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A COMPARATIVE STUDY
CONCERNING
***THE SOUL-BODY PROBLEM IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF MULLĀ ṢADRĀ (1571-1640)
AND IBN SĪNĀ (980-1037)***

BY
ABBAS ALI SHAMELI

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A thesis submitted to
the faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Art

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INSTITUTE OF ISLAMIC STUDIES
McGILL UNIVERSITY
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بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

In the Name of Allah,
the Beneficent, the Merciful

الحمد لله الذي جعل نور معرفته تربية أعيان الأنواع و الانجساد فأوحى في كل شعاع أمرها الإرادة أنوار متجسدة بتدريكات
شعير متحركة يتحرك بها هذه البقاع والبلاد و ينشأ منها الكائنات و يتزقن الأرض بالحيوان و النباتات و الجمادات و كان الأرض
الأساسي منها نشو الألفة و تدور بها بقوى ظاهرة فخلق الإنسان و خلق من بقية طينته الأكوان .

All praise is due to Allah who made the light of his recognition the ultimate result of creation of the souls and the bodies. Then, He revealed in each heaven a particular command in order to choose bodily lights which are moved by the immaterial souls. These lights are the source of all lights and creatures including animals, vegetables and solid beings which are the indicators of beauties in various parts of the earth. The main purpose of generation of these lights is the creation of the other world and its melioration by the purified souls. Accordingly, He firstly created man and generated other creatures from the remainder of his clay.

في الحديث المروي عن سيد الأولياء علي (ع) : « من عرف نفسه فقد عرف ربه »

It is reported in a maxim from Imam Ali (peace be upon him):

" He who knows his soul/self knows his Lord".

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Finally, this thesis could not have been carried out without moral and sincere support of my family. I owe deep thanks firstly to my parents for their enthusiastic encouragement and endless patience. Without the tolerance and unfailing support of

my wife, it would be very difficult for me to imagine it possible to pursue my education.

I have dedicated this work to *Imām* Mahdī (may the best God's regards be upon him) with heartfelt love and respect.

ABSTRACT

*Title: The Soul-Body Problem in
The Philosophical Psychology
of Mullā Ṣadrā and Ibn Sīnā
Author: Abbas Ali Shameli
M.A. dissertation
Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University*

This thesis will partly compare the approaches of two pioneers in Islamic philosophy to the soul-body problem: the philosophical psychology of Mullā Ṣadrā (Ṣadr al-Muta'allihīn Shīrāzī 975-1050/1571-1640) and that of Ibn Sīnā (370-428/980-1037). Our main concern will be with the former, the founder of "transcendent theosophy", particularly his ideas regarding the corporeal generation of the soul.

A brief historical background of the problem is presented in the first chapter. In order to evaluate the real philosophical value of Mullā Ṣadrā's doctrine, the thesis will investigate the soundness of Mullā Ṣadrā's novel psychological findings. "Substantial motion" (*al-ḥarakah al-jawhārīyyah*) and the "gradation of existence" (*al-tashkīk fī marātib al-wujūd*) are the two main philosophical principles formulated and implied by our philosopher regarding the elaboration of his theory on the soul's developmental process.

In our study, we discuss the nature of the soul-body relationship, the evidence which indicates their mutual interaction, and finally, the various forms of this

relationship. In the final chapter, we focus on the developmental process of the soul's substantial motion up to the stage of union with the active intellect. Our analytical discussion is centered on whether or not the theory of the corporeality of the soul's generation yields a meaningful conception of the soul's evolution from materiality to immateriality.

Considering the serious challenges and unsolved difficulties that still remain, it is an open question whether Šadrā's theory, particularly its emphasis on the corporeality of the soul's generation, can adequately account for the soul's developmental process up to the stage of unity with the world of intellects.

**Titre: Le problème de l'âme et du corps dans la
psychologie philosophique de Mullā Ṣadrā and Ibn Sīnā**
Auteur: Abbas Ali Shameli
Diplôme: Maîtrise
Faculté: Institut des Etudes Islamiques, Université McGill

Résumé

Cette thèse vise à comparer les différentes approches de deux pionniers de la philosophie islamique au sujet du problème de l'âme et du corps: la psychologie philosophique de Mullā Ṣadrā (Ṣadr al-Muta'allihīn Shīrāzī) et celle d' Ibn Sina. Cette étude se donne pour but principal d'examiner la pensée du premier fondateur de "la théosophie transcendentale", et plus particulièrement ses découvertes concernant "la génération corporelle de l'âme".

Le premier chapitre présente un bref survol historique. Afin d'évaluer la vraie valeur philosophique de la doctrine de Mulla Sadra, nous étudierons la solidité de ses très idées originales. La motion substantielle et la gradation de l'existence constituent les deux grands principes formulés et compris par notre philosophe dans son élaboration de la théorie du processus du développement de l'âme.

Nous discuterons aussi de la nature de la relation entre l'âme et le corps, des indices montrant leur interaction et finalement, des diverses formes de cette relation. Dans le dernier chapitre, nous allons réfléchir sur le processus de développement de la "motion substantielle" de l'union avec l'intellect agent. Notre analyse sera centrée

autour la question suivante: La théorie de la corporéité de la génération de l'âme conduit-elle à une conception compréhensible de l'évolution de l'âme vers l'immatérialité, au-delà de la matérialité?

Vu la nature du défi et les difficultés encore à surmonter, il n'est guère certain que la théorie de Sadra, plus particulièrement son emphase sur la corporéité de la génération de l'âme, soit adéquate comme explication du développement de l'âme jusqu'au niveau de son unification avec le monde des intellects.

>>< Introduction >><

><< *Introduction* >><

The question of self-knowledge is one of the oldest problems which attracted man's attention. Both in his everyday life, and at the level of systematic knowledge, namely, philosophy and science, man has faced the problem of self-knowledge. Questions like, "Am I only a body with bodily organs or do I have a soul, too?"; "what is my soul if I have one?"; "does my soul have any relation to my body?" and "how is the relation?" are some examples of what man has had to contend with. But in philosophy in particular, the soul-body problem has been one of the most controversial problems, one that has given rise to diverse opinions.

Based on historical sources, the discussions concerning the soul-body problem, may be traced back to the early period of philosophical inquiry in the time of Plato (427?-347 BC).¹ Regarding the soul-body problem, there have been two main philosophical arguments. One concerned the question whether the human being is composed of two distinct things, namely, the soul and the body, or of only one existent, either material or immaterial. This debate led to two major doctrines. One upheld the theory of dualism, and the other took one of two antagonistic positions: idealism or materialism. Plato and Aristotle were precursors to these two opposing views which later on became known as the dualistic and monistic views of man.²

The other main discussion regarding the soul-body problem centered on the problem of whether the soul and the body come into being simultaneously or the soul is itself an eternal existent but if so, how and when does it unite with the body? This argument prompted Plato and Aristotle to take two different positions, thereby giving

¹ Jerome Shaffer, "Mind-Body problem," *Encyclopedia of philosophy*, 1967, vol. 5, p. 336.

² Antony Flew, "Immortality," *Encyclopedia of philosophy*, vol. 4, p. 146.

rise to the emergence of two distinct schools among their adherents, known in the Islamic world as the *Mashshā'in* (Peripatetics) and the *Ishrāqiin* (often referred to as Illuminationists) respectively.

It is noteworthy that the soul-body or the mind-body problem has traditionally been investigated by philosophers and psychologists through two different approaches.³ One can, therefore, see two types of perspectives each with its own characteristics. Leaving aside the discussions about the quiddity (*māhiyyah*) of the soul and its characteristics, modern psychologists began to concentrate only on mental processes. Philosophers⁴, on the other hand, pursued the philosophic approach and by studying the entity of the soul and its functions created philosophical psychology (*'ilm al-nafs al-falsafī*).

In order to gain a general conception of what historically emerged regarding the soul and its nature among Muslim philosophers, we have to refer to Ibn Sīnā's *Kitāb al-Nafs* or *Kitāb al-Shifā*. After Aristotle, no one wrote more extensively on philosophical psychology than Ibn Sīnā⁵ (370-428/980-1037), who gathered together almost all previous ideas regarding the nature of the soul. Few can rival him in this, including al-Kindī (185-260/798-872) or al-Fārābī (259-339/870-950) or any other predecessor in Islamic philosophy before Ibn Sīnā.⁶ However, we should note that although Ibn Sīnā was the one who began to write expansively on the subject, he

³ Despite a significant difference which exists between psychological and philosophical discussions about the above mentioned issue, in this study the terms 'soul', 'mind', and 'self' have been used interchangeably and refer to an incorporeal part of man's existence.

⁴ By "philosophers" I particularly mean Muslim medieval philosophers who are distinguished from the empiricist trend in Western and modern philosophy.

⁵ Ibn Sīnā devoted more than thirty treatises to the soul and its various aspects. Among his writings, we can see some symbolic tales such as "*Ḥayy Ibn Yaqzān*", "*Salāmān wa Ābsāl*" which are about the soul and its relation to the body. The significance will be clearer if we consider the relevant chapters in "*al-Shifā*", "*al-Najāt*", and "*al-Ishārāt*". See Faṭḥ Allāh Khulāif, *Ibn Sīnā Wa Madhabuhū fī al-Nafs* (Beirut, 1974), p. 99.

⁶ Ibrāhīm Madkūr, "*Tasḍīr*," *al-Shifā, al-Ṭabī'īyyāt, al-fann al-sādis, al-nafs* (Qum, 1983), first page. See also Ḥasan Ḥasanzādah Āmulī, *Uyūnu Masā'il al-Nafs* (Tehran: Intishārāt-i Amīr Kabīr, 1371 A.H.), p. 125.

undertook his studies in a period when philosophical thought had already found firm root in the Islamic world, thanks to the translation movement and the exploratory works of previous philosophers such as al-Kindī and al-Fārābī.

As far as philosophical psychology is concerned, it is reported that Qusṭā ibn Lūqā (died about 300 A.H.) was the first one who wrote a psychophysiological treatise on the difference between the soul and the spirit (*al-rūḥ wa al-naḥs*).⁷ Al-Kindī, al-Fārābī and Ibn Miskawaih (320-421/929-1029) also strove to understand the soul's nature by concentrating on Greek findings. Although one can see a considerable amount of knowledge regarding the above mentioned issue among *Ikhwān al-Ṣafā* or other Muslim philosophers, Ibn Sīnā was the one who approached the issue in an extended way.

Turning now to Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī⁸ (979-1050/1571-1640), let us begin by emphasizing his reputation as an innovative Shī'ite philosopher who introduced some interesting new ideas in philosophy. His doctrines were clearly very influential in the last three and half centuries. He founded a new school of Islamic philosophy, namely, "transcendent philosophy" (*al-ḥikmah al-muta'āliyah*) through which he combined pure intellectual reasoning with intuition and illumination. Mullā Ṣadrā experienced these methods in three stages of his life, and finally settled on a new combination on which his advanced philosophical system, covering every subject properly, is based. Needless to say the roots of this new method can be found in

⁷ J.W. Livingston, Qusṭā Ibn Lūqā's psychophysiological treatise on the difference between the soul and the spirit..., *Scripta Mediterranea* (Toronto, 1981), vol. 2, pp. 53-77. See also Hanna al-Fākhūrī, & Khalīl al-Jurr, *Tārīkh-i Falsafa Dar Jahān-i Islāmī*, translated by A. Āyatī (Tehran, 1958), Vol. 2, p. 462.

⁸ His full name is Muḥammad Ibn Ibrāhīm entitled Ṣadr al-Dīn or Mullā Ṣadrā and also Ṣadr al-Muta'allihīn (e.g., foremost among the theosophers). Among his circle of disciples he is often referred to simply as Ākhūnd. Muḥammad Bāqir kha^ẓansārī, *Rawḍāt al-Jannāt* (Qum: Intishārāt-i Ismā'īliyyān, 1970), vol. 4, pp. 120-21. Muḥammad Ali Mudarris, *Raiḥānah al-Adab* (Tabriz: Intishārāt-i Khayyām, 1967), vol. 3, p. 417. See also Muḥammad Husain Ṭabāṭabā'ī, "Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad Ibn Ibrāhīm Shīrāzī Mujaddid-i Falsafah'-i Islāmī...", *Yād-nāmah'-i Mullā Ṣadrā*, (Tehran: Tehran University, 1340 A. H.), p. 15. See also Seyyed Hussein Nasr, *Islamic Life and Thought* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), p. 166, notes No. 7.

Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, Suhrawardī (549-587/1155-1191), Shams al-Dīn Turkah (died 835 or 836 A.H.), and Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī 592-672/1198-1273). Beyond this, what needs to be pointed out is that the Sufi Ibn 'Arabī also played an even more significant role in laying the cornerstone of Ṣadrā's school of thought. This will become clear when we consider Ibn 'Arabī's repeated citation in Ṣadrā's works. Mullā Ṣadrā, however, systematized and applied the idea of this school of thought masterfully instead of merely adopting them.⁹

He has also consecrated a significant position to psychology in the overall framework of his metaphysical vision. His doctrine about the soul-body problem, the physical origin of the soul's coming into being (*al-ḥudūth al-jismānī*) has some controversial aspects that will be examined in the course of this thesis. Examining his whole theory of philosophical psychology, S. A. H. Qazwīnī says that Mullā Ṣadrā's new findings are centered around three main principles:

1. the corporeal origination of the soul and its spiritual survival (*jismāniyyat al-ḥudūth wa rūḥāniyyat al-baqā'*),
2. the overwhelming role of the soul vis-à-vis its faculties (*al-naḥs fī waḥdatihā kull al-quwā*),
3. union of the rational soul with the active intellect.¹⁰

Against all previous philosophical theories, which were dualistic in nature and assumed the soul to be an immaterial thing united with the body, Mullā Ṣadrā proposed that, based on his philosophical thesis concerning "substantial motion" (*al-ḥarakah al-jawhariyyah*) and "systematic ambiguity of existence" (*al-tashkīk fī*

⁹ Muḥammad Ḥusain Ṭabāṭabā'ī, "Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad Ibn Ibrāhīm Shirāzī Mujaddid-i Falsafah-i Islāmī...", *Yādnāmah-i Mullā Ṣadrā*, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-17.

¹⁰ Sayyid Abu al-Ḥasan Qazwīnī, "The Life of Ṣadr al-Muta'llihīn Shirāzī and a discussion of motion in the category of substance," *Yādnāmah-i Mullā Ṣadrā*, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

marātib al-wujūd)¹¹, it is reasonable to assert that in its early generation the soul is first generated corporeally beside the body or as a bodily form; then through substantial motion it changes into an immaterial entity. Therefore, the duality of the soul and the body will have a specific meaning.

Unlike Ibn Sīnā and other philosophers who considered psychology or the science of the soul as a branch of natural science (*al-ʿilm al-ṭabīʿī*) Mullā Ṣadrā placed it in metaphysics (*ilāhiyyāt*). This difference was in fact a reflection of his whole view about metaphysics. He believed that the doctrine of being and the principiality of being indicate the core of all things, both in their transcendent origin and their ultimate end. This integrated metaphysical point of view enabled him to look at the universe as a unique harmonious whole and cosmos. Consequently, in his judgment about everything, he bases his idea upon its metaphysical origin rather than its own face value. Thus, we see him approach the field of psychology in a completely different way than modern psychologists have done. He traces the soul, its creation, immateriality, and immortality through a metaphysical framework rather than reducing it to a collection of mere thoughts and feelings.¹² Illustrating the particular position of the soul in the metaphysical version of Mullā Ṣadrā, Professor ʿAbdul Haq says as below:

Tracing the origin of the human soul, Mullā Ṣadrā asserts that the first creation of God is intellect and the last creation is he who is the bearer of this intellect, i.e., the human being. Intellect was created first as the seed of creation the synthetic fruit of which is man who possesses intellect, the same seed. Thus the bringing of man into existence is what the whole process of creation has been aiming at and man is what he is by virtue of his soul and not his body; ... It is therefore, through the creation of the human

¹¹ The term "*al-tashkīk fī marātib al-wujūd*" has been differently translated into "systematic ambiguity of existence", "gradation of being" and so on. We have used various translations depending on the context.

¹² Muḥammad Abdul Haq, "The Psychology of Mullā Ṣadrā," *Journal of the Islamic Research Institute* (Karachi, 1970), Vol. 9, p. 173.

soul that God completes in the end what He has initiated in the beginning.¹³

Although the idea of the soul's coming into being (*al-ḥudūth*) has previously been proposed by Ibn Sīnā in his various psychological writings, he associated it with immateriality, whereas Mullā Ṣadrā believes that the soul has corporeal origin and then moves toward spirituality. Mullā Ṣadrā, however, has devoted considerable attention to refute the idea of the total materiality of the soul's nature regardless of its relation to the body. He has strongly rejected the doctrine that reduces the soul to the bodily level (*jismāniyyah*) or even to the output of the bodily faculties' mixture and interactions (*mizāj*).¹⁴

Concerning the soul-body problem, the thesis will first deal with the historical background of the subject, focusing on Islamic tradition.

As far as Mullā Ṣadrā is concerned, the focus of the discussion will be devoted to the examination of the corporeal process of the soul's createdness (*al-ḥudūth al-jismānī*). Since Ṣadr al-Muta'allihīn based this theory on two philosophical principles, namely substantial motion (*al-ḥarakah al-jawhariyyah*) and the ambiguous hierarchy of existence (*al-tashkīk fī marātib al-wujūd*), we will approach them analytically.

The thesis will then investigate Mullā Ṣadrā's point of view regarding the validity of the distinction between the soul and the body. If, according to him, there are two things to which these two terms can be applied respectively, we can, in those cases, ask what kind of relation they may have with one another. In order to establish

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ See the following note at N. 44. Since *mizāj* is a corporeal phenomenon, Mullā Ṣadrā devoted a whole chapter in his *al-Asfār* to prove that the soul in its reality is not even a *mizāj*. See Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Asfār*, Vol. 8, *al-bāb al-thānī, al-faṣl al-awwal*, pp. 29-41. It should be mentioned that since various editions of Mullā Ṣadrā's *K. al-Asfār* may create difficulties in finding the original Arabic texts of discussed paragraphs, bibliographical data of this book in footnotes are offered in detail.

this doctrine, Mullā Ṣadrā tries to solve the problems raised in the explanations of the relation between the soul as an immaterial thing and the body as a physical thing.

This study includes also another important issue which appears when we encounter the question of how the soul becomes an immaterial independent being, at the time of death. Assuming the soul to be a physical existent in its initial generation, which possesses many potentialities both intellectual and practical, the thesis deals with the developmental process undergone by the soul up to the highest level of its perfection. Regarding the interrelationship between the soul and the body, the thesis will deal with Mullā Ṣadrā's doctrine about the converse relation between the soul and the body. According to Mullā Ṣadrā, along their developmental process the soul and the body will turn into two different directions. As the soul gains more perfection and independence, the body becomes weaker. Finally, the soul will leave the body and return toward its original world; the realm of immaterial intellects (*ʿālam al-tajarrud al-ʿaqlī*).

Chapter One

>>< *Literature Review* >><

- 1.1. Dualism, Materialism and Idealism
- 1.2. Soul in the view of Plato and Aristotle
- 1.3. Historical background of Muslim philosophical psychology

Chapter One

><<Literature Review>><

1.1. Dualism, Materialism and Idealism

What is important to note in relation to the soul-body problem, above all, are its two distinct components, namely, the soul and the body. Having pointed this out, we can then discuss how they relate to each other and whether or not there is any interaction between them? In general, however, there are two sorts of theories, monistic theories, which deny even that two things here exist which can be related; and dualistic theories, which admit that there are two mutually related things, and offer various accounts of this relation.¹⁵

Before considering these kinds of questions philosophically, we should point out that people commonly speak in ways which imply the existence of a contrast or of contrasts between the spiritual and the corporeal, mental and physical, material and non-material, physiological and psychological and so on. Even a materialist can probably understand such a statement as "the mind is not a material thing". If he did not understand it, how would he be able to deny it, or try to refute it? Beside those statements which describe a person's body, and his bodily states, there are other statements that refer to a distinct sort of events. Thoughts and feelings, hopes and fears, memories and expectations, moods and humors, features of personality and character, motives and intentions "are items that refer to a new field against the body as mind or mental events".¹⁶

¹⁵ Jerome Shaffer, "Mind-Body Problem," *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. by Paul Edwards *et al.* (Macmillan Inc., 1967), Vol. 5, p.338.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 336.

Even if we accept that there are two different things, there will still be the question of what the entity of the soul or the mind is in contrast to the body? In other word, one may ask: Is mind a substance or is it a concatenation of complex states, attributes and dispositions of a living human being? In the case of the former, is mind a spiritual or immaterial substance or is it a material one to be found, for instance, inside the skulls of living human beings? Philosophically, there are at least three distinct points of view: idealism, materialism and dualism.

Materialism, the second avenue, has many variants, but it always holds that matter is fundamental, and that everything else depends on matter. In its most extreme form, materialism is the view that whatever exists must be physical.¹⁷ The materialist, for example, asserts that the soul or the mind is an ordinary piece of matter. Speaking more precisely, a materialist may propose that matter or body is the "real" or "substantial" thing and mind is its product or in some way, depends on it both for its existence and for its qualities.¹⁸ In modern psychology, this orientation has been known as behaviorism. A behaviorist, in opposition to both dualism and idealism, states that mind is not a substance at all, but simply some complex form of behavior. In their extreme reaction to the dualists, behaviorists denied the existence of the mental realm altogether. They reduced "mentalistic" items such as belief and desire to physical dispositions of bodily movement. This position no longer has many supporters, primarily because it has proved impossible to provide a physical translation of a mentalistic report like "I have a pain".¹⁹ Beyond all these possibilities some believe that mind is, in fact, a form of energy or a kind of force.²⁰

¹⁷ Shaffer, "Mind-Body Problem," *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, *op. cit.*, Vol. 5, p. 338.

¹⁸ J. L. McIntyre, "Body And Mind," *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, ed. by James Hastings *et al.*, (New York, 1955), Vol. 11, p. 747.

¹⁹ Shaffer, "Mind-Body Problem," *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Vol. 5, *op. cit.*, p.338.

²⁰ Jenny Teichman, *The Mind and the Soul. An Introduction to the Philosophy Of Mind*, (Humanities Press Inc., 1974), pp. 1-2.

Idealists, in contrast to materialists, declare that mind alone is real or substantial, and that matter or body is its appearance, its manifestation, or in some other way dependent on it for its existence and quality.²¹

Dualism is the view which asserts that there are two worlds. There is, on one hand, the physical world, which contains matter and energy and all tangible things, including human bodies; then there is the psychical world, which consists of mental events and states belonging to a private world which is inaccessible to public observation.²² A dualist believes that mind is an independently existing, incorporeal substance.

Summing up, we have to realize that any discussion concerning the soul and its relation to the body is intelligible only once we accept some form of dualism. The question with which all dualism has to deal at some point concerns the identity of the soul. Moreover, if one accepts that there is an independent substance distinct from the body, what is the principle of its individuation? If we imagine that to the number of human beings, there is a corresponding and equal number of separate souls, what makes them individual souls? The most natural response to this question is to say that the soul takes its individuality from its body. Such an answer is conceivable, given that each soul belongs to only one body. The problem here is that if the individuality or the identity of the soul logically depends on the identity of the body, we cannot any longer call the soul a substance, since a substance is something whose existence and identity is not dependent on the existence of other things.²³ According to Islamic Philosophy there are two possible ways out of this dilemma. One may state that the soul possesses its own identity, however incomplete, before ever belonging to the body. Or, alternatively, one may hold that the soul comes to

²¹ McIntyre, *op. cit.*, p. 774.

²² Antony Kenny, *The Metaphysics Of Mind* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 1.

²³ Jenny Teichman, *The Mind and the Soul. An Introduction to the Philosophy Of Mind* (Humanities Press Inc., 1974), pp. 16-17.

existence along with the body, thus acquiring its own independent identity alongside the body. This issue will be examined in more detail when we deal with the unification of the soul and the body.

