The Colonial Origins of Ethnic Warfare?

Re-examining the Impact of Communalizing Colonial Policies in the British and French Empires

Abstract: The literature on colonialism and ethnic violence claims that communalizing colonial policies (CCPs) affected ethnic violence, that the British used these policies more than the French, and that ethnic violence therefore varied by the identity of the colonizer. Yet these claims are based on scant empirical evidence and ignore whether different types of CCPs have different effects. To address these limitations, we present a new typological theory on CCPs, gather data on four different CCPs for British and French colonies, and test the relationships between different CCPs and ethnic civil warfare onset. We find that discriminatory CCPs are associated with an increased odds of ethnic civil war onset, that differentiating and accommodating CCPs have no general effect, and that empowering CCPs either have no effect or decrease the odds of ethnic civil war onset. Although discriminatory CCPs are concentrated in British colonies, we offer evidence that ethnic warfare is not more common in former British and French colonies because former British colonies without discriminatory CCPs have particularly low odds of ethnic civil war onset.

Key Words: Colonialism, Ethnic Violence, Communalizing Colonial Policies

Colonialism is almost universally recognized as massively transformative, and social scientists began to pay attention to its legacies even before the age of imperialism had ended. The earliest analyses transferred colonial competition to new academic arenas and explored which colonizer left the best legacy, with most comparing the British and the French Empires. This long-standing literature notes the British penchant for indirect rule and the French preference for direct rule and also describes how the British made a greater effort to maintain indigenous cultures and institutions whereas the French pursued assimilation (Crowder, 1968; Gann and Duignan, 1967; Lugard, 1936; Wieschhoff, 1944). Diverse works within this literature, in turn, note that the different forms of British and French rule affected a variety of social outcomes. Among these, several analyses consider whether the different forms of rule promoted contrasting patterns of ethnic violence and usually find that the French left the more desirable legacy, with ethnic violence being more common in former British colonies (Abernethy, 2000; Blanton, Mason, and Athow, 2001; Lange and Dawson, 2009).

From the very beginning, however, claims of broad inter-imperial differences have been questioned. Some recognize that both the British and the French combined direct and indirect rule (Betts, 1961; Fieldhouse, 1981; Kiwanuka, 1970; Lange, 2009; Mamdani, 1996). Others note that precolonial institutions, geography, and discourses affected the form of colonial rule as much as or even more than the identity of the colonizer (Boone, 1995; Charrad, 2001; Gerring et al., 2011; Lange, Mahoney, and Vom Hau, 2006; Steinmetz, 2007). These critiques have strengthened in recent years, with social scientists commonly downplaying claims of inter-imperial differences as exaggerated and imprecise and focusing on intra-imperial variation.

More specific empirical and theoretical shortcomings also affect the literature on colonialism and ethnic violence. Empirically, past analyses focus on communalizing colonial

policies (CCPs) that recognize and institutionalize communal divisions among the colonized population. They claim that the British employed CCPs much more frequently than the French, propose that this difference promoted contrasting long-term risks of ethnic violence, but simply use the identity of the colonizer as a proxy for CCPs, thereby failing to actually measure the policies that are supposedly implicated in the violence and ignoring any intra-imperial variation. More theoretically, past analyses either focus exclusively on one particular CCP or make general claims about CCPs, thereby ignoring whether different types of CCPs have different effects. Yet because many different types of CCPs existed and affected social relations in different ways, it is possible that CCPs had diverse effects on ethnic violence.

In this article, we return to the question of whether British and French colonialism had different effects on ethnic violence and address both of these shortcomings by creating a new dataset that includes indicators of several different CCPs. For insight into past claims, we test whether CCPs were more common in the British Empire, analyze whether the odds of ethnic civil war onset varies by empire, and explore whether CCPs are related to the odds of ethnic civil war onset among between 1946 and 2010. At the same time, we redirect the literature by exploring whether the impact of CCPs depended on the type of CCP. We recognize that CCPs commonly did different combinations of four things—they recognized communal difference, accommodated communal interests, discriminated based on community, and empowered communities. We hypothesize that CCPs promoted relatively high risks of ethnic civil warfare when they were highly discriminatory, especially when they affected the power and autonomy of communities. Alternatively, when they recognized communal difference, empowered communities, or accommodated communities in non-discriminatory ways, we expect that CCPs

had little effect on the risk of ethnic civil warfare. With a measure of each type of CCP, we test our hypotheses by exploring how different CCPs affect the odds of ethnic civil war onset.

Literature Review: Communalizing Colonial Policy and Ethnic Violence

A communalizing colonial policy, or CCP, is any policy implemented in a formal colony that explicitly recognizes the presence of multiple colonized communities in ways that strengthen inter-communal boundaries. In recognizing communities and providing them with some degree of self-rule, for example, indirect rule commonly strengthens self-identification with community, thereby making it a CCP. While very different, colonial censuses that enumerate communal membership are also CCPs, as they formally recognize and differentiate between colonized communities. Other notable examples include language policies that recognized a variety of indigenous languages and policies that give preferential treatment to certain communities in key colonial institutions, such as the military or legislature.

The literature on colonialism pays great attention to these policies and argues that they shaped inter-communal relations in important and enduring ways. The earliest analyses equate CCPs with "divide and rule" and argue that they increased inter-communal antipathy and hostilities by pitting communities against one another (Abernethy, 2000; Horowitz, 1985; Idris, 2005; Lange and Dawson, 2009; Mamdani, 2001; Morrock, 1973; Newbury, 1983; Pollis, 1973; Weber, Hiers, Flesken, 2016). These works note that communities hurt by CCPs resented the communities that benefitted from them, viewing the beneficiaries as stooges who received unfair advantages from an illegitimate colonial master. At the same time, communities benefiting from CCPs expected to retain their privileged status and mobilized to protect their interests. And the co-presence of one community that was angry and resentful over colonial favoritism and another that assertively protected its advantages created a high risk of violence.

Other analyses draw on the work of Tajfel (1970, 1974) and suggest that CCPs promoted ethnic violence even when they were not overtly discriminatory. These works describe how colonial powers created ethnographic states that divided colonized peoples into social categories in order to make them legible and, thereby, controllable (Cohn, 1987; Dirks, 2001; King, 1999; Mamdani, 2012; Wyrtzen, 2015). According to this view, these policies promoted community-based cognitive frameworks, which, in turn, contributed to inter-communal discrimination, competition, and violence (Cohn, 1987; Lieberman and Singh, 2012). Supplementing this view, some suggest that communalized cognitive frameworks were most likely to promote ethnic violence when communities possessed organizations and resources—such as those provided by indirect rule—that could mobilize and sustain broad-based violence, noting, in turn, that CCPs commonly created a variety of community-based mobilizational resources (Blanton et al., 2001).

