

**THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ROLES OF JANISSARIES IN A 17TH
CENTURY OTTOMAN CITY: THE CASE OF ISTANBUL**

**by
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ABSTRACT

Title: The Economic and Social Roles of Janissaries in a 17th Century Ottoman City: The Case of Istanbul

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This study examines the ways in which the janissaries were part of civic society in early seventeenth-century Istanbul. It is based on the premise that investigation of the relationship between military cadres and civilians in Ottoman cities will reveal how hitherto unnoticed or underestimated aspects of urban life was during the early modern era. Making use of the Istanbul court records (*şer'îye sicils*), probate registers (*tereke defters*), conscription (*eşkal defters*) and salary registers (*mevacib defters*) of the janissaries, and registers of central state decrees (*mühimme defters*), the study focuses on the economic and social roles of the janissaries in Istanbul, as they entered into an enhanced urbanization process due to the social and political transformations of the Ottoman Empire in the seventeenth century.

By studying various aspects of janissaries' lives this dissertation reveals the extent of their involvement in seventeenth century Istanbul's civic society. First, the methods of becoming a janissary are investigated and how these methods changed during the early seventeenth century are laid out. The profiles of janissaries in seventeenth-century Istanbul became much different than those of previous centuries as a result of changes in the conscription methods. These profiles are looked at more closely in the following sections of the dissertation. An examination of the janissaries' residential patterns in Istanbul reveals that the urban topography of the capital was directly influenced by an increase in the number of janissaries who were not living in the barracks and therefore were not segregated from the civic population. Solidarities and antagonisms that emerged thanks to the intertwinement of the janissaries with the city is another important concentration of this dissertation. A two-way

movement between the janissaries and the artisans as well as solidarity among them emerged, which was reflected in janissary-led urban protests. These are all important dimensions of the newly emerged urban dynamics in Istanbul. Another one is the enhanced janissary solidarity through the economic bonding among the same regiment members through the strengthening of the regiment waqfs. This study reveals that the urbanization process of the janissaries in seventeenth-century Istanbul and their economic activities was a reflection of the general trends of increased capital accumulation and growth of a credit economy in Ottoman society.

RÉSUMÉ

Titre: Les rôles économiques et sociales des Janissaires dans une ville ottomane du 17^e siècle: le cas d'Istanbul

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La présente étude vise à examiner les moyens dans lesquelles les Janissaires faisaient partie de la société civile d'Istanbul au début du 17^e siècle. Il se fonde sur la prémisse qu'une investigation des rapports entre cadres militaires et civiles dans les villes ottomanes révélera des aspects de la vie urbaine, jusqu'ici inaperçus ou sous-estimés, dans la période moderne. En exploitant les documents de la cour de justice d'Istanbul (*şer'iye sicils*), les registres de testament (*tereke defters*), les registres de conscription (*eşkal defters*) et des salaires (*mevacib defters*) des Janissaires, et les registres des décrets de l'état centrale (*mühimme defters*), l'étude concentre sur les rôles économiques et sociales des Janissaires en Istanbul au moment où ils se sont embarqués dans un processus d'urbanisation rehaussée dû à la transformation sociale et politique de l'empire ottoman au 17^e siècle.

Par une étude des différents aspects de la vie des Janissaires, cette dissertation découvre l'étendu de leur implication dans la société civile d'Istanbul dans cette période. D'abord, il est question d'examiner les moyens de devenir janissaire et comment ces moyens ont changé dans les premières décades du 17^e siècle. Les janissaires d'Istanbul ont subis en ce temps un grand changement de profil à la différence des siècles précédents suite aux changements dans les méthodes de conscription. Ces profils sont examinés de plus près dans les sections qui suivent. Une étude des dispositions résidentielles des Janissaires en Istanbul révèle que la topographie urbaine de la capitale a été directement liée au surcroît dans le nombre de Janissaires qui ne résidaient plus dans les casernes et qui n'étaient donc pas isolés de la population civile. Les solidarités et les antagonismes qui s'ensuivaient, dus aux

entrelacements des Janissaires avec la ville, font un autre focus de cette dissertation. Le va-et-vient entre les janissaires et les artisans, ainsi que la solidarité qui se formait entre ces deux groupes, est reflété dans les protestations menées par les janissaires. Ce sont tous des dimensions signifiantes d'une nouvelle dynamique urbaine à Istanbul. Un autre, c'est la solidarité rehaussée parmi les Janissaires qui découlait de la rapprochement économique à l'intérieur des régiments causée par la renforcement des waqfs régimentaires. L'étude révèle aussi que le processus d'urbanisation des Janissaires dans l'Istanbul du 17^e siècle ainsi que leurs activités économiques reflétaient les tendances générales d'accumulation accrue du capital et l'essor d'une économie de crédit dans la société ottomane.

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CONTENTS

Abstract.....	i
Acknowledgements.....	v
Contents.....	vii
List of Illustrations.....	ix
Abbreviations.....	x
A Note on Transliteration.....	xi
 INTRODUCTION.....	 1
1. Research Parameters.....	14
2. Sources	18
 CHAPTER 1: THE MAKING OF A JANISSARY: THE <i>DEVSHIRME</i> SYSTEM AND THE RESPONSIBILITIES AND ROLES OF ‘ <i>ACEMI OGLANS</i> ’	 23
1.1.The Historical Background of the <i>Devshirme</i> System	25
1.2.The Conscription of Children as <i>Devshirmes</i>	30
1.2.a. Selection of Boys.....	30
1.2.b. Methods of Avoiding Child-Levy.....	34
1.2.c. The Conscription Process.....	39
1.2.d. A Closer Look to the 1603-4 Conscription.....	41
1.2.e. The Ages of Boys.....	55
1.3. After Arrival to Istanbul.....	60
1.3.a. <i>İç Oglans</i>	60
1.3.b. ‘ <i>Acemi Oglans</i> ’.....	62
1.3.c. The Responsibilities as ‘ <i>Acemi Oglans</i> ’.....	65
1.4. Examining the Transformation of the <i>Devshirme</i> System through the Comparison of 1603 Conscription with 1490s.....	71
 CHAPTER 2: THE JANISSARIES AND THE CITY: SPATIAL RELATIONSHIPS AND SOLIDARITIES.....	 84
2.1. Istanbul: The Mega City	85
2.2. A Look at the Events and Campaigns of the Early Seventeenth Century	98
2.3.The Demography of the Janissaries in Early Seventeenth Century Istanbul.....	107
2.4. Residential Patterns.....	122
 CHAPTER 3: JANISSARY LED-REBELLIONS IN EARLY SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ISTANBUL: MILITARY REVOLTS OR URBAN PROTESTS?.....	 135
3.1.Theory of Protest in Pre-modern Cities.....	137
3.2.Theorizing Protest in an Ottoman Context.....	143
3.3.Janissary Protests in Istanbul.....	152

CHAPTER 4: THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRATIFICATION OF THE JANISSARIES: THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF THE JANISSARY PRESENCE IN THE CITY	175
4.1. Distribution of Wealth and Capital Formation.....	179
4.2. The Social Stratification of the Janissaries	185
4.2.a. The Poor.....	185
4.2.b. Production and Trade: Artisans, Merchants, and Wholesalers.....	189
4.2.c. The Formation of New Wealth: The Credit Economy.....	223
CONCLUSION.....	244
APPENDICES	
1. DISTRIBUTION OF JANISSARIES IN FORTRESSES	251
2. THE NUMBER OF AFFILIATED MEMBERS TO EACH CEMAAT AND AĞA BÖLÜK IN THE JANISSARY ARMY	268
3. SOME POSSESSIONS OF THE JANISSARIES ACCORDING TO THE PROBATE REGISTERS	275
4. LOANS GIVEN TO THE JANISSARIES DURING 1610s	291
5. LOANS TAKEN BY THE JANISSARIES DURING 1610s	297
6. LOANS GIVEN TO THE JANISSARIES DURING 1660s	300
7. LOANS TAKEN BY THE JANISSARIES DURING 1660s	307
8. THE PROBATE REGISTER OF MUSTAFA HALİFE B. AHMED	313
9. THE PROBATE REGISTER OF HUSEYİN BEŞE B. HASAN	327
10. THE PROBATE REGISTER OF OSMAN BEŞE B. ABDULLAH	330
GLOSSARY.....	331
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	336

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

TABLES

Table 1.1: The Conscription Groups as Listed in the <i>Eşkal Defteri</i>	42
Table 1.2: Conscription Groups from the Province of Rumelia	45
Table 1.3: Conscription Groups from the Province of Bosnia	47
Table 1.4: Conscription Groups from Avlonya Area	48
Table 1.5: Conscription Groups from the Province of Anatolia	50
Table 1.6: The Conscription Groups as Listed in the <i>Eşkal Defters</i>	74
Table 2.1: The Demographic Distribution of Janissaries	109
Table 2.2: The Distribution of Janissaries to <i>Kal'as</i>	114
Table 2.3: The Demographic Distribution of the Janissaries in Istanbul	116
Table 3.1: The Silver <i>Akçe</i> and Gold <i>Sultani</i> 1584-1689	163
Table 4.1: The Exchange Rates of European Coins Expressed in <i>Akçes</i>	180
Table 4.2: List of Janissaries Dealing with Trade and Crafts.....	215
Table 4.3: The Numbers and Proportions of Different Social Groups Engaged in Loan Taking from Janissaries and Janissary Regiment Waqfs	228
Table 4.4: Numbers and Proportions of Janissary Lenders with Different Titles	235
Table 4.5: The Numbers and Proportions of Different Social Groups Gave Credits to the Janissaries	240

GRAPHS

Graph 1.1: The Ratio of Age Groups in the Entire Register of 1012/1603-4	56
Graph 1.2: The Ratio of Age Groups from Rumelia	58
Graph 1.3: The Ratio of Age Groups from Bosnia	58
Graph 1.4: The Ratio of Age Groups from Anatolia	59
Graph 1.5: The Ratio of Age Groups from Avlonya	59
Graph 1.6: The Comparison of Age Groups of the 1490s Conscriptions and the 1603-4 Conscription	76
Graph 4.1: Net Estate of Janissaries (1013-1079/1604-1668)	181
Graph 4.2: Comparative Distribution of Net Estates of Janissaries	183
Graph 4.3: Accumulation of Cash during the Seventeenth Century	223

MAPS

Map 1.1: Conscriptions from Rumelia, 1012/1603-4	51
Map 1.2: Conscriptions from Bosnia, 1012/1603-4.....	52
Map 1.3: Conscriptions from Avlonya, 1012/1603-4	53
Map 1.4: Conscriptions from Anatolia, 1012/1603-4	54
Map 2.1: Istanbul in the Sixteenth Century	93
Map 2.2: Galata in the Seventeenth-Century	95
Map 2.3: Üsküdar in the Seventeenth-Century	96
Map 2.4: The Distribution of Janissaries in Istanbul	125

ABBREVIATIONS

BOA	Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (Prime Ministry's Ottoman Archives, Istanbul)
MDM	Bab-1 Defteri Mütferrik collection in the BOA
MAD	Maliyeden Müdevver collection in the BOA
KK	Kamil Kepeci collection in the BOA
MD	Mühimme Defterleri collection in the BOA
<i>Kavanin-i</i> <i>Yeniçeriyân</i>	"Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyân-ı Dergah-ı Ali" in Ahmet Akgündüz ed., <i>Osmanlı Kanunnameleri ve Hukuki Tahlilleri</i> , vol. 1 (Istanbul, 1996), 127-268, facsimile, ibid., 269-366.
IE. AS	Ibnülemin Askeriye collection in the BOA
İK	Istanbul Kadılığı
BK	Bursa Kadılığı
KA	Kısmet-i Askeriye
EI ²	Encyclopedia of Islam (Leiden: Brill, 1986)
IstA	Istanbul Anskilopedisi
DIA	Diyanet İslam Ansiklopedisi
IA	İslam Ansiklopedisi
IJMES	International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
JESHO	Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient
BSOAS	Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies

NOTES ON TRANSLITERATION AND PLACE NAMES

Ottoman terms have been used in their Ottoman Turkish spelling with the Turkish Alphabet. Words commonly used in English are rendered in their most common forms (e.g. *devshirme*, *pasha*, *agha*, *waqf*, or *sharia*) I italicize all foreign words. For place names, I preferred to use the Ottoman forms or Turkish forms. The internationally accepted place names (e.g. Baghdad, Damascus) have been retained.

INTRODUCTION

The seventeenth century is commonly accepted as an era in which the participation of the military strata in Ottoman urban life drastically increased. Though the expansion of the *'askeri*, the stipendiary non-taxed elites of the empire, was a major development of the century that was not limited to the janissaries, however, the janissaries left their mark on the discussions of the time. One of the central themes that appears in the contemporary official histories is the alleged corruption of the janissary army during this period, and the notion that they were the culprits who caused the decay of the empire. This study goes beyond these perceptions and focuses on the urbanization of the janissaries in the capital of the Ottoman Empire during the first half of the seventeenth century.

The late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries were a period of “crisis and change.”¹ The invention of firearms in Europe, the change in the nature of warfare, population pressure in Mediterranean countries, and monetary fluctuations were some of the main causes that triggered the crisis during the late sixteenth century. New weaponry and warfare methods necessitated new type of soldiers who can use firearms after only a short period of training in contrast to soldiers who needed to be trained for years to become professional warriors, and resulted in bigger armies which can efficiently use the new technology. In the Ottoman context the response was to change the methods of conscription in order to obtain new type of soldiers. Muslim *re'aya* began to be accepted to the ranks of the janissary army in addition to the conscription through the *devshirme*.

¹ Suraiya Faroqhi, “Crisis and Change, 1590-1699,” in Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert eds., *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 411-623.

As will be examined in this study, the selection criteria of the *devshirme* system were also modified to meet the new necessities. The result was the rapid expansion of the janissary army. The figures we have from the mid-sixteenth century were close to 13,000 janissaries. But at the beginning of the seventeenth century this number rose up to 35,000 and then to 40,000. The impact of this increase became apparent in various aspects of urban life from insufficient accommodation facilities that forced urban settlement to inability to sustain soldiers' financial needs.

The changing technology of warfare began to raise military costs for the central government. After mid-sixteenth century the costly wars with Safavid Iran in the east and the Habsburgs in the west put the imperial treasury under enormous fiscal burden. The Ottoman government introduced new fiscal policies including a series of debasements and corrections of coinage policies. From the debasement of 1585-86 to the period until 1640s was an exceptional instability for *akçe* which decreased the living conditions of janissaries who were receiving their salaries in *akçe*. The pay was so low that some began to search for other resources to support themselves and engaged in other trades which enhanced the urbanization process of the soldiers. New economic conditions created polarity on the wealth levels of janissaries. They became an economically heterogeneous group containing the poorest soldiers living in slums like barracks of the city and the wealthiest who were more money-lenders or merchants than soldiers.

This study examines the civilianization of the military, and the militarization of civilians on the basis of the case of the janissaries in seventeenth century Istanbul. It investigates the social and economic networks in which the janissaries were engaged, which resulted not only in the diffusion of janissaries into urban culture as a one-direction movement, but in the evolution of

a city in which civilians were also dynamically merging with soldiers. Laying out these intricate social and economical lineages allows for a nuanced approach to the phenomenon of military in an urban context. In doing so, this study does not claim to be comprehensive; however, even delineating some of the dynamics existing between soldiers and civilians, I argue, influences the way we approach Ottoman urban society. We are now not looking at the oppositional groups of the rulers and the ruled, oppressing despots supported by absolutely loyal slave armies and the silent masses, but at a society moving with dynamics beyond these neat stratifications. We are looking at a society where state-given titles were not the only elements that classified and segmented the society, but a society of a more complex nature.

This study surveys a multitude of processes that contributed to the urbanization process of the janissaries in early seventeenth century Istanbul, using a variety of sources, from court registers (*şer'i sicils*) to probate registers (*terekes*), from central state archives of salary (*mevacib*) registers to conscription (*eşkal*) registers in combination, through textual criticism, and comparative and quantitative analysis. A number of research agendas in Ottoman urban history are used to investigate this transformation, including the discussion of slavery, the urban socio-topography which is linked with the questions raised by the theory of the “Islamic city,” the nature of rebellion in early modern cities, and finally forms of capital formation and wealth accumulation in Ottoman society.

In the debates of slavery in the Ottoman Empire the *devshirme* system has often been considered as an important institution. Travel accounts recorded up until the eighteenth century had recurring themes of the treatment of the Christian subjects, the *devshirme* system itself – which was seen as the biggest cruelty of the empire toward Christians – the loyal slave military

administrative strata and the absence of a noble class that could balance the power of the Sultan.² The main themes in the travel accounts became the core elements of the “Oriental despot” model that is fully defined in the eighteenth century, which left its mark on debates on eighteenth-century Europe, and became a basis for major theoretical works from the “Asian mode of production” of Karl Marx to Max Weber’s idea of “Sultanism.”³

The idea of “Sultanism” was particularly important since it explained the issue of slavery/freedom in the Middle Eastern societies by addressing the janissary army. Weber pinpointed the means of warfare as the determinant of the difference between the Occident and the Orient. He claimed that one of the most significant features of “Sultanism” was the existence of a professional army of slaves, the janissaries, which is privileged over the masses and completely loyal to its master.⁴ According to his argument, the existence of an enslaved military strata enabled the prevalence of the tyrannical regime of the sultan in all spheres of life, so that any kind of autonomous bodies, including the city, did not emerge.⁵ Beyond the formalist bias of

² Some examples are: Bernardo Navagero, “Relazione Dell’Impero Ottomano,” *Relazioni Degli Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato*, vol. 1., (Firenze, 1840), 48-57. See also: Lucette Valensi, *Venice and the Sublime Porte, the Birth of the Despot*, Arthur Denner, trans (Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 1993); Richard Knolles, *The General Histoire of the Turks, From the First Beginning of That Nation to the Rising of the Ottoman Familie: With all the Notable Expeditions of the Christian Princes Against Them* (London: Adam Islip, 1603), last section [no pagination in this last section]; C. J. Heywood, “Sir Paul Rycaut, A Seventeenth-Century Observer of the Ottoman State: Notes for a Study,” in Ezel Kural Shaw and C. J. Heywood, eds., *English and Continental Views of the Ottoman Empire 1500-1800* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972), 45; Nicolas Nicolay, *Dans L’empire de Soliman le Magnifique*, (no publication place: :Press du Cnrs, 1989), 65, 83, 156; Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, *The Turkish Letters of Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq*, Imperial Ambassador at Constantinople 1554-1562, tr. Edward Seymour Forster (Oxford, 1968).

³ Wittfogel argues that a non-Western semi-managerial system of despotic power, i.e., Oriental despotism, became a total managerial and fully despotic under Communist totalitarianism. Karl August Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism; A Comparative Study of Total Power*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978).

⁴ Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, eds. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (London: University of California Press, 1978), 1015-1019.

⁵ The recognition of the orientalist bases of Weber’s thought is not new. It was first raised by Rodinson, then followed by Turner, Said, and Springborg. These studies concentrate on Weber’s interpretation of why Oriental societies could not develop modern capitalism while the Occident did, mostly converging on his arguments about

the Weberian framework this study questions the notion of the janissaries' so-called loyalty to the state by looking at how the *devshirme* system was transformed and complemented by other methods of levy during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, resulting in change of the profiles of janissaries who became the residents of Istanbul during the early seventeenth century and affecting their way of interaction with the city; and how new alignments outside the regimental system introduced new solidarities for the janissaries.

Istanbul, estimated to have a population of 300,000, was one of the most highly populated cities of early modern Europe and a mega city within the Ottoman territories.⁶ By virtue of its overwhelming size and being the capital, Istanbul had a unique development compared to the other major cities of the empire. At the heart of the Ottoman Empire, in the capital city of Istanbul, two large barracks housed thousands of janissaries, which immediately brings us the question of how the city physically was influenced by this presence. One of the themes of this thesis is the spatial relationships of the janissaries within the city that would help the reader visualize their presence and to understand how the urban topography was influenced by the dispersal of janissary residences in Istanbul. As will be examined in this study, the model of vertically segmented religious and ethnic districts lacking civic unity described by the “Islamic

law, state administration, commerce and acquisition of ethics. Therefore they have predominantly emphasized the “means of production” that he employed in examining the characteristics of Occidental cities. However, ‘means of warfare’ and ‘means of law’ were also important features that were equally stressed. Maxime Rodinson, *Islam et Capitalisme* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1966), 99-117; Bryan Turner, *Islam: Islam, State, and Politics*, (Routledge, 1974), 257-86; Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage, 1979); Patricia Springborg, *Western Republicanism and the Oriental Prince* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1992), 9.

⁶ Halil İnalcık, “Istanbul,” *EF* vol. 4 (Leiden: Brill, 1986): 230-239.

city” model was not applicable to seventeenth century Istanbul, occupational and economic factors were also at play in shaping Istanbul’s neighborhoods.⁷

The janissary effect on the city was not only on its topology but also on its socio-political events, mainly through janissary-led urban protests. The janissary uprisings in Istanbul have been studied from the political perspective and focused on the inter-elite rivalries that manifested themselves in these rebellions. Less understood are the popular nature of these rebellions and civilian participation in them. This study investigates how transformations in state and economic systems of early modern times led to janissary-led urban protests in early-seventeenth century Istanbul. Rather than viewing the janissaries as passive instruments of outside parties having no particular motive other than plunder and revenge, this study concentrates on understanding the demands of the janissaries during the uprisings, especially the economic issues, and how janissaries acted together with the civilians in expressing those demands.

Janissary rebellions in the first half of the seventeenth century closely resemble other popular urban protests of the early modern era which have been most studied in the case of Europe. This study is conversant with the literature that adapts E. P. Thompson’s theory of “the moral economy of the crowds” in explaining the early modern popular rebellions. It argues that the crisis of the era changed the role of the state in the economy. The state failed to provision the necessities of its subjects, which in the paternalist pre-modern economic world was seen as one of the major duties of the state. The people considered insufficient provisioning as a violation of

⁷ The “Islamic city” model has been used mostly by French scholars to study mainly North African cities such as Tunis and Fez. W. Marçais, “L’Islamisme et la vie urbaine,” *L’Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, Comptes Rendus* (Paris: January-March 1928): 86-100; R. Brunschvig, “Urbanisme médiéval et droit musulman,” *Revue des Études Islamiques* 15 (1947): 127-155; J. Sauvaget, *Alep: Essai sur le Développement d’une Grande ville Syrienne, Des Origines au Milieu du XIXe Siècle* (Paris: P. Geuthner, 1941); G. E. Von Grunebaum, “The structure of the Muslim town,” *American Anthropologist* 57, no.2, (1955):141-158; G. Baer, “The administrative, economic and social functions of the Turkish guilds,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 1 (1970): 28-50.

their rights and protested the authorities through popular revolts in various parts of Europe and Asia. Bread riots in London, Paris, and Bordeaux, several food riots in China under the Qing dynasty, and soldier-civilian protests in Moscow were all popular rebellions protesting the effects of fiscal and political transformation of the early modern state.

The socio-economic transformations of the early modern era, especially the change in the fiscal and political procedures of the Ottoman state, led not only to urban protests by those who suffered from deteriorating economic conditions but also, in reverse, allowed for the process of capital accumulation at the hands of a relatively small group. A restricted circle of janissaries were among those who accumulated capital. The main methods of acquiring this new wealth as this study shows were credit relations and regiment waqfs, two processes that intensified solidarity amongst the janissaries.

Examining the urban experience of janissaries in early-seventeenth century Istanbul from multiple viewpoints necessitates a survey of literature on different topics, such as studies on urban demography in early modern cities, or theoretical studies on urban protests. These topics will be treated in later chapters. The main literature that this study bases itself is the works examining the military urban strata of several Ottoman cities.

Eldem, Goffman, and Masters claim that the latest trend in urban historiography specializing in Oriental societies seeks not to produce theories, models, or typologies, but rather to understand the uniqueness of every single city on its own terms.⁸ Yet, although the goal is not to find a city pattern that is uniquely Ottoman, Arab, or Islamic, there is still an important

⁸ Edhem Eldem, Daniel Goffman, and Bruce Masters, *The Ottoman City between East and West: Aleppo, Izmir and Istanbul* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 13.

concern in modern Ottoman scholarship to propose a theoretical framework that would reflect the Ottoman approach to and interpretation of civic culture. This is why the study of civic institutions such as the court⁹ and waqf¹⁰, or examining the neighborhood structures of Ottoman cities, and the changing dynamic nature of Ottoman civic culture¹¹ have become more and more significant.

⁹ Ronald Jennings, "Kadi, Court and Legal Procedure in 17th C. Ottoman Kayseri," *Studia Islamica* 48. (1978):133-172; Ronald Jennings, "Limitations of the Judicial Powers of The Kadi in 17th C. Ottoman Kayseri," *Studia Islamica* 50 (1979):151-84; Ronald Jennings, "The Office of Vekil (Wakil) in 17th Century Ottoman Sharia Courts," *Studia Islamica* 42 (1976): 147-69. Ronald Jennings, "Urban Population in Anatolia in the Sixteenth Century: A Study of Kayseri, Karaman, Amasya, Trabzon, and Erzurum," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 7, no. 1 (1976): 21-57.

¹⁰Bahaeddin Yediyıldız, one of the leading historians in this field, studies the institution from every aspect such as its administration, the social role of piety, and the intentions behind establishing different types of waqfs. Bahaeddin Yediyıldız, *XVIII. Yüzyılda Türkiye’de Vakıf Müessesesi: Bir Sosyal Tarih İncelemesi* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2003); Bahaeddin Yediyıldız, "Vakıf," in *İslam Ansiklopedisi* 13 (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1986), 153-172. Haim Gerber, "The Waqf Institution in Early Ottoman Edirne," in Gabriel R. Warburg and G. Bilban eds., *Studies in Islamic Society* (Haifa UP: 1984), 29-45. Another important approach to studying the waqfs is to look at the social function of the institution within the urban context. Authors such as Çiğdem Kafesçioğlu, Amy Singer, Fatma Acun and Suraiya Faroqhi have drawn attention to the fact that the sultanate waqfs as well as those established by the Ottoman elite were used for founding new urban centers, and that this characteristic was not specific only to newly-conquered cities. In addition, the projects of the major establishments built through waqfs funded by the Ottoman elite were designed in Istanbul, indicating conscious city planning on the Ottoman government’s part. Çiğdem Kafesçioğlu, "In the Image of Rum’: Ottoman Architectural Patronage in Sixteenth-Century Aleppo and Damascus," *Muqarnas* 16 (1999): 76-96; Amy Singer, *Constructing Ottoman Beneficence: An Imperial Soup Kitchen in Jerusalem* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002); Fatma Acun, "A Portrait of the Ottoman Cities" *The Muslim World* 92 (2002): 255-285; Suraiya Faroqhi, *Towns and Townsmen of Ottoman Anatolia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). More importantly, Singer promotes the interpretation of the waqf system in the Ottoman Empire under the theory of "gift giving" and argues that the beneficent acts through waqfs were not only done for religious reasons. The act of giving also involved the definitions of an "ideal citizen" which in a way promote the virtues and characteristics of Ottoman urban identity.

¹¹ Suraiya Faroqhi for example, compares the judicial registers of two Anatolian cities, Ankara and Kayseri, within two different time spans: the beginning and the end of the seventeenth century. This method allowed Faroqhi to compare the two cities by delineating the changes in both time and space. One of her main goals in this study is to change the practice of treating the subject matter as an unchanging entity. She examines the changes in the lifestyles of families and the use of domestic space through the typologies she created for Anatolian urban households. Faroqhi also indicates that the neighborhoods in these two cities were not separated according to ethno-religious backgrounds as was claimed by the "Islamic city" model; on the contrary, there were poorer and better off neighborhoods, which indicates that segregation by income was a fact of life. Suraiya Faroqhi, *Men of Modest Substance: House Owners and House Property in Seventeenth-Century Ankara and Kayseri* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). The list of case studies in Ottoman urban history can be enlarged, see for example, the articles on different cities in Irene A. Bierman, Rifa’at A. Abou-El-Haj and Donald Preziosi eds., *The Ottoman City and Its Parts- Urban Structure and Social Order* (New York: Aristide D. Caratzas Publisher, 1991).

i.e., these institutions were the means of promoting civic identities and defining the relationships among different civic groups.

