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# **Mass Diplomacy: Foreign Policy in the Global Information Age**

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**Résumé:** Une forme sophistiquée de diplomatie d'État-à-population basée sur les dernières technologies de communication tend à se développer rapidement depuis quelques années et à acquérir une place de plus en plus importante au sein d'un nombre significatif de systèmes de politique étrangère. Initié par les poids lourds de la scène internationale, le phénomène s'est rapidement étendu aux puissances de second rang avant de s'élargir à la plupart des autres états de la planète. Cette thèse est une tentative de résoudre l'énigme soulevée par l'essor subit de cette nouvelle concentration de politique étrangère et de comprendre les raisons qui expliquent à la fois sa croissance quantitative et son évolution qualitative en termes de formulation, d'organisation et de mise en oeuvre. Le premier argument que cette thèse développe est que la brusque ré-émergence de la diplomatie publique est déterminée par la phase actuelle d'accélération de la révolution de l'information (force habilitante nécessaire) et amplifiée par des facteurs contingents: l'explosion du terrorisme global (accélérateur) et la perception qu'ont les leaders et décideurs de politique étrangère de ce nouvel environnement diplomatique (prisme). Le second argument est que, au delà de la croissance quantitative, le nouveau contexte opérationnel généré par l'avènement de la société globale de l'information a provoqué une évolution qualitative de la diplomatie publique héritée de la Guerre Froide vers ce que l'on appelle la diplomatie de masse. Le résultat est une diplomatie de marché employant des techniques de persuasion empruntées au monde des relations publiques et du marketing. La nouvelle diplomatie est une diplomatie entrepreneuriale qui limite le leadership gouvernemental à un minimum nécessaire et encourage au maximum la participation de sous-contractants privés ou étrangers. C'est aussi une diplomatie du cyberspace équipée de nouveaux instruments de politique étrangères comme l'imagerie satellite haute résolution, les réseaux haute vitesse, la diffusion digitale et mille autres merveilles de la révolution technologique de la fin du XX<sup>e</sup> siècle. Enfin, à travers l'étude empirique de cette diplomatie hybride, l'objectif sous-jacent de cette étude est de confirmer l'hypothèse d'une réorientation de la politique vers des sources d'influence plus intangible, d'offrir une illustration concrète des modalités d'exploitation de ce que l'on a aujourd'hui coutume d'appeler le soft power et ce faisant de contribuer à combler le vide entre idéalisme et realpolitik.

**Abstract:** A sophisticated and high tech form of state-to-foreign population diplomacy based on the use of the latest communication technologies has developed rapidly in recent years and has acquired an increasingly important position within a significant number of foreign affairs systems. Pioneered by the heavyweights of the international stage, the phenomenon has spread rapidly to secondary powers and is progressively extending itself to varying degrees to all states around the globe. This thesis grapples with the enigma raised by the brisk re-emergence of this foreign policy concentration by attempting to understand the reasons behind both the quantitative increase in public diplomacy activities and the qualitative evolution of these activities in terms of planning, organisation and implementation. The first argument that this thesis broaches is that the sudden growth of public diplomacy is the result of the shift to a new phase of the information revolution (necessary enabling force) which has been amplified by contingent factors: the explosion of global terrorism (accelerator) and the perception of leaders and foreign policy makers of this new environment (prism). The second argument is that, beyond quantitative growth, the new operational context born of the advent of the global information society provoked a qualitative evolution of the public diplomacy inherited from the Cold War towards what is today mass diplomacy. The result is the appearance of a market driven diplomacy employing persuasive techniques borrowed from the world of public relations and marketing. The new diplomacy is an entrepreneurial diplomacy that limits governmental leadership to a necessary minimum and encourages the participation of private and foreign sub-contractors. It is also a cyber-space diplomacy equipped with new diplomatic instruments such as high-resolution satellite imagery, high-speed networks, digital broadcasting and other marvels of the late twentieth century communications revolution. Finally, by way of an empirical study of this hybrid diplomacy, the underlying goal of this work is to confirm the hypothesis of a reorientation of policy toward more intangible sources of influence by offering a concrete illustration of the operation methods of what has come to be called "soft power" and in the attempt, to bridge the gap between idealism and realpolitik.

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## List of Acronyms

**ABC:** American Broadcasting Corporation  
**ABC:** Australian Broadcasting Corporation  
**ABCCAP:** Australia Broadcasting Corporation for Asia Pacific  
**ACC:** Australia–China Council  
**ACCT:** Agence de la Francophonie (France & Multilateral)  
**ACPD:** Advisory Commission for Public Diplomacy (US)  
**AFAA:** Association Française d'Action Artistique (France)  
**AFP:** Agence France Presse  
**AIC:** Australia–India Council (Australia)  
**AICC:** Australian International Cultural Council  
**AIR:** All India Radio  
**AOL:** America on Line  
**AP:** Associated Press  
**ASI:** Associations of International Solidarity  
**ATV:** Armenia TV  
**AUPELF:** Association des Universités Partiellement ou Entièrement de Langue Française  
**BBC:** British Broadcasting Corporation  
**BBCWS:** BBC World Service  
**BBG:** Broadcasting Board of Governors (US)  
**BC:** British Council  
**BFO:** British Film Office  
**BIB:** Board of International Broadcasting (US)  
**BSN:** British Satellite News  
**CA:** Channel Africa (South Africa)  
**CBS:** Columbia Broadcasting System  
**CESDPP:** Common European Security and Defence Policy Project  
**CFI:** Canal France International  
**CFII:** Chaîne Française d'Information International  
**CFR:** Council on Foreign Relations (US)  
**CIR:** Comity on International Relations (US Senate)  
**CIC:** Coalition Information Centres (US-UK)  
**CIRTEF:** Conseil International des Radios-Télévisions d'Expression Française (France)  
**CNN:** Cable News Network  
**CPA:** Irak-based Coalition Provisional Authority  
**CRDG:** Cultural Relations Discretionary Grants (Australia)

**CSA:** Conseil Supérieur de l'Audiovisuel (France)  
**CSFP:** Commonwealth Scholarships and Fellowships Plan (UK)  
**DAAD:** German Academic Exchange Service  
**DAETEC:** Direction de l'Audiovisuel Extérieur et des Techniques de Communication (France)  
**DCCL:** Direction de la Coopération Culturelle et Linguistique (France)  
**DFA:** Department of Foreign Affairs (South Africa)  
**DFAIT:** Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canada)  
**DFAT:** Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australia)  
**DFID:** Department for International Development (UK)  
**DGCID:** Direction Générale de la Coopération Internationale et du Développement (France)  
**DGCRE:** Directorate-General for Cultural Relations and Education Policy (Germany)  
**DGPCC:** Direttore Generale per la Promozione e Cooperazione Culturale (Italy)  
**DGRCST:** ex-Direction Générale des Relations Culturelles Scientifiques et Techniques (France)  
**DND:** Department of National Defence (Canada)  
**DNHB:** Department of National Heritage Broadcasting (UK)  
**DSTV:** Digital Satellite TV (South Africa)  
**DVD:** Digital Versatile Disc  
**DW:** DeutscheWelle (Germany)  
**ECA:** Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (US)  
**ECE:** Educational and Cultural Exchanges  
**EFTA:** European Free-Trade Area  
**EITO:** European Information Technology Observatory  
**ELC:** English Language Centers  
**ESD:** External Services Division (India)  
**EU:** European Union  
**FCO:** Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)  
**FED:** European Development Funds  
**FIS:** ex-Foreign Information Service (US)  
**FPA:** Foreign Policy Analysis  
**FPC:** Foreign Policy Center (UK)  
**FTA:** Free Trade Agreement  
**G20:** Group of 20  
**G8:** Group of Eight  
**GAO:** General Accounting Office (US)  
**GATS:** General Agreements on Trade in Services  
**GIIN:** Goethe Institute/Inter Nationes (Germany)  
**GOF:** Global Opportunities Fund (UK)



**GYE:** Global Youth Exchange (Japan)  
**HCCI:** Haut Conseil de la Coopération Internationale (France)  
**HE:** Higher Education  
**HKW:** House of World Cultures (Germany)  
**HR 3969:** The Freedom Promotion Act (US)  
**HR 105-277:** 1998 Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act (US)  
**HR 1646:** 2003 Foreign Relations Authorization Act (US)  
**HSBC:** Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corporation  
**IBA:** International Broadcasting Agency (US)  
**IBB:** International Broadcasting Bureau (US)  
**IFA:** Institute for Foreign Relation (Germany)  
**IFOR:** NATO Implementation Force in Bosnia  
**IIP:** US Bureau of International Information Programs  
**IMC:** International Marketing Council  
**IMU:** Islamic Media Unit (UK)  
**IPA:** Institute of Practitioners in Advertising  
**IPIG:** International Public Information Group (US)  
**IRIB:** Islamic Republic of Iran's Broadcasting  
**IRNA:** Islamic Republic News Agency (Iran)  
**ISAF:** International Security Assistance Force  
**Itar-Tass:** News Agency of Russia  
**ITU:** International Telecommunication Union  
**JET:** Japan Exchange and Teaching  
**KFOR:** Kosovo's International Peacekeeping Force  
**LPS:** London Press Service (UK)  
**MBC:** Middle-East Broadcasting Corporation (Lebanon)  
**MBC:** Middle East Broadcasting Center  
**MCM:** Monte-Carlo Music  
**MCNG:** Mission pour la Coopération Non-Gouvernementale (France)  
**MEADEV:** Indian Ministry of External Affairs  
**METN:** Middle East Television Network  
**MFA:** Ministry of Foreign Affairs (New Zealand)  
**MNEs:** Multinationals  
**MOFA:** Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
**MP3:** MPEG Audio Layer 3  
**MPEG:** Moving Pictures Experts Group  
**MTV:** Music Television

**NAFTA:** North American Free Trade Agreement  
**NAN:** News Agency of Nigeria  
**NATO:** North Atlantic Treaty Organisation  
**NBC:** National Broadcasting Company  
**NBR:** Nacional Brazil Radiobras  
**NFDC:** National Film Development Corporation (India)  
**NGO:** Non-Governmental Organisation  
**NHK:** Radio Japan  
**NIC:** National Intelligence Council (US)  
**NICT:** New Information and Communication Technologies  
**NKC:** New Komeito Center (Japan)  
**NTA:** Nigerian Television Authority  
**NTV:** Nevazisimaya TV (Russia)  
**NYSE:** New York Stock Exchange  
**OECD:** Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development  
**Ofcom:** Office of Communications (UK)  
**PBS:** Public Broadcasting Service (US)  
**PDA:** Personal Digital Assistant  
**PDB:** Public Diplomacy Board (PR of China)  
**PDCS:** Public Diplomacy Coordinating Structure (project)  
**PDSB:** Public Diplomacy Strategy Board (UK)  
**PRC:** People's Republic of China  
**PSA:** Public Service Agreement (UK)  
**QDR:** Quadrennial Defence Review (US)  
**RAI:** Radiotelevisione Italiana (Italy)  
**RCI:** Radio Canada International  
**RD Congo:** République Démocratique du Congo  
**RELO:** Regional English Language Officers (US)  
**RF:** Radio Farda (US)  
**RFA:** Radio Free Asia (US)  
**RFE/RL:** Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (US)  
**RFO:** Réseau France Outremer  
**RMC:** Radio Monte-Carlo  
**RSF:** Reporters without Borders  
**RTBF:** Radio Télévision Belge de la Communauté Française (Belgium)  
**RTP:** Radio Television Portugal  
**RTVE:** Radio Television Espana

**SAARC:** South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation  
**SARS:** Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome  
**SFOR:** Stabilisation Force in Bosnia  
**SMEs:** Small-to-Medium Size Enterprises  
**SOFIRAD:** Société Financière de Radiodiffusion (France)  
**TRT:** Turkish Radio Television  
**TIKA:** Turkish International Cooperation Agency  
**TSR:** Télévision Suisse Romande  
**Türksoy:** Joint Turkic Agency for Cultural Cooperation  
**TV5M:** TV5 Monde (France)  
**UK:** United Kingdom  
**UN:** United Nations  
**UNESCO:** United Nations Organization for Education, Science, Culture and Communications  
**US(A):** United States (of America)  
**USAID:** US Agency for International Development  
**USG:** US Government  
**USI:** UNESCO Statistical Institute  
**USIA:** United States Information Agency  
**USPD:** Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy  
**USSR:** Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
**VOA:** Voice of America  
**VoT:** Voice of Turkey  
**WAP:** Wireless Application Protocol  
**WEF:** World Economic Forum  
**WHOGC:** White House Office of Global Communications  
**WTO:** World Trade Organisation  
**WWI and WWII:** World War I and II  
**WWW:** World Wide Web

## Preface and Acknowledgements

I have always been greatly interested in the ways culture, information and psychological activity are used to affect public opinion for foreign and domestic policy ends. This sensitivity to the importance of ideational factors in intra- and inter-state relations was without a doubt accentuated by my education within a family of diplomats torn by the Cold War and the ideological strategies characterising that period of history. A direct witness of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, I was able to see for myself to what extent ideas, religious arguments and cultural values could be used as political instruments to galvanise the crowds and produce historical upheavals of enormous consequence. My experience and my studies of history confirmed, at a later point, my belief in this view of the world. More than once, the fate of great empires, beginning with Athens and Rome, was played out in the arena of public opinion, whether in the Agora or amongst the plebes. Did not the ancients say “Rome is the mob, and that to control the mob is to control Rome?” History has constantly confirmed the importance of ideas, values, beliefs whether it be in the construction of national identities<sup>1</sup>, or in the relations between nations.<sup>2</sup>

Thus, it was with the clear intention to verify my assumptions about the political role of these ideational factors that I undertook my studies in Political Science in 1997. The concept of mass diplomacy, however, is the product of a long period of intellectual gestation. I explored many other conceptual and theoretical options before I came to mass diplomacy towards the end of 2002. My thinking was guided in the first years by the work of Joseph Nye and constructivists such as Alex Wendt and Peter Katzenstein (who are mentioned repeatedly in the introductory chapter for their contribution to the study of mass diplomacy). I have worked for a quite a time with the notion of cultural policy and normpolitik, defined as a strategy for diffusing and institutionalising national values abroad, as well as on the hypothesis that these strategies could serve to promote national interests abroad by affecting the identities and the preferences of other states, whether friendly or otherwise. Though I remained convinced of the solid foundations of this intuition, it struck me that an explanation inspired by constructivism was overly mechanical, disembodied and inadequate. How (by which logical process and through what means) do the ideational stimuli alter, or even reshape, the perception of a country? It quickly became obvious

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<sup>1</sup> See for instance, Ernst Gellner, *Nation and Nationalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (New York: Verso, 1983); Robert Muchembled, *Culture Populaire et Culture des Éléites* (Paris: Flammarion, 1991).

<sup>2</sup> Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992).

to me that this monolithic concept of state relations (like an isolated billiard ball hitting another) was not an adequate solution to the problem.

During my first years at McGill, it became increasingly clear to me that public opinion, an element that had been absent from both Nye and the constructivists, was the missing link that would allow me to complete my explanatory schema. The idea that came to me then was that an influx of information from the exterior could alter the structure of preferences of a nation in the long term by affecting public opinion or by acting directly on the perception of the masses and elites that determine its actions. It was a logical conclusion to arrive at, and yet, a hidden conclusion that, as I point out in chapter 1, had passed almost entirely unnoticed by international relations scholars preoccupied with questions of brute strength and military and economic power. It remained however to complete this explanation by identifying the concrete means of this policy of indirect influence. There too, the explanation revealed itself. At the turn of the twenty-first century, it was hardly necessary to be the most sensitive of observers to note the increasing influence of new communication technologies. By means of their accelerated propagation and the transformations they brought at all levels of interaction, they seemed poised to become the tools *par excellence* of a sophisticated state-to-foreign population diplomacy. The work of the Foreign Policy Center (Mark Leonard) and the explosive growth of global terrorism only confirmed my conviction that a new form of public diplomacy that I have dubbed “Mass Diplomacy” had appeared.

This thesis is thus the fruit of a long intellectual journey. Over the last decade, many, in a veritable act of faith, have given their help and support to this project. Their support was all the more commendable both because I am naturally reticent to ask for assistance and because the project subject was untested and for the most part unknown. I would like to mention their contribution at various steps along the way. I must begin by thanking all those that participated in the genesis of this study at the University of Montreal. I am thinking in particular of Gérard Chaliand, who initiated me to the fundamental notions of psychological warfare and political propaganda, and Bahgat Korany who showed me the greatest confidence in accepting to supervise my thesis on Turkish cultural policy in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus at a time when the subject was of little interest to the majority of international relations scholars.

I would also like to extend my great sense of gratitude to McGill University and the Political Science Department. I found a stimulating and encouraging research environment there. It had been said to me “Careful, they are dyed-in-the-wool realists over there [at McGill] interested only in tangible issues of political economy and armaments. They’ll never be interested

in your wishy-washy topic". But of course I was to find scholars with open minds, curious about a new area of inquiry, and willing to encourage me in its pursuit. To mention only a few of those who welcomed me and provided unconditional support, I'd like to thank Michael Brecher (for having given me confidence in the opening stages), Alan Patten (for having enriched my thinking about essential elements of political theory) and Hudson Meadwell, Catherine Lu and Arash Abizadeh. Naturally, my greatest debt lays with my thesis supervisors: T.V. Paul and Mark Brawley. These renowned scholars immediately grasped the potential of a subject until then unknown and were able to steer my efforts and bring out the best in my work. It was an honour and privilege to work with scholars of such talent and professionalism. They deserve all the more praise considering that my devotion and zeal for the thesis often took me physically far from them and the department. Nevertheless, I always felt part of a veritable family. That warmth and welcome is without a doubt at the core of McGill's success as an institution.

Beyond confidence and supervision, the Department of Political Science provided me generous financial support. All students know to what extent these two kinds of support combined are vital to the success of the doctoral venture. I would like to thank the trustees of the Nathan Steinberg and Guy Drummond bursaries for having not only facilitated, but actually made possible, my university career at McGill. For material support but also for moral and intellectual support, I would like to extend my gratitude to the *Research Group in International Security co-directed by McGill and the University of Montreal*. Apart from financial help on many occasions, REGIS provided me with a privileged venue for academic exchange and research in regards to recent changes in foreign policy. It is also fitting to include in this list the Government of Quebec and the body responsible for the *Fonds de la Recherche sur la Société et la Culture*. During the delicate final stages of my thesis and while my third child was being born, the FQRSC provided critical support for which I will always be grateful. This generous support accumulated during my doctoral years has only confirmed to what point this country is a privileged place for study, innovation and the advancement of learning.

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constant encouragement, I would like to express my great love for my wife Camille, and through her, for my children, Louis, Jana and Matthias who, perhaps more than anyone others, suffered because of this academic odyssey. For their discreet but crucial role, especially in the improvement of my imperfect prose, I would also like to thank Robert Sampson, Ariane Rahnema, Liselotte Obrecht and my friend Fujita Graben. We never accomplish anything alone in life and this thesis was the perfect proof of that for me. To all those that I did not have the room to include here: thank you.

Montreal, September 20, 2004

## Chapter I. Introduction: Why Study Mass Diplomacy?

To see through ideological disguises and to find behind them real political forces is an important task that researchers must undertake  
Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 1948

### Introduction

Not since World War II and the height of the Cold War have governments undertaken such frenzied efforts to reach foreign populations and put pressure on their leaders through public diplomacy. Until very recently, foreign policy, limited to the confines of government offices and to the exchange of confidential communiqués, could in essence be summarized as the interaction between states. While public diplomacy programs played a part in this process, their role remained quite insignificant and their existence was even threatened with extinction in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. But the world has radically changed during the past decade and, with it, the paradigm governing the conduct of foreign policy. A number of factors, apparently linked to the new international order, have driven diplomatic practice to look beyond the circle of governing elites towards targets of a considerably larger scope through an entirely refurbished public diplomacy: mass diplomacy. For the last five years, the place of mass diplomacy programs have been debated more vigorously than at any time before while their contribution became a matter reflected in ever greater appropriations of funds and institutional role within foreign policy systems. Instigated by the heavyweights of the international stage, the phenomenon has spread rapidly to secondary powers and is progressively extending itself in varying degrees to all states around the globe.

This thesis attempts to resolve the enigma raised by the brisk emergence of mass diplomacy and in the process, explain a little known (and in some quarters, still unknown) phenomenon. In particular, this puzzling phenomenon draws attention to the following two questions under investigation in this study: 1) *What elements of the new international environment drove a growing number of states to invest increasing amounts of attention and effort in a then moribund branch of foreign policy and 2) to what extent have these factors engendered a transformation of Cold War public diplomacy?* The goal of this thesis, in other terms, is to understand the reasons that explain both the quantitative increase in public diplomacy activities and the qualitative evolution of these activities in terms of planning, organisation and implementation. The sudden and synchronous nature of the global phenomena suggests that a “hold-all” argument about the effects of the globalisation of trade and economic interdependence are inexact. Though these



already long-established factors might well have created a hospitable terrain for the rise of mass diplomacy by encouraging governments to pursue their objectives through strategies of indirect influence, they do not explain why public diplomacy did not experience growth before the late 1990's (instead, it underwent a period of marked decline lasting almost the entire decade). Another factor, on the other hand, seems to coincide more directly with this paradigm shift in the art of public diplomacy: the passage of the information revolution through a critical threshold characterised not only by the explosive growth of information and communication technologies (NICTs) but also by the democratisation of their use and the advent of the global information society.

The heightening of the information revolution at the end of the nineties is the factor most likely to explain the *timing* and *nature* of the boom of mass diplomacy. This new context is the *necessary enabling force* without which this resurgence would not have been as simultaneous or similar across the world. The amplification of the information revolution and the development of the information society have played a decisive role, on one hand, by making available to states weapons of mass persuasion and, on the other hand, by offering them the opportunity to reach potentially unlimited audiences increasingly open to the influence of external information and culture. However, secondary factors, conditioned by the information age, intersect with it and combine to shape in varying ways the operational context within which public diplomacy has been revitalised. Explaining the *scope* and the *celerity* of the growth rather than the growth itself, the terrorist crisis and leaders' perceptions have acted as catalysts dramatically accelerating the re-emergence of public diplomacy by magnifying the relevance of policies that reach the "hearts and minds" of foreign populations. The first argument that this thesis broaches then is that *the sudden growth of public diplomacy was the result of the shift to a new phase of the information revolution (necessary enabling force) and amplified by contingent factors: the explosion of global terrorism (accelerator) and the perception of leaders and foreign policy makers of this new environment (prism)*. Through a complementary analysis at both the systemic and decision-making levels, the goal is to attempt to provide a comprehensive answer to what is a complex question.

The second argument is that, beyond quantitative growth, *the new operational context born of the advent of the global information society provoked a qualitative evolution of the public diplomacy inherited from the Cold War towards what is mass diplomacy*. Beyond technological innovation, this new environment is characterised by a liberalisation of the exchange of information, increasing scepticism in regards to governments (and thus the limited effectiveness of government operations) and a redefinition of the principles of communications and political


governance. These factors are what caused public diplomacy to change so radically: in order to remain competitive and persuasive, traditional public diplomacy has had to accept the challenges of the new context and make use of the new opportunities it presents. The result, as we shall see, is the apparition of a market driven diplomacy employing persuasive techniques borrowed from the world of public relations and marketing. The new diplomacy is an entrepreneurial diplomacy that limits governmental leadership to a necessary minimum and encourages the participation of private and foreign sub-contractors. It is a cyber-space diplomacy equipped with new diplomatic instruments such as high-resolution satellite imagery, high-speed networks, digital broadcasting and other marvels of the late twentieth century communications revolution. In sum, it is a hybrid diplomacy with considerable potential about which no comprehensive study has been attempted so far. In addressing this deficiency, this thesis aims to define the contours of this new diplomacy and provide a glimpse of what foreign policy will be likely to become in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

## **1. What Mass Diplomacy is and is not**

Before surveying the existing research on the subject and the ways in which this study can contribute to that body of knowledge, it seems appropriate to briefly provide a definition of what does and does not fall within the purview of mass diplomacy.

- *Definition:* While traditional diplomacy refers to the management of state-to-state relations, by contrast, mass diplomacy (similarly to public diplomacy, its earlier manifestation) includes the entirety of cultural, educational and audiovisual programmes sponsored by a government within the framework of its foreign policy to obtain international support by targeting the populations of other nations. Ways to describe the purpose of this state-to-public strategy are abundant: winning trust and empathy, gaining hearts and minds, making friends and isolating enemies, projecting values and advocating issues, building the policy context, etc. In essence, mass diplomacy is the effort by one government to influence foreign public opinions for the purpose of turning the policy of their government to advantage. The increasingly shared premise for mass diplomacy is that it is now possible, thanks to new communication and information tools and to populations increasingly exposed to foreign influence, to pave the way for hard foreign policy goals, including security and economic interests, by re-shaping the perception and preferences of foreign populations instead of trying to convince their governments alone (Fig.1).

**Figure 1: The Defining Principle of Mass Diplomacy**



• *Origins:* Although the relative emphasis put on this facet of foreign policy is changing, it could be said that public diplomacy exists since the genesis of organised political entities (see chapter III for an historical background). However, its modern concept and practice were principally developed during the last century by the Anglo-Saxon nations, in particular, by the United States. Public diplomacy is the direct inheritor of the notion of “open diplomacy”, formulated by the American President Woodrow Wilson following World War I in response to the secret and elitist diplomacy practiced by the European powers. But this idealistic diplomacy intended to increase democratic participation of populations and thus the impact of public opinion has given way to a more realistic principle of persuasion intending to influence foreign governments through their populations. Forged during the ideological conflict of the Cold War, the concept was used for the first time in 1965 by Dean Edmund Gullion of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. Its birth as a concept and practice also owes much to the establishment at the Fletcher School of the Edward R. Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy, named after one of the pioneers of the field.<sup>1</sup>

• *The Distinction between Public Diplomacy and Traditional Diplomacy:* Public diplomacy is the alter ego of traditional diplomacy in that it extends the reach of the latter. While one deals with governments, the other deals primarily with citizenry. In the same way that traditional diplomacy

<sup>1</sup> In one of the earlier pamphlets published by The Murrow Center, public diplomacy was described as follows: “Public diplomacy . . . deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with those of another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as between diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the processes of inter-cultural communications...Central to public diplomacy is the transnational flow of information and ideas”. See United States Information Agency Alumni Association, “Public Diplomacy”, USIA Alumni Association, September 2002, <http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/1.htm> (accessed september 2003).

serves as an intermediary between official figures in the highest offices of public hierarchies, public diplomacy mediates exchange between nations via public and private players emerging mostly from the non-governmental milieu of the business and media worlds. That said, it is no less “official” than other branches of diplomacy. “It is not simply some kind of frilly extra”, explained Joshka Fisher, but an integral aspect of foreign policy aimed at completing and sustaining foreign policy goals.<sup>2</sup> The soft side of diplomacy is often described as the “third pillar” of foreign affairs after politics and economics, and some go so far as to suggest that it might even be considered as the “second half” of foreign affairs.<sup>3</sup> Paraphrasing Clausewitz, public diplomacy could be described as the continuation of foreign policy by other means, these means being the cultural and educational programs, but also new technologies and communications strategies and the increased and informal participation of external partners, whether they be from the world of non-governmental organisations, private enterprise or foreign institutions.

- *Mass Diplomacy as the New Public Diplomacy*: Public diplomacy is the official term given to the discipline, but that term is not always clear as to whether it suggests an open and transparent diplomacy or if it refers instead to diplomacy targeting foreign audiences, which it is above all. Though ambiguity undoubtedly has its uses in this domain, it impedes analytical precision. Beyond the lack of clarity, “public diplomacy” is a term coined more than forty years ago that does not always respond adequately to the novelty of the contemporary phenomenon. The neologism “mass diplomacy” has the advantage of offering a more precise picture of the phenomenon being studied in the context of the global information age. In effect, it allows us to account for both the new diplomacy that attempts to cultivate the support of the *masses*, and for the means of communication and information transmission that can rightly be dubbed *mass communication*. It also provides a generic term allowing us to include traditional cultural and educational programs (to which original public diplomacy was limited) and the new cyber-diplomacy programs, which consist of harnessing mass media for foreign policy goals. Whatever the case, mass diplomacy being a form of public diplomacy, the terms will be used indiscriminately in this work.

- *The Distinction between Mass Diplomacy and Propaganda*: The line between mass diplomacy and propaganda is quite thin but the difference is nevertheless critical to understanding the former adequately. Since its return to the forefront of international relations, many have argued that the

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<sup>2</sup> Germany – Auswärtiges -Amt, Joshka Fischer (Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs) (address at the opening of the Forum on the Future of Cultural Relations Policy, Berlin, July 4, 2000).

<sup>3</sup> U.S. – House of Representative, Committee on International Relations, Rep. Henry J. Hyde (Chairman), “Speaking to Our Silent Allies, The Role of Public Diplomacy in U.S. Foreign Policy” (address delivered to the Council on Foreign Relations June 17, 2002).

new public diplomacy is nothing but sophisticated and refined propaganda. Etymologically speaking, this is arguably true since they both consist of propagating a message, ideas and information with the intended effect of convincing a target audience to rally to a particular vision of the world. But mass diplomacy goes beyond the more vulgar strains of disinformation and brute manipulation based on falsehoods and untruths. "Public diplomacy is full of inner contradictions and intentions," acknowledges John Brown, professor at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University. He stresses however that a battle exists within the public diplomacy realm to prevent it from being considered raw propaganda.<sup>4</sup> If mass diplomacy attempts to distinguish itself from propaganda, it is because in the global information age strategies perceived as brain-washing and ideological browbeating are not only very unlikely to meet with success but also increasingly likely to be counterproductive and damaging.<sup>5</sup> From Woodrow Wilson to Mark Leonard and Edward R. Murrow, the experts agree that to succeed, public diplomacy must be based on verifiable facts. To be persuasive mass diplomacy must be considered as credible and truthful as possible.<sup>6</sup> In the age of information where exposure to news and information from different quarters is almost inevitable, disinformation campaigns and psychological manipulation, while often effective in time of war, are increasingly likely to fail.<sup>7</sup> Any attempt to influence public opinion which leaves people feeling manipulated eventually backfires, demolishing credibility and reinforcing international defiance. "Truth is the best propaganda" Murrow liked to repeat, even if the truth is often carefully channelled, selected and filtered to emphasize the most advantageous content.<sup>8</sup> This subtle and sometimes ambiguous distinction, which is at the heart of the mass diplomacy's potential for influence, makes mass diplomacy particularly difficult to classify and analyse using pre-existing theoretical structures.

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<sup>4</sup> John Brown (Associate at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University), "Public Diplomacy or Propaganda?" (Brown Bag lecture at the Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies (IERES), Elliott School of International Affairs The George Washington University February 12, 2003).

<sup>5</sup> Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Propaganda isn't the Way", *International Herald Tribune*, January 10, 2003.

<sup>6</sup> Woodrow Wilson understood this perfectly when he stated that "one of the best means of controlling news is flooding news channels with 'facts', or what amounts to official information"; Stephen Vaughn, *Holding Fast the Inner Lines* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 194.

<sup>7</sup> More legitimate in times of war, psychological operations are still capable of winning victories on the battlefield by tricking the enemy and undermining its popular support; see Pierre Cyril Pahlavi, *Entre Esprit de Conquête et Conquête des Esprits* (Paris: l'Harmattan, 2004).

<sup>8</sup> Edward R. Murrow (former head of the USIA), quoted by USIA Alumni Association, *op. cit.*.

## 2. The Deficiencies of Existing Bodies of Theory.

### a. Dominant Paradigms

Of all theoretical paradigms, **classical realism** is probably the one that offers the most appropriate framework for analysing and understanding mass diplomacy given that this strategy of subterfuge and persuasion aimed at bolstering national influence and interests is above all a new instrument of *realpolitik*.

Though it could seem paradoxical given today's marriage of some of realism's heirs to hard materialism (see below), thinkers in the realist tradition have long debated the nature of the links between political power and ideological influence. In antiquity, Thucydides did not doubt that the relations between nations were shaped and governed by ideational factors rather than solely by bare statedness.<sup>9</sup> Echoing the Chinese thinker Sun Tzu, Machiavelli also developed the idea that permanent conquest of a nation must necessarily be achieved with the "support of one's fellow-citizens"; conquest must include the seduction of the conquered masses along with the exercise of military and economic power.<sup>10</sup> The Florentine thinker considered that though influence gained in this way might be difficult to acquire, it was more rewarding and of longer duration than that acquired through simple economic or military strength, especially in the cases of political entities in which the populace play an important role. In the tradition of Polybus, Plutarch and Tacitus, the Prussian Clausewitz also made his contribution to the body of theoretical work about what we call the "small war" or the "war of opinion" without which, according to him, there is no "grand strategy" worthy of the name.<sup>11</sup> In fact, history endlessly illustrates and confirms the – generally ignored – realist notion that the longest lasting political victories are those that combine physical conquest with manufacturing the consent of the conquered people. The stumbling block of great invaders, such as Napoleon, has often been a lack of patience and willingness to consolidate territorial conquests with the conquest of the hearts and minds of populations.

Nearer our own era, the fathers of modern realism came closest to addressing the phenomenon of public diplomacy. Edward H. Carr contributed to the idea that states have a greater chance of attaining their goals by presenting them to the public at large beneath the veil of moral discourse. According to him, there was no doubt that the liberal doctrines of *laissez-faire* and collective

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<sup>9</sup> See, in particular, Thucydides' "The Melian Dialogue," in *Classics of International Relations*, John A. Vasquez ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1996), 9-14.

<sup>10</sup> Nicolo Machiavelli, 'Chapter IX. Des Principautés Civiles', in *Le Prince*. Introduction and notes by Raymond Naves (Paris: Édition Garnier, 1968 [1517]).

security, prevalent during the inter-war period, belonged to this type of ideological disguise intended to bring international public legitimacy to the powers' real interests.<sup>12</sup> In his seminal work, *Struggle for Power and Peace*, Hans Morgenthau explained that "a subtle diplomacy aiming not at the conquest of territory or at the control of economic life, but at the conquest and control of the minds of men" is one of the most powerful "instruments for changing the power relation between nations."<sup>13</sup> Visionary that he was, Morgenthau captured vividly the potential of mass diplomacy along those lines: "If one could imagine the culture and the political ideology, with all its concrete imperialistic objectives, of state A conquering the minds of all of citizens determining the policies of state B, state A would have won a more complete victory and would have founded its supremacy on more stable grounds than any military or economic conqueror"<sup>14</sup>. Equally convincing, the French political thinker, Raymond Aron considered that 'genuine realism' must acknowledge the place of ideologies in the diplomatic and strategic construct,<sup>15</sup> since ignoring them can only produce a restricted and impoverished theory.<sup>16</sup>

Though public diplomacy enjoyed a golden age as one of the most important weapons in the ideological clash between Moscow and Washington (see chapter III), research on the subject has quite paradoxically been sidelined by emphasis on other issues. Unfortunately, the military and nuclear confrontation between the two blocs consumed the bulk of attention and impeded the development of more complete theoretical considerations of the diplomacy of mass persuasion. In the sixties and seventies, most scholarly attention shifted towards hard power issues associated with tangible and easily measurable resources such as military and economic strength. Adopting a positivist approach, specialists treated public diplomacy as an add-on to the rest of states' foreign policy – an element of superstructure not worthy of scientific attention. Many scholars found justification for their neglect in the dismantlement and drastic budget cuts which public diplomacy suffered in the aftermath of the Cold War and throughout most of the 1990's. As a result, the majority of mainstream theoretical approaches, whether they be realist or liberal, overlook or fail to adequately treat the manner in which countries influence each other by educating or informing their respective bodies of public opinion. In general, these approaches

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<sup>11</sup> On Clausewitz's contribution to the understanding of the 'War of Opinions' see Walter Laqueur, *Guerillas. A Historical and Critical Study* (London: Weinfeld and Nicholson, 1977).

<sup>12</sup> E.H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1951 [1939]).

<sup>13</sup> Hans Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5<sup>th</sup> ed. (NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973[1948]), 74.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 74.

<sup>15</sup> Raymond Aron, *Paix et Guerre entre les Nations*, 5<sup>th</sup> ed. (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1962), 587.

<sup>16</sup> Raymond Aron, "Qu'est-ce qu'une Théorie des Relations Internationales?", in *Théorie des Relations Internationales*, Philippe Braillard (Paris: PUF, 1977).

have so profoundly shaped current academic debate that mass diplomacy remains obscure, even alien, to those whose training has been primarily within the positivist mainstream.<sup>17</sup>

As a result, the paradigms that currently dominate theoretical approaches to international relations do not offer an analytical framework that lends itself to the analysis and comprehension of mass diplomacy:

- Structural-realism or **neo-realism**, despite its effectiveness in explaining power relations among major powers, is particularly inappropriate for accounting for the way a state can influence its partners from within by educating and influencing their populations. In the neo-realist view, states are said to behave as rational actors pursuing the maximization of material interests shaped by the distribution of hard power exclusively defined in terms of tangible capabilities.<sup>18</sup> This dogmatically materialist approach leaves little room for 'intangible factors' such as culture, information and public opinion. In fact, while neo-realism offers a useful formalisation of international relations at the systemic level, it is certainly not suitable for explaining strategies of indirect influence.<sup>19</sup> Acknowledging that mass diplomacy and public opinion interfere with the regulation of international interaction by recognizing the importance of ideational factors emerging from the domestic sphere would contradict some of the very propositions on which neo-realism depends. Yet, in defending a static concept of rationality, neo-realism is condemned to remaining limited in its account of the factors that shape states' interests.
- The alternate paradigm, **neo-liberalism**, seems *a priori* more open in regard to questions dealing with ideational factors such as information, culture and public opinion. But, notwithstanding its merits regarding the study of these social factors, institutionalist-functionalist neo-liberalism continues to treat states' preferences as both independent and rational. As a result of this emphasis on rationality and economic interpretation of behaviour, it simply cannot account for how states' interests are socially constructed by transnational flows of values and

<sup>17</sup> R.B.J. Walker. In *Culture and International Relations*, ed. Jongsuk Chay (New York: Praeger, 1990), 11.

<sup>18</sup> See K. Waltz, *Theory of International Relations* (New York: Random House, 1979);

R. Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

<sup>19</sup> I. Grunberg and Th. Risse-Kappen, "Theories of International Relations and the End of the Cold War", in *The End of the Cold War: Evaluating Theories of International Relations*, eds. P. Allan and K. Goodman (Dordrecht&London: Martinus Nijhof, 1992);

R. Little, "Rethinking System Continuity and Transformation," in *The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism and Structural Realism*, eds. Barry Buzan, Charles Jones and Richard Little (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993);

J. Derderian, in *New Thinking in International Relations Theory*, M. Doyle and J. Ikenberry eds. (Westview Press, 1997).



information.<sup>20</sup> The cognitivist strand of the school attempts to go further in conceiving of states' behaviour as standard-guided i.e. as constrained by the normative framework within which they operate.<sup>21</sup> The apparent progress consists in assuming that inter-subjective norms constrain states behaviour by establishing relevant courses of action.<sup>22</sup> However, norms remain elements of the superstructure, which only play a regulatory role in constraining states externally, without affecting their inner social character.

#### b) Alternative Approaches

Though new approaches in recent years have allowed us to better understand the importance of culture and information in international relations, they have failed to provide tools adapted to the study of mass diplomacy.

- At the centre of the **interdependence school** of thought, the work of **Joseph Nye** constitutes an important contribution by presenting culture and information as sources of soft power. Coined in Nye's prescient 1990 study, *Bound to Lead*, the term "soft power" - the ability of a country to persuade others to do what it wants without force or coercion - is now widely invoked in foreign policy debates. Nye's merit has been to draw attention once again to the strategic dimension of culture and information, allowing for a better understanding of the advantages that they can represent for public diplomacy. This being the case, he returned to the theoretical debate a traditional and crucial notion buried by many decades of blind materialism and a fixation on military and economic power. Nye's most recent book, *Soft Power*, re-introduces the idea and argues for its relevance in forming post-September 11 foreign policy.<sup>23</sup> Though it may suggest in a seductive way that information and culture now constitute unavoidable auxiliaries of modern

<sup>20</sup> R. O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Co-operation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985);

R.O. Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches", *International Studies Quarterly* 32 (1988). For a critical view see S. D. Krasner, "Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective", *Comparative Political Studies* 21 (1988): 66-94;

S.D. Krasner, "Global Communication and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier", *World Politics* 43, no 3 (1991): 336-366.

<sup>21</sup> S.D. Krasner dir., *International Regimes* (Ithaca-London: Cornell University Press, 1983);

A. Hasenclever, P. Mayer and V. Rittberger, *Theories of International Regimes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997);

S. Haggard and B.A. Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes", *International Organization* 41, no3 (1987).

<sup>22</sup> J.G. Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Post-War Economic Order", in Krasner, *International Regimes*;

F. Kratochwil and J.G. Ruggie, "International Organization: a State of the Art on an Art of the State", *International Organisation* 40, no 4 (1986).

<sup>23</sup> Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).

diplomacy, Nye's theory remains incomplete. First of all, it fails to explain how the diffusion of information and culture alter the interests and behaviour of states. Being strongly bound by neo-liberal rationalism and thus devoid of a comprehensive theory of preference or interest formation, Nye's approach obscures the mechanism by which these external intrusions modify the interests of a foreign state or reshape the attitudes and opinions of overseas populations (figure 2). Additionally, Nye fails to account for how exactly, and through what kind of policy, states can concretely harness the soft power of culture and information. By evading the question of an explicit soft power policy serving to channel and magnify cultural and informational influence, his theory remains unfinished in regards to the study of mass diplomacy.

- **Constructivism** presents an inverse problem: the influence of information and cultural values on nations is better explained but the questions of agency and power are completely absent. The constructivist approach's strength lies in its ability to make good a number of gaps in regards to ways in which ideational factors determine states' identity and preferences. Borrowing from the sociological study of knowledge<sup>24</sup> and structurationism,<sup>25</sup> constructivism establishes a useful analytic correlation between the normative, cultural and informational structure of the international system (independent variable), state identity (intervening variable) and state interests (dependent variable). This has the merit of teasing out the 'causal factors' of national interests formed by socio-cultural institutions and the socially constructed identity of nations - factors that have been obliterated by other approaches.<sup>26</sup> However, in spite of these improvements, constructivism does not fully succeed in providing an efficient analytical framework for the study of mass diplomacy. It does not fit the study of this subject because it treats social determinants as independent factors and overlooks the role of governmental policy in shaping them. Indeed, this approach "overemphasises the role of social structures and norms at the expense of the agents who help create and change them in the first place."<sup>27</sup> It is as if culture, values, and norms were reified and presented as a given, spontaneously flourishing variable which leaves unresolved the question of the role of agency and power in the transformation of ideational factors. Another major problem with constructivism is the failure to take into account

<sup>24</sup> P. Berger and T. Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality* (New York: Anchor Books, 1966).


<sup>25</sup> A.E. Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory", *International Organization* 41, no3 (1987).

<sup>26</sup> A.E. Wendt, "Anarchy is what States make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics", *International Organisation* 46, no2 (1992); P. Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

<sup>27</sup> J.T. Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn in IR Theory", *World Politics* 50, no2 (1998): 325; see also T.V. Paul, *Power versus Prudence* (Montreal, Kingston & London: McGill-Queens's UP, 2000), 159, note 22.

the role of public opinion as an intermediary variable between ideational factors and interest-perception. The concept of 'state identity' that takes its place is particularly abstract and lends itself badly to empirical study. Figure 2 shows that despite the proximity and the place they bestow on ideational factors, Nye's approach as well as constructivist approaches are unsuited to the hybrid mechanism of mass diplomacy.

**Figure 2: The mechanism of mass diplomacy (1) and the lacunae of the Nyeian (2) and Constructivist (3) approaches.**



Given the unsuitability of these approaches, which essentially all fit within the category of systems level theories, we might expect that decision level theories and in particular, those specializing in **Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA)**, would be more appropriate to the study of mass diplomacy. In reality, theoretical lacunae are even more worrying at this level of analysis.

A review of the major theoretical approaches in Foreign Policy Analysis makes clear the extent to which mass diplomacy is a phenomenon left unexplored and how urgent it is to remedy this deficiency. FPA is particularly unsuited to developing socio-cultural explanations of politics, such as the way factors such as foreign flows of culture, ideas and information can modify government behaviour. The fact is that the dominant approaches, behaviourism and its variants, are essentially focused on the analysis of psychological, bureaucratic and organisational factors conditioning the foreign policy decision-making process.<sup>28</sup> From its establishment in the 1960's to today, specialists in the field have concentrated their research on those aspects, almost entirely sidestepping the ideational factors such as culture and information.<sup>29</sup> Seen through the lens of the Cold War nuclear competition between superpowers, neo-realist scholars emphasized their exclusion from the study of foreign policy as they did from the study of international relations in general. Despite some efforts over the past few years to include their role in the formulation of

<sup>28</sup> J.N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy" in *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics*, edited by R. Barry Farrell (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966); J. De Rivera, *Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy* (Columbus: C.E. Merrill Pub. Co., 1968); G. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *Foreign Policy* (1969): 332-378.

<sup>29</sup> R. Little and S. Smith, *Belief Systems and International Relations* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988).

foreign policy,<sup>30</sup> cultural and informational explanations remain the least developed angle of analysis in this domain.

In addition to being unsuited to understanding the influence of culture and information, FPA is even less appropriate when it comes to considering them as tools for influence within the framework of foreign policy.<sup>31</sup> Rare are scholars who acknowledge that ideologies, culture and information are full-fledged instruments of states' foreign policy and even those that do, fail to treat this issue with all the care it deserves.<sup>32</sup> "Heirs of an epistemological legacy that devotes little room to questions of policy implementation"<sup>33</sup>, FPA's dominant approaches are particularly deficient regarding the study of this new strategy; the way it is organised and how it is executed. The absence of methodical study of the phenomenon of mass diplomacy appears all the more evident in the context of the post-Cold War era. We can only agree with Valérie Hudson when she asserts the urgency of developing a new research agenda that devotes a larger place to the joint study of culture, information and diplomacy without which it may be increasingly difficult to understand foreign policy and international relations in the age of global information.<sup>34</sup>

### 3. A Review of the Pertinent Literature

#### a. A Topic Still Conspicuously Ignored by Academia

This overview makes evident that not only has academia forsaken the analysis of this form of diplomacy but also that the conventional theoretical categories of international relations are particularly ill suited to undertaking the task. An overview of the recent literature on the subject confirms the dismal state of public diplomacy as a field of study. Limiting ourselves to academic publications, articles and monographs included, there are less than fifty publications devoted to the theme of public diplomacy written since the end of the Cold War. It should be noted that

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<sup>30</sup> J. Goldstein and R. Keohane (dir.), *Ideas and Foreign Policy* (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1993);

J. Goldstein, *Ideas, Interests and American Trade Policy* (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1994); see also an important contribution by B.L. Nacos, R.Y. Shapiro and P. Isernia (eds.), *Decision-making in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000).

<sup>31</sup> This shortcoming is particularly consequential when one's goal is "to develop not only cultural explanations of politics, but political explanations of culture";

F. Gaenslen, "Advancing Cultural Explanations", in *Culture and Foreign Policy*, dir. by Valérie M. Hudson (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner, 1997), 265-280.

<sup>32</sup> R. McCridis (ed.), *Foreign Policy in World Politics*, 5<sup>th</sup> ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1985), 6.

<sup>33</sup> Bahgat Korany et al, *Analyse des Relations Internationales. Approches, Concepts et Données* (Montréal: Éditions Gaétan Morin, 1987), 226.

<sup>34</sup> Hudson, *op. cit.*, 19.

NATO's bibliographic service contains a special rubric for the subject which lists only twenty publications.<sup>35</sup> In fact, there is no scholarly literature, as such, that would provide a global or comparative explanation of the phenomenon, even though in recent years, and in particular since 2001, more and more researchers seem to be gaining interest in the subject.

The state of publications in scholarly journals devoted to international relations and foreign affairs during the last decade is particularly stunning. Between 1992 and 2003, only fifteen articles have been published on public diplomacy by independent researchers (those who are not diplomats or civil servants). Amongst the journals that have published one article on the subject are: *World Today*<sup>36</sup>, *Orbis*<sup>37</sup>, *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*<sup>38</sup>, *Current History*<sup>39</sup>, *National Journal*<sup>40</sup>, *Australian Journal of International Affairs*<sup>41</sup>, *Comparative Media Law Journal*<sup>42</sup>, *Journal of Public and International Affairs*<sup>43</sup>, *Harvard International Journal of Press and Politics*<sup>44</sup>, *Revue Études Internationales*<sup>45</sup>, *Information & Security, Policy Brief*<sup>46</sup>. *Foreign*

<sup>35</sup> NATO – “Public Diplomacy”, NATO's Library and Bibliography Service, [http://www.nato.int/structur/library/bibref/public\\_diplomacy.pdf](http://www.nato.int/structur/library/bibref/public_diplomacy.pdf) (accessed April 10, 2004).

<sup>36</sup> Cooper Jeffrey, “New Skills for Cyber Diplomats”, *The World Today* 55, no 3 (1999).

<sup>37</sup> Lord Carnes, “The Past and Future of Public Diplomacy” *Orbis* 42, no 1 (1998): 49-72. This article analyses U.S. government information programs from their outset during WWII, through the 1970s and 1980s, focuses on their restructuring in the late 1990s, as deals with the debate over the future of the USIA and its relationship to the State Department. It also focuses to a degree on broadcasting efforts, such as VOA and RFE-RL.

<sup>38</sup> C. Skuba, “Branding America”, *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* 3, no 2 (2002): 105-14. Skuba studies how marketing professionals approach the concept and practice of branding, how it might be appropriate for U.S. foreign policy, and what is required to make it effective, in the context of improving communication with Islamic countries during the war on terrorism through public diplomacy.

<sup>39</sup> D.F. Eickelman, “Bin Laden, the Arab “street,” and the Middle East's democracy deficit”, *Current History* 101, no 651 (2002): 36-9.

<sup>40</sup> D. Kirschten, “Restive relic: the U.S. Information Agency was launched in 1953 as another weapon in America's arsenal against international communism; four decades later, the agency is struggling to redefine itself”, *National Journal* 27 (1995): 976-80.

<sup>41</sup> R. Smyth, “Mapping US public diplomacy in the 21st century”, *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 55, no 3 (2001): 421-44. R. Smyth analyses the structural and functional adaptation of the former United States Information Agency (USIA), merged into the State Department, to the information age; includes use of the Internet for information dissemination and interactive communication.

<sup>42</sup> M.E. Price, “Public Diplomacy and the Transformation of International Broadcasting”, *Comparative Media Law Journal* 1 (2003): 78. Price's article undoubtedly offers the best overview of the actual conduct of mass diplomacy and the manner in which it integrates the use of new information and communication technology. Even though his main subject is the United States, he offers a comparative analysis with other countries such as the United Kingdom and Germany.

<sup>43</sup> L. Baxter and J.A. Bishop, “Uncharted Ground: Canada, Middle Power Leadership, and Public Diplomacy”, *Journal of Public and International Affairs* (1998). The two authors, doctoral students at the time of publication, offer an interesting perspective on the Canadian situation and the way in which mass diplomacy can improve the stature of a middle power on the international scene.

<sup>44</sup> S. Soroka, “Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy,” *Harvard International Journal of Press and Politics* 8, no 1 (2002): 27-48. Although, Soroka's article is not specifically about mass diplomacy per se it, it tackles many important issues related to it.

<sup>45</sup> P. Pahlavi, “La diplomatie culturelle à l'ère de l'interdépendance globale: la Turquie à la recherche des éléments fédérateurs de l'identité panturque”, *Revue Études Internationales* 23, no 2 (2002).

*Affairs*<sup>47</sup> and *Washington Quarterly*<sup>48</sup> lead the pack with two articles published each. The excellent issue of the now defunct journal *Information Impacts Magazine* (IMP) devoted to the theme *Diplomacy in the Information Age* in June 2001 should be added to this list.<sup>49</sup> Otherwise, we are limited to the occasional mention of public diplomacy in the context of vaguely related subjects such as the anti-guerrilla wars in Latin America or Sino-Taiwanese relations.<sup>50</sup> Of these fifteen articles, one fifth was published before 1995 and only addresses the dismantling of the Cold War apparatus. Three of the articles were published between 1995 and 2000 and half after 2001. Over the entire period, three-quarters of the articles were devoted exclusively to the American case (in comparison to one investigating the Canadian case). Since 2001, this proportion grows to more than 80% of which the majority deal with the events of September 11 (table 1). The content also leaves much to be desired: the majority of these articles are by nature prescriptive and limit themselves to debating a certain aspect of the American strategy. In general, the authors lose themselves in conjectures about specific subjects such as the good derived from the break-up of the US Information Agency or, more recently, of effective or ineffective means of influencing Islamic or Arabic populations in the Middle East. Except for one

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<sup>46</sup> R.S. Zaharna, "The Unintended Consequences of Crisis Public Diplomacy: American Public Diplomacy in the Arab World", *Policy Brief* 8, no. 2 (2003).

<sup>47</sup> Walter Laqueur, "Save Public Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 5 (1994): 19-24; This article is an appeal for the maintenance of American mass diplomacy in the face of the wave of downsizing at the beginning of the 1990s;

D. Hoffman, "Beyond public diplomacy", *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 2 (2002): 83-95. Hoffman's article is a critique of what he calls the US propaganda campaign to win "hearts and minds" in the Muslim world in support of its war against terrorism. He suggests U.S. promotion of freedom of the press and local, independent media.

<sup>48</sup> P.P. Blackburn, "The post-cold war public diplomacy of the United States", *Washington Quarterly* 15, no. 1 (1992): 75-86. The author reviews realisations of the US Information Agency (USIA) and suggests consolidation of the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and Radio Liberty;

A.J. Blinken, "Winning the War of Ideas", *Washington Quarterly* 25, no 2 (2002): 101-114. Blinken recommends a 12-point plan to help bridge the perception gap of which is suffering America in the Arab World.

<sup>49</sup> "Diplomacy in the Information Age", *Information Impacts Magazine (IMP)*, (2001), [http://www.cisp.org/imp/july\\_2001/07\\_01livingston.htm](http://www.cisp.org/imp/july_2001/07_01livingston.htm). Two other online papers merit attention:

W. Ostick, "Public Relations, U.S. Public Diplomacy and Foreign Policy Public Affairs", *Capstone Projects*, (2002), <http://www.Fall2002/Ostick.pdf>;

T. Martin, "Cyberpolitik", *e-Merge-A Student Journal of International Affairs* 2, (2001).

<sup>50</sup> For example, in *Foreign Affairs*, one of journals devoting the most space to the new diplomacy, we can cite the following articles :

G. Bates, "Limited Engagement", *Foreign Affairs* 78, no 4 (1999);

R. N. Gardner, "The One Percent Solution", *Foreign Affairs* 79, no 4 (2000);

K. M. Campbell and D. J. Mitchell, "Crisis in the Taiwan Straits?", *Foreign Affairs* 80, no 4 (2001);

Peter L. Berger, "Picking up the Pieces", *Foreign Affairs* 81, no 2 (2002);


Michael Hirsh, "Bush and the World", *Foreign Affairs* 81, no 5 (2002);

Shibley Telhami, Fiona Hill et al., "Does Saudi Arabia Still Matters? Differing Perspectives on the Kingdom and its Oil", *Foreign Affairs* 81, no 6 (2002);

Fouad Ajami, "Iraq and the Arab's Future", *Foreign Affairs* 82, no 1 (2003).

or two articles of global scope (of which only one dates from after 1994), no articles contribute to a comprehensive study of the issue. In regards to scholarly work written outside the Anglo-Saxon world, if we make exception for a few studies of French audio-visual policy or German cultural policy, we come upon almost complete silence on the subject of public diplomacy.

**Figure 3: 50 Academic Studies in 10 years**



There are only slightly more monographs devoted to mass diplomacy. During the period 1992-2003, less than thirty books by academic researchers appeared whose central topic is public diplomacy. This is a ridiculously small number when the annual publication levels of even middling publishers specializing in international relations or foreign policy are considered. Moreover, half of these works were published before 1997 and have been made redundant by fundamental changes in the field of mass diplomacy over the last six years. These older books, to which we must add recent historical studies,<sup>51</sup> can certainly help to provide an interesting historical background to issues such as the formulation, organisation and implementation of American diplomacy during and immediately after the Cold War.<sup>52</sup> Nevertheless, these

<sup>51</sup> S. McEvoy-Levy, *American Exceptionalism and U.S. Foreign Policy Public Diplomacy at the End of the Cold War* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001); Alan L. Heil Jr., *Voice of America: A History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003); H.H. Kendall, *A Farm Boy in the Foreign Service: Telling America's Story to the World* (1<sup>st</sup> Books Library, 2003).

<sup>52</sup> W. L. Bennett and D. L. Paletz (eds.), *Taken By Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). This book, for instance, describes the role of the mass media and public opinion in the development of U.S. foreign policy in the 1991 Gulf War; J. R. Saul, *Culture and Foreign Policy* (Toronto: Penguin, 1994) about the Canadian case; J. B. Manheim, *Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford UP, 1994); R. S. Fortner, *Public Diplomacy and International Politics* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994); R. Sabel (dir), *Public Opinion in US Foreign Policy* (Lanham: Rowman, 1993); H.N.Tuch, *Communicating with the world: U.S. public diplomacy overseas* (N.Y.: St.Martin's Press, 1992); on the Cold War period see also R.F. Staar (ed.), *Public Diplomacy: USA Versus USSR*. (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1986);

monographs are of little use in understanding and evaluating the present nature of the phenomenon. Despite a marked increase in the last three years of monographs devoted to the phenomena of contemporary public diplomacy, these remain rare and incapable for the most part of responding to the demand for a global analysis of the issue (table 2). In effect, 85% of the monographs published since 1998 limit themselves to a discussion of one or two cases: with a few exceptions, they are all exclusively concerned with an analysis of American public diplomacy and situated within a very particular geo-historical context.<sup>53</sup> More precisely, two-thirds of these monographs deal with the role of mass diplomacy in the U.S. fight against terrorism.<sup>54</sup> Over the entirety of the period, there are only four studies with a more or less general scope, two of which appeared prior to 1996.<sup>55</sup>

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J.B. Manheim, *All of the People, All the Time: Strategic Communication and American Politics* (Armonk-NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1992);

J.H.Esterline, *Innocents Abroad, How We Won the Cold War* (Lanham, MD:UP of America, 1997);

R. Amerson, *How Democracy Triumphed Over Dictatorship: Public Diplomacy in Venezuela* (Wash.DC: American UP, 1995);

F.Roche and B.Piniau, *Histoire de la diplomatie culturelle* (Paris: La Documentation Française, 1995).

<sup>53</sup> The three exceptions deal with Canadian, German and Israeli public diplomacy programs:

A. Phillips, *Power and Influence after the Cold War. Germany in East-Central Europe* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000);

J.Fishman, *Information Policy and National Identity: Israel's Ideological War* (research paper, Ariel Center Policy Research, 2002);

R. Irwin (ed.), *Ethics and Security in Canadian Foreign Policy* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003).

On American public diplomacy see:

W. Dizard Jr, *Digital Diplomacy: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Information Age* (NY: Prager, 2001). In this book W. Dizard describes how the U.S. is the first information-age society, one whose major activity is the production, storage, and distribution of information, and includes a discussion of implications for public diplomacy;

M.A. Abramson and T.L. Morin (eds.), *E-Government 2003* (Lanham, MD: Rowman&Littlefield, 2003). The book includes a collection of nine research reports sponsored by the IBM Endowment for The Business of Government. But among the papers the only worthy of note is a chapter by Barry Fulton entitled "Leveraging Technology in the Service of Diplomacy: Innovation in the Department of State." The paper is also available on the web at <http://endowment.pwcglobal.com/publications.asp>.

<sup>54</sup> J.F. Hoge Jr and G.Rose, *How did this Happen? Terrorism and the New War* (NY: Public Affairs, 2001);

K. Campbell and M. A. Flournoy, *To prevail : An American Strategy for the Campaign Against Terrorism*, (Washington, D.C. : CSIS Press, 2001);

S. Hess and M. Kalb (eds), *The media and the war on terrorism* (Wash.DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003);

B. Nacos, *Mass-Mediated Terrorism: The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and Counterterrorism* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002). A book on the media and terrorism which includes extensive research on post 9/11 issues ;

S. Silberstein, *War of Words: Language, Politics and 9/11* (NY: Routledge, 2002). A linguist's critical study of the "strategic deployment of language" by the Bush Administration to build support for the war on.

<sup>55</sup> C.W. Kegley and E.R. Wittkopf, *American foreign policy : pattern and process* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996). Only chapters 5 and 6 deal with mass diplomacy and the role of values, culture and public



What stands out from this overview of the scholarly literature on public diplomacy is that mass diplomacy is an issue that the academic world has just about completely ignored so far. To be fair, it has not yet been the subject of systematic study mainly because it is a very recent phenomenon. In its present form, mass diplomacy dates back no more than 5 or 6 years. Foreign policy and international relations analysts are traditionally slow to react to events outside their ivory tower: increased attention will surely follow. For the moment, the void of scholarly writing contrasts sharply with the flood of attention devoted to the new diplomacy outside academic circles.

#### b. A Fashionable Subject for Practitioners and the Media

In a general way, the community of mass diplomacy specialists is still largely limited to the diplomats, counsellors and foreign policy makers who gravitate to the State Department, the Foreign Office, DFAIT, the Quai D'Orsay, Auswärtiges-Amt or the Palacio Farnese. It is these practitioners and the institutions that employ them that currently produce the bulk of the studies of the subject. The first panel devoted exclusively to public diplomacy by the International Studies Association (ISA), for example, was made up entirely of government bureaucrats.

The majority of the publications in this area are written by members of the State Department and the American government such as Christopher Ross or Barry Fulton.<sup>56</sup> Also leading the way, British mass diplomacy thinkers, notably those belonging to the London based Foreign Policy Centre, are the only ones who have attempted to conduct anything resembling an in-depth and comparative study of the issue<sup>57</sup>. The important contributions of Evan H. Potter, communications advisor to the Policy Planning Division of the Canadian DFAIT, should be noted, in particular concerning the audiovisual dimension of public diplomacy.<sup>58</sup> However, the absence of a scholarly perspective and distance tends in general to undermine the quality of the contribution of these

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opinion in US foreign policy – but the approach is particularly rigorous and scientific; Fortner, *op. cit.* More recently see W.A. Hachten, *The world news prism : changing media of international communication*, 5th ed. (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1999);

W. L. Bennett, *News: The Politics of Illusion* (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, Inc., 2003).

<sup>56</sup> C. Ross (State Department Official and Member of The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology), "Public Diplomacy Comes of Age", *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no 2 (2002): 75-83.

<sup>57</sup> M. Leonard and C. Stead, *Public Diplomacy* (London: Foreign Policy Center, 2002);

M. Leonard, "Diplomacy by Other Means", *Foreign Policy* 132 (2002): 48-56.

<sup>58</sup> E.H. Potter (Special Advisor to the Policy Planning Division of the DFAIT), *Cyber-Diplomacy. Managing Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century* (Montral&Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 2002);

see also E.H. Potter, "Canada and the New Public Diplomacy" (Discussion Paper in Diplomacy, Published by Spencer Mawby, University of Leicester, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2002).

practitioners to the body of scientific knowledge of this branch of foreign policy. The work produced is usually prescriptive rather than analytical and is affected by the considerations of practitioners or diplomats. Their approach is mostly concerned with immediate problems and priorities fixed by government agenda instead of rigorous and critical scholarly research. The comparative analysis of the causes and organisational models of public diplomacy is in general left aside. This is illustrated by the monolithic quality of the subjects chosen by American mass diplomats: between 1998 and 2001, almost the entirety of their publications addressed the role of public diplomacy, that is to say, the organs of the defunct USIA, within the structure of the State Department.<sup>59</sup> After September 2001, the role of public diplomacy in the U.S. campaign against terrorist networks took over as the central topic of discussion.<sup>60</sup>

In a more general way, the new reality of the information age and the post 9-11 events have had the effect of pushing the subject into the floodlights drawing, in particular, the attention of civil society and the media. Hardly a day goes by without a mention of public diplomacy by politicians, in social debates and in the newspapers.<sup>61</sup> A informal survey conducted through Google's News Alert service reveals for example that between March 6<sup>th</sup> and May 6<sup>th</sup> 2004, more than 220 pieces of journalism were published in the world on the theme of "public diplomacy" which is equivalent to 2.6 articles per day whereas three years ago scarcely one article a year appeared on the subject. Limited to the Anglophone press, this count also shows that far from being restricted to American newspapers, these articles have been published around the world in publications with titles as diverse as the *Vanguard* (Nigeria), *The Manila Times* (Philippines), *The Toronto Star* (Canada), *The New Kerala* (India), *The Daily Star* (Lebanon), *The Borneo Bulletin* (Brunei), *The International Herald Tribune* (Paris), *The Jerusalem Post* (Israel), *The New Nation*

<sup>59</sup> D. Pendergrast, "State and USIA: Blending a Dysfunctional Family", *Foreign Service Journal* (March 2000);

H. Cincotta, "Thoughts on Public Diplomacy and Integration", *State Magazine* (Feb.-March 2000);

J.F. Metzl (Senior Advisor for U.S. Information Technology, Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, and Senior Coordinator for International Public Information at the U.S. Department of State), "Can Public Diplomacy Rise from the Ashes?", *Foreign Service Journal* (July-Aug 2001);

A. Kotok, "Public Diplomacy and Information Technology: America's Semi-Secret Weapons", *U.S. Techno-Politics*, May 28, 2002.

<sup>60</sup> One can notably think of the report of the Independent Task Force on Public Diplomacy sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations advertised in *Foreign Affairs* by Peter Peterson:

P. Peterson, "Public Diplomacy and the War on Terrorism", *Foreign Affairs* 81, no 5 (2002): 74-95.

<sup>61</sup> On the media hype to which public diplomacy is subject since the terrorist attempts of 2001, see a host of other examples:

*Economist*, "From Uncle Ben's to Uncle Sam: Charlotte Beers's job is to fix America's image overseas; can the schmooze queen of Madison Avenue deliver?" Feb. 23, 2002;

S.F. Hayes, "Uncle Sam's makeover: the State Department's answer to Osama bin Laden is to "redefine America"", *Weekly Standard*, June 3, 2002;

*Middle East Reporter Weekly*, "Al-Jazeera: little known, world-wide respect", Oct. 20, 2001.

(Bangladesh), *The China Post* (Taiwan), *The People's Daily News* (China), *The Sidney Morning Herald* (Australia), *The Guardian* (Britain) or *The New Straits Times* (Malaysia). Public diplomacy is now in vogue in the media because it is becoming increasingly evident that informing, educating and engaging foreign populations matters as much as negotiating with their governments. Across the world, politicians, journalists and the man in the street are once again becoming interested, although without much real understanding of the phenomenon, in the strategy of winning hearts and minds. To bring a dispassionate and precise analytical perspective to the debate is per se a good reason why academia should take interest in this important issue.

#### **4. The Empirical and Theoretical Objectives**

An in-depth study of mass diplomacy is urgently needed. Almost no methodical work has to date been attempted, even though mass diplomacy plays a more and more important role in international relations and even though it attracts more and more attention. Most IR researchers are ignorant of the very existence of this facet of foreign policy and it is time to attempt a general portrait. It is critical to determine its principal characteristics, the fundamental forces that lie beneath it, the type of change it has undergone these last years, the role it plays within foreign affairs, the type of organisation and of strategy it involves and its eventual scope. It seems necessary to investigate these previously unexplored aspects of mass diplomacy in order to be able to proceed subsequently to the much needed evaluation of its effectiveness. In the hope of clearing the way, this study has two fundamental goals: understanding the reasons for the resurgence of public diplomacy and understanding the transformation public diplomacy has undergone. From a theoretical point of view, this study of mass diplomacy aims at bolstering the general argument about the complexification of state power sources and a particular reorientation of their foreign affairs policies towards intangible sources of power and influence. In that respect, this study also goes further by identifying the concrete means available to states to domesticate what has been called *soft power* and make it serve the hard power objectives of their foreign policy.

##### **a. Understanding the Resurgence**

The first part of this thesis (chapters 2 to 5) is devoted to understanding the reasons that lie behind the growth at the end of the 1990's of a branch of foreign policy that had been dismantled and marginalised at the close of the Cold War. In other words, this first section addresses the

following question: Why was public diplomacy so suddenly propelled to the forefront of the international scene after having been almost forgotten for a decade? The answer considered here is that the necessary cause of the re-emergence is the heightening of the mass media revolution and the advent of the global information society. It is acknowledged that factors such as the globalisation of trade and economic interdependence have prepared the terrain by driving governments to search out more indirect means of pursuing their interests.<sup>62</sup> These factors are insufficient however to explain the withdrawal of public diplomacy and its re-emergence at the end of the 1990's. The critical threshold reached by the explosive growth of NICTs and their widespread use at the global scale constitutes the only decisive factor that can satisfyingly account for the sudden nature and planet-wide scope of the growth of such a marginalized element of foreign policy.

This argument will first be explored by attempting to determine whether a temporal and causal correlation exists between the deepening of the information revolution and the re-emergence of public diplomacy. The discussion will consist in the first instance (chapter 2) of an effort to demonstrate that the 1990's was a pivotal period of the information revolution that corresponds with important modifications of the operational environment of foreign affairs. This will be accomplished in particular through the analysis of a number of quantitative indicators concerning NICTs and their penetration rate at the global level as much as in the domestic sphere. In a second instance (chapter 3) the discussion will make apparent the re-emergence of public diplomacy, during the years that correspond to the technological change, through key indicators detailing its changing budget, institutional status and the place of communication technologies including resources requests, public funding, annual reports, and other documentation attesting quantitative changes taking place in this sphere during the period. The goal is to prove the existence of a close causal relationship between the advent of the global information society and that of mass diplomacy and, this being the case, to understand in what ways the new information and communication technologies revolution played a role of necessary enabling cause in the renaissance of public diplomacy.

The argument concerning the existence of a causal relationship will be bolstered by making evident the fact that the advent of mass diplomacy was accelerated by contingent factors that were themselves avatars of the information age. In particular, we will examine (chapter 4) the idea that in bringing the struggle to the battlefield of the screen, of images, of values and of public opinions, global terrorism (itself a extreme form of public opinion diplomacy) has magnified the

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<sup>62</sup> On their contribution to the the mass diplomacy revolution see P. C. Pahlavi "Normpolitik - Revisiting Complex Interdependence", *Diploweb* 40 (2003), <http://www.diploweb.com/english/pahlavi2.htm>.

importance of this diplomacy of mass persuasion and underlined the urgency of increasing its resources. This will be done through the analysis of budgetary and institutional indicators attesting that the explosion of global terrorism corresponds to significant growth in the resources allocated to this branch of foreign policy or to a remarkable acceleration of its re-institutionalisation. In order to complete the systemic level analysis by a decision-making level analysis, we will also examine (chapter 5) the hypothesis that the re-emergence of public diplomacy is also largely conditioned by the perception of political leaders of this new diplomatic environment and the concrete hopes they hold for this facet of foreign affairs. Through an analysis of speeches and official documents, chapter 5 will attempt to make clear that if mass diplomacy is experiencing a period of re-growth, it is also in large part because the decision-makers and architects of foreign policy come to perceive it to be a crucial dimension in the pursuit of foreign policy goals.

#### b. Defining the Transformation of the Paradigm

The second part of this study (chapters 6 to 10) is devoted to measuring the scope of the qualitative change that has taken place and to determine whether the discernable characteristics of mass diplomacy allow us to conclude that it constitutes a new generation of public diplomacy. Beyond the increase of government funding, to what extent has classic public diplomacy adapted to a new marketplace of information and culture saturated by a multitude of new media and political players, and coped to remain persuasive in an age where populations are increasingly sceptical in regards to government initiatives? The argument advanced is that this highly competitive and informal environment challenges the relevancy of public diplomacy of a traditional nature and pushes governments to turn to an entirely renovated “hearts and minds” policy, one adapted to the rules of the new market: mass diplomacy. This argument will be examined by analysing the transformations of public diplomacy at the level of strategy, organisational structure and operational modes while attempting to demonstrate that they reflect not only the technological upheaval but also the new social practices brought about by the information age such as, and in particular, the current practices employed in the spheres of communication, public relations and marketing:

- Firstly, chapter 6 will investigate the hypothesis that, by making traditional methods of influence inherited from the Cold War obsolete, the new media-saturated environment has driven public diplomacy to reinvent its approach with inspiration from techniques such as branding, “spinning” and image-building, more conventionally employed by private firms such as Wal-

Mart and Volkswagen to optimise their campaigns and gain faithful clientele. Beyond the inclusion of marketing techniques themselves, the new fields of expertise of mass diplomats are noteworthy indicators of the transformation along with the extent of collaboration with external communication specialists and public relations firms.

- Secondly, in an attempt to confirm the qualitative change of public diplomacy, chapters 7 and 8 will explore the hypothesis that by undermining the conditions for rigid centralised decision-making and wholly governmental constructs, the conditions of the information age push states to re-conceive the classic organisational model of public diplomacy and to adopt a new mode of organisation defined by a more flexible management open to networking, public-private partnerships and favouring the increased use of new communication technologies generated by the mass media revolution. The existence of this new organisational model that we will call “bureaucratic-entrepreneurial” comes to light in an in-depth analysis of infrastructure, governing bodies and subordinate organisations in charge of the cultural and educational programmes (chapter 7) and audiovisual broadcasting (chapter 8) of a number of different nations.

- Thirdly, Chapter 9 studies the metamorphosis of public diplomacy at the level of its implementation by attempting to verify if it has been affected by the current tendency towards privatisation, decentralisation and liberalisation. The hypothesis is that at a time when state monopolies are shattering, public diplomacy is encouraged to overflow official structures to extend itself into the non-governmental sphere where it is conducted by third parties, both private and foreign. The assumption is that engaging with the myriad of non-governmental players and tapping into their pervasive presence in overseas markets is a new way of responding to the deficiencies of official efforts. A representative overview will demonstrate the connections between official mass diplomacy and a multitude of subcontractors from the private sphere, domestic and foreign media, the business world, sports, cinema, culture and entertainment, and the various means the above use to carry out mass diplomacy's operations in the field.

Once the bounds of the phenomenon of mass diplomacy are clear, and its causes, its organisation and its goals defined, then we can broach the important and delicate question of its evaluation. Chapter 10 will demonstrate that despite the present deficiencies of government evaluation programs and the complexity of the task, it is possible to gauge the phenomenon. The chapter proposes to identity the broad strokes of an evaluation methodology for mass diplomacy. This methodology is inspired in particular by techniques employed in the private sphere for evaluating the success of information dissemination campaigns. On the basis of this model of evaluation, chapter 10 will analyse techniques presently employed by governments and the way they are applied to the different steps of the evaluation process. From there, it will be possible to

determine the deficiencies in these programmes and the reasons for which, despite efforts made and opportunities available, they are still incapable of measuring results and progress in this domain.

## **5. Case-Study Selection and Methodology**

### **a. Case-Study selection**

Based on a six-year research programme and drawing on extensive fieldwork, this thesis is a comparative study that examines the expansion, the role, the characteristics and the future of mass diplomacy within foreign affairs departments of variety of nations. The case selection was a two-step process. Dictated by the necessity of working on a sufficiently representative sample of states in order to isolate, as best possible, the recurrence and the general characteristics of the phenomenon, the first step was to carry out a preliminary study or sampling as randomly as possible instead of focusing exclusively on observations directly fitting a priori theoretical expectations. This preliminary research rapidly revealed the existence of a leading group, familiar with the practice of public diplomacy, and that of an immense group of countries that are currently discovering mass diplomacy. Very few nations remain completely ignorant of the phenomenon. The second stage was thus to select, from amongst the nations that currently use mass diplomacy as a foreign policy tool, a representatively diverse sample. One set of criteria has been variation in terms of power capabilities, history and socio-cultural background. This being the case, the leading group, those countries for which public diplomacy is sufficiently established to be studied rigorously, is constituted by the principal Western, Asian and Muslim powers that despite their diversity, have in common their status as active players on the international scene and their possession of a strong diplomatic tradition. It is in this group of countries that mass diplomacy is currently capable of attaining its highest degree of development, even if many other countries are biting at their heels, and so it is this group that will serve as principal points of reference for this study of mass diplomacy. The countries that have practiced mass diplomacy for only a short while will be used as often as possible but, an exhaustive study being impossible, they will appear in a less systematic way.

Despite the care taken to balance attention between different cases, a large part of this analysis concentrates on American mass diplomacy. This is due not only to its status as superpower and omnipresent player on the diplomatic stage, but also because of its role as precursor in terms of mass diplomacy. For the same reasons, a large part of the study bears on the cases of the great

powers including Great Britain, France, Japan, Germany, China and Russia. Nevertheless, the study includes numerous references to middling powers such as Italy, Canada, India, Australia, Brazil, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia or Israel. This list includes other countries selected from various geographic areas with the intent of increasing the representative qualities of the study. Amongst these, we find analyses of the mass diplomacies of Norway, Switzerland, Qatar, Thailand, South Africa, and New Zealand as well as a few others of all sizes across the globe. Due to the apparent uniqueness of each case, the challenge this study faces is to attempt to provide a general portrait of mass diplomacy. Designed as a “controlled comparison research strategy”,<sup>63</sup> this empirical study allows the analysis and contrast of differing cases in order to identify recurrent patterns and conditions, idiosyncratic factors and significant variables determining mass diplomacy. The use of a comparative transversal and thematic approach is precisely intended to avoid the fastidious and sterile character of isolated case studies that are currently multiplying on the subject and fail without exception to produce the urgently needed in-depth portrait of this fascinating facet of diplomacy.

#### b. Methodology

Empirical research on the phenomenon of states’ mass diplomacy consisted of documenting and studying the formulation, the organisation, the financial appropriation, and the implementation of the diverse aspects of this foreign policy discipline. The main sources of information were official documents, such as reports and studies published and diffused by governments on diverse aspects of their foreign policy related to public diplomacy. With the development of this branch of diplomacy an increasing amount of sources are available on precise aspects of cultural policies and educational and audiovisual programs, including the formulation of their official goals, their budgets, their doctrine, their principal organs and the different actions undertaken in the different parts of the globe. In this regard, the official websites of states’ foreign policy constitutes a rich source of information on the various dimensions of cultural diplomacy. This research was primarily designed to compile evidence in order to determine if there is a link between the intensification of the information revolution and the development of mass diplomacy programs at the end of the nineties. With this in mind, the first task was to verify that the 90’s were indeed a pivotal era in the NICT revolution, as much in terms of the acceleration of technological progress as in terms of socio-political implication slinked to the development of the

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<sup>63</sup> A.L. George, “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured Focused Comparison”, in *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy*, ed. by P.G. Lauren (NY: Free Press, 1979).



global information society. This implied a comprehensive analysis of selected quantitative data and indicators in the major areas of basic ICT infrastructure including the extent of television and radio diffusion, quantities of phone lines or the number of Internet users. For this purpose I have relied on key factors analysed by specialised institutions including OECD, the European Information Technology Observatory (EITO) and UN agencies such as the Geneva-based International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the Montreal-based UNESCO Statistical Institute. The second task was to bring to light a budgetary and institutional resurgence of public diplomacy that matched, both temporally and logically, the NICT boom and the advent of a new diplomatic environment marked by the arrival of the global information society. The same type of approach has been employed to study the impact of the explosive growth of global terrorism on appropriations and attention devoted to mass diplomacy programs. A cautionary note is necessary here. Mass diplomacy does not require large amounts of money to be effective. Initiatives with high strategic value such as launching a website or a radio station are relatively inexpensive. The modest size of public diplomacy budgets does not necessarily represent a lack of interest or activity. For this reason, in the segment of this work devoted to providing evidence of the reemergence of public diplomacy, appropriations increases that might seem relatively small in comparison to other foreign affairs sectors do not at all contradict the thesis this dissertation advances. The revival is most clearly manifest, as we shall see, in the scope of the institutional transformations. Finally, this last part of the study is completed by an analysis at the decision-making level of official documents and speeches in order to provide a more complete explanation of the resurgence of public diplomacy.

The second part of the research was devoted to the analysis of the qualitative transformation of public diplomacy. Special attention was focussed on collecting and analysing data about the different ministries, diplomatic organs, public agencies and cyber-diplomacy tools constituting the increasingly autonomous action networks of states' modern mass diplomacy. Priority was given to the investigation of the powerful agencies which, in each country, have been specifically created to supervise and mediate actions in this domain; including, among others, the US Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA), the British Council, the French Direction Générale de la Coopération Internationale et du Développement (DGCID – ex-DGRCST), the Chinese Public Diplomacy Board or the Turkish International Cooperation Agency (TIKA). A distinctive part of the research design was devoted to the careful analysis of evidence of the new diplomatic tools that are the mass media and global communication technologies and their specific place in states' modern public diplomacy. Particular attention was paid to the collection of data about global broadcasting networks, as well as about the conception, contents and broadcasting conditions of

programs diffused in the target zones. A particular focus was a study of the British Broadcasting Corporation, France's TV5, Deutsche Welle and the US Broadcasting Boards and its media subsidiaries. Finally, the metamorphosis of mass diplomacy was documented through research and collection of information about the ramifications of mass diplomacy programs outside government structures and the participation of partners from the media, cultural sphere or NGOs.

## **6. Conclusion: Some Implications of the Study of Mass Diplomacy**

The study of mass diplomacy should hopefully have important implications as much from an empirical as theoretical point of view. Firstly, it should contribute to the extension of our empirical knowledge of foreign policy through the exploration, comprehension and explication of a neglected aspect of diplomacy. This study should contribute to revolutionizing the traditional cliché of diplomacy that, in the popular imagination at least, consists of well-connected ambassadors in dress clothes, limousines and glittering social functions. What is more, anticipating an inevitable evolution of foreign policy, the study of mass diplomacy, an information age diplomacy led by cyber-diplomats, marketing strategists, and communication specialists, can help to better understand what diplomacy is increasingly likely to become in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. We are still at an early stage of the current information revolution but already more and more countries are using the new diplomatic tools of media, radio, the internet, television and satellites to increase their international influence. With the ineluctable acceleration and diffusion of information and communication technologies, we may expect, in the foreseeable future that this trend will become general. The present work intends to help understand this recent phenomenon that is destined to spread throughout the globe in the coming decades and bound to become a central issue in international politics. In this regard, it can be conceived as a first step designed to give impetus to an extensive inquiry on this crucial, yet still underestimated, branch of states' foreign policy.

The findings in this domain should undoubtedly prove of prime interest for policy-makers. By shedding light on the general causes that underlie mass diplomacy, the role played by new information and communication technologies and the fundamental principles of its infrastructure, this study is particularly useful for improving existing programs and developing new ways of operating. It should also have the merit of attracting attention to the important question of evaluation programmes and to provide a certain number of solutions to the serious problems that exist currently. Public diplomacy has often been seen as a frill or a luxury because it was limited to educational and cultural exchanges that reached a limited audience. By putting the emphasis on

the sophisticated means at its disposal today and its immense potential, this study should hopefully prove that mass diplomacy is now more than rhetoric and good intentions. Mass diplomacy is in the process of becoming a means of obtaining power and promoting security objectives. In the current context of the war against terrorism, governments, secret services and militaries are being confronted by an uncommon type of warfare, a war without fronts or borders and without a clearly identified enemy, a war whose battlefield is public opinions for whom mass diplomacy could be key. The great powers are bitterly aware of the degree to which their conventional and nuclear arsenals are inadequate in regards to this new challenge. In the face of aggression and psychological harassment, of which terror is one form, they must learn once again to reply with acts of persuasion and appeal and are turning towards a strategic “hearts and minds” diplomacy.

By bringing into focus the phenomenon of mass diplomacy, this research also has the capacity to make a valuable contribution to foreign policy and international relations theory. It should provide a useful backdrop for consideration of what is changing in international relations. It can be particularly useful in providing an empirical framework for the debate that specialists have been facing in recent years on the subject of a re-equilibration between hard power, associated with military and economic strength, and soft power, associated with more intangible factors such as culture and information. Until now, theorists of soft power have not yet presented convincing concrete argumentation about the way in which states can harness the influence of culture and thus channel the power of persuasion. The analysis of mass diplomacy holds the promise of confirming, or, according to the results, undermining this proposition through the use of argumentation and empirical illustration. It can, in particular, explain why culture, information and communication constitute a source of enduring soft power and how states can derive the maximum benefit from them. The theorists of soft power have until now held to vague propositions that though seductive have never really been ascertained; this study should allow us to make good this void and push the subject further by demonstrating a concrete use of soft power.

More generally, the study of mass diplomacy can help to prolong, enrich and modernize the realist theory of international relations. It has the potential to demonstrate that the traditional idea of *realpolitik* – the maximization of national interests by any means available – now also passes through non-coercive means of influence completely compatible with the development of peaceful international co-operation. This soft realist view should hopefully bring into focus the fact that realism, far from being obsolete, has the potential to reveal a much more dynamic

perspective on the changing world order. This study should also emphasize the fact that its secular logic is by no means limited to a dogmatic materialist view but can be made perfectly compatible with the study of less tangible factors. This would consist then of taking up anew a completely obscure aspect of this school of thought. Finally, by showing that, in the information age, realpolitik makes use of kulturpolitik – to use a term dear to Bismarck – it is not impossible that this study will participate in the reconciliation of realism and idealism.<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> C. Von Barloeven, “La culture, facteur de la Realpolitik”, *Le Monde Diplomatique* (Nov. 2001): 22-23.

## **PART I**

### **The Quantitative Change**

## Chapter II. A New Diplomatic Environment

“Nations now stand in such constructed relations to one another that none can stand any weakening of its culture without losing power and influence in relation to the others.”  
 - Immanuel Kant, *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent* (1784)

### Introduction

The introduction of new communication and information technologies (NICTs) has provoked an information revolution of comparable magnitude to those spurred by the advent of speech, writing and printing. Similar to those earlier upheavals, the contemporary information revolution has radically altered every level of social life from interpersonal to international relations through its impact on lifestyles, socioprofessional behavior, culture and mindsets, access to knowledge, consumerism, economic transactions and social and political organisation. At first quite gradual, this upheaval has accelerated during the 1990s. The explosive growth of mass media technologies, their widespread use and the generalisation of new modes of social interaction have generated a new international landscape commonly called the global information society. The question is now whether this acceleration of the information revolution and the development of the global information revolution had reached a critical level at the end of the 90s and to what point they have created a new operational environment suitable for the re-emergence of public diplomacy.

The goal of this chapter is to determine if the 1990s were indeed a pivotal period favorable to the development of mass diplomacy. The first task will be to illustrate the characteristics of the technological boom at the end of the 1990's through an overview of selected quantitative data in key areas of ICT including digital radio, satellite TV, Internet, mobile phones and by looking at other indicators about penetration or diffusion levels. Through a qualitative investigation, this chapter will also attempt to understand why the spread of NICTs, and its corollaries, the advent of the global information society and the growing importance of public opinion in the international sphere, may generate a new foreign policy environment which might compel states to evolve beyond traditional diplomacy with its exclusive focus on leader-to-leader interactions towards a hybrid diplomacy of persuasion that targets an audience of unprecedented scope. In this regard, we will grapple with the social and political implications of this technological evolution before addressing how, by increasing the vulnerability of borders to the transnational flow of information, this hypermedia environment may expand the paradigm governing the conduct of diplomacy to include new strategies aimed at engaging foreign public opinion through influence or control over the exchange of information.

## 1. The Globalisation of the Information Revolution

### a. The Sustained Growth of the Information and Communications Market on a Global Scale

Begun during the 1950s, the information revolution entered a critical phase during the last ten years. The development of the first mass medias constituted the founding premises of a phenomena that, however, remained limited to precise sectors and geographical areas until the 1990s. The 90s were characterized by the deepening and exponential multiplication of progress in a variety of information and communication technologies, corresponding to the Schumpeterian definition of a technological revolution. During such a revolution breakthroughs arrive in clusters: "These clusters, if they are important, define an era. They eventually change the way business is done, even the way society is conducted".<sup>1</sup> History has demonstrated repeatedly that there is inevitably a remove between the discovery of new technologies and the manifestation of their impact on society. As Brian Arthur put it "[...] a considerable delay – several decades, usually – lies between the technologies that set a revolution in motion and the revolution's heyday. The enabling technologies of the steel and electricity revolution (the Bessemer steel plant and the electric motor and generator) had arrived by the 1870s, but their full effects were not felt until well into the 1910s."<sup>2</sup> In the same way that television appeared during the 1930s but did not become popular in the West until the 1960s, the internet was invented in the 1960s though its use remained limited to an infinitely small segment of humanity until almost the middle of the 1990s. A process of acclimatisation, adjustment and diffusion is necessary before an invention leaves its mark on an era. It is clear that the effects of the information revolution have only recently begun to be felt. It is not the underlying technical innovation, but the rapidity and scope of the societal transformation that is key then.


What distinguishes the 90s, and makes them a pivotal era, is the explosive growth of NITC and their widespread use at the global scale. As we are going to see in this section, the number of communication networks worldwide has been growing exponentially during this period. In a very short period of time, satellite networks, coaxial cable and fibre optic connections, wireless or high-speed systems, earth and space based networks, have come to constitute an increasingly dense and complex web of communication and information conduits gripping the globe. The 1990s witnessed such a dynamic expansion of new telecommunication infrastructure that, over the course of that decade, the capacity for immediate information transmission to the four corners

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<sup>1</sup> W.B. Arthur, "Is the Information Revolution Dead? If History is a Guide, it is not". *Business 2.0* (March 2002).

of the earth became almost unlimited. By the end of 1999, in a growing number of countries, more than one in two inhabitants had access to an information network and in several OECD nations many inhabitants had access to more than one network.<sup>3</sup> Despite the deflation of the new technologies bubble in 2000, telecommunication networks have continued to expand extremely rapidly (Figure 1) and become more and more unavoidable and indispensable. In order to emphasize the deepening of the information revolution it is necessary to frame the transformation by turning, in the first instance, to an analysis of relevant quantifiable information, such as the extent of television and radio diffusion, quantities of phone lines or the number of Internet users. This section will provide an overview of selected quantitative data and indicators in the key areas of basic ICT infrastructure as well as access and use of ICT.<sup>4</sup>

Figure 1: Worldwide ICT Market Average Growth 1993-2003 (billion Euro)



Source: European Information Technology Observatory

Despite North/South disparities, all regions of the planet are currently affected by the tremendous annual market-driven growth in the ICT industry. At the outset of the 1990's, the effects of the information revolution were still very unequally distributed across regions; a gaping digital divide separated the North from the South while significant imbalance existed also within regions. Although significant disparities persist, relative market shares tend to be distributed more and more evenly amongst Europe, North America, Asia Pacific and the rest of the world (Figure 2). Most projections agree that greater accessibility and the reduction of costs will contribute to

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*


<sup>3</sup> OECD - Working Group on Technology and Innovation Policy (TIP), *The Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2001 - Innovation and Technology Policy* (Reports to the Committee on Scientific and Technological Policy, Based on OECD statistical data, 2001).

<sup>4</sup> They are the key factors analysed by specialised institutions including OECD, the European Information Technology Observatory (EITO) and UN agencies like the Geneva-based International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the Montreal-based UNESCO Statistical Institute



ridging the North/South divide within the next decade.<sup>5</sup> This is more evident in taking into account the penetration of NICTs in households.

Figure 2: ICT Market Annual Growth by Region (in %)



Source: European Information Technology Observatory

#### b. Penetration Rates in the Private Sphere

Analyses of the information revolution often have the tendency to wrongly limit themselves to a vision of the global telecommunications market that is blind to an essential factor: the rate of penetration of new technologies in the private sphere. Another common error is to associate the mass media revolution exclusively with the internet and mobile telephone technology while neglecting the central role that traditional technologies such as the radio and television play in their modern form. To be able to provide a complete and realistic image of the globalisation of the mass media revolution one must be able to describe the penetration of different technologies into the private sphere as well as the integration of these technologies into new communication and information habits across the world. That is the goal for the following section.

