

EPHESOS AFTER ALEXANDER

Socio-Political Transformations in Western Asia Minor during the Early Hellenistic Period

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ABSTRACT

The present study deals with the socio-political transformations in the city of Ephesos in the early Hellenistic period. It shows that during the tumultuous months after the death of Alexander the Great, the Ephesian community sought to re-establish internal and regional stability by appealing to the Macedonian Successors for support. This was achieved at the meeting of Ephesos in the summer of 322 BC, as attested by a detailed epigraphic study of a series of local inscriptions (I. Ephes. 1430-1437). The meeting addressed issues over Ionian democracy and privileges, as well as Macedonian *hegemonia*, in conformity with the precedents set by Alexander. Its successful conclusion saw Ephesos emerge as the leading and representative member of the Ionian *koinon*.

RÉSUMÉ

La présente étude a comme sujet les transformations sociopolitiques dans la cite d'Ephesos dans la haute période hellénistique. Elle montre que pendant les mois tumultueux après la mort d'Alexandre le Grand, la communauté d'Éphèse a cherché à rétablir la stabilité interne et régionale en appelant aux Successeurs Macédoniens. Ce but a été atteint lors de la réunion a Ephese pendant l'été de 322 av-JC, comme il est atteste par un étude épigraphique détaillé d'une série des inscriptions locales (I. Ephes. 1430-1437). La réunion a abordé des questions concernant la démocratie et privilèges Ioniennes, aussi que la *hegemonia* Macédonienne, en conformité avec les précédents mis pas Alexandre. Son succès a vu émerger Ephese en tant que membre dirigeant et représentant du *koinon* Ionienne.

ABBREVIATIONS

FGrH.	Jacoby, F. <i>Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker</i>
I. Ephes.	Keil, J. <i>Die Inschriften von Ephesos</i>
I. Eryth.	Engelmann H. and Merkelbach, R. <i>Die Inschriften von Erythrai</i>
I. Magn.	Kern, O. <i>Die Inschriften von Magnesia am Maeander</i>
I. Prien.	Hiller von Gaertingen, F. <i>Die Inschriften von Priene</i>
IG	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i>
ÖJI	<i>Jahresheften Österreichisches Archäologisches Institut</i>
RE	Pauly, A., Wissowa, G. and Kroll, W. <i>Realencyclopädie des classischen Altertumswissenschaft</i>
Tod	Tod, Marcus. <i>Greek Historical Inscriptions</i>
SIG	<i>Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum</i>

INTRODUCTION: AFTER ALEXANDER

No instance in antiquity has more vividly displayed the authority, charisma and significance of a single man as the moment of Alexander the Great's death in the afternoon of June 11, 323 BC. Plutarch recounts the scene:

Even so, having lost Alexander, his power gasped, struggled, and festered through the likes of Perdikkas, Meleagros, Seleukos, Antigonos, who, as it were, provided still a warm breath of life and blood that still pulsed and circulated. But at length as the host was wasting away and was perishing, it generated around itself maggots, as it were, of ignoble kings and of leaders in their last death-struggle.¹

This bitter and reproachful tone imposes an unfair verdict of failure, indecisiveness, and waste upon the centuries between Alexander's death until the advent of Rome.

Yet such a claim is an illusion supported by academia's retrospective standpoint that tends to ignore the resilient continuities and dynamic changes that molded the "Hellenistic" Age. Indeed, modern authors such as David Braund have claimed that Alexander imposed "a new world order" but had left the self-proclaimed *Diadochoi* with the burden to give it shape and meaning,² as they became involved in "a great funeral contest over him."³ But such an exclusive focus of historiography on "great people" who make "important decisions" of monumental consequences obscures the fact that beyond these lies a variegated array of smaller kingdoms, armies, and cities with distinct traditions, conditions and interests.

¹ Plut. *Mor.* 337A.

² David Braund, "After Alexander: The Emergence of the Hellenistic World, 323-281 BC". *A Companion to the Hellenistic World*. Ed. by Andrew Erskine, 19 (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2005).

³ Arr. *Anab.* 7.26.3.

The purpose of this study is to shift the focus from such a grand-scale survey approach and instead concentrate on specific local conditions and developments in order to evaluate how individual communities received and dealt with, in their own way, the demise of Alexander. Quintus Curtius reports that "the report of such great disaster was not contained within the city walls, but had spread through the region nearest to Babylon and from there through a great part of Asia on this side of the Euphrates."⁴ I will therefore adopt a case-study approach that I hope will assess the immediate impact of such news on a particular community most accurately.

The city of Ephesos in Western Asia Minor serves this purpose well: it was a very old *polis* with a history ingrained in Greek culture and identity. Moreover, Ephesos' strategic location and prosperous harbor made it a very influential presence in local and regional developments. Also, the local Artemision is a rare archaeological case that has provided historians with sufficient, although scanty epigraphic evidence that allows us to reconstruct the events and the regional socio-political transformations during the confusing months after the summer of 323 BC.

Lastly, the Ephesians developed a strong personal bond with Alexander the Great, which they exhibited as they showed their utmost consideration towards their liberator, benefactor, and protector. For this reason I will begin my thesis with a study of Alexander's advent in Western Asia Minor. I will focus mostly on the democratic restoration at the expense of the pro-Persian

⁴ Curt. 10.5.18.

oligarchs at Ephesos, while drawing attention to Alexander's role as the personal guarantor and benefactor of the city's democratic government. This will allow me to emphasize the importance of Alexander's reign by presenting his death as the catalyst for regional insecurity and confusion that threatened the socio-political cohesion and internal stability of Ephesos.

In the second chapter, I will provide a chronological reconstruction of the events taking place in Asia Minor from the death of Alexander up until the crossing of Krateros into Europe. I propose that the crossing was undertaken from the Ephesian harbor, and served as a unique opportunity for the Ephesian community to re-establish channels of interaction with the Macedonian *strategoi* in its efforts to maintain internal stability.

I have based my arguments on close readings of primary literary sources whose translations I have closely examined and in several critical instances also corrected, so as to provide a most accurate version of the historical narrative. The core of my thesis is constructed around epigraphic evidence. As a result, I have dedicated the third chapter to a detailed epigraphic study of the Artemision inscriptions which attest to an *ad-hoc* meeting of the Macedonians as a result of Krateros' return in the Aegean. Preliminary conclusions have led me to dispute the concept of a cohesive Macedonian empire, as regional commanders sought clarifications with regard to the Babylon Settlement and to their own positions. I further argue that the occasion allowed the Ephesian democrats to safeguard the support of the Macedonian generals for their government, as well as their continued devotion towards the temple of Artemis.

In exchange, the Ephesians offered pledges of loyalty in the wake of increasing anti-Macedonian sentiments in the Aegean, as all concerned parties deliberated and negotiated in a common effort for regional stability and continuity.

In the final chapter, I place the Ephesos meeting within the regional context in an attempt to determine the importance and implications that such an event would have had over the other Ionian communities. In the absence of direct evidence, I analyze regional conditions as determined by the precedent set by Alexander which limited, but at the same time facilitated the interaction between the *Diadochoi* and the Ionian *poleis*. Finally, I propose that the meeting in the summer of 322 BC was formative in shaping the interaction of the *Diadochoi vis-à-vis* the Greeks of Asia, as Ephesos emerged as the leading, representative member of the Ionian *koinon* by appealing to its historical and cultural prominence among its kinsmen.

CHAPTER I: THE LIBERATION OF EPHEOS

1.1. Ephesos and Alexander

Hellenic tradition claims that the birth of Alexander on the night of July 20th 356 BC coincided with the conflagration that destroyed the renowned Artemision at Ephesos, prompting contemporaries to remark that "the temple of Artemis was burned down because the goddess was busy bringing Alexander into the world."⁵ In retrospect, this convenient coincidence was interpreted as an omen that the Macedonian prince was destined for greatness. At the same time, the story was meant to emphasize the close relationship that Alexander would forge with Ephesos, not only as the protector of the Artemision, but also as the liberator of the *polis* from the Persian yoke.

Alexander's advent into Asia Minor as part of his grand eastern campaign was a culminating event in Ephesian history. Ephesos was already a very old city whose foundation was conventionally dated *illo tempore*, when it was first conquered by Kroisos. Soon after the defeat of the Lydian kingdom by Persia, "all the Ionians who stayed behind [...] faced the challenge of resisting Harpagos. These men fought courageously for their country. But they suffered defeat and conquest and then stayed in their cities, submitting to Persian rule."⁶ Nevertheless, Ephesos remained a traditionally Ionian Greek *polis* despite many decades of Persian domination, and its subsequent history would be defined by

⁵ Plut. *Alex.* 3.3.

⁶ Hdt. 1.169.

efforts to regain its long-lost *eleutheria*, most famously in 494 BC during the nearly-successful Ionian revolt.

The Ionians were finally liberated after Macedonian armies led by the young king Alexander invaded Asia Minor in 334 BC. Initially it had been his father Philip II who, having established his hegemony over Mainland Greece, "spread the word that he wanted to make war on the Persians on behalf of the Greeks."⁷ Philhellenic propaganda aside, a city like Ephesos would have played a very prominent role in Philip's campaign in the east primarily because of its strategic position and economic potential. Georges Le Rider has emphasized the fact that by the 330's BC, Ephesos possessed "the greatest port in Western Asia Minor"⁸, and was by far the most populous among the other Ionian coastal *poleis*.⁹ Its favorable position on the Aegean shore made it an important hub between Europe and Asia. This was mostly because it was well positioned on the only direct route connecting the Aegean Sea and the Kilikian Gates via Kelainai and Ikonion.¹⁰ This route was, in a sense, the spine of Asia Minor that made commerce, transit and communication through Anatolia very accessible, rendering Ephesos an important regional hub.

Delayed due to the assassination of Philip II in 336 BC, the Macedonian eastern campaign was immediately resumed after "the Greeks gathered together at the Isthmus, where they passed a vote to make an expedition against

⁷ Diod. 16.89.2.

⁸ Georges Le Rider, *Coinage, Finances, and Policy* (Philadelphia, PA: American Philosophical Society), 81.

⁹ According to Bailey's calculations mainly based on Beloch's numbers, Ephesos' population was somewhere around 20.000-25.000 citizens. Colin Bailey, *The Gerousia of Ephesus* (British Columbia, Canada: University of British Columbia, 2006), 83.

¹⁰ Richard Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1990), 45.

Persia with Alexander, and he was proclaimed their leader."¹¹ More importantly, the liberation of the Ionians remained the avowed purpose of Alexander. Indeed, "he particularly benefited (ἐνεργέτει) the Greek cities, making them autonomous and free from taxation, adding the assurance that he had taken upon himself the war against the Persians on behalf of the freedom of the Greeks."¹²

Yet, as A. B. Bosworth points out, "liberated they might be, but the Greeks of Asia Minor were in conquered territory and Alexander did not renounce the rights of victory [as] he dictated the terms he pleased as despot and victor, and the process was wholly unilateral."¹³ While Arrian remarks that "and if indeed at any time, Alexander won a high reputation for the things accomplished in Ephesos on that occasion,"¹⁴ the Ephesian democrats knew quite well where they stood when dealing with their "liberator". According to Strabo, "[Alexander] promised the Ephesians to pay all expenses, both past and future," needed for the rebuilding of the temple of Artemis which had still not been completed since the great fire "on condition that he should have the credit therefore on the inscription." To his surprise, however, "the Ephesians were unwilling to do this," but because it was difficult to refuse anything that Alexander asked, they resorted to flattery and said that "it was not appropriate for a god to dedicate offerings to gods."¹⁵ A. J. Heisserer considers this a ploy by

¹¹ Plut. *Alex.* 14.1.

¹² Diod. 17.24.1.

¹³ A. B. Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire* (Bath, England: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 251.

¹⁴ Arr. *Anab.* 1.17.12.

¹⁵ Strab. 14.1.22.

Alexander to gain extra honour, while aiming for the tacit acknowledgement by the Ephesians that they were doubly indebted to him.¹⁶

This passage also hints at the Ephesians' continuing efforts to further their own interests given the circumstances, as the intricate language of negotiation became essential in establishing their position vis-à-vis the young conqueror while still trying to maintain the appearance of *autonomia*. Nevertheless, Alexander was recognized as the restorer of Ephesian democracy, as well as a benefactor towards the Artemision. He increased the sacred *temenos* of the temple after learning that "by a concession of Herakles, since he had control over Lydia, the sacred precinct of the temple had been increased."¹⁷

Under the circumstances, news of Alexander's death carried great significance for Ephesos because the city was suddenly faced with a practical dilemma which, in turn, bred uncertainty as the city's political regime was thrown into confusion. The problem was that Ephesos had negotiated its situation with Alexander personally. Indeed, Arrian records how, after his victory at the Granikos River in 334 BC, "Alexander reached Ephesos on the fourth day, restored the exiles who had been turned out of the city on his account, and after destroying the oligarchy he established a democracy; he also ordered them to contribute to Artemis the taxes they had been paying to the barbarians."¹⁸ Michele Faraguna takes this as typical of Alexander given that

¹⁶ A. J. Heisserer, *Alexander the Great and the Greeks* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1980), 157.

¹⁷ Tac. *Ann.* 3.61. Herakles was the fabled ruler of Lydia and was supposedly also Alexander's ancestor on his mother's side, Olympias from Thrace. Alexander's gesture was highly symbolic as he sought to emulate his ancestor in order to gain personal prestige.

¹⁸ Arr. *Anab.* 1.17.10. We shall return to this episode in subsequent chapters.

"the king proceeded on an *ad hoc* basis", proposing that "each city therefore needs to be analyzed as an individual case."¹⁹ There was, in fact, no consistent policy upon which the Ephesians could proceed in their public and foreign affairs. With Alexander gone, however, privileges and, more importantly, democratic authority could be challenged as no longer binding; an unpleasant situation for a community to be in, given the circumstances.

Therefore, in order to piece together and understand the actions of the Ephesians in the context of Alexander's death, we must first analyze Alexander's actions towards Ephesos and understand his impact upon the Ionian community. To do this, we will focus on the full implications of Ephesian democracy and its potential effects on the socio-political stability of Ephesos, given the complex circumstances before, during and, most importantly, after the reign of Alexander the Great.

1.2. Ephesian Democracy

Alexander arrived at Ephesos at a time when internal factional tensions had already taken their toll on the Ephesian population. His first actions were, as we have seen, to establish a democracy and to restore those exiled by the oligarchic faction during recent upheavals in the city. These exiles were undoubtedly part of the pro-Macedonian faction which had supported the democratic movement a few years earlier. At that time Philip II "opened the war

¹⁹ Michele Faraguna, "Alexander and the Greeks," *Brill's Companion to Alexander the Great* Ed. Joseph Roisman, 109 (Boston, MS: Brill, 2003).

with Persia by sending into Asia as an advance party Attalos and Parmenion, assigning to them a part of his forces and ordering them to liberate the Greek cities."²⁰ The success of this force culminated with the "liberation" of Ephesos in the summer of 336 BC.

The result was immediate, as the Ephesians showed their recognition by erecting a statue of Philip II within the temple of Artemis. Moreover, Diodorus Siculus reports that on the fateful day of the Aegae games:²¹

[Philip II] wanted as many Greeks as possible to take part in the festivities in honour of the gods [...]. Out of all Greece he summoned his personal guest-friends and ordered the members of his court to bring along as many as they could of their acquaintances from abroad.²²

There is no clear evidence that Ephesian democratic delegates were present at the festivities, but we may surmise that their presence would have profited both parties. On the one hand, the presence of the liberated Ionians was an excellent *coup d'image* on Philip's part, since "he was very determined to be thought well by the Greeks and to respond with appropriate entertainment to the honours conferred upon him when he was appointed to the supreme command."²³ On the other hand, the Ephesian democrats would have undoubtedly profited from such an affiliation aimed at strengthening their position to the detriment of their pro-Persian oligarchic opponents.

²⁰ Diod. 16.91.1.

²¹ The day was meant to celebrate the marriage of his daughter Kleopatra to Alexander, king of Epiros, but instead it is remembered as the day when Philip II was assassinated in 336 BC.

²² Diod. 16.91.4-5.

²³ Diod. 16.91.6

But after the Persian *strategos* Memnon of Rhodos²⁴ received the authority to deal with the invading threat, the Macedonian advance force was pushed all the way back to the Hellespont by 334 BC. This situation was certainly exacerbated by news of Philip's assassination. The result of this unexpected and rapid turn of events was an oligarchic counter-revolution at Ephesos, "[qui] a permis à certains de régler des comptes."²⁵ Its consequences may be inferred from Arrian's report of what took place after Alexander's re-imposition of the democracy soon after:

The Ephesian populace, relieved from fear of the oligarchs, rushed to kill those who had been calling in Memnon, those who had plundered the temple of Artemis, and those who threw down the statue of Philip in the temple and dug up the tomb of Heropythes, the liberator of the city, in the market-place.²⁶

Those who had been recently exiled by the oligarchs supported by Memnon now held the upper hand and they proceeded to inflict damage upon their earlier persecutors. Arrian explains: "Syrphax, his son Pelagon, and the sons of the brothers of Syrphax were pulled out of the temple and stoned."²⁷ Arrian describes the beginning of mob violence which Alexander managed to put an end to, only after "[he] prevented further inquiry or punishment, knowing that once permission was given the people would put to death innocent men along with the guilty, from private hatred or in order to seize their property."²⁸

²⁴ Memnon was a landholder in the Troad, and an intimate and relative by marriage of the Persian noble Artabazos. Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, 34.

²⁵ Pierre Debord, "Stratifications Sociales en Asie Mineure Occidentale." *Sociétés Urbaines, Sociétés Rurales dans l'Asie Mineure et la Syrie Hellénistiques et Romaines*, 36 (Strasbourg, France: AECS, 1987).

²⁶ Arr. *Anab.* 1.17.11.

²⁷ Arr. *Anab.* 1.17.12.

²⁸ Arr. *Anab.* 1.17.12.

Stasis was averted, but such tensions would surely have persisted. As a matter of fact, democracy was only safely in place while Alexander was physically present at Ephesos. His imposed amnesty has been catalogued by Richard Billows as "benevolent despotism", basically forcing the oligarchic faction to accept their democratic opponents as "the backbone of the new government."²⁹ There was in fact no effort on Alexander's part to alleviate such tensions, by exiling the oligarchs, for example. In a way, he did not need to do so because his word was to be accepted as law and no one in Ephesos was in a position to question it, especially after Spithrobates, the satrap of Ionia, had been killed at the Granikos by Alexander himself in hand-to-hand combat.³⁰

In the long run, however, this volcanic situation was always bound to erupt. Indeed, soon after Alexander's departure, his recent conquests were already threatened by the Persian fleet under the command of the same Memnon of Rhodes who "sought to divert the war into Macedonia and Greece."³¹ By 333 BC, Chios had surrendered due to their pro-Persian oligarchs, as well as most of Lesbos, with the exception of Mytilene. According to Diodorus Siculus, "news of the general's activity spread like wildfire and most of the Kyklades sent missions to him."³²

We can only imagine how much unrest these developments created in Ephesos, since the city was literally at the geographic core of the hostilities as alliances constantly shifted. There are no reports describing the internal

²⁹ Billows, *Conquest and Empire*, 45.

³⁰ Diod. 17.20.1-6.

³¹ Arr. *Anab.* 2.1.1.

³² Diod. 17.29.3.

situation at Ephesos, but given that pro-Persian oligarchs still resided in the city supposedly unharmed, we may surmise that they were eager for revolution provided that the right opportunity appeared. Alexander's reaction was prompt:

He gave Amphoteros command of the fleet at the shore of the Hellespont and Hegelochos of the land forces, in order that these officers might free Lesbos, Chios and Cos from the enemies' garrisons. To them 500 talents were given for the expenses of war, and to Antipatros and those who were defending the Greek cities 600 talents were sent.³³

Bosworth interprets this as "tacitly admitting a military blunder" after the Macedonian king had earlier disbanded his fleet, thus "[he] had given [the Persians] virtually *carte blanche*."³⁴ Indeed, Alexandrian cities such as Tenedos in north-western Asia Minor had been lost to the Persians during this tumultuous situation "since Hegelochos, who had received orders from Alexander to re-assemble a fleet, had not raised a force sufficient to make them expect any speedy help from him."³⁵

In the end, however, the Persian counter-offensive came to a halt when Memnon died of illness while besieging Mytilene. Nevertheless, it may be conjectured that during such fragile and hostile times, the democrats of Ephesos must have felt that their position was in no way secure with Alexander farther and farther away and with the Persian fleet roaming around the Aegean coast. As mentioned earlier, Memnon had been called at Ephesos just a year before to reinstate the oligarchy loyal to the King of Kings. Local stability in the city, then, rested on the Persian fleet's success which, fortunately for the democratic pro-

³³ Curt. 3.1.19-20.

³⁴ Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, 47.

³⁵ Arr. *Anab.* 2.2.3. Arrian puts Hegelochos as head of the second fleet instead of Amphoteros, as Curtius suggests.

Macedonian faction, soon stalled as Darius III decided to abandon his naval initiative and instead pool his troops for one decisive land encounter against Alexander's smaller army.³⁶

This time, Alexander seems to have learned his lesson and as he was advancing through southern Asia Minor, he left behind Nearchos of Crete as "satrap of Lykia and the country bordering on Lykia as far as Mount Tauros."³⁷ Nearchos was childhood friends with Alexander and a very prominent member of his entourage. Given that he was later known to be a very skilled admiral, his appointment was probably meant to counteract the potential threat from the remaining Persian fleet. Not much has been recorded about Nearchos' specific duties and undertakings in and around Asia Minor, but an inscription from Ephesos may offer valuable clues. Its fragmented text states:

... to the Macedonian from Amphipolis who is a benefactor of the city to
give citizenship in equal and like manner to him and to his
descendants ...³⁸

Unfortunately, the inscription cannot be precisely dated due to lack of material information, which is probably why no modern scholar has chosen to discuss it. However, the few details that we do possess suggest that the Macedonian from Amphipolis mentioned here is indeed Nearchos the admiral.

Although originally from Crete, Nearchos had his residence in Amphipolis, where his family had settled during the reign of Philip II.³⁹ Also, the arrangement of the inscriptions on the wall of the Artemision suggests that this

³⁶ Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, 53.

³⁷ Arr. *Anab.* 3.6.6.

³⁸ I. Ephes. 1429.

³⁹ Arr. *Ind.* 18.4.

inscription was published no later than 323/322 BC.⁴⁰ Moreover, the Macedonians mentioned in the Artemision inscriptions could not have been honoured at Ephesos before 334 BC since they were not initially part of Philip II's spearhead campaign in 336 BC. They arrived to Asia Minor while accompanying Alexander in his eastern campaign. Therefore, the inscription seems to date from sometime during Alexander's reign in the East.

Finally, we know of only four prominent Macedonians from Amphipolis that took part in Alexander's eastern campaign. Two of them were the sons of Larichos, Erigyios and Laomedon. They were both prominent in Alexander's entourage, they had been exiled together with Alexander over the Pixodaros affair,⁴¹ and both later followed Alexander east, deep into central and eastern Asia.⁴² The third Amphipolitanean was Androstenes son of Kallistratos, originally from Thasos but settled by Philip II at Amphipolis.⁴³ We learn from Strabo that he also continued to follow Alexander into central Asia, sailing around the Persian Gulf.⁴⁴ Therefore, Nearchos was the only Macedonian from Amphipolis who was left behind in Asia Minor and played some role in regional affairs.

⁴⁰ The Artemision inscriptions will be analyzed in detail and more precisely dated in Chapter 3.

⁴¹ Pixodaros was the Persian satrap of Karia who attempted to marry his daughter to Alexander for diplomatic reasons. The secret negotiations were uncovered by Philip II and, fearing dynastic complications, the Macedonian put an end to the negotiations. In the aftermath of this incident, Philip II banished five of Alexander's companions: Ptolemaios, Harpalos, Nearchos, Erigyios and Laomedon. All five friends of Alexander were later raised to high positions in his entourage. Paul Cartledge, *Alexander the Great: The Hunt for a New Past* (Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press, 2004), 95.

⁴² Waldemar Heckel, *The Marshals of Alexander's Empire* (New York, NY: Routledge, 1992), 209-211. The two brothers were naturalized Macedonians. Erigyos died at Sogdiana in 328-327.

⁴³ Arr. *Ind.* 18.4, FGrH 133 F1. At Triparadeisos, Laomedon is confirmed as satrap of Syria. We last hear of him as an exile to Alketas in Karia, after escaping Ptolemaios' ploy to kill him and capture Syria. He may have perished soon after at Kretopolis along with Alketas in 319 BC. Heckel, *Who's Who*, 146.