It therefore follows that studying the economic and social roles of the military cadres in general, and janissaries in particular, in urban life would also contribute to this literature. In the last decades, there have been studies concentrating on the transformation of the janissaries and associated corps from those in the imperial army located at the center to those who were local power groups in major provincial urban centers of the empire. The only work that concentrates on the janissaries' social and economic relations within seventeenth-century Istanbul is Cemal Kafadar's M.A. thesis completed in the 1980s, which is still an influential study on this field today.¹² In this work Kafadar points out that the janissaries were only active in petty trades and crafts and street peddling but did not penetrate the guild structures. However, in his article "Janissaries and Other Riffraff of Ottoman Istanbul: Rebels Without a Cause?" Kafadar revisits his opinion on the degree of janissary involvement into the Istanbul market and suggests that they were not only artisans dealing with petty trade but janissaries from higher ranks were also became artisans within the guild structure.¹³ Finally, Eunjeong Yi's recent study on Istanbul guilds during the first half of the seventeenth century proves that the janissary involvement in the guilds and various trades was an ordinary fact of Istanbul's daily economic life.¹⁴ Another helpful source in this topic is Halil Inalcık's pioneering article "Military and Fiscal Transformation in the

¹² Cemal Kafadar, "Yeniçeri Esnaf Relations: Solidarity and Conflict," M.A. Thesis (McGill University, 1980).

¹³ Cemal Kafadar, "On the Purity and Corruption of the Janissaries," *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* 15 (1991): 273-279.

¹⁴ Eunjeong Yi, *Guild Dynamics in Seventeenth-Century Istanbul, Fluidity and Leverage* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2004).

Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700,” which also devotes a section on the urbanization process of the janissaries during the seventeenth century under the broader topic of fiscal and military decentralization policies of the Ottoman state.¹⁵

André Raymond’s works should be included among the leading ones. His extensive studies on seventeenth and eighteenth century Cairo also prove the janissary diffusion into civic society and their growing importance in the economic life of the city.¹⁶ Charles Wilkins’s book on late seventeenth century Aleppo is also a remarkable study. Wilkins traces the janissary diffusion into provincial society through examining three main elements: residential quarter, professional organizations, and patrimonial households. Wilkins uses wide range of sources from fiscal records to court registers for this research.¹⁷ Another important study concentrating on the economic presence of the military cadres in an urban setting was done for Damascus by Establet Colette and Jean-Paul Pascual. Their work investigates 54 probate registers from the late seventeenth century for a comparison of the ratios of wealth accumulation and credit relations between the military cadres and civilians.¹⁸ A final study that can be included in the group of

¹⁵ Halil İnalcık, “Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire (1600-1700),” *Archivum Ottomanicum* 6 (1980): 283-339.

¹⁶ André Raymond, “Soldiers in Trade: The Case of Ottoman Cairo,” *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 18 (1991): 16-37; idem., *Artisans et commerçants au Caire: au XVIIIe siècle* (Damas: Institut Français de Damas, 1974).

¹⁷ Charles Louis Wilkins, *Forging Urban Solidarities: Ottoman Aleppo, 1640-1700* (Leiden: Brill, 2010).

¹⁸ Colette Establet and Jean-Paul Pascual “Comportements économiques des agents civils et militaires à Damas, fin du XVIIème siècle” in *Mélanges en l’honneur d’André Raymond*, G. Alleaume, S. Denoix, and M. Tuchscherer ed., (IFAO, 2009).

works concentrated on Arab lands is Jane Hathaway's investigation of the rise in the Qazdagli family in Cairo since the family was of janissary origin.¹⁹

Hülya Canbakal again examines the probate registers, this time from seventeenth century 'Ayntab, outlining the wealth accumulation practices among the military elements in the city. Even though her work is concentrated on the military cadres in general it provides information on the janissaries' position in the city as well.²⁰ Molly Green's study on Ottoman Crete in the late seventeenth century proves that the Ottoman conquest did not turn the capital city of Crete, Candia, into an Ottoman garrison town, nor did trade fall fully into the hands of the Ottoman elite, contrary to what Greek historiography argues. However, she also shows that the conquest of the island added a third element to the demography and economic and cultural life of Candia: the city began to be dominated by the janissaries.²¹

As can be seen, this literature is very limited but developing. These studies although dealing with different set of questions, have the commonality of investigating the relationship between the military cadres and the civilians in various cities. This approach offers a new vision in revealing how vibrant urban life was during the early modern era. My study builds upon this research and investigates the economic and social function of janissaries in early seventeenth century Istanbul.

¹⁹ Jane Hathaway, *The Politics of Household in Ottoman Egypt: The Rise of the Qazdaglis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

²⁰ Hülya Canbakal, *Society and Politics in an Ottoman Town: 'Ayntab in the 17th Century* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2007).

²¹ Molly Greene, *A Shared World: Christians and Muslims in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000).

Before this new approach to the military, i.e., the study of the military elements in a social setting, we had studies concentrated on the institutional history of the janissaries, or the examination of the corps within the history of warfare, which are important, but deal with different sets of questions than those investigating the urban military cadres. Among the most important of these are İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı's comprehensive work on the *kapıkulu* as an institution, which is consulted frequently in this study. The author examines the institution starting from the moment of conscription of children for the army, the training of the soldiers, the organization of the regiments, the method by which the janissaries received stipends, the regulation of the corps, and so on. The work mainly concentrates on the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, which the author probably accepted as the utmost mature stage of the institution. To see the Ottoman institutions at their peak and at their most ideal state during the classical period has been a common tendency among scholars writing under the decline paradigm. Although it is the only – and very valuable – study on the janissary corps as an institution, this study suffers from the pitfalls of accepting the decline paradigm and of reflecting on the findings for the classical period only, and thus fails to show the evolution of the institution..

Other types of approaches that discuss the janissary corps are those on warfare and military campaigns. The only comprehensive work done on Ottoman warfare is Rhoads Murphey's *Ottoman Warfare 1500-1700*, where the author revises presumptions of the Ottomans being a war machine and Ottoman society being a military one. He criticizes the decline paradigm according to which the ending of a *timar* system and the enlargement of the janissary army were seen as the triggering factors.²² Gábor Ágoston's *Guns for the Sultan* concentrates on

²² Rhoads Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare 1500-1700* (London: UCLA Press, 1999).

the weaponry and war technology in the Ottoman Empire. The author rebuffs the Orientalist views of Ottoman society as completely militarized, and rejects the decline paradigm which argues that the Ottomans were left behind in weaponry and warfare techniques starting from the sixteenth century due to the extreme Islamic conservatism.²³ The author tackles with this question and provides various cases showing that Ottomans were receptive to new ideas and western military technology even during the seventeenth century. This work also reflects upon the expansion of the janissary corps and the new human resources joined to these corps during the seventeenth century.

One of the most striking topics for the students of Ottoman history has been the abolition of the janissary corps in 1826. The themes revolving around the abolition especially in the latest works is the reevaluation of the role of janissaries in Istanbul's economy, popular political life, and urban protest.²⁴

²³ Gábor Ágoston, *Guns for the Sultan: Military Power and the Weapons Industry in the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), Chapter 2.

²⁴ Taner Timur, *Osmanlı Çalışmaları: İlkel Feodalizmden Yarı Sömürge Ekonomisine* (Istanbul: V Yayınları, 1989); Şerif Mardin, "Freedom in an Ottoman Perspective," in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., *State, Democracy and The Military: Turkey in the 1980s* (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1988): 23-35; Donald Quataert, "Janissaries, Artisans and the Question of Ottoman Decline 1730-1914," in idem., ed., *Workers, Peasants and Economic Change in the Ottoman Empire 1730-1914*, (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1993): 197-203; Cengiz Kırılı, "A Profile of the Labor Force in Early-Nineteenth Century Istanbul," *International Labor and Working Class History* 60 (2001): 125-140; Nalan Turna, "The Everyday Life of Istanbul and its Artisans, 1800-1839," Ph.D. diss. (State University of New York, Binghamton, 2006). Mehmet Mert Sunar, "Cauldron of Dissent: A Study of the Janissary Corps, 1807-1826," Ph.D. diss. (State University of New York, Binghamton, 2006).

1. Research Parameters

This thesis is a study of the social and political transformations of the Ottoman Empire through an examination of the presence of janissaries in the imperial capital city of Istanbul. It seeks to understand how the relationship of the janissaries with the civilian population and the ruling power evolved during the process of transformation into a bureaucratized sedentary state in the early modern era. Building upon the research on Ottoman urban studies, my inquiry on the janissaries aims to locate their economic and social intermingling with the civic society in Istanbul during the first half of the seventeenth century. The goal here is not to create a ‘model’ for Ottoman cities; however, in the midst of the overwhelming influence of Orientalist stigmas and the lack of models that would enrich Ottoman urban historiography, applying a different methodology and studying this heavily debated sector of society within the urban context is believed to be rewarding. This approach has two main goals: first, it enables us to question the Orientalist argument that the janissaries had unquestioned loyalty toward the sultan, and secondly, looking into another layer of urban class strata will improve our understanding of the Ottoman city, therefore contributes to urban studies.

Contrary to the Orientalist approach, which narrates how soldiers prevented the emergence of a civic identity in the Ottoman Empire, this thesis concentrates on how soldiers actually became a part of a city’s identity. The goal, however, is not to search for the “correct way of being” in Istanbul defined under the notion of the Occidental city, but to understand Istanbul’s civic culture and the janissaries’ involvement within its dynamics. One of the reasons for the inability of Oriental societies to form a “correct way of being” is presented as the presence of the slave army of janissaries that was the main source of protection for the sultan’s regime.

The main problem, here, lies not on the janissaries being, let us say, powerful, disciplined, or corrupt, but on their being “slaves.” Thus, a study of the janissaries should begin from the moment of their forced conscription.

The *devshirmes* were the main resource for the military and administrative strata of the Ottoman Empire until the mid-seventeenth century. However, partly due to the lack of sources, works dealing solely with this system are very limited. So far, the scholarship on the *devshirme* system has mainly concentrated on the debates of origin and the issue of legality. There is, however, a need in the literature to set down the basics of this institution of recruitment, since there is no extensive study done thus far. It is useful to study the *devshirme* system as an institution, because we can understand the consideration the state gave to the process, and the politics behind it by looking at from where, with what frequency, and with which criteria the state selected the children to be levied. Furthermore, to be acquainted with the background of a janissary before we examine his economic and social behavior in the city will give us a better perspective.

Therefore, in Chapter 1, I examine the conscription process – the *devshirme* system – and how it was transformed during the seventeenth century. The most important argument of this chapter is that the transformation of the conscription system affected who became janissaries in the seventeenth century, and the shift in the profiles of the conscripted soldiers also altered the ways in which they interacted in the city. The ‘*acemis*, novice janissaries, who worked as laborers and artisans during their apprenticeship before being appointed as janissaries, are another important theme of this chapter. I argue that one of the steps in understanding the involvement of janissaries in urban life lies in understanding how they related to the city as ‘*acemis*. The primary

sources used in this chapter are discussed at length in the introduction. Broadly speaking, two records of conscription, *eşkal* registers, of 1494 and 1603 are used to outline the process of conscription itself and to trace the changes that occurred in the *devshirme* system in the seventeenth century. This data is complemented by research in the *Bursa Şer'iyye Sicils* and *mühimme* registers.

Chapter 2 begins with the intention of acquainting us with the city of Istanbul itself. A description of the geography and topography of Istanbul in the seventeenth century is provided, and its population during the seventeenth century is analyzed in comparison with other major Ottoman and European cities. The main question in this chapter is what it meant for a city to host thousands of janissaries. How the janissary presence in the capital physically showed itself is demonstrated first, by demographics, through a thorough examination of a *mevacib* (salary) register of 1663-4 in comparison with other data derived from published Ottoman budgets and other salary registers; and second, by a residential analysis of janissaries during the mid-century through consulting the probate registers of 100 janissaries, delineating the neighborhoods in which they lived within the city walls.

In Chapter 3, I present a portrait that is completely at variance with Weber's description of absolutely loyal enslaved soldiers. Leaving Weber's views aside, E.P. Thompson's theory on urban protests is used to interpret the janissary uprisings in seventeenth century Istanbul. Thompson argues that urban protests before the modern era had to be investigated under the concept of "moral economy of the poor," which can be shortly summarized as the right to protest when ordinary people believed that their rights given to them within paternalist economies were violated by the authorities. This theory was espoused by many scholars and applied to various

societies such as England, France, and China in the early modern era. I argue that it is possible to apply this approach to seventeenth-century Istanbul, as well. Within this theoretical framework, Chapter 3 investigates the conflicts, antagonisms, and confrontations within and against janissaries during the early seventeenth century. This investigation is done mainly with the sources narrating the protests such as the chronicle of the official Ottoman historian Mustafa Naima, the chronicle of Tugi, and the anonymous *Tarih-i Gilmani*.

Chapter 4 can be seen as the structure atop the building blocks of the previous two chapters. It investigates further the solidarities of the janissaries and presents the economic background for these dynamics. This chapter deals with janissaries who belong to different economic groups which are presented under the headings of the poor, production and trade, and the formation of new wealth. The findings from the evaluation of the probate registers of 173 janissaries who died in Istanbul within the years 1595-1668 and the records from the Istanbul court during the 1610s and 1660s are used to delineate as much economic activity of janissaries as possible in the early seventeenth century. The result is striking. It is seen that there was a newly emerging sector of wealthy janissaries in Istanbul at the time, some engaged in monetary activities as moneylenders, wholesalers, or substantial merchants. There were also poor ones who lived mostly in the barracks and survived on their salaries, or on petty trade. Plus, we see artisan janissaries living within modest means. Finally, this research reveals that many janissaries were active within various guilds not only as artisans, but as the administrators within the guilds themselves. This chapter also shows that the janissaries established strong solidarity amongst themselves by pointing out the high proportion of loan relations with each other under the regiment waqfs (*oda vakfi*) as the century progressed. These waqfs functioned similar to the rest

of the cash waqfs in Ottoman society. Through highlighting the emerging economic relations among these groups, this chapter also helps to explain the collaboration between the janissaries and the *ulema*, as well as between the janissaries and the artisans during the rebellions.

3. Sources

Rather than using one set of primary sources, a variety of sources are used in this study. The goal here is to examine a shorter time span, mainly the first half of the seventeenth century – although there are sources used from the late sixteenth and late seventeenth centuries – using different types of sources to provide different information on the janissaries' economic and social life. Each chapter concentrates on one type of primary source while utilizing other archival sources as much as possible.

One set of documentation is extrapolated from the examination of the court registers of Istanbul in Islam Araştırmaları Merkezi (ISAM). The oldest nine registers that survive are investigated for this study, covering two periods, 1612 to 1620, and 1660 to 1662. In delineating the cases related to the janissaries, the terms *beşe* and *racil* (infantry) are considered as the titles that were used for janissaries. Therefore, except for including entries that mention the plaintiff or the defendant as a janissary carrying titles other than *beşe* –this could be *bey*, *çavuş*, or even *celebi* – all entries that include *beşes* and *racils* were scrutinized for this study. Accordingly, 415 cases between two time periods relating to the janissaries were analyzed in comparison. These cases provide a mine of information including property sales, credit records, manumission, marriage, divorce, inheritance settlements, issues related to waqfs and guilds, and personal

disputes; in short, valuable information regarding the daily life of janissaries in Istanbul. This study combines the conventional thematic reading of the court record with simple quantitative reading, and recognizing the incomplete nature of the court records, it provides context to the documents through the use of probate registers (*tereke*s) and central state archives.

Another set of documents, probate registers of the janissaries residing in Istanbul, are taken from Istanbul court registers called '*askeri kassam* registers in ISAM. The probate registers provide detailed records of estates including cash, movables, real estate, and debt, together with the amount of the total estate of the deceased. The total number of the janissary inheritances in this dissertation are taken from Said Öztürk's study on the first six '*askeri kassam* registers of Istanbul covering the period from 1595 to 1668.²⁵ Öztürk provides the data from the inheritances of 1,000 people who belonged to the '*askeri* class and passed away in Istanbul during this time period. Among these, 173 janissaries were detected and subjected to a separate comparative analysis. In so doing, I also went back to the original documents of the janissary inheritances and extracted further information mainly on the occupations they were involved in, the shops they rented, and the credit relations of especially those who acted as moneylenders.

The *Kamil Kepeci* classification located in the Prime Ministry Archives (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri (B0A)) in Istanbul contains a large number of registers including *mevacib* (salary) registers, out of which only two contain the complete payment records of the entire janissary corps in Istanbul. The first of these is the register of 1623, which Uzunçarşılı examined. I have used the second complete register, from 1663-64, and compared it with the first. The information derived from these registers are used in an innovative way that enables the researcher

²⁵ Said Öztürk, *İstanbul Tereke Defterleri (Sosyo-Ekonomik Tahlil)* (Istanbul: Osmanlı Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1995).

to reflect upon the demography of the janissaries in Istanbul during the first half of the seventeenth century.

An important archival finding in this study are the *eşkal* registers found in the *Maliyeden Müdevver* and *Müteferrik Defterler* classifications in the Prime Ministry Archives. *Eşkal* registers are the detailed records of conscripted boys, providing information on the exact location from whence they were taken, their original names, their Muslim names adopted after conscription, their parents' names, the description of their physical characteristics, and their ages. So far, only two such registers have been detected in the archives: the conscription of 1603, and the registers that contain consecutive conscriptions of the years 1494/5, 1498/9, and 1502/3. So far, only that from 1603 is used by Prof. Michel Kiel in comparison with *tapu tahrirs*, cadastral survey registers, to examine the demography of the Balkans. In this study, I examine both registers in a comparative perspective to map the conscription processes, and to detect a shift in the *devshirme* system from the late fifteenth to the early seventeenth century. The methodological problems in working with these registers are, first, we have detected only these two in the archives so far. Therefore, we do not have a large sample that reflects the frequency of conscriptions, or the changes in the number of boys conscripted throughout the centuries. Secondly, the layouts of the registers vary, which results in difficulties in comparison. It is possible, however, to detect some major tendencies in the application of the system, and the changes in the ages of the boys selected, which makes these registers valuable.

There are some other archival documents that add vital information helping to complete the picture in understanding the lives of the janissaries in Istanbul. Among these *mühimme* registers (records of decrees sent to Ottoman officials in various parts of the empire) of the late

sixteenth and the seventeenth century from BOA, are some records from the *İbnülemin* collection from BOA, and orders related to the conscription of 1603 in the Bursa court registers found in ISAM. A special note should be made in regard to the study in the Bursa court registers. Following the hypothesis that the decree ordering the conscription should have been sent to the related region before the process started, the Bursa court registers of 1603 were examined, and the assumption proves correct. The decree that was sent to Bursa contained some detailed information, which we could never have learned from the *eşkal* registers alone. The same methodology could be applied to other cities where we know that conscription took place in various years. This would enable us to make a more comprehensive study on the *devshirme* system, especially in detecting the needs and policies of the center, and any changes in the system.

Complementing the documentary sources with the literary sources are narrative chronicles and traveler accounts. The primary ones are the travelogue of Evliya Çelebi,²⁶ the chronicle of the official Ottoman historian Mustafa Naima,²⁷ the chronicle of Hüseyin Tugi,²⁸ the chronicle of

²⁶Evliya Çelebi was a son of imperial goldsmith and a slave-girl. He received his early training in Muslim faith and was educated at the Palace School (*Enderun*) during the reign of Murad IV. He journeyed thorough the Ottoman Empire and neighboring lands over a period of forty years and recorded his travels in his *Seyahatname*.

²⁷Mustafa Naima Efendi is the author of the famous Ottoman *vekayiname*, titled “Ravzatu’l-Hüseyin fi Hulasati Ahbari’l-Hafikayn,” and is known as *Tarih-i Naima*. Naima was born to a janissary family in Aleppo in 1655. His father was the janissary *serdar* Mehmed Agha, and grandfather was Küçük Ali Agha. Naima came to Istanbul in the 1680s and started working at the Old Palace. In 1686, he was appointed as an imperial scribe. Mustafa Naima, *Tarih-i Naima*, vol. 1, ed. Mehmet İpşirli (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2007), xiii-xvii.

²⁸Hüseyin Tugi was a retired soldier who wrote the most influential narrative of the deposition of Osman II in 1622, since he was actually present as the events unfolded. His work has been used by historians of the Ottoman Empire as an eyewitness account. For a detailed analysis of versions of his manuscript see, Baki Tezcan, “Searching for Osman: A Reassessment of the Deposition of the Ottoman Sultan Osman II (1618-1622),” Ph.D. diss. (Princeton University, 2001) Appendices, 268-300.

Mehmet Halife, *Tarih-i Gilmani*,²⁹ the *risales* of Koçi Bey's,³⁰ Eremya Çelebi's history of Istanbul and the narration of the 1656 janissary uprisings "Çınar Vakası."³¹ Some *kanunnames*, such as *Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan*,³² and *Kavanin-i Pençik*³³ were also consulted.

²⁹Mehmed Halife was one of the Ottoman historians of the seventeenth century. He was from Bosnia and came to Istanbul in 1630 to become *ic oğlan* of Koca Kenan Pasha. In *Tarih-i Gilmani*, Mehmet Halife narrates the events that took place 1623-1664, such as "Çınar Vakası," the uprisings in Istanbul due to the debased coinage, and the Crete campaign. Being an eyewitness account, his chronicle was used as a source by some Ottoman historians such as Naima. Mehmed Halife. *Tarih-i Gilmani*, ed. Kamil Su (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1986), v-x.

³⁰Koçi Bey was an Albanian *devshirme* who was educated in the Palace School (*Enderun*) and served during the reigns of Ahmed I and Murad IV. He was especially close to Murad IV, and presented his point of view on the problems of the Ottoman Empire, among which he highlighted the "corruption" of the *devshirme* and *timar* systems, and proposed solutions to them in his *risales* given to the sultan. Koçi Bey, *Koçi Bey Risaleleri*, ed. Seda Çakmakçıoğlu (Istanbul: Kabalcı, 2007), 1-10.

³¹Eremya Çelebi Kömürciyan was a prominent Armenian scholar who lived in the seventeenth century. He was the son of Armenian priest Mardiros who worked in Jerusalem and then in Istanbul at the Sur Sargis Church in the Langa neighborhood. Eremya Çelebi lived in Istanbul and wrote various important books, some of which include the history of Istanbul, *Ruzname*, in which he narrates important events occurring between 1648 and 1663; *Vekayiname*, in which he narrates 42 events that took place during 1648-90; and his book on the life of Sabatay Sevi. Eremya Çelebi Kömürciyan, *İstanbul Tarihi*, trans. Hrand Andreasyan (Istanbul: Eren Yayıncılık, 1988), ix—xxi.

³²*Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan* was written by an anonymous author who was from the janissary corps. It is also known that his ancestors were janissaries too. Even though he did not mention his sources, it is understood that he consulted *Tac'üt-Tevarih* of Hoca Sa'deddin, and orally transformed rules and regulations of the corps. This work compiles all the regulations and decrees related to the janissaries and was presented to the sultan in 1610.

³³*Pençik* was the practice of allotting one-fifth of war captives as booty to the sultan for use as soldiers. This was an earlier usage in Islamic societies that had been determined by Islamic law, and continued to be applied in the Ottoman Empire right from the beginning. This tradition was formalized in the *Pençik* Law during the reign of Beyazid II in 1510. "Kanunname-i Pençik," in Ahmet Akgündüz ed., *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri ve Hukuki Tahlilleri, II. Beyazid Devri Kanunnameler*, vol. 2 (Istanbul: Fey Vakfı Yayınları, 1990), 128-129.

Chapter One

THE MAKING OF A JANISSARY: THE *DEVSHİRME* SYSTEM AND THE RESPONSIBILITIES AND ROLES OF ‘*ACEMI OGLANS*’

As though reaping grain at harvest time, the Ottoman state, through a system known as the *devshirme*, collected children from specific parts of the empire where the Christian subjects resided in order to train and use them in military and administrative positions. Menage defines this system as “the forcible removal of the children of the Christian subjects from their ethnic, religious, and cultural environment and their transplantation into the Turkish-Islamic environment with the aim of employing them in the service of the Palace, the army, and the state, whereby they were to serve the Sultan as slaves or freemen and to form a part of the ruling class of the State.”¹ This was painful for the Christian subjects. Many travelers to the empire noted their sadness; women wept in their folk songs. During the rise of nationalism in the nineteenth century, more than a century after the abolition of the system, the image of the barbaric Turk taking children away was still used as an inflammatory metaphor in the national awakening of Greeks, Serbians, and Bulgarians. The Ottoman enslaved military administrative strata was used by orientalist as the clearest example in describing the Ottoman sultan as an “Oriental Despot”.² Some scholars, on the other hand, note the

¹ V. L. Menage, “Some Notes on *Devshirme*,” *Bulletin of the School of Oriental African Studies* 29, no. 1 (1966): 64.

² Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology* (London: University of California Press, 1927), 1015-1019; Peter Sugar, “A Near-Perfect Military Society: The Ottoman Empire,” in L. L. Farrar ed., *War, A Historical, Political, and Social Study* (Oxford, California: ABC-Clio Press, 1978): 95-109.

advantages held by the conscripted within the Ottoman system, and emphasized the willing participation of many poor Christian families.³

This chapter investigates this controversial practice by examining the levied children as the main historical actors and tracing their experiences in the process of being cut off from their primordial ties in childhood. The whole phenomenon of forced-levy will be covered in three main parts: (1) the moment of reaping — the methods of conscription, the selection criteria, the childrens' journey to Istanbul; (2) the process of cropping – the assimilation techniques used by the state, the education children were given, such as placement in a Muslim family, the training in the barracks; (3) the usage of the boys as a labor force in state enterprises i.e. mines, ship construction, and the service sector, as unfree wage-laborers before they became soldiers. Another important process, the transformation of the system by the seventeenth century, is investigated in this chapter in order to derive a more accurate profile of a janissary in the making. With these main points of focus, this chapter examines the pre-conditions and networks that set the ground for janissaries to enter urban life in Istanbul during the early seventeenth century.

Three methodologies are used: (1) A critical reading of the regulations for the *devshirmes*, which enable us to outline the selection criteria of the state in conscripting children. One of the most well-known primary sources is an anonymous treatise composed in 1606, *Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyân*, (the Regulations for the Janissaries)⁴.

(2) Creating a database of the 1603-4 conscription. It is known from the secondary literature that *eşkal defters*, lists of children prepared at the time of conscription, had existed but until now there has not been a comprehensive study of these registers. The only study so far was done by Machiel Kiel, who examined the 1603-4 conscription register to test the

³ İsmail H.Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilatında Kapıkulu Ocakları* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1943); Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600* (London: Phoenix Press, 2000), 78.

⁴ For facsimile, transliteration and concise interpretation of *Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyân* — see Ahmet Akgündüz, *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri ve Hukuki Tahlilleri, I. Ahmet Devri Kanunnameleri* 9 (İstanbul: Fey Vakfı Yayınları, 1990), 127-367. This study has been the major primary source for İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı's work, the only comprehensive study on kapıkulus. İsmail H.Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilatında Kapıkulu Ocakları* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1943).

common belief of the devastating impact of the *devshirme* system on regional population growth among the Balkanists. He took a sample area from Greece and the Island of Lesbos (Midilli) and compared it with the cadastral survey (*icmal tahrir*) registers of the region.⁵ This chapter presents this 1603-4 conscription register located in the Prime Minister's Archives in Istanbul.⁶ It is a long list of 2604 conscripted boys. This register not only gives us a chance to cross-examine the regulations, but it also provides us with data for delineating the trends and policies on conscription. Moreover, another set of records of conscriptions from 1490s is used for comparison and to help trace the transformation of the system in early modern times.

(3) A complementary archival study on the *Bursa Kadi Sicils* and *mühimme* registers, e.g., a decree found in *Bursa Kadi Sicils* allowing the officer to collect boys from the region for the same conscription group of the year 1603-4.⁷ This decree presents detailed information on how the boys were gathered, the problems that were faced during transportation of the children, and on the resistance methods of the families and the locals. Furthermore, multiple decrees related to conscriptions in ninety *mühimme* registers of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century are examined.