- Due to digital technology, traditional information distribution and communication media such as **radio and television** continue to play a crucial role in the globalisation of the information society. Digitization is allowing these earlier generation media to increase their programming capacity and audience base constantly. 1) The introduction of global wireless networks and the deregulation of markets have renewed radio and television communication. During the last 30 years, the total number of radio broadcasting receivers across the world per 1000 inhabitants has grown by nearly 100% (400% in the developing nations), with a particularly strong growth rate during the last decade.<sup>6</sup> We now count 2.5 billion listeners, up from 245 million listeners in 1970


<sup>5</sup> K. Boyanov and O. Martikainen, "Some Trends in Information and Communication Technology" (Next Generation Network Technologies International Workshop, Sponsored by the EC within the framework of "Centre of Excellence BIS-21" project, Rousse, Bulgaria, October 2002);

France - Conseil d'Analyses Économiques, *Rapport sur la Fracture Numérique* (CAE, december 2003).

<sup>6</sup> UNESCO - Institute for Statistics, *Statistical Yearbook 1999* (Montreal: UIS, 1999).


and 348 million in 1985. 2) The same structural reasons are also at the heart of the accelerated increase in television receivers in recent years. In two decades, 299 million viewers, concentrated mainly in industrialised nations, have become 1.5 billions viewers today across the globe with half inhabiting southern nations (Map 1). With the unbridled extension of satellite networks, the development of digital technologies and the constant decrease of the access costs for this medium, this global audience is bound to grow even more considerably in the years to come.

**Map 1: Number of Television receivers, per 1000 habitants (1999)**



- The level of **telephone** use is another indicator of the rapid expansion of the global information society in the nineties. Telephone use is relevant to mass diplomacy in that the telephone is a communication medium, a conduit for information, but above all because telephone technology increasingly supports other ICTs such as the Internet. According to the statistics provided by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the number of telephone main lines increased from 97 lines per 1000 inhabitants in 1990 to 139 lines in 1997 (Figure 3).


**Figure 3 : Phone Lines Worldwide 1987-2000 (million)**



Source: International Telecommunication Union, 2000

The rate of penetration of the telephone medium is also useful as an indicator of the progressive reduction of the North/South communicational divide. In 1991, the penetration rate of total telephone use (including both land lines and mobile lines) stood at 49% in developed nations, 3.3% in emerging nations, and barely 0.3% in less advanced countries. Today, these totals have grown respectively to 121.1%, 18.7% and 1.1%.<sup>7</sup> This tendency is even more marked if you take into consideration the progress of mobile telephones. Africa has more than 20 million mobile telephone users and by the end of 2001, twenty-eight African nations (more than half of the nations in the region) had more subscribers to mobile services than to conventional telephone service, which represents a higher proportion than on any other continent. Map 2 shows that the presence of mobile phones exceeds that of fixed phone lines in several countries in the developing world (particularly parts of Africa). Another sign of the shrinking divide is that, today, countries with the strongest growth rate are the least advanced nations. In the late nineties, many broke the symbolic barrier of one telephone user per 100 inhabitants.<sup>8</sup> This apparent anomaly is partially explained by what experts call the “leapfrogging effect”, a phenomenon whereby the wide adoption of a less sophisticated technology is bypassed by using the latest. In the case of telephone versus mobile phones, this adoption can be explained by the fact that mobile phones do not need the infrastructure at a household level required by fixed phone lines, an important issue in most developing countries where even basic infrastructure such as electricity is in short supply.<sup>9</sup>

**Map 2: Number of Fixed Telephone Lines versus Cellular Mobile Telephone Subscribers, 2001**



Source: ITU World Telecommunication Indicators Database (2003)


<sup>7</sup> UIT, “Reinventing Telecommunications” / “Tendency for reform in the telecommunications industry” / “Towards more Effective Regulation” (Reports on the development of world telecommunications, 2002).

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>9</sup> UNESCO, Institute for Statistics, *Measuring and Monitoring the Information and Knowledge Societies: A Statistical Challenge* (Montreal: UIS, 2003), 18.

• The most visible indicator of the acceleration of the mass media revolution and of the advent of the global information age is the explosive development of the **Internet** in the last 5 years. In this interval, the World Wide Web has spread at a dazzling speed, becoming one of the principal elements of the infrastructure of the information society. By the end of the 1990s, the Internet network already consisted of more than 3.8 million domains (organisations) joining approximately 40 million computers.<sup>10</sup> At that point, the Internet linked 220 million people across the globe and no less than 100 million more joined that total the following year. Since the beginning, Internet flooding into household use was made possible by the increasingly affordable cost and ease of use of personal computers. Through the 1990s, there was a significant rise in the use of PCs from approximately 98 million in use in 1990 in the world to over 500 million in the year 1998.<sup>11</sup> By the end of the decade, in most OECD countries (for which data are available) more than 40% of all households had computers. The growth of the share of households equipped with computers corresponds to a strong increase in household Internet use. This tally has seen a veritable explosion in certain countries such as Japan, where a record 74% growth was seen between 1999 and 2000. The private use of the Internet, especially in the developing world, was also boosted by the spread of cybercafés.<sup>12</sup> By the end of the decade, the Internet had irreversibly altered the habits and ways of life of a significant number of people around the globe, and this was only a beginning (Figure 4).

Figure 4 : OECD Household- & Person-Based Measures of Internet Access and Use (%)



Source: OECD Statistical Institute

Despite a relative slump in 2000, the Internet continued to grow at an extremely fast pace. By 2001, the number of Internet hosts in the OECD area reached 112 million, up from 82 million in


<sup>10</sup> UIT, "Rapport de l'UIT sur la croissance et le développement d'Internet" (Genève, septembre 7, 1997).

<sup>11</sup> US – CIA, *The Computer Industry Almanach* (CIA, 1998).

<sup>12</sup> BBCWS, "Kabul's cyber cafe culture", Friday, 13 June, 2003.

2000.<sup>13</sup> The formidable expansion of the Internet infrastructure is equally clear, as demonstrated by the number of hosts per 100 inhabitants in various countries. In July 2001, the OECD average was 10.1 hosts per 100 inhabitants; the EU average was 5.3 hosts per 100 inhabitants; the United States was far ahead of the other OECD countries, with more than 27.2 hosts per 100 inhabitants. That said, Internet access in households soared everywhere, for instance in Portugal, where the access rate grew by 125% between 2000 and 2001. The increase registered in the United Kingdom is also notable, where household Internet use increased by 110% in the same period, and in Mexico, albeit from a very small base, from 2.8% in 1999 to 6.2% in 2001.<sup>14</sup> As map 3 shows, the global growth trend clearly continued in 2002-2003.


**Map 3: Internet Hosts per 100 Inhabitants (2002-2003)**



Sources: ITU World Telecommunication Indicators Database (2003); UNPD World Population Prospects (2002).

The extreme imbalance of the world network will likely right itself over the coming years. At

**Figure 5: Internet Users by Region**



the moment, 91 % of internet users in the world live in industrialized nations, nations that make up only 19% of the world population. Africa, making up only 13% of the world population, provides only 1% of Internet users. It is interesting to note that five

<sup>13</sup> OECD, *The Science...*, op. cit.

<sup>14</sup> OECD, *Communications Outlook* (OECD statistical data, 2001).

countries are home to between 16.5 and 37 hosts per 100 inhabitants, and that these five countries all lie in the developed world. Disparities exist also within the developed world. For example, countries of Southern Europe are significantly behind the United States and the Scandinavian nations in terms of Internet use. Nevertheless, the present trade seems to confirm the prediction of specialists that the Internet divide will disappear completely by approximately 2015.<sup>15</sup> From 16% in 1997, the rate of personal computer ownership in France accelerated sharply to reach 42% in March 2003, equal to the American level of 5 years prior. With the multiplication of cybercafés and the number of Internet users, developing nations are also starting to bridge the gap. It's estimated that some seven million Iranians now have access to the Internet. That's one in 10 people, and twice as many as in 2002. Even conservative Mullahs are surfing the web!

The number of internet users across the globe is already situated at between 605 and 620 million users - more than 10% of the planet's population – and that will continue to grow with the constant decrease of costs and advances in applications. The growth of high speed networks is flooding the market in the North while the Wap (Wireless Application Protocol) will likely democratize internet access in the South by allowing connections through already well established mobile telephone networks.<sup>16</sup> As of 2004, the Internet has reached an equivalent importance to radio and television, the other great audiovisual communications media. After the bumpy first years of existence, “in 2003, the Internet reached a phase of industrial growth”, points out François-Xavier Husherr, director of the Department of Internet and New Media at Mediamétrie.<sup>17</sup> According to experts, the total number of users will jump to 940 million by 2004 and will pass the billion mark by 2005. With 1 in 6 humans connected to the World Wide Web via full-time or part-time, direct or dial-up connections, the Internet is becoming, if it has not already, the planet's principle communication and information network. The development of new supercomputer networks, such as the Grid, promise to revolutionize not only internet use, but also through its use, other ICTs. By becoming the access platform for other networks, it is well-placed to establish itself as the principal conduit of the global information age and an important motor of the mass diplomacy development.

- Of course this report of the actual state of mass media would be incomplete without mentioning the increasingly effective and well-engineered **information transmission networks** upon which they rely. Terrestrial high-speed fibre optic networks, long-haul submarine cables and telecommunications satellites provide the vital infrastructure that wires the world together. A large number of ever-more sophisticated satellites have been deployed over recent years. The

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<sup>15</sup> *Le Monde*, Dec. 9, 2003.

<sup>16</sup> *BBCWS*, “Mobile net growing in popularity”, October 3, 2003.


largest existing system, Intelsat, has continued its expansion without interruption, linking a hundred different states through 24 satellites of six different types, each more technically advanced than its predecessor. Of the 6000 satellites actually in orbit, many hundreds are telecommunications satellites providing radio-television network infrastructure and broadband satellite Internet to a growing number of individuals around the world. Intercontinental telecommunication satellites can replace tens of thousands of telephone, televisual and internet circuits that currently extend across the surface of the planet. There too, the North/South divide is shrinking: with the increasingly accessibility of satellite technology, more and more developing nations such as China, India, Brazil, Iran and Saudi Arabia are acquiring their own systems. These satellites carry a vast stream of information freely across national borders without any real possibility of regulation, in the process flooding diverse societies across the globe. If the coverage areas of telecommunication satellites and Internet are juxtaposed, the earth is covered many hundreds of times leaving no region without coverage, the whole resembling a vast neural network unifying the new information society (Map 4 & 5).

**Map 4: Global Internet Transmission Networks**



© Bell Labs / Visual Insight

**Map 5: Global Satellite Networks**



SaVi Satellite Visualization System

<sup>17</sup> AFP, “Le haut débit a dopé Internet en 2003, selon Médiamétrie”, March 15, 2004.

## 2. The Emergence of a Global Information Society

As we have seen, the 1990s constituted a pivotal period characterised by the global propagation of new information and communication technologies. An inevitable threshold was crossed, but not only from a technological point of view. The 1990s also marked the inauguration of the global information society and the apparition of a new operational environment, an environment propitious, as we shall see, to the development of mass diplomacy. Unfortunately, the debate surrounding the information revolution tends to focus on a rather restrictive economic or technological agenda, with little attention given to social and human aspects. It is important to emphasize that the impact of the NICTs is not limited to the advent of new instruments; the technologies reshape our ways of transmitting information and communicating and how we perceive and interact socially.<sup>18</sup> The sudden nature, the concentration and the scope of the explosive growth of NICTs has given birth to what we call the global information society; “a society that makes extensive use of information networks and information technology and produces large quantities of information and communication goods and services.”<sup>19</sup> Its advent constitutes a revolutionary change for civilisation whose effects are only recently beginning to be felt on a planetary scale. Humanity has passed from an age of local, oral and written communication to that of instant, massive and global communication. The transformation has been compared to the social upheavals caused by the invention of speech, the alphabet or printing. The same view suggests that this isn’t only an information and communication revolution, “but also a third industrial revolution” which, like the previous ones, is conducive to a revolution in the art of foreign policy.

Before proceeding to an analysis of the link between the two revolutions, it is necessary first to mention reasons why caution is necessary. Prudence is required in interpreting the magnitude of the transformation generated by the mass media in the social, political and diplomatic landscape of the world today. Being in the midst of the process itself and given the pace, scope, and complexity of the changes, it is particularly difficult to make sense of what is actually happening, let alone measuring its social influence with accuracy.<sup>20</sup> While market growth and penetration rates are easily quantifiable, the human impact is more difficult to measure due to its

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<sup>18</sup> UNESCO, *Measuring and monitoring...*, *op. cit.*, 105.

<sup>19</sup> H. Jeskanen-Sundström, “ICT Statistics at the new Millennium – Developing Official Statistics – Measuring the Diffusion of ICT and its Impact”, (IAOS Satellite Meeting on Statistics for the Information Society, Tokyo, 2001).

<sup>20</sup> Carnegie Endowment for Peace, Study Group on the Information Revolution and World Politics, “The Impact on the Structure of World Order - Introduction and Overview” (Rapporteur’s Report prepared by Taylor Boas, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000).



inherent socio-cultural complexity and a general inadequacy of proper measurement tools to generate comparable cross-cultural data. Most of the existing data and indicators on access and usage are in their infancy while the lack of conceptual conventions hampers attempts at comparing data from different countries.<sup>21</sup> One must equally be wary of the dangers of too quick generalisation about the scope of the change brought about by the NICTs. Not all regions are affected equally. But this must not bring us to minimize the scope of the revolution that is taking place in the South and to underestimate the capacity of developing countries to overcome their digital backwardness. The numbers must not blind us to the proclivity and capacity of the information revolution to penetrate borders and go even where NICTS are still rare. As the World Economic Forum emphasizes, giant leaps have been taken, everywhere, that have already caused enormous socio-political change.<sup>22</sup>

#### a. The Social Implications at the Micro Level

Though the global information society is marked by fundamental inequity and the proof of its existence is primarily technological and economic, its substance is increasingly made evident through socioeconomic change. These effects are already discernable around the globe both at the micro and macro levels.

At the micro level, that is to say, at the level of individuals, an “information culture” is emerging based on new symbols, codes, practices, models, programmes, formal languages, virtual representations and mental landscapes. Through its impact on access to knowledge, the democratization of the use of ICTs is becoming a “crucial educational force comparable in many ways to what was seen a century ago with the generalization of literacy skills in industrial nations.”<sup>23</sup> This “information literacy” implies a profound redefinition of the traditional modes of knowledge sharing, diffusion, socio-economic behaviour, business and political practices, political engagement, media customs, leisure and entertainment. The shift is perceptible in the way a growing part of humanity is able to consume, save, process and disseminate information in different forms, from different platforms, without any limitation of time, distance or volume. The growing influence of this information-based society is due to the extreme pervasiveness of NICTs and to their capacity to become increasingly integral aspects of many transactions in daily life. This hypermedia way of life not only alters the manner in which many people in the world are exposed to news and information, it also defines their perception and preferences, behaviour,

<sup>21</sup> UNESCO, *Measuring and monitoring...*, *op. cit.*, 16-17.

<sup>22</sup> *Le Monde*, Dec. 9, 2003.

consumption habits, participation in civil society and government affairs, amongst other effects. In other words, it is so intimately linked to the unfolding of contemporary life that it inevitably shapes people's notion of who they are and where their interests lay both individually and collectively.

#### b. Macro Level Social Changes

The advent of the information age also has socio-cultural repercussions on the macro level, on the level of the international society. Satellites, radio, television and the Internet bridge the divide between different societies, binding them ineluctably, one to the other, both culturally and ideologically.<sup>24</sup> The technological innovations have drastically increased the quantity of information conveyed across national borders while at the same time diminishing the cost and the delay of that transmission, creating a veritable "global village."<sup>25</sup> During the last few years, a significant increase has been observed in the flow of information, values, norms and ideas across national borders. An indication of this is the rapid and unprecedented expansion of world imports of cultural goods which rose from only \$48 billion in 1980 to \$214 billion in 1998 (from \$12 per capita in 1980 to \$45 in 1997), quadrupling in less than twenty years.<sup>26</sup> NICTs constitute today a key infrastructure underlying and tying together virtually all domains of social and intellectual activity, not only within but also between nations. A planet-wide web has emerged that connects societies together, linking them with a vast network of wire, fibre-optic cables and satellite and wireless transmissions. This ever more dense web and the cross-border flow of information that it carries behaves as an interface between nations (including those that were until now isolated) exposing them to mutual influence. Borne by this technological flood, the transnational

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<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> It is important to note that this phenomena is not fundamentally new. Cultural exchange has certainly always existed within history's great empires and as early as 1972, R. Keohane and J. Nye ranked cultural exchange as a major source for transnational interaction (see R. O. Keohane and J. S. Nye, *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1972)). Yet for the most part, for centuries, countries have been almost hermetically sealed entities, interacting and influencing each other like billiard balls: brutally, but superficially. Except in the case of military conquest, the links between distinct civilian societies were kept to a strict minimum. But this is no longer the case. Indeed, it wasn't until the explosion of new communication and information technologies, that it truly gained its contemporary strength and scope.

<sup>25</sup> "In the era of global communications", notes H. Assefi, "messages are being exchanged in an unimaginably short time and the world is becoming smaller day by day"; Iran - MFA, Dr. Hamirreza Assefi (Iranian Foreign Policy Spokesman), "Mass Media Play a Pivotal Role in Modern World", October 15, 2002, <http://www.mfa.gov.ir/News/Index.htm>,

<sup>26</sup> UNESCO - Institute for Statistics, *Facts and Figures 2000* (Montreal: UIS, 2000).

movement of values and norms accelerates with each passing moment collapsing distance and time between nations.

Everywhere, countries are evolving into permeable entities without any real control over the daily transnational exchanges that occur within their borders. “Thanks to technological innovations”, highlights DFAIT’s White Book, “borders have become more porous to the flow of ideas diminishing the ability of states to act independently since they can no longer isolate themselves from the world [...]”.<sup>27</sup> The collapse of distance and the increasing density of the cross border flow of information create a world in which nations are, for better or worse, condemned to the mutual dependence of perception and preferences.

One of its most important consequences is to expose public opinions that were until recently quite isolated to external informational and cultural importations. Access to massive amounts of information has not rendered the public more politically conscious but mostly more vulnerable to external influence than before.<sup>28</sup> With the rise of the new communication technologies, people from different backgrounds have increasing access to foreign values, ideas, products and norms.<sup>29</sup> Under the effect of these transnational flows of information their perception and their inclinations tend to become both more unstable and more malleable. The various polls undertaken by polling firms such as Pew or Zogby point to what extent public opinion has become volatile (see chapters III and X). Populations increasingly define and redefine their views in the light of massive doses of exogenous values, norms and beliefs thus becoming more vulnerable to foreign influence. This does not contradict the fact that these populations apply growing pressure to their government’s policy decisions, whether that pressure is applied at the ballot-box, through collective action or through consumerism. On the contrary, it is this double phenomenon, the increasing volatility of public opinions under external influence and their growing power on the domestic scene that makes domestic populations a choice target and a very desirable means of putting pressure on

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<sup>27</sup> Canada - DFAIT, “Projecting Canadian Values and Norms”, in *Canada in the World - Canadian Foreign Policy Review – 1995*, [http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign\\_policy](http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy) (accessed July 21, 2003).

<sup>28</sup> This reasoning is slightly different from the common argument that public opinion has become a key element in international relations because it is better informed and thus better able to defend its interests. This widespread idea, prominently championed by authors such as James Rosenau, consists of the idea that the revolution in communication and the dissemination of knowledge have resulted in the empowerment of people and the constitution of interest group and other ‘non-state actors’ carrying as much clout as the political elite and authorized decision makers in shaping the dynamics of world politics. Although partly right, this argument is insufficient to account for the new importance acquired by public opinions. It is certainly not false that ordinary citizens have acquired more influence than in the past over their governments, thus contributing to the framing of international affairs. However, this is due more directly to the progress of democracy and civil society than to the mass media revolution per se; see J. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics. A Theory of Change and Continuity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).

local governments.<sup>30</sup> It is therefore in a way despite themselves that bodies of public opinion have become an important element in international relations.

Given the scope of these social changes both at the micro and macro levels, it seems highly reasonable to consider that the advent of the global information society generates new challenges, alters incentives and expands the range of diplomatic possibilities. Though we must be wary not to reify the information revolution, we must recognise that it is, along with all historically important technological revolutions, an incentive for change in international relations. Although its scope and outcomes are not clearly definable, it appears now that “[t]he information revolution undoubtedly has reshaped in some respects the operational environment in which foreign policy and international relations are conducted.”<sup>31</sup> This revolution in the means of communication and exchange acts, as we will see in the next section, as a necessary enabling condition for a profound mutation of foreign policy.<sup>32</sup>

### 3. A Shifting Diplomatic Environment

Technological developments in the communications sphere have, historically, not only caused fundamental disruption of the social and political order but they have also revolutionised the rules governing the conduct of foreign affairs. Why would the era of global information be an exception? Like the agricultural and industrial revolutions before it, the mass media revolution involves a systemic transformation, the passage of one technological age to another and the emergence of a new diplomatic environment. Diplomacy is a form of communication and the technical progress that affects communication also affects diplomacy as a consequence. It is, however, practical to emphasise the very reasons why the deepening of the information revolution acts as such a powerfully enabling force that generates new challenges, diversifies incentives and considerably expands fields of action for the emergence of a renewed public diplomacy. The argument developed in this section is that the considerably accelerated flow of information and the opportunities to communicate directly with increasingly malleable public opinion worldwide

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<sup>29</sup> M. Leonard and L. Noble, “Being Public: How Diplomacy Will Need to Change to Cope with the Information Society”, *Information Impacts Magazine* (July 2001).

<sup>30</sup> “In the information age, diplomatic influence and military power go to those who can disseminate credible information in ways that support their interests and effectively put public pressure on the leaders of other countries”; U.S. - State Department, Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, “Building America’s Public Diplomacy Through a Reformed Structure and Additional Resources” (2002 Report), 5.

<sup>31</sup> Carnegie Endowment for Peace, Study Group on the Information Revolution and World Politics, *op. cit.*

<sup>32</sup> The information revolution works in a similar way to a territorial variable that, according to Vasquez, will not alone be sufficient reason for war, but an underlying necessary cause; in J.A. Vasquez, *The War Puzzle* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994).

create an operational landscape which both constrains and facilitates the art of governing and diplomacy. “The emergence of global information society can be viewed as both an opportunity and a challenge”<sup>33</sup> experts observe. It is a challenge in that we are vulnerable to the influence of others and a challenge in that we are now able to influence them through their populations. But this critical idea that the information revolution’s changes are a double edged sword certainly deserves clarification.

#### a. Challenges

On one hand, governments are less and less able to isolate their public opinion from outside influences. NICTs contribute to the weaving of a dense web of virtual links between the communities of the world that superimpose themselves upon traditional territorially based allegiances and increasingly diminish the emotional authority of local governments. Today, “the rise of the new communication technologies such as the internet is creating virtual communities of interest where people from different backgrounds can learn from each other and understand each other.”<sup>34</sup> In this new landscape, global links that transcend territorial boundaries were established that encourage individuals – or at least offer them the possibility – to choose their own identities and allegiances and to form new type of communities based around shared transnational values, beliefs and norms. Consequently, in managing their international relations, governments are obliged to take into account new sources of uncertainty resulting from the increasing openness of their borders to 'subversive' values, ideas, practices and norms. A wide array of transnational factors, many of which are of an ideological and cultural nature, put growing stress on national authority by creating new sources of loyalty. For some, it will consist of the westernization or the “liberal contagion”, for others it will be religious fundamentalism or the call to Jihad.<sup>35</sup> External pressures are not only becoming more complex but also more intangible than before.<sup>36</sup>

Governments are not taking lightly the increasingly porous nature of national borders and the questioning of traditional allegiances. The fear of a growing number of them is that the intensification of cultural exchange and the revolution in communications will reduce their moral and political authority and erode their popular support. It is now commonly accepted that the

<sup>33</sup> UNESCO, *Measuring and monitoring...*, *op. cit.*, 15.

<sup>34</sup> Potter (Special Advisor to the Policy Planning Division of the DFAIT), “Canada and...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>35</sup> R. Jepperson, A. Wendt and Peter Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security,” in Katzenstein (ed.), *op. cit.*, 10.

Soviet fortress fell not to the blows of the American army but to a large extent to the subversive effects on its population of western media such as Hollywood, Voice of America and MTV.<sup>37</sup> Convinced by this history lesson, countries such as China, Iran or Saudi Arabia have attempted (in vain) to filter global information or to erect 'virtual barriers' in order to isolate their populations from the global information society.<sup>38</sup> For instance, Cuba recently passed a law regulating its nationals' access to foreign internet service providers.<sup>39</sup> These countries are not alone in their fears. Many democratic states are also attempting to, in one way or another, hamper the transnational flow of information. France actively and strategically deploys its cultural products to stem the mass culture of America while America has managed for its part to be, along with China, the only country in the world to import less than 5% of its cultural products. However, these efforts are generally destined to failure, at least as long as the effects of NICTs lie beyond the scope of classic governance. In effect, unless one day a method is devised for creating self-contained societal bubbles capable of isolating one society from all others, government will be more and more vulnerable internally to external influence.

With the diversification and intangible nature of threats, the traditional diplomatic firewalls are no longer sufficient.<sup>40</sup> As it will be shown later on, policy and diplomacy are driven to reform in response to these heterogeneous and intangible challenges.<sup>41</sup> Traditional approaches were sufficient when the task was to prevent external physical threats that were for the most part limited to territorial integrity. But in an inextricably integrated and globalised world, securing societal and cultural interests matter as much as protecting traditional material interests.<sup>42</sup> New methods impose themselves, tailor-made to a world in which the 'battle fields' multiply on very

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<sup>36</sup> K.J. Holsti, *Peace and War. Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989* (NY: Cambridge UP, 1989).

<sup>37</sup> In *The Battles of Western Broadcasting in the Cold War*, Michael Nelson defends his hypothesis that it is not weapons that cracked the iron curtains and allowed the West to win the Cold War, but the constant bombardment of increasingly vast amounts of information made possible by more and more effective communication tools : M. Nelson, *Wars of the Black Heavens: The Battles of Western Broadcasting in the Cold War* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse UP, 1997).

For other contributions to what could be called the "MTV Effect" thesis see also V. Kubalkova, *The Tale of Two Constructivisms at the Cold War's End* (Manuscript Presentation, REGIS, McGill, Montreal, Oct. 2001); AP/CNN, "Rock and Roll Helped Beat Soviet Regime", Nov. 9, 2003.

<sup>38</sup> Similarly, Beijing has often threatened to limit western influence by building a large 'wall of iron and steel'; see M.-R. Djalili, "Caucase et Asie Centrale : Entrée en scène et recomposition géostratégique de l'espace". *Central Asian Survey* 13, no 1 (1994), 11.

<sup>39</sup> BBCWS, "Cuba cracks down on internet use", January 11, 2004.

<sup>40</sup> J.S. Nye Jr, *The Paradox of American Power - Why the World's Only Superpower can't Go it Alone* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002), 58.

<sup>41</sup> U.S. - National Intelligence Council, "Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future with Non-government Experts" (National Intelligence Council Report, December 2000), <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/globaltrends2015/index.html>.

different levels, including, and above all, within the heart of societies rather than just at their periphery.

#### b. Opportunities

On the other hand, a key dimension of the information revolution's impact on international affairs is to open all new horizons in the art of diplomatic influence. The diverse uses of cyberspace stimulate states to redefine and to restructure their foreign policy to take advantage of new opportunities. Powerful tools have been put at the disposal of diplomats for the rapid collection, production, and dissemination of information on a world-wide scale. No matter the approach then, new information and communications technologies contribute to the practical modifications of foreign policy.

As the following chapters will attempt to confirm, the advent of mass communication technologies alters the parameters of diplomacy and drastically transforms both its execution and its content.<sup>43</sup> At the most basic level, these recent technological advances "clearly affect how top foreign policy-makers do their job."<sup>44</sup> In an age of instant information and media-dominated communication, classic diplomatic techniques of communiqués and interviews restricted to a tiny circle of professional elites have been radically altered. World leaders have, like U.S. Secretary Colin Powell, a former member of the board of AOL, modernised traditional foreign policy infrastructures by equipping them with the most up-to-date communications equipment.<sup>45</sup> An uncommonly densely networked environment of websites, e-mail publishing and wireless applications have effectively revolutionised states' foreign policy organisation by reducing hierarchy, accelerating the pace of the diplomatic game and offering their users heightened flexibility and access to ever increasing information resources.<sup>46</sup> It must be emphasised though that new communication and information technologies have an impact "not only on how

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<sup>42</sup> S. J. Brown and M.S. Studemeister, "Virtual Diplomacy: Rethinking Foreign Policy Practice in the Information Age", *Information & Security* 7 (2001): 28-44.

<sup>43</sup> See J.R. Cooper, "Implications for Content and Conduct", *Information Impacts Magazine* (July 2001); S. Livingston, "Diplomacy and Remote Sensing Technology: Changing the Nature of Debate", *Information Impacts Magazine* (July 2001).

<sup>44</sup> W.P. Strobel, "The Media: Influencing Foreign policy in the Information Age", *U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda* (March 2000).

<sup>45</sup> U.S. - Ambassador W.C. Harrop, "Revitalising American Diplomacy", *American Diplomacy* (2002).

<sup>46</sup> H. Cincotta, "Post-Modern Diplomacy and the New Media", *Information Impacts Magazine* (July 2001); see also R.H. Solomon, "The Internet and the Diffusion of Diplomacy", *U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda* (March 2000).

diplomats do business, but on *what* their business is.”<sup>47</sup> As the rest of this study demonstrates, in addition to affecting foreign-policy organisation they also, and more importantly, affect the overall foreign affairs agenda.<sup>48</sup> The introduction of the Internet, high-resolution public satellite imagery and other new possibilities transform the entire diplomatic landscape, offering diplomats new opportunities they would never have dreamed of before.

The most important effect is certainly the considerable expansion of foreign policy’s traditional sphere of action. New global communication tools present governments with the opportunity to implement a broadened diplomatic strategy capable of addressing not only other governments but also increasingly large foreign populations throughout the world.<sup>49</sup> Where the clientele of states were once solely constituted of small political and economic elite, it can now be considerably scaled up to include virtually everybody around the globe having access to the global information and cultural marketplace. This is facilitated by the fact that massive amounts of information and culture flow inexpensively across national borders daily, permeating civil societies without being filtered by local authorities. It is also made easier as more and more citizens gain access to the Internet and satellite television broadcasts (see above); the same citizens that increasingly constrict their governments and govern the relations among states. Thanks to the information revolution, diplomacy’s “context of persuasion has expanded to include anyone anywhere connected to and affected by any of the information and communications media.”<sup>50</sup> For instance, the globalization and mass popularization of the Internet provides governments with capabilities that they undoubtedly only dared dream of prior to now. Now that the Internet and digital television broadcasts transcend borders and challenge government information monopolies, the conditions have arrived to lift modern mass diplomacy from the realm of science fiction.<sup>51</sup>

#### 4. The Necessity of a Public Opinion Diplomacy

The era of global information brings to prominence a new arena of diplomatic action: the realm of public opinion. The challenges generated by this new environment like the opportunities, confirm the unavoidable importance of this sphere for modern diplomacy. The information

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<sup>47</sup> G. Smith (Deputy Minister of the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade), “The Challenge of Virtual Diplomacy” (*Virtual Diplomacy Initiative*, Session: “What Does It Cost and Who Pays?”, United States Institute for Peace, 2002).

<sup>48</sup> A.C.E. Quinton, “Creating Change Insurgents at State”, *Diplomacy in the Information Age*, *Information Impacts Magazine* (July 2001).

<sup>49</sup> Noble & Leonard, *op. cit.*

<sup>50</sup> Brown & Studemeister, *op. cit.*, 28-44.



society has had the effect of lifting public opinion from its domestic isolation into the realm of world politics. In today's overwhelmingly media-conscious context, more than ever before, domestic and the international affairs mingle intimately. One of the principal reasons is that national audiences, feeding upon massive amounts of information from international sources, have become a channel for influence through which foreign pressure can constrain state behaviour from within. The growing porosity of national borders has important implications for the conduct of diplomacy by putting into question the cloistering of the domestic sphere from states' foreign affairs. "The borders between the outside and the inside are growing thin in the same way that the distinction between foreign and domestic politics is evaporating" explains Dominique de Villepin.<sup>52</sup> In the global information society, "domestic policy is foreign policy...foreign policy is domestic policy" corroborate German Foreign policy makers.<sup>53</sup> What is meant is that this new hypermedia environment creates incentive for diplomacy to extend its traditional sphere of action by reaching into the heart of foreign nations ... and to influence them through their public opinion.

a. The Increased Importance of Public Opinions as a Sphere of Diplomatic Action.

With the coming of the information age, public opinion has become a key factor with which states must learn to contend more than they ever did. In an age where general populations are acquiring increased political clout, their sensitivity to uncontrollable external influences constitutes a significant challenge for the conduct of foreign policy. State institutions are finding themselves increasingly required to communicate about and legitimise their case in the court of international public opinion. *Vox Populi Vox Dei*, as the ancients said, and antiquated though it is, the adage is more pertinent than ever to today's governments for which public opinion is becoming an unavoidable stricture. "What governments do and don't do" stresses Henry Hyde, "is heavily conditioned by what is happening in the hearts and minds of almost 7 billion human beings on a shrinking globe in an age of almost instantaneous information."<sup>54</sup> States may choose to ignore this new reality, but they increasingly depend on the support of public opinion, domestic and foreign, to succeed in their endeavours. The majority of international crises that have followed in quick succession in recent years, including the second Iraq war, illustrate to what

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<sup>51</sup> Martin, *op. cit.*

<sup>52</sup> France - D. de Villepin, "Dizième Conférence des ambassadeurs. Discours d'Ouverture du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères", *Foreign Policy Statement* (August 27, 2002), [www.france.diplomatie.fr](http://www.france.diplomatie.fr).

<sup>53</sup> The Special Joint Parliamentary Committee Reviewing quoted in Canada – DFAIT, *Canada in the World...*, *op. cit.*

degree it is now imperative to obtain the blessings of what Hegel called the 'impartial beer-swilling public'.<sup>55</sup> It is obvious to all that, "without a favourable public opinion environment overseas, progress towards foreign policy objectives will be difficult, if not impossible".<sup>56</sup> Winning public sympathy and favor constitutes a precious source of international legitimacy that governments no longer dare ignore. In an ever more media-conscious landscape, overseas populations become therefore vital foreign policy parameters.

In today's complex and pervasive infosphere, the task of diplomacy becomes not only to take into account but also to actively engage foreign populations. As we are going to see in subsequent chapters, managing the opinions of billions of people at home and abroad therefore has come to constitute a central element in state agendas. If governments want to work from a position of strength to achieve national goals, they are forced to assure themselves of the support of every single individual at home and abroad and to burnish their international image through public relations campaigns. Although the 'appearance of official transparency' counts, what really matters is the capacity to "pitch the case of a country before all audiences".<sup>57</sup> As emphasized by a Canadian foreign policy advisor: "If governments do not first prepare the publics of the states they wish to target, it will become that much more difficult to sway the governments of these states".<sup>58</sup> Public opinion works, as Jünger Habermass explained, as a normative referent for each individual; it is thus important to gain its support to assure oneself of the support of a nation and its government.<sup>59</sup> British decision makers admit that a political strategy adapted to today's hyper-information world must necessarily take into account the orientation of foreign public opinion.<sup>60</sup> Despite its superpower status, even the United States needs not only the support of allied governments but also the sympathy of their populations, a fact illustrated by recent interaction with the United States' Spanish ally. An adviser to the American government declared in this respect that: "our objectives require a multi-lateral approach, and that depends on positive public opinion in those countries on which we depend for support."<sup>61</sup> In pursuing their international

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<sup>54</sup> U.S. - Hyde, "Speaking to Our Silent Allies...", *op. cit.*

<sup>55</sup> G. F. Hegel's 'theory of public opinion' is systematically explained in paragraphs 316 to 318 of his *Philosophy of Right*, translated with Notes by T. M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992); on this matter see also A. Bavaresco, *La Théorie Hégélienne de l'Opinion Publique* (Paris-Montréal: L'Harmattan, 1998).

<sup>56</sup> R. Harper (State Department Fellow in Ketchum's Washington), "The Art of Public Diplomacy" (Ketchum, February 2003).

<sup>57</sup> Brown & Studemeister, *op. cit.*, 28-44.

<sup>58</sup> Potter, "Canada and...", *op. cit.*, 7 & 19.

<sup>59</sup> On 'Public Opinion' as a social norm constraining individual's preferences and behavior see J. Habermas, *L'Espace Politique*, translated by Marc de Launay (Paris: Payot, 1992), 249-254.

<sup>60</sup> U.K. - British Council, "British Council's Official Homepage", <http://www.britcoun.org/governance/medinf/govmed2.htm> (accessed Sept. 2003).

<sup>61</sup> U.S. - State Department, Advisory Commission for Public Diplomacy, H.C. Pachios (Chairman), "The New Diplomacy" (remarks to Wellesley College, Wellesley, Mass., December 4, 2002).

objectives, states must now take into account the growing constraints imposed on each other by their respective bodies of public opinion. This mutual dependence in regards to domestic populations compels states to seek new approaches where once they would have acted taking little into account beyond their material interest.

The information revolution does more than create incentives to undertake public relations diplomacy; it also makes available to governments the technological tools to do so. If, as seems very likely, the realm of public opinion becomes the new arena of diplomatic action brought to prominence by the information age, communication and information tools or media will be the currency of this realm (a reality that is illustrated in chapter VIII). The advent of NICTs radically improves diplomatic yield by considerably reducing the cost of information propagation and by opening almost unlimited means of infiltrating national borders through communication channels. New communication technologies allow states to influence their partners from inside by flooding their population with values, ideas and norms, possibly resulting, for example, in the installation of sympathetic groups or generations to positions of power or influence. Governments can effectively tap into information resources and export national influence massively and on a global scale.<sup>62</sup> In fact, their ownership and the ability to exploit the transnational flows of information and cultural product already represent crucial policy assets for capturing the thoughts and minds of people the world over, vesting states that possess them with increased influence on the global scene. With the acceleration of progress in the technological domain, these assets are likely to become amongst the most effective for diplomacy abroad. New communication technologies have come to constitute a significant plus that provides states, much in the same way as material resources, with competitive diplomatic advantages in the international arena. Throughout history, the diffusion of information and ideas has “guaranteed power and the ability to increase the capacity to control and develop a state’s potential.”<sup>63</sup> Clearly, given the increasing strategic importance of public opinion (especially in democracies, but also within societies of all types), new diplomatic tools such as satellite, digital TV and internet are becoming increasingly unavoidable in the new diplomatic competition to win sympathetic minds around the globe.<sup>64</sup> By allowing access to billions of peoples beyond the halls of governmental institutions, mass media has then become an inescapable foreign policy resource.

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<sup>62</sup> Todd Martin writes: “with its emphasis on information and knowledge, the new communications environment is making soft power more practical. Indeed, the new information and communication technologies hold the key to soft power, making it possible to appeal directly to a multitude of players. It emphasizes the shaping and sharing of ideas, values, norms, laws, and ethics through soft power” in Martin, *op. cit.*

<sup>63</sup> M. Foucault, *L'Ordre du Discours* (Paris: NRF, 1990), 9. See also M. Foucault, “The Subject and Power” in *Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, eds. H. Dreyfus & P. Rabinov (Chicago: UCP, 1982), 21.

## b. The Appeal of a Soft Power Diplomacy

As we have seen, in the new operational landscape brought by the intensification of the information revolution, there are many incentives for a revolution in the art of diplomacy. In this new context, traditional gun-boat and dollar diplomacy, diplomatic strategies founded on the use of material force, tend to lose their relative preponderance in favor of more subtle or indirect means. This is not to say that traditional power politics are today obsolete or that they have lost their importance. As international events suggest, it is still possible to use force to coerce others to obtain international co-operation. But coercing or threatening others seems increasingly risky, counterproductive and detrimental to long term security concerns and other interests. In a world where societies are inextricably connected through a dense network of communication, an approach relying *exclusively* on the pressures of gunboat diplomacy results in only partial returns. Hard power resources are and will remain vital foreign policy resources, but they are no longer the sole foundations for national power. Traditional diplomacy was sufficient in the previous era when tasks were limited to strategic and economic relations, but that is no longer the case in a new world as social, cultural and ideological relationships between peoples become more complex and acquire greater political significance. Even the most pragmatic people, understands today that national power can not be limited to military power, but must henceforth include cultural, informational and diplomatic power- adding public diplomacy to this list.<sup>65</sup>

What is being brought about before our eyes, and what the rest of this thesis will make more apparent, is then a complexification of the components and nature of diplomacy. In an intricate world where simple distinctions tend to become blurred, diplomacy becomes inevitably more sophisticated.<sup>66</sup> As means of exchange intensify and nations become inextricably entangled, there is mounting need to combine direct force with alternative means and to search for more subtle methods of persuasion. The challenge for states is to develop an integrated approach complementing classic power diplomacy with more indirect strategy oriented toward cyber-space and public opinions.<sup>67</sup> “The sources of national power underpinning relations with other

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<sup>64</sup> Solomon, *op. cit.*

<sup>65</sup> “It is necessary to use all all elements of national power - military, financial, information, law enforcement, intelligence and public diplomacy”; U.S. - National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, “Testimony of US Secretary of Defence Donald H Rumsfeld” (*NCTA Report*, March 24, 2004).

<sup>66</sup> U.S. - National Intelligence Council, “Global Trends...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>67</sup> As stated by J. Nye, “in such a variegated world, all three sources of power – military, economic and soft – are relevant, although to different degrees in different relationships”, Nye, *The Paradox...*, *op. cit.*, 12.

countries, or foreign policy, have become diverse in today's international community [...]" acknowledge Japanese foreign policy thinkers.<sup>68</sup> "To be successful," wrote R. Haass, "today's diplomacy must imperatively begin by comprehending both the realities of power, its potential and its limitations, and the challenges and opportunities attached to them."<sup>69</sup> This does not mean that the point of foreign policy is no longer to acquire influence and gain power for the nation. It does mean though that these goals can no longer be accomplished by relying on brute force alone. In fact, the age of global information fosters a re-equilibration between 'hard power' diplomacy and 'soft power' diplomacy; a re-equilibration which is the core factor lying at the heart of the foreign policy revolution and the emergence of mass diplomacy.

The information age not only undermines prerequisite conditions for hard power diplomacy but also creates favourable conditions for the flourishing of soft power diplomacy.<sup>70</sup> In the new hypermedia environment, states' ability to influence their partners depends increasingly on factors that transcend raw economic and military power and that appeal to public perception abroad. Bases for indirect influence, persuasion and appeal are assuming increasing significance in the mix of power resources stimulating states to re-think the conduct of their foreign policy. Indeed, "[s]tates hoping to retain advantages in traditional areas of power, including military and economic, must engage this decentralized environment in new and creative ways in order to retain these advantages... To retain current levels of relevance into the next century, governments must recognize and internalize this [communications] transformation."<sup>71</sup> A proactive and multi-layered diplomatic policy capable of addressing the diverse challenges of the global age by capitalising on new information and communication assets is gaining momentum.

The following chapters will show that, with the mass media revolution and the unprecedented means of communication that it puts at their disposal, governments feel the pressing need to broaden their diplomatic agenda by devoting a growing attention to the mobilisation of public opinion at home and abroad through the diffusion of values, ideas and norms.<sup>72</sup> There is a suddenly expanded recognition that the capacity to influence "hearts and minds," is a necessary supplement to the use of armed force. Heads of state realise the extent to which it is henceforth

<sup>68</sup> Japan – MOFA, *Diplomatic Blue Book 1999*, "Chapter I. General Overview", <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1999/I-a.html> (accessed may 2004).

<sup>69</sup> R.N. Haass (Director of the US Office of the Policy Planning Staff), "Remarks to Carnegie Endowment for International Peace/Center on International Cooperation Conference" (Wash., DC: November 14, 2001)

<sup>70</sup> J. Arquilla and D. Ronfeldt, "What if there is a Revolution in Diplomatic Affairs?," *Virtual Diplomacy Series* (February 25, 1999), <http://www.usip.org/oc/vd/vdr/ronarqISA99.html>.

<sup>71</sup> M.E. Price, "Journeys in Media Space. Global Media and National Controls: Rethinking the Role of the State" (paper presented at the 2001 Spry Memorial Lecture), <http://www.fas.umontreal.ca/COM/spry/spry-mp-e.html> (accessed june 2004).

<sup>72</sup> B. Buzan, "New Patterns of Global Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century", *International Affairs* 67, no30 (1991).

important to “take advantage of the positive aspects of globalisation” and in particular, of the “increasing openness of societies” by utilising “the new counterpart to power”: the exchange of culture and information.<sup>73</sup> Governments are progressively becoming more conscious that a country's standing and influence increasingly depend on the ability to diffuse information<sup>74</sup> and to win the confidence of foreign audiences.<sup>75</sup> In this global world, as a French diplomat exclaimed, “victories are no longer won only by armies but by ideas and values.”<sup>76</sup> Cultural magnetism, knowledge and the ability to demonstrate moral and intellectual leadership are more than ever effective sources of power.<sup>77</sup>

A successful diplomacy for the twenty-first century is therefore one capable of building a broad-based public consent abroad. We will see that foreign policy makers are acquiring the certitude that “fostering understanding and influencing audiences will play an ever more important role in the pursuit of foreign policy”<sup>78</sup> (see chapter V). Diplomats of tomorrow, note British specialists “will need to increase their reach from communicating mainly with governments and civil servants to communicating with larger audiences and building networks that cut across frontiers and sectors.”<sup>79</sup> By the same token, Canada's former Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy remarked that, “as borders become increasingly porous, foreign policy practitioners will have to deal with issues affecting the lives of individuals.”<sup>80</sup> To successfully transmit their message across national borders requires that diplomats develop their communication skills and become adept at the art of mass persuasion. Their mission becomes to

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<sup>73</sup> France - MAE, P.-A. Wiltzer (Minister-delegate for cooperation and the French-speaking world), “Closing speech” (Plenary session of the French network for cooperation and foreign cultural action, Paris, July 18, 2002), [www.france.diplomatie.fr](http://www.france.diplomatie.fr).

<sup>74</sup> U.K.- British Council, *op. cit.*

<sup>75</sup> H. Assefi (Spokesman of the Iranian Foreign Ministry), “Foreign Ministry's Success Is in Changing World Public Opinion”, *Iran* (Morning Daily) (May 23, 2001), 8.

<sup>76</sup> B. Delaye (General-director for for Cooperation and the French-speaking world), in France – DGCID, *Action 2000 - Annual report on the activities of the Direction Générale de la Coopération Internationale et du Développement* (Paris:MAE), 13, [www.diplomatie.gouv.fr](http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr). (acc. July 21, 2003).

<sup>77</sup> After decades of murderous and fruitless conflict, India and Pakistan have come to a new recognition that the conflict in Kashmir has more chance to be resolved through confidence-building measures including enhanced dialogue and public diplomacy efforts than through military means alone *BBCWS*, “Nuclear Rivals Hold Landmark Talks”, February 16, 2004.

<sup>78</sup> W.R. Roberts, “Government Broadcasting”, *Information Impacts Magazine* (July 2001).

<sup>79</sup> Noble & Leonard, *op. cit.*

<sup>80</sup> Canada – L. Axworthy (Foreign Affairs Minister), “U.S. Urged to Bolster Weak Support for UN, Human Security, and World Criminal Court,” *Canadian Speeches* 12, no3 (June 1998), 8-12.

turn to profit ‘the endless fluctuating orientations of public opinions’<sup>81</sup> as a way of influencing partner governments indirectly.<sup>82</sup>

## Conclusion

The goal of this chapter was to explain the fundamental reasons for which the 1990s represent a critical threshold for the history of public diplomacy. To this end, the chapter has demonstrated that the decade has constituted an important turning point in the development and propagation of new information and communications technologies, these new weapons of mass persuasion that lie at the heart of this branch of foreign policy. Nevertheless, the strictest circumspection has been adopted in assessing the information revolution’s impact on world politics and foreign policy. It has been crucial “to avoid the sort of technological determinism that is common in much of the popular discourse about the information revolution.”<sup>83</sup> It is in fact impossible to affirm conclusively that the explosive growth of NICTs constitute the only cause of the emergence of a new type of diplomacy. Technology is neither an independently causal force, nor the only stimulus for change in any domain.

For this reason, the emphasis has been placed on the analysis of the social and international consequences of the information age and their implications for public diplomacy. The democratisation of new modes of knowledge sharing, ideological change and institutional evolution are all important factors that intersect the technological revolution as such. In this vein, we have seen that the 1990s corresponded to the advent of a global information society characterised by the entrenchment of a new culture and lifestyle and the marked strengthening of the transnational flow of information and culture. The second part of this chapter was devoted to demonstrating that this new operational environment was accompanied by new challenges and new opportunities favoring the growth of mass diplomacy. This new context, characterized by increasing permeability of national societies and hthe growing sensitivity of local populations to external influence, brings together the ideal conditions for the reemergence of a diplomatic strategy targeting foreign public opinion.

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<sup>81</sup> U.S. - State Department, *U.S. Department of State Strategic Plan 2000* (Released by the Office of Management Policy and Planning, U.S. Department of State, Oct. 25, 2000), [http://www.state.gov/www/global/general\\_foreign\\_policy/2000\\_dos\\_stratplan\\_index.html](http://www.state.gov/www/global/general_foreign_policy/2000_dos_stratplan_index.html).

<sup>82</sup> For instance, certain specialists consider that the best means for France to influence the policies of the American superpower is not through direct confrontation, but by playing the card of American public opinion. In this regard, Joseph Nye considers that “an effective diplomatic policy must try to bring together public opinion in the two countries”, in *Le Monde*, September 20, 2003.

<sup>83</sup> Study Group on the Information Revolution and World Politics, *op. cit.*

Everything seems to encourage the development, in complement of traditional foreign policy, of a diplomacy based on pure persuasion that takes advantage of new communication technologies to extend its sphere of influence to include an audience on a scale never seen before. Given the scope of these social changes both at the micro and macro levels, it seems highly reasonable to consider that the advent of the global information society generates new challenges, alters incentives and expands the range of possibilities in a favourable sense for public diplomacy. This being said, it is still to be determined if the emergence of foreign policy considered in this chapter is really taking place at the heart of state institutions, if it coincides with the deepening of the information revolution in the second half of the nineties and what position this diplomacy of the masses really occupies in terms of budget allocation and organisational structures. This will be addressed in the following chapters.



### **Chapter III. Mass Diplomacy in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century: Golden Age, Decline and Renaissance**

#### **Introduction**

At the end of the 1990's the extension of the NICT revolution and its corollary, the advent of the global information society brought significant changes in human civilization from a technological perspective, but also from social, cultural and political points of view. The main idea presented in the preceding chapter was that this revolution contributed to creating a new operational environment for diplomacy by offering new methods for mass persuasion and opening new possibilities; a new environment favourable to a significant redefinition of the paradigm governing the conduct of foreign policy that had until now been essentially preoccupied with managing relations between states. The idea was developed by providing a historical survey of the mass media revolution and by attempting to determine the characteristics of the new diplomatic landscape that may have incited states to elaborate the principle of a modern public relations strategy extended to foreign public opinion. Though the connection has been explained, it remains to be demonstrated. The key questions at hand then concern the extent of the paradigm shift, whether it coincides historically with the globalisation of the mass media revolution and whether or not its new shape suggest that the shift is a direct response to a new technological environment.

The goal for this chapter is thus to demonstrate that there was in fact a marked upsurge in the practice of mass diplomacy that reflects, in historical and technological terms, the worldwide spread of mass media at the end of the 1990's and that the resurgence was of a similar and simultaneous nature in a significant number of cases. The demonstration follows the historical evolution of mass diplomacy during the second half of the twentieth century through an analysis of key indicators reflecting budgetary fluctuations and the evolution of institutional status, such as resources requests, public funding, annual reports, and other documentation attesting to changes taking place during this period (the post 9-11 evolution will be the subject of the following chapter). In spite of the difficulties inherent in a direct comparison, analyses of different cases reveal a common trend: after having played a significant role during the two world wars and the golden age of the Cold War, public diplomacy programs were pared to almost residual proportions despite the context of globalization and economic interdependence. It is only at the end of the 1990's, at the moment of the explosive growth in NICTs, that public diplomacy was suddenly resuscitated and reorganized as a foreign policy priority in a simultaneous and

analogous way by a significant number of governments across the globe especially among the principal players of the international diplomatic scene.

## **1. From Golden Age to Decline**

### **a. Mass Diplomacy: A Weapon of War.**

Influencing the actions of foreign leaders by modifying the perspectives and preferences of their constituencies has always been a central, if not obsessive, preoccupation of states. In the sixth century BC, Sun Tzu insisted on the importance of complementing physical conquest with actions intended to reach the opinions of a population. This preoccupation has been echoed by Western strategists from Thucydides to Machiavelli and Clausewitz (see chapter I). States have always exerted themselves in an attempt to frame the political agendas of their rivals by winning the attention and trust of their populations with the help of what some broadly label propaganda. European powers, embroiled in endless struggles for influence, learned early the advantages of diffusing information and culture amongst foreign populations and elites.<sup>1</sup> A proto-version of public diplomacy appeared during the twentieth century at the same time as early communications technologies such as radio and television were being developed and public opinion was gradually gaining importance as a strategic target. Nevertheless, it was only at the end of the twentieth century that stunning technological progress in the domains of information and communication progressively shaped this craft into mass diplomacy as we know it today.

During the last century, the Anglo-Saxon nations, and in particular the United States, laid the foundations for the growth of public diplomacy. In April 1917, President Woodrow Wilson created the Committee on Public Information, which was designed to convince the citizenry of foreign countries of the nobility of America's foreign policy goals. The so-called Creel Committee established offices abroad and flooded foreign audiences with pamphlets and movies before shutting down after the Great War ended.<sup>2</sup> During the interwar period, Great Britain had also discovered the amazing potential of modern communications to reach and influence populations across the planet with the launch of the British Broadcasting Corporation. In 1932, on air with the BBC, King George V made clear his enthusiasm for this new intercontinental communication tool: "Through one of the marvels of modern science, I am enabled this Christmas Day to speak to all my peoples throughout the Empire...I speak now from my home

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<sup>1</sup> On the origins of public diplomacy see Roche and Piniau, *op. cit.*, 6-56.

and from my heart to you all, to men and women so cut off by the snows and the deserts or the seas that only voices out of the air can reach them...”<sup>3</sup> Dubbed “Aunt Bee” by the British, the BBC has faithfully served British diplomacy ever since. “The truth” emphasized H. Lasswell in 1927, “is that all governments [were] engaged to some extent in propaganda as part of their ordinary peace-time function.”<sup>4</sup> This tendency would only increase during the years of the Second World War. Immediately before Pearl Harbor, President Franklin Roosevelt established the Foreign Information Service (FIS) to counter the Axis nations’ mass propaganda campaigns.<sup>5</sup> Amongst the war propaganda units of the FIS, the famous “Voice of America” became an inextricable element of American public diplomacy.<sup>6</sup> However, it wasn’t until the post-war ideological confrontation between Capitalism and Marxism, that public diplomacy truly won its spurs.

During the Cold War, the United States created a powerful arsenal of instruments of public diplomacy designed to spread American values behind the Iron Curtain and plead the US case to unaligned nations. The Soviet side made an equivalent attempt with Pravda and film production, though less effectively. The U.S. public diplomacy initiative was established immediately following the war by President Truman to “tell America’s story” and to promote its foreign policy objectives. In 1953, President Eisenhower created the U.S. Information Agency (U.S.I.A.) to influence international public opinion more effectively. He declared at its inauguration, “It has long been my conviction that a unified and dynamic effort in this field is essential to the security of the United States and of the peoples in the community of free nations.”<sup>7</sup> The U.S.I.A. became ever-present around the world: it operated Voice of America, created American libraries, published magazines advocating Washington’s policies and developed creative programs, including educational exchanges, jazz tours, and art exhibits. The National Security Archive at George Washington University recently released interesting documents describing early public diplomacy campaigns to win hearts and minds in the Middle East, launched 50 years before current efforts. The documents collected describe cultural programs and the methods that were utilized, including graphic displays, news, books, movies, cartoons, activities directed at schools

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<sup>2</sup> On the Creel Committee see L. J. Matthews ed., *Newsmen and National Defense: Is Conflict Inevitable?* (Washington: Brassey’s Publishing, 1991); see also Vaughn, *op. cit.*

<sup>3</sup> King George V, speech on BBC, Christmas Day 1932.

<sup>4</sup> H.D. Lasswell, *Propaganda Techniques in the World* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927), 83.

<sup>5</sup> The Nazis and Soviets have made their contributions though their methods have been more closely tied to manipulation and traditional disinformation.

<sup>6</sup> A.L. Heil, Jr., *op. cit.*

<sup>7</sup> U.S. – President’s Committee on International Information Activities (Jackson Committee), Archives Records, 1950-53 (Accession 83-9, Processed by DJH, March 1984, Abilene, Kansas: Dwight D. Eisenhower Library).

and universities, and exchange programs.<sup>8</sup> Proponents of public diplomacy are quick to point out that the generations targeted by these old programmes are markedly less anti-American than those under 30 educated during the era of the dismantling of these programs.

In the decades that followed, each successive US presidential administration provided strong political and financial support for mass diplomacy activities.<sup>9</sup> The height of the U.S.I.A.'s prestige probably came in the 1960's. President Kennedy put Edgar R. Murrow at its head, one of America's best-known journalists and a pioneer of cyber-diplomacy. Murrow left an indelible mark on American diplomacy by exploiting the new media that was television to the maximum at a time when the world of information was already changing dramatically. Kennedy also appointed his good friend George Stevens, the famous movie director, to produce a number of documentaries describing American life that were shown in many places in Asia and Eastern Europe. Enjoying a healthy budget, Voice of America was, in those days an, if not the most,



important source of information for many intellectuals and students behind the Iron Curtain.<sup>10</sup> This infrastructure allowed the United States to launch ambitious campaigns to win hearts and minds of peoples across the globe.<sup>11</sup> For M.D. Nalapat, as for many historians, the fact that the vanquished Axis powers, Germany, Italy and Japan became such reliable partners

of the United States owes much to the fact that their conquest was not only achieved on the ground, over physical territory – as in 1918 – but over the mind of the “enemy” populace as well. An active policy of public diplomacy, the cultural operations of the Marshall plan and its initiatives such as project Orange, patiently administered and with impressive funding, has had the effect of saturating the three former Axis powers as well as many other nations with western values, eradicating – at least temporarily – hostility from the minds of their populations.<sup>12</sup>

Between the 1950's and 1980's, most governments whether in one Cold War camp or another, had recourse to public diplomacy. Locked in ideological battle, they naturally came to consider

<sup>8</sup> U.S. - National Security Archive, “U.S. Propaganda Activities in the Middle East - The Early Years”, *National Security Archive Update*, George Washington University, December 13, 2002. <http://www.nsarchive.org/NSAEBB/NSAEBB78>; The National Security Archive is an independent non-governmental research institute and library located at The George Washington University in Washington, D.C. The Archive collects and publishes declassified documents acquired through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

<sup>9</sup> U.S. - USIA, J. Duffey (Director), *Archive* (released by the United States Information Agency, 1993).

<sup>10</sup> U.S. - State Department, Pachios, “The New...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>11</sup> For more on these earlier forms of public diplomacy see for example U.S. - National Security Archive, “U.S. Propaganda Activities...”, *op. cit.*

the use of public outreach as the best method to advance their own values and interests. At the centre of each foreign affairs apparatus, specialized units such as the British Council or the BBC in the case of the United Kingdom, the *Direction Générale des Relations Culturelles Scientifiques et Techniques* (DGR CST) in the French case, or *Deutsche Welle* in the German case, to name just a few, were tasked with implementing public relations diplomacy. Authorities considered public diplomacy efforts crucially important during the entire period of the Cold War, a period of constant ideological struggle. Public diplomacy underpinned almost all diplomatic and security efforts to contain rival powers and to build a more friendly international system. Enormous resources and talent were put to use. Despite their activism, public diplomacy efforts did not draw much attention, but that in itself could well be one of their merits. Mistakes were made, but considering the state of the world at the close of the Cold War, we might consider the successes even more impressive. “Regrettably, a strategic miscalculation opened the post-Cold War chapter in the story of public diplomacy and citizen engagement”, observes James F. Hoge Jr.<sup>13</sup>

#### b. Dark Years for Foreign Affairs

During the years following the end of the Cold War, a crisis of confidence occurred in regards to public diplomacy. This crisis was part of a larger, more general, crisis that affected the entirety of foreign affairs. It took its cue from the dissolution of the Soviet Union, as if the international powers, large or small, no longer considered diplomacy a tool vital to their interests. The utility and pertinence of diplomacy - in general - and public diplomacy - in particular - no longer recognised, both fell victim to widespread budget cuts: financial resources and active units underwent a period of brutal atrophy that lasted almost the entire decade of the 1990's.

Foreign affairs and diplomacy temporarily lost their vital importance for the United States, the only super power in an apparently pacified and friendly world. The conjunction of other factors, such as the world economic recession and the galloping budget deficit, helped Washington considerably reduce the energy and resources devoted until that point to its foreign affairs. The decline of U.S. spending on international affairs, began with the Glasnost, accelerate abruptly at the start of the 1990's. The Congressional appropriations for the conduct of U.S. diplomacy melting away rapidly in the years following the end of the cold war (figure 1).<sup>14</sup> Between 1992-

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
<sup>12</sup> M.D. Nalapat, “The battlefield is the mind”, *The Washington Times*, October 13, 2003.

<sup>13</sup> U.S. – State Department, J.F. Hoge Jr., “The Benefits of Public Diplomacy and Exchange Programs” (National Council for International Visitors, March 12, 2003).

<sup>14</sup> U.S. - Office of Management and Budget, Executive Office of the President, “The Budget for Fiscal Year 2000”, *Historical Tables of the 2000 U.S. Government Budget* (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999).


97, funding for foreign affairs management decreased in real terms by an average of 4% per year, whereas overall foreign affairs funding declined by an average of 6% annually.<sup>15</sup> Cuts prevailed for most of the Clinton period. The result being that by 1999, specialists predicted that, if the current trend in budgetary decline continued, by 2002 international affairs spending would be about half of its 1980-1995 average in constant 1997 dollars and at its lowest level since 1955.<sup>16</sup>

**Figure 1: International Affairs Budget Decline 1991-1998 (millions of constant U.S. dollars)**



During the same period, cutbacks hit the foreign affairs departments of other players on the international scene. Dans le cas des budgets de politique étrangères de la France, l'Allemagne ou la Grande Bretagne, on observe notamment une baisse marquée jusque vers 1998 avant que la tendance ne se stabilise et ne s'inverse (figure 2).

**Figure 2: Compared Evolution of Some Foreign Policy Budgets 1993-2001 (in constant structure)**



Sources: State Department, FCO, Quai d'Orsay, AA.

<sup>15</sup> U.S. - GAO, *International Affairs Budget: Framework for Assessing Relevance, Priority, and Efficiency* (GAO Report: GAO/T-SIAD-98-18), 3-4.

<sup>16</sup> R.L. Borosage, "Money Talks: The Implications of U.S. Budget Priorities", *Special Report* (Sept. 1999).


The decline of foreign affairs funding appears clearly when compared to the evolution of total public spending. In inflation-adjusted dollars, the U.S. foreign affairs budget, which shrunk by over 50% from 1985, also dropped in relative terms from 2.5% to barely 1% of the \$1.66 trillion spending of the U.S. federal government in 1999.<sup>17</sup> The French foreign affairs budget shrank similarly until it represented little more than 1.2% of the French budget in 1998. In the American case, the government spent about 17% of its total budget on national security and international activities, with the military consuming 94% of the total sum. The budget adopted in 1999 saw the total overseas budget, including that of the State Department, reduced to 6% of spending earmarked for international affairs (Figure 3).

Figure 3: U.S. Military Budget vs. Total Overseas Budget (1999)



The global economic recession and the concomitant budgetary restrictions imposed on governments do not alone explain the decline in interest in diplomacy. Budgetary austerity affected foreign affairs much more than other spheres of government spending. As the French case illustrates, in reality, general spending had a tendency to increase, while diplomatic spending slipped (figure 4).

Figure 4. Comparative Evolution in the Budgets of the French State and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (in constant structure)



Source: Quai d'Orsay

### c. The Unilateral Disarmament of Weapons of Mass Persuasion

<sup>17</sup> U.S. – U.S.I.S. Washington File, “Fiscal Year 2000”, *Budget for International Affairs* (February 1999).

The crisis of foreign affairs in the 1990's had substantial repercussions for public diplomacy. It resulted in a significant reduction in public financing and the drastic dismantling of public diplomacy programs by most nations that had made use of them during the Cold War. For six or seven years, public diplomacy literally disappeared from international affairs. It underwent a much stronger crisis of credibility and purpose than other branches of the diplomatic establishment.

In the United States, the crisis reflected a general lack of interest on the part of American public opinion. An enquiry by the Advisory Commission for Public Diplomacy points out that, between the end of the Cold War and the late nineties, there were no more than two or three newspaper articles about public diplomacy and a few brief references by television commentators.<sup>18</sup> Similarly, public diplomacy was receiving only modest support amongst the leadership class. Republicans and Democrats in congress and in government no longer saw the utility of this type of "propaganda" in a world apparently already won over to the American view of the world: "Even groups like the Council on Foreign Relations did not press for it. Public diplomacy simply was not a priority of Presidents or of Secretaries of State of both parties from 1988 on."<sup>19</sup> Washington came to believe that it was no longer required to devote as much energy as it had to maintaining and cultivating friendly relationships with foreign countries.

No longer seen as a legitimate diplomatic practice, decision-makers, especially during the Clinton administration, progressively stripped public diplomacy programs of their resources and rendered them ineffective. The agency traditionally responsible for public diplomacy, the U.S. Information Agency, had its resources reduced steadily for more than a decade, with many of its overseas posts in the Middle East and elsewhere cut back by one-third to one-half. The restructuring that began in 1993 also resulted in a reduction of the number of employees, the discontinuation of a good number of information programs and heavy cutbacks to its operating funds. In three years, from 1993-1996, the U.S.I.A.'s global budget, including funding for both exchange programs and information programs, was slashed by 23%, dropping from \$1.409 billion to \$1.077 billion. From 1993 to the end of the decade, overall funding for educational and cultural exchange programs fell by more than 33%, from \$349 million to \$232 million (adjusted for inflation). This resulted during the same period in a dramatic reduction in the number of exchange participants from approximately 45 000 to 29 000. It is interesting to note that exchanges with Muslim countries and more precisely, with countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and

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<sup>18</sup> U.S. - State Department, Pachios, "The New...", *op. cit.*


<sup>19</sup> Price, "Journeys in Media Space...", *op. cit.*



Pakistan also dropped by nearly one third.<sup>20</sup> Exchanges with Afghanistan were simply discontinued for a decade.

Other countries underwent the same process by scaling back their mass diplomacy budgets and closing down overseas posts and operational programs.<sup>21</sup> Because of austerity measures, the UK, France, Russia, Canada and other major players gradually dismantled their cultural programs and broadcasting apparatus. In retrospect, it is interesting to see to what extent governments had lost faith during this period in the utility of strategies of influence, opting instead for a dogmatic materialism and pragmatism. This was notably the case in Germany where, in a context of budgetary consolidation, the government opted for severe cutbacks in the realm of public diplomacy. From 1992 to 1999, funding in this domain - which had steadily risen in the 1980s – had been cut by 7.8%. Given rising prices and wages in real terms, the cuts were actually more significant. During this period, its budget was slashed by approximately 10%; dropping from 1.3 billion DM (€635 million) to 1 billion DM (€577 million) (figure 5). Between 1991 and 1999, public diplomacy's share in the federal budget and in the foreign affairs budget fell respectively from 0.3% to 0.23% and from 37% to 33%. By scaling back its financial efforts in the domain of mass diplomacy, Berlin was forced to dismantle a large number of its operational structures, closing down many branches of the Goethe-Institute, for instance, all over the world.

**Figure 5. German Public Diplomacy Budget Drop (1993-1998)**



Source: Auswaertiges-Amt - *Foreign Policy Concept 2000*

After having played a crucial and much publicized role during the Cold War, public diplomacy came to be regarded as a *Stiefkind* (a stepchild) of German foreign policy. As the

<sup>20</sup> In the case of Afghanistan, these programs were simply cut short.

U.S. – State Department, Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, C. Dolan (Vice Chairman), “Public Diplomacy, Exchanges and the War on Terror” (Remarks to The American Council of Young Political Leaders, Washington, DC, Dec. 2002).

<sup>21</sup> Leonard, “Diplomacy by ...”, *op. cit.*

foreign policy specialist Marco Overhaus explains, the reasons for this neglect were manifold and were not solely limited to the context of financial austerity: “As compared to other policy fields such as security, military or development policy, [it] received relatively little media or academic attention. [...] Unlike traditional security policy, it did not deliver immediate results and could not be presented in clear-cut decisions or by way of highly symbolic events (such as high-level summits). Instead, it consisted to a considerable degree of less visible day-to-day activities among a plurality of actors, such as cultural institutions, artists, intellectuals or ordinary citizens.”<sup>22</sup> This negative image as well as the end of the ideological preoccupations at the heart of the East/West confrontation initially drove the German government, like many others, to scale back its efforts at cultural promotion and to slash the budgets of their communication services. We had to wait until the very end of the nineties for the reversal of tendencies and public diplomacy to recover its popularity.

#### d. The Crisis in Foreign Audiovisual Broadcasting.

The budgetary cuts of the 1990s affecting public diplomacy were particularly observable with regard to external broadcasting programs. Most atrophied significantly, while the very existence of others was put into question. During the 1990s, countries such as Canada, Australia and the Netherlands starved their respective services (RCI, Radio Australia and Radio Netherlands) of funds, almost reducing them to silence. The numerous budget crises that threatened the existence of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation from 1990 until 1996 received widespread public attention. In 1991, the CBC almost took RCI off the air. Radio Canada International owed its survival only to a last-minute Federal Government bailout initiative. Even so, RCI lost 7 of 14 broadcast languages, half of its staff and three-quarters of RCI-produced programming. As it celebrated its 50th anniversary in 1995, there was still a great deal of uncertainty about the future of the service. In December of that year, when CBC announced that there was no more money to keep RCI afloat, funds to keep it on the air were only barely scraped together. In fact, the “Voice of Canada” to the world was in agony during the whole of the 1990's. RCI's dire straights were

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<sup>22</sup> M. Overhaus, “Cultural Relations: Not Just Security Policy by Different Means”, in “Foreign Cultural Policy after 11 September - A Shift of Priorities and Resources?”, *German Foreign Policy in Dialogue*, edited by M. Overhaus, Hanns W. Maull and Sebastian Harnisch (Volume 4, Number 11, Trier, Germany, September 4, 2003), 3, <http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de>.

only relieved in 1998 by a desperately needed financial transfusion of almost C\$500 million coinciding with the reinforced importance of international communications.<sup>23</sup>

Not even the celebrities of the international audiovisual scene avoided the wave of cutbacks hitting public diplomacy departments. The pride of American public diplomacy, the famous radio stations, Voice of America, Radio Free Europe and Radio Marti fell victim to cuts that paired them down to almost residual proportions.<sup>24</sup> In 1995, Congress reduced the Voice of America's budget by \$54 million, a small amount in terms of the federal budget, but it represented nevertheless a 21% drop in relation to its operating level of 1994 (\$487 million).<sup>25</sup> During the 1990s, funding problems considerably reduced staff and broadcast hours, pushing the radio stations to the edge. In comparison to the Cold War period, these radio stations were almost silenced: they were no longer champions of the global struggle against socialism. At the same time, total spending for U.S. international broadcasting declined by 40 percent between the end of the Cold War and the end of the decade. Germany's Deutsche Welle (DW) suffered a similar fate. Receiving most of its funding from the German federal government, the TV and radio auxiliary of German diplomacy failed to escape the governments restructuring and downsizing initiatives. In 1998, DW saw its annual budget cut by 40 million deutschmarks and further cuts were to follow in the years to come. In 1999, the budget committee of the German parliament voted to slash DM 30 million off the DW budget of DM 635 million. In only three years, DW was relieved of DM 124 million (€60 million) which represents a total 17% drop in funding. Even funding for the British Broadcasting Corporation was seriously undermined during this period.<sup>26</sup> Consequently, BBC World Service dropped shortwave service to some strategic markets including North America and the Pacific thereby "abandoning" more than 1.2 million listeners.

Between 1991 and the end of the 1990's, the public diplomacy programs of most of the important players on the international scene had been severely handicapped, putting their ability to efficiently influence foreign public opinion into question. "They seemed less necessary after the disappearance of the Soviet threat and Communist competition. The world was expected to be more peaceful, less conflicted. The value of democracy and market economics would need less promotional push" wrote James F. Hoge Jr., underlining the enormous strategic miscalculation that was the unilateral disarmament of weapons of mass persuasion. "Such expectations

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<sup>23</sup> Canada – RCI, P. Beatty, "Address to the Royal Canadian Military Institute", *CBC/Radio Canada*, March 18, 1998.

<sup>24</sup> Leonard, "Diplomacy by ...", *op. cit.*

<sup>25</sup> E.J. Feulner, "The Voice of America: Don't Silence America's Voice in the Global Marketplace of Ideas", *Heritage Foundation*, September 7, 1995.

unravelling amidst the low-level conflicts of the 1990's and crumbled altogether on September 11, 2001. Instead of peace and tranquility, ethnic conflicts, international terrorism and proliferating weapons of mass destruction beset us and anti-Americanism flourishes, running from resentment in Europe to rage in the Middle East"<sup>27</sup>. Paradoxically, this crisis of confidence in public diplomacy occurred at precisely the moment when the information revolution was becoming unavoidably important. In the course of rapid technological developments, with the increasing deregulation of the international media markets, the growing impact and appeal of transnational flows of information, the task of communicating with and gaining the confidence of overseas audiences became more critical than ever. For that reason, the decline of mass diplomacy was only transitory. A growing number of governments chose to revive their programs at the turn of the century.

## **2. Renaissance (1998-2001)**

### **a. A Historical Turning Point for Foreign Policy**

As we shall see in this section, public diplomacy re-emerged, at the same moment, and in the same way principally major diplomatic players but also in a significant number of countries, first through an increase in budgetary allocations and then, progressively, through structural reorganization. Nothing coincides more closely with this unexpected re-emergence than the deepening of the information revolution described in the previous chapter. As we have seen, a confluence of forces, for the most part linked to the mass media explosion and to the growing importance of the information society, generated a new operational environment for foreign policy. By creating new opportunities, new incentives and new fields of influence, this media saturated context led a growing number of governments to reconsider the conduct of their foreign policy and to rediscover the virtues of public diplomacy.

States were beginning to experience what Turkish foreign policy analysts described then as a 'historical turning point' in the art of foreign policy brought on by the new technological structure of world order.<sup>28</sup> Everywhere, leaders and foreign policy makers came to realize the importance of communication and persuasion among governments and peoples.<sup>29</sup> Even though long-standing

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<sup>26</sup> Leonard, *op. cit.*

<sup>27</sup> Hoge, *op. cit.*

<sup>28</sup> Turkey - MFA, "Functions of the Directorate General of Cultural Affairs and its Activities for the Years 1998-1999", <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ao/01.htm> (accessed June 2004).

<sup>29</sup> U.S. - Amb. Harrop, "The Infrastructure...", *op. cit.*

traditional practices were unavoidably to persist, diplomacy had to adapt itself to the irreversible and growing reality of the global information age.<sup>30</sup> The revitalisation of public diplomacy was becoming both more relevant and urgent to deal with the downside of the global information age as well as with its new opportunities regarding the renewed importance of overseas audiences.

The last years of the nineties witnessed a global renewal of public diplomacy. The movement was instigated by the heavyweights of the international stage, those countries that had already developed, during the Cold War, abilities and experience in this area. As we will see in this section, they form the vanguard in the wave of revitalisation sweeping public diplomacy. Nevertheless, we shall also see other states around the globe, neophytes this time, start to adjust their foreign policy to the new operational environment and to discover the advantages of a diplomacy of hearts and minds.

#### b. The American Phoenix

This trend quickly became apparent in the United States, where public diplomacy was progressively re-organised as a powerful apparatus of global reach equipped with a robust array of cultural programs and communication instruments. At the very end of the 1990's, the U.S. government was becoming aware that, in order to embrace the inexorable circumstances of techno-globalisation, it was critical to include mass diplomacy more systematically in the formulation and implementation of its international policy.

It is within this context that the first important reform attempt took place in American foreign policy and its public diplomacy since the end of the Second World War. The unending criticism in recent years of the State Department's crippling bureaucracy, outdated communication technology and deficient public diplomacy ultimately drove Washington to reconsider its approach. The reorganization was carried out in accordance with the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 that called notably for the dissolution of the USIA and the integration of its branches within the State Department. Celebrating the merger, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright welcomed the U.S.I.A.'s ex-employees as "co-architects in building a vigorous and far-sighted American foreign policy, with public diplomacy at its core; a policy that will lead our nation and the world into a new era".<sup>31</sup> Effective October 1<sup>st</sup> 1999, Public Law 105-277 endowed


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<sup>30</sup> Brasil – F.H. Cardoso, "Introduction", in *Diplomacia Brasileira - Palavras, Contextos e Razões (Brazilian Diplomacy - Words, Contexts and Reasons)*, by L.F. Lampreia, <http://www.mre.gov.br/acs/diplomacia/> (accessed July 2003).

<sup>31</sup> Metzl, "Can Public Diplomacy...", *op. cit.*


American diplomacy with a completely new structure (Figure 6) providing the new diplomacy with a more central role.

**Figure 6. U.S. Public Diplomacy Organisational Structure**



An Undersecretary position was created with the task of overseeing and coordinating the public diplomacy programs directly administered by the Bureau of Cultural and Educational Affairs (ECA) and the Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP). The Undersecretary was also put in charge of ensuring that mass diplomacy (engaging, informing, and influencing key international audiences) was practiced in harmony with public affairs (outreach to Americans) and the rest of traditional diplomacy. The newly created Broadcasting Board of Governors, at the head of which sits the Secretary of State (figure 7), took over the U.S.I.A.'s international broadcasting operations. From then on, the BBG supervises all civilian, non-military international broadcasting funded by the U.S. government, including Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (Radio and TV Marti).

**Figure 7. Organizational Structure of the Broadcasting Board of Governors (1998)**



Source : State Department

It is important however to point out that what some call the “consolidation” of the U.S. public diplomacy into the State was not accepted unanimously. Despite the original intention of the reform, which was to rationalise public diplomacy by associating it more directly with the foreign policy planning process, partisans of public diplomacy still questioned its success. According to them, although it seemed to bring about a second youth for public diplomacy, its only effect was to emasculate the branch further, fragmenting its functions, depleting its resources and slashing its programs. From the standpoint of these detractors, integration into the rigid and centralised State Department bureaucracy would deprive it of its capacity for initiative and the freedom of action that it enjoyed as part of the USIA.<sup>32</sup> As noted in U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy’s *October 2000 report* marking the first anniversary of the consolidation, progress on integration was initially slow and difficult, due in large measure to the State Department’s multi-layered and complex bureaucracy and a culture that did not traditionally value public diplomacy.<sup>33</sup> As everybody was aware, the adaptation process promised to be slow and to take many years before producing results. In retrospect, it is still not clear whether the merging of the USIA marked the last act of the dismantling of public diplomacy or whether it was the first step taken toward its rejuvenation.

The integration of the United States Information Agency nevertheless had the immediate effect of re-igniting the debate over the necessity of re-establishing mass diplomacy’s priority status. Proponents of the new approach insisted on the importance of putting in place a renewed “state-to-foreign populations diplomacy” designed to propagate American values and norms internationally.<sup>34</sup> After having lost its relevance with the end of the East-West ideological conflict, the need to tell America’s story and broadcast its values worldwide was experiencing a revival within American diplomatic circles. Whereas, from lack of resources, public diplomacy was getting bogged down in government circles, the modifications of the international system began to push the theoreticians and policy makers to develop an increasingly reactive response to the necessity of adapting foreign policy. The result was that during this period, considerable amounts of fresh thinking surfaced about matters relating to American public diplomacy:

From 1998 to 2001, dozens of expert commissions and official task forces studied and recommended comprehensive reforms in order to integrate the search for “persuasion and trust”

<sup>32</sup> U.S. - State Department, Pachios, “The New...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>33</sup> U.S. - State Department, Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, *Building America’s Public Diplomacy...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>34</sup> H.C. Babbitt et al., “Rethinking Foreign Policy Structures”, *The Project on the Information Revolution and World Politics* (Carnegie Endowment for Peace, Airlie House Conference Center in Warrenton, VA, December 8-9, 2000).

as a top priority as a response to the new challenges created by the information age. Their common objective was to better understand the consequences of the globalisation of the information revolution on the formulation and conduct of American foreign policy in order to find appropriate models.<sup>35</sup> In 1998, the report, *Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age*, emphatically recommended familiarising foreign publics with U.S. values and practices as a way of advancing the national interests of the United States in an hypermedia global environment.<sup>36</sup> In 2000, *The White House Conference on Culture and Diplomacy* explored the best means to marry the promotion of US culture and diplomacy in the context of the free flow of information.<sup>37</sup> The same year, *The Project on the Information Revolution and World Politics* of the *Carnegie Endowment for Peace* sponsored a series of studies on the theme of the remaking of the US foreign affairs system. This analysis preceded many other major studies, notably, *Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age*, *Equipped for the Future: Managing U.S. Foreign Affairs in the 21st Century* and *America's Overseas Presence in the 21st Century*.<sup>38</sup> Amongst the initiatives in this domain, the symposium on *Information Age Diplomacy* jointly organised by the National War College and Northwestern University deserves special note.

This critical attention gave momentum to a reform movement within American foreign policy. In 2001, *The Independent Task Force on State Department Reform*, organised under the auspices of both the Council on Foreign Relations and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CFR/CSIS), and presided over by former Defence Secretary and National Security Advisor Frank Carlucci, was charged with synthesizing many of the constructive findings of earlier studies and providing a concrete plan of action for the new administration.<sup>39</sup> In the first week of the presidency of George W. Bush, Carlucci visited newly appointed Secretary of State Colin Powell and urged him to adopt a new approach and modernise communication and information systems as quickly as possible.

Immediately before 9-11, American officials already no longer doubted the necessity of practicing more effective public diplomacy “to justify U.S. policies to international audiences, to

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<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>36</sup> R. Burt et al., *Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age* (Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, October 1998), <http://www.csis.org/ics/dia/final.html>; see also Brown & Studemeister, *op. cit.*, 28-44.

<sup>37</sup> U.S. - State Department, M. Albright (Secretary of State) (Remarks at Dinner for White House Conference on Diplomacy and Culture, November 27, 2000)

<sup>38</sup> B. Fulton, “Editorial Note”, *Information Impacts Magazine* (July 2001).

<sup>39</sup> C. Yost (dir.), in *State Department Reform*, Council on Foreign Relations and the Center for strategic and International Studies (Co-sponsored by CFR/CSIS, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 2001), <http://www.cfr.org>; See also B. Fulton et al., “Diplomacy - Revolution or Reform”, (Carnegie Endowment for Peace, *Information Revolution and World Politics Project*, *Information Age Diplomacy*, Northwestern University Symposium, National War College, April 5-6, 2001).



influence perceptions, and to shape debate.”<sup>40</sup> With in view the new international landscape created by the mass media revolution, many agreed that it was high time to lift public diplomacy out of the marginal role to which it had been relegated for a number of years if they did not want to seriously compromise vital interests and national security.<sup>41</sup> The responsibility shifted then to the government and Congress.

Although the International Affairs Budget, made public by the Bush Administration at the beginning of 2001 for the 2002 fiscal year responded only partially to the supporters of the reform, it nevertheless initiated a new trend in the history of public diplomacy appropriation. The total foreign affairs budget grew from \$22.6 billion for the preceding fiscal year to \$23.9 billion (+5.5%), a substantial increase compared to the trend of the 1990s. Mass diplomacy also saw its funding augment by 3.5% in relation to fiscal year 2001 and by 4.6% in relation to FY2000. The financing of education and cultural programs grew from \$232 to \$242 million, while that of international broadcasting jumped from \$420 to \$470 million.<sup>42</sup> It should be noted that, though the increases seem at first sight to be relatively modest, they nevertheless break the trend of successive decreases during the preceding period and bear witness to a changing tendency and the beginning of a process of renewal that will flourish in the following period.

### c. Global Revitalisation

After having initially slashed the budget of their communication services and scaled back their efforts at communicating with foreign audiences, a growing number of other governments also reconsidered their actions at the end of the 1990s. Motivated by the need to adapt to the challenges and opportunities created by the information age (see chapter II), a significant number of them began to restructure and streamline their overall framework for public diplomacy. As we will see, they increasingly rationalised that branch of their foreign policy with the intention of re-creating an autonomous sub-system fully equipped with specialised radio, TV, Internet and satellite networks.

From 1998-1999, the UK undertook a program of modernisation of its public diplomacy including an in-depth renovation of its structures and operational equipment. Similar to that of the United States, the reform was grounded in a prolonged burst of introspection and study involving

<sup>40</sup> W. Drake (Senior Associate and Director), in *Ibid.*

<sup>41</sup> Metzl, “Can Public Diplomacy...”, *op. cit.*; see also U.S. - Harrop, *op. cit.*

<sup>42</sup> U.S. – State department, Office of the Secretary of State Resources, *Plans and Policy : U.S. Department of State* (April 9, 2001).

government officials but also members of civil society, media and business. In 1998, the Blair government established *Panel 2000* with the two tasks: that of framing and stimulating a major debate about the image Britain should project to the world and that of providing the political direction for the project to get off the ground. The Foreign Policy Center, a think-tank financed by the BBC World Service and the British Council to reconsider the communications strategy of British diplomacy, was established in 1999. In the report entitled *Public Diplomacy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, Mark Leonard, one of Britain's leading foreign policy thinkers, and his collaborators concluded that public diplomacy could no longer be treated as an add-on to the rest of diplomacy - in a "globalized" world it becomes a central device that Britain needs to influence and co-opt foreign audiences.<sup>43</sup> Following the example laid out by these study groups, British authorities began overhauling diplomatic institutions in 1999. British diplomacy benefited from a considerable boost to its financial resources and pledged to take the essential steps towards a comprehensive upgrading of information technology systems.

As in the United States, the budgetary increases accompanying the structural reforms of public diplomacy, though relatively modest, signal once again the reversal of a trend, a reversal that will be confirmed, as we shall see, during the following period. Between 1999 and 2001, the total budget for mass diplomacy increased from £1107 million to £1143 million (+3%). During the same period, expenditure on cultural and educational programs administered by the British Council and expenditure on overseas broadcasting under the responsibility of the BBC jumped respectively from £127 to £152 million (a gain of 20%) and from £163 to 180 million (a gain of 10%). This significant increase in funding permitted investment in faster and more sophisticated information and communication tools necessary for the development of a more efficient global action policy (£10 million was put aside especially for this end). Delighted, Foreign Secretary Robin Cook remarked, "Our Public Diplomacy work will receive a major boost from the additional resources we have secured for the BBC World Service and the British Council. The BBC World Service will be able to replace ageing short wave transmitters and expand on-line and FM broadcasting services. The British Council will be able to establish new knowledge and learning centres and intensify its work around the globe."<sup>44</sup> The arrival of this "gift from heaven" meant that the realm of public diplomacy was the British foreign policy's "fastest growing field."<sup>45</sup> The 5.8% real increase that British mass diplomacy enjoyed during this period allowed it,

<sup>43</sup> The report's conclusion were first published in M. Leonard and V. Alakeson, *Going Public: Diplomacy for the Information Society* (London: Foreign Policy Center, 2000).

<sup>44</sup> UK – F.C.O., *Quicker Response to Global Foreign Policy Issues* (F.C.O. Press Releases, 18 July 2000).

<sup>45</sup> UK – B.C., E. Marsden (Dir.), *The British Council India*, [http://www.britcoun.org/who/full\\_story.htm](http://www.britcoun.org/who/full_story.htm) (accessed sept. 1999).

in any case, to overcome the decline due to the repeated budget cuts imposed on the BBC World Service and the British Council in the mid-1990s and to re-establish Britain as a major purveyor of information and influence abroad.

At about the same time, in February 1998, the **French** government decided to restructure its mass diplomacy radically with the goal of reinforcing coherence and effectiveness and of returning it to its place of prominence as an essential element of France's foreign endeavours. Effective January 1, 1999, this reform, one of the most important in the history of the Quai d'Orsay, resulted in the fusion of the Ministry for International Cooperation and the *Direction Générale des Relations Culturelles, Scientifiques et Techniques* (DGRCST) in the midst of the *Direction Générale de la Coopération Internationale et du Développement* (DGCID). This unified and modernised diplomatic front was equipped with communication channels of global reach. Its objective was to bring France to prominence internationally by reinforcing its influence amongst other nations. By 2000, Hubert Védrine affirmed that the pursuit of influence and solidarity was "again at the heart of France's foreign affairs agenda."<sup>46</sup>

The birth of the DGCID coincided with a notable expansion of the budgets accorded to mass diplomacy and foreign affairs in general. After a long period of stagnation that lasted until 1998, the international budget of the Quai d'Orsay once again began to increase, attaining an annual growth figure of 5.5% for the period 1998-2001. During this period, funding for foreign affairs represented in constant francs, the double of what it was in 1990.<sup>47</sup> According to the findings of the *Cour des Comptes*, this increase in public funding was explained by the modernisation of external information and communication devices.<sup>48</sup> At the turn of the century, with a budget stabilised around 1.4 billion euros, the French public diplomacy came to constitute a significant 37% of the total budget for foreign affairs demonstrating that this branch now occupied a place of equal importance in France's international strategy.<sup>49</sup>

The structural modernisation of French public diplomacy resulted in a particularly strong emphasis on the domain of foreign audiovisual transmissions. In terms of funding, public support jumped spectacularly in 1998 bounding from 134 to 200 million euros.<sup>50</sup> Between 1998 and 2001, the growth of public funding for the modernisation of external broadcasting structures, including

<sup>46</sup> H. Védrine (French Minister of Foreign Affairs) in France – DGCID, *Action 2000*, *op. cit.*, 9.

<sup>47</sup> France - Sénat, *Projet de loi de finances pour 2003* - Tome III : Les Moyens des Services et les Dispositions Spéciales (Deuxième partie de la loi de finances), Culture et Communication: Communication Audiovisuelle (Rapport Général 68 Tome III (2002-2003) Annexe 7 : Commission des Finances).

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>49</sup> France - DGCID, "I. Servir la Politique Étrangère de la France" in *Action 2000*, *op. cit.*, 23.

in particular the development of a range of new digital initiatives, caused a leap of 70%.<sup>51</sup> During this period, France invested an enormous amount of effort in perfecting its information and communication devices, in particular, TV5, Canal France International (CFI), Radio-France Internationale (RFI) and a series of new communication satellites. Financed more than 70% by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, TV5, which became, TV5 *Monde* in 2001, constantly improved its organisation, its technical devices and its programming. The goal was for TV5 to join the club of the most commonly viewed television channels in the world and become a crucial showcase for France.<sup>52</sup>

In the wake of the geopolitical earthquake of the early 1990's and the tumultuous period of national reunification, German foreign affairs also rediscovered the virtues of public diplomacy.<sup>53</sup> Foreign affairs Minister Joschka Fischer, advocated the idea that diplomacy of pure persuasion capable of reaching out to large foreign audiences and gaining friendship abroad is "the real hard issues that foreign policy is all about."<sup>54</sup> According to him, far from being an unnecessary extravagance, mass diplomacy is crucial: for this reason it should be granted "a greater role in the formulation of German foreign policy" and should "be placed at the top of the international political agenda in the 21<sup>st</sup> century" on the same footing as the day-to-day operational side of foreign policy.<sup>55</sup>

A clear shift of emphasis occurred in 1999 when a considerable effort was invested in the redefinition and reorganization of German public diplomacy. The new direction was provided by a Federal report, an inter-ministerial forum as well as a series of debates organised in the Bundestag during 1999. This period of study and discussion resulted in the elaboration of *Concept 2000* and established foundations for a reform that would strengthen and specify the role of mass diplomacy as an integral part of German foreign policy.<sup>56</sup> This reform entailed a re-conception of the new diplomacy as a whole, the formulation of new principles for various fields

<sup>50</sup> France - MAE, "L'explosion de l'audiovisuel - L'action audiovisuelle extérieure de la France", <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/france/fr/edu/index.html> (accessed june 2004).