⁴⁴ Strab. 16.3.2 and Waldemar Heckel, *Who's Who in the Age of Alexander the Great* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 29.

If this interpretation is correct, it is plausible that the inscription was erected during the late 330's BC in honour of Nearchos, given that by 329 BC the admiral was operating in Eastern and Central Asia at Alexander's orders. Afterwards, we next hear of him much later in 317/6 BC at Antigonos' side in the territory of the Kossaians, far from Ephesos.⁴⁵ It is thus tempting to interpret his role as 'benefactor' as having to do with increased regional security. Along the same lines, the dedication implies public pro-Macedonian Ephesian sentiments promoted by the democratic government in place at the time, whose interest was to maintain Macedonian support.

1.3. Regional Stability

The domestic situation at Ephesos seems to have stabilized only after Alexander's decisive victory at Gaugamela in 331 BC and the subsequent death of Darius III, which coincided with the fall of the Achaemenid Empire. Until that time, however, western Asia Minor experienced further disturbances even after the Macedonian defeat of Darius III himself at Issos in 333 BC. Despite the historiographic trend to focus on Alexander's exploits and advance, we must not forget that there were serious Persian efforts to retake the territory lost to Alexander, meant to isolate the young king into submission.⁴⁶ Just as after Granikos, "the generals of Darius who had survived the battle of Issos, and all the force that had followed them in their flight, with the addition of vigorous

⁴⁵ Heckel, *Marshals*, 229 and Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed*, 408.

⁴⁶ Surprisingly, as opposed to Billows, Burn and Briant, Bosworth does not discuss these developments.

young soldiers of the Kappadokians and Paphlagonians, were trying to recover Lydia."⁴⁷

Ephesos was thus once again threatened by the Persian resurgence, just as it had been twice before. Alexander was already in Phoinikia, undertaking the painstaking siege of Tyre and the situation seems to have been more problematic than thought because once again the Persian effort met with supporters in various places. For instance, the mention of the Paphlagonian contingent in the Persian army has been taken as evidence that the Persians had temporarily taken over Paphlagonia from the Macedonian satrap Kalas.⁴⁸ Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that some of the Greek *poleis* joined the Persian effort or were coerced into it. Curtius even specifies that "these same Greeks a short time before had been listening for the breeze of uncertain report, with the intention of following whithersoever Fortune should lead their wavering minds."⁴⁹ This is revelatory of the complicated situation in Asia Minor as individual communities constantly weighed their options and chose, or were forced to choose, whatever seemed to them more readily profitable. For example, Antigonos was left behind as satrap of Phrygia in order to deal with the heavily fortified citadel of Kelainai "[which] sent envoys to Alexander, offering, in case [Persian] help did not come to them on a day previously appointed [...], to surrender their position."⁵⁰

⁴⁷ Curt. 4.1.34.

⁴⁸ Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed*, 44.

⁴⁹ Curt. 4.5.12.

⁵⁰ Arr. *Anab.* 1.29.2.

Coercion, then, was a double-edged blade since both sides could use it to gain supporters for their cause. It was a problem that Alexander and his satraps had to constantly deal with. Indeed, they were actively implicated in stomping out pockets of Persian resistance especially in the context of this new Persian resurgence:

Not only did the King himself proceed against the cities which still rejected the yoke of his rule, but his generals also, distinguished leaders, invaded many places: Kalas Paphlagonia, Antigonos Lykaonia; Balakros, having vanquished Hydarnes, Darius' satrap, recovered Miletos.⁵¹

This passage discloses the reality of Macedonian (re)conquest in the context of an unstable and fragmented system of alliances that needed to be constantly supervised and, if need be, reasserted, as individual members negotiated their allegiance based on what was more profitable or, rather, what was potentially less threatening. Under these circumstances, the seemingly insidious actions of a *polis* such as Miletos whom Alexander and his representatives had to force into accepting his sovereignty more than once, are characteristic of a community with a pro-Persian faction in the city and a renewed Persian counter-attack; 'loyalty' and 'liberation' are more interest-driven concepts than the literary sources would have us believe.

Ephesos' interests lay with the Macedonians since the democratic faction restored to power by Alexander was surely concerned with retaining its position of prominence. Luckily for them, "Antigonos, praetor Alexandri, Lydiae praeerat."⁵² Some translators such as John Rolfe have presented this phrase as

⁵¹ Curt. 4.5.13.

⁵² Curt. 4.1.35.

"the governor of Lydia was Antigonos, one of Alexander's generals." This raises several issues because, as has been pointed out earlier, Arrian places Antigonos as satrap of Phrygia. W. W. Tarn and A. R. Burn have interpreted this as a clumsy mistake on the part of Curtius, confusing Phrygia with Lydia.⁵³ Pierre Briant believes instead that "ce territoire correspondait également à la Lydie de Crésus, dont l'Halys marquait la frontière orientale."⁵⁴ Even if this theory is unlikely, Richard Billows nonetheless agrees with Briant that "Antigonos was given supreme command over all of western Asia Minor in order to deal with this emergency, which threatened the entire Macedonian position, in Asia Minor and beyond."⁵⁵

The problem is in fact a matter of translation. The verb *praeerat* (from *praesum*) does in some cases mean that "he was governor" but in this context a more general meaning "he was presiding, he was in charge of, he was in control of" might be more appropriate, since the statements of Arrian and Curtius are not mutually exclusive. Moreover, *praeerat* might even be taken in the sense of "he was defending, he was protecting", meaning literally that when the Persian threat presented itself, Antigonos protected Lydia from being taken over since "he was at hand" with a considerable land force.⁵⁶ Indeed, Curtius further states that "[he] scorned the barbarians and led his forces out to battle. [...] in three

⁵³ Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed*, 43 and A. R. Burn, "Note on Alexander's Campaigns, 332-330," *JHS* 72, 81-84 (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1952).

⁵⁴ Pierre Briant, *Antigone le Borgne* (Paris, France: Les Belles Lettres, 1973), 65.

⁵⁵ Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed*, 44.

⁵⁶ A. Ernout and A. Meillet, *Dictionnaire Étymologique de la Langue Latine* (3rd Edition. Paris, France: Klincksieck, 1951), 1174-1175, s.v. "praesum". A similar interpretation is provided by Michiel de Vann, *Etymological Dictionary of Latin* (Boston, MA: Brill, 2008), 599, s.v. "sum, esse".

battles fought in one region and another the Persians were defeated."⁵⁷ Antigonos thus seems to have broken the Persian impetus and pushed the enemy back. Alternatively, "at the same time a fleet of the Macedonians, which had been summoned from Greece, defeated Aristomenes, who had been sent by Darius to recover the coast of the Hellespont, and captured or sank his ships."⁵⁸ It is in this context that the Macedonian initiative against the last remaining pro-Persian elements in the area must be interpreted when "[Alexander's] generals also, distinguished leaders, invaded many places."⁵⁹

As a result, Ephesos remained under Macedonian control. Alexander's strategy was finally paying off and as he victoriously advanced, we hear of no further Persian threats in Asia Minor. After the fall of the Achaemenid Empire, no contender was left to seriously challenge the supremacy of Alexander and of his appointed satraps. Significantly, it is only after the capture of Bessos that Nearchos was recalled from Lycia in 329/8 BC, having been asked to provide further military support for Alexander's eastern expedition where his naval skills would likewise prove to be very useful.⁶⁰ It has been suggested that Antigonos was left behind as superintendant of Lycia and Pamphylia in Nearchos' stead. Thus, "perhaps as a result of his successes [Antigonos] was in command of some two-thirds of the Macedonian-held portion of Asia Minor."⁶¹

⁵⁷ Curt. 4.1.35.

⁵⁸ Curt. 4.1.36. Nearchos was possibly the Macedonian admiral who defeated Aristomenes. See I. Ephes. 1429 above.

⁵⁹ Curt. 4.5.13.

⁶⁰ Arr. *Anab.* 4.7.2.

⁶¹ Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed*, 46.

Under these circumstances, an oligarchic revolution at Ephesos was now virtually impossible. After the battle of Gaugamela, upon his proclamation as king of Asia, Alexander wrote to the Greeks that "all their tyrannies were abolished and they might live under their own laws."⁶² Pacification was finally achieved in Asia Minor. And as Alexander had demonstrated on a number of occasions before and would continue to do so, his word was law, while satraps such as Antigonos were on location to make sure that this was the case.⁶³

1.4. The Exiles' Decree

In the few years after, while Alexander was campaigning far off in Central-East Asia we know nothing specific about Ephesos, as the Greek situation became a secondary, even tertiary, priority for the King. However, Alexander marked his return in Babylon in 324 BC with a sudden reappraisal of his position vis-à-vis the Greeks. This came in the form of the so-called Exiles' Decree announced at the Olympic Games in the summer of that same year. According to Diodorus Siculus, its text proclaimed the following:

King Alexander to the exiles from the Greek cities. We have not been responsible for your exile, but we shall be the cause of your return to your own native cities; save for those who are under a curse. We have written to Antipatros about this to the end that if any cities are not willing to restore you, he may constrain them.⁶⁴

The tone of the proclamation is immediately striking, "point[ing] to the hegemonic voice that permitted an exchange of information without any

⁶² Plut. *Alex.* 34.2.

⁶³ Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, 257.

⁶⁴ Diod. 18.8.3-4.

meeting of the *synhedrion*."⁶⁵ Indeed, the decree heralded the dissolution of the Corinthian League as Alexander presented his new role as King of Asia and Ruler of all the Greeks.⁶⁶ This is also evident in many decrees from various cities struggling with the implementation of the exiles' return as a result of Alexander's authoritative proclamation. One particularly telling example is the inscribed *diagramma* of Alexander to the Chians:

In the term of Deisitheos as *prytanis*; from King Alexander to [the] *demos* of the Chians. All the exiles from Chios are to return; the form of government in Chios is to be *demos*. Law-drafters are to be chosen, who shall draft and revise the laws, in order that nothing may be contrary to the democracy or the return of the exiles; the results of the revision and drafting are to be referred to Alexander.⁶⁷

A closer look at the clauses of the Exiles' Decree reveals the complex character of its composition. For instance, the fact that Alexander does not take responsibility for the initial expulsions serves a dual purpose. On the one hand, Alexander made it clear that "he was restoring those persons expelled before his accession and by actions other than his own."⁶⁸ On the other hand, those exiled as a result of the Macedonian crossing into Asia and the "liberation" of the Greeks from Asia Minor were not covered by the decree.

Diodorus Siculus argues that Alexander took this decision "partly for the sake of gaining fame, and partly wishing to have in each city many devoted personal followers to counter the revolutions and seditions of the Greeks."⁶⁹ For Michele Faraguna, "it is conceivable that Alexander was now firmly determined

⁶⁵ Elisabetta Poddighe, "Alexander & the Greeks: The Corinthian League". *Alexander the Great, A New History*, Ed. Waldemar Heckel and Lawrence Tritle, 117 (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009).

⁶⁶ Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, 223, Poddighe, 117.

⁶⁷ Tod, 192.

⁶⁸ Tod, 224.

⁶⁹ Diod. 18.8.2.

to solve the problem of instability and disaffection in Greece at the root, regardless of the consequences in the short term."⁷⁰ Indeed, in some parts of Greece such as Athens and Sparta, Macedonian resentment was naturally still very strong. According to Bosworth, the restoration of tens of thousands of exiles would force local governments "[to] have their hands too full with domestic problems to plan or support any military uprising."⁷¹ There might be some truth in this claim given that even in cities such as Ephesos whose restored democratic government had remained loyally in place, there were still members of the former oligarchy whose muted resentment continued to play a role domestically.

Curtius describes the aftermath of the decree: "the Greeks, not daring to disregard his order, although they thought that it was the beginning of the breakdown of their laws, resolved to restore even to those who were condemned such of their property as was left."⁷² This order was in fact the first officially sanctioned decision from Alexander that would cover the entire Greek world under his control. Previously, each city had negotiated its position individually on an *ad hoc* basis. And given its comprehensive character, Elisabetta Poddighe has argued that the decree came with a very detailed *diagramma* with procedural guidelines.⁷³ Despite Curtius' claim, however, some Greeks were loud supporters of the decree:

⁷⁰ Faraguna, 126.

⁷¹ Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, 223.

⁷² Curt. 10.2.5.

⁷³ Poddighe, 118. Her claim is based on a fragment of Hypereides about "the orders he had had brought with him from Alexander, concerning both the exiles and the ... of the general congresses of Achaians and Arkadians and Boiotians ..." (Hyper. Dem. 18) There is, however, no

When the herald announced this, the crowd showed its approval with loud applause; for those at the festival welcomed the favour of the king with cries of joy, and repaid his good deed with praises. And all the exiles had come together at the festival, being more than twenty thousand in number.⁷⁴

The Ephesians, who were surely represented at the Games, were among those who welcomed the proclamation because the implications of the Exiles' Decree were enormous. On the one hand, Alexander made it explicitly clear that "we have not been the reason for your exile."⁷⁵ Therefore, "Alexander did not consider the people he had exiled as covered by the Decree; he was restoring those persons expelled before his accession and by actions other than his own."⁷⁶

As a result, this clause served as official acknowledgement of the authority of the democratic government already in place after being restored by Alexander back in 334 BC. By extension, any attempted constitutional change would have been officially condemned and subsequently reprimanded. Moreover, one may argue that the *atimia* clause in the Exiles' Decree excluding "those who are under a curse"⁷⁷, officially condemned "those who had plundered the temple of Artemis, and those who threw down the statue of Philip in the temple and dug up the tomb of Heropythes, the liberator of the

evidence suggesting that Hypereides directly referred to clear clauses from the Exiles' Decree or to some "second rescript". His comment might have been a personal inference that was clear to everyone, based on Alexander's emphasis on and exclusive recognition of individual *poleis*. Therefore, a more detailed *diagramma* would not have been necessary given that Alexander concisely and cleverly covered this clause in the initial proclamation.

⁷⁴ Diod. 18.8.5.

⁷⁵ Diod. 18.8.4.

⁷⁶ Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, 224.

⁷⁷ Diod. 18.8.3.

city, in the market-place."⁷⁸ This would have permanently damaged the former Ephesian oligarchs' position, *de facto* expelling them from public life.

Given these circumstances, the Ephesian democrats were greatly in favour of Alexander's proclamation. This is made clear by a decree in honour of Nikanor of Stageira published at the initiative of the democratic government. It states as follows:

Resolved by the council and the people: a certain someone proposed: concerning Nikanor of Aristotle of Stageira: a certain someone proposed: because Nikanor of Aristotle of Stageira -- of the King -- [[]] to be offered to him citizenship in equal and like manner, and freedom from taxation for import and export of the things which he might come in possession.⁷⁹

There are good reasons to connect this inscription with the Exile's Decree. Nikanor of Stageira, the adopted son of Aristotle the Philosopher, had been sent by Alexander sometime in May 324 BC from Susa, tasked with delivering the proclamation at Olympia. During his trip westward his mission was made public, sparking fierce debate and also consternation.⁸⁰ Therefore, we may assume two moments when this decree was voted: either before Nikanor's crossing into Europe from Asia Minor, maybe from Ephesos, or after the official proclamation in the summer.

The democratic faction thus seized this opportunity to show its appreciation and celebrate Nikanor's mission. Yet at the same time, they were well aware of the tenuous relation between the Exiles' Decree - in spite of its

⁷⁸ Arr. *Anab.* 1.17.11. This incident, as mentioned before, had taken place after Philip II's spearhead campaign in Asia Minor, following a successful Persian counter-offensive led by Memnon of Rhodes.

⁷⁹ I. Ephes. 2011.

⁸⁰ Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, 221.

benefits - and the publicly celebrated "autonomy" of the city. This is evident from the tone of the Nikanor decree:

The priests are to assign him by lot into a tribe and a Thousand, so that all may see that the community of the Ephesians rewards those who are zealous with regard for deeds on its account with honorable gifts. The allotted tribe -- the Thousand --⁸¹

By emphasizing the central role of the Ephesian community as the catalyst for honouring Nikanor and by extension his King, the Ephesian democrats deliberately presented the Exiles' Decree not as an authoritarian command, but rather as a benefaction brought about by the zeal and concern of Alexander towards his liberated "allies". Given the complex circumstances, the Ephesians attempted to preserve their claims of *autonomia* by referring to the community's initiative and authority in bestowing such honours in order to show continued support for Alexander that could translate in future benefits towards Ephesos.

Beyond the rhetoric, however, practical mechanics required a considerable period of time for the implementation of such an extensive law, since restoration came with the restitution of the exile's confiscated property. This could lead to serious administrative issues - some exiles had been expelled more than a generation earlier, while some 'property' could comprise of an entire city.⁸² Restoration was met with a fired reaction. It seems that even Ephesos did not remain unaffected by sparking tensions following the Exiles' Decree despite its overwhelming support. In his *Stratagemata*, Polyainos reports that,

⁸¹ I. Ephes. 2011, ll. 6-10.

⁸² Faraguna, 124-125. Athens, and the Aetolians were most affected by the decree. Athens had established a cleruchy in Samos back in 365 BC, while the latter had seized Acharnanian Oeniadae and banished its inhabitants.

Anaxagoras, Kodros, and Diodoros, sons of Echeanax, killed Hegesias, the tyrant of Ephesos. When Philoxenos, king Alexander's *hyparchos* of Ionia, asked the Ephesians to surrender the men and they refused, he brought an armed force into the city, arrested the three men, and sent them chained in collars to the citadel in Sardeis.⁸³

The existence of a tyrant at around this time is improbable given that the city was technically a democracy, while Bosworth has conjectured that "Hegesias may simply have been the dominant personality of Ephesos, a political boss who could impose his will on the city's democratic institutions."⁸⁴ Whatever stood at the core of the argument, the military intervention of Philoxenos "was a violation of sovereignty"⁸⁵, hence the Ephesians' initial refusal to give up the three brothers.

Despite their earlier efforts to maintain some advantage in its interaction with the King as an autonomous community, it was now clear to the Ephesians that "there was now not even lip service to the concept of autonomy. Alexander simply imposed his will by *fiat*"⁸⁶: the three brothers were to be trialed before Alexander himself. To the democrats, this smacked of 'tyranny', thus possibly alienating some of Alexander's supporters given that he no longer referred to the language of negotiation formerly in place. The trial never occurred, however, because the King soon died and the entire dynamic of authority changed dramatically.⁸⁷ But the episode would have been a sobering realization for the Ephesians concerning the shifting nature of the negotiation of power between *polis* and *basileus*. As we shall see in the next chapters, such

⁸³ Poly. 6.49.1-11.

⁸⁴ Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, 257.

⁸⁵ Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, 257.

⁸⁶ Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, 228.

⁸⁷ Poly. 9.49.19-20.

awareness would play an important role in Ephesos' future negotiations with Alexander's *Diadochoi*.

1.5. The Babylon Settlement

The Exiles' Decree announced a complete overhaul of the socio-political situation in the Aegean world because the blatant revival of kingship changed the relationship between *poleis* and King. Alexander was no longer their 'elected leader' by the now-defunct Corinthian League, but their supreme ruler. For cities like Ephesos, however, this was not an unprecedented situation since "many Greek cities, such as those in Asia Minor, had long cohabited with monarchical regimes such as Lydia and Persia, sometimes paying tribute."⁸⁸ At the same time, as we have already seen, the Hegesias incident shows that they were unwilling to entirely relinquish their 'liberated' status and the privileges previously bestowed upon them by Alexander himself and reaffirmed sometime after Gaugamela. The Ephesians were well aware of their position of dependence towards Alexander since he had first landed in Asia Minor, but his increasingly despotic attitude in recent months had disrupted their earlier relationship of interdependence. The early interdependence had brought them them privileges such as the redirection of the tribute towards the Artemision, their status as autonomous (if only for the sake of appearances) and democratic government. These benefits were now imperiled by Alexander's autocratic tone.

⁸⁸ Graham Shipley, *The Greek World After Alexander* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2000), 59.

News of Alexander the Great's death in June 323 BC, however, created an even bigger shock and presaged even bigger problems. Despite the fact that the Decree had been proclaimed ten months before, in reality its clauses had not been firmly established since they created particular problems for individual communities. Ancient authors mention how there was a great wave of diplomatic embassies from many *poleis* to their King, some from "those who wished to present arguments against receiving back the exiles."⁸⁹ Thus, the Greeks sought one of two things: clarification and negotiation with regard to the procedural implementation of the Decree; or at least to delay the unavoidable and unpleasant outcome of restorations as much as possible. Indeed, it proved to be "too short a time for the exiles to be returned, re-established and entrenched as [Alexander's] loyal supporters."⁹⁰

Without Alexander the status of the Exiles' Decree was suddenly ambiguous since its authority came directly from "King Alexander to the exiles from the Greek cities."⁹¹ This created a very serious dilemma for the Ephesians because without the Decree and with the patron of their democracy gone, the socio-political environment was vulnerable to change. The democratic government would naturally seek to maintain their position, while the oligarchic faction, whether at home or abroad, could use this moment as an opportunity to regain former prominence, albeit without the aid of their former Persian patron.

⁸⁹ Diod. 17.113.3.

⁹⁰ Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, 227.

⁹¹ Diod. 18.8.3.

Ephesos was in fact abandoned as it lay divided between two contending points of view; a sure recipe for *stasis*. Yet at the same time, the demise of Alexander also presented opportunities for the entire community since the question of its *autonomia* could once again be discussed; without a king, there were technically no subjects. Ephesos' future proved once again ambiguous, yet there is no evidence that it experienced overt social unrest in the last months of 323 BC. Circumstances suggest that the new authority of the 'empire' were the satraps and former *Hetairoi* commanding powerful armies who had been appointed by Alexander throughout Europe and Asia. The Ephesians could appeal only to them for a solution to the crisis that emerged after Alexander's death, while diplomacy and negotiation became once again the main channels of communication and decision-making in search of regional stability.

CHAPTER II: EPHEOS AND THE *DIADOCHOI*

2.1. From Companions to Successors

At Babylon, Alexander's death produced a shockwave of confusion and uncertainty. In a matter of moments the shared feeling among Macedonians was that "they had been deserted amid hostile and un-subdued people, who would seek to inflict punishment for their many disasters, whenever an occasion was offered."⁹² The situation was exacerbated by the fact that "[the] empire was a personal dynasty on a vast scale,"⁹³ as the *Hetairoi* were faced with an unprecedented succession crisis. For individual *poleis* such as Ephesos, the Babylon settlement that followed proved to be, as we will see in the following paragraphs, irrelevant to their socio-political evolution.

For the *Diadochoi* immediately affected by Alexander's sudden demise, the issue of succession to the Kingship of Macedon seemed almost overwhelming since there was no living heir and no named successor. In typically Macedonian fashion, discussions over the next King quickly degenerated almost to the point of civil war. The issue was finally settled by the staunch loyalty of the army to the Argead line, since "they would tolerate no other king than one who was already born to such a hope, and they ordered Arrchidaios to be called [...] and the soldiers hailed him as king under the name Philip." Finally, "an oath was exacted of each man that they would submit to a

⁹² Curt. 10.8.10.

⁹³ Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, 179.

king born of Alexander," although with the prominent Perdikkas and Leonnatos "as guardians of the son to be born of Rhoxane."⁹⁴

Throughout the empire, however, by 324 BC the satrapal administrative system was under close scrutiny, as "half of the provincial governors had either already been executed for treason and malfeasance or were awaiting that fate."⁹⁵ The Harpalos affair portrays the atmosphere of uncertainty that must have crept in the various satrapies "when Alexander did come back from India and put to death many of the satraps who had been charged with neglect of duty." Among them was Harpalos, "[who] became alarmed at the punishment which might befall him."⁹⁶ One may be tempted to argue that the Babylon Settlement sought to address this situation, as provinces were assigned as follows: Ptolemy chose and was granted Egypt, Antigonos was offered Pamphylia, Lycia and Great Phrygia, Assandros got Caria, Menandros was allotted Lydia, Leonnatos received Hellespontine Phrygia, Eumenes was to pacify and govern Cappadokia and Paphlagonia, while in Europe, Antipatros was re-affirmed in Macedonia.⁹⁷ Finally, Krateros was offered the ambiguous title of prostates of the kingship of Arrchidaios.⁹⁸

A quick glance at this distribution, however, reveals that the Settlement was not designed to impose an administrative system on the various regions of the Empire, but to share the spoils of "spear-won territory" among those who

⁹⁴ Curt. 10.7.6-9.

⁹⁵ Winthrop Adams, "The Hellenistic Kingdoms". *The Cambridge Companion to the Hellenistic World*. Ed. Glenn R. Bugh, 28 (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

⁹⁶ Diod. 17.108.6.

