

THE DECISION TO ALTER PAKISTAN'S ALIGNMENT POLICY,

1962-65

by

Pamela J. Butler

ABSTRACT

The major questions posed in this study are: Why do decision-makers in "new" nations decide to alter their countries' alignments and, by doing so, are they successful in achieving their objectives? Elite images are treated as the decisive inputs of the Pakistan foreign policy system. Former Pakistani President, Mohammad Ayub Khan and former Foreign Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto have been selected for study.

The process of policy-formation is explored in order to understand why these two decision-makers decided to alter Pakistan's alignments in the 1962-65 period. In addition, an analysis of the outcomes and success of these two decision-makers' policies is undertaken.

Four major variables comprise the framework used to research the images of the two former Pakistani decision-makers. The relative importance of each of these variables is evaluated. Three hypotheses are tested and refined and new hypotheses, emerging from the data, are formulated. Finally, some guidelines for future research are offered.

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ELITE IMAGES AND FOREIGN POLICY OUTCOMES : A
STUDY OF THE DECISION TO ALTER PAKISTAN'S
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The development of the nation-state is only in part a domestic process. All states are shaped in very fundamental ways by the nation-state system and they are constantly interacting with it. The emergence of the new states of Africa and Asia has added an important new dimension to the international system. World War II ended with the breaking up of great colonial empires and "new states" came to outnumber the old ones. The leaders of these new states have faced many challenges from their new global setting. They must determine their country's foreign policy objectives as well as the role their country is to play in the international system. Moreover, they must set priorities in organizing bilateral relations with other individual states. Leaders of new states must determine not only which nations are potentially friendly but they must also decide how to deal with threats from nations which are less well disposed. In making assessments such as these, leaders must consider their state's capabilities relative to those of other states.

a. Empirical Problem

Undoubtedly, the best known characteristic of the new and developing states is their low level of economic development. This cannot be seen as an isolated characteristic for it is an integral part of their shortage of capabilities in other spheres. Although the new states naturally differ according to their inherent resource bases, one

measure of development is the degree to which they are able to maximize the full potential of their given resources. The stimulus for this can come from the domestic environment or from other political systems in the international environment. Usually, these two stimuli to maximize capabilities interact with one another.

Alliances have generally been viewed as products of efforts to establish and strengthen national capabilities relative to those of other nations. The attempt to redress capability imbalances by means of alliances has helped participants to make up for varying kinds of weaknesses ever since the system of alliances set the general pattern for international agreements. This balancing technique is as old as international relations itself and has been studied extensively by historians and political scientists alike.

Cooperation between states may take many forms. We shall refer to the entire range of cooperative efforts between two or more states which are directed at other states as alignments. The term alliance is more precise and may be defined as "an organization or a commitment of a number of states to take certain cooperative actions against another state or states under specified conditions."¹ Examples of alliances are such agreements as the North Atlantic Treaty, the Warsaw Treaty and the Southeast Asian Treaty. Although this distinction departs somewhat from current usage,² alliances will be treated as a

¹David V. Edwards, International Political Analysis, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., New York, 1969.

²See, for example, Chapter IV in Michael Brecher's The New States of Asia: A Political Analysis, Oxford University Press, London, 1963.

specific type of alignment between two or more nations which has been formalized.

What is the role of the new nations in this international balancing system? Can we simply incorporate them into the established theories of coalition-building or do they constitute special cases that require separate study? Are the leaders of these new states aware of the ancient "rules of the game" or are they making up their own rules? What are their goals in forming alignments or joining alliances? I would submit that a general theory of alignments cannot emerge until the alignment policies of the new states have been studied extensively. It cannot be assumed that the motive forces for the new states' alignment patterns are the same as those of states which have been involved in this balancing game for centuries. Although they may indeed be the same, the alignment policies of the new states must be studied on their own terms before they can be incorporated into a general theory. The purpose of this paper will be to concentrate efforts on generating and testing propositions about the various stages of alignment policies within the new nations.

The major question being asked in this study is: Why do leaders of new nations change their country's alignment patterns? If leaders' first years as heads of new states are spent in searching for a national identity in the world system—in determining the states which are potential friends and enemies, and setting up alignment patterns to conform with these assessments—why then do they decide to modify their country's

alignments? To answer this question two steps are required. First, we must establish the leaders' objectives when they framed alignment policies for their newly independent nations. Only after we have a clear notion of the goals they hoped to attain can we proceed to the second step which is the question of why they decide to alter their country's alignments. This can be answered by examining whether the goals themselves have changed or whether alternative methods of attaining the same goals are the basis for changing alignments. In the latter case, changes in the environment may or may not have led decision-makers to adopt different means to achieve their goals.

The central problem can now be summarized as follows:

Patterns of alignment in the new nations of the world are responses to perceived capability deficiencies. Therefore, new nations will seek alignments which will maximize the capabilities of their state.

This can be put in the form of three hypotheses:

Hypothesis I

If a decision-maker perceives a threat to his state's security, then he will attempt to use alignments to strengthen his country's military capabilities.

Hypothesis II

If a decision-maker perceives a threat to his state's security, then he will accord economic capabilities a lower priority in his search for allies.

Hypothesis III

The more accurately a decision-maker perceives his environment, the more successful he will be in fostering alignments which will maximize his state's capabilities, vis-à-vis the perceived source of threat.

b. Theoretical Concepts

Eugene Meehan defines theoretical concepts as "... inferences, manufactured by humans for their own purposes, and not discoverable in nature."³ As such, concepts serve to organize the data and to make analysis easier by providing a framework in which questions can be generated and research carried on. These concepts may be either implicit or explicit but without a conceptual scheme, explanation is impossible. Therefore, this section will attempt to explicate those concepts which guided the selection, classification and analysis of the data.

In order to study changing alignments we must first understand the way a state acts in foreign policy. Foreign policy can be conceived as a system of behavior. This behavior may be viewed by some as a product of the past but unique and distinct in its essentials. An alternative approach provides a theoretical framework within which seemingly unconnected kinds of behavior can be related. It seeks to go beyond particularization to identify broad trends which will allow us to engage in rigorous comparative analysis and will hopefully aid us in our efforts at prediction. It is the latter approach which is being adopted in this paper. A comprehensive model of foreign policy provides the broad theoretical framework within which we may relate the empirical data of a cluster of foreign policy decisions within one nation-state.

Before giving a description of the model, it would be useful to trace the development in the literature of those aspects of the model

³Eugene Meehan, Contemporary Political Thought: A Critical Study, The Dorsey Press, Homewood, Ill., 1967, p. 11.

which I will use to study the changing alignments of the new states.

In the later part of the 1950's Harold and Margaret Sprout published an article which dealt with the complex problems which must accompany any effort to assess the role of environmental factors in the conduct of foreign policy.⁴ The Sprouts used the term cognitive behaviorism as a label to designate the simple and familiar principle that "a person reacts to his milieu as he apperceives it—that is, as he perceives and interprets it in light of past experience."⁵ In addition cognitive behaviorism was used to draw a sharp distinction between the psychological environment (within which an individual defines choices and takes decisions) and the operational environment (which sets limits to what can happen when the decision is executed). The Sprouts envisioned two different types of analysis as stemming from these two important concepts.

The first type of analysis involves the policy-forming process. In this phase of foreign policy analysis it is the psychological environment which is relevant. What matters is what the policy-maker believes the milieu to be, not what it actually is. For the researcher, this entails linking environmental factors to policy decisions to find out how the given policy-maker, or policy-making group, conceives the milieu

⁴Harold and Margaret Sprout, "Environmental Factors in the Study of International Politics," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, I, 1957, pp. 309-28. The pages cited in this paper refer to a reprint of this article in J.N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy, The Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1961, pp. 106-19.

⁵Ibid., p. 109.

to be. The researcher is also interested in how the decision-making elite interprets the opportunities for and limitations on the goals it wishes to reach. However, as the Sprouts pointed out, a theory of decision-making must then be applied which includes assumptions as to a) the purposes or ends toward which the policy-maker's efforts are oriented; b) the environmental data which the policy-maker deems relevant to his purposes and from which he derives his estimate of the situation and c) his mode of utilizing such data in deciding which ends are feasible and in formulating strategy calculated to attain the ends envisaged.⁶ The Sprouts were acutely conscious of the role of the researcher in evaluating this policy-making process.

... some concept of ends to be accomplished underlies all foreign policy analysis and the analyst's assumptions as to the general orientation and specific objectives envisaged by the policy-makers in a given situation will affect his conclusions as to what environmental factors probably were (or will be) taken into account in the deliberations under consideration.⁷

In the context of policy-formation analysis, the basic premise is that the decision-maker's relationship to his environment rests mainly on his perception of the environment and the use he makes of that perception.

The second type of analysis involves the interrelationship of the psychological and operational environments. Here it is not enough to understand why a particular decision was made; the researcher also

⁶Ibid., p. 113.

⁷Ibid.

becomes concerned with the outcomes of policy choices. The Sprouts maintained that discrepancies between the policy-maker's estimate of the situation (his psychological environment) and the operational environment become highly significant when the problem is to explain the results of a given decision. In the words of the Sprouts, the question then becomes: "How may the properties present or latent in the milieu affect the operational results of that decision, even though these factors are not known or taken into account in the decision-making process?"⁸ In this second type of analysis, the role of the researcher changes somewhat. He does not simply delineate what he considers to be the relevant perceptions of the elite for a particular decision. He must now make an independent judgment as to what the opportunities and limitations are and how they will affect the course of events, apart from the way that these factors are conceived or taken into account by the decision-makers in question.

In summary, the Sprouts were the first to conclude that it is fruitful to distinguish analytically between the relation of environmental factors to policy decisions, on the one hand, and to the operational results of decisions, on the other. "With respect to policy-making, what matters is how the policy-maker imagines the milieu to be, not how it actually is. With respect to the operational results of decisions, what matters is how things are, not how the policy-maker imagines them to be."⁹

⁸Ibid., p. 116.

⁹Ibid., p. 118.

The Sprouts' contribution to theory-oriented studies of foreign policy was adopted by several proponents of the decision-making approach, most notably, Joseph Frankel¹⁰ and the team of Snyder, Bruck and Sapin.¹¹ Following the Sprouts, Frankel distinguished between the operational and psychological environments. The main weakness was that Frankel did not treat the operational environment in a structured manner. His treatment of the psychological setting was more complete but the two environments were not integrated and he was unable to assess the congruence or disparity between them and the resultant implications for foreign policy. Within the Sprouts' conception of the two types of analysis, Frankel placed much greater emphasis on the policy-forming process than he did on the problem of trying to explain the results of a given decision.

The Snyder, Bruck and Sapin study also accepted the Sprouts' distinction between the operational and psychological environments but, unlike Frankel, its authors ignored the former as irrelevant. The weaknesses of their model are grave; the categories are unwieldy and overly complex rendering the model difficult to operationalize. In any case, the authors have not provided a framework within which we may study policy outcomes.

¹⁰Joseph Frankel, The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Decision-Making, Oxford University Press, London, 1963.

¹¹Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics, The Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1962.

After the original distinction between the psychological and operational environments was made by the Sprouts and accepted but not rigorously applied by Frankel and the Snyder team, another group realized the importance of these concepts. In 1969, a paper was published by M. Brecher, B. Steinberg and J. Stein in which they put forward the view that the task of theory in the realm of foreign policy analysis was to aid in a systematic study of the cause-effect relations among the pertinent variables, as well as in the search for patterns of regularity in state behavior.¹² They felt that in gathering and analyzing empirical data, the distinction made by the Sprouts between the psychological and operational environments should be kept clearly in mind.

Underlying the model was the view that,

the operational environment affects the results or outcomes of decisions directly but influences the choice among policy options, that is, the decisions themselves, only as it is filtered through the images of decision-makers.¹³

Thus, for the first time, the two different types of analysis which the Sprouts envisioned were systematically combined within one framework or model. The aim of this model was not only to explain how and why foreign policy decisions were made but also to assess the outcomes of these decisions. To emphasize this interrelationship between the psycho-

¹²Only those aspects of the framework to be utilized in this paper will be discussed in the Introduction. The entire framework is fully explained with case studies by M. Brecher, B. Steinberg and J. Stein, "A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior," Journal of Conflict Resolution, XIII, March, 1969, pp. 75-101.

¹³Ibid., p. 81.

logical and operational environments, the authors have examined the same categories or variables in both environments.

In focusing their model on decision-making, Brecher et al. have divided decisions into two analytic types: strategic and tactical. Strategic decisions are defined as "broad policy acts measured by significance for the actor's foreign policy system as a whole, duration of impact, and the presence of a subsidiary cluster of decisions to operationalize that decision."¹⁴ These subsidiary clusters constitute tactical decisions. It is at the level of tactical decision-making that strategic decisions undergo constant change and reformulation in response to competing demands within the international political system. Implementation of a strategic policy choice through tactical decisions will affect the entire foreign policy system by changing in varying degrees both the operational environment and elite images of it. New strategic decisions based on changed perceptions will lead to new tactical decisions. In short, there is a continuous flow effect or feedback from operational environment to elite images to decisions. The distinction between strategic and tactical decisions is a crucial one in the cluster of foreign policy decisions being investigated here.

The authors of the foreign policy model are in accord with the Sprouts when they suggest that "... decision-makers act in accordance with their perception of reality, not in response to reality itself."¹⁵

¹⁴Ibid., p. 88.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 86.

Although this may seem a simple and obvious truth, it has many important ramifications. The close link between elite images and policy acts is one of the major propositions to be tested in this study. If policy choices can be shown to flow inexorably from the images of the decision-making elite, then elite images can provide a foundation for explaining the past behavior or predicting the future behavior of a group of foreign policy-makers. Within the confines of this work, if the link between elite images and policy acts can be demonstrated, then these images can serve as a basis for explaining and predicting changes in alignments. That is, hypotheses I and II can be tested through the use of these concepts.

If the only purpose of this paper were to understand why a particular decision was made, a study of the psychological environment would suffice. More precisely, if our sole purpose were to explain why a new state decides to modify its alliance patterns, we could stop after we understood a) the goals of the leaders of the new states and, b) the way in which the decision-makers feel that alignments will help them to achieve these goals. However, we are also concerned with the outcomes of policy choices and whether or not the elite goals are actually achieved.

The operational environment constitutes the setting in which foreign policy decisions are taken. The concept of setting refers to "... a set of potentially relevant factors and conditions which may affect a state's external behavior."¹⁶ The operational environment thus

¹⁶Ibid., p. 81.

sets the boundaries within which decision-makers act and the crucial question in terms of outcomes is whether or not they perceive these boundaries. The relationship of the two environments—operational and psychological—also provides a technique for measuring "success" in foreign policy decisions. Unless elite images coincide in some way with what is commonly perceived as "reality,"¹⁷ decisions based on these images are not likely to fulfill the elites' expectations. By stressing the importance of the operational environment, the Sprouts and the team of Brecher et al. have provided the conceptual tools for exploring the policy outcomes of new states in maximizing their capabilities through alignments. For our purposes, assessing the congruence between the psychological and operational environments will enable us to test the third hypothesis.

c. Methodological Questions

Having defined the concepts, we must now examine the means to make them operational. This can be divided into four broad tasks.

The first task is to designate the elite. The decision-making elite consists of those individuals who perform the function of political authorization in the foreign policy arena. The core elite group consists of the Head of Government and Foreign Minister but the size and composition of the relevant group may vary with the issue. For our purposes we will examine the elite images of the former Pakistani President,

¹⁷The term "reality" equals the analyst's observations of the operational environment and will be discussed more extensively below.

Mohammad Ayub Khan and the former Pakistani Foreign Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

In designating the elite for the analysis of any decision, institutional position is a necessary first-approximation for any researcher. However, those legally authorized to make crucial foreign policy decisions may serve merely as fronts for others who exercise de facto authority. Whereas formal holding of office permits the initial delimitation of an elite, functional yardsticks are also required for validating elite membership.

After one understands the nature of the political system as well as the constitutional system of a country, one can begin to determine the people who exercise this de facto decision-making authority. When Martial Law was terminated in Pakistan, a new constitution was promulgated on March 1, 1962. This constitution made the President the central, if not the sole, repository of all power in both domestic and foreign policy matters. One political analyst claims that the powers of the Pakistani President were greater than those of the United States President or even of General de Gaulle and that the wide authority given to the President made him almost a constitutional dictator.¹⁸ Ayub Khan made full use of these powers and there is no question that the formulation of foreign policy in the 1962-65 period was firmly in his hands.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was made Foreign Minister in 1963. He had always been vocal on the subject of foreign affairs even before it

¹⁸ D.P. Singhal, "The New Constitution of Pakistan," Asian Survey, II, August, 1962, p. 22.

became his official duty, as evidenced by his speeches in the Pakistan National Assembly. Although his role was definitely secondary to that of President Ayub Khan, I will argue below that pressure from Bhutto had a great deal to do with Pakistan's change in alignment policies.

The second task is to define the decisions to be analyzed. The precise focus is the cluster of decisions that led Pakistan to seek closer ties with the People's Republic of China (and later the Soviet Union) and to move away from a policy of close alignment with the United States. The sequence of decisions being studied was taken in the period between 1962 and 1965. This cannot be seen as a rigid time span because the origins of many of the elite images are to be found in the years before the actual decisions were made and these must be studied in all of their complexity. Then too, events prior to this time are often crucial in the immediate context of these decisions.

There were, however, three major events which marked this period. The first was the agreement, on May 3, 1962, of the Governments of Pakistan and China to demarcate the Sino-Pakistan border. The second was the Sino-Indian border conflict in November, 1962. The third major event took place in the fall of 1965, when Pakistan and India confronted each other in armed conflict over Kashmir. Each of these events was to prove crucial in the decision to modify Pakistan's alignments.

The third task is to reconstruct the foreign policy images held by two members of the Pakistani elite when they made the decision to

seek new alignments. This can be accomplished by examining the psychological environment which includes two general types of variables, external and internal.¹⁹ The former refers to conditions and relationships which exist beyond the territorial boundaries of state actors and operates at three distinct levels. The first is the global system, the second is the subordinate and other subordinate systems and the third is bilateral including dominant bilateral relations.²⁰ The internal variables necessary to understand elite images are five: military capability; economic capability; political structure; the specific demands on foreign policy made by interest groups; and the general demands made by competing elites. These ten variables provide the researcher with a general framework within which decisions can be studied.

Preliminary research has shown that not all of the ten variables included within the model are relevant to the decisions under consideration. In limiting the scope of this study to a new state which was attempting to alter its alignments, four of the variables have proved of crucial importance. Therefore, two external variables and two internal variables will be investigated. The first external variable is Pakistan's dominant bilateral relations with the two superpowers. Since the United States and Pakistan were formally allied, greater emphasis will be placed on this relationship. However, the Soviet Union was also involved in

¹⁹This section is taken almost verbatim from the Framework presented by M. Brecher et al., op. cit., p. 82.

²⁰The relevant variables will be defined at the beginning of each chapter.

Pakistan's attempt to change her alignment policies. Both superpowers represented sources of additional capabilities for Pakistan, so both must be considered. The second external variable involves Pakistan's bilateral relations with two of her neighbors: the People's Republic of China and India. The internal variables will be limited to military capability and economic capability.

The third task presents formidable difficulties. The analyst is attempting to reconstruct the foreign policy images of the decision-makers despite the fact that he is functioning at some distance from his subjects. He may also have to contend with ideological, social or other barriers to communication and understanding. He often works with insufficient, incomplete and sometimes even contradictory evidence and this is made even more difficult when the analyst cannot personally interview his subjects. The Sprouts realistically explained this problem of the analyst in the following words:

At best, the analyst's inferences regarding his subject's image of the milieu and his orientation to it rests invariably and inescapably on more or less arbitrary decisions as to the relevance and weight to be given to various kinds of evidence perceived and filtered through the analyst's own (and usually several intermediaries') culture-biased spectacles.²¹

Since not all relevant elite perceptions are necessarily articulated, how can these images be researched?²² The methodology used

²¹Sprout and Sprout, op. cit., p. 113.

²²M. Brecher et al. address themselves to this problem and the arguments given here are their own, op. cit., p. 89.

in researching elite images is basically that of analyzing the content of available speeches, writings and interviews of the decision-making elite. The authors of the foreign policy model being applied here contend that while unarticulated images may exist, they are distinctly secondary to articulated images in delineating the psychological environment. The rationale for this is two-fold. Firstly, the repeated public expressions of elite perceptions, even when consciously distorted, create public commitments and expectations which the decision-makers will probably feel compelled to fulfill; the alternative is a credibility gap with likely consequences for their security of tenure. Secondly, if decisions are made on the basis of concealed images this too may have the same impact on the attentive public—incredulity and pressure for policy changes consistent with articulated images or even the demand for changes in elite personnel.

Despite the problems involved in researching elite images, the authors of the framework feel that it is a worthwhile approach to foreign policy analysis and it will be applied in this study. Although it was impossible to gain personal interviews with the two Pakistani leaders, or even to have the benefit of observing them in action directly, there were other compensatory advantages in dealing with this particular country.

It is well known that it is often difficult to obtain reliable information about the foreign policies of the new states. This also applies to Pakistan in all areas except one: there has been abundant publication of the speeches and writings of the Pakistani leaders. Some of the sources

which provide verbatim records of the speeches and writings of the two leaders are transcripts of radio broadcasts; biographies; documents of the Pakistani Government and the United Nations; and news conferences and statements reported by the domestic and foreign press. Moreover, the former President of Pakistan has written a political autobiography and both leaders have written articles and books on Pakistan's foreign policy.

The fourth task is to evaluate the congruence of elite perceptions with reality in order to understand the outcomes of policies. This also presents formidable problems. In a footnote, the authors of the framework discuss the difficulties involved in defining "reality," which is a term applied to the analyst's observations of the operational environment.²³ It may be questioned whether the social scientist is capable of more accurate perceptions of the environment than is the participant decision-maker. The authors admit that this will vary in degree with the analyst and the decision-maker. Although the national leader has superior access to sources of information, the social scientist is normally less involved and therefore likely to be more objective. Then too, an analyst can turn to other scholars to gain a consensual concept of reality. If he is studying the outcomes of a specific decision historically rather than predictively, then his task is to describe the opportunities and limitations implicit in the operational environment, and he will have the added benefit of hindsight. The precise measurement of the gap between

²³Ibid., p. 81.

the psychological and operational environments is very difficult but we cannot refrain from asking important questions simply because the answers will not be precise. Instead, we can offer qualitative statements (i.e., greater-than/lesser-than statements) about congruence which will allow us to go beyond studying policy formation to an analysis of the outcomes and success of policies.

By studying a four-year period of Pakistani foreign policy, we can observe the continuous flow effect or feedback from the operational environment to elite images and then to decisions. By focusing on a subsidiary cluster of tactical decisions which are used to implement the major strategic decision, we will be able to view policy-making as the continuous and dynamic process that it is. We can also assess changes in the relationships between the variables during this four-year period.

The proposed outline for exploring decision-makers' perceptions and their resultant choice among alignment options is the following. Chapter II is comprised of two main sections. The first section traces briefly the developments of Pakistan's foreign policy toward the United States and the People's Republic of China from the time of Pakistani independence to 1962. It is important to understand the history of Pakistan's relations with these two countries before we can focus on the 1962-65 period. The second section of Chapter II contains a discussion of the Pakistani leaders' general foreign policy orientations under the three main headings of brief biography, personality and belief system.

The psychological environments of the two decision-makers will be delineated in Chapters III and IV. Each chapter is organized around the four major variables and one policy-maker will be studied in each chapter. The data in these chapters will enable us to test the first two hypotheses.

Chapter V contains an assessment of the degree of congruence which exists between the psychological and operational environments, using the same four variables. A comparison of the perceptions of the two decision-makers will be undertaken in this chapter and an attempt will be made to determine which of the two leaders more accurately perceived reality. In this way, we will be able to study not only the goals of the two leaders but also their coinciding and conflicting images which, among other factors, determined whether or not their goals were achieved. Therefore, this chapter relates to the testing of the third hypothesis.

The concluding chapter has three main purposes. The first is to summarize the theoretical and empirical conclusions of the paper. This will be accomplished by ranking the four variables and some explanations will be given for the relative prominence of some variables to the decision-makers' images and the relative weakness of others. From there we can proceed to the second purpose of the conclusion which is to confirm or negate the hypotheses which have been formulated in this Introduction. Finally, we will offer some theoretical guidelines for future research.

There is a complex web of factors which must be considered in attempting to understand the entire foreign policy of a particular nation-state. I am attempting to investigate only specific aspects of the foreign policy process. The major questions which are posed in this study are: Why do decision-makers in new nations decide to change their country's alignment policies and, by doing so, are they successful in achieving their objectives? To answer these questions, part of a model of foreign policy is being used. In proceeding from the theoretical discussion presented in this Introduction to the empirical data of the decisions themselves, it is important to keep clearly in mind that elite images will be regarded as the decisive inputs of a foreign policy system.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL SETTING AND THE FOREIGN POLICY ELITE

On August 15, 1947, the new self-ruling nation of Pakistan came into existence. The "raison d'être" of Pakistan was to provide Muslims with a homeland in which they could mold their lives in accordance with Islamic principles.¹ This was the basis for the "two-nation theory" and the founding of Pakistan. The "two-nation theory" has been described as the essence of Pakistan by Keith Callard.

The demand for the partition of India was based on the desire of the Muslim 'nation' to have a state of its own. It asserted that there were two nations in India, the Muslim and the Hindu, and that between nations, there could be no question of majority and minority.² Nations are sovereign and equal irrespective of size.

This two-nation principle, therefore, has significance only as far as relations with India are concerned, but India occupies a crucial position in Pakistan's foreign policy considerations.³

Relations with India have been discordant from the moment of independence in part because the partition of the sub-continent along reli-

¹The word "Islam" means "submission" to the will of Allah and the person who so submits is a "Muslim" or a "Moslem." Muslims honor Muhammad as an apostle of Allah and as the last and greatest of the prophets.

²Keith Callard, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Interpretation, 2nd ed., Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1959, pp. 5-6.

³Pakistan is a country in two parts: the east wing and the west wing. The two wings are separated by over 1,000 miles of Indian territory.

gious lines was accompanied by dissension and bitterness. Boundary disputes, arguments over the disposition of property left behind by refugees and the division of assets and liabilities were impossible to resolve to the satisfaction of all. The violence that accompanied this turbulent period left a residue of acrimony between Pakistan and India that has never been overcome.

The dispute over Kashmir has been the most virulent source of hostility between the two countries. To Pakistan the issue is quite simple. The state of Jammu and Kashmir is inhabited by a population that is predominantly Muslim. For Pakistanis, the broad principle of partition was that Muslim majority areas should go to Pakistan, the remainder to be included in India. If this principle had been put into practice, the Kashmir dispute might well have been solved on the same lines as the partition of India itself. The issue was, however, not resolved in accordance with the "two-nation theory." The result has been that the greater part of the state has become part of India. The Pakistanis find it intolerable that a Muslim majority area should be prevented from joining the other Muslim majority areas of the sub-continent. To suggest that the Muslims of Kashmir should remain in a secular India is to challenge the whole validity of the two-nation principle on which Pakistan is based. On the other hand, India has never accepted the "two-nation theory," and Pakistanis are convinced that India cannot voluntarily relinquish control over Kashmir without accepting the validity of this theory. Thus the case of Kashmir cuts at the

root of the two-nation principle and the issue itself is enmeshed in the historic problems of Hindu-Muslim enmity.⁴

In short, relations with India have been the main preoccupation of Pakistan's foreign policy. This fact should be kept clearly in mind as we trace the developments of Pakistan's relations with the United States and the People's Republic of China in the 1947-62 period.

Pakistan and the United States 1947-62

In the early years after independence, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, advocated a policy of neutrality and non-alignment in foreign affairs. By 1951, however, Pakistani fears of Indian "intimidation" had grown stronger and General Ayub Khan, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, began thinking in terms of a military alliance with the United States. On the strength of religious ties, Pakistan had counted a great deal on the support of Muslim countries in the dispute with India but soon began to realize that she had overestimated the power of religious appeals to Muslim countries. Thus, by 1953, Pakistan was thoroughly disillusioned in her attempts to get the diplomatic backing of the Muslim world in her feud with India. As Callard noted, "In the first appraisal of her position among the community of self-governing nations, Pakistan could find no single country which could be counted as an unfailing friend and ally willing to lend aid and comfort

⁴Limitations of space preclude giving a full account of the history of the Kashmir issue and certain side issues. For a detailed study of how the dispute developed, see: Michael Brecher, The Struggle for Kashmir, Oxford University Press, New York, 1953.

in time of need."⁵

Pakistan's feeling of isolation coincided with the assumption of power by the Republicans in the United States. The new U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, embarked upon an active policy in South and Southeast Asia of containing Communism by trying to win over the newly-independent states of Asia. The objective of the United States—to contain Communism—and the Pakistani fear of Indian aggression gradually moved the two countries to a point where their interests seemingly converged. American policy insured Pakistan's security by assisting it in the development of a modern military force in exchange for political, diplomatic and military support. Pakistani leaders also thought that the Western Powers might put pressure on India to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir if Pakistan allied itself with the West.

A Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement was signed with the United States in 1954, and this was followed, in 1955, by membership in the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). In 1955, Pakistan also became a member of the Baghdad Pact which later became known as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Although the United States was not formally a member of CENTO, it participated in its military planning and extended economic aid to CENTO members. Finally, Pakistan signed a bilateral agreement with the United States in March, 1959, which contained special guarantees regarding the defence and

⁵Keith Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1957, p. 303.

security of Pakistan.⁶ It should be recalled that Pakistan adopted this course of action at a time when other newly-independent countries (such as India) adopted a neutral or non-aligned policy on the issues created by the Cold War. It is against the background of these treaties that an assessment has to be made of the course of United States - Pakistan relations and the points of tension which have gradually emerged.

Ever since the signing of SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, Pakistan's political leaders have justified those military alliances in terms of their contributions to Pakistan's defence.⁷ All political analysts are agreed that Pakistan entered into a military alliance with the United States primarily with the view to strengthening herself against India.⁸ Khurshid Hasan says the Pakistani leadership expected the military aid agreements

⁶Under the American-Pakistani accord of March 5, 1959, the United States recognized that Pakistan's independence and integrity were vital to its own interests, and "in case of aggression against Pakistan, the Government of the United States of America, in accordance with the Constitution of the United States of America, will take such appropriate action, including the use of armed force, as may be mutually agreed upon." Cited in a work by Fred Greene, U.S. Policy and the Security of Asia, A Volume in the series, The United States and China in World Affairs, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1968, p. 128, Article I of Agreement of Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Pakistan, T.I.A.S. 4190.

⁷Khalid Bin Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1967, p. 269.

⁸Professor Sayeed notes that it can be argued that since Pakistan with its divided territory was both a Middle Eastern as well as a South-east Asian country, it had joined CENTO to protect its West wing and SEATO to insure the safety of East Pakistan. In posing the question as to whether or not Pakistan joined SEATO in order to insure its security against China he says: "There is clear evidence to suggest that from the very beginning Pakistan was not thinking of a threat from China but primarily of its defensive positions against India." "Southeast Asia in Pakistan's Foreign Policy," Pacific Affairs, XXXV, Fall 1962, p. 232.

to lessen the power inequality between Pakistan and India, reduce the burden of heavy defence expenditure necessitated by a strong and "hostile" India, increase diplomatic support in the solution of her disputes with India and obtain increased quantities of economic aid for development purposes.⁹ However, the United States did not give outright support to Pakistan against India. The aid given to Pakistan had strained Indo-American relations and the United States did not want to exacerbate them further by taking sides in the Indo-Pakistan disputes. Thus both Pakistan and the United States viewed quite differently the objectives and purposes of their alliance. Notwithstanding this, Pakistan between 1954 and 1960 followed a policy of close alignment with the United States.

The advantages which Pakistan gained from the alliance with the United States were considerable, especially in the military sphere. However, there were also many disadvantages which Pakistan endured as a result of close ties with the West. The Baghdad Pact had divided the Arab world and through its membership in that Pact Pakistan was held responsible, by many of the Arab countries, for contributing to that division. Pakistan's success in forging closer ties with Muslim countries was largely confined to Iran and Turkey, also members of CENTO. Then too, Pakistan was the object of Soviet protests over its alliance with the United States. This reached an embarrassing climax with the discovery that the United States U-2 espionage aircraft, which landed in the Soviet

⁹Khurshid Hasan, "U.S.-Pakistan Relations," Foreign Policy of Pakistan: An Analysis, ed. by Khurshid Hasan, The Allies Book Corporation, Karachi, 1964, p. 54.

Union in 1960, had taken off from an air base near Peshawar in Pakistan. But most important of all in November, 1953, when the United States informed India of its intention to offer Pakistan substantial military assistance, India withdrew an offer she had made to Karachi the previous August to consider a plebiscite for Kashmir and then adopted "a position of complete rigidity on the issue."¹⁰ U.S. military aid to Pakistan also brought about another change which was detrimental to the interests of Pakistan. The Soviet Union, which had been neutral on the Kashmir issue, supported India from 1955 onwards; this made it more difficult to satisfy Pakistan's desire to have the conflict settled to her benefit through the United Nations.

Throughout this period Pakistan accepted the notion that Communism was a threat to the peace of the world. As a member of SEATO and CENTO, Pakistan expressed her determination to stand by the United States in the fight against Communism. It is interesting to note Ayub Khan's views on Communism when he still adhered to a policy of close alignment with the United States.

... people talk about coexistence with Russia today. I maintain that coexistence isn't possible; ... If Communism were to prevail in our part of the world we should have the status of a satellite. The Russians have different treatment for different countries. If the bulk of the country is large like China, it is treated as equal. Maybe if India is to become Communist, she would be treated as equal because of bulk; but we would just be ground away.¹¹

¹⁰F. Greene, op. cit., p. 127.

¹¹Quoted by B.L. Sharma, The Pakistan-China Axis, Asia Publishing House, New York, 1968, p. 61.

