THE CONCEPT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL MATURITY IN THE LIGHT OF THE CHRISTIAN ESTIMATE OF MAN

A Thesis

by

John Winston Kerr

Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Sacred Theology.

McGill University

1960

CONTENTS

- - - - - -

INTRODUCTION

It is the purpose of this thesis to examine the concept of psychological maturity in the light of the Chrisitan estimate of man. Over the past thirty years the term maturity has become part of the idiom of the day. In the strictly biological sense maturity means the teaching of a terminal point on a scale of growth. An animal is mature when it has reached the point of growth at which it can fulfil the fundamental functions of maintaining itself, and reproducing its species. Its growth towards maturity can be judged at any moment by these criteria. The concept of psychological maturity carries overtones of this meaning, in greater or lesser degree, according to the theory of human personality which gives it form.

But there are many different schools of personality theory, and each school is divided into a number of groups each of which puts forth a different theory of human growth and development. They all have much in common. Disagreement is not so much disagreement about observable fact as disagreement about the nature of man. Some psychologists will not even admit that man has a nature to disagree about. Any theory of personality will keep close to the objective facts, but the way in which the facts are interpreted, and the implications drawn from them, will depend upon prior philosophical assumptions. Only a rigid positivist will regard his theory as the logical result of empirical observation. Unfortunately, many psychologists seem to suffer from perpetual inferiority feelings because the subject of their

investigations is man. They are more enthusiastic about having their discipline accepted as an empirical science, than about giving an adequate account of the existential richness of human being and human life.

The empirical, or objective psychologies employ both mechanical models and biological models as paradigms of human nature. Behaviourist psychologies are mechanistic. The organism has a few elemental tissue needs and innate reflexes. The whole of human behaviour can be explained in terms of the organism's search to satisfy its primary innate needs. Society steers the primary drives towards culturally approved satisfactions, and thus creates the secondary drives that mark human life and society. Thus the organism 'learns' its behaviour. Other behaviourist schools grant the organism a more active part in satisfying tissue needs. All human behaviour is an elaboration of the organism's activity to maintain the stability of its internal environment. Granting man as man nothing that is his own, these psychologies postulate maturity as an adequate adjustment.

Organismic psychology also uses a biological model to interpret human nature. The organism is moved by but one drive, the drive to actualise itself, to leave, as it were, its form upon its environment. Maturity, therefore, is that stage in the organism's life when it achieves completion, and all its parts are united and active in its realisation of itself. Transposed into more humane terms this sets the goal of growth as a full life in which all a man's powers

and abilities find full expression, unhindered by any frustration arising out of a sense of his own inadequacy.

The concept of psychological maturity originated in medical psychology, yet there is little explicit attention given to it in psychiatric literature.[1] Harry Stack Sullivan, the American psychiatrist, has said that human maturity is not a psychiatric problem, for it is not accessible to psychiatric examination. The people who manifest most maturity do not consult psychiatrists, and as soon as patients progress towards maturity, they remove themselves from psychiatrists' observation. The subject of psychological maturity has been left to the authors of popular books on personality psychology. One of them, Overstreet, has written grandiloquently of the concept of maturity as, "the master concept of our time". It is "central to our whole enterprise of living. This is what our past wisdoms have been leading up to"[2] That the concept is "central to our whole enterprise of living,"all psychiatrists would agree,- if only they could discover what maturity is.

The medical version of the concept of maturity has grown out of the study of immaturity. It is closely linked with the theories of arrested development and regression. The popular usage of the term reflects its origins, for it has become the fashion to describe certain attitudes, tastes, and types of behaviour as immature without explicit reference to any positive meaning that maturity might have. Both 'regression' and 'arrested development' are mechanical processes set in motion by the degree of anxiety the environment evokes in the

individual. The amount of anxiety any one individual can bear and still function efficiently, depends upon his childhood experiences of love and affection. Too little or too much will handicap his growth to adulthood. In adult life, if he has to cope with more anxiety than his up-bringing has fitted him to bear, he will try to deal with his problems in a manner that would be more appropriate to an earlier stage of development. As, for example, when an adult reacts to frustration or thwarting with a temper tantrum.

The genetic approach to human growth assumes that certain well defined psychological attitudes accompany each phase of biological development. A person is ripe psychologically when he has outgrown the dependency and explosive hostilities of childhood; is ready to assume the responsibilities of parenthood; has come through the awkwardness and competitiveness of adolescence with a high degree of self-confidence; can control his aggressive impulses; is able to centre his interests in his environment rather than himself; and in general accepts himself for what he is, and the world for what it is. These characteristics predominate in a mature person: they do not exist absolutely.

But the individual plays little or no conscious part in his growth towards maturity. His development depends upon circumstances that are external to himself. His psychological well-being in later life is set, for weal or for woe, during the plastic days of early childhood. He cannot be held wholly responsible for what he does with himself. But given a decent environment in child-

hood with the right amount of affectionhis life will unfold in a satisfactory pattern.

There are other medical psychologies that give the concept of maturity the status of a value judgment. These are the schools that give more attention to man as a social being than to man as a biological organism. The Neo-Freudians, the Adlerians, and the disciples of Harry Stack Sullivan are the principle representatives of the medico-social psychologies. Sullivan does not grant the individual any part in the formation of his character. He is merely the index of the treatment he has received at the hands of society represented by his interpersonal relations. The Neo-Freudians and the Adlerians speak of human maturity in terms of human qualities such as the ability to love, to work productively, and to take responsibility for oneself and others. They enclose, however, the human capacity for self-determination in a very narrow room. Finally, the new school of Existential psychotherapy makes freedom the essential characteristic of human nature, and this will have a profound influence upon the concept of maturity. In fact it will probably dissolve the concept, for it is an unpardonable philosophic solecism to mention concept and existential in the same breath.

We have gathered our material for this thesis from primary references only. We propose to discuss ten representative psychologies and include some reference to existential psychology. We

shall put three questions to our material. What, if any, is the image of the full grown man in the psychological sciences? How does he attain maturity? How does the psychological image of the mature man stand beside the image of man in the Christian revelation?

The Christian revelation estimates man as in a measure responsible for transforming his fate into a destiny. It places him in the context of a creative purpose to which he can give his 'yea' or 'nea'. Man, therefore, possesses a measure of self-determination. There is no upper limit to his development as a person, for he has been created to bear the likeness of his creator. The criticisms we shall offer in the course of the first few chapters, will be made from the point of view that man is a self-determining being. In the last chapter we shall try to see him within the context of his Creation and Re-creation, and confront the psychological 'image of man' with man created and re-created in the image and glory of God.

CHAPTER I

THE PSYCHOLOGICALLY ADJUSTED MAN

1

Man is a nucleus of biologic life. From the biological point of view he is a complicated animal who has emerged from simpler forms of life, but who in physical and mental behaviour is essentially like them. Man, as a biological organism, is a community of millions of cells living together more or less successfully as one individual. At every moment the organism engages in ceaseless activity to maintain the stability of its internal environment. The internal environment, now known as homeostasis, distinguishes the organism from its surroundings by maintaining a more or less constant pattern of chemical properties. Sugar, calcium, salt, protein, oxygen and water in the blood stream are held within well defined limits to fairly constant amounts. The temperature of the blood and of the general internal environment varies slightly. The organism also has a strong tendency to resist change and decay. It is in continuous interaction with its external environment where chemical and thermal characteristics vary greatly, but it still maintains its stability and identity in a constant relationship with changing surroundings. In a normal environment, the organism maintains its own internal environment by a complex of processes which constitute the adaptation of the organism to its environment. Whenever this balance is disturbed by changes in the chemical composition or temperature of the environment, regulatory processes are set in motion within the organism, involving the sympathetic nervous system, the endocrine glands, the functioning of the liver, kidneys, bone marrow, heart and lungs,

to re-establish homeostatic equilibrium. If these processes fail to preserve homeostasis, the organism dies. At all times, in order to maintain inner equilibrium, and therefore its life, it must put forth tremendous activity in which the various organic functions are co-ordinated. Two concepts arise out of the organism's need to keep its internal environment in a state of equilibrium. One is the concept of tissue needs, and the other visceral tension or inner stimuli. The organism has six essential needs: the need for food as a source of energy; the need for keeping intact the fluid matrix of the body, for the organs and processes can work only when surrounded by alkaline fluids; the need for oxygen; the need to maintain body temperature within narrow but well-defined limits; the need to rid the body of its waste products from food, and to expel carbon dioxide; and lastly, the need for rest pauses in order that the processes of rebuilding tissue might catch up with its depletion through activity. These needs force the organism into contact with its external environment, and the processes by which it interacts with the outside world in order to supply continually depleting tissue needs, are known as behaviour.

An organism experiences a break in the biological equilibrium as tension, which arises in the body as a tissue need grows. The longer a need remains unsatisfied the stronger it grows, and the more the visceral tensions increase. These tensions are caused by physiological changes within the body. The uncomfortable sensations of hunger, for example, are caused by the contracting of the smooth muscle in the wall of the stomach. Thirst, originating in the sensations of dryness

in the tissues of the mucous membranes of the mouth and throat, is a signal that the body's fluid content has been reduced. Pressures within the body set in motion the appropriate processes, such as urination or defecation, to relieve them. It is not wholly clear how the glandular secretions work as signals of organic needs, but there seems to be little doubt that by regulating the body chemistry they act as the stimuli of behaviour. The tendency of the organism to maintain the stability of its internal environment seems to be the primary dynamic force in every living being at the biological level. Disequilibrium produces a state of tension within the body, which is experienced as painful or unpleasant sensations, which in turn act as inner stimuli to the type of behaviour that will reduce tension, and restor homeostasis.

A stimulus which becomes strong enough to impel action is a drive. The elemental necessity of the organism to maintain itself and reproduce its kind, gives rise to internal stimuli that have an impelling intensity.[2] These are generally known as primary or innate drives. Hunger, thirst, pain, and sex are examples of primary drives, and their strength depends upon the intensity of the needs that underly them. The effect of innate drives upon human beings can be seen only when society breaks down under the weight of war, famine, revolution or 'act of God'. In the West, primary drives usually find satisfaction before they reach agonizing strength. The one possible exception is the sex drive, which can gain painful strength before it finds socially approved reduction in marriage. As the human being grows, so the Behaviourists claim, he also acquires a large number of secondary drives. These learned drives

are acquired on the basis of the primary drives, represent elaborations of them, and serve as a facade behind which the functions of the underlying innate drives are hidden.

The unity of the physiological organism, the forces involved in its acting upon, and re-acting to the environment, are the organic determinants of human personality. For some psychologists they are the sole determinants; for others, they are channeled by the cultural milieu into definite patterns of stimulus and response.

Dollard and Millar[3] have constructed a method of psychotherapy based upon the theory that the responses which become habitual are those which have been 'rewarded' by a reduction in the intensity of the drive. The organism 'learns' to respond to stimuli that afford the greatest amount of tension release.

According to Dollard and Millar[4] the four most important elements in learning are drive, cue, response, and reinforcement. The child at birth has a number of reflexes, some primary drives, and an innate hierarchy of responses. The primary drives move the individual to act, but they do not direct the action. 'Cues' gradually take over the direction of behaviour from the reflexes and hierarchy of responses. "Drive impels a person to respond. Cues determine when he will respond, where he will respond, and which response he will make."[5]

Cues are stimuli to which the individual has learned to make specific and habitual responses. Reinforcement or reward strengthens the bond between the cue stimulus and the response. In order to establish a lasting and effective connection, the reward must not only

satisfy the acquired drives but the primary ones as well.

Every individual develops a hierarchy of responses. Language, and culture with its codes of socially acceptable behaviour are the principle agents in determining the order of responses. Specific responses can be linked to words. The same word might elicit a very different order of responses depending upon the situation the word describes. On the other hand the same situation can evoke different orders of responses depending upon the term that names it. A situation described as 'menacing' will call forth a different order of responses when it is described as 'fun'.

There are two types of responses, the instrumental and the cue-producing. The first class of responses consist of simple automatic habits: thought plays no part: they are direct responses to simple cues in the external environment or to internal drives. Cue-producing responses lead to other responses, and they in turn stimulate still other responses. The last link in the chain of responses is the response that issues in action. The chain of internal responses leading to action is commonly called a train of thought. Reasoning, therefore, is essentially a mechanical function.

Language stamps society's impress upon the individual. Words, sentences, and the non-verbal language of imagery act as symbolic stimuli to which all kinds of responses can be reinforced, and by which they can be evoked. Since language originates in society, and since all behaviour is learned behaviour under the tutorage of the prevailing culture, an understanding of human development requires a knowledge

of the conditions of learning. The social anthropologist and the psychologist enrich each other's data.

Dollard and Millar's learning theory sketched briefly here, is an attempt to modify, and simplify Hull's reinforcement theory in order to use it effectively in psychotherapy. Beginning with the behaviourist concepts of stimulus-response psychology the authors extend their theory to include Freudian notions of the unconscious, repression, displacement, and conflict. Objective psychology and Freudian mentalism are not such incongruous partners as they might at first appear to be. Freudian 'wish' and behaviourist 'drive' spring from the same state of somatic excitation. The super-ego, which according to Freudian theory originates in society and transforms organic needs (libido) into sublimated forms, has many features that are similar to those processes of socialization and learning that elaborate primary drives into secondary ones.

Man as a being with characteristics peculiarly his own has little place in behaviourist theories of personality and its development. Man is an animal, and so the prototype for investigating the fundamental elements in human behaviour should be an animal. "Humans have the added capacity of speech and symbolic behaviour, with the accompanying advantages of the higher mental processes. Whether this introduces any primary behavioural laws remains to be determined".[6] Consequently, Hull chose the simple white rat hoping that against the background of carefully controlled experiment, it would yield a fundamental knowledge of the core of human behaviour.

Human nature, in this view, is no more than an extension of the physio-

logical processes by which the organism satisfies its basic tissue needs. Learning and socialization direct and shape the primary strivings towards the goals which culture offers for their fulfilment. The response becomes specific and habitual when it is rewarded, or reinforced by a reduction in drive stimulus, and a resultant release from tension. The core of human personality is therefore a hierarchy of habits. Indeed, the concept of habit as a stable stimulus-response connection is a pivotal concept in this theory. By implication, a mature person is one who has learned a hierarchy of habits that will ensure his functional well-being as he interacts with his physical and social environment. The cultural milieu writes the recipe for his personality. The rich variety of human types owes its wealth, not to anything unique within the individual, but to the fact that "each has learned a different combination of motives and values under the different conditions of life to which he has been exposed."

Stephen Neill has asked the question: What does a psychotherapist try to do? Dollard and Millar would answer that they try to teach the patient new responses to stimuli so that he can maintain an harmonious interaction with his social environment. The yardstick is the 'normal'. 'Normal' is used as a synonym for 'conventional', or 'average', and in accordance with behaviourist empiricism, average can only mean the statistically average. "Of particular interest are the changes that occur in a neurotic person during and after psychotherapy. After therapy he is indistinguishable from the mine run of people".[8] Conventional people do not think of (and do not need to think of) unconventional things. Normal people have made the useful discriminations. . . .

in normal people the repressions and inhibitions of the individual coincide with the mores of the group."[9]

The word 'normal' is the adjectival form of the noun 'norm', and means a criterion, that against which something else can be measured or judged. The norm of human nature should be human nature with all its capacities in fullest manifestation. Trotter has made a pertinent criticism of psycho-analysis which is equally relevant here. "If once the statistically normal mind is accepted as being synonymous with the psychologically healthy mind (this is the mind to which the full capacities are available for us) a standard is set up which has a most fallacious appearance of objectivity. The statistically normal mind can be regarded only as a mind that has responded in the usual way to the moulding and deforming influence of its environment - that is, to human standards of discipline, taste, and morality. If it is looked upon as typically healthy also, the current human standards, of whose influence it is a product, must necessarily be accepted as qualified to call forth the best in the developing mind they mould"[10]

Three hundred years before Pavlov, Watson and Hall,[11] John Locke stated the philosophical assumptions underlying their psychology. The mind of the new-born infant is like a blank sheet of paper upon which the world begins to write its impressions. Sensation and reason are the two pathways by which knowledge travels, and consequently all knowledge comes from experience.

Our knowledge of physical objects can be divided into three different categories. First, there are the characteristics that are

essential to the nature of objects which Locke called the primary qualities. These he named as "solidity, extension, figure and mobility".[12] Secondly, the qualities which are not essential to the nature of the object such as colour, smell, sound, hardness, softness, texture and pain, he terms secondary qualities. A third classification consists of the tertiary qualities, powers that inhere in objects enabling them to make changes in other objects as, for example, the power of fire to change the consistency of wax, or produce a new colour. All these qualities enter the mind by means of motion caused by the object which stimulates the appropriate senses, and sends impulses along the nerve pathways to the brain.

Knowledge of reality can be constructed only on the basis of information provided by the primary qualities. Sense experience of the secondary qualities is illusory. They do not exist out 'there' in the object in the same form as I experience them. They are the result of the impact upon my mind of primary qualities. In other words, there is no direct correspondence between the secondary qualities as I experience them and the object from which they come. Our experience of primary qualities, however, corresponds directly to the characteristics of the external objects which give them rise in our minds.

Simple ideas of primary qualities combine in a regular relationship to form complex ideas. Of these the two most important are causality and substance. When certain ideas occur repeatedly in regular succession we infer that the first is the cause of the second: when a number of ideas regularly occur together we infer that they belong to

the same thing or substance. The fundamental unit in our knowledge of reality, accordingly, is the simple idea.

This way of thinking provides the philosophical context for much of the contemporary psychology of Britain and America. Man is regarded as merely a reactive organism. The simple units of reflex and habits are the keystones of his growth and development. Every essential feature of his nature can be studied without loss in a simpler species such as the rat. The goal of growth for the complex human animal is not essentially different from that of his simpler kinsmen, namely, adjustment to the social and physical environment through adaptive behaviour.

The terms 'adjustment' and 'maladjustment', as Snygg and Combes point out, are terms from an external frame of reference. "They . . . describe behaviour as it appears to an outside observer. More often than not they are applied to evaluations to which an individual's behaviour conforms to social expediency."[13] Objective psychology cannot go beyond the measurable and quantitative if it insists on remaining true to its concept of itself as an empirical science. At the same time some criteria of adequate and inadequate adjustment would appear to be necessary.

In psychological literature two goals of adjustment are commonly represented. There is the satisfaction felt by the individual about the adjustment he is making, and there is the degree to which the individual's behaviour conforms to the expectations of society. The first criterion of felt satisfaction indicates the completion of the process of adjustment. When the individual is thwarted while pursuing a course

of motivated behaviour towards an end-result, he makes varied responses until he overcomes the obstacle, and is able to carry on as before. The chief steps in the adjustment sequence, therefore, are motive, thwarting, and varied responses which lead to tension reduction or solution. "From the psychological point of view the sole criterion of what constitutes the solution of a problem is tension reduction."[14] The second criterion, as we have already seen, is implied in the behaviourist idea of learned responses, and the statistical concept of the normal. "The principle factor in growth or maturation is learning. It is the only factor aside from the physical development of the body, including, of course the nervous system and the glands."[15] Since society provides the cues and rewards the responses, conformity to the social mores will determine the quality of adjustment.

Nevertheless the problem of what constitutes a good adjustment continues to trouble some psychologists. Shaffer dealing with this problem writes: "The problem of what constitutes a good adjustment is a very difficult one for which there is no single answer. Good and bad are essentially ethical concepts and have no place in the realm of science . . . . As a scientist the psychologist can ignore any consideration of good and bad and can think of so-called maladjustment as a certain kind of behaviour . . . . To the psychiatrist or clinical psychologist, however, a maladjustment is an ailment to be remedied. Like the physician, he is called upon not only to investigate but also to judge and modify behaviour."[16]

Shaffer, nonetheless, attempts to formulate a psychological cri-

terion of adjustment. He rejects the satisfaction of needs and motives considered as the satisfaction of one motive at a time, for "the unlimited satisfaction of one drive may severely thwart the achievement of other ends."[17] It is this "uneveness of satisfactions that underlies many, if not all, cases of maladjustment."[18] He continues:

> "For a person to satisfy all his motives with regard for their function as an interrelated system, is good adjustment. To achieve this requires unified and integrated behaviour, the presence or absence of which provides what is perhaps the clearest distinction between good or poor adjustment."[19]

But the concept of unified and integrated behaviour is not wholly adequate. Thus . . . .

> "the concept of individual integration must, however, be supplemented with one of integration in society. When the interrelated motives of a person are satisfied without undue emphasis or slighting of any one motive, and when this is achieved with consideration for the adjustments of other persons, then a state of good adjustment may be said to exist."[20]

In 1942 E. C. Tolman[21] wrote an essay called 'Drives Towards War' in which he upheld the thesis that the world was ready for a new myth, the myth of The Psychologically Adjusted Man. Tolman based his claim on Peter Drucker's[22] thesis that since the beginning of Christianity, Western Europe had been dominated by four successive concepts which represented a certain type of man, and a certain form of social life as ideal. The concepts, which Tolman calls myths, point the way to individual happiness and welfare. Drucker's four types of man are, The Spiritual Man of early Christianity and the Middle Ages; The Intellectual Man of the Renaissance; The Economic Man of both dogmatic capitalism and equally dogmatic socialism; and the myth of The Heroic Man of Fascism. The myth of The Psychologically Adjusted Man was Tolman's own contribution to Drucker's thesis.

The Psychologically Adjusted Man is

> "the concept, that only when man's total psychology is understood and all his absolutely necessary psychological needs are allowed balanced satisfaction will a society permitting relatively universal happiness and welfare be achieved and war abolished. It is the myth (or rather, I dare hope the ultimately true concept) that man is, societally speaking, not a spiritual, intellectual, economic, or heroic being, but rather an integrated complex the entirety of whose psychological nature must be understood if general happiness and welfare are to result."[23]

[24]

Edward Tolman's behaviourism is more purposive than that of Hull and the Stimulus-Response school. The distinction between his theories and those of Hull is usually held to be due to the opposition between cognitive and Stimulus-Response theories. He was the first to formulate clearly the concept of intervening variables, and to introduce the idea of 'sign-Gestalt expectancy', now know more briefly as 'expectancy'. This principle states that with the appearance of certain signs the organism expects a certain goal to manifest itself if it follows the usual behaviour pattern. If it reaches its goal the expectation is confirmed. If it does not, the organism may vary its behaviour. The principle still chains the organism to the stimulus. We behave according to our expectancies, or in other words, according to the clues we have learned.

In 'Drives Towards War' Tolman combines certain Freudian notions with concepts derived from the study of rats and chimpanzees, and applies them to the problems of human society, especially the problem of war. Like all behaviourists, he assumes that the sole driving forces in human beings are those which man shares with the lower animals. He classifies these biological drives under two headings, the appetites and the aversions. Under 'appetites' he lists hunger drives, thirst drive, sex drive, maternal

drive, nurturance drive, infantile dependence drive, nest-building drive and general activity drive, general exploratory drive, rest or sleep drive, elimination drives, and play and aesthetic drives. The 'aversions' cover fright (injury-avoidance), aggression (obstruction-avoidance) and gregariousness (isolation-avoidance).

Secondary or social drives are essentially instrumental in character, and have developed partly through evolution, and partly through individual experience. Tolman prefers the term 'social techniques' in order to emphasize that they serve the function of providing greater satisfaction for the primary biological drives. He groups the social techniques into four sub-classes namely: Self-assertive Techniques, Self-Abasive Techniques, Collective Techniques, and Collective-Assertive Techniques. All human individuals seem to inherit certain seminal propensities towards self-assertion, self-abasement, collectivity, and towards collective assertion. But there is much more evidence "that most individuals can be extraordinarily moulded as far as their social techniques are concerned by the requirements of the given culture".[25]

The individual 'learns' which type of social technique will be instrumental to the greatest amount of satisfaction in a given environment for the biological drives. When the environment changes, and the learned instrumental relationship becomes inadequate, new learning takes place, that is to say, the individual discovers which social technique will afford the greatest satisfaction in the new conditions. "Learning is thus a 'reasonable' activity which tends to keep the individual well adjusted to the actual environment realities".[26]

Besides the biological drives and their auxiliary social techniques, there are certain psychological dynamisms which act as mechanisms, or 'channels' through which the energy generated by the biological drives is discharged into final acts of behaviour. When the biological drives are frustrated, the individual resorts to the social techniques to overcome the thwarting. Learning and the psychological dynamisms 'steer' the energy from the frustrated drives into the specific techniques and consequent behaviour. Tolman names nine such dynamisms which he has taken over from Freud. Fixation, Repression, Reaction-Formation, Introjection, Symbolization, Displacement, Identification with parents or other adults, Identification with the group, and Projection. These dynamisms, unlike learning, "tend to persist in hardened and blind form."

We have already seen that a crucial factor in the adjustment process is the conquest of obstacles in the environment that thwart the natural course of the biological drives. These supply all the basic energy. When they are frustrated the individual will, because of the processes of learning and fixation, resort to either self-assertive techniques or collective techniques, or move from one to the other depending upon the environmental circumstances. If the self-assertive propensities are frustrated, there are a number of alternative techniques. A child, for example, punished by his parents for bumptiousness, may identify himself with his parents or parent surrogates. He will then direct his self-assertion into socially approved channels by doing the things his parents and other authorities approve. But he may not be able to achieve such an identification. Punishment then will lead through learning and re-

pression to self-abasive techniques, which always appear at the cost of repressing hostility against the parents, and other dominant figures.

Self-abasive techniques together with the accompanying repression of hostility work a sorry rash of ills. They may express themselves by means of a re-action formation in a compulsion for the reverse type of behaviour, such as over-solicitude and sentimentality. Through introjection, that is to say, by taking into himself the punitive attitudes of others, the individual will develop hostility towards himself, and express it in self-punishing behaviour. Or all authorities may become symbols of his parents, and he will give vent to his hostility in crime and general anti-social tactics. The hostility may become displaced from its original object, and take the form of aggression against inferiors. If the individual identifies himself with a Group, he may project his hostility onto those outside his group in the sort of aggression of which war is the most disastrous example.

Having described the psychological background to the major maladjustments that bring upon the world most of its horrors, Tolman finds salvation in the myth of The Psychologically Adjusted Man. This man will be the product of a society that will embody six principles. We shall let Tolman speak for himself.

"1) The biological needs are basic and must be satisfied in all individuals.
2) Both the Self-Assertive Techniques and the Collective Techniques are instrumentally useful means toward the biological satisfactions, and both are to be accepted as equally appropriate and necessary types of activity.
3) The Self-abasive Techniques, because of their accompanying repressed hostilities which tend to come out in individually and socially disruptive activities are bad. Self-abasement and accompanying repression are to be reduced to a minimum.

4) Good identifications with parents or other accepted authorities are, on the other hand, to be encouraged.
5) Group loyalty (the Collective-Assertive Technique) appears to be something to which human beings, like chimpanzees, are tremendously prone. We probably cannot diminish or obviate such loyalties. We must try instead to redirect them into more useful and less harmful channels.
6) Instead of permitting such group loyalties to express themselves primarily in wars between nations, we must redirect them into the mere policing of recalcitrant subgroups, and into campaigns against hostile nature."[26a]

Tolman suggests three practical steps for bringing about a society that will live under the myth of The Psychologically Adjusted Man.

"a) We must evolve an economic order which will abolish too great biological frustration.
b) We must invent an educational, and social system which encourages and makes possible easy identification with parents, or other acceptable authorities.

c) We must create a supranational state to which individuals, wherever they may be, can become more loyal than they then will be to their narrower national groups." [27]

Whether or not Tolman's thesis is wholly convincing, it is not necessary for us to decide. There is a great deal of sound wisdom in some of his suggestions for the building of a society that will place fewer obstacles in the way of men becoming mature. Nevertheless, the implications of his case are questionable. Man is pushed by the energy of his drives into the channels cut for him by the society in which he lives. He himself has no energy beyond his drives, and no purpose other than the pursuit of culturally designed satisfactions for his basic biological needs. If this is to, The Psychologically Adjusted Man turns out to be a well-fed member of a docile animal species.

Stimulus-Response psychology does not take into account the dynamic processes of the organism itself, nor does it recognise the fact that an

organism behaves in response to its own needs.[27a] Symonds in his popular textbook, 'The Dynamics of Human Adjustment', bases his concepts entirely upon biology. His views have much in common with the Stimulus-Response schools, but he goes beyond them in his belief in the self-propelling activities of the organism. Man's psychic dynamism is contained in a tendency to equilibrium and repose. The loss of equilibrium causes tension and activity to restore homeostasis. A condition of displeasure rises out of the break in equilibrium. Activity is stimulated by the force which tends to hold the internal environment in balance, and thus put an end to the painful state of tension. Man, therefore, in his essential nature tends towards a state of repose and dynamic equilibrium.

Against this biological background Symonds has worked out the dynamics of adjustment. The goal of adjustment is normality, and the normal person is one in whom there is a "balance between the drives, the ego restraints, the superego restraints or urges, and the defenses against anxiety."[28] Normality and maturity are 'synonymous', but they cannot be fixed concepts for "there is no limit to the extent to which a person can socialize his tendencies, learn to tolerate frustration, gain wider understanding of reality, learn to love more objectively".[29] The crux of the adjustment problem lies in the resolution of conflicts between inner and outer demands. The mature person finds a fruitful compromise between inner impulses, urges and wishes, and the demands of social living.

There is no universal goal of adjustment; "rather each individual must work the most adequate and satisfying adjustment possible for him".[30] The quality of anyone's adjustment must be judged in terms of ability to

work, play, and love, to feel happy and contented, to accept reality, to express one's emotions freely, to exhibit normal inhibitions, rather than in terms of patterning "behaviour according to any set formula or standards". Symond's, nonetheless, sets certain criteria of good adjustment which are not objective standards, but rather subjective criteria for ensuring the relatively smooth functioning of the individual in relationship to his total environment. We shall tabulate them thus:-

1) Personality Intergration. (freedom from inner conflict)
2) Ego-Development - Effective Intelligence
3) Acceptance of Reality
4) Responsibility for Self
5) Emotional expression
   a) Happiness and Pleasure in Life - Subjective sense of well-being
   b) Relaxation
   c) Ability to love
6) Social Relationship
   a) Good rapport with others
   b) Not too unlike the group in which he lives
   c) Recognition of others
   d) Capacity to Enjoy Society of other sex
   e) Extroversion better than introversion
7) Consistancy of Personality
8) Adaptability
9) Adequate Gratification of Bodily Desires
10) Emotional Perception of World
11) Recognition of Capacities and Limitations
12) Capacity to Refrain from Self-injury
13) Ability to Accept Love
14) Adequate Drive.[31]

It is surely pertinent to question '6 (b)' and to ask how it is possible not to be too unlike the group in which one lives without accepting the set standards of that group?

At this point another question, which we have already skirted in dealing with Shaffer's effort to find some criteria of good adjustment, arises. To what extent can psychology be a normative science? If it is purely empirical then it has no business setting up norms or criteria. A normative dis-

cipline develops standards of good and bad, of right and wrong for the regulation and control of behaviour, adjustment, personality development, health and the like. There are several normative sciences that seek to regulate human conduct such as ethics and mental hygiene, and the formation of norms could be left to these. But psychology deals with psychological and psychosocial phenomena which are regulated by their own laws and principles independently of other normative disciplines. This fact alone might justify a normative psychology.

> "The goal of psychology" Allport has written, "is to reduce discord among our philosophies of man and to establish a scale of probable truth, so that we may feel increasingly certain that one interpretation is truer than another."[32]

This goal, he concludes, probably lies far in the future. Will the goal ever be achieved if the moral and ethical dimension is at worst ignored, or at best regarded as identical with cultural norms? Symonds has stated that

> "moral values are identical with the cultural norms, and that meaning of adjustment as conformity is the moral meaning . . . cultures vary and consequently moral values do not have the universal nature which from time to time they have had attributed to them." [33]

[34]
Louttit sets forth certain criteria without any reference to ethical norms as such:

> "In order to define deviating behaviour it is necessary to accept some description of average normal behaviour. This can be formulated only in terms of social adaptability and acceptance. Evidently a definition in social terms will depend upon the society that sets the standards . . . .
>
> "Most simply stated, the requirements for average normal behaviour in our culture include:1) a physical organism physiologically and anatomically adequate to maintain its own living processes, and to carry out necessary receptor co-ordinating, and response functions.

> 2) Abilities, both in the nature of so-called general intelligence and in specific attitudes, sufficient to enable the individual to acquire the knowledge and skills necessary to secure and retain a position significant to the broad socio-economic needs; 3)maturity, which involves control and direction of 'emotion' and the physiological drives to the end of the efficient functioning of the person within the group; and 4) the operation of all the foregoing in a stable, integrated total individual.

These criteria are all psychological but the implications for ethics are serious. The social mores determine whether or not a form of behaviour is deviant. Society alone decides whether or not the deviant behaviour is moral or immoral.

Again, Thorpe[35] in writing about the objectives of mental hygiene rejects an important aspect of morality.

> "Mental hygiene emphasizes the importance of satisfying human needs and assisting the individual in feeling adequate, rather than depreciating him and deflating his ego. It has dispensed with the concept of blame, and has supplanted it with that understanding of human dynamics i. e. the cause of behaviour 'good' and 'bad'.
>
> The objectives of mental hygiene include the fullest possible development of personality, as well as harmonious interpersonal relationships . . . . Mental hygiene practice is intdnded to make possible the building of personalities sufficiently well-adjusted to withstand the cross currents of stress and frustration incidental to a competitive society."

