THE ALLEGORY OF REASON IN SPENSER'S THE FAERIE QUEENE

by

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INTRODUCTION

This thesis is an attempt to map out some of the battlefields in The Faerie Queene on which are fought the wars between reason on the one hand and the passions and senses on the other. This war seems to me to be the core or backbone of the moral allegory of the poem, despite the fact that the relationship to Aristotle has received rather more critical attention. In accordance with this belief, I shall be treating the figures of the poem as if they were intended to be more or less realistic representations of human beings, not abstract figures whom we are supposed to identify completely with the nominal virtue for which they stand and fight. It is possible, though I doubt it, that Guyon and Britomart are sometimes to be understood as being in some sense the virtue they exemplify; but if this is so, it is a level of allegory with which I am not concerned in this thesis. I am interested here in the position which these persons, seen as full human beings, take up on the battlefield over which reason and its chief enemies, sense and passion, fight varied and subtly defined battles. For me, Guyon is a temperate and therefore reasonable man, and Britomart a chaste and therefore reasonable woman. But Guyon is not Temperance, nor is Britomart Chastity; at least not in the same sense that Belphoebe is Honour.

One result of this is that I shall be tracing patterns of thought, feeling, and action which in themselves tend towards sin, though often they do not lead to overt or outrageous acts in the episodes under

discussion. Thus I believe Guyon to be considerably less than perfect, though in the final estimation he is highly admirable. I feel that it is possible to attribute minor failings to major figures without impairing their fuctioning as heroes in the poem, and that these minor failings are an important part of the ethical allegory. Spenser tries to teach us temperance not so much by frightening us with Acrasia as by showing us how difficult it is even for Guyon to keep to the true path.

There is another consideration here. Some critics have felt that the motivation of many incidents in the poem is chance, or the desire to write a true romance, in which exciting adventures occur without any moral significance.[1] I feel that this attitude is very wide of the mark, and that in one form or another the ethical allegory is very nearly continuous throughout the poem. This involves the belief that, in general, affliction and painful passions come only to those who have in some way invited them by their behaviour; clearly, we can only determine the nature of mistaken moves in the war between reason and the senses by following their effects. If an action has evil results, then it is a mistaken and therefore sinful action: we must not judge actions by only a casual glance at what seems to us to be their nature.

Fortunately, there is ample evidence that the Elizabethans felt in just this way about actions and their consequences. They felt that history was a mirror in which we could see the sad consequences of sinful actions, and that tragedy was a dramatic representation of the downfall which inevitably followed after such evil.[2] References to this feeling that our actions, not chance, ruled the events of our lives,

are very numerous. Cardan, in his popular Comforte, wrote that "who so doth marke it wel, shall fynde that for the most part we are causes of oure owne evill,"[3] and the introductory lines of Jack Cade's story in The Mirror for Magistrates are well worth quoting:

> Our lust and wils our evils chefely warke.
>
> It may be wel that planets doe enclyne,
> And our complexions move our myndes to yll,
> But such is Reason, that they brynge to fine
> No worke, vnayded of our lust and wyl:
> For heauen and earth are subient both to skyl.
> The skyl of God ruleth al, it is so strong,
> Man may by skyl gyde thinges that to him long.
>
> Though lust be sturdy and wyl inclined to nought,
> This forst by mixture, that by heavens course,
> Yet through the skyl God hath in Reason wrought
> And geuen man, no lust nor wyl so course
> But may be stayed or swaged of the sourse,
> So that it shall in nothing force the mynde
> To worke our wo, or leaue the proper kynde.
>
> But though this skil be gemen every man
> To rule the wyl, and kepe the minde alofte,
> For lacke of grace ful fewe vse it can,
> These worldly pleasures tickle vs so oft.[4]

This gives us in a nutshell the subject of a great part of this thesis. Spenser expresses the central theme of Jack Cade's speech when he writes that

> ... faulty men vse oftentimes
> To attribute their folly vnto fate,
> And lay on heauen the guilt of their owne crimes.[5]

As a final testimony to the belief that each man was capable of controlling his own destiny, and was therefore responsible for it, we can turn to Richard Hooker's statement that "there is not that good which concerneth us, but it hath evidence enough for itself, if Reason were diligent to search it out."[6] This thesis will describe in effect the ways in which reason is seduced or nearly seduced from this search.

Notes to Introduction

1 For a recent example of this attitude, see E.E. Stoll, "Criticisms Criticized: Spenser and Milton," JEGP, XLI (1942), 460: "The physical torments inflicted on her [Amoret] have no inner significance."

2 For discussions of these themes, see L.B. Campbell, Shakespeare's Tragic Heroes, Slaves of Passion (Cambridge, 1930), pp.3-24; the same author's Shakespeare's Histories, Mirrors of Elizabethan Policy (San Marino, 1947), pp.85-105; and E.M.W. Tillyard, Shakespeare's History Plays (London, 1944), p.46 and, especially, pp.75-90.

3 From Bedingfield's trans. (1573), cited by L.B. Campbell, Shakespeare's Tragic Heroes, p.18.

4 The Mirror for Magistrates, ed. L.B. Campbell (Cambridge, 1938), pp.171-172.

5 "The Faerie Queene," V. iv. 28 in The Poetical Works of Spenser, ed. J.C. Smith and E. de Selincourt (London, 1912); all future references to "The Faerie Queene" and Spenser's other poems will be to this edition.

6 Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, ed. C. Morris, Everyman's Library (London, 1907), I, 173.

CHAPTER I

DEADLY SLEEP

Sleep is naturally associated with night and death, and Spenser specifically refers to the association several times.[1] Night is the time when evil and deceit walk fearlessly over the face of the earth under the protection of darkness, as Arthur complains:

> Vnder thy mantle blacke there hidden lye,
> Light-shonning theft, and traiterous intent,
> Abhorred bloudshed, and vile felony,
> Shamefull deceipt, and daunger imminent;
> Foule horror, and ekes hellish dreriment:
> All these I wote in thy protection bee
> (III.iv.58)

Night brings death, for "our life is day, but death with darknesse doth begin" (III.iv.59), and sleep is a lesser, temporary death: "next to death is Sleepe to be compard" (II.vii.25).

But sleep has these pejorative connotations not only on account of its relationship to the poetically negative images of night and death. Sleep is unconsciousness, and therefore in sleep the defences of reason are no longer available to the human organism, which thereby becomes much more vulnerable to attack.[2] Moreover, though sleep causes a suspension of the working of reason, it can also be said that to allow reason to lapse into forgetfulness is to fall asleep, and thus sleep comes to be an almost unconscious metaphor for a failure of reason, as can be seen in the reference to Sawles Warde in note 2. Through this very natural association of unconsciousness with loss of reason sleep

comes to have surprisingly pejorative implications, which are strengthened by another close association.

Sleep is assimilated into the concept of unreason, but it is also closely related to sloth and idleness, the nurse of all sin. Thus it can represent a failure of both reason and the will, though naturally there is usually no clear distinction made between the two. We can return to Arthur's diatribe against night for the first reference to the blameworthiness that is so often attached to sleep in The Faerie Queene; he inveighs against "the slouthfull bodie, that doth loue to steepe/ His lustlesse limbes, and drowne his baser mind" in sleep (III.iv.56). Here the image of drowning the mind points specifically at an almost wilfull loss of the power of reason. In somewhat similar fashion the Mariner whose boat Florimell enters wakes up "droncke with drowsinesse" (III.viii.22), a metaphor which approximates the unconsciousness of sleep to the unreason produced by strong drink, which again is a wilfully induced state meriting blame. Similarly, Idleness in the parade of the Seven Deadly Sins is shown as "drownd in sleepe" (I.iv.19).

Spenser sometimes uses sleep as a conscious metaphor referring to the associations discussed above, as in the comment on Marinell:

> But ah, who can deceiue his destiny,
> Or weene by warning to auoyd his fate?
> That when he sleepes in most security
> And safest seemes, him soonest doth amate
> (III.iv.27).

Marinell is trying to suppress his true nature, and the meaning of the words "destiny" and "fate" in the passage are modifed by this context to mean something like "nature" or "true self." To sleep in this context thus means to remain unaware of a fact which it is in one's power to become aware of through the exercise of reason.

Another interesting and clearly metaphorical use of the image of sleep occurs in Guyon's visit to Mammon's cave. An ugly fiend follows Guyon with the intention of seizing him as prey if "euer sleepe his eye-strings did vntye" (II.vii.27), and the temptation to rest comes to its peak when Guyon, now very weary after three days in the underworld, is invited to sit and rest on a silver stool in the Garden of Proserpina (II.vii.63). It is quite clear from the context that the fiend must represent something like theft or unbridled covetousness of wealth, to which Guyon will succumb if he slackens for a moment in the rational control which is temperance. It is worth noting too that here, as often elsewhere, the opposite of sleep is a wary watchfulness:

> But he was warie wise in all his way,
> And well perceiued his deceiptfull sleight
> (II.vii.64).

To sleep under these circumstances would mean to allow oneself to be deceived and thus fall into sin.

Usually Spenser does not use sleep in quite so obviously a metaphorical fashion, and one must read carefully to sense the pejorative associations which are present. But since in both the literal and the

metaphorical sense sleep involves, or rather is, a loss of rational consciousness, there is no clear line dividing the two uses, and in a sense it can be said that sleep always carries some allegorical overtones. The best and most consistent evidence of this is to be found in the large number of instances in which harm comes to someone during sleep. One must tread a little warily in examining some of these instances; for example, the Red Cross Knight is quite clearly not responsible for the tempting dream which Archimago sends to plague his rest (I.i.46-48), and the dream does not achieve its immediate mission (I.i.55). But even here there is a hint of moral ambivalence and doubt. The Knight had been accosted by Archimago disguised as a Hermit, and invited to spend the night. St. Augustine had written that "the devil when he entendeth most deeply to circumuent and deceave the sonnes of Men: then he pretendeth the most religious and holiest shewes of all,"[3] and surely it is a very suspicious circumstance that the Hermit tells his beads all day (I.i.30). Moreover, if we remember that the Devil has no power to deceive the truly chaste and can only attack where he finds an entrance prepared to receive him,[4] then the case against the Knight begins to build up. He has allowed his prudence and watchfulness to lapse in the face of fatigue, and has allowed himself to be deceived. He has fallen into a "deadly sleepe" (I.i.36), the consequences of which are indeed nearly fatal, since only grace can finally save him.

This view of the Knight's share of guilt in allowing sleep to overtake him in a dangerous place is corroborated by the many other

misfortunes which befall people during sleep or rest. Fradubio is finally trapped by Duessa while "drownd in sleepie night" (I.ii.42) and, since rest shares all the connotations of sleep in this kind of context, we may go on to note that the Red Cross Knight meets trouble again when he sits down disarmed to rest by a fountain (I.vii.2). The very specific mention of the disarming makes it clear that resting in this case is a temporary secession from the effort of living a virtuous life according to reason.

Guyon is threatened with death by Pyrochles and Cymochles while in a fainting sleep (II.viii.10-11), and is only saved by the joined forces of God's love and Arthur, who represents here the saving power of grace. It is significant that the Palmer, who represents Prudence or Reason, appears more or less helpless; he is suppliant (II.viii. 16) and does not seem able to prevent the two "Paynim knights" from beginning to despoil the seeming corpse (II.viii.17), so helpless is reason during sleep. There is a fairly close parallel to this incident later on, when Arthur in his turn (no longer, apparently, an emissary of God's grace) lies alone, "loosely displayd vpon the grassie ground,/ Possessed of sweete sleepe, that luld him soft in swound" (VI.vii.18). While Arthur lies thus sleeping, the false knight Turpin tries to persuade Sir Enias to kill him, but the latter refuses (VI.vii.23). There is a keen realization of the danger inherent in the situation in the contrast between the plotting knight and the Briton Prince who lies unarmed and "fearelesse of foes that mote his peace molest" (VI.vii.19),

and again, as with Guyon, it is only external circumstances that save him.

There are many such incidents. Britomart is approached, or perhaps invaded, by Malecasta while sleeping unarmed in Castle Joyous (III.i.60-62). The significance of the fact that she is disarmed is driven home by the earlier statement that Britomart, unlike the Red Cross Knight, refused to allow herself to be disarmed when Malecasta led them into a bower for cheer and entertainment (III.i.42). As a final example of the dangers inherent in sleep and unconsciousness, there is Serena's capture by the "saluage nation" while she lay "drowned in the depth of sleepe all fearelesse" (VI.viii.36), as a result of which casual attitude to life she came perilously close to being eaten.

It will have been noticed that there are several images which recur in these episodes; the sleeper is fearless or careless of danger, is usually disarmed, and is often said to be drowned in or lulled by sleep. These closely related images, all referring to a general relaxation of the spirit and a ceasing of effort, strengthen the interpretation placed upon Spenser's metaphorical use of the images of sleep and rest which is the main argument of this chapter. The world of The Faerie Queene is one filled with all manner of known and unknown dangers:

> Ay me, how many perils doe enfold
> The righteous man, to make him daily fall?
> Were not, that heauenly grace doth him vphold,
> And stedfast truth acquite him out of all.
> (I.viii.1).

Grace and truth will only keep man safe if he adds thereto the fullest and most unremitting exertion of his God-given faculties; slothful sleep destroys the co-operation between reason and grace[5] and leaves man an open prey to his enemies.

It may be objected to this argument that it is a little hard-pressed, a little unrealistically puritanical, and that it does not allow for the necessity of sleep to the human constitution. There are two replies to this objection, but before presenting them I shall reiterate the commonplace fact that The Faerie Queene is an allegory, and that according to standard allegorical practice the narrative itself bears an allegorical significance. Moreover, the application of this metaphorical use of sleep gives added meaning to portions of the poem, and this itself seems a valid defence. But there are explanations in the poem itself, which can be supported by background references.

The first argument is that in a rational man, such needs as sleeping and eating are under the control of reason,[6] and must therefore be fitted in to comply with the demands of more essential matters. Need does not answer to all requests (IV.viii.27), and therefore reason must balance the important against the less important and, if it chooses rest and sleep, it is responsible for the consequences. There is also the very real danger of sleeping too much, and there are several references in Spenser to the amount of rest or sleep due or necessary to the maintenance of health and vigour;[7] presumably sleep beyond this is sloth

and sinful idleness.[8] Diggon chides those shepherds who "sleepe, as some doen, all the long day,"[9] and there are several references to there being a good and fitting time for sleep, as for everything else.[10] It is in keeping with this that many, though not all, of the danger-inducing sleeps referred to in this chapter seem to take place during the day, when presumably something more active should have been underway. This is the literal, narrative-level explanation of the dangers attendant upon sleeping in the world of The Faerie Queene.

The underlying allegory however depends upon a realization of the kind of attitude expressed by Hooker when, after explaining that the search for knowledge which enables men to act in accordance with right reason is a painful thing, which makes the will disinclined to apply itself thereto, he goes on to add that it was because of this that "the Apostle, who knew right well that the weakness of the flesh is an heavy clog to the Will, striketh mightily upon this key, 'Awake thou that sleepest; Cast off all which presseth down; Watch; Labour; Strive to go forward and to grow in knowledge.'"[11] Such watchfulness is the proper alternative to sleep in Spenser too, and forms a contrary theme which heightens the significance of those episodes involving sleep or slothfulness already discussed. The virtuous life in Spenser is a strenuous one, as the encompassing image of the embattled knight would suggest, and the need for constant vigilance is by no means the least strenuous of its demands.

One may begin an examination of this counter theme of

watchfulness as it appears in The Faerie Queene by recalling the function of the eyes in the Castle of Alma; they are "set in watches stead" (II.ix.46) and flame "continually." The vow never to rest until a specified quest is achieved is made frequently;[12] presumably these vows must not be taken quite literally, and should be compared with the description of Calidore's chase of the Blatant Beast, which appears to be a more reasonable version of the same promise:

> Ne rested he himselfe but natures dew,
> For dread of daunger, not to be redrest,
> If he for slouth forslackt so famous quest
> (VI.ix.3).

But even if the numerous vows are not to be taken as completely realistic, they make their allegorical point clearly enough.

Apart from these vows and numerous passing references, there are several notable exemplars of the virtues of constant wakefulness and watchfulness. There is the Boatman who takes Guyon and the Palmer to the Bower of Bliss, who

> Held on his course with stayed stedfastnesse,
> Ne euer shruncke, ne euer sought to bayt
> His tyred armes for toylesome wearinesse,
> But with his oares did sweepe the watry wildernesse
> (II.xii.29).

Or one can take Britomart as the exemplar; at Castle Joyous she slept, and was forced to fight for her life against Malecasta's six knights (III.i.63-67). But in the Castle of Busyrane, which is a very close parallel to Castle Joyous, she remains on watch, for she has had experience of the likelihood of treachery in establishments of this kind, and has no desire to be caught unawares again:

> And now sad shadowes gan the world to hyde,
> From mortall vew, and wrap in darkenesse dreare;
> Yet nould she d'off her weary armes, for feare
> Of secret daunger, ne let sleepe oppresse
> Her heauy eyes with natures burdein deare,
> But drew her selfe aside in sickernesse,
> And her welpointed weapons did about her dresse
> (III.xi.55).

In this instance, as so often, sleeping is closely connected to disarming, and Britomart achieves her end by doing neither, but by subjugating natural desires to a rational end.

