INFORMATION TO USERS

This was produced from a copy of a document sent to us for microfilming. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the material submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or notations which may appear on this reproduction.

- 1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting through an image and duplicating adjacent pages to assure you of complete continuity.
- 2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a round black mark it is an indication that the film inspector noticed either blurred copy because of movement during exposure, or duplicate copy. Unless we meant to delete copyrighted materials that should not have been filmed, you will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame. If copyrighted materials were deleted you will find a target note listing the pages in the adjacent frame.
- 3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., is part of the material being photographed the photographer has followed a definite method in "sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin filming at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. If necessary, sectioning is continued again—beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.
- 4. For any illustrations that cannot be reproduced satisfactorily by xerography, photographic prints can be purchased at additional cost and tipped into your xerographic copy. Requests can be made to our Dissertations Customer Services Department.
- 5. Some pages in any document may have indistinct print. In all cases we have filmed the best available copy.

University
Microfilms
International

·		
	·	

Thompson, Donald Frederick

ETHICS OF METAPHYSICS AND ETHICS OF VALUE: A STUDY IN THE THOUGHT OF BERNARD LONERGAN

McGill University (Canada)

PH.D. 1981

University
Microfilms
International 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106

by
Thompson, Donald Frederick
All Rights Reserved

		1
		1
		ı
		ı
		1
		1
		1
		1
		ı
		1
		1
		I
		1
		1
		ı
		'
•		

PLEASE NOTE:

In all cases this material has been filmed in the best possible way from the available copy. Problems encountered with this document have been identified here with a check mark $\sqrt{}$.

1.	Glossy photographs or pages		
2.	Colored illustrations, paper or print		
3.	Photographs with dark background		
4.	Illustrations are poor copy		
5.	Pages with black marks, not original copy		
6.	Print shows through as there is text on both sides of page		
7.	Indistinct, broken or small print on several pages		
8.	Print exceeds margin requirements		
9.	Tightly bound copy with print lost in spine		
10.	Computer printout pages with indistinct print		
11.	Page(s) lacking when material received, and not available from school or author.		
12.	Page(s) 145 seem to be missing in numbering only as text follows.		
13.	Two pages numbered Text follows.		
14.	Curling and wrinkled pages		
15.	Other		

University Microfilms International

		·	1 1 1 1 1
			, , , ,
•			
			1 1 1 1
			,

ETHICS OF METAPHYSICS AND ETHICS OF VALUE:

A STUDY IN THE THOUGHT OF

BERNARD LONERGAN

bу

Donald F. Thompson

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

McGill University Montreal, Québec.

ABSTRACT

Within the thought of Bernard Lonergan, is described a universal dynamic structure immanent within intellectual, moral, and religious consciousness. In Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, his analysis of the invariant pattern of that structure grounds a cognitional theory, an epistemology, and a metaphysics which then enables him to propose an ethic based on the structure of the good as immanent within every act of rational self-consciousness. In later works, principally Method in Theology, his orientation shifts to incorporate a new notion of value, which is distinct in that it is apprehended through feeling. The result is an ethic oriented to the transcendental objective of value and developed from the patterns of cognition which apprehend that value. This thesis studies that shift, and focuses on Lonergan's admitted sources to it: Max Scheler, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Jean Piaget, Susanne Langer, Abraham Maslow, and existential thought generally. In reconstructing it, the thesis finds grounds to differentiate the cognitional theory based upon analysis of intellectual as opposed to affective operations, their invariant norms for authentic operation, and their contents in facts and values respectively.

ABREGE

Dans la pensée de Bernard Lonergan, se trouve décrit une structure dynamique universelle immanente, à l'intérieur de la conscience intellectuelle, morale et religieuse.

Dans l'ouvrage <u>Insight: A Study of Human Understanding</u>, son analyse du schème invariant de cette structure fonde une théorie cognitive, une épistémologie et une métaphysique qui lui permet de proposer une éthique basée sur la structure du "bien" immanent en chaque acte de conscience de soi rationnel. Dans ses derniers ouvrages, principalement dans <u>Method in Theology</u>, son orientation change alors qu'il en vient à incorporer une notion nouvelle de la "valeur", qui est distincte en ce que celle-ci se trouve être appréhendée par la sensation. Il en résulte une éthique qui s'oriente vers l'objectif transcendantal de la valeur et qui se développe de la cognition qui appréhende de cette valeur. Cette Thèse étudie ce déplacement de l'éthique et se concentre sur les sources que Lonergan reconnait l'y avoir conduit:

Max Scheler, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Jean Piaget, Susanne Langer, Abraham Maslow, et de façon générale, la pensée existentialiste.

En la reconstruisant, cette thèse trouve un fondement pour différencier la théorie cognitive basée sur l'analyse des opérations intellectuelles en opposition avec les opérations affectives, leurs normes invariantes pour les opérations authentiques, et leurs contenus respectifs dans des faits et des valeurs.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapt	er	page
	Preface	vi
I	The Ethics of <u>Insight</u> : Metaphysics	1
	A - Lonergan's Overall Project in <u>Insight</u>	2 25 42 62
II	The Ethics of Method: Value	71
	A - Lonergan's Overall Project in Method	72 94
	Method	109 135
III	Data for a Higher Viewpoint: Max Scheler	146
	- Some Observations on Scheler's Program for Ethics Footnotes	168 176
IV	Data for a Higher Viewpoint: Dietrich von Hildebrand	182
	- Some Observations on von Hildebrand's Program for Ethics	205 212
v	Further Data for a Higher Viewpoint	216
	A - Jean Piaget	217 226 230 237 244
VI	Issues in Reconstructing the Higher Viewpoint	249
	A - Issues Concerning Cognitional Theory	250 269 288 304 321
VII	A Modified Reconstruction of the Higher Viewpoint	
	A - Questions and Answers Suggestive of a Modified Reconstruction	323 342 356

v	
-··	
p	age
- Appendices	357
Diagram #1 The Structure of the Human Good	
Diagram #4 The Transformation of Consciousness 3	360
- Bibliography	36I
A - Primary Sources	

PREFACE

In the writings of Bernard Lonergan, a dynamic structure immanent within intellectual, moral and religious conscious operations is described that could provide a basis for ethics that is both universal in scope yet thoroughly contextual in application. It assumes a basic cognitional theory which has been derived from analysis of the cognitive operations by which we genuinely know or do anything. In essence, it suggests that ethics is fundamentally a matter of method -- but a method which is as universal as its human operators while still being as contextual as the human history within which each of those operators exist.

The work which first and most comprehensively lays the groundwork for this approach to ethics is Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (1957), where the basic cognitional operations are explored for the reader's appropriation of a cognitional theory grounded upon those operations, an epistemology suggested which makes clear the objective content of those subjective operations, and a metaphysics outlined which makes explicit both the goals as well as the structures of knowing. Such a basis enables Lonergan to propose also the structure of the good (isomorphic with the structure of reality) which is intelligible, his ethic being derived from the norms immanent and recurrently operative within every act of choosing (every act of rational self-consciousness). It is this ethical method as metaphysical, universal on the side of the object while still governing the operations of every particular subject, which leads us to characterize Lonergan's project in Insight as an "Ethics of Metaphysics".

But in later works, principally Method in Theology (1972), a significant shift is apparent in Lonergan's thinking -- particularly in a new notion of value, which Lonergan identifies as the object or goal of a still further level of responsible operations. What is distinct about this notion of value from that of Insight, is that it is apprehended through feeling rather than rationally known. Within the conscious operations of deliberation and decision, Lonergan in Method identifies particular cognitive acts of both affective apprehension and judgment of value, whereby there occurs an integration of thinking and feeling within the existential decision to act. Value, immanent within any situation, becomes realized and constituted by a person's decision to act in proportion to his authentic apprehension and response to it. While this ethical method, as in Insight, still focuses on the norms immanent within the dynamic structure of knowing and doing (now described in terms of transcendental method), it now incorporates a new content -- value -- as the transcendental objective of our feelings of something. Hence we characterize Lonergan's later work, such as Method, as tending towards an "Ethics of Value". It retains its metaphysical characteristics, but shows a shift in emphasis from what is universal on the side of the object, to explicating the operations which are universal on the side of the subject -- such as apprehension of value.

Lonergan, in these later writings, mentions certain writers who have influenced his thought on specific notions and to whom he refers his readers for a more complete analysis of various phenomena. In terms of his description of the level of responsible operations and, in particular of affective apprehension of value, Lonergan makes constant and

consistent reference to the phenomenologists of value, Max Scheler and Dietrich von Hildebrand, and in discussing development, meaning and value generally, he often refers to Jean Piaget, Susanne Langer, Abraham Maslow, and a variety of existential writers. It is a basic goal of this thesis to attempt an independent retrieval of these sources who seem, by Lonergan's own reference, to have played a significant role in the development of his thinking as to the nature and function of conscious moral operations. Hopefully such a retrieval of sources will be of use to students of Lonergan wishing to follow his suggestions for further study.

But such a retrieval of sources, to be of any significance, must be set against the background of Lonergan's own development of an ethical perspective. A secondary goal of this thesis therefore must be a presentation of Lonergan's basic projects in both <u>Insight</u> and <u>Method</u>, and a highlighting of the consequences each holds for the field of ethics.

The setting of some of the sources to Lonergan's thought on moral operations against the background of Lonergan's own developed conclusions on these matters, will enable us to pursue still further a goal in this thesis. Does Lonergan's use of these sources do justice to what, in fact, was the subject of their investigations? To what degree, for instance, does Max Scheler's description of affective value apprehension correspond to that of Lonergan? What of von Hildebrand does Lonergan appropriate, and what does he not? What significance is to be made of such appropriation/non-appropriation? The asking and answering of such questions will help us distinguish the respective positions of these

writers in relation to Lonergan, as well as to put into some perspective the significance of Lonergan's own position.

A final goal of this thesis, enabled by the prior study of Lonergan and his sources, is the opportunity to propose our conclusions on some of these matters. From our adverting to these sources, we propose a slight modification of Lonergan's description of the structure of consciousness, such that analysis of the intellectual, affectional, and volitional operations give us grounds to propose that they might be understood as three distinct but interrelated "streams", which become integrated at the point of deliberation and decision. This proposition, based primarily upon Lonergan's metaphor of "levels" of consciousness but modified so as to differentiate intellectual and affectional streams, follows upon our retrieval of Scheler, von Hildebrand, and Piaget.

In this study, hermeneutical considerations are obviously central and necessitate a methodological approach. To start with, as neither Insight nor Method are works primarily addressed to the specialized concerns of ethics, we must attempt a retrieval of Lonergan's own thought within the "moving viewpoint" which characterizes his writing of both works. Each work is further usefully set against the questions that Lonergan was attempting to answer, both before and after each of these works. Hence germane to his writing of Insight was his previous study of Aquinas, while the challenge from the Geisteswissenchaften, the problems of critical history and hermeneutics, initiated much of the project represented by Method. We will attempt to recover some of this essential background to Lonergan's own thought, in our first and second chapters, as we outline his basic projects in both Insight and Method.

In order to fulfill one of the secondary goals of this thesis, (that Lonergan's use of certain sources does or does not do justice to what, in fact, was the subject of their investigations,) necessitates the incorporation into the study of what may be termed the principle of verification. Following the procedure from empirical science where one looks for sufficiency of evidence to make a judgment of probability that such an insight may, in fact, be so, the thesis will attempt verification that Lonergan's fourth level and ethics of value may, in fact, be so, through reconstruction of evidence which led to its proposition. Can one find adequate indication of the basic propositions, or are other propositions indicated? Does the proposition answer all the questions posed by the data of the new horizon, or are there further unanswered questions? These procedures, obviously drawn from Lonergan's own description in Insight of the process of insight and judgment, will be employed in the following manner:

- Chapter I a description of the Lonergan of <u>Insight</u> and the "ethics of metaphysics".
- Chapter II a description of the higher viewpoint of the Lonergan of Method, and the "ethics of value".
- Chapter III, IV & V a description of the source material which led to the higher viewpoint.
- Chapter VI a reconstruction of the higher viewpoint using the source material, referenced against the description of that higher viewpoint made in Chapter II.
- Chapter VII a modified reconstruction of the higher viewpoint, utilizing both Lonergan and his sources, in a manner responsive to the problems discovered in the reconstruction in Chapter VI.

In following these procedures, care will be taken throughout Chapters

I to V to introduce as directly as possible all sources, to stay within

the bounds of description during introductions of such data, and to set apart within separate sections observations and interpretations which are the product of this study and not of the sources. Chapters VI and VII will therefore be utilized as the principle areas to which conclusions of this study will be confined.

Original to this study is the examination, utilizing sources, of Lonergan's shift to an "ethics of value" with reference back to his previous "ethics of metaphysics" as outlined in Insight. The closest work done to this study is an excellent paper by Father F.E. Crowe given at the 1975 Lonergan Workshop Boston College entitled "An Exploration of Lonergan's New Notion of Value" (Science et Esprit - 1977 - and also on file at the Lonergan Centre, Regis College, Toronto). Other articles and dissertations which make reference to that shift, but do not focus on it exclusively are:

- Boyle, J.P. "Lonergan's <u>Method in Theology</u> and Objectivity in Moral Theology" -- Thomist 37(1973):589-601.
- Conn, W.E. <u>Conscience and Self-Transcendence</u>. Ph.D. Thesis, Columbia U. (1973).
- Doran, R.M. Subject and Psyche: Ricoeur, Jung, and the Search for Foundations. (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1977).
- Geitz, W.A. Toward a Cognitive Theory of Ethics, Ph.D. Thesis, U. of Rochester (1974).
- Roach, R.R. Fidelity: The Faith of Responsible Love. Ph.D. Thesis, Yale University (1974).
- Self, D.J. Value Language and Objectivity: An Analysis in Philosophical Ethics. Ph.D. Thesis, U. of North Carolina (1974).

Therefore the analysis of the shift, and the tracing down and analyses of the sources to it, constitute the principal originality of this thesis.

Also the modified reconstruction of the higher viewpoint, being principally an elaboration of an alternate heuristic structure, the "Streams" and "Transformation of Consciousness", is entirely that of this author, and has been developed solely as a conclusion to this study.

In thanking all those who enabled me to undertake and complete this study, I would mention firstly my wife Susan, who encouraged and loved me through it (not to mention typed the first draft); Dr. J. Arthur Boorman who, as thesis advisor, both supported and challenged my thinking and writing throughout; Father F.E. Crowe who helped me clarify my direction and pointed out many helpful materials at the Lonergan Centre; Dean J.C. McLelland who gave helpful critique as the thesis came to a conclusion; numerous members of the "Lonergan community", who both supported my inquiry while still enlarging its horizons; and most especially to Father Bernard Lonergan himself who, both in his writings and in person, helped me become conscious of and appropriate my thinking and acting — the essence both of the conclusion of this study, and of my living.

Donald F. Thompson
November, 1980.

CHAPTER I

THE ETHICS OF INSIGHT:
METAPHYSICS

Section A - Lonergan's Overall Project in Insight

Bernard Lonergan's Insight: A Study of Human Understanding is not a book principally about ethics. It is a study of human understanding that is written from the moving viewpoint of examining the basic act of understanding (an "insight") and of thematizing the implicit patterns in such acts of understanding which can be discerned in the congnitional activity performed in scientific and mathematical method. From such examination, Lonergan is able to answer the question of congnitional theory: "What am I doing when I am knowing?" His viewpoint then moves from the answer to the cognitional theoretic question to the epistemological question: "Why is doing that knowing?" It is only after these questions have been addressed, that Lonergan moves to the point of central interest to our study, namely, the metaphysics and the ethics isomorphic to cognitional theory (the compound structure of knowing and doing). To reach this point, we must first take seriously the route that has led there, which means to take seriously the offer Lonergan makes to readers of Insight:

Thoroughly understand what it is to understand, and not only will you understand the broad lines of all there is to be understood but also you will posses a fixed base, an invariant pattern, opening upon all further developments of understanding. 2

The "fixed base" and "invariant pattern" will be our goal, but the subject necessarily will be not merely Lonergan but also ourselves. For Insight is written...

...to assist the reader in effecting a personal appropriation of the concrete, dynamic structure immanent and recurrently operative in his own cognitional activities.³

Thus we must undertake the analysis of the structure immanent and recurrently operative in our own cognitional activities, to determine what the fixed base and invariant pattern is, and whether it can be said to exist.

Lonergan's cognitional analysis distinguishes and differentiates activities and patterns which one can monitor in one's own consciousness. He identifies the central act as "insight". The best illustration is always that of Archimedes rushing naked from the baths with the cry "Eureka," when he hit upon the solution of King Hiero's problem of the possibly impure crown of gold - to which Archimedes responded with a test involving displacement and the principle of specific gravity. ⁴
This "insight," writes Lonergan:

- comes as a release to the tension of inquiry;
- comes suddenly and unexpectedly;
- is a function not of outer circumstances but inner conditions;
- pivots between the concrete and the abstract;
- passes into the habitual texture of one's mind. 5

Where, however, does the "tension of inquiry" come from? Lonergan, following Aristotle, identifies it as the spirit of wonder and inquiry which is the beginning of all wisdom:

Deep with us all, emergent when the noise of other appetites is stilled, there is a drive to know, to understand, to see why, to discover the reason, to find the cause, to explain. 6

This "intellectual desire" or "Eros of the mind" is more precisely the "pure, detached, disinterested desire to know." The drive to know begins with the data of sense experience ("the content of an act of

seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, smelling"), and provokes the fundamental questions for intelligence - how?, why?, what is it? At such a moment one becomes aware of images and concepts that are playfully presented by the imagination for consideration, often under the inspiration of a clue in which one seeks to comprehend the reality, digest the sense, correlate the data, answer the question. The appropriate image or schematic figure which suddenly releases the tension of inquiry (Eureka!) is one in which the requirements posed by the questioning mind are seen as fulfilled in the act of understanding. Images or concepts then are given the different role of expressing or formulating the insight, either in a "nominal" definition (in the descriptive use of language which merely identifies sensible similarities) or in an "explanatory" definition (propositions beyond the descriptive to an explanatory use of language). Empirical methodology as found in scientific procedure illustrates the same set of cognitional operations:

- 1. the observation of data.
- 2. insight into data.
- formulation of the insight or set of insights, and the verification of the formulation.

Other elements Lonergan relates to the activities of insight are the "higher viewpoint" (when the questioning of an inquiry forces one beyond one's existing structure of insights, definitions, etc.); 11 the inverse insight (when the questioning produces the act of understanding that "there is nothing to be understood" 12); and the "empirical residue" (the particularity in the concrete data, such as the continuum of space and time, which is incidental or irrelevant to the expression of an understanding). 13 The latter element points to the abstracting quality in an act of understanding, namely, that while the act of understanding occurs with respect to the data of sense, the intelligence selects from that data what is essential to the understanding, and leaves aside the remaining data as the "empirical residue." This abstracting quality points also to the heuristic character of all knowing that is quite explicit in scientific method:

It is named heuristic because it anticipates insights of that type and, while prescinding from their as yet unknown contents, works out their general properties to give methodical guidance to investigations. It is named a structure because, though operative, it is not known explicitly until oversight gives way to insight into insight.

After utilizing mathematics and scientific method to identify the act of understanding itself and its related elements in their differentiatedness, Lonergan turns to the most common of the two diverse modes of knowing that exist in man. The first he identifies as "common sense," which is "a specialization of intelligence in the particular and concrete." Whereas science is more prone to "explanatory" understanding and tends toward abstract and universal heuristic structures, "common sense" operates merely out of the accumulation of insights which act as "pointers" but not universal premises from which deductions can be drawn. 16 Common sense approaches the objects of its understandings from the point of view of their particular relation to the sensorium of the inquirer, and it proceeds naturally and spontaneously -- rather than through clearly differentiated methodological procedures (as in science). In it, successive insights complement the accuracy or cover the deficiency of what went before -- but not in the sense of modification of a theory

towards a "higher viewpoint" as in science:

Common sense, on the other hand, has no theoretical inclinations. It remains completely in the familiar world of things for us. The further questions, by which it accumulates insights, are bounded by the interests and concerns of human living, by the successful performance of daily tasks, by the discovery of immediate solutions that will work. Indeed, the supreme canon of common sense is the restriction of further questions to the realm of the concrete and particular, the immediate and the practical.

Common sense can therefore be viewed as dealing with things as related to our sense (which are dependent upon the state of our senses) rather than the object-to-object concerns of things in relation to other things (e.g. water in relation to a thermometer or physical objects in relation to rods and clocks) in which change in the sensorium of the subject is not directly relevant. 18

In order to clarify the operations of common sense knowing,
Lonergan introduces the notion of "patterns of experience," an
explanatory formulation of the various streams of consciousness which are
immediately related to bodily-based acts: "seeing, hearing, touching,
tasting, smelling."

The "set of intelligible relations that link together sequences of sensations, memories, images, conations, emotions,
and bodily movements" can be termed biological when the sequences "converge
upon terminal activities of intussusception or reproduction. It can
be characterized somewhat as the conscious yet spontaneous response to
the stimulating elementary objects of the stimulated elementary subject.
Above this elemental level of pain and pleasure, one is "led to acknowledge that experience can occur for the sake of experiencing," and that
the purposiveness of an aesthetic pattern of experience leads one to

strain for such things as truth, joy, and value "without defining them." 21 In this case, the intelligence grasps (through insight) novel forms (such as artistic forms) that relate and unify the purely experiential pattern of sense and human experience. But however magnificent may be such imagined forms, quite another higher pattern (the intellectual) can be differentiated from it when the spirit of inquiry itself becomes the conscious activity and precise formulation its purpose. This pattern is what Lonergan is in throughout his investigation in Insight, as he formulates cognitional activity. 22 The most ordinary pattern in human living Lonergan calls the "dramatic," in that it constitutes one's first work of art, which is one's own life. Its purpose is clear, "to get things done," but it incorporates all the other levels in the biological exigence, the aesthetic liberation, and the intellectual inquiry by which the "getting done" is infused with a distinct style altogether the product of its originating subject. As the dramatic pattern is operative, it is always...

...outlining how we might behave before others and charging the outline with an artistic transformation of a more elementary aggressivity and affectivity. Ordinary living is not ordinary drama. It is not learning a role and developing in oneself the feelings appropriate to its performance. It is not the prior task of assembling materials and through insight imposing upon them an artistic pattern. For in ordinary living there are not first the materials and the pattern, nor first the role and then the feelings. On the contrary, the materials that emerge in consciousness are already patterned, and the pattern is already charged emotionally and conatively.²³

In the life of the dramatic subject, an interplay takes place in which on the one hand neural processes are subordinated to one's psychic determinations (one's conative, sensitive, and emotive elements direct

and release one's movements), while on the other hand neural patterns and processes demand psychic representation and conscious integration ("memory and imagination, conation and emotion, pleasure and pain, all have their counterparts in corresponding neural processes and originate from their specific demands"). While a person is in the intellectual pattern, his spirit of inquiry "cuts off the interference of emotion and conation," but within the dramatic pattern of experience it...

...penetrates below the surface of consciousness to exercise its own domination and control and to effect, prior to conscious discrimination, its own selections and arrangements. Nor is this aspect of the dramatic pattern either surprising or novel; there cannot be selection and arrangement without rejection and exclusion; and the function that excludes elements from emerging in consciousness is now familiar as Freud's censor.

Therefore, while insights can be desired, so can they also be unwanted —both on a conscious and unconscious level. Along these lines, Lonergan identifies "scotosis" (a blind spot resulting from unconscious censorship of emergent psychic contents), "repression" (an aberration of Freud's constructive censor in preventing arrangements of the unconscious from giving rise to insight) and "inhibition" (which represses an appropriate combination of image and affect):

For the combination was inhibited, precisely because it was alien. Insights are unwanted, not because they confirm our current viewpoints and behaviour, but because they lead to their correction and revision. Inasmuch as the scotosis grounds the conscious, affective attitudes of the persona performing before others, it also involves the repression of opposite combinations of neural demand functions; and these demands will emerge into consciousness with the affect detached from its initial object and attached to some associated and more or less incongrous object. 26

Common sense focuses not only on objects-for-me, but on objectsfor-us (i.e. - a social group) such that "the practical common sense of a group, like all common sense, is an incomplete set of insights that is ever to be completed differently in each concrete situation."27 This is a functional unity, that typically underwrites technologies, economics, politics, and culture, but is not a unity of universal definitions, postulates, and deductions. The role of science in its use of theory to reach its abstract and universal objects, equally needs as its complement the role of common sense to apply methods and understandings to concrete and particular situations. Common sense also functions as a unity of intersubjectivity when men discover they are "social animals and the primordial basis of their community is not the discovery of an idea but a spontaneous intersubjectivity."28 While intially anyone may identify the good with an object of desire, in community such objects must survive the tension between one man's desires and another's, the result being that ...

> Man's practical intelligence devises arrangements for human living; and in the measure that such arrangements are understood and accepted, there necessarily results the intelligible pattern of relationships that we have named the good of order.

This result creates a tension or dialectic between the desires of one man (individual common sense) and the desires of others (inter-subjectivity), such that only the common bonds of intelligent behavior can make...

...the experience of each resonate to the experience of others; and, besides this elementary communion, there are operative in all a drive to understand and an insistence on behaving intelligently that generate and implement common ways, common manners, common undertakings, common commitments. 30

But as with an individual, within an intersubjective community, scotosis, biases, repression, and inhibition also function to hinder the progress or development of a society. Egoism biases "The Eros of the mind, the desire and drive to understand" by giving it rein only where one's interests are concerned ("intelligent selfishness"), and equally a "group is prone to have a blind spot for the insights that reveal its well-being to be excessive or its usefulness at an end." Such group bias tends, in the shorter cycles of human history, to neglect anything but immediate advantage. Then there is the more general bias inherent in all individual and intersubjective common-sense knowing, namely, that common sense is incapable of analyzing itself and of providing its own corrective (especially in realizing that its focus on the immediately practical disregards larger issues and long term results). This general bias of common sense, in the longer cycles of human history,

involves the disregard of timely and fruitful ideas, and this disregard not only excludes their implementations but also deprives subsequent stages both of the further ideas, to which they would give rise, and of the correction that they and their retinue would bring to the ideas that are implemented.

The result is a "social surd," a residue of unintelligible facts that represent successive flights from detached and disinterested intelligence. The only remedy to such a disease of successive lower viewpoints and decline is the higher viewpoint,

the logical expansion and the recognition of the principle that intelligence contains its own immanent norms and that these norms are equipped with sanctions which man does not have to invent or impose.

The utilization of intelligence invites progress in human science that is empirical, critical, and normative; the withdrawal of intelligence

and its subsequent biases, invites decline. What is needed is a reversal towards a culture beyond all politics and domination, all myths and rationalizations, a culture formed around man's "capacity to ask, to reflect, to reach an answer that at once satisfies his intelligence and speaks to his heart." Such would be Lonergan's notion of "Cosmopolis" — a society "that is founded on the native detachment and disinterestedness of every intelligence, that commands man's first allegiance, that implements itself primarily through that allegiance, that is too universal to be bribed, too impalpable to be forced, too effective to be ignored." Only such intelligence is capable of overcoming what is now a <u>subjection</u> of man to emergent probability ("cumulative realization of concretely possible schemes of recurrence in accord with successive schedules of probabilities" by a discovery, anticipation, and dominion over emergent possibility:

For man can discover emergent probability; he can work out the manner in which prior insights and decisions determine the possibilities and probabilities of later insights and decisions; he can guide his present decisions in the light of their influence on future insights and decisions; finally, this control of the emergent probability of the future can be exercised not only by the individual in choosing his career and in forming his character, not only by adults in educating the younger generation, but also by makind in its consciousness of its responsibility to the future of mankind. Just as technical, economic, and political development gives man a dominion over nature, so also the advance of knowledge creates and demands a human contribution to the control of human history. 38

Cosmopolis represents the ultimate objective goal of common sense, an unrestricted movement towards practical development by intelligent inquiry, but it is a goal that can only be realized by a collaboration of

common sense with science in a manner that overcomes its natural biases.

Lonergan's moving viewpoint, having touched on the objective of common sense understanding, then moves towards the objective of explanatory (scientific) understanding in the "notion of a thing." To do so, he identifies a new type of insight which, rather than grasping after correlations between data, grasps instead the "unity, identity, whole in data." In contrast to the notion of a "body" as that which is "already out there now real" as a biological and non-intelligent response to stimulus (i.e. it is "sensed" merely on the elementary experiential level of knowing common to animals), a "thing" is "that which is to be known by the knowing constituted by experience and inquiry, insight and hypothesis, reflection and verification."40 The notion of a "thing" implies not only intelligent unities that can be grasped when one is operating within the intellectual pattern of experience, but that there can possibly be discovered distinctions between things (in their relations between one another). This latter notion of things as the objective of that which can be known through the unfolding of consciousness on the empirical, intellectual and rational levels with dramatical, practical as well as intellectual patterns of experience, provides the critical framework of objectivity for explanatory science. It is the intelligible within the sensible data which, when attended to and inquired into, yields intelligibility to the intelligence in sequences "of systems that unify and relate otherwise coincidental aggregates of sensible contents."41

Lonergan having defined "a thing" as "that within sensible data that is intelligently grasped and rationally verified," goes on to thematize the level of reflective knowing (verification) which asks the fundamental question for judgment: "Is it so?" He has differentiated thus far two levels of cognitional operations:

- I Level of presentations (the empirically given data of consciousness prior to any act of understanding).
- II Level of intelligence (inquiry, understanding, formulation).

 Lonergan now differentiates a third level which thematizes acts of verification through that question "Is it so?"

III - Level of reflection (reflection & judgment).

As he differentiates this level, we grasp the importance of the distinction between the direct and introspective modes of cognitional process; the direct operating with respect to or upon the data of sense, the introspective with respect to or upon the data of consciousness:

...the three levels of cognitional process operate in two modes. Data include data of sense and data of consciousness. Data of sense include colours, shapes, sounds, odours, tastes, the hard and soft, rough and smooth, hot and cold, wet and dry, and so forth. The direct mode of cognitional process begins from data of sense, advances through insights and formulations to reach reflection and judgment. Thus, empirical science pertains to the direct mode of cognitional process. On the other hand, the data of consciousness consist of acts of seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, touching perceiving, imagining, inquiring, understanding, formulating, reflecting, judging, and so forth. As data, such acts are experienced; but, as experienced, they are not described, distinguished, compared, related, defined, for all such activities are the work of inquiry, insight, and formulation. Finally, such formulations are, of themselves, just hypotheses; they may be accurate or inaccurate, correct or mistaken; and to pronounce upon them is the work of reflection and judgment. Thus, the three levels of the direct mode of cognitional process

provide the data for the introspective mode; and as the direct mode, so also the introspective unfolds on the three levels, an initial level of data, a second level of understanding and formulation, and a third level of reflection and judgment. 42

Each of these levels, while having differentiated operations, is unified when, as sensed, understood, and judged, they become a single known content. The third level involves two related cognitional acts:

- reflection is the process of seeking the answer to the question
 as to whether our understanding and formulation
 are correct.
- judgment expresses or formulates the answer we reach as to
 whether or not it is correct.

These acts presume both logical and dialectical processes in respect of past, present, and future judgments. Logic demands coherence and organization at any stage of developed insights and judgments: dialectic moves upon the breakdown of coherence and organization to bring about a new stage of developed insights and judgments which will once again cohere.

In Lonergan's thematization of reflective consciousness and the particular nature of a reflective insight, the reflective insight grasps the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence that the conditions for our hypothesis to be true are, or are not, fulfilled. With the question for reflection the prospective judgment is conditioned, but the question is answered by the reflective understanding that grasps the conditions as being known and fulfilled: if they are in fact fulfilled, the judgment that proceeds from the reflective act is virtually unconditioned.

43

His example of a concrete judgment of fact illustrates this:

Suppose a man to return from work to his tidy home and to find the windows smashed, smoke in the air, and water on the floor. Suppose him to make the extremely restrained judgment of fact, something happened. The question is, not whether he was right, but how he reached his affirmation.

The conditioned will be the judgment that something happened.

The fulfilling conditions will be two sets of data: the remembered data of his home as he left it in the morning; the present data of his home as he finds it in the evening. Observe that the fulfilling conditions are found on the level of presentations. They are not judgments, as is the minor premise of syllogisms. They involve no questions for intelligence nor insights nor concepts. They lie simply on the level of past and present experience, of the occurrence of acts of seeing and smelling.

Now, in the particular instance under consideration, the weary worker not only experiences present data and recalls different data but by direct insights he refers both sets of data to the same set of things which he calls his home. The direct insight, however, fulfils a double function. Not merely are two fields of individual data referred to one identical set of things but a second level of cognitional process is added to a first. together contain a specific structure of that process, which we may name the notion of knowing change. Just as knowing a thing consists in grasping an intelligible unity-identity-whole in individual data, so knowing change consists in grasping the same identity or identities at different times in different individual data. If the same thing exhibits different individual data at different times, it has changed. If there occurs a change, something has happened. But these are statements. If they are affirmed, they are judgments. But prior to being either statements or judgments, they exist as unanalysed structures or procedures immanent and operative within cognitional process. It is such a structure that links the conditioned with the fulfilling conditions in the concrete judgment of fact.

The three elements have been assembled. On the level of presentations there are two sets of data. On the level of intelligence there is an insight

referring both sets to the same things. When both levels are taken together, there is involved the notion of knowing change. Reflective understanding grasps all three as a virtually unconditioned to ground the judgment, Something happened.

The example also well illustrates the point that judgment on the correctness of insights presupposes a prior acquisition of a large number of other correct insights (for reflective analysis).

In descriptive or common sense knowing, one is making judgments regarding things related to oneself (individual judgements on things in our own individual situations). Its typical test is that ideas are true if they work (when there are no further practical questions). They are further tested against our previous insights, and by others with whom we collaborate. However, the biases of groups, classes, etc. often preclude any guarantee that there is a solid foundation of correct insights. In explanatory or scientific/theoretic knowing, the quite different standards criteria of things as they are in relation to each other prevail. Scientific judgments, while still moving towards the virtually unconditioned, are usually never more than probable since approximation or convergence towards that complete knowledge are all that classical and statistical laws, provisional analytic principles ever attain.

Once we have analyzed the cognitional process (the <u>activity</u> of insight) culminating in judgment, we can now move with Lonergan to the pivotal question as to whether that analysis, in fact, describes the activity by which we know. We have to answer the question for ourselves, according to Lonergan, by seeing if we are able to affirm the existence within ourselves of an instance of the cognitional process he

has described. The instance proposed is the judgment of fact that "I am a knower":

The relevant conditioned is the statement, I am a knower. The link between the conditioned and its conditions may be cast in the proposition, I am a knower, if I am a concrete and intelligible unity-identity-whole, characterized by acts of sensing, perceiving, imagining, inquiring, understanding, formulating, reflecting, grasping the unconditioned, and judging. The fulfillment of the conditions is given in consciousness.⁴⁵

Crucial here is the notion of consciousness. Lonergan asserts that consciousness is the "awareness immanent" in the cognitional acts that we have been differentiating and thematizing hitherto:

But such acts differ in kind, and so the awareness differs in kind with the acts. There is an empirical consciousness characteristic of sensing, perceiving, imagining. As the content of these acts is merely presented or represented, so the awareness immanent in the acts is the mere givenness of the acts. But there is an intelligent consciousness characteristic of inquiry, insight, and formulation. On this level cognitional process not merely strives for and reaches the intelligible, but in doing so it exhibits its intelligence; it operates intelligently. The awareness is present but it is the awareness of intelligence, of what strives to understand, of what is satisfied by understanding, of what formulates the understood, not as a schoolboy repeating by rote a definition, but as one that defines because he grasps why that definition hits things off. Finally, on the third level of reflection, grasp of the unconditioned, and judgment, there is rational consciousness. It is the emergence and the effective operation of a single law of utmost generality, the law of sufficient reason, where the sufficient reason is the unconditioned. It emerges as a demand for the unconditioned and a refusal to assent unreservedly on any lesser ground. It advances to grasp of the unconditioned. It terminates in the rational compulsion by which grasp of the unconditioned commands assent.

Yet while the awareness differs with each kind of act, it constitutes a unity in that the "contents on diverse levels cumulate into a single

known,"⁴⁷ all of which are a response to the basic desire to know in each one of us. That desire to know, the natural asking of questions, is the key condition that must be fulfilled in order for one to be a knower.⁴⁸ One is aware of one's asking questions and getting answers (as well as the object intended by those operations). This awareness (consciousness) of the unfolding structure of questions for understanding, of direct insights and formulations, of questions for reflection, of reflective insights and judgements, fulfills the conditions of the proposition. One is free to affirm one's judgment and knowledge of a fact (any fact being the natural objective of human cognitional process):⁴⁹ I am a knower.

Before Lonergan's viewpoint shifts to the question of why the actuation of cognitional structure attains knowledge (the epistemological question) and the structure it promotes, he asks about the <u>objective</u> of the pure desire to know. For Lonergan, this is the meaning for the notion of "being": the <u>content</u>, either known or anticipated to be known, of the pure desire to know. As such, it is all-inclusive:

Apart from being, there is nothing. Again, being is completely concrete and completely universal. It is completely concrete; over and above the being of any thing, there is nothing more of that thing. It is completely universal; apart from the realm of being, there is simply nothing. 50

Its unrestrictedness perhaps sets it as "the supreme heuristic notion."⁵¹ in that it anticipates all there is to be known by the inquiring intelligent and rational consciousness. The notion of being also is the core of "meaning," which is "the intention of being."⁵² The "meaning" of any true judgment is thus an <u>element</u> of what has been determined of "being."

To the question as to whether the desire to know can reach what is objectively real, Lonergan's answer is once again grounded in knowing itself. For Lonergan, objectivity is "what is known through any set of judgments satisfying a determinate pattern." Such a pattern would be: A is; B is; A is not B; A is the subject. Knowing must proceed from experience to understanding through to judgment, and the being that is thus known through correct judgment is objective. But such being is merely a part of being (A is; B is), and so equally is the known (the subject) a part of being (I am A). As the knower makes the correct judgments that "A is" "B is," and further that "I am A," so objective distinctions can be made as one judges "I am not B":

I am a knower...

This is a typewriter...

I am not this typewriter...⁵⁴

Objectivity and transcendence for Lonergan means that the knower gets beyond himself by making judgments; and so being is known "within which there are positive differences and, among such differences, the difference between object and subject." Aspects of objectivity itself can be distinguished as the desire to know moves through each of the three levels of consciousness: 1st, experience, the given as given, experiential objectivity; 2nd, understanding, the <u>pure detached</u> desire to know, normative objectivity; 3rd, judgment, the formally unconditioned, absolute objectivity. In a sense, it is the unrestricted, detached, disinterested desire to know that provides the immanent criterion of objectivity.

Lonergan understands metaphysics as that which "underlies, penetrates, transforms, and unites all other departments." It is latent within

the pure desire to know. As this desire unfolds into inquiring intelligence and reflective reasonableness, so one may attempt to develop one's intellectual pattern of experience as dominant within the "biological, aesthetic, artistic, dramatic, pratical, intellectual, or mystical" patterns that make-up the polymorphic human consciousness. 57 Such is the mastery of the mind, the "criticizing activity" of the "thinking subject" which establishes metaphysics as the governing of knowing, rather than the government of knowledge. 58 On this position, "the only coherent way to maintain a counter-position is that of the animal; for animals not only do not speak but also do not offer excuses for their silence. 159 The intelligently and rational conscious <u>activity</u> of inquirer himself is the position. Lonergan explicates metaphysics in three phases as it is operative within each of the three levels of consciousness. First it is latent because, although it is operative knowing, it is still merely implicit and not grasped with any clarity (the given as given). Second, it becomes problematic by being formulated as a series of positions and counter-positions on knowing that proceed from man's polymorphic consciousness. Finally, metaphysics becomes explicit when the immanent and operative knowing of any knower becomes explicated, reflected upon, and judged as an affirmation of the dynamic structures of one's own knowing. This explicit metaphysics would therefore be "the conception, affirmation, and implementation of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being."60 This is an explanatory formulation of metaphysics as a dynamic structure of knowing which can know being as proportionate to whatever can be experienced, grasped, and affirmed by a particular knower.

Any subject that can experience, understand, and judge that he knows as a matter of fact by experiencing, understanding intelligently, and judging critically, can attain an explicit metaphysics. This explicit metaphysics can become a "normative principle" that will govern the outcome of all inquiry. ⁶¹ Having made explicit the latent structure of his pure desire to know, he will naturally find the directions of method...

...first, of reorientating one's scientific knowledge and one's common sense and, secondly, of integrating what one knows and can know of proportionate being through the known structures of one's cognitional activities.

But there is also a relationship between the activity (the cognitional acts) and the structure of the known (the contents of the acts) in that "cognitional activity operates within heuristic structures towards goals that are isomorphic with the structures." To explicate them, Lonergan turns firstly to the elements of latent metaphysics, the heuristic structures of explanatory knowledge that can be known through the immanent and operative structures of knowing of the self-affirming subject. The basic terms denoting the three contents (of experiencing, understanding, and judging) which coalesce into a single known are:

<u>Potency</u> denotes the component of proportionate being to be known in full explanatory knowledge by an intellectually patterned experience of the empirical residue.

Form denotes the component of proportionate being to be known not by understanding the names of things, nor by understanding their relations to us, but by understanding them fully in relations to one another.

Act denotes the component of proportionate being to be known by uttering the virtually unconditioned 'Yes' of reasonable judgment.⁶⁴

These traditional metaphysical elements are, for Lonergan, the three components of proportionate being as a single content. By them, intellectually patterned experience (potency) heads towards insights (forms) and judgments (acts) in a "directed dynamism." But there are two modes of knowing such being -- "things" which are concrete and relative, and scientific laws and systems which are abstract. In the first "central" mode, a thing is known as an individual (potency) unity, identity, whole (form) which is existent (act). Because a thing is also known by its relation to others, its generically distinct properties, its sequences of relations, one may also formulate systems of conjugate intelligibility, successive higher viewpoints, etc. For example, "at any stage of his development a man is an individual existing unity differentiated by physical, chemical, organic, psychic, and intellectual conjugates." The pursuit of the detached, disinterested desire to know leads to the dominance of the intellectual conjugate, and it...

... reveals to a man a universe of being, in which he is but an item, and a universal order, in which his desires and fears, his delight and anguish, are but infinitesimal components in the history of mankind. It invites man to become intelligent and reasonable not only in his knowing but also in his living, to guide his actions by referring them, not as an animal to a habitat, but as an intelligent being to the intelligible context of some universal order that is or is to be. Still, it is difficult for man, even in knowing, to be dominated simply by the pure desire, and it is far more difficult for him to permit that detachment and disinterestedness to dominate his whole way of life. For the self, as perceiving and feeling, as enjoying and suffering, functions as an animal in an environment, as a self-attached and self-interested centre within its own narrow world of stimuli and responses. But the same self, as inquiring and reflecting, as conceiving intelligently and judging reasonably, is carried by its own higher spontaneity to quite a different mode of operation with the opposite attributes of detachment and disinterestedness. It is confronted with a

universe of being in which it finds itself, not the centre of reference, but an object co-ordinated with other objects and, with them, subordinated to some destiny to be discovered or invented, approved or disdained, accepted or repudiated.

This tension between man as the subject he is (self-centeredness, limitation) and towards the subject he is to be (the universe of being, transcendence) is the key to human development arising out of the "upwardly but indeterminately directed dynamism of all proportionate being" (the pure desire to know). And as further questions give rise to further developments, so is one faced with integrating such developments into the fabric of one's habitual living. The law of such development is genuine ness as it arises from the pure detached desire and is pursued either non-consciously and spontaneously as in the simple and honest soul, or consciously and by self-scrutiny as in the self-consciously developing subject. It is the necessary condition for harmony within consciousness between limitation and transcendence.

Lonergan also identifies an overall notion of development in the "Genetic Method," which outlines the general method grounded in the metaphysical order immanent in all inquiry. Specifying the "operator" as "the higher system on the move," To Lonergan sees all methods of inquiry as seeking understanding of higher integrations, the source of transition to such higher integrations being the "operator." The specification of the operator gives some determination of the direction in the inquiry.

Explicit metaphysics, its elements and method, were reached through adequate self-knowledge, a self-objectification of the unity of cognitional acts of experiencing, understanding, and judging latent in the dynamic

structure of all knowing. That self-knowledge was arrived at by an explanatory understanding (cognitional theory) of intellectual development, of following the activity of the pure desire to know. But it is "not uncommon for other desires to interfere with the unfolding of the detached and disinterested desire to know, and the result of such interference will be error about reality." Intelligent consciousness is a basic corrective to all other streams of consciousness (e.g. -mythic consciousness, etc.) operative in one's concrete being:

- (1) that the world of pure science and of metaphysics is somehow very different from the world of poetry and of common sense.
- (2) that the apprehension of explanation stands in opposition and tension with the flow of the sensitive presentations, of the feelings and emotions, of the talking and doing that form the palpable part of our living with persons and our dealing with things.
- (3) that as explanation is reached through description, so it must be applied concretely by turning from explanation back to the descriptive world of things for us, and therefore
- (4) that man's explanatory self-knowledge can become effective in his concrete living only if the content of systematic insights, the direction of judgments, the dynamism of decisions can be embodied in images that release feeling and emotion and flow spontaneously into deeds no less than words.

But does intelligent consciousness guarantee us truth? To Lonergan, truth is merely the conformity of the subject's affirmations and negations (reflective grasp of the virtually unconditioned) with what is and what is not. This conformity is attained when the conditions of its being known genuinely through inquiry and reflection have been fulfilled. As inquired into and judged as true (what is known), being is the content (what is meant) of the expression in language (what is said). 74

In respect to our inquiry into ethics, the key to truth is the point where we appropriate a truth (meaning) so as to make it our own. At that point...

...our reasonableness demands consistency between what we know and what we do; and so there is a volitional appropriation of truth that consists in our willingness to live up to it, and a sensitive appropriation of truth that consist in an adaption of our sensibility to the requirements of our knowledge and our decisions. 75

But to appropriate truth, we must learn it and accumulate its insights, we must be able to grasp and identify concrete instances of it, and we must be able to maintain an orientation and application of it lest we restrict or turn away from the truth in reality we actually know. In such a case, "human intelligence and reasonableness function as the higher integration" of the sensitive flow of dramatic living, 76 the higher integration of human willing and doing which follows upon truth. Such truth may be universal (an ordered totality of viewpoints of being), but it will vary "in content with the experience, the insights, the judgments, and habitual orientation of each individual." While envisaging this potential completeness, we must remain oriented to subjects and their particular necessities, and therefore to the reachable content and context of every other subject's meaning (insight into the insight of others). This requires a methodological hermeneutic to grasp the meaning of another human subject and, in the measure that such a subject is intelligent, we can expect him both to speak and to act in the light of his ever accumulating set of insights.

Section B - Lonergan's Ethics from Metaphysics

It is on the basis of a metaphysics which governs the cognitional activity by which proportionate being is known, and our intelligence and reasonableness which demands consistency between our knowing, that Lonergan

can propose the possibility of ethics. Such a possibility emerges whenever one's empirical, intelligent, and rational self-consciousness expands into the field of doing, acting, and making. Lonergan's account of the expansion begins with a definition of the notion of the good: "as being is intelligible and one, so also it is good." The dynamic movement towards this good comes from that same "pure unrestricted desire to know." But the goodness of being comes to light only by considering the expansion of intellectual activity into deliberation and decision, choice and will.

"Good" can be explicated as emerging in different ways on three levels of cognition as Lonergan has described them. On the level of sensation and data (metaphysically, the "potency"), the good is experienced as the "object of desire" - that which specifically is desired not merely as "pleasant, enjoyable, and satisfying" but as that which is desired by one's own insight that is correct (by the genuine activity of one's pure desire to know). 79 On the second level of inquiry and insight, the object of desire is promoted by insight beyond the particular and the concrete to a more universal and abstract understanding - the good of order. Here schemes of recurrence in respect of, say, the family, are sought by the pure desire not in terms of the family in its particularity, but in terms of the family as a well-functioning institution. On the level of reflection and judgment, however, desire of the good is promoted from the good of order to value itself. Value is discerned in possiblities that reveal things as they might be, and initiates practical intelligence to single out such possiblities by decision and choice to issue into practical results.

Lonergan suggests that "will" is an "intellectual or spiritual appetite" to objects presented by intellect; it is the capacity to make decisions concerning them. As potency, it is the capacity to will. As form, it is the habitual willingness to will. As act, it is the actual event of willing. The pure disinterested desire to know grasps and judges and decides about the concrete and practical possibilities of that being. If one has appropriated one's process of knowing being, "there springs inevitably an exigence for self-consistency in knowing and doing." Such an exigency roots ethics in the metaphysics of cognition.

Value for Lonergan is "the good as the possible object of rational choice" and it clearly falls under the aspect of intelligibility. Value as the object of choice is rooted in this consistency between knowing and doing:

It demands, not consistency in the abstract, but consistency in my consciousness, not the superficial consistency purchased by the flight from self-consciousness nor the illusory consistency obtained by self-deception and rationalization nor the inadequate consistency that is content to be no worse than the next fellow, but the penetrating, honest, and complete consistency that alone meets the requirements of the 83 detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know.

In the intelligent order created by the consistency between knowing and doing, there emerge concrete objects of desire in the order (values). From such objects in that order, says Lonergan, can be determined a body of ethical principles that can be derived simply by asking what concretely is implicit in one's exigence to know and to do consistently. But these principles as principles emerge only in the self-appropriated and self-conscious <u>individual</u>, for the thrust of Lonergan's ethical and metaphysical perspective is aimed at the individual who is first and

foremost a <u>subject</u> who is ethically self-conscious. As the subject, by action, brings value into being, ethics must direct itself to what is "latent and operative in everyone's knowing, it is universal on the side of the subject" ... and must "ground a dialectic criticism of subjects." To deduce universals on the side of the object would be to neglect the primary self-appropriation of the subject's operations. The key is to appropriate and maintain the genuineness and accuracy of one's operations, so that in one's moral living one meets the challenge to "know thyself." Ongoing analysis of one's deeds, one's words, one's mixed motives, etc., results in a self-criticism which roots out biases, aberrations, and all other flights from intelligence. Lonergan prescribes a program for moral self-consciousness or, put another way, a following of one's moral conscience based upon a genuine self-appropriation of one's moral operations. Above all, such a program for ethics arises out of ethical doing.

Lonergan's suggestion as to the method of doing ethics arises out of the dialectic of position and counter-position that characterized the movement in cognition at the second inquiry level, the <u>problematic</u> movement from latent to explicit metaphysics. Such movement is toward truth, goodness, being, as known through classical, genetic, statistical, and dialectical methods. Its object is "being," but the being of concrete living which is discerned in possibilities, decided upon and chosen, and can issue in practical results. Even within the broader perspective of what Lonergan called "the shorter and longer cycles of human history," positions and counter-positions in the ethical order "either enforce their own reversal or destroy their carriers."

towards progress, but it is a movement of individual human subjects realizing through particular intelligent and reasonable choices, actual instances of the universal order (value):

Objects of desire are manifold, but they are not an isolated manifold. They are existents and events that in their concrete possibility and their realization are bound inextricably through natural laws and actual frequencies with the total manifold of the universe of proportionate being. If objects of desire are instances of the good because of the satisfactions they yield, then the rest of the manifold of existents and events also are a good, because desires are satisfied not in some dreamland but only in the concrete universe. Again, the intelligible orders that are invented, implemented, adjusted and improved by men, are but further exploitations of prehuman, intelligible orders; moreover, they fall within the universal order of generalized emergent probability, both as consequents of its fertility, and as ruled by its more inclusive sweep. If the intelligible orders of human invention are a good because they systematically assure the satisfaction of desires, then so also are the intelligible orders that underlie, condition, precede, and include man's invention. Finally, intelligible orders and their contents as possible objects of rational choice, are values; but the universal order, which is generalized emergent probability, conditions and penetrates, corrects and develops, every particular order; and rational self-consciousness cannot consistently choose the conditioned and reject the condition, choose the part and reject the whole, choose the consequent and reject the antecedent. Accordingly, since man is involved in choosing and since every consistent choice, at least implicitly, is a choice of universal order, the realization of universal order is a true value. 87

But does such a movement towards progress and the finality of being not deny "the rather evident fact of evil in this universe?" Lonergan replies that such a movement does not deny or attempt to minimize the pain and suffering, the disorder, and the false values present in the universe. But it does "by-pass human feelings and sentiments to take its

stand exclusively upon intelligible order and rational value."89 Insight, Lonergan advances that this is the way to discern and move towards "the ascertainable intelligibility of the universe that exists."90 The matter of the human decider and doer does, however, remain the root of the problem -- for it is an essential aspect of human freedom to cooperate or not (to cooperate) with the givenness of the true or the good, 91 the realization of the higher integration presented by the desire to know. Practical reflection is the means to discern the good to raise questions, to evaluate consequences, to run risks. Such a process enables one to become rationally self-conscious and to have insight into a possible course of action. The decision to act itself is (somewhat) unique, differing from a rational judgment of truth or fact, in that it regards a course of action that is only possible prior to one's carrying it out. On the other hand, the decision to act must be made reasonably, or follow upon verified judgment of what ought to be done and with equal concern for truth as well as goodness. But given the human condition it is always possible that one's doing and deciding diverge from one's knowing - and this is made possible by the exigence of freedom. One is free to follow the exigences of the true and the good, and one is free to neglect them.

"Effective freedom" is acting in accord with genuine sensing, inquiring, judging. It is grounded in "essential freedom," which is also open to one's acting out of constraint, fear, bias, self-deception, etc. rather than in accord with genuine knowing. "Effective freedom itself has to be won" by a genuinely moral person as he implicitly or explicitly acts in accord with unrestricted desire to know as it moves

him towards a universal willingness. But knowing how to live comes after living; living in accord with sufficient knowledge is often a much later achievement. Before such living has a chance to emerge, man's non-rational desires and fears blend or mix with the intellectual and ethical in the more typical dramatic patterns of daily living. The challenge however, is to a self-development which can differentiate and discriminate between those patterns, and follow the pure desire to know towards higher integrations of human living. It is to be conscious of the individual psychoneural biases and aberrations in the subject, the intersubjective attachments and cumulative historical and cultural biases of the society, and to rise above and overcome them by opting only for "the intelligent and reasonable course of action."

The fundamental ethical movement for Lonergan <u>always</u> takes place in the "practical insight." It occurs in the coincidental manifolds of sensible presentations, when practical insights grasp possible courses of action that are examined by reflection, decided upon by acts of willing, and either are or are not realized in the underlying sensitive flow. It issues from a reflection not intent upon grasping a virtually unconditioned, but rather in asking questions regarding the course of action as to the steps in its execution, its alternatives and what each excludes, the risks it involves, the seriousness of its consequences, its agreeable/ disagreeableness, its utility, the degree it improves the accepted order, its effects on my habits, its overall values as true or false. ⁹⁴ More often than not, there is no reflection, for such courses of action are habitual. Then the question concerns more the antecedent willingness which constitutes the moral habit (will as habitual inclination). As

there is the practical insight, so too there must be the practical introspective reflection which subjects one's willingness to self-conscious scrutiny: what are the reasons for my own acts? Such reflections are still a knowing, but it is a knowing that is focused on the objective of making being, of what is to be done. Such knowledge confers actuality upon a mere possible course of action, and these actions emerge in as much as they are understood by intelligent consciousness, evaluated by rational consciousness, and willed by rational self-consciousness. It is the rational self-consciousness which demands the consistency of one's knowing and doing in one's willingness. This movement from knowledge to act occurs if one is effectively rational, and does not allow one's other desires to interfere with one's pure desire to know. In this respect, the commitment to a conformity of doing with knowing by reasonable decision, arises out of

...a succession of enlargements of consciousness, a succession of transformations of what consciousness means. Waking replaces dreaming. Intelligent inquiry emerges in waking to compound intelligent with empirical consciousness. Critical reflection follows understanding and formulation to add rational consciousness to intelligent and empirical consciousness. But the final enlargement and transformation of consciousness consists in the empirically, intelligently, and rationally conscious subject:

- (1) demanding conformity of his doing to his knowing, and
- (2) acceding to that demand by deciding reasonably 96

To act in such a way is to be bound by a form of obligation or necessity, and to act in a determinate manner by a transformation in consciousness. It is to be in full self-possession of the detached disinterested desire, and therefore to put all of one's activity under its control. The transformation is the result of the reasonable act of will to be a knower,

to act with genuine consistency between one's knowing and doing, and to refuse to allow other desire to interfere with the reasonable unfolding of the detached, disinterested desire to know. This act of will is the point at which consciousness becomes self-consciousness, for by it, the subject by judgment and decision habitually confers actuality on genuinely known action or being that is otherwise merely possible. To be ethical is to be self-consciously aware and committed to genuine knowing and doing. And Lonergan proposes that the essential link between genuine knowing and doing, is reasonableness.

Lonergan has been asserting from the start that intelligibility is intrinsic to being. But is the intelligibility of material reality the same as the intelligibility of distinctly human operations? Lonergan distinguishes between the two different levels of reality as being intelligible in different ways. There is the "material" reality of the chemical and physical orders of events, and its static systems operate subject to basic intelligible laws. But there is also a "spiritual" reality of organic and psychic levels, that operates according to the "laws of spirit" as they reside in the dynamic structure of our cognitional and volitional operations. These laws are the "legislative function" for human willing and doing, and are systematic and intelligible as they seek for a further intelligible order beyond otherwise merely coincidental manifolds. But there will always be the inconsistent and the unintelligible because of the "common experience of a divergence between what one does and what one knows one ought to do." To the extent to which this divergence is overcome by intelligence and reasonableness, the "laws of spirit" can be seen as residing...

...in the dynamic structure of its cognitional and volitional operations, and their concrete application is effected through spirit's own operations within that dynamic structure. Thus, in working out the notion of the good, we discovered in the rationally self-conscious subject an exigence for consistency between his knowing and his doing, and we saw how a body of ethical precepts would be derived simply by asking what concretely was implicit in that exigence. As metaphysics is a corollary to the structure of knowing, so ethics is a corollary to the structure of knowing and doing; and as ethics resides in the structure, so the concrete applications of ethics are worked out by spirit inasmuch as it operates within the structure to reflect and decide upon the possible courses of action that it grasps. 98

The scope and limitation of "possible courses of action" are worked out by spirit inasmuch as it operates within the structure to reflect and decide upon the possible courses of action that it grasps. But as has been said before, one is essentially free to do other than what one knows one ought to do. The exigence to do as one knows is spontaneous and natural; but its fulfillment is not a necessity but a matter of one's de facto willingness. Effective freedom is limited by external restraint, limitations of one's active intelligence and will, and the extent of one's development generally:

Man develops biologically to develop psychically, and he develops psychically to develop intellectually and rationally. The higher integrations suffer the disadvantages of emerging later. They are the demands of finality upon us before they are realities in us. They are manifested more commonly in aspiration and in dissatisfaction with oneself than in the rounded achievement of complete genuineness, perfect openness, universal willingness. Finally, even that rounded achievement is itself not a goal but a means to a goal; for genuineness and openness and willingness name, not acts, but conditions for acts of correct understanding and good willing.

The concrete being of man, then, is being in process. His existing lies in developing. His

unrestricted desire to know heads him ever towards a known unknown. His sensitivity matches the operator of his intellectual advance with a capacity and a need to respond to a further reality than meets the eye and to grasp his way towards it. Still this basic, indeterminately directed dynamism has its ground in potency; it is without the settled assurance and efficacy of form; it tends to be shouldered out of the busy day, to make its force felt in the tranquillity of darkness, in the solitude of loneliness, in the shattering upheavals of personal or social disaster.

This tension between the exigence of man's developing, and his moral impotence to sustain that development, finds its source in incomplete intellectual and volitional development. Whether man can affirm his successes, and evaluate and learn from his failures, is critical to that developing. Man moves ahead towards what is right in the concrete situation according to whether it is reasonable and intelligent, and in so doing effects a transformation of his life, his family, his community, the economy and the polity. Development occurs when intelligibility is grasped and implemented or its inverse, the lack of intelligibility, rejected. But...

One can agree with Christian praise of charity, with Kant's affirmation that the unqualified good is the good will, with existentialist exhortations to genuineness. But good will is never better than the intelligence and reasonableness that it implements. $^{100}\,$

Hence man often seems to lose as much ground as he gains, as cumulative bias sets in, and the effective capacity for development becomes lessened. The solution would seem to lie in one's willingness and reasonableness, but Lonergan argues that the only final solution to man's incapacity for sustained development "has to be in still higher integration of human living." 101

It is to present the option of such a higher integration of human living, through both a general transcendent knowledge (of God) and a special transcendent knowledge (of a supernatural solution to the problem of evil), that Lonergan directs his two final chapters of Insight. these two chapters therefore integrate religion and ethics into a higher viewpoint, their usefulness for Lonergan's understanding of ethics comes more from the vision itself than from a method outlined for attaining that Their content will thus be summarized briefly. The procedure is to extrapolate principles of knowing from man's past and present, to determine principles governing possibilities that arise in man's future. At the heart of it is still the dynamic movement of the pure, unrestricted desire to know, which moves man through inquiry to try to transcend the limitations to his own proportionate being. The objective (transcendence) of that immanent desire, anticipates, grasps and affirms the possibility of God as that which, as complete intelligibility and the ultimate cause of causes, is capable of grounding the explanation of everything about everything, and of grounding value as that which overcomes contingence at its deepest level. The existence of God is therefore argued:

If the real is completely intelligible, God exists. But the real is completely intelligible. Therefore, God exists. 102

And the definition of God becomes:

God is the unrestricted act of understanding, the eternal rapture glimpsed in every Archimedean cry of Eureka. 103

But Lonergan has raised the subject of God in reference to the particular problem of man's impotence in his own development - the problem is faced in his final chapter:

Still, there is a fact of evil and man is inclined to argue from that fact to a denial of the intelligence or the power of the goodness of God. Even though it is argued that the evil of objects of aversion is, from an intellectualist viewpoint, a potential good, even though it is agreed that the evil of disorder is an absence of intelligibility that is to be understood only by the inverse insight that grasps its lack of intelligibility, there remains the concrete fact of evil and the practical problem of determining what one is to do about it.