Before studying the real nature of the soul based on the idea of dualism, we have to determine the approach we shall adopt in our examination. Do we want to deal with this issue scientifically or philosophically? In the present study, all issues have been examined based on a philosophical perspective.

1.2. Soul in the view of Plato and Aristotle

In his attempt to establish a dualistic formulation of the problem, Plato argued that human beings perform actions and display capacities, which are not bodily. Such actions and capacities must therefore belong to the soul. In the *Phaedo*, for instance, he states the following:

"Is there or is there not an absolute justice? Assuredly there is. And an absolute beauty and an absolute good? Of course. But did you ever behold any of them with your eyes? Certainly not. Or did you ever reach them with any other bodily sense? and I speak not of these alone, but of absolute greatness, and health and strength, and in short of the reality or true nature of everything. In general,... understanding is not a function or capacity of the body, hence it must be a function or capacity of some other thing.²⁴

Plato, then, attempts to identify the nature of the soul. His definition in fact reflects an idea widely accepted by early Greek thought. This idea entails two main factors, namely, life and movement. In the *Phaedrus* Plato writes: "...what is the nature of the soul... the soul is identical with the self-moving". In the *Phaedo* he says: "whatever the soul occupies, to that it comes bearing life"²⁵

These passages show that, Plato also thought of the soul as, on one hand, something which infuses life in the body when occupying it, and, on the other hand, as something related to life itself, or something identical with life. Being self-moving also is an appearance or a sign of life. But for him the "soul" was, above all, the source of motion. It is the only thing which can move itself and other things without being itself moved by anything else. This insistence led him to the idea of the priority

²⁴ Ibid., p. 18.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 22. One cannot abstract the exact definition which Plato gives in different passages taken from various works. In the same dialogue (*Phaedon*), Plato sometimes defines the soul as "the pure thought", and some others considers it as the source of life and movement of the body. However, he does not explain how to correlate these two definition nor determine which is the main one. See Abu Naṣr Fārābī, *Kitāb al-Jam' Baina Ra'yay al-Hakimain*, 4th ed., (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1985), p. 12.

of the soul in relation to the body.²⁶ Influenced by Anaxagoras, Plato thereby attempted to link the concept of the soul as a whole to the pre-eminence of the mind.²⁷

It is noteworthy that Plato was probably the first philosopher to make a sharp distinction between the mind and the body, holding that the mind could exist both before and after its residence in the body and rule the body during that residence.²⁸ In his elucidation of the relation between the soul and the body, Aristotle argued that the former was related to the latter as was a form to a matter. In fact, the body is also the very instrument of the soul, for matter is merely potency and exists only in so far as it is necessary for the realization of a form, whereas, the soul is inevitably bound up with the body, and can have no life apart from it.²⁹

By examining the Platonic and Aristotelian points of view, one can discern two opposing views of man. For Plato the "mental or spiritual" side of human life was sharply separated from the body. He thought of mind as something which could exist before joining the body, but after becoming imprisoned in it, it attempts strenuously to release itself. Aristotle's view provided a much more closely integrated understanding of the mind and the body, and defended a monistic idea. He is still considered as the philosophical founding father of the school which thought that each person was a living human organism, which view however found no room for any belief in personal immortality.³⁰ Rejecting the idea of a duality between the

²⁶ John Burent, "Soul (Greek)," *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, ed. by Hastings *et al.* (New York, 1955), Vol. 11, p. 741.

²⁷ R. S. Reters & C.A. Mace, "Psychology", *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, *op. cit.*, Vol. 7, p. 1.

²⁸ Shaffer, Mind-Body Problem," *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Vol. 5, *op. cit.*, p. 336.

²⁹ John Burnet, "Soul (Greek)," *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. 11, *op. cit.*, p. 741.

³⁰ Antony Flew, "Immortality," *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Vol. 4, *op. cit.*, p. 146. & H. D. Lewis, "History of Philosophy of Religion" , Vol. 6, *op. cit.*, p. 279.

soul and the body, Aristotle believed that these two things were, in fact, two elements of one substance.³¹

³¹ al-Fākhūrī & al-Jurr, Vol. 1, p. 67.

2.3. Historical background of Muslim philosophical psychology

Turning to the Islamic intellectual tradition, we are faced with a whole array of ideas and schools of thought. During my preceding discussion, in this chapter particularly, I make reference to a specific line of thought, namely, the eastern school of Islamic philosophy. Islamic tradition includes both theological and philosophical currents. The more Philosophically oriented schools themselves are divided into eastern and western poles. Since the main goal of this thesis is to compare the Philosophical psychology of Mullā Ṣadrā with Ibn Sīnā's, I have only concentrated on the eastern branch of Islamic philosophy, rather than Islamic thought as whole. Within this general area, also, I have not dealt with every philosopher individually, but instead used representative figures. Hence, the reader may sense a certain bias toward the eastern schools which only reflects the need to approach our topic in the most appropriate and direct way possible.

Having briefly alluded to philosophical psychology among Muslim philosophers from its very early appearance, we must point out that these philosophers were mostly influenced by Neo-Platonic ideas. But their aim was to reveal the angelic and divine dimension of the human soul in light of the Aristotelian psychological analysis of *nafs* (soul). *Ḥarrān* and other Syrian centers happened to be the first places through which Greek wisdom flowed towards the Muslim world, and Neo-platonism - which was believed to have been the real philosophy of Aristotle - was transmitted to the Muslims by Syriac-speaking scholars.³²

Aristotelian ideas also have had an impressive impact on Muslim philosophers. Indeed, his analysis of the human soul, as presented in *De Anima*, and later handed down by Alexander of Aphrodisias and Porphyry, had been adopted with little modification by the early Muslim philosophers, such as al-Kindī, al-Fārābī

³² Shaykh Muḥammad Iqbāl, *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia* (London, 1908), p. 24.

(258-339/872-950), and even Ibn Sīnā (370-428/980-1037), and Ibn Miskawayh (320-421/929-1029).³³

Al-Kindī (185-252/801-866) was the first Muslim pioneer in this field, having introduced Neo-Platonic doctrines of the soul into the earliest Arabic philosophy. He did so after he had revised 'Abd al-Masīh al-Nā'ima's translation of the treatise, "*The Theology of Aristotle*", which quotes and paraphrases Books IV-VI of the *Enneads* of Plotinus.

Both al-Kindī (185-260/798-872) and Thābit ibn Qurrah (d. A.D. 901) wrote treatises based on Neo-Platonic conceptions, and al-Fārābī's student Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī, as well as Abū Sulaymān al-Sijistānī, al-Tawḥīdī, and, specifically Miskawayh each, in their own ways, adhered to Neo-Platonic doctrines. This influence was particularly true in relation to emanationism.³⁴

Examining al-Kindī's writings about the soul, one hardly finds any elements which truly belong to him. His writings instead reflect almost exclusively Greek thought. In addition to his "*Kitāb al-Nafs*", there is a small epistle entitled as "*Kalāmun Li al-Kindī Fī al-Nafs Mukhtaṣar Wajīz*," his second work on the soul. These writings show that he was not really familiar with Aristotle's own ideas on the soul, and what he instead attributes to him are in fact passages from Plotinus' writings particularly "*Theology*".

Defining the soul, he nonetheless sometimes follows Aristotle, considering it as a perfection of the body which makes the body alive. Other times he pursues the Plato-Pythagorean idea which emphasizes movement and number in explaining the nature of the soul. Regarding the eternity and createdness of the soul, he is not very explicit. However, he believes that soul's relation to the body is such that soul needs the body as a tool. But being substantially apart from the body, the soul continues its

³³ Calverley, *op. cit.*, p. 258.

³⁴ F. E. Peters, *Aristotle and The Arabs...*, (New York University Press, 1968), p. 169.

life after the death.³⁵ Preferring the idea of Plato because of its spirituality, which is nearer to the spirit of Islamic thought, al-Kindī tends to be more platonic in his explanation of the soul. Al-Fārābī, like al-Kindī, had a flexible attitude toward both Plato's and Aristotle's ideas concerning the soul. His teacher in philosophy was Yūḥannā ibn Khailān, a Christian philosopher who belonged to the Alexandrian school of philosophy and taught him in Baghdad after 295/890. Al-Fārābī had also a close relation with Abū Bishr Mattā ibn Yūnis (d. 329/940) who was one of the great figures of the Christian Peripatetic school of thought in Baghdad.

Consequently, one may say that al-Fārābī was influenced mainly by the Aristotelian school of Baghdad and also recent Alexandrian ideas in the 10th century.³⁶ His interest included Plotinus' metaphysics, which he renewed and distinguished from that of Proclus.³⁷ Although he followed Aristotle in his definition of the soul, and considered it as the first perfection (*kamālun awwal*) of the natural body (*jism-i ṭabīʿī*) or as the form of the body, he departed from him when he took the soul as a simple and spiritual substance having a completely different nature in relation to the body.³⁸ This kind of conception of the soul put both al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā in the school of Neo-Platonism. We should, however, further add that al-Fārābī does not follow Plato in his idea about the eternity of the soul. On the contrary, he states, "We can neither believe that the soul existed before its connection with the body -as Plato believed- nor adhere to the idea of transmission of the soul into another body -as metempsychosists (*aṣḥāb al-tanāsukh*) believed."³⁹

³⁵ al-Fākhūrī & al-Jurr, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, pp. 383-85.

³⁶ R. Walzer, *al-Fārābī, Fārābī Mu'asis-i Falsafah-i Islāmī*, translated by Rezā Dāvarī (Tehran, 1977), p. 105.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

³⁸ al-Fākhūrī & al-Jurr, *op. cit.*, p. 420. He quotes from Fārābī's *Risālah Fī Ithbāt al-Mufāriqāt*, p. 7, and his *ʿUyūn al-Masāʿil*, p. 21.

³⁹ al-Fākhūrī & al-Jurr, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 421; quotes from al-Fārābī, *ʿUyūn al-Masāʿil*, p. 21.

Trying to show the roots of immortality or intelligibility of man's soul, Muslim philosophers mainly followed Plotinus' theory of the emanation of the human soul. Accordingly, they believed that the human soul emanates first through the Spirit of Intelligence, and then through the Universal Soul to which it belongs. This theory became central to later Muslim mysticism and philosophical psychology.⁴⁰ Proposing the idea of the physical somehow coming into existence in the soul, however, Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī represented a further advance on this doctrine.

It is interesting to add though that the theory of the emanation reflected a distinctly philosophical tendency, different from the earlier non-philosophical approach to the spirit (*rūḥ*), which entailed something simply opposed to the body (*badan*). Theologians (*mutakallimūn*) of both orthodox and heterodox inclination, took a more or less material view of the soul. Trying to explain the soul's relation to the body, they expressed *rūḥ* (spirit) as a fine body (*djism laṭīf*) running through the body like water in green wood or fire in charcoal. Accordingly, the soul, like the body, is a corporeal substance, the only difference being that the latter is "coarse" (*kathīf*), while the soul is "subtle, and fine" (*laṭīf*).⁴¹ The doctrine which regards the soul as a purely incorporeal substance consisting of the essential nature of man is upheld only by few members of the school of theology. They mostly considered soul as a corporeal substance or an accident of material substances.⁴²

In sum, we can hardly give a complete picture of what was debated among Muslim philosophers and theologians concerning the nature of the soul. However, we can give the list offered by al-Abīwardī (d. 966 A.D) in his *Rawḍah al-Janān*.⁴³ At

⁴⁰ Calverley, *op. cit.*, p. 257.

⁴¹ Macdonald, *op. cit.*, p. 317.

⁴² T. J. De Boer, "Soul (Muslim)," *Ency. of Religion and Ethics*, ed. by J. Hastings et al. (New York, 1955), Vol. 11, pp. 745-46.

⁴³ Abū al-Ḥassan Ali Ibn Aḥmad al-Abīwardī (d.966 A.H.), the author of *Rawḍah al-Janān* or (*Rawḍāt al-Jannāt*), one of the sources which has been used by Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī in *al-Asfār al-Arba`ah*.

the end of his *Rawḍah*, al-Abīwardī states that there are numerous and diverse ways of understanding what is referred to by "*ana*" (a term by which every one refer to himself), namely, *nafs*. Here are some of its meanings :

1. The majority of theologians believe that *nafs* (soul) is precisely the observable structure we refer to as *badan* (body).
2. *Nafs* is identical to the fleshy heart located inside our body.
3. *Nafs* is our brain.
4. Al-Nazzām believed that *nafs* was a collection of some indivisible elements located in the heart.
5. *Nafs* consists of the fundamental parts (*al-aḍḍā' al-aṣliyyah*) which are produced from sperms.
6. *Nafs* is *mizāj* (a common quality which comes out of the combination of all elements - *Kaifiyyah mutashābihah yaḥṣalu bintizāj al-'anāsir*⁴⁴ outcome of all physical functions performed by different parts of the body)
7. *Nafs* is a *jism-i laṭīf* (a fine body) which runs through the body like water through the rose.
8. *Nafs* is identical to water.
9. *Nafs* is fire (*al-nār*) or instinctive heat (*al-ḥarārah al-gharīziyyah*).
10. *Nafs* is the breath (*al-nafas*).
11. *Nafs* is the Creator (*bārī*) - but He is above what unjust people claim.
12. *Nafs* consists of the four elements (*al-arkān al-arba'ah*), namely, water, soil, fire, and air.

⁴⁴ In his explanation of the term "*mizāj*", al-Tihānawī states that according to philosophers it is a common quality which emerges out of the combination, intermediary and interaction among various elements. In this case every element sheds its own form and takes on a new one which is common to all elements. See Muḥammad 'A'lā Ibn Ali al-Tihānawī, *Musū'at Iṣṭilāḥāt al-'Ulūm al-Islāmiyyah, al-Ma'rūf bi Kashshāfu Iṣṭilāḥāt al-Funūn* (Beirut: Khayyat, 1966), Vol. 5, pp. 1318-1322.

13. *Nafs* is a species form (*ṣūrah naw'īyyah*) which subsists in the body and is united with it.

14. *Nafs* is an incorporeal substance which cannot be equated with the body and does not have any corporeal characteristic - such as quantity (*miqdār*), shape (*shakl*), direction (*jihat*), place (*ain*), position (*wad'*) - but is related to the coarse body (*jism-i kathīf*) in such a way as to allow it to govern that body and to utilize it much like the governor does a city or the one who loves does the beloved. This idea has been accepted by Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, al-Rāzī, and al-Ghazālī and some other theologians.⁴⁵ Considering all these doctrines about the soul and its relation to the body, one can hardly find a commonly accepted position among Muslim philosophers and theologians.

⁴⁵ It is worth mentioning that Bahā' al-Dīn al-Āmilī (al-Shaykh al-Bahā'ī, 935-1031 A.D.) gives the same list in his *al-Kashkūl*. It seems that he quotes from Abiwardī's *Rawḍah*. See *al-Kashkūl*, edited by Ṭāhir Aḥmad al-Zāwī (Dār Iḥyā' al-Kutub al-'Arabiyyah, 1961), vol. 2, p. 417. See Ḥasanzādah Āmulī, *'Uyūnu Masā'il al-Nafs*, *op. cit.*, pp. 122-23. And from the same author *Itihād-i 'Āqil bi ma'qūl*, 1st ed., (Tehran: Intishārāt-i Hikmat, 1984), p. 49. The latter quotes from Abiwardī's *Rawḍah al-Janān*.

Chapter Two

>< *MAIN STRUCTURE* ><

- 2.1. Psychology of Mullā Ṣadrā and Ibn Sīnā (Characteristics)
- 2.2. Terminology
- 2.3. Mullā Ṣadrā and duality of the soul and the body
- 2.4. Soul-Body Relationship
- 2.5. Bodily createdness of the soul
- 2.6. Philosophical foundation of bodily createdness of the soul

CHAPTER TWO

><< *Main Structure* >><**2.1 Psychology of Mullā Ṣadrā and Ibn Sīnā (Characteristics)**

Investigating the issue of the soul-body relationship in the works of Mullā Ṣadrā compared with those of Ibn Sīnā, we need firstly to gain a general perspective of their respective approaches to psychology. Such a perspective should help us to arrive at a more precise understanding of what each has contributed in this area and their differences. Although psychology occupied a vital role in Ibn Sīnā's school of philosophy and his theories in this regard were of great importance in the history of Islamic thought, some major differences nevertheless separate his psychological doctrines from those of Mullā Ṣadrā which appeared in the post-Ibn Sīnā period. These differences are significant even if we admit that Ibn Sīnā's writings were not merely an imitation of the Aristotelian tradition. His ideas, indeed, provided the ground for the later developments of Iranian mystical philosophy or gnosis (*'irfān*). And this transformation of *falsafah* is rooted in the philosophical investigation of the soul, or perhaps in the implications that psychological doctrines have yielded for all areas of philosophical inquiry.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Robert E. Hall, "Some Relationships between Ibn Sīnā's Psychology, Other branches of His Thought, and Islamic teachings," *Journal for the History of Arabic Science* (Aleppo: University of Aleppo, 1979), vol. 3, pp. 46-47.

Mullā Ṣadrā and Ibn Sīnā differ from one another in that each established his own type of school of philosophical psychology. While Ibn Sīnā, following Aristotle, considered the science of the soul (*'ilm al-nafs*) as a part of natural philosophy, Mullā Ṣadrā placed it under metaphysics, complementary to the science of the origins of the things.⁴⁷ This specific metaphysical world view led him to view the universe as an ordered whole. In this unified world view, he considered everything in terms of its metaphysical origin. This might be also why he never reduced the human soul to a collection of mental states or mental processes, as some modern psychologists have done. Instead, he traces the metaphysical roots of everything, establishing a doctrine in terms of which he investigates metaphysical characteristics such as creation, immateriality and immortality.⁴⁸ Although Mullā Ṣadrā put forth this new formulation by emphasizing the physical origin of the soul, which would seem to be a more properly discussed in natural philosophy, this position was due to the fact that our philosopher believed that *'ilm al-nafs* is, in fact, a preliminary step toward knowing God and being aware of what will happen in the other world as far as the gathering (*ḥaṣhr*) of individual souls and bodies is concerned.⁴⁹ These goals would be achievable if we considered the soul as a being which survives and leads us to God both in its generation (*ḥudūth*) and its survival (*baqā'*).

Ibn Sīnā in some of his writings believed that the term "soul" does not refer to the substance of the soul as such, but to the soul as it relates to the body and

⁴⁷ Seyyed Hossein Nasr, "Ṣadr a-Dīn Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā)," *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, edited by M. M. Sharif (Pakistan, 1966), Vol. 2, p. 953.

⁴⁸ Muḥammad `Abdul Haq, "The Psychology of Mullā Ṣadrā," *Journal of the Islamic Research Institute* (Karachi, 1970), vol. 9, p. 173.

⁴⁹ Mullā Ṣadrā, *Risālah 'i Si Aṣl*, edited by Hossein Nasr (Tehran: Tehran University, 1979), p. 13.

governs it. Considering it as something which bears a relationship to matter and, consequently, to movement, he takes the body to be an element in the soul's definition and says, following Aristotle, that the soul is the form or the first perfection of the body⁵⁰. In this sense, therefore, the most appropriate place for discussing the soul is natural philosophy.⁵¹ Nevertheless in another attempt he states that although the soul is the form or the first perfection of the natural body, it is an incorporeal substance which emanates from the world of intellects.⁵²

Rejecting Ibn Sīnā's apparent self-contradiction and modifying the Aristotelian definition of the soul as well, Mullā Ṣadrā states that when the soul comes into existence it is nothing other than something which relates to the body and will only change substantially when it passes through substantial motion.⁵³ At the same time, Ṣadrā also mentions that my emphasis on the soul's related mode of existence at its early stage does not imply Ibn Sīnā's idea that the soul is a rational concept and not a substantive one.⁵⁴ So there will not be any unknown substance for the soul separated from its relation to the body at its early existence. However, he insists that no one is able to discover the soul's essence (*dhāt*); all we can relate, in

⁵⁰ Unlike the above mentioned argument, in his *al-Risālah al-Aḥwāliyyah fī Amr al-Ma'ād* Ibn Sīnā emphasizes that the word "*ana*" which reflects the soul refers to something beyond the body or any part of it. See *al-Risālah al-Aḥwāliyyah fī Amr al-Ma'ād*, edited by Sulaymān Dunyā (Cairo, 1949), pp. 94-95.

⁵¹ Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb al-Nafs Min Ajzā Kitāb al-Shifā'*, edited by Fazlur Rahmān (London: Oxford University, 1959), p. 10-11.

⁵² Ibn Sīnā, "*Risālah fī al-Hudūd*," *Tis' Rasā'il fī al-Hikmat wa al-Ṭabī'iyyāt*, edited by Ḥasan 'Āṣī (Beirut: Dār Qābis, 1986), pp. 69-70.

⁵³ Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī, *al-Asfār al-Arba'ah* (Qum: Kitāb-furūsh-i Muṣṭafawī, 1378 A. H.), vol. 8, *al-safar al-rābi'*, *al-bāb al-awwal*, chapter 1, pp. 9-11.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13. See also Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā* (Albany: State University of New York, 1975), pp. 196-97.

fact, are various facts about its faculties and the lower mental and intellectual levels (*quwā wa manāzilihā al-nafsīyyah wa al-`aqliyyah*).⁵⁵

Mullā Ṣadrā also departs from Ibn Sīnā on some other psychological points, such as the eternity and createdness of the soul, the immateriality (*tajarrud*) of the imaginative power,⁵⁶ and the effective role of the soul in relation to its faculties, through which it exists in all its uniqueness (*al-nafs fī waḥdatihā kull al-quwā*).⁵⁷ It is necessary to mention that even though Mullā Ṣadrā's psychology covers a vast terrain, including the vegetative and animal souls, we have limited ourselves in this study to the case of the human soul.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, *al-bāb al-sādis*, chapter 2, p. 310.

⁵⁶ Going beyond Ibn Sīnā and other previous Muslim philosophers who followed Aristotle in attributing immateriality only to universal intellect, Mullā Ṣadrā asserted that the faculty of imagination is also a given immortal and independent existent. Regarding this doctrine, he followed certain Sufi and Hermetic teachings which established an opposite school of thought vis-à-vis the Peripatetics. For more information refer to the M.A. dissertation written by M. J. Zarean entitled as *Sensory and Imaginary Perception according to Mullā Ṣadrā*, (Montreal: Institute of Islamic Studies, 1994.)

⁵⁷ Sayyid Abu al-Ḥasan Qazwīnī, "The Life of Ṣadr al-Muta'llihin Shīrāzī and...", *Yādnāmah-i Mullā Ṣadrā* (Tehran: Tehran University, 1340 A. H.), p. 4.

2.2. Terminology

Speaking of the soul and the mind, philosophers have traditionally proposed two basic orientations. Some believe that mind and soul are the same, others that mind is a part of the soul. A third group proposes that the mind and the soul are entirely different and what, in fact, exists is mind characterized by intellect and will. While philosophers have insisted on the existence of the soul as something which can survive after the death of the body independently or, better to say, without a corporeal body, modern defenders of the notion of the mind maintain the existence of the mind as something which is not immortal, but characterized by intellect and will.⁵⁸ According to the latter, the human mind is primarily the capacity to acquire intellectual abilities. Therefore, it is a capacity, not an activity. They argued that babies have minds even though they have not yet exhibited intellectual activities. In other words, infants possess a basic ability to acquire new abilities.⁵⁹

Beyond these views, some have gone further to state that no satisfactory account of our concept of the mind can be really offered. As Shaffer explains:

The only thing that we know of each person is a series of mental changes, mental states, and mental processes. Because of the inability to say what a mind is, many philosophers prefer to speak not of minds as such, but simply of mental properties or mental events.⁶⁰

This line of thinking has been taken by many modern psychologists as the very basis of their field.

⁵⁸ Teichman, *The Mind and the Soul*, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-2. See also Kenny, *The Metaphysics of Mind*, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

⁵⁹ Kenny, *The Metaphysics of Mind*, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

⁶⁰ Shaffer, "Mind-Body Problem," *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, *op. cit.*, p. 337.