Watchfulness and wakefulness become major themes in Book V, where they are necessary to forestall the deceit and treachery of dangerous and evil men. Talus appears never to need sleep, and "vsde in times of ieopardy/ To keepe a nightly watch, for dread of treachery" (V.iv.46), a task in which he is several times shown engaged.[13] Much the same seems to be true of Artegall when he leaves Britomart to resume his central quest; he "ne day nor night did euer idly rest" (V.viii.3).

Britomart also partakes of the general alertness and vigilance which the moral atmosphere of much of Book V seems to make so necessary. When she arrives at the house of the seemingly courteous Dolon, she accepts his offer of hospitality,

> But she ne would vndressed be for ought,
> Ne doffe her armes, though he her much besought.
> For she had vow'd, she sayd, not to forgo
> Those warlike weedes, till she reuenge had wrought
> Of a late wrong vppon a mortall foe
> (V.vi.23).

Again, waking and remaining armed are closely connected, and both are clearly symbols of the alert and unsleeping reason. In this case they save Britomart's life; Dolon does prove a villain, and Spenser divides the credit for the preservation of his heroine's life between God and her own perseverance, emphasizing the co-operation between reason and grace already referred to: "by Gods grace, and her good heedinesse,/ She was preserued from their traytrous traine" (V.vi.34). Clearly under the circumstances sleep would have been reprehensible, and wakefulness is the proper price to pay for self-preservation in a dangerous world. Thus sleep is death, and rational consciousness life, on both the narrative and the allegorical levels of Spenser's world.

Notes for Chapter I

1 For example, F.Q. I.v.30-31; II.vii.25; III.iv.55-59; VII.vii.44.

2 Cf. "Sawles Warde," in Old English Homilies and Homiletic Treatises, ed. Richard Morris, E.E.T.S., O.S. 34 (London, 1868), p.264. Here the soul's house is unsafe, on account of the imminent rebellion of thoughts and passions, when the proper houselerd, Wit, is "asleep or goeth anywhere from home (that is, when man forgetteth his wit)."

3 Cited by Kerby Neill, "The Degredation of the Red Cross Knight," in That Soueraine Light, ed. W.R. Mueller and D.C. Allen (Baltimore, 1952), p.105; cf. the whole of his excellent analysis of this episode.

4 See Intro., p.3.

5 See lines from The Mirror for Magistrates cited in the Intro., p.3.

6 Hooker, I, 170.

7 For example, F.Q. II.i.47; II.ix.20; VI.ix.3.

8 See Sir Thomas Elyot, The Castel of Helth, Scholars' Facsimiles and Reprints (N.Y., n.d.), 45r-45v: "to a hole mā hauing no debilitie of nature, and digesting perfittly the meate that he eateth, a lytel slepe is sufficient," and 46r: immoderate sleep makes "the wittes dulle."

9 The Shepheardes Calendar, September, l.233.

10 F.Q. VI.xi.24; and Epithalamion, l.355: "tymely sleep, when it is tyme to sleepe."

11 Hooker, I, 174.

12 F.Q. I.ix.15; I.ix.32; II.ii.44; V.iv.34; V.vii.24.

13 F.Q. V.vi.26; V.vii.26.

CHAPTER II

THE WANDERING WOOD

The warfare between reason and its opponents can also be illustrated from other battlefields, and one of these is that defined by such images as the path and the guide. This chapter will trace the history of this particular aspect of the war as it occurs in The Faerie Queene.

The central theme of this discussion is the quest. All of the chief protagonists of the poem have a task allotted to them. The Red Cross Knight is to free Una's parents from the ravages of the dragon (I.i.3-5); Guyon vows to avenge the orphan Ruddymane whose parents have been killed by Acrasia (II.i.61); Britomart has what amounts to a double commission, to find Artegall whom she has only seen in a mirror (III.iii.51-62) and to rescue Amoret, whom Scudamour is unable to save (Letter to Raleigh, p.408). Artegall has his proper mission, the bringing of succour to the beleaguered Irena (V.i.3-4), and Calidore has the task of capturing the Blatant Beast (VI.i.7). Thus each knight is already dedicated to a particular task when the book containing his story opens, and all time expended on pursuits other than this allotted task is time stolen or at best borrowed.

This theme cannot be pressed too hard or too literally, for we have Spenser's own word for it that many "aduentures are intermedled,

but rather as Accidents, then intendments,"[1] but it is important. Moreover, the intermeddling of other strands of narrative does not excuse the protagonists from failing to press hard their own central quests, which means following the most direct path. As Sidney said, "a mynde well trayned and longe exercysed in vertue, ...dothe not easily chaunge any Course yt once undertakes, but uppon well grounded and well weyed Causes."[2]

I

The first instance of this wandering from the true path of reason is found in the very first incident of the poem. The Red Cross Knight, following his quest, is assailed by a shower of rain, and because he desires shelter, the knight leaves the path he has been following and enters a shady grove nearby "that promist ayde the tempest to withstand" (I.i.7). Padelford suggests that the thickness of the trees, "that heauens light did hide" (I.i.7) and which no star can pierce is a symbol of worldliness, as it is in the Inferno.[3] This is helpful, but it is a rather external way of presenting the allegory; one of the finest things about Spenser's allegory is his power to present temptation as it appears to the protagonist, while nevertheless giving us sufficient clues to recognize the temptation as a temptation. The kind of comment paraphrased above does not explain why the knight enters the wood, nor the ethical significance of the entrance, an understanding of which is quite as relevant to interpretation of the incident as the knowledge of what the wood nominally represents.

In stanzas 7-9 Spenser presents a wonderfully serene picture of the wood "yclad with sommers pride" and filled with the sweet song of birds. The stanzas have a sensuous air quite unlike the atmosphere of the preceding stanzas; in fact, until the description of the wood we did not even know what season forms the background to the episode. The change is subtle but dramatic; the air had been full of fatigue, care and then storm and rain; inside the wood all is summer and bird-song, and the storm of life is excluded entirely. The completeness of the change should act as a subtle warning that the wood is not quite real, is in fact more than a little magical. Its convenient proximity at the very moment the storm breaks hints at the possibility of collusion between storm and wood, or a manipulation of circumstances by a designing power. The suggestion remains only a suggestion because Spenser is past enough to leave such things embedded in the texture of his poetry; it is the allegory implied by the events of the narrative itself that we are dealing with, not a separate level of meaning superimposed upon the narrative.

The magic and appeal lies in the powerful effect of sensuousness and ease, and it has its way with our knight. In stanza 3 he was led by a yearning to "preue his puissance in battell braue/ Vpon his foe", but by stanza 8 he is "with pleasure forward led." Pleasure is a potentially disastrous guide, and by stanza 10 he has strengthened his hold and has grown into "delight." It is only <u>after</u> this subtly indicated process of seduction from the straight path of reason and duty that the knight comes upon the beaten path that leads to the cave of Error.

In this instance we are told that this is a wandering wood, and the moral is drawn for us plainly enough: in future the knight will keep that path "which beaten was most plaine,/ Ne euer would to any by-way bend" (I.i.28). We can add to this that if the knight had not given way to fatigue and the temptation to leave his stormy path for the ease and pleasure of the wood, he would never have encountered Error at all, and his fight would have been unnecessary. The right path is a path which must be determined and held continuously by reason against all the subtle temptations of the ease and pleasure-loving senses.

This is not the last that we hear of the Red Cross Knight's wanderings from the path of truth. After he has been parted from Una by Archimago and the strength of unruly passions,[4] Spenser says of him that "will was his guide, and griefe led him astray" (I.ii.12). The images of being led astray and leaving the path are continued more obviously in Duessa's leading the knight to the House of Pride (I.iv.Argument) and are completed by his frank admission to Una's father of the nature of his past misdeeds, where he declares that his meeting with Duessa belongs to a portion of his life that is now finished with:

> It was in my mishaps, as hitherward
> I lately traueild, that vnwares I strayd
> Out of my way, through perils straunge and hard
> (I.xii.31).

This brief resumé, however, bypasses Canto X, which has a quite extraordinarily concentrated number of references to paths and guides;[5] it would appear that Heaven naturally thinks in terms of these

images. This Canto makes it abundantly clear that Spenser was very conscious of their significance and that we could not take too lightly an apparently passing reference to someone missing the path or being led by any but the most highly qualified and soberly accredited guides. Dame Caelia[6] expresses very clearly the central meaning of the image when she laments:

> ... So few there bee,
> That chose the narrow path, or seeke the right:
> All keepe the broad high way, and take delight
> With many rather for to go astray,
> And be partakers of their euill plight,
> Then with a few to walke the rightest way
> (I.x.10).

There are also in this Canto two very clear statements of the theme that there is a way through the world which will not mislead those who travel upon it, provided that they have proper guides. Mercy (presumably in the sense of the mercy God shows to man through grace) is given charge of the Red Cross Knight "to lead aright, that he should neuer fall/ In all his wayes through this wide worldes waue" (I.x.34), and a little later the hermit Contemplation beckons to the knight to come and see the way "that neuer leads the traueiler astray" (I.x.52). It is in statements of this kind that one can see how pervasive are the themes of the path and the guide. In them we can find a standard by which to measure the conduct of the narrative of the poem.

II

In the second book of The Faerie Queene Guyon has both a

proper guide, as we are very often reminded,[7] and a specified quest. These facts are referred to so continuously that it is possible to trace the progress of the hero by means of them. Guyon leaves with the Palmer as his authorized guide, but is separated from him by Archimago (II.i.13) when he leaves the path on a false trail; Guyon is thereafter shown as being driven by passions rather than led by reason,[8] and is correspondingly guided by Archimago instead of his Palmer (II.i.24). During this episode he becomes "inflam'd with wrathfulness" (II.i.25) but conquers this "through goodly handling and wise temperance" (II.i.31), at which moment, appropriately enough, the Palmer catches up with him again and resumes his guidance with the aid of reason (II.i.34). The change of guide signifies that Guyon has temporarily allowed himself to be deceived by a false cause which has swayed his passions to action without the consent of reason.[9] One can almost hear the Palmer panting from his exertions as he catches up with his hasty charge (II.i.31).

The image of the journey, often seen as a sea journey,[10] continues, and Guyon for a while remains "mindfull of his vow yplight" (II.iii.1), while the Palmer continues to keep him on the right path:

> ...that blacke Palmer, his most trusty guide;
> Who suffred not his wandring feet to slide.
> But when strong passion, or weake fleshlinesse
> Would from the right way seeke to draw him wide,
> He would through temperance and stedfastnesse,
> Teach him the weake to strengthen, and the strong suppresse
> (II.iv.2).

Spenser moves from this kind of statement to a more literal representation of someone leaving an actual path or way in the narrative without

any change of meaning; the images and aphorisms of the verse and the conduct of the narrative imply the same moral.

Now we come to the Argument of Canto VI, which says that "Guyon is of immodest Merth/ led into loose desire." Phaedria is a servant of Acrasia (II.vi.9), owns a "wandring ship" (II.vi.10) and an island that fleets over the wide sea -- in other words, a wandering island (II.xii.14). This island is described as possessing all that can yield pleasure to the senses, and it is added that Phaedria herself makes it appear more seductive than it really is: "And all though pleasant, yet she made much more" (II.vi.24). All these things relate the island very closely to the "wandring wood" discussed at the beginning of this chapter, and confirm the suspicion there voiced that the sweetness of the wood is in part the work of magic; Phaedria and Archimago both manipulate appearances in the direction of sweetness. Acrasia's Bower of Bliss is also apparently very similar, for it is situated "within a wandring Island, that doth ronne/ And stray in perilous gulfe" (II.i.51), and in it

> ...what euer in this worldly state
> Is sweet, and pleasing vnto liuing sense,
> Or that may dayntiest fantasie aggrate,
> Was poured forth with plentifull dispence,
> And made there to abound with lauish affluence
> (II.xii.42).

This suggests something similar to Phaedria's enhancing art.

Guyon reacts much as the Red Cross Knight had done; the natural conclusion to be drawn from the blunt statement of the Argument

heading the Canto, and Guyon's quick realization, "he wist himselfe amisse" (st. 22), is that his parting from the Palmer signifies a departure from reason and his proper path.[11] As he chides Phaedria, "me litle needed from my right way to haue straid" (st. 22). Phaedria's reply is an exposition of what the images of the wandering wood and the floating island stand for:

> Who fares on sea, may not commaund his way,
> Ne wind and weather at his pleasure call:
> The sea is wide, and easie for to stray;
> The wind vnstable, and doth neuer stay
> (II.vi.23).

The sea and the forest are symbolical of the undifferentiated flux of sense experience, unsorted, and not ruled by reason, which creates a path to a chosen destination. It is when the will and reason relax in pleasure and aimlessness that deceit may find a way to enter the mind and quietly steer it to an undesired goal, as Phaedria takes Sir Guyon to her island. However, he manages to withstand further temptation, and his stay on the Idle Lake is of short duration.[12] He does not escape, moreover, without an implied censure when the Palmer brushes Phaedria off with a bitter rebuke as Guyon and the Palmer voyage to the Bower of Bliss (II.xii.16); the poet seems to add his own rebuke to her for having led his hero astray as he silently contrasts his behaviour on that occasion with his behaviour now:

> That was the wanton Phaedria, which late
> Did ferry him ouer the Idle Lake:
> Whom nought regarding, they kept on their gate,
> And all her vaine allurements did forsake
> (II.xii.17).

The implication is clearly that Guyon was led astray.

When he is returned to firm land by Phaedria, he is still without the Palmer, "his trusty guide" (II.vii.2). Who will lead him now?

He is shown in a rather striking image as being now his own guide, and is compared to a Pilot who, since a storm has hidden the steadfast star by which he had been steering, must now make do with his own experience and his card and compass (II.vii.1). The image makes it quite clear that this is very much of a second-best method of navigation; indeed, Prince Arthur, caught by night in the forest and described in an exactly parallel image,[13] finds it necessary to cast anchor for the night to wait for the light of day before continuing. Guyon is taking a distinct risk in navigating blind with imperfect instruments — that is in letting his own fallible capacities lead him without the help of the Palmer.

In short, Guyon is more or less lost, and the implications of the landscape through which he travels support this interpretation:

> For still he traueild through wide wastfull ground,
> That nought but desert wildernesse shew'd all around
> (II.vii.2).

Significantly, it is just during this portion of his travels that he comes upon "a gloomy glade,/ Couer'd with boughes and shrubs from heauens light" (II.vii.3). This is another manifestation of the wandering wood; the repetition of the detail of the boughs shutting out heaven's light assists in the identification. As a sign that this is no casual, merely descriptive detail, it is repeated by Mammon (II.vii. 19) and then once again by Guyon (II.vii.20). There is thus a very specifically pointed reference in the opening of the next Canto, "and is there care in heauen?" for Guyon has almost wilfully removed himself from the light of heaven by descending into the cave; yet heaven still

shows care for him. Closely woven patterns of imagery like this are one of the signs of the all-pervasive allegory which is imbedded in the narrative of The Faerie Queene.

Mammon is evidently waiting for Guyon, as we can see from his theatrically exaggerated surprise at seeing him (II.vii.6); the whole thing is a baited trap set up to catch Guyon as he wanders without his Palmer. A further indication of the illusory nature of the grove and cave is the fact that it seems to dwindle into insignificance at the end of the episode. When the Palmer returns, he finds nothing but a shady delve "where Mammon earst did sunne his threasury" (II.viii.4), and Mammon himself seems to have disappeared completely.

This leads to the important point that Guyon is seriously at fault in entering the cave at all.[14] The Argument to Canto VII shows that there is a temptation which results in Guyon's descent into the cave, a temptation which is therefore quite distinct from the more obvious lures in the cave itself, and it is to this first temptation that Guyon falls prey. As he himself recognizes, he has no right thus to waste the time which he should be devoting to the destruction of Acrasia:

> Me ill besits, that in der-doing armes,
> And honours suit my vowed dayes do spend,
> Vnto thy bounteous baytes, and pleasing charmes,
> With which weake men thou witchest, to attend
> (II.vii.10).

The conclusion is inescapable that Guyon had no right to endanger himself

in this manner. Mammon calls him a "Hardy Elfe" (II.vii.7), clearly using the word in the sense of "foolhardy," and the word is repeated with ambivalent meaning in II.vii.27. Thus when Spenser, at the moment of Guyon's faint at the end of the episode, calls the descent a "hardie enterprize" (II.vii.65), he is giving a very mixed judgement on the whole affair. Guyon was hardy, that is, brave and strong, to resist the temptations in the cave, but also hardy, that is, foolish, to take such unnecessary risks at all.[15]

It is only quite late in Book II that Guyon really gets down to the business in hand. We should not miss the undertone of gentle reproof in the editorial lines that introduce the long-delayed attack upon Acrasia:

> Now gins this goodly frame of Temperance
> Fairely to rise,
> - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
> And this braue knight, that for that vertue fights,
> Now comes to point of that same perilous sted
> (II.xii.1; my italics).

There seems to be an almost whimsically regretful realization of personal shortcomings in Guyon's prayer that Arthur should "constant keepe the way, in which ye stand" (II.ix.8) and this shows also an attitude that we recognize as typical of faulty men:[16]

> Fortune, the foe of famous cheuisaunce
> Seldome (said Guyon) yields to vertue aide,
> But in her way throwes mischiefe and mischaunce,
> Whereby her course is stopt, and passage staid.
> But you, faire Sir, be not herewith dismaid,
> But constant keepe the way, in which ye stand
> (II.ix.8).

