Failure to Protect:
Explaining the Response of the United States to the Crisis in Darfur

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the failure of the United States to meaningfully respond to the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, Sudan. Specifically it asserts that the U.S. response is markedly incongruent with the expected outcome of its rhetorical commitment to humanitarian intervention. Drawing on constructivist arguments, this paper suggests that this commitment is reflective of an emergent norm of humanitarian intervention. Given constructivism's limitations, however, the presence of this norm alone cannot predict its impact on policy formation. Therefore, this thesis considers the causal mechanisms posited by realism and liberalism. Through the realist lens this analysis suggests that U.S. policy makers perceive increased involvement in Darfur as compromising the American national interest. Alternatively, the liberal perspective emphasizes a lack of domestic preferences supporting intervention. Combining these realist and liberal findings with the constructivist potential for change ultimately suggests a route toward a more effective response to humanitarian crises.

RÉSUMÉ

Ce mémoire analyse l'échec du gouvernement américain pour résoudre de façon significative la crise de Darfour, à Soudan. Notamment, il constate que la réponse américaine est extrêmement disproportionnée par rapport à l'engagement rhétorique quant à l'intervention humanitaire. Faisant usage des arguments constructivistes, ce mémoire suggère que cet engagement reflète une norme émergente de l'intervention humanitaire. En revanche, étant donné les limitations du constructivisme, la seule présence de cette norme ne peut pas prédire son impact sur la création des politiques. C'est pourquoi ce mémoire considère les mécanismes de causalité exigés par le réalisme et le libéralisme. Du point de vue réaliste cette analyse suggère que, selon les hommes politiques américains, davantage de participation à Darfour compromettrait l'intérêt national américain. D'autre part, la perspective libérale souligne un manque des préférences domestiques soutenant l'intervention. Finalement, en combinant les connaissances réalistes et libérales avec le potentiel modificateur constructiviste, une route vers une réponse plus effective à des crises humanitaires est suggérée.

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INTRODUCTION

"Much has been written, discussed, argued and filmed on the subject of Rwanda, yet it is my feeling that this recent catastrophe is being forgotten and its lessons submerged in ignorance and apathy. The genocide in Rwanda was a failure of humanity that could easily happen again."
– LGen. Roméo Dallaire

Within a year of the early 2003 explosion of violence in Sudan's western Darfur province, the resultant humanitarian crisis had become by UN standards "one of the worst in the world."[1] Exacerbated by spillover into eastern Chad and northern Central African Republic, it is by mid-2007 estimated that between 200,000 and 400,000 people have been killed and over 2.5 million displaced.[2] From aid agencies to members of Congress, student groups to Hollywood actors, the violence in Darfur has sparked an outpouring of appeals for the United States to assume a strong leadership role in helping restore peace and security to the region. Yet in return, the U.S. has taken few actions other than to label the atrocities "genocide," call on Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir to halt the violence, and continue pre-existing unilateral sanctions against the Sudanese government—yielding little to no improvement on the ground.

It is particularly striking that this limited response comes at a time when the U.S. has pledged to uphold a "responsibility to protect," known as R2P. Drawn from the recommendations of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), this concept was endorsed by UN member nations at the 2005 World Summit. There it was resolved that states are inherently responsible for the welfare of their citizens, but that in the event that "national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations," it falls to the international community to take collective action to protect them.[3] As pertains to the people of Darfur, there can be no question that the Government of Sudan has unequivocally failed on its end of this responsibility (except

perhaps by President Bashir's own account, which has steadily accused Western reports of exaggerating the crisis). Yet as an R2P-endorsing state on the other end, the U.S. has also consistently failed to implement a response anywhere near sufficient to protect the people of Darfur, rhetorical pledges notwithstanding. Why?

Accounting for this lack of meaningful U.S. involvement in Darfur is the main objective of this paper. Specifically, it will seek to do so by considering the normative context surrounding the formation of the U.S. response. By drawing on constructivist contentions, this paper begins with the assertion that U.S. endorsement of R2P—as to the Geneva Conventions, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the UN Genocide Convention before it—is in fact a manifestation of an emergent norm supporting humanitarian intervention. Hence, these commitments can be understood as derived at least in part from a societal recognition of and belief in the principles they pledge to uphold. As constructivist scholars argue, in contrast to earlier consensus that humanitarian intervention ought to be limited to aiding only similarly situated people (white Christians, in the case of Western countries) or was prohibited by the prerogative of sovereignty, a changed society has likewise led to a changed understanding of this norm: one that now supports and indeed obligates intervention universally to protect populations targeted by genocide, ethnic cleansing, and other crimes against humanity.

Attempting to base an explanation of the U.S. response to Darfur on the presence of this emergent norm, however, quickly runs up against constructivism's limitations. In particular, constructivism is not equipped to explain how the asserted causal arrow running from norm internalization to policy development functions. Consequently, the progression of American normative support for intervention and the accompanying

commitment to principles like R2P on their own can tell us very little about whether or not the U.S. genuinely intends to convert its rhetoric into action. A better understanding is gained by turning to predictive explanations of state behavior. Accordingly, in order to draw from multiple levels of analysis and obtain the fullest account of U.S. policy determinants, this thesis will extrapolate from the causal mechanisms posited by both realist and liberal theory to explain why the U.S. has failed to intervene in Darfur.

In order to apply these theories, however, it is important to first specify this paper's definition of "humanitarian intervention" and secondly, qualify accordingly the "non-intervention" charge it levels against the U.S. response.

Defining "Humanitarian Intervention"*

Throughout this paper, the use of the term "intervention" is understood to refer specifically to the humanitarian type, in keeping with the International Committee of the Red Cross's definition of "humanitarian acts" as those that work to "prevent and alleviate human suffering."[4] Consensus on how this is accomplished is more contentious. "It is curious that those who support humanitarian interventions assume that these interventions must be military," asserts Mahmood Mamdani, as the use of force is indeed prescribed by most definitions.[5] The following version by Sean Murphy is representative: humanitarian intervention is "the threat or use of force by a state, group of states, or international

* It is important to acknowledge that humanitarian intervention is far from universally accepted. Mamdani argues, "calling an intervention 'humanitarian' cannot strip it of its politics," and Eric Brown asserts, "The general problem here is that humanitarian intervention is always going to be based on the cultural predilections of those with the power to carry it out."[7] The debate has only intensified following efforts to justify the U.S. invasion of Iraq on humanitarian grounds, fueling the contention of countries like China, Russia, and India that support for humanitarian intervention is only a foil for Western imperialist motives. Gareth Evans recalls that this accusation nearly defeated R2P endorsement at the 2005 World Summit.[8]

organizations for the purpose of protecting the nationals of the target states from widespread deprivations of internationally recognized human rights."[6]

To center the definition on the use of force, however, does not adequately take into account the wide range of non-military opportunities for involvement and their potential utility. This moreover presents a convenient excuse for countries disinclined to utilize military force to wash their hands of involvement altogether. This certainly contributed to the non-response to Rwanda, typified by the example of a *New York Times* editorial from April 23, 1994, which lamented, "The horrors of Kigali show the need for considering whether a mobile, quick-response UN force under UN aegis is needed to deal with such calamities. *Absent such a force*, the world has little choice but to stand aside and hope for the best."[9] The use of force definition also risks ingraining "the law of the tool" into our responses to humanitarian crises. Drawing on the adage, "If all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail," the law of the tool dictates that a response will be primarily guided by the resources most available to you, rather than a recognition of what would be most useful to resolving the situation.[10] Defining intervention by the use of force has essentially turned military deployment into this hammer, to the detriment of the other tools we might use and their potential greater effectiveness.

This consideration is particularly pertinent to the U.S. response to Darfur, as the deployment of American troops could seriously risk exacerbating the situation. With the passage of each UN Security Council resolution relating to international involvement in Darfur, extremists within Sudan have raised the alarm of imperialism, calling on their followers to defeat the coming "crusader army."[11] Deliberately encouraging this anti-Western sentiment, President Bashir has warned, "If you like Iraq, you'll love Darfur!"[12]

Clearly U.S. intervention must aim for more productive results than creating the next anti-Western insurgency hotspot. Furthermore, as Alex de Waal argues, a military deployment to Darfur, regardless of whether or not it included U.S. troops, is not a sufficient solution in the first place. "Many of us would wish for international troops that can disarm the *Janjawid*, protect all civilians, and bring about peace and security," he asserts, but the reality of what such a mission could accomplish "dictates that we lower our expectations."[13] While it would doubtless be a useful tool, the use of force is just one component of the needed intervention.

In considering the potential for international and especially U.S. involvement to help end the crisis in Darfur, it is thus far more useful to consider "intervention" as actually implying a "*continuum* of intervention." As Samantha Power suggests, this continuum would supplement military measures with diplomatic and economic options, thereby enlarging our toolbox and improving our chances of implementing successful policy.[14] This definition is far more consistent with the conception of involvement outlined in the ICISS Responsibility to Protect report as well, which calls for a range of "interventionary measures."[15] Under this conception, military intervention is designated a measure of last resort, to be enacted only after economic, political, judicial, and other military measures short of mission deployment have been tried. These could include dedicating high-level diplomats to a peace process, restricting access to petroleum products, freezing financial assets, or enforcing no-fly zones. In short, intervention should encompass a full variety of options in its attempt to protect. For the purposes of this paper, "intervention" is thus defined as entailing this continuum of interventionary measures, and "non-intervention" as the lack thereof.

The U.S. Response

In leveling this charge of non-intervention at the U.S., greater nuance is merited. When it comes to the American response, certainly Darfur is not Rwanda. President George W. Bush has expressed his commitment to finding a solution, Congress has held hearings, and the State Department has sponsored diplomatic overtures. Accusing the U.S. of absolute non-intervention is therefore admittedly unfair. Yet it is also true that the actions the U.S. has taken as of mid-2007 (along with those of the broader international community) have been ineffective at ending the crisis. Small achievements have been made along the way—though most, like cease-fire agreements and governmental promises to disarm its militias, have been reneged—but irrefutably, the atrocities have continued unabated. In fact, since the Darfur Peace Agreement was signed in May 2006, the situation has actually worsened.[16]

In undertaking to explain U.S. non-intervention in Darfur, then, this paper is more precisely examining why the U.S. has failed to enact *meaningful* intervention. Certainly this definition is heavily subjective and both raises the question of who is to judge an action's meaningfulness and seemingly makes it unfeasible to do so until after implementation. To defend against these drawbacks, two considerations are key: First, while granted it is impossible to completely anticipate the outcome of a proposed action before it has been implemented, it is possible to reach a fairly accurate approximation. It should be evident, for example, that repeatedly issuing demands for the violence to stop without the backing of credible leverage to compel this response accomplishes little.

Second, even failing accurate predictions, it should be possible to learn in close to real time from what has thus far failed or succeeded and adjust accordingly. This

expectation seems particularly reasonable given that the current conflict has drawn on for more than four years, to say nothing of the experience of previous U.S. engagements with the Khartoum regime over the 1990s. As an International Crisis Group report argues, "No one can guarantee what will work with a regime as tough-minded and inscrutable as Sudan's, but patient diplomacy and trust in Khartoum's good faith has been a patent failure."[17] These lessons should have been learned by now, so that if the U.S. were in fact serious about helping to end the violence, it could have implemented far more effective policy. This paper therefore contends that accusing the U.S. of failing to meaningfully intervene in Darfur is warranted—further illustrating the deficiency in the next chapter—and proceeds from this starting point to examine the potential causes of this response.

Argument Structure

This paper asserts that the U.S. response to Darfur is markedly incongruent with the expected outcome of its rhetorical commitment to humanitarian intervention. To explore this backdrop, this paper will initially consider the constructivist insistence on the inclusion of norms as important determinants of state behavior. Accordingly, it will argue that the U.S. endorsement of R2P is in fact part and product of a normative pattern of support for humanitarian intervention, which has particularly emerged since the end of the Cold War. This properly situates the U.S. response to Darfur within its normative context and bolsters the case that asking why the U.S. has not intervened in Darfur is in fact a legitimate and useful question in the first place. As the incongruence demonstrates, however, and constructivists themselves admit, simply recognizing the presence of this emergent norm does little to further our understanding of how it impacts policy in practice. Thus, while maintaining that norms are indeed relevant to U.S. policy

formation, this thesis acknowledges that they are nonetheless mitigated by other factors better accounted for by traditional realist and liberal theory.

This paper will therefore consider humanitarian intervention through both realist and liberal lenses, using the causal mechanisms of state behavior endorsed by these theories as a framework for explaining the specific case of the U.S. response to Darfur. First, exploration of the realist perspective will reveal that humanitarian intervention is not a policy states would be expected to undertake. This stems from the central realist assumption that states seek to maximize both relative and absolute power and security, namely, to pursue their national interests. By contrast, humanitarian intervention is likely to involve significant costs and risks to this goal. While thus not prohibiting humanitarian intervention, the realist explanation holds that unless intervention is perceived as serving the national interest, such action will not occur—regardless of rhetorical commitments. In the case of the U.S. response to Darfur, then, non-intervention is in fact the expected realist outcome, suggesting that policy makers perceive increased involvement as compromising the American national interest. To explain why, three potential factors will be considered: the effect on counterterrorism efforts, the prospect of resource exhaustion, and the impact on U.S. interests pertaining to the Sudanese North-South peace process.

The liberal explanation presented next will focus on the shaping power of domestic influences. In contrast to the realist emphasis on capabilities, liberalism posits state behavior as best understood by its preferences. As such it does not make an *a priori* prediction about the likelihood of support for humanitarian intervention, but rather suggests intervention policy is best understood as dependent on the inclination of domestic preferences. Consequently, this paper will argue that non-intervention in Darfur

must be the result of one or both of two alternatives: either interventionist proponents have failed to effectively transmit their preferences, or, existing intervention-supportive preferences are too few to begin with. To address the first possibility, this paper will examine the impact of the Darfur advocacy movement, and to the later, the influence on preference formation of Darfur's geographical location, the psychological consequences of the crisis, and the impact of media coverage. To more fully account for the domestic influences on policy formation, this paper will then supplement the liberal argument by taking into account the growing body of literature focused on the impact of leaders and individual decision-making on policy. This will specifically explore the rationale that non-intervention in Darfur might also stem from a lack of presidential leadership.

In considering these varying explanations, it is not this paper's purpose to definitively answer the puzzle of U.S. non-intervention. Especially since Darfur's crisis continues to unfold at the time of writing, such a conclusion could likely come only years after its final resolution. Rather, this paper seeks to shed light on a number of factors that have likely contributed to the U.S. response, some more strongly than others. Hence the realist and liberal focus on differing levels of analysis is particularly useful, as together they give broad scope to a range of influence and markedly different explanations of non-intervention. Taking these explanations into account, this paper will conclude with a return to the constructivist emphasis on interests and preferences as *changeable* conceptions, asserting the continued relevance of the normative R2P context to the realist and liberal conclusions. That is, by applying the constructivist potential for change to the realist- and liberal-revealed caveats to meaningful humanitarian intervention, we can

begin developing the tools and strategies to move toward a genuine commitment to protect the targets of the coming decades' inevitable crises.

Outline

The argument outlined above will proceed over five sections. Chapter I will present a two-part background, beginning with a brief explanation of the Darfur crisis. Then a review of the U.S. response over the past four years will seek to highlight the deficiency of its actions. Chapter II will present the constructivist conception of normative influence and make the case for understanding R2P as part of a normative evolution of humanitarian intervention. The realist and liberal positions will be detailed in Chapters III and IV, respectively, beginning with a literature review of each theory's causal mechanisms, and followed by their application to explain the U.S. response. Finally, the paper will conclude by applying the constructivist potential for change to the lessons of both realist and liberal analysis, and thus broaden the paper's findings from the specific case of Darfur to preliminarily address the more general task of improving our collective response to future humanitarian crises.

[1] "Humanitarian and security situations in western Sudan reach new lows, UN agency says," *UN News Service*, Dec. 5, 2003.
[2] Darfur's violence has made reaching consensus on statistical accuracy particularly difficult. For the most recent discussion, see Eric Reeves, "Darfur Mortality: Shoddy Journalism at the New York Times," Sudan Tribune, Aug. 14, 2007.
[3] *UN World Summit Outcome Document*, Sept. 15 2005, para. 138 and 139.
[4] Nicholas Wheeler and Alex Bellamy, "Humanitarian Intervention and World Politics," in *Globalization of World Politics,* ed. by John Baylis and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 393.
[5] "Humanitarian Intervention: A Forum," *The Nation*, July 14, 2003.
[6] Sean Murphy, *Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), 11-12.
[7] "Humanitarian Intervention: A Forum."
[8] Gareth Evans, "Responsibility to Protect in 2007: Five Thoughts for Policy Makers," *Panel Discussion on The Responsibility to Protect*, United Nations, New York, Apr. 13 2007.
[9] Emphasis added, Samantha Power, *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide* (New York: HarperCollins, 2002), 374.
[10] Quote from Bernard Baruch, explanation in John Prendergast, *Frontline Diplomacy: Humanitarian Aid and Conflict in Africa* (London: Lynne Rienner, 1996), 7.
[11] Samantha Power, "Dying in Darfur," *The New Yorker*, Aug. 30, 2004.
[12] Samantha Power, "The Void: Why the Movement Needs Help," *The New Republic*, May 15, 2006.
[13] Alex de Waal, "Darfur: Necessary Knowledge for Effective Action," *Social Science Research Council*, May 28, 2007, 7.
[14] Power, *A Problem from Hell*, 504.
[15] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), 29.
[16] International Crisis Group, "Getting the U.N. into Darfur," Oct. 12, 2006, 1.
[17] Ibid.

CHAPTER I – CONFLICT OUTBREAK AND THE U.S. REACTION

The 2003 Crisis

The Darfur region of western Sudan occupies an area roughly the size of France. Ever since its 1916 absorption into the modern Sudanese state, Darfur has been treated as a neglected appendage of the centralized Khartoum government. Under British rule the region received only 5-6% of total investment in the country, and Sudan's independence in 1956 brought little change.[1] Despite their significant role in helping Khartoum's ruling parties win election, Darfuris became increasingly disillusioned that though good enough to serve in the military and vote, their political loyalties did not entitle them to a fair share of the government's budget.[2] Tracing its roots back to this legacy of marginalization, the current crisis is also more recently derivative of decades of ethnic identity politicization.[*]

While Darfur's crisis has been widely described as an ethnic conflict between "Arabs" and "Africans," these identities are largely constructed and were deliberately manipulated to serve power struggles in Khartoum and neighboring Libya and Chad. While Khartoum's power has been traditionally consolidated in those claiming Arab (or Arabized-Nubian[3]) ethnic descent, Darfur is historically far more diverse and variously estimated to include anywhere from 36 to 90 tribes and sub-groups.[4] Lifestyle and geographic location is a more accurate way to understand their differences. Most of those considered to be of indigenous "African" tribes became sedentary farmers in Darfur's central fertile area, with the exception of the migratory *Zaghawa* in the north. Those descendent from "Arab" tribes (but distinct from Khartoum's riverine Arab elite) either herded camel in the arid, semi-desert north, or cattle in the wetter south.[5]

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[*] For a more detailed discussion of Darfur's ethnic identities and the conflict's historical backdrop, see especially Gérard Prunier, *Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).