Trying to define *rūḥ* or *nafs*, some Muslim philosophers, on the other hand, have stated that no one can obtain or know the exact nature of *rūḥ* even if one is sure that there is, indeed, something like *rūḥ*.⁶¹

According to D.B. Macdonald, *rūḥ* in Arabic is a primary noun which has become broadly equivalent in meaning to the Latin *spiritus*, or "breath", "wind", "spirit". From one end, it may even be related back to the most primitive folklore and, from the other end, it is closely linked, as in the Islamic use of the word "spirit," to the entire history of philosophy. In the course of its journey between these two extremes, the meaning of the term has been alternatively used in all theology and philosophy, from metaphysics to so-called superstitions.⁶²

In purely philosophical tradition, soul or *nafs* is sometimes considered as a form (*ṣūrah*) or perfection (*kamāl*) or power (*quwwah*), implying the principle of affections and acts (*mabda' al-āthār wa al-af'āl*). All these terms depend on certain considerations. If we regard it as the source of actions and effects in relation to the body, the soul is called *quwwa*.⁶³ However, it could be the form of matter that carries it or something which completes matter and causes it to be actualized.⁶⁴

Switching to the technical meaning of the soul according to Ibn Sīnā's school of thought, let us first present his point of view on the soul's definition. In *al-Najāt* it

⁶¹ Muḥammad 'Alī al-Fārūqī al-Tihānawī, *Istilāḥāt al-Funūn* (Beirut: al-Maktabah al-Islamiyyah, 1966), Vol. 3-4, p. 18.

⁶² D. B. Macdonald, "The Development of the Idea of Spirit in Islam," *Acta Orientalia* (1931), p. 307.

⁶³ It should be noticed that *quwwah* has different meanings in philosophical texts, but is used in the above mentioned discussion referring to the soul as the source or basis of the action (*mabda' al-āthār wa al-af'āl*).

⁶⁴ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Asfār*, vol. 8, *op. cit.*, *al-safār al-rābi'*, *al-bāb al-awwal*, chapter 1, pp. 7-9.

seems that he simply accepts the Aristotelian definition of the soul⁶⁵ and insists on the intellectual aspects such as thinking, inference, and the perception of universals.⁶⁶ He considers the soul as the first perfection (*kamālun awwal*) of the natural body. However, he departs from Aristotle when he emphasizes the difference between perfection and form. Perfection according to Aristotle is equal to form (*ṣūrah*), which cannot stand by itself, while Ibn Sīnā believes that perfection and form are not interchangeable. Each form is equal to perfection but each perfection is not a form. Using Aristotle's metaphor of the ship's captain⁶⁷ to explain the difference, Ibn Sīnā states that the captain is a kind of perfection for the ship but is not its form. In the case of the soul, too, we must state that a transcendent perfection (*Kamālun mufāriq*) is neither the form of matter nor is it located in it.⁶⁸

On closer examination, one may note a certain inconsistency in Ibn Sīnā's words. On the one hand, he states that the soul is the first perfection of the body, which necessitates admitting the idea of being form. For, "first perfection" is something that causes matter to be actualized. Therefore, its relation to the body cannot resemble that of a captain to a ship, which are two independent existents. No one considers the captain as the "first perfection" of the ship. On the other hand, he considers the soul as a transcendent perfection (*kamālun mufāriq*), which is in fact the final not the first perfection of the body. This excludes the proposed definition.

⁶⁵ According to Aristotle, "soul is the first actuality (or the first entelechy) of a natural body having in it the capacity of life", See Aristotle, *De Anima*, (London: Oxford University, 1950, 1955), translated by J. A. Smith under Ross editorship, Book II, I, 412a.

⁶⁶ Ibn Sīnā, *al-Najāt*, edited by 'Abd al-Rahmān 'Umayarah (Beirut: Dār al-Jail, 1992), vol. 2, p. 196.

⁶⁷ Aristotle, *De Anima*, *op. cit.*, Book II, I, 413a.

⁶⁸ Ibn Sīnā, *al-Shifā'* (Qum: al-Najafī al-Mar'ashī pub, 1983), vol. 2, *al-Ṭabī'īyyāt, al-fann al-sādis, al-maqālah al-'ūlā*, p. 7.

Ibn Sīnā sometimes defines the soul by referring to its functions. In *al-Shifā'*, he introduces the human soul as the source of nutrition, growth, sensation, motion, and intellection (*maṣḍar al-ghadhā', al-numuww, al-iḥsās, al-ḥarakah, wa al-ta'aqqul*). These two said definitions are Aristotelian.⁶⁹ In another attempt, Ibn Sīnā tries to combine Aristotle's position on one hand, and Plato's on the other hand. He states accordingly that although the soul is the form or the first perfection of the natural body, it is an incorporeal substance which emanates from the world of intellects.⁷⁰

Though Mullā Ṣadrā quotes passages in his *al-Asfār* indicating that according to the philosophers, *nafs* is nothing other than what is related to the body⁷¹ and which functions as a source of intellectual acts and universal perceptions, in his *Mafātīḥ*, he states that all definitions of the soul which are presented by them as being essential definition are, in fact, nominal definitions (*ḥadd biḥasab-i al-'ism*) because *nafs* is in its reality one of God's immaterial lights (*nūrun min anwār-i Allāh al-ma'nawiyyah*).⁷² In order to remove this ambiguity, Mullā Ṣadrā declares that the human soul has a unique existence which is continuously in essential motion and does not have any static essence or particular stage of existence like other existents located in the natural, psychical and intellectual realms. Consequently, it would be very hard to perceive its essence as it is. All we say about the soul can only indicate

⁶⁹ Aristotle, *De Anima*, op. cit., Book II, 1, 412a.

⁷⁰ Ibn Sīnā, "*Risālah fī al-ḥudūd*" *Tis' Rasā'il fī al-Ḥikmat wa al-Ṭabī'iyyāt*, edited by Ḥasan 'Āsī (Beirut: Dār Qābis, 1986), pp. 69-70.

⁷¹ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Asfār*, vol. 8, op. cit., *al-safar al-rābi'*, *al-bāb al-awwal*, chapter 1, pp. 9-11.

⁷² Mullā Ṣadrā, *Mafātīḥ al-Ghaib*, commented by Mullā Ali Nūrī, edited by Muḥammad Khawājāwī, (Tehran, 1984), p. 514

the levels of its existence in relation to the body and refer to its accidents of perception and motion (*'awāriḍ al-idrākīyyah wa al-taḥrīkīyyah*).⁷³ Therefore, philosophers usually define "*nafs*" as the first perfection (*kamālun awwal*) of the body. This definition simply reflects a kind of relation (*iḍāfah*) existing between the soul and the body, whereas the soul is indeed a substance (*jawhar*). It is like when we define a builder (*bannā'*) as a person who constructs buildings, which defines him as a builder not qua human being.⁷⁴

One may note a kind of contradiction between this account and what he offers in his *al-Asfār* which clearly shows that Mullā Ṣadrā considers the soul at its very early existence as something relating to the body without having any other transcendent essence.⁷⁵

Again, in an attempt to define *nafs* (soul), Mullā Ṣadrā asserts that each active power (*quwwah fā'iliyyah*) capable of causing different effects is called *nafs*. This definition refers to the soul as an active power. The soul's simple essence (*dhātiḥā al-basīṭah*), on the other hand, has another definition which cannot be dealt with in natural science, he says.⁷⁶

In Mullā Ṣadrā writings, one can barely tell that he explicitly distinguishes between *nafs* and *rūḥ*. Although he often applies *nafs* to refer to that which is related to the body, he also sometimes uses *rūḥ* as an alternative. In his *'Arshīyyah*, he uses

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 310.

⁷⁴ Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad Ibn Ibrāhīm al-Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā), *al-Mabda' Wa al-Ma'ād*, edited by Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshṭiyānī (Tehran, 1976), pp. 232-33.

⁷⁵ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Asfār*, vol. 8, *op. cit.*, *al-safar al-rābi'*, *al-bāb al-awwal*, chapter 1, pp. 11-12.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

rūh to refer to something he calls *nafs* in other works.⁷⁷ The Distinction is perhaps clearer when Mullā Ṣadrā adds suffixes to the term "*rūh*". He distinguishes between vaporous spirit (*al-rūh al-bukhārī*) and immaterial spirit (*al-rūh al-mujarrad*) in his writings. The former, according to him, is a subtle, hot body (*jism ḥārr laṭīf*) which is made up of four tempers (*akhlāṭ arba'ah*) which carries perceptual powers and runs in the body. The latter, on the other hand, has an incorporeal existence which can only be known by perfect men through the intuition (*binūrin ashraf min al-'aql*). *Al-rūh al-bukhārī* could be investigated in natural science through experiment and deduction with the view to maintaining body's health. *Al-rūh al-mujarrad* must be known through intuition as a way of knowing God.⁷⁸

There is one case in which Mullā Ṣadrā maintains that *rūh* and *nafs* are two levels of the soul. Comparing the soul's levels to those of the Qur'ān's meanings, Mullā Ṣadrā enumerates seven degrees of existence for the soul. These degrees are the following: nature (*ṭabī'ah*), soul (*nafs*), intellect (*'aql*), spirit (*rūh*), secret (*sirr*), hidden secret (*khafī*), and the most hidden state (*akhfā*) which is that of perfect union with God.⁷⁹ According to this point of view, *nafs* and *rūh* are not two independent things, but rather two levels of one reality which unfolds through substantial motion.

⁷⁷ Ṣadr al-Mut'allihīn Shīrāzī, *Arshīyyah*, edited and translated by Ghulām Ḥusain Āhanī (Isfahan: Kitābfurūshī-i Shahriyār, 1341 A. H.), p. 235. In the same page he uses the term "*rūh*" to refer to the highest level of the soul's development, and in another passage he uses the term to refer to the lowest stage of the soul's existence which is related to the body and is interchangeable with the term "*nafs*". This synonymy is found in Ṣadrā's discussion in his *Tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-Karīm*, edited by Muḥammad Kh 'ājawī (Qum: Intishārāt-i Bīdār, 1982), vol. 7, p. 58.

⁷⁸ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Mabda' wa al-Ma'ād*, *op. cit.*, pp. 250-54.

⁷⁹ Mullā Ṣadrā, *Tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-Karīm*, *op. cit.*, vol. 7, p. 23. See also Seyyed Hossein Nasr, "Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī," *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, edited by M. M. Sharif (Karachi, 1983), vol. 2, pp. 955-56. Nasr here states that according to a famous *hadīth* of the Prophet Muḥammad, accepted by Shī'as and Sunnis alike, the Qur'ān has seven levels of meaning the last known only to God.

As we noticed one can hardly arrive at a clear understanding of the terms. The whole terminological ambiguity is, of course, related to the history of these terms. There are at least four different layers to be distinguished, and each has its own ambiguity:

- a) Qur'ānic application (*nafs*, *rūḥ* with very different meanings according to various contexts).
- b) Mystical usage (basically as in the Qur'ān).
- c) Medical meanings (*rūḥ* may be used as referring to blood, life, etc.).
- d) philosophical notion (*rūḥ* means psyche, particularly rational soul <*al-nafs al-nāṭiqah*>.

2.3. Mullā Ṣadrā and duality of the soul and the body

Basic to any investigation of the soul-body relationship is the idea that man consists of two distinct things, namely, the soul and the body. Mullā Ṣadrā and Ibn Sīnā discussed this duality in similar ways, sometimes overlapping the discussion on the immateriality of the soul. The evidence presented by Mullā Ṣadrā for the distinction between the soul and the body may be categorized into two main groups. He sometimes employs introspection as a way of helping the person to realize that there is something other than his body. Otherwise he uses conceptual analysis to indicate that the soul has a distinct existence.

As an example of the first group, he mentions self-consciousness, which all individuals experience in all states. One can easily see that both Ibn Sīnā⁸⁰ and Mullā Ṣadrā assert the existence of this kind of knowledge about the self (*dhāt*), whether in sleep, drunkenness or unconsciousness. According to Mullā Ṣadrā, even during sleep, drunkenness (*al-sukr*), and unconsciousness (*al-ighmā'*) no one forgets himself. Now, if the soul were nothing other than either the whole body or a part of it, it would, in fact, be forgotten, for, we know that we sometimes forget our body in its entirety or some part of it. Moreover, for most people, the internal parts of the body -like the heart and brain- are known only through instruction (*al-ta'lim*) or dissection (*tashrīḥ*). Therefore, by contrast, the soul is something of which we are always aware.⁸¹

⁸⁰ Ibn Sīnā, *al-Ishārāt*, *op. cit.*, *al-namaṭ al-thālith*, vol. 2, p. 320 & *al-Shifā'*, *op. cit.*, *al-Ṭabī'īyyāt*, *al-fann al-sādis*, *al-maqālah al-'ūlā*, *al-faṣl al-awwal*, p. 13. & *al-maqālah al-khāmisah*, *al-faṣl al-sābi'*, pp. 225-26.

⁸¹ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Mabda' wa al-Ma'ād*, *op. cit.*, pp. 294-95. See also *al-Shawāhid al-Rubūbiyyah*, edited by Jalāl al-Dīn Āshṭiyānī (Mashhad, 1346 A.H.), pp. 211, 212.

Trying to clarify the distinction between the soul and the body, Ibn Sīnā offers an interesting argument which E. Gilson calls that of the "Flying Man/Homme Volant".⁸² While his other arguments are mostly borrowed from the previous Peripatetics, this one is put together by Ibn Sīnā himself.⁸³ Ibn Sīnā in this argument asks each individual to go through introspection and to concentrate on himself by supposing that he is just created, equipped with a healthy intellect and neither his body nor any part of it will attract his attention. In this state he forgets everything but himself. This knowledge reflects something which is not his body. A well-organized form of this argument is offered in *Kitāb al-Shifā'*.⁸⁴

In the third part (*al-namaṭ al-thālith*) of his *al-Ishārāt*, Ibn Sīnā states that the existence of the soul and its perception are self-evident and need no proof. It is the first and clearest knowledge that one can have.⁸⁵ So, he starts to offer his proof in order to draw our attention (*tanbīh*) and then comes to the conclusion that this kind of knowledge cannot be achieved through any essential definition (*ḥadd*), description (*rasm*) or proof (*burhān*).⁸⁶ As a final word, he adds:

⁸² E. Gilson, "Avicenne," *Archives D'histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire*, du Moyen age, T. IV, 1929, p. 41.

⁸³ In Fārābī's *Kitāb al-Jam' Baina Ra'yay al-Ḥakīmāin*, 4th ed., (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1985), a similar argument is attributed to Aristotle, although its real author was Plotinus in his *Enneads* through the *Theology*. Plotinus applied introspection to draw attention to the soul, while the body and both its external and internal parts are forgotten. According to this argument, it is impossible to know the soul except when we unite with the intellectual world. See al-Fārābī, *Kitāb al-Jam'*, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

⁸⁴ Ibn Sīnā, *al-Shifā' al-Ṭabī'īyyāt, al-fann al-sādis, al-maqālah al-ūlā, al-faṣl al-awwal*, p. 13. & *al-maqālah al-khāmisah, al-faṣl al-sābi'*, *op. cit.*, pp. 225-26.

⁸⁵ Ibn Sīnā, *al-Ishārāt*, vol. 2, *op. cit.*, *al-namaṭ al-thālith*, p. 320.

⁸⁶ Ibn Sīnā *al-Ishārāt*, vol. 2, *op. cit.*, *al-namaṭ al-thālith*, p. 320.

Here I am and I know myself even if I do not have any knowledge about my hand or my foot or any other of bodily limb being internal or external.⁸⁷

Since the idea of dualism provides the basis for any further discussion about the soul-body relationship, Ibn Sīnā like his predecessors devoted much space in order to deal properly with this issue. In one of his treatises devoted to the human soul, he offers another argument, based on the knowledge that each person has about his unique personality throughout his life. He points out that although the body is in a continuous process of change, each individual at every moment has the same understanding of himself as the one he had as a child. This uniqueness which helps us to remember our early childhood reflects the existence of something else beside the changeable body.⁸⁸ One may suppose that both Ibn Sīnā and Mullā Ṣadrā have probably relied on this form of evidence, on introspection and knowledge by presence, hoping to trigger an awareness of ourselves through a concentration on the "self", which happens to be beyond even of our mental forms. Following Ibn Sīnā and Mullā Ṣadrā, S. M. H. Ṭabāṭabā'ī says that we all have a permanent and correct

⁸⁷ Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb al-Nafs*, edited by Fazlur Rahmān, *op. cit.*, p. 255.

⁸⁸ Ibn Sīnā, "*Risālah fī Ma'rifat al-Nafs al-Nāṭiqah*," *Ibn Sīnā wa al-Nafs al-Bashariyyah*, *op. cit.*, p. 31. It should be added that the authenticity of this treatise strongly doubted by J. P. Michot in his book *La destinée de L'homme Selon Avicenne*, p. XXIX-XX. However, the idea is attributed to him based on his other writings. Prof. H. Landolt mentions that according to F. Rāzī this argument has been initially dealt with by Ghazālī with the conclusion that "essence of man" (*ḥaqīqat-i ādamī*) is not identical with his body. See H. Landolt, *Ghazālī and "Religionswissenschaft"*, some notes on the *Mishkāt al-Anwār* (Bern: Peter Long, 1991), p. 69, F. N. 205.

The idea of a stable and unique personality, which is the characteristic of our spiritual realm has also been proposed by two modern psychologists, namely, Bergson and William James. See Khulaif, *op. cit.*, p. 106. He quotes from Ibrāhīm Madkūr, *Fī al-Falsafah al-Islāmīyyah*, pp. 172 & 194. See also al-Bair Nasry, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

understanding of ourselves throughout the life, but we perhaps make a mistake when we want to interpret or conceptualize it.⁸⁹

According to M. T. Mişbāḥ Yazdī, It should be mentioned that although the self-knowledge may be acquired by each person who is able to concentrate on his ego, it has different levels of lucidity which develops along with the development of the soul itself. Therefore, in its initial appearance, it would be almost unconscious or possess a very low level of lucidity. Even after years it may not be much clearer or, at least, not clearly interpreted by the mind. Often it is mistaken for the body. Whenever the soul becomes more perfect or acquires a higher level of immateriality, self-knowledge becomes clearer, until it perceives itself as an entirely transcendent being. But this kind of knowledge is acquired only by a few people who have reached the highest level of spiritual development. Most require other types of evidence before they can acquire self-conscious knowledge of themselves.⁹⁰

However, it remains unclear how we can be aware of ourselves in the cases of unconsciousness, drunkenness or sleep. The assertion is conceivable only when we are healthy and conscious.

Supporting Mullā Ṣadrā's idea regarding the presence of self-knowledge even in the case of unconsciousness or drunkenness, Ṭabāṭabā'ī states that what one may

⁸⁹ Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusain Ṭabāṭabā'ī, *al-Mizān Fī Tafsīr al-Qur'ān* (Tehran: Dār al-Kutub al-Islāmiyyah, 1970), vol. 6, p. 200. It must be emphasized that this point had been specially elaborated by Suhrawardī in his various writings. He insisted that since self-knowledge is a type of direct knowledge, which is acquired without any mental intermediary, it will be absolutely true. See Shihāb al-Dīn Yaḥyā ibn Ḥabash al-Suhrawardī, "K. al-Talwihāt", *Majmū'ah fī al-Ḥikmah al-Ilāhiyyah*, ed. H. Corbin (Istānbūl: maṭba'ah al-Ma'ārif, 1945), vol. 1, pp. 70-72. & "Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq", *Majmū'ah-i Muṣannafāt-i Shaykh-i Ishrāq*, ed. H. Corbin, (Tehran: Institut Franco-Iranien, Académie Iranienne de Philosophie, 1331s./1952), vol. 2, pp. 110-112.

⁹⁰ Muḥammad Taqī Mişbāḥ Yazdī, *Āmūzish-i Falsafah* (Tehran: Sazman-i Tablighāt-i Islāmi, 1989), vol. 2, p. 154.

say after each of those two unusual situations is that he is not aware of what has happened for him during that period or better to say he is not able to remember it, but he cannot say that he did not have any knowledge of himself when he was drunk or unconscious. We have heard of some people, who suffered from unconsciousness or drunkenness, that they had experiences such as what we may have in our usual dreams during sleep.⁹¹

In his *al-Asfār*, Mullā Ṣadrā adduces more arguments which may be categorized as samples of the second group. Here he follows Peripatetic tradition by listing the soul's functions and analyzing their relation to the soul. The soul is said to be an active power which causes various voluntary effects, such as intellect, sensation, motion, feeding, growth, reproduction. He argues that these kinds of effect can neither be derived from matter nor from physical form, not even from the whole body as a combination of matter and corporeal form. This is because matter, on the one hand, is a pure receptivity (*qābiliyyah maḥḍah*) having no function or effect. Form, on the other hand, cannot be considered as a source of these effects, since it is common to all bodies (*ajsām*), although we observe these effects emanating from some types of bodies. So, there must be another source beyond the body, in order to explain those effects we see in some bodies. This source is what we call the soul (*nafs*).⁹² The evidence here presented is similar to what Ibn Sīnā offers in *Kitāb al-Shifā'*,⁹³ and is borrowed from Plato and Aristotle.

⁹¹ Ṭabāṭabā'ī, *al-Mizān*, vol. 6, p. 192.

⁹² Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Asfār*, vol. 8, *op. cit.*, *al-safar al-rābi'*, *al-bāb al-awwal*, chapter 1, p. 6.

⁹³ Ibn Sīnā, *al-Shifā'* *op. cit.*, *al-Ṭabī'yyāt*, *al-fann al-sādis*, *al-maqālah al-'ūlā*, *al-faṣl al-awwal*, p. 5.

In his explanation concerning the distinction between the soul and the body, Mullā Ṣadrā sometimes refers to the capacity of the soul and the body to acquire forms and to deal with them independently. Following Ibn Sīnā and Suhrawardī, he maintains that the body can bear only one form or quality at a time; and, if it loses a quality, it cannot regain it without an external cause. But the soul can independently preserve, remember and reproduce any intelligible form at any time. It is like a board containing various sciences and knowledge of innumerable objects.⁹⁴ He also argues that man is capable of conceiving universals and intelligible forms which cannot be formed in the body. This is because the body is infinitely divisible, whereas an intelligible form is indivisible.⁹⁵

Continuing his argument, Mullā Ṣadrā maintains that another evidence for the duality of the soul and the body is their "opposite directions" in the process of development. While continuous and intense intellectual activities eventually lead the body to weakness, which may end in death and dissolution, they produce mental perfection and intellectual maturity. It is evident that it would be impossible for the same thing to be the cause of both the perfection and the destruction of a thing at the same time. Therefore, the soul or the mind is something other than the body.⁹⁶

⁹⁴ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Shawāhid al-Rubūbiyyah*, *op. cit.*, pp. 213, 214. See also Muḥammad `Abdul Haq, "The Psychology of Mullā Ṣadrā," *Journal of the Islamic Research Institute* (Karachi: 1970), vol. 9, p.177.

⁹⁵ Yaḥyā ibn Ḥabash Shihābaddīn Suhrawardī, "Partu Nāma", *Majmū`ah-i Āsār-i Fārsī-i Shaykh-i Ishrāq*, Ed. S. H. Nasr (Tehran: Institut Franco-Iranien, Académie Iranienne de Philosophie, 1348s./1970). vol. 3, pp. 24-25. See also Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Asfār*, *op. cit.*, vol. 8, *al-safar al-rūbī*, *al-bāb al-sādis*, chapter 1, pp. 260-64.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 295. Criticizing this evidence, Mullā Ṣadrā adds that what is, indeed, impossible is that one cause creates both perfection and dissolution in the same thing and at the same time. However, one may think of the possibility of a cause which leads to the occurrence of perfection and dissolution in one thing but at two different times or based on two different considerations.