1.1. The Historical Background of the *Devshirme* System

Different variations of this institution have existed in Islamic societies since the Abbasid Caliphate — the traditional source of the enslaved military-administrative strata had always been war captives. The practice of allotting one-fifth of war captives as booty to the sultan for use as soldiers was an earlier usage in Islamic societies and had been determined by Islamic

⁵ I would like to thank Prof. Machiel Kiel for sharing his findings with me. Unfortunately, he had not yet published his research on the 1603-4 register. However, the research he did on the cadastral surveys (*tahrir defters*) for the Bulgarian and Greek districts, which rebuffs the assumption that there was a decline in the numbers of Christians in these lands in the seventeenth century due to the violent Islamisation policies of the Ottoman government, should be consulted: Machiel Kiel, "The Ottoman Imperial Registers: Central Greece and Northern Bulgaria in the 15th-19th century; the Demographic Development of Two Areas Compared," in John Bintliff and Kostas Sbonias, eds., *Reconstructing Past Population Trends in Mediterranean Europe (3000 BC-AD 1800)* (Oxford: Oxbow Books, 1999).

⁶ BOA, MAD 7600.

⁷ BKS, A 155, no. 1128 (1012/1603).

law. This was also followed in the Ottoman Empire right from the beginning.⁸ In the Ottoman Empire, this tradition was formalized in the *Pençik* Law — *pençik* literally meaning “one-fifth” in Persian.⁹

The origin of the *devshirme* system, however, is uncertain. The account that sets the origin to the earliest date, to the reign of Orhan I (1326-1359), is *Heşt Bihîşt* by the chronicler Idris Bitlisi. This account was mainly accepted by Western scholarship, until it was questioned by Franz Babinger and Friedrich Giese. Babinger put forth a second argument deriving from the chronicler Aşıkpaşazade, noting that the system was established at the time of Murat I (1359-1389) through *pençik*. A few years later, Giese edited the text of the chronicle of Oruç, who based his narrative on Aşıkpaşazade’s account.¹⁰ Both texts narrate that Kara Rüstem suggested allotting one-fifth of the human booty for Murat I and establishing a new army with them after the conquest of Edirne (1361) for the first time.¹¹ Taking human booty for the Sultan is actually the definition of the *pençik* system. This description in Aşıkpaşazade and Oruç Bey merges the *pençik* system into *devshirme*, since it mentions that these boys were *devşirildi*, which is a Turkish word referring to the whole process of conscription. They also describe the process by writing that the human booty was sent to nearby Turkish villagers in Anatolia to learn Turkish and became janissaries afterwards. This is the source Uzunçarşılı accepts.¹² The *Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyân*, on the other hand, ascribes the origin of the system to the aftermath of the Battle of Ankara in 1402, in

⁸ J. A. B. Palmer, “The Origins of the Janissaries,” *John Rylands Library Bulletin* 35, no. 2 (1953): 448-481, esp. 462.

⁹ For facsimile, transliteration and concise interpretation of *Kanunname-i Pencik* — see Ahmet Akgündüz, *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri ve Hukuki Tahlilleri, II. Beyazid Devri Kanunnameleri 2* (İstanbul: Fey Vakfı Yayınları, 1990), 128-134.

¹⁰ Palmer, “The Origins of the Janissaries,” 448.

¹¹ Aşıkpaşazade, *Aşıkpaşaoğlu Tarihi*, ed. Nihal Atsız (Ankara: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, 1970), 58; Oruç, *Oruç Bey Tarihi*, ed. Necdet Öztürk (İstanbul: Çamlıca Basım, 2008), 24-25.

¹² Uzunçarşılı, *Kapıkulu Ocakları*, vol. 1, 145.

which Timur destroyed the Ottoman army, arguing that rapid Ottoman expansion during the fifteenth century increased the demand for more soldiers, ergo Ottoman officials were forced to search for new sources for conscription. After the Battle of Ankara, state officials decided to conscript the non-Muslim youth of the empire to form a new military force, called the janissary army (the New Corps).

Of all the institutions of the Ottoman state, the *devshirme* has perhaps been the one of the most debated by scholars, with the main issue being its legality. According to the Sharia, non-Muslims living under the authority and supremacy of the Islamic state received *zimmi* status and were treated differently than non-Muslims living outside the empire (*harbis*), that is, in the Abode of War (*dar-ül harb*). The non-Muslim societies of the empire were thus protected.¹³ Some scholars have therefore interpreted the *devshirme* system as an infringement on the *zimmi* status. J. Palmer argues that the system is unjustified by Islamic law but can be legitimized through custom and analogy.¹⁴ He claims that it evolved gradually from *pençik*. Palmer considers the Muslim land-holders taking 25 *akçe* as rent from Christian tenants (*ispenç*) as a corrupted form of taking one captive out of every five as human booty (*pençik*).¹⁵ He then concludes that the sultan took rent from his own tenants, but claimed it in kind, which was the *devshirme*.¹⁶ Paul Wittek, however, rightly questions Palmer's equating *ispenç* with *pençik*, given that the former is an annual land tax whereas the latter is a one-time

¹³ Hakan Erdem, *Slavery in the Ottoman Empire and Its Demise* (London: Macmillan, 1996), 19-20.

¹⁴ Palmer, "Origins of the Janissaries," 464.

¹⁵ This argument is found in Aşıkpaşazade. He explains the *devshirme* system established when Gazi Evrenuz was ordered to collect 25 *akçe* from the captives and came with children. Then it was decided that those children would be sent near Turkish families and then trained as soldiers." Aşıkpaşazade, 58.

¹⁶ Palmer, "The Origins of the Janissaries," 464-468.

payment of redemption money (*bedel*). In other words, the two terms and taxes have nothing to do with one another.¹⁷

Wittek argues that explaining the legitimacy of the *devshirme* system through custom and necessity is not sufficient.¹⁸ He presents legality from the shafa'ite conception of *ahl al-kitab*, a term used to designate non-Muslim adherents to faiths which have a book of prayer the time before the Prophet. They are reserving the status of *zimmi*. Those who embraced their religion after the Prophet were not given the status of *zimmi*. He claims that with this doctrine, the majority of Christians in the Balkans would have been denied the *zimmi* status, since they accepted Christianity after the Prophet. Therefore, the argument goes, since they were not granted *zimmi* status, there could not be any infringement on their status by taking them as *devshirmes*. He also points to the exemption of Jews from *devshirme* as proof of his hypothesis.¹⁹

The argument that Christians in the Balkans had never been granted genuine *zimmi* status was reiterated by Idris Bitlisi, an historian who lived during the early years of the sixteenth century; however, on different grounds. He asserts that the children of infidels could be taken since their lands were conquered by force, in war, and they became slaves of the Sultan.²⁰ Ménage reminds us that Hoca Sa'adettin, who frequently duplicates Idris Bitlisi, does not include this particular argument in his book, and speculates that Bitlisi's justification for the legitimacy of conscripting Christian Balkans is too facile.²¹ This argument cannot be

¹⁷ Paul Wittek, "Devshirme and Sharia," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 17, no. 2 (1955): 273.

¹⁸ Wittek, "Devshirme and Sharia," 275.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 277.

²⁰ V. L. Menage, "Notes and Communications: Sidelights on the *Devshirme* from Idris and Sa'uddin," *BSOAS* 18, no. 1 (1956):182.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 183.

accepted indeed, since the conscriptions were from among free *zimmis*, who were paying poll tax (*cizye*) and land tax (*harac*), and were under the protection of the sultan.

Another argument, which is probably the strongest, is that the Ottoman state formalized the idea of conscription among the *zimmis* as allowable by law, claiming that it was a form of tribute in kind. According to Islamic law, a person who acquires *zimmi* status has to pay two types of taxes: *cizye* (from the root word *ceza*, meaning punishment), and *harac*. Abdulkadir Özcan argues that *cizye* was not taken from women, children, or the elderly, but only from those who could be soldiers. Therefore, whenever there is a need, the state should maintain the right to require military service in lieu of *cizye*.²² In other words, the ones who were conscripted were the ones selected to pay their head tax in kind through military service rather than paying in cash. Inalcık also stresses the fact that the relatives of boys who were conscripted for the janissaries were exempt from *cizye*.²³ However, I have not seen evidence supporting such an exemption. Still, the argument for considering the forced-levy of Christian boys for military service as a form of *cizye* in kind seems to be the most plausible explanation for how the Ottomans legitimized the *devshirme* system.

Acknowledging the *zimmi* status of children generates another problem: religious conversion. Islamic law forbids enforced conversion. However, these children were converted to Islam during their conscription. Özcan explains this procedure according to a *hadis*, “every child was born pure,” which is the same *hadis* Idris Bitlisi used to argue the legality of the system.²⁴ Özcan maintains that this led Ottoman legal specialists to conclude that every child was born Muslim and then learned their parents’ religion. It would therefore be legal to convert a child before he reaches puberty. Özcan asserts that the upper limit for male puberty

²² Abdulkadir Özcan, “*Devşirme*,” *DIA*, vol. 9 (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1988), 256.

²³ Halil İnalcık, “Osmanlılar’da Cizye,” *DIA*, vol. 8, 47.

²⁴ *her çocuk fitrat üzere doğar*. Özcan, “*Devşirme*,” 256; *kullu mevludın yuledü ala fitratı’l-Islam*. Idris Bitlisi, *Heşt Bihişt*, vol 1., eds. Mehmet Karataş, Selim Kaya, and Yaşar Baş (Ankara: Betav, no publication date), 248.

is 18 according to Ebu Hanife, but, as it will be seen in this chapter, boys who had already reached puberty were also conscripted through the *devshirme* system in the seventeenth century.

To sum up, the issue of the legality of the *devshirme* system remains unresolved. It is probable that a deeper examination of legal writings from the time of the establishment of the system could lead us to firmer conclusions. This leads to the paradoxical problem that only once we determine the originating time period for the system can we locate the legal writings related to it.

1.2. The Conscription of Children as *Devshirmes*

1.2.a. The Selection of Boys

How then did the recruitment process for this military-administrative strata work? Who were selected as *devshirmes*? What were the considerations of the state in establishing the selection criteria? How was the system perceived by the locals subjected to the conscriptions?

From the point of view of the state, two main principles evolved in the selection process: (1) effectiveness (2) the ethnic origins of the children. The effectiveness principle worked in two ways. First, the state did not want to exploit the human resources of an area to the extent that an economic drawback occurred. According to *Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyân*, it was forbidden to take the only son of a family, or more than one boy from the same family; and only one boy could be taken from every forty households. Uzunçarşılı states that “the one in forty” application was rarely used, but the basis for his statement is unclear.²⁵ Machiel Kiel demonstrated that the ratio applied in the old *kaza* of Salona, the ancient Amphissa (area around the famous Oracle of Delphi), was one in two hundred in the 1603-4 conscription. His research also confirms that the cities and even the villages from which the boys were

²⁵ Uzunçarşılı, *Kapıkulu Ocakları*, vol. 1, 16.

conscripted were chosen very systematically. In his attempt to map the conscription process in Athens and its surroundings, he realizes that sometimes the conscription officers were crossing a very mountainous area to arrive at a village in order to gather only a few boys, although they had the option of going to a closer village that was relatively easier to reach.²⁶ This suggests that there may indeed have been efforts not to choose too many boys from a compact area. But we do not have more detailed information on how the ratio of selected boys to the population of the area is determined.²⁷ The needs of both the state and the village determined the number of children to be taken. The regulations state that those who were needed to continue cultivating the land were not to be taken. Also, children who were needed to labor in state lands were not taken.²⁸ For example, during the 1603-4 conscription, a Christian village called Egerciler, in Bursa, declared that they were responsible for providing sheep to the capital, and the children of the village were very much needed as shepherds. They asserted that even though they were not obliged to give any children for the army, the officers took some anyway, and that they should be returned. A decree returns the children back to the villagers.²⁹ The *Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyân* also states that the children of those working in the mines were not taken.

This kind of benevolent leniency in conscription was not only important for the villages but also for the state. The children were seen as human resources from which the best use should be derived. Therefore, the most promising children were used in various fields

²⁶ Based on personal discussions with Prof. Machiel Kiel.

²⁷ The previously accepted view by the Bulgarian scholarship on the Ottomans' impact on the Balkan cities was that the cities were devastated and deserted by Ottoman invasions. The local people were exterminated, taken into slavery, or hid away to the mountains that Turks re-populated the areas. One of the first and most prominent Balkanists before and after the World War II, K. Jireček was the adamant supporter of this thesis: Konstantin Jireček, *Geschichte der Bulgaren* (Prag: Hildesheim, 1876); Andrej Protić, *Denacionalizirane i Vāzraždane na bālgarskoto izkustvo* (Sofia, 1927); Petār K. Petrov, *Asimilatorskata politika na turskite zavoevateli* (Sofia, 1962); and for the discussion of this literature see Machiel Kiel, *Art and Society of Bulgaria in the Turkish Period* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1985).

²⁸ *Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyân*, 138.

²⁹ BKS, A 155, no. 1131 (1012/1603).

according to their strengths. To ensure this, the state set up high criteria for the selection of the children: able-bodied, good-looking, and clever boys were selected.³⁰ As well as physical competence, their social and psychological states were taken into consideration. They should be unmarried, rural dwellers, with no artisanal skills. The state was looking for candidates that could be easily assimilated into the system. Strong social ties such as marriage, or skills that would give a boy economic independence, were considered a handicap. Boys who went to Istanbul and came back were not wanted, for they would be too vigilant (*çok yüz görmüş ve bi haya olur*); orphans were also not accepted because they were believed to be greedy, and lacking a proper upbringing.³¹ The regulation also stated that tall (*tavilü'l-kame*) boys should not be taken since they would be goofy (*ahmak*), or short ones (*kasır*) since they would be obstinate (*fitne*).³² They were looking for boys that were submissive to authority, and that could be more easily trained.

The second principle involved the ethnic origins of the children. Predominantly Serbs, Greeks, and Albanians were recruited. Jews, Gypsies, Kurds, Persians and Turks could not be *devshirmes*.³³ This differentiation can partly be explained by the strict Sharia prohibition against enslaving Muslims. The importance of not conscripting Muslim boys can be seen in the criteria of not taking circumcised boys. Circumcision was seen as one of the signs that indicated a boy could be Muslim. However, being non-Muslim was not a criteria exempt from reversal. It is well known that, based on the special, long-standing permission of Mehmed II, conscription of Bosnian Muslim boys was permitted.³⁴

³⁰ *Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan*, 139.

³¹ *Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan*, 138.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Ibid.*, 143.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 141.

Even so, the exclusion of certain groups of non-Muslims from the *devshirme* is puzzling. These constraints on the ethnic background of the boys are perhaps indicative of how the state defined “us,” the Ottomans, and whom it rejected as the “other.” Here, the definition of the “other” is provided by ethnic stereotyping, e.g., considering Jews as being unsuitable for warfare for being townspeople, or Gypsies as unreliable.³⁵

Another reason for preferring certain ethnic origins and Christians was to enable the dismantling of clan ties and dissolving of old traditions. Being cut off from their traditional bonds and converted to Islam made these boys receptive to a new identity formation that would otherwise be more problematic. The *Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan* stresses that the levied boys should not be Turks, because they would be more powerful due to gaining ‘*askeri*’ status, and would abuse this power by harassing the people back in the villages from which they came.³⁶ Here there is a differentiation between possible Muslim levies and Christians: alienation of the Christian conscripts because of their conversion. It was important to alienate the levies from their origins and forcing them to change their religion was the strongest way to accomplish that.

The success of this assimilation project is debatable. It is known that many *devshirmes* did not lose contact with their villages and some who were raised in the Ottoman system invested in and endowed their hometowns. Sokollu Mehmet Pasha renewed the Serbian Orthodox Church by declaring the restoration of the Peć Patriarchate during his third vizierate (1561-1565) and supported Makarije Sokolović as a Patriarch of Serbia, who is reported to be either his brother, nephew, or first cousin. He also endowed a renowned bridge to his hometown Višegrad, while Koçi Bey, in accordance with his will, was buried in his

³⁵ Wittek, “Devshirme and Shari’a,” 278;

³⁶ *Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan*, 138.

birthplace of Gumulcine (in the Thrace region of modern Greece).³⁷ Yet it can be assumed that generally, they were alienated from their former lives enough to remain in the Ottoman system. Transformation of identity and assimilation were only part of the reason that conscripts did not reestablish old ties. The main factors in assuring their loyalty to the empire were the new solidarities a *devshirme* built in Ottoman society. They were assimilated to Ottoman society and defined themselves with an Ottoman identity that had roots in a different culture. They maintained some old ties and traditions to a certain degree but were still integrated enough to not to leave the Ottoman system.³⁸ No matter what the outcome, it was certain that the state aimed for an assimilation project, and within that assimilative system the *devshirmes* did not have much choice but to adapt.

1.2.b. Methods of Avoiding Child Levy

There was no one single attitude toward the conscription of boys. The decrees sent to the areas show the state's insistence on not accepting anyone into the *devshirme* system who did not meet the criteria, which shows us that there were boys who wanted to take their chances within the system. Given that 41 percent of the boys were 18 or above in the 1603-34 conscription — probably this conscription register was reflecting the seventeenth century — it is very likely that youths who did not have a large enough share of the family farm might find the system appealing. Many parents were happy to have their sons chosen, thinking that they would escape from poverty, and have the possibility of a career.³⁹ Moreover, there is a

³⁷ Gilles Veinstein, "Sokollu Mehmed Pasha," *El²*, vol. 9 (Leiden: Brill, 1986), 706-711, especially 706 and 708; Lewis Thomas, *A Study of Naima*, ed. Norman Itzkowitz (New York: New York University Press), 9, 20-22.

³⁸ Metin Kunt argues that due to these maintained old ties a solidarity based on origin in Ottoman society. He also presents various examples of maintained ties. Metin Kunt, "Ethnic-Regional (Cins) Solidarity in the Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Establishment," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 5, no. 3 (1974): 233-239.

³⁹ Domenico Trevisano, "Relazione, 1554," in Eugenio Alberi ed., *Relazioni Degli Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato*, vol. 1, (Firenze, 1840) 130; Lorenzo Bernardo, "Relizione, 1592" in *ibid.*, 332.

documented case where parents asked the sultan to consider their children eligible for recruitment: during the reign of Sultan Mehmed II, Bosnians were known to have asked to be conscripted, and as is seen in our register, Muslim boys were indeed levied from Bosnia.⁴⁰

However, the general tendency seems to be to avoid *devshirme* in every way possible. One way to do this was through recourse to legal rights. In the privileges Mehmed II gave to the Genoese in Galata during the siege of Istanbul, the Sultan declares that he will never “on any account carry off their children or any young man for the janissary corps.”⁴¹ Also, *zimmi*s, Christian subjects of the empire, applied for exemptions from the child levy in addition to exemptions from extraordinary *avarız* taxes and other taxes that were owed specifically by Christians. One example of this was the village of Egregli, mentioned earlier, which claimed that it was in tremendous need of future shepherds.⁴² A decree sent to Bursa for the 1603-4 conscription mentions that there were villagers who did not want to give their children away; they claimed that they were the *re‘aya* of waqf lands and that they were exempt from taxes and the child-levy. Harsh language was used in the decree, making it clear that no exemption would be made to those villagers, even if they had held an exemption right

⁴⁰ *Kavanin-i Yenigeriyan*, 141. When Mehmed II conquered Bosnia the entire community converted to Islam, in order to honor this behavior Fatih asked them to wish for whatever they wanted and they wanted to be conscripted.

⁴¹ Vryonis gives the translation of the related part of the ‘Capitulations of Galata’: “Since the archontes of Galata have sent to the Porte of my domains their honored archontes...who did obeisance to my imperial power and became my slaves [the original Greek text has *kuls* as slaves], let them (the Genoese) retain their possessions...their wives, children, and prisoners at their own disposal....They shall pay neither *commercium* nor *kharaj*....They shall be permitted to retain their churches... and never will I on any account carry off their children or any young man for the Janissary corps.” Speros Vryonis, “Isidore Glabas and the Turkish *Devshirme*” *Speculum* 3, no. 3 (1956): 433-443, esp. 440-441.

⁴² BKS, A 155, no. 1131 (1012/1603).

in the past.⁴³ A similar claim from Yeni Pazar argues that they had a decree exempting them from giving children away as *devshirmes*, and it was again rejected by the state.⁴⁴

Another important factor to keep in mind regarding the attempts by villages to receive exemption rights from giving boys as *devshirmes* was that in many cases, it was initiated by those who owned villages as *hasses*, *zeamets*, and *timars*, or as a property of a waqf. These land-owners saw the young population as human resources that kept the production of the area going. Therefore, excessive conscription would cause disturbance among the land-owners. The exemption from giving *devshirme* boys to the state was sought by the waqf owners themselves in cases where the village lacked an exemption right. In 1056/1646, the trustee of the waqf of grand vizier Mustafa Pasha requested from the authorities that the *devshirme* officers should not disrupt the locals of the villages in Talanda, since they belonged to the Mustafa Pasha waqf and were exempt from *devshirme*.⁴⁵ The same year, the sister of Ibrahim I Ayşe Sultan petitioned that the officer responsible for collecting *devshirmes* collected money from the villages that she owned as a fief conferred on the royal women (*paşmaklık hass*) in Yanya. The officer was warned by a decree and threatened with severe

⁴³ BKS, A 155, no. 1128 (1012/1603).

⁴⁴ *Yenipazar kadısına hüküm ki: Memalik-i mahruseden yeniçerilik için oğlan cem' etmek kanun-ı mu'ayyen olmağın Dergah-ı mu'allam yayabaşlarından Üsküplü Mahmud zide kadruhu ile mufassal hükm-i hümayunum irsal olunup hükm-i şerifümle 'avarız-ı divaniye ve tekalifden mu'af için hükm-i şerif virilen kura halkından ta'allül itdirmeyüp kanun üzre oğlan alup ve oğlan alınmakdan aynı ile mu'af olup ol babda dahı hükm-i şerif virilen kura halkından dahı kanun üzre oğlan cem' idüp oğlan virmemek için hükm-i şerif vardır diyü ta'allül itdirmeyüb ol hükmi dahı alup mühürleyüp Südde-i Sa'adet'üme gönderesin diyü mastur u mukayyed iken taht-ı kazanda Ma'den halkı: "Elimizde oğlan virmemek için hüküm vardır ve hükümde Boğdan halkı diyü yazılmışdır, Ma'den yazılmamışdır" diyü oğlan virmekte ta'allül ü inad itdükleri ve muma-ileyh yayabaşına te'addi itdükleri muma-ileyh Südde-i sa'adetime arz eyledi. İmdi, emr-i şerifümde ol asl hükmi olanlardan ta'allül itdirmeyüp oğlan alup hükmi dahı alup mühürleyüp Südde-i sa'adetime gönderesin diyü umum üzere mukayyed iken Ma'den halkı bu vechile ta'allül ü inad ide, sen men' itmeyüp ihmal ü müsaheleden naşidür. Buyurdum ki: Hükm-i şerifüm vusul buldukda, eger Ma'den halkıdır ve eger gayrıdır, kimseye ta'allül ü bahane itdirmeyüb emr-i sabık hükümlerin dahı alup mühürleyüp Südde-i sa'adet'üme gönderesin ve ol inad idenlerden yayabaşı da'va-yı hakk eyler ise Şer'ile görüp ol babda emr-i Şer' ne ise icra idüp ve inad idenler kimler ise isimleri ile yazup bildüresin. Mühimme 3, eds. Nezihi Aykut, İdris Bostan, Murat Cebecioğlu, Feridun Emecen, Mücteba İkgürel, Mehmet İpşirli, Cevdet Küçük, Özcan Mert, Abdülkadir Özcan, İlhan Şahin, Hüdaî Şentürk, Mustafa Çetin Varlık (Ankara: Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı, 1993), 169-170, no. 369 (967/1559).*

⁴⁵ *Mühimme Defteri* 90, ed. Nezihi Aykut, İdris Bostan, Feridun Emecen, Yusuf Halaçoğlu, Mehmet İpşirli, İsmet Miroğlu, Abdülkadir Özcan, and İlhan Şahin (İstanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1993), 240, no. 301 (1056/1646).

punishment.⁴⁶ In 981/1573 some villages in Filibe were exempted from giving *akıncıs* since they were owned by the soup-kitchen waqf of the Sultan in Üsküdar.⁴⁷

People also avoided service illegally. Villagers sometimes tried to prevent the conscription of village boys by falsifying baptism registers, circumcising them or declaring them as being married.⁴⁸ There are documents revealing that some levied children escaped back to their homelands and converted back to Christianity. Decrees were sent to the officers in the homelands of the escapees in order to bring them back to Istanbul.⁴⁹

Those who could not make it back to their places of birth hid in other places. A decree sent to the judge of Mirali and Marmara islands in 1567 shows that the runaways were protected and hidden by the locals.⁵⁰ This implies that some people resented the conscription system, and that these boys were sometimes protected from the state, probably by non-Muslim locals. The state was quite meticulous in tracking down runaways. There are reports listing runaways for 1626, and one such report shows that 404 children, '*acemi* boys, went missing.⁵¹ Not only were the children who ran away tracked, the state also took responsibility for finding children who were kidnapped en route to Istanbul. As one decree from 1590 shows, a child named Sotiri, then Hızır, was conscripted from Limni and was captured by the enemy. He was found in a ship (*kadırga*) that Rodos Beg and Kaya Beg seized from the enemy, and was placed among the state captives (*miri esirs*) to do penal servitude in ships. It

⁴⁶ *Mühimme Defteri* 90, 163-164, no. 191, 192 (1056/1646).

⁴⁷ BOA, MD 23: 330, no. 733 (981/1573).

⁴⁸ *Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan*, 141.

⁴⁹ BOA, MD 7: 336, no. 966 (975/1567); BOA, MD 7: 799 no. 2187 (976/1568); BOA, MD 7: 955, no. 2632 (976/1568); BOA, MD 30: 108, no. 263 (985/1577).

⁵⁰ BOA, MD 7: 12, no. 45 (975/1567).

⁵¹ BOA, IE. AS: no. 242 (1036/ 1626).

was ordered that the child be sent to Istanbul.⁵² Some parents went a step further to get their children back. In 1564, villagers from Sis came to Istanbul and took their children back.⁵³ The villagers in the *kazas* of Karaman hid their children by collaborating with the appointed officers during the 1574 conscription.⁵⁴

At times, reactions were more collective. The decree sent to Bursa for the 1603-4 conscription mentions that leaders of the community such as *voyvodas*, judges, and *subaşı*s formed lobby groups and negotiated with the conscription officers to prevent their children from being taken. Sometimes it became brutal. In 1540, for example, a village in Iskenderiye (Alexandria in Albania) attacked and wounded the officers who came to conscript boys.⁵⁵ In 1558, villagers around Ilbasan refused to give children to the officers and rebelled against the state, and were ordered to be severely punished.⁵⁶

To sum up, it is clear that the state was meticulous and very strict in applying the selection criteria for conscriptions, and following up after they became novices. Its priority was to assure the continuance and efficiency of the system. Families who lost children, on the other hand, experienced *devshirme* more personally and emotionally, because of their bond to their children. They sometimes even went so far as to pursue legal avenues and emphasized the need for the children to stay home in order to preserve economic efficiency of the region. Occasionally, desperate families even acted more boldly, formally rebelling against the state.

⁵² BOA, MD 24: 28, no. 84 (981/1626).

⁵³ BOA, MD 6: 302, no. 551 (972/1564).

⁵⁴ BOA, MD 23: 239, no 509 (981/1573).

⁵⁵ BOA, MD 5: 159, no. 947 (966/ 1558).

⁵⁶ *Acemi oğlanu devşirmekten dönen yeniçerilere saldırdıkları...öteden beri isyan üzere olduklarıbaşkalarına ibret olacak şekilde haklarından geline.* BOA, MD 5: 161, no. 959 (956/1558).

