psychology in chapter two, and a strictly immaterial one, such as we saw in the subjective stream. Kalupahana's reasoning for his view comes from the 12-fold chain of dependent origination (*paṭicca-samuppāda*). He explicates that, since *vedanā* is dependent upon both mind and body, it can be said to be a mixture of immaterial and material elements. In this way, the Buddhist view of "sensation/emotion" is a middle point between the entirely materialist and immaterialist extremes.

As was mentioned previously, L. A. Govinda picks up on the same line of thinking as Davids, de Silva and Barua when he states that *vedanā* represents the hedonic tone aspect of feeling and emotion. Furthermore, Govinda comes up with a rather complex view of *vedanā*, which states that, in addition to the basic three hedonic tones to feeling, positive, negative and neutral (*adukkham-asukha*), there are also three "locations" of feeling: bodily, mental and spiritual. He also comes up with another additional two-fold ethically-based division: hedonic and ahedonic.²⁰⁴ All spiritual feelings are categorized as ethical and therefore ahedonic. Some bodily and mental feelings are also considered to be ethical and ahedonic, but some are considered to be hedonic and therefore unethical. Here, the word "unethical" should not be taken to connote the antithesis of "ethical", but rather, as indicating the fact that certain mental and bodily reactions do not have an ethical purpose within them. In other words, they are merely reflexive reactions.

Govinda categorizes the term *adukkham-asukha* as a neutral, hedonic, bodily reaction. (This means that it also fits into the category of 'sometimes ethical'). The other two bodily reactions are the positive reaction of bodily pleasure (*kāyika-sukha*) and the negative reaction of bodily pain (*kāyika-dukkha*). In the mental category, Govinda outlines five basic reactions, as opposed to three under the rubric of the physical. There are mental pleasure (*cetasika-sukham*), mental joy (*somanassa*), mental pain (*cetasika-dukkha*), mental grief (*domanassa*) and mental indifference (*upekkha*). In the spiritual realm, there are three basic feelings: spiritual happiness (*sukha*), spiritual suffering (*dukkha*) and spiritual equanimity (*tatra-majjhataṭṭā*).²⁰⁵

A few reactions to Govinda's schema might be helpful here. One important point that he touches upon here is the interpretation of *adukkham-asukha* and *upekkha* within the context of explications upon *vedanā*. Govinda's observations concerning these two terms are not entirely in accordance with certain passages from the Pali Canon. For example, in *Samyutta Nikāya* v.209, *upekkhindriya* is explicitly explicated as being both physical and mental, not just mental.²⁰⁶ Also, in the *Majjhima Nikāya*'s *Cūḷavedalla Sutta*, *adukkham-asukha* is explicated as both mental and physical.²⁰⁷ Hence, Govinda's categorization of *upekkhindriya* as purely mental and *adukkham-asukha-vedanā* as purely bodily is not entirely correct if we consider Canonical references.²⁰⁸

Bhikkhu Buddhādāsa (1989)²⁰⁹ focuses upon the three-fold explication of *vedanā*, i.e. *vedanā* as neither-painful-nor-pleasant (*adukkham-asukha*), painful

(*duḥkha*) and pleasant (*sukha*), with reference to both the body and the mind. In this focus, he is in accord with many modern interpreters. Yet, unlike some other interpreters, Buddhādāsa stresses the practical application of the teachings on *vedanā*. He explicates *vedanā* as a principal source of suffering and says that “the most deep-rooted cause of all strife is really subservience to feeling.” He stresses feeling as a particularly important object of meditation,²¹⁰ saying that many *arahants* have reached enlightenment merely by taking feeling as an object of study.

Buddhādāsa also makes a clear link between feelings and volition, and mental defilements.²¹¹ He believes that those people who do not have proper control over their minds are slaves to their feelings and often act to appease them. In this way, he goes back to *paṭicca-samuppāda*, in that *vedanā* directly precedes *taṇhā* or desire in that list, and thus links feeling clearly to the impulsive aspect of desire.

H. S. S. Nissanka’s (1993) research is also more on the practical level. He analyzes Buddhist psychology in hopes of finding an “alternative theoretical model for psychotherapy.”²¹² Like Buddhādāsa, he emphasizes *vedanā*’s aspect as a principal source of suffering. Bringing in modern Western psychological theory, Nissanka tells us that prolonged suffering deadens sensitivity to painful and pleasurable feelings alike, including sexual, and he advocates the Buddhist meditative technique of mindfulness to feeling (*vedanā-anupassanā*) to revive these deadened feelings. (Here, he is referring to what Western psychiatrists

have termed “anhedonia” in depressive people). He also advocates a combination of this technique with Western therapeutic techniques, which attempt to revive past memories of pleasant and unpleasant events.²¹³

Edwina Pio’s (1988)²¹⁴ remarks are not principally or even secondarily concerned with emotivity. However, she does devote considerable efforts to understanding the general bent of the early Buddhist teachings concerning the mentally ill. She states that, with regard to mental abnormalities, “the dominant concern of Early Buddhism was the normal man and helping him to grow and achieve his potential.”²¹⁵ Here, she refers to the refrain-like passages from the *Vinaya*, already mentioned in chapter three in the context of our discussion of insanity (*ummattaka*), as proof that Buddhism saw itself as primarily addressing the “normal man”. Pio bases her understanding of “abnormal” upon the definitions given in the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (II)* of the American Psychiatric Association; yet, she also makes allowances for cultural relativity in her definitions of abnormality.²¹⁶

Pio’s research has relevance for this thesis in relation to the third original motivating question of this thesis: namely, how does Buddhism purport to heal mental illness. In addition, Pio’s research is also relevant to our attempt to establish a province for the establishment of a Buddhist psychology.

Pio pinpoints one important difference between modern Western psychology and Buddhist psychology: modern Western psychology no longer sees certain people as insane or sane, but rather, uses more subtle and varied

demarcations of mental illnesses based on an illness' symptoms and treatments. For example, schizophrenia and bipolar depression are considered to be two separate mental illnesses, with different biological bases and different symptoms, and therefore different sorts of treatments. In modern Western psychology, one person who has bipolar illness and another who has schizophrenia would not be categorized neatly under the same rubric of "insane".

There is one additional point that is worthy of note in regards to Pio's study and the healing of emotional illness in Buddhism in general. Early Pali Buddhism almost uniformly claims to be able to destroy the various *kilesas*, *āsavas* etc. which afflict human beings. To this author's knowledge, there is not a declaration that certain levels of *kilesa/āsava* intoxicification are incurable and certain levels are curable. Thus, at the very least, we must take it for granted that early Buddhism saw itself as capable of curing any level of debility resulting from *kilesas* etc. Since the list of *kilesas* includes such things as delusion (*moha*) and rigidity of mind (*thīna*) etc., there is some province for saying that early Pali-based Buddhism may have seen itself as being capable of curing even the most severe delusions and obsessional behavior. If this is so, then Pio's stand, namely, that early Pali Buddhism saw itself as primarily addressing the ills of the "normal" man, may not be entirely true.

Gananath Obeyesekere (1985)²¹⁷ comes up with another critique of the stand taken by Pio, in that he questions Western notions of mental illness, abnormality etc., particularly depression, being applied to other cultures. In the

modern context, he cites the example of a friend in Sri Lanka who was diagnosed by a Western psychologist as being depressive, yet whose angst was more understandable and “normal” within the Buddhist context. In the ancient context, he cites the story of Kisa Gotami, whose extreme grief could easily be categorized as depression in retrospect, but who, Obyesekere says, was merely expressing grief within the parameters of Buddhism. Here, in contrast, it is interesting to note that Pio quotes the story of Kisa Gotami as a possible example of schizophrenia, using *the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual-II* (DSM-II) as her basis of information. However, she does qualify her statement by saying that there is not enough detailed description to ascertain this.

The Dalai Lama (1997), in Daniel Goleman’s *Healing Emotions: Conversations with the Dalai Lama on Mindfulness, Emotions and Health*,²¹⁸ states that there is no translation of the English word “emotion” into Tibetan. Because the Tibetan vocabulary he is referring to here represents primarily translations from Sanskrit texts, his statement is a relevant reflection on Buddhist concepts in Sanskrit (and Pali) as well. Also, since his statement comes within the context of an interview with Western cognitive scientists, psychologists and neurologists, it is particularly applicable for this study.

In the interview mentioned above, when the Dalai Lama clearly states that there is no Tibetan translation for the English word “emotion”, he is referring to the word “emotion” with all of its modern physiological etc. connotations. He says that the closest translation is “feeling” (*vedanā, tshor-ba*), and also, that there

is a concept of “negative emotions” or “afflictions” (*kilesa*, *kleśa*, *non-mongs-pa*) in Tibetan Buddhism.²¹⁹ He states that, while it is possible to have cognitions arise without afflictions (*kilesa*), it is not possible to have cognitions without feelings. Furthermore, as was previously mentioned, the Dalai Lama seems concerned with the development of a discrete definition for the concept of emotion as a psychic phenomena. This seems to imply that there are some practical applications for such a definition.

Finally, the Dalai Lama concerns himself with the Western scientific understanding for the concept of equanimity (*upekkhā*, *upekṣā*, *btang snyoms*). He feels that this is the natural state of mind, the mind at equilibrium, and says that equanimity is a feeling. Perhaps most importantly, he states that the state of mind called equanimity is one in which the afflictions (*kleśa* etc.) are absent.²²⁰

Brief Overview of Canonical and Commentarial Explanations of Vedanā

From the previous chapter, we have already seen that *vedanā* is described as a part of *nāma* or mind. Also, we have seen that it is associated with immateriality. Both of these characteristics of *vedanā* are similar to the idea of “feeling” outlined at the end of chapter two.

In addition, in the previous section, we examined some of the various translations of *vedanā* used by Western scholars based on the three-fold, five-fold etc. schemas outlined in the Pali Canon and its commentaries. Amongst the schemas examined, perhaps the principal distinction made in regard to *vedanā*

was the three-fold one. As Davids, de Silva etc. have already stated, this distinction is made with regard to hedonic tone: *vedanā* is divided into pleasant (*sukha*), unpleasant or painful (*dukkha*) feelings, and feelings which are neither-painful-nor-pleasant (*adukkham-asukha*). The *Majjhima Nikāya Cūḷavedalla Sutta*²²¹ tells us that pleasant feelings are pleasant when they persist but painful when they do not; painful feelings are pleasurable only when they cease but remain painful if they persist; and, neither-painful-nor-pleasant feelings are only unpleasant when they are not understood yet become pleasant when they are understood. Thus, in a sense, there are only two distinctions with regard to hedonic tone, pleasant or unpleasant, as neither-painful-nor-pleasant feelings are also classified as painful and pleasant depending upon one's understanding of them.²²²

According to the *Samyutta Nikāya*, an important aspect of a monk's training was to develop the proper attitude towards these three basic types of feelings: a monk should not to be swayed nor moved by any of them, and he should comprehend them fully.²²³ In addition to developing an understanding of neither-painful-nor-pleasant feelings, a monk had to cultivate himself so that he eliminated repulsion (*paṭigha*) towards painful feelings and impulsion (*rāga*) towards pleasant ones. In other passages in the *Samyutta Nikāya*, the ideas of repulsion and impulsion are expressed by the terms *virodha* and *anurodha* respectively.²²⁴ In addition, the terms *anurodha* and *virodha* also appear several times in our text of focus, Aśvaghoṣa's *Saundarananda*.²²⁵

Yet, up to this point, we have not really examined the tangible aspect of *vedanā* directly. Exactly how did early Pali Buddhism characterize the experience of *vedanā* itself? The answer to this question will give us some valuable insight into the phenomenon of *vedanā*, and will help us ascertain whether or not it is truly close to the modern idea of “feeling” or “emotion” etc. in connotation?

In this regard, the *Majjhima Nikāya*’s *Mahāvedalla Sutta* tells us that *vedanā* is so-called because “it feels” (*vedeti*).²²⁶ The *Pali-English Dictionary* gives us two basic meanings for the verbal base *ved+*: 1) to know (in the sense of intellectually) 2) to feel or experience. In order to have a better understanding of this term, we must look to Buddhaghosa’s *Atthasālinī*, as it is here that we have a detailed explanation of the tangible aspect of *vedanā*.

The *Atthasālinī* tells us that *vedanā* is that which feels or experiences (*vediyati*) and has the flavor or taste (*rasa*) of experiencing or partaking in (*anubhavana*).²²⁷ All three *vedanā*, namely, *sukha*, *dukkha* and *adukkham-asukha*, are said to have these qualities of tasting (*rasa*) or partaking in (*anubhavana*). This usage of the term *rasa* to depict the feeling of *vedanā* is similar to the way in which the term is used in Bharata’s *Nāṭyaśāstra*, in which Bharata describes emotion (*bhāva*) as being relished (*āsvādana*) within the heart of the appreciative listener: in both texts, this relishing or tasting is called *rasa*.

Ekantato pana issaravatāya visavitāya sāmibhāvena vedanā va ārammaṇarasam anubhavati. Rājā viya hi vedanā, sūdo viya sesā dhammā.

But feeling alone, through governance, proficiency, mastery, partakes in the taste of an object. For feeling is like the king, the remaining states are like the cook....

Yathā hi sūdo bhattakadesam eva vīmaṃsati evaṃ sesadhammā pi
ārammaṇarasekadesam eva anubhavanti. Yathā pana rājā issaravatāya visavitāya
sāmī hutvā yadicchakam bhuñjati evaṃ vedanā pi issaravatāya visavitāya
sāmībhāvena ārammaṇarasam anubhavati, tasmā anubhavanarasā ti vuccati.²²⁸
(At, 109-110)

And as the cook tests a portion of the food, so the remaining states partake in a portion of the object, and as the king, being lord, expert, and master, eats the meal according to his pleasure, so feeling, being lord, expert and master, partakes in the taste (*rasa*) of the object, and therefore it is said that partaking in or tasting is its function.²²⁹

Here, it is interesting to note that the metaphor of tasting (*rasa*) also occurs in the *Sutta Nipāta* of the *Khuddaka Nikāya*, a much earlier work, in conjunction with the idea joy (*pīti*).

pavivekarasam pītvā rasam upasamassa ca/
niddaro hoti nippāpo dhammapītirasam pibam 'ti /²³⁰ (SuN.257)

Having drunk the draught of seclusion and of tranquillity
I am without fear or sin, and have tasted the joy of the law (*dhamma*).

If we are to define joy (*pīti*) as an affect, then the idea of mentally tasting an affect is clearly evident in the Canonical literature. Depending upon the exact dates of Bharata, this could also mean that Bharata and his predecessors may have borrowed this analogy from Buddhism, or, perhaps both early Buddhist and aesthetic thinkers were drawing upon a common stream of thought which was pan-Indian.

Also, the above passage seems to indicate that the ideal for the sage in early Buddhism was not that of a complete lack of affect. If one considers the passage from the *Sutta Nipāta* in conjunction with that of the *Atthasālinī*, one gets the impression that any type of emotive phenomenon, be it a positive affective state, such as joy, or just a pleasurable feeling, involved a tasting aspect. This tasting aspect can be compared to the aspect of tangibility described in our definition of subjective feeling in chapter two.

However, if the tangible aspect of feeling and the tasting aspect of *vedanā* are being compared, they are not a perfect match, as *vedanā* also is also composed of physical sensations. In addition to the three-fold distinction with regard to *vedanā*, there is also a two-fold mental and physical distinction made in the Canonical texts. In the *Majjhima Nikāya*'s *Cūḷavedalla Sutta* and the *Samyutta* iv.231, for example, *vedanā* is portrayed as either bodily (*kāyika*) or mental (*cetasika*).²³¹

The five-fold schema of *vedanā* elaborates further upon the distinction between mental and physical *vedanā*, by attaching different words, *domanassa* and *somanassa*, to mental suffering and happiness respectively.²³² Physical pain and happiness are represented by the words *dukkha* and *sukha*. Thus, painful and pleasant feelings are each divided up into two categories, the mental and the physical, with the fifth category being neither-painful-nor-pleasant (*upekkhā*) feelings. Yet, in certain Canonical passages, *upekkhā* is divided up into mental

and physical as well: thus, in this sense, the traditional five-fold schema can be thought of as six-fold.²³³

There are a number of other important distinctions concerning *vedanā*. There is a six-fold schema which attaches a feeling to each one of the six senses: the five standard ones, i.e. smell, sight, taste etc., with the addition of the mind (*manas*). As Boisvert has mentioned, if one analyzes *vedanā* from this standpoint, *vedanā* appears to be primarily physical in nature. Yet, in the other schemas of *vedanā* we see a more mental focus. For example, in the 18-fold classification spoken of in *Samyutta Nikāya* iv.232, it is said that there are six ways of giving attention (*upavicāra*) to mental pleasure (*somanassa*), mental pain (*domanassa*) and neither-painful-nor-pleasant feelings (*upekkhā*).²³⁴ Thus, there are 18 types of feelings because of the 6 ways of giving attention to the three categories. Since *domanassa* and *somanassa* are classified as mental elsewhere in the *Samyutta* and since *upekkhā*, in regards to feeling, is classified as at least partly mental, from the 18-fold classification, one could conclude that *vedanā* is primarily mental.

Finally, there are the 36-fold and 108-fold explications of *vedanā*,²³⁵ but their exact contents will not be explicated here, as a literal understanding of these two schemas will not figure prominently in this thesis. Rather, what may be more important with regard to the 36-fold and 108-fold analyses of *vedanā* is a symbolic interpretation. Perhaps, these two classifications are meant to communicate the possibility for many nuances within one's subjective feelings, as opposed to the more basic hedonically or pleasure-based classifications of the

three-fold and five-fold type. This interpretation of *vedanā* is closer to the definition of “feeling” outlined at the end of chapter two. In this definition, the concept of feeling was presented as having many different nuances, or, as having a different shade of tangibility for each emotion to which it is attached. Even if one reads the Canonical passages literally, the above interpretation is possible. For example, the passage on the 36-fold classification speaks of six forms of joy (*somanassa*), six forms of grief (*domanassa*) and six forms of neither-painful-nor-pleasant feelings (*upekkhā*) (all in relation to worldly life and renunciation).

Concluding Remarks concerning Vedanā

There are a number of significant observations that one can make in reaction to the various modern and ancient analyses of *vedanā*. First of all, many modern scholars used words such as “emotion”, “feeling” etc. without fully clarifying their definition of these words, or, without making it very clear that they have based their comments upon only one particular usage of the term “emotion” etc. This can be misleading. For example, in one section of his book *Psychology of Nirvana*, Rune Johansson states that *nibbāna* is without emotions. Even though he does qualify this somewhat, it is necessary to be much clearer, in that such a statement can lead the beginner to the conclusion that Buddhism is preaching a complete lack of emotivity or affect.

In addition, more clarification needs to be made in regard to the third type of feeling: neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling. The interrelation of terms *upekkhindriya*, *adukkham-asukha-vedanā* (and also *avyākata-vedanā*) is not entirely clear in the Canonical literature and its commentaries, and therefore, it may be necessary for future students of Buddhism to make further attempts at clarification. However, since this topic is vast and complex, and would take us far afield into a deeper exploration of *vedanā* within the Pali Canon instead of emotion etc. within the *Saundarananda*, we will not undertake such an endeavor here.²³⁶

To conclude this section, our final translation of the term *vedanā*, based on the modern and Canonical writings, will be “feeling”. The term “feeling” seems more appropriate, because, in modern standard English, “feeling” can refer to either physical sensations or mental feelings. Similarly, *vedanā* can be either mental or physical. Now, how would the term *vedanā*, as it has been portrayed in the previous Canonical passages and by modern writers on Buddhism, relate to the definition presented of feeling at the end of chapter two?

As was stated in chapter three, *vedanā* is considered to be a part of mentality or *nāma* and also one of the immaterial aggregates. Thus, in these two ways, *vedanā* fits well with our previous understanding of feeling, as feeling was said to be mental or psychic and the immaterial component of emotional complexes. However, our previous definition given in chapter two also stated that feeling has a different nuance with each emotion it accompanies. An

examination of melancholy and sadness, two very intimately related emotions, provides us with a good example of this notion of feeling. Because melancholy is a slightly different emotion than sadness, the immaterial feeling attached to it would be slightly different. Melancholic feelings would be characterized by a mixture of pleasure and the pain, as there is a whimsical, pleasurable, reflective aspect to the emotion of melancholy as well as a subtly depressing and sad aspect; in contrast, sad feelings would be characterized by a more overtly depressing, painful aspect.

Can *vedanā* be said to have a similar quality: does it change subtly in accordance with each emotion? There does not seem to be this aspect to the definition of *vedanā* in the Canonical and commentarial texts examined, not unless we interpret the 36-fold and 108-fold schemas symbolically. If we were to read the 36-fold and 108-fold schema symbolically, we could possibly say that the scriptures are attempting to indicate an infinite or great number of possible *vedanā*; yet, this is only a speculation.

Just as the modern word “feeling” in English can include many nuances, “sensation” can also signify a much broader spectrum of meaning than just painful, pleasant or neutral (“neutral” here is being made equivalent to neither-painful-nor-pleasant). Sensations are not just pleasant, painful or neutral; they can also be sharply painful, dull, tingly, throbbing etc. Thus, it appears that, if we take *vedanā* in its more fundamental form, based on its two-fold, three-fold and five fold schemas outlined in *Samyutta* and *Majjhima* (*Bahuvedanīya Sutta*) etc., it

appears to be a subset of the English words “feeling” and “sensation”, or, the component of these terms which communicates pain or pleasure. Thus, in this way, Rhys Davids’ original idea of “hedonic tone” as a description of *vedanā* still seems appropriate. This is even true in regard to *adukkham-asukha-vedanā*, as these types of feelings are associated with pleasure when they are known, and pain when they are unknown.

In conclusion, *vedanā* may adequately express the notion of feeling, but it does not express such notions as emotion or affect. *Vedanā* is not a term which signifies emotive processes as a whole, and especially not emotive processes as we defined them in chapter two, i.e. as being situated within the realm of mentality and as functioning in accompaniment with cognitive and volitional processes. Hence, we have not discovered a term within the Pali Canon and its commentaries which adequately represents the notion of emotion as we have previously defined it. This being said, we will proceed to the next emotively related word in the Pali Canon, *kilesa*, in hopes of gaining further insight into the phenomenon of emotion in early Pali Buddhism.

Modern Writers on Kilesa

The second major Buddhist concept to be analyzed here is the term *kilesa*. This section of my literary review focuses primarily on those authors, particularly Guenther and Lamotte, who have chosen to translate *kilesa* as an

emotive vocabulary word, although some preliminary remarks have been made concerning authors who have translated it otherwise.

One of the most frequent translations of *kilesa* is “defilement” or “affliction”. Kogen Mizuno (1996) translates *kilesa* as “defilement” and explicates this concept as the principal idea within the domain of mental defilements or afflictions, while other terms, such as *āsava* etc. are listed as synonymous to this central term of *kilesa*. In this regard, he lists the following words: *saṃyojana*, *nivaraṇa*, *yoga*, *āsava*, *ogha*, *gantha* etc.²³⁷ Thus, following Mizuno’s lead, we will explicate *kilesa* and words directly derived from *kilesa* (*upakkilesa* etc.) as the central concept in the domain of mental defilements or afflictions.

Mizuno states that *kilesas* “are not usually manifest but lie deep in the mind as inclinations or proclivities.”²³⁸ He says that *kilesas* in a dormant state are termed *anusayas* and in an active state, *pariyuṭṭhāna* (*paryavasthāna*, Sanskrit). Andre Bareau (1987)²³⁹ repeats Mizuno’s observation, with one significant addition: he equates the existence of *anusaya* within the subconscious (*subscient*) in Western thought.²⁴⁰ In accordance with Bareau, De Silva also feels that concepts such as *anusaya*, along with *saṅkhāra* and *āsava*, are references to the notion of the unconscious in Buddhist thought.²⁴¹

Herbert Guenther (1974)²⁴² is one scholar who has explicated the concept of *kilesa* as a possible direct translation for the concept of emotion. In one place, he also uses the term “affects” to translate the concept of *kilesas*.²⁴³ Underlying his choice is a specific definition of “emotion” in English: emotion constitutes a

change in one's psychological make-up, but always in the negative sense. In other words, emotions are disturbances which interrupt, sidetrack or explode upon rationality.²⁴⁴ This decidedly negative that connotation Guenther gives to the word "emotion" differs from my definition in chapter two. My definition does state that change is the factor which delineates emotion; however, change is not seen as necessarily negative or anti-rational.

Guenther bases his translation of *kilesa* on a passage from the *Atthasālinī*, in which *kilesa* is equated with *chandarāga*. In this passage, Guenther translates *chandarāga* as "passionate desire".²⁴⁵ In the passage below, the phrase "our author" indicates the author of the *Atthasālinī*.

By pointing to the emotions our author has made a very important observation. Both the actual emotional explosion and the latent potentiality of an emotion are no doubt a great hindrance to our dealings with the problems of life as they arise. Moreover, the fact should not be overlooked that an emotion complex always and entirely depends upon the fact that a real conscious adaptation to an immediate object situation has been impossible and this failure of adaptation results in the explosion of an emotion....

Emotional outbursts, i.e. feelings and emotions attached to ideas, are forces that will inevitably carry the individual away with them and color any and all sorts of human response.... It is this tendency to react by emotions that is called 'the world', *Samsāra*, as opposed to the tranquil equanimity of *Nirvāṇa* which is attained by a radical change in attitude.²⁴⁶

Guenther touches upon a number of important points here. First of all, his particular definition of "emotion" becomes clearer: emotion is a negative force which explodes upon or impinges upon rationality. He also discusses

equanimity or *upekkhā* and opposes the tranquil equanimity of *nirvāṇa* to the emotional turbulence of *samsāra*.

Another significant point raised by Guenther is that *kilesa* or emotion signifies the opposite of mental dexterity.²⁴⁷ In this regard, he says the emotional explosion is due to the failure of an adaptive mechanism: in other words, if the mind was more supple in its adaptive mechanism, emotional outbursts would not come about.

Like Guenther, Nyanaponika Thera (1949)²⁴⁸ touches upon the idea of pliancy of mentality as being a healthy condition of mind and its opposite, mental rigidity, as being unhealthy. Nyanaponika does this within the context of his translation of the wholesome (*kusala*) factors of consciousness (*dhamma*) as they are explicated in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*. Thus, he translates factors explicated in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* such as *citta-mudutā* and *kāya-mudutā* as pliancy of consciousness and pliancy of concomitants respectively.²⁴⁹ (*Kāya* here indicates the three aggregates, which are seen as concomitant with mind or consciousness (*citta* or *viññāna*): *vedanā*, *saññā* and *sankhāra*). In this regard, Nyanaponika translated other aspects of the mind (*citta*) and mental concomitants (*kāya*), such as *lahutā* and *kammaññatā*, as agility and workableness.

Pliancy (*mudutā*, lit. "softness") is the susceptibility, elasticity, resilience, and adaptability of the mind, which bestow on the mind a greater and more durable efficiency, a "sounder health", than it could be expected to possess when in a rigid state. "Soft conquers hard," says Lao-tse. It should be remembered how often mental insanity is associated with an excessive rigidity or lack of pliancy or

resilience of mind. If this factor refers to the condition of mind in general, it is called “pliancy of consciousness” (*citta-mudutā*).

Pliancy of concomitants (*kāya-mudutā*) consists, for example, in adaptability of the respective functions to their various tasks....It is the capacity of intellectual faculties to learn and to unlearn ever anew, to be benefited by experience. It allows one to discard inveterate habits and prejudices pertaining to thought, emotion and behavior....²⁵⁰

Nyanaponika’s remarks are important for this thesis in that he attempts to make a connection between rigidity of mental habits or reactions, including emotional ones, and mental unhealth. In this observation, he is in accord with most modern psychological theorists of emotion.

Etienne Lamotte (1974)²⁵¹ translates the term *kleśa* (*kilesa*) as “passion”. Lamotte draws his evidence partly from the *Pali Nikāyas* and partly from the *Sarvāstivādin Āgamas*. Also, a portion of his study deals with the concept of *kleśa-vāsanā*, a concept which, according to him, was not deemed important by either the *Theravādins* or the *Sarvāstivādins*, but more significant in later *Mahāyāna* writings and in the writings of some other early *Hinayāna* sects.²⁵² Thus, because this section of the thesis deals primarily with the concept of *kilesa*, and primarily with the concept of *kilesa* as it was seen in the early *Theravādin* materials, a significant portion of his study falls outside of the rubric of this thesis.

Nevertheless, the way in which Lamotte translates the term *kleśa* is still relevant for this study, as it again demonstrates the frequent lack of precise definitions given for emotive terms in English as translations for Buddhist notions. Like Guenther, Lamotte’s translation of the *kleśas*, as representing the

“passions”, seems to be coming from a particular view of the term “passions” (“passions” being a term that can be seen as synonymous to “emotions” in many modern studies):²⁵³ namely, “passions” or “emotions” are unhealthy (*akuśala*) forces that erupt into the mind and defile it.²⁵⁴

In conclusion, while it is certain that in Buddhism that *kilesas* / *kleśas* were always a corrupting, unhealthy forces, this connotation cannot necessarily be attached to the words “passion”, “emotion” etc. in modern English. For example, the physiological stream of emotive studies in Western psychology does not attach any value judgement to emotive occurrences: they are considered to be composed of morally neutral bodily changes. Also, my own definition in chapter two does characterize emotions as changing forces, but not necessarily as always unhealthy.

If we cannot translate the concept of *kilesa* or *kleśa* as “emotion” or “passion”, what sorts of terms could we use to depict *kleśa*? This part of our analysis will be undertaken in the next section.

Canonical and Commentarial Explanations of Kilesa

There are a number of factors in Buddhism which have been labelled as “hindrances”, “obstructions” or “afflictions” etc. Here, I am primarily referring to such categories as the *kilesas*, *āsavas*, *saṃyojanas*, *anusayas*, *nivaraṇas*, *oghas* etc. Instead of explicating each one of these categories and their various enumerations, I have chosen one category, the category of *kilesa* and one

standard enumeration of it. In regards to my choice of enumerations, I have chosen the 10-fold enumeration present in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*.²⁵⁵ Below, I have listed this enumeration for the reader's convenience.

10 Kilesas

- 1) *lobha* - greed - volitional
- 2) *dosa* - hate - emotive
- 3) *moha* - delusion - cognitive
- 4) *māna* - conceit - emotive
- 5) *diṭṭhi* - (false) view - cognitive
- 6) *vicikicchā* - uncertainty - emotive and cognitive
- 7) *thīna* - stiffness (of mind) - emotive and volitional
- 8) *uddhacca* - agitation - emotive
- 9) *ahirika* - consciencelessness²⁵⁶ - emotive and cognitive
- 10) *anottappa* - shamelessness – emotive and cognitive

In the list above, I have attempted to place each term within the rubric of volitional, cognitive or emotive. In this regard, “emotive” has been chosen over the term “affective” because “affect” has been used in this thesis to connote a stable, persisting mood. While some of the *kilesas* may connote persistent emotivity in a negative sense, because of the inclusion of such terms as *uddhacca*

and *vicikiccā*, both of which connote a flitting or a temporariness, the term “emotive” has been chosen over “affective”.

