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OWNER-TENANT RELATIONS IN A DECLINING AREA

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OWNER-TENANT RELATIONS IN A DECLINING AREA

This study examines micro-social processes in a comparatively underdeveloped sector of our economy, that of small-unit rental housing. Its specific focus is on owner-tenant relations in a changing neighborhood. An attempt is made to identify and describe social forces at work in these relations and to trace their implications for neighborhood decline.

The theoretical perspective derives from economic anthropology and centers around the social character of owners and tenants, their strategies and bargaining power, as well as the terms of reciprocity they enter into.

The core data is based on interviews with 29 owners and their tenants in a two block area of eastern Outremont. It suggests that social elements of power and reciprocity are closely interwoven with contractual economic exchange, and have specific implications for both rental relations and neighborhood change.

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PREFACE

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Professor Roger Krohn, whose insights and generous guidance were invaluable in the preparation of this report.

I would also like to thank all those who readily assisted at various stages of the research, in particular, Mr. Guy Choquette of Outremont City Hall, and Mr. James Carson of the Quebec Rental Board.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

This study attempts to add to our understanding of the social relationships involved in housing. Such a focus seems relevant in view of the current debate over urban decay, to which poor housing is generally considered to be a major contributor.[1] At the same time, housing is less often seen as a complex social process with its own dynamics. In particular, little is still known about the specific social context in which the production, ownership, exchange, rental, and maintenance of urban housing occur.

The dynamics of rental housing especially deserve more attention. Rental housing involves the majority of our urban population,[2] particularly those living in lower-income areas. For them, poor housing has always been problematic, for financial as well as other reasons.[3] The

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[1] See Charles Abrams, City is the Frontier, New York: Harper and Row, 1965, p. 19 ff.

[2] In 1961, 80% of dwellings in the city of Montreal were tenant-occupied. Dominion Bureau of Statistics, "Population and Housing Characteristics by Census Tracts: Montreal", Bulletin CT-4, 1961, p. 30.

[3] In a survey of 2,595 Negroes in Newark, 66% of the responses on the major problems facing them were on rental housing. Even references to employment were far fewer. Market Planning Corporation, Newark - A City in Transition, Volume II, 1959, cited in George Sternlieb, The Tenement Landlord, Rutgers: The State University, 1966, p. 36.

rental process also has implications for such basic features of our housing situation as high tenant mobility and building deterioration and, therefore, for neighbourhood change. The research reported here focuses on a key structural element in the rental process, namely, the landlord-tenant relationship and some of its implications in a specific context.

Little attention has so far been given to the landlord-tenant relationship. Works or surveys concerned with the social aspect of housing make no reference to it. [1] Neither do some recent studies of urban neighbourhoods and neighbourhood change point to rental relations as a possible factor of importance. [2] This is to be compared with the disciplines and sub-disciplines devoted to, for example, the study of employer-employee relations.

Articles and discussions of more or less direct relevance have appeared in the popular press and, to a lesser extent, in real estate literature. [3] Among more scholarly research, we found only two studies that directly bear on our problem. [4]

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[1] G.H. Beyer, Housing and Society, New York: Macmillan, 1965; B. Duncan and P. Hauser, Housing a Metropolis - Chicago, New York: Free Press, 1960; W.L.C. Wheaton, G. Milgram, and M. Meyerson, eds. Urban Housing, New York: Free Press, 1966.

[2] Herbert Gans, Urban Villagers, New York: Macmillan, 1962; Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, New York: Vintage Books, 1961.

[3] Mark Arnold, "Tenants Find a New Source of Power", National Observer, May 1966; Barding Dahl, "A White Slumlord Confesses", Esquire, July 1966; William Manchester, "The Life and Times of a Slum Landlord", The Reporter, 15 November 1956; M. McInnes, "Living By Rent", New Society, August 1966. Also: Ernest M. Fisher, Urban Real Estate Markets, National Bureau of Economic Research, New York, 1951.

[4] George Sternlieb, op. cit. and Ted R. Vaughn, "The Landlord-Tenant Relation in a Low-Income Area", Social Forces, Vol. 16, No. 2, Fall 1968.

Both studies approach housing from a micro-structural viewpoint. They suggest that large-scale urban processes, such as neighbourhood deterioration or the apparent inability of a neighbourhood to improve itself, can be seen as the logical result of specific social conditions and processes. They suggest that these have to be better understood before public policy can effectively intervene in, and direct, the larger processes.

Sternlieb has examined the social and economic dynamics of slum ownership in Newark shortly before the 1967 riots. Among other things, he has discovered and described a vicious circle in which rental strategies and patterns reflect, and in turn reinforce, the decline of the area. Vaughn, in his smaller study of a slum area in Columbus, Ohio, deals more explicitly with owner-tenant relations. He argues and presents evidence that these are not merely economic contracts, but involve social dimensions as well, specifically those of power and conflict. The resulting strategies are seen as having indirect consequences for neighbourhood change.

This limited literature sets the theme of our study, which attempts to describe landlord-tenant relations in the context of a changing urban neighbourhood. More specifically, it will seek to: (1) generate basic data on the social character of owners and tenants and identify some basic types; (2) trace the relations between owners and tenants in a specific ecological and demographic context; and (3) begin to look for the way these relations reflect and affect neighbourhood change. The social character of owners and tenants, their rental strategies and patterns, and neighbourhood change will then be seen as a dynamic, inter-related process.

A changing area with a heterogeneous population and a presumably wide range of rental strategies was chosen. It is located in the eastern part of Outremont, a central Montreal suburb. In recent years, this area has changed from a predominantly native middle-class to an immigrant working-class district.

Table 1 summarizes the major factors of change in the tract that forms the northeast corner of Outremont and includes half the study area:

Table 1. Major Changes in Tract 268 (1951-1961) *

(in percentiles, ranked by variables)

Increases in:	
Low income [a]	15.67
Grade school education only	14.44
Persons per household	12.82
Persons per family	12.50
Blue collar occupation	11.30
Density	8.82
Youth [b]	8.26
Decreases in:	
Long-term residence [c]	-22.98
Jewish	-18.37
Bilingual	- 9.14
British	- 7.17

a) below $4,000 in 1961

b) under 15 years of age

c) 5 years or more

* Source: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Bulletins CT-3 (1951) and CT-4 (1961), and Bryn Greer-Wootten, "Cross Sectional Social Area Analysis: Montreal, 1951-1961" (draft), Department of Geography, McGill University, 1968.

As this table shows, the area has experienced a rapid decline in recent years. In a city-wide survey of 281 census tracts, this tract and the surrounding area to the east and north were identified as an area of major decline between 1951 and 1961, in terms of such key factors as density, occupation, education, ethnicity, and income (See Appendix: Map 1).[1]

In fact, the district has become a source of concern to Outremont city officials and is earmarked for urban renewal.[2] Significantly, rent levels and property values have not kept up with city-wide averages during this period of change. Between 1951 and 1961, average rents in the two tracts that form the eastern part of Outremont have increased only 26% compared to the city (Montreal) average of 85%. Property values have increased in like moderation. In the face of city-wide inflation of rents and real estate prices, the area has, therefore, at best remained stable since the early 1950's.[3] These factors of relative decline, on the one hand, and price and rent stability, on the other, provide then one

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1 Bryn Greer-Wootten, "Cross Sectional Social Area Analysis: Montreal, 1951-1961" (draft), Department of Geography, McGill University, 1968. Altogether, 27 variables were analysed to identify areas of decline.

2 See, Plan Directeur d'Aménagement et de Rénovation Urbaine, by La Société J.C. Lahaye (1968) for an urban renewal report commissioned by the City of Outremont. In a preliminary study, the north-east part of the city was clearly identified to be in need of renewal (Lahaye, 1967). See also, Appendix: Maps 2 - 6, relating the north-east part of Outremont (Tract 268) to the rest of the city.

3 If we take into account an annual inflation rate of 3%.

specific context for studying the rental process and its relation to urban decay.[1]

We felt that, within the limits of our research, this could best be done by the detailed analysis of a limited number of rental relations. This would allow us to approach what have been considered primarily economic questions with the research methods of sociology and anthropology.

Such a micro-social approach seemed justified in view of the literature cited above. This literature suggests that the rental process includes important social dimensions, in addition to, and separate from, the specifically economic contract based on supply and demand. This broader social context, moreover, has economic consequences that, to a considerable degree, modify 'rational' market patterns. More specifically, in our research ethnicity, immigrant status and life cycle, as well as elements of status and power, will be seen to play an important part in rental housing decisions. These factors, moreover, suggest a relation between rental patterns and neighbourhood change.

Our view of rental housing will, then, be that of a changing, interrelated pattern, or system, of reciprocal relationships whose dynamics are related to the strategies of participants operating in a given social context. It leads us to ask questions about the social character of owners and tenants, their strategies and bargaining power, as well as the terms of reciprocity they enter into.

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[1] As part of a larger research project, rental relations are being studied in two other areas as well. One is located in a stable, low-income "urban village", the other in a traditionally middle class area that has been appreciating in value. The focus and approach in the three areas is similar and should yield comparative data.

An approach relating social reciprocity, bargaining power, and economic exchange has already been developed in the literature of economic anthropology. Social dimensions were found to be not only inherent in complex exchange systems, such as gift exchange and peasant markets, but also to have specific economic consequences. [1] A similar perspective on exchange has been elaborated in a broader, theoretical context by some sociologists. [2]

Housing, moreover, shares certain structural characteristics with peasant markets. Both are still largely in the hands of small, part-time operators who have little capital and lack an entrepreneurial strategy. In addition, a large part of these operators do not calculate their return on labour or capital, nor do they try to enlarge profits by expanding their operations or rationalizing for efficiency. [3]

A view of exchange occurring in a structurally similar context, yet not based on a purely competitive model of economic relations directs our attention to questions not suggested by a rational economic model of the housing market.

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1 See: Alice Dewey, Peasant Markets in Java, New York: Free Press, 1962; George Foster, "The Dyadic Contract in Tzintzuntzan II: Patron-Client Relationship", American Anthropologist, Vol. 65, 1963, pp. 1280-1294; Clifford Geertz, Peddlers and Princes, University of Chicago Press, 1963; Marcel Mauss, The Gift, Cohen and West, London, 1954.

2 Peter Blau, Power and Exchange in Social Life, London: John Wiley, 1964.

3 Cf. Geertz, op. cit., and his discussion of the 'bazaar' type economy.

These considerations in mind, we sought interviews with all owners of rental property [1] in a two block area of eastern Outremont. We then interviewed one tenant of the willing owners. To obtain better comparison, four absentee owners and their tenants were added from two contiguous blocks. In this way, we obtained detailed information on 29 owner-tenant relationships. Separate interview guides were used for owners and tenants, but both centered around rental strategies. The interviews lasted two hours or more for owners, and somewhat less for tenants. Additional data were provided by census statistics, street directories, records of the City of Outremont and the Quebec Rental Board, as well as from interviews with real estate agents and other persons knowledgable about the area. The writer, moreover, lived in the area for two years.

Before we can, however, proceed to a more detailed analysis of the data, we must outline the general ecological and demographic conditions in which property ownership and rental relations occur, and how these affect the social character of owners and tenants and their selection strategies. Once we are familiar with the overall context, we will be in a better position to understand the dynamics of particular owner-tenant relationships.

HISTORY AND ECOLOGY

Our study area lies between Hutchison, Durocher, Lajoie and St. Viateur Streets. It is divided by Bernard Street into two blocks that form part of the eastern border between the cities of Outremont and

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[1] Apartment buildings were not included, since our focus was on owners of small parcels, that is, duplexes and triplexes.

Montreal (see Appendix: Map 7). The two block area consists mostly of densely built, residential row housing, except for some commercial establishments and large apartment buildings on Bernard Street.

Located about two miles north of the downtown area of Montreal, the area is easily accessible by way of Park Avenue, a major commercial street. (See Map 1). In direction downtown and to the east of Park Avenue is a densely built area of old, dilapidated housing which has traditionally been the area of first residence for new immigrants. Southwest of the area, and west of Park Avenue, lies Mount Royal, whose northern slope has attracted many of the better-established local families. The proximity of the downtown area, the traditional immigrant district, and the mountain are major ecological factors that have shaped the area's history.

In the latter part of the last century, overcrowding and the rapid expansion of the old city core led to the settlement of Mount Royal's northern slope up to and along Cote Ste. Catherine.[1] These early settlers were generally well-to-do French families living in large mansions.

In the 1890's, streetcars began operating first along Cote Ste. Catherine and later along Park Avenue. This led to settlement of the eastern part of Outremont, initially by French and English middle class families along Laurier and Hutchison Streets, and by a sizable group of

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[1] Most of the historical information was taken from three sources: the archives of the City of Montreal, a name count of early street directories, and, to our knowledge, the only available book on the history of Outremont: St. Viateur d'Outremont, by Pere Hector Tessier, C.S.V., Presbytere St. Viateur, 1954.

MAP 1

LOCATION OF THE AREA



French and English working-class families along Van Horne Street. (See Appendix: Map 8). Most of the latter were initially railroad employees working in the nearby Outremont Yard and Mile-End Station. [1]

These two nuclei of initial settlement influenced in important respects the ecological and demographic future of the area. The better-off families along Laurier and Hutchison Streets preferred to own cottages. Similarly, the people settling in the area immediately to the north and west of them bought cottages. Later, many of the cottages in the more densely built-up areas, especially along Hutchison Street, were converted into duplexes. Generally, eastern Outremont below Bernard and above Laurier consists today of cottages and duplexes, most of which were built by 1920. The area along Hutchison and most of Durocher Street consists of row housing, while property further west is either detached or semi-detached. The one section with more modern buildings belonged to a religious institution, which did not sell its land until 1925. This block lies immediately to the west of our study area, and together with the comparatively high-priced, non-rental housing to the south and south-west, it has been a formidable ecological barrier to people of working class origin. (See Appendix: Maps 8 & 8A).

The working-class families who initially settled close to Van Horne, on the other hand, preferred more economical property or accommodation. As a consequence, the district north of Bernard consists almost exclusively

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[1] This information, as well as a history of the transit system in and around Outremont, is taken from an unpublished manuscript: "The Montreal Park and Island Railway Company", by Mr. Omer Lavallée, Public Relations Department, Canadian Pacific Railways, 1962.

of densely built rows of triplexes between 40 - 60 years of age. When, beginning in the 1930's, immigrants began to move from the older immigrant area into and through Outremont in large numbers, they found these triplexes economically attractive. At the same time, the ecological barrier to the south served both as an impediment to further penetration by new, working class immigrants, and an anchor for better-to-do French, English and, later, Jewish families, which has persuaded some local families to stay who would otherwise have moved.

Like other urban neighbourhoods, the area has been subject to a series of ethnic 'invasions' and 'successions'. The original French and English population was to a large extent replaced in the 1930's by predominantly Polish and Russian Jews who previously had lived in the area to the southeast. [1] After the war, after they had become economically better established, this group left 'en masse' for new suburbs that had been 'opened up' as a result of the post-war building boom. They were, in turn, replaced in the 1950's by a mixed group of recent immigrants, mostly from southern and eastern Europe. At the same time, a smaller group of French working class families has also entered the area from the eastern part of Montreal.

This history of change, together with the location of the area between two ecologically and demographically distinct districts, has resulted in a presently highly heterogeneous population. Reflecting the area's past and present, the major differences among residents are along ethnic and class lines.

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[1] Rosenberg, Louis, "A Study of the Growth and Changes in the Distribution of the Jewish Population in Montreal", from The Canadian Jewish Population Studies, No. 4, Montreal, 1955.

The trend of increasing ethnic heterogeneity in both tract and study area is expressed by the following tables:

Table 2. Ethnic Change in Tract 268 (in %) *

	1951	1961	1968
English and French	41.0	36.6	34.2
Jewish	53.0	37.0	16.9
Others	6.0	26.4	48.9
	100.0	100.0	100.0

* The study area is located in two tracts, but all census data presented is based on tract 268 (1961 census) since this tract is clearly more representative of the blocks studied.

Source: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Bulletins CT-3 and CT-4. The last column (included for comparison) is based on the Outremont Census (1968) and covers the two-block area and parts of two adjacent blocks (N=343).

Table 3. Ethnic Change in the Study Area (by name count; in %)

	1921	1941	1951	1961	1968	N
English and French	82%	65%	58%	53%	42%	545
Jewish	8	25	29	28	24	218
Other	10	10	13	19	34	173
Total	100	100	100	100	100	--
N	168	190	190	194	194	936

Source: Lovell's Street Directory

Variations between the two tables, particularly the greater proportion of French and English in the study area as compared to the census tract, are accounted for by one of the two blocks which is located outside the tract,

south of Bernard Street. In this area, closer to the mountain, the local population has not been replaced to the same extent as elsewhere. Nevertheless, the tables show that Jews and more recent immigrants have to a considerable extent replaced the originally dominant group of local French and English.

At the same time, the district has become increasingly 'run down', both physically and socially. The remaining long-term residents say that fifteen years ago it was still a 'first class district', a clean, quiet residential area. They feel that this has changed and overcrowding, noise and poor maintenance have made the area a less desirable place to live. Moreover, long-term residents tend to have a white-collar background, while the new immigrants are more often blue-collar workers, many of them unskilled.

Table 4. Occupational Change in the Tract *

	1951	1961
Professional & Managerial	23%	17%
White-collar	40	27
Service, transport & communications	10	17
Craftsmen, labourers & other blue-collar	27	39
	100	100

* Adapted from Dominion Bureau of Statistics Bulletins CT-3 and CT-4.

A small survey of street directories over the last fifty years confirms this trend, and, in addition, points to the great increase of unskilled blue-collar workers in recent years.

Table 5. Occupational Change in the Study Area *

	1921	1941	1961	1968
Managerial & Professional	18%	12%	12%	9%
White Collar	64	47	41	31
Skilled Blue Collar	18	35	29	33
Unskilled Blue Collar	0	6	18	27
TOTAL	100	100	100	100
N	17	17	18	48

Source: Lovell's Street Directory. Data for the last column (included for comparison) is based on sample interviews.

To summarize, we find that the area under study has changed considerably in the last fifteen years, both in terms of ethnicity, physical appearance and class. It is well on the way to becoming a working-class immigrant district. At the same time, there remain, however, middle class locals representing the area's past. It is this context of heterogeneity and decline that has formed the present character of the neighbourhood.

THE NEIGHBOURHOOD

The district is in several respects a convenient place to live. It lies close to downtown Montreal and smaller stores are within walking distance on Park and Bernard Streets. In Outremont, parks, good schools and municipal services are readily available. Considering also the area's low rents and large flats, it is not surprising that vacancy rates are low. [1]

[1] Based on interviews with owners and real estate agents. Though it is easy to rent in the area, it is not as easy to sell. There is considerable demand for property by new immigrants. Several French and Jewish owners, for example, are bothered by immigrant strangers asking if they want to sell. Real estate agents and evidence from the interviews agree, however, that few owners are offered a reasonable price. The weak purchasing power of potential immigrant buyers is a major factor.