Most qualitative analyses of CCPs focus on British colonies (Christopher, 1988; Idris, 2005; Lange, 2017; Mamdani, 2009; Pollis, 1973; de Silva, 1986; Tambiah, 1986). This is not by coincidence, as several analyses recognize that the British Empire was exceptional in the extent to which it recognized and institutionalized communal difference among colonial subjects. In fact, past statistical analyses use British colonialism as a proxy for CCPs and test claims about CCPs by exploring whether ethnic violence was more common in former British colonies (Lange and Dawson, 2009; Blanton et al., 2001; Wucherpfennig, Hunziker, and Cederman, 2016). Most analyses find that British colonialism increased the risk of ethnic violence relative to French colonies and claim that CCPs explain this difference (Abernethy, 2000; Lange and Dawson, 2009; Blanton et al., 2001). Wucherpfennig et al. (2016) is an exception, however, arguing that British colonialism facilitated inter-communal power-sharing more than the French by recognizing and empowering diverse communities. To date, however, no analysis of British and

French colonialism has measured CCPs to test whether CCPs are related to ethnic violence or whether they account for inter- and intra-imperial variation in ethnic violence.

Theoretical Framework: The Type of CCP and Ethnic Violence

In addition to these important empirical shortcomings, existing theories about CCPs are overly general and underdeveloped. Past claims that CCPs promote ethnic violence largely ignore whether different types of CCPs have different effects and either overlook that there were several types of CCPs or lump all CCPs together. We note that CCPs were used for different purposes and recognize four different types of CCPs: differentiating, empowering, accommodating, and discriminating CCPs. We argue, in turn, that the impact of CCPs depend on the type, with only discriminatory CCPs having general effects on ethnic violence.

All CCPs recognize communal difference, and differentiating CCPs do little else than document the presence of multiple communities. One example is colonial censuses, which commonly recognize the existence of different communities but have little direct, clear or systematic effects on empowerment, accommodation, or discrimination. Within the social scientific literature, there are competing views on the impact of communal recognition on ethnic violence, suggesting that differentiating CCPs might either promote or deter ethnic violence. According to Tajfel (1974), the simple act of group differentiation promotes discrimination, prejudice, and competition. He therefore suggests that recognizing difference promotes inter-communal violence. Several scholars of inclusive nationalism take an opposing view. They note that the recognition and institutionalization of communal difference in communally divided societies helps to contain inter-communal competition and antagonisms by preventing one-sided assimilationist policies and symbolically recognizing all communities as members of the nation (Kymlicka, 1995; McEvoy and O'Leary, 2013; Stepan, Linz, and Yadav, 2011). This view

therefore suggests that differentiating CCPs limit the risk of ethnic violence. We believe that both sides of this debate make convincing arguments that are possible under different circumstances, arguing that the differentiating CCPs have the potential to either promote or deter ethnic violence and hypothesizing that differentiating CCPs have little or no general effect on ethnic violence.

Similar to differentiating CCPs, we propose that empowering CCPs—that is, CCPs that both differentiate between *and* empower communities—have little or no general effect on ethnic violence because they promote opposing mechanisms. Some claim that communal empowerment communalizes politics, contributes to Tajfelian mechanisms, and provides communities with the mobilizational resources needed to act on grievances violence (Blanton et al., 2001; Lange, 2017). In sharp contrast, others argue that CCPs that empower communities deter ethnic violence by promoting inclusive power-sharing arrangements (Wucherpfennig et al., 2016). According to this view, communal empowerment strengthens the bargaining power of communities vis-à-vis the state, thereby forcing states to share power with diverse communities.

Accommodating CCPs recognize communal difference in order to provide communities with public goods and services that accommodate communal cultural practices. Two examples include the use of pluralist legal systems that apply different systems of family law to different communities and the provisioning of education in vernacular languages. Similar to differentiating and empowering CCPs, we argue that accommodating CCPs have little or no general effect on ethnic violence: Communal accommodation can either limit ethnic violence by promoting mutual respect and inclusive politics or institutionalize divisions in ways that increase competition and antipathy.

Finally, discriminatory CCPs privilege particular communities more than—and commonly at the expense of—other communities. Common examples of discriminatory CCPs include providing select communities with special legislative representation and stacking the colonial military with particular communities. In contrast to differentiating, empowering, and accommodating CCPs, we hypothesize that highly discriminatory CCPs have strong and positive effects on ethnic violence. Communities that suffer from discrimination resent those who benefit from it. This is especially the case in a colonial setting, as those who face discrimination view the beneficiaries as colonial stooges. At the same time, communities benefiting from discriminatory policies expect to retain their privileged status and mobilize to protect their interests after independence. And the co-presence of one community that is angry and resentful over colonial favoritism and another that is scared and mobilizes to maintain the advantages it gained during colonialism hinders communally inclusive power-sharing arrangements while creating strong grievances and intense competition, all of which promotes ethnic violence.

While all types of discrimination can promote ethnic violence, CCPs that differentially affect the power and autonomy of communities likely have the strongest impact. As the literature on ethnic civil warfare notes, political discrimination creates extremely powerful grievances, as communities are concerned about their power and autonomy and the place of their community in the nation-state. Such grievances, in turn, commonly push communities to either try to take over the state or to secede, both of which result in ethnic civil warfare (Wimmer, 2013). Alternatively, economic and social inequalities, while still a source of grievances, rarely mobilize efforts to take over the state or secede.

Our claims about discriminatory CCPs have implications on our hypothesis about other types of CCPs. For example, CCPs that empower communities need not do so equally, and we

expect that CCPs that formally empower communities to different extents have positive effects on ethnic violence. Similarly, CCPs that accommodate the cultural practices of some communities but not others likely create anger, resentment, and competition that can contribute to ethnic violence when unequal accommodation empowers some communities more than others, with the recognition of only one vernacular as an official language being an example.

Based on this discussion, we make the following four hypotheses:

H_1: Politically discriminatory CCPs increase the long-term risk of ethnic civil warfare.

H_2: CCPs that primarily differentiate between colonized communities have little or no general effect on ethnic violence.

H_3: CCPs that both differentiate and empower have little or no general effect on ethnic violence.

H_4: CCPs that both differentiate and accommodate have little or no general effect on ethnic violence.

Measuring CCPs

In order to test our hypotheses, we measure four different CCPs, one for each type of CCP. These CCPs include communal census categories (differentiating), indirect rule (empowering), educational language policies (accommodating), and special communal legislative representation (discriminatory). Because we engage with past works that compare former British and French colonies, we gather data on these CCPs for both British and French colonies, although we only have data on indirect rule for British colonies.

Colonial censuses are a common means of recognizing and institutionalizing communal differences, and we measure the extent to which colonial censuses recognized diverse types of

communities as an indicator of the extent to which a differentiating CCP was employed. Although clearly having the ability to empower some communities more than others, we believe that colonial censuses were rarely used in a way that systematically discriminated against communities. Based on our theoretical framework, we therefore expect that the collection of communal census categories had little or no general effect on ethnic civil warfare. For this variable, we use data from Lieberman and Singh (2017) measuring whether censuses gathered information on caste, linguistic, racial, religious, and tribal categories and calculate the largest number of types of categories ever collected in a colonial census. Scores range from 0 (no types of communal categories collected) to 5 (caste, ethnic, racial, religious, and tribal categories all collected). Countries that never had a colonial census are scored as 0.[1]

Because the provisioning of education in vernaculars is a clear example of accommodating cultural practices, we use measures of linguistic policies for colonial primary education as an indicator of an accommodating CCP. For this, we create a variable with the following three categories: No indigenous language used in colonial primary education, only one indigenous language used in colonial primary education, and multiple indigenous languages used in colonial primary education. To the extent that these policies were not discriminatory, we hypothesize that the type of linguistic policy had little or no effect on postcolonial ethnic violence. For this variable, we used data from Albaugh (2014) for British and French colonies in sub-Saharan Africa (as well as Algeria), and gathered scores for all other British and French colonies from primary and secondary sources.