The emotive, cognitive and volitional labels chosen are, of course, limiting. For example, cognitive afflictions (*moha* etc.) can also have a corresponding emotive components, and volitional afflictions (*lobha*) can have corresponding cognitive components etc.

The first three terms, greed (*lobha*), hatred (*dosa*) and delusion (*moha*) are especially important as they also appear as the three “fires,” “impurities” or “poisons” throughout the Pali literature.²⁵⁷ These three terms seem to represent volitional, emotive and cognitive difficulties respectively. In the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, *dosa* (not to be confused with *doṣa* in the *Āyurveda*, a Sanskrit word referring to 3 humours etc.) is made synonymous to all types of resentment, hatred and anger which occur in the mind (*citta*). In this regard, the synonyms given are as follows: anger (*kopa*), anger or resentment (*krodha*), resistance/repulsion (*virodha*), ill-will (*byāpāda*) etc. Three of these terms, *kopa*, *virodha* and *vyāpāda* (Pali, *byāpāda*), appear in the *Saundarananda*, although, in one chapter, *kopa* specifically indicates a disturbance in the three humours (*doṣas*) and not the concept of anger.

In the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, *lobha* is described at length with various synonyms such as passion (*rāga*), attachment (*sanga*), infatuation (*sarāga*), fawning (*anunaya*), longing (*icchā*) etc. In contrast to advocating against volition in general, as was mentioned previously, the words used to describe *lobha*, such as *anunaya*, *sanga* and *sarāga* etc. seem to be depicting a certain driven quality in the

felt aspect of volition. This driven or impulsive quality is said to be detrimental to Buddhist practice.

Moha is the concept within the three “fires” or “poison” which connotes incorrect cognition. In the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, it is described by synonyms such as lack of knowledge (*añāṇa*) and ignorance (*avijjā*). What seems of central concern here is ignorance or lack of knowledge concerning the four noble truths.

In regard to the next two on the above list, *māna* and *diṭṭhi*, *māna* has been labelled as emotive and *diṭṭhi* as cognitive. The reason for this is that, in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, *māna* seems to be comprised of conceited reactions to false beliefs, whereas, the description of *diṭṭhi*, the false views themselves are emphasized. Here, conceit is being labelled as an emotive state.

If we take into consideration both passages from the *Samyutta Nikāya* (iii.106) and the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* (232) in our analysis of the next term, *vicikiccā*, it is clear that it depicts a doubt or perplexity concerning Buddhist doctrine, the *saṅgha* etc. In the *Samyutta Nikāya* iii.106, this doubt and perplexity is also described as producing a joylessness (*anabhirati*) in the practitioner. This description of joylessness and the effect that it has on the body and the mind of the practitioner is somewhat reminiscent of modern descriptions of anhedonia in depressive patients. Thus, *vicikiccā* has been labelled emotive, in that it seems to connote a fearful and painful doubt; yet, it has been labelled cognitive as well, in that it is a doubt concerning certain beliefs.

In the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, the next term, *thīna*, is defined as a mental stiffness or lack of mental adaptability (*akammaññatā*), and as a kind of stickiness, infatuation or adherence (*olīyanā*).²⁵⁸ *Thīna* has been categorized as emotive primarily because the assumption that, within attachment, the part of attachment which makes one adhere is emotional, in that this adherence represents a kind of emotional infatuation. *Thīna* has also been categorized as partly volitional, as it symbolizes that type of volition which is driven, impulsive and inflexible.

Uddhacca signifies a lack of calmness (*avupasama*).²⁵⁹ It is described as an agitation (*vikkhepa*) of the heart (*cetas*) or a wandering of the mind (*citta*). From this description, one gets the impression that *uddhacca* signifies the flitting of the mind or heart from one emotional worry to another: thus it has been labelled as an emotional type of *kilesa*.

In the *Visuddhimagga*, the next two *kilesas*, *ahirikam* and *anottappam*, are said to be reactions to all types of actions, including bodily ones.²⁶⁰ Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli, in his translation of the *Visuddhimagga*, renders *hiri* as “conscience” and *ottappa* as “shame”. (Here, since the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*’s description was very brief, additional sources had to be utilized). In the *Visuddhimagga*, Buddhaghosa tells us that *hiri* has the characteristic of disgust (*jigucchana*) at sin (*pāpa*), while *ottappa* is said to be characterized by a fear (*uttāsa*) of sin. Also, the *Visuddhimagga* tells us that the feeling/thoughts of *hiri* are directed at oneself whereas *ottappa* is something that is centered upon others. Thus, in brief, *hiri* (or *hirika*) can be interpreted as a kind of disgust directed towards one’s own sins.²⁶¹ Since disgust,

in Western psychological understanding, is considered to be an emotional state, *hiri* can be interpreted as emotive as well; however, since disgust at sin also implies that one has some idea of what is sinful, *hiri* can also be thought of as cognitive. *Ottappa* can be looked at in a similar way. While there may be a fearful emotive reaction involved within the rubric of *ottappa*, there are also conceptions or judgements involved concerning what is sinful.

In summary, if one looks at the entire list of *kilesas* and our explications concerning them, it is clear that the *kilesas* are a mixture of all three mental components: volitional, cognitive and emotive. Because of this, terms such as “negative emotions”, “emotions” etc. do not seem to be appropriate as translations for *kilesa*. Instead, I will use the term “mental affliction” to translate the concept of *kilesa*.

If we examine one description of *kilesa* from the *Samyutta Nikāya* as a case study, we may be able to have a better idea of how *kilesas* are felt or perceived in the mind. On this subject, the *Samyutta Nikāya* says the following: the mind is defiled by a number of fundamental afflictions (*kilesa* etc.) which obstruct it from seeing the truth and feeling joy etc.; through systematic attention (*yoniso manasikāra*), the seven limbs of enlightenment arise; if one cultivates (*bhāvanā*) these seven factors of enlightenment the mind will be freed from the influence of the mental afflictions (*upakkilesa*) and will eventually be liberated from suffering (i.e. attain *nibbāna*).²⁶²

In the *Samyutta Nikāya*, the mind or *citta* is explicitly stated as being the location for these defilements. The following passage compares the corruptions of gold to the corruptions or defilements (*upakkilesa*) in the mind. In this passage, the relationship between the *āsavas* and the *upakkilesas* is somewhat unclear, but what is most important is that both refer to defilements which impinge upon the mind.

Pañcime bhikkhave jātārūpassa upakkilesā // Yehi upakkilesehi upakkiliṭṭham
jātārūpam na ceva mudu hoti // na ca kammaniyam na ca pabhassaram
pabhāṅgu ca na ca sammā upeti kammāya //

Monks, there are these five corruptions of gold, tainted by which gold is neither soft, nor pliable, nor gleaming, nor easily broken up, nor fit for perfect workmanship....

evam eva kho bhikkhave pañcime cittassa upakkilesā yehi upakkilesehi
upakkiliṭṭham cittaṃ na ceva mudu hoti // na ca kammaniyam na ca
pabhassaram pabhāṅgu ca na ca sammā samādhīyati āsavānaṃ khayāya //
Katame pañca....

In like manner, monks, there are these five corruptions (*upakkilesā*) of the mind (*citta*), tainted by which, the heart is neither soft, nor pliable, nor gleaming (*pabhassara*), nor easily easily unhardened, nor perfectly composed for the destruction of the taints (*āsavas*). What are the five? //

Kāmacchando bhikkhave cittassa upakkilesa // ...byāpāda...thīna-
middha...uddhacca-kukkucca....²⁶³ (SN, v.92-93)

Sensual desire (*kāma-cchanda*), monks, is a corruption of the mind...malevolence (*byāpāda*)...sloth and torpor (*thīna-middha*)....²⁶⁴

The above passage explicates the taints (*āsavas*) and the afflictions (*upakkilesa*) as phenomena that impact negatively on the mind (*citta*) and it

elaborates how this is so. More specifically, these negative mental phenomena cause a darkening and a hardening of the mind. Here, there do seem to be some parallels to the descriptions of mental illness in the journals of modern psychotherapists. According to most psychotherapists, one trait of a mentally /affectively unhealthy person is a hardening of their viewpoints and an inflexibility of mind.

One of the other categories mentioned in the previous passages is the inherent gleaming (*pabhassara*) quality of mind. Somehow, the *kilesas*, *āsavas* etc. diminish this light-filled, bright quality of mind. Here, another parallel can be made with subjective accounts of psychotherapeutic patients: they often describe their depressions and states of mind as grey, gloomy or even black.

In the *Anguttara Nikāyas*, the taints (*āsavas*) and the *upakkilesas* are spoken about in a similar fashion. They are said to have a tendency to diminish the mind's inherent flexibility and luminosity. Also, the healthy mind is said to be one that is malleable, or, in other words, not the type of mind which is able to control or impel someone towards one action over another.

cittaṃ bhikkhave bhāvitam bahulīkatam mudu ca hoti kammaññaṃ ca ti.

Indeed, monks, the mind that is cultivated and made much of is pliable and adaptable....

pabbhasaram idaṃ bhikkhave cittaṃ taṃ ca kho āgantukehi upakkilesehi upakkiliṭṭham. Tam assutavā puthujjano yathābhūtam nappajānāti. tasmā assutavato puthujjanassa citta-bhāvanā n'atthi ti vadāmi ti.

This mind, monks, is luminous, but it is defiled by taints that come from without. But this the uneducated manyfolk understands not as it really is. Wherefore for the uneducated manyfolk there is no cultivation of mind, declare.

pabhassaram idaṃ bhikkhave cittaṃ tañ ca kho āgantukehi upakkilesehi vip̐pamuttaṃ. Taṃ sutavā āriyasāvako yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti. tasmā sutavato ariyasāvakassa cittaabhāvanā atthū ti vadāmī ti.²⁶⁵ (AN, i.9-11)

That mind, monks, is luminous, but it is cleansed of taints that come from without. This the educated Āriyan disciple understands as it really is. Wherefore, for the educated Āriyan disciple there is cultivation of mind, I declare.²⁶⁶

Concluding Remarks in regards to Kilesas.

Thus, in conclusion, if we attempt to define the *kilesas* (including the *upakkilesas*) in terms of how they are subjectively felt: they seem to be felt as restrictive or inflexible in nature, and as dark, the opposite of luminosity.

Because they have a subjectively felt aspect to them, does this mean that a *kilesa* is, in fact, an emotive phenomenon, and that, therefore the term *kilesa* is best translated as something like “negative emotion(s)”? According to our definitions presented in chapter two, this would not necessarily be true, as volition can also have a subjectively felt aspect. Thus, we will adhere to our earlier translation for *kilesa* as “mental afflictions”.

Concluding Remarks for Chapters Four

At the beginning of this chapter, a question was posed as to whether or not Buddhism possesses a separate word to describe emotive or affective processes. After all of the above investigation, what can we conclude? How does

the vocabulary of the Pali Canon match up with “affect”, “feeling” and “emotion”?

As was previously mentioned, *vedanā* can serve as an adequate translation for “feeling”, although not without some qualification, as *vedanā* also includes physical sensations. *Kilesa* seems a partial fit for “negative emotions”, but not entirely.

It is true that there are other words in the Canon, such as compassion (*karuṇā*) equanimity (*upekkhā*), joy (*pīti*) etc. which certainly could be said to represent positive emotive or even affective states. For example, in the *Atthasālinī*, *pīti* is said to be a “thrilling or satisfying of mind and body” (*kāya-citta-pīṇana*).²⁶⁷ This sounds very much like the description of an emotion. *Karuṇā* is depicted as a caring for the welfare of others. Since, within the context of the Buddhist sage, this is usually depicted as a constant state, *karuṇā* could be called an affect according to the way in which we have defined the term “affect” in chapter two.

Yet, although the above terms can be said to depict particular affects and emotions, none of them depict emotive or affective processes as a whole. Thus, it seems to be the case, in our brief survey of Canonical literature, that we have not uncovered a single term which could translate either “emotion” or “affect”.

Concluding Notes for Introductory Chapters 1-4: Providing of Context for the Saundarananda

In these first four introductory chapters, we have attempted to provide a context for the process of translating the English term “emotion” into the Sanskrit vocabulary of Aśvaghoṣa’s *Saundarananda*. The analysis of material from the *Nāṭyaśāstra* was introduced in chapter one in order to explicate the poetic medium of Aśvaghoṣa’s writings and its stance in regards to emotion and psychology. The analysis of concepts from the early *Theravādin* Canonical writings and their commentaries was introduced in chapters three and four for the same reason: to explore one possible background (i.e. early *Theravādin* thinking) behind Aśvaghoṣa’s Buddhist conceptual understanding. As was mentioned in chapter one, more effort has been devoted here towards explicating the Buddhist side of Aśvaghoṣa’s thinking because of Aśvaghoṣa’s self-avowed intention: namely, that liberation and not poetic amusement was the primary goal of the *Saundarananda*.

In addition, the modern Western psychological understanding was introduced in chapter two in order to provide some basic concepts to attach to the words “emotion”, “affect” etc. And, lastly, the *Āyurvedic* understanding was briefly introduced in chapter three because of its presence both in the Canonical writings and in the *Saundarananda*, and also, to provide a contemporary example of a so-called physically-based medical practice as opposed to what we have defined as a predominantly psychologically-based practice: that of Buddhism.

In the beginning of chapter three, we posed five initial questions which were responded to in chapters three and four. Of these five questions, the first was a preliminary question related to the *Āyurveda*, and thus, need not be repeated here again. In regards to the other four questions, we have established that, as early as the *Sutta Piṭaka* in the Pali Canon, the view that Buddhism addresses primarily mental illness was at least present, albeit alongside the idea that Buddhist practice could heal physical disease as well. We also established that, in the *Sutta Piṭaka*, there existed the viewpoint that disease begins in the mind or psyche. In addition, we established the existence of an alternative viewpoint to psychically-originated disease, namely, physically-originated disease, which was said to be caused by a disorder in one of the three humours, bile, phlegm or wind.

In chapter three, it was also established that, as early as the *Sutta Piṭaka*, a category of mentality (*nāma*) was recognized as being in a discrete but interdependent relationship with materiality. Also, as early as the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka*, the category of mentality was clearly identified with the immaterial. This identification of mentality with immateriality and the four immaterial aggregates was the most clearly explicated in later commentarial works such as the *Visuddhimagga* of Buddhaghosa.

Even though Buddhaghosa was the clearest explicator of mentality's interdependent relationship with materiality, this understanding was also present, in a more germinal form, in the earlier works of the Pali Canon. Thus, all

of the basic elements for a psychological analysis of Buddhism, according to how we have defined “psychological” in chapter two, seem to be present: the positing of a psychic life as a separate phenomenon, the positing of disease or pain that originates or is based in the psyche, and, the postulation that Buddhism heals mental pain. Now, the following chapters will explore these very same questions within the context of our text of focus, the *Saundarananda* of Aśvaghoṣa.

Chapter 5: The Province for a Psychological Study of the *Saundarananda* and the Beginnings of an Emotive Analysis

Introductory Remarks concerning the Possibility for a Psychological Study of the Saundarananda

In this chapter we will attempt to prove that there is a province for the psychological study of the *Saundarananda* by answering a similar group of questions with regard to our text as were answered in chapters three and four concerning the Pali Canon. However, here we will leave out the first question, concerning the *Āyurveda*, posed in chapter three, and answer only the last four questions. Also, the last of these four questions, concerning the possibility of translating the terms “emotion” and “affect” etc. into the Classical Sanskrit of the *Saundarananda*, will be partially but not entirely answered in this chapter. The bulk of the answer for this question will be explicated in the following chapter, chapter six.

In brief, the four questions that will be answered in the next two chapters are as follows: 1) does the *Saundarananda* have the notion of a psyche as a phenomenon and what are its particular speculations concerning the psyche or mind?; 2) does the *Saundarananda* see this psyche or mind as an originating point for disease?; 3) does Aśvaghoṣa, in the *Saundarananda*, see Buddhism as addressing primarily psychic ills or maladies?; 4) and finally, is there a word or words within the *Saundarananda* which could translate the concepts of “emotion” and/or “affect” in their signification as emotive/affective processes as a whole?

As in chapters three and four, all of our answers here for psychologically-oriented questions will be based upon the definitions of the “psyche”, “mind”, “emotion” etc. presented at the end of chapter two. Again, the manner of procedure will be to prove the existence of a certain viewpoint within the *Saundarananda*, and not to prove that this viewpoint is overwhelmingly dominant. Our purpose here is to demonstrate that there is a province for a psychological study of the *Saundarananda*; it is not to show that this is the only way or the best way to study the text.

In this chapter and the two ensuing chapters, material from Aśvaghōṣa’s other works, such as the *Buddhacarita* and the *Śāriputraprakaraṇa* has been deliberately excluded. This was done in order to provide a very specific focus here in the second portion of the thesis (chapters 5-8), and also, to concentrate upon the *Saundarananda* as a test case for some of the ideas presented in chapters three and four with regard to Buddhism in general.

A Note on the Saundarananda’s Mentally-Oriented Vocabulary

In the *Saundarananda*, Aśvaghōṣa tends to use a number of different words to indicate the notion of mind or heart, as opposed to the physical body. For example, in verses 8.3-8.5, he uses three different words to express seemingly the same, other-than-corporeal category: mind or thoughts (*cetas*), mind (*manas* or *manomaya*) and inner self (*adhyātmā*). Mental pain, in verse 8.3, is attached to the word *cetas*. In verse 8.5, the adjective “mental” is translated as *manomaya* and

when the author speaks of physicians of the mind, mind is translated as *manas*.

At the end of this same verse, these physicians of the mind are described as investigators of the inner soul (*adhyātmā-pariksaka*).

To complicate matters of vocabulary even more, in chapter 13, Aśvaghoṣa also categorizes the other-than-corporeal realm as *hardam*, or “belonging to the heart”.

na ca prayāti narakam śatruprabhṛtibhir hataḥ/
kr̥ṣyate tatra nighnas tu capalair indriyair hataḥ // Sau, 13.33 //

For a person does not go to hell when attacked by enemies and so forth. Rather, he is dragged there helplessly (*nighna*) when struck by the wandering senses.

hanyamānasya tair duḥkham hārdam bhavati vā na vā/
indriyair bādhyamānasya hārdam śārīram eva ca // Sau, 13.34 // ²⁶⁸

For someone who struck by them (enemies), there may be heart-suffering or there may not. But, for someone who is attacked by the senses, there will be both heart-suffering and bodily suffering.

(As a tangential note, one can remark that verse 13.34 above bears a resemblance to *Samyutta Nikāya* iv.208-209, mentioned in chapter three. In the *Samyutta Nikāya*, the untaught person was said to suffer from both mental and physical suffering, as opposed to the Buddhist monk, who only had physical suffering).

If we add the vocabulary from verse 13.33-13.34 above, Aśvaghoṣa has at least four different but more or less interchangeable ways of expressing non-physicality or mentality in a human being: *hṛdaya*, *manas*, *adhyātmā*, *cetas*. If we

were to examine the entirety of the *Saundarananda*, other words such as *citta*²⁶⁹ and at times *mati*, could be added to this list.

In our text, the interchangeability of vocabulary is extreme. Often two or three synonymous words are used within the same verse or adjacent verses with no attempt at reconciling their definitions. Also, at times, it is obvious that a different word is being used in order to fulfill the meter requirements. This fluidity of vocabulary may be due, in part, to the Aśvaghoṣa's utilization of poetic devices. In poetry, ornamentation (*bhuṣaṇa*), often takes precedence over clearly defined terminology, which is the rule in more philosophically-oriented texts. Also, the concept of *saṃśaya* in aesthetic theory, as reviewed in chapter one, implies a doubt or a planned ambiguity. It is possible that both of these techniques are being employed by Aśvaghoṣa in the *Saundarananda* in regards to the usage of mentally-oriented vocabulary.

In spite of the possibility of this influence from the stylistic devices associated with the medium of poetry (*kāvya*), we have chosen here to interpret the *Saundarananda's* understanding of mentality within the context of Buddhist doctrine. As was mentioned previously, in verses 18.63-64, Aśvaghoṣa identifies his message as primarily Buddhist in nature and clearly states that the medium of poetry serves only as a disguise or artifice (*vyāja*) in which the true message of Buddhist liberation is encapsulated. Since this is the case, we have decided to follow in the footsteps of Buddhist texts such as the *Samyutta Nikāya*,

Visuddhimagga etc. which assert a synonymity between words such as *hṛdaya*, *manas*, *citta*, *vijñāna* etc.

A Brief Note on Volition in the Saundarananda

Much like the case of the Pali Canon, volition is not seen as wholly negative in the *Saundarananda*. Rather, desire or volition towards objects which are conducive to Buddhist practice is seen as positive; and, vice-versa, desire for objects which obstruct Buddhist practice is seen as negative. Since there are two types of volitions advocated in *Saundarananda*, this brings up an additional question: does this mean that the subjectively-felt aspect of these two types of volitions is different? Yet, because Aśvaghoṣa does not elaborate upon this point, we will resist further speculation upon it here.

The Psychological Study of the Saundarananda

Now, let us attempt to answer the first of the psychologically-oriented questions outlined above concerning the *Saundarananda's* speculations on the nature of mind or psyche. What is Aśvaghoṣa's definition for mind or mentality, and, does he delineate mentality from the material body? There are only a few passages in the *Saundarananda* which directly address this type of theoretical question, yet the few that are present provide us with at least a basic sketch of Aśvaghoṣa's viewpoint.

sa rūpiṇaṃ kṛtsnaṃ arūpiṇaṃ ca sāraṃ didṛkṣur vicikāya kāyaṃ /
 athāśuciṃ duḥkhaṃ anityaṃ asvaṃ nirātmakaṃ caiva cikāya kāyaṃ / /Sau,
 17.16//

He examined the human aggregate (*kāya*) in its entirety, desiring to see its immaterial and material essence. But, he perceived that the human aggregate (*kāya*) was impure, composed of suffering, impermanent, without self and without soul.

Anityatas tatra hi śūnyataś ca nirātmato duḥkhata eva cāpi
 mārgapravekeṇa sa laukikena kleśadrumaṃ sañcalayāñ cakāra / /Sau, 17.17//²⁰

For, upon (seeing) its (the human aggregate's) impermanence, its emptiness, its lack of self and especially its suffering, he shook the tree of the mental afflictions (*kleśa*) by the greatest of the mundane paths.

In verse 17.16, immateriality and materiality appear as a part of the notion of *kāya*. Here, Johnston translates *kāya* as “body”.²¹ However, this translation in the above context seems unlikely if one considers early Buddhist doctrine, as the concept of “body” in the Pali Canon usually does not contain immaterial components. Instead, here it seems better to translate *kāya* as the collective human organism as a whole.

There are some precedents in early Pali Buddhism for this type of translation. For example, as we saw in chapter three, in the *Dīgha Nikāya*'s *Mahānidāna Sutta*, a “mental body”, *nāma-kāya*, and *rūpa-kāya*, a “physical body”, are mentioned. In this *Sutta*, the word *kāya* can be roughly translated as “aggregate” or “category”: thus, the translation of *nāma-kāya* would be the “aggregate or component of mentality”, and, for *rūpa-kāya*, “the aggregate or component of materiality”. Furthermore, in C. R. Davids' and W. Stedes' *Pali-*

English Dictionary, *kāya* is defined as “aggregate” or “collection”. This same type of meaning for *kāya* as an aggregate or collection also appears in Monier-William’s *Sanskrit-English Dictionary* and Edgerton’s *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary*.²⁷²

Within the Buddhist context, *kāya* can also be translated as the three non-material aggregates or mental concomitants (*cetasika*): *vedanā*, *saññā* and *saṅkhāra*. This sense of the word appears in the *Dhammasaṅgani*.²⁷³ However, the former sense of *kāya*, as the aggregate of the entire human organism, seems the more likely of the two readings, as, within the idea of *cetasika*, there are not both immaterial and a material components.

If this translation is correct, then this would establish the fact that Aśvaghoṣa saw immateriality and materiality as two distinguishable categories within a human being. However, two major points still remain unclear: first of all, what is the relation between these two categories of immateriality and materiality; and, secondly, what would be the relationship of the mind and body to the immaterial and the material? Both of these issues are addressed in verse 16.13 below.

kāye sati vyādhijarādi duḥkhaṃ ksuttarṣavarṣoṣṇahimādi caiva/
rūpāśrite cetasi sānubandhe śokāratikrodhabhayādi duḥkhaṃ // Sau, 16.13 // ²⁷⁴

The suffering (which affects) the body is sickness, old age etc. and hunger, thirst, rain, heat and cold. The suffering in the mind (*cetas*), with its accompaniments, which is dependent upon/related to materiality, is sorrow, non-enjoyment, anger and fear etc.

In the previous verse, the mind (*cetas*) is identified as dependent upon or related to (*āśrita*) materiality (*rūpa*). It is difficult to ascertain if the word *āśrita* is implying the same kind of interdependence that we saw in passages from *Buddhaghosa's Visuddhimagga* with the example of "the drum" and "the baton", or, if Aśvaghoṣa actually means that materiality is at first cause when it comes to the tandem of materiality and mentality. Later passages from the same chapter in the *Saundarananda* seem to favor the former interpretation of interdependence, as *nāma-rūpa*, or, in places, *śarira-citta*, are spoken of as a conglomerate.²⁷⁵

If we take into consideration the different definitions given for *āśrita* given in Apte's and Monier-Williams Sanskrit-English dictionaries, three principal meanings present themselves as possibilities: "depending upon", "relating to", and "dwelling in". Thus, one could read verse 16.13 as depicting the relationship between mentality (*cetas*) and materiality (*rūpa*) in three ways. *Cetas* can be said to be either dependent upon *rūpa*, related to it, or, dwelling within it. Between these three interpretations, the choice is not entirely clear, although, in my translation, I have tended towards the first and/or the second possibilities.

One more point needs to be clarified with regard to verse 16.13 before we undertake an analysis of the concepts presented: this point concerns the concept of concomitants or *anubandha*. My tendency here is to translate this term as synonymous to the Buddhist concept of *cetasika* or mental concomitants. In this regard, perhaps the most relevant definition of this term comes from Apte, as he says that *anubandha* can mean "an adjunct of a thing" or a "secondary member".

Yet, since the term *anubandha* does not appear again in the *Saundarananda* within the same context, it is difficult to ascertain the word's exact meaning. Thus, we will have to leave this question open to speculation.

In spite of the doubts raised by the above verse (16.13), there are certain, very salient questions that are answered in a relatively clear fashion. First of all, *kāya* (signifying "body" in verse 16.13 as opposed to "human organism" or "aggregate" in verse 17.16) is equated to materiality (*rūpa*). Secondly, since mentality (*cetas*) is clearly stated to be related to or dependent upon materiality, then one can assume that mentality is a different entity from materiality or body. Furthermore, since mentality is different from body, which is material, it can be concluded here that mentality is something immaterial. Also, from verse 17.16, we know that such a category, i.e., of immateriality, existed in Aśvaghoṣa's writings.

These conclusions concerning immateriality, materiality, mind and physical body are not as clear in the *Saundarananda* as they are in the *Visuddhimagga* or even in the *Dhammasaṅgani*. However, it does seem plausible to conclude, based on the above passages, that Aśvaghoṣa's *Saundarananda* identifies mentality with immateriality and the physical body with materiality. Also, it seems reasonable to conclude that Aśvaghoṣa saw these two entities as in some sort or either dependent or interdependent relationship. This brings Aśvaghoṣa's view at least fairly close to the viewpoint explicated in Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimagga*.

Thus, we have adequately addressed the first question at the beginning of this chapter concerning the nature of Aśvaghoṣa's speculations concerning the interaction between mind and body. Now, let us pass onto the second question of this chapter: namely, does the *Saundarananda* see suffering as originating in the mind or the body, or some combination of both? While verse 16.13 clearly makes a distinction between the two types of suffering, mental and physical, it does not directly state that suffering originates in the mind, nor does it state that it originates in the body. What exactly would Aśvaghoṣa's viewpoint be on this matter?

Tan nāmarūpasya guṇānurūpaṃ yatraiva nirvṛttir udāravṛtta/
tatraiva duḥkhaṃ na hi tadvimuktaṃ duḥkhaṃ bhaviṣyaty abhavad bhaved
vā//Sau, 16.16//²⁶

Oh one of noble conduct, thus, where there is the origination of mind and body (*nāma-rūpa*), according to its qualities, there is suffering, for, separate from it (mind and body), suffering will not be, was not and cannot be.

In the above verse, the *Saundarananda* clearly states that the arising of the mind-body aggregate (*nāma-rūpa*) is identical with the arising of suffering. This stance differs slightly with the passages reviewed in chapter three from the Pali Canon. In the previously quoted passages quoted from the Canon, an emphasis was placed on the mind or psyche as the originating point for suffering; above, the emphasis is on the combination of mind and body as the cause or originating point of suffering.

It is important to note here that this difference between the *Saundarananda* and the Canon is not so clear-cut if one takes into account the whole spectrum of viewpoints present in the Pali Canon. For example, within the 12-fold chain of dependent origination, *nāma-rūpa* eventually gives rise to craving and clinging, which epitomize suffering in Buddhism. This notion is close to the idea expressed in verse 16.16 above from the *Saundarananda*.

In relation to the third question posed at the beginning of this chapter as to whether or not Buddhism addresses primarily physical or mental suffering, or both, the *Saundarananda* seems to be of two opinions. The passages below assert that Buddhist practice removes all suffering, which seems to imply physical suffering as well. Yet, there are also some passages which state that Buddhism addresses primarily mental suffering.

sarvaduḥkhāpahaṃ tat tu hastastham amṛtaṃ tava
viṣaṃ pītṛvā yad agadaṃ samaye pātum icchasi // Sau, 12.25 // ²⁷

Yet, you have the eternal elixir in your hand which removes all suffering (*sarvaduḥkha*). Having drunk poison, you wish to drink that which is its cure just in the nick of time.

duḥkhakṣayo hetupariḥsayāc ca śāntaṃ śivaṃ sāṅghikuruṣva dharmam/
tṛṣṇāvirāgaṃ layanaṃ nirodhaṃ saṃtānaṃ trānaṃ ahāryaṃ āryaṃ // 16.26

And, the end of suffering is due to the dissipation of the cause. Realize liberation (*dharmā=nirvāṇa*) which is peaceful, blissful, free from impulsion towards desire, resting, cessation, eternal, saving, unassailable and holy.

yasmin na jātir na jarā na mṛtyur na vyādhayo nāpriyaḥ samprayogaḥ/
necchāvipanna priyaviprayogaḥ kṣemaṃ padaṃ naiṣṭhikaṃ acyutaṃ tat // Sau,
16.27 // ²⁸

The state (*pada*) in which there is neither birth, nor old age, nor death nor sicknesses (*vyādhi*), nor contact with what is unpleasant, nor failure of one's wishes, nor a separation from what is pleasant, (that state) is peaceful, constant and immovable.