⁹⁷ Diod. 18.3.1-5 and Curt. 10.10.1-4.

⁹⁸ FGrH 156.F1.3.

helped to conquer it.⁹⁹ In fact, the allocation of satrapies was only undertaken when a compromise was reached after "they decided that the most important of the Friends and of the Bodyguards take over the satrapies and obey the King and Perdikkas."¹⁰⁰ The aim was the reaffirmation of authority along the lines of the personal prominence formerly held by those in Alexander's entourage. How the satrapies would be governed by their newly-(re)appointed satraps was perhaps left to the discretion of each.

It would seem that Greeks throughout the Macedonian *oikoumene* were in fact left on their own to deal with the potential issues that might arise upon Alexander's death. The case of Ephesos is particularly interesting because the Ionians of Lydia technically had Menander as satrap since 331 BC.¹⁰¹ In 323 BC, however, we learn from Arrian that "Philoxenos also came to [Alexander] bringing an army from Karia, as well as Menandros leading other troops from Lydia, and Menidas who brought the knights that were assigned to him."¹⁰² The journey from Lydia to Babylon was certainly a long one, which might suggest that Lydia, and thus implicitly Ephesos, were left without a satrap for at least several months before Alexander's death.

This would explain the circumstances of the *stasis* that occurred between the sons of Echeanax and Hegesias, the supposed "tyrant" of Ephesos according to Polyainos.¹⁰³ It is surely no coincidence that social unrest re-erupted at Ephesos during this time. Left behind without a satrap, the Ephesians and the

⁹⁹ Peter Green, *The Hellenistic Age* (New York, NY: Modern Library, 2008), 47.

¹⁰⁰ Diod. 18.2.4.

¹⁰¹ Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed*, 402.

¹⁰² Arr. *Anab.* 7.23.1.

¹⁰³ Poly. 6.49.5-6.

other Greeks in the area had to deal by themselves with the arduous implementation of the Exiles' Decree and its implications. Naturally, tensions might have escalated.

Menander's absence also explains the military intervention of Philoxenos, who is described by Polyainos as "Ἀλεξάνδρου βασιλέως ὑπαρχος Ἰωνίας."¹⁰⁴ Peter Krentz translates ὑπαρχος as "governor" which is historically unsuitable in this context; also, this term is nowhere equated with the satrapal office. However, a more accurate translation as "subordinate commander" to that of "satrap"¹⁰⁵ allows for a better understanding of the situation at Ephesos around 323 BC. With Menander away, Philoxenos was there to make sure that things did not get out of hand in such volatile circumstances. It is possible that Polyainos and Arrian are referring to the same Philoxenos. According to Arrian, Alexander had appointed him to be "collector of the tribute on this side of the Taurus"¹⁰⁶ - i.e. Asia Minor. A father is never named, although it seems unlikely that there were several prominent Macedonians named Philoxenos in the region.¹⁰⁷ If this is so, then Philoxenos would have returned to Asia Minor after leading troops from Karia to Alexander while Menandros remained with the King. Moreover, following Alexander's purge of underperforming satraps and Harpalos' flight in 324 BC, Philoxenos' prompt military intervention is

¹⁰⁴ Poly. 6.49.7.

¹⁰⁵ Etymologically the prefix ὑπο denotes "under the orders of/inferior to/subordinate" when coupled to offices and positions such as ἄρχων. Pierre Chantraine, *Dictionnaire Étymologique de la Langue Grecque* (Paris, France: Klincksieck, 1999), 1160, s.v. "ὑπο".

¹⁰⁶ Arr. *Anab.* 3.6.4.

¹⁰⁷ Berve identifies four different prominent Macedonians by the name of Philoxenos during Alexander's reign. But due to the lack of a patronym, he concedes that the four individuals might be the same person in different circumstances, undertaking different tasks, as is suggested in this thesis. Helmut Berve, RE 20.1 (1941), s.v. Philoxenos (1-4), col. 189-190.

understandable for someone in charge of the proper flow of tribute from Asia Minor to his monarch.

The circumstances of this episode reveal the tense situation at Ephesos in the months of 323 BC. There was in fact no prominent leader in Ephesos or in the immediate vicinity to deal with the situation after news of Alexander's death reached Asia Minor. We know from all ancient sources dealing with the Babylon conference that Menander remained in Babylon throughout the negotiations over Alexander's legacy. The *Diadochoi* were in fact more interested in cutting expenses which would have been diverted into their own pockets, and in avoiding alienating any prominent individuals during these negotiations. Indeed, Diodorus Siculus explicitly states that when faced with Alexander's *memoranda* prescribing overly-ambitious undertakings - in both magnitude and expenses - "[the *Hetairoi*] valued highly the name of Alexander, nevertheless seeing the projects extravagant and impracticable, they decided to carry out none of those that have been mentioned."¹⁰⁸ Their more important order of business was dealing with Krateros' initial duty to replace Antipatros as overseer in Macedonia, as "it seemed best to the successors not to carry out his planned projects."¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁸ Diod. 18.4.6.

¹⁰⁹ Diod. 18.4.1. These plans consisted of: building a thousand warships, constructing a road network from Lybia to the Pillars of Herakles, the erection of six very costly temples, the founding of numerous cities both in Europe and Asia, and the building of a tomb to his father Philip II that would be greater than the Pyramids of Egypt.

As we learn from Arrian, Krateros' specific orders stated that "he was to take charge of Macedonia, Thrace, Thessaly and the freedom of the Greeks."¹¹⁰ Krateros, as Antipatros' replacement, would in turn assume the duty of constraining any Greek cities who were unwilling to restore their exiles, as promulgated by the Exiles' Decree. He would thus continue as regional overseer for the proper implementation of Alexander's decisions vis-à-vis restorations, as is implied by the "freedom of the Greeks" clause.¹¹¹

Under these circumstances, the canceling of Krateros' mission implies that there was no immediate effort from Babylon to address the Greek situation as far as the Exiles' Decree was concerned. For the moment, then, any appeals for clarification on the part of the Greek *poleis* would fall on deaf ears. Yet, as later events would show, it is precisely this seeming Babylonian disinterest in local concerns throughout the empire that provided individual communities with the impetus to seek a resolution, even a violent one. It is certainly not a coincidence that "only two native risings occurred on the news of Alexander's death, and both of these [...] involved Greeks."¹¹² One was the rebellion of the Greeks in the Upper Satrapies who, "although they longed for the Greek customs and manner of life and were cast away in the most distant parts of the kingdom, yet submitted while the king was alive on account of fear; but after he died they revolted."¹¹³ Perdikkas dispatched the able Pithon to deal with the

¹¹⁰ Meanwhile, "Antipatros was to bring drafts of Macedonians of full age to replace the men being sent home." Arr. 7.12.4.

¹¹¹ Both Peter Green and Waldemar Heckel make this assertion, given the context. Heckel, *Marshals*, 490, 492.

¹¹² Peter Green, *Alexander to Actium* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), 6.

¹¹³ Diod. 18.7.1.

insubordination, which he accomplished. However, Peter Green fails to mention the ousting of the Macedonian garrison by the Rhodians, whose proclamation of *autonomia* further fueled tensions in the Aegean basin.¹¹⁴

More serious, however, was the revolt of the Aitolians and the Athenians. As Diodorus specifies, their actions were a direct consequence of the Exiles' Decree and the disinterest manifested by the Macedonians in 323 BC, since "many people welcomed the restoration of the exiles as a good thing, but the Aitolians and the Athenians being displeased with the undertaking, bore it with difficulty."¹¹⁵ The eruption of the so-called Lamian War caused a flurry of reactions and deliberations in the Aegean World. Antipatros, having been defeated and besieged in Lamia by the Athenian *strategos* Leosthenes, called on Leonnatos, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, and Krateros who was at that time in Kilikia (more will be said about him at a later time), while the Aitolians managed to enlist many of the Thessalians to their cause. The defection of these traditional allies of the Macedonian kings who had provided both Philip and Alexander with considerable contingents of cavalry, exposes the extent of the opposition to the Exiles' Decree.¹¹⁶

As far as Ephesos is concerned, however, there is no evidence to suggest that Alexander's death prompted the resurgence of widespread *stasis*, despite its potential to do so. Of course, *stasis* must not always be considered the expected and actual result, but the circumstances do provide some answers as to why

¹¹⁴ There was in fact no immediate reaction from the part of the *Diadochoi* against Rhodos. Diod. 18.8.1. This incident shall be discussed later in a different context.

¹¹⁵ Diod. 18.8.6.

¹¹⁶ Faraguna, 130.

Ephesos continued to enjoy socio-political stability. As the Philoxenos episode shows, it was certainly possible for any regional disturbances to be kept in check by local armed forces, if necessary. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that Antigonos was present in the neighboring satrapies of Pamphylia, Lycia and Greater Phrygia, with a sizeable army ever since he had been placed in charge over these regions by Alexander himself in 334 BC. In fact, Antigonos almost single-handedly stopped the Persian re-conquest campaign in 333 BC, becoming the most prominent individual in Asia Minor, actively involved in re-imposing Macedonian hegemony, hunting down pro-Persian elements, and stomping out any potential rebellion.

2.2. Polyperchon's Bid

Despite the seeming disinterest of the *Diadochoi*, it is nevertheless surprising that the consequences of an event as important as the proclamation of the Exiles' Decree receive very little attention in the literary sources dealing with the events after Alexander. This is partly due to the sources' focus on the growing anti-Macedonian sentiment in the Aegean, and to the subsequent Wars of the Successors. However, Diodorus Siculus does provide us with a peculiar statement in a speech attributed to Polyperchon dated to 319 BC. The letter hints at the first official response to the Greek communities with respect to the Exiles' Decree, as Diodorus has Polyperchon claim the following:

Since it has come upon our ancestors to provide many benefits (ἐνεργετηκέναι) to the Greeks, we wish to maintain their policy and to

make clear to all our goodwill which we continue to have towards the Greeks. Formerly indeed, when Alexander departed from among men and the kingship descended upon us, since we believe it necessary to restore all to peace and to the constitutions that Philip our father established, we have sent written instructions to all the cities concerning these matters.¹¹⁷

This passage raises more questions than it answers, because it alludes to decisions and events in the past without any level of specificity. The circumstances of its release make it even more difficult to interpret. For Malcolm Errington, the decree was wholly meant to attract the support of all the Greek cities who had formerly been opposed to Antipatros' constitutional changes in the struggle against his brother Kassandros.¹¹⁸ Nevertheless, if such an initial "restoration" did indeed take place, the question becomes how it came about. Bosworth is convinced that "the regents at Babylon considered it prudent to send a circular letter to the cities announcing the restoration of [Philip's] peace."¹¹⁹ Bosworth goes on to say that it was all for propaganda purposes and that it was also "a reaction against the despotism of Alexander's last months", but he does not further explain why the Lamian War occurred nonetheless.

One possibility is that such a restoration was never actually undertaken. Diodorus certainly does not mention it when discussing Perdikkas' annulment of Alexander's *memoranda*. But such an important document cannot be so hastily dismissed, and there are reasons to believe in the authenticity of this proclamation. In fact, upon more careful scrutiny, it becomes obvious that the format of Polyperchon's letter is very formulaic; it could have been inscribed in

¹¹⁷ Diod. 18.56.1-2.

¹¹⁸ Malcolm Errington, *A History of the Hellenistic World* (Malden, Mass: Blackwell, 2008), 24.

¹¹⁹ Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, 228.

stone, for all we know. Jane Hornblower points out that no less than sixty such citations of documents are available in books 18-20 of Diodorus' *Bibliothēke* - a sharp contrast to previous books, many of them containing no such evidence - explaining that "the source is evidently one who valued primary evidence and whose authority is therefore to be respected."¹²⁰ She further argues that the source of these documents, including Polyperchon's letter to the Greeks, is Hieronymos of Kardia, a contemporary to the events following Alexander's death, and a highly-regarded historian in the entourage of Eumenes and then the Antigonid house.¹²¹ If Diodorus did in fact loyally follow Hieronymos' account of events as well as his use of documents and speeches, then there might be some truth to Polyperchon's claim.

As a result, if such 'instructions' did get passed around, there are then two possibilities as to why the Lamian War erupted in spite of them: either word of them did not reach Europe in time due to geographical constraints, or conflict was inevitable given that it was probably not in Athens' interest, for example, to let slip the opportunity to shake off the Macedonian yoke. The latter option corroborates Polyperchon's claim that "some of the Greeks, not judging rightly, waged war against the Macedonians and were defeated by our generals."¹²² But yet again the problem is further complicated by Diodorus himself who claims that "the Athenians waged what is called the Lamian War against Antipatros. It is necessary to put forth the reasons for this war in order

¹²⁰ Jane Hornblower, *Hieronymus of Cardia* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1981), 37.

¹²¹ Jane Hornblower, 131.

¹²² Diod. 18.56.3.

that the events that took place in it may be made clearer."¹²³ He then goes on to discuss Alexander's decision to restore all exiles, and his motives behind such a decision. Moreover, it is also inferred that Athens was already contemplating Macedonian resistance even before there was reason to believe that Alexander was dead, "not being a match for his forces, they formerly kept their silence, waiting for a favorable opportunity; which Fortune quickly gave them."¹²⁴

Returning to Ephesos, it is entirely possible that its stability, if even only for a short period of time, was due to the dispatch of such 'instructions' from Babylon. Such a 'Philippic' restoration could technically be interpreted as continued support for the democratic government already in place. Indeed, Philip II's initial plan to impose pro-Macedonian democracies in Asia Minor at the expense of pro-Persian oligarchs in 336 BC came to fruition during the spear-head campaign conducted by Parmenion. Due to its overwhelming initial success, for the first time in many decades Ephesos was formally deemed a democracy and Philip II was rewarded with lavish, almost super-human honors, by having a statue of himself placed alongside that of Artemis in the *Artemision*. Thus, the ambiguity and insecurity previously created by Alexander's exclusive focus on his own person as the decision-making factor could finally be bypassed and in the future avoided.

Circumstances suggest, however, that the Lamian War erupted almost immediately after news of Alexander's death reached Athenian ears. Diodorus vividly describes this situation when he informs us that,

¹²³ Diod. 18.8.1-2.

¹²⁴ Diod. 18.8.7.

Immediately, then, the public speakers, giving shape to the wishes of the people, wrote a decree that the people be responsible for the common freedom of the Greeks and liberate the cities that were being garrisoned; that they prepare forty quadriremes and two hundred triremes; that all Athenians up to the age of forty be enrolled; that three tribes guard Attica, and that the other seven be ready for campaigns beyond the frontiers; that envoys be sent to visit Greek cities and inform them that formerly the Athenian people [...] had fought by sea against those barbarians who had invaded for their enslavement, and that now once again Athens believed it necessary to endanger lives and money and ships for the common safety of the Greeks.¹²⁵

This open declaration of war, and the rapid turn of events it triggered, suggest that even had such a 'Philippic restoration' existed, it would not have reached the Greek mainland in time to placate the disgruntled factions under Antipatros' command. It would have taken several weeks, if not months, for such a general amnesty to be even provisionally put in place, especially given the hectic developments back in Babylon as presented by Quintus Curtius. Indeed, "it was the seventh day since the king's body was lying in its coffin, with the cares of all turned towards establishing public order, away from such solemn duty."¹²⁶ Therefore, it seems reasonable to argue that at the time of the Lamian War no such 'instructions' had yet reached the Aegean world.

But where there is commotion there is opportunity, and Ephesos profited from the outbreak of the war. According to Polyainos, "when Alexander died in Babylon, [Diodoros] was sent back to Ephesos by Perdikkas to be judged according to the law."¹²⁷ Under the circumstances of three Greek revolts having

¹²⁵ Diod. 18.10.1-3.

¹²⁶ Curt. 10.10.9.

¹²⁷ Poly. 6.49.19-21. Diodoros was one of the three sons of Echeanax charged with the murder of Hegesias. They were arrested and taken to prison in Sardeis to await trial before Alexander himself. In the meantime, Anaxagoras and Kodros managed to escape and flee to Athens, while Diodoros was recaptured.

already erupted, Perdikkas' acknowledgement with respect to the precedence and competence of the local courts at Ephesos appears as a concession towards an already disgruntled and important *polis*. As was already noted, Philoxenos' armed intervention came after the Ephesians' refusal to give up the culprits to be judged before Alexander. Even for the sake of appearances, such an action would have been a blatant breach of local *autonomia*. Bosworth, then, rightly assumes that Perdikkas tacitly admitted that Alexander's latest policy was a violation of sovereignty,¹²⁸ as he tried to avoid further local disgruntlement which might degenerate into a hostile environment prone to rebellion.

In retrospect, his calculations proved fruitful since Ephesos did not experience *stasis*, nor did its citizens commit *hubris* against Macedonian hegemony. One may further argue that if Perdikkas had indeed sent 'instructions' to various Greek cities regarding the status of the Exiles' Decree, it would have been done through such channels of communication with individual communities as circumstances allowed or demanded. From this perspective, then, Polyperchon's claim, if genuine, is not entirely incompatible with the circumstances it addresses. This would explain Ephesos' seeming detachment despite the great commotion sweeping the Aegean basin.

Perdikkas' actions signaled a return to the *polis-strategos* interaction promoted by Philip II and severely strained by the increasingly autocratic Alexander. They also represented the formal recognition of the importance and necessity of inter-dependence as both Ephesos and the *Diadochoi* sought regional

¹²⁸ Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, 257.

security and stability. As Perdikkas had learned back in Babylon, not encouraging antagonism was crucial during those troubled weeks. From Ephesos' point of view, it had formally regained its internal *autonomia*, and we may surmise that the democratic government remained in place for the time being, in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

But in contrast to the previous decade when Alexander was consulting and negotiating with individual cities on constitutional matters, the dynastic situation after 323 BC was widely recognized as transitory since Perdikkas was no king, but merely acted as the guardian of Alexander's yet unborn child and supposedly future king, provided the child was a son. Moreover, despite the fact that Philip III was indeed hailed at Babylon as the new king, being the half-brother of Alexander, it was obvious to everyone that he carried no real authority. According to the sources, "he was afflicted with incurable mental ills"¹²⁹; possibly epilepsy or mental retardation. At Babylon, Perdikkas, although his role in the succession process was ambiguous to say the least, emerged as "the most influential of the Friends and of the Bodyguards."¹³⁰ His concern for the situation at Ephesos, then, mattered insofar as it provided the Ephesians with some sense of certainty in uncertain times. Their concerns had been answered.

At the same time, however, the Babylon Settlement also confused matters for the very simple reason that it was by no means a universal settlement, since not all prominent Macedonian figures were present at

¹²⁹ Diod. 18.3.1.

¹³⁰ Diod. 18.2.2-4.

Babylon. This is why Bosworth has observed that "The Babylon Settlement, then, is a misnomer [since] it is the compromise between the conflicting factional groups at Babylon which entrenched Perdikkas as the dominant figure - the dominant figure at Babylon."¹³¹ It can be further argued that despite his rise to power at Babylon, Perdikkas' position was by no means undisputed even at the court, especially after the assassination of Meleagros, since "Perdikkas was suspicious to all, and he himself was suspicious of them."¹³²

Of those who had been absent from Babylon at the time of Alexander's death, the now-aged Antipatros was very much in control back in Macedon.¹³³ Also, the widely-popular general Krateros was still in Kilikia after having been sent with ten thousand veterans back to Pella by Alexander earlier in 324 BC. Finally, both Errington and Bosworth omit Antigonos Monophthalmos, who was by far the most prominent man in Asia Minor since being left there by Alexander in 334 BC. Peter Green rightfully adds that "how any of them would react to attempted coercion from Babylon was completely unpredictable."¹³⁴ For our purposes, this is an important point because it reveals the unsettling Ephesian reality that Perdikkas' claim offered little comfort, given that it was not universally binding. Theoretically, at least, their position as an autonomous democratic *polis* was in no way settled once the Babylon absentees are taken into account. Ephesos' status would have to be negotiated with, and approved by each absentee.

¹³¹ Bosworth, *The Legacy of Alexander* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002), 33-34.

¹³² FGrH 156 F9.19.

¹³³ Bosworth, *Legacy of Alexander*, 32. n. 17. He might have sent his son Kassandros to negotiate in his place. He had supposedly reached Kilikia by that time.

¹³⁴ Green, *Hellenistic Age*, 28.

2.3. Krateros at Ephesos

It is no wonder, then, that in the next couple of months Ephesos actively undertook a series of diplomatic contacts and negotiations, directly or indirectly, with other very important *strategoi* in the area, as circumstances demanded. The first evidence for this is a partial inscription of a people's decree that was dedicated,

To Hagnon of Kaballos the Teian, because he is zealous towards the temple and according to what the ambassadors have reported after being sent before Krateros, that he confers benefits towards the city of Ephesos and towards those of the citizens who meet with him, it seems right for the council and the people ...¹³⁵

The context of this inscription is debated, as several dates of publication have been offered. Keil has proposed 320 BC and Billows agrees, arguing that the text should be put in the context of the crossing of Antipatros and Krateros over to Asia Minor from Europe before their clashes with Perdikkas and Eumenes, respectively. However, an earlier date has been proposed by H. Hauben, who puts the inscription somewhere between autumn 322 and spring 321 BC.¹³⁶ Krateros was already fighting in Europe by 321 BC so it seems that the most probable date for the inscription is the second half of 322 BC. Indeed, if the inscription had been published as a result of the Macedonians' return to Asia Minor, we would have expected Antipatros to have been mentioned in the text. His omission does not make sense at this time given that both generals had crossed together and that Antipatros was recognized by Krateros himself as the

¹³⁵ I. Ephes. 1437.

¹³⁶ H. Hauben, "On Two Ephesian Citizenship Decrees," *ZPE*, 57 (Bonn, Germany: Rudolf Habelt Verlag GMBH, 1972, 9).

more prominent figure. This is clear from Diodorus' statement that "after entering Thessaly and freely yielding the chief command to Antipatros, [Krateros] shared a camp with him beside the Peneios river."¹³⁷

Therefore, the acceptance of the 322 BC date is significant given that in the wake of the Lamian War, "when Antipater learned about the death of the king at Babylon and of the distribution of the satrapies, he sent for Krateros into Kilikia, beseeching him to come to his aid as soon as possible." We later learn that in the late summer/fall of 322 BC "Krateros also arrived in Macedonia after departing from Kilikia, to assist those around Antipatros and to make good the defeats that befell the Macedonians."¹³⁸ Hence, this inscription stands between Krateros' departure from Kilikia and his arrival to Macedonia. This reconstruction is corroborated by a new study from Tom Boiy on the chronology of the Early Hellenistic Period that dates the crossing of Krateros into Europe in late summer 322 BC.¹³⁹

Returning to the decree, the honouring of Hagnon of Kaballos from Teos reveals the circumstances of the decree's publication. He is mentioned on several occasions by Plutarch and Athenaios as being a luxury-loving flatterer in the entourage of Alexander the Great; this might simply reflect his influence at

¹³⁷ Diod. 18.16.5.

¹³⁸ Diod. 18.12.1 and 18.16.4.

¹³⁹ Boiy, 132. The new reconstruction provided by Boiy is based on a series of date formulas including the Solar Saros, cuneiform and Aramaic evidence, as well as Egyptian, Lydian and Babylonian calendars. It is not the purpose of this thesis to discuss in detail the evidence for the chronology of the Early Hellenistic Period, but for more information on Hellenistic calendars, please refer to Boiy, 95-104. Boiy proposes an Eclectic chronological model that combines the "High" and the "Low" chronological models for the Early Hellenistic Period. For more info, see Tom Boiy, *Between High and Low* (Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Antike Verlag, 2007), 117-141.

Alexander's court.¹⁴⁰ Arrian also mentions a certain Andron of Kabeleos from Teos as trierarch in his *Indica*. Both Keil and Billows take him for the same Hagnon because "it is hard to believe that Teos produced two men [...] who both served as high officers in the Macedonian courts and forces of this time."¹⁴¹ We last hear of him with Thymochares of Sphettos after a naval encounter with the Athenian fleet.¹⁴²

His role in the entourage of Krateros is peculiar given that he was certainly not Krateros' fleet commander, since Krateros did not control a fleet at this time; the incumbent Macedonian admiral in the Aegean was Kleitos the White, to whom we shall return later. Given his prominence around Krateros, as well as his naval experience, we may assume that he was in fact directly responsible for the crossing of Krateros' forces into Europe. Indeed, as Christian Habicht has pointed out, an individual's duties in the entourage of a *Diadochos* could vary according to his expertise, in fact "there was no clear line of demarcation [...] the same man alternately held civilian office, military commands and high priestly dignities."¹⁴³

¹⁴⁰ Plut. *Alex.* 22, 40 and Ath. 12.539c. Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed*, 387.