Indeed, since God is the first agent of every event and emergence and development, the question really is what God is or has been doing about the fact of evil. 104

In more secular terms, what Lonergan is concerned about is the current sense of despair with which the notion of progress or development is tainted. Man's very being is dynamic, and anything that impedes or devalues that movement must be challenged. Its challenge is the unrestricted desire to understand which correctly heads towards an unrestricted act of understanding, towards God and "rejects the interference of other desire." The will that is good (by its consistency with knowledge) heads towards an antecedent willingness that matches the desire to know both in its essential detachment from the sensitive subject, and in its unrestricted commitment to complete intelligibility, to God. "The whole world of sense is to be, then, a token, a mystery of God, for the desire of intelligence is for God and the goodness of will is the love of God." But "will is good by its conformity to intelligence," and therefore the problem typically lies in the failure of the will to so conform. The answer, argues Lonergan, is that

the will can contribute to the solution of the problem of the social surd, inasmuch as it adopts a dialectical attitude that parallels the dialectical method of intellect. The dialectical

method of intellect consists in grasping that the social surd neither is intelligible nor is to be treated as intelligible. The corresponding dialectical attitude of will is to return good for evil. For it is only inasmuch as men are willing to meet evil with good, to love their enemies, to pray for those that persecute and calumniate them, that the social surd is a potential good. It follows that love of God above all and in all so embraces the order of the universe as to love all men with a self-sacrificing love.

Thus as intellect rises to the knowledge of God as it cuts through untruth to truth, so will rises to the love of God as it meets evil with good. It is this re-orientation of the will towards God and the good through love, that constitutes the effectively probable solution to the failure of the will:

Again, a man or woman knows that he or she is in love by making the discovery that all spontaneous and deliberate tendencies and actions regard the beloved. Now as the arm rises spontaneously to protect the head, so all the parts of each thing conspire to the good of the whole, and all things in their operations proceed to the realization of the order of the universe. But the order of this universe is actual and the orders of all other universes are possible because of the completeness of the intelligibility, the power of the reality, and the perfection of the goodness and love of God. It follows that, apart from the surd of sin, the universe is in love with God; and good will is the opposite of the irrationality of sin; accordingly, the man of good will is in love with God. 109

But how can this correction of intellect and will be achieved in a permanent and universally acceptable way? An answer can be found in belief, argues Lonergan, which provides certitude through communication of reliable knowledge from those whom one knows to know. Such a judgement to believe would move as follows:

- preliminary judgments on the value of belief in general, on the reliability of the source for this belief, and on the accuracy of the communication from the source,
- (2) a reflective act of understanding that, in virtue of the preliminary judgments, grasps as virtually unconditioned the value of deciding to believe some particular proposition,
- (3) the consequent judgment of value,
- (4) the consequent decision of the will, and
- (5) the assent that is the act of believing. 110

In essence, this is an act of will to believe because of the <u>value</u> that one affirms or decides to accept. It is typical of judgments to believe when immanent knowledge is unattainable. It is corrected by cumulative inquiry into sources, motives, and supporting judgments upon which such decisions to believe are based. Lonergan then proceeds to outline, in thirty-one instances, the general characteristics of a heuristic structure which would provide the solution to the problem of the breakdown of intellect and will. Of the possible solutions outlined, he identifies one as that which exists in the form outlined in general characteristics:

For if possible solutions are many, the existent solution is one, universally accessible and permanent, continuous with the actual order of the universe, and realized through human acts of acknowledgement and consent that occur in accordance with the probabilities; it is a divinely sponsored collaboration in the transmission and application of the truths of the solution; it is a mystery in the threefold sense of psychic force, of sign, and of symbol; it moves from an initial emergent trend through a basic realization and consequent development to the attainment of an ulterior goal; it is operative through conjugate forms of faith, hope, and charity, that enable man to achieve sustained development on the human level inasmuch as they

reverse the priority of living over the knowledge needed to guide life and over the good will needed to follow knowledge; it is a new and higher integration of human activity that, in any case, involves some transcendence of human ways and, possibly, complicates the dialectic by adding to the inner conflict between attachment and detachment in man the necessity of man's going quite beyond his humanity to save himself from disfiguring and distorting it.111

While this obviously describes the Catholic church and its tradition,

Lonergan does not make the connection other than for himself in the

concluding Epilogue, and rather admits that "the task of identifying the
solution is not the same for all." Now on the one hand, one can

see that the essence of Lonergan's program for ethics in <u>Insight</u> arises

out of the first eighteen chapters which...

were written solely in the light of human intelligence and reasonableness and without any pre-supposition of God's existence, without any appeal to the authority of the church, and without any explicit deference to the genius of St. Thomas Aquinas. 113

But on the other hand, this final solution or higher integration is not unrelated to the natural movement of human intelligence and reasonableness, for the detached, disinterested desire to know orients man to the known unknown in the conjugate forms of faith, hope, and love.

we are led to distinguish between natural solutions, relatively supernatural solutions, and absolutely supernatural solutions. All three types would have the common feature that they provide solutions to man's problem of evil. But the natural solutions would not offer to faith any truths that man could not discover for himself through the development of his own understanding; they would not offer to hope more than the natural immortality that can be deduced from the spirituality of the human soul, and the knowledge of God that is consequent upon the separation of the immortal soul from the mortal body; they would not offer to charity more than the perfection of a total, self-sacrificing

love in a creature for his or her creator. In the relatively supernatural solutions, man's natural capacities cease to set a limiting rule; the object of faith includes truths that man could not reach through the development of his understanding; the object of hope is a knowledge of God beyond the appropriate attainment of an immortal soul; and charity is the more abundant response to a more indulgent beneficence. Still, all such solutions are only relatively supernatural, for though they go beyond the measure set by human nature, still there are other possible creatures, more excellent than man, for whom they would be natural solutions. Finally, there are the absolutely supernatural solutions. Conceived negatively, they are absolutely supernatural, because there is no possible creature for which they would be the natural solutions. Conceived positively, they are absolutely supernatural, because their sole ground and measure is the divine nature itself. Then faith includes objects beyond the natural reach of any finite understanding. Then hope is for a vision of God that exhausts the unrestricted desire of intelligence. Then charity is the transport. the ecstasy and unbounded intimacy that result from the communication of the absolute love that is God himself and alone can respond to the vision of God. 114

This movement by conjugate forms to higher integrations "is a harmonious continuation of the present order of the universe." The assent of faith is merely its starting point; its transcendence of humanism not a displacement but its fulfillment in terms of the upward dynamism of the pure detached desire by which "humanism will lead beyond itself." But it calls forth an entirely new level of development, which one might call that of religious consciousness or awareness. Lonergan in Insight just briefly alludes to it and its implications for living in his epilogue:

The advent of the absolutely supernatural solution to man's problem of evil adds to man's biological, psychic, and intellectual levels of development a fourth level that includes the higher conjugate forms of faith,

hope, and charity. If follows that now the four considerations regard not three but four levels of develoment.

Considered in themselves, faith, hope, and charity consitute an absolutely supernatural living that advances towards an absolutely supernatural goal under the action of divine grace.

Considered in their relation to other human intellectual and volitional activities,

- they are anticipated inasmuch as rational self-consciousness adverts to its need for the divine solution of its problem of evil,
- (2) they constitute a dialectical higher integration inasmuch as they make possible the sustained development of rational self-consciousness by reversing counter-positions through faith and by overcoming evil through the firmness of hope and through the generosity of charity, and
- (3) they call forth their own development inasmuch as they give rise to an advance of the understanding, knowledge, and wisdom, by which man apprehends, appreciates, and applies the divine solution to human living in all its aspects. 117

The significance of another possible level of development will become more apparent as we look to the ethical and religious perspectives found in Lonergan's later Method in Theology.

Section C - Background and Observations to the Ethics of Insight

While we have, to a large degree, followed Lonergan's moving viewpoint in <u>Insight</u> in terms of summary and description, we must attempt
as well some explanation and reflection as to both the context and
significance of the project Insight represents.

From our ethically oriented perspective it is not inappropriate to hearken back to Newman's <u>Grammar of Assent</u> which Lonergan read six times as a young philosopher at Heythrop College and which probably provided him

inspiration to become a cognitional theorist. Newman wrote:

My only business is to ascertain what I am, in order to put it to use. It is enough for the proof of the value and authority of a function which I possess, to be able to pronounce that it is natural.

As Newman undertook with such care to discover upon what terms inference became sufficiently apprehended for real assent (Lonergan likens his reflective act of understanding to Newman's "illative sense" 119), so Lonergan undertook to discover upon what "natural" terms and by what "natural" operations the true and the good could be known. To do so in precise fashion, involved reaching up to the mind of St. Thomas Aquinas and, more generally, to recover the essential movement of heart and mind in the Catholic theological tradition. This was his task, given his orientation towards cognitional theory, in Gratia Operans and most especially in Verbum. 120 For those of us viewing that tradition from without rather than from within, it is important to appreciate some of the fundamental orientations of that tradition:

Aristotle opened his <u>Metaphysics</u> with the remark that naturally all men desire to know. But Aquinas measured that desire to find in the undying restlessness and absolute exigence of the human mind that intellect as intellect is infinite, that <u>ipsum</u> esse is <u>ipsum</u> <u>intelligere</u> and uncreated, unlimited Light, that though our intellects because potential cannot attain naturally to the vision of God, still our intellects as intellects have a dynamic orientation, a natural desire, that nothing short of that unknown vision can satisfy utterly. For Augustine our hearts are restless until they rest in God; for Aquinas, not our hearts, but first and most our minds are restless until they rest in seeing Him. 121

This sense, especially in Aquinas, in which the human mind is a created participation in the divine mind is absolutely central to appreciate

Lonergan's orientation in cognitional theory. Following the Aristotelian tradition whereby knowing is by perfection, act, and identity, Lonergan in Verbum distinguished it from the Platonist tradition, Duns Scotus, and right down through contemporary dogmatic realists who typically take the position that knowing is a confrontation of the intellect with reality. This confrontational view of knowledge which is characterized in Insight as the mistaken analogy in terms of which knowing is thought to be a matter of "taking a look," is countered by the Thomistic account of knowledge by identity which follows upon the psychological facts ascertained by reflecting on one's own acts of understanding:

But being is not just one thing, with knowing quite another. We know by what we are; we know by knowing what we are; and since even the knowing in "knowing what we are" is by what we are, rational reflection on ourselves is a duplication of ourselves.

This identity of knowing and the known is expressed in <u>Insight</u> as the isomorphism between knowing and the known. Lonergan follows Aquinas's scientific thematization of Augustine's discovery within interiority of a <u>verbum intus prolatum</u> which, as neither language, memory, apprehension of objects or rationality, is instead an "inner word" grounded in intellect's presence to self: the mind's self-expression in concept and judgment. This inner word, which constitutes the meaning of <u>verbum prolatum</u>, has its origin in what Aristotle called "insight into phantasm" (the act of intellect being an insight, the object and mover of intellect being phantasm) and which begins with the question, <u>quod quid est</u>? in wonder about data (<u>Insight</u>'s Level I), and proceeds to the search for causes. The inner word proceeds from and is caused by

insight's grasp of an object: it expresses the content of the act of understanding (Insight's Level II). The apprehension of intelligibility (the answer to the question, quid sit?) does not stop with insight; but insight comes into fuller possession of itself by an emanatio intelligibilis, namely, the conception, definition, formulation, hypothesis. Then it asks an sit?, and attains a reflective act of understanding (Insight's Level III) "which is a grasp of necessary connection between the sources and the hypothetical synthesis; from this grasp there proceeds its self-expression which is the compositio vel divisio, the judgment, the assent" (by a second emanatio intelligibilis).

Acts of both direct and reflective understanding are governed, according to Aquinas, by the habits of intellect and wisdom respectively. 127 The habit called intellect is the capacity to grasp causes, while the habit wisdom is the capacity to judge such causes rightly and ultimately. By right judgment, the mind reaches the true and the real. And the reason it can truly know the real, is that the mind can know itself, the nature of its knowledge, and the method to be employed for reflection:

Just as Thomist thought is an ontology of knowledge inasmuch as intellectual light is referred to its origin in uncreated light, so too it is more than an embryonic epistemology inasmuch as intellectual light reflectively grasps its own nature and the commensuration of that nature to the universe of reality. 128

This self-knowledge, as it moves through presence to itself, understanding of itself, and judgment on its understanding, produces normative knowledge:

The most nuanced account of this is to be found in the <u>De Veritate</u>, where three types of self-knowledge are distinguished. There is the empirical

self-knowledge, actual or habitual, based upon the soul's presence to itself; there is the scientific and analytic self-knowledge that proceeds from objects to acts, from acts to potencies, from potencies to essence; but besides this pair with which we are already familiar, there is also a third. It lies in the act of judgment which passes from the conception of essence to the affirmation of reality. Still, it is concerned not with this or that soul, but with what any soul ought to be according to the eternal reasons; and so the reality of soul that is envisaged is not sorry achievement but dynamic norm. Now knowledge of the norm, of the ought-to-be, cannot be had from what merely happens to be and, too often, falls far short of the norm. Normative knowledge has to rest upon the eternal reasons. But this resting, Aquinas explained, is not a vision of God but a participation and similitude of Him by which we grasp first principles and judge all things, by examining them in the light of principles.

It is self-knowledge, and therefore self-knowledge of the dynamic norm of knowing, that is the psychology which issues into metaphysics in Aquinas and, somewhat similarly, in Insight.

Lonergan's study of the concept of <u>verbum</u> was drawn from Aquinas' trinitarian theory in which the analysis of rational consciousness and its "inner word" led to the analogy of the procession of the Divine Word. Similarly, Aquinas used an analysis of the act of love within the will for an analogy of the procession of the Holy Spirit:

he argued that in everyone who understands there must also be a will: secondly, he showed that the basic act, to which all other acts of will are to be reduced, is love; thirdly, he pointed out the difference between the presence of the beloved in the intellect and his presence in the will of the lover; in the intellect he is present "per similitudinem speciei;" in the will he is present dynamically, as the term of 30 movement in the movement's proportionate principle.

This identification of love as the term of a movement is important, since the act of love is to the will as the act of understanding is to the intellect (as perfection to its perfectible). 131

What Aquinas held is quite clear. In us there is a procession of love from the will, but that is processio operationis and irrelevant to trinitarian theory. In us there is a procession of one act of love from another, but also is irrelevant to trinitarian theory. In us there is a procession of love from the inner word and, as Aquinas very frequently repeated, that is the procession that is relevant to trinitarian theory... The act of will is caused partially by the will and partially by the object presented by the intellect; in confirmation the intention of Augustine is adduced that amor procedit a mente and this is followed up by the contention that if the object is only sine qua non to the act of love, then the Word is only sine qua non to the procession of the Holy Spirit. 132

While intelligence in act produces the inner word of understanding, volition in act is moved by the inner word of intellect. In this sense, Aquinas defines the will as a "rational appetite," and his notion of the good is what reason pronounces to be good:

Natural appetite is blind; sensitive appetite is spontaneous; but rational appetite can be moved only by the good that reason pronounces good. Because of the necessity of intelligible procession from intellect to will, sin is not act in the will but failure to act; it is failure to will to do the good that is commanded, or it is failure to will to inhibit tendencies that are judged to be wrong.

This framework can be seen as essentially that of <u>Insight</u>, where will is an intellectual or spiritual appetite which seeks the good as intelligible and therefore reachable as the object of rational choice. Similarly, sin is a failure of the will — either to act, to respond to the command (of intellect), or to inhibit tendencies (e.g. biases,

repression) that have been judged to be wrong. And finally, Aquinas' trinitarian theory, developed on the analogy of the psychological processions proper to the human drive to understand, to have no rest until it rests in God and sees him as he is, ¹³⁴ gives us the definition of God as "an infinite and substantial act of understanding" ¹³⁵ which becomes the "unrestricted act of understanding" of <u>Insight</u>.

Lonergan made another significant retrieval of Aquinas in his doctoral dissertation <u>Gratia Operans</u>, and that too becomes an important contributor to <u>Insight</u>. As a study of the theoretic horizons of medieval theology, Lonergan followed Aquinas' development of a theology of grace built upon St. Augustine's counter to the Pelagian position on grace:

Augustine countered with a parallel distinction between divine operation and divine cooperation. It was a complete and perfect answer. God cooperates with good will to give it good performance; but alone he operates on bad will to make it good; so that good will itself no less than good performance is to be attributed to the divine gift of grace. To pluck out our heart of stone and substitute a heart of flesh is, indeed, a divine operation; and since our heart of stone neither desires nor deserves such a transformation, Deus sine nobis operatur...Thus God operates to initiate us in the spiritual life, and he cooperates to bring us to perfection; alone he works to give us good desires, and together with our good desires he labours to give us good performance.

But in later theology, distinctions began to be drawn between an idea of grace as <u>naturalis</u> and <u>gratuita</u>. For Aquinas, at issue was <u>gratia</u> operans as an instance of divine transcendence, and the question of the extent of human freedom. For Lonergan, the key to Aquinas' development was his appropriation of Aristotle's notion of the good as the actual acquiring of the "virtues" or right habits. Aquinas, while distinguishing

grace from the virtues, essentially finds the virtues to have their origin in grace and to be the effects of grace. 137 They are natural inclinations, both acquired and infused. But different graces can be distinguished; there is habitual grace (which translates good intentions into good performance) and actual grace (which initiates or moves us into the spiritual life by giving good will). 138 Each of these graces (habit or motion) are both operative and cooperative (as Lonergan described freedom in Insight):

A grace may be either a habit or a motion, but both habits and motions may be operative, and both may be cooperative. For grace operates inasmuch as the soul is purely passive; it cooperates inasmuch as the soul is both passive and active.

Now there are two kinds of human acts, interior and exterior. With regard to the former, the will is purely passive, notably when a will, formerly evil, is made good; with regard to the latter, the will is not only passive but also active, and so grace cooperates. In this fashion, grace as a motion is divided into operative and cooperative.

On the other hand, habitual grace like any other form has two effects, esse and operari. Accordingly, inasmuch as habitual grace cures or justifies the soul or makes it acceptable to God, it is said to be operative. But inasmuch as it is a principle of meritorious acts, it is cooperative.

What a man needs is a "greater actuation of human potency," but the question is whether doing this by divine interference would not really just leave man as bad as he had been. Thomas opted in the direction of a connaturality of man to God, a natural desire of man to love God, that oriented man to the heart of God just as, in terms of knowing, he is oriented to the mind of God. The means of perfecting man to God begins "with an insistence on the immanent perfection of the virtues; it ends with a nuanced theory in which the transcendent perfection of God is

communicated to man through the double channel of immanent virtues and transient motions." The question as to how active such virtues can become, is a matter of proportion:

... the term, proportion, takes on an increasing significance as the actus basing the proposition increases. Thus, God, the angels and men are all proportionate to the true and the good, for all are rational beings. But in God this proposition is such that divine operation cannot be defective; in the angels it implies only that for the most part the operation will not fail; while in man it gives a mere possibility with no guarantee of success, so that for the most part men do what is wrong. Nevertheless, give man the virtues and in place of the statistical law governing humanity one will have an approximation to the statistical law governing the angels. Man endowed with the virtues becomes an agens perfectum and, for the most part, does what is right; a will adorned with the virtue of justice performs just deeds with the spontaneity and the regularity with which fire moves upwards.

But do these virtues in fact limit man's freedom -- to do good or to sin? The question is one of human nature, and the freedom of the will (not the freedom of man) to follow or not to follow the "inner word" of intellect:

Why is the will free? Because it is not determined by the intellect and because it does determine itself. Why has man free will? Because man has an intellect that arrives contingently at different courses of action. Finally, why are there free creatures? Because there is an universe in which different courses of action are objectively possible. Thus the first cause is the objective possibility of different courses of action; the second cause is the intellect that knows this objective possibility; and the pro-ximate cause is the will that selects, not because determined by the intellect, but through its own self-motion.

But does the freedom of the will not limit God's infallible knowledge, His irresistible will, and His absolutely efficacious actions? The answer is to be found in what Lonergan called Thomas' three-lane highway, in which he distinguished between what God wills to happen, what He wills not to happen, and what He permits to happen. 144 The matter of man's sin does not reduce the divine design; it is an instance of man's withdrawing from the ordinance of divine intellect which informs his will. But God can both directly and indirectly orient the will to its ends; he controls the situations which intellect apprehends; he indirectly controls the determinants of intellectual attitude, mood, and temperament; he controls the time which gives man the opportunity to will; "there is no end of room for God to work on the free choice without violating it": 145

God's knowledge is infallible, His will irresistible, His action efficacious. He exercises control through the created antecedents — true enough; but that is not the infallible, the irresistible the efficacious, which has its ground not in the creature but in the uncreated, which has its moment not in time but in the cooperation of eternal uncreated action with created and temporal action. Again, the antecedents per se always incline to the right and good. But the consequent act may be good or it may be sinful: if it is good, all the credit is God's, and the creature is only His instrument; but if it is evil, then inasmuch as it is sin as such, it is a surd (preceded, indeed, by a divine permission which is infallible without being a cause or a non-cause), and so in the causal order a first for which the sinner alone is responsible.

In the end, Lonergan finds a notable parallel between habitual grace and actual grace as operative and cooperative, for in both cases operative grace changes the radical orientation of the will, and then the changed will responds in a new way to the apprehensions of intellect. 147 In habitual grace, divine operation infuses the habit and it becomes cooperation when man effectively utilizes the habit to free acts. The

habits (e.g. prudence, justice, temperance, fortitude) perfect the faculties in which they inhere. They improve human action, but do not improve man himself. In a sense, they are preparatory to justification. But in actual grace, divine operation "effects the will of the end to become cooperation when this will of the end leads to an efficacious choice of means." But the radical re-orientation of the will in this case is seen as supernatural, in the sense that God moves the will "to a special end" by the gift of conversion resulting in charity. 150 The term generally employed is conversion; the perfect conversion of the beatific vision, the meritorious conversion of habitual grace, the preparatory conversion. But actual grace still aides the efficacious choice of means; as well as acts of faith, servile fear, and hope that may precede justification. 152 In both cases, man is always an instrument, for his volitional activity is deployed in two phases; in the first he is governed (divine, operative), and in the second he governs (divine/ human, cooperative).

To bring these recollections conclusively to bear on the Lonergan of <u>Insight</u>, perhaps it would be well to point to Aristotle's wonder, Aquinas' natural desire to know God by his essence, and Lonergan's pure desire to know as <u>natural inclinations</u> immanent in man. There is a potency or restlessness in man to know God -- and Lonergan, with Aquinas, would say that this is an operative form of grace which originates with God. But as such, it is mere possibility; it respects man's freedom and it does not dominate human consciousness. The surd of sin, the overall problem of evil, can still incapacitate it -- although <u>not destroy</u> it. Yet man can and does cooperate with God in the pure desire, in

which case it can, to a limited degree, issue into good performance. Insight we would understand that this happens either through a spontaneous adverting to the pure desire, or through a conscious sensing, understanding, judging, and appropriation of it as the normative principle in one's living. Such adverting brings about a transcendence, but a limited transcendence which cannot sustain development. Man's moral impotence is revealed in the obvious restrictions upon his effective As Aquinas said, "for the most part the operation will fail." The only solution, as sought by the pure desire, is the higher integration which Lonergan identified in Insight as the relatively and absolutely supernatural solutions. Both these solutions, as they transform one by a knowledge of God through the conjugates of faith, hope, and charity, cannot be reached merely through man's development of understanding. They are clear gifts of grace as sanans (healing the natural inclinations in man which cannot develop because of biases, prejudices, etc.) which initiates us into the spiritual life by giving us good will. Good will, as realized through the supernatural virtues of faith, hope, and charity ("give man the virtues...") enables man to cooperate with God as an "agent of perfection." In this state, man, said Aquinas, "for the most part does what is right" through a special transcendence, through a knowing and a willing which is disproportionate to human knowing and willing. Yet this is still within the progression that follows the objective of the pure desire, which moves one from lower to higher integrations in the natural, relatively supernatural, and absolutely supernatural solutions to the problem of evil. It is in this sense that the solutions maintain a "harmonious continuation of the

actual order of the universe" but by a new and higher collaboration not simply of men with one another, but basically by "man's cooperation with God in solving man's problem of evil." 153

The cognitional theory of knowledge by identity, and especially with the mind's ability to know itself (Insight's introspective mode of understanding) is in total contrast to prevailing cognitional theories in which there is a sense of confrontation or detachment of the mind from the reality it seeks to comprehend -- hence Lonergan's characterization of them in Insight as "taking a look." Such theories are the result of oversight of the basic psychological fact of the act of insight. To grasp the presence, nature, activity and significance of this act was Lonergan's achievement as a retrieval of Aquinas in Verbum, and as a thoroughly developed cognitional theory in Insight. In contrast, Kant identifies the knowing of objects (a posteriori) only through Anschauung (intuition) on the immediate level of Empfindung (pure sense knowledge) and all other knowing (Verstand & Vernunft) are qualified as being reality-for-us. Lonergan roots objectivity in the performing subject who, through the "direct insight" of intelligent consciousness, and the "reflective insight" (judgment) of rational consciousness, reaches absolute objectivity by which the subjectivity of our mere experience is transcended in knowledge about real things in relation to other things or of real things in relation to our senses (common sense knowledge). The a priori, according to Lonergan, is the cognitional structure of our consciousness:

> The questions we ask "invest" the data, and only then does the data mediate reality to us, a reality which is first intended and only subsequently

known... The manifestation of reality is possible because the question, in that anticipating movement which constitutes it as question, already has the meaning of reality; without this primordial knowledge, which is of the essence of spirit in so far as spirit is being in its luminousness, and hence meaningful to itself, the datum could not be revealed to us as reality. 154

The <u>a priori</u> of the question, and the <u>a posteriori</u> of the data, give rise to the insight, the act of understanding, which grasps the intelligibility in the sensible, becoming one with it so that the subject/object split so typical of the "confrontation" theories of cognition is overcome.

While Lonergan's cognitional theory accounts for the human cognitional structure that produces knowledge about being, it is of even greater significance to ethics in that it grounds the principles of metaphysics as basically a <u>structure</u> which "is latent and operative in everyone's knowing, it is universal on the side of the subject." Insight begins to reveal not only...

...the objective pole of the total horizon but also ... the method of performing which thematized and made explicit, reveals the subjective pole in its full and proper stature.

This rooting of metaphysics in the performance of the subject Lonergan shares with those associated with J. Maréchal and the transcendantal method, 157 including Johannes Lotz and Karl Rahner. But Lonergan sees metaphysics for ethics as grounding, at the <u>subjective</u> pole of the inquirer, "a dialectical criticism of subjects" that can take subjects as they are, invoke dialectical criticism to bring fundamental orientations into agreement, and apply such agreement to the whole concrete domain

of proportionate being:

For the root of ethics, as the root of metaphysics, lies neither in sentences nor in propositions nor in judgments but in the dynamic structure of rational self-consciousness. Because that structure is latent and operative in everyone's choosing, it is universal on the side of the subject; because that structure can be dodged, it grounds a dialectical criticism of subjects. Again, because that structure is recurrent in every act of choice, it is universal on the side of the object; and because its universality consists not in abstraction but in inevitable recurrence, it also is concrete. Accordingly, ethical method, as metaphysical, can take subjects as they are; it can correct any aberration in their views by a dialectical criticism, and it can apply these corrected views to the totality of concrete objects of choice. Such a method not only sets forth precepts but also bases them on their real principles, which are not propositions or judgments but existing persons, it not only sets forth correct precepts but also provides a radical criticism for mistaken percepts; it is not content to appeal to logic for the application of precepts, for it can criticize situations as well as subjects and it can invoke dialectical analysis to reveal how situations are to be corrected; finally, because such a method clearly grasps an unchanging dynamic structure immanent in developing subjects that deal with changing situations in correspondingly changing manners, it can steer a sane course between the relativism of mere concreteness and the legalism of remote and static generalities; and it can do so not by good luck nor by vaguely postulating prudence but methodically because it takes its stand on the ever recurrent dynamic generality that is the structure of rational self-consciousness.

It is this vision of the ethical functioning of metaphysics on the side of the subject, which leads us to call <u>Insight</u> an "Ethics of Metaphysics." It is rooted in performance, in the methodological structure latent and operative in everyone's choosing. As performance, it criticizes both the choosing subject and the situation whithin which he chooses. This means, on the side of the object, that what is universal is the

inevitably recurrent intelligibility of situations and things, given the universal dynamic structure operative within each and every choosing subject. Situations and contexts may and do vary, but the understanding grasps similarities in situations, prescinding from the empirical residue. What is true and good is understood, judged, and chosen. But what can be known as universal on the side of the subject is the normative principle governing one's inquiring and choosing; what can be known as universal on the side of the object is the indication from emergent possibility of "the universal order that is to be." Such universals are therefore known as recurrent in concrete instances of actually knowing and choosing, rather than through prior knowledge of the universal which is then "applied" to the particular instance. And if there is anything "static" in Lonergan's methodical ethics of metaphysics, it is not any universal propositions but it is only the universal principle governing one's inquiring and choosing. It remains fundamentally a system on the move: Man is always potency in the realm of the intellect.

Perhaps the image of cosmopolis captures best Lonergan's sense of the actual functioning of social ethics. For cosmopolis is once again a description of ethics as performance. Its thrust is toward knowing, and a doing fully informed by a knowing. Its greatest contribution is its distinction between common sense knowing and scientific knowing, and the need for collaboration between the two for the sake of progress and development. The distinction between the two in terms of things in relation to us and things in relation to themselves once again prevents possible misapplication of any universal to a particular through

the call for collaboration of the practical common sense of, say, the group to the abstract discoveries and understandings of a science which may be applied to it. Each specialization of intelligence, one with respect to the particular and concrete, the other with respect to abstract and universal intelligibility, need and complement the other both in terms of generation of knowledge and in terms of application and implementation. Once again, the dynamic structure of knowing governs the differentiated methodological procedures of collective knowing. But universals do emerge recurrently, through emergent possibility. The real challenge inherent in cosmopolis, however, is not to follow history through recurrent possibilities, but to anticipate and control history through the discovery of and cooperation with emergent probability. For every concrete possibility may be factually apprehended in terms of natural laws and actual frequencies. Such a vision is again, not of an ideal and static society or civilization, but of collaborative intelligence on the move -- realizing instances of the universal in concrete particular situations.

In all of the projects of <u>Insight</u>, it is very clear that becoming aware of, appropriating, and following the "pure detached disinterested desire to know" as it moves through the various acts of understanding, is central. As in Aquinas, the intellect is the critical faculty which, when given ascendancy, can give direction and government to the other faculties. Within intelligence are the immanent and universal norms, and these norms can govern all of one's knowing and doing:

For genetically one mounts from empirical to intellectual consciousness, from intellectual to rational consciousness, and from rational consciousness to rational self-consciousness. As long as one is moving towards full selfpossession, the detached and disinterested desire to know tends to be in control. But once one is in the state of rational selfconsciousness, then one's decisions are in control, for they set the objective of one's total activity and select the actions that are to lead to the goal. So it is that a person, caught as it were unawares, may be ready for any scheme or exploit but, on the second thoughts of rational self-consciousness, settles back into the narrow routine defined by his antecedent willingness. For unless one's antecedent willingness has the height and breadth and depth of the unrestricted desire to know, the emergence of rational self-consciousness involves the addition of a restriction upon one's effective freedom. 159

The unrestricted desire to know, which is the fundamental exigence towards transcendence, seeks the development and the higher integration that brings about progress. As differentiated from "other desires", it, especially in scientific understanding, can interfere with the natural progression of the desire to know and result in "errors about reality." However, in speaking of the dramatic pattern of experience (which is the pattern which incorporates all other patterns, including the intellectual), Lonergan suggests the role of such other desires to be in appropriate combinations of the various images and affects —patterns in consciousness that "emerge already charged emotionally and conatively." Such patterns typically motivate one's living under the pressure of "elementive purposiveness," and can be both non-conscious and intermittently conscious. But they must be excluded from the intellectual pattern; and so they are excluded to a large degree from

<u>Insight</u>, which was written from within the intellectual pattern. Consequently, Lonergan tells us that...

...it will not be amiss to assert emphatically that the identification of being and the good bypasses human feelings and sentiments to take its stand exclusively upon intelligible order and rational value. ¹⁶¹

The final chapter of <u>Insight</u>, however, is an exception to this general rule. Here Lonergan speaks about the transformation in consciousness that comes about when "the man of good will is in love with God." This regard for the beloved is, in fact, the order of the universe which "is in love with God," and it is realized in concrete instances for "the man of good will is in love with God." 162 In what is an instance of actual grace as operative, the man of bad will is transformed into a man of good will; and by actual grace as cooperative, that man cooperates with the "laws of the spirit" in activating his cognitional and volitional operations. The conjugate forms of faith, hope, and charity orient the unrestricted desire towards the unrestricted act of understanding -- God. Such a description of religious consciousness is obviously affect-laden, and involves a whole new set of psychic determinants. What would seem to differentiate affect on this level (religious consciousness) as opposed to any other level, is that it is oriented (rather than disoriented) to the pure and unrestricted desire. As in Aristotle, Lonergan sees movement towards the absolute, the universal, as transcending egoism and altruism. Pure love would then be a well ordered regard for all things under God. It would displace the "other desires" which render intelligence selfish and so collapse the tension of limitation and transcendence. By the affect of love, it

would seem, we are not naturally but only supernaturally oriented to God. Its context within the will, as opposed to the intellect, tends to make it blind to all things not in line with the orientation of the pure unrestriced desire.

One other aspect that appears in the final chapter of <u>Insight</u>, but which has its origin and elaboration for Lonergan in the <u>Gratia Operans</u> articles, is what God has been doing about the fact of evil. The re-orientation of the will towards God so as to meet evil with good, to love the enemy, to pray for the persecutor, is basically "to love all men with a self-sacrificing love." This re-orientation or transformation of the will which is the mark of religious consciousness, would seem to be what Lonergan in <u>De Verbo Incarnato</u> refers to as the "law of the <u>cross."</u> As one ordering of the many orderings of divine justice, the law of the cross brings forth good from evil to repair the <u>malum culpae</u> which God does not will but only permits. This understanding of redemption, which is not a human, but only a divine and gratuitous solution to the problem of living would seem present although understandably unelaborated in <u>Insight's</u> notion of self-sacrificing love.

Having moved through <u>Insight</u> and backward through some of Lonergan's earlier works, we now must shift to a new starting point -- Lonergan's post-<u>Insight</u> works -- and outline the ethical perspective which he developed in them.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER I

Lonergan, B.J.F. - <u>Insight: A Study of Human Understanding</u> (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957). Designated hereafter as <u>Insight</u>.

²<u>Ibid</u>. p. xxviii

3 <u>Ibid</u>. p. xvii

⁴<u>Ibid</u>. p. 3

⁵<u>Ibid</u>. p. 4

6_{Ibid}.

7<u>Ibid</u>. p. 74

8<u>Ibid</u>. p. 73

9<u>Ibid</u>. p. 11

10<u>Ibid.</u> p. 79

¹¹<u>Ibid</u>. p. 13-16

12<u>Ibid</u>. p. 19

13<u>Ibid</u>. p. 25-32

¹⁴Ibid. p. 45

15<u>Tbid</u>. p. 175

16<u>Ibid</u>. p. 176

17_{Ibid}. p. 178

18<u>Ibid</u>. p. 181

19 Ibid.

22 see Tracy, D. - The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970). p. 116, footnote # 31.

25_{Ibid}.

26<u>Ibid</u>. p. 191-3

27_{Ibid}. p. 211

28_{Ibid}. p. 212

²⁹<u>Ibid</u>. p. 213

30<u>Ibid</u>. p. 215

31<u>Ibid</u>. p. 221

32<u>Ibid</u>. p. 223

33_{Ibid}. p. 229

34<u>Ibid</u>. p. 234

35<u>Ibid</u>. p. 236

36<u>Ibid</u>. p. 238

37<u>Ibid</u>. p. 227

38_{Ibid}.

³⁹<u>Ibid</u>. p. 246

- 40<u>Ibid</u>. p. 252
- 41<u>Ibid</u>. p. 267
- 42<u>Ibid</u>. p. 274
- 43<u>Ibid</u>. p. 280
- 44<u>Ibid</u>. p. 281-2
- 45<u>Ibid</u>. p. 318
- 46_{Ibid}. p. 322
- 47_{Ibid}. p. 325
- 48<u>Ibid</u> p. 328
- 49<u>Ibid</u>. p. 331
- ⁵⁰<u>Ibid</u>. p. 350
- ⁵¹<u>Ibid</u> p. 356
- 52<u>Ibid</u>. p. 358
- ⁵³<u>Ibid</u>. p. 377
- ⁵⁴<u>Ibid</u>. p. 376
- ⁵⁵Ibid. p. 377
- ⁵⁶<u>Ibid</u>. p. 390
- ⁵⁷<u>Ibid.</u> p. 385
- ⁵⁸<u>Ibid</u>. p. 389
- ⁵⁹<u>Ibid</u>. p. 388
- 60<u>Ibid</u>. p. 391

- 61<u>Ibid</u>. p. 397
- 62<u>Ibid</u>. p. 401
- 63<u>Ibid</u>. p. 400
- 64<u>Ibid</u>. p. 432
- 65_{Ibid}. p. 436
- 66_{Ibid}. p. 459
- 67<u>Ibid</u>. p. 470
- 68<u>Ibid</u>. p. 473
- 69<u>Ibid</u>. p. 477
- 70_{Ibid}. p. 467
- 71_{Ibid}. p. 535
- 72_{Ibid}. p. 537
- 73_{Ibid}. p. 547
- 74_{Ibid}. p. 555
- ⁷⁵<u>Ibid</u>. p. 558
- 76_{Ibid}. p. 561
- 77<u>Ibid</u>. p. 565
- 78_{Ibid}. p. 596
- 79_{Ibid}.
- 80<u>Ibid</u>. p. 598
- 81<u>Ibid</u>. p. 599

```
82<u>Ibid</u>. p. 601
```

83<u>Ibid</u>. p. 602

84<u>Ibid</u>. p. 602, 618.

85<u>Ibid</u>. p. 603

86 Ibid.

87<u>Ibid</u>. p. 605

⁸⁸Ibid. p. 606

89_{Ibid}.

90 <u>Ibid</u>. p. 607

91 See Lonergan's exploration of operative and cooperative grace in "St. Thomas' thought on <u>Gratia Operans"</u> in <u>Theological Studies</u> 2 (1941) pp. 289-324; 3 (1942), pp. 69-88, pp. 375-402, and pp. 533-78. Collected in Burns, J.P. (ed) <u>Grace and Freedom</u>, (New York: Herder & Herder, 1971) p. 143. Designated below as <u>Grace and Freedom</u>.

92<u>Insight</u>, p. 623

93<u>Ibid</u>. p. 600

94<u>Ibid</u>. p. 610

95<u>Ibid</u>. p. 617

96<u>Ibid</u>. p. 613

97_{Ibid. p. 619}

98<u>Ibid</u>. p. 618

99<u>Ibid</u>. p. 625

100_{Ibid}. p. 629

- ¹⁰¹<u>Ibi</u>d. p. 632
- 102<u>Ibid</u>. p. 672
- 103<u>Ibid</u>. p. 684
- 104<u>Ibid</u>. p. 687
- 105_{Ibid}. p. 673
- 106_{Ibid}. p. 689
- 107_{Ibid}. p. 691
- 108<u>Ibid</u>. p. 699
- 109<u>Ibid</u>. p. 698
- 110 <u>Ibid</u>. p. 708
- 111<u>Ibid</u>. p. 729
- 112<u>Ibid</u>. p. 730
- 113_{Ibid}. p. 744
- 114_{Ibid}. p. 726-7
- 115 Ibid. p. 726
- 116_{Ibid}. p. 728
- 117_{Ibid}. p. 741
- Newman, J.H.- The Grammar of Assent. (New York: Doubleday & Co. 1955). p. 273.
- 119 Lonergan, B.J.F. "Insight Revisited" in <u>A Second Collection</u> ed. W.F.J. Ryan & B.J. Tyrrell. (Philadephia: Westminster Press, 1974) p. 263 Designated hereafter as <u>Second Collection</u>.

Published originally in <u>Theological Studies</u> 7 (1946) pp. 49-92; 8 (1947) pp. 37-76, and pp. 404-44; 10 (1949) pp. 3-40, and pp. 359-93. Collected in Burrell, D.B. (ed) <u>Verbum</u>: <u>Word and Idea in Aquinas</u> (Notre Dame: U. of Notre Dame Press, 1967). Designated below as <u>Verbum</u>.

```
121<sub>Ibid</sub>. p. 89-90
```

$$124$$
Ibid. p. x

 $^{134}\mathrm{St.}$ Thomas Aquinas <u>Summa Theologiae</u> I-II q.3 a.8

136 Grace & Freedom p. 3

```
139<u>Ibi</u>d. p. 38
```

¹⁵⁴ See Giovanni Sala "The A Priori in Human Knowledge: Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and Lonergan's Insight," The Thomist XL (1976) p. 183.

¹⁵⁵ Insight p. 603

 $^{^{156}}$ see Lonergan, B - "Metaphysics as Horizon" in <u>Collection</u>, p. 220.

^{157&}lt;u>Ibid</u>. p. 202 ff

¹⁵⁸ Insight p. 604

- 159<u>Ibid</u>. p. 623
- 160<u>Ibid</u>. p. 183
- 161<u>Ibid</u>. p. 606
- 162_{Ibid}. p. 699
- 163 Lonergan, B.J.F. De Verbo Incarnato (ad usum auditorum). Rome: Greg. Univ. Press, 1964. 2nd edition pp. 622-31.

CHAPTER II

THE ETHICS OF METHOD: VALUE

Section A - Lonergan's Overall Project in Method

Just as Insight was not principally a book about ethics but rather a study of human understanding, so is Lonergan's Method in Theology not about ethics but rather about theology as a process which mediates between a cultural matrix and the role of religion in that matrix. It is not unlike Insight in that it asks of its readers "what they can discover in themselves as the dynamic structure of their own cognitional and moral being". 2 From the discovery of such a dynamic structure, follows the outlines of method, which is merely the "framework for collaborative creativity". But this structure includes an elaboration of both cognitional and moral being. It is also significant that Method's outline of the eight functional specialities of method in theology, presupposes the key background chapters of method, the human good, meaning, and religion. These chapters, of critical importance to ethics, give us a good indication of the "higher viewpoints" or broader horizons which have been the context of Lonergan's development since his concluding of Insight. We will try to outline this horizon as it is presented in Method, and also fill out that outline using the many articles written between Insight and Method which more fully explore particular points.

In a not dissimilar way from <u>Insight</u>, <u>Method</u> begins by appealing to both the "successful sciences" and also to the procedures of the human mind to discern a transcendental method that outlines "a basic pattern of operations employed in every cognitional enterprise". ⁴ The sciences yield a notion of method as "a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results". ⁵

The appeal to the procedures of the human mind is proposed similarly as in Insight (introspection), but with what seems at first to be a new method of analysis: intentionality. As operations have objects, so operations intend objects and, by operating, one becomes aware of the object. One becomes aware of oneself (the operating subject) at the same time, and also of one's operations. This awareness, this consciousness of object, subject, and operation, is the subjective experience that provides the context for the intentionality analysis of cognition:

In our dream states consciousness and intentionality commonly are fragmentary and incoherent. When we awake, they take on a different hue to expand on four successive, related, but qualitatively different levels. There is the empirical level on which we sense, perceive, imagine, feel, speak, move. There is an intellectual level on which we inquire, come to understand, work out the presuppositions and implications of our expression. There is the rational level on which we reflect, marshal the evidence, pass judgment on the truth or falsity, certainty or probability, of a statement. There is the responsible level on which we are concerned with ourselves, our own operations, our goals, and so deliberate about possible courses of action, evaluate them, decide, and carry out our decisions.

All the operations on these four levels are intentional and conscious.

The empirical, intellectual, and rational levels of consciousness are clearly those of <u>Insight</u> (Lonergan later reflected that what he had, in fact, been doing in <u>Insight</u> was intentionality analysis). The responsible level, while incorporating the exigency in <u>Insight</u> from knowing to doing, seems to have a distinctive content beyond the criteria of truth and certitude of the rational level:

There is a still further dimension to being human, and there we emerge as persons, meet one another in a common concern for values, seek to abolish the organization of human living on the basis of competing egoisms and to replace it by an organization on the basis of man's perceptiveness and intelligence, his reasonableness and his responsible exercise of freedom.

This fourth level Lonergan typically describes as the point at which one emerges as a person, one makes oneself what one is to be, etc. It is the point at which one is a "doer", one that "deliberates, evaluates, chooses, acts". Lonergan adverted to this description of "the existential subject" in his Aquinas lecture of 1968 where he explicitly rejected the "schematism of older faculties, such as intellect and will", for their failure to draw attention to the subject " in his key role of making himself what he is to be". 10 The more complete explanation for this movement away from the categories of faculty psychology is found in Method where, in showing the limiting denotation of categories from those of Aristotle to the modern chemist's periodic table, he suggests using "transcendentals" which as "comprehensive in connotation, unrestricted in denotation, and invariant over cultural change", are radical intendings that "go beyond what we know to seek what we do not know yet". 11 And, most significant of all, these intendings are accessible to introspective analysis within experience, while metaphysical categories, however true in themselves, are not directly given in experience.

Searching for such transcendentals, Lonergan finds in consciousness the various levels as first of all "the unfolding of a single thrust, the eros of the human spirit" which is a single transcendental intending. But within each level, there can be distinguished differing objectives to that intending:

What promotes the subject from experiential to intellectual consciousness is the desire to understand, the intention of intelligibility. What next promotes him from intellectual to rational consciousness, is a fuller unfolding of the same intention: for the desire to understand, once understanding is reached, becomes the desire to understand correctly; in other words, the intention of intelligibility, once an intelligible is

reached, becomes the intention of the right intelligible, of the true and, through truth, of reality. Finally, the intention of the intelligible, the true, the real, becomes also the intention of the good, the question of value, of what is worthwhile, when the already acting subject confronts his world and adverts to his own acting in it. 13

Now if one objectifies the content of any of these intendings, one can form the transcendental concept of that content (e.g. the content of responsible intending will give us the transcendental concept of value, of the truly good). But such concepts "can be misconceived and often are", and of far greater importance are the transcendental notions that constitute the <u>dynamism</u> of our conscious intending, "promoting us from mere experiencing towards understanding, from mere understanding towards truth and reality, from factual knowledge to responsible action". 14

Having identified the essential notion of method and the basic patterns of recurrent and related cognitional operations Lonergan is in a position to describe transcendental method as that normative pattern of operations which is not confined categorically to any field or subject, but which can envisage "any result that could be intended by the completely open transcendental notions". But he suggests that, in a sense, everyone knows and observes transcendental method to the degree that they are spontaneously attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible. But the method can be known in a significantly heightened sense as one objectifies one's consciousness, and applies one's discovered operations as intentional to one's operations as conscious in the following fourfold manner:

(1) experiencing one's experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding, (2) understanding the unity and relations of one's experienced experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding, (3) affirming the reality of one's experienced and understood experiencing,

understanding, judging, deciding and (4) deciding to operate in accord with the norms immanent in the spontaneous relatedness of one's experienced, understood, affirmed experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding. 16

This fourfold experience is a consciousness, an awareness, of one's intending -- the "object" in this case is the subject's operations. Lonergan asks the reader if these operations occur in his consciousness, and whether they occur spontaneously in the described pattern. Similar to the point in Insight where one asks "am I a knower?", one has to respond to the awareness of this intending, one begins to learn of the spontaneous structured dynamism of it, the norms present in its operations, and one has to decide whether to operate (cooperate) in accord with it. The norms or "transcendental precepts" Lonergan finds immanent within each respective level of consciousness are: (1) Be attentive (empirical level), (2) Be intelligent (intellectual level), (3) Be reasonable rational level), (4) Be responsible (responsible level). These norms, whether one is conscious of them or not or whether one has decided to cooperate with them or not, are immanent in the transcendental method of one's knowing and doing as revealed by their intendings. For transcendental method is merely "the concrete and dynamic unfolding of human attentiveness, reasonableness, and responsibility". 17 As such, when applied to a discipline such as theology, it supplies the anthropological component of its knowing. With any discipline, it provides a basic set of patterns and relations that govern the intended knowing of any object (or human subject) within the human cognitional process.

Having explicated transcendental method, Lonergan in Method next turns to an exploration of the human good as he moves towards religion

itself. It is an exploration of various components that are clearly instances of the human good in its concrete functioning. He begins, using Piaget, with an analysis of skills, and the process of learning by which a child discovers and masters basic operations in various stages of development. He describes such learning within the notion of mediation, in which the world of the infant is a world of immediacy (what is felt, touched, grasped, sucked, seen, heard -- immediately experienced) as opposed to the child and later adult whose world is increasingly mediated by meaning (what is signified or represented by image, picture, word, story, symbol, literature, etc.). Higher cultures live within this wider community of meaning whereby the memories of other men, the labors of scholars, the experience of saints, become mediated to us and can be appropriated by us. In such development, we may also become aware of differentiations within our consciousness as we become increasingly aware of ourselves, of our distinction from "the world", and of the differing patterns of our experiencing (artistic, theoretical, mystical, etc.). Awareness of our operational development, enables a proficiency for an individual, and for the learning of new operations to be put together "in new combinations to new ends". 18

As operations have their process of development, so, too, do feelings — not so much as mere physical states (fatigue, anxiety, thirst) but more as clearly intentional responses where the feelings relate us to objects, to goals. By them, "we are oriented massively and dynamically in a world mediated by meaning". They empower our accumulated set of meanings which we have learned and lived, and therefore they empower our response to living itself. As intentional responses, they regard two main classes

of objects: the agreeable/disagreeable, and values. While response to the agreeable/disagreeable is ambiguous, "response to value both carries us towards self-transcendence and selects an object for the sake of whom or of which we transcend ourselves". 20 There is also a scale of preference with respect to these values. Following Max Scheler and Dietrich von Hildebrand, Lonergan distinguishes values called vital (e.g. health, grace), social (good of the community, of order), cultural (creation, critique, and improvement of value), personal (a person's self-transcendence, in himself and inspired and invited by others), religious (the heart of meaning, of value in man's living). Our response to objects or situations representing any of these values is spontaneous, and therefore "not under the command of decision". 21 It is generally a response of surrender of self, towards something for the sake of which we transcend ourselves. However, upon critical reflection, we may wish to reinforce or curtail any value -- or modify the scale of preference -- and this can generally be done over time given attentiveness to the preferred values and objects that arouse them. Some of the feelings -- particularly those on the personal and religious level -- run very deep, literally direct one's life, and are far less open to conscious change. The supreme example is falling-in-love and being-in-love -- which is, once it occurs and for as long as it lasts, a "first principle in one's living". 22 presents itself in three different ways -- being-in-love with one's mate, children and family, -- being-in-love with one's community and society -- being-in-love with God. It is a dynamic state that promotes one to transcend oneself (surrender the self). More about it will have to be said later. Its reverse, "ressentiment" (Scheler), the constant

"re-feeling of a specific clash with someone else's value-qualities", ²³ equally can become a kind of first-principle for extended hostility, anger, indignation, hatred, and violence that therefore twists, distorts and encloses (rather than transcends) one's value-structure into self-serving egoism. In general, Lonergan suggests that it is "better to take full cognizance of one's feelings" and not "leave them in the twilight of what is conscious but not objectified". ²⁴

Lonergan then turns to explore the notion of value. It is a "transcendental notion", for it is what is intended (but not known) in questions for deliberation as to what is or is not worthwhile, what is truly as opposed to merely apparently good. 25 It is not a definable category, but rather what is being pursued or intended in questions for deliberation within one's responsible consciousness. As it is reached in specific instances, "success" is rewarded in "self-transcendence with a happy conscience" and failure with an unhappy conscience. 26 With Aristotle, Lonergan refuses to speak of ethics apart from the ethical reality of good men, "of the nature of virtue apart from the judgment of the man that possesses wisdom", 27 and therefore points out that it is only by reflection on the functioning of our intention of value within our acting, that we come to know what the notion of value is. As we become conscious and discriminating about our intending in the "drive to value", so our limited realization of it brings a disenchantment that constantly asks...

> ...whether what we are doing is worthwhile. That disenchantment brings to light the limitation in every finite achievement, the stain in every flawed perfection, the irony of soaring ambition and faltering performance. It plunges us into the height and depth of love, but it also keeps us aware of how much our loving falls short

of its aim. In brief, the transcendental notion of the good so invites, presses, harries us, that we could rest only in an encounter with a goodness completely beyond its powers of criticism. 28

When we actually make judgments of value, they will generally follow upon judgments of fact (experienced, understood, judged), through which there will be a knowledge of reality in, say, a particular situation. Between judgments of fact and judgments of value can be discerned an apprehension (through feelings) to the value in that situation. Our response, which will be more or less spontaneous, will have been filtered through our scale of value preferences and will therefore be reinforced or deprived of some of its dynamism depending upon the feelings towards values which we have appropriated. Then there will be the judgment of value itself, in which there will be a thrust towards moral self-transcendence as it can be realized by way of that particular instance. The awareness and development of these moral feelings in judgments of value head one towards

...the existential discovery, the discovery of oneself as a moral being, the realization that one not only chooses between courses of action but also thereby makes oneself an authentic human being or an unauthentic one. With that discovery, there emerges in consciousness the significance of personal value and the meaning of personal responsibility. One's judgments of value are revealed as the door to one's fulfillment or to one's loss. Experience, especially repeated experience, of one's frailty or wickedness raises the question of one's salvation and, on a more fundamental level, there arises the question of God.²⁹

To the extent that one has cultivated, enlightened, and strengthened one's moral feelings, particular judgments of value will be <u>intentionally</u> self-transcendent. One's growth and development is realized in the extent, precision, and refinement to which one's responses to value are

advancements through the scale of value preferences towards cultural, personal and religious values. But there is no supreme value which entails all the others, save

...the deep-set joy and solid peace, the power and the vigor, of being in love with God. In the measure that that summit is reached, then the supreme value is God, and other values are God's expression of his love in this world, in its aspirations, and in its goal. In the measure that one's love of God is complete, then values are whatever one loves, and evils are whatever one hates so that, in Augustine's phrase, if one loves God, one may do as one pleases, Ama Deum et fac quod vis. Then affectivity is of a single piece. Further developments only fill out previous achievement. Lapses from grace are rarer and more quickly amended.

One's growth towards ever fuller authenticity is, however, an intended and conscious growth. While one may exercise self-transcendence in the liberty of one's given horizon, there is even greater authenticity in selecting and developing one's horizon by working out what is "worth-while for one to make of oneself, and what it would be worth-while to do for one's fellow men". 31 To the extent to which one does this, one has worked out one's transcendent notion of value.

One's own experience, insights, judgments of fact and value are only a small fraction of what any civilized person actually knows and utilizes. Of far greater proportion is what one knows through the experience of others which one appropriates through belief. One's social, cultural, and religious heritage is largely appropriated through belief from a "common fund" of knowledge and values which can be communicated. As one appropriates them, one is making a judgment of value as to the usefulness of a division of labour in the acquisition of knowledge and value, the trustworthiness of its source, the decision to believe and, in the end the act of believing itself that something

is true or of value. It is in this way, Lonergan suggests, that we appropriate, to large degree, the human good.

There is, as well, a basic structure that can be discerned of the human good as a series of interrelationships between individuals in their potentialities and actuations, and cooperating groups — both as they represent a development towards ends. He outlines it in a schematization in which the good is realized, as in <u>Insight</u>, from instances of the particular good, the good of order, and value itself: 32

INDIVIDUAL		SOCIAL	ENDS
Potentiality	Actuation		
capacity, need	operation	cooperation	particular good
plasticity, perfectibility	development, skill	institution, role, task	good of order
liberty	orientation, conversion	personal relations	terminal value

The terms concluding each vertical column represent movement towards the transcendent or what the authentic person or community develops as self-transcendent by good choices. In such choosing, one is an "originating value" as one chooses true instances of the particular good, or as a society develops appropriate roles for the good of order. One is moving towards terminal values as values self-consciously chosen — at which point "originating and terminal values can coincide". The individual, this represents the achievement of moral self-transcendence in so far as that "self regularly opts, not for the merely apparent good, but for the true good", and brings about terminal value in decisions for particular goods and the good of order that are truly good. When each member of the community both wills authenticity in himself and, inasmuch as he can,

promotes it in others, then the originating values that choose and the terminal values that are chosen overlap and interlace". 35 At the root of such development are the transcendental notions which enable advancement in understanding, truthful judging, and sensitive response to values. But development is not inevitable, and failures call for a change in direction, a change for the better, which is conversion. In conversion, one "frees oneself from the unauthentic" and overlooked values are apprehended, scales of preference shift, and biases are removed as one moves "to leave one open to things as they are and to man as he should be". 36

But as there is development towards the human good for both individual and community, so is there also progress (and decline) in societies and cultures. Such progress "proceeds from originating value, from subjects being their true selves by observing the transcendental precepts, Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible". 37 As these precepts are observed, possibilities for the good advance in probability in a continuous flow that is progress. But "evaluation may be biased by an egoistic disregard of others, by a loyalty to one's own group matched by hostility to other groups, by concentrating on shortterm benefits and overlooking long-term costs". 38 Such egoism, both in the individual and the group, creates aberrations that turn progress into decline. As self-transcendence promotes progress, so its refusal as inattention, oversight, unreasonableness and irresponsibility promotes cumulative decline that is alienation. One key role that a religion which promotes self-transcendence to the point of self-sacrificing love plays, is the redemptive role of such love as "can undo the mischief of decline and restore the cumulative process of progress. 39

Having elaborated the human good, Lonergan next in Method turns to discuss "meaning" which, in persons and in their subjectivity, embodies what generates so much of human living. Lonergan draws on Max Scheler's description of "intersubjectivity" to describe the vital and spontaneous communication between persons that is the "we" that precedes even the "I-Thou" relationships. 40 There are the intentional responses previously mentioned, but of a social nature, such as community of feeling (parallel responses to the same object) and fellow feeling (a response in one effects a response in another). There are also vital responses such as psychic contagion (sharing another's emotion without adverting to its object) and emotional identification (a single stream of instinct and feeling). Now these intersubjective responses all communicate meaning, but a multiplicity of meaning rather than the univocal type of meaning of language. Linguistic meaning is objective, but meaning in a smile is intersubjective. A smile may be any meaning from welcome, to amusement, to contempt. It is known by the situation and persons surrounding it, and more than revealing an object

...it reveals or even betrays the subject, and the revelation is immediate. It is not the basis of some inference, but rather in the mile one incarnate subject is transparent or, again, midden to another, and that transparency or hiddenness antedates all subsequent analysis that speaks of body and soul, or of sign and signified.⁴¹

Lonergan turns to Susanne Langer's philosophy of art to provide a means of comprehending another mode of transfer or mediation or intersubjective meaning. In <u>Feeling and Form</u>, ⁴² art is defined as the objectification of a purely experiential pattern, a creation of forms symbolic of human feeling. The artist has to detach and distance

himself from the feeling that has transformed him, and find the elemental meaning or form that grasps, as Lonergan put it, at

...what is, or seems significant, of moment, concern, import, to man. It is truer than experience, leaner, more effective, more to the point. ...The work of art is an invitation to participate, to try it, to see for oneself...so the work of art invites one to withdraw from practical living and to explore possibilities of fuller living in a richer world.⁴³

As such, art is a carrier of intersubjective meaning, and is therefore a carrier of the human good as it is proposed or expressed by the artist.

Symbols are still another medium that evoke, or are evoked by, feeling and hence communicate meaning. Affective development frees symbolic communication as the manifold images presented by the symbol converge in meaning:

The symbol for me is the "affect-laden image." It's evoked by an affect, or an image evokes the affect. They're linked. It's the means of internal communication between psyche and mind and heart. Where mind is experience, understanding, judgment; and heart is what's beyond this on the level of feeling and "is it worth-while" -- judgment of value, decision. Without feelings, this experience, understanding, judgment is paper-thin. The whole mass and momentum of living is in feeling. 44

Feelings are related to objects (desire of food, bearing of pain), to one another (desire of good that is absent, feelings related through personal realtionships such as tenderness), and to their subject (as the "mass and momentum and power of his conscious living, the actuation of his affective capacities, dispositions, habits, the effective orientation of his being"). 45 But the same objects may well evoke different feelings in different subjects. The affective capacities, dispositions, and habits of a given individual can be specified "by the symbols that awaken determinate affects and, inversely, by the affects that evoke determinate symbols". 46 The

significance of affective development, then, is that one's intentional orientation in life can determine one's affective capacities, dispositions, and symbols by transforming the symbols to express new affective capacities. To achieve this, there is the need of internal communication between one's organic and psychic vitality, and one's intentional consciousness, in order that they may collaborate. Such internal communication of mind, body and heart is through symbols. The older interpretative systems (Freud, Adler, Jung) and the more recent "Third Force" in psychology (self-actualization, as in Maslow) are means of appropriating one's symbols, to effect the "constitution of one's self in one's world".

