

THE EDUCATIONAL THOUGHT OF NIETZSCHE

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ABSTRACT

It is the contention of this thesis that educational reforms in North America, although well-meaning, have failed to provide education for leadership and have also failed to eliminate two problems -- alienation and the loss of values.

This thesis examines the teachings of Friederich Nietzsche on the assumption that the implementation of his views could help eliminate these problems and provide an education for leadership. His philosophy is based on the principle that all men are not equal and everyone has to be afforded the opportunity to become himself so that he can freely decide whether he wants to lead or be led. Accordingly, Nietzsche maintains that education should be geared in two directions -- a rigorous and demanding one for the leaders, and a utilitarian one for all others. Such a system (since it is based on free choice) will eradicate alienation while at the same time creating an aristocracy of leaders who will create values.

ABREGE

Cette thèse a pour but de soutenir l'opinion que, quoique les réformes éducatives en Amérique du Nord ont été des plus honnêtes, elles ont été incapables de pourvoir aux besoins de la formation de chefs futurs et de plus, elles n'ont point éliminé deux problèmes majeurs -- l'aliénation et la perte des principes.

Nous examinerons ici, l'enseignement de Friedrich Nietzsche en supposant que l'exécution de ses opinions pourrait aider à enrayer ces problèmes, ainsi que d'amener une formation complète des futurs chefs. Sa philosophie est basée sur le principe que tous les hommes ne sont pas nés égaux les uns aux autres et que chacun d'eux doit recevoir l'occasion de devenir lui-même pour qu'il puisse décider librement si il veut diriger ou être mené. En conséquence, Nietzsche soutient que l'éducation devrait être dirigée dans deux directions -- une stricte et rigoureuse pour les chefs, et une utilitaire pour tous les autres. Un tel système enraiera l'aliénation puisqu'elle est fondée sur le choix libre et en même temps, créera une aristocratie de chefs qui créeront par la suite de nouveaux principes.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Two major problems seem to afflict North American education today, namely, alienation among our youth and a loss of values. Such developments as the increase of drug usage among our youth, delinquency, and vandalism in schools may be said to stem directly from these two problems.

Erich Fromm describes alienation as "a mode of experience in which the person experiences himself as an alien", almost like someone "estranged from himself". Instead of being the master of his creations, he has allowed his creations and their consequences to overcome him.¹ The presence of alienation in Western society today seems particularly bewildering since materially, at least, the future for our young people appears most pleasant. Higher education is more easily available to them, the welfare state has ensured that they will never starve, science has freed them from many diseases, and technology has provided them with much that seems to make life worth living. Yet there is a lack of direction and a sense of frustration prevalent among the young that is manifested by the increase in anti-social activity generally.

What is the reason for this alienation? It can be argued that

¹Fromm, Erich, The Sane Society, (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1955), p. 111.

since freedom is an inalienable right of man, any attempt to curtail it leads to frustration and feelings of rejection. Such feelings can be repressed for a while but ultimately they break out in a show of violence.

R.D. Laing observes that

We all live under a constant threat of our total annihilation. We seem to seek death and destruction as much as life and happiness Only by the most outrageous violation of ourselves have we achieved our capacity to live in relative adjustment to civilization apparently driven to its own destruction.²

The existentialists maintain that modern youth needs an answer to the question "Who am I?". It will rebel against any answer that chooses to regard the individual only as part of a whole called Society. Since the "I" is always unique, man has to refuse to submit himself to any purpose external to his own growth and happiness. Hence the question "Who am I?" can be answered in one way: "I am what I make of myself". Human existence spans the gap between the nothingness of pre-existence and the nothingness of post-existence. It is only through free choice that man can define himself and create the "something" that will fill the void of "nothing". Otherwise, there will always be nothing, since there is no essence outside the freely chosen action of the individual. As Karl Jaspers observes:

²Laing, R.D., 'Violence and Love' in Humanitas, Journal of the Institute of Man, (Duquesne University, Pennsylvania), Fall 1966. Vol. II, No. 3, p. 206.

Man's 'freedom' means that his alterability involves more than changes in accordance with those natural laws that apply to all existence: he is responsible for his own transformation.³

Freedom, provided it is real in theory and practice, eradicates alienation. Unfortunately, true freedom is found neither in Society nor in the school. So long as the school continues to exist in the service of Society, the truly Free Man will remain a dream. Perhaps it is too late for Society to change for, as Albert Camus indicates, there is a vast conspiracy of silence to force people to conform instead of allowing each individual to fulfil his own self.⁴ But when this malaise spreads to the schools, it forebodes ill for the future. Even in the so-called comprehensive schools, for example, little of the freedom which was promised has been put into practice. Such schools were supposed to enjoy flexibility in class time and size as well as in the range and nature of the subjects offered. However, except for the addition of a technical-vocational programme, there are only superficial differences between these schools and their more traditional counterparts. The mandatory courses in both types of schools remain the same, as do the curricula, the weekly amount of class time, the examinations, and other such aspects of school life. Freedom in the school continues to remain an elusive quarry.

³ Jaspers, Karl, Nietzsche, translated by Charles F. Wallraff and Frederick J. Schmitz, (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1966), p. 139.

⁴ Camus, Albert, 'Neither Victims nor Executioners', translated by Dwight MacDonald in Seeds of Liberation, edited by Paul Goodman, (New York: George Braziller, 1964), p. 27.

Some educational thinkers argue that students today are becoming more and more aware of their existential self and the mystery of their own being and are refusing to let themselves be relegated to the position of mere objects. Hence the numerous dropouts and the increasing acts of vandalism and a total decrease in school spirit. They regard the public system as "authoritarian and oppressive", says Herbert Kohl, something designed to deprive them of "the right to make choices concerning their own destinies".⁵ Jules Henry asserts that the schools are not existing for the benefit of children but are run by adults for adult purposes and hence tend to express "the demands of the community and idiosyncracies of the adults who run the school".⁶ The schools have undertaken the task of socializing the individual and fitting him into the mould of the perfect conformist who, even when he is disgruntled with his lot, cannot place his finger on the source of his problem. Such an individual, as Gabriel Marcel observes,

short of an especial grace . . . is indeed doomed to see himself like the man of Heidegger and of Sartre, as the victim of some cosmic catastrophe, flung into an alien universe to which he is bound by nothing.⁷

⁵ Kohl, Herbert R., The Open Classroom: A Practical Guide to a New Way of Teaching, (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), pp. 11-12.

⁶ Henry, Jules, Culture Against Man, (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 183.

⁷ Marcel, Gabriel, The Philosophy of Existentialism, translated by Marjorie Garbus, (Secaucus, New Jersey: The Citadel Press, 1973), p. 102.

The student, says John McMurtry, cannot possibly develop a sense of responsibility when "he has no rights, no recourse, no appeal, no veto in any . . . decision but is merely expected to show a successful and reflex-like obedience".⁸ All the rules and all the decisions are made by adults. The students, says Peter Martin, are left with only two choices: "to drop out (either physically or mentally) or to make themselves smaller and smaller until they can act in ways their elders expect".⁹ They are expected to discard everything that is best about them and adjust to an environment that children lived in about a century ago.¹⁰ "Caught in their own impotence", the children, Marin insists, remain "depressed and resentful, filled with self-hatred and a sense of shame".¹¹ The system thus encourages the development of obedience, frustration, dependence and fear. It isolates the individual, empties him of life and breeds in him a lack of respect for it.¹² Once the impulse toward living is suppressed, can alienation be far behind?

The second problem that confronts education today, the loss of values, implies the loss of individual values -- values that a person has

⁸ McMurtry, John, 'School Decision-Making: A Critique' in Must Schools Fail?, edited by Niall Byrne and Jack Quarter, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, Ltd., 1972), pp. 191-192.

⁹ Marin, Peter, 'The Open Truth and Fiery Vehemence of Youth' in High School, edited by Ronald Gross and Paul Osterman, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971), p. 35.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 36.

¹² Ibid., p. 37.

created or accepted as having a personal meaning in his own life and not something that he has unquestioningly inherited from others. The youth of today are faced with such conflicting external values that if they are not provided with an opportunity and even encouraged to make their own values, they will simply make them, as Sidney Simon indicates, 'on the basis of peer pressure, unthinking submission to authority, or the power of propaganda'.¹³

The Scientific Age destroyed the exalted position held by religion and brought about a collapse of the universal code of values that religion had established. As Nietzsche pointed out, man killed God -- the God that was the creation of religion.¹⁴ The Ultimate Truth on which men relied had now disappeared, and man found himself on an inclined plane in a headlong flight into Nothingness. While it may be said that belief in God and divine teleology diminishes the value and significance of man, it could be equally well argued that the non-existence of God threatens human life with nihilism from which the man of the future has to be saved. As Paul Tillich observes, "God must be called the infinite power of being which resists the threat of non-being".¹⁵ Seeking refuge from forlornness, man bartered his freedom for security and permitted Society to act as the

¹³ Simon, Sidney B. et al., Values Clarification, (New York: Hart Publishing Co., Inc., 1972), p. 16.

¹⁴ Nietzsche, F., Joyful Wisdom, translated by Thomas Common, (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1971), III, 125, p. 167.

¹⁵ Tillich, Paul, Systematic Theology, Vol. I, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 64.

arbiter of values. The herd-morality that Nietzsche so vehemently condemned as being "directed toward standstill and preservation" with "nothing creative in it",¹⁶ was once more the order of the day. Education fell in line and created what David Riesman has called "the outer-directed man" -- a person who has sensitized himself to the desires and expectations of other people and conforms to those external directives.¹⁷

Alienation and loss of values cause the boredom that seems to pervade the educational scene today. Michael Novak calls boredom "the first taste of nothingness" since it leads to "killing time" and causes every action to become unattractive. The self, instead of acting, allows itself to be acted upon.¹⁸ This finally leads to a negation of the self and culminates in what the existentialists describe as the horror of nothingness. The future appears to be meaningless, and the student, as Donald Barr indicates, "is likely to forget the criteria of controllability and take unmanageable risks -- by drugs . . . and challenges to the police".¹⁹ Kurt Reinhardt has shown that a certain

¹⁶Nietzsche, F., The Will to Power, translated by Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale, (New York: Random House, 1968), II, 285, p. 162.

¹⁷Riesman, David, et al., The Lonely Crowd, (New London, Conn.: The Yale University Press, 1950), pp. 37-38.

¹⁸Novak, Michael, The Experience of Nothingness, (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 6.

¹⁹Barr, Donald, Who Pushed Humpty Dumpty?, (New York: Atheneum, 1971), p. 52.

kind of boredom can be 'authentic in the sense that it "forces man into decision and choice and thus aids him in gaining his authentic existence".²⁰ Such boredom will involve the need for probing the unknown since one is dissatisfied with what one has achieved. It is a process of frequent transcendence which faces only one facticity -- death. It consists of not knowing what to do but knowing that there is something to be done. Unfortunately with the rigid curricula and the courses of study in our schools today, little attempt can be made to probe the unknown. Such "garden variety of schooling", as Donald Vandenberg calls the present system of education, can only lead to "disinterested learning" and create "a dominant mood of dullness" so that "what is learned is learned superficially and is quickly forgotten".²¹ Richard Jones has observed that our educational system favours pragmatic, conventional, cognitive intelligence rather than creative, imaginative and affective intelligence.²²

The emphasis on material success may also be considered as a cause for alienation. Jules Henry notes that "every man reared in our culture" is forced "over and over again, night in, night out, even at the pinnacle of success, to dream not of success, but of failure. In school, the

²⁰ Reinhardt, Kurt F., The Existentialist Revolt, (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1964), p. 235.

²¹ Vandenberg, Donald, Being and Education, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971), p. 160.

²² Jones, Richard M., Fantasy and Feeling in Education, (New York: New York University Press, 1968), p. 4.

external nightmare is internalized for life To be successful . . . one must learn to dream of failure".²³ Such insistence on success dehumanizes human action since the emphasis is placed on the success achieved and not on the worth of the performance. The concept of internal worth is rendered useless. Even hard work is regarded in terms of success. Hence the awarding of prizes and medals which results in competition. Harold Lasswell says,

Individual marks at school, sets the person at rivalrous odds with his fellows. 'Success and failure depend on you'. 'Strive and succeed' means 'If you strive, success comes; if success does not come, you have not striven hard enough'. When such an ideology impregnates life from start to finish, the thesis of collective responsibility runs against a wall of non-comprehension.²⁴

Such intense competition with the end result being success, denies a human being any internal sense of dignity for the work he has accomplished. What passes for success in our schools is based merely on one's intellectual capability and on how much one knows of what is included in the basic curriculum instead of the successful development of one's general capabilities.

Another cause of both alienation and a loss of values is said to be the emphasis on objectivity. Objectivity has entered into our very experience of our own selves. It has given us new identities and new

²³Henry, Jules, op. cit., p. 296.

²⁴Lasswell, Harold D., Politics: Who Gets What, When, How?, (New York: Meridian Books, 1958), pp. 33-34.

aspirations of what we should like to be and of what we should appear to be. Everything has become too automatic and functional. Objectivity, says Novak, is a myth, and yet those students who wish to enter the field of science and technology are compelled to suppress all fancies, dreams, impulses and wishes, and they have to keep them suppressed permanently. It is the job of the schools to effect such suppression.²⁵

The kind of objectivity which turns the individual into a mere spectator leaves him impervious to life. He is unmoved even by the worst atrocities. He is anxious to know what is happening, but he never seeks to know why it is happening. He is like the main character in Camus' The Stranger²⁶ and Franz Kafka's The Trial²⁷ - men to whom everything seems to be happening outside themselves. Fromm says that in the economic, the social and the political spheres, objectivity has forced the individual to cease to exist. He is nothing: just a face in the anonymous crowd.²⁸ Even in the realm of action -- social, economic or political -- objectivity presents a further difficulty. No person can or should decide upon a course of action unless he has a knowledge of all the possibilities, all the choices that exist. But such knowledge is impossible so long as he remains

²⁵ Novak, Michael, op. cit., p. 37.

²⁶ Camus, Albert, The Stranger, translated by Stuart Gilbert, (New York: Random House, A Vintage Book, 1946).

²⁷ Kafka, Franz, The Trial, translated by Willa and Edwin Muir, (New York: Schocken Books, 1970).

²⁸ Fromm, Erich, Escape from Freedom, (New York: Rinehart and Co., Inc., 1941), p. 129.

a mere spectator, and hence any choice he may make will be too dependent on whim rather than on the kind of concern that demands a careful analysis of the facts. The key question is not whether he can do something but whether he should do it.

Novak criticizes the notion of objectivity as a value-free and pragmatic approach. He says,

Persons who claim to speak objectively . . . in abstraction from moral and political considerations, are exemplars of bad faith. For whatever their conscious intentions, their activities involve them in moral and political commitments. . . . Their claims to detachment and disinterestedness are belied by the salaries paid them and the deference shown them.²⁹

Thus, Novak argues, those in power only pay lip-service to objectivity. As to the masses, they are unaware of the true meaning and source of their personal troubles.³⁰ If the schools wish to produce the disciplined individual who will not be overwhelmed by his burdens and troubles but rather will be able to transcend them, it is their task to translate troubles into issues, and issues into the terms of their human meaning for the individual. Unfortunately, says C. Wright Mills, the schools are not doing this but are rather operating on "an ideology of 'life adjustment' that encourages happy acceptance of mass ways of life rather than the struggle for individual and public transcendence".³¹

²⁹ Novak, Michael, op. cit., p. 43.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Mills, C. Wright, 'The Mass Society' in Man Alone: Alienation in Modern Society, edited by Eric and Mary Josephson, (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1973), p. 222.

Such objectivity also leaves a person stereotyped both in mind and in activity. He lives in a little world of his own, and the only people whom he can understand are those who live in that small world. He has only a prejudiced image of the people who live outside his world. Caught in this narrow space, he does not have a chance of transcending either by discussion or by action. He cannot detach himself to observe or to evaluate what he is experiencing or what he is not experiencing. He had no projects or standards that he can really call his own except those he has taken over from others. He does not even have standards whereby he can judge himself. Mills notes that such an individual "loses his independence, and more importantly, he loses the desire to be independent: in fact, he does not have hold of the idea of being an independent individual with his own mind and his own worked-out way of life".³² He has a certain smug complacency towards life and he wants to get out of it all he can without putting in anything.

Yet, the existentialists' overemphasis on subjectivity cannot be seen as a viable alternative. As George Kneller indicates, "self analysis is born to a life unseen if the analysis has no point of reference beyond its own existential determinants".³³ The teacher has to encourage his students to transcend the being-in-itself and achieve the being-for-itself,

³² Ibid., p. 225.

³³ Kneller, George F., Existentialism and Education, (New York: Philosophical Library, 1958), p. 155.

but there is no way in which he can succeed in this task so long as objectivity, that is the objectivity of the mere spectator, is regarded as enlightenment and progress. Martin Buber, while favouring total subjectivity, regrets the fact that it may not be possible, since today the I-Thou relationship has been usurped by the I-It relationship. This 'It' has become the 'lord of the hour' and in its omnipotence "it acknowledges nothing and actually shuts us off into the darkness of ignorance".³⁴ Not all men are capable of attaining subjectivity. Life, as Wilhelm Dilthey indicates, is "an infinite multiplicity of positive and negative existential values".³⁵

To replace the present system of education with its lack of freedom, in the existential sense, by a system which places an emphasis on total freedom could result in greater alienation since it merely replaces one form of tyranny with another. As Tillich observes,

The Existentialist protest against dehumanization and objectivation, together with its courage to be as oneself, have turned into the most elaborate and oppressive forms of collectivism that have appeared in history.³⁶

³⁴ Buber, Martin, Eclipse of God. Studies in the Relation Between Religion and Philosophy, translated by Maurice Friedman et al., (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), pp. 69-70.

³⁵ Dilthey, Wilhelm, Pattern and Meaning in History. Thoughts on History and Society, translated and with an introduction by H.P. Rickman, (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 104.

³⁶ Tillich, Paul, The Courage To Be, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), pp. 152-153.

Jean-Paul Sartre himself says that "to-be-what-he-is-not" and "not-to-be-what-he-is" is the ontological disposition of man.³⁷ Consequently, what is required is a philosophy of education that will afford man an opportunity to become himself either through subjectivity and existential freedom or through objectivity and lack of such freedom. The adoption of such a philosophy of education could help eradicate a loss of values among our youth since each person would be free to choose to reevaluate all values or not to do so. It would also help eradicate alienation since it would leave a person free to exercise his freedom or barter it for security. Such an approach is found in the educational philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche.

We mentioned earlier that Nietzsche vehemently criticized the 'herd-morality'.³⁸ As an antithesis to the creatures of the 'herd-morality', Nietzsche put forward the idea of the Superman whom he called "the meaning of the earth".³⁹ The Superman does not constitute a new species that will appear only among the 'master races'. He is only the present human being who has perfected his nature, overcome his animality and organized his appetites and impulses. At the same time, Nietzsche notes that "there is an opposite type of man that is also on a height and also has free vision --

³⁷ Sartre, Jean-Paul, Being and Nothingness, translated and with an introduction by Hazel E. Barnes, (New York: Philosophical Library, 1969), p. 439.

³⁸ cf. p. 6.

³⁹ Nietzsche, F., Thus Spoke Zarathustra, translated by R.J. Hollingdale, (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1971), Prologues: 3, p. 41.

but looks down".⁴⁰ Such a man, says Nietzsche, is the "Ultimate Man". He is "the most contemptible man", but, Nietzsche admits, "his race is as inexterminable as the flea".⁴¹ The Superman and the Ultimate Man are classes into which men could freely choose to fall. Such free choice would remove alienation since it leaves the student free to decide whether he should use his freedom to overcome himself and reach the heights, or barter it for conformity and security. Because of social pressure, most people would reject individual freedom in favour of conformity, says Viktor Frankl.⁴² However, an appropriate educational system would enable us to arrange a separate educational route for the Supermen who will be the future leaders. Hence Nietzsche's view of freedom of education would help man to discover his real Self. In his search for Being, man has to decide whether he wants to be a leader or a follower. To start with, man's freedom will have to be infinite; later he himself will choose to place limits on it, and he should be free to do so.

Even in the realm of values, Nietzsche calls for a "revaluation of values" whereby man, "the evaluator",⁴³ is enabled to examine all values

⁴⁰ Nietzsche, F., Beyond Good and Evil, translated by Walter Kaufmann, (New York: Random House, 1966), aphorism 286, p. 227.

⁴¹ Nietzsche, F., Thus Spoke Zarathustra, op. cit., Prologues: 5, p. 46.

⁴² Frankl, Viktor E., Man's Search for Meaning, translated by Ilse Lasch, (New York: Washington Square Press, 1965), p. 169.

⁴³ Nietzsche, F., Thus Spoke Zarathustra, op. cit., I: 15, p. 85.

in the light of his own existence, accepting those that are good for him, rejecting others, and creating others. The theory that absolute values must be unquestioningly accepted is meaningless since values are merely the interpretation of phenomena, and each man has the right to interpret them for himself. However, while all men should be provided with the freedom to reevaluate all values and create new ones, not all men are capable of doing so. The creation of values is the highest expression of the Will to Power, and this can be attained only after a long period of self-restraint, self-overcoming and sublimation. It is only some men who will be able to create these values, and they will naturally lead the masses who cannot create values but who need the guidance of values. But these creators of values know the meaning of suffering and hence in creating values they are led by a strict sense of duty and of natural obligation.⁴⁴ Nietzsche was a highly religious man and he did not believe that religious values should be allowed to disappear totally. He says that

to ordinary human beings . . . religion gives an inestimable contentment with their situation and type, manifold peace of heart, an ennobling of obedience, one further happiness and sorrow with their peers and something transfiguring and beautifying, something of a justification for the whole everyday character, the whole lowliness, the whole brutish poverty of their souls.⁴⁵

⁴⁴Ibid., 1: 1, p. 54ff. Also cf. The Will to Power, op. cit., pp. 457ff.

⁴⁵Nietzsche, F., Beyond Good and Evil, op. cit., aphorism 61, p. 73.

What Nietzsche meant is that the sense of a loss of values is not a universal phenomenon but it is keenly felt by some and these people should be afforded the opportunity of creating new values.

Karl Lowith has observed that Nietzsche wanted that man should be educated in the totality of his corporeal humanity.⁴⁶ Man will first have to find the answer to the question: What is Man? before he can understand himself and seek self-perfection. Self-discovery is possible only if there is freedom in education. However, as Eliyahu Rosenow has pointed out, Nietzsche's concept of freedom is 'freedom for' rather than 'freedom from'. Man has to discover his authentic being and become free by struggling with himself. Nietzsche treats man as an autonomous individual at the centre of the educational activity. However, he does not exclude the need for intervention.⁴⁷ Freedom for Nietzsche is not the uncontrolled freedom advocated by Sartre that can lead to nausea and even to anarchy. Rather, it is the controlled freedom that is exercised by men who have developed a sense of responsibility for their actions, and a sense of self-consciousness.⁴⁸ However, J.W. Hillesheim notes that while the doctrine of self-perfection can be applied to anyone, whatever his intellectual or artistic talents may be, Nietzsche realized

⁴⁶ Lowith, Karl, From Hegel to Nietzsche, translated by David E. Green, (New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., Anchor Books, 1967), p. 303.

⁴⁷ Rosenow, Eliyahu, 'What is Free Education? The Educational Significance of Nietzsche's Thought' in Educational Theory, Vol. 23, No. 4, Fall, 1973, p. 370.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

that there are only a few individuals who are capable of rising above the mediocrity of the masses and becoming truly creative. He felt it was the duty of education to seek out and nurture such individuals.⁴⁹

All of Nietzsche's works are today available in English. The most recent translations are those by Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale. There are several critical works on Nietzsche's philosophy including the monumental works written by Karl Jaspers and Martin Heidegger. However, it is present-day studies done by Walter Kaufmann⁵⁰ and R.J. Hollingdale⁵¹, and an earlier work by J.M. Kennedy⁵² that appear to this writer to provide the most thorough and valid understanding of Nietzsche's philosophy. Contemporary critical works on Nietzsche's philosophy of education are rather rare. A good evaluation of Nietzsche's educational philosophy is to be found in two articles written by J.W. Hillesheim entitled 'Nietzsche on Education'⁵³ and 'Nietzsche Agonistes'⁵⁴, and also an article by

⁴⁹Hillesheim, J.W., 'Nietzsche on Education' in Education, December, 1963, p. 226.

⁵⁰Kaufmann, Walter, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, (New York: Random House, 1968).

⁵¹Hollingdale, R.J., Nietzsche, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973).