<sup>51</sup> France - Projet de loi de finances pour 2003, *op. cit.*

<sup>52</sup> H. Védérine (French Minister of Foreign Affairs), "Entretien sur la réorganisation de TV5", *Le Monde*, June 23, 2001.

<sup>53</sup> On the effect of the geopolitical turmoil of the nineties on the German foreign policy see A. Phillips, *Power and Influence after the Cold War. Germany in East-Central Europe* (Lanham-Boulder, New York & Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000).

<sup>54</sup> Germany - J. Fischer, *Address at the opening of the Forum on the Future of Cultural Relations Policy*, *op. cit.*

<sup>55</sup> J. Fischer (Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs), Interview by *Humboldt-Kosmos*, July 2001.

<sup>56</sup> Germany - Auswaertiges-Amt, *Concept 2000 - German Foreign Policy*, available @ [http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/aussenpolitik/kulturpolitik/grundsatz/index\\_html](http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/aussenpolitik/kulturpolitik/grundsatz/index_html) (accessed jan. 2004).

of activity, an adjustment of programs (such as the merger of the Goethe Institute and Inter Nationes) and a modernisation of information and communications infrastructure. The result was a revitalised system jointly co-ordinated by the *Kulturabteilung* (Directorate-General for Cultural Relations and Education Policy) and the German party-affiliated foundations. In 1997, the "Deutsche Welle law" had already restructured German media policy by reorganising DW and by establishing the Broadcasting Board responsible for supervising its efforts;<sup>57</sup> in 1999, the Green Paper updated the architecture of this cyber-diplomacy in the light of rapid technological development by defining the use of new electronic tools such as satellite technology, digitalization and the Internet. The Federal Government's confidence in regards to its consolidation policy contrasted with its timidity in regards to financing its new policy.<sup>58</sup> In the German case, more than in the cases of other Western powers, priority was given to the rationalisation and optimisation of the system while its budgetary revitalisation only occurred gradually. Despite a brief stagnation in 2000 there was, however, a global growth trend between 1998 and 2001. During this period, the spending on public diplomacy grew from 30% to 33% of the total budget for foreign affairs, a modest increase, certainly, but once bearing witness nevertheless in an unequivocal way to the rebirth of a once moribund branch of the *Auswaertiges-Amt*.

Other important nations during this period such as **Canada, Italy and Japan** also began to deploy their public diplomacy programs. As early as 1995, Canada chose to make public diplomacy the "third pillar" of its foreign policy along with politics and the economy. Consulted within the context of the reorientation of international strategy, specialists, amongst them John Ralston Saul, came to the conclusion that it constituted one of Ottawa's greatest trumps on the international scene. Their reasoning was that a middle power such as Canada, dwarfed in many hard power areas, had everything to win from more subtle soft power diplomacy.<sup>59</sup> The Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade began developing a strategy for promoting Canadian values abroad relying on Canada's leading expertise in the communications field.<sup>60</sup> Canadian policy makers could pride themselves on being amongst the pioneers of cyber-diplomacy.<sup>61</sup> Despite the savage cuts that continued to handicap external audio-visual broadcast,

<sup>57</sup> Germany - DW, "The bodies of Deutsche Welle" (released by DW-World.de), available @ <http://www.dwelle.de> (accessed May 2004).

<sup>58</sup> Germany - Auswertiges-Amt, *4th Report of the Federal Gvt on Cultural Relations Policy* (1999), 5

<sup>59</sup> Saul, *op. cit.*

<sup>60</sup> Smith (Deputy Minister of the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade), "The Challenge...", *op. cit.*

<sup>61</sup> Potter, *Cyber-Diplomacy...*, *op. cit.*

this re-orientation was accompanied by a noteworthy increase in the Canadian public diplomacy budget of the order of 5% between 1999 et 2001.<sup>62</sup> At the same time, on the other side of the globe, Japan developed a public relations diplomacy program intended to win the support of the international community by gaining the trust and goodwill of its populations.<sup>63</sup> As part of this new soft power strategy, Japan took radical steps to develop its communication infrastructure and increase its competitiveness in the field of cyber-diplomacy.<sup>64</sup> The Berlusconi government and Minister Dini put a similar reorientation in place in Italy in 2000. The reform of the Palazzo Farnèse, seat of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, introduced a shrewd diplomatic policy giving higher priority to the development and modernisation of all support to public diplomacy.<sup>65</sup> Italian leaders had come to the conclusion that information, mass communication and the propagation of Italian values were the “best ambassadors” of Italy’s interests in the world.<sup>66</sup> The new system of public diplomacy, combining strategic centralisation and operational decentralisation, was to become one of the best conceived in the world (see chapters VII & VIII).<sup>67</sup>

The important Northern industrial nations were not alone in priming their public diplomacy arsenals at the turn of the century. Many diplomatic powers of the developing world, and significantly from the Arab world, also began, sometimes even prior to Northern nations, to renew their programs or to create them if they were without. From the second half of the 1990s onwards, **Iran** radically re-oriented its foreign policy towards a policy of persuasion, attempting to create an attractive international reputation intended to sway foreign populations and create an enabling environment.<sup>68</sup> **Saudi Arabia**’s evangelical communication strategy was also boosted, playing an important – if not tragic – role in international relations at the end of the 1990’s. Riyadh made use of *Organisation of Islamic Conferences* and Wahhabite charitable associations to carry

<sup>62</sup> Canada – DFAIT, *Spending Review 2001-2002* (2002), 8.

<sup>63</sup> Japan – MOFA, *Diplomatic Blue Book 1999*, *op. cit.*; Japan – MOFA, “Chapter II. Section 5. Domestic Public Opinion, Public Relations Activities, and Promoting Understanding of Japan in Other Countries” in *Diplomatic Bluebook 2001*, available @ <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2001/chap2-5-b.html> (accessed February 2004).

<sup>64</sup> Japan – Dentsu Institute for Human Studies, “Reinforcing Japanese Competitiveness through the IT Revolution” (2002); Japan – MOFA, IT Strategy Council, *Basic IT Strategy* (adopted by the IT Strategy Council on 27 November, 2000).

<sup>65</sup> “Farnesina, The Managers of Diplomacy”, *Il Sole 24 Ore*, July, 28 2000; see also D. Calabria, “A Model of Preventive Diplomacy”, *Italia Chiama Italia*, 2001.

out an active religious diplomacy exemplified by the dispatch of millions of copies of the Koran, religious instructors, the opening of religious schools and mosques and the offer of free Hadj to pilgrims across the world.<sup>69</sup> **Qatar**, a small almost unknown emirate, threw itself into the race for influence on the international scene with the launch in 1996 of Al-Jazeera – a quintessential example of a public diplomacy tool. “Qatar has discovered a new commodity more precious than its gas and oil”, wrote an editorialist in the *Jerusalem Post* in 2000, “a power-generating satellite TV”.<sup>70</sup> Though **Turkey** was also part of this wave of mass diplomacy renewal, its case is atypical. In the immediate aftermath of the implosion of the Soviet bloc, while other nations were dismantling their systems and reducing funding, Turkey, hoping to exploit the void in influence left by the USSR, was becoming a pioneer of the art of modern mass diplomacy with the aim of extending its regional influence within the Turco-Iranian system.<sup>71</sup> Well before its partners, Ankara was building a sophisticated implementation system under the supervision of the powerful Turkish cooperative agency (TIKA) and equipping it with high tech information and communication tools. Of signal importance amongst these, the Eurasiatic television station, Avraza, came on air in 1992, becoming “the central instrument of the cultural expansion of Turkey”<sup>72</sup> along with the Pan-Turkish satellite Türksat, launched in 1996 to spread Turkish information and values from the Adriatic to the Great Wall. With little fanfare or credit, and within the means its resources have allowed, Turkey was fully embracing the new era of audio-visual diplomacy.<sup>73</sup> Elsewhere in the Middle East, progress in the new diplomatic field where slightly more gradual. As we will see, not until 2003 did **Israel** successfully implement a public diplomacy program, though many abortive attempts took place between 1999 and 2001 that failed

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<sup>66</sup> M. Baccini (Italian Undersecretary of State), *Il Tempo*, 26 February 2002.

<sup>67</sup> G. Baldocci, “The new Farnesina: how to bring our diplomacy up to speed in the global age”, *Corriere della Sera*, 3 May 2002; For an analysis of the reform of Italian foreign policy in the light of the processes of internationalisation see R. Aliboni et al. eds., *L'Italia e la Politica Internazionale*, Publication of the Istituto Affari Internazionali and the Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI), Edition 2000.

<sup>68</sup> Iran – Assefi, “Foreign Ministry's Success...”, *op. cit.*, 8.

<sup>69</sup> M. E. Ahrari, “The Dynamics of the New Great Game in Muslim Central Asia”, *Central Asian Survey* 13, no 4 (1994), 530; M. Haghayeghi, “Islamic Revival in the Central Asian republics”, *Central Asian Survey* 13, n°2 (1994), 262.

<sup>70</sup> E. Ya'ari, “The Al-Jazeera Revolution”, *The Jerusalem Report*, March 27, 2000.

<sup>71</sup> Pahlavi, “La diplomatie culturelle...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>72</sup> H. Sahin and A. Aksoy, “Global Media and Cultural Identity in Turkey”, *Journal of Communication* 43, no2 (1993), 38.

<sup>73</sup> For more on Turkey's cultural diplomacy see P.C. Pahlavi, “The Conquest of a Common Cultural Legacy: Turkey and Turkic Asia”, in *The Cultural Legacy of Conflict in Central and Inner Asia* - Toronto Studies in Central and Inner Asia 6, edited by M. Gervers & al. (Toronto: Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, 2004).

due to lack of cooperation and funding.<sup>74</sup> It should be pointed out that embryonic public diplomacy programs were also gestating at this point within foreign policy institutions of Commonwealth nations such as **Australia** (DFAT), **New Zealand** (MFA) and **South Africa** (DFA).

## Conclusion

During the period, the United States, Great Britain, France and Germany were at the forefront of this wave of renewal for mass diplomacy, a fact easily explained by their status as super and great powers respectively. However, many other countries were already biting at their heels. Admittedly most programs initiated during this period were still at an initial stage; they had not yet the resources or status that would be theirs in the coming years (a topic discussed in the following chapters). Nevertheless, the fact is that the trend was now begun and all the great international actors, that is to say all those who play a central role on the international chess board, whether they be regional or international powers, whether they be rich or poor, from the North or South, had started to turn towards the “new diplomacy” in the context of the technological upsurge of the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. It is important to point to the exceptions of China and Russia that waited respectively to 2003 and 2004 before including public diplomacy in their own foreign policy programs. Then, although this first wave has gone almost unnoticed, the number of countries rediscovering and redeploying their public diplomacy at the end of the century was already significant, confirming the impact of the information revolution on the art of diplomacy.

Much has changed in the realm of public diplomacy during the decade that followed the Cold War. In the space of a few years, mass diplomacy was disassembled, forgotten and then, discovered anew following a schedule and manner almost identical in different parts of the globe. This global trend that saw a significant number of international players reshape their diplomatic institutions sheds light on the impact of the mass media revolution on foreign affairs. Without the danger of accusations of technological determinism, we would have little choice but to conclude that the widespread use of NICTs and development of the global information society play a significant role in the simultaneous and similar nature of the reforms. This wave also provides testimony for the new position of importance occupied by mass diplomacy within the foreign policy of a growing number of states. After the decline of the opening years of the 1990s, the

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<sup>74</sup> E. Gilboa (Bar-Ilan University & Holon Institute of Technology), “Public Diplomacy as the New Diplomacy: Israel's Public Diplomacy, 2000-2003” (paper presented at the International Studies



diplomacy of hearts and minds seems once again to be destined to play a part at the forefront. This reinstatement is made clear by revitalised budgetary allocations and perhaps even clearer by institutional reorganisation.

The growing portion of foreign affairs budgets that was already devoted to mass diplomacy attests to this redemption. In a general way, we can not speak of a boom because the allocations were still modest. But we can instead speak of a radical shift of tendency in comparison to the situation immediately following the end of the Cold War. While almost disappearing a few years prior, public diplomacy now enjoys a respectable budget that is nearing the billion-dollar mark for the largest powers, demonstrating that it is no longer just a sideshow to more central foreign policy efforts. Powerful and influential states are investing increasingly large sums of money. It should be pointed out that the United States spent around 1 billion dollars on public diplomacy prior to September 11<sup>th</sup>, a little less than France, Great Britain, Germany and Japan that each spent well above one billion dollars. According to some observers, this deficit relative to other nations can only have contributed to the decline of the American image in the world. This is a subject to which we will return in the chapters that follow.

The expanding role of public diplomacy is also indicated by the increasingly important place it came to occupy within the structures and institutions of foreign affairs departments. Through the 1990's it was increasingly subordinated to other branches of diplomacy. In this new operational context created by the age of information, a significant change has occurred. Mass diplomats found themselves enjoying increasing independence and freedom of action. Across the globe, the new diplomacy was in the process of becoming a distinct foreign policy concentration organised in autonomous spheres with its own strategy, its own agencies and its own high-tech communication facilities. By 2001, it was already commonly referred to as the third branch or the third pillar of foreign policy in Canada, France, Japan and Germany.

Although public diplomacy seemed off to an auspicious future as a distinct realm of foreign policy, there was still much to do at the beginning of this century. As emphasized by Laurence Baxter and Jo-Ann Bishop, it was only “the beginning of a process-oriented trend.”<sup>75</sup> States were only beginning to change their habits and to remodel their diplomatic organisations to adapt to the information age. Many had not even begun. The term “public diplomacy” was still largely unknown by a great proportion of policy makers and totally unheard of amongst the general public. It would require a shock of considerable proportions for it to find its position as a central preoccupation for elected leaders. The shock was to be that of September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001.

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Association, 45<sup>th</sup> Annual Convention, Montreal, March 2004).

<sup>75</sup> Baxter and Bishop, *op. cit.*

## Chapter IV. Mass Diplomacy in the Wake of 9-11

In modern war, it is an absolute necessity to use the weapons of your enemies  
Colonel R. Trinquier, *The Modern War*, (1961)

### Introduction

Between 1998 and 2001, mass diplomacy experienced renewed vitality after a number of years of atrophy. The re-emergence of mass diplomacy within a significant number of foreign affairs systems worldwide coincided directly with the deepening of the mass media revolution and the advent of the information society. Though active, the resurgence of mass diplomacy remained understated and gradual due largely to the scepticism or ignorance of political leaders and the media. The question, then, is what other factors returned public opinion diplomacy to the forefront of the diplomatic arsenal? This chapter argues that the acceleration of the revival of mass diplomacy was caused by another factor linked to the information society and to the growing importance of public opinion as an arena for strategic action: global terrorism. The postulation is that, in its present form, terrorism in the age of mass media is neither more nor less than a brutal, stateless, form of mass diplomacy being as it is, like mass diplomacy, an enterprise of communication, psychological action and persuasion targeting the masses, also greatly motivated by the new technological possibilities of the information society. By bringing the battle to the world's screens, and harnessing images, values and public opinion, global terrorism has magnified the urgency and importance of mass diplomacy, accelerating and making general its restitution within foreign policy institutions around the world. .

The principal goal of this chapter is to demonstrate that the tremendous shock of September 11<sup>th</sup> and its sequels (Bali, the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, and Madrid) have greatly invigorated the practice of mass diplomacy. This chapter will examine this claim through an analysis of a number of financial indicators showing remarkable budgetary increases for mass diplomacy. Another goal for the chapter is to demonstrate that although the terrorist crisis was the pivotal factor that accelerated the dramatic upsurge in mass diplomacy, the resurgence of this foreign policy concentration has continued to be motivated by an adaptation to the information age. A number of other indicators show, in fact, that the current preoccupation of governments with mass diplomacy is mainly a reaction to a longer-term will to adjust their foreign policy to the new demands of the global information society and the emergence of new techniques of mass persuasion. Numerous reforms had been implemented prior to the terrorist crisis that were clearly

destined to last beyond the present situation. Additionally, the mass diplomacy reform is in no way confined to nations involved in the struggle against terrorism, which makes it likely that the “terror” factor has only accelerated the progress of an enduring structural phenomenon.

### **1. The Shock of 9-11 and U.S. Mass Diplomacy**

In the months that followed the events in New York, everywhere across the world, governments strengthened the role of mass diplomacy significantly. Greater appropriations of funds for mass diplomacy reflected the necessity of its contribution. This trend was marked amongst Western nations and in particular, as the following section shows, in the Anglo-Saxon nations such as the United States, the UK and the principal members of the Commonwealth.

#### **a. The Immediate Reaction to 9-11**

For obvious reasons, the 9-11 effect has been particularly observable in the case of the United States where it has greatly sped up the trend to reform the cultural, educational and information programs of the U.S. foreign policy. In spite of three consecutive years of revitalization evidenced by restructuring and budget increases (1998-2001), mass diplomacy still was not, on the eve of the terrorist attacks, playing more than a quiet role still largely subordinated to the needs of state-to-state diplomacy. September 11<sup>th</sup> changed all of that. Within weeks, mass diplomacy had become a hot topic and a national priority.<sup>1</sup>

The collapse of the twin towers left most Americans puzzled – how had the country of liberty come to generate such hate in such a large segment of the world population? From one day to the next, they realized with pain the extent of the divide that had grown between the United States and a number of foreign nations following the end of Cold War. At the same time, a series of studies by the Pew Research Center, the German Marshall Fund, the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, and the University of Michigan confirmed the worldwide decline of public support for the United States.<sup>2</sup> In the space of less than a decade, America had lost its place in the hearts of a number of important nations including those that had been traditional allies (figure 1). The study conducted by the Pew Research Center found that in Italy, Britain, Argentina and Germany,


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<sup>1</sup> U.S. - State Department, Pachios, “The New...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>2</sup> U.S. - Senate, Dr. R.S. Zaharna, “American Public Diplomacy and the Islamic and Arab World: A Communication Update & Assessment” (Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, February 27, 2003), available @ [foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2003/ZaharnaTestimony030227.pdf](http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2003/ZaharnaTestimony030227.pdf).

popular support in favour of United States had dropped by 6, 8, 16 et 17 percent respectively.<sup>3</sup>

**Figure 1: U.S. Image Slips Across the Globe (Percentage Favorable View of U.S.)**



The study also showed that negative opinion of the United States was most prevalent in Muslim countries even in those whose governments have close political and economic ties to Washington. Favourable public opinion had shrunk by 13% in Pakistan and 22% in Turkey while support plummeted to 5% in Egypt. A remarkable “surprise” was to realize that this lack of popularity was at its zenith with the Saudi Arabian and Afghani populations while Washington had been the main Saudi Arabian strategic partner and the principal investor in Afghanistan even during the Taliban regime.<sup>4</sup>

Whatever the causes, there was only one conclusion to reach: America had a serious image problem – and it was necessary to revive quickly the crippled U.S. public relations diplomacy in order to have any chance of restoring that image. 9-11 jolted the American government with the realization that the growing antipathy of overseas populations toward the U.S. could be highly damaging - especially but not only - by fuelling terrorism and that it was a matter of national security to find solutions to blunt it. The attacks underscored the importance of public diplomacy by creating the certainty amongst American leaders that “winning the hearts and minds” of foreign audiences was a way to deprive enemies of the ability to gain ground with their ideas but also to gain global influence. It once again became evident to them that “national image” and “foreign policy” were both part of an integrated whole.<sup>5</sup> Although the information revolution had already pressed the U.S. government to give greater attention to the cultivation of favourable opinions abroad, the immediate presence of threat made the task of revitalizing mass diplomacy an urgent priority. Through the weeks following September 11<sup>th</sup>, almost everybody came to an agreement about the necessity of acting

<sup>3</sup> The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, *What the World Thinks in 2002* (Pew Global Attitudes Project, Dec. 2002). Pew surveyed 38,000 people in 44 countries over a 4-month period (July through Oct. 2002) to assess how the publics of the world view their nation, the world, and the US.

<sup>4</sup> M. Abdelhadi, “Eyewitness: America's tainted image”, *BBCWS- Cairo*, February 7, 2003.

<sup>5</sup> Peterson, *op. cit.*

as fast as possible to restructure the American international public relations apparatus. In Congress, voices such as that of H. Hyde, spoke out to demand that mass diplomacy receive “a more prominent place in the planning and execution of [...] foreign policy”<sup>6</sup>; a response to the fact that “half of modern foreign policy is missing.”<sup>7</sup> “We have to do a better job of telling our story”<sup>8</sup> declared President George Bush echoing the sense of urgency also shared by his Secretary of State Colin Powell.<sup>9</sup> Nevertheless, if the context of crisis without a doubt accelerated the reform of American mass diplomacy, it should be pointed out that the essential steps that were taken in response to the crisis during 2002 had been planned and decided before the event of September 11 2001. The legal and budgetary initiatives had been worked out, for the most part, during the preceding months or the year prior. *The consequence of the attack was to precipitate their ratification and their implementation while considerably amplifying their initial scope.*

b. The 2002 ‘Freedom Promotion Act - H.R. 3969’

At the beginning of 2002 the *Freedom Promotion Act* was promulgated which radically reshaped the direction and manner in which U.S. public diplomacy was carried out in terms of organisation, technologies, and targets.<sup>10</sup> Within the State Department, the Secretary of State saw his supervisory role reinforced by the cooperative action of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and the International Broadcasting Agency. Colin Powell's mission officially became to assure that there is a “cohesive and coherent” strategy to “aggressively...counter misinformation and hostile propaganda concerning the United States.”<sup>11</sup> The highest authority in this regard, the Under Secretary, was given new authority over public diplomacy directors serving in the State Department's six regional bureaus to improve coordination of joint activities. At the same time, new prerogatives were granted to the State Department to extend its activities beyond governmental spheres and to work directly with private partners and intermediaries such as domestic media and foreign television broadcasters; a novelty of which we will see the crucial importance in chapters VI, VII, VIII and IX.

<sup>6</sup> U.S. - House of Representatives, CIR, “Committee Expected to Report Legislation” (Reform of U.S. Public Diplomacy, *American Diplomacy*, March 15, 2002).

<sup>7</sup> U.S. - Hyde, “Speaking to Our Silent Allies...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>8</sup> U.S. - Senate, Zaharna, “American Public Diplomacy...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>9</sup> U.S. - C. Powell (Secretary of State), “Cultural Action and National Interests”, in U.S. - State Department, ECA, *Annual Report 2002* (Washington: Wilson Editions, 2002).

<sup>10</sup> U.S. - House of Representatives, CIR, *Freedom Promotion Act of 2002*, (introduced by U.S. Rep. H.J. Hyde (Chairman), March 14, 2001- Reported by HIRC, April 25, 2001).

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

The *Freedom Promotion Act - H.R. 3969* reorganized the U.S. international broadcasting system in depth, in particular through the creation of the International Broadcasting Agency (IBA) headed by a director appointed by the former Board of Broadcasting Governors. The goal was to rationalize and to optimize the process of decision-making while causing minimal disruption to broadcasting operations and preserving the strengths of the Board. The BBG was reconstituted as the Board of International Broadcasting of the U.S. International Broadcasting Agency and retained operational control of entities including Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, and Radio Free Europe. A new office of global communications was added within the White House to help coordinate public diplomacy efforts.<sup>12</sup> These changes introduced by the new legislation constitute *the most important reform in the domain of U.S. diplomatic telecommunications since the early years of the Cold War.*

In addition to these long planned innovations, were one or two initiatives in the final version of the legislation intended to respond directly to the crisis. The *H.R. 3969* legislation notably included a \$135 million provision specifically aimed at restructuring and expanding satellite television and radio broadcasting to countries with predominantly Muslim populations. This plan re-branded the Voice of America's Arabic service as "Radio Sawa" ("Radio Together"), a 24-hour Arabic-language service featuring American and Arab pop music with short news broadcasts targeting a potential audience of 99 million listeners aged 15 to 34 from Egypt to the Persian Gulf.<sup>13</sup> Also added was a Persian radio network (Radio Farda) and several Arabic language Web sites. These projects had been in the planning stages since 1999 but they were hurriedly implemented following 9-11. Beyond the new radio ventures, the Voice of America was endowed with increased government funding to expand its broadcasts in the Dari and Pashto languages into Afghanistan and throughout Central Asia while Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty expanded its broadcasting to the region. Finally, VOA revived the dormant Radio Free Afghanistan.<sup>14</sup> All these initiatives were generously funded and placed under the supervision of the IBA.

#### c. A Budget for a Time of Crisis: FY2003 (February 2002)

The crisis spurred a noticeable financial effort on the part of Washington to support the revamping of the American foreign policy and its mass diplomacy concentration. In general

<sup>12</sup> U.S. - House of Representative, Committee on International Relations, *The Foreign Relations Authorization Act* (Recommendations by H.J. Hyde (chairman), U.S. Council on Foreign Relations' study on Public Diplomacy, Conference Report on H.R. 1646, Fiscal Year 2003 – January).

<sup>13</sup> A. Hassan, "U.S. Radio Broadcasts Vie for the Hearts and Minds of Arab Youth - Spin Unspun", translated transcript of a *Radio Sawa* newscast, Cairo, Egypt, available @ [www.radiosawa.com](http://www.radiosawa.com), Sept.2002.

terms, FY 2003 was a year of plenty for the International Affairs budget (Function 150 of the Federal budget) which totalled \$25.4 billion - an increase of 6% over the FY 2002 level. If this transfusion remains modest compared to the increases experienced by the defence budget during this period, it is nonetheless significant considering the scale of diplomacy. This budget, voted at the outset of 2002, was the result primarily of the greatly expanded role expected of public diplomacy within the war against terrorism. During his testimony in support of the budgetary initiative secretary of State Powell declared to the Senate Budget Committee:

Such activities have gained a new sense of *urgency* and importance since the brutal attacks of September. We need to teach the world more about America, about our values system (...). The terrorist attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup> underscored the urgency of implementing an effective public diplomacy campaign. Those who abet terror by spreading distortion and hate and inciting others to take full advantage of the global news cycle. We have to do the same thing.<sup>15</sup>

For fiscal year 2003, the American mass diplomacy budget was significantly increased reaching a budget of \$1.5 billion. Though this budget still constituted 5% of the international affairs budget and 15% of the budget of the Department of State, it nevertheless increased of 7.75% over the preceding fiscal year. As was traditional, the funds were almost evenly divided between the State Department in charge of educational and cultural programs (53%) and the Board of International Broadcasting, which oversees the activities of U.S. government-sponsored broadcasting overseas (47%).

With \$595.7 million, the State Department increased its mass diplomacy resources overall by 5.4% over the FY 2002 funding level. Of the amount allocated to the State Department, \$247.1 million were for Educational and Cultural Exchanges (+20%).<sup>16</sup> We must remember however that this increase happened in the context of a trend begun before the end of 2001. In two fiscal years, the budget managed by the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy augmented from \$544 million in fiscal year 2001 to \$594 million in fiscal year 2003, or about 9% in real terms. The same observation holds true in regards to the increase in the number of mass diplomacy specialists employed by the State Department. There again, the attacks accelerated a process begun at an earlier date: Between fiscal years 2001 and 2003, the number of authorized Foreign Service officers involved in public diplomacy overseas augmented by about 11%.<sup>17</sup> During this period, Congress financed the creation of 84 positions for mass diplomats with the State Department out of a total of 759 positions created within the framework of the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative.

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<sup>14</sup> PBS Online newshour, "Reaching out", February 18, 2002


<sup>15</sup> U.S. - Senate, C. Powell (Secretary of State), Testimony before the Senate Budget Committee on the Department of State's fiscal year 2003 operating budget (February 2002).

<sup>16</sup> U.S. - General Accounting Office, "U.S. Public Diplomacy State Department Expands Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges" (Report to the House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, Washington, D.C.:GAO-03-951, September 2003), 9.

66% of these positions were created for FY 2002, i.e. before September 11<sup>th</sup> and 3% for FY 2003 to support the increased emphasis on public diplomacy following September 11.<sup>18</sup> To some extent, these numbers actually suggest a relative deceleration in comparison to the pre-9-11 growth.

The impact of the terrorist attacks on American mass diplomacy can be seen above all in the reorientation and redistribution of resources towards priority regions in the aftermath of September 11<sup>th</sup> (figure 2). While the State Department's Europe and Eurasia bureau still received the largest overall share of overseas public diplomacy resources, the largest percentage increases in such resources since September 11 occurred in the South Asian and Near Eastern Affairs bureaus, where many countries have significant Muslim populations. Public diplomacy funding increased in South Asia from \$24 million to \$39 million and in the Near East from \$39 million to \$62 million, or by 63% and 58%, respectively. While Africa experienced an 18% rise, the East Asian and Pacific region enjoyed a 9% increase. During the same period, authorized American mass diplomacy officers in Africa increased from 79 to 89, in South Asia from 27 to 31 and in the Near East from 45 to 57 or by 13%, 15%, and 27%, respectively.

**Figure 2: Increases in US Public Diplomacy Resources by region for Fiscal Years 2001 through 2003 (\$ millions) - Source: State Department GAO**



With \$520 million for the FY 2003, the budget of the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), the federal agency responsible for foreign radio and television broadcasting, remained stable compared to preceding fiscal years. Nevertheless, a special fund of \$60 million was rapidly made available after the terrorist attacks to implement an “aggressive” public diplomacy effort through international broadcasting to eliminate support for terrorists.<sup>19</sup> This special funding was

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 10-11.

<sup>18</sup> U.S. – State Department, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, C. Beers, “Funding for Public Diplomacy” (statement before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, and State of the House Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC, April 24, 2002).

<sup>19</sup> U.S. – State Department, C. Powell (Secretary of State), *FY 2003 Budget Request: International Affairs* (Office of the Spokesman, February 2002).



designed to boost the U.S. mass diplomacy efforts in the Muslim world and to help build support for the U.S. coalition's global campaign against al-Qaida networks. In addition, the *Freedom Promotion Act - H.R. 3969* earmarked funding for new mass diplomacy instruments (radio, TV and websites). As we shall see in chapter VII, efforts in this area led to the formation of an arsenal of the highest quality in terms of cyber-diplomacy material.

Prompted by war on terrorism, the significant budgetary increases and reorientations were matched by a rapid implementation of mass diplomacy programs (the details of which will be analysed in several places in subsequent chapters). Soon after the events of September 11, the Bush Administration announced an ambitious heart and minds campaign to restore relationships damaged over the past decade and to blunt the anti-American sentiment growing in many parts of the globe. By offering an opportunity to put into practice new organizational precepts, honed during the 1998-2001 period, the attacks instilled a sense of great urgency in programs recently begun. This new orientation was made concrete by the nomination of a marketing and public relations specialist, straight from the advertising world, to the post of Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy. Under the direction of Charlotte Beers, public diplomacy rapidly became a priority for ambassadors and embassy staff.<sup>20</sup> "Public diplomacy has been much more active than it has been in 10 years" observed a State Department official. "The Under Secretary has instilled a sense of dynamism in what had been a moribund activity."<sup>21</sup> The considerable intensification of the U.S. public diplomacy efforts after September 11 was concentrated in particular on Muslim-majority countries considered to be of strategic importance in the war on terrorism. In addition to extra funding, the government launched a multitude of new initiatives specifically designed to reach a broader and younger audience in countries with large Muslim populations. The spearhead of this strategy consisted of a wide-ranging mass media campaign jointly coordinated by the State Department and the White House war room. To this end, a new communication and information infrastructure was put in place with the establishment of a new Middle East radio network, Arabic language web sites and exchange programs for journalists.<sup>22</sup> Overall, it constituted a campaign of unprecedented scope in the annals of American public diplomacy, largely due to the exceptional

<sup>20</sup> M. Leonard, "Velvet fist in the iron glove", *The Guardian*, June 16, 2002.

<sup>21</sup> Ira Teinowitz, "The Selling of America", *AdAge News*, available @ <http://www.adage.com/news>, September 23, 2002.

<sup>22</sup> As an example of this information strategy, one must note the massive distribution through Internet and traditional medias of a booklet called "The Network of Terrorism" – State's most widely disseminated brochure ever. Washington also launched the Shared Values initiative, an aggressive – and largely criticised – ad campaign featuring a series of 'glossy' mini-documentaries stressing the proximity of American and Muslim value systems; J. Leyne (US State Department correspondent), "US gets the cold shoulder", *BBCWS*, December 31, 2002.

situation created by September 11. While the campaign was harshly criticized for its improvised nature and, above all, for its resemblance to typical war propaganda, the campaign was nonetheless a sign that the new diplomacy was to play a role of the first importance in the international response to the crisis at hand.

#### d. Permanent Change

Apart from the immediate reaction to 9-11, the reform of American mass diplomacy is being undertaken with the intention of moulding a strategic tool crafted to the requirements of the new international environment. Even in the midst of a full crisis, its evolution has above all been dictated by more long term considerations linked to the revolution of NICTs and to the upheavals they provoke; decisions that had been fully considered and debated in the period preceding the attacks.

The research groups mandated by the government to determine the rough shape of this reform recognized the initiatives taken while pointing out their shortfalls. These groups stressed out that the media, Congress, and America's think tanks have once again recognized the utility of mass diplomacy and that the U.S. diplomatic establishment is progressively re-installing public diplomacy as a distinct concentration in U.S. foreign policy.<sup>23</sup> Nevertheless, they also pointed out that the U.S. government had so far significantly under-performed in its efforts to build an efficient mass diplomacy apparatus. Without necessary resources, a well-suited organizational structure and a coherent strategy, mass diplomacy has been unable to meet the challenges of an increasingly crowded communications world.<sup>24</sup> The U.S. Advisory Commission called for significant reforms to supplement the redirection of this "strategic component of American foreign policy" in order to make it "razor sharp."<sup>25</sup> Chairman Harold C. Pachios expressed the view, shared by a growing number of specialists and officials in Washington, that public diplomacy needed to move further from the margins of foreign policy to the center.<sup>26</sup> Emphasising the still low level of budgetary increases, experts agreed that Washington was still under-investing in public diplomacy especially compared with many other countries that spend proportionately larger amounts of their foreign affairs budgets on this area. This had contributed,

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<sup>23</sup> U.S. - State Department, Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, *Building America's Public Diplomacy...*, *op. cit.*, 1 & 6.

<sup>24</sup> U.S. - CFR, "Public Diplomacy: A Strategy for Reform" (report of the Independent Task Force on Public Diplomacy, Sponsored by the CFR, July 30, 2002).

<sup>25</sup> U.S. - State Department, Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, *Building America's Public Diplomacy...*, *op. cit.*, 3-5.

<sup>26</sup> U.S. - State Department, Pachios, "The New...", *op. cit.*

in their opinions, to the decline of the image of the United States in the world.<sup>27</sup> Specialists considered however that to rely exclusively on the injection of resources would solve nothing without an strategic direction and an appropriate and durable program structure that responds to the requirements of the information age.<sup>28</sup>

More constructively, the recommendations of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy agreed on four key points around which the general physiognomy of American mass diplomacy was to be designed. 1) The first recommendation was to establish a determined and intelligent leadership by more directly linking the government (State Department, Congress and the White House) to the conduct of mass diplomacy through various means including the newly established White House Office of Global Communications.<sup>29</sup> 2) The second recommendation was to continue to bolster its institutional status as a distinct concentration and to rationalize its operational structure.<sup>30</sup> 3) An essential priority was to promote private sector involvement and with and through third parties in order to extend as much as possible the reach and scope of mass diplomacy beyond strictly governmental lines. To this end, the creation of a Public Diplomacy Coordinating Structure (PDCS) was recommended to oversee and coordinate public diplomacy between government, the private sector partners and indigenous actors abroad.<sup>31</sup> The rationale was to draw into the U.S. public diplomacy effort the talent and energy of independent actors by engaging communications consultants, the academic community, and the advertising and entertainment sectors.<sup>32</sup> 4) Further recommendations included greatly expanding the use of Internet, TV, satellite and radio facilities, strengthening the Office of International Information Programs (IIP), and significantly increasing media skills and public diplomacy training for all diplomats and Foreign Service personnel.<sup>33</sup>

Adopted and applied in the months following 9-11, these recommendations reflected a major change in the philosophy of the conduct of mass diplomacy. This philosophical reorientation confirms the hypothesis that the implantation of mass diplomacy is far from being a passing trend responding to the events of the day. It establishes the basis for a 21<sup>st</sup> century public diplomacy perfectly adapted to its era; flexible and effective, with a minimum of leadership and a maximum

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<sup>27</sup> U.S. - State Department, Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, *Building America's Public Diplomacy...*, *op. cit.*, 9.

<sup>28</sup> U.S. - GAO-03-951, *op. cit.*, 1.

<sup>29</sup> U.S. - Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, Dolan, *op. cit.*

<sup>30</sup> U.S. - State Department, Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, *Building America's Public Diplomacy...*, *op. cit.*, 6.

<sup>31</sup> U.S. - CFR, "Public Diplomacy...", *op. cit.*

<sup>32</sup> U.S. - State Department, Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, *Building America's Public Diplomacy...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>33</sup> U.S. - CFR, "Public Diplomacy...", *op. cit.*


of decentralization. This 'bureaucratic-entrepreneurial' model, discussed in chapters VI, VII, VIII and IX, is one as we shall now see, that other governments have also turned to.

## 2. Anglo-Saxon Mass Diplomacy

### a. The United Kingdom

More than any other ally of the United States, Great Britain has been profoundly affected by the events of September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001. "They affected Britain particularly" consider British leaders, "because of the numbers of British citizens killed, because of Britain's close links with the USA and because of the Government's immediate commitment to supporting a multinational response to combat the threat of international terrorism."<sup>34</sup> The 2001 attacks marked a major shift in the UK's foreign affairs; a shift that resulted in substantial increases in the Foreign and Commonwealth mass diplomacy budget. The 2002 Spending Review increased the FCO's resources by an average 2.8% annually above inflation between 2002-03 and 2005-06 which is a total increase of £219 million during this period – a fact without precedent since the Cold War.

While the FCO's SR2002 settlement (excluding conflict prevention) was the largest since the end of the Cold War, it was also the second Spending Review in succession to increase the FCO's spending plans faster than the forecast growth of the economy.<sup>35</sup> This constant growth



underscored the importance the government attached to improved services to the public overseas not only because of 9-11 but also because of the new context of international relations in general. The ambitious targets set by the Spending Review

emphasised the need for the British public diplomacy services to support Britain's long-term and global interests and international status by achieving a better perceptions of its culture, values, products and policies abroad. Following the events of September 11th, building Britain's reputation as an outward-looking nation was assuming even more urgency than before for

<sup>34</sup> U.K. - FCO, "Chapter 5 - Britain in the World", in *2002 Spending Review: New Public Spending Plans 2003 – 2006* (FCO, 2002).

<sup>35</sup> U.K. - FCO, "£76 Million Boost for BBC world service and British Council", FCO Press Releases, July 16, 2002.

London. As the SR 2002 demonstrates, the portion of citizen-oriented diplomacy in Britain's foreign policy (approximately 27%) is slated to increase constantly over the coming years (figure 3).

The Settlement clearly recognised the value of mass diplomacy by allocating extra resources for its most important organs, the BBC World Service and the British Council. The package included sizeable increases for the BBC World Service, the world's best known and perhaps most influential mass diplomacy broadcaster. In early 2002, the British government announced an additional £48 million over the three years 2003-06, on top of annual funding of £211 million for a total of £8/13/27 million over three years representing an average growth of 3.4% per year after inflation. Welcoming this boost, Mark Byford, Director of the BBC WS commented: "This is a good settlement for the World Service. It's a strong endorsement from the government of the quality and impact of the World Service. It will enable us to improve services in key areas, expand our FM presence, develop our successful on-line capability and support our important capital modernisation."<sup>36</sup> Although this cash boost provided BBC World Service with "the biggest government help in its history"<sup>37</sup>, it is still only the most recent in a series of infusions begun at the end of the 1990's. Since 1997, BBC World Service had received an extra £150 million from the Government. For instance, the 2000 spending review augmented the governmental grant-in-aid by an additional £11 million for 2003/4. With these repeated funding increases, the BBC World Service had been renewing transmitters and investing in on-line technology, as well as producing new programming long before 9-11. The role of the 9-11 crisis has had the result in Britain as elsewhere of encouraging an existing trend.

Dominated by the events following 11 September 2001, 2002 was also a remarkable year for the British Council. The 2002 settlement provided the famous British mass diplomacy agency with an additional £2/8/18 million over three years plus an extra £3/2/2 million of capital which represents an average growth of 3.1% per year after inflation. The plan intended a budgetary increase from £152 million for 2001-02 to £186 millions for 2005-06 and from £329 million to £403 million when government grant-in-aids are added as well as other financial sources - a significant increase of 22% over 5 years. Like elsewhere the spending on the Council is calculated to redirect its efforts towards target audiences in countries of strategic interest, particularly young people in the Middle East, South Asia and Africa. The extra funding is also intended to boost the Council's educational programs on a global scale.<sup>38</sup> "This is excellent news for the British Council, and it demonstrates the Government's strong commitment to public

<sup>36</sup> U.K. - FCO, *Spending for 2002*, FCO Press Notice, July 15, 2002.

<sup>37</sup> U.K. - FCO, "£76 Million Boost...", *op. cit.*


marketplace and to improve the reach, reputation and impact of BBC services worldwide.<sup>44</sup> Simultaneously, the FCO was equipped with its own press agency – the London Press Service (LPS)<sup>45</sup>. Finally, the FCO's television news service - British Satellite News (BSN) - was refocused to provide overseas broadcasters with more coverage of worldwide topical events from a perspective advantageous to British interests.<sup>46</sup>

## b. Canada

9-11 gave heightened urgency to the revitalization of Canadian mass diplomacy. Conscious of the growing importance of information and communication technologies, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade had exerted itself since 1995 to integrate them more fully into the foreign policy making process. But this process only really became concrete in the post 9-11 context as mass diplomacy was launched to the forefront of Canada's foreign policy strategy.<sup>47</sup>

Though more modest than in the American or British cases, DFAIT's mass diplomacy budget

Figure 4: Mass Diplomacy in Canadian Foreign Policy Budget 2000-2003



Source: DFAIT – Rapport sur les plans et priorités 2002

experienced sustained increases. It was quickly apparent that the period of cutbacks that had marked the decade of the 1990's was at an end and that a period of expansion had begun.<sup>48</sup> After three consecutive years, the total spending on mass diplomacy reached a national record \$101.3 million (net of revenue) or 6.6% of the

departmental budget (figure 4). Public diplomacy had grown to meet the status of “third pillar” of Canadian foreign policy, a status bestowed by the 1994 *White Book*, with a budget equal to that of the Trade, Economic and Environmental Policy (\$107 millions) dwarfed only by spending on

<sup>44</sup> As from 2002, the *BBC World Service* was made available via digital satellite, cable and the internet at [www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice](http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice). See *Ibid.*

<sup>45</sup> LPS' Islamic Media Unit, also set up in October 2001, was designed to address Islamic opinion throughout the world with a special emphasis on the Arab media; see *Ibid.*, 83.

<sup>46</sup> BSN has a bilingual website (English and Arabic) with an archive search facility; see [www.bsn.org.uk](http://www.bsn.org.uk).

<sup>47</sup> Canada - DFAIT, “Section III - Departmental Plans and Priorities”, in *2002-2003 Estimates* (DFAIT, July 2003).

<sup>48</sup> D.M. Malone, *Canadian Foreign Policy Post-9/11: Institutional and Other Challenges* (International Peace Academy, 2003).

International Business Development (\$253 millions) and International Security and Cooperation (\$611 millions).<sup>49</sup>

Apart from the budgetary infusion, the events of 2001 and their aftermath stimulated renewed efforts to put in place an effective program of public diplomacy that would allow Canada to play an increased international role in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The need for institutional reform was sharply reinforced in this area with enhanced communications and horizontal policy coordination within DFAIT and with external partners. Official reports closely analogous to those produced by in the British and American cases anchored the reform of Canadian mass diplomacy.<sup>50</sup> Those groups produced a certain number of priorities and recommendations similar to those made in previous cases at the same moment. New priorities included: 1) Increasing the focus and coherence of mass diplomacy making through strengthened leadership. DFAIT is reaffirmed as the only federal department responsible in this domain; the prerogatives of the Policy Board were increased to strengthen its supervisory capacity over the development of policies and strategies in pursuit of longer-term Canadian interests. 2) Instituting improved coordination between the public and private sectors. With this goal in mind, a new policy coordination division was established with the function of harmonizing the operations of the different governmental and non-governmental players involved in the dissemination of values, culture and Canadian information to foreign populations.<sup>51</sup> 3) Deepening the integration of NICTs in the conduct of mass diplomacy. DFAIT undertook to pursue this goal by redesigning its internal and external communications functions and by strengthening its capability and expertise in new communication technologies. Amongst the first initiatives, we saw the launch by Radio Canada International (RCI) of its live, daily Digital Radio Mondiale (DRM) broadcasts in June 2003.<sup>52</sup> In 2003, within the context of the debate about the future of Canadian diplomacy, Foreign Minister Bill Graham reiterated his confidence in mass diplomacy's ability to create a more favourable environment for the pursuit of Canada's objectives.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Of course, this excludes the part of DFAT's devoted to purely administrative activities secured by the Corporate Services, Services to other Government Departments and Passport Services.

<sup>50</sup> The contributions to the development of the Canadian Mass diplomacy foreign policy include round tables on such themes as: Afghanistan after the Taliban, New Directions in U.S. Foreign Policy, the New Face of Terrorism, and Economic and Social Issues in Africa; see also Centre for Security and Defence Studies, "Changing Canadian Foreign Policy: A Debate" (sponsored by the CSDS (Carleton) / the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute / the Centre for International Relations (Queen's University) / Institut québécois des hautes études internationales (Université Laval), Ottawa, October 31, 2003).


<sup>51</sup> Canada - DFAIT, *2002-2003 Estimates...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>52</sup> Canada - RCI, "RCI broadcasts on DRM (Digital Radio Mondial)", *What's New?*, June 2003.

### c. Mass Diplomacy Down Under

In the Australian case, the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks were a shock but the real wakeup call for public diplomacy came with the attacks on Bali that targeted Australia more directly. As in the American case, the events revealed the negative image that Australia suffered from amongst the populations of South East Asia and the dangers that its reputation as an “arrogant and imperialist” power entailed.<sup>54</sup> The authorities recognised the urgent need to revamp Australian public diplomacy by responding to the weaknesses of its articulation and financing, and by putting in place a long-range soft power strategy capable of more effectively serving the regional ambitions

Figure 5: Mass Diplomacy In Australian Foreign Policy Budget



Source: DFAT – Annual Reports 2001-2002-2003

of Canberra from then on.<sup>55</sup> The immediate effect of the events of 2001, as in preceding cases, was a significant increase of the budget for mass diplomacy. *Its part of the total foreign policy budget passed from 7% for the fiscal year 2000-2001 to almost 10% for the 2002-2003 fiscal year* (figure 5). From being a diplomatic light-weight,

public diplomacy quickly became one of the priorities of the budgetary and strategic agenda of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT).

While having been hastened by the terrorist crises the resurgence of mass diplomacy is a response to larger preoccupations linked to the more general background of the information age. Beyond its contribution to the anti-terrorist efforts, the DFAT's heightened interest in public diplomacy is intended to deal with other key issues such as Australia's active role in the WTO Doha Round, FTA negotiations with the United States, indigenous peoples' issues or the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) virus outbreak.<sup>56</sup> It is within this larger perspective that it is necessary to understand the structural reforms that affected Australian mass diplomacy and its operatives after 2001-2002. The efforts of the Australian government bear also on the reorganization of external audiovisual broadcasting and the integration of new communications technologies. From the end of 2001, Radio Australia's budget and status were restored and expanded through the creation of an international television service.<sup>57</sup> Soon after, ABC Asia

<sup>53</sup> Canada - DFAIT, B. Graham (Foreign Affairs Minister of Canada), “A Dialogue on Foreign Policy”, (DFAIT, Jan. 2003). Available on [www.foreign-policy-dialogue.ca](http://www.foreign-policy-dialogue.ca).

<sup>54</sup> T. Plate, “Australia has an Image problem in Asia”, *Korea Times*, June 10, 2003.

<sup>55</sup> P. Kelly, “Soft option for hard heads”, *The Australian*, June 8, 2002.

<sup>56</sup> Australia - DFAT, *Annual Report 2002-2003* (released by the DFAT, 2003), 9. Available @ [http://www.dfat.gov.au/dept/annual\\_reports/01\\_02/s02/3-1-2.html](http://www.dfat.gov.au/dept/annual_reports/01_02/s02/3-1-2.html)

<sup>57</sup> Price, “Public Diplomacy...”, *op. cit.*, 78.



Pacific (ABCAP), funded by the government under contractual arrangements managed by the DFAT, commenced broadcasting in the Asia-Pacific region. ABCAP satellite television service made major breakthroughs in 2003 by securing a channel on the major *I-Cable* network covering Hong Kong and Macau and re-broadcasting arrangements in 25 out of a possible 35 countries in its satellite footprint. Its programming were re-formatted to present a more cosmopolitan, sophisticated and appealing image of Australia, as well as engaging culturally and politically with local populations.<sup>58</sup> At the same time, the DFAT considerably enhanced its internet communication tools. Its initiatives are part of a long-term strategy to further Australian ambitions on a regional and global scale.

As we will see in more detail in following chapters, in the wake of Australia, Canada, Britain and the United States, other Anglo-Saxon countries decided during this period either to redevelop their mass diplomacy, or to acquire a program if they were without. Motivated by the growing importance of information and communication in the conduct of foreign policy, they were certainly concerned by the wide-ranging terrorist threat. New Zealand is an example of a nation with a mass diplomacy operation started from nothing based on the models of Commonwealth partners. Prime Minister Helen Clark was inspired in particular by the British experience and the recommendations of the Foreign Policy Center of London to implement a new public relations structure.<sup>59</sup> Amusingly, this innovative new public diplomacy has been equipped with a special program designed to capitalize on the *Lord of the Rings* in order to project a better image of the New Zealand archipelago where Peter Jackson's international hit was filmed (see chapter IX for more details).

### **3. The Effects of the Anti-terrorist Campaign and the Second Iraq War**

#### **a. Hard Power Politics Fuelling Soft Power Diplomacy**

The Iraq war has prolonged the 9-11 effect while contributing to the resurgence of mass diplomacy. This could seem paradoxical, as it appeared at the outset that this war was the irrefutable proof of the overwhelming power of classic gunboat diplomacy and power politics. Nevertheless, as the second Gulf War progressed, it slowly became clear how useful a diplomacy of pure persuasion was and how necessary it was to reinforce its importance within foreign policy systems.

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<sup>58</sup> More information on ABCAP's programs and schedule is available at <http://www.abcasiapacific.com.au>.

<sup>59</sup> Leonard and Alakeson, *op. cit.*

“Winning the hearts and minds” of foreign publics rose to the very top of the Bush administration's agenda as depressing statistics about anti-American sentiment continued to mount during the anti-terrorist campaign. The initiatives undertaken directly following September 11<sup>th</sup> had not yet had the chance to bear fruit while the war against terrorism and its mistakes widened the gap between foreign populations and the United States. A study released by the Pew Research Center in March 2003 showed that public opinion of the United States further declined among its allies due to antiwar sentiment and disapproval of the administration's policies.<sup>60</sup> This decline was even more marked with the Arab nations because of a strategy that was perceived not as being anti-terrorist, but anti-Arab (figures 6 and 7). During the early stages of the Iraq campaign, positive public opinion of the United States in Turkey and Jordan further decreased from 30% to 12% and from 45% to 1% respectively. The Pew Center's report released in June 2003 showed that with the extension of the American occupation, negative opinion of the United States in Muslim-majority countries increased dramatically in several cases.<sup>61</sup> A new study dating from March 2004 demonstrated that after one year of conflict, the distrust of Muslim nations quieted down relatively while it had continued to grow in European countries with respectively 12%, 6%, and 7% favourable public opinion in Great Britain, France and Germany.

Figure 6: Public Opinion of the US in Selected Muslim-majority Countries (% favorable view)





Figure 7: Public Opinion of the U.S. in Selected Western Countries (% favorable view)



Source: Pew Research Center

A decisive element of the accentuation of public diplomacy has nevertheless been the growing consciousness by the members of the coalition of the limits of the exclusive use of brute force and its high cost in regards to public opinion. They have discovered to their detriment that military

<sup>60</sup> The Pew Research Center, “America’s Image Further Erodes, Europeans Want Weaker Ties” (Pew Global Attitudes Project, March 2003). Pew interviewed more than 5,500 people in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Poland, Russia, Turkey, the U.K., and the US from March 10 through 17, 2003.

<sup>61</sup> The Pew Research Center, “Views of a Changing World” (Pew Global Attitudes Project, June 2003).

force is often impotent in the face of hostile public opinion upset by an unpopular war but also, on many cases, fed by adverse propaganda and government-supported media, mullahs, and madrassas. They have learned this so well that slowly as military operations stagnated and the disaffected multiplied around them, even the more fervent believers in brute force began to support a strategy that included the use of public diplomacy. Expressing the beliefs of a growing section of the American establishment, the American Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, until then renown for his scepticism in regards to mass diplomacy, declared in October 2003: "We are in a war of ideas, as well as a global war on terror, [...] And the ideas are important, and they need to be marshalled, and they need to be communicated in ways that are persuasive to the listeners".<sup>62</sup> "To win the war against terrorism, we must also win the war of ideas: the battle for the souls of those recruited by the terrorist networks around the world," concluded Rumsfeld, apparently shedding his habitually militarist attitude and somewhat scornful approach to the indirect methods of the practitioners of mass diplomacy.<sup>63</sup>

#### b. More Money, More Attention.

This growing awareness within the circles of power is reflected in the record budgetary allocations earmarked for mass diplomacy for fiscal year 2004 in the U.S. case. With the Iraqi campaign as a keynote, the total authorization for mass diplomacy is \$1.269 billion; a \$66 million increase over the initial Administration's budget request. The operational sector recorded an absolute increase of \$154 million and a relative increase of nearly 14% over fiscal year 2003. On the whole, this increase was *the greatest budgetary increase for mass diplomacy since the end of the Cold War*. Again it must be pointed out that this increase should be viewed as *an integral part of 5 years of constant increases starting in 1998*. The State Department's portion for fiscal year 2004, S.925, was set at \$699 million; a \$57 million increase over the President's budget request and a 17% increase over FY2003. The bulk of that boost was for a reinforced effort aimed at the Muslim world but also to support the reorganization of the operational apparatus and the establishment of a specialized training program for mass diplomacy officers.<sup>64</sup> Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs (ECE) consuming, as is customary, half of the budget of the Under

<sup>62</sup> U.S. Defence Secretary D.H. Rumsfeld quoted in B. Gertz, "Rumsfeld pushes 'new sense of urgency'", *The Washington Times*, October 24, 2003. This memorandum was inspired by an Oct. 16 meeting with top military commanders.

<sup>63</sup> AFP-*Le Monde*, "Rumsfeld veut désormais lutter contre le terrorisme avec des 'idées'", *Le Monde*, October 26, 2003.

<sup>64</sup> M. Helmke, "Remarks presented at the Public Diplomacy Council" (released by Public Diplomacy NewsWire, June 2003).

Secretary for Public Diplomacy, saw their financing for the preceding year (\$245 million) grow by \$100 million earmarked for projects in Eastern Europe and the states of the former Soviet Union. The remainder of the budget was devoted to scholarships (Fulbright, Humphrey) and to promoting academic and professional exchanges and received a significant boost. Allocation of exchange resources clearly reflected the priority of the Arab and Muslim world; 25% of funding for exchanges was allocated to programs in the Middle East and South Asia in FY 2004, compared to 17% in FY 2002.

The overall authorization for U.S. Government non-military international broadcasting operations was \$572 million through the International Broadcasting Operations (IBO) account. The new budget of the Broadcasting Board of Governors represented an \$9 million increase over the Administration's request and a 10% jump over FY 2003.<sup>65</sup> Commenting on this exceptional cash injection, Kenneth Y. Tomlinson, Chairman of the BBG declared, "Considering the economic climate of the times, international broadcasting fared rather well in terms of the FY' 04 budget request". According to him, Bush's FY 2004 budget reflected the increased importance of the audiovisual dimension of mass diplomacy in the context of the anti-terrorism campaign.<sup>66</sup> The budget also clearly revealed the shifting of priorities away from the predominantly Cold War focus on Europe to broadcasting in new strategic zones such as the Middle East and Central Asia. The grant included \$30 million for the Middle East Television Network – a new Arabic-language satellite TV network broadcast from Dubai's media city.<sup>67</sup> Launched in February 2004, Al-Hurrah – "The Free" in Arabic -, was the youngest offspring of the fleet of mass diplomacy vehicles the BBG put in place to "conquer the hearts, minds and souls of the Arabs."<sup>68</sup> "Al-Hurrah is the most ambitious American government media project since 1942, year of the creation of Voice of America", emphasized the *New York Times*, while introducing this generalist television station mixing news and information, cultural programs and entertainment for a potential audience of 310 million people in 22 Arab nations.<sup>69</sup> The grant also involved funding to double radio and television programming in Indonesia and to initiate a special radio and TV broadcasting program in Persian. In parallel to these efforts directly related to the war on terrorism, the 2004 spending plan expanded the U.S. international broadcasting capacities in general by providing a special

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<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>66</sup> U.S. - BBG, K.Y. Tomlinson (Chairman), "Statement on President Bush's FY 2004 Budget Request" (BBG in the News, Washington, D.C., February 03, 2003).

<sup>67</sup> U.S. - Senate, C. Powell (Secretary of State), "Statement on the President's International Affairs Budget for 2004" (Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, February 6, 2003).

<sup>68</sup> G.W. Bush, Interview on Al-Hurrah, *Le Monde*, March 10, 2004.

<sup>69</sup> N. MacFarquhar, "Washington's Arabic TV Effort", *New York Times*, February 20, 2004.

Broadcasting Capital Improvements Fund to maintain the BBG's worldwide transmission network and to improve the security of U.S. broadcasting transmission facilities overseas.<sup>70</sup>

The 2005 budget confirms the trend and continues to increase funding with a significant raise of 13% for the State Department.<sup>71</sup> Although funds allocated to the BBG record a decline of 5%, dropping from 572 million to 569 million dollars, a supplementary amount is given to the audiovisual programming department targeting the Near East with a special budget of \$100 million. The most remarkable fact is the relative growth in the overall portion allocated to mass diplomacy which symbolically moves from 5% to 6% of the federal government total, an answer to the prayers of its most fervent proponents in recent years.<sup>72</sup> Mass diplomacy is now an integral part of American foreign policy as it was in the golden age of the Cold War.

The anti-terrorist campaign has not only spurred spending, it has also made clear the need to restructure the apparatus and improve the delivery of public diplomacy for the long term. The effort is not limited to increasing appropriations, but also to the moulding of a "new public diplomacy" armed with a "new strategy", with improved means of communication and strengthened structures. Members of the Bush Administration have progressively come to recognize the utility of this institutionalization of methods for persuading the masses within American policy. And so, the U.S. Secretary of Defence suggested the creation of a "21st-century information agency in the government" to help in the international battle of ideas, to develop a long-range plan for fighting terrorism but also to reinforce America's strategic influence in the world in general.<sup>73</sup> As the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan and Iraq was winding down the Hearts and Minds campaign was geared up.<sup>74</sup>

The 'retooling' process of mass diplomacy acquired new vigour during this campaign.<sup>75</sup> Following the recommendations of the Advisory Commission and the CFR's Independent Task Force, the government proceeded to the rapid implementation of the White House Office of Global Communications, project envisaged recently as a means of coordinating the entire mass diplomacy system. The *2003 Foreign Relations Authorization Act - HR 1646* significantly re-shaped critical structural elements such as the granting of new authority to the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, the development of a comprehensive strategy for official

<sup>70</sup> U.S. - Powell, *Statement...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>71</sup> U.S. - Senate, C. Powell (Secretary of State), Testimony before the Senate Budget Committee on the Department of State's fiscal year 2005 operating budget (February 2004)

<sup>72</sup> U.S. - *Fiscal Year 2005 Budget* (Released April 9, 2004).

<sup>73</sup> U.S. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld quoted in Gertz, *op. cit.*

<sup>74</sup> PBS Online newshour, *Reaching out*, *op. cit.*

<sup>75</sup> C. Weiser, "Report lists 'public diplomacy' failures", *USA Today*, September 15, 2003.

communications overseas, and new requirements that hiring and promotions within the department be based in part on public diplomacy experience.<sup>76</sup> A bill that passed in August 2003, created an Office of Global Internet Freedom with the function of reaching out to foreign populations by evading the opposition of local governments.<sup>77</sup> At the same time, a new committee, headed by former diplomat Edward P. Djerejian, was established to study the American methods and to recommend steps to improve on any weaknesses.<sup>78</sup>

It is interesting to note that a similar increase in the mass diplomacy budget as well as similarity in terms of restructuring is to be seen in the majority of Anglo-Saxon nations where it was promoted to priority foreign policy status in 2001. This process has in effect reached a climax through the year 2003 in Great Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.<sup>79</sup> Other states such as Spain, Italy, Japan and Poland, on the forefront of the battle against terrorism because of their alliance with Anglo-Saxon nations, have also reacted in the same way by creating, sometimes in tragic circumstances, a mass diplomacy program. Al Qaeda's 3-11 attacks in Madrid were Spain's 9-11 wake-up call on public diplomacy. The "Attocha Lesson" like that of the Twin Towers for the United States and Bali for Australia has been that global terrorism is an unpredictable threat that can be fought better at the level of public opinion than with the military force alone.<sup>80</sup>

In a general way, terror and counter terror, which are mostly media-based and psychological, have joined to accelerate the resurgence of mass diplomacy begun at the end of the 1990's. This reality is put perfectly by the British expert, Monroe E. Price, in his article entitled "Public Diplomacy and the Transformation of International Broadcasting":

The events of September 11 and the war against terrorism brought to the foreground debates over the future of public diplomacy and the future of international broadcasting. These debates sharpened an understanding of the interest one society has in the media space of others. There are few other contexts in which there is so direct a discussion of a national purpose to alter the mix of voices, to affect the market for loyalties, to achieve greater civic participation in target societies and finally, to win over hearts and minds.<sup>81</sup>

<sup>76</sup> U.S. - House of Representative, CIR, "The Foreign Relations...", *op. cit.*

<sup>77</sup> K. Poulsen, "U.S. Sponsors Anti-Censorship Web Service", *SecurityFocus*, August 26, 2003.

<sup>78</sup> R. Satloff (Director of policy and strategic planning of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy), "How to Win Friends and Influence Arabs: Rethinking Public Diplomacy in the Middle East", *Weekly Standard*, August 18, 2003; Weiser, *op. cit.*

<sup>79</sup> Here too, the explanation is undoubtedly due to the fact that these countries were more directly targeted by the events of the opening years of the millenium. It is these countries that were the most involved in the anti-terrorist campaign and have, by this fact, become more sensitive earlier than others to the utility of a diplomatic strategy based on public persuasion.

<sup>80</sup> Several articles discuss this issue: J.C. Hulsman, "After Madrid: war, prevention, dialogue?", *openDemocracy*, March 29, 2004; J.B. Roberts II, "Spain in revolt", *Washington Times*, March 18, 2004; N. Kraleov, "Cultural Diplomacy Pays Off", *The Washington Times*, March 22, 2004.

<sup>81</sup> Price, "Public Diplomacy...", *op. cit.*, 91.

The dramatic context of the beginning of the millennium has been a catalyst for the growth of mass diplomacy. That said, terror and counter terror are but accelerators and not causes of a process begun independently prior to September 11 caused, as we have seen, by the deepening of the information revolution and the growing of the information society.

#### **4. Beyond the War on Terror: A Process of Global Adaptation**


Once again, it is important to insist on the fact that the heightening of the information revolution and the new operational landscape it has generated constituted the necessary enabling cause of the re-emergence of public diplomacy while the terrorist boom is only the catalyst which has accelerated in a dramatic way its upsurge. Crisis does not constitute the necessary cause of the emergence of mass diplomacy. To use Thucydides' words, the second force is a facilitator, while the first is the *aletestaté prophasis* or older and truer cause of the phenomenon.<sup>82</sup> This point is crucial for assessing the durability of mass diplomacy as a global phenomenon and for assuring that it is not a crisis measure but a permanent dimension of the new world order. In other words, this allow saying that mass diplomacy is an aspect of the diplomatic landscape that is likely to persist because its emergence was sparked by the media-saturated nature of the system rather than by the furtive events of the moment.

Two elements strengthen this argument. Firstly, as we saw with the Anglo-Saxon nations, it is bolstered by the fact that public diplomacy's renewal is accompanied not only by budgetary increases that can easily be rescinded when the crisis has faded, but also by an in depth reorganization of the foreign policy structure and apparatus. The other element that suggests that the new diplomacy is larger than the terrorist crisis is that it is developing in a growing number of nations not directly concerned or implicated in the war on terror as members of the coalition led by the United States. From 2002-2003, the affirmation of mass diplomacy as a distinct foreign policy concentration with increasing financial means and institutional importance became clear in a growing number of countries around the globe from France to China even though that growth may be less spectacular than in the case of the Anglo-Saxon powers. Whatever their degree of involvement, more and more nations are currently investing in a constant but discrete effort to rationalize this branch of their foreign policy.

### a. The French Case

This trend is particularly apparent in France, where mass diplomacy has been discreetly but speedily re-organised as a powerful apparatus of global reach equipped with a robust array of cultural and communications instruments. While enjoying increasing attention since 1998, French mass diplomacy has been relatively unaffected by the climate of terror during the 2002-2003 period. After the advances of the years 1998-2000 and a small decline in 2001, allocations have

Figure 8: French Mass Diplomacy Budget through FY1999 to 2003 (in million euro)



only slowly climbed following the New York attacks (figure 8). In 2002, the DGCID, the principal unit responsible for public diplomacy within the ministry, had 1.15 billion euros available (1.65 billion if we consider Development Aid (AD) and European Development Funds (FED)) which represents 33% of the budget for the

ministry of foreign affairs (44% with AD and FED funds) but only a slight increase of 1% from fiscal year 2001.<sup>83</sup> The 2003 budget, responding to the second Gulf War, also showed only a very slight increase (barely 2%) with a budget of 1.178 billion euros (before AD and FED contributions).<sup>84</sup> This corresponded to the gentle but constant growth in the budget of the Foreign Affairs Ministry (+ 2.61% in 2003).<sup>85</sup> There were increases, but their small scope contrasted sharply with the spectacular growth in financial resources made available for American public diplomacy.

The other sign indicating the relative unresponsiveness of the French mass diplomacy to the climate of crisis is the absence of a geographic reorientation of the budget, similar to that carried out by Anglo-Saxon diplomacies. Unlike them the French budget was not reprioritized toward new strategic zones including in particular the Muslim world (programs targeting the Middle East make up only 7% of the total budget). The priority zones for French public strategy continue to

<sup>82</sup> Thucydide, *Histoire de la guerre du Péloponnèse*, translated and introduced by Jacqueline de Romilly (Paris: R. Laffont, 1990).

<sup>83</sup> Although if we include the AD and FED contributions, the DGCID's allocation rises from 1.65 billion to 2.03 billion euros- an increase of 23.6%.


<sup>84</sup> France - Sénat, "Affaires étrangères : Aide au développement", in *Projet de loi de finances pour 2003...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>85</sup> It must be noted that foreign affairs' budget share in the total of French state budget is increased by 1,24% in 2003 and 1,25 % in 2004. France – MAE, DGA, Direction des affaires budgétaires et financières, *Le Projet de Budget 2004 du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères* (Paris, September 26, 2003).



correspond to traditional French spheres of influence (figure 9). At most, the terrorist crisis confirmed the necessity of operating within the Arab and Muslim world. The DGCID's priority targets remained Western Europe and the community of states of the "Francophonie" – the French-speaking world.

Figure 9: French Mass Diplomacy Budget by Regions for Fiscal Year 2002



If there has been a reaction on the part of French diplomacy during the period of crisis it has been most significant in terms of a counter-offensive against the Bush Administration than against the threat of terrorism. As Dominique de Villepin put it in his recent work, the intention of the Quai d'Orsay was to promote the "Other vision of the world" in opposition to that of the United States.<sup>86</sup> What Stanley Hoffman calls the "lucid idealism" of French diplomacy was then dictated by general considerations, beyond the specific context of the terrorist crisis and the anti-terrorist reaction. It is to a great extent the perceived need to adapt French foreign policy to the global information age that has underpinned the development of French mass diplomacy; a development that is not antithetical to the context of terrorism, but responds to more fundamental preoccupations related to the new relationship between media and diplomacy. French leaders, as well as for many counterparts across the planet, were becoming aware that in the information age, "the traditional diplomatic channels offer only partial answers."<sup>87</sup> It had become apparent that in this media-saturated environment "the use of force is nothing without the meaning and justification that culture and information bring."<sup>88</sup> French authorities acquired the certainty that it is now crucial to obtain the ability to influence foreign public opinion or else stagnate.

The effort invested in the new diplomacy was displayed less in budget increases and more in structural reforms with long term orientations. This reform, accelerated by the post 2001

<sup>86</sup> D. de Villepin, *Un Autre Monde*, pref. by Stanley Hoffmann (Paris: L'Herne, 2003).

<sup>87</sup> France - Villepin, "Dizième Conférence...", *op. cit.*

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*

climate<sup>89</sup>, had been undertaken well before the crisis. Alain Juppé and Hubert Védrine, Villepin's predecessors at the Quai d'Orsay, had already emphasised the development of the audiovisual and communication sector and instigated its reform at the end of the 1990's. For a number of years, the DGCID drove itself to improve its tools and work methods by modernizing technical assistance and improving productivity and responsiveness. The priorities of this reform were, in particular: 1) to reinforce methods of coordinating the operations of the government agencies and external agencies (private, institutional, foreign); 2) to develop a more decentralized operational system; emphasizing partnership with the public sphere, the business world and NGOs; and to promote the role of private volunteerism; 3) to develop evaluation tools and programmes to measure the success of mass diplomacy; 4) modernise the technological infrastructure necessary for a diplomacy based on communication and information. On the whole, the general shape of these reforms were similar to those adopted in the Anglo-Saxon cases which also revolved around the intention to develop a mass diplomacy organized on a hybrid "bureaucratic-entrepreneurial" model which will be studied in the second part of this dissertation.

Of all these goals, it is without a doubt the modernization and rationalization of the external audiovisual sector that has been the priority of the moment. Here too, can be seen the depth of the information revolution and the accelerating effect of the terrorist crisis. It is the first explanation that Dominique de Villepin invokes to justify the modernisation of the French "diplomacy of persuasion": "great battles", declared the French minister for foreign affairs, "are first won not on the ground or in planning rooms, but in the opinions and thus in the arena of mass communication."<sup>90</sup> But it is undoubtedly the second explanation that spurred the process begun in 1997-1998; the acceleration was felt in particular in terms of the budget for the external audiovisual broadcasting. With a total of €210 million, the 2003 budget saw an increase of 11% over the preceding year; the budget for 2004 repeated this with a 12% increase and a total budget of €235 million.<sup>91</sup> To put these budgetary increases in perspective, the total French external audiovisual broadcasting effort (including TV5 and RFI) was about equal to that of BBC World

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<sup>89</sup> During this crisis and particularly during the televised sittings of the Security Counsel preceding the war in Iraq, Minister Villepin and his collaborators recognized the enormous importance of bringing the diplomacy to the cameras; S. Pinel, "Dominique de Villepin veut accélérer la mue du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères", *Le Monde*, August 28, 2002.

<sup>90</sup> France – D. de Villepin (Ministre des Affaires Étrangères), Audition du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères par la Mission d'Information Commune de l'Assemblée Nationale sur la Création d'une Télévision Française d'Information à vocation internationale (Paris, April 30, 2003).

<sup>91</sup> This evolution prolongs and goes beyond the growth of the rest of the French public audiovisual sphere: +3% in 2003 and +5,6% in 2004; *Le Monde*, "L'audiovisuel public doit bénéficier d'une dotation en hausse de 3 %", September 26, 2003.

and below that of the budget of Deutsche Welle (€300 millions).<sup>92</sup> The effort is there and seems to have accelerated during the years 2002-2004. Nevertheless, the authorities agree that the priority must be the restructuring and rationalizing of the French broadcasting operations in the world rather than simply increasing its budget.<sup>93</sup> This conviction is especially clear in the area of television.

The French authorities realized that in spite of significant sums of money devoted to the communication sector, France did not have an effective external audiovisual vehicle. A 2002 report by the Cour des Comptes showed that the division of funds between TV5, Arte and Euronews undermined the homogeneity of the French strategy and inhibited France's voice from being clearly heard on the international media stage.<sup>94</sup> The impulse to consolidate the French television presence in the service of mass diplomacy came from the very top of the French state apparatus. In February 2002, President Jacques Chirac emphasized the importance of such a broadcasting consolidation:

Is it understandable that year after year, we continue to deplore the persistent deficiencies of Francophone news and audiovisual broadcasting on the world scene? [...] Certainly, we all acknowledge the recent progress that has been made by RFI, by TV5, by CFI thanks to the efforts of their teams and public authorities. But each of us knows that we are still far from having at our disposal a great French international news network, capable of rivalling the BBC or CNN. The recent crises have shown that a country, a cultural community, is at a great disadvantage if it does not carry the necessary weight in the battlefield of images and airwaves. We must ask ourselves, in this time of Hertzian networks, of satellites, and of the internet, about our strategy in this domain and in particular about the scattering in of public funds that are devoted to the subject.<sup>95</sup>

Jacques Chirac was pleading for the creation of a great French international news network: "We must be ambitious and envision a great French international news network, the equal of the BBC or CNN for the Anglophones. It is essential for our country's influence."<sup>96</sup> To respond to this ambition a sizeable study of the various means of creating an international French news network was launched which brought together parliament, the ministry of foreign affairs, the ministry of culture and communication, as well as the public or private broadcasters. The climate of crisis helped: only two years separated the announcement and its implementation in late 2004. Time

<sup>92</sup> France's effort to extend its radio, television and Internet coverage around the world only represents 9% of public funding given to national operators, an effort only slightly superior to that invested in the coverage of overseas French territories with Radio France Outre-mer (with a budget of 195 millions euros) or for the Franco-German cultural channel ARTE (with 178 millions euros from the French government); France - Villepin, Audition du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères..., *op. cit.*

<sup>93</sup> France - Sénat, "Culture et Communication...", in *Projet de loi de finances pour 2003...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>95</sup> France - J. Chirac (Président de la République), Allocution du Président de la République lors de la réception en l'honneur du Haut Conseil de la francophonie (Paris, Palais de l'Elysée, February 12, 2002).

<sup>96</sup> France - J. Chirac (Président de la République), Discours du Président de la République devant les représentants des Français de l'étranger (Paris, Palais du Luxembourg, March 7, 2002).

was of the essence, especially since CNN was working on a French version.<sup>97</sup> The general shape of the world news network was made public in September 2003 in the context of a report on the restructuring of the whole of France's external broadcasting.<sup>98</sup> CFII was designed to be a hybrid semi-private, semi-public network with an annual budget of 70 million euros provided to a great extent by the State.<sup>99</sup>

But what is the motivation behind the "Chaîne Française d'Information Internationale" (CFII)? If the date of its announcement indicates that its implementation was precipitated by the climate of the explosive growth of international terrorism, the real reasons behind its conception relate to the information revolution and to the new political stakes that the revolution implies. Villepin states this clearly: "Television is now a leading player in international events. It interacts with events and has even acquired the power to create or deny events according to what it shows or chooses not to show. To be a major player in the world [...] broadcasting is a necessary central weapon."<sup>100</sup> Public authorities are motivated by the desire to stay in the race for the conquest of the audiovisual market share and to not lose ground to foreign rivals whether they be the "Anglo-Saxon giants" (CNN, Fox News, BBC World, etc.) or new "regional competitors" (Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabia, etc.).<sup>101</sup> Officially, the goal is to defend the French vision of the world from, on one side, the "globalization" camp, and on the other, the "essentialist" camp. In reality, the creation of a "French CNN" is intended to serve France's new "soft power" ambitions.<sup>102</sup>

#### b. The Senior Practitioners

A similar logic is at play within a good number of foreign policy organizations around the world. If the events of 2001-2003 had the effect of justifying the status and resources of mass diplomacy amongst nations that already had such a foreign policy branch, it also encouraged those nations who had none, to follow the example of their predecessors and acquire a mass diplomacy infrastructure.

<sup>97</sup> B. Mathieu, "M. Brochand pose les bases de la chaîne d'information mondiale française", *Le Monde*, October 1, 2003.

<sup>98</sup> G. Dutheil and B. Mathieu, "Les conclusions du rapport Brochand", *Le Monde*, October 2, 2003.

<sup>99</sup> Within a five year period, its information broadcastings, essentially furnished by *Agence France Presse*, are diffused in priority over Europe, Africa, and the Middle East before being bolstered over other zones including Asia and Americas. It is also planned to put in place special version designed for arabophone and Anglophone markets; B. d'Armagnac, G. Dutheil and F. Lemaître. "Pour le PDG de TF1, la chaîne internationale démarrera plutôt fin 2004", *Le Monde*, October 7, 2003..

<sup>100</sup> France - Villepin, "Audition du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères...", *op. cit.*

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>102</sup> J. Charmelot, "Now is France's opportunity to make 'soft power' relevant", *The Daily Star*, Aug. 24, 2002.

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks and the “War on Terrorism” proclaimed by U.S.-president George W. Bush, mass diplomacy – especially with regard to the Islamic world – has resolutely left its previous *niche* existence within **German** foreign policy. “If the time for the Goethe-Institut is not now, then it never will be.” This statement by journalist Heinrich Wefing, appearing in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* on November 2001, refers to the effects 9-11 attacks had on German mass policy propelling it suddenly at the forefront of many peoples’ minds.<sup>103</sup> After 2001 many politicians and intellectuals, who recognized the shortcomings of conventional security policy in the strained relations between the Middle East and “the West”, emphasized the role of foreign education, cultural policy and international public broadcasting to reach a better understanding with foreign cultures and thus to contribute to the prevention of conflicts.<sup>104</sup> Yet, as in the French case, the German resurgence does not demonstrate the budgetary leaps that occurred in the cases of the Anglo-Saxon nations, but instead shows a modest increase in 2002. German mass diplomacy experienced a stable evolution much like that of French mass diplomacy. With a total budget of €567 million, in 2002 the Federal Foreign Office provided cultural diplomacy with only a meagre increase of €5 million or a 1.06% increase compared to the two previous years. The Federal Foreign Office's expenditure on mass diplomacy also remained stable with 26% of its total budget (2001: 27%).<sup>105</sup>

The dynamic within the Auswärtiges-Amt is best characterized by a changing perception in regards to the strategic utility of mass diplomacy; a change triggered not only by the terrorist crisis, but also by the new challenges of the information age. Stefan Weidner, editor-in-chief of the journal *Fikrun wa Fann* published by Goethe Institute/Inter Nationes, confirms in his analysis not only an up-grading of cultural relations with the Islamic world, but also a “change of awareness” on the German side which ultimately transformed mass diplomacy from a “passive, largely reactive policy into an actively initiatory approach.”<sup>106</sup> German mass diplomacy specialists consider that the shocks of 11 September and its aftermath may have helped foreign cultural policy to get the attention it deserved but that the change is long term in nature. For them, mass diplomacy has emancipated itself as an equal building block in a comprehensive framework

<sup>103</sup> M. Daum and S. Whatley, “Goethe Institut Inter Nationes: German Foreign Cultural Policy within the Field of Library & Information Services”, *WESS Newsletter* 25, no2 (Spring 2002).

<sup>104</sup> J. Ebert, “The Goethe Institute in Islamic Countries: Preventing Conflict Through Cultural and Educational Exchange”, in Overhaus & al., *op. cit.*, 5.

<sup>105</sup> Germany - Auswärtiges Amt, *Federal Government Expenditure on Cultural Relations Policy* (Feb. 2003).

<sup>106</sup> Ebert, *op. cit.*, in Overhaus & al., *op. cit.*, 11.

for German foreign policy.<sup>107</sup> This movement has resulted, as in the French case, in structural reforms influencing in particular the modernization of external audiovisual broadcasting and its infrastructure. The Director General of Deutsche Welle, Erik Bettermann, emphasized on the fiftieth anniversary of the international German network that the promotion of German influence on the international scene has been a part, is a part and will always be a part of his mission. He added that in coming years efforts will be devoted to the rapid implementation of the reform process already under way for several years.<sup>108</sup> This implies among other things the integration of the latest digital technology for production and broadcasting and the implementation of projects such as DW-TV and DW-Radio programmes as well as the website DW-World.de.

After 9-11, other pioneers of mass diplomacy continued their efforts to develop a distinct and autonomous foreign policy concentration. But these efforts nevertheless happened within the context of a general process of reorganization and reorientation of foreign policy in response to the changing nature of the international system and the increasingly important role now played by information and communication technology.

- The decision-makers of the Palazzo Farnese, whose infrastructure underwent major renovations since 2000, came to consider that to keep pace with today's changing international scenarios and to remain competitive, it is imperative for **Italian** foreign policy to streamline its cultural and informational diplomacy by equipping it with better technological resources to allow it to reach foreign audiences.<sup>109</sup> As with their counterparts in other nations, they too have been involved for a number of years in a process of reform, an expression of confidence in the ability of mass diplomacy to promote national objectives abroad.<sup>110</sup> In December 2003, the "Gasparri" law redefined the whole of the Italian broadcasting apparatus allowing, while partially privatizing the RAI, the strengthening and expansion of the effective operational scope of RAI Internazionale, principal broadcasting vehicle for Italian mass diplomacy.

- **Japan** has also continued to concentrate the reorganisation of its foreign policy around the implementation of a modern cultural diplomacy capable of exploiting its soft power potential.<sup>111</sup> In late 2002, Japan's Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi, confirmed that "cultural power stands

<sup>107</sup> Overhaus, *op. cit.*, in *ibid.*, 4.

<sup>108</sup> *Deutsche Welle* homepage: [www.DW-WORLD.DE](http://www.DW-WORLD.DE).

<sup>109</sup> Baldocci, *op. cit.*

<sup>110</sup> Canada - DFAIT, Graham, *A Dialogue...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>111</sup> Japan - New Komeito Center, "Chapter 8: Establishing a peaceful foreign policy by making the best use of our *soft power*" (NKC, 2002).

alongside economic power as an important pillar of Japanese foreign policy.”<sup>112</sup> Following the example of France, Germany and many others, Japan concentrated its efforts on external audiovisual broadcasting. In March 2003, conscious of the technological and political instability affecting the world of broadcasting, the Lower House and the Upper House jointly and unanimously endorsed a major financial increase for NHK (Japan's BBC). The increased budget had the goal of allowing the Japanese international network to face crisis situations but also to uphold long term goals of promoting Japanese vision and values in the world. For this purpose, steps were taken to incorporate the latest technical innovations into broadcasting with, for instance, the development of a super high-definition image system.

The joint effect of the information revolution and the terrorist crisis has naturally been deeply felt within the Muslim world, where it has stimulated other pioneers of mass diplomacy to redouble their efforts. Since 2002-2003, competition has raged between the principal entrepreneurs of the diplomacy of persuasion in the region.

- In **Iran**, political and foreign policy leaders have continued to give priority to the development of programs destined for foreign consumption with a particular emphasis on the broadcasting of news.<sup>113</sup> The Islamic republic intends to accomplish this mission with the help of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Broadcasting (IRIB) and its powerful national news agency IRNA but also with the help of sophisticated broadcasting capabilities acquired in 2004 through new international communication satellites.<sup>114</sup>

- Though a late-comer, **Qatar** holds one of the most effective mass diplomacy tools. Majority-owned by the Qatari government and beamed via satellite to millions of viewers, Al-Jazeera continues its effort to be the dominant media presence in Arab homes around the world. In November 2003, Al-Jazeera appointed a new board of directors and a new manager in a reshuffle to “enhance the station's capabilities and ensure standards of professionalism.”<sup>115</sup> In addition, at the end of 2004, Qatar will launch a pan-Arab satellite channel for children, which has the goal of “offering educational programming that is both playful and appealing.”<sup>116</sup> But upstart Qatari network is only a drop, although still the biggest, in the ocean of the middle-eastern broadcasting

<sup>112</sup> Japan - Task Force on Foreign Relations for the Prime Minister, *Basic Strategies for Japan's Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: New Era, New Vision, New Diplomacy* (November 28, 2002).

<sup>113</sup> *IRIB News*, “Leader stresses importance of news”, January 11, 2004.

<sup>114</sup> *BBCWS*, “Tehran aims for satellite launch”, January 5, 2004.

<sup>115</sup> *BBCWS*, November 25, 2003,.

<sup>116</sup> This project has been initiated by the Qatari foundation for Science and Education, headed by the Emir's spouse, cheikha Mouza Bent Nasser Al-Misnad, and the Doha-based Al-Jazeera satellite TV network; AFP, “Lancement fin 2004 au Qatar d'une chaîne satellitaire panarabe pour enfants”, January 11, 2004.

scene. It must contend with increasingly staunch rivals. New satellite channels like Abu Dhabi TV, US Radio Sawa and Lebanon's Al-Manar TV have stimulated competition.

- The determined **Saudi Arabian** response must also be taken into account. After decades of public diplomacy and religious proselytizing of a traditional nature such as massive distribution of Korans and the financing of mosques and madrassahs, the Wahhabite regime has broached the era of cyber diplomacy with, in January 2004, the launch of al-Ikhbariya, its first all-news satellite television channel. According to the Saudi authorities, Saudi Arabia's fourth state-owned TV channel is intended to present a new image of the Gulf Arab state.<sup>117</sup> In addition, in March 2004, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia ordered the creation of a new organization baptized as "the Civil Saudi Council for aid and charitable acts overseas", charged with allowing Saudi Arabia to better coordinate the development of Sunni Islam around the world.<sup>118</sup> This reform came after certain Saudi charitable organisations were accused of financing terrorism.<sup>119</sup>

### c. The Neophytes

Since 2002, the phenomenon of mass diplomacy has reached a group of nations that had been without a mass diplomacy program before. The example of pioneers and the climate of crisis have in effect pushed a certain number of chancelleries to develop this branch of their foreign policy. But many of them have been motivated above all by the certainty that new strategies aimed at influencing foreign public opinion had become an indispensable element of foreign policy in an increasingly media saturated international landscape.

- **Russia** jumped directly from the age of Soviet propaganda to the era of modern mass diplomacy. Moscow had essentially dismantled its vast public relations apparatus during the time following the end of the Cold War, with the exception of the renown Tass agency, leaving Russia without a voice on the international scene. Faced with a world in a state of profound evolution, this "still great power" had little choice but to restructure the organisation of its foreign policy.<sup>120</sup> As Igor Ivanov, architect of this reform, has emphasized, the development of emotional contacts with overseas audiences is becoming one of the most important aspects of its "new foreign policy."<sup>121</sup> "[T]he new Russia", considers the former Russian foreign affairs minister, "should be understandable by the mind; understandable both to its own citizens and to foreign publics.

<sup>117</sup> *BBCWS*, "Saudi TV news channel goes on air", January 12, 2004.

<sup>118</sup> *AFP*, February 28, 2004

<sup>119</sup> M. Abdelhadi, "Saudi charity head dismissed", *BBCWS*, January 8, 2004.

<sup>120</sup> I.S. Ivanov (Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs), *La Politique Étrangère de la Russie à l'Époque de la Mondialisation* (Moscou: Olma-Press, 2002).



Herein lies the chief meaning of [its] public diplomacy.”<sup>122</sup> Abundantly endowed with diplomats experienced in matters of influence and persuasion, Russia will most likely assume a position amongst the leaders of mass diplomacy in the years to come.

- In 2004, **China**, the other important absentee on the mass diplomacy scene, decided to take a great leap forward in this direction. In recent years, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has made efforts to be more public-oriented, but Beijing remained, with Moscow, the only great capital still without a public diplomacy worthy of the name. In March 2004, the Information Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs invited experts and scholars from the Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee, the Information Office of the State Council, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, several Universities, the Foreign Affairs College, the Institute of Modern International Relations as well as the Xinhua News Agency to discuss and lay the foundations of China's public diplomacy. At this occasion, assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, Shen Guofang noted there that it would take time before China catches up with the development of public diplomacy in some developed countries.<sup>123</sup> But to this end, a Division for Public Diplomacy has been established under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The present effort is aimed at exploring ideas, channels and measures with regard to public diplomacy to bring about a new positioning of public diplomacy in China. Symptomatic of this new awareness, the *People's Daily*, noted recently that mass diplomacy had become an unavoidable element of the foreign policy of a country allowing it to serve its interests by forging relationships with people outside the upper class in foreign countries, classes which, with the progress of the information age, had grown to play a more pivotal role than they used to.<sup>124</sup>

- Also in the process of reforming the spectrum of its foreign policy institutions, **Norway**, like other Scandinavian states, has in recent years equipped itself with a mass diplomacy apparatus. Like New Zealand, the Scandinavian kingdom follows the British model. The current project is to implement the ‘Norwegian Public Diplomacy Board’ - a new central strategic group with high-level political leadership and substantial external participation from business, communications and civil society. According to Mark Leonard, to be effective, this ‘Public Diplomacy Board’ still needs to be based on necessary authority (power), sufficient funding (resources) and competent

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<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>122</sup> Russia - Igor S. Ivanov (Minister of Foreign Affairs), “A New Foreign Policy Year for the World and Russia”, *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn Magazine* 9-10 (2003) (translation released by the Ministry Of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Information And Press Department, October 22 2003).

<sup>123</sup> China - MFA of the People's Republic of China, “Academic Seminar on China's Public Diplomacy” (MFA, March 19, 2004).

<sup>124</sup> *People's Daily* (China), March 24, 2004.

leadership (daring and speed).”<sup>125</sup> In the long term, by aligning new communication and information tools with the conduct of traditional diplomacy, Norway’s goal is to transcend its modest size and geo-political weakness to assume a position of influence far beyond its actual condition would suggest.<sup>126</sup>

- East Asian countries such as **Thailand**, **Indonesia** and **Malaysia** increasingly believe that their soft power resources, derived from culture and information, can be greatly effective in enhancing their standing in the world. Their governments invest increasing effort in the creation of up-to-date soft power diplomacy systems and the acquisition of telecommunication resources in order to strengthen their influence on the regional and international scene. “Indonesia has built up its soft power considerably [...] whereas Thailand is fully involved in cultural diplomacy and uses soft power to gain better standing in world politics and influence.”<sup>127</sup> A public diplomacy department has been created within the Indonesian Foreign Affairs Ministry. Even Malaysia, profiting from the experience of its President Than Shwe in psychological warfare, has acquired a cyber-diplomacy apparatus operated by the Myanmar TV and Radio department. Public Diplomacy is already so well developed in the region that it has become a channel for interaction and competition between Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur.<sup>128</sup>

- Mass diplomacy has overnight become one of the top ten priorities of **South African** foreign policy.<sup>129</sup> South African mass diplomacy is charged with communicating South African foreign policy goals, position and achievements, seeking appropriate global positioning for RSA through marketing (imaging and branding), facilitating the development of a unified and consistent image of South Africa, collaborating with the International Marketing Council, creating and sustaining a tailored and single-minded South Africa brand message, synergising the various marketing and promotional campaigns, supervising the development and distribution of media products, and creating an informative, up to date and well maintained departmental website communication and media strategy.<sup>130</sup> With the help of this quiet diplomacy, South Africa intends to build bridges with foreign audiences and consolidate its position as a continental ‘big brother’.<sup>131</sup>

- **Israel** made many vain attempts at launching a mass diplomacy program between 1999 and 2001. Faced with the deterioration of its image and the strategic importance that this issue holds, the Israeli government has undertaken to definitively bridge this gap in 2003 by depending in

<sup>125</sup> M. Leonard and A. Small, *Norway’s Public Diplomacy* (London: Foreign Policy Center, 2003), 61-62.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*, 12.