In verse 16.26, the *Saundarananda* says that the *pada* or state (i.e. of *nirvāṇa*) is the end of suffering (*duḥkha-kṣaya*). In 12.25, Aśvaghoṣa characterizes Buddhist practice as an elixir which is capable of removing all suffering (*sarva-duḥkha*). Also, in verse 16.27, Aśvaghoṣa states that liberation is a state where there is no sickness or *vyādhi*, and *vyādhi* is the term Aśvaghoṣa uses to categorize illnesses of the body in verse 16.13. (Please see 16.13 quoted earlier in this chapter). If we consider all of these facts and the rest of the description given for *nirvāṇa* in verses 16.26 and 16.27, it does appear that the *Saundarananda* is saying that Buddhism can heal all suffering, both physical and mental.

However, in chapter 8, the *Saundarananda* presents us with a different viewpoint. Here, the author makes a distinction between physical and mental disease and their respective treatments. In the passages below, Buddhism is portrayed as primarily treating the mental realm of disease.

dvividhā samudeti vedanā niyataṃ cetasi deha eva ca/
śrutavidhyupacāraḥ dvividhā eva tayoś cikitsakāḥ // Sau, 8.3 //

Surely, it is understood that there are two types of pain (*vedanā*): that of the body (*deha*) and that of the mind (*cetas*). And, for these two (types of pain), there are two types (of physicians): physicians of medical lore (*cikitsaka*)²⁹ and physicians who are skilled in the conduct and rules of religious texts.

tad iyaṃ yadi kāyikī ruḍā bhiṣaje tūṇam anūnam ucyatām/

viniguhya hi rogam āturo na cirāt tīvram anartham ṛcchati // Sau, 8.4 //

Thus, if your pain is bodily, explain it quickly (and) thoroughly to a doctor. For, if a sick person conceals his illness, he quickly reaches a more disastrous state.

atha duḥkham idaṃ manomayaṃ vada vakṣyāmi yad atra bheṣajaṃ /
manaso hi rajastamasvino bhiṣajo 'dhyātmavidāḥ parīkṣakāḥ // Sau, 8.5 // ²⁸⁰

But if (your) suffering is mental (*manomaya*), tell (it to me and) I will then proclaim its cure. For, the physicians of the mind (*manas*), which is characterized by passion and darkness, are investigators who understand the (workings) of the inner soul (*adhyātmā*).

First of all, it is important to note that, in the passages above, *vedanā* is translated as “pain” rather than “feeling”. *Vedanā* is used here as synonymous to *rujā*, which signifies “pain”, “sickness” etc. (A fuller explanation of this translation is given in chapter six under the section entitled *vedanā*).

In the above passages, the phrase “physician of the mind” is obviously referring to a member of the Buddhist order, as the person who has approached Nanda here is a Buddhist monk. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that Aśvaghoṣa is depicting Buddhist practice as primarily addressing mental suffering. Judging from other passages in the *Saundarananda*, it is likely that the physically-oriented doctor refers to an *Āyurvedic* physician, although this is not entirely clear from the information offered to us.

In addition to the passages above, there are other verses which support the interpretation that Aśvaghoṣa saw Buddhism as addressing primarily mental disease. For example, in verse 11.12, *Nanda*, the hero of the story, is said to be

suffering from a serious (*balavat*) mental disease (*mānasa vyādhi*) which can only be mastered by steadfastness (*dhṛti*) of mind. This kind of steadfastness of mind is developed through Buddhist practice.

If one examines the previous verses, especially verse 11.10, mental disease seems to be equated with *rāga* and *kāma*. In chapter 15 (15.3), *kāma* or desire is said to be a fever (*jvara*) of the mind, the fever which Nanda suffers from. And, in verse 8.5 quoted earlier, mental disease is characterized as being caused by *rajas* and *tamas*. It is interesting to note here that the latter definition of mental illness, involving *rajas* and *tamas*, is the same as the *Caraka Saṃhitā*'s definition of mental disease. (Here, I am referring to verse 1.57 from chapter three).

Furthermore, in chapter 16 of the *Saundarananda*, there are clear references to the *Āyurvedic* notion of humours (*doṣas*),²⁸¹ and thus, there is an explicit admission of another type of more physically-oriented healing practice and diagnosis. In this chapter, there are a number of passages which compare Buddhist meditation practices and their effect on mental ailments to the effect of *Āyurvedic* doctors' practices upon physical ailments. For example, Aśvaghoṣa describes the Buddhist meditation practice of healing certain negative emotive, cognitive and volitional patterns (*rāga*, *vyāpāda* etc.) by using positive emotive, cognitive etc. counteragents (*pratipakṣa*), such as impurity, compassion (*aśubha*, *maitrī* etc.), as one's object (*nimitta*) of meditation.²⁸²

As a parallel to this Buddhist practice, Aśvaghoṣa cites the example of the *Āyurvedic* doctor who treats a patient suffering from a disturbance in one of the

three *doṣas* or humours and the necessity for this doctor to adjust his treatment to fit the particular *doṣa* which is aggravated. Aśvaghoṣa says that, if the disturbance is centered upon the bile or choler (*pitta*), then a soothing, cool remedy is needed. Yet, if the disturbance is centered upon phlegm (*kapha*), then an astringent (*rūkṣa*) remedy is needed etc.

Thus, in summary, the answers to the first three questions posed at the beginning of this chapter are as follows. First, the *Saundarananda* does accept a distinguishable category of mentality which is interrelated with materiality and equated to immateriality, although it is unclear as to whether or not this category is seen as being in a relationship of complete interdependence. Hence, it is difficult to say whether or not Aśvaghoṣa is entirely in agreement with the viewpoint expressed in Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimagga* and in the *Dhammasaṅgani*.

Second, the *Saundarananda* does not possess the viewpoint that mentality alone is the first cause for all suffering. As was mentioned in chapter three, this viewpoint was present in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* and the *Dhammapada*, and in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* of Śāntideva. Instead, the *Saundarananda* clearly states that the conglomerate of mind and mentality is identical to suffering: there is no traceable first cause amongst these two. Thus, psychic disease, as we have defined it in chapter two, is more applicable to certain streams of understanding in the Pali Canon than to the *Saundarananda*.

In response to the third question concerning Buddhism's capacity to heal primarily mental or physical suffering, or both, the *Saundarananda* presents us

with two viewpoints: a) Buddhism cures all suffering, implying physical and mental ailments; b) Buddhism only or primarily addresses mental suffering.

In the *Saundarananda*, mental suffering is defined as those states of mind which result from *rāga*, *kāma*, indulging in sense objects etc. The *Saundarananda* does not seem to include the category of insanity, which appeared in the *Vinaya Piṭaka* with the term *ummattaka* (nor does the *Saundarananda* explicate the idea of epilepsy, *apasmāra* or *apamāra*). When cognate terms in Sanskrit, such as *unmāda*, *mada* etc., appear in the context of the *Saundarananda*, these terms are not so explicitly defined. In certain verses, they do seem to be referring to a kind of madness, or, the binding power of love.²⁸³ Yet, it is often difficult to discern if this madness is something which is considered to be out of the scope of Buddhist practice, or, if it is merely the madness of excessive desire (*rāga*). Any madness of desire, according to Aśvaghoṣa, is always curable by Buddhist meditation and adherence to moral codes.²⁸⁴

The fourth central question of this portion of the thesis, concerning Aśvaghoṣa's view of emotion, will be begun in this chapter and completed in the ensuing chapter. During our analysis of the various cognate concepts for emotion etc. presented in the *Saundarananda*, some attention will be paid to the association of different emotive vocabulary words with the mind, in order to prove their psychological nature.

A Note on Kṛtajñā-bhāva and the Devotional Aspect in Aśvaghoṣa's Work

The presence of the concept of *kṛtajñā-bhāva* is indicative of the devotional focus of Aśvaghoṣa's work,²⁸⁵ and since devotion is decidedly an emotional phenomenon, a few words will be said here about this particular bent of our author. In addition to *kṛtajñā-bhāva*, devotionally-oriented words such as *bhakti*, *prasāda* and *śraddhā* have a significant role in the vocabulary of the *Saundarananda*. For example, in chapter 12 of our text, Aśvaghoṣa tells us that faith or *śraddhā* is the foundation of Buddhist practice, just as the roots of a tree are the foundation for its trunk and branches.

yasmād dharmasya cotpattau śraddhā kāraṇam uttamam
mayoktā kāryatas tasmāt tatra tatra tathā tathā //Sau, 12.40//

And, because faith (*śraddhā*), due to its effects, is the greatest cause of the production of the Law, consequently, I describe it in these ways and in these different situations (examples given previously).

śraddhāṅkuram imaṃ tasmāt saṃvardhayitum arhasi/
tadvṛddhau vardhate dharmo mūlavṛddhau yathā drumah //Sau, 12.41//²⁸⁶

Therefore, you should cherish this shoot of faith (*śraddhā*), as the Buddhist understanding (*dharma*) grows with its growth, just as a tree grows with the growth of a root.

In addition to chapter 12, in which a significant number of verses are devoted to a eulogy on faith or *śraddhā*, there are other sections of the *Saundarananda* in which *bhakti* and *prasāda* figure prominently.

yasyārthakāmaprabhavā hi bhaktis tato 'sya sā tiṣṭhati rūḍhamūlā/
dharmānvayo yasya bhaktirāgas tasya prasādo hṛdayāvagāḍhaḥ//Sau, 18.4//²⁸⁷

For, one whose devotion originates in sensual desire and its objects has his roots entrenched (in them), (whereas) one whose passion for devotion (*bhakti-rāga*) is linked to Buddhist practice has grace (*prasāda*) entered into his heart.

saṁvardhante hyakuśalā vitarkāḥ sambhṛtā hṛdi
anarthajanakās tulyam ātmanaś ca parasya ca//Sau, 15.20//

For unwholesome thoughts increase, burdening the heart and they cause misfortune for both oneself and others.

śreyaso vighnakaraṇād bhavanty ātmavipattaye/
pātrībhāvopaghātāt tu parabhaktivipattaye//Sau, 15.21//²⁸⁸

They lead to one's own misfortune by creating an obstacle to the highest good and also lead to the destruction of others' devotion by harming their ability to be a worthy receptacle.

In the two verses above, it is interesting to note that both grace (*prasāda*) and devotion (*bhakti*) are portrayed as entering into the practitioner from the exterior. In the case of *prasāda*, grace is said to enter into (*avagāḍha*) the heart if one's passion for devotion (*bhakti*) is centered around the Buddhist *dharma*. In the case of devotion, one has to be a worthy receptacle (*pātri-bhāva*) in order to receive it. Is Aśvaghoṣa advocating here that grace is a motivating factor and that motivation enters from without? If so, this would be similar to later developments in *Mahāyāna* Buddhism, such as in the sect of Pure Land Buddhism, and to more theistically-oriented religions in general.

In the *Saundarananda*, the Buddha is the object of devotion. In fact, Nanda claims outright that his enlightenment was entirely due to the teaching of the

Tathāgata in a number of places: he does not credit his own efforts in any way. In the verse below, which takes place shortly after Nanda has successfully passed through the four *dhyānas* and achieved *arhatship*, Nanda attributes his success entirely to the magical or majestic power (*anubhava*) of the *Tathāgata*.

rogād ivārogyam asahyarūpād mād ivāṇṇyam anantasankhyāt/
dviṣat sakāśād iva cāpayānaṃ durbhikṣayogāc ca yathā subhikṣaṃ // Sau, 17.69 //

tadvat parāṃ śāntim upāgato 'ham yasyānubhāvena vināyakasya/
karomi bhūyaḥ punar uktam asmai namo namo 'rhāya tathāgatāya // Sau,
17.70 // ²⁸⁹

Like someone who has gained good health after an extremely unbearable illness, like someone who has emerged from debt after a debt of countless proportions, and like someone who escapes from facing his adversaries or someone who has reached plenty after being in famine, in the same way, I have arrived at ultimate peace through the majestic/magic power (*anubhava*) of the Hero, the one to whom I pay obeisance to again and again, the one who is called the worthy Tathāgata.

Here, we have followed Johnston in his translation of *anubhava* as something akin to “majestic” or “magical power”. This is one possible sense of the word in Pali but not in Classical Sanskrit. Since Aśvaghoṣa often uses Classical Sanskrit words with meanings very close to those in Pali, this is a plausible translation. (Both Y. Hadedā and R. Salomon comment upon this aspect of Aśvaghoṣa’s language).²⁹⁰

Here, we can only speculate at the reason for Aśvaghoṣa’s devotional bent. Previous scholars in Aśvaghoṣa studies, such as Biswanath Bhattacharya and E. H. Johnston, have wondered if this devotional bent implied that Aśvaghoṣa was

part of a proto-*Mahāyāna* sect such as the *Mahāsaṅghikas* or one of their offshoots such as the *Bahuśrutikas*.²⁹¹ Yet, what is significant here is that, since devotion implies an emotive or affective foundation, a greater emphasis on devotion in the *Saundarananda* implies a greater emphasis on emotion in Buddhist practice. This lends further credence to our approach of study here.

Introductory Remarks on the Emotive Vocabulary of the Saundarananda

As was mentioned previously, there seem to be two conceptual worlds which feed into the vocabulary of the *Saundarananda*. One conceptual world is that of Buddhist soteriology and practice; the other has a more poetic or aesthetic bent to it. The influence of the aesthetic stream of thinking is not openly admitted but still seems present, whereas the Buddhist stream of thinking is proclaimed as dominant, but, in actuality, seems to be more in a state of interaction with the aesthetic one. This kind of interaction is most clearly noticeable with certain vocabulary words such as *bhāva* and *rasa*, which are analyzed in chapter six.

Vikriyā and Dhṛti

In M. Monier-Williams' and V. S. Apte's Sanskrit-English dictionaries, *vikriyā* is explicated as "perturbation", "agitation", "transformation", "disfigurement", "excitement of passion" etc. Here, the prefix "vi" in Sanskrit is utilized in the sense of "moving away from" or "diverging from". In this case, *vikriyā* is diverging away from *kriyā*, which connotes "action", "purificatory rite"

or even “motion”. Thus, if one attempts to analyze *vikriyā* by its grammatical components alone, *vikriyā* connotes a “motion” or “an action away from”.

One occurrence of *vikriyā* comes in the context of Nanda’s period of mourning for the company of his wife, which takes place at the beginning of his pledge to become a Buddhist monk. In this passage, Nanda’s downward slide into mourning and dismay is equated with *vikriyā*.

atha nandam adhīralocanam gṛhayānotsukam utsukotsukam/
abhigamyā śivena cakṣuṣā śramaṇaḥ kaścīd uvāca maitrayā // Sau, 8.1 //

Then, a monk with tranquil eyes approached Nanda, who was with unsteady eyes and eagerly longing to return home, and spoke (to him) with compassion.

kim idaṃ mukham aśrudurdinaṃ hṛdayasthaṃ vivṛṇoti te tamaḥ/
dhṛtim ehi niyaccha vikriyāṃ na hi bāṣpāś ca śamaś ca śobhate // Sau, 8.2 // ²⁹²

What is this tear-strewn face? It reveals the darkness (*tamas*) in your heart (*hṛdayastha*). Become steadfast (*dhṛti*)! Restrain emotional turbulence (*vikriyā*)! For, tears and peacefulness do not go well together.

In the above passages, *vikriyā* seems to connote that aspect of emotivity and volition which are associated with disturbances in one’s inner peace: those surging, impelling types of emotions and desires that tend to make one lose concentration and inner calm. The images are telling: Nanda’s unsteady eyes (*adhīra-locana*), his eager longing (*utsuka*) to go home, the gloominess or cloudiness (*durdina*) in his face covered with tears, and the darkness (*tamas*) in his heart. All of these images connote an unsteadiness, a disturbance, and a lack of peacefulness.

The mien of the Buddhist monk is deliberately contrasted to that of *Nanda*: he is compassionate (*maitra*) and has tranquil (*śiva*) eyes. The monk preaches *dhṛti* as opposed to *vikriyā*. *Dhṛti*, in the *Saundarananda*, is a concept which connotes a steadiness or steadfastness of mind, a peacefulness, a satisfaction, a non-impulsiveness, and a lack of inner turmoil. *Dhṛti* and its cognate words such as *dhairya* etc. are always portrayed as the antithesis of *vikriyā* and its cognate words such as *cala*, *adhīra* etc. This contrast is one of the principal ideological themes in the *Saundarananda*.

According to M. Monier-Williams and V. S. Apte's Sanskrit English Dictionaries, *dhṛti* is derived from the verbal root *dhṛ*, and signifies "holding", "supporting", "firmness", "constancy" and even "satisfaction" and "joy". *Dhṛti* can also mean resolve or determination, thus giving it volitional connotations in addition to the emotive sense implied by the words "satisfaction" and "joy". Other passages from the *Saundarananda* give us further insight into how *dhṛti* interfaces with *vikriyā* in the thinking of Aśvaghoṣa. The passage below takes place in the context of Nanda's conversion to Buddhist practice. In order to convert Nanda, the Buddha is attempting to convince him to practice the *dharma* in order to obtain heaven and eternal life with the *Apsaras*.

dhṛtiṃ pariśvajya vidhūya vikriyāṃ nigṛhya tāvac chrutacetasī śṃu/
imā yadi prārthayase tvam aṅganā vidhatsva śulkārtham ihottamaṃ tapaḥ / /Sau,
10.59 / /²⁹³

Just (*tāvat*)²⁹⁴ listen (to me)! Embrace steadfastness (*dhṛti*)! Shake off emotional turbulence or unsteadiness (*vikriyā*)! Restrain what you have learned and your

heart (*śruta-cetas*)! If you desire these women, practice the most difficult austerities here in order to pay their price (in heaven).

Thus, in contrast to *vikriyā*, *dhṛti*, within the context of the *Saundarananda*, signifies the exact opposite of being forcefully pulled around by one's emotions. For example, in verse 8.53, *dhṛti* is contrasted to the forceful power of sensual love and that impulsive aspect of love which drags and pulls one around according to its commands. In verse 9.50, the forces of steadfastness (*dhṛti*) and tranquillity (*śarma*) are juxtaposed, while the blinding power of love (*mada*) is placed in opposition to them. The implication seems to be that *dhṛti* and *śarma* are complementary, positive forces in the mind whereas *mada* is a factor which causes confusion or mental blindness (*andha-cetas*). In addition, in verse 10.41, Nanda is described as being "forcefully dragged around" (*jehṛīyamāna*)²⁹⁵ by the wandering senses (*lola-indriya*), and the notion of being "dragged around" is contrasted to the idea of being steadfast or steady (*dhṛti*) with respect to the senses.

One of the more interesting portrayals of *dhṛti* comes in verse 11.12, where *dhṛti* is portrayed as the opposite of mental disease (*mānaso vyādhi*). This verse comes within the context of Ānanda's speech to Nanda concerning the foolishness of practicing Buddhism in order to obtain something else. By mental disease, Ānanda is referring not only to Nanda's desire to obtain the *Apsaras*, but also to his previous state of being impulsively driven by the desire for sense objects.

durharo mānaso vyādhir balavāṃś ca tavābhavat/
vinivṛtto yadi sa te sarvathā dhṛtimānasi//Sau, 11.12//²⁹⁶

Your mental sickness was difficult to remove, as it had become strong. If it is entirely eliminated, then your mind is completely at equilibrium (*dhṛti*).

Dhṛti is thus portrayed as a quality of someone who is completely cured of mental illness. In *Aśvaghoṣa's* sense of the word, mental illness is defined by the tendency to be impulsed by the pursuit of sense objects. As was mentioned previously, in verse 11.10, Nanda's mental illness is described clearly as due to the influence of *rāga* and *kāma* (sensual desire), which are two words that usually signify the impulsive desire for sense objects. In the *Saundarananda* verse 17.66, *dhṛti* is said to be like water (*ambu*) for the fire of sensual desire (*kāma*), and, in verse 17.61, *dhṛti* is listed as one of the qualities of arhatship (*arhattva*) in Nanda's enlightenment.²⁹⁷

In chapter three, the Buddha is portrayed as one of steady mind (*niścita-mati*), which is contrasted to the easily influenced mind of someone who is subject to *vikriyā*. Here, I view *niścita-mati* as being synonymous with *dhṛti*, as both are used in direct contrast to *vikriyā* and in roughly the same context. Hence, I have used the translation "steady in mind" for *niścitamati* instead of other possible meanings like "resolved in mind" etc.

pratipūjayā na sa jaharṣa na ca śucam avajñāyāgamat/
niścitamatiḥ asicandanayor na jagāma duḥkhasukhayoś ca vikriyāṃ//Sau,
3.19//²⁹⁸

He did not become excited at praise, nor did he grieve at scorn/
 He was steady in mind: he did not become perturbed (or swayed) (*vikriyā*) by
 either violent opposition (*asī*) or sycophancy (*candana*), nor by happiness or
 sorrow.

Thus, after an examination of the previous verses (especially 3.19, 8.2 and 10.59) how exactly would we translate the concepts of *dhṛti* and *vikriyā* within the context of the terms “affect”, “emotion”, “volition” etc.? *Dhṛti* occurs frequently and in many contexts in the *Saundarananda*. Hence, we will begin with it, and, since *vikriyā* is clearly explicated as *dhṛti*’s opposite, we will use *dhṛti*’s antithesis as our translation of *vikriyā*. This is the most reasonable procedure, as *vikriyā* occurs rarely and with little detailed explanation to accompany it.

Considering the previous passages (and others throughout the *Saundarananda*), the best possible translation for *dhṛti* is “affective and volitional steadfastness”. Yet, we will use the abbreviated form of “steadfastness” for the sake of simplicity. The word “affective” is used instead of the word “emotive” in order to indicate the quality of steadiness and non-changeability associated with *dhṛti*. (Here, please refer back to my definitions of “affect” and “emotion” in chapter two).

It is clear from an examination of the verses involving *dhṛti* and its cognate words in the *Saundarananda*, that *dhṛti* connotes a peacefulness and steadiness, or, a positive and stable affective state of mind. In regards to volition, *dhṛti* implies a steadfastness with regard to impulsive types of desires, and thus, a volition which is not impelled or driven in its subjectively felt aspect.

For Aśvaghoṣa, *dhṛti* seems to symbolize the tendency of the Buddhist sage to remain fixed and unmoved in the face of any sort of external or internal turbulence. In contrast, we can define *vikriyā* within the context of the *Saundarananda*, as “emotional and volitional unsteadiness or turbulence”. Yet, for the sake of simplicity, I will translate *vikriyā* here as “emotional turbulence”. *Vikriyā* seems to symbolize impulsive desires and that aspect of affectivity which is unsteady or disturbing.

The concept of *dhṛti* is very important for this thesis. *Dhṛti* is a quality that is consistently ascribed to the sage and the ideal Buddhist practitioner throughout the *Saundarananda*. Thus, any affective description cannot obviate this aspect of the sage’s psychological make-up. If the Buddhist sage does indeed have an emotional life, according to Aśvaghoṣa, it cannot be one of constant change or perturbation; rather, it has to be one of steadiness and positivity. This idea is explored more in the section below entitled “Additional Qualities of the Buddha or the Ideal Practitioner”.

Synonyms of Vikriyā

More insight into the term *vikriyā*, and consequently, into the nature of the sage can be deduced from an analysis of several of *vikriyā*’s synonyms. For example, in some passages, the term *vyasana* can be seen as a close synonym, although, in others, it signifies the more concrete idea of a physical calamity or misfortune. In the verse below, *vyasana* could take on either meaning.

sthite viśiṣṭe tvayi saṁśraye śraye yathā na yāmiha vasan diśaṁ diśaṁ/
yathā ca labdhvā vyasanakṣayaṁ kṣayaṁ vrajāmi tan me kuru śaṁsataḥ
sataḥ // Sau, 10.57 // ²⁹⁹

I take refuge in you, a refuge which has been established as excellent. Do act (do it) upon my behalf,³⁰⁰ as I am devoted (to you), so that³⁰¹ I do not wander aimlessly here from birth to birth, (and) so that I may obtain the abode which is the destruction of passion/misfortune.³⁰²

According to both V. S. Apte's and M. Monier-William's Sanskrit-English dictionaries, in addition to the idea of "calamity" or "misfortune", *vyasana* can connote "vice", "evil passion" or "evil habit". In comparison, as was previously mentioned, *vikriyā* can signify "perturbation", "agitation", "transformation", "disfigurement", "excitement of passion" etc. Both *vyasana* and *vikriyā* seem to be employing the prefix "vi" in Sanskrit in the sense of "moving away from" or "diverging from". What they are diverging away from is *as+* (in the case of *vyasana*) and *kriyā*. In this regard, *as+* means "throwing" or "hurling" and can perhaps be said to connote a "missing of the mark", or a throwing which is not straight. In the context of emotion, this could signify an emotion which deviates from a state of health, perhaps implying that there is such a thing as a healthy emotion or passion.

Vikāra is another possible synonym of *vikriyā*. M. Monier-Williams Sanskrit-English dictionary states that *kṛta-vikriyā* is synonymous with *kṛta-vikāra*, both meaning "change" or "alteration". In chapter 17 of the *Saundarananda*, Aśvaghoṣa refers to the concept of *vikāra* alongside the concepts of *in̄jita* and *spandita* when he describes Nanda's passage through the four

dhyānas. In the group of passages below, verse 17.52 is referring to the third *dhyāna*, which has just been called the highest of all blisses in verse 17.51. After passing through the four *dhyānas*, Nanda then proceeds to the state of the *arhat*.

dhyāne 'pi tatrātha dadarśa doṣaṃ mene paraṃ śāntaṃ aniṇjaṃ eva/
ābhogato 'pīñjayati sma tasya cittaṃ pravṛttaṃ sukhaṃ ity ajasraṃ // Sau,
17.52//

Then, even there in that level of meditation (third *dhyāna*), he saw a flaw (*doṣa*), (as) he understood that the highest (stage) is peaceful (and) unchanging (*aniṇja*).³⁰³ (Yet), due to enjoyment (i.e. of bliss or *sukha*) his mind was ever changing, perpetually in the motion (*pravṛtta*) of happiness (*sukha*).

yatreñjitaṃ spanditaṃ asti tatra yatrāsti ca spanditaṃ asti duḥkhaṃ/
yasmād atas tatsukhaṃ iñjakatvāt praśāntikāmā yatayas tyajanti // Sau, 17.53//

Because (*yasmād*), wherever there is change (*iñjita*), there is motion (*spandita*), and, wherever there is motion, there is suffering, religious followers who desire peace (*praśāntikāmā*) abandon this happiness (i.e. of the third *dhyāna*) due to its variability (or, due to the fact that it is constantly changing).

atha prahāṇāt sukhaduḥkhayoś ca manovikārasya ca pūrvam eva/ dadhyāv
upekṣāsmṛtimad viśuddhaṃ dhyānaṃ tathāduḥkhasukhaṃ caturthaṃ // Sau,
17.54//³⁰⁴

Then, after he had already (*pūrvā*) abandoned the changes of the mind (*manovikāra*) with respect to happiness (*sukha*) and sorrow (*duḥkha*), he applied (himself) to the fourth level of meditation (*dhyāna*), which was without either happiness (*sukha*) or sorrow (*duḥkha*), (and) which was pure, being characterized by awareness (*smṛti*) and equanimity (*upekṣā*).

Thus, the most important point here is that mental changes/movements (*iñjita*) or alterations (*vikāra*) or motions (*spandita*) are equated with suffering.

If we combine the notions of *vikāra* etc. with *vikriyā*, what does this mean for our study? How do these notions in the *Saundarananda* relate to concepts such as “emotion”, “affect” etc., as they were defined in chapter two?

What Aśvaghoṣa seems to be implying here is that an emotional life which is constantly undergoing alteration indicates instability and is therefore contrary to Buddhist practice (and liberation). Does this mean that all affectivity is antithetical to Buddhist practice? Aśvaghoṣa does not appear to be saying this, as the qualities he attributes to the Buddhist sage, such as steadfastness (*dhṛti*), satisfaction (*tr̥pti*), empathy (*anukampa*) etc. indicate an affective life. Also, if we just consider the concept of *dhṛti* itself, it signifies a constancy of both affect and volition.

Ideal Qualities of the Buddha or the Ideal Practitioner

Here, in order to answer the questions posed in the previous section, a more detailed analysis into the affective nature of the sage in the *Saundarananda* is necessary. In regards to depictions of the Buddha in the *Saundarananda*, he is often depicted with positive affect, but never with *vikriyā* or any emotion which wavers, fluctuates or surges into the consciousness to disturb a state of inner tranquillity. For example, in verse 5.33, 17.73 etc., the Buddha is described as having empathy (*anukampa*). In verse 5.34, 18.47 etc., the Buddha is depicted as having a mind of compassion (*maitra-manas* or *cetas*). And, in verse 18.47 (and

also in 3.15), the Buddha is said to be *anujighṛkṣatā* with regard to all beings, or “desirous of showing them favor or grace”.

Furthermore, in regard to his affective qualities, the Buddha is never said to be sometimes compassionate and sometimes not, or, at times, empathetic, and, at others, disdainful or apathetic. On the contrary, every action of the Buddha is considered to be motivated by compassion. In this regard, even the most questionable action of the Buddha in the poem, that of enticing Nanda into Buddhist practice by offering him the *Apsarases*, is said to be compassionate.

dosāṃś ca kāyād bhiṣag ujjiḥsur bhūyo yathā kleśayituṃ yateta
rāgaṃ tathā tasya munir jighāmsur bhūyastaraṃ rāgaṃ upānināya // Sau,
10.43 // ³⁰⁵

And, just as an (*Āyurvedic*) doctor, desiring to remove diseases (*doṣa*) from the body, attempts to bring greater disease upon it, similarly, the Sage, desiring to destroy his (Nanda's) impulsive desire (*rāga*), brought him in the midst of even greater desire.

The above action of the Buddha is explained in the following way: he is intending to arouse an even greater desire within Nanda. The arousal of a greater desire in Nanda was supposed to generate further internal conflict and force Nanda into a deeper state of self-reflection. Thus, the Buddha never loses the positive affect of compassion throughout the entire process of Nanda's instruction. He always has his student's best wishes in mind.

In addition to the affective descriptions of the Buddha, there are a number of similar descriptions of the ideal practitioner in the *Saundarananda*. In chapter

11, verses 11.34-35, the ideal practitioner is portrayed as someone who actually feels delight (*rati*) in his/her inner self and does not need external things, such as music, finery etc. to achieve this delight. Also, in verse 8.24, we see that the highest delight (*abhirati*), delight in the *dharma*, is equated with steadiness in nature (*acalātmā*).

śravaṇe grahaṇe 'tha dhāraṇe paramārthāvagame manaḥśame/
aviṣaktamateś calātmano na hi dharme 'bhiratir vidhūyate//Sau, 8.24//

For, highest delight (*abhirati*) in the law (*dharma*) is not bestowed upon someone who is of unsteady nature (*calātmā*), whose mind is not attached to (*aviṣakta*) peace of mind, or the listening, apprehending and grasping (things related to) the understanding of the ultimate truth.

viṣayeṣu tu doṣadarśinaḥ parituṣṭasya śucer amāninaḥ/
śamakarmasu yuktacetasaḥ kṛtabuddher na ratir na vidyate//Sau, 8.25//³⁰⁶

But, someone who has an accomplished intellect, whose mind is attached to peaceful actions, who is unconceited, pure and satisfied and who sees the fault in sense objects will experience great delight (*rati*).