A consistent tracing of the images of the path and the guide has thus helped in determining the precise meaning of some episodes in the narrative, and in apportioning blame and honour where they are really due. It has also shown that there are more or less distinct levels of allegory in The Faerie Queene. Guyon as an embodiment of the virtue of temperance has not broken down, has indeed been that virtue combatting and defeating other vices, such as "immodest Merth" and greed for gold. But Guyon as a representation of ordinary man has been guilty of several faults, notably idleness on the Idle Lake, and curiosity and covetousness of the eyes[17] in Mammon's cave. Thus Spenser's allegorical method makes it possible for him to use the same figure as both the exemplar or even personification of a virtue, and as an ordinary man striving to achieve that particular virtue. It is this second kind of allegory, which could be identified as the ethical meaning of the surface narrative, with which we are concerned here.

III

The allegory of the wandering wood and the lost path does not end in Book II. But in its next appearance there is a slight difference: the heroes are said to be searching simply for "aduentures hard, to exercise/ Their puissance" (III.i.14), though this is not strictly accurate, as Arthur should be seeking Gloriana, and Britomart trying to identify Artegall. In fact only Guyon is an errant knight seeking fresh

adventures; but since the search for a magically revealed but as yet unknown lover cannot be imaged as a quest directed along a straight path, Spenser is pointing to a real difference.

> Britomart, Arthur, and Guyon in their travellings come to a
>
> ...forrest wyde,
> Whose hideous horror and sad trembling sound
> Full griesly seem'd
> (III.i.14).

While they are in this wood, they are startled to see a fair lady on horseback rush past them, followed at a distance by a fierce forester. Arthur and Guyon spur after the lady, Timias pursues the forester, while Britomart refuses to be drawn from her forward journey (III.i.19) into the chase for beauty or ladies' love, but continues as straight as she can: "ne her right course for ought forsooke" (III.iv.44). Arthur however finds himself benighted like a ship "whose lodestarre suddenly/ Couered with cloudes, her Pilot hath dismayd" (III.iv.53) and finds himself cursing "his wicked fortune, that had turned aslope" (III.iv.52). Though one hesitates to implicate Arthur in such things[19] this seems clearly to indicate that he has taken a wrong path and that he is at fault.[20] However, one may note that he seems to know perfectly well that the beauty he is chasing is not that of Gloriana. The hope that this might be so appears as only one of the "thousand fancies [that] bet his idle braine/ With their light wings, the sights of semblants vaine" (III.iv.54). Arthur, strayed from his proper path and the rule of reason, finds himself lost at night and tortured by an uncontrolled imagination — a proper enough punishment. Guyon disappears from sight,

and Timias encounters many troubles which seem to be controlled by the historical references rather than the moral allegory, so that we shall not make use of them. How has all this happened, and where are the faults that have led to this situation?

Firstly we should see that the darkness or "hideous horror" of the wood that the knightly friends entered relates it to the two wandering woods already discussed. There is also a more direct clue, for we learn afterwards that

> Yet did false Archimago her [Britomart] still pursew,
> To bring to passe his mischieuous intent,
> Now that he had her singled from the crew
> Of courteous knights, the Prince, and Faery gent
> (III.iv.45).

This makes it appear that the sudden appearance in the wood of Florimell chased by the forester is to some degree contrived by Archimago in order to separate Britomart from her companions.[21]

This analysis must not be pressed too far, or it will rob Florimell of all responsibility for her actions (though she does appear as a rather passive figure). But it does seem that Archimago is given considerable license to deceive, and he has already shown his talent for separating true companions.[22] He may not be able to control Florimell, the forester, and the knights as if they were marionettes, but it does appear that he has the power to time and arrange their conjunctions by means of the misleading powers of the wood, and that he can to some degree manipulate the appearance which each presents to the others. None of the knights is able to see Florimell clearly, as her speed "scarse them

leasure gaue, her passing to behold" (III.i.15), while the image of her resemblance to a comet that "importunes death and dolefull drerihed" (III.i.16) casts a sinister shadow on the suddenness of her appearance. The wood seems to continue to co-operate admirably with Archimago, for the path through it soon divides into two, thereby separating Arthur and Guyon (III.iv.46); now all the friends are isolated. The deceit of an illusory appearance of sweetness (illusory at least in its effects) has again confused and troubled even the strong and has transformed the search for honour through adventures hard (III.i.14) into the search for heart-pleasing beauty (III.i.19; III.iv.45).

In The Faerie Queene woods are usually harbourers of danger and deceit; it is while Amoret walked through a wood that Lust caught her (IV.vii.4), and it is out of a forest that the Blatant Beast rushes to capture Serena (VI.iii.23). In both cases pleasure or liking is specifically named as the guide,[23] as it was when the Red Cross Knight entered the wandering wood, and as it soon became when Arthur and Guyon entered their wood in Book III, Canto 1. It is also easy to get lost in a wood, as the Red Cross Knight (I.i.10-11) and Calepine (VI.iv.24) find to their discomfort. Woods, with their labyrinthine paths (I.i.7) and encompassing lack of light and clarity, are thus natural symbols of the mind of man obscured and split into many paths by undirected passions and misguiding phantasms of the imagination. They are images of thick, unordered appearances not yet classified by the path of reason, of many-

faceted sensations which by themselves lead everywhere and thus nowhere. As images of these mental states, woods naturally tend to reflect the mental states of those who enter them, and when understood in this way, are seen to be part of the allegory embedded in the narrative of the poem.[24]

IV

Artegall and Calidore are also guilty of leaving the due path leading to the accomplishment of their quests. When Artegall meets and rescues Sir Terpine, he asks the latter how it happened

> That ye were runne so fondly far astray,
> As for to lead your selfe vnto your owne decay
> (V.iv.26).

Artegall in his turn becomes bound to Radegund "by his owne wilfull blame" (V.v.20) and so leaves his proper path. As a direct result of this blameworthy delay, and in spite of the prompt resumption of his quest upon release, Irene nearly loses her life (V.xi.40). Artegall very properly expresses his remorse for this:

> ... Now sure and by my life,
> Too much am I to blame for that faire Maide,
> That haue her drawne to all this troublous strife,
> Through promise to afford her timely aide,
> Which by default I haue not yet defraide
> (V.xi.41).

He is more officially censured for this delay in the brief resumé of the action given in V.xii.3, where it is said that he had "forslackt" his proper mission. Delay is as serious as losing the path, is in fact

much the same thing. But Artegall's delay is a very simple one, and needs no commentary; Calidore's is more interesting.

Calidore's quest is the subjugation of the Blatant Beast, though he is very conscious of having no guide to bring him straight to his desired prey (VI.i.6). He leaves the poem at VI.iii.26, chasing the Beast at strenuous speed, and re-enters it at VI.ix.2, still "sewing" with all good conscience, and sleeping no more than necessary:

> Ne rested he himselfe but natures dew,
> For dread of daunger, not to be redrest,
> If he for slouth forslackt so famous quest
> (VI.ix.3).

Eventually, with the perspiration of righteous striving still on his brow (VI.ix.5), he comes to the domain of the shepherds, who have never heard of the Blatant Beast (VI.ix.6).

Once among the shepherds, Calidore is seduced from his quest by the sweetness of the pastoral life, and remains among them for a while. This truancy from the quest has been variously interpreted as a result of Spenser's inability to resolve a conflict inherent in his allegory[25] and as a diversion into the true source of all courtesy.[26] This latter interpretation is attractive and at least partially correct, but I cannot accept it entirely.

Among the pleasantness/es of the pastoral condition enumerated by Meliboe is lack of effort (VI.ix.21) and even what appears to be slothfulness:

> And when I wearie am, I downe doe lay
> My limbes in euery shade, to rest from toyle,
> And drinke of euery brooke, when thirst my throte doth boyle
> (VI.ix.23).

Having written the first chapter of this thesis, I cannot but conclude that this is no life for a true knight. Moreover, Meliboe's tongue is called "pheasing" (VI.ix.26), a dubious compliment in Spenser,[27] particularly when associated with images of ravishing, greedy ears, and melting sensuousness, as here (VI.ix.26). Indeed, in this stanza it is said that Calidore "lost himselfe, and like one halfe entraunced grew," by virtue both of the old man's words and the beauty of Pastorella.

As a natural result of this loss of self and rational control, Calidore is reproved by the poet, and is accused of being "entrapt of loue, which him betrayd" (VI.x.i). He intends no longer to "sew/ His former quest, so full of toile and paine" (VI.x.2) and seems to have changed course completely. Eventually, however, conscience and duty catch up with him, and he is ashamed to think

> ... how he that enterprize,
> The which the Faery Queene had long afore
> Bequeath'd to him, forslacked had so sore
> (VI.xii.12).

Because of this renewed realization he leaves his newly won Pastorella and completes his quest successfully, though the Beast escapes again. This summary should make it quite clear that there has been some kind of truancy, and that no theory of the structure of the book can completely disregard that truancy.

But I have intentionally omitted consideration of two stanzas which state that the book has followed a way "whose course is often stayd, yet neuer is astray" (VI.xii.1) and that

> ...all that hetherto hath long delayd
> This gentle knight, from sewing his first quest,
> Though out of course, yet hath not bene missayd,
> To shew the courtesie by him profest,
> Euen vnto the lowest and the least
> (VI.xii.2).

This hesitation and near-contradiction suggests that the images of the path and the quest are being used a little differently in this book, and that the problem lies in the relationship of the quest to the vision of the pastoral life presented by Meliboe.

The answer to the problem seems to lie in the word Antiquity. Let us look first at an earlier discussion of the nature of the "antique world." Guyon, in the cave of Mammon, states that

> The antique world, in his first flowring youth,
> Found no defect in his Creatours grace,
> But with glad thankes, and vnreproued truth,
> The gifts of soueraigne bountie did embrace:
> Like Angels life was then mens happy cace;
> But later ages pride, like corn-fed steed,
> Abusd her plenty, and fat swolne encreace
> To all licentious lust, and gan exceed
> The measure of her [Nature's] meane, and naturall first need
> (II.vii.16).

To this Mammon rejoins that nowadays work is necessary:

> Thou that doest Liue in later times, must wage
> Thy workes for wealth, and life for gold engage
> (II.vii.18).

It is thus quite certain that Spenser is here using Antiquitie as an image of the state of man before the Fall, before work became the curse of Adam.

If we look at the shepherds of Book VI, we shall find that they are but a fuller representation of the same image. Courtesy, we read, was at its truest in Antiquitie,[28] and the images of Antiquitie and the pastoral life are thus united. Like man before the Fall, the shapherds do not need to work in order to live,[29] and, again like prelapsarian man, they are ignorant of "any wicked feend, that mote offend/ Their happie flockes, nor daunger to them draw" (VI.ix.6). Thus Guyon has stumbled upon a pocket of perfection; but since the curse of Adam is the necessary lot of all men, he cannot remain among the shepherds, any more than the Red Cross Knight can remain on the hill of Contemplation. They must turn back to accomplish their quests, which have been transfigured into the image of man's attempt to win back his first state of bliss by means of continual endeavour. The journey back to a state of grace is the underlying meaning of knightly endeavour in The Faerie Queene, and there are no short cuts on this road.

All this is closely reflected in the pattern of the narrative. First of all the mere presence of Calidore, a fallen mortal, disturbs the state of the pastoral world, and frightens away the Graces who surround Colin Clout's love. The Graces are ultimately symbols of Grace itself, as Colin makes clear: "for being gone, none can them bring in place,/ But whom they of them selues list so to grace" (VI.x.20). Almost at the same time the lawless Brigands break into the shepherds domain, which had never before known strife, and carry off Pastorella (VI.x.40). The realities of the fallen world have broken rudely into

into the little Eden of the shepherds, which seems to be a reflection of a great longing in the minds of Calidore and Spenser for a world of innocence and simplicity. The blame for the destruction is laid upon "fortune fraught with malice, blinde, and brute" (VI.x.38), but we have learned already that such an attribution of responsibility is suspect. It usually represents the nature and errors of fallen men.[30] Here it seems to mean the nature of fallen man in general. Thus this portion of the narrative parallels the meaning of the final escape of the Blatant Beast; humanity is still fallen, and the shepherds' world remains an impossibility in the world of men.

The truancy then has been both a diversion into true felicity and a forslacking of the proper task appointed to him, and Spenser's ambivalence about it has reflected this double nature. Calidore's conception of his quest seems to have been purified by the diversion, if one accepts the implications of the lines which seem to connect his pursuit of the Beast with the hunt after courtly favour (VI.x.2-3).[31] But return to his quest he must, if he is to avoid shame in the world of men (VI. xii.12), and the poem ends very appropriately in the real world with a hero who carries in his mind the memory of a better world and a hope to return to it by way of his Pastorella.

Notes to Chapter II

1 Letter to Raleigh, p.408. The context leaves it uncertain whether this refers to the whole poem, or only to Books III and IV. The position of the sentence, and the fact that all the "Accidents" listed come from these two books, lead me to think that these are the only books meant, leaving the others still governed, nominally at least, by a continuing quest.

2 Philip Sidney, The Countess of Pembroke's Arcadia, original version ed. Albert Feuillerat (Cambridge, 1926), p.10.

3 F.M. Padelford, "The Spiritual Allegory of the Faerie Queene, Book One," JEGP, XXII (1923), 7.

4 See Kerby Neill, passim.

5 The references are scattered throughout Book I, Canto X, but see especially stanzas 9, 10, 34, 35, 51, 52, 55, 61, 63.

6 Belphoebe utters a very similar lament on behalf of honour (II.iii.41).

7 F.Q. II.i.7; II.i.34; II.ii.1; II.iv.2; II.vi.19; II.vii.2; II.xi.5; II.xii.18.

8 "Fierce ire/ And zealous hast," (II.i.13).

9 For the relationship, or identity, of the Palmer and reason, see Chapter V, pp. 83-84.

10 F.Q. II.i.32; II.vii.1; II.xii.passim.

11 Cf. J.C. Maxwell, "Guyon, Phaedria, and the Palmer," RES, N.S.V (1954), 388-390.

12 See discussion of the Palmer's function in relation to Guyon, Chapter V, pp.

13 Arthur's state is said to be "like as a ship, whose Lodestarre suddenly/ Couered with cloudes, her Pilot hath dismayd" (III.iv.53). Cf. the image which Britomart uses to depict her grief (III.iv.8-10); this image and its implications are well analysed by J.S. Weld, "The Complaint of Britomart: Word-play and Symbolism," PMLA, LXVI (1951), 548-551. Cf. also The Teares of the Muses (ll. 139-144), where the staff of wisdom is associated with reason as with the Palmer (II.i.7), and where we are told of the dreadful fate of a ship caught in a storm without "helme or Pilot her to sway."

14 This point is usually passed over in favour of Guyon's successful resistance to the temptations in the cave. But see Ernest Sirluck, "The Faerie Queene, Book II, and the Nicomachean Ethics," MP, XLIX (1951-2), 73-100. Sirluck attributes curiosity as Guyon's motive for entering the cave (p.91). See also Harry Berger, The Allegorical Temper (New Haven, 1957), pp.18-29, for an excellent discussion of this point, to which I am considerably indebted.

15 For other instances of the use of "hardy" to mean "foolhardy" see F.Q. III.ii.13; III.v.44; VII.vi.33.

16 That is, blaming fortune rather than oneself: see F.Q.V.iv.28 and Intro., pp.2-3.

17 For the seriousness of these sins, which are represented by the repetition of the image of Guyon's feasting on what he sees (II.vii. 9, 24) and by Guyon's continual questioning (II.vii.48, 59, 62), see Berger, pp.20-23. Cf. also "coueytise-of-eyes" in William Langland, The Vision of William concerning Piers the Plowman, ed. W.W. Skeat, E.E.T.S., 4 vols. (London, 1867-77), II, 169 (Passus XI, l.13).

18 Cf. Berger's theory (pp.29-35) that one level of the allegory is aimed at the super-human Guyon and the other level at Everyman or the Common reader. The discussion is valuable and interesting, but I think that the two levels are better expressed as representing the two modes of existence of Guyon, one as an abstract allegorical virtue, and the other as a complete Elizabethan human being.

19 See Intro., pp.1-2.

20 For confirmation of this view of the incident, see Kathleen Williams, "'Eterne in Mutabilitie': The Unified World of 'The Faerie Queene'," in That Soueraine Light, pp.44-45.

21 J.H. Walter, "'The Faerie Queene': Alterations and Structure," MLR, XXXVI (1941), 40-41, points out that in the poem Archimago makes no attempt to realize his "mischieuous intent," and that this stanza is therefore merely a loose end in the narrative. But this does not alter the value of the stanza as evidence of what Spenser saw as the controlling force behind the incident, which is the point at issue here.

22 Archimago separates the Red Cross Knight from Una and very nearly separates the Red Cross Knight from Guyon also (II.i.25-28).

23 In Spenser's world there is no guide more dangerous than pleasure or uncontrolled liberty. See the fate of Clarion in Mviopotmos; led by the desire for variety and sweetness (ll.177-179) and enjoying delight with liberty (ll. 209-211), he is caught by Aragnoll and ends "in lymie snares the subtill loupes among" (l. 429). Amoret and Serena are both captured while indulging in a similarly pleasurable freedom.