In the past, the area has served as a stepping stone for successful immigrants who left the older immigrant areas to the south-east, and later (like the Jews) moved to the suburbs to the north-west. This is changing. Increasingly, eastern Outremont seems to become an area of first residence for newly-arrived immigrants, [1] such as orthodox Jews, and particularly Greeks, who initially stay with or near to friends or relatives who already live in the area. At the same time, local communities of orthodox Jews and Greeks have begun to form.

These two ethnic groups are probably the most visible element to someone visiting the area for the first time. Most of the small stores and restaurants are owned by Greeks or Jews and cater to their needs. Some more conspicuous ones include Kosher bakeries and butcher stores, Greek fish markets and travel agencies, as well as two Greek cinemas on nearby Park Avenue, in a section often referred to as "Little Athens". Street life in the residential area is also dominated by immigrants, particularly in the more densely built sectors with triplexes and small apartment buildings. On summer evenings, anyone walking down one of the streets is likely to hear the sound of foreign, often Mediterranean languages or music from balconies or open windows. On Fridays and Saturdays, small groups of orthodox Jews with black coats and long, fur-brimmed hats are a common sight. During weekday afternoons, the cosmopolitan atmosphere is less pronounced. At this time, elderly French and Jewish couples are usually seen sitting on the balconies, while the sidewalks and alleys become a playground for large numbers of children.

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[1] All four immigrants in our sample who had entered the country within the last three years had moved directly into the north-eastern part of Outremont. All four have friends or relatives close by.

In spite of the outward appearance of an active social life among residents, it seems that there is no close contact among neighbours. Of 49 residents asked, 34 have a 'talking' relationship with one or more persons in the block, but only fourteen visit each other. [1] Of these, only four visit with more than one family within the block. It seems that close social relations are limited to, and kept within, particular ethnic groups. Of the fourteen residents who visit, twelve are orthodox Jews, Greeks or French Canadians. All but two of these fourteen visit with others of their ethnic group only. This does not mean that many immigrants do not have friends and relatives in the larger area. [2] The evidence on this point suggests, however, that most, if not all, the broader contacts in the surrounding area are again limited to one's ethnic group.

Kinship or other "old country" ties [3] and ethnic institutions such as the synagogue seem to be the basis of social contact, rather than immediate geographical proximity. The dominant attitude is that one had better not get too involved with one's neighbours for fear of 'bad experiences' or losing one's privacy. [4]

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[1] In another six instances, owner and tenant have visited each other socially.

[2] Another survey (Gilmour, 1969) of 81 households in the same area (tract 268) shows 19 having relatives in the "area" (left undefined). Most of these were Greek or French Canadian.

[3] The social contacts of Greek immigrants in Montreal are often limited to people from their own village in Greece. See Sheila Arnopoulos "The Immigrant's Dilemma", The Montreal Star, 1968. It seems that this is true also of other ethnic groups in the area, particularly Italians and orthodox Jews.

[4] Friendship among children, however, was sometimes observed as providing an indirect social link among neighbours of different ethnic background.

Often, moreover, neighbours are unable to speak another's language. Our sample alone includes French and English Canadians, Jews, Greeks, Italians, Portuguese, Chinese, Poles, and West Indians. Some speak only French, others only English, and others only their mother tongue (especially women and older people).

These linguistic problems are compounded by cultural differences. Long-term residents, particularly, feel that the district is becoming run down by the new immigrants and their way of life. [1] It has become "crowded", "noisy", and "less well cared for". [2] The more densely built areas do indeed give this impression. Of course, the buildings are by now quite old, most of them having been built over 50 and even 60 years ago. (See Appendix: Map 2).

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1 Real estate brokers tend to agree. The two we spoke to feel that the district is "run down" and "finished".

2 It is a fact that population density has increased (see Table 1). This results from the tendency for poor immigrants, especially Greeks, to share flats either with relatives or other families and thereby save on rent.

CHAPTER II

OWNERS AND TENANTS

RECENT TRENDS

Changes in the area are reflected in the traits of both owners and tenants. The proportion of resident owners of other than French, English or Jewish ethnicity, most of them post World War 2 immigrants, has doubled since 1961 (See Appendix: Table 1), so that now they represent over half the resident owners (See Appendix: Table 2). [1] On the other hand, many Jewish resident owners have left the area during this time, and at present there are only half as many Jewish owners as there are other, more recent immigrants. The only group whose relative size has not changed since 1961 are French and English resident owners. [2] These owners form a stable minority in the area. 83% of resident French owners in 1961 still owned their building six years later, compared with 57% of Jewish and 64% of 'other' owners. [3]

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[1] Data on present ethnic distribution, age, and family size is taken from the 1968 census conducted by the City of Outremont. Figures are based on the extended study area which includes the two block area and parts of two adjacent blocks on Hutchison Street (N of 91). The data on ethnic change since 1961, on the other hand, is the result of a survey of name lists in tax rolls and street directories. This survey was limited to the smaller, two-block area (N of 48).

[2] In 1961, 25% of residents in tract 268 were of French Canadian and 11% of English Canadian origin. For brevity, we will henceforth refer to "French" owners, meaning, however, both French and English. There are, moreover, no English owners in the sample.

[3] Based on an N of 41.

The new immigrant majority differ in age and family size from the French and Jewish owners who remain. French and, to a lesser extent, Jewish owners tend to be elderly people whose children have left the area and whose families are accordingly small. 'Other' owners, however, are much younger and have large families (Table 6). The present distribution of French, Jewish, and 'other' resident owners, and the different stages in lifecycle that they represent, clearly suggest that these three ethnic 'groups' also represent different successive stages in the area's history. [1]

Table 6. Ethnicity and Life-Cycle for Resident Owners and Tenants *

(study area, in means)

	Resident Owners			Tenants		
	Age	Family Size	N	Age	Family Size	N
French and English	64	2.2	17	50	4.5	99
Jewish	58	3.4	36	45	4.9	33
Others	36	5.2	34	35	5.6	120
N			87			252

Source: Outremont Census (1968). Data for this census is collected yearly by the City of Outremont and was kindly made available.

Together with ethnic change has occurred a decrease in absentee ownership, from 34% in 1961 to 24% in 1967. [2] In fact, absentee owners

[1] The ethnic shift is also reflected among absentee owners. In the two-block area, the proportion of French and Jewish absentees has decreased 50%, while that of 'others' has increased from zero to 40% (Table 1 in Appendix).

[2] This contrasts with the common notion that absentee owners buy into a declining neighbourhood.

have been mainly responsible for the high turnover of property in recent years. Of a total of 37 property transactions [1] since 1961, 70% of the sellers (and 53% of the buyers) were absentee owners. Low return on investment and ready immigrant buyers seem to have been main reasons for selling.

Among tenants, the proportion of post World War II immigrants has similarly doubled since 1961 (See Appendix: Table 1) and they now represent over half the tenants in the area (See Appendix: Table 2). [2] The number of Jewish and French tenants, however, differs from that of owners. There are three times more French than Jewish tenants, although, among owners, Jews outnumber the French. When we compare owners and tenants, moreover, we find that only half as many Jews, but twice as many French Canadians, are tenants. The proportion of French tenants was even larger in 1961. Low mobility may partly account for the comparatively large proportion of the latter. Thirty-six per cent of French tenants in 1961 were still renting the same flat in 1967, compared with 28% of Jewish, and 17% of 'other' tenants. [3]

As with owners, we find that these broad ethnic categories relate to successive stages of the life-cycle that, in turn, reflect the area's past. The household heads of French families are older, and have smaller families than Jewish, and especially 'other' tenants (Table 6).

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[1] Involving half (49%) of the buildings in the two-block area.

[2] The 'Jewish' category includes a considerable number of post World War II immigrants.

[3] Based on an N of 118.

Among both owners and tenants we find, then, that new ethnic elements representing a younger stage of the life-cycle are taking over the area. These new residents, as we have noted in the previous section, also bring with them a different cultural and class background. As a result, we find a mixture of old and new, past and present, that has important consequences for the rental process, particularly its first step, the selection of owners and tenants.

SELECTION PATTERNS

An important link in both the rental process and neighbourhood change is the mutual selection of owners and tenants. That recruitment is not a random process is clearly indicated by Table 7.[1] It suggests that two basic dynamics underlie the selection process, one characteristic of resident owners and their tenants, the other of both resident and absentee owners.

Resident owners and their tenants select each other on the basis of ethnic (and cultural) affinity.[2] Jews, especially, select each other 2.3 times as often as by chance alone.[3] The same, though to a lesser extent, holds true for French owners and tenants (1.9 times chance).[4]

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[1] See also Table 3 in the Appendix for a similar pattern of ethnic selection of owners and tenants in the sample.

[2] As defined in terms of our three broad ethnic categories.

[3] 30% as compared to 13%.

[4] The data allows no conclusions as to the direction of selection.

Table 7. Ethnic Selection by Owner and Tenant (Study Area)

	Resident Owners			Absentee Owners				Total	
	F & E	Jews	Other	F & E	Jews	Other	Companies	%	N
Tenants									
F & E *	75%	33%	26%	58%	36%	23%	17%	39	99
Jewish	--	30	10	5	11	23	17	13	33
Other	25	37	64	37	53	54	66	48	120
%	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	-
N	28	46	66	38	55	13	6	-	252

* French and English

Among absentee owners, on the other hand, only the French select each other frequently (1.5 times chance), while Jewish absentee owners and tenants choose each other less often than would be expected by chance (11% as compared to 13%).

It seems clear that ethnic affinity among absentees and their tenants does not play nearly as much a rôle as with residents. One reason may be that the latter are choosing not merely partners to a rental contract, but also neighbours. Cultural and ethnic compatibility may then become an important criterion for selection. The difference may, however, also be seen as part of a broader power interpretation.

Table 7 shows that French tenants rent in declining order of frequency with French, Jewish, 'other', and company owners, respectively. The same is true of 'other' tenants, except that the order is here reversed. The most plausible explanation of this pattern is that French tenants, having

a fairly strong bargaining position, [1] are best able to exercise their preference of one owner over another. Using their choice as indicator, it seems that resident owners, particularly French resident owners, are preferred owners. These owners can then afford not to accept less desirable new immigrant tenants. As a result, the latter find themselves renting with immigrant resident, or immigrant and company absentee, owners who are unable to attract better tenants. [2]

These considerations suggest that ethnic affinity as a factor in owner-tenant selection must be viewed in a context of relative power advantage, since only the powerful are able to effectively exercise choice.

This interpretation would help account for the greater pressures toward mutual selection among French, compared with 'other' resident owners and tenants. [3] These exist among absentees and their tenants as well, though to a lesser extent. The difference could again be seen in a power perspective, that is, in the better position of resident owners to exercise choice.

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1 In the sense that they are considered desirable tenants and have had considerable renting experience. This is in contrast to 'other' tenants who often overcrowd to save on rent, are considered to have 'different' standards, and have little acquaintance with local renting customs.

2 The fact that, regardless of ethnic origin, tenants renting with absentee owners have larger families than those renting with resident owners (See Appendix: Table 4) supports the general point that the weak end up with the weak.

3 Note that the ethnic heterogeneity of 'others' may also account for the lack of selectivity shown here.

The one exception to this pattern of ethnic recruitment is Jewish absentee owners and tenants. As we have seen, they select each other less often than would be expected by chance. A much higher proportion of Jewish tenants rent with 'other' and company (absentee) owners instead. One reason for this may be that in recent years, many Jewish owners have sold their property, while their (mainly Jewish) tenants often continued renting with the new owners, including companies and ex-resident immigrant owners. It is, however, also possible that (new) Jewish tenants are finding a margin of power advantage in renting with these owners.

This analysis of selection patterns in the area suggests, then, that social, non-economic factors play an important rôle in the establishment of owner-tenant relations. It is, however, individuals, not traits, that select each other. We will, therefore, move from a general, area-wide interpretation of the data to a more detailed description of particular owners and tenants.

OWNERS AND TENANTS AS SOCIAL TYPES

Moving to a more concrete level of analysis, we find that owners and tenants in our sample fall into several distinct groups or types. [1] The factors that identify them are both simple and basic. They are: immigrant status, length of owning or renting, and, with owners, place of residence.

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[1] Our sample is reasonably representative of the larger area, both in terms of ethnic character (See Table 8 and Appendix: Table 5) and the proportion of absentee owners (31% in the sample compared to 27% in the extended study area). Deviations are, however, not a critical problem since we tried to identify types rather than closely describe the area.

Among property owners we can distinguish three broad types: Local Resident owners, Immigrant Resident owners, and Absentee owners. These groups differ by place of residence and immigrant status. Locals are those who either were born in Canada or entered before 1945, while all those who came after 1945 will be referred to as Immigrants. This means primarily that Jews of pre-World War II immigration will be treated together with French Canadians as Locals (See Appendix: Table 6). We found it more useful to distinguish owners on this basis than in terms of ethnicity, since immigrant status reflects more accurately the changes that have occurred in the area and also relates closely to other key data. [1]

For tenants, the Local-Immigrant dimension is again basic. There is a clear distinction between French and English tenants and the other groups who have come since the War (See Table 8). [2] Unlike with owners, however, a sizable number of locals have entered the area within the last ten years. These New Locals differ in social character from the Residual Locals who came before and will accordingly be treated separately. Similarly, we will need to distinguish New Immigrants who have been in the country for two years or less from Established Immigrants who came earlier (but after 1945). We can altogether, then, distinguish four main types of tenants: Residual Locals, New Locals, Established Immigrants, and New Immigrants.

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1 Data on immigrant status was unfortunately not available for owners and tenants in the larger area.

2 As with owners, this again means that Jews who were born in Canada or arrived before World War II will be grouped with French and English Locals.

Table 8. Sample Tenants, by Ethnicity and Time of Arrival in Canada

	"Locals"		"Immigrants"		Sample		Area * (tenants)
	Natives	Before 1939	1949-59	1960 +	N	%	%
French and English	10	1	-	-	11	38	39
Jewish	1	-	3	1	5	17	13
Others	-	-	8	5	13	45	48
N	11	1	11	6	29	100	100

* Based on an N of 252

Local Resident Owners

The nine local residents in our sample are a residual element. Three have owned for 45 years or more, and only one owner has bought in since 1958. [1] As a group, local residents bought in before the time of marked ethnic change, a median average of 17 years ago.

These owners are in several respects the most homogeneous group. Seven of them are French Canadians and two are Jews of pre-World War II immigration. Similar to French owners in the larger area, local residents are late in the life-cycle. Six household heads are over 60 years of age and only one is under 50 years old (mean age: 62). These owners are elderly couples or widows whose children have left the area. Four live alone and three others share with only one person (mean family size: 2.1).

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1 The three long-term owners all own triplexes, while the most recent one bought a duplex bordering on a newer, higher priced area.

The older local residents originally all came from central and eastern Montreal. [1] The two most recent ones, on the other hand, previously lived to the west and southwest (See Appendix: Map 9). [2] There seems to be no clear relation between either time of purchase or area of origin and occupational status, but six of the nine local residents have or had white-collar occupations. They include, moreover, the only three resident owners with a managerial or professional background. (See Appendix: Table 7). The six owners who no longer work derive a stable income from rents, pensions, and, in some cases, investment returns. Since, in addition, all but one have paid off their mortgages on the property, the financial position of local residents as a group is fairly secure.

In their attitude to the building, local resident owners set economic considerations in second place. Their main concern is a long-term home or residence in which to settle. The desirable features of the area as a residential district constituted an important factor in their initial purchase of the property.

Since then, they feel the district has changed for the worse. They do not like the new immigrants with their large, noisy families and their 'different way of life', but they feel there is little they can do about it. Moving is not seen as an alternative. As one owner said, "Oh, no, I'm too old. Besides, where would I move to?" At the same time, their social

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[1] One owner had previously been a resident of Outremont but originally also came from the eastern part of Montreal.

[2] Note again that all directions refer not to the 'true' co-ordinates but to common local practice that equates Park Avenue with the North-South axis. All areas east of St. Denis Street are, moreover, included in "the eastern part of Montreal".

interaction with neighbours is limited, except where some old French or Jewish neighbours have remained. Even then, they prefer to keep to themselves and generally restrict social contact to chats on the street, across the backyard, or over the telephone. [1]

Local resident owners, then, are a stable group of elderly, mostly middle class owners who entered the area when it was still considered a desirable place to live and are now faced with neighbourhood change. Table 8 (see Appendix) expresses the shift from locals to immigrants in terms of their time of purchase.

Immigrant Resident Owners

This group of owners form part of the increasing number of immigrants who have bought into the area in recent years. All eleven owners in the sample originally come from southern or eastern Europe. They arrived in Canada a median average of fourteen years ago and bought their present property a median average of six years ago. All bought in since 1958, [2] a year that may well serve as a benchmark for change in the area. [3]

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1 The "good name" of Outremont, together with good services and facilities for its residents, is another factor that has induced these owners to stay. Although they react negatively to their immediate neighbourhood, all feel that Outremont is a "good area".

2 Seven of the nine immigrant resident owners for whom information is available bought from Jewish owners.

3 Note also that only one local resident owner has bought in since then (page 26). In street directories and tax rolls, moreover, the first Greek names do not appear till 1958.

Immigrant resident owners are of quite varied ethnic origin, unlike locals. There are three Greeks, three orthodox Jews, three Slavs and two Italians in the sample. As a group, they are also much younger than local owners - ten of the household heads being between 25 and 48 years of age (mean age: 39) - and have much larger households, seven of them with five or more persons (mean family size: 5.2).

The great majority have moved into Outremont from the poor immigrant sector immediately to the east and south-east (See Appendix: Map 9).[1] This relates to the working class background of immigrant owners. Seven of them have mainly skilled, blue-collar jobs. Due to their mortgage payments and large families, they are, moreover, financially not as secure as local resident owners.

Like local owners, immigrants did not buy for primarily economic reasons. In fact, most have no clear idea, considering their investment and other expenses, what it costs them to live in their homes. Their main reason for buying is, rather, a desire for economic security and independence, the feeling of 'being your own master'. Tradition is also a factor. As one Greek owner said: "We're from Europe, I had a house there, and my father and grandfather had houses. The first thing is to have a house."

Coming to eastern Outremont and owning a house is part of making a better place for themselves and their family in the new country. As the new element in the area, these owners are not concerned about neighbourhood change, if they are aware of it at all. Of those who are, some[2] welcome

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[1] The two immigrant owners who previously lived in Outremont moved there initially also from the south-east.

[2] Two of the three Greek owners.

the fact that more people of their ethnic group are moving into the area.

Several immigrant owners have close friends and relatives in the area, particularly the Greeks and orthodox Jews, who have begun to form local communities. Since these two groups constitute more than half the immigrant residents in the sample, it is not surprising that, as a group, these owners like the area as a place to live in.