Although Ayub Khan proclaimed Martial Law in 1958, this did not signify any change in Pakistan's policy of alignment, as evidenced by the 1959 bilateral agreement which was more comprehensive in scope than that of 1954. There were changes occurring in the United States, however.

With the death of Dulles in May, 1959, the Republican Administration was more inclined to tolerate non-alignment as an acceptable line of policy. This became the professed basis of American policy in Asia and Africa after the Democrats came to power in 1961 and many of the leading Democrats were thought to have a pro-India bias.¹² Cultivation of Indian friendship ranked high among the objectives of the new Kennedy Administration since the United States felt it was vital to build a strong India to counterbalance the increasing influence of Communist China. This became apparent in May, 1961, when Lyndon B. Johnson, then Vice-President of the United States, made a tour of several Asian countries in which "he carried with him specific authorization by President Kennedy to make military, para-military and economic commitments within a pre-arranged limit."¹³ He revealed that "he had appealed to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India to extend his activities in Southeast Asia with a view to strengthening the area and that he had a favorable response."¹⁴

¹²K. Sayeed gives evidence to support this contention, The Political System of Pakistan, op. cit., pp. 271-2. For Chester Bowles' and Kennedy's statements on this point see, Selig S. Harrison, India and the United States, Macmillan, New York, 1961, pp. 28 and 64.

¹³New York Herald Tribune, May 25, 1961. Cited in Latif Ahmed Sherwani, India, China and Pakistan, Council for Pakistan Studies, Karachi, 1967, p. 64.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 65.

This shift of emphasis in American foreign policy was not lost on Pakistan and reinforced her growing disenchantment with the United States. To Pakistan, a strong India was a much greater menace to her security than international Communism.

There were other problems that also troubled the Pakistanis during the Kennedy Administration. One was the suspicion that American liberals, intellectuals, and New Frontiersmen did not view with sympathy the historical depth and intensity of Pakistan's Muslim nationalism.¹⁵ Another area of concern was the decreasing dependence of the United States on military bases in foreign countries. Changes in military technology, particularly the development of ICBM's and nuclear submarines fitted with Polaris missiles, had considerably reduced the military value of bases supplied by Asian allies. Restiveness about the tie grew as the U.S. steadfastly refused to use SEATO as an instrument for pressure against India. These trends in American foreign policy strained the relations between Pakistan and the United States. By 1961, Pakistan began to see more clearly the lack of harmony in the interests of the two countries. Ayub Khan's visit to the United States in 1961 did not fundamentally ease the heightening tension in their relations. The Democratic Administration's pro-India stance clashed with the anti-India feeling in Pakistan. Despite good will on both sides, the conflict of interests was not resolved.

¹⁵ Khalid Bin Sayeed, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Pakistan's Fears and Interests," Asian Survey, IV, March 1964, p. 753.

Pakistan and the People's Republic of China 1947-62

Pakistan recognized the People's Republic of China on January 5, 1950. Immediately afterwards, Pakistan abstained from voting on the United Nations General Assembly Resolution (sponsored by the United States) condemning China as the aggressor in the Korean War. Pakistan also abstained on the United Nations Resolution imposing an embargo on strategic goods and materials destined for China and North Korea.¹⁶

Britain devalued the Pound Sterling in 1952 and India promptly devalued its rupee. The Government of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan decided not to devalue the Pakistan rupee. As a result, India refused to accept the new rate of exchange of the Pakistan rupee and halted Indo-Pakistan trade. This posed a serious threat to Pakistan's economy, and its rail system, which was then dependent on coal from India, was in danger of paralysis. China came to Pakistan's aid by signing a barter agreement under which China was to supply coal in exchange for Pakistan's raw jute and cotton. China soon became one of Pakistan's major customers and Pakistan enjoyed a very favorable balance of trade with China. However, although Pakistan did establish economic links with China in the early 1950's, their relations in other spheres were not developed. Since the Communist party was outlawed in Pakistan, people-to-people contact between the two countries was restricted.

In 1954 when Pakistan allied herself with the West in SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, Peking's reaction was naturally critical but not

¹⁶Area Handbook for Pakistan, Foreign Areas Studies, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1965, pp. 341-2.

as violent as the outbursts from Moscow. In fact, it was New Delhi that decried the alliance most vehemently. Several authors have speculated that it was perhaps Major General Raza, envoy to Peking and close friend of Prime Minister Chou En-lai, who convinced the Chinese that Pakistan had joined the Western alliance for defence against India and not with aggressive designs against China.¹⁷ Sino-Pakistan trade actually grew in volume and their relations showed no signs of deterioration, although these relations could not be characterized as intimate or close.

At the Bandung Conference in 1955, the new Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali of Bogra, and Chou En-lai met for the first time. The Chinese leader was further assured that Pakistan's membership in SEATO did not imply that Pakistan opposed China nor did Pakistan fear any aggression from China. Addressing the Political Committee of the Bandung Conference in the presence of Mr. Mohammad Ali, the Chinese Premier said:

The Prime Minister of Pakistan further assured that if the United States should take aggressive action under the military treaty or if the United States launched a global war, Pakistan would not be involved in it. He said Pakistan would not be involved in it just as it was not involved in the Korean War. I am grateful to him for this explanation because through these explanations we achieve mutual understanding. This created agreement and harmony amongst us in understanding each other in regard to collective peace and cooperation.¹⁸

¹⁷For example see Qutubuddin Aziz, "Relations between Pakistan and the People's Republic of China," Foreign Policy of Pakistan: An Analysis, ed. by Khurshid Hasan, The Allies Book Corporation, Karachi, 1964, p. 77. Also Anwar Syed, "The Politics of Sino-Pakistan Agreements," Orbis, XI, Winter, 1968, p. 803.

¹⁸Q. Aziz, op. cit., p. 79.

Because of Chou En-lai's conciliatory attitude at Bandung, the Pakistan Prime Minister was left with the impression that China's attitude towards Pakistan was both reasonable and moderate.¹⁹ This meeting was an important landmark in the development of Sino-Pakistan relations. In 1956, visits were exchanged between the Chinese Prime Minister and the new Pakistani Prime Minister, Mr. H.S. Suhrawardy. The formation of the China-Pakistan Friendship Association was announced in Peking in the same year.

Ayub Khan became the leader of the Pakistani nation in 1958 and no attempt was made on either side to improve Sino-Pakistan relations during his first years in power. In fact, Ayub seemed to retain his predilection for siding with the West as indicated in the following statement.

... Pakistan has openly and unequivocally cast its lot with the West. ... We do not believe in hunting with the hound and running with the hare. We wish to follow and are following a clear and unambiguous path.²⁰

During 1959-60, serious differences arose between India and China over Tibet and the Chinese occupation of territory around Aksai Chin in Ladakh. It is interesting to note Ayub Khan's evaluation at this particular time for, as we shall see, it conflicts with statements that he made later on.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 80.

²⁰Mohammed Ayub Khan, "Pakistan Perspective," Foreign Affairs, XXXVIII, July 1960, p. 555.

As a student of war and strategy, I can see quite clearly the inexorable push of the North in the direction of the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. This push is bound to increase if India and Pakistan go on squabbling with each other. If, on the other hand, we resolve our problems and disengage our forces from facing inwards as they do today, and face them outwards, I feel we shall have a chance of preventing a recurrence of the history of the past, which was that whenever this subcontinent was divided someone or other invited an outsider to step in.²¹

The new Pakistani leader tried to establish friendly relations with India and had even put forward a plan for joint defence in 1959. Although Ayub Khan found Nehru unreceptive to his offer for joint defence, Peking asked against whom this co-operation would be directed. This offer, as well as Pakistan's support of a resolution in the United Nations General Assembly condemning the Communist Chinese Government for suppressing the Tibetans, were not viewed with favor by Peking. Thus, because of Ayub's preferences and Peking's suspicions, prospects for friendly relations between Pakistan and China did not look bright in the early stages of the Ayub Administration.

In October, 1959, when relations between Pakistan and China were rather strained, the Government of Pakistan came into possession of a Chinese map which showed a large portion of Pakistan's extreme northern region as Chinese territory.²² Requests for clarifications

²¹Ibid., p. 556.

²²Pakistan's border with the People's Republic of China extended along a line starting from the tri-junction of Pakistan, Afghanistan and China to the Karakoram Pass in the East—a distance of two hundred miles. For a more detailed description of the geography of this area see: K. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, op. cit., p. 275.

brought the familiar reply that the map was drawn up by the pre-Communist regime. Although China had used peaceful means in demarcating her frontiers with Burma and Nepal, Pakistan was still uncertain about the Chinese attitude. Consequently, Pakistan strengthened her forces stationed in Hunza and Baltistan as a precaution against Chinese "incursions" into these areas.²³ However, Pakistan's undefined border with China remained a source of concern to the Government of Pakistan.

Within a few weeks after receiving the Chinese maps, Ayub Khan announced his intention of approaching China for a peaceful settlement of the Chinese-Pakistan border. China did not respond immediately to Pakistan's initiative. Throughout 1960, which was the year of the U-2 incident and heightened global tensions, Sino-Pakistan relations remained static. In May, 1961, after consulting with the President of Azad Kashmir, Pakistan submitted detailed proposals to Peking for the demarcation of the border. The Chinese Government informed Pakistan that it would examine the proposals and submit a reply in the near future. In the interim, Pakistan took steps to demonstrate a desire for friendship with China, such as its vote in December, 1961, in favor of seating the People's Republic of China in the United Nations. In the middle of March, 1962, more than two years after Pakistan had first proposed negotiations, China decided to discuss the border question. On May 3, 1962, the Governments of Pakistan and China simultaneously announced that they had agreed to demarcate the Sino-Pakistan border.

²³This sequence of events is described by Nasim Ahmad, "China's Himalayan Frontiers: Pakistan's Attitude," International Affairs, XXXVIII, October 1962, p. 478.

Events Involved in the Sequence of Decisions

The foregoing description of Pakistan's relations with the United States and the People's Republic of China has carried us to the period being studied in this paper. As mentioned in the Introduction, there were three main events which the Pakistani decision-makers perceived as stimuli and therefore, I would like to describe these three events from an operational perspective.

One of these events, the border negotiations between Pakistan and China, was superimposed upon another, the Sino-Indian border war. In fact, actual negotiations for the demarcation of the Sino-Pakistan border began on October 13, 1962, a week before Chinese and Indian troops clashed on the Sino-Indian frontier.

The Sino-Indian border conflict had grave consequences for Pakistan's foreign policy in that it created a harmony of interests between the United States, Great Britain and India. Chinese troops penetrated the North East Frontier Province in November, 1962. The following month at the Nassau Conference, President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan agreed that the United States and the Commonwealth should each provide India with military equipment worth \$60 million.²⁴ Later, in June, 1964, the United States announced that between 500-525 million dollars worth of military aid would be extended to India over the next five years.²⁵

²⁴Keesing's Contemporary Archives, XV, Keesing's Publications Limited, Bristol, 1963-64, p. 19649.

²⁵K. Hasan, "U.S.-Pakistan Relations," Foreign Policy of Pakistan, op. cit., p. 58.

The American decision to give military aid to India fundamentally altered the American-Pakistan alliance. India was now perceived by Pakistan as an even greater threat than before. Pakistan felt that the action of her allies in supporting the neutralists instead of their pledged friends had raised grave doubts about the wisdom of Pakistan's policy and the reliability of those allies.²⁶ Though the United States sponsored Indian-Pakistan talks in 1963, it refused to make its new assistance to New Delhi conditional on a Kashmir settlement. In short, the border war had broken the old diplomatic order, and necessitated a re-assessment of Pakistan's foreign policy.

The Sino-Pakistan border agreement was signed in Peking on March 2, 1963.²⁷ While demarcating the boundary between China and the area "the defence of which is under the control of Pakistan" the agreement provides that it is subject to negotiation, after the settlement of the Kashmir dispute, with the authority which gains sovereignty over the area.²⁸ If the sovereign power is Pakistan, no further negotiation will be necessary and the provisional agreement will become firm and permanent.

²⁶Ibid., p. 59.

²⁷The text of the Boundary Agreement can be found in Guy Wint, ed., Asia, A Handbook, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1966, pp. 765-6.

²⁸The border consisted of parts of Kashmir under Pakistani control but India also claimed these areas as part of her own territory. In deference to the United Nations' decisions and the international commitments regarding the future of the former state of Jammu and Kashmir undertaken both by Pakistan and India, Pakistan has never claimed "sovereignty" over the boundary between Azad Kashmir and Sinkiang, but continues to "defend" it.

In the agreement both sides made concessions. The area in dispute was about 3,400 square miles and the compromise left about 2,050 square miles of the disputed area on China's side. Pakistan, however, gave up only claims on maps whereas the People's Republic of China agreed to withdraw its frontier forces and administration from about 750 square miles.²⁹ The new territory brought Pakistan only modest economic advantages—some grazing grounds and the Daraband-Darwaza salt mines which would be useful to Pakistanis in adjacent areas.³⁰ Secure possession of the waters draining into the Indus River system must also be counted as an advantage in view of Pakistani apprehensions about the future of streams flowing into West Pakistan from the Indian-occupied part of Kashmir. Most important, the agreement was significant politically because it mitigated the potential for conflict between the two countries and placed China formally on record as maintaining that Kashmir did not, as yet, belong to India. The settlement by negotiation of the Sino-Pakistan border issue was a new beginning of improved relations between the two countries.

The third major event affecting Pakistan's alignment policies in the 1962-65 period was the Indo-Pakistan border war. In April, 1965, an armed conflict flared up between India and Pakistan over the Rann of Kutch. In August, the Indian Government claimed that Pakistan had been sending "infiltrators" into Indian-held Kashmir and in the same

²⁹K. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, *op. cit.*, p. 276.

³⁰Anwar Syed, "The Politics of Sino-Pakistan Agreements," Orbis, XI, Winter, 1968, p. 804.

month India retaliated by moving troops across the previous cease-fire line. Pakistan maintained that there had been an internal rebellion against the Indian regime in Kashmir and responded to India's "aggression" by crossing the line herself in the south. Extensive and bitter fighting ensued, with Pakistan appearing to have somewhat the upper hand. Then Indian forces crossed the international border between India and Pakistan near Lahore and the two countries were plunged into a very real, if undeclared, war. The armed hostilities were brought to an end by the Tashkent Agreement of January 10, 1966. At Tashkent, Pakistan and India agreed to withdraw their troops to their former positions. They also agreed to restore diplomatic relations and to consider measures for the restoration of economic and trade relations.³¹

The Indo-Pakistan border war was an important event in terms of Pakistan's decision to alter her alliance policy. The war cannot be viewed as a local one involving only Pakistan and India; the situation became explosive from the international point of view. The two superpowers as well as Communist China played major roles in the dispute even though they did not participate directly in the fighting. The United States and the Soviet Union exhibited a rare coincidence of interests in their desire to terminate the hostilities. China, on the other hand, threatened to escalate the conflict by initiating military activity against India on the Sikkim border. Unlike the two superpowers, who did not

³¹For a more extensive account of the Indo-Pakistan border war see: K. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, op. cit., pp. 279-83. Also, Arif Hussain, Pakistan: Its Ideology and Foreign Policy, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., London, 1966, pp. 170-72.

officially take sides during the hostilities, China came out very strongly in favor of Pakistan. The various maneuverings between the five nations will be discussed in subsequent chapters but it should be clear, even at this point, that the Indo-Pakistan war would have important implications for Pakistan's relations with the three major powers.

Now that we have discussed the major events in the period under examination, our next task is to identify the principal decision-makers and to trace their backgrounds.

The Foreign Policy Elite

Before examining elite images in a specific set of decisions, it is important to have some understanding of the personal characteristics of the key decision-makers as well as their general orientations to foreign policy. Therefore, the concluding section of this chapter will serve to introduce the two Pakistani leaders to the reader. Their general foreign policy orientations will be discussed under the three main headings of brief biography, personality, and belief system.

a. Mohammad Ayub Khan

Field Marshall Mohammad Ayub Khan was the President of Pakistan longer than any other man in the country's history. Born in the village of Rehana in Pathan Province on May 14, 1907, Ayub came from a conservative Muslim middle-class family background. He grew up with a purely Muslim social influence and attended the Muslim university, Aligarh, a college in which religious education was combined with the study of modern arts and sciences. By his own admission, he

was neither a very bright student nor did he find his studies particularly absorbing.

He attended Sandhurst Military School in the late 1920's. He reported that he was aware of being regarded as an inferior human being as a result of belonging to a subject race.³² Training in technology and contact with foreign specialists also sensitized him to the relative backwardness of his own country. He claimed he never developed a deep understanding of England and that Sandhurst was not conducive to mixing with the British.³³ However, the military atmosphere was to have an important influence on the way in which he viewed problems in later life.

After Sandhurst Ayub joined a British regiment, the Royal Fusiliers, who were stationed in Ambala in the eastern Punjab. In his various army capacities (General Officer Commanding in East Pakistan, Adjutant-General and finally Commander-in-Chief), Ayub was called upon to solve the problems of the formation and training of the army in Pakistan. The Pakistan Army at the time of partition was created from the Muslim elements which had left the British Indian Army. To regroup and reorganize these bodies into a homogeneous force was an enormous task in itself. Ayub believed that after independence Pakistan's very survival depended upon the establishment of a well-trained, well-equipped and well-led army and he was determined to create this type of military

³²Field Marshall Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography, Oxford University Press, London, 1967, p. 10.

³³Ibid.

establishment for his country.

In August, 1952, apparently independent of government initiative, Ayub instructed the new military attaché to Washington to explore the possibilities of a military alliance with the United States. In October, 1953, General Ayub Khan visited the United States, once more without significant evidence of his government's support. In fact, the Government of Pakistan "had not corresponded with the State Department at all about it."³⁴ Ayub's biographer, Colonel Ahmed, asserts that it was General Ayub's visit to the Pentagon in 1953 that was responsible for the United States policy of extending aid to Pakistan in the fields of industry, commerce, economics and defence. He feels that it was the recognition of Ayub's integrity that led American decision-makers to ignore political considerations in giving aid to Pakistan. Apart from negotiating with American authorities, General Ayub invited influential people from the United States to visit Pakistan and inspect army installations to see things for themselves.

These visitors gave glowing accounts of the efficiency of the Pakistan Army when they returned to Washington. Their reports regarding our civil government and politicians were necessarily not very complimentary, but it seems that the advantages of having the Pakistan Army on their side outweighed American apprehensions about the shortcomings of our political leaders.³⁵

Major-General Fazal Muqeem Khan corroborates this estimation of Ayub's success in building up the Pakistan Army.³⁶ He stresses the

³⁴Colonel Mohammad Ahmed, My Chief, Longmans, Green and Company, Lahore, 1960, p. 75.

³⁵Ibid., p. 76.

³⁶Major-General Fazal Muqeem Khan, The Story of the Pakistan Army, Oxford University Press, Pakistan Branch, Karachi, 1963, pp. 165-80.

fact that General Ayub had acquired great stature in national life, not only by the manner in which he had built up and led the army, but also as a result of his personality and appeal to the masses.

By 1958, the whole country was gripped by an economic crisis.³⁷ Despite the confusion there was talk of holding general elections under the 1956 Constitution. These elections were promised for November, 1957, but were then postponed to 1958. As the general elections approached, the question of maintaining law and order would, in Ayub's view, involve the army whether it liked it or not.

The sense of demoralization had seeped down to the masses and they started saying openly, 'Let somebody save this country!' The implication was obvious: it was the army alone that could step into the breach. That was the only disciplined organization that could give the country the necessary covering fire, in order to enable it to steady itself and extricate itself from the evils which had surrounded it . . . as conditions were, the army alone could act as a corrective force and restore normalcy.³⁸

Thus Ayub stressed that it was not he who sought political power but the circumstances and the popular will which thrust the reigns of leadership into his hands. He went on to emphasize that he had turned down previous offers of leadership because he felt the army should remain

³⁷ Ayub explained the reasons for the economic crisis in the following words: "Reckless spending seemed to be the order of the day. We were incurring foreign exchange liabilities to the extent of Rs. 30 to 40 million every month in excess of our earnings. The foreign exchange reserves were down to Rs. 420 million, of which about 140 million were not negotiable. In another ten months or so the currency would have lost all value and we might have had a complete breakdown of the monetary and banking system in the country." Friends Not Masters, op. cit., p. 56.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 58.

aloof from politics. However, by 1958, the turmoil of Pakistani politics seemed to warrant drastic action.

The October Revolution was handled by Ayub as a military operation and there was very little opposition or bloodshed. Ian Stephens remarked that "Pakistan's military revolution of October, 1958, seems likely to go down to history as the most efficient and benign thing of its sort that the twentieth century has seen."³⁹ After gaining power, one of Ayub's objectives was to modernize his country and he saw no reason not to use Martial Law to carry out fundamental reforms.

The personality of Ayub Khan has been described by his biographer as "direct, spontaneous and frank, a willing listener and seldom indulging in sarcasm. In his manner he is detached yet friendly, social yet reserved."⁴⁰ Colonel Ahmed notes that Ayub viewed individual problems not only in a detached and impersonal fashion but related them to national affairs and national life. He recalls Ayub's firm adherence to the impartiality which he practised throughout his army career. He sees Ayub Khan as an intense patriot who was dedicated to Pakistan.⁴¹ This view is substantiated by Major-General Fazal Muqeem Khan who also worked closely with Ayub in building up the Pakistan Army. He relates that although there was much to occupy Ayub Khan's time when he was Commander-in-Chief, "a great capacity for work and a keen desire to

³⁹Ian Stephens, Pakistan, Ernest Benn Ltd., London, 1963, p. 246.

⁴⁰M. Ahmed, op. cit., p. 11.

⁴¹Ibid., passim.

know more allowed him long periods which he could devote to the study of his country's problems."⁴²

Another aspect of Ayub's personality which comes through strongly in all of his speeches and writings is his great respect for discipline and order. This is undoubtedly a direct result of his military training. One analyst observed that if one looks at the structure of Basic Democracies in Pakistan which Ayub instituted after the termination of Martial Law, one is impressed by its neat hierarchical form. "Each layer has clearly delegated authority and functions which is somewhat like the neatness of the Army administration."⁴³ Ayub himself made this explicit when he visited the rural areas of West Pakistan to explain the system of Basic Democracy: "It is my desire to see the country as organized as her army."⁴⁴

In terms of his belief system, Ayub laid great stress on the importance of Islam to Pakistan. An attitude of near-desperation can be seen in the following plea to his people.

Please do remember that no other country or nation is in such dire need of depending on Islam as Pakistan. If, God forbid, other countries of the world choose to stray away from the path of Islam, then, whatever the consequences in the other world, in this world at least they can still afford to exist as nations and communities. The posi-

⁴²Fazal Muqeem Khan, op. cit., p. 196.

⁴³Khalid B. Sayeed, "Basic Democracy and Political Development," unpublished lecture presented to the conference on Pakistan Since 1958 at McGill University, Institute of Islamic Studies, June 17-19, 1964 (mimeographed), p. 1.

⁴⁴Dawn, Karachi, December 20, 1959.

tion of Pakistan is entirely different. Our country was founded in the name of Islam and it can subsist only on this name. There is no other basis for our national cohesion and solidarity except Islam.⁴⁵

Ayub's attitude towards Islam was sincere but not dogmatic. He continually emphasized the value of Islam to Pakistan, not only as a founding principle but also as a source of spiritual strength. On the importance of this latter point, he asserted that the failure of the West in political and spiritual fields could be attributed to the "loss of its grip on eternal values."⁴⁶ He also saw the discordant world situation as a product of the current imbalance between scientific forces and spiritual values.⁴⁷

Ayub stressed over and over again that Islam was a progressive religion and should help Pakistan to advance. He felt that a society should possess an ideology not only to regulate its collective life but also to give it a foothold in a world of perpetual change.⁴⁸ He sorrowfully admitted that Muslim communities all over the world were among the most backward and attributed this to a lack of mobility and incentive on the part of the Muslim populations. He did not feel that this immobility was inherent in Islam itself but merely a misapplication of Islamic principles. Ayub continually cited those sections of the Qur'ân which

⁴⁵Ayub: Soldier and Statesman, Speeches and Statements (1958-1965) of Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, ed. by Rais Ahmad Jafri, Mohammad Ali Academy, Lahore, May 1966, pp. 84-5.

⁴⁶Speeches and Statements, III, Pakistan Publications, Karachi; July 1960-June 1961, p. 39.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 93.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 39.

encouraged progress and development and warned of the serious consequences of failing to adapt Islam to present-day problems.

The President claimed that he did not see the world in absolutist terms. He prided himself on being a pragmatist in pursuing the possible in a moderate manner. Ayub insisted that he viewed compromise and the give-and-take of politics as natural parts of statecraft.

Now, in life, decisions have to be taken. The choice often is between so many evils and the art of statesmanship lies in weighing different alternatives and eventually deciding which is the least evil which can do you the least amount of harm.⁴⁹

Again we can see the influence of Ayub's military background where he was trained to balance realistically a whole range of defence problems with capabilities.

Ayub believed that his pragmatism also extended to the realm of foreign policy. He contended that Pakistan could not afford the luxury of neutralism which to him meant the freedom to "criticize and curse everybody else." Foreign policy must be based on the needs of the nation, taking into account vital interests and advancing those interests. The plan which he developed, and which he asserted was both rational and pragmatic, was that of setting up bilateral equations with each of the major powers.⁵⁰ In this way normal relations could be established with each of them without antagonizing any one of them. He was aware of the delicacy of such a policy since no bilateral equation could be established in isolation. The various equations would influence one

⁴⁹Speeches and Statements, VI, July 1963-June 1964, pp. 12-13.

⁵⁰Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, op. cit., pp. 118-9.

another's levels and, in the end, each equation would be determined by the limits of tolerance of third parties. For this policy to work, it was necessary to determine clearly the limits of tolerance within which bilateral equations might be constructed. To accomplish this, Ayub intended to limit Pakistan's foreign policy aspirations as well as to control the style of Pakistan's diplomacy so that it would not antagonize any great power.

In summary, Ayub's military training was a very important influence in his life. He was an intense patriot who felt that he could best serve his country through the army. He laid great stress on the importance of Islam to Pakistan but he continually emphasized its progressive aspects. Apart from this strong belief in Islam as the basis for Pakistan's survival, Ayub prided himself on being a pragmatist. In setting out his theory of bilateral equations, he was well aware of the restrictions on a leader of a new and underdeveloped country. Consequently, Ayub sought to tailor both his foreign policy objectives and his means for achieving these objectives in accordance with the limitations which he perceived.

b. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto brought a varied and international background to Ayub's Foreign Ministry. Born in 1928, he came from one of the oldest aristocratic families of Sind. He attended the University of California (Berkeley) where he received an honors degree in Political Science. In 1952, he received his M.A. in Jurisprudence from Oxford where he was a member of Christchurch College. While at Oxford he

was given an award for debating and cited as having outstanding qualities of leadership. The same year he was called to the Bar at Lincoln's Inn, London, and also became a lecturer in international law at the University of Southampton. In 1953, he returned to Pakistan and began to practise law in Karachi.

Until his resignation on June 18, 1966, Mr. Bhutto was the only Minister who had been a member of the Presidential Cabinet uninterruptedly since its formation in 1958. He served the government as Minister for Commerce from 1958 to 1960. The next two years he was Minister of several departments: Minority Affairs and National Reconstruction; Information; Fuel, Power and Natural Resources; and Kashmir Affairs. From 1963-66, he was Minister of Foreign Affairs and of Atomic Energy. Even before attaining these positions Bhutto was interested in foreign affairs; he was a member of numerous foreign delegations and was leader of the Pakistani delegation to the United Nations in 1959, 1960, and 1963.

Bhutto had a more complicated personality than did Ayub and he tended to see things in more emotional terms. One can feel the contrast between the more pragmatic orientation of Ayub and the more subjective basis of Bhutto's thought from their respective speeches and writings; the choice of language is markedly different. Despite his emotionalism, Bhutto was the more intellectual of the two leaders. He had a much broader view of history than did Ayub and a keener sense of the historical forces which have shaped the present-day world. There is an almost scholarly ring to his admonition to "approach events more

systematically and to put an end to the age-old habit of impetuous and arbitrary ad hoc responses."⁵¹

The preservation of the independence of the new nations was paramount in Bhutto's personal value system. He was sensitive to the fact that, after twenty years, there continued to exist a sharp difference between what he termed "independence and sovereign equality." It was this belief that led him to entitle his latest political work, The Myth of Independence. Bhutto asserted that the struggle to attain sovereign equality continues undiminished. "Foreign domination has been replaced by foreign intervention, and the power to make decisions radically affecting the lives of our peoples has been curtailed by the canons of neo-colonialism."⁵² Both this emotional involvement and Bhutto's talent for oratory are demonstrated in his discussion of the proper goals for Pakistan.

The force of freedom must triumph because it is stronger than any other force for which man will lay down his life. It is still possible for the smaller nations, with adroit handling of their affairs, to maintain their independence and retain flexibility of action in their relationship with Global Powers.⁵³

Independence and flexibility, then, were his guideposts in outlining Pakistan's foreign policy objectives.

⁵¹Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, The Myth of Independence, Oxford University Press, London, 1969, p. 79.

⁵²Ibid., p. 5.

⁵³Ibid., p. 13.

Bhutto's ideology is a mixture of the extreme nationalism found in so many of the leaders of the developing nations, and a distinctly Marxist orientation. Lamenting the fact that Pakistan's independence had to some extent been undermined by her dependence on economic and military aid from abroad, he asked, "Should the smaller nations therefore obediently follow the dictates of Global Powers and exchange their independence for material gains and promises of economic prosperity? The answer is an emphatic 'No'."⁵⁴

Bhutto, like Ayub, saw Islam as the basis of Pakistan society; within his own ideological framework, he also saw it as a historical force in the world which could effect great changes.

Islam was born to be a force for the establishment of equality and justice. The opposition to imperialism and colonialism of other forces is at best founded on an apprehension and a doctrinaire conviction, but in Islam it is part of the religion itself. Thus Islam is committed morally and historically to the struggle against domination and exploitation.⁵⁵

On the other hand, Bhutto felt that Islam, as a political force, had suffered more at the hands of the Christian states than of others "and is still in the process of recovering from the damage inflicted."⁵⁶ Bhutto, to a far greater extent than Ayub, retained the conviction of a traditional hostility between the Muslim world and the Christian empires.

⁵⁴Ibid., pp. 12-13.

⁵⁵Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, The Quest for Peace: Selections from Speeches and Writings 1963-65, Karachi, The Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1966, p. 83.

⁵⁶Z.A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence, op. cit., pp. 132-3.

Like President Ayub, Bhutto denigrated neutralism as a policy for Pakistan; he felt that to become part of the neutralist camp would automatically place Pakistan under the domination of India.⁵⁷ Bhutto too espoused the theory of bilateral equations but in a conceptually more complicated way: "When the national interests of a state clash with the interests of a Global Power, it would be preferable to isolate the area of conflict in the direct dealings with that Great Power. A workable equilibrium should be sought independent of the point on which vital interests differ. . . ."⁵⁸ Bhutto was also more keenly aware of what political scientists term "the international system"; perhaps this stemmed from his personal experience at the United Nations. He understood that bilateral relations would be affected not only by other bilateral relations but also by the international system as a whole. He saw the necessity of examining relations with states, not on an ad hoc basis, but within the broader context of world events and international conditions that influence the relations of all nation-states, large and small. "Indeed, the true implications of recent happenings can only be judged if every major development is viewed in its proper place in the vast jig-saw puzzle of international power politics."⁵⁹ Consistent with his tendency

⁵⁷Bhutto's statements vis-à-vis India reflect a deep-seated emotional antagonism. In line with Bhutto's personal characteristics, one can detect a more virulent attitude towards India than is the case with Ayub Khan and a greater emotional attachment to Communist China is also manifested.

⁵⁸Z.A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence, op. cit., p. 13.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 6.

to view events in broad terms was his concern to use the contemporary scene as a source of clues, "as to the kind of problems or hazards that might have to be faced in a world which moves uncertainly between co-existence and co-annihilation."⁶⁰ Given the role of Marxism as a source of both explanatory concepts and normative guidelines in Bhutto's thought, accurate prediction was not only possible because of historical trends, but desirable for the successful pursuit of goals.

To summarize, Ayub Khan and Bhutto came from very different backgrounds and belonged to different generations. Bhutto's approach to foreign policy was both more emotional and more intellectual than that of Ayub. Bhutto was an extreme nationalist and combined this with a Marxist interpretation of international politics; yet, his Marxist framework was modified to accommodate Islam. Whereas Bhutto emphasized Islam as both a regional and an international force, Ayub laid stress on the importance of Islam to Pakistan itself. Both leaders, however, were unambiguous about their faith in the superiority of Islam over both the Communist system and the capitalist system. Despite the lip-service Bhutto paid to limitations in foreign policy, he was less apt to accept restraints than was Ayub. This was particularly true with regard to India and the Western Powers. Ayub was prepared to compromise with the "give-and-take" of politics but Bhutto felt that anything which would undermine Pakistan's independence and sovereignty was unacceptable as a line of policy. In short, the personal experiences and ideologies of

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 4.

the two leaders resulted in two different approaches to foreign policy.

The purpose of this chapter was to give a historical perspective to the decision under examination, to explain the three main events which served as catalysts to that decision, and to describe the two major policy-makers. We can now turn to the substance of the paper—the examination of the elite images of these two leaders. Through the analysis of images, we can explore the reasons for change in Pakistan's alignment pattern.

CHAPTER III

MOHAMMAD AYUB KHAN'S FOREIGN POLICY IMAGE

In this chapter four major variables will comprise the framework used to research the images of the former Pakistani President, Mohammad Ayub Khan. First, Pakistan's dominant bilateral relations with the United States and the Soviet Union will be explored. Second, Pakistan's bilateral relations with the People's Republic of China and India will be examined. Third, Pakistan's military capabilities relative to those of the four powers will be investigated. Finally, Pakistan's economic capabilities relative to these same four countries will be studied. This framework will enable us to investigate the shifting alignments of a new nation.