⁵²Kennedy, J.M., The Quintessence of Nietzsche, (New York: Duffield and Company, 1910).

⁵³Hillesheim, J.W., 'Nietzsche on Education', op. cit., pp. 226-230.

⁵⁴Hillesheim, J.W., 'Nietzsche Agonistes' in Educational Theory, Fall 1973, Vol. 23, number 4, pp. 343-353.

Eliyahu Rosenow entitled 'What is Free Education? The Educational Significance of Nietzsche's Thought'.⁵⁵ But it is ultimately to Nietzsche himself that one has to go for a full understanding of his teachings.

The first step is to present an interpretation of those philosophical ideas of Nietzsche that have the closest bearing on his educational philosophy. Chapter II starts with the idea that is central to Nietzsche's philosophy, namely, the Death of God. This pronouncement, as Kaufman points out, was not "a dogmatic statement about a supernatural reality" but rather "an attempt at a diagnosis of contemporary civilization".⁵⁶ With the death of God, old values have fallen into disrepute and there is a need for the Revaluation of all values. While the revaluation and the creation of new values are within the power of every man, there are only a few who are willing and able to do so. These few, the Supermen, possess the true Will to Power. The chapter concludes with an examination of the rather vague doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence.

The concept of the Superman which Nietzsche claimed was the true aim of education, requires special attention, and Chapter III attempts to clarify the picture of Nietzsche's ideal man.

Chapter IV first examines Nietzsche's criticism of education and then proceeds to examine what route he wanted education to follow so that the concept of 'Be Yourself' could become a reality. Chapter V attempts

⁵⁵ Rosenow, Eliyahu, op. cit., pp. 354-370.

⁵⁶ Kaufmann, Walter, op. cit., p. 100.

to list the subjects that Nietzsche would consider as forming the core of the curriculum. What is more important in this chapter, however, is Nietzsche's approach to the teaching of these core subjects and so the chapter also examines the role of the person whom Nietzsche placed at the centre of the educational system -- the teacher. Zarathustra, Nietzsche's greatest creation, is a teacher and Nietzsche realizes that it is upon the teacher that the greatest tasks of education devolve.

The concluding chapter, after giving a brief summary of the preceding discussion, briefly considers, in the light of Nietzschean thought, some present-day efforts by specialists in education to identify and educate those individuals who might be regarded as rightful future leaders in society.

This study was based on the assumption that it is possible for education to be revamped so that each person can be aided in self-discovery with the result that alienation and a loss of values can be averted, and the Superman can arise to take his rightful place as the leader. Hence the main aim of this study is to examine Nietzsche's educational thought and, in particular, those aspects that focus on the education of the Superman.

CHAPTER II

THUS SPOKE NIETZSCHE

"Nietzsche's books", says Arthur Danto, "give the impression of having been assembled rather than composed".¹ The large number of short aphorisms and short essays that are to be found in most of his works, together with the fact that he frequently fell into the error of making statements that he does not proceed to develop, leave Nietzsche's ideas open to misinterpretation. Thus, to cite an example, Danto quotes various aphorisms to prove that Nietzsche did not believe that any truth exists. Hence the death of God would signify the death of truth since God is truth.² Yet, a reading of the aphorisms cited by Danto³ -- a complete reading -- shows clearly that Kaufman is correct when he observes that Nietzsche's attack is against the existence of pragmatic and utilitarian truth.⁴ Nowhere does Nietzsche deny that truth exists: all he insists upon is that each man not be satisfied with the truth that

¹ Danto, Arthur C., Nietzsche as Philosopher, (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1970), p. 19.

² Ibid., pp. 190-191.

³ cf. On the Genealogy of Morals, translated by Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale, (New York: Random House, A Vintage Book, 1969), III, 24, 25, and Joyful Wisdom, op. cit., V, 343, 344, where it is obvious that Nietzsche was criticizing blind faith while at the same time encouraging a search for the truth. Nietzsche does not hold that such a search will automatically yield the truth, but nevertheless it is something worth undertaking since the will to truth is a step toward the will to power.

⁴ Kaufmann, Walter, op. cit., p. 360.

is presented to him but rather make a careful inquiry into it. The death of God has brought about the death of pragmatic truth but has intensified the search for the will to truth whereby men ought to live. In one of his final works, Nietzsche most emphatically states,

At every step one has to wrestle for truth; one has to surrender for it almost everything to which the heart, to which our love, our trust in life, cling otherwise. That requires greatness of soul: the service of truth is the hardest service.⁵

The death of God, in fact, implies the rebirth of man and a renewal of the search for the Truth. This is the corner-stone of Nietzsche's philosophy. There is a need for creating new values and revaluating the old ones. Since not all men are capable of this enormous task, it devolves on the Supermen -- the superior race of men who have succeeded in overcoming themselves and attaining the Will to Power. Hence the urgent need for cultivating such men who will lead mankind into the brightness of a new day. Man can then lead a life which will not make him ashamed when he confronts it repeatedly in the context of the Eternal Recurrence. Any analysis of Nietzsche's philosophy has to start with the awesome tidings of the death of God.

The Death of God

Nietzsche first announced the death of God in Joyful Wisdom:

⁵ Nietzsche, F., 'The Antichrist' in The Portable Nietzsche, translated, edited and with an introduction by Walter Kaufmann, (New York: The Viking Press, 1971), section 50, p. 632.

The Madman --- Have you ever heard of the madman who on a bright morning lighted a lantern and ran to the market-place calling out unceasingly: "I seek God". -- As there were many people standing about who did not believe in God, he caused a great deal of amusement. Why is he lost? said one. Has he strayed away like a child? said another. . . . The insane man jumped into their midst and transfixed them with his glances. "Where is God gone?" he called out. "I mean to tell you. We have killed him, -- you and I. We are all his murderers. But how have we done it? . . . Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the whole horizon? What did we do when we loosened this earth from its sun? Whither does it now move? . . . Backwards, sideways, forwards, in all directions? . . . Do we not stray as through infinite nothingness? . . . Do we not hear the noise of the grave-diggers who are burying God? God is dead. God remains dead. . . . The holiest and the mightiest that the world has hitherto possessed has bled to death under our knife. . . . Shall we not ourselves have to become Gods merely to seem worthy of it.⁶

From superficial readings of passages such as this, it is easy to conclude with George Morgan that "beyond question the major premise of Nietzsche's philosophy is atheism".⁷ But such conclusions tend to be hasty and incorrect. The very fact that Nietzsche allowed his greatest creation, Zarathustra, to make a similar pronouncement,⁸ should indicate that the madman is not mad in the clinical sense of the word. The madman symbolizes the madness that will overcome the world once people realize that the false gods they worshipped have made them lose total contact with the real God.

⁶Nietzsche, F., Joyful Wisdom, op. cit., III, 125, pp. 167-168. (Translators italics.)

⁷Morgan, George A. Jr., What Nietzsche Means, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1941), p. 36.

⁸Nietzsche, F., Thus Spoke Zarathustra, op. cit.; Prologues: 2, p. 41.

Man has lost sight of the reason for his own existence. He who was created in the image and likeness of God and was "almost God" now finds himself "on an inclined plane . . . slipping faster and faster away from the center into . . . nothingness".⁹ The madman is not announcing a personal loss but a universal loss of values.

Prophetically, Nietzsche cries out about the misery that will subsequently assail a godless world:

If we have the doctrines of the finality of "becoming", of the flux of all ideas, types, and species, of the lack of all radical difference between man and beast . . . thrust on the people in the usual, mad way for another generation, no one need be surprised if that people drown on its little miserable shoals of egoism, and petrify in its self-seeking. At first, it will fall asunder and cease to be a people. In its place . . . individualist systems, secret societies for the extermination of non-members, and similar utilitarian creations will appear on the theatre of the future.¹⁰

He hopes that this tragic event may never be known to man for if it is known then "there will be wars such as have never happened on earth".¹¹

Secondly, unlike Sartre who attempts to explain the non-existence of a metaphysical God in ontological terms so that man may become God,¹²

⁹Nietzsche, F., On the Genealogy of Morals, op. cit., III, 25, p. 155.

¹⁰Nietzsche, F., The Use and Abuse of History, translated by Adrian Collins, (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1957), IX, p. 61.

¹¹Nietzsche, F., Ecce Homo, translated by Walter Kaufmann, (New York: Random House, A Vintage Book, 1969), 4: 1, p. 327.

¹²Sartre, Jean-Paul, Being and Nothingness, op. cit., p. 566.

Nietzsche accepts the presence of a metaphysical God. "The 'God' whose 'death' Nietzsche announces", says Reinhardt, "is the same scurrilous specter that is satirized by Kierkegaard and Ibsen, that 'good old uncle', the 'God' of a complacent bourgeois society, who has been divested of all power and majesty: the guarantor of the safety and satiety of man's 'every-dayness', the conniving helper of man in the attainment of his selfish desires".¹³ All his life, Nietzsche remained a man in search of the real God. In the chapter entitled 'The Sorcerer' in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, there is a beautiful poem (only part of which is quoted here):

Who still warms me, who still loves me?
Offer me hot hands!
Offer me coal-warmers for the heart!
.
.
.
You unknown -- God!

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.
.
He is gone!
He himself has fled,
My last, sole companion,
.
.
.

No! come back,
With all your torments!
Oh come back
To the last of all solitaries!

My unknown God! My pain! My last -- happiness!¹⁴

Can this be the agonized cry of a man who Morgan would have us believe was

¹³ Reinhardt, Kurt F., op. cit., p. 119.

¹⁴ Nietzsche, F., Thus Spoke Zarathustra, op. cit., 1: 5, pp. 265-267.

an atheist "by instinct"?¹⁵ Kaufmann rightly indicates that the death of God is "not a metaphysical speculation about ultimate reality" but is merely "a diagnosis of contemporary civilization".¹⁶ Hence, Fernando Molina is wrong when he asserts that it is the Superman "who has become god-like by murdering God".¹⁷ In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the prophet Zarathustra is "chilled to his very marrow" when he meets "the ugliest man" who is "the murderer of God". He calls him "an unutterable creature" and feels much "coldness and loneliness" after he has left him.¹⁸ Nietzsche could not possibly be describing the Superman in these words. In reality, Nietzsche maintained that the Superman has to fill the void created by the death of God. This important event provides man with an opportunity to discover his own values without any promises of reward or punishment. However, only a few people, the Supermen, will avail themselves of this opportunity and so they become the annihilators and the creators at the same time. "The highest evil belongs to the greatest goodness: but this is being creative", says Nietzsche who then goes on to call himself "the first immoralist" since he has become an "annihilator par excellence".¹⁹

¹⁵ Morgan, George A. Jr., op. cit., p. 36.

¹⁶ Kaufmann, Walter, op. cit., p. 100.

¹⁷ Molina, Fernando, Existentialism as Philosophy, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1962), p. 29.

¹⁸ Nietzsche, F., Thus Spoke Zarathustra, op. cit., 1: 7, pp. 276-279.

¹⁹ Nietzsche, F., Ecce Homo, op. cit., 4: 2, p. 327.

Thirdly, we should not lose sight of the symbolism of the lantern in the madman's hand at noon. The brightness signifies that the death of God has not affected the masses, but Nietzsche sees the darkness at noon. To clear away this darkness was a task he appointed to himself. He did not choose the path of rebellion from the true God -- only from the God that religion had created. This latter God had been forced upon the masses, and man has not been permitted to go in search of the real God and find out exactly what is expected of him as an individual. Thus God, says Nietzsche, has become "a gross answer, an indelicacy against us thinkers -- at bottom a gross prohibition for us: you shall not think".²⁰

The real God is the One in the Old Testament who spoke directly to the "noblest spirits of the chosen people."²¹ Because He did this, it is in the Old Testament that we find "there are human beings, things and speeches in so grand a style that . . . with terror and reverence one stands before these tremendous remnants of what man once was".²² Then came Christianity that demands "man's self-surrender to God".²³ It required man to fix his attention on "otherworldliness" and deny his very

²⁰ Ibid., 2: 1, pp. 236-237.

²¹ Kennedy, J.M., op. cit., p. 67.

²² Nietzsche, F., Beyond Good and Evil, op. cit., aphorism 52, p. 65.

²³ Reinhardt, Kurt F., op. cit., p. 119.

existence. This was contrary to the teachings of Jesus, who, Nietzsche maintains, had a "deep instinct for how one must live, in order to feel oneself 'in heaven'".²⁴ Jesus, says Nietzsche, was "a free spirit" who believed that "the experience of life" consisted in resisting "any kind of word, formula, law, faith, dogma".²⁵ The fault rests with St. Paul whom Nietzsche calls the Apostle of the annihilation of the Law.²⁶

St. Paul and the later evangelists bifurcated human life into sacred and secular spheres as against the interest of a harmonious development of individuals and society. They preached that the Kingdom of Heaven came only after death. Such teaching depreciates human life because people will be willing to put up with imperfections in this life in the expectation of becoming perfect in the life to come. Such depreciation can also lead to a complete disvaluation of anything a man might do in this life. "The Kingdom of Heaven", Nietzsche asserts, "is a state of the heart -- not something that is to come 'above the earth' or 'after death'". It is not something "that one expects: it has no yesterday and no day after tomorrow, it will not come in 'a thousand years' -- it is an experience of the heart; it is everywhere, it is nowhere".²⁷

²⁴ Nietzsche, F., The Antichrist, op. cit., section 33, p. 607.
(Translators italics.)

²⁵ Ibid., section 32, p. 605.

²⁶ Nietzsche, F., 'The Dawn' in The Portable Nietzsche, op. cit., aphorism 68, p. 78.

²⁷ Nietzsche, F., The Antichrist, op. cit., section 34, p. 608.

"The Church", says Nietzsche, "is precisely that against which Jesus preached — and against which he taught his disciples to fight".²⁸ Jesus negated "the whole Jewish ecclesiastical doctrine" and preached "a new way of life, not a new faith".²⁹

Nietzsche wanted man to remain true to the earth. Man's aim should not be to desire the kingdom of heaven but rather to "want the kingdom of earth".³⁰ There is no reason for him to feel guilty about 'sin' since this is merely the invention of the priests to cage him like an animal.³¹ In fact, says Nietzsche, it is precisely this Christian interpretation of "good and evil" that has led to the destruction of God.³² But this darkness at noon cannot last forever. Once Christian morality poses the question "What is the meaning of all will to truth", it will destroy itself. This, says Nietzsche, will be "the most terrible" but also "the most hopeful of all spectacles".³³ Then will dawn the era of the Superman who will effect the much-needed revaluation of values.

The Revaluation of Values

What is the revaluation of values? Crane Brinton maintains that

²⁸ Nietzsche, F., The Will to Power, op. cit., II, 168, p. 101.

²⁹ Nietzsche, F., The Antichrist, op. cit., section 33, p. 607.

³⁰ Nietzsche, F., Thus Spoke Zarathustra, op. cit., 4, 18: 2, p. 325.

³¹ Nietzsche, F., On the Genealogy of Morals, op. cit., III, 20, p. 140.

³² Ibid., III, 27, p. 160. Also cf. Joyful Wisdom, op. cit., V, 357, pp. 305-311.

³³ Ibid., III, 27, p. 161.

it is an attempt to fight fire with fire. Since the priests have given a good name to bad actions, and called these 'moral', we shall have to become immoralists. Their good becomes our evil and vice versa. But since this makes us better moralists than they, because we have got rid of the values of antiquity, we shall have to call this the revaluation of values.³⁴ If what Brinton says is true, then we shall have to regard Nietzsche's philosophy as being nihilistic. In fact, Danto fully subscribes to this view when he says that "Nietzsche's is a philosophy of Nihilism".³⁵ Danto claims that "a deep and total Nihilism" which "is not an ideology but a metaphysics" is the main concept of Nietzsche's philosophy.³⁶

This is a serious charge and cannot be lightly dismissed. That the revaluation implies a destruction of old valuations is clear from the following passage:

After the Yes-saying part of my task has been solved, the turn has come for the No-saying, No-doing part: the revaluation of our values so far, the great war -- conjuring up a day of decision. This included the slow search for those related to me, those who, prompted by strength, would offer me their hands for destroying.³⁷

Yet, at the same time, he never fails to praise virtues like honesty, generosity, politeness and intellectual integrity -- none of which may

³⁴ Brinton, Crane, Nietzsche, (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 136.

³⁵ Danto, Arthur C., op. cit., p. 80.

³⁶ Ibid., pp. 30-31.

³⁷ Nietzsche, F., Ecce Homo, op. cit., 'Beyond Good and Evil', section 1, p. 310. (Translator's italics.)

be considered as new values. What he is protesting against and seeking to destroy is the old valuations of these virtues. Thus, for example, he praises chastity; but for him it means that in a man "sexual taste has remained noble; that in eroticis he likes neither the brutal nor the morbid nor the prudent".³⁸ Kaufmann quite correctly remarks that "the 'revaluation' is not a new value-legislation but a reversal of prevalent valuations -- not from a new vantage point, nor arbitrary, but an internal criticism: the discovery of what Nietzsche variously refers to as 'mendaciousness', 'hypocrisy' and 'dishonesty'".³⁹ Hence he criticized the Christian idea of pity as not being a virtue since it tends to be condescending and contemptuous. Pity, says Nietzsche, is "a practice of nihilism" since it increases misery and advances decadence. "In our whole unhealthy modernity there is nothing more unhealthy than Christian pity".⁴⁰ Since self-perfection is possible only through suffering, pity robs both receiver and giver of this opportunity.

It must be admitted that, on superficial reading, remarks such as the following strengthen Danto's claim that Nietzsche "spoke of his philosophy as Nihilism":⁴¹

³⁸ Nietzsche, F., The Will to Power, op. cit., IV, 947, p. 499.

³⁹ Kaufmann, Walter, op. cit., pp. 111-112. (Author's italics.)

⁴⁰ Nietzsche, F., The Antichrist, op. cit., section 7, pp. 573-574.

⁴¹ Danto, Arthur C., op. cit., p. 22.

It is the measure of strength to what extent we can admit to ourselves, without perishing, the merely apparent character, the necessity of lies. To this extent, nihilism, as the denial of a truthful world, of being, might be a divine way of thinking.⁴²

Nihilism . . . can be a sign of strength: the spirit may have grown so strong that previous goals . . . have become incommensurate.⁴³

It could be the sign of a crucial and most essential growth . . . that the most extreme form of pessimism, genuine nihilism would come into the world.⁴⁴

That I have hitherto been a thoroughgoing nihilist, I have admitted to myself only recently.⁴⁵

It must be noted that all these remarks are taken from Nietzsche's notebooks that were published posthumously under the single title The Will to Power. In fact, in the works published during his lifetime, he goes to great extents to condemn nihilism and he never refers to himself as a nihilist. In Beyond Good and Evil, he states that "there may actually be puritanical fanatics of conscience who prefer even a certain nothing to an uncertain something to lie down on -- and die. But this is nihilism and sign of a despairing, mortally weary soul".⁴⁶ In The Antichrist he says: "Nihilism and Christianity: that rhymes, that does not only rhyme".⁴⁷ Again, in the Genealogy of Morals,

⁴²Nietzsche, F., The Will to Power, op. cit., I, 15, p. 15. (Translator's italics)

⁴³Ibid., I, 23, pp. 17-18.

⁴⁴Ibid., I, 112, p. 69. (Translator's italics.)

⁴⁵Ibid., I, 25, p. 18.

⁴⁶Nietzsche, F., Beyond Good and Evil, op. cit., aphorism 10, p. 16.

⁴⁷Nietzsche, F., The Antichrist, op. cit., section 58, p. 650.

he firmly asserts that the Superman "will redeem us not only from the hitherto reigning ideal" of Christianity, "but also from that which was bound to grow out of it, the great nausea, the will to nothingness, nihilism". It is the "antichrist and antinihilist" who will be the victor over God and nothingness".⁴⁸ Even in The Will to Power, Nietzsche condemns "the nihilistic movement" as "the expression of physiological decadence"⁴⁹ and claims that it is rooted in Christianity.⁵⁰ Janko Lavrin says that the very doctrine of the will to power was put forward as an antidote against nihilism and as a form of affirming the ascending type of life.⁵¹

It is clear that Nietzsche understood the term 'nihilism' in quite a different sense from that which Danto uses to attack him. He was a nihilist in so far as he denied any moral order or purpose to the universe and demanded freedom from imposed values. But, as Robert Solomon has noted, he did not attack all values nor did he endorse principles and positions merely because they were anti-moral. In fact, "Nietzsche ridicules those who would deny all values, he rejects those who would adopt an anti-morality, which, after all, retains the foundations of morality but only perverts its substance, and he attacks values --

⁴⁸ Nietzsche, F., On the Genealogy of Morals, op. cit., II, 24, p. 96.

⁴⁹ Nietzsche, F., The Will to Power, op. cit., I, 38, p. 24.

⁵⁰ Ibid., I, 1, p. 7.

⁵¹ Lavrin, Janko, Nietzsche, (London: Studio Vista), p. 85.

including anti-moral values -- which are 'against life'.⁵²

Nietzsche's nihilism (if it can be called that at all) is directed toward Christianity which, he claimed, aimed at the levelling of all men. Christian virtue insists that men "should cease to be distinct" and "begin to resemble one another in their needs and demands -- more clearly! that they should perish".⁵³ All his life he waged a war against this 'No-saying' to life that, he felt, characterizes Christianity. Hence, says Solomon, "Nietzsche's nihilism is . . . a clearing of the ground to make room for a new conception of values".⁵⁴ When he talked about the revaluation of values, Nietzsche did not wish to imply that new values (currently non-existent) can or need to be created. Man's ultimate task is to become God, and he can accomplish this only by saying 'no' to everything that is cut and dried and imposed from without as a value, and by saying 'yes' to all that comes from within himself. As Solomon observes: "Nietzsche's attack on morality is not simply an assault on a set of principles whose significance is given; it is a battle within a series of interpretations of disconnected prejudices, some of which he wants to reject, some of which he wants to continue to accept".⁵⁵ It is obvious that not every man is capable of such

⁵² Solomon, Robert C., 'Nietzsche, Nihilism and Morality' in Nietzsche. A collection of critical essays, edited by Robert Solomon, (New York: Anchor Books, 1973), pp. 208-209.

⁵³ Nietzsche, F., The Will to Power, op. cit., II, 315, p. 174.

⁵⁴ Solomon, Robert C., op. cit., p. 209.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 219.

revaluation. Moreover, to set oneself up against societal values in a search for the truth, says Nietzsche, one has to follow a lonely and a dangerous route. This dangerous route in search for the truth can only be followed by one who has the Will to Power.⁵⁶

The Will to Power

Nietzsche believed that the Will to Power could be attained by anyone but would be achieved only by a few.⁵⁷ Nietzsche had been experimenting with the idea of 'power' in several of his earlier books.⁵⁸ It is, however, in Thus Spoke Zarathustra that the Will to Power first

⁵⁶ Nietzsche, F., Joyful Wisdom, op. cit., II, 106, p. 145.

⁵⁷ Ernst Breisach observes that the term 'Will to Power' was an unimaginative one and was obviously derived from Schopenhauer's use of the term 'will'. Nietzsche, who rejected Schopenhauer's explanation of "man's life and actions in terms of a will to live", felt that there was an all-pervading force "which aimed beyond what already is". This is the 'Will to Power' which Nietzsche would equate with a will to create. It is a synchronising of all the human forces present in man, and to use it, man has to strive "for the truly human in himself". (Introduction to Modern Existentialism, New York: Grove Press Inc., 1962, p. 51ff.)

⁵⁸ cf. Walter Kaufmann, op. cit., Chapter 6, sections I and II for details concerning Nietzsche's earlier interpretation of 'power'. It is obvious that initially Nietzsche understood the term only in the conventional sense. In his earliest book, The Birth of Tragedy (translated by Clifton P. Fadiman in The Philosophy of Nietzsche, New York: The Modern Library, n.d.) he refers to power as always being evil (section 3, pp. 960ff). In Richard Wagner in Bayreuth, he asks: "Who of you will renounce power, knowing and experiencing that power is evil?" (quoted by Walter Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 180). He then proceeds to say that when the young Wagner "renounced success . . . and foreswore the thought of power, 'success' and 'power' came to him". (quoted in Ibid.).

appears in detail in the form of self-overcoming. Zarathustra announces it in the following words: "A table of values hangs over every people. Behold, it is the table of its overcomings; behold, it is the voice of its will to power".⁵⁹ The Will to Power, says Breisach, by no means implies "the will to success, wealth or military, racial or political power".⁶⁰ Instead, it may be regarded as a synthesis of strength and reason. Lavrin says that the Will to Power is the highest goal aimed at the highest plane where there is no room for Christian or any other notions of meekness and pity.⁶¹ Since it is achieved through one's own effort and suffering and demands "extraordinary hardness", it can only be used for good.⁶² Anyone who has overcome himself knows how to master his passions. Later in Zarathustra, Nietzsche equates the will to truth with the will to power.