There are also external restraints on their mobility. Two immigrant owners want to move to a newer district and have tried to sell their property. For two years, however, they have so far not been able to obtain the desired price or down payment. However, regardless of whether individual immigrant owners stay or leave, the proportion of these owners in the area is clearly increasing. [1]

Absentee Owners

The nine absentee owners in our sample include both owners who once lived in the building (ex-residents) and owners who did not (outside investors). They include, moreover, immigrants as well as locals. Absentee owners are therefore a fairly heterogeneous group who do, however, share a primarily economic attitude to owning that sets them apart from resident owners. In addition, their occupational status is typically higher. Seven of the eight individual owners are either professionals or independent businessmen (See Appendix: Table 7),[2] and six now live in well-to-do suburban areas.

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[1] Inferred from the ethnic data for 'other' owners in the larger area.

[2] Three owners own or co-own small stores or restaurants. These small entrepreneurs have been included in the "white collar" category.

On the basis of their time of purchase, we can distinguish two major subgroups. Those owners who bought their property fifteen or more years ago, that is, before the time of marked ethnic change, will be referred to as Residual Absentees. This is in contrast to New Absentees who all bought in within the last ten years.

Of the four residual absentee owners in our sample, two are French Canadians and two Canadian-born Jews. These middle aged locals (mean age: 48) have owned for a median average of 33 years. Three of them are ex-residents. Their parents had originally bought the building as a residence, but after their death, their children, the present owners, had in each case left for new suburbs to the north and northwest. They decided to keep the building, however, and two have bought additional property since then. [1] One Jewish ex-resident and the French outside investor, in particular, have fairly large holdings of 29 and 79 dwellings, respectively. These are scattered over mainly low-rent districts in the Montreal area, and include duplexes, cold flats, and small apartment buildings. [2] In addition, both own commercial rental property and stocks. All residual absentees own for long-term investment and revenue and are not planning to sell. The multiple-parcel owners, moreover, buy rental property to diversify their investment.

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1 The exception here, as in other instances, is an 84-year-old French Canadian ex-resident who has not sold for sentimental rather than economic reasons.

2 By contrast, three resident owners, two of them immigrants, own other rental property. Two each own a small apartment building, the third a triplex, all in the area or nearby. None of the resident owners owns more than two buildings.

The five new absentee owners have bought in a median average of only two years ago. They include immigrants as well as locals, more specifically a French Canadian, a Canadian-born Jew, two Chinese, and a company. The two immigrants are fairly young (mean age: 38). One is an ex-resident while the other plans to move into the building. The other two owners [1] are elderly (mean age: 63) outside investors. The immigrants own no other rental property and are relatively inexperienced. The two outside investors, on the other hand, are real estate broker and chartered accountant by profession and own 43 and 22 dwellings, respectively, in addition to commercial property and stocks. [2] They and the residual absentees with larger holdings are, moreover, the only owners in the sample that rationally calculate their return on the investment. Nevertheless, these new outside investors bought for different reasons. One wants, together with the immigrant absentees, a stable long-term investment and rental income, while at least one of the other two outside investors bought for short-term investment only.

Neighbourhood change is seen by absentee owners in basically economic terms, namely in how far it affects vacancies, maintenance, rents, and, for some, prices. The main source of concern for residual long-term investors is the increasing difficulty in finding good tenants, together with the physical deterioration of the area. Those who more recently bought

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1 The company owner is excluded here. This is a wholesale groceries firm that acquired the property through a merger. It owns no other residential rental property.

2 The distribution of dwellings by area and building type is similar to those of multi-parcel residual absentees.

for resale, on the other hand, are only marginally concerned about tenants and change. [1]

We can summarize the main features of owners in our sample by the following paradigm:

	Types of Owners			
	Local Residents	Immigrant Residents	Residual Absentees	New Absentees
Length of ownership Median (in years):	long 17	short 5	long 33	short 2
Immigrant status	local	immigrant	local	varies
Age Mean (in years):	elderly 62	young to middle age 39	middle age 48	varies 50
Family size Mean (in years):	small 2.1	fairly large 5.2	-- --	-- --
Building type	duplex/ triplex	duplex/ triplex	triplex	triplex
Occupation	white collar	blue collar	white collar	white collar
Financial position	secure	insecure	secure	varies
Main reason for owning	to settle	'senti-mental'	income	income
Approach to owning	long-term	medium to long-term	long-term	varies
Attitude to neighbourhood change	concerned	not concerned	concerned	varies
Main concerns	neighbourhood (tenants)	financing	long-term investment (tenants)	investment

[1] It is these owners, however, that may play a rôle in introducing new ethnic elements. Of the first ten Greek families in the area (according to tax rolls), eight rented with absentee owners.

Residual Local Tenants

Among local tenants in the sample, there are four who entered the area before the period of greatest change, that is ten years ago or more. These tenants have rented their present flats a median average of twelve years. All are French Canadians who, like most local owners, originally came from the central and eastern part of Montreal (See Appendix: Map 10). They were looking for long-term homes and considered eastern Outremont, as one put it, "a top neighbourhood at the time". [1] Friendship and kin ties were also a reason for moving here. According to another tenant: "I wanted to move back into the Outremont area where we had grown up and where many of our friends were living." A third tenant moved into his sister's house when the university where he was teaching was relocated closer to Outremont.

Residual local household heads are now elderly, between 51 and 64 years of age (mean: 56), and their families are small, varying between 1-4 persons (mean: 2.0). Two no longer work, but three have or had a white-collar and one a professional occupation. (See Appendix: Table 9).

Their solid middle class background is in contrast to newer elements in the area, and is experienced as such. All residual local tenants feel that the district has deteriorated in recent years. Moreover, surrounded by immigrants with a different way of life and speaking a different language, they feel, again like local owners, increasingly isolated. So far, good

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1 This tenant rented in 1957. Her statement is further evidence that most new immigrants entered the area later, after 1958.

landlords, low rents, and the trouble of moving [1] have kept them from moving. Long-term French and English neighbours may also be a reason: "Mr. Thompson next door, and Mr. Roy on my right, are very close. I would have moved if it wasn't for them. We form an old coalition in this immigrant neighbourhood."

From interviews, it is, however, apparent that many of these older local tenants have by now left the area. Three of the four tenants in the sample are, moreover, planning to leave in the near future, two for French-speaking suburbs to the north. They explicitly cite neighbourhood change as the main reason.

New Local Tenants

There is another, larger group of eight tenants who represent a more recent 'counterflow' of locals into the area. All have rented within the last seven years, a median average of four years ago. Their social character is less homogeneous than that of residual locals and we can distinguish at least two subgroups.

In one group of four families, the household heads are, or were, middle aged to elderly (span: 48 - 69 years) blue-collar workers with fairly large families of 4 - 7 persons. Two are of French and two of English ethnicity. The former come from the poor central area to the south-east, the latter originally from rural areas in eastern Canada. All may therefore be considered upwardly mobile. For them, the area meant a better

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1 These long-term tenants have their flats extensively furnished. The furniture, e.g. piano and dishwasher, tends to reflect the tenants' middle class background.

place to live, and they liked its central location, large flats, and low rents.

There are also four new local tenants who have artistic and white-collar occupations and who come from better-to-do areas. [1] Ethnically, three are French and one a local Jew. Two of the French tenants are young (under 30), newly married couples, one with a small child. They work in an artistic milieu and were attracted to the district by its cosmopolitan flavour, as well as the low rents. The two remaining household heads are middle-aged locals (between 45-50 years of age) [2] who came to rent with relatives.

Middle class values have made this second group of new locals invest considerably more in their flats than the working class locals. Nevertheless, none of the new local tenants are certain that they will stay, and five plan to move in a year or two. Of these, four want to stay in Outremont, but in the better-to-do residential area to the west.

The reasons for moving vary. Neighbourhood change is a factor, at least among the middle class locals. Only one tenant, however, mentioned it explicitly as a reason. Another factor may be the lack of close friends in the vicinity. Only two of the eight new locals have neighbours or friends nearby whom they visit regularly. [3]

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1 Two came from middle class areas to the west, like the two most recent local resident owners. Another tenant previously lived in an eastern suburb. The fourth came from out of town but was born in the area (See Appendix: Map 10).

2 One is a widow and lives alone, the other has a family of five.

3 Owner relatives not included.

Established Immigrant Tenants

The largest group of tenants in the sample are thirteen immigrant tenants who have been in the country for several years, twelve of them seven years or more. In terms of median averages, they rented the present flat four years ago, that is, five years after arriving in the country. Their previous residence was typically either in Outremont or the older immigrant area to the southeast (See Appendix: Map 10).[1] Again, low rents and large flats were important factors that attracted them. Some also came to stay near to, or with, relatives or friends who had moved here before them.[2]

These tenants represent the wave of upwardly mobile immigrants that have transformed the district in recent years. They include three Greeks, three orthodox Jews, two West Indians, one Lithuanian, one German, one Italian, one Portuguese and one Chinese. The household heads are young to middle aged, between 28 - 47 years of age (mean: 39),[3] and have households of 3 - 14 persons (mean: 5.8). The great majority, eleven out of thirteen, have blue-collar jobs, of which eight are skilled (See Appendix: Table 9). They like eastern Outremont as a place to live, especially now when ethnic

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1 A study on migration patterns of 81 households in tract 268 (most of them tenants) found that 25% of last moves occur within the tract and 42% within the Outremont area. Moreover, statistical analysis of the last three moves of each household shows the preferred route into the area to be from the immigrant "corridor" to the southeast. The data suggests that this migrant pattern applies particularly to immigrants. (Gilmour, 1969).

2 The sharing of flats to lower the rent is common practice among poor immigrants in the area, particularly Greeks. Our sample includes one household of fourteen persons and consisting of three Greek families.

3 One tenant, an exception, is 63 years of age.

services are improving, and consider it to be a better place than the older immigrant area where most had lived before. This is particularly true of Greeks and orthodox Jews, who also have close friends and relatives in the area.

In some cases, these ties act as a restraint on further mobility. On the other hand, at least four tenants have friends who moved to newer areas and are considering going there themselves. These four tenants will move when their lease expires. Two want to go to outlying suburbs to the northwest, one to a mainly Jewish area in the same direction but closer by. The fourth tenant (Greek) wants to stay in Outremont close to his relatives.

New Immigrant Tenants

There are four tenants in the sample who are newcomers not only to the area, but to the country as well. All have immigrated to Canada within the last two years. Two, with the help of friends, moved into their present flat almost directly upon arrival, while the others stayed first with relatives for a few months. In every instance, relatives living in the district were responsible for bringing these new arrivals directly into eastern Outremont.

In contrast to most established immigrants, none of these newly-arrived immigrants came from Europe. Instead, they are from Turkey, Israel, Hong Kong and the West Indies, respectively. The heads of the households, which vary from 4 - 6 persons, and in two instances include parents (mean family size: 5.3), are young, three being under 35 years of age (mean: 32). Their occupational level is the lowest in the sample. All four have unskilled blue-collar jobs (See Appendix: Table 9).

They regard their present flat as convenient because of its low rent and its location close to friends or relatives. Basically, however, they see it as a temporary, makeshift residence until they have better established themselves. Since they have little furniture and only very limited social contact with their new neighbours, there is little to hold them back. As we shall see, however, it is primarily conflict with their landlords that makes them want to move.

The following paradigm outlines the social character of our four major tenant types:

TYPES OF TENANTS

	Residual Locals	New Locals	Established Immigrants	New Immigrants
Length of renting:	long	medium	medium	short
Median in years:	12	4	3	1
Age:	middle age to elderly	varies	young to middle age	young
Means in years:	56	40	39	32
Family size:	small	varies	medium to large	medium
Means:	2.0	3.8	5.8	5.3
Occupation:	white collar	varies	blue collar	unskilled blue collar
Approach to renting:	long-term	medium	medium to long-term	short-term
Attitude to neighbourhood change	concerned	varies	not concerned	not concerned
Main concerns	neighbourhood rent	location rent	location rent space	rent

CHAPTER III

TYPES OF OWNER-TENANT RELATIONS

The dynamics of neighbourhood change, implicit in the description of owners and tenants, become more explicit in their inter-relations. As we have seen, owners and tenants tend to choose each other in terms of their social and historical character. The selection process, in turn, has consequences for reciprocity and patterns of rent and maintenance.

Our framework of four owner and four tenant types permits sixteen possible combinations. We find that five of these describe 22 of the 29 owner-tenant relations in our sample (Table 9). These are: Local Resident owners with Residual Local tenants, Local Resident owners with New Local tenants, Immigrant Resident owners with Established Immigrant tenants, Residual Absentee owners with Established Immigrant tenants, and New Absentee owners with New Immigrant arrivals. These combinations, or types of relationship, not only appear as the most frequent in our sample, but, more importantly, form a consistent pattern whose logical opposite is empirically absent.

Table 9. Owner-Tenant Selection by Type

Tenants	Owners				
	Local Residents	Immigrant Residents	Residual Absentees	New Absentees	N
Residual Locals	3	-	1	-	4
New Locals	5	2	-	1	8
Established Immigrants	1	8	3	1	13
New Immigrants	-	1	-	3	4
N	9	11	4	5	29

To show how this patterning of rental relationships relates to neighbourhood change, we will describe in some detail the four major types of owner-tenant relations in the sample: [1]

1) Local Resident owners with Local tenants

2) Immigrant Resident owners with Established Immigrant tenants

3) Absentee Owners with Immigrant Tenants

   (a) Residual Absentees with Established Immigrants

   (b) New Absentees with New Immigrant Tenants.

Although in each type of relationship the number of sample cases is small, we feel that their internal homogeneity as well as their logical continuity point to more general dynamics of owner-tenant relations and neighbourhood change.

Local Resident Owners with Local Tenants

There are sixteen owners and tenants in this group. They have rented longer with each other than any of the other groups, an average of 7.0 years. Seven of the eight owners and the three Residual Local tenants moved here ten or more years ago, before the time of greatest change. As we have seen, they are a remnant of the area's past, and, together with the five New Local tenants, represent the French and older Jewish minority in the area. As a group, the owners and tenants are elderly, middle-class, and financially relatively secure. [2] Ethnicity, life cycle, and class

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[1] Since the rental patterns of Residual and New Local tenants are similar, we will simplify the discussion by collapsing them into one type.

[2] Cf. pp. 26-27.

set them apart from other owners and tenants and influence importantly their rental behaviour.

Local resident owners are quite particular about the kind of tenant they want. Common to all but one of them is that their tenants be ethnically and culturally compatible. Of the six French owners, five have only French tenants.[1] Of the two Jewish owners, one has French, the other French and Jewish tenants. With one exception, therefore, none of the owners has immigrant tenants. The reasons are largely cultural. As one landlady rather typically said: "I refuse immigrants because they have a peculiar way of living." Others, in addition, want " ... well educated persons, no workers. It is easier to deal with such people." At least three owners definitely do not want children in the house. The fact that half are renting to (younger) relatives suggests that they are also looking for tenants on whom they can, at least occasionally, rely for help. Ethnicity, class, family size and kin ties seem, then, the crucial factors considered in selecting tenants. Directly or indirectly, these effectively exclude immigrants.

Local owners are willing, and able, to wait for the right kind of tenants. One owner left his flat unrented for five months in order to find a suitable tenant, and, as a group, local owners take a longer time to rent than other (immigrant) resident owners. (See Appendix: Table 10). This is partly due to the fact that half the owners prefer to find tenants through private rather than public means (Table 11).[2] This includes regu-

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[1] These six owners have a total of ten rentable flats. Nine of these are rented to French Canadians.

[2] See Appendix.

larly scanning the newspapers: "When I have a vacancy, I never announce it. I don't want people to walk in all day. I read the ads in the newspaper and choose my tenants by their description and by what they desire. Only the people I contact come to look at my flat. They're either English, Scottish, or French Canadian."

Two other owners announce their vacancies in newspaper advertisements that specify the kind of tenant they want.

Local owners not only take care in recruiting tenants, but also check them carefully. All five owners who did not rent to a relative ask for references, and four make a point of checking them. At least one landlady, moreover, has a tenant relative (her son) [1] visit the prospective tenant's flat. In one case, the tenant actually became quite irritated with the owner's thorough "research".

Local tenants are likewise selective in regard to whom they rent with. They are looking for a building that looks reasonably respectable and well cared for, and whose other tenants (or resident owner) are 'decent, quiet people. In addition, they feel that they can understand each other better if the owner has a similar ethnic and cultural background. This is reflected in the way these tenants select owners. Three tenants rented with relatives, another advertised, and specified his preference, in a (French) newspaper, while a fifth tenant looked for a month and a half and was "so exhausted looking for a place". (See Appendix: Table 12).

Underlying what we have said so far is the owners' desire to rent to long-term tenants, and, conversely, the tenants' desire for a long-term home.[2]

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[1] Not included in the sample.

[2] The exception here, as in other instances, is one young, artistically inclined couple.

This is evidenced by the fact that half the tenants initially signed three-year leases (See Appendix: Table 13), while another two had long-term understandings with their owner relatives. Tenant turnover, moreover, is lower than among any of the other groups (See Appendix: Table 15). [1]

What, then, are the main themes of exchange within this selective long-term context? Our data suggest the relationship of local owners and tenants is one of selective reciprocity. This refers to the tendency for both parties to co-operate in certain aspects of the relationship more than in others. Its specific form is related to the social character of these owners and tenants and underlies their major patterns of rental behaviour, particularly those concerned with maintenance and rent level.

Local owners are unwilling, or unable, to look after repairs in their tenants' flats. [2] Some go as far as to stipulate this in the lease: "The tenants must take my conditions or leave it. I won't do any repairs or repainting. This is written into the lease."

This emphasis seems related to the owners' age. Owning and looking after general upkeep is already a burden, and assuming responsibility for their tenants' flats is more than they feel they are able to do at their age. [3]

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[1] Half the local owners, moreover, presently have tenants they have rented to for 15 years or more. Two owners also mentioned spontaneously that they had had tenants for 15 and 29 years, respectively, in the remaining third flat.

[2] An exception are two of the three relations between kin.

[3] One owner is willing to co-operate but the tenant feels he is not in a position to do so effectively. As he puts it: "He's very nice and co-operative. Only, he's past 80 and he and his wife are very ill." As a result, the tenant looks after his own repairs.

They feel that since they have chosen their tenants carefully, they need not feel concerned with the latter's standards of maintenance. As one landlady said: "I leave everything up to them. I chose them well and feel I don't have to check them. I haven't seen their flat in two years."

The very fact that they hesitate to get involved in these repairs is a further safeguard against undesirable tenants. For example, only two of the eight owners repainted the flat before renting. This serves to attract only those tenants willing to invest time and energy into their flats, namely, long-term (local) tenants.

Local resident owners do, however, care for their property and its over-all upkeep, which they accept to be their responsibility. Since they see upkeep in a long-term perspective, they prefer to have repairs done well. As one tenant said about her owner: "When something goes wrong, he calls the best people. He doesn't have things done cheaply and is concerned with the upkeep of the house, as you may have noticed."