While the symbol embodies elemental meaning and multiple meanings, such as spontaneously arise out of one's living, it is linguistic meaning with its names and definitions that "brings conscious intentionality into sharp focus" for both the ordering of one's world and the orientating of oneself within it. 48 Available language develops and moulds that conscious intentionality; it stresses some things while passing over others, it provides expression for moods and intentions, and in general it gives structure to the world around the subject. That also means that it is "the vehicle in which the human community conducts its collaboration in the day-to-day pursuit of the human good". 49 ordinary language is based in common sense, which will be a nucleus of insights centered around the subject or centered around particular groups. With division of labor, language becomes specialized to a task or field. In its literary expression, language is intended not merely for understanding but also for feeling. But whether language, art, or

symbol is the "carrier" of meaning, all such expressions are first of all an <u>incarnate</u> meaning -- "the meaning of a person, of his way of life, of his words, or of his deeds". 50

Lonergan turns from his analysis of meaning, to distinguish the basic elements of meaning:

Sources of meaning are all conscious acts and all intended contents, whether in the dream state or on any of the four levels of waking consciousness. The principal division of sources is into transcendental and categorical. The transcendental are the very dynamism of intentional consciousness, a capacity that consciously and unceasingly both heads for and recognizes data, intelligibility, truth, reality, and value. The categorical are the determinations reached through experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding. The transcendental notions ground questioning. Answers develop categorical determinations. 51

The acts of meaning are potential (experiencing), formal (understanding), full (judging), constitutive or effective (deciding), and finally instrumental (external expressions for interpretation by others). Now these elements of meaning function in four different ways. There is the cognitive function, which takes us out of the infant's world of immediacy into the world mediated by meaning in which we live out our lives. Immediacy comes with the mating of lovers, the mystic's cloud of unknowing, or "when one objectifies cognitional process in transcendental method and when one discovers, identifies, accepts one's submerged feelings in psychotherapy." The world mediated by meaning, opened up by the intentionality of understanding and judgment, can go even beyond all worlds of immediate experience. Secondly, meaning functions efficiently, in that it intends the making and the working that represents human enterprise. Thirdly, meaning is constitutive, in that any development of an idea within, say, a culture, must be formulated before it can be

communicated. And finally, meaning is communicative, in that a <u>common</u> meaning enables there to be common experience, common understandings, common judgments, and common commitments in human living. All the elements of meaning within the world mediated by meaning are central to man as a historical being (standing outside nature) and the inheritor of a particular tradition — a world mediated by meaning.

As different elements and functions of meaning can be distinguished, so also differing realms or worlds of meaning can be distinguished, according to differing modes of conscious and intentional operation. As in Insight, Lonergan differentiates the realm of common sense from the realm of theory, given their different objects in things in relation to us as opposed to things in relation to each other. So, too, there is a realm of one's own interiority, subjectivity, operations; their structure, norms, and potentialities. In this realm, one's attending is to one's intending and subsequent acts. It is withdrawal into interiority for self-appropriation that enables grasp of transcendental method. Such a grasp provides one with the tools for analysis and the structure of method that develop procedures for application in common sense and theory. And finally, there is a realm in which God can be known and loved, which is indicated by the transcendent exigence in the unrestricted demand for intelligibility, the demand for the unconditioned in judgment and the critique of every finite good. Beyond the realms of common sense, theory, and interiority, lies this realm where "man can reach basic fulfillment, peace, joy". 53 The unity of these differentiations comes not in the homogeneity of undifferentiated consciousness, but with "the self-knowledge that understands the different realms and knows how to shift anyone to any

other". ⁵⁴ Yet the awareness of the differentiations is the key to development — just as in the western tradition of culture, Lonergan sees stages as being able to be distinguished as the worlds of common sense, theory, and interiority were discovered within the world mediated by meaning.

Lonergan concludes his "background" section in Method with a chapter on religion, since "the facts of good and evil, of progress and decline, raise questions about the character of the universe". Since we grant that the universe is intelligible by the assumption implicit in the knowledge we already understand we possess of the universe, then we raise the question of God as we search for the ground of intelligibility. Does there or does there not exist a transcendent, intelligent ground of the universe? It is our "conscious intentionality" which asks this question, as it arises out of the a priori structured drive that promotes us from experiencing, to understanding, to judging, to choosing rightly. 56 And while the answer to this question may well be beyond man's horizon, the unrestricted intending is well within that horizon. Now as man achieves authenticity in self-transcendence according to his capacity to realize the transcendental notions in his questions for intelligence, reflection, and deliberation, so that capacity becomes an actuality in the state of moral self-transcendence when...

...one's being becomes being-in-love. Such being-in-love has its antecedents, its causes, its conditions, its occasions. But once it has blossomed forth and for as long as it lasts, it takes over. It is the first principle. From it flow one's desires and fears, one's joys and sorrows, one's discernment of values, one's decisions and deeds.

This phenomenon of being-in-love is experienced in at least three different ways, each reflecting a certain degree of transcendence and therefore self-surrender. There is the intimacy of husband and wife, parents and children; there is the love of one's fellow man; and most of all there is love of God with all heart, soul, mind, and strength. They are experiences of living by grace,

because God's love has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit which has been given to us. 58

Any state of being in love brings some of this sense of fulfillment, its peace, its fruit in love for others, a better and more authentic ethical intention and performance, and a sense of the supreme value — God — and other values which are "God's expression of his love in this world, in its aspirations, and in its goal". But to say we experience this (within consciousness), does not mean to say we know it. It is conscious on the level of responsible consciousness, for it is the type of consciousness that deliberates, makes judgments of value, decides, and acts responsibly and freely:

But it is this consciousness as brought to a fulfillment, as having undergone a conversion, as possessing a basis that may be broadened and deepened and heightened and enriched but not superseded, as ready to deliberate and judge and decide and act with the easy freedom of those that do all good because they are in love. So the gift of God's love occupies the ground and root of the fourth and highest level of man's intentional consciousness. It takes over the peak of the soul, the apex animae. 60

This gift, then, of God's love is really sanctifying grace, but is first operative grace (conversion) until, with our self-consciousness and intending, it becomes cooperative. 61 At that point, the gift of God's love takes over the highest level of man's consciousness:

It is a change in one's antecedent willingness; one becomes antecedently willing to do the good that previously one was unwilling to do; secondly, the free and full acceptance of this change constitutes the existential decision that contemporary moral theologians name one's fundamental option, one's basic religious commitment. 62

It is an experience of the holy (as in Rudolf Otto), the sense of ultimate concern (Tillich), consolation without a cause (Rahner), and generally a fulfillment which gives an easy freedom to deliberate, judge, decide, act and do all good. But it is fundamentally an experience of being in love without qualifications, conditions, reservations or limits — being in love with someone transcendent. As that love is the <u>fulfillment</u> of one's unrestricted thrust to self-transcendence through intelligence, truth, and responsibility, so the one who fulfills that thrust must be supreme in intelligence, truth, and responsibility. And as one feels chosen by the gift of fulfillment of love, so one concludes the giver must be love. Loving in return is trancending oneself (denial of the self to be transcended) and giving attention to the giver, in prayer, meditation, and contemplation. And so

...from an experience of love focused on mystery there wells forth a longing for knowledge, while love itself is a longing for union; so for the lover of the unknown beloved the concept of bliss is knowledge of him and union with him, however they may be achieved.

Religious development is, however, precarious in terms of the self as transcending and the self as transcended. Something like human authenticity is not a secure possession. Every authentic insight, gives one further insight into one's oversights. Religious development is dialectical in "the very precise opposition between authenticity and unauthenticity, between the self as transcending and the self as

transcended". 65 It enables development, decline, and recovery. The expression of religious experience Lonergan calls "the word", which is any expression of religious meaning or value. Such expressions, especially as spoken and written, are the means by which religion enters the world mediated by meaning and regulated by value. Yet before this word, is the "prior word" God speaks to us in our immediacy, by flooding our hearts with the unmediated experience of the mystery of love:

But the prior word in its immediacy, though it differs in intensity, though it resonates differently in different temperaments and in different stages of religious development, withdraws man from the diversity of history by moving out of the world mediated by meaning and towards a world of immediacy in which image and symbol, thought and word, lose their relevance and even disappear.

The word is personal to the subject, social to the believing community, and historical in that it is spoken in context. But its expression provides a world mediated by meaning and regulated by value which enables a person to some degree to comprehend and at least feel support in living on this highest level of conscious operations. This world of religious meaning, drawn from the experience of the mystery of love and awe, will move through the stages of meaning and speak within the different realms (common sense, theory, interiority) just as with all other experience understood, judged, decided, and expressed. The complementary purposes of the different paths of cognitional activity apply to all experience.

The knowledge that is born out of the experience of religious love is faith; that area of "reasons of the heart" which are not known on other conscious levels. Interpreting Pascal's "heart's reasons" as those feelings that are intentional responses to value, Lonergan suggests that, besides factual knowledge (reached by experiencing, understanding,

verifying), "there is another kind of knowledge reached through the discernment of value and the judgments of value of a person in love". 67

Faith is such further knowledge, when the love is God's flooding our hearts — giving us apprehension of vital, social, cultural, personal and transcendent value. This apprehension of value consists in the experienced fulfillment of our unrestricted thrust to self-transcendence, and "that thrust in its unrestrictedness may be objectified as a clouded revelation of absolute intelligence and intelligibility, absolute truth and reality, absolute goodness and holiness". 68 Within such an apprehension, the question of God recurs in new form (decision): Will I live the gift of his love, or withdraw? The apprehension of value involves differentiation between relative and absolute value:

Without faith, the originating value is man and the terminal value is the human good man brings about. But in the light of faith, originating value is divine light and love, while terminal value is the whole universe. So the human good becomes absorbed in an all-encompassing good. Where before an account of the human good related men to one another and to nature, now human concern reaches beyond man's world to God and to God's world.... To conceive God as originating value and the world as terminal value implies that God too is self-transcending and that the world is the fruit of his self-transcendence, the expression and manifestation of his benevolence and beneficence, his glory. As the excellence of the son is the glory of his father, so too the excellence of mankind is the Glory of God. 6

Without faith, the world is clearly too evil for God to be good and for a good God to exist. But faith recognizes that, as God has granted men their freedom but called them to authenticity, so faith has the power of undoing man's failures which promote decline:

...human possessiveness and human pride have to be replaced by religious charity, by the charity of the suffering servant, by self-sacrificing love. Men are sinners... They have to acknowledge their real guilt and amend their ways. They have to learn with humility that religious development is dialectical, that the task of repentence and conversion is life-long. 70

Finally, among the values that are discerned by faith is the value of believing "the word" of religion. For religious experience is not solitary, but it can be recognized as a common orientation in living, feeling, and orientation shared by a religious community. That community can express itself and, as it endures over time, its expressions become traditional. Further, as we experience "being in love" as a response, so there are divine initiatives in history -- "the personal entrance of God himself into history,... the advent of God's word into the world of religious expression" as in Judaism and Christianity. The narrative of such encounters in religious expression has the specific meaning of the work of God itself. Living in a community informed by such words and expressions, gives nurture and support to the awareness of divine initiative and human response. Such a sense of living with God in history becomes an ultimate sustenance for authentic intellectual, ethical, and religious living.

Section B - Lonergan's Ethics of Value; Natural & Christian

We must turn now to Lonergan's application of functional specialization to method in theology and his development of a functional specialization of theological tasks which moves from data to results in eight basic stages, and this differentiation sets the context in which the tasks of ethics and other disciplines are set. In order to establish that context,

we will have to make reference to the functional specializations.

Underlying the specializations is the idea of a division of labour in order that scholarship can cope effectively with the continually increasing body of human knowledge, and still maintain appropriate contacts between each relevant field. Briefly, Lonergan proposes the following eight specialties: 72

Research - making available data relevant to theological investigation.

Interpretation - understanding what is meant by the data.

History - historian's informing, understanding, judging, the sum of relevant cultural, institutional and doctrinal movements in their concrete settings.

Dialectic - dynamically moving through contradiction to comprehension to evaluation.

Foundations - objectifying conversion in man's conscious and intentional operations.

Doctrines - expressing the objectifications in judgments of fact and judgments of value.

Systematics - further questionings to promote understanding to find appropriate systems and more familiar analogies within experience.

Communications - establishing external relationships and communications with other disciplines, and with the hearts and minds of men of all cultures and classes.

The first four stages are more oriented to listening to "the word" of religious meaning and value, while the latter four are more oriented to the proclaiming of it. Each set of stages is also related to the four different cognitional levels of experiencing, understanding, judging and deciding. The first four

...challenge to a decision: in what manner or measure am I to carry the burden of continuity or to risk the initiative of change? That decision, however, is primarily not a theological but a religious event; it pertains to the prior more spontaneous level on which theology reflects and which it illuminates and objectifies; it enters explicitly into theology only as reflected on and objectified in the fifth specialty, foundations.⁷³

This religious event is conversion, and objectification of conversion provides theology with its foundations. The specialties then function in reverse order -- decision, judgment, understanding, and data. Between the two sets lies the critical personal encounter, the conversion, the transformation of the subject and his world, and the transvaluation of his values -- which then gives both substance and intention to the final data produced. Authentic conversion initiates one into a new horizon, which to the unspiritual man is folly, and he cannot grasp it. While each set of specialties is distinct yet interdependent, there remains a dynamic unity of subjects in process of development who are the operators of the process.

Now Lonergan's program for ethics would seem to be focused in two areas. The first area would be that of the transcendental method and its four imperatives drawn from the authentic operation of the human spirit:

Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible. As in In-sight, Lonergan assigns to philosophy (and hence philosophical or "natural" ethics) the role of criticizing all methods engaged in human knowing:

The basic discipline, I believe, is not metaphysics but cognitional theory. By cognitional theory is meant, not a faculty psychology that presupposes a metaphysics, but an intentionality analysis that presupposes the data of consciousness. From the cognitional theory there can be derived an epistemology, and from both the cognitional theory and the epistemology there can be derived a metaphysics. These three are related to all other disciplines, not by supplying them with elements for their basic terms and relations, but providing the nucleus for the formulation of their methods. ⁷⁴

At the basis of this would be cognitional method and therefore intellectual conversion, and the horizon unfolded by such a perspective. But to the extent to which philosophy of God and systematics

...have a common origin in religious experience, so also they have a common goal in the development of persons. But each person is one, a whole, and not just a set of parts. It follows that the study of what makes persons persons is not to be carried on under different principles and in different departments. Philosophy of God and the functional specialty, systematics, may and should unite. They have a common origin; they complement and reinforce each other; they are concerned with the common goal, the promotion into clear consciousness of the major factors in the integration and development of the person. 75

Therefore as all philosophy and theology are similarly grounded in the apprehension of the human good, and the meaning of good and value, then "natural ethics" and "Christian ethics" really share the theological area of the functional specialty "systematics."

It (natural ethics) comes into systematics the way philosophy of God comes into systematics. It should be introduced not only on that level. You have to say something in general about the human good, not just that the good is 'what everything seeks' and leave it at that.⁷⁶

Thus there would seem to be two thrusts for ethics as Lonergan conceives it: first, to work out with each and every discipline the transcendental precepts of method; second, to develop ethical method and precepts from the common base in human experience of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion.

The dialogue with each and every discipline as to method is sometime, that Lonergan has already begun and is working on at present. The also cites others who also engage in the clarification of method and analysis — such an example being his article "The Example of Gibson Winter". In Winter's analysis of the seldom-noted difference between social science

and social policy, he outlines clearly a place in sociological method where value judgments do enter in significantly, and therefore where social philosophy should quite overtly be undertaken as a phase in the task. It is such intentionality analysis, and distinction and differentiation of tasks, which becomes significant to the differentiated consciousness operating out of the transcendental method. What are truths versus untruths, values versus disvalues, biases, scotosis, ressentiment, breakdowns? The essence of Lonergan's approach is dialectic: to develop positions, reverse counterpositions. This constant scrutiny and openness to further questioning is the essence of an attack upon incomprehension, distortion, and misunderstanding. For Lonergan, it is "encounter":

It is meeting persons, appreciating the values they represent, criticizing their defects, and allowing one's living to be challenged at its very roots by their words and by their deeds. Moreover, such an encounter is not just an optional addition to interpretation and to history. Interpretation depends on one's self-understanding; the history one writes depends on one's horizon; and encounter is the one way in which self-understanding and horizon can be put to the test. 79

But encounter does not always offer resolution, since very often differences are those of horizon — the boundaries and limits of our knowledge and of our self-knowledge. Intellectual, moral and religious conversions can, in such instances, become the barrier since they transform knowing and transvalue valuation. But new horizons can only be glimpsed, and further options opened, through encounters which bring just such problems to light. Therefore one looks for concrete issues and contexts which can be creatively worked through:

questions of detail are going to be solved by committees dealing with concrete problems. When I say that the formal object is settled by the method, I mean that distinctions and/or separations are determined by comparing and contrasting, not subjects, but methods. 80

But what one is essentially trying to establish is the universal and natural law of the transcendental method, and to facilitate the conversions which enable one in self-transcendent movement to: Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible.

But one other aspect has to do with the openness of religion and theology generally to insights that come through any and all of the disciplines. Lonergan has admitted that behind his shift (from <u>Insight</u> to <u>Method</u>) "there is a greatly enlarged notion of theology" as well as a shift from "objects to operations and operators". Sod's grace is operative and available to all, whether or not it is appropriated with or without his name.

Just as God himself is love (2 John 4:8, 16) and it is the overflowing of that love that creates and sustains and promotes this seething universe of mass and energy, of chemical process, of endlessly varied plant and animal life, of human intelligence and of human love; so too the love that God gives us overflows into a love of all that God has made and especially of all persons whom God wishes to love.⁸³

Therefore the carriers of ethical and religious meaning will be found in many places and under various names—in fact, wherever meaning is being sought:

...at the present time it would seem that the immediate carrier of human aspiration is the more concrete aspiration of the human good effected through such theories of history as the liberal doctrine of progress, the Marxist doctrine of dialectical materialism and, most recently, Teilhard de Chardin's identification of cosmogenesis, anthropogenesis, and christogenesis.⁸⁴

Meaning itself, found in the vital reality of human living, is then the essential field for the heightening of consciousness of a process already natural and implicit—manifesting needs and satisfactions, responding to values, intending goals, deploying structures, and endowing all with cultural significance. Natural and Christian ethics both operate out of an apprehension of the human good, and therefore both have to promote the discussion and integration of truth and value within theology and scientific human studies generally:

The aim of such integration is to generate well-informed and continuously revised policies and plans for promoting good and undoing evil both in the church and in human society generally. Needless to say, such integrated studies will have to occur on many levels, local, regional, national, and international.⁸⁶

But the ground of such encounters will be that of authentic persons—subjects— for objectivity and self-transcendence are the fruit of authentic subjectivity:

The judgment of value in a good person reveals truth insofar as it occurs with a good conscience and reveals its weakness by the uneasy conscience. Objectivity is the fruit of authentic subjectivity. All along the line, insofar as you are attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible, you will also be objective. They are the criteria. If you want to have something else, you'll box yourself up in some corner. 87

Christian or theological ethics are not, in essence, all that different from the natural ethics derived through transcendental method—and Lonergan indicates that a detailed account of one or the other would come within the functional specialty, systematics. Systematics does, of course, function from presupposition—the doctrines which have been evaluated in dialectic. Its aim is to promote understanding. But most of all, Christian ethics would presuppose the basic conversions, while "natural"

ethics may well be working towards them. Specifically, "natural ethics" may not wish or be able to presuppose God and his love, while religious conversion and love of God would constitute that as the very essence of the horizon of a Christian position—both in theology and in ethics. The consciousness of religious conversion, and the transvaluation of values, occurs at the topmost level of human consciousness, which is the conscience, "the peak of the soul, the apex animae". And, as Lonergan has stated constantly with Aristotle, you can't talk of virtue without talking of the virtuous man. Therefore a fundamental task of Christian ethics is to promote just such a conversion in any and all, and then

...it is essential here to be able to speak from the heart to the heart without introducing elements that, however true in themselves, have the disadvantage of not being given in experience. 90

Such communication for the promotion of affective understanding is just such an appropriate task for ethics, when it can be based on the horizon of religious commitment:

And from there comes my method, the transcendental method: it's intentionality analysis at its root; you're starting from the subject and his operation. You can get a theological method if you have something further in the subject that will make that transcendental method into a theological method. And that is again religious experience, religious experience at its finest: God's gift of his love. 91

Conversion, as has been said, radically alters one's horizon—it even moves one from one set of roots to another. 92 It changes relation—ships as well. For it is in such relationships that is mediated the world of meaning—and conversion radically alters that meaning. Hence "although conversion is intensely personal, it is not purely private". 93 For immediately one seeks to share one's cognitive, constitutive, and

effective meaning. And socially, it means, therefore, that

...one begins to belong to a different social group or, if one's groups remains the same, that one begins to belong to it in a new way. 94

For the church as just such a social grouping, it means for Lonergan living out of what Oliver Rabut called the unassailable fact of the existence of love: 95

There is in the world, as it were, a charged field of love and meaning; here and there it reaches a notable intensity; but it is ever unobtrusive, hidden, inviting each of us to join. And join we must if we are to perceive it, for our perceiving is through our own loving. 96

The church then lives out of such interiority, and yet tries to objectify and explicate it. To do so, ties it in with the history of such objectification and explication from the past, the salvation history of that community rooted in being-in-love and promoting such amongst men. There is, then, a "commonly accepted set of meanings and values shared by people in contact with one another". These meanings and values have a normative function as doctrines for they have been developed

...by appealing to the foundational reality of intellectual, moral, and religious conversions. 98

Given the centrality of conversion generally and the three conversions specifically, we must look more closely at their role throughout the functional specialties.

Conversions, as has been noted, may be intellectual, moral or religious. Intellectual conversion is a radical clarification of reality, objectivity, and human knowledge achieved through answering for oneself "what one is doing when one is knowing". 99 It is a conversion to truth attained by cognitional self-transcendence; a discovery of the cognitional structure immanent and operative in the human process of coming to know,

and an appropriation of and cooperation with that structure within oneself to an authentic governing of one's knowing. As in <u>Insight</u>, it is experiencing, understanding, and judging that one does, in fact, experience, understand, and judge as the operations of one's knowing. As with the other conversions, it is a radical shift and transformation from empiricism, idealism, and realism, to mention just a few.

Moral conversion is a change in "the criterion of one's decisions and choices from satisfactions to values". 100 At its root is moral knowledge which, of course, is the proper possession only of morally good men. It comes about through self-knowledge (one's biases, potentialities, resentments, habits, etc.), knowledge of human reality and potentiality, elements of progress and decline, and one's intentional responses to values and their scales of preference. Fundamental to it is the exercise of freedom, and an actual choice for the truly good (value) as opposed to mere satisfaction, with the realization that choosing affects ourselves just as much as the chosen or rejected objects. As one chooses one's values, one's responses, and consciously pursues them in one's doing, one has exercised vertical as opposed to horizontal freedom; one has decided what one is to make of oneself. Religious conversion differs from the other two in that it is more than an act, it is more a surrender -- to the grasp of ultimate concern, of being-in-love with God. For Christians, it is experienced as the gift of grace, God's love flooding our hearts through the Holy Spirit given us, replacing our hearts of stone with a new horizon of a heart of flesh. Cooperation with that grace is becoming effective in good works through human freedom:

Operative grace is religious conversion. Cooperative grace is the effectiveness of conversion, the gradual movement towards a full and complete transformation of the whole of one's living and feeling, one's thoughts, words, deeds, and omissions. 101

All these conversions have to do with self-transcendence occurring within a single consciousness, and this Lonergan understands in terms of Rahner's notion of sublation. Whatever sublates means going beyond what is sublated, introducing something new and distinct, yet, rather than interfering or destroying the old, "includes it, preserves all its proper features and properties, and carries them forward to a fuller realization within a richer context". 102 In terms of levels within consciousness, this means cognitional self-transcendence (conversion) promotes one to moral self-transcendence (conversion), and that in turn to religious selftranscendence (conversion) in which the existential subject is transformed into a "subject in love". In this radically new state of religious loving without conditions, one can see that all the other conversions are both preserved and yet moved forward to a fuller realization, which is an example of development "from above downwards" 103 rather than from below upwards:

Though religious conversion sublates moral, and moral conversion sublates intellectual, one is not to infer that intellectual comes first and then moral and finally religious. On the contrary, from a causal viewpoint, one would say that first there is God's gift of his love. Next, the eye of love reveals values in their splendor, while the strength of this love brings about their realization, and that is moral conversion. Finally, among the values discerned by the eye of love is the value of believing the truths taught by the religious tradition, and in such tradition and belief are the seeds of intellectual conversion. For the word, spoken and heard, proceeds from and penetrates to all four levels of intentional consciousness. 104

Now the question of conversion becomes predominant within the fourth functional specialty, "Dialectic". For in that specialty, conflicts are dealt with that will be found to have their source in fundamental stances stemming from one's cognitional theory, one's ethical stance, and one's religious outlook. As these subjective differences are objectified, what each person represents in terms of intellectual, moral, and religious assumptions will become clear. Such a theologian, investigator, etc., must overcome his own internal conflicts at such a point, through a movement towards cognitional and moral self-transcendence that seeks development. The route to such resolution, and to the discovery of the differentiations in consciousness, realms of meaning, etc., which can also be the cause of conflict, is the "self-appropriation of the subject" 105 that proceeds to "an objectification of the subject, to an intelligent and reasonable affirmation of the subject, and so to a transition from the subject as subject to the subject as object. Such transition yields objective knowledge of the subject...". 106 Such objectification can take place as researchers and investigators deal with the issues of their conflicts head on, find their assumptions, question them, and search for the intelligent, reasonable, and responsible within themselves. Such a method itself promotes conversion.

Within the fifth functional specialty, "Foundations", the oppositions revealed within "Dialectic" force a conscious deliberation, evaluation, and decision "about one's horizon, one's outlook, one's world-view. It deliberately selects the frame-work in which doctrines have their meaning in which systematics reconciles, in which communications are effective". 107 Such a decision is not arbitrary, for it is a conversion from unauthenticity

to authenticity, it is a "total surrender to the demands of the human spirit: be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible, be in love". 108 For unconverted and converted may well be able to work together in research, interpretation, history, or dialectic, but there is a radical shift in horizon, and personal and social living that comes with conversion -- and only such as have dedicated themselves not to their own interests, but to the welfare of mankind, can mediate the high seriousness and mature wisdom of their social group and tradition (e.g. Christianity). Such distinctions, similar to those of Aquinas' Summa contra Gentiles and Summa theologiae, point to the foundational reality of religious conversion which needs to ground the work of foundations, doctrines, systematics, and communication. This is not to say that such being in love with God can be there by definition, but rather by a dialectical achievement of moving towards authenticity by a withdrawal from unauthenticity. While never complete and always precarious, a community that seeks authenticity by prayer and the forgiveness of sins can move methodically towards a real lived charity by such correction, modification, and complementation. "Foundations discriminate between truth and error by appealing to the foundational reality of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion". 109

There is a "normative function of doctrines", which is constitutive of both the individual and community as a "commonly accepted set of meanings and values shared by people in contact with one another".

These meanings and values are given to us both linguistically and incarnately:

The Father has spoken to us of old through the prophets and in this final age through the Son (Heb.1:1-2). His communication is twofold; it is both by linguistic meaning and by incarnate meaning. By linguistic meaning he

rebuked those that give scandal, announced redemption for sinners, provided for the forgiveness of sin, established the bond of the Eucharist, promised the gift of the Spirit, and set before men the destiny of eternal life. But all such linguistic meaning was endlessly reinforced by the incarnate meaning to be contemplated in the life and ministry and, above all, in the suffering, death, and resurrection of Christ. 111

While there is an anonymity and obscurity to the spirit that is given us in religious conversion, the word spoken by the Father and mediated by an institution (the church), is much more precise. In this sense, there is a significant normative function to the historical narratives, conclusions, and formulations of the earliest down to the present Christian community:

It is at this point that there emerges the function of church doctrines and theological doctrines. For that function is to explain and to defend the authenticity of the church's witness to the revelation in Christ Jesus. 112

Both the spirit and the word mediate the constitutive meaning and value formulated under the specialty, "doctrines". This then, is the source of the Christian and natural ethics spoken of above.

Systematics, as has been said, would be the main area for Christian and natural ethics. Its task is the promotion of <u>understanding</u>, with the presupposition of doctrines. It operates out of what is natural in a theologian's or ethicist's operations, and also out of what is supernatural as is found in the mysteries of faith. But while the meaning may be mediated out of such immanent and transcendent realms, one's <u>questions</u> originate from man and from the world. Such questions, in their intending and in their answers, "can reveal an intelligent, necessary, moral ground of the universe". The resulting theological understandings, while having a permanent base (dogma), are set in the cultural context of a religion. The role of theology (and ethics?), as was said in

Lonergan's Introduction to Method, is to mediate between a cultural matrix and the role of a religion in that matrix. Understandings are the variables which change according to context as one seeks understanding in the assent of faith and the living out of conversion. Its task is to facilitate just such understanding in harmony with its basic religious origins and aims.

In the final specialty of Communications, the task is for understandings to contribute to the common meaning constituted by people's common field of experience (society) through communication of cognitive, constitutive and effective meanings. Ideally, the basis of society is community as it takes its stand on moral, religious, or Christian principles. As such, men individually are responsible for what they make of themselves, and collectively responsible for the world in which they live. But there is great need within society for organizations that genuinely labour for community, that promote the good of order within society, and systematically undo the mischief initiated by alienation and consolidated by ideology. The church has just such a role:

The Christian church is the community that results from the outer communication of Christ's message and from the inner gift of God's love. Since God can be counted on to bestow his grace, practical theology is concerned with the effective communication of Christ's message.

The message announces what Christians are to believe, what they are to become, what they are to do. Its meaning, then, is at once cognitive, constitutive, effective. It is cognitive inasmuch as the message tells what is to be believed. It is constitutive inasmuch as it crystallizes the hidden inner gift of love into overt Christian fellowship. It is effective inasmuch as it directs Christian service to human society to bring about the kingdom of God.

To communicate the Christian message is to lead another to share in one's cognitive, constitutive, effective meaning. $^{114}\,$

Above the promotion of the good of order within society, the church is specifically entrusted to be a redemptive process, to meet the reality of sin in alienation and ideology by the self-sacrificing love of Christian charity that reconciles alienated man to his true being. The integration of the church within society and the integration of theology with scholarly and scientific studies by a methodical cooperation, will be the means by which communication is to be effected. "The aim of such integration is to generate well-informed and continuously revised policies and plans for promoting good and undoing evil both in the church and in human society generally". 115

Section C - Background and observations on the Developments in Method

We have been basically outlining Lonergan's overall project in Method, and heightening those aspects of it which pertain particularly to an ethical perspective. In order to appreciate that project as a whole which represents many single developments since Lonergan finished writing Insight, we shall now take several steps backwards to look at those developments as they began to appear in the late fifties and the sixties.

One of the first of these smaller projects that Lonergan undertook was a series of lectures on Existentialism given to a group of scholastic philosophers at Boston College in the summer of 1956. In preparation for these, he read widely in Jaspers, Heidegger, Sartre, and Marcel. But by his own admission, a more adequate reflection of his appreciation of existential thought was his summer of 1959 lectures at the Institute of the Philosophy of Education given at Xavier University in Cincinnati. 117 For that, he had read far more widely in Karl Jaspers. Still, in the

eleventh lecture of the 1956 Boston College series, Lonergan cited the example of President Eisenhower being asked of the risk involved in sending a fleet into the Mediterranean during the Egyptian crisis, to which Eisenhower responded "We have to be men". Lonergan commented:

Being a man in that sense is a very brief clue to what the existentialists are concerned with. Being a man in that sense results from a decision. It is the consequence of the use of one's freedom. It is something we have to be. It makes one the sort of man one is. And it involves risk. In the present instance, the risk of nuclear warfare was in the back of the mind of the journalist asking the question. Now, that simple notion of being a man as something one has to be and that one is not necessarily, that comes about freely. It makes one what one is.

This simple but profound notion within existential thought of making one what one is, remained central to what Lonergan came to call "existential consciousness" (fourth level) in which, using the language of Method, one makes one's own edition of oneself. Lonergan also linked this up with the existentialist's concern with time and history:

connected with the notion of time. And that intrinsic connection with time involves a connection with Husserl, in the sense of development of human institutions, human cultures and human ideas. And the intrinsic connection between 'being a man' and time is emphasized in Heidegger's title Sein und Zeit. Again it is highlighted in Marcel's title Homo Viator; man is a being on the way. However, concern with history on the grand scale appears only in Jaspers, as far as I know. 119

But this "being a man" that results from the use of freedom, Lonergan noted, is something prepredicative and preconceptual — "they are concerned with the man who is the <u>source</u> of concept, the man who is the <u>source</u> of the judgment. They are concerned with foundations, with the ground, the origin, the source". This is the point where, he said, scholasticism must be differentiated from existentialism, for the latter aims at reality

not expressed, conceptualized, or objectified. Rather than propositional truths and abstract definitions of freedom, it aims at the human subject as conscious, emotionally involved, having sentiments as well as thoughts. In fact, the focus is the (human) subject in the stream or flow of consciousness as oriented to choosing, being totally free to choose. But the knowledge grounding the choice is always incomplete — hence the element of risk. Choosing not only settles ends and objects,

...it gives rise to dispositions and habits. It makes me what I am to be. It makes it possible to estimate what probably I would do in a given situation. It gives me a second nature and that second nature is what existentialists particularly refer as to the essence of man... It is the essence you get in so far as you develop habits and dispositions by choices. 121

This is the meaning Lonergan traced to the existentialist term "Being Oneself": it is in choosing that I become myself. The "I" is not determined by external or internal contraints, it is the I that is myself that chooses the manner and mode in which I choose. While there are limiting situations to choice (one's context, sex, struggle, suffering, death, etc.), the choices that one is able to make and makes (or fails to make) constitute what one is, one's character, oneself. The existentialist talks not of one's speculative human nature, but only about the concrete men that exist, that are acting.

Lonergan also discussed the notions of conversion, reorientation, transformation of self, and radical discovery which, he said, are ideas right in the center of existentialism. "When a basis has one's living organized on a lower level, the movement to a higher level involves something like the apparent eruption of a latent power". He discussed such conversions in terms of Kierkegaard's four spheres: the aesthetic

man, the ethical man, the religious man A, the religious man B. But he pointed out that movement from one to another sphere can't come from the principles upon which the lower sphere was based. It comes rather from the discovery or revelation of something that had previously been hidden, repressed, or the subject of an oversight. And this discovery of what was already there, takes place when "the ultimate issues come back to the subject". This adverting back to the subject, is precisely what in Existentialism is relevant to Scholasticism in its divisions, said Lonergan back in 1956.

Lonergan then turned to what he termed a "really significant" element in existentialism in the later works of Husserl, namely, transcendental phenomenology. Outlining Husserl's Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenchaften und die transzendentale Phynomenologie, 124 he presents the centrality of discovery of new methods as determined by the criterion of their original intentions. Central notions which he elaborated were those of intention (what the subject is the source of, is intentional -- what he means, symbolizes, etc.), of horizon (the totality of a perceptible -a "world" being one's total horizon of knowing), of epoche (withdrawal of concern with the really real), and of transcendental reduction (reduction of the object to the subject). He particularly noted the erroneous leaps in various disciplines (such as scientific psychology) where understanding is attempted in terms of a pseudo-object, rather than in terms of the understanding subject. In Husserl, the subject is always prior and intending, and transcendental phenomenology attends to the transcendental subject. While criticizing Husserl's over-distinction between Abschattung-Horizont and Einstellungs-Welt (to Lonergan they are unified in the notion

of being), his orientation to the engaged consciousness of choosing (to Lonergan, such is a flight from intelligence), and his demand for absolute necessity and certitude, Lonergan's praise of Husserl is for his discovery of phenomenology. Giving it his own definition of "an account, description, and presentation of the data structured by insight", 125 Lonergan went beyond Husserl's intuition of essences to suggest that it is ultimately insight that grasps the unity in data and that heads towards synthesis (as in Insight). But phenomenology has contributed a technique for explanation and presentation of whole realms of phenomena and matters of fact that are significant. Lonergan pointed particularly to the importance of such investigations within consciousness.

Lonergan then shifted to "Heidegger's existentialism" which, he said, is oriented to man as the source of meaning, while Husserl's phenomenology is oriented to the structure of meaning. In Heidegger's <u>Dasein</u>, he noted, the subject-object split is entirely overcome as man is seen as the origin of meaning. The basic formation of <u>Dasein</u> is stream of consciousness; <u>Sein</u>, on the other hand, is the intelligibility conferred on the self by <u>Dasein</u>. As fundamentally a method, the phenomenology of conscious living is to let the stream of consciousness come to light, for "what is true is what is manifest, has been uncovered, unveiled, revealed". The truth of phenomenology is a discovery of being-in-the-truth, which is authentic <u>Dasein</u>. But Heidegger sees people as not letting be manifest what is manifest, as hiding or dodging the phenomena which are there. While authentic <u>Dasein</u> is expecting, projecting, and freely and responsibly discovering and realizing one's own potentialities, inauthentic <u>Dasein</u> is hiding, escaping, occupying oneself and seeking release from being

oneself. A network of possibilities of <u>Dasein</u> arises in the ideas presented to one's creative imagination. The basic tension between authentic and inauthentic living is adverting to our withdrawing from such anticipation. The critical experience is anxiety, which one feels "whenever there is any attempt to fool around with a person's concrete synthesis that is successful in his living". Lonergan called it "the conservative principle", and later contrasted it to conversion, which is the new viewpoint, the higher integration. 128

In the remainder of his 1956 lectures Lonergan reviewed some of the principle notions of existentialism, such as horizon, stream of consciousness, conversion, etc., and expanded them with some of his own notions (e.g. his patterns of consciousness as "flows" of consciousness, conversion as something of a leap). He pointed out that the chief point of comparison between scholasticism and existentialism is found not so much in the realm of being as in the realm of the good. Existentialism contributes a concern for the good that is a concern for the total man in concrete living, a concern for "not truth in general but the truth that I live by; the truth involved in my selfconstitution." Of particular significance is the notion of horizon, as the total field of concern for the existential subject within history. He concluded the lectures with a résumé of the existentialists' fundamental orientation to the subject as subject, prior to any and all objectification, the subject as reality "in the sense that we live and die, love and hate, rejoice and suffer, desire and fear, wonder and dread, inquire and doubt". 130 This is the root of the horizon, and Lonergan suggested that that is as far as existentialism takes us. He

ended by pointing out how, in <u>Insight</u>, the subject's self-affirmation of himself as a knower, can take one further to a metaphysics founded upon an analysis of the subject as subject.

In the 1959 lectures on the <u>Philosophy of Education</u>, Lonergan argued that as education should aim at promoting the human good, so a better understanding of the function of education can be had if one understands the structure of the human good. He described the human good then as

...a history, a concrete, cumulative process resulting from developing human apprehension and human choices that may be good or evil. And that concrete, developing process is what the human good in this life is, the human good on which depends man's eternal destiny. 131

What is so central to this description is that the human good is seen as a <a href="https://history.com/history.co

- Aesthetic value is the realization of the intelligible in the sensible.
- Ethical value is the conscious emergence of the subject as autonomous, responsible, free.

- Religious value appears when you go a step further, when the autonomous subject stands before God with his neighbour in the world of history...¹³³

On the first level, then, there are immediate apprehensions of the good; on the second, with the emergence of ethical value, things are done because they are right; on the third, the autonomous subject stands before God with his neighbour in the world of history, and reason is subordinate to God and sense to reason — giving an immediate apprehension of good within the grace of God. Lonergan also used the Harvard sociologist Sorokin's distinctions between three basic types of society or culture to parallel both his own distinctions in levels of consciousness, structure of the human good, metaphysical categories, and Kierkegaard's types of men. Sorokin distinguishes cultures that are sensate when attention is concentrated on particular goods, while good of order and value are mere means towards acquiring more particular goods (the greatest good for the greatest number). When cultures become idealistic, the good of order becomes the primary focus; when they become idealional, the good of value predominates.

Lonergan also made distinctions in the realities of sin which parallel the structure of the human good. First, he discussed particular sin (parallel to the particular good) where negations of particular goods, such as the departure from accepted norms in crime in society, indicate a basic disregard for the standard of a society. Secondly, there is sin "as a component in social process, sin as the opposite to the development of the civilizational order". This lack of development leads to class divisions and oppositions, suspicions and biases — and the powerful as opposed to the initiators exercise control. The realizable ideal becomes

relegated to the esoteric ivory tower, the far future, or the ancient past. "Sin as a component in the social process lets the material development go ahead and at the same time takes out of it its goal". 135 And finally, there is sin as aberration — the opposite to cultural development on the reflective level. As consciousness and history both "float" in that they are not externally determined but rather take their orientation according to the interest of their originators, so the human subject in consciousness can follow the ideal tendencies of the human spirit towards the true, the right and the good as can the spirit of an age advert to a true philosophy or symbolic vision of life. But just as the conscious subject can block off dominance of his higher aspirations, so can a society and culture within history create its demands for degrading myth and false philosophy — both because of man's moral impotence.

What is needed in man to break away from the aberration of sin is a leap; not a leap beyond reason as irrationalist philosophers would urge, but a leap from unreason, from the unreasonableness of sin to reason. And that leap is not merely a matter of repeating, pronouncing, affirming, agreeing with the propositions that are true; it is a matter of really assenting to, really apprehending -- Newman's distinction between real and notional apprehension, real and notional assent. What is wanted is something existential, real apprehension, real assent to the truth. 136

This task of promoting apprehension and assent to the true and the good is fundamentally the task of education. Whether it is the promotion of true philosophy in a society, or the basic apprehension of good within persons, education within a society is the primary function for achieving such a goal. In terms of this understanding of a society, Lonergan even suggested that "The annual crop of infants is a potential invasion of

barbarians, and education may be conceived as the first line of defense" 137 and one very central aspect of that education in the human good is an understanding of redemption. Though part of a supernatural understanding of the concrete order, the natural and supernatural, while distinct, are "united dynamically", and redemption occurs both outside and inside the church -- such as in the revolutionary doctrines "that are having a great influence on our time". 138 Lonergan further outlined four historical experiences of such redemption: a "break with the past", as with a new start; a "new land", such as with the development of a society and culture afresh; revolutions and their destruction of existing institutions, etc.; and redemption in Christ Jesus which transforms evil and sin into good through grace. 139 In a seeming elaboration of Insight's natural and supernatural "solutions", Lonergan described the three conjugates (theological virtues) as transforming the three differentiations of sin. In faith, we can be re-established in the truth to counter sin as aberration in history; in hope, we can resist the determinism of societal structures; in self-sacrificing love, "we can love our enemies" and break the chain reactions of sin as crime . 140

To consolidate these parallels into a schematization allows us to make some interesting observations:

Consciousness	Men	Cultures	Goods	<u>Evils</u>	Redemption
experiencing	aesthetic	sensate	particular good	sin as crime	charity
understanding	ethical	idealistic	good of order	sin as a component in social process	hope
judgment	religious	ideational	value: (aesthetic ethical religious	sin as aberration	faith

The first is that parallels are clearly related to the three differentiations in consciousness, and basically follow the rational notion of good described in Insight. The inclusion of Kierkegaard's and Sorokin's categories of types of men and cultures or civilizations add a personal and social dimension which, in the scheme of Method, seem to have been developed into the basic distinctions between "individual" and "social". The schema of the structure of evil which parallels the good is an important addition in appreciating the tension between development and decline. It seems unfortunate that it was not retained in the schema in Method. But most interesting of all is the elaboration of redemption as a response to the three descriptions of sin. For here it is evident, as we noted in Method and in his 1975 lectures at the Thomas More Institute, that through conversion, development takes place from above downwards as faith, hope, and charity transform sin. This puts the self-sacrificing love of charity on the immediate level of experiencing -- whereas in Method Lonergan described it as at the topmost level of human consciousness, the peak of the soul. At another point in the lectures, in talking of the flow patterns and levels in consciousness (where he made a transition from faculty psychology), he again described the supernatural end of charity as perfecting and completing the practical pattern of experience. Rahner's notion of sublation, as Lonergan later used it, would seem prefigured here.

Another subject Lonergan dealt with in these lectures is moral development in relation to education in the human good. Lonergan summarized Piaget's studies of moral development in children -- the learning of rules, conventions, and finally autonomous morality.

But in a more fundamental manner, he also elaborated Piaget's psychology of intelligence as that process by which the subject begins to be differentiated from the object and a notion of what is real emerges. He outlined Piaget's group theory which describes development as proceeding by assimilation and accommodation (Lonergan substituted "adjustment" for accommodation) towards an ever-increasing sum of adaptations, operations, skills, and meanings. Important for Lonergan was the point that "habits for Piaget are not impressed activities, but acquired modes of activity developed out of previous modes of activity". 142 This seems central to his later account of Piaget in Method as "skills". But he also saw Piaget, by his group theory, as giving precise meaning to development in terms of the way a child gradually constructs his world "as the totality of objects of operations" that he commands, his horizon corresponding "to the group of operations one has mastered". 143 This construction of one's world of meanings becomes, in the end, the socialization of one's mind. Hence it is of fundamental importance in education of the human good. But Lonergan stressed in the end that Piaget's chief significance was of formulating education as the development of a person's assimilative power on a general level. In this sense, Piaget has a basic appreciation for the subject, of what is meaning to that subject, and how that develops through assimilation.

There are several other subjects which Lonergan covered in these lectures, which we should mention briefly in conclusion. One is a discussion of intersubjectivity, in which Max Scheler and Martin Buber are both mentioned. Only Scheler's notion of "ressentiment" is mentioned explicitly, while in a more general way Lonergan presented

intersubjectivity as one's apparatus for dealing with persons. Using the phenomenology of the smile as a typical determinant in an interpersonal situation (similar to his account in Method), he pointed out how a fundamental part of our knowing, of our ordinary living, comes from "the feeling we have with different persons, and the way it unconsciously determines a great part of our dealings with them". meaning is immanent in these relationships, but not univocal as in language controlled by logic. Hence, Lonergan pointed out, there is a danger in inter-subjective apprehension being used for other than interpersonal relationships, for such apprehension makes "everything alive" in a universal personification -- resulting in mythic consciousness and mistaken apprehensions of reality. Lonergan also made frequent references to Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Sartre throughout the lectures. But at an important point, he also recounts something of Jasper's work, particularly his fundamental concepts "Existenz" and "Transzendenz". While criticizing Jasper's failure to identify rational consciousness and use a truth as a medium through which reality is known, (no breaking of Kantian immanence) Lonergan did appreciate his descriptions and analyses of the human subject (Existenz) as he heads towards transcendence. This transcendence emerges in self-awareness out of "the illumination that self can have in experiencing itself,...especially in the exercise of freedom in limiting situations, the situations involving guilt and struggle and suffering and death". The aim of self-awareness is selfappropriation. The parallel with Lonergan's own project here as focusing on the existential subject and his appropriation is clear -- as also is the distinction between the two, namely that in being illumined by and appropriating the self, one is actually knowing something.

Lonergan was Professor of Dogmatic Theology at Gregorian University in Rome from 1953 until 1965, and a detailed account of his development in thought could probably be had by following his Latin lecture notes during that period. By his own admission, he was mostly facing the challenge "from the Geisteswissenschaften, from the problems of hermeneutics and critical history, from the need of integrating nineteenth century achievement in this field with the teachings of Catholic religion and Catholic theology... The eventual outcome has been the book, Method in Theology". 148 We have already seen some of this in his English lectures; it is also present in his articles and addresses over the period. In "Methaphysics as Horizon" (1963) he distinguished his agreement and disagreement with Fr. Emerich Coreth and the Maréchalian Thomists in terms of his view of transcendental method and metaphysics. Disagreeing with Coreth that metaphysics is not the Gesamt-und Grundwissenschaft because it does not coincide with the total and basic horizon of human existence but only the objective pole of that horizon, Lonergan asserted instead that...

... latent in the performance of the incarnate inquirer not only is there a metaphysics that reveals the objective pole of the total horizon but also there is the method of performing which, thematized and made explicit, reveals the subjective pole in its full and proper stature .149

The subject, the incarnate inquirer, one liable to mythic consciousness, "develops in a development that is social and historical, that stamps the stage of scientific and philosophic progress with dates..."

Historical consciousness, the reality that is constituted by meaning and is contingent upon the free acts of that human subject, necessitates a broader horizon to study the multiple meanings of man than the "science"

of metaphysics. In "Existenz and Aggiornamento" (1964) and "Dimensions of Meaning" (1965) one sees Lonergan's shift to the broad horizon of "human reality, the very stuff of human living" which is, not merely meant, "but in large measure constituted through acts of meaning". 151 Lonergan talked of the breakdown of classical culture, and the new task of philosophy not to be asking about man in the abstract, in some state of pure nature, but rather in the existential and historical context of man here and now in the concreteness of his living and dying. As contemporary philosophy has invaded the field of the concrete, the particular, the contingent, the decisions of the existential subject, and the history of peoples, societies, cultures, so a new science of man is called for which goes beyond the essential, necessary and universal. In fact, such a new science must include the arts, which incorporates

... the priority of poetry...to proclaim that the human spirit expresses itself in symbols before it knows, if ever it knows, what its symbols literally mean. It is to open the way to setting aside the classical definition of man as a rational animal and, instead, defining man with the cultural phenomenologists as a symbolic animal or with the personalists as an incarnate spirit .152

This, then, is the "subjective pole in its full and proper stature" to which Lonergan, at this point, is clearly adverting. And while in <u>Insight</u>, his focus was on the operations of the subject as experiencing, understanding, and judging <u>about facts</u>, his focus has now become the operations of the subject as experiencing, understanding, and judging about facts <u>as well as values</u> and so as constituting himself in history by his acts of meaning. Constitutive meaning has become central and thematic.

Lonergan, from this period on seemed to focus upon the human reality that is meant and constituted through acts of meaning (by the

subject). This concern for meaning and the various realms of meaning (as in Method) still represented Lonergan's project to get at "being" -but a being not abstract but concrete, not universal but particular, not necessary but contingent, within not a classical but a historical perspective. Not only is it "the world", but also and especially it is the subject's world -- and that world constantly changing, becoming. Lonergan's mode of analysis was no longer narrowly cognitional but more broadly intentional: "what we make, we first intend". 153 It is more coherently the method of phenomenology which takes its stand within us "to make thematic our perceiving, the preconceptual activities of our intellects, the vertical liberty by which we may emerge out of prevoluntary and prepersonal process to become freely and responsibly, resolutely yet precariously, the persons we choose to be". 154 This orientation and method drawn so clearly from his own study and conclusions on the significance of the existential movement, also included much of its language -- such as in "authentic or inauthentic living" to which, however, Lonergan gave a much more precise meaning: "be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible". 155 While in Insight the project dealt with a study of human understanding and things that are virtually unconditioned (as facts), Lonergan at this point seems more to be dealing with human choosing and things that are the objects of possible and free choice. It is a project to discover the absolute good that is God as it is implicit in human choosing:

In personal living the questions abstractly asked about the relations between nature and grace emerge concretely in one's concern, one's interests, one's hopes, one's plans, one's daring and timidity, one's taking risks and playing safe. And as they emerge concretely, so too they are solved concretely. 156

And as the "being oneself", when thematized and made explicit, reveals the absolute good that is God, so one's "being in love" reveals the love of God as a love that overflows, a being in love with God that can be as full and dominant an experience as human love. In each case, what takes place is that what is present but not necessarily adverted to, becomes known as appropriated.

In 1966 in his address to the Canon Law Society of America, 157

Lonergan gave indication of the more precise working out of some of the consequences of adverting to historical consciousness as the context for thematizing and making explicit the human good. He reiterated his outline of the dynamic structure of human history in terms of progress, decline, and redemption as he presented it in Insight, and also mentioned its theological complement of the Lex crucis presented in De Verbo Incarnato. He also made a specific reference in support of Karl Rahner's observation that natural law should be approached through a transcendental method, commenting that

...the more concrete and historical apprehension of man provides itself with its appropriately concrete foundations in the structural features of the conscious, operating subject, but a method that has come to be named transcendental. 158

Although not in this address claiming such a method explicitly as his own, he none-the-less set his quest for the human good in the concrete apprehensions of that good in this century as can be derived from such a method. The method was first significantly referred to in a 1966 lecture on "The Future of Thomism" where he outlined the overall transposition from logic to method ("a method is a normative pattern of related and recurrent operations"), from science as necessary to science as probable,

from soul to subject, from human nature to human history (where meaning is constitutive of human living), and from first principles to transcendental method. ¹⁵⁹ In indicating the overall task of the twentieth century theologian to do for our age what Aquinas did for his, Lonergan identified the natural and human order, culture, and the human subject as a stream "on the move", and the river-bed as a method through which that stream must flow. To control the river-bed is to possess the basic method--transcendental method-- "and all other methods are just so many extensions and adaptions of it." ¹⁶⁰

The year 1968 was the occasion of several lectures and articles that in general give indication of Lonergan's having substantially integrated and consolidated his project into the form in which it was later to appear in Method. Perhaps the most significant was his Aquinas Lecture, "The Subject" which, in a sense, revealed most clearly the subjective pole in its full and proper stature. Beginning with the horizon of the neglected subject (as in Hegel, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Buber), he noted that study of the object (as in objective truth) is quite different from the study of the subject, "for it is the study of oneself inasmuch as one is conscious." But there is, in less recent Scholasticism, a neglect of the subject, particularly in the affirmation of concepts and disregard of insights that results in a truncated subject and a thought of truth as so objective as to get along without human minds. Lonergan pointed out that one's questioning, one's knowing, intends being -- and this knowing involves "an intentional self-transcendence". 163 One becomes intentionally self-transcendent as one knows one's knowing, the objectivity of that knowing, and appropriates

that self-knowledge as "a matter of conversion, of personal philosophic experience, of moving out of a world of sense and of arriving, dazed and disorientated for a while, into a universe of being." But beyond thinking of the subject as a knower, "we now have to think of him as a doer, as one that deliberates, evaluates, chooses, acts. 1165 As a doer, one is free and responsible, within a reality of morals in which one builds up or destroys one's character and personality by one's acts. Those acts are the free and responsible expression of oneself. At this point Lonergan explicitly rejected the categories of intellect and will as distinctions which do not sufficiently advert to the subject in his key role of making himself what he is to be. Using intentionality analysis, he instead presented the scheme of differentiations, of consciousness in which each higher level sublates the lower levels, distinguishing first dreamless sleep, then dreaming sleep, then awake experiential subjects, intelligent subjects, rational subjects, and finally rationally self-conscious subjects where human consciousness is at its fullest and where one's "personal essence, is at stake."166 His notion of sublation here is key for, unlike Hegel, he understands the lower levels to be retained, preserved, and yet transcended and completed by the higher levels. Each level can be distinguished by an inquiry or questioning which promotes one's intending to the next level of inquiry, while still remaining integrated in a single unfolding.

Finally, the intention of the intelligible, the true, the real, becomes also the intention of the good, the question of value, of what is worthwhile, when the already acting subject confronts his world and adverts to his own acting on it. 167

Lonergan, in "The Subject", then introduced for the first time his transcendental notion of value -- the notion which, to us, lends itself to characterizing Lonergan's ethics in Method as an ethic of value. His context of analysis is the intending of the doer which, like the intending of the knower, "ontologically resides only in the subject" while intentionally it goes beyond the subject. 168 What the doer regards is <u>value</u> which, Lonergan suggested, is the transcendental notion of the good. There can be distinguished, as in Insight, particular goods, the good of order, and the good of value. But "just as the notion of being intends but, of itself, does not know being, so too the notion of value intends but, of itself, does not know value." Hence the notion of value is "the fuller flowering of the same dynamic principle that now keeps us moving towards ever fuller realization of the good, of what is This is Lonergan's basic transcendental notion of value--what is intended (but not known) in questions for deliberation as to what is or is not worthwhile. With Aristotle he refuses to speak of ethics apart from the ethical reality of good men or of the nature of virtue apart from the judgement of a man possessing practical wisdom. Such men strive for value in the concrete and, by reflecting upon their striving, can come to know what their notion of the good is. This is one's first hand access to the good, to value. This transcendental principle, the intention of the good, is universally prior to any choice or action, but Lonergan requested not to be asked to determine it or its instances, "for their determination in each case is the work of the free and responsible subject producing the first and only edition of himself." To attempt such a determination for another would be, once

again, to neglect the subject by replacing him with the objectivity of value. And that, in turn, would truncate the freedom and responsibility of the existential subject. But on the other hand, to speak of the good or value only in terms of the moral agent and his acts, without asking the question of whether the world is good or whether there is a moral agent responsible for the world's being and becoming, is to fall into "a new neglect of the subject, a new truncation, a new immanentism." 172

In other lectures delivered in that same year, Lonergan also elaborated significantly on meaning and value as it is discerned in social and cultural living. While the "social" is basically a way of life, a set of conventions, manners and laws that order a society, the "cultural" is more fundamentally a society's understanding of its own doing; the meaning and value it accords to its way of life. Such meaning and value is "immediately intuited, felt, spoken, acted out" in any culture, but as a culture becomes more advanced "there is an enormous process in which meanings are elaborated and values are discerned in far more reflective, deliberate, critical fashion" such as in reflections of philosophers, sociologists, political scientists, jurists, and many schools of thought within such areas. Lonergan underlined his concern with modern culture in that it tends to preach an ideology which it has objectified, and "there is the disastrous possibility of a conflict between human living as it can be lived and human living as a cultural superstructure dictates it should be lived. 174 The challenge for the church is to know, assimilate, and transform that culture, and that involves firstly disengaging itself from classical culture.

The challenge for the church also involves providing for contemporary culture, in which there is an absence of God (through science exclusively directed to knowledge of this world), a dimension where 'God lies within the horizon of man's knowing and doing, that religion represents a fundamental dimension in human living." Following the intention of the traditional doctrine of the natural knowledge of God, Lonergan contended that, if human knowing consists in asking and answering questions, and, if further questions arise, honest answers are given--then "we can and do arrive at a knowledge of God" (as in Insight, chapter 19). 176 But that argument Lonergan re-shaped in terms of transcendence and intentionality, significantly incorporating not merely the intellectual apprehension of God, but the moral and religious apprehension of our experience and relationship to Him (as in Method). While admitting that it is only by God's grace that He is known, Lonergan still points out that such knowledge attained is natural. And one of the ways current phenomenology and various forms of existentialism allow us some access to God is through an insistence on the subject: "a not-tobe objectified inner world of subjects striving for authenticity."177 God as a subject to whom we are subjectively oriented is a moral and religious experience, grace perfecting nature, the entry of God into the life of man. Lonergan cited Dietrich von Hildebrand and, several times, Max Scheler, as vastly enriching our understanding of moral and religious development in terms of our apprehension of God. Lonergan did, however, take issue with Scheler's cognitional theory (that we can know other persons and God as a person only intersubjectively through co-operation and co-performance, but not objectively). He contended

that, "as we pass from consciousness of the self as subject to objectification of the self in conception and judging so too we pass from
intersubjectivity to the objectification of intersubjectivity." However, the point is that as by intellectual experience we can know of God
as object, so by the subject-to-subject relation of moral and religious
experience, we can apprehend God by reasons of the heart that reason
does not know (Pascal). But, while acknowledging the distinction of
moral and religious experience from intellectual apprehension, Lonergan
still denied that the three should fail to harmonize.

One other area that Lonergan further elaborated in 1968 was the degree to which a theology, with a properly developed method, is related and would be of use to both the human sciences and the humanities. Agreeing with Karl Rahner, he suggested that religion is intrinsic to an authentic humanism, that in theology theocentrism and antropocentrism coincide. From our viewpoint in terms of ethics, what is significant here is Lonergan's outline of human development as a matter of man's getting beyond himself in a self-transcendence which moves from a sensibility, an understanding, a judgment about facts, to a decision about values, such as in "principles of benevolence and beneficence, of genuine co-operation, of true love." 181 dynamic state of "falling in love" and of "being in love" becomes a first principle in one's living. It is typically of the three forms as mentioned in Method: being-in-love with one's mate and children; being-in-love with the civil community; being-in-love with God. This authentic being-in-love in all its forms is something personal, intimate, and profoundly attuned to the deepest yearnings of the human heart:

There exists, then, in man a capacity for holiness, a capacity for love that, in its immediacy, regards not the ever-passing shape of this world but the mysterious reality, immanent and transcendent, that we name God. Deeply hidden, intensely personal, this love is not so private as to be solitary. The Spirit is given to many, and the many form a community. The community endures over generations, spreads over different nations, adopts to cultural changes. It acquires a history of its origins, its development, its successes and failures, its happy strokes and its mistakes. Its failures and its mistakes becloud its witness, but they argue not for abolition of religion but for its reform. 182

This description of religion as a state of being in love with God, Lonergan stated to be parallel with Friedrich Heiler's seven features common to all religions. 183 In an article a year later, he outlined the seven features in order to highlight the basic function of religion in human living. Deriving the conclusion from analysis of the four levels of man's intentional consciousness that authentic human living consists in self-transcendence, Lonergan also asserted that "our self-transcendence is not solitary. We fall in love. The love into which we fall is not some single act of loving, not some series of acts, but a dynamic state that prompts and molds all our thoughts and feelings, all our judgments and decisions." This being in love determines one's total context or horizon, and grounds faith (which is the "eye of love, discerning God's hand in nature and his self-disclosure in revelation") and hope (which is the security and the confidence of those to whom God has given his love"). 185 We must note that love here begins the sequence of faith and hope, whereas in the Philosophy of Education lectures and in Insight, it is in the traditional order of faith hope, and charity. Finding its origin in the shift from a cosmological viewpoint to an anthropological one, Lonergan explained:

Where before man contemplated an objective universe and understood himself in terms of the same objective categories, now what is first to be understood is not the universe but man, even though it is man as the principle whence one can come to know the universe. Where before knowledge preceded, founded, and justified loving, now falling-in-love and being-in-love culminate and complete the process of self-transcendence, which begins with knowledge but goes beyond it, as Blaise Pascal saw when he remarked that the heart has reasons which reason does not know.