External: Dominant Bilateral

The first external variable to be explored is termed dominant bilateral. This refers to the total pattern of interactions between any state and the super-powers in the global system.¹ Within this category, the United States and the Soviet Union are treated separately. Pakistani ties with the United States were an emanation of the various military treaties signed with the super-power. Therefore, the political aspects of these agreements are treated as dominant bilateral variables and the military aspects are treated as military-capability variables. This distinction is somewhat difficult to sustain in practice because both aspects

¹M. Brecher et al., op. cit., p. 83.

are so inextricably intertwined but it is analytically useful.

a. United States

By the time Ayub Khan became responsible for the foreign policy of Pakistan in 1958, the political identification with the West was complete. He claimed that his interest in these pacts had been exclusively in terms of the defence of the country.² As he became responsible for the economic and political development of Pakistan, however, he came to realize the necessity of having good relations with the United States and other western powers who were in a position to help Pakistan economically. He felt that the "equation" between the United States and Pakistan had been one of close friendship and alliance.³

With the emergence of the People's Republic of China as a major Asian power and more particularly, after the conflict between India and China in 1962, Ayub felt that American policies had undergone a fundamental change. The most important element in this change, from Ayub's point of view, was the United States build-up of India as a bulwark against China.⁴

Earlier, Ayub had recognized the change of attitude in the United States towards neutralism and he claimed that over the years, "it has come to assume a mantle of respectability in American eyes."⁵ He felt

²Ayub: Soldier and Statesman, op. cit., p. 176.

³Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, op. cit., p. 129.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid., p. 132.

that Pakistan had increasingly been taken for granted and that India had received a disproportionate amount of aid from the United States "without accepting any of the obligations that devolve on an ally."⁶ There were definite feelings of resentment before 1963, but it was the Sino-Indian border conflict and the "massive" American aid which followed that gave Ayub Khan the greatest cause for alarm.

Although the Sino-Indian border war was a major cause of Pakistani-American tensions, the rapprochement between Communist China and Pakistan was another source of stress between the two allies. In an interview, President Ayub was asked if Pakistan were drawing away from the West and moving closer to Red China. His answer was:

I do not think it would be correct to say that there is any change basically in our foreign policy. The fact that we want to settle our border dispute with China is a thing that has been a part of our foreign policy and is part of our general desire to have friendly relations with our neighbors.⁷

This statement is indicative of the reluctance with which Ayub Khan began to alter Pakistan's alignment policies. Throughout the 1962-65 period Ayub reflected the widespread disillusionment in Pakistan with the United States. However, despite numerous public criticisms of the U.S., Ayub's remarks were usually phrased in relatively moderate terms.

The Pakistani President held a view of the future that was related to the United States-Pakistan-Communist China triangle. He articulated the view at various times that within the United States important groups

⁶Ibid., p. 133.

⁷Pakistan Affairs, XVI, January 16, 1963.

were seeking a normalization of relations with China. He saw this as a foundation for America's future policies vis-à-vis China. When asked if Pakistan's improved relations with China, together with its continued membership in SEATO could allow Pakistan to play an intermediary role between Peking and Washington, Ayub referred to just such an example in the case of Laos. He went on to say: "We are deeply interested in peace all over the world, and especially in Asia, but peace in Asia cannot come unless there is some measure of understanding between the United States of America and China. If we can in any way assist towards that end in our own humble way we shall be delighted to do so."⁸

However, Ayub did seem to recognize the difficulties involved in any kind of Sino-American understanding. He realized these difficulties stemmed from two contradictory objectives, i.e., the United States commitment to Chiang Kai-shek and Taiwan, and Communist China's repudiation of "two Chinas." Although he supported the Chinese position, he did refer to the American commitment with some degree of sympathy when he said, "It is a political commitment, it is an honorable commitment."⁹

During the Indo-Pakistani War in 1965, Ayub felt that the United States should play a more "positive role" in the armed conflict. He

⁸"President Ayub Khan Addresses Joint Press Luncheon," President Ayub Khan . . . On the Record, Reprinted by the Department of Films and Publications by Courtesy of the High Commissioner for Pakistan, London, July 13, 1964, p. 20.

⁹Pakistan Affairs, XVII, March 5, 1964.

said the United States had an important role to play in Asia. It had both power and influence, and with its influence, the United States could further its own interest in having a strong Indo-Pakistan sub-continent.¹⁰

Ayub's attitude towards the United States clearly revealed that he did not want to sever ties between the two countries. He was merely attempting to implement his policy of establishing friendly relations with China without overstepping bounds and antagonizing the United States. In applying the theory of "bilateral equations" Ayub was well aware that Pakistan was walking a dangerous tightrope but American aid to India had significantly altered the complexion of this dominant bilateral equation. Although he moved away from the previous policy of unqualified alignment with the United States, he continued to stress the importance of this relationship. Furthermore, he asserted that closer ties with Communist China did not fundamentally alter the common interests which existed between the U.S. and Pakistan.

b. Soviet Union

Within Ayub Khan's scheme of bilateral equations the Soviet Union began to figure more prominently in the latter part of the period under examination. Earlier, Ayub perceived that Pakistan's membership in SEATO and CENTO had alienated the Soviet Union.¹¹

Russia's posture in the Sino-Indian confrontation, together with her increased military assistance to India after 1962, were both undesir-

¹⁰ Ayub: Soldier and Statesman, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

¹¹ Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

able policies from Ayub's perspective. Russian aid to India had neutralized American aid to Pakistan in the past and this situation had worsened since joint Soviet-American aid had been given to India during the border war. Therefore, Ayub sought to alter the relationship between the Soviet Union and Pakistan. He reasoned that Pakistan's membership in SEATO and CENTO was not directed against the Soviet Union and there should be a possibility of coming to an understanding with the Russians if Pakistan could remove their doubts and misgivings.¹²

Ayub paid a visit to the Soviet Union in 1965—the first visit ever made to that country by a Pakistani chief of state. A joint communiqué (April 11) revealed that Ayub Khan and the Soviet leaders had discussed various aspects of Soviet-Pakistani relations and how they could be improved. Both sides had agreed to promote further development of their relations, "guided by the principles of respect for territorial integrity and State sovereignty, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and equality of all States."¹³

In his autobiography Ayub Khan related the impressions he had of the Soviets during his visit.¹⁴ He explained to the Soviets that he

¹²Ibid., p. 117. In the early part of the period being examined, Pakistan did enter into a few limited agreements with the Soviet Union. However, the value of these agreements did not lie so much in their material worth as in their signifying the new bearings in Pakistan's foreign policy.

¹³Keesing's Contemporary Archives, XV, June 12-19, 1965, p. 20797.

¹⁴The full discussion of Ayub's visit to the Soviet Union from which this account was taken can be found in his autobiography, Friends Not Masters, op. cit., pp. 168-74.

blamed the legacy of colonialism for their strained relations in the past because after the British had departed, Pakistan naturally turned to the West for support. India had aggravated the situation by presenting Pakistan to the Soviet Union "as some kind of theocratic state opposed to all liberal movements."¹⁵ His visit to the Soviet Union was essentially intended to recover the lost links.

In his discourse with the Soviet leaders Ayub argued that Russian policies of aiding India were the same as those of the United States; both sets of policies had the effect of exacerbating discord in the sub-continent by encouraging India to "perpetuate her forcible occupation of a large part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and to flout the United Nations Resolutions with impunity."¹⁶ He explained that the Soviet veto in the United Nations had given India added assurance that her intransigent stand would be supported. Ayub took great pains to clarify the point that Pakistan's membership in the Western pacts was not directed against the Soviet Union and seemed to feel that a greater understanding of the Pakistani position was the result of this meeting. This marked the real beginning of discussions on various possibilities for cooperation between the Soviet Union and Pakistan on a bilateral basis. Ayub recalled that both sides saw this meeting as a turning point in their relations. He seemed to feel that if he could convince the Soviet leaders of the sincerity of his position, this would have a definite effect on their future relations. He believed that he succeeded in doing just that.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 169.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 171.

In his talks with the Soviet leaders, Ayub seemed particularly interested in understanding the nature of Sino-Soviet differences. This was part of his recognition of limits in building up his bilateral equations. In seeking to have friendly ties with two countries which were at odds with one another, he must understand the dynamics of these differences so as not to antagonize one of them while drawing closer to the other. His assessment was as follows: The Chinese felt that the Soviet Union did not want them to emerge as a major power. On the other hand, the Soviet Union was a revisionist state and did not want to lose all that it had so far achieved by provoking war with the West—even though this might bring about Chinese recriminations of "selling out." Ayub's evaluation was that, despite the fact that arguments were being exchanged on an ideological plane, the causes for mistrust were basically nationalistic. China feared that her major aim of attaining a position of equality with the Soviet Union and the United States would be delayed with super-power coexistence. Ayub thought that Sino-Soviet differences would continue but,

... if either the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China is exposed to attack by a third country, the differences will disappear and the two communist powers will offer united resistance. Whatever may be the views of the leaders in the two countries, the people of one country will not sit back and watch the people of the other country fighting a major war all on their own.¹⁷

Thus Ayub saw a basic commonality of interests between the Soviet Union and Communist China.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 174.

As we have seen, the Russian leaders' support of India in the Kashmir dispute was one of the major stumbling blocks in what Pakistanis termed the "normalization" of relations with the Soviet Union. However, Ayub welcomed the Soviet offer to help resolve the dispute during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War. He now said that the Soviet Union could lend a powerful helping hand in the framing of a meaningful resolution that could lead to an honorable settlement of the Kashmir issue.¹⁸ Consequently, he accepted the good offices of the Soviet Union in Tashkent.

Ayub was very impressed with Kosygin's role in the discussions. There were strong indications that India might not agree to the Pakistani demand to include the Kashmir problem as a specific issue on the agenda. It was reported, however, that Mr. Kosygin urged that Kashmir should be included.¹⁹ Although Ayub said that the Tashkent Declaration was a good beginning, he felt that it did not go as far as it should have to resolve the differences in Indo-Pakistani relations.²⁰ Ayub stated that the interest of the Soviet Government would facilitate the task of discussing Kashmir but the Tashkent Declaration itself in no way altered Pakistan's stand on Kashmir.²¹

Despite the fact that the Tashkent Agreement was viewed as something less than perfect, the direct Soviet involvement in resolving

¹⁸Ayub: Soldier and Statesman, op. cit., p. 149.

¹⁹Dawn, Karachi, January 6, 1966.

²⁰Ibid., January 11, 1966.

²¹Ibid., January 15, 1966.

the conflict, the Soviet admission that there was indeed a Kashmir issue, and the new Soviet concern for Pakistani susceptibilities were all factors which revised Ayub's images in favor of the Soviet Union. The three major powers which were involved by proxy in the Indo-Pakistani conflict were the Soviet Union, the United States and the People's Republic of China. From Ayub's point of view it was the Soviet Union and Communist China which proved to be the true friends of Pakistan. With increased doubts about the reliability of American commitments, Pakistan-American relations suffered accordingly.

External: Bilateral

Bilateral relations are the second variable to be examined.

This includes the total pattern of interactions between any two states except for relations involving super-powers within the global system.²² Within this category Pakistan's relations with the People's Republic of China and India will be treated separately. These two Asian neighbors, more than any other individual state apart from the United States, directly influenced Pakistan's decision to disengage herself from an almost satellite dependence on the United States.

a. People's Republic of China

Ayub Khan became increasingly aware of Communist China's presence in Asia after the 1959 incursions in Tibet.²³ He felt then that

²²M. Brecher et al., op. cit., p. 83.

²³Ayub explains his misgivings about the undemarcated Sino-Pakistan border in Friends Not Masters, op. cit., pp. 161-2.

a similar situation could arise from Pakistan's own undemarcated border with this powerful neighbor. His fears increased when he came into possession of "pre-Communist maps," which located parts of Pakistan's territory within Chinese boundaries. In addition, Ayub seemed to see in the new tensions in Sino-Indian relations an opportunity to gain a friend in the international arena—an increasingly important objective after Pakistan's own major allies began to give military assistance to India. Thus, the Sino-Indian War opened up an option for Ayub which did not exist before.

Ayub believed that the Communist Chinese hesitated at first in responding to his offer to settle the border question because they did not want to get involved in another argument with India.²⁴ He carefully explained to the Chinese Government that all Pakistan desired was the identification of the line between two stated points. The area to the north of the line would constitute Chinese territory. The area to the south of the line would possibly remain undetermined but would be under the defence of Pakistan. After the Chinese leaders understood this point, Ayub noted that they were ready to negotiate.

On the whole, Ayub found the negotiations for the border agreement very harmonious. As in the discussions with the Soviet Union, Ayub believed that in negotiating with China, "All we had to do was to convince her of our sincerity and friendly intent."²⁵

²⁴For Ayub's account of his negotiations with the Chinese see, ibid., pp. 161-68.

²⁵Ibid., p. 118.

There can be no doubt that the border agreement with China was partly dictated by long-standing considerations, deriving from the efforts of Ayub Khan to settle all border questions. However, Ayub assessed the ramifications of the agreement as far-reaching.

This agreement on border demarcation was the first step in the evolution of relations between Pakistan and China. Its sole purpose was to eliminate a possible cause of conflict in the future. But as a result of this agreement, the Chinese began to have trust in us and we also felt that if one was frank and straightforward, one could do honest business with them.²⁶

Resolution of the border dispute was also seen within a wider context of avoiding any misunderstanding with China and thereby ensuring the peace of Asia.²⁷ Linked to this was the perceived triumph for Pakistani diplomacy.

After the border agreement had been signed, Ayub had many words of praise for the People's Republic of China.²⁸ He said China was making significant progress in all spheres of life and was anxious to have friendly relations with her neighbors. He remarked that relations between Pakistan and China had always been cordial and referred to two thousand years of history in which there was no evidence of any wars or disputes between the two countries. Ayub told the Chinese Prime Minister that "History and geography have provided our two countries with links which provide a sound basis for good neighborly relations in the

²⁶Ibid., p. 164.

²⁷Pakistan Affairs, XVII, March 5, 1964.

²⁸This section is drawn from a speech given on February 20, 1964, Speeches and Statements, VI, July 1963-June 1964, pp. 139-40.

interests of our two peoples."²⁹ He identified Communist China as a country, like Pakistan, which was pre-occupied with the task of national reconstruction after a common colonial heritage. Both countries desired world peace for this purpose and Ayub cited more recent history to exemplify their common interests at Bandung in 1955.

As usual, Ayub also saw the limits in this particular bilateral equation, as he did in others.

I think the limits within which Pakistan's relations with China can develop are fully understood and respected on both sides. There are two factors that can influence the development of this relationship. One is the Chinese feeling that the United States, in collaboration with the Soviet Union, are trying to draw a ring round China so as to contain and isolate her. Now, if Pakistan were to join any such arrangement either with the Soviet Union or with the United States of America, then the relationship would collapse. So we have to convince the Chinese that we are not in the market for any such deal and that, therefore, they need have no fear or doubt about us.³⁰

Ayub believed that "the Chinese are prepared to be reasonable with anybody who is prepared to be reasonable with them."³¹

During the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War, there were many charges of "collusion" between Pakistan and China.³² However, in a television interview with the American Broadcasting Corporation, Pakistan's ambassador in Washington declared that "there have been no promises,

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, op. cit., p. 166.

³¹Pakistan Affairs, XVII, March 5, 1964.

³²This will be discussed more fully when we turn to an examination of the operational environment.

no agreements, no collusion of any kind between my Government and China."³³ The ambassador must have had directions from the Pakistan Government to make this statement on a nation-wide program before the American people. Dawn reported that attempts were being made by Indians and some Western correspondents to link difficulties delaying a settlement at Tashkent with China's latest Note.³⁴ This Note warned India against further provocations along the Sino-Indian border. Dawn, however, was clear in reporting that the Pakistani decision-makers failed to see how the Chinese Note had any relevance to the Tashkent talks.

Ayub vehemently denied any suggestion of Sino-Pakistan "collusion." His expressions of gratitude to the Chinese were usually comprised of oblique references to support from "all those who believe in peace and freedom." Probably the most extensive pronouncement from Ayub was the following: "The moral support which the Chinese Government extended to us so willingly and so generously will for ever remain enshrined in our hearts."³⁵ On the whole, Ayub was cautious in expressing friendliness and gratitude toward China and the above statement did not really single China out for special mention; China was mentioned along with several other countries that had given Pakistan their support. If we

³³Dawn, Karachi, September 14, 1965.

³⁴Ibid., January 9, 10, 1966.

³⁵Broadcast to the Nation on the Cease-Fire by Pakistan, Produced by the Department of Films and Publications, Government of Pakistan, Karachi, September 22, 1965.

return to Ayub's request to the United States to play a more dynamic role in the conflict, this takes on added meaning. According to Dawn of September 16, 1965, Ayub observed that by exercising her influence in the right measure, "the United States could further its own interest of having a strong Indo-Pakistan sub-continent." Anwar Syed has advanced the theory that the Chinese threats to India did cause concern in many quarters, including Pakistan.³⁶ This would seem to be validated by the fact that the government and the press in Pakistan did not acknowledge that the Chinese threats levelled against India had anything to do with the Indo-Pakistan conflict. In fact, they tried to disentangle the two situations. In an editorial on September 21, 1965, Dawn insisted that the "Chinese move has nothing whatever to do with Pakistan's defensive war with India."

The statements of Ayub Khan concerning China's role in the 1965 war are not so readily available as his statements on other subjects. Comments by the Pakistani leaders on almost all issues are easily obtainable and that leads one to ponder the omission of this highly important development in Pakistan's foreign policy.³⁷

b. India

India had a predominant role in every foreign policy objective formulated by Ayub. His decision to modify Pakistan's alignments was

³⁶Anwar Syed, "China and the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965," Orbis, X, Fall, 1966, p. 877.

³⁷The reasons for this lacuna will be examined when we turn to the operational environment in Chapter V.

no exception. Although India has been, and will be mentioned as a factor in each of the categories, the study would be enriched through a better understanding of Ayub's perceptions of India itself.

Ayub expressed the sentiments of the population of Pakistan when he explained that it was Brahmin chauvinism and arrogance that forced Pakistanis to seek a homeland of their own.³⁸ The Muslim objective was to have a state where they could order their lives according to their own thinking and faith. Before partition, the Muslims believed that the Indians wanted them to remain serfs in an independent India. This was the status that Ayub felt Muslims still had in India today. The fundamental opposition between the Muslim and Hindu faiths was manifested in Indian society which was based on rigid caste distinctions. Then too, the whole philosophy of life differed as a result of Islamic and Hindustani cultures.

We, as Muslims, believe in generosity, in equality and brotherhood of man, whereas the basis of Hindu religion is rigidity, stultification of society, and other things. And in spite of secularism and so on and so forth: mind you, Mr. Nehru made a very honest effort to break this barrier, break this rigidity in Hindu religion: I think that was his real aim, but I don't think he succeeded. I don't think he could succeed. . . .³⁹

Ayub's expressed aim was to make India realize that it would be detrimental to her national interest to maintain a hostile attitude

³⁸ This paragraph is drawn from Friends Not Masters, op. cit., p. 172.

³⁹ "The World Today," B.B.C. Radio, July 14-15, 1964, in President Ayub Khan . . . On the Record, Reprinted by the Department of Films and Publications, by courtesy of the High Commission for Pakistan, London, September, 1964, p. 4.

towards Pakistan.⁴⁰ He did not minimize the difficulty of achieving this aim; Ayub believed that the Indian attitude toward Muslims could be explained only in pathological terms.⁴¹

Although Ayub claimed that he wanted peace between Pakistan and India, he saw no possibility of confederation between the two states because of their fundamentally different ideologies. "Indian nationalism is based on Hinduism and Pakistan's nationalism is based on Islam."⁴² The two could never combine but they should be able to live side by side in peace and understanding. Again, Ayub returned to his notion of sincerity and said that one of the reasons why Nehru did not accept Pakistan's peaceful overtures was that the Indian leader was doubtful of Ayub's sincerity. By the same token, Ayub doubted the sincerity of the Indian decision-makers:

India currently presents three faces to the world: one to the West, simulating a resolve to fight China in order to secure the maximum of western arms assistance; a second to the Soviet Union, stressing her resolve, nevertheless, to remain 'non-aligned'; and a third to China, seeking a peaceful settlement of the dispute by secret peace overtures through neutral emissaries.⁴³

Thus Ayub felt that lack of trust between the Pakistani and the Indian leaders was a major source of the continuing tensions which existed between the two countries.

⁴⁰Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, op. cit., p. 47.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 115.

⁴²Ibid., p. 128.

⁴³Ibid., p. 135.

The intransigence of the Indian leaders figured prominently in Ayub's assessment of the Kashmir dispute. Although the Kashmir issue is thought to be very complex, Ayub explained that it was in actuality, very simple. "I believe that if there is a change of heart on the part of India, it should not be difficult to find an equitable and honourable settlement."⁴⁴ Ayub also recognized that the population of Pakistan was united on the issue of Kashmir and "no government in Pakistan could possibly forget the problem."⁴⁵

There were times when President Ayub Khan envisaged a situation when a weak and dilapidated India would crumble under its own weight. However, there were other times when he observed that India was one of the major contenders for power and influence in the world. Ayub was asked if he agreed with the contention of some Americans that the future of democracy in Asia depended on India's ability to achieve, through democratic means, a better standard of living more quickly than the Chinese Communists could realize by their methods.⁴⁶ Ayub answered by referring to India's relationships with her immediate neighbors—Pakistan, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, Burma, Malaya, and Ceylon—and

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 143.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 124. Arif Hussain brings up the very important point that one of the very real difficulties in achieving a solution to the Kashmir problem is that both India and Pakistan think in terms of diplomatic victories rather than the solution itself. In conjunction with Ayub's statement he notes that there is also a lack of trust in the public and the leaders of both countries think that any concession will make them unpopular. Pakistan: Its Ideology and Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 84.

⁴⁶Ayub: Soldier and Statesman, op. cit., p. 211.

emphasized their apprehensions about India's designs.

Now just imagine that as a result of this development programme and acquisition of military power and so forth, India gets more powerful. Do you mean to say that these countries are going to feel more secure? In fact they will be looking for protection elsewhere. . . . And my belief is that they will seek protection from the Chinese. (Emphasis added.)⁴⁷

Although Ayub did not predict that India was capable of challenging the People's Republic of China for leadership in Asia, he did see India's ambitions as unlimited.

During the 1965 conflict between Pakistan and India, Ayub seemed saddened that India did not have a change of heart. As mentioned, he felt this was essential for the settlement of disputes and for ushering in an era of peace. The Indian delegation at the Ministerial meeting in Tashkent conceded the need to settle the Kashmir dispute but added that "the atmosphere was not yet congenial for this."⁴⁸ "But," asked President Ayub, "how can a congenial atmosphere be created if Indian leaders continue to say that Kashmir is an integral part of India?"⁴⁹ In short, the incidents in the Rann of Kutch in 1965, further embittered Indo-Pakistan relations and made a solution of the Kashmir dispute even more difficult.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ "Pakistan: Dissatisfaction with Tashkent," Round Table, LVI, July, 1966, p. 311.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

Internal: Military Capability

Military capability is defined as "the ability to wage war or to deter other states from attacking."⁵⁰ However, to understand Ayub's evaluation of Pakistan's military capability, two things must be kept clearly in mind. Firstly, military capability cannot be defined in absolute terms for the entire range of foreign policy decisions. Instead, it must be assessed in relation to the capabilities of other states. Secondly, military capability must be related to objectives. This refers to a) the objectives which Ayub himself hoped to achieve and b) the objectives of leaders in other countries whose foreign policy actions were relevant to Pakistan. It is in the context of these two considerations that we will examine why and how Ayub Khan wanted to increase Pakistan's military capabilities.

Ayub Khan has said that the territorial integrity of Pakistan, including Kashmir, was a sacred principle in Pakistan's foreign policy.⁵¹ However, his special concern was the defence of Pakistan against any possible aggression by India. This was not some vague future possibility but a very real and omnipresent one in Ayub's eyes.⁵² War with India would be a national war in every sense of the word because India's aim was to expand, dominate, and spread her influence. Furthermore, the Indian leaders themselves had said that Pakistan was their principal

⁵⁰M. Brecher et al., op. cit., p. 83.

⁵¹Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, op. cit., passim.

⁵²The following explanation is drawn from ibid., p. 47.

enemy. Pakistan, on the other hand, could not aim at conquest of India because that would be a negation of the "two-nation theory." Since partition of the sub-continent, India was hostile to Pakistan.⁵³ The basic reason for this, in Ayub's opinion, was "India's ambition is to absorb Pakistan or turn her into a satellite."⁵⁴ Thus Indian efforts in the field of foreign policy were all directed towards two major aims—the isolation of Pakistan and its disintegration.⁵⁵

Ayub assessed India's attitude towards Pakistan in the following way.⁵⁶ India wanted to gain tactical advantages over Pakistan by having more trade and more freedom of movement between the two countries. This would soften feelings on the two sides and once an atmosphere of good will and understanding developed, all problems would resolve themselves. Ayub refuted this position and asked how good will and understanding could develop when basic differences and disputes remained unresolved? He repeated over and over again that the issue of Kashmir was a question of life and death, not only for the people of Kashmir but also for the people of Pakistan. Moreover, Kashmir was vital to the integrity and defence of Pakistan. Thus when Indian leaders said that good will should grow and the problems would resolve themselves, Ayub interpreted this as India's seeking to buy time to consolidate her occupa-

⁵³Ibid. p. 115.

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 117.

⁵⁶Ibid., pp. 121-22.

tion of Kashmir. He analyzed India's tactics in the following way: "Let things become normal and we will deal with the problem" and "now that things are normal, why raise the problem?"⁵⁷

The President became more concerned about Pakistan's ability to defend herself against India after India had received American military aid beginning in 1962-63. He did not, of course, accept the Indian assertion that her war potential was intended to contain future Chinese aggression. "How is it then that the type of machine which they are evolving can operate essentially on the plains? How can Pakistan ignore the fact that India is in a position to unleash vast forces against Pakistan at a few hours notice?"⁵⁸ Ayub assessed India's military forces as three times the strength of Pakistan's, of which no more than fifteen per cent could face China, the rest being poised against Pakistan.⁵⁹ In this way, India continued to exploit the boundary dispute with China demonstrating once again her policy of opportunism in order to gain arms.⁶⁰

In earlier years Ayub Khan saw the United States as the major source of additional military equipment for Pakistan. Furthermore, he felt that Pakistan's membership in the Western Pacts would also enhance Pakistan's military security. As we have seen, Ayub's fears of Indian aggression grew stronger after 1962-63. We shall now explore Ayub's

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 123.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 122.

⁵⁹Pakistan Affairs, XVI, January 16, 1963.

⁶⁰Speeches and Statements, VI, July 1963-June 1964, pp. 147-48.

perceptions of the three major powers in terms of the contributions he thought they could make to Pakistan's military security against India.

a. United States

The initial reaction of the Pakistani decision-makers to the American aid bestowed upon India in 1962-63, was one of increased resentment and betrayal. President Kennedy had assured President Ayub that he would be consulted as an ally before any military aid was given to India.⁶¹ Not only was this not done but Kennedy suggested to Ayub that he send a private message to Nehru telling him that he could count on Pakistan's taking no action on the frontiers to alarm India. India would then be free to concentrate on Chinese "aggression." Ayub replied,

Mr. President, what you now ask of us is to give an assurance to Mr. Nehru of a kind that will enable him to deploy his troops, at present concentrated against us, elsewhere. I am surprised that such a request is being made to us. After all, what we have been doing is nothing but to contain the threat that was continuously posed by India to us. Is it in conformity with human nature that we should cease to take such steps as are necessary for our self-preservation? Or, will our own people ever accept such a position?⁶²

In response to the American guarantee that arms supplied to India would not be used against Pakistan, Ayub said:

⁶¹A lengthy discussion of the events surrounding American military aid to India in 1962-63, can be found in Friends Not Masters, op. cit., pp. 132-48.

⁶²Letter to President Kennedy, November 5, 1962, ibid., pp. 141-2.

This is very generous of you, but knowing the sort of people you are dealing with, whose history is a continuous tale of broken pledges, I would not ask a friend like you to place yourself in an embarrassing situation. . . . Our belief is that the arms now being used against China will undoubtedly be used against us at the very first opportunity.⁶³ (Emphasis added.)

Ayub, therefore, tried to convince the United States that a balance of power between India and Pakistan should be fostered in the interest of peace and tranquility.

Ayub also disagreed with American leaders on the nature of the Sino-Indian conflict itself. The United States seemed to accept the theory that the Chinese would escalate the war and attack India over the Himalayas. Ayub rapidly changed his mind from the "inexorable push from the North" position that he had assumed in 1959,⁶⁴ and observed that this was a military absurdity. Ayub thought that the Sino-Indian conflict would continue to be limited in nature because of the terrain over which it was being waged.⁶⁵ Then too, Ayub felt that the war would have started sooner if either party had intended it to be a major war. But even more fundamentally, he felt:

. . . the Red Chinese intentions and objectives in Tibet are limited, and that is a fact of life. Militarily it cannot become a base for a major offensive operation against a huge sub-continent. It does not make military sense at all, because their supplies start coming over land routes from about five-thousand miles away. . . .

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴See p. 35.

⁶⁵Ayub discusses this in Pakistan Affairs, XVI, January 16, 1963. . .

If the invasion of India was intended, then there are other ways of invading India, much easier ways through much softer areas. . . .⁶⁶ (Emphasis added.)

Thus Ayub saw the border war as a "phony war" and felt vindicated when China declared a cease-fire and unilaterally withdrew her forces from the conquered territory when India "was on the run." The main thrust of his argument was that the United States should not give military assistance to India because the Chinese threat to India was not serious enough to warrant massive military aid and, above all, because such military assistance would ultimately endanger Pakistan's security.

Ayub's fears for Pakistan's security continued long after the termination of the Sino-Indian border war. His major complaint remained the same: "It may suit the United States to build up India by massive doses of arms and economic aid but we have every reason to complain if American guns are trained against us and put a threat to our existence."⁶⁷ Ayub reiterated that the American arms build-up in India had put a tremendous strain on the close friendship which had previously existed between Pakistan and the United States. Beyond this, Ayub also felt that if the United States insisted on giving military aid because of the Chinese Communist threat in Asia, then it should at least pressure India into settling the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan.⁶⁸ This was especially true in 1962-63, when Ayub believed that the United

⁶⁶Ibid.

⁶⁷Ibid., XVII, December 16, 1965.

⁶⁸Ibid., XVI, January 16, 1963.

States had considerable leverage over India.

The value that Ayub attached to Pakistan's membership in SEATO and CENTO also underwent a change following the Sino-Indian border war. He began to feel that both treaties had lost much of their value. Ayub recognized that the SEATO Treaty embodied nothing more than a commitment of the various countries concerned to meet and decide what kind of contribution they could make. He added that the pacts might still have some value in that "the member countries might feel it their duty to express their sympathy for another member in times of difficulty; but as far as their military value is concerned, I think they are more an irritant than a help."⁶⁹ Thus he viewed the arrangements as no longer realistic in the new world order: "The change in the American attitude towards the Soviet Union has certainly reduced CENTO to an anachronism."⁷⁰ When asked if Pakistan might withdraw from the Western Pacts, he replied that there had been a great deal of discussion about that possibility.

We wanted security both from . . . any Communist country as well as from India, because immediately we have been threatened for the last fifteen years from India, intimidated, and so forth. The pact did not give us the protection for that. People are wondering how much value there is in these pacts, really, as far as our total security is concerned . . . one thing is becoming quite clear, that the line between friends and those that have not been friends is now getting obliterated.⁷¹ (Emphasis added.)

⁶⁹Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, op. cit., p. 157.

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 158.

⁷¹Pakistan Affairs, XVI, January 16, 1963.

American leaders had frequently complained that Pakistan's rapprochement with China was in sharp contradiction with Pakistan's membership in SEATO and CENTO. Despite Ayub's diminishing faith in the value of the pacts, he did not seem ready to withdraw. He continually emphasized that defence pacts were strictly and exclusively for defensive purposes and were not, therefore, incompatible with the normalization of relations with other states. "SEATO, being a defensive alliance, a member state need have no quarrel with China unless the latter should attack the former's territorial integrity or that of another member state."⁷²

Ayub had always attached greater significance to American bilateral guarantees of Pakistan's security than he did to Pakistan's membership in SEATO and CENTO.⁷³ However, his diminishing trust in American military protection was also extended to these bilateral ties as a result of an incident that occurred in 1963.⁷⁴ Under the 1959 bilateral agreement, in which the United States was to come to Pakistan's assistance should the latter be subjected to attack, several attempts were made by the United States to reassure Pakistan that this would indeed be the case. The United States made plans to fly out a task force to Pakistan. Ayub, as a military man, wanted to know whether such a force would carry out a contingency plan in com-

⁷²Dawn, Karachi, March 29, 1965.

⁷³Speeches and Statements, VI, July 1963-June 1964, pp. 197-8.

⁷⁴Ayub describes this incident in Friends Not Masters, op. cit., pp. 152-3.

bination with the Pakistan armed forces. The Americans would not agree to this and Ayub complained,

... all they wanted was to demonstrate to us their ability to fly out to Pakistan from far-off bases. In this we were not interested. Since they did not agree to participate in the kind of exercise we had suggested, we felt that no useful purpose would be served by having a U.S. task force come to Pakistan for any exercise. By this time it was becoming clear to us that, in the event of India attacking us, it was most unlikely that the U.S.A. would honour its commitment and come to our assistance.⁷⁵ (Emphasis added.)

During the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War, Ayub maintained that his fears concerning U.S. military aid to India were fully justified. "We had warned our friends time and again that this aid would not be used against China, but against Pakistan. This has come to pass."⁷⁶ During the period of open warfare, American weapons and military equipment were used on a large scale by Pakistan and apparently on a smaller scale by India.⁷⁷ The use of these arms clearly violated the conditions under which they had been given to both states. From Ayub's point of view, this only proved that the United States had no control over the use of the arms which had been given to India. This made any guarantee to Pakistan regarding their use absolutely meaningless.

Another source of resentment during the 1965 war was the United States suspension of arms aid to both India and Pakistan soon after the two countries became involved in open hostilities. In addition, the United

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 153.