¹⁴¹ Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed*, 388.

¹⁴² Athenian inscription (IG II/III² 1.682) records the incident, mentioned by Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed*, 387. The inscription further mentions how Antigonos along with Thymochares "joined in the war in Cyprus and *elabei* Hagnon of Teos and the warships with him." (ll. 7-9) This has led Bayliss to believe that Hagnon was in fact operating on behalf of Perdikkas well before Krateros' death, and later against Antigonos and Thymochares. However, the verb *elabei* (from *lambanō*) may indeed mean to destroy/defeat/overcome. But it may also signify take over/ incorporate/ receive. (Chantraine, 616 s.v. *lambanō*) It may just be the case that once at Cyprus, Antigonos' army incorporated Hagnon's small fleet, since the latter was left without a general following Krateros' death. This makes better sense given that Krateros had been an ally of Antigonos; joining the latter appeared a natural alternative for Hagnon.

¹⁴³ H. Habicht, *Hellenistic Monarchies* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 28.

That the crossing took place from the docks of Ephesos itself is a sound assumption given that Ephesos was strategically positioned at the extremity of the southern route through Asia Minor, the only direct land link connecting the Ionian coast to Kilikia, where Krateros had set up camp at the moment of his summons to Europe.¹⁴⁴ This further explains Hagnon's prominence among the Ephesians, both as a naval commander and as the intermediary between the Ephesian embassy and Krateros himself; he was the man on the ground, as it were. It is also worth remembering that Teos was considered as one of the twelve neighboring cities that were part of the Ionian League,¹⁴⁵ and one may wonder to what extent this facilitated the interaction between the Ephesian ambassadors and Krateros, *via* their Ionian kinsman Hagnon.

Moreover, the language and honours awarded by the decree suggest a certain stylistic awkwardness vis-à-vis Krateros as *euergetes*. Paul Veyne distinguishes between two types of *euergetai*, the notables of a city and the kings, arguing that the difference is but one of degree:¹⁴⁶ one operates at the local level, the other on the higher, international stage. This distinction between local notable and king is also adopted by Gauthier, among others. From their perspective, Ephesos is a good example of a city that "very quickly began to develop the manipulative element in the euergetism system so as to seek to manoeuvre the kings to their own advantage."¹⁴⁷ The case of the *Diadochoi*, however, is not specifically considered by any scholar. And as we well know,

¹⁴⁴ Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed*, 45.

¹⁴⁵ Strab. 14.1.3.

¹⁴⁶ Paul Veyne, *Bread and Circuses* (New York, NY: The Penguin Press, 1990), 103.

¹⁴⁷ Richard Billows, *Kings and Colonists* (New York, NY: Brill, 1995), 74.

Krateros himself was neither a king nor merely a local notable. That the Ephesian community was well aware of his ambiguous position is evident from the fact that the decree does not directly address Krateros, but rather his subaltern. Therefore, by considering Hagnon as a 'zealous' *xenos* from Teos who deserves the honour of an inscription, the Ephesians are able to introduce the name of Krateros, the one who actually "confers benefits towards the city of the Ephesians," (ἐνεργετῇ) without having to address his ambiguous status. This is emphasized by the fact that Krateros is presented unaccompanied by any title or position.¹⁴⁸ His name is his own authority which does not need to be explained or justified, a critical point to which we shall return.

The aim of the decree, then, is to emphasize the bond between the *polis* and Krateros. At the same time, the fact that the ambassadors "report" back concerning Krateros' benefactions, suggests that a certain understanding between the Ephesian representatives and the *strategos* had been reached. In fact, the use of the verb itself, ἐνεργετῇ, signals that "tel étranger a rendu d'éminents services à la cité et a donc mérite [...] la reconnaissance de la communauté."¹⁴⁹ This is made clear by the fact that such an understanding is inscribed in stone; the very act of ἀναγραφεῖν in order to commemorate an *euergetes* is meant to make such an agreement official.¹⁵⁰ Moreover, its formulaic text emphasizes the institutionalization of *euergesia* and its central importance for the community. Its implication, however, is two-fold: on the one hand the

¹⁴⁸ This point will be discussed in more detail at a later time.

¹⁴⁹ Philippe Gauthier, *Les Cités Grecques Et Leurs Bienfaiteurs* (Paris, France: École Française D'Athènes, 1985), 2.

¹⁵⁰ Gauthier, 21.

city acknowledges and honours the benefactor, while on the other it accepts the commemoration, as well as his association with that specific community.

To be sure, despite the decree's postulating that Hagnon acted "because he is zealous" or because "it seems right" to the Ephesian community to honour those who are mindful towards it, behind such claims of mutual goodwill there were important practical concerns. From the Ephesians' point of view, the gains following such a relationship were assiduously sought and highly appreciated. These are revealed by the text of the decree, and even though it only mentions the conferral of certain "benefits," the fact that "it seems right for the *boule* and the *demos*" to honour the city's benefactor points unambiguously to the democratic government of Ephesos. The Ephesian ambassadors involved, then, must have been representatives of the democratic faction in the city, whose successful association with the now-legendary Krateros practically guaranteed the (re)confirmation of their government at the expense of their political rivals.

This was an important achievement because it successfully addressed the political uncertainty of the period. Indeed, "many civil wars broke out in the context of larger conflicts" as "rival groups within a city would occasionally try to defeat their opponents with the help of a foreign ally, promising in exchange to offer support themselves after their victory."¹⁵¹ The situation appears similar in the case of Ephesos. In the tense and volatile atmosphere of the outbreak of the Lamian War and without a central authority, the need for the (re)validation of their socio-political authority prompted the Ephesian democrats to seek a

¹⁵¹ Angelos Chaniotis, *War in the Hellenistic World* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 16.

powerful supporter in the person of Krateros. Their diplomatic success may in turn be translated as a success for the whole Ephesian community because *stasis* was averted before tensions degenerated into civil war. Moreover, by accepting the role of *euergetes*, Krateros laid himself open to moral pressure in order to live up to his own propaganda as a benefactor,¹⁵² and thus made it his duty to make sure that what had been agreed would be upheld.

There were in fact other important considerations that had to be addressed by the Ephesians when faced with a considerable army on their territory. In times of war the mobilization of armies automatically implied that considerable resources were needed to supply the troops. As a result, a community such as Ephesos could see itself under the burdensome obligation to provide at least part of the needed supplies. Moreover, there was always the risk that rowdy troops could cause significant damage and unrest if not properly supplied or kept in line by an imposing *strategos*. The fact that such concerns were constantly addressed by generals and communities alike exposes the frequency of such unfortunate outcomes.¹⁵³ Thus, it was in the great interest of the Ephesians to receive assurances from Krateros that the behavior of his Macedonian veterans would be exemplary over the course of their stay.

It follows that Hagnon was directly responsible for such promises being kept so that the crossing be completed in an orderly fashion. This is further emphasized by the fact that Hagnon is mentioned by the decree as being "zealous towards the temple." This clause carries significant implications

¹⁵² Billows, *Kings and Colonists*, 74.

¹⁵³ Chaniotis, 123-124.

because the *Artemision* - to which the decree unmistakably refers - carried deep religious authority, as well as important administrative functions. Its sacred precinct was clearly determined, having been extended several times in the course of its history; as already mentioned, the most recent extension had been undertaken by Alexander himself, following the example of his mythical ancestor Herakles. The designated temple precinct carried with it the granting of *asylia*, territorial inviolability.¹⁵⁴ This was a practice that had been employed since the 6th century BC in order to guarantee territorial protection against "the right of seizure" (*sylos*) that could occur in the context of territorial invasions.¹⁵⁵ Therefore, Hagnon's zeal towards the temple could be translated as continued Macedonian recognition of the precinct's status as *asylus*, thus assuring the integrity of its territory and property. This was a great concession indeed, given that "the temple was much used as a bank of deposit;"¹⁵⁶ as we shall see in subsequent chapters, this would also imply that the tribute would continue to flow into the temple as had been initially decreed by Alexander. As a result, the Ephesian ambassadors to Krateros appear to have reacted promptly and effectively in assuring the stability and integrity of their city and territory, respectively, when faced with the potential of internal and/or external threats.

Ephesos, therefore, is a perfect example of a community that quickly adapted to the new realities of the post-Alexander years. This instance in particular exposes the complex interaction behind the reaction of the *polis* to

¹⁵⁴ Kent Rigsby, *Asylia* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1996), 387.

¹⁵⁵ Christopher Jones, *Kinship Diplomacy in the Ancient World* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999), 56.

¹⁵⁶ Rigsby, 386.

the rise of the *Diadochoi* at a microscopic level during this difficult period of transition. This decree in particular also provides us with insight into the evolution of euergetism at a critical point in time between the undertaking of local *litourgiai* during pre-Alexandrian times and the granting of royal benefactions by Hellenistic *basileis* according to the model of Alexander the Great.

2.4. A Macedonian Affair

Most important for our purposes, however, is the fact that the decree offers an invaluable glimpse into the tense relations among *Diadochoi*, while communities such as Ephesos are caught in between the prevalent suspicion and animosity of those months. As mentioned earlier, the decree refers to the Macedonian *strategos* simply as "Krateros," unaccompanied by any title or position. But by then it was widely known that back in Babylon, the title of *prostates* of the monarchy had been bestowed upon Krateros. In this context, the omission of such an honorary function to such a prominent personality appear odd to say the least, unless it exposes Krateros' conscious rejection of these honours. By implication, Krateros refused to acknowledge the Babylon Settlement and, in turn, Perdikkas' authority. Indeed, it is important to keep in mind that "it was not a matter of course for a decree to be engraved,"¹⁵⁷ but was the result of a public debate and an official decision to set up a stele, which

¹⁵⁷ Veyne, 128.

constituted an honour in itself.¹⁵⁸ Thus, the inscription itself reflects a conscious decision on Ephesos' part to ignore the Babylonian settlement, most certainly at the instructions of Krateros, who in this way publicly announced his position *versus* Perdikkas.

True, Perdikkas took all three of the absentees - Antipatros, Antigonos and Krateros - into account when assigning satrapies and offices, but the real issue was one of principle: whoever bestowed these titles and commands tacitly asserted his primacy over matters and his superior position over all others. Perdikkas did not have such authority and could certainly not impose it. Therefore, if in 323 BC it was not certain "whether they accepted the authority of the officers and rank-and-file at Babylon,"¹⁵⁹ by 322 BC the absentees made it abundantly clear that they not only understood the implications of Perdikkas' actions, but that they also rejected his authority.

Status and prominence remained, in fact, central concerns for Macedonian elites who were now left without "a rough and vigorous monarchy ruling, by main force, over ambitious barons whose chief interests in life were fighting and drinking."¹⁶⁰ In such a competitive world, one's bid for supremacy needed to be backed by great personal prestige and, more importantly, by a loyal and superior military following. The reality was that Perdikkas, when compared to other *Diadochoi*, could boast of neither. Antipatros had been firmly in command in Macedonia since Alexander started his grand campaign, and was the only surviving member of the "old guard" of Philip II. This was very

¹⁵⁸ Gauthier, 20-22.

¹⁵⁹ Bosworth, *Legacy of Alexander*, 34.

¹⁶⁰ Green, *Alexander to Actium*, 5.

significant given that "there must have been a coterie of powerful nobles who had remained in Macedon throughout the reign, many of them survivors from Philip's day, and they will have had their views on the succession."¹⁶¹

Also, age was a key element that weighed heavily in claiming primacy, especially in the eyes of the army, as a passage from Diodorus Siculus shows when describing Polyperchon, "who was almost the oldest of those who had campaigned with Alexander and was held in honor by those in Macedonia."¹⁶² As a result, he probably did not view Perdikkas' rise to power with approbation, but nonetheless he chose the path of consolidation by being initially in favor of a marriage alliance with the young and ambitious *epimeletes* through his daughter Nicaea.¹⁶³

Of the other *Diadochoi*, however, Krateros was probably the most prominent. He was supposedly so popular among Macedonians that, before fighting against him near Kappadokia, Eumenes "did all he could so that it may escape the notice of his men that Krateros himself was campaigning against him" because "he had strong fears that his Macedonians, if they recognized Krateros, would go over to him."¹⁶⁴ Moreover, there was a clear reason why Krateros had chosen Kilikia as his base of operations before moving on to Macedonia in 324 BC. It was at the time the richest of the western satrapies; the treasury of Kyinda housed tens of thousands of talents. This was partly because preparations for Alexander's western expedition were being undertaken in this

¹⁶¹ Bosworth, *Legacy of Alexander*, 31.

¹⁶² Diod. 18.48.4.

¹⁶³ Diod. 18.23.1.

¹⁶⁴ FGrH 156, F9.27 and Plut. *Eum.* 7.1.

region.¹⁶⁵ Bottom line, "the marshals at Babylon were not sufficiently strong or united to give orders to Krateros,"¹⁶⁶ hence his open rejection of their empty honors bestowed upon him.

Yet rejection did not necessarily imply hostility towards Perdikkas, at least not yet. In 322 BC general attention was focused on Mainland Greece, where Antipatros was struggling against the anti-Macedonian league spearheaded by Athens' general Leosthenes. That Krateros and Perdikkas continued to collaborate - if only indirectly - under these circumstances, is suggested by a passage from Diodorus, who writes that during the Lamian War,

Since the Macedonians had command of the sea, the Athenians prepared other ships in addition to those which they already had, such that there were in all one hundred and seventy. Kleitos had command of the Macedonian ships, which numbered two hundred and forty. Engaging with Euetion the fleet commander of the Athenians he defeated him in two naval battles and destroyed a large number of the enemy ships near the islands that are called the Echinades.¹⁶⁷

We learn from Plutarch that the first naval encounter between the two admirals took place near Amorgos in June, at about the same time that Krateros had already started marching from Kilikia.¹⁶⁸ As Diodorus' chronology suggests, Kleitos was master of the sea by the time Krateros was ready to cross into Europe.¹⁶⁹ Since his was the only dominant fleet in the area that could ferry a

¹⁶⁵ Bosworth, *Legacy of Alexander*, 52-53. Supposedly, even as late as November 315 BC, Antigonos was able to appropriate 10,000 talents from Kyinda alone. Diod. 19.56.5.

¹⁶⁶ Bosworth, *Legacy of Alexander*, 53.

¹⁶⁷ Diod. 18.15.8-9. Heckel, *Marshals*, 186, n. 84 suggests that the Echinades must be the Lichades in northern Aegean. It would not make sense for the second naval battle off the coast of Acarnania.

¹⁶⁸ Plut. *Dem.* 11.4. Kleitos is specifically mentioned as the commander of the Macedonian fleet in Plut. *Mor.* 338a.

¹⁶⁹ Kleitos' presence at Ephesos in late summer 322 BC is further corroborated by the fact that by spring 321 BC Kleitos is already operating in Kilikia. Bayliss, 117 based on Briant, 214.

considerable army, Heckel has concluded that "Kleitos' responsibility was undoubtedly to secure the crossing of the Hellespont by Krateros himself."¹⁷⁰

2.5. Perdikkas' Men at Ephesos

The earlier argument that this crossing was undertaken from Ephesos is further corroborated by two important pieces of evidence. The first is a subtle allusion to the fact that the Macedonian fleet had indeed been present at Ephesos: we are told by Diodorus that when Antigonos Monophthalmos would later flee to Antipatros in 320 BC, "he secretly made arrangements for flight and escaped undetected during night with his personal friends and his son Demetrios, boarding the Athenian ships."¹⁷¹ We know that Antigonos' crossing was undertaken from Ephesos.¹⁷² Therefore, these Athenian ships must have been none other than the ships that were seized by Kleitos following his victorious encounters with Euetion, and which were brought to Ephesos on the occasion of Krateros' presence, where the Athenian ships remained until Antigonos' crossing.¹⁷³

Another important inscription provides further evidence that Kleitos was present in Ephesos. Its fragmentary text is dedicated,

¹⁷⁰ Heckel, *Marshals*, 186. This reconstruction of events with Perdikkas' men providing support to Krateros and indirectly to Antigonos, downplays Édouard Will's suggestion that Krateros and Perdikkas were already openly at odds with each other by spring of 322 BC, as the former "[preferred] to place his veterans, who in any case had to return to Macedon, at the service of Antipatros rather than to have to face Perdikkas." Will, 32.

¹⁷¹ Diod. 18.23.8.

¹⁷² Heckel, *Marshals*, 173.

¹⁷³ This conclusion is corroborated by H. Hauben's chronological study of the regional developments in 322-321 BC - "The First War of the Successors", 91 *Ancient Society* 8 1977 (Leuven, Belgium).

To Kleitos and Alketas because they are zealous towards the temple and the city, it seems right for the council and the people, for them to be citizens in equal and like manner: and these things to be also for their descendants. And to assign them by lot into a Tribe and a Thousand.¹⁷⁴

Given the evidence that has already been provided, it is possible to recreate the circumstances surrounding this inscription. First, the presence of the captured Athenian ships supports the argument that the publication of this decree was undertaken after Kleitos' victories. Second, if Heckel is correct that Kleitos' presence at Ephesos was due to Krateros' mission to cross into Europe, then the best conjecture is that the inscription was set up precisely when both Kleitos and Krateros were in the city, preparing the latter's crossing. Therefore, this is a fortunate case where the publication of the two extant fragmentary inscriptions discussed above may be related, not only concerning the same point in time, but even interconnected events: Krateros' crossing into Europe that was made possible after Kleitos' naval victories.

Kleitos' victorious entrance into the Ephesian harbor with the captured Athenian ships might explain the enthusiasm of the *boule* and the *demos* towards the Macedonian fleet commander. This was the new master of the Aegean, to whom a harbor city such as Ephesos would do well to pay homage given that its maritime trade now depended on his protection and oversight. This was very important given that Cretan pirates, for example, were and would remain a constant concern for Mediterranean cities up until the 1st century BC, when Rome finally took the initiative to eradicate this threat.¹⁷⁵ Significantly, however, according to Angelos Chaniotis piracy was not always practiced only

¹⁷⁴ I. Ephes. 1435.

¹⁷⁵ Chaniotis, 44.

by rebel groups throughout the Mediterranean. In fact, 'piracy' actually comprised a variety of groups, from simple merchants to privateers who supported the naval operations of a *Diadochos* by essentially attacking ships and plundering coastal cities.¹⁷⁶ Thus, behind the Ephesians' enthusiastic initiative to honor the two Macedonians because "it seems right," there lie important practical concerns which the representatives of the democratic government sought to address by means of diplomacy. As in the case of Hagnon, the fact that Kleitos and Alketas "are zealous towards the temple and the city" suggests that the Ephesian democrats were successful in their appeal, as they were offered assurances with regard to the socio-political and territorial integrity of Ephesos and its *Artemision*.

The presence of Alketas, however, stands out. If the assumption is correct that this was the same Alketas as the son of Orontes, none other than the brother of Perdikkas,¹⁷⁷ then his presence reveals much about the developments and interaction between Ephesos and Alexander's *Diadochoi*. First of all, it would seem that, contrary to what Heckel has suggested, Alketas did not remain at Babylon with his brother, or at least not for long.¹⁷⁸ We do know from literary sources relating to the Kynnane affair that he was already in Asia Minor by 321 BC.¹⁷⁹ By then it seems that he was operating in Pisidia.¹⁸⁰ It is thus plausible that by 322 BC he had left Babylon and joined Kleitos in the Aegean.

¹⁷⁶ Chaniotis, 134.

¹⁷⁷ Briant, 214.

¹⁷⁸ Heckel, *Marshals*, 172.

¹⁷⁹ Kynnane had been the daughter of Philip II, and she arranged to have her own daughter Adeia marry Philip III Arrhidaios. Perdikkas, fearful of a potential challenge to his authority, arranged to have Kynnane assassinated. We learn from Diodorus Siculus (19.52.5) that Alketas himself had

Alketas' specific role in the area, however, is harder to determine, since no other primary source gives any detail and no modern author has discussed this issue, or for that matter the present inscription. That he represented the interests of his brother is a certainty given their close relationship and also the fact that Alketas is encountered one year later in Pisidia and then in Hellespontine Phrygia - hence, throughout the Ionian coast - after being summoned by Perdikkas to block the crossing of the European Macedonians into Asia Minor at the beginning of the First Diadoch War.¹⁸¹ Also, Alketas' presence in the West, while Perdikkas " [took] with him King Philip and the royal army, [and] campaigned against Ariarathes, the ruler of Kappadokia [...] at around the same time,"¹⁸² should not be dismissed as simple coincidence. Alketas' activity at Ephesos is implied by the fact that he is equally honored alongside Kleitos, which in turn suggests that he also had an active role in the interaction between the city and the Macedonians.

More is revealed concerning Perdikkas' plans by his subsequent actions after his Babylon Settlement. He campaigned against the obstinate Ariarathes of Kappadokia, and dispatched Pithon against the rebellious Greek colonists far off in Baktria.¹⁸³ He also summoned Leonnatos and Antigonos "to escort Eumenes and declare him satrap of [...] Kappadokia, Paphlagonia and the southern coast

been the murderer of Kynnane, an action which brought great opprobrium upon the sons of Orontes. FGrH 156 F9.22 and Poly. 8.60.

¹⁸⁰ Bosworth, *Legacy of Alexander*, 13. 17.

¹⁸¹ Diod. 18.29.2.

¹⁸² Diod. 18.16.1, 4.

¹⁸³ Diod. 18.7.3.

of the Pontic Sea as far as Trapezos."¹⁸⁴ Such an initiative suggests a conscious effort on the part of Perdikkas both to quench any anti-Macedonian resistance and to secure regions that had not been completely pacified, in order to strengthen or expand Macedonian control as had been decided back at Babylon. Significantly, Perdikkas dispatched Pithon "after giving him letters for the satraps, in which it was written to give troops to Pithon, ten thousand footmen and eight thousand horsemen."¹⁸⁵

The mention of such documents suggests that on the one hand Perdikkas asserted his control over those satrapies in that far-off part of the Empire, and to a certain extent he also weighed the loyalty of the other satraps, based on the promptness of their response to such letters. According to Édouard Will, these early successes "served further to round off the empire only a year after Alexander's death", which in turn "increased the prestige and power of Perdikkas, and his ambition, and still more the impatience felt by some Macedonian satraps at having to accept his authority."¹⁸⁶

According to this policy pattern, we may conjecture that Alketas had a similar role in the Ionian coast: his presence and involvement in local affairs were meant to further the interests of his brother in the area, making sure that *poleis* such as Ephesos continued to be well-minded towards Perdikkas and that they remained loyal to the Macedonian cause, especially in the context of the ongoing Lamian War. In fact, signs of dissent had already manifested themselves

¹⁸⁴ Plut. *Eum.* 3.2.

¹⁸⁵ Diod. 18.7.3.

¹⁸⁶ Édouard Will, "The Succession to Alexander". *Cambridge Ancient History: The Hellenistic World* (7). Ed. by Walbank and Austin, 34 (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

in the area when "the Rhodians, driving out the Macedonian garrison, freed their city"¹⁸⁷ the moment news of Alexander's death reached them.

More importantly, literary sources suggest that Perdikkas had to constantly deal with the seditious tendencies of those who were nominally under his authority. For example, Perdikkas suspected Pithon "was a man of great ambition," who supposedly intended "to work in his own interests and become the ruler of the upper satrapies."¹⁸⁸ In turn, Leonnatos is marked by Plutarch as a man also driven by his own interests, who "really meant, as soon as he had crossed into Europe, to lay claim to Macedonia."¹⁸⁹ Perdikkas was supposedly also suspicious of Antigonos as a potential threat to his authority.¹⁹⁰ It appears then that Perdikkas perfectly understood the duplicitous and interest-driven nature of the other *Diadochoi* and constantly sought to hamper it. Under these circumstances, sending Alketas with Kleitos the White appears as a sensible course of action, given that the task of attempting to impose control in the Aegean and Western Asia Minor was too important to be left to the initiative of a man who, according to Plutarch, "after sinking three or four Greek triremes at Amorgos, was proclaimed Poseidon and carried a trident."¹⁹¹ Alketas' presence at Ephesos and his partnership with Kleitos were probably meant to provide both a check against Kleitos' selfish and arrogant character, and a trusty representative when dealing directly with important communities and individuals like Ephesos and Krateros.

¹⁸⁷ Diod. 18.8.1.

¹⁸⁸ Diod. 18.7.4.

¹⁸⁹ Plut. *Eum.* 3.5.

¹⁹⁰ Diod. 18.23.3.

¹⁹¹ Plut. *Mor.* 338A.