The psychological criteria mentioned in the quotations from Symonds, Louttit and Thorpe embody sound principles as far as they go. But in assessing adjustment solely from the standpoint of the functional well-being of the organism interacting with the environment, they fall into the fallacy of confusing the 'segmental' with the'total'. A total adjustment would include adjustment to man's sense of 'oughtness'. Man makes demands on himself, and has demands made upon him. He may feel,

after due reflection, that he ought to act in a way that is seemingly against his own interests or against his environment. He has a deep need to become a more adequate person in the give and take of life and to feel at one with a moral order of the world. Every time we say 'I ought' we recognize this need as an essential part of our being. There are, undoubtedly, many different analyses of 'good', 'ought' and 'right', but no matter how the nature of moral obligation is interpreted, a serious thinker cannot doubt its reality, nor its importance for the understanding of human nature.

> "Man is neither a mere automatic machine nor a capriciously free agent. He is a responsible person, obligated at times to act in opposition, both to existing environmental conditions and to his own immediate desire. In thus doing his duty - what is due or owed, what he 'ought' - he achieves his own proper being, as a human person." [36]

Psychology can establish norms for human functioning, but it will hardly succeed in doing so if its models for personality are the white rat and the chimpanzee. These animals can teach us something about the basement level of human nature, for man cannot be separated from his physiological organism. They can tell us nothing about the upper levels of human personality. It would be doubted by some animal psychologists whether the captive rat can yield much information even about the psychology of the rodent, or the imprisoned ape contribute anything to a knowledge of anthropoid psychic life. The Psychologically Adjusted Man portrayed in the Behaviourist psychologies is a sub-human creature, pushed by his drives and moulded by his environment. Having used the rat and the ape as a paradigm of human nature, the Behaviourist offers us a picture of the well-adjusted man that resembles a tamed member of both species.

The criteria of adjustment for a human being should include a number of characteristics that are commonly ignored by objective psychology. Some of these would be intellectual and emotional insight, an adequate philosophy of life and scale of values, resiliency, a realistic attitude to time, and an ability to give oneself an adequate account of one's part in society, one's moral principles, and one's religious outlook. Psychology can furnish norms for the efficient functioning of personality so that a human being might be able to fulfil his humanity. Among these criteria would be emotional stability, a sound level of integration, reasonably good achievement and efficiency, and freedom from crippling personality quirks and symptoms.

The image of man we have found in Stimulus-Response psychology and allied points of view has little relevance to democratic society or humane education. Both democracy and the humanities ask of man a measure of reason, a degree of self-determination, and some powers of critical discrimination. The stimulus-bound,cue-producing 'irritable organism' has none of these qualities. The best he can do is adjust to his tissue needs on the one hand, and the social mores on the other. The type of society to which he adjusts does not matter provided it supplies him with adequate drive reduction and tension release. It might be a tribe of cannibals, a Nazi state, a group of delinquents, a society of wife-beaters. These are minor considerations. Chacun son goût, à chacun son goût. The great business in life is drive reduction; the great task a satisfactory adjustment. Such a 'low-ceiling psychology' implies a contempt for human personality!

CHAPTER II

ORGANISMIC PSYCHOLOGY - SELF-ACTUALISING MAN

Organismic personality theory provides a richer picture of the capacities of human nature than stimulus-response psychology or any of the related behaviourist schools. While it is biologically orientated, it has room for a concept of freedom and conscious choice, and consequently for a morality which stems from a concept of human potentialities rather than a conditioned conformity to cultural norms. It has almost become a rallying ground for a reaction against mind-body dualism, faculty psychology, behaviourism, and every atomistic viewpoint. Briefly, the organismic theory maintains that there are no separate compartments within the organism; that the whole is something other than the sum of its parts; that what happens to the part happens to the whole; and that mind is not a separate entity from the body obeying different laws and discharging independent functions.

The organismic point of view is closely related to Gestalt psychology from which it has borrowed many of its concepts. Shortly before the first World War Wertheimer, Koffka and Kohler[1] led a revolt against the mental analysis then being performed by Wundt[2] and his followers. They started with the perceptual field as a whole, and proceeded to differentiate it into figure and background, and then studied how each influenced the other. They threw over the doctrine of association in learning, and substituted the concept of insight. We learn a task as a meaningful whole rather than in piecemeal fashion. Gestalt psychology has had little to say about personality as a whole.

Organismic psychology has taken its principles and extended them to include the function of the organism as a distinct unity.

The leading exponent of the organismic theory today is Kurt Goldstein. He has described his theory in two major works, The Organism, published in 1939, and Human Nature in the Light of Psychopathology. The latter work consists of the William James lectures given at Harvard University in 1938-39. As the result of his work with brain-injured soldiers during World War I and earlier research in speech disturbances, Goldstein came to the conclusion that every sympton had to be considered as a manifestation of the total organism. The organism always behaves as a whole and not as a series of differentiated parts.

> "More and more we approach the conviction that the essential element of disease is the shock to the existence of the individual caused by the disturbance of the well-regulated functioning of the organism by disease. If restoration is out of the question, the only goal of the physician is to provide the patient with the possibility of existing in spite of the defect. To do this one has to consider each single sympton in terms of its functional significance for the total personality of the patient. Thus, it is obviously necessary for the physician to know the organism as a whole, the total personality of his patient, and the change which this organism as a whole has suffered through disease." [3]

The organism is a single unit. What happens in part affects the whole.

Methods of study which investigate the functions of the separate parts of the organism have met with little success in the understanding of the organism as a whole, because the organism is more than the sum of its parts.

> "If the organism is a whole, and each section of it functions normally within that whole, then in the analytic experiment which isolates the sections as it studies them, the properties and functions of any part must be modified by their isolation from the whole organism. Thus they cannot reveal the function of these parts in normal life." [4]

Normal human nature possesses one distinctive characteristic, namely the capacity for abstraction. Goldstein studied the impairment of the abstract attitude in patients who had suffered injuries to the frontal lobes of the brain. He found that such patients could react to a simple stimulus in a simple concrete way. Their behaviour was directly determined by the stimulus. When faced with alternative courses of action they were incapable of choice, for here they had to transcend a given situation "and this is the very thing they cannot do. The lack of ability to grasp the abstract impairs all voluntary activities." [5] It cuts across all forms of behaviour. "In the concrete situation action is set going by the stimuli, in the situation involving the abstract, action is begun after preparation which has to do with a consideration of the whole situation." [6] Action is determined by the account of the situation the individual gives himself. The abstract attitude is not merely a synthesis of lower mental functions, it is a totally different activity of the organism in which conscious will is an essential factor. Goldstein speaks thus:

> .... "we have characterized the patients' deficiency in different terms - as lack of a grasp of the abstract, lack of approach to imagined things, inability to give himself an account of his own acting or thinking, inability to make a separation between the ego and the world, and lack of freedom. All these terms - - - -

> mean basically the same thing - - - the lack of an attitude towards the abstract." [7]

The organism is moved by one and only one force, the drive to self-realisation. Hunger, sex, power, achievement and so forth are not separate drives, but different expressions of the all-sovereign motive to actualise oneself.

> "The tendency to actualise itself is the motive which sets the organism going; it is the drive by which the organism is moved. This idea about drives is in contradiction to most theories of drives, which assume (1) that the goal of the drive is to release itself, to release the tension which corresponds to it, and (2) that a number of different drives exist. In my opinion both assumptions are wrong." [8]

So much has been made of tension reduction as the moving force behind all behaviour, human and animal alike, that another point of view comes like a strong sea breeze in a stuffy room. Goldstein claims that the tendency to release tension is a characteristic phenomenon of pathological life. "It is the only means the sick organism has to actualise itself, even if in an imperfect way." [9] Observations of the sick, of young children, and of animals under experimental conditions, that is, made under circumstances in which some of the activities are isolated from the whole, have given rise to the concept of separate drives. This seems to be the case in diseased organisms and in children, because the organism of the child lacks a centre, and it is the case in experiments with animals because of the experimental conditions. A normal organism will satisfy a particular need when it is absolutely necessary for self-realisation. The healthy individual

is able to repress a hunger feeling or a sex urge if he has something to do which he cannot neglect without endangering his whole organism. One of the errors of Freudian theory, Goldstein points out, is that tendencies observable in sick people are considered as basic drives for normal healthy people.

Self-actualisation is a universal phenomenon in nature. The specific goals for which people strive vary from person to person. Their innate potentialities vary as do the environments and cultures in which they realise themselves, and from which they receive the necessary nourishment for growth. The innate potentialities of any one person can best be determined by finding out what he prefers to do and what he does best. His preferences correspond to his potentialities.

> "On the basis of many facts, I reached the conclusion that preferred behaviour in one field always means preferred behaviour on the part of the whole organism; the tendency toward preferred behaviour is an expression of the fact that the organism constantly seeks a situation in which it can perform at its best and with optimal comfort." 10

In realising his potentialities man always comes into conflict with the opposing forces of the environment. This never happens without shock and anxiety, but life takes its course through uncertainty, shock and anxiety. The normal person, in spite of a tendency to diminish anxiety by retreating from new outer and inner situations, is carried forward by his inherent desire "for new experience, for the conquest of the world; and for an expansion of the sphere of his activity in a practical and spiritual sense." 11

The more creative a person is the more he will expose himself to incursions of anxiety and shock. The capacity for bearing anxiety is a manifestation of courage. "In the final analysis courage is nothing but an affirmative answer to the shocks of existence, and to the shocks it is necessary to bear for the sake of realising one's own nature." [12] This sort of courage is peculiar to man. It requires the ability to view a single experience within a larger context, and to maintain freedom of decision regarding different possibilities. Anxiety can be overcome when man's native capacity for abstraction is unimpaired, and "self-actualisation issues from within, and when it overcomes the disturbance arising from its clash with the world not by virtue of anxiety but through the joy of coming to terms with the world." [13]

In order to actualise his potentialities the individual develops preferred ways of acting, perceiving and evaluating, which become durable habits or 'behaviour constants'. The more adequate these constants become to meet the demands of the objective environment, the more integrated, the better "centred" the individual will be. Self-actualisation, however, suffers restrictions from the physical environment, and also from the presence of others who are also driven to realise themselves. There is no pre-established harmony amongst human beings. Self-actualisation can only be attained by some renunciation on the part of another, and each must ask for that renunciation from others. But there is a capacity in man for self-restriction in the interest of another. Man cannot live in effortless harmony with his world.

He must seek it actively, fully realising his freedom of decision. This freedom is a basis characteristic of human nature, but it also carries with it the necessity of encroaching upon the freedom of others.

Self-restriction and encroachment appear in the vocabularies of some psychologies as "submission" and "aggression", and are regarded as basic drives of human nature. Man, according to Goldstein, is neither submissive nor aggressive by nature. In actualising himself, and in coming to terms with his environment, he has at times to be submissive and at times aggressive depending upon the situation. Normal human life fluctuates in balanced proportions between self-restriction and encroachment upon the freedom of others. Freedom, in fact, means "the right and the inner necessity to actualise one-self, a right which as we have seen presupposes the possibility of actualisation on the part of all other individuals. Freedom fundamentally presupposes the freedom of all others, - equality, not indeed, equality in the simple political sense of the word but equal rights and equal duties." [14] Both self-restriction and encroachment are experienced as suffering that has to be endured, but this suffering reveals the highest form of life "in the phenomenon of freedom."

In Goldstein's thinking the individual is primary to society, and yet he cannot exist without society. The individual and society depend upon each other. The life of the individual is shaped by the habits, customs, and institutions of the society in which he lives. These are not "simply the mechanically conditioned products of a society that pre-exists or takes primary place over individuals." [15] Self-restriction

and encroachment upon the freedom of others are the bases of all forms of society and social organization. Customs, habits, institutions emerge during the building of a society "as avenues for the best possible self-actualisation of individuals forming that society."[16]

It is our purpose to examine the psychological concept of maturity as it is contained or implied in some of the contemporary theories of personality psychology. A concept is clearly implied in Goldstein's exposition of organismic theory. We can quote the words with which he concludes his "Human Nature in the Light of Psychopathology" as summing up two attributes of the full grown man:-

> ..."first readiness to restrict oneself and to encroach upon others in the interest both of one's own actualisation and that of others, and second courage in the struggle against those resistances of the inner and outer world which oppose human nature - faculties which one might consider the two paramount manifestations of the highest capacity of man, the capacity for freedom." [17]

Against this general background of organismic theory Prescott Lecky set the basic postulate of his Self-Consistency theory, that "the individual must define for himself the nature of that totality that he is."[18] This definition of self becomes a dynamic centre or nucleus around which the individual organizes his total experiences of life as he moves forward to fulfill himself. Lecky writes about the activity of the organism:-

> "The usual formulation is that the organism acts because it is stimulated. We assume on the contrary, that every organism, as long as it remains alive, is continuously active, and hence continuously purposive. Life and activity are co-existent and inseparable. We do not have to explain why the organism acts, but only why it acts in one way rather

> than another. A stimulus does not initiate activity, but merely tends to modify in one way or another way the activity already in progress." [19]

This activity has as its purpose the achievement of unity or self-consistency. In order to maintain self-consistency the organism tries to organize values in such a way that they are felt to be consistent with each other. The environment presents the individual with a continuous series of problems that must be solved. It sets the conditions under which man, ever active and ever purposive, strives to achieve unity. Consequently, man moves forward to self-consistency through conflict, which is not a permanent psychic state, but rather a temporary condition that exists while he re-organises his experience into an integrated whole. All behaviour is motivated by the need for unity.

"The point is that all of an individual's values are organized into a single system the preservation of whose integrity is essential. The nucleus of the system around which the rest of the system revolves, is the individual's valuation of himself." [20] Self-definition, then, is the focal point of personality structure. Once the individual has assimilated a definition of himself, "he endeavours to perfect himself in the part to which he has been assigned, and grows more and more unmanageable the more his behaviour is condemned." [21] Neurotic behaviour is just as much a striving for self-consistency as normal, and the resistance encountered in therapy is an attempt to maintain the integrity of the personality itself.

Regularity of behaviour reflects the individual's organisation of values. This organisation defines his role in life and furnishes him with standards he feels obliged to uphold. These standards are internal psychological standards, not objective norms. There is nothing to stop anyone from accepting external standards and making them part of his system. It is a matter of accepting and maintaining definitions of ourselves, not only as isolated individuals, but also as members of groups. We shall act in consistency with the definitions we assimilate into the self whether as members of the same family, the same profession, nation or race. If we do not assimilate them we shall not maintain them.

> "The personality develops as a result of actual contacts with the world, and incorporates into itself the meanings derived from external contacts. Essentially, it is the organisation of experience into an integrated whole."[22]

Thus Lecky believed that personality represents a style of life which automatically creates a set of internal standards for the acceptance or rejection of new patterns of thought and behaviour, and these standards are governed by the need to preserve the individual's essential integration and unity.

Every person has two sets of problems. He must preserve inner harmony within himself and outer harmony with his environment, especially his social environment. If he is to understand the environment his interpretations must remain consistent with his experience, while at the same time he can maintain integrity only by organising his interpretations to form a system which is internally consistent. "This consistency is not

objective -- but subjective and wholly individual."[23]

The aim of therapy "consists in making the subject aware of his own inconsistency."[24] This means that he must be willing to let go inhibiting definitions and see them as useless burdens. As everyone has assimilated values other than those which are causing unhappiness, it is possible for the individual to re-define himself in their terms. Most people regard themselves as self-reliant, useful to others, willing to do their bit, and capable of making a contribution to the group to which they belong. Such values offer hope of forging new definitions that will help to eject the old, but the new definition, no matter how socially desirable it may be, will not be accepted unless it seems to be consistent from the subject's point of view. "We do not aim at consistency with the demands of society, but only at self-consistency. Social ends must be approached indirectly. In other words, if the personal problem is solved and the unity of action achieved, the social problem disappears."[25]

During the process of development between birth and death, the individual passes through a sequence of biological phases. Each brings its own problems of adaptation, and each involves types of experience which the person must interpret in such a way that they will fuse harmoniously with previous experience. Infancy, childhood, adolescence, adulthood, and old age, all the various eras of life, visit the person with maturational changes in his constitution. Multifarious patterns of environmental stimulation elicit constant changes in ideas, and especially in those about the self.

The most constant factor in any person's experience is himself and the interpretation of his own meaning. The next most important element is the mother. The structure of the infant personality is made up of these two elements, but before long the child must face the task of assimilating those situations in which the father plays a part. This thrusts upon him an inevitable organisation out of which he emerges with a broader personality. By identifying himself with his parents, he tries to bring himself and them into a unified and consistent relationship. When the child reaches the age of five, having assimilated the usual atmosphere of the home, he is ready to meet problems outside the family. During adolescence the need for unity is most acute, for this is a transitional phase of growth when the youth is forced to revise his childish values and take on mature ones. Indeed, definitions of the self will undergo constant but gradual revision throughout life if the person is to function with a reasonable degree of stability and happiness.

Neurotic behaviour has its roots in inconsistent and unrealistic nuclear ideas concerning the value of the self, with the result that new experiences lead to interpretations that conflict with the existing organisation of ideas. The neurotic has a vested interest in maintaining the self-definitions of childhood and early life. He preserves immature attitudes as a defence against new experiences that would tend to force the re-organisation of personality. There is in all psychoses and all neuroses, to a greater or lesser degree, a dissolution of the self. Neurotic personalities, by clinging to unhealthy organisations of

ideas, block the striving for self-consistency which alone can weld new experiences and the existing organisation into a unified style of life. Consequently, dynamic disorganisation takes place.

In contrast, the normal person constantly revises his definitions of himself with every enrichment of his experience. The word normal is used here as a synonym for mature. The normal person is one whose total organisation of ideas "has a relatively high degree of internal consistency in relation to ideas of the self as well as with external reality."[26]

Lecky had the highest regard for the innate potentialities of man. Left to his own powers of growth, man, he believed, would move forward in fulfillment of himself, creating by the assimilation of new experiences, a vigorous and unified style of life.

Kurt Goldstein's organismic theory grew out of his work with patients who had suffered brain damage and also from his research into language disorders. Prescott Lecky taught psychology at Columbia, but maintained at the same time a successful private practice as a consulting psychologist. Both formed theories from their contacts with disorganised and defective people to embrace the whole organism, whether sick or healthy. Abraham Maslow on the other hand has rebuked psychologists for their "pessimistic, negative and limited conception of the full height to which the human being can attain."[27] They have been only too content to study rats in a maze, and then form theories based on their observations to embrace the whole of human nature and its capacities. Psychotherapy

has contributed a lot of useful data about human motivation gained from the treatment of the neurotic. "Are", Maslow asks, "the moving forces of the neurotic to be a paradigm for the motivation of the healthy and strong who realize their highest capacities?" [28]

Psychology has limited itself to only half its rightful jurisdiction and that the meaner, sordid half. It has had a great deal to say about man's shortcomings, his sins, and his twists and turns, but practically nothing about his potentialities or his full stature as a whole human being. A psychology which limits itself to the study of the crippled, the stunted, the immature and the unhealthy will become a crippled and stunted psychology. Self-actualising people must provide the material for a more universal science of psychology.

Maslow has attemplted to paint the other side of the picture. Man's inner nature is good and never evil. It is not obvious or strong like the instincts of animals, but is rather hidden and unfulfilled, delicate and subtle, and easily overcome by habit, cultural pressure, and wrong attitudes towards it. In all normal people it persists, and perhaps even in the sick although denied and driven underground. Maslow writes of the whole man as follows:-

> "Now let me try to present briefly and at first dogmatically the essence of this newly developing conception of the psychiatrically healthy man. First of all and most important of all is the strong belief that man has an essential nature of his own, some skeleton of psychologiaal structure that may be treated and discussed analogously with his physical structure, that he has needs, capacities and tendencies that are genetically based, some of which are characteristic of the whole human species, cutting across all cultural lines, and some of which are unique to the individual. These needs are on their face good or neutral

> rather than evil. Second, there is involved the conception that full healthy and normal and desirable development consists in actualising this nature, in fulfilling these potentialities, and in developing into maturity along the lines that this hidden, covert, dimly seen essential nature dictates, growing from within rather than being shaped from without. Third, it is now seen clearly that psychopathology in general results from the denial or the frustration or the twisting of man's essential nature. By this conception what is good? Anything that conduces to this desirable development in the direction of actualisation of the inner nature of man. What is bad or abnormal? Anything that frustrates or blocks or denies the essential nature of man. What is psychopathological? Anything that disturbs or frustrates or twists the course of self-actualisation. What is psychotherapy, or for that matter any therapy of any kind? Any means of any kind that helps to restore the person to the path of self-actualisation and of development along the lines that his inner nature dictates." [29]

As this passage shows, Maslow uses the word normal, not in the sense of the average, but in the classical sense of measure or standard. The normal man is the healthy man, and the healthy man is one who is realising his basic inner nature and fulfilling its potentialities. People become warped and neurotic when their basic needs have been denied gratification and their drives to self-actualisation thwarted. Neither frustration, nor deprivation, nor conflict in themselves plunge the person into neurosis, but deprivation and conflict experienced as a threat "to his life goals, his defensive system, his self-esteem, to his self-actualisation, that is, to his basic needs." [30] To the extent that the environment threatens the satisfaction of basic needs it can be said to twist and warp the inner nature. Aggression and destructiveness are the prime effects of threatening frustration. They are not indigenous to man. When the frustration is removed, aggression disappears. "We are now pretty well convinced that nasty aggressiveness is reactive rather than basic, effect rather than cause, because as a nasty person

gets healthier in psychotherapy he gets less vicious, and as a healthier person gets more sick, he changes in the direction of more hostility, more venom, and more viciousness."[31]

Maslow conceives needs as arranged in a hierarchy of motives according to their potency. As the needs that have the greatest potency or priority are satisfied, the next needs in the hierarchy emerge and press for satisfaction. The physiological needs, such as hunger and thirst, form the first rung on the ladder of motives. The safety needs clamour for satisfaction when fulfillment has released the hold of the physiological needs upon the organism. Then the needs for belongingness and love emerge, and when they have been satisfied the esteem needs rise to dominance. Gratification of all these needs releases the desire for self-actualisation. "What a man can be, he must be." The tendency to become all that we are capable of becoming is the top rung in the ladder of motives. But two other classes of needs are intimately linked with the drive of self-realisation. Maslow calls these the desire to know and understand and the need for beauty.

Satisfactions for the basic needs are seriously vitiated unless certain conditions accompany them. According to Maslow these conditions are the freedom to speak, freedom to do as one wishes without harming others, freedom to express oneself, freedom to investigate and seek for information, freedom to defend oneself, justice, fairness, honesty and orderliness in the group. He also adds another qualifying rider to his concept of prepotent motives. Those who are best equipped to tolerate

the deprivation of a basic need in later life are those who have known satisfaction for the need in early life.

In his study of self-actualising people, Maslow found that they held fifteen features in common. 1) They were realistically oriented. 2) They accepted themselves, other people, and the world for what they were. 3) They had a great deal of spontaneity. 4) They were problem-centred rather than self-centred. 5) They had a capacity for detachment and a need for privacy. 6) They were autonomous and independent. 7) Their appreciation of people and things was fresh rather than stereotyped. 8) Most of them had had mystical experiences of the nature type which Freud described as a state of oceanic feeling. 9) They possessed that depth of empathy, sympathy, compassion, and concern for mankind which Adler called Gemeinschaftsgefuhl. 10) Their intimate relationships were profound and deeply emotional, but with only a few people who were especially cherished. 11) Their values and attitudes were democratic. 12) They did not confuse means with ends. 13) Their sense of humour was philosophical rather than hostile. 14) They were deeply creative. 15) They resisted conformity to culture.

The subjects of this study were both living and historical persons. Some were well-known public figures such as Eleanor Roosevelt and Einstein. The historical figures included Lincoln, Jefferson, Spinoza and Beethoven. Maslow gave special attention to the quality of love in these self-actualising people. He has summed up his conclusions under nine headings.

1) The dropping of defenses in self-actualising love relationships

As the relationship deepens it tends to become more and more a spontaneous revelation of each to the other. A growing intimacy and honesty banishes all anxiety, for there are no facades to bolster or tear down. The unveiling of the self shows not only the virtues of each partner, but also the faults and weaknesses.

2) The ability to love and be loved

The data here pointed to the conclusion that all psychological health grows out of being loved. This basic gratification of a primary human need is the essential prerequisite for the capacity to love and the ability to be loved.

3) Sexuality in Self-actualising love

There is a profound distinction between love and mere sexuality, but in self-actualising people they tend to merge. Healthy men and women do not seek sex for its own sake, nor are they satisfied with it alone. Maslow's data convinced him that his subjects would rather not have sex at all than have it without affection. Sex to them was an ecstatic union between two people at every level of their being, and orgasm which was frequently accompanied by oceanic feelings, was the climax of a total union. On the other hand, these men and women were able to tolerate sexual deprivation and still continue to love. The temporary deprivation enhanced their satisfaction when sexuality was gratified.

While they enjoyed sex it did not occupy the centre of their philosophy of life. At times their sexual pleasure was intense to the point of ecstasy. At other times it was a delicate, gay, light-hearted experience, titillating and full of play. The fact is that these people accepted the facts of sexuality with ease and whole-heartedness, just as they had accepted themselves, other people and the world, and having done so they did not feel driven to seek compensatory sex relationships outside of marriage. "The easier acceptance of the facts of sexuality seems to make it easier rather than harder to be relatively monogamous."[32]

Maslow's study also convinced him that "the Freudian tendency to derive love from sex, or to identify them is a bad mistake."[33] Freud regarded sexuality as aim-inhibited sexuality. When, for example, two people could not fulfill the sexual aim of coupling and yet wanted to, but dared not admit their desire to themselves, they settled for tenderness and affection as a compromise product. The obvious question here is: If affection and tenderness have their source in inhibited sexual intercourse, what is the source of the tenderness and affection that accompanies an intense experience of sexual coupling?

4) Care, Responsibility, The pooling of needs

"One important aspect of a good love relationship is what may be called need identification, or the pooling of the hierarchies of the basic needs in two persons into a single hierarchy."[34]

A profound empathy develops between the partners. Each goes out from the self to take the other within his orbit. Each becomes the other through "henoses" - 'a one fleshedness', and this union is strengthened rather than weakened when tragedy lays a hand upon the partnership, or sickness attacks one of its members.

5) Fun and gaiety in the healthy love relationship

There is a strong element of fun and sportiveness in the love and sexual relationship of self-actualising people. Most writers on the ideal love relationship, Maslow remarks, have made it sound like a task and a burden. They have overlooked the fact that it is also full of cheer, humour and play.

6) Acceptance of the other's individuality: Respect for the other

Among Maslow's subjects neither partner demanded that the other sink the distinctiveness of his personality within the union. Each affirmed the other's uniqueness spontaneously. They respected each other.

7) Love as End experience: Admiration: Wonder: Awe

Healthy people are not driven by their needs to fall in love, says Maslow. They are attracted to it as one might be attracted by apperceptive perception to great music - one is awed by it, overwhelmed by it, and loves it. They give admiration which by its very nature asks for nothing, and receives nothing beyond the rich experience of admiring.

The reason for this is that self-actualising people are free from deficiency motivations. They do not expect their partners to supply deficits in the satisfactions of their basic needs for safety, belongingness, love status, and self-respect. These needs have been satisfied already, so they are free to grow without striving in the fulfillment of their highest nature. In short, they love because they are loving persons.

8) Detachment and Individuality:

While the partners enjoyed each other and were extremely close, they lived by their own standards. The two tendencies, to transcend individuality and at the same time sharpen and strengthen it, were not in opposition but came together as partners when expressed in the love relationship.

9) The greater task and perceptiveness of healthy lovers

Self-actualising people, according to Maslow, possess an extraordinary degree of perceptiveness, and this is nowhere more evident than in their choice of mates. Their choice was by no means always perfect, but it was much better than average. Character was the basis of their choice, and economic, educational, and social shortcomings were far less important than character defects. Physical attractiveness was given no place in their criteria. They married people whose virtues were the same as their own, virtues such as honesty, sincerity, kindliness and courage. Differences of income, class status, education, religion,

> national background and so forth had little significance in their choice of partners. "The people", Maslow writes, "with whom my subjects fall in love are soundly selected by either cognitive or conative criteria. That is, they are intuitively, sexually, impulsively attracted to people who are right for them by cold, intellectual, clinical calculation."[35]

Undoubtedly Maslow's self-actualising people had reached a high degree of psychological maturity. His subjects, however, were not psychic 'supermen'. They all carried a load of guilt, anxiety, sadness, self-castigation and conflict, but these were not 'character-conditioned.' Their source did not lie in the tangled undergrowth of the neurotic personality structure. Rather, they were honest reactions to a situation. These people also had their share of human failings. They were prone, at times, to outbursts of temper. They could be boring, stubborn, and irritating. They were not free from pride, vanity and egoism. Nonetheless, even allowing for Maslow's reading into his data some of his own assumptions about the nature and maturity of man, there can be no doubt that his self-actualisers had become persons. They were no longer merely individual categories within a general species.

E. Mounier[36] has described the human person as constituted by a free relationship with other persons. His primary action is to co-operate with others in sustaining a society of persons. The sentiments that govern such a society, as well as its structure and institutions, are governed by the nature of its members as persons. The human person, in Mounier's idiom, has three well-developed capacities. He is himself and

in possession of himself, but he can also go out from himself, decentralize himself, to be available to others. He makes this gift of himself without self-impoverishment. The human person has understanding, or in psychological terms empathy. He does not look at himself solely from his own point of view. He is able to see himself from the standpoint of others, suffering neither dread nor threat as he does so. He does not look for himself in someone else chosen because of a general likeness to him, nor does he seek to know another by applying general categories to him. A taste for psychology is not necessarily an interest in persons!

According to Maslow, the conditions that encourage the maximum individual growth — in Mounier's terms sustain persons — permit gratification, expression, and free choice from a wide range of possibilities. "From the point of view - - - of self-actualisation or health, a good environment (in theory) is one that offers all necessary raw materials and then gets out of the way and stands aside to let the organism itself utter its wishes and demands and make its choice (always remembering that it often chooses delay, renunciation in favour of others, etc., and that other people also have demands and wishes)".[37] Healthy growth depends upon the gratification of the basic needs for safety, love, belongingness, and esteem. When these are satisfied growth starts from within and unfolds in self-actualisation. The neurotic is dependent upon his environment for certain satisfactions, and is therefore less autonomous, less self-determined, less shaped by his innate nature. To the healthy person the environment is a means to

self-realisation. All research indicates that a good environment nourishes the growth of healthy personalities. It also has established the fact that individuals can be much healthier than the culture in which they grow and live. The essential condition to psychic health is inner freedom, which manifests itself in an independence of public approval and a reliance upon self-approval.

Maslow offers his hypotheses of need gratification as a tentative, partial, and limited theory which, to use his own words, "is not capable of independent existence or validity." This is not the place to offer any criticism of the theory on psychological grounds. In any case Maslow's acknowledgment of the theory's limitations forestalls any criticism of that order. It is legitimate here however to put certain questions to his basic assumptions which are not psychological but philosophical. He would deny that this is so, for he contends that the organism itself dictates hierarchies of values ordered on the basis of the relative potency of the fundamental needs. Thus, the 'higher' needs such as the need for knowledge, for understanding, for a philosophy of life, for beauty and a theorectical frame of reference, are dynamisms "built into" the structure of the organism. Their full flowering waits only upon the satisfaction of the basic needs to release the drive towards self-realisation in its specifically human, and adult manifestations.

This conception of human growth is achieved when internal and external conditions are favourable. The fact remains that Maslow interprets his data within the framework of assumptions that psychology

as a science can neither prove nor disprove. First, he places the span of human life within the parenthesis of birth and death: secondly, he assumes that there is no essential, qualitative difference between the animal search for food and sex, and the human quest for truth and beauty: thirdly, he assumes that the biological processes of unfolding are an adequate paradigm for human growth. From these assumptions he draws the only conclusion they will yield, that the proper ends of human life are the fullest possible development of the talents, capacities, and potentialities of the individual, and the maintanance of that state of euphoria which is attached to such a self-realisation. In short, the ultimate goal of human growth is psychic health manifested objectively in the appropriate modes of self-actualisation, and subjectively in feelings of well-being. "This implies" writes Maslow, "that a higher-need hedonism might very well stand where a lower-need hedonism would fall." He continues with some ethical speculations:

> "The philosopher of ethics has much to learn from a close examination of man's motivational life. If our noblest impulses are seen not as check-reins on the horses, but as themselves horses, and contrariwise, if our animal needs are seen to be of the same nature as our highest needs, how can a sharp dichotomy between them be sustained? How can we continue to believe that they can come from different sources?
>
> Furthermore, if we clearly and fully recognize that these noble and good impulses come into existence and grow potent primarily as a consequence of the prior gratification of the more demanding animal needs, we should certainly speak less and less of self-control, inhibition, discipline, etc., and more and more of spontaneity, of gratification, and of permissiveness. There seems to be less opposition than we thought between the stern voice of duty and the gay call to pleasure." [38]

We are not quarrelling with Maslow's advocacy of psychic health. It must stand very high in any hierarchy of goods. Nor can we take issue with a modified form of his gratification theory. There can be no doubt that those who have their basic needs -- physiological, safety, love and esteem needs -- gratified during their formative years find the road to self-realisation and health smoother, broader, and less steep than those who have been deprived. But is the organic force whereby a living organism actualises its biological form an adequate model of adult human growth? Are the growth motives mere spontaneous outcroppings of irresistible pressure springing up after the prior satisfaction of more demanding animal needs? Do even the most refined hedonistic suppositions explain the tension, hardship, physical and mental suffering an individual will sustain in loyalty to a cause, the pursuit of an ideal, devotion to long range purposes, and fidelity to a commitment? Is the fulfillment or satisfaction of one need in a hierarchy of needs truly the mainspring of the succeeding one in the order of priority? G. W. Allport writes "Indeed the measure of our intellectual maturity - - is our capacity to feel less and less satisfied with our answers to better and better problems."[39]

Man is a biological organism, but he is more, for the dynamic forces within him carry him beyond the confines of a biological species. He possesses, as animals do not, a strong drive towards self-transcendence, and this is manifest in all distinctively human activity.[40] Ruth Benedict has described man as a 'culture-making animal,' but no other animal has

a culture. Human civilization, even a decadent one, stands in utter contrast to animal stagnation. Behind man's culture-making activities there lies a constructive force which is active in the individual, and expresses itself in the pursuit of ideals. Whether a civilization is vital and alive, or sick and decaying depends in the long run upon the sort of personal ideals men are pursuing.