In fact, five of the eight tenants feel that their owners keep their property in better than average condition (See Appendix: Table 16). Their impressions are supported by a more 'objective' survey [1] in which the buildings of half these owners were rated in very good or good, that is, better than average, condition. (See Appendix: Table 18).

Long-term concern with good upkeep tends to lower maintenance costs. Since tenants are left to look after their own repairs, it is not surprising

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1 Done independently by two sociology graduate students. Buildings were rated in terms of structure, painting and cleanliness. (See also Methodology section in the Appendix).

that local owners have the lowest maintenance expenditures in the sample (see Appendix: Table 17). [1]

At the same time, local owners are not willing to make renovations or major improvements. This may be due partly to their age, but several owners give another explanation: "I don't make improvements because I know I wouldn't be able to keep up with expenses."

Still, the key to the apparent paradox of good upkeep and tenant satisfaction, together with low maintenance costs, seems to lie in the mutual agreement among owners and tenants that the latter assume responsibility for their flat. All tenants (renting with non-relatives) seemed quite willing to accept this arrangement. As one put it: "We agreed on everything. It was up to us to fix everything the way we wanted it."

Others even seemed to prefer it this way since " ... we wanted to be able to redecorate as we liked." A third tenant is perhaps an extreme example of willingness to invest in a new home: "Whatever wasn't there, we just ordered and arranged for ourselves at our expense. We took away a useless chimney, had a different ceiling placed in the kitchen, ... tiled the floors, put in central heating ... We must have spent around $2,000."

A rough tabulation indicates that at least half the local tenants have their flats well furnished and in better than average condition. (See Appendix: Table 19). This investment in their flats clearly expresses as well as reinforces their long-term intentions.

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[1] This is particularly true of local triplex owners.

Lack of involvement by owners in tenant repairs is matched by lack of social interaction. Local owners and tenants generally do not borrow or exchange items or establish personal ties in other ways. (See Appendix: Table 20). There are exceptions. One landlady tries to please her tenants with "little extra services", such as taking care of parcels in their absence. As she says: "Good relations are important." The tenant, however, denied any exchange of favours. In five of the eight relationships, owners and tenants have, in spite of their long-term contact, never visited each other socially. (See Appendix: Table 21).

Undoubtedly, this 'social distance' is partly the result of differences in class [1] and life-cycle. [2] Perhaps more importantly, it also expresses the owners' attitude toward renting. They feel that: "Business is business", which has led one tenant to complain openly about her owner's lack of 'friendliness'. [3]

As with maintenance, owner-tenant relatives are again an exception. Social reciprocity here is frequent and 'dense'. In the words of one tenant: "We do so many things for each other." At least two owners rely considerably on their tenant relatives. When one owner still owned other

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1 Three of the owners are of clearly 'higher' class (occupation) than their tenants, while the reverse seems true in two other cases.

2 The median age of local resident owners is 66, compared to 50 for tenants.

3 This refers to the personal aspect of the relationship only. This tenant considers her owner a very good landlord. The latter has, moreover, helped another tenant by granting deferrals in rent payments.

property, his tenant daughter agreed to administer it. Another tenant had this to say about her owner-relative: "He's happy I'm living here. It's a security for him. Besides, I take care of his mother, my aunt. So, I'm useful to him."

In return for their demands, local owners are ready to make economic concessions. This is most dramatically expressed in their low rents. [1]

These owners have the lowest rents in the sample, both in terms of absolute rent as well as rent per square foot. (See Appendix: Tables 22 and 23). Typically, local triplex owners have not raised rents in at least one of their flats for an average of eight years. This strategy of low or flexible rents [2] serves to attract potential tenants and thereby increase the owners' choice. On the other hand, it expresses the owners' hesitancy to raise the rent of good long-term tenants for fear of aggravating, and perhaps losing, them. In effect, this often means that rents are raised for new tenants only:

"For my previous tenant, the one who lived here 29 years, I tried to raise the rent a few years ago. He was driving around in a new Buick and was a well-to-do old bachelor. When I tried to raise, he didn't like it and showed it. He said I had no right to raise. I felt I just couldn't raise and didn't.... When he moved out, I raised the rent for my new tenant."

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1 Some owners are quite aware of using low rents as a leverage for getting tenants to accept their conditions of maintenance, such as the landlady who said: "My rent is always reasonable but I have my conditions. I won't do any repairs, I won't repaint or do anything for my tenants."

2 Rents vary with the tenant's appeal. One owner says he would charge $20 more to a new tenant with several children than he would if the latter had none.

When local owners do raise the rent, it accordingly tends to be by a higher than average amount. Nevertheless, it is clear that they have not been able to keep up with rising property and school taxes. [1] As several owners said: "You can't just increase the rent each time taxes are raised." This is so, although all eight tenants said that a $5 increase in rent would not make them leave.

Tenants realize that their rents are a bargain. All eight tenants, four of whom know rents in neighbouring flats, consider their rents very low or low. (See Appendix: Table 24). [2] All, moreover, think it would be difficult or impossible to find a similar flat for the same rent.

Local owners are willing to make other kinds of economic concessions as well. One temporarily unemployed local tenant, for example, is three months behind in paying his rent - with the owner's consent: "I know he's reliable and that he's having a hard time." Another owner, when approached by the tenant, was willing to share $400 painting expenses, although the lease had been signed shortly before and repainting had not been discussed. The de-emphasis of formal renting conditions, in these and other instances, in favour of a more informal understanding of good will is also expressed by the fact that half the tenants now have automatically renewed leases (of less clear legal force)[3] while a fifth tenant has no lease at all.

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[1] In the last 7 years, property and school taxes increased by 122%. During this time, the typical local triplex owner, as we have seen, did not raise rents in one flat. In the other he has raised rents once by an average of $10.

[2] One tenant even decided to raise his rent $10 to be fair to his owner-relative.

[3] Province of Quebec Bill No. 7, An Act to Promote Conciliation Between Lessees and Property Owners, Section 16, automatically prolongs leases that are not terminated in writing. We have not investigated relevant legal cases, but most people seem to feel that a 'current' lease is more binding.

The careful selection of tenants, the initial agreement on owners' non-involvement in tenant repairs, as well as low rents - these factors tend to minimize conflict between local owners and tenants. Where it does occur, it is again dealt with informally, that is without appeal to outside agencies. None of the three tenants who have experienced some tension with their owners has complained to the City of Outremont or gone to the Rental Board, although all owners and tenants are aware of its existence. All three of these tenants are New Locals and, perhaps surprisingly, two are relatives of the owner. The owner's unwillingness to do repairs for the tenant is the problem in two instances. Both involve the relatively short-term Jewish owners [1] who initially do not seem to have sufficiently emphasized their intention not to get involved in tenant repairs. The third case involves a small raise which, in the tenant's eyes, violated the informal terms of reciprocity that had developed between herself and her owner-relative: "I was shocked and surprised - for $5! What is it to him! If he would have asked for $15, I would understand, but $5! It was very embarrassing."

Two of these tenants are planning to move as a result of this tension, while the third has resigned himself to doing his own repairs. It is significant that only one tenant, however, has complained to his owner. These tenants, it seems, prefer not to articulate any grievances either outside or within the rental relationship. As several said: "I don't like to

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[1] These two owners are also the consistent exception to the good over-all upkeep by owners in this group, both in terms of tenant evaluation and in terms of our survey. One of them, moreover, was the only resident owner sent a mandatory repair notice by the City.

argue or complain." None of the owners, moreover, has ever been involved with the Rental Board as the result of a tenant's complaint, in spite of their long term of owning. [1]

On the other hand, one owner successfully used the Rental Board to have two tenants evicted. Another owner intended to take legal action against a previous tenant, but was dissuaded from doing so. His situation points to a more general dilemma:

"The tenant living upstairs blocked the faucet. We said he was responsible, it was his doing, and he would have to have it repaired. He refused to, so we went to a notary ... He finally advised us to drop the case. For such a small amount, it wasn't worth the trouble, he told us. So we just had it fixed and paid. But we didn't like the idea, and we weren't on good terms with the tenant after that."

In sum, we find that these owners and tenants engage in a selective form of reciprocity. Local owners are unwilling to compromise in regard to the kind of tenants they rent to, the social relations they enter into with them, and the repairs they are willing to do for them. On the other hand, they are ready to make economic concessions and, with tenants they know, informal leasing arrangements. These demands and concessions reflect the defensive strategies of a remaining middle class minority of long-term elderly people in an area of ethnic change.

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1 On the other hand, all Rental Board cases in the area since 1961 (a total of seven) involved French or English, that is, local tenants. Six of the cases were directed against absentee owners, none against French or English resident owners.

Tenants are looking for long-term homes and are, accordingly, also selective. They want to rent in a building of good upkeep and with the right kind of owner. In turn, they are willing to look after their own repairs, and, if there is cause for complaint, not involve outside mediators.

The long-term orientation of both local owners and tenants, and their mutual give and take make these relationships relatively stable. [1] This is especially true of kin-based relations where reciprocity tends to be more diffuse and multi-faceted than is usual.

It seems that neighbourhood change may threaten this stability and gradually increase turnover. [2] Another, more important, consequence of neighbourhood change is that now, as evidenced in the low rents, local tenants tend to have the power advantage over local owners, once the initial selection has been made. Long-term local tenants are increasingly difficult to find. Owners unwilling to rent to immigrants are obliged to make concessions to attract and hold them. Dependent local residential owners with low rents then emerge as a new element in the area.

Immigrant Resident Owners with Established Immigrant Tenants

If locals renting with locals represent the area's past, immigrants renting with immigrants reflect its present. Although immigrant owners are

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[1] See Appendix: Table 15.

[2] We have only scattered evidence on this point. Several owners, however, mentioned long-term tenants who have moved in recent years. Several local tenants, moreover, have expressed their intention to move as a result of neighbourhood change (cf. page 35).

not fully represented in the sample, this relationship is still modal (Table 9). The eight owners and their tenants have entered the area only recently, all but one within the last ten years. The great majority are young to middle aged blue-collar workers. [1]

Two factors are perhaps central to an understanding of this type of relationship. One is the weak financial position of both owners and tenants. [2] The other is the short-term (compared to locals) character of the relationships. Immigrant owners and tenants have rented with each other an average of only two years. Only three tenants have rented longer. One reason may be the upward mobility of immigrant tenants, as suggested by their fairly high turnover.

These relationships also lack the social 'density' characteristic of those between locals. Six of the eight tenants are of different ethnic origin from their owners, [3] and in no case are they related. Unlike with local owners, we therefore find little evidence of selective recruitment on an ethnic basis. On the other hand, immigrants tend to rent with immigrants. Twelve out of a total of fourteen flats are rented to immigrant rather than local tenants. It seems plausible, however, that this is the result of exclusion by local tenants rather than by immigrant owners.

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1 In the sample, 78% of established immigrant tenants and 64% of immigrant resident owners have blue-collar jobs.

2 All owners, for example, have mortgages on their property. Their return on investment, moreover, is the lowest in the sample. (See Appendix: Table 17).

3 The exceptions are two pairs of orthodox Jewish owners and tenants.

Immigrants see flat or tenant selection as less of a problem than locals. All of the tenants were willing to rent the first flat that was clean and had the right rent. Most looked at up to five flats before renting their present one, and two rented the first one they looked at. (See Appendix: Table 12). Of the owners, four of the five who have so far had vacancies accepted the first tenant willing to leave a deposit. The following comment is typical: "Most would say they'd phone back, and some said they couldn't pay till next Saturday. I rented to the first person who offered to pay on the spot." [1]

These owners say they had "no trouble getting tenants" and four of them (out of five) rented their flat within a week. (See Appendix: Table 10). The one qualification they have is that the tenant does not share his flat with other families, since they have had, or heard of, problems with large tenant households. [2]

This lack of selectivity does not mean that immigrant owners are not concerned about the kind of tenant they are renting to. They feel, however, that getting good tenants is mostly a matter of luck and outside their control: "You never know if you get good people", or "It depends how lucky you are." This attitude is

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1 In this particular case, the (Greek) owner rented to a German, although most of the people who visited the flat were Greeks. He clearly did not select tenants by ethnic criteria.

2 As already mentioned, this is a widespread practice among poor tenant families in the area.

reflected in the way immigrant owners recruit and select tenants. In contrast to local owners, all five immigrants with vacancies announced them by public means. Three owners put up "for rent" signs only and just one owner, advised by his friends, advertised in a newspaper instead. (See Appendix: Table 11).

Moreover, only one of these five owners thought it worthwhile to check references. Most have little confidence in their value. As one owner said: "He gave me the name of his boss at work who's not going to say anything against him." An exception are again two orthodox Jews who, because they are part of an ethnic community, were able to make reliable inquiries.

The signing of the contract is typically a short affair, with the owner specifying the rent and minimal term of lease, which is usually not less than two years. (See Appendix: Table 13). Owners see no need for lengthy discussion of conditions. One owner said this of his prospective tenants: "I don't want people who argue because they'll argue later all the time too."

Only one, relatively long-term, owner [1] states more detailed conditions. In turn, four of the five new tenants accepted the owners' conditions right away, especially since the latter repainted, or promised to repaint, the flat. [2] In one case, the tenant pressed the owner to put in a new stove, which he agreed to do.

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[1] This owner is one of the two immigrant resident owners who own other rental property, namely, a triplex in the old immigrant area where he had lived before.

[2] Most owners are also willing to pay for the paint if the tenant wants to repaint the flat at a later date. (See Appendix: Table 25).

Once initiated, the relations between immigrant owners and (established) immigrant tenants take, as among locals, the form of selective reciprocity. This reciprocity, however, grows out of a different economic and social context.

Immigrant owners are in an economic "squeeze" and cannot make rent concessions like local owners. In terms of both absolute rent and rent per square foot, their rents are higher than those of locals. In fact, they are the highest in the sample. [1] (See Appendix: Tables 22 & 23).

Immigrant owners also raise rents more often than locals, an average of once every 4.5 years. [2] This is partly because they feel that tax increases leave them no other choice, partly because they don't have long-term tenants who might make raising rents difficult. [3]

On the other hand, these owners hesitate to raise rents for their present tenants due to the risks and inconveniences of a vacancy. This attitude is expressed in the following comment: "A few dollars don't make much difference, considering I may not get good people and considering the trouble of cleaning and renting."

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1 These figures do not take into account and control for the quality of the dwelling and maintenance service by the owner.

2 Compared to a raise once every 6.4 years for locals (per flat). Only owners who have owned five years or more are included here.

3 Unlike locals, immigrant triplex owners have raised rents in both rented flats within the last five years.

Several owners feel that they could easily get tenants even if they raised their rent $10, but they "want to keep a good tenant", and "don't want to take a chance". [1] Besides, most owners feel that "the people (tenants) can't pay more; they aren't rich." In fact, however, only two of the eight tenants said they would definitely move if the owner were to raise the rent. Only one tenant felt his rent was too high. Most (five) found it reasonable, and two tenants actually considered it low. [2] (See Appendix: Table 24).

Immigrant resident owners, then, are under economic pressure to raise rents, while at the same time fearing the loss of good tenants if they do so. As a result, most have so far limited their rent raises to new tenants. Of a total of nine tenants, [3] seven had their rent raised only when they first rented the flat. [4] The fairly high tenant turnover, however, allows owners to raise (new) tenants sufficiently often and thereby not fall too far behind tax increases. In some cases, moreover, the tenant's initiative prevents a rent raise: "I wanted to raise last year when the tenant's lease was up.

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[1] For similar reasons, two new immigrant owners, who prefer to live on the main floor, have instead moved into other floors in order not to lose a good tenant who would otherwise have left.

[2] Half the tenants know other rents in the immediate vicinity.

[3] This refers to the total number of past and present tenants who rented, or rent, with the five immigrant resident owners that have owned their property five years or more.

[4] To justify this raise, immigrant owners usually repaint the flats before renting.

They said, 'Look, we want to stay here a few more years if you don't raise. We'll clean and fix up the place.' I said, 'Okay, I won't raise if you do that.' So they painted all over and fixed it up. It cost them $400."

Conversely, another owner did not raise for six years "because I didn't want to paint". It is worth noting that both these instances involved orthodox Jewish tenants, who have both rented for over five years and show no intention of leaving.

Regardless of the immigrant owners' hesitancy to raise rents for their present tenants, the fact remains that their rents are comparatively high. On the other hand, since the owners did not choose their tenants carefully, earning the latter's good will becomes all the more important. They do this by good maintenance and friendly relations, in the hope of reciprocation. As several owners said: "If you're nice to them, they'll be nice to you."

These owners, proud of their new home, invest in it and improve it within their economic ability.[1] In contrast to local owners, they are also willing to look after tenant repairs. Being relatively young and manually skilled, this is not a problem for them and the reward in good relations with the tenant seems well worth the small effort. Half the owners, for example, feel that tenants sometimes call them about things they should be able to fix themselves. Three of the four owners nevertheless

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[1] At least three owners spent $2,000 on the building in their first two years of ownership. Another immigrant resident owner in the sample spent around $6,000 in the first three years to improve his property. Still another owner cited several immigrant acquaintances in the district who did the same.

agree to do the repairs.[1] Other owners, such as the following, are even more explicit on this point: "When she (the tenant) wants something fixed, it's my job to fix it."

Since the owners do many repairs themselves, looking after tenant maintenance is not as heavy an economic burden as it could be. Even if larger sums are involved, however, several owners give priority to tenants and their flats. Perhaps the best example is an owner whose property exterior is in clear need of repair. Yet he recently agreed to pay 60% of his tenant's redecorating expenses.[2] The concern for tenants may partly account for the tendency of immigrant owners to allocate their limited budget to repairs and improvements inside the house while, at least initially, often neglecting the outside. This would, in turn, account for the fact that, in spite of sometimes fairly extensive early repairs, the exterior maintenance of more than half the immigrant resident owners in the sample (five) is less than satisfactory. (See Appendix: Table 18).

Whereas owners try to please their tenants, the latter are, in turn, fairly demanding. They feel that maintenance is the owner's responsibility. As two put it, rather strongly: "The house belongs to him, so let him pay." It is not surprising, then, that at least two owners feel their

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1 Although these added responsibilities had in no case been agreed to initially.

2 The outside of the building was ranked "poor" by two independent observers. The owner was willing to share the $400 expenses because the tenant was a "good", long-term one who, furthermore, accepted a raise in rent at the same time.

tenants are sometimes "fussy". Still, they have so far always agreed to do the repairs. As a result, maintenance is not seen as a problem by tenants. Of six tenants, [1] three consider their owners very, and two reasonably, concerned about the property and repairs. (See Appendix: Table 16).

Conversely, seven of the eight owners feel that their tenants take reasonable to very good care of the flats. This was also the writer's impression. (See Appendix: Table 19). It seems that long-term tenants, that is, tenants renting for five years and more, are the best tenants in this respect (among immigrants). They are willing to invest more than other immigrant tenants for more and better furniture, for example. All three flats that were in better than average condition were rented by long-term tenants. In general, the main threat to good upkeep of the tenants' flats are the latters' children, [2] but only one owner sees this as a serious problem.