This change liberates religion and theology from rationalist tendencies, from the need or desire to prove the truths of faith simply from reason and history. For though both reason and history have their contribution to make, still that contribution is subordinate to God's gift of his love to us, to the love that discerns God's self-manifestation in nature and his self disclosure in revelation. 186

It is in this sense, then, that in <u>Method</u>, Lonergan often refers to "God's gift of his love flooding our hearts" and "people falling in love" as the major and minor exceptions to the general Latin tag, <u>Nihil amatum nisi praecognitum</u> (knowledge precedes love). 187 The falling in love is an exercise of vertical liberty when one takes on a new organization. But the dynamic state of being-in-love is on the one hand the grace that God offers all men, a "dynamic vector, a mysterious undertow, a fateful call to a dreaded holiness" that underpins what is good in all religions. On the other hand, it is brought to fulfillment when one undergoes conversion and becomes "ever more ready to deliberate and evaluate and decide and act with the easy freedom of those that do all good because they are in love." At this point, when the gift of God's love takes over the ground and root of the fourth and highest level of man's waking consciousness, it sublates all the other levels — transvaluing our values and transforming our knowing.

Although Lonergan in 1970 and 1971 delivered several other lectures (e.g. "Doctrinal Pluralism", ¹⁸⁹ which was formative to Chapter 12 of Method) and articles (e.g. "The Example of Gibson Winter", ¹⁹⁰ as we have referred to it earlier in this chapter), his overall project had, by this point, become Method in Theology which he completed during his year as Stillman Professor of Ecumenical Studies at the Divinity School of Harvard University, 1971-72. Therefore our investigation into the developments that led to Method have returned to their starting point with the publication of Method itself. We must now turn to some of the sources which we have found to be ingredient to Lonergan's development of a new notion of value in Method.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER II

1Lonergan, B.J.F. Method in Theology. (New York: Herder & Herder, 1972). Designated below as Method.

- ²<u>Ibid</u>., p. XII.
- 3 Ibid., p. XI.
- ⁴Ibid., p. 4.
- ⁵<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 5.
- 6<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 9.

⁷Lonergan, B.J.F. "Insight Revisited" (1973) in <u>A Second Collection</u>, ed. W.F.J. Ryan & B.J. Tyrell. (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1974) p. 277. Designated below as Second Collection.

- 8 Method, p. 10.
- 9"The Subject" in Second Collection, p. 79.
- 10 Indem.
- 11 Method, p. 11.
- ¹²<u>Ibid</u>., p. 13.
- 13"The Subject", in Second Collection, p. 81.
- 14 Method, p. 12.
- 15<u>Ibid</u>., p. 14.
- ¹⁶Ibid., p. 14-15.
- ¹⁷Ibid., p. 24.
- ¹⁸<u>Ibid</u>., p. 30.
- ¹⁹Ibid., p. 31.

```
20<sub>Ibid</sub>.
```

- 21 <u>Ibid</u>., p. 32.
- 22Lonergan, B.J.F. "Theology and Man's Future", reprinted in Second Collection p. 145.
 - 23_{Method}, p. 33.
 - 24<u>Ibid</u>., p. 34-35.
 - ²⁵<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 35.
 - 26_{Ibid}.
 - 27"The Subject" in Second Collection, p. 82.
 - 28_{Method}, p. 36.
 - ²⁹Ibid., p. 38.
 - 30_{Ibid}., p. 39.
 - 31 <u>Ibid</u>., p. 40.
 - 32<u>Ibid</u>., p. 48.
 - ³³<u>Ibid</u>., p. 51.
 - 34<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 50.
 - 35<u>Ibid</u>., p. 51.
 - 36<u>Ibid</u>., p. 52.
 - ³⁷<u>Ibid</u>., p. 53.
 - 38_{Ibid}.
 - 39<u>Ibid</u>., p. 55.
 - 40<u>Ibid</u>., p. 57.

```
41 <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 59.
```

- Langer, Susanne K. Feeling and Form A Theory of Art. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953). p. 40.
 - 43 Method, p. 64.
 - 44"An Interview with Bernard Lonergan" in Second Collection p. 220-221.
 - 45_{Method}, p. 65.
 - 46 Ibid.
 - 47 <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 69.
 - 48_{Ibid}., p. 70.
 - ⁴⁹Ibid., p. 71.
 - ⁵⁰<u>Ibid</u>., p. 73.
 - ⁵¹<u>Ibid</u>., p. 73-74.
 - ⁵²<u>Ibid</u>., p. 77.
 - ⁵³<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 84.
 - 54_{Ibid}.
 - ⁵⁵<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 101.
 - ⁵⁶<u>Ibid</u>., p. 103.
 - ⁵⁷Ibid., p. 105.
- $^{58}\text{Romans}$ 5:5, often quoted by Lonergan in this context. e.g. "The Future of Christianity" (1969) reprinted in Second Collection. p. 153.
 - ⁵⁹Method, p. 39.
 - ⁶⁰Ib<u>id</u>., p. 107.

- 61 Grace and Freedom, p. 139-145.
- 62 See "Bernard Lonergan Responds" in <u>Foundations in Theology</u>, ed. P. McShane. (Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame Press, 1971). p. 228.
 - 63"The Response of a Jesuit...", Second Collection. p. 173.
 - 64_{Method}, p. 109.
 - 65<u>Ibid</u>., p. 111.
 - 66 Ibid., p. 112.
 - 67<u>Ibid</u>., p. 115.
 - 68<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 116.
 - 69_{Ibid}.
 - ⁷⁰<u>Ibid</u>., p. 118.
 - 71 <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 119.
 - ⁷²<u>Ibid</u>., p. 127-33.
 - ⁷³Ibid., p. 135.
- 74 Lonergan, B.J.F. <u>Philosophy of God, and Theology</u> (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1973). p. 33. Designated below as <u>Philosophy of God</u>.
 - 75 <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 59.
 - 76 <u>Ibid</u>., p. 17 (brackets mine).
- ⁷⁷In an unpublished work entitled "Circulation Analysis" (1944) which deals with economic analysis and method. More recently he has been updating his economic analysis, teaching such courses as "Profit and Exponential Growth" (Boston College-1977), and preparing material for publication.
- ⁷⁸Lonergan, B.J.F. "The Example of Gibson Winter" (1970), reprinted in <u>Second Collection</u>, p. 189-192.

- 79_{Method}, p. 247.
- ⁸⁰Fr. Lonergan's response to a question: in <u>Philosophy of God</u>, p. 16.
- 81"Bernard Lonergan Responds", Foundations of Theology, p. 224.
- 82 See dialogue with Lonergan, in Philosophy of God, pp. 19-20.
- 83"The Future of Christianity", Second Collection, p. 154.
- 84 Lonergan, B.J.F. "Transition from a Classicist World-View to Historical-Mindedness" (1966), reprinted in Second Collection, p. 7.
 - 85 Method, p. 211.
 - 86<u>Ibid</u>., p. 366.
 - 87 See dialogue with Lonergan in Philosophy of God, p. 44.
 - 88<u>Ibid</u>., p. 16.
 - 89"The Response of a Jesuit..." Second Collection, p. 168-173.
- Donergan, B.J.F. "Philosophy and Theology" (1970), reprinted in Second Collection, p. 204.
 - 91 See dialogue with Lonergan in Philosophy of God, p. 18.
 - 92_{Method}, p. 271.
 - 93<u>Ibid</u>., p. 269.
 - 94_{Ibid}.
- 95<u>L'experience religieuse fondamentale</u>. (Tournai: Castermann, 1969), p. 168.
 - 96 Method, p. 290.
 - 97<u>Ibid</u>., p. 298.
 - 98<u>Ibid</u>., p. 299.

```
99<u>Ibid</u>., p. 239-40.
```

100 <u>Ibid</u>., p. 240.

101_{Ibid., p. 241.}

102 Indem.

103 Lonergan, B.J.F. "Healing and Creating in History" in <u>3 Lectures</u> (sic) ed.R.E. O'Connor (Montreal: Thomas More Inst, 1975) p. 63.

104 Method, p. 243.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., p. 266.

106_{Ibid.}, p. 262.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., p. 268.

108_{Ibid}.

109_{Ibid., p. 299.}

110 <u>Ibid</u>., p. 298-99.

111 "The Response of a Jesuit..." Second Collection, p. 175.

 $^{112}\text{Lonergan, B.J.F.}$ Doctrinal Pluralism. (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1971), p. 28.

113 Method, p. 342.

114_{Ibid., p. 362.}

115<u>Ibid</u>., p. 366.

116 See unpublished typescript (N. Graham, 1975) of Lectures on Existentialism, given at Boston College, Summer 1957, this typescript being held at the Lonergan Centre, Regis College, Toronto; and also Notes on Existentialism, being notes taken at those lectures and reprinted by the Thomas More Institute, Montreal, 1957. Excepts from the lectures quoted with permission.

```
117 From an interview with Father Lonergan on the evening of December 15th, 1976, in St. Mary's Residence of Boston College: Question: What (did you read) of the Existentialists? Was that all prior to your lectures here in 1957? Answer: Oh, that was a put-together job, to secure my "bus-fare", you know! I did more reading after that. It is better reflected in my lectures on the Philosophy of Education.
```

Question: What existentialists did you read primarily? Answer: Jaspers.

```
118 Lecture on Existentialism, op. cit., p. 3.
119 Tbid., p. 6.
```

120 Ibid., p. 8.

121 <u>Ibid</u>., p. 22.

122 Ibid., p. 32.

123_{Ibid}.

124 Ed. W. Biemel (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1954).

125 Lectures, op. cit., p. 56.

126_{Ibid.}, p. 73.

127 Ibid., p. 86.

128 Ibid., p. 87.

129 Ibid., p. 96.

130 Ibid., p. 126.

¹³¹ See unpublished typescript of <u>Lectures on the Philosophy of Education</u>, given at Xavier University, Cincinnati, Summer 1959. These notes are held at Lonergan Centre, Regis College, Toronto, p. 286. Excepts from the typescript used with permission.

¹³² See Contemporary Education and Sinful Social Structures (1959 being a paper given at the Lonergan Workshop, Boston College, Summer, 1979. This unpublished paper is held at Lonergan Centre, Regis College, Toronto.

```
133 Lectures on the Philosophy of Education op. cit., p. 2:10, 2:11, 2:12 respectively.
```

- 134<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 3:10.
- 135 <u>Ibid</u>., p. 3:13.
- 136_{Ibid., p. 3:15.}
- 137_{Ibid., p. 3:10.}
- 138 Ibid., p. 3:24.
- 139 Ibid., p. 3:17-20.
- 140 Ibid., p. 3:20.
- 141 Philosophy of Education op. cit., p. 4:18ff.
- 142<u>Ibid</u>., p. 8:19.
- 143_{Ibid.}, p. 8:25.
- 144 Ibid., p. 3.9
- 145 Ibid., p. 6:15.
- 146 Ibid., p. 6:16.
- 147_{Ibid.}, p. 8:13.
- 148"Insight Revisited" in Second Collection, p. 277.
- 149"Metaphysics as Horizon in Collection, p. 220.
- 150 <u>Ibid</u>., p. 219.
- 151"Dimensions of Meaning" in Collection, p. 252.
- 152<u>Ibid</u>., p. 263.

```
<sup>153</sup>Ib<u>id</u>., p. 253.
    154<sub>Ibid</sub>., p. 264.
    155"Existenz and Aggiornamento" in Collection p. 249.
    156<u>Ibid</u>., p. 250.
158<u>Ibid</u>., p. 6.
    159 See Second Collection p. 50f.
    160 Ibid., p. 52.
    161"The Subject" in Second Collection, p. 70.
    162<u>Ibid</u>., p. 73.
    163<sub>Ibid., p. 75.</sub>
    164<sub>Ibid.</sub>, p. 79.
    165<sub>Ib1d</sub>.
    166<sub>Ibid., p. 80.</sub>
    167<sub>Ibid</sub>., p. 81.
    168<sub>Ibid., p. 70.</sub>
    169 Ibid., p. 82.
    170<sub>Ibid</sub>.
```

173 See "Belief: Today's Issue" in Second Collection p. 91.

¹⁷¹Ibid., p. 83.

172 Ibid., p. 86.

- 174 See "The Absence of God in Modern Culture" in Second Collection p. 103.
- 175 See "Natural Knowledge of God" in Second Collection, p. 139.
- 176_{Ibid}., p. 127.
- 177 Ibid., p. 123.
- ¹⁷⁸Ibid., p. 119, 120, 122, 131, 132.
- ¹⁷⁹Ibid., p. 131.
- 180"Theology and Man's Future" in Second Collection p. 148.
- ¹⁸¹Ibid., p. 144.
- ¹⁸²Ibid., p. 146.
- 183_{Ibid}.
- 184 See the Future of Christianity" in <u>Second Collection</u> p. 153.
- 185_{Ibid}., p. 154.
- 186 Ibid., p. 161-2.
- ¹⁸⁷Method, p. 122, 278, 283.
- 188 See "The Response of the Jesuit" in <u>Second Collection</u>, p. 172-173.
- Lonergan B.J.F. <u>Doctrinal Pluralism</u>. (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1971).
 - 190 See "The Example of Gibson Winter" in Second Collection p. 189.

CHAPTER III

DATA FOR A HIGHER VIEWPOINT: MAX SCHELER

Lonergan, in preparing to take an institute at Xavier University in Cincinnati on the philosophy of education for the summer of 1959, mentions:

In preparing that, I read a lot of Piaget, also Susanne Langer Feeling and Form, things like that, and that was the beginning of entry into these things. Then von Hildebrand, and Frings' book on Scheler were a big help. 1

As well as this comment, Lonergan also makes numerous references and footnotes to Manfred Frings' book on Max Scheler in Method and in several articles from that period, but at no time makes a reference to any of Scheler's own works. This is also true of his lectures notes from the Gregorian University in Rome De Intellectu et Methodo (1959) and De Methodo Theologiae (1962) where he mentions secondary references such as Frings, with the one single exception of Scheler's Wesen und Formen der Sympathie. When asked by us directly what books by or on Scheler that he had read, Lonergan responded "Frings' book . . . oh, and perhaps a chapter or two from the Nature of Sympathy". This gives us the clear indication that Lonergan draws or Scheler from three basic sources:

- 1) Frings on Scheler
- 2) Dietrich von Hildebrand (a student of Scheler)
- 3) Wesen und Formen der Sympathie

In this chapter, we will try to draw out the basic perspectives on Scheler which are available from Manfred Frings' excellent little introductory book on Scheler, and which could be seen to be central to Scheler's Wesen und Formen der Sympathie. We will leave sources from Dietrich von Hildebrand, an acknowledged student of Scheler, to the next chapter, where his own particular insights on and beyond Scheler can be presented. We will go beyond Frings' interpretation of Scheler to primary sources

from Scheler whenever the topic is sufficiently introduced in Frings to warrant further pursuance.

One of the most striking things one finds upon reading both Scheler and Lonergan is that they both present themselves as proposing distinctly non-Kantian positions. For Lonergan this involves underlining the essential subject/object relationship between the knower and the known, and therefore he proceeds a step beyond Kant's "Intuitionist" principle of reality merely "known" through sense data, to insights and judgments on reality. Scheler is more Kantian in this sense for, as with Husserl and the phenomenological method, he describes intuition as an essential mode of knowing reality. But Scheler differs from Kant in rejecting as a priori the categories of cognition, and instead recognizes an a priori intuition of essences:

We designate as "a priori" all those ideal units of meaning and those propositions that are self-given by way of an <u>immediate intuitive</u> content in the absence of any kind of positing of subjects that think them and of the real nature of those subjects, and in the absence of any kind of positing of objects to which such units of meaning are applicable.

These units of meaning present themselves <u>before</u> cognition, for cognition is seen by Scheler to be a more relative, culturally-influenced and sociological process. So while Kant proposes a universal and absolute ethics which is based upon an <u>a priori</u> subjective principle (formal reason-categories of cognition), Scheler proposes a universal and absolute ethics which is based on <u>a priori</u> non-formal and material essences. To Scheler, these immediately intuited essences reveal values which are universal and absolute, and their intuition comes through feeling feelings. Scheler thus elevates the value and role of feelings as not mere senses

in need of control by reason, but as almost a parallel if not primary mode of human cognition of essences. He takes particular issue with Kant for linking such central and critical human emotions as love and hate with mere sensible feelings, and therefore to be excluded from any moral relevance to bearing values, willing, or acting. 8

The emotive elements of spirit, such as feeling, preferring, loving, hating, and willing, also possess original a priori contents which are not borrowed from "thinking", and which ethics must show to be independent of logic. There is an a priori ordre du coeur, or logique du coeur, as Blaise Pascal aptly calls it. Since its introduction by the Greeks, the term reason, or ratio—especially when placed in opposition to so-called sensibility—has always designated only the logical side of spirit, not the other non-logical a priori side . . . Thus axioms of values are wholly independent of logical axioms and are not mere "applicactions" of the latter to values. Logic and a pure doctrine of values stand side by side.

His phenomenological investigation into the role and functions of feelings in man enables Scheler to propose a phenomenological theory of values based on the non-rational intuitive grasp of these values, and to differentiate it from Kant by a title which brings together terms which, to Kant, ought to remain apart: 10

"Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die Materiale Wertethik".

Scheler's basis for a theory of value based on an <u>a priori</u> intuition of value essences comes out of a phenomenological investigation which is itself <u>a priori</u>, and which therefore either one sees or one does not. It is a self-evident insight. The role of philosophy is integral to such insights:

In essence philosophy is strictly self-evident insight, which cannot be either augmented or nullified by induction and which has a priori validity for contingent existents: insight into all such essences and essential interrelations of beings as are accessible to us from available instances, in the order and hierarchy as they stand in relation to the absolute entity and its essence. 11

Behind this role of philosophy is an ontology of God, man, and creation which underlies all of Scheler's work, and most of all his very particular concern to describe man's particular role in these ontic relationships. Scheler understands there to be two basic principles at work in the cosmos. One involves drives and senses, which instinctively relate organic life to the environment. The other is Spirit (Geist), 12 which is unique to man in that it promotes objectification and consciousness of both the environment and the cosmos.

Man alone—in so far as he is a person—is able to go beyond himself as an organism and to transform, from a centre beyond the spatiotemporal world, everything (himself included) into an object of knowledge. Thus man as a spiritual being is a being that surpasses himself in the world. As such he is also capable of irony and humor which always indicate the transcendence of actual existence. The centre, however, from which man performs the acts by means of which he objectifies body, psyche, and world in its spatial and temporal abundance cannot itself be part of this world. It cannot be located in space or in time: it can only be located in the highest Ground of Being itself. 13

Spirit exists in the specific act of revealing this essence which transcends existence, but the human person is a participant in this overall principle of the cosmos, the Ground of Being. 14 As such, he cannot objectify his participation in Spirit, although he can objectify his environment and world. Rather, man exists in a "genuine co-creation of the essences, ideas, values and goals coordinated with the eternal logos, the eternal love, and the eternal will". 15 But the essences, ideas, and values of Spirit can be known by the "act of ideation" which

...means to grasp the essential modes and formal structures of the world through a single case only, independent of the number of observations and inductive inferences which belong to intelligence. The knowledge so gained is then universally valid for all possible cases of the same essential nature, and for all possible subjects who think about the same case, quite independent of the accidents of the senses and the manner and degree of their stimu-

lation. Insights so gained, therefore, are valid beyond the limits of sensory experience. They are valid not only for this world, but for all possible worlds. In technical language, we call them a priori.

This knowledge of essences fulfills two different functions. On the one hand, it provides the presuppositions, or fundamental axioms, for the positive sciences. . . . For metaphysics, on the other hand, whose goal is the knowledge of absolute being, the essences are, as Hegel said appropriately, 'windows into the absolute.'

This ontic belongingness, then, lies behind Scheler's sense of the <u>a priori</u> intuition into essence. Looked at from the point of view of religious phenomenology, Scheler talks therefore of the "eternal in man," and states that only in ethical and religious acts (of the spirit) is the human being "invariably looking into a realm of being and value which is in basis and origin utterly different from the whole remaining empirical world." Man is inextricably linked as a participant to this ground of being or essence. (Later we will see this relates to Scheler's concept of God). This, too, constitutes the absolute that grounds Scheler's ethics.

What was so unique to Scheler as a phenomenologist was that he identified the key aspect of spiritual life to be found not only in cognition and in thinking, but also in the affective realm of feeling, preferring, loving, hating, etc. What are presented as essences in the affective side of the person are values, which are "clearly feelable phenomena" +they are "the affects, the desires, and feelings themselves." Intentional feelings, Scheler states, are the "organs for comprehending values." But a distinction must be drawn between feeling states themselves, and intentional feelings of something. The former may be states of pain, disagreeableness of food or scent, agreeableness in taste, pleasure in food, drink, etc. The latter are feelings of something. In the cause or intent of such feeling states—such as the cause of my feeling sadness—is found the act, the good, or the person bearing the value or disvalue primarily felt.

Hence there is a "cognitive function" to feeling when it is not just a state but a "goal-determined movement". 20 But what is the goal? Scheler agrees with Kant that the value contents of "good" or "evil" cannot be realized in any one act (e.g. a "good act"), but rather "it is located, so to speak, on the back of this act". 21 It is the essence of Scheler's non-formal theory of values that they are realized only in acts. More of that will be said later. For the present, it is essential to see that our feelings toward such acts (or acting-persons), is the seat of our "moral cognition", or "value cognition", or "value-intuition" such as "comes to the fore in feeling, basically in love and hate". 22

Scheler differentiates several phenomena of intentional feelings. He says firstly that there is a stratification and hierarchy of both positive and negative feelings, each of which somehow relates to different value complexes and can be operative simultaneously. For instance, a human being can be blissful while still suffering bodily pain. This sort of difference in both quality and depth of feeling leads Scheler to suggest that there are at least four basic levels of feeling-states:

- 1) "Sensible or pleasure feelings", such as pain, taste, touch, etc.
- 2) "feelings of the lived body and life", or vital feelings, such as illness, fatigue, vigour, weakness.
- 3) "pure psychic feelings", or feelings of the ego such as sorrow, and blissfulness.
- 4) "spiritual feelings" or "feelings of the personality", such as bliss, despair, peace, resentment, etc. 23

The content of sensible and vital feelings often relate directly to lifegiving or danger signals in both the body and the environment. Psychic
feelings are very different, however, in that they dominate the ego and
engage the lived (historical) life of the person or relate to that of
another person. One can feel, for instance, not only one's own sorrow

from an act, but also that of someone else--as well as re-feeling a former sorrow in one's own life. The content of the feeling comes from the realm of meaning and value. Spiritual feeling states emanate directly from the very core of our person, and give a content to our "being" that surpasses all others (e.g. to "be" despairing, however safe, secure and physically satisfied). Spiritual feeling states have the most intentional character of the four levels of feeling-states, 24 and therefore have the greatest potential as bearers of value. These are also the least controllable by any form of willing.

Scheler also discovered that the higher levels of feeling-states could extend beyond the individual to function as inter-personal emotional experiences. In Wesen und Formen der Sympathie he outlines four phenomena of inter-emotional experience:

- "community of feeling", such as two parents standing beside the dead body of a beloved child, feeling the same sorrow and grief. It involves, therefore an emotional unity.
- 2) "Fellow-feeling" such as a third person feeling the sorrow and grief of the two parents by an intentional act of commiserating with their sorrow and grief. It involves one feeling another's feeling. Such vicarious feeling can be merely visualized or actually participated in.
- "Emotional infection", or "psychic contagion", when one is "swept up" into the gaiety of a party, the excitement of a game, or the grief of a funeral. While a transference of the <u>feeling state</u> occurs, its cause or intention (the celebration of the party, the winning of the game) may not be present at all. Hence the knowledge present for "community of feeling" or "fellow feeling" to take place, is entirely absent. The feeling is transferred involuntarily.
- 4) "Emotional Identification", such as the total identification of a person with a character in a play (so as to "live the play"), or a child losing herself in play involving the role of her mother (to live her mother), or the total identification that can take place in sexual intercourse, (to be consumed by the other). In all cases, the ego of one is suspended for a time by the total presence of the other's ego. It is psychic contagion in its utmost extreme. In adults it is generally willed or at least allowed,

while in children it can happen quite spontaneously through the absence of well-defined ego. 25

These four phenomena of togetherness feelings (sympathy) are modes for the transfer of the essential knowledge of a person, especially one's scale of values, which makes one a unique person. Scheler conjectures that, at its best, such transfer of knowledge is invariably found "midway between bodily consciousness . . . and that intellectual cum-spiritual personality which is the centre of activity for all the higher acts of intention."26 Civilizations seem to be more prone to one mode of transfer than another, and much of Scheler's Wesen und Formen der Sympathie is concerned with Western Civilization's dominant orientation to the knowledge of rationality rather than to the elemental knowledge of the ontic oneness of man and cosmos found more in eastern civilizations. But he claims that transference of knowledge and meaning by combinations of the four modes of what together might be called "fellow-feeling" is "an ultimate and original function of the $spirit^{"27}$ and one which must precede rational knowledge. (This is still another indication of what in Scheler is a basic "emotive apriorism"). What we will investigate somewhat later is how these modes of transfer, when combined with the intentionality of value preference, can be described as basic forms of love.

Scheler's phenomenology of feeling is for the purpose of describing the laws of moral cognition. But the values apprehended through feelings, are presented by persons and in acts. Scheler's theory of acts and his theory of the person are inextricably linked. His theory of acts (in living beings) is premised on the differentiation of functions from acts. "Functions" man shares with animals and vegetables—they are vital drives and activities of life, generally directed towards preservation of

the life involved, and can be studied and measured by the sciences as natural laws. 28 Acts, however, are unique to man in that they are spontaneous and unrelated to necessary movements in space or time. 29 They are events which take place not by natural necessity, but by intentionality. They are the intentions of persons in response to all that is unique to being a human person—which Scheler describes as Spirit(Geist). The inter-relation between these notions of act, person, and spirit can be seen in the following collected definitions:

- -The person is the concrete and essential unity of being of acts of different essences. 30
- -. . . a concrete act can never be fully and adequately comprehended without the antecedent intending of the essence of the person. 31
- -... the person is and experiences himself only as a being that executes acts . . . but the whole person is contained in every fully concrete act, and the whole person "varies" in and through every act. 32
- -Spirit is the only being incapable of becoming an object. It is pure actuality. It has its being only in and through the execution of its acts. The centre of spirit, the person, is not an object or a substantial kind of being, but a continuously self-executing, ordered structure of acts. The person is only in and through his acts. 33

This description of person as a sort of "central concretion of our responsible acts" ³⁴ is thus, of course, the person revealed in acts, apprehended through fellow-feeling, and known through feeling. But all this relates to ethics in that the person is also the "centre of spirit", that faculty of absolute essences, absolute Spirit, God:

. . . against the background of its existing awareness that all finite things are created, the human spirit (Geist) has an empirical sense of being God's principle creation and of being at the same time permanently rooted in him, 'grounded' on him, and moved by him in the execution of its acts We are dealing with an experience of the relation, with an experience of the human spirit as the reflected and living mirror of the divine . . . Thus the human mind's faithful

likeness to God is engraved in the mind itself, in its very being, without its having to establish that likeness through a natural perception of the original The 'act-centre of the human mind--the spirit--is, of course, in contrast with actus purus, a permanent centre of potential activity. 35

This understanding of the eternal in man Scheler arrives at through a phenomenological analysis of the religious or mental act, in which man becomes conscious of his spirit(Geist) having an immanence of God as Spirit. Scheler builds, for instance, on Otto's description of the value-mode "holy" (but denies his religious epistemology) 36 which is an example of the self-givenness of divine essence. But above all, essence, spirit, person, and act present themselves to us as subjects—immediately (by intuition)—and cannot be objectivized for observation. 37 Even reflective knowing cannot objectify them. 38 And it is precisely for that reason that they are "known" by forms of participation, where there is a relationship of identity between divine spirit, human spirit, and human spirit shared amongst persons (and perceived in fellow-feeling):

Therefore our own participation in these acts is not simply a matter of discovering or disclosing some being or essence that exists independently of us. It is, rather, a genuine co-creation of the essences, ideas, values, and goals coordinated with the eternal logos, the eternal love, and the eternal will.³⁹

The key understanding for our purposes in ethics is, however, that divine essence (in mind or spirit) is both mirrored and engraved upon the human essence of person, concretized in his/her acts, apprehended in fellow-feeling, and finally known through feeling itself.

It remains for us to examine what is actually meant by the <u>a priori</u>

<u>content</u> of the acts of the spirit/person. Such contents or units of meaning are values (feelable phenomena) which are qualities borne on the back
of acts by persons, but which are never reducible to mere acts or things

or goods themselves (only acting persons can be good or evil). 40 They move in one of two directions: to love and prefer, or to hate and reject. 41 Love and hate are not themselves feelings, but are modes of response to feelings (fundamental movements of intention). In either direction, however, there is perceived a ranking of values according to their height:

All values (including the values "good" and "evil") are non-formal qualities of contents possessing a determinate order of ranks with respect to "higher" and "lower". This order is independent of the form of being into which they enter .42

The relative height of a value is immediately apparent in the act of preferring one value over another. The ranking of higher and lower in these values is apparent in the feelings they arouse. On the lowest level of sensible feeling, there are values of the agreeable and the disagreeable. 43 These range from responses of pleasure to responses of utility. They are generally relative to the organism they serve. On the level of vital feeling, there are values of health/illness, strength/weakness, glad/sad. These are, Scheler proposes against Kant, an original modality in themselves, and cannot be reduced to the hedonistic level of agreeable/disagreeable. 44 Both sensible and vital value categories contain all values relative to life. However, values relative to the Person (which are always revealed by our tendency to sacrifice vital values for them) involve the two higher modalities of spiritual values and values of the holy. Spiritual values are present in feelings of love/hate, attractive/ugly, right/wrong, joy/ sorrow. 45 They are dependent upon objects themselves (goods, acts, persons), and are not reducible to any biological lawfulness (as values relative to life). The highest value--modality is that of the holy/unholy. 46

It appears only with reference to the intention of the absolute (God). The feeling-states range from bliss to despair, arising out of the sense of the body which is directed towards persons and therefore experienced as a form of personal being. Values of this modality relate to the very essence of the acting person.

There is both a universal ranking of values, and a particular rank present in every acting person. This ranking is an aspect of spirit (Geist), which is itself a manifestation of the divine essence:

To all knowledge (and indeed all intentional acts) a being must correspond, and to every being a possible knowledge. Similarly, to all love and preference there must correspond a value, and to every value a love and preference.⁴⁷

The particular loving and hating of an acting person is set

...in an immeasurably vast world of sensible and spiritual objects which set my heart and passions in constant motion. It follows that any sort of rightness or falseness and perversity in my life and activity are determined by whether there is an objectively correct order of these stirrings of my love and hate, my inclination and disinclination . . . It depends further on whether I impress this ordo amoris on my inner moral tenor. 48

Scheler's notion of the <u>ordo amoris</u> is that it is on the one hand objective and normative as a macrocosm of the absolute ranking of values, while on the other hand it is descriptive of the microcosm of the actual valuations and value preferences in any acting person. It is for moral man "what the crystallization formula is for the crystal", ⁴⁹ and correct moral action is found in realizing the value in its order. Obviously, but another way of understanding the absolute spirit or essence as reflected and engraved on the mind of every person, Scheler describes the <u>ordo amoris</u> as being reflected on every person's heart and constituting every person's

participation in the absolute <u>ordo</u> <u>amoris</u>. Every acting person has both the restriction and possibilities of his particularity—but in essence that means that each has his particular ordo amoris:

He carries this shell along with him wherever he goes and cannot escape from it no matter how quickly he runs. He perceives the world and himself through the windows of this shell, and perceives no more of the world, of himself, or of anything else besides what these windows show him, in accordance with their position, size, and colour . . . The goods . . the practical things . . . are from the very first always inspected and "sighted" as it were, by the particular selective mechanism of his ordo amoris. 50

Man's "fate", therefore, is the way in which his particular <u>ordo amoris</u> is formed--from the love and hate objects of early childhood, to the present.

There is a very particular function of love and hate in all of this.

Love and hate are acts in which the value-realm accessible to the feeling of a being is either extended or narrowed . . . this act plays the disclosing role in our value-comprehensions, and this is the only act that does so. This act is, as it were, a movement in whose execution ever new and higher values flash out, i.e., values that were wholly unknown to the being concerned. Thus this act does not follow value feeling and preferring, but is ahead of them as a pioneer and guide. 51

One of the best descriptions of love Scheler gives is of a dynamic becoming, a growing, "a welling up of things in the direction of their archetype, which resides in God". Love "awakens both knowledge and volition" and is "the mother of spirit and reason itself". It, therefore, is the positive dynamism of all acts of the person. And Scheler is clear about the order of how this works in man. "Man, before he is an ens cogitans or an ens volens, is an ens amans". And some the insight through loving come first, but it produces a different sort of reason to that of ens cogitans. Following Pascal and his famous phrase on the heart and its reasons, Scheler adds:

The heart has its reasons, "its", of which the understanding knows nothing and can never know anything; and it has reasons, that is, objective and evident insights into matters to which every understanding is blind--as "blind" as a blind man is to color or a deaf man is to tone...It is the totality of well-regulated acts, of functions having an intrinsic lawfulness which is autonomous and rigorous and does not depend on the psychological organization of man; a lawfulness that operates with precision and exactness. Its functions bring before our eyes a strictly objective sphere of facts which is the most objective, the most fundamental of all possible spheres of fact; one which remains in the universe even if Homo sapiens is destroyed just as does the truth of the proposition $2 \times 2 = 4$. Indeed it is more independent of men that the validity of that proposition. 55

The reasons of the heart bring before us objective facts, which are quite independent of any human being feeling them. ⁵⁶ But they present themselves only in acts of the heart--occasions when we act in the fullness of the spirit(<u>Geist</u>) such as in honouring, loving, creating, praying. In such acts, the scale, for instance, of what is worthy of love, exists for everyone generally in a determinate and a unique position. This is in its <u>essence</u>, when every contingency (such as the possibilities or non-possibilities for its expression in actual existent persons in a particular culture and society) has been stripped away. ⁵⁷ Man through love moves towards the archetype of values and the eternal-God--in a process of self transcendence. ⁵⁸ The whole process of loving and valuation moves man beyond himself.

The phenomenon of love was the subject of much of Scheler's study.

In the Nature of Sympathy he identified three basic forms of love which correspond to the latter three or four feeling states. On the level of vital feelings, there is a passionate love which, like the values of health and nobility, lead to loves like loyalty, friendship, and sexual love. On

the level of psychic feelings there is a mental love which moves towards beauty, law and justice, knowledge--value objects of the culture of persons. On the highest level of spiritual feelings, there is the spiritual love of persons and of God. As the forms are seen in a movement upward, it can be seen that there is less and less significance in the physical object of that love, and yet an object is still present through a stirring, a "hankering", a "yearning" for it as a possibility. On But to describe love as having an "object" is a misleading aspect of language, for love never really approaches another person as an object. As in his discussion of inter-emotional experience, it is clear that there is more of an immediate involvement or participation in subjects, and this constitutes an essential nature of love and valuation:

The person of another can only be disclosed to me by my joining in the performance of his acts, either cognitively, by understanding and vicarious 'reliving', or morally by 'following in his footsteps'. The moral code of the personality of Jesus, for example, is revealed to one man only: His disciple. 62

This "participation", or "joining in" is the essence of love through to love of God itself, which is itself a participative encounter:

For this reason alone the mystic, comtemplative love for God as the highest good must necessarily lead to participation in, and emulation of, God's infinite action of love towards himself and his creatures—so that the conduct of us men towards our fellow—creatures is analogous to that of God toward us. Conversely, love "in" God, which is the active insertion of the nucleus of mental personality into the core of the divine person, and a loving of all things with the love of God, must of its own accord revert to God as the highest object of love and thus perfect itself mystically, contemplatively, in the amare Deum in Deo. 63

This conclusion that love, in essence, is an inter-emotional participation of one person in another, is the foundation of Scheler's understanding of how values are transmitted—through "disciples" and "model persons". There is somehow a transmission of the ideals of another person—not only his/her present ordo amoris, but all its possibilities as well. There is a love of the other person's becoming:

The 'being' we are concerned with here is that 'ideal being' postulated in love which is neither an empirical and existential one, nor one which it 'ought' to have, but a third thing, which is as yet indifferent with regard to this distinction; the same being that is implied, e.g. in the phrase 'Become what thou art', which means something quite different from 'Thou shouldst be thus and thus,' while it is also quite different from the being of empirical existence, for what one 'is' in this latter sense, one does not need to 'become'.64

Through the acts and person of one loving, is disclosed his/her ordo amoris, the ranking of values, -- the essence and possibilities of that person. This is especially true, however, of what might be called "model" persons -- both actual historical persons (e.g. St. Augustine) and also pure model types (e.g. saint, the hero). In either case, such a person is a bearer of a particular group of values for a culture or a society. 65 a societal ordo amoris. Such persons are the subject of stories and myths which exist in every society. They are the teachers and exemplars of values, but they are not normative except for the historical and actual person whose actions posited them. 66 The closest one could come to an interpersonal norm would be through such a degree of fellow-feeling, and love for the person as a model, that it is internalized as a norm for the one modeling it. While Scheler advocates the centrality of model persons as one of the most efficacious means of transmitting and encouraging (or discouraging), his intention is the reverse of such models functioning as normative:

The true relation between value-universalism and value-individualism remains preserved only when every individual

moral subject submits those value-qualities which he alone can grasp to a special moral cultivation and culture, though of course without neglecting universally valid values.⁶⁷

It means that within the particular of place and time and the universal of absolute and eternal there is a

...coincidental grasp of values which temporally are universally valid and of 'historical' concrete situational values, i.e., in the frame of mind in which one continuously surveys the whole of life and listens for the unique 'demand of the moment'. 68

Yet behind such a unique historical person acting in time lies the Person of persons--God--with the totality of the <u>ordo amoris</u> or the spirit (<u>Geist</u>) of God. One's window into the eternal <u>ordo amoris</u> is both a direct view and yet a uniquely limited view of that ordo. It is to

...catch sight of the value-essence of my person--in religious terms, of the value-picture, so to speak, which God's love has of me and which God's love draws and bears before me insofar as this love is directed to me. . . And precisely this content places me in a unique position in the moral cosmos and obliges me with respect to actions, deeds, and works, etc., which, when I represent them, all call, 'I am for you and you are for me'. 70

God's love endows a person, therefore, with the ground of his being--love-and enables participation in that love for the world.

Much has been said, thus far, of the function of love as the discoverer of value. The reverse of this is true of the antithesis of love—what Scheler, following Nietzsche, refers to as "ressentiment". Both in his study of 1912 <u>Uber Ressentiment und moralisches Werturteil</u> and in many later works, the theme of ressentiment as a description of the phenomenon of non-love is central to Scheler's thought. In its context as a French word, it denotes profoundly negative feelings against someone or something—of far more import than is carried by the English word resentment.

Ressentiment is a self-poisoning of the mind which has quite definite causes and consequences. It is a lasting mental attitude, caused by the systematic repression of certain emotions and affects which, as such, are normal components of human nature. Their repression leads to the constant tendency to indulge in certain kinds of value delusions and corresponding value judgments. The emotions and affects primarily concerned are revenge, hatred, malice, envy, the impulse to detract, and spite. 72

Resentiment is a reactive response to an event or person which caused a repression of feeling through impotence or weakness to that event or person. But central to it is the reaction that one's values or person have been rejected or compromised:

. . . the man of ressentiment originally loved the things which in his present condition he hates, and only his hatred at not possessing them or at his powerlessness to acquire them comes subsequently to eradicate these things. 73

Ressentiment begins with love and value, and then with their repression.

A normal or appropriate reaction to such repression, such as anger or indignation, is stifled by an either real or merely imagined sense of weakness or impotence. The stifled reaction triggers instead intentional rancor, envy, jealousy, and hatred. This sense of weakness also negatively affects one's ability to compare constructively someone else's good qualtities with one's own, and, because of a subsequent negative judgment, to cause one to resent and gradually to deride the very good quality that was sought after in the first place. But ressentiment in particular describes...

...the repeated experiencing and reliving of a particular emotional response reaction against someone else. The continual reliving of the emotion sinks it more deeply into the centre of the personality, but concomitantly removes it from the person's zone of action and expression . . . it is a re-experiencing of the emotion itself, a renewal of the original feeling.

It is the re-living and re-feeling aspect of it which is unique to the phenomenon, for it results in the diffusion of the reaction first to other

like persons and events, and then gradually to more and more un-like persons and events--until it has literally become a poisoning against all of humanity and of life itself.

The significance of ressentiment for philosophic thought lies in its effect of disrupting, deceiving, and distorting one's value-feelings and therefore value-intuition. It begins with the simple denial that a certain thing or person possesses a value that one feels one cannot attain. One responds by choosing a lower or even a negative value instead of the value sought after. But as ressentiment disrupts the value-intuition of one value, so it interrupts the whole order of values that are perceived.

What Nietzsche calls 'falsification of the tables of value' is built on this foundation. In this new phrase, the man of <u>ressentiment</u> no longer turns away from the positive values, nor does he wish to destroy the men and things endowed with them. Now the values themselves are inverted: those values which are positive to any normal feeling become negative. 75

When disvaluation proceeds to the point of transvaluation through ressentiment, then one's conscience itself is affected, and one has moved beyond all conscious lying and falsifying to a deeper "organic mendacity". ⁷⁶

One's value-intuition of the absolute scale of values has been replaced by a pathological set of values which are constructed entirely to serve one's own interest. Ressentiment man, on a conscious level, then experiences his actions with the value-feeling of "good" and agreeable. In other words, just as love was firstly the discoverer of value, its anti-thesis--resentiment--becomes the discoverer of disvalue.

Some of the most profound insights of Scheler's description of ressentiment apply to its effect beyond an individual to a society, a culture,

and even an age. While different rankings of values in various cultures and epochs may often be brought about by different actions being seen as carriers of the same absolute value, 77 so also ressentiment values are carried in cultures by tradition, education, and suggestion. 8 Examples of this range from civil wars and revolutions (the French Revolution) 79 to the social ressentiments (black or Jewish). Of particular interest in this regard is what Scheler calls "modern Humanitarian love" which has arisen from the 17th and 18th centuries:

The humanitarian movement is in its essence a resentiment phenomenon, as appears from the very fact that this socio-historical emotion is by no means based on a spontaneous and original affirmation of a positive value, but on a protest, a counter-impulse (hatred, envy, revenge, etc.) against ruling minorities that are known to be in the possession of positive values. "Mankind" is not the immediate object of love (it cannot be, for love can be aroused only by concrete objects)—it is merely a trump card against a hated thing. Above all, this love of mankind is the expression of a repressed rejection, of a counter-impulse against God. It is the disguised form of a repressed hatred of God. 80

This humanitarian love tends particularly to develop in societies where equality has been valued highly as a means of achieving a new social order, and there has been a leveling of previous social roles. Of a radically different nature, proposes Scheler, is Christian love:

The Christian view boldly denies the Greek axiom that love is an aspiration of the lower towards the higher. On the contrary, now the criterion of love is that the nobler stoops to the vulgar, the healthy to the sick, the rich to the poor, the handsome to the ugly, the good and saintly to the bad and common, the Messiah to the sinners and publicans. 81

Christian love, in this bending down, is not to be confused with pity (as Nietzsche corrected Schopenhauer). 82 Rather it is a love for each man's spiritual core, his individual personality, "through which alone he parti-

cipates in the Kingdom of God". 83 There is a totality of essences in the love of God and neighbour, and this is radically reduced in humanitarian love which only encompasses the collective entity of mankind. 84 Implicit in humanitarian love is Jeremy Bentham's principle that "each individual should count for one, and none for more than one". 85 The value of the person and all persons is thereby restricted to the collective. This results in a value disorder where pleasure values (agreeable/disagreeable) and vital values (fine/vulgar) and spiritual values (joy/sorrow) are re-ranked--such as the subordination of the noble to the useful as vital to pleasure values. 66 Christian love, however, is fundamentally related to the absolute order of values, with God and personhood (Scheler's theory of person) ranking highest, and acts of love and sacrifice being the essence of that order.

How, then, is a disordered set of values set in order again? It comes through a combination of two things: the experienced call of the ideal model person, and the act of repentance. The ideal or model person functions, as has been said, as a medium of personhood through which an ideal ordo amoris can be felt (through fellow-feeling) to be in action. One is attracted to be as that model person, to will and act as he/she wills or acts. Experienced love of an exemplar is, as love itself, the discoverer of new values—a more accurate ordo amoris. So it was with Jesus and his disciples:

They wanted in an act to co-experience and re-live the life of his historically fortuitous brief life of simplicity . . . they wanted to permeate and leaven their . . . historical situations and their work . . , with the individual nature of His person and His mysterious life. 87

This is the essence of self-revelation which occurs between God, the Person of persons, and all his persons. Through participation in another person, one sees and feels more clearly the image of the person one can or ought to be—and is lovingly drawn to realize that higher self. But this act of repentance that resultingly follows is incredible, for in one act, one leaves behind an old self for a thorough appropriation of a new:

It is a fearful thing that we can win life only on the dark <u>via dolorosa</u> of repentance. But it is glorious that we have any way to life.⁸⁹

As in all human phenomena, there is a collective dimension to repentance as well. It is the means of new and more perfect realizations of personhood and civilization, and also the only means of extinguishing the movement of ressentiment in a culture:

into a mighty torrent; how it rushes for a generation through whole peoples and civilizations; how it opens obdurate hearts to compassion; how it historically illumines the past of nations which was hidden by racial pride; how it broadens the once ever-narrowing future into a broad bright plain of possibilities—and so prepares the way for the regeneration of a collective moral existence.

With the investigation of the phenomenon of love discovering new values which generate repentance and new life out of ressentiment, we complete our summary circle of describing the main investigations of Scheler's phenomenology and theory of values. It remains for us to make some observations on these discoveries.

Some Observations on Scheler's Program for Ethics

Scheler's program for ethics is most notable precisely for the fact that it isn't a program. It is, rather, a phenomenological description

of how people function morally—from the immediate intuition of moral data, to the moral judgment and act which in turn sets the cumulative moral standard for future intuitions and acts. Scheler would claim that his description has an immediate <u>a priori</u> content which is simply given in phenomenological investigation. It should be able to be verified by whoever makes similar analysis of human moral functioning using Husserl's phenomenological reduction.

What is so central to Scheler's understanding of ethics is that the a priori is found in immediate intuitions of the affections, and that these intuitions relate to an absolute order which is neither reachable nor verifiable by rational cognition. Scheler has both built on Kant (in concluding that a formal ethics of goods and purposes leads, in the end, to relativism) and yet significantly gone beyond him (in finding a source of value that is both absolute and yet particular in that it is found in the intuition of the affections of every living person). While these values are ideal objects, they are only realized in the moral actions of persons—and this results in an ethical understanding which is distinct in being non-formal and material. The values are given and intuited from the material acts of persons, in a process that precedes cognition:

The theory of cognition, therefore, is a discipline which does not precede or ground phenomenology, but follows it . . . However, any such theory presupposes the phenomenological investigation of the essence of that which is given. Cognition and valuation are themselves particular forms of a "consciousness of something" built up from the immediate consciousness of self-given facts. Accordingly, cognition, if the word is used meaningfully, always has to do with any production, formation, or construction of the given. There is no cognition without the prior existence and self-givenness of the things recognized. 91

The self-givenness of values in the acts of persons is at the very heart, therefore, of Scheler's understanding of human ethical functioning. Behind it lies an understanding and assumption of the ontology of spirit and world derived from the observation that there is

. . . a structure of interconnected essences belonging to a world which all the empirical facts of our human world or of our empirical milieu merely exemplify. The structure of this world and the structure of the spirit form one essentially connected structure in all their parts. 92

The intuition into these essences is immediate and the essences are given, prior to any process of cognition or valuation. The intuition, therefore, is our essential point of contact with the absolute, and it is only the particulars of our cognition, valuation, volition and action (which come after the givenness of the absolute) which may tend to relativize that absolute. Precisely because of such relativization, Scheler uses the content of the given being felt and acted upon through the rather immediate process of the affections, rather than being processed through rationality. Hence he proposes that affection and rational cognition might be seen as distinct although perhaps parallel processes. An observer of this description might respond, however, by wondering with what accuracy one can differentiate between the immediate intuition of the given, and the processes of affection, cognition, etc., which follow it. Scheler does not describe this process in such a way that his readers might identify with it and self-appropriate it.

To comprehend this ontology of essences, Scheler describes it predominantly in terms of <u>Geist</u>. This primordial spirit of the cosmos is unique to God, the Person of persons, and to man, the person. While merely organic beings function through drives, man through <u>Geist</u> can be

conscious of and objective to his universe as having primordial being and purpose. This ontic belongingness describes the eternal in man. the source of the essences of the absolute, which to Scheler is "engraved on the mind". There are two predominant ways that Scheler describes this. On the one hand, man's intuition of essences is described as man's "window into the absolute" and man's "mirror of the divine". This description of the act of ideation focuses more on the process by which man intuits the essences given by God and the absolute. The other way Scheler often describes it is that man is a participant in acts of Geist, and therefore acts in the co-creation of essences. This description tends to be found more in his later works such as Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos. It focuses not only on the essences given by Geist, but also the whole person who enacts Geist. This would seem to be an appropriate conclusion given the way in which Geist, person and acts are understood to be so thoroughly intertwined. But it would seem to make the self-critical function, such as the correction of value disorders (as with ressentiment) a major task, with the "person" being understood as a whole inseparable into parts.

The translation of Scheler's sense of ontic belongingness into ethics results primarily in his description of the <u>ordo amoris</u>. Really a significant insight going well beyond Pascal and his <u>ordre du coeur</u>, Scheler probes the objective order "to my stirrings of love and hate". There is the absolute <u>ordo amoris</u> and there is an impression of it engraved on every <u>adult</u> person's mind or heart. It is only in every adult person precisely because it has to be built up over time through feelings, actions, actions perceived, fellow-feeling, and new actions. Values, therefore, become

developed over time through one's own actions and those of other persons and model persons. But the critical function of the <u>ordo</u> comes in the preferring of one value over another, by the strength of love/hate, attraction/repulsion. Loving and hating, therefore, function as the seat of the order itself—but again, it is a learned order acquired through acting and perceiving the actions of others. The love of values is seen as God's love, in which man is enabled to participate. The participation enables one to love and value as God, and to learn a similar order of preferences. This acquiring of a form of such an order is central to Scheler's understanding, for it establishes the order as absolute to every person:

The most radical relativity of moral value-estimations gives us no reason to assume a relativism of moral values themselves and their order of ranks. One can only say that a complete and adequate experience of the cosmos of values and its order of ranks, and, with this, the representation of the moral sense of the world, is essentially connected with the cooperation of the different forms of ethos which unfold historically according to its laws. It is precisely a correctly understood absolute ethics that strictly requires these differences—this value—perceptivism of values among peoples and their times and this openness in the formative stages of the ethos. 93

The key, here, is the idea of perspective on a single absolute. It is much like a mountain or mountain range—surrounded by valleys in which we humans live. ⁹⁴ The values—eternal and absolute—compare to the mountains, while our perspective from the valleys below remains always limited and diverse. Only God, who surveys the scene from above, can know the totality of the mountain. Yet each perspective affords a basic view of the mountain which is correct, although another from a different valley would retain still another unique but correct perspective. The ethos of each perspective involves both the changing definitions of what might be

considered, say, profiteering, theft, or robbery, as well as the variations in what might be called the prevalent ethical theory in any ethos. While an ethos can be decidedly deceived, it can be, according to Scheler, corrected over time by others "whose ethos did not fall victim to such deceptions". This, it seems to us, is a very slow and laborious corrective to a deceived perspective, and one which would do little good to those limited by time and space to a particular ethos. However, the concept of perspective does justice to ethical absolutes without relativizing them into particularities and value individualization.

Scheler's whole theory of value <u>a priorism</u> must, of course, by necessity apply to the subject rather than object side of human cognitive and affective functioning. For the content (values) to be <u>a priori</u> and absolute, they must be immediately given. The immediate comes through <u>Geist</u>—the intuition of essences. But Scheler's special contribution to ethics comes in how this occurs between persons. His four categories of fellow-feeling, by which the affective side communicates its contents to other persons, are very significant insights applicable to far more than just ethical theory. But for Scheler, they remain central to communicate value-preference from one to another through the acts of persons which are bearers of those values. That the essence of such communication is various degrees of participation in the value-acts of another person, enables one to see how the subject side which is <u>a priori</u> and immediate can be communicated without becoming <u>a posteriori</u> and relative.

One other area that is central to Scheler's understanding of moral functioning is the purpose of love and hate. Love is both the discoverer of persons and the discoverer of value. Hate precludes both. Love and

hate, too, are immediate responses, involving no reflection, and neither one under the control of the mind or the will. Hence they are natural and appropriate movements of the <u>a priori</u> intuition of essences. But perhaps a gap in Scheler's description concerns the functioning of <u>will</u> after the intuitions of value have been given. As the value preference or <u>ordo amoris</u> is implicit and apparent in the acts of the person, so it would seem that the gap between apprehension of value and enactment of value is relatively small. Scheler at one point describes this area as to how conations enter the sphere of willing:

. . . it is characteristic of the nature of a man of high moral standing that the involuntary and automatic appearances of his inner conations, and the non-formal values at which the conations "aim", follow an order of preference, and that such conations are an already virtually formed complex of contents for willing—as measured against the objective order of non-formal value ranks. This order of preference becomes, in the case concerned, the inner rule of automatism of conation itself and the inner rule of how conations enter the central sphere of willing.96

The essence of Scheler's concept of volition seems to be that willing should conform to "the comprehension, given in the act of preferring, of the being-higher of value contents given in inclinations". 97 The conformity with the immediate intuition, therefore, would be the imperative for the will. No reflective act is encouraged, since this is another mode of cognition which would be "blind" to the reasons of the heart. Rather, "passionate willing" seems to be the norm for proper use of the will. Very likely, however, Scheler would acknowledge the role of reflection in reviewing the value preferences of one's <u>ordo amoris</u> as revealed in one's willing and acting, but would claim that such reflection plays no significant role at the time of moral intuition, willing, and acting. Not until

a value change has actually been effected in both willing and action, and thereby changed one's <u>ordo amoris</u>, would Scheler say that reflection has significantly entered in. More likely, it has served to clarify the degree of attractiveness or repulsion (feeling) to the value concerned, rather than to judge a particular value as to some degree, good or not good. It is with this feeling level and not with rational theories, that Scheler finds the subject matter of ethics:

the fact that ethical cognition is effected according to strict laws of "feeling" does not make ethics "subjective". . . . If in questions of ethics we do not rely on the solutions of scholars and teachers of morals as in astronomy we rely on astronomers, it is because all 'ethics' presupposes moral insight as already evidential in feeling, preferring, loving, hating. . . a subjective aptitude for moral insight presupposes something that can only be the fruit of moral insight; namely, a whole system of means to eliminate sources of deception so that moral insight can become possible. That is, we are confronted here with the antinomy of which Aristotle was already aware. Moral insight is necessary to lead a good life (to will and to act in a good way). A good life is necessary to eradicate the sources of deception...⁹⁹

Scheler's ethics builds upon good lives and the moral insight both leading to such a life and stirred in others by such a life. Rather than subscribing to the laws of rationality, moral insight functions by its own separate and immediate laws. While some would attempt a comprehensive system to incorporate both, Scheler is content with an ethics which is simply and absolutely "Le coeur" and "ses raisons".

Footnotes - Chapter III

- "An Interview with Fr. Bernard Lonergan S.J." in Second Collection. p.222.
- From Fr. Lonergan's collected lectures notes in typed manuscript held at the Lonergan Centre, Regis College, Toronto. Reference to Scheler's Wesen und Formen der Sympathie is made on p.32 of De Intellectu et Methodo. Reference to secondary works on Scheler is made on p.17 of De Methodo Theologiae.
- From an interview with the author on the evening of December 15th, 1976, in St. Mary's residence of Boston College. We also asked Fr. Lonergan at that time if he had read the secondary works on Scheler mentioned in his lecture notes at the Gregorian, and he replied "No. I'm a man of a few books, you know".
- Frings, M. Max Scheler: A Concise Introduction into the World of a Great Thinker. (Pittsburg, Pa.: Duquesne U. Press 1965). Designated hereafter as Intro.
- (Bern: A. Francke A.G. Verlag, 1973). Designated hereafter as Sympathie. Translations are from that of Peter Heath The Nature of Sympathy. (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1970). Designated hereafter as Sympathy.
- Scheler, Max Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik.

 (Bern: A. Francke A.G. Verlag, 1954) (Vol. II of the collected works). p. 68.

 Designated hereafter as Formalismus. Translated by Manfred Frings and Roger Funk as Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values.

 (Evanston, III.: Northwestern U. Press, 1973) p.48. Designated hereafter as Formalism. This passage also quoted in Intro. p.40.
- See Scheler, Max <u>Vom Ewigen im Menschen</u>. (Bern: A. Francke A.G. Verlag 1968). (5th ed.) p. 346 Designated hereafter as <u>Ewigen</u>. Translations will be from that of Bernard Noble <u>On the Eternal in Man</u>. (London: S.C.M. Press, 1960). p. 349. Designated hereafter as <u>Eternal</u>. <u>Intro</u>. p.176ff.

- 8 Formalismus. p. 256. Formalism p.241. Intro p.50.
- Formalismus. p. 84. Formalism. p. 63/4.
- "die materiale Wertethik" would be, to Kant, <u>a posteriori</u>, and therefore an invalid ground for ethics which must be absolute and <u>a priori</u>. See Scheler, <u>Formalismus</u> p. 30, <u>Formalism</u> p. 6/7.
- 11 <u>Ewigen</u> p. 98. <u>Eternal</u> p.104.
- The German word "Geist" in Scheler should, as Frings argues, be translated in English "spirit" and not "mind", because of Scheler's understood inclusion of both the rational and affective side of man. All English translations of Scheler in this chapter have been corrected for consistency in the translation of "Geist" as "spirit". See Frings, Intro. p.13.
- Scheler, Max <u>Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos</u>. (Bern: A. Francke A.G. Verlag 1976, p. 39). Designated hereafter as <u>Stellung</u>. Translations are by Hans Meyerhoff <u>Man's Place in Nature</u>. (New York: Noonday Press, 1961). p.46/7. Designated hereafter as Place.
- 14 Intro. p.39.
- 15 <u>Stellung</u>. p.40 <u>Place</u>. p.48. <u>Intro</u>. p. 187-8.
- Stellung. p.41. Place p.50/1. Intro. p.39.
- 17 <u>Ewigen p.170. Eternal p.173. Intro. p.40/1.</u>
- Formalismus p.39. Formalism p.16. Intro. p.111.
- 19 Formalismus p.270. Formalism p.255 Intro. p.50.
- Formalismus p.272. Formalism p.257. Intro. p.52.
- Formalismus p.49. Formalism p.27. Scheler disagrees with Kant however, that it is realized in duty. Intro. p. 111f, also p. 51
- Formalismus p.88. Formalism p.68. Intro. p.68.
- Formalismus p.344ff. Formalism p.332ff. Intro. p.53.
- Formalismus p.278. Formalism p.264. Intro. p.55.
- 25 Sympathie p. 23ff. Sympathy p.12ff. Intro. p.56.
- Sympathie p.44. Sympathy p.33. Intro. p.64.