This constructive force is a manifestation of the urge to self-transcendence. In the life of the individual it expresses itself in conscious intervention and personal effort to go beyond the merely spontaneous processes of biological growth. The way in which a man rises above the automatisms of his being, what he does with himself, is a matter of personal responsibility.

The constructive impulse, the urge to self-transcendence, does not operate without a guide. In pressing for expression it unveils in man ever new potentialities, and under the influence of social and cultural conditions, it creates in human consciousness a guiding image. The image reveals what a man proposes to make of himself. It is an ideal in concrete form of self-realisation, built up by the individual out of his own characteristic perceptions of his physical and social environment, and his impulsive energies.

The urge to self-realisation which runs through the whole of man's psycho-physiological organism is rooted in the general tendency of every living organism towards a fuller development, and a wider integration of elements in the environment. But on the human level it

manifests itself in a new form of existence. Man is not bound by the limits of the material universe. His consciousness carries him beyond the world of organic impressions. He perceives the sights, colours, sounds, odours and physical objects of the universe, and he not only feels them, but he is also aware of feeling them. He is not 'absorbed' into physical and biological realities. He can stand outside them, judge them, and refer them to events outside himself. He can make the knowledge gained by perception and judgment the ground of purposive action to change either himself or his environment.

Thus, man as knower can conceive new forms of personal development, and man as judge can take up an attitude towards the form of development he is pursuing and the point in his development he has attained. It is the fact that man can become conscious of himself and aware of what is going on within him, that deflects the biological tendency towards self-actualisation into a new and specifically human form. On the one hand this form is present in him as a personal ideal towards which he moves; on the other, he can take up an attitude towards the present state of his personality and the tendencies that are at work within it.

Because of his capacity for transcendence man not only exercises himself in knowing and assessing, he also judges by comparing. He can measure what now exists by what he believes ought to be. He can refer what he now is to his ideal image and take practical steps to close the gap, either by recasting the image into a closer approxima-

tion to his capacities, or by asserting himself more vigourously to realize the image in his day to day living.

As a matter of fact when a man seeks self knowledge he will find within him the forces of development moving in different directions. Some will be in harmony with the concrete ideal that predominates at the moment of self-examination, others will be inclining him towards behaviour that is incompatible with it. When, after due reflection upon all that is involved, he decides to actualise his potentialities, whether intellectual, social, moral, or in any other sphere, forces will rise within him that will present ideals of less constructive ways, as for example submerging himself in the impulse of the moment. Conversely, the man who has given himself to the ideal of abandonment to impulse may still have more constructive forces within him striving to present their case.

At the heart of human dynamism there is an active state of conflict, an opposition, a tension. Man does not follow simply and spontaneously the impulse to self-development. He is confronted at every moment with many forms of self-realisation and with forces pulling in various directions. Equally, at every moment he is faced with a choice, and in making his choice, he must bring into being the capacities that constitute him as a person. From his vantage point of self-consciousness, that is to say, as an existent who is conscious of himself as part of, yet distinct from, the whole of reality, he exercises himself in knowing, assessing, comparing, and thence in purposive action. He renounces 'this' in order to gain 'that': He denies satisfaction to some organic

needs in order to give reign to other aspirations: he checks certain 'higher' aspirations in order to maintain the balance of his being. "It is by repeatedly consenting to the satisfaction of certain needs, and refusing to satisfy others that human dynamism develops throughout the greater part of man's life in certain special directions."[41]

An individual will use some of his potentialities to the full and neglect others. He will consciously seek certain goals which will lead to new dynamic developments, and reject others. As a result some real potentialities atrophy or disappear, because they have never been actively used to realise the individual's aspirations. Allport has this to say:-

> "An individual may without serious conflict forego some specific gratification, provided that he finds other sources of equal satisfaction --- In such instances the individual simply disregards his unfulfilled desires, letting them atrophy, or repressing them without disaster, in the interest of an alternative plan of life that satisfies not these desires but satisfies him as a whole man." [42]

He adds that this is not sublimation, for the individual is not using the energy of the ungratified desire, but is busy leading a satisfying life in spite of the lack of fulfillment of a certain desire.

The psycho-analytic doctrine maintains the opposite point of view, namely that the neglected desire goes underground and from the unconscious carries out guerilla attacks. Freud, however, came near to the idea of atrophy. In The problem of Anxiety he writes that "he has become mindful of the distinction between the mere repression and the true disappearance of an old desire or impulse."[43]

Two forces meet in man, both of them constructive on their own level. The impulsive energies which drive man to seek satisfaction in the pleasure of the moment, and the tendency towards self-actualisation that propel him to conceive new ideas and new values through an ever widening contact with reality. The tension between the two is itself a constructive force, for it tends to release specifically human potentialities whereby man can intervene intentionally in his own development, and go beyond the automatic development of the psycho-physiological organism. The process of integration is essentially the creation of some form of personal ideal in which the two forces are held in balance. But, as we have already seen, there is never a moment when man is not faced with choice as the instrument of his integration and self-realisation. Such negative words, therefore, as self-renunciation and abnegation can have a positive meaning. They can signify vital forms of self-realisation in freedom.

The organismic theorists leave little room for man to take positive action in his own development. Goldstein limits the exercise of freedom to voluntary self-restriction, voluntary tolerance of encroachment by others in the interests of their drive to actualise themselves. Freedom is manifest at its highest in willingly suffering the restrictions placed upon self-realisation by the environment. Provided his abstract ability is unfettered by brain damage, and his coping capacities are strong enough to withstand shocks and anxiety, man will automatically actualise himself on the highest level that is consistent with

his abilities. He has no real choice to make between levels of self-realisation.

Nor does the person have any real choice in Lecky's concept of self-consistency. The person is determined by the self-definitions he assimilates from his environment. These become the dynamic nuclei which organise into a unified whole all the individual's experience. Nevertheless, human beings do experience themselves as choosing purposes, and of carrying them through, and of intervening in their own lives and changing their direction. Lecky implies that the self-concept develops haphazardly. But the fact remains that a self-definition can represent sound self-knowledge, and that while a man may resist having his definition of himself changed for him, he himself can and does change both it and the ideal image toward which he is striving.

Maslow's distinction between deficit motives and growth motives is a useful one. But his shibboleth which seems to be, "Take care of the deficit motives and the growth motives will look after themselves" is hardly true to all that is known about human striving and the place that ideals play in the development and growth of the human being. No one with but the slightest insight into human nature can underestimate the overwhelming influence upon later life of a childhood starved for affection. During the first five years of its life a child needs affection and support. He also wants to be 'someone', and it is only by feeling that he is loved and surrounded by affection that he can have the confidence in himself to move forward psychologically. 'He is then free to become': he can move forward; he will not be dragged

back by his pathological cravings for security, nor be chained to childhood hatreds and resentments. But in moving forward he must still deal with himself; he must still face conflict and resolve it creatively; and he must still exercise himself in choice as to which forces within him he will realise by referring them to his ideal image. Consequently a moral philosophy which dwells "more and more upon permissiveness, gratification, and spontaneity", and "less and less upon self-control, inhibition and disipline," throws light upon only one corner of the human situation. Full illumination requires all these elements to be held in balance. Self-control, and self-discipline, state the conditions under which the human person can reach self-realisation on increasingly higher levels.

CHAPTER III

THE ORGANISM, THE SELF, AND THE PERSON

A personality theory which places the responsibility for growth and health upon the individual, has developed over the last two decades out of a method of psychotherapy. This is Carl Rogers' 'Self-theory'. The therapeutic method which gave it birth has become known as 'non-directive' or 'client-centred' therapy.

Carl Rogers first described his views on psychotherapy in his book 'Counseling and Psychotherapy' which was published in 1942. The latest and most complete account of the non-directive method appears in 'Client-Centred Therapy', published nine years later in 1951. It would be an impossible task to estimate the influence of Rogers' theory and method upon those who work in any field in which human relations are involved. In social work, guidance in the schools, and personnel-counseling in industry, the non-directive approach has provided an effective tool for dealing with human woes whilst preserving and enhancing the individual's sense of independence. Pastoral practice has welcomed it, and made it its chief ally in the cure of souls. Here, more perhaps than any other area, client-centred therapy has had its greatest influence.

Rogers insists that the fundamental aim of therapy is to mobilise the healthy constructive forces which lie at the centre of the patient's personality. Classical psychoanalysis has emphasised the action of pathogenic destructive forces in man, but to Rogers the nucleus of the self is "the one basic tendency to actualise, maintain, and enhance"[1] itself. He has written recently:

> "I have little sympathy with the rather prevalent concept that man is basically irrational, and that his impulses, if not controlled,

> will lead to destruction of others and self. Man's behaviour is exquisitely rational, moving with subtle and ordered complexity toward the goals his organism is endeavoring to achieve. The tragedy for most of us is that our defenses keep us from being aware of this rationality, so that consciously we are moving in one direction, while organismically we are moving in another. But in our person who is living the process of the good life there would be a decreasing number of such barriers, and he would be increasingly a participant in the rationality of his organism. The only control of impulses which would exist or which would prove necessary is the natural and internal balancing of one need against another, and the discovery of behaviors which follow the vector most closely approximating the satisfaction of all needs. The experience of extreme satisfaction of one need (for aggression, or sex, etc.) in such a way as to do violence to the satisfaction of other needs (for companionship, tender relationships, etc.) - an experience very common in the defensively organized person - would be greatly decreased. He would participate in the vastly complex self-regulatory activities of his organism - the psychological as well as physiological thermostatic controls - in such a fashion as to live in increasing harmony with himself and with others."[2]

Rogers' theory of personality combines in a synthesis with his self-theory elements from three different schools of thought. He has adopted the phenomenology of Snygg and Combs.[3] "Every individual exists in a continually changing world of experience of which he is the centre"[4] - the changing world of experience being Snygg and Combs' phenomenal field. "The organism has one basic tendency and striving to actualize, maintain, and enhance the experiencing organism".[5] This proposition is also borrowed from Snygg and Combs, but it is too the fundamental concept of organismic psychology, the second source of Rogers' synthesis. He has drawn upon Sullivan's theory of interpersonal relations:-

> "As a result of interaction with the environment and particularly as a result of evaluational interactions with others, the structure of the self is formed - an organized, fluid, but consistent conceptual pattern of perceptions, of characteristics and relationships of 'I' or the 'me' together with values attached to these concepts.
>
> Values attached to experiences, and values which are part of the self structure, in some instances are values experienced directly by the

> organism, and in some instances are values introjected or taken over from others, but perceived in a distorted fashion as if they had been experienced directly."[6]

Rogers makes his own contribution through his self-theory. "Most of the ways of behaving which are adopted by the organism are those which are consistent with the self."[7] In this proposition he acknowledges a debt to Lecky whose Self-consistency theory we have already discussed.

> "Behaviour may, in some instances, be brought about by organic experiences and needs which have not been symbolized (brought into consciousness). Such behaviour may be inconsistent with the structure of the self, but in such instances the behaviour is not owned by the individual."[8]

Rogers recognises two behaviour systems; one regulated by the self and the other by the organism. If the two systems oppose each other, the result is tension and maladjustment, but if they work together harmoniously and co-operatively, healthy growth towards maturity ensues. To work together harmoniously, the self must assimilate consciously all the sensory and visceral experiences of the organism, and incorporate them into a consistent relationship with its concept of itself. But the self may perceive some experiences as a threat to its structure and organisation, and the more perceptions there are of this sort, the more the self builds up its defenses by denying threatening experiences access to its system. Consequently the self-image becomes distorted, and the self erects stronger barricades against reality in order to maintain the false image. The self loses touch with the organism, and there rises an increasing opposition between the two. Client-centred therapy, however, can effect an harmonious integration of the self and the organism.

> "Under certain conditions, involving primarily complete absence of any threat to the self-structure, experiences which are inconsistent

with it may be perceived and examined, and the structure of the self revised to assimilate and include such experiences." [9]

The patient takes the action that is necessary to construct his own personality. The therapist acts as a catalyst to promote the growing processes. The first aim of treatment is to create 'the certain conditions', the permissive, warmly accepting atmosphere in which the client can explore his feelings, emotions, and attitudes, and thus experience his personality in a 'world' that is new to him. The warmth and permissiveness constitute a new world for one organised defensively against the world and against himself. In any therapy, Rogers insists, the important thing is to give the patient a new idea of himself. The therapist does this by his warmth and acceptance of the patient's personality as it is. Having gained a new perception and new experience of himself, the patient can move forward to solve his own problems constructively.

Non-directive therapy places its chief emphasis on the subjective way in which a patient experiences himself and others. It tries to enter into the subjective world of each patient's experience, and to express this world without using objective terms or a particular terminology. Such language cannot express the way the patient sees himself or the world. This approach has given rise to the phenomenological study of personality which receives its data, not from trying to find out as much as possible about the patient, but from making the effort to see and experience the world as he experiences.it.

Non-directive therapy makes some special demands upon the therapist himself. He must believe that the patient can be responsible for himself.

He must possess the gift for feeling with - empathy - and suffering with - sympathy - the patient. He must be able to clarify the patient's attitudes by reflecting them back to him. Above all, he must be the sort of person who can listen without approving, condemning, asking questions, making suggestions, offering advice, or attempting interpretations.

The healing power emanates from the constructive forces of growth within the patient's personality. Having experienced acceptance on the part of the therapist, the patient feels safe enough to drop his defenses, and talk about the deeper emotional attitudes that rule his behaviour. He is then willing to look at certain aspects he has hitherto ignored, gaining a new insight into his conduct, and seeing it in a different light. As a result he acquires a sounder knowledge of his motives. In this way his spontaneous powers of growth are released. He himself takes the initiative to free himself, and devise fresh ways of personal development. The new goals he sets before himself are signs of growth and maturity. An important by-product of successful therapy is a deeper understanding and acceptance of others.

The move forward in self-actualisation costs the patient struggle and pain, but the patient accepts the struggle and bears the pain because the creative urge to grow is so strong. He cannot grow, however, unless he has perceived clearly and become so aware of all the choices that he is able to give himself an adequate account of them. He must be able to distinguish between healthy forms of behaviour and regressive ones, and when he does, he will always choose to grow rather than regress.

Rogers sums up his theory thus:-

> "This theory is basically phenomenological in character and relies heavily upon the concept of self as an explanatory concept. It pictures the end point of personality development as being a basic congruence between the phenomenal field of experience and the conceptual structure of the self - a situation which, if achieved would represent freedom from internal strain and anxiety, and freedom from potential strain; which would represent the maximum in realistically oriented adaptation; which would mean the establishment of an individualized value system having considerable identity with the value system of any other equally well adjusted member of the human race."[10]

Shorn of its repellent jargon, this means that when I accept my total experience of myself in the world, I close the gap between what I think I am and what I really am. My private world reflects a clearer image of the world as it is. Thus I am free from tension and anxiety and prepared to meet any future stress without taking flight from reality. I am also free to accept the world for what it really is, and to find my own values keeping in mind my fundamental needs as a human being. When I have attained this degree of personal growth, I have achieved maturity.

It is not our purpose to criticise the technique of non-directive therapy: it has many features that make it an excellent method for the treatment of certain classes of disturbances, especially those that used to be classified as 'cases of conscience'. A troubled person does not have to surrender his conscience to another; rather, in an atmosphere that is free from the pollutions of hatred and moralism, he can rid himself of the debris that has been accumulated from the past, and thus free his conscience from 'bondage to corruption'. He can discover too the unique quality of human relationships based upon a respect for personal freedom, and he can experience, perhaps for the first time, the warmth of communion that understanding, mutual trust, and faith bestow upon a partnership. He comes, in

the words of Rogers,

> "to let the counselor and his trust and care enter into his life, not only as a counselor but on the basis of a felling of communality, of brotherhood within" . . . and to discover "that it is not devastating to accept the positive feelings of another, that it does not necessarily end in hurt, that it actually 'feels good' to have another person with you in your struggles to meet life is one of the most profound learnings one may have." [11]

Love works within the relationship of client to counselor to cast out fear.

Non-directive therapy seems to be an excellent method of treatment, not only in what are known technically as cases of conscience, but in a wide variety of cases where the main symptoms are anquish and despair over oneself. But there are other cases, notably those where ignorance accompanies the symptoms, which in the later stages of treatment need a 'directive', or at least a 'suggestive' approach. A word of comment will often contain for the patient a suggestion that throws some necessary light upon his confusion, and stimulates his constructive potentialities.

The crucial factor in any type of psychotherapy, as indeed, in any personality theory, is the concept of self-acceptance. The word 'acceptance' as it is used in the therapeutic frame of reference needs more careful definition than psychologists have been willing to give it. According to Rogers, the patient achieves a fuller acceptance of himself through the therapist's accepting him as he is. But a fuller acceptance of oneself is not merely self-acceptance. It does not mean that the patient must accept his attitudes and development as they are at the beginning of treatment except in the sense of recognising them as part of himself. It does mean that he must accept his psychic equipment, his impulses, urges, and poten-

tialities as his own.

The fundamental attitude of the therapist is not one of merely accepting the client's actual personality, but of complete understanding. He does not react against, or attack, or critise what he actually is. He accepts what he is as the spring-board for new growth, and this implies accepting his real potentialities and possibilities. From the beginning of treatment the therapist's acceptance must convey to the patient that there is a real possibility of a change for the better, and that he will help him to make this change. This is the real reason why the patient asked for help in the first instance.

Rogers implies that if only man can be brought to participate in "the rationality of his organism", the only control of impulses that would be necessary would be the natural internal balancing of one need against another. He could trust the "self-regulatory activities of the organism - the psychological as well as physiological thermostatic controls" - to govern his conduct in such a way that he would live in harmony with himself and others. But most of us are "consciously moving in one direction while organismically we are moving in another", with the result that guilt, tension, anxiety and strain throw the psychological 'thermostatic controls' out of balance. Acceptance restores their equilibrium.

To Rogers then self-realisation follows simply and directly along one line that is parallel to the growth of the biological organism. It is essentially the biological unfolding common to all living things. The strains and stresses of life may thwart this unfolding to the extent that a man

suffers severe alienation from his own nature. It is then that acceptance becomes the healing word.

But there are two aspects to 'acceptance', a therapeutic and a moral. It is true that many moral problems are at the bottom psychological ones. Disturbed people often impale themselves on the horns of a pseudo-moral dilemma. Scrupulosity is one example of this. It is equally true that many psychological problems are at root moral ones, and even when this is so, it is probably a good thing at first to see the problem in terms of growth,and thus liberate the patient emotionally from the moralistic self-reproaches his behaviour has brought down upon him. This can never be the ultimate aim of therapy. Yet Rogers sometimes reports the progress of his clients as if it were; and that as a result of non-directive therapy they are reconciled to themselves as they are with all their old moral attitudes good, bad and indifferent.

> "I've always tried to be what others thought I should be, but now I am wondering whether I shouldn't just see that I am what I am ... I find that when I feel things even when I hate, I don't care. I don't mind. I feel more free somehow. I don't feel guilty about things." [12]

Rogers feels that it is a sign of a step forward that this patient should perceive herself 'realistically' as she is; and so it is, but not in order that she might become incapable of feeling guilty. This, surely, is not the goal of therapy. The true aim is to help the patient to 're-form' his disturbed functions that he can attain a truly human attitude of mind towards the Transcendent, others, and himself. A realistic perception of oneself as one is, is the starting point for a new type of

development in this direction.

Rogers, in fact, maintains the 'soft' naturalism of Rousseau. He interprets man in terms of a beneficient organismic nature the only controls of which need to be the organism's built-in self-regulating system. Man's chief problem is 'evil' in the form of 'threat', which thwarts his innate nature. Give him a warm accepting, permissive, environment and he will be led to express his innate nature freely. The result will be peace, brotherhood, goodwill and trust.

13
Historically, 'soft naturalism' has always been subject to a curious dialectic. When Rousseau discovered that the psychological solution was not enough he then passed over to a sociological solution. In 'The Social Contract' he advocated that the individual give up all natural right to the free expression of his natural endowments in favour of the whole community. In other words, the state should become absolutely supreme over the individual. A Rousseauistic concept of man's innate nature seems to follow the same pattern. It leads to a romantic individualism, which in turn, passes over into despair from which only the deification of the state promises release.

We have discussed the impulse to self-actualisation in man as a drive to realise his specifically human powers. It is intimately associated with his urge to pass beyond the limits of a biological species in self-transcension. This urge does not express itself spontaneously. Many forces make up the impulse to psychic development, but at all times man must choose which potentialities he will realise. He renounces some in order to achieve a fuller

expression of himself along the lines he has chosen. The moral order gives a unity, a balance and proportion to man's realisation of himself on the human level. Morality, in this sense, is the highest form of self-realisation. It exercises man's capacity for choice, and organises all his powers, organismic and psychic, around his urge to self-transcension.

The balanced person does not disown those potentialities he does not choose to develop. He accepts them as real elements within his personality. He recognises the clamour of impulse for immediate satisfaction; he neither feels guilty about the impulse, nor resents the necessity of foregoing its immediate satisfaction in favour of other modes of self-realisation. He accepts his total being as 'given', as the challenging raw material out of which he will build his personality. Some of his potentialities he will use to further his self-development; others he will allow to atrophy or refuse positive gratification. He will welcome the conflict at the centre of his dynamic structure as a definitely constructive element in the realisation of his personality.

Another facet of Rogers' self-theory, upon which we must comment here, is man's capacity for 'volitional control', - to use his own phrase. Allport has complained:

> "One may look through a hundred successive American books on psychology and find no mention of 'will' or 'freedom'. It is customary for the psychologist, as for other scientists to proceed within the framework of strict determinism, and to build barriers between himself and common sense lest common sense infect psychology with its belief in freedom." [14]

Contemporary psychology ignores the fact that as a human being I can take up an attitude towards my needs. Once they become conscious they can be raised to a specifically human level, and I can decide to pursue the

'values' which are their goals, or follow some other course. At this moment I am hungry and I am also anxious to finish with Rogers. I can adopt an attitude towards my tissue need and decide to eat, or I can decide to press on with my work and complete this section on Rogers. The need, in as much as it rises into consciousness, and the attitude I adopt to it become a new starting point in the development of an autonomous personality.

Rogers offers a similar conception of the human person's capacity for self-determination:-

> "The clinical experience could be summarized by saying that the behaviour of the human organism may be determined by the influences to which it has been exposed, but it may also be determined by the creative and integrative insight of the organism itself. The ability of the person to discover new meaning in the forces which impinge upon him, and the ability to alter consciously his behaviour in the light of this new meaning, has a profound significance for our thinking which has not been fully realized. We need to revise the philosophical basis of our work to a point where it can admit that forces exist within the individual which can exercise a spontaneous and significant influence upon his behaviour which is not predictable through that of prior ifluences and conditionings. The forces released through a catalytic process of therapy are not adequately accounted for by a knowlege of the individual's previous conditionings, but only if we grant the presence of a spontaneous force within the organism which has the capacity of integration and redirection. This capacity for volitional control is a force which we must take into account in any psychological equation." [15]

This account comes very close to the traditional philosophic concept of human personality. It is not significant because of that fact alone. Rogers uses the therapeutic process for experimental research, and submits his conclusions to empirical verification. A new school of existential psychology has arisen recently with a method of therapy that insists upon man's freedom as its primary datum. Psychotherapy in general

presupposes a capacity for choice based upon decision. It still speaks of 'will' with embarrassment. The fact remains that, wherever values are recognised as having a place in the integration of personality, freedom, choice, decision cannot be ignored. Client-centred therapy, in theory and in practice, is drawing attention to aspects of human nature and growth that psychology has tended to dismiss as unworthy of an empirical science.

Scattered throughout this thesis there are a number of quotations from a small book entitled 'Becoming' by Gordon W. Allport, the Harvard psychologist. The books is based on the Terry Lectures delivered at Yale University in 1954. Until the new edition of his 'Personality' appears, 'Becoming' must serve as a summary of his most recent thought on growth and maturity. He is now revising his major work. It will contain a restatement of his theory of the functional autonomy of motives, and give greater place to his emphasis on ego functions and intentionality.

Allport has not attracted a band of followers large enough to be elevated to the dignity of a school of thought nor has he suffered from a dearth of critics. In part, this is due to the fact that he sets human personality in a framework of reference that cannot be wholly contained within empirical concepts. He upholds the uniqueness of the individual; this in itself is enough to bring down upon him the wrath of the social psychologists, who assume that common and general principles give an adequate account of individuality. His theory has been summarily dismissed by many of his critics for no other reason than that it describes man in terms that are similar to those in which man accounts for himself. When, however, the Division of Clinical and Abnormal Psychology of the American Psychological Association circulated a

questionnaire[16] asking which personality theorist its members found most valuable in their day to day work, Allport was named second only to Freud.

Most psychologists, even his critics, have borrowed from Allport's definition of personality:-

> "Personality is the dynamic organization within the individual of those psycholphysical systems that determine his unique adjustments to his environment."[17]

The phrase 'dynamic organization' draws attention to the fact that while personality has some stable features, it is continually evolving and changing. "Psychophysical reminds us that personality is neither exclusively mental nor exclusively neural. The organization entails the operation of both body and mind, inextricably fused into a personal unity."[18] The word 'determine' implies that determining tendencies play an active part in behaviour. "Personality is something and does something . . . It is what lies behind specific acts and within the individual."[19] But no two individuals make exactly the same adjustments either in quality or in any other way, hence the inclusion of the word 'unique'. 'Adjustments to his environment' must be understood broadly enough to include spontaneous creative behaviour towards the physical world as well as the ideal world.

Allport's best known and most controversial contribution to the psychology of growth is his theory of the functional autonomy of motives. In many respects this concept is the key-category of all his thinking about the development of personality, for many of his conclusions about the nature of man follow from this principle. Stated simply, the theory maintains that a given activity or form of behaviour may become a goal in itself, in spite of

the fact that it was originally a response with a different aim. Contemporary psychology explains all motivation as emanating from the tissue needs of the organism, and all behaviour as seeking to eliminate the tension caused by tissue deficits. But the reduction of all human behaviour to organic needs and drives cannot account for the dynamics of the normal mature personality.

"One of the chief characteristics of the mature personality is its possession of sophisticated and stable interests, and of a characteristic and predictable style of conduct. Convictions and habits of expression are definitely centred. Evaluations are sure, actions are precise, and the goals of the individual life are well defined."[20]

Following Allport's first statement of the theory, he was attacked by Bertocci. Is it true, Bertocci asked, that any form of behaviour repeated often enough will become autonomous? If it is true, what is there to prevent the individual from developing a state of anarchy within in which he is torn asunder by several opposing motives?

In his reply, Allport clarified his concept and gave greater place to the functions of the ego. He recognized two types of autonomous behaviour. One, the perseverative behaviour which is common to animals and men, and the other issuing out of the motivating power that lies in acquired interests, values, sentiments and total life style. In his book "Becoming", he calls the former 'opportunistic' patterns and the latter 'propriate' motives. The following passage from his reply to Bertocci summarizes his position:-

"The principle of functional autonomy holds (1) that all motives are contemporary, that whatever drives must drive now; that the 'go' of a motive is not bound functionally to its historical origins or to early goals, but to present goals only; (2) that the character of motives alters so radically

from infancy to maturity that we may speak of adult motives as supplanting the motives of infancy; (3) that the maturity of personality is measured by the degree of functional autonomy its motives have achieved; even though in every personality there are archaisms (infantilisms, regressions, reflex responses), still the cultivated and socialized individual shows maturity to the extent he has overcome early forms of motivation; (4) that the differentiating course of learning (reflecting ever more diversified environmental influence), acting upon divergent temperaments and abilities, creates individualized motives. The dynamic structure of every personality is unique, although similarities due to species, culture, stages of development, climate, may produce certain resemblances that justify-- so long as they are admitted to be approximations-- the use of universal dimensions for the purposes of comparing individuals in reference to a norm, or for the purpose of constructing convenient 'types' according to the special interest of the investigator. While not denying the possible existence of instincts in infancy-- or even the persistence of some instinctive (or reflex) forms of activity throughout life-- still the principle of functional autonomy regards the developed personality as essentially a post-instinctive phenomenon."[21]

We have come a long way from the barely recognizable human being of Hull and Company to Allport's unique, autonomous human person. The log of the journey could "be written in terms of the friction engendered between earlier and later stages of development. Becoming is the process of incorporating earlier stages into later; or when this is impossible, of handling the conflict as well as one can."[22]

The newborn infant is a creature of heredity, primitive drives, and reflexes. The distinctly human characteristics which will appear in the course of maturation exist as inherent possibilities. At this point the child's behaviour is moved towards the reduction of segmental tensions, the achievement of pleasure, and the avoidance of pain. Behaviourist theories of motivation account adequately for the behaviour of the child during its earliest years. Conditioning, reinforcement theories, and habit-hierarchy are important principles governing the opportunistic learning of animals and infants. But the process of development in a child is also governed by a disposition to become characteristically human at all stages of growth. One

of the most pressing urges within the individual is the necessity to form a personal style of life that is self-aware, self-critical and self-enhancing.

To develop fully the child needs an affectionate environment in order to acquire a productive life-style. If he has experienced acceptance, he will learn more easily to accept himself, and to handle conflicts in later life maturely. But while the child needs love and security as a background to growth, he wants them to remain in the background, and to leave him free to follow his preferred ways of acting. He also refuses to submerge himself entirely in his social environment. He resists fiercely all attempts to smother his individuality, and all his life he will be trying to hold together two opposing forces. The one, playing upon his desire for harmonious social relations will make him into a mere mirror of his culture. The other, being a strong desire for personal autonomy, will light the "lamp of individuality within."

With the capacity for an individual style of life that is self-aware and self-enhancing pressing for development, there emerges in the individual a sense of what is peculiarly his. Some psychologists call this sense the 'self', others the 'ego', but Allport names it the 'proprium', He has chosen this name deliberately, in order to avoid the common concept of 'ego' or 'self' as a homunculus, a little man within who organises and administers the personality. The proprium covers all aspects of the personality that tend towards inward unity. He has defined it as "the individual quality of organismic complexity."[23]

There are eight aspects of the proprium. Body-sense, or dim awareness of the stream of sensation which we usually recognize as the bodily me, and which is the core of becoming. Self-identity, which gives a sense of stability and continuity to the individual in his manifold experiences. Ego-enhancement, the self-seeking aspect which is intimately linked with the need for survival. These three facets occur early in development, and are the distinctive marks of the child's proprium. They are probably extensions of organismic tendencies.

With growth and learning, the sense of what is mine expands to include possessions, causes and loyalties. We go beyond possessions, clothes, and home to identify with groups and nation, and later in life we take within our orbit moral and religious values. Allport calls this process ego-extension and remarks:"Indeed a mark of maturity seems to be the range and extent of one's feeling of self-involvement in abstract ideals."[24]

The proprium discharges the function of a rational agent within the total complexity of personality. This is one of the chief characteristics of Allport's psychology. He places stronger emphasis upon conscious determinants of behaviour than upon unconscious. Not that he dismisses the concept of unconscious motivation, but he gives an important place to the role of rational processes in the functioning of the normal person. Whether the proprium reasons or rationalizes it tries to create a synthesis of inner and outer reality.

We have noted the vital function of the self-image in unifying personality and especially that aspect which presents imaginatively our aspirations.

The other facet of the self-image reflects the way we assess our present abilities and achievements. Both aspects can be distorted, but whether distorted or true the self-image guides propriate development.

Propriate striving possesses one outstanding feature that makes it the precise opposite of opportunistic response. Its aim is not the elimination of tension and the restoration of internal balance, but the sustaining of tension, and the resisting of equilibrium. Propriate striving seeks long range goals, and pursues ideals that are unattainable:

"Its goals are, strictly speaking, unattainable. Propriate striving confers unity upon personality, but it is never the unity of fulfillment, of repose, or of reduced tension. The devoted parent never loses concern for his child; the devotee of democracy adopts a lifelong assignment in his human relationships. The scientist, by the very nature of his commitment, creates more and more questions, never fewer."[25]

The eighth function of the proprium is 'knowing'. The self as knower, Allport claims, is an inescapable postulate. Its philosophical implications do not concern us here. We have already assumed that man is aware of himself as part of, but distinct from, reality. This assumption would be vain apart from the idea of the self as knower. The single self as knower, thinker, feeler, and doer perceives itself as object and apperceives itself as subject.