Will to the conceivability of all being; that is what I call your will. You first want to make all being conceivable; for, with a healthy mistrust, you doubt whether it is in fact conceivable. But it must bend and accommodate itself to you. Thus will your will have it That is your entire will . . . ; it is a will to power.⁶³

⁵⁹ Nietzsche, F., Thus Spoke Zarathustra, op. cit., 1: 15, p. 84.

⁶⁰ Breisach, Ernst, op. cit., p. 51.

⁶¹ Lavrin, Janko, op. cit., p. 85.

⁶² Breisach, Ernst, op. cit., p. 52.

⁶³ Nietzsche, F., Thus Spoke Zarathustra, op. cit., 2: 12, p. 136.
(Translator's italics.)

Zarathustra asserts that the Will to Power is to be found in all men: "Where I found a living creature, there I found the will to power; and even in the will of the servant I found the will to be master".⁶⁴ In fact, this Will to Power is not only "the basic urge of man" but also "the fundamental drive of all living beings".⁶⁵ Thus, says Zarathustra, "Only where life is, there is also will: not will to life, but . . . will to power".⁶⁶ Thus it would follow that "life itself is will to power".⁶⁷ In fact, the very world as seen from inside would be "will to power and nothing else".⁶⁸

There are two basic forces underlying the Will to Power. The first of these would include control of Nature and of Self, and a cultivation of intellectual and moral strength. Since brute strength does not constitute the will to power, its attainment is possible only when a man succeeds in overcoming himself through the sublimation of his instincts.

Why is this sublimation important? Every moral system implies a control of man's passions and instincts. But since the conception of morality varies from society to society, moral codes of self-overcoming have also varied. This problem has arisen owing to the fact that moral codes have made clear-cut distinctions between what is moral and what is

⁶⁴Ibid., 2: 12, p. 137.

⁶⁵Kaufmann, Walter, op. cit., p. 206.

⁶⁶Nietzsche, F., Thus Spoke Zarathustra, op. cit., 2: 12, p. 138.

⁶⁷Nietzsche, F., Beyond Good and Evil, op. cit., aphorism 13, p. 21. (Translator's italics.)

⁶⁸Ibid., aphorism 36, p. 48.

immoral. Nietzsche maintains that there can be no absolute standards of good and evil, right and wrong. In the words of Zarathustra: "I found much that was called evil in one place was in another decked with purple honors".⁶⁹ Hence, says Zarathustra, "this power of praising and blaming is a monster".⁷⁰ Before judging any action, we must take into account the intrinsic value of human instincts and emotions whereby good can arise from even the most awesome and inhuman feelings. Such baser instincts can be sublimated through reason and used for constructive purposes. Kaufmann provides examples of how this can be done:

A sexual impulse . . . could be channeled into a creative spiritual activity instead of being fulfilled directly. Similarly, the barbarian's desire to torture his foe can be sublimated into the desire to defeat one's rival, say, in the Olympic contests; it can even be sublimated into the rivalry of the tragedians who vie with each other for the highest prize.⁷¹

Reason, says Nietzsche, enables man to make a "tremendous self-examination"⁷² and gain an insight into his instincts. This will give him power over himself and over nature. Thus while a man who is a slave to his sexual urges is base, Reason enables him (if he so desires) to channel these urges into more creative directions. Nietzsche preferred a man with strong

⁶⁹ Nietzsche, F., Thus Spoke Zarathustra, op. cit., 1: 15, p. 84.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 1: 15, p. 86.

⁷¹ Kaufmann, Walter, op. cit., p. 220. Kaufmann notes that while both Jaspers, op. cit., and Morgan, op. cit., mention the term 'sublimation' while commenting on Nietzsche's thoughts, they pay little attention to its importance in his philosophy (p. 218).

⁷² Nietzsche, F., The Will to Power, op. cit., III, 585, p. 316.

impulses than one with no impulses. "The force and power of the senses -- that is most essential in a successful and complete man: the splendid animal must be given first -- else what does all 'humanization' matter?"⁷³ A true culture which Nietzsche envisaged for the future needs men who are able to control and sublimate their impulses, and not suppress them.

The second manifestation of the basic force of the Will to Power is Geist, that is Spirit. In man, this Spirit could take two forms -- to obey or to command. But in both forms, the will to power is manifested. Those who obey do so because they believe that through conformity they can achieve success having won the respect of society as 'good' men. But even they desire to be masters "over those weaker still". Nietzsche, however, considers these people to be weak. The only way they can achieve power is to "steal the power".⁷⁴ The man who truly aspires to the Will to Power is the one who knows how to command -- he is the strong man. He is also the creative man and hence does not feel obliged to obey existing laws. The creative man creates through the greatness of his own mind and soul. "Greatness of soul", says Nietzsche, "is independence".⁷⁵ Thus we have composers, like

⁷³ Morgan, George A. Jr., op. cit., p. 130.

⁷⁴ Nietzsche, F., Thus Spoke Zarathustra, op. cit., 2: 12, pp. 137-138.

⁷⁵ Nietzsche, F., The Will to Power, op. cit., VI, 984, p. 514.
(Translator's italics.)

Beethoven, who did not feel obliged to create music according to the laws laid down by their predecessors. As far as music is concerned, Beethoven was a law unto himself.⁷⁶ Even Jesus, says Nietzsche, preached that the strong should be a law unto themselves when he said to his disciples: "The law was for servants What are morals to us sons of God".⁷⁷

But, says Rosenow, Nietzsche does not preach 'lawlessness' and 'liberation from everything'. For a man to find a way to himself, the way of creation, he must undergo great pain and suffering, and this is something not everyone can undergo.⁷⁸ Zarathustra himself asks: "Do you call yourself free? I want to hear your ruling idea, and not that you have escaped from a yoke. Are you such a man as ought to escape a yoke? There are many who threw off their final worth when they threw off their bondage. Free from what? Zarathustra does not care about that. But your eye should clearly tell me: free for what?".⁷⁹ This, says Rosenow, shows that "the Nietzschean freedom . . . does not mean 'freedom from' but 'freedom for', and it involves on the part of man the assumption of the heaviest responsibility . . . for his own good and bad actions".⁸⁰ As Zarathustra says, "Can you furnish yourself with your

⁷⁶Kaufmann, Walter, op. cit., p. 250.

⁷⁷Nietzsche, F., Beyond Good and Evil, op. cit., aphorism 164, p. 91

⁷⁸Rosenow, Eliyahu, op. cit., p. 363.

⁷⁹Nietzsche, F., Thus Spoke Zarathustra, op. cit., 1: 17, p. 89.
(Translator's italics.)

⁸⁰Rosenow, Eliyahu, op. cit., p. 354.

own good and evil and hang up your own will above yourself as a law? Can you be judge of yourself and avenger of your law?".⁸¹ If a man is to become his own master, he has to practice self-obedience and self-legislation -- two difficult tasks that also have the added burden of loneliness. Isolation is the lot of the Superman since there are many in Society who cannot stand the sight of the exceptional person and throw "injustice and dirt" at him. But Nietzsche exhorts the Superman to go on his lonesome way undeterred for "if you want to be a star, you must shine none the less brightly for them on that account".⁸²

That Nietzsche was opposed to the unrestrained use of the impulses can be seen in the following aphorism:

To "give style" to one's character -- that is a grand and a rare art. He who surveys all that his nature presents in its strength and in its weakness, and then fashions it into an ingenious plan, until everything appears artistic and rational, and even the weaknesses enchant the eyes -- exercises that admirable art.

He goes on to say that the strong do not object to some restraints being placed upon them because they know that they can shape these restraints to achieve perfection under their own law. But,

it is the reverse with weak characters who have not power over themselves, and hate the restrictions of style: they feel that if this repugnant constraint

⁸¹Nietzsche, F., Thus Spoke Zarathustra, op. cit., 1: 17, p. 89.

⁸²Ibid., 1: 17, p. 90.

were laid upon them, they would necessarily become vulgarised under it: they become slaves as soon as they serve, they hate service. Such intellects . . . are always concerned with fashioning and interpreting themselves and their surroundings as free nature -- wild, arbitrary, fantastic, confused and surprising.

And he concludes that

man should attain to satisfaction with himself
He who is dissatisfied with himself is ever ready to
avenge himself on that account⁸³

Hence, to achieve the true will to power, man has to learn how to command and to create, but this creativity has to come from within, and it can come only if he first learns how to command himself.

The Will to Power thus becomes the natural result of rationality since the rational man refuses to accept anything until he has examined it carefully. Even then, his acceptance can only be tentative, for, says Nietzsche, "the will to logical truth can be carried through only after a fundamental falsification of all events is assumed".⁸⁴

Rationality, however, can cause suffering since it may bring us into conflict with our basic instincts. However, this suffering is part of the price one must pay to achieve the Will to Power. Nietzsche cites the example of Brutus to prove this point:

⁸³ Nietzsche, F., Joyful Wisdom, op. cit., IV, 290, pp. 223-224.
(Translator's italics.)

⁸⁴ Nietzsche, F., The Will to Power, op. cit., III, 512, p. 277.

Independence of soul -- that is the question at issue. No sacrifice can be too great there: one must be able to sacrifice to it even one's dearest friend, although he be the grandest of men, the ornament of the world, the genius without peer.⁸⁵

However, rationality has its compensations since it fosters strength in man -- not physical, but mental and moral -- and this in turn brings true happiness. Nietzsche realizes that his Will to Power is a fearful doctrine and in the face of it, "the weak and the failures shall perish",⁸⁶ but it will bring hope to the strong since it asserts their rights to create values,⁸⁷ and it is only the strong who can face the doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence with equanimity.

The Doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence

The urgent need for creating new values was obviously on Nietzsche's mind when he put forward his doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence. It makes its first appearance in an aphorism in Joyful Wisdom in which Nietzsche asks some very penetrating questions:

What if a demon crept after thee into thy loneliest loneliness some day or night, and said to thee: "This life, as thou livest it at present, and hast lived it, thou must live it once more, and also innumerable times; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and every sigh, and all the unspeakably small and great in thy life must come to thee again, and all

⁸⁵Nietzsche, F., Joyful Wisdom, op. cit., II, 98, p. 131.

⁸⁶Nietzsche, F., The Antichrist, op. cit., section 2, p. 570.

⁸⁷Nietzsche, F., Beyond Good and Evil, op. cit., aphorism 261, p. 209.

in the same series and sequence" Wouldst thou not throw thyself down and gnash thy teeth, and curse the demon that so spake? Or hast thou once experienced a tremendous moment in which thou wouldst answer him: "Thou art a God, and never did I hear anything so divine". If that thought acquired power over thee as thou art it would transform thee and perhaps crush thee; the question with regard to all and everything: "Dost thou want this once more and also for innumerable times?" would lie as the heaviest burden upon thy activity. Or, how wouldst thou have to become favorably inclined to thyself and to life, so as to long for nothing more ardently than for this last eternal sanctioning and sealing.⁸⁸

Reduced to simple terms, Eternal Recurrence means that whatever is at the present moment will come again, since whatever is is merely a repetition several times over again of whatever has been in the past. Without beginning or end, the whole cycle of events repeats itself continuously. Nietzsche believed that identical things have happened in the past and will do so in the future. Thus, he has Zarathustra say:

"Now I die and decay", you would say, "and in an instant I shall be nothingness"
 "But the complex of causes in which I am entangled will recur -- it will create me again. I myself am part of these causes of the eternal recurrence".
 "I shall return . . . not to a new life or a better life or a similar life:
 I shall return eternally to this identical and self-same life in the greatest things and in the smallest"89

⁸⁸ Nietzsche, F., Joyful Wisdom, op. cit., IV, 341, pp. 270-271.

⁸⁹ Nietzsche, F., Thus Spoke Zarathustra, op. cit., III, 13: 2, pp. 237-238. (Translator's italics.)

Danto criticizes the doctrine on the grounds that it is unscientific. He claims that it is based on the assumption that the universe is infinite in time and space and hence events in it must have occurred an infinite number of times. But it is not certain whether the universe is infinite in extent. Moreover, if two things represent each other so closely how are we to tell them apart since there is no evidence that there are two things to be distinguished from each other. If they could be told apart then at the point of differentiation they would negate the theory.⁹⁰

However, says Richard Schacht, Nietzsche is "less concerned with the truth of the doctrine than with the cultivation of an affirmative attitude toward life so great that one not only could endure the thought of an eternal recurrence of the same series of events which has produced and is the existing world, but moreover could desire such a recurrence. To will the eternal recurrence of the same events is for Nietzsche the ultimate expression of an affirmative attitude toward

⁹⁰ Danto, Arthur C., op. cit., p. 204. It should be stated here, however, that this thesis is not concerned with whether the doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence is scientific or not. I am inclined to agree with Ivan Soll (cf. 'Reflections on Recurrence' in Nietzsche. A Collection of Critical Essays, op. cit., p. 323) that Nietzsche never raised the issue whether his doctrine of Eternal Recurrence deserves to be believed. Soll says, "Nietzsche is drawn by the distinction between an attitude toward oneself, life and the world that would dispose one to want to reject the doctrine of eternal recurrence no matter how strong or weak the evidence for it might be and an opposite attitude that would dispose one to want to believe it, regardless of its degree of theoretical plausibility".

life".⁹¹ In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche puts forward "the ideal of the most high-spirited, alive, and world-affirming human being who has not only come to terms and learned to get along with whatever was and is, but who wants to have what was and is repeated into all eternity".⁹²

From the point of view of human existence, the doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence is very important. First of all, it saves man from despair for though it may make him aware of the fact that he cannot change his past mistakes, it also makes him rejoice at the thought that whatever good he has done will be repeated and thus assure him of immortality. In existential terms, as Danto remarks, the doctrine is a plea for authenticity in human existence. It does not rule out immortality in a future existence. Only, this immortality will not be spent in heaven or hell but right in this world.⁹³ Secondly, since man realizes that the evil he does will also be repeated, it will help him modify his life so that he can keep the hollowness out of it and live it to the fullest. This is the first step in the process of overcoming. Thirdly, by removing both from the world and from man the notion that there is a goal or purpose higher than the one found in life, it makes man aware of the fact that unless he provides a meaning to his life, it

⁹¹Schacht, Richard, 'Nietzsche and Nihilism' in Nietzsche. A Collection of Critical Essays, op. cit., p. 68. (Author's italics.)

⁹²Nietzsche, F., Beyond Good and Evil, op. cit., aphorism 56, p. 68. (Translator's italics.)

⁹³Danto, Arthur C., op. cit., p. 212-213.

will always remain meaningless. Unless he provides it with value and significance, he can never look forward with joy to its recurrence.

"My formula for greatness in a human being," says Nietzsche, "is amor fati: that one wants nothing to be different, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity".⁹⁴

The basic value of the doctrine is twofold. First of all, it rejects nihilistic pessimism since a person is required to accept all his mistakes without regret. Secondly, it places a high premium on human existence and compels everyone to regard every moment as being precious since there is a constant need for affirming life so that we would be willing to accept it again in an identical manner. To the 'Ultimate Man', no doubt, this doctrine would spell disaster since all he can look forward to is a monotonous display of a wasted life. And Nietzsche regretted that as the world was progressing, the human species of the future would degenerate. Regretfully he tells us that

man as a species is not progressing. Higher types are indeed attained, but they do not last. The level of the species is not raised.

Among men . . . the higher types . . . perish most easily as fortunes change.⁹⁵

Zarathustra, too, speaks in a similar vein when he says:

⁹⁴Nietzsche, F., Ecce Homo, op. cit., 'Why I am so Clever', 10, p. 258. (Translator's italics.)

⁹⁵Nietzsche, F., The Will to Power, op. cit., III, 684, p. 363. (Translator's italics.)

Alas! The time is coming when man will give birth to no more stars. Alas! The time of the most contemptible man is coming, the man who can no longer despise himself. 'What is love? What is creation? What is longing? What is a star?' thus asks the Ultimate Man and blinks.⁹⁶

Perhaps by putting forward the doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence, Nietzsche felt that he could jolt an insulated world into realizing the necessity for creating the Superman. For the Superman, the creator, the Eternal Recurrence holds no terrors. He will seek out alternatives to all that he finds unpleasant. He will make a further reaffirmation of life so that when it recurs in future, it will be in its new and more sublime form -- something to look forward to.

Nietzsche set himself the herculean task of transforming the Darwinian ape-man into a god-man. He had full faith that deep down in man there lies the possibility of a great future, despite the fact that the world generally is inimical toward him. Man needs to justify his existence not in any moral sense but through achieving perfection. This is possible through providing him with the type of education suitable for him, something which will enable him to practice (if he so desires) the only true virtues, namely, self-discipline, self-obedience, and creativity. The only enemy that stands in man's way toward achieving perfection is himself. Thus Zarathustra says: "But you

⁹⁶ Nietzsche, F., Thus Spoke Zarathustra, op. cit., Prologues: 5, p. 46. (Translator's italics.)

yourself will always be the worst enemy you can encounter".⁹⁷ Often man's impulses are recalcitrant; often he is too indolent to say 'no' to all that would seek to hold him back. Nietzsche maintained that it is essential for man to negate all that is not conducive to the realization of his ideal which is to become a Superman. By saying 'no' he liberates himself and is now in a position to assert the Self. But, as Rosenow indicates, "the liberation from conventions and the creation of one's own law are not a single, one-time act which leads to happiness. It involves a constant struggle with one's wildest passions, with the barbaric element in one's soul The liberation for the sake of creation and self-legislation is a process which has to be gradual and through which one must be guided. One should not skip any of the stages leading towards it".⁹⁸

"Nietzsche is more truly the philosopher for our age", says William Barrett.⁹⁹ There is no reason to doubt this statement, and hence I believe it is the task of education to seek the answers to the various questions that Nietzsche posed and thus serve its all important purpose which is the creation of the man of tomorrow -- The Superman.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 1: 17, p. 90.

⁹⁸ Rosenow, Eliyahu, op. cit., p. 364.

⁹⁹ Barrett, William, Irrational Man, (New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1958), p. 181.

CHAPTER III

THE SUPERMAN

Nietzsche maintained that the true goal of education had to be the creation of a few picked men for great and lasting works.¹ He criticized any attempt to educate the masses for these people "were born to serve and obey".² He blamed the State for being an enemy of "true culture" by seeking, through education, to emancipate "the masses from the mastery of the great few" when, in reality, "the most sacred hierarchy in the kingdom of the intellect" is "the servitude of the masses, their submissive obedience, their instinct of loyalty to the rule of genius".³ Higher education, especially, was not for the masses, and Nietzsche maintained that instead of increasing the number of higher institutions, there should be a fewer number of such institutions, and these should cater exclusively to the superior men.⁴ Hillesheim has noted that Nietzsche is not suggesting that Society form a social pyramid based on those of the past where "the vortex" was formed by "men of military, political and economic strength". Rather, the vortex is to be

¹Nietzsche, F., 'The Future of Our Educational Institutions', op. cit., p. 519.

²Ibid., Nietzsche is not implying that the masses should remain uneducated but merely that their education is of secondary importance.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

formed by the Supermen of the passionate but controlled mind. Modern man has forgotten that some sort of "order" or "rank" is absolutely essential. Similar to Aristotle, Nietzsche believed that "some men are born to obey; others to command". Some are slaves by nature; others, rulers. Unfortunately, "the laws of a country have not coincided with the laws of nature" with the result that the "natural" slaves have not been recognized and allowed to function accordingly, while real rulers have often been "natural slaves".⁵

The first reference to the Superman (though not under this name) is in Joyful Wisdom, where he is equated with the gods and heroes of antiquity and is set up as antithesis to mediocrity and stagnation. Such a man has refused to conform but rather wishes to establish his individuality. He rejects "eternal horizons and perspectives" while enjoying the power "to create".⁶

In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, where the term makes its first appearance, the attainment to the status of the Superman takes the form of self-overcoming. In his first speech to the masses, Zarathustra says: "I teach you the Superman. Man is something that should be overcome".⁷ It is obvious, says R.J. Hollingdale, that "the 'superman'

⁵Hillesheim, J.W., 'Nietzsche Agonistes', op. cit., p. 350.

⁶Nietzsche, F., Joyful Wisdom, op. cit., III, 143, pp. 178ff. (Translator's italics.)

⁷Nietzsche, F., Thus Spoke Zarathustra, op. cit., Prologues: 3, p. 41. (Translator's italics.)

is a certain type of man, and not . . . a form of life destined to supercede man".⁸ Zarathustra claims that the Superman is the "meaning of the earth" because he remains "true to the earth". He has great contempt for what is unearthly. In a state of what may best be described as creative insanity, he rejects "happiness", "reason", "virtue", "justice", and "pity" as being "poverty, dirt and miserable ease".⁹

The fact that Thus Spoke Zarathustra is the only book in which the Superman is dealt with in detail may lead to the erroneous conclusion that Nietzsche abandoned the entire idea as unfeasible. In fact, Kaufmann asserts that the race of the Superman is not a possibility. He uses Zarathustra's statement that "man is a rope fastened between animal and Superman -- a rope over an abyss"¹⁰ to imply that man lives "between two worlds and reaches out for ideals he cannot attain short of crossing an apparently insuperable abyss".¹¹ Yet one must question Kaufmann's interpretation of this point for nowhere in Zarathustra does Nietzsche even imply this belief.¹² Moreover, the last part of The Will to Power (a

⁸Hollingdale, R.J., op. cit., p. 98. (Author's italics.)

⁹Nietzsche, F., Thus Spoke Zarathustra, op. cit., Prologues: 3, pp. 42-43. (Translator's italics.)

¹⁰Ibid., Prologues: 4, p. 43.

¹¹Kaufmann, W., op. cit., p. 310.

¹²The story of the tight-rope walker who stumbles and falls to his death while boldly plying his trade (Zarathustra, op. cit., pp. 42-48) can be better interpreted as a warning that anyone on his way to becoming a Superman should have confidence in himself and not be assailed by doubts. The tight-rope walker perishes because he does not have within himself the requirements for becoming a Superman.

book containing the notes that Nietzsche intended to develop in subsequent books) deals almost in its entirety with the idea of the Superman and contains the famous statement: "Not ('mankind' but Superman is the goal".¹³

In a chapter entitled 'Of the three Metamorphoses' in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche indicates the three stages through which any man will have to pass to become the Superman.¹⁴ The initial stage is that of the camel, the load-bearing animal. His attitude is that of submission and reverence. He voluntarily submits himself to the strictest discipline and patiently endures the maximum load imposed by

¹³ Nietzsche, F., The Will to Power, op. cit., IV, 1001, p. 519. (Translator's italics.) It should be remembered that owing to his tragic breakdown, Nietzsche was unable to develop several of his earlier ideas.

¹⁴ These three stages are not similar to the three stages enumerated by Søren Kierkegaard in Either/Or, translated by Walter Lowrie, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959). First of all, Nietzsche could not have read Kierkegaard since it was not before the last few months of 1888, only a short while before his final tragic breakdown, that Georg Brandes drew his attention to the works of the Danish philosopher (cf. Kaufmann, W., op. cit., p. 125). Secondly, Kierkegaard's 'religious man', that is the highest stage, has to make a leap into faith and confront God. In this confrontation, in fear and trembling, man will create values hoping to receive divine sanction. This implies man's ultimate submission to God. Nietzsche, however, seeks no supernatural sanction for the values created by the Superman. He excludes God totally from human existence, and resists any desire for making a great 'leap into faith' (cf. The Will to Power, op. cit., IV, 1038, pp. 534-535). Without God there is chaos, and this is the only possibility for true creation and the realization of the Superman (cf. Breisach, Ernst, op. cit., pp. 45-47). He, in fact, ridicules the entire idea of a great leap into faith and refers to it as "weariness that wants to reach the ultimate with one leap, a poor ignorant weariness that does not want to want any more". (Thus Spoke Zarathustra, op. cit., I: 3, p. 59.)

the law and traditional morality without any qualms of conscience since he has to know against what evils the struggle must be waged.

Next comes the stage of the lion that seeks freedom from the bondage imposed by the dragon of the law, tradition and belief that arrogantly claims: "All the values of things -- glitter on me. All values have already been created, and all created values -- are in me. Truly, there shall be no more 'I will'". The lion, however, insists on the 'I will' and enters into contest with the dragon. This contest reaches a stalemate since, though the lion asserts its freedom, it has nothing positive to hurl against the dragon. It remains in the middle stage of the road from 'no' to 'yes'.