Most immigrant owners also co-operate with tenants by making themselves socially accessible, at least more so than local owners. In six of the eight relationships, owners and tenants help each other out in small ways, such as occasionally lending tools, taking care of parcels, and looking after children. (See Appendix: Table 20). It seems, moreover, that in most instances owners do things for tenants, rather than the reverse. Half

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1 Two tenants felt they were not yet able to make a judgment.

2 Established immigrant tenants have a family size of 5.8, compared to 3.3 for local tenants.

the owners and tenants also have visited each other socially at one time or other, though in only one case frequently.[1] (See Appendix: Table 21).

Some owners feel that too close social contact involves certain risks. One landlady, for example, has stopped visiting her tenants since the latter would then mention repairs they wanted done. A second owner wants to move out of the building, citing tenant demands as one reason. Most owners and tenants, however, consider each other as "not friends, but friendly people" with whom they have some, though often irregular, social contact or exchange.[2]

Direct, intentional reciprocity seems to be the basic dynamic of most relationships. In several instances, however, another dynamic, based particularly on life-cycle and ethnic affinity, comes into play. Three immigrant owners and their tenants have children of similar age who play with and invite each other. Another owner, a Greek, has a widowed mother who regularly visits the mother of a Greek tenant for a chat. It is difficult to estimate the indirect effect of these added social ties[3] to the owner-tenant relationship.

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[1] In three relationships, owners and tenants have invited each other to parties.

[2] In fact, the latter owner has more social contact with his tenant than any other immigrant owner in the sample. The direction of exchange is indicated by the tenant's comment: "He's been kind to us."

[3] Personal ties among heads of households seem rare, especially if they are of different ethnic or linguistic origin. Language seems often the problem. Social class also exerts an indirect inhibiting influence in that many tenant families (men and women) have long working hours that keep them away from the home.

Although tenant demands could be a source of potential conflict in immigrant-tenant relations, the elements of co-operation that we have described above seem effectively to contain it. Only two relationships show strong signs of dissatisfaction. Both involve new owners confronting vulnerable tenants. In one case, a new owner will not renew the lease for a tenant with five children who he feels are too noisy and destructive.[1] The other instance of conflict concerns a 68-year-old immigrant tenant who has lived in the building the last seventeen years.[2] He is alarmed by the fact that his new owner (who badly needs money to pay off his mortgage) has raised the rent twice in the last three years.[3] This tenant, moreover, feels that the owner (in fact because of his economic situation) is "doing nothing" in return. This situation seems a clear example of a breakdown in tenant co-operation as a result of the owner's inability to reciprocate.

The long-term tenant just referred to has heard of the Quebec Rental Board but seems skeptical of any outside agency. So far, none of the tenants or owners has had contact with the Rental Board. One owner, however, who owns two triplexes, has three times successfully gone to court against other tenants. This man is the one resident owner who owns other

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1 It is worth noting that this tenant is the only one in the group who was initially recruited by an absentee owner.

2 In both respects, he is a clear exception to the typical immigrant tenant.

3 The owner also wanted the tenant to pay the water tax, but the latter refused. The owner, wanting to keep the tenant, did not insist further.

rental property. He was able to evade the Rental Board [1] largely because the tenants seemed unaware of its existence. In fact, not only immigrant tenants but many immigrant owners as well seem ignorant of their legal rights. [2] Only three of the eight (established) immigrant tenants and half (four) of their immigrant resident owners know of the Rental Board.

In fact, most immigrant owners seem to feel that there is not much point in legal action, or even arguing with the tenant, even if they are in the right. An example is the following (paraphrased) account of an immigrant owner about one of his previous tenants:

"I had two Greek families living in the flat upstairs. They had a two-year lease. One decided to move after one year. The other family then said the place was too large for them alone and asked me if they could leave too. I said, 'All right.' What could I do?"

This owner seemed to be aware of his legal rights, but felt a lawyer would cost more than the trouble was worth. Besides, "I don't want to have tenants that I have to hold by the neck."

In sum, we find that, like local owners and tenants, the immigrants in this group also engage in selective reciprocity. Its specific form, however, differs from that of locals, mainly as a result of differences in economic strength, length of ownership, life-cycle, and class. As new owners, immigrants have high mortgages on their property. They also have fairly large families and their blue-collar jobs are not always well paid. [3]

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[1] Whose decisions are of no cost to tenants and, compared with courts, are favourable to them.

[2] The Rental Board is the only official, generally available source of information on rental regulations.

[3] For example, one is a painter, another a clothes presser, and two more are cooks in small restaurants.

This situation creates a greater than usual dependence on rental revenue as an added source of income and accounts for the high rents of these owners.

On the other hand, especially since they do not choose their tenants carefully, immigrant owners must gain their tenants' co-operation and good will. Accordingly, they emphasize 'friendly' relations with tenants, doing repairs for them and maintaining at least some social contact. This form of reciprocity limits overt conflict. It also suggests a rough balance of power.

Absentee Owners with Immigrant Tenants

There are seven such relationships in the sample. Characteristic of all is the geographical and social distance between owners and tenants. None of the owners, by definition, lives in the building, nor, for that matter, in the area. Relations are, as a consequence, impersonal. There is, moreover, a considerable social gap between owners, who are predominantly of upper middle class, and tenants, who are mostly semi- or unskilled blue-collar workers. This gap is increased by the fact that all the tenants are immigrants, while most owners are French Canadians or Canadian-born Jews. These differences influence the attitudes and, ultimately, the behaviour of owners and tenants. An example is one absentee owner's comment about his tenants: "They're new immigrants, poor people. They arrive with a chip on their shoulder and think you're out to soak them for everything they've got ... They're nice people, but excitable and sometimes a bit of a nuisance."

Another example of differences between the background of absentee owners and immigrant tenants relates to the latter's relative inexperience with renting. As one owner said: "They (the tenants) don't usually know what it's all about. They go by show."

This situation to a large extent accounts for the poor maintenance and open conflict that we find between absentee owners and their tenants. [1] To some degree, the absentee owners' poor building maintenance may be accounted for by rising taxes and wages, increases which only two of the nine owners have been able to get back through higher rents. Typically, however, it is the single parcel immigrant resident owner and, to a lesser extent, single parcel ex-residents who are most concerned about tax increases, while the multi-parcel absentee has his greatest trouble with the kind of tenants he is able to find. [2]

These relations, then, lack the personal contact and common background that serve to limit tension among resident owners and their tenants. More importantly, both owners and tenants have a predominantly economic attitude to owning and renting that prevents the establishment of co-operative, reciprocal ties such as we find among the relationships discussed

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1 More than three times as many complaints and twice as many repair warnings were received about, or sent out to, absentee owners by the City of Outremont than could be expected on the basis of chance alone. Moreover, 64% of all Rental Board cases between 1951-1961 (N = 84) involved absentee owners, although in 1961 they represented only 27% of all owners. Since then, again, six of the seven Rental Board cases have involved absentee owners, although their overall proportion has decreased.

2 This supports Sternlieb's findings in the slum areas of Newark. (Sternlieb, op. cit., pp. xvi & 212).

so far. There is little, if any, sentimental attachment to the property or flat.[1] Unlike resident owners, moreover, most absentees own other residential and commercial property. Those who do calculate their return rationally, also unlike resident owners.[2] Tenants, on the other hand, (especially New Arrivals) rent because they did not have time to look for better flats or cannot afford the higher rent. They found the present flats convenient to rent, but do not consider them to be long-term homes. Both owners and tenants, therefore, have a distinctive contractual, (economically) rational approach to renting.[3]

Within this common context there are differences which can perhaps best be expressed by distinguishing absentee owners who bought into the area before its dramatic change, that is, fifteen or more years ago (Residual Absentees), and those who bought in since then (New Absentees). We find that all three (immigrant) tenants renting with Residual Absentees are Established Immigrants, while three of the four (immigrant) tenants renting with New Absentees are New Immigrant arrivals (Table 9). Although their N

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1 Three of the seven owners are ex-residents, and another bought to live there eventually. This, however, seems to make little difference to their present economic attitude to renting.

2 They all, however, look after the property themselves. They have no managers and all tenants can reach them directly by telephone.

3 This orientation does not apply to all absentee owners in our sample. A notable exception is the French Canadian ex-resident already referred to. She seems to own mainly because of sentimental attachments to the property and her tenant friends. (She is 81 years old). She is also an exception in other respects. Close co-operation between owner and tenants makes this the best-maintained parcel in the sample. At the same time, her rents are far below market level. All her tenants, however, are French and the parcel could therefore not be included here.

is very small, there are sufficient differences between these two sub-types to make a separate description seem worthwhile.

a) Residual Absentee Owners with Established Immigrant Tenants

Residual Absentees include long-term investors who represent the decreasing proportion of French and older Jewish ex-residents,[1] as well as outside investors who bought in before the time of greatest neighbourhood change. All are locals and own other rental property. The three owners in this group, two Jewish ex-residents and a French Canadian outside investor, bought their property between 1927 and 1951.[2] In addition to the triplex included in our sample, each owns an average of 35 other dwellings. Two owners also own commercial real estate.

It is their rational, long-term strategy that distinguishes residual from new absentee owners. This, in turn, affects the way residual owners recruit tenants, the arrangements they make with them, and the consequences for rental behaviour.

It is not surprising that none of the three tenants is a newly-arrived immigrant, for residual absentees are careful about the tenants they rent to. Many they reject before having even met them:

"A lot of people called, but I didn't think it worth while to go and show them around. I weeded them out on the 'phone already, asked

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1 See Appendix: Table 1, although ex-residents and outside investors are here combined.

2 In two cases, it was the owners' parents who originally bought the building.

them where they lived before, how long, the number of children - that's very important - and asked for references ... I went down only twice (to show people the flat)."

They are looking for long-term tenants who will take reasonably good care of their flat. Although they agree that demand for flats in the area is high, it usually takes them two to four weeks before finding a suitable tenant. (See Appendix: Table 10). All three owners ask detailed questions of potential tenants, and also ask for references. They do not usually check them, however, both for lack of time and because they find references to be unreliable. Instead, two owners make it a point to visit the prospective tenant's flat. The third owner does not take the time to do this, but feels he has had enough experience to recognize a good tenant.[1]

The three tenants, all from southern Europe, are equally selective. As with their owners, this selectivity is, unlike that among local resident owners and local tenants, based primarily on economic considerations. With fairly large families and low-paying jobs,[2] they are forced to look for

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1 It is an indication of the weak bargaining power of Residual Absentee owners that none of their nine tenants in the three sampled buildings are locals, although they consider them desirable tenants. For example, one owner, talking about another building, said that only the one French Canadian tenant he has so far had seemed to treat his flat like a home, "trying to make it look comfortable, decorating the windows for Christmas, and looking after most of the small repairs himself."

2 Kin ties also seem to be a consideration. Unlike in the first type of relationship discussed, however, the ties are between tenants, not tenants and their owners. Two of the three tenants have relatives living in the same or neighbouring buildings.

flats with the right size and rent. These are not always easy to find, for these tenants looked at an average of twelve flats before renting the last time.[1] (See Appendix: Table 12).

Detailed conditions are set down and discussed before renting. Two owners insist on three-year leases, the third wants at least a two-year one. All have a 'talk' with new tenants about redecorating, what they have to pay themselves, the deadline for paying the rent, and how many relatives they are allowed to take in. Only one owner, however, has these specifications written into the lease.

Tenants have their own demands and sometimes the owner gives in: "There is always some bargaining, usually about repainting. Most of the time I offer paint if they repaint; sometimes I give in with a good tenant and repaint myself. Usually, I repaint only if the tenants accept a three-year lease."

After the new tenant has moved in, the owner makes it a point to check on the upkeep of the flat. One owner sees his tenants about once every two months, while another "make(s) it a business to pass by once in a while". The third owner, who has the largest number of tenants, feels she has good tenants whom she can trust. Still, in some cases, she 'drops in' to check on them. Repairs often provide an additional reason (or excuse) for such visits.[2] These visits are clearly not of a 'social' nature

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1 Refusal by resident owners may have been a factor here.

2 Rent payments provide no opportunity for contact, since, at the owner's request, all three tenants send payment by cheque through the mail.

and only underline the impersonal, 'distant' character of these relations. (See Appendix: Tables 20 and 21).

The owners try to keep their property in good enough condition so as not to lose on their investment. (See Appendix: Table 18). Maintenance for these owners is a long-term, large scale, rational operation. Since they own several buildings, they can cut costs by rotating repairs, that is, making only certain repairs in a particular year, but in all buildings.[1] This economically rational procedure, however, to some extent creates friction with tenants and City Hall[2] when owners hesitate to act on specific complaints that do not fit the pattern, even if they admit responsibility. This has led two of the tenants to feel that their owners do not really care for the property (See Appendix: Table 16), since they delayed promised repairs for three and six months respectively.[3]

These two owners try to keep the property in adequate condition for long-term investment. They are, however, unwilling to do repairs for tenants if they cannot recuperate the expense. As one of them said:

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[1] Expenses will vary with the kind of repairs done in any year. The high maintenance expenses of residual absentees over the last three years are unusual (by their own admission) and must be seen in this context. It is worth noting that, even so, their return on investment is the highest of all the owners. (See Appendix: Table 17).

[2] Two of the three owners received repair warnings from the City of Outremont within the last two years, one of them twice.

[3] In one case, part of the ceiling plaster had broken off, and the tenant had to complain to City Hall before the owner had the damage repaired. In the other instance, the owner had promised to put in aluminum windows by March 1st in return for a $10 raise in rent. The tenant was interviewed in late May, by which time the windows had still not been installed. In retaliation, the tenant was withholding payment of rent.

"I give service for what I charge, but I want $3 clear for every $10 I spend." The French Canadian owner also has a long-term perspective on the property, but, unlike the two Jewish ex-residents, feels that this sometimes implies concessions to tenants: "My tenants never read their lease and I don't keep to it either. Toilets and that is their business, but I have to send somebody all the time. If you don't look after it yourself, you can be sure that after a year or so it will cost you more."

On the other hand, this policy allows her to control the quality of the tenantry and also raise rents: "They are good people and pay good rent. I don't want to let them go, so I have to look after the place ... (Besides), it pays because it makes the place clean and I get good (new) tenants that way. Also, it allows me to raise."

The other owners as well try to combine repairs and minor improvements with rent raises.[1] In several instances, this has brought them into direct confrontation with older, long-term tenants who (often successfully) resist these attempts at renovation, partly because they feel comfortable the way they are, but largely because they want to avoid a raise in rent.

It is because of these long-term tenants that residual owners typically raised rents in only two of their three flats in the last five years. In these two flats, however, they raised an average of 1.5 times more frequently than other owners.

The rent strategies of these owners vary, partly with the owner's size of holdings. The owner with the smallest holdings tries to maximize

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[1] See the previous footnote.

rents. He tries not only to keep up with, but ahead of, the fairly high recent tax increases.[1] Although he seems ready to make concessions to his one long-term tenant and "wouldn't do anything to make him leave", he has nevertheless raised his rent by $20 in seven years. He considers these raises just, since the building (like his small business) has to return a steady 30% profit. Besides, he is willing to do something for them in exchange: "The tenants are getting an increase, so they demand something in return, and usually I go along with what they ask for ... I give service for what I get."

The other two, multi-parcel owners are less aggressive in regard to rents and rent raising. They have raised in response to tax increases and the rising cost of living, but admit that, at least for the moment, they cannot recoup them. They could raise rents more often, but feel that, "It's better to have less profit and keep a good tenant", and "It's worth $5 a month (less rent) not to be bothered." For good, usually long-term tenants, they often charge very low rents. One owner, for example, has raised one of these tenants (in another building) only $10 in 23 years.

The rents of these owners (in the sampled buildings) vary, therefore, from high to fairly low.[2] None of the tenants, however, consider them excessive, (See Appendix: Table 24) although all three know other rents in the immediate vicinity. This may partly account for the fairly low turn-

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1 We would not want to suggest a clear relation between size of holdings and rent strategy. The highest rents in the sample are charged by two other (new) absentee owners, namely, the company owner and a French long-term investor who owns a total of 22 flats.

2 See also Tables 22 and 23 in the Appendix.

over of tenants. (See Appendix: Table 15). Residual absentees are the only group, aside from local resident owners, with tenants that have rented for fifteen years or more. [1]

For two owners, legal sanctions are one reason why they have not raised rents more often. As one said: "The Rental Board is still existing, so you can't raise unless you make improvements or have a tax increase. I made some (improvements), so I raised, but Mrs. M. [2] went to (the Rental Board) court three times."

The rent-maximizing owner, however, is more determined, and ready to get justice on his own terms:

"It doesn't matter what the Rental Board says. If I feel I am not getting my legitimate profit for my services, I just don't send the plumber right away, or turn off the heat in May till October, and so on. It's different if I charge more than across the street, but if I charge less [3] and still don't get my raise, then it's only fair to take such action."

All three owners have been taken to the Rental Board by tenants with, as we see, varying success. None of the three sampled tenants, however, has so far contacted the Board, although two of them know of it. [4]

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[1] Long-term residence may vary with the owner's rent strategy. There are three long-term tenants, renting with absentees, all with non-maximizing owners. The latter, moreover, mentioned such long-term tenants renting in their other buildings as well.

[2] A Jewish lady and her husband who have lived in the building for 27 years.

[3] He seems to refer here to rents charged in a recently built, modern apartment building.

[4] Skepticism about the Rental Board is not restricted to owners. One tenant's impression of it was: "Much talk, but no results".

Most of the tension between residual absentees and their tenants revolves less around rent raises as such, but a more basic lack of co-operation. To the owner concerned with his property, this is a source of constant frustration:

"The ones you help the most give you the most trouble. One tenant stole a new hot water tank ... One is four months behind in his rent, another two. When I try to talk with them, they pretend they don't understand (the language), and when I go there, they don't answer the door. As soon as you let them get away without paying for one month, you're in a bad spot." [1]

The two large-scale owners find that they have to have undesirable tenants evicted quite frequently. They do this through civil courts, rather than the Rental Board, [2] where they are represented by their own lawyers (unlike most tenants). Recourse to this form of legal action, or the threat of it, is seen to be in most instances the only effective way of dealing with problem tenants.

The problematic behaviour of tenants is, however, sometimes also a reaction to what is seen as negligence on the owner's part. Delayed rent payments offer an example. Faced with a delay in promised repairs, yet

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1 The observation that the strength of the debtor's position increases with his debt has been made by Geertz in his study of peasant markets in Java (Geertz, 1963). The structure of these markets allows for little social or legal control of economic exchange. Our data suggest elements of a similar situation for rental housing in our area.

2 They find that this procedure brings quick, positive results, and is well worth the added expense.

at the same time unwilling or unable [1] to move, tenants decide to withhold the monthly rent to force the owner to action. If the owner chooses to take a 'hard line', the threat of legal action is often sufficient: "Sometimes they won't send the rent until something is fixed. Well, I can't always get a man to go there right away. I have to get tough about it and threaten to call my lawyer; they give in."