<sup>127</sup> E.T.ChuCheow, “Changes and Transitions in the East Asian Region”, *PacNetNewsletter*49 (nov. 2002).

<sup>128</sup> “An Act Of Diplomacy Or a PR Exercise?”, *The Star/ANN*, April 4, 2004.

<sup>129</sup> South Africa - Department of Foreign Affairs, “Priority Six: Public Diplomacy”, in *Strategic Plan 2003-2005* (DFA, 2003), 55.

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid.*

particular on the advice of British, Canadian and American experts.<sup>132</sup> “No country has a more urgent public-relations task than Israel. And no country has performed that task so negligently” commented an article in the *Jerusalem Post*.<sup>133</sup> In the context of escalating crisis in the Middle-East, Israel has begun taking steps to develop this missing branch of its international policy. In December 2003, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon approved the creation of a beefed-up public relations program.<sup>134</sup> With a modest budget of \$9 million, the embryo of Israeli mass diplomacy benefits nonetheless from an unprecedented coordination among several key ministries to improve an image that has become exceptionally tarnished abroad.

- Elsewhere in the Near East, in a climate exacerbated by influence and counter influence, other states are jumping on the mass diplomacy bandwagon. In the Arabian peninsula, **Dubai**, an international geopolitical hodgepodge, has been trying recently to establish itself as a major player in the political broadcasting market with the launch during the Iraq crisis of the new Al-Arabya TV network. Owned by MBC (Middle East Broadcasting Center) and presided over by a member of the royal family, the network has a budget of 300 million dollars for the next five years in order to establish the regional and international influence of the Arab emirate.<sup>135</sup> **Egypt, Pakistan and Morocco** have in recent months equipped themselves with modern propaganda machines mixing popular culture, ideological debate and news with a foreign population in mind. In July 2003, the **Jordanian** army radio launched its own news station based on the pop-Arabic music format. “Others are to follow”, prophesies Robert Satloff, director of policy and strategic planning at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. If other countries such as North Korea “haven't gotten used to public diplomacy yet,” everything seems to be pushing them now in that direction.<sup>136</sup>

## Conclusion

The explosive growth of global terrorism in the opening years of the millennium have spurred the foreign policy ministries around the world to hasten the development of mass diplomacy projects begun at the end of the 1990's. 10 years after the end of the Cold War, 9-11 and its aftermath have unleashed a new type of ideological conflict, a new Cold War, that has launched

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<sup>131</sup> C. Dempster, “South Africa's 'silent' diplomacy”, *BBC Harare*, March 5, 2003.

<sup>132</sup> Gilboa, in ISA 2004, *op. cit.*

<sup>133</sup> *Jerusalem Post*, November 13, 2003.

<sup>134</sup> G. Rosenblatt, “Israel Targets PR, Finally”, *The Jewish Week* (New York), December 12, 2003.

<sup>135</sup> H. Tewfik, “La nouvelle télévision arabe Al-Arabiya part à l'assaut d'Al-Jazira”, *Le Monde*, March 15, 2003.

<sup>136</sup> *New York Times*, April 20, 2004.

mass diplomacy to the top of political agendas by pushing governments to become aware that convincing the masses is now as important as convincing their political leaders. But although global terrorism focused attention on mass diplomacy and accelerated its renewal, it has not been the fundamental reason for its return. The terrorist shock was not the cause of the process that had begun prior to the attacks and that will probably continue after the effects of the crisis have passed. Other crises of this type might occur that will accelerate or, on the contrary, impede the development of mass diplomacy. The phenomenon itself is independent of these historical epiphenomena because the underlying structural conditions, the explosive growth of NICTs and the information society are now unavoidable parameters of the new international order. Therefore, it is because it does not depend on topical incidents but on one of the distinctive features of the new world order that mass diplomacy is destined to play a permanent and important role in the years to come.

We are taking part in a global restructuring process of foreign policy that reveals itself in particular in the increased institutionalisation of mass diplomacy as a distinct concentration. "Once the stepchild of diplomats", wrote a Canadian specialist, "it now assumes its rightful place at the centre of diplomatic relations."<sup>137</sup> In a growing number of countries, this sophisticated *kulturpolitik* tends to be organised in autonomous spheres with its own action strategy, its own specialists, agencies and high-tech communication facilities. As we will see in the next chapter, leaders and foreign policy makers increasingly view it as an ideal option for the pursuit of national goals, fully adapted to the reality of a globalized and interdependent world with the special advantage of involving a lesser amount of violence and coercion than the traditional methods of gunboat and dollar diplomacy. This is probably the first stages of the development of this foreign policy concentration but with the constant progress of communication technologies and the growing importance of the information society, it seems off to an auspicious future. This trend holds the promise to result in the apparition of a new arena of international competition, an arena in which states will compete to channel information, to control the "truth", to control what the masses should believe and how their governments will react. With technological globalisation and the soft power revolution, this new age of international competition is already looming, previewing the strategic role that an effective diplomacy targeting "hearts and minds" could come to play.

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<sup>137</sup> Potter, "Canada and...", *op. cit.*, 1.

## **Chapter V. Soft Power Strategies and Hard Power Goals: Mass Diplomacy in the Eyes of Policy Makers**

### **Introduction**

The globalisation of the mass media revolution made possible the development of new horizons for public diplomacy while the explosive growth of global terrorism made clear the urgency of engaging with public opinion once again. Though taking into account these factors allows us to better understand the systemic environment that stimulates the growth of this branch of public diplomacy, it provides only a partial image of underlying motivations. To fully understand this phenomenon, we need to understand the considerations that push decision makers to give to it such importance. Why do foreign affairs leaders increase the resources and responsibilities of mass diplomacy and what are the tangible results that they expect? The key idea here is that the re-emergence of public diplomacy is largely conditioned by the perception and concrete hopes that political decision-makers have of the potential of mass diplomacy. The goals of this chapter are thus to complete the analysis of this re-emergence through an investigation aiming to dissect the reasoning of government officials. Of course, the goal is not to assess critically the validity of leaders' assumptions, but to uncover the reasoning that lies behind the growth of this 'new diplomacy'.

We are thus concerned with demonstrating that if mass diplomacy is returning in force to the fore of the diplomatic scene it is in large part because the decision-makers and foreign policy architects perceive it as a crucial dimension of international policy and as an indispensable element of the pursuit of foreign policy goals at the age of global information society. Analysis of speeches and official documents allows us to distinguish three levels of nuance in official discourse. First of all, this analysis makes clear that many believe that this public relations diplomacy can effectively benefit states in the international arena by creating a general environment that is more favourable to more amicable interactions with other states. Pushing the analysis farther, it is also clear that the capacity to act upon the opinions of foreign domestic populations is now perceived as a means of influencing the outcomes of international relations and facilitating the pursuit of national interests considered generally. Finally, we will see that for a growing number of leaders and foreign policy officials, mass diplomacy can advantageously be put to very precise uses, such as the growth of security and economic prosperity. In the process, this chapter will show that mass diplomacy, as it is conceived today, is a subtle mix of idealism and *realpolitik*, of advocacy of principle and extension of national interest.

## 1. A Dichotomy of Official Discourse on Mass Diplomacy

In recent years, mass diplomacy has become increasingly popular in foreign affairs ministries around the world. For Iranian, Japanese and Russian foreign policy makers it has become, respectively, an “indispensable line”, a “pivot”, or else, a “pillar” on the same level as other more conventional fields.<sup>1</sup> It is now accepted at the Quai d’Orsay that without it, the rest of diplomacy “would be frozen and impotent.”<sup>2</sup> The same is true in the United States where there is a consensus about its utility that is increasingly evident within American political classes<sup>3</sup>. Mass diplomacy is seen as “as a critical component, almost a centerpiece at this point in time in history of America’s foreign policy effort”<sup>4</sup>; a component now taken “very seriously.”<sup>5</sup> It is interesting to remember that the theoretical literature on the subject also suggests that it is an important aspect of foreign policy. A few decades ago, Karl Deutsch observed that “directly linked to the interests of each state [...] is the policy of diffusion of its own ideological propaganda in foreign countries, and the policy of support for cultural and scientific exchanges compatible with this goal.”<sup>6</sup> More recent authors explain this in underlining that that an implicit assumption among many leaders is that the promotion of a set of norms and values viewed as preferable for one’s own society as well as for the world in general is an important national goal.<sup>7</sup> It is important then to attempt to understand what, according to leaders, is the strategic utility of mass diplomacy and what precisely they expect from it; why do so many foreign policy makers believe that disseminating information and cultural values across international society can be beneficial to national interests? With this goal in mind, it is necessary start by establishing categories and dichotomies for the principal elements of the discourse in favour of mass diplomacy.

### a. Generating an Atmosphere of Trust

The most common reason advanced by decision-makers to explain the priority given to mass diplomacy is that it can serve to foster trust and understanding in foreign countries. Though it is a

<sup>1</sup> Ivanov, *La Politique Étrangère de la Russie...*, *op. cit.* ; Iran – Assefi, “Foreign Ministry’s Success...”, *op. cit.*, 8; Japan – Task Force on Foreign Relations for the Prime Minister, *Basic Strategies...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>2</sup> France – MAE, DGCID, “La Coopération et l’Action Culturelle, Instruments de Solidarité et d’Influence du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères” (DGCID, 2004).

<sup>3</sup> U.S. Rep. J. Leach (Iowa) in U.S. - House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, *The Role of Public Diplomacy In Support of The Anti-Terrorism Campaign* (Serial n°107-47, Oct. 10, 2001).

<sup>4</sup> U.S. Rep. W.D. Delahunt (Massachusetts) in *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> K. Deutsch, *The Analysis of International Relations*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1988), 87.

<sup>7</sup> J. Spanier and D. Wendzel, *Game Nations Play* (CQPress, 1996), 89.

reason that may be given above all to camouflage the ultimate strategic function of mass diplomacy, it occupies nonetheless an important place in the perception of public authorities. One of the central tenets of the German policy is to teach values and norms to foreign 'learning communities' in order to get them to know and understand Germany better. In doing so German mass diplomats hope to create networks and dialogue across ideological and cultural fault lines<sup>8</sup>. Adopting Wilfrid Laurier's idea that "the only way to defend one's ideas and principles is to make them known", Canadian policy also makes a considerable investment in the dissemination of Canadian pluralist values throughout the world. Their expectation is to express and promote Canada's unique identity amongst foreign populations and to build genuine relationships.<sup>9</sup> Creating understanding, goodwill and convergence are viewed in the DFAIT as indispensable for the process of establishing a relationship with solid foundations with partner countries<sup>10</sup>. Similarly, the Japanese consider that mass diplomacy is instrumental in attenuating ideological, cultural and ethnic differences, thus creating inter-societal rapprochement. They therefore believe that Japan must actively promote its culture abroad as a means of engendering trust among nations and building truly friendly relationships.<sup>11</sup>

Even if it is only an intermediate objective (from which governments hope to draw more material benefits) and does not provide a clear picture of the motivations behind the resurgence of mass diplomacy, the primary goal that current leaders assign to mass diplomacy seems genuinely to be building trust and empathy with foreign population. In recent years, promoting mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the peoples of the world through international information and cultural exchanges has become a "distinct and vital goal" for the State Department.<sup>12</sup> In the eyes of German decision makers, as in those of most of their counterparts, this facet of diplomacy is no more only a matter of "the good, the beautiful, the true"<sup>13</sup> or "some kind of frilly extra"<sup>14</sup>; rather it has become an integral part of foreign policy aimed at completing and sustaining the diplomatic process. In fact, explains Joshka Fisher, the head of the German Foreign Service, to develop emotional relations with civil societies abroad is today one the "real hard issues that foreign policy is all about"<sup>15</sup>. Iranian foreign policy makers

<sup>8</sup> Germany - Auswaertiges-Amt, "Strategy for the immediate future", in *Concept 2000...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>9</sup> Canada - DFAIT, *Canada in the World...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>10</sup> Potter, "Canada and...", *op. cit.*

<sup>11</sup> Japan - MOFA, "Chapter IV: International Exchange and Public Relations Activities", in *Blue Book 2000* (JMOFA, 2001), available @ <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2000/I-a.html>.

<sup>12</sup> U.S. - State Department, *Strategic Plan 2000*, *op. cit.*

<sup>13</sup> Germany - Auswaertiges-Amt, "Kulturpolitik Grundsätze - Principles of Cultural Diplomacy", in *Concept 2000...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>14</sup> Germany - Fischer, "Address at the opening of the...", *op. cit.*

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

also believe that a policy of persuasion based on the ‘dialogue of culture and civilisations’ holds the potential to improve the generally negative image of the Islamic Republic worldwide and constitutes therefore a crucial aim in itself.<sup>16</sup> It is a goal that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution, regularly speaks of himself as being supremely important for the future of Iran.<sup>17</sup> Similarly, Italian leaders consider that to establish deep-rooted and solid relations with foreign societies through the propagation of information and cultural values is a goal in itself that public relations diplomacy can achieve<sup>18</sup>. In a world of constant interaction, it is admitted that it is vital to international cohabitation to develop mutual comprehension and a dialogue between cultures. While the argument about the dialogue between cultures, as noble and sincere as it might be, it does not constitute the bottom line of the reasoning of political leaders in favour of mass diplomacy. To stop there would provide only a superficial and incomplete explanation of mass diplomacy’s present success.

#### b. Creating a Cooperative Relationship with Key Peoples

The argument about the creation of a dialogue between cultures and an exchange of information can be better understood by dissecting the reasoning upon which it reposes. This reasoning comprises three assumptions, shared by present leaders, upon which rest the justification of the development of mass diplomacy.

1) The first assumption, based on a gramscian model of reasoning (rather than a constructivist model), is that mass diplomacy is able to modify the value structure of targeted societies and to reorient them in this way towards a favourable orientation of preferences and perceptions. Accordingly, as Stanley Hoffmann put it, “power – my exercise of control over you – becomes the art of making you see the world the way I see it, and of making you behave in accordance with that vision.”<sup>19</sup> American officials have no doubts today that by educating and informing foreign populations and by familiarising them with their vision of the world, mass diplomacy will be able to reverse entrenched antagonism and win more sympathy and support. In 2000, at the *White House Conference on Diplomacy and Culture* Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright

<sup>16</sup> Iran – Assefi, “Foreign Ministry’s Success...”, *op. cit.*, 8.

<sup>17</sup> *IRIB News*, “Leader stresses...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>18</sup> Italy - Ministero degli affari esteri - Direzione Generale per le Relazioni Culturali, “Istituti Italiani di Cultura all’Estero” (released by la *Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana* 401 (december 22, 1990)). Article 2 of this legislation stipulates that : “1. La Repubblica promuove la diffusione all’estero della cultura e della lingua italiane, per contribuire allo sviluppo della reciproca conoscenza e della cooperazione culturale fra i popoli, nel Quadro dei rapporti che l’Italia intrattiene con gli altri Stati”.

<sup>19</sup> S. Hoffmann, *Gulliver’s Troubles, or The Setting of American Foreign Policy*(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), preface to the French Edition, 57.



affirmed this certainty and called for the further development of this branch of American diplomacy, then in its infancy.<sup>20</sup> Today, in the context of the aftermath of September 11<sup>th</sup>, there is hardly an official speech about American foreign policy where its importance for external psychological operations is not mentioned. This certainty seems to be reinforced by program evaluations showing that foreign populations exposed to mass diplomacy develop more empathy for their host country (see chapter 10)<sup>21</sup>. It is also founded on the idea that it is no longer wishful thinking but a tangible reality to the extent government now have available the means of communication and information necessary to act directly on the perception of foreign populations.<sup>22</sup> The influence that mass diplomacy can have on the structure of values of foreign populations tends also to be a unanimous conclusion in the British Foreign Office. According to top British mass diplomacy strategists, this approach can achieve a wide variety of results. Among other things, it is believed that it can increase foreign people's familiarity with one's country, increase their appreciation of one's country (by creating positive perceptions and manipulating others into seeing issues from the same perspective) and thereby enable them to engage with one's country (by encouraging them to buy British products or understand and subscribe to British practices and policies).<sup>23</sup>

2) Hidden behind the first, the second shared assumption is that by gaining the support of foreign populations mass diplomacy is an indirect means of influencing their governments. In other terms, bringing foreign masses to share a common vision of the world is viewed as an indirect means of applying pressure to their governments and gaining control over their agenda. Fifty years ago, visionary Hans Morgenthau had already conceived of the potential of this subtle diplomacy aiming to influence governments through their populations.<sup>24</sup> Today, with the revolution of mass media and the new opportunities that it offers in terms of the potential to influence of opinion, there is less and less doubt amongst foreign policy decision-makers that mass diplomacy can be a means of securing a partner's consent or support by modifying the will of significant segments of its population.

Today, foreign policy officials acknowledge the capacity of mass diplomacy to modify the perception of foreign voters and consumers for political ends in an almost unanimously way. A

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<sup>20</sup> Madeleine Albright declared: "many of our other more officials ambassadors have told me of the value that cultural programs have in improving perceptions about America"; see U.S. - Albright, *op. cit.*

<sup>21</sup> U.S. - State Department, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, *Annual Report 2002*, *op. cit.*

<sup>22</sup> U.S. - State Department, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, Office of International Information Programs, "About the Office of International Information Programs", available @ <http://usinfo.state.gov/about/index.htm> (acc. July 2004).

<sup>23</sup> Leonard and Stead, *op. cit.*, 9-10.

<sup>24</sup> Morgenthau, *op. cit.*, 74; See also K. Holsti, *International Politics* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1992), 116.

consultant for the Canadian government makes the point very clearly: "If there is initial resistance from the target government, it will be through public diplomacy that new alliances will be shaped with local groups to attempt to change policy."<sup>25</sup> U.S. decision makers also acknowledge that it can help building a corps of informed opinion leaders of strategic importance in the national political, economic, cultural, and social infrastructures of their countries.<sup>26</sup> The crucial purpose of the U.S. public diplomacy must be "to engage allies among the peoples of the world" Hyde considers; these "silent allies" "represent an enormous reservoir of strategic resources waiting to be utilized" explains the chairman of the *House International Relations Committee* adding that it is a convincing reason to devote more attention to the practice.<sup>27</sup>

3) A third assumption that flows logically from the two first is that mass diplomacy can favourably influence the results of relations between states. The idea is that it procures more control over the outcome of international interactions by re-shaping the opinion of foreign populations and by framing thereby the political agenda of their governments in a favourable sense. British experts express this postulate most clearly: public diplomacy cannot force partner governments to co-operate, "but what public diplomacy *can* do is change the environment in which the debate takes place, and this has a real effect on its outcome."<sup>28</sup>

For a number of years American experts have considered that the justification for a policy of persuasion resides in the capacity to generate a facilitating context for the United States. For them it is instrumental in creating emotional ties with foreign nations that provide in turn "a sensible context in which the United States can articulate its policy, intentions, and actions abroad more easily."<sup>29</sup> The State Department strategic plan stipulates clearly that mass diplomacy allows the U.S. to assemble a platform of international support from which it is easier to influence partner countries even when there is initial governmental resistance.<sup>30</sup>

At the Canadian DFAIT, there is little doubt that a country's success on the international scene increasingly depends on how it is perceived abroad and therefore, to a large extent, on the ability of its diplomacy to project its values, ideas and culture globally. For its officials, what they call "the open diplomacy, has the goal of giving depth and scope to the Canadian presence around the world"; if it is effective, they consider, "Canada will occupy its rightful place."<sup>31</sup> In 2003, within the context of the debate about the future of Canadian diplomacy, Foreign Minister Bill Graham

<sup>25</sup> Potter, "Canada and...", *op. cit.*, 19.

<sup>26</sup> U.S. - State Department, ECA, *Annual Report 2002*, *op. cit.*, 8.

<sup>27</sup> U.S., Hyde, "Speaking to Our Silent Allies...", *op. cit.*

<sup>28</sup> Leonard and Noble, *op. cit.*

<sup>29</sup> U.S. - State Department, ECA, *Annual Report 2002*, *op. cit.*

<sup>30</sup> U.S. - State Department, *Strategic Plan 2000*, *op. cit.*

<sup>31</sup> Canada - DFAIT, *2002-2003 Estimates...*, *op. cit.*, 35.

reiterated his confidence in mass diplomacy to create a more favourable environment for the pursuit of Canada's global ambitions.<sup>32</sup>

The same argument appears in a similar vein elsewhere around the world. The Iranian foreign minister, Dr. Kamal Kharrazi is convinced that Iran can depend on mass diplomacy to inflect world public opinion in its favour allowing Iran to acquire a better foothold in the international arena. It's from this perspective that we must understand his support for mass diplomacy: "the need to expand cultural relations with other countries is as pressing as that of enhancing classic diplomatic ties."<sup>33</sup> Old hands at this aspect of foreign policy, the French consider, for their part, that this diplomacy conducted "in the public space" is one of the best guarantees of the expansion of national influence internationally and key resources allowing a more central diplomatic position to be occupied.<sup>34</sup> Their Italian, Japanese and German counterparts also share the idea that mass diplomacy can make valuable contributions by encouraging a friendly environment and a dynamic of good will and voluntary co-operation among their partners.<sup>35</sup>

### c. Fostering Hard Interests

These three postulates allow us to better understand the principal reason why a growing number of decision-makers and foreign affairs officials now support the development of mass diplomacy: their reasoning rests on the relatively simple idea that it can actually maximise national interests abroad by influencing foreign nations through their public opinion. As Leonard and Stead explain, mass diplomacy is more than simply enchanting the populace and engaging government for the sake of it; if it is flourishing around the globe, it is because "it is about getting results."<sup>36</sup> An increasingly widespread belief among today's leaders is that, by cultivating special relationships with foreign nations and by creating an enabling international context, this soft policy paves the way for a wide array of hard goals. In other words, mass diplomacy is a subtle *mélange* of idealism and realism, of advocacy of principle and extension of

<sup>32</sup> Canada - DFAIT, Graham, *A Dialogue...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>33</sup> Iran - MFA of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Dr. Kharrazi (Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs) (released by the MFAIRI, Aug 20, 2002), available @ <http://www.mfa.gov.ir/News/Index.htm>.

<sup>34</sup> France - Wiltzer, *op. cit.*; see also France - MAE, "Une Diplomatie Nouvelle" (MAE 2002), [www.france.diplomatie.fr](http://www.france.diplomatie.fr).

<sup>35</sup> Italy - Ministero degli Affari Esteri, "Indirizzi Generali per la Promozione e la Diffusione All'estero della Cultura e della Lingua Italiana e per lo Sviluppo Della Cooperazione Culturale Internazionale" (Raccomandazioni Della Commissione Nazionale per la Promozione Della Cultura Italiana All'estero, Ai Sensi dell'Articolo 4, comma 2, lettera a della legge 4/01/1990), available @ Attività degli Istituti ; Japan - MOFA, "Chapter II. ..." in *Diplomatic Bluebook 2001*, *op. cit.*; Germany - Auswaertiges-Amt, "International media policy", in *Concept 2000...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>36</sup> Leonard and Stead, *op. cit.*, 47.

national interest. It lies somewhere between pure altruism and the most pragmatic Machiavellianism and that's probably makes it so redoubtable and difficult to understand.

It has become clear, for example, to American leaders that mass diplomacy has a vital contribution to make to United States foreign policy goals. For the State Department, "public diplomacy has value as a strategic element of power in the information age."<sup>37</sup> The belief is that through educating, informing and influencing foreign audiences, it can significantly promote the national interest of the United States<sup>38</sup>. Mass diplomacy is valuable because its purpose "is not to increase U.S. popularity abroad for its own sake, but because it is in America's national interest to do so" insists Peter G. Peterson of the Council on Foreign Relations.<sup>39</sup> "Polishing America's image is a key element of public diplomacy too", states the Director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, "but only to the extent that it serves vital U.S. interests."<sup>40</sup> What is called the "new diplomacy" is now officially presented as a "sine qua non" or "indispensable" instrument for addressing such critical objectives as increasing global economic growth, promoting democratic principles of government and securing a sustainable global environment.<sup>41</sup> "Without mutual understanding and the trust it engenders", stipulates the State Department Strategic Plan, "it would be virtually impossible for American diplomacy to pursue successfully [its] Strategic Goals."<sup>42</sup> Secretary of State Colin Powell was amongst the first to be convinced of the attention and effort that must now be devoted to this facet of diplomacy to solidify contacts at all levels, to advance U.S. interests and to provide the moral basis for U.S. leadership in the world.<sup>43</sup> In recent interviews with more than 260 Foreign Service officers at about 30 U.S. missions around the world, a majority said *public diplomacy today is as important as traditional diplomacy*. The ambitious global agenda of a superpower, they said, cannot be carried out with the help of foreign governments alone. Support from ordinary people is essential in achieving such objectives as national security or economic prosperity.<sup>44</sup> American decision makers are not

<sup>37</sup> U.S. - State Department, Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, *Building...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>38</sup> Harper, *op. cit.*

<sup>39</sup> Peterson, *op. cit.*

<sup>40</sup> Satloff, *op. cit.*

<sup>41</sup> U.S. - State Department, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, Official Website, <http://www.state.gov>.

<sup>42</sup> U.S. - State Department, *Strategic Plan 2000*, *op. cit.*

<sup>43</sup> U.S. - Powell, "Cultural Action...", in U.S. - State Department, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, *Annual Report 2002*, *op. cit.*, 8; It is stipulated in the funding document of the Bureau of Cultural Affairs that : "Essential to promoting the strategic goals outlined in the Department of State International Affairs Strategic Plan, cultural exchanges seek to establish trust, confidence, and international co-operation with other countries that sustain and advance the full range of American national interests" in "Exchanges in National Strategy", in *Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>44</sup> Kraleov, *op. cit.*

alone in considering that mass diplomacy has become, in the present context, an essential tool for the implementation of national objectives abroad.

Realising that their countries cannot match U.S. hard power at this point in time, many other foreign policy makers increasingly rely on the potential of this soft power diplomacy to assume a key position and to increase gains of all sorts. In this regard the justification for mass diplomacy largely rests on a power-based argument. The idea that mass diplomacy can help Canada to remedy its relatively modest hard power assets and to make a difference on the international scene is a less and less contentious idea in Ottawa<sup>45</sup>. It is believed that given the new realities of global affairs and the growing porosity of national borders to transnational flows of information and culture, ethical diplomacy consisting of disseminating a set of preferred values and norms will advance Canada's economic and security interests<sup>46</sup>. The DFAIT stated it clearly: "the projection of Canadian values and culture is key to our success in the world."<sup>47</sup> We can see that leaders have the certainty that this type of diplomacy is not only capable of fostering Canada's goals abroad, but is also able to address a wide range of other issues including strengthening social cohesion at home and forging national identity domestically.<sup>48</sup>

British leaders also make their confidence in public diplomacy quite clear. The promulgation of the United Kingdom's image, values and policies overseas are, in their eyes, effective ways to promote and protect Britain's national interests.<sup>49</sup> For the senior British diplomat Michael Butler, "the purpose of public diplomacy is to influence opinion in target countries to make it easier for the British Government, British companies or other British organisations to achieve their aims"<sup>50</sup>. If the British are willing to devote such resources and efforts to support their international broadcast programs, like the BBC, it is unsurprising that they believe firmly that there is a multitude of tasks that they can achieve. "The broadcast programs have an element of cultural advertisement; they are an instrument of informal diplomacy; they bring individuals in touch with a nation" affirmed John Tusa, a former head of the BBC World Service, concluding that so many factors can only help in achieving the external goals of a state.<sup>51</sup>

<sup>45</sup> Baxter and Bishop, *op. cit.*

<sup>46</sup> A. Latham, "Theorizing the Landmine Campaign: Ethics, Global Cultural Scripts, and the Laws of War", in Irwin, *op. cit.*

<sup>47</sup> Canada - DFAIT, *Canada in the World...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>48</sup> Potter, "Canada and...", *op. cit.*, 4-5.

<sup>49</sup> U.K. - BC, "Public Diplomacy Strategy" (released by BC, 2002). Available @ <http://www.ukinbangladesh.org/pds2001.doc>.

<sup>50</sup> M. Butler (former British permanent representative to the European Union), quoted in Leonard and Stead, *op. cit.*, 3.

<sup>51</sup> J. Tusa (former head of BBC World Service), "Media: Britannia Rules the Airwaves", *The Independent*, December 9, 1992, 19.

Public diplomacy is, in the eyes of the German decision makers, “part and parcel of foreign policy” because, more than ever they believe it is possible to maximise German gains abroad. They are confident in mass diplomacy’s potential to build trust and empathy abroad, because it “directly supports and serves general foreign policy goals and aspirations”. Though it is difficult to evaluate the results, the Germans don’t doubt for an instant that it makes valuable contributions in paving the way for fruitful international cooperation: “By winning partners and friends for our country”, the official document that governs German foreign policy reads, “cultural relations policy directly serves vital national interests.”<sup>52</sup> Like the German Secretary of State Dr Pleuger, many leaders agree that this approach represents a powerful diplomatic channel: a pipeline simultaneously serving “soft” and “hard” political issues.<sup>53</sup>

Many other governments consider mass diplomacy to be a medium through which they will be able to enhance their international standing and have greater impact than their present position allows them to. In Asia for example, mass diplomacy is viewed by Chinese officials as “an all-dimensional opening up axe” of its “grand strategy” serving long-term national goals.<sup>54</sup> For Indians, winning international understanding and support plays a central role for the defence of national interests, priorities and aspirations.<sup>55</sup> Italians, Turks and Iranians agree that cultural policy helps champion national interests by contributing to the improvement of their relations with the rest of the world at all levels.<sup>56</sup>

## 2. Mass Persuasion and Security

The political leaders are above all pragmatic, and if they thought that mass diplomacy serves only to create an enabling context for the pursuit of vague purposes, it is unlikely that they would devote so much attention to it. What interests them is that they consider it capable of accomplishing precise tasks at little cost and little risk.

<sup>52</sup> Germany - Auswaertiges-Amt, “Kulturpolitik Grundsätze – Principles of Cultural Diplomacy”, in *Concept 2000...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>53</sup> Germany - Dr Pleuger (German State Secretary), Interview in *Deutschland*, April 2000.

<sup>54</sup> U.S. - State Department, IIP, *Annual Report on Military Power of People's Republic of China* (Report to Congress released by IIP, 2000), available @ <http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/uschina/dodrpt00.htm>.

<sup>55</sup> India - MAEDEV, *International Affairs Strategy of India* (MAEDEV, 2002), available @ <http://www.meadev.nic.in/> (accessed April 2004).

<sup>56</sup> “La promozione della cultura e della lingua italiane all'estero è strettamente legata ai rapporti politici ed economici che l'Italia mantiene con tutte le aree del mondo” in Italy - Ministero degli Affari Esteri, F. Aloisi de Lardere (Direttore Generale per la Promozione e Cooperazione Culturale), “Promozione e Cooperazione Culturale - Presentazione dell'attività della Direzione Generale per la Promozione e la Cooperazione Culturale”, available @ <http://www.esteri.it/eng/foreignpol/index.htm> (accessed April 2003); Turkey - MFA, “Functions of the Directorate...”, *op. cit.*; see also Pahlavi, “La diplomatie culturelle...”, *op. cit.*; Iran - Assefi, “Foreign Ministry's Success...”, *op. cit.*; Charmelot, *op. cit.* 8.

### a. Mass Diplomacy and Preventive Security

One of these clearly defined goals, that a good number of decision makers wish mass diplomacy to serve, is security. In their eyes, it is becoming an essential element of a modern security policy questioning traditional perspectives according to which defence and security were matters best dealt with through brute military might. As leaders of the *Common European Security and Defence Policy Project* point out, it is becoming more and more difficult today to pursue security by relying exclusively on brute force or classic military dissuasion.<sup>57</sup> As well as many political leaders around the world, these last note that the notion of security policy has been constantly broadened beyond the narrow classic definition to include non-military factors such as social, cultural and communication considerations. In fact, the idea that the diplomacy of hearts and minds can serve security policy by alternate means is not new. Conceived of by authors as wide ranging as Polybus, Plutarch, Tacitus, Machiavelli, Le Mièrre de Corvey and Clausewitz, it saturates classical strategic thought and is constantly on the minds of current leaders.<sup>58</sup> The reasoning is based on relatively simple precepts: Psychological operations on a foreign populace are a major peace-keeping mechanism for eliciting a friendlier attitude from other nations and introducing a mood hospitable to international stability. In turn, it can be used as a first line of defence to anticipate the development of hostile sentiment in a given area by attacking at a grass-roots level through a patient and resolute strategy combining education and the dissemination of information. This traditional concept is met in many classical authors by the idea that public diplomacy can be used as a crisis management tool to isolate and neutralise hostile organisations by discrediting them and depriving them of popular support.<sup>59</sup>

However, in spite of the lip service paid to this venerable idea, public diplomacy had, until recently, played only a marginal role in states' security strategies. As David Hoffman points out, public diplomacy has long been the stepchild of diplomats and "has only recently taken its rightful place at the table of national security."<sup>60</sup> New factors, among which, as we've seen, feature prominently the mass media revolution and the growing political weight of public opinion, have led policy makers to consider a diversification of functions and levels involved in the definition and delivery of security policy. In the information age, leaders across the globe

<sup>57</sup> J. Howorth, "III. Norms, values and political legitimacy" in *European Integration and Defence: the Ultimate Challenge?* (edited by the Institute for Security Studies of WEU, November 2000).

<sup>58</sup> See G. Chaliand, *Stratégie de la Guerilla- Anthologie Historique* (Paris: Gallimard, 1979).

<sup>59</sup> For more on these points see Pahlavi, *Entre Esprit de Conquête et Conquête des Esprits*, *op. cit.*

<sup>60</sup> D. Hoffman, *op. cit.*

came to realise that the conduct of security policy is increasingly tied to issues of cultural influence, media and International broadcasting.<sup>61</sup>

As Joseph Nye and General Owen pointed out as early as 1996, leaders are increasingly aware that the information revolution has changed classic security theory: "Now the details of events seem to count more [...] and all nations want to know more about what is happening and why to help them decide how much it matters and what they should do about it". Consequently, security policy, they explains "will proceed less from the military capacity to crush any opponent and more from the ability quickly to reduce the ambiguity of violent situations, to respond flexibly [...]".<sup>62</sup> In these new circumstances, issues of "transparency", moral legitimacy and accountability to foreign populations are likely to be central to the success of states' defence and security policies, even though they have traditionally been absent from classic approaches in these areas. As progress is achieved in the domain of communication and information technology, decision makers increasingly acquired the conviction that mass diplomacy is not only a necessary but also feasible security tool. In such a way that today, culture, information and communication are viewed as strategic assets for policies of pre-emptive dissuasion and crisis management. According to the former German president Roman Herzog, they become "imperatives of security policy."<sup>63</sup> For instance, it is particularly interesting to note that public diplomacy has become one of the principal branches of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) despite its essentially military or security orientation.<sup>64</sup> In fact, mass diplomacy's utility is recognised by politicians and diplomats around the world.

Today, for many American leaders, as for the members of the *U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy*, communication and information facilities are strategic assets that become "as important to national security as political, military, and economic power". As a U.S. congressman put it, "public diplomacy [...] has a central role to play in the task of making the world safer for the United States."<sup>65</sup> Within public bodies a strong consensus has been building in recent years around the idea that the safety of the United States necessitates that more resources be earmarked not just for military and intelligence functions, but for the propagation of civil information as well. As everywhere else the utility in terms of security of mass diplomacy has been magnified by the mass media revolution and the advent of the global information society. The role of military

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<sup>61</sup> Price, "Public Diplomacy...", *op. cit.*, 91.

<sup>62</sup> J. Nye and W.A. Owens, "America's Information Edge: The Nature of Power", *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 1996) also available in U.S.I.A's Electronic Journals 1, no12 (September 1996).

<sup>63</sup> Von Barloeven, *op. cit.*, 22-23.

<sup>64</sup> NATO, *Structure...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>65</sup> U.S. - "Committee...", *op. cit.*



force in security policy has not been questioned, but it is increasingly admitted that mass diplomacy must complete and reinforce it. In the eyes of the White House officials, the State Department and the American Congress, the United States has everything to win by integrating this branch of diplomacy into their security policy.

American leaders consider that the comparative advantage that the United States possesses in the area of NICTs and its “global cultural umbrella” can effectively enable its public diplomacy to serve its international security policy. America’s technological, cultural and information edge provides, according to a former assistant Secretary of Defense for international affairs, the power to effectively reinforce emotional links with foreign nations and to prompt alliances and ad hoc coalitions<sup>66</sup>. It is assumed that if public diplomacy efforts are undertaken in a timely and adequate manner with sufficient means they can decrease the possibility of more costly conflicts and help resolve emerging problems at a low cost before they represent serious threats. The expectations are particularly significant in regards to fragmenting states and unstable regions where public diplomacy is intended to help cultivate feelings of sympathy and trust instead of hostility and hatred.<sup>67</sup> For example, an official remarked that the present deficiencies of American mass diplomacy in Central Africa could have catastrophic consequences comparable to those of the Near East.<sup>68</sup> If the members of the Advisory Commission have admitted in this regard that “public diplomacy is only part of the picture”, they nevertheless think that it can contribute to reducing the increasing hostility that “makes achieving U.S. policy goals far more difficult.”<sup>69</sup>

The same can be seen in the Canadian case, for whom there is today a clear and growing utility for security policy to “go beyond simple military preparedness” and to include new approaches based on cultural and information relations. They believe that the successful promotion of Canada’s peaceful values, such as multiculturalism and democracy, can make an important contribution to national security and international stability.<sup>70</sup> It is a strongly held conviction that the dissemination of these values “will be critical to the struggle for international

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<sup>66</sup> Nye and Owens, *op. cit.*

<sup>67</sup> D. Oglesby, “Diplomacy in the Information Age”, *Information Impacts Magazine* (July 2001), available @ [http://www.cisp.org/imp/july\\_2001/07\\_01oglesby.htm](http://www.cisp.org/imp/july_2001/07_01oglesby.htm).

<sup>68</sup> U.S. – State Department, J. Fisher-Thompson, “Former US Envoy Calls for More Security Assistance to Nigeria” (posted on *All.Africa.com*, April 6, 2004).

<sup>69</sup> U.S. – State Department, Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, “New Strategic Direction Urged for Public Diplomacy” (Press Release, Washington, October 1, 2003). Another security goal that mass diplomacy is designed to achieve is to “promote and strengthen international norms and principles that formalise and help verify non-proliferation commitments”. It is believed that in establishing an international consensus on such moral norms as the “no-first-use pledge” and the “nuclear taboo, weapons of mass destruction (WMD); T.V. Paul, “Power, Influence and Nuclear Weapons: A Reassessment” in *The Absolute Weapon Revisited*, Edited by T.V. Paul (University of Michigan Press, 1998), 30-31.

<sup>70</sup> Canada – DFAIT, *Canada in the World...*, *op. cit.*

security in the face of new threats to stability.”<sup>71</sup> It is also assumed at the DFAIT that this type of diplomatic marketing can play a critical role in projecting an image of Canada as a reliable ally, especially with respect to the United States.<sup>72</sup>

In recent years, the heads of the British Foreign Office have been committed to developing “a more strategic approach to public diplomacy” by engaging increasingly with target audiences, particularly young people, in countries of interest for security reasons. The conflict prevention program created in 2000 funded a range of mass diplomacy programmes overseas intended to reduce conflict in key areas, including by geographical region (e.g., the Balkans) and by theme (e.g., reducing the number of small arms in circulation). The successes have solidified the certainty that combining peacekeeping with public diplomacy activity is “less costly - to local people, to the UK and to the wider world.”<sup>73</sup>

The same type of reasoning is shared by an increasing number of foreign policy officials in countries around the world. Amongst the main actors on the international scene, the relevance of public diplomacy to national security in terms of being a preventative measure is almost completely unanimous. Italian strategists are confident that this preventive diplomacy is a crucial vehicle for peace and stability in the world.<sup>74</sup> J. Fisher shares the conviction that mass diplomacy can play a critical role in preventing conflict by socialising “difficult” partner countries and by drawing them closer to the international community.<sup>75</sup> The head of the Iranian Foreign Service also believes that “Iran’s successful policy of détente and push for dialogue among civilisations to enhance relations has significantly lowered the cost of maintaining national security.”<sup>76</sup> This perspective is shared by Iran’s Indian, Turkish and Japanese counterparts for whom mass diplomacy holds a central place within a comprehensive security policy.<sup>77</sup>

#### b. Between Daring and Caution: The Importance of Prudent Diplomacy

One of the principal reasons leading political decision makers consider mass diplomacy an integral element of modern security policy is that it is perceived as a strategy implicating a

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<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>72</sup> Canada - DFAIT, *2002-2003 Estimates...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>73</sup> U.K. - FCO, “Chapter 5...”, in *2002 Spending Review...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>74</sup> Calabria, “A Model of Preventive Diplomacy...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>75</sup> J. Fischer (German Federal Foreign Minister), “We Have to Support the Reformers in Tehran”, Interview in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, July 13, 2000.

<sup>76</sup> Iran - MFA, Kharrazi, *op. cit.*

<sup>77</sup> India - MFA, *International Affairs Strategy ...*, *op. cit.*; Japan - MOFA, “Chapter II. Sec. 4. Social Issues - Human Rights and Democracy” in *Diplomatic Bluebook 2001*, *op. cit.*; Turkey - MFA, “Turkey’s Security Perspectives and its Relations with NATO”, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/af/secure.htm> (acc. april 2004).

minimum of risk in the pursuit of national interests. As a Canadian expert point out, it is currently viewed as one of the less threatening ways to engage foreign publics, build strong relationships and genuine alliances.<sup>78</sup> This reasoning is applicable particularly in sensitive reasons and is well illustrated with the case of Turkish foreign policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

What is customarily called “the traditionally prudent diplomacy of Ankara”<sup>79</sup> is particularly apt as Turkey is part of a delicate regional context, especially, some consider, since the end of the Cold War.<sup>80</sup> The perception that Turkey is “surrounded by a number of circles of fire”<sup>81</sup> excludes in the eyes of Turkish officials any overly adventurous policy and constrains them to opt for a foreign policy that allows them to exploit new opportunities without irritating the sensitivities of their neighbours and rivals.<sup>82</sup> Turkish officials consider that this balance is “vital” for Turkey.<sup>83</sup> In these conditions, Turkish officials have been progressively drawn to consider mass diplomacy has a pertinent and advantageous alternative. They quickly came to consider that this indirect strategy would allow them to circumvent the geopolitical constraints to which Turkey is subject<sup>84</sup> and to reinforce strategic ties to sister peoples in the Caucasus and Central Asia without challenging regional rivals; It would be affordable while promising substantial returns.<sup>85</sup> Finally, Turkish leaders rapidly acknowledged that “the spirit of cooperation”<sup>86</sup> that accompanies cultural policy would be the most effective means to extend Turkish influence in a durable fashion around the Turko-Iranian world situated between the Adriatic and the Great Wall of China. All these considerations have very promptly led to the certainty that mass diplomacy constitutes not only a strategy capable of balancing “daring and prudence”<sup>87</sup> but also able to offer Turkey a judicious means, if not the best means, to attain its new regional ambitions.<sup>88</sup>

<sup>78</sup> Potter, “Canada and...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>79</sup> S. Bolukbasi, “Ankara's Baku-centered Transcaucasia Policy: Has it failed?”, *Middle East Journal* 51, no1 (1997), 80. In the official brochure of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, entitled *Goals and Principles*, it is stipulated that it is imperative to “promote a policy of peace [...] establish and maintain amicable and harmonious relations with all countries and particularly neighbouring nations”; Turkey - MFA, *Goals and Principles of Turkey's Foreign Policy*, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr> (accessed July 2004).

<sup>80</sup> S.E. Cornell, “Turkey and the Conflict in Nagorno Karabakh: A Delicate Balance”, *Middle Eastern Studies* 34, no1 (1998), 65.

<sup>81</sup> M. Mufti, “Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign Policy”, *Middle East Journal* 52, no1 (1998), 34.

<sup>82</sup> S.D. Bazoglou, “View from Turkey ; Turkey's New Security Environment : Nuclear Weapons and Proliferation”, *Comparative Strategy* 14, no2 (1995), 150.

<sup>83</sup> S.T. Hunter, “The Muslim Republics of the Former Soviet Union: Policy Challenges for the United States”, *Washington Quarterly* (1992), 69.

<sup>84</sup> I. Suat, “Geopolitics Developments and the Turkish World”, *Eurasian Studies* 3 (1995), 25.

<sup>85</sup> J. Landau, *Pan-turkism; From Irredentism to Cooperation* (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana UP, 1995), 210.

<sup>86</sup> U. Arik, “Turkey and the International Security”, *Eurasian Studies* 4 (1995/96), 10.

<sup>87</sup> P. Robins, “Between Sentiment and Self-interest: Turkey's Policy Toward Azerbaijan and the Central Asian states”, *Middle East Journal* 47, no4 (1993), 593-610.

<sup>88</sup> R. Hasan, “Role of Turkey in the Central Asian Republics”, *Journal of European Studies* 1 (1993), 100.

The same reasons led the United States to privilege mass diplomacy in its relationships with powerful but risky countries such as Iran or China. American leaders have effectively realised, as we've seen, that exclusive recourse to military force as in Afghanistan or Iraq carries great drawbacks and that they could not always depend on this type of policy to achieve their ends. To isolate the Iranian regime, they have, among other things, opted for a mass diplomacy that targets youth in a prudent and discrete way.<sup>89</sup> The same is true in China where they hope to engage with those Henry Hyde called "Washington's latent allies" to generate a grass-roots movement and a change of regimes.<sup>90</sup> The result, they are aware, could not be achieved by other means at the present time considering the economic and military power of Beijing. A majority of diplomats questioned on this point consider that engaging a foreign public on issues such as cultural and social exchanges mass diplomacy programs can prove more productive than other approaches.<sup>91</sup>

### c. Serving "Democratic Peace"

Leaders of Western powers hope that mass diplomacy will spread democracy and through its values and principles, contribute in a significant way to international security and stability. The hypothesis, based on a well known Kantian assumption, is that like-minded democracies tend to develop quasi-fraternal relations and form an almost absolute sphere of peace. It is in the interests then of democratic powers to use mass diplomacy to co-opt other nations into the democratic club.<sup>92</sup> As the Italian Prime Minister very pertinently pointed out, "[i]n the modern world, democracy cannot spread with the use of weapons, except under exceptional circumstances."<sup>93</sup> Conscious of this point, the believers of the Democratic Peace Theory consider that the expansion of the zone of democratic peace is facilitated by the diffusion of democratic values, ideas and norms within non-democratic societies.<sup>94</sup> Among the concrete measures designed to spread "democratic tastes across borders" and instigate democratic norms, Michael Doyle prescribes what he calls an "active democratic right diplomacy", incorporating the use of information,

<sup>89</sup> J. Hughes, "Diplomacy is best option with Iran", *The Nation*, June 04, 2003; see also *The Eyeranian*, "Is Iran the Next Target?", May 22, 2003.

<sup>90</sup> U.S. - Hyde, "Speaking to Our Silent Allies...", *op. cit.*

<sup>91</sup> Kraleov, *op. cit.*

<sup>92</sup> Lucid in this regard, Kant had affirmed that 'moral politics' designed to spread republicanism is a matter of interest as much as authentic idealism and altruism. He had also specified that it requires politicians and governments to be 'innocent as a dove' but also 'wise as a serpent', I. Kant, *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays*, translated, with Introduction by Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), 370-72.

<sup>93</sup> Italia - S. Berlusconi (Italian Prime Minister and Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs), "Speech to the Chamber of Deputies", available @ <http://www.esteri.it/eng/foreignpol/index.htm>.

<sup>94</sup> For more on this theory see B. Russett and Z. Maoz, "Normative and Structural Causes of the Democratic Peace, 1946-1986", *American Political Science Review* 87 (1993), 624-638.

communication, broadcasting and educational exchanges.<sup>95</sup> Western leaders consider mass diplomacy to be one of the instruments best adapted to fulfill this task.

Many democratic states count on such “democracy diplomacy” to expand their moral influence and serve their geopolitical goals. A crucial task given to the U.S. mass diplomacy is to integrate other nations and governments into a democratic network consistent with U.S. values and norms.<sup>96</sup> As stipulated by the State Department Strategic Plan, by supporting liberal democracy, public diplomacy “not only promotes fundamental American values,” but also helps create a more secure and prosperous world in which the United States can advance its national interests.<sup>97</sup> The chairman of the House International Relations puts it rather clearly: “in addition to genuine altruism, our promotion of freedom can have another purpose, namely as an element in the United States’ geopolitical strategy.”<sup>98</sup> British leaders also perceive their mass diplomacy to be a mechanism for introducing more stability but also as a means of initiating political shifts abroad consistent with the UK’s interests.<sup>99</sup> Henry Kissinger, a proponent of *realpolitik*, recently emphasized the valuable contribution of a pro-democracy diplomatic campaign targeting foreign public opinions to the security interests of the United States and to the maintenance of international stability.<sup>100</sup>

#### d. Mass Diplomacy and the Global Terror War

The idea of mass diplomacy as a “security policy by different means” has been widely floated within leadership circles ever since the end of the 1990’s for all the reasons mentioned above.<sup>101</sup> But the events of September 11<sup>th</sup> and the global war on terror have been an eye opener for leaders around the globe, prompting them to devote more attention and more space in their security arsenal to mass diplomacy.

Given their degree of implication, it is understandable that the events of 2001-2004 have convinced American leaders of the utility of weapons of mass persuasion and dissuasion for

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<sup>95</sup> M.W. Doyle, “A Liberal View: Preserving and Expanding the Liberal Pacific Union”, in *International Order and the Future of World Politics*, Edited by John A. Hall and T.V. Paul (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999), 45-53.

<sup>96</sup> Haass, *op. cit.*

<sup>97</sup> U.S. - State Department, *Strategic Plan 2000*, *op. cit.*; see also U.S. - State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, *Human Rights Reports*, available @ <http://www.state.gov/g/drl> (accessed april 2003).

<sup>98</sup> U.S., Hyde, “Speaking to Our Silent Allies...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>99</sup> Price, “Public Diplomacy...”, *op. cit.*, 86.

<sup>100</sup> H. Kissinger, “Democratic values and foreign policy”, *Manilla Times*, April 13, 2004.

security policies. Overnight, mass diplomacy began to offer great hope within the American political class and is becoming the subject of the hour in public debate.<sup>102</sup> Following 9-11, members of the Council on Foreign Relations claimed loudly that: "Strong public diplomacy is critical to winning the war against terrorism."<sup>103</sup> Since then, an increasing number of Congressmen have come to see that while public diplomacy is not a silver bullet, making it an equal component of the foreign policy-making process is a vital step towards ensuring the nation's security.<sup>104</sup> The threat comes not only from terrorist groups, but from the influence extreme ideologies and extremist public media have over the masses. American leader understand that the war on international terrorism must be a war of information and ideas in which public broadcasting will play a decisive role.<sup>105</sup> This opinion has been reinforced throughout the antiterrorist campaign, with many observers realising that military force was not enough to eradicate the terrorist menace unless it was combined with a concerted mass diplomacy campaign attacking its roots<sup>106</sup>. Congressman Howard L. Berman put this feeling clearly: "The war against terrorism is much more than a military operation. It is also a battle of ideas."<sup>107</sup> The same reasons have assured the growing support of many American politicians for mass diplomacy. More surprising is the growing trust of the Pentagon hawks in a facet of foreign policy that they had until then traditionally scorned. Breaking with his traditional preference for conventional methods, the American Secretary of Defense recently announced that "to win the war on terror" we must also "win the war of ideas."<sup>108</sup> Throughout 2004, Donald Rumsfeld even went so far as to affirm that public diplomacy now constituted a crucial element of national power in the struggle against global terrorism.<sup>109</sup> This is a radical shift of philosophy that, it seems, is since recently endorsed by a significant part of the American political establishment.<sup>110</sup> Francis X. Taylor, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, confirmed that through the months following the attacks in New York, it became strikingly evident among U.S. officials in charge of security affairs that mass diplomacy was now crucial to the goal of generating a global anti-terrorist front,

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<sup>101</sup> Overhaus, *op. cit.*, in Overhaus & al., *op. cit.*.

<sup>102</sup> U.S. - State Department, Pachios, "The New...", *op. cit.*

<sup>103</sup> U.S. - "Committee...", *op. cit.*

<sup>104</sup> U.S. - CFR, "Public Diplomacy...", *op. cit.*

<sup>105</sup> U.S. Rep. E. Royce (Cal.) in U.S. - House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, *The Role of Public Diplomacy ...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>106</sup> Nye, *The Paradox...*, *op. cit.* ; U.S. - "Committee...", *op. cit.*

<sup>107</sup> U.S. Rep. Howard L. Berman (California), in U.S. - House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, *The Role of Public Diplomacy...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>108</sup> AFP-*Le Monde*, "Rumsfeld...", *op. cit.*

<sup>109</sup> U.S. - NCTA, "Testimony...", *op. cit.*

<sup>110</sup> U.S. - D.H. Rumsfeld (Defense Secretary) quoted in Gertz, *op. cit.*

to the goal of winning the hearts and minds of people exposed to hostile influence, and to the goal of diminish the underlying conditions that allow terrorism to take root and flourish.<sup>111</sup>

In this context of consensus following 9-11, the reform of public diplomacy and its integration into the strategy of the fight against terrorism became “an urgent national security priority.”<sup>112</sup> Its specific contribution to U.S. psychological warfare was fixed by the White House’s *National Security Strategy* and State Department’s *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*.<sup>113</sup> These official documents stipulate that one of the rationales for mass diplomacy is to serve “a war of ideas”:

In waging this war of ideas, explains Secretary Powell, we will be equally resolute in maintaining our commitment to our ultimate objective [...]. We strive to build an international order where more countries and peoples are integrated into a world consistent with the interests and values we share with our partners -values such as human dignity, rule of law, respect for individual liberties, open and free economies, and religious tolerance. We understand that a world in which these values are embraced as standards, not exceptions, will be the best antidote to the spread of terrorism. This is the world we must build today.<sup>114</sup>

The goal assigned to public diplomacy programs is to “dry up the ideological swamp” and eliminate the conditions terrorists require to recruit successfully.<sup>115</sup> A subsequent task designated by C. Powell is also to compete effectively with European partners in an area of strategic importance.<sup>116</sup> For the current administration, it is more than just a first line of defence for U.S. national interests; it is “the front line of offense” in pursuing national security.<sup>117</sup> It must be noted however that if public diplomacy is trusted by the current Republican administration, this confidence in public diplomacy as a security tool is even more marked amongst Democrats:

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<sup>111</sup> U.S. – Amb. F.X. Taylor (Coordinator for Counterterrorism), “The Global War Against Terrorism: The Way Ahead” (address to the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, DC, October 23, 2002), available @ <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/14570.htm> ; in the same token Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy declared that “[i]t is extremely dangerous to ignore groups of people who are busy creating misperceptions about the United States so that it becomes part of a cause of fanatics” in Leyne, “US gets...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>112</sup> U.S. - The Council on Foreign Relations and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, *State Department Reform...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>113</sup> U.S. - White House, “Chapter IX. Transform America's National Security Institutions to Meet the Challenges and Opportunities of the Twenty-First Century”, in *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, available @ <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html> (accessed august 2003) ; U.S. - State Department, Office of International Information Programs, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (released by the IIP, February 2003), available @ [usinfo.state.gov](http://usinfo.state.gov).

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>115</sup> U.S. - National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, “Statement of the U.S. Secretary of State C. Powell “ (written Remarks Submitted by Secretary of State to the NCTA, March 24, 2004).

<sup>116</sup> U.S. - Powell, “Cultural Action...”, in U.S. - State Department, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, *Annual Report 2002*, *op. cit.*, 8.

<sup>117</sup> US - State Department, A. Khan, “State Department Gears Up Diplomacy to Meet Terrorism Challenge” (*Washington File*, April 2002).

“None of the American efforts will prevail”, J. F. Kerry said, “unless the war of ideas is won.”<sup>118</sup> Outlining his own counter-terror strategy, the American presidential candidate advocates “a lot of public diplomacy” to compete with radical ideologies and establish a pacified world.<sup>119</sup> This suggests a continued growth of the effort in this area in the case of democratic victory in 2004.

The relevance of mass diplomacy to the conduct of security policy also became evident to many other leaders in the West with the rise of global terrorism. As neighbours of the United States, Canada has been closely affected by the shock of the events of September 11<sup>th</sup>. They have sharply reinforced the importance of public diplomacy in the eyes of Canadian foreign policy makers notably with regards to Canada's role in counter-terrorism and the public safety agenda.<sup>120</sup> In the months following 9-11, the DFAIT's public diplomacy efforts were assigned to address many critical issues related to homeland security, missile defence, border management, and the Canada-United States strategic alliance by ensuring that there is continuing awareness among Americans of Canada as a close friend, ally and partner.<sup>121</sup> More than ever, British leaders have acquired the feeling that the diffusion of information, values, and ideas can contribute to creating a safer world for the pursuit of British interests. “Following the events of 11 September”, a Foreign Office official remarked, “it is even more important that the Government continues to build on Britain's proud tradition as an outward-looking nation to provide security.”<sup>122</sup> Their belief is that “communication and building relationships do have a part to play to avoid slipping into a battle between the West and the rest.”<sup>123</sup> The French position, though slightly different, is very similar to those of its NATO partners. Dominique de Villepin defends the assumption that such diplomacy, far from being futile, can reinforce security and facilitate the struggle against terrorism by allowing the patient development of exchange, legitimate relations and international solidarity.<sup>124</sup> President Jacques Chirac himself is amongst those who publicly affirm their trust in the security role of mass diplomacy. As he stated recently, “in a world increasingly more open and often dangerous, images and information have critical power and importance.”<sup>125</sup> The same is true of German leaders that, after having long contemplated the idea from afar, now consider mass diplomacy to be an extension of a broader conflict prevention policy, are now certain that in that concept, they have an idea that merits the greatest of attention.<sup>126</sup>

<sup>118</sup> J. Zuckman, “Kerry outlines own terror war strategy”, *Chicago Tribune*, February 28, 2004.

<sup>119</sup> *Wall Street Journal*, April 1, 2004.

<sup>120</sup> Canada - DFAIT, *2002-2003 Estimates...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*, 35.

<sup>122</sup> U.K. - FCO, “Chapter 5...”, *2002 Spending Review...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>123</sup> Leonard and Stead, *op. cit.*, 2.

<sup>124</sup> France - Villepin, “Dizième Conférence...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>125</sup> *Le Monde*, 12 Janvier 2004.

<sup>126</sup> Overhaus, *op. cit.*, in Overhaus & al., *op. cit.*, 4.



#### e. A New Battlefield?

An inverse evidence that mass diplomacy is perceived as a security factor is that the mass diplomacy of rival powers is increasingly perceived as a security liability. This strategic phenomenon is well known: that which increases my security decreases yours. Let us remember that Western governments are not alone in holding to this facet of foreign policy. As seen in chapter 3 and 4, the idea is shared by almost every government across the globe: “rival powers are also increasingly becoming sophisticated in using technology to get their message across and recruit followers.”<sup>127</sup> A few years ago, there was no particular incentive for those nations to seek the same mass diplomacy system as Western countries, especially as they believed they were not threatened by it.<sup>128</sup> But this is no longer the case. Leaders in the Third World have become conscious of the stakes attached to information, telecommunications and public opinion; they realize that the diplomacy of hearts and minds is a source of considerable influence, a source within the reach of almost all states, allowing them to frame international debate and public opinions.<sup>129</sup> Emerging states and regional powers amongst which there are many “dissatisfied powers” such as Iran, China or Saudi Arabia also try to harness the power of information and communication to promote their national interests and security.

Currently the development of the mass diplomacy of these dissatisfied powers and in particular that of Arab or Muslim nations has become a security problem for Western leaders that see it as one of the leading causes of the growth of fanaticism and terrorism. Saudi leaders have never hidden the fact that the goal of their public diplomacy is to serve the interests of the Wahhabite kingdom while diminishing the perceived negative influence of Western media.<sup>130</sup> Saudi Arabia's decades-long effort to spread its form of Islam to every point of the compass has been an example of a very successful yet radical soft power diplomacy causing great disquiet in the West.<sup>131</sup> Other Muslim cyber-diplomats and the development of their technological capacity also worry the West. The proliferation of weapons of mass persuasion in the entire region is seen as a growing threat against international security.<sup>132</sup> Many think that by giving the antenna to the most radical of dissidents, government-owned satellite channels like Al-Arabiya from Dubai,

<sup>127</sup> Leonard and Noble, *op. cit.*

<sup>128</sup> Nye and Owens, *op. cit.*

<sup>129</sup> P.C. Pahlavi, “Cultural Globalisation and the Politics of Culture”, in Centre d'Études des Politiques Étrangères et de Sécurité, *CEPES - Note de recherche* 24 (December 2003), 5-29.

<sup>130</sup> “We want to tell the world about our country, to give a new image... The American media... put out things about Saudi Arabia that are not true” (the director of the state-owned channel, al-Ikhbariya); *BBCWS*, “Saudi TV...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>131</sup> M. Woollacott, “‘Soft Power’ Can Win the Battle for Hearts and Minds”, *The Guardian*, August 2, 2002.

<sup>132</sup> Peterson, *op. cit.*

Qatari Al-Jazeera, Abu Dhabi TV and Lebanon's Al-Manar TV have become sources of exacerbation and of the legitimization of global terrorism. The American government has repeatedly accused media such as Al-Jazeera, the Egyptian government-sponsored newspaper Al-Akhabr and the Beirut-based Hezbollah's satellite television channel of being puppets to the power of fundamentalism and anti-American hate.<sup>133</sup> The irony is that the Arab powers see “Western propaganda” as a threat to their socio-political integrity.

Ultimately, whether governments are justified in considering mass diplomacy to be a security risk isn't important. What does count is that, in one way or another, we seem to believe firmly in its strategic importance and in the necessity of developing it to counter the influence of rival powers, and the phenomenon has even seemed to generate a new form of competition where the playing field is the minds of populations.<sup>134</sup> It must be recalled however that this competition for cultural leadership and global mind space need not take the form of a Huntingtonian “clash of civilisations”<sup>135</sup>. Mind space is open to all. Spheres of influence can be superimposed without automatically generating armed conflicts. This is what makes ideological and cultural action so very attractive to so many leaders especially those of relatively weak countries. But the “peaceful” nature of this competition for influence does not diminish the strategic importance of mass diplomacy for states' security policy. On the contrary, the discovery by leaders that public opinion could be a significant front and an area of engagement has greatly emphasized the security role of public diplomacy.<sup>136</sup> The acceleration of the competition for influence goading it along, “in the future, conflict prevention will become a main driver of public diplomacy” predict Noble and Leonard.<sup>137</sup>

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### 3. Advancing Economic Interests

The second of the two principle goals that current leaders attribute to public diplomacy is the promotion of economic interests. Like Italy's former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lamberto Dini, leaders everywhere around the world agree that the time when states could pursue their economic

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<sup>133</sup> U.S. Rep. E. Royce (California) in U.S. - House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, *The Role of Public Diplomacy...*, *op. cit.*; R. Scarborough, “Rumsfeld accuses Arab TV”, *The Washington Times*, November 26, 2003.

<sup>134</sup> Nalapat, *op. cit.*

<sup>135</sup> In fact, even the proponent of a clash of civilizations, Samuel Huntington, recognized that the broadcast of information and culture can ease the mutual mistrust between two potentially hostile societies; in Overhaus, *op. cit.*, in Overhaus & al., *op. cit.*

<sup>136</sup> Price, “Journeys in Media Space...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>137</sup> Leonard and Noble, *op. cit.*

interests through economic means alone is now over: “Culture and economics, sentiments and signs, practices and values can no longer be dissociated.”<sup>138</sup> This is a common point of view in international political economics.<sup>139</sup> Leaders have the conviction that communication and information are now the determining factors in international economic relations “even if they are only imperfectly indicated by traditional statistical indicators.”<sup>140</sup> In fact, they are increasingly seduced by this form of diplomacy because they are convinced that education, culture and audio-visual broadcasting are tools that allow them to influence their partners and increase their influence and competitiveness in the world economy. After all, it is not that surprising that we should expect mass diplomacy to be of service in this regard, when, as we shall see in the next chapter, this hybrid strategy borrows enormously from the techniques of marketing, branding, “spinning” and employs numerous experts from the business world.

- Firstly, governments rely on mass diplomacy to shape favourable macroeconomic structures by influencing and educating foreign political and economic leaders into adopting norms and practices that they view as preferable for their own economy and for the world economy in general. The assumption is that information and cultural exchanges are able to forge close cultural links with economic leaders on the private level which in turn foster economic co-operation between governments.<sup>141</sup>

As shown by the Department of State Strategic Plan, U.S. strategists, for example, are convinced that public diplomacy can achieve a wide array of goals in this regards : Information programs targeting foreign leaders can help persuade governments to adopt or maintain market-oriented macroeconomic, trade, investment, exchange rate, legal, and regulatory policies supporting economic growth; they can favourably predispose future leaders to support global efforts to strengthen the international financial system and to adopt domestic policies, such as appropriate exchange rates and improved banking regulations, consistent with these

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<sup>138</sup> Italy - Ministero degli Affari Esteri, H.E.Lamberto Dini (Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy), Address to the Conference “Culture Counts: the Financing, Resources and the Economics of Culture in Sustainable development” (released by the Italian Foreign Ministry, Florence, 4 October 1999), available @ [http://www.esteri.it/eng/archives/arch\\_press/index.htm](http://www.esteri.it/eng/archives/arch_press/index.htm).

<sup>139</sup> IPE's *Psychological Approach* insists on the way their ideological, religious, ethnic and cultural factors influence the choice of strategies; see R. Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); see also E. Comisso and L. d'Andrea Tyson (eds.), *Power, Purpose and Collective Choice* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986).

<sup>140</sup> C. Josselin (Minister-delegate for cooperation and the French-speaking world) in France – DGCID, *Action 2000*, *op. cit.*, 10.

<sup>141</sup> Germany - Auswaertiges-Amt, “Kulturpolitik Grundsätze – Principles of Cultural Diplomacy”, in *Concept 2000...*, *op. cit.*

improvements.<sup>142</sup> Another claim is that they encourage broad-based reforms, critical for clearing the path for effective economic partnerships, particularly with developing and transitional economies. It is also held that these programs can promote the transition from state protectionism to market-based economies, good governance, accountable leadership, fiscal responsibility, and financial market development.<sup>143</sup> This same type of reasoning has been adopted by the governments of other large industrial nations. For British officials, mass diplomacy has the potential to persuade foreign decision-makers to observe the rule of law (civil and economic codes) and a certain number of preferred norms and practices such as those agreed at the World Trade Organisation's Doha meeting in 2001. They also assume it can foster domestic growth and stability by stimulating the transformation to more socially stable, free market-oriented, regimes.<sup>144</sup> The French agree that mass diplomacy can play a key role in the training of executives, the restructuring of the civil service, the establishment of the rule of law and the extension of the conventions of the market economy.<sup>145</sup>

- In addition to influencing foreign leaders, mass diplomacy information and cultural programs are believed to serve national economies on the world stage by re-shaping the perception, way of life and tastes of foreign populations through education, information and promotion of a mass consumer culture.

From this perspective, one of the first goals targeted by mass diplomats is the demographic stabilization of foreign societies as a *sine qua non* pre-condition of mutually beneficial economic development. Like many counterparts, U.S. foreign policy clearly integrates humanitarian issues and world population regulation into a comprehensive economic strategy in which educational and cultural initiatives play a key role:

Achieving healthy and sustainable world population growth is vital to US interests. Economic and social progress in other countries can be undermined by rapid population growth, which overburdens the quality and availability of public services, limits employment opportunities, and contributes to environmental degradation. Not only will early stabilization of the world's population at sustainable levels promote environmentally sound economic development in other countries, it will also benefit the US by improving trade opportunities and mitigating future global crises.<sup>146</sup>

<sup>142</sup> U.S. - State Department, *Strategic Plan 2000*, *op. cit.*

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>144</sup> U.S. - State Department, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, *Annual Report 2002*, *op. cit.*

<sup>145</sup> France - MAE, DGCID, "3. Aide au Devpt et à la Coopération", in *Action 2000*, *op. cit.*, 57 & sbq.

<sup>146</sup> Certain observers have remarked on the ambiguous nature of humanitarian initiatives, suggesting that the U.S. diplomatic effort "is concerned less with serving basic needs in desperate countries than with cheerleading the market-based reforms that we export" (Borosage, "The Privatization... *op. cit.*"). The long quotation is taken from U.S. - State Department, *Strategic Plan 2000*, *op. cit.*

Policies incorporating information, educational and cultural programs, such as family planning and other reproductive health programs, targeting women and adolescents in emerging countries are taken immensely seriously in regards to the demographic and economic stabilization of developing nations. They are said to complement efforts to prevent humanitarian crises (disease, starvation, and conflicts) by providing necessary education to remedy them or early warning to mitigate their consequences.<sup>147</sup> This perspective is in large part shared by the officials of the DGCID that believe that these programs can render enormous services to the economic interest of a country by helping to assure the economic and social health of society for foreign economic partners.<sup>148</sup> France's economic policy in developing nations includes providing information, attempts at fostering social education (health, family planning) and cultural education (literacy, schooling, gender equality) in populations and ultimately the development of their consumer tendencies.<sup>149</sup> In general, Western leaders consider that mass diplomacy and more specifically human rights and democracy diplomacy have the capacity to stabilize partner countries and to turn them into "good investment environments."<sup>150</sup> Last but not least, mass diplomacy is believed to contribute to the emergence of vibrant mass consumer societies by enhancing communication with business sectors and foreign populations, by increasing social awareness, by providing access to new sources of information and education and by attenuating socio-economic disparities.<sup>151</sup> Again, mass diplomacy appears as a mix of realism and altruism, of good will and cold pragmatism.

- Thirdly, mass diplomacy is believed to contribute effectively to foreign trade policy by opening foreign markets and stimulating exports.

It occupies a central place in the U.S. trade liberalisation strategy whose mission is to promote core liberal standards, increase trade and free the flow of U.S. goods, service and capital.<sup>152</sup> For American foreign policy makers there is little doubt that domestic outreach efforts in the domains of information and culture are central to building popular support for further trade liberalisation. The State Department's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs prides itself on fostering America's economic prosperity by expanding world trade and by enlarging the area of vibrant

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<sup>147</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>148</sup> France – MAE, DGCID, "3. Aide...", in *Action 2000*, *op. cit.*, 45-46.

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>150</sup> L.W. Craner (Assistant Secretary of State) in U.S. - State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, *Human Rights Reports 2001* (DHRL, 2001); see also Pleuger, *op. cit.*

<sup>151</sup> U.S. - State Department, *Strategic Plan 2000*, *op. cit.*

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*

open-market economies.<sup>153</sup> According to the ECA, mass diplomacy supports trade policy by contributing to export promotion efforts. Finally, Washington relies on the capacity of its cultural and information diplomacy to reach and engage consumers overseas in order to expand U.S. exports.<sup>154</sup>

Canada also depends significantly on mass diplomacy to support its economy. The mandate that DFAIT officials hold is “to brand Canada as a dynamic and technically advanced nation, and as a reliable commercial partner, endowed with a rich and diverse heritage.”<sup>155</sup> They depend enormously on mass diplomacy’s capacity to represent Canada as a dependable commercial partner of the United States for issues such as border management, environmental questions, and trade in softwood lumber, steel and agricultural products.<sup>156</sup> The priority is to target key opinion-makers and leaders, current and future, in politics, business, the media, and academic circles; these priorities imply an emphasis on developing institutional contacts such as within national institutions, broadcasting, business associations and training centres.<sup>157</sup> In recent years, the approach adopted by Canadian mass diplomats consisted of a niche strategy that prioritizes the “economic pillars” of comparative advantage, efficiency, and maximum impact in the national interest rather than broader popular targets.<sup>158</sup> Even if the means of evaluation do not yet exist, within DFAIT there is a belief that this diplomacy of public relations contributes significantly to attracting investment, energizing exchange and benefiting Canada’s economy

Numerous other actors on the international scene are increasingly tempted to use mass diplomacy to sustain their economic policy. For other leaders of the G8, such as the Italians, “the promotion of culture abroad does not only mean mobilising Italy’s ingenuity and credibility abroad but more specifically, preparing the ground for greater economic and commercial penetration of products and companies.”<sup>159</sup> The British are no less persuaded of the legitimacy of this reasoning. The heads of the FCO are clear: “We seek to exert influence on behalf of the British Government as a whole – to explain British policy, and to win understanding and support for our positions: on behalf of British business, particularly in pursuit of commercial contracts; on behalf of the devolved administrations or regional Government bodies seeking inward investment into the UK; and on behalf of a panoply of British bodies or institutions with interests abroad.”<sup>160</sup>

<sup>153</sup> U.S. - State Department, ECA, *Annual Report 2002*, *op. cit.*

<sup>154</sup> U.S. - State Department, *Strategic Plan 2000*, *op. cit.*

<sup>155</sup> Canada - DFAIT, *2002-2003 Estimates...*, *op. cit.*, 36.

<sup>156</sup> *Ibid.*, 35.

<sup>157</sup> For an illustration of this approach see Canada – DFAIT, Public Diplomacy Department, “Asia Pacific Branch 2002/03 Priorities” (DFAIT, 2002).

<sup>158</sup> H. Smith, “Niche Diplomacy in Canadian Human Rights Policy: Ethics or Economics?”, in Irwin *op. cit.*

<sup>159</sup> “Culture Must Increasingly Become Italy’s Ambassador”, *Il Tempo*, February 26, 2002.

<sup>160</sup> U.K. - FCO, “Influence Worldwide”, *FCO Annual Report 2003*, *op. cit.*, 83.

For Germans too, informing and educating foreign audiences is an increasingly important facet of their trade strategy.<sup>161</sup> For instance, Joshka Fisher admits that German schools abroad not only communicate German culture and language but also serve as “base camps for Germany’s export industry” by engaging future leaders emotionally.<sup>162</sup> The French have also considered mass diplomacy to be an essential tool allowing French products to be sold, “to accompany French enterprises abroad” and to develop trade.<sup>163</sup>

The rest of the world has ultimately understood the range of this enlarged concept of foreign economic strategy. Other leaders, such as those of Australia and South Africa are choosing to integrate their public diplomacy and their economic strategy in order to tout their strengths, attract investment and energize commerce. The Australian DFAT heightened priority given for public diplomacy is, among other things, intended to deal with key economic issues such as Australia’s active role in the WTO Doha Round or FTA negotiations with the United States.<sup>164</sup> Finally, we can see the interest devoted by the South Africans to marketing their image and branding their foreign policy in their quest for a better position for South Africa in the global economic system.<sup>165</sup>

## Conclusion

Increasingly, political leaders and foreign policy-makers from around the globe have come to consider mass diplomacy a necessary, pertinent, affordable and effective strategy for the twenty first century. It has become evident to them that culture, information and communication are essential tools for acquiring better international status and for maximising national interests.

- It is seen first as a relevant approach fully equipped to deal with both the downside of the global information society and the new opportunities it presents. Diplomats are aware that deep and lasting changes to the global landscape, such as new technologies and increasing democratisation, have made it not only feasible but also increasingly essential to the success of states in the international arena. Mass diplomacy appears an appealingly simple approach in the context of a very complex age. Mindful that the lines between economic, security and cultural policies are blurred, foreign affairs officials are increasingly seduced by this new diplomacy that allows them

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<sup>161</sup> Germany - Auswaertiges-Amt, “Kulturpolitik Grundsatzte – Principles of Cultural Diplomacy”, in *Concept 2000...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>162</sup> Germany, J. Fischer, Address at the opening..., *op. cit.*

<sup>163</sup> France – MAE, DGCID, “3. Aide au Developpement et à la Coopération”, in *Action 2000*, *op. cit.*

<sup>164</sup> Australia - DFAT, *Annual Report 2002-2003*, *op. cit.*, 9.

<sup>165</sup> South Africa - DFA, *Strategic Plan 2003-2005*, *op. cit.*

to deal with different diplomatic goals simultaneously and, at the same time, to contribute to each of them meaningfully and distinctly.

- Mass diplomacy also suggests itself as a clever means to attain one's international ambitions while involving a minimum of risk for national security. It is now unanimously considered a strategy that moderates daring with caution and enables the cultivation of harmonious relations with foreign relations and the full enjoyment of the opportunities that new international order offers without irritating other countries. In many regards, it is considered to be one of the less threatening ways to engage foreign audiences and build strong relationships and long-lasting alliances.
- Mass diplomacy also benefits from the fact that it is perceived as a cheap way to frame the international debate and to play a key role in world politics. In an age where the use of military force is increasingly viewed as risky and unproductive, it constitutes an ideal palliative, exercising a growing appeal for governments. Relatively small investments in mass diplomacy hold the potential of creating the conditions for stability and economic growth while decreasing the possibility of future problems that might prove more costly to resolve later. Even though it is a privileged tool of rich countries, it is also considered a "poor man's diplomacy" with the potential to even out international interactions by allowing smaller players to compensate for their lack of hard power.

With each passing moment, mass diplomacy appears more indispensable to the conduct of foreign policy. Through the attraction it exercises over the leaders and foreign affairs officials, it is acquiring a central position in the diplomatic toolbox. Many decision makers see it as the instrument *par excellence* for the conquest of hearts and minds of the million of citizens across the globe on which more and more states depend for achieving their goals. It's why a growing number of them increasingly swap the "spirit of conquest" for the "conquest of the spirit". Whatever the case, it is essential to attempt to better understand how mass diplomacy is perceived and valued in leadership circles if we want to be in a position to determine precisely the causes that underlie its recent success. Knowing if leaders are correct in their appreciation of the potential of mass diplomacy is not really relevant in this regard. It is enough to know that they believe in it. In effect, the swelling consensus amongst present leaders on the utility of this branch of diplomacy is itself one of the reasons for its development at the present time.



## **PART II**

### **The Qualitative Change**

## Chapter VI. Adapting to the Marketplace

It is unnecessary to have all the good qualities, but it is very necessary to appear to have them... The masses are always taken by what a thing seems to be and the masses make the world.  
Machiavelli, *The Prince*, XVIII (1517)

### Introduction

The explosive growth of mass media and the advent of the information society were accompanied by a marked growth of public diplomacy. As we've seen in the first part of this thesis, this return to the forefront was in particular reflected in the significant budgetary increases and accelerated re-institutionalisation for this foreign policy concentration in a simultaneous and synchronised way in a significant number of cases around the world. It has once again established itself, as it did during the era of East/West ideological confrontation, if not more so, as a crucial dimension of diplomacy. The question remains nevertheless to know if this re-emergence of public diplomacy was limited to a quantitative increase or whether it also resulted in a qualitative transformation. To what extent did the old diplomacy inherited from the Cold War have to adapt itself to the new environment? Beyond the possession of new weapons of mass persuasion, how has it adjusted to remain competitive in the deregulated information market place despite the competition of multitude of private actors, and above all, in an era where the masses, saturated with information, are increasingly sceptical about government discourse. This second part of the thesis is devoted to the study of these new mechanisms and new skills attesting to the shift of public diplomacy of yesterday towards the mass diplomacy of tomorrow.

The reform of the practice of public diplomacy and old communication techniques are the first manifestations of a transformation of this facet of foreign policy and its adaptation to the new reality of the information society. This chapter aims to demonstrate that the process of adjustment has made public diplomacy into a market-oriented diplomacy that associates itself with the world of marketing while drawing techniques from the public relations domain. The indicators of this reorientation are first the employment of communications consultants, pollsters, media specialists and public relations firms by governmental mass diplomacy operatives and, second, the use of an operating method proper to the world of business and advertising. In particular we will devote attention to this last indicator to demonstrate that the new public diplomacy is now formulated as a veritable communications platform articulated around two principal tenets: On one hand, there is the content of the message that strategically combines information and culture while selecting

and amplifying their most beneficial aspects. On the other hand, the message shaping implies an interactive and market-sensitive approach capable of increasing its effectiveness by optimising presentation and spinning techniques.

## 1. A Market-Research Design

### a. Integrating Public Relations and Communication Tactics

Not since World War II and the height of the Cold War has there been such frantic effort by states to harness international broadcasting and influence the marketplace of ideas. What is inexperienced though is that more than ever public diplomacy efforts coalesce around the idea that the support of foreign populations can be gained through the type of image-oriented campaign employed by big corporations to increase their customer base. As a matter of fact, the new mass diplomacy programs have much in common with marketing and communication strategy. Today's Mass communication is also about promoting and communicating a brand's culture, values and merits and as such it employs tactics from the business world and applies persuasive communication strategies designed to facilitate the penetration of markets by convincing, engaging and gaining the trust of foreign audiences. Many non-governmental organisations increase their popularity through marketing: "so why not apply the same approach to strengthen a country's soft power, creating a worldwide campaign for its value and beliefs?" asks Julia Hanna.<sup>1</sup> Marketing matters today. After all, the phenomenon of mass consumption is a product of today's civilisation (whether we willingly participate or not), one in which marketing and communications play unavoidable parts. And so, it is not really surprising that the diplomacy of the twenty-first century has adapted to and integrated one of the most important cultural features of its time.

Naturally, the United States, birthplace of spin, branding, advertising and marketing, has been leading the way. Since the end of the 1990's, U.S. mass-diplomacy strategists have resolutely opted for a market-research approach. Structures and programs have been overhauled following the dictates of market research.<sup>2</sup> Following September 11, specialists became even more mindful of the urgent need to incorporate selling techniques to re-invigorate the declining support of foreign populations. In *The Paradox of American Power*, J. Nye supports the view that drawing lessons from marketing has become indispensable in the task of repairing America's weakened

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<sup>1</sup> J. Hanna, "Going Alone?", *Kennedy School Bulletin* (Spring 2002).

<sup>2</sup> B. Fulton quoted in Carnegie Endowment, *Information Revolution and World Politics...*, *op. cit.*

moral leadership<sup>3</sup>. Advocating a similar view, author William Ostick argues that “public diplomacy should properly be seen as public relations focused on building long-term relationships with foreign audiences and providing policy explication and advocacy for the United States”. He adds that “If we explicitly acknowledge public diplomacy as a type of public relations, rather than as a specialised diplomatic function as it is persistent viewed, we will more consistently adopt the approaches and techniques developed and tested by private sector practitioners of integrated marketing communications.”<sup>4</sup> Secretary of State Colin Powell confirmed that it is time “to change from just selling the U.S. ... to really branding it;” adding that this should be done by “branding the department, marketing the department, marketing American values to the world, and not just putting out pamphlets.”<sup>5</sup> This market-orientation is clearly reflected in the 2002 restructuring bill, H.R. 3969 and the plethora of Madison style initiatives begun by the U.S. mass diplomacy since its implementation. For the last three years, the buzzwords have been “spinning”, “selling”, and “branding” America and its values. The “total communication” effort undertaken by the Bush staff in this domain has been based on the new assumption that the loyal support of overseas “customers” could be earned with the same techniques used by Wal-Mart to win faithful clientele.<sup>6</sup>

1) The first indication of a market orientation for modern mass diplomacy is the growing importance of the role played by communications specialists and public relations firms within the government apparatus. Again, and for the same reasons, this tendency is particularly apparent in the case of American mass diplomacy. Immediately following 9-11, faced with the urgency to better spin America's message to the world, U.S. mass diplomacy makers called for consulting “those in the private sector whose careers have focused on images both here and around the world.”<sup>7</sup> Reports published by the Council on Foreign Relations and the Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy recommended the involvement of private sector specialists to provide relevant expertise on media trends, market analysis, production techniques, and emerging technologies.<sup>8</sup> As result of new hiring requirements adopted in 2002, the cast of U.S. mass diplomacy now includes a reasonable share of marketing consultants, strategic communications firms, pollsters and media experts.

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<sup>3</sup> Nye, *The Paradox...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>4</sup> Ostick, *op. cit.*

<sup>5</sup> Teinowitz, *op. cit.*

<sup>6</sup> Satloff, *op. cit.*

<sup>7</sup> H. Hyde (R.-Ill.) (chair of the House of Representative's Committee on International Relations), quoted in Hoffman, *op. cit.*

<sup>8</sup> U.S.-State Department, Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, *Building America's Public Diplomacy...*, *op. cit.*

It is extremely revealing that the considerable task of reorganising and streamlining the U.S. mass diplomacy programs was entrusted to a veteran advertising executive and marketing expert. Before being hired to fill the position of the State Department's Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Charlotte Beers had been the only executive in the advertising industry to have served as chairman of two of the top 10 worldwide advertising agencies (J. Walter Thompson and Ogilvy & Mather). It is therefore not surprising that, between 2001 and 2003, she provided U.S. mass diplomacy a strong market-oriented design. In her view, "the principles of persuasive communication hold true whether you find yourself in the world of marketing or of foreign affairs."<sup>9</sup> Under Beers, the motto was to win trust and goodwill abroad by branding USA with the same type of slogans and campaigns that have won repeat customers for McDonald's and Burger King for decades. While the "Queen of Madison Avenue" was eventually dethroned by Margaret Tutwiler, a "traditional" diplomat, Veronique Rodman, a public relations specialist and former television producer, was nominated to direct the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) the other operational arm of U.S. mass diplomacy. Rodman was director of public affairs at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, a Washington-based think tank. Before joining AEI in 1999, she worked for many years in broadcasting, serving as a producer of ABC-TV's 'This Week with David Brinkley' amongst other posts. Another fact that illustrates the growing interpenetration of mass diplomacy and marketing is the fact that M. Tutwiler, after leaving her position with the State Department in April 2004 was hired by the New York Stock Exchange to direct its public relations department. These recurrent exchanges clearly indicate that frontiers between mass diplomacy and Madison Avenue grow thinner and thinner.

In the same category, another sign of the new orientation is the increasingly marked propensity of diplomacy to work with private firms specialising in public relations. For instance, the State Department is employing the services of the Ad Council, a globally renowned group that collaborates with all the main advertising agencies in the United States, all of whom have international capabilities.<sup>10</sup> They first partnered with GSD&M Advertising to develop a series of TV spots celebrating the United States' diversity and tolerance by showing people of many ages, races, and religions saying the "simple yet powerful" line "I am an American."<sup>11</sup> A short while

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<sup>9</sup> U.S. - State Department, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, C. Beers, "Public Service and Public Diplomacy" (address at the Citadel - The Military Academy of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, October 17, 2002).

<sup>10</sup> U.S. - House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, *The Role of Public Diplomacy...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>11</sup> Advertising Council, "I am American", *Campaigns for America* (Ad Council), available @ <http://www.adcouncil.org/campaigns/> (accessed March 2004).

later, the “Campaign for Freedom,” was launched, an initiative developed in coordination with the entire U.S. advertising industry. This collaboration between private and public specialists in the struggle for hearts and minds is not entirely without precedent since the Ad Council had assisted American public diplomacy in its WWII moral-boosting efforts. The joint effort combined this time to inform, engage and inspire public opinion on a massive scale around the entire planet. This type of alliance is increasingly common: The BBG also works with its own audience research contractor, InterMedia (see chapter 10) while the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) has hired a London public relations company, Bell Pottinger, to encourage Iraqis to take part in the political process after the transfer of sovereignty on 30 June 2004.<sup>12</sup>

Although the trend is particularly striking in the U.S. case, other states are also increasingly consulting marketing experts and increasingly integrating business-oriented tactics into the mass diplomacy process. All around the world, communications consultants, pollsters, and media specialists are being employed by diplomats to provide relevant expertise on media trends, market trends, production techniques, and emerging technologies. Precocious in this regard, Turkish leaders called upon communication and public relations professional such as Ü. Oskay, T. Aykut and E. Polatoglu to reformulate their diplomatic strategy early on in 1990's.<sup>13</sup> Dr. Zakir Avsar, an influential theoretician of Turkish mass diplomacy, has placed particular emphasis on the importance of “encoding the knowledge, emotions/sentiments/feelings and information that must be contained by the content disseminated through communication channels”<sup>14</sup>. From the end of the decade this trend became general. Sponsored by the FCO, the United Kingdom-based Foreign Policy Centre, a multidisciplinary think-tank gathering diplomacy and marketing specialists, has developed an active research agenda that explores strategic solutions designed to improve the effectiveness of the British “spin”.<sup>15</sup> Collaborating with advertising companies such as BMP DDB Needham, they have fine-tuned projects designed to re-branding Britain such as “public diplomacy in the 21<sup>st</sup> century” and ‘Global Britons’.<sup>16</sup> The Japanese government has collaborated with bodies such as the New Komeito Center in an attempt to design an efficient public relations

<sup>12</sup> Bell Pottinger, known for its crisis public relations work, was paid nearly \$6 million to mount a television campaign aired in Iraq between April and June 2004. The firm worked with Bates PanGulf of WPP Group and a Baghdad-based services company, Balloch Roe. H. Timmons, “On Advertising: Selling Iraq on a new government”, *International Herald Tribune*, April 5, 2004

<sup>13</sup> See Ü. Oskay, *İletişimin ABC'si (ABC of Communication)* (Istanbul: Simavi Yayinlari, 1992) ; T.A-E. Polatoglu, *Kamu Yönetimine Giriş (Introduction to Public Relations)* (Ankara: Todaie, 1988).

<sup>14</sup> Turkey – MAERT, B. Z. Avsar, “Communication Between the Turkish Republics”, *Eurasian Studies* 1 (spring 1996), 103.

<sup>15</sup> U.K. - The Foreign Policy Centre, *The Centre's Research Programme*, available @ <http://fpc.org.uk/main.html>. (accessed november 2003).

strategy capable of maximising Japan's soft power assets.<sup>17</sup> The Indian Foreign Office and Information and Broadcast Minister have mandated an expert panel headed by information technology and marketing specialists to renovate the image of India's international broadcasting channel and set up a marketing division.<sup>18</sup> This trend, observable around the globe, assumes increasing momentum in the mass diplomacy making process. The heads of the German and Canadian foreign affairs departments agree that the contribution of these experts to improving the design of mass diplomacy programs and publicising their countries' image is critical to enhancing relations with foreign nations in today's hypermedia world. In Paris, Teheran and Canberra professionals are also being allocated the task of exploring a wealth of powerful new ideas, concrete proposals and inspiring projects to facilitate the penetration of new markets for soft power diplomacy initiatives.<sup>19</sup> A new kind of diplomat is clearly emerging (see conclusion).

2) Another indication of the marketing orientation of mass diplomacy is an operational model with strong similarities to those of private public relations firms. This new operational mode consists of a flexible, multi-media, research-driven infrastructure, incorporating special task forces, regional networks and external partners; a structure whose day-to-day operations are managed in an entrepreneurial way by a lead agency acting as the full-time supervising and coordinating CEO. Designed to ensure market competitiveness, this new architecture has the capacity to work 24 hours a day, 7 days a week to deliver rapid reaction diplomacy and proactive communications campaigns – a decisive break with the rigid and immovable structures of traditional public diplomacy. Beyond the new organisational model that we will return to in the following chapters is a new mode of formulating strategic direction that resonates strongly of private practices. “Marrying the message to the market” is the basic goal of today's mass diplomacy programs; a goal dictated by the new diplomatic environment.<sup>20</sup> Priority populations

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<sup>16</sup> U.K. - BC, “Public Diplomacy...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>17</sup> Japan - Task Force on Foreign Relations for the Prime Minister, *Basic Strategies...*, *op. cit.*; Japan - NKC, “Establishing a peaceful...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>18</sup> As a result, Doordarshan changed its name to Prasar Bharati, appointed a new dynamic CEO and has also changed the name of its large New Delhi complex from Mandi House (which means market) to Prasar Bharati Bhavan, to change its association with a “bazaar”; J. Fine, “Indian Television Turning to Globalization”, *Transnational Broadcasting Studies* 4 (Spring 2000).