The final stage is that of the child who is creative out of his pure and joyous innocence. He has the healthy and strong will to say 'yes' to life, and to create incessantly.¹⁵

Though he claimed that men like Goethe, Napoleon and Julius Caesar came closest to the ideal of the Superman, Nietzsche hastens to add:

There has never yet been a Superman. I have seen them both naked, the greatest and the smallest man. They are still all-too-similar to one another. Truly, I found even the greatest man all-too-human.¹⁶

He blames Society for the failure to create the Superman. Society, he maintains, prefers stereotypes and seeks to keep down the "higher type"

¹⁵ Nietzsche, F., Thus Spoke Zarathustra, op. cit., 1: 1, pp. 54ff.

¹⁶ Ibid., 2: 4, p. 117.

of man. Even when a "higher type" of man does appear it is the result of "a fortunate accident" and not the intentional product of Society.¹⁷ Nietzsche says that Society has failed to realize that the Supermen do not have to be subservient to it or conform to its norms since they, as individuals, represent in themselves all that is best in Society.¹⁸ Nietzsche believed that Society should not look "at masses but at individuals who form a sort of bridge over the stream of becoming". Its goal has therefore to be the cultivation of the highest specimens. The Superman's task is to emphasize the "will to live" and to do this he has to destroy all existing foundations and resolve them "into the ever-flowing stream of becoming."¹⁹

Zarathustra introduces the concept of the Superman just after he has announced the death of God. This awesome incident has resulted in chaos and the loss of traditional values. It has, therefore, become necessary for man to create individual values. Such values can be created by any man provided he has a firm belief in his own destiny and practices the virtues of self-overcoming and self-obedience. But since not all men wish to practice such virtues, the task of creating values is left to the Superman who has now to occupy the throne vacated by God on earth. Since it is within the nature of most men to desire to worship something, Zarathustra provides them with someone on a par with

¹⁷ Nietzsche, F., The Antichrist, op. cit., section 3, p. 570.

¹⁸ Nietzsche, F., 'Twilight of the Idols', translated by Walter Kaufmann in The Portable Nietzsche, op. cit., 7: 44, pp. 547-548.

¹⁹ Nietzsche, F., The Use and Abuse of History, op. cit., IX, pp. 54ff.

God Himself -- the Superman. Zarathustra tells the people: "Once you said 'God' when you gazed upon distant seas; but now I have taught you to say 'Superman'".²⁰ Rosenow observes that "God is nothing but a human conjecture and an object of human desire. Therefore the concept of God is legitimate only as long as it is conceived of within the boundaries of human will and of human understanding Nietzsche . . . requires that God qua Superman be humanly conceivable and humanly sensible" so that man can consider it "to be his own human creation".²¹ Rosenow further adds that any authority "which is not grounded in human consciousness and in human understanding is totally unacceptable" to Nietzsche.²² This is indicated by the fact that Zarathustra tells his listeners that God is a supposition that should go no further than their creating will. They should not concern themselves with a metaphysical God which they cannot create, but instead, try to work at creating the Superman. This will enable them to create "the World" in their image by their reason, will and love.²³ On man alone devolves the task of creating the rulers who will be the Supermen.

Initially, the task of revaluating old values and creating new ones is difficult even for the Superman. He has to overcome his fear, for it is out of this fear that virtue grows and so does courage "with

²⁰ Nietzsche, F., Thus Spoke Zarathustra, op. cit., 2: 2, p. 109./

²¹ Rosenow, Eliyahu, op. cit., p. 363.

²² Ibid.

²³ Nietzsche, F., Thus Spoke Zarathustra, op. cit., 2: 2, p. 110.

eagle's wings and serpent's wisdom".²⁴ This courage enables him to say 'nay' to everything that hinders self-development; it enables him to burn a 'No' into his soul against all recalcitrant impulses and abandon current beliefs and false hopes. He knows that by doing this he will be hated by the "good and the just" because he has smashed their "tables of values": but in his own heart he knows that he is "a creator".²⁵ Once he has said 'No' to everything that is not conducive to the realization of his ideal, and has destroyed all false gods, false loyalties and false traditions, the way is now clear for him to see the truth and make a strong affirmation of life and create for himself and for others a sound and permanent culture. Nietzsche declares that

such a spirit who has become free stands amid the cosmos with a joyous and trusting fatalism, in the faith that only the particular is loathsome, and that all is redeemed and affirmed in the world -- he does not negate anymore. Such a faith, however, is the highest of all possible faiths.²⁶

But Nietzsche cautions us that this path of joyful wisdom to the Superman lies only in the context of misfortune. "The path to one's own heaven" he says, "always leads through the voluptuousness of one's own hell".²⁷

²⁴Ibid., 4: 15, p. 312.

²⁵Ibid., Prologues: 9, p. 51.

²⁶Nietzsche, F., Twilight of the Idols, op. cit., 9: 49, p. 554. It should be noted that the vitality and the elan vital with which Nietzsche infuses his 'will to live', at least in the case of Superman, is in sharp contrast with the lack-lustre and pessimistic 'will to exist' put forward by Arthur Schopenhauer whom he first admired but later rejected. (cf. The Philosophy of Schopenhauer, translated by Irwin Erdman, New York: The Modern Library, Inc., 1928.)

²⁷Nietzsche, F., Joyful Wisdom, op. cit., IV, 338, p. 266.

Nietzsche must have realized that there was always the danger of misinterpreting his conception of the Superman,²⁸ and in The Antichrist he proceeded to point out that he was not speaking of a "higher type" as the product of a supposedly advancing mankind but as something that could be achieved intentionally, with proper education, in diverse cultures in his day:

The problem I thus pose is not what shall succeed mankind in the sequence of living beings (man is an end), but what type of man shall be bred, shall be willed, for being higher in value, worthier of life, more certain of a future. Even in the past this higher type has appeared often -- but as a fortunate accident, as an exception, never as something willed.²⁹

And again:

²⁸Even the word 'Superman' causes confusion. Danto refuses to translate the word 'Uebermensch' since he feels that the prefix 'super' can be misleading and denote a rather more athletic ideal than Nietzsche intended. (cf. Danto, Arthur, op. cit., p. 196). Kaufmann uses the word 'overman' since he claims that George Bernard Shaw gave the word 'Superman' an ironic tinge which is still maintained by the comic books. (cf. The Portable Nietzsche, op. cit., p. 115). There is no reason, however, for not using the word 'Superman'. Serious students will disregard any incidental connotations and understand that the prefix 'super' is not used in the sense of 'extraordinary', as something beyond the nature, the reach or the ability of man. Rather, the intention is to imply something 'beyond the nature of the ordinary' in man. This is how the term 'Superman' is to be understood in this study.

²⁹Nietzsche, F., The Antichrist, op. cit., section 3, p. 570. (Translator's italics.)

Mankind does not represent a development toward something better or stronger or higher in the sense accepted today Further development is altogether not according to any necessity in the direction of elevation, enhancement, or strength Success in individual cases is constantly encountered in the most widely different places and cultures: here we really do find a higher type . . . a kind of superman.³⁰

Well over two thousand years ago, Plato in The Republic³¹ had emphasized the need for a special education for the superior human beings who would be the leaders. Plato called them 'philosopher-kings' but there are essential differences between his concept and Nietzsche's which must be considered in order to make Nietzsche's position clearer.³²

First of all, the philosopher-king is educated by a teacher who believes in moulding him fully in the name of an Idea which is metaphysical perfection. However, as Rosenow indicates, Zarathustra, Nietzsche's teacher par excellence, considers metaphysical perfection as only forming a part of life since it is only one of the ways in

³⁰ Ibid., section 4, p. 571. (Translator's italics.)

³¹ Plato, The Republic, translated by Francis MacDonald Cornford, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968).

³² Lucien in the second century A.D., and in more recent times writers like Heinrich Muller, J.G. Herder, Jean Paul and J.W. von Goethe had all used the term 'Superman' before Nietzsche. Nietzsche, however, made it symbolic of the repudiation of any conformity to a single norm: an antithesis to mediocrity and stagnation. (cf. Kaufmann, Walter, op. cit., pp. 307-309.)

which man can express himself.³³

Secondly, Plato believed that the student could learn the Truth because "truth is common to all and is latent in everyone" and, since he identified the absolute Idea with the truth, his student could be shown the truth. Nietzsche, however, identifies the absolute Idea with man's authentic being and hence, his student had to discover the truth. However, Plato admitted that some people cannot face the truth and similarly, Nietzsche believed that many will not go in search of the truth.³⁴

Thirdly, as Rosenow points out, while the education of the philosopher-king possesses an "ontological, ethical and aesthetic meaning", the Superman's education "has no meaning beyond the aesthetic".³⁵ The Nietzschean education "is an aesthetic justification of existence".³⁵

Fourthly, the Platonic teacher remains with the student throughout his education, moulding him according to his (the teacher's) conception. Consequently, the teacher's approach can be described as objective in the sense that it makes the teacher the subject and the pupil the object.³⁶ On the other hand, Nietzsche's approach to the education of the Superman can be described as subjective since he makes the teacher, Zarathustra

³³Rosenow, Eliyahu, op. cit., p. 367.

³⁴Ibid., (italics added).

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Ibid., p. 368.

insist that his disciples leave him and even rebel against him in their search for the truth.³⁷

Fifthly, Plato maintained that the philosopher-king will not be ready to rule until he is at least fifty. He believed that younger people (even those as old as thirty years of age) are incapable of forming independent opinions or judgements; rather, they prefer to imitate others. An older person, however, is capable of seeking his own truth and is not swayed by the opinions of others.³⁸ In Twilight of the Idols when Nietzsche criticizes the undue haste in education, he is not suggesting that an individual should reach a certain age before he can be considered to be ready to assume the role of the Superman. All he is implying is that each individual be provided with all the time he needs. Hence, Nietzsche's statement that "at thirty one is . . . a beginner, a child",³⁹ is not to be regarded as a universal truth. The very fact that Nietzsche wants the teacher to abandon his student in the middle of the education road should indicate that those who can become rulers or leaders will have earlier opportunities to do so. Nietzsche's call is for individual opportunities wherein each person takes his own time -- a time not determined either by the State or by the schools.

³⁷ Nietzsche, F., Thus Spoke Zarathustra, op. cit., 1: 22 (3), p. 103.

³⁸ Plato, The Republic, op. cit., vii, 539-540, pp. 261-262.

³⁹ Nietzsche, F., Twilight of the Idols, op. cit., 8: 5, pp. 510-511.

Lastly, the philosopher-king has to believe in God and in personal immortality after death. In other words, faith is a vital part of his make-up. Plato believed that God can bring relief to the distressed and encourage the embattled.⁴⁰ God is not responsible for evil, Plato insists, and adds, "whereas the good must be ascribed to heaven only, we must look elsewhere for the cause of evils".⁴² Plato is at pains to explain that though there is no way of proving either the existence of God or of a life after death, there is no harm and perhaps a lot of good done in believing these ideas. Nietzsche's Superman, on the other hand, refuses to assign God any role in human existence for this would deprive man of his freedom of action. The belief that God approves or disapproves of what every man does will diminish the value of man.⁴³ "The concept of God", says Nietzsche, "is the greatest objection to existence",⁴⁴ Neither does the Superman place any reliance on faith. Faith and a belief that God knows the intimate thoughts of man, asserts Nietzsche, would presuppose that "man does not know . . . what is good for him, what evil".⁴⁵ Such beliefs are unworthy of the

⁴⁰Plato, The Republic, op. cit., II, 377-389, pp. 68ff.

⁴¹Ibid., II, 378, p. 71.

⁴²Plato, 'Phaedo', translated by Benjamin Jowett in The Philosophy of Plato, (New York: Modern Library, 1928), pp. 100ff.

⁴³Nietzsche, F., Twilight of the Idols, op. cit., 6: 8, pp. 500-501. Also cf. The Will to Power, op. cit., II, 243, 245, pp. 140-141 and Ecce Homo, op. cit., 'Why I am so clever', 3, pp. 242ff.

⁴⁴Ibid., 6: 8, p. 501.

⁴⁵Ibid., 9: 5, p. 516.

Superman.

That Nietzsche would have devoted an entire book to the Superman is indicated by the fact that part two of a four-part Revaluation of All Values was tentatively entitled 'The Free Spirit'.⁴⁶ Time, however, ran out on him after he had only completed the first part, The Antichrist, and so, though we can say that the Superman vastly differs from Plato's philosopher-king, we have only one aphorism in Nietzsche's notes, The Will to Power, in which his characteristics are listed. This is what Nietzsche has to say about this unique person;

He enjoys the taste of what is wholesome for him;
his pleasure in anything ceases when the bounds
of the wholesome are crossed;
he divines the remedies for partial injuries;
he has illnesses as great stimulants of his life;
he knows how to exploit ill chances;
he grows stronger through the accidents that
threaten to destroy him;
he instinctively gathers from all that he sees,
hears, experiences, what advances his main concern --
he follows a principle of selection -- he allows much
to fall through;
he reacts with the slowness bred by a long caution
and a deliberate pride -- he tests a stimulus for its
origin and its intentions, he does not submit;
he is always in his own company, whether he deals
with books, men or landscapes;
he honors by choosing, by admitting, by trusting.⁴⁷

Taken as they are from mere notes, these descriptions tend to be vague,
and hence the best solution is to draw a composite picture of the

⁴⁶ cf. Kaufmann, W., The Portable Nietzsche, op. cit., pp. 565, 657.

⁴⁷ Nietzsche, F., The Will to Power, op. cit., IV, 1003, p. 520.
(Translator's italics.)

Superman from the various statements Nietzsche made concerning him.

Nietzsche maintained that every man had in himself superhuman, human and animalistic instincts. He says,

In man creature and creator are united; in man there is material, fragment, excess, clay, dirt, nonsense, chaos; but in man there is also creator, form-giver, hammer hardness, spectator, divinity, and seventh day.⁴⁸

The human and the animalistic instincts represent the true self of man, and it is entirely up to him as to which of these instincts are allowed to predominate. However, only the Superman is really capable of rising above the animalistic and should be provided with all the help he needs since, says Nietzsche, the goal of humanity lies not in the end but in the breeding of the highest specimens.⁴⁹ Such men are values in themselves and need be of no instrumental value to the rest of society⁵⁰ who, according to Nietzsche, count for little since they are nothing better than "shopkeepers", "Christians", "cows", and "other democrats"⁵¹ -- terms which he specially reserves for all those he regards with contempt. The Supermen "find their happiness where others would find their destruction". They are hard toward themselves and

⁴⁸ Nietzsche, F., Beyond Good and Evil, op. cit., aphorism 225, p. 154. (Translator's italics.)

⁴⁹ Nietzsche, F., The Use and Abuse of History, op. cit., IX, pp. 61ff. Note that 'breeding' is mentioned in the context of the whole of humanity, not of any particular race.

⁵⁰ Nietzsche, F., Twilight of the Idols, op. cit., 9: 44, pp. 547ff.

⁵¹ Ibid., 9: 38, p. 542.

toward others. They delight in "self-conquest" and "ascetism". For them "difficult tasks are a privilege" and they "play with burdens which crush others". They seek knowledge wherever they can find it.⁵²

The Superman also knows how to exercise his freedom. He is like a warrior who never once allows his freedom to degenerate into a search for "pleasure". He uses his freedom for purposes of overcoming. Since he is "the Roman Caesar with Christ's soul",⁵³ it is obvious that he cannot become a tyrant, not because he cannot be one, but because he refrains from becoming one. Nietzsche tells us that

the highest type of free men should be sought where the highest resistance is constantly overcome; five steps from tyranny, close to the threshold of the danger of servitude. This is true psychologically if by 'tyrants' are meant inexorable and fearful instincts that provoke the maximum of authority and discipline against themselves.⁵⁴

Such people are also the "kindest" and "most cheerful" of men. "They rule not because they want to but, because they are; they are not free to be second".⁵⁵ Instead of seeking their own advantage they rather choose to deny themselves".⁵⁶ They do not collapse under the weight of

⁵² Nietzsche, F., The Antichrist, op. cit., section 57, p. 645.

⁵³ Nietzsche, F., The Will to Power, op. cit., IV, 983, p. 513.

⁵⁴ Nietzsche, F., Twilight of the Idols, op. cit., 9: 38, p. 542.

⁵⁵ Nietzsche, F., The Antichrist, op. cit., section 57, p. 646.
(Translator's italics.)

⁵⁶ Nietzsche, F., The Will to Power, op. cit., II, 379, p. 204.

heavy responsibility.⁵⁷

The Superman has to combine in himself "a brief abstract of man", his "higher and lower desires". He must also "be just and fair in the highest sense, but profound in love, hate and injustice". He should not content himself with remaining a "spectator" but should become a "legislator".⁵⁸

Nietzsche believed that the man who acts rationally on instinct is superior to the man who acts impulsively or the one who counteracts his impulses.⁵⁹ For Nietzsche, 'instinct' implies the need for questioning everything -- the need not to accept any "gross answer" or "gross prohibition".⁶⁰ In fact, Nietzschean rationality implies that everything should be subjected to rational scrutiny.⁶¹ At the same time, Nietzsche does not want the Superman to "waste" himself on questions "that are none",⁶² but rather he should concentrate his attention on questions

⁵⁷ Ibid., IV, 975, p. 511.

⁵⁸ Ibid., IV, 976, p. 511-512.

⁵⁹ Kaufmann, Walter, op. cit., p. 233. Kaufmann notes that Aristotle adopts a similar position in Nicomachean Ethics.

⁶⁰ Nietzsche, F., Ecce Homo, op. cit., 'Why I am so clever', 1, pp. 236-237.

⁶¹ Kaufmann, Walter, op. cit., p. 234. Even Nietzsche's 'atheism' is not a result but rather a corollary of his commitment to question every conviction, including his own. cf. Ecce Homo, op. cit., pp. 236-237.

⁶² Nietzsche, F., Ecce Homo, op. cit., 'Why I am so clever', 1, p. 236. Also cf. The Will to Power, op. cit., III, 539, p. 291, where Nietzsche says: "What can be thought of must certainly be a fiction".

that provide a meaning to his life and thus discover his true self which does not lie deep within himself but immeasurably higher.⁶³

Physically, the Superman must possess a constitution that can overcome sickness. Health is to be measured by the amount of sickness the body can successfully counteract.⁶⁴ In fact, Nietzsche asserted that for the healthy type, sickness may be an energetic stimulant to life, to more life.⁶⁵ He believed that Homer, Goethe⁶⁶ and Shakespeare⁶⁷ had written great works only because they had known physical suffering and overcome it. Julius Caesar, too, he maintained, had fought against his "sickliness" by frugal living and "continuous exertion".⁶⁸ All this is, however, in no way to be taken as an assumption that a thoroughly healthy person (if at all one exists) cannot become a Superman. Rather it demonstrates that even in the realm of the physical, Nietzsche wanted to show that there are no barriers toward becoming the higher type of man.

⁶³Nietzsche, F., Schopenhauer as Educator, quoted by J.W. Hillesheim in 'Nietzsche on Education', op. cit., p. 226.

⁶⁴Nietzsche, F., 'The Dawn' in The Portable Nietzsche, op. cit., aphorism 202, pp. 85ff.

⁶⁵Nietzsche, F., Ecce Homo, op. cit., 'Why I am so Wise', 2, p. 224. Also cf. Twilight of the Idols, op. cit., 1: 8, p. 467.

⁶⁶Nietzsche, F., On the Genealogy of Morals, op. cit., III, 4, p. 101.

⁶⁷Nietzsche, F., Ecce Homo, op. cit., 'Why I am so clever', 4, p. 246.

⁶⁸Nietzsche, F., Twilight of the Idols, op. cit., 9: 31, p. 532.

Socially too, the Superman has to show a maturity greater than that shown by others. In this respect, Nietzsche differs greatly from other existentialists who, as John Wild has indicated, have a tendency to view social contact as impersonal, debased and inauthentic, and reduce all communication to terms of conflict.⁶⁹ Nietzsche makes Zarathustra come down from the mountain to dwell among people because these form the raw material on which he has to work, however abhorrent most of it may be.⁷⁰ Only through communication can the Superman seek "the opposition of the masses, of the leveled and learn how to stand on them".⁷¹ He is a person who can deal with others with sensitivity and empathy without submerging his individuality. He regards the group as a means of fulfilling the goal that holds a personal meaning to him. He considers himself a unique individual and is aware of the important role he plays in the lives of others and, conversely, of the roles they play in his life.⁷²

With the composite picture of the Superman before us, the final question is whether Nietzsche regarded him as a person of Ideas, Science or Nature. He is certainly not a man of Ideas since, according to Nietzsche, Ideas pre-suppose "truth in Itself", and Nietzsche wanted the

⁶⁹ Wild, John, The Challenge of Existentialism, (Bloomington: University Press, 1966), p. 165.

⁷⁰ Nietzsche, F., Thus Spoke Zarathustra, op. cit., 2: 2, pp. 109ff.

⁷¹ Nietzsche, F., The Will to Power, op. cit., IV, 866, p. 464.

⁷² Lesnoff-Caravaglia, Gari, Education as Existential Possibility, (New York: Philosophical Library, 1972), p. 52.

Superman to contradict all proofs of established truth.⁷³ He claimed that ideas give "a false reality to a fiction as if events were in some way obedient to something". Ideas, like reason, tend to enable us "to fix the real world" and arrange it in a manner "in which our existence is made possible". Thus is created a world which is "calculable, simplified, comprehensible . . . for us".⁷⁴ But this is not the world of a Superman who does not accept the truth as it has been established but only the truth he himself has proven. In fact, passages like the following one show that Nietzsche was totally opposed to Plato's doctrine of Ideas:

Plato measured the degree of reality by the degree of value and said: "The more 'Idea', the more being". He reversed the concept of 'reality' and said: "What you take for real is an error, and the nearer we approach to the 'Idea', the nearer we approach 'truth'" . . . Fundamentally, Plato . . . preferred appearance to being, lie and invention to truth, the unreal to the actual.⁷⁵

At the same time, Science, as it currently exists in the world, was regarded by Nietzsche as a "form of sickness"⁷⁶ that is "deeply influenced by decadence".⁷⁷ That he was not opposed to Science per se

⁷³Nietzsche, F., The Will to Power, op. cit., III, 515, pp. 278-279.

⁷⁴Ibid., IN, 521, pp. 282-283.

⁷⁵Ibid., III, 572, p. 308. For Plato's doctrine of Ideas cf. The Republic, op. cit., v, 474-480, pp. 181ff.

⁷⁶Ibid., I, 50, p. 32.

⁷⁷Ibid., I, 53, p. 33.

is clearly indicated by the fact that he referred to his doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence as "the most scientific of all possible hypotheses".⁷⁸ What he opposed was what passes under the name of science or technology which, in his opinion, was merely "the desire to make comprehensible; the desire to make practical, useful, exploitable" -- all the conditions suitable for "the average type of man" to gain ascendancy.⁷⁹ Nietzsche maintained that science and life are no longer wholly separate but represent a way of life, and he favoured science so long as it constituted "a passionate quest for knowledge, an unceasing series of courageous experiments".⁸⁰ The Superman will be a man interested in scientific enquiry for the will-to-truth is attained only in this manner.⁸¹ However, he will not permit his science to be based on "principle", "belief", or "conviction".⁸² As Kaufmann observes:

By 'science', Nietzsche means the willingness to question, to submit one's opinions to experiments, and to revise one's beliefs in the light of the new evidence. Not to do this is a manifestation of irrationality, a weakness, and a lack of power.⁸³

⁷⁸ Ibid., I, 55, p. 36. (Translator's italics.)

⁷⁹ Ibid., I, 68, 69, 71, 79, pp. 44ff. Also cf. Joyful Wisdom, op. cit., V, 344, pp. 276ff.

⁸⁰ Kaufmann, Walter, op. cit., p. 90. Even Nietzsche's own doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence was to be subjected to an intense investigation to obtain proofs. (cf., The Will to Power, op. cit., IV, 1066, p. 549.)

⁸¹ Nietzsche, F., Joyful Wisdom, op. cit., V, 344, p. 276ff.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Kaufmann, Walter, op. cit., p. 232.