1.2.c. The Conscription Process

It is known that the conscription process began at the request for a new levy by the Agha of the Janissaries; a decree was issued indicating the number of boys needed and the locales to conduct recruitment.⁵⁷ Unfortunately, such a decree is missing for the 1603-4 conscription. However, the decree recorded in the Bursa court registers, given to the janissary officer – in this case a *turnacıbaşı* (73rd regiment of the janissary army) – who was sent to the conscription area, is preserved in the archives. The Venetian ambassador Bernardo Navagero reports in 1553 that these officers, who were sent to various regions for conscription by decrees given to them, asked village priests for a list of baptized boys upon their arrival in town, and made the selection through comparison of this list with the actual boys gathered in the town center.⁵⁸ However, our decree does not mention baptism lists: it orders fathers to bring every boy fifteen to twenty years old from the villages, counties (*bilad*), waqf lands, and *timars*, to the *turnacıbaşı*. The boys were scrupulously selected at the village center by the janissary officer. The decree warns the officer about those who try to enroll themselves without meeting the criteria. Also, it states that the punishment for those who try to hide children from the officers is execution.

When the desired number of boys had been chosen, they were organized into groups of one hundred, one hundred and fifty, or two hundred for transport to the capital. These groups were called *sürüs* (herds, batches). The children were dressed in *kızıl aba* (red clothing) and *külâh* (a conical shaped hat) in order to prevent any escapes or kidnappings

⁵⁷ Uzunçarşılı basis this on a decree about 2 person who attempted to collect boys as a *devshirme* with a fake decree. Uzunçarşılı, *Kapıkulu Ocakları*, vol. 1, 14-15. Another decree indicating that the officers came with decrees given by the state mentions that the villagers from Ma'den resists to the conscription claiming that they had an exemption, and they also indicate that even if they would not have an exemption the decree orders the officers to collect boys from among Bogdan but not Ma'den. *Mühimme* 3, 169-170, no 369 (966/1559).

⁵⁸ Bernardo Navagero, "Relazione, 1553," in Eugenio Alberi ed., *Relazione*, 3rd serice, vol. 1, (Firenze, 1855), 49; Albert Howe Lybyer, *The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Magnificent* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1913), 52.

during the transfer.⁵⁹ It is known that the cost of clothing and transportation was charged to the families of the levied children.⁶⁰ Another precaution was to record carefully the characteristics of each selected boy in two registers, so that if they tried to escape they could be brought back. Forgery could be prevented through comparison of the two registers, one of which stayed with the *devshirme* officer while the second was sent to Istanbul with the *sürücü* (the officer who brought the boys to Istanbul).⁶¹ Also, the decree mentions that during transportation to Istanbul, the boys should be guarded closely, and they should not camp at the same place twice nor accept any food from the locals.⁶² These precautions attest to the generally involuntary nature of the procedure, as well as concern on the part of the authorities to prevent any loss of boys through kidnappings during the journey.

When the *sürü* was brought to the capital, the children were allowed to rest for two to three days. According to a decree that reiterates the regulation for 976 deported non-Muslims residing in 14 neighborhoods of Istanbul, these residents were responsible for feeding the boys from the time they were brought to the capital to the time they were registered.⁶³ After resting and spending some time with these Christian families, they were stripped in the presence of the Chief of Janissaries and examined for bodily defects. They were circumcised and distributed to different locations according to their abilities and looks. The talented ones were placed in palace schools to be educated to become administrators in various capacities.

⁵⁹ Uzunçarşılı, *Kapıkulu Ocakları*, vol. 1, 21.

⁶⁰ *Kanunname*, Atıf Efendi Kütüphanesi, 51, no. 1734.

⁶¹ *Her oğlan ki alınur kendü adı ve babası ve köy ve sipahisi adları ve oğlanın hilye ve evsafı ve 'alaim yazub mufassıl defter ile defter ol-vechle kayd eyledikten sonra gaybet edecek olursa kim idiüğü deftere müracaat olunub malum olundukda gerü ele getürüle.* BKS, A 155, no. 1128 (1012/1603).

⁶² *oğlanları Istanbula getürür iken kondurmayub kimesneden bir habbe nesne almayub ve ta'arruz etdirmeyüb togru yoldan konub ama yolu konakları şaşırub bir köye tekrar konmayalar ki köy halkı yeniçeri oğlanlarına etmek virmegin ve alub zabt eylemegin mazayaka lazım gelmeye.* BKS, A. 155, no. 1128 (1012/1603).

⁶³ *Kanunname*, Atıf Efendi Kütüphanesi, 51b-52a, no. 1734. Their other responsibilities include searching the palaces at the time of a campaign to see if there is any weaponry to be sent out, or to carry the arrived weaponry, to guard the *mehterhane* in At Meydanı, to maintain the hayloft in the palace stable (*Hassa Anbar*), and to clean up places like, At Meydanı, palaces where novice Janissaries residing, and the Sultan Beyazid's Harem.

The rest were recorded as novice boys (*'acemi oğlans*) to whom we will return later in this chapter.

1.2.d. A Closer Look at the 1603-4 Conscription

2,604 boys were taken in the conscription of 1603-4. The register was organized into 20 groups of boys taken from Rumeli, the Balkans, Albania, Bosnia, and, in Anatolia, from the area around Bursa which represents the first column in table 1.1. These are the numbers I gave to the groups in order to show the organization of the register.

The beginning and the final dates of conscription were recorded at the end of the lists, and the names of officers responsible for selection and transportation were given with the seal of the head conscription officer (*ser sürücü*). However, this is not consistent information. Some groups lack the dates, the name of the officers, or the seal. I have detected 4 seals of head officers who were sent to 4 different provinces, but the only name of an officer sent to Rumeli mentioned in the register is: *Serseksoncu* Mustafa. Since I could not detect the name of the officers, I gave numbers to the seals. Accordingly, the head officers responsible for conscriptions from the Avlonya area have seal number 2, Anatolia seal number 3⁶⁴ and Bosnia seal number 4.

The *sürü* numbers are not adequate to explain the process either. Only half of the groups were given *sürü* numbers, and the rest were not identified. The numbers were not the ones given to correspond with the conscription places, the dates, or the officers in charge. Therefore, they are inadequate in reflecting the conscription process since it is not possible to determine on what basis these numbers were given.

⁶⁴ It is understood from a document in Bursa court records that the officers title was *turnacıbaşı*, but his name was not indicated. BKS A. 155, no. 1128 (1012/1603).

Table 1.1: The Conscription Groups as Listed in the *Eşkal Defteri* of 1012/1603-4

Given # of the Batch	Province	# of Boys	Sürü No	Beginning Date of Collection	End Date of Collection	Seal No
1.	Rumeli	105	3	? Şaban 1012 ? January 1604	3 Ramazan 1012 3 February 1604	1
2.	Rumeli	105	2	17 Şaban 1012 19 January 1604	17 Şaban 1012 19 January 1604	1
3.	Bursa	131	-			No seal
4.	Avlonya	194	-	Evahir-i Şevval 1012 end of March 1604		2
5.	Anadolu (bursa)	165	4	1012 1604		3
6.	Avlonya	130	-	Evasıt-ı Ramazan 1012 mid-February 1604		2
7.	Bursa	125	-			Not clear
8.	Rumeli	128	4	1 Ramazan 1012 1 February 1604	19 Ramazan 1012 19 February 1604	1
9.	Delvine	122	4	Evail-i Ramazan 1012 Early February 1604		2 seals not clear
10.	Bosna	132	4	Ramazan 1012 February 1604		4
11.	Rumeli	127	5	20 Ramazan 1012 20 February 1604	14 Şevval 1012 15 March 1604	1
12.	Rumeli	147	6	14 Şevval 1012 15 March 1604	13 Zilkade 1012 12 April 1604	1
13.	Anadolu	110	-	Şaban 1012 January 1604		Not clear

Given # of the Batch	Province	# of Boys	Sürü No	Beginning Date of Collection	End Date of Collection	Seal No
14.	Rumeli	145	-	Evail-i Ramazan 1012 Early February 1604		No seal
15.	Rumeli	109	-	Evasıt Ramazan? 1012 mid-February? 1604	5 Şaban 1012 7 January 1604	No seal
16.	Rumeli	118	7	3 Zilkade 1012 2 April 1604	15 Zilkade 1012 14 April 1604	1
17.	Ohri	150	-	Evasıt -ı Zilhicce 1012 mid-May 1604		2
18.	Bosna	159	-	Receb 1013 November 1604		4
19.	Bosna	141	-	Rebiyülahır 1013 August 1604		4
20.	Bosna	105	-	Zilhicce 1012 May 1604		No seal

Source: BOA, MAD 07600

Therefore, I chose to outline the conscription process according to the identified provinces in the registers and the dates of the conscriptions provided. This data reveals that there were four groups of officers working in four different regions. Before we go into the examination of these four groups, one last thing to be mentioned regarding the register is the nature of the data provided on boys. The register lists all the conscripted boys according to their given Muslim name, former original name, the name of their parents, and their physical characteristics. An analysis of their physical appearance is not analyzed in this study; however, Prof. Hedda Reindl-Kiel's examination of a sample of 601 boys reveals that 40 percent of boys were tall, 60 percent had medium height. There were no short ones and 2

unidentified. An interesting finding from her examination is that 395 boys (66 %) had scars, and 24 (4%) had pock-marks. Reindl-Kiel attributes this to the fact that the officers chose boys that had a tendency for fighting.⁶⁵

The first group worked under *Serseksoncu* Mustafa in Rumeli. There were 7 groups gathered and sent to Istanbul separately (table 1.2). The Rumeli group is the best-recorded, and we can trace the route of the officers clearly. They started conscripting from the area composed of Silivri, Rodoscuk, Migalkara, Kavak, and Gelibolu and sent 109 boys to Istanbul; took another 105 children from Midillu Island; they continued to the area of Ilmiye, İnöz, Keşan, İpsala, Megri, Firecik, and Dimetoka to conscript 104 children; they then moved further west to Gümilcine, Yenice-i Karasu, Taşyüzü, Baraketlü, Pravişte, Draman, Kavala, and Zihna to take 168; the fifth group had 127 children from Siroz, Timurhisar, Selanik, Avrethisar, Yenice-i Vardar, Vodane; then they moved to the south along Aegean Sea, to the towns of Karaferye, Alasonya, Dominik, Tırhala, Yenişehir, Fenar, and Serfiçe; and the last 128 children were gathered around Izdin, Modenç, Salona, Atina, and Agriboz (map 1.1). The entire process lasted 4 months.

Another group of officers conscripted children around Bosnia (table 1.3). There was no specific route that can be traced and the conscription took almost a year.

⁶⁵ I would like to thank to Prof. Hedda Reindl-Kiel for sharing this unpublished study with me.

Table 1.2: Conscription Groups from the Province of Rumeli, 1012/1603-4

Given # of Batches	Kazas	Collection Purpose	Number of Children	Average Age	Sürü	Beginning Date of Collection	End Date□of Collection	Seal
15	Silivri, ?, Rodoscuk, Migalkara, Kavak, Gelibolu	<i>Ez-gayr</i>	109	16.15	-	Evasıt-ı Ramazan 1012 mid- February 1604	5 Şaban 1012 7 January 1604	1
2	Bozcaada, Movolak ?, Midillu, Kalonya	<i>Ez-gayr</i>	105	15.26	2	17 Şaban 1012 19 January 1604	17 Şaban 1012 19 January 1604	1
1	Ilmiye, İnöz, Keşan, İpsala, Megri, Firecik, Dimetoka	<i>Ez-gayr</i>	104	16	3	? Şaban 1012 ? January 1604	3 Ramazan 1012 3 February 1604	1
8	Gümilcine, Yenice-i karasu, Taşyüzü, Baraketlü, Pravişte ?, Draman, Kavala, Zihna	<i>Ez-gayr</i>	168	15.92	4	Gurre-i Ramazan 1012 1 January 1604	19 Ramazan 1012 19 February 1604	1
11	Siroz, Timurhisar, Selanik, Avrethisar, Yenice-i Vardar, Vodane	<i>Ez-gayr</i>	127	16.25	5	20 Ramazan 1012 20 February 1604	14 Şevval 1012 15 March 1604	1
12	Karaferye, Alasonya, Dominik, Tırhala, Yenişehir, Fenar Serfiçe	<i>Ez-gayr</i>	147	16.25	6	14 Şevval 1012 15 March 1604	13 Zilkade 1012 12 April 1604	1
16	Izdin, Modenç, Salona, Atina, Agriboz,	<i>Ez-gayr</i>	128	16.55	7	3 Zilkade 1012 2 April 1604	15 Zilkade 1012/ 14 April 1604	1

Source: BOA, MAD 0760.

Four groups of children were taken almost every 3 months approximately from the same regions. This area can be marked by the towns Hersek, Mostar, Nüvesin, Balagay, Yeni Pazar, Imočka, Foča, Vişegrad, Saray, Teşene, Çayniçe, Yeni Pazar, and Bosna (map 1.2). The children conscripted from the province of Bosnia were mostly Muslims.

As can be seen in table 1.3, 410 children were Muslims, and only 82 were Christians. This was due to special permission given in response to the request of Bosnians by Mehmed II. The Muslim boys taken from the area were called *poturoğulları* (Bosnian Muslim boys who were conscripted for the janissary corps), and taken only into service under *bostancıbaşı*, in the palace gardens.⁶⁶ Another interesting note in the conscriptions from Bosnia is the record that was most likely made after the arrival of the children to Istanbul, saying *şekine-i arz-ı yahudi* (suspected to be Jews) for 7 children. The regulations for janissaries denote that in such cases the entire batch would be sent to the arsenal. This note also indicates that even in the seventeenth century the criterion on excluding certain ethnicities from the *devshirme* was still enforced.

The Avlonya group that was sent to what is now modern Albania started to conscript boys from the south of the region (table 1.4). Again, the conscription process lasted 4 months. They levied 122 boys from Merdak, Eregri-kasrı, and Pogonya; moved to Premedi to take 130 boys; conscripted 194 children from the *kazas* of Avlonya, Müzakiye, and Belgrad, and finally from Ilbasan and Işpat they took 122 boys. One of the groups from the Manastır and Pirlepe area under the province of Rumeli seems to have been conscripted

⁶⁶ Uzunçarşılı, *Kapıkulu Ocakları*, vol. 1, 18.

Table 1.3: Conscription Groups from the Province of Bosnia, 1012/1603-4

Given # of Batch	Kazas	Collection Purpose	Numbe r of Childr en	Chr/Mus/ Suspected Jews	Age	Sürü	Beginning Date of Collection	End Date of Collection	Seal
10	Prijedor?. ? Mitroftça, Yeni Pazar	<i>Ez-gayr</i>	132	36/96	16.9 7	4	Ramazan 1012 February 1604		4
20	Hersek, Mostar, Nüvesin, Balagay, Yeni Pazar, Imočka, Brezidin?, Tinbid?, Foça, Vişegrad, Saray, Brenoca?, Gabala, Bosna, Saray	<i>Ez-gayr</i>	67	11/51/5	16.7 0	-	Zilhicce 1012 May 1604		no seal
19	Bosna, Saray, Nüvesin, Teşene, Çayniçe, Yeni Pazar, Taşlıca, Tuzla, Mostar, Foça, Balagay, Çelebi Pazarı, Vişegrad	<i>Ez-gayr</i>	141	14/125/+2	16.7 3	-	Rebiyülahır 1013 Sebtember 1604		4
18	Bosna, Saray, Yeni Pazar, Foça, Vişegrad, Mostar, Çaynice, Nüvesin	<i>Ez-gayr</i>	159	21/138	16.4 9	-	Receb 1013 December 1604		4

Source: BOA, MAD 07600.

Table 1.4: Conscription Groups from Avlonya Area, 1012/1603-4

Given # of Batch	Kazas	Collection Purpose	Number of Children	Age	Sürü	Beginning Date of Collection	End Date of Collection	Seal
9 (Delvine)	Merdak?, Eregri-kasrı, Pogonya	<i>Ez-beray</i>	122	17.55	4	Evail-i Ramazan 1012 Early February 1604		Two seals
6 (Avlonya)	Premedi	<i>Ez-beray</i>	130	17	-	Evasıt-ı Ramazan 1012 Mid-February 1604		2
4 (Avlonya)	Belgrad, Avlonya, Müzakiye	<i>Ez-beray</i>	194	18.13	-	Evahir-i Şevval 1012 End of March 1604		2
17 (Ohri)	Ilbasan, Işpat, ?	<i>Ez-beray</i>	150	17.97	-	Evasıt-ı Zilhicce 1012 Mid-May 1604		2
14 (Rumeli) ⁶⁷	Manastır, Pirlepe	<i>Ez-beray</i>	145	16.41	-	Evail-i Ramazan 1012 Early February 1604		No seal

Source: BOA, MAD 07600.

⁶⁷ This batch is recorded as the conscripted children from Rumeli, but the style of the scribe, and the route of the officers denotes that this batch is more likely collected by the officers appointed to Avlonya area.

by the Avlonya group. 145 boys were taken from this area (map 1.3). Similar to the Bosnian case, some boys in the Avlonya batch were marked as being *şekine* (suspicious).

Four batches taken from Anatolia were selected from the Christian villages around Bursa (table 1.5). This group of officers did not date the conscription in detail but it seems that it was during the month of Şaban and Ramadan. The children were picked from around Kocaeli, Iznik, Lefke, Akhisar, and Yenişehir in the first month, and in the next, from around Bursa, Mihaliç, Manyas, Bilecik, and Biga (map 1.4). This group and the conscription batch 15 from Rumeli show how surprisingly close some conscription regions were to Istanbul.

The information given on the top of lists for different batches indicates that the children were collected for different purposes. They were collected as either *ez-beray-ı gılman-ı ‘acemiyan cem’ şode* (collected for the ‘*acemi ocak*), or *ez gayr-ı gılman-ı ‘acemiyan cem’ şode* (collected for service outside the ‘*acemi ocaks*). The group from Avlonya was collected to be ‘*acemis*. The Bursa conscriptions were noted as *gılman-ı ‘acemiyan* only, therefore, they were taken with the goal of becoming ‘*acemis*. The groups from Rumeli and Bosnia were intended to be used as non-‘*acemis*. It is not very clear what this indicates, but when we combine this with the fact that Bosnians, as *poturoğulları* were only used in the palace: these boys were intended to be taken directly into palaces. Therefore, in the 1603-4 conscription the number of children who were intended for use in the palace service was 1,387 out of 2,604.

Table 1.5: Conscription Groups from the Province of Anatolia, 1012/1603-4

Given # of Batch	Kazas	Collection Purpose	Number of Children	Age	Sürü	Beginning Date of Collection	End Date of Collection	Date on The Cover	Seal
13	Kocaeli, Iznikmid, Lefke, Akhisar, Bursa- Yenişehir	<i>Gilman- acemiyan</i>	110	15.1	-	Şaban 1012 January 1604			Not clear
3	Bursa, Mihaliç		131	15.83	-			Ramazan 1012 February 1604	No seal
5	Mihaliç, Manyas, Inegöl?, Bilecik, Biga	<i>Gilman- acemiyan</i>	162	16.32	4	1012/ 1604			3
7	Bursa	<i>Gilman</i>	125	16	-			3 Ramazan 1012 3 February 1604	No seal

Source: BOA, MAD 0760.

Map 1.1: Conscriptions from Rumeli, 1012/1603-4



The map shows the geographical context of the 'Izvornik Text' within the Balkans. A red line delineates a specific area, likely the region of interest for the study. Key locations labeled include:


- North:** BELGRAD, Feth-i Islam
- Central:** Tuzla, Sokol, Ujice, Vişegrad, Istarik Eflak, Cačka, Alacahisar, Banë, Isferlik, İznepol, Şehirköy, Kolotina, Berkofça, İvrac, Niş, Birezniç, Sofya, Radomir, Samok, Köstendil, Dupniça, Bazı
- South:** Yeni Pazar, Trepçe, Piriştina, Kozniç, Kodmen, Yanova-i Kadim, Kumanova, Egri Dere, Kıratova, Usküb, Kalkandelen, İşkodra, Dukagin, İskodra
- West:** Hersek, Saray, Çelebi Pazarı, Foça, Nüvesin, Mostar
- Coastal:** Various islands and the coastline of the Adriatic Sea.

Geographical coordinates are marked: 16°E, 20°E, 44°N.

Map 1.3: Conscriptions from Avlonya, 1012/1603-4.



Map 1.4: Conscriptions from Anatolia, 1012/1603-4.



1.2.e. The Ages of the Boys

By law, childhood lasted until puberty. Although this age varies from child to child, it was usually accepted as 15 years in the court records, especially when determining the need for a legal guardian.⁶⁸ Another source we can look at to delineate age groups from birth to maturity is the *Pençik Kanunnamesi*, that is, the regulation concerning the one-fifth of war captives taken by the state.⁶⁹ The regulation determines the amount of redemption money (*bedel*) that will be taken according to age groups. Accordingly, a male from new-born to the age of 3 was called *şirhor* (the word comes from *şirhare* meaning nursing baby); a male aged from 3 to 8 was called *beççe* (small child); from 8 to 12 years old was considered a small child and called *gulamçe* (child). A *gulam* (child who reached puberty) is one who reached puberty; therefore accepting the age range of 12 to 15 as *gulams* seems logical and matches the legal applications accepting the age of 15 for the onset of puberty. When this information is compared with our register, the first group, those under 12, is less than 1 percent of the register. The age group of *gulam* corresponds to *oglan*. In the regulations it is mentioned that boys should not have beards. They should not have passed the age of puberty and reached adolescence. However, in the conscription of 1603-4 this age group of *gulam* is extended up to 20 years.⁷⁰ 42 percent of the boys in the register were 18 years old and above. And the average age of all the boys is 16.6. (graph 1.1)

The ages of the boys in the 1603-4 conscription is relatively older than what is assumed in the secondary literature, and this brings up various questions about their assimilation into their


⁶⁸ Margaret L. Meriwether, "The Rights of Children and the Responsibilities of Women, Women as Wasis in Ottoman Aleppo, 1770-1840," in Amira El Azh Sonbol ed., *Women, the Family, and Divorce Laws in Islamic History* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1996), 225.

⁶⁹ *Kanunname*, Atıf Efendi Kütüphanesi, 36a-37a, no. 1734.

⁷⁰ The *eşkal defters* from 1490s that will be examined later in this chapter show that the term *gulam* was actually used for the boys aged between 12 and 15.

new environments as well as on the transformation of the *devshirme* system during the early modern era. These will be discussed later in this chapter.

Graph 1.1: The Ratio of Age Groups in the Entire Register of 1012/1603-4



Source: BOA, MAD 07600


The register also reveals variations in the age groups selected in different regions. In Rumeli, the average age is 16. Out of 839 children conscripted from the region, 29 percent were aged 15, and 33 percent were 18. In Bosnia, the average is similar, 16.72. Out of 499 children, the highest percentage is at age 18 with 27 percent, followed by age 16 with 24 percent, and 15 with 20 percent. In Anatolia the average is 15.81. Again the most frequent age group was age 18 with 20 percent; and it is followed by ages 16 and 17, with 16 percent each. The age groups in Avlonya vary from the others: the average age is 17.41. The biggest age group is age 20 (36 percent), followed by age 18 (27 percent).

To a certain degree this difference can be explained by different officer groups doing the collection. The decree sent to Bursa ordered that boys between the ages of 15 and 20 should be conscripted.⁷¹ The officers sent to Bursa mostly chose children at the age of 15 and 16. On the other hand, the officers in Avlonya conscripted older boys. In the batch that was conscripted from Rumeli by the officers of Avlonya (table 1.3), it can be seen that the average age was 16.41, lower than those gathered around Avlonya. If it was left to the initiative of the officers, those in Avlonya might have chosen older boys from Rumeli as well. This shows that the variation in the ages of selected boys was not solely due to the preference of different officers, even if they did have an influence. Another possibility is that the officers had a general idea of where the children would be used after the conscription, and they might have made their selections accordingly, including the age. Unfortunately, however, the registers do not indicate what ages were used for what.

Another reason could be availability in a given area: the available age groups that could be conscripted without harming the economy of the region and while still meeting the selection criteria of the state.


Graph 1.2: The Ratio of Age Groups from Rumeli, 1012/1603-4

⁷¹ BKS, A. 155, no. 1128 (1012/1603).




Source: BOA, MAD 07600.

Graph 1.3: The Ratio of Age Groups from Bosnia, 1012/1603-4




Source: BOA, MAD 07600.

Graph 1.4: The Ratio of Age Groups from Anatolia, 1012/1603-4



Source: BOA, MAD 07600.

Graph 1.5: The Ratio of Age Groups from Avlonya, 1012/1603-4



Source: BOA, MAD 07600.

1.3. After Arrival in Istanbul

After the conscription process, *devshirme* boys were distributed to different locations according to their abilities and looks. It is possible to say that these boys were used in multiple ways, from state governance to soldiery, or from skilled artisanship to unqualified workers. Apart from outlining the function of the *devshirme* system, this chapter also seeks to portray the experiences of the conscripted children and boys as ‘*acemi oglans*, especially examining the work areas in which they were mainly used. In a way, this chapter examines the pre-conditions and networks that set the ground for janissaries to enter the city economy.

1.3.a. İç Oglans

Those who were selected for palace service were placed in one of four palaces: Iskender Çelebi, Galatasaray,⁷² Edirne, or Ibrahim Paşa. In these palaces the children were taught Turkish and Islamic practices, the sciences, and were given military training.⁷³ Every three to seven years, the most talented few were selected to continue their education in the Enderun and the rest were sent to the *kapıkulu* corps to become soldiers.⁷⁴

The transition of the talented to palace culture began as soon as they arrived. They were subjected to clearly defined rules of behaviour. Immediately after registration, they were introduced to officials and older pages. They were taught to be humble and polite, to show

⁷² The *iç oglans* in Galata Sarayı were placed into the others in 1675 and only 40 *bostancıs* were left there as guards. Robert Mantran, *Istanbul dans la seconde Moitié du XVIIe siècle* (Paris: Librairie Adrien Maisonneuve, 1962), 77.

⁷³ İbrahim Emiroğlu, *Tarihi Dekor İçinde Özel Dersler ve Evreleri, Saray Eğitimi, Padişahların Hoca ve Laları* (İzmir: Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1992), 33.

⁷⁴ İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı. “Acemi Oğlan,” *IA*, vol. 1 (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1978), 118; Uzunçarşılı, *Kapıkulu Ocakları*, vol. 1, 2-4. *Kapıkulu* corps were composed of *acemis*, *yeniceris*, *cebecis*, *topçus*, and *top arabacıs* as foot-soldiers, and *sipah*, *silahdar*, *sağ ulufeciler*, *sol ulufeciler*, *sag garipler*, and *sol garipler* as cavalry. To soldiers *lağımcıs*, and *humbaracıs* were added during the seventeenth century. *Devshirmes* placed to any of these regiments. Those who were graduated from the mentioned four palaces were promoted to the ranks of *sag ulufeciler*, *sol ulufeciler*, *sag garipler*, and *sol garipler* as cavalry.

reverence by holding their heads down with their hands crossed before them, and to kiss the hands of their superiors as a sign of respect. Their daily schedule was meticulously organized as each hour had its appointed task. The times for waking up, praying, eating, sleeping, exercising, and studying were all laid out. They had to walk sedately, eat slowly, bathe weekly, shave regularly, wear well-pressed clothes, and perform the five daily prayers.⁷⁵

There were five preparatory and four occupational schools in the palaces. The average period of full training was fourteen years, of which the preparatory period lasted seven or eight. The novices received a salary of seven or eight *akçes* per day whereas those in the higher ranks received ten to twelve.⁷⁶ Not all the students who graduated from preparatory school continued to the occupational schools. The great majority were appointed to lower posts in the *kapıkulu* corps and government according to their grades, or chosen for different ranks in the ruling class. The curriculum of the schools was carefully designed not only to prepare candidates for further specialization but also to supply trained personnel for appointments to military and administrative posts. N.M. Penzer argues that the palace schools functioned like regiments. They fostered a strong solidarity among the students.⁷⁷

The four occupational schools specialized in different subjects. The Expeditionary Force chamber provided mainly musical training but also taught sewing, embroidery, leatherwork, arrow-making, and gun-repair.⁷⁸ The Commissariat chamber taught students to prepare royal beverages, whereas the Treasury chamber trained pages in financial responsibilities. Lastly, the

⁷⁵ Ülker Akkutay, *Enderun Mektebi* (Ankara: Gazi Üniversitesi Gazi Eğitim Fakültesi, 1984), 127-128.