Hence, thus far, if we combine the various descriptions of the Buddha and the ideal Buddhist practitioner in the *Saundarananda*, Aśvaghoṣa appears to be saying that the ideal Buddhist is someone who is steadfast and unwavering, yet also a person who possesses positive affective characteristics like compassion (*maitrī*), empathy (*anukampa*) and delight (*rati*). In addition to these positive qualities, a sage should be “satisfied” or “content”, or, characterized by *tṛpti* or *tuṣṭi* etc. For example, in verse 14.51, the Buddha describes the ideal practitioner as someone who has a satisfied heart (*tṛpta-hṛdaya*).

Furthermore, the descriptions of Buddhist liberation in the *Saundarananda* are not without affective qualities. In verses 17.65-66, Nanda's liberation is equated with the highest ecstasy (*param hlādam*) and greatest happiness (*sumahat-sukham*). And, in verse 12.24, the everlasting happiness (*avyayam-sukham*) of Buddhist liberation is compared to the fleeting happiness of sensual pleasures (*kāma*).

If we analyze these descriptions of the Buddha in the *Saundarananda* in relation to the definitions of "affect" and "emotion" which have been outlined in chapter two, we can come to a few conclusions: first of all, the Buddha has positive affect but not negative affect; also, he does not possess emotion, at least as we have defined it, for he undergoes no internal changes or modifications (*vikāra, vikriyā* etc.). Or, it could be that, at the very least, the sage is unaffected by internal change as he³⁰⁷ remains constant (*dhairya*) in his resolve, no matter the external or internal situation.

The significance of these observations is not in the semantics of the different emotional vocabulary words that we use to describe the mind state of the enlightened sage in Buddhism. The sage could just as easily be defined as possessing "emotion" and not "affect", or, "feeling-tone,"³⁰⁸ as Johansson has defined it, and not "emotion" etc., depending upon how one were to define these various terms. Rather, what is significant here is that Aśvaghoṣa has clearly described the enlightened ideal within Buddhism as affective: a sage is joyous, empathetic, compassionate and satisfied. He is not someone who is dull and

lifeless, and completely lacking in affectivity. By doing this, Aśvaghoṣa seems to imply that affective life has a place in Buddhist practice, and that Buddhist practice must not mean merely a distancing from affective life or some sort of entirely non-affective state.

Concluding Remarks concerning Vikriyā etc. and Affect of Sage in the Saundarananda

Thus, in summary, Aśvaghoṣa seems to be telling us the following things in regards to the emotivity of the sage. First of all, emotivity that is changeable, subject to alteration, and unsteady, is not sage-like. *Vikriyā, vikāra,*³⁰⁹ *inījita, spandita* and *vyasana* all seem to connote affectivity that is changeable and therefore unsagelike. Also, negative affect is not a quality of the sage. In contrast, any affects which are positive and persistent are attributes of the sage. In certain contexts, words like *dhṛti, rati, tṛpti, hlāda, sukha* etc. are all used to connote the continually positive affective life of the sage.

Is Aśvaghoṣa implying here that Buddhist practice is partly a process of emotive or affective development? Then, does progress in Buddhist practice evince itself by an increase both in the stability and positive nature of one's affective states rather than the attenuation of emotivity or the disappearance of it into some non-emotive (or affective) state called "detachment"? This final speculation will be explored more in chapters six and seven, but particularly in chapter seven.

Chapter 6: Additional Translations of Emotive Vocabulary from the Saundarananda

Introductory Remarks

In this chapter, we will complete the process of matching the English words “emotion”, “affect” etc. with some corresponding concepts in the Classical Sanskrit vocabulary of the *Saundarananda*. As was stated in the previous chapter, many of the vocabulary words in the *Saundarananda* will be analyzed from the point of view of both Buddhist theory and aesthetic theory.

Here, one additional point may be worthy of note. Although this translation process may seem long and tedious, it is one possible means towards a desired end: that is to say, one of the emerging goals here is to understand Aśvaghoṣa’s vision of Buddhist practice and liberation through an examination of emotion and all of its related concepts. Thus, the translation process here is not seen as valuable in and of itself, but rather, as a necessary foundational task. In the concluding remarks, we will attempt to summarize Aśvaghoṣa’s overall point of view from the material in chapters five and six.

Bhāva

With regard to *bhāva*, it is difficult to ascertain which is the dominant stream of influence, aesthetic or Buddhist philosophy. Certainly, as we saw in chapter one, *bhāva* is a dominant emotive concept in Bharata’s *Nāṭyaśāstra*. However, an emotive signification for *bhāva* is not entirely absent in the Pali

Canon either. For example, in certain passages in the *Jātakas*, *bhāva* is used to signify affection or sentiments, especially in the context of being in love.

Kīle rājā amaccehi bhariyāhi parivārīto,
nāmacco rājabharyāsu bhāvaṃ kubbetha paṇḍito // Ja 6.293 // ³¹⁰

In leisure activities, (when) a king is surrounded by (his) ministers and wives, a wise minister should not become infatuated/develop feelings (*bhāva*) for the king's wives.

The usage of *bhāva* in the quote above is similar to its usage in verse 4.10 of the *Saundarananda* where Sundarī and Nanda are described as being in love (*bhāva-anurakta*).

Within the context of the *Saundarananda*, *bhāva* is probably best translated by both "emotion" and "affect". If we compare *vikriyā* and *bhāva* in the *Saundarananda*, *vikriyā* always has a negative tone vis-à-vis Buddhist practice. It connotes emotive perturbation and a confusion of one's resolve or volitional impulses. In contrast, *bhāva*'s semantic range is much broader, and it also does not have the same volitional connotations. *Bhāva* can be a more neutral, less value-laden term in relation to Buddhist practice, or, it can signify a negative or positive force in practice. If we go according to our schema laid out in chapter two, *bhāva* is better translated by the term "affect" in the places where it connotes a desirable emotive quality for a Buddhist practitioner. For, as we have already seen in our previous analyses, the only emotive qualities which are sage-like,

according to Aśvaghoṣa, are those in which there is a quality of steadiness or stability.

However, *bhāva* and *vikriyā* have one central point in common in relation to the definitions for emotive terminology presented at the end of chapter two. Neither the concept of *bhāva* nor *vikriyā* are connected to immaterial feeling, and therefore, no clear delineation can be made between cognitive and volitional processes and *bhāva* or *vikriyā* based upon immaterial feeling. Thus, in this sense, neither are an exact fit for our definitions of either “emotion” or “affect”.

In the *Saundarananda*, one clear example of *bhāva* being used in the sense of a positive affect comes in verse 18.52. In this verse, the Buddha uses the term *kṛtajña-bhāva*, or, “affect of gratitude”, to describe Nanda’s attitude after he has reached enlightenment. Here, Nanda is also described as an *arhat*, or, as someone whose mind (*cetas*) is free from passion (*rajas*) and mental darkness (*tamas*).

rajastamobhyāṃ parimuktacetāsas tavaiva ceyam sadṛśī kṛtajñatā/
 rajaḥprakarṣeṇa jagaty avasthite kṛtajñabhāvo hi kṛtajña durlabhah/ /Sau,
 18.52/ ³¹¹

As the world is sunken due to the dragging (force) of passion (*rajas*), oh grateful one, it is rare to find the affect (*bhāva*) of gratitude (*kṛtajña*). Yet, for someone like you, whose mind is freed from darkness (*tamas*) and passion (*rajas*), this gratefulness is proper (*sadṛśī*).

In addition to the positive usage of *bhāva* quoted above, *bhāva* can also be used in a very neutral sense in relation to Buddhist practice. For example, in chapter 12, verse 12.11, after Nanda has realized that practicing *dharma* for the

attainment of something else (i.e. the *Apsarases*) is not the wisest course of action, he approaches the Buddha to tell him his feelings or *bhāvas* about this. In this case, *bhāva* is used in a very general, everyday sense: Nanda is merely expressing what sentiments he feels inside.

At the end of chapter 9, the Buddha is described as someone who perceives all of the human emotions (*bhāva*). And, in chapter 13, in response to Nanda's approach and demand for advice, the Buddha states that the open expression of emotions (*bhāva*) brings about a quality of straight-forwardness in a person, which is essential for Buddhist practice. Here, too, *bhāva* is used in a very general, neutral sense vis-à-vis Buddhist practice; it is open expression which is being explicated as positive. In verse 13.12, the Buddha seems to be saying something very close to a modern-day English expression: expressing your feelings or emotions is good for you.

prayogaḥ kāyavacasoḥ śuddho bhavati te yathā/
uttāno vivṛto gupto anavacchidras tathā kuru//Sau, 13.11//

Act in a way that the employment of your body and speech is pure, so that (*tathā*) you are candid, open, circumspect and faultless.

uttāno bhāvakaraṇād vivṛtaś cāpy agūhanāt/
gupto rakṣaṇatātparyād acchidraś cānavadyataḥ//Sau, 13.12//³¹²

Candid, due to the expression of (your) emotions (*bhāva*); Open, due to the fact of not concealing anything; Circumspect due to devoting yourself to self-government; and without flaw because of being blameless.

In the *Saundarananda*, *bhāva* is also used in a negative sense with regard to the goals of Buddhist practice and liberation. For example, in chapter four, Nanda and Sundarī are compared to a *Kimṇuruṣa* and *Kimṇarī* standing beneath a waterfall in loving devotion. Here, the phrase for devotion used is *bhāva-anurakta*, which literally means something like the following: “being attached or devoted in one’s emotions.” Roughly, in everyday English, this seems to mean something like “in love”.³¹³ Yet, in the context of the *Saundarananda*, since the love of Sundarī and Nanda is portrayed as a lesser form of devotion than Buddhist practice, one can only conclude that the term *bhāva* is being used here in a negative sense, or, at the very least, in a less positive sense.

Finally, *bhāva* is clearly a psychological term. It is associated with mentality, as is illustrated by verses such as 5.35-5.36 (*rudantam antarmanasa*) and verses 18.52 where the term *kṛtajñā-bhāva* is associated with the liberated mind (*parimukta-cetas*) of Nanda. Along similar lines, in verse 6.16, Sundarī, in bemoaning the absence of Nanda, has a whimsical thought of jealousy enter her mind in which she speaks of the physical beauty and emotional strength of a possible rival: “Surely my beloved has seen another who excels me in physical beauty (*rūpa*) and in feeling/emotion (*bhāva*).” Here again, *bhāva* seems to stand for a concept which is not in the realm of the material beauty or *rūpa*, but more mental or psychological.

In summary, *bhāva*, like *vikriyā*, is a psychological term related to emotivity. However, in the *Saundarananda*, Nanda as an *arhat* (and thus an

enlightened person), is said to possess certain *bhāvas*, whereas neither he nor the Buddha are ever said to possess *vikriyās*. For this reason, it has been concluded here that there is some delineation being made between these two concepts. We have attempted to capture this delineation by translating the two terms differently. In this regard, *bhāva* has been translated as “affect/emotion” and *vikriyā* as “emotional and volitional perturbation, unsteadiness, deterioration” etc. In my translation of *vikriyā*, I attempt to express its greater volitional content, vis-à-vis *bhāva*.

There is one way in which *vikriyā* is actually closer to our definition of “emotion”: in the *Saundarananda*, *vikriyā* clearly includes the meaning of “a change in one’s psychological state”, whereas *bhāva* is not explicated in this way. In chapter two, we defined “emotion” as a change in one’s mental or psychological state”, and, in this way, we differentiated the concept of “emotion” from “affect”, which was said to indicate a more persistent type of emotivity. Thus, if we consider the notion of change as central to “emotion”, then *vikriyā* is a closer equivalent than *bhāva*.

This being said, there is also a sense in which *bhāva* is closer to our original definition of “emotion”: *bhāva* has a more varied semantic range. Whereas *vikriyā* is always negative, *bhāva* can be either negative, positive or neutral. In chapter two, we defined emotion as constituting a change in one’s mental state without either a positive or negative connotation. This definition seems a better fit for the semantic range of *bhāva* than for that of *vikriyā*.

Rasa

In the *Saundarananda*, Aśvaghoṣa uses the word *rasa* to signify both “physical taste” or “fluid” and “mental taste” or “draught”. Its occurrences in the physical sense are in verses 9.31, for example, where the fluid (*rasa*) of the sugar cane is compared to the body’s life force, and in verse 9.48, where the word *rasa* designates the taste (*rasa*) of the *kiṃpāka* fruit. When it is used in the sense of “mental taste”, it is usually employed with more positive, liberation-oriented terms, such as peacefulness (*śama*), renunciation (*naiṣkramya*)³¹⁴ or wisdom (*prajñā*).

śraddhāhanam śreṣṭhatamaṃ dhanebhyaḥ prajñārasas tṛptikaro rasebhyaḥ/
pradhānam adhyātmasukhaṃ sukhebhyaḥ vidyāratir duḥkhatamā
ratibhyaḥ // Sau, 5.24 // ³¹⁵

The wealth of faith (*śraddhā*) is the greatest of wealths; the taste (*rasa*) of wisdom (*prajñā*), amongst the tastes, is the bringer of satisfaction; the principal happiness amongst the happinesses is inner (*adhyātmā*) happiness; the enjoyment (*rati*) of vain knowledge (*vidyā*) is the most sorrowful of the enjoyments (*rati*).

kvacid bhuktvā yat tad vasanam api yat tat parihito
vasann ātmārāmaḥ kvacana vijane yo 'bhiramate/
kṛtārthaḥ sa jñeyāḥ śamasukharasajñāḥ kṛtamatih
pareṣām saṃsargaṃ pariharati yaḥ kaṇṭakam iva // Sau, 14.50 //

He is considered to be accomplished, who is of accomplished mind (*mati*), who knows the taste (*rasa*) of happiness (*sukha*) and peacefulness (*śama*), who rejoices in solitude, who lives, self-content anywhere (*ātmārāma*), who eats whatever, anywhere, who wears whatever type of clothing and who avoids contact with others like a thorn.

In the previous verses, it is difficult to say if *rasa* is being used in the Buddhist sense, as was illustrated by passages from the *Sutta Nipāta* and the *Atthasālinī* in chapter four, or, in the aesthetic sense, as was demonstrated from certain passages from the *Nāṭyaśāstra*. In the *Atthasālinī*, *rasa* is mentioned in the description of *vedanā* or feeling: “feeling partakes in the taste (*rasa*) of the object”.³¹⁶ In the *Sutta Nipāta*, the author mentions the taste (*rasa*) of joy (*pīti*). The *Nāṭyaśāstra* states that *rasa* so named because of its quality of being relishable (*āsvādyatva*). However, this relishing can take place only in the context of a dramatic performance and is said to occur within the minds of an empathetic observer (*sumanasa prekṣaka*). The basis of this relishing is the principal emotions (*sthayī-bhāva*) within the empathetic onlooker.

In regard to the origins of the usage of *rasa* as “mental taste”, V. Raghavan asserts that the Buddhists and Jains were probably responsible for introducing the concept of *śānta-rasa* into aesthetic theory. In this assertion he refers directly to the *Saundarananda* as one possible source of *śānta-rasa*, but does not mention earlier sources such the *Sutta Nipāta*.³¹⁷ Although Raghavan’s discussion falls within a different context, namely within the debate over the origins of *śānta-rasa* as the ninth *rasa* in aesthetic theory, there is some import in his remarks for this thesis. What is of import here is that the “black and white” distinctions we have made between the aesthetic and the Buddhist schools of thought may not be entirely accurate. Rather, it could have been that Buddhist texts such as the

Saundarananda may have actually been at cause for many of the concepts in aesthetic texts such as the *Nāṭyśāstra*.

Whatever the particular sectarian origin of the word *rasa* in the meaning of “mental tasting” (or, the origin could be merely common sense), there seems to be some intersection between the aesthetic and Buddhist schools of thought here. In both schools of thought, the physical sense of tasting implied by the word *rasa* becomes a mental tasting of either feeling (*vedanā*), the various principal emotions (*sthāyi-bhāva*), or sage-like affects such as joy (*pīti*) etc. Similarly, in the *Saundarananda*, this same idea of psychological tasting is present with regard to wisdom (*prajñā*), peacefulness (*śama*) and renunciation (*naiṣkramya*).

Now, two questions emerge from the discussion above: a) how can we be sure that *rasa* refers to a psychological concept?; b) and, how does this concept relate to our definitions of “affect”, “emotion” and “feeling” outlined in chapter two? In regards to the first question, we will only attempt to answer it within the context of the *Saundarananda*. In the *Saundarananda*, *rasa* is clearly portrayed as psychological. For example, in verse 14.50, someone who has knows the taste (*rasa*) of the happiness of tranquillity (*śama*) is said to be of accomplished mind and self-content (*ātmā-ārāma*). In verse 14.51, someone who has the taste (*rasa*) of wisdom is said to be tranquil in heart (*śānta-hṛdaya*) and of satisfied heart (*tr̥pta-hṛdaya*). These references to the heart and mind of the ideal practitioner alongside references to his ability to experience the taste (*rasa*) of wisdom etc. seem to imply that *rasa* is a psychological phenomenon.

If this is so, then how does this idea of psychological tasting, as it is presented in the *Saundarananda*, fit into our definitions of “affect”, “emotion” and “feeling”? What *rasa* seems to represent is the tangible aspect of “affect”, “emotion” and “feeling”. This tangible aspect is the lowest common denominator within all three concepts, and can best represented by the translation of “subjective feeling”: thus, within the context of the *Saundarananda*, *rasa* can be rendered as “mental taste” or just, “feeling”.

Vedanā

Whereas in the Pali Canon, the concept of *vedanā* as “feeling” plays a prominent role, in the *Saundarananda*, the term “*vedanā*” appears only briefly. In fact, in the *Saundarananda*, the five *skandhas* are mentioned just once specifically, in verse 18.15, and there, only in the sense of sources of clinging (*upādāna skandhā*)³¹⁸ or attachment. The word *vedanā* itself appears in one verse, verse 8.3. This verse was already quoted in chapter five, but here, it may be useful to quote this verse and its accompanying verses again for the sake of clarification.

dvidvidhā samudeti vedanā niyataṃ cetasi deha eva ca/
śrutavidhyupacāraḥ kovidā dvidvidhā eva tayoś cikitsakāḥ // Sau, 8.3 //

Surely, it is understood that there are two types of pain: that of the body (*deha*) and that of the mind (*cetas*). And, for these two (types of pain), there are two types (of physicians): physicians of medical lore (*cikitsaka*) and physicians who are skilled in the conduct and rules of religious texts.

tad iyaṃ yadi kāyikī rujā bhiṣaje tūrnam anūnam ucyatām/
viniguhya hi rogam āturo na cirāt tīvram anartham ṛcchati // Sau, 8.4 //

Thus, if your pain is bodily, explain it quickly (and) thoroughly to a doctor. For, if a sick person conceals his illness, he quickly reaches a more disastrous state.

atha duḥkham idaṃ manomayaṃ vada vakṣyāmi yad atra bheṣajam/
manaso hi rajastamasvino bhiṣajo 'dhyātmavidaḥ parīkṣakāḥ // Sau, 8.5 // ³¹⁹

But if (your) suffering is mental (*manomaya*), tell (it to me and) I will then proclaim its cure. For, the physicians of the mind (*manas*), which is characterized by passion and darkness, are investigators who understand the (workings) of the inner soul (*adhyātmā*).

As was mentioned in chapter five, *vedanā* can be best interpreted here as “pain”. One reason for this is that, in verse 8.4, the word *rujā* is substituted for the idea of bodily *vedanā* and *rujā* usually signifies “pain”, “affliction” etc. in Classical Sanskrit. Also, in verse 8.5, *duḥkha* is substituted for mental *vedanā*, and *duḥkha* always signifies something painful.

Thus, the connotations of *vedanā* in the *Saundarananda* are quite different from most of the prevalent notions of it as “feeling” in the Pali Canon. This being said, there are also certain Canonical passages in which the connotation of *vedanā* as “pain” is possible. For example, in *Samyutta Nikāya* iv.208 previously quoted in chapter three, the untaught common person (*puṭhujjana*) is said to experience both mental and physical pain (*vedanā*) as if he was being pierced by a dart or a barb, whereas the Buddhist disciple only feels physical pain and not its mental counterpart. In addition, according to Monier-Williams’ *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, *vedanā* meaning “pain” etc. is listed as a possible reading within the context of Classical Sanskrit.³²⁰

In summary, in contrast to the prevalent signification of *vedanā* as “feeling” in the Pali Canon, within the context of the *Saundarananda*, *vedanā* is not really translatable as “feeling”, but rather, as “pain” or “affliction”. Thus, *rasa* (and *āsvādana* as well)³²¹ is the only word left to us in the *Saundarananda* which could possibly translate the concept of bare tangibility within the notion of subjective feeling.

Doṣa, Kleśa and Dvandva

Amongst the vocabulary words in the *Saundarananda* used to connote “affliction”, “sin”, “fault” etc., *kleśa* and *doṣa* emerge as the two most frequently occurring. In addition, these two terms are more clearly associated with psychic conflicts than the other affliction-related vocabulary words in the *Saundarananda*. Thus, because of their frequency and their usual association with the psyche or mind, *kleśa* and *doṣa* will be the only two terms of this genre reviewed here. In addition, because of their approximate synonymity, they will be reviewed together.

In regards to the other terms used to depict “affliction”, “sin” etc. in the *Saundarananda*, the next two most frequently used terms are *āsrava* and *anuśaya*. In addition, the terms *saṃyojana* and *kaṣāya* also appear but very rarely: in fact, the term *saṃyojana* appears but once in the entire *Saundarananda*, and the term *kaṣāya*, with the meaning of “sin”, also appears only once.³²² Another term of approximately the same frequency of *āsrava* and *anuśaya* is the term *pāpman/pāpa*

or sin. However, in the *Saundarananda*, Aśvaghoṣa uses *pāpman* to refer to bad or sinful actions in general. *Pāpman*, usually does not seem to have its focal point within the psychological realm. (An exception to this is verse 9.3, where *pāpman* and *rāga* are both associated with mental darkness or *tamas*).

vīryaṃ paraṃ kāryakṛtau hi mūlaṃ vīryād ṛte kācana nāsti siddhiḥ/
udeti vīryād iha sarvasampan nirvīryatā cet sakalaśca pāpmā/ /Sau, 16.94/ /³²³

With respect to getting the necessary things done, energy (*vīrya*) is the most important foundation. Without energy, nothing is accomplished. In this world, all success arises from energy; if energy is fragmented, then sin (*pāpman*) arises.

Unlike *pāpman*, the notion of *kleśa/doṣa* is usually seen as purely psychological in the *Saundarananda*. Yet, before we proceed with a psychological analysis of *kleśa/doṣa*, it is important to note that, even though *kleśa/doṣa* are usually associated with the mind in the *Saundarananda*, in a few places, they are also associated with the physical body. In verse 16.21 below, *kleśa* primarily signifies negative emotional states, and these negative emotional states are said to be the cause for the particular nature of one's *āśraya* or mind/body. Here, I have equated the word *āśraya* as synonymous to *nāma-rūpa*. This is not a standard translation for *āśraya*, but, in this case it seems to be plausible, as *nāma-rūpa* is the general subject of this oratory.³²⁴ *Nāma-rūpa* is mentioned directly a few verses earlier in verse 16.16.

krodhapraharṣādibhir āśrayāṇām utpadyate ceha yathā viśeṣaḥ/

tathaiva janmasv api naikarūpo nirvartate kleśakṛto viśeṣaḥ // Sau, 16.21 //

And, just as in this birth (*iha*), the particularity of (people's) minds/bodies (*āśraya*) arises due to anger, delight etc., similarly, this particularity arises again in (future) births, in many forms, produced by the mental afflictions (*kleśas*).

doṣādhike janmani tivradoṣa utpadyate rāgiṇi tivrarāgaḥ /
mohādhike mohabalādhikaś ca tadalpadoṣe ca tadalpadoṣaḥ // Sau, 16.22 // ³²⁵

Someone who has intense hatred will arise in a birth with an excess in hatred; someone who has intense desire will arise in a birth which is desire-filled; someone who has an excess in the predominant quality (*bala*) of delusion will arise in a birth with an excess of delusion; and someone who has few faults will arise in a birth with few faults.

Although, in verse 16.21, both tendencies explicitly mentioned are emotional, in the following verse, most of the tendencies mentioned are not necessarily emotional; volitional and cognitive deficiencies in the form of *rāga* and *moha* respectively are included. In addition, the above two verses illustrate the approximate synonymy of *kleśa* and *doṣa* in the *Saundarananda*. Even though 16.22 presents different negative qualities, the two words seem to be used interchangeably. This same tendency is also demonstrated in verse 16.34 quoted below.

kleśāṅkurān na pratanoti śīlaṃ bijāṅkurān kāla ivātivṛttaḥ /
śucau hi śīle puruṣasya doṣā manaḥ salajjā iva dharsayanti // Sau, 16.34 // ³²⁶

Moral behavior (*śīla*) does not grow from the shoot of the mental afflictions (*kleśa*), just like the wrong season will not bring forth shoots from a seed. For, the mental faults (*doṣa*), as it were, attack hesitantly the mind of a person who is pure in moral behavior.

Although it is true that in most places *doṣa* and *kleśa* are used interchangeably in the *Saundarananda*, in a few places, *doṣa* is given the same meaning as in *Āyurvedic* texts such as the *Caraka Saṃhitā*. Here, it is worth noting that Aśvaghoṣa actually uses the word *doṣa* within the context of *Āyurvedic* theory in two different ways. In the first verse quoted below (10.43), *doṣa* is used to indicate a deficient or disturbed state of the body, as the word *doṣa* literally denotes; in the second verse, however, *doṣa* merely refers to the three humours as a category, in their tranquil state. In this context, in order to refer to their disturbed state, Aśvaghoṣa uses the word *kopa*. These two different uses of the word *doṣa* actually reflect, according to Hartmut Scharfe, two different trends within *Āyurvedic* literature itself.³²⁷ (Please refer back to chapter three for more information).

dosāṃś ca kāyād bhiṣag ujjiḥsur bhūyo yathā kleśayitum yateta
rāgaṃ tathā tasya munir jighāṃsur bhūyastaraṃ rāgaṃ upānināya / /Sau,
10.43 / /³²⁸

And, just as an (*Āyurvedic*) doctor, desiring to remove diseases (*doṣa*) from the body, attempts to bring greater disease upon it, similarly, the Sage, desiring to destroy his (Nanda's) impulsive desire (*rāga*), brought him in the midst of even greater desire.

yathā bhiṣak pittakaphānilānāṃ ya eva kopam samupaiti doṣaḥ /
śamāya tasyaiva vidhiṃ vidhatte vyadhata doṣeṣu tathaiva buddhaḥ / /Sau,
16.69 / /³²⁹

Just as a *Āyurvedic* doctor applies a cure (*vidhi*) in order to bring to rest a (particular) humour (*doṣa*) amongst bile/choler, phlegm or wind (*anila*) which has become disturbed (*kopa*), similarly, the Buddha applied (certain) rules leading to the appeasement of the mental faults (*doṣa*).

Apart from the *Āyurvedic* connotations of *doṣa*, in the *Saundarananda*, *doṣa* and *kleśa* are usually described as resting within the mind, and can be thus said to delineate some sort of mental deficiency. When we speak of mental deficiency here, this notion is referred to in the sense that the *Saundarananda* defines it: as desire (*rāga* or *kāma*) for the wrong things and as darkness (*taṃas*) in the mind. For example, in verse 18.29 of the *Saundarananda*, where the Buddha is describing Nanda's previous addiction to making love and the sensual world of the householder in general, *kleśa* is defined as that burning feeling in the mind (*cetas*) one gets from an addiction to passion (*rāga*).

Another passage which clearly associates the concept of *doṣa/kleśa* to the mind and certain emotional states comes from chapter three, verse 3.14. In this chapter, the qualities of the Buddha are described. The Buddha is said to have crossed the ocean of mental faults (*doṣa*) that is disturbed by the waves (*tarāṅga*) of anger (*krodha*), fear (*bhaya*) and arrogance (*mada*). Elsewhere, in verse 16.13 previously quoted in chapter five, anger and fear are clearly associated with mentality and immateriality. Finally, in verse 17.23, the war against the *kleśas* is said to take place on the battlefield (*rana-ajira*) of the mind (*citta*).

sajjñānacāpaḥ smṛtivarṇa baddhvā viśuddhaśīlavratavāhanasthaḥ/
kleśāribhiś cittaraṇājirasthaiḥ sārddham yuyutsur vijayāya tasthau // Sau, 17.23 // ³³⁰

He, having buckled on the armor of mindfulness (*smṛti*) (and) the bow of correct knowledge, stood in the chariot of pure vows and conduct, wishing to fight, until he was victorious, with (*sārddham*) the enemies of the mental afflictions (*kleśa*), which reside in the battlefield of the mind (*citta*).

Verse 17.23 contains one of the clearest depictions of the psychological nature of *doṣa/kleśa*. In the above verse, the *kleśas* are depicted as being at war with the forces of good, such as mindfulness (*smṛti*), good conduct etc. in the battlefield (*raṇa-ajira*) of the mind. This image of the non-sage being mentally-conflicted and the Buddhist sage being without psychological conflict is also present in chapter 14, verse 14.51. Here, a Buddhist sage is said to be *niradvandva* or without conflict, whereas the everyday world is said to be *dvandva*.

Another meaning for the word *dvandva* is pair or polar opposites. Thus, the implication seems to be that the sage is without the feeling of two, constantly conflicting polar opposites in the psyche. Here, we can make some comparisons to some of the concepts previously outlined in chapter four. For example, in the *Samyutta Nikāya*, the Buddhist monk was said to be without repulsion or *paṭigha* (*pratigha*, Sanskrit) towards negative feelings (*dukkha-vedanā*) and without impulsion or desire (*rāga*) towards pleasant feelings (*sukha-vedanā*). In addition, the concepts of inclination (*anurodha*) and disinclination (*virodha*) vis-à-vis sense objects, which are similar to the ideas of *paṭigha* and *rāga*, also appear in both the *Samyutta Nikāya* (iv.210) and in the *Saundarananda* (13.48, 17.67). What all of these concepts seem to be implying is that, within the mind of the sage, there is neither a feeling of mental resistance against internal and external phenomena, nor the feeling of being dragged towards them. For, both of these feelings would be manifestations of psychic conflict.

However, in the *Saundarananda*, in spite of the negative connotations of words like *dvandva* and also *vikriyā*, which connote disturbances, one cannot say that conflict or disturbance is portrayed in an entirely negative fashion in Aśvaghoṣa's writings. The word *saṃvega*, meaning agitation, connotes a kind of agitation which sets one on the Buddhist path.

aparīkṣakabhāvāc ca pūrvaṃ matvā divaṃ dhruvaṃ/
tasmāt kṣeṣṇuṃ pariśrutya bhṛśaṃ saṃvegāṃ eyivān//Sau, 12.4//

Because of his unreflective nature, he (Nanda) has previously thought that heaven was permanent. Thus, upon hearing that (heaven) was a fleeting, he became extremely agitated.

mahatām api bhūtānām āvṛttir iti cintayan/
saṃvegāc ca sarāgo 'pi vītarāga ivābhavat//Sau, 12.8//

He reflected that even the greatest of beings come back again (to be reborn). And, because of this agitation (due to this reflection), even though he (formerly) had been desirous, he now became, as it were, free from desire (impulsive desire).

babhūva sa hi saṃvegaḥ śreyasas tasya vṛddhaye..... Sau, 12.9//³³¹

For that agitation led towards the growth of his (tendency) for the highest good (*śreyas*)...