Indirect rule is a clear example of an empowering CCP, as it provides communities with a high degree of self-rule. Although many recognize that the French also employed indirect rule,

[1] For the statistical analysis in the next section, we score this variable as continuous.

the French form of indirect rule focused on using indigenous intermediaries locally and did not attempt to empower communities by providing them with the control of "traditional" institutions (Collier, 1982; Crowder, 1968; Firmin-Sellers, 2000; Miles, 1994; Müller-Crepon, forthcoming). We therefore only measure the extent of indirect rule for British colonies. For this indicator, we use data from Lange (2009) measuring the proportion of the total colonial court cases heard in customary courts presided over by "traditional" authorities, with customary courts being a clear sign of communal self-rule. The variable ranges from 0 to 1.[2]

Communal legislative representation is a highly discriminatory CCP giving select communities special political representation, and we create a variable measuring whether colony-level legislatures reserved seats for select communities. Communal legislative representation is, in turn, an important form of empowerment, as legislative representation affects a community's ability to pursue communal interests and is a symbol of special communal status. Based on our theory, this form of discrimination therefore has the potential to contribute to powerful grievances and intense political competition over the control of the state and the form of the nation-state, and we hypothesize that it increases the risk of postcolonial ethnic violence. For this variable, we gather information from primary and secondary sources, and the variable is dichotomous, with 1 measuring the presence of communal legislative institutions and 0 denoting their absence. Because of our interest in indigenous divisions, we score cases as zero if legislatures only gave special representation to non-indigenous peoples.[3]

[2] Data from Lange (2009) are not available for the three British Mandate Territories in the Middle East (Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Jordan).

[3] Because a Chinese community was present in the Malay Peninsula prior to British colonialism, we categorize them as an indigenous community and therefore score Malaysia as 1 for this variable (given reserved seats for the Chinese community).

The literature on colonialism and ethnic violence assumes that the British employed CCPs much more than the French, although we are unaware of any analysis that actually tests this claim. To provide insight into this assumption, Table 1 compares the average scores of these four CCPs by colonizer for all British and French colonies with more than one million people, with data only available on the extent of indirect rule for British colonies.[4] Although showing considerable intra-imperial variation, the data highlight clear inter-imperial patterns, with the British being much more likely to employ CCPs. The British collected two and one-half times as many types of communal categories on colonial censuses, were two and one-half times more likely to have communal legislative representation, and were 13-times more likely to provide primary education in multiple vernaculars. The evidence therefore supports past claims that CCPs were more common in the British Empire than the French Empire. It remains to be seen, however, whether CCPs affected ethnic violence, an issue we now explore.

CCPs and Ethnic Civil War Onset

In this section, we analyze relationships between CCPs and the prevalence of postcolonial ethnic violence, thereby offering insight into both past claims and our hypotheses. Our set includes all formal British and French overseas colonies that have more than one million inhabitants. The exclusion of countries with very small populations follows past statistical analyses of ethnic violence, which remove micro-countries from analysis either because of missing data or over concerns about causal heterogeneity. And because we define colonialism as formal imperial control of domestic and foreign policies in overseas territories, we exclude

[4] See the following section for a full description of the cases and case selection. Notably, the inter-imperial differences for all three variables are considerably larger when limiting the set to colonies that received their independences after 1945.

informal colonies, internal colonies, and protectorates in which the imperial power simply controlled foreign relations. When a colony was simultaneously controlled by multiple powers, we recognize the colonizer as the colonial power that ruled over the largest population. Alternatively, when a colony was ruled by multiple colonizers in succession, we recognize the colonizer as the last power that formally colonized the region for at least ten consecutive years. Based on these criteria, our set includes 34 former British colonies and 24 former French colonies.[5]

For our dependent variable, we use data from the Ethnic Armed Conflict dataset (Wimmer et al., 2009) to analyze the odds of ethnic civil war onset. This dataset includes the dates and locations of all ethnic civil wars that occurred between 1946 and 2010. Using this data, we create a time-series dataset scoring whether or not an ethnic civil war began during a particular year, with 0 representing no ethnic civil war and 1 representing an ethnic civil war that began in that year.

Because our data on ethnic civil warfare begin in 1946 and because some countries in our set—Australia, Canada, Egypt, Haiti, Iraq, New Zealand, South Africa, and the United States—received their independences well before this date, some cases lack complete data for all post-independence years, something that might bias our analysis of the relationships between CCPs and ethnic civil war onset. The cases with early independences were also unique in ways that

[5] The former British colonies include Australia, Bangladesh, Botswana, Canada, Cyprus, Egypt, Gambia, Ghana, India, Iraq, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritius, Myanmar, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, United States, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The former French colonies include Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso. Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, Haiti, Laos, Lebanon, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Syria, Togo, Tunisia, and Vietnam.

could bias our analysis in additional ways: They gained their independences decades before other colonies, most were either settler or plantation colonies, others were colonized for short periods, a few experienced informal American rule, and all of these characteristics might have shaped models of the colonial nation-state and long-term patterns of ethnic warfare in unique ways. Except when noted differently, we present results using both sets of cases.

For our focal independent variables, we employ the four CCPs described previously: communal census categories, educational language policy, indirect rule, and communal legislative representation. For the analysis, we use communal census categories as a continuous variable and measure indirect rule in tens of percentage points. In addition to these variables, we include one standard control variable and two sets of additional controls. We include the number of years since independence as a standard control variable in all models, as the impact of colonialism potentially varied over time. We enter this variable into the regressions as cubic polynomials and do not report the results in the tables in order to save space (Carter and Signorino, 2010).

Our first set of additional controls includes four factors that preceded colonialism and potentially confound relationships between CCPs and postcolonial ethnic warfare. As noted by Alesina et al. (2003), a country's latitude measures ecological conditions that have shaped long term trajectories of development and communal diversity. Among our set of cases that received independence after 1945, for example, the correlation between latitude and contemporary ethnic fractionalization is -0.49, whereas the correlation between latitude and log of per capita GDP is 0.40. Precolonial ethnic diversity and development, in turn, might have shaped both CCPs and postcolonial ethnic warfare and could thereby account for any relationship between the two. Our second historical control measures the extent of a country's territory that is mountainous, which

past analyses find increases the ability of communities to fight civil wars against the state (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). At the same time, this environmental condition might have promoted resistance to colonialism, as places with mountains were able to avoid colonial rule and organize prolonged anticolonial violence. Such resistance, in turn, might have contributed to CCPs seeking to weaken anticolonial resistance, thereby causing a spurious relationship between CCPs and ethnic warfare. Our third historical control measures the presence of a large and long-standing precolonial state. Paine (2019) and Ray (2019) argue that precolonial states have long-term effects on ethnic warfare by promoting conflict between communities with and without precolonial states.[6] At the same time, this social environment was ideal for divide-and-rule-style policies and might have promoted the use of CCPs. To measure precolonial statehood, we use data from Borcan, Olsson, and Putterman (2018) on the extent to which there was a long-standing and autonomous precolonial state that controlled the same territory as a contemporary state. The variable ranges from 0 to 50 and measures 50-year periods, and we average the scores for all periods between 1001 and 1700 AD. Finally, we include a measure of the log of total population in 1900. Total population is strongly and consistently related to ethnic warfare in past analyses, and population size might have affected the use of CCPs.