Although such identities were up until the early 1980s "complex and overlapping," asserts Alex de Waal, allowing "individuals and groups [to] shift from one category to another," their deliberate political manipulation began to resonate.[6] As ecological degradation intensified competition between farming groups and migratory herders, these identities were further exacerbated, increasingly redefining "traditional" resource conflicts along ethnic divides.[7] Continued neglect by the central government on top of these environmental strains—particularly in the aftermath of the massive 1984 drought-induced famine—only intensified the divisions. As Gérard Prunier explains, the reaction of those pinned as ethnic "Africans," "was bound to have a double aspect: against that of the [Arab] Center itself and, unfortunately, against the ethnic groups locally perceived as supporting that Center's oppression."[8] On the other hand, this enabled the central government to mobilize these local "Arab" groups "for the defense of the Center's interests, even though the 'native Arabs' were themselves in an economic and political situation not much better than the ["Africans"]."[9]

The immediate catalyst of the current crisis came in February of 2003 with the emergence of a rebel group (drawn from "African" tribes) calling itself the Sudanese Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M), followed by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). Demanding an end to Darfur's marginalization, the SLA/M took control of Gulu, the capital of a Darfur province.[10] Initially the Government of Sudan publicly dismissed the rebel movement as "banditry,"[11] but the situation escalated significantly in April when the rebel groups mounted successful attacks on military outposts in northern Darfur. Seventy soldiers were reportedly killed, several aircraft were damaged, and rebels looted fuel and arms caches as well as food supplies, prompting government retaliation. [12]

With a newly consolidated hold on power, having emerged the victor from recent divisions within the ruling National Congress Party (NCP), President Bashir and his loyal security cabal remained determined to quash any threat to their control.[13] Caught somewhat off-guard by the strength of the rebel movement, the regime responded with a massively disproportionate counterattack that would target not only the rebels, but also civilians accused of supporting them. It would be the latest example of a counter-insurgency tactic de Waal describes as "genocide by force of habit."[14] Such a military solution required a supplemental force, however, as much of the standing Sudanese army was comprised of Darfuris, pressed into service to fight the war against southern Sudan.[15]

Accordingly, the government recruited the *Janjawid*. Prunier compares this militia to the *Interahamwe* génocidaires of Rwanda, as it includes a loose federation of "Arab" bandits, soldiers, released criminals, fanatics, the unemployed, and men engaged in land disputes, who should not be viewed as representative of Darfur's "Arab" community as a whole.[16] Provided by the government with AK-47s, camels or horses to ride, and often an initial $100 USD bounty, the *Janjawid* have targeted non-Arab tribes in what International Crisis Group (ICG) describes as "a scorched earth strategy" with "carte blanche" permission to loot, rape, and kill.[17] Survivor testimonies demonstrate a clear pattern of attacks: Often villages are first targeted by heavy aerial bombardment. Then *Janjawid* mount ground attacks, alone or accompanied by regular Sudanese forces.[18] All attacks are designed to terrorize and leave those who escape with little hope of return.*

* While a large part of the violence fits this pattern, the "Arab" versus "African" characterization remains an oversimplification. Several "Arab" tribal leaders have refused to take part in the violence, sometimes becoming victims themselves, and Eric Reeves notes that local "Arab" support for Khartoum's policies is waning. "African" rebel groups have also committed serious human rights violations.[16]

On a visit to the region in 2004, *New York Times* journalist Nicholas Kristof came upon an oasis close to the Chadian border, where tens of thousands of Darfuris had sought refuge under its trees after being driven from their villages by *Janjawid*. His account of the experience encapsulates the horror to which the region has been subjected:

> Under the first tree, I found a man who had been shot in the neck and the jaw; his brother, shot only in the foot, had carried him for forty-nine days to get to this oasis. Under the next tree was a widow whose parents had been killed and stuffed in the village well to poison the local water supply; then the Janjaweed had tracked down the rest of her family and killed her husband. Under the third tree was a four-year-old orphan girl carrying her one-year-old baby sister on her back; their parents had been killed. Under the fourth tree was a woman whose husband and children had been killed in front of her, and then she was gang-raped and left naked and mutilated in the desert. . . . In every direction, as far as I could see, were more trees and more victims. [20]

The Bashir regime has since tried to distance itself from these marauders on horseback, yet documents obtained by Human Rights Watch and the findings of other human rights organizations overtly implicate the government in the *Janjawid's* reign.[21] Beyond these direct attacks, more people have actually died as a result of starvation and disease, asserts de Waal, arguing that famine must be properly understood as a deliberate governmental "policy."[22] Prunier agrees, noting that the government's strategy has been to manipulate its response to the international community so as to gain enough time for the famine and disease levels to decimate their targets.[23]

ICG reporting notes that fighting isolated between Sudanese government forces and SLA/M and JEM rebels would constitute internal armed conflict. By deliberately targeting civilian populations, however, the government has acted in violation of Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which Sudan ratified in 1957.[24] The restoration of security to Darfur is desperately needed to halt this violence and especially to allow humanitarian aid operations to continue. In early 2007 a joint statement by

fourteen UN humanitarian agencies warned, "In the face of growing insecurity and danger to communities and aid workers, the UN and its humanitarian partners have effectively been holding the line for the survival and protection of millions. That line cannot be held much longer."[25] Aid operations have gratefully credited the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) with providing at least a modicum of security, yet without stronger international support, the roughly 7,000-strong mission is woefully under-equipped to provide the scale of protection needed.[26] A lasting solution must entail more than security, however. Properly viewed through the historical legacy of governmental neglect and manipulation, Darfur's crisis demands a political solution that will ensure the region an adequate share in Sudan's power and wealth distribution, as well as a means of addressing the continued pressures of ecological change.*

U.S. Reaction to the Crisis

This paper rests on the contention that the U.S. response to Darfur has been more rhetorical than tangible, falling far short of the contribution a committed leadership role could make. The main task, developed over the following chapters, is to uncover why this has occurred, but it will be useful to first solidify this claim with a brief overview of the U.S. deficiency. Though space will not allow for the subsequent presentation of a detailed policy prescription for what the U.S. ought to do in comparison, this section will seek to highlight the point that given its stated commitment to ending violence in Darfur, the U.S. response could indeed have been more significant and its actions more effective.

* For more on the development of the current crisis, see especially International Crisis Group, "Darfur Rising: Sudan's New Crisis," Mar. 25, 2006 and Human Rights Watch, "Darfur In Flames," Apr. 2, 2004. For information on the spillover into Chad and Central African Republic see Amnesty International, "Chad: Are We Citizens of this Country?" Jan. 29, 2007, and online country pages.

President George W. Bush made his first public acknowledgement of the Darfur crisis on April 7, 2004—more than one year after the outbreak of violence. Condemning the atrocities, the President called on the Sudanese government to immediately halt militia attacks and ensure unrestricted access for humanitarian aid.[27] Since then, Bush and Administration officials have referred to Darfur on a sporadic basis, but their speeches have failed to mobilize significant consequences for Khartoum's continued non-compliance, despite promising to do so. Susan Rice describes this pattern as one of "bluster and retreat."[28] The few actions the U.S. has taken have generally fallen into two categories: ad hoc diplomacy or weak unilateral sanctions. As the following chronology of key events makes clear, the response to Darfur has been overwhelmingly inadequate.

- *July 22, 2004* – Following a joint visit to Sudan, Secretary of State Colin Powell and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan met to discuss a way forward. While Powell said the Security Council would consider passing a resolution that might impose sanctions, he maintained that the onus of security provision lay with Khartoum. When asked if it was "nonsensical" to expect the government to disarm the *Janjawid*, Powell replied, "No, it's not nonsensical at all. Since they turned it on, they can turn it off . . . And we're making it clear to them that there will be consequences if it is not turned off."[29] But a *Washington Post* editorial admonished, "Asking a government like this to provide security in Darfur is like calling upon Slobodan Milosevic to protect Albanian Kosovars."[30] Later UNSC Resolution 1556 was passed on July 30, calling on Khartoum to disarm the *Janjawid* by the end of August. When it failed to do so, consequences were not forthcoming.

- *September 9, 2004* – Following a State Department investigation, Secretary of State Colin Powell announced during a Senate hearing that genocide had indeed taken

place in Darfur.[31] In his address to the UN General Assembly, President Bush reiterated this conclusion, making his the first U.S. administration ever to label an ongoing humanitarian crisis "genocide." In a press statement calling the violence "appalling," he announced the U.S. would seek a Resolution to encourage the expansion of the African Union force and promised, "We will also seek to ban flights by Sudanese military aircraft in Darfur."[32] Resolutions 1564 and 1591 addressed these respectively, but AMIS was still insufficiently supported and the flight ban was repeatedly violated with no penalty.

- *May 5, 2006* – The seventh round of peace talks between rebel groups and the Sudanese government initiated in November 2005. When significant progress was still lacking five months later, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick joined Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo and British International Development Secretary Hilary Benn to expedite the process. "Because of the gravity of the situation on the ground, and because of the frustrations with the slow pace of the negotiation, we were stampeded into a very quick settlement," recalls Alex de Waal, present as an advisor to the AU mediation team.[33] Zoellick and the others gave the parties less than a week to come to an all-or-nothing agreement, so "it was not owned by the parties."[34] De Waal argues that this hurried, irregular process was the main reason the negotiations fell through. In the end the resultant Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed by only the government and one rebel faction (a breakaway wing of the SLA/M led by Minni Minawi), and the agreement failed to bring an end to the violence. Still, President Bush congratulated Zoellick and asserted that the DPA represented "the beginnings of hope for the people of Darfur."[35]

Several factors highlight the deficiency of the American diplomatic involvement: During the talks the U.S. had privileged Minawi, who after the DPA signing visited the

President in the Oval Office.[36] This fueled distrust among the other parties, particularly within Khartoum, who did not believe U.S. interest was truly motivated principally by human rights concerns.[37] Secondly, as de Waal points out, besides Zoellick's weeklong trip, the U.S. had not dedicated a single full-time diplomat to the peace talks, nor did Zoellick remain on the diplomatic offensive, as he left the State Department in June.[38] Finally, when Khartoum held that only signers of the DPA could be party to the ensuing August Darfur Ceasefire Commission—a move President Bashir knew would essentially render it ineffective—the U.S. stayed uninvolved rather than assert pressure for the inclusion of all groups.[39] At no point did the U.S. seriously commit to the diplomatic process, and as de Waal sums up, their involvement "lacked both strategy and vision."[40]

- *September 15, 2006* – In a press conference weeks after UN authorization of a peacekeeping force to Sudan (UNSCR 1706), President Bush expressed frustration over the continuing violence and argued, "The problem is, is that the United Nations hasn't acted."[41] Singling out the UN for blame is unfair at best, and a feeble excuse for the U.S. not taking a stronger leadership role at worst. Certainly the UN has its own bureaucratic and accountability deficiencies. Yet ultimately the UN is only as strong as its member states make it, as Prime Minister of the Netherlands Jan Peter Balkenende argues well: "Rather than pretending that the UN is some entity, distinct from us member states, we should acknowledge that the UN is 'us' and that we determine whether it is an effective tool or not. If we do not want the UN to be a lame duck, we must dare to give it the wings to fly."[42] In other words, rather than simply express frustration, the U.S. could have stepped up its leadership on the Security Council and facilitated implementation efforts.

In criticizing the UN, President Bush also made a surprising assertion. Referring to the peacekeeping force delay he argued, "What you'll hear is, well, the government of Sudan must invite the United Nations in for us to act. Well, there are other alternatives, like passing a resolution saying, we're coming in with a UN force, in order to save lives."[43] Later a senior official confirmed the President's suggestion: "we don't see the Government of Sudan having a veto power over whether the UN puts a peacekeeping force there or not."[44] Yet the question of whether the UN can or should deploy nonconsensual force is highly contentious, and it is unlikely that troops from any country, certainly not Americans, would sign on to such a mission. Asserting this as a viable option, then, only served to entrench Khartoum's perception that the U.S. would renege on its tough talk. It was, John Prendergast argues, "the height of hubris,"[45] contributing to the attitude behind a Sudanese government official's swagger, "The UN Security Council has threatened us so many times, we no longer take it seriously."[46]

- *September 19, 2006* – In his 2006 address to the UN General Assembly, President Bush devoted one paragraph to acknowledging the "unspeakable violence" in Darfur (the crisis was not mentioned in his 2005 address). Even failing the Sudanese government's cooperation, the President asserted, "the United Nations must act," but he mentioned only his appointment of Andrew Natsios as his Special Envoy to Sudan as a specific means of furthering this goal.[47] *The New York Times* argued, "Mr. Bush cannot stop there. A credible presentation would include an assumption of responsibility" to act. To create a genuine, significant response, "Bush could make a difference if he threw aside his usual script, devoted this speech to the horrors of Darfur, and committed himself personally to stopping the genocide."[48] As it was, the President failed to exhibit any such leadership.

Certainly the President's appointment of a special envoy was significant though, despite coming more than three years into the conflict. Formerly the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Natsios had been visiting Sudan for the past 17 years. Meeting with Natsios shortly after his appointment Bush explained, "We believe the world has a responsibility to respond to what this government has called genocide. And Andrew Natsios is going to help rally the world to solve the problem."[49] In spite of Natsios' efforts, however, Prendergast maintains, "After all this rhetoric, we still don't have a cohesive, comprehensive Sudan policy in the United States government."[50] Diplomacy requires the full-time commitment of more than a part-time professor at Georgetown University, he argues (alluding to Natsios), with strong teams outlining a clear plan for achieving peace in Darfur—as well as for Sudan as a whole.*

- *November 20, 2006* – Warning of a forthcoming "Plan B," Natsios signaled the most significant U.S. attempt to coerce Khartoum into allowing UN peacekeepers. After continued deadlock, Kofi Annan had reached a compromise agreement in mid-November with the AU and Sudanese government to deploy a hybrid AU-UN mission. Asserting the U.S. intention to assist the UN in enforcing Bashir's cooperation, Natsios announced, "January 1 is either we see a change [by Khartoum] or we go to Plan B." He specifically refused to detail what the illusive Plan would entail should Khartoum fail to meet this deadline, however, offering only the assurance that it would be a significant change from the status quo. Doubting the efficacy of this reinforced ambiguity, an ICG report noted, "History suggests that NCP policies and behavior are more likely to be changed by the application of meaningful pressure than by . . . vague threats."[52]

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* Indeed, Prendergast contends the U.S. has also taken its "eye off the ball" on supporting implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the peace deal ending Sudan's North-South civil war, which initially benefited from intense American diplomatic engagement.[48]

When the January 1 deadline came and went with no Plan B implementation, a bipartisan group of twenty-six U.S. Senators sent President Bush a letter: "We appreciate your Administration's efforts at aggressive diplomacy and negotiation," they wrote, "but it seems clear that the Sudanese are not responding to such tactics." After calling for more disclosure about Plan B, the letter concluded, "Simply condemning the worsening violence is not enough; we believe it is past time to use all resources at our disposal to stop this humanitarian tragedy."[53] Details leaked to *The Washington Post* in February revealed that the Plan was mainly a series of unilateral sanctions against Khartoum, but this prompted even more frustration among those waiting for concrete action. The measures "should have been implemented swiftly, not leaked," contended Susan Rice, arguing that this gave Khartoum an advance warning with time to evade potential consequences.[54] Despite the leak, however, sanctions were still not forthcoming.

- *April 18, 2007* - Finally President Bush unveiled Plan B during a speech at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum. The planned announcement of its implementation was postponed, however, as the new UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon had requested more time to pursue personal negotiations with President Bashir. In his speech President Bush announced that the Plan would both tighten existing U.S. economic sanctions on Sudan (directed at some 130 Sudanese companies since 1997) and extend them to an additional 29 companies, as well as implement targeted sanctions against key individuals linked to the violence. If these failed to be effective, he continued, the U.S. would seek even stronger measures, including steps toward a no-fly zone over Darfur. "It is evil we are now seeing in Sudan," the President avowed, "and we're not going to back down."[55]

Weeks after Ban Ki-Moon's efforts had failed to make headway with Bashir, President Bush enacted Plan B's measures on May 29, 2007. Though powerful on paper, however, these new sanctions are unlikely to significantly change Khartoum's calculus. "After ten years of dealing with unilateral U.S. sanctions," argue Prendergast and colleague Colin Thomas-Jensen, "the Sudanese government and its commercial partners have by now figured out how to circumvent any additional U.S. measures."[56] Moreover, the Sudanese oil industry—the principal source of the government's wealth—was largely established within this context, and is now outside the reach of U.S. sanctions. As such, Prendergast argues, "all the unilateral action in the world will not make a difference."[57] The much-heralded Plan B has not lived up to its promised decisive action, rounding out the continuation of the U.S. failure to significantly engage the Bashir regime with anything near the leverage needed to implement security and restart the peace process.

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On the occasions when President Bush has spoken out about Darfur, he has frequently employed phrases like "America will not turn away,"[58] "The world knows, and the world sees,"[59] and "We will not avert our eyes."[60] Yet all this rhetoric has supplied is a spectator to the atrocities. Even worse, the repeated pattern of undelivered promises has only emboldened the Khartoum regime to step up attacks. As Prendergast argues, "Barking without biting is the diplomatic equivalent of giving comfort to the enemy."[61] When the violence first escalated in 2003, Roger Winter, a senior USAID official, tried frantically to raise the alarm within the Bush Administration. Although masses of aid were subsequently deployed, his warning fell on apathetic ears. "There was no real intention of taking effective action," Winter asserted. "[Khartoum] saw that. They read us. And so they weren't threatened."[62] In a February 2006 interview, when pressed about

intensifying the U.S. response to Darfur, Vice President Dick Cheney answered, "I am satisfied we're doing everything we can do."[63] A more accurate statement would have revealed, "We're doing everything we're *willing* to do."

Moving Toward a Meaningful Response

International efforts to help resolve the crisis in Darfur must focus on two primary aims: securing civilian protection and restarting the peace process. Both require strong multilateral backing, particularly to force Khartoum's cooperation. By now President Bashir has perfected his methods of manipulation to escape fulfilling previous agreements, having "turned saying 'no' into an art form," as *The Guardian*'s Jonathan Freedland asserts."[64] Without fear of significant consequences, his Administration has little incentive to participate in a solution. In order to change this calculus, significant leverage must be waged. "The impasse over deploying a major UN peacekeeping force to Darfur," contends the ICG, "results directly from the international community's three-year failure to apply effective diplomatic and economic pressure on Sudan's government and its senior officials."[65] As this section has detailed, the U.S. is guilty on both accounts.

Alternatively, the international community must commit to presenting Khartoum with a single ultimatum: cooperate or face serious consequences.[66] An intensified U.S. response could play a pivotal role in mobilizing the leverage needed to actualize this stance.[*] Working through the Security Council or pressuring influential countries such as China directly, the U.S. could encourage implementation of multilateral sanctions against

[*] Again, the intent of this section is not to argue a coherent policy prescription for the U.S, but rather to highlight areas where the U.S. response could be more effective. For a more detailed analysis, see especially the recommendations of International Crisis Group as highly credible examples of the best practices. See particularly "Getting the UN into Darfur," Oct. 12, 2006, and "Darfur: Revitalizing the Peace Process," Apr. 30, 2007, available at www.crisisgroup.org.

both Sudanese individuals and companies underwriting the violence. Actions could include individual travel bans, freezing off-shore accounts, capital-market sanctions on foreign firms conducting business with Khartoum, calling on international financial institutions to halt transactions with the government, and divestment campaigns, particularly targeting the oil sector.[67] However, it is important to recognize that these could additionally create significant consequences for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and Government of South Sudan, so ICG emphasizes the need to also provide compensatory aid to the South to protect its continued development.[68]

The U.S. could also press for multilateral military options short of a peacekeeping force. Enforcement of a no-fly zone has been suggested, but this carries serious risks of inhibiting humanitarian relief operations, even endangering the organizations themselves. De Waal believes a no-fly zone would be counterproductive as tantamount to an act of war, but Prendergast maintains that holding this as a threat, say by NATO drawing up plans for an intervention, could facilitate a good cop/bad cop strategy of negotiation with Khartoum: "You can go to the table with [them] and say 'the barbarians are at the gate, what do you want to do?'" he suggests.[69] Increased U.S. support for the International Criminal Court's investigation—particularly by providing intelligence—could also convince Khartoum to cooperate, as prosecution remains a very real NCP fear.[70] More broadly, this would also help demonstrate international resolve to end impunity.