⁷⁶ Barnette Miller, *The Palace School of Muhammad the Conqueror* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 128-129.

⁷⁷ N. M. Penzer, *The Harem* (London: George G. Harrap & Co., 1936).

⁷⁸ *Ibid*, 134.

Royal Bedchamber trained those who would be responsible for the protection of the Holy Relics.⁷⁹ After their graduation, most pages were promoted to higher ranks in military or state administration. They were appointed by seniority according to the occurrence of vacancies.⁸⁰

1.3.b. ‘*Acemi oğlans*

The remainder of the conscripted boys, which is our main focus here, became ‘*acemi oğlans* and passed through a two-stage training process. We do not have detailed information about the first stage of their training. *Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan* mentions that they were hired out to Turkish families in Anatolia or Rumeli by the army — in return for payment — for approximately three to eight years.⁸¹ The regulation states that if the boy was conscripted from Rumeli he would be sent to Anatolia, and vice versa. The reason for this was to place them in locations far from their villages to prevent them from fleeing, indicating that their participation was usually not voluntary.⁸² Many other sources from histories to travelogues reiterate the existence of this practice. Koçi Bey mentions vaguely that they were sold to “Turkistan”, for 2 *flori* for four to five years.⁸³ Nicolay Nicolas also gives the duration of their placement with Turkish peasants as four

⁷⁹ Miller, *The Palace School*, 123.

⁸⁰ Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire, The Classical Age 1300-1600* (New York: Phoenix Press, 2002), 80-81; Uzunçarşılı, “Acemi Oğlan,” 117-118. The boys could be promoted to serve in the palace at several ranks, they could be also promoted the highest ranks of *kapı kulu sipah* and *silahdar bölüks*, cavalry regiments, or could be *silahdar*, *çuhadar*, *has oda başı*, and from there they could rise up to the ranks of beglerbegs, viziers.

⁸¹ *Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan*, 137.

⁸² Uzunçarşılı, *Kapıkulu Ocakları*, vol. 1, 24.

⁸³ Koçi Bey, *Koçi Bey Risaleleri*, ed. Seda Çakmakçıoğlu (Istanbul: Kabalcı, 2007), 39. By Turkistan he probably refers to Anatolia, especially the Karaman region and Bursa where we know that the boys were placed from other travelers’ records and some records found in Bursa court records.

years, and specifies the rural areas around Bursa and Karaman.⁸⁴ Evliya Çelebi says that boys were distributed to Turks for half an *akçe*, and a yearly amount of *çuha*. The outstanding (*güzide*) ones were placed in state workshops, and the rest were placed near the shoe-makers in Istanbul.⁸⁵ Hoca Saadettin Efendi notes that these children were given to those willing to take them, especially those who were state officials (*devlet hizmetinde*).⁸⁶ One decree also shows us two cases where Andrea, the son of Davud from Livadya, was hired out to a *müezzin*, and Berata from Avlonya, placed at a pasha's farm.⁸⁷ Koçi Bey mentions a register that was kept to follow up the children sent to rural areas, and says that call-backs would be made every four to five years according to this register; however, no such register has been located at the archives so far.⁸⁸ Also, the regulations mention that every year the '*acemi oğlanı kethüdası* (chief of the '*acemi oğlans*) sent someone to the areas where these boys were placed to check up on them.⁸⁹ Some entries selected from Bursa court records show that these children were followed up quite closely: an '*acemi oğlanı* placed near İsak bin Hamza for service in Karaman – a village of Bursa – was recorded as having died from the plague. Davud, who served near Emir Isa bin Mahmud in

⁸⁴ Nicolay Nicolas, *Dans L'empire de Soliman le Magnifique*, (no publication place: Press du Cnrs, 1989), 65.

⁸⁵ Evliya Çelebi narrates the story that once when the janissaries refused to drink their soups, a sign of protest, Süleyman Han threatened them to call the bachelor shoe-makers, *pabuççu bekarları*, who were known to be strong and armed men who did not stay away from fights. When they heard this threat they armed and came to the janissary barracks. Due to their loyalty they were allowed to keep *devshirme* boys until they were promoted to be janissaries. Their request was recorded as follows: *ecdad-ı 'izamin zamanlarında ocağımıza değışirmeden gelme yarar gulamlar verüp okıdıp yazdırup kemal-i marifet sahibi idiüp bizden kapuya çıkub yeniçeri ağası huzurında bir sille ile revane olup yeniçeri olurdu. Bادهu bunların ocağında neşv ü nüma bulan oğlanlar eşkiya olur diyü ocağımıza değışirme oğlanı verilmez oldu anı reca ideriz ki yine ocağımıza değışirme oğlanı verilüp bizden yeniçeri olalar*. Evliya Çelebi, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi Topkapı Sarayı Bağdat 304 Yazmasının Transkripsiyonu-Dizini*, eds. Orhan Şaik Gökyay, Zekeriya Kurşun, Seyit Ali Kahraman, Yücel Dağlı, vol. 1 (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1996), 285-286.

⁸⁶ *devlete yardıma hazır ve devlet hizmetinde olanların yanlarına verilmeleri*. Hoca Saadettin Efendi, *Tacü't-Tevarih*, ed. İsmet Parmaksızoğlu, vol. 1 (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1992), 69.

⁸⁷ Stefanos Yerasimos, *Süleymaniye* (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi, 2002), 68.

⁸⁸ *Koçi Bey Risalesi*, 39.

⁸⁹ *Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyân*, 145.

Çavuş village of Bursa, Hızır and İlyas, serving the grocer Mehmed bin Hızır, and Hüseyin, serving for *kethüda* Hacı Halil, all died from the same plague in Bursa.⁹⁰ We have these records because when an ‘*acemi*’ boy died, the family that took responsibility for him and had to record the death in the courts to be able to prove cause of the death to the authorities.

These cases suggest that the placement of children might have been a more systematic process whereby the people who were responsible for them were actually chosen for this task rather than placing them randomly on a voluntary basis. It was not only the peasants but also local notables taking responsibility for these boys. The object of these placements was commonly presented as to acquaint the boys with the Turkish language and customs and Islamic practices while they worked for their host families. The children were thus transplanted into a Turkish-Islamic environment different from their ethnic, cultural, and religious background. Furthermore, the boys were hired out to specific people. The *Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan* notes that they were not given to *danişmends* (learned men in the law) or *kadıs* because those did not have land. Physical labor was part of the boys training, assuring strength and endurance. They would not be given to artisans or to anyone in Istanbul because it was thought that if they developed an interest in gaining money, they would not go on campaigns.⁹¹

After the boys were taken away from their host families and placed in the barracks, the second phase of the training began. At this stage of training the ‘*acemi oğlans*’ served as a major labor force used in various tasks. Yerasimos notes that there were approximately 7,500 ‘*acemi oğlans*’ in the mid-sixteenth century. Uzunçarşılı provides the numbers of the ‘*acemi oğlans*’: in 1566-67 there were 7,745 in Istanbul, Edirne, and Gelibolu. In 1576 there were 6,556 in total. At

⁹⁰ BKS A19/19, 143/b2; BKS A19/19, no. 40/45, 29a; BKS A19/19, no. 40/45, 29b/1; BKS A19/19, no. 40/45, 29b/2 in Coskun Yılmaz, and Necdet Yılmaz eds., *Osmanlılarda Sağlık-Health in the Ottomans*, vol. 2 (Istanbul: Biofarma, 2006), 30, 40-41.

⁹¹ *Karla meşgul olup savaşa gitmezler. Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan*, 145.

the beginning of the century their numbers increased to 10,982.⁹² Yerasimos mentions that each year, one-tenth of the total number of boys was promoted to become janissaries. This means during the classical application of the system, conscripted children were around the age of 16-19 when they came back to Istanbul or Edirne, and then served approximately 10 years as '*acemi oğlans* from age 18 to 28.⁹³ In the seventeenth century, this practice of sending the conscripted children to the rural areas is known to have decreased.⁹⁴ The data from the 1603-4 conscription supports the picture, since 42 percent of the boys were already 18 or older.

1.3.c. The Responsibilities of '*Acemi Oğlans*

Service was required from '*acemi oğlans* once they were called back from their rural host homes. Most of this servitude was laboring in Istanbul, enabling the boys to establish closer ties with the city. *Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyân* gives a detailed account of the ways in which they were used as workers.

One of the main duties was laboring in ships. *Yayabaşıs* (head of the foot soldiers), *çorbacıs* (colonel of the janissaries), and *katibs* (scribe) of '*acemi oğlans* were given ships where '*acemi oğlans* were to be placed. Such ships were used to bring soldiers from Üsküdar and Dil,⁹⁵ to bring wood for the Old Palace and the New Palace, to carry stone, sand, and other materials that were needed in the construction of imperial buildings. They also worked in small boats to

⁹² Uzunçarşılı, *Kapıkulu Ocakları*, vol. 1, 79-80.

⁹³ Yerasimos, *Süleymaniye*, 67.

⁹⁴ Uzunçarşılı presents two documents from 1622 and 1636 showing that the boys were not given to Turkish families. He also mentions that Evliya Çelebi provides such an example where the boys were not serving near Turkish families. Uzunçarşılı, *Kapıkulu Ocakları*, vol. 1, 24. Also the register that is dealt with in this chapter, BOA, MAD 07600, also proves that not all the collected boys were sent to the *acemi ocaks* and marked as *gayr-ı gılman-ı acemiyan cem' şode* (collected to use outside the acemi ocaks).

⁹⁵ I could not locate Dil; *Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyân* does not provide any hint of its location.

carry ice from Bursa to the palace.⁹⁶ *Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyân* notes that there were 4,000 boys working in 72 ships at the time of Sultan Süleyman, but at the author's time, (early seventeenth century) their numbers increased to 12,000, whereas the ships were down to 12. He complains that not enough boys were available for service even though the number of registered boys was excessive.⁹⁷ This implies that by the seventeenth century, the boys were able to avoid obligatory service. The relatively older age of the conscripted boys during this period probably helped them engage in other activities, and to establish social and economic networks in the city that could have enabled them to avoid obligatory service to a certain extent.

Supplying and transporting wood, ice, animals, and kitchen products of the palaces were the responsibility of *'acemis*. They would hire out as porters (*hammals*), who picked up wool and other goods from customs in Istanbul, and guarded the transportation of these goods.⁹⁸ Other service, related to artisanship, included work as laundrymen (*cameşuyan*), woodchoppers (*teberdaran*), cooks (*tabbahin*), water carriers (*abkeşan*), warehousemen (*anbarcıyan*) in palaces such as Galata and the Old Palace, *simid-giran* (bagel-makers) in Bursa, state butchers (*kasaps*), spinach growers (*ıspanakçıs*), chicken farmers (*tavukçus*), and yogurt makers (*yogurtçus*). Woodchoppers and cooks worked under the agha of the palace (*saray aghası*) and would only become janissaries by his petition.⁹⁹

The boys also worked in the palace gardens. There was one regiment in the imperial garden (*hass bahçe*); others were assigned to various other gardens. The primary garden among the provincial gardens (*taşra bahçes*) was in Büyükdere. The Üsküdar garden was the small *hass*

⁹⁶ *Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyân*, 135.

⁹⁷ *Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyân*, 150.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 165.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 165.

bahçe, where horses were kept. The gardens in Edirne were maintained by several ‘*acemi*’ regiments. The Edirne *aghası* was responsible for those ‘*acemi oğlans*’, and they could only be promoted to become janissaries when he petitioned for them.¹⁰⁰

The state workshops were filled with ‘*acemi*’ boys doing their service before they became janissaries. There were two types of workshop in Istanbul: the bigger ones directly under the control of the state, and private artisan workshops. All of them were geared primarily to meet the needs of the state.¹⁰¹ State workshops worked for the army and the navy, the palace and mosque complexes. They were run by state officers called *emins*, raw materials were provided by the state funds, and the salaries of the workers were paid by the state.¹⁰² The main state workshops were located at Kasımpaşa (arsenal, imperial dockyard, armory and *baruthane* (gunpowder workshops); At Meydanı (belonging to the janissaries); Hagia Sophia (for *cebecis*); the Macuncu bazaar (the largest gunnery, run by *barut emini*; between Unkapanı and Cibali), *tophane* (gunnery for making *balyemez* (long-range battering guns)); and Kağıthane (gunpowder workshop).¹⁰³ There were also warehouses for the provisioning of the army in Istanbul. One of the biggest warehouses was the *çuha* (broadcloth) warehouse run by the *emins* (superintendents) and 150 janissaries under him. In this warehouse the blue *çuha* from Selanik was kept for janissary clothing with which they were provided once a year by the state. The *çuha* was brought to the state tailors who had 10 workshops around Yeni Odalar (New Barracks) in Aksaray.¹⁰⁴ Two big workshops that employed 500 workers each were located at Arslanhane and Alay Köşkü

¹⁰⁰ *Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan*, 163.

¹⁰¹ Mantran, *Istanbul dans la seconde Moitié du XVIIe siècle*, 398.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 399.

¹⁰³ *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, vol. 1, 185, 206-7, 257.

¹⁰⁴ Mantran, *Istanbul dans la seconde Moitié du XVIIe siècle*, 403.

(Procession Kiosk) on the outer walls of the New Palace.¹⁰⁵ The *dolamacıs* were those from related industry who worked on the processing of the *çuha*. All these workers were noted by Evliya Çelebi as *kuls* of the sultan as opposed to being *re‘aya*.¹⁰⁶

In all these workshops *‘acemis* were employed along with civilian laborers, janissaries, and slaves, even though it is hard to give a precise number. Some *‘acemis* were placed with bachelor shoe-makers (*bekar pabuççus*). These shoe-makers owned 3,000 shops. There were 4,007 shoe-makers, including the boys.¹⁰⁷ The *‘acemis* also worked in production units under specialized janissaries as boot makers (*çizmecis*), coppersmiths (*kazancıs*), blacksmiths (*demircis*), and even as doctors (*cerrahs*).¹⁰⁸

Provisioning the janissary army was a major part of the responsibility of the *‘acemi* regiment. The state bakeries (*sekban furunu*) were in their servitude. The boys working here were organized under a separate regiment. *Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyân* gives the number of boys in this regiment as 50 to 60. Evliya Çelebi mentions that there were 300 *‘acemis* working in these bakeries.¹⁰⁹ The officer leading this regiment was called head bread maker (*etmekçi başı*) and earned 14 *akçe* a day. *Halifes* (junior clerks) and *‘acemis* who were retired from this regiment earned 7 *akçe* a day. Under them there were dough makers (*hamurkars*) receiving 5 *akçe* a day and *simitçis* receiving 4 *akçes* a day.¹¹⁰ *‘acemis* also worked in biscuit (*peksimet*) bakeries that baked only for the army. 105 bakeries employing 1,000 workers were in Galata, Kırk Çeşme (in

¹⁰⁵ Evliya Çelebi *Seyahatnamesi*, vol. 1, 280.

¹⁰⁶ *cümle padişah kullarıdır. Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, vol.1, 280.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 286.

¹⁰⁸ Cemal Kafadar, “Yeniçeri-Esnaf Relations: Solidarity and Conflict,” MA Thesis (McGill University, 1980), 58.

¹⁰⁹ Evliya Çelebi *Seyahatnamesi*, vol. 1, 230.

¹¹⁰ *Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyân*, 157.

Fatih), and Yeniköy.¹¹¹ Other provisioning workshops included millet drink (*boza*), oil-lamp (*kandil*) and candle (*mum*) workshops.¹¹² At the time of the campaigns the ‘*acemis* replaced the janissaries in policing the city, and also served as night watchmen and firemen.¹¹³

‘*Acemi* boys were also used as unskilled laborers in state mines all over the empire and in any major construction projects. Ömer Lütü Barkan’s work on the account registers of the Süleymaniye mosque complex (1550-1557) for a period of 5 years and 7.5 months reveals that out of 2,678,506 work days in the construction zone and the stone mines around Istanbul, ‘*acemi* boys worked 1,069,460 whereas regular slaves worked only for 140,415 days. Accordingly, 55 percent were free laborers, 40 percent were ‘*acemi* boys, and 5 percent were slaves.¹¹⁴ The ‘*acemis* working in the Süleymaniye construction were mainly unskilled laborers. 71 percent of them actively worked in the construction zone, and even though their responsibilities were not mentioned in the registers, those that were recorded included guards (*bekçis*), carriers with a cart (*arabacı*), ironsmiths (*nalbant*), coalmen (*közürcüs*), coal carriers (*közü hammalı*), raftsmen (*salcı*), carriers with a mule (*katırcı*), warehouse guards (*ambar bekçisi*), night guards (*gece bekçis*), carriers (*sırt hammalı*), sawyers (*bıçkıcı*). In the stone mines in Mihaliç, İzmit, Kyzikos (Aydincık), and Troya they worked as stonemen (*taşıcı*) for 3-4 *akçe* a day, diggers (*lagımcı*) for 1 *akçe* a day, and *tesfiyecis* (one who levels the ground). Yerasimos mentions that there were 42,000 extra work days recorded for ‘*acemis* in the stone mines that are not seen in the initial

¹¹¹ Mantran, *Istanbul dans la seconde Moitié du XVIIe siècle*, 404.

¹¹² Ibid., 404, 408.

¹¹³ Menage, “Some Notes on *Devshirmes*,” 66-67.

¹¹⁴ Ömer Lütü Barkan, *Süleymaniye Camii ve İmareti İnşaatı (1550-1557)*, vol. 1 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1972), 93.

account registers of the mosque construction.¹¹⁵ They also worked in the related industries of transporting materials to Istanbul. This added an extra 100,000 work days for ‘*acemis*. 1,500 shipments were made and 100,000 *akçes* were paid to them in return. They would mainly carry sand and bricks from Hasköy on the north shore of Halic, lumber from the Black Sea coast, and marble.¹¹⁶

‘*Acemis*, as well as being the novice janissaries, were laboring *kuls* who got paid in return for their services. In the construction of Süleymaniye, and probably in other construction fields as well, they would get paid 1-2 *akçes* per day as additional income. Their basic income was 1 *akçe* a day in addition to the food, clothing, and accommodation provided by the state. They were exempt from taxes and also had the security of being able to retire temporarily or permanently due to illness. The general pay rate for the workers in the Süleymaniye complex varied between 1 to 12 *akçes*. The skilled workers were paid over 9 *akçes*. Those who were paid 10 to 12 *akçes* represent 52 percent of the labor force. Those who were paid 1 to 3 *akçes* represent 9 percent – probably the ‘*acemi* apprentices – unskilled labor.¹¹⁷ At that time, 60 *akçes* was equal to 1 *flori*. The value of 1 *akçe* was 1 kg grain, 2.5 kg bread, 1 kg lamb meat, 10 eggs, ½ kg cheese, or 2 kg milk. A pair of shoes cost 15-20 *akçes*, a pair of boots 32 *akçes*, and a horse cost 400 *akçes*. Therefore, it can be concluded that an ‘*acemi* boy who was working as an unskilled worker at that time was earning a basic income, barely enough to survive on. It can be surmised that the experience and social connections they derived from these jobs, topped with the tightened economic conditions of the early seventeenth century, may have stimulated them to look for extra income within the city, especially after they became janissaries.

¹¹⁵ Stefanos Yerasimos, *Süleymaniye*, 70.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 70.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 64-68.

1.4. Examining the Transformation of the *Devshirme* System through a Comparison of the 1603-4 Conscription with 1490s

Traditional decline theory considers the Ottoman Empire as a living body — one that was born, grew, and died. Hence, there were three stages in Ottoman history: the period of emergence from the end of the 13th century to the mid-15th century, its period of full maturity from the mid-15th century to the beginning of the 17th century, and its decline beginning roughly with the death of Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent in 1566. The second stage has been taken as a reference point, as the “golden age” of the empire, indicating the perfect, ultimate form of its institutions such as land division (*timar*), justice, army, waqf, and tax collection. It was during this period that the *Pax Ottomanica* was achieved.¹¹⁸ The theory regards the deterioration as having begun primarily in the *devshirme* and the land systems at the end of the sixteenth century.¹¹⁹ By then, the weakening of the central power and various institutions are said to have led to a cultural decadence, manifested by an increase in bribery and favoritism involving state officials.¹²⁰

Even though this idea of crisis and change has not been totally rejected, a new revisionist approach to Ottoman history has emerged in the last twenty years, which argues that the assumed reasons for the crisis may not have been as pertinent as was once thought. In these revisionist works, a consensus has been practically reached to abandon the notion of decline.¹²¹ With the

¹¹⁸ Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire*, 3.

¹¹⁹ İlber Ortaylı, *Ottoman Studies* (Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University Press, 2004); Mustafa Akdağ, *Türk Halkının Dirlik Kavgası* (Ankara: Barış Basım Yayın, 1999).

¹²⁰ Halil İnalcık, “Tax Collection, Embezzlement and Bribery in Ottoman Finances,” *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* 15 no. 2 (1991): 327-346.

¹²¹ In the collective volume, *The Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, Suraiya Faroqhi points out that, after the second half of the seventeenth century, although there was a population decrease in both urban and rural areas, urban life was far from being in decay, while the commercialization of the countryside had begun in earnest, such that the textile industry – silk, mohair, and wool – so vital to most pre-industrial economies, recovered from the crisis and became increasingly profitable. Suraiya Faroqhi, “Crisis and Change, 1590-1699,” in eds. Halil

new approach stressing “crisis and change” in the seventeenth century, how can we interpret the changes in the *devshirme* system? First of all, relevant registers from the two periods should be compared. The earlier conscriptions from the 1490s reflect the classical application of the *devshirme* system, and the 1603-4 conscription shows a growing change in the state’s needs and priorities.

The data that we have from the conscriptions of the 1490s is found under the classification of *müteferrik defterler* (miscellaneous registers) in the Prime Ministry’s Archives, which comprises documents on different topics. This is not an individual register that solely records a single conscription like the 1012/1603-4 conscription register, but a set of conscriptions that were recorded in a register containing other records as well, such as an account register of the Imperial dockyard in Istanbul.

The register contains conscriptions from the years 899-900/1494-95, 904/1498-99, and 908/1502-3 (table 1.6), indicating that the conscriptions were made at least every four years during the late fifteenth century when the system was applied traditionally. Unlike the 1012/1603-4 conscription register, the conscriptions were recorded by different scribes using different criteria for recording the boys. The registers of different years are not systematic or consistent. For example, only the conscriptions from Iskenderiye, Ilbasan and Hersek give full information on the name of the father, the physical characteristics, and the ages of the children. The ones from Agriboz and Belgrad only give the name of the parents and the age of the children, lacking the physical characteristics of conscripts, whereas those from Tırhala and Kostendil give

İnalçık and Donald Quataert eds., *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 411-623. See also, Haim Gerber, *Economy and Society in an Ottoman City: Bursa, 1600-1700* (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, 1998). Linda Darling, *Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy: Tax Collection and Finance Administration in the Ottoman Empire, 1560-1660* (Leiden: Brill, 1996); Rhoads Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare, 1500-1700* (London: UCL Press, 1999); Leslie Peirce, *The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

the name of the parents and the physical characteristics of the children, but not the age. (see table 1.6, column 6).

If we more closely examine the register of each conscription, it is easier to understand the outline of the registers. There were two groups of conscriptions during 1494-95. 10 batches of children were conscripted from the areas Vize, Agriboz, Belgrad, Ilbasan, Iskenderiye, and Hersek within two consecutive years. They are not dated, so it is impossible to trace the route of the conscriptions, or even to detect if it is one set of conscription that gathered 1553 children. It is probable that there were two different conscriptions, separated according to years noted in the register: 1494 and 1495. This would give the numbers of children collected in each year as approximately 600 to 900 respectively. Or we can divide the conscriptions of 1494 and 1495 not according to the years the children were conscripted but according to the scribes' classification method, i.e. the information they provided on the children. In that case, we also derive two different groups: the first group lists the name of the father, the physical characteristics and ages of the children, while the second group provides information on the name of the parents and the age of the children. Again this gives the collected number of children as approximately 600 to 900 for the first and second groups respectively.

The conscription groups from the years 1498-99 and 1502-3 reveal information that could hint at pattern. In the first group where the children were gathered from the Tırhala region in 1498-99, there were 5 *sürüs*, each composed of 150 children, with one *sürü* of 152 children. The last group is the conscriptions from the Kostence region. It is composed of 6 *sürüs*, 5 of them consisting of 150 children, with the last *sürü* of only 50. With this data it can be concluded that the conscriptions were made quite often – at least every three years – and approximately 700-800 children were taken each time.

Table 1.6: The Conscription Groups as Listed in the *Eşkal Defters* of 899-90/1493-1502

Given #	Location	# of Child.	Date of Collection	Seal	Provided Information
1.	Iskenderiye	150	899/1494	<i>bölükbaşı</i> Bali	Name of the father Physical characteristics Age of the child
2.	Vize	204	900/1494	-	Name of the father Physical characteristics Age of the child
3.	Ilbasan	150	899/1494	Emin Bali Beg <i>yayabaşı</i> Ali Beg	Name of the father Physical characteristics Age of the child
4.	Agriboz	165	Rebiyülevvel 900 November 1494	-	Name of the father Name of the mother Age of the child
5.	Iskenderiye	150	899/1494	Emin Bali Beg, <i>yayabaşı</i> Ali Beg	Name of the father Physical characteristics Age of the child
6.	Hersek	147	899/1494 and <i>yayabaşı</i> Ali Beg	Name of the father Physical characteristics Age of the child
7.	Agriboz	151	Safer 900 October 1494	Mirliva Iskender Bey	Name of the father Name of the mother Age of the child
8.	Belgrad	115	-	-	Name of the father Name of the mother Age of the child
9.	150	9 Cemaziyelevvel 900 4 February 1495	-	Name of the father Physical characteristics Age of the child
10.	Iskenderiye & Hersek	150	900/1494	Bali, Cafer, Ali <i>subaşı</i>	Name of the father Physical characteristics The age of the child
11.	Tırhala	752	904/1498-99	-	Name of the father Name of the mother Physical characteristics
12.	Köstendil	800	908/1502-3	-	Name of the father Name of the mother Physical characteristics

Source: BOA, MAD 07600 and BOA, MDM 36805.

Konstantin Mihailovic argues that the *devshirme* was applied when the number of war prisoners was insufficient. He was in the service of the Ottomans as a janissary from 1455 to 1463. Basilike Papoulia indicates that there were levies of 1543, 1546, 1553, 1557, 1559, and 1565 in Athens.¹²² That the frequency is not regular does not necessarily mean that the levies were completely irregular, because they may not have intended to recruit children from Athens during every conscription. It was highly possible that there were other conscriptions going on in different regions of the empire.

Ottoman scholars state that the *devshirme* became less and less frequent and more and more disorderly in the second half of the 17th century, and small levies for staffing the Palace continued until the mid-eighteenth century.¹²³ Since we have only one conscription register for the seventeenth century, it is hard to compare and form conclusions on the frequency or number of conscriptions. However, if the expression *ez gayr-ı gılman-ı ‘acemiyan* is interpreted as indicating children that would be taken into Palace service, it could be said that the conscriptions were becoming more Palace-oriented at the beginning of the 17th century.


The comparison of the ages of children conscripted in 1498-9 and 1603-4 also reveals the changes that occurred in the *devshirme* system during the early modern era. The children conscripted in the early 17th century were, on average, aged 16.6. 85 percent of the boys were aged 16-20. In the 1498-9 conscription not even one boy was above 15 years old; the average age of children conscripted was 13.5.

¹²² Basilike D. Papoulia, *Ursprung und Wesen der “Knabenlese” im Osmanischen Reich* (München: Verlag R. Oldenbourg, 1963), 95.

¹²³ Uzunçarşılı, *Kapıkulu Ocakları*, vol. 1, 68-69.

As can be seen in graph 1.6, the earlier conscriptions only took children aged between 12 and 15. By 1603-4, however, the age span had grown — there were a few children conscripted at the age of 6, 10 or 11, but most were older children, boys around 18 to 20 years old.

Graph 1.6: The comparison of age groups of the 1490s Conscriptions Conscription and the 1603-4 Conscription



Source: BOA, MDM 36805.