In addition to these four historical variables, we also include four variables that past analyses commonly highlight as predictors of ethnic warfare: ethnic fractionalization (Fearon 2003)[7], the percentage of the population excluded from formal politics because of their ethnicity (Wimmer et al., 2009), the natural log of per capital GDP (Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer, 2015),

[6] Although Wimmer (2018) makes opposite claims.
[7] This variable measures the likelihood that two randomly selected people from the same country share the same ethnicity, with higher scores therefore suggesting greater ethnic diversity. We enter it into the regression models in tens of percentage points.

and the natural log of total population (Feenstra et al., 2015). Notably, colonialism preceded and might have influenced these variables, making it potentially problematic to include these common controls in the same models with measures of CCPs. We therefore use these common controls to test the robustness of our findings.

Using these variables, we create a cross-national panel dataset using country-year as the unit of analysis and conduct a series of time-controlled logit regressions. Because observations within each country are dependent, we use cluster-robust standard errors.[8] We test all regressions for multicollinearity and find no evidence of any data-based collinearity. As a robustness check, we also rerun all regressions with regional fixed effects, and the results are similar and consistent with those presented in this section.

Because we have either the entire set of former British and French colonies with more than one million people or the set of all such colonies that gained their independences after 1945, some might argue that inferential statistics should not be used, suggesting instead that our statistical findings are best interpreted as describing the relationships between variables as they played out in actual history. Yet one can also view the British and French colonies in our set as one random sample of many different possible samples that could have been generated by the same (putative) underlying macrohistorical mechanisms, and significance levels are relevant if accepting this perspective. Recognizing both views, we follow dominant disciplinary norms by reporting significance levels but also consider the magnitude of coefficients even when they are insignificant.

TABLE 2 NEAR HERE

[8] The residual intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) conditional on the time controls is 0.33, indicating a substantial degree of within-cluster correlation.

The results in Table 2 use communal legislative representation as the focal independent variable, with the first three models using the set of cases that received their independences after 1945 but different control variables and the final three models replicating the first three while using the entire set of cases. In addition to odds ratios, the table provides percent confidence intervals in parentheses. As a discriminatory CCP that affects the power of communities, we hypothesize that communal legislative representation is associated with increased odds of ethnic civil war onset, and the findings clearly support this claim. The odds ratios of communal legislative representation are large and significant in all models and estimate that the presence of this politically discriminatory CCP is associated with a 220 to 320 percent increase in the odds of ethnic civil war onset in former British and French colonies between 1946 and 2010.

TABLE 3 NEAR HERE

Table 3 replicates the models of Table 2 but substitutes communal census categories as the focal independent variable. The odds ratios of colonial census categories are above one in both models without controls (and significant in the model with the limited set of cases) but are near one and insignificant in the models with the controls, suggesting that the collection of more census categories has little or no effect on the odds of ethnic civil war onset, especially when controlling for potential confounders. The results therefore support our hypothesis that differentiating policies have little or no general effect on ethnic violence.

TABLE 4 NEAR HERE

Table 4 includes the variables measuring different linguistic policies for colonial primary education as the focal independent variables, with no indigenous language used in primary education as the reference category. Supporting our theory, the results highlight no clear or strong relationship between either having instruction in one indigenous language or multiple

indigenous languages. Most notably, the odds ratios of instruction in multiple indigenous languages are well above one but insignificant when only controlling for time since independence but near one and insignificant when controlling for either historical or common controls.

TABLE 5 NEAR HERE

While supporting our hypothesis, our theory also suggests that accommodating CCPs can contribute to ethnic violence when they are discriminatory. One way to test this hypothesis is to include an interaction term multiplying the variable measuring one language of instruction by ethnic fractionalization. The use of one vernacular likely does not promote—and might deter—ethnic civil war onset when the population is ethnically homogeneous. Yet when used in a region with a diverse population, this policy is usually highly discriminatory. We therefore expect that the use of only one indigenous language in places with diverse populations increases the odds of ethnic civil war onset. Supporting our hypothesis, the results in Table 5 suggest that the impact of teaching in only one indigenous language depends on ethnic fractionalization: The interaction terms are well above one and significant in five of six models, thereby providing evidence that using only one indigenous language in places with diverse populations increases the odds of ethnic civil war onset.[9] The predicted probabilities are visualized in Figure 1 using the different models and the full set of cases. The figures clearly show that the odds of ethnic civil warfare spikes when ethnic fractionalization is high in places with educational systems that taught in only one vernacular, whereas ethnic fractionalization has a more muted effect in places with other educational language policies.

[9] We exclude Tanzania from this analysis, as the one non-European language used in colonial primary education—Kiswahili—is a Creole language that developed along the coast for trading purposes that combining local African languages with Arabic, Hindustani, Persian, Portuguese, and Malay. In this way, its exclusive use in colonial education was not beneficial to any particular community and, based on our theory, should not have contributed to ethnic warfare.

FIGURE 1 NEAR HERE

Table 6 presents the results using the extent of indirect rule as the focal independent variable and restrict the set to former British colonies. We expect that the variable has little or no general relationship with ethnic civil war onset, and four of the six models support this claim, with odds ratios being insignificant and very close to 1. In both models with the common controls, however, the coefficient is below one and significant, thereby estimating that places with high levels of indirect rule had lower odds of ethnic civil war onset. As we hypothesize that the extent of indirect rule has no general relationship with ethnic violence, these findings offer only mixed support to our claims.

TABLE 6 NEAR HERE

Although only two models provide evidence that indirect rule deters ethnic warfare, the results in Table 6 potentially hide a greater suppressive effect, as indirect rule was sometimes used in a discriminatory fashion that we hypothesize promoted ethnic violence. To test this possibility, we create three categorical variables measuring the form of colonial rule: Whether a colony was ruled completely directly, whether a colony was ruled through a discriminatory form of indirect rule, and whether a colony was ruled through a non-discriminatory form of indirect rule. For these variables, we use data by Lange (2009) to categorize countries as being either completely directly ruled or having some degree of indirect rule. Among cases with some degree of indirect rule, in turn, we categorize them as having a discriminatory form of indirect rule if indirect rule was characterized by one of two things: Either only some communities were ruled indirectly while others were ruled directly or some traditional authorities empowered by indirect rule were formally given greater power and prestige than others. For the latter, we focus on whether only select traditional authorities received reserved seats on the colonial legislature, a

practice giving their communities a privileged political status as well as an important advantage to pursue communal interests in national politics. If the case had some degree of indirect rule but the system of indirect rule was not discriminatory in either way, we categorize it as a non-discriminatory system of indirect rule. We scored these variables based on information from a variety of primary and secondary resources.