⁷⁶Ayub: Soldier and Statesman, op. cit., p. 138.

⁷⁷Norman Palmer, "The Defense of South Asia," Orbis, X, Winter, 1966, pp. 928-9.

States asked all members of NATO, CENTO and SEATO not to supply any arms to Pakistan. The American attitude towards its ally Pakistan was in sharp contrast with the Russian attitude to India. The Russians never stopped their military supplies to India. Ayub was acutely aware that the cessation of military aid had more serious consequences for Pakistan than for India.⁷⁸ The gravity of the situation can be gauged by the fact that the Pakistan Armed Forces were equipped mainly with American weapons. Pakistan, therefore, was heavily dependent upon Western sources for supply replacements and most of the ammunition. Hence, the American decision froze the defence capacity of Pakistan at the level at which it then stood until such time as Ayub could turn to other sources of military supplies. Thus the actions of the United States during the 1965 war served to reinforce Ayub's growing suspicions that he could not rely on the Americans to come to Pakistan's defence when it was most needed.

Ayub was already considering ways to overcome this problem immediately after the U.S. arms embargo had been announced.

A special organisation has been set up to deal with the problem of defence production and procurement in both Wings. What we can spare from our own resources may not be adequate for all our defence requirements. We have, therefore, to seek assistance from others to supplement our efforts. In obtaining assistance from other sources we have to guard against the danger of relying too heavily on any single source of supply. Already we have suffered on this account. We cannot afford to repeat the same mistake. We must secure

⁷⁸Speech delivered in Pakistan on November 7, 1965.
Ayub: Soldier and Statesman, op. cit., p. 166.

what we need for our defence from whatever avenues may be available to us for this purpose.⁷⁹ (Emphasis added.)

The freeze on military equipment did make further acquisitions of new American equipment most doubtful and led Ayub to turn—with some success—to Peking for tanks and jet combat planes.⁸⁰

b. People's Republic of China

Prior to 1965, Ayub had hinted that China might well play a role in warding off Indian aggression. The President was asked in an interview if the value of the Western Pacts did diminish and there was an Indian attack, would Ayub turn to China for military assistance? His reply was, "Well, it's too difficult to answer that question in a hypothetical fashion. It depends on how the circumstances evolve. . . . Again, the Chinese, even if they want to, can't help us much because of this physical barrier."⁸¹ All of Ayub's replies to this question have not been of the same type, however. At times he seemed to attach importance to leaving the option of Chinese protection as vague but open.

The answer to that lies with the United States authorities. If India grows menacingly strong, we shall be in a great predicament and shall have to look around for someone to help us. And if we are attacked by India, then that means India is on the move and wants to expand. We assume that other Asiatic powers, especially China, would take notice of that.⁸² (Emphasis added.)

⁷⁹Ibid.

⁸⁰F. Greene, op. cit., p. 138.

⁸¹Speeches and Statements, VI, July 1963-June 1964, p. 198.

⁸²Washington Post, September 12, 1963.

c . Soviet Union

In the 1962-65 period Ayub did not openly express any hope that the Soviet Union would give Pakistan military aid. If he did consider this as a possibility for the future, his speeches and writings did not reveal it. He did say, however, that it was necessary for Pakistan to take the first step in establishing friendlier relations with the Soviet Union. Therefore, when Ayub visited Russia in 1965, he tried to convince the Soviets of two things.⁸³ Firstly, Pakistan's membership in the Western Pacts was not directed against the Soviet Union but against India. Secondly, the Soviet leaders should realize that they were increasing tension in the sub-continent by arming India. Ayub believed that he succeeded in making the Soviet leaders understand these two important aspects of Pakistan's foreign policy. Furthermore, the Russian role at Tashkent gave Ayub hope that the Soviet Union might take a more neutral position in Indo-Pakistani disputes in the future. The transformation of Russia from a state which was completely antagonistic to Pakistan to one that could understand Pakistan's security problems was viewed by Ayub Khan as a major achievement. He believed that this was an important first-step in strengthening Pakistan's position vis-à-vis India.

In summary, although Ayub could hardly have been oblivious of a possible Communist threat, as evidenced by his joint defence proposal to India in 1959,⁸⁴ he did not see a clear and present danger to the

⁸³Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, op. cit., pp. 170-72.

⁸⁴See p. 35.

Indo-Pakistan sub-continent as emanating from China or the Soviet Union. "Well," said Ayub, "they have not been aggressive or expansionist with us."⁸⁵ Communism may pose a threat to all but it was not likely to make Pakistan its exclusive target whereas India had made it clear more than once that Pakistan was her principal enemy. Although Ayub believed that he had done everything possible to convince Indian leaders that Pakistan wanted to live in peace with India, the latter could not accept the existence of a strong and independent Muslim state next door. This forced Ayub to examine the Pakistani situation "dispassionately and realistically."

As a result of American support to India and the American posture in the 1965 war, the Pakistani President was no longer sure that he could rely on the American guarantee. It is in this perspective that Ayub's desire to leave open the option of Chinese protection must be understood.

On the other hand, Ayub's friendly overtures towards Communist China were rather cautious, as were his gestures towards the Soviet Union. He certainly did not propose that Pakistan join the Communist camp. Ayub was not prepared to make a stronger commitment to Peking or Russia, even in return for the limited military aid that they might provide. He did not withdraw from SEATO and CENTO despite his misgivings concerning their military value. Moreover, he knew he could not afford to ignore any additional military aid that might come from the

⁸⁵"President's Interview to Press and Radio," President Ayub Khan . . . On the Record, op. cit., p. 6.

United States in the future. The important lesson which Ayub had learned was that Pakistan should never again make the mistake of depending on a single source for her arms supply. Therefore, he began to comprehend the importance of organizing relations with other countries, particularly neighbors, in a manner consistent with the needs of Pakistan's security.

Internal: Economic Capability

Economic capability can be defined as "the total of all material and human resources available to the state for external behavior."⁸⁶ These range from natural resources like food and raw materials through industrial plant to scientific and technical skills, etc. As with the military capability variable, economic capability cannot be defined in absolute terms. It must be assessed in relation to the capability of a super-power, of other states in its own region, or relative to specific rivals.

Ayub Khan viewed Pakistan's low economic capability as a fundamental problem facing his government.⁸⁷ Ayub's aim was to industrialize rapidly while increasing agricultural production which was the backbone of the Pakistan economy. "Our objective is to evolve an agricultural-cum industrial economy, which suits the talent and meets the challenge of an ever-increasing population."⁸⁸ Beyond this, it became

⁸⁶M. Brecher et al., op. cit., p. 84.

⁸⁷Speeches and Statements, II, op. cit., pp. 1-2.

⁸⁸Ibid.

one of the most important functions of Pakistan's foreign policy to secure all the foreign aid that was needed and also to get it from sources and under such conditions that her independence was not compromised in any way.

a. United States

Ayub was well-aware that Pakistan had relied heavily on external assistance. In addition, he knew that Pakistan's development was very much dependent on American aid in particular:

Development presupposes resources, and in our social conditions and our scheme of values these resources cannot all be generated or mobilized through regimentation. Therefore we have to look for external assistance to build up the social overheads and provide the initial capital investment. This necessitates our having good relations with the United States and other western powers who are in a position to help us economically.⁸⁹ (Emphasis added.)

Although the United States had given Pakistan a great deal of aid for development purposes, Ayub was still not content.⁹⁰ Pakistan had to pay for capital goods which it was forced to import in order to process its raw materials. But, assistance and loans could be repaid only if enough foreign exchange was earned by selling processed goods in foreign markets. Ayub complained that Pakistan had only limited access to these markets because the United States and other developed countries preferred to buy only raw materials from Pakistan and then make their own arrangements for manufacturing these raw materials.

⁸⁹Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, op. cit., p. 118.

⁹⁰Ayub discusses Pakistan's economic problems in ibid., pp. 183-85.

Prices of raw materials were subject to wide seasonal variations and the terms of trade always tended to operate against Pakistan. The difficulties were increased with tariffs, quota restrictions and other obstacles which prevented the expansion of Pakistan's export trade. Ayub emphasized that this put Pakistan at a great disadvantage and made it very difficult indeed to satisfy commercial and industrial needs through imports as well as repaying the heavy loans which had been incurred. He singled out the United States as being especially guilty in this regard. America would allow Pakistan to export only twenty-five million yards of cloth a year to the United States—"a ridiculously small quantity." Cloth was one of Pakistan's major export hopes, but this principle also applied to other goods. Ayub remarked:

It is self-evident that to provide aid and to deny trade to the less developed countries amounts almost to giving with one hand but taking away with the other.⁹¹

Ayub's faith in the good will and ethics of the United States and the West was diminished as a result of their "economic opportunism." As a pragmatist, however, Ayub understood that for the time being, Pakistan would have to adapt to the situation as it was.

The President related an incident which demonstrated how American economic practices could be detrimental to Pakistan in yet another way. During early July, 1965, at the request of the United States, the Aid-Pakistan Consortium meeting (which included nine countries and was scheduled for July 27, 1965) was postponed for two months.

⁹¹Speeches and Statements, VI, op. cit., p. 88.

Ayub was seeking \$500 million from the Consortium for the first year of Pakistan's Third Five-Year Plan. The official American position was that without Congressional authorization, the United States could not pledge 40% of the amount that Pakistan had asked for. Ayub's reaction was bitter because the United States had pledged \$940 million to India well in advance of authorization by Congress.⁹² Ayub's statements demonstrated that his anger at what he considered preferential military treatment for India also extended into the economic realm:

Now in respect of India, the United States made a special effort with the other contributing countries to persuade them to match the United States effort. The United States went out of her way to bequeath a billion dollars as their contribution at a time when the Indian plan was not even worked out. In our case, all sorts of objections were raised. Some were genuine while some were, to my mind, spurious—the sort of things which are designed to put off a caller. There did not seem to be a real effort to recognize the situation. And I don't think the United States made any special effort.⁹³

Furthermore, Ayub insisted that there was no real difference between economic and military aid; substantial economic assistance to India had made it possible for that country to allocate other resources to a military build-up against Pakistan.⁹⁴

The dispute with India was directly related to Pakistan's economic capability in yet another way. Ayub considered the Kashmir

⁹²K. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, *op. cit.*, p. 277.

⁹³Ayub: Soldier and Statesman, *op. cit.*, p. 210.

⁹⁴Norman D. Palmer, South Asia and United States Policy, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1966, p. 299.

dispute the basic one in the conflict. As developing nations, both India and Pakistan had pressing economic problems and neither country could afford to divert any sizable proportion of its budget to defence;⁹⁵ yet, Ayub explained that the escalating arms race between Pakistan and India continued to drain the economies of both countries. Consequently, his resentment against American economic and military aid to India and lack of political pressure for a settlement of the Kashmir dispute was intensified when economic factors were taken into consideration.

Ayub Khan's dilemma can be stated very simply. If he economized on Pakistan's defence, he exposed his country to external aggression; if he continued to spend huge amounts on defence, Pakistan's development program would suffer with a proportionate lowering of the standard of living. Where did Ayub's priorities lie in this conflict of interests? Again, his pragmatism played an important role in determining his priorities. For purposes of maintaining a rapid pace of economic development, Ayub tried to prevent Pakistan's relations with the United States from deteriorating below a certain level of tolerance. However, he was not prepared to undermine Pakistan's security by remaining totally dependent on a major power that did not appreciate Pakistan's defence needs.

While countries strive for freedom in order to develop they will not seek development at the cost of freedom. The country's economic progress and prosperity of its people are of the utmost importance, but its security and

⁹⁵"Address by Mohammad Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan," December 13, 1965, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Plenary Meetings, III, United Nations, New York, 1967, p. 3.

independence come first. It is our right as an independent nation to normalize our relations with our neighbors however different our ideologies might be and that right we shall not allow to be compromised. It was in this context that I said we are looking for friends not masters. (Emphasis added.)⁹⁶

b. The People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union

Ayub expressed pleasure that trade between Pakistan and China was growing. He cited the establishment of air communications between China and Pakistan as a major step forward in developing closer economic ties between the two countries.⁹⁷ The President was careful to re-assure the West that this agreement did not have political implications. "So far as we were concerned, the whole thing was essentially dealt with as a commercial transaction."⁹⁸

Ayub believed that Western misgivings about Sino-Pakistani economic ties could be attributed to the fact that Pakistan was now beginning to take a more active role in Afro-Asian affairs.⁹⁹ Ayub did, in fact, view Pakistani trade links with Communist China as part of a larger program to counter the economic exclusiveness of the developed countries. "And why must our trade be tied to Europe and America?"¹⁰⁰ Ayub suggested that developing countries which produced similar things

⁹⁶Pakistan Affairs, XIII, August 2, 1965.

⁹⁷Speeches and Statements, VI, July 1963-June 1964, p. 140.

⁹⁸Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, op. cit., pp. 164-5.

⁹⁹Ibid., p. 165.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., p. 185.

should join together so that they would have collective bargaining power in the world market. For Ayub, the salvation of the third world depended on "the formation of homogeneous groups to protect common interests and to work for the solution of common problems."¹⁰¹ Consequently, he supported the Communist Chinese call for a second Afro-Asian Conference.

Ayub made very few references to the Soviet Union as an additional source of economic aid for Pakistan. The President's account of his 1965 visit to Russia reveals that he was far more interested in creating a better impression of Pakistan by explaining Pakistan's problems with India. Although economic aid was certainly not his primary concern, he did express satisfaction that "new prospects of growing co-operation between Russia and Pakistan in the economic and cultural fields are opening up."¹⁰²

In short, Ayub viewed increased economic ties with China and Russia as part of a larger pattern. Again, he recognized the pragmatic limitations on prospects for increased economic aid in the short-run. When asked if he were discussing increased trade with the Soviet and Chinese leaders, Ayub replied,

Well, that we are discussing with every country. We shall have to diversify our trade. . . . We find it very difficult to compete in the European market and so we are up against a tremendous problem . . . and our trade

¹⁰¹Pakistan Affairs, XVII, March 5, 1964.

¹⁰²"Pakistan: The Coolness of America," The Round Table, LV, 1964-65, p. 372.

has been oriented towards Europe for the last two hundred years, since the British occupation. To change the pattern would take an enormous amount of effort and an enormous amount of time.¹⁰³ (Emphasis added.)

Thus Pakistan's economic capability was one important element that Ayub had to consider. He realized that Pakistan could not become economically self-sufficient in the short-run without the help of the United States. However, he was not prepared to make Pakistan's economic development his primary foreign policy goal. Ayub firmly believed that his first priority must be to insure the security of Pakistan against external aggression.

In conclusion, Ayub Khan's foreign policy images may be briefly summarized. His perception of Indian aggression was the most important factor in his decision to modify Pakistan's alignment patterns. The experiences of 1962-65 had taught him that Pakistan could no longer rely exclusively on the American guarantee and that Pakistan should never again make the mistake of depending on a single source of arms supply. In seeking closer ties with the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, Ayub understood that the United States might react by reducing economic assistance to Pakistan. This was the price he knew he must pay to increase Pakistan's military security. However, as a pragmatist, Ayub's recognition of Pakistan's dependence on American foreign aid—both military and economic—made him move with caution by keeping Pakistan's overtures to China and Russia within clearly defined limits.

¹⁰³Pakistan Affairs, XVI, January 16, 1963.

After we have examined the foreign policy image of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, it will be possible to compare the images of these two Pakistani foreign policy decision-makers based on the four major variables that have been explored—dominant bilateral, bilateral, military capability and economic capability.

CHAPTER IV

ZULFIKAR ALI BHUTTO'S FOREIGN POLICY IMAGE

When Zulfikar Ali Bhutto became Foreign Minister in 1963, he was in a position to exert pressure for a more "flexible" Pakistani foreign policy. He emphasized Pakistan's independent role in the international system during the 1963-65 period, as opposed to the "servile and senile policy" which was followed by former Pakistan Governments.¹

It was Bhutto's firm conviction that foreign policy should be a long continuous process, dynamic but with no abrupt changes, "like autumn changing into winter."² The function of diplomacy was to avoid abrupt decisions which sounded like ultimatums. Of central importance was the direction and implementation of policy. Change would come about gradually and imperceptibly "like sowing a seed for a harvest which will mature only in its natural period."³ He contended that understanding between countries was built over a period of time and should not be cut off precipitously as a result of passing expediency because "Friendship in inter-state relations is not a personal factor; it is entirely impersonal."⁴ We shall now see how this conviction was related to Bhutto's images of the United States and the Soviet Union.

¹Foreign Policy of Pakistan: A Compendium of Speeches Made in the National Assembly, November 26, 1962 - June 22, 1964, Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi, p. 112.

²Ibid., p. 17.

³Z.A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence, op. cit., p. 106.

⁴Foreign Policy of Pakistan, op. cit., p. 45.

External: Dominant Bilateral

Bhutto's modified Marxist framework made him see the super-powers in global as well as in dominant bilateral terms. As we mentioned earlier, he was more aware of the "international system" than was Ayub Khan.⁵ Because Bhutto believed that the global policies of the super-powers usually determined the kinds of bilateral relations they developed with lesser powers, we shall examine both these strands in Bhutto's thinking.

a. United States

Bhutto explained that the United States had a "modern lust for ideological and neo-colonial supremacy."⁶ He saw "small and under-developed"⁷ nations as victims of the designs of the super-powers. Pleas of justice or the righteousness of the causes of small nations would not influence these giants of the world. In the final analysis, it was not the virtue of a cause that became the determining factor but the "cold self-interest" of the super-powers. Bhutto warned that a policy of drift would undermine the independence of a small nation. Confrontation with a super-power should be avoided, but if it became unavoidable, it should be faced instantly and firmly. Delay or irresolution would inevitably

⁵See, for example, Z.A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence, op. cit., pp. 3-4.

⁶Bhutto develops this argument more fully in ibid., pp. 6-29.

⁷It is interesting to note that Pakistan, with a population of over 100 million people is classified by Bhutto as a "small nation." In fact, he specifically mentions that all "developing" nations fall in the category of "small nations" relative to the "Global Powers." Ibid., p. 7.

bring about piecemeal compromises or what Bhutto called "capitulation by installment." Such a policy could only result in an outcome which would be injurious to the national interest of a small nation.

Bhutto also saw U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China in global terms.⁸ Although he recognized that there was a détente between the super-powers after 1962, this was not seen as a permanent fact of international life. The military, industrial, and technological development of the two super-powers were fairly equally balanced; they had the capability of not only destroying each other but the rest of the world as well. Because of this balance of terror between the United States and the Soviet Union, China was in a position to tilt the scales in favor of one or the other. Bhutto was not convinced that China's future decision would be pre-determined by ideological factors. He cited the fact that it was the Soviet Union and not the United States which had territorial disputes with Communist China.

In this fluid state of affairs it would be fatal to be dogmatic about the future course of international events. At present the United States is engaged in a conflict—just stopping short of war—with China; such a situation cannot last forever.⁹

Bhutto said that nothing would give him greater satisfaction than to see the development of mutual understanding between China and the United States.¹⁰ He felt that the global situation urgently called for such

⁸This is discussed more fully in ibid., pp. 15-20.

⁹Ibid., p. 20.

¹⁰Foreign Policy of Pakistan, op. cit., p. 123.

a breakthrough. In fact, this would be the most important single factor conducive to international peace and security. Moreover, Pakistan might well have a modest role to play in such an event.

We know that world conditions require that at a certain stage there must be some relaxation in the tension between the United States and China. The present situation cannot last for long. . . . It is wrong to say that a détente or good relations between the Soviet Union and the United States are in the interest of world peace and at the same time to maintain that the isolation of China is in the interest of world peace. These double standards are obnoxious and cannot be applied to diplomacy in this second half of the twentieth century.¹¹

Bhutto carried this line of reasoning a step further in saying that if Pakistan were to take provocative steps against China, "her position would be the more perilous when relations between China and the United States improve."¹²

In relating these global images to Pakistan's relations with the United States, Bhutto asserted that it would be "myopic" for smaller nations to identify themselves completely with one power or another.¹³ He conceded that there might be certain issues that would lead a smaller nation to identify itself with one particular super-power. However, he believed that it would be most detrimental to take a predetermined position on all international issues "on the basis of identification with one Great Power as against another, for the sake of fleeting material benefits

¹¹Ibid., p. 124.

¹²Z.A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence, op. cit., p. 134.

¹³Ibid., p. 22.

or because its regime in power believes that it is being propped up by a Power without whose support it would be liquidated by its own people."¹⁴ It is clear that Bhutto had both ideological and practical reasons for advocating a more "flexible" foreign policy for Pakistan.

Bhutto did not become Foreign Minister of Pakistan until after the Sino-Indian border conflict in 1962. As a member of the Cabinet, he did speak forcefully in the National Assembly against the United States' precipitous arming of India.¹⁵ However, in line with his belief that foreign policy should not undergo abrupt changes, Bhutto rejected Opposition demands that his government terminate the alliance with the United States. He reasoned that in the "cold ruthlessness of international politics" one could not expect to find a perfect alliance or a state of relations which could be ideal from Pakistan's point of view alone. Repeatedly in the National Assembly, even when he threatened the West with "agonizing reprisals," he ended by declaring that his government contemplated no "basic" or "radical" change in its foreign policy.

Although Bhutto refused to sever ties with the United States, he did issue certain caveats to the super-power. He asserted that the global interests of the United States must necessarily comprise the interests of its allies as much as its own. Furthermore, a great power could not "ride two horses at the same time."

Its own global interests must be consistent with the interests of its allies and friends who share with it

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Foreign Policy of Pakistan, op. cit., pp. 40-44.

common ideals and aspirations and have undertaken certain obligations towards it. Or else, it must recognize that a new situation has arisen in which those alliances are no longer an asset, but rather a burden and a liability and consequently, it must abandon the policy of alliances. But as I said, you cannot have it both ways. You cannot have a system of alliances and a system of betrayal of the interests of your allies.¹⁶ (Emphasis added.)

Bhutto regretted the deterioration that had taken place in American-Pakistani relations but stressed repeatedly that this was not the fault of Pakistan but rather "something that has been imposed upon us."¹⁷

As a result of Bhutto's greater antipathy towards India, he reacted more strongly than did Ayub Khan against American preferential treatment of India at Pakistan's expense. After explaining the history of America's thwarted efforts to woo India, Bhutto said,

The Sino-Indian border conflict of October 1962 removed all doubts as to America's complete support for India. It was now decided to support India even at the risk of alienating Pakistan. This was the opportunity for which the United States had been yearning from the time of Partition—its cherished dream was coming to reality.¹⁸ (Emphasis added.)

Bhutto believed that American leaders were attempting to effect a reconciliation between Pakistan and India in a way that would necessarily subordinate Pakistan.¹⁹ It is noteworthy that Bhutto listed six reasons for U.S. military assistance to Pakistan and three of these referred to

¹⁶Ibid., p. 108.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 121.

¹⁸Z.A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence, op. cit., p. 62.

¹⁹Ibid., passim.

the American goal of greater Indo-Pakistani cooperation based on their common understanding of the Communist Chinese threat to the sub-continent.²⁰ "What the United States wants is the maximum effective encirclement of China, for which neither Pakistan nor India is alone sufficient; their collaboration is essential."²¹

The fear that the policies of the United States and India ran parallel after the Sino-Indian border war was a crucial element in Bhutto's perceptions and led to a greater disenchantment with the United States than Ayub experienced. Bhutto did realize, however, that the ultimate objectives of the United States and India differed and, "In the interest of its sovereignty, it is essential for Pakistan to conduct its diplomacy in such a way as to divide the parallel lines and enlarge the contradictions."²² This can be related to Bhutto's general foreign policy orientations, i.e., the preservation of independence as the most important goal of Pakistan's foreign policy.²³

Although there were some similarities in the way Ayub and Bhutto viewed the United States prior to 1965, it was the Indo-Pakistani War in that year that led to a sharp divergence between them. Bhutto was disgusted by America's inert posture during the war. By merely directing its efforts towards achieving a cease-fire, the U.S. was not

²⁰Ibid., p. 105.

²¹Ibid., p. 110.

²²Ibid., p. 113.

²³See p. 51.

going to the root of the problem.²⁴ Laying aside the previous conviction that there should be no abrupt changes in foreign policy, Bhutto seemed convinced that Pakistan-American relations should be subject to radical revision. Moreover, he began to criticize severely a number of American policies which he had carefully avoided mentioning during most of the period being examined. As an example, Bhutto's attitude towards American actions in Vietnam may be cited.

In Vietnam, Bhutto charged that liberal and progressive forces were being crushed to prevent the country from becoming Communist.²⁵ The United States was trying to collect on her influence in the sub-continent by forcing Pakistan and India to rally to her side. Solemn commitments to Pakistan were not honored but in Vietnam, "the world is being taken towards an international catastrophe in the name of commitments."²⁶ Officially, Ayub Khan did not support America's policies in Vietnam but he used considerable discretion when he discussed the issue publicly. Bhutto's world view, together with his growing antipathy towards the United States after the 1965 war, made him oppose this "imperialistic" activity of the United States far more openly. Ayub later disclaimed many of Bhutto's emotional outbursts which were directed

²⁴"Kashmir and the United Nations," Speech at the Security Council, September 22, 1965, Government of Pakistan, Produced by the Department of Films and Publications, Karachi, p. 8.

²⁵Bhutto discusses the Vietnam issue in The Myth of Independence, op. cit., pp. 126-30.

²⁶Ibid., p. 146.

against American policy in the third world generally, and specifically against U.S. policy in Vietnam. We may speculate²⁷ that this was one important reason why he was replaced as Foreign Minister in June, 1966.²⁸

To summarize, Bhutto saw the United States in global as well as in dominant bilateral terms. America's "imperialist policies" were inimical to the development of "small states" and it was in Pakistan's national interest to resist "capitulation by installment." Bhutto advocated a more "flexible" foreign policy so that Pakistan would be in a better position to adjust to changes in the international system. He did not contemplate any radical change in Pakistan's alliance policies as a result of American military aid to India in 1962-63. However, Bhutto did have misgivings about the unqualified identification by Pakistan with the United States. Bhutto's major complaint was that American leaders wanted a united Indo-Pakistani front to ward off any possible Chinese aggression; this could only result in Pakistan's subordination to India. After the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965, Bhutto abandoned his previous policy of caution towards the United States. Several months later he resigned his post as Foreign Minister.

b. Soviet Union

Bhutto's assessment of Soviet-Pakistan relations did not differ greatly from that of Ayub Khan. The Foreign Minister and his President

²⁷As have other analysts such as Rehman Sobhan, "Pakistan's Political Crisis," The World Today, May, 1969, p. 204.

²⁸The official reason for his departure was "for reasons of health."

both understood that, prior to the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War, Russia was unsympathetic to Pakistan's problems with India. During the early 'sixties, both leaders hoped for greater friendship between the two countries.

Bhutto's statements reflected some ambivalence when he discussed the global role of the Soviet Union.²⁹ On the one hand, he saw the Soviet Union as a protector of oppressed people. On the other, he viewed the Soviet Union as a revisionist state which was cooperating with the United States to fulfill their common objectives. It was the second of these two contradictory views that particularly displeased Bhutto; he thought the Soviet Union, like the United States, was attempting to effect a reconciliation between India and Pakistan. Although Soviet reasons differed from those of the U.S.,³⁰ the end result would, in Bhutto's opinion, be damaging to Pakistan. He hoped that the Soviet Union would not continue to compromise with the United States; Russia would then have to relinquish its claims to leadership of oppressed peoples. He warned the Soviet leaders that their policy of drift could not continue for long.

The time has surely come for the Soviet Union to redefine its global role and remove doubts occasioned by its being pushed into one compromise after another by the United States. In any event, Pakistan is capable of exercising considerable manoeuvrability to negotiate a more favourable future relationship with the Soviet Union.³¹

²⁹Z.A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

³⁰Bhutto explains this in greater detail in *ibid.*, pp. 84-5.

³¹Ibid.

Bhutto was very interested in understanding the nature of the Sino-Soviet dispute. On this particular issue, he saw the Soviet Union in an intermediary position between the United States and China. With his usual predilection to see inter-state relations in global terms, Bhutto said,

Had it not been for the dispute between China and the Soviet Union, it might not have been impossible for the Communist World, represented by the Soviet Union and China, and the Capitalist World, represented by the United States, notionally to divide the world into different spheres of influence.³²

Bhutto believed that the Sino-Soviet conflict would remain within certain specified limits. Russia's claims to leadership of the Communist countries were based on ideology and only at the cost of international Communism could the Soviet Union allow its ideological differences with China to reach a point of no return.³³

During the September war of 1965, Bhutto viewed the Soviet Union as acting within the context of its global evaluation of the war. The Soviet Union was alarmed by the Chinese ultimatum and sought to end the conflict. In this way, the Soviet position was not determined by the extent of Indian or Pakistani identification with her, but by Russia's own global aims.³⁴ During the negotiations at Tashkent, Bhutto was full of praise for Kosygin.³⁵ Immediately afterwards, the

³²Ibid., pp. 15-16.

³³Ibid., p. 16.

³⁴Ibid., pp. 138-9.

³⁵Dawn, Karachi, January 7, 1966.

Foreign Minister's estimation of the U.S.S.R. continued to rise. He affirmed that the Soviet Union believed in the right of self-determination of all peoples and added,

The great state on the soil of which the conference took place, the U.S.S.R., came into being as a result of a mighty historic movement based on the principle of equality of man and self-determination of peoples. Historically and ideologically the commitments of the Soviet Union to these ideals are irrevocable.³⁶

In short, Bhutto viewed the Soviet Union in two different contexts: global and dominant bilateral. In global terms, Bhutto evaluated Russia within a Marxist framework, i.e., the Soviet Union had an ideological responsibility to protect the oppressed peoples of the world. However, as a "great power" the Soviet Union was also making compromises with the United States in a way that would undermine Soviet leadership of the "proletarian nations of the world." On a bilateral basis, Bhutto's attitude towards the Soviet Union was quite similar to that of Ayub Khan. Both leaders resented Russian support of India but saw a possibility of better relations between Pakistan and Russia as a result of their experiences at Tashkent.

External: Bilateral

Bhutto has said that "geography continues to remain the most important single factor in the formulation of a country's foreign policy."³⁷ He contended that if a nation were incapable of adjusting to its neighbors,

³⁶Ibid., January 16, 1966.

³⁷Z.A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence, op. cit., p. 28.

it would find that it was even more difficult to arrive at understandings with nations situated far away.

A nation's maturity and flexibility in international relations is born of the maturity and flexibility of its behavior towards its immediate neighbors.³⁸

We shall now examine these statements in the light of Bhutto's perceptions of the People's Republic of China and of India.

a. People's Republic of China

Bhutto believed that he personally exercised a great deal of influence in Pakistan's new policies towards China which began with the border demarcation. As he said later, "... it is worth emphasizing that the policy of close relations with China, which I formulated and put into operation, is indispensable to Pakistan..."³⁹ This statement is indicative of the great importance Bhutto attached to Pakistan's relations with Communist China.

The Foreign Minister viewed Pakistan's relations with China not only in global and bilateral terms but in a regional context as well. He asserted that Sino-Pakistani friendship would reduce tensions in Asia. China was a member of the family of Afro-Asian nations and Bhutto attached the greatest importance to the awakening and solidarity of the peoples of Asia and Africa.⁴⁰ In line with his ideology and general

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Ibid., Preface viii.

⁴⁰Z.A. Bhutto, The Quest for Peace, op. cit., pp. 31-39.

foreign policy orientations, Bhutto sympathized with China's position on Vietnam. "There should be a settlement, which is equitable and honourable for the people of Vietnam, and not through bringing them to their knees by methods other than peaceful."⁴¹

As noted previously, Islam was a major factor in coloring Bhutto's foreign policy images.⁴² However, it was the Christian states which Bhutto seemed to resent most bitterly. With regard to China, Bhutto did not perceive Pakistan's differing ideology as an impediment to increased friendship and understanding.

Our relations are based on the Bandung principles and on the strict adherence to the concept of non-interference. Nowhere is it mentioned in the scriptures of Islam that fostering friendship with non-Islamic states involves a compromise of identity.⁴³

In fact, Bhutto went on to cite the historical and cultural ties which existed between Pakistan and China.

There is a large Muslim population inhabiting North-West China and its Sinkiang province. Good neighbourly relations with the People's Republic of China have once again enabled Pakistan to revive its historical and cultural links with this important segment of the Chinese people, links which were altogether ruptured during the period of colonial rule in the subcontinent.⁴⁴

When Pakistan and China agreed to demarcate their common border, Bhutto was impressed with China's conciliatory attitude. He

⁴¹Ibid., p. 29.

⁴²See p. 52.

⁴³Z.A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence, op. cit., p. 133.

⁴⁴Z.A. Bhutto, The Quest for Peace, op. cit., p. 96.

was convinced that the Chinese had peaceful intentions towards their immediate neighbors and he felt that India was to blame for the continuation of Sino-Indian tension. In the National Assembly, Bhutto remarked,

The People's Republic of China has thus shown its eagerness to settle the dispute peacefully rather than by the use of force. The Charter of the United Nations enjoins that all disputes should be settled by peaceful means. Thus China, which is not a member of the United Nations, has respected its Charter. India, which is a prominent member of that organization has ignored it.⁴⁵

Bhutto was careful to stress that relations with China were not of a negative character, i.e., they were not based solely on the fact that China and Pakistan both had disputes with India. He declared that "Pakistan's friendship with China is an independent factor in Pakistan's foreign policy, not contingent on any other and nothing will be permitted in any way to endanger those relations."⁴⁶

Bhutto believed that China and Pakistan had a fundamental common interest which had survived despite the fact that Pakistan was aligned with the West and had been given aid to combat Communism. Because of India's belligerent policy towards both states, "... it is in China's national interest to support Pakistan and it is in Pakistan's national interest to develop friendly relations with China."⁴⁷ That the United States disapproved of Pakistan's normalization of relations with

⁴⁵Foreign Policy of Pakistan, op. cit., p. 37.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 65.

⁴⁷Z.A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence, op. cit., p. 148.