We must also consider the Superman as a man of Nature. For Nietzsche's purpose, this is important since he considers Nature by itself to be inadequate, wasteful, and inefficient, and it is the task of man to help Nature while working toward his own perfection.⁸⁴ Nietzsche's conception of Nature is both physical and spiritual. For him, it is important that "the spirit" not be forgotten.⁸⁵ The Superman has to be a man of Nature if he is to rise above the beasts and thus give the lie to Darwin's "deadly" gospel.⁸⁶ The Superman will live according to Nature but only after he has equated it with Life. Living according to Nature will therefore imply living according to Life.⁸⁷

Nietzsche rejected attempts to see man as an animal only and stated that only "scholarly oxen" would suspect him of catering to Darwinism or read in his writings echoes of "the hero-worship of that unconscious and involuntary counterfeiter, Carlyle".⁸⁸ In fact, his doctrine of the Superman represented a revolt against Darwin's animalising of man. For Nietzsche, the difference is not between animal and man but between man and man. That man who will use his potentiality to the fullest can attain unknown heights. The Superman embodies the state of

⁸⁴ Nietzsche, F., Schopenhauer as Educator, quoted by Walter Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 174.

⁸⁵ Nietzsche, F., Twilight of the Idols, op. cit., 9: 14, pp. 522-523.

⁸⁶ Kaufmann, Walter, op. cit., p. 175.

⁸⁷ Nietzsche, F., Beyond Good and Evil, op. cit., aphorism 9, p. 15.

⁸⁸ Nietzsche, F., Ecce Homo, op. cit., "Why I write such good books", 1, p. 261.

being for which everyone yearns. He is the ideal of self-integration, self-creation and self-mastery, all of which he has attained through suffering, something that Nietzsche was familiar with and could truly appreciate. The Superman places the greatest emphasis on life and hence defends "the body against any encroachments on the part of the 'soul', of traditional morals, and of the world 'beyond'", says Janko Lavrin.⁸⁹ Instead of remaining merely a creature, he seeks to develop the creator part of his nature so that ultimately man will be to him what today the apes are to man -- "a laughing-stock or a painful embarrassment".⁹⁰

While it is true, as Kaufmann has observed, that "some people are more favoured by nature than others" to become Supermen,⁹¹ Nature itself gives us no clue at the beginning of a person's existence as to whom it favours. It is therefore necessary that every person be treated as if he were a potential Superman, and be provided with the necessary freedom to make his own choice. Hence in schools, while a careful watch has to be kept from the earliest grades so that students with the potentialities of Supermen may be discovered, the actual education of the Supermen has to be delayed to later grades. For Nietzsche,

⁸⁹ Lavrin, Janko, op. cit., p. 82.

⁹⁰ Nietzsche, F., Thus Spoke Zarathustra, op. cit., Prologues: 3, p. 42.

⁹¹ Kaufmann, Walter, op. cit., p. 285.

the capability to become a Superman was inherent in all men.⁹² However, few people had the ability or the willingness to traverse the difficult road toward becoming a Superman, and even those few would be discouraged and abandon the task if the schools did not nurture and encourage them by catering to them in a special way. The creation of the Superman has to be the ultimate end of education.

⁹²It should be noted that Nietzsche had no particular race or nationality in mind when he preached the doctrine of the Superman. The setting of Zarathustra could be anywhere in the world, and the terms used are "man", "human beings" and "mankind". Certain terms used by him like 'blond beast', 'blood' and 'breeding' have tended to be disquieting and have frequently led to misinterpretations. The 'blond beast' is obviously the lion referred to in the chapter on 'The Three Metamorphoses' in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, op. cit., pp. 54ff. That the 'blond beast' cannot refer to the Nordic races is clear from the fact that in the same section in which the term first appears, Nietzsche says that great men have arisen among the Arabs, Japanese, Romans and Greeks -- none of whom were Nordics. (cf. On the Genealogy of Morals, op. cit., I, 2, pp. 39ff.). Concerning 'blood', Nietzsche does admit that an individual is the sum total of characteristics inherited from generations of ancestors (cf. The Will to Power, op. cit., IV, 969, p. 508). At the same time he asserts that the blood of Plato, Pascal and Spinoza runs in his veins (cf. Nietzsche's Notes quoted by Walter Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 306), thus implying that one can inherit characteristics also from mankind at large. In fact, this is the manner in which he uses the term 'breeding' as well:

Breeding, as I understand it, is a means of storing up the tremendous forces of mankind so that the generations can build upon the work of their forefathers -- not only outwardly, but inwardly . . . and becoming something stronger. (The Will to Power, op. cit., II, 398, p. 215).

In Twilight of the Idols (op. cit., 7: 3, 4, pp. 503-505), Nietzsche criticizes the law of Manu for making outcasts of certain people by reason of birth.

Walter Kaufmann has made a very incisive and analytical examination of Nietzsche's theory of race that gives the lie to hostile critics like Brinton, op. cit., and Nietzschean misinterpreters like the Nazi

philosopher Alfred Baumlér, who have claimed, though for different reasons, that Nietzsche was a racist (cf. Kaufmann, Walter, op. cit., Chapter 10, pp. 284ff.)

It should also be made clear that Nietzsche did not admire everything in people like Cesare Borgia (cf. Beyond Good and Evil, op. cit., section 197, pp. 108-109). All he maintained was that even a Borgia with all his vices was preferable to an emasculated man, the creation of Christianity. Hence we should look "even for a Cesare Borgia than for a Parsifal" (Ecce Homo, op. cit., 'Why I write such good books', 1, p. 261). A man with strong impulses is better than a man with no impulses. (Kaufmann, Walter, op. cit., p. 224.)

CHAPTER IV

FREEDOM AND EDUCATION

Rosenow has indicated that since the days of Plato and Aristotle, freedom in education has essentially meant "freedom for" which in turn means "a complete, unreserved acceptance of an idea . . . and a conscious identification with it".¹ Hence a man is considered to be autonomous and free if he accepts an idea (or a system of ideas), internalizes it and identifies with it.² Over the centuries, despite the criticism of the traditional concept of freedom, nothing was really done to remedy it. Rosenow argues that even the three educators -- Jean Jacques Rousseau, John Dewey and A.S. Neil -- who supposedly have led a revolt against the traditional concept have in reality not done so.³ He expresses surprise that the critics of the traditional concept of freedom have not paid attention to the teachings of Nietzsche -- a philosopher who gave the idea of freedom "as extreme non-conformism and individualism, a highly systematic and self-consistent validation, without at the same time giving up the possibility of education".⁴ The concept of freedom in Nietzsche's educational thought can best be understood in terms of, first, his criticism of education and, secondly, his more

¹ Rosenow, Eliyahu, op. cit., p. 355.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid., p. 356.

positive view of education.

Criticism of Education

First of all, Nietzsche dubbed as the "poison" of Christianity the democratic principle that all men are created equal and hence should be provided with equal opportunities.⁵ Hillesheim has observed that Nietzsche was consistently anti-egalitarian. Nietzsche reasoned that since every individual was unique with "different capacities, talents, strengths and limitations, to accord everyone equal rights or equal treatment would be the height of injustice".⁶ If the theory of equality is accepted, the only result can be a stifling of personal initiative and an all-round levelling of talent. Ambition will then have ceased to exist and no one will vie for distinction. "The doctrine of equality!" exclaims Nietzsche. "There is no more poisonous poison anywhere: for it seems to be preached by justice itself, whereas it really is the termination of justice. 'Equal to the equal, unequal to the unequal' -- that would be the true slogan of justice; and also its corollary: 'Never make equal what is unequal'".⁷ Democracy as the progenitor of egalitarianism hates and represses men of genius while compelling everyone to conform to a certain middle norm. "The

⁵ Nietzsche, F., The Antichrist, op. cit., section 43, p. 619.

⁶ Hillesheim, J.W., 'Nietzsche Agonistes', op. cit., p. 350.

⁷ Nietzsche, F., Twilight of the Idols, op. cit., 9: 48, p. 553.
(Translator's italics.)

trainability of men", says Nietzsche, "has become very great in this democratic Europe; men who learn easily and adapt themselves easily are the rule: the herd animal . . . has been prepared".⁸ Hillesheim notes that "egalitarian movements tend to eliminate the very challenges upon which growth depends, the result being that the entire culture will cease to grow and eventually decline".⁹ Nietzsche himself summarized it in the following words:

'Equality', as a certain factual increase in similarity, which merely finds expression in the theory of 'equal rights', is an essential feature of decline. The cleavage between man and man, status and status, the plurality of types, the will to be oneself, to stand out -- what I call pathos of distance, that is characteristic of every strong age. The strength to withstand tension, the width of the tensions between extremes, becomes ever smaller today; finally, the extremes themselves become blurred to the point of similarity.¹⁰

Secondly, Nietzsche is opposed to the Socratic principle in education. Rosenow indicates how in his very first book, The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche was loud in praise of the Dionysian experience whereby man sheds all inhibitions and is not controlled by reason. He identifies himself with the cosmos and sees no difference between the intellect and the emotions. However, since this experience leads to the total annihilation of his individuality, man has a natural ability to protect himself against the Dionysian excesses. He does this through an illusion.

⁸ Nietzsche, F., The Will to Power, op. cit., I, 128, p. 79.

⁹ Hillesheim, J.W., 'Nietzsche Agonistes', op. cit., p. 350.

¹⁰ Nietzsche, F., Twilight of the Idols, op. cit., 8: 37, p. 540. (Translator's italics.)

the subtlest expression of which is Art. Nietzsche dubbed this aesthetic experience as the "Apollonian". Despite the fact that the Apollonian experience is merely an illusion, it serves its purpose in the existence of an individual since it provides him with a correct perspective of things as viewed from a distance (almost a manner in which a god would look at them) and makes life more bearable. It provides "an aesthetic justification for human existence" and serves "as a palliative to feelings of dread and terror arising out of the direct encounter with human experience". The ideal, therefore, has to be a synthesis of the Dionysian and the Apollonian. "This perfect fusion of reality and illusion", says Rosenow, "enables man to see God and live".¹¹ The pre-Socratic Greeks, Nietzsche felt, had been creatures of instinct and habit. They did not care to analyze anything that was unclear to them. The individual Greek sought to understand just those things that made his personal existence worthwhile.¹²

But Socrates, "a buffo with the instincts of Voltaire",¹³ changed all this by appealing to their rational nature and by declaring that everything could and must be understood.¹⁴ Nietzsche was not inimical to Reason. He appreciates the fact that Socratic rationality pushes man in search of knowledge, and thus human energy is used for something more

¹¹ Rosenow, Eliyahu, op. cit., pp. 357-358.

¹² Nietzsche, F., The Birth of Tragedy, op. cit., section 5, pp. 969ff.

¹³ Nietzsche, F., The Will to Power, op. cit., II, 432, p. 236.

¹⁴ Nietzsche, F., The Birth of Tragedy, op. cit., section 14, pp. 1021ff.

than merely achieving "the practical i.e. the egotistical ends of individuals and peoples".¹⁵ Otherwise,

The instinctive love of life would be so much weakened in general wars of destruction and continual migrations of peoples, that, owing to the practice of suicide, the individual would perhaps feel the last remnant of a sense of duty -- and thus a practical pessimism might even give rise to a horrible ethics of general slaughter out of pity -- which, as a matter of fact, exists and has existed wherever art in one form or another, especially as science and religion has not appeared as a remedy for and preventive of that pestilential breath.¹⁶

What he criticized in Socrates was that while he encouraged the Greeks to think for themselves, he misled them into paths where they tended to think only about what they wanted to think, or rather, what they thought they wanted to think. Thus he perverted their natural instincts and made them creatures of bad faith. Nietzsche regrets that

the old Marathonian stalwart capacity of body and soul was being sacrificed more and more to a dubious enlightenment that involved the progressive degeneration of the physical and mental powers.¹⁷

Moreover, he condemns Socrates for teaching that Reason alone can justify human existence and aid in improving the world.¹⁸ Rosenow has observed

¹⁵ Ibid., section 15, p. 1030.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid., section 13, p. 1018.

¹⁸ Ibid., section 15, p. 1030.

that Socrates' attitude to the world was one-sided and purely intellectual. "Instead of the rich, full life of the whole personality, the Socrates conception resulted in a systematic narrowing of the personality and its life-force. Man's feelings and senses have been undermined, his vitality suppressed and his individuality submerged".¹⁹ Socrates attempted to substitute Reason for the Apollonian aesthetic principle, and this is totally alien to human nature. Hence Nietzsche regarded Socratic teaching as an attempt to suppress the basic will to power.²⁰

Thirdly, Nietzsche will not endorse Rousseau's conception of a return to Nature. He says that Rousseau's theory will attract "everything shallow and mediocre".²¹ When it is imitated by the masses, it could lead to what Kaufmann refers to as "the unbridling of the most savage and destructive forces".²² A child's world is full of conflicts, and to be left entirely on his own will only augment these conflicts however warm and tender the environment may be. A return to nature with Rousseau's connotation, will be a return to the jungle rather than an ascent, which is what Nietzsche wanted. He cites the example of primitive man who "far from enjoying freedom, lived in

¹⁹ Rosenow, Eliyahu, op. cit., pp. 358-359.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 359. Kaufmann however argues that Nietzsche admired Socrates (cf. Kaufmann, Walter, op. cit., Chapter 13, pp. 391ff).

²¹ Nietzsche, F., Twilight of the Idols, op. cit., 9-48, p. 553.

²² Kaufmann, Walter, op. cit., p. 167.

constant fear of savage animals, of his barbarian enemies, of his gods, and even of his own dreams".²³ What Nietzsche really wanted was that man should cultivate, improve and remake Nature.²⁴

Fourthly, Nietzsche opposes two related aspects of public education. On the one hand, he criticizes the striving to achieve the greatest possible extension of education and, on the other, the tendency to minimize and to weaken it.²⁵ Nietzsche felt that any attempt to extend education to all reflected merely a concern for economic gains and weakened any true educational institution which, he believed, ought to inculcate culture through awakening in students a keen appreciation and even a deep concern for art and literature. The masses were meant to serve and obey. Even if a system of compulsory education were to be introduced, it would only have an outward effect on the masses. The inward levels like religion, customs and the like which brought them into real contact with culture, would remain unaffected by education. All these have to be demolished violently, but it will take time, and education will only delay the demolition since it will lull people into a feeling of well-being. Encouraging the education of the masses would mean the preferment of mediocrity, the principle aim being the production

²³ Ibid., p. 170.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Nietzsche, F., 'The Future of Our Educational Institutions', translated by J.M. Kennedy in Modern Philosophies of Education, edited by John Paul Strain, (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 508.

of specialized slaves for state and business; universal literacy, journalism and a free press pasting a veneer of motley historical cultivation over the masses, thereby degrading the standards of the old education, disguising the ugliness of the modern philistine and making him smug, spoiling folk poetry, folk music and the integrity of feeling from which they spring. Education thus becomes the worst obstacle to a purified and rejuvenated culture.²⁶ Nietzsche scornfully refers to the "education mongers" who would violate "the sacred hierarchy of nature" by proposing equal education for all. These "blatant heralds" of educational needs, when examined at close quarters, are suddenly seen to be transformed into zealous, yes, fanatical opponents of true culture, i.e. all those who hold fast to the aristocratic nature of the mind". Equalitarian educators aim at the "emancipation of the masses from the mastery of the great few; they seek to overthrow the most sacred hierarchy in the kingdom of the intellect -- the servitude of the masses, their submissive obedience, their instinct of loyalty to the rule of genius".²⁷

Fifthly, there is, according to Nietzsche, the danger of education being guided by the profit-making motive. The grossness of such a system is obvious since its main concern is the ways and means of making money as easily as possible. Moreover, it is cramped, cribbed and confined

²⁶ Ibid., pp. 509ff.

²⁷ Ibid., quoted by J.W. Hillesheim in 'Nietzsche Agonistes', op. cit., pp. 349-350.

since its goal is the creation as soon as possible of a money-making being and so it denies man any culture beyond that essential for the interests of general commerce and the world market. The task seems to be "to make man as useful as possible and to approximate him . . . to an infallible machine. Such type of education is monotonous and boring".²⁸ Rosenow observes that Nietzsche believed that "the motives for a wider dissemination of general education are pragmatic rather than humanitarian The dissemination of general education is . . . economically motivated; education is considered to be a way of raising the standard of living of the masses and turning man into something which has cash value".²⁹

Sixthly, Nietzsche regretted the fact that education is often being forced to serve religious, political and economic ends dictated by the State and the Church -- notably the former that sees in education "a means of weakening the church and of bettering the control over the citizens". Hence "the end of education is not man himself but something external to man -- the State".³⁰ A truly liberal education thus becomes impossible. The greatest danger to self-development, as Nietzsche sees it, is the subtle forms of servitude to the State and the Church. Primitive Christianity, says Nietzsche, as Jesus preached it,

²⁸ Nietzsche, F., The Will to Power, op. cit., IV, 888, pp. 473-474.

²⁹ Rosenow, Eliyahu, op. cit., p. 357.

³⁰ Ibid.

"is a way of life, not a system of beliefs".³¹ However, under the influence of the State, it has corrupted itself and created the anti-Christian who negates everything the early Christian stood for, and accepts as the truth everything they had forsworn. Nietzsche observes that

one should only recall what has gradually become of Christianity under the selfishness of the State. Christianity is certainly one of the purest revelations of this urge for culture and especially for the ever renewed generations of the saint; as it has been used hundreds of times, however, to turn the mills of the State's forces, it has gradually become diseased to the very marrow, hypocritical and full of lies, and has degenerated to the point where it contradicts its original aim.³²

Hence, most emphatically, Nietzsche declares that "education through the state's education is to be scorned"³³ since the state can only provide a parliamentary education and thus deprive the nation of good thinkers.³⁴ What the state aims at in education is either scholarly specialization or a journalist's general education. Both are bad since neither of them permits the individual to develop to his full potential. The state is also anti-culture; in fact, it thrives

³¹ Nietzsche, F., The Will to Power, op. cit., II, 212, p. 125.

³² Nietzsche, F., Schopenhauer as Educator, quoted by Walter Kaufmann op. cit., p. 164.

³³ Nietzsche, F., Notes, quoted by Walter Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 418.

³⁴ Nietzsche, F., Schopenhauer as Educator, translated by J.W. Hillesheim and M.R. Simpson, (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1965), p. 73.

at the expense of culture.³⁵ The state also fosters the "herd instinct" in education and "will allow value to the individual only from the point of view of the whole. It hates those who detach themselves".³⁶ It is inimical to men of quality, and its system of education is based on what is useful to the herd.³⁷ The object of state education seems to be "to create in the herd member a definite faith concerning the nature of man: it first invents this faith and then demands 'Truthfulness'".³⁸ Moreover, the teachers it employs are "learned louts" who merely act as "higher wet nurses". There are scarcely any educators among them.

"The aim of state education is "to prepare huge numbers of young men, with as little loss of time as possible, to become usable, abusable, in government service". Everything in the schools -- the teachers, the curricula, the teaching aims -- is directed towards one purpose alone: the achievement of "ambiguous mediocrity".³⁹ Under such a system, conformity rather than freedom has to reign supreme. And Nietzsche asserts that even in the colleges and the universities, the situation is not much different despite the illusion of "academic freedom" that seems to exist. At first glance it may appear that a professor is free to say what he likes, and a student is free to listen to what he wants to hear. But always in the background looms the ominous shadow of the

³⁵ Nietzsche, F., Twilight of the Idols, op. cit., 8: 4, pp. 508-509.

³⁶ Nietzsche, F., The Will to Power, op. cit., II, 275, p. 157.

³⁷ Ibid., II, 276, p. 157.

³⁸ Ibid., II, 277, p. 158.

³⁹ Nietzsche, F., Twilight of the Idols, op. cit., 8: 5, p. 410.

state "wearing the tense expression of an inspector" and reminding both professor and students that it is the end and the essence of this special procedure of talking and listening. Academic freedom therefore becomes nothing more than an ideological fiction, an empty slogan with the help of which the state attempts to camouflage its manipulation of the intellectuals.⁴⁰

Seventhly, Nietzsche also expresses disapproval of the manner in which language (the mother tongue) is taught in the schools. Everybody speaks and writes so badly that force is often needed if at least the best students are to be taught anything at all. He blames the teachers for not encouraging a practical method of self-discipline in the language. What is being adopted is a historico-scholastic method of teaching the mother tongue, that is, the teacher deals with it as if it is a dead language and as if the present and the future are under no obligations to it whatsoever. "What is needed in the teaching of the mother tongue is to foster the ability to do properly and not only the ability to know properly".⁴¹ He points out especially that in the teaching of composition, there is often a tendency on the part of the teacher to select subjects instead of allowing the students to decide on what they wish to write. Even where such a decision is left to the students, the teacher often errs in the manner in which he corrects the completed work. He criticizes the

⁴⁰Nietzsche, F., The Future of Our Educational Institutions, paraphrased by Eliyahu Rosenow, op. cit., p. 357.

⁴¹Nietzsche, F., The Future of Our Educational Institutions, op. cit., p. 515. (Translator's italics.)

the form and the thought involved in the writing of the composition and so, in reality, criticizes the student's individuality. On the other hand, he praises uniform mediocrity.⁴²

Lastly, Nietzsche believed that education cannot be forced; the learning process takes time and this period varies from individual to individual. To discover who we are, and then to become who we are, is a slow and often painful process. But when we look at the state of education we find that "everywhere an indecent haste prevails as if something would be lost if the young man of twenty-three were not yet finished with his education".⁴³

Toward the Creation of the Higher Man

Having seen what Nietzsche criticized in education, the question arises: What did Nietzsche want in education? The great German philosopher placed the highest premium on honesty -- both intellectual and moral. Most emphatically he asserts that

honesty . . . is our virtue from which we cannot get away Let us work on it May its splendor remain spread out . . . like a gilded blue mocking evening light over this aging culture and its musty and gloomy seriousness.⁴⁴

And to be truly honest, Nietzsche believed, one must be onself.

⁴²Ibid., p. 516.

⁴³Nietzsche, F., Twilight of the Idols, op. cit., 7: 5, pp. 510-511.

⁴⁴Nietzsche, F., Beyond Good and Evil, op. cit., aphorism 227, p. 155.

The man who would not belong in the mass needs only to cease being comfortable with himself; he should follow his conscience which shouts at him: "Be yourself. You are not really all that which you do, think and desire now".⁴⁵

According to Nietzsche, man has two selves: an ordinary external self and a real or true self. Quite often, the former is confused with the latter and so our true self is confused with the inessential aspects of our relationship with others. One's true self cannot be discovered through the opinions of others nor through the probing of one's own psyche. "True being", says Nietzsche, "does not lie hidden deep inside . . . but immeasurably high above us".⁴⁶

It is incorrect to regard this classification of the two selves as a form of dualism. Modern day existentialists, like Martin Buber among others, have indicated that the self that man shares with others -- the basic human self -- does not recognize individuality and cannot, therefore, be the real self. Buber, while stressing the fact that the true self can be discovered not in splendid isolation but in establishing a relationship with others, for "through the Thou a man becomes "I"",⁴⁷ nevertheless insists that the man becomes more personal when the "I" of

⁴⁵ Nietzsche, F., Schopenhauer as Educator, quoted by Walter Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 158.

⁴⁶ Nietzsche, F., Schopenhauer as Educator, op. cit., p. 82.

⁴⁷ Buber, Martin, I and Thou, translated by Ronald Gregor Smith, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), p. 28. Also cf. The Eclipse of God, translated by Maurice Friedman et al., (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952), pp. 127-128. (Translator's italics.)

the word "I-Thou" becomes stronger.⁴⁸ A man has to realize that while physically there are others like him, each person's singularity is what makes him different from the others. Buber has observed that unless a man perceives such a difference, he can never break out of the "I-It" relationship and make something of himself since the "I-It" relationship "has no present, only the past".⁴⁹ Man, says Buber, is the only being capable of mingling with his environment and yet also capable of detaching himself from it so as to reflect upon what he is.⁵⁰ Such reflection should convince him of his uniqueness and hence the fact that his main task has to be "the actualization of his unique, unprecedented and never-recurring potentialities, and not the repetition of something that another . . . has already achieved".⁵¹ Buber quotes the Hasidic Rabbi, Zusya, as saying just before his death: "In the coming world, they will not ask me: 'Why were you not Moses?' They will ask me: 'Why were you not Zusya?'"⁵² Buber reminds us that our blind devotion to the collective springs from our fear of being

⁴⁸Ibid., pp. 65ff. (Translator's italics.)

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 12. (Translator's italics.)

⁵⁰Buber, Martin, The Knowledge of Man, translated by Maurice Friedman, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1964), p. 120.

⁵¹Buber, Martin, The Way of Man, According to the Teachings of Hasidim, translated by Maurice Friedman, (Wallingford, Pa.: Pendle Hall Pamphlet, 1959), p. 140.