TABLE 7 NEAR HERE

Table 7 presents the results of this analysis while using non-discriminatory indirect rule as the reference category. In all six models, the odds ratios of discriminatory indirect rule are much larger than one and estimate that the odds of ethnic civil war onset in places that experienced discriminatory indirect rule was between 230 and 950 percent greater than in places with non-discriminatory indirect rule. The results vary somewhat by model, however, with the odds ratios being smallest and insignificant in the models with the historical controls. Overall, these findings provide additional support that politically discriminatory CCPs promote ethnic violence.

Inter-Imperial Variation

Having provided evidence that politically discriminatory CCPs are more common in the British Empire and that they are related to the odds of ethnic civil war onset, one would expect that, all else being equal, the odds of ethnic civil war onset should be greater in former British colonies than in former French colonies. Table 8 explores this possibility by using a measure of British colonialism as a dummy variable and analyzing whether the odds of ethnic civil war onset varied by the identity of the colonizer. Although slightly larger in both models that only control for time since independence, the odds ratios of the British dummy are all near one and insignificant, suggesting that former British and French colonies had similar odds of ethnic civil war onset between 1946 and 2010.

TABLE 8 NEAR HERE

These results are at odds with previous studies finding a general difference between former British and French colonies. One likely reason for this discrepancy is that our dependent variable and analytic design differ from those of past works. Early analyses use MAR data on ethnic violence, and this dependent variable differs from our own in two important ways: It measures ethnic violence between civilians as opposed to ethnic warfare between a state and an ethnic opposition, and it measures the highest level of violence during a decade instead of the onset of an ethnic civil war. Like our analysis, Wucherpfennig et al. (2016) use data on ethnic civil warfare as the dependent variable. Yet they employ a categorical variable measuring whether a case ever experienced an ethnic civil war between 1946 and 2010, whereas we provide a panel-data analysis of ethnic civil war onset, something that allows us to analyze multiple ethnic civil wars in the same case. Even more, they use a different focal independent variable—an interaction term multiplying the British dummy by distance from the coast—and employ it as an instrument for political inclusion, which they subsequently link to the absence of postcolonial ethnic warfare.

Besides contrasting with past analyses, our finding that former British and French colonies had similar odds of ethnic civil war onset seems to conflict with the results presented in the previous tables. Indeed, one would expect that ethnic warfare is more concentrated in former British colonies if (a) discriminatory CCPs are more common in former British colonies and (b) discriminatory CCPs are strongly related to ethnic civil war onset. A variety of factors might account for this discrepancy, and we consider two.

The first and simplest is that settler and plantation colonies are more concentrated in the British Empire and had particularly low odds of ethnic civil war onset between 1946 and 2010.

Although this hypothesis is partially tested when we limit the set to former colonies that received their independences after 1945, three British plantation colonies remain in the more limited set. We therefore exclude all settler and plantation colonies from the set and rerun the models of Table 8 (results not shown). The findings are substantively identical to those of Table 8, suggesting that settler and plantation colonies offer little insight into the lack of a British effect.

A second potential reason for the absence of a general British effect is that former British colonies have particularly low odds of ethnic civil war onset when they lack histories of discriminatory CCPs, with the low odds of places without discriminatory CCPs offsetting the high odds of places with them. This hypothesis coincides with the literature noting that policies recognizing communal difference reduce the risk of ethnic warfare by limiting assimilationist policies and promoting communally inclusive power-sharing arrangements but qualifies these claims by recognizing that any suppressive effect only occurs in the absence of discriminatory CCPs. Our finding that non-discriminatory indirect rule reduces the odds of ethnic warfare offers some evidence in support of this argument.

To test this hypothesis, we explore whether former British colonies without a history of communal legislative representation have a lower risk of ethnic civil war onset than former French colonies that also lack a history of communal legislative representation. For this, we calculate the predicted probabilities of ethnic civil warfare by colonizer for cases without a history of communal legislative representation. As shown in Table 9, the probabilities of ethnic civil war onset are between five and eight times lower in former British colonies relative to former French colonies depending on the controls, and this difference is always significant.[10]

[10] The figures in Table 9 are based on countries that gained independence after 1945, but they are substantively identical when using the full set of countries.

These results therefore provide strong evidence that a lower risk of ethnic civil war onset in former British colonies without discriminatory CCPs helps to explain the absence of a general British effect. In so doing, it also suggests that the more pluralist form of British colonialism reduced the risk of ethnic civil war onset relative to the more assimilationist form of French rule, although only in the absence of discriminatory CCPs.

TABLE 9 NEAR HERE

Conclusion and Discussion

In this article, we test past claims that CCPs promoted ethnic violence in ways that explain patterns of postcolonial ethnic violence in former British and French colonies. At the same time, we refine these claims and attempt to reconcile disagreements in the literature by conceptualizing four different types of CCPs and hypothesizing how each type affects ethnic violence. Differentiating CCPs simply recognize communal difference, empowering CCPs provide communities with political power and autonomy, accommodating CCPs match communities with appropriate public goods and services, and we argue that all three have mixed effects on ethnic violence: They can promote it by communalizing politics or deter it by promoting inclusive power-sharing arrangements. In contrast, we hypothesize that CCPs that discriminate in ways that empower particular communities more than others limit inclusive power-sharing arrangements while promoting conflict over both the form of the nation-state and control of the state.

For an initial test of past claims and our theory, we complete a cross-national statistical analysis of former British and French colonies that uses ethnic civil war onset as the dependent variable and employs several different measures of CCPs as independent variables. With one exception, the findings consistently support our hypotheses and offer strong evidence that

different types of CCPs have different effects. We find that a measure of a politically discriminatory CCP—communal legislative representation—is associated with greater odds of ethnic civil war onset. In addition, we provide evidence that the discriminatory use of indirect rule and educational language policies also increased the long-term odds of ethnic civil war onset. In contrast, the measures of non-discriminatory CCPs either have no effect or negative effects on the odds of ethnic civil war onset. The use of censuses to document communal difference has no general effect on the odds of ethnic civil war onset, nor does the policy of providing primary education in multiple indigenous languages. We provide evidence, however, that indirect rule limits the risk of ethnic civil war onset, especially when it is non-discriminatory. This final finding contrasts with our hypothesis but supports Wucherpfennig et al. (2016)'s claim that the use of indirect rule limits postcolonial ethnic civil warfare by promoting inclusive power-sharing arrangements. At the same time, our findings suggest that their argument must be qualified: Only a non-discriminatory use of indirect rule reduces the odds of ethnic civil war onset.

We also find that CCPs were concentrated in former British colonies but offer evidence that former British colonies have roughly similar odds of ethnic civil war onset as former French colonies. There is therefore a seeming incompatibility with our findings: Discriminatory CCPs are concentrated in the British Empire and promote ethnic warfare, but the odds of ethnic civil war onset do not vary by empire. We explore potential explanations for this apparent incongruence and provide evidence that former British colonies without discriminatory CCPs had particularly low odds of ethnic civil war onset, thereby helping to offset the positive effect of discriminatory CCPs in other former British colonies. The evidence therefore suggests that

British colonialism has no general effect, either promoting ethnic civil warfare in places with discriminatory CCPs or deterring it in places without them.