To sum up: the proprium although a noun describes transitive processes. Body-sense, self-identity, ego-enhancement, ego-extension, rational-agent, self-image, propriate striving, and the self-as-knower, are the aspects of the proprium. These functions Allport says:

"make for the peculiar unity and distinctiveness of personality, and at the same time seem to the knowing function to be subjectively intimate and important. The person is thus an individual organism capable of propriate activities, including of course, the function of knowing".[26]

The dynamics of human maturity have their source in the functions of the proprium, and these functions are peculiarly human functions. The guiding image of Allport's psychology is neither an irritable organism, nor an orgiastic primitive in captivity, nor the noble aboriginal, nor yet a mere hiatus in the social process. It is the psychophysical organism man, an individual centre of life who opens out upon the world, and yet who exists in himself and is conscious of his own individuality, of what is peculiarly his.

The crucial agent in the growth of personality, Allport believes, is conscience.

> "It is a process that controls transitory impulse and opportunistic adjustment in the interests of long-range aim and consistency with the self-image."[27]

Of all man's capacities none has received shabbier regard than his capacity for self-judgment and self-direction. Much contemporary psychological theory has taken over the Freudian concept of super-ego as the internalized voice of authority threatening, nagging and scolding the individual into obeying its dictates. The super-ego in this view originates in the taboos of society, and transforms organic needs or libido into sublimated forms. Home and parents are the primary agents in shaping the recalcitrant child to fit the social mould. When punishment in the form of scoldings, threatenings, and physical chastisement are the graving tools, the child learns to use them upon himself. He takes the voice of authority into himself, so that it becomes his own inner voice. The fear of punishment which he experienced after doing the forbidden thing, becomes a permanent reaction to the threat of self-administered punishment. Guilt at root is the fear of punishment.

The childish conscience undoubtedly functions in this way, and many adults never grow beyond the fearful 'must'. Their development has been arrested. But the mature adult outgrows 'the must' and embraces "the ought". His conscience moves its centre from opportunistic becoming to oriented becoming. A sense of obligation takes the place of compulsion. It gives an order to his values that is consistent with his self-image. It is true that the self-image is in part fashioned out of the raw materials provided by society and his own endowments, but the image is present to consciousness as an expression of his own individuality. It is sealed with the stamp of his uniqueness: conscience guards its integrity.

Allport sums up the changes that occur in the transformation of the must-consciousness into the ought-consciousness:

1) "External sanctions give way to internal.....

2) "Experiences of prohibition, fear, and 'must' give way to experiences of preference, self-respect, and 'ought'. This shift becomes possible in proportion as the self-image and value systems of the individual develop.

3) "Specific habits of obedience give way to generic self-guidance, that is to say, to broad schemata of values that confer direction upon conduct."[28]

He adds: "The generic conscience tells us in effect, 'If you do this it will build up your style of being; if that, it will tear down your style of being."

The style of being draws its shape and substance from the ideal image that the individual constructs out of his hopes, aspirations and values. It is the image of what he intends to become, and of what he is striving to achieve in the future. To the hopes, wishes, plans and ambitions of the person Allport gives the name intention. He defines intention simply as

"What the individual is trying to do".[29] Intentions are "complex propriate characteristics of personality." They are the modes by which the individual addresses himself to the future, but they have a dynamism of their own that determines the present style of life. This concept of intention is one of Allports unique contributions to personality psychology. Other psychologists search the past for the key to present behaviour. Allport looks to the future. He asks in the preface to the Nature of Personality . . . . .

> "Whether certain currently popular models, such as the child, the animal, the machine are suitable prototypes for the functioning of the developed personality. These root metaphors, so well established in psychological thinking today may be seriously misleading. To enhance our understanding and our powers of prediction and control we seem now to require a model of personality that stresses active intention rather than passive expectation, contemporaneous rather than past motivation, interest rather than reward, and cognitive as well as reactive dynamism." [30]

Allport conceives the mature personality as possessing three outstanding qualities, namely, ego-extension, self-objectivication, and a unifying philosophy of life. These characteristics are indispensable to the fullest development of personality, and they seem to be the universal criteria of the full grown man.

Ego-extension describes the capacity for passing beyond the narrow limits of immediate needs and concerns. It is the exact opposite of egocentricity. The mature man does not concentrate upon himself; he has indeed been able to free himself from himself by the gift of himself to that which is objectively valuable. He can lose himself in love and friendship, in work and play, in devotion to a cause and loyalty to himself. Life becomes stagnant foul when it is damned up behind egocentric defences. But

the mature man is actively open to the world and to others. He is available to others, widely receptive to them, and this deepens and enriches his own ego. In this way the self is extended.

> "Possessions, friends, one's own children, other children, cultural interest, abstract ideas, politics, hobbies, recreation and most conspicuously of all one's work, all lead to the incorporation of interests once remote from the self into selfhood proper. Whatever one loves becomes part of one." [31]

Self-objectivication is the capacity for standing aside from oneself in detachment and making an honest appraisal of one's talents and defects, one's achievements and pretensions, one's present goals and future objectives. This capacity for self-knowledge, Allport calls insight. It is the indispensable pre-requisite to change within the personality, but it does not effect a transformation automatically. The mature person uses his insight into himself to gain wisdom from past failures, and when he finds he needs to change he supplements his self-knowledge by "a new orientation, a vigourous plan for the future, a new and effective motivation".[32]

A sense of humour is the handmaid of insight. The mature man "has the ability to laugh at the things he loves (including himself and all that pertains to himself) and still to love them."[33] He can adopt an attitude of benevolent criticism towards himself, laugh at his pretensions, tip his hat to his foibles, and regard his attacks of self-satisfaction with amused irony. One is reminded of the translation of the fifth beatitude in the French Huguenot Bible,"Heureux sont les debonnaires". One of the virtues of maturity is the calm and cheerful acceptance of what one sees when one looks at oneself in true perspective. One accepts the challenge debonairly.

The third attribute of maturity is the possession of a unifying philosophy of life. Man is a being who poses a question to himself about existence. He is aware that he does not exist by himself, that he cannot find in himself any ultimate basis for the fact that he exists. He feels himself to be, that is to say more or less consciously integrated with the order of reality, but in order to create a personal existence for himself he must find the courage to participate in Being itself at every level. But man finds certain ruptures in the way he relates himself to being. He feels guilty when he has succumbed to the blandishments of non-being; he experiences a deep uneasiness in the form of doubt about the objective uncertainties to which he must cling with passionate inwardness if he is to illuminate his existence; he is beset at all times by the threat of non-being, that is, the all pervasive dread of utter dissolution as a person. "Maturity, we feel, means that we should become aware of, and in some way partner to, all the discordant conditions of our own existence."[34]

Man in order to be fully human needs to give meaning to his existence be defining himself in relation to the whole of Being. This need to be more completely himself by understanding as a conscious being what he is, if unsatisfied, engenders an anguish as intense as the pangs of tissue deficits. The philosophical quest is one expression of this need whether it end in materialism, idealism, existentialism, atheism or theism. Being demands more than the participation of reason alone for man to find a disclosure of his authentic relationship to it. He must engage himself totally in faith and love in order 'to save his soul', or in other words maintain himself in existence as a person related to Being as a whole. Religion

begins here as a "quest for a comprehensive belief system capable of relating him to existence as a whole."[35]

We have surveyed in this and the preceding chapter five psychologies that attempt to describe the dynamics of human growth, in order that we might discover the nature of psychological maturity. Goldstein and Lecky occupy themselves mainly with general principles governing growth; all of which stem from the organism's one and only drive to actualise itself or achieve self-consistency. Positive goals of development are implicit in their writings rather than explicit. Maslow in his holistic-dynamic analysis of self-actualising people describes the profile of the psychologically mature person from the organismic standpoint. All three find in biological unfolding the paradigm of human growth.

Rogers skirts a positive concept of maturity by describing good adjustment in terms of the acceptance of all organismic experiences into the self-system. Thus creating an internal condition of freedom from tension, anxiety and stress. His theory of human personality as distinct from his method of client-centred therapy and his doctrine of human nature, are from our point of view limited by his naturalistic assumptions. He does not give adequate recognition to the conflict at the heart of the human dynamism out of which the person fashions an autonomous personality.

Allport alone offers definitive criteria of human maturity. His consuming interest is man as man. He does not regard empirical methods as alone adequate to represent, investigate, or understand the whole man. He stands out against his fellow psychologists as the champion of the

uniqueness of every human being. He does not overlook any dimension of existence; biological, social, moral or religious.

It is a pity that pastoral theology has not given more attention to his psychology than has been the case. Pastoral theology in search for a firm psychological basis has dallied with Freud, sat at the feet of Jung and finally succumbed to Rogers. Pastoral care can use all insights into human nature from whatever direction they come. And Rogers has given the pastor a splendid tool for ministering effectively to human misery. Nevertheless, a theory of personality cannot be separated completely from the method of therapy which gave it rise, nor can the method be entirely detached from the theory that it embodies. The pastoral theologian has had to do a good deal of juggling to adopt methods and theories, formed on wholly naturalistic assumptions, into the dimensions of Christian faith and practice. Why has Allport been overlooked? His psychology offers an adequate foundation to moral science. He looks beyond the confines of naturalism. He presents a map of personality growth and development that is recognisably human. Pastoral counseling would not loose any of the insights of client-centred therapy by using it. But then, perhaps, not even pastoral theologians are immune to the blandishments of the esoteric, the 'deep', and the new.

CHAPTER IV

MEDICAL PSYCHOLOGIES

THE SAVAGE and THE SAGE

The title of this chapter requires some explanation. General psychology began to develop towards the end of the nineteenth century as the offspring of philosophy and experimental physiology. Personality theory owes its origin much more to the exigencies of medical practice than to academic psychology. The pioneers in the field such as Janet, Freud, Charcot, McDougal and Stern were trained in medicine, practiced as psychotherapists, and drew their ideas from clinical practice.

This tradition continued as Freud developed his psychoanalytic theory. His first disciples were physicians with an interest in neurology. Three of them, Jung, Adler, and Ranke broke with him to pursue their investigations along their own lines, and eventually formulated very different theories.

The analytic theories of Freud and Jung were subjected to the same positivism as nineteenth century physics and biology which regarded man as a complex energy system. Personality consisted of a number of processes by which the individual maintained contact with the environment in order to sustain his energy for purposes of survival, propagation of the species, and evolutionary development. The Darwinian concept that some individuals are better endowed to fulfil these purposes than others led early psychoanalysts to study the difference in degree between maladjustment and adjustment. They assumed that man's personality is biological.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century the pendulum began to swing the other way, until it has now reached the opposite pole. Sociology and anthropology have emerged to grow with extraordinary rapidity into independent disciplines. Neither have hesitated to make 'total' pronouncements. Sociologists, having studied man in the advanced civilisations, have found him to be the product of his class and his institutions. Anthropologists, ranging throughout the remote areas of the world to study primitive cultures, have concluded that human nature is infinitely plastic. Man's nature, therefore, is determined by the society in which he lives. His personality is social rather than biological.

Psychoanalytic theory gradually began to feel the influence of the social sciences. Freud refused to recognise any cultural determinents of personality, and continued to develop his theory without reference to them. In 1911 Alfred Adler broke with Freud, and developed a theory in which the two key concepts were a striving for superiority, and social interest. Later, Karen Horney and Eric Fromm rebelled against Freud's instinct theories, and stressed social and cultural factors in the shaping of personality. They keep, nonetheless, well within the psychoanalytic framework, and are usually referred to as Neo-Freudians. Harry Stack Sullivan, using the concepts of anthropology and social psychology, formed his own theory of interpersonal relations, and grounded human personality in social processes.

Horney and Sullivan were trained in medicine. They derived their primary data from clinical practice as psychotherapists. Fromm studied

psychology and sociology at the Universities of Heidelberg, Frankfurt, and Munich, and later trained as a psychoanalyst at the Berlin Institute of Psychoanalysis. But he has become so identified with the analytic tradition started by Freud that he rightly belongs to the medical psychologies. We use the phrase 'medical psychology' to describe those theories of personality that originate in the treatment of disorders by some form of analytic therapy.

Sigmund Freud, taking his clues from Jean Charcot and Joseph Breuer, discovered that certain disorders with an organic basis - such as hysterical convulsions, drug addictions, phobias, depressions and functional stomach upsets - can be cured by uncovering the unconscious factors underlying them. Freud first tried Charcot's method of treating hysteria with hypnosis. Dissatisfied with the results, he turned to Breuer who had devised a method of curing hysterical symptoms by having the patient talk about them. He tried this method and found it to be effective. For a time he co-operated with Breuer in the study of hysteria.

The two soon parted company over Freud's view that sexual conflicts were the cause of hysteria. Thereafter,Freud worked alone developing the ideas that were to form the foundation of psychoanalytic theory. But his books and articles, especially 'The Interpretation of Dreams', began to attract the attention of physicians around the world. Before long he was surrounded by an international band of disciples.

Psychoanalysis, then, had its origin in a method for the treatment of hysteria, but it soon grew into a form of therapy for all non-organic functional disorders. The study of the gross clinical symptoms manifesting neurosis revealed that neurotic people suffer also from character disturbances. These became as much the object of analysis as the clinical symptoms themselves. Ernest Jones, Freud's English disciple, has remarked that the completion of a successful analysis brings not only release from the original disorder that prompted psychoanalytic help, but also dividends in the form of the general improvement of personality. The patient, it is claimed, finds greater joy in living, employs his capacities more fruitfully, and experiences greater internal freedom of feeling. These by-products of analysis have further extended its scope. Not only do people turn to it for release from neurotic ailments, but also because they feel that factors within themselves are impeding their personal growth, and damaging their personal relationships. Psychoanalysis, while still remaining a method of therapy for functional neurosis, has tended to become a means of furthering character development. In this role it has elevated itself increasingly into a conception of life and a philosophy of man. This Weltanschauung has evolved its own 'summum bonum': it is the attainment of psychological or emotional maturity.

To a greater or lesser degree most psychotherapists use some features of the Freudian technique of psychoanalysis. Client-centred therapy resembles Breuer's 'talking cure' more closely than Freud's analytic

method. Some recent therapies have revived hypnosis and suggestion, applying them intensely in a form of benevolent brain-washing. Whatever method psychotherapy might employ, its aim is always the same, to open up the road closed by neurosis, character disorders, and personality difficulties to growth and maturity.

Psychological maturity has been described in a spate of popular books, but never defined. The attributes of maturity are manifest in how a man manages his emotions, settles his problems, reconciles his conflicts, and achieves some sort of inner balance. But no one isolated trait can form the measure of maturity; it can be assessed only in terms of the 'total' character structure. Such knowledge as psychotherapy possesses about it has been won largely through the analysis of the immature. True to its naturalist assumptions, psychotherapy in common with some of the psychologies we have discussed, regards the attainment of maturity "not as a kind of state of grace, but as a psycho-biological process analagous to the maturation of the fertilised ovum."

We have noted that Freud inherited the nineteenth century concept of man as a complex energy system. Man's instincts are the sole source of his energy. According to Freud,

> "An instinct . . . . . arises from the sources of stimulation within the body, operates as a constant force, and is such that a subject cannot escape from it by flight as he can from an external stimulus. An instinct may be described as having a source, an object, and an aim, ... in the course of its path from its source to the attainment of its aim the instinct becomes operative mentally. We picture it as a certain sum of energy forcing its way in a certain direction."[1]

Freud did not attempt to draw up a list of instincts. His theory, presumably, would posit as many instincts as there are organic needs. He assumed that they could be classified under two general headings; the Eros or life instincts, and the Thanatos or death instincts.

The Eros instincts constitute the only constructive force in man and are essentially sexual in nature. The sum total of the energies liberated by the Eros instincts is called libido. Freud, however, employs the word sexual in a very broad sense to denote bodily pleasure. The sexual instinct itself is made up of many component instincts "arising from various regions of the body which strive for satisfaction more or less independently of one another, and find this satisfaction in something that may be called 'organ-pleasure'."[2] Each component instinct has its source in a different bodily region which Freud classified generally as the erotogenic zones. The organ systems that crave constant gratification throughout the span of human life are the alimentary and the genitourinary. These functions are essential to the organism's life.

Libidinous development runs through three phases before reaching 'genital' maturity. In the first period which begins at birth, the mouth dominates infant sexuality. This is the oral phase. The chief source of pleasure derived from the mouth is that of feeding. During the process of feeding the lips and oral cavity undergo stimulation. When the teeth show through, biting and chewing take the place of sucking. These two modes of oral activity are described by Freudians as oral-sucking and oral-biting. The second phase of development centres

around the anus, the opposite pole of the alimentary system. This is the anal stage of growth. The evacuation of feces affords the child relief and pleasure. Under the stress of toilet training the child manifests its anal impulses under another mode connected with the retention of feces. Following the sadistic-anal stage early libidinal organisation enters the phallic phase which is in Freud's words, "the forerunner of the final shape of sexual life".[3] In this phase the child's chief centre of interest is the penis, or in the case of girls the clitoris. All these phases occur between birth and the sixth year, after which there follows a latency period lasting approximately until the ninth year when puberty begins, and the libido enters the genital phase. But the way in which it develops during this fourth and final phase depends upon what happened during the prior phases. For Freud, the first five years of life are decisive in the formation of personality.

Throughout the course of development each new step that is taken imposes upon the child a measure of frustration and anxiety. If these are greater than he is able to bear, normal growth may be arrested, either temporarily or permanently. He becomes fixated at an early level of development. Each step demanded of him is fraught with anxiety, and he may defend himself against it by fixation at a preceding level. Similarly, the child or adult may be overcome by traumatic experiences and retreat to an earlier level of personality. Regression and fixation are closely related defense mechanisms. These conditions are relative; few people are completely stuck or entirely regress. The personalities

of most people include tendencies to infantile behaviour, and predispositions to display immature conduct when thwarted.

The Freudian disciple Karl Abraham[4] has defined character as the sum total of a person's instinctive reactions to his environment. The aim of an instinct never changes: it is always a somatic modification which is experienced as satisfaction, but the object, that is to say the means by which a person attempts to gain satisfaction can and does vary during his lifetime. This variation in object is possible because psychic energy is displaceable, and can be invested in one object after another. But the aim or goal of the instinct is always gratification. This displacement of energy from one object to another is the most important process in character. development.

Instinctive striving at the oral stage which is satisfied by sucking and swallowing, may be satisfied in later life by acquiring possessions and knowledge. Gullibility is a symptom of fixation at the oral level of incorporation. The gullible person will swallow anything he is told. The gratifications of the oral-sadistic phase may be displaced in the form of sarcasm and argumentativeness. Since the baby, during the oral stage is completely dependent upon the mother for sustenance and protection from discomfort, the feelings of dependency which arise tend to persist throughout life, and may break out later under the onslaught of anxiety or insecurity.

The anal phase is a critical period for character formation, according to the Freudians. The crucial factors are the method of

toilet training and the mother's feelings concerning defecation. If the mother is overly strict and repressive, the child may hold back the feces and become constipated. This reaction will be displaced later by obstinacy, stinginess, and avarice. Or the child may vent his rage by evacuating the feces at the wrong time and in the wrong place. Cruelty, wanton destructiveness, temper tantrums, messy untidiness and mistrust, - to mention only a few of the less desirable traits - are displacements of the original impulse to deposit the feces at the most inappropriate times. The child, however, may respond to kindly pleading from the mother, and this response may be displaced in later life by creativity and productivity.

During the phallic phase the growing child meets the most critical and decisive experience in his entire life. The auto-eroticism of this period, and the accompanying fantasies set the stage for the appearance of the Oedipus complex. In its primitive state the libido is directed towards the ego. During this narcissistic stage the child's own body forms the object of the libido, but now the first important choice of objects presents itself. The growing boy begins to feel a strong bond with his mother and at the same time hostility to his father as a rival. The attitude to the father, however, is ambivalent. A deep feeling of veneration frequently goes along with the hostility. At the same time the boy wants to remove his father and possess his mother. This desire, together with the accompanying ambivalence towards his father, constitutes the Oedipus complex. The girl's experience of the Oedipal situation is the reverse of the boy's. She develops an erotic attitude

to the father and feelings of hostility to the mother.

The Oedipus Complex occupies a central place not only in Freud's theory of neurosis, but in all human activity in general and in human culture in particular. The manner in which the complex is resolved determines the quality of the child's future mental health. Because of his feelings of hostility towards the father, the boy fears that the father will attack him and remove the organs that are the source of his erotic desires for the mother. This castration anxiety induces a repression of both the sexual desire and the feelings of hostility. The boy identifies with his father, and his erotic feelings for the mother are turned into tender affection.

The Oedipal situation looms up between the third and sixth years. The libido then remains quiescent until the onset of puberty at about the ninth year when the child enters the genital phase of development. During the pregenital phases he had gained gratification from the stimulation and manipulation of his own body. Other people were valued only because they provided additional funds of bodily pleasure. But if all has gone well the youth begins to throw off his primary narcissim, and to break the power of the pleasure principle to dominate his life. He begins to seek others, to participate in social life, to plan a vocation, and to look towards marriage and a family. There is, however, no radical discontinuity between the genital and pregenital phases. Rather, the oral, anal, and phallic impulses become fused with the genital libido.

The whole of man's constructive psychic life has its roots in the

libido and so too have the three 'sectors' which form the structure of human personality. The deepest roots of life run down into the 'id'. Freud himself has depicted the 'id' in a fine passage of prose:

> "We can come nearer to the id with images, and call it a chaos, a cauldron of seething excitement. We suppose that it is somewhere in direct contact with somatic processes, and takes over from them instinctual needs and gives them mental expression, but we cannot say in what substratum this contact is made. These instincts fill it with energy, but it has not organisation and no unified will, only an impulsion to obtain satisfaction for the instinctual needs, in accordance with the pleasure-principle. The laws of logic - above all, the law of contradiction - do not hold for processes in the id. Contradictory impulses exist side by side without neutralising each other or drawing apart; at most they combine in compromise formations under the overpowering economic pressure towards discharging their energy. There is nothing in the id which can be compared to negation, and we are astonished to find in it an exception to the philosphers' assertion that space and time are necessary forms of our mental acts. In the id there is nothing corresponding to the idea of time, no recognition of the passage of time, and (a thing which is very remarkable and awaits adequate attention in philosophic thought) no alteration of mental processes by the passage of time . . . .
>
> Naturally, the id knows no values, no good and evil, no morality. The economic, or, if you prefer, the quantitative factor, which is so closely bound up with the pleasure-principle, dominates all its processes. Instinctual cathexes seeking discharge, - that, in our view, is all that the id contains." 5

The second 'sector', the 'ego', is that part of the 'id' which has been modified by contact with the external world. The 'ego' has no power of its own. It is merely an executive officer administering as best it can the blind forces of the 'id'. As we shall see in the following passage Freud considered knowledge and conscious thought as simply a 'buffer' between blind instinct and external reality. He writes,

"One can hardly go wrong in regarding the ego as that part of the

> id which has been modified by its proximity to the external world and the influence that the latter has had on it, and which serves the purpose of receiving stimuli and protecting the organism from them, like the cortical layer with which a particle of living substance surrounds itself. This relation to the external world is decisive for the ego. The ego has taken over the task of representing the external world for the id, and so of saving it; for the id, blindly striving to gratify its instincts in complete disregard of the superior strength of outside forces, could not otherwise escape annihilation. In the fulfilment of this function, the ego has to observe the external world and preserve a true picture of it in the memory traces left by its perceptions, and, by means of the reality-test, it has to eliminate any element in this picture of the external world which is a contribution from internal sources of excitation. On behalf of the id, the ego controls the path of access to motility, but it interpolates between desire and action the procrastinating factor of thought, during which it makes use of the residues of experience stored up in memory. In this way it dethrones the pleasure-principle, which exerts undisputed sway over the processes in the id, and substitutes for it the reality-principle, which promises greater security and greater success."[6]

The 'super-ego' is the third sector within the personality structure. It is the "heir to the Oedipus Complex" and retains intimate connections with the 'id'. Freud assigned three activities to the super-ego; self-observation, conscience, and the holding up of ideals. In other words it is the moral arm of personality, representing the ideal rather than the real, and striving for perfection rather than pleasure. In Freud's words

> "It follows from our account of its origin that it is based upon an overwhelmingly important biological fact no less than upon a momentous psychological fact, namely the lengthy dependence of the human child on its parents and the Oedipus complex; these two facts, moreover, are closely bound up with each other. For us the super-ego is the representative of all moral restrictions, the advocate of the impulse towards perfection, in short it is as much as we have been able to apprehend psychologically of what people call the 'higher' things in human life." [7]

The super-ego represents the traditional values and ideals of society as they are interpreted to the child by his parents, teachers, and other significant elders. By processes of identification and introjection the child incorporates into his developing personality the morals

and ideals of his authorities. The punishments meted out to him are introjected as conscience, while conduct that is approved and rewarded is incorporated into the ego-ideal.

We can summarize the main functions of the super-ego as, first, to inhibit the impulses of the id and especially the sexual and aggressive ones; second, to persuade the ego to substitute ideal goals for realistic ones; third, to strive for perfection.

A being so constituted finds the passage to maturity a perilous business. There are many rock-ridden shallows on which to run aground. Progress may be arrested at any one of the pregenital phases, and when this happens frustration follows, gendering anxiety. Anxiety calls upon the organism to fight, or take flight. An angry super-ego pours down blame and guilt and self-castigation upon the ego no matter which course it takes, and the vicious treadmill of regression - frustration - anxiety - fight or flight starts again. This circular process is the core of neurosis.

The concept of maturity as such does not receive any explicit attention in Freud's writings. There is much that is implied in his map of libidinal development and organisation. Maturity begins to bloom when the individual has reached the genital stage, and has achieved a capacity for 'object-interest'. The child, as we have seen, reacts to the world instinctively. Slowly and by degrees it overcomes the pregenital impulses, and moves away from its primary narcissism towards 'object-love'. Before he can reach the final stage he must renounce all remaining traces

of the primitive stages that are anti-social. He cannot move forward until he has overcome the remnants of destructive and hostile impulses left over from the sadistic phase, and the mistrust and avarice derived from the anal ones. When he has successfully resolved the Oedipus complex he has taken some decisive steps in the overcoming of his original narcissism and hostile tendencies, and at the same time has forced the abdication of the pleasure-principle.

Freud believed that all tenderness and affection had its source in 'aim-inhibited sexuality'. The genital impulses, stopping short of finding satisfaction in coupling, overflow into fondness and devotion which continue to exist side by side with erotic desires. The healthy child assimilates his Oedipal feelings with this happy result, and during the latency period the aim-inhibited sentiments prevail over sensual feelings. If development continues to be normal these sentiments are extended to the father and gradually to the whole community.

Karl Abraham[8] has written that "the most complete development presupposes a sufficient quantity of friendly feeling." He has etched maturity in terms of the fullest possible character development. The mature man maintains friendly relations with society, and does not possess too many eccentricities to prevent a wholesome adaptation to the community. His character traits are held in balance. He pursues a mean course between extremes of cruelty and overkindness, avarice and extravagance. The traces of the primal stages have not been entirely obliterated, for he retains those that are useful in maturity. From the

oral phase he gathers enterprise and energy. The anal stage supplies endurance and perserverance. He uses the aggressive instincts to maintain life, and directs the sadistic impulses into constructive channels. The sadistic phases in his development donate the power to carry on the struggle for existence. Consequently, he is able to keep his impulses under control without disavowing any of his instincts, and at the same time achieve a steady conquest of his narcissism and a large measure of victory over his ambivalences.

[9]
Ernest Jones has analysed the attributes of psychological maturity in the light of orthodox Freudian doctrine. With Trotter, Jones defines the normal mind as the mind in which the full capacities are available for use. Maturity as normality in this sense depends upon channels that are clear enough to provide a free flow of permanent energy from the unconscious to the conscious levels of personality. There is a store of psychical energy in everyone that is not at the disposal of the personality. It is held back by internal conflict between guilt and anxiety on the one hand, and the libidinal forces on the other. Much of this energy is held in suspense by the necessity to maintain repressions, or it is expended in creating neurotic symptoms in the place of free expression. Given the chance to flow freely it bestows the power to attain the three attributes of maturity; happiness, mental efficiency and a positive, sensitive regard for other people.

Jones defines happiness as a capacity for enjoyment with self-content. The absence of self-content indicates the presence of unconscious guilt which gives rise to the need for self-punishment, and

impairs the capacity for enjoyment. The difficulties of the Oedipal situation have driven the growing child to regress into narcissism, or to defend himself by retreating into hate. This leads to further fear and guilt which turns inward, and manifests itself in the punitive tactics of self-reprisals.

Mental efficiency depends upon an unimpeded flow of energy from primitive unconscious sources. This energy can be expended in two ways. It can be used in displacement activities where the conscious object remains more or less that of the original unconscious impulse, in which case it becomes subject to whatever conflicts, compulsions or inhibitions surround its primal source. The energy, on the other hand, can be sublimated and expended in cultural, creative, and humane endeavours. In sublimation the external activity has greater significance than the original unconscious source from which it is derived. The nature of the energy undergoes a qualitative change but the zest of the original wishes are retained to the full.

A sensitive, positive, perceptive regard for other people demands a nice balance between the interests of the individual and those of society. Selfishness at the expense of the community may be due to unconscious fear, but quixotic self-sacrifice may proceed from unconscious guilt. An equilibrium between competing claims can be maintained only by the love that is born of confidence. Neurotic conciliatoriness is a re-action formation to instinctive hate. True love and friendliness flow when unconscious sadism has been assimilated, and when a confidence has been born that actuates the super-ego by affection rather than guilt and fear.

The deepest difficulty of the child is to endure libidinal privation without fear of loss, and without developing defences of guilt and hate. Freedom and self-control both reside in the capacity to endure, that is, in the ability to hold wishes in suspension without renouncing them, or reacting to them in defensive ways. The capacity to endure begets fearlessness:-

> "The attainable criterion of normality is fearlessness, not merely manifest courage in the face of danger, but absence of all deep reactions that mask unconscious apprehensiveness. The fruit of this is the willing or joyfull acceptance of life with all its changes and chances. This distinguishes the free personality of one who is master of himself."[10]

Both Abraham's and Jones' analysis of the mature character implies a sort of pilgrim's progress from narcissism to the full possession of the instinctual energies. When conscience is moved by a 'sufficient quantity of friendly feeling' it directs them outward. The Freudian moralist J. C. Flugel has attempted to find norms for the direction and control of the instinctual energies. He recognizes man as a "moral animal", but "Much of his morality is crude and primitive, ill adapted to reality, and often at variance both with his intellect and with his conscious aspirations."[11] The villain in the tragedy is the super-ego, the tyrannical legatee of traditional ethics and avowed enemy of the instincts. A healthy superego, if such can be found, might be entrusted with the routine chores of the moral life. But.....

> "it is clearly unsuited to serve (as it is often expected to do) as the supreme court of moral appeal. If, as seems to be the case, man is by his very nature doomed to conflict, we must seek the ultimate solution of conflict at the higher level of reason rather than at the lower one of conscience and tradition."[12]

An enlightened morality must base its norms on eight general tendencies. These tendencies run as follows: from egocentricity to sociality; from

unconscious to conscious; from autism to realism; from moral inhibition to spontaneous goodness; from aggression to tolerance and love; from fear to security; from heteronomy to autonomy; from orectic (moral) judgment to cognitive judgment (psychological).[13] Such a catalogue of 'progressions' lays down the course that ends in moral maturity.

Since about the end of the second World War the 'ego' has been given greater prestige in the psychoanalytic system. In both therapy and theory it has come to occupy an increasingly important place. The works of Franz Alexander and T. R. French have made notable contributions to this development. From a junior executive position with the function of reconciling the dictates of the superego, the clamours of the 'id', and the demands of the external world, it has risen to senior authority with the responsibility for directing, planning, judging and fighting.[14] In Franz Alexander's[15] description of psychological maturity the 'ego' plays a central role.

The ego is the central governing portion of the personality. One of its functions is to maintain a flexible attitude to changing conditions. "Mature behaviour is characterized by a flexible adaptation to a given situation." The conscious ego must plan the distribution of "energies not needed for survival in a productive creative fashion, by expending them for the sake of others."[16] This is an attribute of maturity.

A generous productive state of mind requires security. Where this is lacking due to repressions and conflicts, the ego, using its functions of intelligence and perception, can increase its conscious control through a knowledge of the disturbing factors.

"Only that person who is not involved in his own internal conflicts, who is not handicapped by anxiety, and confusion about his own problems can turn his interest outwards. In order to obtain such internal peace of mind, the person must be able to adjust his internal needs in a flexible way to changing internal and external condition. The ego must accomplish this in a smooth and economical way."[17]

The sum and substance of the four descriptions of maturity we have considered so far in this chapter can be summed up in Freud's own words, "Where id was,there let ego be". When a man has reached genital maturity and is capable of object-love, and can direct his instinctual energies into constructive and socially approved channels, and can adjust his desires to 'reality', he has become master of himself. He is mature.

Carl Gustav Jung broke with Freud in August of 1914 after an intimate friendship which had lasted for seven years. The immediate reason for the rupture was Freud's concept of libido as wholly sexual in nature. Jung had formed the concept of a primal psychic energy which he called libido, and of which sex was a part, but not the most important part.

Jung's view of man combines causality with teleology; man is determined not only by his personal and racial history, but also by his aims and aspirations. To Freud, the life of the individual is merely a series of variations on instinctual themes: to Jung, the life of the person constantly moves forward in a search for completion. Freud found the origins of personality in the instinctual strivings of the infant, while Jung looks beyond the child to the genesis of homo sapiens. Modern man, he believes, has been shaped by the experience of past generations extending back to the origin of man as a separate species.

It would be impossible to give anything more than a brief sketch of Jung's theory, and then only of those parts that have a bearing upon our subject. Unfortunately, there is no area of his psychology that is not relevant to the achievement of maturity if we think of maturity in terms of individual self-fulfillment. We shall attempt to give an account of his principle concepts in such a manner that they will blend together in the mosaic that Jung terms the self. In Jung's analytic psychology the achievement of maturity is the attainment of selfhood.