24 Cf. John Arthos, On the Poetry of Spenser and the Form of Romances (London, 1956), p.79: "for Spenser the greatest evils are of one's own creation, and most often the dangers of the forest are only likenesses to the darkness in the soul. The wandering wood is sometimes the wood of the passions, ... but normally it has no other definition than in the vastness and variety of the imagination." I agree with this, though not with most of the substance of the chapter from which it is taken.

25 J.C. Maxwell, "The Truancy of Calidore," in That Soueraine Light, pp.66-68.

26 C.S. Lewis, The Allegory of Love (Oxford, 1936), pp.350-351, and H.C. Chang, Allegory and Courtesy in Spenser (Edinburgh, 1955), pp. 193-194.

27 Cf. Archimago dressed as a Hermit with his "pleasing wordes" (I.i.35).

28 F.Q. VI, Proem 4. I think that one can safely ignore the flattery of Queen Elizabeth's court in VI, Proem 6, since it may have been enforced by circumstance and since it is over-ruled by the many other, unflattering references to courts, and to Elizabeth's court in particular, to be found in Spenser's poetry.

29 Meliboe says that "the litle that I haue, growes dayly more/ Without my care but onely to attend [i.e. await] it." (VI.ix.21).

30 See Intro., pp.2-3.

31 Cf. H.C. Chang's view that the Beast is in fact Courtliness, Allegory and Courtesy in Spenser, pp.180-181.

CHAPTER III

THE EYE OF REASON

The nature and meaning of an error of the senses in The Faerie Queene are not usually self-evident. Such errors are as a rule the result of a deliberate deception on the part of some antagonist, and the division of responsibility for the error between deceiver and deceived is not always easily agreed upon. One can see an instance of this in the variety of critical opinion concerning the Red Cross Knight's mistaking Archimago's illusory sprite for Una (I.ii.5). Here views range from that of B.E.C. Davis, who thinks the knight a "blameless fool" whose misfortunes derive solely from "crudity and inexperience,"[1] to that of Kerby Neill, who says that the knight has already "entered into a state of sin; lust, anger, and even despair ... have entered his soul."[2] This kind of disagreement seems to have its roots in a simple question which is not often asked, that is, whether St. George and all those who are faced with the problem of distinguishing between a sprite and Una, or a real Florimell and her false copy, should have been able to make the distinction on the basis of the evidence they have. This chapter will be a study of that question. The first part will deal with the nature of illusion in Spenser, the second, with the nature of cognition, and the third part will apply the conclusions of these discussions to episodes in The Faerie Queene.

I

Illusion in Spenser is closely related to the concept of nothingness, and though this may have a curiously existentialist ring about it, it is a relation worth clarifying. The key-note is struck by Hooker, who defines illusion for us by saying that through neglect of reason, "abused we are with the show of that which is not,"[3] and Spenser has much the same view. He uses the image of nothingness in three distinguishable but related ways in his poetry. In the first context it is opposed quite simply to all being. All that is will, by the agency of Time's quiet destruction, dissolve slowly into an unformed vapour and finally into complete not-being. Thus Rome and Troy have vanished into nothing;[4] Leicester's greatness shall be "vapoured to nought" (Ruines of Time, 1.219) since time will the "workes of noblest wits to nought out weare" (IV.ii.33). Eventually all creation, "all this whole shall one day come to nought."[5]

In the second sense in which Spenser uses the image of nothingness, it is the final state of all fleshly things, as opposed to the final resting in eternity of spiritual things. This is expressed in Amoretti LXXIX:

> Men call you fayre, and you doe credit it,
> For that your selfe ye dayly such doe see:
> but the trew fayre, that is the gentle wit,
> and vertuous mind, is much more praysd of me.
> For all the rest, how euer fayre it be,
> shall turne to nought and loose that glorious hew:
> but onely that is permanent and free
> from frayle corruption, that doth flesh ensew.
> That is true beautie.

Often the contrast is drawn between fleshliness and spirituality, rather than literally between flesh and spirit. For instance, Spenser says that "loose loues are vaine, and vanish into nought" (I.x.62), and describes Corflambo's attempts to convert people to fleshliness as a wasting of them "vnto nought" (IV.viii.48).

Spenser's third use of the image of nothingness reflects the true status of all illusion and deceit; that which is illusory is nothing as contrasted to all that substantially is what it is. Thus the courtiers satirized in Colin Clovts Come home againe are, with their high looks and haughty words,

> ... like bladders blowen vp with wynd,
> That being prickt do vanish into noughts.
> Euen such is all their vaunted vanitie,
> Nought else but smoke, that fumeth soone away
> (ll.717-720).

The giant Orgoglio is of the same nature:

> ... [as] soone as breath out of his breast did pas,
> That huge great body, which the Gyaunt bore,
> Was vanisht quite, and of that monstrous mas
> Was nothing left, but like an emptie bladder was
> (I.viii.24).

Similarly, the False Florimell's goodly form did "into nothing goe" (V.iii.25).

The three uses of nothing can be fitted together to form what is really the core of Spenser's conception of illusion. Love of fleshly and worldly things is "nought" or an illusion[6] because, in the last analysis, it is love of that which only seems to have substantial

reality. To love in this way is to die in part or to unmake oneself, inasmuch as that portion of oneself attached in this way will inevitably follow the object of the attachment into nothingness. The deceiver wastes the very life-substance of the deceived by attaching it to an illusion. Grill unmakes himself as a man in this way, and Artegall almost unmakes himself as a knight by being deceived into pity: Artegall nearly becomes a woman at one point (V.v.20) and his knightly pride is said to dwindle to "nought" (V.vii.40).

The illusory deceives men by the power of sweetness and softness, which appeal to the imagination but not to the reason. The central weakness of the human mind as described by Elizabethan psychologists lay in the faculty of imagination, which judged all things as being either pleasurable or painful and which, if not continually checked and controlled by reason (which judged things as being either good or bad) would issue commands to the body by way of the animal spirits, thereby initiating action directed at pleasure rather than at good.[7]

One of the key phrases in The Faerie Queene is "misseeming sweete" (I.vii.50), applied by Una to Duessa, and associated with witchcraft and inveigling. Pleasure in Spenser when it is without a framework of reason, purposefulness, or solid virtue is a sign that the imagination and the affections are displacing reason and the will; as he says elsewhere, "Gay without good, is good hearts greatest loathing"

(Prosopopoia, 1.232). Another complex of images can here be added to those already mentioned, all of them describing in some way a life led without the activity of reason and will. This complex consists of images of swimming, melting, or bathing in pleasure,[8] signifying a dissolution of reason before the sweetness of illusory, worldly things. These images would have had a very precise and relevant connotation to the Elizabethan reader. All contemporary writers agreed that as sight was the noblest sense, so touch was by far the most base and grossly sensual. It is the nature of water to contact the whole surface of any body immersed in it, so that swimming in this context implies the most complete indulgence in sensuality possible to the human organism.

Illusion in Spenser, then, achieves its end by alluring the weaker sense to sweetness (II.vi.1) and by arousing the imagination to action without the consent of reason. Illusion is a sweet-seeming nothingness which attempts to draw men into its own state of insubstantiality, much as Satan, the minister of Hell, which has so often been defined as the absence of God, tries to draw men into the state of hell thus defined. Indeed Archimago, the great magician or illusionist, is obviously Satan, the arch deceiver, himself. Satan is ultimately to be found behind all deceit and illusion, whether as Archimago, or as the weakness in man, owing to the Fall, which makes his senses react involuntarily to seductive objects.[9] Either way, it is the fallen nature of man which renders him so dangerously liable to deceit through the pleasure of the senses.

II

The antidote to this weakness of sense and imagination is, as might be expected, reason. "Flesh may empaire (quoth he [Arthur]) but reason can repaire" (I.vii.41). But here as elsewhere an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, and we shall now see just how reason can prevent the senses from being deceived by a false sweetness.

The ways in which reason helps are really two. First of all, according to nearly all psychologists up to Spenser's time, reason can correct errors and deficiencies in the information supplied by the senses. When we see what appear to be crows standing far off on a tower, reason, but not sense, can tell us that they are really men dwarfed by distance.[10] Again, reason can work on the composite image produced by the Common Sense or Vertue Estimative by amalgamating the evidence of several senses, thereby producing a much surer picture of reality than the separate sense organs can.[11]

From this opinion it was a fairly short step to the idea that reason could actually see and know more than the senses ever could. The stepping-stone was probably the fairly common idea that the senses see shadows, the imagination sees images which are clearer than the shadows, while understanding (that is Common Sense or Reason) sees the very body or substance of things, and reason, bedides all this, perceives the effects and inner qualities of the things seen.[12]

Thus reason could see and understand more than the senses. But there was also a faculty in man, variously called Reason, Understanding, or merely the Soul, which could go further yet. By the use of this power, man could obtain knowledge by means of direct intuition, the proper and only cognitive mode of angels. Hamlet's words spring to mind, to which we can add a great number of authorities, notably among the Neo-Platonists. Ficino, for instance, believed that the beauty of the body is perceived by the eyes, whereas the beauty of the soul is perceived by the mind.[13] He describes the process as follows: "the soul, in a single point, takes in the whole breadth of the body in a spiritual way and in an incorporeal image, and that beauty only pleases the soul which is taken in by it."[14] This doctrine, particularly as Ficino applies it to the perseption of beauty, is obviously extremely relevant to Spenser, and can be seen in his Fowre Hymnes.

If we add to this the belief that wisdom or reason could see the future outcome of a present action,[15] we can see some of the background which supports radical statements about man's ability to know all truth. Such were Ficino's statement that the intellect can "attain a clear understanding of everything which is included under being"[16] and Richard Hooker's even more explicit summing up, which we can take as the key-stone of this chapter, and indeed the whole thesis:

> there is not that good which concerneth us, but it hath evidence enough for itself, if Reason were diligent to search it out. Through neglect thereof, abused we are with the show of that which is not; sometimes the subtilty of Satan inveigling us as it did Eve, sometimes the hastiness of our Wills preventing the more considerate advice of sound Reason.[17]

As a last comment, we may add that in scholastic theology, the weakness of reason (a result of the Fall) was aided by Grace in the difficult business of distinguishing between a real and an apparent good, and a wrong choice really meant that the chooser had already fallen from the state of grace.[18] The corollary is that falsehood was impotent to deceive the Christian when he was in possession of the truth, that is, when he was in a state of grace.[19] Therefore we have every possible reason to believe that every person in The Faerie Queene who allows himself to be deceived or to make a wrong choice does so from the corrigible weakness of his will, and not from any exterior necessity. The blame for his troubles rests with himself.

III

A good point at which to start the discussion of these themes as they appear in Spenser is the use he makes of the verb "to seem." "Seeming" in Spenser has a stronger verbal force than it now has; it indicates an active attempt on the part of illusion to pass itself off as reality; it is constantly opposed not so much to authenticity as to being itself: "for not by that which is, the world now deemeth,/ (As it was wont) but by that same that seemeth" (Prosopopoia, ll.649-650).[20] It is a mark of his solidity that Sir Satyrane "rather ioyd to be, than seemen sich" (III.vii.29).

In accordance with this fairly consistently metaphysical view of "seeming," Spenser makes it apply to the super-natural as well as the illusory and anti-natural. Una's garment well expresses the fact that she is not of this mortal world, for it "seemd like silke and siluer wouen neare,/ But neither silke nor siluer therein did appeare" (I.xii. 22). Belphoebe also, as a "mirrhour of celestiall grace" (II.iii.25) is of a substance too spiritual to merely "be" in the gross manner of mortal things: "her face so faire as flesh it seemed not,/ But heauenly pourtraict of bright Angels hew" (II.iii.22). The description of Medway's bridal vesture sums up this super-natural aspect of Spenser's use of "seems". It was a garment much like Una's, in that it

> ... seem'd like siluer, sprinckled here and theare
> With glittering spangs, that did like starres appeare,
> And wau'd vpon, like water Chamelot,
> To hide the metall, which yet euery where
> Bewrayd it selfe, to let men plainely wot,
> It was no mortall worke, that seem'd and yet was not
> (IV.xi.45).

More usually, however, "seems" has a sinister import, a warning that the object or person so described is not real. As such, it is of course a warning to the reader; but in view of the theories of rational cognition outlined above, I conclude that it is also a warning sign to the person who is confronted by the "seeming" object or person. In fact, the word seems to have an openly adjectival force, like "blue" or "small." "Seeming" is something that shows itself, but that can easily be overlooked, like the gold woven into the silk cloth in the

arras of Busyrane's castle, that

> lurked priuily,
> As faining to be hid from enuious eye;
> Yet here, and there, and euery where vnwares
> It shewd it selfe, and shone vnwillingly;
> Like a discolourd Snake, whose hidden snares
> Through the greene gras his long bright burnisht backe declares
> (III.xi.28).

The terms of this vivid description are very close to those applied to Duessa by her grandmother Night, who failed to recognize her at first sight.

> In that faire face
> The false resemblance of Deceipt, I wist
> Did closely lurke; yet so true-seeming grace
> It carried, that I scarse in darkesome place
> Could it discerne, though I the mother bee
> Of falshood, and root of Duessaes race
> (I.v.27).

Therefore Duessa can be detected as the fraud she is by the careful eye and the reasoning brain. This is in direct contrast to the behaviour of the Red Cross Knight, for "in his falsed fancy he her takes/ To be the fairest wight, that liued yit" (I.ii.30), but this of course is because

> He in great passion all this while did dwell,
> More busying his quicke eyes, her face to view,
> Then his dull eares, to heare what she did tell
> (I.ii.26).

His senses and imagination are working on his passions without the deliberation of reason. Fradubio's description of Duessa confirms this interpretation of her true appearance; she was only "like a faire Lady" (I.ii.35); she only seems fair (I.ii.37), and he could only joy in her when he was "vnweeting" (I.ii.40). The Red Cross Knight is deceived.

Duessa is not really beautiful at all. Her hideous appearance when stripped (I.viii.46-49) is her true appearance when seen with the eye of reason, which alone can see through her "counterfesaunce" to her real nature.

The False Florimell is another and similar touchstone to test the penetration of the perceiver's sight. She is described with a veritable battery of "seems," "like," and similar phrases,[21] and, as with the sprite who masquerades as Una, it is indicated that her resemblance to the original is close but not exact. She is "in shape and look/ So liuely and so like, that many it mistooke" (III.viii.5) — many, but not all. The vulgar, who judge by outward grace, are deceived;[22] but Britomart, who judges by inner virtue which is visible to her but not to those whose reason is clouded, is never deceived (IV.v.20). When the False Florimell succeeds in deceiving someone she draws him into her own state of evil and unreality; she pleases enough to "hold a foole in vaine delight," entertaining him with shadows (III.viii.10). This state Spenser describes as Hell, for it is a state of utter unreality. When False Florimell caught Braggadochio in her snares, she "made him think him selfe in heauen, that was in hell" (III.viii.19); he is in love with a nothingness (V.iii.24).

The fact that the same person at the same time may be ugly to those who see with the eye of reason and pleasing to those who see with the eye of sense occasionally leads to apparent confusion. When

Spenser first mentions the cavalcade of Blandamour, Paridell, Ate, and Duessa (IV.i.17), both the ladies are said to have an outward mask of beauty. In the next stanza it is said that Ate appears as she truly is, and to reinforce this she is described as an emblematic figure of discord. In stanza 31[23] Ate is again said to wear the disguise of a seeming beauty, but in her subsequent appearance (IV.iv.9-10) she is again a hag. Miss Josephine Waters Bennett has ascribed this apparent confusion to clumsy replanning and altering,[24] but I think it at least as likely that Spenser was merely, and probably unconsciously, focusing on the same figure under first one aspect and then another. To Blandamour she is beautiful, to Spenser she is hideous.

Indeed, The Faerie Queene has several objects which appear differently to different people. There are the terrible sea-monsters sent by Acrasia which tumble the seas into a great turmoil. They appall Guyon (II.xii.25), but the Palmer can see them for the illusion they are. A touch of his staff, and they exist no more, while the sea becomes calm as before (II.xii.26). The flames that guard Busyrane's castle are real flames to Scudamour (III.xi.26), but they present no tangible barrier to Britomart (III.xi.25). It is the nature of the perceiver that determines what is seen or, as Boethius put it, "all that is known is not comprehended according to the force which it hath in itself, but rather according to the faculty of them which know it."[25]

There are in the poem a number of talismans which have the power to overmaster deceit. Before Arthur's shield all illusion fades

and falls into nothing (I.vii.35), and similarly it becomes void and vain at the sound of his squire's horn (I.viii.4). The Palmer's staff can defeat all enchantments (II.xii.40). Talus' flail can thresh out falsehood (V.i.12) and reveal all hidden crimes (V.xii.26). Finally, Awe has the power to exclude all falsehood and deceit from the domain of those she guards (V.ix.22). All of these talismans except the last are clearly symbols of either grace or reason, though Talus' flail seems to be reason in a harshly interrogative mood, and perhaps C.S. Lewis is right in suggesting that it represents among other things the power of the rack to extort confessions,[26] though one would prefer not to believe this. Reason and grace are of course the two powers which co-operate to help man distinguish between real and apparent good, and it is encouraging to find what appears to have been Spenser's theology so accurately embodied in his narrative. Perhaps if we look long enough through the eye of reason, the apparent inconsistencies of the poem will vanish as Florimell did, and leave only the true and the good before us.