Overall, this article makes several important contributions to the literatures on colonialism and ethnic civil warfare. We provide an original dataset measuring several CCPs for British and French colonies and the first analysis of the impact of multiple CCPs in different empires. Theoretically, we point the literature in new directions by arguing and providing evidence that the type of CCP matters, and our focus on different types of CCPs helps to reconcile differences between different theoretical perspectives.

While recognizing these contributions, we end by noting the analysis' main limitation. Statistics provide insight into correlations, not causation, so it remains possible that the relationships that we highlight are spurious. Even more, a number of problems can affect the accuracy of statistical analyses, especially studies like our own with a relatively small number of cases (Babones, 2014; Scharnk, 2013). Our findings are therefore inconclusive, and more research is needed on the impact of CCPs on ethnic violence.

Figure 1. Predicted Probabilities of the Effect of Educational Language policies on Ethnic Civil War Onset by Ethnic Fractionalization for Former British Colonies



Note: Ethnic Fractionalization grand-mean centered and expressed in tens of percentage points.

Table 1. CCPs by Colonizer

	British			French			Difference	
	n	mean	sd	n	mean	sd	t	p
Census Category	34	2.91	1.33	24	1.25	1.26	4.83	0.00
No Indigenous Education Language	34	0.32		24	0.67		-2.58	0.01
One Indigenous Education Language	34	0.15		24	0.29		-1.34	0.18
Multiple Indigenous Education Language	34	0.53		24	0.04		3.90	0.00
Communal Legislative Representation	34	0.41		24	0.17		1.99	0.05
Extent of Indirect Rule	31	0.35	0.32					

Table 2. Communal Legislative Representation and Ethnic Civil War Onset, 1946-2010

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Legislative Representation	3.076* (1.288, 7.342)	2.192+ (0.922, 5.209)	2.377+ (0.934, 6.051)	3.195** (1.375, 7.422)	2.493* (1.127, 5.515)	2.630* (1.132, 6.115)
Latitude		0.161 (0.009, 2.990)			0.125+ (0.011, 1.421)	
log Prop. Mountainous		1.199 (0.912, 1.576)			1.206 (0.929, 1.566)	
State History		0.997 (0.966, 1.028)			0.996 (0.969, 1.023)	
log Population 1900		1.350*** (1.131, 1.611)			1.320*** (1.124, 1.549)	
Ethnic Fract.			1.190** (1.043, 1.357)			1.206** (1.067, 1.363)
Excluded pop.			1.060 (0.963, 1.167)			1.049 (0.961, 1.144)
log Population			1.328* (1.043, 1.690)			1.285* (1.029, 1.605)
log GDP pc			0.534 (0.250, 1.141)			0.528+ (0.267, 1.043)
Constant	0.018*** (0.007, 0.047)	0.019*** (0.007, 0.047)	0.003*** (0.001, 0.012)	0.015*** (0.006, 0.039)	0.015*** (0.006, 0.038)	0.003*** (0.001, 0.010)
N country-years	2617	2617	2617	3137	3137	3137
N war onset	63	63	63	67	67	67

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Time controls not shown

Table 3. Communal Census Categories and Ethnic Civil War Onset, 1946-2010

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Census Category	1.359+	1.048	1.114	1.352	1.040	1.091

	(0.950, 1.945)	(0.752, 1.460)	(0.758, 1.638)	(0.941, 1.943)	(0.748, 1.447)	(0.739, 1.609)
Latitude		0.458			0.315	
		(0.020, 10.494)			(0.017, 5.706)	
log Prop. Mountainous		1.160			1.191	
		(0.887, 1.517)			(0.917, 1.548)	
State History		1.002			1.004	
		(0.971, 1.035)			(0.977, 1.031)	
log Population 1900		1.407**			1.380**	
		(1.100, 1.798)			(1.086, 1.753)	
Ethnic Fract.			1.174*			1.180*
			(1.014, 1.359)			(1.029, 1.353)
Excluded pop.			1.114*			1.097*
			(1.019, 1.219)			(1.007, 1.194)
log Population			1.455**			1.453**
			(1.122, 1.888)			(1.125, 1.876)
log GDPpc			0.614			0.608
			(0.300, 1.254)			(0.312, 1.185)
Constant	0.014***	0.018***	0.003***	0.012***	0.015***	0.003***
	(0.004, 0.043)	(0.006, 0.057)	(0.001, 0.013)	(0.004, 0.038)	(0.005, 0.047)	(0.001, 0.011)
N country-years	2617	2617	2617	3137	3137	3137
N war onset	63	63	63	67	67	67

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Time controls not shown

Table 4. Educational Language Policies and Ethnic Civil War Onset, 1946-2010

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
One Indigenous Language	0.645	0.444	0.692	0.635	0.415	0.668
	(0.215, 1.935)	(0.120, 1.637)	(0.233, 2.054)	(0.209, 1.928)	(0.114, 1.512)	(0.214, 2.090)
Multiple Indigenous Language	2.002	0.901	1.285	2.133	1.026	1.300

	(0.769, 5.214)	(0.345, 2.355)	(0.537, 3.078)	(0.845, 5.386)	(0.411, 2.567)	(0.555, 3.045)
Latitude		0.503			0.358	
		(0.015, 16.464)			(0.016, 8.074)	
log Prop. Mountainous		1.200			1.201	
		(0.917, 1.569)			(0.934, 1.546)	
State History		1.008			1.011	
		(0.975, 1.043)			(0.983, 1.040)	
log Population 1900		1.384**			1.333**	
		(1.127, 1.699)			(1.103, 1.612)	
Ethnic Fract.			1.176*			1.170*
			(1.018, 1.359)			(1.020, 1.343)
Excluded pop.			1.121*			1.093+
			(1.019, 1.233)			(0.997, 1.198)
log Population			1.490***			1.463***
			(1.220, 1.820)			(1.203, 1.778)
log GDP pc			0.639			0.616
			(0.332, 1.233)			(0.330, 1.147)
Constant	0.024***	0.020***	0.004***	0.021***	0.016***	0.004***
	(0.009, 0.064)	(0.008, 0.050)	(0.001, 0.018)	(0.008, 0.056)	(0.006, 0.042)	(0.001, 0.018)
N country-years	2617	2617	2617	3137	3137	3137
N war onset	63	63	63	67	67	67

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Time controls not shown

Table 5. Educational Language Policy, Ethnic Fractionalization, and Ethnic Civil War Onset, 1946-2010

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
One Indigenous Language	0.544	0.528	0.753	0.541	0.468	0.702
	(0.204, 1.445)	(0.196, 1.424)	(0.294, 1.928)	(0.220, 1.330)	(0.186, 1.180)	(0.302, 1.628)
Ethnic Fractionalization	1.185	1.323*	1.114	1.194+	1.341**	1.101
	(0.940, 1.493)	(1.059, 1.654)	(0.937, 1.325)	(0.973, 1.464)	(1.092, 1.647)	(0.940, 1.291)
One Educ. Language x	1.573*	1.385	2.027*	1.593*	1.418+	2.132**