<sup>19</sup> Australia - DFAT, *Annual Report 2001-2002* (released by the DFAT, 2002), available @ [http://www.dfat.gov.au/dept/annual\\_reports/01\\_02/s02/3-1-2.html](http://www.dfat.gov.au/dept/annual_reports/01_02/s02/3-1-2.html) ; Australia - DFAT, Australia International Cultural Council “Promoting Australia's Culture Abroad”, <http://www.dfat.gov.au/aicc/index.html> (accessed July 2003); Iran - Assefi, “Foreign Ministry's Success...”, *op. cit.*; Charmelot, *op. cit.*

<sup>20</sup> ‘Marrying the mission to the market’ summarises the fundamental strategy of U.S. international broadcasting; U.S. – BBG, *Strategic Plan 2004* (BBG), available @ [http://www.bbg.gov/bbg\\_plan.cfm](http://www.bbg.gov/bbg_plan.cfm) (accessed March 2004).

have multiplied and media environments have advanced virtually everywhere with an explosion of private and public media outlets that compete aggressively for audience share. Broadcast and computer technologies have made quantum leaps, with satellite television and the Internet becoming preferred information modes for millions. Consequently, the task of reaching a significant audience is a far more difficult than reaching an audience a decade ago. A mass diplomacy mastering public communication tools and strategies is prevailing because it is the most adapted to today's information saturated world.

**Figure 1: Marketing Mass Diplomacy Programs**

Challenge	Tasks
Branding and positioning	To cultivate a distinctive and positive image.
Target markets and audiences	To identify key zones and segments in regards to key strategic goals.
Formats and programs	To develop a clear, coherent and specially tailored message for the target population.
Delivery and placement	To ensure programs are reached and control strategic distribution channels
Marketing and promotion	To Improve awareness and trust levels
Technology	To maximize the use of multimedia and cross-promote broadcast products

Figure 1, derived from BBG's strategic plan and GAO's report on U.S. information dissemination programs, presents the major market challenges faced by mass diplomacy programs and their respective solutions. The table makes clear that the preoccupations of mass diplomats are today analogous even identical in some cases to those of most of the public relations firms. In integrating in its agenda vocabulary such as branding, positioning, formatting, testing, tailoring messages, delivering and placing products, public diplomacy definitely entered the era of modern communication. According to interviewed public relations executives, governments can no more avoid full implementation of these solutions to market challenges if they want to be really competitive on the global information marketplace. Each of these challenge-solution pairs contains numerous specifications which will be analysed in the subsequent pages.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>21</sup> U.S. – GAO, *International Broadcasting: New Strategic Approach Focuses on Reaching Large Audiences but Lacks Measurable Program Objectives* (report to the House of Representatives's Committee on International Relations, GAO report: GAO-03-772, Washington, D.C., July 2003), 19-20.



The targeting of markets and key audiences occupies a very important place in this mass public relations diplomacy. Each mass diplomacy program centers the bulk of its effort on a non-exclusive priority zone of influence; what J. Rosenau has called “spheres of authority.”<sup>22</sup> For instance, the British strategy concentrates on a list of 18 countries, amongst which are the members of the G20, the E.U. and, particularly important, France and the United States.<sup>23</sup> This list is flexible and evolves in relation to the international situation and national interests. For example, Britain has recently added the Czech Republic and Hungary with regard to their new role in the EU. Similarly, in the immediate aftermath of September 11, the focus of the U.S. mass diplomacy shifted from ex-communist Europe towards Muslim-majority countries. This type of short-term adjustment is not always productive though. For example, in the context of the war in Iraq, directive DoD 3600.1 emanating from the Pentagon launched a public relations campaign targeting the public opinion of France and Germany with the goal of pushing Paris and Berlin to align themselves with Washington, thus strengthening the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance.<sup>24</sup> Table 2 presents a list of the five priority markets for selected mass diplomacy programmes based on spending by country and region.

**Figure 2. High Priority Markets for Selected Programs**

Norway	Germany	Britain	Turkey	France	United States
United States	United States	United States	Germany	Francophone Africa	Western Europe
Britain	France	France	United States	Muslim World	Muslim World
Germany	Russia	Commonwealth	Caucasus	South America	China
Russia	Britain	Muslim World	Central Asia	United States- Canada	Asia Pacific
France	Eastern Europe	Africa	Balkan	Asia Pacific	Americas
Japan	Italy	Russia	France	South Asia	Africa

Sources: FCO, Foreign Policy Center, GAO, DGCID, TIKA, Auswaertiges-Amt

This type of classification provides useful information about the international policies of countries: it reveals an interesting perspective on the general geopolitical interests and priorities by distinguishing in particular amongst those with a global strategy (the U.K, the U.S. and France) and those with a regional concentration (Norway, Germany and Turkey). This classification also facilitates the identification of key target audiences. The United States and

<sup>22</sup> J. Rosenau, “States, Sovereignty, and Diplomacy in the Information Age”, *Virtual Diplomacy Series* (Feb. 25 1999), available @ <http://www.usip.org/oc/vd/vdr/jrosenauISA99.html>.

<sup>23</sup> Leonard and Stead, *op. cit.*, 28 and 98-100.

<sup>24</sup> In regards to Directive DoD 3600.1 see J.-B. Jusot, “La France et l’Allemagne Ennemis Publics Numéro Un?”, *InfoGuerre* (november 1, 2003), available @ <http://www.infoguerre.com>; also see J.S. Nye Jr., “Propaganda isn’t the Way”, *op. cit.*

France – two culturally strong countries both having the reputation of being tough markets with refractory public opinions – appear to be highly prioritised targets by several programs.

#### b. The Limits of the Market Metaphor

Although the marketing metaphor is instructive, it is important to understand that mass diplomacy is much more than a simple advertising campaign designed to sell a basic commercial product. It is a branch of foreign policy that, even if it recruits private specialists and integrates certain industry techniques, remains at the end of the day of a political and diplomatic nature and cannot consequently be abandoned to the marketing and communication world. In this regard Graham Spry, a Canadian specialist wrote: “To trust this weapon (the shaping of public opinion through electronic media) to advertising agents and interested corporations seems the uttermost folly.”<sup>25</sup> To paraphrase Napoleon, we could say that political marketing is too serious a matter to be left to businessmen. Furthermore, the “Madison Avenue” approach of Under Secretary Beers and the millions of dollars that were invested in aggressive television advertisement have drawn, occasionally justifiably, the harshest criticism from public diplomacy specialists. Joshua Muravchik, a resident scholar at the Washington-based American Enterprise Institute, called Ms. Beers' attempt at re-branding the U.S. “silly”. “What we are facing with the world is nothing you could fix with advertising,” he said.<sup>26</sup> The flaw in Ms. Beers' marketing-centered approach is the “information overload” syndrome found in America, where all communication problems are solved through marketing and spin. “We always think we have to put a spin to convince people”, a U.S. mass diplomacy officer said. “There is a certain manipulative quality to the way we buy and sell and deal with each other.”<sup>27</sup> On the contrary, this approach to public diplomacy as a pure public relations or marketing campaign can be counterproductive especially in regions and countries that hold a more relationship-centered view of communication<sup>28</sup>. For instance, many in the Arab world felt insulted by what they perceived as base commercial propaganda that inferred a perception of them as mindless consumers.<sup>29</sup>

According to the evidence, mass diplomacy must go far beyond simple public relations campaigns and demand flexibility and finesse in equal proportion to the complexity of the issues and the stakes. It is about promulgating ideas and legitimising a whole vision of the world

<sup>25</sup> Price, “Public Diplomacy...”, *op. cit.*, 91.

<sup>26</sup> Teinowitz, *op. cit.*

<sup>27</sup> Krlev, *op. cit.*

<sup>28</sup> Zaharna, “The Unintended ...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>29</sup> R.G. Khour (executive editor), “The US public diplomacy hoax: Why do they keep insulting us?” *The Daily Star*, February 11, 2004.

through the diffusion of a set of values and norms perceived as preferable for one's own society as well as for others in general. Culture, values and information, the component parts of soft power, can't be sold in the same way as ordinary household items. Winning friends abroad is not achieved through glossy commercials. Mass diplomacy is a job that requires much more than an advertising background.<sup>30</sup> Charlotte Beers herself is aware of the limits of the analogy between legitimising a country and its values and selling services and goods: "The buyer is interested, at some level, in buying the product or service. However, in the world of public diplomacy today, we have many complex audiences, but more often than not we don't have any agreement that they will even listen to our proposition."<sup>31</sup> This is why the U.S. public diplomacy is gradually moving away from the browbeating associated with the American "hard sell" towards something subtler while fusing the best of diplomacy and communication techniques. Yet, the complexity and competitiveness of the global marketplace of ideas still requires modern diplomats to develop their persuasive skills in order to become accomplished communicators with the ability to employ new diplomatic tools such as the Internet, television and satellites. As a result and whether we like it or not, marketing techniques play an omnipresent role in the mass diplomacy process. They are employed to formulate the message, to make it attractive and credible and to shape it in a way that it reaches the widest audience possible within targeted markets.

The integration of conventional techniques used in the marketing world into the practice of public diplomacy is without a doubt the most visible indicator of the metamorphosis of this facet of foreign policy and its adjustment to the new rules of the marketplace. As the next sections will demonstrate, these techniques participate in the formulation of the message (culture + information) and in its presentation (spinning, branding). The result is a market-sensitive communication platform capable of revolutionising the art of political communication. Though they intervene in each of the stages analysed in the coming pages, they remain subordinated to the exigencies proper to this mutant form of foreign policy that is mass diplomacy. The analysis of the new requirements of the process of formulating mass diplomacy as much at the level of content as the intended shape has in fact demonstrated that we are in the presence of something entirely new, halfway between marketing and traditional diplomacy, something perfectly acclimatised to the demands of the information marketplace, something that, implemented in a rigorous way, could be astonishingly effective. Let us start by investigating the content of the message.

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<sup>30</sup> Teinowitz, *op. cit.*

<sup>31</sup> U.S. – State Department, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, Beers, "Public Service...", *op. cit.*

## 2. The Content of the Message

### a. Information and Culture: A Winning Combination

However they are conceptualised, mass diplomacy programs essentially operate in two separate but complementary and closely linked ways. The first is information policy and the second is about cultural exchange. While the former has short-term focus on defending *issues*, the later is a long-term investment in promoting *values*. Combining both ingredients is indispensable for the success of mass diplomacy efforts. If one or the other is missing or neglected, the entire enterprise becomes unsteady. The challenge consists then of orchestrating the defence of the issues and the infiltration of values in a way that their effects on public opinion complete the other and amplify mutually. The awareness of this dual *modus operandi* is one of the aspects of the adaptation of public diplomacy to the global age.

Whereas the task is intensive, complex and fraught with difficulties, information diplomacy generally associated with cyber-diplomacy is basically a short term effort with a relatively simple goal: to project a favourable image of a country and its policy abroad. It plays a growing role in modern statecraft and constitutes an unavoidable tactical consideration in the design and conduct of mass diplomacy as it is palpably the most potent and rapid agent for shaping public opinions. In an era where masses are more and more sensible to the flow of instantaneous information, a cyber-diplomacy organisation capable of adapting to the 24/7 news cycle pressure represents a critical asset. "Rapid reaction diplomacy" is particularly useful in managing information in crises: For instance, the U.S.-British Coalition Information Centres (CIC) played a pivotal role in terms of information co-ordination and dissemination in the context surrounding 9-11 and the war in Afghanistan (see chapter 8 for more on cyber-diplomacy). More generally, a proactive communication strategy and an efficient information dissemination network is about the projection of a favourable representation of a country, justifying its actions, countering unfriendly information, tempering hostility and violent situations, providing situational awareness to target publics, mobilising populations on critical matters and, in general, channelling and shaping international opinion. Therefore, being able to gather, process and disseminate information through as many communication channels available, public and private, becomes a strategic facet for modern public diplomacy.

But, as rewarding and well articulated as information diplomacy programs may be, they represent only half of mass diplomacy's responsibility. For many reasons, raw information deprived from cultural inputs cannot suffice for the conduct of an effective campaign of mass

diplomacy on the long run. Foreign policy makers have come to realise that news without cultural content is little more than a summary of events without substance or force. At the most, it can momentarily modify public perception of day-to-day issues without affecting the underlying value structure from which public opinion springs. Specialists agree that the effect does not persist long enough to begin a genuinely engaging interaction.<sup>32</sup> Incisive though they may be, short newscasts cannot significantly alter the perception of an entire population even when repeated in cycle. Creating dialogue and trust, let alone empathy, is not a result that can be achieved overnight by information and communication campaigns alone. "Simply informing is not enough", emphasise U.S. experts, "if only because we can't rely on the openness and neutrality of our audiences."<sup>33</sup> As stress by the German philosopher Gustave Le Bon, author of *Raping the Masses*, "facts are not enough to teach men held prisoner by belief or dogma."<sup>34</sup> In other words, brute information is insufficient to influence a population in any meaningful way, especially in the face of increasing scepticism in regards to "foreign propaganda" and growing competitiveness of the information market.

Chancelleries have begun to become aware of the error of focusing exclusively on information programs at the expense of cultural dimensions. If one looks at public diplomacy as a mixture of long term cultural relationship-building strategies and shorter term information and image-building strategies, it clearly appears that American efforts have been very much centered on the later. To engage foreign populations, many experts believe U.S. mass diplomats must stop using massive doses of information designed to achieve quick public opinion changes and instead link policies more closely to America's cultural values "especially those that are widely shared by many of the world's cultures."<sup>35</sup> Many Foreign Service officers overseas agree that media policy alone can't do it. "Public diplomacy is not really about getting things in the press," one officer said. "It's about long-term engagement. It can't be just about supporting the policy — it has to be deeper than that"<sup>36</sup>; a depth provided by more cultural content. America's communication campaign could succeed, considers Mamoun Fandy, professor at the National Defence University, "if there was more American content, probably more cultural content - soft content rather than just hard news."<sup>37</sup> Experts agree that British mass diplomacy has also failed to concentrate sufficiently on the strategic delivery of cultural messages for the long-term, but has

<sup>32</sup> C. Beers, "Interview with Terence Smith", *The News Hours – Pew Charitable Trust* (January 2003).

<sup>33</sup> U.S. – State Department, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, Beers, "Public Service...2, *op. cit.*

<sup>34</sup> G. Le Bon, *Hier et demain. Pensées brèves* (Paris: Flammarion, 1918).

<sup>35</sup> U.S. - CFR, "Public Diplomacy...", *op. cit.*

<sup>36</sup> Kraleov, *op. cit.*

<sup>37</sup> M. Fandy (Professor at the National Defence University), "Reaching Out", *Online News Hour*, February 18, 2002.

instead focused too much on information reactivity and rebuttal. The problem is that the current international crisis isn't only about issues, it is also about values, a way of life and fundamental beliefs. This is why it is vital for current efforts to move "from news to entertainment, from 'objective and impartial' reportage to promotion of a particular 'culture or style'" according to Monroe Price.<sup>38</sup>

Cultural and educational efforts constitute the essential other half of mass diplomacy programs. Without them, mass diplomacy inevitably lacks "consistency and effectiveness" acknowledge Canadians<sup>39</sup>. Their purpose is to develop lasting relationships with key foreign audiences through several inter-connected initiatives including educational exchanges, language training, cultural export (of both high and popular culture) and telecommunication development programs. The idea is to tap into the symbolic power of cultural values and norms making them more palatable and easily adopted by others. "Done properly, cultural programs are not simply the government's version of art for art's sake, a luxury, or the provinces of cultural elites", observe Christopher Ross, a senior U.S. mass diplomat, "cultural programs are, instead, the frank mobilization in the service of national security of what Joseph Nye referred to as "soft power"."<sup>40</sup> Cultural policy programs are no longer solely limited to touring orchestras, art exhibits, and tedious academic conferences on Madame de Staël or Tallemant des Réaux.<sup>41</sup> The new programs are also designed to reach mass audiences and opinion leaders, who now constitute the most influential intermediaries between governments. They are about promoting every appealing aspect of culture that government wants known abroad including academic studies, ideology, religion, but also, for better or for worse, popular music, sports, The Simpsons, Bollywood, Japanese Mangas, Brazilian soap operas or Hong-Kong action flicks, as long as they help convey their message.<sup>42</sup> In fact, it does not need to be limited to national culture and can include any "foreign" values and norms that they would like other nations to adopt or enact because they view them as consistent with their foreign policy interests. The so-called "pluralist approach", which in the case of the BBG's popular Radio Sawa consists of mixing Eminem with local songs and Arabic-language sitcoms, is more likely to build trust and win friendship than monolithic programs with purely national content.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>38</sup> Price, "Public Diplomacy...", *op. cit.*, 91.

<sup>39</sup> Canada – DFAIT, *Canada in the World...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>40</sup> Ross, *op. cit.*, 75–83.

<sup>41</sup> A. Decaux (Minister-delegate for the French-speaking World), quoted in Roche and Piniau, *op. cit.*, 138.

<sup>42</sup> U.S. - State Department, Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy, ECA, Ambassador C. Schneider, "Culture and the Practice of Diplomacy" (report from the White House Conference on Culture and Diplomacy, Washington, DC, Nov. 28, 2000), [http://state.gov/r/whconf/001128\\_whcon\\_rapprpts.html](http://state.gov/r/whconf/001128_whcon_rapprpts.html).

<sup>43</sup> Satloff, *op. cit.*

After several year of exclusive insistence on information programs, governments have come to recognize cultural exchanges as a high-priority investment, even though the returns are not immediately apparent and even if they are difficult to measure. In fact, some countries like France or Germany have always given priority to long-term programmes in various areas of culture aimed at developing enduring links and networks, over issues-oriented activities that have only a short-term impact<sup>44</sup>. The United States has overlooked culture as an inherent feature of public diplomacy and it is only now that it has begun to adopt a more relationship-building approach. U.S. foreign policy makers like many others around the globe, are progressively coming to consider that, “if anything is certain about the future, it is the growing influence of culture and its relationship to politics, values, and social change - it affects how we express and think about ourselves, how we communicate with each other and how we perceive, conceive of, and interact with the world.”<sup>45</sup> American diplomats, especially those based in the Middle East, think that cultural programs are more likely to make a difference than aggressive media campaigns and Madison Avenue-style advertising. They acknowledge that educational and cultural programs usually take years to produce dividends, but note that “effective public diplomacy is measured not by the immediacy of its results so much as by the durability of those results.”<sup>46</sup> What makes cultural programs more attractive is that through new possibilities offered by new communications technologies, this aspect of foreign affairs, once thought elitist and superfluous, offers potential with far reaching consequence.

The immediate purpose and value of cultural diplomacy is to attract foreign attention by differentiating countries from their competing partners. Canadian specialist Evan H. Potter, judges that in an age of cultural convergence, the diplomatic advantage goes to countries that are able to present an original image and a distinct voice.<sup>47</sup> For the same reasons, his British counterparts agree that mass diplomats must, like salesmen, single out their product and stress their distinctive qualities by tapping into national culture and identity.<sup>48</sup> This is where the utility of branding, selling and image building techniques becomes apparent. To this end, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs implemented an active program designed to promote “a deeper and wider appreciation of Australia internationally” by “strategically linking” its cultural

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<sup>44</sup> Germany - Auswaertiges-Amt, “Kulturpolitik Grundsätze – Principles of Cultural Diplomacy”, in *Concept 2000...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>45</sup> U.S. - State Department, Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, *Annual Report 2002*, *op. cit.*, 24.

<sup>46</sup> Králev, *op. cit.*

<sup>47</sup> Potter, “Canada and...”, *op. cit.*, 7

<sup>48</sup> For instance, the ‘Global Britons’ project and the British Council’s ‘Through Other Eyes’ are attempts to find an appealing outward-looking concept for Britain; P. Griffith and M. Leonard, *Reclaiming Britishness* (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2002), xi; Leonard and Noble, *op. cit.*

distinctiveness<sup>49</sup>. 2) In the longer run, cultural diplomacy also offers the potential of building-up solid relationships based on deep-rooted confidence and enduring empathy. Karl Deutshe would agree that when adequately designed and diligently conducted, mass diplomacy can alter the value structure of foreign audiences and change their cognitive and emotional vision of reality<sup>50</sup>. According to this rational, cultural policy constitutes a subtle soft power diplomacy capable of bringing foreign audiences to make decisions based on values, preferences and expectations closer to your preferences.

#### b. Moving Beyond Propaganda: Turning “Truth” into Profit

The line between public diplomacy and propaganda is awfully thin indeed but it is the distinction is nevertheless critical. This issue has prompted an ongoing debate and much has been said. Etymologically speaking, mass diplomacy is arguably a specific form of propaganda but at the same time it goes beyond the more vulgar strains of disinformation and brute manipulation based on falsehoods and untruths. Although mass diplomacy is full of inner contradictions, it is vital for its success to be kept from being considered raw propaganda.<sup>51</sup> Avoiding propaganda is not a moral but a strategic choice.

The reason it is so important that mass diplomacy distinguishes itself from base propaganda is that in the age of global information, attempts to mislead public opinion are not only very unlikely to succeed but increasingly counterproductive and damaging. Deceiving the enemy by distorting or perverting information is an acknowledged and effective technique in the context of psychological warfare. In an information society however, where the public must be treated with care and information travels increasingly quickly, this approach carries risks. Aggressive psy-ops campaigns are unlikely to win hearts and minds and are in fact much more likely to produce suspicion and defiance.<sup>52</sup> “Any attempt to sell a country that does not reflect the reality is doomed to be undermined by people’s actual experience” explains Mark Leonard.<sup>53</sup> Populations are slow to forgive those caught in the act of flagrant manipulation of information as the Spanish Prime minister had the misfortune to experience during the terrorist attacks in Madrid.<sup>54</sup> As the former-U.S. Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy emphasised, “to leave someone feeling manipulated – whether by an ad campaign or a foreign policy campaign – eventually turns them against you

<sup>49</sup> Australia - DFAT, *Annual Report 2001-2002*, *op. cit.*

<sup>50</sup> Deutsch, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

<sup>51</sup> Brown, *op. cit.*

<sup>52</sup> Nye “Propaganda isn’t the Way”, *op. cit.*

<sup>53</sup> Leonard and Stead, *op. cit.*, 18.



even more firmly than before.”<sup>55</sup> The line between propaganda and public diplomacy has become crucial.

By ignoring the distinction between propaganda and public diplomacy and by having chosen a public relations campaign of the “psychological operation” type, the Bush Administration has progressively riled international public opinion. During the Afghanistan campaign the massive diffusion of shorts video and the parachuting of “leaflet bombs” displaying doctored photos of Bin Laden accompanied by simplistic slogans had the inverse effect of awakening the suspicion and abrading the sensitivities of local populations. The suspicion that Washington deliberately exaggerated the Iraqi nuclear threat and voluntarily overstated the case for military intervention – suspicions increased by a certain number of revelations and inquiry reports<sup>56</sup> – have only amplified the blame of global public opinion.<sup>57</sup> Other faux-pas have followed, such as the sending of false letters from soldiers exaggerating the success and local popularity of the military intervention.<sup>58</sup> One after the other these misfires and half-truths have severely weakened the endeavour and inexorably alienated public opinions rapidly constraining leaders to concentrate their clearest efforts to denying persistent accusations of disinformation. The White House and the Pentagon have not stopped affirming that they are “not lying to the American people. They are not lying to foreign publics. They don’t do that kind of thing.”<sup>59</sup> The fact is that what some have characterised as “crisis public diplomacy” resembles in no way mass diplomacy. By disregarding its basic rules, this hasty approach to capturing heart and minds has backfired and demolished credibility and inexorably antagonised international populations.

Moving resolutely beyond traditional propaganda, modern mass diplomacy relies as much as possible on the power of truth. It “is not about being a huckster with a predilection for shading the truth.”<sup>60</sup> There is growing consensus among experts that building long-term relationships based on trust can only be achieved through a subtle mix of marketing and authenticity. Woodrow Wilson summed up this view best when he said that “one of the best means of controlling news was flooding news channels with “facts” or what amounted to official information.”<sup>61</sup> Fascinated by German philosopher Hegel, the idea is that the best way to influence perception and the

<sup>54</sup> M. Daoudi, “Azhar en flagrant délit de manipulation”, *Radio France Internationale*, March 16, 2004.

<sup>55</sup> U.S. – State Department, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, Beers, “Public Service...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>56</sup> Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *WMD in Iraq - Evidence and Implications* (report prepared by J. Cirincione, J.T. Mathews, G. Perkovich, with A. Orton, January 2004) ; see also *BBCWS*, January 8, 2004.

<sup>57</sup> J. Leyne (US State Dept correspondent), “CIA ‘overstated case for war’”, *BBCWS*, October 24, 2003.

<sup>58</sup> “US Army’s ‘fake’ letters cause stir”, *BBCWS*, October 14<sup>th</sup>, 2003.

<sup>59</sup> G.W. Bush and D. Rumsfeld quoted by *Agence France-Presse*, February 26, 2002.

<sup>60</sup> U.S. – State Department, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, Beers, “Public Service...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>61</sup> Vaughn, *op. cit.*, 194.

interests of individuals is to suggest an opinion that seems credible to which they feel they are adhering voluntarily, an idea that seems neither foreign nor forced. To succeed, it is imperative that the enterprise relies, as with advertising, for a large part on palpable reality. "Truth is the best propaganda and lies are the worst", Edward R. Murrow, liked to repeat when serving as the Director of the U.S.I.A. "To be persuasive we must be believable; to be believable we must be credible; to be credible we must be truthful. It is as simple as that."<sup>62</sup> The very pertinent question raised by the U.S. Committee on International Relations remains however: In what does this truth consist?<sup>63</sup> Although some transcendent truth may be out there, nobody can really pretend to know it fully as it is a highly subjective matter. The solution then consists of concentrating on known facts that are demonstrable and above all, facts of which operatives are convinced. This might seem naïve but, as marketing experts claim, we are never more convincing when we believe what we say. But the success of mass diplomacy is not limited to a question of conviction.

As with any communication operation, mass diplomacy must also attempt to communicate the best version of the "truth"; it is therefore about sorting, selecting and redistributing values and information while always *magnifying the best and filtering the worst* with regards to foreign policy interests. There is a certain manipulative quality in the process but it would be inaccurate to speak of it as an attempt to "control" or "censure" the free flow of cultural or information exports – especially because such an intervention is out of the question because the flow of information is uncontrollable. Following the example of advertising, the mass diplomat is content to promote the most attractive content at his or her disposal. He or she acts therefore "at the margins by seeking to clear paths for the most positive messages to reach mass audiences and to correct the negative perceptions produced by the marketplace."<sup>64</sup> Though apparently limited, the task of channelling, gathering, selecting and filtering information and culture is in fact one of the highest strategic importance. To a large extent, this is what mass diplomacy is all about: acting at the margins of the market to orient advantageously the flow of information.

This crucial task consists first of emphasising aspects of culture and information that can be most beneficial for a country's international reputation. Italian, British, German, Japanese, Iranian and a growing number of leaders around the world have come to realise that projecting a flattering and appealing positive picture of their country is of the utmost significance to winning

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<sup>62</sup> Quoted by U.S. - United States Information Agency Alumni Association, *op. cit.*

<sup>63</sup> U.S. - House of Representatives, CIR, *The Role Of Public Diplomacy...*, *op. cit.*, 58.

<sup>64</sup> Leonard and Stead, *op. cit.*, 4.

overseas empathy and advancing foreign policy goals.<sup>65</sup> This is the Palazzo Farnese's intention in "disseminating everything that is good and beautiful about Italy". "We want Italy not only to be looked up to and thought well of, but to be an emblem of reliability", said the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs responsible for the promotion of Italy's culture and image.<sup>66</sup> A reputation for integrity, honesty and altruism has to be earned quote the British Council.<sup>67</sup> In every mature mass diplomacy program a communication platform has been developed to project a distinct "dream image". For example, mass diplomats from the Australian DFAT are working on the concept of a multicultural Australia that is tolerant, democratic and dynamic<sup>68</sup>; those of the Quai d'Orsay exploit the perception of France "as being on the cutting edge of progress but still a bearer of traditional values."<sup>69</sup> British specialists believe for their part that one of the most important tasks for public diplomacy is processing and disseminating a celebratory and inviting picture of the U.K. focusing on British diversity, internationalism, humanitarian generosity, creativity and innovation in technology, arts and design.<sup>70</sup> In showcasing "the best of American society and culture", the new diplomacy has also become a key instrument for polishing America's image of a benevolent and welcoming giant.<sup>71</sup> Of course the even more challenging part of the task for all those working in public relations programs is to exorcise the spectre of harmful international stereotypes. Iran seeks to avert the stigma of religious radicalism, European nations attempt to bury typecasts of racism, Japan works against images of xenophobia, Turkey, militarism, Great Britain, euro-scepticism, and so on. Countries such as Ireland, Spain and Norway have instigated an innovative "re-branding" strategy attempting to trade in their reputation as rural and traditional nations for that of modern and industrious nations that are open to the world.<sup>72</sup> Finally, the United States attempts through their mass diplomacy to counter the more and more entrenched reputation of an imperialistic, violent, materialistic and individualistic nation by presenting 'proofs' that Americans care above all about faith, love of family, education, and respect.<sup>73</sup>

<sup>65</sup> Japan - MOFA, "Chapter II. Section 5..." in *Diplomatic Bluebook 2001*, *op. cit.*; Germany - *Auswaertiges-Amt*, "Kulturpolitik Grundsätze - Principles of Cultural Diplomacy", in *Concept 2000...*, *op. cit.*; Iran - Assefi, "Foreign Ministry's Success...", *op. cit.*, 8.

<sup>66</sup> T. Debenedetti, "Institutes of Culture: the Paris and Berlin Directors are at risk", *Il Mattino*, march 7, 2002.

<sup>67</sup> U.K. - BC, "BC's Official Homepage", *op. cit.*

<sup>68</sup> Australia - DFAT, *Annual Report 2001-2001*, *op. cit.*; Kelly, *op. cit.*

<sup>69</sup> France - DGCID, "I. Servir...", in *Action 2000*, *op. cit.*, 33.

<sup>70</sup> U.K. - BC, "Public Diplomacy...", *op. cit.*; see also Griffith & Leonard, *op. cit.*; "Country profile: United Kingdom", *BBCWS*, November 5, 2003.

<sup>71</sup> Harper, *op. cit.*

<sup>72</sup> Leonard & Small, *Norway's...*, *op. cit.*, 17.


<sup>73</sup> U.S. - State Department, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, C. Beers, "Public Diplomacy Plans for the Future" (statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, released by ECA, June 11, 2002).

### 3. Shaping the Message

#### a. Custom Tailored to the Target

Regardless of the content, the shaping of the message occupies an essential place in the mass diplomacy process. All the pieces matter: the channels of communication, the messengers, “the tone of voice in which it speaks, and its familiarity with the environment in which it is speaking.”<sup>74</sup> Mass diplomats, like communications experts, know that the form has to be relevant to the consumer and reflect his/her preoccupations and interests.<sup>75</sup> One of the most complex requirements in this regard is that the communications process should never be a straightforward one-way two-stage process consisting of a speaker sending a message to a listener. The mass diplomacy communications process is about stimulus, impact and response - so two steps become five as presented in figure 3.<sup>76</sup>

**Figure 3: The Five-Stage Mass Diplomacy Communication Process**



The first reason for this circular process is that a communications campaign perceived as a one-way flow of culture and information is likely to be counterproductive by generating suspicion and defiance instead of confidence.<sup>77</sup> A one-way message is a message often unsuited to the target market because it does not reflect the psychology and the expectations of the public. Misperception and cultural differences in terms of delivery style cause communications campaigns to fail: “If there is asymmetry in cultural styles, a nation’s effort to improve its public diplomacy may inadvertently magnify cultural differences and amplify misunderstandings. One can alienate the very same audiences one is trying to persuade. That’s a public diplomacy

<sup>74</sup> Ross, *op. cit.*, 83.

<sup>75</sup> U.S. –S. Telhami, “Public Diplomacy”. Testimony before the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, April 24, 2002. Foreign Policy Studies Program (The Brookings Institution).

<sup>76</sup> U.S. – State department, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, Beers, “Public Service...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>77</sup> Nye, *The Paradox...*, *op. cit.*, 12.

backfire.”<sup>78</sup> The U.S. mass diplomacy campaign in the Middle East offered a very useful illustration of this by reflecting a uniquely American style of communication, public relations, and advertising and revealing little understanding of the significant cultural and national symbols of the region: America’s style relying on “speaking straight”, communicating resolve and presenting facts and so-called “scientific” evidence as the primary tools of persuasion have resonated positively with American public but have had the opposite effect of antagonising Muslim populations that are more sensitive to analogy, metaphor, rumours on the street and interpersonal communication.<sup>79</sup> Such blindness is more likely to exacerbate misunderstanding between Americans and Arabs, rather than solve it.<sup>80</sup> In a general way, other’s myopia makes it difficult to establish a persuasive dialogue based on meaningful arguments.

Influencing overseas audiences wherever in the world more and more demands a continuing cycle communication so that “diplomacy is increasingly about engaging in dialogue.”<sup>81</sup> *Interchange is a prelude to persuasion.* First it can avoid the suspicion and defiance created by a one-way flow of culture and information; second, and more importantly, it allows better knowledge of the target publics; it allows “adapting your message to their history, their point of view, their closely held passions, myths, and biases.”<sup>82</sup> “We must listen and discuss”, observes a U.S. expert, “This requires time, patience, resolve, and resources.”<sup>83</sup> “If we strive to be successful in our efforts to create understanding for our society and for our policies”, believe Canadian mass diplomats “we must first understand the motives, culture, history, and psychology of the people with whom we wish to communicate, and certainly their language.”<sup>84</sup> Madeleine Albright confirms that without understanding target publics one would “fail to interpret correctly what others say, and fail to convey clearly to others what we intend.”<sup>85</sup> Dialogue allows practitioner to correct potential errors, adjust the message to the market and influence better. As Immanuel Kant emphasised, effective persuasion requires that one “knows man and what can be made of him (for

<sup>78</sup> U.S. - Senate, Zaharna, “American Public Diplomacy...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>79</sup> As a result of this spiralling and mutual *qui pro quo*, “Arabs and Americans are like ships passing in the night, sounding their horns, firing their guns, making known their views, but having no impact on the other”; Khour, *op. cit.*

<sup>80</sup> Aware of its previous errors in this domain, US administration has appointed an Arab-American, Walid Maalouf, at the post of director of public diplomacy for Middle East issues at the US Agency for International Development (April 2004).

<sup>81</sup> Leonard and Noble, *op. cit.*

<sup>82</sup> U.S. – State Department, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, Beers, “Public Service...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>83</sup> U.S. – State Department, P.T. Reeker (Deputy Spokesman), “Remarks Upon Acceptance of the Edward R. Murrow Award” (Tufts-Fletcher School, September 3, 2003).

<sup>84</sup> G.D. Malone, *Political Advocacy and Cultural Communication: Organising the Nations, Public Diplomacy* (Landheim, Md : University of America, 1988), 2.

<sup>85</sup> U.S. - Albright, *op. cit.*

which a high stand point of anthropological observation is required).”<sup>86</sup> As a Turkish specialist remarked, it requires mass diplomats to become sociologists and experts in the art of information-gathering, polling, surveying, opinion research, focus groups. These disciplines are now indispensable to comprehend the motivations, expectations and apprehensions of audiences. They are needed to help to evaluate why attitudes exist among “foreign consumers”, how they can be altered and whether attempts at changing them have been successful.<sup>87</sup>

This is what explains to a great extent the success of Osama Bin Laden in the domain of communication and his capacity to galvanise a significant part of public opinion in the Arab world:

The man in the cave demonstrated a clear understanding of his audience; thus it is not that surprising that his audience understood his message. It is that mirror phenomenon again. When one thoroughly understands the audience, the appropriate tools, strategies, and tactics almost define themselves. More important than speaking in Arabic, bin Laden spoke in the cultural style that spans wider than the Arabic-speaking world. He spoke to evoke feelings, not logical explanations. He used the simple imagery of metaphors that resonates with the personal experience of an uneducated public. He tapped into historical references in a region steeped in history. He harnessed the power of religious symbols that worked as emotional cues to spark his audience to action. And, he did it in a cave.<sup>88</sup>

Bin Laden’s secret was in fact to work with familiar terrain. A pioneer in the domains of psychological operations and mass manipulation, Mao Zedong insisted on the idea that techniques of mass persuasion have the greatest chance of success when we were “like fish in water” i.e. when we evolve in our own socio-cultural environment – clearly a trump that the Al-Qaida leader put to good use.

What makes the difference in today’s information saturated world then is, again, the ability to marry the message to the market. The processes of dialogue and building understanding are indispensable for adjusting and tailoring the message to fit the needs and expectations of the target public. As Charlotte Beers put it, “focusing on the desired response brings you to the threshold of persuasion.”<sup>89</sup> In addition to being relevant to all audiences worldwide, a custom-made message reflects the constraints and sensitivities of local populations. For obvious reasons, the Quai d’Orsay cannot communicate with the Iranian public in the same way it communicates with Americans just as Volkswagen or Nike do not sell their products everywhere based on the same catchphrases. While maintaining a general strategic direction, a “one-size-fits-all” model is

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<sup>86</sup> Kant, *op. cit.*, 374.

<sup>87</sup> U.S. – State Department, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, Beers, “Public Diplomacy...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>88</sup> R.S. Zaharna, “American Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World: A Strategic Communication Analysis”, *Foreign Policy in Focus (FPIF) - Policy Report* (November 2001).

<sup>89</sup> U.S. – State Department, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, Beers, “Public Service...”, *op. cit.*

generally avoided.<sup>90</sup> This is what French leaders have in mind when they ask for modular content that is “coherent but adaptable to the diversity of the situation.” More essential than overcoming linguistic barriers are the psycho-cultural nuances that shape the efficiency and effectiveness of a message. A senior official of the British Council puts it quite clearly: “In our experience you can only build relationships by tapping into people’s needs. You can’t engage them meaningfully – i.e. beyond the cocktail chat – in any other way.”<sup>91</sup> Briefly, practitioners of mass diplomacy are familiarising themselves, as any good salesperson, with the expectations of their clientele in order to maximise their slogans and their campaigns.

This adjustment of supply to local demand is particularly important when it is a question of reaching, as in many public relations operations, certain key segments of the target populations. Although contacts are ultimately deepened at all levels, certain clusters of people matter more because of the weight they carry at a local level. In the words of German mass-diplomats, the effort is “more strongly focused on achieving maximum impact by targeting people who act as multipliers in society.”<sup>92</sup> The main target groups identified by the British Council are current and future elites, Media, opinion shapers and especially mainstream youth.<sup>93</sup> Social and political leaders as well as the “successor generation” remain critical targets but given the fact that traditional elites are no longer the single opinion shaping bloc, the attention is shifting towards non-habitual, often female, younger and less educated people.<sup>94</sup> These new “multiplier networks” include “opinion-molders” such as intellectuals, artists, NGOs, religion, sports and entertainment figures as well as teachers, scientists and mothers. But programs are also increasingly oriented towards “the new young mainstream” particularly in emerging countries where the young comprise an unprecedented and growing share of the population.<sup>95</sup> The young generations constitute a privileged target because they are impressionable and because they will constitute future public opinion, consumers, voters and, in democratic societies, decision makers. With this in mind, the British Council has created programs such as *Connecting Futures*<sup>96</sup> to anchor their public diplomacy efforts. In a general way, this phenomenon can be seen in particular at the level of broadcasting policy where broadcasters such as Radio Sawa or TV5 develop specially

<sup>90</sup> France – MAE, DGCID, “I. Servir...”, in *Action 2000*, *op. cit.*

<sup>91</sup> Leonard and Stead, *op. cit.*, 53.

<sup>92</sup> Germany - Auswaertiges-Amt, “Kulturpolitik Grundsätze – Principles of Cultural Diplomacy”, in *Concept 2000...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>93</sup> U.K. - BC, “Public Diplomacy...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>94</sup> U.S. - NCTA, “Statement...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>95</sup> U.S. – M.B. Tutwiler, “Reaching Beyond Traditional Audiences : Public Diplomacy” (testimony before the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, Washington, DC, February 4, 2004).

<sup>96</sup> UK - BC, *Connecting Future Project*, see homepage @ <http://www.britcoun.org>.

conceived marketing formats designed to attract an under-30's audience. On a similar model, Qatari mass diplomacy is gearing up to launch a satellite channel for Arab children with the intention of broadcasting "educational programming, in a playful and attractive form" announced the president of the Al-Jazeera television channel, Hamad ben Thamer Al-Thani.<sup>97</sup> Projects of this type are becoming increasingly common.

#### b. Appearances and Perception

In the end, the art of mass diplomacy is also largely a matter of appearances, presentation and perception-manufacturing. Describing the arts of persuasion, Machiavelli put in plain words that the masses are not so much convinced by facts themselves as the way in which they are presented to them.<sup>98</sup> In communication, perception of reality - not reality itself - is what matters in the end explains Professor Zaharna: "Perception is what makes spin possible despite an abundance of facts or logic."<sup>99</sup> To quote Foucault, a certain number of procedures allow you to select, organise and improve discourse without necessarily creating a travesty but in a way that grants legitimacy and authority.<sup>100</sup> A thousand astute techniques exist to embellish and "lift" the message in order to render it more credible and marketable. Like advertising specialists, political campaign directors, impresarios and all of those whose job consists of convincing large audiences, new mass diplomats learn to "select words, images and symbols, encode them and then package them seductively".<sup>101</sup> Clarity, symbolism, subtlety, circumspection, tact, tone, the acuity and the coherence of the message make all the difference.

Mass diplomats understand that a key to an effective communications strategy is the clarity of the message and the vivid symbols used to accompany it. An easily understood national narrative helps to explain a country's values, norms, practices and policies better.<sup>102</sup> Considering mass diplomacy's immense target audience, a few very simple but powerful messages matter more than long and involved speeches.<sup>103</sup> The impact of the message is considerably increased with the use of clearly resonating symbols. In a time when people are subjected to a constant barrage of information, the use of simple and clear concepts contribute to captivate the attention and mark

<sup>97</sup> AFP, "Lancement fin 2004...", *op. cit.*

<sup>98</sup> Machiavelli, *op. cit.*

<sup>99</sup> Zaharna, "American Public Diplomacy...", *op. cit.*

<sup>100</sup> Foucault, *L'Ordre...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>101</sup> Turkey - MAERT, Avsar, *op. cit.* 103.

<sup>102</sup> Metzl, "Can Public Diplomacy...", *op. cit.*; U.S. - Harrop, "The Infrastructure ...", *op. cit.*

<sup>103</sup> U.S. - State Department, Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, *Building...*, *op. cit.*, 6.



the imagination.<sup>104</sup> As much in the area of information as in long-term cultural programming, the goal is to transcend purely cerebral forms of communication by combining verbal and non-verbal communication which constitutes 90% of all types of communications today.<sup>105</sup> We can think in particular of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs' touring photography exhibit, *After September 11: Images from Ground Zero*.<sup>106</sup> One can also think of the graphic images of the civilian victims of the U.S. bombings in Baghdad or images of maltreatment inflicted to Iraqi POWs that Arab media distributed worldwide through the Internet. Having well understood that aspect of mass diplomacy, the Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs puts on-line videos showing the mutilated corpses of victims of Hamas and Hezbollah attacks in order to shock international public opinion more directly.<sup>107</sup> Mass diplomacy is now obliged to integrate notions that were foreign before, to attempt to draw out the emotions, to stimulate the imagination, becoming as Joseph Nye remarked, more and more "theatrical" in its message, marking a clear adaptation to the new "society of global spectacle."<sup>108</sup>

Paradoxically, if mass diplomacy is becoming more theatrical, it is also constrained by the need to remain discrete in its delivery of its message due to the ubiquity of distribution and access to current information and the growing public distrust. Given the growing suspicion of state institutions, the association of mass diplomacy with an explicit official policy is increasingly avoided. As British specialist point out, "people are often quick to question the motivations behind the diplomatic pronouncements of a state or suspicious of information relayed directly by a government."<sup>109</sup> Mass diplomacy explicitly conducted under the umbrella of state self-promotion is damaging as it creates irritation and mistrust among the target audience discrediting the nation responsible. Once again, the Americans have recently given an excellent illustration of this principle by showing "what shouldn't be done". In the aftermath of 9/11, the new American campaign was launched with great fanfare and by announcing its ambitions loudly. Though the goal may have been to reassure the American public, the result was to increase distrust and to reinforce the cynicism of targeted populations. In the era of global information, everything that is said is known everywhere immediately. For example, the American government promptly terminated in its inception a planned Disinformation Bureau in the Pentagon after having

<sup>104</sup> Chris Powell (chairman of advertising company BMP DDB Needham and advisor of the British mass diplomacy), quoted in Leonard and Stead, *op. cit.*, 15-16.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*, 50.

<sup>106</sup> U.S. - State Department, Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy, ECA, "After September 11: Images from Ground Zero" (Washington, DC, September 5, 2002).

<sup>107</sup> Israel - MFA, Gateway, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/>; see also *BBCWS*, "Bomb victim's family praise video", January 31, 2004.

<sup>108</sup> Nye, *The Paradox...*, *op. cit.*, 59.

<sup>109</sup> Leonard and Stead, *op. cit.*, 55.

announced it with great publicity: “There were so many articles about the Bureau [...] that it seemed clear the bureau had been so undermined that it could not function effectively”, declared the American Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld.<sup>110</sup> Matters such as these should not be publicised even with careful attention to the language in which the announcements are couched. Tact is important. As the Arab-American expert point out, the use of terms such as “battle”, or “conquest of hearts and minds” are extremely prejudicial because they suggest a separation between the two camps, that of the victors and that of the vanquished.<sup>111</sup> Such phraseology initiates a cycle of defensive communication in which the targeted audience is immediately cued to put their guard up. Defiance, not cooperation, is often the response.

The importance of discretion has two direct implications for the formulation and the implementation of modern mass diplomacy. First, extreme circumspection is necessary. To remedy the increasingly negative reception of terms such as “public diplomacy”, some such as the French or Germans, cover their tracks with terms such as “cultural audiovisual policy”, while others, such as the Iranians evoke the freedom of information and the dialogue between cultures. Learning the lesson the hard way, America is also gradually moving away from aggressive persuasion and the obvious hard sell. “Our recent products are very different from a few years ago. It requires good detective work” the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy now boasts<sup>112</sup>. Secondly, governments are progressively coming to understand the importance of working as much as possible outside governmental structures through third parties (see chapter IX). As a result, the implementation of mass diplomacy is more and more decentralised and delegated to credible third party structures and organisations. It is increasingly rewarding for governments to make their message heard “through the voice of others.”<sup>113</sup> An expanded and inclusive mass-diplomacy strategy is believed to have more chance of winning trust and confidence by working through independent networks such as the private sectors, NGOs, and national and foreign media.<sup>114</sup> Germans strategists note that a crucial dimension of a mass diplomacy agenda is

<sup>110</sup> J.-M. Stoullig, “Mort du «bureau de désinformation» du Pentagone”, *AFP-Washington*, Feb. 26, 2002.

<sup>111</sup> U.S. - Senate, Zaharna, “American Public Diplomacy...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>112</sup> U.S. - State Department, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, C. Beers, “American Public Diplomacy and Islam” (testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, February 27, 2003, released by ECA).

<sup>113</sup> U.S. - State Department, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, C. Beers, “Statement at Hearing: Public Diplomacy”, (House International Relations Committee, Washington, DC, October 10, 2001, released by the Bureau of Public Affairs.)

<sup>114</sup> F. Carlucci et al., *Equipped for the Future: Managing U.S. Foreign Affairs in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* (Washington, DC: Henry Stimson Center, oct. 1998). Available @ <http://www.stimson.org/pubs/asia/#final>

therefore to develop alliances with a vast array of authentic intermediaries<sup>115</sup>. American and British experts go even farther to affirm that the most credible and effective spokesmen for mass diplomacy are those with a reputation for hostility and contempt for governmental institutions, such as Oxfam in the U.K. and Mohamed Ali in the U.S.<sup>116</sup>

A critical part in the mass diplomacy communication process consists of averting the stigma of imperialism or neo-interventionism while constantly painting a picture of pluralism, altruism and goodwill. Seeming selfish or self-interested or being included in the rubric of a “clash of civilisations” tends to result in immediate failure.<sup>117</sup> It is therefore not only moral but vital to carry out various programs under the umbrella of tolerance, pluralism and shared interests.<sup>118</sup> Shibley Telhami, a U.S. specialist, emphasises that it is important “not to portray the global campaign as a campaign between ‘us and them,’... A more prudent strategy would focus on supporting the voices of moderation and tolerance.”<sup>119</sup> Jamie F. Metzl supports this idea when he remarks that “a revitalized public diplomacy must promote global cultural pluralism and meaningful sharing and exchange across geographic, cultural, and technological boundaries.”<sup>120</sup> For example, a clever move from the Quai d’Orsay strategists was to abandon the defence of the French “cultural exception” in favour of a doctrine of multiculturalism and multilingualism. This skilful manoeuvre has allowed France to join hands with other countries “threatened” by Anglo-Saxon cultural hegemony while at the same time providing a base from which to safeguard French culture and interests.<sup>121</sup> The British also adopted this rewarding tactic by placing notions of cultural pluralism, cross-cultural cooperation and shared relationships at the forefront of their diplomatic efforts. “Our purpose is the well-being of citizens: that they may choose their own governments, speak freely, take responsibility for their own lives and contribute creatively to a lively, liberal civil society” (British council).<sup>122</sup> With the same goal in mind, Iranian foreign policy has traded the policy of anti-western ideological confrontation of the 80’s for a diplomacy of intercultural détente and dialogue, dubbed “bouquet of flowers”, allowing Iran to bolster its

<sup>115</sup> Germany - Auswaertiges-Amt, “Kulturpolitik Grundsätze – Principles of Cultural Diplomacy”, in *Concept 2000...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>116</sup> “I think Muhammad Ali is a great idea because Muhammad Ali has both the image and the credibility. People in the Muslim world see Muhammad Ali as a man who tells the truth. Even if the American government tells him to sell something to the Muslim world, he will tell the truth. This is a very classic case where the messenger and the message mesh very nicely. That’s a perfect idea”; Fandy, *op. cit.*

<sup>117</sup> France - Wiltzer, *op. cit.*

<sup>118</sup> N.L. Rosenblum, “Civil societies and the Moral Uses of Pluralism”, *Social Research* 61 (fall 1994), 142.

<sup>119</sup> U.S. - Telhami, “Public Diplomacy”, *op. cit.*

<sup>120</sup> Metzl, “Can Public Diplomacy...”, *op. cit.*; U.S. - Harrop, “The Infrastructure ...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>121</sup> France – MAE, “La Politique Culturelle de la France”, website of the French Foreign Ministry: [www.france.diplomatie.fr](http://www.france.diplomatie.fr) (accessed October 2002).

<sup>122</sup> UK - BC, “Media and Information” (conference sponsored by the Council and the Economic Development Institute of the World Bank, May 1997), available @ [govmed.htm](http://govmed.htm) (accessed april 2003).

capital of trust with its European partners.<sup>123</sup> Again mass diplomacy appears as a mix of idealism and realpolitik, of advocacy of principle and extension of national interest, somewhere between genuine altruism and true manipulation.

## Conclusion

Diplomacy is scrambling to redefine its role and a new mutant race of diplomats is clearly springing up before our eyes. For centuries, their tasks were limited to serving as intermediaries between governments, to reading speeches, to acting as a buffer in times of crisis and to going to cocktail parties. Now they are plunging into a new era, where evening clothes, gilt scissors, confidential telegrams and champagne flutes seem to have become to stuff of a foreign affairs museum. Today, they are being told that they must become communication specialists and sociologists with extensive marketing experience. "Yesterday, you were charged with listening to states, to governments and everything that is official. Today, you must listen to the people..."<sup>124</sup> the French President declared in 1998. Old habits die hard but they must already master the new diplomatic tools such as the satellite, the television and the internet. New standards already include talented personnel operating in a high-tech environment with state-of-the-art equipment, including the latest in information technology.<sup>125</sup> But as emphasised by a Canadian Deputy Minister, the real challenge is not a technical one; it lies elsewhere at the level of interpersonal skills and knowledge of the socio-cultural terrain because the field of action of mass diplomats is the street, the networks of influence, but also the market place of hearts and minds.<sup>126</sup>

In government corridors around the world there is profound re-evaluation of the diplomatic profession. The State Department, the Quai d'Orsay, the Foreign Office, the Palacio Farnese and their equivalents are developing a new specialised workforce by adopting hiring and training programs based on communications skills, language and cultural knowledge, technical expertise, science and technology literacy, management ability and, of course, a deep understanding of the international and local environment.<sup>127</sup> More and more foreign ministries attract and recruit those in the private sector whose careers include image-building and marketing. The upheaval is such

<sup>123</sup> For what iranians call '*siasat-é dast-é gol*' see R.O. Freedman, "Radical Islam and the Struggle for Influence in Central Asia", *Terrorism and Political Violence* 8, no2 (1995), 225.

<sup>124</sup> France – J. Chirac (Président de la République), Discours du Président de la République devant les représentants des Français de l'étranger (Quai d'Orsay, august 26, 1998).

<sup>125</sup> Cooper, "New Skills...", *op. cit.*

<sup>126</sup> Canada - Smith, *op. cit.*

<sup>127</sup> An exemple among other is the Italian Foreign Ministry's new skills base requirements : Baldocci, *op. cit.*; see also U.S. – State Department, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, "Public Diplomacy Plans...", *op. cit.*

that Barry Fulton (U.S. State Department) and Evan H. Potter (DFAIT) admitted that anthropologists, sociologists, theologians, linguists, psychologists and other “professional bag packers” are now in a position to be of great use to mass diplomacy, as much or more so than traditional diplomatic trainees whose background is traditionally in foreign affairs.<sup>128</sup> Not so long ago, researchers were very prudent and even sceptical of the impact of the mass media revolution and the advent of the information society on the art of diplomacy.<sup>129</sup> Now there is less and less doubt that this major upheaval redefines, if not the essence, then certainly the components and the procedures of diplomacy.

But the integration of communication techniques and marketing strategies are not the only signs that testify to the adaptation of public diplomacy to the information society. As we will see in subsequent chapters, citizen-oriented diplomacy is also made more efficient by combining strategic centralisation and managerial decentralisation. The existence of this new organisational model that we will call “bureaucratic-entrepreneurial” comes to light in an in-depth analysis of infrastructure, governing bodies and subordinate organisations in charge of the cultural and educational programmes (Chapter 7) and audiovisual broadcasting (Chapter 8) of a number of different nations. This subtle approach permits control over the conduct of strategy while at the same time delegating to the greatest extent to governmental agencies, semi-government agencies or non-governmental allies for production and application.

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<sup>128</sup> Interviews with Barry Fulton (George Washington University & former-USIA agent (U.S.)); Eytan Gilboa (Bar-Ilan University & Holon Institute of Technology (Israel)); Evan H. Potter (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Canada)); Robin C. Brown (University of Leeds (U.K.)); conducted in Montreal, March 18, 2004.

<sup>129</sup> J. Neuman, “The Media’s Impact on International Affairs”, *SaisReview* 16 (winter/spring 1996), 109-23; N. Hopkinson, *The Impact of New Technology on the International Media and Foreign Policy* (London: HMSO, 1995).

## **Chapter VII. A “Bureaucratic-Entrepreneurial” Architecture**

### **Part I: The Central Agency and Cultural and Educational Programs**

It is education that you must count on to shape the souls of men so as to control their opinions, their likes or dislikes.  
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Government of Poland* (1772)

#### **Introduction**

The information age redefines, as we’ve seen in the preceding chapter, the art of public diplomacy by causing it to adapt to the rules of the market and to new techniques of communication and public relations. But it also structures government to re-conceive its organizational mode by undermining the conditions for wholly governmental constructs and rigid centralised decision-making. By obliging states to compete in an increasingly deregulated market to keep up with new rivals such as the media, companies, NGO’s and by de-legitimizing government efforts to control information, this new context forces public diplomacy to organize itself differently in order to influence public opinion. The challenge is for governments to find means to overcome the obsolescence of wholly government-sponsored operational structures without abandoning the transnational flux of information and culture to some global market from which they would be absent. How has the architecture of public diplomacy adjusted to respond to the double necessity of maintaining centralized control of the export of information and culture while at the same time responding to the disuse and inefficiency of traditional approaches based on state monopoly?

The goal of this chapter is to demonstrate that modern public diplomacy adapted itself to the times and new modes of governance that characterise it by adopting a hybrid structure defined by a more flexible management style giving greater space for network building, public-private partnerships and modern communications. The result is a “bureaucratic-entrepreneurial” mass diplomacy combining a minimum of decision-making centralisation and a maximum of managerial decentralisation replacing the obsolete hierarchical system inherited from the Cold War period. Through an analysis of its infrastructure, the institutions that orchestrate its operation and the organs that link it to the private sector, it is important to understand the internal logic of this new network management model as well as the way in which it allows diplomacy to escape its governmental framework and habitual modes of operation within the different foreign policy systems. Two of the three elements of this new architecture will be the subject of this chapter: 1) The centralized operational system and 2) the cultural and educational programmes – cyber-diplomacy will be the subject of the next chapter.

## 1. The Mass Diplomacy Pyramid

### a. A New way of Doing Business: Combining Centralisation and Decentralisation

Given that its goal is above all to influence foreign public opinion, mass diplomacy has come to rely, more than any other branch of foreign policy, on a decentralised and outward-looking form of organisation especially today in the age of information, of transparency and of civil governance. This open organization allows it to build networks of influence and to act with the help or through the intermediary of private sector or even foreign partners.<sup>1</sup> The tendency is to avoid the rigidity and hierarchism that characterised the old organization of the cold war public diplomacy, but instead be flexible and responsive in order to allow a new form of governmental lobbying engaging actively and effectively with foreign populations “without really seeming to.”<sup>2</sup> The result is what Italian specialists have termed a “bureaucratic-entrepreneurial” *modus operandi*; one designed to maintain a minimum of governmental leadership and governmental mechanisms with as much decentralisation as possible. According to the strategists of the Palazzo Farnese, with this modern network management model, more typical of commercial enterprises than of traditional public administration, “a new way of doing diplomatic business has emerged clearly.”<sup>3</sup> This hybrid machinery provides the advantageous illusion of a virtual diplomacy while at the same time, in reality being orchestrated by the state and piloted remotely by its agencies, this approach could well become the operational norm in the field of public diplomacy.


The application of the bureaucratic-entrepreneurial model to the organization of mass diplomacy results in a powerful apparatus with global reach equipped with a robust but supple array of specialised institutions and communication instruments capable of developing complex relationships in the non-governmental sector. In schematic terms, this modular structure can be broken down into three principal hierarchies (figure 1):

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<sup>1</sup> Babbitt, *op. cit.*

<sup>2</sup> Leonard and Noble, *op. cit.*

<sup>3</sup> “Farnesina...”, *Il Sole*, *op. cit.*

**Figure 1 : The Mass Diplomacy Pyramid**

1) At the top of this system is situated the nerve centre of mass diplomacy in the form of a decision making body situated within the ministry of foreign affairs. As the lead agency it has the core responsibility for planning and supervising the implementation of the strategy by managing the operation of governmental organizations and the relations with non-governmental intermediaries. The decision-making process is most often fed by the input of independent think tanks. 2) At the lower level of the pyramid, we find specialized organs, normally shared between those who work in the domain of culture and education and those who coordinate the action in the domain of information and telecommunications (Chapter VIII). There are generally cost-effective and well-maintained facilities deployed worldwide that serve as a medium between the central organization and civil societies. 3) At the base of this ideological “war machine” can be seen the extension of the entrepreneurial model in the private sector. These private partners whether they be NGO’s, multilateral institutes or communication networks, allow the system to extend its effects into the very hearts of foreign society. They serve to prolong mass diplomacy by other means. We will analyse them in depth in chapter IX. This managerial action network resembles a vast multi-layered and multi-faceted nervous system designed to relay effectively and discretely the policy of influence of a country abroad.

#### b. The Nerve Centre

Operating from within foreign ministries, the lead agency plays the role of orchestra conductor for mass diplomacy. Becoming, as we saw in earlier chapters, the third pillar of foreign policy, its operational scope is expanding to acquire more and more autonomy and more and more



prerogatives. It is the lead agency that benefits from this promotion or emancipation and sees itself entrusted with increasingly extensive tasks such as the formulation of more and more ambitious strategy for, its content and its priorities, the coordination of public and private participants and the evaluation of the results. As the central decision-making body, it provides overall policy guidance and institutional support for the formulation and implementation of global outreach efforts. In the light of its strategic importance, we can better understand why the functioning of this brain agency has been entirely reconceived in recent years. In most countries, it was renovated to act as an “entrepreneurial agency”, the CEO of mass diplomacy, able to provide policy direction but also to monitor its implementation in connecting governmental and non-governmental networks and in managing their relationships. Governments have progressively come to the conclusion that to undertake this vital task efficiently requires both 1) leadership and 2) flexibility:

1) The authority that resides with the central institution is one of the cornerstones of modern mass diplomacy. Most of the specialists agree on its vital necessity and on the fact that it must be strengthened to the maximum in order to assure the best functioning<sup>4</sup> - a concept that is reflected in the reforms undertaken recently by governments (Chapters III and IV). The goal is first to assure a coherence for mass diplomacy; to establish its continuity and its consistency with the pursuit of national strategic goals.<sup>5</sup> This is also to avoid gaps in public diplomacy activities by ensuring that there is strategic supervision and co-ordination. The idea is also to draw the most influence by channelling and coordinating the complementary efforts of the private and public sectors 2) Nevertheless, governments have also become conscious that for the operation of the central agency to be truly effective, it must combine strategic leadership with a propensity for *flexibility* and *operational decentralization*. To enhance its global capacity for surveillance and response to key cross-cutting issues, it must imperatively depend on a supple administration that calls on entrepreneurial management, network-building and private partnership. Far from impeding this flexibility, it seems that the decision-making monopoly and large bureaucratic prerogative are in fact beneficial to it in facilitating coordination and rapid reaction. In a general way, the challenge is for the central agencies to leave the widest possible room for manoeuvring to private partners while maintaining direct supervision of their actions. The central agency acts therefore as a catalyst, leveraging expertise and energies to further foreign policy objectives. The

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<sup>4</sup> H. Tuch, *Communicating with the World : U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 1990), 3; Price, “Journeys in Media Space...”, *op. cit*; see also Canada - Smith, *op. cit*.

<sup>5</sup> U.S. – State Department, *Strategic Plan 2000*, *op. cit*.

study of a few concrete cases should allow us to better understand its position, its role and its vital utility to the functioning of modern public diplomacy.

**Figure 2. Tasks and Activities of the Lead Agency**

<b>Tasks</b>	<b>Actions</b>
Consolidate and rationalize the overall enterprise	To leverage all resources and bring all the separate parts together into a more effective whole.
Roles and responsibilities	To sort out the respective roles and responsibilities of diverse agencies and partners.
Resource allocation	To allocate resources in an adequate and comprehensive manner according to performance measures.
New requirements to ensure market competitiveness	To strengthen multimedia programming, to conduct opinion research, to carry out marketing and promotion efforts, and secure qualified staff.
Interagency Relations	To establish an overall relationship of mutual respect, trust, and cooperation within the government's foreign policy community and between public and private participants.

Source: BBG strategic plan, GAO report GAO-03-772

• In addition to supervising the conduct of the UK government's relations with other governments as it has always done, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) has also in recent years been assigned the function of directing and coordinating the new British mass diplomacy. According to the 2002 Public Service Agreement (PSA), its mission in that domain is to generate "pivotal influence world-wide over decisions which affect U.K. interests by projecting a positive foreign perceptions of the U.K."<sup>6</sup>; One of the most important missions but also one of the most difficult of the FCO, in the opinion of British strategists, can only be accomplished if the UK spectrum of public diplomacy institutions is centrally-managed by a strong body based in London.<sup>7</sup> For Jack Straw this centralized leadership is necessary to identify an overarching public diplomacy strategy and a coherent framework allowing diplomats to avoid overlaps and duplications, to handle cross-cutting issues, to increase complementarities and, in this way, maximize the collective effort of all public and private participants.<sup>8</sup> "The aim is that the overall impact of this activity should be more than the sum of the parts," emphasizes the head of the British diplomatic service.

Nevertheless, the heads of British diplomacy are conscious that to put across their messages efficiently to foreign audiences they also need to adopt a "lively and flexible approach" implying

<sup>6</sup> U.K. - BC, "Public Diplomacy...", *op. cit.*; "Chapter 13", in UK - FCO, *2002 spending...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>7</sup> Leonard and Stead, *op. cit.*, 98-99.

<sup>8</sup> U.K. - FCO, Public Diplomacy Strategy Board, J. Straw (Secretary of State), "Further Memorandum Submitted by the FCO" (letter to the Chairman of the Committee from the Secretary of State, House of Commons, FCO, May 22, 2003).

more openness and devolution in regards the private sphere.<sup>9</sup> Relationship-building and networking have been the bread-and-butter work of the FCO for decades.<sup>10</sup> But today, the maintenance and the development of this informal network of influence has become one of its vital priorities. For Jack Straw it is now indispensable that the FCO “work with others, including the business and diaspora communities and NGOs.”<sup>11</sup> This is what he pushed himself to do by integrating in his operational sphere an array of independent institutions from TPUK and the British Tourist Authority to the Westminster Foundation for Democracy and DFID to name but a few (other will be analysed in chapter IX). An approach, that, in the opinion of British has enabled “better and more effective lobbying” as in the case, for example of the context of Great Britain's European policy.<sup>12</sup> The FCO's leitmotif in regards to mass diplomacy matters is thus to exercise an omnipresent leadership while depending on a flexible management and an elastic frame of action. This is a leitmotif shared by the American State Department.

- The U.S. government mass diplomacy community including the White House, the Broadcasting Board of Governors and in a more informal way the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency is orchestrated by the Department of State.<sup>13</sup> Within this group, the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy is responsible for the overall leadership and coordination of the efforts of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, the Bureau of Public Affairs and the Office of International Information Programs. This organization springs from the certainty that to provide the strategic direction, the administrative expertise, logistical support, telecommunications network, and the physical infrastructure, “there must be a robust and up-to-date support structure.”<sup>14</sup> The need for leadership in the conduct of mass diplomacy reflects, according to some, the “militarist” culture within the Department of State brought by General Powell. Without a doubt, actual leaders are today persuaded that this area of action requires the same type of authority, seriousness and application as those who support national defense and traditional state to state diplomacy. To extend this strategic direction government-wide, the White House will be more directly involved and will instigate a high-level interagency mass diplomacy coordinating group within the National Security Council.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>9</sup> U.K. - BC, “Public Diplomacy...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>10</sup> Leonard and Stead, *op. cit.*

<sup>11</sup> U.K. - FCO, Public Diplomacy Strategy Board, Straw, *op. cit.*

<sup>12</sup> U.K. - FCO, *Quicker Response...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>13</sup> Although the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) is independent from the State Department, it is supervised by the Secretary of State - an arrangement that is intended to strengthen coordination efforts between State and the Board.

<sup>14</sup> U.S. - State Department, *Strategic Plan 2000*, *op. cit.*

<sup>15</sup> U.S. - State Department, Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, “New Strategic...”, *op. cit.*

Nevertheless, the architecture of the new American mass diplomacy is conceived in such way so that this centralizing direction can be at once “flexible and agile” and open to networking and the participation of the private sector.<sup>16</sup> The 2002 Freedom Promotion Act has moreover established a legal framework encouraging the State Department to work more actively and more systematically with private partners, NGOs and foreign media<sup>17</sup>. To address the private sector cooperation, a new position was created in 2004 in the Undersecretary office to explore ways to draw on the expertise of the private sector to advance public sector objectives.<sup>18</sup> It is also projected in the long term to create a public/private not-for-profit “Corporation for Public Diplomacy” to integrate into the government effort the creativity and credibility of independent and indigenous messengers such as journalists, sports figures, scientists, business and opinion leaders capable of reaching foreign publics more effectively than official bodies.<sup>19</sup> The State Department is thus adapting progressively to respond to a vital priority in the world today, as emphasized by Charlotte Beers, which is to be able to address non-governmental audiences by delivering messages as much as possible through forums and global networks, in “almost every kind of channel of distribution.”<sup>20</sup> As a result, the more we orient ourselves towards this openness, the greater the need for centralized leadership. As the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy reminds us, a competent political authority is necessary to support, guide, channel and fund the media, the arts, performances and sports abroad in order to make best use of the renewal source of good will and influence that occurs when “the right message” is delivered “to the right audience at the right time.”<sup>21</sup> The same reasoning holds in regards to the question of flexibility: while mass diplomacy personnel located at overseas posts have a great deal of autonomy in executing their specific programs, they must at all times stay in contact and act in harmony with the central organization in order to guarantee the coherence and continuity of the collective. An imperative, Washington believes, without which “the conduct of a multi-faceted cross-agency foreign policy would not be possible.”<sup>22</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Burt and Robinson, *op. cit.*; see also U.S. - State Department, Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, H.C. Pachios (Chairman), “Hearing to Examine U.S. Understanding of Arab Social and Political Thought” (testimony before the Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations, Washington, DC, October 8, 2002).

<sup>17</sup> U.S. - House of Representatives, CIR, *Freedom...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>18</sup> U.S. - State Department, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, M.B. De Tutwiler, “Public Diplomacy Activities and Programs” (testimony before the House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations, Washington, DC, February 10, 2004).

<sup>19</sup> U.S. - CFR, “Public Diplomacy...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>20</sup> U.S. - State Department, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, Beers, “Statement...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>21</sup> U.S. - State Department, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, Beers, “American..”, *op. cit.*

<sup>22</sup> U.S. - State Department, *Strategic Plan 2000*, *op. cit.*

● With an annual budget of approximately 44% of the total budget for the Quai d'Orsay, the DGCID, veritable 'jack of all trades' of French mass diplomacy, does not have to be jealous of the FCO and the State Department. Public officials consider that its bureaucratic leadership is necessary to guaranty the coherence of operations and the "steering of the private organizations under its wing."<sup>23</sup> Bruno Delaye, a senior French public diplomacy official considers that this bureaucracy is important to fulfill his crucial task, that is to say to "win the public opinion of the nations of the North and the South" and to "have influence over the ideas and debates that determine the future of France".<sup>24</sup> These are the motivations that in 1999 pushed them to fuse the old DGRCSST and the Ministry of Cooperation, that is to say, to reunite within one operational structure "all the tools of solidarity and all the tools of influence at the disposal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for the service of France."<sup>25</sup> Some regret the unavoidable monopoly that results while at the same time recognizing that the institutional reform has benefited the power and influence of the central agency.<sup>26</sup>

The bureaucratic centralization of decision-making power does not conflict with the DGCID's "modular architecture" that allows the strengthening of inter-ministerial relationships, the effective use of multilateralism and the deepening of associations and participation of the private sphere.<sup>27</sup> It is an elastic operational structure that is beneficial on a day to day basis for working with other ministries, private operators, universities, businesses, multilateral and community organizations, local groups and associations both at home and abroad.<sup>28</sup> French diplomacy's priorities for the future are precisely the development of decentralized cooperation, to foster and improve partnership with the private sphere, NGO's, the world of business and to promote civil society volunteerism and individual involvement. The motto of the French strategy is to work with and through others, but always under the direction of coordination of the bureau of strategic studies of the DGCID.<sup>29</sup> Within the DGCID, the *Mission pour la Coopération Non-Gouvernementale* plays a key role in the managerial conduct of French mass diplomacy by assuring the liaison between the general leadership and the territorial groups, international solidarity organizations and the institutions and businesses of all kinds to take over operations from France. The MCNG also contributes to elaborating in concert with its different partners and the other relevant ministry services, the doctrine and the orientation of the general leadership in

<sup>23</sup> France - DGCID, "I. Servir...", in *Action 2000*, *op. cit.*, 15.

<sup>24</sup> France - DGCID, Delaye, *op. cit.*, 13; France - DGCID, *Action 2000*, *op. cit.*

<sup>25</sup> France - DGCID, Védérine in *Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>26</sup> France - DGCID, "I. Servir...", in *Ibid.*, 20.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 15-23.

<sup>28</sup> France - DGCID, Védérine in *Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>29</sup> France - DGCID, "I. Servir...", in *Ibid.*, 20.

regards to the support to nongovernmental cooperation. Completing this plan, the *Haut Conseil de la Coopération internationale* (H.C.C.I.) was created in 1999 to better link the private sphere and French public diplomacy. The H.C.C.I.'s mission is to enable a regular dialogue between public and private participants, to keep the public informed, to develop a space for reflecting about and evaluating the policies implemented. The H.C.C.I. regularly emits notices and recommendations concerning the gamut of public diplomacy questions. Regular relationships have been instituted between the H.C.C.I. and the DGCID.

- Under the supervision of the Auswärtiges-Amt, German mass diplomacy is characterized by a particularly high level of decentralization and openness. A large part of the effort in this domain is carried out independently by so-called cultural organizations such as registered associations, political foundations or limited liability companies.<sup>30</sup> The Federal Government also cooperates closely with the Länder (federal states), private organizations and a wide range of social groups which, legally speaking, enjoy substantial autonomy in pursuing their respective aims, programmes and activities. This pluralist approach and the legal autonomy of the organizations working in this field serve to safeguard the credibility and diversity of the German mass diplomacy. “There is no such thing as state culture”, German mass diplomats are happy to remember, for whom the adequate strategy must imperatively shift away from wholly government-sponsored structures abroad (cultural institutes, schools) to organizational forms based on local private-public partnerships.<sup>31</sup> Since it involves many players on the societal level, one specialist emphasizes, mass diplomacy has to rely, logically, on a much more decentralized form of visibility than most other areas of foreign policy.<sup>32</sup> This shift in focus and the greater involvement of private partners has so far enhanced results according to them.

Nevertheless, this liberal and pluralist organizational model is nothing to weaken the strategic leadership of the ministry of foreign affairs in regards in mass diplomacy. The fact that private partners operate in accordance with their own specific mission and structures does not interfere that they do so within the framework of the guidelines established by the Federal Government's Directorate for Public Diplomacy. It is acknowledged that “[w]hile these organizations operate independently, the Foreign Office nonetheless has a duty to continually seek improvements in the

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<sup>30</sup> Germany - Auswärtiges-Amt, “Kulturpolitik Grundsätze – Principles of Cultural Diplomacy”, in *Concept 2000...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>32</sup> Overhaus, *op. cit.*, in Overhaus & al., *op. cit.*, 4.

conditions under which they and their staff operate abroad.”<sup>33</sup> The DGCREP is in charge of the formulation of a common agenda, of the distribution of responsibilities and the funding between the different participants as well as the supervision of their collective efforts. This is essential, the German officials consider, to ensure a coherent approach, close coordination with the relevant federal ministries, the Länder and non-governmental organizations.<sup>34</sup> Moreover, in recent years the trend has been to strengthen this leadership.

- In carrying out Canada’s public diplomacy, the DFAIT, like its German counterpart, works closely with other federal departments, the provinces, a wide range of citizens, the cultural and academic communities at home and abroad, foreign governments and the major international organizations to which Canada belongs. One example of the Department’s collaborative ventures with the provinces is the recent announcement during the Team Canada visit to Germany of the opening of Ontario and Alberta sub-offices (the deployment of provincial government trade officers) within the Canadian Consulate General in Munich. Through many means, the Department also assists Canadian artists, performers, sport teams, students and faculty in showcasing their talents abroad and pursuing international opportunities and interests. DFAIT’s principal objective is to optimise their natural ability to engage foreign audiences “for the purpose of persuading these foreign publics to regard favourably the national policies, ideals and ideas of the targeting state.”<sup>35</sup> In this way, DFAIT plays a key role in the formulation, the management and the implementation of Canadian mass diplomacy. Public powers are quick to agree on the rapid strengthening of the ability to project Canada and Canadian values worldwide by establishing a new policy coordination division that will help formulate policy strategies with other federal departments and contribute to government-wide policy initiatives.<sup>36</sup>

- This flexible and decentralized model of leadership is well on the way to becoming standard in mass diplomacy with minor variations in various countries. It is beginning to become common in Europe such as in Italy where it was conceived of at the end of the 1990’s. It is not only present but even more marked in Anglo-Saxon nations where mass diplomacy has known more pronounced development (chapter IV). For example, the Australian DFAT’s Public Diplomacy Department has been designed to be able to coordinate a wide-ranging outreach program actively

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<sup>33</sup> Germany - Auswaertiges-Amt, “Kulturpolitik Grundsätze – Principles of Cultural Diplomacy”, in *Concept 2000...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>35</sup> Potter, “Canada and...”, *op. cit.*, 3.

<sup>36</sup> Canada - DFAIT, *2002-2003 Estimates...*, *op. cit.*, 35.

associating bilateral foundations, councils, institutes, businesses and community groups committed to international cultural and communication promotion. Through this eclectic spectrum the department is capable of expanding overseas markets for Australian information and culture, monitoring international media coverage of Australia and, in general, improving Australia's influence abroad.<sup>37</sup> We also find the same type of organization within the South African DFA, where the role of the International Marketing Council (IMC) is to "synergize" the efforts of external partners such as South African Tourism, Proudly South African and others, to streamline and facilitate the implementation of mass diplomacy programs.<sup>38</sup> In other Western industrialized nations the development of this model is happening in a similar fashion. A sign of the extension of this style of management, Saudi Arabia has recently announced it is to set up a new agency to co-ordinate all the kingdom's public diplomacy efforts abroad.<sup>39</sup> Practically at the same time (March 2004), China has equipped itself within its ministry of foreign with a Public Diplomacy Board.<sup>40</sup> Otherwise, with a very few exceptions, the other governments are still largely equipped with traditional decision making mechanisms, as the Turkish example suggests. With a hand of steel and in an omnipresent manner, the Turkish International Cooperation Agency (TIKA) orchestrated a multitude of initiatives in the areas of culture, education, information and telecommunications, to rapidly impose itself as a central and unavoidable organ of Turkish mass diplomacy.<sup>41</sup> We can see nevertheless that, on a global scale, the general trend is to extend the mass diplomacy system outside government structures with a constant effort at flexibility, network building and openness.

### c. Advisory Boards

In most cases, the lead agency is assisted in its orchestrating role by one or several consultative boards drawing together leaders from government, the cultural community, civil society and business with a common interest in more effective international promotion of national influence abroad. These groups provide expert advice on a variety of issues related to the conduct of mass diplomacy.

Created in 2002, the Public Diplomacy Strategy Board helps the FCO to develop strategy and programme for specific overseas campaigns, to identify sectoral and geographical priorities

<sup>37</sup> Australia - DFAT, *Annual Report 2001-2001*, *op. cit.*.

<sup>38</sup> South Africa - DEFA, *Strategic Plan 2003-2005*, *op. cit.*, 53.

<sup>39</sup> BBCWS, "New Saudi Body to Oversee Cultural Action Abroad", February, 28, 2004.

<sup>40</sup> China - MFA of the People's Republic of China, "Academic Seminar...", *op. cit.*



(China in 2003) and to provide a coordinating mechanism for cooperative activity among the main bodies involved in mass diplomacy efforts. The Board is chaired by the Permanent Under-Secretary of the FCO, senior officials from other organisations concerned with public diplomacy (British Council, British Trade International, BBC World Service, British Tourist Authority, and Department for International Development) together with external non-civil servant members.<sup>42</sup> The participation of private sector representatives is designed both to ensure coherence with the activities of British business and to benefit from their experience and influence in the private sector. According to Secretary of State Jack Straw, “the establishment of the Public Diplomacy Strategy Board marks a new phase in our efforts to further improve the cohesion, effectiveness and impact of our public diplomacy.”<sup>43</sup> Among other things, the Board recommended establishing a new advisory committee to improve the cohesion, effectiveness and impact of FCO’s efforts to promote the UK overseas.<sup>44</sup>

It is more and more customary today that mass diplomacy be coached by a council of wise men. On this model, the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, comprised of governmental and non-governmental experts, is a bipartisan panel mandated by Congress and the White House to provide oversight of U.S.-government activities intended to understand, inform, and influence foreign publics.<sup>45</sup> In the Italian case, its also a pluralist forum, the National Commission for the Promotion of Italian Culture Abroad, presided over by the Foreign Affairs Minister and comprising representatives of the government authorities, civil society, and Italy's leading cultural institutions that emits and receives recommendations destined for the DGRC.<sup>46</sup> Enjoying large statutory decision-making autonomy, the “Commissione” has the power to make propositions – sometimes dubbed diktats – on the direction and content of Italian mass diplomacy.<sup>47</sup> The same model exists in Canada where DFAIT’s Policy Board offers a forum in which are discussed, amongst other issues, the various means to improve the conduct of Canadian

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<sup>41</sup> Turkey - MFA, *TIKA Annual Report 1997* (released by the TMFA), 1; see also Turkey - MFA, “Functions of the Directorate...”, *op. cit.*.

<sup>42</sup> These include John Sorrell, co-Chair of the former Britain Abroad Task Force, the work of which has been subsumed by the Strategy Board.

<sup>43</sup> U.K. - Public Diplomacy Strategy Board, Straw, *op. cit.*

<sup>44</sup> U.K. - FCO, “Influence Worldwide” in *FCO Annual Report 2003*, *op. cit.*; U.K. - FCO, Public Diplomacy Strategy Board, see homepage <http://www.fco.gov.uk>.

<sup>45</sup> The Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy also includes divers under-comity in charge to study the different means to improve the U.S. influence machinery as well as to relevent approaches for specific geographic zones; see U.S. - State Department, Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, *Building America's Public Diplomacy...*, *op. cit.*, 20 pages.

<sup>46</sup> Italy - Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Direzione Generale per le Relazioni Culturali, “Istituti Italiani...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>47</sup> Baccini (Italian Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs), *op. cit.*

mass diplomacy and to improve its horizontal co-ordination.<sup>48</sup> Finally, note that the French, for their part, study the creation of an inter-ministerial delegation for external cultural operations and the implementation of a High Council for foreign cultural activity that would bring together representative of the private sphere.

To these official advisory groups have been added in recent years privately incorporated, governmentally funded think tanks composed of international relations, marketing and communications specialists participating in thinking about various means of maximizing the effectiveness of mass diplomacy. The model of the sort is without a doubt the Foreign Policy Centre launched by Prime Minister Tony Blair (Patron) and former Foreign Secretary Robin Cook (President) in 1999 to examine the impact of globalization on foreign and domestic policy. It brings together Nobel Prize laureates, global corporate leaders, NGO activists, media executives and cultural entrepreneurs able to better focus on the effectiveness of strategies designed to build relations and engage with overseas publics and to provide British mass diplomacy makers with recommendations for improving their policy.<sup>49</sup> Another separate body, Britain Abroad, was set up in 2001 for the purpose of bringing together the various public sector organisations and companies with a stake in how the UK is perceived overseas. This tendency is one of the aspects of the privatization of mass diplomacy and underlines the importance that this facet of foreign policy is acquiring for governments but also various elements of society at large that, outside purely diplomatic and strategic circles, are increasingly perceived as the spearhead of the socio-economic interests of a country abroad (chapter V).

It should be noted that this hybrid architecture combining managerial leadership and decentralization results in the implementation of the recommendations made in most countries by think tanks such as the Council on Foreign Relations, the Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy (USA), the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, the Centre for Security and Defence Studies (Canada), the *Mission pour la Coopération Non-Gouvernementale* (France); recommendations that, as we have seen in Chapter IV, have generally converged on four main points: 1) the establishment of a centralized system of cooperation joining public authorities 2) the growth of budgetary allocations and the rationalization of operational structures 3) the strengthening of public/private collaboration and 4) the modernization of communications means. Even though most have been achieved, progress still needs to be made to improve the bureaucratic-entrepreneurial model in regards to coordination. A recent report by the GAO

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<sup>48</sup> Canada – DFAIT, *2002-2003 Estimates*..., op. cit., 35.

underlines that the greatest weakness of the American system is the absence of an interagency public diplomacy strategy setting forth the messages and means for government-wide communication efforts.<sup>50</sup> Because of their differing roles and missions, the White House, State, and other public diplomacy players often focus on different audiences and use varying means to communicate with them. The rationale for an inter-agency strategy would be to consider the foreign publics in key countries and regions, the relevant U.S. national interests there, what U.S. government communication channels are available, and how to optimize their use in conveying desired themes and messages. For the moment, the lack of an interagency strategy complicates the task of conveying consistent messages and thus achieving mutually reinforcing benefits. This is why steps are currently being taken to improve interagency coordination. The new State Department-USAID Joint Policy Council and State Department-USAID Management Council is intended to improve program coordination in public diplomacy, as in other areas, and help ensure the most effective use of program resources and to extend the operational scope of public diplomacy in the area of development aid.<sup>51</sup>

## 2. The Cultural and Educational Organs of Mass Diplomacy

Below the central agency, which acts as the brain of mass diplomacy, subordinate organizations exist which act as the arms and legs for the realisation of mass diplomacy programs. Though there is no single model, these organs are generally classifiable under two main rubrics: On one hand, there are the specialized organs in “traditional” domains of culture and education, and on the other there are the “new” organs that share the area of cyber-diplomacy (information and telecommunication)<sup>52</sup>; an area that will be the subject of the following chapter.

The first of these two branches, that of cultural and educational programming, continues to play a strategic role despite the considerable importance acquired by new communications and information technologies. They are what bring public diplomacy its content, its soul and its difference. As Jody K. Olsen and Norman J. Peterson noted, new technologies and cyber-diplomacy can be used to complement, but not replace, educational and cultural exchanges.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> *Guardian Unlimited*, “The Foreign Policy Center”, Special File, available @ <http://politics.guardian.co.uk> (accessed January 2003).

<sup>50</sup> U.S. - GAO-03-951, *op. cit.*, 28

<sup>51</sup> U.S. - State Department, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, Tutwiler, “Reaching...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>52</sup> The classification is for convenience’s sake since there is in reality significant between the two fields.

<sup>53</sup> New technologies and cyber-diplomacy “cannot substitute for the interaction of cultures, for the taste and feel of foreign lands, for the empathy that develops as one learns to appreciate a new society”; J.K. Olsen

These programs have always been instruments of soft power and will undoubtedly remain so in the information age.<sup>54</sup> Cultural and educational programs are in general led by a specialized infrastructure that extend abroad with the help of cultural institutes implanted across the world and in particular, in zones targeted by mass diplomacy. These public establishments enjoy an increasing autonomy and a great openness in terms of partnership with the private sector. This flexibility allows operations that have more nuance, are more diversified and more critical than those supported directly by the government. Nevertheless, “this independence is dependent on two facts” noted an Italian specialist: “the first is that their governments provide them with substantial financial resources, and the second is that they only employ personnel belonging to a specific cultural promotion career, with technical and managerial independence.”<sup>55</sup> Here are some concrete examples:

a. Great Britain, the United States, Australia and Japan

- Created at the beginning of the last century, the British Council is the common ancestor and model for the agencies specializing in cultural relations. Its mission is to serve Britain’s national interests in winning recognition for its culture, values, ideas, and achievements and nurturing lasting and emotional relationships with foreign publics around the world.<sup>56</sup> Its legal status is particular since, according to the Royal Charter that governs it, it is a “non-departmental public body” or “charity” under the patronage of the Queen and the Prince of Wales. This being the case, the BC receives its strategic direction from a Board of Trustees, whose members are appointed by the Secretary of State for the FCO that controls its budget. In fact, this particular status allows it to build enduring partnership with foreign civil societies and to conduct a coherent long-term operation “despite changes of government or policy.”<sup>57</sup> Allowing it to better transmit its message abroad, this openness is strengthened by an operational network of almost 220 offices and centres in more than 110 countries. While respecting the strategic line drawn by the Foreign Office and its London HQ, each office holds quite a margin for autonomous activity designed to develop partnership with foreign governments and civil societies and to promote in this way British influence on a larger scale.

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and N.J. Peterson, “International Educational Exchange in the Information Age”, *Information Impacts Magazine* (July 2001).

<sup>54</sup> Nye, *The Paradox...*, *op. cit.*, 68.

<sup>55</sup> Baccini (Italian Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs), *op. cit.*

<sup>56</sup> “Through the unique combination of strengths it brings to cultural relations, the British Council contributes in a distinctive but integral way to the United Kingdom's international relations, supporting and complementing its diplomatic, commercial and development efforts”; U.K. - BC, “Official..”, *op. cit.*

Over the years the Council has built relationships with a considerable number of political and opinion leaders around the globe including arts administrators, scientists, civil servants, academics, teachers, journalists, policy advisers, and even military personnel.<sup>58</sup> This global influence network is the result of a multitude of programs developed mainly in the area of education, language, the arts and popular culture. Here are two or three examples:

- In the domain of education, the British Council administers – on the FCO's behalf – prestigious scholarship programmes comprising the Chevening scholarships, the Commonwealth Scholarships and Fellowships Plan (CSFP) and Marshall and Atlantic Scholarships (for US citizens). These programs engage actual or potential foreign leaders to create transnational links encouraging inter-governmental collaboration. These links are actively maintained through alumni associations, publications, the internet, e-mail and contacts with Ministers.<sup>59</sup> The exchanges and teaching are also promoted on a larger base through initiatives targeting the whole of youth generations abroad such as the very dynamic Connecting Futures program launched in 2002. In regards to the propagation of language, the BC depends on the network of English Language Centers (ELC) as well an informal system of exchanges employing approximately 40 000 students and assistants annually giving 1.2 million hours of English classes to hundreds of thousands of students around the world. The BC also attempts to reach a world wide audience through multi-media and interactive English language instruction.

- The British Council also works to promote British cultural and artistic influence in the world through specialized sub-offices. The BC's Arts Office for example, is in charge of extending the audience for music, design, architecture and British literature through exhibits but also through the Internet, the radio and television. Exhibitions such as "Millennium Products", "Typiquement British" in Paris, the fashion week in Delhi or the "UK with NY" festival held in New York right after 9-11 are good examples of popular artistic events being used to create a positive multiplier effect on Britain's perception abroad. BC's Britfilm Office supports the British film industry abroad by smoothing access to overseas markets, showcases and festivals (Venice, Cannes). Beyond massive grants, the Britfilm Office depends on a effective network of influence composed of the very active British Film Office based in Hollywood and a core team of sector specialists with direct links to members of the foreign film industry. It is important to note that

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<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>58</sup> Leonard and Stead, *op. cit.*, 81.

<sup>59</sup> U.K. - FCO, "Influence Worldwide", *FCO Annual Report 2003, op. cit.*; U.K. - FCO, Public Diplomacy Strategy Board, *Official...*, *op. cit.*

the BC privileges products with content related to human rights, governance and economic transformation whether they be films, television soap operas or documentaries.<sup>60</sup>

- Based on the British model, the Australian International Cultural Council (AICC) is the DFAT's primary vehicle for projecting a positive image of Australia, advancing foreign and trade policy interests, and promoting the export of Australian cultural products. Chaired by the secretary of State, the AICC comprises senior figures from the arts community, business and government arts agencies. The department provides the AICC secretariat and plays a lead role in delivering AICC programs, particularly through our network of overseas posts.

In the area of education, the Australian Council runs a very dynamic exchange program putting Australia third behind the United States and Great Britain in terms of students recruited. In the artistic domain, the AICC works closely with the Australian Council for the Arts and the Australian Film Commission.<sup>61</sup> The department complemented the work of the AICC through the Cultural Relations Discretionary Grants (CRDG) program which provides seed funding to assist Australian arts companies to take their work overseas in support of Australia's foreign and trade policy objectives.<sup>62</sup> It is noticeable that this program presents many similarities with DFAIT's International Cultural Relations Program that gives Canadian artists and academics the possibility to reach an international audience through various grants and business development programs.<sup>63</sup>

- The American system presents numerous similarities with the British, Canadian and Australian systems, while remaining focused on the educational sphere. Established by the Fulbright-Hays Act and merged into the State Department in 1999, the U.S. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) is one of the most powerful specialized agencies working in this area. Working under the close supervision of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, the ECA's strategic function is to build relationships of trust with other countries by engaging their populations and societal leaders through a wide range of cultural, academic and youth exchange programs. "The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs is the Department's long-term investment banker" explains Assistant Secretary Helena K. Finn.<sup>64</sup> With a budget of \$500 million annually (half of the total budget for mass diplomacy), of which more than 35 percent comes from non-USG sources, ECA has considerably extended in recent years its ramifications beyond the scope of the

<sup>60</sup> UK - BC, "Media and...", *op. cit.*; see also UK - BC, Marsden, *The British Council India, op. cit.*

<sup>61</sup> Australia - DFAT, *Annual Report 2002-2003, op. cit.*, 161.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 162.

<sup>63</sup> Canada - DFAIT, *2002-2003 Estimates...*, *op. cit.*, 35.

<sup>64</sup> U.S. - State Department, ECA, *Annual Report 2002, op. cit.*, 5.