This is similar to what is offered in the classical argument in the Peripatetic tradition. They argue that intensive sense-perception eventually weakens the body, while intellectual activity brings the mind to maturity.⁹⁷

In spite of his eagerness to prove a clear duality of the soul and the body, Mullā Ṣadrā attempts to show that an intimate and metaphysical link exists between them. He goes so far as to assert that the body and the soul are two levels of one existent. The body is the state or stage (*martabah*) of hardness and heaviness for that being, whereas the soul constitutes a degree of lightness and subtlety. Here, one may ask how these two distinct existents come to be so intimately linked together. Leaving it unanswered, saying that it is a divine secret, Mullā Ṣadrā nevertheless gives an example. He states that just as the material of the wick gets ready to accept fire and then gradually becomes red and bright until it becomes luminous and burning, so the human sperm gets physically ready to accept the rational soul, which is a spark from heaven and then develops until it unites with the active intellect.⁹⁸ As we shall see, Mullā Ṣadrā attempts to demonstrate that although the soul is an immaterial being, and quite distinct from the body, its creation is based on a corporeal origination.

⁹⁷ Aristotle, *De Anima*, *op. cit.*, Book III, 3, 429a, line 30 & 429b, line 4.

⁹⁸ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Wāridāt al-Qalbīyyah Fī Ma'rifat al-Rubūbiyyah*, edited by Aḥmad Shafī'ihā (Tehran: Iranian Academy of Philosophy, 1979), pp. 85-86. See also *al-Asfār*, vol. 8, *op. cit.*, *al-safār al-rābi'*, *al-bāb al-thālith*, chapter 13, p. 148.

2.4. Soul-Body Relationship

In the previous section, we investigated whether or not there was something incorporeal beside the body, considering what Mullā Ṣadrā and Ibn Sīnā have put forward in this regard. In the present section, we will first deal with the issue whether the soul has an eternal pre-existence (*qadīm*), or whether it is created in time (*ḥādīth*) just like the body. If it is said to be a created existence, one may ask again whether the soul joins the body as a physical thing, which then changes into an incorporeal existent, or it joins the body as a created but incorporeal thing. We must deal with these issues before we can determine what were the basic philosophical foundations of soul-body relationship in the psychology of Mullā Ṣadrā.

By way of an introduction into these questions, we may briefly consider a classification of all the doctrines concerning the soul's eternity and createdness into four groups, which has been proposed by the 19th century philosopher and mystic Mullā Hādī Sabzawārī.

According to his classification, a group of theologians held the idea that the soul is always corporeal (*jismānī*) both in its createdness (*ḥudūth*) and its persistence (*baqā*). Peripatetics (*Mashshā'in*), the second group, took the opposite stand stating that the soul is immaterial in both its createdness and immortality (*ḥudūth wa baqā*). But this immateriality belongs only to its essence, since it needs to be united with the body in order to perform its functions and to perfect itself. Connection with the body, they assert, is in the form of a relation (*ta'alluq*) not imprint (*intibā*), so that the soul is immaterial even when it relates to the body. The third group consists of

mystics,⁹⁹ followed by Mullā Ṣadrā, who maintained that the soul is physical only in its createdness, but changes gradually into immaterial quiddity after it has been created in the body. The fourth group took a view opposite to Mullā Ṣadrā's, stating that some souls were immaterial upon creation and were related to the body, but became corporeal after they joined with the body. Metempsychosists (*aṣḥāb al-tanāsukh*) hold that when the soul relates to the body, it will be deeply affected by the body. They also say that through its relation to the body, the soul becomes corporeal (*jismānī*), not the body (*jism*) itself, because there is a big difference between being corporeal (*jismānī*) and being a body (*jism*). Even though Sabziwārī concurred in general with Mullā Ṣadrā, it seems that he tended to believe in the idea of the fourth group, adding further that this is what all investigators believed in (*hādhā shai'un yaqūlu bihī al-kull min ahl al-taḥqīq*).¹⁰⁰

According to Mullā Ṣadrā, the debate on the eternity and createdness of the soul goes back to Plato and Aristotle's period. Plato upheld the idea of its eternity, whereas Aristotle believed in its createdness.¹⁰¹ He himself refutes the idea of eternity with a number of arguments. For example, he declares that it is impossible for the soul to be eternal, since then it must pre-exist either in form of the soul or the intellect (*ʿaql*). If it pre-exists in the form of the soul, it must be inactive (*muʿaṭṭal*)

⁹⁹ By mystics he probably means Ibn ʿArabī and Rūmī and all who followed their school of thought. As an example Sabzawārī cites a poem from al-Shaykh Farīd al-Dīn ʿAṭṭār:

تن ز جان نبود جدا عضو از اوست جان ز کل- نبود جدا جزوی از اوست

In this line ʿAṭṭār considers the body as an organ for the soul and the soul as a part of the whole.

¹⁰⁰ ʿĀmulī Shaykh Muḥammad Taqī, *Durar al-Fawā'id, Ta'līqat ʿalā Sharḥ al-Manzūmah li al-Sabzawārī* (Tehran: Markaz Nashr al-Kitāb, 1378/), pp. 342-44.

See also Ḥasanzādah ʿĀmulī, *Uyūnu Masā'il al-Nafs* (Tehran: Intishārāt-i Amīr Kabīr, 1371s./1992), p. 229. He quotes from Sabzawārī, *Ta'līqat ʿAlā Ghurar al-Farā'id, al-tab' al-ḥajarī al-a'lā (al-ṭab' al-nāṣirī)*, p. 298.

¹⁰¹ Mullā Ṣadrā, *Mafātiḥ al-Ghaib*, Commented by Mullā Ali Nūrī (Tehran, 1984), p. 536.

waiting to connect to a body.¹⁰² If it rather pre-exists as an intellect, how can it bear any new accident when it is actual, without having any potentiality.¹⁰³ The problem, according to Mullā Ṣadrā, starts when we believe that the soul pre-exists in the same manner as it is related to the body. The soul before joining with the body would be a pure immaterial and actual existent which possesses immediately all it can attain. Therefore, it would have no potentiality to be actualized in cooperation with the body. If it is an eternal and thus perfect being, how is it possible for a perfect being to become contaminated by corporeal powers and instruments which are vegetative or animal and imperfect?!¹⁰⁴

The other problem is that of plurality. Here, he just maintains that the pure immaterial thing cannot be more than one, since it does not have any individuating matter. Like Ibn Sīnā¹⁰⁵, Mullā Ṣadrā argues that if the soul existed before the body, then there would have to be either a plurality of souls or one soul. A plurality of souls is impossible. For in their prior existence these souls are immaterial and since matter is the individuating principle, these souls cannot be many.¹⁰⁶ But the

¹⁰² It is noteworthy that the soul philosophically refers to something which is related to the body in order to govern it. So, if it pre-exists without dealing with the body, it will be inactive (*mu'atfal*). See Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Asfār*, vol. 8, *op. cit.*, *al-safar al-rābi'*, *al-bāb al-sābi'*, chapter 2, p. 332.

¹⁰³ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Mabda' wa al-Ma'ād*, *op. cit.*, p. 313. See also *al-Shawāhid*, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

¹⁰⁴ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Asfār*, vol. 8, *op. cit.*, *al-safar al-rābi'*, *al-bāb al-sābi'*, chapter 2, pp. 330-31.

¹⁰⁵ Ibn Sīnā, *al-Risālah al-Aḥwāliyyah fī Amr al-Ma'ād*, edited by Sulaymān Dunyā (Cairo, 1949), p. 88-91. & Ibn Sīnā, *Aḥwāl al-Nafs*, edited by F. Ahwānī (Cairo, 1952), pp. 96-97. See also Michael E. Marmura, "Avicenna and the Problem of the Infinite Number of Souls", *Mediaeval Studies*, (Toronto: Pontifical Institute Of Mediaeval Studies, 1960), vol. 22, p. 234.

¹⁰⁶ Refuting the idea of plurality, Mullā Ṣadrā argues that plurality derives either from form (*al-ṣūrah*) or from matter (*al-māddah*), or from the agent (*al-fā'il*), or from the final goal (*al-ghāyah*). None of these possibilities pertain to the existence of the soul before joining with a body. The soul's form is its essence, which is one and not many. Its matter is the body, which of course is absent before it has joined with the body. What produces it is the active intellect, also one. The final

supposition of the pre-existence of one soul is equally impossible. For then the soul of an individual like Ali would be identical with the soul of an individual like Ḥasan. This is absurd. Nor can it become many after having been one, for the soul is not divisible. If, then, in the supposed prior existence there can be neither a plurality of souls nor one soul, the prior existence of the soul to the body is impossible. The soul cannot exist before the body but must exist with body. Mullā Ṣadrā also insists that if we believe that the soul is an eternal and immaterial substance, we must also believe that a material being came out of the combination of an immaterial and a material thing. It would also be absurd. In his *al-Asfār* he argues :

The soul is the entelechy (completion, *tamām*) of the body, [which means that] a perfect corporeal species comes out of the connection of the bodily matter and the soul. But it is impossible (to see) a natural material species emerges from the connection of a material and an immaterial being. Then, if the consequent is wasted, the antecedent is wasted, too. Accordingly it is clear that as far as the soul's individual existence is concerned, its association with the body and its disposal in it is an essential affair for the soul (*amrun dhātiyyun lahā*). Hence, the soul's relation to the body is its constituting differentia (*muqawwimah lahā*). However, it does not imply that the soul is a type of correlation (*min bāb al-muḍāf*) or it is out of the definition of substantiality (*ḥadd al-jawhariyyah*). Rather it implies that the soul is out of the definition of intellectuality (*ḥadd al-'aqliyyah*).

So, the soul must be a material form in its initial existence as it becomes associated with the body. This is the point, as we shall see, at which Mullā Ṣadrā departs from Ibn Sīnā's position and proposes that being a material form and relating to the body is essential for the soul. Therefore, the soul cannot possess first its own

goal is in God, who is undoubtedly one. So in this fashion there will be no justification for plurality. See *al-Mabda' wa al-Ma'ād*, *op. cit.*, pp. 310-11.

immaterial essence, and then relate to the body. In its early existence, the soul must be a physical form, because it joins matter in order to actualize it¹⁰⁷. It should thus be consistent with the quiddity of matter, which is the same as its form. So, when matter is corporeal, its form also must be corporeal. However, this form has the capacity of becoming an intellectual form.¹⁰⁸

Although Mullā Ṣadrā makes serious efforts to refute the idea of eternity of the soul, he adds that what he is seeking to refute is the eternity of the soul's existence before the body, as a proper and independent existence when it joins with the body. The soul has another type of existence, God's knowledge, and is as eternal as His knowledge is eternal.¹⁰⁹ The only reasonable possibility of existence for the soul before the body is to be sought in God's knowledge, which, of course, cannot be an independent and a proper existent as it is with the body. And this doctrine, he says, may be what Plato (or more precisely Neo-Platonists) and his predecessors had intended by the divine archetypes (*al-muthul al-ilāhīyyah*) or intellectual forms (*al-ṣuwar al-'aqliyyah*)¹¹⁰ This kind of existence, he says, does not have any problematic consequences and is a quite basic of Imāmīyyah philosophers.¹¹¹ Since each perfect cause cannot be separated from its effect, the soul as an effect exists for

¹⁰⁷ Based on Aristotelian theory of form-matter, actuality of all corporeal beings is due to their form. Since the soul is also form of the body, it actualizes the body.

¹⁰⁸ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Asfār (al-Ḥikmah al-Muta'aliyah Fī al-Asfār al-'Aqliyyah al-'Arba'ah)*, (Beirut: Dār Ihyā' al-Turāth al-'Arabī, 1990), vol. 3, *al-safar al-awwal, al-marḥalah al-'āshirah*, chapter 8, pp. 330-31. See also *'Arshīyyah*, p. 241. It is worth mentioning that the book *al-Asfār* is entitled in its new edition as *al-Ḥikmah al-Muta'aliyah Fī al-Asfār al-'Aqliyyah al-'Arba'ah*. However the editions are the same.

¹⁰⁹ Mullā Ṣadrā, *Mafātiḥ al-Ghaib*, *op. cit.*, p. 536.

¹¹⁰ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Asfār*, vol. 8, *op. cit.*, *al-safar al-rābi'*, *al-bāb al-sābi'*, chapter 2, pp. 331-32.

¹¹¹ Mullā Ṣadrā, *'Arshīyyah*, *op. cit.*, p. 239.

its cause before the body as its cause does. So when the cause exists, it contains the perfection of its effects.

One may, however, argue that this type of being is not the soul as such. It is indeed its cause (active intellect or any other immaterial cause) and its immediate perfection. What depends on the body does not have this form of existence. When the soul emanates from its cause in order to acquire new kinds of perfection, it relates to the body as the soul which is distinguishable from its cause. One can easily distinguish between these two types of levels of existence.¹¹² Under one consideration, the soul has a separate or incorporeal existence (*al-wujūd al-mufāriqī*), but under another it is a relative existence (*al-wujūd al-ta'alluqī*).¹¹³

One harsh attack could be addressed to both Mullā Ṣadrā, who upheld a particular type of eternity, and all who believed in the soul's eternity as such. If the soul existed before the body through a separate existence, why does it become related to the body and appear in a lower mode of existence? On this question, Mullā Ṣadrā quotes from Shaykh al-Ishrāq in his *Hikmat al-Ishrāq* where he had previously asked how it was possible for an existent being in the "world of lights" to relate to bodies in "world of darkness"? No one can imagine any change which might occur in the world of immateriality. In addition, one may ask what justifies the relation of a soul to a particular body. Why does a soul become related to this body but not to another?¹¹⁴

¹¹² Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Asfār*, vol. 8, *op. cit.*, *al-safar al-rābi'*, *al-bāb al-sābi'*, chapter 3, pp. 346-47.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 366.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 353.

Explaining the soul's emanation from the realm of intellects, Mullā Ṣadrā states that what may be said about the connection of the soul to the active intellect after death can also be asserted about the emanation of the soul. It is also worth mentioning, he says, that even though the soul has a higher type of existence when it is in the intellectual realm, there still remains some goodness (*khairāt*) and perfections which can be acquired only when the soul become associated to the body.¹¹⁵ Moreover, Mullā Ṣadrā can answer that the emanation of the soul from its cause is not, in fact, a change. There is neither increase nor decrease in the case of emanation.¹¹⁶ It may be argued that if "existent" beings in the intellectual realm are purely perfect beings then why should they seek to acquire new perfections. However, it may be proposed that they are perfect beings in terms of the perfections of that realm. There may remain other perfections which could be attainable only by entering into a new world using the body.

But Mullā Ṣadrā still has to respond to some further questions concerning his theory about the eternity of the soul. According to him, the eternity of the soul is its presence before its cause. So, what indeed is eternal is its cause, not the soul as such. But could it be asserted that souls before and after association with the body do not have an independent existence and are equal to the intellects themselves? Mullā Ṣadrā believes that the soul in its upwards travel unites with the active intellect. This union requires a kind of duality between the soul and active intellect; otherwise there will not be any connection. If Mullā Ṣadrā believes that unification of the soul with

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 353-55 & 358-59.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, *al-safar al-rābi'*, *al-bāb al-sābi'*, chapter 6, p. 396.

active intellect is the very essence of the connective (*‘ain al-rabī*) between the cause and effect, one can say that the latter always exists even when the soul becomes related to the body and is limited neither to a particular realm nor to any kind of soul. All souls being either devilish (*shaiṭānī*) or godly (*raḥmānī*) must be related to their cause. But Mullā Ṣadrā states that only divine souls can be related to the active intellect. Moreover, it would be reasonable if, after death, the soul changes into an independent intellect like its cause. But if it unites with its cause, it would be like its existence before the body. In this case, the creation of the soul must be meaningless. Whereas the intellects (*‘uqūl*) before and after the relation to the body are permanent, the souls are created with the body and will be corrupted by it. In conclusion, the soul may exist before the body as a perfection with its cause, but will be an independent being like its cause after death and this ought to be the true meaning of unification with active intellect.

2.5. Bodily createdness of the soul

Turning to the issue of the soul's createdness, Mullā Ṣadrā first of all tries to establish a new doctrine which is completely different from that of Ibn Sīnā. Unlike Ibn Sīnā, who considered the soul to be an incorporeal being as it enters into relation with the body, Mullā Ṣadrā emphasizes that the soul at that point is nothing but an associated form which has no other essence except the fact that it relates to the body.¹¹⁷ So, this relation is not something additional to its essence but is its very essence. However, it does not mean that the soul is an accident (*ʿaraḍ*) belonging to the category of relation (*iḍāfah*), but rather that it is not an incorporeal intellect when it enters into relation with the body. If it were an accident it would be in need of its matter, while as a form it produces its own matter in order to be actualized and to acquire new perfections through substantial motion.¹¹⁸

If it is asserted that the soul connects with the body as an incorporeal thing, it must be asked how two completely different things can be related in order so as to produce an entity as unique as man?¹¹⁹ Moreover, the same problem concerning the relation of the soul as a separate being to a particular body arises as when we assumed corporeality of the soul. In order to account for the relation of a soul to this body but not to another, Ibn Sīnā maintained that, although souls are independent in their essence, they cannot be transformed from one body to another because each soul is devoted to a particular body. There is, of course, a reason for this specific

¹¹⁷ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Asfār*, vol. 8, *op. cit.*, *al-safar al-rābiʿ*, *al-bāb al-awwal*, chapter 1, pp. 11-13.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁹ Ḥasanẓādah Āmulī, *ʿUyūn Masāʾil al-Nafs*, *op. cit.*, p. 227.

relation which we do not know.¹²⁰ Ibn Sīnā clearly states that souls are incorporeal, simple intellects which are created when bodies come into existence.¹²¹ The first line of his *Qaṣīdah* also reflects his and the Platonic view of a realm in which souls exist independently, and subsequently becoming related to bodies.¹²² It is difficult to summarize Ibn Sīnā's ideas on the eternity or the createdness of the soul, because of their variety. Following Platonic doctrine, he sometime states: "Soul is a spiritual substance which stands by itself (*qā'imun bidhātihī*)."¹²³ Similarly he says: "Soul's substance does not need to be related to the body and whenever it is it becomes weak".¹²⁴ Elsewhere, opposite to this, he adheres to Aristotle's position and maintains: "Human soul is not something incorporeal standing by itself, but is created when the body comes into

¹²⁰ Ibn Sīnā, *al-Ta'īqāt*, edited by 'Abd al-Rahmān Badawī (Tehran: Maktab al-Ilām al-Islāmī, 1984), p. 65.

¹²¹ Ibn Sīnā, *al-Shifā', al-Ilāhiyyāt* (Qum: Intishārāt-i Kitābkhanah-i Āyat Allah al-Mar'ashī al-Najafī, 1983), vol. 4, p. 408.

¹²² هبطت إليك من المحل الأرفع ورقاء ذات تعزز وتمنع

It shows that Ibn Sīnā believed that soul pre-existed in an exalted realm and then came down to relate to the body. See Khulāif, *Ibn Sīnā Wa Madhabuhū fī al-Nafs*, *op. cit.*, p. 137-40. The main problem, however, is that some scholars like Aḥmad Amīn and Aḥmad Fu'ād al-Ahwānī stated that this *Qaṣīdah* cannot be attributed to Ibn Sīnā. Not only the literal style of the *Qaṣīdah* but also the idea of eternity of the soul which is taken from the first line of this *Qaṣīdah* contradicts what Ibn Sīnā basically believes in. See Aḥmad Amīn, "Ainiyyah Ibn Sīnā", *Majallh al-Thiqāfah*, 691 (March, 1952), p. 27. See also Aḥwāl *al-Nafs*, *Risālah Fī al-Nafs Wa Baqā'ihā Wa Ma'ādiḥā*, edited by Aḥmad Fu'ād al-Ahwānī (Cairo, 1952), p. 34.

¹²³ Ibn Sīnā, *al-Ishārāt*, vol. 2, *op. cit.*, *al-namaṭ al-thālith*, pp. 321-332.

¹²⁴ Ibn Sīnā, "*Risālah Fī Ma'rifah al-Nafs al-Nāṭiqah*," *Ibn Sīnā wa al-Nafs al-bashriyyah*, al-Bair Naṣrī, *op. cit.*, p. 33. Although J. Qanawātī in his *Mu'allafāt Ibn Sīnā* considered this *Risālah* as one of Ibn Sīnā's writings, there are some serious doubts regarding its attribution to Ibn Sīnā. Osman Ergin quoted scholars who attributed this *Risālah* to Nu'mān al-Dīn Khārazmī or al-Quṭb al-Shīrāzī or Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī. J. Michot also opts for a post-Avicennan origin rather than attribute the *Risālah* to Ibn Sīnā. See J. Qanawātī, *Mu'allafāt Ibn Sīnā* (Cairo: Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1950), pp. 151 & 163. Osman Ergin, *IBN SINA* (Istanbul, 1956), p. 80. J. R. Michot, *La destinée de L'homme selon Avicenne* (Louvain: Aedibus Peeters, 1986), p. XXIX.

existence.¹²⁵ But he departs from Aristotle when he states that when the matter appropriate for use is created, one of the active intellects creates a particular soul.¹²⁶ Uniting Plato's and Aristotle's theories on this point, he declares : " Soul is both a substance and a form. It is substance in its essence but form in accordance with its relation to the body".¹²⁷

As these passages show, Ibn Sīnā always distinguished between the soul's essence and its position as a form which utilizes the body.

Mullā Ṣadrā, however, insists that what is eternal is not the soul, because even in its essence the soul is nothing other than a corporeal form created in the body. According to Mullā Ṣadrā the error of those who believe in the eternity of the soul is the supposition that the soul, as an independent being, exists before the body and then enters into relation with the body. This relation, according to them, is an accident for the soul, after it has existed independently. But the soul, according to him, is something essentially related to the body and will vanish as a related being when the body is destroyed. The soul is first a natural form (*ṣūrah ṭabī'īyyah*) and afterwards becomes an intellectual being.¹²⁸ Accordingly, the soul (*nafs*) qua the soul is nothing other than a related being unless it becomes an incorporeal, independent being like the intellect to which, however, the term soul can no longer be applied.

¹²⁵ Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb al-Nafs*, edited by Fazlur Rahmān, *op. cit.*, pp. 223-24.

¹²⁶ Ibn Sīnā, *al-Najāh*, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 36.

¹²⁷ Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb al-Nafs*, ed. by Fazlur Rahmān, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-7.

¹²⁸ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Asfār*, vol. 8, *op. cit.*, *al-safar al-rābi'*, *al-bāb al-sābi'*, chapter three, p. 376.