China and took countermeasures against it was, in Bhutto's opinion, an added bond between Pakistan and China.⁴⁸ The actions of the United States merely served to demonstrate to the Chinese that Pakistan was no longer an American satellite, and Pakistan had not given in to American pressures. But there was one common interest between Pakistan and China that overrode all others. This was the Chinese unequivocal support for Pakistan's position in Kashmir "... and this, quite apart from other considerations, must influence Pakistan in seeking friendly relations with China."⁴⁹

There were charges of collusion between China and Pakistan during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War. Despite the great importance that Bhutto attached to Pakistan's relations with China, he denied that there was any collusion between them.⁵⁰ Although he officially supported his President's stand on this issue, the Foreign Minister expressed his gratitude to China on numerous occasions. Bhutto's highly charged and emotional language was in sharp contrast to Ayub's cautious statements of gratitude. For example, Bhutto said,

... our great neighbor to the north, the People's Republic of China, ... gave us full moral support and rising above ideological difference, upheld the cause of righteousness to condemn the war of aggression launched against us by India.⁵¹

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 131.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 132.

⁵⁰"Thus Spake Bhutto," Ayub: Soldier and Statesman, op. cit., p. 303.

⁵¹Ibid., pp. 308-9.

Bhutto regarded China's unequivocal support for Pakistan as unprecedented. Moreover, the events which accompanied the 1965 war served to reinforce Bhutto's view that closer ties between Pakistan and China should be fostered.

To summarize, Bhutto saw Pakistan's relations with China as unsatisfactory for the first decade and a half of Pakistan's existence. As Foreign Minister, he began to rectify this situation. He did not view ideological factors as impediments to closer ties between the two countries. In fact, China had a dominant role in Asia; because Pakistan was above all an Asian state, it was vital for Pakistan to maintain friendly relations with China and thereby strengthen Asian unity. Once the border between China and Pakistan had been demarcated, a major source of stress between the two countries was eliminated. As a result of the Sino-Indian border war and China's support to Pakistan on the Kashmir issue, Bhutto believed that there were strong practical reasons for closer relations between the two countries. As mentioned, Bhutto viewed geography as the most important single element in formulating a country's foreign policy.⁵² Linked to this was his professed desire for Pakistan to have good relations with her immediate neighbors.

b. India

Bhutto saw Indian nationalism as the fundamental cause of discord between India and Pakistan.⁵³ He explained this in terms of

⁵²See p. 108.

⁵³Z.A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence, op. cit., passim.

historical factors and India's problems with internal integration. Indian history revealed that Hinduism had remained dominant by assimilating foreign elements.⁵⁴ Only the Muslim conquest broke the old Indian order. When the Muslims in the sub-continent insisted on retaining their separate identity, the Hindus reacted with an extreme sense of "xenophobia."

Fed on centuries of hatred, their sense of injury received at Muslim hands reinforced by religious dogma, all Hindu movements have conceived the assimilation of the Muslim minority as part of their political objective. . . .⁵⁵

India has carried out this policy to the present day by exploiting every conceivable weakness in Pakistan's internal affairs. Referring to India's problems with internal integration, Bhutto said that "The creation of Pakistan has contributed to the crystallization of Indian nationhood."⁵⁶ Were it not for the hatred of Pakistan which was prevalent in India, the Indian leaders would not even be able to hold their nation together. In other words, it was only the vehement hatred of Pakistan which restrained the separatist urges of the various states and kept India united.

After two decades of independence, Indo-Pakistani relations had remained static. The two nations had been permanently in a state of either enmity or acute confrontation; only the degree of tension varied.

⁵⁴Bhutto discusses the historical foundation of Hindu-Muslim rivalry in ibid., pp. 165-68.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 168.

⁵⁶Ibid. p. 32.

Bhutto explained that their relations had never been "normal"; nor could they become so without the settlement of basic issues. The most basic issue was, of course, Kashmir.

Bhutto differentiated between a mere boundary dispute and the more fundamental problem of Kashmir which was a region held in "colonial bondage."⁵⁷ "To Pakistan," he said, "Kashmir is more than an obsession. . . . It is a bleeding wound, a scar, a cancer."⁵⁸

Pakistan was incomplete without Jammu and Kashmir both territorially and ideologically. . . . It would be fatal to abandon the struggle with India out of sheer exhaustion or intimidation.⁵⁹

Bhutto argued that the level of tension between the two countries must be accepted by the Pakistani people until Kashmir could be integrated into Pakistan. In other words, if Pakistan were to relent and to establish friendly relations with India without first settling the Kashmir dispute, "it would be the first major step in establishing Indian leadership in our parts, with Pakistan and her neighbouring states becoming Indian satellites."⁶⁰ However, the Foreign Minister agreed with his President that the solution could be "simple and direct," based on an Indian change of heart.

⁵⁷Pakistan Affairs, XVII, March 16, 1964.

⁵⁸Sibte Faruq Faridi, Ayub's Manifesto Undertakings, (Election Manifesto), Produced by the Department of Films and Publications, Government of Pakistan, Karachi, May, 1965, p. 48.

⁵⁹Z.A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence, op. cit., p. 180.

⁶⁰Ibid.

Bhutto resented the reputation that India had built as a non-aligned nation. He termed India's predilection to speak with different voices in Washington, Moscow and Peking as a policy of "double alignment."⁶¹ Furthermore, Bhutto felt that Indian leaders were not to be trusted. As an example, Bhutto cited the visit of the Prime Minister of India to the United States in 1961, when he proclaimed grandly: "Peace is a passion with us." Bhutto added, "Three days after delivering this message of peace, India's war drums were beating in Goa."⁶²

Bhutto gained special pleasure from his belief that the Sino-Indian border war demonstrated India's non-alignment to be a sham.⁶³ Because the military situation looked dismal from the Indian point of view, she hypocritically agreed to discuss the Kashmir issue with Pakistan in order to extract arms from the West. With the unilateral ceasefire declared by "peace-loving China," India's attitude changed completely and the discussion got bogged down in procedural wrangles. Despite massive arms from the West, India had to maintain the façade of non-alignment so that she could continue to extract aid from the Soviets as well. Bhutto pointed out that,

⁶¹Foreign Policy of Pakistan, op. cit., passim.

⁶²Z.A. Bhutto, The Quest for Peace, op. cit., p. 43. Bhutto cited six specific "categorical and undeniable instances of Indian aggression" which further undermined the sincerity of that "peace-loving country." In the case of Goa, Bhutto made it clear that he was not condoning imperialism but pointing to Indian methods of resorting to force for settling disputes. "Thus Spake Bhutto," Ayub: Soldier and Statesman, op. cit., p. 323.

⁶³Bhutto discusses this point at length in Foreign Policy of Pakistan, op. cit., pp. 38-40, and Quest for Peace, op. cit., pp. 44 and 47.

To get these arms Nehru has had to break his own image and to violate his much-trumpeted doctrine of Panchshella. Gone is the proud voice of neutralism. That image has been broken and that doctrine shattered.⁶⁴

Bhutto was particularly concerned that after the Sino-Indian War in 1962, the United States considered India to be "virtually a member of an unwritten alliance against Communism."⁶⁵ Furthermore, India was receiving the same privileges as SEATO and CENTO members, "but with the all-important difference that India would be permitted to maintain its veneer of non-alignment and be free from awkward and perilous obligations which reciprocally bound other aligned nations."⁶⁶

Bhutto expressed far greater personal antipathy for Pandit Nehru and Krishna Menon than did Ayub Khan. He felt that Nehru was a prisoner of Menon's personality: "By sheer force of intellect, Krishna Menon controlled the thoughts of Pandit Nehru."⁶⁷ He believed that Nehru's main theme was hatred of Pakistan and that Nehru's life mission was to isolate Pakistan and "create all manner of difficulties for her."⁶⁸ Added to this was the fact that,

Nehru made India lofty at the top but allowed it to remain rotten at the bottom. . . . Internationally, he gave India the posture of non-alignment, of being the

⁶⁴Foreign Policy of Pakistan, op. cit., p. 40.

⁶⁵Z.A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence, op. cit., p. 69.

⁶⁶Ibid.

⁶⁷Z.A. Bhutto, The Quest for Peace, op. cit., p. 64.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 72.

arbiter between the East and the West. In a final analysis, however, he left India friendless and alone, distrusted by its neighbours and reduced from a giant to a dwarf in the eyes of Asia and Africa.⁶⁹

Bhutto perceived that India's policies vis-à-vis Pakistan underwent a change as a result of the September war of 1965.⁷⁰ He felt certain the war had demonstrated to the Indian leaders that they could not destroy Pakistan by confrontation. India would use a more subtle approach in the future by holding out inducements of peaceful cooperation. But Bhutto viewed India's cooperative efforts as attempts to "enter by the back door, like a burglar."⁷¹ In other words, India was merely implementing new devious tactics in order to induce Pakistan to submit to Hindu domination. Bhutto was resolute in affirming that this was one thing that Pakistan would never do. In short, Pakistan could maintain her vital interests only by confronting India until all disputes were equitably resolved.⁷²

To return to Bhutto's statements concerning the primacy of geography in foreign policy and his desire to have friendly relations with immediate neighbors, it is clear that this did not extend to Pakistan's relations with India. Bhutto himself expressed this when he said:

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 69.

⁷⁰Z.A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence, op. cit., pp. 182-93.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 182.

⁷²Ibid., p. 186.

We wish to live in peace, in mutual understanding and friendship with all countries. In the achievement of this objective we have fully succeeded, except in so far as only one state is concerned. That state is India.⁷³ (Emphasis added.)

Since Bhutto perceived the principal objective of Indian foreign policy as domination of Pakistan, he felt that in the near future, armed confrontation with India was not only unavoidable, but indeed the only answer to the solution of Indo-Pakistan disputes.

Internal: Military Capability

During the period when Bhutto was Foreign Minister, he was continually pre-occupied with the question of how Pakistan could adequately meet the "Indian threat." He repeatedly emphasized the importance of a more "flexible" foreign policy for Pakistan. This flexibility was justified not only ideologically, but also as a device for increasing Pakistan's military capabilities relative to those of India. Therefore, we shall first examine Bhutto's assessments of Pakistan's military capabilities relative to those of India. Only then can we understand how Bhutto evaluated the United States, the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union as additional sources of military capability for Pakistan.

Bhutto was keenly aware that India was stronger and more powerful than Pakistan. However, he believed that the Indian leaders had come to tolerate Pakistan because they did not have the power

⁷³ Foreign Policy of Pakistan, op. cit., p. 80.

to destroy her.⁷⁴ If India were able to augment her military strength to the point where she could overpower Pakistan, partition would be terminated and Pakistan and Kashmir together would be re-absorbed into Hindu India.

Apart from ideological considerations, there were three important military reasons why Bhutto felt that Kashmir must be integrated into Pakistan.⁷⁵ Firstly, India wanted to retain those sections of Jammu and Kashmir which she already "occupied" in order to increase her strategic importance. This would be accomplished by India having common borders with the Soviet Union and China, and correspondingly denying Pakistan these frontiers. Secondly, India wanted to possess all of Kashmir. This would enable her to dominate the entire sub-continent. Thirdly, if India were to succeed in absorbing all of Kashmir, this would be only a beginning. India would then proceed to encourage the rivalry which already existed between East and West Pakistan. Once Pakistan's national resolve was broken, subversion to break the link between East and West Pakistan would increase in both wings.

If, in this way, Pakistan were to be divided, each wing would immediately lose its importance by half. Instead of being two mighty pillars in the sub-continent, Pakistan would be reduced to two weak states. The process of disintegration would continue until East Pakistan were absorbed into West Bengal and would provide an encouraging example to separatist movements in West Pakistan.⁷⁶

⁷⁴Z.A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence, op. cit., p. 170.

⁷⁵Ibid., pp. 180-2.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 182.

Each of the three military reasons which Bhutto gave for repudiating India's claim to Kashmir was related to the territorial integrity of Pakistan.

At various times, Bhutto said that military aid to India could not be seen only as an aid to wholesale aggression against Pakistan; it was also a contributing factor to the further deterioration of relations between them. India's bargaining position would be artificially increased to such an extent that it would preclude for all time, the possibility of a settlement on Kashmir—except on India's own terms.

The issue thus is not only that India is receiving military assistance, which may be used against Pakistan, but also that the augmentation of India's military strength invests it with a most dangerous power of dictating its own terms in disputes with other states.⁷⁷

After 1962, Bhutto perceived India as a fallen state which had given in to American bribes of economic and military aid. He thought that India should negotiate a settlement with China but he doubted that she would do this in the near future. Being "vain, deceitful and an imperialist power," India wanted to dominate the entire land mass from the Hindukush to the Mekong River. As India was unable to fight the Chinese colossus, she would turn her recently augmented military power "... against the helpless peoples of South and Southeast Asia."⁷⁸

⁷⁷Foreign Policy of Pakistan, op. cit., pp. 73-4.

⁷⁸These views were expressed in a speech which Bhutto gave to the National Assembly. National Assembly of Pakistan Debates: Official Report (Discussion on Emergency Situation Arising out of Large-Scale Supply of Arms to India), November 24, 1962, pp. 41-68.

Bhutto saw the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War as a vindication of all his prophecies. His anger knew no bounds. In a broadcast to the nation on September 4, 1965, Bhutto raved,

In Jammu and Kashmir, India did not remain content with the denial of the right of self-determination to the people. She launched a barbaric policy of cold-blooded and callous genocide with the sole objective of eliminating the Muslim majority of the State of Jammu and Kashmir by Hitlerite extermination. India unleashed all the horrors and iniquities of imperialism and re-enacted the entire gamut of colonialist devices against which generations of downtrodden humanity have struggled for emancipation.⁷⁹

If Bhutto saw the 1965 war as the realization of all his fears regarding Indian aggression, how then did he attempt to ensure Pakistan's military security? To answer this question, we must explore Bhutto's perceptions of the three major powers as sources of additional military strength during the 1962-65 period.

a. United States

Bhutto blamed the United States for the "frantic" arms race which had developed between India and Pakistan. In addition, he castigated the United States for ignoring solemn commitments to Pakistan from 1962 onwards. He believed that the United States had "arbitrarily and without notice abrogated the letter and spirit of the Mutual Defence Treaties and CENTO and SEATO Agreements."⁸⁰

⁷⁹"Thus Spake Bhutto," Ayub: Soldier and Statesman, op. cit., p. 292.

⁸⁰Z.A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence, op. cit., p. 146.

The Foreign Minister also held the United States responsible for India's increased bargaining power. He stated that India had not taken any drastic actions in Kashmir until the United States decided to provide her with military assistance. In late 1963, "without any justification," India marched her troops into a village in Azad Kashmir. "This and other provocative demonstrations of chauvinism were repeated with greater bravado as the position of the United States became clearer."⁸¹ Bhutto believed that India would not have dared to "commit aggression" against Pakistan in 1965 if there were still the fear that the United States would fulfill her treaty obligations and other commitments to Pakistan.⁸²

In discussing the guarantee of the United States—that American arms given to India would not be used against Pakistan—Bhutto asserted that the facts of India's history made this guarantee meaningless.⁸³ Moreover, in a given situation, it was impossible to determine which state was the aggressor. For Bhutto, this same assurance given previously to India when Pakistan was being armed by the United States was significantly different from the assurances given to Pakistan after the Sino-Indian border war in 1962.

This situation arises from the fact that Pakistan is in every respect a far smaller country than India. . . . Therefore, while the assurance given to India by the United States was quite superfluous, that given to

⁸¹Ibid., p. 74.

⁸²Ibid., p. 76.

⁸³Foreign Policy of Pakistan, op. cit., p. 72.

Pakistan is of little or no value in a situation in which our security is in jeopardy.⁸⁴

Bhutto directed his outbursts over Kashmir not only against India but also against the United States for its failure to bring India to terms. Furthermore, Bhutto argued, the American decision to terminate military assistance to Pakistan in 1965 had increased the threat to Pakistan's security in several ways.⁸⁵

In the first instance, Bhutto saw the American decision to terminate military aid to India and Pakistan as injurious only to Pakistan. Like his President, Bhutto was aware that Pakistan's armed forces were dependent on military supplies and spare parts which could come only from the United States. India, on the other hand, had alternative sources of military aid.

Secondly, Bhutto contended that the temptation to wage war normally arose whenever there was a military imbalance between two antagonistic states. While Bhutto admitted that American aid to Pakistan was not made available for use against India, it did act as a deterrent against India. Moreover, in the 1965 war, Pakistan was able to use U.S. military assistance against India. The question then became, how could Pakistan adequately meet this threat to its security in the absence of renewed military aid from the United States?

Thirdly, Bhutto rejected the notion that the United States could impose effective disarmament on Pakistan and India by merely ceasing

⁸⁴Ibid.

⁸⁵These reasons are drawn from various sections of The Myth of Independence, op. cit.

to give them military aid. He saw that disarmament, to be successful, had to be on a multilateral, universal basis, "... so that no one nation has an advantage over another, ..."⁸⁶ This did not apply to India and Pakistan because:

India is in possession of Jammu and Kashmir and eastern enclaves belonging to Pakistan. In such circumstances, bilateral disarmament between India and Pakistan would mean the victory of the state possessing the disputed territory and the defeat of the dispossessed.⁸⁷

Thus Bhutto violently opposed the suspension of American military aid to Pakistan. He argued that relations between the United States and Pakistan had been characterized by a series of vicissitudes but,

... only the United States' decision to terminate military assistance to Pakistan—a country to which it is technically still bound by the obligations of a Mutual Defence Treaty and an association in the defence alliances of CENTO and SEATO—finally put a stop to the special relationship.⁸⁸ (Emphasis added.)

During the early 'sixties Bhutto had denied that Pakistan would withdraw from the Western Pacts. After 1965, however, his response was entirely different:

The sooner, therefore, that Pakistan dissociates herself from treaties which are no longer valid, the better for her future security and for the peace of Asia.⁸⁹

⁸⁶Ibid., p. 185.

⁸⁷Ibid.

⁸⁸Ibid., p. 2.

⁸⁹Ibid., p. 147.

b. People's Republic of China

As far back as 1962, Bhutto began looking for additional support in his effort to enhance Pakistan's military security against India. In a lengthy statement in the National Assembly, Bhutto argued that China might fulfill this role.

This much we know and can say that if, God forbid, we should be involved in a clash with India, that is, if India were, in its frustration, to turn its guns against Pakistan, the international position being what it is, Pakistan would not be alone . . . a defeated Pakistan or a subjugated Pakistan would not only mean annihilation for us but also pose a serious threat to other countries of Asia and particularly to the largest state of Asia.⁹⁰ (Emphasis added.)

On the question of a non-aggression pact with China, Bhutto found this an acceptable course of action for Pakistan.⁹¹ When Bhutto was still of the opinion that Pakistan should remain in the Western Pacts, he maintained that a non-aggression pact with China would not violate a SEATO member's obligations under the alliance. Commenting on reports in 1962 that China had offered or intended to offer Pakistan such a pact, Bhutto observed:

This offer cannot be regarded as inconsistent with our alliances with the West. Our alliances are for self-defence. A non-aggression pact further reinforces the defensive character of these alliances.⁹²

Bhutto thought that friendship with the People's Republic of China could strengthen Pakistan's position vis-à-vis India in the early

⁹⁰Foreign Policy of Pakistan, op. cit., p. 75.

⁹¹Pakistan Affairs, XVII, March 16, 1964.

⁹²Foreign Policy of Pakistan, op. cit., p. 31.

'sixties and this belief became even stronger as a result of the 1965 war. With each step away from total reliance on the U.S. for military aid, Bhutto moved a step towards China. This can be viewed as a continuous action-reaction pattern which developed during the four-year period. Therefore, Bhutto's images of China did not undergo any basic change; they merely reflected a logical development and strengthening over time.

c. Soviet Union

By contrast, Bhutto's perceptions of the Soviet Union underwent a fundamental change in the four-year period. Bhutto's thesis in 1963 was that "given geography and the power realities of the nuclear age, the military threat to us, if there is one, would come more from the Soviet Union than from China."⁹³ We have seen how Bhutto's assessment of the Soviet Union changed as a result of the Soviet behavior at Tashkent. Despite certain misgivings about Russian global policies, Bhutto did indeed see the Soviet Union as an additional source of military capabilities for Pakistan. After 1965, he even proposed that a treaty of friendship and non-aggression should be concluded with the Soviet Union as soon as possible.⁹⁴

To conclude, Bhutto perceived the primary threat to Pakistan as emanating from India. If the three great powers were ever to threaten Pakistan, it would be at some future time and in the context

⁹³Washington Post, March 10, 1963.

⁹⁴Z.A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence, op. cit., p. 148.

of their global policies, i.e., imperialism. Pakistan had to be especially wary of the United States in this regard. In seeking closer ties with the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, Bhutto did not repudiate any military aid that the U.S. might give to Pakistan in the future. He simply believed that Pakistan could not afford to depend on a single source for military support. Moreover, his country should never again make the mistake of identifying too closely with a great power whose global objectives were inimical to the national interest of Pakistan. Instead, all three great powers should serve as additional sources of military capability for Pakistan. In short, Bhutto had two main objectives in advocating a more "flexible" foreign policy for Pakistan. His long-term goal was to place Pakistan in a better position to resist future domination by great powers. But more important, his immediate aim was to gain matériel and moral support for Pakistan's "just cause" in warding off Indian "aggression."

Internal: Economic Capability

Bhutto was acutely aware of the low level of Pakistan's economic capabilities relative to the industrialized nations of the West. In addition, he saw the economic problems of Pakistan and other developing countries from a modified Marxist viewpoint. He believed that there was a close link between the national and international causes of poverty and he placed greater emphasis on the latter.

The Foreign Minister agreed with his President that the Pakistan Government would have to undertake measures to make the country eco-

nomically self-supporting. He believed that everything possible was being done to overcome the "crisis of want" within Pakistan itself. "But not all our reforms at the national level can provide the final answer to what is really an international problem."⁹⁵ He realized that most underdeveloped countries needed foreign assistance and that Pakistan was no exception. For Bhutto, there were two important reasons why Pakistan was entitled to economic aid from the Western Powers.

The first reason was that it was in the interest of certain powers to give aid to Pakistan. The great powers realized Pakistan's importance to the world as a result of her geopolitical position.

We do not get aid and assistance because we beg for it.
We get aid and assistance because Pakistan is a nation
of a hundred million people with a geopolitical position
of great importance.⁹⁶

Bhutto also understood that foreign aid givers were not motivated by pure altruism. The loans which Pakistan received had to be repaid from her own resources. Moreover, it was advantageous to the economies of the industrialized countries to give loans to underdeveloped countries.⁹⁷

The second reason which Bhutto gave for Pakistan's right to economic aid was a moral one. He explained that the economic exploitation of Asia and Africa by the West had been of the most vicious character.

⁹⁵Z.A. Bhutto, The Quest for Peace, op. cit., p. 51.

⁹⁶Foreign Policy of Pakistan, op. cit., p. 86.

⁹⁷Z.A. Bhutto, The Quest for Peace, op. cit., p. 37.

Colonial rule has sapped our vitality. It has demoralised our people and retarded their growth. Because of it, we find ourselves in a situation of economic dependence.⁹⁸

Moreover, Bhutto saw a direct correlation between the richness of the Western nations and the poverty of Asia and Africa. Had colonies not existed, Bhutto felt certain that the industrialized nations would never have attained the "pinnacle of plenty."⁹⁹ Consequently, the developed countries, particularly the former colonial powers, were under a moral obligation to come to the aid of the underdeveloped countries. In fact he saw aid as a form of "reparation"; it was returning to the people of Asia a small part of the wealth which was taken away during the days of "unbridled imperialism."¹⁰⁰ The reasons which Bhutto gave clearly demonstrate the impact of his personal values on his explanation of Pakistan's need for foreign aid. Although foreign aid can be an embarrassment to the recipient, Bhutto insisted on the retention of Pakistan's "self-respect" and refused to admit that foreign aid was a form of charity:

One fact emerges clearly: The amount needed for the economic development of the currently under-developed, formerly dependent, countries does not bear comparison to the total of wealth which has, over the years, been siphoned from them.¹⁰¹

As Foreign Minister, Bhutto understood the need for foreign assistance if Pakistan's dependent economy were to be turned into a

⁹⁸Ibid.

⁹⁹Ibid., p. 51.

¹⁰⁰Ibid.

¹⁰¹Ibid., p. 57.

self-reliant one. However, if foreign aid were accompanied by foreign interference, Pakistan's dependence on outside powers would increase and the whole purpose of economic aid would be defeated. This was explained more fully in terms of the international system.

Bhutto affirmed that the end of imperialism and the emergence of the super-powers "has changed the whole concept of a great power."¹⁰² He said that the aim of a "great power" was no longer to subjugate the world in the conventional sense. The aim was now to control the minds of men and gain the allegiance of the leaders of underdeveloped nations through economic domination and other devices—without necessarily interfering directly. Economic exploitation was now the principal concern in that "this is the inevitable adjustment in the transition from colonialism to neo-colonialism, which is why our independence is a myth."¹⁰³ He found this economic pressure more insidious in the modern stage, but equally strong. Bhutto felt it an almost heroic national duty to withstand the neo-colonialist policies of the great powers. He tried to make it clear to the Western powers that interference in Pakistan's national objectives would not be tolerated. In other words, Pakistan must "... refrain from accepting preconditions which limit her freedom of action in any respect in the discharge of her national and ideological obligations."¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² Bhutto elaborates on this notion in The Myth of Independence, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 10.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 144.

a. United States

Bhutto viewed Pakistan's economic ties with the United States within this same Marxist international framework. When Kennedy became President of the United States, he began to emphasize greater economic aid to the underdeveloped countries. In essence, however,

The emphasis on greater economic aid was designed to provide markets for the United States' goods in order to maintain pro-West links with the recipient countries.¹⁰⁵

For Bhutto, the economic practices of the United States followed a distinct pattern closely related to American global objectives. He explained this in the following way:

An action is taken to move Pakistan towards global alignments, which occasions loud but ineffectual protests. Then an economic carrot is dangled in front of the Pakistan Government to persuade its official spokesmen to return to their desks. The inducement has taken many forms: . . . Again, after a decent lapse of time, comes another punch prompting protests which are soothed by further economic palliatives, and so the caravan moves towards its destination.¹⁰⁶

To illustrate this, an example was given: In reference to the postponement of the Aid-Pakistan Consortium Meeting in July 1965, Bhutto complained that the U.S. had decided upon this course of action without consulting any of the other members. Bhutto had suspicions that the Consortium Meeting was postponed abruptly in order to exert undisguised pressure on Pakistan. His suspicions were confirmed when the American Ambassador called upon him and advised him to reconsider his position

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 55.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 85.

on Vietnam as well as the close relations that had been developing between Pakistan and the People's Republic of China.¹⁰⁷

Bhutto had noticed that economic aid to India and Pakistan had increased over the years. In his opinion, this meant that the two countries' dependence on the U.S. had also increased.¹⁰⁸ He thought that the United States might try to use economic aid to bring India and Pakistan together "... for the attainment of the United States objectives in Asia and elsewhere."¹⁰⁹ Economic reprisals were not Bhutto's greatest fear, however. He explained that economic difficulties could generally be overcome by internal adjustments. But more importantly,

... the enforcement of economic sanctions does not have the same impact as the termination of military assistance, where it threatens a nation's security.¹¹⁰

Although Bhutto hoped that Pakistan's economy would be strengthened so that she could become self-reliant and resist foreign pressures, his prime consideration was unambiguous: "Pakistan's security and territorial integrity are more important than economic development."¹¹¹

Bhutto saw very clearly that Pakistan would have to endure many economic sacrifices if she did not give in to American pressures. If Pakistan were to freeze the Kashmir dispute, come to terms with

¹⁰⁷Ibid., p. 72.

¹⁰⁸Ibid., p. 83.

¹⁰⁹Ibid., p. 84.

¹¹⁰Ibid., p. 91.

¹¹¹Ibid., p. 152.

India and assume a different attitude towards the People's Republic of China, she would qualify for increased economic aid from the United States. Bhutto was not prepared to compromise on any of these important issues, all of which he deemed crucial to Pakistan's security.¹¹²

b. The People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union

Bhutto rarely referred to China as an additional source of economic capabilities for Pakistan alone. Instead, he viewed China within the broader context of Afro-Asian unity. Bhutto believed that Afro-Asian nations were becoming a powerful force in the world, despite the fact that most of these countries were individually poor.¹¹³ This trend could only be continued if the Afro-Asians banded together.

Afro-Asian solidarity is neither a myth nor an abstract philosophy, but a condition necessary both for our individual advancement as well as our collective protection. The underdeveloped nations, the bulk of which are in Asia and Africa, are the proletarian nations of the world. Though individually they may be as weak and impoverished as is a single workman or peasant, together they are as formidable as a collective movement of the labouring masses.¹¹⁴

As the "undisputed champion of the oppressed peoples in the underdeveloped countries,"¹¹⁵ China had a powerful role to play in helping these "proletarian nations of the world" to advance economically. Although Bhutto saw the necessity of accepting foreign aid in the short

¹¹²Ibid., p. 158.

¹¹³Z.A. Bhutto, The Quest for Peace, op. cit., p. 53.

¹¹⁴Z.A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence, op. cit., p. 114.

¹¹⁵Ibid., p. 121.

run, he felt that "the ultimate aim of the Asian-African countries must be to build up self-reliance and to be free from restraints, direct and indirect, that arise from dependence upon others."¹¹⁶ He believed that Afro-Asian unity under the aegis of Communist China would lead to the permanent solution of Pakistan's economic problems in the future.

The first step towards improving relations with the Soviet Union was taken when Bhutto, as Minister of Fuel, Power and Natural Resources, visited the Soviet Union at the end of 1960 to conclude an Oil Agreement. Bhutto explained, "This was the first contact of major significance between the Soviet Union and Pakistan and it opened the way to contacts in other fields."¹¹⁷ Russian equipment and experts, together with a loan of \$30 million would be used in the enterprise. Werner Levi reports that negotiations for this agreement had begun even before the U-2 incident and resulted from the Pakistan Government's suspicion that the prospecting previously carried out by a Western group "had not been carried on with all possible vigor."¹¹⁸ Even at this early stage, Bhutto viewed the agreement with Russia as a definite shift away from complete dependence upon Western aid.

Although Bhutto was interested in expanding economic contacts with both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, he empha-

¹¹⁶Z.A. Bhutto, Quest for Peace, op. cit., p. 38.

¹¹⁷Z.A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence, op. cit., p. 126.

¹¹⁸"Pakistan, the Soviet Union and China," Pacific Affairs, XXXV, Fall, 1962, p. 218.

sized that this should be "without any cultural imposition or political domination by them."¹¹⁹ Bhutto added,

If we could fight and repel domination by the West, we can just as well resist domination by others and that we will do. The great Powers must realize that the era of overlordship and exploitation has come to an end, a complete, total and final end. We want, at long last, after centuries of subjugation, to order our destiny on a basis of equality and friendship with all the Powers of the world.¹²⁰

Bhutto issued this warning to both Communist countries but, in his other speeches and writings he distinguished sharply between them. The Soviet Union, as a revisionist state, was more likely to "exploit" Pakistan economically than was the People's Republic of China—the "champion" of the "oppressed peoples of the world."

In conclusion, Bhutto's foreign policy images can be briefly summarized. The international system was an important component of Bhutto's perceptions; he strongly emphasized the continuing presence of imperialism and imperialistic practices. It was Pakistan's security problem, however, which was the cornerstone of his image and this was related specifically to India. His perception of Indian aggression was the most important consideration in modifying the pattern of Pakistani alignments. Bhutto believed that Pakistan could not afford to depend on a single source of military support. This was in line with his ideological position that a new nation should have a "flexible and independent" foreign policy. He understood that the United States

¹¹⁹ Z.A. Bhutto, Quest for Peace, op. cit., p. 26.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

would penalize Pakistan economically for her new alignments but Bhutto thought this a small price to pay to enhance Pakistan's military security. In seeking closer ties with the Soviet Union, and particularly the People's Republic of China, Bhutto believed he had promoted a foreign policy in which three great powers would now serve as additional sources of military capability for Pakistan.

In the next chapter we shall assess the outcomes of the Pakistani leaders' policy choices in order to determine whether or not they were successful in achieving their objectives.

CHAPTER V

ELITE IMAGES AND FOREIGN POLICY OUTCOMES

In the two previous chapters we have examined the components of the foreign policy images of Mohammad Ayub Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in order to understand why Pakistan shifted alignments. We have also compared and contrasted the goals of the two leaders and their proposed means for attaining them. In short, we have so far limited ourselves to the policy-forming process. In this chapter we will explore Pakistan's alignment policy from another perspective by studying the outcomes of these policy choices. The major purpose of this chapter is to make an independent judgment as to what the opportunities and limitations were and how they affected the achievement of the Pakistani decision-makers' foreign policy goals.

This chapter is again organized around the four major variables—dominant bilateral, bilateral, military capability and economic capability. Four sub-operations will be performed within each of these four variables. Firstly, we will briefly examine the perceptions of leaders in the four countries which were involved in Pakistan's changing alignment patterns—the United States, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and India. We will be most interested in their statements on issues which Ayub and Bhutto deemed important. Secondly, we will consider other researcher's perceptions of these same leaders, again focusing on the issues which were relevant to Pakistan's alliance policy. Thirdly, we

will assess the congruence which may or may not have existed between the images of the Pakistani leaders and the "reality of" the situation. This will involve introducing my own interpretation and judgment as to which decision-maker was more accurate on which issue. With the completion of these three tasks, we can then proceed to the final and most important purpose of this chapter: to determine whether or not the Pakistani leaders' objectives in modifying Pakistan's alignment policies were achieved. Where the aims and/or means for achieving them differed between the two decision-makers, I will assess which leader's policies were more successful in the short run and which leader was more likely to achieve long-term success.

External: Dominant Bilateral

a. United States

The desire for independence and sovereignty are two objectives which are common to the new states of Asia. Pakistan was no exception. The two Pakistani decision-makers came to believe they had compromised their country's independence by taking refuge under the umbrella of the United States. Consequently, they endeavored to implement a more flexible alignment policy for Pakistan.