⁵²Buber, Martin, The Tales of Hasidim: The Early Masters, translated by Olga Marx, (New York: Schocken Books, 1947), p. 251.

left to rely upon ourselves,⁵³ and he asserts that the true community and true commonwealth will be realized only if the Single One becomes himself and asserts his individuality.⁵⁴

Buber's individual, however, recognizes his facticity in his confrontation with God. Buber, says Paul Pfuete, reminds man that "the fulfillment of the individual personality is the fulfillment of the will of God".⁵⁵ In other words, he has "to realize God's Kingdom on Earth".⁵⁶ Buber holds that a man need not answer to other men for his actions, but he has to do so to God.⁵⁷ From a Nietzschean point of view this is an obvious limitation in Buber's philosophy.

The atheistic existential philosophers fare not much better. Sartre denies the very existence of God and insists that "to be man means to reach toward being God".⁵⁸ But if God does not exist, the very origin of man's existence is called into question. No wonder, says Wilfrid Desan, that "Sartre's heroes choose for the pleasure of choosing and do not use their freedom in view of a higher value

⁵³Buber, Martin, Between Man and Man, translated by Ronald Gregor Smith, (London: The Fontana Library, 1971), p. 115.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 94.

⁵⁵Pfuete, Paul E., Self, Society, Existence, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961), p. 186.

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷Buber, Martin, Between Man and Man, op. cit., p. 68.

⁵⁸Sartre, Jean Paul, Being and Nothingness, op. cit., p. 566.

It is a liberty, not a liberation".⁵⁹ Sartre wants man to be God, but this is a futile task since man can never become God. Thus while he argues that there is no need for an ideal synthesis between the for-itself (the being of the human person) and the in-itself (non-conscious reality),⁶⁰ Sartre admits that such a synthesis has not occurred though there is always a possibility that it may occur.⁶¹ Sartre's individual, therefore, has to wander aimlessly positing his values as he goes along. Hence the obvious nausea that seizes his heroes.⁶²

Nietzsche, on the other hand, wanted to make man God-like. His Superman does not aim at occupying the throne of God. For centuries man had set up before himself a certain image of God. He had attributed to Him certain qualities that he felt a God should have. Hence the death of God leaves man forlorn. All that is necessary, therefore, is not the creation of a God that no one can see, but for each man to reevaluate his values, create new ones if necessary, and overcome himself and attain the stature of the Superman. When he talks about the two

⁵⁹Desan, Wilfrid, The Tragic Finale, (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1960), pp. 183-184.

⁶⁰Sartre, Jean Paul, Being and Nothingness, op. cit., p. 623.

⁶¹Ibid.

⁶²cf. particularly Goetz in The Devil and the Good Lord, translated by Kitty Black, (New York: Random House, 1960); Hugo in Crime Passional, translated by Kitty Black, (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1969); Orestes in The Flies, translated by Stuart Gilbert, (New York: Knopf, 1948); and Garcin, Inez and Estelle in No Exit, translated by Stuart Gilbert, (New York: Knopf, 1948).

selves, therefore, Nietzsche is showing man that god-like qualities exist within himself. Thus man is shown not only what he can become, but also what he ought to become if he truly wishes.

A closer examination of Nietzsche's concept of 'being oneself' reveals several different aspects. First of all, "Be yourself" is an admonition to educators and students not to act out of character for though such behaviour may be caused by conscious or unconscious motives, the end result is the same: an attempt to deceive either others or oneself. Hillesheim says that such imposture is for actors on the stage, not for human beings engaged in the serious business of human existence.⁶³ The discovery of the self is impossible so long as one engages in acts of deception. To be truly educated, one must learn to be honest.⁶⁴ Nietzsche regrets that honesty no longer is the fashion but is reserved only "to those private opinions which are forbidden in this age of public opinions".⁶⁵ Unlike Sartre who insists that "consciousness conceals in its being a permanent risk of bad faith",⁶⁶ Nietzsche holds that people engage in bad faith for ulterior motives or because they know no better,⁶⁷

⁶³ Hillesheim, J.W., 'Nietzsche on Education', op. cit., p. 227.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Nietzsche, F., Schopenhauer as Educator, quoted by J.W. Hillesheim in Ibid.

⁶⁶ Sartre, Jean Paul, Being and Nothingness, op. cit., p. 70.

⁶⁷ Nietzsche, F., On the Genealogy of Morals, op. cit., II, mainly sections 16-18, pp. 84ff.

Nietzsche did not regard bad faith as an inherent part to man's Being and herein lies one of the differences between the Superman and the Ultimate Man: both are capable of becoming true to Being, but only the former chooses to do so.

Secondly, 'Be yourself' can also be understood as 'Know yourself'. It would then imply that Nietzsche wants everyone to study the nature of human beings so that he can understand his own nature. This knowledge, however, has to take into consideration the twofold nature of man. Every man shares certain general qualities with other members of the same species but, unlike the lower animals, each man is "something unique",⁶⁸ and it is this uniqueness that needs to be probed. Hence, an educator should not understand man merely as part of society. To do this alone would make education subservient to "the needs of society: not the possible needs of the future, but the needs of the society of the day".⁶⁹ This would make the 'revaluation' impossible since society imposes upon the individual certain norms that it accepts as being the 'truth'. But if an educator strives to discover what makes each individual unique, he can help each person to become something more than merely a carbon copy of his neighbour. Once a person discovers himself, he cannot suffer a loss of values since he becomes a creator of values. Realization of his own uniqueness makes the individual take

⁶⁸ Nietzsche, F., Schopenhauer as Educator, quoted by J.W. Hillesheim in 'Nietzsche on Education', op. cit., p. 227.

⁶⁹ Nietzsche, F., The Will to Power, op. cit., IV, 898, p. 477.

into consideration the uniqueness of others, and makes him more tolerant and less inclined to criticize. It also makes him disinclined to compete with others but rather to seek after perfection in his own sphere.⁷⁰

Thirdly, since Nietzsche did not consider man as either a social or a political animal, the urging to 'Be yourself' also may be taken to mean that man should free himself from the pressures of public opinion and stagnant morality. Individuality is totally suppressed so long as man is a slave to "borrowed manners and superimposed opinions" and as long as he is "imprisoned by the shackles of opinion and fear".⁷¹ If one can be oneself, then one can rise above mediocrity and achieve true independence -- not the independence with the outer facade of a shell, but the true independence of an autonomous person who is capable of selecting his own goals and setting his own pace.⁷²

⁷⁰This is not meant to imply that Nietzsche was opposed to competition of every kind. Later in this chapter we shall see that he strongly believed in a type of contest in education. This contest, however, is a means, not an end and always has to take the form of one egoistic impulse dominating over another. (cf. J.W. Hillesheim's 'Nietzsche Agonistes', op. cit., p. 346.) The idea that each person is a unique human being, trying for perfection in his own sphere is also re-echoed in Sartre's Being and Nothingness, op. cit. Although Sartre finds the presence of the Other to be disquieting nevertheless he believes that this confrontation with the Other makes for ultimate freedom and transcendence. Sartre says, "I do not choose to be for the Other what I am, but I can try to be for myself what I am for the Other, by choosing myself as I appear to the Other", (p. 529).

⁷¹Nietzsche, F., Schopenhauer as Educator, quoted by J.W. Hillesheim in 'Nietzsche on Education', op. cit., p. 227.

⁷²Hillesheim, J.W., 'Nietzsche on Education', op. cit., p. 227.

Lastly, even the theory of the Superman can be brought in line with the aphorism 'Be yourself'. It was mentioned earlier⁷³ that for Nietzsche, the point at issue was not the difference between man and animal but between man and man. Thus if one strives to become the higher man, says Hillesheim, one must avoid the human, all-too-human qualities of man which are just above the animal level.⁷⁴ To overcome oneself, one has to know what has to be overcome. There is power for much good and evil in man, and it is only the latter that needs overcoming. This is one more assertion of the fact that Nietzsche did not preach the upsetting of all values but only those that tended to keep man on a lower plane of existence.

Every man is capable of self-surpassing, but few men succeed in this goal owing to fear or laziness. This may have been one of the reasons why Nietzsche disliked the state since by forcing men to conform it deprives the individual of the opportunity of finding his real self.⁷⁵ But the question now arises: even if all individuals were given a free opportunity to find their real selves, how does one go about doing this? Nietzsche provides the solution in the form of a question: "What have you really loved till now?" The answer will show you "your true self which does not lie deeply concealed within you but immeasurably high

⁷³ cf. p. 70.

⁷⁴ Hillesheim, J.W., 'Nietzsche on Education', op. cit., p. 227.

⁷⁵ Kaufmann, Walter, op. cit., p. 158.

above you, or at least above what you usually take for your ego".⁷⁶

Our true nature can be revealed if we meditate on what we have admitted most in the great men -- past and present. Nietzsche provides himself as an example: "In Schopenhauer as Educator, my inmost history, my becoming is inscribed This essay gives inestimable information about not 'Schopenhauer as Educator' . . . but his opposite, 'Nietzsche as Educator'".⁷⁷

Man killed God when he felt that all that had hitherto been revered as God was not "god-like".⁷⁸ In other words, he refused to accept all the lower values that pass under the title 'Word of God'. Man has to justify this crime by proving to be God-like -- by creating values worthy of God Himself, that is the true God. In the same section in which he announced the death of God, Nietzsche had asked this question: "Shall we not ourselves have to become Gods merely to seem worthy of it?"⁷⁹ But since man was created in the image of God, to discover God he first has to discover himself by proving to himself every minute that he is a man. To discover himself he has to meditate on the ennobling virtues he admires in others. But Nietzsche also realized that there is a basic underlying idleness in man that may make him hesitate to find

⁷⁶Nietzsche, F., Ecce Homo, op. cit., 'The Untimely Ones', 3, p. 281.

⁷⁷Nietzsche, F., Ecce Homo, op. cit., 'The Untimely Ones', 3, p. 281. (Translator's italics.)

⁷⁸Nietzsche, F., The Antichrist, op. cit., section 47, p. 627.

⁷⁹Nietzsche, F., Joyful Wisdom, op. cit., III, 125, p. 168.

his true self. Rosenow observes that every man is aware of his uniqueness but through fear of the society in which he lives, he chooses to hide his uniqueness behind conventions and willingly changes himself into a herd animal. This fear, however, is caused by laziness, and Nietzsche urges everyone to fight this laziness and obey the dictates of his conscience to be himself and thus transcend the masses.⁸⁰ Whether he does so or not makes for another difference between the Superman and the Ultimate Man -- the former having the willingness of spirit to go in search of the real self. To surpass himself, man must first discover himself.

Can an individual discover his true self within the sphere of a highly specialized or merely a general education? Nietzsche draws no distinction between these two types of education since "one says only that man shall have a center" while "the other says that he shall also have a periphery".⁸¹ The complete individual needs a centre from which his other instincts radiate. It is through "the compulsive and dominating supremacy of this living center that a harmonious system of movements in all directions is formed".⁸² Though, as we shall see in the next chapter, Nietzsche insists upon certain subjects being compulsory in a curriculum, nowhere in his writings does he object to the inclusion

⁸⁰ Rosenow, Eliyahu, op. cit., p. 361.

⁸¹ Nietzsche, F., Schopenhauer as Educator, quoted by J.W. Hillesheim in 'Nietzsche on Education', op. cit., p. 229.

⁸² Ibid.

of several other subjects.

Nietzsche criticizes the schools of his time for not knowing the meaning of "learning to think". No wonder, he says, the Germans were able to accept the teachings of "that most deformed concept-cripple of all time, the great Kant".⁸³ Nietzsche believed that "the schools have no more important task than to teach rigorous thinking, cautious judgement, and consistent inference".⁸⁴ Otherwise, in later life, the thinking-habit would adopt a very narrow form and a person would be content with hasty generalizations. It is only through "consistent critical thinking" that one learns "to distinguish between truth and poetry" and this leads towards the recognition of whether one's "convictions are derived from personal observation and methodical thinking or from fantasies".⁸⁵ In fact, "the greatest progress men have made lies in their learning how to draw correct inferences".⁸⁶ "Thinking", says Nietzsche, "requires a technique, a teaching curriculum, a will to mastery Thinking wants to be learned like dancing, as a kind of dancing".⁸⁷ Unfortunately, "all men now live through too much

⁸³ Nietzsche, F., Twilight of the Idols, op. cit., 7: 7, p. 512.
(Translator's italics.)

⁸⁴ Nietzsche, F., 'Human, All Too-Human' in The Portable Nietzsche, op. cit., aphorism 265, p. 56.

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 57.

⁸⁶ Ibid., aphorism 266, p. 57.

⁸⁷ Nietzsche, F., Twilight of the Idols, op. cit., 7: 7, p. 512.

and think through too little".⁸⁸ Nietzsche placed such emphasis on creative thinking that Jaspers believes he regarded it almost as a form of breeding "for concepts transform the man who thinks best".⁸⁹

The willingness to think for oneself may be considered as yet another difference between the Supermen and the Ultimate Men. The latter, who form the majority, have a Hamlet-like apathy toward action. "They have perceived", says Nietzsche, "but it is irksome for them to act; for their action cannot change the eternal nature of things; the time is out of joint and they regard it as shameful or ridiculous that they should be required to set it right".⁹⁰ Nietzsche calls them "the weak and the failures" who will perish in the ruins of their own folly, "and they shall be given every possible assistance".⁹¹

⁸⁸ Nietzsche, F., 'The Wanderer and His Shadow' in On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, op. cit., aphorism 203, p. 183. Though there may be little comparison between the German schools of Nietzsche's times and those of North America today, it is interesting to note that a modern day critic of North American education also accuses our schools of 'schizophrenia' in matters of 'learning to think'. Richard Renfield in If Teachers were Free, (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1969) notes that "our society is afraid of some characteristics which it admires. For example, we consider it virtuous to come to one's own conclusions -- provided the conclusions are fairly conventional", (p. 150).

⁸⁹ Jaspers, Karl, Nietzsche, op. cit., p. 280.

⁹⁰ Nietzsche, F., The Birth of Tragedy, op. cit., section 7, p. 984.

⁹¹ Nietzsche, F., The Antichrist, op. cit., section 2, p. 570. This statement may sound harsh to our democratic ears, but all Nietzsche is really asking is that instead of the educational system selecting the winners and the losers in society, such a selection should be left up to the individual. It is an elitist system of education but one which cannot lead to alienation since it is based on the free choice of the individual.

Thinking helps one to discover oneself. The next step is self-surpassing. This is more difficult owing to the conflict that arises between man's "noblest" longings and his "terrifying" instincts. In the following words, Nietzsche indicates the twofold tendency that exists within humans:

When one speaks of humanity, the idea is fundamental that this is something which separates and distinguishes man from nature. In reality, however, there is no such separation: "natural" qualities and those called truly "human" are inseparably grown together. Man, in his highest and noblest capacities, is wholly nature and embodies its uncanny dual character. Those of his abilities which are terrifying and considered inhuman may even be the fertile soil out of which alone all humanity can grow in impulse, deed and work.⁹²

In the small fragment entitled: Homer's Contest: Preface to an Unwritten Book, Nietzsche criticizes the ancient Greeks for not making the attempt to control their animal instincts but rather engaging in "voluptuous cruelty" and bloodshed. It is true that Homer with his artistic ability was able to show them as being "better and more sympathetic" than they really were, but, asks Nietzsche

what do we behold when, no longer led and protected by the hand of Homer, we stride back into the pre-Homeric world? Only night and terror and an imagination accustomed to the horrible. What kind of earthly existence do these revolting, terrible, theogonic myths reflect? A life ruled only by the children of Night: strife, lust, deceit, old age, and death.⁹³

⁹² Nietzsche, F., 'Homer's Contest: Preface to an Unwritten Book', quoted by J.W. Hillesheim in 'Nietzsche Agonistes', op. cit., pp. 343-344.

⁹³ Ibid., p. 344.

Nietzsche suggests that there are two ways in which these evil impulses can be handled. One way -- the wrong way -- is to suppress and deny these impulses and attempt to escape into the "goodness" of an "otherworld". This originated in the "mystery cults" of ancient Greece and was later adopted by all the great religions. Such a way is not creative.⁹⁴

The second way, discovered by "Hellenic genius", is to accept such impulses as fully justified and make no attempt to suppress or escape from them. Once they have been accepted for what they are, a way should be found to release them in such a manner that instead of being destructive, they will be creative.⁹⁵ In a previous chapter we have already seen how Nietzsche recommended sublimation as being the best manner of dealing with the wrong impulses.⁹⁶ Sublimation is best achieved in a spirit of contest. Unlike modern educators who "fear nothing as much as the unchaining" of ambition, Nietzsche would urge students to pursue even their more egoistic and selfish impulses in a spirit of contest.⁹⁷

Any contest, however civilized, has to involve the egoistic impulse to dominate. Hillesheim observes that even when a student

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ cf. p. 38.

⁹⁷ Nietzsche, F., 'Homer's Contest', quoted by J.W. Hillesheim in 'Nietzsche Agonistes', op. cit., p. 345.

excels in his assignment, he does not do this to please the teacher but rather "to exert his power over him".⁹⁸ To quote Nietzsche:

Even when he who strives for excellence . . . wanted to make a delightful . . . impression, he did not enjoy this success insofar as he thus delighted his neighbor but insofar as he impressed himself on the soul of another, changed its form and ruled over it according to his will. The striving for excellence is the striving to overwhelm one's neighbor, even if only very indirectly or only in one's own feelings or even dreams. There is a long line of degrees of this secretly desired overwhelmings, and a complete list of these would almost amount to a history of culture from the first still grimace-like barbarism to the grimace of . . . overrefinement.⁹⁹

In no way, says Hillesheim, should the above statement be taken to mean that Nietzsche recommended unbridled ambition. For him a contest is a means, not an end. A contest involves a challenge and the stimulation to make a response which is determined by the goal to be achieved. If the contest is disciplined, it will have a beneficial result even if the goal leaves a lot to be desired. "But", says Hillesheim, "the full educational potential of the agonistic impulse can be realized only when it is subordinated to, and thus guided by, the goal of self-surpassing: then and only then can contest consistently serve the ends of genius and genuine culture".¹⁰⁰

Nietzsche believed that anyone was capable of self-surpassing

⁹⁸ Hillesheim, J.W., 'Nietzsche Agonistes', op. cit., p. 346.

⁹⁹ Nietzsche, F., 'Homer's Contest', quoted in Ibid., p. 346. (Translator's italics.)

¹⁰⁰ Hillesheim, J.W., 'Nietzsche Agonistes', op. cit., p. 347.

through contest for he claimed that "everyone carries within himself a productive uniqueness as the nucleus of his being".¹⁰¹ He was also aware that not everyone would undertake this task of self-surpassing since they often yield to the pressure of conformity and current opinions.

It was here, he felt, that education should play a part in liberating a person's unique capacities.¹⁰² The rest, of course, was up to the individual to decide in which direction he wished to go. Thus in Schopenhauer as Educator, Nietzsche advises the young man that

Your educators can be nothing more than your liberators. And that is the secret of all education: it doesn't provide artificial limbs, false noses or eye-glasses -- on the contrary, what could provide these gifts is merely pseudo-education. Education is rather liberation, a rooting out of all weeds, rubbish and vermin from around the buds of the plants.¹⁰³

Freedom of the individual is the highest morality, while the subjection of individual consciousness to pre-ordained principles may be considered the basest form of morality. Nietzsche believed that the condition of freedom helped a person to free himself from convictions which he held to be objections to the truth.¹⁰⁴ Freedom enables one to see clearly. On the other hand, the man who is not free -- "the man of faith" -- can never regard himself as an end but

¹⁰¹Nietzsche, F., Schopenhauer as Educator, quoted in Ibid., p. 351.

¹⁰²Hillesheim, J.W., 'Nietzsche Agonistes', op. cit., p. 351.

¹⁰³Nietzsche, F., Schopenhauer as Educator, quoted in Ibid.

¹⁰⁴Nietzsche, F., The Will to Power, op. cit., II, 456, p. 250.

only as a means. Such a man, says Nietzsche, "is not free to have any conscience at all for questions of 'true' and 'untrue'".¹⁰⁵ Freedom is that which says 'No' to everything that is inimical to life, and this leads to the will to truth which in turn leads to the will to power.¹⁰⁶ Any man who barter away his freedom for whatsoever reason, will remain "imprisoned by the shackles of opinion and fear".¹⁰⁷

But when he asked his famous question: "Shall we not ourselves have to become Gods?", Nietzsche was warning us that freedom brings awesome responsibilities. The price of freedom is eternal vigilance and a striving towards self-perfection at any cost. To become god-like, one cannot treat freedom as a licence to vegetate. Nietzsche makes this very clear after he asks the question: "What is freedom?". He answers in the following words:

That one has the will to assume responsibility for oneself. That one maintains the distance which separates us. That one becomes indifferent to difficulties, hardships, privation, even to life itself. That one is prepared to sacrifice human beings for one's cause, not excluding oneself.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁵ Nietzsche, F., The Antichrist, op. cit., section 54, p. 639.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., section 36, p. 609.

¹⁰⁷ Nietzsche, F., Schopenhauer as Educator, op. cit., p. 81. Martin Heidegger makes a similar observation when he talks about the dictatorship of the THEY in Being and Time, translated by J. MacQuarrie and E. Robinson, (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 164.

¹⁰⁸ Nietzsche, F., Twilight of the Idols, op. cit., 9: 38, p. 542.

Nietzsche realized that there were people who would either abuse their freedom or else strive to escape from it. In the same section in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, in which he depicted the Ultimate Man, he says:

They have left the places where living was hard: for one needs warmth. One still loves one's neighbor and rubs oneself against him: for one needs warmth Who still wants to rule? Who obey? Both are too much of a burden. No herdsman and one herd. Everyone wants the same thing, everyone is the same.¹⁰⁹

These people have voluntarily chosen to give up their freedom and hence Nietzsche has posited the idea of the Supermen who will have to curtail the freedom of the masses in order to rule them. But Nietzsche sees no cause for alienation here for "the less a person knows how to command, the more urgent is his desire for that which commands, and commands sternly".¹¹⁰

In matters of discipline, Nietzsche is not an extremist. He condemns punishments as serving no useful purpose. Far from producing a sense of guilt in the one punished, punishment serves to add to his resistance.¹¹¹ Of his own experience in teaching, Nietzsche had this

¹⁰⁹ Nietzsche, F., Thus Spoke Zarathustra, op. cit., Prologues, 5, p. 46. The willingness of most people to shy away from freedom in favour of conformity has also been indicated by Erich Fromm in Escape from Freedom, op. cit., and by B.F. Skinner in Walden II, (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1962).

¹¹⁰ Nietzsche, F., Joyful Wisdom, op. cit., V, 347, p. 286.

¹¹¹ Nietzsche, F., On the Genealogy of Morals, op. cit., II, sections 12-15, pp. 76ff.

to say:

During the seven years that I taught . . . I had never had occasion to punish anyone; the laziest boys worked hard Let the instrument be what it may, let it be as out of tune as only the instrument 'man' can be -- I should have to be sick if I should not succeed in getting out of it something worth hearing.¹¹²

At the same time he condemned a lack of discipline as nihilistic for then instincts that have reason to remain hidden break out in a wild frenzy and everything seems justified.¹¹³ For him, a good school was one that demanded not only the good but the exceptional from its students, rarely praised, never indulged and apportioned blame without regard for "talents or antecedents".¹¹⁴

Thus we have seen that Nietzsche placed great emphasis on freedom as an aim in education, for it is only this that brings out the individuality and true nature of a person and aids him in self-awareness, self-surpassing and the attainment of the Will to Power. What he regretted was that often education in an effort to achieve several lesser goals has lost sight of this basic aim. Thus all it has done has been "to change and twist man, alienate him from his true nature and suppress his will to power".¹¹⁵ Rosenow says that the aim of the state in education

¹¹²Nietzsche, F., Ecce Homo, op. cit., 'Why am I so Wise', 4, p. 227.

¹¹³Nietzsche, F., The Will to Power, op. cit., I, 93, p. 57.

¹¹⁴Ibid., IV, 912, p. 482.

¹¹⁵Rosenow, Eliyahu, op. cit., p. 359.

is not the suppression of the 'herd' man who has scarcely any will to power, but rather of the few exceptional people who "frighten society and its leaders out of their wits" because they are "capable of rising and gaining their true stature by treading on the masses".¹¹⁶ In this respect, Nietzsche's philosophy of education may be considered as providing a new direction and a new meaning to education, more in line with the true nature of man.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁶Ibid., p. 360.

¹¹⁷Ibid.