In companion with economic, military, or judicial means of leverage, the U.S. must also increase its diplomatic dedication. Rather than continue insufficient support concentrated in a single envoy, the U.S. should put the "diplomatic A-team" on the peace process, argues de Waal.[71] In particular, an American diplomatic surge should work to

partner its efforts with those countries who hold special influence in the region, such as China and France, and Chad, Eritrea and Libya. Prendergast and Thomas-Jensen suggest the U.S. could support building an American-Chinese-French "troika," which could make a series of high-level visits to Sudan to demonstrate its resolve.[72] Finally, dedicated conflict resolution teams must be set up locally to work full-time with the parties to peace, and the AU and UN should be pressured to develop a viable framework for talks, supported by strong international and regional mediator guidance.[73]

Conclusion

"If there is a Guinness Book of World Records entry for most threats issued with no follow-up, the international response to Darfur is likely setting a new standard," writes Prendergast.[74] Well into the *fifth* year of fighting there are now indications that the tide may finally be turning on the deficiency of international involvement, particularly as European leadership increases and China backs down from its obstructionist position; however, peace is a long way from settled and far from assured. Nor does this erase the insufficient response of the previous four years. The U.S. in particular has failed to assume its leadership potential to mobilize the multilateral commitment needed to leverage compliance from Khartoum. In characterizing the U.S. response to genocide over the 20th century, Samantha Power writes, "Instead of taking steps along a continuum of intervention . . . U.S. officials tended to trust in negotiation, cling to diplomatic niceties and 'neutrality,' and ship humanitarian aid."[75] With few exceptions, the U.S. has yet to break this trend with respect to Darfur. Before turning to examine why, this paper will next consider the surrounding normative context of this response.

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CHAPTER II – NORMATIVE EMERGENCE OF R2P: THE CONSTRUCTIVIST LENS

At the 2005 UN World Summit, member nations acknowledged "Clear and unambiguous acceptance by all governments of the collective international responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity," and pledged "Willingness to take timely and decisive collective action for this purpose, through the Security Council, when peaceful means prove inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to do it."[1] Given the history of humanitarian intervention, this undertaking may seem remarkable. Massive human rights violations during the Cold War met with little to no resistance from the international community, and in those few instances where outside involvement could have been justified as humanitarian intervention, the interveners met with criticism and deliberately denied that this was their main motive.[*] Yet with the Cold War's end, the conception of humanitarian intervention and its legitimacy began to change. Recognizing this properly situates the adoption of the Responsibility to Protect not as a unique event but as part of an emergent pattern, forming what constructivists label a *norm* of humanitarian intervention.

Review of Constructivist Literature

The importance of norms is a central tenet constructivists seek to add to the discourse on state behavior. While realist and liberal theory proceeds from an initial assumption that behavior is motivated by material utility-maximization, constructivism challenges this starting point, arguing for the need to examine the origin of such interests. "Notions of duty, responsibility, identity and obligation (all social constructions) may

[*] The targeting of Tutsis in Burundi in the 1960s, the Ibos in Biafra during the late 1960s, and the East Timorese in Indonesia in 1975 are examples of the former, the intervention of India in East Pakistan in 1971, Vietnam in Cambodia in 1978, and Tanzania in Uganda in 1978 demonstrate the latter. [2]

drive behavior *as well as* self-interest and gain," argue Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink.[3] Consequently, constructivists reject the premise that interests are predetermined and fixated solely on utility-maximization, and as such, Jeffrey Checkel explains, their critique of these two schools "concerns not what [they] do and say but what they ignore: the content and sources of state interests and the social fabric of world politics."[4]

Actors, in the constructivist view, cannot be understood in isolation from this social fabric: It is states' and individuals' interpretations of their social context that give meaning to material structures and fundamentally shape their interests.[5] Norms, understood as "collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors within a given identity," are a principal source of this influence.[6] By informing perceptions of what constitutes appropriate behavior, norms are both *regulative* in their role of providing motivation for actions[7] and *constitutive*, through their ability to create and influence interests in the first place.[8] As such, asserts Audie Kotz, they play an explanatory role in both who we are and what we do, and are not just an "ethical alternative" to maximizing self-interest.[9] When it comes to state behavior, then, norms do not simply constrain actions taken in pursuit of interests, but actually help formulate interests themselves.

Because they play a pivotal role in the formation and guidance of interests, the origin and establishment of norms is clearly central to the constructivist case. To these ends, Finnemore and Sikkink describe the norm "life cycle," detailing the progression of norm emergence, norm cascade, and internalization.[10] In the first stage, dedicated *norm entrepreneurs* champion new norms by attempting to convince states to adopt them, principally by means of persuasion from an organizational platform. In the case of norms recognizing the immunity of medical personnel during war or women's suffrage, Henry

Dunant and Susan B. Anthony for one were respectively such entrepreneurs. Once a "critical mass" of states has been convinced, the authors contend, the norm reaches the tipping point necessary to create a *norm cascade*, during which adherence to the norm spreads among remaining states by social means "analogous to 'peer pressure' among countries," argues Francisco Ramirez et al.[11] Finally, the norm reaches *internalization* by the time it is has moved from the realm of controversy and heated debate to become virtually taken for granted in its influence.

Tracking the development of norms thorough this progression, argues Klotz, is thus examining the "process by which the discourse of 'ought' becomes the 'is' of behavior."[12] Still, questions remain unsatisfactorily answered: Where do norms come from? Why do some successfully navigate through the norm cycle while others do not? Why are some norms more influential than others? And how exactly do they influence policy-making? Various authors have begun to chip away at this deficiency by offering suggestions developed particularly from international law, political philosophy, and psychology, yet constructivists themselves have been among the first to admit the need to more fully justify the causal linkage between norms, interests, and policy-making.[13] As it stands, constructivism's emphasis on norms is more properly an "approach to social inquiry" rather than full-fledged international relations theory, contends Checkel.[14] So, while constructivism may have met its goal of drawing attention to the dual regulative and constitutive effect of norms on state behavior, Finnemore contends that the need remains "to define more specifically the conditions under which certain kinds of norms might prevail or fail in influencing action."[15]

This continuing unmet need has important ramifications for the aim of this paper,

as it limits our ability to understand—from solely a constructivist view—how the norm of humanitarian intervention embodied in the Responsibility to Protect affects the U.S. calculation to intervene in Darfur. From the reality of U.S. behavior it appears clear that the norm has indeed failed to produce action (albeit plenty of rhetoric), but without a predictive explanation of the causal link between norms and policy, we cannot fully understand why. Returning to the causal mechanisms illuminated by realist and liberal theory, alternatively, offers specific means to understand the process of interventionist policy formation. The following chapters seek to apply these mechanisms to the Darfur case, but first the rest of this chapter will briefly elaborate on the contention that R2P does in fact represent a developing norm of humanitarian intervention.

Normative Development of Humanitarian Intervention

The momentum fueling the development of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine was stimulated largely by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's presentation of his 1999 annual report. Addressing the General Assembly, Mr. Annan asserted that the experience of the past decade, particularly the events in Rwanda and Kosovo, had illuminated the central challenge now facing the international community: "to forge unity behind the principle that massive and systematic violations of human rights—wherever they may take place—should not be allowed to stand."[16] Yet, the dilemma of reconciling this imperative with the constraints of sovereignty and legitimacy would demand new ideas, he counseled. The Secretary General's speech brought the intervention controversy to a head, launching a number of Western initiatives. The Dutch and Danish governments commissioned reports, and the contention that states forfeit their claim to sovereignty upon violating their duty to protect their own citizens found champions (effectively

playing the role of norm entrepreneurs) in the former foreign secretaries of Britain and Canada, Robin Cook and Lloyd Axworthy.[17] "By far the most influential intellectual contribution," as David Malone argues, came from the 2001R2P report of the Canadian-sponsored International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).[18]

By defining a *responsibility* to protect, the ICISS's conception for the first time shifted the primary onus of protection squarely onto sovereign states. This spoke to Kofi Annan's call to move "from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention."[19] Should a state become unwilling or unable to protect its citizens, however, this responsibility would transfer to the international community, carrying with it the obligation to act.[20] To explain what this entails in practice, the R2P report lays out specific guidelines, based largely on just war theory, for how situations demanding international intervention are to be approached. The decision to intervene militarily is reserved as a measure of last resort, but in the event that economic, political, juridical, and other military measures have been tried and failed, the report contends that coercive military intervention may be required in "extreme and exceptional cases" encompassing "large scale loss of civilian life."[21]

At the time of the ICISS recommendations, the emergence of a norm of humanitarian intervention had already significantly progressed—the Secretary General's speech itself identified a "developing international norm in favor of intervention to protect civilians from wholesale slaughter."[22] As such, constructivists argue that this highpoint was part and product of a broader changing social context. While most point to the end of the Cold War as an escalation of this transformation, the ideas behind it are hardly so new. Rather, support for humanitarian intervention is part of a continuum of social change, argues Martha Finnemore, encompassing events such as the abolition of

slavery, decolonization, the extension of equal rights across class and gender, and the rise of a belief in the "natural" rights of man.[23] Moreover, Samuel Huntington notes that the American impetus to moral action stretches back to the country's origins, stemming from core U.S. values of liberty, democracy, individualism, and equity,[24] and George Lucas asserts that because of this the U.S. has long felt an "interventionist imperative."[25]

Prior to the 1990s, however, these ideals largely failed to translate into policy supportive of humanitarian intervention. Following the American Revolution Alexis de Tocqueville was the first to observe that U.S. foreign policy was "a defense of moral high ground that bordered on self-righteousness, on one hand, followed by a repudiation of the dangers and excesses of such activism and a withdrawal into isolationism" on the other.[26] The social progression leading to R2P has thus more accurately been not so much one of changing interests themselves, Finnemore asserts, as of changing perceptions about their application. Humanitarian intervention has been part of state behavior for centuries, she argues, but we now judge differently who ought to be protected and how.[27] Crucially, the author posits, because of the social evolution described above, the possibility of Western intervention has extended from the narrow view of protecting only white Christians to gradually encompassing all peoples as equal and possessed of human rights.

This is the change that grew particularly vocal in the post-Cold War era. With the fall of the Iron Curtain, Michael Barnett explains, the West appeared suddenly to face a barrage of humanitarian crises—particularly of those typed "complex humanitarian emergencies," resulting in the breakdown of order and social dislocation.[28] Certainly these types of crises were not absent during the Cold War, but the difference was Western recognition of their existence: "For the first time in the history of modern international

society," describes Nicholas Wheeler, "the domestic conduct of governments was now exposed to scrutiny by other governments, human rights non-governmental organizations, and international organizations."[29] As a result, explains Lucas, Western nations were faced with the task of realizing and confronting "the unpleasant reality that the greatest threat to civilian populations comes not from enemy nation-states so much as from their own governments, or their fellow citizens."[30]

Recognizing this raised a major dilemma for the international community. The cardinal post-Westphalia assumption that governments had an implicit right to absolute control over their state was now clashing head-on with other internationally-recognized safeguards of human rights, and the international community had to decide if upholding the latter trumped the rights of sovereignty. Increasingly, genuine humanitarian concern coupled with the fear that such internal strife could have far-reaching ramifications for international security seemed to push Western nations to answer in favor of human rights. The progression of the legal and moral environment—particularly in codifying human rights law and the growing belief in "cosmopolitanism," conceiving of all peoples as of equal moral worth—thus aroused a call for more extensive intervention.[31] Hence *The New York Times* spoke of a "global kumbaya" and "we-are-the-world cooperative spirit," and scholars and politicians alike proclaimed the advent of a "New World Order."[32] This order, as President Bush in his 1991 State of the Union address explained, would be one in which "diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind: peace and security, freedom and the rule of law. Such is a world worthy of our struggle, and worthy of our children's future."[33] It is within this progressive social context, constructivists would argue, that the R2P debate has emerged.

Linking back to the historical continuum steadily championing human rights since the abolition of slavery, and fueled by ethnic conflicts brought to light with the end of the Cold War, humanitarian intervention has according to constructivists become a norm. Hence the motivation to intervene is understood to be part of the social context that guides and constitutes the U.S. interest. Yet, as Kofi Annan emphasized in his speech, stated commitments to intervention could not stand up to the challenges of the past decade's humanitarian crises. Here Finnemore must admit that the relationship between norm and action is more "permissive" than "determinative," and holds no guarantee against norm violation.[34] Still, argues Luke Glanville, violation does not render the norm ineffective. The Clinton Administration would not have deliberately refused to use the word "genocide" during the Rwandan crisis, he posits, had it not feared the repercussions from norm violation it believed would have resulted from acknowledging the magnitude of the atrocities and still failing to act.[35]

Supporters of R2P clearly aim for accomplishing more than simply prompting a rhetorical cover-up for a decision not to intervene. Yet while there can be little argument with the constructivist contention that the U.S. does in fact recognize an independent impulse to assist those facing grave abuses of human rights, this still tells us little about whether or not the U.S. will actually intervene and why. Constructivism's theoretical limitations leave us with little utilizable understanding about the causal link to policy. In order to understand why the U.S. has failed to meaningfully intervene in Darfur—and therefore learn from this case how to strengthen the norm embodied by R2P to the point of policy imposition in the future—this paper now turns to examine the incidence of intervention policy as explained through the lenses of realism and liberalism.

[1] "Fact Sheet: 2005 World Summit Outcome," *UN Department of Public Information*, September 2005, 1.
[2] See Nicholas Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), introduction.
[3] Emphasis added, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization*, 52, 4 (1998): 887-917, 912.
[4] Jeffrey Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory," *World Politics* 50,2 (1998): 324-348, 324.
[5] Ibid., 325.
[6] Peter Katzenstein, "Alternate Perspectives on National Security," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics,* ed. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 5.
[7] Annika Björkdahl, "Norms in International Relations: Some Conceptual and Methodological Reflections," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 15, 1 (2002): 9-23, 9.
[8] Luke Glanville, "Rwanda Reconsidered: A Study of Norm Violation," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 24, 2 (2006): 185-202, 187.
[9] Audie Klotz, "Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions Against South Africa," *International Organization* 49, 3 (1995): 451-478, 460.
[10] Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics," 895.
[11] Francisco Ramirez, Yasemin Soysal, and Suzanne Shanahan, "The Changing Logic of Political Citizenship," *American Sociological Review* 62, 5 (1997): 735-745, 740, quoted in Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics," 901.
[12] Klotz, "Norms Reconstituting Interests," 452.
[13] See for example Ibid., 452; Glanville, "Rwanda Reconsidered," 199; Katzenstein, *Culture of National Security*, 158.
[14] Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn," 339.
[15] Martha Finnemore, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention," *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics,* ed. Peter Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 185.
[16] "Secretary-General Presents His Annual Report to General Assembly," *UN Press Release*, Sept 20, 1999.
[17] See Nicholas Wheeler, "Humanitarian Intervention after Kosovo," *International Affairs* 77,1 (2001):113-128, 114.
[18] David Malone, "Recent Books on International Law," *The American Journal of International Law* 97, 4 (2003), 1001, qtd. in Rebecca Hamilton, "The Responsibility to Protect: From Document to Doctrine—But What of Implementation?" *Harvard Human Rights Journal* 19 (2006): 289-297, 292.
[19] "Secretary-General Presents," UN Press Release.
[20] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect (*Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), xi.
[21] Ibid., 31.
[22] "Secretary-General Presents," UN Press Release.
[23] Martha Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 71.
[24] Samuel Huntington, "American Ideals versus American Institutions," *American Foreign Policy*, ed. G. John Ikenberry (New York: Addison-Wesley Education Publishers, Inc., 2002), 204.
[25] George Lucas, *Perspectives on Humanitarian Military Intervention* (Berkeley: Berkeley Public Policy Press, 2001).
[26] Ibid., 13.
[27] Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention,* 53.
[28] Michael Barnett, "Humanitarianism Transformed," *Perspectives on Politics* 3, 4 (2005): 723-740, 726.
[29] Wheeler, *Saving Strangers*, 1.
[30] Lucas, *Perspectives on Humanitarian Intervention,* 2.
[31] Barnett, "Humanitarianism Transformed," 727.
[32] Elaine Sciolino, "The World; It Turns Out That All Politics Is Local," *New York Times*, Dec. 7, 1997.
[33] George H. Bush, *Annual State of The Union Address*, Jan. 29, 1991.
[34] Finnemore, "Norms of Humanitarian Intervention," 158.
[35] Glanville, "Rwanda Reconsidered," 186.

CHAPTER III – BARRIERS TO INTERVENTION: THE REALIST LENS

In general, non-intervention is in fact the outcome realist theory would predict in response to humanitarian crises. This stems from the paradigm's principal understanding about the primacy of the national interest and subsequent contention that state behavior is predominantly driven by the pursuit of power and security maximization. In most cases, humanitarian intervention does not serve these interests and may even compromise them, thus signaling for realists the makings of imprudent policy.

Review of Realist Literature*

"For better or for worse," writes John Mearsheimer in *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, "states are rarely willing to expend blood and treasure to protect foreign populations from gross abuses, including genocide."[1] This prediction is rooted in structural realism's focus on the international system as the primary level of analysis and the resulting principal contention that state behavior is best understood as a product of the international system's structure. Lacking an overarching, international government, this structure is anarchical, which means that states exist in a self-help system where conflict and the outbreak of war is a constant threat. As a result of this environment, it follows that survival must be every state's most fundamental aim.

This guarantees the primacy of the national interest—the *raison d'état*—defined first and foremost as what a state needs to ensure and promote its continued existence. This in turn is measured in terms of a state's power and security relative to others, its position in the global balance of power. So as Kenneth Waltz explains in *Theory of*

* Certainly there are many variations within the paradigm, but for my purposes I mainly consider structural realism stemming from the theory of Kenneth Waltz. The intent here is to focus on the shared assumptions of realism that recognize states as power and security maximizing and the primacy of the national interest.

International Politics, "to say that a country acts according to its national interest means that, having examined its security requirements, it tries to meet them."[2] From this foundation a state's main pursuits naturally evolve to include such priorities as bolstering military capacity, improving domestic capabilities, building economic strength, or fostering strategic alliances—thus rendering as the primary function of politics, the management of conflicting interests through the distribution of power.

Guided by this supremacy of the national interest, foreign policy is derived from a state's perception of how various actions, from declaring war to signing international treaties, will influence its relative power and security. As Morgenthau explains in *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, leaders ask themselves, "How does this policy affect the power of the nation?"[3] In practice, this leads to important constraints on state behavior. Realists contend that as rational actors, policy makers ground their decisions in a calculated analysis of the perceived costs and benefits of a particular action. As such, Margaret Hermann and Joe Hagan note, "leaders can choose from only a limited range of foreign policy strategies. If they are to exercise rational leadership and maximize their state's movement toward its goals, only certain actions are feasible."[4]

Prospective humanitarian intervention and the commitment to the Responsibility to Protect must likewise be evaluated through this national-interest lens, and realists assert that the outcome of this cost-benefit analysis will almost certainly tip in favor of non-intervention. This is not a difficult calculation to follow: though certainly dependent on specific circumstances, in general, the cost of intervention is perceived to be extremely high, while the benefit is often quite low—perhaps "only" the saving of foreign lives. Rationally, it would not make sense for states to pursue intervention.