These findings should be interpreted through the lens of economic, social, and political circumstances of the seventeenth century. The changes of the seventeenth century have been discussed with the help of the theory that widespread population pressure in the sixteenth century

was at the root of major structural changes not only in the Ottoman Empire, but in other Mediterranean countries as well. This argument was first proposed by Fernand Braudel and adapted to the Ottoman case by Barkan, and then Michael Cook. However, as İnalcık argues, although population pressure was a significant factor, the initial factors behind the changes were the growing need for soldiery armed with firearms on Central-European battlefields, and the resulting increase in the state's financial burden. The idea of a general crisis in the Asian and European continents in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries is generally accepted by scholars. In addition to the demographic increases, there were also economic and political crises during the early seventeenth century. The vast population increase triggered price increases in the same period, followed by monetary fluctuations and price revolutions. The crisis affected the political scene as well: the changes in political institutions, the changing role of the state in regulating the economy, and the popular revolts of various kinds in Europe and various parts of the Asian continent complete the picture.¹²⁴ The European military revolution of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries and changes in the nature of warfare were a significant part of the crises of the time. European armies were composed of musketeers by the seventeenth century. The number of soldiers in European armies increased due to the use of firearms, since it was easier to teach commoners how to shoot than to train them as professional warriors.¹²⁵ The changes in the nature of warfare were such that, instead of few professional warriors, the army needed a larger number of soldiers equipped with firearms.

One response the Ottoman state gave to the European “military revolution,” and to the immediate need of a larger army was to change the nature of the *devshirme* system. The

¹²⁴ Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats*, 48-49.

¹²⁵ Knud J. V. Jespersen, “Social Change and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe: Some Danish Evidence,” *Historical Journal* 26, no. 1 (1983): 2; Clifford J. Rogers, ed., *The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe* (Boulder: Westview, 1995).

comparison of the two *eşkal* registers confirms that conscription of older boys as *devshirmes* was preferred by the state at the beginning of the seventeenth century, probably with the idea that older boys could immediately become soldiers. There was no need to take children 12 to 15 years old that would need training for years in order to be able to use the means of warfare efficiently. With the invention of new weaponry and development of new military techniques, the boys could become soldiers with a few months of training on how to use the firearms. The state needed older boys for the janissary army. Thus, my surmise is that the *devshirme* system transformed into a system that sought older boys for the army.

The shift in age of conscripted boys was also reflective of the general changes of the early seventeenth century. The increase in population that generated higher numbers of landless young peasants in rural areas might have created a demand for those young men to become part of the '*askeri*' class, which was exempt from taxes and guaranteed an income. The insistence in sultanic decrees that children who do not meet the criteria not to be collected during a conscription also gives the impression that there were boys who tried to filter into the system. Therefore, it was not only the state that was looking for older boys for the army, but the older boys themselves looking to serve under the state. Actually, with the age range given above, we can even call some of them young men.

Another reason for seeking older boys might be to reduce the number of casualties during the conscription. The high risk of becoming sick during the transfer to Istanbul, the extreme work conditions of '*acemis*', and being more vulnerable to kidnapping might be additional reasons on the state's part for choosing older boys during conscriptions.

Contrary to the classical system of *devshirme*, janissaries also started being recruited under the categories *agha çırağı* (recruits in the personal service of the commander of the

janissaries)¹²⁶ and *ferzend-i sipahi* (recruited sons of senior cavalry men),¹²⁷ and were still required to work for a number of years as '*acemis*.'¹²⁸

The second solution to the shortage of infantry men employed by the Ottoman state was to recruit peasants as, in effect, "temporary" mercenaries (*sekbans* and *sarıca*).¹²⁹ As İnalcık points out, the third and most common method was to enlist commoners in the regiments of the janissary army. There were also *re'aya* musketmen who were usually referred to as *levends*.¹³⁰ But, as can be seen in the salary registers of 1623 and 1664, the total *sekbans* in the janissary army was only around 7-8% (see chapter 2). Therefore, this was not the preferred method of expanding the army.¹³¹ The recruitment process for the military-administrative strata gradually

¹²⁶ In his glossary Murphey defines this term as "Hand-picked recruits in the personal service of the commander of the janissaries used for tasks such as water carrier, or attendant of the janissary pack animals during campaign, as distinct from *devshirme* recruits who were promoted to regiments only after a long period of training as novices." Rhoads Murphey, *Kanun-name-i Sultani Li Aziz Efendi (Aziz Efendi's Book of Sultan's Laws and Regulations: An Agenda for Reform by a Seventeenth Century Ottoman Statesman)*, Sources of Oriental Languages and Literatures 9 (1985): 54.

¹²⁷ Sons of members of the Six Cavalry regiments (*altı bölük halkı*) who laid claim to membership in the imperial regiments. The practice of allowing alongside with the legitimately recruited sons of senior cavalrymen (*ferzend-i sipahi*) the sons of other court dignitaries such as the official couriers (*çavuş*), special envoys (*kapudjubaşı*) and even the chief taster in the palace kitchens (*çaşnegir*) served to undermine the long-standing practice of accepting a few of the sons of members of the superior regiments since clearly there were not enough positions available for all..." Halil İnalcık also notes that the Six Cavalry regiments were the only case where Muslims were taken into the ranks of the *kapıkuls* in the classical period. The sources for their recruitment in the sixteenth century were novice janissaries (*acemis*); sons of senior members of the Six Cavalry regiments; and Muslims who come to fight the *ghaza* in the Ottoman army and distinguished themselves. Murphey, "Kanun-name-i Sultani Li Aziz Efendi," 55. Apparently, the quotas for both *ağa çırağı* and *ferzend-i sipahi* enlarged in the seventeenth century as Aziz Efendi complains about it. Halil İnalcık, "Ghureba," *EF*², vol. 2, 1097-1098; *Koçi Bey Risaleleri*, 59.

¹²⁸ *Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyân*, 211.

¹²⁹ İnalcık, "Military and Fiscal Transformation," 288-297; Gábor Ágoston, *Guns for the Sultan: Military Power and the Weapons Industry in the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 26.

¹³⁰ Caroline Finkel, *The Administration of Warfare: The Ottoman Military Campaigns in Hungary, 1593-1606* (Vienna, 1988), 37-48.

¹³¹ The long-term effect of the establishment of *sekbans* regiments were that the peasants were not recruited as *sekbans* permanently. They were used in one or two campaign and then discharged. These *sekbans* did not return to their villages after being discarded and mostly became outlaws, bandits, or supporter and sometimes promoters of the Anatolian uprisings. Mustafa Cezar, *Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler* (Istanbul, 1965); Barkey, *Bandits and*

evolved in the direction of conscripting the Muslim *re'aya* – commoners who were tax-paying Muslim subjects.¹³² In *Kitab-ı Müstetab* the author complains that since janissary positions were given to non-*devshirmes* like Turks, Kurds, Gypsies, and Persians, the system was filled with outsiders (*ecnebis*).¹³³ In 1623, a system of *becayeş* (place switching)¹³⁴ was introduced, through which the regiment commanders (*odabaşıs*) assigned a new janissary to replace a deceased one. However, by and large, the replacements were shepherds, peasants, or criminals who had paid a bribe of forty to fifty *guruş*.¹³⁵ Hence, the local people, or the peasants, who had been kept in their status as a tax resource, and accordingly barred from the military-administrative strata, gained access to these ranks for the first time. Another source for the expansion of the janissary army was the offspring and brothers of existing janissaries.¹³⁶ In 1620, a *yayabaşı* Mustafa Agha b. Abdulmennan sued Mehmed b. Abdullah from the 42nd *ağa bölüğü* claiming that he loaned Mehmed 4,500 *akçe* so that he could register his son Mehmed as a janissary (*kapiya çıkarmak için*) but was never repaid.¹³⁷

Besides the recruitment of Muslims as soldiers, the administrative apparatus was also transformed from a *devshirme* body to a hybrid group that was comprised of converted slaves,

Bureaucrats, 163-170; William J. Griswold, *The Great Anatolian Rebellion, 1000-1020/1591-1611* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag 1983)

¹³² İnalçık, “Military and Fiscal Transformation,” 288.

¹³³ *El-hasıl bir serdar sefere varub gelinceye degin dirlikler ve mansıblar bu vechile alınmak ve satılmak ile beytül-mal-ı müslimin berbad olub ve reaya olanlardan Etrak ve Ekrad ve Cingane ve Tat ve A'cam el-hasıl her isteyen ila'l-an varub eger seferlerde ve eger Asitanede akça ile dirliklere geçmek ile kul taifesine bu sebeb ile ecnebi karışub herc u merc olmuşlardır. Kitab-ı Müstetab*, ed. Yücel, Yaşar, (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1974), 4.

¹³⁴ “The practice whereby a corrupt official permitted a new recruit to serve in a janissary company under a false name by the use of a deceased soldier’s pay-ticket.” Murphey, “Kanun-name-i Sultani Li Aziz Efendi,” 54.

¹³⁵ Murphey, “Kanun-name-i Sultani Li Aziz Efendi,” 6, 29-30; *Koci Bey Risaleleri*, 59.

¹³⁶ Karen Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: the Ottoman Route to State Centralization* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994) 53, 172; Halil İnalçık, “Military and Fiscal Transformation,” 292-293.

¹³⁷ IKS 5: 99a, no. 696 (1620/1029).

freeborn officers, and sons or relatives of those groups. Metin Kunt delineates four avenues for becoming a member of this body: “as a *re‘aya* volunteer, a descendent of those already in the system, a member of officers’ households, and as a slave.”¹³⁸ Kunt defines the holders of military-administrative posts as those who had attained *umera* status, professionals in the state ranks. Those who possessed *umera* status should not be seen as a homogenous group. This group was composed of people who worked in various ranks and positions and they themselves enjoyed different social standings.¹³⁹ The figures Murphey provides for the three successive reigns of Murad III, Mehmet III, and Ahmed I show that there was a 140 percent increase in the number of those recruited for military and administrative staff.¹⁴⁰

This new state policy, which blurred the boundaries between the ruler and the ruled, was the most debated issue among Ottoman intellectuals of the time. In their advisory epistles to the sultan (*nasihatnames*), many of them mentioned the negative effects of these innovations and interpreted them as responsible for the decline of Ottoman society. Thus, Lütü Pasa, the grand vizier of Süleyman the Magnificent, notes the deteriorating conditions within the empire and offers the solution of ‘returning to the good old days’ in his *Asafname* of 1542. However, it was the *Risale* of Koçi Bey, completed in 1630, that most fully developed the idea of a ‘Golden Age’ of Ottoman power and from which a perceptible decline can be seen. There, one of the most important issues was the corruption of the janissary army by the enlistment of commoners, and

¹³⁸ Metin Kunt, *The Sultan’s Servants: the Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government, 1559-1650* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 35.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 44.

¹⁴⁰ Rhoads Murphey, “Kanun-name-i Sultani Li Aziz,” 45. The number of Janissaries rose from 21,094 in 1574 to 45,000 in 1597 and 47,033 in 1609. There was a 123 percent increase. The number of soldiers in Six Cavalry Regiments shifted from 5,957 in 1574, to 17,100 in 1597 and 20,869 in 1609 with a 250 percent increase. The Auxiliary Troops were recruited 2,124 soldiers in 1574 and 7,966 in 1609 which shows a 275 percent increase. The Palace Staff of 1574 that was 6,978 jumped to 10,964 in 1609. The grand total for the military-administrative strata shifted from 36,153 in 1574 to 86,832 in 1609. The figures are taken for 1574 at the reign of Murad III from Koci Bey, those for 1597 from Mustafa Ali in his *Künh al-ahbar*, and those for 1609 for, Ayn-i Ali in his *Risale*.

the provincial administrative positions and grants given to the Ottoman ruling class.¹⁴¹ In 1631, Aziz Efendi reiterated the same concerns in his *kanun-name*, and urged the Sultan to act against the infiltration of the janissary army by members of the tax-paying classes.¹⁴²

The intellectuals who contributed to this genre of advice literature were themselves *devshirmes*, and their main issue was with the infiltration of the Muslim-born into their class. Yet, state policies did not change in response to these warnings; instead other precautions were taken. İnalcık argues that the *devshirme* system could not provide sufficient soldiers for the expanding infantry, and therefore, the central administration opened up the janissary ranks to “outsiders” in the Muslim urban and rural population.¹⁴³ He stresses the reasons that pushed the state to develop these strategies. Karen Barkey, in her book *Bandits and Bureaucrats*, depicts the change in the state policies towards international crises and internal conditions in general, and recruitment methods in particular, as a reflex reaction. She argues that the state was going through serious adjustment, but that state officials were interested in day-to-day difficulties rather than having a calculated agenda.¹⁴⁴ Consequently, it can be concluded that the recruitment of commoners to the ruling class was a new policy, but is hard to say to what extent it was a reflex reaction or a new political strategy.

¹⁴¹ Koçi Bey also stresses the deterioration in the *timar* system as another primary reason for Ottoman decline. He argues that *timars* were began to be given as *paşmaklık* (fief conferred to the mothers, sisters, daughters, or women slaves of the sultan), *arpalık* (fief conferred to the Ottoman ruling and religious elite in addition to their salaries), or added to the treasury. In other words, they were began to be given as bribes among the Ottoman elite. *Koçi Bey Risalesi*, 52-61.

¹⁴² Murphey, 7. – see in Murphey’s transliteration of *Kanun-name-i Sultani Li Aziz Efendi*: “The reason for their [Janissary’s] becoming so numerous and for their corruption has been the adoption of the two new recruitment categories of *ibtidadan boluk* and *veledesh* which has allowed entry into the ranks of the cavalymen of nondescripts, disgraceful Djelali rebels, Turks, men of low character, and city boys.”

¹⁴³ İnalcık, “Military and Fiscal Transformation,” 288.

¹⁴⁴ Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats*, 57.

Changes in European military warfare and other transformations of the early modern era in general deeply affected the janissary army. It was not the *sekbān* and *sarıca* forces that met the needs of the Ottoman army for more human resources, but mostly the new recruits to the janissary army. Recruiting larger numbers of older *devshirme* boys, as well as commoners, resulted in a rapid expansion of the janissary army during the early seventeenth century, a statistical analysis of which will be made in Chapter 2. A bigger janissary army was a desirable outcome for the Ottoman state. However, there were unexpected consequences of this rapid shift in the qualitative and quantitative nature of the janissary army. As a result, the profile of a janissary in Istanbul became much different from those in previous centuries. Whether it was an older boy, conscripted and converted after reaching puberty, or a Muslim boy entering into the janissary corps directly without the same education that *devshirme* boys went through in previous times, the degree of assimilation into a new environment and social status was much different than it was before. In the next chapter, we will be taking a closer look at janissaries in Istanbul to observe the economic and social outcomes of the military transformations of the early modern era.

Chapter Two

THE JANISSARIES AND THE CITY: SPATIAL RELATIONSHIPS AND SOLIDARITIES

Around 35,000 janissaries were living in early seventeenth-century Istanbul according to the figures derived from archival sources.¹ The literature points out that during the seventeenth century, the ways of social and economic interaction between the janissaries and the civilians were altered – janissaries started to live outside the barracks more and more, and increasingly became a component of the urban economy. However, no research geared specifically to the janissaries' daily life in Istanbul has been done. What did it mean for an early modern city to host 35,000 janissaries and other types of soldiers? How was the city affected by their presence? This chapter is devoted to depicting the demographic and geographical presence of the janissaries in Istanbul and considering the social outcomes.

The provisioning, accommodation, transportation, and financial support of the janissary corps in Istanbul can be studied in great detail thanks to the many extant volumes of archival sources. An examination of these sources, which reveal data concerning these aspects of the janissary army, is a promising topic that will help us to reflect better upon urban Ottoman culture regarding the presence of an army in an early modern city, and should be looked at further by Ottoman scholars. This chapter is an attempt to delineate the spatial relationship between the

¹ This number is a rough estimate; detailed statistical and archival data on the demographical distribution of janissaries will be given below.

janissary army and Istanbul. For that purpose, a full salary (*mevacib*) register of janissaries residing in Istanbul in 1663-64 is analyzed and a demographic profile of the army is detected. Plus, a sample group of 100 janissary probate (*tereke*) registers from the early seventeenth century is investigated in order to delineate the residential patterns of the janissaries in the city.

2.1. Istanbul: The Mega City

Demography and commercial and cultural geography are a focus for us in looking at early seventeenth century Istanbul. It is hard to give an exact population estimate for seventeenth century Istanbul due to lack of population surveys, but by providing samples from previous centuries, we can obtain a general idea. In a census of 1477, there were 14,803 households in Istanbul and 16,324 in Galata. This total does not include soldiers, *medrese* students, or slaves. By taking 5 persons per household as the norm, Barkan estimates the population to have been around 100,000 by the end of the fifteenth century, according to population survey registers.² Ayverdi's estimate is higher—167,000-175,000.³

There was a demographic surge throughout the Mediterranean region in this period.⁴ Fernand Braudel argues that there was a population increase of hundred percent all around the world in the sixteenth century, which triggered emigrations. One indicator of overpopulation in Mediterranean Europe was the several expulsions of the Jews from Castile and Aragon in 1492,

² Barkan calls these registers “des registres de recensement” (census registers), i.e. *tahrir* registers, without mentioning the original name. Ömer L. Barkan, “Essai sur les données statistiques des registres de recensement dans l’empire ottoman aux XVe et XVIe siècles,” *JESHO* i/I (1957): 21.

³ Ekrem Hakkı Ayverdi, *İstanbul Mahalleleri* (Ankara: Doğuş, 1958), 82.

⁴ Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 402-418; Michael A. Cook, *Population Pressure in Rural Anatolia, 1450-1600* (London and New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1992), 292-300.

from Sicily in 1493, from Portugal in 1497, from Naples in 1540 and 1541, from Tuscany in 1571, and finally from Milan in 1597. The largest of these groups were settled to Salonica, Istanbul, and North Africa.⁵ Istanbul also attracted many merchants and craftsmen who emigrated there, as well.

Another proof of overpopulation was the massive emigration from mountain regions to the plains and cities. In the first half of the sixteenth century the population of Ottoman cities increased by 80 percent. The theory of population pressure proposed by Braudel was applied to the Ottoman case and investigated systematically by M.A. Cook. Cook establishes that the population growth was more than cultivation could meet.⁶ The huge number of immigrants can also be attributed to the disorder generated in Anatolia by the Celali rebellions (1596-1609). In addition, people fled to urban centers from the countryside and then from outside Anatolia to escape from the paramilitary activities of the excessive number of bandits – former landholding cavalry – who were now unemployed. Istanbul also received immigrants from Central Anatolia and Rumeli, mostly young peasants hoping to work in the city.⁷

Barkan's estimate for 1535 Istanbul is 80,000 households including the suburbs.⁸ For the seventeenth century, the highest number given was by a Venetian bailo, Alberi Garzoni, based on his personal observation. He claimed that there were about one million residents of Istanbul.⁹

⁵ Ibid., 297.

⁶ Cook also stresses in his conclusion that the delineated population growth is not enough to explain the breakdown of social order. Michael. A. Cook, *Population Pressure in Rural Anatolia, 1450-1600* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), 43.

⁷ See Mustafa Akdağ, *Türk Halkının Dirlik ve Düzenlik Kavgası, Celali İsyanları*, (1963; 2nd ed., Ankara: Barış, 1999); William Griswold, *The Great Anatolian Rebellion 1000-1020/1591-1611* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1983).

⁸ Barkan, "Essai sur les données statistiques," 20.

Evliya Çelebi provides the same number, but he should not be considered the most reliable source. Robert Mantran concludes that the population must have been around 600,000-700,000, basing this number on information given by travelers such as the Englishman, Sandys, and the Venetian bailo, Pietro Civrano.¹⁰ Recent consensus among scholars is that, considering the limits of the infrastructure of the city, the population of early modern Istanbul was no more than 300,000.¹¹

Where did Istanbul stand compared to the other big cities of the early modern era in and outside the empire? Nikolai Todorov classified the population size of Balkan cities for the fifteenth and sixteenth century. He used the fields of “up to 400 households,” “401-800 households,” and “over 1,600 households” as his criteria, accepting that a city with a population of over 1,600 households was a big city, even for the second half of the sixteenth century.¹² According to Todorov, the major Balkan cities of the time were Edirne and Salonica with more than 5,000 households, Sarajevo with 4,000 households, and Athens, Vidin, and Nikopol, with 2,000 households each.¹³

Edirne’s population was relatively low compared to Salonica. The cadastral survey (*tahrir defter*) of 1528 shows that the population was above 20,000. Later in the sixteenth century the population was around 30,000, and remained almost the same during the seventeenth century.¹⁴

⁹ Alberti Garzoni, “Relazione Dell’Impero Ottomano,” *Relazioni Degli Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato*, vol. 1 (Firenze, 1840): 389.

¹⁰ Robert Mantran, *Histoire d’Istanbul* (Mexico: Librairie Artheme Fayard, 1996), 253.

¹¹ There were too many large open areas and gardens and almost no multi-story buildings. The water supply and the physical and hygienic conditions were also limited. Halil İnalcık, “Istanbul,” *ET*² vol. 4 (Leiden: Brill, 1986): 230-239.

¹² Nikolai Todorov, *The Balkan City 1400-1900* (London: University of Washington Press, 1983), 29-30.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 32.

¹⁴ M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, “Edirne,” *IA*, vol. 10 (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1978), 428.

In Sarajevo, the population increased dramatically from 1,112 households in the mid-sixteenth century, to 4,035 households at the beginning of the seventeenth century.¹⁵

Suraiya Faroqhi sheds more light on the population figures of Salonica. According to a cadastaral survey (*tahrir defteri*) from 883/1478 and two *mufassal* registers including Salonica (from 967-78/1560 and 1022/1613) she gives the population estimates as such: There were 862 Muslim and 1,275 Christian households in the early fifteenth century. This number doubled by the sixteenth century. At the beginning of the century the distribution households were 1,715 Muslims, 1,688 Christians and 754 Jews. In 925/1519 the population reached at a high point of 1,374 Muslim, 1,387 Christian and 3,143 Jewish households that add up to 5,904 households in sum, confirming Todorov's estimates. After that time there was a drop in population: by 1022/1613 the figures were 1,090 Muslim, 561 Christian and 2,033 Jewish households. Therefore Salonica had a population of 10,000 by the mid-fifteenth century and this number oscillated between 18,000 and 30,000 afterwards. Faroqhi approaches Evliya Çelebi's estimate of 33,000 households for seventeenth century Salonica with doubt, which would give a population of over 150,000, since the estimate given by European travelers in the second half of the eighteenth century is around 60,000 to 70,000 habitants.¹⁶

The figures from late sixteenth-century Anatolian cities were close to those of the Balkan cities. In Kayseri the population rose from 2,287 *nefer*¹⁷ in 1500 to 3,530 in 1523 and to 8,251 in 1583; Karaman's population numbered only 623 people at the beginning of the sixteenth century,

¹⁵ Mahmut H. Şakiroğlu, "Saraybosna," *DİA*, vol. 36 (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1988), 129.

¹⁶ Suraiya Faroqhi, "Selanik," *ET*, vol. 9 (Leiden: Brill, 1986), 123.

¹⁷ Jennings used *nefer*, person, instead of household, and multiplied by 3 or 3.5 as a representative figure for a household to reach the total population number. Ronald Jennings, "Urban Population in Anatolia in the Sixteenth Century: A Study of Kayseri, Karaman, Amasya, Trabzon, and Erzurum," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 7, no. 1 (1976): 21-57.

but grew to 2,048 by the end of the century; 1,990 people were living in Amasya according to the 1523 survey, and the survey of 1576 shows that the city by then accommodated 3,329 people. Trabzon, as the most important Ottoman port on the southern coast of the Black Sea, had 2,122 people living there by the end of the sixteenth century; but there were only 583 people living in Erzurum according to the 1591 cadastral survey.¹⁸ As can be seen, Anatolian cities were rather small or medium-sized urban centers. Kayseri was among the biggest of the Anatolian cities with a population of 25,000-29,000 people by the end of the sixteenth century.

When we turn to the Arab provinces, we find three big cities, Cairo, Aleppo, and Damascus. Cairo was the second largest city of the empire after Istanbul. There are no surveys from which we can take reliable demographic data for Cairo before the nineteenth century. A 1525 law code book for Egypt (*kanunname-i Mısır*) relating to wheat consumption gives an idea of the relative size of the city—that year, Cairo bought 100,000 *irdabbs* of wheat, while Dimyat bought 3,000, and Alexandria 10,000.¹⁹ The figure suggested by André Raymond for the sixteenth century is less than 20,000,²⁰ and for the seventeenth century, less than 300,000.²¹ Raymond argues that the basic demographic conditions in the region from the end of the Middle Ages up to the nineteenth century did not change drastically (including both Cairo and Aleppo). This, of course, excludes factors such as epidemics, famine, and the like. The demography given

¹⁸ Ibid., 21-57.

¹⁹ Michael Winter, *Egyptian Society under Ottoman Rule, 1517-1798* (London: Routledge, 1992), 220.

²⁰ André Raymond, "Cairo's Area and Population in the Early Fifteenth Century," *Muqarnas* 2 (1984): 30.

²¹ André Raymond, "The Ottoman Conquest and the Development of the Great Arab Towns," *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 1, no. 1 (1979/80): 92

for 1516 stayed almost the same until the seventeenth century.²² For Aleppo, it was 9,049 households by the end of the sixteenth century, rising to 13, 854 at the time of the 1683 census.²³ Wilkins estimates the population during this period as being between 100,000 and 115,000.²⁴ Likewise, the characteristic of a stable population until the modern era also applies for Damascus. The population was around 57,000 for the sixteenth century and reached 65,000 people at the beginning of the seventeenth century.²⁵ However, Istanbul, by virtue of its overwhelming size and being the capital, had a unique development compared to the other major cities of the empire.

The population of Paris, one of the biggest cities in Europe, was 200,000 at the beginning of the sixteenth century. However, large outbreaks of the plague hit the city in 1604, 1606-8, 1612, 1618-19, and for a period of ten years during 1622-1632, which can not be excluded from the demographic conditions of this city. It is estimated that 800,000 people died in seventeenth century Paris due to the plague.²⁶ London had the same fate.²⁷ Although much smaller than Paris, London was the largest city in Britain in the early sixteenth century. After the Black Death of the mid-sixteenth century its population was around 70-80,000. By the end of the seventeenth century, London's population seems to have reached 200,000, and data from the London Bills of

²² André Raymond, "The Population of Aleppo in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries according to Ottoman Census Documents," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 16, no. 4 (1984): 451.

²³ Raymond, "The Population of Aleppo," 455-457.

²⁴ Charles Wilkins, "Households, Guilds, and Neighborhoods: Social Solidarities in Ottoman Aleppo, 1650-1700," Ph.D. diss. (Harvard University, 2005), 302.

²⁵ Ross Burns, *Damascus: A History* (London: Routledge, 2005), 229-233; Colette Establet and J. P. Pascual, *Familles et fortunes à Damas - 450 foyers damascains en 1700* (Damascus: Institut Français de Damas, 1994), 16.

²⁶ Vanessa Harding, *The Dead and the Living in Paris and London, 1500-1670* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 20-25.

²⁷ Ibid.

Mortality for 1670s gives a probable range of 475,000 to 550,000.²⁸ Comparison with these cities leads to the conclusion that Istanbul was one of the most highly populated cities of early modern Europe.

Istanbul had three major suburbs (*bilad-ı selase*): Galata, Eyüb (*Havass-ı Refia* or *Haslar*), and Üsküdar, with separate jurisdictions that also included the suburban villages.²⁹ Istanbul – the city inside the walls– was the heart of the economy, politics, and also popular protest. The population was largely composed of administrators, members of the palace, and the army. The janissary barracks – Old Barracks (Eski Odalar) and New Barracks (Yeni Odalar) – were located in this area. The Hippodrome (At Meydanı), close to Hagia Sophia, was one of the significant central areas of the district. This area is known to be where the first Muslim rites of prayer took place after the conquest of Istanbul. It preserved this significant ritual, and before each campaign prayers were performed at this central location.³⁰ It will be seen in the following chapter that the Hippodrome was the gathering place for urban protestors, both civilian and janissary. One of the two major construction projects in Istanbul during the seventeenth century was the construction of the Sultan Ahmed Mosque in the same Hippodrome area (1609). In the seventeenth century, most of the population lived *intra muros* and the population there was larger than that of Üsküdar, Galata and Eyüb combined.³¹ It not only accommodated ‘*askeris* but also

²⁸ Ibid., 14-15.