Ethnic Fractionalization	(1.059, 2.337)	(0.933, 2.055)	(1.181, 3.480)	(1.093, 2.323)	(0.977, 2.058)	(1.321, 3.440)
Latitude		1.152 (0.867, 1.531)			1.129 (0.851, 1.499)	
log Prop. Mountainous		1.026 (0.985, 1.068)			1.031^{+} (0.996, 1.067)	
State History		1.242^{+} (0.990, 1.559)			1.200^{+} (0.972, 1.482)	
log Population 1900			1.053 (0.956, 1.161)			1.047 (0.969, 1.131)
Excluded pop.			1.533*** (1.324, 1.775)			1.512*** (1.310, 1.746)
log Population			0.536^{+} (0.285, 1.011)			0.531* (0.300, 0.940)
log GDPpc		2.219 (0.054, 90.492)			2.285 (0.087, 60.087)	
Constant	0.029*** (0.009, 0.096)	0.009*** (0.003, 0.030)	0.011*** (0.004, 0.034)	0.027*** (0.008, 0.092)	0.007*** (0.002, 0.023)	0.011*** (0.004, 0.034)
N country-years	2567	2567	2567	3087	3087	3087
N war onset	63	63	63	67	67	67

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Time controls not shown

Table 6. The Extent of Indirect Rule and Ethnic Civil War Onset, 1946-2010

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Extent of Indirect Rule	1.068 (0.892, 1.280)	1.073 (0.916, 1.255)	0.766* (0.618, 0.949)	1.106 (0.925, 1.321)	1.099 (0.957, 1.263)	0.816^{+} (0.646, 1.030)
Latitude		0.247 (0.001, 56.742)			0.161 (0.001, 18.118)	
log Prop. Mountainous		1.436 (0.929, 2.221)			1.553* (1.038, 2.324)	
State History		1.041^{+}			1.038^{+}	

		(0.998, 1.086)			(0.999, 1.078)	
log Population 1900		1.396***			1.401***	
		(1.183, 1.648)			(1.180, 1.663)	
Ethnic Fract.			1.257			1.203+
			(0.951, 1.660)			(0.968, 1.495)
Excluded pop.			1.342***			1.279***
			(1.213, 1.485)			(1.142, 1.433)
log Population			2.074***			2.106***
			(1.589, 2.708)			(1.624, 2.731)
log GDP pc			0.596			0.524
			(0.244, 1.455)			(0.185, 1.482)
Constant	0.053***	0.007***	0.001***	0.056***	0.006***	0.001***
	(0.015, 0.183)	(0.002, 0.028)	(0.0002, 0.006)	(0.016, 0.194)	(0.001, 0.026)	(0.0003, 0.007)
N country-years	1261	1261	1261	1651	1651	1651
N war onset	37	37	37	38	38	38

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Time controls not shown

Table 7. Discriminatory Indirect Rule and Ethnic Civil War Onset, 1946-2010

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Direct Rule	0.851	0.858	7.205**	0.466	0.474	4.366*
	(0.139, 5.205)	(0.090, 8.214)	(2.020, 25.694)	(0.081, 2.688)	(0.060, 3.752)	(1.103, 17.281)
Discriminatory Indirect Rule	9.471**	2.534	7.592***	8.487**	2.290	8.022***
	(1.916, 46.812)	(0.202, 31.827)	(2.441, 23.610)	(2.261, 31.860)	(0.263, 19.950)	(2.719, 23.663)
Latitude		0.382			0.320	
		(0.002, 66.037)			(0.003, 35.365)	
log Prop. Mountainous		1.329+			1.336+	
		(0.948, 1.861)			(0.990, 1.804)	
State History		1.022			1.020	

		(0.953, 1.095)			(0.964, 1.080)	
log Population 1900		1.328**			1.324**	
		(1.078, 1.636)			(1.083, 1.618)	
Ethnic Fract.			1.083			1.102
			(0.957, 1.225)			(0.980, 1.241)
Excluded pop.			1.370***			1.369***
			(1.151, 1.631)			(1.159, 1.618)
log Population			1.662**			1.645**
			(1.187, 2.325)			(1.174, 2.305)
log GDPpc			0.505			0.517
			(0.177, 1.439)			(0.187, 1.432)
Constant	0.016***	0.008***	0.001***	0.019***	0.010***	0.001***
	(0.003, 0.079)	(0.003, 0.028)	(0.0001, 0.007)	(0.005, 0.074)	(0.003, 0.030)	(0.0001, 0.007)
N country-years	1261	1261	1261	1651	1651	1651
N war onset	37	37	37	38	38	38

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Time controls not shown

Table 8. The Identity of the Colonizer and Ethnic Civil War Onset, 1945-2010

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
British Colony	1.381	0.984	0.856	1.288	0.951	0.856
	(0.573, 3.329)	(0.396, 2.445)	(0.367, 1.994)	(0.547, 3.029)	(0.382, 2.371)	(0.387, 1.896)
Latitude		0.425			0.294	
		(0.019, 9.386)			(0.016, 5.276)	
log Prop. Mountainous		1.173			1.203	
		(0.892, 1.542)			(0.918, 1.576)	
State History		1.003			1.004	
		(0.967, 1.039)			(0.973, 1.036)	
log Population 1900		1.441***			1.414***	
		(1.166, 1.781)			(1.150, 1.737)	
Ethnic Fract.			1.180+			1.185*

			(0.997, 1.396)			(1.022, 1.374)
Excluded pop.			1.112*			1.097*
			(1.021, 1.211)			(1.011, 1.190)
log Population			1.605***			1.579***
			(1.328, 1.939)			(1.323, 1.884)
log GDPpc			0.630			0.626
			(0.304, 1.304)			(0.321, 1.219)
Constant	0.025***	0.020***	0.003***	0.024***	0.017***	0.003***
	(0.010, 0.063)	(0.006, 0.060)	(0.001, 0.018)	(0.009, 0.060)	(0.006, 0.049)	(0.001, 0.016)
N country-years	2617	2617	2617	3137	3137	3137
N war onset	63	63	63	67	67	67

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Time controls not shown

Table 9. Predicted Probability of Postcolonial Ethnic War Onset by Colonizer in the absence of Communal Legislative Representation

	P (War Onset)	Conf. Low	Conf. High	p
Basic Controls				
British	0.002	0.001	0.010	0.000
French	0.016	0.010	0.028	
Historical Controls				
British	0.002	0.000	0.009	0.002
French	0.016	0.009	0.027	
Common Controls				
British	0.002	0.000	0.011	0.012
French	0.011	0.005	0.021	

References

Abernethy, David (2000) *The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European Overseas Empires 1415-1980*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Albaugh, Ericka (2014) *State-Building and Multilingual Education in Africa*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Alesina, Alberto, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, and Romain Wacziarg (2003) Fractionalization. *Journal of Economic Growth* 8(2): 155–94.