The self flowers when the personality reaches full development and unity. Man does not arrive anywhere near this stage until middle life. Meanwhile the processes of development and unification have been working continuously, and often creatively, to bring into a unique harmony all the aspects of the individual personality. In the total personality, or psyche, there are a number of interacting systems. The principle ones are the ego, the personal unconscious and its complexes, the collective unconscious and its archtypes, the persona, the anima or animus, and the shadow. Besides these interdependent systems, there are the attitudes of extraversion and introversion, as well as the functions of thinking, feeling, sensing, and intuiting. Finally, there is the self, the fully developed and fully unified personality.

From the standpoint of introspection, the ego appears at the centre of personality. It is, in fact, the conscious mind with its memories, perceptions, thoughts and feelings. Two of its chief responsibilities consist in giving the person a sense of self-identity and continuity.

The personal unconscious 'adjoins' the ego. The contents of the personal unconscious are chiefly experiences that were once conscious but have been forgotten, ignored or repressed. These are accessible to consciousness, and there is a good deal of commerce between the two regions. The feelings, memories, thoughts and experiences existing in the unconscious are organised around magnetic nuclei which draw experiences to them. Jung calls such organizations complexes. The nucleus comes into existence from two sources, the individual's inherited racial experience, and the actual experience of living his life. The nucleus of a father complex, for example, will consist in part of the child's ideas drawn from the race's experience of fathers, and from his experience with his own father. The stronger the magnetic force of the nucleus, the more it will draw experiences to itself.

But there are other elements within the unconscious which have no relation to the conscious personal life, nor can they be integrated with it in the same way as the personal elements. Jung calls these other elements the elements of the collective unconscious. These elements make up the psychic residue left over from man's evolutionary development. They have accumulated as the result of repeated experiences over many generations.

The collective unconscious is the most powerful system in human personality.

> "If it were permissible to personify the unconscious, we might call it a collective human being combining the characteristics of both sexes, transcending youth and age, birth and death, and having at its command a human experience of one or two million years, almost immortal."[18]

The collective unconscious is the inherited racial foundation of the whole structure of personality. It influences what a person learns. It guides and

selects behaviour from the very beginning of life. "The form of the world into which he is born is already inborn in him as a virtual image."[19] The virtual image identifies itself with concrete objects in the world and becomes an idea, a perception. To a large extent, but not completely so, all our experiences of the world are shaped by the collective unconscious.

If the ego ignores either aspects of the unconscious it is liable to erupt in a devastating rebellion, seize the conscious rational processes, and twist them into distorted forms. Neurotic symptoms, phobias, delusions and other irrational phenomena are the tragic consequences of ignoring the unconscious. But it can also be a faithful servant of immeasurable value to the conscious psyche.

> "It holds possibilities which are locked away from the conscious mind, for it has at its disposal all subliminal contents, all those things which have been forgotten or overlooked, as well as the wisdom and experience of uncounted centuries which are laid down in its archtypal organs."[20]

The 'archtypal organs' or 'archtypes' are the collective elements in the unconscious. Jung has given them a variety of names such as dominants, primordial images, images, mythological images, and behaviour patterns. An archtype is an innate idea, a kind of universal thought form to which a large amount of emotion is attached, and which creates a vision or image that corresponds to some 'object' in the external world. The archtype of the mother, for example, creates an image of the mother figure which is identified with the actual mother. An archtype originates in an experience of the race that has been repeated over many generations. The mother, for instance, has had pretty much the same basic functions from the eras of pre-history until now, and this experience of 'the maternal' becomes a permanent deposit in the unconscious. So too, since man adopted an upright

posture he has watched the sun rise and move from one horizon to the other, and this awesome sight has become fixed in the collective unconscious as an archtype of the sun-god, the powerful, light-giving body in the heavens that men have worshipped. In like manner natural forces such as waterfalls, floods, hurricanes, lightning and fires, have implanted the archtype of energy that fills man with a fascination for power, and an almost irresistible urge to create and control power.

Archtypes can fuse, sometimes benignly as when the hero and the wise man blend in the 'philosopher king', but at other times malevolently as when the hero and the demon archtypes came together in one satanic figure. The nucleus of a complex may be an archtype drawing all experiences to it, and in this way the archtype can penetrate consciousness. Jung claims that there are a tremendous number of archtypes within the collective unconscious, archtypes of birth, rebirth, death, power, magic, the hero, the child, the demon, the wise old woman, the earth mother, the animal, and God.[21]

Three archtypes have penetrated consciousness to the extent that they lie on the border between the conscious ego and the unconscious. These are the persona, the anima and animus, and the shadow. The term persona is used in the literal sense of mask. It is the mask that convention, tradition, and his own archtypal needs oblige the person to wear. Society casts a man in a certain role, and expects him to play the part in his public life. The persona is a man's public personality as contrasted with the private personality that exists behind the social facade. If the persona and the ego fuse, man becomes alienated from himself and turns into a flat reflection of society, instead of being an autonomous human person.

Man is not only masculine, rather he is masculine-feminine. Conversely, true womanhood bears within it the image of the masculine. The feminine archtype resident in the collective unconscious of the male is called the anima, and its masculine counterpart in the female is the animus. It is because of the feminine image within him that a man can enter into an understanding relationship with a woman. Similarly a woman can establish a satisfactory union with a man only in so far as she is able to accept her own masculinity. But there is always a danger of confusing the ideal prototype with the living partner. The two are never identical; to avoid bitter disappointment and despair there must be a nice balance between the demands of the collective unconscious and the realities of an imperfect world.

As the persona travels towards the light of social favour and public approval, it casts a shadow which silhouettes a darker, fuller shape than appears before society. The shadow is an archtype of the vigourous animal which the lower forms of life have bequeathed to man. It is responsible for the outcast thoughts and feelings that invade the mind, and which are either carefully hidden from public view, or repressed into the unconscious. The shadow hovers between the private world of the ego and the covert region of the personal unconscious. But without the shadow no person is whole. The vital instincts it represents give a full-bodied vigour to the personality.

It will be now obvious that Jung thinks of personality in terms of tensions created by conflict. We have already pointed out in Chapters two and three that any view of personality which ignores the nuclear conflict within the human dynamism gives a misleading account of human personality. It is doubtful whether such an account describes human personality at all.

Tension is the very essence of life. Without tension no energy would be produced, and consequently personality would die.

Personality, according to Jung, emerges from conflict. It is an aggregation of opposites. Opposition holds sway in every area. The ego and the shadow oppose each other: the personal unconscious and the ego are divided: the personal ignores the anima and shuns the personal unconscious: the collective unconscious places itself over against the ego: when the persona rises to hide the battle from the world, the other archtypes attack it. Introversion opposes extraversion, thinking opposes feeling, and sensation opposes intuition. The rational and irrational forces of the psyche constantly engage each other in battle. There is no respite from the conflict.

There is a way however to bring the warring elements in the psychic household into an alliance. It is the way or process of Individuation, and its goal is the realisation of selfhood. The concept of the self is one of Jung's most important psychological discoveries. The self is life's ultimate goal, but the concept is so technical we must allow Jung to speak for himself:

> "If we picture the unconscious mind with the ego as its centre, as being opposed to the unconscious, and if we now add to our mental picture the process of assimilating the unconscious, we can think of this assimilation as a kind of approximation of conscious and unconscious, where the centre of the total personality no longer coincides with the ego, but with a point midway between the conscious and unconscious. This would be the point of a new equilibrium, a new centring of the total personality, a virtual centre which, on account of its focal position between conscious and unconscious, ensures for personality a new and more solid foundation."[20]

Jung divides life into three phases, the prepubescent years and youth comprising the first half of life, and the second half stretching from about

the fortieth year on. Beginning at youth man must be busy giving contour and substance to his life. It is the period of the "acquisition of conscious elements" and their development. The second half is the "period of creative activity". The first half closes with a period of synthesis during which the psychic elements are woven into a pattern, and nothing should be lost which would enrich the pattern. During the second half, everything that will contribute to creative activity should be welcomed and accepted.

"In the morning of life man painfully tears himself from the mother, from the domestic hearth, to rise through battle to his heights..... If he is to live he must fight and sacrifice his longing for the past in order to rise to his own heights. And having reached the noonday heights, he must also sacrifice the love for his own achievement, for he may not loiter".[23]

"It is of the greatest importance for the young person who is still unadapted and yet has achieved nothing, to shape his conscious ego as effectively as possible, that is, to educate his will. He must feel himself a man of will, and may safely depreciate everything else in him, and deem it subject to his will, for without this illusion he could not succeed in adapting himself socially;....It is otherwise with a person in the second half of life, who no longer needs to educate his conscious will, but who needs to understand the meaning of his individual life, needs to experience his own inner being."[24]

The process of individuation cannot begin until the second half of life. It is essentially an experiencing of one's being, and it demands a willingness to sacrifice the love of one's own achievement, or in other words, a willingness to die in order to live. But first it is necessary for the ego to accept the contents of the personal unconscious. What has been repressed must be brought to consciousness and assimilated, so that a wider synthesis of consciousness can be created, and the opposition between ego and personal unconscious reconciled. The wider synthesis means achieving a deeper self-knowledge. This, to say the least, is a painful business, as the thoughts, wishes, tendencies and memories were repressed

in the first place because they were intensely unpleasant.

Having assimilated into consciousness the person unconscious, one is confronted with the collective unconscious "which calmly continues to produce dreams and fantasies." The technique which leads to the acceptance of the collective unconscious is the maintenance of an alert passivity, a detached awareness, so that one can take note of the 'odd things' that interfere with the conscious direction of life. "Acceptance of the unconscious" involves a willingness to suspend judgment and to sit lightly to a pre-determined course of action in order that one might listen to the archtypes, and give them a chance to speak. When one has done this, one has fulfilled the indispensable condition for Individuation to begin. The rest of the work must be left to the Self.

The Self comes. It cannot be conjured up by personal effort. The tensions that arise between opposing forces while accepting the unconscious can only be endured. There can be no sham solutions or dubious compromises. One must wait and suffer until the Self happens. When the Self does happen, it is like a new controlling centre moving into one's life, but what it is can neither be defined nor described; it can only be sensed.

Psychic maturity, according to Jung, is the discovery of Selfhood, and the achievement of personality as an increasing realisation of the fullness of being in which opposing forces are reconciled and nothing is lost.

"The achievement of personality means nothing less than the best possible development of all that lies in a particular, single being. It is impossible to foresee what an infinite number of conditions must be fulfilled to bring this about. A whole human life span in all its biological, social, and spiritual aspects is needed. Personality is the highest realization of the inborn distinctiveness of the particular living being. Personality is an act of the greatest courage in the face of life, and means unconditional affirmation of all that constitutes the individual, the most

successful adaptation to the universal conditions of human existence, with the greatest possible freedom of personal decision."[25]

Men and all mankind strive towards the goal of the fullest, most complete differentiation and harmonious blending of all the diverse aspects of personality. Evolution continues. Each stage in the past has represented an unfolding of life on successively higher planes. Primitive man was an advance over the animals; civilized man represents a higher phase of development than primitive man. But civilized man has not reached the end of the evolutionary journey.

Man moves forward when he accepts this primal law of his being with trustful loyalty. The individual must find his own way to give it concrete form and shape, and he can pursue this way only through commitment and conscious moral choice. If conscious decision is missing, then "the development will come to rest in a stupefying, unconscious automatism."[26] The way leads through swamp and quagmire, skirting the abyss to full consciousness where the ego gives place to the 'self', and man draws upon the rich store-house of human experience that is contained in the deepest regions of his unconscious.

Jung was optimistic about the possibilities of human nature. Freud stands as a bleak contrast to him for Freud was decidedly pessimistic. His mechanistic assumptions combined with his theory of instincts leave no place for any growth beyond the age of five or for man as a social being. He scoffed at urges to self-development, and regarded them as displaced narcissistic wishes. Social behaviour is a reaction-formation to instinctual aggression. The following excerpts from "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego" and from "Civilization and its Discontents" reveal

Freud's pessismism.

> "What appears later in society in the shape of Gemeingeist, esprit de corps, group spirit, etc., does not belie its derivation from what was originally envy . . . Social justice means that we deny ourselves many things so that others have to do without them as well . . . . This demand for equality is the root of social conscience and the sense of duty. It reveals itself in the syphilitic's dread of infecting other people . . . The dread exhibited by these poor wretches corresponds to their violent struggles against the unconscious wish to spread their infection; for why should they alone be infected and cut off from so much? Why not other people as well?" [27]

> We might well imagine that a civilized community could consist of pairs of individuals . . . linked to all the others by work and common interests . . . But such a desirable state of things does not exist and never has existed . . . Restrictions upon sexual life are unavoidable if this object is to be attained . . We may find the clue in one of the so-called ideal standards of civilized society . . . It runs 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself'. . . . Why should we do this? Why should we do this? What good is it to us? Above all how can we do such a thing? . . If he is a stranger to me, and cannot attract me by any value he has in himself or any significance he may have already acquired in my emotional life, it will be hard for me to love him . . . . Not merely is this stranger on the whole not worthy of love, but, to be honest, I must claim he has more claim to my hostility, even to my hatred. He does not seem to have the least trace of love for me, does not show me the slightest consideration . . . If he can merely get a little pleasure out of it, he thinks nothing of jeering at me, insulting me, slandering me, showing his power over me, and the more secure he feels himself, the more helpless I am, with so much more certainty can I expect this behaviour from him towards me . . . . . Civilized society is perpetually menaced with disintegration through the primary hostility of men towards one another . . . Hence its system of methods by which mankind is to be driven to identification and aim-inhibited love-relationships."[28]

Freud assumes a basic antagonism between man and society, and for two reasons. First, he regarded man as driven by the craving for sexual satisfaction, and for destruction . "The aim of sexual desire is complete sexual freedom."[29] This demand together with the Oedipal situation, sets man against society because it is society that limits sexual expression. The frustration of the sexual instincts is in part responsible for

man's aggressiveness, but another source is the innate striving for destruction which Freud called the death instinct.

The second reason for his pessimism must be attributed to his mechanistic thinking which implies that nothing really new is created in the process of development. The present is not only conditioned by the past; it contains nothing but the past. Thus, the instincts always run through a cycle that begins with excitation and ends with quiescence, and the personality is compelled to repeat this pattern over and over again. Freud called this pattern repetition compulsion. But instinctual energy is displaceable, and may find a variety of object choices on which to spend its energy, none of which will result in complete satisfaction. A displacement to cultural activity and achievement is called a sublimation. But the aim of the instinct is always the same regardless of its cathexis. Hence, Freud explained Leonardo da Vinci's interest in painting Madonnas as a sublimated expression of a longing for his mother. The "concept of the beautiful" has its roots in sexual excitation which finds its cathexis in the shape of the body rather than genital activity. Judgment or discrimination is no more than the interplay of Eros and Thanatos. In the first paragraph of 'Totem and Taboo' he reminds us that the psychic life of primitives "assumes a peculiar interest for us, for we can recognize in their psychic life a well-preserved early stage of our own development."[30]

Civilisation has become possible because of the inhibition of primitive object-choices and the sublimation of instinctual energy into creative channels. Freud, however, was by no means as optimistic about

the efficacy of sublimation as some of his disciples have been. "The weak point of this method, however, is that it is not generally applicable; it is only available to the few."[31] Most people repress their primitive urges which continue to plague them from the limbo of the unconscious. Every so often in the history of man the blind, pent up aggressive energies break out to destroy the judge that has passed sentence upon them. War tears civilisation asunder.

Displacement, sublimation and repression are not conscious devices. The residual energy left over from sublimation and displacement retains its vigour in the timeless region of the 'Id'. Repression, and ego defence mechanism, never allows the instinctual urges to enter awareness, but they continue to clamour for expression and find it in symbolic form in neurosis or psychosis. The ego will use repression to hide its own tactics from itself, to defend itself against the castigations of the super-ego, and to remain deaf to the fierce urgings of the 'Id'. All these processes belong to the submerged seven-eighths of personality which Freud designated the unconscious, and which contains within its 'region' that maelstrom, the 'Id'.

The purpose of this excursus on Freud's mechanistic assumptions and consequent pessimism is to pose a question. If man is nothing but the plaything of mechanistic and organic forces working below the level of consciousness how can we account for his conviction of freedom? This is not a question of setting indeterminacy over against determinacy. As Paul Tillich[32] has remarked recently, that issue is dead. It is rather a question of the extent to which society has the right to hold men re-

sponsible for their actions, if in fact those actions are the result of the operation of forces of which they are unaware. What margin of real choice does man have in what he imagines to be his decisions? Whilst Freud claimed that "determinism in the psychic realm is carried out uninterruptedly,"[33] he also said, "Analysis sets out to give the patient freedom to choose."[34]

All psychotherapy presupposes some capacity to choose. A therapist assumes that when repressed urges are brought to consciousness, and the patient becomes aware of elements within the self he has never recognised, he will be able to follow a self-chosen course of action after seeing clearly his own personal equation. Self-knowledge sets him free to accept his determinacies, and to endure without fear and anxiety the amoral urgings of the id. "Where id was, there let ego be". With the wider view of ego functions and strength, the concept of determination by unconscious forces has undergone some modification.

Man as a psychophysical organism is a determined being. He is determined by his biological constitution, his physiological needs, by his early training, education, the outlook of his class, race, and nation. As part of the natural order he is an object of knowledge, and can be investigated empirically. The determining forces that shaped him can be to some extent measured and appraised. But man as object is not total man and cannot be. For empirical investigation mean segmental investigation, that is to say, each function is investigated in isolation from the whole, and just as the whole is more than the sum of its parts, so man is more than the sum total of his functions.

Freud arrived at his concepts of the unconscious by analysing the dreams of neurotics. It is not a concept which can be scientifically verified, but it may, nonetheless, be a valid inference. The point at issue is to what extent can the unconscious be said to influence healthy people. Does it have the same power to determine behaviour in normals as it seemingly does in neurotics? It is possible that the study of neurotic psychic functioning yields a different picture of man's inner life than the study of the 'normal mind'. In neurotic illness there is a suspension of rational control, impulses tend to become chaotic, and it is even possible that one specific drive might stand out as ruling the inner roost. Goldstein has pointed out: "All the peculiarities which Freud enumerates as characteristic of the unconscious, correspond completely to the changes which normal behaviour undergoes through isolation by disease."[35]

There is a basic contradiction in Freud's thinking . . . If all philosophies, artistic endeavours, beliefs, judgments and so forth are 'nothing but' the interplay of primary instincts, the concept of the unconscious might be 'nothing but' a symbolic expression of the death instinct to decapitate man in order to hold him more firmly in the Freudian grasp. This is the paradox of all absolute determinism. How can the thinker interpret his facts to form a theory which is not absolutely determined by a psychic mechanism, unless he stands above them, that is, transcends them. Psychological facts never do speak for themselves. The theorist interprets them in the light of scientifically undemonstrable assumptions about human nature. "Each theory becomes a Procrustean bed on which the empirical facts are stretched to fit a

a preconceived pattern."[36]

Man's capacity for self-awareness and self-transcendence is the key-category of existential psychotherapy.[37] This capacity forms the centre of human experience, and any view of human nature that ignores it will give an unreal and distorted picture of man. Existential analysts reject the concept of the unconscious for therapeutic purposes on the grounds that a living being is indivisible; and that the 'non-conscious areas' of the human mind are still part of the person. Rollo May has pointed out that what the existential therapists really reject is the cellar theory of the unconscious as a "basement reservoir from which any deterministic theory can be drawn."[38] He suggests that the term unconscious is a symbol for the enlarging of personality beyond the boundaries of rationalism and immediate voluntarism to include the irrational, the forgotten, and the repressed.

The concept of the unconscious, understood as an enlargement of being to which consciousness shades away, need not degrade the universal human conviction of freedom to the level of a flattering fiction. But it must be held in balance with an adequate concept of the uniquely human capacity for self-awareness and self-transcendence. Man can be aware of himself as object and subject at the same time. He can stand aside from himself, assess his immediate situation, take up an attitude to it, and thereby transcend it. As he does so, he becomes aware of the myriads of possibilities that confront him. Some of them may be regurgitations from the unconscious. He makes his choice having reflected upon himself imaged forth in many possibilities. Kierkegaard

meant something like this when he wrote

> "what feeling or will a man has depends upon in the last resort what imagination he has, that is to say, upon how these things are reflected . . . . Imagination is the possibility of all reflection, and the intensity of this medium is the possibility of the intensity of the self." [39]

Psychic determinism according to the existential point of view is a secondary phenomenon, and works only in a limited area. Two conclusions follow upon this observation. Repression is the process of making oneself unaware of freedom. Before repression is possible a person must have some opportunity of accepting or rejecting his own potentialities - which gives him a margin of choice. Thus, to repress freedom presupposes it as a possibility. The second conclusion is that the deterministic events of the past take their significance from the present and the future. We are never merely the victims of automatic pressures from the past. We select from the past in order to fulfil our present potentialities in the immediate future. Rollo May relates a curious fact about the past of any patient in psychoanalysis "Whether or not a patient can ever recall the significant events of the past depends upon his decision in regard to the future." [40] It is what a person seeks to become that determines what he remembers of his past. It also determines what he is in the present.

William Temple has expressed similar ideas in a different idiom.

> "Freedom is not absence of determination, it is spiritual determination as distinct from mechanical or even organic determination. It is determination by what seems good as contrasted with determination by irresistible compulsion." [41]

He describes will as the whole nature organised in effective unity. Personality is a self-organising system. It takes the initial elements of

physiological equipment, the influences of social environment and organises them around the dynamic principle of that to which it gives habitual attention. Personality has control over the direction of its attention and therefore a real choice of the influences that will determine it.

To sum up: Freud dismissed man's distinctively human capacity for self-transcendence as of no consequence to his development. He regarded man as absorbed within his constitution as a complex energy system, and he interpreted his clinical observations in the light of nineteenth century mechanistic-evolutionary hypotheses. Man's freedom lies in the capacity to endure; his maturity in the resolution to live in the light of 'reality', that is, in the realm of an order of nature absolutely determined by the chain of cause and effect. But man at heart remains an orgiastic primitive who suffers resentfully the restrictions of civilised life for the sake of security. At times his pent-up resentment breaks out to cry havoc through the world.

Jung presents a brighter picture. Man has a destiny. It is the achievement of selfhood through participation in the accumulated experience of the race that lies in the deeper regions of the unconscious. This destiny gives his being its primal law which he must accept and express with trustful loyalty and conscious moral decision, until the fissures in his being are healed, and the self comes to bestow maturity.

Existential therapy seeks to restore man to himself as a self-transcendent being who is free to give meaning and content to his existence. Man must choose what to make of himself, and this freedom is the

harbinger of psychic health and maturity.

> "The truth is that man is accessible to himself in two ways: as object of inquiry, and as existence endowed with a freedom that is inaccessible to inquiry. In the one case man is conceived as object, in the other as the non-object which man is and of which he becomes aware when he achieves authentic awareness of himself. We cannot exhaust man's being in knowledge of him, we can experience it only in the primal source of our thought and action. Man is fundamentally more than he can know of himself."[42]

CHAPTER V

THE SOCIO MEDICAL PSYCHOLOGIES

THE GOOD COMPANION

Alfred Adler seceded from Freud's inner ring of disciples in 1911. He was especially sceptical about Freud's libido theory, and up until the time he left the Viennese Circle, he was the centre of a small opposition group. In 1912 he published his first major work "Uber den Nervoseh Charakter" in which he outlined the foundations of his own theories. His doctrine came to be known as "Individual Psychology".

Between the publication of his first major book and his death in 1937, Adler's conception of man gradually but decisively changed. His early theory was almost as draary and pessimistic as Freud's. The fundamental driving force in man was not libido but the will to power. He was driven to compensate for his basic inferiority feelings by developing a voracious appetite for domination. Adler's mature theory of personality conceives man as motivated by innate social impulses which he expresses by relating himself to others in co-operative ventures, social welfare, and in acquiring a style of life that reflects his nature as a social being.

Man as a psycho-physiological organism is a whole, an indivisible unity, and therefore an individual. Everything the organism does is governed by the immanent aim of the organism itself which is the preservation of its own existence. There are two standpoints from which man's behaviour can be explained. From the first, we can trace the causal connections between each event in the process, and thus show how

it unfolds; from the second, we seek out the meaning of the process, and this becomes clear only from the viewpoint of the goal the organism is striving to attain. Personality cannot be understood unless we know, in all its manifestations, the concrete aim of the whole person. Adler called this concept the finalist explanation of human behaviour.

Adler first sought the goal to human striving in the aggressive will to power. He later abandoned the notion of aggression, and identified the will to power with the "masculine protest", masculinity being the image of the powerful, and femininity of weaknesses. When men and women feel inadequate they resort to the masculine protest as an overcompensation for their sense of inferiority. Finally, Adler came to the conclusion that the one and only goal of all man's strivings is superiority.

Adler uses 'superiority' in a technical sense. He does not mean social distinction, leadership, or rank. He means something analagous to Goldstein's Self-actualisation. The striving for superiority is the striving for completion: it is 'the great upward drive' to move from minus to plus.

> "I began to see clearly in every psychological phenomenon the striving for superiority. It runs parallel to physical growth and is an intrinsic necessity of life itself. It lies at the root of all life's problems, and is manifested in the way in which we meet these problems. All our functions follow its directions. They strive for conquest, security, increase, either in the right or in the wrong direction. The impetus from minus to plus never ends. The urge from below to above never ceases. Whatever premises all our philosophers and psychologists dream of - self-preservation, pleasure principle, equalization — all these are but vague representations, attempts to express the great upward drive." [1]

The striving for superiority or perfection is innate; each drive derives its power from it, and it can manifest itself in a thousand different ways. The neurotic strives for self-esteem and self-aggrandizement. The healthy person shares his goals with others, and takes an active part in perfecting the community.

The striving for superiority is released by man's sense of inferiority. Adler at first thought that bodily weakness was the source of all inferiority feelings. He soon, however, extended the concept to include all felt psychological and social disabilities. In the last phase of his thought he attributed the feelings of inferiority to man's sense of incompletion. "The inferiority feeling dominates the psychological life, and can easily be understood from the feeling of imperfection and of incompletion and from the incessant striving of mankind."[2]

Man has an innate potentiality for social feeling. The German word Adler used to describe this capacity was Gemeinschaftsegtul. Many terms have been used as English equivalents; social feeling, fellow feeling, sense of solidarity, communal intuition, social sense and social interest. Adler came to prefer the last of these. It is more than a feeling, more than an acquired way of life.

> "We are not in a position to define it unequivocally, but we have found in an English author a phrase which clearly expresses what we could contribute to an explanation: 'To see with the eyes of another, to hear with the ears of another, to feel with the heart of another.' For the time being, this seems to me an admissible definition of what we call social feeling." [3]

Social interest is innate, but it also must be evoked and consciously developed. Children must be trained to co-operate, enter into personal relationships, develop empathy and sympathy, and yet social interest is more than all these. Ultimately it is the donation of self to share in the common task of moving society towards its goal of perfection. Man represents to himself the image of perfection by the idea of God.

> "It has taken an unthinkably long time ... for us to recognize a satisfactory image, to experience the revelation of a supreme being who would lead one to the hope and belief of security for the species, and for the individual. It certainly was a nonverbal, nonconceptual insight of religious fervour in which the sacred uniting of man with the goal-setting God first took place as it still takes place today in every religious soul.
>
> "The strong possibilities of a concretization of a goal of perfection, and the irresistible attraction to it are firmly anchored in human nature. So too, are the possibilities of a psychological union with others. The sanctification of these possibilities strengthened them and their development by setting the thinking and feeling apparatus into continuous movement. Included in this progressive strengthening were the ties between mother and child, of marriage and of family, all to the advantage of the care of the young. At the same time, life and the love of one's neighbour were sanctified. Probably the strongest and most significant step towards the preservation and perfection of man was taken when he accomplished his unification with God as the redemption from evil."[4]

Man, nonetheless, is not a mere stencil copy of society's requirements for its members. The deepest core of the personality is a nucleus of creative power, the 'Selbst' or self. Man's striving for completion takes a uniquely personal form in a plan of life and a style of life that reveal the self as a highly individual craftsman.

> "Every individual represents both a unity of personality and the individual fashioning of that unity. The

> individual is thus both the picture and the artist. He is the artist of his own personality, but as an artist he is neither an infallible worker nor a person with a complete understanding of mind and body; he is rather a weak, extremely fallible human being." 4a

> "Do not forget the most important fact that not heredity and not environment are determining factors. - Both are giving only the frame and the influences which are answered by the individual in regard to his styled creative power." 5

Man according to Adler, is not only a dynamic centre of creative life who seeks 'to overcome' in order to assuage his feelings of incompletion, he is also, from sheer biological necessity, a social being. He becomes a unified personality insofar as he contributes himself to the common weal. "Social interest is the true and inevitable compensation for all the natural weaknesses of individual human beings."[6] When man knows his work to be a valuable donation to the welfare of mankind, he feels at home in life. His existence becomes meaningful. He is not daunted by private feelings of inferiority, for he is occupied with strengthening the community of men. Man grows to his full stature as his social interest unfolds and develops.

> "Therefore the brick which we call the innate potentiality of social interest must be made living and working. Such a state of mind and attitude give him more than a feeling of social interest, for he behaves as part of the whole of mankind, he feels at home in a conception of the world as near as possible to the real world, and he has courage and common sense, social functions which are frustrated among all failures. He is ready to accept the advantages of social life and is a good loser whenever disadvantages cross his way. He is and wants to be the master of his fate with an effective regard for the welfare of others."[6]

Alfred Adler was the forerunner of a re-action against Freud's mechanistic outlook in favour of greater emphasis upon social relations rather than biological factors, the self rather than the id and the superego, the striving for self-actualisation rather than the sex instinct,

and the present situation rather than early experiences. Karen Horney, Eric Fromm, and Harry Stack Sullivan were leaders in the movement away from Freud, although Horney and Fromm are usually described as Neo-Freudians, while Sullivan completed his break with Freudian orthodoxy by creating his own theory of interpersonal relations. As long ago as 1931 he laid down the major premise of a new look in psychotherapy when he wrote, "The process of therapy consists of deepening and widening the interest for interpersonal relations"[7] .....words that resound with a loud Adlerian echo.

"My conviction," Horney has written, "expressed in a nutshell, is that psychoanalysis should outgrow the limitations set by its being an instinctivistic and a genetic psychology."[8] Nonetheless Horney regards her views as falling within the Freudian framework, even though she has either discarded altogether or re-interpreted some major Freudian doctrines. She objects strongly to Freud's doctrine that the anatomy of the female genitalia is responsible for the peculiar psychology of women. She takes issue with the Freudian concepts of repetition compulsion, the id, the ego and the superego, anxiety, and masochism. The Oedipus complex is not a sexual conflict between the child and his parents, generating a murderous aggression towards the parent of the opposite sex. It is an anxiety growing out of basic disturbances, such as rejection, over-protection and punishment, in the relationship between the child and his parents. Insecurity spawns self-inflation; this is true narcissism; self-love is not. Subtract these concepts from the Freudian corpus and what is left? Certain fundamental doctrines, Horney would claim.

> "I regard the most fundamental and most significant of Freud's findings his doctrines that psychic processes are strictly determined, that actions and feelings may be determined by unconscious motivations, and that the motivations driving us are emotional forces." [9]

Horney's primary concept is that there are constructive forces inherent in man that drive him to realise his potentialities. Man's values evolve with his striving towards self-realisation, but there are however, certain conditions attached to the development of his possibilities. He must be truthful to himself: he must be active and productive: he must relate himself to others in the spirit of give and take: he must assume responsibility for himself. These conditions free the real self, "that central inner force common to all human beings and yet unique in each" [10] to unveil itself in spontaneous and healthy growth. But man cannot fulfill these conditions without self-knowledge: "The way towards this goal is an ever increasing awareness and understanding of ourselves. Self-knowledge, then, is not an aim in itself, but a means of liberating the forces of spontaneous growth." [11]

The real self, however, is frequently held in slavery to the 'dark idolatry of self', and this idolatry acts as a barricade to keep anxiety at bay. According to Horney's theory, the core of every neurosis is a deep anxiety about the self that has its origins in the circumstances surrounding childhood. She has defined it as ....

> "the feeling a child has of being isolated and helpless in a potentially hostile world. A wide range of adverse factors in the environment can produce this insecurity in a child: direct or indirect domination, indifference, erratic behaviour, lack of respect for the child's individual needs, lack of real guidance, disparaging attitudes, too much admiration or lack of it, lack of reliable warmth, having to take sides in parental disagreements, too much or too little responsibility, overprotection, isolation from other children, injustice, discrimination, unkept promises, hostile

atmosphere, and so on and so on ....."[12]

The child brought up amid any of these circumstances may develop a number of strategies by which he can deal with his feelings of isolation and helplessness. He may try to win back the love he has lost by being overly submissive, or he may try to exact revenge for his ill-treatment by becoming hostile. He may use threats to force people to like him, or he may bribe others to love him. He may develop a lust for sympathy, and wallow in self-pity to satisfy it. He may compensate for his feelings of helplessness, and find an outlet for hostility by seeking power in order to exploit people. He may turn his aggression against himself, and treat himself with contempt. Any of these strategies may become 'fixed' in the personality, and assume the force of a drive or need.[13]

Horney has classified neurotic needs under three heads: moving toward people or the need for love; moving away from people or the need for independence; moving against people or the need for power. In these three basic moves that characterize relationships towards others and oneself, Horney finds the source of inner conflict for normal and neurotic alike. But the conflict is much more severe and intense in the neurotic, who because of his basic anxiety cannot integrate the three 'moves', but is driven to seek irrational, and artificial solutions. He will consciously admit one of the trends and repress the other two, or he will create an idealized image of himself in which the contradictory moves seem to have evaporated, when in fact they have not. The 'search for glory' through an idealized image which imprisons the real self generates the pride-system. All kinds of

unhealthy and destructive forces are set in motion by the 'pride system'; self-contempt, self-abasement, self-hate, disturbances in human relationships, inhibitions in work, - to mention only a few of them.