The granting of citizenship (*politeia*) to the two Macedonians reveals the character of the contract between Ephesos and Perdikkas' men. As Philippe Gauthier has observed, "la *politeia* octroyée par décret était potentielle,"¹⁹² meaning that such an honor was granted/accepted, as both parties were mindful of the future. Indeed, *politeia* served both a practical and an honorific purpose. For the beneficiary, "l'octroi de la *politeia* procure immédiatement [...] un incontestable prestige, plus ou moins grand selon le renom et la puissance de la cité donatrice."¹⁹³ On the other hand, such grants were a means for Ephesos to deal with the unpredictability of a world torn by incessant warfare,¹⁹⁴ as it sought to assure for itself continued protection and privileges from the part of the Macedonian fleet. Moreover, as Adalberto Giovannini points out, such agreements were not presented as formal obligations, but "their only justification is the moral ties binding together [those] concerned: their result is a strengthening of these ties for the future."¹⁹⁵ In this way, Perdikkas, through the presence of Alketas, was placed under the moral obligation that his fleet commanded by Kleitos would in future be mindful towards Ephesian interests. In return, he secured the loyalty of the democrats in the city, a mutually profitable agreement in times of unrest.

¹⁹² Gauthier, 197.

¹⁹³ Gauthier, 151.

¹⁹⁴ Gauthier, 150.

¹⁹⁵ Adalberto Giovannini, "Greek Cities and Greek Commonwealth". *Images and Ideologies: Self-Definition in the Hellenistic World*. Ed. by Anthony Bulloch, Erich Gruen, A. A. Long and Andrew Stewart, 278 (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press: 1993).

2.6. Preliminary Conclusions

One can only imagine the sumptuous atmosphere in Ephesos as the fleet of Kleitos met the land forces of Krateros. Yet at the same time, there might also have been some potential tensions between Alketas, representing his brother Perdikkas, and Krateros, who apparently did not wish to be associated with the Babylon Settlement. Nevertheless, their combined effort against the rebellion spearheaded by Athens suggests that, for the moment, circumstances demanded cooperation. As Bayliss points out, "the Ephesian decrees should then be dated to a time when all the Macedonians named on the stone were at peace with each other *and* at peace with Ephesos."¹⁹⁶

And regardless of how these prominent individuals separately perceived the post-Alexander situation, the common priority was to (re)establish Macedonian hegemony over those who chose to go against it. This is further emphasized by the very fact that the Ephesians openly and publicly negotiated with both Krateros' men and Perdikkas' delegates, suggesting that the city's continued support was important for the Macedonian cause. To be sure, the decrees presented above should in no way be interpreted as some sort of pledge of allegiance towards one personality or another. This is evident in the binding character of these documents, emphasizing the recognition of services brought to the community through the granting of honors and the implicit honorable mention through the inscription itself.

¹⁹⁶ A. J. Bayliss, "Antigonos the One-Eyed's *Return* to Asia in 322," *ZPE* 155 (2006), 118 (Bonn, Deutschland: Rudolf Habelt GMBH).

The ambiguity of these decrees emphasizing inter-dependence on a moral level, as already pointed out, permeates the relationship between the *Diadochoi* and Ephesos. This allowed for a channel of interaction that was mutually beneficial without stating the obvious - yet more complicated, uncertain and universally disdained - reality in the early post-Alexander years. On the one hand, prestige and support was to be gained by the Successors, as they presented themselves as zealous and mindful individuals rather than conquering, pragmatic generals. In turn, the Ephesian community took advantage of the situation in order to further its immediate, local goals.

As we have seen, moral commitment, so enthusiastically displayed in inscriptions, translated into Ephesos' ready assistance to the Macedonian cause. In this way, the Ephesian democrats' prompt diplomatic enterprise on every occasion was meant to display their government's pro-Macedonian feelings as both recent and future Macedonian successes were celebrated; respectively, Kleitos' victories and Krateros' upcoming relief mission. None could deny further support and consideration towards democratic Ephesos whose loyalty was promoted as continued gratitude for its liberation from the oligarchic Persian yoke by Philip II and then by Alexander the Great himself.¹⁹⁷

That Ephesos sought the support of any and all important individuals should not surprise us. To reiterate, only the prestige, power and proximity of a *Diadochos* could provide some sense of continued stability and security in the troublesome times that immediately followed the sudden death of Alexander

¹⁹⁷ We shall return to this specific and important aspect in subsequent chapters.

the Great. Yet this pattern of action and interaction does not seem to be peculiar to the years covered by this chapter. In fact, Pausanias describes several episodes in which he exposes a similar phenomenon:

But when the Attic ships were captured at Aigospotamoi, [...] the Ephesians put up in the temple of Artemis not only a statue of Lysandros himself but also statues of Eteonikos, Pharax and other least unknown Spartans to the Greek world. But when circumstances changed again [...] the Ionians likewise changed their views, and there are to be seen statues in bronze of Konon and of Timotheos [...] beside that of the Ephesian goddess at Ephesos. It is always the same; the Ionians follow, just as all people do, those that are superior in strength.¹⁹⁸

What does stand out in the interaction between Ephesos and the *Diadochoi*, is the prompt and active reaction of the democratic governing faction at Ephesos. Significantly, its diplomatic enterprises in the quest for continuity, stability and territorial integrity are successful on every occasion. This is all the more noteworthy once we take into account that the presence of the *Diadochoi* at Ephesos provided other Macedonians in Western Asia Minor with an opportunity to take part in an *ad-hoc* Macedonian council in an effort to reinstate a clear chain of command in the region. As we shall see in the next chapter, this situation was manipulated by the Ephesians in order to secure further benefits by also celebrating past Macedonian accomplishments.

¹⁹⁸ Paus. 6.3.15-16.

CHAPTER III: THE EPHEOS MEETING

3.1. Epigraphic Considerations

The return of Krateros upon the shores of the Aegean sea carried with it powerful symbolic value; indeed, Alexander himself wished it to be so. According to Arrian, upon dismissing ten thousand veterans, the King "ordered Krateros both to lead them and, after conducting them back, to take charge of Macedonia, Thrace and Thessaly, and the freedom of the Greeks."¹⁹⁹ Krateros' arrival in Macedonia was thus envisioned as the beginning of a new phase of Macedonian rule focused on the reformation, if not consolidation, of Alexander's "spear-won territory".

By the time Krateros reached Ephesos in the summer of 322 BC, however, the variables of the Macedonian equation had changed completely. King Alexander was dead and his *Hetairoi* had to contend with a string of (more or less) serious challenges to Macedonian hegemony before working on a consensus concerning the future of the empire, prematurely sketched by a handful of them at Babylon. Thus, Krateros' very presence at Ephesos with the occasion of his crossing into Europe, was the physical manifestation of the end of Alexander's eastern enterprise. In fact, it was the first time that a *Hetairos* of Alexander returned from the East since he had left Anatolia behind. Moreover, his subsequent meeting with Perdikkas' envoys was also the first occasion for many - both Macedonians and Ionians - to inquire about the Babylon Settlement

¹⁹⁹ Arr. *Anab.* 7.12.4. "Meanwhile, [Alexander] ordered Antipater to bring Macedonian replacements of full age to those who were being sent back." The orders were given in the context of the Exiles' Decree proclamation.

directly from Kleitos and Alketas, who had been by Peridkkas' side at Babylon during the distribution of offices and satrapies. The present chapter, therefore, will attempt to explain the important implications of this encounter and its influence over the socio-political development of Ephesos and Western Asia Minor, given the circumstances which affected both Ionian regional concerns and Macedonian general interests.

As we have seen, the breakout of the Athenian revolt that turned into a full-blown war against Macedonian rule in Europe immediately after the King's death, obligated Alexander's *Diadochoi* to cooperate in order to defend and strengthen Macedonian hegemony. With the aid of Kleitos' fleet, Krateros was to cross into Europe from Ephesos and turn the tide of the Lamian War which the Greeks looked as though they were going to win over Antipatros. This encounter was used by the governing democratic faction at Ephesos to guarantee the socio-political stability of their *polis* according to the criteria established more than a decade ago by Alexander himself upon the liberation of the *polis* from the Persian yoke.

Yet if we look at the epigraphic evidence provided by the Artemision inscriptions, it quickly becomes evident that this was more than a rally point for the Macedonian troops about to cross into Europe. According to the archeological report of Josef Keil for the Österreichisches Archäologisches Institut,²⁰⁰ the already-discussed honorary decrees to Kleitos/Alketas and Hagnon/Krateros are in fact part of a series of decrees inscribed on the same

²⁰⁰ ÖJI, I. Ephes. p. 235.

slab on one of the Artemision walls; there are six more honorary decrees in addition to these. If the facsimile produced in ink by Josef Keil is an accurate rendering of the inscribed slab, the uniform display and format of their texts suggest that these were published *en masse*.²⁰¹ This is further corroborated by the fact that, upon a close inspection of the letter form, distance, and spacing, it is very plausible to conclude that all of the decrees have been inscribed by the same hand.²⁰² This is strong evidence for the argument that all of these decrees were published around the same time; namely, with the occasion of Krateros' meeting with Perdikkas' men. This conclusion is echoed by A. J. Bayliss who adds that "we should also assume that each of the honorands would have been near Ephesos and therefore likely to have benefited the Ephesians."²⁰³

3.2. The Macedonians Strike Back: Neoptolemos, Kallas and Nikarchos

The implication is that with the occasion of the encounter, Ephesos became an *ad-hoc* stage for interaction between various parties whose interests, as we are about to see, lay in Western Asia Minor. Significantly, almost all of the present actors were, or represented, Macedonian commanders. One name that immediately stands out among the other honorees is that of "Neoptolemos son of Billeos the Macedonian"²⁰⁴. According to Arrian, Neoptolemos was "one of the

²⁰¹ I. Ephes. 1430-1438.

²⁰² For the facsimile, see APPENDIX 1. Unfortunately, a professional and erudite epigraphic analysis has yet to be provided in order to firmly validate these conclusions.

²⁰³ Bayliss, 118.

²⁰⁴ I. Ephes. 1431 ll. 1. The inscription is significant because it provides the patronymic information of Neoptolemos, unknown until now.

Hetairoi" since the beginning of the Asian expedition. He was apparently held in great esteem by Alexander, especially after he was the first to scale the walls of Gaza.²⁰⁵ Arrian also informs us that he was a member "of the Aiakidai clan."²⁰⁶ Thus, he was "a scion of the Molossian royal house and perhaps a relative of Arybbas the *somatophylax*."²⁰⁷ We also learn from Plutarch that he held a very prominent position in Alexander's army as *archihupaspistes*, and after the King's death, we find him at Babylon delivering the mocking observation to his rival that "he had followed [the king] with shield and spear, but Eumenes with pen and paper."²⁰⁸

His actions with respect to Ephesos are very difficult to discern, especially since the "zeal" shown "towards the people and towards those of the citizens who meet him"²⁰⁹ is hopelessly formulaic and (intentionally?) vague. However, it is reasonable to assume that it had something to do with his role as commander over a significant Macedonian contingent in the area. Indeed, Neoptolemos was prominent enough to receive from Perdikkas, if not the satrapy, at least the command in Armenia back in 323 BC. But his actions there proved disastrous, as Perdikkas was later forced to send Eumenes there "to bring under control the adjacent country of Armenia, which had been thrown into confusion by Neoptolemos."²¹⁰ The subsequent actions of Neoptolemos are hard to determine because we hear almost nothing more of him until the

²⁰⁵ Arr. *Anab.* 2.27.6.

²⁰⁶ Arr. *Anab.* 2.27.6.

²⁰⁷ Heckel, *Marshals*, 300 and Arr. *Anab.* 3.5.5.

²⁰⁸ Plut. *Eum.* 1.1.

²⁰⁹ I. Ephes. 1431 ll. 1-2.

²¹⁰ Plut. *Eum.* 4.1.

beginning of the First Diadoch War in 321 BC. Edward Anson claims that Perdikkas did not remove him from Armenia, despite admitting that he had proved an ineffective general.²¹¹ However, his presence in Western Asia Minor in the second half of 322 BC, as suggested by the Ephesian decree, shows that he did not in fact remain in the East. In his place, we hear of a certain Orontes as satrap of Armenia after it was pacified by Neoptolemos with Eumenes' decisive help.²¹²

In the context of the impending conflict between Perdikkas and Ptolemy, it is conceivable that Neoptolemos was by then present around Western Asia Minor. We learn from Diodorus Siculus that before the crossing of Antipatros and Krateros into Asia, Perdikkas "also sent with [Eumenes] enough commanders worthy of note, of whom the most prominent were his brother Alketas and Neoptolemos."²¹³ This is taken by Anson as evidence for Neoptolemos' continued presence in Armenia,²¹⁴ but Diodorus specifies that Perdikkas' decision was taken during a war council, where he consulted with "his friends and generals". We also learn that immediately after this meeting, "[Perdikkas] himself, taking the army from Pisidia, undertook the campaign against Egypt."²¹⁵ Therefore, Neoptolemos could not have possibly been in Armenia at this time, given that the war council was apparently held in or near Pisidia. Moreover, for logistical reasons Perdikkas would have dispatched to the

²¹¹ Edward Anson, *Eumenes of Cardia, A Greek among Macedonians* (Boston, MS: Brill, 2004), 80-81.

²¹² Diod. 19.23.3. Orontes had fought at Gaugamela on the Persian side, but later he appears to have spent time at Alexander's court. Bosworth, *Legacy of Alexander*, 122 n. 93.

²¹³ Diod. 18.29.2. Their mission was to hold Hellespontine Phrygia and not allow the Europeans to cross the Hellespont.

²¹⁴ Anson, 81.

²¹⁵ Diod. 18.25.6.

Hellespont those commanders whose armies were relatively close to the Aegean. As we have seen, Alketas was already in Western Asia Minor by 322 BC, whereas Eumenes had been assigned the satrapy of Kappadokia at Babylon and we later hear of him spending considerable time at Sardeis with Kleopatra, the sister of Alexander, negotiating a possible marriage arrangement between her and his superior.²¹⁶ Therefore, Bosworth seems to be correct in claiming that Perdikkas replaced Neoptolemos with Orontes in Armenia and subsequently dispatched him in Western Asia Minor. By the second half of 322 BC Neoptolemos was operating in Asia Minor with his own contingent which he would eventually lose within a few months at the hands of his arch-rival Eumenes.²¹⁷

Under the circumstances, Neoptolemos' outreach to the goings-on at Ephesos is significant. Having witnessed the tumultuous days at Babylon after Alexander's death, he understood how important one's presence was at such gatherings. Indeed, Plutarch tells us that at Babylon "as the rest of the *Hetairoi* had withdrawn from Babylon, [Eumenes], remaining behind in the city, appeased many of the men-at-arms and made them more disposed towards the cessation of hostilities."²¹⁸ The underlying assumption is that Perdikkas and his men had imposed themselves and dominated those proceedings at the expense of the other more prominent individuals precisely because the latter ones had

²¹⁶ FGrH. 156.F9.26.

²¹⁷ Diod. 18.29.4-5. This army seems to have been the same as the one with which he operated in Armenia, since at the Pisidian council only Eumenes received troops from Perdikkas. The implied statement being that Alketas and Neoptolemos already had their own troops which they were to lead to the Hellespont.

²¹⁸ Plut. *Eum.* 3.1.

not been present; as Richard Billows has observed, such direct contact with the leading figure(s) was always important in a personal monarchy such as Macedon.²¹⁹

As such, Neoptolemos would not have passed on the opportunity to stake his claim in Macedonian affairs in Asia, especially since "an individual's career was as subject to change as [his master's] favor, both primarily determined by personal performance, along with other factors."²²⁰ And given his previous shortcomings, the potential of losing his command was indeed real. As Habicht points out, a *Diadochos* "made use of his retainers as utility dictated and, at all events, largely as he pleased," and for that reason "at one moment he commands a whole army, shortly thereafter only a small troop within that same army."²²¹ Consequently, he could not risk slipping into a secondary position that could see him fall into obscurity. The meeting at Ephesos, then, would have appeared as a good occasion for Neoptolemos to highlight his role as one of Perdikkas' *philoï* - a role of quintessential importance for Neoptolemos' career and well-being²²² - and as such, someone that needed to be taken into consideration.

Whether his presence there was the result of a missive from Perdikkas or out of personal initiative, the sources do not tell us. For his own sake, however, it is important to point out that Neoptolemos could certainly not afford to seem uninvolved as one of Perdikkas' *philoï*. Indeed, his past failures and erratic

²¹⁹ Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed*, 41.

²²⁰ Habicht, *Hellenistic Monarchies*, 35.

²²¹ Habicht, *Hellenistic Monarchies*, 35.

²²² Chaniotis, 64.

behavior that earned him the chastisement of Plutarch as "being consumed with pride and empty arrogance,"²²³ would not have boded well with Perdikkas; the latter was already suspicious of the likes of Kleitos and Peithon, whose loyalty would indeed prove questionable.²²⁴ Acting independently, then, and showing an aloof attitude towards Perdikkas' men could potentially turn Neoptolemos into a man of "higher ambitions" in the eyes of his peers. On the other hand, his presence at Ephesos, and outward support for Perdikkas' cause would have ensured him a good reputation, given that trust and reciprocity were central values in the highly personal mindset at the Macedonian court.²²⁵

But we must also keep in mind that beside the *Hetairoi* and other prominent individuals, Alexander's entire contingent was formed of myriads of lower-ranking commanders whose orders consisted of garrisoning a city, supplying the army with fresh men, or securing various secondary, even tertiary, locations within Alexander's hastily acquired empire. To give just a few examples pertaining to Aegean Asia Minor, we learn from Arrian that Alexander sent a certain Alkimachos son of Agathokles "against the Aitolian cities and any cities that were still under the barbarians."²²⁶ Similarly, someone by the name Amphoteros was given the command of part of the fleet in tandem with Hegelochos immediately after the battle at the Granikos river "in order that these officers might free Lesbos, Chios and Kos from the enemies' garrisons."²²⁷

²²³ Plut. *Eum.* 4.2.

²²⁴ Previous chapter discusses Perdikkas' suspicions towards Kleitos and Peithon as presented by Diod. 18.7.4 and Plut. *Mor.* 338A.

²²⁵ Chaniotis, 65.

²²⁶ Arr. *Anab.* 1.18.1.

²²⁷ Curt. 3.1.19.

Finally, we hear of an obscure Balakros who recovered Miletos for Alexander, having defeated the Persian satrap Hydarnes.²²⁸ We hear nothing more of these figures, but there is a distinct possibility that such lower-ranking officers were still in Macedonian service when Alexander died. Their situation could also breed concerns that could lead them to seek clarification and assistance in light of recent major developments.

One of these men was Kallas, whom we encounter being honoured at Ephesos " because the ambassadors announce that he is zealous towards the people"²²⁹, along with the other *Hetairoi*.²³⁰ He had been operating in Western Asia Minor ever since Philip II's days. We first hear of him as part of the initial Macedonian expedition headed by Parmenion, Attalos and Amyntas in 336 BC a little before their king's assassination.²³¹ However, it seems that he did not fare well as commander once he arrived there. Diodorus Siculus limits himself to mention that during the Persian counter-offensive, " Memnon having crossed this mountain, suddenly fell upon the city of Kyzikos and almost took control of it."²³² Polyainos, on the other hand, specifies that it was in fact Kallas, "their Macedonian friend and ally," who was assisting the Kyzikenes at this time. Under Alexander's reign, however, he was placed at the head of the Thessalian cavalry and after the Granikos victory, he was apparently sent "to Memnon's country" which has been identified by Strabo as a place near the Aisepos river,

²²⁸ Curt. 4.5.13.

²²⁹ I. Ephes. 1436, ll. 1-2.

²³⁰ I. Ephes. 1436.

²³¹ Just. 9.5.8-9 and Diod. 16.91.2.

²³² Diod. 17.7.8 and Poly. 4.3.15.

in the Troad.²³³ More importantly, in 333 BC he was part of the Macedonian taskforce along with Antigonos Monophthalmos and Balakros charged with stamping out the last pockets of Persian resistance, which ended with Kallas retaking Paphlagonia, territory which he would annex to his appointed satrapy, Hellespontine Phrygia.²³⁴

Kallas, as well as other lower-ranking officers, would have been confronted with a serious dilemma concerning their continued authority and duties when news of Alexander's death reached Asia Minor, given that there was technically no one in charge; at least not for the moment. Ephesos, then, would have provided them with the opportunity to inquire into the situation of the Empire, as well as their own position in the area from high ranking former Hetairoi such as Krateros. This might also be the case for a certain "Nikarchos of Geron the Macedonian" whom we find being honoured with the occasion of the Ephesos meeting. Unfortunately, we know absolutely nothing of this Nikarchos, but having been identified as Macedonian, it is reasonable to conclude that he was part of the Macedonian contingent in Western Asia Minor. Whether he played a military or administrative role is of little importance, given that "there is not even a clear line of demarcation [of duties, as] the same man alternatively held civilian office, military commands, and high priestly dignities."²³⁵ Therefore, he was probably one of the many regional commanders that would have sought administrative clarification, or even potential support in the tense atmosphere of 322 BC. Indeed, we hear that some such lower-ranking officers

²³³ Strab. 13.1.11.

²³⁴ Curt. 3.1.24 and 4.3.15, and Arr. *Anab.* 2.4.2.

²³⁵ Habicht, *Hellenistic Monarchies*, 28 and Chaniotis, 64.

had to deal with local uprisings, such as that in Rhodes where the Macedonian garrison was driven out of the city.²³⁶

In Kallas' case, however, we may infer slightly more about his immediate concerns and interests in reaching Ephesos by means of *presbeis*.²³⁷ By that time news of the Babylon settlement would have surely reached his ears, yet the outcome had not been kind to Kallas as he had lost his possessions overnight; Hellespontine Phrygia had been assigned to Leonnatos and Eumenes was to take control of Paphlagonia. This sudden - and seemingly unfair - distribution of satrapies would have caused Kallas great alarm and dissatisfaction, which he would have sought to express before Perdikkas' men. And given that Leonnatos had recently died in Europe while fighting alongside Antipatros, Kallas might have attempted to regain his former possession through diplomacy.

More importantly, though, both Arrian and Diodorus Siculus identify Kallas as "son of Harpalos"²³⁸, leading Heckel to conclude that he was a kinsman, maybe a cousin, of Harpalos the Treasurer, and hence an adherent of the Elimeiot royal house.²³⁹ This could prove a great disservice to Kallas, given that the taint of treason of his kinsman Harpalos could lead the Diadochoi to be circumspect about Kallas' loyalty. Indeed, the fact that he was completely - and maybe intentionally - overlooked at Babylon suggests that he was either considered unimportant or someone who was to be ousted from the political

²³⁶ Diod. 18.8.1

²³⁷ Billows (*Antigonos the One-Eyed*, 45, n. 85) had made the suggestion that Kallas had in fact died at the hands of a certain Bithynian by the name of Bas sometime in the 330's BC, but his supposition has been disproven by Waldemar Heckel (*Marshals*, 356).

²³⁸ Arr. *Anab.* 1.14.3 and Diod. 17.17.4.

²³⁹ Heckel, *Marshals*, 355.

stage; or maybe both. Being present or represented at Ephesos, therefore, was a way to reiterate his loyalty towards the Macedonian cause, just as in Neoptolemos' case. Moreover, this was a unique opportunity for Kallas to deliberate and negotiate his position within the Macedonian chain of command.

Significantly, the decree honouring Kallas specifies that "it seems right for the council and the people, for him to be a citizen in equal and like manner: these things are to be also for his descendants: and it is to assign him by lot into a Tribe and a Thousand".²⁴⁰ On the one hand this may represent the Ephesian community's recognition of Kallas' past good deeds throughout his time in Asia Minor. What these services were, we cannot precisely tell. But given that he had fought against the pro-Persian oligarchies in the region under direct orders from Alexander himself, we may surmise that he would have pledged his continued support for the Ephesian democratic faction. On the other hand, the very publication of the decree suggests that Kallas continued to play some role in regional affairs, in which case the Ephesians expected him to continue his "zeal" towards their *polis*. By implication, Kallas would have been successful in his appeal to his Macedonian peers, and indeed, we later find him in the service of Kassandros in 317 BC.²⁴¹

²⁴⁰ I. Ephes. 1436, ll. 2-3.

²⁴¹ Diod. 19.35.3 and 19.36.6.