Admittedly this is an uncomfortable conclusion—and a serious blow to the optimism of those who aspire to the protection of universal human rights. How can states conceive of saving lives as of little benefit? The reason, argues Morgenthau, is that our individual sense of ethics is inapplicable in the realm of politics. Distinct from morality in the traditional abstract, *political* morality is defined by the moral principle of national survival. It must therefore judge policy based on its political consequences: "Realism, then, considers prudence—the weighing of the consequences of alternative political actions—to be the supreme virtue in politics."[5] Otherwise, foreign policy will fail to act in the best interests of the state and likely carry the consequences of diminishing relative power.[6] In the case of humanitarian intervention, Oded Löwenheim explains, this means even states who might "wish" to do so would be constrained by the risk that "intervention might pull the intervener into a "quagmire," disrupt the balance of power, encroach upon another power's sphere of influence, or expose the intervener to the aggression of third parties seeking to take advantage of the unstable situation."[7]

Of course, in practice this may result in a dissatisfied public. Mearsheimer admits realism is generally criticized in the U.S. as overly pessimistic and dismissive of the prospects for peace through the global spread of liberal values.[8] As a result, realists contend that while concern for humanitarianism does not provide statesmen with a sufficient interest to act, it likely does present a strong catalyst for rhetoric. In other words, realists would expect politicians mindful of public opinion to mask pursuit of the national interest, which may potentially offend the public's moral sensibilities, in idealist bluster. As Mearsheimer explains, "states talk a good game when it comes to values, but they actually behave in a very *realpolitik*, or rather cold and calculating manner when the

money is on the table."[9] Walt agrees: "Although U.S. leaders are adept at cloaking their actions in the lofty rhetoric of 'world order,' naked self-interest lies behind most of them."[10] So while dismissing factors such as pressure from human rights norms as instrumental to policy formation, realists do suggest they may be important to how a state publicly justifies its actions. Accordingly, the U.S. commitment to R2P would likely be explained as above all an exercise in rhetoric, not a dedicated pledge to act.

What then of those cases where states *have* undertaken humanitarian intervention? U.S. operations in northern Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo seem to pose clear contradictions to realist rationale. Yet realism does not claim humanitarian intervention can never be part of state behavior. What it does reject is the explanation that humanitarian goals would have been the primary objective in such cases. Instead, intervention likely resulted because of some other consideration that did engage the national interest—an incidence Nicolas Wheeler depicts as "a happy coincidence where the promotion of national security also defends human rights."[11]

This logic is easily applied to the 1991 example of intervention in northern Iraq, Operation Provide Comfort. While this served the humanitarian aims of providing aid and military protection to Kurdish refugees, intervention also clearly involved U.S. geostrategic concerns: The situation threatened security and regional stability, particularly for Turkey, an important U.S. ally. Realists would argue that this—not humanitarian concern for the Kurds—was the true catalyst for intervention.[12] Similarly, realism would emphasize concern for regional stability, the perceived threat to NATO's credibility, and alarm over refugee flows to explain U.S. involvement in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Haiti, respectively.[13]

On the other hand, when faced with the case of Somalia, realism can be fairly criticized as unable to fully account for the U.S. decision to intervene. There is little evidence that vital U.S. interests were in any way involved, while more convincing explanations center around the personal motivation of President George H. Bush—a decidedly non-realist mechanism of state behavior. Still, Morgenthau is not without something of an answer to such a case. Referring to the concept of interest-based policy he explains, "It stands to reason that not all foreign policies have always followed so rational, objective, and unemotional a course. The contingent elements of personality, prejudice, and subjective preference . . . are bound to deflect foreign policies from their rational course."[14] Somalia might thus be explained away as an example of irrational policy, which by its very definition is clearly not something a state should strive toward.

In sum, realism's primacy of the national interest, derived from an emphasis on structural restraint, asserts that we can expect the state to act in ways that maximize its relative power and security. By contrast, humanitarian intervention is likely to accrue significant costs for the state. Statesmen may well market their policy in terms of ideology—particularly to play to public approval—however, they must ultimately derive the policy itself from its relevance to the national interest. Thus we can conclude from realism that unless humanitarian intervention is perceived as serving the national interest, such action will not occur, regardless of rhetorical commitments.

Application to the U.S. Response in Darfur

To apply realism to the specific case of U.S. unwillingness to intervene in the Darfur crisis, this paper will examine three key explanations: First, the CIA has argued that the Government of Sudan is a valuable ally in the "War on Terror." Intervention in

Darfur could end Khartoum's cooperation and thus threaten the current national security priority. Second, occupied as it has been in Iraq and Afghanistan, intervention would further deplete and redirect already heavily extended U.S. resources, again threatening power and security. Third, an explanation most salient to the pre-January 2005 response, intervention in Darfur has been viewed as risking derailment of Sudan's North-South peace process and thereby U.S. interests in sustaining regional stability.

1. The CIA-Khartoum Alliance

In the words of Stephen Walt, the attacks of September 11, 2001 "triggered the most rapid and dramatic change in the history of U.S. foreign policy."[15] Fighting the "War on Terror" has dominated the national interest ever since. By the time of this paper's writing, the absolute supremacy of counterterrorism had become well established as the elephant in every policy-making room in Washington. Indeed, the humanitarian-oriented NGO lobbying community had come to understand well that their best advocacy tactic lay in their ability to establish a link between implementing their proffered agendas and furthering national security—that is to say, counterterrorism.[16]

Advocating for intervention in Darfur is no exception. In this case, however, the burden of proof lies not in demonstrating how intervention in a seemingly non-geostrategically relevant crisis would benefit the national interest, as was the unmet challenge in the case of Rwanda. Sudan is indeed highly relevant to national security, at least according to the Central Intelligence Agency, which currently considers Khartoum an important ally. Instead the major obstacle stems from the intelligence community's belief that intervention in Darfur would seriously jeopardize U.S. security by threatening this alliance. In other words, intervention could actually endanger the national interest.

The government of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir acted on its links to terrorist groups immediately after its successful 1989 coup. From offers of land to set up training camps to Sudanese passports to facilitate travel, terrorists were practically welcomed by Khartoum. Sudan was officially designated a terrorist-supporting country by the U.S. in 1993, and Osama bin Laden himself found shelter there between 1991 and 1996. Nevertheless, concerted pressure from the Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations compelled Bashir's regime to be more cooperative, so much so that the CIA now considers its Sudanese counterpart, the *Mukhabarat*, an important source of counterterrorism intelligence.[17]

In April of 2005, the CIA flew intelligence chief Salah Abdullah Gosh via private jet to Virginia's Langley Air Force Base for a security debriefing.[18] Once bin Laden's handler, Gosh has allegedly been instrumental in detaining terrorist suspects for U.S. interrogation, deporting Islamic extremists from Sudan, and raiding their homes to obtain evidence for the CIA.[19] According to Gosh himself, Sudan has "a strong partnership with the CIA. The information we have provided has been very useful to the United States."[20] Beyond this partnership, Khartoum has also permitted U.S. soldiers to gather intelligence in Sudan.[21] In 2004, evidence revealed secret camps established by Saudi Arabian terrorists along Sudan's Jebel Kurush Mountains. Although Khartoum has not complied with Western pressure to step up their own military surveillance of this area and oust the terrorists, their agreement to allow in a U.S. reconnaissance mission is not insignificant.

For obvious reasons not much else is publicly known about the CIA-Khartoum alliance. Yet its impact on Darfur policy is apparently supreme, especially in meetings of the Principals Committee. Operating one level below that of the National Security

Council, the Principals Committee is a national security advisory body comprised of key cabinet members and advisors, including the Secretaries of State and Defense, the CIA Director, and the National Security Advisor, who chairs the meetings. This group is extremely influential over the direction of foreign policy, and Washington insiders allege that the CIA-Khartoum link has been repeatedly used during its meetings to dilute or block proposals to implement a more robust response to the Darfur crisis.[22]

By empowering this link to be the key determinant of Darfur policy, decision makers have chosen not only to avoid a more robust response to the atrocities, but also to knowingly engage their perpetrators. Indeed, not only is Gosh reporting terrorist activity to the U.S., but he is also the alleged architect of the Sudanese government's strategy to arm the *Janjawid*.[23] This has led actor/activist Don Cheadle and John Prendergast to ask policy makers: "Should you make deals with smaller devils to get to the bigger ones?"[24] Though the question is intended to admonish, realism argues the answer must be "yes." Given its counterterrorism needs, Walt observes, the U.S. will have to subordinate its human rights agenda to the greater import of obtaining assistance from allies who do not necessarily support such goals.[25] Thus the U.S. is right to seek partnerships with actors like the President of Uzbekistan and Afghan Northern Alliance, irrespective of the fact, for example, that "boiling of body parts, using electroshock on genitals and plucking off fingernails and toenails with pliers" are all standard procedure in the former's prisons.[26] It seems Sudan's counterterrorism importance has been defended with the same calculus.[27]

Advocates for intervention thus seem to be at a dead end—yet arguably this security link is perhaps not as solid as the CIA contends. Firstly, given the Bashir regime's significant interest in being perceived as a vital "War on Terror" ally, is it not

possible they may be exaggerating their own utility? The government stands to gain greatly from a normalized relationship with the U.S., both politically and economically. Though Khartoum has greatly benefited from Chinese investment, Sudan's continued presence on the sponsor-of-terrorism list keeps U.S. investment and its accompanying benefits off-limits. And despite bellicose rhetoric, asserts Prendergast, the regime is in truth "enraged" by its continued "international pariah status."[28] In his interactions with the international community, President Bashir has repeatedly proven his ability to manipulate attempts to secure peace in Darfur toward his own ends. Given the gravity of the situation, it seems justified to at least raise the possibility that Khartoum's security importance may not be everything it claims to be.

Nevertheless, even if Khartoum's intelligence is legitimate, there is still one further objection to this allegedly inarguable national interest hypothesis. As noted, U.S. officials have stated that Khartoum's cooperation would be significantly compromised by a stronger U.S. reaction to Darfur. But why is this viewed as a zero-sum trade off? To the contrary, the experience of U.S.-Khartoum relations over the 1990s suggests that the former is more than capable of achieving cooperation from the later without tiptoeing around Bashir's domestic policy. As Prendergast argues, the use of multilateral sanctions and condemnation, the threat of U.S. military action, and aggressive diplomacy by the Clinton Administration (and the Bush government in the aftermath of 9/11) is the reason Khartoum began severing its terrorist links in the first place. [29]

It is unclear why the Bush Administration could not today achieve the dual objectives of continuing Sudan's counterterrorism cooperation and ending the atrocities in Darfur through a similar combination of diligent diplomacy and strategic multilateral

sanctions. That this would be a complex and strenuous task, however, goes without saying. Prendergast acknowledges, "Walking, chewing gum, and whistling at the same time are prerequisites for a successful policy in Sudan."[30] Yet given sufficient resources and willingness—perhaps through a "Darfur Study Group"—deciphering such a strategy might be feasible. Nevertheless, this is unlikely. As Prendergast argues, "maintaining the CIA's close relationship with members of the [Bashir] regime's security apparatus is apparently more important than punishing those individuals for their role in orchestrating mass atrocities in Darfur."[31] Realism would predict that a change in this calculation is improbable: It would do little to further the national interest, yet require implementation of a complex new policy. Because of its relevance to the top American security objective, the lack of U.S. intervention in Darfur is therefore well explained by realist expectations.

2. Overextension

Perhaps *The Economist* states it best: "As everyone knows, America is in trouble in Iraq."[32] As discussed, counterterrorism has been solidified as the principal national security aim, and the Bush Administration has perceived operations in Iraq and Afghanistan as vital to this objective. Were the U.S. not presently engaged in the Middle East, it is likely that the geostrategic non-necessity of intervention in Darfur would still reject expending valuable resources. The fact that the U.S. *is* occupied with this interest-necessitated engagement and exacerbated by its growing challenges, however, means that potential intervention in Darfur can be perceived as a diversion of not only scarce, but also badly needed resources. This renders intervention as highly irrational through the realist lens.

One of the most palpable measures of the toll U.S. engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq has taken on its resources is the effect on the military. The seriousness of the army's overextension has now been widely asserted, from the admission of former top U.S. commander in Iraq General George Casey to opinion polls of veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan tours. By his 2005 annual report to Congress, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard B. Myers conceded that the armed forces were stretched to the point where they risked inability to "quickly and easily" defeat new enemies.[33] By January 2006, a National Security Advisory Group report warned, "our ground forces are under enormous strain. This strain, if not soon relieved, will have highly corrosive and potentially long-term effects on the force."[34]

In 2005, the U.S. Army fell short of its annual recruiting goal for the first time since 1999 and has had to offer larger enlistment bonuses in an (unsuccessful) attempt to regain necessary levels.[35] Soldiers currently deployed have faced second and even third tours of duty, and the Army has utilized its "stop-loss policy" to keep up to 7,000 troops at any given time deployed for up to 18 months past their discharge or retirement dates.[36] Even Navy recruits are starting to drill for land operations, and the Army National Guard has been left with only 53% of the equipment necessary for effective domestic emergency response.[37] Moreover, examples like the recent Walter Reed National Medical Center exposé have revealed an astonishing lack of capacity to respond to the dramatic increase in the numbers of soldiers returning home with serious mental and physical injuries.

Even though U.S. involvement in Darfur need not—and as discussed, likely *should* not—include the contribution of U.S. troops to a peacekeeping mission, the "law

of the tool" overwhelmingly influences the general American conception of intervention. The lasting legacy of "Somalia Syndrome" has firmly associated American involvement in peacebuilding with the use of force, i.e. "the hammer," and subsequent responses have reinforced this precedent: either the U.S. reacts with force (Kosovo) or forgoes involvement altogether (Rwanda). Thus, although possible for the U.S. to assume a leadership role in Darfur without contributing troops, this is not the common *perception*. As such, the acute awareness that U.S. troops are overstretched may contribute to a broad understanding that intervention would further deplete vitally needed resources.

Beyond military overextension, however, the U.S. is also strained diplomatically, as its need for this capacity increases. Especially in the Middle East, the Bush Administration's ability to enforce its preferences has weakened. "Exasperation with the lone superpower," writes *The Economist*, "combined with a sense that the Iraq debacle has sapped its will, is stiffening resistance to American policies and emboldening others to show their hands."[38] This is particularly apparent in the responses to U.S. pressure towards democratic reform, as progress has stalled in Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. The U.S. is also leaning towards a more diplomatic policy of multilateral engagement with countries like Syria and Iran, backing away from its earlier refusal to negotiate with them directly.[39] Increasing diplomatic involvement in Darfur's crisis could thus also be perceived as a threat to the growing need for this resource in the Middle East.

In addition to further straining resources so obviously needed by current security-maximizing operations, intervention in Darfur would also lessen the U.S. ability to respond to new threats. Specifically, confrontation with Iran has emerged onto the Administration's security radar. Because of its nuclear ambitions and alleged support for

anti-Western insurgencies in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Gaza, Iran's future policies are only likely to tax U.S. involvement—diplomatically, militarily, or both. Through the leadership of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the State Department has pursued a multilateral effort to join Europe, Russia, and China in diplomatic engagement with Iran.[40] Similarly, the Treasury Department has pushed for stronger sanctions, both with Europe and Russia to impose economic costs and through the UN Security Council to enact travel bans on Iranian officials and restrictions on Iran's financial institutions.[41]

Alternatively, Administration hawks have advocated military strikes against Iran's nuclear facilities. Recently an aide to the Vice President revealed that Dick Cheney believes the strategy of diplomacy advocated by Secretary Rice is failing,[42] and Senator Joseph Lieberman (I-CT) has said, "I think we've got to be prepared to take aggressive military action against the Iranians."[43] In the words of John Bolton, former U.S. Ambassador to the UN, "Regime change or the use of force are the only available options to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapons capability, if they want it."[44] Although there may be divisions over which type of resources are best suited to deal with Iran—just one example of an emergent interest—there is certainly no question that resources are needed.

The U.S. does not have an unlimited capacity for intervention, argues Christopher Preble, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, no matter how much advocates for involvement in Darfur may like to believe otherwise. "Now is not the time, and Darfur is not the place," Preble argues, "to add yet another peacemaking mission to our military's already-long list of responsibilities."[45] Certainly the various options for greater U.S. involvement would require different degrees of resource expenditure, but the

fact remains that increased involvement in any form *will* utilize resources; thus it is hard to discredit this explanation. Certainly if the U.S. were not presently occupied in Iraq and Afghanistan, there would be a greater opening for intervention in Darfur. As it is, intervention may be perceived as only further risking and depleting limited U.S. resources, at a time when it can least afford the expenditure.

3. Threat to Sudan's North-South Peace Process

In 2003 the U.S. was already considerably invested in achieving peace in Sudan by an end to its civil war—Africa's longest—between the Muslim North and largely Christian and Animist South. Early in its first term, the George W. Bush Administration expressed strong interest in helping to resolve the conflict. President Bush had in fact directed National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice to begin work on a peace process on only his second day in office.[46] Nearly four years later, the January 9, 2005 signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) finally concluded the process of negotiating a settlement between Bashir's National Congress Party (NCP) and the South's Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M). Violence in Darfur thus flared when U.S. interests in Sudan were focused on ending the civil war, to which addressing Darfur in addition was perceived as a threat. Consequently U.S. failure to intervene in Darfur, particularly up until 2005, may be partially explained by its greater desire to secure a North-South Sudanese peace.

As noted, the U.S. had focused on Sudan in the context of counterterrorism since the early 1990s. The attribution of the 9/11 attacks to al-Qaeda only heightened Sudan's strategic importance, as did the growing recognition that terrorism found a breeding ground in areas of protracted civil conflict. The prospect of creating stability through an

end to the civil war therefore became an opportune chance to ensure the country could no longer be a safe haven for terrorists. Secondly, NCP cooperation with the peace process would enable the U.S. to move toward normalized relations with Sudan. To these ends, lifting of the 1997-imposed sanctions and removal from its sponsor-of-terrorism list were offered as strong incentives to promote Khartoum's compliance. These returns would be of obvious benefit to Sudan, yet the U.S. also stood to gain greatly from normalization. Sanctions had cost American firms a lucrative stake in the rapidly expanding Sudanese oil sector. Contracts instead went to countries in the European Union, Japan, Canada, and overwhelmingly to China, now Sudan's largest foreign investor. The promise of access to new oil reserves thus tied a further U.S. strategic interest to peace in Sudan.*

With clear interests in a successful outcome, the U.S. decided to play a key role in the North-South peace process. On September 6, 2001 Bush announced his designation of former U.S. Senator John Danforth to be his Special Envoy for Peace in Sudan, charging him with building momentum towards peace talks. Regional support was concentrated in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) countries comprised of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda, joined by international partnerships with the United Kingdom, Norway, and Italy. In addition to these actors' importance, the U.S. role was widely acknowledged as critical because of the coercive tools uniquely at its disposal. Its tough counterterrorism stance, for one, allowed the Americans to effectively influence the NCP by playing good cop/bad cop with their European counterparts.[47]

By the end of 2003, growing evidence of the deteriorating situation in Darfur forced its recognition, at least privately. There was movement within the diplomatic

* Many analysts also point to the importance of domestic politics—including Congressional pressure and the role of key Republican constituencies in an election year—to explain the Bush Administration's heavy involvement in the peace process. However, such factors are not relevant to the realist level of analysis.

community stationed in Khartoum to mobilize an international response, perhaps through the statement of a senior UN humanitarian official before the Security Council. But such a move was rejected by the U.S. and U.K., in favor of adopting "a lower profile."[48] In December of 2003 U.S. officials approached Bashir with an offer to fund the extension to Darfur of the Civilian Protection Monitoring Team, mandated by an NCP and SPLA/M agreement to protect civilians, but then backed away when the proposal met with resistance from Khartoum.[49] The U.S. Congress too was unwilling to act, inattentive to the violence until mid-2004. "We were late," lamented Representative Frank Wolf (R-VA). "We so wanted to get peace in the South that it was like the Simon and Garfunkel song: 'A man hears what he wants to hear and disregards the rest.'"[50] Because of the progress being made towards the CPA, it was almost as if the U.S. was willing to "overlook" Darfur's violence in exchange. "The IGAD peace process has given the Sudanese government the moral high ground," observed one analyst at the time, "having shifted Khartoum from the center of war to the center of a peace process."[51]

When it did eventually acknowledge the situation's magnitude leading up to its genocide finding, the U.S. determined that a response was called for—but not at the cost of derailing the peace talks.[52] As one analyst tersely observed at the time, "no one is willing to compromise the current prospects of ending Africa's longest war."[53] The U.S. feared that expanding the peace process to include Darfur would do exactly that. As a result, U.S. attention was limited to mobilizing access and contributing funds for humanitarian aid. In early 2004, the U.S. offered the NCP assistance in setting up negotiations with Darfur rebel groups for specifically this purpose.[54] Failing to receive a

response, the U.S. continued its public denunciation of the alarmingly worsening violence, but resisted using any significant leverage to pressure Khartoum to act.