An apt title for Horney's picture of the neurotic personality might well be, 'Everyman in Bondage to Sin'. She would, of course, deny the validity of the category sin. Nor would she admit that the neurotic needed the redemptive power of a 'Divine Act' to release him from his slavery. Sound and sensitive analysis would enable him to centre his life in the real self which is his deepest source of growth. She has defined the goals of such therapy in words that sketch the profile of a mature man.

> "The patient must acquire the capacity to assume responsibility for himself, in the sense of feeling himself the active responsible force in his life, capable of making decisions and of taking the consequences. With this goes an acceptance of responsibility towards others, a readiness to recognize obligations in whose value he believes, whether they relate to children, to parents, friends, employees, colleagues, community, or country.
>
> "Closely allied is the aim of achieving an inner independence - one as far removed from a mere defiance of the opinions and beliefs of others as from a mere adopting of them. This would mean primarily enabling the patient to establish his own hierarchy of values and to apply it to his actual living. In reference to others it would entail respect for individuality and their rights, and would be thus the basis for a real mutuality.
>
> "..... Spontaneity of feeling, an awareness and aliveness of feeling whether in respect to love, hate, happiness or sadness, fear or desire. This would include a capacity for expression as well as for voluntary control . . . . love and friendship should be especially mentioned . . . love that is neither parasitic dependence nor sadistic domination.
>
> "The most comprehensive formulation of therapeutic goals is the striving for wholeheartedness: to be without pretense,

> to be emotionally sincere, to be able to put the whole of oneself into one's feelings, one's work, one's beliefs." [14]

To Harry Stack Sullivan, personality is a supposition, a hypothetical entity which only manifests itself in interpersonal relations. "Personality is the relatively enduring pattern of interpersonal relations which characterize a human life." [15] Perceiving, remembering, thinking, imagining, and all other psychological processes are set in motion by other people. The others do not have to be present; they may be fictional characters, or actors in a dream, yet they are present to consciousness as persons with whom the individual can enter into relationship.

But personality, although an hypothesis, is yet a dynamic centre of various processes. Sullivan defines some of these processes in terms of their properties. The chief ones are dynamisms, personifications, and cognitive processes.

A dynamism is the "relatively enduring pattern of an energy transformation, which recurrently characterizes the organism in its duration as a living organism". [16] An energy transformation is any form of behaviour whether public like talking, or private like thinking or daydreaming. Sullivan says about a pattern that it is "an envelope of insignificant differences". [17] A new feature added to the pattern will not change it, provided that the new feature is not significantly different to the other elements in the pattern.

The peculiarly human dynamisms manifest themselves in interpersonal relations. All people possess the same dynamisms, but their particular

form of expression depends upon the situation and experience of the individual. Habitual hostility is a mode of expression for the dynamism of malevolence; habitual fear of people is a dynamism; habitual sexual promiscuity is the lust dynamism. Any habitual feeling, attitude or action constitutes a dynamism.

Most dynamisms serve the needs of the organism, and use zones of the body such as mouth, hands, anus and genitals to interact with the environment. One dynamism, however, has its origin in anxiety. As the child grows anxiety is transmitted first by the mother and later by any threats to his security. He adopts various protective measures, such as obeying his parents, in order to avoid punishment, and exercises a supervisory control over his behaviour. These guard his security, and form the self-system which approves the 'good me self' and condemns the 'bad me self', and rejects totally the 'not-me'.[18]

> "The self-system thus is an organization of educative experience called into being by the necessity to avoid or to minimize incidents of anxiety." [19]

The self-system, while necessary, has some unfortunate aspects. It is the product of the irrational character of society. It becomes rigid and refuses to recognize anything in the personality that would be a threat to self-esteem. The self-system blinds the person to what he really is, and ignores obvious contradictions between its own inflated notions of itself and the real state of affairs. Consequently, the self-system tends to cut itself off from the rest of the personality. While it serves to reduce anxiety it is also "the principal stumbling block to favourable changes in the personality."[20]

Sullivan blames society for the disintegrating influences of the self-system. No family trains its children to deal with society as it is nor people as they are, with the result that they are often forced to adopt unnatural ways of coping with anxiety. In a rational society these sources of anxiety would not exist. So "the self-system in its actual functioning in life in civilized societies, as they now exist, is often very unfortunate."[21]

Personifications are the mental pictures we have of ourselves and of other people. These images are constructed out of a complex of feelings, attitudes, and conceptions that are garnered from early interpersonal relations connected with the satisfaction of needs, and with anxiety. The relations that produce satisfaction build up good images of the person who is the source: experiences with people who evoke anxiety result in a bad image of them. Various images may be impressed upon the child by the same person, especially the mother, and these tend to fuse, forming a complex personification. These images are never accurate descriptions of the people to whom they refer. Later in life they can distort interpersonal relations, for they may be projected onto people who fill functions similar to the original subjects, but who resemble them in no other way. Personifications born of anxiety can destroy the possibilities of constructive interpersonal relations during adult life. "The stresses of life distort people to inferior caricatures of what they might have been."

Experience, according to Sullivan, occurs in three modes: the prototaxic, the parataxic, and the syntaxic. "These modes are primarily

matters of the inner elaboration of events."[22] The prototaxic mode refers to the experience of the infant who 'knows' neither before nor 'after' but only momentary states. At the next stage - the child experiences things as happening together but can discern no causal or logical distinctions. Experience takes the form of momentary, unconnected states of being. This is the parataxic mode. Later through group activities, social experience, and interpersonal activities, the youngster learns language in the widest sense of communication. When this happens he has acquired the syntaxic mode of experience.

This brief sketch of the principle concepts in Sullivan's theory of the structure of personality is perhaps enough to show that the individual plays no part in his own development. He is made or broken by his interpersonal relations. Sullivan, however, did not believe that personality is set in a rigid mould at an early age. The human organism possesses an infinite plasticity, and at any time as new interpersonal relations arise, personality may change. But if Sullivan's theory is correct, the individual is merely an episode in the social processes. Obviously he thought of man as more than this, but as a practicing psychiatrist and specialist in schizophrenia, he was aware of the devasting results of anxiety - fraught interpersonal relations.

The course of development starting a few minutes after birth runs through infancy, childhood, the juvenile era, preadolescence, adolescence, and adulthood or maturity. Each phase has its outstanding achievements, and each will be outstandingly manifest in the mature personality. Infancy ends with the appearance of articulate speech; childhood with the need for playmates:-"that is companions, co-operative beings of approxi-

mately one's own status in all sorts of respects."[23] The juvenile era lasts until maturation releases the need for an intimate relation with another person of the same status. At this point, if the course of development has gone well there should emerge an 'orientation in living'.

> "One is oriented in living to the extent to which one has formulated or can easily be led to formulate (or has insight into) data of the following types: the integrating tendencies (needs) which customarily characterize one's interpersonal relations; the circumstances appropriate to their satisfaction and relatively anxiety-free discharge; and the more or less remote goals for the approximation of which one will forego intercurrent opportunities for satisfaction or the enhancement of one's own prestige." [24]

Preadolescence is extremely important to sound heterosexual development. Physically it ends with puberty, but psychologically with the transfer of a strong interest in a person of one's own sex to a person of the other sex. Adolescence follows and continues until a pattern for satisfying genital drives has been established when late adolescence begins.

> "Late adolescence extends from the patterning of preferred genital activity through unnumbered educative and eductive steps to the establishment of a fully human or mature repertory of interpersonal relations, as permitted by available opportunity, personal and cultural." [25]

Chief among 'the mature repertory of interpersonal relations' is "the relationship of love for some other person, in which relationship the other person is as significant, or nearly as significant as oneself."[26] This is the highest satisfaction of the last need to make its appearance, the need for intimacy, which Sullivan describes:-

> "As a need for collaboration with at least one other, preferably more others; and in this collaboration there is a

> very striking feature of a very lively sensitivity to the needs of the other and to the interpersonal security or absence of anxiety in the other." [27]

Such a delicacy of feeling for another is based upon respect which in turn is grounded in self-respect. A person who has proved to himself that he can live with and among others happily does not need to use his interpersonal relations to bolster a sense of superiority, or compensate for feelings of inferiority.

> "One of the feeblest props for an inadequate self-system is the attitude of disparaging others, which I once boiled down into the doctrine that if you are a molehill then, by God, there shall be no mountains." [28]

Feeling no need to make invidious comparisons to prop up an inadequate self-system, "the mature .... will be quite sympathetically understanding of the limitations, interests, possibilities and anxieties and so on of those among whom they move or with whom they deal." [29] A healthy self-respect overflows into a regard for life. The mature person, not being chained to himself by nagging doubts concerning his worth, can give himself to an ever widening, and ever deepening range of interest. His life "is always increasing in . . . importance." Consequently, he can face the changes and chances of life with fortitude.

> "It is certain that no person whether mature or terribly ill, is proof against any possibility of anxiety or fear, or against any of the needs that characterize life. But the greater the degree of maturity, the less will be the interference of anxiety with living, and therefore the less nuisance value one has for oneself and for others." [30]

Neo-Freudianism has produced its own social philosopher and apologist in the person of Eric Fromm. Fromm is avowedly religious in his intents and purposes, but the faith he proclaims is a faith in man, a

non-theistic devotion to humanity. God still has a place in his humanistic faith, and indeed the highest place, for the name is a convenient symbol for the totality of human powers. He is not a "symbol of power over men, but of man's own powers". Man needs a religion, a framework of orientation, and an object of devotion. Humanistic psychoanalysis answers this need better than the authoritarian religions. The psychoanalyst, the humanists' physician of the soul, aims to help men achieve attitudes that reflect the credo of humanistic religion. Fromm describes his creed thus:-

> "Man must strive to recognize the truth and can be fully human only to the extent in which he succeeds in this task. He must be independent and free, an end in himself and not the means of any other person's purposes. He must relate himself to his fellow men lovingly. If he has no love, he is an empty shell even if his were all power and wealth and intelligence. Man must know the difference between good and evil." 31

Authoritarian religion cripples and deforms man because it demands the surrender of 'man to a power transcending men'. Man experiences one more form of slavery when he acknowledges God as the ground and end of his being. When he does, he belongs not to himself, but to an unseen power who has control of his destiny and to whom he owes obedience, reverence and worship. Self-abasement, guilt, and remorse prevade his whole life, and rob him of the joy and confidence that accompanies the affirmation of life in humanistic religion. Furthermore, the worship of such a god is self-destructive. While Fromm does not go so far as Freud in declaring all religion to be the universal obsessional neurosis, he finds that Christianity in its organized forms - and therefore authoritarian modes - is a perpetual well of masochism.

> "It is one thing to recognize one's dependence and limitations, and it is something entirely different to indulge in this dependence, to worship the forces on which one depends. To understand realistically and soberly how limited our power is, is an essential part of wisdom and of maturity; to worship it is masochistic and self-destructive." [32]

The need for a framework of orientation is one of man's five needs steming from his situation, and the human situation is the theme that runs throughout all Fromm's writings. Man feels lonely and isolated. He is alienated from nature, from himself, and from other men. This is the human situation. As the child grows it seeks freedom and independence, but the other side of this search involves a growing sense of being alone. When the medieval stratifications of society broke down, a new emphasis upon the individual emerged, but the individual also lost those ties that give him security, a sense of belonging and relatedness to his world. In his book, 'Escape from Freedom', Fromm developed the thesis that as man has gained an increasing amount of freedom over the ages, he has also felt more alone, a condition from which he has often tried to escape by creating a new bondage. The way out of the impasse is for men to unite with each other in the spirit of love and shared work. The alternative is submission to higher authority, and conformity to society in order to gain security.

The human situation has another aspect. Man's life contains a basic contradiction, and every society he has created has been an attempt to resolve the contradiction. Man is both animal and human. As an animal he has certain biological needs that demand satisfaction: as a human being he possesses reason, self-awareness, and imagination. But having these characteristics has meant forfeiting his animal 'harmony'

with the environment. The animal either fits or dies out.

Reason has caused asplit in man's nature that leads to two existential dichotomies which man cannot annul; he can only react to them in a manner relative to his character and culture. The first is the contradiction between life and death.

> "The fact that we have to die is unalterable in man. Man is aware of this fact, and this very awareness profoundly influences his life. But death remains the very opposite of life and is extraneous to, and incompatible with, the experience of living." [33]

The second contradiction also inheres in the fact that man is mortal. Life is too short. Man cannot realise all his potentialities within his life span. If man cannot annul the contradictions he can find a solution to his problem which will allay his anxiety and restlessness. The only solution is "to face the truth, to acknowledge his fundamental aloneness and solitude in a universe indifferent to his fate, and to recognize there is no power transcending him which can solve his problem for him." [34] If he faces the truth without panic he will recognize that there is "no meaning to life except the meaning man gives his life by the unfolding of his powers, by living productively." [35] This is the one task that matters:- "to be himself and for himself and to achieve happiness by the full realisation of those faculties which are peculiarly his . . of reason, love, and productive work." [36]

We have referred to the need for a framework of orientation and an object of devotion. Man has four other needs that stem from the human situation: the need for relatedness, for transcendence, for rootedness, and for a sense of identity. The need for relatedness

thrusts itself upon man because reason and imagination have torn him away from the animals' primary union with nature. "The animal is equipped by nature to cope with the very conditions it is to meet."[37] Man must create his own relationships, and the most satisfying are based upon mutual care, responsibility, respect and understanding,- in a phrase, productive love.

But man needs to rise above his animal nature. Fromm uses the word 'creature'. Having reason and imagination, "he is driven to transcend the role of creature, the accidentalness and passivity of his existence, by becoming a 'creator'."[38] Both love and hate are means of satisfying the need to transcend his creaturely status, and if man's creative urges are thwarted he becomes a destroyer of life.

Man needs to belong, and feel himself to be an integral part of his world. The child's world does not stretch beyond the mother, and then as he leaves childhood behind, the father marks the horizons of his orbit. He must pass beyond the boundries of home, and let down roots in relationships of brotherly love with other men and women. Man also needs a sense of personal identity, to feel himself an individual. If he cannot achieve this through his own creative efforts he will try to find it by identifying himself with a group such as Nation, religion, class, or occupation. When this happens a new herd identity develops.

> "What could be more obvious than the fact that people are willing to risk their lives, to give up their love, to surrender freedom, to sacrifice their own thoughts, for the sake of being one of the herd, of conforming, and thus acquiring a sense of identity, even though it is an illusory one." [39]

These needs are not created by society. They arise from the human situation, the stage man has now reached in the evolutionary process. Maturity or mental health cannot, therefore, be defined objectively, that is, in terms of the adjustment of the individual to society, "but only in terms of the adjustment of society to the needs of men." Society warps and frustrates man when it makes demands upon him that are contrary to his nature: it alienates him from his 'situation' and denies him the fulfillment of the needs that are the basic conditions of his existence. From this point of view both capitalism and communism are sick societies. They try to make man into a robot, a wage slave, a nonenity, with the result that he is driven to assert himself destructively.

It is not our purpose to describe the society which will enable man to rise to his full stature. Fromm has a name for it and a blueprint. The name is Humanistic Communitarian Socialism. In such a society all will have equal opportunity to become fully human. The spectres of loneliness, isolation, and despair will never haunt it because such a society rises out of the human situation. Its windows will be large enough to let in the light and air of maturity and health. Fromm describes the mentally healthy or mature person as:-

> "The productive and unalienated person; the person who relates himself to the world lovingly, and who uses his reason to grasp reality objectively; who experiences himself as a unique individual entity, and at the same time feels one with his fellow man; who is not subject to irrational authority and accepts willingly the rational authority of conscience and reason; who is in the process of being born as long as he is alive, and considers the gift of life the most precious chance he has." 40

Fromm has four strong convictions. He is utterly convinced that man has an essential inborn nature; that societies are created by man in order to fulfill this nature; that no society up till now has satisfied the basic needs that inhere in the human situation; that it is possible to build a society that will satisfy man's drives towards happiness, harmony, love, and productiveness. In order to do so man must have faith, not the faith that assents to doctrines or to the acceptance of an authoritarian power beyond man's own, but a rational faith that issues in self-reliance and the confidence that truth will emerge out of one's own experience, and out of commitment to the productive use of one's powers. This faith will have its source in the exercise of reason in seeing the world, nature, oneself, and other people as they are. Such a faith will evoke the power of loving. "Love is union with somebody, or something, outside oneself under conditions of retaining the separateness and integrity of one's own self."[41]

Man will be kept true to himself by a humanistic conscience. This too is the work of reason.

> "Humanistic conscience is not the internalized voice of an authority whom we are eager to please and afraid of displeasing; it is our own voice, present in every human being . . . . Humanistic conscience is the reaction of our total personality to its proper functioning or dysfunctioning."[42] It is a"re-action of ourselves to ourselves".

A rational faith, from which flow joy, self-reliance, and reverence for life; a humanistic conscience, standing guard over man's integrity as he develops his capacities through relatedness and productive love; these are the cardinal virtues of man for himself.

Eric Fromm's vision of man is a noble one. His ethical religion is humane, and undoubtedly prompted by an 'ultimate concern' for the human person. In a world which seems to be organizing itself to do to death the man in men, we can heed his voice with thanksgiving, and listen with serious attention to his proclamation of what man can become.

Why has not man become a rational being, at one with his fellows in productive love, but at the same time free and independent, building his life in the light of his apprehension of truth while listening to the voice of a humanistic conscience? Winston Churchill, writing after the first Great War said "The only expedients to which the civilized educated states did not resort were cannabalism and torture, and these are of doubtful utility."[43] Had he written similar words at the end of the Second World War, truth would have forced him to omit torture. Daily we face the threat of a third war which would offer the world as a holocaust to national ambition, and the lust for total power. Dr. Fromm would blame society for man's aberrations. He has claimed that the actual ways in which man realises his inner potentialities are determined by "the social arrangements under which he lives". This is one of those half truths in which Dr. Fromm deals so expertly. A slight knowledge of literary history, or of the history of art or music, would show him hosts of men who had changed their social arrangements in order to realise their inner potentialities. This is not, however, the point we wish to make. Dr. Fromm implies that rational man has created the social arrangements that are responsible for his irrationality, violence, and inhumanity.

If man is so rational, so social, and so self-aware, why has he created so many societies that cripple the exercise of reason, productive love, and the affirmation of life?

Fromm regards himself as a twentieth century heir of the French philosophers of the eighteenth century. In his enthusiasm for the Enlightenment he seems to have overlooked the course of the French Revolution. Voltaire's Republic of polite and polished gentlemen contributed the soil in which the seeds of revolution could germinate. Denis Diderot led his group of rebel spirits from the Jesuit schools in scheming out the new world in which man would naturally sustain justice and political competence uncontaminated by corruption. Rousseau followed with his alluring doctrine of the primitive state of virtue from which man had declined, due to the inexcusable activity of priests, lawyers, and kings. The philosophers of the French revolution drew their doctrine of man from Rousseau, their social fervour from Diderot and his Encyclopaedists,[44] and their rationalism from science. Helvetius, for example, believed that it required only a perfect education to make men perfect.[45] Condorcet, even more optimistic than Helvetius, deduced the rights of man from but one principle: that he is a sensitive being capable of arriving at his moral ideas by way of reasoning. He was imprisoned by Robespierre. He died in prison, but the manner of his death is uncertain. He believed that all major social ills would disappear through the spread of the principles of the French Revolution. Fortunately, he did not live beyond 1794. "In revolution", writes Berdyaev, "man desires to set himself free from slavery to the state, to an aristocracy, to the bourgeoisie, to lying sanctities, and falls

into slavery to a new tyranny."[46]

We are not suggesting that Eric Fromm is a revolutionary. On the contrary he adds nothing new to the humanist creed. He has done for Neo-Freudianism in North America what Flugel has done for Freudian orthodoxy in Great Britain. Both writers have given their respective movements an ethic and a religion. Their views are similar. Religion is a fellowship of those who share common values. Humanistic religion seeks to realise oneness with mankind, liberation from fear and guilt, devotion to the commonweal and so on. But the attainment of these values depends, not on God, but on human growth in social living. We maintain that the brutal logic of events in this century as well as in former centuries has completely discredited the humanist doctrine of man.

Humanist religion is beset by the fallacy of 'Angelism'. Freud considered the human in man as an epiphenomon of his animality. Fromm ignores the vital springs of human personality that issue from man's biological endowment. By regarding man as primarily a self-aware psycho-social organism, he alienates him from his biological heritage. He notes the existential dichotomy, but overlooks the existential conflict, or at least gives it little significance in his idea of man. Man's character is formed by the "socio-economic conditions under which he lives." The picture of man on the side of the angels is just as distorted as man on the side of the animals. In other words, no philosophy of man can afford the false optimism that neglects the conflict at the heart of human life. A conflict which man frequently resolves

by a swift relapse into animalism, and by the prostitution of his human characteristics in a cruelty that no other animal has the power to practice.

Fromm's description of the human situation implies a radical discontinuity between the human powers of reason, self-awareness, and imagination and the rest of the created order. From the standpoint of 'the human' he looks out at the universe and finds it indifferent to his fate. The best anyone can do is to accept without panic the fact that there is no power transcending him, and to recognize "that there is no meaning to life except the meaning man gives his own life by the unfolding of his powers and by living productively." But man's capacity to give meaning to his life by the exercise of self-determination, and to live productively - which to Fromm means relating oneself to others in fellowship and love in the full consciousness of one's own selfhood - - is contained within the meaning of the universe. Whatever principle accounts for the World-Process must also account for the emergence of the principle of personality, which manifests itself supremely in purposes of love and fellowship that are chosen; supremely, because here it is furthest removed from the mechanical and organic. And this does not necessarily involve a radical discontinuity between the mechanical and the organic on one hand, and the concrete person, who is a self-organising system reaching out to other self-organising systems, on the other. The devout philosopher sees the principle of individuality . . .

> "Where the rudimentary sentience implied by the plants turning to the sun makes itself apparent; where the organism in search of nourishment detaches itself from its position and exercises self-

> motion; where the animal develops interests and affections beyond what are relevant to the biological concern for survival; where the mind frames ideas drawn from, but also separable from, its particular experiences; where the moral person selects his ends independently of biological or even (in the narrow sense) personal interests, aspiring maybe towards an ideal of which neither his own experience nor all recorded history supplies the origin — at every stage the individual is playing a great part in determining his own reactions to the environment which is the field of activity."[47]

Is it possible for man to give meaning to his life in a meaningless universe? Man is himself part of the universe. He does not conjure his values out of the air. Consciousness in its modes of self-awareness, reason, and imagination is the flowering of the cosmic process. Either it is due to non-conscious causes or to a new creative act of a divine mind, or it is present in germ at the earlier stages of evolution. Physical existence itself cannot account for consciousness or mind, but when, in any given experience, physical existence and mind are the two elements in that experience, mind is capable of accounting for it, at least in principle. Value arises through Mind's discovery of itself in principle.

> "Mind, then, though it appears within the Process at a late stage, discovers throughout that Process the activity of Mind--universally in the form of Truth, commonly in the form of Beauty, sometimes in the form of Goodness. That Mind is pervasive of Reality is a necessary inference from this method of apprehending the world. If that method is justified, as we have tried to show, that it is, the conclusion is inevitable. Mind is the principle of unity in reality, or at least the fullest expression of that principle known to us." [48]

The paragraph above is a cursory sketch of William Temple's lecture "Process, Mind, and Value." It is not cited here to disprove Fromm's belief that the universe is meaningless and indifferent to man's fate, but to show how one eminently rational philosopher gives a reason for the faith that is in him. It does not answer all the questions posed

by a Theistic faith. The problems of evil inextricably intertwined with good, and love with suffering, are chief amongst those that lead men to deny the existence of a benign creator. But if evil is a problem, so is good. The Theist finds creation as a whole very good but he does not ignore evil. His attitude to evil is not "Why should this be?" but "How can this be made subservient to good?" "How can we bring good out of this evil?"[49]

"Freud's method, psycho-analysis, made possible the most minute and intimate study of the soul."[50] After the minute and careful study of many souls presumably, Fromm concludes that the greatest barrier to full maturity is Theistic religion. Authoritarian religion and Theistic religion are synonymous. He quotes the definition of religion given in the Oxford Dictionary as an accurate definition of authoritarian religion: "Religion is the recognition on the part of man of some higher unseen power as having control of his destiny, and as being entitled to obedience, reverence and worship." This power, according to Fromm, is the projection of man's alter-ego upon the universe. After he has assimilated the disassociated elements of himself, he wakes up to himself with wonder and joy, and discovers to his delight that he can extend his benevolence to the whole of mankind. Authoritarian religion alienates him from his powers: humanistic religion restores him to himself.

There are three elements in the religious experience of the humanist. He is filled with wonder as he becomes aware of his own existence, and puzzles over his relatedness to the world. Wonder begets an ultimate concern "with the meaning of life, with the self-realisation of man, with the fulfillment of the task which life sets us,"[51] (94) Ultimate

concern orders all desires and aims according to their contribution to the realisation of the self. Beyond wonder and concern there is the mystic experience "of oneness not only with one's fellows but with all life, and beyond that with the universe."[52] The psychoanalytic cure of souls aims at helping men to achieve this experience. "It enables him to gain the faculty to see the truth, to love, to become free and responsible, and to be sensitive to the voice of conscience."[53]

There is so much in Fromm's writings that is sound and good, and so much that is naive and contradictory. He has an irritating habit of making the most sweeping generalizations based upon half-truths and partial insights. It would take another thesis to point them out. We would refer the reader to 'Escape from Freedom' and 'Psychoanalysis and Religion' as examples of this annoying peccadillo. Suffice it to point out one.

Fromm does not bother to examine the grounds for a Theistic interpretation of the universe. He decides on the basis of treating neurotic patients that all Theism is authoritarian and all authoritarianism is bad. There is some confusion here between authority and authoritarianism. Granted that authoritarianism stunts the growth of those who are held under its domination, it does not necessarily follow that the recognition of authority is a symptom of immaturity. Ideally the relationship of a patient to the analyst ought not to be authoritarian, but the patient must grant the analyst the authority to which his knowledge and skill entitle him. And especially so since the analyst possesses a most effective method for "the most minute and intimate study of the soul"!

A mature relationship to God follows the same pattern. When the Christian approaches God, he knows himself to be loved by God. The experience of being loved by God is the essence of all Christian religious experience. This love is the respect of a Father for the freedom and powers of a son. It is a unique kind of love, for it never threatens, never demands, never imposes its will. The experience of God's love teaches faith in love and in love's ability to set free. God's love enables me to realise that in the depths of my soul I am lovable. He esteems me, why should I hate myself? I can bring every part of myself, both the good and the bad, before him, and he will lead me to see myself as He sees me, and His friendship will empower me to realise them. So accepted by God I learn to love and accept the love of others.

Unfortunately Fromm does not bother to find out the essence of a mature relationship to God. That there are guilt ridden masochistic, immature relations to God, no one will deny. These are not due to Theism as such, but to other factors. We all tend to think of God in terms of our attitudes to significant elders during childhood, and in terms of their attitudes to us. During growth to religious maturity our ideas of God undergo purification and refinement. This is one of the disciplines of the spiritual life. Even so, in maturity we have only the language and images of finite existence in which to describe our apprehension of the Infinite. Theological discourse is always analogical. We are driven to use the highest categories of our experience as persons in order to communicate our apprehension of God, while realising that He is beyond personality. The Christian understanding of God is primarily mediated through a 'relationship' between God and man in which neither is object

to the other, but each is an 'I' to the others 'Thou'. For the Christian, the possibility of such a relationship is disclosed in Jesus Christ.

At this point we are faced with some questions. How can man establish a loving society in which men accept their possibilities and realise them productively in co-operation with other men? How can man be freed from a conscience that is no more than a mirror to reflect childish habits of obedience and punishments for disobedience? How can man recognize the indifference of the universe to his personal fate, bring meaning to his life through self-realisation and enter into an experience of oneness with the meaningless universe. Who will halt man in his escapes from freedom? The fact is Fromm does not bother to explain precisely how man acquires a social character. Is it enough to be exposed to a society for that society to stamp indelibly its mark upon character? Or do people react with insight and foresight to the social environment, selecting those features they think will produce a better organisation of personality, and rejecting those features that are inconsistent with their style of life? Fromm does not answer these questions. But perhaps they would not arise in a society of Psychoanalyzed Humanistic Communitarian Socialists!

Our survey of the medical psychologies points to one inescapable conclusion:- man's possibilities show themselves chiefly in 'splendid incapacities'. This is the human predicament. For Freud, it originates in the restrictions placed upon instinctual satisfactions in order to establish a measure of security for civilized life. The frustrations involved breed rage which in turn begets anxiety and guilt, and these find a

temporary assuagement in aggression turned either inward against the self or outward against society. For Jung, even if there is a normal and successful course of development during the first half of life, a general malaise of meaninglessness attacks the second. Adler grounds all human striving in basic inferiority feelings set in motion by the child's helplessness in an adult world. If fortune smiles he will find a healthy compensation in striving for completion by cultivating social interest. He does not say how the social urges are released or in what manner of society they will find the greatest measure of expression. Organisational man of modern society is compelled to stifle the creative self. Horney's real self must first cope with anxieties about its worth that are gendered in the home acting as a surrogate for a fissured society. Sullivan has commented upon the human predicament in the crisp but grim dictum, "for the majority of people . . . the stresses of life distort them to inferior caracatures of what they might have been". Fromm finds that no society has yet recognized the human situation with its existential dichotomies. Man seems to hover between freedom and security, for in every society he has created up to the present he has sought to escape from the burden of self-actualisation. So, he is plunged by the demonic transformation of his unlived life into destructiveness. Fromm's attack on Theism, however, contains a warning against finding refuge from the burden of freedom in an idolatrous devotion to God.

All of these psychologies seem to discern behind every instance of human misery an image of what man ought to be, and indeed, of what he can be, if only he can find the energy to become his true self. They detect in man a forward thrust towards maturity that all too often becomes snarled

in the neurotic undergrowth of ailing societies. So man is thrown back into egocentricity and the more he tries to extricate himself, the more he finds himself pre-occupied with himself, for he has only the ego through which to release himself from the ego. The 'ideas' to which he gives his attention, and by which he hopes to achieve deliverance, are themselves subject to 'existential distortion' by egocentricity. For what is the ego but a distorted image of the true self? St. Paul has described the human quandary more succiently than any psychologist. "I can will what is right, but I cannot do it. For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do."[54] Deliverance from the bondage of the will is the real human problem, and to find it we shall need to look to a dimension beyond the human.

CHAPTER VI

UNTO A MATURE MANHOOD

The essential and fundamental problem of man is man himself. He is the bearer of immense possibilities which he manifests chiefly in splendid incapacities. He is part of nature but cannot be explained in terms of nature. In essence he is free: in existence he is bound. He has the power to create and feels compelled to destroy. He is unique and delights in reducing himself to the common, the average and the mediocre.

We have studied the enigma man from the standpoint of several psychologies. We have found him to be in need of deliverance from an insoluble quandary. Before we look to another dimension for the hope of rescue from his predicament, we shall sketch the shape of his image as it appears in the psychological sciences.

Man is a centre of individual life. While human personality is a unity it is convenient to think of it as unfolding on three levels. Man first of all is a core of biological life, maintaining homeostasis by assimilating from the external environment what he needs to repair biochemical deficits, and to reduce physiological tension. The organism regulates and adapts its behaviour on the biochemical and physiological level in order to maintain itself and its species. It assimilates 'nourishment' from the environment: it is not assimilated by the environment, and consequently it preserves a rudimentary individuality. But it is not sufficient unto itself.

Man is not self-sufficient at any level of his being. Not only is he a biological organism, he is a psycho-social being. His life opens

out upon a 'world'. He is nourished psychically by his world: he develops as a person by encountering persons, and by participating in societies of persons. His intellectual life and his emotional life develop in the give and take of social life. On this level he experiences his environment as a meaningful situation, and this is quite different to the biochemical experience of the same environment in the process of metabolism. There is no physiological equivalent to the experience of meaning as such. The stimulus-response mechanism acts within a closed situation. On the psycho-social level man is open, not to an environment but to a world, that is to say, to a universe of meaningful relations in which he exists, and which he helps to shape.

Man could not grasp a situation, and bring meaning to it unless his life could unfold on a third level. This is the level of self-awareness, of self-transcendence, apart from which knowledge and meaning would be impossible. For here man transcends what is given and experienced. He poses questions to himself about his existence, becomes conscious of others, and realises that they are involved in his existence. He cannot find any ultimate basis within himself for his existence. He senses that his existence is supported by the whole order of reality. He discovers that he lives and moves and has his being only in so far as he participates in Being itself. Neither on the biological level, nor the psycho-social level, nor the level of personal existence is man sufficient unto himself. He is involved from the depths of his being with that which is not himself.

The term 'level' is metaphorical. Human personality is indivisible. These levels inter-penetrate. They are contained in greater or lesser

degree in every human act. This image of man as functioning in all three levels is ideal, an outline of the possible rather than the actual. Eric Fromm has shown that man is in fact alienated from his possibilities, from his powers for love, reason, productive work, and true community. This self-estrangement corrupts every sphere of his life. But Fromm has no real solution. In order to reconcile man to himself we must change the structure of society, but in order to change the structure of society we must reconcile man to himself.