- 27 Sympathie p.137 Sympathy p.130.
- Formalismus p.399 Formalism p.388.
- 29 Stellung p.36. Place p.44. Intro. p.38.
- Formalismus p.394. Formalism p.383. Intro. p. 134.
- Formalismus p.395. Formalism p.384.
- Formalismus p.395. Formalism p.385. Intro. p. 134.
- 33 Stellung p. 39, Place p.47. Intro. p.133f.
- Ewigen p.37. Eternal p.43.
- Ewigen p.190-1. Eternal p.194 (translation altered). Intro. p.38/9.
- 36 Ewigen p.167. Eternal p.170.
- Formalismus p.397. Formalism p.386. See also Stellung p.48, Place p.47. Intro. p.133.
- Formalismus p. 384. Formalism p.374. Intro. p.142/3.
- 39 <u>Stellung</u> p. 40. <u>Place</u>. p.48.
- Formalismus p.105. Formalism p.85. Intro. p. 126.
- Formalismus p.102. Formalism p.81. Intro. p.70.
- Formalismus p.40. Formalism. p.17. Intro. p.68.
- Formalismus p.125. Formalism p.105. Intro. p.114-5.
- Formalismus p.126. Formalism p.106-7. Intro. p.115-7.
- Formalismus p.127-28. Formalism p.107-8. Intro. p.116.
- Formalismus p.129. Formalism p.108/9. Intro. p.117.
- 47 <u>Ewigen p.180. Eternal p.184. Intro. p. 102.</u>
- Scheler, Max "Ordo Amoris" in <u>Schriften aus dem Nachlass</u> (2nd ed. Rev.)
 (Bern: A. Francke A.G. Verlag 1957). p.347. Designated hereafter as <u>Schriften</u>.
 Translations are by David Lachterman in <u>Selected Philosophical Essays</u>.
 (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern U. Press, 1973). p.98. Designated hereafter as <u>Philosophical</u>.

- Schriften. p. 348. Philosophical p. 100. Intro. p. 71.
- 50 Schriften p. 349. Philosophical p.101. Intro. p.71.
- Formalismus p.275. Formalism p.261. Intro. p.71/2.
- 52 Schriften p. 355. Philosophical p. 109. Intro. p. 188.
- 53 Schriften p. 356. Philosophical p.110. Intro. p.71.
- 54 <u>Schriften p. 356. Philosophical p.110/1. Intro. p.67.</u>
- 55 Schriften p. 362. Philosophical p.117. Intro. p.50.
- 56 Schriften p. 362. Philosophical p.118. Intro. p.111.
- 57 Schriften p. 367. Philosophical p.124. Intro. p. 179f.
- Scheler, Max "Zur Idee des Menschen" in <u>Vom Umsturz der Werte</u>. (4th ed. rev.). (Bern: A. Francke A.G. Verlag, 1955). p. 186. <u>Intro</u>. p. 188.
- 59 Sympathie p.170. Sympathy p.169/71. Intro. p.76ff.
- Sympathie p.173. Sympathy p.172. Intro. p.188.
- 61 <u>Sympathie</u> p. 168. <u>Sympathy</u> p. 167. <u>Intro</u>. p. 133/4.
- Sympathie p.168-9. Sympathy p.167. See also Stellung p.40. Place p.48. Intro. p.187.
- 63 Ewigen p.220. Eternal p.226. Intro. p. 159, 163.
- Sympathie p.162. Sympathy p.159. Intro. p.69.
- Formalismus p.568. Formalism p.566. Intro. p.130,140.
- 66 Formalismus p.575. Formalism p.573. Intro. p.130.
- 67 Formalismus p.497. Formalism p.492. Intro. p.123ff.
- 68 Formalismus p.498. Formalism p.493.
- 69 <u>Ewigen p.220. Eternal p.226. Intro. p.131.</u>
- 70 <u>Formalismus</u> p.495. <u>Formalism</u> p.490.
- /1 (Leipzig: Verlag Engelmann) 1912.

- "Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen" in Vol. 3 <u>Vom Umsturz der Werte</u> (ed. Maria Scheler). (Berne: A. Francke A.G. Verlag, 1955) p.38.

 Designated hereafter as <u>Werte</u>. Translations are from L.A. Coser (ed.) and W.W. Holdheim <u>Ressentiment</u>. (New York: Schocken Books, 1972).

 p.45/6. Hereafter designated as Ressentiment. Intro. p.82/3.
- 73 Schriften p.369. Philosophical p.126. Intro. p.91/2, 75.
- Werte p.36. Ressentiment p.39. Intro. p.82.
- Werte p.66. Ressentiment p.76. Intro. p.92.
- Werte p.67. Ressentiment p.77. Intro. p.93.
- In current society, the preservation of human life is probably an essential carrier for the value of the person. At the time of the inquisitions, however, the purification of the heretical soul through death into heaven was also a carrier of the value of the person (as well as the carrier of the value of "good" society).
- 78 Werte p.67. Ressentiment p.77. Intro. p.88.
- Werte p.68. Ressentiment p.82. Intro. p.96.
- Werte p.103. Ressentiment p.122. Intro. p.95.
- 81 Werte p.72. Ressentiment p.86. Intro. p.170.
- 82 See Scheler's footnote, Werte p.78-9. Ressentiment p.183.
- Werte p.91. Ressentiment p.108. Intro. p.172/3.
- Werte p.96. Ressentiment p.115. Intro. p.96.
- 85 Werte p.97. Ressentiment p.116.
- 86 Werte p.131. Ressentiment p.155. Intro. p.98/9.
- ⁸⁷ "Vorbilden und Führer" in Schriften p. 285.
- 88 Ewigen p.46. Eternal p.53.
- 89 <u>Ewigen p.55. Eternal p.61/2.</u>
- 90 Ewigen p.52. Eternal p.58.
- Scheler, Max "Phänomenologie und Erkenntnistheorie" in <u>Schriften</u> p.404 and in <u>Philosophical</u> p.159. <u>Intro</u>. p.178/9.
- 92 Schriften p.396-7. Philosophical p.159.

- 93 Formalismus p.317. Formalism p.303. Intro. p.70,94/5.
- W. Stark in "Introduction" to <u>The Nature of Sympathy p.XVII.</u> The analogy came originally from Franz Brentano <u>The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong.</u>
- 95 Formalismus p.320. Formalism p.306.
- 96 Formalismus p.64. Formalism p.43. Intro. p.102.
- 97 Formalismus p.63. Formalism p.42. Intro. p.117.
- 98 Formalismus p.82. Formalism p.61.
- Formalismus p.339. Formalism p.327. Intro. p.129.

CHAPTER IV

DATA FOR A HIGHER VIEWPOINT - DIETRICH VON HILDEBRAND

Lonergan, in describing his preparations for the institute on the philosophy of education at Xavier in 1959, mentioned reading both von Hildebrand, and Frings' book on Scheler. In works after this date Lonergan makes occasional reference or footnotes to von Hildebrand, such as that in Method, on the topic of feelings:

A wealth of analysis of feelings is to be had in Dietrich von Hildebrand's <u>Christian Ethics</u>, New York: David McKay, 1953. See also Manfred Frings, <u>Max Scheler</u>, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1965.

References are only made to <u>Christian Ethics</u>, and the subject matter centres around categories of feelings, feelings as apprehension of value, and the dominating feeling of value of being in love. There are no references to von Hildebrand in earlier articles or in <u>Insight</u>. We find it therefore appropriate to conclude that Lonergan's single source for von Hildebrand was <u>Christian Ethics</u>. It also would seem true that this provides the most comprehensive coverage of von Hildebrand's ethical theory of any of his works. However, it is of historical interest to note that Lonergan had read and been rather critical of von Hildebrand at a much earlier date—1942—when he reviewed von Hildebrand's Marriage:

Von Hildebrand's affirmation is this: while the primary end of marriage is the procreation and education of children, the primary meaning of marriage is love, the natural love intended by God when he made Adam a helpmate like unto himself, the supernatural love intended by Christ when he raised marriage into the sacrament that showed forth his own love for his spouse, the church. The difficulty is the studied vagueness of the position. A book has been written on "The Meaning of Meaning" and it concluded that "meaning" has over eight hundred meanings. Which of these is meant by von Hildebrand, what is a primary meaning, what would be a secondary meaning, are so many questions conveniently left without an answer. So far is such lack of precision from Catholic philosophy and theology that it reminds one rather of Anglican comprehensiveness. It would indeed be unjust to say that the author is combating biological materialism by re-affirming Victorian romanticism, for his roots are in the second chapter of Genesis and in the fifth of the Epistle to the Ephesians. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that he shares the romanticist vagueness and thinks in a misty middle distance where ideal love and plain fact merge.⁴

While Marriage does not outline von Hildebrand's basic value theory, it does take a values approach to marriage and its primary value of love such that Lonergan's review was entitled "Values Sound-Doctrine Vague". 5 But there is no indication in this review or in any later works until 1959 that Lonergan either knew of or appropriated Scheler or von Hildebrand's ethics of value. Von Hildebrand was a member of the early "Munich school" of phenomenologists influenced by Husserl, a follower of Scheler, and some of his first published articles(1915) as well as many later books and articles expand on Scheler's phenomenology of values. fore it is not surprising that von Hildebrand's position on some things is almost identical to that of Scheler, while at other times he fits into the broader stream of catholic moral theology as influenced by Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas. For our purposes in this chapter, it would seem appropriate to outline von Hildebrand's ethics in its basic form, developing particularly those areas where he goes beyond or opposes Scheler in Christian Ethics, and simply making reference to other areas where von Hildebrand and Scheler are basically of the same mind.

Von Hildebrand's starting point is from the "immediately given" — the data of moral experience itself. 6 It is a "given" similar to Scheler's starting point, and following Husserl's phenomenological reduction:

The "given" at which we are aiming, and which we oppose to theories, interpretations, and hypotheses, is always a necessary, intelligible entity, the only true object of philosophy, such as being, truth, knowledge, space, time, man, justice, injustice, numbers, love, will, and many others. It is the object possessing a necessary and highly intelligible essence; it is the object which imposes itself on our intellect, which reveals and validates itself fully when we focus on it in an intellectual intuition.

The original intuition of intelligible essences therefore introduces the prime data of moral experience. It must then be checked for harmonization with other formerly acquired data, yet not disregarded if it raises more new questions than it answers. These data are apprehended fully from our

fer to supernatural facts as arguments for our knowledge. In taking into account all moral data which we can know by experience, embracing also the morality which manifests itself in the Christian saints, we do not leave the field of things which are "given" to us. Our aim is to grasp the nature of this morality and of all the factors determining its presence insofar as they are accessible to us by the natural light of our mind.

In concluding his work, however, von Hildebrand points out that "everything which is to be found in natural morality is found on a higher level and in its ultimate meaning only in the light of Christian morality", 9 but the essence of his method is that the morality of the Christian Saint on the one hand and the noble pagan (such as Socrates) on the other hand equally are the subject of philosophical exploration as to the totality of morality. 10 Thus the fullness of the moral data of experience is available through straightforward philosophical analysis, but the resulting moral values discovered only possess their "ultimate majestic obligation, if they are ultimately rooted and embodied in the Absolute Person of God". 11 The key to this position, therefore, is the utilization of moral experential data from both Christians and pagans. Particular aspects of Christian morality, which von Hildebrand identifies as the cen-

tral role of humility, the interpenetration of fundamental moral attitudes (in a higher synthesis), the specific goodness of charity, and the value response to everything in the love of God in Christ¹², are therefore included in this moral data, but without their theological derivation. Von Hildebrand attempts to build only on the data to be found in experience and thus accessible to philosophical analysis. It is thus first and foremost—Ethics.

Von Hildebrand uses a much narrower definition (than Scheler) of what specifically is "value", and introduces a much broader notion under the term "importance".

The character which enables an object to become the source of an affective response or to motivate our will shall be termed by us "importance". Fully aware that "importance" is often used in another sense, we shall here use this term technically as connoting that property of a being which gives it the character of a bonum or malum; in short, "importance" is here used as the antithesis to neutrality or indifference. 13

Positive importance is what is traditionally called a good; negative importance an evil. Further, von Hildebrand would find positive and negative importances not mere phenomena, but topics of ultimate metaphysical and philosophical interest, with "definite objective meaning". 14 Importance is a function of all moral acts of the person (such as knowledge, love and joy) and is capable of "motivating our will, or of engendering an affective response, or of touching our soul." This motivation or desiderare is typically "directed toward the possession of a good; its formal object is possession of, or fruition in, a good. But in a larger sense the object of importance is the coming into existence of a good which is not yet real. Differentiation can be made between what would seem to

be different categories of importance. There is a first category centered around objects or events which bring a pleasure or satisfaction only to ourselves. This category von Hildebrand claims is known for the way it "finally throws us back on our own limitedness, imprisoning us within ourselves." He uniquely terms it "the merely subjectively satisfying" and finds it of a totally different nature than that which motivates us to acts of forgiving, loving, or being charitable, noble or generous. These other motivations von Hildebrand finds possess an importance in themselves. They are, he finds, essentially different from the merely subjectively satisfying of derived pleasure, and von Hildebrand uses the term "value" exclusively for the importance which moves toward the intrinsically important and the derivation of pleasure as very much secondary. With the latter, the principium is value, (the determining rather than the determined), whereas with the former, it is pleasure. 18 In identifying these two categories as essentially different, von Hildebrand goes beyond Scheler who found the sensible (agreeable/disagreeable), vital, and spiritual modalities to be all of the same family but of different rank in value.

It is most surprising that the fundamental difference between the merely subjectively satisfying and the value had not been grasped by Scheler, to whom we owe so many insights into value and other basic ethical problems. 19

Von Hildebrand sees instead that there is a separate scale and ranking both of importance (the merely subjectively satisfying) and of value (the important in itself), and the essence of this is transcendence beyond the self. It is a fundamental difference in motivation. ²⁰

One of Scheler's important points was in describing the occasions which, like ressentiment, precipitate the transvaluation of values—the

upsetting or reversal of the order of ranking. Von Hildebrand finds

Scheler's description inadequate because of the fundamental difference between the subjectively satisfying and value (the important in itself).

. . . if it were true that in preferring a lower good to a higher good the choice would be based on a common denominator, namely, the point of view of their value, it would be impossible to explain why one could choose the lower instead of the higher. So long as one and the same point of view is really at stake, there must be a reason why that which is inferior from this point of view, is nevertheless preferred. 21

The reason why the subjectively satisfying may be followed rather than value is that the "ratio" of each category tends to be exclusive in and of itself. What seems to safeguard each from exclusiveness is a third category of importance (unique to von Hildebrand) — the important or good for me. Somewhat like a synthesis of the two categories,

. . . The character of this <u>bonum mihi</u> (good for me) as a category of importance differing from the value as well as from the subjectively satisfying also reveals itself when we contemplate its negative counterpart: the objective evil for the person, for example the formal object of human forgiveness. 22

This separate entity of the good for me (or the evil for me) is very evident in the imperative to ask forgiveness of someone, although one cannot change the objective evil which occurred. It is the attitude of the offender which is object of the act of forgiveness, and this is at the heart of the category of the objective "good for me". The category is essentially the Socratic concept of bonum, which follows from the observation that it is better to suffer injustice than to commit injustice (there seems to be a moral wrong in committing injustice, but not in suffering it). As such, it presupposes the value to which there is response, but makes the distinction of a higher objective good for the person beyond any other good which bestows pleasure or happiness. It is also the objective good for the

person which, in love, is wished by the lover for the beloved rather than the merely subjectively-satisfying. Moral good and transcendence of the self therefore both arise out of von Hildebrand's categories of value and objective good for me, while moral evil inevitably arises out of the merely subjectively satisfying.

Of the categories of importance, von Hildebrand claims we innately look for something transcending our own being, which has its "inner necessity independently of ourselves, and which relates to ultimate meaning."

This ultimacy of importance is, he says, the essence of value, of importance-in-itself:

Our aim at present is to remind everyone of what he possesses in a deeper stratum, to draw him to this deeper stratum in which the datum of value is grasped and which even constitutes the pivotal point of existence and life. 26

The important-in-itself(value) thus ranks above the important-for-me because of its basic transcendence as a motivation and both of course, rank above the subjectively-satisfying. But do values have any real properties, beyond that indicated in motivation? Von Hildebrand finds a necessary and intelligible link between objects and acts and their value, because he observes that "especially we discover the value in concrete real acts."

Indirectly, values are also presupposed in the possession and enjoyment of goods, but through the category of the objective good of the person. It is in their nature of being good for the person therefore, that they derive value—and "the ultimate source of this value is obviously the value of the human person."

Value is the ultimate datum in the categories of importance, and such is "grasped solely in an original intuition" which cannot be reduced to anything else. But is value absolute, or merely rela-

tive to culture and context? Von Hildebrand following Scheler finds most instances of difference explainable in different understandings or beliefs concerning the nature of a thing, rather than its value. But the source of value, and of value perception, is a complex process—all of the facets of which we are seldom aware:

But in the case of the moral value-perception much more is required: not only another degree of reverence and of opening our mind to the voice of being, a higher degree of "conspiring" with the object, but also a readiness of our will to conform to the call of values, whatever it may be. The influence of the environment, of the milieu, of the traditions of a community, in short the entire interpersonal atmosphere in which man grows up and lives, has a much greater influence on this type of knowledge than on any other. In the ethos of a community, moral convictions are present in another way than are convictions concerning other spheres. They are embodied not only in the laws and customs, but above all in the common ideal which forms an ever-present pattern for judging our fellow men and ourselves. The entire atmosphere is so saturated with this moral pattern that the conscious and unconscious influence on the individual is a tremendous one.30

This value-structure which is present in every society, is both a fundamental hierarchical order that is the source of all morality (as Augustine's and later Scheler's <u>ordo amoris</u>), ³¹ and yet one of considerable diversity involving some differences both in ranking and in quality. Von Hildebrand finds a qualitative difference between such value domains as the intellectual, the moral, the aesthetic, and the ontological (the value of the person). The ontological domain ranks highest, (because of its being a reflection of God, an <u>imago Dei</u>.) and it can be identified by the absence of disvalue (an antithesis to, say, human life does not exist) or even of comparative values amongst human beings (there is no more or less to being a human). ³² Next comes the moral domain in which the qualities of being

human are the object (the moral direct and specific reflection of God—similitudo Dei) such as generosity, humility, etc. Then follow other value domains, such as the intellectual and aesthetic, and including many other areas which have yet to be described. While variations occur in ranking within each of the value domains, the basic ordering of the domains with the ontological in primacy, is universal.

There are several other qualities to values which von Hildebrand finds to be significant. One is that contradictory opposites in values (disvalues) have a quality all of their own rather than being merely the absence of the value. The identity comes from prospering on the negation of the positive value (e.g. beauty and ugliness, intelligence and stupidity). Still another antithesis comes in value polarity (e.g. vitality vs. delicacy) by which one and the same being cannot be endowed with two such values simultaneously. 34 Antitheses generally help make clear the primacy of the positive, as well as the qualitative of higher to lower. But a fundamental quality of value is its relationship to being. This issue arises out of the observation that "the notion of good and the notion of being are not identical", 35 and that existence does not presuppose value. Yet von Hildebrand observes that when the mystery of being as opposed to non being is contemplated, a value proper to being reveals itself-a value which is neither qualitative nor ontological in nature but in a certain way neutral. It is a value of more significance mystically than morally (as distinct from ontological or moral values), yet it does exist-perhaps precisely in the fact that "every value is itself objectively a being"36, and thereby an equal participant in being. In the end, such an observation brings von Hildebrand to an appreciation for the unity of all values:

In God ail the values are one. Once we see every being in the light of God's creation, every being thereby possesses independently of its ontological or qualitative value not only the general value of being, but also the value of being created by God, the Infinite Goodness and Sanctity. If the ontological value reflects God and the qualitative value reflects God still more intimately and directly; if the general value of being is still a reflection of God's infinite being, this new value accrues to the object from the link with God, which is given in the fact of its being created. This link with God, the Infinite Good, the Absolute Holiness, deneutralizes the entire reality in giving to everything an indirect dignity and preciousness which we have seen are present to the minds of the saints. 37

While this relationship between God, value, and being reflects the goodness and sanctity of creation, there is the other generality to life which is disharmonious and evil. Beyond disvalues in man, physical and spiritual suffering, and death itself, there is

. . . something negative in itself. If we prescind from all knowledge by revelation and look at reality as disclosed in natural experience, we are confronted with a universe filled on the one hand with innumerable values, ontological and qualitative, with countless objective goods for man, with many events and situations that invite us to rejoice over man's felicity and to praise his circumstance; and on the other hand, with innumerable qualitative disvalues: the wickedness of man, his errors and his shallowness, all kinds of objective evils for man, the disrupture in his own nature, the rebellion of the inferior part of his being against the superior (which Plato described so eloquently in the Phaedrus), filled too with so many hostile and threatening forces that the world seems to proclaim with sorrow and alarm the tragedy of the human situation.38

The question inevitably arises—which of the two has the final word? Von Hildebrand suggests that in all good acts and qualitative values, there is implied as it were "a promise that all the splendor and intrinsic light shining forth from the values is not simply a qualitative entity, but a triumphant metaphysical reality." This is part of an overwhelming in-

sight, which is the basis of Christian natural theology as opposed to metaphysical pessimism, that supreme Being cannot but be Absolute Goodness. Therefore von Hildebrand sees values as ultimately "realized" in God, for only there do they have "ultimate, substantial reality" 40 the created world. As values are embodied in the acts of men, they reflect God, who is the sum of all values. But it is not necessary to start from the notion of God in order to grasp ontological values - such as the preciousness of a living being, the dignity of man, the evilness of murder, There is a stronger "message" of God contained in qualitative values, such as in the beauty of a glorious landscape or the transfiguration of a sublime musical moment. Moral values, being embodied in the person already endowed with ontological value, show forth the most intimate reflection of God in the most compelling way—just as moral disvalues proclaim the greatest offensiveness to man and God. Ontological and qualitative value are combined in the moral value, which presuppose a person, and that person is responsible (free to) to realize that value. But failure to realize that value affects our conscience- still another distinguishing feature of the moral value. Such failure, and the guilt engendered by it, demands atonement (whereas other values- aesthetic or intellectual- in no way call for atonement). Similarly, as Kant so appreciated, realization of moral values calls for merit or reward. 41 That ultimate recognition, by the very way in which moral values transcend man, comes from God rather than man.

Von Hildebrand's theory of value is prefaced with the assumption of the free life of man in a cosmos pregnant with values; it implies man's response to goods endowed with values, and at least in an implicit way, man's response to God, the Infinite Goodness. 42 Man is <u>secundum naturam</u> oriented to perception and realization of those values of the morally good.

The analysis of man's nature in the light of the universe of values is therefore one of the most essential ethical tasks. But the star guiding us in this research, the compass which points the way, is precisely the datum of moral goodness and moral evil. Thus the inquiry into the sources of moral evil and moral goodness in man must start with those acts which are indubitably endowed with moral values, the analysis of which will aid us in discovering those factors determining their moral goodness. Such an inquiry must start from an analysis, not of man's neutral tendencies, but of the goods to which man is ordered by no mere entelechial need in his nature, but because of the intrinsic value of such goods. 43

This datum begins with <u>intentional</u> experiences (as in Scheler)—that which presupposes a conscious, meaningful knowledge of the cause of such experiences (conviction, joy, doubt, sorrow, love and hate). Such experiences involve a consciousness or knowledge in me the human subject of something on the object side which confronts me: "I partake intentionally in the being of the perceived object, which is necessarily before me." They differ from mere feeling states (e.g.—tiredness) which have no object or natural instincts or drives, such as hunger towards food. A good example is conviction, which involves a definite "yes" to the object of the conviction. As opposed to feeling states or drives, the authority of our personal center is essential to intentional experiences. Now all intentional experiences begin with the revelation in our minds of the data of perception—of material bodies, of relations, of other persons, of values, of essences, etc. In the cognitive act that follows,

the intention goes, so to speak from the object to ourselves: the object reveals itself to our mind, it speaks and we listen . . . In responses it is we who speak: the content of our act is addressed to the object; it is our response to the object.⁴⁶

But perception precedes all such responses, for "only after a thing is known to us, can it motivate a response in our soul" (Nihil volitum nisi cogitatum)4/. There seem to be three forms of such response: the theoretical (e.g. the saying "yes" to a fact or conviction-where knowledge "prescribes" the response we should give), the volitional (e.g. the bringing into existence of something not yet real-where importance is the motivating factor), and the affective (e.g. evoked joy or sorrow, esteem or contempt -- where knowledge, importance and a completing "new word" from the heart draws to or repels us from something). The latter involves our entire person, but is not free as is the volitional. We cannot engender such responses—as with love, it is "always granted to us as a gift." 48 Moving against the Aristotelian, Platonic, and Thomistic traditions which conceive of the passions, even joy and love, as non-spiritual and irrational emotions to be controlled, von Hildebrand builds on Augustine and Scheler in affirming the meaningful, rational, and spiritual character of affective responses. 49 It is the affective and volitional responses, he claims, that are paramount to morality. Essential moral data are introduced by the cognitive act in the affective response-the "being affected" which senses another's hostility, or the beauty in music, or a friend's compassion that consoles us. For this to take place, there must be

... an intrinsic affinity between both object and effect, a correspondence in their nature and meaning. And this intelligible relation of inner correspondence is at the basis of the real engendering, at the basis of the ontological dependence of this affective experience on the object engendering it. 50

There is somehow a sharing of the same experience of another (the object) in me the subject. The affective response then engenders something to the object:

Being affected has, so to speak, a centripetal character, while the response has a centrifugal one. In the one case the object bestows something on me; in the other, I, by my response, impart something to the object. 51

So central is being affected to the affective and value response, that it must be nurtured with great care and attention:

Being affected plays a paramount role in the development of a personality. Through this channel come seduction, moral poisoning, blunting, narrowing and cramping, as well as moral elevation, purification, enrichment, widening and liberation. For the pedagogue, one of the principal means for moral education is to expose the souls of his pupils to being affected by values. In every effort toward moral and religious progress, this opening of the soul also plays an eminent role. 52

Of the affective response, there are several types. There are those motivated by values or disvalues. There are those motivated by the subjectively-satisfying and dissatisfying—in sharp distinction to those involving objective good for the person or value. Those motivated by value response have a character of self-abandonment or self-donation, and a relative absence of self-centeredness:

The value response . . . is characterized by an element of respect for the good, an interest in its integrity and existence as such, a giving of ourselves to it instead of consuming of it. 53

This element of what is best termed transcendence has its imperative in that such a value response is objectively due the object, and stresses the fact

...that we are created for a knowledge and love of God, to transcend the realm of a mere immanent unfolding of our nature. They stress the fact that we are ordered to a participation in the absolute, a consciously experienced 'dialogue with' ${\rm God.}^{54}$

The nature of man's sensitivity to values, his ability to be affected and motivated by them, is man's givenness in being ordered and destined for a

good. It differs radically (as in Scheler) from being driven by an urge,—
which is rooted only in our nature and oriented only to our needs—for a
value response finds its creative source in its object (a person or value)
rather than in its subject. As long as it is a value which affects us,
its appeal seems to be in our "loving, reverent center"—that "from which
charity issues". 55
But what perception of value takes place in this being
affected which evokes a response? Von Hildebrand differentiates three cognitive acts in any act of perception:

first, the real presence of the object. Secondly, the fecundating contact with the object in which the object discloses itself to my mind, informs me, and imposes itself on my mind in its autonomous being; Thirdly, the intuitive character of the contact. The object deploys its 'such being' before my mind as opposed to all discursive control through concepts. 56

Any value—endowed object (person or act) discloses itself upon our minds, unless we have been predisposed by habitual disvaluation or selfish interests to blind this disclosure. Therefore a certain reverence for values is a precondition to such value perception, as is the habitual use of such perception. But there are occasions where value even cuts through negative preconditioning:

In being affected, however, there is a content $\underline{\text{in}}$ $\underline{\text{my soul}}$. (e.g.,the specific experience of $\underline{\text{being moved}}$ which another's generosity or purity effects in $\underline{\text{my soul}}$, or the consolation I experience in $\underline{\text{my soul}}$ in confronting an object or event endowed with a high value). The fact that the value acts on $\underline{\text{my heart}}$ in a deep, meaningful manner, in melting it, in piercing through the crust of $\underline{\text{my indifference}}$ and bluntness, is evidently a new and $\underline{\text{more in-timate}}$ contact with the value. $\underline{^{57}}$

This disclosure enables such a participation and spiritual union with another person, (Scheler's fellow-feelings) that it engenders a response which is, categorically and qualitatively, complementary (e.g. indignation as a response will always be imparted in a degree corresponding to the

rank of the value.)⁵⁸ It is limited quantitatively by the recipient's capacity. Von Hildebrand summarizes these insights in the axiom:

To every good endowed with a value, as well as to every thing tainted by a disvalue, an adequate response is due. 59

The conformity of response to value has at its core the <u>ordo amoris</u> which St. Augustine considered the backbone of all morality, and which calls for the <u>logique du coeur</u> (Pascal) in its response. ⁶⁰ The imperative, therefore, is what the good calls for. If it is responded to indifferently or inadequately, then <u>sui generis</u> an objective disharmony embodying a disvalue is constituted. It is not a knowledge of the value that is involved, but rather a perception or intellectual intuition of the value— "a specific object—communion takes place which has no analogy in any other kind of knowledge" — which then must be responded to with an affective plenitude appropriate to the value.

As has been said above, our perception of values can be adversely effected by habitual disvaluation or egoism, and can be encouraged by a reverence for values and a habitual use of value perception. Simply stated, it could be said that "every morally good value response implies in some way the general will to be morally good, to act and behave in a morally right manner." This fundamental value response, which is absent in the immoral or morally unconscious person, is an overall response to the world of moral values and, ultimately, to God. It involves both a fundamental reverence for the value of the good, as well as for the moral significance of actualising it. But the realization or actualization of these values only appears "on the back of our attitude or action" (as says Scheler), for a value is realized for persons and not as an end in itself. Our

awareness of the realization of value is, interestingly enough, only secondary to our awareness of the realization of disvalue. Conscience is particularly the sensor of disvalue—conditioned to "warn us to avoid anything which is morally evil" but there is no equivalent sensor of value, apart from the general "being affected" of value perception. In other words, there is stronger warning by our conscience to avoid moral evil, than there is clear direction as to the moral good. However, there is an entire predisposition for the good in the reverence for values and habitual use of value perception.

As we move to understand volitional responses as they differ from affective responses, the matter of human freedom assumes a central role. Affective responses, as has been said, are not as "free" as the volitional, for the "word" of the heart speaks whenever a situation provokes it. But in volitional responses, a person is free to respond to a value, person, or situation and to command body and mind to act as is willed and as they are able. The will therefore has power to say "yes" or "no" to a motivation from the affective or any other center of the person, and to say "thou wilt be" to what is proposed as "thou shouldst be". 65 This capacity is unique to man, presupposes free choice, and is a conscious response to a known state of facts (as opposed to a mere urge-hunger- or animal voluntariness-an animal's attack on its prey). The orientation of the will can be either towards the important-in-itself (value) or towards the merely subjectively satisfying. Its parameters are those areas of our direct or indirect influence. In its orientation to value, it consciously opens our free centre to "being affected", exposes our souls to the contents of each object perceived, and says "yes" or "no" to the response enkindled. Therefore volitional responses are based on an operative freedom. But much of their content comes from affective responses, the responses of the heart in which "the plenitude of a human personality are actualized." In this sphere, our freedom is cooperative—that is, it is our "capacity of sanctioning and of disavowing our own spontaneous attitudes." This, von Hildebrand proposes, is a moral act at the core of our human freedom; (to will) to be fully awake and attuned to the call of values, and to reinforce such calls with adequate responses which are very much our own (from our own personal centre). It is a decision to be predisposed to values in affective responses—representing the deepest stratum of freedom:

In the sanction the person places himself on a completely different level, the objective level of the free confrontation with the call of the morally relevant values and their moral significance. On this level, which is illuminated by the logos of moral values, man is able to accomplish this ultimate genuine confirmation with his free spiritual center. This unique actualization of his freedom endows his affective responses, though they arise by themselves, with an element of genuine freedom. 68

Many of von Hildebrand's most significant insights into affective value response have to do with the preparation in our soul of the ground from which right responses will arise spontaneously. Here he finds that we can exert indirect influence on our freedom to respond to values, by nurturing all the potential capacities of our personality. While we have no control over the gifts or liabilities with which we are born, little control over the formative influences of our lives (family, education, cultural context), no control over the dominant life-experiences which present themselves, we do have significant control over the meaning and attitude we draw from all these factors. It is here that we face our greatest moral

responsibility, in the acquiring of virtues and the rooting out of vices. The sphere of the virtues has to do with the general superactual (subsisting) value responses that pervade our entire personality, and which enable us to be more spontaneously disposed to moral affective and volitional response. They become actualized in specific value responses, but in so doing actualize not only the specific "being affected," but tap a plenitude of valuation stored up in that person. The innermost value response of the virtues (which Scheler also saw) is charity, "which superabundantly flows in its goodness, overflows, and surpasses the frame of a value response." Such a virtue is an intention that can be encouraged to pervade one's entire personality. Similarly a

...veracious man, will without any effort never lie, because the value-responding superactual attitude of truthfullness has victoriously pervaded his nature, because he has such horror of the disvalue of a lie, such a fundamental reverence for reality and truth, that all temptations to tell lies, temptations which may arise because of fear, concupiscence, or pride, have lost their power in him. 70

Such superactual attitudes can be encouraged by various techniques in terms of habit, disposition, sensitivity, and time to the extent that they themselves represent a moral struggle, but they must never be allowed to neutralize the moral value of our willing the value response—either actually or superactually. More fundamentally, the process of assimilating virtues is in fact the process of transformation in Christ to become rooted and grounded in love (Ep. 3:17). The end result is, however still the attainment of the axiological principle that "to every good endowed with a value (or disvalue), an adequate response is due."

In the above respect, von Hildebrand affirms Scheler in his analysis of

value preference and the notion of Augustine's <u>ordo amoris</u>, that we are responsible to choose the higher ranking value in any "contest" between moral values. 71 Such a ranking of objective goods for the person would be:

- 1) the objective good for a person to be endowed with values.
- possession of goods which bestow true happiness on us because of their value.
- 3) objective goods which are indispensable for life.
- 4) merely agreeable things (which appeal to a legitimate center in us) which are objective goods for the person. 72

From this ranking of values related to objective goods, can be seen the primacy of possession of moral values (virtues)—not as an end in itself, but as the ultimate value response to God (similitudo Dei). It sets a virtued life within the context of assimilation of virtuous living.

We have seen that man is set in a universe of values and yet disvalues, of goods and yet also evils. The ultimate promise seems to be for value, for the good, for God, but it is still necessary to look at the actual roots of moral evil in man, and to become aware of how that root system grows. Von Hildebrand describes two kinds of qualitatively negative acts. The first, the reversal of love, humility, reverence, justice and generosity, is seen in revengefulness, hardheartedness, and envy—in pride. The first another family of evil acts—laziness, impurity, and covetousness—that seem to be of a different quality. While both are egocentric and seem to stem from the merely subjectively satisfying, pride seems to describe a perversion in being, while the other—which von Hildebrand calls concupiscence—seems to describe a perversion in having. At issue is how these three centres (one positive, two negative) can coexist in man. Von Hildebrand describes five forms of such coexistence:

- the person fundamentally willing to conform to the reign of morally relevant values, and to submit to their call.(value-response prevails over pride and concupiscence).
- 2) the morally unconscious person, in which the two negative centres coexist but do not confront each other (unconsciousness prevents the confrontation and direction of evil). e.g. Fielding's Tom Jones.
- 3) the person in whom the antithetic centers assume the character of a compromise (hence value-response is seldom pure or genuine but ambiguous) e.g. serving God and mammon.
- 4) the person in whom the antithetic centres are both at work in combination e.g. the idolator (a good endowed with value, reinforced out of all proportion by pride)
- 5) the person in whom the value-response attitude, and pride or concupiscence, dominate alternately (hence an unpredictable transition from one centre to the other) e.g. Dostoevski's Rogoshin in the Idiot. 75

In all the forms of coexistence, the incompatability of value response with pride or concupiscence is evident. The negative centres begin their preponderance as concern for the merely subjectively satisfying ceases to be subservient to the reign of morally relevant values. The imbalance generally begins with over-sensitivity and fixation to merely agreeable things (see ranking of "objective goods for the person" above), at which point such things become valued over the higher categories of objective goods for the person. The lower orders are no longer "tamed" by the reign of the higher. Concupiscence generally starts this trend with "the persistent craving for the subjectively satisfying, the blunt outlook toward the world which conceives it as a mere means of one's satisfaction." Indifference to morally relevant values gradually leads to a casting aside of moral obligation, and a hostility and rebellion towards it: from lazy to passionate concupiscence. But the fixation with concupiscence remains in having-what St. Augustine calls the evil of the flesh, as opposed to pride (being) which he calls the source of all evil. 77 In pride the egocentrism is not focused on subjectively satisfying goods, but on the person himself. It involves a re-ranking of the moral values of the person according to the merely subjectively satisfying—an exaltation of one person above all others:

Thus the man dominated by the ultimate pride hates all light and the intrinsic beauty and harmony of every authentic value. The fundamental gesture of this pride is an impotent attempt to dethrone all values, to deprive them of their mysterious metaphysical power. The war which the man who is victim of this pride wages, is directed against the reign of values as such, and ultimately against God himself. 78

Such a person, as Shakespeare's Iago or Dostoevski's Rakitin, tries to replace the true order of values by a fallacious order of pseudo-values and therefore dethrone the values by replacing them with a negative counterpart (Scheler). This satanic pridefulness is more arrogant than all the other forms of pride: self-glorification or aggrandizement, vanity, and haughtiness. The extent of either pride or concupiscence depends upon "the rank of the destroyed or disrespected morally relevant good," and also upon the nature of the link between the subjectively satisfying and the disrespected good or value (i.e. to the degree to which it is sought for its own sake). As the disrespected or dethroned values rank higher in the ordo amoris, and as the disvalue becomes more sought after for its own sake, so evil becomes actualized in a man with all its Satanic possibilities.

Von Hildebrand concludes his ethics with an elaboration of the term "Christian" ethics. As has been said, the parameters for his study have been the natural capacities of human knowledge, from what is observable (through philosophic exploration) from moral and immoral men. He has

concluded that notions and admiration of moral goodness, and revulsion towards moral evil, exist for pagan and Christian alike- and without the introduction of Christian revelation. He does insist, however, that Christian moral men, as well those of both other and no religion, must equally be the subject of philosophic explanation. In another work, Transformation in Christ, von Hildebrand specifically explores Christian morality, finding it not qualitatively different from natural morality but somehow representing a higher level of moral understanding. 81 But von Hildebrand contends that the essence of natural moral law in values is given equally to all humanity. Those values take on greater significance and intention, however, to the degree that some sense of an absolute is implied, still greater significance to the extent that the absolute is understood as good, as personal, as loving- and finally, as God. The natural moral virtues, therefore, find ultimate fulfillment in Christian moral goodness. But the response, which, while an indirect manifestation of God, remains at the heart of moral living wherever and under whatever understanding it is found.

Some Observations on von Hildebrand's Program for Ethics

One of the first things that seems evident from von Hildebrand's outline of ethics, is the extent to which he remains very much in the mainstream of catholic moral theology. He draws throughout and concludes with "St. Augustine, Father of Christian ethics," and the central figures of that stream—Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas—are referred to constantly for their insights into man's moral nature which are confirmed in modern phenomenological analysis. Perhaps one of the central assumptions within this stream is the Greek notion of natural right, which underpins the understand—

ing of natural law in catholic moral theology. With this assumption of a recognized source of moral truth attainable through human reason alone, yet such truth (in the catholic tradition) not understood as incompatible with that derived from revelation, von Hildebrand inherits a tradition where philosophy and Christian theology are understood as having a common source although the latter provides a higher synthesis. Within this context, von Hildebrand simply begins "doing" philosophy by asking the reader "to look without any philosophical prejudice at the moral data themselves, 'to listen to the voice of being' itself, and to ignore everything which does not bear the credentials of that which is immediately given."83 The significant phrase here is obviously the "immediately given", and it means in particular what is grasped in "an intellectual intuition."84 Although not expressly mentioning Husserl and the phenomenological method, he quite clearly maps out a not dissimilar method of phenomenological reduction of essences based on what is a priori given in intellectual intuitions. An example of the centrality of its use comes when he introduces his central category of value:

Many attempts have been made to reduce value to something other than itself. But these attempts are futile and vain because the notion of value refers to an ultimate datum, not only in the sense that it is grasped solely in an original intuition and is undeducible (this would also apply to the colour red), but also in the sense that it is a fundamental datum which we necessarily always presuppose. Value is an ultimate datum in the same way as existence, truth, knowledge—these we cannot deny without tacitly reintroducing them.⁸⁵

He also builds significantly on Husserl when he introduces the term "intentional", stating "we refer to a terminology introduced by Husserl, in which 'intentional' means any conscious, meaningful relationship to an object."

It thus seems appropriate to appreciate von Hildebrand's work both within the context of catholic moral theology, and also as substantially influenced by phenomenological philosophy (especially phenomenological method).

It is particularly within the context of catholic moral theology, that we see these notions taking on a significant role in von Hildebrand, that was not true for Scheler. These are the notions of the merely subjectively satisfying, pride, and concupiscence. As we have described it previously, Scheler proposed a broad notion of value, in a ranking that ranged from the agreeable/disagreeable (sensible) to the vital and spiritual. He depicted all men (save those value-blinded by ressentiment, etc) as being oriented to value, but those values in their ranking more and more incorporate the element of transcendence so that in the case of spiritual values (joy, right, truth), the hedonistic level of agreeable/disagreeable has been surpassed and the orientation to self transcended. Von Hildebrand, on the other hand, does not find the level of agreeable/disagreeable worthy even of the category "value", and instead proposes the broader category of "importance" to accommodate it. The significance of this becomes apparent when, in describing pride and concupiscence, von Hildebrand sees both as resulting from an over-valuation or appropriation of the merely subjectively satisfying. In fact, to him the orientation to the merely subjectively satisfying is a rejection of the orientation to value. Scheler obviously saw a natural progression from mere value for me (agreeable/disagreeable) to spiritual values which are characteristically values for all humanity, and all humanity under God. It would be our impression that von Hildebrand has, in these instances, been dominated by the traditional insights and categories of catholic moral theology rather than perhaps the straight datum of

human moral experience. Von Hildebrand, with insufficient critical analysis, has merely followed the accumulated Christian devotional tradition by which self-denial, through simplicity, humility, meekness, and self-surrender, are central virtues, and pride and concupiscence the deadly sins. The would be our position that more critical material, such as that which characterizes his analysis of value perception, the true kinds of value response, etc, would be needed to support his notions of the merely subjectively satisfying (as having no orientation to value), pride and concupiscence. Scheler's description of the progressive ranks of value—and the reversal of those ranks in dis—or trans-valuation through ressentiment—seems to us to describe more accurately those phenomena which Christian theology has described in terms of self-denial and its reversal in pride, and concupiscence.

We have, in the last chapter, summarized Scheler's description of value perception, of fellow feeling, and model-persons, and the function of these phenomena as modes of communicating value. Von Hildebrand, covering somewhat the same territory, describes the function of "being affected" in the cognitive act of the affective or value response. In this unique form of human knowing, which takes place secundum naturam, I partake intentionally of the being of a perceived object, it reveals itself and speaks to my mind while I listen, and then I act in response and my intentionality speaks similarly to that object. This being of the object is communicated immediately, before all discursive contact through concepts. Any value-endowed object, person, or act discloses itself to others in this way, and creates a form of spiritual union which then grounds the value response. His use of the word intentionality (a conscious, meaningful relationship)

to a value) seems to us to be a useful category to describe a content which is both the value <u>and</u> a person, act or event in relationship to it (for, as both von Hildebrand and Scheler agree, value rides "on the back" of persons and acts.).

Von Hildebrand has made some significant contributions to the phenomenology of ethical decision-making by establishing clear distinctions between theoretical, affective, volitional responses. This encapsulates cognitive acts in a trilogy of feeling, will and intellect. The theoretical is bimilar to the intellectual pattern as we would see it in Lonergan. But of more significance is von Hildebrand's distinction between volition and affection. He makes the distinction in terms of freedom, where, in the case of the will, there is freedom to command body and mind to act as is willed and as they are able. But in the affections, this "word" of the heart speaks whenever an event, person, or thought provokes it. One cannot stop its issuance, save in a general way to discourage in oneself sensitivity to values: one cannot stop a specific instance of "being affected". Hopefully one wills to be sensitive to values, which means to exercise cooperative human freedom in being affected by values. One can more will or control, however, the response to being affected- the extent to which I let my heart respond after it has been pierced. This is the extent to which I let the value transmitted through the content of intentionality, grow to its full stature in my heart. But von Hildebrand makes clear the operative freedom of the will itself, to say a complete "yes" or "no" to any affectional response to value— as it can also say "yes" or "no" to a "word" from the theoretical realm. The will has the tremendous freedom to act truthfully, or untruthfully, to act morally or immorally, and von

Hildebrand places great emphasis on appreciating the extent of that freedom and therefore a critical concern for the integrity of the will.

Von Hildebrand also uniquely develops what he calls the general will to be morally good or evil. He points out that every fulfilled or co-operated with value response becomes part of a general will to be good. In other words, responding sensitively and appropriately to any value, has the effect of encouraging further sensitivity and response to value. The converse is also true—and constitutes a general will to be insensitive to value. Habitual insensitivity can therefore weaken and atrophy this "organ" of the affect. While this naturally leads into what in the Christian tradition are the human virtues and vices, this is a case where there seems to be ample phenomenological evidence for what is transmitted with equal insight from moral and devotional literature. It is von Hildebrand's specific contribution to ethics to appreciate those basic persuasions (virtues) that can gradually be willed and appropriated (reverence, purity, veracity, etc.), and which then can enable a more accurate and sensitive value response.

One other major contribution of von Hildebrand, which goes significantly beyond Scheler, is his axiom: "To every good endowed with a value, as well as everything tainted by a disvalue, an adequate response is due." In this, von Hildebrand is appreciating a subtle but important distinction between a particular good as it is "transmitted" in intentionality, and how in general such intentionality is "received". It heightens the point just made of one's general responsibility to will to be morally good (and therefore to be "attuned" to it) as well as to will to be good in any specific. The adequacy of one's responses is something built up and refined as also can be one's inadequacy, even beyond indifference. The inadequacy of a

specific value response may have implications for one's moral life far beyond that one specific, for it is under one's general control to blunt or sharpen one's value responses. This point is not to be confused with the ability of the will to say "yes" or "no" to any specific value response which issues from the affections—to deny its expression or action. It is rather to point out the overall responsibility of man to nurture his moral life with consistently sensitive and appropriate value responses, quite before such responses issue (hopefully) in equally appropriate moral acts.

Footnotes - Chapter IV

```
<sup>1</sup> "An Interview with Bernard Lonergan S.J.". in <u>Second Collection</u>. p.222.
```

- Method. p.31, Footnote #2.
- 3 see Second Collection, p.132, 221-223.
- The Canadian Register (Quebec Edition) May 23, 1942, p. 5.
- 5 Ibid.
- on Hildebrand, D. Christian Ethics; (New York: David McKay, 1953) and republished in 1972 by Franciscan Herald Press. Hereafter referred to as Ethics. p.2.
- 7 Ibid. p.10.
- 8 Ibid. p.19.
- 9 Ibid. p.455.
- 10 Ibid. p.454.
- 11 <u>Ibid.</u> p.456.
- 12 <u>Ibid.</u> p.460-62. See also von Hildebrand's <u>Transformation in Christ</u>; (New York: Halicon Press, 1948. for a thorough exploration of the specific Christian virtues.
- 13 Ibid. p.24.
- 14 <u>Ibid</u>. p.27.
- 15 Ibid. p.28.
- 16 <u>Ibid</u>. p.30.
- 17 Ibid. p.36.
- 18 <u>Ibid.</u> p.37.
- 19 Ibid. p.40.
- 20 Ibid. p.43.
- 21 <u>Ibid.</u> p.45.
- 22 Ibid. p.51.

```
see Plato's Republic, Books I & II - especially the Dialogue "Gorgias."
```

- 27 Ibid. p.89.
- 28 <u>Ibid.</u> p.92.
- 29 Ibid. p.95.
- 30 Ibid. p.110.
- 31 Ibid. p.129 from De Civitate Dei XV, 22.
- 32 <u>Ibid</u>. p.132/4.
- 133 <u>Ibid.</u> p.132. Von Hildebrand points to the very limited research presently available on qualitatively-different value domains.
- 34 <u>Ibid</u>. p.141.
- 35 Ibid. p.145.
- 36 <u>Ibid.</u> p.152.
- 37 <u>Ibid</u>. p.152.
- 38 <u>Ibid.</u> p.157.
- 39 <u>Ibid</u>. p.159.
- 40 <u>Ibid. p.160.</u>
- 41 <u>Ibid.</u> p.175.
- 42 Ibid. p.187.
- 43 <u>Ibid</u>. 190.
- Ibid. p.191 coincides with Husserl's definition of intentional.
- 45 <u>Ibid.</u> p.192.
- 46 Ibid. p.196.

Ethics p.59.

^{25 &}lt;u>Ibid.</u> p.73.

²⁶ Ibid. p.76.

```
47
     Ibid. p.197.
 48
     Ibid. p.203.
 49
     Ibid. p.205. see Augustine Tractatus 26 in Joannem.
50
     Ibid. p.209.
51
     Ibid. p.209.
52
     Ibid. p.210.
53
     Ibid. p.216.
54
     Ibid. p.221.
55
     Ibid. p.228.
56
     Ibid. p.229, Footnote #37.
57
     <u>Ibid</u>. p.234.
58
     Ibid. p.239.
59
     Ibid. p.241.
60
     <u>Ibid.</u> p.241. also <u>De Civitate Dei</u>, XV, 22 (Augustine) <u>Pensées</u> 277 (Pascal).
61
     Ibid. p.251.
62
     Ibid. p.257.
63
     Ibid. p.262.
64
     <u>Ibid</u>. p.264.
65
     <u>Ibid</u>. p.287.
66
     Ibid. p.320.
67
     Ibid. p.321.
68
     <u>Ibid</u>. p.334.
69
    <u>Ibid</u>. p.356-7.
70
     <u>Ibid</u>. p.374.
71
     Ibid. p.380-84.
```

```
72 <u>Ibid. p.393/4.</u>
```

- 75 Ibid. p.415-425.
- 76 <u>Ibid</u>. p.432.
- see <u>De Civitate Dei</u> XIV, 3.
- 78 Ethics. p.442.
- 79 <u>Ibid. p.443.</u> Von Hildebrand acknowledge drawings from Scheler's <u>Das</u> Ressentiment in Aufbau der Moralen.
- 80 <u>Ibid</u>. p.451.
- New York (Helican Press) 1948 also Image Books, 1962.
- 82 <u>Ethics</u>. p.463.
- 83 <u>Ibid.</u> p.3.
- 84 <u>Ibid</u>. p.10.
- 85 <u>Ibid.</u> p.95.
- 86 Ibid. p.191, Footnote #1.
- This is very evident in his <u>Transformation in Christ</u>, where each of these virtues is the subject of a soul-searching chapter.

^{73 &}lt;u>Ibid</u>. p.412.

⁷⁴ Ibid. p.441.

CHAPTER V

FURTHER DATA FOR A HIGHER VIEWPOINT

As has been mentioned in Chapter III, in preparing his Institute at Xavier University in 1959, Lonergan read from several sources-Piaget, Susanne Langer, Scheler and von Hildebrand. While the influence of Scheler and von Hildebrand are obviously strong in Lonergan's shift from an ethics of metaphysics to an ethics of value- these other sources clearly have a certain role to play in his shift as well. It is our purpose in this chapter to make brief summaries of the probable contributing notions of these writers, in order to balance out what must have been many ingredients to the shift. We shall begin with Piaget (whose studies, we shall see, bear a family resemblance to Lonergan both in cognition and epistemology), and then shift to Susanne Langer's philosophy of art. We shall then try to summarize the psychologist Abraham Maslow, from whom Lonergan derived stimulus in describing the moral and religious patterns of experience out of which arise meanings representative of the human good. Then finally- and necessarily incomplete summary—we shall try to describe certain in a notions (and terms from) existential thought which pervade Lonergan's discussion of the human good and meaning.

A - Jean Piaget

In preparing his institute at Xavier University, Lonergan mentions that he read "a lot of Piaget". A reading of those lecture notes ¹ indicates that Lonergan did indeed read extensively in Piaget's psychology of the child, moral development of the child, psychology of intelligence, and genetic epistemology— such as that based in his International Center for Epistemological Research (1956). This reading was part of Lonergan's preparation for the topic of the Xavier institute, but was also an excur-

sion into the field of education to discover how cognitional skills actually develop from infancy to adulthood, and to explore further what might be their invariant structure. Piaget's research provided a natural complement to Lonergan's hypotheses, since it supported neither rationalist nor empiricist presuppositions, but seemed to suggest a cognitional structure not dissimilar to that projected by Lonergan. It is our intention in these next few pages to summarize very briefly the key notions which Lonergan drew from Piaget,

-as well as to mention a few particulars from Piaget's research which are referred to by Lonergan from time to time. As Piaget's writings are so extensive, we will of necessity be confined to highly condensed summaries or succinct quotations that we have selected on the basis of Lonergan's usage of key Piagetian notions in his post 1959 writings.

In an article summarizing his own findings in the field of developmental psychology, Piaget singles out three basic observations which are confirmed in all of his research:

- (1) Knowledge of an object does not consist of having a static mental copy of the object but of effecting transformations on it and reaching some understanding of the mechanisms of these transformations. An intelligent act consists above all of coordinating operations, uniting, ordering (in the sense of introducing order), etc. These operations, which derive from the subject's internalization of his own actions, are the instruments of the transformations that knowledge is concerned with.
- (2) Logical relationships are, first and above all, operational structures. Although their most advanced forms are certainly expressed by language, their origins are found in the coordination of the subject's own actions. Even at the sensorimotor, preverbal level, a child is involved in activities that include uniting, ordering, introducing correspondences, etc.: and these activities are the source of operations and logico-mathematical structures.
- (3) Knowledge is not determined strictly by the knower, or by the objects known, but by exchanges or interactions between the knower and the objects (between the organism and the environment). The fundamental relation is not one of simple association but of assimilation and accommodation:

The knower assimilates objects to the structures of his actions (or of his operations), and at the same time he accommodates these structures (by differentiating them) to the unforeseen aspects of the reality he encounters.²

In these basic observations is contained Piaget's conclusion that knowledge comes through a process of transformation, from the interaction between objects to be known, and the knowing subject. Knowledge being neither a "copy" of external reality (an empiricist position) nor contained a priori in the structures of the knower (a rationalist position), Piaget emphasizes the interaction that takes place between the developing mental structures of the knower, the accumulation of the known in the knower, and the increasing horizon of environment which determines the experience of the knower. This interaction proceeds according to the two principles of assimilation and accommodation within any particular group of opera-Reality is reconstructed in a child's thought as he assimilates those aspects of reality (say, eating with a spoon) by repeating that already-learned operation, coordinating it with others, and generalizing it into its own form. When a new aspect of reality (say, attempting to eat with a knife or a fork) presents itself, the form must be accommodated (adjusted) to take into account its different usage or circumstance. As the enlarged form becomes operative and complete (eating with knife, fork and spoon), that group of operations is said to be attained, and it becomes a functional part of a child's organization of functions-coordinated, differentiated from, and internalized with many others. Central to it is the idea of a group as a fundamental set of operations, by which the whole grouping can be mastered by application of the same single operation 1+1=2, 2+1=3, 5+1=6, etc.). In such mastery, there is a general tendency towards equilibrium where a balance is achieved between environmental stimuli, and

the structures a person develops by assimilation and accommodation to comprehend them. Piaget's findings therefore describe how a subject develops his own mental structures to interact with and transform environmental objects through assimilation and accommodation, to the achievement of equilibrium between the subject and the environment in mastery of that group of operations and organized or coordinated with his other operations. 3

As the notion of group enables Piaget to measure intellectual development, so it also enables him to describe distinctly different stages in that development. He finds four such stages: the Sensorimotor (approximately birth to two years); the Preoperational (approximately 2-7 years); the Concrete Operational (approximately 7 to 11 years); the Formal Operational (approximately 11 years and after). In the first stage, learning is primarily confined to the sphere of the reflexes and their organization, although there is the beginning of problem-solving (such as removing an object barring the way to a sought-after object) and of fundamental systems of signification (language, imitation, etc.) by which objects or acts are represented. In Preoperational Thinking, the internalization of structures or actions assimilated must await significant decentering of the egocentrism which characterized the first stage. When this has taken place, the child becomes aware of the differentiation between objects and their permanence, and the child's sense of being a subject. The presence of this more objective and symbolic thinking enables the child to conclude grouping of basic learned operations - e.g. to be able to reverse a learned procedure, such as a trip to another street (assimilated) and the reverse return trip home (accommodated). However, language and symbols will still be according to the child's own limited experience of things, and will not take in-

to account the interrelations of things apart from their single relation to him. In the Concrete Operational stage, there is a highly developed assimilation of the particular nature of external objects, through manipulation, trial and error, final mastery, and organization of them. presence of symbolic thought, while rooted in the particular, enables intuition (insight?) to take place, restructuring as well as structuring, and fundamental notions such as speed and space. The final Formal Operational stage, consolidated during adolescence, involves the development of flexible and effective structures of reasoning, the ability to work at a high level of abstraction and verbal hypothesizing from any particular reality being its chief characteristic. The child can develop theories and hypothesis which comprehend either a particular or hypothetical (anticipated) reality, and can draw conclusions which have been tested according to their results. To do so requires reflection and evaluation of any particular operation (be it real or hypothesized), and also progressive differentiation of operations and their organization and integration within any subject's operations. Reflection on both objective and subjective operations is well developed, marking a significant end to egocentrism with the differentiation between self and others. At this point, the child has developed his own set of mental structures which can comprehend the world as he experiences it, can be flexibly adapted as those structures are extended and become more complex, and above all can be operational in living within that world. 4 This analysis of intellectual development supports Piaget's fundamental insight as to the nature of knowledge:

. Knowledge derives neither from objects independent of a subject nor from a subject independent of objects; it derives from an indissociable interaction between subject and object or, in more general terms, between organism and environment. This interaction leads at first to a lack of differentiation, or confusion, between objective and subjective, as is evident in the child's egocentrism. Later, it takes two related developments. One is decentering, which results in the objectivity of experimental knowledge. (This objectivity is not a given of the knowing process but is a slow and laborious conquest.) The other is reflective abstraction, which leads to the construction of logicomathematical structures.

Intellectual development itself, then, proceeds by assimilation and adaption to cope with ever-increasing horizons of experience, which are "understood" by accumulated abstractions of ever-increasing complexity. To use Loner-gan's terms (which we do not find in Piaget, but they are Kantian) the "immediate" (sensations) of experience become "mediated" as they are "understood" by this interaction and development of logical structures through assimilation and adaption.

Another area in Piaget from which Lonergan draws is the area of language, symbol, and meaning. 6 In a rather specific working out of the theory of intellectual development previously described, Piaget describes the appropriation of language. He finds the real task for a child being the construction of meanings for words and symbols, which correspond to an adequate degree to the meanings used by other people with whom the child lives and interacts. The first process by which this occurs is by imitation, repetition, and copying (assimilation), whose purpose is not specifically communication. This egocentric use of language (generally monologue) progresses to socialized language, which involves communication of meaning in a more objective sense. Socialized language initially is comprised of words which, when expressed, get things done or have an effect. They are primarily functionals At a much later stage, the child constructs a more elaborate meaning connoted by a

word. But this has been developed more by adaptation—discovered usages of the word which necessitate a broader meaning for the word than was initially assimilated. However the essence of Piaget's conclusions on language involve description of the processes by which a child constructs, and constantly adapts, his own schemes of meaning. Above all, a child does not merely copy words and their meaning, but constructs his own versions which, in the end, have to bear a reasonable resemblance to those used by others (socialization).

A further area of Piaget's research which Lonergan does not specifically mention, save in his lectures at Xavier, but which must have related to his other readings at this time, is the role affectivity plays in intellectual development. Essentially, Piaget sees cognitive and affective development progressing side by side in a correlated process, each basically inseparable from the other. But there is a fundamental role affectivity plays as that which <u>energizes</u> cognitive and behavior patterns. However, in affectivity, initially there is no differentiation between the self and both physical and human environments, while in cognition objectivity develops as soon as egocentrism begins to decline. As the human environment becomes more differentiated from the physical, the affectivity of others through contagion and later through communication, becomes sought after and persons then become objects of affectivity, and affectivity becomes socialized. As in logical thinking, development in affectivity takes place in interaction with the affectivity of others—both assimilation of it and accommodation to it. A significant development in affect takes place when this becomes remembered evocation, rather than evocation being dependent upon the presence of an affective object. Here too, language,

symbol and image become the carriers of affect and sentiment—which are assimilated and constructed by the child through his social relations first with adults, and then later with other children. Moral behavior is the result of both logical and affective development, in that particular assimilated conventions (a prime example is games) become a basis for social interaction in which first egocentric affective energy motivates the behavior, but later the known affectivity of others takes on significance as ego-centrism declines. In order for a sense, say, like "duty" to develop, there must be the presence of sentiment or affect "on the part of the person who receives the order, toward the person who gives it."8 Through such interaction, the socialization of affectivity thereby takes place. More significant moral development occurs at the time of formal operations, however, when moral behavior assimilated from parents and other role-models becomes subject to significant adaptation through a strengthening sense of identity of the affective self. In the end, it is autonomous objective responsibility that develops in a child moving towards adulthood, where the moral structures have been both assimilated and adapted by him, and by such reconstruction, thereby energized by his own affect or sentiment. As in adolescent abstract thought, the principles and values of affectivity are equally abstract in the adolescent stage, and therefore can become characterized as universals rather than as concrete particulars of specific moral behavior. Adult affectivity therefore moves towards socialization (as adult logical thinking moves towards objectivity) through two fundamental transformations:

> First, feelings relative to ideals are added to interindividual feelings. Secondly, personalities develop in relation to social roles and scales of values derived from social interaction.