American government. Since 1997, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs has leveraged increasingly substantial support for exchanges through innovative partnerships with local governments, higher education, business, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), foundations, U.S. allies, and other non-USG agencies.<sup>65</sup>

In the domain of education, the ECA is best known for its management of academic programs such as the Fulbright Academic Scholarship for exchange of students, scholars, and teachers and the Humphrey Fellowship Program for academic study and internships in the United States for mid-career professionals from developing countries. These are “strategic” activities to which American leaders grant the highest importance. For President Bush, “the relationships that are formed between individuals from different countries, as part of international education programs and exchanges, can also foster goodwill that develops into vibrant, mutually beneficial partnerships among nations.”<sup>66</sup> For his part, Colin L. Powell does not doubt that “ECA’s exchanges support long-term U.S. foreign policy goals.”<sup>67</sup> The thousands of future Nobel and Pulitzer prize winners, governors and senators, ambassadors and artists, prime ministers and heads of state, professors and scientists, Supreme Court justices, and CEOs that have been “fulbrighted” in more than 200 countries each year constitute in effect in their eyes potential “recruits” for America.<sup>68</sup> Exchange programs constitute the single largest part of the State Department public diplomacy budget, \$316 633 000 in FY-2004. Last year, the State Department directly sponsored over 30 000 academic, professional and other exchanges worldwide. For strategic reasons, there is also a prioritisation of the Arab world that now consists of 25% of the exchange budget (up from 17% in 2002). Currently 200 high school students from predominantly Islamic countries are living with American families and studying at local high schools. Another 450 high school students from the Middle East and South Asia will come to the United States for the next academic year (2004-2005).<sup>69</sup>

Above all the, ECA has worked hard to develop a cooperative network with the non-governmental world of education. Numerous projects have been conducted in partnership with private institutions such as the American Councils for International Education, Civic Education Project, International Research and Exchange Board, Institute for International Education, Open

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.

<sup>66</sup> U.S. - State Department & Department of Education, G. W. Bush, “Introducing Speech” (International Education Week 2001, November 13, 2001).

<sup>67</sup> U.S. - Powell, “Cultural Action...”, in U.S. - State Department, Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, *Annual Report 2002*, *op. cit.*, 4.

<sup>68</sup> Read *Washington Post*, “How I Became a Recruit for America, an interview of an Egyptian alumnus of the Fulbright scholarship”, January 20, 2002 ; sees also M. Lussenhop, “Creativity and Patience: Public Diplomacy Post-Sept. 11”, *Foreign Service Journal* 79, no4 (April 2002).

<sup>69</sup> U.S. - State Department, under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, Tutwiler, “Reaching Beyond...”, *op. cit.*

Society Institute, Project harmony or Youth for Understanding. A large part of these projects are also partnered with foreign universities and local governments. “We have to get them in the game”, because mass diplomacy effort is more productive “in consulting and agreeing to shape things together” explained Under Secretary Beers.<sup>70</sup> That is what the new Middle East Partnership Initiative is also about, as well as many other programs recently developed in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Third World. Outside the academic sphere, the ECA also conducts programs targeting current and emerging leaders such as the International Visitor and Citizen Exchange programs for which it partners actively with U.S. non-profit organizations, voluntary community organizations, professional associations, and universities at home and abroad.<sup>71</sup> The CultureConnect program sends famous and not-so-famous writers and performing artists overseas as cultural ambassadors. In 2004, for instance, the program will be sending cellist Yo-Yo Ma to South Korea and Middle East, singer Mary Wilson to Ethiopia, Oman, India and Bangladesh as well as author Frank McCourt to Syria and Algeria.<sup>72</sup>

As in many other cases, the propagation of language is a separate endeavour. English teaching is considered as the ultimate “secret weapon” of American mass diplomacy to the extent that it is the “key” to all the projects with the advantage that it is welcomed and supported by local partners due to its universal utility.<sup>73</sup> The ECA’s Office of English Language Programs is in itself, a perfect example of a flexible infrastructure with extensive reach. The Washington office staff conducts, promotes and supports programs sponsored by American Embassy-related English language programs (Bi-national Centers) but also by host country institutions such as Ministries of Education and universities. Deployed worldwide, its Regional English Language Officers (RELOs) organize and participate in teacher training seminars and workshops and offer guidance on all aspects of English Teaching in consultation with host-country ministry, university, and teacher-training officials. As language educators, RELOs also have the mission to promote understanding of American society by familiarizing students with values such as individual and women’s rights, democracy and pluralism.<sup>74</sup> Vast campaigns of Anglicisation are presently underway in strategic zones such as Eastern Europe, West Africa and Central Asia.<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>70</sup> U.S. - State Department, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, Beers, “American...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>71</sup> U.S. - State Department, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, ECA, *Annual Report 2002*, *op. cit.*, 5.

<sup>72</sup> N. Schaefer, “Art as Diplomacy”, *Wall Street Journal/Opinion Journal*, January 28, 2004.

<sup>73</sup> U.S. - State Department, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, Beers, “American...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>74</sup> U.S. - State Department, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, Office of English Language Programs, C. Duffy, “Language and Civil Society - Peace Education English”, in *Language Program* (Office of English Language Programs, 2002).

<sup>75</sup> U.S. - State Department, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, C. Beers, “Teaching English in Central Asia: Opening Doors to Success” (remarks to the first annual Conference of Central Asian Teachers of English, Samarqand, Uzbekistan, June 20-22, 2002).



- While occupying a place apart in the universe of cultural diplomacy, the Japanese system, resembles the American system in terms of language policy and education policies.

Spearhead of the Japanese cultural policy, the Japan Foundation is particularly active in the promotion of the Japanese language around the world. When the Foundation was created in 1979, the number of students studying the Japanese language around the world through its programs was 127 167. After nearly twenty years, when a survey was conducted in 1998, the number had grown to over 2.1 million. In the past, those who chose to study the Japanese language were students and scholars majoring in Japanese linguistics or Japanese studies. Today, businessmen and engineers, junior and senior high-school students, and in some countries, primary school pupils, are studying the language, a strategic victory for the Foundation.<sup>76</sup> Established as an affiliated organization of the Japan Foundation, the Japanese-Language Institute, Urawa, was established in 1989 to provide further assistance to Japanese-language education abroad. Its worldwide network is an effective means to familiarize foreign public not only with a language but also with a culture and a way of life.

The Japanese cultural policy also possesses with the Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) Programme a unique and much envied operational tool in the academic domain. "A scheme that is capitalized on with a great deal of follow-up, network building, and long-term relationship development" observe Leonard and Stead.<sup>77</sup> The number of young people visiting Japan through the JET Programme, engaging in teaching foreign languages and international exchange activities in local governments, has steadily risen each year since the end of the 1990's. Through the development of new programs such as the Global Youth Exchange (GYE) and the integration of new teaching technologies, Japanese officials intend to tap foreign youth populations and "recruit" 100 000 foreign students between 2000 and 2010.<sup>78</sup>

#### b. France, Germany and Italy

Cultural and educational diplomats of the continental European states such as France, Germany and Italy can be distinguished from that of the Anglo-Saxon states and Japan in two ways. They depend on a much more decentralised organisation involving external subcontractors

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<sup>76</sup> The Japan Foundation also supports publication exchange from the information standpoint, distributing up-to-date information on Japanese publications to overseas countries, where such information is scarce, in the form of a newsletter and a bibliography.

<sup>77</sup> Leonard and Stead, *op. cit.*

<sup>78</sup> Japan - MOFA, "Chapter IV...", in *Blue Book 2000*, *op. cit.*

(NGO's, business, and mixed organisations). Their efforts are also much more focussed on the cultural and artistic dimension. Nevertheless, as in the preceding cases, their operations are under the composite "stato-managerial" principle.

- In the case of Germany, cultural diplomacy is conducted within the framework of the guidelines established by the Federal Government's Directorate-General for Cultural Relations and Education Policy (DGCERP). However, German history favours more than anywhere else a decentralised system, and cultural and educational programs are for the most part carried out independently by so-called cultural organizations under private law (as registered associations, foundations or as limited liability companies), using Federal funds. This structure ensures that the message disseminated by them abroad "does not appear to be prescribed by the state."<sup>79</sup> This spectrum of cultural operations consists in, in particular, of the Goethe-Institut Inter-Nationes, the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), the Central Agency for Schools Abroad, the Institute for Foreign Relation (ifa), German schools abroad and private foundations. Their joint operations are coordinated by special Commissioners appointed by the DGCERP for strategic regions or within comprehensive programs such as the Dialogue with the Islamic World launched in 2002.<sup>80</sup>

The Goethe-Institut Inter-Nationes (GIIN) is the most representative and also the most versatile of the institutions that serve as spearheads for German cultural diplomacy. According to the framing agreement established by the Federal Republic, GIIN answers to Auswärtiges-Amt in regards to general direction as well as for a large part of its annual funding (€180 million); it remains autonomous however in regards to the local initiatives of its 130 branches operating in more than 75 countries. Through this flexible and open network, GIIN cooperates closely on a contractual basis with local partners by establishing privately-operated centres functioning like official Institutes. The GIIN also improves liaison by developing multiplier networks in its specialized fields of operation which are language, culture and the arts.

In this consummately decentralised system, no institution really dominates. Without having a monopoly, each has its specific field of operation for which it shares the management with external allies.

- The cultivation of the German language abroad is the realm of the Goethe Institute; an area in which it cooperates actively with the Central Agency for Schools Abroad, the German schools

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<sup>79</sup> Germany - Auswärtiges-Amt, "Kulturpolitik Grundsätze – Principles of Cultural Diplomacy", in *Concept 2000...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>80</sup> Dr. G. Mulack (German Commissioner for dialogue with the Islamic world), "On a positive and peaceful footing", Interview to *Qantara.de* webpage, February 25, 2003.

abroad, private foundations and the Educational Exchange Service of the Standing Conference of the Ministers of Cultural Affairs of the German Länder. These organisations collectively administer 150 000 German teachers teaching many million individuals outside the German-speaking area. As in the U.S. and French cases, language promotion is a cultural relations priority as it is viewed as “the key” to the fullest possible understanding of German life and culture but also to a wide range of political, security and economic goals.<sup>81</sup> The main target groups are current and future leaders in political, economic, academic and cultural life and the media as well as German-speaking minorities in Central and Eastern Europe.

- Besides its huge language programmes, GIIN also promotes German culture, art, literature and cinematography through a cooperative initiative with semi-public organisations such as the Institute for Foreign Relations (ifa), the German Music Council or the House of World Cultures (HKW). Their operations consist particularly of financing the production and broadcasting of national films or foreign films that project a favourable image of Germany such as ‘Donia’ directed by two young Egyptian film-makers describing the “agreeable” life of Muslims in Berlin.<sup>82</sup> Organized visits for librarians, intellectuals, journalists and art managers to Germany are also good examples for the manifold activities in this respect.<sup>83</sup>

The range of educational and academic programs of mass diplomacy is supervised by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) and the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation (AvH) in collaboration with the private sector and the German Länder. With federal financing of €100 million annually and a structure designed to deal with the new challenges of the international education market, these organisations manage more than 250 public, semi-private and private education institutions abroad as well as the organisation of exchanges between German and foreign universities. While the universities' own efforts are the starting-point, their role is to press constantly for improvements in general conditions conducive to an even greater internationalization of contacts with Germany's academic partners abroad. DAAD and AvH are also responsible for research and exchange grants falling under the rubric of mixed programmes such as Erasmus, Socrates or Roman Herzog.

- As in the German case, the French model of cultural operation is characterized by decentralisation. Entirely revamped in 1999, its centre is the DGCID's *Direction de la*

<sup>81</sup> Germany, Fischer, “Address at the opening...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>82</sup> Another example is the Berlin Festival awarded ‘Head On’ (2004), a joint German-Turkish production, chronicling the life of Sibel, a young German born to Turkish parents who escapes her conservative Muslim family by marrying a liberal German punk.

*coopération culturelle et linguistique* (DCCL) that provides a strategic framework as well as financial and technical support. Nevertheless, the essence of French cultural policy is transmitted by operators in the field such as the *Association française d'action artistique* (AFAA) or the *Alliances françaises*. L'AFAA and its establishments abroad constitute pipe-lines for the cultural, intellectual and artistic influence of France in the world. Its network is directly under the supervision of the Quai d'Orsay and the *Direction de la Coopération Culturelle et linguistique*.<sup>84</sup> But a recent reform in 2000 has given it a more flexible status that allows it to more easily involve representatives of business in its management. The AFAA is charged with the task of making links between culture and external operations, with a double mission, a traditional one of broadcasting or propagation, and a newer one, of advising ("cultural engineering").<sup>85</sup>

French cultural strategy is also carried out by specialized operatives in the promotion of cultural products, such as the *Bureau Export* for the musical industries and *Unifrance* for the cinema.<sup>86</sup> In cooperation with DCCL, *Unifrance* supports the commercial distribution of French films particularly in the context of the Cannes, Venice, Berlin film festivals as well as the Celebration of French film in Lisbon, the Martell French Film Tour in Great Britain, the Festival of French Cinema in Moscow or Ciné Cinéma in Bogota. France also supports the promotion of an alternative and Francophile cinematography with the help of the Sud funds and the ADC from which almost a thousand foreign films have benefited in the last twenty years. French Cultural, linguistic and educational strategy is also carried out, as we shall see more fully in Chapter 9, within international cooperatives such as the *l'Association des universités partiellement ou entièrement de langue française* (AUPELF) or the *Agence de la Francophonie* (ACCT).

- Italian institutes are the cultural voices of mass diplomacy for Rome- 'la voce culturale della politica estera italiana'.<sup>87</sup> Their role is "to disseminate everything that is good and beautiful that exists and is produced in Italy."<sup>88</sup> Officially independent, the institutes are in fact under the financial and strategic control of the Director General for Cultural Relations at the Palazzo Farnese (DGRC). This arrangement allows the growth of their freedom of action and their capacity to ally themselves with participants from the non-governmental sphere. In recent years,

<sup>83</sup> Dr Albert Spiegel (Director-General for Cultural Affairs), "Cultural Relations Policy and Literature", *Liberal*, June 2, 2001; see also Ebert, *op. cit.*, in Overhaus & al., *op. cit.*, 8-9.

<sup>84</sup> France - DGCID, "4. Encourager...", in *Action 2000*, *op. cit.*

<sup>85</sup> Among these initiatives a remarkable one is the franco-european cultural cooperation program 'Generation 2001' designed to boost the export of young french artists abroad.

<sup>86</sup> France - DGCID, "4. Encourager...", in *Action 2000*, *op. cit.*

<sup>87</sup> Italy - Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 'Promozione e Cooperazione Culturale', Istituti di Cultura, 2002, available @ Attività degli Istituti.

<sup>88</sup> Debenedetti, *op. cit.*

numerous operational programmes have been developed with the direct cooperation of celebrities of the theatre and film (Alberto Sordi), with the business world (Confindustria) and with the world of fashion and design (Armani) with the goal of diversifying and modernizing Italy's image.<sup>89</sup>

The propagation of the Italian language and, through it, of "a particular way of life", constitutes one of the priorities of Italian cultural policy.<sup>90</sup> The Institutes collaborate in this area with academic, cultural and entertainment spheres as well as with the Società Dante Alighieri and its network of 3 269 language centres around the world. In a similar way, the Institutes promote Italian film in partnership with independent organizations such as Cinecitta Holding, Agenzia Italia Cinema or the l'École Nationale du Cinéma (Cineteca Nazionale).

### c. Regional Cultural Policies

For different reasons relating to issues of financial resources and international ambition, the cultural and educational diplomacy systems of most countries is not like the global systems of Great Britain, France or the United States. Many of countries are content to concentrate on key geo-strategic zones for the foreign policy and where it would be most profitable. Amongst these regional cultural policies, the Instituto Cervantes, spread throughout the Spanish World comes to mind, or the Australian International Cultural Council concentrated on the Asia-Pacific zone and in particular, the Australia–China Council (ACC), The Australia–India Council (AIC), the Australia–Indonesia Institute or the Australia–Japan Foundation.<sup>91</sup>

- The system of Turkish cultural policy is also regional in nature since it is mainly targeted at Turkish populations in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia. The Turkish strategy consists in particular of making use of ethno-cultural links that unite these populations to build a pan-Turkish cultural solidarity around Turkey.<sup>92</sup> It depends essentially on Türksoy (Joint Turkic Agency for Cultural Cooperation), an institution of multilateral appearance but which is *de facto* controlled from Ankara.<sup>93</sup> The Turkish strategy depends also on a multitude of initiatives in the areas of language, education, the arts and religion, co-supervised by TIKA and Türksoy. A

<sup>89</sup> "Culture must ...", *Il Tempo*, *op. cit.*

<sup>90</sup> D. Calabria, "The Italian language – a heritage to defend", *Italia Chiama Italia*, 2002.

<sup>91</sup> Australia – DFAT, International Cultural Council, released by the AICC, available @ <http://www.dfat.gov.au/aicc/paca/program.html> (accessed April 2004).

<sup>92</sup> Turkey - MFA, P. Bübüloğlu, "Cultural Cooperation in the Turkic World", *Eurasian Studies* 3 (1996).

<sup>93</sup> The depositor nation for the TÜRKSOY Organization is the Republic of Turkey. The official language of TÜRKSOY is Turkish and the administrative center is Ankara; see the official website @ <http://www.turksoy.org.tr/eng/anasayfa.html>.

representative example of such an initiative is a vast project financed and organised by TIKA allowing the scriptural transition of the former Soviet Turkic republics from the Cyrillic alphabet to the Latin alphabet of 34 letters that the Turks themselves have used since 1923. With the help of different incentives, Turkey supports the adoption of a 'standard' or 'simplified' Turkish language based on common structures allowing the tightening of linguistic links between the some 150 millions Turkish speakers outside Turkey and to facilitate cooperation between their governments.<sup>94</sup> In all of these projects, Turkey depends on multilateral institutions and the help of non-governmental organisms. Once again, as we've seen, Turkey is the exception in its centralised approach to administering cultural policy.

## Conclusion

The times change and with them institutions of influence. To reach an ever larger and ever more sceptical audience, wary of anything resembling state propaganda, it is now necessary to work undercover, through intertwined networks, across others and with the help of a light-handed and flexible government administration. The same reasons push states to adopt a bureaucratic-entrepreneurial style. It is an approach from which a new way of influencing populations is emerging. Moreover, there are numerous analysts that agree that it will soon constitute the “operational norm” for public diplomacy.<sup>95</sup> Its analysis provides insight into what the future holds for this type of foreign policy: a business strategy, a conquest of markets and strategic partnerships.

Nevertheless, this portrait of public diplomacy would be incomplete if we did include its other wing: broadcast policy. Without that which we call “cyber-diplomacy” and its sophisticated mass communication and information instruments this facet of foreign policy would undoubtedly continue to play a restrained role for a relatively limited audience. It is in large part the new tools such as satellites, television and the Internet that make modern mass diplomacy so pervasive and therefore so powerful. That said, beyond the technological dimension, the question is to determine how audiovisual diplomacy is structured and how it integrates, in the image of the cultural branch, the bureaucratic-entrepreneurial model. This is precisely the goal of the following chapter.

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<sup>94</sup> Landau, *op. cit.*, 211-212

<sup>95</sup> Canada - Smith, *op. cit.*

## **Chapter VIII. Mass Diplomacy's 'Bureaucratic-Entrepreneurial' Model**

### **Part II: Cyber-Diplomacy**

#### **Introduction**

As we saw in the preceding chapter, the information age and the advent of a media saturated global society completely upset the structure of public diplomacy inherited from the Cold War. This upheaval put into question diplomacy's restriction to culture, education and the arts as spheres of operation by putting at its disposal new weapons of persuasion. The art of influencing foreign populations now integrates new sophisticated diplomatic tools such as high-resolution satellite imagery, coaxial cable networks, fibre optic, wireless and high-speed networks, digital radio and television and other marvels of the late twentieth century communications revolution. The organisation of this cyber-diplomacy confronts governments with the same dilemma they face with the rest of public diplomacy: They are conscious that they cannot depend entirely on private broadcasters to make their case to foreign populations and engage them in a favourable way. But they are also conscious that it would be illusory and counterproductive to wish to fulfill this strategic function with a rigid information and communication system that carries the reputation of being entirely controlled by the state.

The question then is to know which mode of organisation allows the use of these new communication and information technologies to influence foreign public opinion while not appearing to be an instrument of state propaganda while remaining competitive in an audiovisual market that is increasingly saturated. This chapter attempts to demonstrate that for the majority of governments, the solution lies here again with a hybrid bureaucratic-entrepreneurial organisational model that extends the approach already adopted in the areas of culture and education by allowing the participation of partners outside strictly governmental spheres while maintaining a minimum of leadership and governmental structure necessary for supervision and the coordination of joint initiatives amongst various partners. At the heart of this hybrid system lies an apparatus that is flexible and open and endowed with a sophisticated arsenal of centrally-managed news agencies, satellite networks, radio stations, television broadcasters and internet websites. It is upon this technological apparatus that the next chapter concentrates, as well as on its capacity for openness and involvement with the external world; capacities of which the practical applications will be analysed in the next chapter.

## 1. A Centralized System for International Broadcasting

### a. The Hub

During the last decade, it became primordial that states not only learn to master the new communication technologies by also to equip themselves with an infrastructure that allows them to domesticate, channel, filter and direct the flow of information in the most effective ways, but also in the most furtive and subtle ways. They had to adapt to a social context in which the public is increasingly sceptical in regards to official interventions in this domain. For instance, according to a study conducted in December 2003 in France with 900 young people aged 11 to 20 representative of this age group, only 38 percent of respondents thought that the information provided by official media was trustworthy.<sup>1</sup> For all governments around the globe, irrespective of their power, historical background or regime, given the growing ineffectiveness of rigid or state-led approaches, it was urgent to put in place an audiovisual broadcasting operating system that was discrete, flexible and open to decentralised management and an active partnership with the non-governmental sphere.

In most cases, the resulting external audiovisual system appears as a web at the center of which operates a specialized organisation in charge of all government and government-sponsored international broadcasting services directed at overseas audiences (figure 1). It is in other terms a formal network on which is superposed a larger, more informal network made of external allies. Within this complex network, the specialized agency in charge of cyber-diplomacy acts in a certain way as “the hub controls the spokes.”<sup>2</sup> Its primary function is to provide a common strategic direction to the ensemble of satellite, radio, television and Internet wings that make up the core central operation. This core or centre is also responsible for building external relationships allowing the participation of external media partners (private and/or foreign) gravitating around the core organisation. Its role as orchestra conductor is ultimately to supervise and guarantee the coherence of the collective effort of the various participants. It acts as a catalyst, leveraging all energies and technical expertise available and bringing together all the key parties - both governmental and nongovernmental - to further foreign policy objectives by getting the message out to the most people in the least time. In this it is comparable to the specialized agencies in the domain of culture and education, though its field of operation reaches a

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
<sup>1</sup> At 45%, television is, the media that inspires the most confidence in terms of news. The press comes second at 30% followed by the internet at 15% and radio at 10%; Médiamétrie, “La perception des médias par les 11-20 ans” (december 2003).

<sup>2</sup> Nye, *The Paradox...*, *op. cit.*



considerably larger audience due mostly to the tools of mass influence under its control. This section will analyse the function of some of these external broadcasting operators starting with the US case.

**Figure 1. The External Broadcasting Web: A Network of Networks**



- The Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) supervises all civilian, non-military international broadcasting funded by the U.S. government, including Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, Radio Sawa, Radio Farda and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (Radio and TV Marti) as well as their cooperation with a vast array of external private and foreign partners. The BBG provides oversight and guidance to the International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB) and to external broadcasting corporations; it also allocates funds among various broadcasters; ensures compliance with broadcasting standards and evaluates the mission, operation, and quality of broadcasting activities. By considering only strictly governmental organisation, the BBG now supports 65 broadcast languages through over 90 language services to more than 125 markets worldwide. In the context of the system that it supervises, more than 100 million listeners, viewers, and internet users around the world turn-on, tune-in, or log-on to U.S. international broadcasting programs every week. In a word, it's the fundamental core of the American broadcasting policy and a model for other mass diplomacies (Moreover, it's a perfect illustration of figure 1).

Nevertheless, the operational scope of the Broadcasting Board of Governors is far from being limited to this core operation. What increases the market competitiveness of American cyber-diplomacy and its ability to engage foreign audiences in complex, competitive media environments worldwide is the BBG ability to extend its reach beyond governmental structures. The 2002 Freedom Promotion Act which entirely redesigned the U.S. broadcasting architecture formally institutionalised this arrangement by enjoining the BBG "to work with foreign television broadcasters and other media to produce and distribute programming."<sup>3</sup> The strengthening of its

<sup>3</sup> U.S. - House of Representatives, CIR, *Freedom...*, *op. cit.*

leadership, combined with the extension of its field of operation allows the BBG to be the effective command center of U.S cyber-diplomacy while “marrying its mission to the market” through the integration of independent distribution networks. Another major benefit of the Broadcasting Board of Governors is its perceived independence of the State Department. The Board acquired this formal independence as the result of the 1998 Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act (Public Law 105-277), the single most important legislation affecting U.S. international broadcasting since the early 1950s. But this autonomy is only relative since its budget, policies, and executives depend entirely on the State Department and that the Secretary of State personally supervises its operations by chairing its steering committee. In reality, mass diplomacy operatives are working for increased centralization of cyber-diplomacy<sup>4</sup>; a centralization that can be seen in particular with the increasing control that the White House Office of global communications holds over the external broadcasting policy.<sup>5</sup>

- The British have nothing to envy the Americans; with the BBC World Service, they hold the most competitive, influential and most imitated cyber-diplomacy agency in the world. This is due not only to swelling resources put at its disposal (see chapters 3 and 4), its infrastructure and its ultra-effective multimedia arsenal, but also the longevity of the network of informal influence and the relationships of trust built over years with an audience of many hundreds of millions of listeners, viewers and Internet surfers, amongst which are found a large number of cultural and political leaders. All these reasons result in the ability to make clear to British leaders that in today’s growingly hypermedia and networked world, the BCC World Service is “one of the most important global assets Britain has”.

“Aunt Bee” as the BBC is affectionately known amongst the British is above all a tool for British foreign affairs. Though it manages British cyber-diplomacy with an editorial independence reinforced by the 2002 Broadcasting Agreement, it is nevertheless constrained by the need to respect the strategic lines drawn by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office who approves most of its decisions and tactical choices. Under the current regime, the FCO provides 94% of the financing of this public service through a licensing fee indexed to inflation and fixed

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<sup>4</sup> “Coordination and executive leadership really are crucial, based on history and recent experience”, Tucker Eskew (U.S. appointee at the Coalition Information Centre in London), quoted in Leonard and Stead, *op. cit.*, 39-40.

<sup>5</sup> This trend is also observable in crisis periods in interdepartmental organs such as the International Public Information Group (IPIG). Established in the US State Department in 1999, this group which includes members of the intelligence and military community reflects the importance of media to foreign policy and national security.

until 2006.<sup>6</sup> Due to this subsidy, the World Service has a budget that is the envy of rivals but is no more independent of public powers. Especially since the Kelly affair and the Hutton Report<sup>7</sup>, there is increasing talk of tightening its regulation by replacing its board of governors, appointed by the Queen, by a new governmental media watchdog, the Ofcom. In February 2004, the British government considered a plan to partially dismantle the BBC including the possibility of removing part of its independence.<sup>8</sup> In fact the BBC artfully combines the two seemingly contradictory functions: the control of audiovisual broadcasting policy and the guarantee of impartiality and credibility that a leading media group proffers.

But the World Service would be misunderstood without taking into account its real strength: its unequalled ability to maintain central control while weaving external networks outside public structures. The Royal Charter and Licence Agreement, which set the terms and conditions under which it must operate, specifically states its mission as “*to enter into joint ventures or partnerships with - or to subsidise and assist - external partners capable of facilitating any of the objects of the Corporation in any manner that may be thought fit.*”<sup>9</sup> The public service is also mandated “to commission, compile, prepare, edit, make, print, publish, issue and provide to other bodies, whether within United Kingdom or elsewhere, by such means and methods as may be convenient, programmes and materials capable of facilitating any of the objects of the Corporation.”<sup>10</sup> The BBC system is luxuriously gifted with the flexibility and the networking capacity necessary to garner the greatest advantage from an environment that is increasingly networked and competitive. Thanks to these predispositions and the significant resources and techniques at its disposal, the BBC system is in a better position to attain its objectives: to become “a global hub for information and communication”, “the world’s reference point” and subsequently “a showcase for Britain’s values, ideas, culture and policy.”<sup>11</sup>

The Coalition Information Centre (CIC) offers an interesting example of cooperative effort. The CIC was implemented by the FCO and the American State Department with the goal of combining the potential of the BBG and the BBC World Service to cope with exceptional

<sup>6</sup> The remaining funds come from its production and audiovisual affiliate organ, BBC Worldwide, thanks to which the British public service operate to some extent as a private channel.

<sup>7</sup> Lord Hutton was charged with investigating the circumstances of the death of armaments expert David Kelly, the anonymous source of a BBC report affirming that the government had exaggerated the threat of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction in a claim made in September 2002.

<sup>8</sup> *Sunday Times*, February 15, 2004.

<sup>9</sup> U.K. - Department of National Heritage Broadcasting, *Royal Charter of the British Broadcasting Corporation* (Crown copyright material reproduced with the permission of the Controller of HMSO and the Queen's Printer for Scotland, 1996).

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>11</sup> U.K. - BBC, ‘The World’s Reference Point’, *Annual Review 2002* (released by BBC), available @ [http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/us/annual\\_review/2001](http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/us/annual_review/2001) (accessed June 2003).

situations that their respective structures were not able to manage separately. Created following 9/11, this bilateral cyber-diplomacy infrastructure can perform “rapid reaction diplomacy” by being activated in response to any situation the State Department or the Foreign Office think necessary.<sup>12</sup> The CIC has the central power to bring together and coordinate every branch of government involved in a crisis situation but also the flexibility and outreach capability to call on connections in other countries and involve any partners necessary to resolve the situation. The Coalition Information Centre undoubtedly prefigures what could be the cyber-diplomacy alliances of tomorrow.

- The Deutsche Welle strategic leaderships, supported by the DW Broadcasting Board, is a model for how best to combine the bureaucratic dimension of cyber-diplomacy with its entrepreneurial dimension. On a strictly bureaucratic level, the 1997 “Deutsche Welle law” mandated it the traditional mission of managing and coordinating the German audiovisual arsenal composed of DW-TV, German TV, DW-Radio and DW-World.de.<sup>13</sup> It is also encouraged the organisation to bring its expertise to bear in cooperation with independent players from the German civil society such as the Länder.<sup>14</sup> But what really characterises the German approach is that it integrates methods from the business world more effectively than most other nations. DW’s leadership assures the promotion of German programs on the global audiovisual market thanks to partnerships with over 4 300 affiliated broadcast stations and 436 broadcast institutions around the world. With the help of the slogan “we are wherever you are”, it continually increases its “DW affiliates” to which it sells informational programming, documentaries and light entertainment. Through the intermediary of these thousands of re-broadcasters Deutsche Welle has an audience that greatly exceeds its own capacity.

- Based on the same model in many ways, the *Direction de l'Audiovisuel Extérieur et des Techniques de Communication* (DAETC), generates and implements programs and strategic projects for the *Direction Générale* (DGCID) in regards to France’s external broadcasting. The DAETC orchestrates, in cooperation with the *Conseil Supérieur de l'Audiovisuel* (CSA) operations for the French communications system composed in particular of TV5, Canal France International (CFI), Radio-France Internationale (RFI) and its radio affiliates of the SOFIRAD

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<sup>12</sup> Leonard and Stead, *op. cit.*, 31-35.

<sup>13</sup> Germany - DW, “The bodies of...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>14</sup> Germany - Auswaertiges-Amt, “Cultural Relations Policy: Arts and Media”, in *Concept 2000...*, *op. cit.*

that brings together state and private concerns on audiovisual initiatives.<sup>15</sup> The DAETC supports international broadcast by television, radio or internet, of French programming and French language products, and French language news or news from French sources. It also watches over the development of the presence of its programs on international communication networks with the help of the *Mission pour la Coopération Non-Gouvernementale* (MCNG) already mentioned in the previous chapter with regard to cultural programs. The MCNG plays a key role in the conduct of French cyber-diplomacy by planning the orientation and resources of the non-governmental partnership and by assuring the liaison with the *Direction Générale* and the local authorities, private intermediaries and institutions and intermediaries “of all sorts” furthering the propagation of French operations abroad.<sup>16</sup>

These examples are representative of almost all modern organisation structures for audiovisual diplomacy. Following the American, British, German and French examples, numerous nations have equipped themselves with a central body in charge of the strategic direction, the coordination and the management of their foreign media policy. Behind most of the major state-run international broadcasting systems such as RAI (Italia), Avrazya, (Turkey), ABC (Australia), IRIB (Iran), Al-Jazeera (Qatar), and of those less established systems that have popped up everywhere in recent years, can be found a similar supervisory board. The field of action of these operators is rarely limited, as we’ve seen, to the simple management of a publicly-owned technological and communicational arsenal. Like the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, the majority now also meet their mandate through strategic alliances and partnerships contracted outside the halls of foreign affairs ministries. Whether this is done with the help of independent allies, or through the sale or distribution of programming to sub-contractors, or by partially privatizing government operational structures, it is now necessary for centralized management to extend its influence through means other than itself. Let's turn now to some of the ramifications of this new cyber-diplomacy machinery.

#### b. Media Relations and Press Agencies

A distinct dimension of audiovisual diplomacy, that precedes and is distinct from the broadcasting stage by satellite, radio, TV and Internet as such (next section), concerns the filtering, triage, selection and preparation of information destined to be used by governmental

<sup>15</sup> France - MAE, “L’explosion de l’audiovisuel...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>16</sup> France – MAE, DGCID, *Organigramme du Ministère des Affaires étrangères* (MAE, may 1999).

organisations or distributed to external media and foreign audiences. One aspect of this work is done by the press information and media relations services. Following the example of the Chinese Press and Media Service, their conventional task consists of releasing news stating the government's position concerning international issues and providing feedback explaining and justifying various aspects of its policy.<sup>17</sup> The DFAIT's Media Relations Division defends Canada's position on all fronts from questions about foreign policy and security (UN, Africa, Middle East, Europe/NATO/EU, NACD, Small Arms, Mox) to cultural questions (Canadian Studies/International Academic Relations, Film Productions) and economic issues (Trade disputes, WTO, GATS, NAFTA, Trade missions, PEMD-I, Singapore Free Trade Agreement, Brazil/PROEX, Steel, Wheat Europe, EFTA, Wines & Spirits, - and even - shrimp disputes with Europe). The augmentation and modernization of means have allowed governments to develop new media outreach strategies and to improve their ability to monitor trends in media coverage of portfolio-related issues. Through its extended network of 40 regional or branch offices and new print, audio, visual and electronic tools, the Indian Press Information Bureau is thus equipped with a refined media monitoring process providing key foreign commentators with timely information and feedback. In the same way, the modernised DFAT's Media Services (Australia) is equipped to respond to more than 20 000 requests for information from foreigners and to reorient in a more favourably way to Australia the coverage of major policy issues.<sup>18</sup>

The other part of the work is taken care of by information agencies governments establish to assume responsibility of their external audiovisual broadcasting. These agencies are twinned in an autonomous way with the governmental system (majority of cases), or directly integrated into the diplomatic audiovisual apparatus as in the British or American case. In southern nations, the first version dominates still. Agencies, such as the Agência Brasil-Radiobrás Brazilian state property or China's Xinhua News Agency act as information auxiliaries for public diplomacy. The influential Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) is described by the Iranian Foreign Ministry as "the pivot of the Iranian modern diplomacy perspective."<sup>19</sup> In general, this practice is more widespread in systems that do not have a developed tradition of freedom of the press. "Associated news agencies" such as Anadolu Ajansı (Turkey), Itar-Tass (Russia), Xinhua (China), NAN (Nigeria) or Antara (Indonesia) serve as government mouthpieces for their respective governments. In the North, especially where press agencies are independent, we see the

<sup>17</sup> China - MFA of the People's Republic of China, Press and Media Service, available @ <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/> (accessed november 2003).

<sup>18</sup> Australia - DFAT, *Annual Report 2002-2003*, *op. cit.*, 151-52.

<sup>19</sup> Iran - Assefi, "Foreign Ministry's Success...", *op. cit.*, 8.

installation of complete cyber-diplomacy systems possessing their own integrated press agencies within the foreign policy system. This integrated format is presently used in the United States with the Office of International Information Programs (IIP), in Britain and in a smaller way in France and Germany.

Created in 1999 from elements of the former U.S. Information Agency (USIA), the Office of International Information Programs is the principal international communications service of the U.S. mass diplomacy system. "Operating as a reinvention laboratory", IIP designs, develops, and implements a variety of information initiatives and strategic communications programs, including web-based and print publications, traveling and electronically transmitted speaker programs, media outreach and information resource services.<sup>20</sup> These include Daily "Washington File" compilations of official speeches, International Web sites (<http://usinfo.state.gov>), electronic journals, print publications and programs for associated television networks. Designed to support the State Department's and the Broadcasting Board's efforts, these initiatives all target key international audiences, such as the media, government officials, opinion leaders, and the general public in more than 140 countries around the world.<sup>21</sup> In parallel, the Office of Policy produces daily editorials and other programs that convey official U.S. government policies for use by all VOA language services and television.<sup>22</sup> Through its many programs, products and services, the Office of International Information Programs provides the raw resource material on which the rest of the US mass diplomacy community (State Department, BBG, IBB) relies to influence the opinion of foreign audiences about U.S. foreign and domestic policy, American society, policies, culture and values. With this particular goal in mind, the IIP has, for instance, produced videos and booklets entitled "Muslim Life in America" insisting on the similarities between Arab cultures and American society.<sup>23</sup> More recently, it contributed to the creation of the Arab language monthly *Hi* targeting the 18-35 year old Arab population segment while publicizing the production amongst the foreign media with the help of prominent personalities such as the

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<sup>20</sup> U.S. - State Department, "About...", *op. cit.*

<sup>21</sup> U.S. - State Department, "Overview of the Organisation of the Department of State/ Department Organization/ Organization chart", all available @ <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/dos/42.htm> (last access March 2004).

<sup>22</sup> For instance, guests from inside and outside of government appear on the Office's public affairs program, On the Line, to discuss major policy issues; see @ <http://www.ibt.gov>.

<sup>23</sup> Also in the framework of the "Shared Values Initiatives", IIP has produced different programmes insisting on the universal and not only anti-American character of the 9/11 attacks. For example, it created and helped disseminating the pamphlet: "Iraq: From Fear to Freedom" emphasising the horror of Saddam Hussein's regime and the benefits of a democratic and unified Iraq; U.S. - State Department, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, Beers, "American Public Diplomacy...", *op. cit.*

ambassador Christopher Ross.<sup>24</sup> The ambition of the IPP is above all to “get other use out of programming that it produces and makes available”.<sup>25</sup> A goal pursued through “strategic alliances” outside the USG sphere but also through a complex management structure abroad: The Office of Geographic Liaison is the first point of contact within the IIP for missions overseas and the audiences they serve. Its teams’ writer-editors, information resource officers, program officers, and translators provide regionally oriented products and services.<sup>26</sup> IPP also operates Overseas Information Resource Centers and offers reference specialists based in Washington DC to answer specialized information queries from abroad.<sup>27</sup> The Office of International Information Programs uses liaison officers – foreign correspondent spokespersons of international stature from the academic, political and cultural world; it works with and through the American Embassy Television Network and the U.S embassies’ press sections to provide local media and local authorities with key information regarding U.S. government actions and positions.

Following the example of the State Department, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office possesses its own system of integrated press agencies. Made up of a number of organisations, this apparatus assures the quasi-autonomy of British audiovisual broadcasting. The News Section manages relations with the press and ensures positive coverage on issues of strategic interest to the U.K.. With the help of its web site ([www.fco.gov.uk/news](http://www.fco.gov.uk/news)), it provides visitors with official speeches made by British leaders and informs them of Britain’s official positions on high profile issues. The London Press Service (LPS), FCO’s own press agency, allows the Foreign Office to provide a weekly selection of illustrated features for free use by the overseas media. LPS is a database and a photo bank thanks to which the FCO provides foreign media information favourable to the image and influence of Great Britain abroad. British Satellite News (BSN), the FCO’s own television news service, provides overseas broadcasters with coverage of worldwide topical events “from a British perspective”. Since 9/11, BSN offers the service in Arabic, and puts a new emphasis on stories of particular interest to the Islamic world for which it produces specific radio and television material such as documentaries on Muslims living in the U.K.<sup>28</sup> In October 2001, the FCO’s Islamic Media Unit (IMU) was set up to addresses Islamic opinion throughout the world with a special emphasis on the Arab media. In only a few months, the Unit became past masters of the art of using local media to get its message across and to create privileged contacts

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<sup>24</sup> “*Hi* is a way to establish long term relationships with individuals who will be the future leaders of the Arab world” (C. Ross); T. Hakem, “*Hi*, a magazine for young Arabs financed by the American Congress”, *Le Monde*, November 11, 2003.

<sup>25</sup> U.S. – State Department, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, “American...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>26</sup> U.S. – State Department, “About...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>28</sup> U.K. – FCO, “Influence Worldwide”, *FCO Annual Report 2003*, *op. cit.*, 84.



with key political, religious and academic figures in the Islamic world.<sup>29</sup> Thanks to this self-sufficient system and its network of redistribution, the FCO's Public Diplomacy Department is equipped with all the necessary instruments to conduct a media campaign worthy of the name on all fronts and on all continents.

The example of Canal France International (CFI) is also noteworthy. Since its creation in 1989, it has acted as a bank of programs and images of the French system destined for foreign markets. CFI broadcasts on average 30 000 hours of programming per year in more than 80 countries through more than 100 television partners. Thanks to six satellite channels covering 5 continents covering 5 continents, it has a potential audience of 354 million.<sup>30</sup> Based on a similar principle, DGCID's 'Fonds Image de France' makes available to the foreign promotional networks a vast catalogue of audiovisual programs available for export. Germany's DW also has an integrated system of production, stocking and distribution of information, images, documentaries and various programs available through a catalogue and targeted at foreign audiences. Through this system more than 23 000 programme copies have been disseminated to approximately 1 200 independent stations in 106 countries each year since 2000. Deutsche Welle makes products for mass diplomacy that are not only useful but lucrative by commercialising its products.

## 2. Weapons of Mass Influence

Let's turn now to mass diplomacy's new weapons of mass persuasion. Mass media technologies are indeed indispensable "weapons for influence" necessary for winning the battles of today, the battles that take place on the airwaves, through images and through networks.<sup>31</sup> Audiovisual weapons are not only tools for winning a larger place in the information market. They are also for winning the hearts and minds of foreign nations, shaping their perceptions of the world and steering their political choices. Ownership, financing and the development of these information and communication tools have become of considerable importance, a fact recognised by governments (chapter V). This explains the colossal sums that are invested in their communication arsenal and their new system of foreign affairs. The United States is in the lead with in excess of €455 million spent on its extensive network of international radio, television and

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<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 84-85.

<sup>30</sup> Endowed with a \$30 millions budget, CFI broadcasts eleven daily information magazines, of which two are in english, as well as a multitude of entertainment and sport programs ; France - MAE, "L'explosion de l'audiovisuel...", *op. cit.*

<sup>31</sup> France – Chirac, "Allocution du Président de la République...", *op. cit.*

online broadcasting organisations. Great Britain followed by Germany and France come second with respective investments of 350, 300 et 210 million Euros annually for their external audiovisual policy (see figure 2 in the Conclusion). It is important to note that these cyber-diplomacy budgets have all experienced on average a rise of 10% between 2002 and 2003 (see chapters III and IV for details).

#### a. Radio Diplomacy

The time when Berlin and London crossed swords with the help of antique shortwave radios is long gone. Nevertheless, radio, la Déesse aux Cents Bouches, as the French call it, remains an important tool for gaining influence. “Radio broadcasting,” wrote Robert W. McChesney, “is palpably the most potent and significant agent for the formation of public opinion.”<sup>32</sup> By reason of its accessibility and its universal usage, but also because of numerous technological improvements radio occupies today an important place amongst the primary tools of external broadcasting policy.

Despite the unlimited possibilities offered by television and the internet, the industrial powers continue to trust in radio diplomacy for their policy of international influence. Since 1932, Radio-France Internationale (RFI) has presented French and international news “from France’s point of view” to listeners around the world.<sup>33</sup> Thanks to the satellite coverage of digital quality, RFI has become one of the 4 great world radio networks with the BBC, Voice of America, and DW with an audience of 45 million individuals in most of the countries around the world. RFI possesses a programming that incorporates continuous news bulletins and programs that deal with all aspects of French cultural, economic and social life, as well as international questions such as the building of Europe, African issues or international economic relations.<sup>34</sup> Since 1991, RFI has resumed service of RMC Moyen-Orient broadcasting in Arab and French with 13 million listeners on medium waves in the near and middle east and, on FM, in a growing number of Arab capitals.<sup>35</sup> And the system wouldn’t be complete without Medi 1 that broadcasts 19 hours of

<sup>32</sup> R.W. McChesney, “Graham Spry and the Future of Public Broadcasting”, *Canadian Journal of Communication* 24 (1999), 28.

<sup>33</sup> France - MAE, “L’explosion de l’audiovisuel...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>34</sup> It is noteworthy that, as many comparable systems, RFI is equipped with its own press agency, MFI (Médias France Intercontinents), that provides more than 300 subscribers across the world with international news or a general or specialised nature. Each year MFI produces a million articles and documentaries destined principally to Francophone media, particularly to the Maghreb, sub-Saharan Africa and in the Indian Ocean. In 2000, more than 10 000 articles from MFI were reprinted in the Francophone press alone.

<sup>35</sup> France - MAE, “L’explosion de l’audiovisuel...”, *op. cit.*

programming per day in Arabic and in French towards the 11 million listeners of the Maghreb countries. Its annual budget of 100 million Euros, that was until recently provided entirely by the state, is today 40% reliant on advertising revenue, proof of a process of adaptation to the rules of the market.<sup>36</sup> On the same principle, Radio Canada International (RCI) is a central element of Canada's audiovisual system and an unavoidable part of its public diplomacy. Since 1999, RCI acts as an integral partner of team Canada to promote national goods and services abroad.<sup>37</sup> Radio Japan (NHK), China Radio International and Voice of Russia can also be included in this category.

The contribution of radio to public diplomacy is particularly important in regions of the world where this medium remains people's principal source of influence. Taking into account its place in societies of the Indian subcontinent we come to understand the strategic utility that the External Services Division (ESD) of All India Radio (AIR) holds for Indian public diplomacy in terms of regional influence. ESD broadcasts informational programmes for about 70 hours daily in 24 languages (16 foreign including English and 8 Indian languages). Newsreels, talks and discussions on socio-economic, political, historical, and cultural subjects, classical, folk and popular music of the different regions of the country form a major part of the total programme output. These broadcasts project the "Indian viewpoint on world affairs", and acquaint listeners living abroad with the current changes and developments in the country's outlook, along with providing comprehensive information on India, as a whole. ESD transmitters directed to SAARC countries continue to carry 2100 hours of news bulletins in English. ESD prides itself on assuming "the role of a cultural ambassador of India to the world, projecting and promoting the Indian image at a global level."<sup>38</sup> For the same reasons, Voice of Turkey occupies an important place in Turkish radio diplomacy. From the outset of the 1990's, Ankara reformed and revamped the *Voice of Turkey* that served before as a broadcaster for classic propaganda destined for the Turkish populations of the Soviet Union. Integrated into its new mass diplomacy, VOT still targets the same audience to which it promotes the Turkish social, political and economic model. Channel Africa (South Africa), Voice of Indonesia or Radio Mexico Internacional could also be included in this category.


Created in the context of the World Wars, the American radio system has for along time been the model in the field, distinguishing itself by the number of stations of which it is made up. Instead of one station as in the preceding cases, the American system is now composed of six stations allowing it to respond to demand by personalising programs to target audiences. The

<sup>36</sup> France – RFI, *Rapport Annuel 2003* (RFI, 2003).

<sup>37</sup> Price, "Public Diplomacy...", *op. cit.*, 78 (footnote 15).

Voice of America covers all regions of the world, with the exception of Western Europe and the United States; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty targets the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; Radio Free Asia (RFA) broadcasts to China, Tibet, Burma, Vietnam, North Korea, and Cambodia; Radio Marti and Radio Sawa are respectively directed toward Cuban and Arabic audiences.<sup>39</sup> This armada of diverse stations makes up the most extensive umbrella of radio diplomacy in the world (figure 2). Their status of “surrogate” radio stations is what characterises and constitutes one of their major resources of the American strategy in this area. These international broadcasting institutions are registered as private grantees and their employees do not officially belong to the U.S. civil service. But at the same time they are tax-supported institutions affiliated with the U.S. Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) on which they depend financially and to which they must report. This peculiar status of “privately incorporated, federally funded and managed grantees” has for a long time allowed them to deny all links with the American government and permits them to continue to claim moral and editorial independence.<sup>40</sup> Though they are no longer the purveyors of massive amounts of Cold War propaganda, their mission is still to influence in a positive way the opinions of foreign populations directly or through various types of collaboration with local partners.

**Figure 2. The Broadcasting Board of Governors and the U.S. Broadcasters**



Source : State Department, B.B.G.

<sup>38</sup> India - MEADDEV, *All India Radio*, <http://www.meadev.nic.in/media/air.htm> (accessed May 2004).

<sup>39</sup> Following the Cold War, during which they played an extremely important part, these radio stations were stripped of their financing and partially dismantled (as were the majority of mass diplomacy instruments). But they experienced a period of rebirth following the information revolution at the end of the 1990's (see chapters II and III). At this time, “lobbying groups and public officials”, explains M. Price, “favoured ‘surrogate’ or a more hard-hitting approaches by tax-supported international broadcasting institutions”; Price, “Public Diplomacy...”, *op. cit.*, 82.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 75-82.

Voice of America is the archetype of radio stations run by the Broadcasting Board of Governors. Since its first broadcast on February 24, 1942, VOA has been a central player in the U.S. public diplomacy. The oldest U.S. broadcasting arm, it is mandated by its charter “to serve the long-range interests of the United States by communicating directly with and influencing the peoples of the world by radio.”<sup>41</sup> The Voice of America broadcasts in 53 languages to an estimated audience of 91 million people each week. By the late nineties, it was already the primary news source for 60 percent of the educated Chinese.<sup>42</sup> The secret of Voice of America's influence lies in its mixed broadcasting network: Besides direct broadcasts, VOA also relies on “affiliate” radio stations throughout the world to expand its listening audience. Re-broadcasting allows it to provide programming by satellite, pre-recorded tape, or phone “feed” to over 1 000 “affiliates” worldwide. VOA also regularly invites media personalities such as former President Jimmy Carter, Pop star Madonna or talk show host Jay Leno to appear on their programmes.<sup>43</sup>

Launched in 2002, the last born of the American radio fleet, Radio Sawa (“Radio Together” in Arabic) has the specific mission of reinvigoration declining American influence in the Arab world by targeting youth under 30 years of age who comprise more than 60 percent of the region’s population. “The newest songs and the latest news” is the catch phrase of the commercial-free station. Around the clock, Radio Sawa broadcasts fast-paced music blasts mixing Britney Spears, Eminem and Egyptian pop-star Hakim interrupted twice every hour by “subliminal” information bulletins in Arabic.<sup>44</sup> “The news is very short, very simple, very headline. No analysis, no deep coverage,” observes a specialist.<sup>45</sup> But despite the fact that Sawa is funded by the U.S. government to the tune of US\$35 million a year, BBG’s directors insist that “it is not a propaganda arm”: “We are not in the business of making people like us. We are in the business of making sure people have information to form their opinions.”<sup>46</sup> Proving remarkably popular to date, Radio Sawa is available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week on FM frequencies throughout the Muslim Crescent from Pakistan to Morocco and above.

The current tendency in international broadcasting is increasingly to combine live direct transmissions with indirect transmissions via affiliate subcontractors. This system of subcontracting, precisely illustrative of the bureaucratic-entrepreneurial model, allows diplomats

<sup>41</sup> U.S. - *Public Laws* 94-350 and 103-415 (USG, 1960).

<sup>42</sup> Nye and Owens, *op. cit.*

<sup>43</sup> U.S. - VOA, “Jay Leno Speaks to Iranian Youth”, *Next Chapter* (Farsi-language program) (Oct. 17, 2002), available @ <http://www.voa.gov>.

<sup>44</sup> *The Wall Street Journal*, “U.S. Dials Up Radio Network to Reach Young Muslims”, Nov. 27, 2001, A24.

<sup>45</sup> Hassan, *op. cit.*

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*

to sell programs, indirectly propagate news and information through third parties and also to considerably extend their foreign audience. As many have come to believe, the future of radio diplomacy lies increasingly with second-hand transmission. With an average increase of 7% resulting from retransmission, the 4 largest public radio broadcasters BBC, VOA, RFI et DW representing respectively 6.5%, 4%, 3% and 2% of the world radio audience. This is a significant result taking into account the deregulation of the market, the proliferation of small local radio stations and, above all, the segments of the market won by rival state-run cyber-diplomacy programs.

Broadcasting since the early 1930s, BBC remains the world's best known and most listened to international radio broadcaster. With an audience of 160 million listeners around the globe, "Aunt Bee" is the clear global leader, significantly ahead of its nearest international broadcasting competitor, Voice of America, who claims 91 million listeners. The World Service is now present on FM in 43 languages and in 131 capital cities - 70 per cent of all capital cities - and three times as many as its European rival Radio France Internationale. Nevertheless, the BBC's strategies have quickly understood that new approaches must be employed not only to stay at the head of global competition but also to stay in the race for influence in a highly challenging context. The radio crisis, the growing competitiveness and the deregulation of the market necessitated an important strategic reorientation.<sup>47</sup> The solution presented itself in 2000-2001: to increase indirect broadcasting through private and foreign transmitters. Thanks to this strategy of subcontracting, the number of listeners has grown from 150 million in 2001 to 160 million today. An independent investigation shows in effect that at the same time, the number of listeners by retransmission increased by 8 million; nearly 30 per cent of BBC International's radio audiences (45 million) now listen to BBC programs through re-broadcasting partners.<sup>48</sup> More than 2000 independent stations around the world now broadcast BBC World Service programming. For example, audiences in the USA via FM re-broadcasters are at their highest level ever - up 25% from 2.3

<sup>47</sup> In a 2002 report, BBC World Service Director Mark Byford declared: "Media markets have become increasingly volatile across the world. Audiences are changing their habits dramatically in the face of increased competition, deregulation of markets, seismic changes in technology and even greater listener choice. But we have been nimble in adapting to the rapid pace of change" in *The Guardian*, "World Service loses 3m listeners", April 16, 2002.

<sup>48</sup> U.K. - BBC, "BBC World Service has global audience of 159 million listeners", (BBC Press Release, April 16, 2002), @ [http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/us/021707\\_global\\_audience.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/us/021707_global_audience.shtml); U.K. - FCO, "Chapter 13..", *op. cit.*

million to 2.9 million. Audiences in Australia nearly doubled to two million. In both cases nearly all increases were realized through re-broadcasting partners.<sup>49</sup>

Retransmission, an increasingly common practice in external broadcasting, is also the channel that Deutsche Welle strategists chose to reinforce their presence on the global information market. In terms of direct transmission DW-RADIO can take pride in being in fourth place behind BBC, VOA and RFI with 28 million regular listeners. All of its 31 language services - from Amharic and Urdu to Bengali and Ukrainian - have been given a new audio design and presented with a new musical theme. In 2003, DW-RADIO began digital operations with twelve hours of broadcasts to Europe and the Middle East in German, English and Arabic. But this progress is nothing in comparison to those who have turned to commercial radio. DW-Radio works with more than 2 000 partner broadcast stations and 200 private institutions thanks to which it extended its audience base significantly. These partners are provided with a large number of programmes free-of-charge that can be fed to their station via Deutsche Welle's worldwide satellite network or downloaded as MP3 files from DW's broadcasting center's server in Germany. They are offered a large variety of products from news to documentary to light entertainment all with the common feature of throwing a favourable light on Germany. Among these is a 5 minute bulletin of world news at the top of the hour, seven days a week supplemented with Newslink, a 25 minute look at current affairs around the world with regional editions. There is also a wide range of feature programmes ranging from the popular "Living in Germany" to "Insight", a weekly feature which deals with political issues. These are supplemented and padded out with cultural and popular programming such as "Arts on the Air", "World Music" or "Europe on Stage."<sup>50</sup>

#### b. TV-Diplomacy

Nevertheless, radio as a source of information and influence is increasingly losing out to television as the principal medium of cyber-diplomacy. With an audience of more than 1.5 billion TV watchers around the world (of which more than half are found in developing nations) and a high level of household penetration constantly reinforced by the unbridled extension of satellite networks and the development of digital technologies, the tool that is television has become the

<sup>49</sup> Both were areas where direct short wave transmissions were discontinued or reduced in response to changing audience listening habits. It must be noted that in addition to tuning into increasing number of FM re-broadcasters, listeners can also listen by digital satellite and cable.

<sup>50</sup> Germany - DW Radio, "Become a rebroadcaster of DW-RADIO's fine English language programming", available @ <http://www.dw-world.de> (accessed February 2004).

ambassador of choice for states. "Television" remarked M. Tutweiler recently, "offers a powerful tool for public diplomacy."<sup>51</sup> From Japan and the NHK to Brazil with NBR and India with the ex-Doordashan and Spain with RTVE<sup>52</sup>, most countries are equipped today with this central organ of foreign policy that is public television networks broadcast abroad. We can nevertheless establish a typology following a gradation starting with the 100% public model (Worldnet, Avraza, IRIB) to the commercial model (BBC World) passing through the mixed model (TV5, CFII). This follows an evolution towards a televisual diplomacy that is increasingly entrepreneurial in nature and adapted to the marketplace.

The U.S. Worldwide Television and Film Service, Worldnet, which can be viewed as the basic model for televisual diplomacy, is entirely financed by public funds and under the operational jurisdiction of the VOA and the Broadcasting Board of Governors. Beginning its telecast in 1983, Worldnet remains an influential global television network aimed at presenting U.S. perspectives on important domestic and international events, explaining U.S. Government policies to a global audience, and transmitting a visual image of American culture, history, and scientific and technological achievements.<sup>53</sup> Worldnet reaches approximately 130 countries, delivering live and taped TV programming daily to more than 225 TVRO antennas at U.S. embassies and USIS posts worldwide.<sup>54</sup> On the same model, Turkey's T.R.T.-Avraza (Turkish for Eurasia) was launched in 1992 by the Turkish state to serve the ends of pan-Turkish diplomacy aimed at the Caucasian and Central Asian republics. Avraza was specifically designed "to become the central instrument of the cultural expansion of Turkey."<sup>55</sup> According to its director, "the aim behind TRT-Avraza is to open the sphere of influence in the Turkish world and especially in the emerging republics beyond the Caspian Sea, accompanying the flow of Turkish capital and political influence."<sup>56</sup> The Eurasian network can take pride in being the community television station of more than 150 million Turkish speakers dispersed between the Adriatic and the Great Wall of China. Thanks to the AVRO re-broadcasting stations and the launch of the two Türksat satellites, Avraza is equipped with technological resources that allow its directors to take pride in calling it the "the second most important channel after CNN in terms of its audience's size."<sup>57</sup> Since 1999, the

<sup>51</sup> U.S. - State Department, Under Secretary for Public Affairs, Tutwiler, "Reaching Beyond...", *op. cit.*

<sup>52</sup> M. Silber, "La télévision publique espagnole accusée de soutenir la politique étrangère de M. Aznar", *Le Monde*, May 16, 2003.

<sup>53</sup> U.S. - State Department, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, Office of International Information Programs. F.A. Emmert, "U.S. Media in the 1990s - Part II. The Broadcast Media", available @ <http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/media/media1cd.htm> (accessed October 2001).

<sup>54</sup> For more on Wordnet see IBB's homepage @ <http://www.ibb.gov/worldnet> (accessed May 2004).

<sup>55</sup> Sahin et Aksoy, *op. cit.*, 38.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, 38.

<sup>57</sup> *Hurriyet*, 30 avril 1992.



Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting's Jâm-e-Jam television channels (IRIB1 and 2) and its Arabic version Al-Alam give Iran a global televisual showcase entirely financed and controlled by the state and relayed across the world since the end of 2003 by its own system of satellites and telecommunication. Among many others, CCTV-9 (China), NBR (Brazil), RTP Internacional (Portugal) and NTA (Nigeria) can also be classed in this category. However, some claim that the 'Worldnet model', inherited from the Cold War, could well be adjusted to the new demands of today's media environment.<sup>58</sup>

In recent years the "basic model" has had a tendency to evolve towards a more managerial model allowing government oversight to cooperate with private partnership and allowing the re-broadcasting of programmes by subcontracted broadcasters. This evolution can be seen in particular with DW-TV (Germany), Al-Jazeera (Qatar) et ABC (Australia).

Deutsche Welle TV, as with the entirety of the DW system, is the property of the German State and its annual budget of around €285 million comes almost entirely from Federal taxes. Fixed by federal law – the 1997 "Deutsche Welle Law" – its mission is to "provide listeners and viewers abroad a comprehensive picture of political, cultural and economic life in Germany and to present and explain the German position on important issues."<sup>59</sup> Via cable or "direct-to-home" reception, DW TV broadcasts its message in more than 30 languages to an audience estimated at more than 128 million while concentrating its efforts on "target groups" constituted by the German-speaking populations, opinion leaders and the so-called "information elite."<sup>60</sup> Nevertheless, its status as a public institution has not impeded the diversification of the DW TV network and audience thanks to ingenuous and lucrative re-broadcasting partnerships. As DW Radio does, this system allows one to recycle programmes and to prolong their impact. The programmes generally include news and documentaries and are formatted to correspond to the needs and the language of the clients, whether they are for airlines, schools or leisure areas. For instance, DW-TV is fed into 3 600 hotels, resorts and cruise ships reaching an impressive 660 000 individual rooms internationally. More than 23 000 programme copies have been sold to approximately 1 200 stations in 106 countries in 2002.

Australia's ABC Asia Pacific (ABCAP) satellite television service provides another good example of this bureaucratic-entrepreneurial turn taken by state-run audio-visual programs.

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<sup>58</sup> Ross, *op. cit.*, 75–83.

<sup>59</sup> Germany - DW, "Mission and Competence" (released by DW-World.de, 2000), available @ <http://www.dwelle.de>.

<sup>60</sup> It is noteworthy that in 2001 the DW televisual group acquired GERMAN TV, a channel for Germans and German-speakers abroad first targeted as a pay-TV platform to North America; *Ibid*.

Launched in 2003, ABCAP is funded by the Australian Government under contractual arrangements managed by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFAT). The five-year contract upholds the editorial independence of ABCAP in accordance with the *ABC Act 1983* and the ABC's editorial policies. But at the same time it sets the Government's objectives for the ABCAP service to engage culturally and politically with audiences in the Asia Pacific region by presenting a more cosmopolitan, sophisticated and friendly image of Australia.<sup>61</sup> For the moment, an estimated six million households in the Asia Pacific region are capable of receiving ABCAP's programs by satellite. This network, which presently has over 500 000 subscriber households, opens access to a major regional television market and creates exceptional marketing opportunities for ABCAP. In order to extend audience reach, re-broadcasting arrangements with free-to-air, cable and satellite broadcasters have been negotiated in several countries. ABCAP currently has re-broadcast arrangements in 25 out of a possible 35 countries in its satellite footprint but negotiations are under way to gain access to other television markets, assisted by ABC's network of overseas posts.<sup>62</sup>

State-owned yet market-oriented, Al-Jazeera, the influential pan-Arab satellite broadcaster, allowed Qatar to emerge from almost complete anonymity to become one of the heavyweights of the international broadcasting scene alongside the Anglo-Saxon giants. By promoting an "Arab" point of view of world events, it confers on the tiny emirate the privilege of reorienting information and international debate and weighing-in in its favour on the opinion of its regular audience of 50 million viewers throughout the world. To increase its market share, the Qatari channel is managed like a veritable private enterprise. It counts on a sophisticated marketing strategy, modernisation of its structures and the diversification of its programmes (such as the launch of a children's educational channel in 2004).<sup>63</sup> Al-Jazeera subcontracts its programmes, sells advertising space and works in direct collaboration with the business world. It is also entering into "strategic alliances" with private partners such as the Allied Media Corp that will serve as intermediaries for the penetration of foreign markets by accessing broadcasting networks through cable-satellite networks (such as Echostar in America) and by better targeting its


<sup>61</sup> Australia - DFAT, *Annual Report 2002-2003*, *op. cit.*, 166.

<sup>62</sup> More information on ABCAP's programs and schedule is available at <http://www.abcasiapacific.com.au/>.

<sup>63</sup> This project has been initiated by the Qatari foundation for Science and Education, headed by the Emir's spouse, cheikha Mouza Bent Nasser Al-Misnad, and the Doha-based Al-Jazeera satellite TV network; *AFP*, "Lancement fin 2004...", *op. cit.*

audience<sup>64</sup>. Thanks to this ingenious strategy of penetration Al Jazeera has become the most popular Arab channel present throughout the world (figure 3).<sup>65</sup>

**Figure 3. AlJazeera TV Footprint - Coverage**



Source: Al-Jazeera 2004

It should be pointed out that the Qatari model of televisual diplomacy has been much emulated in the Arab peninsula. In 2003, Dubai started on its own quest for the conquest of the political broadcasting market with the launch, in the middle of the Iraq crisis, of the new Al-Arabya TV network. Owned by the MBC group (Middle East Broadcasting Center) that is presided over by a member of the royal family, the network has a budget of \$300 million available to increase the regional and then global influence of Dubai, another geopolitical hodgepodge. In January 2004, it was the Saudi Arabia's turn to enter the era of cyber-diplomacy with the launch in January of al-Ikhbariya, its first all-news satellite television channel. Its goal, explains the director of the Riyadh-based channel, is to project a more favourable image of the Wahhabite regime.<sup>66</sup> Morocco, Egypt and Dubai and in fact almost all the Arab states are now equipped with similar diplomatic organs. Even the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah possesses its own satellite television channel – Al-Manar. In order to face this growing competition and to reclaim the Arab market, the American government launched in February 2004, Al Hurra, Arabic for 'the free one,' the most expensive of a number of post-Sept. 11 efforts aimed at changing attitudes about the

<sup>64</sup> Allied Media Corp also works with AT&T, British Airways and G.M. and the US State Department; see AMC's homepage [http://www.allied-media.com/about\\_us.htm](http://www.allied-media.com/about_us.htm)

<sup>65</sup> K. Diaz, "For the Arabs, Al Jazeera is the only game in town", *Minneapolis Star-Tribune*, March 10, 2003, available @ <http://www.startribune.com/stories/303/3744530.html>.

<sup>66</sup> BBCWS, "Saudi TV...", *op. cit.*

United States through government-supplied information.<sup>67</sup> After difficult debuts, the experienced has proved successful so far.

Next on the spectrum, we find the model of semi-public international television. It is usually organised as a joint venture offering the potential of sharing financial burdens with external partners (foreign and/or private) while providing the valuable impression of a multilateral venture. We could label it the French model after its successful application by the Quai D'Orsay in the context of its broadcasting strategy.

This mixed model is excellently illustrated by TV5, the international French-language network. TV5 presents itself as a cooperative television venture linking France, Canada, Belgium and Switzerland on which programming is provided by 10 francophone partner networks: France 2, France 3, France 5, ARTE France, the *Radio Télévision Belge de la Communauté Française* (RTBF), la *Télévision Suisse Romande* (TSR), Radio Canada, Télé Québec, *le Réseau France Outremer* (RFO) and the *Conseil International des Radios-Télévisions d'Expression Française* (CIRTEF). Despite this multilateralism and pluralism, France controls the network de facto by providing the “the bulk of TV5’s budget and programming.”<sup>68</sup> 70% of the €50 million annual budget (including revenue) and 75 % of public contributions are provided by the French government through the intermediary of the broadcasting funds of the DGCID.<sup>69</sup> In addition, 75% of the programmes and 75% of the news broadcast on TV5, whose head office is in Paris, are provided by French public channels.<sup>70</sup> This mixed status in fact allows it to better serve French mass diplomacy by increasing its international credibility.<sup>71</sup> And indeed, TV5 serves French cyber-diplomacy well with more than 135 million households in 165 million reached by cable or satellite receiving it which equals 11 million viewers daily, one of the most extensive networks in the world, alongside MTV and CNN and just behind BBC World, its main public rival. Re-transmission by third parties allows TV5 to appear in 3 million hotel rooms, on 9 airlines and in thousands of educational institutions that reach more than 50 million travelers, 7.5 million “tele-passengers”, 32 000 teachers and millions of students around the world. To better face international competition, the network has reformed itself, modernised and armed itself with new

<sup>67</sup> P. Richter, “U.S. to Reach Out to Arabs Via TV”, *Los Angeles Times*, February 5, 2004.

<sup>68</sup> Potter, “Canada and...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>69</sup> According to the present formula of TV5, operating budgets include common costs assumed by the five funding governments, in the following proportions: France 6/9, Belgium 1/9, Switzerland 1/9, and Canada/Quebec 1/9.

<sup>70</sup> France - MAE, “L'explosion de l'audiovisuel...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>71</sup> Védrine, “Entretien...”, *op. cit.*

technological tools such as 18 satellites and 34 digital television packages (i.e. 52 relay stations) and more than 6 000 cable networks.

With the *Chaîne Française d'Information Internationale* – French International News Network (CFII), whose launch is planned for the end of 2004, the French government aims to repeat the successful experience of the “international joint venture” but, this time with the involvement of private partners. This project is a response in particular to President Jacques Chirac’s desire to equip France with a “world-class international news network in French, capable of rivalling the BBC or CNN”.<sup>72</sup> Equipped with a mixed status, CFII will be a private company managed equally by public television and the private television company TF1. This public-private alliance is “a positive political sign for our country and this project”, suggests the study produced by the French Parliament: “The network must be seen to be independent and not an organ of the government. It is a necessary condition to assure the credibility of news and analysis.”<sup>73</sup> In addition to advantages in terms of credibility, the idea of this cooperative/audiovisual duo is also to benefit the network through the “vigour” of the private network, its network of foreign correspondents and image productions, while maintaining public control over the content of the news (the main provider being Agence France Presse analysed in the next chapter). The same principal prevails on the level of financing: the state maintains control by providing the majority of the funding (€65 million annually) while canvassing a “founders club”, made up of a score of companies responsible for providing €5 million for financing through advertising. In return, these companies receive the support and patronage of the state in various forms.<sup>74</sup>

On the extreme commercial end of this scale of televisual diplomacy lies BBC World, BBC's commercially funded international 24-hour news and information channel. Along with BBC World Service Radio and Internet, BBC World is an integral part of the BBC's cyber-diplomacy edifice and, as with the latter, the channel is regulated by the Royal Charter of the Corporation that mandates it to serve British mass diplomacy “by all strategic and financial means available.”<sup>75</sup> BBC World is also dependent on the British Corporation for news, programs and images that are provided by its press agencies and its global network of correspondents. The difference between BBC World and the other branches of the BBC, which remain publicly funded through grant-in-aid, is however that BBC World has been entirely self-financing since 1995 through subscription and advertising. In this regard, it is certainly interesting to note that

<sup>72</sup> France - Chirac, “Discours du Président de la République...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>73</sup> Mathieu, “M. Brochand Pose les Bases....”, *op. cit.*

<sup>74</sup> Dutheil and Mathieu, *op. cit.*

<sup>75</sup> U.K. - Department of National Heritage Broadcasting, *Royal Charter...*, *op. cit.*

advertisers to the channel include; Allianz, American Express, Aventis, Barclays, BT Cellnet, Credit Suisse, HSBC, JP Morgan, Marconi, Microsoft, Mitsubishi, Palm Computing, Panasonic, Salomon Smith Barney, SAS Airlines and The New York Stock Exchange. This distinction makes it the only commercial government televisual diplomacy organ that is 100% autonomous in terms of budget. A veritable commercial channel, BBC World has assured itself a central position on the global television news scene through a particularly effective marketing strategy. In 2001, it was received in 91 million homes in more than 200 countries and territories. In August 2002, this number grew to 222 million homes of which there are 630 000 each day in the United States and three times as many viewers as CNN in India. At this point, the government justified the decision to deprive BBC World of public funds “on the grounds that it will distort the market and give BBC World an unfair advantage over commercial operations such as Sky News.”<sup>76</sup> Re-transmissions contributed significantly to the growth in market share of the British news channel.<sup>77</sup> Through direct and indirect telecasting, BBCW can now be viewed in approximately 255 million homes, over 800 000 hotel rooms and countless airline seats, cruise ship cabins and airport lounges.

But, falling victim to its own success, BBC World is today under fire by critics who accuse it of having strayed too far from its public service sphere of activity. It is accused by its private rivals, of which the ringleader is the Murdoch empire, of having abused the advantages conferred through its mixed status.<sup>78</sup> The Institute of Practitioners in Advertising (IPA) has blamed the BBC for favouring “mass market appeal” over its public service commitments.<sup>79</sup> The Independent Television Commission head claimed the corporation had allowed the chase for ratings to “distract” it from its public service obligations.<sup>80</sup> The government, for its part, accuses it of having failed in its duty of circumspection and showcase for Great Britain in the Kelly affair in which the media indirectly incriminated 10 Downing Street in the disappearance of the British scientist (see above for details). On the whole, BBC World is accused of combining two antithetical functions: that of being an instrument of public diplomacy and that of commercial media. To reaffirm their authority, public powers called on the media watchdog Ofcom to regulate the public service. Despite this example, more and more governments are tempted by this

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<sup>76</sup> Leonard and Stead, *op. cit.*

<sup>77</sup> Program sales are managed by ten offices and agents located in London, Frankfurt, New York, Paris, Singapore, Hong Kong, Dubai, Mumbai, Delhi and Bangalore.

<sup>78</sup> M. Roche, “La BBC entre dans une zone de turbulences à l’occasion de la révision de sa charte”, *Le Monde*, December 16, 2003.

<sup>79</sup> C. Cozens, “BBC ‘too commercial’ say advertisers”, *The Guardian*, February 5, 2004.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*

model of privatisation and commercialisation of their cyber-diplomacy arm.<sup>81</sup> A restructuring and partial privatisation of the public external broadcasting is presently being considered in France while the Prime Minister and media tycoon Silvio Berlusconi has pushed through a similar reorganization of Radiotelevisione Italiana (RAI), the state-owned network of public television, radio and satellite stations.<sup>82</sup> Are cyber-diplomacy and commerce compatible? What is the balance that must be achieved to assure a solid marriage? It could be that the ideal format for audiovisual diplomacy lies somewhere between TV5 and BBC World.

### c. E-Diplomacy

If the growth of cyber-diplomacy and that of the Internet coincide it is certainly not by accident. Having begun as a government-incubated medium, the Internet has become very flexible and pervasive. In this regard it has directly contributed to the bureaucratic-entrepreneurial turn of public diplomacy by decentralising its conduct – a phenomenon called the “diffusion of diplomacy<sup>83</sup>”. There is not a shadow of a doubt for mass diplomats about the necessity for direct links between the two systems: With the explosion of the Internet - with 1 billion users before 2005 - one of them predicts “the network of communications technology will become the central nervous system of international relations, making public diplomacy more important than ever.”<sup>84</sup> The new medium is already an indispensable element of diplomacy that a number of states count on to increase their role as ‘a global interactive hub’ for news and information to millions of people around the globe.<sup>85</sup>

E-diplomacy already occupies a central position in the work of foreign affairs ministers and ambassadors who, increasingly, develop and use their own web sites as key means of disseminating information more quickly than ever to mass audiences overseas. For example DFAIT’s site, which has been very carefully developed, is the principal communication platform today for providing information and explaining Canadian positions on high-profile issues.<sup>86</sup> The mastery of new technologies has also allowed the Australians to strongly increase their visibility

<sup>81</sup> M. Grade, appointed president of the BBC by Downing Street in Avril 2004, has promised that he will work to protect the tradition of “editorial independence” of the British broadcaster; *AFP*, April 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2004.

<sup>82</sup> For a critic analysis see C. Sverige, “Berlusconi recasts Italian state television in his own image”, *World Socialist Web Site*, 3 June 2002, available @ [www.wsws.org/sections/category/news/eu-ital.shtml](http://www.wsws.org/sections/category/news/eu-ital.shtml).

<sup>83</sup> Solomon, *op. cit.*

<sup>84</sup> Harper, *op. cit.*

<sup>85</sup> “We will use internet to increase our role as the world’s reference point and global interactive hub for news and information to millions of people around the globe”; U.K. - BBC, “BBC World Service has global audience...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>86</sup> Canada - Smith, *op. cit.*

over the past few years, through DFAT's website ([www.dfat.gov.au](http://www.dfat.gov.au)) registering regularly 500 000 page-views per week in 2003.<sup>87</sup> Above all, these official sites tend to diversify their content and to become more interactive to reach larger audiences with better targeted products such as the Foreign Office's Planet Britain intended for a "young audience". Their role is essentially that of a portal, providing links to other key mass diplomacy web sites run by private partners and specialised in the domain of culture, leisure and information. Even new arrivals to the art of mass diplomacy have adopted the internet as a key technology. The website of China's foreign ministry (<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn>) is designed to facilitate the central coordination of overseas missions but also to serve as a "window of public diplomacy for the Ministry" through services such as "Meet the diplomats online", "On-line Comment" and "News Subscription."<sup>88</sup> The content also is changing. Some are improving their mastery continuously of the art of communication in the service of the image and foreign policy of a country. Thus, the Israeli Foreign Affairs Ministry has opted for a shock tactic consisting of putting on-line videos showing the results of suicide bombings with extremely graphic images of mutilated corpses not shown by other media, intending to draw the sympathies of international public opinion ([mfa.gov.il/mfa](http://mfa.gov.il/mfa)). These videos have so far been successful in terms of audience, drawing many hundreds of thousands of "hits" per day.<sup>89</sup>

The Internet has become "a fundamental medium" for the conduct of U.S. mass diplomacy.<sup>90</sup> A two-year, multi-million-dollar project has propelled U.S. diplomacy into the electronic age. Equipped with "state-of-the-art" technology, U.S. virtual diplomacy also possesses its own organs such as the Department of State's Office of E-Diplomacy in charge of elaborating web-based outreach tactics. Some of these initiatives are very inventive: The U.S. Virtual Consulates program, for example, uses the power of the Internet to communicate with foreign audiences through a locally branded Internet Web site with customized content<sup>91</sup> (for example, the site in Tyumen, Russia, has the web address of <http://usa.tyumen.ru>). By creating a unique product for each region, the Virtual Consulate program provides a localized feel and relevance to the target community. According to its inventor, Tom Niblock, this program helps to foster alliances, connections, and partnerships between Americans and host countries, thereby creating *direct diplomacy*, by streaming germane and time sensitive information to their citizens in places where

<sup>87</sup> Australia - DFAT, *Annual Report 2002-2003*, *op. cit.*

<sup>88</sup> China - MFA of the People's Republic of China, *The New Website of China's Foreign Ministry* (December, 25, 2000).

<sup>89</sup> "Bomb victim's...", *op. cit.*

<sup>90</sup> Ross, *op. cit.*, 78.

<sup>91</sup> U.S. - State Department, Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, *The New Diplomacy: Utilizing Innovative Communication Concepts That Recognize Resource Constraints* (2003 Report, July 2003).



the United States has no physical presence.<sup>92</sup> In addition to serving web-based mass diplomacy, such a virtual consulate is said to be able to perform up to 50 percent of the work of an actual consulate and do it in a timely and cost effective manner.<sup>93</sup> With the explosion of the number of Internet users it only makes sense to invest heavily in this kind of interactive e-diplomacy for the future that allows the development of virtual portals through which foreign populations come into better contact with embassies and consulates in three dimensions. In addition to web-based outreach programs an office of Global Internet Freedom has been created in 2004 with a \$50 million annual budget to help citizens of foreign governments skirt local Internet censorship.

The Internet has also demonstrated an increasing tendency to take up the burden of radio and television as instruments of audiovisual diplomacy. Consumption habits have changed in terms of audiovisual products during the last decade and “the internet is now a trusted source of news and information,” says Myra Hunt, Head of BBC’s New Media Office.<sup>94</sup> The number of internet users reading, listening and watching news online has increased substantially. That fact has constantly strengthened the use of the Internet within cyber-diplomacy. Almost all cyber-diplomacy radio stations from ABC (Australia) and AIR (India) to CBC (Canada) have now successfully converted to the Internet. As in the case of Radio France Internationale, digitization and web presence have been means to re-stimulate radio activity and to spur the growth of audiences through the distribution of regional and multilingual programmes.<sup>95</sup> Following the example of Deutsche Welle (<http://www.dwelle.de>) the presence on the World Wide Web has also allowed them to diversify the fields of action by allying themselves with pedagogical or instructional language or information programs. In all cases, the digital age revolutionised radio diplomacy.

Old Aunt Bee was one of the first diplomatic organs to jump from the air waves to cyberspace. Today, it can also be heard and read via digital satellite, cable and the internet at [www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice](http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice).<sup>96</sup> World Service news sites have been built to be robust and reliable at times of high traffic. This was helped by the re-launch of the English news site in a new widescreen format (800 pixels wide) in February 2003 (many journalists now work in bi-media newsrooms, creating content for both radio and online services). Meanwhile, the World Service has also improved or initiated new news sites in Arabic (BBCArabic.com), Chinese, Russian, Spanish, Hindi, Urdu, Pashto and Portuguese, with many more to follow. Reputed for its

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>93</sup> U.S. – State department, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, Tutwiler, “Reaching...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>94</sup> U.K. – BBC, *Annual Review 2003* (released by BBC), available @ [www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/us/annual\\_review/2002/new\\_media](http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/us/annual_review/2002/new_media) (accessed April 2004).

<sup>95</sup> France – RFI, *Rapport Annuel 2003*, *op. cit.*

interactive news services, the e-radio has become an obligatory stop for major political figures that want to address international public opinion, whether it is Tony Blair and UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw or Anglophile leaders such as Aung San Suu Kyi, Nelson Mandela, Kofi Anan and Hamid Karzai. With an impressive online presence, the BBC manages to attract one of the largest audiences of any site in the world, public or private. Around the world the BBC World Service sites are regarded as a key source for both headline news and comprehensive analysis. Between December 2001 and December 2002, online usage – both text and audio – more than doubled from 33.6 million online page views to 76.9 million – an increase of 43.3 million in 12 months.<sup>97</sup> Demand for news about the Iraq war led to unprecedented levels of traffic for the World Service's news websites.<sup>98</sup> In March 2003, traffic almost doubled from the previous month's figure to 228 million page impressions. Today, BBC continues to achieve growth rates well above industry norms far exceeding the expectations of the FCO.

Radio broadcasters are not the only ones to turn to digital and Internet technology; in an increasing number of cases, televisual mass diplomacy organs such as Aljazeera TV network are also doing so. In January 2001, Aljazeera.net (Arabic) was launched as the first mainstream Arabic news site. The online version of Arab satellite news channel has seen traffic soar since the September 11 terrorist attacks, quickly rising to the top of the Arab media. The largest number of visitors to aljazeera.net in 2001 came from the U.S., even though the site was still in Arabic only. In 2002, Aljazeera.net received more than 811 million impressions and 161 million visits. According to its Qatari directors, the secret of this success is the interactivity of the online version: "Our ultimate goal" they say, "is to set up a more proactive relationship with our audience, where the audience is not simply a visitor at the other end of the line."<sup>99</sup> This interactivity and the relationship of trust that it allows between the sender and the target are without a doubt amongst the most important contributions of the Internet to cyber-diplomacy.

Nevertheless, the Internet and the new media are far from being simple ersatz versions of radio and television. With technological progress, they have increasingly begun to reach further

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<sup>96</sup> U.K. - FCO, "Influence Worldwide", *FCO Annual Report 2003*, *op. cit.*

<sup>97</sup> Year on year, the English language site increased page views by 84 per cent, usage of BBCMundo.com - the Spanish language site - nearly quadrupled, BBCRussian.com nearly doubled while BBCArabic.com - the Arabic language site - has gone up by nearly 40 per cent; U.K. - BBC, "BBC World Service has global audience...", *op. cit.*

<sup>98</sup> The U.S. State Department website had undergone the same phenomenon right after 9-11 events. By October 2001, it was one of the top five in the country; within a month, the hits went from 1 million to 2 million and many times certain pages were nine times the reader rate they were before 9-11; *U.S. News & World Report* quoted in U.S. - State Dep., Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy, "Statement...", *op. cit.*

<sup>99</sup> Qatar - Aljazeera.net, "About Aljazeera", see @ english.aljazeera.net.

than the latter by offering new services to the cyber-diplomacy of tomorrow. The element of interactivity that they introduce that were lacking in traditional media contribute to the creation of new links and new communities crossing traditional broadcasting boundaries. Other communication platforms such as high-resolution public satellite imagery or mobile phones and Personal Digital Assistants (PDA) will further change the diplomatic landscape “by introducing still another dimension of transparency in international relations.”<sup>100</sup> For instance, in recognition of the fact that people increasingly rely on cell phones, the U.S. Department instituted a mobile messaging system through which subscribers can regularly receive U.S. information, texts, images and statements<sup>101</sup>. “New technologies are giving us a level of interaction with our audiences we have never seen before. It is remarkable, stimulating and rewarding,” says Nigel Chapman, Deputy Director, BBC World Service.<sup>102</sup> What will mass diplomacy become when it will be possible to communicate with a very large number of individuals whenever and wherever thanks to mobile equipment (that will soon be possible)? Assuredly, we are only at the beginning of this technological-diplomatic revolution that is radically altering the discipline of diplomacy.

## Conclusion

As we’ve seen throughout this chapter, by forcing it to adapt, the new communication environment is radically transforming the art of diplomacy. Complex technologies such as, high-resolution satellite imagery, high-speed computers, internet, DVDs and other wonders of the mass media revolution are being integrated to provide the ability to gather, sort, process, transfer, and display information to an audience of unprecedented scale. These sophisticated tools are now replacing the telegrams and messages of yesteryear in the modern diplomatic landscape. Use of the new media is at the same time changing the qualifications of staff and the work they are called on to do. It isn’t by chance that, just about everywhere, new government directives demand that new mass diplomats be trained in the techniques of communication and familiar with the latest technologies.<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>100</sup> Livingston, *op. cit.*

<sup>101</sup> Lussenhop, *op. cit.*

<sup>102</sup> U.K. – BBC, *Annual Review 2003, op. cit.*

<sup>103</sup> For instance, the 2002 *Freedom Promotion Act* requires that hiring and promotions within the U.S. State Department be based in part on public diplomacy experience; U.S. – “Committee...”, *op. cit.*; similar requirement are in force at the Auswaertiges-Amt ; see Germany - Auswaertiges-Amt, “Kulturpolitik Grundsätze – Principles of Cultural Diplomacy”, in *Concept 2000...*, *op. cit.*

Nevertheless, as Gordon Smith suggests, “only about 10% of the challenge is a technical one; the other 90% lies below the surface in organisational and operational procedures.”<sup>104</sup> What is important is not so much the mastering of technology as the use that is made of it to reach the public in a world increasingly allergic to organs of state influence. Obviously mass diplomacy must be responsive to new developments in media technology, digitalization and issues of convergence. But the real challenge is to develop new strategies to deal efficiently with the flood of information. More than ever, its conduct requires broad-based connectivity between governmental agencies and those of other governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and independent organisations or informal groups. In other terms, diplomacy of influence for the 21<sup>st</sup> century must, in order to succeed, think beyond the rigid framework of public institutions to extend its reach and build alliances within the non-governmental sphere.

As we have seen for cyber-diplomacy, and as we saw in the preceding chapter for cultural programs, this approach that we’ve dubbed “bureaucratic-entrepreneurial” requires a flexible infrastructure that preserves a minimum of leadership with a maximum of decentralisation and public-private cooperation. Only this hybrid architecture can allow the development of networks of influence vital to the diplomacy of hearts and minds. We have often linked power and information; it seems to me that with advent of cyber-diplomacy, this affirmation makes even more sense. We must now turn to the way this hybrid system that has been analysed in the last two chapters, succeeds, in a practical sense, in expending its ramification beyond the halls of public institutions and harnessing the potential of the private sector to serve the interests of the public sector. That is the subject of the chapter to come.

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<sup>104</sup> Canada - Smith, *op. cit.*

## Chapter IX. Persuasion by Proxy: Stealth and the Practice of Mass Diplomacy

Power (das Macht) is the ability to get others want and do what you want  
Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, 1947

### Introduction

As we've seen over the course of the last two chapters, one of the major changes brought about by the information age is the evolution of public diplomacy towards a decentralised model while making itself more open to partnership with the private sector in order to better bridge the famous "last three feet" that stand between it and its target audience.<sup>1</sup> A market-oriented strategy and sophisticated communication methods are a good step in the right direction but are not sufficient to erase the crucial distance - as much physical as psychological - between diplomats and target populations - with audiences increasingly sceptical about government initiatives. In an era of increasingly vocal nongovernmental players and deregulation of information exchanges, governments can no longer rely solely on their own official communication channels to win the heart and minds of foreign populations. The success of mass diplomacy depends increasingly on the capacity to develop alliances with credible external players capable of furthering its message. It remains to know whether this bureaucratic-entrepreneurial model truly succeeds in extending its reach beyond the limits of the state institutions and to privatise its operations. Who are these external allies of mass diplomacy? From where are they recruited and what sorts of services do they provide?

This chapter aims to show that mass diplomacy is succeeding in its privatisation and that a large part of its operations take place through the efforts of third-party intermediaries from the private sphere, domestic and foreign media, non-governmental organisations, the business world, sport, cinema, culture and entertainment enlisted both at home and abroad. At a time when state monopolies are being shattered, engaging with this myriad of non-governmental actors and taping into their networks is a way of filling the gaps between official efforts and effectively reaching out to foreign children, consumers, politicians, journalists, business and opinion-makers targeted by mass diplomacy. These allies provide credibility, fabulous global reach, pervasive presence in overseas markets and a capacity to create exuberantly receptive audiences. More and more, it is behind them, through them, and by them that mass diplomacy extends itself and furtively,

surreptitiously and effectively influences public opinion abroad. The goal of this chapter is thus to present a panorama, as comprehensive as possible, of the diverse extensions of mass diplomacy outside the governmental sphere; to show what the advantages of this strategic option are and what ways the more or less formal links are woven with various independent players from the national and international spheres through which they work.

## 1. Going Public: Why and How

A number of reasons explain why mass diplomacy depends increasingly on the remunerated services of private partners. 1) First of all, the shift towards broad-based private-public partnerships offers financial benefits. It is in this case more costly to do something oneself than to have another do it for you. To encourage non-governmental organizations to play a greater role in mass diplomacy efforts abroad is a means of maximising the budget at the disposal of this branch of foreign affairs. The Germans consider that their “savings” in this way can be used to maintain and expand actual activities that contribute directly to the strengthening of mass diplomacy.<sup>2</sup> 2) A joint approach has amongst other things the advantage of increasing the effectiveness of mass diplomacy by exploiting the advantages of complementarity.<sup>3</sup> For the FCO's secretary of State, Jack Straw, involving the business world, diaspora communities, NGOs and others undoubtedly reinforces the effectiveness of mass diplomacy; with their contribution, “the overall impact of this activity is more than the sum of the parts.”<sup>4</sup> One result of this joined-up approach, explain German diplomats, is to enhance liaison and collaboration at the local level between all actors involved in implementing initiatives and thus enhancing public diplomacy efforts in this area.<sup>5</sup> 3) The partnership with external allies also has the advantage of integrating their respective expertise. Hollywood, Media Corp, Amnesty International and UNESCO can be much more flexible in their ability to engage varied audiences while their corporate communications and financial capacity often outstrip that of foreign affair ministries.<sup>6</sup> With capable friends and allies, it is easier for governments to win the heart and minds of foreign populations than if they act

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<sup>1</sup> “The really crucial link in the international communication chain is the last three feet”; Edward R. Murrow, former head of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), quoted in Harper, *op. cit.*, 1.