3.3. Financial Considerations: Philoxenos and the Artemision

The cases of Neoptolemos, Nikarchos and Kallas allow us to draw some preliminary conclusions concerning the importance of the meeting at Ephesos between Krateros' army and Kleitos' navy. As we have seen, this important event was a unique opportunity for regional lower-ranking officers to reconnect with the *Hetairoi* that had followed Alexander eastwards, in an attempt to make sense of the scrambled state of the Empire, and their own role within it, after their King's death. At the same time, there were also regional considerations that had to be discussed when attempting to re-emphasize Macedonian hegemony in Western Asia Minor. Specifically, an economic re-evaluation of the region was necessary because any past decisions had been taken by Alexander personally. For instance, we learn that Alexander demanded contributions for the war against Persia, or offered financial exemptions to various communities. But given that the Persian Empire had been utterly destroyed, *syntaxeis* were technically no longer needed, especially since Alexander's campaign to the east had officially come to an end. More importantly, it was not clear to anyone whether any such decrees to individual communities were still in place after his death.

A short honorary decree provides us with invaluable information about the complex economic situation at Ephesos, as well as the Macedonian response as it attempted to offer clarification to any Ephesian concerns. The decree honours a certain "Theuchrestos of Philoxenos the Macedonian, because he is

zealous towards the temple and the city."²⁴² Unfortunately, we know nothing of Theuchrestos. In fact, no one by this name is even recorded during this period of time.²⁴³ However, we do have quite a lot of information about his father, Philoxenos the Macedonian. As mentioned in previous chapters, there is only one Philoxenos prominent among Alexander's Macedonians in Asia Minor, whom we have previously met at Ephesos as *hyparchos* of Ionia in 324 BC. According to Arrian, he was assigned as "collector of the tribute on this side of the Taurus."²⁴⁴ This has led Bosworth to conclude that Philoxenos' authority extended outside of his Karian satrapy that was eventually granted to him after Alexander's return from India.²⁴⁵

Plutarch further identifies Philoxenos as "τοῦ τῆς παραλίας ὑπάρχου"²⁴⁶. Frank C. Babbitt, the translator of the Arrian Loeb edition, has interpreted this as "governor of the coast-lands of Asia Minor", while a more literal translation might simply mean "commander of the coast."²⁴⁷ Bosworth draws attention to the dangers of translation, suggesting that *παραλία* might here refer to limited tracts of coastline such as Ionia, or Aeolis, but also to the entire coast between Karia and Kilikia.²⁴⁸ Based on such ancient statements, P. Goukowsky has concluded that in fact Alexander created financial districts that might

²⁴² I. Ephes. 1433, ll. 1.

²⁴³ Neither Jacoby-Wisowa, Berve or Heckel provide entries on Theuchrestos at this time.

²⁴⁴ Arr. *Anab.* 3.6.4.

²⁴⁵ A. B. Bosworth, *A Historical Commentary* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1995), 281.

²⁴⁶ Plut. *Mor.* 333A. As noted in the previous chapter, the term *hyparchos* is quite ambiguous, but in Philoxenos' case it simply refers to him as a "subordinate commander".

²⁴⁷ Arr. *Anab.* Babbitt, 419.

²⁴⁸ Bosworth, *Historical Commentary*, 281-2.

encompass several satrapies under the watch of overseers such as Philoxenos.²⁴⁹

Whether such districts existed at all, is hard to determine due to the ambiguity of our sources. But given Philoxenos' numerous dealings with the city of Ephesos, it is safe to conclude that he oversaw the financial matters of at least parts of the Aegean coast of Asia Minor, including Ephesos.²⁵⁰

In light of Alexander's death, any such arrangement or administrative policy imposed by Alexander himself would have raised serious concerns for someone in Philoxenos' position. The case of Ephesos is especially revealing. As we know from Arrian, "Alexander ordered [the Ephesians] to contribute to the temple of Artemis the taxes which they previously paid to the Persians."²⁵¹ Yet in 322 BC it was no longer clear if such decree was still applicable without its patron. For Philoxenos, therefore, contacting the other Macedonian leaders, especially those that had been present at Babylon, would have allowed him to inquire into the financial situation of the coastal Ionian cities - was there still a tribute to be paid? If so, how much, and to whom? Implicitly, his continued role in the area would have also been on Philoxenos' mind, given that his reputation had diminished in Alexander's eyes. According to Plutarch, the cause of this was Philoxenos' suggestion to purchase handsome Ephesian boys, an initiative that brought him great rebuke as "Alexander almost relieved him of his

²⁴⁹ Paul Goukowsky, *Essai sur les origines du mythe d'Alexandre* (Nancy, France, Université de Nancy, 1978), 318.

²⁵⁰ The fact that we also encounter him at Athens on behalf of Alexander concerning the Harpalos affair should not surprise us; after all, this was first and foremost a financial issue on a grand scale that had to be rectified by he who now oversaw it, in the wake of Harpalos the Treasurer's theft of five thousand talents and subsequent flight. Demosthenes' famous retort "what will they do on seeing the sun who are blinded by a lamp?", as the Athenians are silent in fear at upon his arrival, quite vividly depicts Philoxenos' authority. Plut. *Mor.* 531 A.

²⁵¹ Arr. *Anab.* 1.17.10.

command."²⁵² Fortunately for Philoxenos, it seems that he continued to be highly regarded by his peers and we later encounter him fighting on the side of Kassander.²⁵³

Returning to the honorary decree, its content suggests to us the outcome of the deliberation. The text informs us that "because he is zealous towards the temple and the people it seems right to the Council and the People, that *proxenia* be granted to him in like manner as to the other *proxenoi*."²⁵⁴ The explicit reference to the Artemision suggests that the Ephesian delegates secured from Philoxenos' son and representative, the continuation of previous benefits; namely, the flow of the previous tribute into the temple. And since, as mentioned before, the temple itself was also a bank, this outcome effectively ensured a steady and financially privileged future for the city of Ephesos. The Artemision, of course, had been granted *asylia*, territorial inviolability, by Alexander himself, and as we have seen Krateros and Perdikkas' men in turn recognized it. In fact, it was precisely because of such assurances that sanctuaries could perform other functions within the community.²⁵⁵ By implication, therefore, any meddling with the integrity of the temple and its possessions, wealth included, could be deemed as sacrilegious and Philoxenos was careful to avoid such taint.

That this policy was in fact respected even in the years to come is evidenced by the actions of Antigonos Monophtalmos in 319 BC. After retaking

²⁵² Plut. *Mor.* 1099 D.

²⁵³ Diod. 19.35.3.

²⁵⁴ I. Ephes. 1433, ll. 1-3.

²⁵⁵ Ulrich Sinn, "Greek Sanctuaries as Places of Refuge". *Greek Sanctuaries: New Approaches*, 90 (New York, NY: Routledge, 1993).

Ephesos from Kleitos, Diodorus Siculus mentions that "after Aischylos of Rhodos sailed into Ephesos carrying from Kilikia in four ships six hundred talents of silver that were being sent into Macedonia to the kings, Antigonos seized it all, saying that he had an obligation towards his hired mercenaries."²⁵⁶ Significantly, Antigonos abstained from demanding or even pillaging the sum from the city's incredibly wealthy Artemision. Such an action suggests that despite the pressing circumstances,²⁵⁷ Antigonos nonetheless respected past agreements and heeded the Temple's integrity as *asylos*. Strabo in fact tells us that there was unbroken continuity with regard to the temple's privileges by pointing out that, The temple remains *asylos* now as before, but the boundaries have often been changed, as Alexander increased them by a stadion, and as Mithradates shot an arrow from the corner of the roof and reckoned that it had gone a little beyond the stadion, while Antony doubled this, and thus encompassing in the right of *asylia* a part of the city.²⁵⁸

3.4. The Ephesian Initiative at the Meeting of Ephesos

In conclusion, when Krateros' veterans encountered the fleet manned by Kleitos under the supervision of Alketas, Ephesos was quickly turned into a council-place for Macedonians. As news of Krateros' impending crossing into

²⁵⁶ Diod. 18.52.7. Admittedly, one may argue that Antigonos in fact wanted to hurt the kings as "he had begun to act for his own ends." But at the same time, there is no evidence that any conquering power, be it Macedonian or Roman, ever assumed Ephesian/Artemisian funds.

²⁵⁷ Mercenaries were in fact notoriously volatile when it came to their pay, as Antipatros found out the hard way at Triparadaizos, where his soldiers almost lynched him after learning that he did not have ready cash to pay them. FGrH. 156.F9.33.

²⁵⁸ Strab. 14.1.23.

Europe spread, other Macedonian commanders and lower-ranking officers that had been operating in Western Asia Minor saw this as a unique opportunity to encounter, deliberate and negotiate with respect to the Macedonian authority in the region. This situation is in fact revealing of the state of the Macedonian Empire and, in fact, exposes the fragility of the very concept of "empire". As news of Alexander's death spread from Babylon, so did the Macedonian *oikoumene* instantly break down into a myriad of smaller units governed by now-isolated pockets of Macedonian contingents, bringing complete change and insecurity.²⁵⁹ For those left behind on the Aegean coast of Asia Minor, the continued possession of the conquered lands and their administration was determined at Ephesos, as dire circumstances demanded the immediate re-affirmation of Macedonian hegemony, and of the hierarchy of command within the Macedonian ranks.

The honorary decrees discussed above (I.Ephes. 1430-1438) also reveal the active role played by the city of Ephesos during the Macedonian proceedings. The numerous references to *πρέσβεις* and *τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας* reveal the initiative of the Ephesians behind the grants of citizenship and *proxenia* to the Macedonians. To what extent these contacts took place within the very city, cannot be decisively determined because phrases such as "those of the citizens who petition to him"²⁶⁰ remain hopelessly (and conveniently) vague. Yet the verb *ἐντυγχάνω* does entail "avoir une entrevue avec un personnage puissant, venir le trouver, [pour] souvent lui présenter une

²⁵⁹ Boiy, 40.

²⁶⁰ I. Ephes. 1431, 1432, 1437.

demande, une supplique."²⁶¹ Only in Philoxenos' case do we know that his son represented him in his dealings with the Ephesians. Thus, on the one hand, the Ephesians themselves may have acted as intermediaries between the Macedonian officers in the region. On the other hand, this situation equally implies multiple, even simultaneous, Ephesian delegations that dealt with various individuals, in tandem with Macedonian deliberations and preparations for the eventual crossing into Europe.

What is certain, however, is that the Ephesians opened negotiations with certain individuals with specific goals in mind pertaining to their function and role. This explains why the "zeal" towards the Artemision is emphasized only in the decrees honouring Kleitos/Alketas, Hagnon/Krateros, and lastly Theuchrestos/Philoxenos. While the first two groups represented the greatest authority in the eyes of the Macedonians, at least in that region and at that time, the latter was the person that had been responsible with the finances of the region. Naturally, a decision pertaining to the Artemision would have required an agreement with these groups exclusively.

Beyond ensuring the Artemision's continued privileged status, the Ephesians profited politically from these negotiations with the Macedonian faction. We have already discussed the clear re-affirmation of the democratic faction through the emphasis on "the Council and the People" as the authority over the granting of honours. And by granting *politeia* with a potential beneficial role, Ephesos effectively "aurait créé des citoyens du dehors" that would

²⁶¹ Chantraine, 122-123, s.v. ἐντυγχάνω.

hopefully continue to represent the city's interests and adopt "au moins aux moments de crise, un comportement quasi civique."²⁶² This could ensure, for example, stability during periods of crop failure or protection from marauding pirates by the local Macedonian commanders, while at the same time also created a bond of loyalty between Ephesos and the Macedonians; a very important concession given the tense or even rebellious state of affairs in the Aegean world.

Moreover, by recognizing foreigners as *proxenoi*, the Ephesians acknowledged that those individuals would be useful to them in the future.²⁶³ Such honour usually implied economic benefits for the honorand, such as the facilitation of importing and exporting goods. And for a harbour-city like Ephesos, sealing such relationships had real potential because, even if the *proxenos* would only occasionally profit from the advantages that came with the title, it "created at least opportunities for economic activities."²⁶⁴ Not surprisingly, Theuchrestos is the only Macedonian singled out as "given to him *proxenia* as to the other *proxenoi*."²⁶⁵ This was a highly personal relationship and targeted the immediate utility of the individual. And in this case, Theuchrestos son of Philoxenos, the *chiliarchos* overseeing regional finances, was a perfect candidate that would benefit the city of Ephesos economically in the years to come. This is precisely why the specific duties of the *proxenos* were explicitly left ambiguous, since they would vary according to circumstances (and crises) that

²⁶² Gauthier, 161.

²⁶³ Gauthier, 142.

²⁶⁴ Gary Reger, "The Economy". *A Companion to the Hellenistic World*, Ed. by Andrew Erskine, 345 (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005).

²⁶⁵ I. Ephes. 1433, ll. 2.

could include grain shortage, construction funds, trade agreements, contributions - or in Ephesos' case, exemption from -, tariffs etc.²⁶⁶

The active, interest-driven negotiations between Ephesos and the Macedonian elite discloses the tripartite model of interaction between the Ephesians, the local Macedonian commanders, and finally those directly involved in the Macedonian crossing into Europe. Local, regional and general interests were thus concomitantly addressed at Ephesos with the occasion of Krateros' meeting with Perdikkas' men. It remains to be seen how the Ephesos meeting affected the other communities in Western Asia Minor, and how it addressed their own concerns and aspirations. This will in turn allow us to determine Ephesos' role among its Ionian neighbors.

²⁶⁶ Gauthier, 142, 144.

CHAPTER IV: EPHESOS IN THE IONIAN CONTEXT

4.1. Regional Significance of the Ephesos Meeting

The deliberations at Ephesos had implications that went beyond local Ephesian concerns and Macedonian interests. After all, this was the first direct Macedonian response towards a Greek community in the Aegean since their return from the east. As a result, the question would arise to what extent their treatment of Ephesos was indicative of the Macedonian stance towards all Greeks in the area. Indeed, evidence suggests that as news of the *ad-hoc* meeting reached the other communities on and off the Ionian coast, they showed great interest in the outcome and even sought to take part in the negotiations.

The most revealing case is that of Echekratides son of Xennos from Methymna whom the Ephesian community honoured along with the Macedonian *strategoi* in the same series of honorary decrees (I.Ephes. 1430-1437). His presence at Ephesos is significant precisely because he was the only honoree that was not part of the Macedonian contingent. According to Berve, he is the same Echekratides who was the peripatetic philosopher and friend of Aristotle.²⁶⁷ Although we possess little information about him, the little we know allows us to understand his role and motivations at Ephesos in 322 BC. According to Plutarch, the Athenian General Phokion received from Alexander the Great "the release of Echekratides the sophist, Athenodoros of Imbros, and

²⁶⁷ Berve ii, 162 no. 333 and Martini, RE 5.1 (1905), s.v. Echekratides (1), col. 1910.

two men of Rhodos, Demaratos and Sparton, who had been arrested upon various charges and imprisoned in Sardeis."²⁶⁸

All the individuals mentioned by Plutarch were untrustworthy, having exhibited pro-Persian affinities in the past. For instance, Athenodoros of Imbros had been a mercenary commander in the service of Darius III and was taken prisoner when Alexander stormed Sardeis,²⁶⁹ while the two brothers Demaratos and Sparton became a symbol of Rhodos' resistance to Macedonian hegemony. Rhodos' stance towards Alexander had indeed been an ambiguous one. On the one hand, Arrian tells us that after the battle of Issus the Rhodians surrendered their ports to Macedon, and even sent nine triremes for the war effort.²⁷⁰ But during Alexander's reign, "the Rhodians and the Chians made complaints of their garrisons,"²⁷¹ the same garrisons that were expelled immediately after the King's death.²⁷² Rhodos' surrender had been one of necessity when faced with the overwhelming Macedonian force, but the Rhodians' struggle for their community's *autonomia* continued through mercenary commanders such as Memnon, and the brothers Demaratos and Sparton. Indeed, we learn from Arrian through Photius' *Bibliotheka* that Attalos' forces, in their attempt to retake Knidos, Kaunos and Rhodos, "were heavily defeated by the Rhodians, with Demaratos as their *nauarchos*."²⁷³

²⁶⁸ Plut. *Phoc.* 18.6.

²⁶⁹ Dem. *Or.* 23,170-173, Berve ii, 14 no. 27, Judeich, RE 5.1 (1896), s.v. Athenodoros (2), col. 2043.

²⁷⁰ Arr. *Anab.* 2.20.2.

²⁷¹ Curt. 4.8.12.

²⁷² Diod. 18.8.1.

²⁷³ FGrH. 156.F11.39.

Echekratides' anti-Macedonian stance had been even more virulent, he had been instrumental in restoring the pro-Persian oligarchic government at Methymna during the Persian counter-offensive on Lesbos in 334/333 BC. It is noteworthy that of all the Lesbian *poleis*, only Methymna's rival city Mytilene had resisted Memnon of Rhodos. It seems probable that Echekratides' imprisonment might have occurred after "[Alexander] gave Amphoterios command of the fleet at the shore of the Hellespont and Hegelochos of the land forces, in order that these officers might free Lesbos, Chios and Kos from the enemies' garrisons."²⁷⁴ After Memnon's death and the Macedonians' success on Lesbos, the *stasis* instigators and Persian partisans were arrested and imprisoned at Sardeis, with Echekratides among them.

Under the circumstances, Echekratides' presence at Ephesos was quite timely. News of a Macedonian naval expedition into Europe initiated by Krateros himself would have been a serious concern for most Lesbian communities, including Methymna. With Alexander gone, its commitment to the Macedonian cause would have been once again called into question given their duplicitous past, specifically due to the prevalent instability in the Aegean, exacerbated by Rhodos' defection. Thus, the prospect of having to watch as a Macedonian navy passed by the island was a terrifying one for the ruling body of Methymna. As mentioned before, generals could take advantage of such opportunities to plunder coastal cities or islands, especially those that had not formally offered their assistance,²⁷⁵ and the Methymnaians would surely seek to

²⁷⁴ Curt. 3.1.19-20.

²⁷⁵ Chaniotis, 134.

avoid this. Echekratides, then, would have sought to clarify his own and Methymna's position *vis-à-vis* the Macedonian *strategoi* in the area, offering assurances of loyalty and assistance in exchange for their "well-minded" attitude towards the Methymnaians. Whether he also represented the interests of the other cities on Lesbos is hard to determine, but this is an attractive prospect given Echekratides' prominence and affiliations.

The fact that he is honored at Ephesos among the Macedonians suggests that the pleas of Echekratides and, by implication, of Methymna, were positively received by the Macedonian contingent. Furthermore, the decree in honour of Echekratides specifies that,

Because he is zealous towards the temple and the city, it seems right to the Council and the People, that he be citizen in equal and like manner. And these are to be granted also to his descendants. He was assigned the Teios Tribe and the Sperchuleos Thousand.²⁷⁶

Specific details of the interaction between Echekratides and Ephesos escape us, but we may infer from the decree's formulation that some sort of *rapprochement* was established between the Lesbian communities and democratic Ephesos. Not much is known about the governments on Lesbos, but epigraphic evidence makes it clear that the Lesbian communities experienced a democratic revolution with the advent of Alexander the Great.²⁷⁷ For instance, a series of decrees from Eresos mentions the *demos* as the ultimate ruling body, imposed and supported by Alexander against the families of Agonippos and Antigonos.²⁷⁸

²⁷⁶ I.Ephes. 1434, ll. 1-3.

²⁷⁷ For more information, see Chapter I. Democracies were imposed after Alexander sent his generals to retake the island communities lost as a result of the Persian counter-offensive in 333 BC. In particular, see footnote 39.

²⁷⁸ IG XII 2.526 and Heisserer, 78.

Similarly, Mytilene was ruled after 334 BC by the pro-Macedonian *boule* and *demos* that withstood Memnon's coercive attempts to re-impose the former pro-Persian oligarchs.²⁷⁹

The Exiles' Decree and subsequent death of Alexander would have further complicated socio-political conditions for many communities on Lesbos. This was the case even for a loyal and democratic city like Mytilene that had to contend with various incidents brought about by the return of some exiles. Such tensions are vividly expressed by a local decree which states:

If any of those who have returned does not abide by these settlements [let him not receive (?)] from the city any property and let him not [enter into possession] of any of those things which those previously in the city granted to him, but let those previously in the city who granted (them) [to him] enter upon possession of these things.²⁸⁰

As a result, initiatives such as Echekratides' provided a rare opportunity to seek clarification and pledges of security directly from the *Diadochoi* in exchange for claims of loyalty, as well as to establish good relations with neighboring democratic communities in a bid for regional stability. The Ephesos proved to be the ideal setting for these purposes.

4.2. The Question of Democracy²⁸¹ and the Alexandrian Precedent

The actions of the other cities on the Ionian coast, however, are more difficult to determine because of insufficient direct evidence. Nevertheless, we do possess circumstantial evidence that allows us to bridge this lack of

²⁷⁹ IG XII 2.6 and Heisserer, 131.

²⁸⁰ Tod, 201.

²⁸¹ For a discussion of Ephesian democracy as opposed to oligarchy, see Appendix 4.

information by analyzing regional history and conditions. In doing so, we seek to find connections and patterns of interaction between Ephesos and the other Ionians in order to better understand the regional impact of the Ephesos meeting.

One aspect that stands out is the question of democracy. Continued Macedonian support for democratic regimes was as important for the other Ionian Greeks as it was for Ephesos. Evidence suggests that democracies were firmly in place in the region by 322 BC. Even the Samians, whose restoration had been a complicated matter, referred in contemporary decrees to the *demos* and the *boule* as the ultimate governing bodies after the forceful evacuation of the Athenian *klerouchoi*.²⁸²

Democratic governments in the area were set in place, as we have already seen, after Alexander "ordered the oligarchies everywhere to be overthrown and democracies to be established."²⁸³ Some communities such as Magnesia and Tralles embraced these measures and handed over their cities immediately, especially since Alexander "restored its own laws to each city and remitted the tribute they used to pay to the barbarians."²⁸⁴ To implement the changes, the young King "sent also Alkimachos son of Agathokles, [...] to the Aiolian cities and to any Ionian towns still object to the barbarians."²⁸⁵ Meanwhile, Antigonos Monophtalmos was sent to liberate Priene and impose a democratic government. For his initiative, the Macedonian general was offered

²⁸² Shipley, 169. Habicht, *Hellenistic Monarchies*, 78. SIG. 312, ll. 4 with the typical formula: "it seems right for the Council and the People."

²⁸³ Arr. *Anab.* 1.18.2.

²⁸⁴ Arr. *Anab.* 1.18.1.

²⁸⁵ Arr. *Anab.* 1.18.1.

great honours by the Prienian community in a decree emphasizing their newly-acquired *autonomia*:

[It seems right] to the *boule* [and the *demos*,] determined on the second [of the month] of Metageitnion, at a [general] assembly, the Prieneans being autonomous, in the *prytany* of Hippokrates: to Antigonos of Philip the Macedonian who has been a benefactor and who is zealous towards the city of the Prieneans, to give him *proxenia* and citizenship ...²⁸⁶

Diodorus Siculus, discussing the situation in Asia Minor, notes that "[Alexander] particularly benefited (*ἐνεργέτει*) the Greek cities, making them autonomous and free from taxation, adding the assurance that he had taken upon himself the war against the Persians on behalf of the freedom of the Greeks."²⁸⁷ This statement reinforces the central role of Alexander and his direct, individual relationship with every Ionian community. As in the case of Ephesos, the condition of the Ionians depended on Alexander's will and initiative. This went beyond symbolic value: Alexander promoted himself as the personal supporter and guardian of their democratic governments.

As a result, in the wake of the King's unexpected death, the Ionian Greeks quickly reacted by emphasizing the importance of Alexander's benefactions, as they flaunted their personal connection to him before the *Diadochoi*. Local coinage expresses the Ionians' initiative to associate themselves to the memory and image of Alexander. As archaeological finds suggest, during Alexander's reign Ionian mints started producing a great number of coins with the name of Alexander and motifs representing him.²⁸⁸ According to Georges Le

²⁸⁶ Tod. 186, ll. 1-8.

²⁸⁷ Diod. 17.24.1. Passage has also been discussed from a different perspective in the first chapter.

²⁸⁸ Le Rider, 86.

Rider, the mints "seem to have acted with complete independence in accordance with local needs,"²⁸⁹ suggesting that the initiative came from the communities themselves, as they sought to promote and strengthen the personal bond between community and King.