Babones, Salvatore (2014) *Methods for Quantitative Macro-Comparative Research*. London: Sage.

Betts, Raymond (1961) *Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory, 1890-1914*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Blanton, Robert, David Mason, and Brian Athow (2001) Colonial style and post-colonial ethnic conflict in Africa. *Journal of Peace Research* 38: 473–491.

Boone, Catherine (1995) Rural interests and the making of modern African states. *African Economic History* 23: 1–36.

Borcan, Oana, Ola Olsson, and Louis Putterman (2018) State history and economic development: evidence from six millennia. *Journal of Economic Growth* 23(1): 1–40.

Carter, David and Curtis Signorino (2010) Back to the future: modeling time dependence in binary data. *Political Analysis* 18: 271–92.

Charrad, Mounira (2001) *States and Women's Rights: The Making of Postcolonial Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Christopher, Anthony J. (1988) 'Divide and rule': the impress of British separation policies. *Area* 20(3): 233–240.

Cohn, Bernard (1987) *An Anthropologist Among the Historians*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Collier, Ruth Berins (1982) *Regimes in Tropical Africa: Changing Forms of Supremacy, 1945–1975.* Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Crowder, Michael (1968) *West Africa Under Colonial Rule*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

de Silva, K.M. (1986) *Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka, 1880–1985*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.

Dirks, Nicholas (2001) *Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Fearon, James (2003) Ethnic and cultural diversity by country. *Journal of Economic Growth* 8(2): 195–222.

Fearon, James and David Laitin (2003) Ethnicity, insurgency and civil war. *American Political Science Review* 97(1): 75–90.

Feenstra, Robert C., Robert Inklaar, and Marcel P. Timmer (2015) The next generation of the Penn World Table. *American Economic Review* 105(10): 3150–3182.

Fieldhouse, D.K. (1981) *Colonialism, 1870-1945: An Introduction*. New York: St. Martin's.

Firmin-Sellers, Kathryn (2000) Institutions, context, and outcomes: explaining French and British rule in West Africa." *Comparative Politics* 32(3): 253–272.

Gann, Peter and L.H. Duignan (1967) *Burden of Empire*. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institute.

Gelditsh, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margereta sollenberg, and Håvard Strand (2002) Armed conflict 1946-2001: a new dataset. *Journal of Peace Research* 39 (5): 615–37.

Gerring, John, Daniel Ziblatt, Johan Van Gorp, and Julián Arévalo (2011) An institutional theory of direct and indirect rule. *World Politics* 63 (3): 377–433.

Horowitz, Donald (1985) *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Idris, Amir (2005) *Conflict and Politics of Identity in Sudan*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Iliffe, John (1995) *Africans: The History of a Continent*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

King, Richard (1999) Orientalism and the modern myth of 'Hinduism.' *Numen* 46(2): 146–85.

Kiwanuka, M. Semakula (1970) Colonial policies and administrations in Africa: the myths of the contrast. *African Historical Studies* 3(2): 295–315.

Kymlicka, Will (1995) *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Lange, Matthew (2009) *Lineages of Despotism and Development: British Colonialism and State Power*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

-----(2017) *Killing Others: A Natural History of Ethnic Violence*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Lange, Matthew and Andrew Dawson (2009) Dividing and ruling the world? A statistical test of the effects of colonialism on postcolonial civil violence. *Social Forces* 88: 785–818.

Lange, Matthew, James Mahoney, and Mattias vom Hau (2006) Colonialism and development: a comparative analysis of British and Spanish colonies. *American Journal of Sociology* 111(5): 1412–1462.

Lieberman, Evan, and Prerna Singh (2012) The institutional origins of ethnic violence. *Comparative Politics* 45: 1–24.

Lieberman, Evan, and Prerna Singh (2017) Census enumeration and group conflict: a global analysis of the consequences of counting. *World Politics* 69(1): 1–53.

Lugard, Lord (1936) African and the powers. *Journal of the Royal African Society* 35: 4–17.

Mamdani, Mahmood (1996) *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

----- (2001) *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and Genocide in Rwanda*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

----- (2009) *Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror*. New York: Pantheon Books.

-----(2012) *Define and Rule: Native as Political Identity*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

McEvoy, Joanne and Brendan O'Leary (eds) (2013) *Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Miles, William F. (1994) *Hausaland Divided: Colonialism and Independence in Niger and Nigeria*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Morrock, Richard (1973) Heritage of strife: the effects of colonialist 'divide and rule' strategy upon the colonized peoples. *Science & Society* 37(2): 129–151.

Müller-Crepon, Carl (2019) Continuity or change? (In)direct rule in British and French colonial Africa. Available at: http://www.carlmueller-crepon.org/publication/indirect_rule/ (accessed 3 January 2020).

Newbury, Catharine (1983) Colonialism, ethnicity, and rural ethnic protest: Rwanda and Zanzibar in comparative perspective. *Comparative Politics* 15(3): 253–80.

Paine, Jack (2019) Ethnic violence in Africa: destructive legacies of pre-colonial states. *International Organizations* 73: 645–83.

Pollis, Adamantia (1973) Intergroup conflict and British colonial policy: the case of Cyprus. *Comparative Politics* 5(4): 575–599.

Ray, Subhasish (2019) History and ethnic conflict: does precolonial centralization matter? *International Studies Quarterly* 63: 417–431.

Schrank, Andrew (2013) Quantitative cross-national sociology and the methodological abyss: comment on Alcacer and Ingram. *American Journal of Sociology* 118(4): 1099–1111.

Steinmetz, George (2007) *The Devil's Handwriting: Precoloniality and the German Colonial State in Qingdao, Samoa, and Southwest Africa*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Stepan, Alfred, Juan Linz, and Yogendra Yadav (2011) *Crafting State-Nations: India and Other Multinational Democracies*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Tajfel, Henri (1970) Experiments in intergroup discrimination. *Scientific America* 223: 96–102.

-----(1974) Social identity and intergroup behavior. *Social Science Information* 13: 65–93.

Tambiah, Stanley (1986) *Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Weber, Anke, Wesley Hiers, and Anaid Flesken (2016) *Politicized Ethnicity: A Comparative Perspective*. New York: Palgrave.

Wieschhoff, H. A. (1944) *Colonial Policies in Africa*. Westport, CT: Negro Universities Press.

Wimmer, Andreas (2013) *Waves of War: Nationalism, State Formation, and Ethnic Exclusion in the Modern World*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

----- (2018) *Nation Building: Why Some Countries Come Together While Others Fall Apart.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Wimmer, Andreas, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Brian Min (2009) Ethnic politics and armed conflict: a configurational analysis. *American Sociological Review* 74: 316–337.

Wucherpfennig, Julian, Philipp Hunziker, and Lars-Erik Cederman (2016) Who inherits the state? colonial rule and postcolonial conflict. *American Journal of Political Science* 60(4): 882–898.

Wyrtzen, Jonathan (2015) *Making Morocco: Colonial Intervention and the Politics of Identity*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Ziltener, Patrick, Daniel Künzler, and Andre Walter (2017) Measuring the impacts of colonialism: a new data set for the countries of Africa and Asia. *Journal of World-Systems Research* 23(1): 156–190.