The evolution of Pakistan's alignments must be viewed against the background of the profound changes in the international situation. Bhutto's keener awareness of the international system was especially important in this regard. He realized that Pakistan's bilateral equation

with the United States was affected not only by other equations but by the nation-state system as a whole. Moreover, he understood that shifts in the global system during the 1962-65 period were related to Pakistan's alignments because all alliances were being re-examined in the light of changing circumstances. This would inevitably change the role of one of America's "most allied, allies" in the overall bloc structure.

The dynamics of the Cold War before 1962 made it difficult for any country formally allied to the United States to follow an independent line in foreign policy. However, as shifts in the international political scene occurred, the international system was no longer considered strictly bipolar. Bhutto's image of the global system reflected the actual change in the world balance of forces, together with changes in Pakistan's particular circumstances. He correctly recognized the lessening of conflict between the two super-powers and the greater caution in international affairs as a result of the Cuban missile crisis in the fall of 1962. He grasped the transitional character of the global system—the increasing diffusion of capabilities and the progressive fragmentation of the two blocs. In each bloc, China and France pursued increasingly independent foreign policies. These new characteristics of the international system enabled Pakistan to loosen the rigidity in her alignment policy and make it more flexible.

Bhutto had a more polarized vision of the world than did Ayub Khan. This was not in terms of bipolarity between the super-powers

but in the two-way struggle between the ex-colonial powers and the newly-independent states. It is a moot point whether or not Bhutto exaggerated his contention of the "modern lust for ideological and neo-colonial supremacy" of the great powers. Both decision-makers, however, stressed the wisdom of staying out of ideological global conflicts. Keith Callard has said,

A small nation is in a difficult position. It may take sides in the quarrels of the big powers and thus acquire a patron and an enemy. Or, it may attempt to play one side against the other with the attendant risk of being disliked by both.¹

Former Pakistani leaders had hoped that they could find allies who would look upon Pakistan's quarrels as their own. In this they were sorely disappointed. After 1962, the two Pakistani leaders were approaching the second of Callard's options but Ayub was trying very hard to avoid the "attendant risks."

As we have seen, many of the difficulties and disagreements between Pakistan and the United States centered around India. It is therefore necessary to look at American policies and aims towards India in greater detail.

The Pakistan-American alliance stemmed partly from a common exasperation with India in the mid 'fifties. American leaders seemed unable to adjust to the complicated idea of a third dimension which India wanted to project. After Kennedy became President the two Pakistani leaders levelled three main protests against the new President's policies.

¹K. Callard, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Interpretation, op. cit., p. 12.

First, they complained that India's policy of non-alignment had come to assume an aura of respectability in American eyes. Second, they charged that Kennedy ranked India, the "bastion of democracy in Asia," more highly than Pakistan. And third, they asserted that Kennedy regarded India as the major counterweight to China. These complaints merit further investigation because it was during the Kennedy Administration that the re-appraisal of Pakistan's alliance policy began.

Kennedy's biographers discuss the President's views on neutralism at some length. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. reports that, while Dulles saw neutralism as immoral, Kennedy was neither surprised nor appalled by the spread of non-alignment in the new nations.²

Oh, I think it's inevitable. . . . The desire to be independent and free carries with it the desire not to become engaged as a satellite of the Soviet Union or too closely allied to the United States. We have to live with that, and if neutrality is the result of concentration on internal problems, raising the standard of living of the people and so on, particularly in the underdeveloped countries, I would accept that. It's part of our own history for over a hundred years.³

Theodore C. Sorensen corroborates Schlesinger's reporting and reveals how Kennedy's beliefs were related to the U.S.-Pakistan-Indian triangle.

Allies such as Pakistan at times complained that he was equally friendly with neutrals such as India. But inasmuch as the purpose of our alliances was to preserve the independence and safety of nations he saw no reason to treat less favorably any nation in which that

²Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House, A Fawcett Crest Book, Fawcett Publications, Inc., Greenwich, Connecticut, 1965, p. 468.

³Ibid., pp. 468-9.

purpose was best served by a course of nonalignment. The Soviets had long wooed the neutrals assiduously and Kennedy had no desire to withdraw from the competition.⁴

A more critical evaluation of the new American policy towards neutral nations and its adverse effects on American allies is given by Henry Kissinger.

For a time we acted as if the only political significance of the new nations was as potential military allies in the cold war. The quest for neutrality was officially condemned. Great efforts were made to induce new nations to join security pacts. Within the space of a few years this policy has been replaced by its precise opposite. Instead of castigating neutrality we have been almost exalting it. Instead of seeking to create security pacts, we have conducted ourselves in a manner which may make our allies, at least outside the North America area doubt the wisdom of close association with the United States. The oversimplification which could see no political role for the new nations outside the cold war has been replaced by another oversimplification based on the premise that the real contest is for the allegiance of the uncommitted.⁵

Thus Ayub and Bhutto were indeed accurate when they noted that official American policy towards non-aligned India underwent a substantial change in the early 'sixties.

Did Kennedy accord democratic India higher priority than treaty-aligned Pakistan as Ayub and Bhutto had charged? This question is answered indirectly by Schlesinger. "Of all the neutral countries, Kennedy was most interested in India, which he had long regarded as 'the key area'

⁴Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy, Harper & Row, New York, 1965, p. 538.

⁵Henry Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice: Prospect of American Foreign Policy, Anchor Books, Doubleday & Co., New York, 1962, p. 341.

in Asia."⁶ In 1958, India's Second Five-Year Plan was in jeopardy. On March 25, of that year, the then Senator Kennedy and Senator John Sherman Cooper formed a bipartisan team to present India's case in the light of democratic development in Asia and its importance to the United States.⁷ "If the second plan collapses," warned Mr. Kennedy, "so may democratic India and the democratic hope in all of Asia, setting in motion forces which would erode the broad security interests of the United States and its allies. . . . No thoughtful citizen can fail to see our stake in the survival of free government in India."⁸ Senator Cooper followed with a speech which is worth quoting at length because it contains one of the clearest statements of the importance of India to the United States.

Why should the United States assist India? I do not derogate the necessity of continuing assistance and friendship for our old and true friend, the Philippines, or for Japan, Pakistan and other Asian friends. But the case for India is self-evident. It is the largest non-communist nation in Asia. It is the most powerful country in the south Asian, Middle East, and African region in terms of resources and present economic development. It is engaged in a great effort of political and economic development . . . by democratic means. . . . If India should fail, there is grave danger that the peoples of Asia and Africa would view it as a failure of democratic institutions and methods. If this happens, the balance of power and influence will actually fall against the United States and other free countries, and our danger would be intensified. . . . A strong, demo-

⁶A.M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, op. cit., p. 482.

⁷Norman D. Palmer, "India as a Factor in United States Foreign Policy," International Studies, VI, July 1964-April 1965, p. 65.

⁸Ibid.

cratic India is in accord with our national security, and is in harmony with our goal of sovereign, democratic nations.⁹

Norman Palmer attests to the fact that Cooper's speech was typical of many others made in 1958-59 by Senator Kennedy, Congressman Chester Bowles and many other members of the Congress especially interested in India.¹⁰ This evidence does not prove conclusively that Kennedy accorded India priority over Pakistan. However, in 1962, the extensive discussions in Washington on economic and military assistance to India did bring Pakistan's enemy to the forefront of official American consideration. Moreover, it cannot be denied that since the Sino-Indian border war, India and the United States have been cooperating more closely than ever before. Although the Pakistani leaders may have exaggerated their claims that the United States treated India preferentially, closer Indo-American cooperation was a reality which they could not afford to ignore.

The third criticism which Ayub and Bhutto directed at Kennedy concerned the American President's policy of strengthening India as a counterweight to China. On this point, Kennedy was unambiguous. The struggle between India and China "for the economic and political leadership of the East," he said in 1959, "would determine the Asian future."¹¹ He went on to say,

We want India to win that race with China. . . . If China succeeds and India fails, the economic development balance of power will shift against us.¹²

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 66.

¹¹Cited in A.M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, op. cit., p. 482.

¹²Ibid.

This line of reasoning prompted Kennedy to increase the supply of economic and military aid to India. On this issue both Pakistani leaders evaluated Kennedy's motivations correctly.

The evidence presented above suggests that the points of discord between Pakistan and the United States cannot be attributed solely to Pakistani misperceptions of their American ally. Indeed, Kennedy's statements on three contentious issues reveal that Ayub and Bhutto were quite accurate. I would submit that an additional factor must be considered, viz., the goals of the Pakistani and American leaders were at such variance that they could not be resolved simply by increased understanding of the other's position.

The United States was faced with a very difficult policy dilemma. She was seeking to establish friendship with both Pakistan and India, who were themselves divided over Kashmir. This situation was made even more impossible in that both countries viewed the American friendship in terms of their mutual rivalry. Both India and Pakistan were dissatisfied with the American position in the Kashmir dispute.

On the whole, the official and unofficial American views on Kashmir have been more sympathetic to the Pakistani side as evidenced by U.S. support of the United Nations resolutions. "But aside from supporting the U.N. resolutions of August 1948, and January 1959, which call for extensive demilitarization in Kashmir and the determination of Kashmir's future by reference to the people of that state, the United States

has not supported any specific solution of the Kashmir question."¹³ On the other hand, the Pakistani decision-makers, and Ayub in particular, seemed to have had an exaggerated idea of the capacity of the United States to exert pressure on India. An editorial in the New York Times on December 26, 1962, summed up the posture the United States had assumed in the dispute.

It is impossible to demand any quid pro quo of a Kashmir settlement as a condition for further aid to India. We can merely stay out of direct negotiations, while pointing out to both parties that it is in their mutual interest to settle the vicious Kashmir argument.

The United States also had to choose between conflicting priorities. In the confrontation between non-aligned India and treaty-aligned Pakistan, Washington had to weigh Pakistan's requests against a variety of other pressures and probabilities. These included American assessments of future Russian and Chinese actions.

So far we have noted that the changes in the international system during the 1962-65 period were conducive to a more flexible alignment policy for Pakistan. In addition we have observed that Ayub's and Bhutto's perceptions of the United States were fairly accurate on three issues which they themselves emphasized. Although both Pakistani leaders regarded the Kennedy Administration with some misgivings, they differed markedly in their proposals for Pakistan's counterresponse. Given the

¹³ N. Palmer, South Asia and United States Policy, op. cit., p. 26.

fact that both leaders wanted a more flexible alignment policy to strengthen Pakistan's position relative to that of India, which of these two leaders was more likely to achieve this aim?

Bhutto injected a new dynamism into Pakistan's foreign policy. His ideological proclivities made him react violently against Pakistan's "servile" dependence on the United States. He believed that if he could succeed in building bridges to the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, Pakistan's dependence on the United States would be reduced. In practical terms, the question then became, could Bhutto's policy sustain these new links without resulting in the counterproductive outcome of destroying American support which had been given to Pakistan in the past?

During the early part of the period this question could have been answered in the affirmative. In the short run, Bhutto's policies could be termed successful; by cultivating cordial relations with Communist China, Pakistan's importance had been increased in the eyes of both the United States and the Soviet Union in the sense that neither of them wanted Pakistan to be drawn closer towards Communist China. As early as 1962, this eventuality was already being considered by American policy-makers.¹⁴ On the other hand, Pakistan also had to pursue its relations with Communist China with considerable adroitness and skill

¹⁴ Sorensen reports that during the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, Kennedy dispatched a high-level survey team to India to report precisely how American aid could be most useful "without driving Pakistan into Red China's arms." Kennedy, op. cit., p. 663. (Emphasis added.)

so that the U.S. would not be provoked into suspending its military and economic aid to Pakistan.

In 1965, during the Indo-Pakistani War, Bhutto's emotionalism and virulent attitude towards the United States became inimical to the achievement of his own aims. It was then that his policies began to founder and had they been allowed to continue, Pakistan's position might have been undermined considerably. Aside from military considerations which will be discussed below, Pakistan could not afford to sacrifice American diplomatic support on the Kashmir issue—however reserved and ineffectual it was believed to be. If Bhutto had irritated the American leaders to the point where they abandoned their pro-Pakistan position in the United Nations, Pakistan's case for a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute most assuredly would have been weakened. The People's Republic of China could offer Pakistan no aid whatsoever in this particular diplomatic contest.

Bhutto supported a non-aggression pact between Pakistan and China whereas Ayub was adamantly opposed to such a course of action. Again Pakistan's flexibility might have been forfeited if Bhutto had had his way. At a press conference President Kennedy conceded that American military supplies to India weakened Pakistan's position in the South Asian balance of power.¹⁵ He realized that Pakistan would protest this policy but he claimed to be acutely aware of Pakistan's grievances. Nevertheless, Kennedy warned that his attitude would be much different

¹⁵New York Times, September 13, 1963.

if Pakistan were to have a formal alliance with China as this "would change completely . . . the SEATO relationship and all the rest."¹⁶ On several issues then, Bhutto was prepared to overextend the bounds which were acceptable to the United States.

I would conclude that it was Ayub Khan who had a more realistic appreciation of the limitations imposed upon Pakistan's flexibility in foreign affairs. Ayub was predisposed to regard the United States in a more favorable light than was Bhutto; he was also more realistic in determining how far Pakistan could go in forging closer ties with Russia and China without antagonizing the United States. Despite stresses and strains in the Pakistan-American alliance which accompanied the first tentative efforts to modify Pakistan's foreign policy, Ayub took great care not to jeopardize any future American aid and support that might be forthcoming. Moreover his greater understanding of and deference to American sensibilities have proved to be beneficial to Pakistan's long-term success.

Pakistan's friendly relations with the United States were revived soon after Bhutto's resignation and American leaders came to accept Pakistan's "New Look" in her foreign policy. Dawn reported on January 1, 1966, that the United States "has recognized what President Ayub called Pakistan's geopolitical compulsions that made it absolutely imperative that Pakistan maintain normal relations with Russia and China." American economic assistance, halted during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan

¹⁶ Ibid.

conflict, has been resumed.¹⁷ Chief of the Agency for International Development, David E. Bell, told the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in April 1965,

Now, the judgment that has been made continuously, and is still our judgment, is that despite the flirtation between the Pakistanis and the Communist Chinese, it remains true that the Pakistan Government is a strong Government and a strongly anti-Communist Government. . . .¹⁸

In brief, although Ayub was prepared to give Bhutto a certain amount of freedom to forge a more independent foreign policy for Pakistan, he exercised a pragmatic control over his Foreign Minister's policies. Although the impetus for flexibility came from Bhutto, it was Ayub who was able to sustain the links to Communist countries, while at the same time, retaining Pakistan's status as an ally of the United States. In my view, Ayub's policies were more successful in achieving a truly flexible alliance policy for Pakistan.

b. Soviet Union

Ayub's and Bhutto's perceptions of Soviet-Pakistan relations before 1962 were completely congruent with reality. The Soviet Union most certainly reacted unfavorably to Pakistan's membership in SEATO and CENTO. Referring to the foreign policy of the Pakistan Government, Khrushchev remarked,

¹⁷A. Syed, "China and the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965," op. cit., p. 379.

¹⁸Cited by M.S. Venkataramani and Harish Chandra Arya, "America's Military Alliance with Pakistan: The Evolution and Course of an Uneasy Partnership," International Studies, VIII, July 1966-April 1967, p. 119.

If Pakistan were to adopt the same independent attitude as for example, India, conditions would be provided for the establishment of friendly relations between Pakistan and neighbouring countries.¹⁹

The Soviet Union complained bitterly of Pakistan's participation in Western alliances; accused Karachi of allowing the United States to construct air bases and missile installations on its territory; and claimed that Pakistan had asked for atomic and rocket weapons at a CENTO meeting.²⁰ Russia particularly attacked the bilateral American-Pakistani accord of 1959, arguing that such links drew Pakistan into the military ventures of third powers and infringed on Moscow's security.²¹ But most important of all, from the Pakistani perspective, was the Soviet position on Kashmir. Analysts who have studied Soviet writings on Kashmir from 1947 to 1958 have summarized these articles as follows:

... the Kashmir Question was decided at first de facto and subsequently de jure by the Kashmiris themselves; and that the Kashmir Problem was the artificial creation of initially the British and afterwards the Americans who wanted the whole north-west frontier area to be under one military command, and made use of the Pakistanis in trying to achieve that result. In this sense the Pakistanis are no more than the immediate culprits.²²

¹⁹Cited by Aslam Siddiqi, Pakistan Seeks Security, Longmans, Green and Co., Pakistan Branch, 1960, pp. 31-32.

²⁰"Pakistan's Military Alliances," Central Asian Review, X, 1962, pp. 90-94. L. Vasil'yev, "What Does Participation in Blocs Bring to Pakistan?" From the Soviet Magazine Aziya I Afrika Segodnya, No. 9, 1961.

²¹Ibid.

²²"Azad Kashmir: 1947-58," Central Asian Review, XI, 1963, p. 89. Translated from an article by Yu. V. Gankovskiy in Kratkiye Soobshcheniya Instituta Narodov Azii, no. 51, 1962.

On August 14, 1962, Bakinskiy Rabochiy carried a long article by S. Borisov, alleging that after the granting of independence to India and Pakistan fifteen years ago, Pakistan remained a dependent state, with the difference only in having "changed masters." "The Borderlands in the Soviet Press," Central Asian Review, X, 1962, p. 417.

Thus the Soviet Union held the United States and Pakistan jointly responsible for the turmoil in Kashmir.

The Soviet leadership under Khrushchev came to recognize the pressing need for securing a firm foothold in South Asia. Aside from asserting Soviet influence in Asia, Russia had other objectives. These included countering American actions in the sub-continent and later on, those of the People's Republic of China as well. In close to a decade, this policy resulted in the extension of more than a billion dollars of credit and aid for India's economic development and about three-hundred million dollars worth of credit and aid for India's defence requirements.²³

Bhutto and Ayub realistically saw the implications of the Sino-Soviet schism for Southern Asia. Until Sino-Soviet differences broke out in the open, India could rely on Russia to restrain China partially. The break with China ended any restraining influence Russia might have had on Peking. Then too, Pakistan's friendship with China made it impossible for the Soviet Union to leave Pakistan outside the scope of her plans; Pakistan now had to be detached from China. In this way, the Sino-Soviet conflict served to make the Kremlin more sensitive to Pakistan's problems.²⁴

²³ R. Vaidyanath, "Some Recent Trends in Soviet Policies Towards India and Pakistan," International Studies, VII, July 1965-April 1966, p. 430.

²⁴ Other analysts have arrived at similar conclusions. For example, K. Sayeed remarked "... it seems that as Pakistan became increasingly alienated from the United States during 1962-65 and cordial towards the Chinese, the Russians started adopting a neutral attitude towards the Indo-Pakistan conflict." The Political System of Pakistan, op. cit., p. 281. See also H.R. Vohra, "A Kashmir Settlement May Now be Possible," The New Republic, CL, January 4-June 27, 1964, pp. 11-12.

During the 1965 Indo-Pakistani flare-up, the Soviet Union exhibited great concern for the sub-continent. Russia re-affirmed her interest in Asia and further undermined the Chinese contention that she "is not an Asian power."²⁵ As the war continued and the possibility of escalation seemed imminent, Russia sought to focus attention on this new danger and condemned the acts of

... certain forces seeking to profit by the worsened Indian-Pakistani relations and trying to push the two countries toward the further aggravation of the military conflict ... by their incendiary statements.²⁶

One analyst advanced the theory that the Soviet leaders believed that a massive Chinese invasion would force India to seek American military aid.

... any large-scale American commitment to India was bound to affect Soviet interests in South Asia adversely, and, at the same time, sap the strength of Indo-Soviet ties. These dangerous implications of the situation re-inforced the Soviet Union's determination to secure an immediate termination of the Indo-Pakistani conflict.²⁷

There was also evidence of increased Soviet behind-the-scene efforts in the United Nations after China threatened to become actively involved in the conflict.²⁸

²⁵A Correspondent, "The U.S.S.R. as Peacemaker: Tashkent and After," The World Today, XXII, February 1966, p. 47.

²⁶Pravda, September 14, 1965. Cited by R. Vaidyanath, op. cit., p. 440.

²⁷R. Vaidyanath, op. cit., p. 442.

²⁸See Philip Ben, "China's Presence at the U.N.," New Republic, CLIII, October 2, 1965, p. 9.

According to Drew Middleton, Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, told Dean Rusk in New York that his government regarded India as its "chief ally" in Asia, especially in the context of containing China. The Soviet Union, he said, supported India against Pakistan in the Kashmir dispute, but wanted to see the Indo-Pakistan conflict ended because it invited Chinese pressures on India. "News of the Week in Review," New York Times, September 12, 1965.

There was general agreement among observers that the Tashkent Declaration constituted a diplomatic victory for Russia.²⁹ Some even felt that the U.S.S.R. was now "under a moral obligation not to veto the Kashmir issue if it was again raised in the United Nations."³⁰ I would argue, however, that although Russia opposed a military solution in Kashmir, and did depart from its traditional pro-Indian stand, India remained the more important of the two sub-continental nations. Moreover, it is likely that Moscow felt unable to extend very much support to Pakistan as this might imperil long-standing Indo-Soviet ties.

Ayub Khan fully endorsed Bhutto's plan to improve Soviet-Pakistan relations. Furthermore, the two Pakistani leaders were able to achieve some measure of success in convincing the Russian leaders that Pakistan was no longer a Cold War satellite of the United States. The Soviet leaders responded by no longer giving exclusive attention to India and they began to take Pakistani susceptibilities into account.

Since 1965, Soviet pronouncements on Pakistan have undergone a significant change. This change in Russian policies was summed up by the Russian press in 1966.

²⁹Two examples are: R. Vaidyanath, op. cit., p. 443, and "The U.S.S.R. as peacemaker: Tashkent and After," op. cit., p. 47.

³⁰"Pakistan: Dissatisfaction with Tashkent," Round Table, op. cit., p. 309.

Striving for a further development of relations with Pakistan, the Soviet Union considers that good neighbourliness between our states does not contradict our friendship with any other third state. The strengthening of ties between the U.S.S.R. and Pakistan should be viewed as a part of a general policy which is directed for securing peace in Asia and the whole world. We would like that Soviet-Pakistan relations, like our traditional friendship with India, become a stabilizing factor for the situation in Asia and facilitate the normalization of relations between India and Pakistan.³¹

If viewed against the background of previous Soviet utterances on Pakistan, Ayub's assertion that his 1965 visit to Russia was a turning point in their relations is substantiated. It is doubtful, however, that the President's "sincerity" was the causal factor.

Following Ayub's Moscow visit there was a subtle modification of the Soviet approach to the Kashmir problem.

Soviet pronouncements on Kashmir, for one thing, have become rarer and less frequent and for another, even when they are made, concern themselves more with 'exposing' the maneuvers and manipulations of the Western Powers than with making clear the Soviet attitude. . . . Not only has there been an indication that Soviet news organs are no longer prepared to indulge in the categorical denunciation of Pakistan's stand on Kashmir as before, but also that they have assumed an attitude almost bordering on timidity.³²

This serves to justify Ayub's belief that he had succeeded, to a certain extent, in effecting a breach in the solid wall of Indo-Soviet friendship.³³

³¹Pravda, August 24, 1965. Cited by R. Vaidyanath, op. cit., p. 434.

³²R. Vaidyanath, op. cit., p. 435.

³³A further confirmation of Ayub's success in changing the pattern of Soviet-Pakistani relations was given by Kosygin himself. In a speech to the Supreme Soviet on August 3, 1966, Kosygin remarked, "... the improvement of our relations with Pakistan evokes a feeling of satisfaction. For its part, the Soviet Union intends to take further steps to expand Soviet-Pakistani contacts." "Soviet Foreign Policy Reviewed," Survival, VIII, June 1966, p. 322.

It would be a serious mistake, however, to believe that there has been any basic change in Russia's posture. A close observer of the Soviet-Indian-Pakistani triangle has written, "... in all its dealings the Soviet Union has so far not encouraged Pakistan to believe either that the Soviet policies towards India can be reversed or that Pakistan itself can become the focal point of Soviet attention in the subcontinent."³⁴ Ayub, possibly as a result of Bhutto's persuasion, showed a greater interest in establishing some contacts with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, no marked pro-Soviet shift in Pakistan's policies was demonstrated. Ayub Khan probably calculated that Russia was not prepared to give Pakistan the kind of support he deemed necessary to make a complete break with the United States worthwhile. From the available evidence, Ayub's assessment would seem to be correct.

External: Bilateral

a. People's Republic of China

Although Pakistan's relations with China have undergone the vicissitudes common to most countries in the international arena, there has not been the deep and abiding hostility that might have been expected between two countries with such differing ideologies and global commitments.

In the Sino-Pakistan border agreement, Ayub's and Bhutto's aims were clearly stated to be the prevention of a dispute similar to that which

³⁴R. Vaidyanath, op. cit., p. 443.

led to the border clash between China and India. In an interview with the Associated Press of Pakistan on April 10, 1963, Premier Chou En-lai gave an interesting explanation for China's generosity in settling border issues with Burma, Nepal, Mongolia, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The reason is simple. Since the boundary questions left over by history are settled through friendly negotiations, and since China is bigger than these neighbouring countries and the border areas are mostly sparsely populated, China always made more concessions than the opposite party in the process of mutual accommodation in order to seek a settlement of the question.³⁵

China also categorically rejected the Indian Government's "unreasonable" objections to the Sino-Pakistan negotiations for a provisional boundary agreement. In a note to the Indian Embassy, China asserted that the boundary had never been formally demarcated and it was therefore "entirely necessary, proper and legitimate and in accordance with international practice" that the two governments work towards an agreement.³⁶ Thus the Chinese fully supported Pakistan against Indian protestations in Pakistan's first tentative move towards her Chinese neighbor.

It is difficult to accept Ayub's and Bhutto's assertions that the Indian arms build-up was designed entirely to attack Pakistan. However, one can sympathize with their former qualms about Indian-Chinese friendship and the detrimental effects it had on Pakistan. The Sino-Indian War eased that anxiety and the breach between Pakistan's two neighbors was

³⁵Dawn, Karachi, April 11, 1963.

³⁶"China Rejects India's Protest," Peking Review, V, June 8, 1962, p. 12.

further widened after Chou En-lai's visit to Pakistan in 1964. China, for the first time, gave unequivocal and forthright support to resolve the Kashmir issue "in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir, as pledged to them by India and Pakistan."³⁷ As one analyst has remarked, "China's new stand on Kashmir is the more remarkable because it will be cited against China by those who advocate a plebiscite solution of the Taiwan issue."³⁸ In this manner, both China and Pakistan came out strongly in support of the other in major foreign policy objectives; Pakistan opposed the scheme for creating two Chinas and the Chinese supported the Pakistani demand for a plebiscite in Kashmir. In China, Pakistan had at long last found a friend who would side with her in her disputes with India. This provided a strong bond between the two countries that should not be underestimated.

Bhutto and Ayub were citing history correctly when they mentioned that Islam spread to the sub-continent of India and China at about the same time. This brought the two territories close to each other in cultural and other spheres and considerably increased the commercial relations which already existed between them.³⁹ The Chinese province

³⁷"China-Pakistan Joint Communiqué," full text of the Communiqué issued in Rawalpindi on February 23, 1964. Peking Review, VIII, February 28, 1964, pp. 8-9.

³⁸S.M. Burke, "Sino-Pakistan Relations," Orbis, VIII, Summer 1964, p. 399.

³⁹Nasim Ahmed, "China's Himalayan Frontiers: Pakistan's Attitude," International Affairs, XXXVIII, October 1962, p. 483.

of Sinkiang and the contiguous territories in Pakistan had many centuries-old links but Bhutto and Ayub neglected to mention that these were severed after the rise of Communism in China. Although cultural Islamic ties may still remain, the atheistic teachings of Communist ideology are in sharp contrast to the strong theistic leanings of Pakistani Muslims. It is interesting to recall that Indian leaders referred to this same lack of historical enmity with China prior to the Sino-Indian War.⁴⁰

There is considerable difficulty in attempting to assess the congruence of images with reality when the whole complex question of Chinese intentions is raised. Chinese motivations remain in the realm of speculation, but then speculation is an essential part of political analysis. It would seem safe to assume that China's friendship with Pakistan would continue only as long as it is in China's interest to do so, but this was also realistically understood by the Pakistani elite. There is a great deal of mystery which surrounds the People's Republic of China; it is not even clear whether Peking regards Washington or Moscow as the principal enemy. However, it may be affirmed that Sino-American relations have become a key factor in China's relations with other countries and this would certainly be true of Pakistan.

Peking seemed gratified when Pakistan reduced her participation in the various treaty organizations with the West and adopted a more independent stance in foreign affairs. The fact that Ayub, and especially Bhutto, did not support the American war effort in Vietnam was also a

⁴⁰Michael Brecher, Nehru: A Political Biography, Oxford University Press, London, 1959, pp. 589-90.

diplomatic success for Communist China. Despite this, the Chinese have not given evidence of exerting undue pressure on Pakistan to abandon her Western allies completely. China's leaders did not even seem overly anxious to force Pakistan into signing a non-aggression pact. During Chou En-lai's visit to Pakistan in 1964, he affirmed that the question of a formal treaty between China and Pakistan did not figure on the agenda of the talks.⁴¹ He said that relations between Pakistan and China were so cordial that he did not feel it necessary to sign a treaty of co-existence between the two countries. He had received the assurance that SEATO and CENTO were defensive treaties and "we believe what the Pakistan Government says."⁴²

As we have seen, the Pakistan-India-China triangle was intricately bound up with American and Soviet policies towards these three countries. During the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War the Chinese not only condemned the United States but also placed an uncharitable interpretation on Soviet efforts to resolve the conflict. They pointed out that as far back as 1955, Khrushchev had declared Kashmir to be an integral part of India.⁴³ Peking advanced the view that both the United States and the Soviet Union were more favorably disposed toward India than toward Pakistan.⁴⁴ In addition the Chinese warned that Pakistan should not

⁴¹Dawn, Karachi, February 26 and 27, 1964.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³"Who Backs the Indian Aggressors?", People's Daily editorial on September 18, 1965, in Peking Review, VIII, September 24, 1965, pp. 13-16.

⁴⁴Ibid.

expect justice from the United Nations which had had a "bad reputation" in the matter of Kashmir. For eighteen years it had permitted India to act "lawlessly" without "lifting a finger" to restrain her.⁴⁵ It appeared that the Chinese leaders were anxious to present themselves as the only real champions of the Pakistani cause.

In the two previous chapters we noted that Bhutto was far more committed to expanding Sino-Pakistani contacts than was Ayub Khan. During the 1965 war, Ayub vehemently denied any suggestion of Sino-Pakistan "collusion," whereas Bhutto expressed his gratitude profusely for Chinese support. What did Ayub hope to gain by his caution towards China and what benefits accrued to Pakistan as a consequence of his policy?

Bhutto seemed to view increased Sino-Pakistani cooperation as an end in itself but this was certainly not the case with Ayub Khan. He was not predisposed to view the People's Republic of China with the same ideological admiration as did his Foreign Minister. I would suggest that Ayub came to understand the advantages India had derived from her policy of non-alignment—advantages which had previously been denied to Pakistan. During the 1950's India's friendship with the three great powers of the world had brought her considerable benefits and Ayub probably believed that Pakistan could benefit in the same way. Consequently, Ayub's aim

⁴⁵"Chinese Government Statement," Peking Review, September 10, 1965, pp. 6-7.

was to maintain a balance of cordiality with the three major powers—the United States, the U.S.S.R. and China.

During the 1965 war Bhutto came to believe that China's primary aim was to assist Pakistan in her hour of need. Ayub, on the other hand, realized that there was more to Chinese support than simple altruism and he seemed almost annoyed and embarrassed by China's over-reaction. Ayub probably believed that the charges of Sino-Pakistani "collusion" would damage what remained of Pakistan's good relations with the United States. In addition, Ayub may have feared that China was curbing his own freedom of action by unilaterally threatening to escalate the conflict.

There can be no doubt that Chinese threats had a significant impact on the political-diplomatic course of the war. If the United States and the Soviet Union had desired to side with India more openly, they were prevented from doing so by China's threats. This view has been expressed by Anwar Syed.

Had they [the Soviet Union and the United States] been unencumbered by the Chinese factor, they would have felt free not only to aid India but also to put a great deal more pressure on Pakistan than they were actually able to do. In that event, Pakistan would have lost face, and beyond that, she might have had to settle, in territorial terms, for something less than the status quo ante bellum. As it turned out, the two great powers, loath to see Pakistan drift closer to China, found themselves inhibited.⁴⁶

I would conclude that Ayub's policy during the 1965 war was more "successful" in terms of his desire to maintain cordiality with all

⁴⁶ A. Syed, "China and the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965," op. cit., pp. 872-3.

three great powers. Although Bhutto had often stated that he did not want to rupture Pakistan-American links, his behavior during the 1965 conflict was not conducive to that end. Because Bhutto was pre-occupied with resisting "neo-imperialist domination," he was deeply impressed by China's ability to confront both super-powers during the war. Ayub was inclined to address himself to more practical problems. Unlike his Foreign Minister, Ayub's actions demonstrated that he did not want to be pushed into the arms of Red China. The Chinese leaders could not have regarded with favor either Ayub's request for the United States to play a more vigorous role in the sub-continent or his acceptance of Soviet good offices at Tashkent. Nevertheless, Chinese diplomatic support to Pakistan continued unabated. By striving to preserve Pakistan's relations with all three great powers, Ayub was able to implement his general foreign policy objectives—even during a time of crisis.

b. India

The relations between Pakistan and India are incredibly complex and it is beyond the scope of this thesis to delineate specifically the many points of discord that exist between the two countries. Nevertheless, it is important to understand the atmosphere of profound mutual mistrust which prevails. For brevity, this section will be limited to four topics which Ayub and Bhutto considered crucial. These are: the Kashmir quarrel; Indian attitudes towards Pakistan and Kashmir; Indo-American relations; and finally, the prospects for Indo-Pakistani co-operation.