In fearing that a more forceful engagement would undermine the peace process, the U.S. likely recognized the tenuousness of Khartoum's cooperation. Under Bashir's leadership, the NCP had from the beginning a vested interest in obstruction. It was and continues to be a "spoiler:" by Stephen Stedman's definition, "leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it."[55] Moreover, the NCP is closest to Stedman's categorization of a "total" spoiler (as opposed to the more compliant "limited" or "greedy" types), in that its paramount objective is to retain control. Since seizing power in the 1989 coup, Bashir and his loyal elites have pursued preservation of their power at all costs, dealing harshly with those who threaten their position.[56] As such, Stedman explains, "any commitment to peace by a total spoiler is tactical—a move to gain advantage in a struggle to the death."[57]

Full implementation of the CPA—with its authority and revenue-sharing accords and potential for Southern succession—is a clear threat to NCP power. Anticipating this, mediators purposely made strong regional and international pressure a cornerstone of the peace process.[58] As discussed, the U.S. in particular contributed the promise of ending Sudan's international pariah status and invoked fears of post-9/11 reprisals.[*] By NCP calculations there were thus compelling reasons to participate. Yet this could not guarantee unpremeditated cooperation; the end objective of retaining as much authority as possible continued to drive NCP strategy. Against the threat of upcoming elections, for

[*] In 1998 the U.S. bombed a Sudanese pharmaceutical factory it argued was being used to manufacture chemical weapons. Though widely controversial, the move laid bare the seriousness of U.S. interests to Khartoum, proving an effective means of compliance then, and a useful "reminder" after September 11th.

example, the NCP has pursued full partnership with the SPLM, scheming that this would prevent the latter from leading political opposition.[59] Barring that, the NCP reasoned, it could undermine the agreement later on. They have already deliberately encouraged infighting within the South's militias and failed to meet deadlines for troop withdrawal.[60]

Cognizant of the delicate process thus required to deal with the NCP spoiler, the U.S. interpreted widening the talks to include Darfur (or initiating a separate process) as a potentially fatal blow to North-South negotiations. Consequently, while willing to flex its diplomatic muscle over cooperation with the South, the U.S. lacked the same aggressiveness in engaging the Bashir government over Darfur. The tragic irony is that the NCP was able to manipulate this response to its advantage. By the time negotiations reached the critical juncture of determining a timeline for the CPA's implementation, discussed in late 2004, "the Khartoum regime correctly judged that the international community would not criticize it at a crucial point in the peace process," contends an ICG report, "so it slowed the process in Naivasha to give itself time for a major offensive in Darfur."[61] Although the U.S. was moved to express grave concern over the resulting violence, its greater interest in preserving Khartoum's cooperation in the North-South peace process likely explains one more piece of the non-intervention puzzle.

Conclusion

Although we cannot definitively prove the extent of their influence, each of these three explanations suggests a plausible means by which policy makers could perceive of intervention in Darfur as jeopardizing the U.S. national interest. As such, the U.S. response is consistent with realist expectations. The fact that the Bush Administration has labeled the situation "genocide," however, points to the influence of R2P and its

normative context—but only to the extent of rhetoric, as realists like Mearsheimer and Walt predict. Mindful of President Clinton's experience during Rwanda, policy makers have likely realized the political utility of publicly acknowledging the crisis' magnitude, while nonetheless deriving policy from the directives of the national interest unchanged. The paradigm further offers little hope that this outcome is likely to alter: with few exceptions, the realist calculation renders humanitarian intervention imprudent, risking unnecessary costs to the pursuit of power and security maximization. It stands to reason that were these three perceptions of threat not present, there might at least be an opening to consider intervention. Because the case presents risks to U.S. national security that have allegedly resonated so strongly with policy makers, however, intervention in Darfur faces a significant challenge realist analysis argues it is unlikely to overcome.

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CHAPTER IV – BARRIERS TO INTERVENTION: THE LIBERAL LENS

In contrast to realism's focus on capabilities, threats, and security maximization, liberalism posits state behavior as best understood by its domestic preferences. Understanding the liberal explanation of intervention can thus best be achieved by focusing on the origin of these preferences and liberalism's core assumptions about the shaping power of domestic influences. As such, the paradigm understands the potential for intervention not as a fixed outcome based on expectations about power- and security-maximizing behavior, but rather as dependent on its compatibility with state preferences.

Review of Liberal Literature

Born of the Enlightenment, liberalism is rooted in that era's optimism about the continual improvement and promise of humanity. Hence all liberal variations share a belief "in at least the possibility of cumulative progress," notes Robert Keohane.[1] As such, it has been widely criticized as idealistic and even utopian, but the seminal work of Andrew Moravcsik in "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," firmly differentiates between liberal ideology and liberal theory—and establishes the latter as a significant contribution to social scientific thought. Still, a strong Kantian influence remains, particularly in Moravcsik's emphasis on rational man. It is the relationship states have with the preferences of these rational actors that drives liberalism's central assumptions about the causal mechanisms of state behavior.

Liberalism holds that as "rational and risk-averse" actors, individuals and groups generate interests by pursuing material and ideational welfare "under constraints imposed by material scarcity, conflicting values, and variations in societal influence."[2] As such, these interests and the demands they dictate are understood as "analytically *prior* to

politics"—giving liberalism its characterization as a bottom-up view of policy formation, through which the state is understood not as an actor in itself, but as an institution representative of these interests.[3] As Moravcsik explains, "socially differentiated individuals define their material and ideational interests independently of politics and then advance those interests through political exchange and collective action."[4] This advancement of interests, or preferences, of social actors translates into state preferences by means of the "transmission belt of representative institutions and practices," thereby forming the basis of a government's strategic calculations that shape policy.[5] In short, state behavior is determined by state preferences, in turn shaped by domestic interests.

Certainly not all domestic preferences will be equally represented by the state, however. Instead, variations among representative institutions differentiate how preferences are conveyed. Consequently, the form of domestic political representation—the type of transmission belt—as well as representative practices, both formal and informal, are key to the liberal understanding of the state, as these determine how and whose interests among societal subsets will be used to define state preferences. In the extreme case, a system of tyrannical dictatorship would represent only the preferences of a Pol Pot or Stalin.[6] Here the *selectorate*, defined by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al. as the section of the polity enfranchised to participate in the selection of political leadership, is markedly small.[7] Yet even a representative democracy, in which the selectorate includes the majority of the polity, will have means of privileging certain preferences over others. In the U.S. case, peculiarities such as gerrymandering* or Washington's K-

* "Gerrymandering" is the deliberate geographical redrawing of congressional voting districts in an attempt to ensure one party's dominance over another, at the expense of fair representation of voters' preferences. (The name hails from the 19th century case of a district under Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry so obviously manipulated that its shape resembled a salamander.)

street lobbyist maneuverings are just two examples of how the interests of certain American subgroups are privileged with greater influence over policy makers.

In "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace," Bueno de Mesquita et al. characterizes these privileged subgroups as the *winning coalition*, "those people whose support is required to keep the incumbent in office."[8] Because remaining in office is assumed to be their primary interest, leaders are understood as first and foremost motivated to satisfy the interests of their winning coalitions. Stephen Saideman elaborates: "Politicians have to pay attention to their supporters' preferences, because they might otherwise give their support to someone else."[9] As such, the political costs attached to satisfying their winning coalitions are the main constraints leaders face in formulating policy. Bueno de Mesquita and other democratic peace liberalists use this relationship to explain the war-making tendencies of democratic states, explaining how the mobilization of resources needed to successfully wage war imposes costs on the selectorate, which in turn risks political costs to the policy makers. However, this mechanism is also instructive to the formation of interventionist policy.

We can extrapolate from this explanation that the U.S. response to a humanitarian crisis will depend on the interests transmitted from the current winning coalitions of the American selectorate. In seeking to satisfy these groups, policy makers are understood as risk-averse, for whom intervention, like war, is perceived to be costly. Therefore, if leaders are not urged to intervene, it stands to liberal reason that they will have little incentive to do so. As Samantha Power explains in *A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*, "American political leaders interpret society-wide silence as an indicator of public indifference. They reason that they will incur no costs if the United

States remains uninvolved, but will face steep risks if they engage."[10] Consequently, there will be no involvement beyond what can be undertaken without risking significant costs. Power argues that this response typified the U.S. reaction to genocide over the past century: "Although isolated voices have protested the slaughter, Americans outside the executive branch were largely mute when it mattered." Because of this "society-wide silence," she contends, "the battle to stop genocide has thus been repeatedly lost in the realm of domestic politics."[11] Accordingly we can understand the liberal explanation of non-intervention as the result of risk-averse policy makers responding to a lack of domestic preferences supporting this outcome.

Application to the U.S. Response in Darfur

Unlike realism, for which non-intervention is the expected outcome of prudential state behavior, liberalism has no such *a priori* assumption. Instead, intervention policy is understood as primarily dependent on domestic preferences that can be either pro or con intervention. Consequently, a liberal examination of non-intervention in Darfur is essentially a task of identifying the nature of the preferences that have led to this outcome. This paper will explore two potential alternatives: either 1) though not from lack of trying, the interventionist preferences that do exist have so far failed to successfully translate into policy or 2) there is simply not enough domestic interest in increased U.S. involvement in Darfur to begin with. In short, the predicament is either one of *ineffectiveness* or *insufficiency*. To illustrate the factors that might contribute to each, this section will examine the impact of the Darfur advocacy movement, and the influence on preference formation of Darfur's geographical location, the psychological consequences of the crisis, and media coverage. Then, to more fully account for the

domestic influences on policy formation, this paper will subsequently consider the impact of individual decision-making, specifically arguing that non-intervention in Darfur also stems from a lack of presidential leadership to the contrary.

1. Ineffective Interest

In contrast to the U.S. reaction to the Rwandan genocide, atrocities in Darfur have not been met with the same societal silence. Throughout the country, both new and already existing local and national groups have turned their focus toward educating the public about the violence and urging collective action to stop it. The involvement of faith-based Christian and Jewish groups, student activists, and even Hollywood celebrities has been particularly prominent. Largely because of this, the general public is growing increasingly more aware of the crisis and can now readily access the means to become involved in the activist movement.

Nevertheless, it is one thing to raise awareness and quite another to use it to effect change. As such, the key test for this new burst of Darfur activism—of which most activists are themselves aware—is whether or not this higher profile will translate into concrete political pressure, to the point where winning coalition-conscious policy makers will be forced to act. "*If* U.S. citizens can make enough noise to press their government to do what's right," argues John Prendergast, "then we will have saved literally tens, perhaps hundreds of thousands of lives in Darfur."[12] This is a considerable challenge. Despite the energy and devotion of these activist groups, it may be that at least during the initial four years of violence, their strategies have not been adequately effective in transmitting to policy makers society's interest in intervention. In other words, while the interest may be there, it might not have created enough—or the right kind of—"noise."

Recollecting the lack of domestic pressure on the U.S. government to intervene in Rwanda, former Senator Paul Simon (D-IL) believes, "If every member of the House and Senate had received 100 letters from people back home saying we have to do something about Rwanda, when the crisis was first developing, then I think the response would have been different."[13] Indeed, when Senators Simon and James Jeffords (I-VT), then the respective Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa, hand-delivered a personal letter to the White House about Rwanda themselves, they received no response. Days later a National Security official told them, "We don't feel there is a base of public support for taking any action in Africa."[14]

Since then, today's Darfur activists have internalized this lesson. "There will be no structural change in how we [the U.S. government] respond to these horrors," argues John Prendergast, "until enough citizens are willing to say 'We're mad as hell and we're not going to vote for you anymore!'"[15] Members of Congress have also advised activists to take this route. Senators Barack Obama (D-IL) and Sam Brownback (R-KS) write that individuals must "sound the alarm," and "hold [their] leaders accountable"[16] for failing to act in the face of such atrocities, and a congressman urged Prendergast, "We have to hear it from our constituents. Make as much noise as you can, scream bloody murder, force us to care!"[17] As such, the Darfur movement has largely focused on mobilizing constituents to directly target their representatives—in both Congressional and Executive branches.

One of the largest organizations behind this mobilization is the Washington D.C.-based Save Darfur Coalition (SDC).* SDC formed after a meeting of 40 non-profit groups in July 2004, spearheaded by the American Jewish World Service (AJWS) and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM). Since its official launch in 2005, SDC has become a partnership of more than 170 organizations, including Amnesty International USA (AIUSA), Citizens for Global Solutions (CJS), Genocide Intervention Network (GI-Net), International Crisis Group (ICG), and Students Taking Action Now: Darfur (STAND), in addition to SDC's own core of some 30 employees. Unlike many other organizations focused on Darfur, SDC's proceeds go directly toward the activist movement itself rather than to humanitarian aid—in short, to lobbying. During the fiscal year of 2006, SDC had an operating budget of some $15 million, several million of which were spent on national advertising aimed at bringing public attention to the crisis.[18]

Most of SDC's major advocacy events took place in 2006, when it started the year off with a "Million Voices for Darfur" campaign, an effort to present President Bush with one million hand-written and electronic postcards from Americans asking him to support a robust, multinational peacekeeping force in Darfur. On April 30, 2006, SDC organized the first Global Day for Darfur, with a massive rally on the National Mall that was attended by some 50,000 people, prompting media coverage of over 800 stories across the U.S. and Canada.[19] These major events are supplemented by suggestions maintained on SDC's website of actions individuals can take anytime, from signing a petition to sending a letter to Congress. SDC's member organizations have also sponsored independent campaigns, such as AIUSA's Darfur Lobby Week sponsoring constituent

* SDC is by no means the only advocacy group promoting increased U.S. involvement in Darfur; however, because it has garnered great visibility and is a unique coalitional organization of other advocacy groups, it bears special attention here as representative of the activist movement.

visits to their congressional offices, STAND's series of awareness-raising events across American college campuses, or GI-Net's Sudan Divestment Task Force project urging special targeted divestment in ways minimally damaging to ordinary Sudanese.

Through these activities, asserts Alex de Waal, SDC and its partner organizations have "done something that none of us thought would ever be possible—to start a mass movement on Sudan."[20] U.S. Special Envoy Andrew Natsios concurs, "The Save Darfur Coalition has kept this issue in the news media and before the public and has focused the issue in a way that hasn't happened in foreign relations maybe since the South Africa anti-apartheid movement."[21] There is even evidence to suggest this effort has made an impact within the U.S. government. Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE) believes, "Save Darfur's efforts to pressure the administration and Congress and keep the issue alive have had a tremendous impact."[22] Officials in the Bush Administration have also acknowledged this: "These advocacy organizations play a good role in keeping American citizens informed of some issues that aren't always on the nightly news," notes Gordon Johndroe, a National Security Council spokesman. "The administration listens and speaks regularly to Save Darfur and other groups."[23]

While it is thus extremely significant that Darfur advocacy efforts have gained the ear of Congress and the White House in the first place, this does not guarantee that these preferences will be incorporated into policy. After all, the President and Congressional members face a myriad of concerns from their constituents, but have a limited ability to respond. Crucially, preferences for increased involvement must thus be expressed in such a way that policymakers will fear a *political cost* for failing to incorporate them. This is a

significant challenge for the advocacy community and one it seems not yet fully met. Darfur activist Eric Reeves contends, "A number of well-placed sources have confirmed to this writer that the administration's priority is politically 'managing' the American Darfur advocacy movement . . . rather than responding to advocacy demands."[24]

Importantly, however, the continuation of this challenge ought not to belittle the effort that has so far been made: indeed, advocacy pressure has achieved a number of smaller successes, particularly as the conflict has drawn on. In the spring of 2007, for example, AIUSA called upon its grassroots members to write, call, and visit their Senators in order to urge them to sign a letter calling on China's President Hu Jintao to utilize his influence on the Government of Sudan. All but four Senators were persuaded. Still, judgment of advocacy's success cannot ignore the hard fact that it is now 2007, hundreds of thousands of Darfuris are dead, millions more are displaced, and the violence has spread to areas of Chad and the Central African Republic. Transmission of increased-involvement interests has clearly not been as effective as needed to bring peace to Darfur.

A number of factors have likely contributed to this unsatisfactory outcome. Firstly, it is fair to point out that mobilizing a massive public reaction to human rights abuses in real time is an extremely difficult undertaking for grassroots organizations.[25] Clearly the broader, permanent organizations were not biding their time waiting for the Darfur crisis to erupt, but had to divert attention away from other causes. Building a new campaign takes time as it runs up against internal bureaucratic delays and resource shortages—for instance, there may well be only a handful of individuals in charge of brainstorming campaign ideas and little financial support to back them. By the time advocacy groups were organized enough to launch the SDC partnership, the crisis was

nearly a year old, and reaching the point of staging major events took even longer. Sadly, the length of Darfur's conflict seems key to SDC and other advocacy groups achieving the influence they hold today. The multiplicity of ways the public is encouraged to become involved in mid-2007 were not yet widely promoted in 2003 or 2004.

Secondly, the fact that the advocacy community managed to jointly create an overarching SDC alliance does not mean that the advocacy goals of individual member organizations have been likewise united. Organizations are constrained by individual missions, so they cannot necessarily support all coalitional campaign ideas. In the case of Darfur, calls for divestment, sanctions, and no fly-zones are such problematic policies. Moreover, there are also significant differences between what advocacy organizations recognize as priorities on the one hand and operational humanitarian organizations on the other. The latter, for example, have understandably been extremely cautious about any policy that might infringe upon their ability to operate in Darfur, especially as concerns the safety of their colleagues on the ground. As such, the goals one organization urges their followers to champion might not be supported by another, ultimately weakening the impact of each campaign and creating competition between the various organizations.