CHAPTER V

THE CURRICULUM AND THE ROLE OF THE TEACHER

From a reading of Nietzsche's works, it is obvious that his concept of freedom in education does not include a totally open curriculum wherein a student is free to select all his subjects.¹ There are certain subjects that he regarded as being compulsory. What we have to see in this chapter is Nietzsche's suggested approach to these subjects. Nietzsche, an educator himself, knew that subject matter is the grindstone upon which the student hones his intellect and refines his standards of tastes and that it can only be dispensed by being transformed into the experience of the individual. He was therefore violently opposed to any form of education that had as its aim merely the dissemination of information or the transmission of culture. Such an education, he claimed, is against nature. Instead of producing the liberally educated man, it produces "the historically and aesthetically trained Philistine, the babblers of old saws and new wisdom on Church, State, and Art, the sensorium that receives a thousand

¹cf. particularly the following works: Thus Spoke Zarathustra, op. cit., Human, All Too-Human, op. cit., The Use and Abuse of History, op. cit., The Future of Our Educational Institutions, op. cit., Schopenhauer as Educator, op. cit., The Case of Wagner, translated by A.M. Ludovici, extracts in The Philosophy of Nietzsche, edited by Geoffrey Clive, (New York: New American Library, 1965), extracts from this last book are also found in The Portable Nietzsche, op. cit. ✓

impressions" and yet does not possess "the clear light of understanding".²

If education is to be truly successful, we have to abandon the idea that what currently passes under the name of education is "necessary".³ What is really important is that we encourage the child to live now. It would be a strange world indeed if what is best for the child in living his life now is not the best preparation for his adulthood. His education has therefore to be a cluster of attitudes, feelings, perceptions, abilities and skills, including the ability to experience life fully and honestly. Youth, says Nietzsche, has to deny itself any established culture; rather it has to create its own for there can be

no party cry from the present-day mint of words and ideas to symbolize its own existence; but only claims of conviction from the power in it that acts and fights, breaks up and destroys; and . . . an ever heightened feeling of life when the hour strikes.⁴

Such students appear to be uneducated to the "educated men" of their times, but in reality they are uneducated only in the sense that they do not want to know what is already known but seek to find something new to provide a new meaning to their lives. It is such people, says Nietzsche, who in the end will cease to be "mere shadows of humanity".⁵ Hence the

²Nietzsche, F., The Use and Abuse of History, op. cit., X, pp. 66-67.

³Ibid., p. 67. (Translator's italics.)

⁴Ibid., X, p. 71.

⁵Ibid., X, p. 71-72.

need for being oneself and capitalizing from one's own experiences. Such a sincerity "is a further step toward true culture".⁶

Since Nietzsche stressed the need for developing a special breed of individual while at the same time not neglecting the needs of any groups, any curriculum based on his teachings will have to take into account the following aspects of the individual's life and experience: the individual differences in experience, the individual differences in capacity, the life aims or objectives of the individual, the spontaneous interest of the individual, and the special abilities of the individual. A Nietzschean curriculum will fulfil the truly broader aim of education by allowing the student to establish his own identity and discover self -- his talents, his weaknesses, what he wants from and what he can give to life. Once we have considered the Nietzschean curriculum, we shall have to take a look at that person who, Rosenow says, plays the central part in the Nietzschean scheme of education -- the teacher. There is no doubt that Nietzsche was rather virulent in his criticism of the teachers of his time. He called them "learned louts"⁷ who provided the models of "sublime monotony in action".⁸ He also accused them of dissimulation for not saying what they thought but only what they thought in relation to

⁶ Ibid., X, p. 73.

⁷ Nietzsche, F., Twilight of the Idols, op. cit., 8: 5, p. 410.

⁸ Nietzsche, F., The Will to Power, op. cit., IV, 888, p. 474.

the requirements of those they educated.⁹ The teachers in his day were hopeless "herd-men", conservatives in the negative sense of mere conforming. They were hostile to novelty, enterprise and adventure; they formed a guild responsible for the spread of Socratic rationalism in its modern and deadly forms of science and scholarship; they conspire against and suppress the rare spirits.¹⁰ In Nietzsche's day, says Brinton, the academic mind was devoted to "the process of embalming" and there was no room in it for anything alive.¹¹ However, there is much that Nietzsche has to say concerning the role of the teacher that is positive and constructive. This is precisely what is of significance for us today and what we shall examine in the second half of this chapter.

From Nietzsche's writings, it is obvious that the subjects that would form the core of his curriculum have to be the following: history, the national language(s), art and music, and morals.

"The language of the past", says Nietzsche, "is always oracular: you will only understand it as builders of the future who know the present". He advises the student of history that the only way in which he can know what was the greatest and noblest in the past is by straining the "noblest qualities" to the utmost. Otherwise, the past will only be brought down

⁹ Ibid., IV, 980, p. 512.

¹⁰ Nietzsche, F., Schopenhauer as Educator, paraphrased by Crane Brinton in Nietzsche, op. cit., pp. 111-112.

¹¹ Brinton, Crane, op. cit., p. 111.

to the level of the present and there will be nothing on which to build the future.¹² If man uses his noblest qualities to review the past, then he does not run the risk of being overwhelmed by it and thus being forced to "withdraw into himself" and become "dry and withered".¹³ Nor will one run the risk of adopting a superior attitude toward the past and criticizing everything that it stood for.¹⁴

Nietzsche's approach to history is empirical. As a believer in the Eternal Recurrence, he preferred to compare the past and the present so that the evils of the past might be avoided in future, not necessarily by eradicating the causes but by reacting differently to them. He claims that history does not provide either "the means" or "the instrument" to a happy future. Rather, it provides us with examples of great men who were able to rise above the herd. If history is to have any meaning then its principal aim has to be to help everyone attain maturity so that he can become "a fighter against his time" and build a future that will have a personal meaning in the light of his own existence.¹⁵ History thus helps Nietzsche demonstrate his important

¹² Nietzsche, F., The Use and Abuse of History, op. cit., VI, p. 40.

¹³ Ibid., IX, p. 64.

¹⁴ Nietzsche, F., 'The Dawn of Day', translated by J.M. Kennedy, aphorism 176 in The Philosophy of Nietzsche, op. cit., pp. 248-249.

¹⁵ Nietzsche, F., The Use and Abuse of History, op. cit., VI, p. 41.

premise that the difference between man and animal is less than the difference between the Superman and the Ultimate Man. In every generation, great men have arisen because they have chosen to transcend their animal nature. Such transcending is possible for all men but few choose to take the trouble. Those who do so are "the philosophers, artists and saints" and it is only such people who are "no longer animals" but "truly human beings".¹⁶ History holds such people up as examples of men in search of being who have refused to lose themselves in the stream of becoming. While an insight into the past may cause the weak to negate life, it will yet help the strong to overcome their suffering and create beauty. For the latter, history proves to be a great teacher since it helps them overcome the reverses by showing them what others have suffered and overcome. Such knowledge will show them that good things have existed in the past and may yet occur in the future.¹⁷ But history is not only for the strong: it is for everyman for it helps him not only to preserve the past but also to provide it with a new meaning in the context of his own existence.

Nietzsche cautions us against introducing objectivity into the study of history. Objectivity turns us into judges and, he says, "ages and generations never have the right to be the judges of all previous

¹⁶ Nietzsche, F., Schopenhauer as Educator, op. cit., p. 118.

¹⁷ Nietzsche, F., The Use and Abuse of History, op. cit., II, pp. 12ff.

ages and generations".¹⁸ George Kneller rightly states that history has to be "studied and written with Nietzschean anger and enthusiasm". The student has to handle his history "with passion, personal thrust, and in the manner of a stage director, talentedly manipulating the human scene with all its heroes, villains and plots".¹⁹ A meaning can be found in the existence of all historical characters, however widely divergent they may be. Such a meaning will provide significance of our own existence. It is not necessary for a person to know all the facts; it is more important for him to interpret the facts he possesses in the light of his own existence. Only when we "learn better to study history as a means to life", says Nietzsche, "can we have a pleasant life as active men who go forward and respect the course of the world".²⁰

In the previous chapter it was pointed out that one of the things that Nietzsche criticized in education was the manner in which the national language was taught.²¹ The result was that the students were unable to read and write correctly. In some of his works, he went into detail regarding the proper teaching of the national language.

¹⁸ Ibid., VI, p. 40. It should be noted that in Being and Time, Martin Heidegger also criticizes objectivity in the study of history for, he claims, it would preoccupy us with the study of the past and estrange us from our task as the makers of history (op. cit., p. 396).

¹⁹ Kneller, George, Existentialism and Education, (New York: Philosophical Library, 1958), pp. 129-130.

²⁰ Nietzsche, F., The Use and Abuse of History, op. cit., I, p. 11.

²¹ cf., p. 85.

Concerning literature, Nietzsche believed that it should be taught through analysis and appreciation. We should, he says, "take our classical authors and show, line for line, how carefully and with what precision every expression has to be chosen when a writer has the correct feeling in his heart and has before his eyes a perfect conception of all he is writing". But he hastens to add that the teacher should "urge his pupils . . . to express the same thought ever more happily".²² Nietzsche regards a piece of Literature as a conundrum which each person tries to solve in his own way. Initially it evokes in him some type of emotion like love, hate, anger and the like. However, it also awakens in him "the feeling for all that is orderly and regular in life". He may accept or reject this symmetry but whatever interpretation he puts on it will be in the context of his own existence.²³ There can be no boredom when a student is free to choose his own material for study and provide his own interpretation. The study of Literature then becomes tantamount to embarking upon a voyage of discovery. While some control may be maintained on wild flights of fancy or deliberate misinterpretations, the teacher should not inhibit the student by forcing him to accept one interpretation alone. "Life is an adventure", Nietzsche asserts, and since the poets

²² Nietzsche, F., The Future of Our Educational Institutions, op. cit., p. 514.

²³ Nietzsche, F., 'Human, All Too-Human', Vol. II, aphorism 119, translated by Paul V. Cohn in The Philosophy of Nietzsche, op. cit., p. 527.

and the playwrights have merely depicted the various aspects of life in their works, it is essential that each person experience it in a personal context.²⁴ Only then will he discover that the only ugly thing in life is the "degenerate man". He will then hate such a man for this man threatens "his will to power, his courage, his pride". This hatred may encourage him to reach greater heights.²⁵ But this is only possible if the student brings his own meaning and understanding to bear on a literary work. The teacher should encourage him to do so.

Regarding composition, we have seen in the previous chapter that Nietzsche criticized the teachers for correcting it in a manner that inhibited creativity while encouraging uniform mediocrity.²⁶ A student can do his composition well only if he is made aware of his own qualities, since composition makes an appeal to the individual. Hence topics for composition cannot be set by the teacher. If a teacher sets the topics, then he cannot demand originality. Yet, originality is precisely what should manifest itself in any composition.²⁷ In order to learn the art of writing correctly, Nietzsche would not recommend the study of formal grammar which he condemns as the mere

²⁴ Nietzsche, F., 'The Dawn of Day', op. cit., aphorism 240, p. 533.

²⁵ Nietzsche, F., Twilight of the Idols, op. cit., 10: 20, pp. 526-527.

²⁶ cf. p. 85.

²⁷ Nietzsche, F., The Future of Our Educational Institutions, op. cit., p. 516.

"acquisition of facts".²⁸ But it is obvious that he recommends functional grammar -- grammar in action -- for he speaks of the need for a "severe linguistic discipline"²⁹ and then proceeds to criticize the teaching of the mother tongue as if it were a dead language and as if the present and future were under no obligation to it. He emphasizes the need for doing rather than for merely knowing.³⁰ If the schools fail in this task, then composition (and consequently the mother tongue) will be reduced to nothing more than merely scribbling.³¹

That Nietzsche placed great emphasis on the creative arts is clear from his emphatic statement: "it is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the world are eternally justified".³² In the Foreward to his first book, The Birth of Tragedy, he had declared that "art is the highest task and the proper metaphysical activity in this life".³³ Since Nietzsche held that the arts are based on the principle of individuation,³⁴ it is obvious that he would reject the need for any curriculum or teaching on these subjects. When a person

²⁸Ibid., p. 514.

²⁹Ibid., p. 513.

³⁰Ibid., p. 515.

³¹Ibid., p. 517.

³²Nietzsche, F., The Birth of Tragedy, op. cit., 5, p. 974.

³³Ibid., 'Foreward to Richard Wagner', p. 950.

³⁴Ibid., 1, p. 594.

creates a work of art, he places a personal meaning on it. The world has suddenly appeared ugly to him and he has found it necessary to create something out of this ugliness.³⁵ Nietzsche found art to be "the great stimulant of life, the only superior counterforce to all will to denial of life".³⁶

The death of God has brought much misery and suffering to man, but it is out of the depths of this suffering that the spirit of art emerges. This spirit is a mingling of "the nethermost depths of human happiness" with "the bitterest and most repulsive drops".³⁷ The Greeks were the first to recognize the importance of the spirit of the arts. This spirit was the "comfort" that the Greeks created for themselves since they recognized in it "a redeeming and healing enchantress" which alone could transform the "horrible reflections on the terror and absurdity of existence into representations with which man may live".³⁸ What Nietzsche is trying to say is that art and music create the necessary illusions whereby man can face the terror of existence. They provide him with a personal meaning -- the final synthesis of the Dionysian and the Apollonian. Kennedy has observed that both music and art initially originate in an ultra-Apollonian

³⁵ Nietzsche, F., The Will to Power, op. cit., II, 416, p. 224.

³⁶ Ibid., III, 853(11), p. 452.

³⁷ Nietzsche, F., 'The Case of Wagner', op. cit., p. 288.

³⁸ Nietzsche, F., The Birth of Tragedy, op. cit., 7, p. 985.

sphere of art. They transfigure a region by removing all dissonance and thus justify the very existence of the world. Hence the Dionysian becomes the original artistic force. But now arises the need for a new transfiguring appearance to keep alive the world of individuation. This is the Apollonian function.³⁹ This would imply that in the creative arts classroom, the teacher should encourage the student to create out of the frenzy of his own imagination and then aid him in restoring some order in the chaos not based on any artistic standard but upon what the student himself finds meaningful.

Finally, though he preached the death of God, there can be no doubt that Nietzsche was a moralist of the highest order. In fact in all his major works, we find Nietzsche anxiously seeking a new morality to replace the decadent Christian morality. For Nietzsche, "morality" meant something different from the Christian conception of the word. Christianity was the "holy lie" since its concepts were dreamed up by the priests who in turn made people believe that they were revelations from God. Sooner or later these beliefs became convictions, and man became incapable of knowing by himself what is good and evil.⁴⁰ In a typical display of "bad faith", man then convinced himself that he knew the meaning of these terms, and hence Zarathustra is able to say: "I disturbed this somnolence when I taught that nobody yet knows what is

³⁹ Kennedy, J.M., The Quintessence of Nietzsche, op. cit., pp. 139-140.

⁴⁰ Nietzsche, F., The Antichrist, op. cit., section 55, pp. 639ff.

good and evil".⁴¹

A person needs to be educated, not trained, in morality. Training in morality would imply that moral principles of "good" and "evil" are cut and dried and have merely to be assimilated by the individual so that they may become a part of his life. However, words like "good" and "evil" are merely descriptions of acts, not of entities. What is good for one person may be evil for another. There is, therefore, no criterion for good and evil, and it has to be left to the judgement of each man. Zarathustra says that if people wish to "maintain" themselves, they must not evaluate as their neighbours evaluate. "Much that seemed good to one people seemed shame and disgrace to another I found much that was called evil in one place was in another decked with purple honors".⁴²

With the death of God, morality has to assume a new task, namely, the Will to Truth. This Will to Truth does not let one allow himself to be deceived nor does it let him deceive himself.⁴³ Man has to set himself up as the arbiter of good and evil. He has to reject all belief in "the concepts of the church" which hitherto have been regarded as the truth but which in reality are "the most malignant counterfeits that exist" -- concepts such as "beyond", "Last Judgement",

⁴¹Nietzsche, F., Thus Spoke Zarathustra, op. cit., 3, 12: 2, p. 214. (Translator's italics.)

⁴²Ibid., 1: 15, p. 84.

⁴³Nietzsche, F., Joyful Wisdom, op. cit., V, 344, p. 278.

"immortality of the soul", and the "soul" itself, "instruments of torture" by means of which "the priest became master" and "remained master".⁴⁴ The new morality preached by Nietzsche and based upon the revaluation of values would create a "freedom of will whereby a spirit could bid farewell to every belief, to every wish for certainty" and become "the free spirit par excellence".⁴⁵

Nietzsche, however, realized that there will always be people who live by faith and become true believers and require to be commanded.⁴⁶ For such people, religious instruction is vital. Nietzsche indicates three good effects of religious instruction. First it provides the strong and independent individuals with a means of overcoming resistance and provides them with the ability to rule by delivering to them the consciences of their subjects. As an example he cites the Brahmins of India who were even superior to the kings. Secondly, it provides some of the ruled with the opportunities necessary for them to rise above their current status and become future rulers. Thirdly, for the masses it gives a meaning to their existence. It provides them with an illusion that takes them above the hardness of their humdrum existence.⁴⁷

⁴⁴Nietzsche, F., The Antichrist, op. cit., section 38, pp. 611-612.

⁴⁵Nietzsche, F., Joyful Wisdom, op. cit., V, 347, p. 287.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Nietzsche, F., Beyond Good and Evil, op. cit., aphorism 61, pp. 72ff.

Regarding the rest of the curriculum, there is nothing in Nietzsche's works to indicate he was opposed to the inclusion of any of the other subjects. In the previous chapter we had seen that Nietzsche saw no real difference between a specialized or a general education.⁴⁸ However, the decision concerning what other subjects he should add to his basic curriculum, cannot be left to the student alone. Rosenow has indicated that it is the educator and not the disciple who is central to the Nietzschean scheme of education.⁴⁹ Since it is the teacher's task to uncover the basic essence in every disciple⁵⁰ and since education is the means of self-expression of the teacher,⁵¹ it is the teacher who will have to decide what a student is capable of studying. This should not imply that this entire matter of subject selection is arbitrarily done by the teacher. He will obviously have to do this in consultation with the student. The student is free to choose his subjects after the teacher has made him aware of his limitations. But since the Nietzschean teacher will not be with his students forever but will sooner or later leave them on their own,⁵² the final choice will have to be his so that he can start the moulding

⁴⁸ cf. p. 96.

⁴⁹ Rosenow, Eliyahu, op. cit., p. 368.

⁵⁰ Nietzsche, F., Schopenhauer as Educator paraphrased in Ibid., p. 366.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 368.

⁵² Ibid., p. 369.

process which will finally be completed by the student.⁵³ This may seem like an awesome responsibility but when Nietzsche placed the teacher at the centre of the educational system, he naturally placed such a responsibility on him. Nietzsche himself has indicated that man's educators are actually his liberators for the secret of every education is that it liberates man by bringing to light his authentic elements. While journeying towards Himself, man must encounter those educators who reveal himself to himself.⁵⁴ Rosenow indicates that the idea that a teacher should mould a student according to a pre-conceived programme is nothing new. It is found in the philosophies of Plato, Rousseau and Dewey. But while these philosophers justify their reasoning on the grounds of some "transcendental humanitarian or social idea", Nietzsche speaks only "in the name of the creative aesthetic activity", since for him the justification of education is that "it can reform and improve oneself".⁵⁵ In a Nietzschean scheme of education, therefore, the teacher will select the activity, that is the courses, but what use will be made of them will depend entirely upon the student.

Having selected a suitable curriculum for each student, the teacher's only task now is to help a student discover himself. His

⁵³ Ibid., p. 366.

⁵⁴ Nietzsche, F., Schopenhauer as Educator, paraphrased in Ibid., p. 361.

⁵⁵ Rosenow, Eliyahu, op. cit., pp. 368-369.

first task has to be to abandon belief in all "otherworldly virtues". The death of God has necessitated the abandonment of all fixed values. The only values worth having are the personal values of evaluation, creation, will and knowledge since they show that the goals of man should remain within the limits of what is thinkable by man. If man is to be saved from the nausea brought about by the death of God, he has to be able to evaluate his position in the universe. Herein lies the importance of creation. Creation provides value to life and requires the greatest of changes. He should also value will, because willing frees one from fixed patterns and is the commencement point for all creative processes. Finally comes knowledge which delights one in "becoming and begetting". Knowledge is the hammer that drives the creative will.⁵⁶

Secondly, following Zarathustra's example, a teacher has to regard his students as raw material that has been left in his hands to be shaped according to the highest good. This raw material that signifies men as they are, is for the most part abhorrent to Zarathustra and he refers to it as "the hardest, ugliest stone".⁵⁷ However, he knows that this is all that there is, and somewhere in this ugly mess resides some good. Like Zarathustra, the teacher has to adopt the role of the sculptor and take the hammer to the stone.⁵⁸ Rosenow

⁵⁶ Nietzsche, F., Thus Spoke Zarathustra, op. cit., 2: 2, pp. 110-111.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 2: 2, p. 111.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

observes that education, like stonecutting is a violent process. The sculptor has only one direction, and that is the form he envisions. The rest is nothing but splinters that fly around him as he strikes the stone, and to which he pays no attention. "This is the image of the uncompromising educator, moulding his students according to his vision".⁵⁹ The teacher may also be compared to a fisherman who casts his bait into 'the human sea' and says:

Open up, human abyss! Open up and throw me your fishes and glistening crabs! With my finest bait shall I bait today the strangest human fish! My happiness itself shall I cast far and wide . . . to see if many human fishes will not learn to kick and tug at my happiness, until they, biting on my sharp, hidden hooks, have to come up to my height, the most multicolored groundlings of the abyss to the most wicked of all fishers of men. For I am he, from the heart and from the beginning, drawing, drawing towards me, drawing up to me, raising up, a drawer, trainer, and taskmaker who once bade himself, and not in vain: 'Become what you are'.⁶⁰

From what has just been said, it follows that, thirdly, the role of the teacher has to be one of personal creativity. If the teacher adopts the role of a sculptor or a fisherman, his relation to his students has to be an aesthetic one. Zarathustra's need for friends (disciples) does not stem from altruistic feelings or from a desire to communicate but rather from a desire to achieve perfection through

⁵⁹ Rosenow, Eliyahu, op. cit., p. 363.

⁶⁰ Nietzsche, F., Thus Spoke Zarathustra, op. cit., 4: 1, p. 252. (Translator's italics.)

creative activity.⁶¹ However, the creative man cannot find friends; he has to create them. Zarathustra therefore brings into existence the very disciples he needs in order to build up his own soul. It is not the disciples themselves, nor their hidden beauty and hidden qualities which challenge him to become their teacher, but only his own inner need to educate in order to realize himself.⁶² Hence, says Rosenow, "for the Nietzschean educator the disciple or student is from the very first only an object the attraction of which lies in its possibilities for the educator. Since at the center of the educational process stands the educator, rather than the one who is to be educated, the educational process as a whole is conceived of as a creative act through which the educator expresses himself and realizes his own potentialities".⁶³ Left at this point these remarks may suggest that this position differs little from that of the traditional teacher who uses the student merely as an object in a teacher-centred educational process. Such a conclusion, however, would be erroneous for, as will be pointed out later in this chapter, the aim of the Nietzschean teacher is not the creation of disciples who will be imitations of himself but

⁶¹ Rosenow, Eliyahu, op. cit., p. 365.

⁶² Nietzsche, F., Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 3: 3, paraphrased in Ibid., p. 365.

⁶³ Rosenow, Eliyahu, op. cit., p. 365.

of individuals who will assert themselves and express their independence.

Fourthly, every teacher would do well to take a page out of ancient Greek culture and foster the spirit of contest with his students.⁶⁴ However, any teacher who wishes to foster the spirit of contest in his students must himself possess such a spirit. Among the Greeks we find that

just as the youths were educated through contests, their educators were also engaged in contests with each other. The great musical masters, Pindar and Simonides, stood side by side, mistrustful and jealous; in the spirit of the contest, the sophist, the advanced teacher of antiquity, meets another sophist; even the most universal type of instruction, through the drama was meted out to the people only in the form of a tremendous wrestling among the great musical and dramatic artists. How wonderful "Even the artist hates the artist".⁶⁵

Fifthly, the teacher must be honest both towards himself and towards his students. Self-discovery is possible only if both teacher and student engage in it and share introspections. While not failing to praise a student for his achievements ("for those who praise affirm, judge, evaluate"⁶⁶), he never provides him with an inflated opinion of himself. He does not hesitate to admonish the student who does not work up to his potential. If the teacher is honest, he has to demand of the student "the good, even the exceptional", and when he has to apportion blame, he must do so "sharply, objectively" and "without regard for talent or antecedents".⁶⁷ Superman is the product of a

⁶⁴Hillesheim, J.W., 'Nietzsche Agonistes', op. cit., p. 345.

⁶⁵Nietzsche, F., Homer's Contest quoted in Ibid., p. 346.