<sup>2</sup> Germany - Auswaertiges-Amt, “Kulturpolitik Grundsatzte – Principles of Cultural Diplomacy”, in *Concept 2000...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>3</sup> Arquilla and Ronfeldt, *op. cit.*

<sup>4</sup> U.K. - Public Diplomacy Strategy Board, Straw, *op. cit.*

<sup>5</sup> Germany - Auswaertiges-Amt, “Kulturpolitik Grundsatzte – Principles of Cultural Diplomacy”, in *Concept 2000...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>6</sup> Borosage, “The Privatization ...”, *op. cit.*

unilaterally.<sup>7</sup> British strategists don't doubt that this joint venture approach is the best way to draw "on the best ideas and sources of information from many more sources than are currently harnessed."<sup>8</sup> Their U.S. counterparts agree that it is crucial for mass diplomacy to leverage private sector outreach, creativity, insight, critical judgment and flexibility.<sup>9</sup>

Beyond the practical advantages, the turn to privatisation also allows the legitimisation of the public diplomacy effort. It is believed that relying on informal coalitions including private partners is likely to have greater success fostering trust than will a wholly government-dominated structure. The main reason is that the public is more and more sceptical in regards to anything of a governmental nature. A recent poll conducted by GlobScam shows that only 47% of the 1000 participants questioned in G20 countries have "a lot" (9%) or "a little" (38%) trust in government institutions (only 27% have a little or a lot of trust in the American government).<sup>10</sup> 5) This loss of trust in elected leaders and public institutions has important implications for the conduct of mass diplomacy: "If a message is delivered from a conspicuously "British" standpoint, or appears to be "the Voice of America", it will arouse suspicions of partisanship" consider British specialists. "In fact it would be far more useful in many cases to keep British governmental involvement with an event as inconspicuous as possible."<sup>11</sup> To recover that so volatile yet vital trust, mass diplomacy must imperatively shift away from wholly government-sponsored structures and cultivate alliances with third parties entrusted with carrying its message abroad.<sup>12</sup> Therefore, "in order for a state to have its voice heard, and to have influence on events outside its direct control, it must work through organisations and networks that are separate from, and independent of, and even culturally suspicious toward government itself" note Leonard and Stead.<sup>13</sup> Relying on these credible messengers, "ensures that the culture disseminated by them abroad does not appear to be prescribed by the state"<sup>14</sup>. believe Germans specialists. Of course, the fact that part of the responsibility for mass diplomacy is given to third parties isn't without problems.<sup>15</sup> Nevertheless,

<sup>7</sup> U.S. – State Department, *Strategic Plan 2000*, *op. cit.*

<sup>8</sup> Noble & Leonard, *op. cit.*

<sup>9</sup> U.S. - CFR, "Public Diplomacy...", *op. cit.*; for the same conclusions see also U.S. - State Department, Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, *Building America's Public Diplomacy...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>10</sup> GlobScam, *2004 Global Issues Monitor* (Toronto: GlobScam Brochures, 2004), 13.

<sup>11</sup> Leonard and Stead, *op. cit.*, 55-56.

<sup>12</sup> U.S. - Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, Beers, "Public Diplomacy...", *op. cit.*

<sup>13</sup> Leonard and Stead, *op. cit.*, 55.

<sup>14</sup> Germany – Auswärtiges-Amt, "German Foreign policy...", *op. cit.*

<sup>15</sup> Sub-contractors are often motivated by their own interests and do not always do what is expected of them. Another problem is that according to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, these subcontractors are not fully part of the diplomatic and career-consular missions and do not benefit from the same status and diplomacy advantages. U.N. – "Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations", *Treaty Series* 500 (1961), 95.

these disagreements are largely balanced by the benefits of subcontracting, such as the elimination of bureaucratic and financial impediments.

Persuasion by stealth, through others, has become an essential dimension of modern mass diplomacy with the advent of global information society. Far from being a mystery, governments now recognise the mobilisation of external partners to be a vital element in an increasingly decentralized environment.<sup>16</sup> In most cases, new regulations such as the 2002 Freedom Promotion Act (US) or the Concept 2000 (Germany) were adopted to strengthen subcontracting and decentralisation.<sup>17</sup> This new legal armoury facilitates and encourages mass diplomats to associate and work closely with others (U.K.)<sup>18</sup>; to draw on their energies and networks of influence (U.S.)<sup>19</sup>; whether they be private operators (Italy)<sup>20</sup> or “external service providers” (France)<sup>21</sup> to build “informal coalitions” allowing diplomats to better influence “target populations” (Canada).<sup>22</sup> Governments have available a number of different methods to co-opt their external partners and to make them serve their mass diplomacy. In a more or less informal way, these methods include expanding or altering state-sponsored activities; grants of facilities and various encouragement to allies from the media, business, entertainment and education worlds; press contact and reward programs; media monitoring and training; re-broadcasting and programs selling; developing enduring relationships and network-building; working in cooperation with domestic and international NGOs; engaging with foreign private allies; contracting regional agreements, treaties, and customary international law; using international mechanisms and multilateral forums to force changes in the international agenda.<sup>23</sup>

As we’ve seen in the preceding chapter, and so it is not necessary to return to it here, one of the principal characteristics of the bureaucratic-entrepreneurial organisation and operating system on which modern public diplomacy functions now is turned towards external partnership.<sup>24</sup> Its managerial character encourages and facilitates association with private and foreign allies. To increase the effectiveness of this extraverted system, it is paired with a modernised system of grants designed to stimulate external partnership. For instance, the Foreign Office's Public Diplomacy

<sup>16</sup> J.F. Metzl, “Popular Diplomacy,” *Daedalus* 128, no2 (spring 1999), 182.

<sup>17</sup> U.S. - House of Rep. - Committee on International Relations, *Freedom Promotion Act of 2002*, *op. cit.*

<sup>18</sup> U.K. - Public Diplomacy Strategy Board, Straw, *op. cit.*

<sup>19</sup> U.S. - CFR, “Public Diplomacy...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>20</sup> Italy - MAE - Direzione Generale per le Relazioni Culturali, “Istituti Italiani...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>21</sup> France - DGCID, “1. Servir...”, in *Action 2000*, *op. cit.*

<sup>22</sup> Baxter and Bishop, *op. cit.*

<sup>23</sup> The majority of these methods are presented in particular in U.S. - State Department, *Strategic Plan 2000*, *op. cit.*

<sup>24</sup> Specialised organs such as the Corporation for Public Diplomacy (Etats-Unis), la Mission pour la Coopération Non-Gouvernementale (France) or the International Marketing Council (Afrique du Sud), to



Challenge Fund was established in 2002 to support “high quality, practical projects emanating from private partners that promote a modern and relevant UK overseas and support the FCO’s policy objectives.”<sup>25</sup> Note also initiatives such as the U.S. Secretary of State’s Award for Corporate Excellence (ACE), established in 1999 to reward private sector operators for contributing to the projecting of a positive image of the United States. Past winners include both multinational (MNEs) and small-to-medium size enterprises (SMEs) such as Coca-Cola Egypt and Chindex (China).<sup>26</sup> Governments also act in more indirect ways on operators from the private sphere by establishing a certain number of rules and quotas structuring their international operations and channelling their efforts to the profit of mass diplomacy. Monroe E. Price notes for example that, “[w]hether implicitly or not, U.S. trade policies assisted Hollywood and Madison Avenue, CNN and the Motion Picture Association of America to serve as effective carriers and projectors of American (or Western) values.”<sup>27</sup> Even though market forces predominate in these days of globalization and liberalization, governments still play a strategic role as facilitators and catalysts observes Indian Union Minister for Information and Broadcasting.<sup>28</sup> The proxies of mass diplomacy and the means to integrate them into mass diplomacy efforts are infinitely various but they can be grouped under a few large categories that I will try and identify now.

## **2. Drawing on the Life Force of Civil Society.**

### **a. Culture and Entertainment: Inexhaustible Sources of Influence.**

Given that it is increasingly forbidden for governments to intervene directly in private cultural affairs, public diplomacy, stunningly adaptable, uses several tactics to intervene indirectly. As DFAIT does as part of its International Cultural Relations Program, numerous governments mobilise their artists in service of mass diplomacy with the help of grants and financial incentives.<sup>29</sup> Financial support allows artists to benefit from cultural exchanges, international

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name just a few, have had for specific mission to draw into public diplomacy efforts the talent and energy des acteurs de la sphère privé and to synergise their collective contribution.

<sup>25</sup> U.K. - FCO, “Promoting the UK” (The Public Diplomacy Challenge Fund); for the Public Diplomacy Challenge Fund Criteria against which bids are judged see <http://www.fco.gov.uk>.

<sup>26</sup> U.S. - State Department, *Public-Private Partnerships and Public Diplomacy* (released by the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, March 3, 2003).

<sup>27</sup> Price, “Journeys in Media Space...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>28</sup> Fine, “Indian Television Turning to Globalization...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>29</sup> This program aims to project Canada and Canadian culture abroad by supporting the presence of professionals in the Canadian film and television industry at international festivals abroad and certain pre-

marketing assistance, project development grants and training and to become known around the world. This promotes culture and art in order to help it serve as a showcase for national culture abroad and to bring the creativity and cultural diversity of a country to the fore. "The purpose of the grants is not to subsidise Canadian culture per se" emphasises a DFAIT advisor, "rather, it is *to select specific cultural activities that will reinforce foreign policy objectives*; this point is frequently misunderstood."<sup>30</sup> Amongst the cultural ambassadors recruited by DFAIT by means of grants are such celebrities as Diana Krall, The Cirque du Soleil, Nelly Furtado, Alanis Morissette and Shania Twain. These are but a sample of the vast number of Canadian artists and cultural groups performing or staging their productions abroad on behalf of Canadian mass diplomacy. Canada is far from alone in using grants to further its cultural policy. There is nothing new in France's government lending a hand to creative industries, such as cinema, television or music although this tends to be done more systematically lately. Many funds administered by the Quai d'Orsay and the Minister of Culture and Communication, have the multiple goals of supporting the cultural industry and preserving French cultural heritage, while also to defending France's image around the world.<sup>31</sup>

Another way to use tax payer's money is to sponsor foreign artists. For instance, the US State Department spends tax money on promoting Native Deen, a Muslim rap group, whose lead singer, Joshua Salaam, is civil rights director for the Hamas-friendly Council for American-Islamic Relations. Salaam is an ideal agent for mass diplomacy because he served four years in the U.S. air force while being known at home for his rebellious nature and for having praised the terrorists who blew up the USS Cole for having "a lot of guts to attack the United States military."<sup>32</sup> With the same sort of idea, the Goethe Institute produces enormous concerts featuring local artists such as the Egyptian pop icon Mohammed Mounir alongside German performers. "Six months after 11 September 2001, Mounir's euphoric statement in favour of intercultural tolerance not only impressed youth populations; it also set a good example for the symbolic potential of artistic cooperation between East and West" commented German mass diplomacy

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selected foreign markets. The grant program offers financial support for participation in international events abroad for the purpose of promoting a product, selling distribution rights, securing financing for a production and stimulating international co-productions.

<sup>30</sup> Potter, "Canada and...", *op. cit.*

<sup>31</sup> For instance, France's independent video games industry is slowly coming back to life on the international market, thanks to financial help from the French Government; see D. Reid, "French gamers get a helping hand", *BBCWS*, November, 2 2003.

<sup>32</sup> Satloff, *op. cit.*

specialist Johannes Ebert.<sup>33</sup> Similarly, France gives subsidies to foreign directors to produce Francophile and Francophone films helping to produce about thirty films a year in this way.<sup>34</sup>

Legions of artists, singers and actors also serve mass diplomacy ends “despite themselves” outside the systems of incentives (competitions, awards, grants), through radio or television retransmission of their works or performances. The State Department couldn’t dream of better ambassadors for the United States than Beyonce, Britney Spears and Jennifer Lopez.<sup>35</sup> Placing their most recent hits on the play lists of the different stations of the Broadcasting Board of Governors (Radio Marti, Radio Farda or Radio Sawa) alongside information bulletins is an assured mass diplomacy coup. On its side, BBC has also been able to channel the energy of the British music industry with the Top of the Pops, one the most popular radio, television and internet programs amongst adolescents around the world, including as it does interviews with “hot” stars like Dido, Ozzy Osborn or Cold Play, charts, chat, quizzes, and polls on current international issues.<sup>36</sup> MCM, the musical channel of the Quai d’Orsay, one of the most popular in Europe, consists for its part of a quasi obligatory rite of passage for French and francophone artists while being a showcase for France’s international image.<sup>37</sup> There are endless examples considering that all aspects of pop culture such as sitcoms (Friends) or bestselling books (Harry Potter) can be, whether voluntarily or not, put to the service of the diplomacy of hearts and minds by being mixed with more official programs.

#### b. Hollywood, Bollywood and Wellingwood at the Service of Mass Diplomacy

Cinema plays a very particular role in mass diplomacy and merits attention. The history of the 7<sup>th</sup> art is linked to that of state propaganda. David W. Griffith (*Birth of A Nation*), Eisenstein (*Battleship Potemkin*) or Leni Riefenstahl (*Rising Star*) are all directors with talent who at one moment or another, put their art to the service of the policies of their governments. Acclaimed filmmakers such as Frank Capra during World War II or Elia Kazan during the Cold War collaborated extensively with Washington's public diplomacy efforts. Times have changed and

<sup>33</sup> Ebert, *op. cit.*, in Overhaus & al., *op. cit.*, 5.

<sup>34</sup> Amongst the films having benefited from the DGCID *Fond pour la production cinématographique* are “La Saison des Hommes” by Moufida Tlatli (Tunisia 2000); “Ali Zaoua” by Nabil Ayouch (Morocco 2001); “Le Quai” by Jia Zhang Ke (China); “Adanggaman Roi nègre” by Gnoan M’Bala (Ivory Coast); “La Saison des Goyaves” by Dang Nhat Minh (Vietnam)... Since its inception in 1984, the Fund has subsidised 232 productions, 30 of those in 2000.

<sup>35</sup> Leonard, “Diplomacy by ...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>36</sup> U.K. - BBCi, “Top of the POP”; see homepage @ <http://www.bbc.co.uk/totp/> (accessed April 2004).

relations between the cinema industry and government have become more subtle, but film remains a formidable means of influence. These links tend to appear more clearly in times of crisis probably because then the political utility of the cinema becomes more tangible and that film-making community is more easily mobilised.

In a similar way to the aftermath of Pearl Harbor, in which the Hollywood studios took part in Washington's morale-boosting war effort, they were called on to support the war on terrorism following the attacks of the September 11, 2001. Answering Washington's call, more than 20 entertainment heavyweights including top executives from every major Hollywood studio such as Paramount, Warner Bros, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Universal, Walt Disney and 20th Century Fox – rival moguls traditionally opposed to the Bush administration – together with union leaders and other top power brokers in the television industry signed on and vowed to assist the nation's diplomatic fight against terrorism.<sup>37</sup> Communicating America's vision to audience “is something that Hollywood can do much better than Government” explained the Chairman of the Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy.<sup>38</sup> The joining of these entertainment titans to Washington's mass diplomacy effort was qualified by Jack Valenti, chairman of the Motion Picture Association of America, as a “unique experience” and Sherry Lansing, chairwoman of Paramount Pictures, called it “the beginning of the beginning.”<sup>40</sup> Mindful of concerns in some quarters of Hollywood that the White House was seeking a war propaganda arm, the two parties repeatedly declared afterward that there was no overt attempt to dictate the content of movies or television. “Our job will not be to direct, to approve, or to ask,” insisted Karl Rove, Bush's top political advisor, “The industry decides what it will do and when it will do it.”<sup>41</sup> The collaboration was based on a “seven-point agenda” of broad themes for Hollywood to ponder, including creative ways for the industry to urge Americans to support the war with volunteerism, to raise the morale of U.S. troops, and to illustrate that “this is a war against terrorism, not Islam.”<sup>42</sup> Since 2002, this collaboration between Hollywood and the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy has been discrete but fruitful with the putting in place of “American Rooms” in several Middle Eastern and Central-Asian universities (developed with the Smithsonian Institution), the production of ads and movie trailers about homeland security or Islam, bilingual documentaries and mass market

<sup>37</sup> Even the content of certain works can be involuntarily made fit to certain mass diplomacy ends. A choice piece for Radio Sawa and Radio Farda destined for majority Muslim populations, for example, would be a single from the group Live, about individual faith and the separation of church and state; Hassan, *op. cit.*

<sup>38</sup> D. Calvo, “Hollywood signs to Assist War Efforts”, *LA Times*, Nov. 12, 2001.

<sup>39</sup> U.S. – State Department, Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, H.C. Pachios, “Announcement of 2002 Public Diplomacy Recommendations” (State Department, September 18, 2002).

<sup>40</sup> D. Campbell, “The other round the clock war”, *The Guardian*, November 10, 2001.

<sup>41</sup> R. Sanchez, “Hollywood's White House War Council”, *Washington Post*, November 12, 2001, C01.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*

movies targeting an Arab audience such as *Hidalgo* (2004) or *Sheherzade: The Untold Story* (2005).<sup>43</sup> The producer Peter Ziebert recently stated: “We are committed to making *Sheherzade* an important part of U.S. public diplomacy to Pakistan and the Islamic world.”<sup>44</sup> It is statements like these that affirm that “Hollywood is as crucial a weapon in the U.S arsenal as hardware.”<sup>45</sup>

Elsewhere in the world, the cinema industry also plays an important role in mass diplomacy, crisis or no crisis. Bollywood, the second largest producer and exporter of cinematographic products in the world, maintains a direct relationship with the public authorities, following the Californian model<sup>46</sup>; a relationship strengthened by the existences of the government-funded National Film Development Corporation (NFDC). Over the years the NFDC has provided a wide range of services essential to the integrated growth of Indian Cinema. In two decades the NFDC has produced or co-produced, financed or co-financed thousands of films, short films and documentaries, several of which were made by prominent film makers such as Satyajit Ray. In response, the transformation of Bollywood is facilitated by various tax benefits provided by the Indian Government.<sup>47</sup> This production, financed as it is, serves in return to bolster India’s image in the world through regional and increasingly global promotion. A similar cooperative relationship exists between the UK’s movie industry and the Foreign Office. Many British films reach the important film festivals (Venice, Berlin, Cannes) and foreign markets thanks to the active support of the FCO’s Britfilm Office and its very well developed network of influence. Works such as Sir Ridley Scott’s \$135 million “Kingdom of Heaven” that projects a “more sympathetic” image of the Britain of the crusades in relation to Arab nations are promoted in this way.<sup>48</sup> This type of diplomatic cinematography, fostered and promoted by agencies specialising in production and distribution, is common throughout the world as the examples of the DGCID’s Unifrance or the Japan Foundation’s Film Production Support Program<sup>49</sup> would suggest.

<sup>43</sup> U.S. – State Department, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, Beers, “Public Diplomacy...”, *op. cit.*; U.S. – GAO-03-772, *op. cit.*, 17.

<sup>44</sup> The government of Pakistan’s Punjab Province has given permission to the Hollywood film company to shoot the film near Chakwal. President Pervez Musharraf has also given his personal backing to the film set in the 13th century; *Daily Times*, April 15, 2004.

<sup>45</sup> “Exporting the American dream”, February 23, 2004.

<sup>46</sup> Since 2001, two members of the Indian government are former movie stars: Shatrughan Sinha in the cabinet and Vinod Khanna as a junior minister.

<sup>47</sup> N. Zacharias and A. Parekh, “Transforming Bollywood - A Legal Perspective” (Nishith Desai Associates), <http://www.nishithdesai.com/Research-Papers/Bollywood-legal-perspective.pdf> (accessed May 2004).

<sup>48</sup> It is noteworthy that the film presents the French (the Knights Templar) as archvillains and sowers of discord amongst the idyllic “Brotherhood of Muslims, Jews and Christians”, see C. Edwardes, “Historians say film ‘distorts’ Crusades”, *Washington Times*, January 18, 2004.

<sup>49</sup> For example, the French produced and distributed, in particular through TV5- the cartoon “Kirikou et la légende de la Sorcière” that calls on African populations to reject superstition and the occult powers of the evil eye for individual rationality.

But the contribution of cinema to mass diplomacy is not always a deliberate affair. More often, a film is integrated in a strategic operation *a posteriori* because it is considered to be close to the message or image that diplomats want propagated or even more simply because of its success at the box-office. These motives explain how Peter Jackson's blockbuster, *Lord of the Rings*, became - a little reluctantly - the spearhead of New Zealand's mass diplomacy. To capitalise on this New Zealand-made trilogy, the government created a special organisation within the MFA – the Ministry of the Rings. An initiative that Prime Minister Helen Clark explains in these terms: “With all three of the trilogy's films shot at a range of locations throughout New Zealand, *Lord of the Rings* presents a unique opportunity to showcase our country to the world. The government is determined that the enormous opportunities offered by the epic *The Lord of The Rings* project [...] are not lost.”<sup>50</sup> This “movie diplomacy” program is co-ordinated by Pete Hodgson, “Minister for Lord of the Rings”, who works with a special ministerial committee chaired by the Prime Minister herself. Among the various *The Lord of The Rings*-related projects, screenings have been organised around the world (Paris, Beijing, New York) for influential investors in order to stimulate new investment in key New Zealand industry sectors. One of them, personally hosted by Prime Minister Helen Clark and two supporters of the epic trilogy in Manhattan, attracted over 350 key U.S. investors, film executives, trade and



business representatives, as well as journalists from heavy-weight business publications *The Economist*, *Fortune*, and *The Wall Street Journal* (picture 1: PM H. Clark Promotes New Zealand with Frodo and Bilbo - December 2002). Like Hollywood and Bollywood, Wellingwood is also hot in pursuit of world

public opinion.

### c. Sport Diplomacy

Extremely tense since the cultural revolution and the Vietnam War, relationships between China and the United States improved briskly in 1971. A table tennis match between Chinese and American teams, followed by a visit from Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to Peking, diffused the tension and opened the road to the normalisation of relationships between the two

<sup>50</sup> New Zealand – H. Clark (Prime Minister.), “Govt to secure spin-offs from *The Lord of The Rings* and America's Cup regatta with \$9 million funding package” (Records of Executive Government, NZ, 2002).

countries. What ping pong diplomacy did for U.S.-China relations, mass diplomacy has attempted to replicate with other sports. The United States tried baseball diplomacy in Cuba when President Clinton asked a U.S. team, the Baltimore Orioles, to arrange exhibition matches with the Cuban national team; an attempt imitated today by Taiwan.<sup>51</sup> Wrestling with traditional diplomacy, Iran and U.S. organised wrestling team visits in an attempt to get to grips with their differences. The British tried their hand at football diplomacy with China to give a kick-start to British businesses. Also a fan of “football diplomacy”, the Quai d’Orsay has greatly profited from France’s victory in the 1998 Soccer World Cup - what President Chirac has called the “World Cup Effect”. For many months, the football star Zinedine Zidane was France’s busiest ambassador to the world.<sup>52</sup> Today, cricket diplomacy seems to be working marvels for relations between India and Pakistan<sup>53</sup> while European countries apply golfing diplomacy to seduce Asian populations.<sup>54</sup>

Behind these apparently spontaneous initiatives we can see a diplomatic infrastructure specialising in the art of capitalising on the popularity of sports. Australian mass diplomacy, for example, excels at in the art. The DFAT works in conjunction with the Australian Sports Commission on different sporting events such as the Rugby World Cup and the Olympic and Commonwealth Games to instil and broadcast “positive messages about Australia”. For instance, the department encouraged international business participation in the Rugby Business Club, run by Austrade, in order to promote business involvement in activities in Australia during the 2003 Rugby World Cup.<sup>55</sup> With the same idea the MFAT allocates up to \$1 million a year on a range of projects aimed at capitalising on sport events staged in New Zealand like the America’s Cup regatta. The German Foreign Office for its part gives financial support to sport projects having a “broad public appeal” and capable of “fostering international contacts.”<sup>56</sup> Germany’s National Olympic Committee and the Tennis Federations run a wide range of outreach programmes funded by the Foreign Office (€4 million annually). The German mass diplomacy organisation also supports German sports federations hosting large-scale international competitions. A highlight of the year 2000 was the successful bid of the German Football Association (Deutscher Fußball-Bund) to host the World Cup in 2006. Finally, it is difficult to ignore the intense use of sports that is made by countries such as China or Iran.

<sup>51</sup> C. Gluck, “Taiwan Tries Baseball Diplomacy”, *BBCWS*, March 12, 2004.

<sup>52</sup> Bùi Xuân Quang, “Lecture croisée entre football et relations internationales”, *Approches-Asie* 16 (1999). In the same spirit it has been said that David Beckham has been “ [...] a fine ambassador for England”, *BBCWS*, June 25, 2004

<sup>53</sup> J. Terzieff, “Cricket Diplomacy”, *San Francisco Chronicle*, March 13, 2004.

<sup>54</sup> *Borneo Bulletin* (Borneo, Brunei Darussalam), April 18, 2004.

<sup>55</sup> Australia - DFAT, *Annual Report 2002-2003*, *op. cit.*, 163.

<sup>56</sup> Germany - Auswaertiges-Amt, “Kulturpolitik Grundsätze – Principles of Cultural Diplomacy”, in *Concept 2000...*, *op. cit.*

Given their immense reach and the broadcasting methods at their disposal, the arts and entertainment industry today are essential allies that governments can not do without. Governments have found numerous ways to allow an “exchange of goods” through which both parties benefit. Less known are the links that exist between states and other members of civil society, in particular, NGO’s and diaspora communities.

### **3. Connecting Domestic and Foreign Realms: Diaspora Communities and NGOs**

#### **a. Diaspora Diplomacy**

One of the consequences of the unprecedented migratory flux of the 20th century is that around the world, there are vast and dynamic diaspora communities linking their home and host countries. Through the intensification of trade, transport and communications, these expatriate communities have continued to nourish direct relationships with their native lands while living as citizens of their adoptive nations. The situation is well illustrated by the candidacy of Lia Roberts, leader of the American Republican Party of Nevada, in the presidential elections of Romania (2004), by the election of Jairo Martínez Fernández, American citizen, as “external” member of parliament of the Bolivian National Assembly (2003) or by the conversion of French diplomat, Salome Zurabishvili, into minister of foreign affairs of Georgia (2004). In today’s globalised world, “émigrés can sip their morning coffee while reading online newspapers from their native countries or even listening to the radio stations they left behind. In the evening, satellite dishes allow immigrants to catch the broadcast news of their homelands.”<sup>57</sup> Hyphens between their domestic civil societies and foreign civil societies, diaspora communities are perfect conductors for mass diplomacy. For all these reasons, governments are increasingly tempted to use these communities as channels through which to propagate their mass diplomacy to the hearts of foreign populations.

Countries with a traditionally high level of emigration have understood, for a long time now, the benefit to diplomacy of using ambassadors from civil society. Some nations have already developed programmes in their foreign policy intended to make best use of their émigrés. The Turkish foreign policy is a good example. With a pointed sense of the diplomatic potential to be drawn from Turkish diaspora communities that currently number 4 million individuals, of which 3.3 million are settled in E.U. countries (80% in Germany), Ankara has opted for a double



strategy: On one side, it consists of maintaining vital cultural, linguistic and religious connections with émigrés and the mother country through the sending of school books, the building of schools, the sending language instructors and history and religion teachers to host nations. At the same time, the priority has been to assure that the “Turks” “participate actively in the political life of the host countries [...] not only as plain labourers but also as academics, researchers, experts, scientists, doctors, journalists, businessmen, artists and other professionally active persons.”<sup>58</sup> The assumption is that an émigré that occupies a position of influence is worth a thousand speeches. Granting political and social influence to immigrants while maintaining emotional links is a tactic that Italy, another country with a traditionally high level of emigration, has also opted for. To steer this aspect of mass diplomacy the Palacio Farnese is equipped with a sophisticated infrastructure composed in particular of the Directory General for Expatriate Italians and RAI Internationales responsible for cultivating Italian identity and maintaining it vivacious in emigrants.<sup>59</sup>

The awareness of this potential is starting to take hold in traditional emigrant nations that, before now, did not attempt in any particular way to exploit this resource to serve their foreign policy goals. India's Minister of External Affairs recently stated “One important strength [...] which India has acquired over the last decade or so is the emergence of the Indian Diaspora and the political influence they enjoy in various countries, be it the E.U., the U.S. or elsewhere.”<sup>60</sup> Together with Bollywood, India's influential diaspora certainly constitutes an important soft power resource that is ready and waiting for mass diplomacy uses.<sup>61</sup> Consequently, it is the view of the Indian Government that the relations with the diaspora must be actively nourished: “This is an aspect of our foreign policy we propose to continue to emphasise in future” promised Shri Yashwant Sinha.<sup>62</sup> Benefiting from the presence of millions of Brazilian immigrants in various parts of the globe, Brazilian leaders also believe that this is an aspect of foreign policy that can “help build up stronger and very different links with their host countries.”<sup>63</sup> In the case of Israel, this awareness is even stronger because, as Leonard put it, “the diaspora provides the state of

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<sup>57</sup> M. Naím, “The New Diaspora”, *Foreign Policy* (July/August 2002).

<sup>58</sup> Turkey - MFA, “Turkey and Turks Living Abroad”, available @ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr> (acc. Nov. 2003).

<sup>59</sup> Italia - MAE, Direzione Generale per gli Italiani all'Estero, Palacio Farnese Web Site.

<sup>60</sup> India - MAEDEV, S. Yashwant Sinha (Minister of External Affairs), “India's Foreign Policy: Successes, Failures and Vision in the Changing World Order” (talk at National Defence College, New Delhi, November 18, 2002).

<sup>61</sup> Pahlavi, “Cultural Globalisation...”, *op. cit.*, 5-29.

<sup>62</sup> India - MAEDEV, Shri Yashwant Sinha, “India's Foreign Policy...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>63</sup> Brazil - Luiz Felipe Lampreia (Minister of Foreign Affairs), “Brazil and the world in the XXI century”. (speech given at the III National Meeting of Strategic Studies, Rio de Janeiro, October 1996), available @ <http://www.mre.gov.br/aacs/diplomacia>

Israel with something that goes far beyond material help: legitimacy.<sup>64</sup> Mexico, Pakistan, Iran and Armenia<sup>65</sup> have all recently begun to express similar interest in their vast minority spread around the world.

With the opening of their borders new emigrant nations from the Eastern bloc are now turning towards diaspora diplomacy realising that tapping into their demographic power can contribute to alleviating their deficit of political and economic might. In the image of many countries in the East, Hungary has begun a process of “involving the Diaspora in the conduct of foreign policy.”<sup>66</sup> As in Poland, the Ukraine, or Romania, the “key” element of this process is to extend citizenship to Hungarians living abroad and – it’s worth noting – giving priority to those established in Western nations. Realising that they constitute means of both applying political pressure and relaying its cultural policy, Russian acted similarly in offering dual-citizenship” to its “red feet” – Russians living abroad.<sup>67</sup> Another form of emerging Diaspora politics is the capitalisation of communities of adopted children. As in China or Vietnam, Korea is becoming aware of the diplomatic importance of this child diaspora. With a population of 150 000 adopted Koreans, there are almost 100 000 adopted Koreans living in the U.S. consisting of half of all internationally adopted children and 15% of the total ethnic Korean population in that country, and almost 50 000 in Europe representing an estimated one third of both all internationally adopted children and ethnic Koreans on the continent.<sup>68</sup>

Countries with a strong tradition of emigration are not alone in being able to profit from the gift from heaven that is the mixing of populations. In effect, Western nations have only recently become involved in developing a diaspora diplomacy. Though they are themselves without significant diaspora communities, they target the diaspora communities of other nations that they are trying to exploit. The principle consists of using different communities that it shelters as intermediaries to favourably broadcast the image of the country back to the home country. One example is the State Department’s “Shared Values” project (mentioned above) of which one of the initiatives involves recruiting Muslim Americans to act as spokespeople for American mass

<sup>64</sup> M. Leonard, “The necessity and impossibility of taking sides”, *Observer*, 19 January 2003.

<sup>65</sup> Diaspora and diplomacy are closely intertwined in the case of Armenia. For instance, the first foreign minister was US-Armenian Raffi Hovannesian, son of the famous historian Richard Hovannesian. After his resignation in 1992, foreign policy was mainly the domain of the presidential adviser, political scientist Gerard Libaridian, born in Lebanon and later a US resident; V. Cheterian, “Armenia rebuilt by its diaspora”, *Le Monde Diplomatique* (January 2004).

<sup>66</sup> Hungary – MFA, “Foreign Policy and the Hungarian Diaspora”, available @ [http://www.magyarorszag.hu/diaszpora/diaszpora\\_a.html](http://www.magyarorszag.hu/diaszpora/diaszpora_a.html) (accessed January 2004).

<sup>67</sup> H. Carrère d’Encausse, “L’Ombre et la Lumière, La Russie post-communiste, Puissance ou Déclin?” (Conference presented at l’École Polytechnique de Montréal, October 29, 1997).

diplomacy in Middle Eastern nations. On the same principle, the British Council's "Connecting Futures" project (also mentioned above) attempts to bring together young people from ethnic minority groups in the UK with young people from Muslim countries from Nigeria to Egypt and Indonesia. Another example is the Foreign Office's high profile dispatch of a consulate team to the Muslim pilgrimage site, the Hajj intended "both to provide assistance to the 20 000 British Muslims who perform the Hajj, and as an initiative in cultural relations."<sup>69</sup> The British Council in India has also instituted an innovative programme of events and activities that demonstrate the contribution of the diaspora to UK culture and business. Since September 11<sup>th</sup>, the DFAIT also works more closely with Muslim diaspora communities in Canada.<sup>70</sup> Diasporas form symbolic bridges between domestic civil society and foreign civil societies, bridges that are being used more and more today and that express, thanks to new communication opportunities, all the potential that had been imagined for centuries.

#### b. NGO Diplomacy

Following the example of the diasporas, the NGO's also form symbolic bridges between domestic civil society and foreign civil societies. They hold three key resources that governments often lack: the confidence of the public, the experience of the terrain and wide reaching and well established foreign networks. In this way, they constitute precious allies to mass diplomacy. The Globscam poll in 2004 revealed that 60% of 1000 subject questioned in G20 countries still trust NGO's as opposed to only 47% that trust government institutions.<sup>71</sup> This higher level of trust is one of the reasons that governments have understood the importance of purveying their message through NGO's – especially those known for their independence and their anti-establishment positions. Because of the left of center image it enjoys as an NGO amongst world public opinion, Amnesty International, is, according to British specialists, an ideal partner for legitimising, if only partially, the current policies of the United States and Great Britain.<sup>72</sup> Mission accomplished with

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<sup>68</sup> T. Hübinette, "The Adopted Koreans - Diaspora Politics and the Construction of an Ethnic Identity" (paper presented at the First World Conference of Korean Studies, Academy of Korean Studies, Seongnam, Korea, July 18-20, 2002).

<sup>69</sup> Leonard and Stead, *op. cit.*, 59.

<sup>70</sup> Canada – DFAIT, "Canada should work more closely with Muslim Diaspora communities in Canada" (the Canadian Center for Foreign Policy Development, january 2004), available @ [www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/cfp-pec/library/retreat\\_muslim-en.asp](http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/cfp-pec/library/retreat_muslim-en.asp).

<sup>71</sup> GlobScam, *op. cit.*, 13.

<sup>72</sup> Leonard and Stead, *op. cit.*, 55-56.

William Schultz's publication *Tainted Legacy: 9/11 and the Ruin of Human Rights* (2003) in which the head of Amnesty legitimizes the active struggle against terrorism.<sup>73</sup>

NGO's hold another significant resource, which governments are also without, and which makes them formidable partners: their experience in the field. As the strategists of the British Council point out, this is a point on which Governments and NGOs agree: "Each can help the other in educating the public. NGOs have specialist knowledge of democratic issues and personal expertise at a grassroots level. They need the oxygen of publicity to spread the word."<sup>74</sup> To credibility and experience can be added the fact that NGOs maintain and control prodigious networks of operatives and relationships that could serve to bring influence to bear with the aim of accomplishing a strategic goal within a foreign population: "No diplomatic mission possesses (or would wish to possess) the capability to organise demonstrations on the streets, nor are they well positioned to co-ordinate sustained lobbying campaigns", emphasize Leonard and Stead. "There are over 20 000 transnational NGO networks already active on the world stage (of which 90% were formed during the last 30 years) many of whom could make effective partners for the conduct of public diplomacy."<sup>75</sup> Governments, conscious of the immense potential for soft power, increasingly attempt to develop it. They have a number of possibilities for doing so, from isolated incidences of cooperation to projects of great breadth.

Most mass diplomacies maintain regular collaboration with the NGO community. The Foreign Office regularly backs up and then permanently hires employees of certain environmental NGOs, people from Amnesty International in its human rights sections, and even recruited its Head of Policy Planning from Oxfam.<sup>76</sup> The French humanitarian galaxy of 157 associations of international solidarity (ASI), including, Doctors Without Borders, Handicap International and Unicef-France work actively with the Quai d'Orsay to the point of being labelled the "Trojan Horses" of French diplomacy.<sup>77</sup> The State Department also collaborates directly with U.S. and foreign-based NGO organizations especially those involved in family and humanitarian assistance<sup>78</sup>; an essential collaboration we are reminded by J. F. Metzl for the success of

<sup>73</sup> While not exactly praising Bush and Blair, Schultz call leftists and intellectual to support their policy against global terrorism to help safeguard democratic values; W. Schultz (Executive Director of Amnesty International), *Tainted Legacy: 9/11 and the Ruin of Human Rights* (New York: Nation Books, 2003); On Schultz support see also R. Martineau, "La Caméra ou le Bazooka", *Voir-Ondes de Choc*, november 2003.

<sup>74</sup> UK - BC, "Media and Information", *op. cit.*

<sup>75</sup> Leonard and Stead, *op. cit.*, 56.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, 56.

<sup>77</sup> *Le Monde*, January 7, 2004; It is not a coincidence if the French government has recently decided "to re-boost its collaboration with NGOs"; France - RFI, "La 'feuille de route' de la coopération" in France - RFI, *Rapport Annuel 2003*, *op. cit.*

<sup>78</sup> U.S. - State Department, *Strategic Plan 2000*, *op. cit.*; see also U.S. - State Department, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, Beers, "Statement...", *op. cit.*

American foreign policy.<sup>79</sup> This interaction between mass diplomacy and non-governmental organisations also results in more permanent joint projects, such as the FCO's "On the Line" Project. With the slogan "diplomacy does not stop at the doors of embassies", this project aims to systematise the partnership between the Foreign Office and NGO's working in a variety of fields. Originating with Oxfam, the World Wildlife Fund, Voluntary Service Overseas and Channel Four it has gone on to include a host of organisations "which do not normally work together."<sup>80</sup> One successful instance of NGO diplomacy is the famous joint campaign to eradicate the use of landmines worldwide. The Ottawa process on landmines offers a compelling case of how government – in this case Canada and Norway – can ally themselves with non-government sections of global civil society – in this case several anti-landmine NGOs (and Princess Diana) – to achieve a landmark diplomatic victory – the Ottawa Convention ban on landmine use.<sup>81</sup> "A strikingly successful piece of non-state based diplomacy" commented British observers.<sup>82</sup> By pitching an idea to international public opinion, NGO diplomacy allowed Ottawa and Oslo to gain significant position and to act far beyond what their actual status would suggest was possible.

#### **4. Influencing through Private and Foreign Media**

##### **a. Domestic Media**

Given the exponential growth that they are experiencing with the revolution of NICT's, the immense impact that they have on foreign populations and their independent status, private media is becoming an indispensable resource for completing the public plan. It was not a mere coincidence if President Kennedy appointed Ed Murrow and George Stevens, two of America's best known and revered journalists, to supervise the U.S. public diplomacy programs during the Cold War. Of all the elements of civil society, the media are without a doubt those with the biggest value for mass diplomacy. If their contribution is important, it is even more important if they remain private and independent. By reinforcing the credibility of the media, the independence and privacy optimises its message and makes of it an excellent vector for mass diplomacy. Napoleon understood this when he demanded that the Press working for him "remains

<sup>79</sup> Metzl, "Can Public Diplomacy...", *op. cit.*

<sup>80</sup> U.K. – FCO, Baroness Scotland (FCO Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State) (speech given at the 'On the Line' Project Party, Foreign Office, London, January 18, 2000).

<sup>81</sup> Potter, "Canada and...", *op. cit.*, 12.

<sup>82</sup> Leonard and Stead, *op. cit.*, 58.

private, considering that a reader is more accepting of information from a private newspaper that he considers independent.”<sup>83</sup>

- Before addressing this system of cooperation with the media there is first the issue of press agencies. Press agencies are a strategic target for systems of mass diplomacy without an integrated agency (see Chapter VIII for incorporated agencies). The press agencies are the information wholesalers: they provide all sort of information to press organs and information institutions of all kinds such as text, photos and graphics. In some newspapers, more than 80% of the published news comes from one or many press agencies.<sup>84</sup> The importance of strengthening alliances with “one’s own independent press agency” is clear. 75% of the information in circulation in the world passes by three great press agencies, Associated Press (United States), Reuter (United Kingdom) and Agence France Presse (France). The first two are cooperatively owned and the connections they maintain with their respective governments are extremely slender. The links between AFP and French diplomacy are more tangible:

The law of January 10<sup>th</sup> 1957 made Agency France Press an independent research and broadcast organisation “complete and objective, precise, impartial and worthy of confidence”. Under these statutes, AFP is an agency independent both from the state and commercial interests which can have no shareholders, nor can it raise capital; the agency “must not, under any circumstances, pass under the legal and effective control of any ideological, political or economic group.”<sup>85</sup> Nevertheless, the state plays a determining role within its governing body. Amongst the 15 members of this body, three are direct representatives of the state and two represent public broadcasting. The CEO of the AFP is appointed by this governing body and in order to be elected, must have the trust of the government: “The government can block the election of a person during the three first rounds of voting since a majority of 12 votes is necessary and the government controls 5.”<sup>86</sup> Above all, about 50% of the revenues of the AFP derive from public funds. The President of the Republic had made no bones about his willingness to “provide

<sup>83</sup> J. Ellul, *Histoire de la propagande* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967), 90.

<sup>84</sup> Governments often give the impression that they are waging a veritable information war through their respective agencies. In December 2003, Associated Press and Reuters provided abundant coverage of the American and British diplomatic success in the dismantling of the Libyan nuclear program. Reuters largely insisted on the personal success of the Foreign Office and Tony Blair (e.g. Reuter, 20/12/03). To this media triumph, AFP ‘replied’ with an interview with the Egyptian president Mubarak in which he declared: “We welcome the Libyan decision” - but “Israel must also eliminate its weapons of mass destruction” (AFP, 21/12/03). On the whole in recent years, AFP has been accused of being pro-Arab while Reuters and AP have been thought to be biased in favor of Israel.

<sup>85</sup> France - Assemblée de l’Union française, *Loi n° 57-32 du 10 janvier 1957 - Loi portant statut de l’agence France-Presse* (Direction des Journaux Officiels, 1957).

<sup>86</sup> C. Conso and M. Mathien, *Les agences de presse internationales* (Paris: PUF, 1997), 82.

comfort, particularly in its global vocation” to this “remarkable information tool.”<sup>87</sup> Echoing the position of Jacques Chirac, the official recorder of the finance committee of the national assembly, declared in November 2002 that the development of the AFP was a “government priority”, the Agency being “a tool without equivalent for propagating a favourable image of France in the world.”<sup>88</sup> Today it is evident that the powers see the AFP as “a symbol of France's influence in the world”, one reason that explains why they are ferociously opposed to its privatisation.<sup>89</sup> AFP constitutes a precious ally because it exerts considerable power in the global information landscape. Working in 165 countries, broadcasting 2 million words a day in 6 languages and 70 000 photos a year, it runs the most-far reaching network of any news service. AFP reaches, directly or indirectly, three billion people and supplies 10 000 media outlets with information<sup>90</sup>.

- Further down in the chain of public/private cooperation, we find the main national media networks; radio, television and internet. The attraction of private media in the United States and the absence of powerful public auxiliaries such as the BBC or TV5 explain why American diplomacy has turned itself towards networks such as CNN, ABC, CBS, NBC and Fox, a perfect illustration of the private/ public cooperation in this area of mass diplomacy.

Over the last ten years, it has often been said of CNN that it has been significant advantage for the United States on the international stage. A famous expert and onetime White House counsellor has in particular suggested that it is a considerable source of soft power that has allowed the United States to structure international interactions to its advantage.<sup>91</sup> Incontestably, the power of information and the influence of CNN on international public opinion are indisputable. Pioneer of 24-hour rolling TV news, the Atlanta network is a global giant when it comes to televised information. Globally, CNN boasts that its combined branded networks and services are available to more than 1 billion people in over 212 countries and territories. CNN International also boasts of the world's most syndicated news service, providing video and audio reportage to more than 900 television stations, 1700 radio stations as well as to millions of hotel rooms worldwide (890 000 in the U.S. alone).<sup>92</sup> But can we be certain that CNN and U.S. mass

<sup>87</sup> France - Chirac, “Discours du Président de la République...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>88</sup> France - Assemblée Nationale, *Constitution du 4 Octobre 1958, Annexe n° 12 - 1<sup>ère</sup> partie, Culture et Communication : Communication* (Rapporteur spécial : M. Patrice Martin-Lalande (Député)).

<sup>89</sup> B. James, “A Struggle Over the Future of Agence France-Presse”, *International Herald Tribune*, October 11, 2000.

<sup>90</sup> France – MAE, ‘Les Agences de Presse’, available @ <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr>.

<sup>91</sup> Nye, *The Paradox...*, *op. cit.*, 68.

<sup>92</sup> For instance, under DD-CNN agreement, which came into force with effect in 1995, CNN has been allowed by the Indian government to produce and transmit upto 24 hours a day of news and information

diplomacy are acting in concert? It is undeniable that they have provided mutually beneficial services to each other. Ted Turner's Cable News Network propagates a "patriotic" vision of international relations and, in turn, the American government encourages it to serve as an "effective carrier and projector of American's point of view" by offering fiscal and legal facilities.<sup>93</sup> Nothing exceptional is taking place, then. But, if the relationship is anodyne in times of peace, it has tendency to become increasingly "special" in times of crisis:

Many recent studies have emphasized the existence of a direct relationship between the American diplomacy and CNN in particular during the war in Kosovo (1998-1999). Measuring the volume of CNN television coverage to the quantity and quality of U.S. government reactions over a timeline of 15 months preceding NATO's military intervention as well as CNN's framing of issues, the assignment of blame and the propensity for military intervention, an LSE study has clearly shown that the news network contributed to preparing the ground for international public opinion in favour of armed anti-Serb intervention<sup>94</sup>. If the fact that the network strongly supported the cause for the intervention is not enough to convincingly say that there was cooperation with the American diplomacy establishment, other facts bolster the hypothesis. In 2000, the European press (*The Guardian-Trouw*) revealed the presence within the CNN team of American army personnel.<sup>95</sup> In addition, it was common knowledge that Christiane Amanpour, CNN's leading foreign correspondent, and a woman whose reports about the fate of Kosovan refugees did much to fan public appetite for NATO's war, was "literally and figuratively in bed" with spokesman for

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programming for re-transmission on the government owned Doordarshan TV; India - MEADDEV, Press Information Bureau, see PIB's Homepage @ <http://www.nic.in/India-Image/PIB>.

<sup>93</sup> Price, "Journeys in Media Space...", *op. cit.*

<sup>94</sup> Findings revealed: 1) a strong correlation between television coverage of the conflict and government foreign policy activity; 2) disproportionate reactions by Washington and its allies each time CNN covered a major televised conflict/massacre versus non-televised ones; 3) clearly distinguishable shifts towards intervention in the immediate aftermath of these televised conflict/massacres and little or no shift when events were not televised. Regarding the treatment of information, the study reveals a clear bias in favour of a U.S. intervention against Serbia: In an average CNN article words like refugees, ethnic cleansing, massacre, mass killings and expulsions were used nine times on the average. But the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army (0.2 mentions) and the Serbian civilian victims (0.3 mentions) barely existed for CNN; see B. Bahador (LSE), "The CNN Effect on Western Foreign Policy before the Kosovo Intervention" (paper presented at the Canadian Political Association general Meeting, CPSA, May 2003).

<sup>95</sup> Cable News Network acknowledged that members of the US Army 4th Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) Group served as interns in their news divisions and other areas during the Kosovo war (*The Guardian*, April 12, 2000). The US Army Information Service confirmed the presence of these Army psy-ops experts at CNN, saying, "Psy-ops personnel, soldiers and officers, have been working in CNN's headquarters in Atlanta through our program, 'Training with Industry'. They worked as regular employees of CNN. Conceivably, they would have worked on stories during the Kosovo war. They helped in the production of news". CNN has ended this program while minimising its importance. Sue Binford, CNN executive vice president for public relations, claimed that while the interns were present "no government or military expert has ever worked on news at CNN"; Major T. Collins (US Army Information Service) quoted by A. de Vries, *Trouw* (Dutch newspaper), 21 February, 2000.



the U.S. State Department, and a leading supporter for NATO during that war, her husband James Rubin. Without being able to prove an active collaboration, it is noticeable that the news network provided precious help to American foreign policy by legitimizing the anti-Serb military engagement in the eyes of international public opinion. In that respect, Joseph Nye is probably right to assert that “CNN’s soft power allowed the USA to frame the issue.”<sup>96</sup> This support has also been reiterated in the context of the war in Afghanistan by ordering news presenters to end reports with a reminder that the Taliban regime harbours terrorists who supported the September 11 attacks on the U.S.<sup>97</sup> The line between patriotism and collaboration seems once again extremely imprecisely drawn. Whatever the case, from 2002, the Atlanta network progressively began to cede position to other media allies ideologically closer to the Bush administration.

Relieving CNN, in a sense, many of the principal American commercial networks volunteered to support the war effort in Iraq (2003-2004) through official cooperation with American mass diplomacy. In the name of providing Iraq’s people with a taste of a “free press,” ABC, CBS, NBC, Fox and the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) accepted to provide content for Iraqi TV managed by the State Department’s BBG. The five-hour-a-day program, called “Toward Freedom,” consisted primarily of repeats of ABC *World News Tonight*, CBS *Evening News*, the PBS *NewsHour* with Jim Lehrer, NBC *Nightly News* and Fox News *Special Report* with Brit Hume.<sup>98</sup> Some British content, one hour of the daily total, was also supplied by Britain’s Foreign Office, which had outsourced production to a private London-based company called World Television. The heads of these entertainment giants quickly overcame any reservations about collaborating with State Department communications agencies after having been convinced by American officials of the patriotic nature of their help.<sup>99</sup> Again following the logic of the public/private alliance, Iraqi TV was progressively handed over to the commercial managers. Its programs were first beamed throughout Iraq via Commando Solo, a fleet of specially equipped

<sup>96</sup> Nye, *The Paradox...*, *op. cit.*, 68.

<sup>97</sup> News presenters were specifically required to end each report with a formula such as: “The Pentagon has repeatedly stressed that it is trying to minimise civilian casualties in Afghanistan, even as the Taliban regime continues to harbour terrorists who are connected to the September 11 attacks that claimed thousands of innocent lives in the US”. Alternatively, they could say: “We must keep in mind, after seeing reports like this, that the Taliban regime in Afghanistan continues to harbour terrorists who have praised the September 11 attacks that killed close to 5,000 innocent people in the US”; M. Wells, “CNN to carry reminders of US attacks”, *The Guardian*, November 1, 2001.

<sup>98</sup> U.S. – State Department, Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy, International Information Programs, “Iraq Liberated” (IIP), <http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/iraq> (accessed April 2004).

<sup>99</sup> For instance, CBS News President Andrew Heyward said he was “skeptical” on first hearing that the project would be funded by the government and operated by the Middle East Committee of the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG). He became convinced that “this is a good thing to do ... a patriotic thing to do” after conversations with “some of the most traditional-minded colleagues” at CBS News; J. Deans, “US to beam American news into Iraq”, *The Guardian*, April 11, 2003.

military C-130 cargo planes—the same planes that had conducted the Pentagon’s psychological warfare operations on Iraqi television frequencies since the U.S.-led invasion began. But in 2004, the American government decided to pass the torch. In January, the Pentagon awarded a \$96 million contract to a U.S. communications equipment maker Harris Corp. to run the now called al-Iraqiya and to turn it into an independent TV.<sup>100</sup> Whatever the case, what the collaboration between these major commercial networks shows is that mass diplomacy does not have to be propaganda produced by the state and that can be conducted through the private sphere. The reason is that private networks and their programmes have a capacity for persuasion of foreign populations that is far greater than would ever have had content prepared by government agencies. Governments are not good communicators and they know it well. Nevertheless, this does not lessen the fact that this private participation is directly framed by public institutions and that programmes are filtered and selected with care.<sup>101</sup>

Today, the Fox Broadcasting Company, started by media baron Rupert Murdoch in 1986, has imposed itself as the principal private supplier for American mass diplomacy. In 2002-2003, News Corp., deliberately acted in the service of the pro-war Anglo-Australian-American coalition. Mr Murdoch, an Australian-American himself, doesn’t hide his profound sympathy for the position adopted by the Bush administration in the same way that doesn’t “hide his willingness, rare for a president of a large multinational media group, to have a direct influence over editorial policy, staying in constant contact with the leaders of his principal newspapers and television networks.”<sup>102</sup> And so, it is natural that the media outlets owned by Rupert Murdoch have made themselves the “echo of the credo of their employer” resolutely in favour of Washington’s foreign policy. If on the side of News Corp. this alliance is dictated by the personal sympathies of Rupert Murdoch, it is on the other hand, on the side of American diplomacy, motivated by the global reach of the media empire and by the planet-wide audience to which it provides indirect access. In the United States, the Murdoch Empire includes the *New York Post*, *The Weekly Standard* and above all Fox News, leading news channel in terms of audience size since the beginning of 2002. In Britain, the Murdoch group owns 40% of the written press with a variety of titles such as *The Sun*, *The Times*, *The Sunday Times* and *News of the World* to which it adds a satellite outlets BskyB which includes the very influential Sky News. In Australia, News Corp. has “almost complete control over the media” with three quarters of the market share of the

<sup>100</sup> W. Pincus, “US Firm to Run Iraqi TV”, *Washington Post*, January 12, 2004, A13.

<sup>101</sup> In the case of Iraqi TV this ‘coaching’ was accompanied by additional content: Pentagon briefings given by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and speech by State Department officials, translated into Arabic were interspersed with the private network programs.

daily newspapers (among them *The Australian*) and cable pay-TV. The group is expanding into the rest of the world, in particular into Italy and France.<sup>103</sup> Besides giants ABC, CBS, NBC and Fox specialised networks such as Discovery or PBS “have offered to help [the State Department] acquire programs”<sup>104</sup>. These also produce programmes from “The Hunt for Saddam” (Discovery) to Sesame Street for Teens (PBS) that the U.S. Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy is responsible for distributing abroad.<sup>105</sup>

Nevertheless, it is not always necessary to proceed through pacts or alliances that are more or less formal to profit from the private media. A simple method now currently applied consists of using them as forums; expressing oneself through their services. Take this illustrative situation: to



advocate the U.S. message to a new audience Secretary of State Colin Powell participated himself in a Global Town Meeting on MTV in February 2002. For 90 minutes he took questions from young people in Washington, D.C., Cairo, London, Milan, Moscow, New Delhi and São Paulo with an audience of some 375 million globally (picture 2). Powell's MTV appearance perfectly reflects a new turn in the U.S. public diplomacy strategy. “We can’t be content with a speaker who reaches 200; we need 2 million and all

our posts are asked to take on this goal of magnification” explained Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, C. Beers. “A new goal we set ourselves is to access a more diverse set of communications channels and techniques to reach these larger audiences.”<sup>106</sup> The idea is that the official auxiliaries of mass diplomacy and those of their allies is not enough - though they’re working around the clock. American strategists consider that the best means to bridge the critical

<sup>102</sup> B. Mathieu et al, “L’Empire de Rupert Murdoch au Service d’une Propagande Pro-guerre”, *Le Monde*, April 12, 2003.

<sup>103</sup> In 2003, NDS, a subsidiary of News Corp. bought MediaHighway (ex-Canal+ Technologies) from Thomson (France). By taking over MediaHighway, Murdoch acquired a dominant position in digital service and bolstered its world dominance on satellite television; *Le Monde*, September 15, 2003

<sup>104</sup> U.S. – State Department, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, Beers, “Public Diplomacy...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>105</sup> Such public-private alliances also extend increasingly to the internet sphere. Such a pact was contracted between the Broadcasting Board of Governors and the electronic privacy company Anonymizer, Inc. providing Iranians with free access to a Web proxy service to circumvent their government’s online censorship efforts. In 2003, the U.S. government responded to Tehran’s filtering by paying Anonymizer (neither the IBB nor Anonymizer would disclose how much) to create and maintain a special version of the Anonymizer proxy which only accepts connections from Iran’s IP address space, and features instructions in Farsi. Among the de-banned sites are the website for the U.S.-funded Voice of America broadcast service, and the site for Radio Farda, another U.S. station that beams Iranian youth a mix of pop music and westernized news; both stations are run by the International Broadcasting Bureau (see chapter VII). Poulsen, *op. cit.*

<sup>106</sup> U.S. – State Department, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, Beers, “Public Service...”, *op. cit.*

“last three feet” to reach a target audience - in this case the 15-25 age bracket - and to do so through the appropriate media - here with MTV. “Our mission here is to take a very complicated subject, which is the war on terrorism, and explain it to the world,” said James Wilkinson, who manages the White House war room that oversees all of the administration's efforts at public diplomacy.<sup>107</sup> The Bush team has booked more than 2000 interviews for government officials, including a media blitz by the First Lady.

#### b. Foreign Media

Working with and through local medias is certainly one of the most crucial and delicate aspects of mass diplomacy. It is a crucial task because communities tend to rely on local information sources before foreign ones in most situations. Without necessarily attempting to manipulate the content of these local media outlets, the goal is to make them carry out the message – especially, emphasises J. Metzl, those who have the reputation of being critical like Al-Jazeera for the United States.<sup>108</sup> In addition to presenting your views in a culturally appropriate way, they can be much more fluid in their ability to engage their compatriots in an interactive dialogue than foreign government through conventional one-way “push-down” communications.<sup>109</sup> Diffusing mass diplomacy content through indigenous networks is likely to have a deeper impact than through national networks whether they are public or private. However, enlisting local media is also a very delicate undertaking. For obvious reasons, local television and radio stations are generally not inclined to promote the message of a foreign government. These governments nevertheless have many means at their disposal to overcome this reticence.

- A first consists of constructing relationships of trust with representatives of the foreign press. To cultivate and deepen links with them is important because it is they who can really convince their public. The U.S. Foreign Relations Council considers in this regard that foreign reporters must be actively engaged for “they are the main means of transmission for what the United States is doing and why.”<sup>110</sup>

- Journalist exchange and media relations programs have been put in place in several mass diplomacy systems to establish a more reactive and proactive relationship with foreign media.

<sup>107</sup> A. Maggin, *ABC World News*, February 2002

<sup>108</sup> Metzl, “Can Public Diplomacy...”, *op. cit.*; U.S. - Harrop, “The Infrastructure ...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>109</sup> U.S. - CFR, “Public Diplomacy...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*

The Australian DFAT's International Media Visits program arranges targeted working visits by senior international journalists and commentators to generate "positive" international media coverage "in support of Australian foreign policy objectives."<sup>111</sup> Similarly, the State Department organises visits by foreign media to conduct interviews of high-level officials and reports on sensitive issues, such as Ground Zero and the non-American victims of the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks, to be broadcast in their country of origin.<sup>112</sup>

- The great centers of international journalism such as London, Paris and now Dubai also serve as ideal locations for solidifying these kinds of contacts. With one the greatest concentrations of Arab media outlets in the world, the British capital has "become kind of a gateway for many of the Arab and Muslim television and newspaper people."<sup>113</sup> For this reason U.S. Arabic-speaking teams have been implanted in London and directed to infiltrate this media diaspora in order to build networks of influence with the intention of extending them to the Middle East. In these informal networks, we find individuals such as Saad Al-Bazzaz, editor in chief of the daily newspaper *Al-Zaman* created in London in 1997 and then reinstalled in Baghdad in April 27 2003 the same day as allied forces captured Saddam Hussein's capital.<sup>114</sup> Another communication gateway to the Arab world is Dubai's "Media City". Its opening in February 2000 was considered by western government as "a concrete opportunity" for developing strategic links with local press, television and opinion leaders. In October 2001, the Foreign Office set up its Islamic Media Unit (IMU) there to address Islamic opinion throughout the world with a special emphasis on the Arab media.<sup>115</sup>

Once established, these relationships of trust with foreign media can work "like enduring family relationships."<sup>116</sup> They are precious because, though difficult to initiate and maintain, they build long term alliances that do not necessitate subterfuge or exertion of pressure to continue to be effective. In an information-rich environment, "the human relationship is the especially critical nexus for the communication of policy information" notes a senior US mass diplomat.<sup>117</sup> It is the same sort of relationship that links journalists such as Qatari Ibrahim Hilal to the BBC. This revered Arab journalist, who helped start Al-Jazeera in 1996, has been editor-in-chief since July

<sup>111</sup> Australia - DFAT, *Annual Report 2002-2003*, *op. cit.*, 160.

<sup>112</sup> "We can greatly increase visits from journalists, newspaper writers, and television producers who can go home and offer their insights from a totally different perspective" (C. Beers); U.S. - State Department, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, Beers, "Public Diplomacy...", *op. cit.*; see also Lussenhop, *op. cit.*

<sup>113</sup> U.S. - State Department, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, Beers, "Statement...", *op. cit.*

<sup>114</sup> "*Al-Zaman* a pris son envol au moment où les bombes américaines achevaient de pulvériser le trône de Saddam Hussein", *Le Monde*, January 3, 2004.

<sup>115</sup> U.K. - FCO, "Influence Worldwide", *FCO Annual Report 2003*, *op. cit.*, 84-85.

<sup>116</sup> UK - BC, "Media and Information", *op. cit.*

<sup>117</sup> Ross, *op. cit.*, 79.

2001, covering the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq despite strong U.S. criticism of the station's editorial policies and airing of tapes made by al-Qaida. But in January 2004, Hilal unexpectedly submitted his resignation to help BBC and FCO on projects for media development in Arab countries.<sup>118</sup> The famous media specialist Noam Chomsky considers that such acquaintances also link American mass diplomacy to important names in the international press such as the *Globe and Mail* (Toronto) or *Libération* (Paris).<sup>119</sup> However, because of their very informal characters, these “enduring family relationships” are quite difficult to identify which is undoubtedly one reason why they are so valuable.

- Beyond the construction of relations of confidence, mass diplomacy can also get foreign media to serve its ends by working directly on their content. Two techniques stick out:

- The more conventional technique and the most common consists of using local media as a forum for expressing one's point of view, as Powell did with MTV, but abroad. Tony Blair's intervention on the airwaves of Al-Jazeera to directly convince Arab public opinion following the attacks in 2001 was a memorable example.<sup>120</sup> Since then, British mass diplomacy has deliberately opted for this strategy as the best way to address the Arab audience. The FCO's IMU played a central role in arranging thousands of interviews by government ministers with Arab/Muslim media and by placing many more articles in Middle Eastern and Pakistani newspapers.<sup>121</sup> There was even a suggestion of naming a permanent spokesperson to the most influent Arab media. Recognizing the need to speak directly to the Arab world, U.S. officials also made a record number of appearances on regional media outlets. Between September 11<sup>th</sup> and February 2002, there were over 2 000 media appearances by U.S. officials (Secretary of State Colin Powell, Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and many others) in Arabic and regional media such as the Middle East Broadcasting Centre, Abu Dhabi Satellite TV, and Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation International.<sup>122</sup> In addition, U.S. mass diplomacy spread its anti-terrorist message through digital-video conference or simply by buying airtime on several Arabic satellite channels including Al Jazeera.<sup>123</sup> Washington also tunes into America-based foreign media such as KRSI

<sup>118</sup> *Jerusalem Post* (AP), “Al-Jazeera editor-in-chief joins BBC”, Jan. 18, 2004.

<sup>119</sup> N. Chomsky, “Machines à endotriner”, *Le Monde Diplomatique* (August 1998), 13.

<sup>120</sup> A. La Guardia, “Blair spreads message on bin Laden TV”, *Daily Telegraph*, October 10, 2001; This approach may also prove a risky business as one remember that the broadcast planned by Downing Street turned into a painful grilling for the Prime Minister. For the Transcript of Tony Blair's Interview with Al-Jazeera see 10 Downing Streets Newsroom's archives @ <http://www.number-10.gov.uk>, October 10, 2001.

<sup>121</sup> U.K. - FCO, “Influence Worldwide”, *FCO Annual Report 2003*, *op. cit.*

<sup>122</sup> This tactic has been used a thousand times since then; U.S. – State Department, Under Secretary for Public Affairs, Tutwiler, “Reaching Beyond...”, *op. cit.*; Lussenhop, *op. cit.*

<sup>123</sup> J. Koranteng, “Al-Jazeera Accepts US Government Ads”, *Ad Age News*, 22 October 2001.

Radio Sedaye Iran - which broadcasts from Los Angeles or New York on short wave and on the internet – to air their pro western message to millions of dissent listeners in Iran or China.<sup>124</sup>

- The other means of acting directly on the content of foreign media consists simply of supplying the programming they broadcast, or even better, selling them the programming. As we saw in the preceding chapters, nearly 10% of audiovisual mass diplomacy is conducted through foreign affiliate re-broadcasting. Re-broadcasting has become the clearest and most lucrative method for getting others to propagate your message.

Governments increasingly rely on partner broadcast stations to be heard throughout the world. DW-Radio works with more than 2.000 “affiliate” radio stations and 200 private institutions which are provided with a large number of programmes that are fed to their station via Deutsche Welle's worldwide satellite network or downloaded as MP3 files from the DW broadcasting center's server in Germany. Thanks a similar system, more than 2000 independent stations around the world now broadcast BBC World Service programming. Re-broadcasting allows VOA too to provide programming by satellite, pre-recorded tape, or phone “feed” to over 1 000 “affiliates” worldwide. In China, for example, growing numbers of media outlets are carrying material distributed via BBG's radios and the International Information Bureau's Chinese-language website.<sup>125</sup> This method presents marked strategic advantages: it both allows one to extend one's audience and to diversify that audience by capturing that of broadcasting partners. Nearly 30% of BBC international radio audiences (45 million) listen now to BBC programs through re-broadcasting partners.<sup>126</sup> In most regions of the globe, the implementation of re-broadcasting has been accompanied by a jump in audience numbers. For the BBC, this strategy has been very successful as the alliance with digital radio services such as XM Radio and Sirius Radio not only facilitated the discontinuation of direct shortwave transmission to the American market, but also affected an audience increase of 25% jumping from 2.3 to 2.9 millions listeners. In Australia, retransmissions doubled the BBC's audience in one year from 1 to 2 million listeners in 2002. And so, retransmissions have become an important strategic target and the object of vigorous competition amongst mass diplomacy programs. In 2001, BBC and VOA achieved a strategic victory over their rivals by obtaining a commitment that the government interdiction on the on the re-broadcasting of foreign radio stations would be lifted only for them and that their programmes were permitted to be aired by privately-run networks such as Raga

<sup>124</sup> KRSI is with National Iranian TV one of a number of broadcasters which circumvent jamming by the Iranian authorities and transmit radio and television programmes from USA into the Islamic Republic calling for change; R. Clarke, “Washington tunes in to Iranian radio”, *BBCWS*, December 4, 2003.

<sup>125</sup> U.S. – State Department, Under Secretary for Public Affairs, Tutwiler, “Reaching Beyond...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>126</sup> U.K. - BBC, “BBC World Service has an audience...”, *op. cit.*; UK – FCO, “Chapter 13...”, *op. cit.*

FM. Excluded from the agreement, Radio France Internationale had to content itself with broadcasting towards Kinshasa (RD Congo) through affiliated radio stations based on the other side of the in neighbouring Brazzaville (Congo).

The situation is similar to that of television where the technique of re-broadcasting increasingly allows the delegation of mass diplomacy to affiliate stations. In the long term, it is quite likely according to German authorities that these commercial partners will progressively take over from government-sponsored structures freeing up effort and resources for other projects.<sup>127</sup> On the five continents, partners such as ATV (Armenia), TransAct (Australia), RDI (Canada), NTV (Russia) and DSTV (South Africa) serve as platforms for programming for the international francophone channel TV5. Australia's ABCAP has currently re-broadcast arrangements in 25 out of a possible 35 countries in its satellite footprint but negotiations are under way to gain access to other television markets.<sup>128</sup> More than 75 million individuals watch BBC World indirectly through associated subcontractors. And that doesn't include millions of other viewers watching BBC World in airplanes, hotels and other leisure establishments. BBG's Worldnet has developed an active placement program with foreign television stations. The networks broadcast Worldnet programs on their stations because the feed provided footage of top U.S. policymakers and others to whom foreign networks would not otherwise have had access. The model was successful partly because of vigorous sales work by public diplomacy Foreign Service officers in the field, who lobbied, sometimes with significant success, for stations to carry Worldnet programs.<sup>129</sup>

Using re-broadcasting is an art that calls for great skill and tact the U.S. Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy has remarked. Affiliate broadcasters may be "very thirsty for programming", but the challenge is no less delicate: you must place the right program in the right place for the right audience.<sup>130</sup> With this goal in mind, mass diplomacy must act as intermediaries between domestic producers of programmes and foreign broadcasters of these same programs. Take the example of American mass diplomacy in the Near-East. At the domestic level, the State Department has worked with ABC's WTN service, NBC, Hollywood, PBS and Discovery that supplied audiovisual material for export. Abroad, the State Department has "placed" these private-made programs with local media outlets such as the Middle East Broadcasting Company

<sup>127</sup> Germany - Auswaertiges-Amt, "Kulturpolitik Grundsatzte - Principles of Cultural Diplomacy", in *Concept 2000...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>128</sup> More information on ABCAP's programs and schedule is available at <http://www.abcasiapacific.com.au/>.

<sup>129</sup> It is noteworthy that the technique of market placement also works with print journalism: For instance, *Panorama*, Italy's most influential weekly news magazine, reproduced most of *The Network of Terrorism* in its own full-color, Italian-language edition; Ross, *op. cit.*, 78-79.



(MBC), Lebanese LBC, Al-Jazeera, and Future Television “which are keen for new programming and assure us they are open to new material.”<sup>131</sup> They broadcast these programs in such a way that, Beers remarks, “it requires good detective work” to trace the suppliers and benefactors.<sup>132</sup> This type of example perfectly illustrates what mass diplomacy signifies today: a discrete but strategic mediation between the offer of content and the target market.

- In addition to supplying programming for foreign media, it is possible also to act indirectly upon the making of content by foreign media. Again, there are two possibilities:

- First there is the traditional method of grants and production subsidies which, while not new, have the advantage of being proven. Following the example of the U.S Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy, most of the mass diplomacy operations are equipped with a special fund devoted to the financing of allied foreign media productions. The goal as one counsellor of the Broadcasting Board of Governors stressed out is not to manipulate the content of these medias, but “to empower voices of moderation around the world.”<sup>133</sup> In other terms, the goal is to support local radio and television that might present a strategic benefit for public diplomacy and national interests. Through the means of “funds supporting the national audiovisual production of developing nations” and the international organisation of the Francophonie, the DGCID supports, for example, media that projects a positive image of France and/or share its vision of the world. In 2000, the organisation, Reporters without Borders (RSF) denounced the subsidies provided by the French government and the International organisation of the Francophonie to the daily *Le Courrier du Vietnam* and the monthly Laotian newspaper *Le Rénovateur*: “How can France, How can the International Organisation of the Francophonie, justify grants to these Vietnamese and Laotian newspapers that are, according to the facts, docile mouthpieces for official propaganda.”<sup>134</sup> In fact, as the British explain, this system often benefits both parties: “In Russia”, they explain, “there were two thousands new radio stations, that were not financially sustainable, but we could help.”<sup>135</sup> The British Council, together with the Economic Development Institute of the World Bank, thus comes to the aid of media in need that can help inform and educate the public”. Basically, it’s an exchange of goods that is made even more legitimate by coming under the heading of development funding.

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<sup>130</sup> U.S. - State Department, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, Beers, “American...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>131</sup> U.S. - State Department, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, Beers, “Public Diplomacy...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>132</sup> U.S. - State Department, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, Beers, “American...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>133</sup> Metzl, “Can Public Diplomacy...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>134</sup> AFP, November 30, 2000.

<sup>135</sup> UK - BC, “Media and Information2”, *op. cit.*

- The other aspect of development funding is the technical and professional assistance given to foreign media enabling the indirect intervention in the production of their programming and constitutes an important aspect of mass diplomacy. The Canadian specialist, Monroe E. Price, explains that: "Technical assistance, as a basic tool of foreign policy, sounds neutral and virtually mechanical. But the basis for determining what assistance should be provided can be controversial in the target community and far from neutral in its administration or theoretical grounding. A foreign policy of technical assistance for media reform is a mix of idealism and realpolitik."<sup>136</sup> Long term in nature, technical assistance encourages the birth of media that is more favourably disposed and programmed to act without having to work to foster more favourable coverage at a later date. An effective mass diplomacy operation must be equipped with its own agency that supplies professional and technical assistance. In the French and American cases, these agencies are directly integrated into the central agencies (DGCID and the State Department) while in the German and British cases, these agencies are managed by Deutsche Welle and the British Broadcasting Corporation.

Technical assistance proper, whether it be in the radio or television domain, has three distinctive forms: the hosting of interns and professionals for training and visits concentrating on technical professions and audiovisual management training; missions abroad with the goal of training and sharing expertise<sup>137</sup>; the pursuit of cooperation through international institutions such as the Asia Pacific Institute for Broadcasting Development or the World Bank. Technical cooperation has taken on a strategic importance in the context shaped by liberalisation and the deregulation of the audiovisual market. Through training technicians, technology transfers and consultants, it allows one nation to participate in the restructuring of the broadcasting landscape of another country as Deutsche Welle Radio Training Centre (Cologne) did for Eastern Europe. It also allows the creation of long term partnerships and interdependence with foreign media. This is why it is a "major priority" of international cooperation.

The second aspect of this diplomacy centered on assisting foreign media concerns the professional training of journalists. It is even more crucial that it is not only the inculcation of work methods but also a way of seeing the world and processing information. Gwyneth Henderson, Head of BBC World Service Training, as her French opposites, states that even through it's a long term venture, media training can have enormous influence on social, political

<sup>136</sup> Price, "Journeys in Media Space...", *op. cit.*

<sup>137</sup> Such missions were opportunities for the DGCID to direct the radio broadcasting of a number of African nations. This includes for example an evaluation of a project supporting "Khuluma" community radio in South Africa; a technical study of the installation of OC transceivers in Moyabi in Gabon; as well as a

and economic structures especially in transitional and developing countries.<sup>138</sup> Without being able to act on the whole of the corporation, specialists consider that it is important to build small groups of journalists capable of developing networks in the field. Though the British consider that it is preferable to recruit operatives locally that are able to act independently in the long term, the French for their part have wagered on a programme of trainers of local trainers. With the pedagogical and methodological support of the prestigious Lille-based *École supérieure de journalisme*, the program led by the DGCID “professionalizes” approximately one hundred journalists each year (print, radio, television, press agencies and online journalism) by introducing them to the ethics of journalism and professional norms while sensitising them to the treatment of French and European issues.<sup>139</sup> We can say for certain that with the construction of informal connections, retransmission, grants and technical and professional assistance, mass diplomats have at their disposal quite an array of methods designed to recruit foreign media and help them do with their work.

## Conclusion

By providing a glimpse of the thousand and one means through which external actors might serve mass diplomacy, this chapter shows to what point mass diplomacy overflows the bounds of government institutions and extends its reach extremely far within domestic and foreign civil societies. Taking into account the importance of the players and their considerable capacity for persuasion, it is not surprising that states have done everything to recruit them. “In an age where grassroots NGO's are bearing the brunt of humanitarian crises, and where sub-state political-militant groups are influencing the conduct of internal conflicts, state institutions are finding themselves increasingly unable to control the conduct of world affairs” notes L. Baxter and J. Bishop. “The adoption of this new public diplomacy, a partnership between states and non-state actors in the global system, is an answer to these realities.”<sup>140</sup> In the end, mass diplomacy presents a number of analogies with a war machine: There is the general staff in charge of providing strategic direction and the professional army; and then there are the reservists and the conscripts and the mercenaries. By including, tapping into, engaging with, and supporting the myriad

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strategic evaluation of the No.1 African radio station; France - DGCID, “4. Encourager...”, in *Action 2000*, *op. cit.*

<sup>138</sup> UK - BC, “Media and Information”, *op. cit.*

<sup>139</sup> Based on agreements signed with local universities, five francophone training programs are supported in Moscow, Cairo, Beirut, Saigon and Sarajevo. The project also includes a media watch establishment, the publication of an online magazine “media online” devoted to the evolution of the media landscape and the organisation of theme driven conferences for professionals; France – DGCID, *Action 2000*, *op. cit.*

individuals and groups influencing international relations – business people, artist, clerics, NGOs, media and diaspora communities – new public diplomacy resembles a mass mobilisation. Nevertheless, this aggregate of irregular partners could not function without the orchestration of central agencies acting in the framework of the bureaucratic-entrepreneurial model. While being discrete, this organisation allows the maintenance of cohesive and collective action. It acts as a catalyst, leveraging the energies and expertise of third parties, watching to see that the overall impact of this cooperative effort is more than the sum of its parts.

In essence this is what mass diplomacy is all about today: an extremely decentralised, privatised, denationalised foreign policy with a minimum of central leadership acting most often as an intermediary between internal civil society and the civil society of foreign nations. Essentially the task is to harness the energies of the first and channel them to better influence to second. The foremost task is to make Hollywood, CNN, Britney Spears and Amnesty International participate in the venture by making them Do-it-Yourself diplomats because it is they that are best equipped to win hearts and minds of foreign populations. This is the rationale that Ottawa applies when they ask citizens to participate in the elaboration of Canada's foreign policy. Through patriotism and their own interest, these last respond to this and contribute their support through active contribution to the projection of Canadian values abroad. DFAIT isn't the only one to "work in line with the demands of people."<sup>141</sup> A growing number of leaders consider that soft power resides with civil society and that it is there that it must be sought, before channelling it and exporting through mass diplomacy. What might seem idealistic or a prime example of demagoguery might turn out to be the most realistic and pragmatic option possible.

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<sup>140</sup> Baxter and Bishop, *op. cit.*

<sup>141</sup> Payvand, "Khamenei: Islamic Republic of Iran's Broadcasting should work in line with public demand", April 19, 2003.

## Chapter X. The Question of Evaluation

“Soft power can have hard effects”  
Joseph Nye, *The Paradox of American Power*, (2002)

### Introduction

After a period of budget cutbacks and marginalisation that followed the end of the Cold War, mass diplomacy is, as we've seen, in the process of reclaiming its legitimate place within states' foreign policy initiatives. It is more sophisticated than before, and better suited to the new operational environment of the information age. Though governments increasingly recognise its utility and necessity within the diplomatic tool box, a crucial question still remains unanswered: that of its evaluation. How do we measure the effectiveness of this diplomacy of hearts and minds and its cultural, educational and broadcasting programs intended to influence foreign states through the opinions and sympathies of its population with the ultimate goal of serving the strategic interests of foreign policy? The fact is that if some intuit its potential, most are still without the means and information that prove the tangible results of its implementation. The multiple factors involved in achieving foreign policy aims and influencing foreign policy outcomes makes setting targets and measuring performance a difficult challenge. It is therefore not surprising that no satisfactory program has yet been developed for the systematic assessment of mass diplomacy programs.

The goal of this chapter is to demonstrate that while governments are failing to measure the effectiveness of public diplomacy programs in a systematically and comprehensive way, efforts in this direction, far from being doomed to failure, have the potential to produce important results. Deprived of measurable objectives, current evaluation attempts tend generally to focus on anecdotal evidence and program outputs, rather than indicate progress in changing foreign public opinions and attaining foreign policy goals. Attempts in this area are considerably hampered by the lack of data and distance that are indispensable to long term study. But though there are problems and difficulties to overcome, the enterprise is not futile. Efforts are currently being made to develop evaluation techniques that are for the most part inspired by those used in the private sphere for gauging the success of persuasive actions and public relations campaigns. The pages that follow explore the principal problems hindering evaluation and some of the answers to these problems that are currently available, with the goal of attempting to identify the broad

strokes of a process of evaluation that, while perhaps less than perfect, would provide knowledge about whether mass diplomacy will live up to its promise as the future of diplomacy.

### 1. A Logical Evaluation Framework

The evaluation of foreign policy performance is far from being a simple exercise. There are a few objectives where there is a verifiable relationship between programs and outcomes: for example, the program of issuing visas and the outcome of controlling legal entry of immigrants and non-immigrants. However, as acknowledged by the State Department and many specialists, such relationships are more problematic when applied to most of other goals. Their outcomes depend, generally, on external factors and contingent elements that are beyond the control of governments and are thus impossible to include in operations<sup>1</sup>. Mass diplomacy is unfortunately no exception. The rigid application of a cause and effect rationale is only partially relevant to the complexities of this foreign policy concentration. The multiple factors, both objective and subjective, involved in achieving goals and influencing this branch of foreign policy outcomes makes measuring performance challenging. A 2002 GAO report on strategies for assessing U.S. government information dissemination efforts recognized that “establishing a causal link between agency actions and the ultimate impact of such programs is difficult.”<sup>2</sup> Consulted on this issue, a number of academics specializing in public diplomacy and international affairs issues as well as private sector officials from U.S. public relations and opinion research firms with international operations, all agree on the complexity of measuring mass diplomacy.

But, given the prime importance that mass diplomacy and strategies of influence in general are likely to assume, it is becoming urgent to solve the problem of their evaluation. In a time when an increasing number of governments are adopting such indirect strategy, it is essential to attempt to evaluate its scope and impact. “In programs in which agencies do not act directly to achieve their goals, but inform and persuade others to act to achieve a desired outcome, it would seem all the more important to assure decision makers that this strategy is credible and likely to succeed.”<sup>3</sup> That's why it's imperative that the difficulties be overcome. Yet it is now the case that, despite the difficulties, assessing information dissemination programs is far from being impossible. A point of departure consists particularly, as we shall see, of taking inspiration from methods used in the private sector for gauging the success of persuasive techniques. These methods, commonly used

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<sup>1</sup> U.S. - State Department, *Strategic Plan 2000*, *op. cit.*


<sup>2</sup> U.S. - GAO, *Program Evaluation: Strategies for Assessing How Information Dissemination Contributes to Agency Goals* (GAO Report: GAO-02-923, Washington, D.C. Sept. 30, 2002).

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

for measuring the effectiveness of marketing and communication campaigns, are adaptable to mass diplomacy because, as we've seen repeatedly in the second part of this study, mass diplomacy is in many ways similar to public relations strategies. The General Accounting Office confirms this possibility, stressing that many of the logic model concepts used by ad firms and public relations agencies to gauge the strengthening effects of media and community-based campaigns to reduce tobacco use or to promote the use of seat belts can be adjusted to evaluating mass diplomacy.<sup>4</sup> The difference is one of degree, not of nature.

The solution could be to use a logical framework, or logic model combining measurable data and deduction to establish convincing correlations between short and intermediate outcome goals and the realisation of long-term results. This relatively simple tactic, currently employed by the private sector and increasingly by mass diplomats themselves, consists of evaluating in a systematic way the realisation of short and intermediate term goals as a "proxy" for the more important, but immeasurable, impact of the activity<sup>5</sup>. Given the extreme difficulty of establishing direct causal links between mass diplomacy programs and results, establishing such logical correlations is considered "a reasonable expectation" by specialists.<sup>6</sup> If we exclude the operational phase as such, this method of evaluation breaks down into 5 steps:

**Figure 1: A Logic Model of Evaluation**



1) To apply this method in an effective way, it is important as a precondition, to clearly identify the short, medium and long term goals and to clearly distinguish the indicators of success and to conduct pre-campaign attitudinal surveys for weighing the target audience size and initial opinion on key issues. 2) The next step is to track down outputs by verifying the number of planned activities effectively completed. 3) Short-term outcomes must then be assessed by

<sup>4</sup> U.S. – GAO-03-951, *op. cit.*, 28

<sup>5</sup> Leonard and Stead, *op. cit.*, 91.

<sup>6</sup> U.S. – GAO-03-951, *op. cit.*, 26

determining the reach (overall audience and target segments) but also awareness (distinctiveness of the offer) and trust of target audience vis-à-vis the message conveyed by mass diplomacy activities. 4) Intermediate results concerning target audiences' opinion changes are to be traced through follow-up surveys and story-boards having the goal of determining not only perception shifts but also the distinctive contribution of mass diplomacy efforts to these shifts. 5) Finally, long-term products – the realisation of foreign policy goals prompted by mass diplomacy programs through its effect on public opinions – are to be assessed in the same way public relations and opinion research firms proceed to assess the success of campaigns to reduce tobacco use or to promote any commercial brand by using short and intermediate outcomes identified as a substitute for acquiring a reasonable level of assurance that they can account for expected payoffs. The remainder of this chapter will return in detail to the various steps.

Currently, governments are working on more systematically integrating such an evaluative process into the conduct and appraisal of mass diplomacy. By generalising the use of modern evaluation methods, cost-performance analysis and other management audit techniques, a common aim of the State Department, the Foreign Office, the Quai d'Orsay, the Auswärtiges-Amt and other foreign ministries has become to achieve greater transparency in terms of programme impact and produce better tools for steering mass diplomacy activities.<sup>7</sup> Evaluation is essential and must be a continuous process rather than an activity only carried out at the close of a project. And so, to produce the most reliable product, it is indispensable that this mode of evaluation be applied uniformly, coherently and systematically at each level and step of the operation. But, for the most part, governments are not yet systematically and comprehensively measuring progress toward their mass diplomacy goals. As we shall see in this chapter, mass evaluation programs make one or more of the following mistakes: They depend on immeasurable goals, concentrate on the wrong indicators, are deprived of adequate data set, privilege outputs to the detriment of outcomes, limit themselves to audience size and forget audience awareness and trust; often neglect opinion polls and, as a result, abandon, because of the preceding errors, the analysis of long term results.

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<sup>7</sup> These efforts are supported by new regulations such as the U.S. Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) and the German *Concept 2000*. In certain cases, evaluation bureaus have even perfected techniques for conducting ad hoc evaluations at short notice. France - DGCID, *Bilan des Évaluations 2001* (MAE, 2002), [http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/cooperation/dgcid/publications/brochures/bilan\\_eval\\_01](http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/cooperation/dgcid/publications/brochures/bilan_eval_01).



## 2. Outputs are not Outcomes

One of the factors that hamper the evaluation process at the outset is the difficulty of establishing direct links between public diplomacy goals and desired results. This is because fixed goals of different programs are in general too vague to lend themselves to evaluative efforts. Take the example of the three pillars of U.S. mass diplomacy: the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG). Their respective strategic goals include to “create dialogue”<sup>8</sup>, to “strengthen mutual understanding and mutual trust”<sup>9</sup>, and to “tell America’s Story to the World.”<sup>10</sup> Obviously, these strategic goals are not specific enough to be supported by measurable program objectives: they do not define what would constitute success, nor do they determine what must be measured or the frequency of measurement. A report from the GAO from July 2003 emphasized that it is impossible to know, for example if the BBG is succeeding in its mission because of its imprecision.<sup>11</sup> Recently questioned on the point, American mass diplomats recognise that the goals they target for their operations are neither quantitatively nor qualitatively measurable.<sup>12</sup> Things are only a little better in regards to the three pillars of British mass diplomacy. Their respective goals are “to increase UK influence overseas so that the UK’s views and interests are taken into account in international decision-making” (FCO); to “build lasting relationships between the U.K. and other countries” (British Council) and “to be the world’s best known and most respected voice in international broadcasting, thereby bringing benefit to Britain” (BBC World Service). Though their formulation is clearer, it does not permit the determination of reliable operational indicators.

Deprived of measurable goals, these evaluative programs, on the whole, have a tendency to depend on indicators of activity (how many operations have taken place?) to the detriment of questions of effectiveness (what effect have those actions had?). In the Department of State Strategic Plan, U.S. officials acknowledge that because of the inapplicability of concrete measures to political process goals and objectives they have to use other “indicators” about the amount of program activity.<sup>13</sup> The problem is that the performance indicators that they cite for these goals do not address the ultimate outcomes expected for these programs. For example, to evaluate the contribution of mass diplomacy to reinforcing mutual comprehension between the

<sup>8</sup> U.S. – State Department, Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy, Beers, “Interview with...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>9</sup> U.S. - State Department, Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy, ECA, *Annual Report 2002*, *op. cit.*

<sup>10</sup> U.S. – BBG, *Annual Report 2002* (BBG, 2003).

<sup>11</sup> U.S. – GAO-03-772, *op. cit.*

<sup>12</sup> U.S. – GAO-03-951, *op. cit.*, 24.

United States and the world the indicator used is “the percentage of participants who remain in contact with host country people met on their program one year or longer after their program.”<sup>14</sup> Though it is interesting to know that this percentage has remained relatively stable (81% in 2002 and 2003 versus 75% in 2001), this information does not indicate progress toward the more fundamental objective of achieving changes in understanding and attitudes about the United States. The same holds true for the BBG that considers its capacity “to tell America's story abroad” by depending on a number of indicators (7/10) that have absolutely nothing to do with this goal such as signal strength, satellite network performance indexes or consumable network transmission expenses.<sup>15</sup> While such data sheds light on the level of public diplomacy activity, they do not answer the most important questions dealing with successful persuasion. It should be noticed that even when the goals are clearly formulated, the indicators chosen to evaluate the implementation do not address the outcomes expected for these programs. This is the case for the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy's Performance Goal 1 which is “to influence global public opinion and decision-making consistent with U.S. national interests”. The two output indicators used to assess success are 1) *the Number of page views of the Department's International Website, Mission Websites and Listservs* and 2) *the Level of Media Placement in Foreign Markets in Broadcast and Print*.<sup>16</sup> These indicators are not only insufficient to measure the evolution of foreign opinion in regards the United States but they also have a tendency to be irrelevant when it comes to polling public opinion.

A supplementary consequence of the absence of strategic objectives that are clearly defined is to see evaluation programmes concentrating on partial or anecdotal results, and program outputs, rather than indicate global results such as progress in changing foreign public opinion and fostering hard goals. For instance DGCID's bureau of evaluation tends to measure the French public diplomacy by geographic region rather than on a global basis. The score of reports that have been made public in 2003 are doubly limited by geographic zones (Bulgaria, Senegal, Argentina) or by operational sector (language, education, cinema).<sup>17</sup> Additionally, the estimate ends up, as in the earlier cases, as a list of the actions carried out (schools opened, books sent, films shown). Suffering from the same problem, the South African DFA's program gauges success through irrelevant facts such as the amount of initiatives implemented, the number of positive articles published by foreign media, the quantity of brochures distributed or even the

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<sup>13</sup> U.S. – State Department, *State Strategic Plan 2000*, *op. cit.*

<sup>14</sup> U.S. - Bureau of Resource Management, “Strategic Goal 11: Public Diplomacy”, in *FY 2003 Performance and Accountability Report* (released December 2003).

<sup>15</sup> U.S. - BBG, *Strategic Plan 2004*, *op. cit.*

<sup>16</sup> U.S. - Bureau of Resource Management, “Strategic Goal 11...”, *op. cit.*

maintenance of the departmental website.<sup>18</sup> The Australian DFAT makes exactly the same error, by focusing on the number of Australian performing groups, artists, exhibitors, and other cultural visitors supported annually by the Department (1 386 in 2003) or the number of media-related inquiries handled by its media liaison section (5 500) while not much is said about the quality of these actions or their impact on target audiences.<sup>19</sup> One other tendency consists of analysing the success of a mass diplomacy programs in relation to their budgetary performance. Since 2000, the FCO, BBC World Service and British Council are expected to achieve annual efficiency rates equivalent to 2.5% of their resources. In the same way, the DGCID congratulates itself on making the French audiovisual production industry a significant area of export.<sup>20</sup> If these results are significant in other respects, they are not enough, alone, to evaluate the global effectiveness of the operation. While all these facts and data may be easy to measure or quantify, they reveal little in the way of overall program efficiency. Such measures inform on the level of public diplomacy activity but they fail to determine what is ultimately of most importance, the capacity of mass diplomacy to reach foreign publics, to win their trust and to influence their perception and interests. In this way, these isolated individual attempts deprive the operation of vision of the whole.