Emphasizing the corporeal origination of the soul, Mullā Ṣadrā points out that if we believe that the soul was an indivisible being in essence before its attachment to the body, problems arise. First, we should note that a simple being cannot be created, since it does not have receptive matter. Secondly, if the soul is an incorporeal being in essence, how does it become related to the body and influenced by it. It is impossible for an immaterial being in this sense to be affected by a material being. Moreover, no one can find a way for a simple being to become many when it is related to the bodies.¹²⁹ According to this doctrine the soul will be the same quiddity from its initial early creation to the end of its development through use of the body. Its essence is unchangeable throughout this process of development.¹³⁰

In *al-Shawāhid and al-Mabda'* Ṣadrā offers another reason for the necessity of bodily createdness of the soul. He points out that if the soul were immaterial, then it could not bear any external accident (*'arīḍ gharīb*) [like entering the corporeal world]. Because it is clear that acquiring any accident requires preparedness (*isti'dād*) and potentiality (*quwwah*), which are the characteristics of a purely potential thing in need of a form to be actualized. This must, in fact, be a bodily matter (*al-hayūlā al-jirmāniyyah*), which is associated with the soul even though we had supposed that the soul was immaterial and separated from any matter. Therefore, pre-existence of the soul [as an immaterial being] necessitates its association with the body [as its matter]. And this is

¹²⁹ It must be mentioned that these reasons are similar to those of Ibn Sīnā's which he offered to refute the doctrine of pre-existence of the soul. However, Mullā Ṣadrā departs from Ibn Sīnā in establishing his theory regarding the corporeal createdness (*al-ḥudūth al-jismānī*) of the soul.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 344. According to Mullā Ṣadrā, the soul travels through substantial motion and acquires new levels of existence and, when it reaches the point of separation from the body, it can be in another species than that of a human being.

what logically called "reductio ad absurdum or indirect proof" [*khull'* (i.e., reaching an opposite conclusion to our assumption)].¹³¹

In elaboration, Mullā Ṣadrā declares that createdness is always equivalent to being physical. This is because any kind of change or movement requires potentiality, which is the very characteristic of corporeal matter. Therefore, the immaterial createdness of the soul can never be asserted. He who advocates the createdness of the soul should also advocate its corporeality.¹³²

Despite his emphasis on the corporeality of the soul in its early existence, Mullā Ṣadrā maintains that the human soul at the point of creation (*ḥudūth*) is the highest being of sensible world (*'ālam al-maḥsūsāt*), but the lowest of the spiritual world (*'ālam al-rūḥāniyyah*).¹³³ It means that even though the soul at this level is a material form, it is the most appropriate being to become immaterial. Being double-natured, the human soul brought Mullā Ṣadrā to the conclusion that in the assertion both that the human soul is merely material and that it is absolutely immaterial, its true identity is overlooked.¹³⁴

In explanation of the first step of the soul-body relationship, Mullā Ṣadrā says that in so far as the soul is originally a corporeal form for the appropriate body, the body is its material cause (*'illah mādīyyah*) or receptive cause (*'illah qābiliyyah*) for its existence with the body not for its essence in itself. It means that the soul will not

¹³¹ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Shawāhid*, *op. cit.*, p. 221. & *al-Mabda' wa al-Ma'ād*, *op. cit.*, p. 310.

¹³² Mullā Ṣadrā, *Mafātīḥ al-Ghaib*, *op. cit.*, p. 536.

¹³³ Mullā Ṣadrā, *'Arshīyyah*, *op. cit.*, p. 242.

¹³⁴ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Shawāhid*, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

be created until an appropriate body has previously been created. This relation continues until the soul becomes independent. In sum, the efficient cause (*'illah fā'ilīyyah*) of the soul is the active intellect, but only when there is an appropriate body.¹³⁵

¹³⁵ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Mabda' wa al-Ma'ād*, *op. cit.*, pp. 313-16. It must be mentioned that during his explanation of the soul-body relationship, Mullā Ṣadrā considers the soul as a corporeal form when it is related to the body. But in respect of its substance, the soul is undoubtedly incorporeal. Similarly, the body is the corporeal or receptive cause of the soul in so far as the latter is related to the body. Its essence, however, is beyond any relationship to the corporeal world. See Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Mabda' wa al-Ma'ād*, *op. cit.*, pp. 314-15.

2.6. Philosophical foundation of bodily createdness of the soul

In his effort to establish his transcendent "theosophy" and systematizing a new philosophical foundation, Mullā Ṣadrā was influenced by different schools of thought. He probably adopted the hylomorphisim of the Peripatetics, the gradation of being and the divine archetypes from the Illuminationists (*Ishrāqīn*). Moreover, being attracted by Ibn al-ʿArabī's school of thought, he derived new principles, such as the continual becoming of the substance of the world, and the oneness of being (*waḥdat al-wujūd*). In the systematized form in which they appear in the works of Mullā Ṣadrā, these principles find little or no parallel in any previous school of philosophy.¹³⁶

As previously mentioned, Mullā Ṣadrā based his theory of the corporeal createdness of the soul and its development on two main principles. These are substantial motion (*al-ḥarakah al-jawharīyyah*) and ambiguous hierarchy of existence (*al-tashkīk fī marātib al-wujūd*). He believes that the soul is a single reality but which is not fixed in any particular level of existence. It moves through substantial motion and appears at various levels.¹³⁷ These levels are indeed different modes of its single existence.¹³⁸ As Nasr quotes from Mullā Ṣadrā, the soul firstly appears as

¹³⁶ Nasr, "Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā)," *A History of Muslim philosophy, op. cit.*, p. 940.

¹³⁷ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Asfār*, vol. 8, *op. cit.*, *al-safar al-rābiʿ*, *al-bāb al-sābiʿ*, chapter three, p. 343.

¹³⁸ Needless to say that Mullā Ṣadrā sometimes refers to the levels of the soul's existence as different kinds of existence. In his *al-Mabda' wa al-Ma'ād* he distinguishes between related mode of the soul's existence and its separate existence. These modes of existence are various appearances of a single moving being which passes through different realms. See Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Mabda' wa al-Ma'ād, op. cit.*, p. 315. And *al-Asfār*, vol. 8, *al-safar al-rābiʿ*, *al-bāb al-sābiʿ*, chapter 5, pp. 343, 346, 378.

the body and then changes from within without there being any effusion from the heavenly souls or the active intellect.¹³⁹

One should be careful in understanding the exact meaning of Mullā Ṣadrā's idea concerning substantial development of the soul. In *al-Asfār*, there are passages which indicate his preference for the idea of effusion. For instance, when he wants to explain the soul's development, he starts with this statement:

A series of consecutive, substantial perfections (*kamālāt muta'āqibah jawharīyyah*) was effused from the active source (*al-mabda' al-fa'āl*). This series starts from mineral form, then vegetative form, animal substance and so on. In this way, substantial development occurs in the existence of substantial forms (*waqa'a al-ishtidād fī al-wujūd al-ṣūrī al-jawharī*) until the complete transcendence from matter takes place.¹⁴⁰

In combination, his two ideas of substantial motion and the idea of effusion are not contradictory. It is reasonable to say that effusion occurs when matter undergoes substantial motion to the point of acquiring a particular level of potentiality. In other words, substantial motion is an essential condition for acquiring new forms. This doctrine seems inconsistent with the other idea which emphasizes only the necessity of effusion without considering the substantial motion. Nasr himself quotes another passage from Mullā Ṣadrā's *Iksīr al-ʿArifīn* which indicates the necessity of emanation of the soul through its developmental processes. According to this passage the soul develops through the course of becoming but the

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 953-54. In page 954 at footnote no. 57 Nasr says: "The view of Mullā Ṣadrā regarding the growth and perfection of the soul resembles the alchemical view in which the power to reach perfection is considered to lie within matter itself and not outside it."

¹⁴⁰ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Asfār*, vol. 9, *al-juz' al-thānī min al-safar al-rābi'*, *al-bāb al-thālith, al-faṣl al-thālith 'ashar*, p. 147.

trend and its various levels of development are marked by the active intellects who distinguish one species from another.¹⁴¹

There remains another question pertaining to Mullā Ṣadrā's advocacy of the development of form. One may legitimately ask, if man is composed of form and matter, why does substantial motion occur only in forms and not in matters. More precisely, If form cannot be separated from matter, why does matter not follow form in becoming immaterial? It is also worth mentioning that matter in its second level, which is not called primary matter (*al-hayūlā al-'ūlā*), has its own actuality and is not a mere potentiality.

In his discussion of Mullā Ṣadrā's doctrine concerning substantial motion, Ṭabāṭabā'ī¹⁴² states in an interesting passage, that according to his theosophy, the whole of existence can be divided into two main categories, namely, actual and potential beings. These two types of beings are equivalent to flowing (*sayyāl*) and stable (*thābī*) beings. Corporeal existents are affected by the principle of movement or, better to say, have the potential to move. Incorporeal beings, on the other hand, are stable because they lack any potentiality for change. Like a very wide stream, the corporeal world- including all its elements, both accidents and substances -moves in order to acquire new modes of entity. This process of change is so dominant that

¹⁴¹ Nasr, Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā), op. cit., p. 995. He quotes from Mullā Ṣadrā, *Rasā'il*, pp. 306-07.

¹⁴² 'Allāmah Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusain Ṭabāṭabā'ī (1902-1983/1321-1406) was one of the principal Shī'ite philosophers of this century who introduced Mullā Ṣadrā's school of philosophy to the present generation. Beside his writings in philosophy, he is the author of *al-Mīzān*, one of the most reflective interpretations of the holy Qurān.

each part at each moment is different from what it was in the previous moment. The philosophical basis of continuous development, is given by Mullā Ṣadrā as follows:

Individuals of all material species are limited in four limitations, length (*ūl*), width (*arḍ*), depth (*umq*), and time (*zamān*). Based on time divisions, all corporeal beings are distributed, (*mutafarriq*) plural (*mutakaththir*), and divided (*munqasim*) through various points. Their uniqueness, nonetheless, is held by immaterial souls or by the lords of species (*arbāb-i anwā*).

Ṭabāṭabā'ī adds that according to Mullā Ṣadrā, universal change always occurs between potentiality and actuality or, in other words, from materiality toward immateriality. Various parts of the corporeal world continuously move through this general movement from deficiency and imperfection toward perfection and immateriality. Metaphorically speaking, one may say that this world is similar to the productive line of a manufacture which continuously makes immaterial beings out of material ones by putting them through substantial motion. When a stream of material beings acquires immateriality and departs from the material world, a new stream enters the process and starts to move through a new course of substantial motion. Human souls, like other corporeal beings, undergo this. They begin as material bodies, but then change into immaterial beings after passing different stages of existence by way of substantial motion.¹⁴³

Emphasizing the idea of substantial motion and its effective role in explaining the process of the soul's development, Mullā Ṣadrā states that

¹⁴³ Ṭabāṭabā'ī, "Ṣadr al-Dī Muḥammad Ibn Ibrāhīm Shīrāzī Mujaddid-i Falsafah'-i Islāmī...", *Yādnāmah'-i Mullā Ṣadrā*, op. cit., pp. 22-23. Ṭabāṭabā'ī paraphrases from *al-Asfār*, *al-safar al-awwal*, chapter 33, *baḥṭhun wa taḥṣīl*.

philosophers always wondered how to conceive of describing the various states of the soul's existence: its generation, its survival, its immateriality. They could not because they had not arrived at such a principle. Consequently, some were forced to deny the soul's immateriality and the others to try to refute its survival; another group believed in metempsychosis (*tanāsukh al-arwāḥ*).¹⁴⁴

Mullā Ṣadrā gives us a clearer picture of the path and the different levels which the human soul passes through, one after another. According to his *ʿArshīyyah* the soul is firstly a corporeal faculty (*quwwah jismānīyyah*), then a natural form (*ṣūrah ṭabīʿīyyah*), then a sensible soul (*nafsun ḥassāsah*) with its different levels (firstly animal soul and then human soul). It then acquires the faculties of thinking (*mufakkirah*) and memory (*dhākirah*), and then becomes a rational soul (*nāṭiqah*) possessing theoretical and practical reason, and eventually becomes active intellect. This final level can rarely be found among human being.¹⁴⁵

Applying the principle of the gradation of being to the development of the soul, Mullā Ṣadrā states that the human soul does not have a definite position as entity. Its existence is not fixed in any given grade. Although the other natural, spiritual and intellectual beings have individually their own specific position in the existence, the human soul can move through different realms ordered in such a way that some are prior and some posterior. Because of this flowing (unstable) existence, it has been very difficult for philosophers to know the very existence of the soul. All accounts given by philosophers of the entity of the soul consist merely of various

¹⁴⁴ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Asfār*, vol. 8, *op. cit.*, *al-safar al-rābiʿ*, *al-bāb al-sābiʿ*, chapter three, p. 346.

¹⁴⁵ Mullā Ṣadrā, *ʿArshīyyah*, *op. cit.*, p. 235. See also Morris, *The Wisdom of the Throne*, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

characteristics belonging to the soul, while the soul is associated with the body. Even motion and perception are not unique to human soul, but can be found in animals too.¹⁴⁶

In his *al-Asfār* (at the end of sixth chapter of *al-bāb al-sābi'* from *al-safar al-rābi'*), Mullā Ṣadrā gives a statement of what he means by difference in levels of existence (*ikhtilāfu marātib al-wujūd*):

Know that existence has various realms (*nasha'āt*) each coming after the other in such a way that they have priority in relation to each other. In spite of their differences, they are deeply connected to each other. The last gradation of each level is the beginning of the next one.¹⁴⁷

Declaring this idea in more specific terms which indicate the gradations of soul's existence, Mullā Ṣadrā says that While the human embryo is growing in the womb, the soul is in the level of vegetative soul. This gradation is achieved after nature leaves behind the level of the solid faculties (*al-quwā al-jamādiyyah*). Accordingly, the substance of the human sperm is in this position an actual plant, but is a potential animal until it achieves the abilities of sensation and motion. Since it has the potentiality to become an animal, this plant differs from other species of plant. At birth, it is actually an animal and potentially human, and, finally, at the age of adolescence it is actually human and potentially either an angel or a follower disciple of the Devil.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁶ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Asfār*, vol. 8, *op. cit.*, *al-safar al-rābi'*, *al-bāb al-sābi'*, chapter three, p. 343.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, *al-safar al-rābi'*, *al-bāb al-sābi'*, chapter 7, p. 396.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, *al-safar al-rābi'*, *al-bāb al-thālith*, chapter 10, p. 136-37. See also *al-Shawāhid*, *al-Mashhad al-thālith*, pp. 228-29.

Despite Mullā Ṣadrā's attempts in the preceding passage to give an explanation of various gradations of soul's development, his idea concerning the exact time within which the soul enters a new level of existence is disputable. For instance, one might assert that the human soul is an actual animal not at birth but even when the human embryo is in the womb. This is because new physiological data has shown that the human infants are capable of sensation and motion while passing their prenatal period . It has been reported that by the end of the fourth month, mothers usually experience movement of the fetus.¹⁴⁹ If one argues that since these kinds of movement are not voluntary, they cannot be considered as animal characteristics, we may state that voluntary movements occur not at the birth, but after the maturity of the central nervous system. Hetherington says:

At around five months reflexes such as sucking, swallowing, and hiccoughing usually appear. In addition, a Babinski reflex of a fanning of the toes in response to stroking of the foot occurs.¹⁵⁰

These reflexes indicate that fetus has partly reached the level of sensation. If the fetus is still unable of perceiving stimuli, how does it response to them?

It is very important to keep in mind that, although Mullā Ṣadrā maintains that existence has different gradations, every gradation covers a number of beings which are fixed in that gradation. Interestingly, he mentions that it is only the soul which moves through different gradations one after another. One can conclude that the soul's motion through up and down gradations yields the pattern of two downward

¹⁴⁹ Mavis E., Hetherington & Parke D., Ross, *Child psychology: a contemporary viewpoint*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986) p. 107.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.,

and upward arcs (*al-qaws al-nuzūlī* and *al-qaws al-ṣu'ūdī*) of the soul's development.

The above mentioned doctrine is offered in Ṣadrā's *al-Asfār* as following:

Immaterial intellects are spiritual both in essence and action. Corporeal natures (*al-ṭabā'ī' al-jismānīyyah*), on the contrary, are material in terms of those two dimensions. Accordingly, each substance from a given gradation has a specific status in existence. The human soul by contrast develops through various modes of existence¹⁵¹

One might argue that unlike the immaterial intellects, corporeal natures, like the soul, undergo substantial motion and develop within their own realm. But then, how can we assert that transformation from one stage to the other is the characteristic of souls only? The response to this objection is that, although corporeal natures are not stable in one specific point and undergo their own substantial motion, this movement occurs in the realm of nature. So, they are never transformed from a state of materiality into one of immateriality. Because the soul is not limited in this way it leaves its body and allows it to collapse when it reaches the end of corporeal world even if the body underwent its own development.

Another important point regarding the gradations of the human soul is that, despite Mullā Ṣadrā's emphasis on different levels of soul's existence, he says that these gradations are different levels of a single being which continually takes on new forms.¹⁵² In an attempt to elaborate Mullā Ṣadrā's doctrine regarding the uniqueness of the soul Fazlur Rahmān says:

¹⁵¹ Mullā Ṣadrā *al-Asfār*, vol. 8, *op. cit.*, *al-safar al-rābī'*, *al-bāb al-sābi'*, chapter three, pp. 347-48.

¹⁵² Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Shawāhid*, *op. cit.*, pp. 134.

The truth is that, in accordance with the principle of substantive change or transformation, which is also expressed by the doctrine of the systematic ambiguity (*tashkīk*) of the existence, the soul first emerges as vegetative, then as perceptive and locomotive at the animal level, then as potential intellect, and finally as pure intellect when the term soul is no longer applicable to it. The soul has its being at all these levels and at each of these levels it is the same in a sense and yet different in a sense because the same being can pass through different levels of development.¹⁵³

The reason for the uniqueness of the soul, despite its variability as an entity is the unique self-understanding or self-conception which all individuals have. In spite of all the substantial changes which occur to both bodies and souls, one readily understands that he remains the same person as he was in his childhood. If these gradations were reflections of different beings, we would certainly experience this plurality.¹⁵⁴

One may, however, assert that this unique self-conception is related to the fact that self-conception is typical of the soul when it exists at the grade of human being. For, it is difficult to prove that there is any self-conception for the human soul when it occupies the level of animal or vegetative soul, or any previous level.

¹⁵³ Fazlur Rahmān, *The philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā*, *op. cit.*, p. 205.

¹⁵⁴ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Asfār*, *op. cit.*, vol. 9, *al-juz' al-thānī min al-safar al-rābī*, *al-aṣl al-sābi*, pp. 190-91.

Chapter Three

><< *THE SOUL-BODY INTERRELATIONSHIP* ><

- 3.1. How the soul relates to the body
- 3.2. Ways of demonstrating soul-body relationship
- 3.3. Forms of the soul-body relationship
- 3.4. The Soul's independence of the body
- 3.5. Union of the soul and the active intellect

CHAPTER THREE

><<*The Soul-Body Interrelationship*><

3.1. How the soul relates to the body

Being convinced of the idea of dualism which simultaneously emphasizes the reality of the soul and the body or physical and mental events, we are facing a new issue. How is the relation between the soul and the body to be understood, and how can we explain it? From a scientific perspective, some hypothesized that the answer may have three main suppositions. The mind and the body may relate one to another in a form of complete mutual dependence. This is when we suppose that the mind is a corporeal generated being or a by-product of the brain or physical processes. Parallelism is the next assumption according to which the soul and the body or mental and physical events are considered as two existents along with each other, but never act upon each other. The third standpoint holds the view that mental and physical processes interact based on a mutual exchange. This view is in fact a version of interactionism. Since we can observe in ourselves that there are some bodily movements which, on the one hand, are rendered by our will, and some mental events such as sensation and perception, on the other hand, which are caused by physical objects that have affected our bodily organs, it would be reasonable to adhere to the third idea.¹⁵⁵ However, we face the argument that refutes

¹⁵⁵ J. L. M'Intyre, "Body And Mind," *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics* (New York, 1955), vol. 2, p. 775.

interactionism because of the explicit dissimilarity between mental and physical events. The point is that if these two dimensions are essentially different, there could never be a normal connection between them. Therefore, it is simply impossible that a change in brain cells could produce a thought or a change in thought can have a feedback to the brain cells.¹⁵⁶ Interactionism, however, upholds a mutual causality between mental and physical events. Giving more convincing examples of both sides, interactionists firstly refer to the cases that mental events effect bodily events. They point out that pains may occasionally cause involuntary shiver, thoughts may cause heart pressure, and feelings can cause a person to tremble. The reverse process is equally true. For example, blows cause latent pains, flashes of light cause a person to have a certain afterimage, pieces of music cause a person to have certain feelings or memories, and electrical brain stimulation cause a person to have a given thought.

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Approaching the problem philosophically, Mullā Ṣadrā develops an explanation according to which we have to reorganize the above-mentioned classification. He believes that although both the soul and the body have their own divine cause, they are related one to another in a way that the body as matter requires the soul as a form to be actualized and the soul needs the body to be individualized. So, neither the soul is a by-product of the body (matter), nor is its essential relation one-sided. His words, moreover, lead us to a new doctrine according to which soul-body relationship must be interpreted based on both existential

¹⁵⁶ Jerome Shaffer, "Mind-Body Problem," *Encyclopedia of philosophy*, *op. cit.*, p. 341.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

dependence and interactionism. Accordingly the soul and the body not only act upon each other, but also depend one on the other existentially. This is because they make use of each other to develop through substantial motion. Let us look at his *al-Asfār* in the first chapter of *al-safār al-rābi' al-bāb al-sābi'*, where he explains the soul-body relationship.

He firstly gives a classification about various kinds of relation (*ta'alluq*) when two things are related one to another. Relation of a form to a matter, according to him, is existential and refers to individuality (*al-tashakhkhush*). It means that a form requires a matter both in its generation and its survival. But this requirement belongs to the nature and species of matter not to a specific matter.¹⁵⁸ Turning to explain the relation between the soul and the body, Mullā Ṣadrā maintains that the soul requires the body only in its generation to be individuated and existent. The soul in its early existence is like a natural form which needs matter to exist. But this body is not a specific body because it is under substantial motion. Mullā Ṣadrā then considers another kind of relation between the soul and the body which is due to perfection and acquiring virtue in existence (*iktisāb al-faḍīlah li al-wujūd*), not existence as such (*aṣl al-wujūd*). Perfectional relation, he says, is not the reason for the soul to join the body, as most philosophers held for it starts only when the soul has reached the level of formal maturity (*al-bulūgh al-ṣūrī*) and possesses practical reason (*al-'aql al-'amali*) while its theoretical reason is still a potential.¹⁵⁹ Summing

¹⁵⁸ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Asfār*, vol. 8, *op. cit.*, *al-safār al-rābi'*, *al-bāb al-sābi'*, chapter one, p. 326-27.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 326 & 329. See also Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Asfār*, (Beirut: Dār Iḥyā' al-Turāth al-'Arabi, 1990), vol. 3, *al-safār al-awwal*, *al-marḥalah al-'āshirah*, chapter 8, pp. 330-31.

up he mentions that "perfectional" relation of the soul to the body is the "weakest", although it is still "essential".

The only difference between these two philosophers is that although both consider the soul as a form in relation to the body, Mullā Ṣadrā, according to his theory of corporeal origination of the soul, believes that the soul at its early existence is like corporeal natures (*al-ṭabāy-i' al-māddīyyah*/[material forms]) which need an indefinite matter, but Ibn Sīnā emphasizes that the soul is not imprinted in the body. This relation for Ibn Sīnā is a specific type of relation which is rooted in considering the soul an immaterial being when it relates to the body.¹⁶⁰

It is worth mentioning that both Ibn Sīnā and Mullā Ṣadrā (for Mullā Ṣadrā only the originally material form of the soul) consider the soul and the body as a type of form and matter respectively.¹⁶¹ They then insist that since every existent can have only one actuality, among form and matter the whole actuality is for form. It is impossible, they point out, for the form and the matter to be both actual, for, every being in that case will have two actualities and must be then two.¹⁶²

Analyzing this hot debate particularly the issue of soul-body relationship, Misbāḥ Yazdī declares that although the soul-body relationship is one of the cases of real compositions (*al-tarkīb al-ḥaqīqī*), we do not have to suppose that the soul relates to the body in order to actualize it. The soul and the body both are actual

¹⁶⁰ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Asfār*, vol. 8, *al-safar al-rābi'*, *al-bāb al-sābi' al-faṣl al-awwal*, p. 326. See also Ibn Sīnā *al-Ishārāt*, vol. 3-4, *al-namaṭ al-āshir*, *al-faṣl al-sādis wa al-īshrūn*, p. 893.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 13. See also Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb al-Shifā' al-Ṭabī'īyyāt*, *al-maqālah al-'ulā*, *al-faṣl al-awwal*, vol. 2, p. 6.