In a sense, what has occurred in adolescence are several affective groupings (as in logical thinking) where equilibrium begins to exist in terms of interpersonal feelings and values and principles, that basically stand up for themselves without further accommodation. At such a stage, what basically has come into formation is the organization of affectivity into the will:

. . . to the extent that the emotions become organized, they emerge as regulations whose final form of equilibrium is none other than the will. Thus, will is the true affective equivalent of the operation in reason. Will is a late-appearing function. The real exercise of will is linked to the functioning of the autonomous moral feelings, which is why we have waited until this stage to discuss it. 10

Will, as the regulator of the energy of affect, can only develop as there is increasing conflict of tendencies to pleasures, duties, etc., which require organization and discrimination. In the will, the moral tendencies of the affect are organized. This is necessitated by what seems to be the unchanneled and spontaneous energy of the affections, which both substantially motivate our cognitive and behavioral response to reality, but which also must be regulated to decenter and socialize it. Such is the function of the will.

One particular in Piaget from which Lonergan may have drawn, is a description of the functioning of a smile in human relations. 11 Piaget often mentions the smile, and some research was done on its significance. In children (infants), the smile is primarily a symptom of satisfaction. Hence it can be provoked by mere inanimate objects (such as a rattle) which give satisfaction. But it also early becomes a reaction to another human person when "the infant's smile is very frequently provoked, maintained, reinforced, or 'gratified' by the smile of a human partner, it becomes an instrument of exchange or contagion". 12 Either by exchange or

contagion, it quickly becomes a means of non-verbal communication between persons, and as it becomes organized into an operative group, the smile takes on the complexity of communicating a great variety of sentiments as its decentering and socializing become complete.

There are many other aspects of Piaget's research which may well be relevant to Lonergan's writings, but such investigation is beyond the scope of this brief summary. More recent works, such as <u>Le Structuralisme</u> 13 and <u>Psychologie et Epistemologie</u> 4 are very relevant to much of Lonergan's later works, but obviously post-date the shift in his thinking which is the subject of this dissertation.

B. - Susanne Langer

As has already been quoted, Lonergan mentions that his preparations for an institute at Xavier included reading Susanne Langer's <u>Feeling and Form</u>. ¹⁵ In fact, he spent an entire lecture at the institute summarizing and reflecting upon her thought. Much of the same material is presented in more condensed form in <u>Method</u>— in both cases a word by word elaboration of the sentence definition of art — "the objectification of a purely experiential pattern." ¹⁶ Actually, the definition is Lonergan's and not Langer's— the closest Langer comes to this is: "Art is the creation of forms symbolic of human feeling." ¹⁷ "Art is the creation of forms expressive of human feeling." ¹⁸ To an elaboration of these and Lonergan's definitions, we now must turn.

Langer came under the influence of Ernst Cassirer in his examination of the symbolic consciousness, and also somewhat inherited his neo-Kantian position. Cassirer went beyond Kant's critique of knowledge to

analyze the varieties of ways of thinking—particularly the mythical (not just the scientific, ethical, etc.) and symbolic—in order to find in general the ways by which judgments are made in human cognition. 19 Langer essentially developed her philosophy of art as an analysis of the particular language or "symbolic form" of art, as it is used to describe the affective area of human experience. She finds there to be a highly "formal" character to the non-scientific expressions of art, ritual, and myth—even though feelings are generally associated with the immediate, the spontaneous. This formal character emerges through a certain reflection or abstraction which takes place as the artist distances himself from his immediate emotion in its context, and searches for the ultimate form or pattern which will epitomize it in all its "purity" (devoid of any extraneous feelings). Art is never, therefore, uncontrolled emotive expression. A good example of such psychic distancing Langer quotes from Wordsworth's definition of poetry:

I have said that poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings; it takes its origin from emotion recollected in tranquillity: the emotion is contemplated till, by a species of reaction, the tranquillity gradually disappears, and an emotion, kindred to that which was before the subject of contemplation, is gradually produced, and does itself actually exist in the mind. 20

Art begins, therefore, with the experiential, where the emotion is experienced <u>immediately</u>. ²¹ But then the feeling begins to emerge into consciousness, and can be the object of reflection. The role of the artist begins when the feeling is emerging into his consciousness, and he begins to search for artistic objects which can embody or hold that feeling within consciousness. This is the search for the symbol, the object of expression that can represent the feeling to consciousness, and it is a

search for a representational pattern of hearing, seeing, touching, feeling, or imagining. Langer, with Cassirer, finds that as such experiences rise to consciousness, they become patterned by that reflective perceiving; and seem no longer disjointed or ad hoc. 22 The pattern, therefore, arises out of the experiential - but then must be purified to contain only the essence of the experience. This is the point of real abstraction, for released from the restrictions of space and time, the pattern becomes purified in terms of rhythm, colour, depth, harmony, or whatever. In a sense, Langer calls such created patterns "illusions"- for as abstracted forms, "their content is only a semblance, a pure appearance," whose function is to make them, too, apparent, "more freely and wholly apparent than they could be if they were exemplified in a context of real circumstance and anxious interest."²³ The "work of art" itself is still further objectification or abstraction of the developed pure pattern-although the work is limited by the medium itself as well as the capabilities of the artist. At this stage, however, it is important to note that what began as an experienced feeling, was then formed into a purely experiential pattern, and was then objectivized into the actual work of art. In the end, therefore, art is not

...a symbolic expression of feelings that beset the composer, but a symbolic expression of its forms of sentience as he understands them. It bespeaks his imagination of feeling rather than his own emotional state, and expresses what he knows about the so-called 'inner life'.24

This means that art is directed to consciousness, although the subject is consciousness of emotion or affect.

Art, then, is objectivized form or pattern of feeling—and such feelings are expressed as they exist in life. While they are presented to consciousness, their meaning is never reducible to words or concepts or any other vocabulary:

Its elements, therefore, are discursively known to us only as they figure in typical situations and actions; we name them for associated conditions. But the same progress of excitation may occur in entirely different circumstances, in situations that build up to disaster and in others that dissolve without practical consequences. The same feeling may be an ingredient in sorrow and in the joys of love. A work of art expressing such an ambiguously associated affect will be called 'cheerful' by one interpreter and 'wistful' or even 'sad' by another. But what it conveys is really just one nameless passage of 'felt life', knowable through its incarnation in the art symbol even if the beholder has never felt it in his own flesh. 25

That "felt life" is presented in the work of art, and it elicits understanding "with an intuition of the whole presented feeling." 26 This whole is then subject to discursion and elaboration—but in the beginning, it is presented as a whole and immediately to the recipient's consciousness. What is intuited and elaborated from the artist's emotive symbol, may go well beyond the import of the artist's intended presentation of "felt life", but that is part of the richness of communication by artistic symbol. The symbol thus uniquely relates to the experience of the artist as to the experience of the observer, and broadens each according to the limits of each's experience. But the symbol remains in the context of lived experience, of the feelings of living, and cannot be translated into principle or concept (literal) without losing its power to relate to the particulars of living of any of its possible observer-recipients. This open-ended, multilingual aspect of the symbolic form and the work of art is important in describing aspects of felt life that are not thoroughly known, somewhat obscure, and mysteriously beyond. In fact, for Langer it is essential in artistic expression that in the emotive symbol, many levels of feeling can be heard

to "speak" at the same time, even with one somewhat contradicting the other. 27

In this brief summary of Langer's thought, it can be seen that Lonergan's elaboration (Art is the objectification of a purely experiential pattern) of Langer's definition (Art is the creation of forms expressive appropriate in that there is much substance in of human feeling) is Langer for the notions behind each of Lonergan's words. It is inappropriate in that it overtly shapes the definition towards objectification, while it underplays Langer's focus—the expression of feeling through form in art. We did not find in Langer the distinction between elemental versus conceptualized meaning. These terms more likely have their source in scholastic usage, rather than in either Cassirer or In general, the essence of Langer's definition of art, which is Langer. important to Lonergan, is in finding that there is a logic or form or pattern to artistic expressions of feeling that takes place through their objectification in the work of art. And Langer (from an artist's point of view) therefore articulates what for Lonergan (from a theologian's point of view) is the essential communicative function of human living in art:

Only one function belongs to good art alone, and is what makes it good: the objective presentation of feeling to the beholder's direct perception.²⁸

C - Abraham Maslow

Lonergan mentions several notions from Abraham Maslow's holistic psychology of being at several points in <u>Method</u> and other post-<u>Insight</u> articles, and indicates through such references his familiarity with <u>Toward</u> a <u>Psychology of Being</u> and <u>Religions</u>, <u>Values</u>, and <u>Peak Experiences</u>.

He primarily draws on Maslow to describe particular patterns of experience from which one derives meaning for the notion of the human good, but he also makes reference to his concept of growth. He finds Maslow a key exponent of a "Third Force" in Psychology 31 (meaning an alternate to either Freudian or experimental-postivistic-behavioristic psychology) which would include psychologists of the self, Rogerians, growth-psychologists, humanistic psychologists, and existential and phenomenological psychologists. He can draw positively on such because of their orientation to Being, and because of their direction towards health and growth, rather than sickness or abnormality.

In the next section, we shall be summarizing key notions from existential thought, but it is important to identify Maslow amongst such as Allport, Rogers, Fromm, Erikson, Horney, May, etc. who centre their studies on a quest for identity in existence that is similar (but generally more empirical) to the studies of such as Heidegger and Jaspers. They work with personal, subjective experience, and work with man as he struggles out of his actuality towards his potentiality through a discovery (or uncovery) of a sense of identity which then informs the choices or decisions of that self. The outcome is therefore the moral act, and the method is that personal quest for authentic identity and existence of the self (hence Lonergan's utilization of many of these notions and insights). But in studying this "self", Maslow found himself developing certain assumptions which it would be important to note:

- Each person's inner nature is in part unique to himself and in part species-wide.
- It is possible to study this inner nature scientifically and to discover what it is like (not invent-discover).
- This inner nature, as much as we know of it so far, seems not to be intrinsically or primarily or necessarily

evil. The basic needs, the basic human emotions and their basic human capacities are on their face either neutral, pre-moral, or positively 'good'. Destructiveness, sadism, cruelty, malice, etc. seem so far to be not intrinsic but rather they seem to be violent reactions against frustration of our intrinsic needs, emotions, and capacities...

- Since this inner nature is good or neutral rather than bad, it is best to bring it out and to encourage it rather than to suppress it. If it is permitted to guide our life, we grow healthy, fruitful, happy.
- If this essential core of the person is denied or suppressed, he gets sick sometimes in obvious ways, sometimes in subtle ways, sometimes immediately, sometimes later. 32

These assumptions, derived from his observations in practice, enable Maslow to develop a psychology that moves toward holistic human growth and becoming, and that builds upon the healthy and high-points of personal and social life rather than a psychology oriented to neurosis, psychosis, and psychopathy that searches for the particular ills which might frustrate or twist that life.

Maslow to a degree combines the orientation of psychology to both illness and health by a hierarchical theory of human motivation. Consisting of at least two distinct levels, there are firstly the "deficiency motivations" (in which absence of a need breeds illness, its presence prevents illness, and its restoration cures illness) 33, and there are secondly "growth motivations":

So far as motivational status is concerned, healthy people have sufficiently gratified their basic needs for safety, belongingness, love, respect and self-esteem so that they are motivated primarily by trends to self-actualization (defined as ongoing actualization of potentials, capacities and talents, as fulfillment of missions [or call, fate, destiny or vocation], as a fuller knowledge of, and acceptance of, the person's own intrinsic nature, as an unceasing trend toward unity, integration, or synergy within: the person). 34

This differentiation of motivations relates particularly to the contrasting

dynamics of love, which Maslow terms "B - love (love for the Being of another person, unneeding love, unselfish love) and D - love (deficiency love, love need, selfish love)"35 While, as with the differing motivations, a person with fulfilled needs becomes enabled towards actualization, so a person who has been and is the recipient of love becomes far more able to give love. This becomes encompassed in Maslow's basic theory of defense and growth:

> Therefore we can consider the process of healthy growth to be a never ending series of free choice situations, confronting each individual at every point throughout his life, in which he must choose between the delights of safety and growth, dependence and independence, regression and progression, immaturity and maturity. Safety has both anxieties and delights; growth has both anxieties and delights. We grow forward when the delights of growth and anxieties of safety are greater than the anxieties of growth and the delights of safety. 36

It is with this theory of deficiency and growth motivation in which both needs and possibilities are taken into account, that Maslow sees a reconciliation between the psychologies of being and those of becoming. But Lonergan's particular use of Maslow at this point was in the hierarchy of motivations and the context of growth, 37 probably with special interest in Maslow's thirteen-point summary for child and adult growth versus blocks or inhibitions to that growth. 38

Perhaps the most widely-known aspect of Maslow's research centers around what he calls the "peak-experience". To describe it, he uses the category of cognition, and proposes that there are "B" and "D" types of cognition (as in motivation and love). "B" cognition is organized towards ultimate, peak, or end-experiences and insights, while "D" cognition is organized by the deficiency needs of the individual:

"B" Cognition

"D" Cognition

⁻ the experience or object tends to be - the experience is one of

- seen as a whole, detached from relationships or even usefulness
- the experience is completely absorbing and involving
- the experience is an end-in-itself, regardless of human relevance
- the experience is lived and re-lived with increasing strength or richness
- the experience is so dominant that one's ego is not integrally related, and may, in a sense, "disappear"
- the experience is felt as self-validating, self-justifying, and carrying its own intrinsic value
- the experience carries a disorientation to time and space (e.g. "time stood still"), each becoming absolute
- the experience, regardless of content, is seen as fundamentally good and desirable
- the experience is known according to intrinsic values (wholeness, perfection, justice, aliveness, simplicity, beauty, goodness, uniqueness, truth, etc.)
- the experience is more a receiving, a "choiceless awareness"
- the emotional reaction is wonder, awe, reverence humility
- the experience brings a sense of unity, a total entity
- the experience of the particular is abstracted to the universal without loss of the particular
- the experience fuses, transcends, or resolves what before were dichotomies, polarities, conflicts
- the experience gives its subject a complete, loving, uncondemning, compassionate acceptance of the world
- the experience involves a fusion of the inner and outer, the world and oneself, etc.

- several simultaneous ones, and is imbedded in its world relation-ships
- the experience comes with others,
 each of which is accorded but a
 portion of total perception
- the experience is dominated by human purposefulness or relatedness
- the experience becomes less strong and remembered after its genesis
- the experience has ego needs and involvements
- the experience is felt as mere behavior, and a means towards other ends
- time and space are the context for the experience, and are somewhat relative
- the experience may be desirable or undesirable
- the experience is judged according to means-values (useful, desirable, pleasing)
- the experience is directed, organized, or intended
- the experience carries emotion, but does not overwhelm.
- the experience is but one of many
- the experience of the particular is abstracted into the general
- the experience does not change, or perhaps makes even more fateful, conflicts and contradictions
- the experience does not change basic "acceptance of reality", as it (or the person) merely is
- the experience does not radically alter the sense of self, world, etc.³⁹

This differentiation of "B" cognition from what we would associate with the mundane cognition of day-to-day living, Maslow describes as peak-experiences

of the self-actualizing person:

We may define it as an episode, or a spurt in which the powers of the person come together in a particularly efficient and intensely enjoyable way, and in which he is more integrated and less split, more open for experience, more idiosyncratic, more perfectly expressive or spontaneous, or fully functioning, more creative, more humorous, more ego-transcending, more independent of his lower needs, etc. He becomes in these episodes more truly himself, more perfectly actualizing his potentialities, closer to the core of his Being, more fully human. 40

The experiences Maslow is talking of here may be esthetic, creative, mystic, of insight, of love, or whatever. A self-actualizing person, who is very much in a state of growth, is both receptive to such experiences, and willing and able to integrate them into a self which has an ever increasing degree of "essential humanness". 41

Peak-moments of self-actualization, when studied, can further teach us a great deal about values—from straight descriptions of the free-choices of self-actualizing people (Aristotle and the choices of good men?). To study values in this manner means to reject the notion that men do not yearn for what is "best" for them, for Maslow's findings of self-actualizing people is that they do, in fact, yearn and try to choose what is good for them and for others. Study of such potentialities (even though not yet actualized) will reveal simultaneously both the human being he is and that which he yearns to be—Being and Becoming—without the impositions of a value-source outside of human nature itself. The intrinsic values so characteristic of peak experiences (see above 42) are just such potentialities, and Maslow feels that therapy itself has a role to play in helping the patient discover these in his own experience:

I think it possible that we may soon even define therapy

as a search for values, because ultimately the search for identity is, in essence, the search for one's own intrinsic, authentic values 43

This also means, as Lonergan is fond of quoting Maslow in his own courses on Insight and Method:

All of this implies another kind of education, i.e. experiential education. ...what is necessary to do first is to change the person and to change his awareness of himself. That is, what we must do is to make him become aware of the fact that peak-experiences go on inside himself. Until he has become aware of such experience and has this experience as a basis for comparison, he is a non-peaker; and it is useless to try to communicate to him the feel and the nature of peak-experience. But if we can change him, in the sense of making him aware of what is going on inside himself, then he becomes a different kind of communicatee. It is now possible to communicate with him. He now knows what you are talking about when you speak of peak-experiences; and it is possible to teach him by reference to his own weak peak-experiences how to improve them, how to enrich them, how to enlarge them and also how to draw the proper conclusions from these experiences. 44

In <u>Religions</u>, <u>Values</u>, <u>and Peak-Experiences</u>, <u>Maslow addresses</u> this problem of communication between "peakers" and "non-peakers", and also the inherent danger in any institution (especially organized religion) of conventionalizing, legalizing, and verbalizing literalistically the visions of men given in peak experiences. However, the main contribution Lonergan utilizes in Maslow is the description of growth and deficiency motivations, "B" and "D" love and cognition, and the description of peak experiences and their values. While Lonergan also explores the "peak experience" with a more religious context in some of William Johnston's books, ⁴⁵ its function as that which reveals value in the various patterns of experience remains the same.

D. - Existential Thought

Lonergan, in keeping abreast of twentieth century thought, was obviously well aware of the writings of most authors whom we associate with the existential movement in philosophy. This is true of both his pre-as well as post-Insight period. However, he admits to having done some extensive reading in the field prior to giving a series of lectures on Existentialism to a group of scholastic philosophers at Boston College in the summer of 1957, in which he focused on Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre and Gabriel Marcel. 46 He also indicated that he substantially augmented this reading prior to his 1959 Institute on the Philosophy of Education, particularly with the works of Karl Jaspers. 47 Such an accumulated reading is obviously impossible to trace and equally impossible to summarize. However, there is clearly an influence from existentialism in Lonergan's shift away from an ethics of metaphysics, and one might go so far as to say that phenomenology and existentialism together (inter-related as they are), provide a broad horizon which is the context for Lonergan's higher viewpoint. In this section, we will try to mention key notions from existentialism and phenomenology which seem directly relevant to Lonergan's shift.

Paul Tillich, in an article on "Existential Philosophy", makes a helpful comment in characterizing the focus of existential philosophy:

Reality or Being is not the object of cognitive experience, but is rather 'existence', is Reality as immediately experienced, with the accent on the inner personal character of man's immediate experience. 48

This focus on being, on ontology, is a move away from concerns for the essence of things (abstractions), to concerns that can actually be derived

from lived existence. In philosophy, it particularly represents a shift away from objects and objectification (as distinct from subjects and subjectivity) to the reality or "Being" which must underlie both subject and object before these distinctions are made. Its progenitors—Socrates, Augustine, and Pascal—share with Kierkegaard, its twentieth-century initiator, a move against the dominance of abstract thinking or rationality as that which categorizes and defines experience. Their concern is reality immediately experienced, especially as it arises in man the subject out of the inner, personal character of his experience of the world and himself. This then becomes, as in Kierkegaard, a reversal of the movement (particularly in Hegel) from an objective knowledge which can become indifferent or estranged from its subjects, towards a subjective knowledge of that which is essential for a subject to struggle with existence. 49

Such a shift away from subject/object distinctions to a philosophy in pursuit of Being within existence, necessitates first of all a methodology. Most existential philosophers, to at least some degree, utilize the phenomenological method. This method, which we have referred to both with Max Scheler and Dietrich von Hildebrand, involves firstly the act of reduction, whereby any experience is focused on in such a way that all preconceptions, categorizations, and factual assumptions are "bracketed off" in such a way as makes clear the acts which constitute pure phenomena (free from any transcendent interpretations). This epistemological reduction was Edmund Husserl's radicalization of Kant's critique of pure reason, but still represents a Kantian position. With it, Husserl also built on Franz Brentano's notion of intentionality in consciousness, as that directedness which describes the meaning or purpose given to objects, acts or ideas in

the mind. ⁵¹ Intention has a quality of "objectivating" or identifying experience (focusing out a specific important datum from other data), as well as actually constituting the intentional act. Along with phenomenological reduction, Husserl therefore developed <u>intentional analysis</u> as an analytic method to objectivate, identify, and constitute acts or objects in our consciousness. We do such analysis whenever we begin to identify a "consciousness of", a "perception of", or a "joy at", ⁵² for we identify both the object and act of intention.

These methods enable a focus on pure experience that is characteristic of almost all existential writers. Kierkegaard's studies on anxiety and on despair, Nietzsche's writings or ressentiment and guilt, and the later more explicit phenomenological studies of Scheler on feelings, Jaspers on psychopathology, Sartre on emotion-are typical of existential analysis which utilizes the presuppositions of phenomenology. A particular study that Husserl began, but then was taken up by others, is summed up in his notion of intersubjectivity. Posed with the problem of how another human being, completely individual and "other", can become constituted within one's consciousness without necessarily making the subject/object distinction, he came up with an appreciation of the pluralities of subjectivities who make up a community sharing a common world (intersubjectivity). 53 Both Scheler and von Hildebrand (as we have seen) analyzed such phenomena extensively, as did Martin Buber (the I-Thou relationship) and Martin Heidegger (the notion Mitsein - a relationship with the other of being, rather than of knowledge or consciousness). 54 These various analyses are representative of phenomenological rather than psychological studies, for they are attempts to grasp existential realities without making any a priori

assumptions of either theory or practice.

Kierkegaard, as well as introducing the category of existence, also delineated a condition for an essential knowledge of existence (versus inessential knowledge - objective abstraction). This condition, which is possible only for the subject, is to be personally committed to such knowledge so as to be able to live and act upon it. 55 For one has to exist in such knowledge, and to do so requires both an assimilation and appropriation of one's thought to be able to act upon it. (Lonergan in lecturing on this recalls John Henry Newman with his distinction between "real" and "notional" truth 56 - "real" in this case being existential). Hence one is both responsible for any one act, as well as for one's existential knowledge which informed it. In the risk of enacting such an act, is defined the meaning of one's life-the extent of actualization of one's possibilities. To the extent that one has or is actualizing those possibilities, one has "chosen oneself". Martin Heidegger more fully develops this theme in his analysis of existence, when he asserts that "the essence of human being lies in existence", 57 and by that he further means actual (non-theoretical) existing stripped of "consciousness" and leaving only being. His ontology of existence poses the real possibility in man- to be or not to be authentically (eigentlich). To find one's authentic existence is to be directed towards one's own being (Zu-sein), that which is at stake from one's own living in the world (to be or not to be oneself). The way in which one approaches openly (or attempts to dodge) such aspects of being as death, failure, guilt, or futility are indications of the degree of authenticity to being that one has appropriated in one's existence. such studies, Heidegger puts together phenomenology, existentialism, and

ontology— a phenomenological study of the ontological structures of existence. But in studying this Being of existence, Heidegger moves against any consciousness of it, or any attempt to develop it through logic or metaphysics, as this inevitably hides Being.

Karl Jaspers approaches existence as Dasein - "being" finding itself as being there. This existence is expressed in the words 'I am there' and 'we are there' 58 from a radical understanding of human freedom, which then is built upon with the decisions and acts men make in that freedom: "Existence is constantly confronted by the choice of being or not being. I am only in the earnestness of decision."⁵⁹ For Jaspers, everything develops from the subject, in freedom, making decisions (to act), being fully responsible for those decisions, and sharing that responsibility with neither norm, value, convention, or law. In any context, a voice of conscience develops that is a "communication of myself to myself; an appeal to my empirical existence from the source of my self-being. No one else is calling to me: I am calling to myself." Such communications are immediately (Kantian intuition) given in the mind, but are also mediated by the knowledge, experience, and thought of the mind. But actually to be able to will to follow that voice, is a gift (grace) rather than an ability, and existence is transcended when that happens. 61 Also at this point, one becomes aware of being in the presence of the consciousness of God—not with certainty or knowledge, but with "non-knowledge" where "we experience nothingness or God."62 One is aware of this voice as an individual, and that it is specific to this time, this place, and this person of given age, sex, and life experience. This means that philosophy can only be in pursuit of such truth (encompassing) and never able to

grasp it:

...every single manifestation in the world of the one absolute truth must be historical: it is unconditional for this Existenz (in its specific situation within the world) and for that reason it is not universally valid. 63

On the other hand, every individual faces ultimate situations—where there is doubt, fear, agony, death or any unknown—which do lead to an individual sense of realizing existence in the ultimate sense (transcendence), yet still with a degree of uncertainty.

Jean-Paul Sartre's philosophy of existentialism seems built upon as radical an understanding of human freedom as Jaspers' (but involving a unique aspect of freedom as always threatened), pitted against "The Thing" or the absurd. Seen another way as the subject pitted against the object, in search of reconciliation. 64 Sartre's exploration of Heidegger's ultimate situations often present the likely possibility of self-estrangement and despair when the subjective freedom to be is destroyed by the destructive force of human society. On the other hand, the resistance to oppression and the opposition to force brings "this total responsibility in total solitude—wasn't this the revelation of our freedom?"65 Utilizing phenomenology, Sartre specifically applies it to the emotions in a way that goes beyond the assumption of emotional cognition, which we saw first in Scheler (but which is in Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Jaspers an intentional and revealing phenomenon). Sartre finds that feelings signify purposive behavior, but are misleading and in need of purification (phenomenological reduction) since they tend to run away from reality. 66 Emotions, like logic, can take from man his necessary responsibility- to make himself (act) in freedom against the greater force of Being-in-itself (en soi). Sartre stresses instead all the activistic features of human existence

(choice, decision, etc.) by which, through assumption of freedom and responsibility, man's being becomes derived from his doing. Sartre's ontology seems a sort of negative reversal (of the ontologies mentioned above), in that consciousness or nothingness (the subject) is pitted against and yet necessarily feeds upon Being—an ultimately negative and losing confrontation for the subject. This pessimism is somewhat reversed in his post—war writings, where a notion of man as a self—transcending activist in a completely human universe grounds a positive existential humanism. Engagement (personal, and then, of necessity social) becomes our free choice to act, and it is from such acts that the essence of man proceeds out of his existence in the world. Bad faith⁶⁷ is attempted evasion of engagement, responsibility, and the basic anxiety of existence. In "bad faith", one evades choice of oneself (Heidegger), while in "engagement", one chooses in good faith—, and, it would seem, chooses to be in a 'conversion' to authenticity. 68

This brief summary of key notions of various phenomenologists and existentialists does give some indication of a philosophy trying to abolish the subject/object differentiation by a return to the experiencing subject—and this shift obviously relates to Lonergan's move away from metaphysics to method. What we will have to examine as we come to examine Lonergan's integration of this thought into his own, will be its Kantian assumptions. Particularly Jaspers, but to some degree all the phenomenologists and existentialists we have mentioned, assumed an immediate intuition of sensations as an a priori function. How this can be integrated into Lonergan's levels of cognition in consciousness leading to judgment and value, will be a subject of our concern in the next two chapters.

Footnotes - Chapter V

- "The Philosophy of Education". Lonergan's manuscripts from the series of lectures are held at Lonergan Centre, Regis College, Toronto.
- from "Developmental Psychology: A Theory" by Jean Piaget in <u>International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences</u> (ed. David L. Sills); (New York: Macmillan Co. & Free Press, 1968). Vol. IV p.140.
- summarized from Jean Piaget <u>La Psychologie de l'Intelligence</u>. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1947) translated by M. Piercy & D. Berlyne as <u>The Psychology of Intelligence</u>; (London: Routledge, Kegan Paul Ltd., 1950). see esp. Chapters I, II, & III.
- summarized from Jean Piaget <u>The Psychologie of Intelligence op cit.</u>
 and Jean Piaget and B. Inhelder <u>De La Logique de l'enfant à la logique de l'adolescent</u>, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1955),
 translated by A. Parsons and S. Milgram as <u>The Growth of Logical Thinking</u>, (New York: Basic Books, 1958).
- from "Developmental Psychology; A Theory" op cit. p.147.
- from Le Langage et la Pensée chez Enfant. (Neuchâtel: Delachaux & Niestlé. 1923). translated by M. Gabain as The Language and Thought of the Child. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1926) and from La Formation du Symbols chez l'Enfant. (Neuchâtel: Delachaux & Niestlé, 1946). translated by G. Gatlegno and F.M. Hodgson as Play, Dreams, and Imitation in Childhood. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1951).
- Piaget, J. & Inhelder, B. <u>La Psychologie de l'Enfant</u>. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1966). translated by H. Weaver as The <u>Psychology</u> of the Child. (New York: Basic Books, 1969) p.114.
- 8 <u>Ibid</u>. p.123.
- The Growth of Logical Thinking, op cit. p.348.
- Piaget, J. "The Mental Development of the Child", originally published in <u>Juventus Helvetica</u> 1940, reprinted in Piaget, J. <u>Six Etudes de Psychologie</u>. (Genève: Editions Gonthier S.A. 1964). translated by A. Tenzer as <u>Six Psychological Studies</u>. (New York: Vintage Books, 1968). p.58.
- 11 <u>Method</u> p.59-60.
- Psychology of the Child, op cit. p.23.

- (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968). translated by C. Maschler as Structuralism. (New York: Basic Books, 1970).
- Genève: Editions Gonthier, S.A. 1970) translated by A. Rosin as Psychology and Epistemology. (New York: Viking Press, 1970).
- 15 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953).
- 16 Method. p.61.
- 17 Langer op cit. p.40.
- 18 <u>Ibid</u>. p.60.
- Cassirer, E. <u>The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms</u>. (New Haven: Yale U. Press, 1957) Vol. III, pp. 295-6.
- see W. Wordsworth "Preface to Lyrical Ballad" (1800) in C. Baker, ed. The Prelude; Selected Poems and Sonnets. (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1954). p.25-6. mentioned in Langer op cit. p.176.
- 21 <u>Ibid</u>. p.13.
- 22 Ib<u>id</u>. p.48,50.
- 23 <u>Ibid</u>. p.50.
- 24 <u>Ibid</u>. p.28.
- 25 Ibid. p.374.
- 26 <u>Ibid</u>. p.379.
- 27 Ibid. p.244.
- Langer, S. "The Social Influence of Design" in Holland, L.B. (ed.) Who Designs America. (New York: Doubleday, 1966). p.30.
- 29 (New York: D. Von Nostrand Co., 1968). Hereafter referred to as Being.
- 30 (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1970). Hereafter referred to as <u>Peak-Experiences</u>.
- Method. p.69. See also Maslow's list in Being p.IX and p.223.
- 32 Ibid. p.3,4.
- 33 <u>Ibid</u>. p.22.
- 34 <u>Ibid</u>. p.25.

- 35 Ibid. p.42.
- 36 Ibid. p.47.
- 37 Method. p.39,52.
- 38 Being p.57-59.
- 39 <u>Ibid</u>. p.74-96. A summary of the aspects, some of the wording mine.
- 40 Ibid. p.97.
- 41 Ibid. p.145.
- see Peak Experiences p.92 for a list of fourteen basic "B" or intrinsic values.
- 43 Being. p.177.
- Peak Experiences. p.89.
- Johnson, W. The Mysticism of the Cloud of Unknowing. (New York: Desilée, 1967) also Christian Zen. (New York: Harper and Row, 1971).
- See unpublished typescript (N. Graham, 1975) of <u>Lectures on Existentialism</u>, given at Boston College, Summer 1957, this typescript being held at the Lonergan Centre, Regis College, Toronto; and also <u>Notes on Existentialism</u>, being notes taken at those lectures and reprinted by the Thomas More Institute, Montreal, 1957.
- From an interview with Father Lonergan on the evening of December 15th, 1976, in St. Mary's Residence of Boston College:
 Question: What (did you read) of the Existentialists? Was that all prior to your lectures here in 1957?
 Answer: Oh, that was a put-together job, to secure my "bus-fare", you know! I did more reading after that. It is better reflected in my lectures on the Philosophy of Education.
 Question: What existentialists did you read primarily?
 Answer: Jaspers.
- see The Journal of the History of Ideas (1944) 5.1, pp.44.
- Kierkegaard, S. <u>Concluding Unscientific Postscript</u>, trans. D. Swenson and W. Lowrie (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton U. Presss, 1941). Book II, Part II.
- see Spiegelberg, H. The Phenomenological Movement. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976) p.120.

- Husserl, E. <u>Die Idee der Phänomenologie</u>, translated by W, Alston and G. Nakhuikion as <u>The Idea of Phenomenology</u>. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973.) p.43.
- 52 Spiegelberg. op cit. p.109ff.
- Cartesianische Meditationen (1931), translated by D. Cairns as Cartesian Meditations. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960.) see the fifth meditation.
- Sein und Zeit (1927), translated by J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson as Being and Time. (New York: Harper & Row, 1962.) p.149.
- 55 Kierkegaard, op cit. p.558, also p.177,181.
- Newman, J.H. <u>The Grammar of Assent</u>.(1870) (Westminster, Md.: Christian Classics, 1973.) p.89ff.
- Heidegger, op cit. p.42.
- Jaspers, K. <u>Von der Wahrheit</u> (Munich: R. Piper), 1947. p.53. Trans. lation is from Wallraff, C.F. <u>Karl Jaspers An Introduction to His Philosophy</u> (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton U. Press, 1970.) p.200.
- Jaspers, K. <u>Der philosophische Glaube angesichts der Offenbarung</u>. (Munich: R. Piper, 1962.) p.118. Translation is from Wallraff, op cit. p.103.
- Jaspers, K. Philosophie. Vol. II.(Berlin: J. Springer, 1956.)p.268. Translation is from Wallraff op cit. p.178.
- Jaspers, K. <u>Psychologie der Weltanschauungen</u>. (Berlin: J.Springer, 1919.) p.335. Translation is from Wallraff <u>op cit</u>. p.178.
- Jaspers, K. <u>Philosophie</u>. Vol. I, <u>op. ci</u>t. p.32. Translation is from Wallraff, <u>op cit</u>. p.178.
- Jaspers, K. <u>Von der Wahrheit</u>, op cit. p.974. Translation is from Wallraff. op cit. p.149.
- 64 Spiegelberg, op cit. p.457.
- Sartre, J.P. <u>Situations</u>. (Vol. III, 11-14), quoted from Spiegelberg <u>op cit</u>. p.456.
- Sartre, J.P. Esquisse d'une theorie des emotions (1939), mentioned in Spiegelberg, op cit. p. 466.
- Sartre, J.P. <u>L'Etre et le néant</u> (1943), translated by H.E.Barnes as <u>Being and Nothingness</u>, (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956). Part I, Chapt. ii.

1bid. p. 70. The notion of conversion to authenticity is still underdeveloped in Sartre, save for this particular reference.

CHAPTER VI ISSUES IN RECONSTRUCTING THE HIGHER VIEWPOINT

Section A - Issues Concerning Cognitional Theory

Method is fundamentally the same: cognitional theory. In both cases,
Lonergan undertakes analysis of cognitional activities in order to answer
the cognitional theoretic question: What am I doing when I am knowing?
His orientation to answer this question, we noted, went back to his study
of Newman (p.42)* and proceeded through his retrieval of Aquinas' cognitional theory in Gratia Operans and especially in Verbum (pp.43, 55). We
noted that Lonergan's developing cognitional theory could be characterized
as one of knowing by identity, as opposed to confrontation, in which is
grasped the basic isomorphism between the structure of the known and the
structure of knowing (p.44). And cognitional theory itself is possible,
and can move to an embryonic epistemology, precisely because the mind can
know itself, can know the nature of its own knowledge, and the method it
employs for its own reflection (p.45).

This cognitional theory, which is present throughout Lonergan's works, undergoes development not so much in terms of basic characteristics as in terms of the style of analysis by which it is thematized. In its earliest form, it was a retrieval of Aquinas' implicit cognitional theory as expressed in metaphysical terms and established by metaphysical principles. But in <u>Insight</u>, the procedure is seemingly reversed: metaphysis is expressed in cognitional terms and established by cognitional principles.

^{*}In this and the following chapter, direct references will be made back to pages of previous chapters in this thesis where analysis has been made and specific references given.

Lonergan, however, would still see himself standing with Aquinas in identifying the psychological act, named intelligere, as the proper act of the human soul and as having the power and the nature to demonstrate the metaphysical entities. Insight, then, quite overtly begins with analysis of what Aquinas would call intelligere but which Lonergan identifies as "the concrete dynamic structure immanent and recurrently operative in one's cognitional activities" (p.2).Not surprisingly, it proceeds to a metaphysics which bears a strong family resemblance to that of St. Thomas, including even the categories of potency, form, and act as the structural contents isomorphic to the cognitional acts of experience, understanding, and judgment (p.64). But in his post-Insight period, Lonergan became aware that what he had been doing was intentionality analysis. 2 The challenge, particularly of the problems of hermeneutics and critical history, led him into intentionality analysis and transcendental method as a means of escaping the restricted denotation of categories and moving towards the radical intendings, the transcendentals, which are "comprehensive in connotation, unrestricted in denotation, and invarient over cultural change" (p.74). This shift to the method characteristic of phenomenology, out of the need to pursue a more concrete and historical apprehension of man at the subject-pole of his existence, also entailed the broader horizon not merely of things known (as facts) but of things freely chosen of man the doer as well as man the knower (p.127). The study of each person in each singular historical instance of "making himself what he is to be," the study of constitutive meaning, thus became a central theme in Lonergan's concerns up to and including the period of writing Method (p.123).

With this expanded horizon, then, or field of study, the question

may be asked whether the underlying cognitional theory does remain the same? For while the cognitional theory of Insight assumed analysis of the "compound structure of knowing and doing" (p.2), it clearly began with an analysis of knowing, derived specifically from the intellectual pattern as discerned through introspection and through thematization of cognitional activity implicit in scientific and mathematical procedure (p.7). A basic structure emerged from the performance of the understanding insight of one's intelligent consciousness, the reflective insight of one's rational consciousness, and then the practical insight of one's rational self-consciousness. From that basic structure latent and operative in everyone's knowing, Lonergan derived a cognitional theory, an epistemology, and a metaphysics. But it was that dynamic structure as identified within rational selfconsciousness, which Lonergan took to be the root of ethics -- the structure latent and operative in everyone's choosing (p.56). Such a viewpoint assumed the extension of intelligibility into the field of doing as well as knowing, it utilized the metaphysical categories derived from cognitional theory, and it not surprisingly evolved a notion of value as "the good as the possible object of rational choice" (p.27). That analysis identified the demand of one's intelligence and reasonableness for a consistency between knowing and doing, as being the exigence from the detached, disinterested desire to put all of one's activity under its control (p.32). It admittedly bypassed other human feelings and sentiments "to take its stand exclusively upon intellectual order and rational value" (p.30). That order and value was described as systematic and intelligible, and was realized in reflection and decision by the rational self-conscious subject. But the reflection was still essentially a knowing, a knowing focused on

the objective of <u>making being</u> (p.32) through actualizing known order and value. The ethical question of <u>Insight</u>, then, of "What is to be done?", was basically a question of knowing extending into the field of doing, of realizing the universal order of generalized emergent probability (as in "Cosmopolis") which can be known and discovered (p.11).

We noted that Lonergan's shift in Method to intentionality analysis and transcendental method was not so much a fundamental shift, as a shift in more explicitly using the method of phenomenology which had previously been only implicit (p.73). But it was also a broadening of the field of analysis in that the "fourth level" of conscious operations, mentioned only in <u>Insight</u> as an aspect of the supernatural solution to man's incapacity to sustain his development by re-orientation of the will through love, was now analysed fully for its transcendental intendings. That fourth level, as the level of integration of knowing and feeling and the level where man constitutes his own meaning, very significantly expanded the inquiry and, as Lonergan himself realized, suggested differing priorities with respect to the basic disciplines:

...cognitional theory, epistemology, and metaphysics are needed but they are not enough. They have to be subsumed under the higher operations that integrate knowing with feeling and consist in deliberating, evaluating, deciding, acting. It is on this level that people move from unauthenticity to authenticity; it is on this level that God's love floods their hearts through the gift of the Holy Spirit (Rom.5:5). As before, so here too the account is not to presuppose a metaphysical framework of potencies, habits, acts, objects but basically it is to proceed from personal experience and move towards an analysis of the structures of our conscious and intentional operations. More than anywhere it is essential here to be able to speak from the heart to the heart without introducing elements that, however true in themselves, have the disadvantage of not being given in experience.3

The field of inquiry being a subject's existential data of consciousness

and all intentional acts given in that conscious experience, necessitated cognitional theory and the analysis that precedes it becoming seen as the more basic discipline (p.96). And for Lonergan, one of the most significant intentional acts or operations which he had purposely bypassed in his analysis in <u>Insight</u> but which now assumed a more central position, were feelings. To Lonergan's analysis of feeling and value we now must turn, to determine whether it confirms or alters his cognitional theory.

Lonergan in Method identifies the intentional act of feeling within the fourth (reponsible) level of conscious operations where questions of value, of what is worthwhile, are typically regarded in deliberation, evaluation, decision, and action. Following Max Scheler and Dietrich von Hildebrand, Lonergan describes certain feelings (as opposed to mere physical states or instances of the agreeable/disagreeable) as apprehensions of value which can be distinguished as mental acts occurring between judgments of fact and judgments of value (pp.78, 80). These feelings orient us massively to a world mediated by meaning and, as in the case of falling-in-love and being-in-love, become the "first principles in our living" (p.78). They stimulate our intentional responses to value, which are more or less spontaneous and are not under the command of decision except as they are cultivated over time (p.80). They follow a basic scale of value preferences, from vital through to personal and religious, which become reinforced or curtailed in oneself inasmuch as one moves towards self-transcendence in concrete instances of realizing a particular value. Yet value itself is a transcendental notion, the objectified content of our responsible intending in questions for deliberation. As the goal of our responsible intending, it is not known but rather pursued --

as would be the goal of the intelligible, pursued in our intelligent intending (p.79). A drive to value, as a drive to intelligence, would only be realized by the disenchantment apprehended in our faltering performance which fails to respond to the value (Be Responsible) as in a failure to comprehend the data (Be Intelligent) — or which realizes them to such an extent that one's performance outstrips one's powers of criticism (p.80). This phenomenon inspires Lonergan to term each person as an originating value (a potency) within a transcendental intending oriented towards terminal value (an end). Inasmuch as the originating value (person) wills authenticity (self-transcendence) within himself and others, terminal values are chosen, and then originating values and terminal values "over-iap and interlace" (p.83). But from whence comes this orientation to value, or more particularly, this "apprehension of value"?

Lonergan's position, thus far described, would seem to indicate that value is not something known (using "known" in the same way as reality can be known through facts, as instances of the virtually unconditioned) but still as something apprehended. Now following the apprehension and response of value, comes the judgment of value itself which unites one's judgments of fact, one's intentional response to value, and one's thrust towards moral self-transcendence as effected by the judgment of value itself (p.80). As one makes one's judgments of value and then reflects upon the adequacy or inadequacy of that response to value, one continually forms and reforms one's transcendental notion of the good, of value. This process is the responsibility of each and every subject in producing the first and only edition of himself -- and Lonergan is adamant in refusing to undertake this process for any other, for that would be depriving the originating

value (potentiality) of that subject and substituting for it merely the authentic subjectivity (objectivity) of some other (p.128). But the response to value is what one continually develops and reforms in this moral self-transcendence. What about the actual apprehension of value? Lonergan's answer would seem to lie in the described experience of joy, peace, power, and vigor which comes of being-in-love with God in moral and religious experience. When this occurs, "affectivity is of a single piece" and "values are whatever one loves" (p.81). Our perceiving, at this point, is through our own loving (p.102), for the "eye of love" reveals values in their splendor (p.104). The central ingredient, following the same metaphor, is the light of love through faith:

Without faith, the originating value is man and the terminal value is the human good man brings about. But in the light of faith, originating value is divine light and love, while terminal value is the whole universe (p.93).

Love, then, is critically related to the apprehension of value -- but there is the distinction between the relative apprehension of value without faith (revealing only the human good) and the absolute apprehension of value in the light of faith (revealing the all-encompassing good).

This distinction between the absolute and relative apprehension of value (which does not sound unlike the natural, relatively supernatural, and absolute "solutions" of <u>Insight</u> in which one's response is not limited by a human nature, but grounded in the divine nature itself -- p.42) would seem to correspond to the distinction between development from below upwards and from above downwards (p.104). Development from above downwards follows upon conversion to God's gift of his love, which turns our hearts of stone into a heart of flesh (pp.90, 103). It gives

another kind of knowledge (besides factual knowledge) reached through "the discernment of value and the judgments of value of a person in love" (p.93) -- Pascal's "heart's reasons" which reason does not know. It is the unmediated experience of the mystery of love, a "prior word" in which God speaks to us in our immediacy (p.92). This love that discerns God's self-manifestation in nature and his self-disclosure in revelation, gives "an easy freedom of those that do all good" (p.133). Such a religious apprehension of value through conversion, while still in harmony with the knowledge and value apprehended within moral and intellectual conversion does, however, become an exception to the Latin tag:

Nihil amatum nisi praecognitum is true of human love, but it is not true of God's love that floods our hearts through the Holy Spirit given to us.⁴

Having stated the above in 1970, Lonergan shows some shifting in his position as of the publication of <u>Method</u> in 1972 where the intimacy of husband and wife, the love of one's fellow man, and then finally the love of God itself are seen as steps toward a dynamic state of being-in-love which brings its fruit in love for others, better ethical intention and performance, and a sense of the supreme value — God (p.90). The position seems firm as of 1975:

But there is also development from above downwards. There is the transformation of falling in love: the domestic love of the family; the human love of one's tribe, one's city, one's country, mankind; the divine love that orientates man in his cosmos and expresses itself in his worship. Where hatred only sees evil, love reveals values.⁵

What would seem to be essential about the sense in which it proceeds from above downwards, is that it identifies the development as a gift (grace as opposed to nature) appropriated through conversion -- man

cooperating with God. Unlike what was in Aquinas the immanent perfection of the virtues (natural), the gift of the Holy Spirit brings us into the region of pure supernaturality, making the spirit of truth and love "connatural" to the creature and linking him "dynamically with the sole source of perfection" (p.49f). This distinction, which Lonergan elaborated from St. Thomas in <u>Gratia Operans</u>, seems present in <u>Insight</u> in the description of the supernatural virtue of charity:

...the transport, the ecstasy and unbounded intimacy that result from the communication of the absolute love that is God himself (p.41).

It is also present in <u>Method</u> where God's free gift of his love, unconditioned by any human knowledge, is described as that "principle that introduces a dimension of other-worldliness into any culture". The transformation from God's gift of his love introduces, then, a dynamic state of intimacy with God in which truth and value are revealed. As that which underpins what is good in all religions, it provides a "dynamic vector, a mysterious undertow, a fateful call to a dreaded holiness" which all can experience and by which all can be transformed (p.133). But how, in terms of cognitional theory, does love reveal value? Does human love as well as divine love reveal value? Of what significance are these major and minor exceptions to the Latin tag that knowledge precedes love?

In terms of the first question, the key cognitive aspect to the being-in-love that reveals value would seem to be the intimacy, the connaturality, and the dynamic linkage which provides a form of knowing that is <u>immediate</u>, and not a result of experiencing, understanding, and judging. This comes of the nature of love itself, which is not a longing for knowledge but "a longing for union" (p.91). Yet a spontaneous

communication does occur in that union, and Lonergan turned to Max Scheler's phenomenological description of intersubjectivity for its elaboration. Acknowledging its significance as a vital and spontaneous form of communication between persons within a basic intersubjective "we", he followed Scheler's identification of community of feeling, fellow feeling, psychic contagion, and emotional identification as differing forms of that communication (p.84). Susanne Langer's philosophy of art outlined still another channel of intersubjective communication, in the meaning and value expressed between subjects through the medium, the carrier, of the art form (p.85). The symbol evokes the affect, while the affect apprehends the value. As there is, through the symbol, an internal communication between psyche, mind and heart (p.85), so intersubjectivity is the external but still subjective communication with the psyche, mind and heart of the other subjects. But what form of cognition does this communication assume? Our examination thus far would give us this summary description: there is a conscious experience of an immediate apprehension which comes through falling-in-love and being-in-love and which, by intimacy and intersubjectivity, communicates and gives revelation of value as a dynamic vector and a mysterious undertow towards the good, towards value.

Perhaps an examination of Lonergan's sources for description of the apprehension of value will give us greater precision in theorizing what we are doing when we are apprehending value. We noted from his Existentialism and Philosophy of Education lectures, that Lonergan saw the greatest contribution of existentialists and phenomenologists in their concern with man the source of the concept, the source of the judgment,

man in his prepredicative and preconceptual state, "conscious, emotionally involved, having sentiments as well as thoughts" (p.111). He also praised the explicit formulation of the phenomenological method, as a means of bringing to light a subject's stream of consciousness. But he carefully rejected the Kantian intuition of essences present in Husserl's method of transcendental reduction, and re-described it as "an account, description, and presentation of the data structured by an insight" -in other words, as an account of pure experience (p.113). He later described part of that pure subjective experience (in referring to man's highest level of development) as the experience of "standing before God with neighbour in the world of history", giving one an immediate apprehension of good within the grace of God (p.116). He also put this apprehension within that of intersubjectivity (Scheler and Buber), which gives us subjective apprehensions of persons and their meaning in relationships, but should not be used for apprehension beyond such relationships -- lest a mistaken apprehension of reality result (p.121). comment gives us a helpful clue that Lonergan appreciated a distinction between the knowledge of reality resulting from experience, understanding, and judgment about facts (the virtually unconditioned), and the knowledge or apprehension of meaning and value within the reality of persons in relationships.

By the time of his 1968 lectures and writings, which we outlined, we see that Lonergan's understanding of feelings has been enlarged and often referred directly to the writings of Max Scheler and Dietrich von Hildebrand. In respect to cognitional theory, we found both Scheler and von Hildebrand advancing different positions to that of Lonergan. Scheler,

while rejecting Kant's universal and absolute ethics based upon an a priori subjective principle, instead proposed a universal and absolute ethics based upon a priori non-formal and material essences (p.148). Essential to this was his cognitional theory of immediately intuited essences, by which values are revealed which are universal and absolute, these values being intuited through feelings (p.149). He theorized parallel forms of cognition and valuation -- which are both forms of "consciousness of something" (p.169). The cognitive function of feeling is that it is a goal-determined movement towards essence and value. is an immediate intuitive content to such feelings, which is self-given and is free from any kind of positing of the subject that feels it or the object to which it is applicable (p.148). Behind this theory, however, is Scheler's assumption that there is "a structure of interconnected essences" (p.170), or a co-creation or ontology of essences, in which Geist is the primordial spirit of the cosmos relating God, the Person of persons, with man, the person (p.170-1). Geist, person, and act are interrelated and inter-dependent in this ontology, and form the basis upon which man's intuition of essences is understood as a "window into the absolute" (p.171). But Geist, person and act are only present to us as subjects, and they cannot be objectified for observation or reflection. We "know" them only by our participation in them (p.156), particularly from interpersonal emotional experiences (intersubjectivity-p.153). The specific meaning of "value" for Scheler is that it is the unit of feelable meaning which is "borne on the back" of acts by persons (p.156). As a quality of a person's acts, it moves proportionately in the direction of either loving or hating, preferring or rejecting. It motivates the act - centre

of the person in a genuine co-creation of essences, ideas, and value through co-ordination and participation with "the eternal logos, the eternal love, and the eternal will" (p.156). Hence one's <u>ordo amoris</u> of ranked values is a microcosm of the macrocosm of the divine <u>ordo amoris</u>, love being the dynamism which causes things to "well up" in the direction of their archetype, God (p.159). Scheler's cognitional theory may well be summed up best in his comment, "Man, before he is an <u>ens cogitans</u> or an <u>ens volens</u>, is an <u>ens amans</u>" (p.159). His essence lies in his loving.

In a 1968 address to the Catholic Theological Society of America, Lonergan showed considerable sympathy for Scheler's basic studies, categorizing Scheler's notion of God as Person and theories of intersubjectivity and co-performance as natural modes by which man "knows" God: as a subject to whom we are subjectively oriented". 8 But he took issue with this subjective orientation as a "not-to-be-objectified inner world of subjects" when it excludes an objective orientation and does not allow both the consciousness and objectification of either subjects or intersubjectivity. While acknowledging Scheler and von Hildebrand as heightening our moral and religious apprehensions of God, Lonergan urged that intellectual, moral and religious "are three phases in the single thrust to self-transcendence" and as such, should be in harmony. 10 This gives indication that Lonergan may have, with Scheler and von Hildebrand, expanded his cognitional theory so as to include what he here refers to as moral and religious apprehensions (if he recognizes "apprehension" as a form of knowing).

But Lonergan, while appropriating Scheler's intersubjective knowing and value apprehension through feeling, does not seem to appropriate its

more basic foundation in the dynamic orientation of natural loving, the inter-emotional participation of one person in another, and of all persons in the Person of persons. Rather, his description is typically of the dynamic state of being in love, being-in-love with God. In Scheler, the natural and spontaneous act of loving which links persons, acts, and God is as basic to value cognition as the pure detached disinterested desire to know is with Lonergan. Yet Lonergan seems reluctant to leave behind the structure and metaphors for intellectual knowing even while dealing with the quite different acts of loving and valuation, to the degree of admitting the possibility of something like "a pure detached desire for value". 11 Surely values and the feelings which apprehend them operate precisely by attachment, by attraction -- unless they are disvalues, in which case one is repelled and rejecting. They also are set within the context of persons and acts, rather than in a "dynamic state". It is interesting to note that for the Christian, Lonergan understands being-in-love to be with Jesus Christ -- intersubjectively. But the basic question still remains, if one accepts the distinct and natural phenomenon of moral or affectional cognition, then what am I doing when I am "knowing" by feeling? More specifically, is the mental act one of insight, such as Lonergan would call the sudden release or grasp or discovery experienced in the tension of inquiry; or one of intuition, such as Scheler or von Hildebrand would call an immediate consciousness or recognition of a prior given (fact or value)? Both acts are described as immediate and sudden, but the consciousness of inquiry, the deliberation of asking anything like Lonergan's question "Is it worthwhile?", is entirely lacking in both Scheler and von Hildebrand's descriptions of apprehension of value. What

is present instead is a relationship, a relationship of love or rejected love (resentment), and it is this intersubjective participation which is the component that gives the consciousness of something, either attracting or repelling, that is the apprehension of value.

Scheler assumes love and relationship as a natural and spontaneous movement (although, from a higher viewpoint, clearly part of the divine love) which stimulates development of one's loving and discernment of the basic ordo amoris of value. Lonergan is, as we noted, more ambiguous on this -- first distinguishing human love and divine love with respect to the Latin tag, but later seeing a development from the intimacy such as between husband and wife, to the love of one's fellow man, to the intimacy within the love of God itself. Human love only bringing apprehension of relative value (while divine love brings apprehension of absolute value) seems to originate in Lonergan from the "long history in Catholic theology" of distinctions between faith and reason, grace and nature, supernatural and natural. 13 But might Lonergan's identifications of the intellectual, moral, and religious conversions not be the most accurate way to describe the transformation of intellectual, moral, and religious apprehensions which occur by grace (from above downwards) and which are so disproportionate to their natural or human causes? On the other hand, the intellectual and, if we follow Scheler, the moral apprehensions (and perhaps the religious) are entirely natural and given, having within them the ingredients for their own development upwards.

What would seem to prevent the moral apprehension of value through love and feeling as having its separate and natural "place" in conscious intentional activity as it does in Scheler, is Lonergan's metaphor of

levels within consciousness and his confinement of value apprehension to the fourth level. The judgment of value for Lonergan, as it occurs in response to the question "Is it worthwhile?", unites one's judgments of fact, one's intentional apprehensions and response to value, and one's thrust towards moral self-transcendence as effected by this judgment of value itself (p.80). It occurs within a level of intentional operations called responsible, in that within it "we are concerned with ourselves, our own operations, our goals, and so deliberate about possible courses of action, evaluate them, decide, and carry out our decisions" (p.73). This level of deliberation and decision, is the point at which one's incarnate meaning becomes constituted by acts in the world of common meaning. But is the intending of which we are conscious in the apprehension and response to value the same as the intending of our acts when we constitute our incarnate meaning, when we make our own edition of ourselves? Let us turn to another of Lonergan's sources, Dietrich von Hildebrand, who clearly sees those intendings as different. Von Hildebrand had a similar starting point to Scheler -- the "immediately given" of moral experience as identified through phenomenological reduction and revealed through an intellectual intuition of essences (p.185). He also claimed to be dealing only with our natural capacities of knowing, and not with those identified as supernatural as in his study of the Christian virtues in Transformation in Christ (p.205). Von Hildebrand's cognitional theory is based on intentional experiences (when the intention goes from the object to ourselves; it reveals itself to our mind, it speaks and we listen) and intentional responses (when it is we who speak: the content of our act is addressed to the object; it is our response to

the object) (p.194). He distinguishes three different forms of intentional <u>responses</u> within us, engendered by the intention which reveals itself to our mind:

- the theoretical the saying "yes" to a fact or conviction, where knowledge prescribes the response we should give.
- the volitional the bringing into existence of something not yet real, where importance is the motivating factor.
- the affective evoked joy or sorrow, esteem or contempt, where knowledge, importance and a completing "new word" from the heart draws or repels us from something (p.195).

The theoretical response could be equivalent to Lonergan's experiencing, understanding, and judgment. But what is significant is von Hildebrand's distinction between the volitional and affective, ascribing to the former a basic freedom of response, (as in Lonergan's essential freedom of the will in Insight) while the latter is governed largely by a logique du coeur (Pascal) in which "the value acts on my heart in a deep, meaningful manner, in melting it, in piercing through the crust of my indifference and bluntness, in evidently a new and more intimate contact with value" (p.197). This distinction is not present in Scheler, who proposed that the will should merely conform to the value-comprehension of the affections in a "passionate willing" involving no reflective act whatsoever (p.174). But von Hildebrand's "volitional" response sounds very much like the "practical insight" which Lonergan describes in Insight as basically a reflective and deliberative act (p.31), save that "importance" (von Hildebrand's broad category of value) is as much the subject of reflection as is "fact". These two contents of theoretical and affectional cognition von Hildebrand distinguishes in the notion of being on the one hand (that

which exists but is neutral in value apart from its bare existence) and the notion of value on the other (that which, in terms of ontological or qualitative value, should be realized or brought into existence) (p.191). But being and value are interrelated, even if they can be distinguished. Being itself has the value of essence and existence (which is something known), but it is dependent upon ontological and qualitative value (which is affectionally perceived) by which it should, more or less than other things, come to be. And in affective value responses, knowledge (of facts) as well as importance (value) and a completing "word from the heart" have to combine in the response to value in that situation. While the basic intuition of value is something immediately given and not under our control, there is that aspect to our value responses governed by the virtues and vices (the degree of plentitude to our engendered valuation/disvaluation) which encourages or discourages the axiological principle of a value response: "to every good endowed with a value (or disvalue), an adequate response is due" (p.201). This is the same sense in which, in Lonergan's judgments of value, there is a thrust towards self-transcendence of one's moral existence made in every judgment of value.

This analysis of issues concerning cognitional theory in Lonergan's thematization of the fourth (responsible) level of conscious operations reveals important correspondences to his sources, as it also reveals clear divergencies. Of the latter, those issues which would seem problematic from our study would be:

- 1) Whether apprehension of value is an act of insight or intuition.
- 2) To what extent apprehension of value, as natural, takes place through relational love.

- 3) Whether affectional value apprehension and response constitute distinct enough mental acts within consciousness to be described within their own "level" or "pattern".
- 4) Whether there is a still further unifying conscious act or acts that combines in a reflective deliberation the elements of fact and value in decisions to act.