Presenting a multiplicity of advocacy goals also lessens the clarity with which policy makers receive them. Thinly spreading public support over calling for UN boots on the ground, increased funding for AMIS, divestment, no-fly zones, sanctions, pressure on China, and support for the International Criminal Court indictments is potentially less effective than focusing on just one or two goals. On the other hand, these initiatives do all demonstrate concern for Darfur and speak to advocacy groups' attempts to come at the crisis from as many angles as possible. Still, the lack of clarity has prompted vehement

critics, such as professor Stephen Eric Bronner who argues, "Striking is the lack of reflection, the mixture of desperation and incoherence, and the inability on the part of both the mainstream and most of its progressive critics to specify the end that the tactics they propose should realize in Darfur and the Sudan."[26] De Waal also criticizes many of the activist campaigns for not adequately emphasizing the need to revamp the peace process in addition to implementing security on the ground.[27]

In part this difficulty stems from the nature of the Darfur crisis itself. Successful resolution of the situation must simultaneously address a number of complex issues, including restarting the peace process, supporting rebel unity, enforcing a cease-fire, enabling humanitarian access, providing security on the ground, and addressing the needs of refugees and internally displaced persons, to highlight a few. As such a solution cannot be boiled down to a single initiative the way that, for example, the divestment campaign to end South African apartheid more or less could. In that case, the students who led the campaign had a clear, specific goal to harm the apartheid government of South Africa by targeting its foreign investors, and could therefore advocate a clear, specific means to do so. While complex humanitarian emergencies intrinsically demand a more complex policy response, this does not mean confusion and division among activists is inevitable, but at the very least it suggests this would need to be actively guarded against. As it stands, public interest does appear fragmented among these different pieces of the policy puzzle at the expense of giving a clear directive to policy makers.

Finally, the means by which the public has been encouraged to show their concern for Darfur may also be hindering its effectiveness. Rallies, petitions, and form letters are among the main tools organizations like SDC use to mobilize public concern, and

students from college to primary school have held all manner of Darfur fundraising events from dinners to dance-a-thons. Yet while there is no question these methods help to raise awareness about the crisis, it is less clear whether they sufficiently convey policy-changing preferences. For instance, D.C. congressional offices receive an enormous volume of mail each day. Many are date-stamped and eventually find their way onto a staffer's desk for potential discussion with the representative, but others, particularly large batches of obviously identical form letters might just as easily end up in the recycling bin. "Personal, impassioned letters are more effective, ultimately, than clicking on a website," note Don Cheadle and John Prendergast. "That is what makes politicians take notice: constituents taking time out of their day to write letters themselves."[28] This is what creates an impression of genuine constituent concern in the mind of the policy maker, and hence what creates an impression of potential political cost.

Besides being less effective in conveying genuine interest, these methods also meet their limits with the public—and frankly advocacy organizations as well. Especially as the Darfur crisis has drawn on, the public can easily slip into apathy and hopelessness. While the 2006 Global Day for Darfur rally generated thousands of supporters, the 2007 event was met with only a few hundred. SDC did not publicize the event as successfully as it did the previous year, and the event was planned to be much smaller. Yet lower attendance was also likely a symptom of activist exhaustion or disillusionment over the failure of last year's rally to achieve any major discernable progress toward the objectives of peace and security. Without seeing significant results from their actions, people can only be asked to sign so many petitions, e-mail so many form letters, and attend so many

rallies before they begin to doubt the efficacy of their efforts. And if apathy sets in, the public will be even less effective in transmitting their support for increased involvement.

Ultimately, the public's demonstration of their concern for Darfur has stood out significantly from the response to any previous humanitarian crisis. These advocacy efforts have successfully made policy makers stop and take notice, and it is highly likely that they have played a large role in pressuring what little action the U.S. has so far taken. Yet despite these achievements, it seems public interest in intervention has not been transmitted effectively enough to cause a policy shift. If it had, we would expect policy makers to be nervously confronting the fallout from failing to respond, and this does not appear to be the case. While the current progress is certainly to be applauded, continued non-intervention in Darfur may well be a result of insufficiently effective interest.

2. Insufficient Interest

As the preceding section shows, it is clearly inaccurate to suggest there is no domestic interest in increased U.S. involvement in Darfur. Nevertheless, it is possible this intervention preference is shared by a much smaller segment of the selectorate than its impassioned presence suggests. Alternatively, the majority interest may in truth remain largely unchanged from its usual patterned response of lamenting, "This is a terrible thing, but whose problem is it? It is not mine," as General George Lucas describes of the American response to Rwanda.[29] Consequently, despite the best mobilization attempts of a dedicated subgroup, continued non-intervention could be explained as the result of insufficient domestic pressure to the contrary, stemming in turn from inadequate societal interest in intervention. This might result from the influence of Darfur's geographical location, the psychological consequences of the crisis, and the impact of media coverage.

a. Geographical Consequences

Mustering support for intervention in Darfur potentially faces a challenge unique to African crises. At a 1996 dinner to honor President Nelson Mandela, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali warned, "Today, we face a grave danger: 'Africa fatigue.' . . . It is an easy path from fatigue to despair, from despair to indifference and neglect."[30] As its name suggests, "Africa fatigue" describes an apathy born of continual accounts of atrocities and crises throughout the continent. This can lead to desensitization toward the violence, which in turn takes on a perverse sense of normalcy—what Power describes as "blindness bred by familiarity."[31] This helps explain how Washington had become so used to violence in the Great Lakes region—indeed, 50,000 civilians in Burundi had been killed in October 1993 without a U.S. response—that the 1994 situation in Rwanda was determined by State Department regional specialists to be just "another flare-up" of clearly tragic but nonetheless "acceptable" ethnic conflict.[32] Similarly Representative Alcee Hastings' (D-FL) description of his district was representative of much of public opinion: "Africa seems so far away, and there is no vital interest that my constituency sees."[33]

The media is most often blamed for the prevalence of Africa fatigue, criticized for not making a greater effort to portray the *good* news coming out of the continent. Major progress has been made toward democracy and capacity building, steps have been taken towards greater fiscal responsibility, a number of peace agreements have been negotiated, and the first female president of an African nation has been elected, yet Africa seems to make headlines only when a new crisis erupts.[34] Accordingly, Westerners have come to overwhelmingly associate the region with famine, flood, corruption, AIDS, debt, child

soldiers, or ethnic cleansing, to highlight a few. "By ignoring the positive news, U.S. and European media risk fostering a tendency to dismiss the entire continent as hopeless," argue Cheadle and Prendergast.[35] And as a result, "Crimes against humanity on that continent are largely ignored or treated as part of the continent's political inheritance."[36]

It is not just an alleged disproportionate focus on negative events that contributes to this violence-as-normal sense, but also the way in which crises are depicted. A "tribal" element of Africa's conflicts is often underscored, portraying violence as the result of deep-set ethnic hatred, rather than any political motive.[37] CNN's Gary Streiker reported on Rwanda, for example, by explaining, "What's behind this story is probably the worst tribal hostility in all of Africa, hostility that goes back centuries long before European colonization."[38] By contrast, argues Garth Myers et al., conflicts located elsewhere are covered with a markedly different tone. While *The New York Times* reported on April 10, 1994 that Rwanda was enmeshed in "tribal warfare," it simultaneously described Bosnians as fighting "everyone's war."[39] This slant promotes apathy by suggesting that there is little the West can do to stop a "tribal" war and provides an excuse for indifference by dismissing the conflict as convolutedly hopeless. Prudence Bushnell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in 1994, recalls of the Rwandan crisis, "What I was told was, 'Look, Pru, these people do this from time to time.'"[40] Congresswoman Maxine Waters (D-CA) confessed many Americans simply did not understand who was killing whom.[41]

In April 1994 an ABC *Nightline* interview with Boutros Boutros-Ghali began with the words, "Tonight, Rwanda. Is the world just too tired to help?"[42] While news coverage of Darfur has yet to react quite so bluntly, it is possible this same sentiment

underlies the public's reception of the Darfur crisis. As Cheadle and Prendergast note, "Darfur is competing for international action with human rights emergencies in Congo, Somalia, and northern Uganda—conflicts that along with southern Sudan have left over 6 million dead."[43] Moreover, Power argues that in their treatment of the crisis, U.S. officials have once again "begun trotting out alibis from past ethnic conflicts" to downplay the utility of a Western response. "It's a tribal war," argued Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick in November 2005, "And, frankly, I don't think foreign forces ought to get themselves in the middle of a tribal war."[44] As in the Rwandan case before it, the reaction to Darfur seems to have all the ingredients of Africa fatigue.

Additionally, Darfur's African context may inhibit a large portion of the U.S. selectorate from relating to the victims due to a lack of ethnic ties. As Stephen Saideman explains, "International boundaries do not cause members of ethnic groups to ignore the condition of those who are similar to themselves—their ethnic kin. Constituents will care most about those with whom they share ethnic ties or those with whom a history of ethnic enmity exists."[45] Saideman explores this idea in relation to domestic preferences towards foreign secessionist conflicts, yet it stands to reason that constituents' ethnic ties will contribute to their interest in other types of relevant foreign policy as well. Hence we can understand U.S. support for Israel as partly driven by a strong domestic Jewish lobby, and continued antipathy towards Fidel Castro as an expression of Cuban-American preferences. But if no ethnic ties exist, then certainly groups within the selectorate have much less of an impetus to act—in this case, to press for intervention.

In this respect Darfur is similar to the Rwandan case, as no significant diaspora group exists in the U.S. for either one, and "few African Americans identify specific

ancestral homelands and lobby on their behalf in the way Armenians, Jews, or Albanians might," Power explains.[46] Moreover, Alexander DeConde argues that African American groups in general have much less influence on U.S. foreign policy than the far more successful Anglo-American ethnic group.[47] Of course now that the crisis in Darfur is entering its fifth year, the Darfuri diaspora is increasing as a result, and particularly in New York several pockets of refugees have collected. This reflects a "structural problem" with genocide, notes Power, as "the ethnic groups that you might hope would be mobilizable in real time tend to get created by genocide."[48] Still, the gradual growth of ethnic ties has not translated into political pressure in the Darfur case, and the majority of the selectorate remains without any ethnic connections to compel interest.

Potentially this is not just a question of ethnic ties, but also one of socio-cultural identity. Living in the world's wealthiest, most-industrialized country, many Americans may well find it difficult to relate to the lifestyle of the average Darfuri. For example, in the second week of November 2006, NBC Nightly News presented three consecutive days of special coverage of Darfur. Reporting from the Sudan-Chad border, anchor Ann Curry described the trauma refugee camp orphans suffered, the use of rape as a weapon of war, and the spread of arson across the border. Surrounding these segments, however, were reports about Delta Airline's impending bankruptcy, the risk of breast cancer from eating red meat, consternation surrounding OJ Simpson's forthcoming *If I Did It* book, and Wal-Mart's early holiday price discounting.[49] Between Wal-Mart's laden shelves and Darfur's burned-out huts, the contrast could hardly be more striking. Americans thus might not identify with Darfuri victims the same way they may have with Bosnians, for example, whose plight was set against footage far more similar to the U.S. landscape.

Certainly this explanation suggests an appalling limitation of the public's ability to empathize with fellow human beings, even one bordering on racism. Moreover, it is unlikely we would be able to find hard proof that this was the case, not least because the bias may be unconsciously felt. Yet uncomfortable as the conclusion may be, it is nevertheless within reason to suppose that Darfur's African context may limit the capacity of some Americans to imagine themselves in the position of the victims. There may be a difference, for example, in the ability of an American soccer mom to relate to Sidbela Zimic, a nine-year old Sarajevan girl killed on the playground while playing with a jump rope whose handles were shaped like ice-cream cones,[50] than to the rows of anonymous children pictured sitting in Darfuri refugee camps.

Through both this stark socio-cultural contrast and a lack of ethnic ties, the concern Darfur's crisis stirs may well be limited to sympathy, not empathy. And for the purpose of forming preferences and pressuring policy, the latter is far more effective in turning concern into action.[51] On the other hand, even Bosnia's location in Europe—and subsequently the greater potential for identification by Americans—did not result in an early U.S. response. Moreover, examples such as the outpouring of aid to Asian victims of the December 2004 tsunami demonstrate that Americans do not simply ignore non-Western need. Yet there is a significant difference between sustaining protracted interest in urging policy makers to address a complex humanitarian crisis and simply following natural disaster headlines for a matter of days and making a one-time monetary donation (particularly around the holiday season). Alternatively, were Darfur not located in Africa, it is plausible to at least question whether Darfuris would face the same response. While

Darfur's geographical context is unlikely the whole or even main explanation for the U.S. public's insufficient interest, it is potentially one more piece of the puzzle.

b. Psychological Numbing

The advancements of the information age have rendered the previous excuse in the face of humanitarian crises of "we didn't know" untenable, yet public knowledge of atrocities in Darfur, like that of previous cases, is clearly failing to register. "Because the savagery of genocide so defies our everyday experience, many of us [fail] to wrap our minds around it," argues Power. "We gradually came to accept the depravity of the Holocaust, but then slotted it in our consciousness as 'history;' we [resist] acknowledging that genocide [is] occurring in the present."[52] The findings of a number of psychological studies suggest that similar to the consequences of "Africa fatigue," this reaction may be the product of "psychic numbing." Cognitive and social psychologists use this term to describe the process by which exposure to atrocities on a large scale can overwhelm and desensitize our reactions. Alternatively, Mother Teresa also described this phenomena when she said, "If I look at the mass, I will never act. If I look at the one, I will."[53]

These reactions derive from the way in which our emotional response to information, what psychologists call *affect*, combines with logic to drive our behavior.[54] While key to helping us cope with everyday decision-making, our affective system is limited in how much it can comprehend and process. Psychology professor Paul Slovic points to a quip by author Annie Dillard to illustrate: "There are 1,198,500,000 people alive now in China. To get a *feel* for what this means, simply take yourself—in all your singularity, importance, complexity, and love—and multiply by 1,198,500,000. See? Nothing to it."[55] Clearly we are incapable of such a cognitive effort: the exercise would

be too overwhelming, ultimately "numbing" away any meaning. This holds equally true in our reaction to massive human rights abuses. Both psychological studies and examples from real life provide ample evidence; Darfur is likely no exception.

The "identifiable victim effect" particularly substantiates this process. A 2007 experiment by Small, Loewenstein, and Slovic assessed people's decisions to contribute money to Save the Children under three different conditions. In the first scenario would-be donors were told about the plight of Rokia, a "desperately poor" seven-year-old girl from Mali, Africa, who "faces a threat of severe hunger or even starvation." As a result of participants' donations, Rokia's herself would benefit. The second condition asked for aid to assist 21 million anonymous starving Africans, portrayed as "statistical victims," and the third condition again singled out Rokia, but this time as one face among a much greater epidemic, an "identifiable victim with statistical information." Donations were unsurprisingly much larger under the first condition than the second, but more significantly, they were also much lager than under the third: "Coupling the statistical realities with Rokia's story significantly *reduced* the contributions to Rokia."[56]

Psychology is continuing to study the threshold at which we tip from experiencing concern to numbness, but for the purposes of understanding society's reaction to mass atrocities, we can clearly see how the broader picture is likely to elicit less concern. Even if we can identify a handful of the victim's names, the greater significance will elude us. Beyond these experiments, real life examples are plentiful in the way singular events have had the power to galvanize public attention. For instance, when 18-month-old Texan Jessica McClure fell down an abandoned well in 1987, the rescue attempt consumed the public for 58 straight hours, after which the successful rescuers were even rewarded with

a personal note of congratulations from President Ronald Regan.[57] Darfuri children have also fallen down wells—or more precisely, *Janjawid* militia have thrown their bodies in to contaminate the water source and prevent fleeing villagers from returning to their land—but this has not captivated America's attention.[58]

Even animals in harm's way draw a dramatically greater reaction from the public. In 2002 a dog stranded in the Pacific Ocean sparked an outpouring of $48,000 in private donations, and even the National Coast Guard prepared to join the rescue attempts.[59] And in May 2007—four full years after the start of atrocities in Darfur—the American public was mesmerized by the predicament of two humpback whales stranded in the Sacramento River. The pair sparked a massive rescue attempt, including a special hotline set up for the public to offer ideas for how to lure them back to sea.

In the face of such responses, *New York Times* columnist Nicholas Kristof has sardonically remarked, "Finally, we're beginning to understand what it would take to galvanize President Bush, other leaders and the American public to respond to the genocide in Sudan: a suffering puppy with big eyes and floppy ears."[60] Compared to the public's interest in these other stories, it seems like Darfur's victims are being dismissed. Horrific stories that by all logic should be "acquiring the status of knee-buckling knowledge" are remaining abstract and remote.[61] As such, there is no impetus to act. Ultimately, argues Power, this is no excuse: "We are responsible for our incredulity."[62] Nevertheless, so long as the majority of the public continues to pay more attention to individual famine victims and trapped whales, without making an effort to understand the suffering abstract, it is likely this numbing contributes to insufficient interest in Darfur.

c. Media Coverage

Ever since media coverage of U.S. involvement in Vietnam infamously brought the war into America's living rooms, allegedly triggering a massive drop in public approval, the media has been credited with the power to influence popular support for foreign policy. Known as "the CNN-effect,"[63] this suggests that with graphic, continued coverage of ethnic conflict, natural disasters, and other tragedies, the media can lead the public to demand a governmental response—as Bernard Cohen contends, "[television] has demonstrated its power to move governments."[64] Because of this alleged power, the media has subsequently been heavily criticized for not providing *enough* coverage of crises when public pressure is lacking. Rwanda is a case in point, as the number of international reporters in the country never reached more than fifteen, and coverage of the genocide reflected this deficiency accordingly.[65] It may thus seem fair to lay part of the blame for the public's inattention to Darfur on insufficient media coverage of the conflict.

Indeed, media coverage—both print and electronic—of Darfur has been slim. Of all the world's major newspapers combined, articles about Darfur made headlines 361 times in the first half of 2005, and only 151 times in the second.[66] Of those published in American newspapers, most have been 500 words or less, lacking sufficient space to detail the ethnic, economic, and political complexities of the crisis or include any sort of historical background or perspective.[67] Each year the three major U.S. nightly newscasts of ABC, NBC, and CBS spend about 24,900 minutes covering the news, and out of this they devoted eighteen, five, and three minutes, respectively, to covering Darfur in 2004.[68] In June of the following year, these three networks combined with CNN and Fox ran fifty times as many stories about Michael Jackson and twelve times as many about Tom

Cruise as they did about Darfur.[69] In all, the American media devoted more coverage to the Armenian genocide in 1915 than it has to the current situation in Darfur.[70]

This striking imbalance has even led members of the media to criticize coverage. *The New York Times*' Nicholas Kristof writes, "It seems hypocritical of me to rage about Mr. Bush's negligence, when my own beloved institution—the American media—has been at least as passive as Mr. Bush."[71] CNN's chief international correspondent Christiane Amanpour reportedly "begged" her superiors to let her travel to the region, because she believed more high profile coverage could impact the response.[72] And Dick Rogers of *The San Francisco Chronicle* questioned his paper's priorities recalling the experience of Rwanda: "There was the earnest declaration by so many of us that we were not going to allow another Rwanda to slip by without sitting up and taking notice."[73]

Still, the idea that media coverage of foreign crises has a significant impact on policy making has been strongly challenged, suggesting that this apparent cause-effect relationship is too simplistic. First, it is not at all clear that the causal arrow always runs from media coverage to public outcry to policy development. Jonathan Mermin argues that on the contrary, the media frequently covers events precisely because Washington has deemed them "newsworthy."[74] Indeed, studies have shown that in deciding what should be covered on the news, Mermin notes, the American media most often looks to politicians and government officials for their cues.[75]

Such was the case, argues Warren Strobel, with the early-1990s coverage of Somalia. Rather than generate public outcry for intervention, he argues, most of the media's reporting of Somalia came after the Bush Administration's determination to intervene. Up until the August 12th decision to send a relief airlift, 1992 had seen only

fifteen news stories on Somalia by ABC, CBS, and NBC combined, of which six were only parts of minute-long synopses of general world events.[76] It was not until Andrew Natsios, then Director of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, began meeting weekly with representatives from aid organizations to highlight the need for intervention that the major newspapers, followed by the television networks, seriously picked up on the story—that is, after the President had made the decision to launch a military intervention.[77] In other words, the CNN-effect was not a major cause of intervention policy, but rather largely a *result*.