Notes to Chapter III

1 Edmund Spenser (Cambridge, 1933) p.90.

2 P. 96.

3 I, 173; my italics.

4 Rvines of Rome, vii.7, and F.Q. III.ix.33.

5 Rvines of Rome, ix.14; cf. F.Q. VII.viii.1.

6 Cf. "vaine illusion of their lust vnclene" (II.x.8).

7 To avoid inordinate footnoting, I list in Appendix I the works from which is derived the information on Elizabethan psychology used here and in subsequent chapters. Footnotes to specific passages will be given only when the material is not more or less common to most of the authors listed in the Appendix, or when it is being very closely applied.

8 See for instance "molten into lust" (II.xii.73); "swimming deepe in sensuall desires" (III.i.39); "in pleasure melt" (III.xii.45 [1590]).

9 See V.K. Whitaker, The Religious Basis of Spenser's Thought (Stanford, 1950), p.35. Cf. Campbell, Shakespeare's Tragic Heroes, p. 71.

10 Sir John Davies, "Nosce Teipsum," in The Complete Poems of Sir John Davies, ed. A.B. Grosart (London, 1876), I, 36. Davies says "soul," but the context makes it clear that he means reason here.

11 See J.B. Bamborough, The Little World of Man (London, 1952), p.35. See the same source (p.46) for evidence that Wit (a power of the reasonable soul) could, if healthy, correct errors of the senses and imagination.

12 See Ruth L. Anderson, Elizabethan Psychology and Shakespeare's Plays (Iowa City, 1927), pp.24-25 and Davies, "Nosce Teipsum," pp.76-77. Cf. also "An Hymne in Honovr of Beavtie," ll. 211-217.

13 Marsilio Ficino's Commentary on Plato's "Symposium", ed. with trans. S.R. Jayne (Columbia, 1944), p.130.

14 Ficino's Commentary, p.168.

15 Ficino's Commentary, p.124, and especially p.166.

16 "Five Questions Concerning the Mind," in The Renaissance Philosophy of Man, ed. E. Cassirer et al. (Chicago, 1948), p.199.

17 I, 173.

18 See Whitaker, The Religious Basis of Spenser's Thought, p.35.

19 Padelford, "The Spiritual Allegory of the Faerie Queene, Book One," p.17.

20 See also F.Q. I.ii.37; I.v.26; I.vii.35; III.vii.52; III.xii.16; VI.vii.14.

21 See F.Q. III.viii.6, 7, 8, 10, 14; IV.v.15, etc.

22 See F.Q. IV.ii.22 and V.iii.17. For a useful commentary on the allegory of the two Florimells, see C.G. Smith, Spenser's Theory of Friendship (Baltimore, 1935).

23 The syntax is ambiguous, but the reference to her new found mate in the last line of the stanza makes it clear that it is Ate who has become "as fresh and fragrant as the floure deluce," since the next stanza identifies her lover as Blandamour, and goes on to associate Duessa with Paridell.

24 The Evolution of "The Faerie Queene" (Chicago, 1942), pp.165-166.

25 "The Consolation of Philosophy," in Boethius: The Theological Tractates, ed. with trans. H.F. Stewart and E.K. Rand, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass., 1918), p.389. For a very similar statement, see Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1114 (a).

26 The Allegory of Love, p.348.

CHAPTER IV

THE ENVENOMED WOUND

This chapter will attempt to define the image of the wound, and to define its proper place in the allegorical war between sanse and reason. There are two quite distinct types of wound in The Faerie Queene; there is the injury sustained in battle, which heals overnight, often without being referred to again,[1] and there is the wound which becomes envenomed and refuses to heal without assistance from some extra-ordinary source. The first kind of wound only tells us who is the stronger of the contestants, and does not concern us here. The second kind of wound is clearly allegorical, and its exact significance deserves some consideration. The unhealed wounds fall naturally into two categories, those made by love and those inflicted by the Blatant Beast, and we shall discuss them in that order.

I

That love wounds the heart is of course a commonplace of Elizabethan poetry, deriving from Ovid through Petrarch,[2] and Spenser makes plentiful use of this image in his poetry. But he also several times dramatizes the image by presenting it as a real wound, which has as one of its effects the obscuration of the true sources of the wound. Because such a wound, when presented literally in the narrative

of the poem, must be physically inflicted by one person upon another, it is natural to assume that all the blame should lie with the aggressor, and that the victim deserves nothing less than our wholehearted sympathy. But this may not always be a just and accurate response, as an examination of the component parts that make such a wound possible may show.

These component factors are two. First there is the involuntary arousing of the passions by a pleasing object, which has already been mentioned in passing as a weakness sometimes attributed to the Fall.[3] This immediacy of the passions was not always considered as only a weakness, however, and a man who did not react normally to pleasure was very suspect to the Elizabethans.[4] It was a necessary weakness, one that gave warmth to humanity together with vulnerability, something that had therefore to be closely guarded and watched over by reason. This is a process that we can see very exactly depicted when Guyon is exposed to the wanton maidens in the Bower of Bliss. In his face appear signs of lust, which the Palmer controls by means of good counsel (II.xii.68-69).

Corresponding almost exactly to this weakness was the power of the arts of love to compel love in return. This depended in part on the survival of the old belief that the sense of sight was not purely passive,

> but depended on some kind of ray which issued from the eye, and either impinged on the object and returned to its source, or else acted as a kind of feeler. ... According to this theory, the eyes possessed an 'influence' similar to the 'influence' of the stars — that is, an invisible emanation capable of producing physical effects.[5]

Bamborough goes on to quote a quite extraordinary explanation by Cornelius Agrippa of how the power of 'fascination' works, describing the wounding and infecting of the heart of the person thus fascinated. But rather than this, I shall quote a very similar description by Ficino of the bewitchment of love, since Spenser quite certainly knew his works. Having said that the light sent out by the eye draws with it a spiritual vapour which carries as it were a fine and invisible spray of blood, he goes on to ask whether it is any wonder that

> the eye, wide open and intent upon someone, throws missiles of its own light into near-by eyes and directs also, together with these missiles which are the vehicles of spirits, the bloody vapour which we call spirit? Hence the virulent missile pierces the eyes, and since it is sent from the heart of the one striking the blow, it seeks the heart of the man struck as though [seeking] its proper place. It pierces the heart; but in the back of the heart, which is more resistant, it is condensed and turns into blood. This wandering blood, foreign, so to speak, to the nature of the wounded man, infects his own blood, and the infected blood becomes sick. Hence follows a double bewitchment.[6]

Thus the wounding eyes and piercing darts and beams of Elizabethan love convention have a basis in a theory which, though presumably not often taken literally, seems to have coloured deeply views of the ways of love. It can be seen that this power to fascinate, playing upon the weakness inherent in the involuntary reaction of the passions, creates an exceedingly dangerous situation.

In The Faerie Queene we find a very close approximation to this concept of fascination in Corflambo, from whose

> ... fearefull eyes two fierie beames,
> More sharpe then points of needles did proceede,
> Shooting forth farre away two flaming streames,

> Full of sad powre, that poysonous bale did breede
> To all, that on him lookt without good heed,
> And secretly his enemies did slay:
> Like as the Basiliske of serpents seede,
> From powrefull eyes close venim doth conuay
> Into the lookers hart, and killeth farre away
> (IV.viii.39).

His sight is said to be "infectious" (IV.viii.47) and to have the power to cast "secret flakes of lustfull fire" into the hearts of women (IV. viii.48). Here we have a very close parallel to the passage from Ficino, but the idea of wounding seems to be taken a little less literally. The hyperbole of the image shows that it is a more or less emblematic representation of a psychological process rather than a picture of physiological fact, though the distinction between these two would be much less evident to Spenser than to us.

From Conflambo it is a fairly short step to Paridell, the learned lover,[7] who sends "speaking lookes" (III.ix.28) at Hellenore. She in return "sent at him one firie dart, whose hed/ Empoisned was with priuy lust, and gealous dred." His reaction to this communication shows that the two of them are engaging in the kind of combat which is Conflambo's mode of warfare:

> He from that deadly throw made no defence,
> But to the wound his weake hart opened wyde;
> The wicked engine through false influence,
> Past through his eyes, and secretly did glyde
> Into his hart, which it did sorely gryde
> (III.ix.29).

Here we have the operation of the "double bewitchment" described in the passage quoted from Ficino, but more or less subordinated to the demands

of realistic narrative. Unlike Corflambo, Paridell is a real person, not the personification of a psychological process, and the theme cannot therefore be fully shown in isolation from other factors.

From Paridell we can move to Spenser's first representation of the injury caused by burning eye-beams as a literal wound to the body, which is the flesh-wound Britomart receives from Gardante, one of Malecasta's knights. Malecasta herself is very much the female counterpart of Paridell, and uses the same wiles to try to infect Britomart (whom of course Malecasta believes to be a man) with a reciprocal lust. She roves at Britomart "with crafty glaunce/ Of her false eyes, that at her hart did ayme" (III.i.50), glances which are called "secret darts" in the next stanza. At first she fails completely, but later, when she has crept into Britomart's bed, and has called upon her six knights to assist her in combatting the righteous anger of her guest, she appears to have a very small degree of success, as we shall see.

In the fight Gardante, one of her knights,

> Drew out a deadly bow and arrow keene,
> Which forth he sent with felonous despight,
> And fell intent against the virgin sheene:
> The mortall steele stayd not, till it was seene
> To gore her side, yet was the wound not deepe,
> But lightly rased her soft silken skin,
> That drops of purple bloud thereout did weepe,
> Which did her lilly smock with staines of vermeil steepe
> (III.i.65).

Gardante, whose name of course means "looking," is the first of the six knights, whose names mean more or less looking, speaking, toying, kissing, revelling, and spending the night,[8] and who thus constitute

a ladder of lechery. The wounding is thus certainly allegorical; it means that a covetous aspect shot by Malecasta has penetrated Britomart, though not deeply, and has aroused in her the first movement of lawless passion.[9] She suppresses this immediately with great anger, which parallels the "rigour pittilesse" (II.xii.83) of Guyon in the Bower, where he also has been involuntarily aroused by "many sights, that courage cold could reare" (II.xii.68).

The imagery of the passage depicting Britomart's wound adds further connotations to its meaning. The arrow is sent with "fell intent" against "the virgin sheene" and the overtones point clearly though subtly to an underlying image of violation. This underlying image is continued in the weeping blood, which weeps for lost chastity, and also stains her "lilly smock," providing an emblem of virginity spotted. Britomart has suffered violation in miniature, in the first and least serious of the points that make up the ladder of lechery, through a combination of Malecasta's "malengine and fine forgerie" (III.i.53), the involuntary reaction of the affections, and her own innocence, which implies a degree of ignorance and perhaps a too quick readiness to trust others.[10]

This analysis, however, should not be taken as implying any very profound guilt on Britomart's part. Spenser is merely pointing out a dangerously vulnerable area in the human organism, and warning us to be on guard by showing the results of an extremely minor example

of heedlessness. Britomart only allowed a single glance to wound her, and there was no permissiveness on the part of her will. The arrow was stopped short in its flight; she is no Paridell, to allow it to glide right down to her heart. Yet even this temporary carelessness in a superbly chaste woman allowed a flesh wound and a stain, however small, on her honour. Spenser is more interested in warning his readers than in pressing home blame in such a marginal case.

Curiously enough, while rescuing Amoret, Britomart is wounded once again in a very similar manner by Busyrane with a dagger:

> ... turning to her selfe his fell intent,
> Vnwares it strooke into her snowie chest,
> That little drops empurpled her faire brest.
> Exceeding wroth therewith the virgin grew,
> Albe the wound were nothing deepe imprest,
> And fiercely forth her mortall blade she drew,
> To giue him the reward for such vile outrage dew
> (III.xii.33).

The imagery follows exactly the pattern discerned in the previous wounding. There are the "fell intent," the blood showing aginst white, the overtones of "vile outrage," and the virgin's anger, all of which point to the pattern of a rape in miniature. Even in Britomart there is the residual weakness left by original sin, but it is a very minor weakness. Though "full of amiable grace," she also has

> ... manly terrour mixed therewithall,
> That as the one stird vp affections bace,
> So th'other did mens rash desires apall
> And hold them backe, that would in errour fall
> (III.i.46).

Belphoebe shares the same power, and "with dredd Maiestie, and awfull ire" breaks those darts of Cupid which are intended to kindle

in her his "lustfull fire" (II.iii.23).[11] Womanhood, in the Temple of Venus, defends herself in a somewhat more passive manner:

> ... stedfast still her eyes did fixed rest,
> Ne rov'd at randon after gazers guyse,
> Whose luring baytes oftimes doe heedlesse harts entyse
> (IV.x.49).

Having discussed the power that wounds and the weakness that permits the entry of the wounding power, we can now turn to Amoret in the castle of Busyrane, the most extended treatment of the theme of the wound in Spenser.

Let us look at Busyrane first. He has been analysed as the sensual side of Scudamour himself,[12] or merely as the physical side of marriage, which amounts to much the same thing.[13] But he is clearly a rival of Scudamour, one of the many who felt love for Amoret (III.vi. 52) and was refused (III.vi.53). The same stanza calls Busyrane "an haineus enimy," and this makes it difficult to think of him as a fragment of Scudamour's psyche. He takes advantage of the wedding feast to bring on a mask and, "by way of sport, as oft in maskes is knowen" (IV.i.3) he conveys her away to imprisonment in his castle, in an attempt to revenge himself on her spurning of his suit. He is one of the oppressors in love referred to by Arthur when he says:

> For were no law in loue, but all that lust,
> Might them oppresse, and painefully turmoile,
> His kingdome would continue but a while
> (VI.viii.23).

Busyrane is also an enchanter or magician who uses "wicked bookes" (III.xii.32) and more especially "that balefull booke" (III.xii.36),

almost certainly Ovid's Ars Amoris.[14] He is the artful lover, using Ovid and the powers of "fascination" to try to attain his lustfull purpose. But he is much further abstracted than Paridell and Malecasta, who are parallels, and is partly absorbed into the figure of Cupid himself.[15] Malecasta's "crafty engins" (III.i.57) and Paridell's entrapping "traines" (III.x.11) are the magic arts of Busyrane at a more realistic, less allegorical level. Busyrane then is not part of Scudamour, but an unsuccessful suitor of Amoret, who is using the arts of love and the power of fascination possessed by the eyes to try to force Amoret to allow his lust. But he has been abstracted to such a degree that he is scarcely a man any longer but an agent of Cupid's cruel power to arouse and inflame the passions.

Busyrane traps Amoret by means of a mask given at the wedding feast. Janet Spens says that "even contemporaries were aware of the brutalizing effects of the marriage entertainments of those days,"[16] while Fowler gives evidence to show that we should attribute no blame to Scudamour in the abduction.[17] Vives, in his popular book on the education of women, gives an analysis of wedding feasts which seems to fit closely the circumstances of wine and mirth mentioned in IV.i.3:

> what gard of chastitie can there be, where the mayd is desired with so many eyes, where so many faces looketh upon her, and againe shee upon so many? She must needs fire some, and her selfe also to be fired againe, and shee be not a stone. Moreover there is layd great nourishment unto that heate, by the reason of meat and drincke of the feast, and talking, touching, groping, & plucking, & many other wanton poynts, where unto that unbridled Bacchus, gyveth lybertye and boldnesse. What minde can bee pure and holy amonge all this geare, & not spoted with any though of lust . . . . I dare be bold to say, that fewe young women, after they begyn to waxe to womans state, come from feasts, and banquetts, and resorte of men with safe minds. 18

The implications of the stanza support the notion that Spenser is writing from a viewpoint close to that of Vives; the men at the feast were all "surcharg'd with wine, were heedlesse and ill hedded," and Amoret is said to be "ill of friends bestedded" (IV.i.3). Scudamour seems to have behaved rather carelessly.

The obvious objection to this, which I have not seen made, is Epithalamion, where Bacchus and Hymen are crowned together (ll.248-260), and where the wine is to be poured "without restraint or stay,/ . . . not by cups, but by the belly full." Before we give Spenser up as an insincere poet full of self-contradiction, however, we should look at his purpose in these two cases. The Epithalamion is a celebration of his marriage, and of the joy expected therefrom; it is not a description of a feast. The feast with its classical revelry is merely the external image into which he casts his anticipation; it is the image of something other than itself, and the naming of Bacchus as a presiding god is almost a guarantee of safety. He is to be present as god of joy, for the day is a triumph to make men's minds reel. Spenser is not really talking about drunkenness at all. But in the scene under discussion in The Faerie Queene he is; it is not Bacchus who presides at Scudamour's wedding feast, but the evil of crude alcohol and thick heads. After Scudamour's party there will be hangovers, one may guess, but after Spenser's celebration of his marriage only the memory of joy. Or one could say that there is all the difference between the two that there is between the idea underlying a wedding toast, and getting drunk before

driving a long way at night. Scudamour and his friends drink real alcohol in the real world of many menaces; Spenser and his readers drink the wine of celebration in the house of friendship and love.