The Kashmir dispute was studied extensively by Michael Brecher in 1953; his concluding remarks continue to be relevant to the period under examination.⁴⁷ Firstly, all by-products of partition interact with one another and the hostile atmosphere renders the solution of any one dispute, as well as general rapprochement, more difficult. Secondly, the Kashmir problem seems to have been most significant in the pattern of discord between Pakistan and India. Thirdly, the deadlock over Kashmir has inhibited economic progress in Pakistan and severely hindered economic development in India by diverting an enormous share of their annual budgets into unproductive defence preparations. In order for the malaise to be cured, the vicious circle of Indo-Pakistan disputes must be broken and the key may be Kashmir.

The two Pakistani decision-makers insisted that the solution of the Kashmir question was a matter of life and death for Pakistan. As one close observer of Indo-Pakistani relations has noted,

The fundamental problems of Indo-Pakistani relations arise out of a set of conflicts—a conflict over status, a conflict of images, and finally, a conflict generated by the problem of identity of the two new states as two new nations.⁴⁸

The basic problem was the original suspicions Pakistan and India had of each other and this was reinforced by opposing world views.

Indo-Pakistan relations have made a profound impact on the attitudes and actions of Indian policy-makers. "From the upheaval

⁴⁷The following observations are taken almost verbatim from the concluding section of The Struggle for Kashmir, op. cit., p. 191.

⁴⁸Sisir Gupta, "Indo-Pakistan Relations," International Studies, V, July-October 1963, p. 175.

which accompanied the Partition to the present day, Delhi's principal focus of attention in foreign affairs has been the wide range of unresolved disputes with its predominantly Muslim neighbour."⁴⁹ The Indian leaders' intransigence on the Kashmir issue can be attributed to their conviction that India's future as a secular nation is at stake. The forty-million Muslims which inhabit India are especially important in this regard.

The secession of Kashmir and its inclusion in Pakistan would, in the opinion of Nehru and others, lead to grave consequences for the internal stability of India. Among these would be a strengthening of Hindu communal forces, increasing distrust of the Muslim minority, a challenge to the secular foundations of the Indian Constitution, and a clamour for war with Pakistan.⁵⁰

Krishna Menon, Nehru's closest adviser in foreign affairs, refused to admit that Kashmir was "disputed" territory. "We do not accept that. Part of Kashmir is illegally occupied. That is the fact."⁵¹ When asked if he thought it possible to continue the relationship between India and Pakistan indefinitely on the basis of the status quo in Kashmir, Menon replied,

There is no other way except war. No settlement that would surrender Indian territory to Pakistan is constitutionally acceptable in India.⁵²

In short, Kashmir symbolizes the root of the conflict between India and Pakistan and neither country is prepared to make any concessions to

⁴⁹M. Brecher, Nehru: A Political Biography, op. cit., p. 563.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 577.

⁵¹Michael Brecher, India and World Politics: Krishna Menon's View of the World, Oxford University Press, London, 1968, p. 206.

⁵²Ibid., p. 205.

the other.

An additional area of concern to Pakistan's leaders was India's rapprochement with the United States. India became important to American foreign policy goals not only because of her size and population but also because of her special position in Africa and Asia. As Norman Palmer noted, "India was playing a role in world affairs which was out of keeping with her present power but not with her potential significance."⁵³ Although India defiantly resisted any pressures to join the Western Pacts, two significant events compelled her to adopt a more moderate stance toward the United States. The first has already been discussed at length: the great Himalayan crisis of 1962.⁵⁴ The second was India's growing economic crisis, reflected in food shortages, inadequate foreign exchange, and difficulty in reaching planned rates of growth. "Only substantial Western help, in the hundreds of millions of dollars, enables New Delhi to avert famine, panic, and sky-rocketing food prices."⁵⁵ Meanwhile India had suffered reverses including the loss of prestige following the Chinese border victory in 1962. This defeat, the enmity of Peking, and dependence on both Moscow and Washington for protection caused India's influence to decline, as the Pakistani leaders were quick to grasp. In an important article in Foreign Affairs, Prime Minister Nehru wrote

⁵³N. Palmer, South Asia and United States Policy, op. cit., p. 161.

⁵⁴One result of this débacle was the resignation of Krishna Menon from his post as Defence Minister. His virulent anti-American attitude had long been resented by top policy-makers in the United States.

⁵⁵F. Greene, U.S. Policy and the Security of Asia, op. cit., pp. 132-3.

in 1963,

Indo-American relations have seldom been as close and cordial as they are now. The deep sympathy and practical support received from the United States in meeting the Chinese aggression has created a wealth of good feeling and apart from that, there is much in common between us on essentials. President Kennedy's vision of a world of free and independent nations, freely co-operating so as to bring about a world-wide system of interdependence, is entirely in accord with our own ideas.⁵⁶

Thus, the basic commonality of interests which Bhutto and Ayub perceived between India and the United States, was also perceived by the Indian Prime Minister.

What are the prospects for improved Indo-Pakistani relations? Some interested observers felt that in the immediate aftermath of the Chinese attack, India and Pakistan missed an historic opportunity to place their mutual relations on a new and more cooperative basis. Norman Palmer asked what would have happened if Pakistan had shown sympathy and had given support to India after late October 1962, and had voluntarily agreed not to create additional complications for its harassed neighbor (as President Kennedy had requested)?⁵⁷ Conversely, what would have been the result if India had made some generous gestures in Pakistan's direction, perhaps even including some real concessions on Kashmir? Palmer sadly concluded,

Both countries, for reasons which they must have regarded as compelling, followed a wholly different

⁵⁶Jawaharlal Nehru, "Changing India," Foreign Affairs, XLI, April 1963, p. 465.

⁵⁷N. Palmer, South Asia and United States Policy, op. cit., p. 217.

path, and as a result, in spite—or perhaps partly because—of the talks on Kashmir, Indo-Pakistan relations reached new lows of bitterness and vituperation and mistrust.⁵⁸

Far from improved relations, an uneasy cease-fire now exists between the two countries as a result of renewed hostilities in 1965. The Tashkent Declaration was hardly an achievement, for as Ayub and Bhutto pointed out, it did not go to the root cause of the conflict. The Indian leaders hoped that Kashmir would not be the subject of negotiations because they would be forced to deal with a problem which they asserted did not exist. There is no doubt that Kashmir as an unsettled issue has influenced Pakistan's foreign policy and has increased Pakistani hatred of India. Both countries have evolved an image of the other which extends beyond the Kashmir dispute. The crucial question for both countries would seem to be: Will the basic antagonism which now exists disappear if and when the Kashmir issue is resolved or will the images themselves remain to complicate Indo-Pakistani relations in other spheres?

In assessing the relative success of Ayub's and Bhutto's policies towards India, it may be affirmed that neither was able to achieve his immediate goal. The major portion of Kashmir remains in India's possession and the Pakistani's have been unable to gain this territory either by force or by diplomatic maneuvering. Moreover, the Pakistani leaders were dissatisfied with the outcome of the 1965 war and the Kash-

⁵⁸Ibid.

mir dispute remains as intractable as ever. An observation made over a decade ago remains true today.

What makes the picture of Indo-Pakistani relations especially distressing is that few people in either country deny that the effects have been unfortunate for both, with no apparent compensation, yet all seem incapable of finding a way out of the impasse.⁵⁹

Another aspect of the Kashmir dispute which must be considered is the impact of this central dispute on alignment partners. It has been argued that Pakistani decision-makers have undermined the flexibility of Pakistan's foreign policy by making Kashmir the criterion by which friendship and animosity were judged in foreign affairs.⁶⁰ Bhutto was prone to respond over-enthusiastically to diplomatic support from China on the Kashmir issue without examining the practical assistance which China could render. Although Ayub Khan saw the limitations of Chinese support more clearly than did his Foreign Minister, he too judged his alignment partners by the degree of their support on the Kashmir issue.

Although the Kashmir issue is of paramount significance to Pakistan, it does not have the same importance to the United States, Russia or China. Pakistan's precarious position in seeking allies which are willing to endorse her stand on Kashmir has been explained by Werner Levi.

⁵⁹ M. Brecher, Nehru: A Political Biography, *op. cit.*, p. 577.

⁶⁰ by A. Hussain, Pakistan: Its Ideology and Foreign Policy, *op. cit.*, pp. 80, 108, and 160. Also by Werner Levi, "Pakistan, the Soviet Union and China," Pacific Affairs, XXXV, Fall 1962, p. 222.

At best they see Kashmir in the context of broader (and fundamentally for the world, more important) problems, so that their attitudes on Kashmir are often determined by wider and perhaps ulterior considerations. For this reason their support (or lack of it) of Pakistan's position is apt to change as the conditions in world affairs change, with corresponding elation or frustration in Pakistan. The alternations in the degree of friendliness of Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union, China and also the United States reflect this single-minded approach to foreign affairs.⁶¹

A similar argument has been made by Arif Hussain. He contends that "... a foreign policy cannot be flexible which judges its success solely by one issue—in this instance Kashmir."⁶²

No matter how correct these assessments may be, our purpose is to evaluate the Pakistani leaders' success in terms of the criteria which they themselves set. Their twin objectives in formulating a more flexible foreign policy for Pakistan were: a) to gain diplomatic and military assistance against an "aggressive" India and b) to integrate Kashmir into Pakistan.⁶³ Therefore, we would be guilty of confusing means with ends if we were to say that Pakistan's maneuverability was undermined by Ayub's and Bhutto's "ideological obsession" with Kashmir.

Although Pakistan gained some advantages from her new alignment policy (e.g., limited Chinese support for her position on Kashmir) and

⁶¹W. Levi, "Pakistan, the Soviet Union and China," op. cit., p. 222.

⁶²A. Hussain, Pakistan: Its Ideology and Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 108.

⁶³Only the second objective has been treated here; the first will be discussed under the rubric of Military Capability.

lost some assistance which she had hitherto taken for granted (e.g., American military aid), I would argue that Pakistan's shifting alignments will not bring about the integration of Kashmir into Pakistan. The Kashmir question is a most complex one and the positions taken by India and Pakistan involve basic considerations of national policy. It is not the kind of question that can be resolved quickly, under pressure from external threats or from outside powers unless one side or the other abandons its basic position. This last eventuality seems extremely unlikely.

As mentioned previously, Bhutto had a more rigid and antagonistic attitude towards India than did his President. Ayub Khan (for internal political reasons) was not prepared to make any concessions to India on the vital issue of Kashmir, but he did attempt to place Indo-Pakistan relations on a friendlier basis. That is to say, he did not allow the Kashmir dispute to impinge on all aspects of Indo-Pakistani relations. Although Ayub's attitude seems highly commendable and Pakistan reaped some benefits from his conciliatory approach,⁶⁴ Ayub was no more successful in breaking the Kashmir deadlock than was Bhutto with his uncompromising stance towards India.

Internal: Military Capability

Pakistan emerged after partition as a much weaker military power than India. Furthermore, India refused to transfer the military

⁶⁴See Ayub's discussion of the Indus Basin Water Treaty which was signed on September 19, 1960, Friends Not Masters, op. cit., pp. 107-13.

assets which were allotted to Pakistan when the sub-continent was divided. Because Pakistan was the weaker of the two countries, her decision-makers were obsessed with military security—to a far greater degree than was true of the Indian leaders vis-à-vis Pakistan. This was natural in that India had the capabilities to pose the greater military threat.

I would argue that Indian decision-makers have not seriously contemplated a military take-over of their neighboring state. Krishna Menon adopted a very "hard line" towards Pakistan but he has said on several occasions, "We have no desire to wipe out Pakistan."⁶⁵ Moreover, Bhutto's fear that "Nehru's main theme was hatred of Pakistan" and that "Nehru's life mission was to isolate Pakistan" would seem to be a distortion of reality. On the other hand, such Indian actions as the seizure of Goa have hardly served to reassure the Pakistanis of India's peaceful intentions towards her neighbors. The statements of Ayub and Bhutto reflected their fears regarding India's "misuse" of American arms which were designed to aid India in resisting Communist Chinese aggression. Although it is difficult to stipulate the exact circumstances which would impel India to use these arms against Pakistan, the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 revealed that such circumstances can and do arise. In brief, there is enormous difficulty in assessing congruence with reality on the subject of India's and Pakistan's so-called aggressive designs towards one another.

⁶⁵M. Brecher, India and World Politics: Krishna Menon's View of the World, op. cit., pp. 197 and 205.

Ayub was most certainly correct when he reasoned that long-term arms aid to India from the United States would more than neutralize whatever military benefits Pakistan might have derived from her alliance with the super-power. After the Sino-Indian border conflict, India transferred some industrial establishments to military production.⁶⁶ With Soviet military assistance as well as that of the British and the Americans, India was able to double her effective combat forces and equip them with modern weapons from the arsenal of the super-powers.⁶⁷ In addition, the size and resources of India made the Indian "threat" appear more real. She is five times the size of Pakistan in population. She has a superior resource base and her economy also has a stronger industrial base than Pakistan's. She has steel and coal in abundance, which are being well-exploited, and her armed strength is at least three times that of Pakistan.⁶⁸ The changing balance of power in the Indian sub-continent continues, and with each day India grows militarily stronger while Pakistan has little industrial capacity to maintain parity.⁶⁹

⁶⁶Wayne Ayres Wilcox, Asia and United States Policy, Prentice-Hall Inc., New Jersey, 1967, p. 73.

⁶⁷Ibid.

⁶⁸Ishtiaq Hussain Quereshi, "The Foreign Policy of Pakistan," Foreign Policies in a World of Change, ed. by Joseph E. Black and Kenneth W. Thompson, Harper and Row, New York, 1963, p. 463.

⁶⁹India's defence expenditures were increased by approximately 10 per cent for the fiscal year 1962-63, when they amounted to some \$700 million. In 1962, prior to the Chinese invasion, India and Pakistan together were spending around \$900 million a year on their military establishments. India's annual defence expenditures alone are now nearly double this amount. Norman D. Palmer, "The Defense of South Asia," Orbis, X, Winter 1966, p. 919. For a more detailed comparison of the relative military strength of India and Pakistan see ibid., pp. 898-929.

One observation made by Bhutto was of critical importance to Indo-Pakistani relations. He maintained that a superior power would not necessarily have to use force in order to gain its ends; the mere demonstration of force may suffice to give a greater military power the bargaining strength that it needed to achieve its objectives. More precisely, Bhutto correctly believed that with increased American backing, India could afford to ignore Pakistan's impatient pleas regarding Kashmir with greater impunity.

Both India and Pakistan blame the "permanent conflict" over Kashmir on each other. There seems to be no middle position in this continuing dispute (as the outcomes of the various U.N. Resolutions on Kashmir have so vividly shown). From the strategic point of view, Kashmir is vital to Pakistan. This has been explained in the following words:

A hostile power in occupation of this area would be in virtual control of the vital rail and road communications between the main parts of West Pakistan. Furthermore, enemy control of the waters of the three rivers into Pakistan which pass through Kashmir, and particularly of their lower reaches which are within the state territory, could result in preventing the flow of water into Pakistan and thus destroy the lifeline of the west wing. In short, the occupation of Kashmir by an aggressive power would mean a perpetual stranglehold on Pakistan both strategically and economically.⁷⁰ (Emphasis added.)

Thus, Pakistanis have some reason to fear that if Kashmir is in Indian hands, West Pakistan would be continuously threatened.

⁷⁰Major-General Fazal Mugeem Khan, The Story of the Pakistan Army, op. cit., p. 100.

Alternately, Indian leaders have asserted that Pakistan poses a very real threat to their own military security. Four examples will serve to illustrate some of India's major areas of concern.

Firstly, India has always considered American arms aid to Pakistan as a direct threat; it augments Pakistan's war potential and thereby encourages Pakistani intimidation. Menon explains that without the United States, Pakistan's "inherent expansionism may remain psychologically but it would have no arm, no teeth, and perhaps no body. There is no Pakistan simpliciter today; it is Pakistan plus the United States so far as the Indo-Pakistan issue is concerned."⁷¹ Secondly, India fears Pakistan's growing rapprochement with China. In a speech to Parliament on August 8, 1966, the Indian Defence Minister, Mr. Y.B. Chavan said:

It may suit China to try to attack India through the agency of Pakistani forces. I hope Pakistan will see the folly of any attempt to seek a solution by force.⁷²

Moreover, Sino-Pakistani cooperation has added a new dimension to the Kashmir dispute. Following the 1965 war, Mrs. Indira Gandhi told a New York audience that Kashmir was necessary for India's defence against "Chinese aggression."⁷³ Thirdly, Indian leaders fear the consequences of Soviet arms aid to Pakistan. In the Lok Sabha on July 22, 1968, Mrs. Gandhi complained that "this accretion of strength has the

⁷¹M. Brecher, India and World Politics: Krishna Menon's View of the World, op. cit., pp. 170-71.

⁷²Quoted in "India: A Great Nation Becalmed," The Round Table, LVI, October, 1966, p. 431.

⁷³"Pakistan: Dissatisfaction with Tashkent," The Round Table, LVI, July 1966, p. 311.

effect of encouraging Pakistan in its intransigent and aggressive attitude towards India."⁷⁴ Moreover, India realized how dependent it was on Moscow for military hardware after the United States put a ban on lethal weapons to the sub-continent during the Indo-Pakistani War in 1965.⁷⁵ Finally, Indian leaders are aware that the Indo-Pakistani sub-continent is a natural military unit whose security depends on joint defence policies and coordination of their armed forces. The historic threat to the area came from the north-west and since Pakistan controls the western passes "Pakistan may be called, from the point of view of conventional security considerations, India's first line of defence."⁷⁶ Thus the strategic consequences of Indo-Pakistani tension have been no less severe for India than for Pakistan.

After 1962, both Pakistani decision-makers perceived India as a graver threat than before. Ayub, however, was far more realistic in his assessments of the three great powers as additional sources of military strength for Pakistan.

a. United States

One characteristic of the Pakistan armed forces is their dependence on the United States for the arsenals of the Pakistan Army, Navy and Air Force. Since five divisions of the Army and practically the

⁷⁴Keesing's Contemporary Archives, XVI, November 2-9, 1968, p. 23001.

⁷⁵Christian Science Monitor, May 15, 1969.

⁷⁶N. Palmer, "The Defense of South Asia," op. cit., p. 905.

entire Air Force were reorganized on the American pattern after the United States military aid agreement, the arms needed to keep these forces in shape can come best from the United States.⁷⁷ Pakistan must, therefore, depend on the United States or be prepared to reorganize its defence forces on some other pattern. The latter course would take years to complete and Pakistan's efforts to buy arms elsewhere are hampered by the lack of foreign exchange. Thus Ayub viewed Pakistan's predicament more realistically when he acknowledged that Pakistan was in no position to repudiate American assistance. He also understood that the Chinese could offer only token supplies in the military sphere.

There is a great deal of evidence to support Pakistan's claims that the United States is trying to contain possible Chinese expansionism. F. Greene has remarked, "Washington has a deep appreciation of China's ability to project its power abroad in many ways with great skill and determination."⁷⁸ He goes on to say that the United States is more concerned about checking what it views as a serious threat from Peking than are any of the major states close to China.⁷⁹ "American leaders maintain that they are holding a line until other states respond to the

⁷⁷B.L. Sharma, The Pakistan-China Axis, op. cit., p. 146.

⁷⁸F. Greene, U.S. Policy and the Security of Asia, op. cit., p. 179.

⁷⁹The recent Sino-Soviet border disputes would revise this assessment somewhat but it did seem valid throughout the 1950's and early 1960's.

reality of the situation and participate more rationally in this effort.⁸⁰ In the early period of Pakistan's rapprochement with China, the U.S. seemed to regard every gesture towards China as a potential danger to Pakistan's security. Pakistan was, of course, convinced that danger lay elsewhere. Neither side was willing to concede that both arguments might hold an element of truth. Ayub's perceptions were realistic in the short run when he told the Americans that the Chinese threat to India was not serious enough to warrant massive military aid. In the long run, however, India, like Pakistan, had to provide for military security against a stronger and more powerful neighbor.

While the Americans were engaged in strengthening India against future Chinese "aggression," they were also aware of Pakistan's position. President Kennedy seemed to appreciate that he was dealing with a very complex situation indeed.

The fact, of course, is we want to sustain India, which may be attacked this fall by China. So we don't want India to be helpless as a half billion people. Of course, if that country becomes fragmented and defeated . . . that would be a most disastrous blow to the balance of power. On the other hand, everything we give to India adversely affects the balance of power with Pakistan which is a much smaller country. So we are dealing with a very, very complicated problem because the hostility between them is so deep. . . . I think we are just going to have to continue to work with this one.⁸¹

A situation had therefore developed where the implementation of the global strategy of the U.S. posed a threat to the very survival of Pakistan—an

⁸⁰F. Greene, U.S. Policy and the Security of Asia, op. cit., p. 341.

⁸¹Washington Post, September 13, 1963.

ally. It was Bhutto who grasped this situation most clearly through his realization that Pakistan's bilateral relations with the United States were influenced by American global objectives.

Bhutto was also accurate when he explained to American leaders that a guarantee would be useless if, as is often the case, it is impossible to determine who the aggressor actually is.⁸² The circumstances under which the Indo-Pakistani hostilities developed in 1965 were such that blame could not be assessed. Regardless of the specific circumstances, the U.S. considered it inappropriate to continue furnishing military equipment to either India or Pakistan. It was announced on April 12, 1967, that military assistance would not be resumed to either country.⁸³ In revising American policy, the officials explained that their paramount objective had been to encourage a reduction of defence expenditures in the sub-continent and to achieve an arms limitation.⁸⁴ Although the American

⁸²The formal assurance by the United States was contained in a public statement issued by the Department of State on November 18, 1962. "The United States Government has similarly assured the Government of Pakistan that if our assistance to India should be misused and directed against another in aggression, the U.S. would undertake immediately in accordance with constitutional authority appropriate action both within and without the United Nations to thwart such aggression." Dawn, Karachi, October 9, 1963.

⁸³Keesing's Contemporary Archives, XVI, April 8-15, 1967, p. 21966.

⁸⁴Ibid. Bertrand Russell claimed that Pakistan was being punished because of its friendship with China and its policy of independence. "The Indo-Pakistani fighting enabled the United States to deflect the world's attention from its barbarous war in Vietnam." Bertrand Russell on the India-Pakistan Conflict, Produced by the Department of Films and Publications, Government of Pakistan, Karachi, October, 1965, p. 1.

leaders probably saw this as a positive step towards resolving tensions between India and Pakistan, Bhutto and Ayub were correct that America's action did not go to the core of the problem.

The question of American military aid to Pakistan cannot be divorced from the larger question of the American role in SEATO. Ayub had a correct view of the SEATO alliance when he stressed its inadequacies and gave greater weight to bilateral agreements with the United States.⁸⁵ Doubts about American protection have persisted in Europe. This was magnified many times in Asia where a lesser danger to America was balanced by a less direct security stake. Moreover, when vital decisions were made, as in Vietnam from 1962 to 1965, SEATO proved to be irrelevant. One analyst assessed the value of SEATO in the following way:

It is a rather feeble alliance whose most signal achievement is to have lasted so long and to have avoided alliance operations of a combat kind. This may be celebrated as a triumph of deterrence or as evidence of inactivity, depending on one's interpretation.⁸⁶

As we have seen, one of Pakistan's alternatives was to diversify her sources of support. With decreasing faith in American military backing, Ayub looked again at his geographic position and understood all too well that West Pakistan was wedged in between three enormous powers—China,

⁸⁵Pakistan has refrained from taking part in SEATO military and naval exercises. It is no longer represented at the ministerial level at SEATO and CENTO meetings. Christian Science Monitor, May 23, 1969.

⁸⁶Peter Lyon, "Substitutes for SEATO?" International Journal, XXI, Winter 1968-9, p. 36.

the Soviet Union and India. This location could be a source of military weakness if all three powers were antagonistic towards Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistan's geographic position could be converted into a source of military strength if two of these countries were to render diplomatic and military assistance to Pakistan.

b. People's Republic of China

The Chinese display of power against India in 1962 impressed Ayub deeply but he did not repeat his offer of a joint defence agreement to India. Instead, Ayub and Bhutto adopted an attitude that was markedly unsympathetic to India's plight. They were definitely more alarmed by Western emergency arms aid to India than by the Chinese threat. If the Chinese attack had developed into a large-scale invasion of the sub-continent, Pakistan's reactions might have been very different. The voluntary withdrawal of the Chinese only served to confirm Pakistan's belief that China's objectives were limited ones. As Norman Palmer has cogently argued,

Pakistan's foreign policies are geared for the short run; for it regards the Indian threat as a real and immediate one, and its long-run policies must be dictated by its success or failure in preserving its national unity against internal pressures and against its 'eternally hostile neighbor'.⁸⁷

The strong support which the Chinese gave to Pakistan during the 1965 war has been discussed from the standpoint of the Pakistani decision-makers. We found Ayub Khan reluctant to express his opinions

⁸⁷N. Palmer, "Trends in Foreign Policy Since 1958," Conference on Pakistan Since 1958, op. cit., p. 2.

on this crucial phase of Sino-Pakistan relations but the Chinese did not exhibit the same caution in their own statements during the war. The Chinese ultimatum to India and the alleged collaboration between Pakistan and China led to an explosive situation. This resulted in the Kashmir quarrel itself becoming secondary to the possible international repercussions of the war.

On September 4, 1965, while the Indo-Pakistan fighting was still confined to Kashmir, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Marshal Chen Yi, stopped at Karachi. At a news conference he condemned India's "provocative violations" of the cease-fire line in Kashmir, supported Pakistan's "just" action in repelling Indian attacks, and maintained that India's "cruel and repressive" rule in Kashmir had produced the current struggle of freedom fighters there.⁸⁸ Almost every note that the Chinese Government addressed to India during the fighting and immediately afterwards referred to the fact that both China and Pakistan were "victims" of Indian "expansionism."⁸⁹ The Chinese asserted in these notes that, come what may, they would not be stopped from supporting Pakistan's fight against Indian aggression.⁹⁰

The Chinese ultimatum clearly demonstrated how seriously China regarded the dangerous situation that had arisen in Asia. Some officials

⁸⁸Dawn, Karachi, September 5, 1965.

⁸⁹See Peking Review, VIII, September 10-September 24, 1965.

⁹⁰"Chinese Government Leaders Condemn India Expansionism and Aggression Against Pakistan," Peking Review, VIII, September 17, 1965, p. 10.

in Washington viewed the ultimatum more as a "psychological gambit" to unnerve India and to embarrass the United States and the Soviet Union than as a military threat.⁹¹ Yet no observer could guarantee that China would not implement her threat. One analyst felt that,

... while the Chinese did not contemplate a major attack on India, they would probably mount an action serious enough to trouble the Indians but not large enough to evoke U.S. military intervention. Even if they confined themselves to taking a few Indian posts, India would either have to fight on two fronts or suffer another great humiliation... with only a small effort the Chinese could pin down a substantial number of Indian troops thus aiding Pakistan. This would put Pakistan in debt to the Chinese giving them a new leverage in the tangled affairs of the subcontinent.⁹²

Although this would seem to be a plausible explanation of Chinese intentions, the results of Chinese actions are more easily understood. No one knew exactly what the Chinese would do and this served to increase China's impact on the conflict. The outcome of China's involvement in the dispute has been intelligently assessed as follows:

Further assessment of China's contribution to Pakistan's cause would depend on one's assessment of which nation won the war. If Pakistan's claim that she was winning the war is accepted, Chinese help must be assigned a peripheral role. If India's claim that she was winning, and that with the passage of time the margin of her victory was going to expand, is accepted, the Chinese—to the extent that they were influential in bringing about a cease-fire—could be regarded as having extricated Pakistan from an unfavorable situation. But if one takes the view, as many observers did, that neither side was winning and that after the first week or so a stalemate had

⁹¹New York Times, September 18-19, 1965.

⁹²A. Syed, "China and the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965," op. cit., pp. 869-70.

been reached, the Chinese contribution would have to be seen primarily as a bolstering of Pakistani morale.⁹³

Whether or not Ayub Khan really had the option of calling in Communist China instead of accepting a truce is a question which will have to remain unanswered but I would suggest that this option was not available. The Chinese appeared to be taking unilateral action and Pakistan was swept up in the complex maze of China's regional and global objectives.⁹⁴

c. Soviet Union

Pakistan's breakthrough in her relations with Russia had a much greater significance than may have been foreseen at the time. President Ayub's visit to the U.S.S.R. in the spring of 1965 was a considerable success. The process of establishing friendly ties with the Soviet Union received further impetus when Ayub paid his third visit to Russia in September-October, 1967.⁹⁵ Since January 1966, when Prime Minister Kosygin adopted a mediatory role at Tashkent, India and Pakistan have turned more and more towards Moscow to seek a settlement of their problems.

⁹³Ibid., p. 873.

⁹⁴India and Pakistan agreed to the United Nations proposed cease-fire on September 22, 1965. The Nation commented as follows on the Chinese influence on the course of events: "... the paradox of the cease-fire, in a sense, is the fact that China is perhaps the power responsible for it. Whatever China's intentions may have been—and we shall probably never know—it was the specter of direct Chinese intervention that got things moving.... In this instance, even Pakistan may have been moved to accept the cease-fire in part because of its uncertainty over what the Chinese might do." "China the Peacemaker," editorial, The Nation, CCI, October 4, 1965; p. 177.

⁹⁵Khurshid Hyder, "Recent Trends in the Foreign Policy of Pakistan," The World Today, XXII, November 1966, p. 487.

Pakistan concluded an arms agreement with Moscow in 1968. This agreement has not received a great deal of publicity because the Soviet Union does not want to antagonize India and jeopardize her heavy investment of economic and military aid in that country.⁹⁶ Nevertheless, the Russian Defence Minister visited Pakistan in March 1969, to discuss Soviet arms shipments. He assured Pakistan's leaders that Soviet arms deliveries would be made despite Indian protests.⁹⁷

Indo-Pakistani relations were uppermost in the minds of both Pakistani decision-makers; from this equation flowed the source of Pakistan's security problem. Bhutto was more obsessed with the security threat posed by India but the policies he advocated revealed his inexperience in military matters. Although Ayub's policies did not always achieve success, they were derived from a deeper and more

⁹⁶The irony of this situation is discussed by one observer. "The Soviet assistance is presumably meant to reduce Pakistan's dependence on China for arms, but, ask Indians, against what threat to Pakistan's security is the Soviet Union arming Pakistan, a continuing member of the Western camp? Indians know, from the bitter experience of the use of American arms against India in the 1965 conflict, that there is no (and cannot be any) guarantee that the Soviet arms would not be used against India, and that in the event of such misuse, the Soviet Union, like the United States . . . would or could do nothing to stop Pakistan from using them." M.S. Rajan, "India and World Politics in the Post-Nehru Era," International Journal, XXIV, Winter 1968-69, p. 150.

⁹⁷Qutubuddin Aziz made the following report on Soviet arms to Pakistan: "Informed observers say the Soviet arms supply to Pakistan is considerably less than the military hardware Moscow has given India. Its quantum is believed to be small in comparison with the United States military aid to Pakistan before the Indo-Pakistan war of September, 1965. . . ." Christian Science Monitor, June 2, 1969.

realistic understanding of Pakistan's military security problems.

The contrast between Ayub's and Bhutto's perceptions of India after the 1965 war was striking. Bhutto veered towards solving the problem with India directly, outside the mechanism of the United Nations. He did not exclude the use of force for the attainment of Pakistan's goals. Ayub, with his more immediate knowledge of the hazards of Pakistan's military position relative to India, affirmed that a military answer would not really solve the problem. Ayub was more realistic in this respect for, as the 1965 war should have demonstrated to Bhutto, a quick and easy conquest of Kashmir was not possible against a militarily stronger India.

I would argue that Ayub's policies towards India were more likely to be successful because the goals he sought were limited ones. For Pakistan, complete security against India is an impossibility. Nevertheless, Ayub deemed it imperative that all resources be tapped in order to improve Pakistan's defences. Although Ayub failed to gain Kashmir, I believe that he was more successful in his second and more reachable goal—strengthening Pakistan's position relative to that of India.

Bhutto was less likely to achieve the goal of strengthening Pakistan against India than was his President. Bhutto viewed America's inert posture during the 1965 war as the end of Pakistan's special relationship with the United States. In overestimating the importance of diplomatic support Bhutto tended to underestimate Pakistan's continuing dependence on the United States for military hardware. This dependence on American

military supplies and spare parts explains why Ayub, a soldier, did not ever want to rupture the U.S. link, even while courting Peking and Moscow. Bhutto, a landlord, had little appreciation of this military dimension and the limited value of the Soviet and China link in this sphere.

Through fostering closer ties between Pakistan and China, Bhutto was able to enhance Pakistan's military security in one respect. Friendship with China is indispensable for Pakistan in the context of her Indian policy, and there is no denying the fact that the Sino-Indian War created a shared community of interests between them. However, by realistically assessing the limited value of military aid that the Chinese could offer to Pakistan, I believe that Ayub was more likely to achieve long-term success.

There is no accurate information on the amount of military equipment that Pakistan receives from China but observers agree that it is minimal when compared with the amount the U.S. has provided. Therefore, in buttressing Pakistan against India, a distinction must be made between the deterrent value of Sino-Pakistani friendship and the military hardware that China can supply. I would suggest that Ayub emphasized the deterrent aspect of this link in that Chinese hostility towards India and cordiality towards Pakistan provides some insurance to Pakistan against the security threat from India. Pakistan needs China as a counterpoise to India, a counterpoise that the United States and the Soviet Union will not supply. So long as India and China are locked in a major confrontation along the entire Himalayan frontier, the credibility of a two-front Chinese-Pakistani threat to India will continue. I believe that this

explains why Ayub purposely left open the option of Chinese protection. However, Ayub probably calculated that Chinese support to Pakistan would continue to be largely diplomatic in that the Chinese would not risk for Pakistan what they had been unwilling to risk for Vietnam.