Although we raise these questions in reference to differing accounts of the cognitional theory particularly relating to affectional cognition and value apprehension, Lonergan's positions on them are at least indicated:

- 1) While Lonergan does not himself use the term "affectional insight", it would be hard to imagine his account of value-apprehension not to assume a basic identity between the apprehender of value and the apprehended value, an isomorphism between the structure of value and the structure of valuing (such as the subject as originating value moving towards terminal value). Such apprehension of value by identity would suggest rather the act of insight (knowing by interaction) than that of intuition (the "given" as prior to any interaction). However, Lonergan has not thematized the mental act of apprehension of value to the same degree as he has the intelligent, reflective, and practical insight.
- 2) In both pre-and post-<u>Insight</u> writings, Lonergan's discussion of love as a fundamental human act is nearly always in terms of grace, as a gift of the supernatural. His references as of 1970 in terms of human love leading to love of one's fellow man and finally to love of God show a more nuanced progression, but it is not clear whether the desire to love has the same reliable immanent norms for self-transcendence as the desire to know. The dividing line would seem to come when <u>nihil</u> amatum <u>nisi</u> praecognitum no longer applies.
- 3) While our analysis of Scheler and von Hildebrand has shown distinct intentional qualities in the acts of value apprehension and value response, it is clear that for Lonergan the intentional inquiry "Is it worthwhile?" culminates simply in the judgment of value, which unites one's judgments of fact, one's apprehension and intentional responses to value, and one's thrust towards moral selftranscendence in the deliberateness of decision and commitment.
- 4) While Lonergan's position is basically described in answer #3 above, Lonergan's position in <u>Insight</u> and his identification of the practical insight, which is one of

reflection, evaluation and decision to act, seems somewhat lost in significance within the overall value question of the fourth level of consciousness "Is it worthwhile?". Perhaps this is because Lonergan insists there must be a harmony between our intellectual, moral, and religious apprehensions. Yet if one of our apprehensions is faulty (through bias, resentment, or lack of conversion) surely we must deliberate and decide which "voice" to follow. Such a deliberation and decision would seem most adequately described as Lonergan's practical insight.

We will attempt, in Chapter VII, a slight modification in the sequence and distinction between some of the cognitional acts that

Lonergan, Scheler, and von Hildebrand have been describing. It is hoped that in such reconstruction of a heuristic structure for knowing, valuing, and deciding, more helpful distinctions can be made in respect of these intentional acts, and in their relationship one to another.

Section B. Issues Concerning Affectivity and Love

We have noted that Lonergan roots his cognitional theory and critical metaphysics in one's method of performing (such as in one's knowing) which, when thematized and made explicit, reveals the subject pole in its full and proper stature (p.55). We shall now attempt to present Lonergan's account of loving, of affectivity, as it reveals the dynamic structure of our moral consciousness, and contrast it with other accounts of some of his sources.

Lonergan's <u>Insight</u> intentionally by-passed human feelings and sentiments to take its stand exclusively upon intellectual order and value. This did not mean, however, that affectivity was merely set aside. For one thing, the exigence to know was itself identified as a <u>desire</u>, and such affectivity to know and to wonder was seen as the key motivation to our knowing. But the streams analyzed within consciousness were

restricted to experience related to the bodily-based acts of seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, and smelling (p.6). Feeling as an experience, as a consciousness of something, was not included. It was, however, seen as part of the materials already patterned within consciousness, "and that pattern is already charged emotionally and conatively" (p.7). The dramatic pattern within consciousness, its psychic determinations as well as the neural processes, directs and releases one's basic movements. But there are the constructive and destructive roles of "Freud's censor", the role of the dream as a psychic safety-valve, etc., which functionsto channel neural and affective demands so as to release consciousness from aberrations, to pattern one's preconsciousness with image and insight appropriate to one's interests and concerns -- this channeling or moulding being exercised by "the orientation of intelligence that preconsciously exercises the censorship". 14 Lonergan's concern in Insight seems to have been with one's affects, conscious or pre-conscious, that are inappropriately related to symbols, images, objects, or persons -- for these give rise to one's insight and reflection which in turn will be inappropriate or faulty and result in errors about reality (p.24). It is for this reason that Lonergan argues for the intellectual pattern to be dominant and governing of all other patterns of conscious experience (p.20), as it excludes the "interference of emotion and conation" (p.8). Lonergan even sees the role of therapy as being a cure, by knowledge, of flights from intelligence. 15 For man develops biologically to develop physically, to develop intellectually and rationally: "the higher integrations suffer the disadvantages of emerging later" (p.35). Yet feelings do have their function in concrete living when patterned by intelligence in man's

explanatory self-knowledge, for then

...the content of systematic insights, the direction of judgments, the dynamism of decisions can be embodied in images that release feeling and emotion and flow spontaneously into deeds no less than words. (p.24)

Such would be the higher integration of intelligent development (intellectual conversion) which would pattern our psychic and affective representations in accord with reality.

Natural development, under the higher integration of intelligence, remains the orientation in <u>Insight</u> as Lonergan discusses ethics. He asserts emphatically that

...the identification of being and the good by-passes human feelings and sentiments to take its stand exclusively upon intelligible order and rational value (p.60).

Will, then, is good insofar as it actuates our knowing and conforms to our intelligence. Our antecedent willingness should match the desire to know both in its essential detachment from the sensitive subject, and in its unrestricted commitment to complete intelligibility, to God (p.37). But there is the problem of the failure of the will, of man's impotence to sustain his development within complete intelligibility. Within man's natural development, this results from the conjunction and opposition of, on the one hand, the attachment and interestedness of sensitivity and intersubjectivity which tends towards egoism and altruism and, on the other, "the detachment and disinterestedness of the pure desire to know" which tends towards intelligence and the ultimate synthesis of universalization. ¹⁶ What follows from this is:

- 1) the interference of the lower level with the unfolding inquiry and reflection, of deliberation and decision.
- 2) the consequent unintelligibility of solutions, and
- 3) the increasing irrelevance of intelligence and reasonableness to the real problem of human living. 17

The solution to this conjunction of opposites surpasses, Lonergan argues, the limit of human perfection and necessitates a new and higher integration of human activities such as could be grasped in an absolutely <u>supernatural</u> solution, grounded not in human nature but in the divine nature itself. This fourth level of development, of religious consciousness, transforms the three "natural" levels with the conjugates of: <u>faith</u> which reaches objects beyond the natural reach of any finite understanding (level three); <u>hope</u> in a vision of God that exhausts the unrestricted desire of intelligence (level two); and <u>charity</u> of the transport, ecstasy and unbounded intimacy that result from the communication of the absolute love that is God himself (level one) (p.41). The conjugates of faith, hope, and charity transform the problematic "opposite" of sensitivity and intersubjectivity and

- 1) they are announced through signs that communicate the Gospel,
- they constitute a new psychic integration through affective contemplation of the mystery of Christ and of his Church, and
- 3) they call forth their own development inasmuch as they intensify man's intersubjective awareness of the sufferings and the needs of mankind. 18

This transformation, which Lonergan described with Augustine in <u>Gratia</u>

Operans (p.48) as God initiating perfection by plucking out our heart of stone and substituting a heart of flesh (Ezek.11:20), re-orients the heart or the affections within God's love, the well-ordered regard for all things under God. It is a supernatural transformation of affect through the universalism of transcendence and a collapsing of the former tendencies of egoism and altruism (p.60).

We have already, in the previous section of this chapter, undertaken some evaluation of the analysis and cognitional theory that Lonergan in

Method ascribes to feeling insofar as it is an intentional act, a mental act which apprehends value. His first movement towards this position we noted in his 1959 lectures on the Philosophy of Education, where he described a fundamental part of our knowing as being "the feelings we have with different persons" in an intersubjective apprehension of meaning (p.121). He cautioned use of such knowing beyond interpersonal relationships, as tending towards universal personifications and hence mistaken apprehensions of reality. By the mid-sixties he was advocating the priority of poetry, that aspect of the human spirit that "expresses itself in symbols before it knows, if it ever knows, what its symbols actually mean" (p.123). Aligning himself with the methods of phenomenology and transcendental philosophy in seeking a more concrete and historical apprehension of man, by 1968 he presented his transcendental notion of value as that which is "immediately intuited, felt, spoken, and acted out" within the inquiry of responsible consciousness: Is it worthwhile? (p.128). He paralleled this moral apprehension with the intellectual and religious apprehensions as three modes in which God is known by his grace, "grace perfecting nature", giving man knowledge which is "natural" and derived from his moral and religious experience (p.130). Seeing a coincidence between religion and authentic humanism, theocentrism and anthropocentrism, (p.131), Lonergan no longer distinguished his fourth level of conscious operations as supernatural, the other three being merely "natural". Insofar as the conscious intendings of all four emerge within experience, they are "natural". The intending and knowing descriptive of the quest for value in responsible acts, Lonergan found in the moral and religious apprehension of intersubjectivity, particularly in the writings

of Max Scheler and Dietrich von Hildebrand (p.130). But man's moral development, as his intellectual or religious development, remain basically a matter of real self-transcendence, of man getting beyond himself to become himself the principle "of benevolence and beneficience, of genuine co-operation, of true love". True love emerges from being-in-love with one's mate and children, being-in-love with the civil community to being-in-love with God:

All authentic being-in-love is a total self-surrender. But the love of God is not restricted to particular areas of human living. It is the foundation of love of one's neighbour. It is the grace that keeps one ever faithful and devoted to one's mate. But it is also something in itself, something personal, intimate, and profoundly attuned to the deepest yearnings of the human heart. It constitutes a basic fulfillment of man's being. Because it is such a fulfillment, it is the source of a great peace, the peace that the world cannot give.²⁰

But in a sense, apart from the act of apprehension of value, and the graded states to "being-in-love" which it assumes, this description of love still remains 'remarkably similar to that of <u>Insight</u> in that true love is fundamentally other-worldly, grace perfecting nature, love rid of egoism and altruism to become a principle of benevolence and beneficience.

But there is another sense in which Lonergan's post-Insight description of love is beyond distinctions of natural/supernatural, one of a universal potency in human living. This is a reflection which Lonergan made in 1969 as he was referring to Friedrich Heiler's seven principal areas of unity which could be discerned in all religions — key areas being the transcendent immanent in human hearts, this reality for man being the highest good and truth, the reality of the divine being ultimate love, that love being for man the way of sacrifice, which is always

extended to neighbour as well as to God. ²¹ This exploration of what is universal in religious consciousness and experience (the proper subject of theological method -- p.74) resulted in that vision of love, already quoted (p.99), as creating, sustaining, and promoting the universe of mass and energy, chemical process plant and animal life, human intelligence and love. A love that overflows into a love of all that God had made, it

...makes a husband love his wife with all the tenderness he has for his own body (Eph. 5:28). It is a love that stops the good Samaritan and has him care for the traveller assaulted by thieves. It is a love that has no frontiers, for it seeks the kingdom of God, God's rule on earth, and that rule is universal.²²

This universal gift of love, that grace sufficient for salvation which is given to all men, Christian and non-Christian alike (p.99), Lonergan infers from Heiler's account. In Method, he also refers to Oliver Rabut's assertion that in human living, the one "unassailable fact" is the existence of love, the charged field of love and meaning that, however unobtrusive and hidden, invites us to join "and join we must if we are to perceive it, for our perceiving is through our own loving" (p.102). In other words, a joining in that loving, gives us the perception to know the existence of that charged field of love and meaning, and to follow its dynamic movement. The only other option is to withdraw (p.93).

A typical entry in this charged field would likely be the love of parent and child, or the falling-in-love of husband and wife. Lonergan sees the intending of love, its quality of self-surrender, as a transcendental exigence moving to ever broader horizons with the love of one's fellow man, and ultimately to the love of God itself (p.90). To be in love, then, is first of all to be in love with someone, but as it is a love increasingly

...without qualifications or conditions or reservations or limits is to be in love with someone transcendent. When someone transcendent is my beloved, he is in my heart, real to me from within me. When that love is the fulfillment of my unrestricted thrust to self-transcendence through intelligence and truth and responsibility, the one that fulfills that thrust must be supreme in intelligence, truth, goodness. Since he chooses to come to me by a gift of love for him, he himself must be love. Since loving him is my transcending myself, it also is a denial of the self to be transcended.²³

This reality of my beloved within me, his love the source of my love for him, constitutes what Lonergan calls "the dynamic state of being in love" which possesses me and, for as long as it lasts, takes over as the first principle in my living (p.89). What is unique to it is that it is an experience of the holy, of "being grasped by ultimate concern" that is "an experience with a content but without an apprehended object". 24 This experience of God's gift of his love Lonergan identifies as the ground and root of the fourth and highest level of man's waking consciousness, the peak of the soul which, as

...brought to fulfillment, as having undergone conversion, as possessing a basis that may be broadened and deepened and heightened and enriched but not superseded, as ever more ready to deliberate and evaluate and decide and act with the easy freedom of those that do all good because they are in love.²⁵

This state (of faith -- the "eye of love") brings <u>religious</u> apprehension of <u>absolute</u> value through the unmediated experience of being-in-love, the reasons of the heart which reason does not understand (pp.92,3). When this occurs, affectivity is of a single piece. But there is also the prior state (actualized through the state of "falling-in-love") where the originating value is man (as opposed to man under divine light and love), who brings <u>moral</u> apprehensions of <u>relative</u> value -- the human good relating men to one another and to nature, as opposed to the all-encompassing

good of God and God's world (p.93). The distinction is not so much one of capacity, as of actualizing that capacity:

That capacity becomes an actuality when one falls in love. Then one's being becomes being-in-love....it takes over. From it flow one's desires and fears, one's joys and sorrows, one's discernment of values, one's decisions and deeds. 26

When one falls in love, one is faced with the decision as to whether one will live the gift of love, or withdraw (p.90). To decide affirmatively, is to move from moral towards religious experience, to move towards transformation of the whole of one's living and feeling, one's thoughts, words, deeds, and omissions in effective conversion (p.104). Such conversion to authenticity in a total surrender to the demands of the human spirit, effects now five transcendental imperatives (as well as five conscious levels?): Be Attentive, Be Intelligent, Be Reasonable, Be Responsible, Be in Love (p.106).

What seems confusing about Lonergan's account of love and, in particular, its fruit in a capacity to apprehend values, is whether the apprehension of value is significantly reliable prior to its transformation within the being-in-love that is religious conversion. Only that context gives apprehension of absolute value. But what of the person whose possible fallings-in-love have not yet resulted in actualizing the state of being-in-love? Of what capacity is his apprehension of value? Lonergan is not clear on this, perhaps because prior to 1972, he did not seem to show much interest in what might be called "natural love" or a "natural love of God". His references to the moral apprehension of relative value (the human good relating men one to another and to nature) within moral conversion indicates that within that state, one's most reliable route to value prior to being-in-love is likely the good of order which can be understood. There

is perhaps a relativity to affectivity prior to the state of being-in-love which, in moral conversion, is the subject of self-knowledge and control of one's biases, preferences, etc. (p.103). Knowledge of reality (such as a "good of order") may well substantially shape one's value preferences. This is an intentional and conscious shaping which can be brought about through therapy "when one discovers, identifies, accepts one's submerged feelings in psychotherapy" and when ultimately one appropriates one's own feelings through real conceptions, as opposed to misconceptions. of what one spontaneously is. 27 These feelings should be reinforced or curtailed as a refinement of one's own feelings. But the perimeters of reinforcement or curtailment will be the limit of our vertical liberty in shaping the originating value that we are, and the terminal human value that we have known or perceived. When God's gift of love floods our hearts, it gives us a vertical and horizontal freedom to enable our doing of all good because we are in love. 28 This position is not dissimilar to that we discerned in Insight, namely, that without the infusion of the transcendent divine nature, feelings tend towards egoism and altruism. Although no longer referred to as the "absolutely supernatural solution", the conjugates from religious experience remain in a movement from above downwards in repentance and conversion to challenge decline and restore progress in history:

Without <u>faith</u>, without the eye of love, the world is too evil for God to be good...But <u>faith</u> recognizes that God grants men their freedom,...that he calls them to the higher authenticity that overcomes evil with good. So <u>faith</u> is linked with human progress and it has to meet the challenge of human decline.... Most of all, <u>faith</u> has the power of undoing decline...It is not the promises of men but religious <u>hope</u> that enable men to resist the vast pressures of social decay. If the passions are to quiet down, if wrongs are to be not exacerbated, not ignored,

not merely palliated, but acknowledged and removed, then human possessiveness and human pride have to be replaced by religious charity, by the charity of the suffering servant, by self-sacrificing love.²⁹

Thus, although in Method there is the sense in which falling-in-love leads to being-in-love and being-in-love reveals values, a reliable affective apprehension of value still seems to have to wait upon the religious experience of repentance and conversion which, by faith, gives the eye of love to reveal absolute values, the hope to resist social decay, and the charity to replace possessiveness and pride. Until then, affectivity is not of a single piece for the passions must "quiet down" and be drained of their individual biases towards possessiveness and pride. effective solution is still God's gift of his love, the dynamic state of grace, which takes over the peak of man's soul, and then moves in a transforming development downward within man's consciousness to the first level of experience where man's affectivity and passion is drained of its bias and transformed into a self-sacrificing love. What seemed to be a reverse in the transforming conjugates between Insight and Method (p.133), is more correctly a stronger ider.tification of the basic nature of grace as an experience of the state of being-in-love, with less specific reference to its experienced nature on each level of consciousness (faith, hope, and charity) apart from its transformative quality. In fact, Lonergan may have applied his criticism of faculty psychology to these categories of the theological virtues -- their not being clearly given within experience, but rather by belief.

Although this indicates that Lonergan's fundamental stance of the nature of affectivity has not changed significantly between Insight and

Method, there is the appropriation of affective value apprehension and the language of love which certainly gives his later works a less rational and more affective texture. What are his sources for these, and does his use of them bear out their original intent? The first shift in some of his language and non-Thomistic analysis we noted in his lectures on Existentialism and particularly on the Philosophy of Education (p.109ff) in his adverting to the subject in his "stream of consciousness", the phenomenological method as capable of letting that stream of consciousness come to light, and the phenomenon of intersubjectivity as our apparatus for knowing and dealing with persons. In our brief summary of those writers, we found these themes confirmed -- although we noted the Kantian assumptions typical to the cognitional theory of most of them (p.238). The "immediate intuition" as opposed to "insight", particularly as it relates to the apprehension of value, is an aspect in Lonergan's theory of affectional cognition which, as we have discussed, is still rather unclear. Lonergan also appropriated the philosophy of art of Susanne Langer (another Kantian) at this point, but re-shaped her definition of art ("Art is the creation of forms expressive of human feeling") somewhat more towards his own cognitional theory and its thrust towards objectification ("Art is the objectification of a purely experiential pattern") than really does her justice (p.230). But Lonergan's main entry into the phenomenology of feelings and values came with Max Scheler and Dietrich von Hildebrand in the mid-sixties. We have already noted the issues in cognitional theory which differentiate their respective positions, and raise certain problems. Key analyses in Scheler such as the distinctions between feeling states and their intentional natures (p.152), their scale of preference or ranking of intentional

feelings and their intended values (p.157), the basic forms of intersubjectivity and fellow-feeling (p.153), and the important description of ressentiment (p.163), we found accurately appropriated by Lonergan. One of the major analyses von Hildebrand made beyond Scheler, the clear distinction between the intuition or apprehension of value and the value response (p.195) was also taken up by Lonergan (p.80). But rather crucial aspects of both Scheler and von Hildebrand, Lonergan did not take up. These aspects relate generally to cognitional theory as it pertains to affectivity, and more specifically to an understanding of love as distinct from "the passions". To these we now must turn.

Scheler's notion of love is rooted in the sense of "a welling up of things in the direction of their archetype, which resides in God" (p.159). While this may seem a theological statement, it is phenomenological in that love is seen clearly as a transcendental intending moving man beyond himself towards the highest good, which for Scheler is God. Apart from mere feeling states (agreeable/disagreeable), vital, psychic and personal feelings are all phenomena of intentional loving (or hating, in the case of disvalue), intending value within the absolute scale of value, the These graduated intendings are acts of love, whether "vital" ordo amoris. as in the case of loving/valuing the body's health, or "bliss" as in the case of a spiritual loving for a person (p.152). All loving and intending, then, has its proper "object" (determined by the absolute ordo amoris of God, and mirrored or engraved in all men), and is "natural" and "good" inasmuch as it reasonably corresponds to the absolute table of values (p.159). It is ressentiment, however, which turns man from love to hate, love as the discoverer of value into hate the discoverer of disvalue, and

the absolute table of values into a pathologically distorted and false scale of values (p.165). Such ressentiment, a cultural example of which would be modern humanitarian love (p.166), can only be broken in the repentance that follows upon an act of love in which is genuinely discovered new value that brings about the restoration of one's <u>ordo amoris</u> (p.167). Apart, then, from the forms of hating or rejecting brought about through ressentiment, and the falsified table of values which might result in one valuing say, one's ego psychic needs above one's feeling for a person, one's affective life in its entirety is the source of moral insight and one's access to the good. Such insights are to be passionately willed.

Von Hildebrand, while in many instances much akin to Scheler, in some fundamental areas stood quite apart from him. One key area was his distinction between feelings of "the merely subjectively satisfying", and feelings which apprehend values (p.187). Sensing the fundamental differenre in their motivations (a throwing back upon one's own limitedness, a self-imprisoning -- p.187) and the complete absence of value in one as a determination, von Hildebrand traced the "subjectively satisfying" to egocentric feelings which have their source in pride (a perversion in being) and concupiscence (a perversion in having) (p.202). While agreeing with Scheler that the structure of moral evil is found in the replacement of a true order of values with a fallacious or negative order where disvalues are sought after with a satanic love, von Hildebrand identifies the root of many of these value disorders in subjectively-satisfying feelings which are not neutral or harmless (as seem Scheler's agreeable/ disagreeable) but egoistic themselves. It is precisely this which explains the choosing of a lower rather than a higher value (thus disrupting the basic order), even when the higher and lower are correctly seen (p.188). Thus for von Hildebrand, feelings may be the source of moral insight but with the disease-potential of evil. This is probably why, as we noted, von Hildebrand has a much more developed theory of the will in what traditionally is referred to as the acquiring of virtues and the rooting out of vices (p.201). In fact, in order to live the axiological principle that "to every good endowed with a value, an adequate response is due" not merely supernatural attitudes are required, but a transformation in Christ to become "rooted and grounded in love" (p.205) such as in charity, "which superabundantly flows in its goodness, overflows, surpasses the frame of a value response" (p.201). The natural capacities alone cannot sustain such goodness.

As we put our analysis of Lonergan, Scheler, and von Hildebrand in relation to each other, their different stances on affectivity become clearer. At the one end of a scale would be Scheler, incorporating in positive and natural capacities the full spectrum of affectivity. Assigning to it the intuition of absolute value and the "logique du coeur" which is as fundamental as "2+2=4", Scheler tends to see man's failure not in value intuition but in willing where, in reflection and rationalization, he can find cause not to follow his basic value-intuition. Von Hildebrand's position is much more qualified, although still within the absolute value perspective of the ordo amoris and man as secundum naturam oriented to value. The seeds of disvaluation are present in merely subjectively satisfying feelings, which must be set aside for the value feelings of bonum mihi. It is the will which, through acquired virtues, regularly sets aside such feelings and responds with knowledge, the intuition of value, and the

"word from the heart". Both Scheler and von Hildebrand, however, share a theory of persons/value/acts in which man, by participation and coperformance in love, is oriented towards God the source of all goodness, all value. Lonergan, on the other end of the scale, does not primarily base his position on man's "natural" capacity to discern the good and know God within affectivity but within understanding. The universe is fundamentally intelligible (p.89). Although falling-in-love is an entry into an affectivity capable of being reformed to love God, to become a dynamic state of being-in-love, it is a state in need of infusion of the divine nature so as to "calm the passions" and re-orient them from the self to God (and value). While at times calling intersubjective and affective knowing "natural" modes of knowing God and the good, our analysis has shown that for Lonergan religious conversion and the intimacy of being-in-love with God become Lonergan's means to appropriate Scheler and von Hildebrand's value intuitionism of love. And for that reason, Lonergan does not need to ground this affectional cognition in an intersubjective theory of coperformance of values/acts/persons, for he finds the apprehensions of value within the immediacy of God's gift of his love which gradually tunes our hearts to discern value and gives us a ready will to follow it. He remains within the Augustinian and Thomistic account of justification, of the state of sanctifying grace when, with the autonomous subject standing before God, reason is subordinated to God and sense to reason. 30 This exception to the Latin tag "knowledge precedes love", while a completion of the process of self-transcendence, is not the beginning of the process, where the tag would still seem to be in force. Initially, then, Lonergan would point to the individual and egoistic bias of the affections, (as, to

a lesser degree, would von Hildebrand) the need to take cognizance of one's feelings, to shape and orient them to a higher principle (the transcendent) so that they evoke the determinative symbols and awake the determinative affects which empower our daily living. Where Lonergan and von Hildebrand and Scheler would differ, then, would be in their estimations of the relative strength or frailty of man's natural capacities for self-transcendence implicit in the affections. While all see a certain stage where only divine initiative can sustain and support man's development, they differ in the degree of that initiative (supernatural) they see as needed to make reliable natural affective value comprehension.

All this is not to say that Lonergan's account of affectivity and loving is in any way inadequate or incomplete. We are rather saying that Lonergan's account is rooted within religious consciousness and the experience of conversion, and hence his theory of affective cognition really assumes the theological notion of grace. Von Hildebrand, and, to a much greater degree, Scheler, present accounts where the affections "naturally" apprehend value, good, and God. Yet Lonergan still sees the <u>natural</u> experience of falling-in-love as initiating one into the dynamic state of being-in-love. He also is very aware of the significance of the more recent "Third Force" in psychology as a means of appropriating one's symbols and affects, to effect the constitution of one's self in one's world (p.86). Our brief summation of Maslow's psychology of being, to which Lonergan often refers, found its key element in basic findings about human nature:

⁻ This inner nature, so much as we know it so far, seems not to be intrinsically or primarily or necessarily evil. The basic needs, the basic human emotions and their basic human capacities are on their face either neutral, pre-moral, or positively "good".

- Since this inner nature is good or neutral rather than bad, it is best to bring it out and to encourage it rather than to suppress it. If it is permitted to guide our life, we grow healthy, fruitful, happy (p.231-2).

Maslow's development of the notions of B-love (love for the Being of another person, unneeding love, unselfish love) and D-love (deficiency love, love need, selfish love -- p.233) points to a natural exigency towards self-transcendence within affectivity, as well as its reversal. Such studies of personal subjective experience Lonergan would probably see as being very much his post-Insight concern -- to thematize and make explicit the subject pole in its full and proper stature. Such a thematization as Maslow's may well make explicit the point at which the affections are freely open to growth and development towards the good and value, and the point at which defensive, anxiety-ridden, and self-centred affectional responses (D-cognition) inhibit or warp responses to value. In a state of growth, perhaps it could be said that love precedes or at least equals knowledge, although it may also be said that peak-experiences are "secular" descriptions of gifts of grace, since the energy and capacity for subsequent living seem so disproportionate to the episode that caused them. Such understandings may well be left to the theologians; for our purposes what is important is to point to the essential relationships between affective development and apprehension of the good, of value through intentionality.

Before we conclude our discussions concerning affectivity, we must make reference to the work of Robert Doran, S.J. who, in his 1977 dissertation Subject and Psyche 31 and subsequent articles, has become a creative interpretor of Lonergan's understandings of affectivity. Building, like ourselves, on an analysis of Lonergan's developing notion of the good

between <u>Insight</u> and <u>Method</u>, Doran zeros in on the intentional feelings which, for Lonergan, apprehend value. Noting that, while Lonergan in <u>Insight</u> and <u>Method</u> outlines clearly the process of self-appropriation that is the essence of intellectual conversion, there is no similar explicit outline for how one gains religious or moral self-appropriation (they are self-given, as we noted, through the experience of being in love). ³² Doran advances the notion of "psychic conversion" as the means of appropriating one's dramatic pattern of consciousness where all other patterns are integrated within the drama of one's living:

Psychic conversion is the release of the capacity for internal communication especially through recognition, understanding, and responsible negotiation of the elemental symbols that issue from the psychological depths in the form of dreams. These symbols are dramatic indicators of one's existential subjectivity.³³

Such elemental symbols emerge within our dreaming sleep where consciousness begins. They provide the images and affects which structure our conscious intellect and imagination, by which in turn we shape the dramatic pattern of our own living. Psychic conversion rendering possible appropriation of one's dramatic existential pattern, it does so through the role of symbol as the means of internal communication between psyche, mind, and heart (see above p.85). What is essential to Doran's position and his focus on the symbol in dreaming, is his assertion:

Dreams are a privileged instance of such images, for in dreams symbols are released in such a way that they are not prevented from entering into consciousness by the dramatic, egoistic, group, or general bias of waking consciousness or the ego. When we sleep, the distorted censorship of inauthentic imagination and intelligence is relaxed...34

Such an assertion orients Doran to <u>release</u> one as an originating value, as an uninhibited conscious intentionality. Using Jungian and depth

psychology, he proposes a retrieval of one's sensitive psyche as operator of one's elemental symbols, such that one can self-appropriate the materials of one's dramatic life. While we would fully agree that such awareness and appropriation of one's dramatic consciousness can transform the antecedent willingness operative in one's choosing (and release from bias, etc., oneself as an originating value), we do not think this precludes the cognition of affectivity and its apprehension of absolute value or terminal value. The value theory of both Scheler and von Hildebrand is premised upon there being a cosmos pregnant with values. Lonergan also assumes this after conversion to being-in-love. It is the reality of this cosmos pregnant with values, to which we now turn.

Section C - Issues Concerning Value and the Structure of the Good

We have been making various references to Lonergan's basic notion of the good as it appeared in <u>Insight</u> and his Philosophy of Education lectures, and how that notion developed into a transcendental notion of value in his lecture "The Subject" and later in <u>Method</u>. We shall now attempt to make explicit what that developing notion has been, and how it relates or does not relate to his phenomenological sources.

In <u>Insight</u>, we have noted that Lonergan identifies a conflict within man's practical intelligence as it devises arrangements for human living, namely that the object of desire for <u>one</u> must survive the pressure of <u>other</u> men's desires — and that this necessitates "the intelligible pattern of relationships that we have named the good of order" (p.9). This drive and insistence on behaving intelligently and reasonably involves generating and implementing common ways, common manners, etc. Progress, as in Lonergan's

notion of Cosmopolis, is a society "founded on the native detachment and disinterestedness of every intelligence that commands man's first allegiance, that is too universal to be bribed, too impalpable to be forced, too effective to be ignored" (p.11). Such progress, based upon man's capacity to ask, reflect, and reach an answer that "at once satisfies his intelligence and speaks to his heart" (p.11), realizes the higher integration and intersubjective bond of human intelligence and reasonableness. Only it (apart from redemption) can provide its own corrective by the norms immanent within it, to set aside egoism, scotosis, bias, repression, and the social surd which invite decline. Key to that progress is the discovery and control of "Generalized Emergent Probability" (G.E.P.), a control through intelligence of human history in "cumulative realization of concretely possible schemes of recurrence in accord with successive schedules of probabilities" (p.11). Generalized Emergent Probability is the universal order of all intelligible orders that emerge through good individual objects of desire which are not an isolated manifold, but bound inextricably "through natural laws and actual frequencies with the total manifold of the universe of proportionate being" (p.29). Intelligible orders and their contents as possible objects of rational choice, being good because they systematically assure the satisfaction of desires, are values -- "since man is involved in choosing and since every consistent choice, at least implicitly, is a choice of universal order, the realization of universal order is a true value" (p.29). This linkage of order to value for Lonergan is central, for by it, value is intelligible and can be known.

The notion of Cosmopolis and Generalized Emergent Possibility makes it very clear why in Insight the definition of value is "the possible object

of rational choice" (p.27). For there is that key point in <u>Insight</u> where Lonergan states "as being is intelligible and one, so also it is good" (p.26). The dynamic movement towards the good, as towards being, comes from the one pure unrestricted desire to know. Lonergan had, by that point, also outlined how an explicit metaphysics (which underlies, penetrates, transforms, and unites all other departments -- p.19) can be formulated from the performance of the pure desire to know latent in inquiring intelligence and reflective reasonableness, providing the terms potency, form, and act as denoting the contents of experiencing, understanding, and judgment. This metaphysical order immanent in all inquiry and, through genuineness governing all inquiry, is Lonergan's route into structure of the good. The result as follows (p.26):

<u>Level</u>	<u>Conscious</u> <u>Act</u>	Metaphysical Content	Structure of the Good
III	judging	act	value (value discerned in G.E.P. and realized by decision and choice)
II	understanding	form	good of order (promoted by insight beyond the particular to the universal)
I	experiencing	potency	object of desire (desired by one's own in- sight)

The key ingredient to value is the reflective judgment, decision, and choice of it, which are acts within rational self-consciousness of discerning the good.

In his analysis of rational self-consciousness, the context is set by

the inquiry "What is to be done?" and the central act is the "practical insight" which grasps possible courses of action that are examined by reflection, decided upon by acts of willing, and realized or not realized in the underlying sensitive flow (p.31). The complementary act to the practical insight is the introspective reflection, "What are the reasons for my own acts?" (p.32). Within the introspection is the exigence of the pure detached desire which demands "the conformity of his doing to his knowing, and acceding to that demand by deciding reasonably" (p.32). The transformation of rational self-consciousness is therefore to put all of one's activity under the control of the detached disinterested desire. The problem within rational self-consciousness is that one has the essential freedom to follow or not follow the exigencies of truth, but one has to win the effective freedom of acting in accord with its exigencies. To do so, one has to know oneself in an ongoing analysis and criticism of subjects, of one's deeds, words, and mixed motives, which is the essence of moral self-consciousness and self-appropriation (p.28). This dynamic structure immanent within rational self-consciousness provides the ethical method we call metaphysical. It assumes that there is an inevitably recurrent intelligibility of things (G.E.P.) which can be grasped by the universal dynamic structure operative within each and every knowing and choosing subject. It can be grasped in the inquiry of one's choosing. The structure seems not unlike Aquinas' rational appetite which can be moved only by the good that reason pronounces good (p.47). Such appetite is governed by the virtues, which have their origin in grace. With these, the statistical law governing humanity can be sublated with "the statistical law governing the angels" and man can become, more or less, an agens

perfectum (p.50). This statistical law, in a sense analogous to Lonergan's G.E.P. of the universal order, is grounded in an intelligible universe and in God as "complete intelligibility and the ultimate cause of causes, capable of grounding the explanation of everything about everything and of grounding value as that which overcomes contingence at its deepest level" (p.36).

Value in <u>Insight</u>, then, is the intelligible order (G.E.P.) of a universal order which is grasped as the object of rational choice within rational self-consciousness. Most of all, it is grounded in an order which is intelligible.

We noted in Lonergan's Lectures on Existentialism and the Philosophy of Education a developing orientation from an overall sense of the good and the true, to the specific good and the true which is involved in one's selfconstitution, and one's concrete living. Contrasting Plato's search for the idea of the good to Aristotle's by-passing of the idea of good (which can only be God) for concrete human choice between finite goods, Lonergan opts, with St. Thomas, for the human good as it is discovered through "human apprehension and choice." This enables the human good best to be understood as a history, a concrete cumulative process resulting from a developing human apprehension and human choices that may be good or evil. And that concrete developing process is what the human good is in this life (p.115). His elaboration of the structure of the good, such as we described above in Insight, included Kierkegaard's types of men, Sorokin's types of cultures (as related to value) and then a more nuanced discussion of value than in Insight (p.115f). As the following Diagram #1 shows, one can see that within the category of "Good" there is the value of habitually becoming a certain sort of man (aesthetic, ethical, and religious) when one

t	\	3
١	٥	
ŧ		١

			,				
III	judging	act	religious	ideational	Value: religious ethical aesthetic	sin as aberration	faith
II	understanding	form	ethical	idealistic	good of order	sin as com- ponent in social pro- cess	hope
I .	experiencing	potency	aesthetic	sensate	particular good	sin as crime	charity

Cultures

Good

Evils

Redemption

Men

Metaphysical

Content

Level

Conscious

Act

Diagram #1

The Structure of the Human Good

actually realizes value. In other words, value is an ideal, a goal until, in its realization, it ceases to be an <u>object</u> but instead a <u>subject</u> — the subject of one's own living. This certainly prefigures Lonergan's later discussion of the subject as originating value in <u>Method</u>. His categories of Good, Evil, and Redemption also integrate into a philosophy of history (the human good as history), <u>Insight's</u> "Cosmopolis" (Progress and Decline), and the Absolutely Supernatural Solution (Redemption). And it is here that Lonergan makes his assertion of the transformed religious man, who stands before God with his neighbour in the world of history, his reason subordinated to God, giving him "an immediate apprehension of good within the grace of God" (p.116).

As one embarks upon reading Method, one is almost immediately introduced to a thorough-going discussion of the human good, and in particular, to feelings as intentional and spontaneous responses to value. They are discussed, however, against a backdrop of Piaget's group theory of development. This theory, which enables awareness of one's proficiency and operational development, Lonergan also presented in his Philosophy of Education Lectures, 35 but specifically shaped those lectures towards its application in moral development. Without that specific shaping in Method, its purpose in providing a framework for development of moral apprehension and response (a modern equivalent of the "habits") in the discussion of the human good that follows, is sometimes lost. But Lonergan introduces us to the notion of value as "that which carries us towards self-transcendence and selects an object for the sake of whom we transcend ourselves" (p.78). This quality of value, for the sake of which we transcend ourselves, remains integral to Lonergan's notion of value. In following Scheler at this point,

he not only rules out physical states as non-intentional, but the agreeable/ disagreeable as well (in Scheler, they are intentional feelings -- p.151) as lacking the intention of the vital, social, cultural, personal, and religious feelings (p.78). Of these various feelings (the higher the value, the less open is the feeling response to conscious change), the second highest is towards personal value (the person as self-transcending, loving and being loved, an originator of value in himself) and the highest is towards religious value (the heart of meaning and value -- being in love with God). But while he talks of these feelings, and that they are aroused by a variety of objects, he talks little of value itself -- for it is a transcendental notion of what is intended (but not known) in questions for deliberation as to what is or is not worthwhile (p.79). Just as questions for intelligence intend but do not know the answers, so questions for deliberation intend but do not know value. Our transcendental notion of value, then, is the limited realization of our drive to value within intentional self-transcendence, bringing a happy conscience with its success and disenchantment with every faltering performance (p.80). Such selftranscendence is worked out within the liberty of one's given horizon, but there is even greater authenticity in selecting and developing that horizon by working out what is worthwhile to make of oneself and to do for one's fellow man. Such intentional moral development is the mark of one's having evolved a transcendent notion of value. As in Aristotle, good or value, then, is simply the possession of good men.

The discovery of oneself as a moral being, through the emergence of personal value and one's responsibility within conscious acts, opens the door to one's self-transcendence as making of oneself an authentic or

unauthentic human being (p.80). In particular, as we discussed in the previous section, it is a matter of cultivating, enlightening, and strengthening one's moral feelings as intentional responses to value through particular judgments of value which are, in fact, intentionally self-transcendent. The discovery of oneself as a moral being is key -- but so also is the discovery, through belief in the discovery of others, of the nature of the overall human good. Lonergan offers a revised version of the structure of the human good (see p.82) still similar to that outlined in his Philosophy of Education Lectures. Although clearly related to the dynamic structure of knowing and the metaphysical contents intended by that knowing, this structure is rooted in capacity, that quality of potency that in Lonergan's vision of Cosmopolis was the capacity to ask, to reflect, to reach an answer "that at once satisfies his intelligence and speaks to his heart" (p.11). For potency to become formulated requires plasticity and perfectibility, and for that form to be actualized requires liberty. Such are the metaphysical contents of development. Their actuations differ to the degree that they are realized individually or socially -- hence realization may be through development or skill, or socially through institutions and tasks. The ends or goals, however, are those of Insight and the Philosophy of Education: the particular good, the good of order, and terminal value. What is not in the schema, unfortunately, but is assumed by it -- is persons as originating values, as the capacity and potentiality for ultimate terminal values. The focus, rather, is on the process or method by which persons as originating values, by self-transcendence and development, realize terminal value. This happens, individually and in community, when persons will authenticity in their choices -- and then the "originating values"

that choose and the terminal values that are chosen overlap and interlace (p.83).

But there is the important distinction we noted in our discussion of affectivity above (p.277), that has to do with religious as opposed to moral conversion. Within moral conversion "the originating value is man and the terminal value is the human good man brings about", while within religious conversion "the originating value is divine light and love, while terminal value is the whole universe" (p.93). The distinction is not so much one of capacity, as of actualizing a latent capacity:

That capacity becomes an actuality when one falls in love. Then one's being becomes being-in-love...it takes over. From it flows one's desires and fears, and one's joys and sorrows, one's discernment of values, one's decisions and deeds.³⁷

Thus although Lonergan in his schematization is only attempting to outline the structure of the https://www.human.good, it cannot help but relate to his notion of the all-encompassing good, a conception of "God as originating value and the world as terminal value", implying that "God too is self-transcending and that the world is the fruit of his self-transcendence, the expression and manifestation of his benevolence and beneficence, his glory." (p.93) Yet what must span the gap between human nature and divine nature is the degree of actualization of the capacity of man as originating value, and the horizon of terminal value. Hence in moral self-transcendence, (see our discussion p.274 above), "we are inquiring, not about pleasure or pain, not about comfort or ill ease, not about sensitive spontaneity, not about individual or group advantage, but about objective values." These objective values are the good of order and, as they were in Insight and the Philosophy of Education Lectures, they are intelligible and can be known. Only in religious self-transcendence is reason

subordinated to God, giving one an immediate apprehension (through faith, the eye of love) of the good (the world and universe as terminal value) within the grace of God (divine love). In other words, Lonergan's notion of value has not so much changed from that of <u>Insight</u>, as it has been expanded to include analysis of the transcendental intending towards value that comes within religious experience, the being-in-love with God. There, the good is apprehended immediately and without reason -- such as in intentional feelings.

"Objective values", the good of order, Lonergan does not spell out save by example. Rather he specifically requests not to be asked to determine them, "for their determination in each case is the work of the free and responsible subject producing the first and only edition of himself" (p.128). But relative determination can take place in "encounter" where, in the collective inquiry of a meeting of persons and an appreciating of the values they represent, a challenge and critique of them in terms of self-understanding and horizon brings about a transforming of knowing and a transvaluing of valuation (p.98). As in Aristotle, this represents the on-going discussion of concrete human choices within finite good. Lonergan does not discuss the infinite good (Plato's idea of the good) save in appreciation of the apprehension of the all-encompassing good it brings within the intimacy of being-in-love with God, (religious conversion) and subsequent transforming virtues of faith, hope, and charity. Lonergan's transcendental notion of value, therefore, is rooted not so much in a sense of transcendent or terminal value itself, but rather in the intending of the subject, the doer, who is attempting to realize his own self-transcending intending (p.128). Its only exception is "the word" of religious meaning

and value which, as a "prior" word of God spoken in immediacy, written and communicated, is the means by which religion enters the world mediated by meaning and regulated by value (p.92). Yet such Christian ethics must remain with "natural ethics" within the area of systematics for, apart from the specific task in promoting conversion (crystallizing the inner gift of love), it is a participant in saying "something in general about the human good" (p.97). Such integrated inquiry can, in its intending and its answers, promote revelation of "an intelligent, necessary, moral ground of the universe" p.107). The key characteristic of Lonergan's notion of that ground in value is that it is intelligent. The key to discovering it is through intelligent and authentic inquiry.

Lonergan's notion of value, therefore, has changed not so much in its characteristic in Insight and Method as the intelligible object of rational choice, as in its further context within religious experience, within the intimacy of being-in-love with God that brings immediate apprehension of the good. In our previous section, we related his sources to this in Scheler and von Hildebrand's account of the affective cognition of value. What remains for us to note here is the notions of value that Scheler, and von Hildebrand have in contrast to Lonergan. Scheler, in somewhat parallel style to Lonergan, is hesitant to discuss values themselves apart from the human subjects who apprehend them -- for it is moral insight into value which is necessary to lead a good life, rather than value itself (Aristotle). We have distinguished how Scheler sees them apprehended through natural feelings according to a scale of preference (the ordo-amoris), whereas Lonergan sees them apprehended through intelligent inquiry save for the person in the dynamic state of being-in-love with God, who may apprehend

them immediately (through love -- the eye of faith). We have also noted how for Scheler, such apprehension is integrally related to a theory of acts/persons/values, since only acting persons can have value as good or evil. Value is borne on the back of acts by persons, and value is never reducible to acts, things, or goods in themselves (p.157). Yet this does not deter Scheler from rejecting any relativism of moral values, proposing instead that intuited essences reveal values that are universal and absolute, an ordo amoris, that is revealed in the stirrings of our love and hate in every intentional act. It is this participation in the absolute ordo amoris that grounds discovery of the absolute order, and that awareness will be limited by the particular history of one's discovery (p.159), and the degree to which one has impressed the discovered ordo on one's "inner moral tenor" (p.158). But the ongoing discoverer of value is love, which moves ahead of one's current feeling and preferring "as a pioneer and guide" (p.158). As such, love is a dynamic becoming, a self-transcendence, a "welling up of all things in the direction of their archetype, which resides in God" (p.159-160). Such loving has no object, but only other personal subjects with whom and in whom we participate (p.161). Value is borne on the back of such loving of persons, transmitted through such intersubjectivity, and modeled in the acts of persons we know and love (p.162). While certain aspects of Scheler's affective value-intuitionism have clearly been appropriated by Lonergan in terms of the human good (e.g. intersubjective communication of the good through feeling), the more central aspects Lonergan confines to the being-in-love of religious consciousness which then provides its own base (the immediacy of grace) rather than Scheler's theory of acts/ persons/values. Yet Lonergan and Scheler are fundamentally akin in focusing

on affective and moral <u>development</u>. They are apart in Lonergan being as skeptical of affective conscious intentionality as Scheler is of rational conscious intentionality.

Von Hildebrand's ethics represents, in a sense, a position more reconciled with value that can be known and felt, as well as reflected upon. This issues from his distinction between the notion of good and the notion of being. Existence, he claims, does not of itself presuppose value (save in the contemplation of being as opposed to non-being) while value itself is "objectively a being" (p.191). While in God, all values are one, the qualitative values embodied in specific being reveal God more intimately and directly, but ontological value accrues to an object only by its understood link with God, which deneutralizes everything into an ontological preciousness (p.192). Qualitative values, as discerned within the "natural capacities of knowledge...all the moral data which one can know by experience", are the particular focus of von Hildebrand's ethics (p.185). He ascribes to all values an objective quality, something transcending our own being, which he distinguishes from both physical states and things related only to pleasure, which he calls "the merely subjectively satisfying" (p.188). He is much more specific in his ranking of values than Scheler:

- 1) the objective good for a person to be endowed with values
- possession of goods which bestow true happiness on us because of their value
- 3) objective goods which are indispensable for life
- 4) merely agreeable things (which appeal to a legitimate center in us) which are objective goods for the person (p.202).

These values can be seen as surpassing merely objective goods (which are not ends in themselves) towards the primacy of possession of moral values

(the virtues) which are an ultimate value response to God, a <u>similitudo Dei</u>. Above the qualitative value domain, lies the primary ontological domain (the sphere of specific religious experience) in which there are no antitheses, and in which all takes on the preciousness of being in the image of God (p.190).

But it is important to see that for von Hildebrand, the highest qualitative value is moral development and goodness itself (Aristotle). His particular contribution is the analysis of the three responses (to value or fact, as it "discloses itself to my mind, informs me, and imposes itself on my mind in its autonomous being" 'p.197): the theoretical, the affective, and the volitional. While the theoretical is a Kantian saying "yes" to a fact known by immediate intuition, the affective response (where one is secundum naturam oriented to value) and the volitional response (where, by reflective evaluation, one decides to act) are of particular concern for they must be built up with superactual value responses (the virtues) in order that the morally good man be enabled to be more and more spontaneously disposed to good responses and hence to good acts (p.201). In the case of the affective response, the exigence is the quality of being affected, of self-abandonment, self-donation and reverence for value that increasingly builds up a plenitude of valuation which is tapped thereafter in every value response. The volitional is even more crucial, for not only is it the context to act or actualize in that instance, but it also has the power to say "yes" or "no" to the word from both one's theoretical and affective response centers, thereby encouraging or discouraging the subsisting responses to those centers and their subsequent responses. In this "free spiritual center of a person" (p.200), the axiological principle of moral living is either realized or forsaken:
"to every good endowed with a value, as well as to everything tainted by a disvalue, an adequate response is due" (p.198).

To what degree Lonergan appropriated von Hildebrand as opposed to Scheler is difficult to discern, since in their basic descriptions of intuitions of value by feeling they are almost identical. The notion of the value response, as we have noted, is much more thoroughly analyzed in von Hildebrand than in Scheler. But von Hildebrand made some important distinctions, particularly between affectional and volitional responses, which we must turn to in the next section in an effort to discern the differing intentional acts within value responses and judgments of value. Certainly Lonergan shares with both von Hildebrand and Scheler the basic Aristotelian orientation of valuing moral discernment and development itself above all other value, save God himself.

As we have already noted, it was in the field of cognitional development in general and moral development in particular that Lonergan turned to Piaget. Piaget fits well into Lonergan's cognitional theory, seeing knowledge determined by interactions between the knower and the to-be-known through assimilation and accommodation (p.218). Describing affectivity as the energizer of cognitive and behavior patterns, Piaget sees both cognitional and affective development as proceeding side by side in a decentering movement from egocentrism to objective, abstracting, hypothetical, and universal thinking (p.220). It was in this manner that Lonergan described the moral development of the child in his Philosophy of Education Lectures, while he made the more succinct summary of general development itself by group theory in Method. It is important to note that Piaget's notion of affective

development takes place first by socialization (as well as being the subject of affectivity, one interacts with objects of affectivity) and then by universalization of affect (when idea, image and symbol carry and evoke affect) (p.223-224). When equilibrium typically balances one's various feelings towards self, interpersonal relationships, values and principles, the grouping of adolescent affectivity becomes complete with the "late appearing function of the will" (p.225). This development of the will as the regulator of affect and therefore of value results in the effective functioning of autonomous moral feelings — in a way not dissimilar to the horizontal and vertical exercise of freedom described by Lonergan in moral conversion.

The existentialists will be of major concern in the following section as we discuss issues relating to decision and the meaning constituted by one's authentic (or inauthentic) acts. This meaning born out of the earnestness of decision (e.g. Jaspers -- p.241) is of a much broader horizon than the category "value", but obviously incorporates it. We will see that the existentialists share with Lonergan, Scheler, von Hildebrand and Piaget that moral development proceeds not by any copying or rationalizing of objective or external value, but by authentic subjective decisions of value and meaning which themselves actualize and make the definition of one's life.

Section D - Issues Concerning Deliberating and Deciding

The whole of Lonergan's fourth level of responsible conscious operations as presented in <u>Method</u> is unified by the inquiry "Is it worthwhile?". It incorporates the acts of deliberating, evaluating, deciding, and acting. It is the point where our incarnate meaning becomes constituted, by our

acts, into the world of common meaning. But within <u>Insight</u>, Lonergan focused the reflection of rational self-consciousness within the inquiry "What is to be done?", that reflection taking place within the will under the exigence of intelligence for a consistency between our knowing and doing. As we noted above in our discussion of cognitional theory and affectivity, what has been added to the inquiry and broadened it are the apprehensions, responses, and judgments of value. What we must examine in this section is whether the inquiry "Is it worthwhile?" does in fact encompass a unified objective of transcendental intending such as that of the intelligent (level II) or that of the true (level III). We will utilize our sources, once again, for an "encounter" with Lonergan's positions.

In Lonergan's account of human understanding in <u>Insight</u>, he identified the three levels of cognitional acts (experiencing, understanding, and judging) as encompassing respectively the data of inquiry, the inquiry "What is it?" and the inquiry "Is it so?". The spirit of inquiry or, more precisely, the "pure detached disinterested desire to know" originates this drive to understand, with its purpose being explanation and precise formulation. In its heightened form within the intellectual pattern, it is cut off from emotion, conation and other desires within the overall dramatic pattern in human living, where one "constitutes one's first work of art" (p.7). However, within one's introspective consciousness, one is aware of one's own knowing; the desire to know, the asking of questions, the grasping of answers and reflection and judgment upon them as objectives reached (virtually unconditioned). This capacity to know one's own knowing, provides immanent data for an understanding and judgment which

affirms the dynamic structures of one's own knowing (p.20). The result is an explicit metaphysics (potency, form, and act) which, once it is affirmed, can become the "normative principle" governing the outcome of all inquiry. Such a decision (and we must underline the fact that it would be a decision, encouraged by the exigence of intelligibility) would then govern one's knowing by developing one's intellectual pattern of experience as dominant to all other patterns, by "reorientating one's scientific knowledge and one's common sense and, thirdly, of integrating what one knows and can know of proportionate being through the known structures of one's cognitional activities" (p.22). Such self-appropriation of one's detached, disinterested desire to know and decision to be governed by the intellectual conjugate, confronts man with a tension between his selfattached and self-interested center, and the opposite attributes of detachment and disinterestedness in the universe of being, an object coordinated with other objects all subordinated to some destiny to be discovered, invented, approved and accepted (p.23). To follow transcendence as it arises within the structure and dynamism of the pure detached desire and to reject the limitation of self-centeredness, is to implement the law of genuineness as it arises itself within the pure detached desire. decision can be made non-consciously and spontaneously as in the simple or honest soul, or consciously and by introspection as with the selfconsciously developing subject. This conversion to intellectual transcendence, we would observe, involves the yet-to-be-described rational self-consciousness, both in the saying "yes" to the judgment of fact that I know by experiencing, understanding, and judgment, and in the determination to govern one's knowing by the exigencies of the pure detached desire

and the domination of one's intellectual conjugate (the law of genuineness).

In a sense, the law of genuineness is extended from the field of knowing to the field of doing when, in following the exigence of the detached desire,

...our reasonableness demands consistency between what we know and what we do; so there is a volitional appropriation of truth that consists in our willingness to live upon it, and a sensitive appropriation of truth that consists in an adaption of our sensibility to the requirements of our knowledge and our decisions (p.25).

This higher integration of human willing and doing that follows upon truth will be the experience, the insights, the judgments, and the habitual orientation of each individual. Truth and intelligibility remain its basic characteristics for "as being is intelligible and one, so also it is good" (p.26). This results, as we have already noted, in a notion of value as the possible object of rational choice and the notion of Generalized Emergent Probability as the universal order of all intelligible orders that emerge through good individual objects of desire which are not an isolated manifold, but bound inextricably "through natural laws and actual frequencies with the total manifold of the universe of proportionate being" (p.29). But there is the problem of the human decider and doer who has an essential freedom to cooperate or not cooperate with the givenness of the true and the good, to realize the higher integration posed by the pure desire to know. Within this sphere of such essential freedom lie the acts of rational self-consciousness, in pursuance of the inquiry "What is to be done?". Its basic act is the practical insight, which grasps possible courses of action that are examined by reflection, decided upon by acts of willing, and realized or not realized in the underlying sensitive flow. But its essential act is

the introspective practical reflection which subjects one's willingness to self-conscious scrutiny: "What are the reasons for my own acts?" (p.32). Here the law of genuineness, the exigency of the pure detached desire (transcendence), meets the self-centeredness of limitation. To the degree that one acknowledges the demand to conform one's doing to one's knowing, and one accedes to that demand by, in fact, deciding responsibly -- then one has enlarged or transformed one's consciousness into an effective freedom to be a genuinely moral person (acting in accord with one's unrestricted desire in a universal willingness -- pp.30, 31). The will then, in potency is its capacity to will, in form is its habitual willingness to will, and in act is the actual event of willing. critical area is obviously the habitual or antecedent willingness to will, which must acquire "the height and breadth and depth of the unrestricted desire to know" (p.59). This is acquired through introspective practical reflection, the "second thoughts of rational self-consciousness" when the objective is not merely the action leading to a goal, but the building up of one's antecedent willingness. As in Aquinas, the act of will is caused both by the object presented by the intellect, and by the will itself (p.47). This means in respect of the will and the whole dramatic pattern, as Robert Doran argued, the appropriation and shaping (a psychic conversion) of the images and affects within the dramatic pattern of our living, so that human intelligence and reasonableness function as the higher integration of the sensitive flow of dramatic living, which constitutes "one's first work of art".

However, there is the problem of man's moral impotency which prevents him from sustaining his own development. In particular, it lies in the

failure of the will to conform to intelligence (p.37). What is called for is the still higher integration of re-orientation of the will towards God and the good through love, for the man of good will is in love with God (p.38). This absolutely supernatural solution (divine grace) to the problem of human living through the conjugates of faith, hope, and charity constitutes

...a dialectical higher integration inasmuch as they make possible the sustained development of rational self-consciousness by reversing counter-positions through faith and by overcoming evil through the firmness of hope and through the generosity of charity....(p.42)

These supernatural virtues of faith, hope, and charity therefore make possible, in absolutely supernaturally living, a re-orientation of the intellect in grasping the unintelligibility of the social surd, and of the attitude (habit) of the will in returning good for evil, a love of all men with self-sacrificing love (p.38). But the essence of that re-orientation takes place within rational self-consciousness and from there, re-orients one's effective living.

We noted from Lonergan's lectures on Existentialism and the Philosophy of Education, and several articles prior to those of 1968, that he began to be very much oriented to the existential concern for "being a man" in the sense that it "results from a decision", it is the "consequence of the use of one's freedom", it is something we have to be and "it makes one the sort of man one is" (p.110). This focus on the subject in the stream of consciousness as oriented to choosing, being free and yet risking to choose, gives rise to dispositions and habits:

It makes me what I am to be. It makes it possible to estimate what probably I would do in a situation. It gives me a second nature and that second nature is what existentialists particularly refer to as the essence of man....

It is the essence you get in so far as you develop habits and dispositions by choices (p.111).


This theme that in choosing I become myself (we noted it in Jaspers as "I am only in the earnestness of decision" -- p.241) is also an orientation to "not the truth in general but the truth that I live by; the truth involved in my self-constitution" (p.114) -- such as Kierkegaard's "essential knowledge of existence" (p.240). It is more broadly meaning -- as Lonergan later called it, one's constitutive meaning -- that is "a communication of myself to myself: an appeal to my empirical existence from the source of my self-being" (p.241). An essential quality of it is authenticity -- to be or not be oneself at such key times as death, failure, guilt, or futility (p.240). As well as from acts, it comes from conversions, transformations, and discoveries when, with one's basis organized on a lower level, "the movement to a higher level involves something like the apparent eruption of a latent power" (p.111) through such as Kierkegaard's "leap", Heidegger's choice in good faith, Jaspers' decision, and Sartre's engagement (p.240ff). But above all, it is recognition of the knowledge and meaning constitutive of human living as always set within time, such as Jaspers particularly recognized:

...every single manifestation in the world of the one absolute truth must be historical: it is unconditional for this $\underline{\text{Ex-}}$ istenz (in its specific situation within the world) and for that reason it is not universally valid (p.242).

When Lonergan moved to face the challenges from the <u>Geisteswissenschaften</u>, the problems of hermeneutics and critical history, he determined that historical consciousness (that reality which is <u>constituted</u> by meaning and is <u>contingent</u> upon the <u>free acts</u> of that <u>human subject</u> -- p.122) necessitated a broader horizon to study these multiple meanings of man

than a "science" of metaphysics. The operations of the subject, judging about facts as well as values and thereby constituting himself in history, became Lonergan's new orientation with constitutive meaning. Poetry, symbols, images and feelings such as are preconceptual, prevoluntary, and prepersonal have to be perceived, appropriated, and reinforced so that we become freely and responsibly, "the persons we choose to be" (p.124). Intentionality analysis, as appropriated from phenomenological method, became his tool to make thematic and explicit the performance of the incarnate inquirer and to reveal that subjective pole in its full and proper stature.

With "The Subject" and then the subsequent publication of Method. Lonergan proposed a "new scheme" of distinct but related levels of consciousness in which the "existential subject stands, so to speak, on the top level". 40 All levels are united by the unfolding of a single transcendental intending, the eros of the human spirit, within which the plural interchangeable objectives distinguish the levels, as do the mental acts of each level. Diagram #2 below provides a schematization of our analysis in Chapter II (especially pages 73, 74, 106, 127) and makes the "new scheme" fairly clear. The three levels of empirical, intellectual, and rational consciousness are each described by their typical conscious acts and also by the objectives of their conscious intendings. Such objectives promote movement to the next level of conscious acts (as the arrows indicate). But what was in Insight an explicit metaphysics for the governing of one's knowing reached through adequate self-knowledge (p.23), has become a transcendental method governed by the transcendental precepts (objectifications of the norms present in the structured dynamism in one's



conscious acts -- p.76). One appropriates and cooperates with the dynamic structure and its norms (see p.75) through the intellectual, moral, and religious conversions. Such self-transcendence achieves authenticity as man increasingly cooperates with the norms. Hence the objectives and the precepts, implicit in Insight, have become explicit and identified on each level of conscious operations in Method. Their function in promoting the next level of acts, as well as governing the activity of that level, are indicated by arrows. But in Method there is very clearly a fourth level of operations now named "responsible" (previously rational self-consciousness) as well as possibly a fifth level of religious consciousness where there is a total surrender to the demands of the spirit in a conversion that is transformative: Be in Love (p.106). What in Insight was the fourth (religious) level (p.41) which transformed the other three through faith, hope, and charity, has become the much described "dynamic state of being in love" of Method. Faith, hope, and charity remain the supernatural transformations of the first three levels, but our discussion of affectivity and value apprehensions above (p.279) has indicated that it is the overall state of being in love that takes over the peak of man's soul (the existential or responsible level) and thereby transforms, from above downwards, all the other levels. In order to make plain this transformation, we have followed Lonergan's more recent comment that "You can say it's on the fifth level... It's selftranscendence reaching its summit... "41 and have provided for the fifth "religious" level. However, it is more accurately a transformation of the responsible level in that one deliberates, evaluates, decides, and acts within the consciousness of being-in-love with God. This dynamic

state most of all transforms the existential level where we decide what to make of ourselves. It gives apprehension of transcendent value on the Responsible Level (see p.297). It also reinforces the transcendental precepts of Be Attentive, Be Intelligent, Be Reasonable, with faith (III), hope (II), and charity (I) so as to sustain the progress and undo the decline that otherwise are so characteristic of the universe (the facts of good and evil -- p.84). Using the distinctions of <u>Insight</u>, we would characterize this activity as supernatural as opposed to natural. It is thus the supernatural, divine grace itself, that heals and creates in history (from above downwards) -- the limited natural human development (from below upwards) which is unable to sustain its own potential for progress.