¹⁶² Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb al-Shifā' al-fann al-sādis*, *al-maqālah al-'ulā*, *al-faṣl al-awwal*, p. See also Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Asfār*, vol. 5, *al-juz' al-thānī min al-safar al-thānī*, *al-fann al-thānī*, p. 110. *al-Mabda' wa al-Ma'ād*, p. 265.

existents, but the soul is so dependent on the body that it exists only when it relates to the body. Its deep dependence is like the relation which an accident such as whiteness must have in relation to its substance. Because of this dependence, the soul is considered as a related existent (*al-wujūd al-rābiṭī*)¹⁶³. Miṣbāḥ Yazdī maintains that there is a causal relation not between the soul and the body, but between the soul and the body and man as a being which is generated out of them. In relation to the composed existent (man) which comes out of the body and the soul, the body is the material cause (*illah māddiyyah*) and the soul is the formal cause (*illah ṣūriyyah*) and both are actual.¹⁶⁴

When we state that in the case of the soul-body relationship two actual existent are composed, one may assert that this idea leads one thing to be two things! But we can reply that in this case the soul and the body are united (*muttaḥid*) not one (*wāḥid*). So, both can have their own actuality. He adds that there is not any opposition between the soul and the body when they relate to each other. Consequently, we do not have to say that this is only the soul which is actual but the body is potential. There is no evidence to assert that in all cases of union one of the components must be potential.¹⁶⁵

As was mentioned previously, Mullā Ṣadrā accepts Aristotle's definition of the soul as the first perfection of the body. This idea is rooted in the theory of corporeal origination of the soul which has been emphasized by Mullā Ṣadrā as

¹⁶³ Mullā Ṣadrā himself considers the soul as a related existent (*al-wujūd al-rābiṭī*) in so far as it is related with the body. See *al-Mabda' wa al-Ma'ād*, p. 316.

¹⁶⁴ Muḥammad Taqī Miṣbāḥ Yazdī, *Ta'liqah 'Alā Nihāyat al-Ḥikmah*, (Qum: Dar Rāh-i Haq Institution, 1984), pp. 274-75.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

another main point of the Aristotelian tradition. Accordingly, the soul cannot be separate and independent of matter or better to say it should be physically related to matter. Questioning Ibn Sīnā's point of view regarding the eternity of the soul despite accepting its origination, Mullā Ṣadrā maintains that this idea leads us to a kind of self-contradiction unless we believe in the pre-existence of the soul which in its turn put us in a new problematic situation in which we have to find a solution for the soul and the body integration.¹⁶⁶

Nonetheless, Mullā Ṣadrā departs from Aristotle by proposing his particular idea regarding the relationship between the soul and the body. He states that the soul is not an ordinary physical form in relation to its matter. Since the composition between all physical forms and their matter occurs in a way that the two components are not existentially distinguishable (*tarkībun ittiḥādī*), the form functions directly in matter without requiring any intermediary. The soul on the contrary, works on its matter through the intermediary of other potential forms or instrumental powers. So, the very characteristic of the soul is that it functions on the matter through powers. Although these powers like the soul itself are material and play the role which is done by organs in relation to the body, they are not the organs. Powers for the soul are faculties such as nutrition, appetite and digestion which are similar to hands, liver or stomach for the body.¹⁶⁷ This idea put the soul in a higher position than being a purely corporeal form and, therefore, the soul is a form that although in matter is capable of transcending it.

¹⁶⁶ Fazlur al-Rahmān, *The Psychology of Mullā Ṣadrā*, *op. cit.*, p. 197.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 197-98.

We have learned so far that according to Ibn Sīnā and Mullā Ṣadrā the soul unites the body as a form to a matter. An important question here is that since the union of the soul and the body is not merely a kind of conjunction of two independent things, which one of these two holds the actuality of the man? When the soul unites with the body, what will happen to the form of the body itself? Is it to be replaced by the soul as a more perfect form which consist of the perfection of previous forms or even after the union there are two forms one under the other? In other words, when the human soul unites with the body what will happen to the body, its form and matter? Are the body and millions of cells which constitute it, existent beside the soul or (when the soul comes into being) what actually exists is the soul but the body is potential because it is matter? These questions can also be raised concerning the animal and vegetative souls in relation to their matter. Sequentially, one can ask whether it is possible for two forms to keep their actuality when they unite one to another or one must necessarily loose its actuality and the existent, therefore, should have only one form?

This question will be raised when we discuss the soul's separation from the body. What will really exist after the separation? Is it the body and its previous, actual components which remain after the separation or some new forms must be created since there was only one actuality which belonged to the soul?

Philosophers generally believe that it is impossible for one being to have two actual forms simultaneously. Since the form, they argue, is equal to actuality, if in one being there were two actual forms, it would be indeed two things not one.

Offering another hypothesis against this assertion, Miṣbah Yazdī argues that in the case of composed beings every component has its own actuality and what will appear after the conjunction is union (*Ittiḥād*) not uniqueness (*waḥdat*). So, the previous forms will exist but a new form unites with them in a way that when it separates them, the previous forms will continue to exist separately. The reason is that although after the union of the soul and the body the components of the body are not directly observable, one can observe them by scientific equipment. Cells, red and white globules are immensely alive beings in the body which have their own actuality even after the relation of the soul and the body and they also can be preserved separately outside the body. Hence, the union of the soul does not disturb the actuality of the body and its elements. According to this doctrine on the occasion of separation, the body and its components will remain with their own actuality and without requiring any new form. Conclusively, both the soul and the body will preserve their own actuality vertically under an integrating form without any opposition (*tamānu*). What is really impossible is that two horizontal rejecting forms come together and create one being.

Mineral, vegetative, animal, and human forms which are associated in man are vertical. Moreover, scientific observation on man, shows that cells and globules are alive components which are united with each other without any rejection. They can also live separately out of the body. Collecting the reasons and conclusions, we can divide the forms into two main groups. A group of forms are successive (*muta'âqibah*), rejective and horizontal. The others are vertical or composed

(*mutarākib*).¹⁶⁸ One can assert that the relation between the soul and the body is an example of the latter.

¹⁶⁸ Muḥammad Taqī Miṣbāḥ Yazdī, *Āmūzish-i Falsafah*, (Tehran: Sāzmān-i Tabliqāt-i Islāmī, 1989), vol. 2, pp. 257-60. See also Miṣbāḥ, *Ta'liqah 'Alā Nihāyat al-Ḥikmah*, (Qum: Dar Rāh-i Ḥaq Institution, 1984) pp. 274-75.

3.2. Ways of demonstrating soul-body relationship

Another aspect of the present study is to demonstrate that the soul and the body are interrelated to each other. Both in modern and philosophical psychology, one can see various evidences which indicate the soul-body or psycho-physiological interrelationship. Summoning the spirits (*iḥḍār al-arwāḥ*) as noted by anthropological studies, hypnotism, Psychosomatic disorders, spiritual actions which are done by ascetics are samples that may help us realize soul-body or psychosomatic interrelationship. More than Mullā Ṣadrā, Ibn Sīnā has dealt with this facet in his writings particularly in *al-Ishārāt*, and *al-Qānūn*. Emphasizing the particular interrelation of the soul and the body, Mullā Ṣadrā maintains that if the soul was not related to the body in a uniting relation, it should not be influenced sensibly from bodily disorders in addition to its rational and imaginative pains.¹⁶⁹

Explaining Mullā Ṣadrā's point of view, Ṭabāṭabā'ī says that according to the author (Mullā Ṣadrā) the soul-body relation is a kind of existential relationship which reflects the existential union of the soul and the body. It means that one of these two existents is indeed a level of the other's existence. For example all accidents depend on their subjects and are a level of their subject's existence because they cannot stand by themselves. This type of dependence may occur in relation to the substances which are existentially depending on one another. In soul-body relationship, the soul is the perfectional form and the body including its powers are aspects of its existence. He adds that when we say the soul is the only actual form, we do not mean that the

¹⁶⁹ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Asfār*, vol. 8, *op. cit.*, *al-safar al-rābi'*, *al-bāb al-thālith*, chapter 9, p. 134.

other lower forms like mineral are not actual. Since all forms are vertical actualities there is no opposition between them.¹⁷⁰

There is an important objection here regarding the existential relation between the soul and the body. If the body is indeed an aspect of the soul and existentially is related to it, then the soul must be primarily (without any anatomical knowledge) aware of all bodily functions whereas we do not have any knowledge about our brain functions or blood circulation or the processes of digestion and so on.

Answering this objection, Mullā Ṣadrā mentions that although it is possible for the average soul to be aware of all these processes, it is difficult for it to be conscious of this awareness. The reason, on the one hand, is that whenever the soul is related to the body, it is subject to forgetfulness, and on the other hand, those processes are subject to a severe dissolution of condition that makes it impossible for the soul to be conscious of them. This is like when we successively hear many words which are beyond of our short-term memory. So, we are not able to have a complete list of them in our memory.¹⁷¹

In addition, even though the soul, regardless of its relation to the body, is capable of total consciousness and intuitive awareness, when it unites with the body, it corresponds to the body which is characterized by three determinations, namely, time, space and matter. These factors are responsible for the lack of consciousness about bodily functions.¹⁷²

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, Ṭabāṭabā'ī's comment, No. 2.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, *al-safar al-rābi'*, *al-bāb al-thānī*, chapter 5, p. 72-3.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 73.

What may make us realize the close contact of the soul to the body is the soul's immediate influence by any slight change in the body. The soul experiences and suffers from any disturbing heating, coolness, movement or difficulty which effect the body. This kind of experience is of course beyond what the soul may have as a general knowledge. The general knowledge appears in a form like general threats (e.g., the threat of punishment in violation of law) or promising statements. So, immediate experiences of the soul which are rooted in bodily changes are the reasons for the soul-body relationship. Moreover, a clear sign of the soul's direct contact to the body appears when a severe change like sickness occurs to the body. In such a crucial matter the soul will leave its other duties and concentrate on the bodily crisis.¹⁷³

He points out that since the body itself is a dead being which is totally absent from itself, and is not aware of any part of itself, naturally, whatever relates to it will be absent from itself. This influence will be more effective whenever the relation is more extended.¹⁷⁴

Ḥasanzādah Āmulī quotes an interesting paragraph from Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī in his *al-Sirr al-Maktūm* where he emphasizes soul-body interaction. Al-Rāzī states:

According to both experiment and deduction (*al-qiyās*), conceptions (*al-taṣawwurāt*) may sometimes create various qualities in our body. Harsh aggressive feelings may lead to bodily upset. This interaction could also happen when a person is under the control of his illusions or fantasies. The reason is that when a person suffers from nose bleeding, he is asked not to look at red objects. Similarly all who endure epilepsy are asked not to

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 76-7.

¹⁷⁴ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Shawāhid*, *op. cit.*, p. 244. See also, 'Abdul Haq, "the Psychology of Mullā Ṣadrā," *op. cit.*, p. 176.

watch lightful and fast circulating objects. All these examples indicate that the soul is created in a way that obeys illusions (*inn al-nafs khuliqat muṭī'ah li al-awhām*).¹⁷⁵

Although even in modern psychology it is unclear whether physiological changes are the effects of mental states or their causes or even they both are effected from a third cause, it is obvious that physical and mental states are so interrelated that change in one side is undoubtedly tied with the changes in the other side.¹⁷⁶ So, even if one can deny the causal interaction between these two aspects, the correlation is evident.

Emphasizing the interaction between the soul and the body, Ibn Sīnā offers different chapters in his *al-Qānūn*. In the fourteenth chapter, for instance, he says that all psychological accidents will lead to, or are accompanied by, the soul's movements toward inside and outside (toward itself or to the body). The consequences of this movement may appear gradually or suddenly. In aggression, bodily changes are fast and sudden but in normal pleasure and enjoyment the

¹⁷⁵ Ḥasanzādah Āmulī, *Uyūnu Masā'il al-Nafs*, op. cit., p. 222.

¹⁷⁶ See Rital L. Atkinson et. al, *Introduction to Psychology*, 8th edition (New York: HBJ Inc., 1983), pp. 337-39. In spite of the common idea that bodily changes are responses to the mental states like emotion, we can think of situations when the experience of emotion does follow bodily responses. In a sudden car accident, we automatically grasp the steering-wheel and hold the break, before we have time to experience a state of fear. When the crisis is over, we experience firstly a pounding heart, rapid breathing, and a feeling of weakness or shivering in the arms and legs. It shows that the feeling of fear follows the bodily responses. There are two famous theories concerning the interrelation between the bodily changes and emotional states. According to the James-Lange theory, feedback to the brain from bodily responses produces the conscious experience of emotion. Canon-Bard theory, on the other hand, reveals that the emotional experience occurs as soon as the cortex receives the message from the thalamus; it does not depend on feedback from internal organs and skeletal responses. It means that the bodily changes and the experiences of emotion occur at the same time. Since there is a complex interaction between neural and hormonal signals, it is difficult to determine whether the physiological responses precede or accompany the emotion. Although new scientific findings limit the interaction between neural and physiological changes, one can assert that emotional states are mental states which occur in the field of "self" beyond the bodily changes. At their final level, nervous impulses will be projected to the field of "self" which probably is the soul.

consequences will appear gradually. He then tries to show examples in which the body is affected by mental events. For instance, spiritual forms may affect genetic processes. A new born infant resembles the mental form (particular type of imagination) his/her parents were dealing with at the sexual activity. Similarly the color of the infant's skin might be influenced by what their parents observed at their sexual act. He eventually adds that our feeling regarding the fear and pleasure may change our general physical manner (*mizāj*).¹⁷⁷ It is interesting to see Ibn Sīnā's explanation of soul-body interrelationship when he speaks in *al-Qānūn* about the love and its effects on different parts of the body. He maintains that love sometimes could be an obsessive-compulsive disorder which like melancholia causes some explicit bodily changes. Symptoms mostly appear in the eyes. They flutter rapidly without any tears. The body is totally thin and weak except the eyes which are completely open and have rapid movements. Describing various physical and psychological characteristics of a lover and the method of treating them to be recovered, Ibn Sīnā comes to the conclusion that from these interrelationship we notice that the nature (the body) obeys psychological apprehensions (*awhām*/the soul).¹⁷⁸

Explaining Ibn Sīnā's idea regarding the interrelationship of the soul and the body, al-Ṭūsī states that according to Ibn Sīnā the soul is the source of all voluntary movements and perceptions which, when it separates from the body, the body will stop its functions and become disintegrated.¹⁷⁹ Ibn Sīnā believes that all habits

¹⁷⁷ Ibn Sīnā, *al-Qānūn Fī al-Ṭibb*, (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, undated), Al-Muthanna library proprietor Kāssim M. Ar-Rajab, vol. 2, pp. 94-95.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 72.

¹⁷⁹ Ibn Sīnā, *al-Ishārāt*, vol. 2, *op. cit.*, *al-namaṭ al-thālith*, footnote, p. 332.

(*'ādāt*), characters (*khuluq*), and properties (*malakāt*) which are acquired after we have received a meaning from one of the senses for several times (learning process) indicate the interrelationship between the soul and the body. It should be helpful to add that this doctrine is, in fact, based on a psychological school of thought that emphasizes the important role of the soul or the mind as an intermediate between the stimulus and response. This intermediary functions as a perceptual part of behavior which is not located in any part of the body whether we call it the mind or the soul. But early behaviorists, who believed in the "black box" theory, interpreted all human learning in terms of the "S-R" theory which denied any inter mediation. They returned all types of learning to the conditioning process.

Offering another example regarding the soul-body interrelation in which the soul affects the body, Ibn Sīnā states:

The relation may be vise versa. This is like when we see that an intellectual shape (*hai'ah 'aqliyyah*) affects different parts of our body. Look at yourself (as a person who believe in God) when you perceive Allah and think about His dominion (*jabarūt*), how effective a feeling may you have which affects your skin and makes your hairs to be raised!¹⁸⁰

Elaborating what he establishes in *al-namaṭ al-thālīṭ*, Ibn Sīnā devotes many chapters of *al-namaṭ al-'āshir* to explain the soul-body interactions. In the third chapter, he declares that fearful feelings usually make the person loose his appetite and suffer from digestive malfunctioning. Fears mostly make the person loose his control over normal behavior.¹⁸¹ In the twenty sixth chapter of *al-namaṭ al-'āshir*, Ibn Sīnā states that people's fantasies create overt and sudden or latent changes in the

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 333.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, vol. 3-4, *al-namaṭ al-'āshir*, p. 855.

body. Illusions sometimes make a person suffer from a disease. He adds that it is possible for some people to influence things outside their body. When an individual overcomes his aggression or other motives in his own existence, it would be reasonable for him to control those powers in other people!¹⁸²

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, pp. 893-95. See also al-Ṭūsī's comments.

3.3. Forms of the soul-body relationship

In the previous section we tried to show examples of soul-body relationship. Now we are going to illustrate various forms of soul-body relationship which reflect the process of their development. Mullā Ṣadrā like other Muslim philosophers tries to relate all types of perfection to intellectual maturity. He believes that just as the soul is the perfection of the body, to become a separated intellect (*al-'aql al-mufāriq*) also is the highest goal of the soul's development. For, beyond all faculties which are acquired by the soul through the process of its development, the most important faculty is the intellect. Following the pre-accepted model of intellectual categorization, Mullā Ṣadrā maintains that the intellectual aspect of the soul can be divided into two parts: The practical (*amal*) and the theoretical (*naẓar*). Among these two aspects the first one is related to the bodily development and improvement of behavior and the other deals with the active intellect to progress itself.¹⁸³ According to Mullā Ṣadrā, both practical and theoretical intellect go through a four stage process. These four stages reflect those levels (or road-markers of human perfection) which are suggested by mystics including Mullā Ṣadrā himself who called his main book "The Four Journeys" (*al-Asfār al-Arba'ah*). Development starts with the first stage of the practical intellect and ends with the final stage of theoretical intellect. Practicing the law (*Sharī'ah*) of a particular religion, purifying the soul from all impurities, enlightening the soul with knowledge and spiritual

¹⁸³ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Asfār*, *op. cit.*, vol. 8, *al-safār al-rābi'*, *al-bāb al-thālith*, chapter 8, p. 130. This idea is exactly like what al-Ṭūsī offers in his commentary on *al-Ishārāt* to explain Ibn Sīnā's categorization. See *al-Ishārāt*, vol. 2, *op. cit.*, *al-nama' al-thālith*, p. 363.

virtues and eventually abolishing it in God are stages which could be attained by practical intellect.¹⁸⁴

The theoretical intellect similarly passes four levels. At its early existence it is a material intellect (*al-ʿaql al-hayūlānī*) which has only the potentiality of becoming an actual intellect like a prime matter which has only the potentiality of becoming a sensible existent (*wujūdun ḥissī*). The soul at this level has the capacity of acquiring forms and is called material intellect (*ʿaql al-hayūlānī*). Since at this level the soul is a purely potential existent, it resembles accidents even though it is a real substance.¹⁸⁵

According to Morris in [*The Wisdom of The Throne*]/ tr. of *al-ʿArshiyyah*], Mullā Ṣadrā states that the soul's initial relation to the world of the intellectual forms is that of the seed to its fruit, or of the embryo to the animal. An embryo in its actuality is just an embryo, but potentially it is an animal. The soul also firstly is merely a mortal man but potentially is capable of being an intellect.¹⁸⁶

In its next stage which is called habitual intellect (*al-ʿaql bi al-malakah*) it begins to grasp and apprehend simple and preliminary facts of life (primary facts or *badīḥiyyāt*), such as the fact that the whole is greater than its parts. Thirdly, as an actual intellect (*al-ʿaql bi al-fīʿl*) which no longer requires matter and deals only

¹⁸⁴ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Shawāhid op. cit.*, p. 207. See also Nasr, Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā), *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, vol. 2, p. 956.

¹⁸⁵ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Shawāhid op. cit.*, p. 201. In his *al-Asfār*, Mullā Ṣadrā declares that like the prime matter, the soul at its early existence is devoid of any formal perfection be it sensitive or imaginative or rational. Then it becomes an active intellect capable of creating immaterial forms whether they are universal or particular. At its early stage, the soul is a form of the highest level of material world but the first level of intellectual realm. See *al-Asfār*, vol. 8, *op. cit.*, *al-safar al-rābiʿ*, *al-bāb al-sābiʿ*, chapter 1, pp. 328-30.

¹⁸⁶ James Winston Morris, *The Wisdom of The Throne* (Princeton: University press, 1981), pp. 148-49.

with itself, it gives the soul the power of intellectual demonstration and puts it in a high position which is above the material level of existence. Finally, at the highest level where and when it has gained access to the divine kingdom and dominance, it is called acquired intellect (*al-'aql al-mustafād*).¹⁸⁷ It must be mentioned that despite these different stages, the soul keeps its individuality and travels all these stages on the path toward annihilation in God.¹⁸⁸

Examining this long and gradual process of development, Mullā Ṣadrā comes to the conclusion that the main goal of the whole of creation is the bringing into existence of mankind. The creation of mankind in its turn is aimed at enabling him to acquire intellect and thus to have a direct observation of the intelligible world which will lead him to realize the mystery of nonotherness (everything other than Allah is nothing) or supreme convergence.¹⁸⁹ This doctrine is indeed like what Marmura suggests to be Ibn Sīnā's idea concerning the perfection of the soul. According to Ibn Sīnā the soul uses the body as an instrument to perfect itself through the attainment of theoretical knowledge.¹⁹⁰

As we see the main point in this doctrine is overestimating the intellectual aspect of the soul. The intellect or rational aspect in this theory as an immaterial principle has towered above all previous levels and external and internal faculties.

¹⁸⁷ It is worth mentioning that an elaborated and mystical version of the soul's development both in practical and theoretical intellectualization is offered in *al-Mabda' wa al-Ma'ād*, pp. 262-78.

¹⁸⁸ Mullā Ṣadrā considers all soul's manifestations as different levels of a single existent. See al-Shawāhid, *op. cit.*, p. 228.

¹⁸⁹ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Shawāhid*, *op. cit.*, p. 207. See also *al-Mabda' wa al-Ma'ād*, *op. cit.*, p. 274. & Nasr, "Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā)", *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, vol. 2, p. 956. and 'Abdul Haq, "The Psychology of Mullā Ṣadrā", *op. cit.*, pp. 178-79.

¹⁹⁰ Marmura, "Avicenna", *Encyclopedia of philosophy*, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 228.

Therefore, a criticism has been addressed to all Muslim philosophers to the effect that their explanations of the soul's development are almost entirely metaphysical or epistemological. So, they could not provide an effective contribution in other aspects of the soul's development. This weak-point refers to the fact that they have often dealt with the peripatetic system in a purely intellectualistic method. Although Mullā Ṣadrā bases his theosophy on a multidimensional method which incorporates mystical and religious knowledge, he shares in his predecessors ignoring of the emotional and volitional aspects of the human soul.¹⁹¹ So, one can hardly find any comprehensive explanation regarding the emotional aspect when he reviews Mullā Ṣadrā's writing concerning the soul's development.

A very important issue here is to find a criterion based on which we will be able to divide the soul's powers and faculties. This division reflects various aspects of the soul's development. Some assert that all mental states and actions can be attributed to two main sources, namely, the intellect and the will. This classification might overlap with what has been suggested by the peripatetic tradition as practical and theoretical intellect. They maintain that we may find many characterizations which enable us to categorize mental events. True/false and good/evil are two of the more important criteria. Some mental states and activities might be categorized as true or false, the others might fall into the good/evil classification. Beliefs, with a level of certainty, would belong to the first group and desires, most apparently, may be described as samples of the second one. According to this point of view:

¹⁹¹ T. J. De Boer, "Soul (Muslim)," *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), vol., 11, p. 147.

Those states and activities which can be evaluated on the true/false scale belong to the cognitive side of the soul; those states and activities which are evaluated on the good/evil scale belong to the affective, volitional side of the soul. At the highest level, the truth-bearing (or false-bearing) items are actualization of the intellect; the goodness-bearing (or badness bearing) items are actualization of the will.¹⁹²

Although in this categorization the emotional aspect of the soul is considered as a pair of the cognitive facet, one can assert that the examples are not precise. Like beliefs, desires also might be described based on the true/false scale. It has happened for most of us to have desires which did not have real bases (were not true). For instance, we may feel that we are hungry but not because of our physiological need rather for being influenced by watching a delicious food or hearing a motivating message (influenced by propagation). One, however, might claim that in unreal desires what could be true or false is our perception of internal or external motives which create our desire, but the feelings (desires) themselves should be examined firstly based on the existence\nonexistence criterion and secondly on the good\bad scale. For, in the case of unreal desires people experience that they have the same desire as if it was real. Hence, what could be described based on the true\false scale is the cognitive part of the soul. This is because they represent another thing beyond themselves. Our desires, on the contrary, are always true if they exist. The reason is that they are experienced through the knowledge by presence. Conclusively, one could claim that true\false is the basic characteristic of theoretical intellect and good\bad is the criterion of practical intellect.