I would suggest that Ayub's and Bhutto's policies towards Russia were more successful than even they had hoped. After 1965, the freezing of American military aid made the need for an alternative source quite urgent, especially to replace war losses. Consequently Ayub and Bhutto played down Pakistan's membership in SEATO and CENTO. Their efforts were rewarded by the Soviet-Pakistan arms agreement in 1968. This success cannot be attributed solely to the actions of the Pakistani leaders; the Soviets were quite willing to reciprocate Pakistan's overtures in order to contain China's growing influence in the sub-continent. However, both Pakistani leaders recognized the importance of the Sino-Soviet dispute and were able to take advantage of the opportunities it afforded Pakistan.

Pakistan continues to be the only Asian country to retain Peking's friendship and aid despite its cooperation with the United States and the Soviet Union. This incredible situation demonstrates that the two Pakistani leaders were indeed realistic in regarding all three great powers as additional sources of military capability for Pakistan. Although Bhutto promoted this policy, it is Ayub who deserves credit for sustaining the links to all three countries. His sophisticated understanding of Pakistan's military position permitted Ayub to establish a hierarchy of bilateral equations based on Pakistan's security needs.

Internal: Economic Capability

From 1950-59, Pakistan's industrial production registered the highest growth rate in the world and production in large-scale manufacturing increased five-fold during this period.⁹⁸ During the 1960-65 period, Pakistan's overall economy grew at an average rate of 5.3 per cent annually which was more than twice the rate of population growth.⁹⁹ Considering its narrow resource base, Pakistan made great strides under the leadership of Ayub Khan but Pakistan also received a great deal of economic and military assistance from the United States.

a. United States

Ayub was well-aware that Pakistan had relied heavily on external assistance. About 47.5 per cent of the expenditure for the First Plan came from this source and about the same percentage, involving more than twice as much assistance, was needed for the Second Plan. Eighty per cent of the total amount of foreign aid came from the United States.¹⁰⁰ American assistance in the form of grants, loans, Public Law 480 Food and Fiber for Peace, and participation in consortia under the leadership of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development reached the \$3 billion level by 1965.¹⁰¹

⁹⁸Pakistan Affairs, XVII, December, 1965.

⁹⁹Ibid.

¹⁰⁰N. Palmer, South Asia and United States Policy, op. cit., p. 139.

¹⁰¹Military aid, a classified figure (but estimated at between \$1.5 and \$2.0 billion), is not included in this \$3 billion. Frank N. Trager, "The United States and Pakistan: A Failure of Diplomacy," Orbis, IX, Fall 1965, p. 623.

Pakistan has relied even more heavily on external assistance than has India. Although India has nearly five times as many people and a development program which is approximately five times as large as that of Pakistan, it receives only a little more than twice as much economic assistance from the United States.¹⁰² As one analyst has said,

One wonders whether Pakistan's first two Five-Year Plans would ever have become such striking successes without American-financed aid and technical assistance. Indeed, the United States can take much of the credit for Pakistan's having become, under the benevolent dictatorship of President Ayub, an Asian showplace of economic development and political stability.¹⁰³

Ayub's evaluation of Pakistan's economic situation in the realm of world trade was indeed accurate. Pakistan has experienced almost perpetual foreign exchange difficulties. Her low level of income has inhibited not only the expansion of a domestic market but has also worked in a vicious circle to restrict the supply of foreign exchange and domestic savings. Moreover, Ayub's assessment of Pakistan's role in the world economy was also correct; his country was relegated to producing and exporting agricultural commodities and importing industrial ones. He was probably right when he suggested that relatively small concessions in the trade field could be more effective than larger amounts of foreign aid. The United States may indeed be following a rather short-sighted policy towards Pakistan and other developing countries by maintaining exclusive trade policies.

¹⁰²N. Palmer, South Asia and United States Policy, op. cit., p. 153.

¹⁰³George J. Lerski, "The Pakistan-American Alliance: A Re-evaluation of the Past Decade," Asian Survey, VIII, May 1968, p. 405.

There is evidence to support Bhutto's contention that the United States was using economic levers to influence the direction of Pakistan's foreign policy. Two examples will suffice.

The first incident occurred in 1963. The Managing Director of the Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) visited Peking to investigate a commercial air link between China and Pakistan. The Air Travel Agreement signed in August 1963, was the first of its kind that China had made with a noncommunist country. As a gesture of disapproval, the United States suspended a \$4 million loan to Pakistan that had been offered earlier to modernize Dacca airport.¹⁰⁴

The second incident occurred after President Johnson, quite unexpectedly, requested Ayub Khan to postpone a state visit to the United States in April 1965. The following July he informed Ayub that the U.S. Government was asking the World Bank to postpone, for about two months, a Consortium Meeting scheduled for July 27th. The purpose of this meeting was to consider the amounts of economic assistance which the participating nations in the Consortium would pledge during the first year of Pakistan's Third Five-Year Plan. Several analysts noted that the U.S. added insult to injury by suggesting that the period of postponement could be utilized for discussing "other matters," presumably relating to the many areas of disagreement between the two countries.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁴A. Syed, "The Politics of Sino-Pakistan Agreements," op. cit., p. 811.

¹⁰⁵N. Palmer, South Asia and United States Policy, op. cit., p. 40. This incident was also referred to by F. Greene, U.S. Policy and the Security of Asia, op. cit., p. 137.

b. The People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union

Throughout the 1962-65 period, Pakistan's leaders were endeavoring to expand their country's trade. In 1962, while China awaited the arrival of Pakistan's Foreign Minister to sign formally the border agreement, the Chinese Government sent a trade delegation to Karachi to negotiate a trade agreement between the two countries.¹⁰⁶ On January 4, 1963, the Chinese Trade Delegation signed the first formal Sino-Pakistan trade agreement providing for "most favored nation treatment" in commerce and trade. The Chinese Vice-Minister for Foreign Trade indicated that China would be willing to offer long-term credit to set up small and medium industries in Pakistan. The agreement provided for further arrangements over a period of years for stepping up Sino-Pakistan trade. Pakistan was the only nation, allied with the West in SEATO and CENTO, to which China has agreed to extend the "most favored nation" status in trade and commerce; alternately, China was the only Communist nation to which Pakistan has agreed to give reciprocal status.

Under the trade agreement with Communist China, Pakistan secured some very favorable terms. China was reported to have become the biggest buyer of Pakistani cotton during 1963-64—302,000 bales out of Pakistan's total export of 539,000 bales. The Chinese purchases restored considerable confidence in and stability to Pakistan's cotton market.¹⁰⁷ Despite this agreement, trade with China has not been,

¹⁰⁶Events surrounding the trade agreements are described by Q. Aziz, Foreign Policy of Pakistan, op. cit., pp. 90-95.

¹⁰⁷Cited in K. Sayeed, Policies Towards China, op. cit., p. 244.

and is not today, a significant part of Pakistan's foreign trade.

In July 1964, the Pakistan Minister of Commerce announced Pakistan's acceptance of a \$60 million long-term interest-free loan from China. Pakistan would repay the loan with cotton, jute and manufactured goods and it would purchase Chinese machinery, cement and sugar mills.¹⁰⁸ Considering the fact that American aid to Pakistan at this time averaged \$500 million a year,¹⁰⁹ the Chinese loan was not much more than a gesture of friendship.

As we have seen, China was not the only Communist country to receive Pakistani attention. The Soviet Union also provided economic assistance to Pakistan.¹¹⁰ In 1961, the Soviet Union offered Pakistan a credit of \$30 million to purchase Soviet equipment for the exploration of oil. It also trained Pakistani engineers and sent Soviet experts to Pakistan. In 1964, the Soviet Union extended an additional credit of \$10 million. The two countries are also linked through a commercial airline flying between Moscow and Karachi. Early in 1966, Pakistan entered into barter agreements with the Soviet Union under which, for the export of rice, cotton, jute, etc., Pakistan can obtain Soviet vehicles and agricultural machinery. Apart from the Soviet Union, Pakistan exchanged dozens of delegations and made numerous contacts and agree-

¹⁰⁸B.L. Sharma, The Pakistan-China Axis, op. cit., p. 106.

¹⁰⁹A. Syed, "The Politics of Sino-Pakistan Agreements," op. cit., p. 811.

¹¹⁰The following description of Soviet-Pakistani economic ties is taken almost verbatim from K. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, op. cit., pp. 282-3.

ments with the nations of Eastern Europe.¹¹¹ These barter agreements have contributed only a minimal amount to Pakistan's economic growth.

As President of Pakistan, Ayub Khan was more concerned with Pakistan's economic development than was Bhutto. Both leaders agreed that Pakistan's military security was to take precedence over her economic growth but Ayub made a greater effort to balance these conflicting priorities than did Bhutto. It is on this point that the relative success of their policies will be evaluated.

I would suggest that Ayub and Bhutto achieved some measure of success in reducing Pakistan's economic dependence on the United States. American aid to Pakistan during the 1954-62 period had some distinct disadvantages from the Pakistani perspective; it tended to limit Pakistan's economic and commercial relations with other countries and served to weaken Pakistan's spirit of self-reliance. One of the important by-products of widening the scope of trade relations with China and the Soviet Union has been steady progress in the diversification of Pakistan's sources of economic and commercial credits. This development has lessened, but not eliminated, Pakistan's dependence on a few trading partners and aid givers.

¹¹¹The barter agreement with China was preceded by five such agreements, two each with the Soviet Union and Poland, and one with Albania. Similar agreements were made with Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia during the 1962-64 period. S.M. Burke, "Sino-Pakistan Relations," op. cit., p. 403.

Bhutto viewed Pakistan's relations with the United States from a Marxist framework and insisted that American economic domination should be resisted at all costs. He was far more concerned with Pakistan's "independence" and "self-respect" in foreign affairs than he was in proposing specific solutions to Pakistan's economic problems. The Chinese, in promoting their claims as a regional and world power, made effective use of ideology, anti-colonialism, anti-racism, etc. Moreover the Chinese leaders had the ability to identify with the underdeveloped world and its frustrations. Because Bhutto was more receptive to these appeals than was Ayub Khan, he tended to overlook the limited economic assistance that China had actually offered Pakistan.

I would argue that Ayub had a more realistic appreciation of Pakistan's economic position. He was aware that China and the Soviet Union could not compete with the Western countries in giving economic assistance to Pakistan. The loans and trade agreements with these two Communist countries were of minimal benefit when compared to the enormous amount of aid which Pakistan had received from the United States throughout the years. Ayub understood that Pakistan's economic dependence on the United States precluded a drastic shift in Pakistan's alliance policy. Norman Palmer argues that American economic assistance to Pakistan is absolutely essential if Pakistan's development efforts, "which have now reached a critical stage, are to have any prospect of accomplishing even their minimal objectives."¹¹²

¹¹²N. Palmer, South Asia and United States Policy, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

It is by no means certain that these objectives can be achieved even with large-scale American aid; but it is quite certain that they cannot be achieved if such aid is not forthcoming.¹¹³

By recognizing the interdependence of Pakistan's security and economic needs, Ayub was able to achieve greater success in both spheres. Bhutto's implicit assumption, that all else would fail if Pakistan's security were to deteriorate, contains a fundamental flaw; he ignored the fact that military security would also suffer if her economic position deteriorated beyond a certain level. Ayub clearly understood that a sound economy and industrial base were essential for the defence of his country.

To sum up, Ayub's and Bhutto's actions in foreign policy were dominated by one continuing factor: the desire for protection against India. This led to a strategic decision which has been the focus of our attention throughout this paper: the decision to modify Pakistan's alignment policy in order to strengthen her position relative to that of India. Ayub and Bhutto were both attempting to implement this strategic policy choice but they differed in the means they proposed to achieve it. Throughout this chapter I have argued that Ayub's policies were more successful in attaining the goals that both he and Bhutto desired. This conclusion is based on the following considerations.

Firstly, although the impetus for a more flexible foreign policy came from Bhutto, Ayub was capable of sustaining the links to Communist countries, while, at the same time, retaining Pakistan's status as an ally

¹¹³Ibid.

of the United States. There were at least two instances where Bhutto might have allowed Pakistan-American relations to deteriorate beyond a tolerable level had Ayub not intervened. The first was Bhutto's willingness to sign a non-aggression pact with China (even though the Chinese themselves did not seem overly anxious to force Pakistan into such an agreement) and the second was his virulently anti-American attitude in 1965.

Ayub's policies were more successful in terms of his ability to maintain cordiality with all three great powers. Although Bhutto professed this aim as well, his actions during the 1965 war were inimical to maintaining a balance between the three great powers. During the war, Ayub disassociated China's threats against India from the Indo-Pakistani conflict; Sino-Pakistan "collusion" most certainly would have been detrimental to Pakistan's dominant bilateral equation with the United States. In addition, Ayub did not want to destroy any of Pakistan's sources of real and potential support. By taking care not to jeopardize the aid and backing that might come from each of the three great powers in the future, Ayub's policies were more successful in achieving a truly flexible alignment policy for Pakistan.

Secondly, Bhutto was both more obsessed with the security threat posed by India and more inexperienced in military matters. Ayub had a more realistic appreciation of Pakistan's military security problems as evidenced by his attitudes on the following issues.

Ayub's military objectives vis-à-vis India were more limited than Bhutto's. The President realized that Pakistan had to be capable of its own defence in order to negotiate with India but he emphasized the futility of seeking solutions solely through military force. As the 1965 war should have demonstrated to Bhutto, a quick and easy conquest of Kashmir was not possible against a militarily stronger India.

Although Ayub was no more successful in breaking the Kashmir deadlock than was Bhutto with his uncompromising stance towards India, Ayub did not allow the Kashmir dispute to impinge on all aspects of Indo-Pakistani relations. The former President was able to insulate the major source of conflict between Pakistan and India and to seek adjustments in other areas. The Indus Water Treaty is only one example of the benefits that can accrue to Pakistan as a result of greater flexibility in dealing with India.

Ayub was far more realistic than Bhutto in his assessment of the three great powers as additional sources of military strength for Pakistan. His country's armed forces were dependent on the United States for spare parts and Pakistan was in no position to repudiate American military assistance. Bhutto overestimated the diplomatic support which China gave to Pakistan and ignored his country's continuing dependence on the U.S. for military hardware. Ayub, on the other hand, was conscious of the fact that Chinese support to Pakistan would continue to be largely diplomatic.

Ayub understood that, in the context of Pakistan's Indian policy, friendship with China was indispensable. Chinese hostility towards India and cordiality towards Pakistan provided some insurance to Pakistan against a security threat from India, i.e., a two-front Chinese-Pakistan threat to India was credible. However, Ayub was able to make a distinction between the deterrent value of Sino-Pakistan friendship and the actual military hardware that China could supply. With his practical experience in military matters, Ayub established a hierarchy of bilateral equations with the three great powers based on Pakistan's security needs.

Thirdly, Ayub made a greater attempt to balance the conflicting priorities of economic development and military security than did Bhutto. Ayub had a better understanding of Pakistan's economic problems and realized that China and the Soviet Union could not compete with the western countries in giving economic assistance to Pakistan. Therefore, Ayub knew that Pakistan's economic dependence on the United States precluded a drastic shift in Pakistan's alignment policy. In short, Ayub recognized the interdependence of Pakistan's security and economic needs; a sound economy was essential for Pakistan's defence.

Finally, in modifying Pakistan's alignments, Ayub was more conscious of Pakistan's inherent limitations. He realized that in dealing with other states, especially the three great nations of the world, Pakistan had to be circumspect, wary and suspicious. This approach to foreign policy is shared by leaders in many underdeveloped countries in that they are rarely in a position to seize the initiative; their foreign

policies must often be more reactive than active. Regarded in this light, Ayub's achievements in altering Pakistan's alliance patterns were considerable. His ability to use Pakistan's status as a formal ally of the United States and the bridges he built to Communist China and the Soviet Union to reduce the security threat from India was quite remarkable.

CONCLUSION

The major questions posed by this study were: Why do decision-makers in new nations decide to alter their alignments and, by doing so, are they successful in achieving their objectives? Elite images were the decisive inputs of the Pakistani foreign policy system, in the research design presented here. Mohammad Ayub Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto were selected for study. An attempt was made to examine the process of policy formation in order to understand why these two decision-makers decided to alter Pakistan's alignments. In addition, to the study of policy formation, an analysis of the outcomes and success of these two decision-makers' policies was undertaken.

Although the foreign policy model has been applied in a way that seemed to arrest the 1962-65 period in time, foreign policy must be seen as a dynamic process. Elite images are not only the result of historical legacies and long personal experience but also of the action-reaction-interaction process of international relations. By dividing decisions into two analytic types, Brecher et al. have focused attention on the continuous flow effect or feedback from operational environment to elite images to decisions.¹ The strategic decision which has been the focus of our attention throughout this paper was the decision to modify Pakistan's alignments and make her foreign policy more flexible. However, it was at the level of tactical decision-making that this strategic decision underwent constant change and reformulation. From a policy of unqualified

¹See Introduction p. 11.

alliance, Pakistan has gradually moved towards one of qualified alignment. Though she is still formally allied with the United States through a whole series of bilateral agreements and has not formally renounced her membership in SEATO or CENTO, these relationships are not as they were throughout the 1950's—the mainstay of her foreign policy. Thus, the way in which Ayub Khan and Bhutto attempted to implement their strategic policy choice through tactical decisions affected Pakistan's entire foreign policy system by changing in varying degrees both the operational environment and their images of it.

Three major tasks will be undertaken in this final chapter. Firstly, the importance of each of the variables which have been examined in this study will be evaluated. Secondly, the three hypotheses presented in the Introduction will be tested, and, if necessary, refined, and new hypotheses emerging from the data will be formulated. Finally, some guidelines for future research will be offered.

a. Ranking of the Variables

Although an attempt was made throughout the paper to place the multitudinous factors within their proper perspective, it would clarify the analysis to evaluate which variables were the most crucial in the Pakistani decision to shift alignments. The components of the four major variables have been examined in all of their complexity but I will conclude by ranking the variables on a scale from one to ten to allow greater differentiation. This ranking should not give the impression that the perceptions of the Pakistani decision-makers have been measured in precise quantitative terms; it is given only as a rough indicator of

the costs and benefits that the decision-makers themselves perceived when they embarked upon a revised alignment policy. I will argue that the ranking reflects the priorities of both leaders even though their rationales for determining it were markedly different.

It should be eminently clear from the foregoing presentation that Pakistan's bilateral relationship with India is to be ranked highest (10). Pakistan's obsessive preoccupation with India and Kashmir has dominated her foreign policy since the time of independence and the decision that was studied was no exception. Both Pakistani leaders agreed that India would have to remain Pakistan's primary foreign policy concern unless Indian leaders underwent a radical change in attitude. They cited two prerequisites for friendly relations between the two countries. The first prerequisite was for India to accept Pakistan as an independent and equal partner and base relations not on a projected confederation but on the fact of continued division of the sub-continent into two separate states. The second imperative was to arrive at a mutually acceptable settlement of the Kashmir dispute. Without a "change of heart" on the part of Indian leaders, Ayub and Bhutto believed that the prospect of Indian aggression was real and their foremost concern was to protect themselves against this threat to Pakistan's existence. In short, the key to Pakistan's shifting alignments is to be found in the course of Indo-Pakistani relations.

Military Capability will be ranked next highest (9) but this must be seen as a variable which is closely linked to Pakistan's overriding concern with India. Pakistan was not concerned with gaining military

power per se in the decision being studied, but only in maintaining a force-level which would prevent Indian aggression. After the precipitous American arming of India in the face of Chinese "aggression," Washington announced that \$525 million in military aid would be extended to India up to 1969. Ayub, with prodding from Bhutto, reasoned that if India, strengthened by Western military assistance, were to embark upon aggression against Pakistan, Communist China, a nuclear power, might come to Pakistan's assistance. However, the Pakistani Army was heavily dependent on American matériel in the short run and this served to limit Ayub's range of choices in seeking military security against India.

Pakistan's dominant bilateral equation with the United States will be given a ranking of 8. It was obvious from the beginning of Pakistan's association with the United States that Pakistan's main concern was her relationship with neighboring India. Equally important was the hope of gaining Washington's unequivocal support for Pakistan's objectives vis-à-vis Kashmir. Thus, the interests of Pakistan and the United States were not identical, in the sense that Pakistan sought the alliance to improve her defence capacity against India while the United States allied herself with Pakistan in the hope of garnering support against world Communism. As the years went by, it became painfully apparent that Pakistan's friendship with the United States was not helping to solve the problem that Pakistan considered most important. If anything, the close ties with the United States made the solution of the Kashmir problem more difficult in that Pakistan's alliances had hardened India's anti-Pakistan position. It is notable that most of the difficulties and disagreements between Paki-

stan and the United States centered around India, the fulcrum of Pakistan's foreign policy. With the large-scale American aid to India in 1962, Pakistanis found it difficult to understand why neutralist India should suddenly be given such preferential treatment without the "strings" which Pakistan had to endure as a result of her alliance policy. This lack of consideration for Pakistan's point of view finally convinced Ayub that the United States had decided to make India the dominant power in South Asia and he gradually accepted the advice of men like Bhutto who advocated a modification of Pakistan's alignments.

Both Ayub Khan and Bhutto accorded high priority to Pakistan's dominant bilateral equation with the United States but their reasons for doing so were markedly different. Bhutto was intent on guarding Pakistan's recently won freedom from all possible encroachments. He equated membership in the American-led Western Bloc with loss of freedom of action in external affairs. Moreover, he saw the dangers from big powers to small powers as emanating from the United States in particular. Therefore, his preoccupation with the U.S., especially in the latter part of the period, was framed in essentially negative terms, i.e., the resistance of super-power domination. Ayub, on the other hand, accorded high priority to Pakistan-American relations on a more positive basis. His greatest difficulty lay in sustaining the American tie while pursuing policies so much at odds with American concepts, policies and commitments.

Pakistan's bilateral relations with the People's Republic of China are to be ranked next (6). Both Pakistani leaders were acutely conscious

of their geographic position, contiguous to the Soviet heartland and China. However, Pakistan's rapprochement with China was viewed differently by Bhutto and Ayub Khan. The powerful attraction of Marxism for the Pakistani Foreign Minister created a predisposition which was favorable to Communist China; this affected his outlook on Sino-Pakistan relations throughout the period. Bhutto saw Sino-Pakistani friendship as a value in itself whereas Ayub seemed to regard it as a necessary response to counter the policies of the United States. Notwithstanding this, Ayub conducted Pakistan's foreign policy with great caution. His policy of "independence" within the framework of formal—or nominal—alignment met with more approval in Peking than it did in Washington. Yet, Ayub was not prepared to allow Pakistan's association with China to jeopardize the more extensive contacts which existed between his country and the United States. Thus, Ayub was acutely aware that a delicate and sensitive balance would have to be maintained between Pakistan's relations with China and the United States.

Economic Capability will be ranked next (5). Pakistan's economic development was one important element that Ayub and Bhutto had to consider. Although Bhutto's expressed aim was to make his country economically self-sufficient in a fiercely competitive world situation, he refused to sacrifice Pakistan's political independence for accelerated economic growth. Ayub viewed Pakistan's low level of economic capability not as a factor promoting the decision to alter Pakistan's alignments but as a mitigating factor which prevented the decision from taking more drastic lines than it did. Although trade with China served to strengthen Pakistan's economy to some extent, the goal of autarky was a long way

off and Ayub's recognition of his dependence on American foreign aid made him move with caution by keeping relations with Communist China within "clearly defined limits."

The dominant bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union will be ranked last (3) in the hierarchy of important variables leading the Pakistani elite to modify their country's alignments. Pakistan's growing friendship with China led Ayub and Bhutto to ask why the United States was so implacably opposed to Communist China when American decision-makers seemed willing to come to terms with Communist Russia. Ironically, it was Pakistan that had to face across her frontiers, the world's two great Communist giants. Bhutto's Marxist framework and Ayub's objective of forming friendly bilateral equations with the great powers of the world without antagonizing any one of them can be seen as important factors in the decision to move closer to both China and the Soviet Union. A table representing these rankings is given below.

TABLE I

RANKING OF THE VARIABLES WHICH INFLUENCED THE DECISION
TO MODIFY PAKISTAN'S ALIGNMENTS

| | |
|--|----|
| BILATERAL (India) | 10 |
| MILITARY CAPABILITY | 9 |
| DOMINANT BILATERAL (United States) | 8 |
| BILATERAL (People's Republic of China) | 6 |
| ECONOMIC CAPABILITY | 5 |
| DOMINANT BILATERAL (Soviet Union) | 3 |

b. Testing and Reformulation of Hypotheses

The central problem which was presented in the Introduction was the following:

Patterns of alignment in the new nations of the world are responses to perceived capability deficiencies. Therefore, new nations will seek alignments which will maximize their capabilities.

This was put in the form of three hypotheses which may now be tested.

The first two hypotheses deal with the process of foreign policy formation.

Hypothesis I

If a decision-maker perceives a threat to his state's security, then he will attempt to use alignments to strengthen his country's military capabilities.

This hypothesis is fully confirmed. Pakistan's security problem was the cornerstone of the images of both Ayub Khan and Bhutto. Unquestionably, the most important factor promoting their decision to modify Pakistan's alignments was their fear of Indian "aggression." When the United States began to give military assistance to India, both leaders agreed that they must never again allow Pakistan's military security to become dependent on a single outside source. Consequently, they began to promote bilateral relations with other countries, particularly the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, in a manner they deemed consistent with Pakistan's security needs.

Hypothesis II

If a decision-maker perceives a threat to his state's security, then he will accord economic capabilities a lower priority in his search for allies.

This hypothesis, too, is confirmed. Although Bhutto hoped that Pakistan's economy would be strengthened so that it would become self-reliant, his prime consideration was unambiguous: "Pakistan's security and territorial integrity are more important than economic development."² Ayub Khan was well-aware that Pakistan's economic development was very much dependent on American aid. Yet, he was not prepared to undermine Pakistan's security by remaining totally dependent on a major power that did not appreciate Pakistan's defence needs. "The country's economic progress and prosperity of its people are of the utmost importance, but its security and independence come first."³ Flowing from their fears of India's aggressive designs, both leaders agreed that Pakistan's military security was to take precedence over her economic growth. Consequently, they were prepared to accept the economic sacrifices which would necessarily accompany the modification of Pakistan's alignment policy.

The third hypothesis relates to the outcomes of foreign policy choices.

Hypothesis III

The more accurately a decision-maker perceives his environment, the more successful he will be in fostering alignments which will maximize his state's capabilities, vis-à-vis the perceived source of threat.

In its present form, this hypothesis should be considered neither confirmed nor disproved since even accurate perceptions may not insure

²See Chapter IV, p. 133.

³See Chapter III, pp. 92-93.

achievement of goals. However, this broad hypothesis may be refined by breaking it down into three testable hypotheses which have emerged from this study.

Hypothesis IIIa

A decision-maker will be more successful in choosing alignment partners which will maximize his state's capabilities if the decision-maker's choice of goals is limited to what is operationally feasible.

This hypothesis is related to the general principle that leaders of new nations are both captives and instruments of their state's level of capabilities. Therefore, the coincidence between elite-defined objectives and policy outcomes will be predicated on the decision-maker's ability to adapt what is desirable to what is feasible.

This hypothesis is partly confirmed. It is clear that, of the two decision-makers, Ayub Khan was the more realistic in tailoring his foreign policy goals to Pakistan's inherent weakness in the international system. In addition, Ayub's objectives vis-à-vis India were more circumscribed than those of Bhutto. By accepting India's superior capabilities as a real limitation, Ayub dismissed aggressive military action as a viable policy for Pakistan and was able to achieve some measure of success in his more modest goal of strengthening Pakistan's position relative to that of India. However, Ayub was no more successful than was Bhutto in attaining his second goal. The politico-military situation during the 1962-65 period was such that Ayub's attempt to reverse the status quo in Kashmir was not an operationally feasible goal. Consequently, he was unable to employ successful means to break

the Kashmir deadlock. Therefore, by definition, alignments could not insure the promotion of Ayub's objective in Kashmir.

Hypothesis IIIb⁴

The higher the pragmatic content and the lower the ideological content of a decision-maker's image, the more successful he will be in choosing alignment partners which will maximize his state's capabilities.

This hypothesis is confirmed by the data. Bhutto's views of the United States, the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union were filtered through a Marxist framework which tended to create a more rigidly structured image of these three powers. Because Bhutto was preoccupied with resisting "neo-imperialist domination," he was deeply impressed by China's ability to confront both super-powers in the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War. Consequently, he overestimated the diplomatic support which China gave to Pakistan and underestimated his country's dependence on the U.S. for military hardware. Ayub's image was less ideological, more fluid and decidedly more pragmatic. With his practical experience in military matters, Ayub fostered an alignment policy which was better suited to Pakistan's security needs.

⁴This hypothesis has already been formulated in a slightly different form:

Decision-makers in setting out foreign policy goals do not consciously articulate an image of the possible because they equate objectives with reality. This disposition is more pronounced in decision-makers with a high ideological motivation.

See M. Brecher, India and World Politics, op. cit., p. 335.

Hypothesis IIIc

A decision-maker's success in forming alignments which will maximize his state's capabilities will be undermined if he chooses an alignment partner whose fundamental goals are incompatible with his own.

This hypothesis is confirmed if it is applied to Pakistan's alliance with the United States. After 1962, the priorities of the Pakistani and American leaders vis-à-vis India were at such variance that they could not be resolved simply by increased understanding of the others' position. Therefore, Ayub and Bhutto became convinced that their fundamental foreign policy goals were incompatible with those of the American policy-makers.

On the question of Sino-Pakistan and Soviet-Pakistan alignments, the hypothesis is neither confirmed nor negated. We can only suggest a distinction between three types of goals which may aid in characterizing these alignments. First, there are identical goals or those common interests between two states which are based on broad policy agreements. Second, there are converging goals which are based on reciprocal advantages operating at several specific but circumscribed levels of interaction. Third, there are incompatible goals or goals which are necessarily antagonistic since they cannot be achieved simultaneously by both parties. These three types of goals are based on a simple proposition: all alignments must be viewed as part of a dynamic process of diverse interests and purposes. Whether, and for how long, alignments will suit the purposes of a particular nation-state will depend upon the strength of the goals underlying them as opposed to the strength of other goals of

the nation concerned. During the 1962-65 period, the objectives of the Pakistan leaders were not identical with those of the Chinese and Soviet leaders but they did converge at several important points. Only the future will reveal whether Pakistan's alignments with these two states will continue to be compatible with the overall policies within which they are expected to operate.

c. Guidelines for Future Research

The primary sources which were used to reconstruct the images of Ayub Khan and Bhutto can be divided into two categories. The first includes those works which were written as the events were occurring. The second includes the works which refer to these same events but which were written at a later point in time. Although both types of primary sources were used in this study, future analysts should be aware that discrepancies may occur between these two types of sources and it is the second type which presents graver problems.

In writing several years after an event, the decision-maker may consciously or unconsciously misrepresent his original perceptions. A deliberate distortion of past perceptions might occur for many reasons such as a desire to explain away past failures. On the other hand, the leader's attitudes may have changed with the result that he himself is not aware that his perspective on early events has shifted. As long as the researcher is aware of these difficulties, they need not be insurmountable. While major discrepancies were not apparent in this particular study, an important future research task would be to analyze each

type of source separately and to compare the extent of divergence between them.

This paper was divided into two analytically distinct segments: the process of foreign policy formation and the outcomes or success of policy decisions. In the realm of policy formation, the belief systems of both Ayub Khan and Bhutto were shown to be crucial in the sequence of decisions that were made; through an understanding of their personal predispositions, we were able to understand that each leader viewed Pakistan's problems in his own particular way. Although Ayub Khan held the reigns of power and determined the ultimate course of Pakistan's foreign policy, the images of Bhutto gave us an insight into the pressures that were being put upon the former President. Although we did not study the actual bargaining process which took place between these two decision-makers behind the scenes, we do have some insight into what must have occurred simply by understanding the differing ways each man viewed the world and Pakistan's position in it.

Elite images will not exhibit a one to one relationship with the content of decisions because of this bargaining process. Moreover, if future research is to become more rigorous, it will be necessary to examine the composition of the entire decision-making elite. Only by studying the group dynamics of decision-making can we assign proper weight to each decision-maker. In short, we cannot be content to explore only the content of elite images but must go beyond this to weight the influence of each leader—not for the entire range of foreign policy formation but in close relationship to the particular issue being studied.

The second segment of the analysis comprised the outcomes of policy choices. In assessing whether or not decision-makers are successful in achieving their goals, it will be necessary to examine the communications network within and across political systems. Governmental leaders are dependent on processes of communication. Therefore, the accuracy and degree of completeness in the flow of information which reaches the decision-maker are important factors which can be utilized to evaluate the outcomes of policy choices.

In addition, the process of implementing foreign policy decisions also merits closer attention if degrees of success are to be ascertained. A policy decision must be translated ultimately into a specific course of action. Even if a decision-maker perceives his environment with some degree of accuracy, there may be difficulties in carrying out his policies. In this sphere, the leader is dependent upon the skills of many persons who are in charge of the execution of policy. These include members of the bureaucracy, the diplomatic corps and the military establishment. Thus, in attempting to understand why decision-makers do not reach their goals, we would wish to measure not only the gap between the desirable and the possible but also the gap between what is possible and what is actually implemented.

The structure of the international system must also be explored. Dramatic or unexpected changes in the international system could serve to preclude the realization of elite goals; these changes must be studied in order to evaluate the autonomous impact of the international system on policy outcomes.

Finally, a more rigorous analysis of policy outcomes would require that a distinction be made between short and long term success. We found that the Pakistani elite geared their policies towards achieving immediate goals and we limited ourselves to assessing their short term success. However, this may not be true of other decision-makers. Therefore, the analysis of outcomes would be sharpened if we were to construct a scale to measure short-term successes and failures and their consequences for the long-range pattern of a country's foreign policy.

The entire presentation was an attempt to examine, in depth, a cluster of foreign policy decisions through the images held by two members of the Pakistani foreign policy elite. Despite theoretical and methodological obstacles to rigorous analysis, the study of elite images and their degree of correspondence to the environment provides a viable and researchable key to explain both the process of foreign policy formation and the outcomes of policy choices.

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