Moreover, according to Hyla Troxell, hoards of Alexander coins dating from 332 to 320 BC that had been initially identified as staters from Salamis were in fact produced *en masse* at Ephesos.²⁹⁰ This points to the fact that the Ephesian community considered it important to maintain this connection between the *polis* and its liberator, especially during the troublesome years of the impending Diadoch Wars. A more recent numismatic study produced by Kamen Dimitrov has revealed that coins mentioning Alexander the Great and even Philip II continued to be minted throughout Western Asia Minor, most of them dating from around 322 BC, some even as late as 280-270 BC. Examples range from Miletos, Mylasa, Erythreia, Kolophon, Mytilene, Magnesia-on-Meandros, and of course Ephesos.²⁹¹

In recognition of his benefactions, some communities even honored Alexander with various civic roles. For example, an inscription from Miletos reveals that "Alexandros son of Philip"²⁹² was adopted as the eponymous magistrate corresponding to the year 334-333 BC, the first year of Miletos' "liberation". Most importantly, however, the Ionian *poleis* were overwhelmingly

²⁸⁹ Le Rider, 96.

²⁹⁰ Hyla Troxell, "A New Look at Some Alexander Staters from 'Salamis' ", *Travaux de numismatique Grecque offerts à Georges Le Rider*, 359, 367 (London, England: Spink, 1999).

²⁹¹ Kamen Dimitrov, "The Greek Cities in Ionia, Karia, and the Western Black Sea Area During the Early Hellenistic Age". *100 Jahre Österreichische Forschungen in Ephesos*, 183-184 (Wien, Austria: Verlag, 1995).

²⁹² SIG 1.272, ll. 2.

in favor of Alexander's last and most controversial measure of his reign. Not only did they show support for the Exiles' Decree which, as we have seen, would have officially validated the governments set up by Alexander, but the Ionian communities also showed great enthusiasm towards Alexander's supposed demand that he receive divine honours.²⁹³ For example, a great inscription from Erythrai dating from the 3rd century BC on the sale of priesthoods catalogues the price for the priesthood of "king Alexander" to two thousand drachma.²⁹⁴ According to Malcolm Errington, this high cost "suggests that at Erythrai at least the standing of the Alexander cult was, presumably from the beginning deliberately intended to be equal to or greater than that of the richest city cults."²⁹⁵ At Priene, a private individual was honored in 129 BC for restoring a temple in Alexander's honor, "after he gave with his brother the sum of one thousand drachma for the Alexandreion."²⁹⁶

Moreover, an Ephesian inscription from the Roman period also mentions a priesthood dedicated to Alexander even as late as the 2nd century AD.²⁹⁷ For Bosworth, the granting of divine honors were "expressions of gratitude, voted at the king's suggestion no doubt but popular and enduring."²⁹⁸ Errington points out, however, that "such cults continued to be observed long after the person

²⁹³ There have been many debates whether Alexander really believed he was divine, or whether he accepted divine honours for more pragmatic reasons, as circumstances demanded. For some of these debates and arguments, Bosworth, 278-290.

²⁹⁴ SIG 4.1014, ll. 111-112.

²⁹⁵ Errington, "Alexander in the Hellenistic World", *Alexandre le Grand, Image et Réalité*, 169 (Geneva, Switzerland: Vandoeuvres, 1975).

²⁹⁶ I. Prien. 108, ll. 79.

²⁹⁷ I. Ephes. 719.

²⁹⁸ Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire*, 258.

honored had died, so long as before his death he had given no reason by a change in his attitude to the honoring city, for the cult's being abolished."²⁹⁹

Behind Errington's observation stands the tacit implication that for the Ionian communities the socio-political situation imposed by Alexander was the desired *status-quo* even after his death. Because of this, the memory of Alexander was *un point-de-référence* for the Ionian communities as they welcomed and deliberated with the *Diadochoi*. Hans-Joachim Gherke refers to this phenomenon as "intentional history"; that is, "history in a group's own understanding, especially insofar as it is significant for the make-up and identity of a group."³⁰⁰ By emphasizing the central role and benefactions of Alexander towards their communities, the Ionians severely limited the Successors' margin of negotiation. When faced with the Alexandrian precedent the only viable option for them was to promote a sense of continuity, articulated through expressions of mutual goodwill and loyalty. Anything less from the *Diadochoi* could lead to serious regional disruptions, while their actions could even be deemed sacrilegious if they seemed to go against Alexander's publicly declared will *vis-à-vis* the Ionians on the Aegean coast of Asia Minor.

To be sure, this does not imply that the *Diadochoi* were not initially well-minded towards the Ionians. On the contrary, their actions suggest that they attempted to offer them positive responses to their pleas, as they sought the same outcome; namely, to re-establish regional interaction, and to secure the Ionians' continued adherence to their efforts to restore Macedonian *hegemonia*

²⁹⁹ Errington, "Alexander in the Hellenistic World", 170.

³⁰⁰ Hans-Joachim Gehrke, "Myth, History, and Collective Identity", 298.

in the Aegean. However, circumstances prompted the Macedonian contingent to be mindful of local conditions. For example, local Smyrnaian tradition as recorded by Pausanias claimed that "the modern city was founded by Alexander, the son of Philip, in accordance with a vision in a dream."³⁰¹ Strabo, on the other hand, suggests that "[the Smyrnaians] were reassembled into a city by Antigonos, and afterwards by Lysimachos."³⁰² Getzel Cohen has conciliated the two versions by plausibly concluding that "Alexander may have suggested moving the city and made appropriate promises but left the actual work to Antigonos."³⁰³

Other such similar claims were made with regard to Priene, but "there is no direct evidence to support the contention that Alexander re-founded Priene. [Rather,] it is a hypothesis based on the lack of evidence, literary or epigraphic, for the city in the period c.390 to c.330 BC."³⁰⁴ Nevertheless, Alexander showed great interest in the city and even offered to pay for the rebuilding of the local temple in honor of Athena. The Prieneans gladly accepted the offer, as is made clear by a temple dedication which boldly states that "King Alexander dedicated the temple to Athena Polias."³⁰⁵

As a result, upon arriving on the Aegean coast of Asia Minor, the *Diadochoi* had to provide answers or solutions to any matter concerning socio-political reorganization, urban planning, or continued financial support for

³⁰¹ Paus. 4.5.1.

³⁰² Strab. 14.37.1.

³⁰³ Getzel Cohen, *The Hellenistic Settlements in Europe, the Islands, and Asia Minor* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1995), 182.

³⁰⁴ Cohen, 187.

³⁰⁵ I.Prien. 156.

local building projects.³⁰⁶ Yet at the same time, the persistent emphasis on the image of Alexander as liberator, founder and benefactor in local memory and identity allowed for premises of negotiation that both Ionians and Macedonians could evoke in their effort for mutual agreement.

It was during these initial stages of contact between local communities and the *Diadochoi* that the Hellenistic pattern of interaction through negotiation came to be implemented, along the lines of the Alexandrian precedent.³⁰⁷ As Shipley and Hansen point out, "a city's relationship with the Successor [...] was the most important relationship it could have. Royal power was not absolute; kings often had to earn the support of cities, and cities could sometimes turn this to their advantage."³⁰⁸ But at the same time, the very acceptance of this negotiation with the Macedonian contingent led to the eventual tacit recognition of the ruling power, leading to "the existence of a unitary royal state, underlying the plethora of local commitments and made acceptable by these commitments."³⁰⁹

4.3. Factors of Constraint

Ephesos is a particularly revealing case-study for the importance and implications of maintaining good relations between the *Diadochoi* and the Ionian

³⁰⁶ The temple of Athena Polias at Priene was in fact still in construction, and would only be completed in 290 BC. Cohen, 188.

³⁰⁷ John Ma, "Kings", *A Companion to the Hellenistic World*. Ed. by Andrew Erskine, 185 (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2005).

³⁰⁸ Mogens Hansen and Graham Shipley, "The Polis and Federalism", *The Cambridge Companion to the Hellenistic World*, Ed. by Glenn Bugh, 62 (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

³⁰⁹ Ma, "Kings", 186.

communities, as well as for some of the less obvious constraints that the Macedonian generals might face in the process. Ephesos had always been a strategic settlement since it was a large port city that stood at the gates of Asia. Because of its accessibility, it had been the preferred route of Krateros after he decided to cross into Europe, and it would continue to serve the *Diadochoi* well in subsequent campaigns. Consequently, continued access to such an important place was a constant consideration for the Macedonian contingent in its interaction with the Ephesian democratic government.

Beyond its geographic potential, Ephesos represented the tangible success of Alexander the Great's quest for the liberation of the Ionians as expressed by Delios of Ephesos, who had also supposedly convinced Philip II "to lead an expedition against Asia."³¹⁰ In recognition of its deliverance from the pro-Persian oligarchic yoke, Ephesos had remained loyal to the King's cause even during Persian counter-offensives and general Greek disaffection with regard to the Exiles' Decree. It's no surprise, then, that Ephesos' continued loyalty would have been rewarded with public support from Alexander towards the city's democratic government.

Diadochoi like Krateros and Alketas had little choice in the matter. In the context of growing anti-Macedonian tension in different parts of the Empire, they could not afford to antagonize any local governments, especially those that had proven loyal and well-minded in the past. If they failed in this endeavor, they risked losing the support of, and even drawing the hostility of Ionian

³¹⁰ Philo. *Soph*, 3.

communities such as Ephesos. Potential resistance to the Macedonian armies could in fact prove a serious setback given that "a siege, even by a Hellenistic king, was an expensive and hazardous venture"³¹¹ that could take a long time to complete, time that someone like Krateros could not afford to waste.³¹²

Similar considerations also applied with respect to the Artemision. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the temple was treated with the utmost respect by the Macedonian contingent and continued to enjoy its prestigious *asylos* status. To be sure, religious considerations were not the foremost priority in this regard. The *Diadochoi* could surely have used the temple's wealth for personal means, given that "the Ephesian Artemision surpassed all other Greek sanctuaries in wealth, except Delphi, because of its extensive possessions of land."³¹³ This has led Pausanias to claim that "the land of the Ionians has the finest possible climate, and sanctuaries such as there are to be found nowhere else. First because of its size and wealth is that of the Ephesian goddess."³¹⁴ However, they could neither afford to overlook the prestige and history of the site.

The origins of the Artemision were conventionally dated *in illo tempore*, as the physical manifestation of the Amazon Queen Hippo's worship of the virgin goddess.³¹⁵ Local tradition had in fact an alternative version relating to

³¹¹ John Ma, "Fighting poleis", *War and Violence in Ancient Greece*. Ed. by Hans van Wees, 360 (Oakville, CT: Duckworth, 2000).

³¹² Even Alexander the Great, who gained a reputation for a brilliant besieger, needed eight months to finally seize the Phoinikian city Tyr.

³¹³ Jan Bremmer, "Priestly Personnel of the Ephesian Artemision ". *Practitioners of the Divine: Greek Priests and Religious Officials from Homer to Heliodorus*, 3 (Cambridge, MA: CHS, 2008).

³¹⁴ Paus. 7.5.4.

³¹⁵ Bremmer, 11.

the birth of Artemis, rendering the ground itself in the area sacrosanct.

According to Strabo, who records the Ephesian version of Leto's labors:

On the same coast, slightly above the sea, is also Ortygia [...]The Kenchrinos river traverses it, where they say that Leto bathed herself after her travail. For they tell the story of the birth on that spot, and of the nurse Ortygia, and of the holy place where the birth took place, and of the olive tree nearby, where they say that the goddess rested after she was relieved from her travail.³¹⁶

Therefore, the temple itself was intimately connected with the identity of Ephesos and with Greek culture in general. Moreover, the cult had also incorporated Anatolian elements, as the role of the patron goddess extended to other communities as an expression on the one hand of the indigenous goddess *Ûpis*,³¹⁷ and on the other hand of Kybele, "the Great Mother".³¹⁸ In fact, archaeological evidence suggests that many offerings came from as far as Phoinikia, leading Brenk and de Polignac to conclude that "the temple offered a mediating role between the city and the rest of the world, particularly the world stretching to the east."³¹⁹

Because of its regional prominence, the Artemision had long enjoyed the benefactions of the regional masters, the first of them being the Lydian king Kroisos. According to Herodotus, "the first Greeks whom he attacked were the Ephesians. These, being besieged by him, dedicated their city to Artemis; this they did by attaching a rope to the city wall from the temple of the goddess,"³²⁰ thus gaining the favor of their besieger. Even the subsequent Persian overlords proved mindful towards the temple. Indeed, Strabo reports that the temple of

³¹⁶ Strab. 14.1.20.

³¹⁷ Bremmer, 5.

³¹⁸ F. E. Brenk, "Artemis of Ephesos, An Avant Garde Goddess". *Kernos* 11, 161 (1998).

³¹⁹ Brenk, 164 and de Polignac, 6-7.

³²⁰ Hdt. 1.26.

Apollo at Didyma "was set on fire by Xerxes, as were also the other temples, except that of Ephesos."³²¹

Under these circumstances, Alexander's commitment towards the Artemision, as discussed earlier, should be considered as but another example of respect within an ancient tradition of the temple's prominence in Asia Minor. Not surprisingly, the life of Alexander was subsequently seen as intimately connected to the history of the Artemision. This is best depicted by Plutarch's remark concerning the burning of the temple at the hands of Herostratos in 356 BC. He states that "it was no wonder that the temple of Artemis was burned down because the goddess was busy bringing Alexander into the world."³²² This intimate relation between king and goddess was also visually referenced through the portrait of Alexander that adorned the walls of the Artemision close to where the statue of Philip II had stood back in 336 BC. According to Pliny the Elder, Alexander's court painter Apelles depicted Alexander in the likeness of Zeus the Thunderbolt-Bearer.³²³

Upon arriving at Ephesos, therefore, the *Diadochoi* were exposed to a long tradition of religious and cultural prominence that needed to be dealt with in a most sensible manner. The history of the site demanded that it be treated

³²¹ Strab. 14.1.5.

³²² Plut. *Alex.* 3.3.

³²³ Plin. *NH*, 35.92. The painting was commissioned while Alexander was still in the city in 334 BC immediately after Ephesos' liberation. The imagery was meant to portray Alexander as a Zeus on earth and the supreme overlord of Asia. The image was formative in the later Hellenistic kings' self-perception as they constantly appealed to the image of Alexander. Andrew Stewart, "Hellenistic Art: Two Dozen Innovations". *The Cambridge Companion to the Hellenistic World*, 159 (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006) and Peter Schultz, "Divine Images and Royal Ideology". *Aspects of Ancient Greek Cult*, 125 (Aarhus University Press, 2010).

with the utmost respect. After all, even the hated enemy of the Hellenes, Xerxes, had recognized the temple's importance and dealt with it accordingly.³²⁴

Faced with such vivid legacy, it was in the interest of the *Diadochoi* to follow in the footsteps of Alexander and bestow the Artemision its rightful benefactions. Tacitus suggests that they indeed took heed of the temple's importance, adding that "[the temple's] privileges had not been diminished under the Persian empire; later, they had been preserved by the Macedonians, and lastly by ourselves (i.e. the Romans)." This is corroborated by persistent references in epigraphic evidence to the "zeal" shown towards "the temple" in the Ephesian honorary decrees, as the Artemision along with its prominent history seems to have been constantly referred to during the deliberations at Ephesos.³²⁵

But this was not only a way for the Ephesians to ensure, as we have seen, their city's economic stability through the temple's continued *asylos* status. It was also a means to ensure the cult's integrity abroad, as revealed by an Ephesian inscription recording a court verdict. dated from between 340 and 320 BC. The decree recounts the condemnation of no less than twenty-five individuals to death because "they committed sacrilege upon the sacred objects and maltreated the *theoroi*"³²⁶ as they were heading on a holy delegation to the temple of Artemis at Sardeis. Olivier Masson has observed that, judging from the Greek, Lydian, Iranian, and other "noms étranges" of the accused, "la liste des

³²⁴ See footnote 320.

³²⁵ The evidence as well as its implications have been discussed in detail in Chapter 3.

³²⁶ I.Ephes. 2, ll. 6-8.

condamnés montre une image très bigarrée de la population de Sardeis avant l'époque hellénistique."³²⁷

Masson does not provide conclusive reasons for such violence against a sacred embassy from Ephesos to Sardeis, but the circumstances suggest that this incident might have been collateral damage from Macedonian-Persian hostilities. The chronology similarly implies that the incident occurred at a time when regional tensions escalated, such as during Philip II's initial liberation of Ephesos in 336 BC, or after Alexander's subsequent liberation, or even after the proclamation of the Exiles' Decree. Another attractive possibility is that the confrontation was caused by the resurgence of tensions between Ephesian democrats and remnants of pro-Persian supporters during the critical months after the death of Alexander. A precise date for the sacrilege eludes us, but the event does exhibit regional tensions that might have been addressed by the Ephesians with the help of the Macedonian presence in their city. As a result, the Successors' zealous and public support towards the Artemision, as shown in the previous chapter, would effectively guarantee future protection against such sacrilegious acts of violence.

4.4. The Revival of the Panionion

It must be pointed out that upon arriving in Western Asia Minor in the summer of 322 BC, the *Diadochoi* did not interact with local communities merely

³²⁷ Olivier Masson, "L'Inscription D'Éphèse Relative aux Condamnés à Mort de Sardes (I. Ephesos 2)". *Revue des Études Grecques*, 239 (REG 100).

on an individual basis. They in fact dealt with a (constructed) cultural *koinon*. Indeed, Plutarch depicts the Ionians as sharing a common purpose in their dealings with Macedon. He tells us that after Alexander was confirmed as *hegemon* of the Korinthian *synhedrion* in 336 BC, Delios of Ephesos, a pupil of Plato and the emissary sent by the Greeks of Asia at Korinth, "more than any other kindled his ardor and spurred him on to take up the war against the barbarians."³²⁸ This passage is purely symbolic, depicting the close connection that the Ionians of Asia would come to have with their liberator Alexander. At the same time, we also get a hint of Ephesos' prominent position among the other Ionians, as the Ephesian (exiled?) democratic delegation speaks for the rest of their Ionian kinsmen.

Similarly and significantly, we learn from Arrian that Alexander's initial pronouncement concerning the condition of the Ionians had been made while also at Ephesos after setting local affairs in order, prompting Arrian to point out that "and if indeed at any time, Alexander won a high reputation for the things accomplished in Ephesos on that occasion."³²⁹ Therefore, twelve years after the Alexandrian liberation, Ephesos was once again the "spokesperson" for the democratic governments in Western Asia Minor in their renewed contact with the *Diadochoi* during the Ephesos meeting.

Ephesos' prominence in the area was not merely symbolic. Historically, Ephesos had always played an important part in the region's socio-political and

³²⁸ Plut. *Mor.* 1126D.

³²⁹ Arr. *Anab.* 1.17.12. Bosworth has claimed that the passage represents "a factual statement about the attitude of the Ephesian demos in 334." But we can take this argument further and suggest that in fact the passage refers to the attitude of all Ionians affected by Alexander's 'liberation'. Bosworth, *Historical Commentary*, 133.

cultural developments. This becomes evident once we take into account that Ephesos had been one of the twelve members of the Ionian *koinon*. According to Herodotus, "the reason why they made twelve cities and would admit no more was in my judgment this: there were twelve divisions of them when they dwelt in the Peloponnesos,"³³⁰ suggesting that this "federation" had very old origins.³³¹ Originally, the function of the *koinon* seems to have been primarily cultural, emphasizing the imagined kinship between the twelve Ionian *poleis*. Strabo stresses this fact when he informs us that "the Panionion [lies] three stadia above the sea where the Panionia, a common festival (*κοινή πανήγυρις*) of the Ionians, are held, and where sacrifices are performed in honour of the Helikonian Poseidon."³³² Herodotus corroborates this by mentioning that "the Panionion is a sacred ground in Mykale, facing north; it was set apart for Poseidon of Helikon in common (*κοινῇ*) by the Ionians."³³³

By 322 BC, however, the *koinon* of the Ionians had adopted a more political role. This was the result of a long process of increasing regional threats that compelled the Ionians to take important political and military decisions in common to secure their continued *autonomia* when faced with serious crises. The first and most telling example is the Ionians' revolt against Persian domination. Herodotus once again provides the details:

[The Persians] then coming to attack Miletos and the rest of Ionia, the Ionians, when they had word of it, sent men of their own to take

³³⁰ Hdt. 1.145.

³³¹ It is hard to determine the veracity of the tradition concerning the *koinon*'s antiquity and of the twelve cities, but Alexander Herda has suggested that its origins may be dated to at least the eighth century BC. Alexander Herda, "Panionion-Melia." *Istanbuler Mitteilungen* 2006 (56), 99 (Tübingen, Germany: Ernst Wasmuth Verlag, 2006).

³³² Strab. 14.1.20.

³³³ Hdt. 1.148.

council for them in the Panionion. These, when they came to that place and there consulted, resolved to raise no land army to meet the Persians, but to leave the Milesians themselves to defend their walls, and to man their fleet to the last ship and muster with all speed at Lade, there to fight for Miletos at sea.³³⁴

Following the Persian conquest of Asia Minor, the Ionian *koinon* succumbed to its new master and became inactive as a cultural and political expression of Ionian kinship, freedom of deliberation and common action, respectively. Herodotus notes this when observing that "Mykale is a western promontory of the mainland opposite Samos; the Ionians used to assemble there from their cities and keep the festival to which they gave the name of Panionia."³³⁵ As a result, the subsequent purpose of the Ionian communities was to regain their *autonomia* and the freedom to gather together, deliberate and celebrate freely.

In the process, the Panionion became a political symbol of the Ionians' conflict against pro-Persian oligarchs, as they fought at Lade against "the tyrants of the Ionians who had been deposed by Aristagoras of Miletos and had fled to the Medes, and were now as it happened with the army that was led against Miletos."³³⁶ Indeed, despite the revolt's subsequent suppression, the Ionians' efforts for liberty intensified. This is best portrayed by Xenophon's account of Agesilaos' arrival at Ephesos in 396 BC. When asked by Tissaphernes with what intent he had come, Agesilaos answered in a laconic fashion, "that the cities in Asia shall be autonomous as are those in our part of Greece."³³⁷

Significantly, Xenophon goes on to claim:

³³⁴ Hdt. 6.7.

³³⁵ Hdt. 1.148.

³³⁶ Hdt. 4.9.

³³⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.5.

During the time that Agesilaos was spending in quiet and leisure at Ephesos, since the governments in the cities were in a state of confusion - for it was no longer democracy as in the time of Athenian rule, nor dekharchy, as in the time of Lysander - and since the people all know Lysandros, they beset him with requests that he should obtain from Agesilaos the granting of their petitions.³³⁸

Ephesos, in fact, proved the most ardent supporter of the Ionian democratic cause and was actively involved on several occasions in the effort against the Persian oppressor. A scene from Xenophon's *Hellenika* vividly illustrates this by describing Ephesos as a base of operations for Agesilaos and his army. Xenophon comments that everyone, including soldiers, blacksmiths and artisans were involved in war preparations, "so that one might have thought that the city was really a workshop of war." He further expounds the devotion of the Lakedaimonians to Ephesian Artemis and the soldiers' contempt for the Persian prisoners paraded in the city's agora, commenting that "for where men reverence the gods, train themselves in deeds of war, and practice obedience to authority, may we not reasonably suppose that such a place abounds in high hopes?"³³⁹

As subsequent developments would show, however, such enthusiasm would not be enough to deliver the Ionians from under the Persian yoke. But significantly, the Ephesians' hope for Ionian *autonomia* nonetheless persevered and would again manifest itself through Delios' supposed exhortation towards Alexander at Korinth in 336 BC. Therefore, Alexander's success and support for the democratic factions in Western Asia Minor implied a reinvigorated Ionian *koinon* according to newly-established democratic principles, since all of its

³³⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.7.

³³⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.17-19.

members were part of the democratic ruling class of their respective communities; as pointed out earlier, some *poleis* such as Smyrna owed their re-foundation according to democratic principles to Alexander. This very component may be interpreted as the physical manifestation of the success of the Ionians' decades-long struggle against their Persian oppressor, as they could once again meet freely to deliberate and sacrifice to their gods.

An important epigraphic discovery has provided us with the much-needed information concerning the reinstitution of the Ionian *koinon* as a result of the advent of Macedon in the area. One inscription found at the very site of the Panionion on the promontory of Mykale records a judicial sentence stating:

In the prytany of Amyntos, it seemed right to the council of the Ionians: that the Lebedeians are deemed worthy to publish and set up a stele with their decisions and to set it up at the Panionion concerning the decision that was made with regard to the priesthood of Zeus Bouleios and of Hera. It is to be given to them and are to be deemed worthy of it.³⁴⁰

Hiller von Gaertringen dates the document no later than 335/334 BC by pointing out that "die Prytanen sind die älteren Eponymen von Priene, was sicher auf die Zeit vor 335/334 führt."³⁴¹ This has led Sheila Ager to conclude that the dispute over the priesthood "predates Alexander's expedition to Asia [because] the pattern of arbitrations in Asia Minor in the early Hellenistic age suggest that the preponderant role in this field was played by the kings."³⁴²

Ager's argument, however, implies that Alexander would have been personally involved in every single aspect of the Panionian cult. This does not

³⁴⁰ I. Prien. 139.