¹⁹² Antony Kenny, *The metaphysics of Mind* (London: Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989), p. 75.

Mullā Ṣadrā has approached the issue in *al-Mabda' wa al-Ma'ād* in a way that we can consider him as one of those who divides the intellect upon the above mentioned scales. He considers practical intellect as a power which functions based on the good/bad scale and the theoretical intellect as a faculty which acts according to the true/false criterion.¹⁹³

Examining Ibn Sīnā and Mullā Ṣadrā's descriptions in their different texts, we may summarize their idea regarding the practical and theoretical intellect as the following:

1. Practical intellect deals with particular issues (*'umūr juz'īyyah*) which lead to voluntary goals in terms of primary knowledge (*awwalīyyāt*), popular or experimental preliminaries (*muqaddamāt dhā'i'ah aw tajrībīyyah*) while theoretical intellect deals with universal issues which are not directly in relation to human behavior.¹⁹⁴

2. Practical intellect is based on the good/evil scale¹⁹⁵ while theoretical intellect functions in terms of the true/false criterion.¹⁹⁶

3. Practical intellect is in relation to the body to govern it, but theoretical intellect relates to the world of intellects.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹³ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Mabda' wa al-Ma'ād*, *op. cit.*, p. 261.

¹⁹⁴ See Ibn Sīnā, *al-Ishārāt*, vol. 2, *op. cit.*, *al-namaṭ al-thālith*, pp. 363-64, *al-Shifā'*, vol. 2, *op. cit.*, *al-faṣl al-awwal*, *al-maqālah al-khāmisah*, *al-fann al-sādis*, *al-ṭabī'īyyāt*, p. 184-85. *al-Ta'liqāt*, p. 30. and Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Asfār*, vol. 9, *op. cit.*, *al-juz' al-thānī min al-safar al-rabī'*, p. 82.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁶ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Mabda' wa al-Ma'ād*, *op. cit.*, pp. 261 & 285.

¹⁹⁷ Ibn Sīnā, *al-Shifā'*, vol. 2, *op. cit.*, *al-faṣl al-khāmis*, *al-maqālah al-'ulā*, *al-fann al-sādis*, *al-ṭabī'īyyāt*, pp. 37-38. *al-Najāt*, vol. 2, p. 11. Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Asfār*, vol. 8, *op. cit.*, *al-safar al-rabī'*, *al-bāb al-thālith*, chapter 8, p. 130.

4. Practical intellect is the source of moral principles (*al-akhlāq*) while theoretical intellect is the source of knowledge (*al-'ulūm*).¹⁹⁸

Although it is so important to find a criterion which would enable us to distinguish between various aspects of the soul, it seems difficult to prove the existence of two distinct powers as practical and theoretical for the soul. For, one can assert that this categorization indeed refers to the nature of our knowledge and our perceptions. Why do we not say that the soul itself deals with different subjects in different ways without having different powers?

Considering the above mentioned classification, we may come to the conclusion that the soul-body relationship according to both Mullā Ṣadrā and Ibn Sīnā is explained in terms of intellection. So, the soul uses the bodily senses to acquire sensible data as the first step of its development. As well as a low level of self-knowledge,¹⁹⁹ the soul has some primary knowledge such as the law of contradiction or the proposition that the whole is greater than its parts.²⁰⁰ This primary knowledge is pre-experimental and paves the way of acquiring more complex and extended knowledge. The body in its turn is under the control and the governing of the soul. As well as influencing the body concerning moral values and moral behavior, the soul governs the body in supplying it with the knowledge which helps the body to deal positively with everything that is beneficial for it and negatively with all which are hurtful. Although the body is equipped with its own

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.* & Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Asfār*, vol. 3, *op. cit.*, *al-juz' al-thālith min al-safar al-awwal, al-marḥalah al-āshirah*, chapter 24, p. 418. & *al-Mabda' wa al-Ma'ād*, p. 258.

¹⁹⁹ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Mabda' wa al-Ma'ād*, p. 262.

²⁰⁰ Fazlur Rahmān, *The philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā*, (Albany: State University of New York, 1975), p. 238.

physiological mechanisms, the intellectual aspect of dealing with the external world comes from the soul if we believe that intellection is not material.

3.4. The Soul's independence of the body

Although the soul and the body are interrelated from the first step of their generations, their development and the point they reach are not the same. They make use of one another, but the interaction finally leads to the independence and survival of the soul and corruption of the body. According to Mullā Ṣadrā, although the soul even at its early existence is a substance, it depends on the body like accidents. Since at this level the soul is a pure potentiality, it is, then, even weaker than accidents and has, as such, only potential knowledge even of itself.²⁰¹ The soul's independence is due to its substantial motion which keeps the soul moving through a gradual change from one mode to a more perfect level of existence. This change is perfectional and causes the soul to exit from imperfection to the mode of perfection and independence.²⁰² It is interesting to note that in his *al-Asfār* Mullā Ṣadrā firstly approaches the issue of the soul's independence based on the Peripatetic foundations. Then, he adds that this was the way that we approached the issue previously, but nowadays we go through another way.²⁰³ One can infer that his new way is based on the principle of substantial motion. He concludes that substantial motion is the key in his famous doctrine "the soul is corporeal in its generation, spiritual in its survival".

²⁰¹ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Mabda' wa al-Ma'ād*, *op. cit.*, p. 262.

²⁰² Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Asfār (al-Ḥikmah al-Muta'aliyah Fī al-Asfār al-'Aqliyyah al-Arba'ah)* (Beirut: Dār Ihyā' al-Turāth al-'Arabī, 1981), vol. 9, *al-juz'-thānī min al-safār la-rābi'*, *al-safār al-rābi'*, pp. 51-52.

²⁰³ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Asfār*, vol. 8, *op. cit.*, *al-safār al-rābi'*, *al-bāb al-sābi'*, chapter 6, pp. 392-93.

The more that the soul becomes actualized and developed in its various dimensions, the more the body becomes weak.²⁰⁴ Various forms of decline which we see in the body are accompanied by the opposite developmental attainments in the soul.²⁰⁵ This is because whenever the soul becomes more developed, its effusion to the body decreases. This process will continue until the soul becomes completely independent and separated from the body. According to this point of view the soul's independence and the corruption of the body is a logical consequence of the soul's substantial change which weakened the interrelationship between the soul and the body.²⁰⁶

According to most of the philosophers opposite developmental direction of the soul and the body will lead to two different levels of perfection and survival of the soul. But some philosophers denied survival of the soul. The Peripatetics generally and Ibn Sīnā particularly argue that since there is not any necessary relationship between the soul and the body such as what exists between a cause and its effect, no one can assert that they are interrelated existentially.²⁰⁷ Therefore, it would be reasonable to assert that the soul will survive after the corruption of the body.

Someone may argue that while the body is a necessary condition for the soul's generation, it must be also the condition for its survival. So, when the body

²⁰⁴ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Mabda' wa al-Ma'ād*, p. 321. & *al-Shawāhid*, p. 216.

²⁰⁵ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Mabda' wa al-Ma'ād*, p. 354.

²⁰⁶ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Asfār*, vol. 9, *op. cit.*, *al-juz' al-thānī min al-safar al-rābi'*, *al-bāb al-thāmin*, chapter 4, p. 52.

²⁰⁷ Ibn Sīnā, *Risālah Fī Ahwāl al-Nafs*, edited by Ahmad Fu'ād al-Ahwānī (Cairo: Dār Ihyā' al-Kutub al-'Arabīyah, 1952), pp. 99-102. See also *al-Najāt*, vol. 2, *op. cit.*, p. 35-37.

corrupts, the soul also will be demolished. In response to this objection, Ibn Sīnā says that the body is only the condition for the generation (*ḥudūth*) of the soul not its existence which is emanated from an unchangeable cause. Therefore, nothingness (*‘adam*) of the body cannot be the cause of the soul's nothingness.²⁰⁸

Attacking Ibn Sīnā and his followers, Mullā Ṣadrā points out that this idea contradicts completely with what these people have offered regarding the entity of the soul. If the soul, according to them, is the first entelechy (*kamālun awwal*) of the body,²⁰⁹ then there must be a kind of causal relationship between the soul and the body. Therefore, they cannot consider the soul-body relationship only as a simple togetherness (*ma‘īyyah*).²¹⁰ Moreover, we cannot distinguish between the condition of generation (*ḥudūth*) and existence (*wujūd*). The generation of everything is nothing other than its particular existence. Then, when the condition of generation does not exist, there will be no generated thing. In addition, if Ibn Sīnā and his followers believe that the soul even at its early existence, is an immaterial being, how is it possible for a material thing to bear the potentiality of its existence? Potentiality in material beings always should be a preliminary condition for something which is material.²¹¹

²⁰⁸ Ibn Sīnā, *al-Najāt*, vol. 2, *op. cit.*, p. 36. See also Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Asfār*, vol. 8, *op. cit.*, *al-safar al-rābi‘*, *al-bāb al-sābi*, chapter 4, pp. 380-81.

²⁰⁹ It is worth mentioning that Ibn Sīnā in his *Risālah Fī Aḥwāl al-Nafs* maintains that the rational soul (*al-nafs al-nāṭiqah*) is not the form of the body because it is not imprinted in it. Then when we refer to the soul as the form of the body, it is a common noun for all aspects of the soul (*ishtirāk al-ism*). *Risālah*, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

²¹⁰ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Asfār*, vol. 8, *op. cit.*, *al-safar al-rābi‘*, *al-bāb al-sābi*, chapter 4, p. 382.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 384-85.

Mullā Ṣadrā adds that there is a necessary relationship between the soul and the body like the relationship which connects a form to a matter. Both form and matter are in a deep need of each other. The body needs a soul to be actualized (*fī taḥaqquqihī*), the soul needs the body not for its intellectual absolute reality (*ḥaqīqah al-muṭlaqah al-‘aqliyyah*), but for individuation of its soulhood. Accordingly, he believes that the soul has an essential priority to the body and they are, then, related to each other existentially.²¹² The soul as an absolute spiritual nature (*ṭabī‘ah nafsānīyyah muṭlaqah*) which borrows its individuality from a single stable intellect (*wāḥidin ‘aqliyyin thābit*) animates the body (*muqīmatun li al-badan*), but as far as its various particularities are concerned it needs the body. In this case the soul in relation to the body is like a form which needs the matter to be individuated.²¹³

Approaching the issue of the soul's independence based on another point of view, Ṣadrā declares that since the soul in relation to the body is a separated substance (*jawharun mubāyin*), it depends on the body only in its coming into existence. So, the nothingness of the body does not necessitate the nothingness of the soul. Joined substances or accidents (*al-jawhar wa al-‘araḍ al-muqārīn*), on the contrary, depend on their subject (*maḥall*), both in existence and nothingness. This is because they do not have any other existence than their related existence. Therefore,

²¹² As it has been already mentioned, in his *al-Mabda' wa al-Ma'ād*, Mullā Ṣadrā like Ibn Sīnā firstly distinguishes between the soulhood of the soul and its real essence then he refutes the necessary relationship between the soul and the body. He only accepts that the body is the real material cause of the soul in so far as it is related to the body. But the body is an accidental material cause regarding its essence. *al-Mabda' wa al-Ma'ād*, *op. cit.*, pp. 313-15.

²¹³ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Asfār*, vol. 8, *op. cit.*, *al-safar al-rābi'*, *al-bāb al-sābi'*, chapter 4, pp. 382-83.

when a matter (*māddah*) or a receptacle (*maḥall*) disintegrates, their related form (*al-ṣūrah al-qā'imah*) or related accident will also disintegrate.²¹⁴ Ṣadrā then comes to the conclusion that when an existent has a kind of contribution for another being, it does not mean that its non-existence must have a role for its nothingness.²¹⁵ The case as he mentions is such as when a painter creates a beautiful board utilizing his tools and his thought, but the board will remain even when the painter dies or his tools destroy.²¹⁶

Mullā Ṣadrā states that since the soul according to Ibn Sīnā even at its early existence is an immaterial existent, the body cannot in this view be its cause in any sense. However, he maintains that by distinguishing between two modes of the soul's existence, one can say that whenever the soul is considered as it is related to the body (soulhood of the soul), the body is its material cause.²¹⁷ He also maintains that the soulhood of the soul and its relation to the body is an essential aspect of its existence not an accidental thing to its entity. Being the soul is exactly like being the

²¹⁴ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Mabda' wa al-Ma'ād*, *op. cit.*, p. 317.

²¹⁵ A similar form of this argument is offered by Ibn Sīnā in his *Risālah Fī Ahwāl al-Nafs*. See *Risālah* edited by al-Ahwānī, p. 101.

²¹⁶ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Mabda' wa al-Ma'ād*, *op. cit.*, pp. 317-18. This version about the soul seems to contradict what Mullā Ṣadrā offers in his *al-Asfār*, vol. 8, *al-safar al-rābi'*, *al-bāb al-sābi'*, chapter 1, p. 326:

إنَّ النفس بحسب أوائل تكونها و حدودها حكمها حكم الطبائع المادية التي تنفقر إلى مادة مبهمه الوجود

In another page he adds:

إنَّ النفس في أول حدودها صورة مادية ثم تصير مجردة

al-Asfār, vol. 8, *al-safar al-rābi'*, *al-bāb al-sābi'*, chapter 3, p. 377.

According to these two statements the soul at its early existence is merely an inhering form.

²¹⁷ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Asfār*, vol. 8, *op. cit.*, *al-safar al-rābi'*, *al-bāb al-sābi'*, chapter 4, p. 383. He maintains:

إنَّ البدن علّة مادية للنفس بما هي لها وجود نفسي

It is interesting to mention that in spite of the above mentioned idea the body according to Mullā Ṣadrā himself is the material cause (*'illah māddiyyah*) for man (the whole being which comes out of the connection of form and matter) and a matter (*māddah*) for the soul.

form. As in God, His attributes are not additional to His essence, the soulhood of the soul whenever it is related to the body, is not an additional thing to its existence.²¹⁸ It is our mind that creates various concepts by evaluating a reality. If the soul is a separated intellect, how can it deal with the body and have a mutual relation with it?

Explaining the real meaning of the soul-body relationship, Mullā Ṣadrā states that the relation between the soul and the body is not a simple form of togetherness like when a piece of stone is attached to man. Since the soul is a perfectional form (*ṣūrah kamāliyyah* i.e. entelechy) for the body, it cannot be considered as a separated immaterial being. He adds that being an instrument for the soul, does not mean that the body is like a saw or planer for a carpenter. A carpenter uses his instruments sometimes and leaves them other times and he has his unchangeable essence regardless of his instruments. The soul, on the contrary, is related to the body in a form that uses it continuously and its entity is completely different before and after the relation to the body.²¹⁹ He probably means that the usage of the body affects the level of the soul's existence.

Ṣadrā also refuses to consider the soul's relation to the body like the relation which exists between a captain and a ship or a house with its owner. The captain and the owner enter and exit the ship or the house without bearing any change, while both the body and the soul will change through their relationship. Mullā Ṣadrā eventually comes to the conclusion that the evidence which is offered by Ibn Sīnā

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 383-84

and other Peripatetics proves the survival of an immaterial separated intellect (*al-jawhar al-mufāriq al-‘aqlī*) not the soul qua soul.²²⁰

According to Mullā Ṣadrā the problem of the soul's survival has always been a crucial issue for the philosophers. He refers to a letter sent by Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī to one of his contemporaries, where Ṭūsī asked if the soul was generated while a matter had previously carried its potentiality, why this matter cannot bear the potentiality of its corruption? And if it were so, one may ask again how a corporeal being can carry the potentiality of a separated, incorporeal substance?

Mullā Ṣadrā states that when one reviews al-Ṭūsī's writings, he will notice that al-Ṭūsī did not find any conceivable answer for his question. But he adds that he could answer it in two different ways. The more conceivable answer which is based on our new findings, he says, is as follow:

The human soul has various levels and realms. Generation is the characteristic of some levels of its existence. When the soul moves from the realm of creation (*‘ālam al-khalq*) to the realm of command (*‘ālam al-amr*), it becomes an immaterial separated intellect, and does not need any body. So, its existence when it is created is completely different from its eventual existence. Because of this significant change, we hypothesized that the soul is corporeal in its generation, spiritual in its survival. The relation of the soul to the body is like the relation of the fetus to the womb. Although fetus needs the womb for its development, it separates it when it is developed.²²¹

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 383-84.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, *al-safar al-rābi‘*, *al-bāb al-sābi‘*, chapter 6, pp. 390-93.

Mullā Ṣadrā also mentions that the body is only the material cause of the soul, then its corruption does not necessarily lead to the corruption of the soul. Moreover, in the process of perfectional evolution (*al-ḥarakah al-istikmāliyyah*), when the body lost the potentiality of having a soul, the soulhood of the soul will be demolished and a more perfect being will appear.²²²

The problem, however, appears in a new form. One may ask, then, what is the matter that carries the potentiality of the soul when it changes to an immaterial intellect? When the soul becomes an intellect, a new immaterial being is generated. All generated things undoubtedly need a matter whereas the immaterial beings do not have any matter. Mullā Ṣadrā answers that in this case the soul only connects with the immaterial intellect or better to say changes to it. So, it becomes a related existent to an immaterial separated being. The carrier (*ḥāmīl*) of the potentiality of this connection is the soul itself while it was related to the body.²²³

Commenting on this idea, Ṭabāṭabā'ī says that it is better to say when the soul is related to the body and is a dependent existent, its carrier is the body. When the soul moved through substantial motion and became immaterial, it would be an independent existent which needs no matter and is beyond the time. Ṭabāṭabā'ī adds

²²² *Ibid.*, pp. 393-94.

²²³ *Ibid.*, p. 395. In his *al-Asfār* he says:

نقل الكلام إلى حدوث ذلك الوجود المفارقة للنفس كيف حدث لها وكل حادث يفتقر إلى مادة والمجرد لا مادة له
قلت: الحادث ههنا ليس في الحقيقة الاتصال بالنفس بذلك المفارقة وانقلابها إليه لا نفس وجود ذلك المفارقة وذلك
الاتصال والوجود الربطي أو ما شئت فسمه حدوثه مسبوق بالاستعداد وحامل هذا الاستعداد هو النفس مادامت متعلقة

that since the soul is a material being while it is related to the body, there is an unsolved problem to consider the related soul as matter for the immaterial soul.²²⁴

As well as his analytical approach, Mullā Ṣadrā sometimes tries to use examples which indicate the soul's independence of the body. He mentions that despite their close relationship, the soul and the body have their particular manners. When we sleep our body weakens but the soul will remain active. True dreams and being aware of hidden truths are signs of the soul's activity when we are asleep.²²⁵ Immense thoughts also effect our brain's cell and may destroy them, but they improve the soul and make it more perfect. So what is the cause of imperfection of the body is the cause of soul's perfection. We enjoy physiologically when we eat or drink, but the soul gets happy by divine knowledge. When we are going to meet our beloved or meet a highly respectable person, we completely forget that we were hungry or thirsty. This manner mostly happens for people who know God in a way that their knowledge overwhelms their whole existence. These examples show that the weakness of the body may be accompanied with the strength of the soul or vice versa. So, it will be reasonable for the soul to survive when the body is destroyed.²²⁶

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, Ṭabāṭabā'ī's commentaries, No. 1.

²²⁵ This example is used by Ibn Sīnā in one of his treatises as an evidence for the duality of the soul and the body. Ibn Sīnā, *Risālah Fī Ma'rifah al-Nafs al-Nāṭiqah*, compiled by al-Ahwānī, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

²²⁶ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Mabda' wa al-Ma'ād*, *op. cit.*, pp. 319-20.

3.5. Union of the soul and the active intellect

The final part of our discussion about the soul's development is understanding the entity of its relation to the realm of intellects after it separates from the body. How a material being becomes an immaterial existent? If the soul governs the body and also develops itself through using it, how does it become an unrelated and independent being? Since this issue needs an independent study, we have not dealt with it in detail. Briefly we can say that, according to Mullā Ṣadrā, all natures have an innate motion toward their essential goals. He also emphasizes that all imperfect beings distinctly are intent to acquire perfection. When an imperfect being reaches to the point of perfection, it unites with it. It means that it becomes another being. Human beings are also moving toward a purified goal. When the soul passed different levels of perfection and reached to the position of the intellect, it becomes a pure intellect. At this level, it unites with the active intellect and becomes an active intellect.²²⁷ As Ṣadrā maintains, there is not any generation or change or appearance of a new manner in the world of pure immateriality. Therefore, neither the emanation nor the union of the soul create any change in that realm.²²⁸

Illustrating Mullā Ṣadrā's doctrine concerning the nature of the union of the human soul with the active intellect, Fazlur Raḥmān says that we have to keep two points in our mind. The first point is understanding the exact meaning of the identity of the intellect and the intelligible. Secondly we need to comprehend the unitary character of the active intellect. Simplicity at the level of active intellect, he says, is

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 395.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 396.

the character of existence not essence. In the process of progressive beings, "an ever-increasing number of essences are "taken in" and absorbed by a progressively higher scale of being and as existence becomes more and more strong and explicit, essences tend to become more and more implicit and recoil upon existence, losing their own being, as it were, until, when we reach pure intellects or God, all essences are lost and become "interiorized" in themselves, and Pure Existence takes over."²²⁹

According to this passage, the union of the soul and the intellect is like the union of the intellect and intelligible. The issue will be more understandable if we notice that at the highest level of progressive existence, there is no essence or, better to say, there is no plurality of existents. This is because essences which are the borders of existence (*ḥadd al-wujūd*) and create individuality have been previously lost or recoiled upon existence.

Mullā Ṣadrā adds that in spite of the unity of the soul with the intellect, one must notice that this does not mean that the active intellect will either become multiple and divisible or what one knows is identical with the knowledge of others. Facilitating this understanding, Mullā Ṣadrā gives an example. "The idea of "animal" is a unity in itself, while at the same time containing several ideas under it, e.g., man, horse, bull, lion, etc. When we say "horse," we designate an animal, but we do not mean that the "horse," has been partialized or made divisible: "animal " is not partitioned into these various species of animals. Nor would it be true to say

²²⁹ Fazlur Rahmān, *The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā*, (Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī) (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1975), p. 240.

that by being an animal, horse and bull become identical in content, for a horse is a horse and a bull is a bull. The unity of a concept like "animal" is, therefore, a different kind of unity from a numerical or a physical one." 230

Utilizing the above mentioned example, Mullā Ṣadrā states that human souls similarly can all unite with the active intellect without partitioning it and without having the same type of knowledge. Distinguishing between two aspects of the existence of active intellect, Ṣadrā gives more explanation. He points out that from the two aspects which are known as being-in-itself and being-for-the-other, active intellect contacts with the human mind with its latter existence.²³¹

One can ask here: if the soul in its final level is nothing other than its immaterial cause (active intellect), then what has happened to the souls? If the soul at this level is a new intellect like its cause, then it will be a kind of increase in that realm. If it is nothing other than its cause, one can ask whether it is possible for an effect to be its cause at its final perfection? Moreover, if the soul unites with its immaterial cause without having any independent and separated existence, then we have unconsciously denied eschatology. If the soul unites with its immaterial cause and the body also has previously been corrupted, what will be rewarded or punished after death? Mullā Ṣadrā's theory about the union of the soul with an immaterial intellect also implies disregarding the soul's existence. According to him active intellect both before the generation of the soul and after its union with the soul is the same without any increase or decrease. Conclusively, since the soul's existence and

²³⁰ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Asfār*, vol. 3, *op. cit.*, *al-juz' al-thālith min al-safar al-awwal, al-marḥalah al-āshirah*, chapter 9, pp. 339-40. See also *Ibid.*, p. 240-41.

its developmental motion does not create any change in the realm of intellects, the creation of the soul will be meaningless! Therefore, we still need a more comprehensive interpretation for the soul's union and annihilation.