In verse 12.9 above, Aśvaghoṣa's uses the word *śreyas* or the highest good in order to indicate the goal of the Buddhist path. This is a common usage of the term in the *Saundarananda*.³³² Thus, unlike the agitation of *vikriyā* and *dvandva*, the type of agitation called *saṃvega* eventually leads one to a "higher good". Also, in verse 12.4, one can see that the notion of *saṃvega*, unlike *vikriyā*, is not entirely based upon disturbed emotivity and volition. It is clear from verse 12.4 that

Nanda's agitation (*saṃvega*) is caused by a change in his conceptions concerning the eternal nature of heaven, and thus, *saṃvega* is actually more cognitive than affective.

The most evident questions that now come to mind are: how does one distinguish between the different types of agitations?; and, does this then mean that there is a certain type of agitation which actually serves as a constructive force in Buddhist practice? Here again, Aśvaghoṣa does not give us enough information to formulate a response to either one of these questions. Thus, we will leave these two questions as open ones, without attempting a guess based on scanty evidence.

Doṣa, Kleśa and Tamas

In regards to the specific characteristics of the notion of *doṣa/kleśa* in the *Saundarananda* in its non-Āyurvedic signification, its enumerations are not so consistent and clear-cut as the 10-fold delineation of *kilesa (kleśa)* that we reviewed from the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* in chapter four. For example, in verse 3.14 mentioned above, the *doṣas* are enumerated as anger (*krodha*) fear (*bhaya*) and arrogance (*mada*). Verse 16.13 (previously quoted in chapter five) has *bhaya* and *krodha* in common with verse 3.14, but also adds remorse (*śoka*) and non-enjoyment (*arati*). Later in the same chapter and in chapter 13, additional mental factors are listed as mental afflictions or faults. For example, in verses 16.57-61, malice (*vyāpāda*), hatred (*dveṣa*) and agitation (*uddhava*) are all described as

mental faults (*doṣa*). In addition, in verse 13.14, the *doṣas* are said to be five in number, being listed as hypocrisy / envy (*kuhana*) and so forth.

In summary, Aśvaghoṣa does not have a standard, consistent list of *doṣas/kleśas* that he uses throughout the *Saundarananda*. However, he does consistently stress all three types of negative mental factors in his enumerations: emotive, cognitive and volitional. In this sense, Aśvaghoṣa's notion of *kleśa/doṣa* resembles the notions of *kilesa (kleśa)* in the *Dhammasaṅgani*. Because of this similitude, I have chosen to translate *kleśa* in the same way, as "mental affliction", and because *doṣa* is virtually synonymous to *kleśa*, it will be translated as "mental fault".

One prevalent theme in the enumerations of the *doṣa/kleśa* concept in the *Saundarananda* is the connection made between mental faults/afflictions and the presence of desire for the incorrect objects. In verse 18.29, the fire of *rāga* is actually presented as synonymous to the fire of *kleśa*. Similarly, in verse 16.18, the presence of *doṣas* is defined by the presence of desire (*rajas*) and also the additional quality of mental darkness (*tamas*). And, finally, in verse 16.24, someone who has eliminated all *doṣas* is called *vairāgya*, and is said to be not reborn again. (For a better understanding of the context for verse 16.24, please refer back to verses 16.21-22 quoted earlier in this chapter).

doṣakṣayo jātiṣu yāsu yasya vairāgyatas tāsu na jāyate saḥ/
doṣāśayas tiṣṭhati yasya yatra tasyopapattir vivaśasya tatra // Sau, 16.24 / ³³³

One whose mental faults (*doṣa*) have abated, due to a lack of impulsive desire (*vairāgya*), is not born in the kinds (of births) which are (associated with each *doṣa*).³³⁴ One has a rebirth wherever one has a remnant of a mental fault (*doṣa*) remaining (and) one is powerless (in the face of this).

In addition to *rāga* and its connection to the presence of *doṣa/kleśa*, *tamas* is another important psychological concept in the *Saundarananda*. Because of its psychological nature, it has been translated here as “mental darkness”. In addition to its association with *rāga*, *tamas* is sometimes associated with emotion in the sense of emotional turbulence (*vikriyā*) as we saw in verse 8.2 quoted in chapter five. Also, because, in verse 8.2, Nanda is very confused as to the right decision, we could say that *tamas* might also have to do with conceptual difficulties.

Tamas is often associated with the concept of *doṣa/kleśa* and with bondage to *saṃsāra* or the wheel of rebirth. In this context, *rajas*, a synonym of *rāga* in the *Saundarananda*, is usually paired with *tamas* (perhaps for sonoric effect as well). An example of the pairing of *rajas* and *tamas* is seen in verse 16.18 quoted below. However, in certain verses such as in verse 9.3, it should be noted that *tamas* is presented as the cause of desire (*rāga*) and also sin (*pāpman*). (Here, *pāpman* is used in the sense of psychological wrongdoing and not wrongdoing in general).

na cātra citraṃ yadi rāgapāpmanā mano 'bhibhūyeta tamovṛtātmanah/
narasya pāpmā hi tadā nivartate yadā bhavaty antagataṃ tamas tanu/ /Sau,
9.3/ /³³⁵

It is no wonder that (*yadī*), for a person whose mind is shrouded in mental darkness (*tamas*), the mind is overcome by desire (*rāga*) and sin (*pāpman*); for it is when mental darkness (*tamas*) becomes attenuated that the sin in a man disappears.

jñātavyam etena ca kāraṇena lokasya doṣebhya iti pravṛttiḥ/
yasmān mriyante sarajastamas kā na jāyate vitarajastamas kaḥ // Sau, 16.18 // ³³⁶

Since those who ³³⁷ are characterized by passion (*rajas*) and mental darkness (*tamas*) die (and are thus reborn again) and one who is free of passion and mental darkness is not reborn, it is known, for this reason, that active being in the world (emerges) from the mental faults (*doṣas*).

In verse 16.18, we see that *rajas* and *tamas* are clearly made equivalent to the *doṣas*. Also, the presence of *rajas/tamas* is contrasted to the mind of Buddhist liberation, and they are said to be the cause for rebirth and continued suffering. Verse 9.3 presents a slightly different picture, as mental darkness (*tamas*) here is presented as at first cause, preceding *rāga* and *pāpman*, and *tamas*' attenuation leads to the disappearance of sin.

Could we then say that, in verse 9.3, Aśvaghoṣa is attempting to imply that the alleviation or disappearance of mental darkness is the first sign of liberation of mind? Since he does not explicitly state this, we cannot state this with surety. However, if this is the implication, then Aśvaghoṣa's stance on this issue is close to certain passages in the *Anguttara Nikāya*, quoted in chapter three, in which the Buddha says that the mind's (*citta*) inherent state, before the advent of the *kilesas*, is that of luminosity (*pabhassara*).

In any case, within the context of the *Saundarananda*, what is clear is that darkness (*tamas*) is one of the principal mental qualities which the teachings of

the Buddha seek to dispel. For example, in verses 10.58 and 17.72, the Buddha and Nanda respectively are explicitly stated as being free from mental darkness.

It could be that Aśvaghoṣa sees *tamas* as having a connection to psychic machinations or delusions, i.e. the concept of *parikalpa*. In verse 13.50, Aśvaghoṣa introduces the idea of delusion as the cause of the *kleśas*. *Kleśas* are said to be produced from a combination of *parikalpa* or imagination and *viśayas* or sense objects.

indhane sati vāyau ca yathā jvalati pāvakaḥ/
viṣayāt parikalpāc ca kleśāgnir jāyate tathā // Sau, 13.50 // ³³⁸

As fire burns due to the presence of both wood and wind, similarly, the fire of the mental afflictions (*kleśa*) is born from the sense objects combined with delusive imagination (*parikalpa*).

In verses 13.44-45, Aśvaghoṣa tells us that the proper way to see sense-objects is to “neither add anything onto” them (*na prekṣepya*) nor “subtract anything away from” them (*na apaneya*). Since *parikalpa* represents an improper way to see sense objects, as it helps to produce the mental impurities called *kleśas*, then *parikalpa* must mean adding or subtracting something from the object. In the *Saundarananda*, the word which represents the notion of “adding on” is *abhidhyā* and the idea of “subtracting” is represented by *daurmanasya*. It is interesting to note here that Aśvaghoṣa is not saying that sense objects are inherently bad in themselves; rather, it is our view of them which makes them destructive.

As an additional note, the word *daurmanasya* in Aśvaghoṣa's writings is similar to *paṭigha* and not *domanassa* in the Pali Canon. In Canonical literature, *paṭigha* (*pratigha*) usually denotes a resistance or aversion towards sense objects and *domanassa* (*daurmanasya*) usually denotes painful mental feelings.

In regard to the qualities of *doṣa/kleśa* as a whole, there are other ways in which Aśvaghoṣa's descriptions resemble certain passages from the Pali Canon. In addition to being associated with mental darkness in both genres of texts, they are also associated with an inflexibility of mind and impurity in both the *Saundarananda* and the Pali Canon.

kramenādbhiḥ śuddham kanakam iha pāṃsuvyavahitaṃ
yathāgnau karmāraḥ pacati bhr̥śam āvartayati/
tathā yogācāro nipuṇam iha doṣavyavahitaṃ
viśodhya kleśebhyaḥ śamayati manaḥ saṅkṣipati ca // Sau, 15.68 //

Just as a goldsmith, in this world, frequently turns gold in a fire, gradually cleansing it with water, so as to get rid of the dust, in the same way, the skillful practice of yoga in this world, purifies the mind of mental afflictions (*kleśa*), (and) makes the mind peaceful, free of mental faults (*doṣa*), and focuses it.

yathā ca svacchandād upanayati karmāśrayasukhaṃ
suvarṇaṃ karmāro bahuvidham alaṅkāravidhiṣu/
manaḥśuddho bhikṣur vaśagatam abhijñāsv api tathā
yathecchaṃ yatrecchaṃ śamayati manaḥ prerayati ca // Sau, 15.69 // ³⁹⁹

Just as the goldsmith, by employing different methods (*bahu-vidham*) willfully makes the gold pliable (*sukha*) for (*āśraya*, in relation to) work with respect to many different ornaments, similarly, the monk of pure mind, even with regard to the supernatural powers, willfully (*vaśa-gatam*) brings his mind to peacefulness and focuses it as he will and where (and when) he wills.

Here, Aśvaghoṣa is probably advocating a quality of mind more akin to mental pliability and flexibility rather than mental control. Instead of being impelled to action, the monk is capable of riding the waves of his own mind. This idea stands in contrast to concepts like *thīna*, already explicated in chapter four. As was mentioned previously, in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, *thīna* was defined as a mental stiffness or lack of mental adaptability (*akammaññatā*), and as a kind of stickiness, infatuation or adherence (*olīyanā*).³⁴⁰

Concluding Remarks concerning Kleśa/Doṣa, Dvandva, Saṃvega and Tamas

In this section of the chapter, we have come to an understanding of the different psychological qualities viewed by Aśvaghoṣa as contrary to Buddhist practice and liberation. The concepts reviewed here were *kleśa/doṣa*, *dvandva* and *tamas* etc. In addition, one positive concept was reviewed, *saṃvega*. *Saṃvega* seemed to connote a kind of positive agitation which led Nanda towards an appreciation of Buddhist practice.

If one considers the different descriptions presented in both this chapter and chapter five, the qualities portrayed as contrary to Buddhist practice and liberation are as follows: inflexibility of mind (*kleśa/doṣa*), mental darkness or gloom (*tamas*), unstable emotions and emotional conflict (*dvandva*, *anurodha/virodha* and *vikriyā*) and negative emotive, cognitive and volitional afflictions/faults (*kleśa/doṣa*).

Concluding Remarks for Chapter 6

Here, perhaps it would be useful to review the various translations for emotive vocabulary words reviewed in the previous two chapters in comparison to the definitions presented in chapter two. For the concept of subjective “feeling”, *rasa* has been presented as its closest equivalent. For the concept of “emotion”, *bhāva* (and possibly *vikriyā*) was the closest rendering, but with a few qualifications. First of all, *bhāva* can also be translated as “affect” in certain contexts such as in the case of *kṛtajñā-bhāva*. Secondly, the concept of *bhāva* does not seem to connote change, which was the primary differentiating factor between the notions of “affect” and “emotion” outlined in chapter two. Also, like *vikriyā*, *bhāva* is not explicated as including subjective feeling, and thus does not really possess a factor that differentiates it from volitional and cognitive processes.

In fact, throughout the *Saundarananda*, Aśvaghoṣa does not explicate emotive, volitional and cognitive processes as distinct but interdependent mental processes. This lack of analysis concerning the interrelation of different mental processes stands in contrast to most modern definitions of emotion. For example, in the *Saundarananda*, the concept of *vikriyā* seems to be more of a general term indicating a change in both emotive and volitional direction, and an emotive instability.

In regards to the vocabulary presented in the latter half of this chapter, *kleśa/doṣa* have been translated as “mental affliction/mental fault”. *Tamas* and

dvandva, which represent other negative mental impediments to Buddhist practice, have been translated as “mental darkness” and “mental conflict” respectively. In regards to *tamas*, it is sometimes associated with emotional conflict and sometimes seems associated with cognitive delusion, as well as with impulsive desire (*rāga*).

As for the concept of *saṃvega*, it is perhaps the most difficult to fit into our schema presented in chapter two. In addition, it may contradict our previous assertions, in chapter five, that only stable, positive affect is a desired quality for a Buddhist practitioner or sage. Here, instead of attempting to translate *saṃvega* into English, it may be easier here to relate it another, better known, Buddhist idea: that of *bodhicitta* or thought/impulsion towards enlightenment. This concept is explicated in other Buddhist texts such as the *Bodhicaryāvatara*, *Lalitavistara*, amongst others.³⁴¹

It is worth reiterating that the translations we have presented here in chapters five and six are not of import only in regard to semantic distinctions. Rather, what we are attempting to do here is paint a picture of Aśvaghoṣa’s vision of Buddhist practice and enlightenment by using the tool of textual analysis. One of the stated assumptions in this thesis has been that Aśvaghoṣa’s understanding is actually a product of two streams of thought, the aesthetic and the Buddhist. Yet, what is not evident, even after our analysis of his vocabulary is the following: when is Aśvaghoṣa’s understanding being dominated by his aesthetic leanings and when is it being dominated by his Buddhist ones. The

difficulty or near impossibility of making such a distinction, was evident in the examination of terms such as *bhāva* and *rasa*.

It also remains to be proven whether or not Aśvaghoṣa's poetic presentation of Buddhism is different from other Buddhist writers of a more philosophical bent. This is an interesting avenue for further research, but will not be included in this thesis, as such an undertaking would also include a broader study of many contemporary or near contemporary Buddhist writers such as *Maṛceta*, *Nāgārjuna*, *Buddhaghosa*, *Vasubandhu* etc.

Chapter 7: An Affective Analysis of Non-Attachment in the Saundarananda

Introductory Remarks

This chapter is an exploration of the proper attitude one should take in Buddhist mindfulness meditation (*smṛti* or *sati*). Here, the term Buddhist mindfulness practice is used in the broadest sense of the term to mean both formal meditation practice and the meditative attitude applied to our daily life.³⁴² My purpose here is to argue for the place of affect in the proper Buddhist meditative attitude: in other words, I intend to demonstrate, using textual evidence from the *Saundarananda*, that correct meditative attitude cannot be considered to be void of affect, but rather, always associated with or composed of affects.

In putting forth this argument, my purpose here is not to assert an affective understanding of the Buddhist meditative attitude to the exclusion of cognitive and volitional elements. Of course, these elements are present as well. This has already been demonstrated in previous analyses of verses from the *Saundarananda*. For example, a lack of false imaginings (*aparikalpa*) and a consequent true perception of things are two examples of the cognitive side of correct meditative attitude.

In this regard, the concept of *smṛti* can be seen as one common notion which connotes the cognitive aspect of meditative attitude. Since *smṛti* also means memory, *smṛti* in its signification of mindfulness may be interpreted as indicating that facet of meditative practice which involves the holding of certain

auspicious images or concepts in one's consciousness. Examples of such images or concepts would be the Buddha image, moral conduct (*śīla*), moral law (*dhamma*), seven enlightenment factors etc. When a meditation practice does not revolve around the maintenance of images or concepts in the mind, such as in the case of breath meditation or meditation without any particular object in mind, *smṛti* indicates something like the retaining of a certain state of awareness or attitude from moment to moment. This retentive aspect of *smṛti* is present in both memory and mindfulness. Because this retentive faculty is usually associated with cognition in modern Western psychology, *smṛti* has been considered here as indicating the cognitive aspect of meditation, and thus, falls outside of our primary area of inquiry. In contrast, "non-attachment", "detachment", "neutrality" etc. are concepts which are being treated here as attempting to indicate the affective aspect of meditation, or, what I have called "meditative attitude".

The preliminary term we will put forth to express the Buddhist concept of proper meditative attitude is "non-attachment". (Here, the word "attitude" is being equated more with affect than cognition). "Non-attachment" will be preliminarily defined here as "the absence of mental clinging". Later in the chapter, we will examine the Buddhist terms *upekṣā*, *sakti*, *virāga* and *anāstha*, which are used to describe correct meditative attitude in the *Saundarananda*. After an analysis of these four terms, we will then determine whether or not "non-

attachment" is the best term to express the concept of meditative attitude in the *Saundarananda*.

One of the reasons why the word "non-attachment" has been preliminarily chosen, instead of terms like "detachment", "dispassion", "neutrality" and "indifference" etc., is because all of the latter words connote a distancing from emotion from some point which is non-emotional, while non-attachment does not have this connotation in modern English. In addition, there is another connotation of "detachment", "dispassion" etc.: that of apathy. In modern Western psychology, persistent apathy is actually said to be sign of clinical depression. In fact, this type of apathy connotes that portion of depression which comes from self-hatred, and thus, in this sense, the concept of apathy, and therefore, detachment, can be equated more with emotions such as hatred and resentment than non-emotion. Non-attachment does not seem to have this same connotation of apathy.

For these two principal reasons, "non-attachment" instead of "detachment", "dispassion" etc. has been put forth as the preliminary translation of correct meditative attitude within the *Saundarananda*. Also, because of its clear association with negative emotions, the second connotation of "detachment", that of apathy, will not be explored here. It has been taken for granted that any definition which includes negative emotivity or affect would not be part of the desired meditative attitude in Buddhism. Thus, we will focus here primarily on a critique of that part of "detachment's" definition which implies a distancing from

emotion or affect from some point which is entirely non-emotive or non-affective.

There are many examples of the usage of “detachment”, “dispassion” etc. as translations of correct meditative attitude by Buddhist Studies scholars. For example, Rune Johansson, in *The Psychology of Nirvana*, describes the feelings of the *arhat* as “disinterested and impersonal.” In addition, in many standard Sanskrit-English and Pali-English dictionaries, *virāga* and *upekṣā* (*upekkhā*, Pali) are translated as “dispassionateness”, “indifference”, “zero point” etc. (On another note, *upekṣā* is also rendered as “equanimity” by some translators).³⁴³

E. H. Johnston, who can still be considered to be the principal scholarly figure in Aśvaghōṣa studies, translates *upekṣā* as “indifference” and *virāga* as “passionlessness”. In the same two verses, Alessandro Passi, a more recent translator of the *Saundarananda*, renders *virāga* as “free of passion” (*priva de passione*) and *upekṣā* as the state of being or remaining “indifferent” (*indifferente*).³⁴⁴

Although my usage of “non-attachment” in the stead of “detachment” differs from Passi, Johnston, Johansson etc., it is in accord with other modern Buddhist interpreters such as Lama Anagarika Govinda. Lama Govinda strongly asserts that the term “detachment” is a misleading interpretation of Buddhist doctrine. In addition, he points out that it is not attachment in itself which is necessarily unwholesome, but rather, it is the motivation behind one’s

attachment which determines whether or not attachment is spiritually healthy or unhealthy.

Since Lama Govinda's comments are so poignantly expressed and so relevant to our reasoning here, they are quoted below at length.

The word attachment is frequently used by Buddhists in English. It is intended to express the idea that we bind ourselves through our passionate, demanding possessiveness, and that we therefore necessarily suffer by being so bound when, sooner or later, the object of desire eludes our grasp. It is therefore non-attachment, in giving up and letting go (the sign of the true love that wishes to make not itself but the loved person happy) that the way to the overcoming of suffering is to be sought.

This basic Buddhist attitude that teaches people to show first real love, real compassion, and unrestricted joy in the joy of others (while at the same time, we attain to an inner equanimity in regard to what happens to ourselves), was at a relatively early date reinterpreted and taken to mean that every kind of human attachment and love was devalued. This concept arose because of the wide range of meanings in the English word *detachment*, but the German-speaking Buddhists followed suit, using the words *Verhaftetsein* or *Anhaften* for all forms of love and affection, irrespective of whether it was a matter of passionate desire and possessiveness or of loving devotion. In this way, Western Buddhism was turned into a gloomily ascetic and anti-world doctrine....³⁴⁵

We must test our attachment in regard to its specific nature and characteristics, for only by doing so can we determine whether it is wholesome or unwholesome. If we cling to things or beings with passionate possessiveness, we will experience suffering and learn the unwholesome nature of our actions. But if we are inclined toward things and beings with an inner freedom and with loving sentiments, that is wholesome.³⁴⁶

In summary, my question in this chapter follows closely upon the notions discussed in chapters 5 and 6: if one says that Buddhist practice for Āśvaghoṣa is a process of cultivating positive affect and of attenuating negative affects and

emotions, then what is the role of emotion, affect etc. in this cultivation process? In other words, according to the *Saundarananda*, how does one evolve emotively, from possessing unstable, negative emotivity and negative affects to the possession of primarily stable, positive affect? The hypothesis here is: correct meditative attitude, of which non-attachment is the affective part.

Words in Saundarananda related to the Concept of Non-attachment

First of all, it should be stated that we have not explored all of the vocabulary words related to the notion of non-attachment in the *Saundarananda*. In this regard, first and foremost, we have left the word *dhṛti* out of our explications here, as it was thoroughly covered in chapter five. In addition, there are many other terms that could be examined, such as non-eagerness (*nirutsuka*), detachment or disdain (*nirveda*), without expectation (*nirāśā*) etc. Amongst these, *nirveda* is one concept which could possibly be translated as “detachment”, but it does not occur frequently enough in the *Saundarananda* to provide a strong counterargument to the thesis of this chapter.

Here, there is another point which is worthy of note. As was mentioned in chapter six, Aśvaghoṣa does not entirely deride all attachments: in fact, non-attachment can, at times, be something negative whereas attachment can be something positive. For example, in verse 8.24, Aśvaghoṣa describes someone who is unattached to the *dharma* as *cala* or wavering. *Cala* is one of the many antonyms of steadfastness (*dhṛti*) and is one of Aśvaghoṣa’s standard portrayals

of someone with weak resolution in regards to Buddhist practice. Hence, although Aśvaghoṣa derides such ideas as attachment to family members, he praises attachment to Buddhist practice.

What this means is that it is not entirely accurate to say, even within the context of the *Saundarananda*, that non-attachment is always representative of the correct meditative attitude. The message in our text is much the same as it is in regards to the concept of desire or volitional impulses: it is not attachment itself which is necessarily negative but the focus of one's attachment.

As in the case with volitions, does this mean that Aśvaghoṣa is implying that the subjectively felt quality differs when one's attachments are constructive? Again, Aśvaghoṣa does not answer this more philosophically-oriented type of question. However, in this regard, modern interpreters, such as Lama Govinda, may be able to give us some insight into one possible Buddhist interpretation. Lama Govinda differentiates positive attachment, which is based upon "inner devotion and love" from negative attachment, which is based upon possessiveness. He labels negative attachment by the standard Pali word for the cause of suffering: thirst (*taṇhā*).

But being attached in the sense of inner devotion and love is a very different thing from possessive attachment (*taṇhā*). If a person close to me has an accident or dies, that causes suffering. And to accept this suffering is far better than to remain unmoved in cold equanimity.³⁴⁷

Upekṣā/Samupekṣā

The term *upekkhā* is variously translated in the Pali-English dictionary as “disinterestedness”, “equanimity”, “neutral feeling”, “indifference”, or as a “zero point between joy (*somanassa*) and sorrow (*domanassa*)” etc.³⁴⁸ In his *Buddhism and Society: A Great Tradition and its Burmese Vicissitudes*, Melford Spiro also translates *upekkhā* with the word “detachment”.³⁴⁹ Yet, in contrast to the definitions given in the Pali-English Dictionary, he sees *upekkhā* as emotive and states that it is, in fact, the only desirable emotion in early Pali Buddhism. How does the viewpoint of Aśvaghoṣa compare to these two viewpoints? The Pali-English dictionary definition seems to imply that *upekkhā* (*upekṣā*) is non-emotive or a distancing from emotivity from a “zero point” of non-emotivity; yet, Spiro sees *upekkhā* (*upekṣā*) as an emotion in itself.

Since *upekṣā* is never directly explicated in the *Saundarananda*, it is necessary to engage in some degree of speculation in order to arrive at an acceptable translation of this term. One way of understanding the term *upekṣā* is to analyze its component parts. The prefix “*upa*” can mean “close” or “near” or it can connote respect. For example, the verb *upacar+* can mean “respecting”, “worshipping”, “attending upon” etc.³⁵⁰ Thus, in a sense, one can think of the term *upekṣā* as a careful kind of regard or attention, but also one that keeps a respectful distance. If one sees *upekṣā* like this, it has a more affectively based connotation than words such as “indifference”, “detachment” etc. connote.

In translating *upekṣā* within the context of the *Saundarananda*, it is also useful to examine how Aśvaghoṣa employs related words. For example, *samupekṣā* connotes the idea of disregarding in a proper and careful way. In the *Saundarananda*, this word is used in the context of the goldsmith who leaves the gold alone for the proper time so that it is allowed to cool off and form correctly.³⁵¹ The process of making gold is compared to the process of training the mind. One has to be careful to choose the right object of meditation (*nimitta*) for certain disturbances of mind: the correct *nimitta* will let the mind “cool off” properly while the incorrect one will disturb the disequilibrium of the mind even further.

This “leaving alone” or allowing of the gold to “cool off”, performed by the goldsmith, does not seem to be one of indifference, but rather, a careful nurturing love of an artisan for her work. This idea of leaving something alone in a respectful and nurturing way, attached here to *samupekṣā*, could also be attached to *upekṣā*. In this case, the prefix “*sam*” may just indicate a slight increase in the intensity of the careful (yet not too hovering) regard of *upekṣā*, or, perhaps the idea of “along with” or “together with” *upekṣā*.³⁵²

Aśvaghoṣa’s most telling remarks in regards to *upekṣā* and its place in formal meditation practice come from chapter seventeen. In this chapter, Aśvaghoṣa describes Nanda’s passage through the four *dhyānas*. Throughout the third and fourth *dhyānas*, he is depicted as being possessed of *upekṣā* and *smṛti*.

prīter virāgāt sukham āryajuṣṭaṃ kāyena vindann atha samprajānan/
upekṣakaḥ sa smṛtimān vyahārṣīd dhyānaṃ tṛtīyaṃ pratilabhya dhīraḥ // Sau,
17.50//³⁵³

Then, due to lack of impulsion (*virāga*) towards affection, in obtaining a happiness like that of the saints, (and) in comprehending with the sum of his being (*kāya*)³⁵⁴, he, who was steady (*dhīra*), equanimous (*upekṣaka*) (and) aware (*smṛtimat*), attained the third stage of meditation (*dhyāna*) and rejoiced.

atha prahāṇāt sukhaduḥkhayoś ca manovikārasya ca pūrvam eva/ dadhyāv
upekṣāsmṛtimad viśuddhaṃ dhyānaṃ tathāduḥkhasukhaṃ caturthaṃ // Sau,
17.54//³⁵⁵

Then, after he had already (*pūrvā*) abandoned the changes of the mind (*manovikāra*) with respect to happiness (*sukha*) and sorrow (*duḥkha*), he applied (himself) to the fourth level of meditation (*dhyāna*), which was without happiness (*sukha*) and sorrow (*duḥkha*), (and) which was pure, being characterized by awareness (*smṛti*) and equanimity (*upekṣā*).

yasmāt tu tasmin na sukhaṃ na duḥkhaṃ jñānaṃ ca tatrāsti tadarthacāri/
tasmād upekṣāsmṛtipāriśuddhir nirucyate dhyānavidhau caturthe // Sau,
17.55//³⁵⁶

Since there is neither happiness nor suffering in the fourth *dhyāna* (*tasmin*) and knowledge achieves its end there, purification through awareness (*smṛti*) and equanimity (*upekṣā*) is spoken of in the state of the fourth *dhyāna*.

After the fourth stage of meditation (*dhyāna*), Nanda goes on to achieve final liberation or *arhatship* (*arhattva*). In the subsequent descriptions of Nanda's personal qualities as an *arhat*, *upekṣā* is not explicitly mentioned; however, Aśvaghoṣa clearly states that Nanda's *arhatship* is based upon the fourth *dhyāna*.³⁵⁷ Thus, one can conclude that, for Aśvaghoṣa, the primary characteristics of the fourth *dhyāna*, such as *upekṣā* and *smṛti*, are important for the achievement of Buddhist enlightenment.

In regards to the purificatory aspect of the fourth *dhyāna*, the two principal forces of purification are *upekṣā* and *smṛti*. What exactly does purification mean in this passage from the *Saundarananda*? As is clear from verse 17.54, a pure mind is one in which the alterations of mind have stopped. *Upekṣā* and *smṛti* are two mental phenomena that are present after the cessation of mental alterations or changes. Here, the concept of “mental alterations” is expressed by *manovikāra*, which was presented as a synonym of *vikriyā* in chapter five.

If we focus here on *upekṣā*, since it is the word being examined in this section, then what implications does this have for the notion of *upekṣā* in the *Saundarananda*? What this seems to be implying is that *upekṣā* is not an emotion, according to the definition of the word previously presented, as *upekṣā* does not involve mental changes. Yet, if *upekṣā* is not an emotion, then what can it be defined as? Is it an affect? Is it a point of non-emotion from which we observe all affects and emotions? In answering these questions one has to consider the two principal aspects of *upekṣā*’s description in the *Saundarananda*: it is a mental phenomenon that occurs after mental fluctuations; and, it is one of two essential purificatory forces in the fourth *dhyāna* upon which Nanda’s liberation is said to be based. If we think of the closely-related concept of *samupekṣā* and its connotation as a careful, nurturing regard, and also, if we consider some of the subsequent affective descriptions of Nanda’s enlightenment, keeping in mind that enlightenment has been explicitly stated to be based upon the fourth *dhyāna*, then it seems unlikely that *upekṣā* is something entirely non-affective. In fact, if

we say that *upekṣā* is a characteristic of someone who is enlightened, then, in the context of the *Saundarananda*, we have to admit that *upekṣā* is at least associated with affective states if not an actual affective state itself.