In sum, these are relations set in an economic, rational context where owners try to preserve a long-term investment by screening out questionable tenants, asking for a (comparatively) long-term commitment, making rent concessions for good tenants, and having undesirable tenants evicted through court action. [2] As experienced, multi-parcel landlords with ready access to legal sanctions, they seem to have a clear power advantage over the tenants. They do basic maintenance on a rotating basis to keep the investment, but additional repairs are usually bargained against rent raises. The owners' concern for long-term investment and steady rental income results in a fairly low tenant turnover and, more generally, a stabilizing influence on neighbourhood change.

b) New Absentee Owners with New Immigrant Tenants

Whereas the relations of local resident owners with local tenants are long-term and peaceful, those of new absentee owners and their new immigrant tenants are short-term and conflict-ridden. This contrast fits

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1 Due to the fairly long lease.

2 Or threatening to do so.

the logic of our paradigm of owner and tenant types (See Tables pp. 33 & 39). Moreover, new absentees and new immigrant tenants are a new element in the area and its decline. Their interaction leads to conflict, low maintenance, high turnover and forms an elementary slum profile in eastern Outremont.

All three owners bought their buildings within the last ten years, two of them within the last five. Two are single-parcel, immigrant owners, [1] of whom one previously lived in the building, while the other bought it for future residence. For the sake of convenience, we will refer to both as 'ex-residents'. The third owner is a Canadian-born Jewish real estate broker who owns other property as well. Unlike the two 'ex-residents', he bought the building for short-term, economic reasons. [2]

Compared to residual absentees, these owners are considerably less selective about the tenants they rent to. They announce vacancies by 'For Rent' signs only and rent their flats quickly. (See Appendix: Tables 10 and 11). The 'ex-residents' in particular seem willing to accept the first tenants that offer to rent. For one owner, apparently, "any tenant is good as long as he pays", while the other feels uneasy about questioning tenants closely and prefers a "trial year". Neither of them asks for references. Similarly, the outside investor feels he has neither the time nor energy to check on most tenants. Instead, he judges

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1 For background information, see Page 32.

2 He plans to pay off the (unamortized) mortgage five years after purchase. As a result, leverage with his capital would decrease and "it would be foolish" to keep the building any longer.

them by their appearance, admitting that this method is not always successful. In further contrast to residual absentees, none of these owners makes it a point to visit the tenants' previous flat.

Their tenants also do not seem particular about what and where they rent, as long as they can afford the rent. Of the three tenants in the sample, two rented the first flat they saw and the third visited only two others (See Appendix: Table 12). All three are poor, new to the country,[1] and needed a flat at a time when most flats were already rented. Their choice was, therefore, highly restricted, and one of the tenants found himself renting a flat he did not really like.

There are, however, two things that these tenants do find convenient. The owners are willing to accept tenants on a one-year lease, in contrast to residual absentees (See Appendix: Table 13). Low rents are even more appealing. Except for the local residents, the rents of new absentees are the lowest in the sample (See Appendix: Tables 22 and 23). The tenants, moreover, consider them reasonable to low (See Appendix: Table 24).

Nevertheless, rising taxes have forced both 'ex-residents' to raise rents. They do not, however, do so indiscriminately. One owner, for example, has so far raised rents for only those tenants whom he considers undesirable at the end of a 'trial year'. An even clearer example of rent manipulation is the instance where he made one tenant move by raising the rent, and then lowered it again for another, seemingly better tenant. The other 'ex-resident' is more determined to raise, but has also made compromises.

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[1] See pages 38-39.

When he announced a rent raise of $5 for all his tenants, one of them insisted that he repaint the flat in exchange: "I said, 'No, I won't paint'. But then I thought that by the time he decides to move, I may have trouble renting, so we agreed on a $2.50 raise. The other flats I raised $5."

The outside investor seems least concerned about tax increases and rent raises. In fact, he has not raised rents in five years, although, as already mentioned, taxes increased 107% during this time. In his other buildings, he has found that rent raises sometimes antagonize tenants to the point that they ruin the flat and cause him more of a loss than he would have gained by raising rents. Alternately, he fears they may go to the Rental Board, which he considers to be an anachronism, and which would not allow him to raise unless he made improvements. "This would be foolish with such an old building in this kind of (old) area." At the same time, he feels that the tenants he rents to are poor and could not afford a raise. His opinion is supported by the attitude of the three tenants, who are unanimous in that they would not accept a rent raise. One of them, who is about to move out, gives the following account:

"A few days ago (the owner) came to ask me why I was leaving. He offered to repaint and put in a new heater. But he wanted $10 more rent, which is more than I was willing to pay. He said he couldn't charge any less because it would cost $500 and he'd lose money. He's an old man."

Rents are part of these owners' general approach to the building. Although the insecure financial position of 'ex-resident' owners forces them to raise rents in response to tax increases, concern for their investment leads them to do so selectively. In effect, they use rents as a leverage

in specific situations to retain some tenants and evict others whom they consider undesirable. Since rents then vary with particular tenants, the economic strategy of these owners is not clearly articulated. In fact, the two 'ex-resident' owners do not keep a precise record of revenue or expenses, nor do they have a clear idea of their return on the investment. All this is in contrast to the outside investor, who works within a certain margin of return on capital. His approach is economically rational and sophisticated. Unlike the 'ex-resident' owners, for example, he took the possibility of tax increases into account before he bought the building and is, therefore, not overly concerned about them. Since he has income from other properties as well, his financial position is also stronger. His low rents and disinclination to raise them seem to be, however, less a function of his economic position than of his short-term strategy of keeping his expenses to a minimum. The result is poor service and maintenance, which, as we have seen, is reinforced by the owner's inability to get money spent on improvements back through increased revenue. [1]

A weak financial position, in the case of the 'ex-residents', and a short-term economic strategy, in the case of the outside investor, lead to the poor maintenance characteristic of new absentee owners. Their maintenance expenses are, except for local residents, the lowest in the sample (See Appendix: Table 17). Two of the three buildings are, moreover, in clearly less than satisfactory condition. That of the outside investor, in particular,

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[1] Like other owners, with the exception of some immigrant residents, this owner considers it quite unlikely that he would get any money spent on improvements back through resale. He feels the area is too old to make this possible.

is the worst maintained property in the sample. (See Appendix: Table 18).

Of the three tenants, two feel that their owners do not care for the building and are slow in doing repairs, if they do them at all.[1] (See Appendix: Table 16). Both have called severaltimes about a leaking hot water tank and a defective roof and ceiling, respectively. They say that the owners agreed to look after the matter, but "nothing happens". One of the owners, an ex-resident, finally told his tenant that the high taxes make it impossible for him to spend money for a new water tank. His tenant feels irritated and cheated: "Every time you call, he talks about taxes ... What's the good (of a good rent)? If he doesn't do anything in the house, the money is no good."

The other case involves the outside investor who, as a multi-parcel owner, finds it more economical to repair one thing, such as plumbing or roofs, on all his buildings at the same time. More importantly, after he has deducted his "legitimate" profit, there is often not enough money left to deal with repairs demanded by tenants. As a result, repairs that are urgent to the tenant, but not seen as essential by the owner, are postponed, if not ignored. This may account for the fact that the owner whose tenant had called about the roof and ceiling repaired the hole in the roof, but left the ceiling untouched. To the irate tenant, this is proof that the owner is "only willing to make enough repairs to stop the building from falling down". Both this tenant, and the tenant quoted previously, feel that further

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[1] The third tenant felt she was unable to say whether the owner cared for the building because she is new to the country. It seems, however, that this owner, who until very recently lived in the building, takes somewhat better care of it than the other two new absentee owners do of theirs.

protest is useless and that moving is the only solution. As one of them put it rather strongly: "Perhaps others won't be as stupid as I was (to rent)."

The outside investor, on the other hand, feels that immigrant tenants have the wrong idea about their owners:

"They think the landlord is the capitalist and they are the poor people, but they forget that I had to work and save hard before. Also, I net only $5 out of every $65 I charge. That's not too good if you figure the trouble and the extra time I spend."

One reason for this is that new immigrants "... aren't handy. They can't do even simple things, like starting a furnace, and don't do their own painting. They bother you more often to get things done."

This owner feels that if tenants would at least take reasonably good care of their flats, he would also be able to spend more money on the property. As it is now, the costs of "tenant traffic", that is, the negligent and even destructive behaviour of tenants who then move, are high.

An example of the unco-operative attitude of tenants was given by one of the 'ex-resident' owners who, during one of his regular visits to his building, [1] asked two of his tenants to be more careful that their children not damage the walls. Their reply was essentially: "We paid the rent, didn't we?" Similarly, the tenant of the outside investor, when asked whether he had spent any money on the flat, answered: "No, why should I? I'm not crazy."

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[1] Both 'ex-residents' visit their tenants once a month for the rent, while the outside investor does so more irregularly for major repairs and "to see how things are going". These visits keep owners informed on tenant maintenance, but also allow tenants to air their complaints more effectively. Necessary as these visits are for the owners, they nevertheless put them in a more vulnerable position.

It is not surprising, then, that tenant turnover among new absentees is the highest in the sample (See Appendix: Table 15). Short-term leases and minimal furniture make it easy for new immigrants to move. As one tenant put it succinctly: "If you like it you stay, if you don't like it you move." Two of the three tenants will move this year, and the third as soon as he feels he can afford it. The main reasons for moving are, as already mentioned, dissatisfaction with poor service, and, in one case, a raise in rent.

'Tenant traffic' is a major problem for new absentees, and, as we have seen, all three try to keep reasonably good tenants from moving.[1] Another problem is tenants who do not keep the conditions of their contract - they do not pay the rent, break their lease, or ruin the flat. This is not uncommon, and it seems that the owners can do little about it.[2] Legal action is effective only within limits. One of the 'ex-residents' went to court three times against bad tenants. He succeeded in having each tenant evicted, but also suffered a considerable financial loss. In one case, for example, the (new immigrant) tenant had not paid his rent for five months. Since he was finally "kicked out" in wintertime, it took almost two months to find a new tenant. As the tenant was too poor to repay anything, the owner was faced with a loss of seven months' rent, in addition to his court costs. The outside investor had similar difficulties. Referring to Greek tenants in another building who broke their lease, he says: "They can leave and there's nothing you can do. You can't sue them. The furniture's worthless, and often they go back to Greece."

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[1] See quotes on page 78.

[2] To some extent, as we have suggested, 'ex-residents' are able to exercise some control by means of rent raises.

This lack of legal control means that owners, in effect, have to subsidize tenants on occasion. A relevant incident involves the same owner and another Greek tenant. The tenant complained about a crack in the toilet four months after the owner had installed a new one. The owner had it repaired, but when he held the tenant responsible, the latter refused to pay the bill. After two months, the issue was still not settled. What is striking, however, is the resigned attitude of the owner, who feels that the tenant is clearly at fault, but "he probably won't pay, so I'll have to. I don't have much choice." Incidents such as these may well be partly responsible for the unwillingness of these owners to do future repairs for tenants.

On the other hand, when external sanctions are applied, owners have more ready access to them than do tenants. Unlike tenants, for example, both owners who have gone to court were represented by their own lawyers. New immigrants, moreover, often seem to be unaware of their legal rights. Unlike their owners, none of the three tenants we interviewed knew of the Rental Board.

In sum, these relations take the form of a narrowly contractual, conflict-ridden exchange of rent for space. The result is a 'vicious circle' of poor maintenance and high turnover. Economically vulnerable owners and tenants are obliged to take risks with each other. Mutual distrust and dissatisfaction, as well as the lack of effective social control, encourage negligent upkeep and high tenant turnover. The latter, in turn, leads owners to engage in short-term, exploitive strategies.

CHAPTER IV

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In this paper we have tried to trace the dynamics of rental relations in a declining area, as well as their relation to neighbourhood change. We have presented evidence that rental relations occur in a specific social context, that they involve important elements of power and reciprocity, and that these social elements have economic consequences. In addition, we have seen rental relations and neighbourhood change as part of one inter-related process:

Rental Relations and Neighbourhood Change



Much of the rental housing market in the area is in the hands of independent, small-time operators who are neither financially very secure nor economically rational. This means that rental relations usually take on an individualistic, intuitive character that varies with the social character and bargaining position of the parties involved. At the same time, changes in the area have led to differences in the social background

of owners and tenants which play an important part in their mutual selection. Specifically, owners and tenants were shown to recruit each other in a market restricted by factors of ethnicity, immigrant status, family size and owners' place of residence.

Our analysis suggested also that the relative appeal or bargaining position of owners and tenants in the market is an important element in the selection process. Specifically, resident owners seem to have a bargaining advantage over absentee owners, and locals over, particularly new, immigrants. The powerful, then, select the powerful (attractive) and the weak are left with the weak. Our paradigm of owners and tenants and their key relations fits the logic of this pattern.

Social character and bargaining position affect not only the way owners and tenants select each other, but also the elements of reciprocity that they bring to the relationship. Closely interwoven with these are elements of power and dependence that determine rental strategies and eventually influence the housing market. In our sample, for instance, elderly local resident owners are looking for reliable tenants of their ethnic group and willing to look after their own repairs. Such tenants are in short supply, and as a result, these owners are forced into a dependent position, as evidenced by their very low rents. This is distinct from their strong position in the market, indicated by their ability to select tenants carefully. In clear contrast, residual absentee owners have a weaker position in the market, but a fairly strong one relative to their immigrant tenants. They give little service for the rents they charge, are able to demand fairly long leases, and have ready access to legal sanctions.

In the other two relation types, we find a rough power balance. For immigrant owners and tenants, co-operation in maintenance tends to offset the comparatively high rents these owners charge. Neither party, moreover, is without alternatives and therefore in a dependent position. New absentee owners and new immigrants, on the other hand, represent the weak elements in the market, and owners soon find themselves in conflict with the 'undesirable' new immigrant tenants they have to accept. The new immigrants, in turn, have no bargaining power and can only move, while the owners are also in no position effectively to control tenant negligence and tenant 'traffic'.

Elements of power inherent in rental relationships may then have implications for rent level, maintenance, and turnover. In addition, some relations are more complex and peaceful than others. Here there is a clear difference between resident and absentee owners. The extreme case is that of local resident owners with tenant relatives where rental relations are part of broader, multi-faceted social ties. Other relations involving resident owners are also marked by elements of co-operation that go beyond the formal rental contract, such as informal arrangements about deferred rent payments, doing repairs for 'fussy' tenants, or exchanging favours and visits. Among absentees and their tenants, reciprocity based on mutual interests is replaced by a continuously emerging conflict of interests that, moreover, cannot be absorbed by the typically specific, narrowly contractual ties of exchange.

Inter-related elements of power, conflict and social exchange emerge from and in turn determine the rental strategies of owners and tenants, which in turn relate to neighbourhood change. The impact of these dynamics for rental relations in our sample is summarized in the following paradigm:

Profile of Owner-Tenant Relations

	Local Residents--Locals	Immigrant Residents--Established Immigrants	Residual Absentees--Established Immigrants	New Absentees--New Immigrants
Recruitment	selective	not selective	selective	not selective
Rents	lowest	highest	medium low service	low low service
Maintenance	good outside by owner good inside by tenant	as funds are available	fair	poor
Leases	long-term "understandings"	medium-term (2 years)	medium-term (3 years)	short-term (1 year)
Turnover	low	medium	medium	high

This table shows not only that rental patterns differ by the social type of owners and tenants, but also that some rental relations tend to stabilize change while others accelerate it. In our sample, local resident owners, in particular, are under pressure to maintain rents at low levels, while different terms of reciprocity and power advantage permit higher rents in other relations, particularly those of immigrant resident owners and income-oriented absentees. Again, some relations, those of established and financially secure immigrant, resident owners, result in good upkeep and maintenance, while those of new absentee owners in particular clearly contribute to the decline of the area. Finally, some relations effectively restrain tenant turnover, as in the case of local owners and tenants, while others, particularly those of new absentees and new immigrant tenants accelerate tenant 'traffic' and building deterioration.

If we can generalize from our limited data to eastern Outremont, the process of decline is counteracted by middle class or upwardly mobile local tenants continuing to move into the area. The fate of the neighbourhood will, however, more likely depend on the number of immigrants who will remain and upgrade the area as they become better established. At present, it seems that most immigrant tenants want to leave the area sooner or later. This may in turn loosen the owners' commitment and lead, as with Jews in the 1950's, to another exodus of the successful. It is doubtful whether the aging area could again survive this.

Of the immigrant owners leaving the area, many may decide to keep their property. Potential immigrant buyers often cannot afford the price asked for and outside investors seem willing to buy in at bargain prices only. Small unit buildings in the area do not seem economic on other terms. It seems, then, that an outflow of successful immigrant owners would, at the same time, result in an increased proportion of ex-resident absentee owners.

Both factors would accelerate the decline of the area, for absentee owners clearly do not seem to care as well for their property as those who live in it. In a market where money spent on improvements may be difficult to recover, only economically irrational home-oriented resident owners are willing to renovate their property. This is particularly true of young immigrant owners who, moreover, are often not well informed about market trends.

Residential ownership seems a key factor in improving the area, not only because of the owners' greater willingness to invest in their home, but also because of the implications for tenant upkeep. Resident owners are in a better position than absentee owners to supervise tenants on a continual basis. In addition, residential ownership narrows the destructive social gap between absentee owners and tenants and opens the possibility of greater co-operation. Resident owners who stay will, furthermore, tend to upgrade the district with their economic success and create a base for local leaders that could effectively articulate the needs of residents in the area.

To encourage resident owners to stay, it may well pay, in the long run, to offer them tax relief in the form of "homestead rebates", [1] coupled with a stipulation that these be used to improve the property. Moreover, it is clear that new immigrant owners, who are in the greatest financial "squeeze", would be in a better position to maintain the property if they were better informed on such matters as financing and rental policy. For example, our interviews and the fairly high down payments of these owners (See Appendix: Table 17) indicate that they pursue an ownership strategy of maximal equity without investigating the economically wiser strategy of financial investment. Their method of recruiting tenants also is unsophisticated and leaves much to chance. Lack of entrepreneurial skills and housing education in turn adversely affect maintenance.

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[1] See Sternlieb, op. cit. His findings also indicate clearly that single parcel resident owners are a key to good maintenance in low income areas. pp. xiii, 176 and 230.

Similarly, immigrant tenants new to the country need to be better informed about local housing problems, renting procedures, and legal aid. Rent subsidies for these new immigrants, at least in their first year after arrival, would perhaps enable them to avoid relations with absentee owners that are unhappy ones for both parties and a major element in neighbourhood deterioration.