³⁴¹ I. Prien. T1. pp. 122.

³⁴² Sheila Ager, *Interstate Arbitrations in the Greek World, 337-90 B.C.*, 46-47 (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1996).

have to be the case. It is in fact equally plausible that the dispute occurred immediately after Macedonian forces liberated the region from Persian control; either in 336-335 BC during Parmenion's spearhead campaign, or immediately after Alexander's arrival.³⁴³ Indeed, the fact that such a dispute over the priesthood of a Panionian cult occurs, suggests that such details needed to be deliberated and decided upon, once Macedon offered its support for the restoration of the Ionian *koinon*. Traditionally, as Herodotus tells us, it had been the Prienians who had held such priesthoods, but the Lebedeians now successfully denied the Prienian claim before the other ten members, for whatever reason. This was an internal dispute over matters of tradition, and thus one that did not need to be submitted before Alexander who, as later events would show, could not afford to spend much time in one area due to more immediate and important issues at stake.³⁴⁴ Indeed, as in the case of the foundation of Smyrna, it was sufficient for him to give his approval and let the Ionians decide among themselves the details of organization and cult as they saw fit. After all, they were now technically autonomous and democratic.

Alexander's support, however, was unanimously considered decisive in the revival of the Panionion. Christian Habicht emphasizes this aspect by pointing to the Ionian festival in honour of Alexander. He claims that "das Koinon der Ionier feierte, wahrscheinlich an Geburtstagen des Königs,

³⁴³ It is more plausible that the dispute took place during Alexander's reign if we consider the eponymous change that occurred at Priene from 334/333 BC onwards. The fact that it switched from *prytanis* to *stephanephoros* was probably meant to further emphasize the socio-political changes that occurred with Alexander. For Parmenion's spearhead campaign, see footnote 20.

³⁴⁴ Alexander devised his invasion of Asia as a lightning campaign whose main aim was to catch the Persian defenses unprepared, while trying to coerce as many cities to his cause as possible. He left the task of consolidating and pacifying territories either to his generals or to local satraps who had gained Alexander's favor. Cartledge, 143.

Alexanderspiele mit Agonen und Opfern."³⁴⁵ The evidence is found in Strabo's *Geography*, where we are told that "above the Chalkideis is situated a sacred precinct consecrated to Alexander the son of Philip; and games, called the *Alexandreia*, are proclaimed there."³⁴⁶ The location is not to be confused with the Chalkideis in Macedonia, for Strabo makes it clear that "then one comes to Chalkideis, and to the isthmus of the Chersonesos, belonging to the Teians and Erythraeans."³⁴⁷

Habicht admits that even though "es ist längst vermutet worden, daß der Alexanderskult des Bundes zu Lebzeiten des Königs begründet worden ist,"³⁴⁸ this is difficult to precisely determine. However, it can safely be claimed that after Alexander's death, the *Alexandreia* contests became very important for the legitimacy of the revived Panionion, serving the same purpose as the already-discussed divine honours and priesthoods dedicated to Alexander during his reign, and especially after his death. The festival, then, is a great example which reveals the flexibility of the Greek construction of memory. So, "even historical events and figures could become mythicized, or develop into myth especially if they carried significance, ponderance, or fascination for the relevant community."³⁴⁹

Fragmentary epigraphic evidence suggests that the *Alexandreia* had greater outreach in Asia Minor, beyond the twelve Ionian kin communities. A Magnesian decree in honour of Artemis Leukophryene decreeing the *asylós*

³⁴⁵ Christian Habicht, *Gottmenschen und Griechische Städte* (München, Germany: Verlag, 1970), 17.

³⁴⁶ Strab. 14.1.31.

³⁴⁷ Strab. 14.1.32.

³⁴⁸ Habicht, *Gottmenschen*, 17.

³⁴⁹ Gehrke, "Myth, History, and Collective Identity", 301.

status of the *polis* along with its *chora*, makes a brief mention of the *Alexandreia* at the beginning of the proclamation.³⁵⁰ The decree was probably formalized during these contests. But what is significant is that Magnesia-on-the-Maeandros was never part of the twelve Panionian cities, in spite of its proximity. It is thus probable that the festival was hosted by the twelve Ionian cities, as non-members were invited to participate in the contests; in a similar manner to Panhellenic festivals, but at a regional scale. From a political point of view, such a cultic manifestation would have benefited everyone in the area as it emphasized the region's connection to Alexander.

This is further supported by two important Rhodian decrees from the Roman period. The first mentions "Marcus Antonius [and] Aulus Gabinius who led choruses and competed in the *Alexandrea* in the four-horse chariot race."³⁵¹ The second decree mentions a Rhodian "[who] won in the *Alexandreia* and the *Dionysia* and was victorious in the *Halieia*, and was sent on an embassy to Gaius Iulius the son of Gaius Caesar the *autokrator*."³⁵² These decrees point to the success of the Ionians in promoting the memory of Alexander the Great's influence in the area throughout the centuries. Moreover, they show that "it was imperative that memory of these facts was continually renewed,"³⁵³ as the most prominent Greeks and Romans continually sought to pay homage to him by participating in the *Alexandreia* while gaining regional prestige in the process, to the benefit of the Ionian *koinon*.

³⁵⁰ I.Magn. 16, ll. 1 and 30-35.

³⁵¹ IG XII 1.1116 ll. 3-5.

³⁵² IG XII 1.1119 ll. 8-10.

³⁵³ Gehrke, "Myth, History, and Collective Identity" 305-306.

4.5. Ephesos and the Ionians

The epigraphic evidence, however, presents us with a paradox. None of the previously-discussed inscriptions published with the occasion of the Ephesos meeting (I.Ephes. 1430-1438) make any specific reference to the Ionian *koinon*. *Prima facie*, we might interpret that Ephesos negotiated its own position with the *Diadochoi* without consideration for the rest of the Ionians. But a remark by Diodorus Siculus provides an interesting alternative. The historian claims:

In Ionia nine cities³⁵⁴ were in the habit of holding a common gathering (*κοινήν σύνοδον*) of the Panionians, and of offering sacrifices of great antiquity on a large scale to Poseidon in a lonely region near the place called Mykale. Later, however, as wars broke out in these places, since they were unable to hold the Panionia there, they moved the festival to a safe place near Ephesos.³⁵⁵

The wars mentioned in the text have been interpreted by modern historians as the great satrapal revolts of the 390's BC and Agesilaos' campaigns in the area in 392 BC.³⁵⁶ Simon Hornblower has suggested that this renewed activity of the Panionion at Ephesos led to a strong assimilation of the *Panionia* with the local *Ephesia*.³⁵⁷ Petros Stylianou, however, contradicts Hornblower, claiming that the

³⁵⁴ This is probably a reference to the original nine cities that co-founded the Ionian *koinon* before accepting other members such as Smyrna, as is specified by Herodotus and Strabo.

³⁵⁵ Diod. 15.49.1.

³⁵⁶ Simon Hornblower, "Thucydides, the Panionian Festival, and the Ephesia (III 104)" *ZPE* 31.2 248 (Verlag, 1982). Luisa Prandi "La Rifondazione del Panionion e la Catastrofe di Elice (373 A.C.)". *Contributi dell' Istituto di Storia Antica dell' Universita del Sacro Cuore*, 45-47 (15, 1989), suggests a later date for the move to Ephesos, somewhere around 373 BC. Her date is corroborated by later archaeological studies done by Alexander Herda who claims that with a short exception in 373 BC, the Panionion "immer auf dem sog. Otomatik Tepe beim heutigen Güzelçamlı gelegen hat." Herda, 67, 99.

³⁵⁷ Simon Hornblower, 248.

identification of the two festivals as one is "unjustifiable."³⁵⁸ His argument is that the cult was later revived at Mykale, as suggested by later historians such as Strabo.³⁵⁹ However, Stylianou does concede that Ephesos had been the temporary location of the Panionion for a short period of time. This is shown by an inscription from Ephesos attesting a cult in honour of "Apollōnos Agiyeos Prostateriou Patroou Pythiou Klariou Panioniou."³⁶⁰ This explanation helps us understand Diodorus' observation on the matter of the Panionion, as diachronically positioned between the descriptions of Herodotus and those of Strabo.

This unsuccessful fourth century attempt to revive the Panionion reveals the central role of Ephesos in the region among its fellow Ionians, as it attempted to impose its influence over the Ionian *koinon*, being a most determined supporter of their *koine autonomia*. In this context, Ephesos' leading role in the deliberations with the Macedonian contingent in 322 BC may be interpreted as indicative of the Ephesians' persistent attempt to dominate regional socio-political developments. Indeed, a fragmentary decree dating from the second half of the 4th century BC, proclaims that "it seems right to the Ionians and Aiolians in the month of Hagnesion, as the Ephesians maintain, in the prynany of..."³⁶¹ The reference here is clearly to the Ionian and Aiolian *koina*,³⁶² acting sometime after the revival of the Panionion by Alexander. More

³⁵⁸ Petros Stylianou, "Thucydides, the Panionian Festival, and the Ephesia" *ZPE* 32.2, 249.

³⁵⁹ Stylianou, 248.

³⁶⁰ IG II/III² 7.4995.

³⁶¹ I. Erythr. 16, ll. 6-8.

³⁶² I. Erythr. p. 75.

importantly, however, the specific reference to what "the Ephesians maintain" points unequivocally to Ephesos' guiding role in the Panionion's decisions.

Moreover, another inscription from Mykale dealing with religious stipulations towards "Zeus Boulaios and to the other gods", refers to "the altar of the Panionion on which the sacred things are conducted", while in the bottom, heavily fragmented section, we find a clear reference to the "βασιλέα τῶν Ἐφε[σιῶν]".³⁶³ We are not in a position to clearly determine what the nature of Ephesos' βασιλέα referred to in this context. However, the specific consideration towards the Ephesians, as well as their seemingly prominent role in observing Panionian standards and proper cultic conduct, points to Ephesos' privileged - even leading - position among its fellow Ionian communities. Therefore, during the Ephesos meeting in the summer of 322 BC, Ephesos would have negotiated with the Macedonians either from this position of "first among Panionian equals", or would have sought to impose itself as such in the eyes of the *Diadochoi*. The fact that it is presented in the discussed inscriptions (I.Ephes. 1430-1437) as the sole Ionian voice, suggests that upon publishing these documents on the walls of the Artemision, Ephesos sought to emphasize its dominant position as the sole and direct interlocutor between the Ionians and the Macedonians in Western Asia Minor.

³⁶³ G. Kleiner, *Panionion und Melie*, 49, ll. 6-7, 10, 22 (Walter de Gruyten, 1967).

4.6. Aftermath of the Ephesos Meeting

The Ephesos meeting in the Summer of 322 BC was a turning point for the whole of Western Asia Minor. The conclusion of a whole series of deliberations and negotiations saw the strengthening of local socio-political stability for all the communities in the region. This was made possible primarily because of the precedent set by Alexander the Great with respect to the Ionian Greeks. The image of Alexander as liberator, benefactor and democratic supporter limited the freedom of action of his *Diadochoi*, while at the same time facilitated their interaction with individual communities, as both parties sought to find a mutually agreeable consensus in the confusion that dominated the post-Alexander world.

Threatened by a seemingly increasing anti-Macedonian current, the *Diadochoi* came to understand that the future of the Macedonian kingdom(s) was based on an overt policy of continuity in a rapidly-changing world. The immediate result was the successful conclusion of the Ephesos meeting, with the host city acting as the indefatigable negotiator, not only for itself, but for all the neighboring Ionians. To their credit, the Ephesian democrats quickly realized the rare opportunity they were provided with, and took full advantage of every negotiating tool at their disposal to promote their own regional interests, while attending to the needs of their fellow democrats and kinsmen. In doing so, Ephesos emerged as the political, economic, and cultural leader of the Ionian *koinon*.

CONCLUSION: HELLENISTIC PATTERNS

The study of the early Hellenistic period is a difficult endeavor that should be approached with caution. The chronology of the few years after the death of Alexander the Great is especially hard to reconstruct because of the scanty and treacherous nature of the evidence. As I hope to have showed through the study of Ephesos, such a reconstruction is nevertheless possible by focusing on particular historical instances where local, regional and universal considerations interacted. I have also sought to provide a better understanding of the chronology of the post-Alexander world by providing additional insight ranging from minute details such as the patronyms of individuals, or attempting to bridge the lack of information about the Ionian *koinon* during the second half of the 4th century BC.

In doing so, I have challenged the historiographic trend that focuses exclusively on the main individual protagonists, the Companions-turned-Successors of Alexander, at the expense of local and regional history, wrongly defined as passive. The results have revealed the dynamic initiative of the Ephesian community in trying to deal in its own way with the socio-political crisis following the demise of Alexander. The Ephesos meeting on the occasion of Krateros' crossing into Europe, is the expression of the Ephesian democrats' active involvement in trying to re-establish internal and regional stability.

I have based my argument on a series of Ephesian inscriptions (I. Ephes. 1430-1437) that had not yet received detailed attention from either historians or epigraphists. The main result of my thesis is the proper dating of these


inscriptions and place them in the appropriate historical context. Upon close examination, this series of inscriptions reveals the complex nature of the negotiations taking place at Ephesos during the summer of 322 BC - negotiations which addressed both Ephesian and Ionian concerns, while at the same time confirmed the role and prominence of the Macedonian contingent in the area.

The conclusions of my study should be interpreted in the context of the shaping of the "Hellenistic" Age. Indeed, the Ephesos meeting provides a vivid description of the negotiation of power and the inherent tensions between city *autonomia* and Macedonian *hegemonia*. This pattern of interaction would dominate *polis-basileus* relations for centuries to come, while its formative stages may be found in specific instances such as the Ephesos meeting, as early as 322 BC.

Moreover, I argue against the concept of a Macedonian empire. As the Ephesos meeting attests, without Alexander there was no clear chain of command, nor an administrative system in place to alleviate the succession crisis. Macedonian possessions needed to be reclaimed, while former allies were to be once again "convinced" to show their continued support for the Macedonian cause.

Finally, my efforts to piece together the mosaic of the Hellenistic world should also be regarded as a testament to the enduring image of Alexander the Great. The young king's death scrambled the details and nuances of the Aegean world, but the precedents he had left behind provided a framework to put it back together.

APPENDIX 1 - INSCRIBED SLAB FACSIMILE AND GREEK TEXTS



Block II mit den Dekreten nr.1423-1438

(Facsimile: Josef Keil)

1431 - People's Decree for Neoptolemos

- 1 Νεοπτολέμῳ Βιλλέα Μακεδόνι, ἐπεὶ πρόθυμός ἐστι [περὶ τὸν δῆμον]
- 2 καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας, ἔδοξε [τῇ βουλῇ καὶ τῷ δήμῳ·]
- 3 εἶναι αὐτὸν πολίτην ἐφ' ἴσῃ καὶ ὁμοίῃ· ταῦτα δὲ εἶν[αι καὶ ἐκγόνους· ἔλαχε φυλὴν]
- 4 Ἐφεσεύς, χιλιαστὺν Βωρεύς

1432 - People's Decree for Nikarchos

- 1 Νικάρχῳ Γέροντος Μακεδόνι, ἐπεὶ πρόθυμός ἐστι περὶ τ[ὸν δῆμον καὶ τῶν]
- 2 πολιτῶν τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας, ἔδοξεν τῇ βο[ουλῇ καὶ τῷ δήμῳ, εἶναι αὐτὸν]
- 3 πολίτην ἐφ' ἴσῃ καὶ ὁμοίῃ· ταῦτα δὲ εἶναι καὶ ἐκγόν[οις· ἔλαχε φυλὴν Ἐφεσεύς,]
- 4 χιλιαστὺν Βωρεύς

1433 - People's Decree for Theuchrestos

- 1 Θευχρήστῳ Φιλοξένῳ Μακεδόνι, ἐπεὶ πρόθυμός ἐστ[ι περὶ τὸ ἱερὸν καὶ τὸν δῆμον]
- 2 ἔδοξεν τῇ βουλῇ καὶ τῷ δήμῳ, δεδόσθαι αὐτῷ [προξενίαν καθάπερ τοῖς ἄλλοις]
- 3 προξένους· ταῦτα δὲ εἶναι καὶ ἐκγόνους

1434 - People's Decree for Echekratides

- 1 Ἐχεκρατίδῃ Ξεννέα Μεθωναίῳ, ἐπεὶ πρόθυμός ἐστι περὶ τὸ ἱερὸν καὶ τ[ὴν πόλιν, ἔδοξεν τῇ βουλῇ καὶ τῷ]
- 2 δήμῳ, εἶναι αὐτὸν πολίτην ἐφ' ἴσῃ καὶ ὁμοίῃ· ταῦτα δὲ [εἶναι καὶ ἐκγόνους· ἔλαχε φυλὴν]
- 3 Τήϊος, χιλιαστὺν Σπερχύλεος.

1435 - People's Decree for Kleitos and Alketas

- 1 κλείτῳ καὶ Ἀλκέτῳ
2 ἐπεὶ πρόθυμοί εἰσιν περὶ τὸ ἱερὸν καὶ τὴν πόλιν, ἔδοξε[ν τῇ
βουλῇ καὶ τῷ δήμῳ],
3 εἶναι αὐτοὺς πολίτας ἐφ' ἔσῃ καὶ ὁμοίῃ· ταῦτα δὲ εἶν[αι καὶ
ἐκγόνοις· ἐπικληρῶσαι δὲ]
4 αὐτοὺς εἰς φυλὴν καὶ χιλιαστὺν

1436 - People's Decree for Kallas

- 1 Καλλάδαι· ἐπειδὴ οἱ πρέσβεις ἀπαγγέλλ[ουσι πρόθυμον ὄντα
περὶ τὸν]
2 δῆμον, ἔδοξεν τῇ βουλῇ καὶ τῷ δήμῳ, εἶναι αὐτ[ὸν πολί-
την ἐφ' ἔσῃ καὶ ὁμοίῃ·]
3 ταῦτα δὲ εἶναι καὶ ἐκγόνοις· ἐπικληρῶσαι δὲ αὐτὸν [εἰς φυ-
λὴν καὶ χιλιαστὺν]

1437 - People's Decree for Hagnon

- 1 Ἀγνωνὶ Καβαλλᾷ Τηϊῷ, ἐπεὶ πρόθυμός ἐστι περὶ τὸ ἱερὸν καὶ
καθὰ οἱ πρέσβεις·]
2 ἀπηγγέλκασιν οἱ πρὸς Κράτερον ἀποσταλέντες τὴν Ἐφεσίων
πόλιν εὐεργετεῖ]
3 καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς ἐντυν[χά]νοντ[α]ς, ἔδοξεν [τῇ βουλῇ
καὶ τῷ δήμῳ]

APPENDIX 2 - PHYLAI AND CHILIASTEIS

A point must be made concerning internal social cohesion. As the discussed decrees tell us, the honorees "are to be assigned by lot into a *phyle* and a *chiliastys*."³⁶⁴ P. Gauthier agrees with W. Gawantka that such incorporation into the citizen body was in fact "un instrument de la diplomatie internationale, capable de créer un lien très fort entre deux partenaires."³⁶⁵ There have been speculations concerning the extent to which the acceptance of such honours represented Macedonian recognition of the local system of civic organization already in place.

Yet it must be pointed out that the demographic division into *phylai* and *chiliastyes* is particular to Western Asia Minor, with several *Thousands* making up one *Tribe*; only in this region do we encounter the *chiliastys*.³⁶⁶ Several arrangements have been proposed by Jones and Engelmann, with a general consensus of five *phylai* in the Hellenistic period, each with four to six *chiliasties*.³⁶⁷ Historians have thus been able to determine the population of Ephesos somewhere between 20.000 and 25.000 citizens.³⁶⁸ Based on their designated names, Pierart suggests that these divisions were older and represent a natural demographic progression. Debord, however, believed that they were a Macedonian imposition inspired by the Persian military division by

³⁶⁴ I. Ephes. 1435, ll. 3-4.

³⁶⁵ Gauthier, 153.

³⁶⁶ Pierre Debord, "Chiliastys". *Revue des Études Anciennes*, 209 (Bordeaux, France: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Vol. 86, 1984).

³⁶⁷ Jones, 312 and H. Engelmann, "Phylen und Chiliastyen von Ephesos" ZPE 113, 96-98 (Bonn, Germany: Rudolf Habelt Verlag GMBH, 1996).

³⁶⁸ Debord, 211.

a thousand men, the *chiliarchia* mentioned by Diodorus.³⁶⁹ He argued that population numbers rendered old divisions inadequate by the time Alexander arrived in the area,³⁷⁰ especially if we take into account the Exiles' Decree.

If this is indeed a new institution as Debord claims, this would suggest that the Ephesians are willing to continue with this relatively recent system of civic organization imposed by Alexander, denoting Ephesian willingness to continue with the Macedonian *status-quo*. But as Nicholas Jones has pointed out, there are epigraphic examples which suggest that this division was used as early as the 5th century BC³⁷¹; whether or not this is indeed the result of Persian influence, is hard to determine. This in turn would suggest that quite the contrary, that the Macedonians, in typically Alexandrian fashion, tended to not get too involved in the internal affairs of the city, as long as popular support continued in their favour.

³⁶⁹ Diod. 18.48.4-5.

³⁷⁰ Debord, 210-211.

³⁷¹ Jones, 311.

APPENDIX 3 - ANTIGONOS' PRESENCE

One significant absentee from the Ephesos meeting is Antigonos Monophthalmos. We hear very little of him in the second half of the year 322 BC. Before fleeing to Europe in the wake of Perdikkas' "false slanders and unjust accusations"³⁷², it is presumed that he remained in Phrygia, settling transitional affairs there. Billows is careful not to delve too much into his precise location, limiting himself to claim that "he had his authority over Phrygia, Lykaonia, Lykia, Pamphylia and western Pisidia confirmed at Babylon."³⁷³ The primary sources are also silent on this important point.

Yet this does not mean that he was not present or represented at Ephesos. The series of analyzed inscriptions suggests that it contained more than just those decrees discussed above. It is possible that he is mentioned in one of the now-lost inscriptions. There is one small fragment, for example, which informs us of someone who has received honours "... in equal and like manner. These are to be granted to his descendants as well. The Tribe Euonumos was chosen by lot, and the Leagoreon Thousand."³⁷⁴ We do know from ancient authors that both Antigonos and his son Demetrios entertained good relations with Ephesos, but we must keep in mind that it only did so when he was physically present in the city with the army. Also, even if Ephesos and Antigonos did share good relations in later years, this does not confirm in any way that this is a result of his presence at Ephesos in 322 BC. For the time being, any such evidence is circumstantial and all we are left with are suppositions.

³⁷² Diod. 18.23.4.

³⁷³ Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed*, 56.

³⁷⁴ I. Ephes. 1430.

APPENDIX 4 - EPHESIAN DEMOCRACY

The question of Ephesian democracy is very difficult to answer because it is difficult to clearly determine what a democratic government entailed in terms of specific criteria for political participation. It is equally hard to establish to what extent democracy differed from the former oligarchic regime. Martin Ostwald has pointed out the problems differentiating between an "oligarchic" as opposed to a "democratic" regime, by arguing that "both systems seem to have worked with Assemblies, Councils, and magistrates."³⁷⁵

Hans-Joachim Gehrke has identified the differences between the two forms of government as a difference between property qualifications. He also argues that there are two types of oligarchy, a more relaxed form with wider participation, and a more exclusive one where offices are restricted to a narrow, familial circle.³⁷⁶ What form of oligarchy we have at Ephesos before the advent of Alexander is hard to determine, although it might be the case that Ephesos was under the control of a prominent family led by Syrphax and his relatives.³⁷⁷

It is not the purpose of this study to provide an explanation to this debate. Instead, I argue that at Ephesos we are dealing with a conflict between factions rather than political ideologies, whose interests lay with or against Persian rule - for reasons that might include social justice/advantages. Therefore, the *stasis* surrounding the democratic "tyrant" Hegesias should be seen as an example of the ambiguity between the two forms of government.³⁷⁸

³⁷⁵ Ostwald, "Oligarchy and Oligarchs in Ancient Greece", 394.

³⁷⁶ Gehrke, *Stasis*, 315-320.

³⁷⁷ See Arr. *Anab.* 1.17.12 and page 11.

³⁷⁸ See Poly. 6.49.1-11 and page 27.

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