Yet, one stipulation has to be made here along with this assertion. Since Aśvaghoṣa does not explicitly associate *upekṣā* with the enlightened state of mind but rather with the fourth *dhyāna*, can we truly prove the affective nature of *upekṣā* by pointing out the fact that Aśvaghoṣa's descriptions of the enlightened sage are often affective in nature? There is one additional piece of information which might help us in answering this question. In verse 18.39, a related word, *nirvyapekṣā*, is used to indicate the Nanda's attitude towards praise and blame after he has attained enlightenment.

ity evamādi sthirabuddhicittas tathāgatenābhīhito hitāya/
staveṣu nindāsu ca nirvyapekṣaḥ kṛtāñjalir vākyam uvāca nandaḥ // Sau,
18.39 / ³⁵⁸

Addressed by the Tathāgata in this manner for (his own) benefit, Nanda, whose mind and thoughts were steady, who was equanimous/steadfast (*nirvyapekṣa*) in the face of either praise or blame, who was respectful, said these words.

In verse 3.19 (previously quoted in chapter five), *dhṛti* is used in almost exactly the same way as *nirvyapekṣā* above, and thus, it is reasonable to assume that *nirvyapekṣā* connotes something like steadfastness. With the word *nirvyapekṣā* in verse 18.39, we do have one instance where *upekṣā* or a related word is used to depict a quality of an enlightened person in the *Saundarananda*. If

we combine this understanding with the meaning of *samupekṣā* in the context of the goldsmith's work, and *upekṣā* in the four *dhyānas*, then our translation of *upekṣā* could be something like the following: "a careful, nurturing regard, one which is steady and not subject to constant fluctuation". With respect to its affective aspect, Aśvaghoṣa's understanding of *upekṣā* has some similarities to Buddhaghosa's commentarial explanations of *upekkhā* (*upekṣā*). For example, in the *Atthasālinī*, *upekkhā* is described as follows:

Sattesu majjhataṅkārāpavattilakkhaṇā upekkhā, sattu sambhavadasssanarāsā paṭighānunayavūpasamapaccupaṭṭhānā.... (At, 193) ³⁵⁹

Equanimity has the characteristic of evolving the mode of centrality as regards beings; its function is appreciation of others; its manifestation is quieting of both aversion (*paṭigha*) and sycophancy (*anunaya*).... ³⁶⁰

Thus, in the *Atthasālinī*, as in the *Saundarananda*, *upekkhā* is portrayed as including the idea of appreciation or careful regard. Part of this careful regard involves the ability to perceive things as they are, without either being repulsed or repelled (*paṭigha*) or impulsively drawn to them (*anunaya*). Here, *anunaya* can be seen as synonymous to *rāga* in certain passages of the Pali Canon (*Samyutta Nikāya* iv.208 etc.) and to the concept of *abhidhyā*, *rāga*, *anurodha* etc. in the *Saundarananda*.

In conclusion, since the nature of *upekṣā* in the *Saundarananda* is not directly defined, it is difficult to ascertain all of its qualities. If we can associate it with liberation, as it is portrayed by Aśvaghoṣa, then we could definitely assert

that *upekṣā* is either associated with positive, stable affect, or, itself a stable, positive affect. Yet, even if we do not directly associate *upekṣā* with liberation, it is difficult to believe that a purifying force within the fourth *dhyāna*, which is portrayed as the pinnacle of practice in the *Saundarananda*, would be entirely non-affective, as Aśvaghoṣa's eventual enlightened ideal is affective.

With this final thought in mind, we have chosen to translate *upekṣā* with one of the standard translations: "equanimity". In most standard modern English dictionaries, equanimity is associated with composure, calm, even-mindedness and peacefulness. If one considers notions such as calm and peacefulness to be affective, "equanimity" expresses a certain type of affective composition. Hence, within the context of the *Saundarananda*, this translation seems superior to "detachment", "dispassion" etc.

Anāsthā and Synonymous Words (Anapekṣā/Nirapekṣā/Anavekṣā)

The above cluster of words can be roughly defined as follows. Like the concepts of *samupekṣā* and *upekṣā* described above, all four words in their positive sense (i.e. without the negative prefix "an" or the prefix "nir") connote a consideration, a regard or a caring attitude. However, in contrast to *upekṣā*, which is always seen as positive, Aśvaghoṣa sometimes views the caring or consideration of *āsthā* etc. in a positive light, as something conducive to good conduct and Buddhist enlightenment, and, at other times, as something that is antithetical to Buddhist practice and liberation.

In relation to the term *āsthā*, the negative view of the concept of caring or regard, is slightly more common. Just as *āsthā* is usually given a negative connotation with regard to Buddhist practice, *anāsthā* is usually seen positively, and is used to depict a state of non-attachment or non-expectancy etc. Here, one could conclude that, by presenting a positive view of *anāsthā*, Āśvaghoṣa is implying that caring or consideration can be too fixated on an expectation or a desire for a certain result. In other words, caring can sometimes go too far and become a kind of obsession. In fact, another meaning of both *āsthā* and its synonym, *apekṣā*, is “hope” or “expectation”. Thus, *āsthā* in the passages below can be seen as a feeling of hoping for something in relation to sense objects, as opposed to *anāsthā*, which would connote a state of non-hoping for a particular result, or the non-hoping for the attainment of a particular object of desire.

brahmaṛṣibhāvārtham apāśya rājyaṃ bheje vanaṃ yo viṣayeṣv anāsthaḥ/
sa gādhijaś cāpahṛto ghr̥tācyā samā daśaikaṃ divasaṃ viveda//Sau, 7.35//³⁶¹

The son of Gadhin, who gave up his kingdom to go to the forest and become a Brahmin seer, who felt a lack of attachment/expectations (*anāsthā*) towards sense objects (*viṣaya*), yet (*ca*) was carried away (in passion) by Ghṛtācī, seeing one day (with her) as equal to ten days.

sandhāya dhairyaṃ praṇidhāya vīryaṃ vyapohya saktiṃ parigrhya śaktiṃ/
praśāntacetā niyamasthacetāḥ svasthas tato 'bhūd viṣayesv anāsthaḥ//Sau,
17.6//³⁶²

After applying himself to steadfastness (*dhairya*), being resolved upon heroic energy, abandoning attachment (*sakti*) and grasping power, he was with a peaceful mind (*praśāntacetas*), established in renunciation, contented/healthy (*svastha*) and not attached to (i.e. not expecting a result from) (*anāsthā*) sense objects (*viṣaya*).

Thus, in both passages, *anāsthā* with regard to sense objects is seen as a positive thing, as a state of non-expectation or non-impulsion. In the second passage, *anāsthā* is even equated with affective states, such as peaceful (*praśānta*) and contented (*svastha*). One can say that these words are probably affective rather than emotive in that they are associated with the ideal mind state of the practitioner elsewhere in the *Saundarananda*.

The word *svastha*, literally, “standing within oneself”, can imply someone who is self-contented and satisfied, but also someone who is physically healthy. If the terms *praśānta* and *svastha* can be interpreted as tranquillity and self-contentedness, then *anāsthā* can also be said to possess these qualities in that it is inextricably associated with them. Also, since terms such as *praśānta* are associated with *cetas* or mind, it is clear that *anāsthā* is referring to something mental or psychological rather than physical. In addition, steadfastness or *dhairya*, a term which is synonymous to *dhṛti* in the *Saundarananda*, is said to be another characteristic of someone who is unattached *anāsthā*. Since *dhṛti* (opposed to *vikriyā*) is a term which is usually linked to positive and stable affect, as was proven in chapter five, it seems fair to conclude that *anāsthā* can also be connected to this kind of affectivity.

This association of *anāsthā* with stable and positive affective states, rather than unstable emotive ones, is more plausible when one considers verse 10.51 below. This verse clearly gives *āsthā*, *anāsthā*’s antonym, a similar meaning to *vikriyā*. *Āsthā* signifies being emotionally and physically moved or attracted

towards something, or, looked at from another angle, the state of being attached to specific hopes and expectations for a certain result. In this verse, the Buddha has brought Nanda to heaven for the expressed purpose of making Nanda forget about his love for his wife. In order to do this, the Buddha shows Nanda the exquisitely beautiful *Apsarases*³⁶³ in heaven. Verse 10.51 below expresses Nanda's reaction to the *Apsarases* after he has seen them for the first time.

āsthā yathā pūrvam abhūn na kācid anyāsu me strīṣu niśāmya bhāryām/
tasyām tataḥ samprati kācid āsthā na me niśāmyaiva hi rūpam āsām/ /Sau,
10.51/ /³⁶⁴

Just as, previously, I did not have any feelings (*āsthā*) for other women upon seeing my wife, so now, I am unmoved (*āsthā*) by her when I look upon their (the *Apsaras*) beauty.

Hopefully, not all of us men are as fickle in love as Nanda! This verse describes how Nanda completely forgets about his wife after just a glimpse of the *Apsarases* in heaven. Here, *āsthā* depicts his feeling of being moved or attracted in both an emotional and a physical sense. This sense of the word is fairly clear because, earlier in the poem, Aśvaghoṣa describes the love of Nanda for Sundarī, which was both a physical and mental attraction, and, in the verse above, *āsthā* seems to be attempting to capture the same feeling of this previous attraction.

In contrast to this hypothesis, in certain verses, *āstha*, *anāsthā*'s opposite, and also *apekṣā* and *avekṣā*, the opposite of *anapekṣā* and *anavekṣā*, seem to connote something positive in Buddhist practice. An example of *apekṣā* being used

positively comes from chapter one, verse 1.16, where certain ascetics are depicted as being too extreme in their renunciation and are given the attribute of being *nirapekṣā*, or “careless” in their practice. Furthermore, in the next verse, *nirapekṣā* is equated with *rāga*, or desire. Here, to not have *apekṣā* is to have a kind of recklessness or total disregard for the body and this is destructive to the *dharma*. Again, in verse 7.36, not having *apekṣā* (*anapekṣā*) is equated with a kind of recklessness and neglectful attitude. And, in verse 8.41, *anavekṣā* also has a negative connotation: it connotes a lack of proper consideration or respect given to something.

In summary, *anāsthā* and its synonyms *anapekṣā* etc. are possible translations for the concept of “non-attachment”, yet are probably best translated as “non-expectancy” or “a lack of impulsiveness or overattention”. *Āsthā* can at times connote something emotive, a movement or a feeling of intense regard or consideration. At times, *āsthā* is even depicted as positive in places. Yet, for the most part it is negative and can be seen as a concept which moves or disturbs the inner steadfastness of the practitioner in much the same way as *vikriyā*.

Based on the passages examined, *anāsthā* cannot be thought of as entirely non-emotive or as a distancing from emotions because of its frequent association with positive affects such as peacefulness, contentedness etc. (*praśānta*, *svastha* etc.). In verse 17.6, it is said to be one quality of an ideal practitioner in Buddhism, and the ideal practitioner has already been proven to be characterized by positive, stable affects. In addition, because of its association with the mind in

17.6, one can assume that *anāsthā* is a psychological concept and not a physical one, although *āsthā* in verse 10.51 did also connote Nanda's physical attraction for Sundarī and then the *Apsaras*.

Sakti and Variations

The word *sakti* comes from the verb root *sañj+*, which connotes an adhering, a sticking to something, or the state of being fastened to something. In the *Saundarananda*, this is often associated with cognitive notions such as false imaginings or conceptions (*parikalpa*) of a sense object. In 13.49, for example, the sense organ of the sage is said not to inhere in (*sañj+*) a sense object when there is no false imagination (*parikalpa*) concerning the object.

nendriyaṃ viṣaye tāvat pravṛttam api sajjate/
yāvan na manasas tatra parikalpaḥ pravartate // Sau, 13.49 // ³⁶⁵

As long as delusion (*parikalpa*) in the mind does not exist in regards to a sense object (*tatra*), then the sense organ (*indriya*) does not adhere (*sañj*) to the object, even if it (*indriya*) is active.

abhūtaparikalpena viṣayasya hi badhyate/
tam eva viṣayaṃ paśyan bhūtataḥ parimucyate // Sau, 13.51 // ³⁶⁶

For, one is bound by the unreal apprehension (delusion) (*parikalpa*) of a sense object, (but) the perception of this very same sense object (*viṣaya*), as it truly is, liberates.

ato na viṣayo hetur bandhāya na vimuktaye
parikalpaviśeṣeṇa saṅgo bhavati vā na vā // Sau, 13.53 // ³⁶⁷

Thus, a sense object is not the cause for bondage nor for liberation. Attachment (*saṅga*) may come into existence, depending upon the particular nature of one's conception, or, it may not.

These verses are telling us that, with regard to the formation of attachment *sakti* etc., false cognition is the primary factor: it is more one's perception of sense objects than the objects themselves which binds one to *saṃsāra*. This more cognitive view of attachment is present in other parts of the *Saundarananda*. For example, in verse 15.31, *moha* or delusion is said to be the cause of human attachments. Also, in verse 15.18, a person is said to be attached or inclined to whatever he thinks on (*vitarkayati*) continuously.

This being said, are there other understandings of *sakti* in the *Saundarananda*, or, can it be thought of as arising entirely due to false cognition? In this regard, verses 18.18 and 18.19 are perhaps the most telling in the poem with regard to the author's understanding of *sakti* in particular and the meditative attitude of non-attachment in general. In these verses, Aśvaghoṣa portrays correct meditative attitude as the antithesis of attachment (*sakti*).

caturvidhe naikavidhaprasaṅge yato 'ham āhāravidhāv asaktaḥ/
amūrchitaś cāgrathitaś ca tatra tribhyo vimukto 'smi tato bhavedbhyah / /Sau,
18.18 / /

Since I am not attached (*asakta*), nor infatuated (*amūrchita*), nor bound (*agrathita*) to the four-fold categories of food, with its many types of attachments (*prasaṅga*), with regard to them I am liberated (*vimukta*) from this three-fold existence.

anīśritaś cāpratibaddhacitto dṛṣṭaśrutādaḥ vyavahāradharme/
yasmāt samātmānugataś ca tatra tasmād viśaṃyogagato 'smi muktaḥ / /18.19 / /³⁶⁸

Since I am not dependent upon (*nīśrita*) nor is my mind bound (*pratibaddha*) to seeing, hearing etc. (i.e. the sense organs) with regard to everyday constituents of reality (*dharma*s), I am free (*mukta*), separate (*viśaṃyoga*) with regard to them (*tatra*), watching (*anugata*) them (the *dharma*s) with equanimous mind (*samātmā*).

There are many words used here to portray the idea of attachment or give us a clue as to its approximate meaning. If we take *asakta*, in verse 18.18 as our base word for “non-attachment”, then we could say that the following words seem to depict the same concept or at least a concept which is close: *amūrchita*, *agrathita*, *vimukta*, *anāśrita*, *apratibaddha*, *mukta*, *visaṃyoga* and *samātmā*.³⁶⁹ Thus, if we assume that a combination of this group of words connotes non-attachment or the correct Buddhist meditative attitude, then this attitude would be comprised of the following qualities: “non-infatuated, non-bound, completely free, non-dependent, not fettered, free, separate, and of equanimous spirit”. (The preceding words are listed in the same order as their Sanskrit counterparts listed above).

There are also affective states accompanying the attitude of non-attachment described above. In verse 17.6, for example, the throwing off of attachment (*sakti*) is associated with a peaceful mind (*śāntacetas*) and a self-contentedness (*svastha*). In addition, in verse 7.20 (quoted below), Nanda, in describing a sage under a waterfall, speaks of him as unattached (*asakta*), content (*svastha*), satisfied (*tr̥pta*) and peaceful (*śānta*). There are also other verses which make these same associations.

Thus, one can reasonably conclude here that *asakti* is associated with positive, stable affect, as *śānta*, *tr̥pta* and *svastha* are qualities that Aśvaghōṣa attributes to Nanda after he has attained the enlightened state of an *arhat* and the

Buddha .³⁷⁰ And, judging from the words used to describe non-attachment in verses 18.18 and 18.19 above, non-attachment (*asakti*) is also characterized by non-impulsiveness in feeling and action. Here, I am inferring feeling from the word *mūrchita*, which, in the context of the *Saundarananda*, means the infatuation part of falling in love. In verse 7.36, the verb *mūrch+* is used to portray Sthūlaśīras infatuation/love for Rambhā, and, in verse 8.20, the noun *mūrchā* is associated with sensual love or *kāma*. (Sthūlaśīras and Rambhā are characters from another story which Aśvaghoṣa brings in as illustrations of his point. They are not characters in the plot of the *Saundarananda* itself).

In contrast to the non-impulsiveness of non-attachment depicted in verses 18.18 and 18.19, attachment or *sakti* is portrayed as a dragging force in the mind, and is sometimes associated with, or composed of negative emotions such as *mūrchā* etc. Since non-attachment or non-clinging (*asakti*) is associated with positive, stable affect, by extension, it would make sense to say that attachment could be associated with everything else but positive, stable affect.

baddhvāsanam parvatanirjharasthaḥ svastho yathā dhyāyati bhikṣur eṣaḥ/
saktaḥ kvacin nāham ivaiṣa nūnam śāntas tathā tṛpta ivopaviṣṭaḥ//Sau, 7.20//

Surely, this monk (who) has taken up the seated posture and is meditating near the mountain waterfall, is cheerful (and/or self-content) (and) is not attached at all, unlike me. He seems (*iva*) peaceful and satisfied sitting there.

pumskokilānām avicintya ghoṣam vasantalakṣmyām avicārya cakṣuḥ/
śāstram yathābhyasyati caiṣa yuktaḥ śaṅke priyākaraṣati nāsyā cetāḥ//Sau, 7.21//

He does not ponder the noises of the male cuckoo birds nor do his eyes rest upon the beauty of spring. I doubt that a lover pulls his mind away, for he is strict in reciting religious texts (*śāstras*).

asmai namo 'stu sthiraniścayāya nivṛttakautūhalavismayāya/
śāntātmane 'ntargatamānasāya caṅkramyamāṇāya nirutsukāya // Sau, 7.22 // ³⁷¹

Let there be salutations to him who is resolved and steady, free of pride and covetousness (*kautūhala*), who is peaceful in himself, whose mind has turned inward (away from sensory satisfaction), who goes forth without eagerness (or expectation).

In passage 7.21, attachment is portrayed here as a “dragging” or “pulling away” (*ākṛṣ+*) of the mind. Similarly, in verse 4.9, Sundarī and Nanda are described as being magnetically pulled to one another, and to be with *sakta-citta* towards one another. Also, in verse 7.27, we see again that attachment is defined as a kind of pulling force, and one that takes one away from steadiness or *dhṛti*. In this verse, Vaivasvata and Agni are described as having minds which were pulled towards (*visakta*) hostility (*vaira*), two negative emotive or affective states, on account of their desire for a woman. Also, in verse 15.31, we have the imagery of people being dragged (*ā-kṛṣ*) through *saṃsāra* due to attachment.

From these passages, it is difficult to ascertain what exactly this “pulling force” is. By the nature of the words involved, which connote “pulling” and “dragging” etc., it seems to connote something volitional? Yet, could we also say that this pulling action is also something emotive in nature: is there a feeling or emotion of being pulled or dragged? In other words, is attachment itself actually emotive in nature, or, can it be categorized as more volitional? And, on a more

practical level, is such a distinction between psychic forces such as volition and emotion helpful for the practitioner of meditation or the patient in psychotherapy; or, is it merely a theoretical question?

In psychotherapy, one must describe one's subjective impressions in the most accurate way in order to heal. Similarly, in Buddhist meditation, one has to experience things exactly as they are in order to heal. Thus, if, in fact, a phenomenon such as attachment is actually more emotive than volitional or vice-versa, and if these two forces are indeed of different subjective qualities, then in order to attain healing, one would have to experience the exact nature of these qualities. Thus, in this sense, it could be a fruitful enterprise to separate out the volitional and the emotive from the point of view of psychic healing, and it would not just be a distinction one would make for the purposes of technical definition. Perhaps this was the reason for the Dalai Lama's concern, explicated in chapter four, concerning the development of a discrete definition for emotions as psychic phenomena, separate from thinking etc.

In any case, within the context of the *Saundarananda*, it seems that *sakti* and its variations are actually composed of all three psychic elements which were outlined in chapter two: cognitive, volitional and affective. In regards to affective processes, non-attachment (*asakti*) is associated with positive, stable affects such as the peacefulness, self-contentedness etc. of the sage. In contrast, attachment (*sakti*) is associated with a dragging feeling in the mind, which seems to connote a general unhappiness and the presence of negative emotive and affective states.

In regards to volition, attachment (*sakti*) involves a driven feeling, be it away from or toward an object, whereas non-attachment (*asakti*) involves a feeling of freedom (*vimukta*), a lack of mental strife and infatuation (*amūrchita*), and therefore, a motivation which is felt as neither driven nor impulsive. Finally, *sakti* can be analyzed cognitively, as being a result of false imaginings or *parikalpa*.

In conclusion, the final translation of *sakti* will be “attachment” and that of *asakti*, “non-attachment”. Both “attachment” in English and *sakti* in Classical Sanskrit connote an “adhering” or “clinging”, and therefore “non-attachment” and *asakti* connote the opposite. In addition, although *anāsthā* and *upekṣā* also seem to be referring to the meditative attitude in general, the translation of “non-attachment” is not as accurate when applied to either of these terms. As was mentioned in the preceding sections, *anāsthā* connotes non-expectancy rather than non-clinging or non-adherence and *upekṣā* connotes an equal, caring regard rather than a lack of adherence.

However, this being said, for a correct understanding of meditative attitude as it is portrayed in the *Saundarananda*, all three of these concepts, as well as others, such as *virāga* (see explanation below) etc., are important. Taken together, they give us a more holistic understanding of the concept of meditative attitude, and also, a better idea as to its affective composition. Thus, I will now turn to an analysis of the final concept in this chapter related to meditative attitude: *virāga*.

Virāga (including *Virajas*, *Vairāgya* etc.)

In the *Saundarananda*, *rāga* usually signifies “desire”. In its positive sense, *rāga* signifies the desire for Buddhist practice and liberation; in its negative sense, it implies an impulsive desire for things that run counter to Buddhist practice.

Rāga is often used synonymously with the words *kāma*, *rajas* and *trṣṇā* in the context of the *Saundarananda*. Yet, since *rāga* and its related words fall under the rubric of volition rather than emotion (see definitions in chapter two), these words will not be covered in detail here. However, the antithesis of *rāga*, *virāga* and its variants like *vitārāga*, *vairāgya* etc., will be covered briefly because they relate to the concept of non-attachment in Buddhism.

Within the context of the *Saundarananda*, *virāga* can be roughly translated as “lack of impulsive desire” or “lack of impulsion”, and thus, is decidedly centered around volitional forces. This translation can also be applied to certain portions of the Pali Canon, and thus, I have tended to use this rendering throughout the thesis. In addition, the translation of “lack of impulsion” has been deemed better than renderings such as “desirelessness” or “passionless” for the following reason: since *virāga* is always a positive attribute within the context of Buddhist practice, a translation of “desirelessness” etc. for *virāga* implies that desire is always a negative attribute; yet, this is not the case.

Also, as we saw in chapter four with the concept of *vedanā* and chapter five with regard to *vikriyā* and *dhṛti*, the Buddhist sage is described as someone who cannot be swayed by internal or external occurrences. Thus, it makes sense

that a translation of *virāga* should be opposed to the type of volitional force which implies a drivenness or a quality of being impelled by any external or internal phenomenon, rather than being opposed to desire itself.

duḥkhakṣayo hetuparīkṣayāc ca śāntaṃ śivaṃ sākṣikuruṣva dharmam/
tṛṣṇāvirāgaṃ layanaṃ nirodhaṃ sanātanaṃ trānaṃ ahāryam āryam//Sau,
16.26//³⁷²

And, the end of suffering is due to the final end of the cause. Realize liberation (*dharma=nirvana*) which is peaceful, blissful, free from impulsion towards desire, resting, cessation, eternal, saving, unassailable and holy.

In the verse above, *virāga* is clearly associated with *nirvāṇa* or the enlightened state of the *arhat*. This is the case in a number of other places in the *Saundarananda*. For example, in verses 17.32 above and 17.61, *nirvāṇa* (=dharma in verse 17.32) is described as characterized by *virāga*. In verse 17.32 in particular *virāga* is juxtaposed alongside other characteristics of *nirvāṇa* such as bliss (*śiva*), peace (*śānta*) etc., and thus, in this sense, *virāga* is associated with the ideas of bliss and peacefulness. Because of this association, one could say that, in verse 17.32, *virāga* is portrayed in an affective fashion or is at least associated with positive affects.

In addition, like the concept of *sakti*, *virāga* can be analyzed from a cognitive point of view. In verse 13.22, for example, the basis of *virāga* is said to be correct knowledge (*saṃveda*), and the basis of *saṃveda* is explicated as an insight into knowledge (*jñāna-darśana*). In addition, the agitation of *saṃvega*

(different from *saṃveda*) in verse 12.8 is said to extinguish passion or *rāga*, and this agitation is clearly linked, in verse 12.4, to a change in Nanda's point of view concerning the eternality of heaven. The sequence seems to have been: a) change in point of view; b) *saṃvega* or agitation; c) *virāga*. Thus, in chapter 12, cognitive changes in the form of changes in opinion are portrayed as the cause for *virāga*.

In summary, much like the other three concepts examined in this section, *virāga* is a concept which is not so easily categorizable as affective, cognitive etc. Its basis is a deepening of one's knowledge and its associated affective states are stated to be peacefulness and bliss. The affective states associated with *virāga* are most important for this thesis. Because of their association with *virāga*, it would seem that, in the context of the *Saundarananda*, *virāga* cannot be thought of as a non-emotional point from which a distancing towards emotion takes place. Hence, I have chosen the translation of "lack of impulsive desire" for *virāga* etc. in order to avoid the non-emotive connotations of "detachment", "dispassion" etc.

Concluding Remarks on Non-Attachment

As was mentioned in our introduction, my purpose here was not to argue for an emotive understanding of the correct meditative attitude (i.e. non-attachment) to the exclusion of a cognitive or a volitional one. Instead, it was to demonstrate the worthiness and validity of looking at non-attachment as either possessing or being inextricably associated with affective states as well as

cognitive and volitional qualities. This idea is often overlooked due to certain connotations of frequently used translations such as “detachment”, “dispassion” etc.

Judging from the different passages we have examined here in regards to the concepts of *anāsthā*, *virāga*, *upekṣā* and *sakti*, the semantic ranges of each term are rather broad. Each of the four notions can be said to contain or be associated with affective, volitional and cognitive elements, although the affective element has been given more focus since it relates directly to the hypothesis of this chapter.

Because all four of the above terms seem to be inextricably associated with affective states, it is reasonable to conclude that none of them can be said to describe a “zero point” in the mind, devoid of affect. For, in a sense, association implies a complete interdependence, and complete interdependence indicates something about a phenomenon’s composition. In this regard, judging from the evidence presented in the *Saundarananda*, it is unlikely that this “zero point” in the mind,³⁷³ which is often associated with correct meditative attitude in Buddhism, is void of volition or cognition either.

With these ideas in mind, the four translations of the above terms have been chosen to avoid the idea of non-affect. For the purposes of review, the translations have been as follows: *upekṣā* has been translated as “equanimity”; *anāsthā*, as the state of “non-expectancy”; *sakti* as “non-attachment”; and, *virāga* has been translated as “non-impulsion” or “non-impulsive desire”.

“Detachment”, “dispassion” etc., which were deemed inappropriate at the beginning of this chapter, still seem inappropriate, at least within the context of the *Saundarananda*, for the same reasons as were stated earlier.

Perhaps one could say that correct meditative attitude should be portrayed by English words as mental “freedom”, or a “tranquillity” or “equanimity” with regard to internal and external events. On this subject, Lama Govinda reminds us that equanimity should not be confused with the loss of a love towards the suffering of others: in other words, one should not be equanimous towards the suffering of others, just one’s own. Another modern Buddhist master, Sogyal Rinpoche, equates correct meditative attitude with a correct understanding of self and feelings of “agreeableness” and “inner expansiveness”.³⁷⁴ In his stress on understanding, Rinpoche’s comments are reminiscent of Aśvaghoṣa’s explications of the concept of *parikalpa* and its role in non-attachment or *sakti*.

This is not purely a destructive process. For alongside an extremely precise and sometimes painful realization of the fraudulence and virtual criminality of your ego, and everyone else’s, grows a sense of inner expansiveness, a direct knowledge of the “egolessness” and interdependence of all things, and that vivid and generous humour that is the hallmark of freedom.³⁷⁵

When your attitude changes, then the whole atmosphere of your mind changes, even the very nature of your thoughts and emotions. When you become more agreeable, then they do; if you have no difficulty with them, they will have not difficulty with you either.³⁷⁶

Here, we conclude the section of the thesis on “meditative attitude”.

“Meditative attitude” was given the general name of “non-attachment” at the beginning of the chapter. As a revision to this original assertion, it might be more accurate to say here that, within the context of the *Saundarananda*, it is necessary to analyze all four terms together (i.e. *anāsthā*, *virāga*, *upekṣā* and *sakti*) in order to truly understand Aśvaghoṣa’s view of meditative attitude. Non-attachment can still be seen as a rough translation of meditative attitude in general with the qualification that this attitude must be viewed from the different conceptual angles of each word used to portray it.

Yet, perhaps what is most important for this thesis, is the place of affect within meditative attitude. And, in this regard, it was clear that all four of the words examined occurred in conjunction with affective states such as peacefulness, satisfaction, contentedness etc. Thus, what Aśvaghoṣa seems to be indicating here is that correct meditative attitude is either always composed of, or, always associated with affective qualities; it is not devoid of affect.

Chapter 8: Concluding Remarks and Questions for Future Research

Introductory Summarizing Remarks

As was mentioned in the first chapter, this thesis had four questions as its motivating force, all of which centered around the concepts of emotivity or affect. Here, it might be useful to repeat these four questions. 1) What would be the correct attitude in Buddhist meditation, and, more specifically, does this correct attitude contain an affective component as well, or, is it merely a distancing from emotion from some place of non-emotivity? 2) Similarly, is the Buddhist sage void of emotion altogether or distant from it, or, does even the enlightened sage possess affective processes? 3) If we think of emotional disorder as the catalyst for mental unhealth, how does Buddhism purport to heal mental unhealth? 4) And, in regards to the *Saundarananda* of Aśvaghoṣa specifically, given that the poetic medium is usually a medium which appeals to and consequently elevates emotivity, and that, on the contrary, the Buddhist message in the *Saundarananda* speaks against emotional excitement or agitation, does this paradox with regard to emotivity reveal itself in the vocabulary of our text?

Out of these four questions, the first two were chosen as the focus of this thesis, and were addressed within the context of the *Saundarananda* of Aśvaghoṣa. As was stated in chapter one, in regard to these four questions, we have investigated four different areas: 1) the province for an emotive and psychological study of the *Saundarananda*; 2) the province for an emotive and psychological study of the two streams of thinking that feed into the

Saundarananda, the early aesthetic and the early Buddhist streams; 3) by investigating the nature of the affectivity of the sage, the establishment of the stance that Buddhism is not preaching non-emotivity nor a distancing from it; 4) the establishment of the presence of affect within the correct Buddhist meditative attitude, which is often expressed by the English words “detachment”, “dispassion” etc. but is better expressed with the notion of “non-attachment”.