²⁹ İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, “İstanbul ve Bilad-ı Selase denilen Eyüp, Galata ve Üsküdar kadılıkları,” *İstanbul Enstitüsü Dergisi* III (1957): 25-32.

³⁰ Eremya Çelebi Kömürciyan, *İstanbul Tarihi*, trans. Hrand Andreasyan (Istanbul: Eren Yayıncılık, 1988), 33.

³¹ Halil İnalcık, “İstanbul,” *EF*², vol. 4, 230-239.

both Muslim and non-Muslim urban dwellers. This diversity was reflected in the existence of the Greek patriarchate in Fener, and the Armenian in Kumkapı.³²


Being one of the biggest cities of the early modern era, the needs of its residents were not immediately met by its own means. Istanbul largely had a consumer population. The city did not develop as a production centre but mostly a centre that processed and distributed goods. There was limited industry that was primarily located in Istanbul, hence the city needed to import products that were necessary for the local industries, the army, and the arsenals. Its provisioning was a most formidable task: many commercial businesses, trades and crafts activities were needed so that the daily needs of the Istanbulites were met. The largest markets, wholesale centers, and multiple shops were situated *intra muros*. Through its ports along the Golden Horn, the city received goods from Anatolia, the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the Arab provinces – in fact, from all over the empire.³³ These products were distributed throughout the city via the *bedestans*. The structures for distribution were organized similarly to those in Byzantine Constantinople: products were brought to the Grand Bazaar and sold there or used as a storage of imported goods.³⁴

³² Kevork Bardakjian, “The Rise of the Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople,” in Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis ed., *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Function of a Plural Society*, vol. 1 (New York: Holmes and Merier, 1982), 89-100.

³³ Some locations and main goods they supplied to Istanbul are Egypt: spices, rice, flax, henna, sugar; Izmir and vicinity and the Marmara Sea region: dried fruits, olives, grapes, apples, pears, plums, cherries, and apricots; Black Sea ports: sesame, apples, chestnuts, and citrus; Mediterranean and Black Sea ports of Tekirdağ, Volos, Caffa, Akkerman: barley and millet; Lemnos, Mytilene, etc: cheese and dried beef; Anadolu Hisar, Rumeli Hisar and Izmir: charcoal; Akçay, Sakarya, and Ereğli: lumber; Kavak on the Bosphorus: building stone. Halil İnalcık, “The Ottoman State: Economy and Society, 1300-1600” in Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert eds., *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994): 180-181.

³⁴ Çiğdem Kafesçioğlu, “The Ottoman Capital in the Making: The Reconstruction of Constantinople in the Fifteenth Century,” Ph.D. diss. (Harvard University, 1996), Chapter 2.

Map 2.1: Istanbul in the Sixteenth Century



Source: Halil İnalçık, "Istanbul," *EF* 4: 230-239.

This center was expanded with the erection of new establishments and new craft shops around the bazaar. The bazaar had accommodation for 126 shops inside, and 782 outside, according to a

waqf register from 1489.³⁵ By the mid-seventeenth century, there were two *bedestans* in the Grand Bazaar area according to Evliya Çelebi.³⁶ The area was administered by the board of imperial endowments and the elected body of a guild corporation.³⁷ The Grand Bazaar was connected to three main commercial streets that led to other commercial zones: Mahmut Pasa Street leading to Eminönü; Şehzadebaşı Street to Edirnekapı; and the street passing via Aksaray to Topkapı and Yedikule.³⁸

Galata accommodated the Imperial Dockyard (*tersane*) in Kasımpaşa,³⁹ the Cannon Foundry (*tophane*) in Tophane, as well as candle-making workshops (*mumhane*), and the military factories supporting the Canon Foundry were placed around the Foundry.⁴⁰ One of the three important gunpowder factories (*baruthane*) in sixteenth and seventeenth century Istanbul was located beyond the city walls to the north of Pera, in Kağıthane.⁴¹ Eremya Çelebi depicts the diverse character of this district very vividly, mentioning the workers of these early modern workshops, such as gypsy construction workers, captive slaves working in the Cannon Foundry,

³⁵ Halil İnalçık, “The Hub of the City: The Bedestan of Istanbul,” *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 1, no. 1 (1979-80): 5-6.

³⁶ Evliya Çelebi, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi: Topkapı Sarayı Bağdat 304 Yazmasının Transkripsiyonu-Dizini*, eds. Zekeriya Kurşun, Seyit Ali Kahraman, Yücel Dağlı, vol. 1 (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1999), 295. (hereafter cited as *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*)

³⁷ İnalçık, “The Hub of the City: The Bedestan of Istanbul,” 9.


³⁸ Robert Mantran, *Istanbul dans la seconde moitié: Essai d'histoire institutionnelle, économique et sociale* (Paris: Librairie Adrien Maisonneuve, 1962), 38-39.

³⁹ For detailed information see İdris Bostan, *Osmanlı Bahriye Teşkilatı XVII. Yüzyılda Tersane-i Amire* (Ankara: TTK, 1992).

⁴⁰ Mantran, *Istanbul Dans la Seconde Moitié du xııe Siècle*, 400-401.

⁴¹ The other two were in Şehremini and Bakırköy, again located outside the city walls. Gunpowder was also manufactured in the New Barracks and in the musket factory (*tüfenghane*) in Unkapanı along the Golden Horn. Gábor Ágoston, *Guns for the Sultan: Military Power and the Weapons Industry in the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 129. Evliya Çelebi also mentions the powder plants in Macuncular, the Hippodrome, and another small one that was part of the armory (*cebehane*) in Hagia Sophia. This site was full with several small-arms manufacturing workshops, and the barracks of the armorers (*cebecis*). *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, vol. 1, 257.


Map 2.2: Galata in the Seventeenth Century



Source: Based on Robert Mantran, *Istanbul dans la seconde moitié: Essai d'histoire institutionnelle, économique et sociale* (Paris: Librairie Adrien Maisonneuve, 1962).

Greek wine-house workers, and Mevlevi dervishes.⁴² Many European ambassadors and their translators and aides resided in Galata. This vicinity was frequented by Europeans and the non-Muslim population of the empire. The harbors of the Golden Horn were where international trade was predominantly concentrated.

Map 2.3: Üsküdar in the Seventeenth Century



Source: Based on Robert Mantran, *Istanbul dans la seconde moitié: Essai d'histoire institutionnelle, économique et sociale* (Paris: Librairie Adrien Maisonneuve, 1962).

⁴² Eremya Çelebi Kömürçüyan, *İstanbul Tarihi*, 34-36. Due to the high number of slaves working in the area and the prison close by, it was guarded very carefully. *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, vol. 1, 177.

Üsküdar did not play a significant role in the economy of Istanbul but was a transit site for European commerce. The district's gardens and promenades (*mesires*) were frequented by the inhabitants of the city. Transportation to Üsküdar from Istanbul was by small boats called *kayıks*, *peremes*, and *mavnas*. They were mostly used by Arabs, *azabs*, and *kuls* who were the slaves of *kapı kulu* soldiers. The transport sector was under the control of the janissaries to the point that even at the beginning of the century their *kethüda* was a janissary.⁴³ All military campaigns to the east were launched from Üsküdar.

Eyüp was on the west of the land walls along the coast of the Golden Horn and was connected to the intramural city by gardens, pastures, and fisheries, which fostered the slaughterhouses, tanneries, and candle-making factories on both sides of the wall.⁴⁴ It had a relatively small market, mostly occupied by pottery-makers and sellers.⁴⁵ Eyüb was the main spiritual centre for Muslims and was mostly inhabited by members of the *ulema*. Following Ayub, the Arab warrior who was believed to have been martyred at this location in front of the walls of Constantinople during the Umayyad siege of the capital of the Byzantine Empire in (664-68), the Ottomans set up a shrine to Eyüb Sultan, and the entire area become a center for “internal pilgrimage”⁴⁶

⁴³ Cengiz Orhonlu, “Osmanlı Türkleri Devrinde İstanbul’da Kayıkçılık ve Kayık İşletmeciliği,” *İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi* 21 (1966): 112-113. *Kethüda* in a guild setting refers to the head of a guild who dealt with the material and administrative aspects of guild life. G. Baer, “Kethüda,” *EP*, vol. 4, 894.

⁴⁴ Suraiya Faruqi, “Urban Space as Disputed Grounds: Territorial Aspects to Artisan Conflict in Sixteenth to Eighteenth Century Istanbul,” in *Stories of Ottoman Men and Women: Establishing Status, Establishing Control* (Istanbul: Eren Yayıncılık, 2002), 222-225.

⁴⁵ Inalcık draws our attention to the *sicils* of Eyüp – a very fruitful source for writing the history of pottery making. Halil İnalcık, “Eyüp Projesi,” in Tülay Artan ed., *Eyüp: Dün Bugün* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1993): 7.

⁴⁶ Halil Berktaş, “Azizler, Cismani Kalıntılar, Haclar, Yatırlar: Tek Tanrıcılık İçinde Özümlenmiş Paganizm,” in Tülay Artan ed., *Eyüp: Dün Bugün* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1993): 24.

2.2. A Look at the Events and Campaigns During the First Half of the Seventeenth Century

The accession to the throne of Ahmed I (r. 1603-17) was one of the junctures in the process of reformation of the Ottoman polity (1566-1650) from being a warrior entity to a sedentary bureaucratized state.⁴⁷ There were several manifestations of this process. In 1603, the tradition of fratricide upon accession to the throne was abandoned.⁴⁸ The method of seniority, *ekrebiyet*, (a sultan's next sibling succeeds him, not his children) also put an end to the career of princes as governors, since their elders wanted them to be under strict control.⁴⁹ The shift in method of accession to the throne was even reflected in the rituals of "girding the new sultan with the sword" at the Eyüb Sultan shrine. These rituals might have gone on before the seventeenth century, but 1603 was the first time the rituals were recorded in written sources.⁵⁰ The shift was one of the indications of new palace politics where various factions of statesmen, palace women, and soldiers became more and more influential. This new arrangement increased the power of all palace members who joined together to form stronger influence groups. Leslie Peirce rejects the traditional argument concerning decline, i.e., that the succession of poor sultans after Süleyman

⁴⁷ The traditional narrative accepts this period as one of the "decline" of the empire. This argument has been rebuffed by many scholars over the last twenty years. For a more detailed discussion see Douglas Howard, "Ottoman Historiography and the Literature of 'Decline' of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," *Journal of Asian History* 22 (1998): 52-77; and Gabriel Piterberg, *An Ottoman Tragedy: History and Historiography at Play* (Berkley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2003), 10-16.

⁴⁸ Murad III's execution of his five brothers in 1574, and Mehmed III his nineteen brothers in 1595 created a big reaction in Istanbul.

⁴⁹ In 1617, Sultan Mustafa I came to the throne for the first time according to seniority succession (*ekrebiyet*) instead of fratricide upon the agreement among grandees of the empire that previous Sultan Ahmed I's sons were too young to become sultans. Piterberg, *An Ottoman Tragedy*, 10.

⁵⁰ Cemal Kafadar, "Eyüp'te Kılıç Kuşanma Törenleri," in Tülay Artan ed., *Eyüp: Dün Bugün* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1993): 55.

the Magnificent and the increased influence of women in politics led to a weakening of the state and its ensuing decline. Instead she relates the changing role of women in the dynasty to the transition from a “state geared to expansion and led by a warrior sultan” to a “territorially stable bureaucratic state ruled by a sedentary palace sultan.” She demonstrates that the shift to a more centralized government raised the importance of all residents of the palace, including the women.⁵¹ Parallel to this argument, the increasing power of the janissary *agas* in palace politics had deeper implications than simply making whimsical choices under the influence of different volatile factions gathered around a different statesman or *valide*. That is to say, the importance of the janissary *agas* was also increased similarly to all other residents of the palace, and they most likely had their own agendas rather than being mere passive instruments of a palace faction.

Nor can the murder of Osman II during the 1622 janissary uprising after his personal participation in the unsuccessful Hotin (Khotyn) campaign against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1621 be explained by citing the whimsical and mob-like attitudes of janissaries. It was, rather, an outcome of Osman II’s resistance to the new sedentary sultan image and his attempts to revive the old warrior sultan image. These attempts manifested themselves in his personal leadership of this northern campaign, his marriage to Akile, the daughter of the *şeyhülislam* Esad Efendi (establishing *ulema* lineages similar to that of Osman Gazi), and his order to execute his brother before leaving for the campaign (an attempt at restoring fratricide).⁵²

⁵¹ Leslie Peirce challenges the argument that gender segregation prevented women from assuming powerful roles and claims that, on the contrary, this segregation enabled women to form a hierarchy of status and authority among themselves, parallel to that which existed among men. Also, considering that the most important medium in defining status in Ottoman society was not gender but generation, Peirce also shows that the power of an aging royal woman (the criterion here was to reach an age at which a woman came to the cessation of childbearing age, a post-sexual status) could easily supersede the power of a younger royal male. She also suggests that, although one should keep in mind that political authority was always patriarchal in the Ottoman state, royal women should be examined within the context of family dynamics. Leslie Peirce, *The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 18-27.

⁵² Piterberg, *An Ottoman Tragedy*, 17-20.

Actually, the killing of Osman II was part of only one, though perhaps the most violent, of the many janissary uprisings in early seventeenth century Istanbul that will be looked at in more detail in the following chapter.⁵³

The most important wars of the early seventeenth century were the ongoing campaigns against Iran (1603-1618 and 1624-1639). In 1603, Shah Abbas, who was consolidating his power in the area, captured Tabriz. In the same year, Persia conquered Erivan (Revan). During the next two years the Ottoman commander, Cigalazade Sinan Pasha, fought and lost the battles of Van and Lake Urmiye. Shah Abbas progressed further towards Ganja and Shirvan.⁵⁴ Another defeat came to the Ottoman army in 1618, leading to a peace treaty, and the Shah of Persia reestablished his power in the area.⁵⁵ The peace ended when Shah Abbas besieged and took Baghdad in 1624. To retake Baghdad, the Ottomans organized three unsuccessful campaigns in 1626, 1630, and 1635. The last resulted in the conquest of Erivan and, as Suraiya Faroqhi notes, led to some celebrations and the construction of a pavilion at Topkapı Palace.⁵⁶ The stabilization of the empire internationally was achieved to a great extent during the reign of Murad IV (r. 1623-1640). He finally took Baghdad back from the Persians in 1638.⁵⁷

On the northern border of the empire there was another struggle. The Black Sea was considered as “mare nostrum” or an “Ottoman lake” after the conquest of Istanbul. It was secure

⁵³ This time period also witnesses *sipahi* rebellions. Günhan Börekçi points out the 1600, 1601, and 1603 *sipahi* rebellion against Mehmed III. Günhan Börekçi, “İnkırazın Eşiğinde Bir Hanedan: III. Mehmed, I. Ahmed, I. Mustafa ve 17. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Siyasi Krizi,” *Disiplinlerarası Çalışmalar Dergisi* 14 (2009): 45-96, esp. 48.

⁵⁴ Griswold, *The Great Anatolian Rebellion*, 105-109.

⁵⁵ Suraiya Faroqhi, “Crisis and Change, 1590-1699” in Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert eds., *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994): 421.

⁵⁶ Suraiya Faroqhi, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It* (London, New York: I. B. Tauris, 2004), 49.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

and vibrant with international trade. The Crimean ports were used for provisioning Istanbul with foodstuffs and raw materials – in large part wheat that was grown by the Tatars.⁵⁸ Raids of Cossacks on Black Sea settlements and on the merchant ships on the Black Sea, starting in the second half of the sixteenth century becoming severe from about the 1590s, became a significant problem that threatened both the local people⁵⁹ and the economic and political interests of the Ottomans in the area during the early seventeenth century.⁶⁰ In 1639, there was small-scale warfare with the Cossacks who took control of the mouth of the Don River, which put at risk Ottoman control of the sea. The Ottomans could not launch a full land and sea campaign on the Cossacks before 1641, due to the Persian campaigns and the unrest in Istanbul.⁶¹ There had been constant small-scale warfare between Ottoman forces and Tatar armies and the Cossacks but it did not normally involve the major states.⁶² From that time onwards, Faroqhi argues that this area entered into a *grande histoire* where the major states of the region became more involved,

⁵⁸ Caffa was a transit center for goods: wheat, flour, honey, clarified butter, cheese, fish, caviar, hides, and skins were brought from the Crimea; Georgia sturgeon, cod, caviar, honey, raw silk, woolen cloth, and precious furs were provided from Azov, Circassia and Georgia. The most important trade revenue of the Crimean ports, according to the custom duties of Caffa studied by İnalcık, came from slaves. The Crimean Tatars became the main suppliers of slaves due to their raids into Poland-Lithuania, Muscovy and Circassia. Halil İnalcık, *Sources and Studies on the Ottoman Black Sea 1: The Customs Register of Caffa, 1487-1490* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), 121-124; idem., “The Ottoman State: Economy and Society, 1300-1600,” in Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert eds., *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994): 281-85.

⁵⁹ Victor Ostapchuk demonstrates how disturbing and traumatic these attacks were for the inhabitants of the region. Victor Ostapchuk, “The Human Landscape of the Ottoman Black Sea in the Face of the Cossack Naval Raids,” *Oriente Moderno* n.s. 20 (2001): 23–95.

⁶⁰ In *Gazaname-i Halil Paşa* with an introduction by Victor Ostapchuk it is clear that in 1621 the Cossacks prevented the Ottoman fleet from conveying supplies to the Danube for their army that was fighting against the Commonwealth. Halil Pasha indicates that a naval force was to be sent to protect the regions along the Black Sea coast. Victor Ostapchuk, “An Ottoman *Gazaname* on Halil Pasha’s Naval Campaign against the Cossacks (1621),” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 14 (1990)=*Adelphotos: A Tribute to Omeljan Pritsak by his Students* 14 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1990): 482-521, esp. 485-86.

⁶¹ Victor Ostapchuk, “Five Documents from the Topkapı Palace Archives,” *Journal of Turkish Studies* 11 (1987): 49-104, esp. 51-52.

⁶² Victor Ostapchuk shows that the ongoing small-scale warfare actually did involve the major states since the 1620s at least. Victor Ostapchuk, “The Ottoman Black Sea Frontier and the Relations of the Porte with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Muscovy, 1622-1628,” Ph.D. diss. (Harvard University, 1989), esp. Part I.

starting with the conquest of the fortress of Azov on the Black Sea by a band of Cossacks and their offering the fortress to Tsar Mikhail in 1637.⁶³

Another important site was the Venetian-Ottoman front in Crete. There were two long Venetian-Ottoman campaigns (1645-69 and 1684-99) before Crete was finally taken under Ottoman rule.⁶⁴ The Venetian economy was in crisis at the time due to its loss of stature in the European spice trade and the southern German market after the Thirty Years' Wars. This difficult economic situation had its negative effects on the Venetian navy. Faroqhi thinks that this might have been known by the Ottomans and possibly motivated their attack on Crete.⁶⁵ Crete's strategic location on the trade route from Istanbul to Egypt was a major factor in its importance for the Ottomans following their conquest of East. Crete was also the only remaining land of Venetian control in the eastern Mediterranean. The Ottoman attack at the fortress of Hania was successful. However, the subsequent Venetian success against the Ottoman forces was one of the

⁶³ Faroqhi, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It*, 50.

⁶⁴ The Ottoman conquest of Crete resulted in an emergence of new struggles in the Mediterranean. Braudel's thesis emphasized the common experience of the Mediterranean world due to shared environment independent from state, religion, or other criteria. Andrew Hess, however, stressed that this cultural unity could not be applied to the Ibero-African frontier. Hess introduced a second Mediterranean world that maintained conflict between Latin Christian Spaniards and Muslim Ottomans in North Africa. Greene introduces a third layer of interaction in the region by including Eastern Orthodoxy in the picture and she shows how the dynamics of this constant three-way interaction worked in Crete. The transition of Crete from Venetian to Ottoman rule also signifies a new dimension in Mediterranean history. By the time of the Ottoman conquest of Crete in the late-seventeenth century a three-pronged struggle emerged in the Mediterranean. Green also stresses, however, that after this newly struggle in the Mediterranean during the Ottoman domination of the sea emerged, the general picture did not look very different from that in the time of Venetians in the region, which supports Braudel's thesis. Molly Greene, *A Shared World: Christians and Muslims in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000), 3-5; See also, Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World*; and Andrew Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth Century Ibero-African Frontier* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).

⁶⁵ Faroqhi, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It*, 51.

contributing factors to the janissary rebellion in Istanbul and the dethronement of Ibrahim I in 1648.⁶⁶

This was followed by severe defeats of the Ottoman navy in twelve of thirteen battles between 1646 and 1656. The struggle ended with the Venetian occupation of the islands of Bozcaada (Tenedos), Limni (Limnos), and Semadirek (Samothraki), which cut Istanbul's sea link to the Mediterranean. Istanbul was in panic: provisioning became very limited and prices were inflated. Famine struck. Thousands of Istanbulites, including the Sultan, fled to the Anatolian side of the city.⁶⁷ Chronicles of the time record an extensive urban protest during this period. The janissaries and civilian urban dwellers acted collaboratively and warned the sultan of the dangers of allowing the Bosphorus to be closed and reminded him of his duty to launch a campaign against the Venetians.⁶⁸ Politically, the loss of such crucial islands combined with the unrest in the city resulted in the appointment of Köprülü Mehmed Pasha as Grand Vizier.

What was happening within the city while the campaigns on various fronts were continuing? The Kadızadeli Islamic movement left its mark on early seventeenth century Istanbul history. The movement was named after the founder, Kadızade Mehmed (d. 1635). He was an immigrant from Balıkesir who had received a fundamentalist training from Birgili Mehmed ibn Pir Ali.⁶⁹ He rose in his career as a mosque preacher, starting at the Murad Pasha mosque and

⁶⁶ More detailed information on the 1648 rebellion will be given in the following chapter. Marc David Baer, *Honored by the Glory of Islam: Conversion and Conquest in Ottoman Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 25-37; Right after Ibrahim I was dethroned the grand vizier sent extra soldiers and military supplies to support the forces in Crete. Mustafa Naima, *Tarih-i Naima*, ed. Mehmet İpşirli, vol. 3 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2007), 1178-1179. (hereafter cited as *Tarih-i Naima*)

⁶⁷ Baer, *Honored by the Glory of Islam: Conversion and Conquest in Ottoman Europe*, 57-58.

⁶⁸ Mehmed Halife, *Tarih-i Gülmani*, ed. Kamil Su (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1986), 61. (hereafter cited as *Tarih-i Gülmani*)

⁶⁹ Madeline C. Zilfi, *The Politics of Piety: The Ottoman Ulema in the Postclassical Age (1600-1800)* (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1988), 131.

continuing at the Sultan Selim. In 1623, he was appointed to the Bayezid Mosque, to the Süleymaniye in 1631, and in the same year, to the Hagia Sofia, the most important imperial mosque in Istanbul at the time.⁷⁰ Kadızadeli preached along the line of fundamentalist “orthodox” Islam, following the traditional belief that “every innovation was heresy, every heresy is error, and every error leads to hell.”⁷¹ He condemned the use of coffee, tobacco, opium, and the practices of singing, chanting, dancing, whirling, and *zikr* (recollections of God by repeating pious phrases). His target was mainly the Sufis. Kadızadelis attacked Sufi lodges, coffeehouses, and taverns. Murad IV gave full support to the movement. In fact, his oppressive measures to suppress opposition in Istanbul found public support through this movement.⁷²

It was not a new policy to keep the taverns or consumption and production of alcohol under control.⁷³ However, Murad IV (r. 1623-1640) took it to extremes. He not only prohibited the consumption of alcohol, but also forbade the cultivation, selling and smoking of tobacco all over the empire, and monitored the prohibition.⁷⁴ The reason behind it was presented as being that the use of tobacco prevented the public from working, and caused fires and many other

⁷⁰ Zilfi, *The Politics of Piety*, 132.

⁷¹ Madeline C. Zilfi, “The Kadızadelis: Discordant Revivalism in Seventeenth-Century Istanbul,” *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 45 (1986): 253.

⁷² Zilfi, *The Politics of Piety*, 138.

⁷³ We have prior records of decrees warning the authorities of the excessive number of taverns in Istanbul and Galata, some ordering the shutting down of them all and even the throwing of salt into their stored wines to turn them into vinegar: BOA, MD 7: 504, no. 1473 (975/1568); BOA, MD 27: 302, no. 725 (983/1576); BOA, MD28: 41, no. 100 (984/1576); on prohibition of the production of *rakı*, and wine in Istanbul in 1606, Ahmet Refik Altınay, *Hicri On Birinci Asırda İstanbul Hayatı (1000-1100)* (Istanbul: Enderun Kitabevi, 1988), 32-33.

⁷⁴ A decree was sent to the *kadı*, *bostancıbaşı*, *altı bölük kethüda-yeri*, and *yeniçeri serdari* of Edirne asking them to pursue the question of whether tobacco was cultivated and smoked, especially among *askeris*. 85 *Numaralı Mühimme Defteri (1040-1041 (1042)/ (1630-1631 (1632)-Özet-Transkripsiyon-İndeks* (Ankara: Başbakanlık Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2002), 156, no. 426 (1040/1630).

evils.⁷⁵ After the major fire that started on 27 Safer 1043/1 September 1633 in the Cibali neighborhood (neighboring Balat and the Golden Horn) of Istanbul and burned one-fifth of the city, Murad IV closed all the coffeehouses and taverns in Istanbul with the support of the Kadızadeli movement. This was partly to stop the rumors behind the fire, and also to break the strength of janissary power and stifle public criticism.⁷⁶ Coffeehouses and taverns were the best places to start since they were the most important public spaces of the early modern era, where information was disseminated, and they were also under the dominant control of the janissaries promoting opposition to the state. Murad IV terrorized the city for years, indiscriminately executing dozens of people. He himself occasionally went out at night to perform these executions. Fear dominated the streets of Istanbul for a long time. A curfew was imposed after sunset. The Sultan was resented by both janissaries and civilians.⁷⁷

The Kadızadeli reform movement was revived in mid-century and was very effective until after 1661. The movement was taken up by Valide Hatice Turhan, the mother of Mehmed IV, who had very close connections with Vani Efendi, then the leader of the movement.⁷⁸ She supported Islamization as a form of authority and used all the necessary political symbolism to establish this.⁷⁹

⁷⁵ 85 *Numaralı Mühimme*, 230, no. 305.

⁷⁶ Cavid Baysun, "Murad IV," *IA*, 630.

⁷⁷ *Tarih-i Gilmani*, 13-22.

⁷⁸ Lucienne Thys-Şenocak, "The Yeni Valide Mosque Complex at Eminonu," *Muqarnas* 15 (1998): 59, 67.

⁷⁹ Marc David Baer, "The Great Fire of 1660 and the Islamization of Christian and Jewish Space in Istanbul," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 36, no. 2 (2004): 163-164.

Valide Hadice Turhan used the big fire of 1660 to consolidate her political power.⁸⁰ She confiscated properties in Eminönü and built the Valide Sultan mosque. Jewish merchants had had a powerful position in the area, but the presence of Jews in Eminönü went beyond their being influential merchants of the neighborhood.⁸¹ According to the endowment register of Sultan Mehmed II in 1595-97, 60 percent of the Jews of Istanbul were living in Eminönü, Sirkeci, and Tahtakale⁸² which were then Islamicized: Jews were forced to resettle outside this area.⁸³ Marc Baer mentions that Jews offered a bribe to stop the entire decision. Not only they were refused but also threatened with death if they did not sell their property.⁸⁴ A purchase record in an Istanbul court register mentions that the Jews living in a Hocapaşa (in Sirkeci) neighborhood were ordered to sell their properties to Muslims, and leave the waqf properties to Muslims as well. The properties that were not sold were confiscated by the state.⁸⁵ In this purchase record, an area of 325 *ziraa*/185 m², was auctioned by the treasurer (*defterdar*) Hüseyin Pasha and sold to Mahmud Odabaşı from the 30th regiment of janissaries for 22,000 *akçe*.