One particularly disastrous consequence of the unavailability of valid indicators is to hamper the building of adequate databases through which it would be possible to measure mass diplomacy's progress. Development of the data capacity and information systems is essential to measuring progress toward international affairs goals. But, taking into account the current poverty of data and audience studies, it is materially impossible, in the short term, to proceed to an objective evaluation of the effort made by mass diplomacy to persuade. Governments are making huge efforts to fill these gaps, but currently, evaluation bureaus are not sufficiently obligated to record significant polling data and to follow-up on audience size, audience awareness and opinion changes. Happily, a certain number of evaluation programmes are beginning to go beyond anecdotal information and irrelevant proofs of activity. The progress made in recent years allows a better idea of what an adequate approach would be in this domain. Let's proceed step by step.

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<sup>17</sup> France – MAE, DGCID, “Série Évaluation 2003”, in *Bilan 2002 et Perspectives* (2003).

<sup>18</sup> South Africa - DFA, *Strategic Plan 2003-2005...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>19</sup> Australia - DFAT, *Annual Report 2002-2003*, *op. cit.*

<sup>20</sup> U.K. - FCO, *Spending for 2002...*, *op. cit.*

### 3. Audience Analysis and its Different Degrees

While measuring mass diplomacy results is complex, there are a number of key effectiveness measures that can form a starting point for creating measurable program objectives. First, the traditional measurements of audience size could be made more realistic by including indicators such as audience awareness and real audience reach; Second, complementary indicators such as audience quality, or audience trust and understanding can refine results.

An essential question to investigate at an early stage is how much of the market actually receive public diplomacy's message? An immediate result is offered by simply counting, for example, the number of users of cultural services, beneficiaries of educational programs, listeners, viewers and internet surfers who turn-on, tune-in and log-on to international broadcasting programs. Regular surveys of the number of people listening and viewing mass diplomacy radio and TV programs in an average week provide a basic starting point for measurement and further comparisons. An indicative example is British cyber-diplomacy which is far in the lead with around 280 million visits per week. (156 million for BBC World Service and 120 million for BBC World).<sup>21</sup> By tabulating the listeners and viewers of different auxiliaries of the BBG, American mass diplomacy reaches a weekly audience of 100 million individuals.<sup>22</sup> France places third with a regular audience of 90 million for TV5 and RFI<sup>23</sup>. Each week, 50 million people listen or watch Deutsche Welle programmes.<sup>24</sup> Behind Germany, Qatar (Al-Jazeera) has 40 million regular viewers around the world. Countries such as Canada or Australia come last with foreign audiences of less than 10 million.<sup>25</sup>

But these basic indicators are far from sufficient. To provide useful information, the size of the audience must be refined and defined. First it must include a local measure of **audience awareness** to answer a key question of effectiveness: whether target audiences are even aware of international broadcasting programming available in their area. This measure provides interesting information. For example, TV5 enjoys far greater recognition (54%) than CNN (46%) and BBC World (25%) in Egypt. In Argentina, TV5 is known by 59% of inhabitants of Buenos Aires (versus 46% for BBC World). In Brazil, recognition levels are the same for the cities of Rio and

<sup>21</sup> U.K. – BBC, *Annual Review 2003*, *op. cit.*

<sup>22</sup> U.S. – BBG, *Annual Report 2002*, *op. cit.*

<sup>23</sup> France – TV5, “Le Centre du Monde est Partout”, in *Rapport 2003* (Dossier de Presse, 2003).

<sup>24</sup> Germany - DW, “Mission and Competence”, *op. cit.*

<sup>25</sup> For measuring online audience surveys are conducted in monitoring both the number of people logging on websites and the number of page impression in an average month. BBC counts a monthly average of 13

Sao Paulo (compared to 40% for BBC World).<sup>26</sup> In Maghreb North Africa, TV5 enjoys an exceptional level of recognition: 87% amongst Algerians, 94% amongst Moroccans, 85% amongst Tunisians. The evaluation of local recognition is a complement to the analysis of audience and very useful for correcting a communications strategy.

**Figure 2: Level of awareness of the principal International Radio Stations in Selected Countries**

Country	BBC WS	VOA	RFI	DW-R	RL	RFE
Bangladesh	39.4	29.7				
Indonesia	9.2	3.4				
Ivory Coast			33.0			
Kenya	54.7	25.6				
Nigeria	50.2	40.2				
Pakistan	40.6	9.1				
Poland	36.6			11.8		
Romania	40.0					60
Russia	31.8				28.8	
Syria	5.0		10.0			

Sources: BBCWS & RFI Annual Reports 2003

In second place, to obtain a better evaluation, it is very important to assure that the measurement of the audience is based on **real** audience rather than potential or technical audience rates. It is erroneous to include individuals in the count that live within the broadcast zone but do not have access to the media outlet in question for various reasons irrespective of the awareness rate *per se*. For example, Avraza, showpiece of Turkish mass diplomacy, and VOA's Arabic language service have long claimed a grossly exaggerated audience because many of the viewers of the first had no televisions and because only 2% of listeners could pick up the "barely audible" broadcasts of the latter.<sup>27</sup> It is also crucial to make a distinction between the technical reach and the actual effective reach. For example, 164 millions households in the world can pick up TV5 programming and 80 million that of DW-TV, but only 56 million and 22 millions respectively watch regularly. In the same way, the international Australian channel ABCAP can technically be picked up by 6 million viewers in the Asia-Pacific zone, but it is in actual fact only watched by 2 million of them. These might seem like obvious observations to make, but many evaluation schemes continue to leave them out.

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million visitors and 77 million page views. It is interesting to note that Aljazeera.net isn't far behind with 14 million visitors and 67 million page views.

<sup>26</sup> France – TV5, "Le Centre du Monde...", *op. cit.*

<sup>27</sup> U.S. - House of Representatives – CIR, *The Role Of Public Diplomacy...*, *op. cit.*

While the main evaluation goal was limited until recently to calculating audience size, this is being increasingly redefined to focus on a new framework grouped around: 1) quality (target segments); 2) reputation (trust); and 3) understanding (message retention). Since 2001-2002, evaluation programmes of the principal mass diplomacy operations have sought out information of this type in order to better understand the profile of their audience and their attitude in the face of various programmes to which they are submitted.<sup>28</sup> The result is that this refined study allows not only to alleviate strategic mistakes but also to join the simple audience tally to the next step, an analysis of opinion.

1) The **quality** of the audience is of cardinal importance because upon it depends to a great extent the impact of mass diplomacy. It is the reason for which, as we've seen, mass diplomacy targets multiple segments of society such as future leaders, the youth and opinion-makers in political, economic, academic and cultural life and the media. To find out what people hear the message, evaluation bureaux can commission independent research firms in each country, as the FCO does regularly, to survey peoples by drawing up a list of their profiles, ages, income and class. Generally speaking, the profile is that they are younger, they're more often men than women, and they're much better educated than the norm. This type of surveys show for example that most opinion leaders around the globe look to the BBC for news coverage.<sup>29</sup> One opinion-maker out of four in Boston, New York and Washington listen to the World Service each week (24%), up from one out of five in 2001.<sup>30</sup> In Asian countries, BBC World reaches 13% of business decision makers compared to 36% watching CNN and 13% viewing CNBC. In the case of DW-TV audience is also mainly constituted by opinion leaders and the so-called "information elite."<sup>31</sup>

Taking into account the quality of the audience in the area of educational exchanges also has signal importance to the extent that it is shaped by "the potential overseas leaders of tomorrow". The FCO's target in this domain is to increase the number of students in higher education (HE) and further education by 25% before 2005 and to remain in touch with at least 60% of them. The latest measures reveal an increase of 50 000 students in higher education and 25 000 students in

<sup>28</sup> Leonard and Stead, *op. cit.*, 91.

<sup>29</sup> U.S. - State Department, Pachios, "The New...", *op. cit.*

<sup>30</sup> U.K. - BBC, "BBC World Service has global audience...", *op. cit.*

<sup>31</sup> A noter que le groupe teletel DW s'est enrichi en 2001 de German-TV, une chaîne for Germans and German-speakers abroad first targeted as a pay-TV platform to North America; Germany - DW, "Mission and Competence", *op. cit.*

further education and a follow up rate of 53%.<sup>32</sup> The fact that 30% of these scholars are in positions of influence today is an extra insurance that “the UK's views and interests are taken into account in international decision-making.”<sup>33</sup> In the same regard, “[i]t's significant” believes the U.S. Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, “that 50 of the world leaders with whom we are trying to develop a coalition have been members of and participated in our exchanges over the long number of years that you supported them and we have been able to field them.”<sup>34</sup> The liaison effort with these future civil servants, governors, ambassadors, prime ministers and heads of state is a crucial element that undeniably modifies the simple statistical calculations.

2) Evaluation programs are largely without credible indicators capable of measuring the amount of **trust** amongst target audiences. Audience size is of little use if audiences largely discount the news and information portions of broadcasts. A recent GAO inquiry points to the possibility that U.S. broadcasters (VOA in particular) suffer from a credibility problem with foreign audiences, who tend to view VOA and other broadcasters as biased sources of information. On this question, the results contrast markedly: On the one hand, Al-Irakya and Al Hurra channels, aired respectively in December 2003 and February 2004, draw great scepticism among Arab populations which perceive them as U.S. propaganda tools.<sup>35</sup> On the other hand, a survey by global media ratings giant AC Nielson revealed that BBG's Al Sawa is considered trustworthy by 42% of 15- to 29-year-olds in the Middle East. Among the station's targets in Amman (individuals between the ages of 17 and 28) when asked “What station do you listen to most for news?” 33% said they listened to Sawa. In Morocco, Radio Sawa is now the number one station among the coveted youth audience in Rabat and Casablanca.<sup>36</sup> With the increasing importance of measuring trust, InterMedia, the U.S. BBG's audience research contractor, has decided to more systematically adapt the credibility index used for other private customers. Credibility is an indicator to which evaluation programmes of British mass diplomacy have always paid great attention. Despite recent scandals that damaged its reputation (the Kelly affair) the BBC remains the most credible international media outlet, which is according to its leaders its greatest strength.<sup>37</sup> According to a recent survey, 63% of Nigerians and 74% of Kenyans consider that the BBC “provides unbiased and objective news and information” against 47% and 37% for

<sup>32</sup> Baseline 1996-97: 110,455 in HE and 25,102 in FE. Latest figures: HE (2001-02) 140,905 and FE (2000-01) 46,522 – increases of 30,450 and 21,420 respectively.

<sup>33</sup> U.K. - FCO, “Influence Worldwide”, *FCO Annual Report 2003*, *op. cit.*, 87.

<sup>34</sup> U.S. – State Department, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Beers, “Statement...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>35</sup> B. Hu, “Al Hurra introduction prompts ire”, *The Washington Times*, March 05, 2004; A. Butler, “No Hurras For Al-Hurra”, *Al-Jazeera*, March 11, 2004; *Le Monde*, January 3, 2004.

<sup>36</sup> *Middle East Online*, 7 April 2004.

<sup>37</sup> U.K. - FCO, “£76 Million Boost...”, *op. cit.*

VOA; in Bangladesh and in Indonesia the level reaches 85% and 39% versus 47% and 16% for VOA; in Poland 32% of the audience trusts BBC versus 17% for Deutsche Welle<sup>38</sup>; In Egypt its credibility falls to 17% leading RFI-RMC with 9%. In recent years, the BBC has become the main source of information in strategic areas such as Afghanistan.<sup>39</sup> But other international media outlets are also experiencing growing trust from viewers. In the United States, 97 percent of households subscribing to TV5 affirmed their desire to renew their subscription, 89% because they were satisfied by the quality of the news.<sup>40</sup>

3) A last indicator that is often missed in analyses of audiences is the “recall” and “message retention” rates. As marketing specialists do to assess the impact of any ad campaign, evaluators must include a measure of whether people understand and retain mass diplomacy content. BBG officials have begun to realise that tracking and reporting this data is important for determining if U.S. broadcasters are accomplishing their mission. InterMedia officials noted that developing a measure of this sort is feasible and requires developing appropriate quantitative and qualitative questions to include in the Board's ongoing research activities.<sup>41</sup> Tests conducted locally in Indonesia by the Department of State were declared conclusive with relatively high levels of recall and retention rates (40% for VOA).<sup>42</sup> To find out *what* people hear and retain, FCO also surveys people in various countries by commissioning independent research firms in each target country. They select a certain number of each social category from a cross-section, and they ask them, quite simply, do you listen to the BBC? Is the information relevant to you? What do you remember? On the whole, the 2003 results are probing: the level of penetration of the BBC information is 69% amongst Nigerian listeners, 61% in Kenya, 60% in Bangladesh, 43% in Pakistan and in Indonesia. By way of comparison, the VOA message has a level of penetration of 29% in Kenya and only 8% in Pakistan.<sup>43</sup> This type of information is important but is only pertinent for the evaluation of short term outcomes; other indicators are required to analyse the effect on public opinion.

<sup>38</sup> U.K. – BBC, *Annual Review 2003*, *op. cit.*

<sup>39</sup> U.K. – BBC, “BBC World Service has global audience...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>40</sup> France – TV5, “Le Centre du Monde...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>41</sup> U.S. – GAO-03-772, *op. cit.*, 17.

<sup>42</sup> “The recall of these messages was higher than a soft drink can achieve in six months of advertising. It broke the bank in terms of recall. In terms of message retention, every single person who recognized it came back and said, “They’re talking about the way they live in the United States. I had no idea.” A woman said, “I didn’t know you could wear scarves safely in that country.” Another said, “Do you mean they’re free to pray openly?” (Charlotte Beers) ; U.S. – State Department, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, Beers, “American Public Diplomacy...”, *op. cit.*



#### 4. Evaluating Mass Diplomacy's Efforts to Change Opinions

##### a. A Task Hampered by Deficient Data and Financial Resources

From Goebbels' Nazi propaganda machine to the "Hate Radio" broadcast in Rwanda during the Tutsi genocide, recent history has only reinforced the idea that information and the media could serve to influence and shape public opinion. Any witness of the Cold War, from Vaclav Havel to Lech Walesa, would say, if asked, that the things that changed the minds of the people in Eastern Europe and precipitate the overthrow of Communism in the 1980's were Western music, pop culture and constant broadcasts from U.S. media such as Radio Free Europe.<sup>44</sup> More than ever today, in the information age, new communications technologies and mass culture, opinions can be influenced and shaped.<sup>45</sup> In the post-9/11 era, many have come to think that mass diplomacy efforts can be instrumental in cultivating better public opinion abroad, by creating positive perceptions, by helping others to see issues of global importance from the same perspective and by encouraging foreign populations to engage with one's country.<sup>46</sup> But what means are available to measure the effect of mass diplomacy on foreign public opinion?

The study of the impact of mass diplomacy on foreign public opinion, a critical step in the evaluation process if ever there was one, is currently largely neglected like the rest of the evaluation process. Most evaluation programs are still incapable of measuring this crucial variable for the appreciation of progress and the success of mass diplomacy in a systematic manner. As recent reports pointed out for the State Department and the BBG, many evaluation programs fail to thoroughly and methodically measure success in changing foreign public opinion due to insufficient data and financial resources. U.S. experts have emphasised that measuring progress in changing foreign population's opinion of the United States is not only why they have been sent for but also a matter of national interest. Recently a study group emphasized again that: "Attitudes toward the United States were important in the past, but now they have become a central national security concern."<sup>47</sup> Nevertheless, while there is no way of being absolutely certain of what factor or combination of factors may influence public opinion, there are proven techniques, currently used by the private sector to evaluate the effects of a public relations

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<sup>43</sup> U.K. – BBC, *Annual Review 2003*, *op. cit.*

<sup>44</sup> Rep. E.R. Royce (Cal.) in U.S. - House of Representatives – CIR, *The Role Of Public Diplomacy...*, *op. cit.*, 23; see also *AP/CNN*, November 9, 2003.

<sup>45</sup> McChesney, *op. cit.*, 25-47.

<sup>46</sup> Leonard and Stead, *op. cit.*, 10.

<sup>47</sup> U.S. - House of Representatives - Committee on Appropriations, Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, *Public Diplomacy Programs* (4 February 2004).

campaign. Common public relations firm measurement techniques include surveys and polling to develop baseline data, immediate follow-up research, and additional tracking polls over a period of time to identify long-term changes and their causes. Many in-depth studies have not only underlined the urgent need but also the possibility of undertaking foreign opinion research for assessing public diplomacy effectiveness by adapting these standard procedures.<sup>48</sup> Little by little, efforts are currently being undertaken to fix this problem.

For the moment, databases available to evaluation programmes are however particularly deficient and make difficult or impossible a methodical estimate of progress in matters of influence over populations. This situation results essentially from the state of abandon and neglect in which public diplomacy programmes were left since the end of the Cold War (see Chapter 3). Now that the utility of this type of information is known anew, governments are calling on external contractors to review the paper archives of programmes and convert data to electronic form. However, bureau officials say they still lack the funds to conduct the type of outreach necessary to verify and update information. Even the little information collected until now is unsatisfactorily communicated and badly used. A poll conducted by GAO shows that 46% of participants working within American mass diplomacy evaluation programmes rarely or never see the State Department's polling data and 91% rarely or never receive the BBG's broadcasting audience research data.<sup>49</sup> Some have even admitted to being unaware of the existence of this type of information! Experts think that the use of “data mining” technology and the internet could help aggregate different databases available and help researchers tie trends and shifts in opinion to specific events and efforts. But though the cost of the necessary infrastructure is relatively affordable, (around an estimated \$1 million), it exceeds the means currently available with the system.

Financial means are precisely the second element that impedes the conduct of an effective evaluation of intermediate outcomes. Take the case of the United States where resources are more abundant than elsewhere: One of the GAO report's top criticisms is that unlike private companies, the federal government spends little on polling or focus groups abroad. Marketing and public relations experts interviewed said the \$3.5 million the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research currently spends on overseas opinion research is about a tenth of what it needs to spend. The State Department does not have sufficient funds to conduct more than one or two opinion surveys in each country per year whereas monthly surveys would be necessary to track fast-changing circumstances especially in crisis periods like today. The official estimated that

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<sup>48</sup> Wilton Park, *Changing Perceptions: Review of Public Diplomacy* (UK, March 2002) ; see also U.S. - CFR, “Public Diplomacy...”, *op. cit.*

increased polling and focus groups in high priority countries would require an estimated \$1.5 million in additional annual funding. But external specialists consider that even a \$5 million polling budget wouldn't be sufficient to achieve this crucial task: "To put that in perspective," wrote H. Pachios, "Mike Bloomberg spent more than \$10 million on polling for his New York mayor's race."<sup>50</sup> Private experts estimate that based on their experience with similar information campaigns, of U.S. mass diplomacy's roughly \$1 billion budget, \$60 million to \$100 million should be spent on opinion research and performance measurement. For the time being, this is far beyond the financial capacities of any Foreign Affairs department in the world.

#### b. Alternative Approaches

While insufficient data and financial resources tend to hamper attempts at systematically and comprehensively measuring the influence of mass diplomacy efforts over foreign public opinion, that does not mean that all forms of evaluation are impossible. While waiting for the development of more precise instruments and techniques and more resources be available, a certain number of partial results can be secured:

Changes in foreign audiences' attitudes are easier to estimate in the realm of cultural and educational programs. To assess its achievement in this domain, the British Council has developed an interesting and affordable evaluation methodology based on the "Performance Scorecard" approach (currently in operation in 25% of its overseas posts), where improved perceptions of the UK are tracked through follow-up surveys and story-boards.<sup>51</sup> Used for a number of years, this approach allows one to have quite a precise idea of the number of users of the British Council cultural and educational services whose perceptions of the U.K. are improved as a consequence. The results revealed by the 2003 report from the FCO are as follows: (i) Teaching centre users 44% (2001-02); (ii) Library centre users 63% (2001-02); (iii) International networking events 69% (Apr 02-Jan 03); (iv) Study fellows 74% (Apr 02-Feb 03); (v) Organised visits 86% (Apr 02-Feb 03).<sup>52</sup> The fact that the opinions of 75% of the 200 000 students passing through the British Council exchange program each year change in a positive way as a result of their passage constitutes a significant result, taking into account that most of them will occupy

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<sup>49</sup> U.S. – GAO-03-951, *op. cit.*, 27.

<sup>50</sup> U.S. – State Department, Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, Pachios, "Hearing...", *op. cit.*

<sup>51</sup> Leonard and Stead, *op. cit.*, 90.

<sup>52</sup> U.K. – FCO, "Influence Worldwide", *FCO Annual Report 2003*, *op. cit.*, 82.

positions of influence in their respective nations in the coming years.<sup>53</sup> The State Department's Educational and Cultural Affairs bureau resorts to a performance measurement system for its exchange programs that includes similar components. The ECA surveys exchange program participants on their program experiences, their activities afterwards, and their impressions of the programs' effects on them. The bureau uses this and other data to evaluate specific exchange programs every 5 to 7 years on a rotating basis.<sup>54</sup> The bureau has also recently initiated an effort to ask individuals who have completed exchange programs to recall specific attitudes and knowledge before the programs and how those had changed as a result of the programs. Program evaluation shows that foreign alumni, compared to people who have not had an exchange, are more accepting of American culture and values such as individual rights or pluralism; they are also less tolerant of anti-democratic actions that their governments might take.<sup>55</sup> "We do have long-tested proofs that we can engage successfully" declared the head of the U.S. mass diplomacy programs. "When we bring people in on our educational and cultural exchanges, they are literally transformed from being hostile and suspicious to friends of the United States."<sup>56</sup> These results have compelled greater investment in educational and cultural exchanges (see chapter 3 and 4).

But, if in the cultural and educational domain, governments have available relatively trustworthy instruments, the current lack of technical and financial resources makes the analysis of the effects of mass diplomacy's broadcast efforts to foreign populations particularly difficult to evaluate. While it is possible to measure changes in public opinion over time, the size and the distance of the audience added to the multiple contingent factors make this aspect of evaluation particularly complex. Different research techniques are currently being explored by government and academic study programs that, without providing a perfect approach, have the merit of providing some pieces of the puzzle. One study recently conducted by researchers at Harvard University, for example, contributes interesting indicators of the influence of international media on the perception of the masses.<sup>57</sup> To determine whether public opinion varies in response to the

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<sup>53</sup> However, according to a March 2004 poll conducted by *Le Monde* (sample: 500), 32% of people consider Great Britain as an unreliable partner and 6% as an hostile country while 28% consider it as one of true France's friend; *Le Monde.fr* (Expression Publique, Mars 2004).

<sup>54</sup> However, despite these efforts, the ECA's evaluation program still does not systematically conduct pre- and post-program surveys that directly test and compare participant attitudes and knowledge before and after participation. A more methodical survey system would provide more meaningful data on the effectiveness of exchange programs, but bureau officials estimated that such an approach would require more funds and staff to pre-test all alumni about their attitudes. Officials are however currently in the process of developing a new performance measurement system for the bureau's exchange programs; U.S. – GAO-03-951, *op. cit.*

<sup>55</sup> U.S. – State Department, Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy, ECA, *Annual Report 2002*, *op. cit.*

<sup>56</sup> U.S. – State Department, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, Beers, "American...", *op. cit.*

<sup>57</sup> M.A. Gentzkow and J.M. Shapiro, "Media, Education, and Anti-Americanism in the Muslim World" (Harvard University SSRN, September 15, 2003).

source of information, Matthew Gentzkow and Jesse Shapiro have analysed a variety of attitudes of the spectators vis-à-vis the United States in 9 nations with a Muslim majority according to which they were informed by Arab media or western media (In this case the two important cable networks CNN and Al-Jazeera). Their findings reveal that although CNN and Al-Jazeera convey similar basic information, CNN watchers are slightly more favourable to the U.S. than Al-Jazeera watchers. Gentzkow and Shapiro conclude that “increased exposure to Western information sources could significantly reduce anti-American sentiment in the Muslim world.”<sup>58</sup> They also suggest that mass diplomacy and cyber-diplomacy programs constitute therefore an “attractive policy option” because they are an efficient way to shape foreign public opinion without requiring direct intervention in the affairs of sovereign states.

However, these results raise obvious concerns about reverse causality: it may be that those with relatively more pro-U.S. attitudes are more likely to watch western media than Al-Jazeera, and vice versa for those with relatively less pro-U.S. attitudes. One way to deal with the reverse causality issues and other contingent factors is to interrogate audience directly on their impressions of the programs' effects on their perception with question such as: What source of information do you use the most? Why have you chosen this source of information? Are you always in agreement with its judgement? Has your opinion evolved since you have started using it? Of course it is indispensable in addition to conduct pre- and post-program surveys that directly test and compare participant attitudes and knowledge before and after campaigns. Though it would not solve all the problems, it is a simple technique employed by public relations firms. The BBC used such polls in the context of local evaluation programmes. Interviewed on their most important source for forming an opinion on the U.K. 29% of young professionals in a survey conducted in Poland cited BBC World. Using this approach, BBC chiefs are similarly interested in determining with greater certainty whether foreign audiences' perception of the UK improved as a result of their watching or listening its programs.<sup>59</sup> In absence of appropriate method of evaluation, some authors have speculated on the effects of mass diplomacy on foreign public opinion in particular citing the case of Spain following Franco and Ireland as two examples that have been able, thanks to public diplomacy, to “re-brand” their international image. Small and Leonard show, for example, that after being perceived for a long time as rural and traditional, if not reactionary, nations, their intelligent public relations campaign did a great deal to

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<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>59</sup> U.K. - FCO, “Influence Worldwide”, *FCO Annual Report 2003*, *op. cit.*, 82.

metamorphose their image to that of exciting, innovative nations over a relatively short period of two decades.<sup>60</sup> The hypothesis is interesting even though it is still to be proven.

### 5. The Case of U.S. Mass Diplomacy and America's Global Image

It is appropriate here to explore a slightly divergent if related question to the evaluation of public diplomacy impact on public opinion: the decline of the image of the United States in the world and in particular in the Muslim world offers an interesting opportunity to discuss the capacity of American mass diplomacy to act on foreign public opinion

As emphasised in chapter IV, favourable public opinion of the United States has declined worldwide in recent years. A number of opinion research firms indicate that many foreign publics, especially in countries with significant Muslim populations, view the United States unfavourably. A first study conducted by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press in 2002 found that negative opinion of the United States was most prevalent in the Muslim countries of the Middle East even in those whose governments have had close ties to Washington.<sup>61</sup> Things were particularly bad with two of America's key Muslim allies - only 6% of Egyptians and 10% of Pakistanis had a favourable opinion of the U.S.. According to a second study released by the Pew Charitable Trust in June 2003, anti-American sentiment in the Muslim world intensified and spread in the context of the war in Iraq. In several Arab countries, more than 90% held an unfavourable view of the U.S., and negative perceptions spread from the Muslim countries in the Middle East to Indonesia in the Far East and Nigeria in Africa.<sup>62</sup> A Gallup survey of Baghdad residents completed in September 2003 showed their doubts about the U.S. motives for invading Iraq: 43% of the respondents said they believed that U.S. and British forces invaded in March primarily "to rob Iraq's oil". While 37% believed the United States acted to get rid of the Hussein regime, only 5% thought it did so "to assist the Iraqi people," the poll found.<sup>63</sup> A recent global survey shows that a year after the Iraq war, mistrust of America in Europe is skyrocketing while Muslim anger persists.<sup>64</sup> According to the polling data, the majority of the world now sees the U.S. as an imperialist power and the biggest threat to peace.

What is particularly disconcerting is that, study after study, U.S. support steadily declined despite more than two years of intensive mass diplomacy aimed specifically at restoring trust in

<sup>60</sup> Leonard & Small, *Norway's...*, *op. cit.*, 7.

<sup>61</sup> The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, *What the World Thinks in 2002*, *op. cit.*

<sup>62</sup> The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, *Views of a Changing World*, *op. cit.*

<sup>63</sup> W. Pincus, "Scepticism about U.S. Deep, Iraq Poll Shows", *Washington Post*, November 12, 2003.

<sup>64</sup> The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, *A Year After Iraq War Mistrust of America in Europe Ever Higher, Muslim Anger Persists* (Pew Global Attitudes Project, March 2004).

the Muslim and Arab world. International pundits and commentators have been quick to weigh-in with their criticisms and prescriptions of what Washington must do to win over hearts and minds in the Arab and Muslim world. Many referred to public opinion polls in Islamic countries and some blamed American public diplomacy efforts. "Do a search on Google," wrote a U.S. official, "public diplomacy is a hot topic as described by all the media, who inevitably believe we have failed at the art as if it were a purely quantifiable science."<sup>65</sup> Over the last 3 years, much has been written and debated about the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the U.S. Government's public diplomacy activities and programmes overseas. It is a fact that U.S. image is being battered from Montreal to Pyongyang despite a concerted effort by the administration to shape world opinion. But can we really blame mass diplomacy for the decrease in American popularity? According to specialists, "it is too early to refer to the current attitudes and behaviours in the targeted areas as 'results'".<sup>66</sup> Here are a few reasons:

A more in-depth analysis of the polls in question first makes clear that it is not the values and the ideas transmitted by American mass diplomacy that are challenged by foreign public opinion. Zogby International released a poll in April 2002 that concluded that Arabs and Muslims generally hold a favourable view of American culture, movies, television, science, technology, and education but have generally unfavourable views of the United States when it comes to its policy toward Muslim countries and Palestinians.<sup>67</sup> While it paints a mostly negative picture of American policies, the June 2003 Pew Global Attitudes survey also shows wide support for the fundamental values that the U.S. public diplomacy has long promoted. Globalization, the free market model and democratic ideals are accepted in all corners of the world.<sup>68</sup> Majorities in 33 of the 44 nations surveyed feel that people are better off in a free-market economy, even if that leads to disparities in wealth and income. Interviewed on this issue, S. A. Schleifer, director of the Adham Center for Television Journalism at the American University in Cairo, considers that mass diplomacy has reasonable chances to succeed among groups subjected to western ideologies and medias that tend to be pro-American in terms of culture but might be critical of American politics or swept up by knee-jerk anti-Americanism.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> U.S – State Department, Reeker, *op. cit.*

<sup>66</sup> Zaharna, "The Unintended...", *op. cit.*

<sup>67</sup> Zogby International surveyed 10 Muslim countries between March 4 to April 3, 2002, to determine how adults in certain countries feel about American people and culture, and about U.S. policy in the Middle East region. The countries surveyed included Egypt, France, Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela; Zogby International, *The Ten Nation Impressions of America Poll* (Zogby International, April 11, 2002).

<sup>68</sup> The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, *Views of a Changing World*, *op. cit.*

<sup>69</sup> Hassan, *op. cit.*

What appears therefore is that America was judged not on what she said but what she did with Bush Administration's hard policy contradicting and, to a large extent, annulling the efforts of its soft strategy. Recent researches indicate that public opinion of the United States declined principally due to antiwar sentiment and disapproval of the Administration's international policies.<sup>70</sup> In one poll, U.S. policy toward Muslim countries was given single-digit favourable ratings by Egypt, Iran, Indonesia, Kuwait, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia.<sup>71</sup> For the past 2 years, Anti-Americanism has been reinforced - but not necessarily created by - unpopular U.S. foreign policies in the region. Now, one of the most important factors in the conduct of mass diplomacy is the actual policies of the Government. To succeed, specialists agree that the two must imperatively be consistent to each other. "When the U.S. military entered Iraq," wrote R.S. Zaharna, "it became the new face, the medium and the message of U.S. public diplomacy."<sup>72</sup> The military intervention directly contradicted and weakened the mass diplomacy efforts at building friendly relations and winning hearts and minds. James Zogby, the pollster and president of the Arab-American Institute also considers that this discrepancy between America's words and actions created a credibility problem that can discredit even the best campaign - "Actions always trumps messages."<sup>73</sup> The problem resides then paradoxically in the contradictory message broadcast by the American foreign policy observes a Japanese observer: "The more we understand the values that America claims for itself," he notes, "the clearer it becomes that the actual conduct of American foreign policy is not upholding these values."<sup>74</sup> Many critics agree that the deficit in popularity of the United States is the result, above all, of the fundamental imbalance between the brut direct policies of Washington and its indirect soft power diplomacy.<sup>75</sup>

In addition, the growing hostility of international public opinion in the face of the United States could probably be explained by the efficiency of the rival mass diplomacy initiatives. "Anti-Americanism has a variety of roots", observes J. F. Hoge, "In some cases, it is manufactured by others."<sup>76</sup> The United States, as we know, are not the only ones attempting to

<sup>70</sup> The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, *America's Image...op. cit.*; Pew interviewed more than 5,500 people in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Poland, Russia, Turkey, the U.K., and the US from March 10 through 17, 2003.

<sup>71</sup> Zogby International, *op. cit.*

<sup>72</sup> Zaharna, "The Unintended...", *op. cit.*

<sup>73</sup> J. Zogby, *Media Monitors Networks* (February 3, 2004).

<sup>74</sup> C. Kitagawa (Otsuru -Kansai University), "Want to be Loved?", *Perspective* (December 2002), 2.

<sup>75</sup> N. Gibbs, "Does Kerry have a better idea?", *CNN*, March 8, 2004; "If we focus solely on the hard power of nation-states, we will miss the reality and fail to advance our interests and our values" - Nye, *The Paradox...*, *op. cit.*; S. Tisdall, "Blair's support for Bush on Iraq alienates our allies and brings war closer", *The Guardian*, October 21, 2002; Butler, *op. cit.*; A. DeBorchgrave, *Insight on the News*, Feb. 19, 2004.

<sup>76</sup> Hoge, *op. cit.*



win the battle for hearts and minds; almost every government across the globe is in the race. Rival powers are also increasingly becoming sophisticated in harnessing the power of information and communication to promote their national interests and security. A “basic reason” America does not succeed at making its point of view prevail may therefore be that these other actors are better at conquering mind space and influencing certain populations.

For instance, it has been pointed out that the popularity points that the United States is losing in the Near East, in Africa and in Asia could well be popularity gained by rival mass diplomacy efforts and in particular, those of the very active Arab powers.. For M. D. Nalapat there is no doubt that the evangelical diplomacy of Saudi Arabia has had a marked effect on the evolution of Arab and Muslim public opinion: “Sept. 11, 2001, made clear that a new World War was raging, one that began when the House of Saud initiated the reckless increase in funding of Wahabbism [...]. In this war, the battlefield is not territory but the mind. And while the U.S. has been winning territory after territory, it has simultaneously been losing millions of minds to the enemy.”<sup>77</sup> It is undeniable that the Wahabit Kingdom's obscure effort to spread its form of Islam to every point of the compass for several decades has been an example of very successful soft power diplomacy, if not of the moderate form usually visualized. The same thing could be said of the ambiguous religious policy that Pakistan has conducted very recently in Afghanistan and the rest of the region. This religious diplomacy was even more powerful as ideological rivals of the United States have now available weapons of mass persuasion. The worsening of America's image has much to do with the growing popularity of Al-Jazeera and other media outlets in the region. As shown by the Harvard study cited above, its audience is significantly less likely to hold a favourable view of United States than the local audience of western media. Other government-owned media such as the Al-Arabya network or the Egyptian newspaper Al-Akhabr have been accused of feeding the hatred of the West and cultivating a very negative image of the United States<sup>78</sup>. For David Hoffman, the fact that the U.S. mass diplomacy is losing the opinion war in the Muslim World is not surprising, given the virulent anti-Western messages that Middle Eastern regimes spread through state-run media.<sup>79</sup> In addition, terrorist networks themselves such as Al-Qaida and Hezbollah have shown themselves to be masters in the art of galvanising the masses against Washington. “In a crude but effective way, Osama bin Laden, through his taped message

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<sup>77</sup> Nalapat, *op. cit.*

<sup>78</sup> Two weeks before the World Trade Center bombing, on August 28 2001, one could read the following lines in Al-Akhabr: “the Statue of Liberty in New York Harbor must be destroyed because of following the idiotic American policy that goes from disgrace to disgrace in the swamp of bias and blind fanaticism. The age of the American collapse has begun”; U.S. Rep. E.R. Royce (California) in U.S. - House of Representatives, CIR -, *The Role Of Public Diplomacy...*, *op. cit.*

<sup>79</sup> D. Hoffman, *op. cit.*, 1.

to Al-Jazeera, realized the fundamental importance of public diplomacy in this age of instant global communication” explains R. S. Zaharna. “He took his message directly to the affected publics.”<sup>80</sup>

All these factors combine to explain why the Muslim countries have been a tougher market for U.S. mass diplomacy. Selling Washington's message was tough before, but it is getting increasingly harder under the joint effect of the Bush administration's policy and the mass diplomacy of rival powers. Specialist acknowledge that it won't be easy to win the minds of those people who are both offended by Washington's policy and subjected to the influence of radical anti-western propaganda.<sup>81</sup>

An essential question remains unanswered, that of why mass diplomacy has not been able to compensate for these adverse forces. Why, despite all the efforts made, is mass diplomacy not able to reverse international public opinion? “Americans are brilliant at communication. Why in the world we are all thumbs in this particular area just strikes me as one of the anomalies of history. But it's an important one to solve pretty fast,” declared Senator Richard Lugar, R-Ind., chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.<sup>82</sup> The first of three answers that come immediately to mind the counterfactual hypothesis - the notion that the situation would be worse without the efforts undertaken in the last 2 or 3 years - is seductive, but will not be developed here because it would be extremely difficult to prove or support. Two other explanations are offered instead:

Many consider that the United States is paying the price today for the dismantling and marginalisation of public diplomacy during the 1990's. In the years following the end of the Cold War, as we've seen in chapter III, the mass diplomacy apparatus of the U.S. government drastically atrophied. From 1993 to 1998, its global budget was slashed by 23% and overall funding for educational and cultural exchange programs fell by more than 33%. This resulted in a dramatic reduction in the number of exchange participants from the Muslim world. For example, exchanges with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Yemen declined by 21%, exchanges with Pakistan, Bangladesh and Indonesia declined by 34% while those with Afghanistan were simply interrupted until 2002.<sup>83</sup> In the recent report entitled “Changing Minds, Winning Peace,” the Djerejian Advisory Group for Public Diplomacy in the Middle East criticized what it called “a process of unilateral disarmament in the weapons of advocacy over the last decade [that] has contributed to

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<sup>80</sup> Zaharna, “American Public Diplomacy...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>81</sup> Hassan, *op. cit.*

<sup>82</sup> Weiser, *op. cit.*

<sup>83</sup> U.S. - Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, Dolan, *op. cit.*

widespread hostility toward Americans which has left us vulnerable to lethal threats to our interests and our safety.”<sup>84</sup> Many specialists share the opinion that U.S. foreign policy has been weakened by the failure to include earlier public diplomacy systematically in the formulation and implementation of policy. “After nearly a decade of neglect, we are today suffering the consequences of a chronically under-funded public diplomacy establishment” declared Senator Tom Lantos, chairman of the U.S. Committee on International Relations.<sup>85</sup>

Another explanation is that despite recent efforts to fund mass diplomacy and reinstall it at the center of the foreign policy apparatus, it still does not have the means to operate fully on foreign public opinion “The marginalization of public diplomacy has left a legacy of under-funded and uncoordinated efforts” emphasised a member of the U.S. Council on Foreign relations.<sup>86</sup> Even if budgets and staff have been significantly increased, reallocation of resources is believed to be too slow or not acted upon. Making public diplomacy effective would involve a budget far in excess of the approximately \$1 billion spent by the State Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors in their public diplomacy programming - just 1/20 of the nation's international affairs budget. “Public diplomacy cannot be operated on the cheap” emphasises an ex-member of the U.S.I.A., “it must have a major increase in resources to rebuild decimated field operations in key countries.”<sup>87</sup> It is pointed out that the budget allocated in this domain is laughable in comparison with the \$25 billion devoted to traditional diplomacy, the \$30 billion for intelligence and counter-intelligence initiatives and the \$379 billion for defence. Joseph Nye makes this point very strongly, “If you look at expenditures in the American budget, we spend about 17 times as much on military hard power as we do on all our foreign representation, the State Department budget, foreign aid as well as the Voice of America and all the exchange programs lumped together. There is something wrong with that picture.”<sup>88</sup> Specialists also think that Washington under-invests in public diplomacy compared with many other countries that spend proportionately larger amounts of their foreign affairs budgets on this domain (10% versus more than 30% in France, Great Britain and Germany). Many conclude that it isn't very surprising that the United States has so far underperformed in the task of sustaining a constructive view of America abroad and attracting the support of other nations.

All the facts also suggest that, subordinated to the effort in the war against terror, American mass diplomacy has been applied too quickly and in an inadequate manner. In the urgent search

<sup>84</sup> U.S. - CFR, “Public Diplomacy...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>85</sup> U.S. - House of Representatives, CIR, *The Role of Public Diplomacy...*, *op. cit.*, 13.

<sup>86</sup> U.S. - CFR, “Public Diplomacy...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>87</sup> F.A. Coffey Jr., “Our Crippled Public Diplomacy” (released by U.S. - USIA Alumni Association, *op. cit.*)

<sup>88</sup> J.S. Nye (Dean, Kennedy School of Government) interviewed in Leonard, *Public Diplomacy...*, *op. cit.*, 5.

for security, there have been tensions between the short term military strategy of building military coalitions against terror and the prerequisites on which the long-term legitimacy of this agenda depend. Unlike usual mass diplomacy, which enjoys the luxury of time to cultivate favourable populations individually, the ungainly campaign conducted by the United States has seemed more like a cheap mass diplomacy for a time of crisis, searching for a quick fix for public opinion by using means more commonly used in psychological warfare or propaganda. The Bush Administration's spin and hurried persuasion campaigns heralded in with great fanfare may even had the unintended effect of alienating some segments of foreign audiences.<sup>89</sup> As we have seen, , systematic disinformation, brain washing and ideological browbeating tend to be increasingly counterproductive in today's global information society and are unlikely to win hearts and minds; an expensive lesson for the U.S. that is learning a little late that enhancing their image can not be achieved through military propaganda campaigns.<sup>90</sup> Revelations about the mistreatment of the Iraqi prisoners (April 2004), what could be called the antithesis of public diplomacy, have only made the resentment of the American military occupation worse.

Conclusively, what this example points out is that mass diplomacy is first and foremost a long term strategy whose results will be apparent only over the long term. Many politician and observers expect public diplomacy to deliver goodwill instantly among foreign populations. But while military campaign can proceed at lightning speed, characterized by quick strikes and special operations, it would be more realistic to think of the mass diplomacy effort as "a slow and steady campaign fought over inches and years."<sup>91</sup> Building trust and long-lasting relationships with foreign populations is a task requiring sustained efforts and above all, patience. "Logistically, time is a major factor determining the effectiveness of a public diplomacy campaign" explains S. Zaharna.<sup>92</sup> Washington's heart and soul campaign was at best a late and rushed catch-up effort.<sup>93</sup> Public diplomacy must be included in the "takeoff" of policies, not only as Edward R. Murrow put it, "in the crash landings."<sup>94</sup> Changing opinions about America abroad will take a long, sustained effort that could easily outlast the military phase of the current war on

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<sup>89</sup> An example of this approach is the unsubtle launch of the first Arabic-language U.S. satellite-TV station, named Al-Hurra (Arabic for "the free") in February 2004. From the start, the new American-sponsored satellite television was pilloried in the Arab press as a propaganda arm of the State Department, trying to gloss over America's anti-Arab bias. Analysts have labelled it "Fox News in Arabic"; *New York Times*, February 20, 2004.

<sup>90</sup> Nye, "Propaganda isn't the Way", *op. cit.*

<sup>91</sup> Lussenhop, *op. cit.*

<sup>92</sup> Zaharna, "The Unintended...", *op. cit.*

<sup>93</sup> M. Kondracke, "Bush Poor at Public Diplomacy", *Naples Daily News*, March 30, 2004.

<sup>94</sup> U.S. - State Department, Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, *Building...*, *op. cit.*, 5.

terrorism.<sup>95</sup> The renewed mass diplomacy programs need more time to prove their value. “Just as it has taken us many years to get into this situation,” Margaret De B. Tutwiler, “so too will it take many years of hard focused work to get out of it.”<sup>96</sup> But many are optimistic that over time the broadcasts, the exchanges programs, contacts with civil society actors and alliances with foreign media can bring about more favourable attitudes towards America - if conducted in a more suitable way.<sup>97</sup>

## 6. Can Soft Power Diplomacy have Hard Effects?

### a. A crucial question, yet a difficult one to answer

This, the crucial issue in the evaluation of long term results, deserves more than any other to be explored before the close of this panoramic view of mass diplomacy and its evaluation. If mass diplomacy attempts to influence foreign nations through their public opinion (intermediate outcome) it is ultimately, let us remember, to serve the economic and military interest of nations (long term outcomes). Therefore “the unavoidable question” is whether mass diplomacy accomplishes or assists in the accomplishment of the goals assigned to it.<sup>98</sup> The experts (German, British, Canadian, Israeli, American, French and Germans) consulted on the subject admit that the estimation of the final contribution of mass diplomacy is a priority aspect that depends to a large extent the future of this branch of foreign policy.<sup>99</sup> Without this element, the evaluative response remains incomplete. With it we would finally be able to measure the impact and determine with precision the legitimate place that it should occupy within the external strategies of different nations.

While establishing causal links between this soft power diplomacy and its hard results is at best difficult, the task is not impossible. By systematically identifying the incremental outcomes expected at each successive step as suggested above, it is possible to construct a logical framework that can demonstrate how achieving short and intermediate outcome goals could lead to a certain level of certainty that expected results would be realized. Private sector experts

<sup>95</sup> S. Johnson and H. Dale, “How to Reinvigorate US Public Diplomacy” (*The Heritage Foundation*, April 23, 2003).

<sup>96</sup> U.S. – State Department, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, Tutwiler, “Public...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>97</sup> U.S. - State Department, Pachios, “The New...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>98</sup> Price, “Public Diplomacy...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>99</sup> Interviews with Barry Fulton, George Washington University & former-USIA agent (U.S.); Eytan Gilboa, Bar-Ilan University & Holon Institute of Technology (Israel); Evan H. Pooter, DFAIT (Canada); Robin C. Brown, University of Leeds (U.K.) (conducted in Montreal, March 18, 2004); Interviews realised with DGCID and TV5 leaders or members (Paris, Quai d’Orsay, July 2003).

acknowledge that establishing such convincing correlations is a reasonable expectation. This is how they themselves proceed to assess the success of their public relation campaigns.<sup>100</sup> For example, a corporation such as Coca-Cola makes use of the type of logical model to gauge the positive effects of its advertising campaigns on the consumption patterns for its products on a global and regional scale. In the case of the Coca-Cola Company, short-term outcomes include target audience knowledge and awareness of ad slogans, intermediate outcomes include positive changes in target opinions and long-term outcomes include a noticeable increase in terms of consumption. The realisations of short and intermediate goals are used as a surrogate to establish the generally un-measurable impact of the activity. Of course, this method does not provide 100% certainty about the contribution of the campaign to the success of the brand. The rise in the consumption of carbonated drinks was perhaps caused by a multitude of external factors such as the very simple possibility of a very hot summer. It can also be argued that mass diplomacy efforts cannot be assessed like any other information propagation program. Nevertheless, this logic model of estimation that is relatively simple, standard and often used in the private sphere can beneficially be adjusted to provide a first, fairly precise idea of the value of public diplomacy. The Accounting Office report on U.S. mass diplomacy programs noted that for comprehensive initiatives that bring together various initiatives to achieve a set of goals, such a logic model can help articulate how those initiatives are intended to assist and supplement one another.<sup>101</sup>

If the methodical in-depth evaluation of the programmes of mass diplomacy is theoretically conceivable, the implementation is, on the other hand, considerably hampered by two main types of problems:

- The first problem, touched on throughout this chapter, is that information and the necessary means of evaluation of the results in the long and medium terms are still largely missing. The databases have not been systematically updated, making a systematic estimation of progress in terms of audience and opinions difficult and making impossible any conclusion concerning end results for the moment. This situation is the result essentially of a gaping lack of resources and the state of neglect to which most programmes were left after the Cold War. Staffing and funds allocated to these programs are generally deficient to carry out the long-range monitoring required to adequately measure program effectiveness. Even if sufficient resources were available, it would still be difficult to conduct long-range tracking of audiences and opinion

<sup>100</sup> For information on this mode of evaluation: M. Fairchild, *The IPR Toolkit: Planning, Research and Evaluation for Public Relations Success* (London: IPR, 2001) (manual used by FCO's evaluation bureau).

<sup>101</sup> Evaluations of performance can then assess the effects of an integrated set of efforts; U.S. – GAO-03-951, *op. cit.*, 28.

change because they lack necessary databases to measure progress. Currently, the only evaluations that exist in this regards are uniquely speculative (such as the example of the “feeling” of mass diplomacy officers—see figure 3). Despite concentrated efforts in recent years, the means and information available remain insufficient, to which can be added the lack of a coordinated and concerted evaluation effort. The absence of an integrated structure for appraising mass diplomacy performance impedes governments' ability to amend their course of action or to direct resources toward activities that offer a greater likelihood of success.

**Figure 3: Questionnaire for State Department Mass Diplomacy Officers\***

Is Mass Diplomacy Promoting U.S. Interests?	Very Great Extent	Great Extent	Moderate Extent	Some or Little Extent	No Extent	Not Applicable
In informing foreign audiences of U.S. policies	26.3%	45.8%	26.3%	1.7%	0	0
In influencing foreign audiences regarding U.S. policies	7.6%	16.1%	57.6%	18.6%	0	0
In improving the U.S. image abroad	7.6%	22.9%	52.5%	15.3%	1.7%	0

Source GAO-03-951

\*Results of a study undertaken by the GAO consulting 118 State Department Mass Diplomacy Officers on their personal perception of the contribution of mass diplomacy to the promotion of American interests.<sup>102</sup>

- The other problem, mentioned already, is that it is too early to analyse the results of the mass diplomacy effort because it is a long-term strategy and operational programmes have recently been implemented and their outcomes will not be obvious for a number of years. Many governments are only beginning to “retool” their mass diplomacy programs dismantled in the immediate post-Cold War period (United States, U.K., France or Germany). In some cases these programs are still in the development stage (Canada, Japan, Italy, Iran); sometimes they are not yet organized or in possession of definitive infrastructure and strategic plans (Israel, China, Russia, South Africa). In addition, this new diplomacy is by nature longitudinal and its results, if there are results and they can be evaluated, are not yet apparent. Since the time of its resurgence, at the turn of the century, many analysts have misunderstood mass diplomacy. On the one hand, enthusiasts overvalued its capacity to produce immediate results. On the other hand, sceptics, forgetting the need for distance, hastily concluded it was ineffective. Both sorts of analysts failed to take into account the fact that mass diplomacy is something to be evaluated in the long run. For

<sup>102</sup> In recent interviews conducted in 2004 with more than 260 Foreign Service officers at about 30 U.S. missions around the world, many said public diplomacy today is as important as traditional diplomacy; see *Washington Times*, March 22, 2004.

their part, specialists consider that measuring the impact of public diplomacy programs is premature as the full effects of the renewed effort may not be known for years.<sup>103</sup> It will take time to adjust messages to different markets and understand the organic nature of the broadcasting landscape.<sup>104</sup> The results of this long-term strategy will probably not be apparent before thousands of students educated abroad have acquired positions of influence and millions of children exposed to cyber-diplomacy programs will become adult voters and consumers. In general then, we will have to wait 10 to 15 years before the cultural, educational and audiovisual initiatives launched at the outset of this decade bear fruit and we can usefully gauge their success.

#### b. A Tentative Prognosis

Without instruments indispensable for a complete and adequate evaluation, the Turkish mass diplomacy, the only one launched more than 10 years ago, offers the distance necessary for a preliminary attempt at evaluation. Remember that the Turkish programme was implemented in 1991 to seize the opportunity to fill the void left by the implosion of the Soviet Bloc and reach out to the new Turkic republics in the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia.<sup>105</sup> While it is impossible to establish any straightforward causal correlation, it is nevertheless interesting to attempt to determine to what extent the heightening of the Turkish mass diplomacy campaign in the early 1990's may be connected with any remarkable increase - or decrease - of its economic or strategic gains in the target zone.

The accentuation of Turkey's public diplomacy coincides first with an increase of its economic sway in the Eurasian zone. Between 1993 and 2002, the total value of its trade with Turkish-speaking countries doubled from \$55 billion to \$110 billion in value. Even more revealing is the fact that, at the end of the decade, Turkey became the only middle economic power to be a major trading partner of the Turkic world, standing alongside economic giants such as Europe, Russia, or the United States. In 2002, despite its lack of any noticeable economic appeal, Turkey was the 2<sup>nd</sup> country in terms of imports in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, the 3<sup>rd</sup> in Kazakhstan, and the 5<sup>th</sup> in Uzbekistan.<sup>106</sup> Despite a slight falling off of trade from 2002, Turkey continues to hold an economic position out of proportion to its real economic status. That position is being solidified by the beginning of economic integration into the Organisation for Economic Cooperation, with

<sup>103</sup> B. Barrett (U.S. Advisory Commission for Public Diplomacy chair), quoted in Weiser, *op. cit.*

<sup>104</sup> C. Langdon (rapporteur), "Public Service Broadcasting in Transition States" (Wilton Park Conference: WP675, May 20-22 2002).

<sup>105</sup> For more on Turkey's cultural diplomacy see Pahlavi, "The Conquest...", in Gervers & al. eds., *op. cit.*



the adoption of a plan on 10% Preferential Tariff Agreements, and a long-term project for the complete elimination of trade barriers among the Turkish-speaking countries.<sup>107</sup> Turkey continues to consolidate its special position with the extension of the Black Sea Cooperative Organisation and the development of the Silk Road trading route for which it will be one of the strategic gateways.<sup>108</sup>

Figure 4: Turkey's Foreign Trade with Turkish-speaking Nations (in thousands of euros)

	Exports			Imports		
	1993	1996	2002	1993	1996	2002
Azerbaijan	68 206	239 221	231 431	33 938	38 238	64 627
Kazakhstan	67 834	164 044	160 152	43 741	100 595	203 852
Kirghizistan	17 014	47 100	24 004	3 470	5 879	17 623
Turkmenistan	83 848	65 657	110 021	76 892	100 314	106 349
Uzbekistan	213 518	229 859	93 796	31 934	56 479	75 343

Source : Centre for the Development of Exports (IGEME) country reports (<http://www.igeme.org.tr>) - Under Secretary for Foreign Trade (DTM - <http://www.igeme.org.tr>).

Since the inauguration of its new diplomacy, the more “unexpected” economic results came in the field of hydrocarbon.<sup>109</sup> In Caucasus, Turkey gained a considerable share of the Azeri oilfields, benefiting from an “evident favour to the disadvantage of its Iranian rival”<sup>110</sup> during what has been called the “deal of the century.”<sup>111</sup> Turkey has also been greatly favoured regarding the pipeline project designed to export the Turkish-speaking zone's oil to the world market. It was decided to construct a gas pipeline across the Caspian through Azerbaijan, Georgia and through the Turkish port of Ceyhan to Western consumers even though its cost-effectiveness was highly questionable and “even though the construction costs, estimated to \$231 million, are clearly higher than the costs of the Russian route's tender, evaluated at \$56 million.”<sup>112</sup> Undoubtedly, the U.S. alliance has heavily influenced the selection of the Turkish route but it cannot take all the credit. For example, it does not explain why the Central Asian governments have “lobbied hard” for the piping of their oil and gas via Turkey rather than via Russia or the Black Sea,<sup>113</sup> or why Washington has not favoured another of its regional clients. In fact even those who focus on other

<sup>106</sup> U.S. - CIA, *The World Factbook* (CIA, 2002). <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/aj.html>. (accessed June 2003).

<sup>107</sup> The ECO includes Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan and the 5 new Turcophone republics.

<sup>108</sup> M. Müftüler, “Turkey’s New Vocation”, *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* 22, no3 (1999), 11.

<sup>109</sup> A. Cohen, “The New Great Game: Pipeline Politics in Eurasia”, *Eurasian Studies* 1 (1996), 2-15.

<sup>110</sup> A. Tarock, “Iran’s policy in Central Asia”, *Central Asian Survey* 16, no2 (1997), 196.

<sup>111</sup> Azerbaijan – MFA, *Azerbaijan: An Emerging Free Market Democracy* (Document prepared by the Embassy of Azerbaijan at Washington D.C., Dec. 1993), 16.

<sup>112</sup> D. Billion, *Le Rôle Géostratégique de la Turquie* (Paris: Iris Presse, 1995), 50.

sources of influence recognise that Turkish diplomacy and cultural affinities have played a decisive role.<sup>114</sup>

The heightening of the Turkish public diplomacy program also coincides with a strengthening of Turkey's strategic role in the Turkic world. Turkish diplomacy was successful in emphasising ethno-cultural ties with the populations in the region to create a relationship of trust with their governments and to facilitate the development of a privileged military axis. Leaders of NATO recognise that the use of this variable allowed Turkey to play a key role as negotiator in the expansion of NATO's *Partnership for Peace* programme to the Turkish speaking republics.<sup>115</sup> As a result, Turkey has assumed a central position in NATO operations in the entire Turkic zone.<sup>116</sup> In the Balkans it has participated in all the operations led by NATO since 1995: IFOR, SFOR, KFOR, Essential Harvest, Amber Fox. With a total of 1321 Turkish troops on duty in the region - 502 soldiers serving within its mechanized battalion task force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 684 soldiers on duty within its mechanized infantry battalion in Kosovo, 33 soldiers serving with Task Force Fox in Macedonia, 34 soldiers stationed in Albania and hundreds of police officers operating under the International Police Task Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the UN Mission in Kosovo, Turkey is the most active military power in that part of Europe. Why not Greece? In the Caucasus and in Central Asia, Turkey has also been able to take advantage of its image of "big brother" to establish its military influence, an influence of which one of the culminating points was when Turkey assumed the command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in 2002. In addition, Ankara has considerably developed its bilateral military cooperation with its "sister republics" with the installation of bases and the dispatching of military counsellors across the region from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China. For U.S. observers Turkey is now "at the crossroads of almost every issue of importance to the U.S. on the Eurasian Continent."<sup>117</sup> To a large extent, this omnipresent position acquired by Turkey owes an enormous debt to its mass diplomacy and the legitimacy that it has consolidated over the last decade.

Turkey is clearly punching well above its actual weight in the Turco-Iranian region. Overall, we can speculate on the causes of the appearance, during the last few years, of a flow of

<sup>113</sup> G. Gleason, "Foreign Policy and Domestic Reform in Central Asia", *Central Asian Survey* 20, no2 (2001), 176.

<sup>114</sup> A. Burk, "Pipeline Politics: US Corporations Lead Foreign Economic Policy." *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* 24, no1 (Fall 2000), 7.

<sup>115</sup> NATO, "Chapter 3. How PfP can contribute to the enlargement Process", in *Study on NATO...*, *op. cit.*; see also "Western Aid: A Stabilising Factor?" available @ [http:// www.nato.int/docu](http://www.nato.int/docu) (accessed June 2003).

<sup>116</sup> Turkey – MFA, "Turkey's Security Perspectives and Its Relations with NATO", *op. cit.*

<sup>117</sup> Aysegul Sever, "Turkey's Stance on Dual Containment", *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* 24, no1 (winter 2001), 65.

privileged exchanges among the Turkish-speaking republics or the development of a strategic axis as well as we can ask ourselves whether this nascent “Turkish connection” has been encouraged by mass diplomacy's incentives for pan-Turkish solidarity. After all, Turkey is not the only military power in the region and not the only ally of the United States and its modest economy is far from offering what other economic powers can offer. Why didn't the Turkish speaking republics not develop similar ties with other regional players such as Iran, Pakistan or China? Without asserting that the mass diplomacy and cultural policy are the only variables explaining for these successes, it seems clear that they should be taken into account in a comprehensive analysis.

## **Conclusion**

Though it is tempting to venture a prognosis for mass diplomacy, without appropriate instruments and the longitudinal nature of the “new diplomacy”, it would be presumptuous and precocious to pronounce on its effectiveness. Question can be raised but not answered. Enthusiasts have the tendency of overvaluing its capacity to serve foreign policy while sceptics, both more numerous and less timorous, have taken the habit of concluding hastily and obstinately that the effort is in vain. Nevertheless, neither the former nor the latter have at their disposable enough proof to support their arguments; nor do they have the tools to obtain that proof. As we've seen in this chapter, the reason is that no evaluation programmes worth the name are currently able to measure the impact of mass diplomacy in a comprehensive and systematic way because of a lack of money and data. The goals are difficult to evaluate, the measuring tools are only beginning to be developed, the databases are deficient and there are no adequately coordinated programs. Occasionally, we even have the impression that judging by the few resources earmarked for evaluation, that the greatest problem is the lack of a real will on the part of public authorities to achieve progress in this domain.

Nevertheless, many observers are increasingly becoming aware of the importance of evaluating mass diplomacy. The lack of an integrated system for measuring public diplomacy performance hinders mass diplomats' ability to plot and navigate a course to channel their multifaceted programs toward concrete and measurable progress. This in itself should prompt more efforts. An adequate performance measurement system would provide the ability to correct their course of action or to direct resources toward activities that offer a greater likelihood of success. For the moment they are steering blind without any form of indicator allowing them to assure themselves of the solid foundations of their strategic choices. Being able to measure the

successes and failures of different programs, even if only approximately, would allow them to operate in a more constructive way and to make of mass diplomacy a real strategic tool for foreign policy.

The development of a program capable of measuring the effectiveness of mass diplomacy and its propensity to serve concrete objectives of foreign policy also has considerable implications for our knowledge of international relations. With appropriate instruments it would be possible to know if the influence of culture, education, information and the media can affect states' interests in the same way as more tangible forces such as the military or economics. To be capable of evaluating whether mass diplomacy is effective would give access to a concrete manifestation of the increased complexity of the nature of power of states within the international system. We would be able, in other words, to confirm the seductive hypothesis, still unverified, that soft power 'matters' and 'can have hard results.'<sup>118</sup> On question of evaluation hangs not only the future of this new form of diplomacy of hearts and minds, but also an important revolution in international relations. The answer is at hand.

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<sup>118</sup> Nye, *The Paradox...*, *op. cit.*, 72.

## **Chapter XI. Conclusions**

For centuries, the masses were left apart from a foreign affairs apparatus essentially limited to exchanges between governments entrusted to eminent emissaries such as Descartes, Voltaire, Miranda, or Paderewski. At the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, all of this changed with the emergence alongside this traditional diplomacy of communiqués and secret alcoves of a diplomacy of the information age including in its sphere of influence an audience expanded to include billions of individuals. Its rare specialists thought that it might well revolutionise the art of foreign affairs. Nevertheless, undoubtedly because discretion is its strength and its emergence is very recent, this aspect of foreign policy has until now been essentially ignored. This thesis has attempted to remedy that ignorance. This pioneering study has made evident that the renewal of public diplomacy as well as the sudden attention devoted to it in recent years were essentially stimulated by the new operational environment caused by the expansion of the revolution in information and communications. It also appears that in adapting itself to this new environment it has mutated into a new type of public diplomacy: a diplomacy of the masses, a diplomacy of the marketplace, equipped with sophisticated means of communication, organised in an entrepreneurial way and led with the help of partners external to the government sphere. The new technological context, exacerbated by the psychological shock of global terrorism, has thus suddenly propelled a new form of “battle for hearts and minds” to the top of the international political agenda: mass diplomacy. This examination of how public diplomacy is adapting to the new global information order produced several results having important implications both at empirical and theoretical levels, of which the main points should be reviewed.

### **A Growth Spurred by New Information and Communication Technologies**

The prime mover for the emergence of mass diplomacy is the late twentieth century heightening of the mass media revolution. No other factor better explains its sudden growth or coincides more directly with it than the acceleration of the NICTs revolution and the globalisation of the information society. Born in the twentieth century, at the same time as the television and radio, public diplomacy played only a minor role before the explosion of the internet, satellite networks, digital networks and the other mass media springing from the technological revolution concentrated at the end of the 1990's. In fact, it almost disappeared following the demise of the Cold War despite the influence of the other factors that might explain its development such as the

globalisation of trade and economic interdependence. There is indisputably a direct link between mass diplomacy and the advent of NICTs and the information society. One can observe, for instance, that the principal entrepreneurs of the first, such as the United States, Great Britain, France and Qatar also find themselves as the principal players in the information and communications market. And, in recent years, the development of cyber-diplomacy in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran and China has followed closely on the development of their expertise in the domain of transnational telecommunications. Many other pieces of evidence have been analysed that tend to prove this close correlation between the two revolutions.

The revitalisation of public diplomacy, as we've seen, is also directly linked to the emergence of global terrorism, that other avatar of the information age. To further their objectives, terrorist organisations and extremist powers have also understood the potential of public opinion and weapons of mass persuasion, and are now trying their hand with some degree of success. Equipped with a powerful message and capable of procuring themselves powerful technological tools to broadcast it, many are positioning themselves as leaders in the field. In many regards their TV and radio broadcasts to the Greater Middle East have dwarfed western efforts at public diplomacy. By choosing the battlefield of images, words and screens, they have also strongly contributed to justifying and accelerating the development of mass diplomacy. In order to not lose the battle of ideas and to counteract an intangible enemy particularly resistant to brute force, the general development of strategies of persuasion seems likely. In any case, a growing number of political leaders and foreign policy officials seem persuaded of that fact. In the United States, the proponents of traditional gunboat diplomacy and the hawks of the republican administration have acquired, for their part, the certainty that the most sophisticated weapons have lost their strength in the face of an adversary with relatively few weapons besides fanatical resolution. They are not alone because the democrats have also promised that when they ascend to the White House, they will make the new diplomacy a priority of their foreign policy and the spearhead of their strategy against terrorism.<sup>1</sup> Elsewhere in the world, many other officials now consider that mass diplomacy has become indispensable in order to play extremists at their own game and counter their messages using the same tools. At least, this growing consensus in circles of power, added to the incessant technological progress in the domain of NICTs leaves us to predict a bright future for mass diplomacy.

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<sup>1</sup> "None of the American efforts will prevail", democrat candidate Kerry said, "unless the war of ideas is won" ; Zuckman, *op. cit.*


The simultaneity and the similarity with which mass diplomacy has developed allow us to approach the phenomenon in a global way and to indulge in a number of comparisons. It re-emerged in effect there where it was marginalised and emerged where it had not existed before according to conditions remarkably similar over a relatively short period coinciding with the accentuation of the mass media revolution at the global scale. It grew markedly within the great diplomatic powers that already had a tradition of public and cultural diplomacy such as the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany or Japan. But smaller diplomatic powers such as Australia, Canada, Italy or Qatar stole a step on them with an almost simultaneous development while some newcomers such as Turkey even preceded them by a few years. Accelerated by global terrorism, the boom of public diplomacy then rapidly generalised to the entirety of players on the international political scene, including China, Russia, Brazil, New Zealand, Thailand, Spain...

The means, the attention and the institution status that mass diplomacy enjoys today are the first signs of this revitalisation. While almost disappearing a few years prior, public diplomacy now controls a respectable budget that is nearing the billion-dollar mark for the largest powers, and has committed itself widely to reasonable but regular increase that contrasts sharply with the crisis of the period immediately following the end of the Cold War. The billion dollars that the great powers such as the US, the UK, France, Germany or Japan spend might still seem derisory in relation to the considerable sums invested in the rest of foreign affairs or in defense spending. Nevertheless, it is essential to remember that mass diplomacy can produce impressive results with a proportionally small investment of resources. The management of cultural, educational or audiovisual programs consume little money, especially there where infrastructure already exists. This financial advantage will only increase with the reduction of costs linked to the democratisation of NICTs. It is for that reason that, though financial indicators are revealing, they do not take into account the real scope of the phenomenon that the institutional transformation indicate more clearly.

That being said, the portion of spending in regards to mass diplomacy in the total foreign policy budget also constitutes a significant indicator of the new importance acquired by mass diplomacy (figure 9). In relative terms, mass diplomacy consumes between 1/20 and 1/3 of the total foreign affairs budgets of key players on the international scene. Mass diplomacy represents 6% of the allocations to US International Affairs. The proportion grows to more than 28% of the budget of the foreign affairs department of the United Kingdom and 33% of that of the Federal Republic of Germany. It represents no less than 37% of the Quai d'Orsay budget. These figures jump to 10% of the US budget and 44% of the French budget if we include money devoted to

foreign aide and development grants, properly considered an element of this diplomatic targeting of foreign populations.

Figure 9. Compared Share of Mass Diplomacy in the Total Foreign Policy Budgets in 2004 (%)




As made evident by figure 9, the budgetary criteria allows the distinction between two groups of nations; on one hand the countries of the EU for whom mass diplomacy represents between one fourth and one third of their foreign policy budget and on the other hand, the United States, Canada and Australia where mass diplomacy occupies less than 10% of the total foreign affairs budget. This bears witness to the fact that this facet of foreign policy now occupies a preponderant place in the diplomatic apparatus of “old” European powers. Though some have thought this effort could reflect a hopeless attempt to halt their decline, it is that by placing them ahead in the new front of international relations, this is a strategy for the future, likely to allow them to play again a leading role on the international stage. If mass diplomacy still accounts for only a relatively modest portion of the budget of the “young” powers such the United States, Canada and Australia, that does not signify that it is not taken seriously but that these countries have only recently begun to understand the extent of the strategic ramifications of mass diplomacy. Paradoxically, the US invented public diplomacy, but it is only with the shock of September 11 and the war on terrorism that they truly came to appreciate its value and strategic importance. It is important to remember that this branch of foreign affairs has, in these countries, had the tendency to augment far more quickly than in other countries over the the course of recent months, jumping from 5% to 6% in the American case and from 6 to 10% in the Australian case. What is more, in absolute terms, the American budget is finally as large as that of the great European powers and the portion allocated to its cyber diplomacy sharply higher than that of other countries. But, once again, it is important not to give greater weight to a budgetary indicator than it deserves. In terms of the organisation of external broadcasting, the Europeans especially



lead the way. The British – and to some extent the French and German – are equipped with the best organised example of cyber-diplomacy and the most successful in terms of audience.

Figure 2. Cyberdiplomacy Annual Budgets (million euro)



Source: B.B.G., B.B.C., D.W., Quai d'Orsay.

Mass diplomacy also occupies a growing position in the policy of “new” players on the diplomatic scene from New Zealand to Brazil, South Africa and Iran, bearing witness to the general awareness of its potential. For many of these ascendant powers, it is a solution, not overly onerous, that allows them to make up for the deficit in their military and economic power. What is the most surprising on the other hand, is that it until now was neglected by China and Russia, two major diplomatic powers. Without a doubt the delay has a variety of explanations, but the most important is the prevalence of a traditional concept of foreign affairs still largely associated with sources of brute power that are economics and the military. By challenging this traditional doctrine and by opening the debate on the necessity of developing as quickly as possible a public diplomacy program, Beijing and Moscow have shown that it is only a matter of time before these giants make up their tardiness in this area and install themselves as serious operators. Finally, because they are still engaged in a logic of power politics, deprived of a tradition of foreign affairs and sufficient means, especially in technological terms, some developing nations such as North Korea or Algeria are still without soft power diplomacy.<sup>2</sup> We can expect though that these countries on the periphery of the great diplomatic powers are progressively developing their expertise in this area and will soon join the race for hearts and minds. Despite differences in budget, the mass diplomacy of all governments seems to be motivated by a desire to develop alternative sources of influence, whether to complete, to halt the retreat or to make up for delays in other sources of power.

<sup>2</sup> J. Goldgeier and M. McFaul, “Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era”, *International Organisation* (spring 1992), 479.

A final general observation concerning the growth of mass diplomacy is necessary. Given the direct connections between them, we can expect that NICTs and mass diplomacy will continue to develop together over the coming years. In the first case, while the blessings of NICTs have not yet reached many of those around the world whom governments would like to address, modern mass diplomacy already reaches overseas populations through national frontiers and despite local controls more effectively than could have been imagined a generation ago. The unbridled development of NICTs suggests that populations still out of reach will soon be included in the sphere of influence of the information society. As the network of communications technology is about to become the central nervous system of an increasing interconnected world, mass diplomacy is bound to become more and more important. Secondly, with the democratisation of new technologies and their growing accessibility, we can easily imagine that all nations that do not yet have access will make up this delay, also entering the era of mass diplomacy. Finally, and above all, promises offered by new technological discoveries and their multiple diplomatic applications allow us to envisage a bright future for this branch of foreign policy. The current information revolution is only in its first phase, we can thus suppose that mass diplomacy is still in an embryonic state in relation to what it could become. Scientific and technological progresses regularly allow us to improve communication tools, making mass diplomacy always more effective and indispensable. New web-based breakthroughs such as interactive TV, mobile phones and wireless internet, games consoles and personal organisers (PDAs) offer a new level of interactivity without precedent for establishing permanent contact with target audiences and building new types of connections based around passions, interests and local areas.<sup>3</sup> Thanks to prodigious instruments that are still to be discovered, it will certainly increase this reach far beyond what is even conceivable today.

### **A New Way to Reflect the Demands of the Information Age**

Beyond the quantitative increase in effort that is devoted to it, the re-emergence of public diplomacy can be seen in the qualitative transformation of its strategy and its operational structures, bearing witness as well to the acclimatisation to the new demands of the global information age. Reforms were essential to adapt a public diplomacy system effective during the Cold War to a new operational environment characterised by growing scepticism of populations in regards to government and the unprecedented scope of the role played by public opinion, but also, and above all, the liberalisation of the information marketplace, the increasingly porous

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<sup>3</sup> U.K. - BBCi, "Digital Service" (released by BBC), available @ [www.bbc.co.uk](http://www.bbc.co.uk) (accessed May 2004).

nature of borders to the international flow of information and culture, the effectiveness and the reach of the new persuasion tools available. It became necessary to adjust old programmes inherited from the Cold War based on expired techniques of persuasion and rigid and centralised structures. From this process of adjustment has resulted a metamorphosed public diplomacy perfectly acclimatized to the information age and fully justifying the use of terms such as mass diplomacy and cyber-diplomacy. At the level of its formulation, it has moulted into a communication platform benefiting from the expertise of specialists in media and marketing and integrating branding techniques used in public relations campaigns. At the level of the organisation, it is increasingly shedding the rigid, centralised and strictly governmental structure of the preceding era for a more flexible architecture and managerial model, allowing it to decentralise its operations and to extend its reach far beyond official circles, outside state institutions, through the intermediary of third parties drawn from the world of media, entertainment, civil society and NGO's. Within this organisation, digital radio and television, satellites, the internet and other technological products of the information revolution are playing an unprecedented role. These new diplomatic tools and this infrastructure are transfiguring public diplomacy by projecting it into the era of mass persuasion far, very far, from the era where it was limited to student exchanges, elitist conferences and painting exhibits.

Establishing itself as the model for the new generation of public diplomacy, the American case offers a good view of the evolution of this branch of foreign policy and the problems it will have to overcome in the coming century. On the one hand, it is through it that we can best see the radical transformation from traditional public diplomacy and current mass diplomacy. Undoubtedly encouraged by the laissez-faire attitude about culture and information, Americans have understood better than anyone the obsolescence of strictly state interventions and the benefit to be derived from an entrepreneurial approach allowing influence through the actions and voices of third party players from the media, NGO's and civil society. Archetype of the furtive mass diplomacy of tomorrow, this mass diplomacy increasingly abandons official media and institutions in favour of allied intermediaries with more credibility in the eyes of target audiences such as Disney, Fox and Amnesty International. On the other hand, the American example also illustrates the ambiguities, obstacles and weaknesses of the diplomacy of the future. The American case has in particular shown to what point it can be unbalanced by still underfinanced and hastily reconstituted programmes to regain the trust of public opinion that for a decade has been neglected and submitted to the hostile propaganda of adversaries. It also makes clear the fact that programmes only begun can not provide instant miracles especially when their operations are ruined by blunders and upsets of the rest of foreign policy (scandals, torture, collateral damage).

The American effort in particular illustrates to what extent mass diplomacy is a long term effort of which it would be presumptuous to judge in the same way we judge military or economic initiatives.

In a more general way, bearing witness to the universal character of the phenomena of the adjustment of public diplomacy, the process of restructuring of its operational structure has happened in a quasi-identical way across the globe. Whether they are Americans, Europeans or Asians, countries have reformed their public diplomacy at the same time in a collective wave of reorganisation of diplomatic systems left over from the Cold War. In all cases, one of major similarities of this general remaking has been the strengthening or the creation of a distinct concentration of public diplomacy, equipped with independent means and its own steering agencies, its own organs and its own telecommunication tools.<sup>4</sup> More significant still, this branch has been organised almost everywhere on the same principals and the same priorities. Articulated around the bureaucratic-entrepreneurial model, this restructuring has resulted everywhere and quite simultaneously in the adoption of a more flexible architecture, by the assimilation of new modes of operation inspired by the marketing world, by the integration of new technologies of cyber-diplomacy as well as the adoption of a new style of operation based on more or less formal relationships with external partners. This synchronicity and symmetry clearly confirms a global revolution in the art of public diplomacy made necessary by the adaptation to a new operational environment of the information age. Already, and almost everywhere, the criteria for recruitment within public institutions requires that new diplomats be experts in international politics but also public relations, marketing techniques, sociology and modern communications techniques.

But the upheaval that accompanies the advent of mass diplomacy is not limited to a redefinition of its own sphere because the new model seems to apply to the conduct of the whole of foreign affairs. Allowing significant practical advantages over the organisations of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the bureaucratic-entrepreneurial model seems well suited to become the norm for the whole of foreign affairs. By maintaining a minimum of strategic leadership and by offering a maximum of decentralisation, this system seems perfectly tailored to deal with the new challenges of our era in a variety of fields. It is, for example, increasingly applied to the reorganisation of armed forces to integrate in a more effective way the strategic, operational and

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<sup>4</sup> The fusion of the 'U.S. Information Agency (1998), the *Freedom Promotion Act* (2002), the creation of the DGCID within Quai d'Orsay (1999), the implementation of *Concept 2000* by Auswärtiges Amt, the vote on Charter 1996 by the BBC, the restructuring of the Palazzo Farnese (1998-2001) and the creation of the Chinese 'Public Diplomacy Board' (2004) to cite a few examples, have all clearly been oriented by the same desire to inscribe mass diplomacy more resolutely into the centre of the new foreign affairs.

tactical levels of the chain of command more effectively while granting more autonomy to local units. Because it has adapted itself to a security context that is increasingly demanding and volatile, this modular and flexible architecture resorting to the use of NICTS and the sharing of responsibilities, has in particular been chosen by then American (*QDR 2001*), British (*UK Defense policy 2001*), Canadian (*Strategy 2020*) and Australian (*2000 Australian Defence Review*) general-staffs in the context of the renovation of their operational structures.<sup>5</sup> This shows that the managerial mode that characterises the new public diplomacy reflects a general transformation in the way of conducting foreign affairs. Its analysis can thus provide insight into what international relations will become in the 21<sup>st</sup> century: a market driven strategy equipped with sophisticated communication equipment and benefiting from informal coalitions and operational channels outside the government.

### **Mass Diplomacy: A Mix of Realism and Idealism**

From a theoretical point of view, this study of mass diplomacy tends to bolster the general argument about the complexification of state power sources and a particular reorientation of their foreign affairs policies towards intangible sources of power and influence. This being the case, it also goes further by identifying the concrete means available to states for domesticating what has come to be called *soft power* and making it serve the hard goals of its foreign policy.

Since the Peloponnesian War, academics and practitioners, from Thucydides to Aron, have devoted the greatest attention to the study of factors that link ideational factors such as culture and information to the conduct of foreign policy.<sup>6</sup> However, looking through the narrow lens of the Cold War nuclear competition between superpowers, neorealist scholars emphasized the exclusion of ideational factors from foreign policy considerations and concentrated their research on tangible sources of power and security essentially associated with military and economic force. This restricted approach to foreign policy became increasingly problematic in the post-Cold War era and the context of rapid global communication and exchange. In particular, it quickly became incapable of grasping the increasingly intangible factors affecting diplomacy such as the explosion of new technologies of communication, the increased influence of values, norms, information and the growing importance of public opinion. These tensions led theorists to

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<sup>5</sup> Canada – DND, *L'environnement de sécurité de l'avenir - QDR 2001* (Département de Planification et Gestion de la Défense, 2004); Canada – DND, *Concept d'Action Stratégique des Forces Canadiennes 2020* (Département de Planification et Gestion de la Défense, 2004); Canada – DND, *Rapport Annuel du CEMD-2002-2003* (Chef d'Etat-major de la Défense, 2004).

<sup>6</sup> On this aspect of Thucydides' thought see, in particular, J.B. Elshtain, "Feminist Inquiry and International Relations", in Doyle and Ikenberry eds, *op. cit.*, 20-53.

reintroduce ideational factors into the study of foreign policy. Political scientist Joseph Nye was one of the first to suggest that culture and information had become important sources of power, through the bias of “soft power”, a concept coined in the early nineties. Although it is now widely invoked in foreign policy debates, this notion remains nevertheless, because of its great versatility, difficult to apply to the conduct or study of foreign policy. Nye acknowledges that soft power is quite difficult to use because of its intangible quality, its unpredictability, its tendency to have diffuse effects on the outside world and its inability to achieve specific outcomes.<sup>7</sup> By evading the question of an explicit soft power policy serving to channel and magnify cultural and informational influence, this theory remains therefore incomplete in regards to the importance it is currently acquiring in a world where massive flows of cheap information and culture cross national borders every day.

It is precisely this important fault that an in-depth analysis of mass diplomacy contributes to remedy. It appears in fact as the missing link between the study of the relationship between ideational factors and foreign policy, allowing at the same time to better understand how soft power could be put to the uses of the second. The information revolution makes this new public diplomacy a concrete means by which states can attempt to exploit culture and information, channel them to their advantage and make them serve their own foreign policy goals. Throughout history, these factors have been important sources of soft power. But the new information age provides the tools that were missing to unchain their potential and persuade targets more easily and more massively. “With its emphasis on information and knowledge, the new communications environment is making soft power more practical. Indeed, the new information and communication technologies hold the key to soft power, making it possible to appeal directly to a multitude of actors. It emphasizes the shaping and sharing of ideas, values, norms, laws, and ethics through soft power.”<sup>8</sup> The political leaders and foreign affairs officials were amongst the first to recognise that, with the advent of global communications, “culture and politics have become interdependent.”<sup>9</sup> Suddenly, conscious state participation in the very international marketplace of ideas became technically feasible if not politically rewarding. With the rise of NICTs and by virtue of necessity, a foreign policy of media space has emerged allowing diplomats to tap into the wellspring of culture and information and disseminate preferred values and norms across national borders to shape the information space of other nations and put public pressure on their leaders.

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<sup>7</sup> J.S. Nye, “The Power We Must Not Squander”, *The New York Times*, January 3, 2000.

<sup>8</sup> Todd Martin, *op. cit.*

<sup>9</sup> Iran - Assefi, “Mass Media...”, *op. cit.*

The mechanism by which the projection of soft power acts on the behaviour of foreign governments remained to be resolved. While constructivism establishes a useful analytic correlation between the normative, cultural and informational structure of the international system (causal variable) and state interests (dependent variable), the notion of state identity (intervening variable) remains airtight, ambiguous, impossible to measure and particularly badly adapted to empirical study. Being devoid of a theory of preference or interest formation, Nye's approach is no more able to explain the mechanism by which ideational factors modify the interests of a foreign state or reshape the attitudes and opinions of overseas populations – largely because it simply ignores the importance of public opinions in this course. The study of mass diplomacy resolves this major difficulty by taking into account the until now neglected role of public opinion in the foreign policy making process. The inclusion of this variable is justified at the same time by the growing participation of public opinion in international decisions and their greater sensitivity to the cross-border flow of information and communication. The masses exert more and more weight on their governments while being more and more influenced by the values and external ideas to which they have now access thanks to international media. Mass diplomacy consists precisely of the exploitation of this porosity and growing malleability. Its study shows how one can attempt to influence foreign populations for the purpose of turning the policy of their governments to advantage; influencing partner and rival countries from inside by flooding foreign publics with a set of preferred values. This perspective has the merit of being more complete and more concrete than other existing theoretical approaches that attempt to explain the role of ideational factors in international relations and the behaviour of states (see figure 1 – chapter I) without taking into account that it is more easily given to empirical study (Chapter X).

By filling these gaps, the study of mass diplomacy also helps to show that, far from being obsolete, the realist theory of international relations can be extended, enriched and updated to adapt to the changing world order and reveal a much more innovating perspective on foreign policy. The emergence of this diplomacy of persuasion confirms the classic postulate that the natural interest of states is to compete for power and influence however they can, and to expand the scope of their activities as much as resources allow no matter what these resources are or whether they are tangible or intangible. But through the study of mass diplomacy we can see that states, like flora and fauna, adapt to the evolution of their environment by adapting in particular to new approaches (network-building, public-private partnerships, and modern communications) to complete their traditional sources of power. This seems to confirm that the maximisation of power and influence is not limited necessarily to tangible factors associated with economic and military force, reintroducing to the theoretical debate a totally concealed aspect of traditional

realism. Did not Morgenthau himself suggest that the pursuit of interests and power are not determined once and for all but depend on the context in which states evolve and the means put at their disposal?<sup>10</sup> The traditional idea of *realpolitik* – the maximization of national interests by any means available – now also passes through non-coercive means of influence completely compatible with the development of peaceful international co-operation. Mass diplomacy is a mix of advocacy of principle and extension of national interest and therefore of idealism and *realpolitik*. By showing that in the information age, *realpolitik* can converge with *kulturpolitik* it is not impossible that this study will participate in a reconciliation of realism and idealism.<sup>11</sup>

What this thesis bring forth is a complexification of the components and nature of diplomacy. In an intricate world where simple distinctions tend to become blurred, diplomacy becomes inevitably more sophisticated. As means of exchange intensify and nations become inextricably entangled, there is mounting need to combine direct force with alternative means and to search for more subtle methods of persuasion. In the new operational landscape brought by the intensification of the information revolution, the challenge for states is to develop an integrated approach complementing classic power diplomacy with more indirect strategy oriented toward cyber-space and public opinions. The sources of national power underpinning relations with other countries, or foreign policy, have become more diverse. This does not mean that the point of foreign policy is no longer to acquire influence and gain power for the nation. It does mean though that these goals can no longer be accomplished by relying on brute force alone. What is being brought about before our eyes, and this study contributes to making more apparent, is a re-equilibration between ‘hard power’ diplomacy and ‘soft power’ diplomacy; a re-equilibration which is the core factor lying at the heart of the foreign policy revolution and the emergence of mass diplomacy. The information age not only undermines prerequisite conditions for hard power diplomacy but also creates favourable conditions for the flourishing of soft power diplomacy of which mass diplomacy is a form. In the new hypermedia environment, states’ ability to influence their partners depends increasingly on factors that transcend raw economic and military power and that appeal to public perception abroad. Bases for indirect influence, persuasion and appeal are assuming increasing significance in the mix of power resources stimulating states to re-think the conduct of their foreign policy. Indeed, states hoping to retain advantages in traditional areas of power must engage this decentralized environment in new and creative ways taking into account both the challenges and the opportunities brought by the information revolution. This is

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<sup>10</sup> H. Morgenthau, “Les Six Principes du Réalisme”, in Braillard, *op. cit.*, 82-96.

<sup>11</sup> Von Barloeven, *op. cit.*, 22-23.



why even the most pragmatic leaders and foreign policy makers understand today that national power must henceforth include public diplomacy.

### **Conquering the Sixth Continent: Competing for the Global Mind Space**

The study of mass diplomacy provides a useful backdrop for consideration of what is changing in international relations and allows the anticipation of an evolution that seems inevitable, but which required a grasp of an already palpable reality. With technological globalisation and the soft power revolution, an era of cultural and information rivalry is looming in which the traditional spirit of conquest is progressively displaced by the conquest of spirits. In this hypermedia context, states will increasingly mobilise *en mass*, to compete for the sympathies of the greatest number of people. More and more, international players “are going to compete to promote their individual cultural values”, thus creating a generalised competition for cultural influence on the international scene.<sup>12</sup> But, as several zones of influence can be juxtaposed without necessarily creating tension, this “contest of competitive credibility” does not need to take the form of a “clash of civilisations” and automatically end in a war of global scale. The “societal cold war” described by Barry Buzan is a more probable and less pessimistic scenario.<sup>13</sup> The beauty of cultural and information persuasion is that it is not exclusive as the global mind space for which mass diplomacies will compete is a prize potentially without limits. As long as cultural differences continue to exist, states, big and small, will remain determined to promote their own identity, values and norms.<sup>14</sup> Competition will be about shaping opinions and thoughts, and ultimately attempting to define reality for others. Each actor will attempt to define what's good, what's bad, and whose story gets told. G. F. Hegel envisioned this type of cultural battle for people's minds: “the parties involved will invariably claim to be defending a sacred principle in relation to which the norms of other nations are secondary and of lesser validity.”<sup>15</sup> In this regard, mass diplomacy appears as a perfectly adapted strategy to face the challenges of this new age where the exclusive use of brute force is increasingly problematic and where it is increasingly difficult to obtain the collaboration of states without preparing their respective bodies of public opinion and without their consent. A combination of audacity and prudence, mass diplomacy presents itself as an alternative to naked force offering the promise to provide important services

<sup>12</sup> S.P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilisations?”, *Foreign Affairs* 72, no3 (summer 1993), 29.

<sup>13</sup> Buzan, *op. cit.*

<sup>14</sup> S. Chubin, “The South and the New World Order,” *Washington Quarterly* 16 (1993), 90.

<sup>15</sup> G. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. Introduction: Reason in History*. Translated by H. B. Nisbet, With an Introduction by D. Forbes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 124.

involving a minimum of risk and cost. It appears as one of the best means of promoting one's interests while generating amongst its partners a dynamic of voluntary cooperation and trade, as a preventative tool for security facilitating socialisation and the integration of groups or states that might be potentially dangerous and, in a general way, as one of the tools for peace building and world order in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Traditional public diplomacy has long been regarded with disdain and irony. By attracting attention to its new potential and its expanded field of action, this study has hopefully proved that soft power is more than rhetoric and mass diplomacy more than just luxury.



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### **c. Interviews**

#### **Interviews conducted in Montreal (Canada), March 2004, with:**

- Barry Fulton, George Washington University & former-USIA agent (U.S.)
- Eytan Gilboa, Bar-Ilan University & Holon Institute of Technology (Israel)
- Evan H. Potter, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Canada)
- Robin C. Brown, University of Leeds (U.K.).

#### **Interviews conducted in Paris (France), Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, DGCID, July 2002, with:**

- Yves Saint-Geours, Directeur général adjoint

#### ***Direction de l'audiovisuel extérieur et des techniques de communication***

- Michel Montfort, Sous-directeur du cinéma et de la coopération audiovisuelle (ATC/C)
- Françoise Petitjean, Sous-direction de la télévision et de la radio, Chef du bureau de la télévision (ATC/A)



- Florence Chambon, chargée de mission auprès du directeur de l'audiovisuel extérieur et des techniques de communication (ATC)

***Direction de la coopération culturelle et du français***

- Philippe Dorian, Chargé de mission, Bureau des Établissements culturels et des alliances françaises (CCF)
- Roger Cloître, Bureau des Établissements culturels et des alliances françaises (CCF)
- Bernard Banos-Robles, Bureau de la politique culturelle et artistique (CCF/C)
- François-Xavier Adam, Chargé de mission auprès du directeur de la coopération culturelle et du français (CCF)

***Direction de la stratégie, des moyens et de l'évaluation***

- M. Le Breton (SME)

**Interviews conducted in Paris (France), TV5, July 2002, with:**

- Olivier Bock, chargé de mission

**Interviews conducted in Sophia (Bulgaria), Ambassade de France, Centre Culturel et de Coopération (C.C.C.), "Institut Français", August 2002, with:**

- Gilles Laborde, attaché culturel and directeur adjoint du C.C.C.
- Margarita Nestorova, Médiathèque Jeunesse.

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