What Fromm actually affirms is a doctrine of original righteousness, but his analysis of man, and the societies that he has created up until now, reveal him to be very far gone from his pristine innocence. Man and his world exist in a state of fallenness. The interesting claim in many psychoanalytic descriptions of man's predicament is that humanistic psychoanalysis can restore man to himself. Psychoanalysis is first and foremost a relationship to another. To be of any therapeutic value the relationship must be a loving one, in which the analyst acting from within it becomes a 'participant observer'. The patient accepts an 'intervention' in his world, and in so far as he relates himself to it lovingly, he gains a new experience of himself. Constructive forces for growth are released. He is able to move forward towards self-fulfilment in loving and productive relationships with others.

Whether or not psychoanalysis does produce such results is not the point. The point is that only a new relationship 'intervening' in the patient's world and to which he responds affirmatively, can set him in the direction of wholeness and the possession of his human powers. If

'normal' man organises his psychic forces in response to a self-image drawn from an estranged world, he will remain in a state of self-estrangement. He needs an image of himself presented to him from beyond. He needs to receive this image by means of an intervention in his world that will call him into a new relationship through which he will find his estranged powers. The realm in which he will encounter the possibilities of a new relationship will be the realm of transcendence, but it must be a relationship that will find a place for all activities of body and mind, for beauty of sense, for human love and community feeling. It must give a shining order to his desires, and hold together his thoughts so that he can give a transcendent meaning to his existence. Christianity holds out to man the possibility of just such a relationship.

Our concern here is with the Christian understanding of man, and not with the whole fabric of Christian Faith. We cannot, however, discuss the Christian estimate of man in isolation from the entire scheme of Christian revelation. In one sense it is unfortunate that Christianity is classed as a religion. It is not a religion in the sense of a system of feelings, organised in response to a cultic representation of certain human values that give unity to life. It is first and foremost a revelation, a disclosure of God by God himself. The Scriptures consist of a recorded testimony to the revelation of God. Man receives it by being taken up into it.

The Biblical view of man reveals him both in his essential nature and existential predicament.[1] Man is the roof and crown of God's creation.

He is the link between God and nature, holding power under God over the beasts and the whole created order. He is created in the image of God, for he shares with his maker the powers to create, to understand truth, and to love what is good. Man is not only God's vicegerent in the world, he is also his priest who delights in unfolding before God all the possibilities of creation for truth, and beauty and goodness. He is not only a tiny fragment of the universe, not merely a part of nature; nature bears the signs of God's handywork; it reflects in a measure the beauty and goodness of God; only man has been made in the image and likeness of God.

Man can do what no star or animal can do; he is able to understand and co-operate with the divine purposes. Furthermore man was not made to live alone. He was created for social life and development. The dignity and possibilities of human nature receive striking expression in the creation myths.[2] Man lives on terms of perfect friendship with God. His work is his means of growth, at once a training of his faculties and a deepening of his partnership with his Creator. He is at peace with himself, with his neighbour, with his world, and with God. He is not yet haunted by the anxieties of finitude, of guilt, and of emptiness. "And they were both naked the man and his wife, and were not ashamed."[3] According to the second chapter of Genesis, the essential nature of man consists in the fact that God has made him a finite person in order that he may enjoy a personal relationship to God, and to other finite persons.

But there is another side to the picture. He is "like unto the

beasts that perish".[4] He is "like to vanity; His days are as a shadow that passeth away." He is akin to God, but he is also mortal. "But man abideth not in honour; He is like the beasts that perish." Death, to the Hebrews, did not mean utter non-existence, but rather the dissolution of personal fellowship with God and those 'in the land of the living'. Death meant entrance into a dreary, wraith-like existence in the underworld of Sheol. The offense of death to the Old Testament writers is not so much the possibility of extinction, as the expectation that all fellowship with God will be at an end. When the insight that sin, too, breaks intercourse with God took hold of the Hebrew mind, it became clear that in some way there was a connection between the two. The 'existential dichotomy' in the Old Testament is the twofold status of man; on the one hand he is the image and glory of God; on the other he is mortal; he is sinful; and death is the corollary of sin.

All this receives mythological expression in the third chapter of Genesis in the allegory of the Fall. Man rejects his essential nature, and succumbs to the search for glory. First, he is persuaded that he possesses within himself an inherent principle of immortality.[5] Secondly, he is seduced by the pleasure-principle. The fruit is good for food; pleasant to the eyes; to be desired to make one wise, - that is a richer and fuller experience at all costs.[6] Finally he rejects his status as a created being in order to become his own supreme arbiter in all things. And this is an attempt to usurp the power and glory which properly belong to God himself. Sin, therefore,

is a prideful rejection of God's claim upon man for his obedience and trust. It is also a rejection of his real self. God's image in him is defaced, but not obliterated.

The consequence of this is that not only is man's capacity for truth, beauty and goodness seriously impaired, but his capacity for personal relationship is also vitiated. Every part of his nature is affected by his rebelliousness. He experiences the rupture in his relationship to God as a cleavage within himself, and he is visited with a profound anxiety about the nature of his being. He has become guilty, and life now suffers a malevolent transformation into an escape from the painful knowledge that he is incomplete. "I heard thy voice in the garden, and I was afraid, because I was naked, and I hid myself."[7]

These myths are timeless in application. They have been interpreted literally and allegorically throughout Christian history. It is not necessary to place the 'Fall' at some point in pre-history, as though God once created man who fell from grace, involving all future generations in a cosmic tragedy. God is eternally creating man, sustainin him in being, and delighting in his creation because it is very good: man at every moment of his life is falling, making himself the only referent in life, rebelling against his creatureliness, and his need for fellowship with God.[8] But at each moment 'the fall' is a choice.

Man, at each moment, is free to choose between a creative loyalty to his essential nature, and egocentricity. As Berdyaev has pointed out, the choice of an ego-centred life is a desire for "a godless experience of life, a refusal to give a creative answer to God's call."[9] Yet a

'No' to God's call does not efface completely His image in man. It remains distorted and fragmented in his capacity to exercise reason, conscience, and creative workmanship. He still knows that truth, beauty and goodness exist even though he cannot attain them. Vestiges of the divine image remain in a painful self-consciousness of sin and imperfection. The only time man comes perilously near to total depravity is when he allows himself to be deceived into complacency and self-satisfaction.

These Biblical insights have been expressed in the later doctrines of Original Righteousness and Original Sin. The doctrine of Original Sin makes the humanistic psychoanalyst snort with contempt for the Christian understanding of man. But it is no more, and no less, than an empirical description of man's plight. In comparison the usual humanist description of man appears unreal, naive, and lyrical. Original Sin, however, should at all times be held in balance by Original Righteousness. The substance of the doctrine of Original Sin is the observable fact that at every moment we tend to set ourselves in the centre of the universe, usurping the place of God, rejecting his claim upon us for a creative loyalty, and equally rejecting the claim of our fellows upon us for love, which is part of God's claim.

The problem of original sin is the problem of universal sin. Reason cannot probe the source of the mystery of iniquity to its depths. The locus of sin does not reside in a common biological inheritance; that too is 'very good'. Nor does it reside in the total

effect of society upon the character. Its locus lies in man's nature as a self-organising system, and the tendency to make himself the centre and criterion of his own system of values. He enters the world as a bundles of possibilities; biological, social, and transcendental. It pertains to his essential nature to develop and express these through a personal relationship to God, and consequent upon this, in a personal relationship to his fellows. His essential nature lays upon him a priestly vocation. He is called to stand before God and unveil through his handywork all the possibilities of the created order for Truth, Beauty, and Goodness. Thus, in affirming the nature of God he affirms his own nature. Each man must make his own offering, sign it with the seal of his own uniqueness, and place it within that mosaic of human life and handywork through which God wills to reveal the glory of His Being.

But man is born into a condition of life into which full union with God is broken. Long before he attains the years of discretion 'fallen' society has made him near-sighted to his condition. And 'privatio' inevitably ends in 'depravatio' - that state in which men become blind to the truth concerning themselves, are unable to discern the true meaning of existence and the direction of their lives. Reason moans in a desert land: the 'will' can not come out of Egypt.

The image of man in modern psychology lacks features. 'Psychological processes' are not in themselves enough to give the image a 'face' unless they are understood in the light of man's essential nature. All the medical psychologies derive a doctrine of man from his existential

predicament. Christian Theology describes his existential predicament in the light of his essential nature. The objective psychologies investigate man as an object of knowledge, but the analytic psychologies also claim scientific status. The consulting room is the laboratory, and analysis the microscope "for the minute and intimate study of man's soul." To both the objective psychologist and the psychoanalyst, man is an object of knowledge. Man as an object of knowledge is not total man. Karl Jaspers has commented upon the sciences' disposition to lay claim to an absolute knowledge of the whole man: "they lose sight of the real man and go forward extinguishing their proponents' consciousness of man, and even their own humanity, the humanity which is freedom and relation to God."[10]

Freudian psychology illustrates Jasper's comment. Freud was obsessed with the ambition to have psychoanalysis recognised as a scientific technique, and his discoveries accepted as empirically verified. Rejecting any doctrine of man's nature, his mechanistic-evolutionary hypothesis led him to confuse man's existential distortion with man's essential nature. Hence he stopped short of any elaboration of his concept of sublimation, and was indeed, as we have shown, pessimistic about its general efficacy. But the concept of sublimation deepens our apprehension of that creative goodness which reflects the image of God in man. Paul Tillich has remarked in a recent address:

> "Sublimation is the act which transforms something not sublime into something sublime. And the sublime is a concept which deserves highest standing in formulating a philosophy of life.

> The structure of life shows that the sublime is the greatest potentiality of life. It is not a mere transformation of the non-sublime; then it would be only another form of it. But the sublime is something qualitatively new, it demands a creative act - and this means freedom in a meaningful sense of the word. . . . Freud was 'behind' himself - in that he tried to derive sublime things, like works of art, from non-sublime things . . . . This is not an existentialist, but an essentialist question. It refers to man's essential nature and to the central concept in which converge all elements in man's essential nature, the concept of freedom . . . . the power of a man to react centrally to a stimulus, by deliberation and decision." [11]

Existential therapy confronts the patient with the possibility of losing his own existence. He can indeed destroy himself if he chooses. This is precisely what he will do if he refuses to find some point in his existence to which he can commit himself unconditionally. Such self-commitment requires a centred act of the centred self. But a fully centred self is beyond the achievement of fallen man, for the self is in bondage to sin, or in other words, man cannot fully centre himself until he has overcome those cleavages within his own nature which reflect his rejection of creatureliness and the disruption of the essential unity between man and God.

Sin is the attempt to find the ultimate basis for one's personal existence within that existence. It is the drive for absolute self-sufficiency, the total rejection of one's finitude. And this gives rise to endless striving and desire with an ever increasing intensity and an ever increasing satisfaction.

Many neurotic disturbances treated by psychotherapy are exaggerated manifestations of man's existential predicament. The search for glory, the search for unlimited power, prestige, affection and independence, the

inflated images of what the self is or ought to be - are all gross symptoms of the estrangement from his essential nature that defaces the image and likeness of God in man.

Tillich speaks of neurosis "as a way of avoiding non-being by avoiding being."[12] There is a basic anxiety attached to man's knowledge of his finiteness, and this anxiety is an awareness of non-being: "anxiety is the state in which a being is aware of its possible non-being . . . It is the awareness of One's finitude as finitude."[13] Non-being confronts men as an anxiety about having to die, not about death as an abstraction, but about the fact that "I must die." It faces everyone who affirms his uniqueness either in creative work, or by means of a meaningful appreciation of and participation in a cultural life, as a threat of meaninglessness. It threatens man's moral self-affirmation as the anxiety of guilt. For man must give an account to himself of what he has made of himself.

To express this in another way. The human person's consciousness of himself as an individual centre life is also an awareness of his finititude which is inextricably intertwined with a basic anxiety. Possible non-being confronts him on the biological level as an anxiety about having to die; on the psycho-social level as guilt; and on the transcendent level as meaninglessness.

The neurotic, more sensitive to the threats of non-being than the average man, is forced into a weak, reduced self-affirmation, and into a compulsive defense of its limited and unrealistic basis. He seeks an unrealistic security to offset his anxiety about death; and unrealistic

certitude in relation to anxiety about meaninglessness; and an unrealistic perfection to dethrone his anxiety in relation to guilt.

The 'healthy' man's self-affirmation is fragmentary. He refuses to become aware of the anxiety at the depths of his being. He meets anxiety in the form of fears that can be mastered or endured. He is adjusted to reality in more directions than the neurotic, but he becomes neurotic when changes in the reality to which he is adjusted threaten his fragmentary courage.

Self-affirmation in increasing fullness demands the courage to be in spite of the threats of nonbeing. It means taking the basic anxiety into the orbit of one's life and using it creatively. Courage to be 'in spite of' is born out of faith 'in spite of'. "Faith is not a theoretical affirmation of something uncertain, it is the existential acceptance of something transcending ordinary experience."[14]

We can summarize our discussion thus far. The 'ordinary experience' of self-affirmation on all three levels of human life is one of 'torness', severance, from the source of creative goodness. "The good that I would, I do not; and the evil that I would not that I do."[15] This consciousness of disruption springs out of a rejection of creatureliness and the conditions of its existence. Man tries to elude the painful knowledge of his contingency by striving to reach absolute self-sufficiency, and by regarding himself as self-originating. The rejection of finitude (creatureliness) constitutes original sin; the drive to aseity is the manifestation of sin. Thus man is involved in a continuous violation of his

essential nature which, in Biblical terms, is made in the image and likeness of God, and which can only achieve full affirmation in personal fellowship with God and with other finite creatures.

This two-fold relationship lays upon man the vocation of realizing his essential nature by bringing out of the creation all its possibilities for Truth, Beauty and Goodness. But the cleavage engendered by the rejection of his status, renders him incapable of "the centred act of a centred self". that transforms the non-sublime into the sublime. Furthermore his existence reflects the disruption of his essential nature, and involves him in the existential predicament voiced so poignantly by St. Paul. The self (will) is in bondage to the contradictions and conflicts of existence. Any attempts man makes to restore harmony between himself and God are doomed to failure. All his efforts express the disruptions of existence, the sphere where the violations of his essential nature are actualised. The universal need of mankind, therefore, is a healing that will restore power for the 'courage to be'.

The Christian Revelation is a Gospel because it proclaims a Divine Intervention in existence in order to restore the image and likeness of God in man. God's saving act is not catastrophic; it does not coerce the minds of man by a terrifying display of power, nor does it override man's capacity to choose and decide. Yet in dealing with men as persons, it is effective for these very reasons.

Christianity estimates man in the light of God's saving disclosure of Himself under the conditions of existence - with all its disruptions and

estrangements - in the Person of Jesus Christ. The Incarnation is the heart of the Christian Revelation because it makes known to men the Divine Thought and Life. "No one has ever seen God: the only Son who is in the bosom of the Father, he has made him known".[16] "He who has seen me has seen the Father"[17] But God not only reveals Himself to man; he gives Himself to man. The Divine Life took human nature not only in order that we should see it, but supremely, in order that we should receive it.

Yet the Church has always condemned the idea of Christ as a mere avatar of divinity. It has insisted upon his full, complete, and concrete humanity. For the Christian, he is the supreme revelation of the possibilities of human life in intimate and unbroken fellowship with God. He was in perfect sympathy with the divine purposes. He maintained a constant and complete obedience to the Father. He lived as Son of God because man was created to live as a son of God. He displayed an ultimate concern for all men. Since God gives himself to men, men must give themselves to each other. God is love, and man is made in the image and likeness of God, therefore man must be love too. He was fully self-aware. His human nature contained no contradictions for him. He was conscious of what was in him, and so he knew what was in man, and could interpret human life from within. Jesus Christ, Son of God, Son of Man, is the living image of original righteousness. He alone has realised all the possibilities of human life, and he recognised in every human being, in so far as he is human, a kindred capacity. What he taught, he was. In word and act he affirmed the value of every human being, just because he is human.[18] The Christian Gospel proclaims Jesus Christ as the true 'image of man who is the image and glory of God'.[19]

Christian Faith also proclaims him as "the image of the invisible God"[20] who "reflects the Glory of God and bears the very stamp of his nature."[21] This self-disclosure of God through 'enfleshment' was manifest amid the disruptions of human existence. At every point at which man finds himself caught within the tangled skein of consequences resulting from his falling below the 'image and glory of God', the Divine Pity stoops to restore him to his native dignity.

"The Word became flesh"[22], because the flesh is commonly, but not necessarily, the source of our frailty and sin. In Christ the flesh received its proper dignity for it is the completely responsive instrument of the Spirit. God does not make his self-utterance to the mind and spirit alone. He seeks man at the oozy sea-bottom of creation. The whole of Christ, flesh included, is the self-utterance of God.

He was tempted to misuse his powers, and so "we have not a high priest who is unable to sympathize with our weaknesses, but one who in every respect has been tempted as we are, yet without sinning,"[23] and because he himself has "suffered, he is able to help those who are tempted."[24] He had nowhere to lay his head; he spent a great deal of his time in the company of social pariahs; he was in constant contact with the sick and psychotic; his kinsfolk thought him mad; his twelve especial disciples persistently misunderstood his aims and purposes, and at the end one betrayed him, and another denied him. The establishment opposed him, finally arrested him, manhandled him and shuttled him back and forth between the various jurisdictions. He was mocked by a lecherous old tyrant; taunted like a barrack-room buffoon by the soldiers; and then executed like a common criminal.

But God raised him from the dead.

"For we know that Christ being raised from the dead will never die again; death no longer has dominion over him. The death he died to sin, once for all, but the life he lives he lives to God. So you must also consider yourselves dead to sin and alive to God in Christ Jesus."[25]

This array of tragic circumstances surrounding the life of Christ was the work of sin operating in the minds and hearts of men. His victory was his maintenance of a perfect loving obedience to the Father - "obedient unto death even the death of the cross",[26] in spite of the attacks of sin. The Cross and Resurrection represent God's recreative love meeting man's destructive hate and transforming it into indestructible life. The heart of the Gospel is the offer to men in their existential predicament of a new source of Life, the victorious and living Christ who shares his new humanity with those who are incorporated into his Body which is the Church. The Christian hope is that "as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive".

That this was the experience of the apostolic church is obvious on almost every page of the Acts and the Epistles. St. Paul writes to the Romans -

"Do you know that all of us who have been baptized into Christ Jesus were baptized into his death? We were buried therefore with him by baptism into death, so that as Christ was raised from the dead by the glory of the Father, we too might walk in newness of life".[27]

This gift of the Divine-Human energies of Christ effects a radical change within -- "For ye are dead and your life is hid with Christ in God".[28] The Christian, therefore, becomes another Christ. The Christian life is a

continuation of the Divine-Human life of Jesus.

When St. Paul first approached the infant Christian community he found that all were as one man in Christ Jesus. The only adequate phrase he could find to describe their corporate life was 'the Body of Christ'. The bond of unity in the Divine-Human community was the indwelling Christ. St. Paul describes the presence of Christ in the Church as 'the Spirit of God', 'the Spirit of Christ', or 'Christ'.

"But you are not in the flesh, you are in the Spirit, if the Spirit of God really dwells in you. Anyone who does not have the Spirit of Christ does not belong to him. But if Christ is in you although your bodies are dead because of sin, your spirits are alive because of righteousness."[29]

St. Paul, of all the Apostolic writers, sees most clearly the implications of Pentecost for men and humanity. The tiny Christian community is in type a new humanity. Initiation into it is incorporation into Christ. The victorious humanity of Christ is made available to men by the gift of the Holy Spirit. They are then 'in Christ'; the Body of Christ of which they are the limbs is no mere figure of speech but a vital reality; for the body is energized by the Spirit of Christ.

The usual obstacles to unity among men are dissolved by their unity in the Spirit. Such deep divisions as those based upon the differences of cultural and religious traditions, of economic status, even of sex, are negligible to those who are 'in Christ'. "There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus".[30]

St. Paul calls attention to the tremendous possibilities for personal life in the gift of the Holy Spirit. [31] He describes unregenerate man as psychic, and contrasts 'psychic man' with 'pneumatik' man. Psychic man is

identical with those who are in 'the flesh' (Sarnekoi). For the most part St. Paul uses 'pneumatikos' with the meaning of that which belongs to, or is actuated by the Holy Spirit. But he also uses the word as the equivalent of the 'inner self',[32] the human spirit. The human spirit is the sphere in which Holy Spirit works. The spirit of man responds to the Spirit of God, and through this response a man experiences such a radical renovation that he is a new creature. He is free from the law of the flesh, for to set the "mind on the flesh is death, but to set the mind on the Spirit is life and peace".[33]

The meaning of 'flesh' requires some explanation for it brings us to the heart of our discussion. The Greek work 'sarx' has a wide range of meanings which have not been reduced to a uniform terminology. But St. Paul regards 'flesh' as the total self-organization of unregenerate man. It includes practical reason and the power to make judgments[34] as well as the 'will'.[35] By the use of these powers man seeks to exalt himself to a position of absolute sovereignty in his own affairs. The 'flesh' is the sphere of this sinfulness but this implies that it is much more than the seat of sensuality.[36] In Romans 13.14, flesh obviously means the whole personality wrongly directed, and which can be corrected only by "putting on the Lord Jesus Christ". In Galatians 5.19-24 St. Paul contrasts the works of the flesh with the fruits of the Spirit.

The works of the flesh are rebellious forces which the unregenerate self is not able to hold together in a working harmony. The fruits of the Spirit are the powers that grow and bear fruit when man has yielded his capacity for self-determination to the Spirit of Christ. But the fruit

of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness, self-control. These are the attributes of the personality directed by the Holy Spirit: they are the hall marks of maturity. Self-determination finds its fulfillment in self-surrender.

Self-surrender is a continuous and positive response to the dynamic energies of the Holy Spirit at work within us. Language fails at this point, but the word grace will have to serve as the name for those energies. We do not earn them. God gives them, or calls them forth in us through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. By incorporation in the Body of Christ, the Church, we share in the Holy Spirit which bestows the Divine-Humanity of Christ upon us, so that we become the sons of God, at one with God. In our deepest human relationships, the real essence of love is an inter-penetration of personality: those who love become one, in more than a metaphorical sense. The same is true of God's love for man - only more so. That love results in a real interpenetration which we can only express in terms of indwelling. Grace is the activity of the Holy Spirit whereby "we dwell in Him and He in us".

Christian maturity is at once a gift and an accomplishment. It is a gift inasmuch as it is the work of the Holy Spirit: it is an accomplishment in so far as it is a response to the 'energies' of grace. We are to work out our own salvation as if everything depended upon us, but we are to realise that it is God "that worketh in you both to will and to do of His good pleasure".[37] Christian maturity demands a continuous yielding up of the self to the direction of the Holy Spirit. Growth is a life-long 'putting on of Christ'. It is a "being changed into his likeness from one degree of

glory to another,"[38] as day by day we surrender to the 'Spirit who dwelleth in us' until we all attain to the unity of the faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, to mature manhood, to the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ.

The Christian estimate of man is at once more pessimistic than Freud's and more optimistic than Fromm's. If man can rise no higher than the sum total of his instinctive energies then he is the most dangerous species ever spawned by the evolutionary processes. Tomorrow some member of the species in the grip of thanatos might press the button that will disintegrate the earth into a million meteors. Man, however, is made in the image and glory of God. It is an image which he has defaced by his futile efforts to play the omnipotent Creator. But God in Christ has restored the image. Christ now mediates his Spirit to all who will receive him. The gift of the Spirit restores them to their primordial dignity as sons in the household of God.

Christian revelation sets man within the context of Creation and Recreation before it attempts to estimate his possibilities. In this setting an estimate is almost an impertinence, - and it is only in this setting that he has any real worth, - for his true fulfillment lies in continuing and extending the Divine-Human life of Christ in the particular form and manner determined by his vocation.

The most distinctive and characteristic quality of the Christ-life in men is agapé. We shall use the English transliteration of the Greek rather than the Anglo-Saxon 'love', which has become so comprehensive in meaning that it has lost any specific content. Agapé, which was a neutral term in Classical Greek, became a technical term in New Testament usage

signifying "a one way relation of which the subject is God and the object man".[39] Agapé is a love that is neither spontaneous nor emotional. It is a total response to the agapé which is God's innermost personal being revealed in the life, work and teaching of Jesus Christ. This response is the creation of the Holy Spirit[40] in those who come to the radical decision to surrender themselves to him. The decision can be commanded as a duty from man who is the object of divine Agapé; so too can agapé towards men, for the two cannot be separated: agapé towards men depends upon agapé towards God, and agapé towards God is irrefutably demonstrated by agapé towards men. St. Paul in the fifth chapter of Romans[41] hints that the agapé between men is an overflow of the outpouring of God's agapé into them. In the day by day relationships of the Christian, his agapé is Christ's agapé finding expression through him.

It is a well-known observation of St. Thomas Acquinas that grace perfects nature; it does not destroy it. While agapé stands in opposition to two other relationships of love, because it is not elicited or affected by value of any kind, yet it enriches them and does not supersede them. The eros relationship of love seeks satisfaction through the desire to possess its object in enjoyment. The desire ceases with the satisfaction. Primarily, eros is sexual love, although Plato distinguished between the earthly and the heavenly eros.[42] The word does not appear in the New Testament, its place being taken by epithumia, meaning 'desire' or 'longing'. Whether eros seeks its satisfaction on the 'earthly' or 'heavenly' plane, desire is its basic element, and the desire is elicited by a value residing in the object.

For the Christian, eros-love finds its satisfaction in marriage as

the sacramental form of a union which will include every level of the partners' being. Springing out of sexual desire it is directed to the whole person of the loved one, but it cannot be restricted to sexual satisfaction alone, for it may also seek mental and spiritual satisfaction from the beloved. Agapé imparts a new quality to the eros relationship of Christians. The partners are not only objects of satisfaction; each is a beloved for whom Christ died; each is "in Christ". His agapé transforms their relationship, not by taking the place of eros, but by enriching and controlling it, so that each partner is loved for his or her worth in the sight of God.

The third love that is touched by agape is friendship, or philia. The verb 'phileo' means to love with the love of emotion and friendship. John Burnaby has defined philia as "a mutual relation, a bond between two centres of consciousness in one".[43] This love may assume various forms, the most common being the bond that is forged by common interests and concerns. As such it stands between eros and agape in Christian marriage. Eros has its source in man's biological endowment, philia in his nature as a social being. It gives balance and perspective to eros. In the marriage relationship philial love creates the profound sense of community which is the basis of family life. It is the source of Adler's social feeling and of social life without which men are incomplete and stunted.

In philial love and the community it creates, we find fulfillment for our deepest needs. Through contact with others the personality unfolds and develops. To grow healthily we need to give and receive psychic nourishment through recognising and being recognised, esteeming and being

esteemed, and especially do we need to make an active self-forgetful gift of ourselves in co-operation with others to that which is objectively valuable. The person who concentrates upon himself, who is pre-occupied with his own ego, fails to expand psychologically, and is condemned to immaturity.

Philial love lays the foundation for Eric Fromm's ideal society in which men will possess mental health, because they will be living in a society that is consistent with the possibilities of innate human nature. Harry Stack Sullivan's theory that interpersonal relations make or break a person, testifies to the indispensable role of philia in the attainment of maturity. When men and women do break, it is the philial love of the psychiatrist, acting as 'participant observer' in the therapeutic relationship, that restores them to health. Nor has the patient been restored until he has regained his capacity for philial relationships in which "the interest of another is as important, or almost as important as one's own".

Freud was stubbornly myopic about the place of social life in the development of the individual. For him, philia is eros in a straitjacket. Jung's process of individuation is largely self-enclosed. To the existential therapists, the philial relationship, in which the patient receives 'an experience not an explanation', is the dynamic nucleus of all therapy. This experience is the experience of feeling one's own being through communion with another.

Goldstein's self-actualisation theory regards philial love as encroaching upon the development of others, and the expression of philia as

demanding self-restriction in favour of the self-realisation of others. The voluntary sufferance of encroachment and self-restriction is a manifestation of man's highest capacity, the capacity for freedom. He fails to see the psychic enrichment in the mutual, self-forgetful give and take of philial social relations. Philia does not subtract from the vital powers. On the contrary it bestows a sense of bounty and plenitude upon them. Lecky encloses man within his own self-definition. But the fact remains that human personality unfolds most fully, not when the attention is concentrated on the puny isolated ego, but when its movement is out from itself in the donation of itself to others. In this sense self-renunciation can be a dynamic form of self-realisation.

The essential element in philia is freedom, not the freedom of voluntary sufferance, but the freedom of acceptance on terms of unqualified spiritual equality. Within the marriage bond the philial relationship, gendered by the sharing of a common life and common interests, achieves its consummation in the giving of the body, each to the other. In the philial community each member contributes to the common life the best he has to give, and his best as his best is the equal of any other's best. Philia enters into the Divine-Human community, the mystical Body of Christ, where each cell must become a society of friends.

But philia needs agapé, not to supersede it, but to perfect it. The erotic-philial relationship of marriage often circumscribes itself with barricades against the needs of the world. The philial community can deteriorate into a cosy inner ring pre-occupied with maintaining its own life. Philia is constantly subject to a subtle form of egocentricity.

In friendship there is always the danger of looking upon the other as 'existing for me', and the community as affording 'me' the opportunity to deepen and enrich 'my' personality. In other words the ego is still the point of reference in every attitude and action.

Philia rises to its fullest expression as the sacramental form of agapé. Philial love can take refuge in fantasy as a general love of mankind. 'Soft' naturalism is one form of this fantasy, and psycho-therapeutic literature extols the fantasy in its lyrical praise of humanist faith. The love of mankind is neither philia nor agapé, but all too often eros rationalized and disguised. Love of mankind is a meaningless abstraction apart from agapé towards men, which is realised in neighbour-love. Neighbour-love recognizes the neighbour in friend and enemy, sinner and saint, good and evil, just and unjust, and flows out to them all for their own sake, not merely to actualise the potentialities of the self. Agape towards men acknowledges the claim upon it of every human being no matter what his moral status may be, even as God makes "his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sends rain on the just and the unjust". These are the characteristics of the 'teleios' man, the complete man, the mature man, whom the Holy Spirit has brought to the stature of the fullness of Christ.

Before any man can start on this way he must be brought into a right relation to God. In both Testaments to be brought into right relations with either a person or with God is to be justified. The use of the verb 'dikaioo' in the New Testament does not mean to make just, but to bring into right relation to God. As we have seen, no man can do this for himself, for he is too involved in the disruptions of existence, nor can he break

his bondage of sin, for the self that would accomplish this is itself the bond slave of sin. The essential condition for release is faith in Christ's 'at-one-ing' Life and Death. It is an acceptance of the fact that "God so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten Son, to the end that all that believe in him should not perish"[44]

Again, this faith is more than mere acceptance. It is, to use Dodd's[45] phrase, 'pure receptivity' to the act and mind of God as revealed in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. It is a willingness to let them become the principle of one's own life and to leave the moulding of life to the Holy Spirit.

This is the condition of our justification provided we repent. It is strange how completely repentance is misunderstood by psychotherapists. More often than not it is confused with remorse,- a state of mind which is not Christian, and reveals a structure of conscience that resembles the Freudian superego. Remorse is masochistic unless it leads to repentance which is more than mere sorrow for misdeeds, more than a mere change of mind. Metanoiein involves a total reorientation of the personality away from self towards God. Remorse is the worldly grief that produces death: repentance is a creative grief "that leads to salvation and brings no regret."[46]

Thus, having been reconciled to God through a forgiving acceptance, growth begins. The old rigid conscience is dissolved and the new man is actuated by agapé which he shows forth towards those who

sin against him in forgiveness. Accepted by God he can accept himself, and he can accept God's acceptance of him in the light of what he shall become as well as of what he actually is. And should he fall even into gross sin, he will rise, confess himself, and go on as though he had not sinned. This is the sum and substance of the Christian's agapé towards himself, and it is confirmed by the great spiritual directors of all ages.[47] This creative attitude to the self has profound implications for our moral attitudes to others. "There but for the grace of God go I" is a common pious cliché. It smacks of self-satisfaction. In the presence of a moral derelict the Christian recognises himself. His proper comment, if comment he must make, is "There go I".

Justification opens the way for Christ to work in us what he has done for us, and this cannot be done without suffering. Euphoric feeling as the criterion of mental health and efficient functioning is hardly in accord with the reality principle, much less with Christian spiritual growth. The two capacities necessary for the attainment of Christian maturing are the capacities for joy and suffering. Not that we are to seek suffering. The cheerful acceptance of daily frustrations, irritations, inconveniences, and the ups and downs of mood and vigour is ample discipline. It is our calling to accept the joys of life with thanksgiving; and this means the simple wholesome joys of hearth and home, of friendship, natural beauty, artistic and intellectual endeavour, and at times sheer nonsense. The Christian remains child-like at heart.

Christ's work in us follows a dynamic pattern of dying in order to

live. Self-actualisation before God demands a radical detachment from the purely natural exercise of our feelings, impulses and emotions, a renunciation of our proprietorship of our psychic life which is a complete death, but this does not mean the destruction of its ontological reality. It means rather the expropriation of the self by Christ, in order that through it, and all that pertains to its organization, he might realise his agapé. Thus, the rich vitality of the psychobiological energies are vivified by a greater love, and given a deeper working unity.