A discussion of such length on Britomart and Busyrane leaves the less to be said about Amoret, who, as the one who is wounded, is really the centre of the problem. Amoret, after the capture, is wounded in the same manner as Britomart was by Malecasta, but very much more seriously. Malecasta aimed at Britomart's heart but was foiled (III.i.50). Amoret is not strong enough to resist, and the dart transfixes her heart; her affections have been roused without her volition, and so long as Busyrane keeps them in this state by means of his arts, she is comparatively helpless. She keeps her will intact, but her reason is not strong enough to suppress the involuntary movement of her passions, to which she is a prisoner. There is nothing compelling in the external forces which keep her prisoner; they are "idle shewes, . . . false charmes" (III.xii.29), and the whole castle vanishes to nothing after Busyrane's defeat (III.xii.42). The luckless Amoret has been a victim of the power of the arts of love maliciously to "fascinate," and of her own weak control over her passions.

There are two motifs in the Canto which need a note. The image of the transfixed heart has produced some attempts at finding a source, such as E.B. Fowler's citing of a performance in the reign of Henry VIII which included a banner depicting a lady's hand turning a man's heart,[19] and Dorothy F. Atkinson's ascription of the whole

episode to the influence of a translation of a Spanish romance called The Mirrour of Princely Deedes, largely on the grounds that it featured an exposed and bloody heart. "So far as I am aware," she argues, "this detail has not been found in any analogue in Italian or Medieval romance, nor in courtly love or masque literature."[20] It would seem to me much simpler and more reasonable to ascribe the motif to such detailed descriptions of heart-wounding as that from Ficino quoted above, or to a dramatic realization of the conventional image of love-poetry referring less literally to the same process. If more precise sources are wanted, one can refer to the fact that Cupid was sometimes depicted in painting as having the hearts of his victims threaded on the string of his quiver,[21] and that "le coeur taillade, offert, ou arraché, se rencontre parmi les décorations des coffrets d'amour allemands."[22] The same source also has an illustration of a fourteenth-century French ivory called "L'Allégorie du Coeur Transpercé."[23] The motif was clearly well enough known in the graphic arts long before Spenser's time, and it is not difficult to assume that he might have seen some such object.

The second motif which calls for some explanation is the fact that only Busyrane can cure the wound which he has caused (III.xii.34). This is partly of course a love convention, expressed well enough by Sidney: "I am sicke, and sick to the deathe, I am a Prisoner, neyther ys there any Redress, but, by her, to whome I am a slaue."[24] But one has the uneasy feeling that this and most similar statements are mere poetic convention, that the redress hoped for is consummation rather than

separation, and that in general they belong to a world far removed from the serious life-and-death atmosphere in Busyrane's castle. We can find something a little closer to the context here in Ficino, following his description of the double "bewitchment" of love, which we have termed "fascination." He says that in releasing a caught lover "one must watch out . . ., lest one try to tear out or cut off something which is not yet ready, or lest with the greatest danger, one hack off something which can be more safely released gently."[25] Presumably if Amoret were not properly released by Busyrane, she might never have command over her passions again.

A comment on the nature of the love between Scudamour and Amoret may act as a fitting end to this discussion of the meaning of the image of the wound inflicted by lust in Spenser. Amoret's comparative lack of controlling reason has been mentioned, and need not be elaborated, but little has been said of Scudamour.[26] He seems to me to be Spenser's picture of the man who succumbs to his passions. There is of course no malevolence in him, but he seems to give way to one uncontrolled passion after another. He is a victim (passions leave one passive, merely re-acting to events) to Care (IV.v.32 ff), one of the evil effects named as following in the train of Cupid (III.xii.25), though Scudamour's Care seems closer to Cupid's Grief, with his pincers (III.xii.16). In the emended ending of Book III, he is guilty of despair (III.xii.45 [1596]), and in the original end he succumbs to uncontrolled, almost destroying joy, which overcomes both lovers

(III.xii.45 [1590]), after they have been in "great distresse,/ Twixt dolour and despight halfe desperate," and after having suffered "wilfull anguish" (III.xii.43 [1590]).[27] Somewhat later, Scudamour's heart is "thrild with point of deadly feare" (IV.vi.37), for which he is fairly rebuked by Glauce: "Faire Sir, be nought dismayd/ With needelesse dread, till certaintie ye heare." He is "the lover," but because of this he is not under the control of reason, and is thus in an undesirable state. It is possible to use reason to guide love, as we shall see.

As a reference point by which to judge the bitter-sweet ecstasy of the lovers' reunion in the 1590 version, we should look at the meeting of Spenser's ideal lovers, Artegall and Britomart:

> . . .her modest countenance he saw
> So goodly graue, and full of princely aw,
> That it his ranging fancie did refraine,
> And looser thoughts to lawfull bounds withdraw
> (IV.vi.33).

In short, Artegall's instinct on first seeing Biromart is "obedience/ To doe to so diuine a beauties excellence" (IV.vi.21), whereas Scudamour and Amoret rush into pleasure and "each other of loues bitter fruit despoile" (III.xii.45-47 [1590]). The same weakness that left Amoret a ready prey to Busyrane leaves her a prey to powerful passions, while the same strength that enabled Britomart to rescue Amoret enables her to control (not to suppress, of course) her passionate reaction to Artegall (IV.vi.26-29). Finally, it should be noted that Scudamour and Amoret immediately embrace; that is, they rush to touch, the lowest and

most sensual of the senses, whereas Artegall and Britomart look at one another.[28] Even when they are betrothed, there is no reference to anything parallel to the dangerous raptures of Amoret and Scudamour. It is the difference between virtue and reason beaten down by the importunity of love, and love subordinated to true virtue, as Artegall makes clear when he leaves his newly won love to continue the "hard aduenture" (IV.vi.42) he must still complete.

II

The other kind of envenomed wound in Spenser, the bite of the Blatant Beast, also presents something of a problem. It is only too easy to assume that all the blame for the unpleasantness of the wound lies with the Beast, but there is too much evidence against this view to render it tenable.

The examination of the wound of lust makes it clear that there is always a degree of co-operation on the part of the wounded person, ideally only the slight weakness or vulnerability left by original sin, but usually an inclination of the passions against reason as well. This is equally true of the wounds inflicted by the Beast. The simplest evidence of this is the fact that Artegall and Calidore cannot be bitten. Artegall is slandered by the Beast, but not bitten (VI.i.9) while the Beast does not dare to face Calidore (VI.iii.25). Calidore can go "fearelesse, who ought did thinke, or ought did say,/

Sith his own thought he knew most cleare from wite" (VI.iii.16). Since not all are susceptible to the bite, there must be an inner weakness which permits it. There is no single, simple answer to the question of the nature of this weakness, but it may become clear during an analysis of the exact course of the bites.

Before this analysis, however, one should say something about Elizabethan conceptions of the nature of reputation and honour. Petrarch outlines the root of this concept:

> you know that glory is in a sense the shadow of virtue. And therefore, just as it is impossible that your body should not cast a shadow if the sun is shining, so it is impossible also in the light of God Himself that virtues should exist and not make their glory to appear. Whoever, then, would take true glory away must of necessity take away virtue also.[29]

Thus it would appear that true virtue casts a powerful enough light to make itself known despite the detractions of envious men. Artegall is bitten by the snake of Envy (V.xii.39) and is marked by this, as presumably any man of fame could be pointed at as a man whom other men envied. But Detraction and the Beast only slander and bark at him; "he past on, and seem'd of them to take no keepe" (V.xii.42). He has sufficient virtue to cast a shadow of honour that is stronger than detraction, and there is no question here of the bite rankling inwardly.

The implications of Serena's wound are rather different. She is bitten while she is allowing "liking" to lead her "wauering lust after her wandering sight" careless and thoughtless near a forest (VI.iii. 23-24). In the narrative she is guilty of "loosely wandring here and

there,"[30] which seems to reflect a certain easy sensuality and pleasure-seeking in her solace with the knight. Her wound will not heal because it is "inwardly vnsound" (VI.iv.16); later, when she laments violently the disappearance of Calepine, her knight, it is said that she "euer more and more her owne affliction wrought" (VI.v.6). She laments that she has received a mortal wound both in body and mind (VI.v.28), and finally her wounds "corruption gan to breed," presumably, like the wounds of Timias, "for lacke of heed" (VI.v.31).

Here we may stop for a moment and follow Timias up to this point, since what follows applies equally to both of them. He is bitten (VI.v.16) as a result of being raised to favour again by Belphoebe (VI.v.12). There is, however, a suggestion that he is a little over-confident in his newly-won favour (he is not "of chaunge afeard"), and this suggestion is reinforced by the statement that he is "of perill nought adrad,/ Ne skilfull of the vncouth ieopardy" (VI.v.16). But since Timias seems to be governed by the historical allegory rather than the moral allegory, we should perhaps not lay too much stress on these points.

Now Timias and Serena come to the Hermit, the pain of their wound increasing "through suffraunce" (VI.v.39), and here they finally receive the advise which heals them and shows us their true nature. The Hermit is one who

> knew the diuerse went of mortall wayes,
> And in the mindes of men had great insight;
> Which with sage counsell, when they went astray,
> He could enforme, and them reduce aright,
> And al the passions heale, which wound the weaker spright
> (VI.vi.3).

The reference to passions may seem a little curious in a passage dealing with the wounds of the Blatant Beast, but to show that we must not overlook it, Spenser repeats it even more pointedly when the Hermit finds the wounds have corrupted inwardly to such a degree

> That quite they seem'd past helpe of surgery,
> And rather needed to be disciplinde
> With holesome reede of sad sobriety,
> To rule the stubborne rage of passion blinde;
> Giue salues to euery sore, but counsell to the minde
> (VI.vi.5).

This tells us that the Blatant Beast works his evil by arousing a passion in the person bitten; the passion must be a mingling of shame and unanswered guilt, amounting almost to melancholy despair. Pity, shame, and remorse are all subdivisions of sorrow,[31] and the Hermit tells us that the bite of the Beast leads to "sorrow, and anguish, and impatient paine/ In th'inner parts" (VI.vi.8). It is notable that both Serena and Timias are subsequently shown as being extremely sensitive to shame.[32]

We can see this more clearly perhaps if we look at the exemplary behaviour of Canacee, who never

> ... was with fond affection moued,
> But rul'd her thoughts with goodly gouernement,
> For dread of blame and honours blemishment;
> And eke vnto her lookes a law she made,
> That none of them once out of order went,
> But like to warie Centonels well stayd,
> Still watcht on euery side, of secret foes affrayd
> (IV.ii.36).

The proper shame is "dread of blame," and by taking too little heed of this, Serena and Timias become victims of that uglier shame which results

from a consciousness that inner faults render them incapable of combatting external imputations of dishonour. The venom in the wound is just this incapacity to remain healthy in the face of evil because of an inward guilt for past weakness. Thus the wound of the Beast is in essence similar to the wound of lust in that both are the result of an inner weakness which responds to an outer aggressor and allows the malicious evil to enter. Perhaps we can recommend that Amoret join Serena and Timias in listening to the Hermit's advice.

This advice is really in two parts, corresponding to the collusion of two elements noted above. For the inner weakness the Hermit prescribes the following:

> For in your selfe your onely helpe doth lie,
> To heale your selues, and must proceed alone
> From your owne will, to cure your maladie.
> Who can him cure, that will be cur'd of none?
> If therefore health ye seeke, obserue this one.
> First learne your outward sences to refraine
> From things, that stirre vp fraile affection;
> Your eies, your eares, your tongue, your talke restraine
> From that they most affect, and in due termes containe.
>
> For from those outward sences ill affected,
> The seede of all this euill first doth spring,
> Which at the first before it had infected,
> Mote easie be suppresst with little thing
> (VI.vi.7-8).

It was the outward senses which caused, or rather allowed, Britomart's very minor wounds, and it was the outer senses inflaming the passions which caused the much more serious wounds of Amoret, Serena, and Timias. Here it is the degree of inner strength and soundness of reason which determine the outcome.

But the Hermit has excellent advice for the weak also, advice that will enable those who follow it partially to mitigate their inner weakness;

> The best (sayd he) that I can you aduize,
> Is to auoide the occasion of the ill:
> For when the cause, whence euill doth arize,
> Removed is, th'effect surceaseth still.
> Abstaine from pleasure, and restraine your will,
> Subdue desire, and bridle loose delight,
> Vse scanted diet, and forbeare your fill,
> Shun secresie, and talke in open sight:
> So shall you soone repaire your present euill plight
> (VI.vi.14).

This is advice directed at removing the external temptation, or in its more virulent form what we have called "fascination." It is necessary to try to conquer the inner weakness so far as possible, but since the traces of original sin linger, it is equally necessary to try to avoid those occasions which are liable to expose this weakness.

This twin attack upon the weakness inherent in man and the external forces which play upon that weakness is a theme that is embedded deep in the structure of The Faerie Queene, particularly in Book II. The Palmer constantly urges Guyon to master his recalcitrant passions and senses, the legacy of the Fall, but he also urges him to master occasion. This hag is described as the emblem writers portrayed her (II.iv.4), in which guise she means occasion in both its negative and positive aspects, the positive sense corresponding to the saying "opportunity never knocks twice." But it is obvious that Spenser is thinking chiefly of the negative meaning, for he tells Guyon that he

must either avoid or conquer the hag before he will be able to conquer his powerful passions (II.iv.10-11). Thus the Palmer and the Hermit of Book VI are in part parallel figures, giving good counsel about the two methods of ensuring reason's supremacy over the passions.

The double nature of the attack on the weakness of the senses and the passions is also the explanation of the structure of the last three cantos of Book II. In order for the complete human being, represented by the castle of Alma, to be truly secure from attck, both the inner weakness and the external temptation must be conquered. It is Arthur's task to overcome the inner weakness caused by the senses and passions rebelling under the leadership of Maleger, who represents original sin and its effects upon the human organism. It is Guyon's task to go out and conquer the force of external temptation or occasion as personified in Acrasia, a sorceress. Both lines of defence are necessary to protect the human body and mind from injury or wounds like those of Amoret and Serena. But the nature of the castle of Alma and its besiegers will be more closely examined in the next chapter.

Notes to Chapter IV

1 See for instance the wound Archimago receives from Sansloy (I.iii.35), the wounds the Red Cross Knight receives from Sansjoy (I.v.17), or the several wounds mentioned and forgotten in Sir Satyrane's tournament (IV.iv. passim).

2 See L.E. Pearson, Elizabethan Love Conventions (Berkeley, 1933), pp.313-323 and passim.

3 See above, p.50. For further references to the involuntary nature of the reaction of the affections, see E. Dowden, "Elizabethan Psychology," in Essays Modern and Elizabethan (London, 1910), p.332, Ruth Anderson, p.135, and Ruth Kelso, Doctrine for the Lady of the Renaissance (Urbana, 1956), pp.143-144 and pp.158-159.

4 See for instance Measure for Measure, where the Duke suspects Angelo as a "seemer" because he "scarce confesses/ That his blood flows, or that his appetite/ Is more to bread than stone," Measure for Measure, ed. H.C. Hart, The Arden Shakespeare (London, 1925), I.iii.51-53.

5 Bamborough, p.33.

6 Ficino's Commentary, pp.222-223.

7 For comment on the evils of artful love, see Lewis, The Allegory of Love, p.328. Cf. Sidney: "...simple Love, whiche Chastenes dothe imparte,/ Avoydes the hurtfull Arte" (Arcadia, p.231).

8 See A.H. Gilbert, "The Ladder of Lechery, The Faerie Queene, III, i, 45," MLN, LVI (1941), 594-597, and J. Hutton, "Spenser and the 'Cinq Points en Amours'," MLN, LVII (1942), 657-661. Gilbert suggests (p.594) that the wound "perhaps signifies by allegory that only the first stage of lasciviousness can affect Chastity, and that only to rouse resistance," which seems to me to be correct, though it is not an adequate commentary on the incident.

9 Cf. F.Q. II.xi.8-9, where "lawlesse lustes" and "couetous aspectes," armed with bows and arrows, strive to break the "bulwarke of the Sight." It is of course the duty of the eyes to keep continual guard against the entry of such enemies (II.ix.46).

10 See "who meanes no guile, be guiled soonest shall" (III.i.54) and Britomart, who forgets "carefull [i.e. watchful as well as anxious] thoughts," and drowns "in the depth of deadly sleepe" with the rest of the world (III.i.58-9).

11 Cf. "Believe not that the dribbling dart of love/ Can pierce a complete bosom," Measure for Measure, I.iii.2-3. Cf.also the argument of Comus,verywell discussed by A.S.P. Woodhouse, "The Argument of Milton's Comus," UTQ, XI (1941), 46-71.

12 Janet Spens, Spenser's Faerie Queene: an Interpretation (London, 1934), pp.104-106.

13 F.M. Padelford, "The Allegory of Chastity in The Faerie Queene," SP, XXI (1924), 376. For a convenient summary of views of the episode, see E.E. Stoll, "Criticisms Criticized: Spenser and Milton," JEGP, XLI (1942), 459-461. Stoll himself denies that the episode has any allegorical significance. For a good discussion of the background of love conventions in Ovid, Petrarch and love allegories, see E.B. Fowler, Spenser and the Courts of Love (Menasha, Wis., 1921). For general discussions of the incident see Lewis, The Allegory of Love, pp.340-345, and W.B.C. Watkins, Shakespeare and Spenser (Princeton, 1950), pp.206-210.

14 For Paridell as a specifically Ovidian lover, see E.B. Fowler, Spenser and the System of Courtly Love (Louisville, 1935), pp.86-90. Since Busyrane is directly parallel to Paridell, the identification of the book is fairly certain.