⁶⁶Nietzsche, F., The Will to Power, op. cit., III, 775, p. 406.

⁶⁷Ibid., IV, 912, p. 482.

hard school.

Sixthly, a teacher has to be understanding but not sentimental. Without understanding he cannot motivate his students. In a classroom, a teacher encounters vast differences both in behaviour and intellect and he knows that only a few of them can attain the heights. Hence to act hard towards all of them is unpardonable. Nietzsche says

When the exceptional human being treats the mediocre more tenderly than himself and his peers, this is not mere courtesy of heart — it is simply his duty.⁶⁸

Understanding, however, should not be equated with pity. Pity has no place in education since it is bad both for the giver and the receiver. For the former it represents a form of condescension and even contempt; for the latter it provides no help toward happiness and perfection. We do not pity those we admire.⁶⁹ Moreover, one who pities "knows nothing of all the inner consequences and complications which are called misfortune" and "the economy of the soul". In his desire to help he "does not reflect that there is a personal necessity for misfortune" and that "the path to one's own heaven always leads through the voluptuousness of one's own hell".⁷⁰ Pity also hinders those who feel it. Nietzsche

⁶⁸ Nietzsche, F., The Antichrist, op. cit., section 57, p. 647. (Translator's italics.)

⁶⁹ Nietzsche, F., The Dawn paraphrased by Walter Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 368.

⁷⁰ Nietzsche, F., Joyful Wisdom, op. cit., IV, 338, p. 266.

is very emphatic on this point when he says,

How is it at all possible for a person to keep to his path! Some cry or other is continually calling one aside: our eye then rarely lights on anything without it becoming necessary for us to leave for a moment our own affairs and rush to give assistance Indeed, there is even a secret seduction in all this awakening compassion and calling for help: our "own way" is a thing too hard and insistant, and too far removed from the love and gratitude of others -- we escape from it and from our most personal conscience, not at all unwillingly, and, seeking security in the conscience of others, we take refuge in the lovely temple of the "religion of pity".⁷¹

If we pity anyone, then we are not taking into consideration his need for suffering. Suffering breeds strength and it is out of this that "spirit" and "greatness" are born.⁷²

Seventhly, a teacher must be knowledgeable in the subject he teaches. He must not only be in possession of the facts but must also know how to analyze and to criticize them. However, the specialized knowledge that a teacher possesses should not turn him into a dogmatist. This would kill independent thinking on the part of the students. Nietzsche criticized those teachers who believe that ideas are like an embalmed body put on display. Such men are hopeless conformists to the "herd morality" and are hostile to novelty and adventure in thinking, and always tend to conspire and attempt to

⁷¹Ibid., IV, pp. 267-268. (Translator's italics.)

⁷²Nietzsche, F., Beyond Good and Evil, op. cit., aphorism 225, p. 154.

control the rare spirits.⁷³ A student is like a newly-born bird. There is a time for dependence and there is a time for independent flight. Neither time should be hastened; neither time should be curbed. Moreover, the teacher should also do well to remember that there is something "deep down" that is unteachable. The teacher should stay out when the student is engaged in the process of self-discovery.⁷⁴

Eighthly, to avoid any "levelling process" in education, a teacher must not hesitate to descend to the level of the students. This is neither demeaning nor dishonest; rather, it is the true height of subjective teaching since it enables him to gauge just how much each student can cope with, and also how he should deal with each student. "Some he can drive toward the heights only with the whips of scorn; others, who are sluggish, irresolute, cowardly, vain, perhaps only with exaggerated praise".⁷⁵ Every student is capable of something, and it is the duty of the teacher to find this out and use it in the most constructive manner possible. Of his own teaching career at the University of Basle, Nietzsche says: "Let the instrument be what it may, let it be as out of tune as only the instrument 'man' can be -- I should have to be sick if I should not succeed in getting

⁷³ Nietzsche, F., Schopenhauer as Educator, op. cit., p. 181.

⁷⁴ Nietzsche, F., Beyond Good and Evil, op. cit., aphorism 231, p. 162.

⁷⁵ Nietzsche, F., The Will to Power, op. cit., IV, 980, pp. 512-513.

out of it something worth hearing. And how often have I been told by the 'instruments' themselves that they had never heard themselves like that".⁷⁶

Ninethly, a teacher would do well to keep in mind that his main job is not "to make men better" or "to preach morality" but rather "to create conditions that require stronger men who for their part need, and consequently will have, a morality . . . that makes them strong".⁷⁷ This will enable the Supermen to rise "above the steam and filth of human lowlands".⁷⁸ These ideal conditions can best be created by allowing total freedom to those capable of handling it, and of depriving it to those incapable of doing so. "Small spirits must obey", says Nietzsche.⁷⁹ It is the duty of the teacher to "compel" the Supermen "to sever" themselves from the others⁸⁰ for the ultimate aim of education is not "mankind" but the "Superman".⁸¹

Lastly, as was mentioned earlier in this chapter, the Nietzschean teacher does not aim at the creation of disciples who will be mere imitations of him. While creating his disciples, the teacher should

⁷⁶ Nietzsche, F., Ecce Homo, op. cit., 'Why I am so Wise', 4, p. 227.

⁷⁷ Nietzsche, F., The Will to Power, op. cit., IV, 981, p. 513.
(Translator's italics.)

⁷⁸ Ibid., IV, 993, p. 517.

⁷⁹ Ibid., IV, 984, p. 514. (Translator's italics.)

⁸⁰ Ibid., IV, 891, p. 475. (Translator's italics.)

⁸¹ Ibid., IV, 1001, p. 519.

aim at producing the individual who will be so totally different from the master as to be even willing to challenge him. Rosenow has observed that a constant tension must exist between teacher and student so that the former is willing to leave the latter in the middle of the road, not in the form of "a leave-taking between an old educator and his beloved disciple" but rather as an expression "of a deep conflict and even of rebellion".⁸² Zarathustra advises his followers:

Go away from me and guard yourselves against Zarathustra. And better still: be ashamed of him One repays a teacher badly if one remains only a pupil. And why, then, should you not pluck at my laurels You are my believers; but of what importance are all believers. All belief is of so little account.⁸³

"Rebellion and loneliness are the distinguishing marks of true freedom", remarks Rosenow. Through rebellion the disciple learns how to be on his own, even when he is with others. It is only in loneliness that he learns about himself. At the same time such rebellion helps the teacher for it acts as a challenge in his progress toward perfection.⁸⁴ The Nietzschean teacher only helps his student to liberate himself but he does not create the free man. He points the way to freedom, but

⁸² Rosenow, Eliyahu, op. cit., p. 365.

⁸³ Nietzsche, F., Thus Spoke Zarathustra, op. cit., 1: 22(3), p. 103. Also cf. Ecce Homo, op. cit., Preface, 4, p. 220.

⁸⁴ Rosenow, Eliyahu, op. cit., p. 366.

the ultimate task of freeing himself has to depend on each man.⁸⁵

I do not believe that Nietzsche wanted the teacher to abandon every student in the middle of the road. There is always the Ultimate Man, "the dependent man . . . who cannot posit himself as an end". Such a man engages in acts of "self-abnegation" and "self-alienation". He is a "weak-willed human being" who does "see many things". He has no conscience for questions of "true" and "untrue", and he lacks "integrity".⁸⁶ It may be that Nietzsche would use the abandonment by the teacher as another test for selecting the Supermen and the Ultimate Men. Once this has been done, the teacher would then have to continue leading (albeit reluctantly) such "sick spirits", such "epileptics of the concept" who are not happy unless someone uses them.⁸⁷

⁸⁵ Ibid. Rosenow (Ibid., p. 369) indicates that the Nietzschean teacher, by freeing himself from his students, vastly differs from the educators conceived by Plato, Rousseau, Dewey and Neill. Plato's educator accompanies his disciples all the way to the sun and then back again. Rousseau's Emile, at the conclusion of the book, declares that he will always need his instructor. Dewey insists that life is education for it is a continuous process of adaptation to society and to the environment. Neill when he sends his students out from the school, hopes that society will go on with the educational project he has initiated. Nietzsche, on the other hand, considers his students as threats to his own self-transcendence, and himself as a threat to their transcendence, and hence he abandons them in the middle of the road. He abandons them precisely at the moment when he is presented with the best opportunity of moulding them in his own image and likeness.

⁸⁶ Nietzsche, F., The Antichrist, op. cit., 54, pp. 638-639. (Translator's italics.)

⁸⁷ Ibid., 54, p. 639.

We have seen that though Nietzsche suggested the need for certain subjects to be included in the curriculum, he never prescribed any syllabus nor did he even hint at the topics that may be included. All he showed was the manner in which these subjects should be taught. This is because he placed the teacher at the centre of the educational process. The teacher's task at all times is to see that a person tries to improve himself. This is true of both the Superman and the Ultimate Man. It is not necessary for the teacher to be a Superman or even one attaining to it. If he keeps in mind that the aim of education is the production of the "higher type" of man, all he needs to do is to provide "the basis for the emergence of a higher type".⁸⁸

⁸⁸Nietzsche, F., The Will to Power, op. cit., IV, 859, p. 458.
(Translator's italics.)

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Despite the fact that almost a century has passed since Nietzsche wrote his last work, his teachings, largely ignored in his own days, have not passed into the limbo of oblivion. In fact, they are more relevant today than they ever were.¹ This is because Nietzsche was more than a philosopher: he was a critic, and a prophet. He was more concerned with moral problems than with the validity of a priori synthetic judgements. He did not start with a set of premises and arrive at certain conclusions. His was the voice in the wilderness crying out for means and ways of overcoming the lack of equilibrium and balance in society. What he sought was the development of an individual human being amidst an ever-changing environment. Mankind can only progress when Man is honoured, and Nietzsche's gospel of self-realization sought to transform the Darwinian ape-man into a god-man. To do this he had to set his face against the entire range of Western philosophy

¹ Apart from the influence that Nietzsche has exerted on the existentialist philosophers, most notably Heidegger, Jaspers, Camus and Sartre, it must also be pointed out that Georg Simmel's philosophy of culture, Hans Vaihinger's pragmatism, Oswald Spengler's philosophy of history, and Max Scheler's phenomenology are basically influenced by Nietzsche's philosophy, which may in a way sound ironic for the man who had made his greatest creation, Zarathustra, say that he wanted no disciples. (cf., Thilly, Frank, A History of Modern Philosophy, New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1959, p. 507.)

from Socrates and Plato to Schopenhauer, Kant and Hegel. Like the Superman of whom he preached, Nietzsche was equal to the task.

We have seen that the Death of God was the idea around which Nietzsche built his entire philosophy. Something that men had relied on for centuries had now disappeared thus sounding the death knell of civilization. Nietzsche felt that he had the task of rescuing man from the Nihilism that would inevitably follow. He therefore placed before the world the ideal of the Superman who will be as a God on earth for the common man. The Superman will be the source of inspiration and the law-giver since he will embody all the qualities once attributed to God. He is not a new species of man but merely the present human being who has succeeded in perfecting his nature, overcoming his animalism and organizing his impulses -- all as the result of much suffering and overcoming. Such men could arise in any place, in any culture, and at any time.

Nietzsche criticized democracy since it ignores the unique individuals and breeds mediocrities. What he wanted was a form of aristocracy wherein every man is provided with the opportunity of surpassing himself, and those who avail themselves of this opportunity will become the leaders. While it is the task of the schools to cater to the Supermen, it is not their task to make the initial distinction between the Superman and the Ultimate Man. This is the individual's decision, and can only be achieved through self-realization. Being himself will enable man to think for himself and decide whether the

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struggle against the impenetrable void created by the death of God is worthwhile or whether he will be willing to settle for easy answers obtained through conformity. Not that Nietzsche suggests that conformity be eliminated. In fact, he tells us that

What I fight against: that an exceptional type should make war on the rule -- instead of grasping that the continued existence of the rule is the precondition for the value of the exception.²

Conformity and religion are the two props that the Ultimate Man will need when he is confronted with the awesome discipline of the Eternal Recurrence and realizes there is no redemption in any source external to Man. However, the Superman does not conform. He has to go beyond the sphere of good and evil if he is to realize his full potentiality. He has to go beyond the restraints of determinism and indeterminism and acquire a free personality by discovering the ultimate source of existence within the depths of his own consciousness. Only then can he attain the Will to Power that frees him from the slave morality of the Ultimate Man -- the morality that makes virtues of meanness, pity, ressentiment, contentment, gentleness, humility and helplessness. All the Superman seeks is Power which is synonymous with truth and determines the standard of values. This is not ruthless power since it is attained through self-overcoming. Rather it is the power that makes him

²Nietzsche, F., The Will to Power, op. cit., IV, 894, p. 476.

sympathetic, kind and tolerant. The Superman uses power and compassion, force and persuasion to achieve his mission in life.

It is only after the individual has made his decision as to what role he will assume that education should provide him with the two motives: profit-making (the path of the Ultimate Man) and culture (the path of the Superman). The latter path is arduous and only a few will select it. Hence it is imperative that the schools separate the smaller group from the larger one and permit them to complete the work for which they are destined -- leadership. Hence the first problem that was discussed in the introductory chapter of this study, that of alienation, cannot exist under a Nietzschean system of education which maintains that if one wants to be happy, one should be what one wants to be. Under such a system, nothing is praised and nothing is condemned since everything is beyond good and evil and depends entirely upon the interpretation provided by each man.

The ultimate goal of education, the creation of the Superman, will only be attained if man is left free to choose for himself. Nietzsche warns us of the horrible consequences that follow the inability to create the higher man. Men will then either make "demigods or whole gods out of the great men of the past" or they will "bring many men together into one heap as a parliament" and hope "they will be equally tyrannical".³ The great majority of men need some form of authority to bring meaning

³Ibid., 4: 875, p. 468.

into their existence, and it is the task of education to provide them with this authority in the form of the Supermen.

Concerning the second problem, the loss of values, we have seen that Nietzsche did not believe in inventing values but rather in the revaluation of values so that positive values with individual meaning can be created. This too is the task of the Supermen since most men are incapable of revaluating values. For this reason he admired Christ who, for him, represented a symbol of power that had destroyed the old table of values and had created new ones through revaluation. Christ, the noblest example of the Superman in action, had sought to become God by giving the lie to the myth "that before God men are equal . . . the non plus ultra of nonsense on earth".⁴ Nietzsche firmly asserted that there can never be a single morality for everyone since such a morality is merely a form of "tyranny over other types by that type whom this single morality fits".⁵ The herd-morality is for the "herd". The revaluation is not for them since it demands a constant process of renewal which they are either incapable to perform or too indolent to do so. Such men will be satisfied with the values imposed on them. According to Nietzsche, the Ultimate Man who is representative of such a type is nothing more than "the domestic animal, the herd animal, the sick animal"⁶ and hence of little value.

⁴Ibid., 4: 874, p. 468. (Translator's italics.)

⁵Ibid., 2: 315, p. 174.

⁶Nietzsche, F., The Antichrist, op. cit., section 3, pp. 570-571.

On the other hand, great care should be taken by the schools to preserve and promote the development of the Supermen who represent an ascending course of mankind⁷ and will be the creators of all that is best in human existence. Nietzsche the prophet has warned us that if education fails in its task of creating an aristocracy of rulers then the "herd men" will prevail with their "herd instinct" that "every zero has equal rights, where it is virtuous to be zero".⁸ If our leaders rise from among these "zeros" then we can only have tyranny of the worst type.

This study is not concerned with contemporary efforts to bring about reforms in public education that may be said to approximate to a Nietzschean philosophy of education. The language and concepts of Nietzschean thought cannot be translated easily into the language, concepts and methods of modern educational research. Yet it would not be inappropriate to make a brief comparison, in this concluding part of the study, between the findings of some researchers on the education of the 'gifted' child and the Nietzschean concept of the Superman. If we bear in mind that the Superman was interpreted in this study as representing not qualities beyond the reach of man but qualities 'beyond the nature of the ordinary' in man,⁹ such a comparison may be more justified than may appear at first glance.

⁷Nietzsche, F., The Will to Power, op. cit., II, 273, p. 200.

⁸Ibid., I, 53, p. 33.

⁹cf. Chapter III, footnote 28, p. 58.

Except for the physical and social qualities of the Superman as noted in Chapter III, Nietzsche provided only shadowy details concerning the concrete qualities that the Superman should possess. However, he did say that the Superman would be like "the Roman Caesar with Christ's soul"¹⁰ and we have seen that he frequently mentioned four historical figures who, he felt, jointly embodied all the qualities of the Superman: Cesare Borgia, Julius Caesar, Napoleon and Goethe. If we combine the qualities of these men together with those of Christ's, we will notice that the Superman is a born leader, alert and observant but not irrational. He is capable of clear thinking and possesses a high level of persistence, a sense of independence, a determination to be a non-conformist, and is adventuresome. He has a remarkable insight into problems and his ideas are original and unusual. He is also emotionally stable and is not contemptuous of those below him because he knows that he towers way above them. These are precisely the qualities that modern-day studies have noted in the 'gifted' child.¹¹ Such studies, however, tend to stress intelligence and while there is no doubt that superior intelligence has to form part of the make-up of the

¹⁰Nietzsche, F., The Will to Power, op. cit., IV, 983, p. 513.

¹¹The qualities of the gifted child have been fully listed by Jack Kough and Robert F. Dehaan in Teachers' Guidance Handbook, Vol. I, 'Identifying Children Who Need Help', (Chicago: Science Research Associates, 1955), p. 44. Also cf. Bowers, Joan E. et al., Exceptional Children in Home, School, Community, (Toronto: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1960), pp. 316-317.

Superman, this quality alone, to the absence of the others, cannot make a Superman.¹²

It is unfortunate that while much is being done to cater to the needs of handicapped children, little is being done about the needs of the gifted child. Writers like John Gardner,¹³ James Dunlap¹⁴ and Louis Terman¹⁵ and a host of others have indicated the need for the special education of such children. Even the means of identifying such children present no problem. J.M. Dunlap,¹⁶ L. Fischer and D.R. Thomas¹⁷ have suggested that a multiplicity of tests be administered over the years starting in Grade I to serve as a check against an individual's longitudinal mental growth pattern. Gardner suggests that a written record be maintained of school grades, teacher's judgements, and the judgements made by deans, principals and counselors who have had

¹² It should be noted that even such a classic study on the gifted child as that done by L.M. Terman, M.H. Oden and others places the emphasis on the speed of learning rather than on the quality, and does not take into account physical and social maturity. cf. The Gifted Child Grows Up: Twenty-five Years Follow-up of a Superior Group, Genetic Studies of Genius, Vol. IV, (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press, 1947), pp. 281ff.

¹³ Gardner, John W., Excellence, (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 141ff.

¹⁴ Dunlap, James M., 'Education of Children with High Mental Ability' in Education of Exceptional Children and Youth, edited by W.M. Cruickshank and G.O. Johnson, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1961), pp. 147ff.

¹⁵ Terman, Louis, Oden, M.H., et al., op. cit.

¹⁷ Fischer, L. and Thomas, D.R., Social Foundations of Educational Decisions, (Belmont, Ca.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc., 1965, p. 243. Since Nietzsche does not criticize tests, we may assume that he was not opposed to them.

dealings with the child. The bigger the variety of evidence, the more the justice that can be done to the child.¹⁸ Dunlap also suggests "the use of check lists, guides, anecdotal records, sociograms, or other similar devices" and the opinion of other children.¹⁹ Whatever method (or methods) is used, however, Nietzsche would expect that at some stage the process would allow the individual the freedom to choose to enter or not enter whatever educational programmes are available for such individuals.

Once the gifted child is identified, he should be placed in a homogeneous group. Criticisms of homogeneous grouping suggest that such a system creates "an all-powerful elite . . . that would have the power to rule and make decisions, while being out of contact with the bulk of the population on whose behalf they are making decisions".²⁰ Such a result, however, would not be contrary to Nietzschean thought. Nietzsche has indicated very clearly that an ever-widening gulf has to exist between the Superman and the Ultimate Man. The latter is a "herd animal" to whom the Superman is not a "shepherd" but rather a leader.²¹

There is no age or grade limit for the commencement of homogeneous grouping since everything depends upon individual readiness and willingness. A curriculum revolving around the humanities which,

¹⁸Gardner, John W., op. cit., p. 59.

¹⁹Dunlap, James M., op. cit., pp. 159-160.

²⁰Fischer, L. and Thomas, D.R., op. cit., p. 243.

²¹Nietzsche, F., The Will to Power, op. cit., IV, 879, p. 470.

as several writers have shown, have aroused special interest at the present time,²² would be in line with Nietzsche's suggestions. For the most part, as Bowers has observed, the curriculum should be largely a "do-it-yourself project" since "there are no easy solutions, ready-made kits or pre-fabricated plants".²³ What we have to take into consideration is not only the child's own needs but also what he can contribute to the future. The curriculum should be one that poses a challenge to him.²⁴ These are the children who will form the elite of the future -- an elite into whose hands unlimited power will be entrusted. Any attempt to draw up a standardised curriculum for such persons will defeat the true aim of Nietzschean education. What educators can do is to provide the suitable conditions in which such

²² cf. especially Toffler, Alvin, The Culture Consumers, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964); Eurich, Alvin C., Reforming American Education, (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 118; von Bertalanffy, Ludwig, 'The World of Science and the World of Value' in Problems and Issues in Contemporary Education, (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1968), pp. 244ff.

²³ Bowers, Joan E., et al., op. cit., p. 332.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 337. For further information concerning the curriculum of the gifted child cf. Havighurst, Robert J., et al., A Survey of the Education of Gifted Children, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 20ff; Bowers, Henry, Thinking for Yourself, (Toronto: J.M. Dent and Sons (Canada) Ltd., 1946), pp. 116ff; Dehaan, Robert F. and Havighurst, Robert J., Educating Gifted Children, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 129ff; Mathews, W.D.E. and Chalmers, M.W., School and Classroom Management, (Toronto: J.M. Dent and Sons (Canada) Ltd., 1960), 161ff.; Freehill, Maurice F., Gifted Children, (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1961), pp. 156ff.; Alcorn, Marvin D., Kinder, James S. and Schunert, Jim R., Better Teaching in Secondary Schools, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc., 1970), pp. 206ff.

students can thrive and achieve their fullest potentialities -- "conditions which", as Hillesheim puts it, "may be judged by the masses as 'unfavorable' or 'undesirable' for the advancement of their own immediate ends" but which "are most 'favorable' for the development of the genius".²⁵ Such a curriculum will definitely create a gulf between the superior individual and the mediocre one but, as Hillesheim observes, Nietzsche himself believed that although a state of conflict between the Supermen and the masses was a necessary stimulus to creativity, in the long run, the two groups will unite in "the common goal of self-perfection", for the masses will realize that "their own welfare is ultimately linked with the production of the genius".²⁶

If education is to become a secure, permanent and constructive force in transforming civilization and our individual lives for the better, we cannot rely upon a mere concatenation of facts as collected through educational research. Facts alone will not formulate the fundamental conceptions of human life and human understanding nor will they help solve the problem of values and purposes, objectives and aims in education. What we need to develop is an educational philosophy that has a unitary and consistent view of the universe. Our educational system has to prepare the students for the great battle of life and this can only be done by regarding them not as mere objects but as completely

²⁵Hillesheim, J.W., 'Nietzsche Agonistes', op. cit., p. 353.

²⁶Ibid.

free individuals, noble in reason and infinite in faculty.

We have seen that Nietzsche put the teachers at the centre of the educational process, and hence it is necessary for them to regard themselves as mature human beings. They cannot sit back and complacently hope for change or meekly accept superficial changes. On the contrary, teachers should demand radical changes and make their own contributions. They and their students are the only persons directly involved in the educational process, and it is their voices alone that should be heard.

Alienation and a loss of values are the direct result of the death of God. Man is poised on the brink of Nothingness and can only succeed in destroying himself unless he is led not by indifferent leaders who just happen to be in positions of leadership but by leaders who themselves have freely chosen this task and have received the appropriate education. Two thousand years ago, Plato put forward the idea of the philosopher-king -- an aristocrat by careful selection: a hundred years ago, Nietzsche gave us the Superman -- an aristocrat by free choice. The Nietzschean aristocracy is an open invitation to all, and it is the individual alone who can leave himself out by choice. Two world wars were fought in this century to make the world safe for democracy. Paradoxically, if democracy itself is to be saved, we probably need an aristocracy of Supermen to lead us -- men who have attained the status of God, a God that no longer remains invisible and is no more a tool of religion. Such men can set about the task of creating a world that, we

hope, will be free from alienation and a loss of values. A Nietzschean system of education can usher in the dawn of a new day when man can face the Eternal Recurrence without trepidation.

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