We have already examined Lonergan's fourth level in relation to the apprehension and judgment of value (p.265). But the basic acts of this level are deliberation, evaluation, decision, and action. The deliberation and evaluation focuses on three components: one's judgments of fact (experienced, understood, and judged), one's apprehensions of value, and the completing judgment of value (which involves both the response to value, and the self-transcending thrust to will authenticity or inauthenticity in oneself) (p.80). The latter component, where one subjects oneself to the test of authenticity in terms of one's transcendental precepts, is the distinctly moral phase of the deliberations, since it is where one makes one's own edition of oneself. This is the consciousness, cultivation, and shaping of one's moral feelings in order to become intentionally self-transcendent that we discussed in terms of affectivity and Doran's psychic conversion (which also correspond in Insight to the introspective

reflection "What are the reasons for my own acts?" within the practical insight -- p.39). But Lonergan puts together this introspective reflection of what one is going to make of oneself, with the value response itself in the "judgment of value". Such an understanding probably reflects Lonergan's basic insight that value is not reflected upon in the abstract or the hypothetical, but rather in the concrete. Hence he would say that one's response to value is made in this instance of judgment, as well as in the cumulative effect of other such judgments. Concrete judgments and decisions to act are therefore the means of building up or letting slide one's moral development. What would some of Lonergan's sources say to this issue?

Both Scheler and von Hildebrand retain a sort of faculty psychology in referring to "the will" as a kind of free "act-centre" of the person. Scheler's concern was to restrict as much as possible the reflective acts typical of the will, encouraging a "passionate willing" (p.174) which conforms to and reinforces one's basic comprehension of value. He notes that the highest level of the feeling states ("personal" or "spiritual") has the greatest potential as a bearer of value because its states are the least controlled by willing (p.153). As such, the ordo amoris is itself impressed on the "control sphere of willing" in an "already virtually formed complex of contents for willing" (p.174). It is one's limited "window" into the absolute ordo, therefore, that controls one's value response and the subsequent decision to act. This does not correspond to Lonergan, for Lonergan would see one's feelings as responses to value built up and shaped out of one's history of judgments of value and decisions to act.

Von Hildebrand, somewhat like Scheler, is concerned that there be a "readiness of our will to conform to the call of values" (p.190) but he has a much more positive view of the potential of the will. Distinguishing the volitional centre from the theoretical and affectional by its freedom to say "yes" or "no" to a motivation from any of the other centers of the person (the theoretical and affectional responses are not free and cannot be controlled) and its power to bring into being something not yet real (p.195), von Hildebrand sees our will as capable of becoming (through the acquiring of virtues) more and more cooperative with the responses presented to it by the other centers. Such a cooperative will, built up with the superactual attitudes (e.g. truthfulness), comes about through the more general will to be morally good (p.198). These attitudes, however, are qualities of the will and not of the other centres, although the qualities can either reinforce or hinder the workings of the other centres (p.201). Hence von Hildebrand would say that we cannot control either our intuition or response to value. Only our volitional response can reinforce or curtail "hearing" the voice of our response to value. Such an example would be the will to "being affected", to be consciously open in one's affective center to the call of value (p.201). However, with Lonergan, von Hildebrand would say that such an attitude of the will can only be realized in actual instances of "being affected" which, instance by instance, build up the attitude. The attitude cannot be willed hypothetically. Hence there is a convergence with Lonergan and von Hildebrand on the element within any decision to act which reinforces or curtails one's basic moral attitudes. Where they clearly diverge is whether one's response to value ("thou shouldst be") is a

part of (Lonergan) or separate from (von Hildebrand) one's judgment of value ("thou wilt be"). The distinction is whether one can apprehend a value, be affected by it (the value response), and still say "no" to an act in response to that value. To von Hildebrand, however much superactual attitudes are to be built up and encouraged, they must never be allowed to neutralize the moral value of our freely willing to say "yes" to a value response. This Lonergan would probably not dispute, save that the judgment of value is itself the act of saying "yes" or "no".

Piaget's theory of the will is that it is a "regulator of the energy of affect" which appears towards the completion of moral development (p.225). Linked to his theory that cognition and affectivity are distinct although parallel and related forms of development, he sees the will as a "late appearing function" that develops autonomous moral feelings to govern the affects just as reason governs cognition. Values and scales of value result from the socialization of affect, from affective interaction with other persons when specific moral behavior becomes developed into autonomous moral feelings that are more universal in their application (p.224). Piaget's theory would be of the same "family" as Lonergan's both in its orientation to autonomous moral and intellectual development, and in the sense that decision (will) regulates one's moral feelings. Lonergan would probably take issue, however, with Piaget's sharp distinction between cognitional and affectional development, probably ascribing greater significance to the universe "alive with feelings" and to the integration of those feelings with judgments of fact in the judgment of value.

What is evident from this discussion of issues concerning

deliberation and decision in the Lonergan of Insight and Method, as well as his sources, is a general convergence of theory that in any decision to act, there is a knowledge proposing the act (both in terms of fact and value) as well as an introspection proposing what one will make of oneself by that act. Both these elements were present in Lonergan's description of the will in Insight as the practical insight into "what is to be done?" and "what are the reasons for my own acts?". But with Lonergan's growing appreciation of the existentialist's concern with one's choice as to what one is to make of oneself, one's constitutive meaning, he redefined the fourth level of operations as an existential or responsible level culminating in decisions to act which constitute what one is. The fourth level of consciousness became the level of conscience. At the same time he integrated into that fourth level an affectional apprehension of value which seemingly replaced the notion of rational value and intellectual order known through the intellect. While we have suggested that such affectional apprehension of value in Lonergan is really only reliable in religious conversion, the presence of this differing form of knowing (moral) has caused us to question the adequacy of Lonergan's description of the fourth level as an "integration" of these two fundamentally different forms of knowing.

Another form of integration of affective knowing within the level of deliberation and decision can be derived from cognitional analysis of those acts. Both Scheler and von Hildebrand would assert that there are two if not three cognitive acts involved:

First, the real presence of the object. Secondly, the fecundating contact with the object in which the object discloses itself to my mind, informs me, and imposes itself on

my mind in its autonomous being; <u>Thirdly</u>, the intuitive character of the contact. The object deploys its 'such being' before my mind as opposed to all discursive control through concepts (p.197).

Further, both Scheler and von Hildebrand see the decision to act (willing) as distinct from and following the response to value; a saying "yes" or "no" to it. What then becomes problematic with Lonergan's description of the fourth level, is that 1.) judgments of fact, 2) apprehensions of value, 3.) response to value, and 4.) the thrust towards moral selftranscendence in willing authenticity or inauthenticity in oneself, are all seen as coming together in the judgment of value and decision to act whereby one makes of oneself what one is to be. In particular, this has resulted in a loss of distinction between one's value response (an act basically not under the command of decision) and one's decision to act itself (an act of free will). And while Lonergan is quite right in asserting that one's decision to act (judgment of value) is, in the long term, an act of constitutive meaning having an effect upon one's values, scales of preference, value response, etc., this effect is primarily cumulative -- a gradual shaping of one's moral attitudes and tendencies. Hence it can be differentiated from a apprehension and response to value in any particular person and/or act.

What we will propose in the concluding chapter of this thesis will be a metaphor of Lonergan's four levels of conscious operations somewhat modified so as to allow distinction between the differing "streams" of intellectual, moral, and religious operations. While perhaps assigning more of a role to a "natural" affectional apprehension of value than would Lonergan, it is hoped that otherwise our modified reconstruction will propose only a slightly more nuanced structure by which the

intellectual, affectional, and volitional (including the religious) streams within consciousness may be understood as flowing into the single integrated river-bed of deliberation and decision. With Lonergan, we would see that point as the <u>apex animae</u> of the soul, where one constitutes one's own meaning and makes the first and only edition of oneself.

Footnotes - Chapter VI

- See "Insight: Preface to a Discussion" in Collection, p. 153.
- See "Insight Revisited" in Second Collection, p. 277.
- "Philosophy and Theology" in Second Collection, p. 204.
- "Bernard Lonergan Responds" in <u>Foundations of Theology</u>, ed. P. McShane, op.cit. p. 227.
- "Healing and Creating in History" in <u>Bernard Lonergan: 3 Lectures</u>, [sic] op.cit. p. 63.
- See Grace and Freedom, p. 44.
- Method, p. 283.
- 8 "Natural Knowledge of God" in Second Collection, pp. 117, 119, 123.
- 9 Ibid. p. 131.
- 10 Ibid. p. 132.
- See reference by W.F.J. Ryan & B.J. Tyrrell in the Introduction to Second Collection, p. viii.
- See Philosophy of God, p. 67.
- "Natural Knowledge of God" in Second Collection, p. 119.
- 14 Insight, p. 218.
- 15 Ibid. p. 199-203...
- 16 <u>Ibid. pp. 728, 219.</u>
- 17 Ibid. p. 728.
- 18 <u>Ibid.</u> p. 741.
- 19 "Theology and Man's Future" in Second Collection, p. 144.
- 20 Ibid. p. 145.
- 21 "The Future of Christianity" in Second Collection, p. 150-1.
- 22 Ibid. p. 154.
- 23 Method, p. 109.

- 24 "The Response of a Jesuit" in <u>Second Collection</u>, p. 173.
- 25 Ibid. p. 173.
- Method, p. 105.
- 27 Ibid. p. 77, also p. 34, footnote #6.
- 28 <u>Ibid. pp. 107, 122.</u>
- Ibid. p. 117, underlining mine.
- See Lonergan's own description of this in his "Philosophy of Education" lectures:2:12.
- Doran, R.M. Subject and Psyche: Ricoeur, Jung, and the Search for Foundations (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1977).
- Doran, R.M. "Jungian Psychology and Lonergan's Foundations: A Methodological Proposal" in <u>Journal of the American Academy of Religion</u>, Vol. XLVII (March, 1979) p. 34.
- Doran, R.M. "Dramatic Artistry in the Third Stage of Meaning", being a paper presented at the 1977 Lonergan Workshop, Boston College and on file at the Lonergan Centre, Regis College, Toronto, p. 5.
- "Jungian Psychology..." op.cit. p.33.
- 35 See lecture 4:18.
- 36 Method, p. 32.
- 37 Ibid. p. 105.
- ³⁸ Ibid. p. 104.
- 39 Lecture 4:18.
- 40 "The Subject" in Second Collection, p. 80.
- See Philosophy of God, p. 38.

CHAPTER VII - A MODIFIED RECONSTRUCTION OF THE HIGHER VIEWPOINT

Section A - Questions and Answers Suggestive of a Modified Reconstruction.

As we have been making our study of Bernard Lonergan's perspective on ethics as indicated by his project first in <u>Insight</u> and as it developed later in <u>Method</u>, we have been noting certain questions that have arisen as we have examined some of his sources to those developments. We have now come to the point where we must assemble the most central of these questions and attempt to answer them — either from what would seem indicated from Lonergan's perspective, or from a slight modification or further development of that perspective as would seem necessary to fulfill the conditions posed by the question.

Question #1: To what degree is "natural" affective apprehension of value reliable, prior to the dynamic state of being-in-love with God?

This question arose with us first as we attempted to outline the cognitional theory in answer to the question "What am I doing when I am 'knowing' by feeling?". (p.253) We discovered that affective apprehension of value for Lonergan came to its fullest within religious conversion, within the intimacy of being-in-love with God when there is an immediate apprehension of good within the grace of God (p.257). At that point, man the originating value becomes divine light and love, and terminal value is the whole universe. This Lonergan would describe as God known through religious experience. But he would also say that God can be known through moral experience. Within that level of conscious experience, Lonergan would say that there is moral apprehension of relative value (p.277, 256). In that case, the originating value is man himself within the limit of his

vertical liberty, and terminal value is limited to the understanding of the human good that he brings about. Unlike, say, Scheler at this point, Lonergan would not seem to admit the possibility of a perception of absolute value. In fact, we had difficulty establishing to what degree for Lonergan there is <u>reliable</u> affective apprehension of value without the transformations of affectivity in moral and religious conversion (p.277).

Lonergan's position in Insight was that the affections as the "attachment and interestedness of sensitivity and intersubjectivity" were in opposition to the detachment and disinterestedness of the pure desire to know, and hence subject to egoism and altruism and in need of universalization within the higher integration of the supernatural solution (p.272). This position did not really change in Method, where the healing and transforming graces of faith, hope, and charity had the effect of quieting down "the passions" and removing from them human possessiveness and pride (p.279). The role ascribed to affectivity in Lonergan seems best indicated by whether or not the Latin tag is seen as applying or as being excepted (Nihil amatum nisi praecognitum is true of human love, but it is not true of God's love --p.257). Lonergan's stance in Insight, with a notion of value as the possible object of rational choice, true value being the realization of a universal order which is intelligible, would not be an exception to the Latin tag. But we found that his position in Method, while more difficult to pin down, did not seem much changed with respect to the limited actualization of affective capacity described in, say, moral conversion within the inquiry about objective value and good of order, and the inquiry of what one is to make of oneself (p.278). Philosophy of Education lectures thus might best describe Lonergan's

basic distinction between moral experience (things done because they are right, according to objective value) and religious experience (the autonomous subject stands before God with his neighbour in the world of history, and reason is subordinated to God and sense to reason -- giving an immediate apprehension of good within the grace of God -- p.115-116). Outside of the immediate apprehension of the good within the love of God (religious experience), Lonergan's early position with Aquinas in naming intelligere the proper act of the human soul, would still seem to be his position in Method, and the being-in-love with God of religious experience the only major exception to the Latin tag. The rational self-consciousness of Insight might still, then, describe moral conversion. The only minor exception to the Latin tag would be falling-in-love, which does not so much give reliable grounds for affective value-apprehension, as it provides the entry-point into the charged field of love and meaning with the love of husband and wife, the love of one's fellow man, and ultimately the love of God himself. Only the immediate apprehension of the good and value within the dynamic state of being in love with God, gives one an actualized capacity for a reliable apprehension of value that is a knowing other than by reason (affective cognition) (p.279). In particular, that state transforms the attachment and interestedness of sensitivity and intersubjectivity into a charity and self-sacrificing love within one's immediate experience, collapsing one's previous tendencies towards egoism and altruism into a self-transcendence of the all-encompassing good.

In our discussions of affectivity and value, we discovered that both Scheler and von Hildebrand share an orientation to "natural" value intuition through feelings that is substantially different from that of Lonergan

(p.283). While von Hildebrand identifies that aspect of affectivity (the merely subjectively satisfying) that is not an intentional response to value (a similar identification to that of Lonergan), we have seen in both Scheler and von Hildebrand the degree to which one is still secundum naturam oriented to value through the affective discloser of value: love. Their theory of persons/love/acts, in which love functions as the discoverer of value, the fundamental welling up of all things in terms of their archetype which resides in God, comprehends the basic phenomenon of being affectively oriented to value. Both Scheler and von Hildebrand identify this not so much as a supernatural experience (von Hildebrand was especially clear on this), as a natural orientation to a transcendental intending (p.283). The scale of values represents the transcendental quality of this affective intending. While they both described the cognitional act as an intuition of essence as opposed to an insight or an understanding of essence, they both would share with Lonergan the focus on moral insight and moral development as the basic orientation of ethics, as opposed to any notion of "objective value" which can be known without the active perception of the involved and responsible moral agent (p.299). But in terms of affectivity as the means of perception of value, Lonergan utilizes the intimacy of religious experience as providing the perception, while von Hildebrand and Scheler ground the perception in intersubjectivity itself by which value is revealed "on the back" of acts by persons (p.284). Scheler and von Hildebrand would thus say that, while the perception will be enhanced or debased by the plenitude of one's "stored up" value experience, it will nevertheless give one a window, however small, into the absolute ordo amoris of value (p.299ff). As such, affective value

disclosure upon our hearts can never be ignored. It constitutes "heart's reasons" which reason cannot understand -- and Scheler is particularly adamant that one should not let one's other "reasons" interfere with these reasons of the heart. Both Scheler and von Hildebrand understand there to be an act-centre, a centre of willing, that typically receives "heart's reasons" as well as other reasons for any particular act (p.315). While Lonergan, in talking of the moral (affectional), intellectual, and religious apprehensions of God, asserts that the three modes of apprehension must harmonize -- von Hildebrand and Scheler seem to see much more of a role of the will in discerning which of these voices to follow, the assumption perhaps being that each mode will have its relative degree of development and affectiveness, and hence one mode may or may not harmonize with the others (p.268, 318).

What is so central to von Hildebrand and Scheler is their finding the seat of the affections in the dynamic orientation to love, to be attracted to value in persons and acts — such that loving is an expression of meaning transcendent to the self, oriented to value whose archetype resides in God. With them, we would argue for a more distinctive role of affective value apprehension within Lonergan's description of conscious operations — to something like the degree that Scheler would see cognition and affectivity as parallel streams, or von Hildebrand would see cognition, affectivity, and will as three distinct processes, or as Piaget would see cognitive and affective development as being distinct, however interrelated, and occurring side by side (p.315). With Lonergan, we would see affective development as beginning out of an experience of falling in love, in which one experiences the attraction to value in a person such

that it opens one's "heart" to transcend itself in response to the person/ value beyond itself (p.276). We would see this attached and interested desire to love as just as fundamental to the apprehension of value, as Lonergan would see the detached disinterested desire, the spirit of inquiry, for intellectual knowing. With Piaget, we would agree that love moves towards socialization and universalization, unless its development is hindered such as in resentment (Scheler) or in Deficiency Love (Maslow) -- in similar manner to the possible hindering of intellectual development as in the egoism of "intelligent selfishness" pp.281,284). In both intelligence and affectivity, development is a process of decentering. Both developments are open to impediment, particularly with the flight from transcendence in the reversion to self. But both, as we will argue later, have within them the immanent norms which can promote while not sustain their own development -- as Lonergan has so clearly shown with respect to intelligence. Just as Doran argues more generally for "psychic conversion" as the means of appropriating one's whole dramatic pattern of consciousness, we would argue more specifically for "affective conversion", by which one appropriates the structure and norms immanent within one's affective value apprehension. Those norms, such as von Hildebrand identified in terms of "being affected" and responsive, would suggest that the apprehension of value through affectivity is a "natural" form of cognition which can be developed and heightened -- as in other forms of knowing -- as well as transformed by the supernatural virtues from religious experience. As such, it has a reliability of apprehension of absolute value proportionate to one's affective (moral) development. As natural, it is open to immanent development. As supernatural, it is

open to the grace of divine light and love, which gives one immediate apprehension of absolute value.

Question #2 - What cognitive acts are involved in the affective apprehension of value?

This question follows upon our answer to the previous question, in which we proposed that there is a "natural" affective apprehension of absolute value that occurs with a reliability proportionate to one's affective (moral) development. That answer followed more upon Scheler and von Hildebrand's cognitional theory, for we have suggested that Lonergan's position is rather that the limited capacity of, say, moral conversion provides primarily a rational comprehension of objective value and good of order, while religious conversion gives immediate affective apprehension of true value within the dynamic state of being-in-love with God. Since we are seeking to understand this natural affective mode of apprehending value, we must attempt to determine the basic cognitive acts involved in such apprehension.

Lonergan's cognitional analysis of feeling, which he set within the immediacy of being-in-love with God, followed Scheler and von Hildebrand in identifying the two acts of apprehension of value, and of response to value (p.254). In our analysis of Scheler, we found his cognitional theory to be based rather upon immediately intuited essences which, through intentional feelings, reveal values (p.261). The cognitive process begins with a "consciousness of something", that something being value which has a prior existence and self-givenness in persons and acts. This consciousness of something, of the intention of the person/act (the value), is for Scheler an intuition prior to all discursive acts (p.148). It is

immediately followed by a responsive act, either in the direction of a loving or a hating, which will be one's feeling response aroused by the value presented. In the first act, values "flash out" and disclose themselves. In the second act, one responds with one's own feeling or intention of value — which will depend very much upon one's developed ordo amoris. (p.159). The response will be automatic, based upon one's already formed value-feelings. Scheler is then concerned that the still further act of willing should involve no further reflective act but, as in personal and spiritual feelings, should be that value response immediately enacted (p.153).

Von Hildebrand refined Scheler's theory of affective cognition into a general cognitional theory of three distinctive acts, and its specific application of affective cognition. Its three acts are:

- 1) the real presence of the object
- 2) the disclosure or imposition of the object upon my mind
- 3) the intuitive character of the contact; my response

 Its specific application to affective cognition of value involves:
 - 1) the perceived object, which is necessarily before me
 - 2) the object reveals itself to our mind, it speaks and we listen
 - 3) In responses it is we who speak, the content of our act is addressed to the object (p.194).

The first act would really seem to correspond to Lonergan's first level of immediate experience, in which by acts of sensing, perceiving, imagining and feeling we are conscious but we have not begun to pattern the pure data of that conscious experience. In the second act, which von Hildebrand calls "being affected", the value of the object/act/person "acts upon my

heart in a deep meaningful manner, in melting it", having a somewhat centripetal effect on me (p.196). The third act, which von Hildebrand calls the value response, is centrifugal in character and is the means by which I impart my intention, my value to the object/act/person presented to me. And while, with Scheler, von Hildebrand would agree that the response is governed (almost automatically) by one's developed ordo amoris, he would also point out that there is an axiological imperative to every such response:

to every good endowed with a value, as well as to everything tainted by a disvalue, an adequate response is due (p. 198).

This points out the fact that "being affected" or apprehending value is a conscious act beyond intentional control, while (with Scheler) the value response, by being dependent on one's developed <u>ordo amoris</u>, is open to a degree of intentional control — such that the axiological imperative should be willed to govern its operation.

We would therefore answer our question concerning the cognitive acts of affective apprehension of value, in terms of there being three basic acts. Following Lonergan particularly, we would point firstly to general acts of consciousness (sensing, imagining, feeling, moving) by which we become aware of persons/objects/acts. Lonergan finds within these acts (in terms of intellectual cognition) the required norm of "attentiveness". Since feelings of values are specifically interpersonal or intersubjective apprehensions of meaning (p.121) and are therefore set within relationships, the norm for such experience would be more precisely "sensitivity". Thus "Be Sensitive" would be a transcendental precept appropriate to the objective of the experiencing of feelings within intersubjective relationships.

The next level of conscious acts, following experience, we would see in what Lonergan (interpreting Scheler and von Hildebrand) calls the apprehension of value. We have already noted (p.263,268) that Lonergan avoids calling these acts intuitions (as do both Scheler and von Hildebrand) but also avoids calling them insights. Both terms may be inappropriate in that they are descriptive of divergent theories of intellectual cognition. In using the term apprehension, Lonergan neither presumes "taking a look" nor an act of understanding. Apprehension is a term implying perception with both cognitive and affective connotations. Given the content described by von Hildebrand (p.196f) as a "being affected" such that the value felt acts upon my heart in a deep centripetal manner, we would follow Lonergan in calling it an apprehension of value. Von Hildebrand's description of the act as having the objective of "being affected" by value obviously lends itself to a transcendental precept of "Be Affected" as governing this level of conscious affective acts.

The final level or stage of conscious affective acts, we would call the value response. Not following Lonergan at this point in identifying the response to value within the judgment of value (p.268), we would instead follow von Hildebrand in describing it as a centrifugal act in which there is a clear distinction between the centripetal feeling in which I apprehend the person/act/value, and the responsive feeling that it engenders in me (p.197f). The feeling it engenders in me arises out of my ordo amoris, that developed perception of value arising out of my cumulative value-responses and acts of value. Implicit in it will be my scale of value, my preferences, etc. — my limited perception of absolute value given my level of moral development (e.g. conversion). With von

Hildebrand, we would agree that our value response is <u>almost</u> automatic since it is based in the limited <u>ordo amoris</u> that is our current edition of ourself. But a new value or a revising of one's scale of preference is always possible within the apprehension of value by love, the discoverer of value -- and hence every response to value can expand and re-shape one's <u>ordo amoris</u>, and produce an ever-new revision of oneself. Lonergan, Scheler, and von Hildebrand were all aware (p.315) of the degree to which decision (willing) both shapes and governs this level of responses to value. Von Hildebrand's axiological principle of the adequate response is a good example of the need to govern those responses (p.198). Given the objective, then, of response to value on this level of operations, the transcendental precept "Be Responsive" would best govern both new responses to new or revised apprehended value, as well as cultivate previous responses to confirmed values and instances of the good to which one wishes continually to be responsive.

Question #3 - What cognitive acts are involved in deliberation and decision?


We have already noted, both in the previous question and in our discussion of issues concerning deliberations and decision that Lonergan in his fourth level brings together judgments of fact, apprehensions of value, responses to value, and the thrust towards moral self-transcendence in willing authenticity or inauthenticity in oneself, <u>all</u> within the judgment of value (p.318). The judgment of value is the decision to act, and Lonergan sees that decision within a convergence of fact, value, and authenticity. Within such a decision, one constitutes one's own meaning not only in that single decision to act, but also in the degree of

intellectual, moral and religious conversion that will be realized within oneself by that act. Lonergan's appreciation of the existentialists' orientation to choosing, to the decision that makes me what I am to be and constitutes me (as opposed to a mere hypothetical decision), is at the heart of his post-<u>Insight</u> description of the fourth responsible or existential level of operations. But what are, in fact, the key acts or components to this level of operations?

The first most obvious component on the level of decision, is the reflection answering the question "What is to be done?". In Insight, Lonergan referred to this as the "practical insight" within practical reflection -- to raise questions, evaluate consequences, and run risks in determining a possible course of action (p.30f). Its objective is focused on the making of being. It does so by integrating judgments of fact, and judgments of rational value (evaluation). But it also involves a second act, the introspective practical reflection "What are the reasons for my own acts?" (p.32). Given the significance of introspection in Insight whereby the mind can know itself and the dynamic structures of its own knowing (to say nothing of the reasons for its own acts), the centrality of the introspective reflection of rational self-consciousness would seem to be of far greater importance than is typically accorded it in Insight. Its outcome in a latent or an explicit metaphysics which governs all of one's knowing, is obviously foundational to shaping the rest of one's conscious operations. This foundation becomes clearer in the transcendental precepts of Method when, in light of experiencing one's experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding, understanding the unity and relations of one's experiencing, understanding, judging,

deciding, etc., one decides "to operate in accord with the norms immanent in the spontaneous relatedness of one's experienced, understood, affirmed experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding" (p.76). What is so important here is to recognize the governing quality of introspection, implementing decisions for the determination of one's own operations through self-conscious scrutiny., Our diagram #2, below shows clearly in the right hand columns the scope of the governing of knowing implemented by the decisions of introspective self-consciousness. introspective reflection, which is focused in Method within the thrust towards moral self-transcendence in willing authenticity or inauthenticity in oneself, is as integral a component to decision as is consideration of the possibilities of what is to be done. One might say that in Method, the setting of these two reflective acts within the deliberation "Is it worthwhile?", shifts the emphasis significantly from the question "What is to be done?" towards the value question of self: "What am I to make of myself?" The issue of constitutive meaning has become central to the deliberation.

But it is this most central introspective reflection culminating in any decision which wills authenticity or inauthenticity in oneself, that in the Lonergan of Method we find insufficiently distinguished from the affectional operations of the experience, apprehension, and response to value. In Insight, judgments of fact and judgments of rational value (particularly the good of order) were essential ingredients to the reflection focused on possible courses of action (p.32). The completing introspective reflection scrutinized one's operations to determine the genuineness of the operations by which one proposed such courses of



action. Both reflections affirming the proposal resulted in an assent. But in Method, with the affectional apprehension of value, we have not merely the single stream of intellectual experience, understanding, and judgment proposing fact and value, but we have the affectional stream of intersubjective knowing proposing value as well. This stream, as we proposed in answer to Question No.2 above, has its own dynamic structure and norms immanent in its own operations. It, like the intellectual stream, must be subjected to the self-conscious scrutiny of introspective consciousness as to whether any set of conscious operations are genuine, whether they implement authenticity or inauthenticity within oneself and therefore what meaning will one constitute within oneself by this decision.

But there are at least two value questions going on at the same time in any decision, which must be distinguished. (There may also be a third question of rational value.) The first would typically come from my apprehension and response to value where, say, I am confronted with the value of human life and well-being as I witness a lost and bewildered child in a crowd (my value apprehension), while I am also aware of my sense of hesitation and inadequacy (my value response) by which I want to avoid getting involved. But my introspective self-scrutiny has, for some time now, been reinforcing my self-confidence in becoming more outgoing and involved in public living. So I decide, for my own making of myself, to overturn my inadequate value response. I also decide, in that instance, to respond to the value implicit in that lost and bewildered child, and to help him. On the one hand, I am dealing with the development of my own ordo amoris, my own affectional operation. On the other,

I am dealing with the value and situation presented to me within acts of persons in history. While hopefully I am dealing with them both within the same decision, I may well be neglecting one or the other. The decision should involve both that decision which I am currently making, as well as the decisions I have made in the past and am implementing in my current operations. The point is, as was clearly the case with a distinct category of the will in Insight, (p.27f) that I have freedom to decide to follow or not to follow what is presented to me through either my intellectual or affectional knowing. While Lonergan is undoubtedly right that those internal decisions are generally so important in constituting the meaning of one's life as well as being the specific decision upon which one acts, the sequence of acts he describes as those of the fourth level of conscious operations in Method tends not to call attention to the radical distinction between the relatively habitual and automatic operations of intellectual and affectional cognition, and the completely free acts of volition which can follow or overturn the judgments or responses from intellect and affection.

Thus we would wish to distinguish operations which we would describe as volitional from those that would seem to fall still within the sequence of either intellectual or affectional operations. Following von Hildebrand's distinction that intellectual (theoretical) and affectional operations follow their own sequence and cognition with little possibility of control or interference from other centres, whereas volitional operations take place in a sort of free act-centre of the person, we would say that a volitional act has the freedom to say "yes" or "no" to a motivation from any other centre of operations within the person (p.195f. and p.316).

Unlike either intellectual or affectional acts, volitional acts have not the same immanent norms within them. This would follow Lonergan's description of the will as he outlined it in <u>Insight</u>, especially with the will (rather than the intellect) as free to do other than as intellect knows it ought to do — requiring therefore the higher integration to sustain man's volitional capacity (p.35). These acts would be both reflective and evaluative (involving facts as well as values) and would seem to respond to three basic questions:

- 1) What is to be done? (a practical reflection on possibilities)
- 2) Why should it be done? (a practical rational and affective evaluation)
- 3) Why should I do it? (a practical introspective reflection and evaluation)

The first question is obvious — a factual understanding of reality suggests certain basic possibilities. The second question brings the perspective of value to those possibilities, much as colour brings a more nuanced perspective on seen reality than can the mere distinctions of black and white. Affectional cognition of value within a situation will bring a reason from the heart which will be of a different nature than the more analytic reason from the mind (it will be an intersubjective apprehension). The two "reasons" should coincide — but may not due to unequal intellectual and affectional development. The third question, which builds both on Lonergan's Insight question "What are the reasons for my own acts?" and his post—Insight focus "What am I to make of myself?", moves towards the decision to act while keeping in creative tension the issues of 1) the possibilities 2) the ultimate or terminal

value to be realized in them 3) the originating value to be realized in me. While each person may well pose these questions differently to himself, we would suggest that the three foci of 1) facts 2) terminal or absolute values 3) the self as originating value, would always be involved. And while a responsible self should always consider the facts that it knows, the values it apprehends and to which it responds, and the self as operator which it is intending to be — still that self can refuse to hear any or all of these things, and make its decision on other grounds or upon no grounds at all. Such is the basic freedom that characterizes all volitional acts.

Given this basic freedom of volitional acts, we would therefore be in full agreement with Aristotle, Aquinas, Lonergan, Scheler, and von Hildebrand that virtues, habits, tendencies, superactual attitudes, and graces (whichever term one uses) are a fundamental requirement for moral living to provide a right orientation to the will and its governing of the other streams or patterns within consciousness. This orientation or disposition in one's choosing or deciding is what Lonergan identified as the existentialists' reference to the "essence of man", that "selfconstitution" that is one's "second nature", which "makes me what I am to be" (p.111). It is a self-being brought about by acts that provide the grounds upon which one's authenticity (or inauthenticity) is based. The orientation is either reinforced or diminished with each conscious choice or decision which one makes. Lonergan, however, by identifying the norms immanent within each conscious operation, has given us the fundamental precepts which shape our basic intellectual and moral operations (Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible), to

which we have added those indicated by the affectional operations (Be sensitive, Be affected, Be responsive). These precepts, which encourage self-transcendence, are the result of conversions within one's intellectual, affectional, or moral operations. Upon becoming conscious of and understanding those operations, when we decide to appropriate them as governing our own operations, then our operations become transformed in a more ready intelligence to understand, a more open apprehension to be affected, and a more ready decision to be responsible, etc. Such is a more explicit and modern rendering of the age-old "habits".

But these habits can and do fail, for our volitional acts remain free, however trained and reinforced they may be. Further, we remain subject to oversights, undersights, biases, repressions, scotoses, resentments, etc. With Lonergan and von Hildebrand, we would also agree that there remains, in both intellectual and affective operations, a tendency towards egoism and altruism (Piaget's egocentrism) of which we are never entirely free. The transcendental intending of the desire to know and the desire to love does not cancel out the narrower tendency of self-attachment and self-interest. It remains potentially active, giving us only a limited intellectual, affective, and moral capacity. Only the conversions, that come of the surrender of self in a transcendence beyond that self, give full actualization to one's intellectual, affectional, volitional, and religious conscious operations. As both von Hildebrand and Scheler identify, this transformation, particularly in religious conversion, is characterized by an intimacy with God enabling man to himself become "a principle of benevolence and beneficence, of genuine co-operation, of true love" (p.274), the transcendent suddenly

becoming immanent within the human heart. As Lonergan would say, such conversion transforms one's existential (fourth) level, the <u>apex animae</u> of the soul, into a dynamic state of being-in-love, giving one a ready will to do all good. But it also has a fully actualizing effect on our other operations as well, as our Diagram No.2 (right-hand column) makes clear, giving us a faith to reach objects and values beyond our ability to judge or respond, (Level III) a hope that goes beyond our ability to understand or apprehend, (Level II) and a charity of attentive and sensitive experience (Level I) in which the attachment to self is dissolved in a new awareness that the universe, as well as ourselves, is in love with God. The limitation of our immanence has become transformed into a transcendence that is immanent within us.

Section B - The Modified Reconstruction

By our questions and answers above, as well as in the problems we identified in the previous chapter in reconstructing the "higher view-point" that came to be Lonergan's integration of knowing and feeling within a fourth level of "Responsible" operations, it is obvious that we have some difficulty confirming, both within his sources and within ourselves, the heuristic structure that Lonergan uses to describe and explain the integration of these two modes of knowing. We must now go to the heart of that matter, and try to offer a modification of that structure such as would more suitably describe and explain the relationships involved.

Lonergan has used two basic metaphors to illustrate the basic structure of consciousness. The first, the spatial metaphor of levels,

he originated in Insight to describe the intellectual pattern within consciousness. Identifying the spirit of inquiry, the exigence of the pure detached desire to know, as its dynamic intending, he followed that exigence as it promoted understanding from experience, judgment from understanding, and decision to act from judgment -- differing sequential acts within a dynamic structural unity of understanding. The first three levels doubtless constituted a unity, while the fourth level, the extension of knowing into the field of doing, could well be termed beyond the sequence if factors other than understanding were seen as involved in the decision to act. Those other factors, which emerged so clearly in Lonergan's writings as of 1968, involved particularly values as apprehended by feelings. Lonergan still retained the structural metaphor of levels, but he generally moved away from categorization and towards transcendental intendings as the basic mode of analysis which can follow what is directly given in experience, Honce the pure desire to know was described in a more comprehensive and unrestricted sense as a single transcendental intending, the "unfolding of a single thrust, the eros of the human spirit" (p.74).

But at the same time, he modified the metaphor of levels with its explanation in terms of Hegel's notion of sublation, of a lower being retained, preserved while yet being transcended and completed by a higher (but without the Hegelian view that the higher reconciles a contradiction in the lower). With this notion, which he attributed later to Rahner (p.104), he expanded the metaphor of levels to include the phenomenon of inclusion and fuller realization of the same aspect throughout each stage within a richer context, while maintaining the sense of

interdependence especially in its effect of heightening the value of the lower level (e.g. level I -- Attentiveness) through discovery and exploration of the subsequent level (e.g. intelligence promotes attentiveness). It was in this sense that he introduced the notion of intellectual, moral, and religious conversions, in which each promoted the other, either from below upwards, or from above downwards (p.104). On the other hand, Lonergan was not unaware that there might be various groupings (in the Piagetian sense) within these levels:

The fourth and highest level is that of deliberation, evaluation, decision. It follows that the priority of intellect is just the priority of the first three levels of experiencing, understanding, and judging,²

While he went on, in that context, to talk of the existential subject who does not experience, understand, and judge in a vacuum but rather "has decided to devote himself to the pursuit of understanding and truth", we would simply note that Lonergan did not equally allow, possibly with another stream or pattern of operations, that the priority might be other than intellect, and that (if this priority were affectivity) another priority might be a decision to devote oneself to the pursuit of affective apprehension and value. Providing that there were, at least hypothetically, another transcendental intending within a series of operations such as those unified by the intending of understanding (the priority of intellect), would it not be possible within Lonergan's own structural metaphor of levels and notion of sublation for there to be more than one stream (e.g. intellect and affectivity) feeding the convergent point of existential or responsible consciousness within the unifying acts of deliberation, evaluation, and decision?

It is precisely this possibility we wish in conclusion to propose, the exigence for it coming from Lonergan himself in his identification of at least three different modes of natural knowledge of God:

Again, I should insist that moral and religious development vastly enrich our relations to God and our apprehension of him; in this respect I am greatly in agreement with Max Scheler and Dietrich von Hildebrand. But I should deny that our intellectual apprehension of any real object, least of all, of God is ever complete, closed, excluding further development. I should deny that the developments from moral and religious experience in any way fail to harmonize with intellectual apprehension. I should urge that just as the intellectual, the moral, and the religious are three phases in a single thrust to self-transcendence, so too moral and religious development only reveal more fully the God that can be known by the natural light of human reason. 3


What we would wish to propose is a modified metaphor of levels incorporating (at least for the moment) three differing streams of intellectual, affectional (Lonergan, referring to Scheler and von Hildebrand, called it "moral"), and volitional consciousness, each having within it its own exigence towards self-transcendence. Following Lonergan, we would suggest that each represents but one of the three phases "in a single thrust to self-transcendence". Since all three converge in apprehension of the single, ultimate God who is true and good and loving, they should not fail to harmonize. But our capacity as subjects (our intellectual, moral, and religious conversions which promote, with greater or lesser success, only relative levels of apprehension proportionate to our development) is never fully actualized. Therefore it is possible that our apprehensions may differ, according to their respective levels of development (see above, p.269,270). However, the relative apprehensions converge within the existential subject on the responsible level of deliberation and decision. And it is at that level that one's developed apprehensions constitute what

one is able to make of oneself.

In the following Diagram #3, we have elaborated Lonergan's structural metaphor into three different streams. The "Intellectual Stream" is obviously Lonergan's three levels, as described both in <u>Insight</u> and <u>Method</u>, of experience, understanding, and judgment. This stream, in which the priority is intellect and the exigence the detached, disinterested desire to know, is proposed in the heightened sense in which it was so thoroughly described in <u>Insight</u> and identified with its transcendental precepts in <u>Method</u>. We will refer to the transcendental precepts governing its activity in describing later the Volitional Stream.

The modification of Lonergan's metaphor begins with the identification of a separate stream of apprehension which we name "Affectional", since what characterizes this form of apprehension is the "knowing by feeling", the intentional feelings which are a consciousness of something. Following our description of this stream as described above (p. 330), we would identify the first level as a consciousness (as opposed to preor un-consciousness) of interpersonal or intersubjective feelings -similar to the bodily-based acts of sensing, (hearing, seeing, moving) which within the intellectual stream present the data of consciousness. This first level, within the context of intersubjectivity (personal relationships) presents the affective data of consciousness. Within such data of intersubjectivity, can be discerned the basic exigence to love (or possibly to hate). This desire to love, which both Scheler and von Hildebrand (and, more recently, Maslow) identified as the basic dynamism or energy of affectivity, is attracted to and interested in value (or, conversely, detracted and repelled by disvalue). Agreeing with Scheler

}



The Streams within Consciousness

and von Hildebrand that such value is typically borne "on the back" of acts by persons, we would suggest that the attraction to value typically begins with falling in love (the attachment to and interest in another human subject). But that falling in love promotes one to the objective of the next level of operations -- the desire to apprehend the value itself. While using Lonergan's term "apprehension" we would still describe the act much as has von Hildebrand; the value of the act/person acts upon my heart in a deep centripetal manner -- it "speaks" and we "listen". We apprehend the value by intersubjective feeling, and thereby become conscious of it. That feeling of value then promotes one to a further (third) level of operations as it engenders within us our response -- a degree of loving or, in the case of disvalue, a degree of hating. This response will largely depend upon our developed ordo amoris, upon the plenitude or scarcity of our stored up valuation. But it can also be an entirely new response to value, for such is the basic nature of the exigence of love that it moves ahead of us towards new value "as a pioneer and guide" (Scheler). Throughout these three levels of operation, then, the priority is apprehension of value. The mode of apprehension is affectivity.

As Lonergan saw that "deliberation sublates and thereby unifies knowing and feeling", 4 so we too would see the convergence of the streams of knowing and feeling within the more central "reservoir" (to maintain our analogy of fluids) volition. Its acts, however, are more complex than perhaps may be indicated by the terms deliberation and decision. For, as in our discussion above (see p.338), we would see that deliberation as addressing at least three different issues:

- 1) What is to be done? (a practical reflection on possibilities)
- 2) Why should it be done? (a practical rational and affective evaluation)
- 3) Why should I do it? (a practical introspective reflection and evaluation).

While these three issues all press towards a decision, they are all very much related to the operations that preceded them (intellectual and affectional) both in terms of content(facts and values) and in terms of authentic governing of those operations. In fact, we would identify the volitional flow itself as primarily the introspective mode so well described in Insight, the ability of the mind (and "heart") to know itself. This consciousness that can attend upon one's own understanding and apprehension, can not only govern and vitalize one's understanding and apprehension, but can also ground a decision not merely upon understood facts and apprehended values but as well upon approval or rejection of one's past performance. In fact, the volitional stream is initially a sort of "free flow", passively connected to one's various streams of consciousness, its only essential act being decision. What one does with that "free flow", that latent reservoir, however, is quite another matter -and it is effected by the one basic act of decision, by which one constitutes one's own meaning (as Lonergan so well saw). Its potential direction and energy is provided by the very streams that feed it. Yet they can be wasted or harnessed.

Lonergan's notion of metaphysics in <u>Insight</u> was of an appropriation of intelligent consciousness as a basic corrective to all other orientations of consciousness, and an embodiment of the dynamism of one's images

"that release feeling and emotion and flow spontaneously in deeds no less than words" (p.24). His description of transcendental method represents a similar project, to which he also applies our image of stream or flow:

When the natural and the human sciences are on the move, when the social order is developing, when the everyday dimensions of culture are changing, what is needed is not a dam to block the stream but control of the river-bed through which the stream must flow. In modern science, what is fixed is not the theory or system but the method that keeps generating, improving, replacing theories and systems. Transcendental method is the assault on the citadel: it is possession of the basic method, and all other methods are just so many extensions and adaptations of it. 5

But transcendental method is derived from the norms implicit in one's conscious operations within the structured dynamism of one's streams of consciousness. Our analysis has indicated the norms and dynamism implicit in the intellectual and affectional streams. The volitional stream, passive as mere introspection, becomes an active and flowing stream when its river-bed is constructed and directed by the immanent norms of intellect and affection as known and decided upon for the governing of one's operations. Whether as the simple and honest soul who, unawares, follows the structured dynamism of his intending, or as the conscious and intending soul who identifies and appropriates the same structured dynamism — both implement transcendental method by decision. Both structure and pattern the free-flow (essential freedom) intentionally oriented to the understanding of the true and the apprehension of the good, through the transcendental precepts as in our diagram #3:

III Be Reasonable Be Responsive III

II Be Intelligent Be Affected II

I Be Attentive Be Sensitive I

(intellectual) (affectional)


To the extent that the norms of one's intellectual operations have been appropriated, we would understand what Lonergan calls intellectual conversion to have taken place and to be operative. To the extent that the norms of one's affectional operations have been appropriated, we would understand affectional conversion to have taken place. To the extent that one or the other or both of the intellectual and affectional conversions have taken place, we would say that one's moral conversion has begun to take place (one has, for instance, experienced one's experiencing...etc., etc...and has decided to operate in accord with the norms immanent in the spontaneous relatedness of one's experienced, understood, affirmed experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding). One has, by that decision, begun to govern one's understanding -- and that is a moral act. With Doran (see abovep.287) we would say that one's psychic conversion has taken place to the degree that one has released one's pre-conscious symbols and images from the distorted biases of waking consciousness to enter one's internal conscious communication structure between psyche, mind, and heart. All these conversions to the norms immanent in one's structured operations (intellect, affect, psyche) provide the structure, the river-bed, of one's volitional operations, that structure being implicitly or explicitly erected and strengthened (or dismantled and weakened) by each decision of one's volition. Such is the process by which one constitutes oneself as a passive watershed,

or as an active flow towards the true, the loving, and the good.

But consciousness, and the immanent norms within it, has its limitations. Perhaps a central difference between ourselves and Lonergan, would be the extent of limitation. Lonergan characterized intellectual development as being prone to the limitations of the biases of common sense understanding, scotosis, repression, inhibition, and egoism generally (p.8). The "natural" corrective, which itself could sustain only limited development, was the governing quality of the detached, disinterested desire to know. Lonergan even further qualified the limitations of affective development as tending towares the "egoism and altruism" that characterizes the attachment and interestedness, the "human possessiveness and pride" of sensitivity and intersubjectivity such that only God's gift of his love could transform the bias of sensitivity into a self-sacrificing love (p.271, 278). He did not seem to grant, as we would, that "natural" loving (the attached, interested desire to love) is itself a dynamic transcendent intending which orients one to value beyond oneself and operates according to its own immanent norms. Doran followed Lonergan in this by looking instead to the dream, which he characterized as a "privileged instance" of internal communication between psyche, mind, and heart that was free from the "distorted censorship of inauthentic imagination and intelligence" within the egotistic or general bias of waking consciousness (p.287). In contrast, Scheler and von Hildebrand -- and perhaps also Maslow -- would grant more of a "natural" capacity to affectivity such that love, the discoverer of value, is seen as promoting an affective development similar to the proportion that Lonergan would see the detached disinterested

desire to know as promoting intellectual development (p.283ff). But, with the Lonergan of <u>Insight</u>, we would see the greatest problem of capacity being with the will or the "act-centre" of the person, which distinguishes itself from all other centres by its freedom to say "yes" or "no" to a motivation from any of the other centres of the person (p.308f). With Lonergan, Scheler, and von Hildebrand we would agree that "the will" has not the same immanent norms governing its activity —hence the need of habits and virtues to govern its operation. It is this centre which is in need of the still higher re-orientation towards God and the good through actualization of the dynamic state of being-in-love with God. With Lonergan, we would characterize it as a "Transformation of Consciousness" (see below, Diagram #4).

But there is a still greater conversion that occurs when one's consciousness has been transformed by a being-in-love with God. This transformation, which Lonergan had characterized, with others, as an intimacy with and total surrender to God, becomes actualized in a dynamic state of being-in-love with God. It takes over, in an immanent transcendence, all construction and development of the "river-bed" of our volitional stream, and gives us an effective freedom to become, with God, a principle of benevolence and beneficence, of genuine cooperation, of true love. It is, as Lonergan described it, a healing and creating in history which is development from above downwards. As we have proposed it metaphorically in Diagram #4, it energizes our act-centre of deliberation and decision with the dynamic state of being-in-love. It becomes our first principle: "From it flows one's desires and fears, one's joys and sorrows, one's discernment of values, one's decision and deeds" (p.89).



The Transformation of Consciousness

But it does not alter the structure of our consciousness, however much it may vitalize and reinforce it. It builds upon what is already good in man. Specifically, it reinforces our implicit transcendental method to give it a capacity far beyond the first principles upon which it was based. It gives us <u>faith</u> to reach objects and values beyond our native ability to judge or respond to them. It gives us <u>hope</u> that surpasses our natural ability to understand and apprehend. And it gives us <u>charity</u> within our attentive, sensitive experience in which our attachment to self dissolves into a new awareness that we and the whole universe are in love with God. This sense of the supreme fact, the supreme value, of the supreme person which is God, involves us in a cooperation and co-performance that is the divine light and life itself, a self-transcendence occurring within the whole universe -- to the glory of God who originates it all.

Footnotes - Chapter VII

- 1 "The Subject" in <u>Second Collection</u>, p. 80.
- ² Method, p. 340.
- 3 "Natural Knowledge of God" in <u>Second Collection</u>, p. 132.
- "Insight Revisited" in <u>Second Collection</u>, p. 277.
- ⁵ "The Future of Thomism" in <u>Second Collection</u>, p. 52.


APPENDICES

ω	
ū	
∞	

<u>Level</u>	Conscious Act	Metaphysical Content	<u>Men</u>	Cultures	Good	Evils	Redemption
III	judging	act	religious	ideational	Value: religious ethical aesthetic	sin as aberration	faith
II	understanding	form	ethical	idealistic	good of order	sin as component in social process	-
I	experiencing	potency	aesthetic	sensate	particular good	sin as crime	charity


Diagram #1

The Structure of the Human Good





The



The

The Streams within Consciousness

The

The

Intellectual

The Transformation of Consciousness

The

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

SECTION A - PRIMARY SOURCES

- Aristotle <u>Nicomachean Ethics</u>. Translated by M. Ostwald. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962.
- Cassirer, E. <u>Language and Myth</u>. Translated by S. Langer, New York: Dover Pub. 1946.
- Heidegger, M. Being and Time. Translated Marquarrie, J. and Robinson, E. London: S.C.M. Press, 1962.
- Husserl, E. <u>Cartesian Meditations</u>. Translated D. Cairns. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960.
- Husserl, E. The <u>Idea of Phenomenology</u>. Translated by W. Alston & G. Nakhnikan. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973.
- Jaspers, K. Man in the Modern Age. Translated by Paul, E. and C.; New York: Doubleday, 1957.
- Jaspers, Karl. The Origin and Goal of History. New Haven: Yale U. Press, 1953.
- Johnston, W. The Mysticism of the Cloud of Unknowing. New York: Deselée, 1967.
- Johnston, W. Christian Zen. New York: Harper & Row, 1971.
- Kant, I. <u>Critique of Practical Reason</u>. Translated by L.W. Beck. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956.
- Kant, I. Prolegomena To Any Future Metaphysics. Translated by Carus and Beck, L.W. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1950.
- Kierkegaard, S. <u>Concluding Unscientific Postscript</u>. Translated by D. Swenson & W. Lowrie. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton U. Press, 1941.
- Langer, S. <u>Feeling and Form</u> <u>A Theory of Art.</u> New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953.
- Lonergan, B.J.F. "Bernard Lonergan Responds," <u>Foundations of Theology</u>. Edited by Philip McShane. Notre Dame: U. of Notre Dame Press, 1972: 223-234.
- Lonergan, B.J.F. "Bernard Lonergan Responds." <u>Language</u>, <u>Truth and Meaning</u>. Edited by Philip McShane. Notre Dame: U. of Notre Dame, 1972: 306-312.
- Lonergan, B.J.F. <u>Collection</u>. Edited by F.E. Crowe. New York: Herder and Herder, 1967.

- Lonergan, B.J.F. <u>Doctrinal Pluralism</u>. Milwaukee: Marquette U. Press, 1971.
- Lonergan, B.J.F. Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. New York: Herder and Herder, 1971.
- Lonergan, B.J.F. <u>Insight: A Study of Human Understanding</u>. New York: Philosophical Library, 1957.
- Lonergan, B.J.F. Method in Theology. New York: Herder and Herder, 1972.
- Lonergan, B.J.F. <u>Notes on Existentialism</u> being notes for lectures at Summer School, Boston College, July 1957. Montreal: Thomas Moore Institute.
- Lonergan, B.J.F. Philosophy of God and Theology. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1973.
- Lonergan, B.J.F. <u>Second Collection</u>. Edited by W.F. Ryan and B.J. Tyrrell. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1974.
- Lonergan, B.J.F. <u>3 Lectures</u>. (sic). Edited by R.E. O'Connor. Montreal: Thomas More Institute, 1975.
- Lonergan, B.J.F. <u>Verbum</u>: <u>Word and Idea in Aquinas</u>. Edited by D.B. Burrell. Notre Dame: U. of Notre Dame Press, 1967.
- Marcel, G. Homo Viator: Introduction to the Metaphysics of Hope. Translated by E. Aufurd. New York: Harper, 1962.
- Marcel, G. <u>Metaphysical Journal</u>. Translated by B. Wall. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1952.
- Maslow, A.H. Religions, Values and Peak Experiences. New York: Penguin Books, 1976.
- Maslow, A.H. <u>Towards a Psychology of Being</u>. New York: Van Nostrand, 1968.
- Newman, J.H. An Essay in aide of a Grammar of Assent. Westminster: Md. Christian Classics, 1973.
- Pascal, B. Pensées. Translated by W. Trotter. New York: E.P. Dutton Co., 1958.
- Piaget, J. The Child's Conception of the World. Translated by J. and A. Tomlinson. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1929.
- Piaget, J. The Growth of Logical Thinking. Translated by A. Parsons & S. Milgram. New York: Basic Books, 1958.

- Piaget, J. Judgment and Reasoning in the Child. Translated by M. Warden. New York: Harcourt Brace & World, 1926.
- Piaget, J. The Language and Thought of the Child. Translated by M. Gabain. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1929.
- Piaget, J. The Moral Judgment of the Child. Translated by M. Gabain. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1932.
- Piaget, J. The Psychology of Intelligence. Translated by M. Percy and D.E. Berlyne. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1950.
- Piaget, J. <u>Six Psychological Studies</u>. Translated by A. Tenzer. New York: Vintage Books, 1968.
- Piaget, J. Structuralism, Translated by C. Maschler. New York: Harper Touchbooks, 1971.
- Sartre, J.P. <u>Existentialism</u>. Translated by B. Frechtman. New York: Philosophical Library, 1947.
- Scheler, M. Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values.

 Translated by M. Frings and B. Funk. Evanston: Northwestern U. Press, 1973.
- Scheler, M. Man's Place in Nature. Translated by H. Meyerhoff. New York: Noonday Press, 1961.
- Scheler, M. The Nature of Sympathy. Translated by P. Heath, Hamdon, Conn.: Archon Books, 1970.
- Scheler, M. On the Eternal in Man. Translated by B. Noble. London: S.C.M. Press, 1960.
- Scheler, M. Ressentiment. Translated by W. Holdheim. New York: Schoken Books, 1972.
- Scheler, M. <u>Selected Philosophical Essays</u>. Edited and translated by D.R. Lachterman. Evanston: Northwestern U. Press, 1973.
- von Hildebrand, D. The Art of Living. Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1966.
- von Hildebrand, D. Ethics. Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1953.
- von Hildebrand, D. Man and Woman. Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1965.
- von Hildebrand, D. Marriage. New York: Longmans, Green, 1942.

von Hildebrand, D. <u>Morality and Situation Ethics</u>. Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1966.

von Hildebrand, D. "The Role of Affectivity in Morality." <u>Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association</u>, Volume 32. Washington: The Catholic University of America, 1958: 85-95.

von Hildebrand, D. <u>Transformation in Christ</u>. New York: Helicon Press, 1948.

von Hildebrand, D. <u>Trojan Horse in the City of God</u>. Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1967.

SECTION B - INTERPRETATIVE SOURCES

- Boyle, J.P. <u>Faith and Community in the Ethical Theory of Karl Rahner</u> and Bernard Lonergan. Ph.D. Thesis. Fordham University, 1972.
- Boyle, J.P. "Lonergan's Method in Theology and Objectivity in Moral Theology." Thomist 37, 1973: 589-601.
- Braaten, C. <u>Eschatology and Ethics</u>. Minneapolis: Augsburg Pub. House, 1974.
- Collins, J.D. <u>The Existentialists: A Critical Study</u>. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1952.
- Conn, W.E. <u>Conscience and Self Transcendence</u>. Ph.D. Thesis. Columbia U. 1973.
- Crowe, F.E. "Complacency and Concern in the Thought of St. Thomas." Theol. Studies 20, 1959: 1-39, 198-230, 343-395.
- Crowe, F.E. "Early Jottings on Bernard Lonergan's Method in Theology." Sci. Esprit 25, 1973: 121-138.
- Crowe, F.E. "Spirit as Inquiry: Studies in Honour of Bernard Lonergan, S.J." <u>Continuum</u> 2, 1964: 305-352.
- Deeken, A. Process and Permanence in Ethics: Max Scheler's Moral Philosophy. New York: Paulist Press, 1974.
- Gardner, H. The Quest for Mind: Piaget, Levi-Strauss, and the Structuralist Movement. New York: Vintage Books, 1974.
- Geitz, W.A. $\underline{\text{Toward a Cognitive Theory of Ethics}}$. Ph.D. Thesis. U. of Rochester, 1974.
- Ginsburg, H. and Opper, S. <u>Piaget's Theory of Intellectual Development</u>. Engelwood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969.
- Frings, M. Max Scheler. Pittsburgh: Duquesne U. Press, 1965.
- Frings, M. "Insight Logos Love; Lonergan Heidegger Scheler." Philosophy Today 14, 1970: 106-115.
- Hartmann, W. "Max Scheler's Theory of Person." Philosophy Today XII (4) 1968: 246-261.
- Johnson, D. "Lonergan and the Redoing of Ethics." <u>Continuum</u> 5 1967 : 211-220.
- Lardner, M.D. The Notion of Person as Self-Transcendent in Bernard Lonergan's Philosophy. Ph.D. Thesis. Boston College, 1970.

- Lauer, J.Q. "The Phenomenological Ethics of Max Scheler." <u>Int. Phil.</u> Quarterly I 1961: 273-300.
- Liddy, R.M. Art and Feeling: An Analysis and Critique of the Philosophy of Art of Susanne K. Langer. Dissertation. Gregorium U. 1970.
- O'Brien, W.J. The Role of Judgment in Lonergan's Insight. Ph.D. Thesis. U. of Chicago, 1972.
- Marsh, J.L. "Lonergan's Mediation of Subjectivity and Objectivity." Modern Schoolmen 52 1974-1975 : 249-61.
- McShane, P., editor. <u>Foundations of Theology</u>. Notre Dame: U. of Notre Dame Press, 1971.
- McShane, P., editor, Language, Truth and Meaning. Notre Dame: U. of Notre Dame Press, 1972.
- Novak, M. "Bernard Lonergan: A New Approach to the Natural Law."

 <u>Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophic Association</u>. Catholic University of America Press: Washington, 1967: 246-49.
- Ranly, E.W. "Scheler on Man and Metaphysics." Philosophy Today IX 1965: 211-221.
- Rigali, N.J. "Human Experience and Moral Meaning." Chicago Studies 13 1974: 88-104.
- Roach, R.R. Fidelity: The Faith of Responsible Love. Ph.D. Thesis. Yale U., 1974.
- Ryan, W.F. "Intentionality in Edmund Husserl and Bernard Lonergan." Int. Phil. Quart. 13, 1973: 173-190.
- Sala, G. "The <u>A Priori</u> in Human Knowledge: Kant's <u>Critique of Pure Reason</u> and Lonergan's <u>Insight</u>". <u>The Thomist</u> XL, 1976 p.183.
- Savery, Louis, M. Integrating Values: Theory and Exercise for Clarifying and Integrating Religious Values. Dayton, Ohio: Pflaum Pub., 1974.
- Schlindler, D.L. "History, Objectivity, and Moral Conversion." The Thomist 37 1973: 569-88.
- Schultz, J.C. From Insight to Metaphysics: The Metaphysics of Bernard J.F. Lonergan's Insight. Ph.D. Thesis. U. of Notre Dame, 1972.
- Schwarz, B.V. The Human Person and the World of Values: A Tribute to Dietrich von Hildebrand. New York: Fordham U. Press, 1960.

Self, D.J. <u>Value Language and Objectivity: An Analysis in Philosophical Ethics</u>. Ph.D. Thesis. U. of North Carolina, 1974.

Spiegelberg, H. The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976. Two Volumes.

Tracy, D. The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan. New York: Herder and Herder, 1970.

Tuttle, H.N. Wilhelm Dilthey's Philosophy of Historical Understanding Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1969.

Wallraff, C.F. <u>Karl Jaspers: An Introduction to His Philosophy</u>. Princeton, N.J.,: Princeton U. Press, 1970.