15 In the Mask proper, it is Cupid himself who rides after Amoret triumphing in his proud spoil (III.xii.22), while in the same room the next night it is Busyrane who tortures Amoret (III.xii.31).

16 Spenser's Faerie Queene, p.106.

17 Spenser and the Courts of Love, pp.121-122.

18 Cited by R. Kelso, p.49.

19 Spenser and the Courts of Love, p.131.

20 "Busirane's Castle and Artidon's Cave," MLQ, I (1940), 185-192.

21 E. Panofsky, Studies in Iconology (N.Y., 1939), p.115.

22 R. van Marle, Iconographie de l'Art Profane au Moyen Age et à la Renaissance et la Décoration des Demeures (La Haye, 1931-32), II, 459-460.

23 R. van Marle, II, 447 (fig.479).

24 Arcadia, p.21. Cf. Chaucer, "The Book of the Duchess," ll.39-40, in The Works of Geoffrey Chaucer, ed. F.N. Robinson (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), p.267.

25 Ficino's Commentary, p.229.

26 He has elicited very little critical commentary, and what there is is usually rather general -- e.g. The Allegory of Love, p.345: "Scudamour, taken by himself, is hardly a personification at all; he is the lover, the husband, any husband, or even homo in search of love."

27 For the seriousness of the implications of "wilfull," amounting to a suicidal tendency, see below, pp.96-98.

28 This is closely connected to the nature of Scudamour's passion and easy yielding to grief and despair. Cf. Ficino's Commentary, pp.194-195; sensual lovers despair much more easily than soul lovers, "for we bear much more easily the desires for seeing, than those of both seeing and touching the desired one."

29 "Secretum Meum," in Prose and Poetry of the Continental Renaissance in Translation, ed. H.H. Blanchard (N.Y., 1949), p.55.

30 See above, p.32, for the seriousness of such careless wandering.

31 L. Babb, The Elizabethan Malady (East Lansing, 1951), p.4. See F.Q. II.vii.22, in Mammon's cave, where "lamenting Sorrow did in darknesse lye,/ And Shame his vgly face did hide from liuing eye."

32 F.Q. VI.viii.5 and VI.viii.50-51.

CHAPTER V

THE FORT OF REASON

The preceding chapters of this thesis have been concerned with the various battlefields on which are fought the wars between reason on one side, and the senses and passions on the other. The battlefields have been more or less mapped out, particularly in the last two chapters; vision corrupted by the senses and the body wounded by passion are images of the results of these wars, and the ways in which sense deceives and passion wounds have been fairly closely described. We should turn now to Book II, to see what Spenser has to say about the nature of the opposing force, reason, which so far has been described by means of its defensive and controlling functions, rather than by an analysis of its inner nature.

Guyon's Palmer is the natural point at which to begin. He has been identified with several qualities, including Conscience,[1] but the only suggestions which have been widely accepted are Prudence[2] and Reason.[3] No real choice between these two is necessary, since Prudence is only another name for the application of Reason to the sphere of human affairs; as Aristotle said,

> if in agreement with Plato we take the soul to have three parts, then prudence is the virtue of the rational, gentleness and bravery of the passionate, temperance and continence of the appetitive; and of the soul as a whole, justice, liberality, and magnanimity.[4]

This appears quite close to Spenser's concept of the constitution of the soul, and gives us a useful definition of the relationship between reason and temperance. From this we can see that it really matters very little whether we call the Palmer Reason or Prudence, for the latter, if we follow Aristotle, is only the proper function of the former.

Aristotle goes on to list in some detail the functions of Prudence as he has defined it:

> to prudence belongs right decision, right judgement as to what is good and bad and all in life that is to be chosen and avoided, noble use of all the goods that belong to us, correctness in social intercourse, the grasping of the right moment, the sagacious use of word and deed, the possession of experience of all that is useful. Memory, experience, tact, good judgement, sagacity — each of these either arises from prudence or accompanies it.5

These functions cover the major portion of the reasonable handling of one's life, including such essentially rational acts as judging between what is good and what is bad. The Palmer clearly assists Guyon in making correct decisions, in avoiding the bad, and in grasping the right moment.[6] He also possesses useful experience, such as the knowledge of the magic properties of fountains and lakes (II.ii.5-10). The Palmer is close then to Aristotle's Prudence, which is in effect the proper use of Reason.

In the poem, the word Reason is used fairly consistently to describe the Palmer's advice,[7] and so are phrases such as sage counsel and good counsel.[8] This suggests a possible answer to the problem already mentioned, though not satisfactorily answered, of why Guyon is successful in resisting serious temptation on Phaedria's island when he

is without his Palmer.[9] The Palmer represents not Guyon's personal Reason so much as Reason generally, the accumulated wisdom and experience of mankind. He is able to give Guyon continuously wise counsel because he knows and has seen so much more than his younger charge; he knows about fountains and lakes, about Occasion, and about the magical powers of Britomart's spear (III.i.10), not because he is more intelligent than Guyon, but because he has accumulated the wisdom and experience of knowledge. He is nowhere shown as solving problems by logical processes, because he is not Guyon's reason. He is the help that wise men of experience can give to well-intentioned younger men.[10] He is human knowledge, and "counsell sage" describes him as well as any other phrase, if not better.

Now there was in medieval and renaissance times a pseudo-Platonic typification of Wise Counsel as mastery over the three modes of time, past, present, and future, and also a similar typification of Prudence.[11] It seems to me that these traditions, or this tradition, since they seem to have fused, profoundly affected the three sages in the House of Alma, and also that they can be used to relate the Palmer in some degree to these three sages. The relation seems to me basically to be that of the exterior wise counsel of the sum of human experience embodied in other men, particularly old men and wise tutors, to the interior wise counsel which can be derived from one's own reasonable faculties. This is not quite complete or accurate,[12] but it does seem to me to give some idea of the relationship of the Palmer to the three

sages; since both are closely connected with the concept of reason, there is clearly a relationship somewhere. Moreover, it seems to provide a good explanation for the fact that the Palmer does not seem to accompany Arthur and Guyon on the tour of Alma's castle, though he is with them when they come to the castle. Since he is partly parallel to, and perhaps partly identical with, the three sages there, a meeting with them would only confuse the allegory.

Let me now give a very brief outline of the history of the typifications of Wise Counsel and Prudence already referred to.[13] Cicero defined Prudence as "rerum bonarum et malarum neutrumque scientia. Partes eius: memoria, intelligentia, providentia."[14] This became traditional; Aquinas used the concept (Summa, II.i.Q.57, article 6) and so did Dante (Convivio, IV.27). Dante allegorically represented it in the form of three eyes (Purgatorio, XXIX.130-132), and in this form Chaucer used it as casually as if it had been a commonplace, which it probably was by then. Criseyde laments:

> Prudence, allas, oon of thyne eyen thre
> Me lakked alwey, er that I come here!
> On tyme ypassed wel remembred me,
> And present tyme ek koud ich wel ise,
> But future tyme, er I was in the snare,
> Koude I nat sen; that causeth now my care.[15]

Without the detail of the eyes, the concept of Prudence as mastery of the three modes of time became apparently a scholastic commonplace, and can be found, among other places, in Petrus Berchorius, a popular medieval encyclopoedist.[16] Graphically, the concept was sometimes

shown as a cleric with three appropriately admonishing books, or else as a three-headed figure, an old one signifying the past, a middle-aged head the present, and a young one the future, as in the Titian painting, which has a motto meaning "from the experience of the past, the present acts prudently, lest it spoil future action."[17] Finally, aware of the fact that the idea of prudence as a combination of memory, intelligence, and foresight had originated in the pseudo-Platonic definition of 'wise counsel,' Cesare Ripa in his Iconologia[18] made 'Good Counsel' triple-headed. Panofsky sums up this idea in the statement that

> this co-ordination of the three modes or forms of time with the faculties of memory, intelligence and foresight, and the latter's subordination to the concept of prudence, represent a classical tradition which preserved its vitality even when Christian theology had elevated prudence to the status of a cardinal virtue.[19]

Before applying this to the three sages in Alma's turret, however, I shall give a few examples of the emergence of a tradition something like this in English literature between Chaucer and Spenser. These will make it clear that it was not a continental possession only. Lydgate defined the functions of Prudence as

> Thynges passyd remembre & well dyuyde,
> Thynges present consider & well gouerne,
> For ƀynges commyng prudently prouyde,
> Peyse matyrs or ƀou deme or dyscerne.[20]

Sir Thomas Elyot, in the curious section of the Gouernour which deals with the manner in which dancing teaches men prudence, says that the "reprinse" instructs one in "what hath caused profite or damage in the tyme passed, what is the astate of the tyme present, what aduauntage or

perile may succede or is imminent."[21] Stephen Hawes seems to refer to hhe tradition when he defines sapience:

> It is euer / the grounde of sapyence
> Before that thou / accomplysshe outwardly
> For to reuolue / vnderstandynge and prepence
> All in thy selfe / full often inwardly
> The begynnynge / and the myddle certaynly
> With the ende / or thou put it in vse
> And werke with councell / that thou mayst be sure.[22]

There is a very close parallel to this continental neo-Platonism in Ficino's statement that "any Platonic philosopher ... considers three aspects of any thing: What [sort of thing] has gone before, what accompanies it, and what follows it. If these be good, he praises the thing itself, but if bad, he censures it."[23]

The history of this tradition, and the examples of its occurrence, may seem a little long in proportion to its importance, but it seemed necessary to establish it firmly, and I have nowhere found a comprehensive study. Its relevance can be seen immediately we turn to the three sages who lived in the three rooms of the turret of Alma's castle "and counselled faire Alma, how to gouerne well" (II.ix.48). They are described as follows:

> The first of them could things to come foresee:
> The next could of things present best aduize;
> The third things past could keepe in memoree,
> So that no time, nor reason could arize,
> But that the same could one of these comprize
> (II.ix.49).

Quite obviously we have here an allegory of prudence, reason, or good counsel. These are the faculties that counsel the soul, or, in other words, constitute the several parts of reason. When we know the

background of this tradition, the description of the dweller in the front room will be immediately clear: "he had a sharpe foresight, and working wit, / That neuer idle was, ne once could rest a whit" (II.ix.49). The word "foresight" is his proper name. Similarly, the second dweller is he who can best order the present, and appropriately he is associated with law, the government of men, arts, sciences, and philosophy. When Guyon and Arthur take pleasure in "his goodly reason" (II.ix.54) the word is not used carelessly. The third of course is memory, making the best use of the past in instructing the present. Together, they form a complete allegory of the faculties which constitute human reason, as distinct from the understanding or soul which grasps heavenly things.

In saying this, I am going directly counter to the prevailing view that these figures represent the three inner faculties of the sensible soul, Imagination, the Common Sense,[24] and Memory, and that Alma alone represents the rational soul in her castle.[25] This view cannot be altogether wrong, since the faculty of foresight is given to Phantastes, and in stanzas 50-52 Phantastes is quite certainly given the functions of the imagination. But, in addition to the unmistakable reference to an allegory of prudence or reason which I find in the three sages, there are other objections to the idea that they represent the inner faculties of the sensible soul. The first is that since the imagination is very, very seldom given the ability to foresee the future as it will really happen,[26] as distinct from seeing fantasticall and untrue images, it cannot accurately be called a sage or counsellor. Rowsky sums up

Elizabethan attitudes towards the faculty of imagination as being strongly condemnatory:

> it remains essentially a faculty tied to sense and disease, uncontrolled, easily distorted and distorting and hence lying, idle and purposeless, flighty and inconsistent, and therefore irrational and immoral in the instrumental scheme.[27]

Phantastes appears to coincide with much of that, but if that were all he stood for, he would never be called a sage and a counsellor.

A similar difficulty arises with respect to the unnamed sage of the middle chamber. Berger constructs an ingenious case for regarding him as "particular reason," arguing that the "things present are then whatever events in the course of time are perceived by the senses and, compared by the sage to his archetypal murals, simultaneously judged to be of this or that nature."[28] But this simply does not do justice to the strength of the word "reason" and of the associations with all the arts of man. To make this clear, let me quote Sir Walter Raleigh on the functions of the reasonable soul (he has already described the lesser functions of the sensible soul); "by this [i.e. the reasonable soul] we speak and knit words and sentences together; by this we learn arts, number, and dispute, and foresee, and mount to heaven."[29] Phantastes and the unnamed sage between them appear to fulfill all of these functions except the last.

As a last witness in the debate, we should turn to the much discussed stanza 22 of Canto IX, which has won the distinction of having an entire Appendix devoted to it in the Variorum edition of Book II.

Reference to this will show that the general concensus of opinion has been that the stanza refers to the three souls (vegetable, sensible, and rational) of much Elizabethan psychology. But it now appears that this is not so. Vincent F. Hopper has shown, definitively as far as I am concerned, that the stanza refers to the harmony which should exist between reason and concupiscence, or between body and soul, which both stand on the same base. In other words, the body and the soul meet and are joined by reason, which keeps the mean between them.[30] The stanza is <u>not</u> a reference to the commonly mentioned tripartite soul, but another reference to the underlying trinity in Spenser of body, reason, and soul, in which the body, the senses, and the passions are seen more or less as a single unit. If I may digress into an illustration for a moment, I think that this scheme gives us a perfectly fitting explanation of Guyon's faint. He faints because his limited reason — he is without the Palmer — fails to keep the mean between his body and his soul; he feeds his soul with "his owne vertues, and prayse-worthy deedes" (II.vii. 2), while he starves his body. He looks at "eye-glutting gaine" (II.vii.9) while weakening the mighty pillars which uphold this frail life of man (II.vii.65).[31] He has deserted a vital mean.

But what then becomes of the sensible soul? Daniel C. Boughner, as conclusion to a detailed study of the figure of memory, said the following:

> thus, although in Book 2, Canto 9, he [Spenser] draws on the psychological literature of his day, he reasts his material so as to reconcile it with his moral teaching. In his psychology of memory he converts his science into a sort of minister of right conduct.[32]

This corroborates what I feel to be the implications of the discussion above of Phantastes and the sage of the central room. Spenser has absorbed these faculties of the sensible soul into a whole which includes them together with much more. In comparison with the standard tripartite soul, he has given the inner faculties of the sensible soul to reason, and has given the highest powers of the rational soul to Alma, the soul itself, for whom there is no place in the usual tripartite system.[33]

Since in Elizabethan times the three inner faculties of the sensible soul were sometimes attributed to the rational soul,[34] Spenser is saying nothing unique or revolutionary in this canto. But what really seems to be the explanation is that he is going back to an older system used, among others, by Du Bartas and Alanus de Insulis. Du Bartas writes of his castle that

> ... tu logeas encore l'humain entendement
> En l'estage plus haut de ce beau bastiment;
> Afin que tout ainsi que d'une citadelle
> Il domptast la fureur du corps, qui se rebelle
> Trop souvent contre lui & que nostre raison
> Tenant dans un tel fort jour & nuict garnison,
> Foulast dessous ses pieds l'enuie, le cholere, ...[35]

Alanus describes a rather more complicated system, in which "inborn understanding," "ability in logic," and the "faculty to recall the past," all dwelling in different rooms of the head, do obeisance, as to a goddess, to wisdom, who commands from "the citadel of the head." In the heart magnanimity dwells, also serving under the dominion of "wisdom."[36] There are interesting parallels between this and Spenser, but I think they are a little too distant to be pressed hard; "inborn understanding," for

instance, is not really comparable to Phantastes in either of his guises as imagination and as foresight, a part of prudence or reason.[37]

There are also at least two English works which present what I believe to be the essence of the structure of Alma's castle. In "Sawles Warde," the house of the self is governed by Wit, the lord, while the wayward wife of the house is called Will (in the sense of desire). Under the house-wife are many servants, in the form of potentially rebellious thoughts, who are likely to cause trouble if the lord of the house, Wit, is asleep or away from home. Inside the house is the soul, a treasure which Wit must guard.[38] The allegory of Piers Plowman appears to be rather similar, and casts the idea of the soul as treasure into the figure of a woman.[39]

These allegories, regardless of the vexed question of which, if any, represent Spenser's true source, point up the true nature of the members of the hierarchy in Alma's castle, and the relationships existing between them. The passions or affections are housed in a parlour placed in the main structure of the castle, that is, the body, presumably the heart -- from which one must ascend a flight of alabaster steps (presumably the neck) in order to reach the turret of the head (II.ix.44). This not only mirrors Elizabethan concepts of physiology, but shows the order of the moral hierarchy. The passions are part of the body and must be subordinated to the reason of the head.[40] The sensual implications of the passions are evident; there are jolly

Paramours, careless laughter, idle ease, envy and so on, all ready to lapse into evil excess if stirred or uncontrolled. They are closely related to the troops which attack the senses later on (II.xi.8-10 especially), except that here they are at peace, for Cupid has left behind his bow (II.ix.34). He has only to declarewar and pick it up again for the siege of the passions against the "fort of reason" to be declared once again (II.xi.1 and 8).

The first stanza of Canto XI in a few lines summarizes the relationships existing between the soul, reason, and the bodily passions, and makes it clear that the warfare is against reason with the soul as prize, that is, that the soul, Alma, and reason are separate:

> What warre so cruell, or what siege so sore,
> As that, which strong affections do apply
> Against the fort of reason euermore
> To bring the soule into captiuitie:
> Their force is fiercer through infirmitie
> Of the fraile flesh, relenting to their rage ....