Additionally, this charge of responding-to-rather-than-creating policy indicates that the media is also responding-to-rather-than-creating public opinion. The business of news is after all a business, with success driven by the same economic laws of supply and demand as any other corporation. Jef McAllister, *Time* magazine's London Bureau Chief, notes that this is particularly true as all the major networks have been "taken over by big conglomerates which started taking a look at their news divisions" in terms of how they could "contribute to the bottom line."[78] As such, the stories highlighted by the news media are intended to cater to the public's interests, and since the end of the Cold War, the network news industry has discovered through its constant opinion polling that these interests have turned increasingly away from foreign affairs. McAllister explains, "after the fall of the Soviet Union, the instinctive notion that survival depended upon knowing about foreign countries in a dangerous world faded."[79]

As a result, less airtime was devoted to the foreign correspondents who dominated the previous era, replaced instead by rising news-anchor stars. Magazine shows became popular, and stories were selected based on the availability of good footage and their

salience to U.S. interests, thus creating a marked difference between the reporting on ABC, NBC, and CBS and the print news of the *New York Times* and *Washington Post*.[80] Yet even newspapers reflect this change, as studies by Columbia University have found that international news accounted for about 27% of front-page stories throughout the 1970s and '80s, then dropped to 21% by 2003, while coverage of domestic stories more than doubled.[81] As one journalist summed up, "Americans are tuning out the world."[82]

In view of this, blame for deficient coverage of Darfur would perhaps more rightfully be placed on the American public's lack of interest in the first place. Indeed, when it comes to interest in what little news coverage there has been of Darfur, Pew Research Center surveys have found that the crisis is simply "not registering with most Americans." In December 2006 only 13% of Americans said they followed reports about violence in Darfur "very closely"—the same as in May 2005 and July 2004. This led Pew to include coverage of the situation in Darfur as one of 2006's "top 10 dogs that didn't bark . . . those stories where, despite headline coverage, the public appeared unmoved."[83]

Nevertheless, just because media coverage is not always a powerful catalyst of the public's interest does not necessarily mean that it *cannot* be. It is more likely the media has specifically adopted a less-risky strategy of playing to public interest at the expense of assuming a potential leadership role. Activists and media-insiders alike recognize the power of in-depth reporting to raising public awareness to human rights abuses. "There is such a small group of us covering it," laments the *Washington Post*'s Emily Wax, who in 2004 spent three weeks riding with rebels around Darfur in a stolen Land Rover. "When we don't go in, it means Americans don't see what's happening here. It's a heavy responsibility."[84] Jerry Fowler, staff director of the United States Holocaust Memorial

Museum, believes such reporting has immense power. "When the press covers a story like this, it conveys a sense of importance to the public," he asserts. "It focuses people's attention on it."[85] So, even if media coverage of an event cannot dictate the public's reaction, it can at least force that event into their consideration. Indeed, it is significant that Darfur is to some extent being covered, in comparison to say Sierra Leone, Angola, and Liberia.[86]

Ultimately the media-public interest relationship comes down to a vicious cycle, as Glenn Ruga, director of the Center for Balkan Development and witness to U.S. media reporting on Bosnia, explains: "Editors have to believe the American people are going to take an interest in [an event]. But that's not going to happen until there's better coverage. Clearly, the media must take the first step in realizing this is an important story."[87] In other words, while the media can justify its lack of coverage by pointing to low public interest, it stands to reason that more coverage could produce different results. Admittedly, it might not. As noted earlier, events in Bosnia received significantly greater attention than Rwanda, yet U.S. intervention was still years in coming. Still, regarding Darfur, as Prendergast argues, "it sure would be easier if we had more media coverage."[88] At the very least it could help combat the alarming findings of the 2006 National Geographic-Roper Survey that 54% of 18 to 24 year olds do not know the location of Sudan.[89] While the lack of reporting may be more a reflection than a cause of insufficient interest in Darfur, the media's choice not to increase coverage and maximize their agenda-setting power regardless is likely a strong contributor to continued disinterest.

As individuals faced with a complex world, "we're always deciding what to own and what to privilege," asserts Power.[90] That editorial pieces and advocacy groups are forced to make the case for why Americans should care about Darfur suggests there is a significant lack of concern. The influence of the three factors detailed above help illuminate why the crisis—as opposed to the Michael Jackson trial or Tom Cruise's wedding—has apparently failed to capture a larger audience. If members of policy makers' winning coalitions do not recognize intervention as serving their interests, U.S. leaders will perceive little incentive to intervene in Darfur. As such, the geographical location, psychological consequences, and media coverage of Darfur all likely help to explain why U.S. involvement has been lacking from a liberal perspective.

Addendum to Liberalism: Top-Down Policy Making

Because of this section's stress on the lack of domestic intervention-supportive preferences advanced via the policy transmission belt, the *bottom-up* characterization of the liberal policy-making process as it applies to Darfur is clear. In order to fully account for all the sources from which intervention preferences could originate, however, it is important to consider a *top-down* influence as well. That is to say, in addition to electoral pressure, arguably policy makers could also advance preferences based on their own personal inclinations. Exploring this source takes into account the growing body of literature stressing the importance of individual decision-making to the policy process.

Under the U.S. system, these actors could ostensibly include administration officials and high-level cabinet posts, but in particular, the president has a significant ability to direct policy through his leadership. In this sense, a president's individuality is seen not only as a factor contributing to how selectorate preferences are privileged, but

actually as an independent source of policy origination. As Senator Simon argued after Rwanda, "If there is no base for public support, the president can get on television and explain our reasons for responding and *build* a base."[91] So, even if public opinion is not clamoring for intervention, the president can independently champion this policy. To illustrate, this paper considers the argument that U.S. intervention in Somalia was at least partly motivated by President George H. Bush's personal preferences. By thus supplementing the liberal bottom-up approach with a top-down focus, non-intervention in Darfur is also potentially explained as stemming from a lack of presidential leadership.

Review of (U.S.) Leadership-Focused Literature

In "International Decision Making: Leadership Matters," Margaret Hermann and Joe Hagan note that realism largely discounts the role of individual leaders, since the constraints of the international system inherently limit their foreign policy options.[92] They maintain, however, that individual leaders matter very much, and that the effect of structural constraints is dependent on whether or not leaders perceive themselves to be constrained. "Based on their perceptions and interpretations," the authors explain, "[leaders] build expectations, plan strategies and urge actions on their government that conform with their judgments about what is possible and likely to maintain them in their positions."[93] The way they do this, in turn, is affected by their own personality, their "experiences, goals, beliefs about the world, and sensitivity to the political context."[94]

In the case of U.S. presidents, various authors emphasize different influences that best explain their effect on foreign policy making. David Mitchell argues in *Making Foreign Policy* that presidential management style is key, indicating that how the president organizes and operates with his advisors influences the kinds of decisions he

will make.[95] In *Presidential Power,* Richard Neustadt stresses a president's political ability, "his personal capacity to influence the conduct of the men who make up government."[96] James David Barber's *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House* stresses the influence of presidential personality, arguing that the way a president acts can be anticipated by understanding his character, worldview, and style.[97] As such, presidential personality differs in terms of how much effort they put into their responsibilities, the kinds of goals they bring to the job, and how they deal with the unique powers of the presidency. All these influences, the authors argue, have a profound impact on the policy and decision-making that comes out of the Executive branch.

To answer anyone skeptical of this impact, Fred Greenstein suggests we simply consider what the past century would have been like had vice presidents or the opposite party's presidential challengers held office instead. In *The Presidential Difference*, he argues the entire course of the 1930s and '40s would have changed had Franklin D. Roosevelt not served, and questions whether the U.S. would have gone to war in Vietnam had John F. Kennedy lived.[98] In *Presidential Personality and Performance*, Juliette and Alexander George write extensively on how the personality and psychology of Woodrow Wilson underlaid the creation of the League of Nations,[99] and David Mitchell in *Making Foreign Policy* notes that Kennedy's handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis has led to a theoretical emphasis on personality and relationships as fundamental factors in foreign policy.[100] In short, when making foreign policy decisions, *who* is president matters.

Arguably this has not always been the case in the U.S. The rise of the modern presidency, sometimes called the era of the imperial presidency, came about largely

through FDR's expansion of presidential power through the New Deal and his handling of World War II. Previously, Congress was far more influential in determining policy than the Executive branch. Since then, Greenstein argues, the influence of the presidency has expanded through several key changes. First, the president has become the main policy initiator, often making proposals to Congress or even instigating policy outside the legislative branch altogether by drawing on his administrative power. Secondly, the creation of the Executive Office of the President has given organizational support to the president's policy goals, and thirdly, the presidency has risen to be the most visible representative of the U.S. government, virtually becoming a symbol of the entire system.[101] Barber elaborates on this last point, explaining that as the governmental figurehead and focus of public sentiment, "The White House is first and foremost a place of public leadership."[102] Greenstein also notes that with the end of the Cold War, the president has obtained even more latitude to take initiative, freed from the constraining threat of mutual destruction and the ideological battle between the super powers.[103]

In terms of supporting humanitarian intervention, then, individual presidents are now in a position to exercise significant latitude based on their own policy preferences. As General Anthony Zinni, Director of Operations for the U.S. relief effort in Somalia, argues, "Part of the responsibility of leadership is to help shape the direction of the American people."[104] He cites the example of President Roosevelt, who during the lead-up to U.S. involvement in World War II influenced public opinion to back his own perceptions of how the U.S. could best act. Whereas after the attack on Pearl Harbor most Americans wanted to pursue war in the Pacific, Zinni explains, FDR strongly supported coming to the aid of Europe first and consequently worked to convince the public. If the

U.S. is to decide to humanitarianly intervene, the president can play a critical role in providing the leadership necessary to propel the country down that path. This is further evidenced by the role of the first President Bush in the U.S. intervention in Somalia.

Leadership in Action: Somalia versus Darfur

In their analysis of George H. Bush's personality, Juliette and Alexander George argue that the President had a strong personal interest in foreign policy. From the start of his term, they explain, Bush demonstrated a "marked sense of personal efficacy" and was keen on direct involvement in the policy-making process.[105] "In a dramatic contrast to the detached, chairman-like Reagan," one observer noted, "Bush was knowledgeable and very interested in foreign policy and both willing and able to be at the center of discussions on that topic."[106] Bush is also characterized as being "emotionally expressive,"[107] and this trait, combined with his strong ability to lead in matters of foreign policy, were arguably major contributing factors to the decision to intervene in Somalia.

In late November 1992, the President considered alternatives for action in Somalia and decided to launch a U.S. offensive. On December 3 the UN Security Council authorized a Chapter VII, U.S.-led mission to "establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations," the Unified Task Force (UNITAF). Bush then created Operation Restore Hope, the U.S. contingent to lead UNITAF, thus launching the first U.S. humanitarian intervention with no apparent directive from geostrategic interests.

Those who served in the Bush Administration support the claim that much of the decision to intervene was based on the President's own personal inclination. Indeed, Bush and his advisors alike recollect that the appalling situation in Somalia touched him deeply, especially seeing the images of famine victims on television.[108] Aides recall that

the decisive moment for Bush seemed to be the arrival of a cable from U.S. Ambassador to Kenya Smith Hempstone, who wrote to describe the horrific conditions of refugee camps near the Kenyan border.[109] In the margins of the report Bush wrote, "This is very, very upsetting. I want more information."[110] In the mid-1980s he and First Lady Barbara Bush had visited a Sudanese refugee camp run by CARE, which left a lasting impression. "Barbara and I will never forget all those children who were dying," Andrew Natsios recalls the President saying at the time the Administration was considering options for the UNITAF. The President added, "No one should have to die at Christmastime."[111]

By this time, the President and his Cabinet had become visibly frustrated that the humanitarian situation had failed to improve substantially, despite the presence of the UN Operation in Somalia and previous U.S. Operation Provide Relief airlift. Recalling the success of Operation Desert Storm, the President increasingly began to favor military action.[112] Bush's own preference was buoyed by leaders in his Administration. Shortly after the authorization of UNITAF, Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger expressed his conviction that intervention was the right and necessary choice: "The fact of the matter is that a thousand people are starving to death every day, and that is not going to get better if we don't do something about it."[113] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell also agreed that the situation was now so acute as to warrant a U.S. mission, a complete change from his earlier conviction that the U.S. ought not get involved.[114]

Despite the President's seemingly heartfelt humanitarian concern, some skeptics argue that this mounting sympathy was at least partly motivated by his failure to win reelection, suggesting that in Somalia the now lame-duck Bush recognized an opportunity to build his legacy. Others suggested that the Administration's enthusiasm for the mission

was an attempt to create a diversion from their decision not to intervene in Bosnia.[115] Yet regardless of whether his motivation came from sympathy or more calculated concerns, the principal point is that President Bush exhibited a strong willingness to lead the U.S. toward humanitarian intervention, without which UNITAF may not have been deployed. Moreover, as the earlier discussion of "the CNN-effect" noted, he did this without major pressure from the public, whose support rallied after the decision to intervene.

President George H. Bush's decision-making in the Somalia case suggests that if his son were similarly supportive of increased involvement in Darfur, he could exercise his leadership to implement such a policy, irrespective of the deterrents hindering the growth of bottom-up pressure. Indeed, George W. Bush did once suggest he would be willing to do just that: Early on in his first term, Bush received a memo about President Clinton's failure to act in Rwanda. On the margin of the paper he wrote in forceful lettering, "Not on my watch."[116] Had the President been serious about substantiating this promise, however, he would have needed to take action even before the outbreak of violence in Darfur. As Samantha Power argues, a genuine commitment would require creating bureaucratic capacity for the new commitment, rallying public support behind the cause, and directing the military to begin contingency planning, "not simply visiting a Holocaust museum, and saying 'Never again' as a slogan once a year."[117]

By publicly labeling the violence in Darfur "genocide," President Bush has admittedly gone further than any other previous executive faced with mass atrocities. Yet perversely, this seemingly bold pronouncement has practically become a substitute for taking more meaningful action, and the Administration never misses an opportunity to congratulate itself on the accomplishment. Indicative of this new status quo, when a

reporter at a White House press briefing in late 2006 asked about a recent SDC advertisement charging the President could do more, the spokeswoman countered, "You've heard the President. He is one of—I believe he was the first to call this violence in Darfur genocide."[118]

As detailed earlier, strong rhetoric has not been matched with dedicated, meaningful action, and even the rhetoric itself has been inconsistent. By the 2007 State of the Union Address, Darfur did not even merit an entire sentence of its own, and the crisis was not mentioned at all in Bush's 2004-6 Addresses. Nicholas Kristof argues that the President has a plethora of opportunities available to him to highlight the crisis and build momentum for greater involvement: He could deliver a prime-time speech, jointly lead a meeting of Western leaders with a European head of state, pose for photo-ops with Darfuri survivors, sponsor a summit of Arab and African leaders at the White House, or invite the Chinese to accompany him on a tour of refugee camps, to mention a few.[119] Clearly, the President has failed to take any such action. "For all of the American statements and use of the word 'genocide,'" argues Power, "we know what it looks like when the Bush Administration treats something with significant urgency and that's not what this looks like."[120] Unlike his father before him in the case of Somalia, President George W. Bush has not yet invoked the leadership necessary to launch a major intervention in Darfur.

Conclusion

Taken together, liberal bottom-up and individualist top-down explanations of preference present a compelling case for why the U.S. has not undertaken more diligent involvement in Darfur. Essentially, they point to a lack on all possible fronts of what Power terms "ownership." That is to say, despite the R2P commitment, neither the American selectorate nor its leadership have yet championed intervention sufficiently or effectively enough to create the necessary pressure for policy change. In the case of Bosnia, such ownership was finally achieved when the attack on Srebrenica provoked a massive response from a combination of Congressional concern (driven by the relentless efforts of Senator Bob Dole, R-KS), the outrage of officials at the State Department, public outcry at the slaughter, and even the determination of Vice President Al Gore. The political pressure on President Clinton to act finally became so strong that he exploded in anger, "We're getting creamed!" and decided the U.S. had to intervene.[121] This has not happened in the case of Darfur. Until President Bush or his Cabinet officials take an interest in committing to concentrated, policy-altering leadership or the public succeeds in overcoming both advocacy and apathy challenges to create a political cost, liberal analysis posits that the U.S. response to Darfur will continue to support non-intervention.

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CONCLUSION: IMPLEMENTING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

In his Millennium Report, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan challenged the General Assembly: "If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?"[1] The ICISS report and subsequent UN adoption of the R2P principle have gone further than any previous initiative to answer the Secretary's call. Yet, as UN humanitarian chief Jan Egeland has argued vociferously, the international response to Darfur has not lived up to this commitment,[2] leading Mr. Annan to lament by late 2006, "It is deeply, deeply disappointing and it's tragic, but we do not have the resources or the will to confront the situation."[3] Indeed, the experience of this first practical test of R2P suggests the Secretary's original question, "How should we respond?" ought to also have asked, "And how do we generate the political will to do so?"

Rhetorical commitments notwithstanding, examining the U.S. response to Darfur through the lenses of realism and liberalism reveals significant barriers to intervention that must be addressed in order to proceed with the goals of R2P. The primacy of the national interest to the realist perspective cautions that power- and security-maximizing concerns will overcome all others, leaving little room for unnecessary or potentially threatening humanitarian operations. Alternatively, non-intervention from the liberal view reflects the continued lack of domestic preferences directing policy makers to increase involvement in foreign crises. Whether derived from the constraints of the international structure or risk-averse domestic constituencies, these theories demonstrate that the constructivist insistence on normative influence must still answer to self-interest.

Still, acknowledging the dominance of these constraints does not mean we must concede that their influence is insurmountable. On the contrary, that such barriers exist is simply a reality of politics, asserts Gareth Evans, President of International Crisis Group and co-chair of the ICISS, and recognizing the need to address them defines the central task of operationalizing R2P. "Political will is not hiding in a cupboard or under a stone somewhere waiting to be discovered: it has to be painstakingly built," he argues.[4] Far from relegating the potential for humanitarian intervention to rhetorical futility, then, realist and liberal explanations provide the starting point for successfully building political will by illuminating the conditions that must be met to do so. Specifically, rather than continue dead-end appeals to our "common humanity" or the moral imperative of the world's superpower, proponents of R2P can forge a path toward implementation by convincingly linking intervention to pursuit of the national interest, building a mass of politically-significant domestic support, or most effectively, achieving both.

Learning from Realism

Realist analysis of the case for humanitarian intervention demonstrated that non-intervention is the expected outcome, based on the understanding that involvement is likely to accrue significant costs to the point of threatening the national interest. In the case of Darfur, feared impairment of counterterrorism efforts, prospective resource exhaustion, and interference with the Sudanese North-South peace process all suggested means by which policy makers could conceive of intervention as counter-productive. Constructivists like Martha Finnemore are thus forced to admit that increased normative support for humanitarian intervention in principle cannot ensure execution in practice.[5] However, the key constructivist contribution that R2P proponents should focus on is the

assertion that security and national interest are in fact *constructed* concepts—not "exogenously given or presocially assigned"[6]—and therefore subject to change. Recognizing this opens up space to reevaluate understandings of how the U.S. national interest is pursued and potentially include support for R2P in this new conception.