This points to the high element of risk in rental relations, a key factor linking the rental market to neighbourhood decline. A public referral agency could effectively intervene in this cycle at a strategic point. By keeping a record of the needs of specific owners and tenants as well as of their past performance it would be in a position to recommend compatible owners or tenants to any applicant. Moreover, the recorded comments of a particular owner's previous tenants, or the reverse, would further reduce the risk factor and provide an element of control. If this were done on a sufficiently large scale, such a referral procedure might help to lower the rate of tenant turnover. Tenants who are satisfied with their owners would probably be more willing to invest in the flat, which, in turn, could lead some owners away from short-term exploitive strategies.

In this study, we identified some of the dynamics of rental relations and traced their implications for neighbourhood change. Refined and reaffirmed on a larger scale, our findings may, hopefully, lead to more accurately aimed public policy.

APPENDIX A

METHODOLOGY

In order to describe and analyse in detail a limited number of rental relations without, on the other hand, losing sight of their context, data were collected at different levels of intensity.

On the broadest level, general information on past and present trends in eastern Outremont was obtained mainly through records of the City of Montreal archives, as well as through interviews with real estate agents and other people with knowledge of the area. At this level, we also used Dominion Bureau of Statistics Census data to describe recent changes in a representative tract.

We then collected more information about the ethnicity, age, and family size of each rental household in a three-block area on the eastern edge of Outremont.[1] These data were taken from surveys conducted annually by the City of Outremont. Further information on buildings, taxes, complaints, and so on, was also collected for this area from City records.

Data which proved difficult to obtain on a large scale was limited to a still smaller core area of two blocks. Included here are tabulations of name lists from tax rolls and street directories, as well as records of rental disputes made available by the Quebec Rental Board. This core area, moreover, served as the basis for detailed interview data on 29 owner-tenant relations.

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[1] More precisely, this area consists of two blocks and the east side of two adjacent blocks to the north and south, respectively.

To arrive at this sample, interviews were sought with all owners of rental property in the core area.[1] For better comparison, four absentee owners were randomly added from two adjacent blocks. This became necessary because of the small number of absentee owners in the core area and their high refusal rate (see below). We then sought interviews with one tenant of each co-operative owner. In each case, we tried to contact the head of the household, but when this was not feasible, the spouse was accepted as a substitute.[2]

Each household, except for absentee owners, was contacted in person rather than by telephone, since this procedure proved more effective in securing interviews. A household that could not be contacted after the third attempt was dropped from the sample. If a tenant could not be contacted, or refused to be interviewed, another tenant in the building was contacted whenever possible. If no tenant could be interviewed, the building was dropped from the sample. Altogether, eleven owner interviews were, therefore, taken out of the sample.

The sample does not perfectly reflect the character of the larger area. Unco-operative or inaccessible household heads and, to a lesser extent, language problems, were the major sources of distortion. Forty per cent. of owners, particularly absentee owners, and 23% of the tenants, did not want to be interviewed. Among both owners and tenants, French, English, and older Jewish residents were less willing to co-operate than recent immigrants.

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1 With the exception of apartment building owners.

2 Of the 29 owners interviewed, 26 were household heads, as were 19 of the 29 tenants.

In a number of households, moreover, particularly those of immigrant owners, the long and irregular working hours of respondents made it difficult to arrange an interview, despite willingness to co-operate. As a result, several households had to be dropped from the sample after they had been contacted five or more times.

Distortion due to language difficulties was minor, in comparison. This was largely due to the assistance of Miss Marie Goldberg, a graduate student in the Department who interviewed nine French-speaking households. In another five cases, older children served as interpreters for their parents. Only one or two families had to be excluded from the sample for language reasons. In any case, our main concern was to identify types of rental relations rather than closely describe the area. Differences between sample and area are then not a critical problem of method.

The interviews were conducted with the aid of interview guides, different for owners and tenants, that had been thoroughly pre-tested so as to make our research relevant to the area and its residents. In a preliminary survey, the writer interviewed 34 owner and tenant households that were chosen at random from the three-block area. Half of these households were interviewed without a schedule, but with a focus on rental relations and problems. The other half were approached with preliminary interview guides to test the usefulness of more specific questions that had suggested themselves on the basis of the earlier interviews. An additional source of data at this stage were shorter interviews with about 30 owners in the area, conducted by three undergraduate students for an Urban Sociology course. On the basis of this preliminary material, we designed the interview guides

used for our final sample of 29 owner-tenant relations.

In the interviews, we tried to discover the strategies that owners and tenants bring to bear on the rental process. In terms of practical 'issues' that face owners and tenants, we asked questions about recruitment, rents, maintenance and turnover. In terms of our theoretical perspective, we looked for elements of social exchange, cooperation and conflict, and social control. The interviews took the form of a 'conversation' that lasted from two to three hours for owners and somewhat less for tenants. The interview guides were used mainly as reference and a final check on key questions at the end of the interview.[1] They were also used as guides to the detailed report written after each interview.

Two difficulties should be mentioned that limited the kind of data we were able to obtain. One arose from the impatience of some respondents with questions that struck them as irrelevant. As a result, it became difficult to obtain consistently good data on some aspects of renting that required detail, such as bargaining about rental conditions. However, it was not our impression that such information was withheld on purpose. In fact, cooperation was excellent in most cases. The other difficulty encountered relates to the problems of 'participatory observation' in a fragmented, highly heterogeneous district. Although the writer lived for two years in eastern Outremont, the kind of relevant information obtained in this way was scattered and uneven. Indeed, it would seem that in this heterogeneous area, and with our focus, the role of 'stranger' is a more fruitful one than that of 'neighbor'. At least, it was the writer's experience that residents who

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[1] In the interview guides (see end of Appendix) these questions are underlined.

did not know that he lived in the area were more willing to talk openly about rents and problems with their owners than those who did. One reason may be the greater likelihood of information "leak" if resident owner and tenant have the same neighbour (with possibly highly unpleasant consequences). Another factor seems to be a general attitude of reserve, if not suspicion, among residents, especially in regard to members of a different ethnic group from theirs.

APPENDIX B

Table 1. Shifts in Owner and Tenant Population (1961-1968) by Ethnicity and Owner Residence

(core area)

	Owners				Tenants	
	Resident		Absentee			
	1961	1968	1961	1968	1961	1968
French and English	29%	29%	53%	27%	62%	48%
Jewish	55	38	43	20	19	18
Others	16	33	--	40	19	34
Company	--	--	4	13	--	--
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	41	48	21	15	118	111

Source: Lovell's Street Directory and tax rolls.

Table 2. Owners and Tenants, by Ethnicity and Place of Residence

(extended study area)

	Owners			Tenants		
	Resident	Absentee	Combined		Total	
	%	%	%	%	%	N
French & English	20	27	22	39	33	126
Jewish	27	44	32	13	20	73
Others	53	24	45	48	47	176
Company	--	6	1	--	--	2
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	--
N	91	34	125	252	--	377

Source: Outremont City Census 1968.

Table 3. Owner-Tenant Selection in the Sample, by Ethnicity

	Resident Owners			Absentee Owners				
Tenants	French & English	Jewish	Others	French & English	Jewish	Others	Company	N
French & English	6	2	1	2	-	-	-	11
Jewish	-	3	1	-	-	1	-	5
Others	1	-	6	1	3	1	1	13
N	7	5	8	3	3	2	1	29

Table 4. Tenants' Mean Family Size, by Owner's Place of Residence *

	Renting with		
Tenants	Resident Owners	Absentee Owners	N
French and English	4.6	5.2	74
Jewish	4.1	5.5	19
Other	5.5	5.9	111
N	88	116	204

* Tenants in duplexes are excluded.

Table 5. Sample Owners, by Ethnicity, Residence, and Building Type

	Resident Owners		Absentee Owners	Sample		Area** (owners)
	Duplex	Triplex	Triplex *	N	%	%
Individuals:						
French Canadian	3	4	3	10	34	22
Jewish	3	2	3	8	28	32
Others	2	6	2	10	34	45
Companies:	-	-	1	1	3	
N	8	12	9	29	99	99

* No absentee owners own duplexes

** Based on an N of 125

Table 6. Sample Owners, by Ethnicity and Time of Arrival in Canada

	"Locals"		"Immigrants"			
	Natives	Before 1945	1946-49	1950-59	1960-68	N
French	10	-	-	-	-	10
Jewish	3	2	1	1	1	8
Others	-	-	1	9	-	10
N	13	2	2	10	1	28 *

* excluded: 1 company owner

Table 7. Sample Owners, by Occupation

	Resident Owners		Absentee Owners		
	Locals	Immigrants	Ex-Residents	Outside Investors	N
Managerial & Professional	3	-	1	3	7
White Collar	3	4	3	-	10
Skilled Blue Collar	1	5	1	-	7
Unskilled Blue Collar	2	2	-	-	4
N	9	11	5	3	28 *

* Excluded: 1 company owner.

Table 8. Local and Immigrant Sample Owners, by Time of Purchase

	Resident Owners	Absentee Owners	
		Ex-Residents	Outside Investors
a) Median			
Local	1951 (9)	1927 (3)	1963 (4)
Immigrant	1962 (11)	1962 (2) [a]	--
b) Span			
Local	1913-1962 [a]	1912-1950	1941-1966 [b]
Immigrant	1958-1967	1958-1965	
N	20	5	4

[a] Only one owner bought after 1958.

[b] Only one owner bought before 1962.

Table 9. Sample Tenants, by Occupation and Type

	Residual Locals	New Locals	Established Immigrants	New Immigrants	N
Managerial and Professional	1	-	-	-	1
White Collar	3	3	3	-	9
Skilled Blue Collar	-	3	9	-	12
Unskilled Blue Collar	-	2	1	4	7
N	4	8	13	4	29

Table 10. Owners' Recruitment Methods, by Type of Relation *
(based on last vacancy)

	LR - L	IR - EI	RA - EI	NA - NI	N
Private	4	-	-	-	4
Newspaper only	2	1	-	-	3
Newspaper and sign	-	1	3	-	3
Sign only	2	3	-	3	8
No vacancy	-	3	-	-	4
N	8	8	3	3	22

* LR - L = Local Resident Owners with Local Tenants
IR - EI = Immigrant Resident Owners with Established Immigrant Tenants
RA - EI = Residual Absentee Owners with Established Immigrant Tenants
NA - NI = New Absentee Owners with New Immigrant Tenants

Table 10. Owners' Renting Time, by Type of Relation * (based on last vacancy)

	LR - L	IR - EI	RA - EI	NA - NI	N
1 month or more	1	-	-	-	1
2 - 4 weeks	2	-	3	-	5
1 - 2 weeks	2	1	-	2	5
1 week or less	1	4	-	1	6
N.A. or D.K. **	2	3	-	-	5
N	8	8	3	3	22

* See Table 10, p. 11

** N.A. = not applicable
D.K. = don't know

Table 12. Other Flats Visited by Tenant, by Type of Relation *

	LR - L	IR - EI	RA - EI	NA - NI	N
10 or more	1	1	2	-	4
6 to 9	1	1	-	-	2
1 to 5	1	4	1	1	7
0	5	2	-	2	9
N	8	8	3	3	22

* See Table 10, p. 11.

Table 13. Length of Initial Lease, by Type of Relation *

	LR - L	IR - EI	RA - EI	NA - NI	N
1 year	2	1	-	2	5
2 years	1	3	1	1	6
3 years	4	3	2	-	9
no lease	1	1	-	-	2
N	8	8	3	3	22

* See Table 10, p. 11.

Table 14. Length of Present Lease, by Type of Relation *

	LR - L	IR - EI	RA - EI	NA - NI	N
1 year	2	2	-	3	7
2 years	1	3	1	-	5
3 years	-	-	2	-	2
"Automatic" lease	4	1	-	-	5
No lease	1	2	-	-	3
N	8	8	3	3	22

* See Table 10, p. 11.

Table 15. Tenant Turnover * by Type of Owner

(in tenants' years per flat)

	Local Resident	Immigrant Resident	Residual Absentee	New Absentee	N
Duplex	4.8	6.0**	--	--	4
Triplex	6.7	3.4	4.5	3.1	14
Duplex and Triplex	5.4	3.9	4.5	3.1	18
N	7	5	3	3	--

* Only owners who bought five or more years ago are included.

** Based on 1 case.

Table 16. Tenants' Opinion of Owner Maintenance, by Type of Relation *

	LR - L	IR - EI	RA - EI	NA - NI	N
Good	5	3	-	-	8
Reasonable	1	2	1	-	4
Poor	2	1	2	2	7
N.A. or D.K. **	-	2	-	1	3
N	8	8	3	3	22

* See Table 10, p. 11.

** N.A. = not applicable
D.K. = don't know

Table 17. Financial Data [1] by Type of Owner and Building Type
(in means of dollars)

	Local Resident		Immigrant Resident		Residual Absentee	New Absentee
	Duplex (N=4)	Triplex (N=4)	Duplex (N=4)	Triplex (N=4)	Triplex (N=3)	Triplex (N=3)
Original Mortgage [2]	11,250	-	11,250	15,400	-	13,800
Down Payment	6,000	-	8,250	6,000	-	5,750
Lender	mostly private	-	private/ Bank	private/ Bank	-	mostly private
Interest/yr.	260	-	400	495	-	555
Taxes/yr. [3]	560	680	530	590	550	735
Maintenance [3]	340	185	370	600	675	330
Total Expenses [3,4]	1,080	1,135	1,360	1,780	1,290	1,495
Gross Revenue [3,5]	1,975	2,802	2,310	2,720	2,640	2,770
Net Surplus [3]	875	1,815	950	940	1,350	1,285
Equity	14,890	15,250	12,100	11,090	8,400	13,600
Return on Equity [6]	6.2%	13.2%	8.1%	8.7%	16.9%	10.3%
Return on Total Capital	6.3%	11.0%	7.0%	6.7%	16.9%	8.3%

[1] Based on interviews with owners (with the exception of tax data).

[2] Only buildings still mortgaged are included.

[3] Based on figures for 1967 (fiscal year).

[4] Duplex owners typically pay for their tenants' heating, while triplex owners have cold flats. This was controlled for by deducting owners' expenses in heating their own flats.

[5] Gross revenue includes an approximate rent for the resident owner's flat, taken as equal to the rent charged to his tenants.

[6] Five of the eight duplex owners had a net return of 4.7-6.0%, well below a yield (in 1967) of 6 3/4% on alternate investment in savings certificates.

Table 18. Condition of Building Exterior,[+] by Type of Relation [*]

	LR - L	IR - EI	RA - EI	NA - NI	N
Very good	1	-	-	-	1
Good	4	1	-	-	5
Satisfactory	1	3	1	1	6
Fair	2	4	2	1	9
Poor	-	-	-	1	1
N	8	8	3	3	22

[+] Rated prior to interviewing by the writer, and, independently, by Mr. Berkeley Fleming, a graduate student in the Department, in terms of "structure" and "painting".

[*] See Table 10, p. 11.

Table 19. Condition of Tenant's Flat,[+] by Type of Relation [*]

	LR - L	IR - EI	RA - EI	NA - NI	N
High Investment (Good)	4	3	-	-	7
Medium " (Satisfactory)	4	4	1	1	10
Low Investment (Poor)	-	1	2	2	5
N	8	8	3	3	22

[+] Based on an appraisal made during interviews of "painting", "condition of furniture" and the extent to which the flat could be considered "well furnished".

[*] See Table 10, p. 11.

Table 20. Social Exchange and "Favours", by Type of Relation *

	LR - L	IR - EI	RA - EI	NA - NI	N
Frequent	2	2	-	-	4
Some	3	4	-	-	7
None	3	1	3	3	10
Not applicable	-	1	-	-	1
N	8	8	3	3	22

* See Table 10, p. 11.

Table 21. Exchange of Visits, by Type of Relation *

	LR - L	IR - EI	RA - EI	NA - NI	N
Frequently	2 +	1	-	-	3
Occasionally	1 +	3	-	-	4
Never	5	3	3	3	14
Not applicable	-	1	-	-	1
N	8	8	3	3	22

* See Table 10, p. 11

\+ Relatives

Table 22. Absolute Rent, by Type of Relation * and Building Type
(in mean dollars)

	LR - L	IR - EI	RA - EI	NA - NI	Combined Total	N
Duplex	$88.	$90.	-	-	$91	5
Triplex	71	82	79	76	79	17
Duplex & Triplex	79	84	79	76	81	-
N	8	8	3	3	--	22

* See Table 10, p. 11.

Table 23. Rent per Square Foot, by Type of Relation * and Building Type
(in mean cents)

	LR - L	IR - EI	RA - EI	NA - NI	Combined Total	N
Duplex	5.4	6.5	-	-	5.8	5
Triplex	5.0	6.1	6.1	5.1	5.6	17
Duplex & Triplex	5.1	6.2	6.1	5.1	5.6	-
N	8	8	3	3	-	22

* See Table 10, p. 11.

Table 24. Tenants' Attitude to Rent, by Type of Relation *

	LR - L	IR - EI	RA - EI	NA - NI	N
Very low	4	-	-	-	4
Low	4	2	1	1	8
Reasonable	-	5	2	2	9
High	-	1	-	-	1
N	8	8	3	3	22

* See Table 10, p. 11.

Table 25. Who Pays for the Paint, by Type of Relation *

	LR - L	IR - EI	RA - EI	NA - NI	N
Tenant pays	4	3	1	1	9
Shared	2	1	-	-	3
Owner pays	2	3	1	1	7
Not applicable	-	1	1	1	3
N	8	8	3	3	22

* See Table 10, p. 11.

Table 26. Contacts and Refusals for Owners,* by Place of Residence and Ethnicity

	Resident Owners		Absentee Owners	Total	N
	French, English or Jewish	Others		%	
Interviewed	50%	55%	40%	49	40
Refusals	43	28	52	40	33
Not contacted	7	17	8	11	9
TOTAL %	100	100	100	100	-
N	28	29	25	-	82

* Includes those interviewed with final schedule only.

Table 27. Contacts and Refusals for Tenants,* by Ethnicity

	French, English or Jewish	Others	Total %	N
Interviewed	61%	72	66	37
Refusals	28	18	23	13
Not contacted	11	10	11	6
TOTAL %	100	100	100	-
N	28	28	-	56

* Includes those interviewed with final schedule only.

APPENDIX C

MAPS

SOCIAL AREAS OF MONTRÉAL:

DEFINITION OF "CHANGE" AREAS
1951 – 1961

MAP 1



Source: Greer-Wootten, 1968 a.

MAP 2 * **Density**

persons per acre

- 50 or less
- 51 to 100
- 101 to 150
- More than 150



MAP 3 * **Occupational Groups**

- Mainly professional and administrative
- Prof./Admin. and White Collar
- Mainly White Collar
- Mainly Blue Collar



MAP 4 * **Ethnic Origin**

- French predominantly
- French and Others
- Others predominantly



*Source: Greer-Wootten, 1968a

MAP 5 * Increase in Blue Collar Occupations (1951-61)

Percentile Changes:

- 0 to -9.9
- 0 to +9.9
- 10 to 19.9



MAP 6 * Male Earnings

- Above $5350
- Between $5350 and $4000
- Between $4000 and $3000
- Below $3000



* Source: Greer-Wootten, 1968a.