²³¹ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Asfār*, , vol. 9, *op. cit.*, *al-juz' al-thānī min al-safar al-rābi'*, *al-bāb al-'āshir*, chapter 5, p. 140.

>>< *Concluding Remarks* >><

><<CONCLUSION>><

Despite its long history which goes back to early Greek thought, philosophical psychology took on a specific character among Muslim philosophers. Like philosophy itself, philosophical psychology was synthesized by Muslim philosophers in a new atmosphere and through different ways. Some parts were left unchanged since their formulation in Greek tradition, others elaborated with more advanced proofs. Some were introduced for the first time. The immateriality of the animal soul (*al-nafs al-ḥaiwāniyyah*)²³², the immateriality of the imaginative faculty of the human soul, the corporeality of the human soul in its generation, the uniqueness of the soul and the body as two levels of an existent, the uniqueness of the soul and its faculties in spite of their plurality - all these exemplify the unique nature of Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophy.²³³ We lack enough evidence as to whether Plato or Aristotle ever attempted to prove the immateriality of the human soul, except those ideas which in a way imply the duality of the soul and the body or involve a view of the soul as a separate substance.²³⁴ Considering it as one of the most important subjects in the philosophical psychology, Muslim philosophers devoted an explicit attempt to establish the immatereality of the human soul. Both Ibn Sīnā and Mullā Ṣadrā dealt with this problem in almost all of their writings. In his *al-Asfār*

²³² This term is commonly used against the human and vegetable souls (*al-nafs al-insāniyyah wa al-nafs al-nabātiyyah*).

²³³ Murtaḍā Muṭahharī, *Maqālāt-i Falsafī* (Tehran: Intishārāt-i Hikmat, 1366 A.H.), vol. 3, pp. 42-3.

²³⁴ G. B. Kerferd, "Aristotle, Psychology," *Ency. of Philosophy*, vol. 1, p.158.

and *al-Mabda' wa al-Ma'ād*,²³⁵ Mullā Ṣadrā offered fourteen reasons demonstrating the immateriality of the soul.²³⁶

Miṣbāḥ Yazdī has classified all the evidence concerning the immateriality of the soul or the duality of the soul and the body into three groups. Dreams and interpretation of them, hypnotism, summoning the spirits, strange acts performed by ascetics, are psychological or parapsychological bases which can be used as complementary data in a group of evidence. In the second group, physiological data alongside the psychological findings are usually used. For instance, some philosophers, including Mullā Ṣadrā himself argue that since, on the one hand, we know that all physical organs made up of cells are in a gradual and continuous process of change, and on the other side, we all experience a unique self-knowledge throughout the life, we surely come to the conclusion that the center and source of this feeling must be something other than the body which we call the soul.

Thirdly, some philosophers believe that beyond all other evidence, we can rely on purely philosophical. This is divided into two groups. Some are mainly based on analyzing the self-knowledge which is available to most people in form of knowledge by presence and has been pointed out by Ibn Sīnā and Mullā Ṣadrā. Some, are based on the immateriality of psychological phenomena, such as perception, will (*irādah*) and love. If these phenomena are immaterial, undoubtedly the source of them must be immaterial.²³⁷

²³⁵ In his *al-Shawāhid* Mullā Ṣadrā mentions that he devoted a significant part of *al-Mabda' wa al-Ma'ād* to demonstrate the immateriality of the soul. *Al-Shawāhid*, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

²³⁶ Muṭahharī, *Maqālāt-i Falsafī*, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-8.

²³⁷ Miṣbāḥ Yazdī, *Āmūzish-i Falsafah*, vol. 2, *op. cit.*, pp. 155-56.

Since he believed that knowing the soul is the very key to knowing God and belief in the other world (particularly belief in gathering of the souls and the bodies), Şadr al-Muta'allihīn Shīrāzī accorded a specific place to philosophical psychology in his whole philosophy.²³⁸ Trying to show Şadr al-Muta'allihīn Shīrāzī's contribution in this field, I limited my study to the issue of the soul-body problem. The corporeality of the soul in its generation and its spirituality in its survival, the principle of oneness (*waḥdat*) of the soul with its numerous faculties, and union of the soul with the active intellect are some examples of Mullā Şadrā's new findings in philosophical psychology,²³⁹ each needing a separate investigation. All these issues have a decisive rôle in explaining the soul-body problem.

The issue of the soul-body problem started with the question of whether the soul and the body are two different existents with two different natures or are the same. Considering them two different existents, one may ask how they relate with another? Even Aristotelian theory of form-matter, has to explain the problem of the relation between two types of existence.

Although in both Islamic and Western traditions there is a marked tendency toward dualism, no one could successfully explain the nature of the soul-body relationship. Extreme forms of materialism or idealism were two kinds of reaction against this. In Islamic tradition the Peripatetic school of thought has always come under harsh attack when it tries to illustrate the material/immaterial relationship.

Utilizing his new findings in philosophy, Mullā Şadrā argued that there is a new way to explain the soul-body relationship. He firstly asserted that beside external, accidental, and observable motions which occur in the corporeal world, there is another form of motion which is internal, substantial and unseen. The latter, he found constituted the very basis of the former. According to Mullā Şadrā,

²³⁸ Mullā Şadrā, *Risālah-i Si Aşl*, al-bāb al-awwal, p. 13.

²³⁹ Qazwīnī, "The life of Şadr al-Muta'allihīn Shīrāzī's ...," *Yādnāmah-i Mullā Şadrā*, op. cit., p. 4.

substantial motion is an alternative doctrine to the generation\ corruption theory (*al-kawn wa al-fasād*) offered in Peripatetic tradition to explain the emergence and evolution of corporeal species. Based on the theory of substantial motion, the matter gradually and continuously moves toward perfection and immateriality. So, there is no boundary separating a distinctive border between the materiality and immatereality. Each being leaves, through a continuous course of substantial change, the stage of imperfection to the level of perfection and transcendence. Hence, the course of change in the material world is continuous and perfectional rather than in form of generation\ corruption.

It is interesting to notice that along with the principle of substantial motion, Mullā Ṣadrā emphasizes the principle of the ambiguous hierarchy of existence (*aṣl al-tashkīk fī marātib al-wujūd*). According to this metaphysical foundation, existence is a reality characterized by stages (*dhū marātib*). So, all changes in the corporeal world are from a level of imperfection to a higher one. But these levels are ascending stages of the same and unique being. Accordingly, Ṣadrā maintains that substantial motion moves a being from one level to a higher one, but all theses stages are various levels of a moving existent. As far as the developmental process of the soul is concerned, various levels of existence can be observed throughout the developmental process. Corporeality, spirituality and intellectuality are three main stages of the soul's development. Nevertheless, since the substantial motion is continuous, these supposed levels do not disturb the "singleness" of the soul. Mullā Ṣadrā declares that these levels are, indeed, manifestations of various levels of one moving existence which travels from the realm of imperfection to the stage of perfection and abstraction (*tajrīd*).

By considering Mullā Ṣadrā's theory on the soul's development, both in its practical and theoretical dimensions, we may gain a better understanding of his doctrine of substantial motion leading to an existential development. As our

philosopher proposes, the intellectual development of the human soul must be interpreted only based on the idea of the union of the intelligence and the intelligible (*ittiḥād-i āqil bi ma`qūl*). According to this idea, when the soul receives an intelligible, it indeed unites with its intelligible and strengthens its existence. So, whenever the soul has a new intelligible, it develops its existence by uniting with its intelligible. Mullā Ṣadrā provides a four-level theory both for the practical and for the theoretical intellects, within which the soul strengthens its existence from a low level to a higher one.

The key idea in Mullā Ṣadrā's interpretation of the union of the intelligence and the intelligible is the union of the soul and its perfection, be it practical or intellectual. This union removes any duality between the soul and what it acquires and reinforces the idea of existential development. The human soul, like other corporeal beings is a by-product of substantial motion. A corporeal matter which has the potentiality of acquiring perfection will change to a higher and stronger existent through substantial motion. Therefore, it is the matter itself which changes into immateriality and there is no duality in between. Accordingly, both the Platonic and Aristotelian points of view cannot adequately explain the soul-body relationship. The Platonic standpoint has the problem of explaining the relation between an eternal and a generated being and Aristotelians ignored the substantial changes by limiting themselves to external changes. Based on the principle of substantial motion, Mullā Ṣadrā declares that the relation between the soul and the body is, indeed, a connection between two levels of one being. When the matter moves through substantial motion, it travels from a low level of existence to a higher stage. Going forward, matter gradually leaves behind material characteristics and possess immaterial ones. So, materiality and immateriality are two degrees rather than two kinds of existence. Metaphorically, Mullā Ṣadrā compares the relation between the soul and the body to the relation between the fruit and the tree, but other

philosophers believed that this relation is similar to what exists between a horse and its rider or a bird and its cage.

Not only the soul but all corporeal beings move through substantial motion.²⁴⁰ According to the theory of substantial motion, whenever the matter is at its material level, it has only corporeal characteristics. So, one cannot claim that the soul is the output of the combination of material elements. The correlation between various material elements can only create an interaction between their different characteristics. But the soul is the manifestation (*tajallī*) of a higher level of existence of a matter which moved through substantial motion. This theory is also based on another metaphysical foundation, the principiality of existence (*aṣālat al-wujūd*). Since, according to Mullā Ṣadrā, there is no principle but existence, when a corporeal being moves through substantial motion, the only outcome of substantial change is the strengthening and perfection in existence. So, the soul at its initial stage of generation is a material form belonging to a moving being, but it will be an immaterial existent at a higher level of existence. However, we must remember that being a corporeal form at its early existence does not mean that the soul is a characteristic of matter. The soul, according to Mullā Ṣadrā, is a generated, corporeal and substantial perfection of a moving matter which has the capacity of becoming an immaterial existent.²⁴¹

Mullā Ṣadrā believes that what is presently soul, thought or intellect, was one day a piece of bread then a drop of blood, then fertilized egg then a fetus and so on before changing into the soul.²⁴² He attributes his doctrine to a verse in the Qurān which says the soul is the outcome of a long continuous process of bodily change.²⁴³

²⁴⁰ Mullā Ṣadrā, *ʿArshiyyah*, *op. cit.*, p. 242.

²⁴¹ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Asfār*, vol. 8, *op. cit.*, *al-safār al-rābiʿ*, *al-bāb al-awwal*, chapters 1 & 2.

²⁴² Mullā Ṣadrā, *Asrār al-Āyāt* (The Mysteries of the Qurʾānic verses ed. & tr. by M. Khwājawi, (Tehran: Cultural Studies and Research Institute, 1984), pp. 240-43 & 251. See also Muṭahhari, *Maqālāt-i Falsafī*, (Tehran: Intishārāt-i Hikmat, 1366 A.H.), vol. 1, p. 170.

²⁴³ Mullā Ṣadrā, *Asrār al-Āyāt*, *op. cit.*, pp. 242-43, 251. According to Q. 23:15 which says:

One of the main questions in Mullā Ṣadrā's theory about substantial motion of the soul is that if, as Ṣadrā believes, the body itself changes gradually into an immaterial being (the soul), then, at some point there should not be any body, or at least part of the body should change into soul. Nonetheless, we see that despite the generation of the soul, both the soul and the body have their own independent entity. We can easily separate a group of red or white globules which are bodily components and keep them out of their relation to the soul. This question is raised even if our philosopher asserts that the evolutionary process from corporeality to incorporeality will occur only when the soul develops substantially and enters the world of intellects. We explicitly observe that the body remains without any reduction even though the soul becomes an immaterial being when it separates from the body. Mullā Ṣadrā's theory does not show how and which part of the body changes into the soul. Even after the emergence of the soul as a perfection and a higher level of the body's existence, we see that the lower level also continues to exist.

In other words, one may ask the following. If the soul, as Mullā Ṣadrā believes, is the form of the body and holds its actuality, then when the soul separates from the body there must not be any actuality for the body. Nonetheless, we see that the body even after the soul's separation has its own actuality and continues to exist without any soul. The only answer which is offered, here, by our philosopher is that what, in fact, remains after the separation of the soul is a kind of corporeal thing not

ولقد خلقنا الإنسان من سلالة من طين* ثم جعلناه في قرار مكين*

ثم خلقنا النطفةعلقة فخلقنا العلقه مضغة فخلقنا المضغة عظاما

فكسونا العظام لحما ثم انشأناه خلقا اخر فبأمر الله احسن الخالقين*

Mullā Ṣadrā concludes, When the Qur'ān says; "then, we caused him to grow into another creation", it means the same thing which was created of an extract of clay (a corporeal being) and was moving through a continuous process of evolution, changed into an immaterial existent. Consequently, there is not any opposition between material and immaterial aspect of human existence. See Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Asfār*, vol. 9, *op. cit.*, *al-safar al-rābi'*, *al-bāb al-tāsi'*, chapter one, & *al-Asfār*, vol. 8, *op. cit.*, *al-safar al-rābi'*, *al-bāb al-thālth*, chapter 13. pp. 147-48. See also Ḥasanzādah Āmulī, *Uyūnu Masā'il al-Nafs*, pp. 257-58 & *Itihād-i Āqil bi Ma'qūl*, (Tehran: Intishārāt-i Hikmat, 1984), p. 34.

the body as such. This is because the term "body" according to Ṣadrā refers to a corporeal thing which is related to the soul.²⁴⁴ The objection, raised by however, is that the body even when it is related to the soul has its own actuality. The body is not the prime matter when it relates to the soul to be actualized only under the soul's actuality. Although the body's actuality is overwhelmed by the soul's actuality, the soul and the body are related vertically. So, even after their relation, there will not be any opposition between the two actualities. The reason is that the body or its components (such as cells, white and red globules) may remain even alive separate from their relation to the soul.

Another problem in Mullā Ṣadrā's theory is that he proposes that substantial motion occurs only by way of forms.²⁴⁵ Matter remains substantially unchanged and has only quantitative motion (*al-ḥarakah al-kammīyyah*).²⁴⁶ One can assert that since the form and the matter are existentially related to each other, change in one of them undoubtedly will lead to change in the other. So, the process of becoming immaterial must take place in both the form and the matter. However, we see that at one point only the soul will separate from the body and become immaterial. This means that the process of becoming immaterial is only true for the forms. Although the body as matter for the soul changes, yet it remains material. If the form and matter are interrelated to one another, why does the body not change into an immaterial being? The question may be raised, particularly, when we know that the body in relation to the soul is not prime matter. Therefore, one cannot claim that actuality is always due to the form and matter is a purely potential being. While the body is matter for the soul, it has its own actuality and it should move through substantial motion and become immaterial.

²⁴⁴ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Asfār*, vol. 8, *op. cit.*, *al-safar al-rābi'*, *al-bāb al-sābi'*, chapter 4, p. 382.

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, *al-bāb al-thālith*, chapter 13, p. 147.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, *al-bāb al-sābi'*, chapter 1, pp. 326-27.

This argument will be more effective if we take into account Mullā Ṣadrā's comments in his *Ta'liqah 'Alā Sharḥ Hikmat al-Ishrāq*. Presenting particular principles which pave the way of demonstrating the bodily return (*al-ma'ād al-jismānī*), he states that the individuality of each body is due to its soul. Even though bodily components change throughout the life or even if the body changes into another body at Resurrection²⁴⁷, he says given the unity of the soul, this (new) body is identical with that (previous) body by virtue of its form, the soul, but it is not identical by virtue of its matter.²⁴⁸ Although he cites Ibn 'Arabī who believes that imaginal bodies (*abdān mithāliyyah*) come out of the corporeal bodies,²⁴⁹ Mullā Ṣadrā, on the contrary, maintains that imaginal bodies are indeed the very consequence of the soul's acquirements.²⁵⁰ He explicitly asserts that the body in the other world is not the matter of the soul which pre-exists it,²⁵¹ but it is created by the soul itself.²⁵² He adds that imaginal body in relation to the soul is like the shadow (*ẓill*) in relation to the object which it reflects (*dhī al-ẓill*).²⁵³ Accordingly he does not seem to believe that corporeal body changes into an imaginal body.

²⁴⁷ It is interesting to consider Ṣadrā's own words as following:

ان هذبة البدن وتشخصه بالنفس وان تبدلت اجزائه كما في مدة العمر وكذا الوتبدل هذا البدن بيد من محشور في القيامة مع وحدة النفس فهذا اذا كبعين من حيث الصورة النفسانية وهذا ليس بذلك من حيث المادة فكل القولين صادقان

Although based on the above mentioned passage Ṣadrā emphasizes the identity and sameness of the corporeal body with the body which will associate with the soul at Resurrection, it is still true to say that the body by virtue of itself and as a matter changes (تبدل) from one stage to a higher one. See Mullā Ṣadrā's *Ta'liqah 'Alā Sharḥ Hikmat al-Ishrāq*, (Li Muḥammad Ibn Mas'ūd Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī), compiled by Asad Allah Ibn Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Yazdī, 1313 A.H., p. 513.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 514. Mullā Ṣadrā quotes from Ibn 'Arabī, *Fut ḥāt al-Makkiyyah, al-bāb*, 355 where he says:

فهى أجساد متولدة عن هذه الأجسام الترابية

²⁵⁰ Mullā Ṣadrā's *Ta'liqah 'Alā Sharḥ Hikmat al-Ishrāq, op. cit.*, p. 514. He says :

ان كان المراد أجساما اخرى مختوعة مكسوبة للنفس مجسمة بحسب ملكاتها واعمالها

²⁵¹ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Mabda' wa al-Ma'ād*, p. 337.

²⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 349. He mentions:

اما الابدان الاخرى حاصلة من تلك النفوس بمجرد جهات لاعالية

²⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 337.

In reviewing Mullā Ṣadrā's words regarding the immateriality of the soul, one may come to the conclusion that the soul according to our philosopher becomes immaterial when it separates the body.²⁵⁴ Considering all human souls, we may note that Ṣadrā's criterion cannot adequately explain all cases. One can easily argue that the prophets' souls are immaterial even when they are related to their bodies. Therefore, it will be hard to claim that the immateriality of the souls is equal to their separation from the bodies. The prophets' souls like the active intellects were existentially so developed that they could be considered as immaterial beings even when they were related to the bodies. This objection would be effective unless our philosopher asserts that although the prophets' souls were existentially more developed than the other souls, they became immaterial only when they entered the world of intellects. However, the higher level of existence and the characteristic of being active, which belong to the active intellects, could be found in their souls.

The second part of the present study was devoted to Mullā Ṣadrā's explanation of the final destination of the soul. Examining this aspect, we face some problematic questions which were not properly dealt by our philosopher and require further investigations. According to Ṣadrā's theory, the soul at the final stage of its relation to the body leaves the body and unites with the active intellect which was the cause of its emanation.²⁵⁵ At this stage, the soul is a purely immaterial being which unites with the active intellect in the same manner it had before its generation. As the soul's emanation from the active intellect in the arc of descent (*al-qaws al-nuzūlī*) did not create any change or reduction in the realm of intellects, its union with the active intellect through the arc of ascent (*al-qaws al-ʿuḍī*) does not create any change or addition to that world, Ṣadrā asserts.²⁵⁶

²⁵⁴ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Asfār*, vol. 8, *op. cit.*, *al-bāb al-sābiʿ*, chapter 6, pp. 392-98

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 395 & chapter 7, pp. 397-98.

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 396 & chapter 3, p. 354.

Several unsolved questions come to mind regarding this part of the theory. Firstly, one may ask what the nature of the soul's union with the active intellect is? If, according to our philosopher, the soul unites with the active intellect in such a way that it becomes its cause as it was united with it before its relation to the body,²⁵⁷ he will face the following problems:

1. Neglecting the souls' individuality when they unite with the world of intellects. This assumption is, indeed, in contradiction with the idea of eschatology and the circumstances of the Day of Reckoning, according to all revealed religions, when each individual will be rewarded or punished separately. This idea demands that each person remain individually ununited with the active intellect.

2. Many mystics reported that they could relate intuitively (*bi al-mukāshafah*) with dead persons as if they were in this world. This means that the souls live in the other world individually. Mullā Ṣadrā himself quotes individual cases of the survival of the souls in his *al-Mabda' wa al-Ma'ād*.²⁵⁸

3. According to this doctrine, the soul as an effect of the active intellect can become its cause when it develops through substantial motion. It is obviously impossible for an effect to become its cause even if it develops and strengthens its existence.

Based on Ṣadrā's discussions in *al-Asfār*, one may claim that the soul's union with the active intellect after its substantial development is like its union with the active intellect before the soul's generation.²⁵⁹ As Mullā Ṣadrā believes, the soul's union with its separated cause before its coming into existence means that its cause

²⁵⁷ Proposing the idea of corporeal createdness of the soul, Mullā Ṣadrā asserted that there was no reasonable explanation for the soul's eternity except we say that the soul existed before its generation united with its cause as the perfection of all effects exists before their cause. Accordingly, the soul does not exist as an independent being before its relation to the body. See Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Asfār*, vol. 8, *op. cit.*, *al-safar al-rābi'*, *al-bāb al-sābi'*, chapter 2, pp. 331-32. & *Ibid.*, chapter 4, p. 368.

²⁵⁸ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Mabda' wa al-Ma'ād*, pp. 324-25.

²⁵⁹ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Asfār*, vol. 8, *op. cit.*, *al-safar al-rābi'*, *al-bāb al-sābi'*, chapter 2, p. 337.

possesses the soul's perfection. He emphatically declares that the soul does not exist as an independent being before its generation in the realm of intellects.²⁶⁰ A perfect cause always possesses the perfection of its effects.

If this interpretation of the soul's union is true, one can, nonetheless, argue that this kind of union is not due to the soul's substantial development.²⁶¹ All causes possess the perfection of their effects whether their effects come to existence or not and whether they develop or not. So, our philosopher cannot refer the soul's union after its separation from the body to this type of meaning.

The other assumption of the soul's union with its separated cause is to explain it in terms of the existential link (*al-rabṭ al-wujūdī*) which each effect has with its own cause. All effects existentially depend on their causes. So, they are deeply united with their causes.

This hypothesis also does not confer any clear meaning to the soul's union with its active intellect. Although the soul as an effect of its separate cause is existentially related to it, we cannot consider this union an existential perfection to be acquired once the soul is completely developed. All effects are existentially related to their perfect causes at each moment. In addition, this union is not limited to developed souls. All souls are existentially related to their cause whether they are developed or undeveloped.

Here, there is one more assumption for the soul's union with its separate cause (God or separate intellects). If human souls at their highest level of development recognize their existential dependence on God, they acquire a level of union or nearness (*qurb*). This union is a conscious relation between the soul and its separate causes beyond what exists between each effect and its cause. This is, indeed,

²⁶⁰ Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Mabda' wa al-Ma'ād*, pp. 346-47.


²⁶¹ According to Mullā Ṣadrā the soul unites with the active intellect when it is perfect and developed. See *Ibid.*, pp. 352, 375, 395.

a kind of awareness of the existential dependence, based on various stages of our intuitive knowledge of God. The more our soul develops practically and theoretically, the more it becomes existentially close to God.

On the other hand, if Mullā Ṣadrā asserts that when the soul unites with the active intellect, it becomes an independent intellect like its cause, he will face the problem of the continuous generation of the intellects in an unchangeable realm! Whenever a soul separates from its body and unites with the world of intellects, a new intellect is added to that world. Accordingly, our philosopher must believe that there will be a kind of additional change in the world of immateriality -an idea that has been strongly refuted by him.²⁶²

In conclusion, if we could not find any explanation for the soul's union with the active intellect neither in the form of union (*ittiḥād*) nor uniqueness (*waḥdat*), then what will happen to the soul? As Mullā Ṣadrā believes, the active intellect both before and after the generation of the souls is existentially perfect, incurring no addition or reduction. One may ask here what the main goal of soul's creation is and what will happen to it after it separates from the bodies? The creation of the souls, according to this view is meaningless without some definite purpose.

²⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 396.



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