In regards to point number two, we established in chapter one that Bharata’s *Nāṭyaśāstra* clearly has an emotive component, especially in its analyses of the concepts of *rasa* and *bhāva*. And, because it contains an emotive component in its analyses, by extension, it can also be said to possess a psychological aspect.

Yet, there was another important reason for the inclusion of Bharata’s analyses: from his ideas, we were able to extract a portion of our method of approach from a source which is roughly contemporary to the *Saundarananda*. Bharata states clearly in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* that a poet’s inward sentiments (*antargata bhāva*)³⁷⁷ can be communicated through the words of a poem and understood by an empathetic observer (*sumanasa prekṣaka*). Thus, I applied this allusion to the theatrical arts to the process of interpreting passages here.³⁷⁸

My decision to put a certain amount of faith in the enterprise of interpreting the sentiments or intentions of Aśvaghoṣa is in accordance with the general spirit of interpretation within the Buddhist tradition. As Donald Lopez mentions in his *Buddhist Hermeneutics*, previously quoted in chapter one, the Buddhist tradition with all of its commentarial works etc., is based on the

assumption that it is possible to determine the intentions of the Buddha. In this sense, we have attempted to consider the methodological formulations of both streams which feed into Aśvaghoṣa's work: the aesthetic and the Buddhist.

In addition, in chapter one, we considered the form of poetry (*kāvya*) as it was outlined in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* along with the acknowledgement of this form in Aśvaghoṣa's own closing verses (as well as his overall style), and concluded that Aśvaghoṣa did indeed write within the medium of *kāvya* as Bharata has defined it. This conclusion influenced the interpretive process, as we had to consider the possible interpretations of emotive vocabulary words within the context of both the aesthetic and the Buddhist stream of thinking before we arrived at a conclusion concerning their exact definition. A good example of this problem came with the word *rasa*. The particular usage of the term *rasa* in the *Saundarananda* could easily come from early Buddhist ways of thinking about the term, such as was seen in the passage from the *Sutta Nipāta*, or from aesthetic ways of thinking, such as in certain passages from the *Nāṭyaśāstra*.

Summarizing Remarks regarding the Emotive and Psychological Study of the Saundarananda and early Buddhism

In the last two verses of the *Saundarananda*, Aśvaghoṣa declares his message to be first and foremost that of Buddhism. Thus, a considerable amount of time and energy was expended in chapters three and four in order to assure that a psychological and emotive study was even possible within the medium of

Buddhism before we began a study of the *Saundarananda*. We tested this out by putting forth the following questions to the Pali Canon and its commentaries: 1) Did early Pali Buddhism even have such a category as psychic disease, meaning disease which has its originating point in the psyche? 2) Did it see itself as a healer of psychic disease?; 3) Did it even have such a category as mentality which was considered to be distinguishable from physicality and which was associated with the immaterial?; 4) Was there any word in early Pali or *Theravāda* Buddhism that could be considered as an approximation of the emotive terms outlined in chapter two, such as “feeling”, “affect” etc.? (Here, I have skipped the first question in chapter three concerning the *Āyurveda*).

In regards to the last question, two words from the Pali Canon, *kilesa* and *vedanā*, were chosen as sample vocabulary words, in order to test the possibility of matching emotive concepts in English with certain concepts in the Canon. From this sampling we concluded that *kilesa* could perhaps be translated as “negative emotions”, but, in fact, was best translated as “mental afflictions”, as the category of *kilesa* is composed of volitional, cognitive and emotive elements. In regards to *vedanā*, we concluded that it could be translated as “feeling” in English. This translation was deemed acceptable, in spite of the physical connotations of *vedanā* in the Canon, as the English word “feeling” can be used to signify both bodily and mental feelings.

Yet, in our very brief survey of early Pali materials, we did not really arrive upon a proper translation of either “affect” or “emotion”, the two words

which were used in chapter two to define emotive processes as a category.

Vedanā and *kilesa* (amongst other words like *āsava* etc.) certainly possessed some emotive characteristics but did not really represent the scope of the words “affect” and “emotion”.

In regards to the other three questions listed above, all of the responses were in the affirmative, meaning that the particular viewpoint being investigated at least was present within the Canonical materials. Thus, these affirmative answers concerning Buddhism’s stance on psychic healing etc. allowed us a province for the psychological study of Buddhism (within the rubric of how the term *psychology* was defined in chapter two) and set the stage for the psychological study of the *Saundarananda*, a self-avowed Buddhist text.

With regard to the *Saundarananda*, we attempted to answer the same four preliminary questions as we did for the Pali Canon. The answers for questions two and three were more or less the same as our answers for the Pali Canon. The *Saundarananda* did clearly possess the viewpoint that Buddhism is a healer of psychic disease, although there was some evidence that it saw Buddhism as healing all suffering as well. Also, in regards to the third question, there was some basis for asserting a mentality associated with immateriality, as mentality seemed to be portrayed in a manner similar to the depiction of *Buddhaghosa’s* (quoted in chapter three), namely, as discrete yet interdependent from the material.

In regards to the first preliminary question, the *Saundarananda* differed from the Canonical materials, in that the viewpoint of the psyche alone as the originating point of disease was not present at all; instead the *Saundarananda* stated that a combination of mentality and materiality are at cause for suffering. In question four, however, we saw the greatest difference between the *Saundarananda* and the passages from the Pali Canon. The *Saundarananda* possessed more plausible translations for words such as “emotion” and “affect”, such as *bhāva* (and perhaps *vikriyā*), whereas, in the Canonical materials, the closest approximation we could find was *vedanā* or “feeling”.

However, this being said, neither the *Saundarananda* nor the Canonical materials truly possessed a clear idea of emotivity or affectivity as a mental process or category functioning alongside cognitive and volitional processes. Also, none of the terms surveyed explicated emotion as being possessed of a quality called “subjective feeling”, feeling being defined here as immaterial in nature and the delineating factor between emotive processes and other sorts of processes. Thus, since these two ideas were central to our definition of “emotion” etc. in chapter two, none of the texts in this thesis can be said to have a term which translates either “emotion” or “affect” with even close to one hundred percent accuracy.

Conclusions concerning the First Two Original Motivating Questions of the Thesis

In regards to the first two principal motivating questions behind this thesis, the first regarding the affectivity of the sage and the second regarding the existence of affect in the correct Buddhist meditative attitude, Aśvaghoṣa's *Saundarananda* gives us clear responses. The sage is clearly portrayed as possessing positive, stable affect. This conclusion has been reached based on two factors: first of all, *dhṛti* and its related words govern correct Buddhist attitude and *dhṛti* clearly connotes a steadiness of emotion and a motivational steadfastness with regard to all external and internal occurrences; secondly, the Buddhist sage is consistently portrayed with positive affective states such as enjoyment (*rati*), satisfaction (*tr̥pti*), empathy (*anukampa*) etc. From these two foundational points, it was concluded that the sage has positive and stable affect, and never has negative affects, in that he is devoid of all *kleśas*, *doṣas* etc.

In regards to the correct meditative attitude in Buddhism according to the *Saundarananda*, it is clear that affect seems to be one part of this attitude. For example, adjectives like healthy or content (*svastha*), satisfied (*tr̥pta*), and peaceful (*śānta*) etc. are frequently seen associated with some of the vocabulary words connotating correct Buddhist meditative attitude. Thus, it seems clear that emotivity, in the form of "affect", as we have defined it, is present both within the propounded attitude of Buddhist practice and within the mind of the Buddhist sage. This being said, what implications does this have for emotional healing or health in Buddhism? Does this mean that there are certain emotions or

affects that are higher or purer, and, if so, what would it mean to possess purified emotivity?

These questions are left only partially answered by Aśvaghoṣa, and even his partial answers are revealed only after some additional interpretation on the part of the reader. Here, I am referring to the previously mentioned possibility that Aśvaghoṣa saw Buddhist practice as a process of emotional development: a process of transformation from emotion and negative affects to positive affective states. I will expand more upon this idea in the section below.

Speculations on the Third Original Motivating Questions of Thesis

In regards to our third original motivating question concerning emotive healing in Buddhism, the principal dynamic to understand here seems to be that of *vikriyā* and *dhṛti*. In the *Saundarananda*, *dhṛti* represents one of the most prevalent ideals of mental health, and, in relation to affective processes, it represents their stable manifestation. In contrast, *vikriyā* represents the epitome of emotional (and volitional) unhealth. In regards to affective processes in general, the unenlightened are subject to the whims of constantly shifting emotions and plagued by the negative affects etc. of the *kleśas* and *doṣas*. In contrast, the sage is always depicted as being stable and steadfast and with constantly positive affect.

Thus, in this sense, we could say that Aśvaghoṣa seems to be giving us a foundation for emotional development in Buddhism. When one's emotional life

is constantly shifting and unstable, or with persistently negative affect, one is in the realm of the unenlightened or the unhealthy; when one's emotions stabilize and steady themselves and are always positive, then this is the realm of the sage. There is also some reference to mental darkness (*tamas*) in association with the unenlightened in the *Saundarananda*, and to mental inflexibility. Similarly, in the *Āṅguttara Nikāya*, the mind is referred to as inherently luminous and flexible, before it is impinged upon by the *kilesas*. With these passages in mind, could we not say that Buddhist practice is, in fact, a process of emotional development or maturation. For, it brings the mind of the practitioner out of emotional instability, negativity, darkness and rigidity, and into a mental state characterized by positive, stable, light-filled and supple kinds of affects. (Here, suppleness refers to the fact that the sage's emotivity would not be rigid in its reactions to either internal or external phenomena)?

If one views Buddhism in this way, then its view of mental health is comparable to modern models of the mental health and unhealth. Depressed or melancholic patients, for example, often describe their depressed emotivity as dark, hopeless, and rigid in its productive patterns. Manic patients describe a great instability of emotion. While it is true that the contexts of these descriptions might be different than that of the Buddhist practitioner, nevertheless, the similarity of vocabulary within the descriptions render the comparisons plausible. Also, considering the constant interaction between Buddhist meditation practice and psychotherapy within our modern Western society,

these comparisons may not only be plausible but also useful in a very practical sense.

There is another significant question here in relation to the emotivity of the sage. If the sage is always constant, does this mean that the sage has shifting emotions as well, and is just not swayed by them? Or, does this mean that the sage does not even possess these internal phenomena at all? These two questions are not answered in the *Saundarananda*. However, what is clear is in our text is that, even if the sage were to possess such things, he would still remain steadfast (*dhṛti*) and unswayed by their presence.

Now, this quality of being unswayed seems to imply a central point, a point to which one's being is fastened amidst the effects of all internal and external phenomena. What is this point? Does the presence of such a central point imply the notion of a provisional "self", thus impinging upon the Buddhist idea of no-self. The answer here would depend upon how one understands the doctrine of no-self, and consequently, non-dualism, within the context of Buddhism. According to my understanding, Buddhist non-dualism attempts to bring into question harmful psychological barriers. Therefore, it does not deny the existence of distinctions, but rather, attempts to alleviate our negative reactions to distinctions. In regards to the concept of *dhṛti* in the *Saundarananda* and its implication of a central, unmovable point in Buddhist meditative attitude, this would mean that the existence of a feeling of a distinctive "self" in relation to an internal or external object is not inherently bad or wrong. Instead, this feeling

of immovability, or, of having a central point from which one observes, is absolutely necessary in meditation practice.

In addition, there is one more important offshoot of our third question. If non-attachment is the correct meditative attitude in Buddhism, and Buddhist meditation is said to heal suffering, then perhaps we can see correct meditative attitude as the “motor” or mechanism behind the entire healing process. This raises a number of other questions, all of which are not answerable within the context of our investigation here. For example, can a non-attached attitude truly heal suffering? And, if so, what kind of suffering: both mental and physical or just mental? Is there really such a thing as mental and physical suffering, or, suffering that originates in the psyche and suffering that originates in the body? If there is not, and if it is true, as many have claimed in the modern era (Thomas Szasz etc.),³⁷⁹ that all mental processes are mere reflections of physical ones and therefore there is really no such thing as mental disease, then would an immaterial, non-drug based practice such as Buddhist meditation truly be able to heal disease? If so, what would be its causal mechanism?

In the body of this work, I did not attempt to answer, with any finality, the questions posed above, nor will I try to do so here in my concluding remarks. Rather, part of my purpose here, in my conclusion, is to raise the types of questions to which Buddhist psychological research might address itself in the future.

Speculations on the Fourth Original Motivating Question of the Thesis

The fourth original motivating question for this thesis concerned itself with the apparent paradox between the chosen medium of expression, namely poetry, and its appeal to emotive life, and the nature of the message, namely Buddhist renunciation and the quality of being unmoved by emotivity. Here, we could perhaps speculate and say that the answer lies in the depiction of the Buddhist sage. In other words, in spite of the apparent conflict, the medium and its message are not in conflict as affective processes are not entirely denied in the *Saundarananda*: for, emotion does undergo a certain elevation or metamorphosis within the mind of Nanda in the process of Buddhist practice, just as *bhāva* undergoes an elevation in its transformation into *rasa*.

Was the medium of poetry a tool deliberately used by Aśvaghoṣa in order to bring about such an affective transformation within us, the readers? This question is impossible to answer with any certainty. Yet, it is, nevertheless, within the realm of possibility, especially when one considers the fact that, in his last two verses, Aśvaghoṣa evinces an awareness of the possible paradox between the medium of poetry and its Buddhist content. Also, when we consider the overall cleverness of the man - his style of writing, his ability to concoct clever pun after clever pun, the beauty and force of his descriptions, the emotive force of the passages depicting the love of Nanda and Sundarī etc. - one begins to get the feeling that this is within the realm of possibility.

In conclusion, there is still a portion of Aśvaghōṣa's overall intent which remains a mystery to me, especially in regards to the poetic medium of his expression and the Buddhist content of his message. Was Aśvaghōṣa already in contact with some predecessor of Bharata (or the compilers of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* itself, if the text was *Saundarananda's* contemporary) and therefore fully familiar with a theory similar to the *sthāyi-bhāvas* and their elevation to *rasa*? Did he, in fact, not only use the poetic medium to elevate our emotions, but also deem this type of emotive elevation to be conducive to Buddhist practice? In making such a statement, something skeptical leaps up within me; but then I recall Aśvaghōṣa's last two verses and am brought again to a state of wonder (*camatkāra*). It is here that I would like to end.

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Endnotes

¹ By the word "psychological" here, I am referring to psychiatry, neurology and the "harder" sciences as well. More will be said on the definition of "psychology" in the second chapter of this thesis.

² David Wulff. *Psychology of Religion: Classic and Contemporary Views*. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1991), pp. xi, 1-40, pgs. 167, 172, 203, 246 etc. *MindScience: An East West Dialogue*. Daniel Goleman and Robert A. F. Thurman, eds. (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1991), pp. 39-40. Both of these studies contain examples of meditative phenomena being studied with empirical scientific methods.

³ I present a literary review of most of the other authors in the field of Buddhist psychology in chapter four.

⁴ I am defining the term "Western" here as Europe and North America. This will be the general conception of the term throughout the thesis.

⁵ Mary L. Smith, Gene V. Glass and Thomas I. Miller. *The Benefits of Psychotherapy*. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1980), p. 2. This study appears to be based on U.S. statistics only.

⁶ Buddhist meditation is broadly defined as mindfulness in all situations, and is thus not limited to just formal seated or walking meditation etc.

⁷ An important follow-up to this question is the following: at what point are immaterial treatments such as Buddhist meditation and psychotherapy, sufficient with regard to healing emotional unhealth, and at what point is the intervention of psychotropic drugs necessary? The idea of immaterial within the context of psychological treatment is being defined as non-drug-oriented treatments. (Please see chapter two, definitions section, for more information on my definition of "material" etc.).

⁸ Āśvaghoṣa. *Buddacarita or Acts of Buddha*. E. H. Johnston, tr. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1995; first published 1936). pp. xxiv-xliv and lxxix-xcviii. Bimala C. Law. *Āśvaghoṣa*. (Calcutta: Royal Asiatic Society, 1946), pp. 23-75. Biswanath Bhattacharya. *Āśvaghoṣa: A Critical Study*. (Santiniketan: Santiniketan Press, 1976), pp. 194-412. Rustomji R. Bohn. *Āśvaghoṣa's Saundarananda: A Poetic Study*, Ph.D. Dissertation. (Berkeley: University of California, 1973), pp. 19-288. All four of these works delineate Āśvaghoṣa's Buddhist ideological presentation from the poetic aspects of his work.

⁹ Āśvaghoṣa. *The Āśvaghoṣa of Saundarananda*. E. H. Johnston, tr. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1975; first publ. 1928), 18.63-18.64.

¹⁰ Cognitive therapists would disagree. Most cognitive psychologists see thinking patterns, beliefs etc. as "at cause" for psychic difficulties.

¹¹ Behaviorists such as B.F. Skinner would object here. Skinner preferred to analyze only objectively verifiable phenomena such as behavior. Because of this, he did not attempt to causally link internal states such as emotions with external behavior. See Burrhus F. Skinner. *About Behaviorism*. (New York: Vintage Books, 1976), pp 18-19.

¹² For a concise and clearly written explanation of the different terms for depressive disorders, please see Peter Whybrow. *A Mood Apart: The Thinker's Guide to Emotion and Its Disorders*. (New York: Harper Perennial, 1997), pp. 102-105.

¹³ For a better idea of the Buddhist context, please see chapter four (and chapter six) for my explanation of *kilesas* (*kleśas*).

¹⁴ Please see chapter two, the "psychoanalytic" section, for a further explanation of this idea.

¹⁵ Please see chapter two for a more detailed handling of affect (and cognition).

¹⁶ Sigmund Freud. *Five Lectures on Psychoanalysis*. James Strachey, editor and translator. (London: W. W. Norton and Company, 1989; first published, 1909), pp. 9-10.

¹⁷ Carl G. Jung. *Freud and Psychoanalysis*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985; first published in 1961), pp. 16, 148.

¹⁸ Joseph LeDoux. *The Emotional Brain: the Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life*. (New York: Touchstone, 1996, New York), pp. 18-20.

¹⁹ LeDoux , p. 69. LeDoux tells us the following: "emotion and cognition are best thought of as separate but interacting mental functions mediated by separate but interacting brain systems".

²⁰ Paul M. Churchland. *Matter and Consciousness: A Contemporary Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind*. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984), pp. 7-35. Churchland reviews both Identity theories and more dualistic Interactionist ones. Karl R. Popper and John E. Eccles. *The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for*

Interactionism. (New York: Springer International, 1977), pp. 36-38, 494.

²¹ *Buddhacarita*, Johnston, pp. xvi-xvii. Bhattacharya, p. 20. Both Johnston and Bhattacharya place Aśvaghoṣa within the time period of Kanishka, the Kuṣāna king, who is said to have ruled circa the 1st-2nd century C. E.

²² G.P. Malalasekera. *Dictionary of Pali Proper Names*, Vol. 2. (London: Luzac and Company, 1960), pp. 10-11.

²³ *ibid*

²⁴ Bharata. *The Nāṭyaśāstra*. Manomohan Ghosh, translator. (Calcutta: Manisha Granthalaya, 1967; first published in 1951), pp. lix-lxv. Bharat Gupt. *Dramatic Concepts: Greek and Indian*. (New Delhi: D. K. Printworld Ltd., 1994), pp. 19-39. J. L. Masson and M. V. Patwardhan. *Aesthetic Rapture: The Rasādhyāya of the Nāṭyaśāstra*. (Poona: Deccan College, 1970), p. 1.

²⁵ Gupt, p. 29.

²⁶ Here, I am following the version of the Oriental Institute in Baroda, which has *sattva*. *Nāṭyaśāstram*. M. Ramakrishna Kavi, ed. Baroda: Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Oriental Institute: 1934.

²⁷ Bharatamuni, *Nāṭyaśāstram*, (Dillī: Bhāratiya Vidyā Prakāśan, 1983), 14.2.

²⁸ The last part of this translation was produced from a combination of the Board of Scholars' translation and Manomohan Ghosh's. See Ghosh, verse 15.2 and Board of Scholars' translation, verse 15.2. Bharata. *The Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharatamuni*. A Board of Scholars, tr. (Delhi: Satguru Publications, 1987).

²⁹ NS, 7.2.

³⁰ This word refers to a specific type of gestures called *sāttvika* gestures which include such things as perspiration, horripilation etc.

³¹ NS, 7.2. Ghosh, tr. Also, see prose portion of *Nāṭyaśāstra*, between 6.31 and 6.32 for an explanation of *sumanasa prekṣaka* or benevolent observer.

³² Donald Lopez. "Introduction". Donald Lopez, ed. *Buddhist Hermeneutics*. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1988), pp. 6-7.

³³ Michel Foucault. "What is an Author". *Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-Structuralist Criticism*. Josue Harari, editor. (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1979), p. 157.

³⁴ These studies, mentioned previously, survey all of works attributed to Aśvaghoṣa.

³⁵ NS, 15.172.

³⁶ *Vṛtta* can be interpreted based on 14.37 in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*. In 14.37, *vṛtta* is basically made synonymous to *chandas*.

³⁷ NS, 14.40

³⁸ NS, 16.6

³⁹ NS, 16.11

⁴⁰ NS, 16.14.

⁴¹ See R. R. Bohn, pp. 19-173 and 231-288 in particular.

⁴² NS, prose before 7.1.

⁴³ NS, prose before 7.1, 7.7

⁴⁴ NS, prose passage between 7.7 and 7.8.

⁴⁵ For a comparison of *rasa* and *katharsis* see p. 271 in *Bharat Gupt's Dramatic Concepts: Greek and Indian*. Also, Bharata gives us another view of *rasa* and *bhāva* in which he describes their interdependence. See NS, 6.38.

⁴⁶ Here, I am forced to deviate from the Bhāratiya Vidyā Prakāśan edition of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, which I have been using throughout, as *nivartante* (i.e. "retreat", "turn back", "disappear" etc.) does not make sense here. *Nirvartante* is the verbal form which was used in the other edition at my disposal, and the meaning of this verb (i.e. "originate", "become", "take place" etc.) makes more sense in the context of the rest of the passage. See Bharata. *Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharatamuni with the Commentary of Abhinavagupta*. Madhusudan Shastri, ed. and tr. (Varanasi: Banaras Hindu University, 1971), p. 678.

⁴⁷ NS, prose passage between 6.32-6.33.

⁴⁸ *ibid*

⁴⁹ NS, 6.33-34.

⁵⁰ According to Monier-Williams *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, *upakaraṇa*, which is quite close in derivation to *upakara*, can mean "anything fabricated." Also, *upaskara* can mean "ornament" or "decoration". Thus, I have taken both of these meanings into consideration, especially that of *upakaraṇa*, when translating *upakara*. The image which seems to be evoked here is close to that of a gold miner

straining away particles of silt until he uncovers a piece of gold. See M. Monier-Williams. *A Sanskrit English Dictionary*. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1997; first publ. 1899), p. 195.

⁵¹ Sau, 18.63-64.

⁵² Sau, 11.34-11.35.

⁵³ In the *Saundarananda*, this word, or, a variation of it, only appears once, as *vyapatrāpyante*. See Sau, 16.76. However, this word and its variants in Pali and Sanskrit are common enough in Buddhist texts. Please see the following two dictionaries for a brief overview. Franklin Edgerton. *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary, volume 2*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953; reproduction by Rinsen Book Co, Kyoto, 1985), p. 43 (*apatrāpya*). T.W. Rhys Davids and William Stede. *Pali-English Dictionary*. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, first published, 1921-25; reprinted, 1993): p. 166 (*ottappa*).

⁵⁴ Neither the *Saundarananda* nor the *Buddhacarita* has a commentary. See Johnston, *Buddhacarita*, p. xxxvii.

⁵⁵ MN, i.399. In this passage, *sukha* is said to disappear in the fourth *dhyāna*. See also Rune E. A. Johansson. *Psychology of Nirvana*. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969), p. 27. Johansson tells us that *nibbāna* is characterized by happiness (*sukha*), peace etc. See also, the *Atthasālinī*, in which the different types of usages of the word *sukha* are explicated. At.40-41. *The Atthasālinī*. Edward Muller, ed. (London: Pali Text Society, 1979; first publ. 1897).

⁵⁶ Sau, 7.5-7.6.

⁵⁷ Vaman S. Apte. *The Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, Revised and Enlarged, 4th ed. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1965), p. 181.

⁵⁸ As in chapter one, the term Western psychology is being used in its broadest sense to encompass both modern psychology, psychiatry, certain aspects of neurology and even some philosophers in the field of emotive studies.

⁵⁹ I have developed my own schema of categorization, but it is partially based on other schemas developed by psychologists and philosophers of emotion. See especially K.T. Strongman, *The Psychology of Emotion: Theories of Emotion in Perspective*, 4th edition (West Sussex: John Wiley and Sons, 1996). Also, please see Ronald de Sousa, *The Rationality of Emotion* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), pp.36-46. William Lyons, *Emotion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 1-52.

⁶⁰ LeDoux, p. 12.

⁶¹ By immaterial in this context, I mean to say "non-drug-oriented".

⁶² Skinner, *About Behaviorism*, pp. 18-19.

⁶³ *ibid*

⁶⁴ *Current Psychotherapies*, 5th ed. Raymond J. Corsini and Danny Wedding, eds. (Itasca: F.E. Peacock Publishers, 1995), pp. 198-199.

⁶⁵ William James. *Principles of Psychology*, vol.2. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981; first publ. 1896), p. 1070.

⁶⁶ See Walter Cannon's early research. Cannon tried to explain this unique quality of emotion in terms of physiological processes. He explained the subjective feeling of emotion as being a result of nervous discharges in the thalamus. Please see Walter B. Cannon. "The Thalamic Theory of Emotion". Magda Arnold, ed. *The Nature of Emotion* (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1968), p. 296.

⁶⁷ Strongman, p. 24. Strongman quotes Joseph de Rivera's article "Emotional Climate: Social Structure and Emotional Dynamics". This article appears in *International Review of Studies on Emotion*, Vol. 2. K. T. Strongman, ed. (Chichester: Wiley), p. 198.

⁶⁸ *New Encyclopaedia Britannica: Micropaedia*, vol. 3. (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc., 1998; first publ. 1768-71), p. 434.

⁶⁹ Robert Solomon. *The Passions*. (Garden City: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1976), p. 15.

⁷⁰ The notion of "volition" cannot be said to comprise the entirety of the term *samskāra* (*saṅkhāra* in Pali). Yet, in the *Visuddhimagga*, one part of *saṅkhāra* is defined as volition (*cetanā*). See Buddhaghosa. *Visuddhimagga*. Bhikkhu Nāṇamoli, tr. (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1991; first publ. 1975), p. 463.

⁷¹ Padmasiri de Silva has some interesting observations regarding the interaction between Buddhist and Freudian notions of the unconscious. Please see Padmasiri de Silva, *Buddhist and Freudian psychology* (Colombo: Lake House Investments Ltd., 1973), pp. 34-75. See also William Waldron. "A Comparison of the Ālaya Vijñāna with Freud's and Jung's Theories of the Unconscious." *Annual Memoirs of the Otani University, Shin Buddhist Comprehensive Research Institute*, Vol. 6, pp. 109-150. See especially pp. 112-

118.

⁷² Freud, *Five Lectures*, p. 14.

⁷³ Freud, *Five Lectures*, p. 9.

⁷⁴ Jung, *Freud and Psychoanalysis*, p. 16.

⁷⁵ Leslie S. Greenberg and Jeremy D. Safran, *Emotion and Psychotherapy: Affect, Cognition, and the Process of Change* (New York: Guilford Press, 1987), p. 7.

⁷⁶ David Guralnik, ed. *Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language*, second college edition. (New York: World Publishing, 1972), p. 458.

⁷⁷ Just because a word has a certain Latin root, does not mean that its modern meaning is still reflective of this root. Its meaning could change dramatically in modern usage.

⁷⁸ Joseph de Rivera, *A Structural Theory of the Emotions* (New York: International Universities Press Inc., 1977), p. 11.

⁷⁹ Lyons, p. 60.

⁸⁰ Direction of mental movement is related to volition. "Direction of mental movement" symbolizes the will of the mind towards another course of reaction. This change in motivational or volitional course is often related to a change in emotional states. For example, if one is angry, but then suddenly becomes sad, one's thought direction will change towards the accomplishment of the alleviation of that sadness.

⁸¹ Unipolar depressions are those which are characterized by consistently negative affect. Bipolar depressions, or manic depressions, are characterized by a drastic shift in mood, or, extreme highs and lows.

⁸² Here, it is impossible to state this with any certainty, as Bharata's description of the psychological experience of the empathetic or benevolent observer (*sumanasa preṣaka*) is not very precise.

⁸³ John Searle, *Minds, Brains and Science*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), pp. 14-15.

⁸⁴ Churchland, pp. 26-35.

⁸⁵ Popper and Eccles, pp. 36-38. Churchland, p. 12. Also, the understanding of mind and body as in a state of constant interaction is also held by some psychotherapists.

⁸⁶ Popper and Eccles, pp. 36-38.

⁸⁷ Popper and Eccles, pp. 494-495.

⁸⁸ *Webster's New World*, p. 1146. In the psychiatric definition of this term, Webster's tells us the following about psyche: "the mind considered as subjectively perceived, functional entity, based upon physical processes but with complex processes of its own...."

⁸⁹ Whybrow, pp. 101-106. On p. 103, Whybrow gives specific details as to the classification of mood disorders. The entire book is a very worthwhile read with much detailed information concerning depressive illnesses.

⁹⁰ *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders*, 4th ed. (*DSM-IV*). (Washington D. C.: American Psychiatric Association, 1994), pp. xxi-xxii.

⁹¹ NS, prose between 7.81 and 7.82, also, between 7.84 and 7.85.

⁹² Kenneth Zysk, *Asceticism and Healing in Ancient India*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 41.

⁹³ Introduction to *Visuddhimagga*, Ñāṇamoli, tr., p. xxviii.

⁹⁴ Dominik Wujastyk, *The Roots of Āyurveda*, (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1998), p. 40.

⁹⁵ In the compound word *āyurveda*, *āyus* changes to *āyur* due to rules of *sandhi*.

⁹⁶ Wujastyk, p. 3.

⁹⁷ See previous verse, 1.54. *Agniveśa. Agniveśa's Caraka Saṃhitā*. Ram K. Sharma and Vaidya B. Dash, trs. (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1976).

⁹⁸ Ca, 1.55-57. The translations are my own but I was aided by Sharma's and Dash's translation work and notes.

⁹⁹ The difference between the supreme soul (*paramātmā*) and empirical soul (*puruṣa*) is explained in the Ca, vol. 2. 1.52-62 etc. of the *Śarīra Sthāna* section. See also Ca, pp. 324-327.

¹⁰⁰ Wujastyk, p. 4. Wujastyk tells us that *kapha* is also sometimes termed *śleṣman*.

¹⁰¹ See Wujastyk, p. 4 and pp. 30-34. Wujastyk presents a detailed overview of some of the problems involved in the translation of *doṣa*, and also of a related term, *dhātu*. See also Margaret Trawick, "Death and Nurture in Indian Systems of Healing". *Paths to Asian Medical Knowledge*. Charles Leslie and Allan Young, eds. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 136-137.

¹⁰² Wujastyk, pp. 30-31.