CITY OF MONTREAL
VILLE DE MONTRÉAL
CITY OF MONTREAL
VILLE DE MONTRÉAL
CORE AREA
CITY OF OUTREMONT
MOUNT ROYAL CEMETERY
CIMETIÈRE MONT-ROYAL
CHEMIN BATES ROAD
AVE GLENDALE AVE
NORTH AVENUE
AVE DOLLARD
DUCHARME AVENUE
AVE MANSEAU
AVE ST-CYRIL
VAN HORNE AVENUE
AVE DUVERGER
AVE MURSOLAIS
LAJOIE BOULEVARD
AVE JOYCE
BERNARD AVENUE
LAVIOLETTE AVENUE
AVE ST-JUST
ST-VIATEUR AVENUE
ELMWOOD AVENUE
FAIRMOUNT AVENUE
LAURIER AVENUE
AVE BEAUBIEN
AVE DUROCHER
AVE HUTCHISON
AVE KELVIN AVE
AVE DECOM AVE
AVE AINSLIE
CHEMIN DE LA CÔTE STE-CATHERINE
AVE MAPLEWOOD
AVE WILLOWDALE
AVE STIRLING
AVE SUNSET
AVE HAZELWOOD
AVE GLENCOE
AVE WILDERTON
AVE PLANTAGENET
AVE WOODBURY
AVE CASTLEGUARD
AVE PRINCESS
BOULEVARD MONT-ROYAL
AVE SPRINGRIVE CRES
AVE ROSKILDE
CHEMIN DE LA FORÊT
AVE VILLENEUVE
AVE FERNHILL
MAP 7

MAP 8



SOURCE : Lahaye (1968)
(Adapted)

CITE D' OUTREMONT

PERIOD OF CONSTRUCTION

ECHELLE : 1000' = 1"



MAP 8A

LEGEND

- Single Family Dwellings
- Bi-Family Dwellings
- Multi-Family Dwellings
- COMMERCE
- INSTITUTION
- TRANSPORT
- INDUSTRY
- PARKS
- CEMETERY
- City Limits

SOURCE : SOCIETE JEAN-CLAUDE LA HAYE, 1967.

CITY OF OUTREMONT

LAND USE

MAP 9 Resident Owners' Previous Residence (Sample)



MAP 10 Tenants' Previous Residence (Sample) [1]



[1] If previously resident in the Montreal area.

APPENDIX D

INTERVIEW GUIDES

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR TENANTS

Dept. of Sociology and Anthropology
McGill University

1

2 1. Area Code:

3 2. Case Number:
4 Address of building:
5 T's address:
Name:
Nationality:
Immigrant status:

6 3. Owner's place of residence:

7 4. Building type:

8 5. When did you move to this apartment?

9 6. Where did you live before?
10 Check: Area
11 Building type
RL or AL?

12 7. Where do you originally come from?
13 And your parents?

14 8. (If immigrant) When did you come to Canada?

15 9. So you have lived how many years in Montreal?

16 10. How many different places have you rented so far (in Montreal)?

17 11. Why did you leave your previous apartment? Any specific reason?
18

19 12. How did you find out about this apartment?

13. How many other apartments did you have a look at?
Check: area
building type

Note: found it hard to find a place he liked?

14. What kind of an apartment were you looking for?
Note: facilities, services
space
rent
other

15. Did you prefer to rent in this district?
A. (If yes) Why?
Note: location and/or neighborhood

16. Were you concerned with what kind of a LL you would have?

17. (If owner is AL) When you first saw the apt, who showed you around and told you about renting conditions?

18. Did any of your friends, or relatives see the apt. before you decided to rent it?

19. When you offered to rent, did the owner (or rep) accept right away, or wasn't he able to give a final answer right then?
A. (If the latter) Why not?

20. What made you decide to take this apt.?
Check: facilities and services
space
rent
other

21. What facilities and services are provided by the owner?
Check: heat (what kind?)
electricity
parking (garage)
storage space
use of garden
refrigerator
stove
furniture
janitor
other

22. Could you tell me a little about the apt and renting arrangements?
Check:
number of rooms:
number of bedrooms:
number of persons sharing apt.:
rent (incl. water tax?):
length of lease:
automatically renewed since:
(Check: condition of apt.)

23. Was the rent you agreed to pay the one that the owner had originally asked for?
A. What about the length of the lease?
Probe: What length did you originally want?

24. (If discussion) What understanding did you come to?
A. Was it recorded in the lease? re: rent
lease
redecorating

25. Was anything (else) added on to the lease?

26. How often within the last year have you gotten in touch with your LL about repairs?

27. If AL: Have you sometimes found it difficult to reach him?

28. If AL: How do you pay the rent?
A. (If contact) Do you talk about rental matters on those occasions?

29. Have you ever communicated in writing?
A. (If yes) What about?

30. Has the owner ever tried to get in touch with you about something?

31. What repairs and redecorating were done in your apt. since you moved in? and when?
Date/Done by LL - $
Date/ Work Hired - $
Date/Done by T - $
Probe: (If redecorated) Who paid for the paint?

32. Does the owner seem concerned with keeping the property in good condition?
A. Is he usually prompt in having things fixed?
B. Does he sometimes offer to make repairs, to redecorate, or to make other improvements without you asking him first?

64 33. Do you like your LL living in the building (elsewhere)?

65 34. Would you describe your relationship to him as businesslike or also personal?
A. Do you prefer it that way?

66 35. Have you ever visited each other socially?
Note: How often?

67 36. Is your LL especially cooperative in some ways?

68 37. Do you sometimes exchange or borrow things from any of the other families
69 in this bldg., or help each other out in other ways?
Check: lend things s.a. tools, food items
exchange books or recipes
help in repair work or other things around the house
take care of the children
help find new Ts
give advice
exchange gifts
do occasional shopping
give a ride
other

(Place a, b, or c beside items, depending on family)
Note: Exchange with RL?

A. Would this be often?

70 38. Would you like the owner to be more cooperative in some ways?

71. 39. Do you consider your rent a fair one for what you are getting?

72 40. Do you know other rents in the neighborhood?
73 A. Do you know the other rents in this bldg.?
Note: Number, rents cited

74 41. Do you know the rent paid by the previous T?
A. (If yes) What was it?

75 42. Has your rent been raised since you moved here?
76 A. (If yes) When?
77 B. " How much?
C. " How did you feel about this?
Note: Did he protest? How?

78 ___. Have you ever had difficulties with your LL, or disagreements?
79 A. (If yes) What about?
80 Note: (If about repairs) Over who was responsible, or over whether the repairs were necessary?

2(1) Area Code
2(2) T's Code Number
2(3)
2(4)

2(5) 44. (If disagreement) What happened?
2(6) A. (If court case) Who went to court first?
Probe: QRB case?

2(7) 45. (If no court case) Have you ever gone to some person or agency for legal
2(8) advice on rental matters?
Note: Which?
A. (If yes) What about?
B. (If not) Why not?

2(9) 46. Do you know of the Quebec Rental Board? (if not yet mentioned) What is your impression?

2(10) 47. Do you know of any case where disagreement about rental matters came before
2(11) the rental board or before a court?
2(12) Note: Number, in the area?

2(13) 48. What kind of work do you do? (does your husband do?)
2(14) A. Does your wife (you yourself) also work?
B. (If not working) Do you get some form of pension?

2(15) 49. Has your (your husband's) income changed over the last five years?

2(16) 50. Are you thinking of moving within the next few years?
2(17) A. (If yes) When?
B. (If yes) Why?

2(18) 51. (If thinking of moving) What kind of a place are you looking for?
2(19) Note: area, building type

2(20) 52. (If not moving) Are there some things that make you think of moving?
2(21) Check (and rank): job neighborhood character
transportation character of LL/other Ts
space rent
facilities, services other

2(22) 2(23) 53. (If moving) Are there things which do make you want to stay?
Check (and rank):

job	neighborhood character
transportation	char. of LL/Other Ts
space	rent
facilities, services	other

2(24) 54. (If not moving) What would you do if the LL raised the rent by $10?

2(25) 55. Do you think it would be easy or hard to find another apt. you liked just as well or better, for the same rent?

2(26) 56. Moving must be something of a problem. Do you have friends to help you or would you call a moving company (if you ever decided to move)?

2(27) 2(28) 2(29) 2(30) 2(31) 57. With how many of your neighbors do you have a friendly talk fairly often?
A. How often would this be?
Probe: nationality, LLs/Ts
Note: in or outside the bldg?

2(32) 58. How do you like this district as a place to live?

2(33) 2(34) 59. Would you say the character of this neighborhood has been changing in recent years?
Probe (if applicable): What about property maintenance?

60. Is there anything I haven't asked that you would particularly like to comment on?

61. I have been asking you a lot of questions. Perhaps there is something you would like to ask me?

2(35) Age:

2(36) Sex:

2(37) Marital Status:

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR OWNERS

Dept. of Sociology and Anthropology
McGill University

2 1. Area Code

2-3. Case Number:

Address of building:
3 Owner's address (& floor):
4 Name:
Nationality:
Immigrant Status:

5 4. Place of residence

6 5. Building type

7 6. Condition of building

8 7. Age

9 8. Sex

10 9. Marital Status

11 10. Do you own this building independently?
12

13 11. When did you buy this building?

14 12. Where did you live before?

15 13. Where do you originally come from?
16 A. And your parents?

17 14. (If immigrant) When did you come to Canada?

18 15. So you have lived how many years in Montreal?

19 16. (If RL or AL who was previously resident) What made you decide to buy a house? Did you decide to buy one as soon as you could afford to, or later?

17. Did you have a special (kind of) area in mind?

21 18. What kind of a building were you looking for originally?

22 19. Did the previous owner live in the building?

20. Do you supply any services? What services do you supply?

Check: Heat (kind)
Electricity
Parking (garage)
Storage Space
Use of Garden
Refrigerator
Stove
Furniture
Janitor
Other

21. Are there some things about operating a property such as this that are more problematic than others?
Check: Which seem the most important?

22. How many Ts have you had so far?

23. Could you tell me a little about your Ts?
Check: A. B. C.

Total no. of rooms
Number of bedrooms
Rent (including water tax?)
Length of Lease
Automatically renewed since:
Nationality
Length of stay
Number of persons
Occupation
Wife's occupation
(Check: condition of apartment)

24. What about your recent vacancies?
Check: Last Second Last

Year of last vacancy
Time it took to rent
(If vacant) How long?
How many came to see?
How many offered to rent? (Nation.)

54 25. (If more than 3 vacancies) Has the time it takes to rent an apartment changed in recent years?

26. How do you announce a vacancy?

56 27. If Al: When you have a vacancy, who usually deals with the people coming
57 to see the apartment?
A. (If not the owner himself) What instructions do you leave?

58 28. Do you normally accept the first T willing to pay the rent?

59 29. (If not) What sort of Ts do you try to get?
60 Check: secure job
good position
no children
(not of a) certain nationality
seems responsible, careful
seems cooperative
nice personality
other

61 30. (If selective) Do you check on whether this is the kind of T you want?
Note: Visits T's apt?

62 31. Are you looking for Ts who are willing to stay, say at least 3 years, or aren't you too concerned whether they stay as long?

63 32. When you bought the building, how did you decide what rent to ask for?

64 33. Do you know the rents for similar buildings in the area?
Note: How do the rents he mentions compare to his own?
How many does he know of?

34. Do you normally decide beforehand how much rent you want for an apartment, or are you prepared to give or take a few dollars depending on the circumstances?

A. What about the length of the lease?
B. What about redecoration and repairs?

66 35. The last time you rented an apartment, did the T accept your conditions right away, or was there some discussion?

A. (If the latter) What understanding did you come to?
B. Was it recorded in the lease?
C. Was this typical?

67 36. Has any repainting had to be done either inside the building or outside,
68 since you bought it? (record only from 1960 on)
69 Check: Decription and Dates
70

a.
b.
c.
(Note: partly or wholly)
balcony
gallery
front wall

Probe re a, b, c: before Ts moved in?
painted by T?
who paid for the paint?

71 37. What repair work had to be done for your present Ts?
72 Check: Work you Did / Work you Hired / Done by T
73
74
75 a.
76
77 b.
78
79 c.
80
2(1)
2(2) Other:
2(3)
2(4)

2(5) 38. When was the last time you saw your Ts' apts.?
Check:
a. b. c.

2(6) 39. Do you make a point of keeping up on whether the apartments are being kept in good condition?

A. (If not) Why not?

2(7) 2(8) 40. Do you find that Ts sometimes call you about things that they should be able to fix themselves?
Note: which Ts?

A. (If yes) What do you usually do when this happens?

2(9) 41. Have you and your present Ts ever communicated in writing?
Note occasions.

2(10) 2(11) 42. Would you describe your relationship to them as businesslike or also personal? Check: a. b. c.

A. Is that the way you prefer it?

2(12) 43. So you never (Do you then) visit socially with any of your Ts?
Note: Which Ts, how often.

2(13) 2(14) 2(15) 44. Are any of yout S especially cooperative in some ways?

A. If RL: Do you sometimes exchange or borrow things from each other, or help each other out in other ways?
Check: lend things e. g. tools, foods
exchange books or recipes
help in repair work or other things around the house
take care of the children
give advice
exchange gifts
do occasional shopping
give a ride
other
(Place a, b, or c, beside items, depending on T)

A. Would this be often? a. b. c.

2(16) 45. Would you like some Ts to be a little more cooperative in some ways?

A. (If yes) In what ways?

2(17) 46. If RL: With how many of your neighbors do you have a friendly talk fairly often?
Note: Nationality, LLs/TS
A. How often would this be?

2(18) 2(19) 47. If RL: Are you thinking of moving in the near future? (Note: When?)
A. (If yes) Any specific reasons?
Check: Location
Space, facilities, services
Neighborhood character
Ts
Financially Better
Other

2(20) 48. (If thinking of moving) Where to?
2(21) Check: Area
Building type

49. If RL:
2(22) (If intending to move) Would you then sell this building?

2(23) 50. If RL: How do you like this district as a place to live?

2(24) 51. If RL: Would you say the character of this neighborhood has been changing
2(25) in recent years? Probe: What about property maintenance?

2(26) 52. Do you know owners or other persons with whom you sometimes discuss rental matters? Note: Sees them often?
Probe: Belongs to a relevant association?

2(27) 53. Do you also own other rental property?
2(28) Note: number, kind, location
2(29)

2(30) 54. (If Not) Have you ever owned rental property in the past?
2(31) (If Yes) How do the returns compare?
Probe: If RL - differential treatment?

2(32) 55. If AL: Then you make (don't make) your living from R.E. holdings?

2(33) 56. What kind of job do you hold?
A. (If retired) Do you get a pension?

2(34) 57. Do you intend to sell this property?
2(35) A. (If Yes) When?
2(36) B. (If Yes) Why?
Probe: for profit, loss?

2(37) 58. (If intending to sell) Is the building listed with a R.E. company?

2(38) 59. How much did the building cost you originally?

2(39) 60. Did you take out a mortgage at the time?
2(40) Check:

	Downpayment	Mortgage	Interest	Amortization	Lender
2(41) 1.					
2(42) 2.					
2(43)					
2(44)					
2(45)					
2(46)					
2(47)					
2(48)					
2(49)					

2(50) 61. What are your current expenses with the building? (list per year)
2(51)

Fixed expenses:

Mortgage payments	_____	
Property tax	_____	
School tax	_____	
(Water tax)	_____	
Insurance	_____	
(Janitor)	_____	
Operating expenses:		
Maintenance (ca. per yr.)	_____	
(Heat)	_____	
(Electricity)	_____	
Others:	_____	
TOTAL:	_____	x

Your gross rental income is now how much per year? _____ y

(insert expense total) _____ x

So this leaves you with a net (surplus or deficit of: _____ z

2(52) 62. If AL: How much of your own money do you figure that you have invested up to now? _____ r

_____ (surplus z)

minus _____ (6% cash investment r)

_____ Total (Net profit) s

So the return is: _____ % $\left(\frac{s \times 100}{r}\right)$

Note: Does LL figure in terms of cash flow?

2(53) 63. Originally, how did you expect the building to work out financially?
Note: Resale intentions? Expected level of return?

2(54) 64. Do you expect your present return rate to increase over the coming years?
Note: Considerably? Unto which level?

2(55) 65. When you bought the building, were you considering resale after a few years?
Probe: for a profit?

2(56) 66. Do you expect property values to change within the next few years?
Note: How much?

2(57) 67. If RI: Do you feel that staying here works out better financially?
Note: ever thought about this in detail?

2(58) 68. If AL: Is the resale market such that you can get the money invested on improvement back?
Probe: with a profit?

2(59) 69. If AL: If you improved the property, could you get an adequate return through improved rents?
Check: flexibility in rent and change in vacancy rate
Probe: with a higher net return?

2(60) 70. Taxes have gone up a lot in recent years. How has this affected you?
Check: spends more on the property
increased the rents, or intends to
spends less on maintenance
other

2(61) 71. (If applicable) Why hasn't income matched tax increase?
Probe: Have you ever lowered or not raised the rent for a T who might otherwise have left?

2(62) 72. Have you ever raised the rent for any of your Ts? (beg. 1960)
2(63) Check: (fill in amount)
2(64) Dates

a.
b.
c.
Probe: does this include raises for new Ts?

2(65) 2(66) 73. (If rents were raised) What was the reaction?
Check: Accepted raise without discussion
Accepted raise with discussion
Called Rental Board
Moved
Other

2(68) 74. Would you expect to have difficulties getting Ts if your rents were say $10 higher than they are now?

2(69) 2(70) 75. Have you ever had difficulties or disagreements with a T?
Check: not pay the rent
about repairs
left before the lease expired
other

2(71) 76. (If yes) What happened?
A. (If court case) Which party went to court first?
Probe: QRB case?

2(72) 2(73) 77. Did you ever have a T with whom you did not renew the lease (under the old conditions) because you wanted him to leave?
Check (if yes):
demanded new lease with rent raise
refused to sign a new lease
other

2(74) 2(75) 78. Have you ever had complaints by Ts about other Ts?
Probe: kind, reaction

2(76) 2(77) 2(78) 79. (If no court case) Have you ever gone to see a person or agency s.a. the QRB for legal advice on rental matters?
A. (If yes) Do you have a regular lawyer for rental matters?
B. (If yes) What about?
Probe: Impression of QRB

80. Is there anything I haven't asked you that you would particularly like to comment on?

81. I have been asking you a lot of questions. Perhaps there is something you would like to ask me?

ADDENDA

Date:

Times Contacted:

Condition of apartment:

Grade:
Comments:

Building Maintenance

Grade:
Comments:

Description of interviewed:

Reception:

Check:

Initially unwilling
Hesitant
Willing

Rapport:
Check: guarded
equivocal
open
confiding

Overall on finances

Comments:

Change during interview?

Other persons present:

Effect: on interview:

Special problems encountered:

Topics of greatest interest to LL:

Language spoken:

Points of Special Interest:

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