The words 'dying to live' are not the esoteric formula of a mystery cult. On the contrary, they describe the pattern of growth that nature prescribes for every human life. The infant must die to its dependency upon the mother for the gratification of its bodily needs for food and security, if it is to rise to a healthy childhood. The two year old horror of destructiveness must die to its raw self-assertion in order to become the amenable four year old offspring of civilisation. The child must die to life within the limits of the home if it is to find a place in the wider community of the school. With the onset of puberty the boy or girl is being prepared to die to the carefree life of childhood under the sway of the pleasure principle, to rise again to adolescence, from which he or she should emerge to embrace wholeheartedly the reality principle. Adolescence presents the young man or woman with the problem of full biological development and a psychic life that lags behind. The adolescent must die to the longings for the irresponsible life of childhood,

learn to submit his emotions to the death-like processes of rational control, and discipline himself to do what it is given him to do well if he is to rise to the self-confident maturity of adulthood.

But in order to move from one phase to the next succeeding one the child needs love and an affectionate environment. Deprived of these it is difficult for him to find the self-confidence to thrust forward to maturity. On the other hand love and affection must be appropriate to the child's needs at each stage of development. Too much is as bad as too little, and equally impedes growth towards a sturdy independence and responsibility. The story of healthy human development can be told in terms of eros gradually surrendering to the control and direction of philia, a surrender which is not easily achieved if eros has been either thwarted or overindulged.

Most of the psychologies we have discussed stop here with the unfolding of personality on the psycho-social level. Some emphasise the social determination of the satisfactions for biological needs, as do the Stimulus-Response school. Man becomes whatever society makes of his biology, and this is an insult to human personality. To others, such as Goldstein, Lecky, and Maslow, the individual is primary to society and he is moved by one organismic drive, - the drive towards self-actualisation. This is the biological paradigm for human growth and maturing. Rogers regards man as a point at which his organismic cravings and social attitudes intersect. He decides in favour of a doctrine of the innate innocence of man's organismic nature, and grants

the human being a measure of self-determination. Allport takes a more human view of human nature, offers a recognisably human map of personality, and stresses the uniqueness of every individual. Allport's man becomes what it is given him to become by exercising propriate activity in a fruitful interaction with society, and by relating himself to the whole of Being.

Freud assumes that man must settle for an uneasy compromise between instinctual cravings and social inhibitions. Jung, as biological as Freud, finds the full flowering of personality in Gnostic mysticism. Adler, Horney, Sullivan and Fromm stress social factors in the determination of the course of human growth. But only Fromm grants any significance to man's distinctively human characteristics of self-awareness, reason, and imagination. Fromm's idea of self-transcendence however, makes it a springboard for a vertical leap into Humanistic Communitarian Socialism. The Existential analysts regard man's freedom and capacity for self-transcendence as crucial in a fully human life.

The Christian estimate of man denies neither his biological origins nor his organismic needs, nor the influence of society on his development, nor the psychobiological processes of growth. It welcomes any knowledge that psychological science can give about the growth and healthy functioning of human nature. It especially appreciates the place of both erotic love and philial love in the development of the child and the sustenance of the adult. But Christian faith cannot accept any idea of man that reduces him to a complex

of physiological, psychological, and sociological processes. Man possesses a capacity to select those forces that will determine him. He has the seminal capacity to "react centrally to a stimulus, by deliberation and decision." And because he has this essential freedom, he has the capacity to respond to a destiny. Psychology offers him a fate. The psychological image of man, however, is not 'total man'. What Tillich has said of the therapeutic psychologies is true of all personality theories:

> "No therapeutic theory can be developed without an implicit or explicit image of man . . . No doctrine of man is possible without a general understanding of the processes of life, their trends and ambiguities . . . no understanding of life processes is possible without a doctrine of being."[48]

Man, because he is self-aware and self-transcendent, needs a 'universe of meaning' on which he can draw to give meaning to his existence. When he poses questions to himself about the meaning of existence it is a sign of maturity, and it is a sign of even deeper maturity when he faces the fact that he cannot find any ultimate basis for his existence within himself. A still greater maturity is required to face squarely the anomalies, the enigmas and disruptions of existence, not the least of which is man himself. At this point he can either shrug his shoulders, say 'God is dead', look squarely at the 'no exit' sign, and make an act of blind faith in his power to create himself; or he can accept his contingency, make an act of faith in the Christian revelation and begin, albeit experimentally at first, to illumine his existence with its light.

All the self-actualisation psychologies make man the centre of the

universe. Existential psychology with its welcome doctrine of freedom, yet still makes man the supreme arbiter and disposer of his being. The Christian revelation unveils a 'universe of meanings' and communicates them to man in the highest categories he knows, the categories of personal experience. It redeems his birth from the ridiculous, and his death from the absurd. It recalls him to his native dignity as the image and likeness of his Creator. It offers him the possibility of a new manhood that will unfold as he deepens his personal relationship to the Father. It tells him the innermost nature of him before whom he stands, for the Father has disclosed himself in a Son.

The Son, Jesus Christ Our Lord, is our true self-ideal, and this is not the same thing as saying he is our ideal self. In his presence we dare to look at ourselves as we are, and accept ourselves with benevolent criticism, knowing that we have his Spirit, and can therefore move forward each day to do the Father's will. God makes his will known in the creative opportunity of the moment, and we respond to it with decision and deliberation from a fully centred self. For the self is fulfilling its true function when it is the temple of the Holy Spirit, and occupying its proper place when it stands in relation to God. Human personality achieves its true and only worth when it is unified by the love which is the innermost personal being of God himself.

Day by day we respond to the Spirit within us with a creative 'yes'. Growth to Christian maturity does not spare us from the attacks of impulse that would topple our style of life. But we do not give the Spirit an opportunity to do his work if we meet the impulse in

head-on conflict. St. Paul has supplied the remedy. It is to turn our attention to "whatsoever is true, whatsoever is honourable, whatsoever is just, whatsoever is pure, whatsoever is lovely, whatsoever is gracious, if there is any excellence, if there is anything worthy of praise, think about these things."[49]

There is no single definitive concept of Psychological Maturity. There are a variety of descriptions of what a human being might become if he develops all his capacities. These range from the 'psychologically adjusted man', to 'man for himself' expressing his powers by relating himself to others in productive love. Karen Horney is not far from the Kingdom when she names responsibility for oneself and others, inner independence from mere re-action formations, spontaneity of feeling or emotional sincerity, and wholeheartedness as the hallmarks of maturity. But these are, surely, dispositions that lead to maturity, rather than maturity itself. They are the essential inner conditions for psychological growth, rather than the fullness of growth. Within their own framework of reference they are valid and helpful. Until psychology includes in its estimate of human nature, not only the factors in man's generation but also those in his regeneration, it will give an inadequate and confusing account of man's state - more confusing than ever if it claims to present to the world a picture of 'total' man.

The Christian estimate of man places him within the drama of Creation, and Re-creation. It gives man as man a specific nature. It shows him that he has handicapped himself grievously by rebelling against his status, and

violating his nature as the image and glory of God. It assures him that God has rescued his nature from its plight, by entering into it and facing all the consequences of human sin. "For God . . . . hath in these last days spoken unto us by His Son."[50] The Son who maintained a perfect obedience to the Father, now shares that obedience with men, and thereby restores them to their dignity. They can receive the new re-created nature by incorporation into his Body, the Church. Through them, in relationship to God and each other, he will work his good purposes of love.

The love Christ realises through us is God's own love. It pervades all other loves. It finds a place for all activities of our nature, for a sense of beauty, for the body as well as the soul. It gives a shining order to our desires, and crowns our work and human love. It is not afraid of beauty or of truth. It asks of us a total self-surrender, and then vivifies us with a sense of freedom and uniqueness. It gives us light, without which we fall into discord with ourselves, and fail to find the wholeness our nature needs. It gives us, as our measure of maturity, the stature of the fullness of Christ.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. Harry Stack Sullivan, M. D., The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry, Edited by Helen Swick Perry and Mary Ladd Gawel. (W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 1953) pp. 309-310.

2. H. A. Overstreet, The Mature Mind (W. W. Norton, 1949) p. 14.

CHAPTER I

1. For this section on the physiology of the organism see:-

   W.B. Cannon, The Wisdom of the Body (Norton: revised edition 1939)

   See also Physiological Psychology by Clifford. T. Morgan and Elliot Stellar (McGraw Hill Publications in Psychology - New Second Edition 1950) pp 100-106 and the whole of Chapter 9.

2. The theory of instincts as "inherited modes of reaction to bodily needs or external stimulus" has passed out of fashion. The view which is favoured today is that the modes of expression for innate drives are determined by learning and experience. We do not need to take sides!

3. John Dollard and Neal E. Millar, Personality and Psychotherapy. (McGraw-Hill Publications in Psychology. 1950)
   The theory is known as the Reinforcement Theory.

4. Op. cit p. 25

5. Op. cit pp. 34-41. See also pp. 49-124

6. C. L. Hull, A Behaviour System (New Haven, Yale University 1952) p. 4.

7. Stephen Neill, A. Genuinely Human Existence (Doubleday & Company, Garden City, New York, 1959). p. 34.

8. Dollard and Millar, op. cit p. 5

9. ibid p. 432.

10. W. Trotter, Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War, (The MacMillan Company, New York, Second Edition 1919) pp. 79-80.

11. John Locke 1632-1704

12. Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding (The Open Court Publishing Co., Chicago - Second Edition 1912). p. 53

13. D. Snygg and A. W. Combs, Individual Behavior, (Harper and Brothers, New York, 1949) p. 114.

14. Laurance Frederic Shaffer, Ph.D., The Psychology of Adjustment, (Houghton Mifflin Company, 1936) p. 122.

15. Shaffer, op. cit pp. 132-133

16. Shaffer, op. cit pp. 136-137

17. Shaffer, op. cit p. 137

18. Shaffer, op. cit p. 137

19. Shaffer, op. cit p. 138

20. Shaffer, op. cit p. 138

21. Edward Chace Tolman, Drives Towards War, (D. Appleton-Century Company, New York, 1942).

22. Drucker's thesis presented psychologists with a philosophy of history. It crops up again and again in text-books on personality theory. See Maslow: Motivation and Personality; also Stagner, Psychology of Personality.

23. Tolman, op. cit p. 5

24. See Tolman's Purposive Behavior in Animals and Men, (D. Appleton-Century Company, New York, 1932.)

25. Drives Towards War p. 57

26. Tolman, op. cit p.60

26a. Tolman, op. cit p. 101

27. Tolman, op. cit p. 102

27a. Percival M. Symonds, The Dynamics of Human Adjustment, (D. Appleton-Century Company, New York, 1949).

28. Symonds, op. cit p. 567.

29. Symonds, op. cit pp. 567-568

30. Symonds, op. cit p. 10

31. Symonds, op. cit pp. 569-579.

32. Gordon W. Allport, Becoming, (New Haven-Yale University Press, 1956) p. 17

33. Symonds, op. cit pp 10-11

34. C. M. Louttit, Clinical Psychology of Children's Behavior Problems, (Harper Brothers, New York, 1947) pp. 16-17

35. L. P. Thorpe, The Psychology of Mental Health, (The Ronald Press, New York, 1950) p. 6

36. Robert L. Calhoun, What is Man? (Hazen Books on Religion. Association Press, New York 1939). p. 57.

CHAPTER II

1. Max Wertheimer, 1880-1943. Kurt Koffka, 1886-1941, Wolfgang Kohler, 1887- . These three, who had been research students at the University of Berlin, and later came together in Frankfurt, rebelled against Wundt's "brick-and-mortar psychology". The bricks were the sensory elements in experience and the mortar association by contiguity. See Robert S. Woodworth's, Contemporary Schools of Psychology, (The Ronald Press, New York, Revised Edition, 1948) pp. 121-127.

2. Wilhelm Wundt, 1832-1920. Head of the Leipzig Laboratory, and one of the founding fathers of modern psychology.

3. Kurt Goldstein, Human Nature in the Light of Psychopathology. (Cambridge:Harvard University Press, 1940) p. 6

4. ibid p.10

5. ibid p. 53

6. ibid p. 51

7. ibid p. 59

8. ibid p. 140

9. ibid p. 141

10. ibid p. 183

11. ibid p. 112

12. ibid p. 113

13. ibid p. 112

14. ibid p. 213.

15. ibid p. 214

16. ibid p. 214

17. ibid p. 258

18. From Gardiner Murphy's preface to Self-Consistency, by Prescott Lecky, (Island Press, New York, 1951) p. 151.

19. Lecky, op. cit p. 151

20. ibid p. 153

21. ibid p. 181

22. ibid p. 155

23. ibid p. 155

24. ibid p. 184

25. ibid p. 184

26. ibid p. 223

27. A. H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality. (Harper Bros. New York, 1954). p. 35.

28. ibid p. 343

29. ibid pp. 340-341

30. ibid p. 156

31. ibid p. 346

32. ibid p. 244

33. ibid p. 246

34. ibid p. 248

35. ibid p. 266.

36. Emmanuel Mournier, Personalism- Translated by Philip Mairet, (Routledge and Paul, 1950) pp. 4-6

37. Maslow op. cit p. 349

38. ibid pp. 151-152

39. Allport, op. cit p. 67

40. See Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture, (Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1934)

41. Joseph Nuttin, Psychoanalysis and Personality, (Sheed and Ward, 1954) p. 184

42. Gordon W. Allport, Personality, (Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1937). footnote on p. 185.

43. S. Freud, The Problem of Anxiety, (Norton, New York, 1927) p. 82.

CHAPTER III

1. C. R. Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy, (Houghton Mifflin Company, 1951) p. 487

2. C. R. Rogers, Article in Pastoral Psychology, May, 1960, 'The Nature of Man', p. 25.

3. Donald Snygg and Arthur W. Combs, Individual Behaviour, (Harper Bros. New York, 1948) Chapter II.

4. Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy, p. 483

5. ibid p. 487

6. ibid p. 498

7. ibid p. 507

8. ibid p. 507

9. ibid p. 517

10. ibid p. 583

11. ibid pp. 3-4

12. C. R. Rogers, "Some observations on the Organization of Personality"; The American Psychologist, 1947, II, p. 363.

13. See Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy. p. 600. "The whole theory of life . . . . is self-refuting, in the sense that its adoption in practice leads to the realization of something utterly different: a dictatorial State in which the individual is severely repressed."

14. Allport - Becoming - p. 83

15. C. R. Rogers - Significant Aspects of Client-centered Therapy. (The American Psychologist, 1946, I. p. 422)

16. R. Schafer, I. Berg, and B. McCandless. Report on survey of current psychological testing practices. Supplement to Newsletter. Division of Clinical and Abnormal Psychology. American Psychological Association, 1951, 4, No. 5.

17. G. W. Allport, Personality, p. 48

18. ibid p. 48

19. ibid p. 48

20. ibid p. 190

21. G. W. Allport, The Nature of Personality: Selected Papers (Addison-Wesley, Cambridge, Mass. 1950) "Reply to Mr. Bertocci" p. 545.

22. Becoming, p. 28

23. ibid p. 64

24. ibid p. 45

25. ibid p. 67

26. ibid p. 61

27. ibid p. 76

28. ibid p. 73

29. The Nature of Personality op. cit p. 189

30. Op. cit Preface p. vii

31. Personality, Op. cit p. 217

32. ibid p. 221

33. ibid p. 223

34. Becoming p. 79

35. ibid p. 95

CHAPTER IV

1. S. Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, (W.W.Norton & Co., 1933) pp. 132-133

2. ibid p. 135

3. Freud, An Outline of Psychoanalysis, (W.W. Norton & Co., New York, 1941) p. 29.

4. See "Selected Papers on Psychoanalysis" (Hogarth Press, London, 1927).

5. Freud, New Introductory Lectures, pp. 103-105

6. ibid p. 106

7. ibid pp. 94-95

8. Abraham, op. cit p. 407

9. Ernest Jones, "The Concept of the Normal Mind" (The International Journal of Psychoanalysis,Volume XXIII, Part 1.)

10. Jones, op. cit.

11. J. C. Flugel, Man, Morals, and Society. (Duckworth, London, 1944) p. 240.

12. ibid. p. 241

13. ibid. Chapter XVI

14. See Franz Alexander and Thomas French: Psychoanalytic Therapy. (Ronald, New York, 1946., Chapter 8)

15. Franz Alexander, M. D., Emotional Maturity. (Mental Hygiene Bulletin, Illinois Society for Mental Hygiene, 1948, No. 26) pp.1-4

16. Op. cit.

17. Op. cit.

18. C. G. Jung, Modern Man in Search of a Soul,(Harcourt, New York, 1933). p. 215.

19. C. G. Jung, Two Essays on Analytical Psychology. (Volume 7 of 'Collected Works': Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1953) p. 188

20. ibid. p. 114

21. See Essays: The Relation of the Ego to the Unconscious, Essay 11.

22. Op. cit. p. 245

23. C. G. Jung, The Psychology of the Unconscious, (Translated by B. M. Hinckle: Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1944) p. 215

24. C. G. Jung, The Practice of Psychotherapy. Volume XVI, of Collected Works, para 109 and 110.

25. C. G. Jung, The Integration of Personality, (Farrar and Rinehart, New York, 1939) p. 286

26. ibid. p. 289

27. Freud, Group Psychology And The Analysis of The Ego. (The International Psycho-Analytic Library. Edited by Ernest Jones, M. D. Translated by James Strachey: Liveright Publishing Corporation, New York, 1951) pp 81-88

28. Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents. (Hogarth Press, London, 1930) pp. 80-87

29. ibid. p. 69

30. Freud, Totem and Taboo. The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud. (Translated and Edited by A. A. Brill, The Modern Library, New York) p. 807

31. Civilization, p. 33

32. Paul Tillich, Existentialism, Psychotherapy, and The Nature of Man. An address delivered at the Conference on Existential Psychotherapy in New York City on February 27th, 1960. (Published in "Existential Inquiries" and reprinted in Pastoral Psychology, June, 1960) pp. 11-18. p. 14

33. Freud, The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, in The Basic Writings. p. 162

34. Freud, The Ego and The Id (Howgarth Press, London, 1927) p. 72- footnote.
Note - Where id was, there let ego be - New Introductory Lectures, p. 112.

35. Kurt Goldstein, The Organism, (American Book Co., New York,)p. 323.

36. Ernst Cassiver, An Essay on Man, (Yale University Press, 1944) p. 21

37. See - Existence; A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology. (Edited by Rollo May, Ernest Angel, and Henri F. Ellenberger. Basic Gooks Inc., New York, 1958)

38. Op. cit. p. 91

39. S. Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death. (Translated by Walter Lowrie, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1951) p. 46.

40. Existence, p. 70

41. William Temple, Nature, Man and God. (MacMillan & Co. Ltd., London, 1956) p. 229

42. Karl Jaspers, Way to Wisdom. An Introduction to Philosophy. (Translated by Ralph Manheim. Victor Gollanoz Ltd. London, 1951) p. 63

CHAPTER V

1. A. Adler, Individual Psychology. In Psychologies of 1930 (Edited by C. Murchison. Clark University Press, Worcester, Mass. 1930) pp. 395-405. p. 398.

   We quote profusely in this section from an anthology of Adler's writings edited by H. L. & Rowena R. Ansbacher, and entitled 'The Individual-Psychology of Alfred Adler'. (Basic Books, New York, 1956). Adler was a notoriously unsystematic writer. Consequently he is frequently misrepresented. But there seems to be little excuse for Outler's misrepresentation in his 'Psychotherapy and The Christian Message' pp. 111-113 and p. 153. "Adler believed that the will to power was the basic force in human behaviour. Interpersonal relations are inherently competitive." Outler bases his evaluation of Adler on one book - one of his earliest - 'A Study of Organ-Inferiority and Its Psychical Compensation' published in English in 1917, but written in 1912. Our quotations are chosen to illustrate the thinking of the later Adler.

2. Ansbacher, op. cit. 117

3. ibid. p. 135

4. ibid. p. 462

4a. ibid. p. 117.

5. Personal message on the back of a photograph opposite the title page of the Ansbachers' anthology.

6. Ansbacher, op. cit. p. 156

7. Harry Stack Sullivan, 'Socio-Psychiatric Research; its implications for the schizophrenia problem and for mental hygiene' (American Journal of Psychiatry, 10) pp. 977-991

8. Karen Horney, NewWays in Psychoanalysis (W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 1939). p. 8.

9. ibid. p. 18

10. Karen Horney, Neurosis and Human Growth (Norton, 1950) p. 15

11. ibid. p. 15

12. Horney, Our Innter Conflicts (Norton, 1945) p. 41

13. See - The Neurotic Personality of Our Time (Norton, 1937).

14. Our Inner Conflicts. op. cit. pp. 241-242

15. Harry Stack Sullivan, The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry. op. cit. pp. 110-111.

16. ibid. p. 163

17. ibid. p. 104

18. ibid. p. 161

19. ibid. p. 165

20. ibid. p. 169

21. ibid. p. 169

22. ibid. p. 29

23. ibid. p. 30

24. ibid. p. 243

25. ibid. p. 297

26. ibid. p. 34

27. ibid. p. 310

28. ibid. p. 309

29. ibid. p. 310

30. ibid. p. 310

31. Eric Fromm, Psychoanalysis and Religion (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1950) p. 76

32. ibid. p. 53

33. Eric Fromm, Man for Himself (Rinehart, New York, 1947)pp. 41-42

34. ibid. p. 45

35. ibid. pp. 44-45

36. ibid. p. 45

37. Eric Fromm, The Sane Society (Rinehart, New York, 1955) p. 23

38. ibid. p. 36

39. ibid. p. 63

40. ibid. p. 275

41. ibid. p. 31

42. Man for Himself, p. 159

43. Winston Churchill, The World Crisis, (Charles Scribner's & Sons, New York, 1931) p. 4

44. Helvetius (1715-1771)

45. Condorcet (1743-1794)

46. Nicolas Berdyaev, Slavery and Freedom (Charles Scribner's & Sons, New York, 1944) p. 190

47. William Temple. op. cit. p. 230

48. ibid. p. 219

49. See Temple's Lecture. 'Process, Mind and Value' in Nature, Man and God.

50. Psychoanalysis and Religion p. 7

51. ibid. p. 94

52. ibid. pp. 94-95

53. ibid. p. 93

54. Romans VII, vv. 18-19

CHAPTER VI

1. Genesis I. vv 26-31 Psalm 8. vv 4-8

2. Genesis, Chapters 1-3

3. Genesis 2, v. 25

4. Psalm 49, v 12 and v. 20

5. Genesis 3, v. 4

6. Cf..Bicknell , A Theological Introduction to the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England. (Longman, Green & Co., London, Second Edition. March 1947) pp. 221-253

7. Genesis 3, v. 10

8. Cf. An Existentialist Theology by John Macquarrie. (S.C.M Press, London, 1955) pp. 110-111, para. 14.

9. Nicolas Berdyaev, The Destiny of Man (Geoffrey Bles, London, 1937) p. 37

10. Karl Jaspers, Way to Wisdom p. 66

11. Paul Tillich, Existentialism, Psychotherapy, and the Nature of Man, pp. 14-15

12. Paul Tillich, The Courage To Be (Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn. 1952) p. 66

13. ibid. pp. 35 & 36

14. ibid. p. 173

15. Romans 7, vv. 18, 19.

16. St. John 1, v. 18

17. St. John 14, v. 9

18. Mt. 6, v. 26; 12, v. 12.

19. 1 Cor. 11, v. 7

20. Col. 1, v. 15

21. Hebrews 1, v. 3

22. St. John 1, v. 14

23. Hebrews 4, v. 15

24. Hebrews 2, v. 18

25. Romans 6, vv.9-11

26. Philip 2, v.8

27. Romans 6, v.4

28. Col.3, v.3

29. Romans 8, vv.9-11

30. Galatians 3, v. 28

31. Romans 8, vv. 9-11

32. 1 Cor. 2, v. 11; 2 Cor. 7, v. 15; 2 Cor. 2, v. 13

33. Romans 8, v. 13

34. 2 Cor. 5, v. 16; Rom. 6 v. 9; 1 Cor. 1, v. 26

35. 1 Cor. 1, v. 13

36. Romans 13, v. 14

37. Philip 2, v. 13

38. 2. Cor. 3, v. 18

39. John Burnaby, Amor Die (Bles, London, 1938) p. 20

40. Galations 5, v. 22

41. Romans 5, v. 5 . . . . "because God's love has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit which has been given us."

42. Symposium, 1800 f

43. Burnaby, op. cit. p. 18

44. St. John 3, v. 16

45. C. H. Dodd, The Meaning of Paul for Today (Fontana Books, Collins, London, 1958) See Chapter 9.

46. 2. Cor. 7, v. 10

47. "Take, then, this rule and method in all the falls you shall make be they great or small; yea though ten thousand times in the same day, you shall have incurred the same crime". De Caussade On Prayer, (Burns, Oates & Washbourne, London, 1949) footnote, p. 173 NWhen the subject is within ourselves, one of the best exercises of meekness we can perform is never to fret at our own imperfections." St. Francis De Sales - Introduction to the Devout Life,(Image Books, Doubleday, Garden City, New York) p. 145

48. Paul Tillich - Existentialism, etc. op. cit. p. 13

49. Philip 4, v. 8

50. Hebrews 1, v. 2

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abraham, K. Selected Papers, Hogarth Press, London, 1925

Adler, A. Individual Psychology in Psychologies of 1930, Clark University Press, Worcester, Mass.

Alexander Franz, Psychoanalysis and the Total Personality

Alexander F., and French, T. R., Psychoanalytic Therapy. Ronald Press New York, 1946

Allport, G. W., Personality: A psychological interpretation, Henry Holt, New York, 1937
The Nature of Personality, Selected Papers, Addison-Wesley, 1950
Becoming: Basic considerations for a psychology of personality. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1955

Ansbacher, H. L. and R. R., The Individual-Psychology of Alfred Adler, Basic Books, New York, 1956

Bailey, Derrick S., The Mystery of Love and Marriage, S. C. M. Press, London, 1958

Benedict, R., Patterns of Culture, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1934

Berdyaev, N., Slavery and Freedom. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1931.

Bicknell, E. J., A Theological Introduction to the Thirty-nine Articles of The Church of England. Longman Green & Co., London, 1947.

Burnaby, John, Amor Dei. Bles, London, 1938

Calhoun, R. L. What is Man? Hazen Books on Religion. Association Press, New York, 1939

Cannon, W. B., The Wisdom of the Body, Norton: revised edition, 1939

Cassirer, Ernest, An Essay on Man. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1944

Cave, S., The Christian Estimate of Man. Duckworth, London, 1944

Cox, D., Jung and St. Paul. Association Press, New York, 1959

De Caussade, On Prayer, Burns, Oates and Washbourne, London, 1949

De Sales, St. Francois, Introduction to the Devout Life. Image Books, Doubleday, Garden City, New York.

Dewar, L., The Holy Spirit and Modern Thought. A. R. Mowbray & Co., London, 1959.

Dix, Gregory, The Image and Likeness of God. Morehouse-Goreham, New York, 1954

Dodd, C. H., The Meaning of Paul for Today. Fontana Books, Collins, London, 1958

Dollard, J. and Millar D., Personality and Psychotherapy. McGraw-Hill, New York, 1950

Farrer, A., The Freedom of the Will. Gifford Lectures: Adam and Charles Black, London, 1957

Flügel, J. C., Man, Morals, and Society. Hogarth Press, London

Freud, S., An Outline of Psychoanalysis, Norton, New York, 1940
New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, Norton, New York, 1933
A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis. Garden City, New York, 1943
The Psychopathology of Everyday Life in The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud. Random House, New York, 1938
Selected Papers on Psychoanalysis. Hogarth, London, 1927
Three Essays on Sexuality in Basic Writings.
Totem and Taboo, in Basic Writings
The Problem of Anxiety, Norton, New York, 1927
The Ego and The Id. Hogarth Press, London, 1928
Civilization and Its Discontents. Hogarth Press, 1930
Group Psychology and the Analysis of The Ego. Liveright Publishing Corp., New York, 1951

Fromm, E., Escape from Freedom. Rinehart, New York, 1941
Man for Himself. Rinehart, New York, 1947
The Sane Society. Rinehart, New York, 1950
Psychoanalysis and Religion. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1950

Frost, Bede, The Art of Mental Prayer. Philip Allan, London, 1934

Goldstein, K. Human Nature in the Light of Psychopathology. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1940
The Organism. American Book Co., New York, 1939

Hall, C. S. & Lindzey, G., Theories of Personality. John Wiley & Sons Inc., New York, 1957

Horney, K., Neurotic Personality of Our Time, Norton, New York, 1937
New Ways in Psychoanalysis, Norton, New York, 1939
Self-Analysis, Norton, New York, 1942
Our Inner Conflicts, Norton, New York, 1945
Neurosis and Human Growth, Norton, N w York, 1950

Hull, C. L., A Behaviour System. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1952

Jaspers, Karl, Way to Wisdom. Translated by Ralph Manheim. Victor Gollanz, London, 1951
The Perennial Scope of Philosophy. Translated by Ralph Manheim, Philosophical Library, New York

Jung, C. G., Two Essays on Analytical Psychology. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1953
The Practice of Psychotherapy. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1954
The Integration of Personality. Farrer and Rinehart, New York, 1939.
Psychology of the Unconscious, Dodd, New York, 1925
Modern Man in Search of a Soul. Harcourt Press, New York, 1933

Kegley, C. W. & Bretall, R. W., The Theology of Paul Tillich. The MacMillan Co., New York, 1952

Kierkegaard, S., The Sickness unto Death. Translated by Walter Lowrie, Princeton, 1951

Lampe, G. W. H., etal. The Doctrine of Justification by Faith. Mowbrays., London, 1954

Lecky, Prescott, Self-Consistency. Island Press, New York, 1951

Locke, John, Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Open Court Co., Chicago, Second Edition, 1912

Louttit, C. M., Clinical Psychology of Children's Behaviour. Harper Bros., 1947

MacQuarrie, John, An Existentialist Theology. The Library of Philosophy and Theology, S. C. M. Press, 1955

Manson, T. W., The Teaching of Jesus. Cambridge University Press, 1931

Mascall, E. L., The Importance of Being Human. Columbia University Press, New York, 1958

Maslow, A. H., Motivation and Personality. Harper Bros., New York, 1954

May, R., Angel, E., Ellenberger, H., Existence; A new dimension in 'Psychiatry and Psychology'. Basic Books Inc., New York, 1958

Morgan, Clifford, T. and Stellar, E., Physiological Psychology. McGraw-Hill, New York, Second Edition, 1950

Mournier, E., Personalism. Routledge and Paul, 1950

Neil, S., A Genuinely Human Existence. Doubleday, Garden City, New York, 1959

New Testament - Revised Standard Version

Nuttin, J., Psychoanalysis and Personality. Sheed and Ward, London, 1954

Old Testament - Revised Version

Overstreet, H. A., The Mature Mind. Norton, New York, 1953

Owen, D. R. G., Scientism, Man, and Religion. The Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1952

Ramsey, Paul, Basic Christian Ethics. S. C. M. Press, London, 1953

Reinhold, Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. One Volume edition. 1949

Roberts, D. E., Psychotherapy and a Christian View of Man. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1950

Rogers, C. R., Client-Centered Therapy, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1951
Counseling and Psychotherapy. Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1944

Russell, B., A History of Western Philosophy. Simon and Schuster, New York, 1945

Shaffer, L. F., The Psychology of Adjustment. Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1936

Snygg, D., and Combs, A. W., Individual Behaviour. Harper Bros., New York, 1949

Sullivan, H. S., The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry. Edited by H. S. Perry and M. L. Gawel. Norton, New York, 1953

Symonds, P. M., The Dynamics of Human Adjustment. Appleton Century, New York, 1949

Temple, W., Nature,Man and God. Gifford Lectures, 1932-33 and 1933-34. MacMillan Company Ltd., London, 1956

Thorpe, L. P., The Psychology of Mental Health., The Ronald Press, New York, 1950

Tillich, Paul, The Courage to Be. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1952

Tolman, E. C., Drives Towards War. Appleton-Century, New York, 1942
Purposive Behaviour in Animals and Men. Appleton-Century, New York, 1932

Trotter, W., Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War. The MacMillan Co., New York, Second Edition, 1919

Williams, N. P., The Ideas of The Fall and of Original Sin. Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1927

Woodworth, R. S., Contemporary Schools of Psychology. Ronald Press, New York, Second Edition, 1931

Reference Books:

A Theological Word Book of the Bible. Edited by Alan Richardson, S. C. M. Press, London, 1950

Manual Greek Lexicon of the New Testament. G. Abbott-Smith Third Edition, 1948. T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh

Periodicals:

Pastoral Psychology, May, 1960. Article by Rogers on 'Human Nature'.
Pastoral Psychology, June, 1960. Paul Tillich on 'Existentialism Psychotherapy and the Nature of Man'
Supplement to Newsletter, Division of Clinical and Abnormal Psychology, American Psychological Association, 1951. No.5.
The American Journal of Psychiatry, 1931, 10
Article by Harry Stack Sullivan. 'Socio-Psychiatric Research, its implications for the schizophrenia problem and for mental hygiene'.
The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, Volume xxiii, part 1.
Article by Ernest Jones on 'The Concept of the Normal Mind'.
Mental Hygiene Bulletin. Illinois Society for Mental Hygiene, 1948, No. 26. Article by Franz Alexander on 'Emotional Maturity'
The American Psychologist, 1946, 1. Article by C. R. Rogers, 'Significant Aspects of Client-centered Therapy'
The American Psychologist. 1947, 11. Article by C. R. Rogers, 'Some Observations on the Organization of Personality'.