¹⁰³ Wujastyk, p. 33. Scharfe's article is referred to in Wujastyk's *Roots of Āyurveda*, but, according to Wujastyk, the article is not yet published.

- ¹⁰⁴ Ca, vol. 1, 9.4. According to the translator, the verse I am quoting here is referring to *dhātu*, but he qualifies his translation by saying that *dhātus* include *doṣas*. In this regard, M. Trawick defines *dhātu* as being composed of seven things: *rasa* (food in the stomach), blood, muscle, fat, bone, marrow and semen. See Trawick, pp. 136-137.
- ¹⁰⁵ Ca, vol. 2, *Śarīra Sthāna*, 1.52-1.62.
- ¹⁰⁶ Ca, vol. 2, *Śarīra Sthāna*, 1.62.
- ¹⁰⁷ Ca, vol. 2, *Śarīra Sthāna*, 1.117. *Karmaja* diseases cannot be cured by *Āyurvedic* medicine. The patient has to wait for the fruits of the actions to exhaust themselves.
- ¹⁰⁸ These diseases are listed in the chapter of contents to volumes 1 and 2 of *Agniveśa's Caraka Saṃhitā*.
- ¹⁰⁹ Ca, vol. 2, *Nidāna Sthāna*, 7.19-23. Here, the *Caraka Saṃhitā* is referring to treatments for insanity (*unmāda*).
- ¹¹⁰ Ca, vol. 1, 1.63-104 etc. These verses explain the various types of medicines used.
- ¹¹¹ Wujastyk, p. 4.
- ¹¹² *The Dhammapada*. John R. Carter and Mahinda Paliawadana, trs. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 1.1-1.2.
- ¹¹³ The English translation was taken from Venerable Sri Acharya Buddhārakkhita's translation of the *Dhammapada*. (Bangalore: Maha Bodhi Society, 1986; first publ. 1956), p. 3.
- ¹¹⁴ AN, ii.177. (London: Pali Text Society, 1976; first publ. 1888).
- ¹¹⁵ The translation was taken from F. L. Woodward's translation in *The Book of the Gradual Sayings* (*Anguttara Nikāya*), vol. 2. (London: Pali Text Society, 1982), p. 185. Here, Woodward translates *citta* as *thought*, but I have changed this translation to *mind*.
- ¹¹⁶ *Śāntideva. Śāntideva's Bodhicharyāvatāra*. Parmananda Sharma, tr. (New Delhi: Aditya Prakashan, 1990), 5.3-5.5.
- ¹¹⁷ DhP, 3.36-3.37
- ¹¹⁸ Translation taken from *Dhammapada*, Carter and Mahinda's version.
- ¹¹⁹ Tulku Thondop. *The Healing Power of Mind*. (Boston: Shambhala, 1998), p. 25.
- ¹²⁰ Tulku, p. 86.
- ¹²¹ MN, i.280. See Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli's translation. *The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha: A New Translation of the Majjhima Nikāya*. (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1995).
- ¹²² MN, i.56. *Majjhima-Nikāya*. V. Trenckner, ed. (London: Pali Text Society, 1979; first publ. 1888).
- ¹²³ *Majjhima Nikāya*. Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli, tr., p. 145.
- ¹²⁴ SN, v.79. See *Samyutta Nikāya*. M. Leon Feer, ed. (London: Pali Text Society, 1976).
- ¹²⁵ There appears to be a typo in the text. It has *ābadha* and not *ābādha*.
- ¹²⁶ SN, v. 79-80, Feer, ed.
- ¹²⁷ For translation, see *The Book of Kindred Sayings* (*Samyutta Nikāya*). F. L. Woodward, tr. (London: Pali Text Society, 1979; first publ. 1930).
- ¹²⁸ Davids and Stede, *Pali-English Dictionary*. pp. 103 and 251.
- ¹²⁹ *Vinaya Piṭaka, Mahāvagga*, Hermann Oldenberg, ed. (London: Luzac and Company, 1964; first publ. 1879), pp. 200-201.
- ¹³⁰ AN, v.218-219. Professor E. Hardy, ed. (London: Pali Text Society, 1979; first publ. 1900). Davids' and Stedes' *Pali-English Dictionary* tells us that the *ābādhas* include not just a disturbance in the humours, but also, such afflictions as the ripening of *karma*, untoward happenings etc.
- ¹³¹ AN, v.218-19. Hardy, ed.
- ¹³² For translation, see F. L. Woodward's version, Pali Text Society.
- ¹³³ Zysk, pp. 52-61. Zysk gives a detailed account of the "Jivaka legend".
- ¹³⁴ Wujastyk, p. 149.
- ¹³⁵ Wujastyk, pp. 104-105. Wujastyk dates the *Suśruta* between roughly the 3rd cent. BCE and the 5th cent. CE.
- ¹³⁶ *The Long Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the Dīgha Nikāya*. Maurice Walshe, tr. (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1995, first publ. 1987), i.13.
- ¹³⁷ *Vinaya Piṭaka, Mahāvagga*. 278-279.
- ¹³⁸ The translation has "mental" state here but I wonder if this is a typo.
- ¹³⁹ SN iv.230. Pali text has short 'i' in Sivaka. This may be a typo, as, in all other places a long 'i' is used.
- ¹⁴⁰ SN iv. 230.
- ¹⁴¹ For translation, see F. L. Woodward's version, Pali Text Society.

- ¹⁴² SN iv.208-209.
- ¹⁴³ For translation, see F. L. Woodward's version.
- ¹⁴⁴ *The Dictionary of Physiological and Clinical Psychology*. Ron Harré and Roger Lamb, eds. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986), pp. 90-91.
- ¹⁴⁵ *ibid*
- ¹⁴⁶ *Dict. of Physiological Psychology*, p. 126.
- ¹⁴⁷ *ibid*
- ¹⁴⁸ Ca, vol. 2. *Nidāna Sthāna*, 7.1-7.44.
- ¹⁴⁹ Ca, *Nidāna Sthāna*, 7.4 and 8.4.
- ¹⁵⁰ *Vinaya Piṭaka*, vol. 4. *Suttavibhaṅga*, second part etc. Hermann Oldenburg, ed. (London: Pali Text Society, 1984; first publ. 1882), pp. 20, 32, 35, 37, 39. For translation, see *The Book of Discipline (Vinaya Piṭaka)*, vol. 2 (*Sutta Vibhaṅga*). I. B. Horner, tr. (London: Pali Text Society, 1982; first publ. 1940), pp. 202, 222, 229, 234 and 237.
- ¹⁵¹ *Vinaya, Mahāvagga*, p. 90.
- ¹⁵² *Vinaya, Mahāvagga*, pp. 89-91, 120.
- ¹⁵³ *Vinaya, Mahāvagga*, p. 90.
- ¹⁵⁴ Y. Karunadasa. *Buddhist Analysis of Matter*. (Colombo: Department of Cultural Affairs, 1967), p. 1.
- ¹⁵⁵ Pali dictionary states that *arūpin/arūpa* are synonymous. See Davids' and Stede's *Pali-English Dictionary*, p. 78.
- ¹⁵⁶ Here, we will not delve into a more precise definition of the material versus the immaterial according to modern science.
- ¹⁵⁷ MN, i.53. *The Majjhima Nikāya*, vol. 1. V. Trencker, ed. (London: Pali Text Society, 1979; first publ. 1888).
- ¹⁵⁸ MN, i.53. Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli, tr.
- ¹⁵⁹ DN, ii.62. *Dīgha Nikāya*. T. W. Rhys Davids and J. Estlin Carpenter, eds. (London: Pali Text Society, 1975; first publ. 1890).
- ¹⁶⁰ DhS, 245. *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*. Bhikkhu J. Kashyap, ed. (Nalanda: Pali Publication Board, Bihar Govt., 1960).
- ¹⁶¹ For translation, see *A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics*. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, tr. (Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, 1975; first publ. 1900), p. 289.
- ¹⁶² DhS, 284-285.
- ¹⁶³ *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, Rhys Davids, tr. pp. 341-342.
- ¹⁶⁴ Vis, 593. For translation, see Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli's version, p. 612.
- ¹⁶⁵ *Visuddhimagga*, Ñāṇamoli, tr., p. 612.
- ¹⁶⁶ In some places in the Canon, as well as in the *Visuddhimagga*, a three part schema of personhood is advocated. This schema is as follows 1) *viññāna* 2) *vedanā, saññā and saṅkhāra* 3) *rūpa*.
- ¹⁶⁷ Vis, 595-596.
- ¹⁶⁸ For translation, see Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli's, pp. 614-615.
- ¹⁶⁹ Popper and Eccles. pp. 494-495. See also Churchland, pp. 7-22, especially p. 12.
- ¹⁷⁰ Vis, 452; See Vasubandhu's *Vimsatikāvṛtti*, p. 1 in *Seven Works of Vasubandhu*. Stefan Anacker, tr. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984), p. 413. SN ii.95; *Atthasālinī*, 140. The *Atthasālinī*. Edward Müller, ed. (London: Pali Text Society, 1979; first publ., 1897).
- ¹⁷¹ Jan Ergardt. *Man and His Destiny, the Release of the Human Mind: A Study of Citta in Relation to Dhamma in some Ancient Indian Texts*. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986), p. 3. Johansson, *Psychology of Nirvana*, p. 31. Johansson agrees with Ergardt and states that "*nibbāna* is attained through a transformation of *citta*."
- ¹⁷² Herbert Guenther. *Philosophy and Psychology in the Abhidharma*. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1991; first publ. 1974), p. 15.
- ¹⁷³ C. A. F. Rhys Davids. *Buddhist Psychology: An Inquiry into the Analysis and Theory of Mind in Pali Literature*. (London: Bell and Sons, 1914), pp. 12-73.
- ¹⁷⁴ See, for example, DhS, 25.
- ¹⁷⁵ De Silva. *Buddhist and Freudian Psychology*, pp. 11 49-75. Padmasiri De Silva. *Introduction to Buddhist Psychology*. (London: MacMillan Press, 1979), pp. 77. Mahathera Piyadassi. *The Spectrum of Buddhism*. (Staten Island, Jivinda De Silva, 1991), p. 183. In his *Introduction to Buddhist Psychology*, p. 77, De Silva states that, with the concepts of *āsava*, *saṅkhāra* and *anusaya*, there is a definite base for speculation upon the unconscious in early Buddhism. However, De Silva also mentions that concepts such

as *bhavanga sota* belong to the *Abhidhamma* literature and not the *Sutta Piṭaka*. Piyadassi feels that there is not a complete parallel between Freudian notions of the unconscious and the Buddhist notion of *bhavanga-citta*. See also William Waldron. "A Comparison of the Ālayavijñāna with Freud's And Jung's Theories of the Unconscious." *Annual Memoirs of the Otani University, Shin Buddhist Comprehensive Research Institute*. Number 6: pp. 109-150.

¹⁷⁶ Robert Morrison. "Three Cheers for Tañhā". *Western Buddhist Review*, vol.2, p. 5 (email text).

¹⁷⁷ Vis, 651. This is seen in the phrase *muñcitukama*, or, "desirous of liberation".

¹⁷⁸ Daniel Goleman, ed. *Healing Emotions: Conversations with the Dalai Lama on Mindfulness, Emotions, and Health*. (Boston: Shambhala Publications, 1997), p.82.

¹⁷⁹ Caroline A. F. Rhys Davids. *Buddhist Psychology: An Inquiry into the analysis and Theory of Mind in Pali Literature*. (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1914). Caroline A. F. Rhys Davids. *Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics*. (New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corp., 1975; first publ. 1900).

¹⁸⁰ Davids, *Psychological Ethics*, p. lxxxv.

¹⁸¹ Davids, *Psychological Ethics*, p. 6.

¹⁸² Davids, *Buddhist Psychology*, p. 84.

¹⁸³ Padmasiri De Silva. *Buddhist and Freudian Psychology*. (Colombo: Lake House Investments, p. 1973). Padmasiri de Silva. *An Introduction to Buddhist Psychology*. (London: MacMillan Press, 1979). Amal K. Barua. *Mind and Mental Factors in Early Buddhist Psychology*. (New Delhi: Northern Book Centre, 1990), pp. 43-50. Lama Anagarika Govinda. *The Psychological Attitude of Early Buddhist Philosophy and its Systematic Representations according to Abhidhamma Tradition*. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1969; first publ. 1961), p. 117.

¹⁸⁴ Govinda, 117.

¹⁸⁵ Davids, *Psychological Ethics*, p. 11.

¹⁸⁶ De Silva. *Introduction to Buddhist Psychology*. p. 42.

¹⁸⁷ *ibid*

¹⁸⁸ *ibid*

¹⁸⁹ Rune E. A. Johansson. *The Dynamic Psychology of Early Buddhism*. (Oxford: Curzon Press, 1979).

Rune E. A. Johansson. *The Psychology of Nirvana*. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969).

¹⁹⁰ Johansson. *Dynamic Psychology*, p. 88.

¹⁹¹ Johansson. *Dynamic Psychology*, pp. 87-88.

¹⁹² Johansson, *Dynamic Psychology*, p. 89.

¹⁹³ Johansson, *Psychology of Nirvana*, p. 24.

¹⁹⁴ Johansson, *Psychology of Nirvana*, p. 27.

¹⁹⁵ Johansson, *Psychology of Nirvana*, p. 24.

¹⁹⁶ Johansson, *Psychology of Nirvana*, p. 31.

¹⁹⁷ Johansson, *Psychology of Nirvana*, p. 27.

¹⁹⁸ Mathieu Boisvert. *The Five Aggregates: Understanding Theravada Psychology and Soteriology*.

(Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier Press, 1995).

¹⁹⁹ MN, iii.281.

²⁰⁰ Boisvert, *The Five Aggregates*, p. 53.

²⁰¹ *Ibid*

²⁰² David J. Kalupahana. *The Principles of Buddhist Psychology*. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987).

²⁰³ Kalupahana, p. 46.

²⁰⁴ Govinda, pp. 117-118.

²⁰⁵ See F. L. Woodward's note regarding *tatra-majjhāt' upekkha* on SN, v.210. *The Book of the Kindred Sayings (Samyutta Nikaya)*. F. L. Woodward, tr. (London: Pali Text Society, 1979).

²⁰⁶ SN, v.209. *Samyutta Nikaya*. M. Leon Feer, ed. (London: Pali Text Society, 1976; first publ. 1898).

²⁰⁷ MN, i.303. *Majjhima Nikaya*. V. Trenckner, ed. (London: Pali Text Society, 1979; first publ. 1888).

²⁰⁸ Govinda, p. 117. In this observation, Govinda has been influenced by Shwe Zan Aung (*Compendium of Philosophy*, p. 233).

²⁰⁹ Buddhādāsa. *Me and Mine*. Donald K. Swearer, ed. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989).

²¹⁰ Buddhādāsa, p. 31.

²¹¹ Buddhādāsa, 32. Here, it is not clear whether or not "defilement" is a translation of *kilesa*.

- ²¹² H. S. S. Nissanka. *Buddhist Psychotherapy: An Eastern Therapeutical Approach to Mental Problems*. p. (Delhi: Vikas Publishing, 1993), p. 11.
- ²¹³ Nissanka, p. 31.
- ²¹⁴ Edwina Pio. *Buddhist Psychology: A Modern Perspective*. (New Delhi: Shakti Malik, 1988).
- ²¹⁵ Pio, p. 126.
- ²¹⁶ Pio, p. 125.
- ²¹⁷ Gananath Obeyesekere. "Depression, Buddhism, and the Work of Culture in Sri Lanka." *Culture and Depression: Studies in Cross-Cultural Psychiatry of Affect and Disorder*. Arthur Kleinman and Byron Good, eds. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 134-152.
- ²¹⁸ Daniel Goleman, ed. *Healing Emotions: Conversations with the Dalai Lama on Mindfulness, Emotions, and Health*. (Boston: Shambhala, 1997).
- ²¹⁹ Goleman, pp. 81, 86-87.
- ²²⁰ Goleman, pp. 87-88.
- ²²¹ MN, i.303.
- ²²² See note 235.
- ²²³ SN iv.208-210 and iv.217.
- ²²⁴ SN.210.
- ²²⁵ Sau, 13.48 etc.
- ²²⁶ MN, i.293.
- ²²⁷ At, 109.
- ²²⁸ At, 109-110.
- ²²⁹ Here, I have made some minor changes to Pe Maung Tin's translation. *Anubhavana* has been translated as "partaking in" instead of "enjoyment", and, *rasa* has been translated as "tasting" instead of "experience". See *The Expositor (Atthasālinī)*. Pe Maung Tin, tr. (London: Pali Text Society, 1976), pp. 145-146.
- ²³⁰ SuN.257. The Sutta Nipāta. P. V. Bapat, ed. (Delhi: Sri Satguru, 1990; first publ. 1924).
- ²³¹ MN, i.303. SN, iv.231.
- ²³² MN, i.303. SN, v.209.
- ²³³ MN, i.303.
- ²³⁴ SN, iv.232.
- ²³⁵ *ibid*
- ²³⁶ It could be that *adukkham-asukha* feelings, for example, are comparable to feelings which rest in the "unconscious" (in Freudian terminology). *Adukkham-asukha* feelings are said to become pleasant when knowledge is brought to bear on them, just as, in Freudian psychology, liberation from the control of a repressed affectively-centered complex can only be achieved when that complex is brought to light and analyzed in the conscious mind.
- ²³⁷ Mizuno, pp. 203-206.
- ²³⁸ Mizuno, p. 203.
- ²³⁹ André Bareau. "Richesse et diversité de la pensée bouddhique ancienne". *Présence du Bouddhisme*. René de Berval, ed. (Paris: Gallimard, 1987), pp. 151-164.
- ²⁴⁰ Bareau, p. 160.
- ²⁴¹ De Silva, *Introduction to Buddhist Psychology*, p. 77.
- ²⁴² Herbert V. Guenther. *Philosophy and Psychology in the Abhidhamma*. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1991; first publ. 1971).
- ²⁴³ Guenther, p. 8.
- ²⁴⁴ This notion may come out of the tradition of Descartes. We will also see it in Lamotte's thinking.
- ²⁴⁵ Guenther, p. 6.
- ²⁴⁶ Guenther, pp. 8-9.
- ²⁴⁷ Guenther, pp. 6-7.
- ²⁴⁸ Nyanaponika Thera (a title). *Abhidhamma Studies: Buddhist Explorations of Consciousness and Time*. (Boston: Wisdom Publications and Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1998; first publ. 1949).
- ²⁴⁹ Nyanaponika, p. 73.
- ²⁵⁰ *ibid*
- ²⁵¹ "Passions and Impregnations of the Passions in Buddhism". Étienne Lamotte. *Buddhist Studies in Honour of I. B. Horner*. L. Cousins, A. Kunst and K. R. Norman, eds. (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1974).
- ²⁵² Lamotte, p. 91.

²⁵³ Please see Robert Solomon. *The Passions*. Garden City: Anchor Press, 1976. Solomon addresses this issue directly in chapters one and two.

²⁵⁴ *ibid*

²⁵⁵ *Dhammasaṅgani*, 270-273. Bhikkhu J. Kashyap, ed. (Nalanda: Pali Publication Board, Bihar Govt., 1960). This list also appears in the *Visuddhimagga*, 683.

²⁵⁶ Here, I have taken my translation directly from Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli. See Buddhaghosa's, *The Path of Purification (Visuddhimagga)*, p. 708.

²⁵⁷ Mizuno, p. 206.

²⁵⁸ DhS, 272.

²⁵⁹ *ibid*

²⁶⁰ Vis, 464.

²⁶¹ *ibid*

²⁶² SN, v.78-80.

²⁶³ SN, v. 92-93.

²⁶⁴ For translation, see F. L. Woodward's version from Pali Text Society.

²⁶⁵ AN, i.9-11.

²⁶⁶ For translation, see F. L. Woodward's version from Pali Text Society.

²⁶⁷ At, 115.

²⁶⁸ Sau, 13.33-34.

²⁶⁹ See, for example, chapter 16 in the *Saundarananda*, where *citta-sarira* (16.11) seems to be used synonymously to *nāma-rūpa* (16.16). Also, in the *Buddhacarita*, verse 13.43, *citta-sarira* is used in the same way.

²⁷⁰ Sau, 17.16-17.

²⁷¹ *ibid*

²⁷² Davids and Stede, *Pali-English Dictionary*. pp. 207-209. Monier-Williams, *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, p. 274. Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit*, pp. 177-78.

²⁷³ See, for example, DhS, 24-25.

²⁷⁴ Sau, 16.13.

²⁷⁵ The notion of *samucchraya* also implies 'conglomerate' (16.8), yet it is not entirely clear as to whether or not *samucchraya* is a synonym of *nāma-rūpa*. Also, in 16.21, *āśraya* seems to imply something like mind-body.

²⁷⁶ Sau, 16.16.

²⁷⁷ Sau, 12.25.

²⁷⁸ Sau, 16.26-27.

²⁷⁹ This could be referred to *Āyurvedic* physicians.

²⁸⁰ Sau, 8.3-8.5.

²⁸¹ Here, I am using the word *doṣa* to mean the "humours" in general, in both their aggravated and unaggravated states. Please see chapter three for more details on this issue.

²⁸² In these passages as well, *citta*, *cetas* and *manas* are used interchangeably.

²⁸³ Sau, 9.50.

²⁸⁴ Sau, 5.29, 7.38, 17.61 and 18.61 etc.

²⁸⁵ Sau, 18.52.

²⁸⁶ Sau, 12.40-41.

²⁸⁷ Sau, 18.4.

²⁸⁸ Sau, 15.20-21.

²⁸⁹ Sau, 17.69-70.

²⁹⁰ Richard Salomon notes this characteristic, especially with regard to the *Saundarananda*. See Richard Salomon. "The Buddhist Sanskrit of Aśvaghoṣa's *Saundarananda*." *Weiner Zeitschrift für die Kunde Sudasiens*. XXVII, 1983. pp. 107-108. Salomon argues against the idea that Aśvaghoṣa writes in a language which can be labelled Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit. In contrast, Y. Hakeda asserts the widespread use of Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit in Aśvaghoṣa's works. See Yoshito S. Hakeda. *Characteristics of the Language of the Epics of Aśvaghoṣa especially as Compared with that of the Epics of Kālidāsa*. Dissertation. (New Haven: Yale University, 1960), pp. 3-37.

²⁹¹ Johnston, Introductory chapter to the *Saundarananda*, pp. xxv-xxvi. Biswanath Bhattacharya. *Aśvaghoṣa: A Critical Study*. (Santiniketan: Santiniketan Press, 1976), p. 13.

²⁹² Sau, 8.1-8.2.

²⁹³ Sau, 10.59.

²⁹⁴ See M. Monier-Williams, p. 445 for uses of *tāvat*. Ex: *itas tāvat* ("just come hither").

²⁹⁵ This is an intensive form of the verbal root *hr̥+*.

²⁹⁶ Sau, 11.12.

²⁹⁷ This being said, *dhṛti* can also be used in a more mundane sense, i.e. in the sense of regaining one's composure. See Sau, 6.44.

²⁹⁸ Sau, 3.19.

²⁹⁹ Sau, 10.57.

³⁰⁰ One meaning of the verb *kr* is the following: "to do anything for the advantage or injury of another." M. Monier-Williams tells us that this meaning can take either the genitive or the locative. Thus, I have interpreted "me" here as genitive. Monier-Williams, p. 301.

³⁰¹ Here, *yathā* appears to be used like *tathā*.

³⁰² In verse 13.43 of the *Buddhacarita*, *vyasana* is used in the sense of affliction(s) of the body and mind (*citta-sarīra*).

³⁰³ See Hakeda, p. 56. Hakeda says that the word *aniñja* is derived from the verb *iñjati* (move, stir), which is common in both Pali and Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit. Hakeda says that the specific word *iñjakatva* (verse 17.53) does not appear anywhere else in the various Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit and Pali dictionaries.

³⁰⁴ Sau, 17.52-54.

³⁰⁵ Sau, 10.43.

³⁰⁶ Sau, 8.24-25.

³⁰⁷ "He" is used here and in other places because the enlightened characters in the *Saundarananda* are male.

³⁰⁸ Johansson, *Psychology of Nirvana*, p. 27.

³⁰⁹ *Vikāra* is also mentioned as a sign of sickness in the *Caraka Samhitā*.

³¹⁰ Jātaka, vi.1275. *The Jātaka together with its Commentary*, vol. 6. V. Fausboll, ed. (London: Pali Text Society, 1964; first publ. 1896).

³¹¹ Sau, 18.52.

³¹² Sau, 13.11-12.

³¹³ Sau, 4.10.

³¹⁴ In verse 11.2 of the *Saundarananda*, Aśvaghōṣa uses the term *naiṣkramya-rasa*, or "taste/flavor for/of renunciation". This is similar to the idea expressed in *Sutta Nipāta*, 257, in which the author speaks of *paviveka-rasa*, or "taste/draught of seclusion".

³¹⁵ Sau, 5.24.

³¹⁶ At, 109.

³¹⁷ V. Raghavan. *The Number of Rasas*. (Madras: The Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1967; first publ. 1940), p. xviii.

³¹⁸ Boisvert, pp. 20-30. Boisvert explains the difference between the five aggregates (*pañcakkhandhā*) and the five clinging aggregates (*pañcupādānakkhandhā*).

³¹⁹ Sau, 8.3-8.5.

³²⁰ Monier-Williams, p. 1016. This meaning can also be seen in Pali. Davids and Stede *Pali-English Dictionary*, p. 648. Rune E. A. Johansson also tells us that *vedanā*, in Pali, can mean "painful feeling in connection with illness. Johansson, *Dynamic Psychology of Early Buddhism*, pp. 88-89.

³²¹ Sau, 8.60 and 18.9. In these verses, *āsvādana* is used in a synonymous fashion to *rasa*: i.e. as "mental tasting" etc.

³²² *Kaśāya* appears in verse 7.49 and *samyojana* in verse 17.57.

³²³ Sau, 16.94.

³²⁴ In Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit, *āśraya* can have the following related meanings: a) the basis of all consciousnesses b) sense organ c) the body along with the six sense organs d) body. See Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit*, p. 110. In Classical Sanskrit, *āśraya* can also mean the six sense organs. In addition, Aśvaghōṣa uses another word, *samucchraya*, in an almost synonymous fashion. In verse 16.8, for example, *samucchraya* is said to be the body plus the sense organs. It is unclear whether or not *samucchraya* in this verse can also be seen as synonymous to *nāma-rūpa*.

³²⁵ Sau, 16.21-22.

³²⁶ Sau, 16.34.

³²⁷ Wujastyk, pp. 30-33.

- ³²⁸ Sau, 10.43.
³²⁹ Sau, 16.69.
³³⁰ Sau, 17.23.
³³¹ Sau, 12.9.
³³² Sau, 18.35, 18.41 etc.
³³³ Sau, 16.24.
³³⁴ This appears to refer back to Sau, 16.22.
³³⁵ Sau, 9.3.
³³⁶ Sau, 16.18.
³³⁷ Here, *Aśvaghoṣa* uses the interrogative pronoun *kaḥ* etc. like a relative pronoun (*yaḥ* etc.).
³³⁸ Sau, 13.50.
³³⁹ Sau, 15.69.
³⁴⁰ DhS, 272.
³⁴¹ Francis Brassard. *The Concept of Bodhicitta in Śāntideva's Bodhicaryāvatāra*. (Montreal: McGill University, Dissertation, 1996). Although this dissertation is focussed upon the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, Brassard does a thorough study of the concept of *bodhicitta* in general.
³⁴² Thondop, p. 48.
³⁴³ Johansson, *Psychology of Nirvana*, p. 27. Monier-Williams, *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, pp. 215, 982. Davids and Stede, *Pali-English Dictionary*, pp. 150, 634. Also, in Bhikkhu Nāṇamoli's translation of the *Majjhima Nikāya*, *virāga* is rendered as "dispassion" and *upekkhā* as "equanimity". *The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha: A New Translation of the Majjhima Nikaya*. Bhikkhu Nāṇamoli, tr. (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1995), p. 1384.
³⁴⁴ Sau, 17.32, 17.50 etc. Johnston tr. Sau, 17.32, 17.50 etc. Passi, tr.
³⁴⁵ Lama Anagarika Govinda. *Buddhist Reflections*. (York Beach: Samuel Weisner, 1991), pp. 87
³⁴⁶ Govinda, *Buddhist Reflections*, pp. 87-89.
³⁴⁷ Govinda, *Buddhist Reflections*, p. 88
³⁴⁸ Davids and Stede, *Pali-English Dictionary*, p. 150.
³⁴⁹ Melford E. Spiro. *Buddhism and Society: A Great Tradition and its Burmese Vicissitudes*, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982; first publ. in 1970), p. 48.
³⁵⁰ Apte, *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, p. 280. Richard Hayes. *Continuing Sanskrit*. (Montreal: McGill University, 1995), p. 100. Hayes' notes are unpublished and in use just at McGill University.
³⁵¹ Sau, 16.65-66.
³⁵² Hayes, p. 99.
³⁵³ Sau, 17.50.
³⁵⁴ As in Pali. in Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit, *kāya* can signify "mass, collection, totality" etc. This seems to be the meaning here.
³⁵⁵ Sau, 17.52-54.
³⁵⁶ Sau, 17.54-55.
³⁵⁷ Sau, 17.56. *Aśvaghoṣa* states that Nanda relies upon or depends upon the fourth *dhyāna* (*caturtham dhyānam niśritya*).
³⁵⁸ Sau, 18.39.
³⁵⁹ Ar, 193..
³⁶⁰ Buddhaghosa. *The Expositor (Atthasālinī)*. Pe Maung Tin, tr. (London: The Pali Text Society, 1976; first publ. 1920), p. 259.
³⁶¹ Sau, 7.35.
³⁶² Sau, 17.6.
³⁶³ I have used the spelling *Apsaras* here and not *Apsarases* because the word *Apsaras* in Sanskrit can be used to indicate the entire class of beings called *Apsaras*. See Monier-Williams, p. 59.
³⁶⁴ Sau, 10.51.
³⁶⁵ Sau, 13.49.
³⁶⁶ Sau, 13.51.
³⁶⁷ Sau, 13.53.
³⁶⁸ Sau, 18.18-19.
³⁶⁹ See also Sau, 18.17. Nanda's mind is described as being unattached (*vibaddha*) to thoughts.
³⁷⁰ Sau, 17.62, 18.61, 18.62 etc.

³⁷¹ Sau, 7.20-22.

³⁷² Sau, 16.26.

³⁷³ Davids and Stede. *Pali-English Dictionary*, p. 150. Here, "zero point" is a direct reference to one of the definitions given in this dictionary for *upekkhā*.

³⁷⁴ Sogyal Rinpoche. *The Tibetan Book of Living and Dying*. (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), pp. 74, 119.

³⁷⁵ Rinpoche, p. 119.

³⁷⁶ Rinpoche, 74.

³⁷⁷ NS, 7.2.

³⁷⁸ This remark of Bharata's was made within the context of drama, but, since poetry was stated clearly by Bharata to be the form of drama, we have taken the liberty of applying this idea here.

³⁷⁹ Thomas Szasz. *The Myth of Psychotherapy: Mental Healing as Religion, Rhetoric and Repression*. (Garden City: Anchor Press, 1978).