Specifically such a re-conceptualization could build on the growing emphasis that weak or failed states, of which humanitarian crises are often indicative, represent a serious threat and therefore demand an interventionist response. As the post-September 11th era unfolds, Evans asserts, "it is simply no longer possible to dismiss as irrelevant, as the British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain famously did in the 1930s, 'quarrels in far away countries between people of whom we know nothing.'"[7] On the contrary, Stephen Krasner and Carlos Pascual contend that addressing weak and failing states is now the chief global foreign policy challenge.[8] Susan Rice, President Clinton's Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, explains that the porous borders and ineffective rule of law symptomatic of failed states create ideal conditions for terrorist safe-havens and spillover potential.[9] Where such crises result in people feeling as though they "have no rights, no security, no future, no hope, and no means to survive," argues Lieutenant General Roméo Dallaire, failing to intervene risks their becoming "a desperate group who will do desperate things to take what they believe they need and deserve."[10]

For the second year in a row, the Fund for Peace and *Foreign Policy* magazine have rated Sudan as number one on their annual index of failed states.[11] The fact that al-Qaeda previously operated in Sudan should therefore be cause for particular alarm and prompt the U.S. to fully support (multilaterally) the rebuilding of good governance and strong civil society institutions in Darfur. Otherwise it stands to reason that Darfur's

lawlessness and porous borders risk the region developing into a security threat reaching far beyond the safety of its immediate civilians. This is particularly significant given that eight of the failed state index's top ten states are in Africa. The violence of Darfur has already spilled into Chad and the Central African Republic, fueling additional chaos sparked by their own internal conflicts. The intensity has prompted the UN Security Council to approve a potential EU military and UN police mission to the two affected states, yet the UN is already under heavy strain to meet its unprecedented peacekeeping load. Had a robust UN operation (or AU mission with strong international support) been deployed to Darfur soon after the 2003 outbreak of violence, it is possible that much of the spillover might have been prevented. Continuing the weak response risks a level of state failure in the region that might spiral beyond international peacekeeping capacity.

Beyond the threat of spillover, failing to intervene also risks emboldening other independent ethnic cleansing campaigns. The *génocidaires* of the past century all learned lessons from their global predecessors, argues Samantha Power, including the likelihood of impunity. "If anything testifies to the U.S. capacity for influence," she asserts, "it is the extent to which the perpetrators [of genocide] kept an eye trained on Washington and other western capitals as they decided how to proceed."[12] The Khartoum regime has been so emboldened to continue their "counter-insurgency" while maintaining that Western reports of the violence are exaggerated. The U.S. and international community's failure to deliver a swift, decisive response to the Bashir government's atrocities may well also be signaling to future perpetrators that they can expect the same levels of impunity and low response, unintentionally encouraging latent plans of ethnic cleansing elsewhere.

Beyond acknowledging the threat of failed states, however, the U.S. must learn how to diffuse it. The Bush Administration has itself acknowledged the general hazard, citing in its 2002 National Security Strategy that "America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones."[13] Nevertheless, Evans, Krasner, Pascual, Rice, and Dallaire all concur that the U.S. and international community have yet to develop and implement an effective response: "What we need is a whole new conceptual base," argues Dallaire, recognizing that adequately resolving such threats requires moving from peacekeeping to stabilization and reconstruction.[14] In light of this, the ICISS report's triple emphasis on preventing, reacting, and rebuilding promises not only a means of halting egregious human rights abuses, but also a framework from which to tackle the threat of failed states. As such, including R2P in a new perception of pursuing the U.S. national interest would not only focus necessary attention on this emergent danger, but additionally offer the U.S. an initial concept for how to effectively address it.

A third consideration to overcoming realist barriers to R2P support is the recognition that cooperation is increasingly necessary to security in our globalized world, for which failing to adhere to internationally-recognized norms can have significant consequences. The U.S. cannot, argues Evans, approach a solution to failed states unilaterally, just as Moisés Naím has argued of the "five wars of globalization"—the illegal trade of drugs, arms, intellectual property, people, and money laundering—not to mention the risk of a global health pandemic and environmental degradation.[15] This necessity for cooperation has led Joseph Nye to stress the importance of pursuing a foreign policy that emphasizes soft power—the ability to "get others to want what you want"—by aligning national interests with the goals of the international community.[16] If

U.S. policy affronts these goals by flouting internationally-upheld norms of behavior, for example, it does so to the detriment of its credibility and legitimacy, thereby diminishing its influence and damaging prospects for much-needed international cooperation.

While the U.S. has yet to experience any significant international fall-out from failing to implement R2P in Darfur—presumably because this norm has not yet strengthened to the point of internalization—its counter-terrorism efforts have sparked quite the opposite response. From dispensing with UN authorization for the War in Iraq, sexually exploiting Abu Ghraib prisoners, and denying the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to suspected al-Qaeda detainees, the U.S. has been "seen to thumb [its] nose at international law" with serious consequences.[17] Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) laments that America's moral authority has spun "into a free fall,"[18] and even realist Stephen Walt warns of the fallout from the world no longer looking up to the U.S. as the country that once put a man on the moon.[19] Pew Research's Global Attitudes Poll reveals America's image around the world has plummeted over the past five years,[20] leading Fareed Zakaria to assert that internationally, "America is seen as too arrogant, uncaring, and insensitive."[21]

All this suggests that the U.S. has squandered the outpouring of international goodwill in the aftermath of 9/11, to the great detriment of its national security objectives. The Schlesinger Report's review of detention policy concluded that prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay significantly hindered the U.S. ability to collect vital intelligence and has damaged U.S. legitimacy in the eyes of populations whose support is crucial to counterterrorism efforts, as well as its own troop morale.[22] Public opinion towards the U.S. is now particularly low in the Middle East, but beyond

simple disapproval, WorldPublicOpinion.org has found that large majorities in Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan, and Indonesia believe undermining Islam is a chief U.S. foreign policy goal.[23] Such animosity is clearly counter-productive to U.S. democracy-building goals in the region at best, and fuel for anti-Western extremist recruitment at worst. Even among allies U.S. credibility has suffered: NATO partner Turkey has made an astounding drop from 52% favorable views of the U.S. in 2000 to just 9% in 2007.[24] U.S. decline in moral authority has reached the point, as Power sums up, where its "influence has eroded such that we are unable to actually achieve our policy objectives."[25]

Turning back to normative support for R2P, the experience of U.S. counter-terrorism-related norm violation suggests that if and when international support for R2P strengthens, the U.S. will face repercussions if it also fails to adhere. Alternatively, taking steps to support R2P now could potentially counter-balance current American standing—so long as this was accomplished with sincere multilateral commitment (such as in partnership with the UN) to ward off suspicions of ulterior, "imperialist" motives. Recognizing that it cannot hope to prevail in the post-9/11 era unilaterally, Stephen Walt recommends the U.S. make some "concessions" in the name of cooperation.[26] He suggests supporting renewed efforts to combat global warming or a fresh round of global trade talks, but expressing genuine support for R2P could also rally America's image. Thus not only is there a case to be made for pursuing R2P due to the threat from failed states, but also for the sake of indispensable global cooperation.

When a group of American NGOs was interviewed about the prospects for R2P implementation, they expressed a "deep skepticism" about the ability of states to "put aside" their national security concerns.[27] The realist explanation of the U.S. role in Darfur

suggests that their skepticism is well founded: situating interventionist policy in direct competition with the national interest is unlikely to ever produce more than rhetorical support for R2P. Linking humanitarian intervention to the growing threat of failed states, emphasizing the unparalleled utility of the R2P framework, and recognizing the importance of norm adherence to international cooperation, however, is far more likely to yield successful implementation and further the norm on its way to internalization.

Learning from Liberalism

Liberal analysis posited the case for humanitarian intervention as dependent on the interests of privileged domestic constituencies, explaining a non-intervention outcome as the result of risk-averse policy makers responding to a lack of domestic preferences supporting increased involvement. Specifically to Darfur, this would imply that American constituencies have not yet championed intervention effectively or sufficiently enough to create the necessary pressure for policy change. The challenge of mounting an effectual advocacy campaign, the influence of Darfur's geographical location, the psychological consequences of the crisis, and the impact of media coverage all suggest factors that impede the successful transmission of intervention-supportive preferences. Yet similar to its response to realist constraints, constructivism's emphasis on changeable, constructed interests also provides R2P a means of overcoming these liberal barriers to intervention. Recognizing the importance of norms to shaping domestic interests creates an opportunity to build a mass of politically-significant domestic support for intervention.

Current American public opinion suggests there is genuine cause to believe an R2P-supportive constituency could in fact be mobilized. Polling by The Chicago Council on Global Affairs and WorldPublicOpinion.org found that when asked if they believed

the UN had a responsibility "to protect people from severe human rights violations such as genocide, even against the will of their own government," 74% of U.S. participants answered affirmatively, and 83% believed the UN Security Council had the right to authorize military force in such situations. In the case of Darfur, Americans are second only to the French in supporting UN intervention, with 48% supporting a "responsibility" to act, and an additional 35% acknowledging a "right" to do so.[28]

Still, expressing passive support in an opinion poll does little to operationalize R2P. As Samantha Power argues, "the only way that the public is going to see their interests in those issues internalized by senior policy makers is if they make it vocally and painfully clear to policy makers that there is a strong domestic political constituency for a change in course."[29] Consequently, the challenge is to mobilize such a constituency that will move from simply marking "yes" on polls to actively demanding interventionist policy. Whereas the efforts of U2-singer Bono, DATA (Debt AIDS Trade Africa), and the ONE campaign have progressed in building constituencies concerned about debt relief, AIDS, and global poverty, argues John Prendergast, a similar effort is needed to focus on crimes against humanity.[30] Answering this need prompted Prendergast, representing ICG, and colleague Gayle Smith of the Center for American Progress to launch ENOUGH: the Project to Abolish Genocide and Mass Atrocities in early 2007.

ENOUGH seeks to act as an information clearing-house of training, strategic support, and field-based policy recommendations for groups around the country, as well as a facilitator to consolidate separate efforts into a more cohesive movement. Instead of relying on "incidental responses by activists," explains Smith, ENOUGH will seek to build a continuing support base and thus the necessary "sustained pressure to change

policy at the structural level."[31] The Genocide Prevention Leadership Summit of March 2007 was also conceived with these goals in mind. Jointly sponsored by GI-Net, STAND, and the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, the summit drew together activists to network and train with workshops on effectively using the media, engaging with faith-based organizations, building an online advocacy community, organizing local communities, and fundraising. If repeated annually, the summit could serve as a valuable forum for continued R2P mobilization beyond Darfur. These initiatives are joined by specific projects from broader human rights NGOs, but what they particularly address is the potential for greater efficacy through collaboration and a move away from *ad hoc* crisis response. The ENOUGH campaign and other such projects thus offer promising vehicles to propel latent support for R2P into the liberal avenues of policy prescription.

Mobilizing support for R2P is not only a matter of increasing effectiveness, however, but also of ensuring sufficient support in the first place. Comprised of self-interested actors, constituencies are unsurprisingly most interested in events they interpret to affect them directly. As such they are "rarely if ever aroused by foreign events," argues Power, [32] and proponents of R2P must thus also focus on linking intervention with domestic perceptions of interest. Here as with realism, one way to do this may be by highlighting the connection between humanitarian crises abroad and security at home. As Senators Obama and Brownback argue, "When we look out at the sea of humanity forced to live off handouts in UN refugee camps in Chad or Sudan it is easy to forget that stopping genocide is not simply about charity," but that in fact, "it is about creating a safer world for American children as well as for the refugee children stuck in the squalor of exile."[33] Fostering this understanding can help move Africa-fatigued constituencies

away from the temptation to erroneously write off the continent as irrelevant to their interests.

Increased education is also instrumental to this endeavor. In May of 2005—eight months after Secretary Powell characterized the violence as genocide—an International Crisis Group and Zogby International poll found that only 18% of Americans would classify themselves as "very aware" of the situation in Darfur. Those who were not aware comprised fully 36% of participants, one out of every three voters.[34] As such there is clearly a role for increased media coverage to bring the crisis into America's living rooms and onto the front pages of their newspapers. Education's potential, however, extends beyond increasing familiarity with current events to the need to develop the broader context of human rights. Tellingly, in the U.S. today, 53% of high school students are unable to correctly identify the Holocaust.[35] If knowledge of massive atrocities was instead supported as significant to our global interconnectedness, such education would cultivate a base of social awareness about human rights from which constituencies could recognize their importance and support their protection.

As one such initiative, the newly formed Genocide Education Task Force seeks to facilitate the creation of state-level legislation mandating education about genocide.[36] Equally important to raising awareness about humanitarian crises for the purposes of creating political costs, however, is the manner in which this is done. As demonstrated, knowledge of atrocities in Darfur often failed to provoke an advocacy response. Part of the solution to this may be tapping into the power of imagery. For example, while psychologically we are largely powerless to comprehend the reality of six million Holocaust victims, witnessing the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum's display of

thousands of shoes recovered from concentration camps forces our comprehension out of the abstract and into meaning.

Some Darfur advocates have already begun to provide concrete representations at rallies of the numbers killed, and technology offers another powerful tool. By teaming up with GoogleEarth's satellite imagery capacity, for instance, Amnesty International's "Eyes On Darfur" project allows web users to literally watch over villages at risk of attack in Darfur and view irrefutable evidence of atrocities. These projects go a long way towards creating the kind of empathetic connection that fuels a demand for action. Such tools must be remembered and expanded upon in the advocacy response to the next crisis. Additionally, when educating viewers and readers, media coverage must rely on responsible journalism that resists over-simplistic characterizations of "tribal" violence and provides careful analysis about the broader impact. Thus ensuring constituents have access to meaningful information about continuing atrocities could also help widen perceptions of preferences to include support for humanitarian intervention.

"A non-response to genocide doesn't occur in a vacuum," asserts Power. It is "affirmed by societal silence."[37] Overcoming liberal barriers to intervention thus requires ensuring society no longer remains silent, both by building intervention-supportive constituencies and effectively mobilizing the power of their preferences. Alternatively, this paper also discussed the possibility for top-down change, suggesting in particular that presidential leadership could champion intervention policy. Because this is understood as dependent on the individuals in power, however, this is one area where proponents of R2P may likely have the least influence. "It would be nice if we saw . . . enlightened leadership on behalf of genocide prevention,"[38] notes Power, but a more active approach

to addressing the liberal caveats to R2P implementation suggests cultivating constituent support for intervention and facilitating the creation of political costs for failure to implement policy accordingly.

* * *

The failure to take meaningful action in Darfur has prompted International Crisis Group's Colin Thomas-Jensen to conclude, "The international community is a bit like the alcoholic who is always saying he'll quit tomorrow. We've identified . . . a framework for response, but we have not taken the concrete actions to protect vulnerable populations in Darfur and elsewhere."[39] Analyzing this deficiency through the lenses of realism and liberalism offers a means of explanation, revealing that the U.S. normative commitment to humanitarian intervention is still trumped by calculations of national interest and a lack of domestic support. Recognizing the potential for change argued by the constructivist contribution, however, asserts that this response need not be inevitable. Instead, it offers a starting point to encourage building structures to institutionalize R2P and mechanisms for implementation, tasks Gareth Evans suggests we address through a "Global Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect."[40] By working to reconstruct interests and subsequent perceptions about how they are best served, the lessons of the U.S. response to Darfur can potentially change our reaction to future crises—and offer hope that one day our reply to mass atrocities will amount to more than verbal hand wringing.

[1] Kofi Annan, "We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the Twenty-First Century," U.N. Doc. No. A/54/2000, Apr. 3, 2000, 48.
[2] See, for example, "Sudan 'Begins New Darfur Attacks,'" *BBC News*, Nov. 18, 2006.
[3] Kofi Annan, broadcast interview with Katty Kay, *BBC World News*, Dec. 4, 2006.
[4] Gareth Evans, "Responsibility to Protect in 2007: Five Thoughts for Policy Makers," *Panel Discussion on The Responsibility to Protect*, United Nations, Apr. 13, 2007.
[5] Emphasis added, Martha Finnemore, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics,* ed. by Peter Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 158.
[6] Ted Hopf, "Review Article of National interests in International Society by Martha Finnemore," *The American Political Science Review* 93, 3 (1999), 753.
[7] Gareth Evans, "Ending Deadly Conflict: Just a Dream?" *Address to UN Women's International Forum*, New York, Feb. 5, 2007.
[8] Stephen Krasner and Carlos Pascual, "Addressing State Failure," *Foreign Affairs* 84, 4 (2005), 153.
[9] Susan Rice, "U.S. Foreign Assistance and Failed States," *The Brookings Institution*, Nov. 25, 2002.
[10] Romeo Dallaire, Shake Hands With the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2003), 521.
[11] "The Failed States Index 2007," *Foreign Policy magazine*, July/August 2007.
[12] Samantha Power, *A Problem from Hell* (New York: Perennial, 2003), 506.
[13] The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," *The National Security Council*, September 2002, qtd. in "The Failed States Index 2005," *Foreign Policy magazine*, July/August 2005.
[14] Romeo Dallaire, "Statement before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Human Rights and Law," Feb. 5, 2007.
[15] Moisés Naím, "The Five Wars of Globalization," *Foreign Policy* 134 (2003), 29.
[16] Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *The Paradox of American Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 9.
[17] Samantha Power, interview by Molly Lanzarotta, "Samantha Power on U.S. Foreign Policy," *Kennedy School Insight,* Mar. 14, 2007.
[18] Charles Babington, "Critics of Guantanamo Urge Hill to Intervene," *The Washington Post*, Jun. 16, 2005.
[19] Power, interview by Molly Lanzarotta.
[20] Pew Research, "Global Unease With Major World Powers," *Pew Global Attitudes Project*, Jun. 27, 2007.
[21] Fareed Zakaria, "Beyond Bush," *Newsweek*, June 11, 2007.
[22] James Schlesinger, "Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review Department of Defense Detention Operations," Aug. 2004, 91 and 18-19.
[23] "Poll: Muslims Believe Key U.S. Goal is to Undermine Islam," *Worldpress.org*. Jul. 10, 2007.
[24] Pew Research, "Global Unease With Major World Powers."
[25] Power, interview by Molly Lanzarotta.
[26] Stephen Walt, "Beyond bin Laden: Reshaping U.S. Foreign Policy," *International Security 26, 3* (2001), 67.
[27] The World Federalist Movement and Institute for Global Policy, "Civil Society Perspectives on The Responsibility to Protect," *R2P-CS*, Apr. 30, 2003, 16.
[28] "International Public Opinion on the Responsibility to Protect and Darfur," The Chicago Council on Global Affairs and WorldPublicOpinion.org, Apr. 5, 2007.
[29] Emphasis added, Power, interview with Molly Lanzarotta.
[30] Don Cheadle and John Prendergast, *Not On Our Watch: The Mission to End Genocide in Darfur and Beyond* (Hyperion: New York, 2007), 89.
[31] Ibid., 196.
[32] Samantha Power, *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide* (New York: HarperCollins, 2002), 509.
[33] Barack Obama and Sam Brownback, "Introduction: When Ordinary Becomes Extraordinary," in Cheadle and Prendergast, *Not on Our Watch*, xiii.
[34] International Crisis Group and Zogby International, "Do Americans Care about Darfur?" Jun. 1, 2005.
[35] "Genocide Prevention Leadership Summit," *United States Holocaust Memorial Museum*, Mar. 24-25, 2007.
[36] Ibid.

[37] Samantha Power, "Fulfilling A Responsibility to Protect: What will it take to end the 'Age of Genocide?'" *United States Holocaust Memorial Museum*, May 4, 2004.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Colin Thomas-Jensen, "When the Theory Meets the Janjaweed," *Symposium on Protecting Vulnerable Populations*, Conrad Hilton Foundation Prize, Geneva, October 31, 2005.
[40] Gareth Evans, "Responsibility to Protect in 2007."

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