Thus the war of Canto XI is only a dramatic representation of the state of things in Canto IX, except that in Canto IX the war has been temporarily won, and the passions are at peace.

This is the meaning of F.Q.II.ix.1, which tells us that there will be a double presentation of the main theme:

> Of all Gods workes, which do this world adorne,
> There is no one more faire and excellent,
> Then is mans body both for powre and forme,
> Whiles it is kept in sober gouernment;
> But none then it, more fowle and indecent,
> Distempred through misrule and passions bace:
> It growes a Monster, and incontinent
> Doth loose his dignitie and natiue grace.
> Behold, who list, both one and other in this place.

Most commentators have ignored this last line; one has suggested that Alma's castle is the body in sober government, while Maleger himself is the body grown a monster.[41] But this is an impossible reading of the allegory; if Alma's castle represents the body and mind in Canto IX, then it must still represent the body and mind in Canto XI. It has become a monster -- temporarily -- because of the rebellion of the "passions bace," which attack the senses with their newly mobilized weapons of war. I see no reason whatever for modifying Professor Woodhouse's identification of Maleger as original sin or the human tendency to depravity which is the result of the Fall.[42] This inherent weakness is the natural leader and inflamer of the passions, as we saw in Chapter IV. The allegory of the double representation of Alma's castle is completely in accord with the allegory of Britomart's wounding by Malecasta, of Amoret's grievous injury and imprisonment, and of Serena's envenomed wound from the Blatant Beast. The enemies are always within, as we can see from the Palmer's advice to Guyon to contend with his affections while they are still weak:

> For when they once to perfect strength do grow,
> Strong warres they make, and cruell battry bend
> Gainst fort of Reason, it to ouerthrow
> (II.iv.34).

T. C. Hamilton has said that "the image of the besieged body [in II.xi.1] ... is the unifying metaphor of the book,"[43] but this is only true if we read "reason" for "body," and add that the besiegers are the passions <u>within</u> the body in malevolent collusion with the senses.

Once the passions and senses have been reduced to their proper state of friendly and dutiful subservience to reason, once the castle of

Alma is restored to its proper order by Arthur, then the inwardly sound man can resist the power of outward occasion working upon his weaknesses. Thus the internal war of reason and the passions in Canto XI must be won before Guyon, who really is the house of Alma, is strong enough to venture into the Bower of Bliss and conquer its seductions. Guyon has been strengthened by the trials of the book. In Canto IV, as we saw, it was necessary for him to conquer -- that is, to avoid -- occasion in order to maintain mastery over his passions, and therefore he was still vulnerable to external attack. His passions could still be aroused if occasion caught up with him. But after the insight into his own nature which he receives in the castle of Alma, and after Arthur's defeat of Maleger and the passions and weaknesses of sense, Guyon is able to destroy Acrasia, the occasion of sin in man. The central victory of the book is won within Guyon himself.

This battle of reason against the passions is a battle waged in deadly seriousness, for its issue is literally a matter of life and death, on two levels. The most basic need for reason to master the passions and senses is the maintenance of bodily life. The Renaissance was healthily realistic about this. Hooker's remark that "to live virtuously it is impossible except we live"[44] is a neat formulation of the attitude.

Spenser refers frequently to the necessity of maintaining bodily health and strength, and blames any neglect of this need as a

kind of wilful self-destruction.[45] This necessity, caused by human weaknesses resulting from the Fall, places a limit upon the degree of charity which a man can extend to his fellow beings.[46] It is not for ordinary men to imitate Christ in the matter of self-sacrifice, for they are not strong enough. The two most important exemplars of the importance of maintaining bodily life and health are the Red Cross Knight and Guyon. There are very close parallels between the two in this matter, and both are brought to the point where only Arthur or grace can save them. The Red Cross Knight after leaving the house of Pride becomes "both carelesse of his health, and of his fame" (I.vii.7) and as a result is taken prisoner by Orgoglio. This imprisonment leaves him with "all his vitall powres / Decayd, and all his flesh shronk vp like withered flowres" (I.viii.41). In this state, with "shrunken synewes" and still "weake and wearie" (I.ix.20) he becomes a natural prey to the most serious form of melancholy, religious despair (I.ix.48-50). Ironically enough, he has just incredulously asked Sir Terwin, himself fleeing from despair, how it is possible that a man may "with idle speach / Be wonne, to spoyle the Castle of his health?" (I.ix.31.)

The Red Cross Knight has found to his cost that neglect of his health weakens life at its root, the vital powers, and that this is akin to despair and suicide, a mortal sin. It is a function of Alma and her counsellors to maintain health (II.xi.1-2), and if they do not, they, like Timias, become liable to Belphoebe's serious reproach on seeing that

poor squire a mere ghost of his former self. If his state is caused by heaven,

> ... then none may it redresse or blame,
> Sith to his powre we all are subiect borne:
> If wrathfull wight, then fowle rebuke and shame
> Be theirs, that haue so cruell thee forlorne;
> But if through inward griefe or wilfull scorne
> Of life it be, then better doe aduise.
> For he whose daies in wilfull woe are worne,
> The grace of his Creator doth despise,
> That will not vse his gifts for thanklesse nigardise
> (IV.viii.15).

Guyon learns the same bitter lesson in Mammon's cave, where he remains so long

> ... that vitall powres gan wexe both weake and wan,
> For want of food, and sleepe, which two vpbeare,
> Like mightie pillours, this fraile life of man,
> That none without the same enduren can
> (II.vii.65).

We could gauge how far Guyon is from the path of true reason merely by comparing his state here, caused by his own voluntary action, with the allegory of the castle of Alma. The destructive passions grow fiercer through "infirmitie / Of the fraile flesh" (II.xi.1), and frail flesh in this context means both bodily weakness and the weakness of fleshly sensuality. Truly considered, the two weaknesses were the same in origin; they were both the legacy of the Fall, and Maleger may very well represent both disease and original sin. Without the intervention of redeeming grace, both result finally in death. It is reason's function to steer body and soul towards the sources of life.

Notes to Chapter V

1 M.Y. Hughes, "Spenser's Palmer," ELH, II.(1935), 151-164.

2 See for instance, the Variorum Spenser, "The Faerie Queene, Book II," p.188, p.405, and p.414.

3 See for instance Berger, p.6.

4 Ethica Eudemia, 1249a-1250a.

5 Ethica Eudemia, 1250a.

6 See his advice to Guyon to conquer Occasion before fighting her son Furor (II.iv.10-11).

7 See F.Q.II.i.28, 34; II.ii.5, 11; II.iv.34, etc. In all, the word "reason" is used 19 times in Book II; the next book in order of frequency is Book VI, with only 10 instances.

8 F.Q. II.i.7; II.vi.48; II.xii.38, 69, 82, etc.

9 For comments on this from different points of view, see E. Sirluck, "The Faerie Queene', Book II, and the Nicomachean Ethics," MP, XLIX (1951-2), 73-100; Sirluck argues that Guyon represents continence when the Palmer is present, and temperance when the Palmer is absent. See also R. Hoopes, "'God Guide Thee, Guyon': Nature and Grace Reconciled in 'The Faerie Queene,' Book II," RES, N.S.V (1954), 14-24, and J.C. Maxwell, "Guyon, Phaedria, and the Palmer," RES, N.S.V (1954), 388-390.

10 Cf. M.Y. Hughes, "Spenser's Palmer" (pp.160-161) referring to the conversation on the fourth day in Castiglione's Courtier, where it is agreed "that growth unhindered by fortune is possible only if an individual has a maestro, a master or censor, by which they meant something like the Socratic daemon. Such a Socratic guardian Spenser intended in his comely palmer, clad in black attyre."

11 See E. Panofsky, "Titian's 'Allegory of Prudence': A Postscript," in Meaning in the Visual Arts (N.Y., 1955).

12 See the discussion of memory in Berger, pp.79-81.

13 The chief sources of this are E. Panofsky, "Titian's 'Allegory of Prudence'" and E. Panofsky and F. Saxl, "A Late Antique Religious Symbol in Works by Holbein and Titian," in The Burlington Magazine for Connoisseurs, XLIX (1926), 177-181. These articles do not, however, give references to medieval and renaissance English literature. These are to be found in S.C. Chew, The Virtues Reconciled, Toronto, 1947. For brief additional references to graphic illustrations of Prudence as two- or three-headed, signifying the several modes of time, see: E. Droulers, Dictionnaire des Attributs, Allégories, Emblèmes, et Symboles (Turnhout, Belgium, n.d.), under "Prudence"; R. van Marle, Iconographie, p.22 and p.50; H. Schwarz, "The Mirror in Art," The Art Quarterly, XV (1952), 104-105.

14 De Inventione, etc., ed. with trans. H.M. Hubbell, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass., 1949), p.326.

15 "Troilus and Criseyde," in The Works of Geoffrey Chaucer, ed. F.N. Robinson, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), p.467 (Bk. V, lines 744-749).

16 E. Panofsky, "Titian's 'Allegory of Prudence'," p.149.

17 E. Panofsky, "Titian's 'Allegory of Prudence'," pp.148-150.

18 E. Panofsky, "Titian's 'Allegory of Prudence'," p.163.

19 E. Panofsky, "Titian's 'Allegory of Prudence'," p.149.

20 "A Pageant of Knowledge," in The Minor Poems of John Lydgate (Part II, Secular Poems), ed. H.N. MacCracken, E.E.T.S., No. 192 (London, 1934), p.725.

21 The Boke Named The Gouernour, ed. H.H.S. Croft (London, 1883), I, 254.

22 The Pastime of Pleasure, ed. W.E. Mead, E.E.T.S., O.S. No. 173 (London, 1928), p.47.

23 Commentary on Symposium, p.124. See also same work, p.166; reason perceives not only "the present, as the senses do, but also what is above the heavens, in the past, and in the future."

24 See above, p.48, for a definition of this faculty, which is quite different from what we understand by the words.

25 The best statement of this standard view is Berger, pp.77-85.

26 The only reference I have been able to find is one to Huarte and DuLaurens in W. Rossky, "Imagination in the English Renaissance," p.61. For works referred to in this connection, see Appendix I.

27 W. Rossky, p.62.

28 P. 83.

29 "A Treatise of the Soul," in The Works of Sir Walter Raleigh, ed. Oldys and Birch (Oxford, 1829), VIII, 587.

30 "Spenser's 'House of Temperance'," PMLA, LV (1940), 958-967.

31 See also above, p.96. This explanation is not intended to destroy the comments there made about curiosity, etc., but to provide the schematic framework into which they fit. Berger (pp.18-27) has the essence of this, but he misses the important point that there should be a mean between body and soul, which Guyon deserts. Because he misses this, his argument is a little diffuse and over-complex. But he does provide such insights as "the eye-feeding figure is part of a larger metaphoric pattern in which the quality of edibility is applied to inedible things and edible things are shown as inedible" (p.28).

32 "The Psychology of Memory in Spenser's 'Faerie Queene'," PMLA, XLVII (1932), 89-96.

33 Berger (p.80) of course is forced by his view to make her the sole representative in the castle of the reasonable soul. I find this unconvincing.

34 See Anderson, Elizabethan Psychology and Shakespeare's Plays, pp.16-17; Dowden, "Elizabethan Psychology" p.321, for a reference to Bacon, De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum Libri LX, Book III, Chap.1, and L.B. Campbell, Shakespeare's Tragic Heroes, p.65.

35 Cited by A.H. Upham, The French Influence in English Literature (N.Y., 1908), p.518. Cf. same source, p.170: "the Faerie Queene does not deviate materially [from Du Bartas] until the pictures of Understanding, Memory, and Imagination, which are personified and placed in their proper chambers in the head, instead of merely having their functions commented upon, as in the Semaine." The important point is that the sages correspond to understanding or reason, which must rule the passions.

36 The Complaint of Nature, trans. D.M. Moffat (N.Y., 1908), p.27.

37 However, see E. Greenlaw, "Some Old Religious Cults in Spenser," SP, XX (1923), 216-243, for a determined effort to reconcile Alanus and Spenser.

38 In Old English Homilies and Homiletic Treatises, ed. with trans. R. Morris, E.E.T.S., No. 34 (London, 1868), pp.244-246.

39 See C.L. Powell, "The Castle of the Body," SP, XVI (1919), 197-205. Powell discusses Du Bartas, Grosseteste's trans. into Anglo-Norman of Le Chasteau d'Amour, "Sawles Warde," and Piers Plowman, and concludes (p.204), that Spenser must have taken Alma and the three sages from one or more of those he discusses other than Du Bartas. For suggestion that the name Alma might have been taken from the Alme of Gower, see J.L. Lowes, "Spenser and the Mirour de l'Omme," PMLA, XXIX (1914), 447.

40 See F.Q. II.ix.45, where the turret surveys the things beneath it "as hils doen lower ground."

41 A.C. Hamilton, "'Like race to runne': The Parallel Structure of The Faerie Queene, Books I and II," PMLA, LXXIII (1958), 332.

42 "Nature and Grace in 'The Faerie Queene'," ELH, XVI (1949), 221. For the same view see also V.K. Whitaker, The Religious Basis of Spenser's Thought, p.50.

43 "Like race to runne," p.332.

44 Cited in Variorum ed. of Book II, p.469. Cf. Hoby's trans. of Castiglione's The Book of the Courtier, ed. W. Raleigh (London, 1900), p.321, and Alciati's Emblemata, cited by E.C. Knowlton, "The Scale of Man," Studies in the Renaissance, III (1956), 136.

45 See F.Q. III.vii.6, 41; III.viii.15.

46 See F.Q. I.v.18 and IV.vii.10: "selfe to forget to mind another, is ouersight."

CHAPTER VI

REASON TRIUMPHANT

It is possible that the argument of this thesis has given a rather harsh and even negative picture of Spenser's view of the world; it may be felt that an analysis of the relationship of reason and sensuality should account for such apparently triumphant and unreproved sensuality as that of the Temple of Venus. I think that there are two answers to these possible suspicions of unbalance, corresponding roughly to the two possible objections.

The first has been neatly summed up in the statement that "we have lost Spenser's feeling that in the rational life there is something superhuman."[1] It is perhaps unnecessary to repeat Hamlet's words on the functions of reason, but a few references may help define the final place of reason in man as the Elizabethans, and indeed nearly all Western civilization, saw it. Aristotle had said that "reason more than anything else is man,"[2] and we find the sentiment echoed often enough, as by Sidney: "yf wee will bee men, the reasonable parte of youre sowle, ys to haue absolute Comaundem^t."[3] And it is echoed by all those, notably including Spenser, who referred to men living in defiance of reason, as beasts.

Reason, in its basic sense of the ability to distinguish between good and evil,[4] is something very close to the divine, and is in fact often described as a gift from God, or as the operation of grace

in man.[5] This opinion seems to be held by Spenser, as we can see in the closely related figures of Sapience and Urania. Spenser tells us that God grants his grace to man by allowing him to glimpse Sapience, and gather a few of her riches,[6] and Urania in her lament expresses nearly the whole doctrine, in a passage which is central enough to quote at some length:

> What difference twixt man and beast is left,
> When th'heauenlie light of knowledge is put out,
> And th'ornaments of wisdome are bereft?
> Then wandreth he in error and in doubt,
> Vnweeting of the danger hee is in,
> Through fleshes frailtie and deceipt of sin.
>
> In this wide world in which they wretches stray,
> It is the onelie comfort which they haue,
> It is their light, their loadstarre and their day;
> But hell and darkenesse and the grislie graue
> Is ignorance, the enemie of grace,
> That mindes of men borne heauenlie doth debace
> (The Teares of the Muses, 11487-498).

Wisdom, right reason and knowledge here are all divine gifts, and ignorance is pointedly called the enemy of grace. Thus right reason is the operation of grace in the mind.

Here I would like to take up a point made by Professor Woodhouse in writing that Spenser was probably "preparing for an ultimate synthesis of nature and grace in the person of Prince Arthur."[7] I would suggest that to some extent this synthesis has already been made, for Arthur seems to be as distinctly connected with reason (I.vii.41-42) as he is with grace (I.viii.1). Both reason and grace can mend man's weaknesses, for ultimately they are from the same source.

The final point to be made is that the need for reason, as a controlling force, to keep a very close hand on the passions is a result of the Fall, which drove a wedge in between reason and the passions. If this had not happened, the passions would themselves be reasonable, and therefore free. The Temple of Venus and the pastoral paradise of Book VI are images of this unfallen and integrated condition; but the antique age of gold has not yet returned. There is much work to be done before time travels back to its timeless beginning, and Spenser is as much concerned to give instructions as to how that work may best be continued as he is to describe the ultimate goal of all good work on earth. It is comparatively seldom that he succours his travailing knights with the glittering vision of the Eternal City which is bound together by the love of which the loves mirrored even in the Temple of Venus are but the earthly, though unfallen, shadows.

Notes to Chapter VI

1 M.Y. Hughes, "Spenser's Palmer," p.160.

2 Nicomachean Ethics, 1178a.

3 Arcadia, p.16.

4 See Hooker, I,171, etc.

5 See Whitaker, The Religious Basis of Spenser's Thought, p.35.

6 "An Hymne of Heavenly Beavtie," ll.239-252.

7 "Nature and Grace in 'The Faerie Queene'," p.209.

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