In the early seventeenth century, the main political and social events that engaged the urban dwellers of Istanbul were those such as changing Sultans, campaign preparations, the

⁸⁰ The biggest fire of the seventeenth century in Istanbul began somewhere close to Firewood Gate (Odun Kapısı) west of Eminönü. The fire rapidly spread to Unkapanı, the Hippodrome, and Mahmud Pasha Street where the biggest market was located. It continued for two days, reaching Kumkapı and Samatya. 40,000 people died and 280,000 houses were burned. The city suffered further deaths due to the following plague. Baer, "The Great Fire of 1660," 159.

⁸¹ Thys-Şenocak, "The Yeni Valide Mosque Complex," 61-63

⁸² Baer, "The Great Fire of 1660," 166.

⁸³ Ibid., 166-171; Uriel Heyd, "The Jewish Community of Istanbul in the Seventeenth Century," *Oriens* 6 (1953): 311-313.

⁸⁴ Baer, *Honored by the Glory of Islam*, 87. Baer derives this information from Silahdar Fındıklı Mehmed Ağa, *Tarih-i Silahdar*, vol. 1 (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1928), 218.

⁸⁵ IKS 9: 178a (1072/1661).

ongoing trade and crafts activities necessary to support this highly populated city, fires, plague outbreaks, confiscation policies, and ultra-orthodox Islamic movements. Where were the janissaries in all this, both physically, and politically? How were they affected by them? And how did they affect the city in return?

2.3. The Demography of the Janissaries in Early Seventeenth Century Istanbul

How many janissaries were there within the confines of Istanbul in the early seventeenth century?

A demographical investigation of the janissaries can be carried out by inspecting *mevacib* (salary) registers and Ottoman budgets. Most of the *mevacib* registers in Hagia Sofia were burnt after the abolition of the janissary regiments in 1826, and therefore, only two complete registers of all janissary regiments in Istanbul for one full year are extant.⁸⁶ Luckily, they are both from the early seventeenth century: the register of 1033/1623, and 1074-75/1663-64. In the first *mevacib* register, Uzunçarşılı examined the *masar* salaries (the salaries given to janissaries for the first three months of *Muharrem*, *Safer*, *Rebiyülevvel* – *masar* is an abbreviation derived by taking the first letters of these months). The later register will be examined here and compared with the former, which outlines the *lezez* salaries (the fourth salary payment of janissaries in a *hicri* year for the months of *Şevval*, *Zilkade*, and *Zilhicce* – the word is derived by taking the first letters of these months) of 1074/1663 and the *masar* salaries for 1075/1664.⁸⁷

The comparison of the two registers reveals that both are organized in the same way. They begin with lists of the janissaries in the *ağa bölüks* (company in the troops), starting with

⁸⁶ Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilatının Kapıkulu Ocakları*, vol. 1 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi. 1943), 432.

⁸⁷ BOA, KK 6599.

the *kethüda bölük* and continuing up to the 61st *ağa bölük*. At the beginning, they give the name of the *çorbacı* (the regimental head of the *bölük*) and the total number of soldiers in that particular *bölük*. Then, they record the name and daily salary of every member. It goes from the highest salary to the lowest, ending with those transferred from other regiments and newly promoted *a'cemis*. At the bottom, the calculations of the daily *akçe* pay, and the sum for a three month period are recorded. Following these calculations, the *tekiüds* (those who were retired from that *bölük*) and the lists of *nanhuregan* (janissary orphans of that *bölük*) are recorded with the stipends they received under the name of the *bölük*.

After dealing with the *ağa bölüks*, the *cema'ats* (regiment) are recorded in the same system. The *cema'at* were organized into two groups but there is no particular designation observed for this division. The first group was composed of the *cema'at* from the first to the fifty-ninth, and the second from the sixtieth to the one-hundred-and-first. *Korucus*, were marked throughout the registers. *Korucus* (lit. “guard”) were the elderly soldiers who were not yet retired from either *ağa bölüks* or *cema'at* s. They did not go on campaigns but instead guarded the regiments in Istanbul.⁸⁸ If there was a specific responsibility for a janissary, it was recorded after his name, for example, *korucu-i rah-ı ab* (the guard of water ways), *korucu-i ağnam-ı miri* (the guard of state sheep), *korucu-i anbari-i çuka-i Selanik* (the guard of the warehouse for the woolen cloth coming from Selanik), *bevfab-ı bab-ı kule-i heft* (the guard of the Yedikule gate of Istanbul), *meremmati-i cami-i miyane* (the mender of the janissary mosque in the barracks called Orta mosque), *hizmet-i meydan-ı tir* (the servant in Ok Meydanı, “Arrow Square”), *anbari-i furun-ı sekbanan* (the warehouse guard of the *sekban* bakeries), and so on.

⁸⁸ Uzunçarşılı, *Kapıkulu Ocakları*, vol. 1 , 438.

Table 2.1: The Demographic Distribution of Janissaries in the Early Seventeenth-Century

	1567-68	1623	%	1654	%	1663-64	%
janissaries in physically present in Istanbul				24,543	58	19,506	50
number of janissaries out of Istanbul				17,584	42	19,460	50
total number of janissaries registered in Istanbul	12, 798	35,925		42,127		39,571	

Sources: The figures for 1567-68, Gábor Ágoston, "Ottoman Warfare in Europe, 1453-1812," in Jeremy Black ed. *European Warfare, 1453-1815* (London, 1999): 135. The figures for 1623, İsmail H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilatında Kapıkulu Ocakları* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi. 1943), 444, based on the *masar* salaries in the salary register for 1033/1623. The figures for 1654 comes from Mehmet Genç and Erol Özvar ed., *Osmanlı Maliyesi: Kurumlar ve Bütçeler 2* (Istanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Araştırma Merkezi, 2006). The figures from 1664 are from the salary register in the BOA, KK 6599.

As can be seen from the table 2.1, the number of janissaries was only 12,798 in 1567-68. Other sources confirm that the number of janissaries did not exceed 15,000 before the mid-sixteenth century.⁸⁹ However, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, there is quite a significant increase in the number of janissaries. The register of 1623 states that there were then 35,925 janissaries, 2,343 of them being *sekbans*, in Istanbul.

Not all janissaries were resident in Istanbul, but were instead on Eastern campaigns or serving in fortresses (*kal'as*) in places such as Bagdad, Van, Budapest, Estergon, and Belgrade.⁹⁰ In the budget of 1064/1654 during the reign of Mehmed IV, their number rose to 42,129, of

⁸⁹ Koçi Bey, *Koçi Bey Risaleleri*, ed. Seda Çakmakcioğlu (Istanbul: Kabalcı, 2007), 38-39. (hereafter cited as *Koçi Bey Risaleleri*)

⁹⁰Uzunçarşılı, *Kapıkulu Ocakları*, vol.1, 439-444.

which 17,584 were mainly on duty in the campaigns. After the confrontation between the Ottoman and Safavid forces in Baghdad and the subsequent Ottoman victory, the fortress continued to be supported by soldiers constantly sent to the *kal'a* of Bagdad and Van. The full-scale warfare between Venice and the Ottomans between 1645 and 1669 in Crete was reflected in the recorded high number of janissaries sent to the fortress of Hania in Crete, and other nearby islands to support the navy in Crete.

In the 1064/1654 budget it is further seen that the other main fortresses to which the janissaries were sent were those used in the campaign of Hungary and those in Bosnia. Finally, in the 1664 *mevacib* register, the number of janissaries registered in Istanbul decreased to 39,571, and half of these men had been sent on different campaigns, though predominantly still in Persia and Crete.

Clearly, this was a large number of soldiers for even a mega-city to accommodate. The impact must have been apparent in various aspects of urban life. In a city of 300,000 people, 35,000-40,000 janissaries alone amounted to around 13 percent of the population. We do not have specific information as to how many of the janissaries were married and settled outside the barracks of Istanbul, however, among the detected 173 probate registers of janissaries living in Istanbul during the early seventeenth century in the *kismet-i 'askeriyye* registers, 85 janissaries out of 173 were married.⁹¹ This constitutes about half of the total janissary probate registers. If we are to accept these figures as a reflection of the general frequency of marriage among janissaries, we may assume that again about half of the janissaries residing in Istanbul would be married and had separate households. This would come to almost 17,150-19,600 janissaries from the total of 35,000-40,000. Therefore, there were around 18,000 janissary households in Istanbul

⁹¹ Based on Said Öztürk's raw materiel on 1,000 probate registers of *askeris* who died in Istanbul. Out of 1,000 *askeris* 173 were janissaries. Said Öztürk, *İstanbul Tereke Defterleri (Sosyo-Ekonomik Tahlil)* (Istanbul: Osmanlı Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1995), 438-493.

during the early seventeenth century. Of course, this figure is only a postulation. Another parameter that should be kept in mind is the other affiliates of the janissary regiments — the retired janissaries and orphans residing in Istanbul. 8,889 *tekaüds* and 3,531 *nanhuregans* were recorded in the 1663-64 *mevacib* register. Adding them to the number of people in the regiments of the 1663-64 register, it can be seen that the number of people affiliated with the janissary army in Istanbul at that time, excluding their households, extends to 51,973.

There is limited information on the number of janissaries living in other cities of the empire and their ratio to civilians. Cairo is one of the few for which there is information. The number of soldiers organized under seven regiments there was 12,000 in 1634. This number reached 16,000 in the 1671 *mevacib* register, which was 6 to 8 percent of the estimated total urban population of 200,000.⁹² Wilkins' work on Aleppo shows that the number of soldiers was 655 in 1616, and 639 in 1700.⁹³ The estimated population of Aleppo for that period was 100,000 to 115,000. Therefore, the military population was as low as 0.5 percent of the total.⁹⁴ However, examining the tax registers of Aleppo for 1678, he determines that 526 of a total of 10,538 inhabitable houses were owned by soldiers, which is 5 percent. Wilkins arrives at the number of people living in soldier households by using a multiple of eight persons, thus obtaining a figure of 4,208.⁹⁵ Canbakal estimates the number of people with direct affiliations to the army as 552.

⁹² Raymond, *Artisans et commerçants* 2, 659-600.

⁹³ The breakdown of the sum is 214 *gönüllüyan* soldiers including 110 infantry, 286 *müstahfızan* (citadel guards), 40 *bevvan*, (gate keepers), and 14 palace guards for 1616; 216 *gönüllüyan*, 423 citadel guards. Wilkins, "Households, Guilds, and Neighborhoods," 302.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ The multiplier 8 was used by Aleppine historian Ghazzi and adopted by Raymond as well. However, it should be indicated that for the population estimates of Istanbul, Barkan used the multiplier of five persons. This number was even lower than Jennings' estimates for Anatolian cities, which was 3 to 3.5. I found the five persons multiplier more reflective. Wilkins, "Households, Guilds, and Neighborhoods," 304; Barkan, "Essai sur les données statistiques";

Considering each person as one household, Canbakal asserts that 17 percent of Ayntab households were soldiers, not specifying the percentage of janissaries.⁹⁶ After the conquest of Crete, 3,000 soldiers stayed in Candia, which makes them a strong power in a population of slightly more than 10,000. Greene argues that this was mostly because of Christian converts willing to enroll in the military cadres, rather than the imposed military cadres sent from Istanbul.⁹⁷

Compared with other cities, Istanbul had a greater concentration of janissaries if we include the non-active affiliated members, for example the retired members, *oturaks* (those injured and unfit for combat), janissary orphans, and their households. The estimate is that they were close to 20 percent of the population, taking into account their households. Such a concentration, considering also their privileges and power over the civilians, would easily make them an influential group in the city. Furthermore, they were in the capital of the empire and were one of the groups residing very close to the palace; in short, they were at the heart of the politics and economy of the empire which might have increased their influence. In order to test the argument that the janissaries were an influence group, we should investigate the dynamics and characteristics of the janissaries residing in Istanbul.

Taking a closer look at the 1664 *mevacib* register reveals some valuable information about the nature of the janissary regiments of the time, one of them being the solid fact that they were mainly warriors than civilians. In the summer of 1612, Cemile bint Mustafa abandoned her house and her husband, taking some precious items along with her. Her husband, janissary

Ronald Jennings, "Urban Population in Anatolia in the Sixteenth Century: A Study of Kayseri, Karaman, Amasya, Trabzon, and Erzurum," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 7, no. 1 (1976).

⁹⁶ Hülya Canbakal, *Society and Politics in an Ottoman Town, 'Ayntab in the 17th Century* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2007), 68-70.

⁹⁷ Molly Greene, *A Shared World*, 37-39.

Ahmed Beşe, started looking for her. He found Cemile forty days later hiding with a *sipahi*'s wife, Ayşe, in Kasımpaşa, and took her to court, claiming she had stolen his belongings. Cemile confessed that she had taken his belongings, sold some of them for her expenses and had given some money to a *subaşı* to help her escape to the countryside. In her defense, she argued that her husband had been on three campaigns during their marriage and that she could not take it anymore!⁹⁸ What caused Cemile to leave was ultimately her rejection of the realities of a janissary's life. A janissary would be constantly sent to on long-term campaigns. About half of the 35,000- 40,000 janissaries, therefore, were away from Istanbul most of the time. In the 1664 *mevacib* register the number of janissaries registered in Istanbul seems to have decreased to 39,571 with as usual fifty percent of these being away from home. At that time many of them were stationed in at campaigns in Bagdad (23 percent) and Van (5 percent) against the Safavids. (Table 2.1) For the Crete campaign they were located in Hania, Crete, and in Midilli, with Movalak as a supporting force, comprising 36 percent of the soldiers that were sent outside of Istanbul. A great number of soldiers were sent to the *kal'a* of Uyvar (Nové Zamky in Slovakia). The siege of Uyvar continued from the autumn of 1663 to the early summer of 1664. Uyvar fell after the battle of St Gotthard between the Ottoman and Habsburg armies.⁹⁹ There is also a place marked with an Arabic letter ط that might refer to Trabzon. Janissaries could be sent there to protect the region against Cossack sea raids.¹⁰⁰ Another possibility for ط could be

⁹⁸ *mezbur Ahmed beşe zevcimdir lakin beşe 3 harb etmek 'adet olub tahammül edemeyub ahar alınub halas olmak için salifi'z-zikr esbab alub kasaba-i Kasım Paşada bir sipahi karısı Ayşe nam hatun yanında kırk gün böylece olmuş idim.* The mentioned Ahmed Beşe is my husband but he went to three campaigns so far, [I] couldn't take it anymore and to escape I took the mentioned goods and stayed near a *sipahi*'s wife Ayşe for forty days. IKS 1: 25b (1021/1612).

⁹⁹ Rhoads Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare 1500-1700* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1999), 122-123.

¹⁰⁰ The *kal'a* of Trabzon was important for defending the city against Cossack raids as reflected in the *mühimmes*. *Mühimme Defteri* 90, (Istanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1993), 198, no. 255.

Table 2.2: The Distribution of Janissaries to *Kal'as* in 1074-75/1663-64

Cemaat/Bölük	Crete	Hania	Midilli/ Movalak	Bagdad	Van	Uyvar	Persia	T	Kerkuk	Bosnia	Damascus	Budin	other places	total
Ağa Bölüks (1-61)	1758	181	150	1588	326	988	173	527	6	52	19		280	6048
Cemaats (1-59)	1364	555	183	1749	158	481	256	135	135	189	214	141	912	6472
Cemaats (60-101)	1514	1078	191	1071	500	312	1084	166	3	14	4	9	994	6940
TOTAL	4636	1814	524	4408	984	1781	1513	828	144	255	237	150	2186	19460
TOTAL (percent)	24	9	3	23	5	9	8	4	0,7	1,4	1,2	0,7	11	100

Source: BOA, KK 6599 (1074-75/1663-64).

Temeşvar. Soldiers were also sent to Kerkuk, Bosnia, Damascus, Budin (Budapest) and other places such as Salonica, Egri, and İskenderiye (Alexandria). The distribution of janissaries can be viewed in table 2.2.

Another interesting body of data in this register relates to absentee janissaries. The register was not used only for accounting janissary salaries, but also for determining who was sent where and who did not show up, whether in Istanbul or on campaign. Those who could not be traced were recorded as *reft sefer neyamed* (not present in the campaign). The chroniclers of the time stress the absences of soldiers from wars as one of the main signs of lack of discipline in the janissary armies.¹⁰¹ In 1664, 2,543 janissaries were registered as absentees. This is only 7 percent of the total – not a low ratio, but given the narrative in the chronicles, one expects it to be higher. But again, it should not be forgotten that this register was prepared during the grand vizierate of Fazıl Ahmed Pasha, after the vizierate of his father, Köprülü Ahmed Pasha of 1656-1661 when the army was taken under control, and relative discipline was reasserted.

The question to be asked here is who went missing? Was there a specific pattern to the absenteeism? Among those who did not show up for the campaigns, 66 percent were from the *ağa bölük*, followed by 34 percent from the entire *cema'ats*. 55 percent of those who stayed in Istanbul were again mostly from the *ağa bölük*. Of 17,097 janissaries from the *ağa bölük*, 10,826 stayed in Istanbul while the rest were out on various campaigns. This constitutes 63 percent of the janissaries from the *ağa bölük*.

¹⁰¹ *Kitab-ı Müstetab*, ed. Yücel, Yaşar (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1974), 4-8. (hereafter cited as *Kitab-ı Müstetab*).

Table 2.3: The Demographic Distribution of the Janissaries in Istanbul According to the 1074-75/1663-64 *Mevacib* Register

<i>Cemaat/Bölük</i>	#	<i>Sekbans</i>	Absent (<i>reft sefer</i> <i>neyamed</i>)	outside Istanbul	remaining in Istanbul	<i>korucu</i>	<i>tekaüd</i>	<i>nanhoregan</i>
<i>Ağa Bölüks (1-61)</i>	17097		1685	6048	9364	690	3995	882
<i>Ağa Bölüks</i> percentage of total	43 %		66%	31%	53%	50%		
<i>Cemaats (1-59)</i>	10396		423	6472	3501	316	2344	1604
<i>Cemaats (1-59)</i> percentage of total	26%		17%	33%	20%	23%		
<i>Cemaats (60-101)</i>	12078	3450	435	6940	4703	374	2550	1045
<i>Cemaats (60-101)</i> percentage of total	31%	100%	17%	36%	27%	27%		
Total	39571	3450	2543	19460	17568	1380	8889	3531

Source: BOA, KK 6599 (1074-75/1663-64).

Was there resistance to leaving Istanbul? The *ağa bölüks*, obviously, were not under full control during 1660s. Whether the *cema'ats* were always more disciplined or simply taken under control following the strict policies of Murad IV or of Köprülü is unknown.

The register also reveals that the absentee janissaries were not scattered over all the regiments. Absenteeism occurred only in particular *ağa bölüks* or *cema'ats*. Among the *ağa bölüks* there were 33 *bölüks* from which janissaries went missing –more than half of the *bölüks* – and among 101 *cema'ats*, 21 of them experienced the same problem. Why did some regiments suffer from absenteeism while others did not? There may be some correlation between the absences and the infiltration of the *re'aya* into the janissary regiments, not to mention the urbanization of the janissaries. Those who were civilians in origin and registered under janissary regiments to avoid some taxes might have been in a position to avoid military service only through certain regiments. Such under-the-table acts might be more prevalent in some regiments than in others. Another possibility is that janissaries from certain regiments may have had wider opportunities to enter the guilds or some trade sectors just because they had connections through the regiments. It is known, for example, that the 56th *ağa bölük* was in charge of controlling the transportation of foodstuffs into Istanbul.¹⁰² According to the 1663-64 register, the 56th *ağa bölük* was one of the problematic ones. Of 544 members, 73 were noted as absentees, and 456 of them remained in Istanbul while only 88 of them were sent on campaign. If we were to speculate from this example, there is a chance that the regiments whose members were active in urban economy were more reluctant to fulfill their military obligations.

On the other hand, the urban economic involvement was not limited to the undisciplined regiments. It is seen in the 1663-64 register that there were highly disciplined regiments that had

¹⁰² Reşat Ekrem Koçu, *Tarihte İstanbul Esnafı* (Istanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2003), 245-246.

connections with certain guilds in Istanbul. For example, the 10th *ağa bölük* sent 180 out of a total of 215 soldiers to different places according to the 1663-64 register, giving the impression that it was a rather disciplined regiment with no absentees. The *çorbacı* of the 10th *ağa bölüğü* Mustafa b. Ismail was in close contact with the administrators of the candle-makers guild. We learn from two court cases that sometimes he even used the members of the guild as his personal agents. In the first case he sent three candle-makers Andon v. Dimitri and Tatoş v. Andon and the *yiğitbaşı* of the candle-makers guild, Hristo v. Manko, to the village of Tırnova in Yenişehir which took 260,000 *akçes* loan in order to pay their taxes. The candle-makers were the agents of Mustafa Agha who was responsible for repaying the money within 50 months.¹⁰³ The same candle-makers were again the agents of *çorbacı* Mustafa Agha b. Ismail in collecting the head-tax (*cizye*) of the Fenar district in Rumelia.¹⁰⁴ This regiment was likely to have a close connection with the candle-makers guild of Istanbul, but unlike the 56th *ağa bölük* it was a disciplined squadron.

Another remark that should be made in terms of the debate of the civilianization of the janissaries is on the *tekaüds* and *korucus*. In *Kitab-ı Müstetab*, an important text in the advice literature of the early seventeenth century, it is mentioned that whereas the entire population of the janissary army numbered around 12,000 in the past, only the *tekaüds* and *korucus* exceeded 7,000 at the time the work was written.¹⁰⁵ The author compares this with the number of those injured and unfit for active service (*oturaks*), which came to hardly a thousand – an attempt to stress the empire's inability to force janissaries go on campaigns. These *tekaüd* and *korucu* positions were, as argued in *Kitab-ı Müstetab*, purchased by the janissaries so that they could stay in Istanbul. Even if the initial responsibility of the *korucus* was to guard the mountains and

¹⁰³ IKS 9: 155a (1072/1661).

¹⁰⁴ IKS 9: 155a (1072/1661).

¹⁰⁵ Yaşar Yücel guesses that the piece was written in or around 1620. *Kitab-ı Müstetab*, xxi.

vineyards, a new responsibility was created, i.e., to guard the barracks.¹⁰⁶ The number of *tekaüd* and *korucus* was even larger in the 1663-64 register. There were 8,889 (22%) *tekaüds* and 1,380 (3.5%) *korucus*. Once again the highest numbers were from the *ağa bölüks*. In a speech where Sultan Murad III (r. 1574-1595) addressed the Janissary Agha and other officers of the permanent standing army regiments recorded in *Kanunname-i Sultani Li'Aziz Efendi*, it is indicated that a lot of able-bodied and fit janissaries declared themselves as *oturaks* or as *korucus* and that such people often earned their living as merchants in the markets.¹⁰⁷ A decree sent to a janissary officer who was responsible for transferring the *korucu* and *oturaks* to the campaign in 1636 affirms that they resisted going on the campaign.¹⁰⁸

It was thought that the *sekban bölüks* were the main squadrons in the janissary army where the landless young peasants enrolled themselves in. Uzunçarşılı mentions that there were 2,343 *sekbans* listed on the 1623 *mevacib* register, all being in the 65th *cema'at*. Forty years later, it can be seen that the *sekbans* were expanded into the 60th, 61st, 62nd, and 63rd *cema'ats* in addition to the 65th *cema'at*. Their number increased to 3,450 *sekbans* who had separate *bölüks* in 1663-64. Their ratio to the total number of janissaries, however, hardly changed, going from 7 percent to only 8 percent. This reveals that the increase in the number of janissaries was not due mainly to new *sekban* recruits but to other reasons that were discussed in the previous chapter, such as the recruitment of janissaries also under the categories *ağa çırağı* (recruits in the personal service of the commander of the janissaries) and *ferzend-i sipahi* (recruited sons of senior cavalry men) who were still required to work for a number of years as *a'cemis*, *becayeş* (people who

¹⁰⁶ *Kitab-ı Müstetab*, 10.

¹⁰⁷ Rhoads Murphey, "Kanun-name-i Sultani Li Aziz," 9.

¹⁰⁸ BOA, MD 87: 26, no. 58 (1046/1636)

were recruited by a system of placing a new janissary instead of a deceased one, by and large, they switched shepherds, peasants, or criminals by taking a bribe), and recruitment of the offspring and brothers of existing janissaries.

The Sultan's speech addressed the issue of place-switching (*becayeş*) as discussed in the previous chapter.¹⁰⁹ Those who were part of this system were identified as a second group that was involved in trade.¹¹⁰ As was mentioned in chapter 1, the recruitment of janissaries through the classical system of *devshirme* altered during the seventeenth century to a certain extent and was replaced by other methods of recruiting civilians under the categories *ağa çırağı* and *ferzend-i sipahi*, who were still required to work for a number of years as *a'cemis*.¹¹¹ Also a new application of place-switching (*becayeş*), was introduced in 1623 by the Chief Finance Minister, Mustafa Pasha, allowing outsiders to take the place of deceased janissaries. It is seen in the 1663-64 register that most of the recorded absences from the campaigns were among the newly promoted *a'cemis* and new transfers from other regiments, which might well be the ones coming through the *becayeş* system, even though this is not indicated in the register. This should not, however, lead us to conclude that those who entered the urban economy were the new recruits who were conscripted by methods other than the *devshirme* system. These new applications might have caused the urbanization process to develop; however, as will be seen in chapter 4, economic involvement in civilian life was not confined to the lower rank janissaries that were introduced to the army through unconventional means, but also included high ranking officers. Arguments which attribute misdeeds to the 'outsiders' who were seen as corrupting the original system should be interpreted as a defense by the Ottoman elite who were of *devshirme* origin.

¹⁰⁹ See footnote 129 in Chapter 1 for the definition of the term; *Koçi Bey Risaleleri*, 59.

¹¹⁰ Murphey, "Kanun-name-i Sultani Li Aziz," 9.

¹¹¹ See footnotes 122 and 123 in Chapter 1 for a detailed definition of the terms.

This group was did not take the changes in the system very well, and blamed the newcomers to the system for any kind of corruption.

The sources confirm, the boundaries between being a soldier and being a civilian in Istanbul were blurred, and this blurriness became more pervasive. It is seen in the court registers that in the first quarter of the century, the janissaries were recorded with the title of *beşe*, indicating that they were infantry (*racils*), i.e., *çeri* as opposed to *sipahis*, e.g., *Mehmed beşe b. Abdullah nam racil*. In some cases, it brings a more specific definition of the janissary status, saying that they were infantry with a *beşe* title (which is enough to accept the person as a janissary), but clearly mentioning that they were *dergah-i ali yeniçerilerinden* (the janissaries of the High Court), and rarely is their regiment given.

Around mid-century, in the 1660s, a change in titles can be observed in Istanbul court registers. The phrase *dergah-i ali yeniçerilerinden* began to be used more often, even systematically, and the regiment to which the janissary was affiliated was recorded more often, such as *dergâh-ı ali yeniçerilerinin 88. cema'atine mahsus oda ahalisinden Mehmed Beşe b. Hasan* (Mehmed Beşe the son of Hasan who belongs to the 88th regiment of the janissary army). Another phrase that started to be used was *zümre-i racilin*, though it was a rare usage, e.g., *zümre-i racilinden Mehmed Beşe b. Abdullah* (Mehmed Beşe the son of Abdullah who is from the infantry). Parallel to the change toward providing specific information about the affiliation of the janissaries, a contrary usage emerged, a further ambiguous use of the title *beşe*. There were many cases where one or both of the litigants in court registers were called solely *beşes*, without indicating that they were from the infantry. Furthermore, some were recorded as *kimesne...beşe* (a person who was called so-and-so *beşe*), in contrast to being *racils*, i.e., *Mehmed Beşe nam kimesne* as oppose to the old usage of *Mehmed Beşe b. Abdullah nam racil*. It should be also remembered here that the appearance of *kimesne* in the court records corresponds to the period

when the systematic use of indicating the janissary's regiment in a given court case began. Was there any difference between the social status of someone referred to by the name of his regiment, and a *kimesne* with the title of *beşe*? There is a possibility that *beşes* identified as *kimesne* could have a civilian background, or might be conscripts through methods other than *devshirme*. The ambiguity in the usage of these titles, *yeniçeri*, *beşe*, *racil*, and *kimesne*, might be a reflection of the ambiguity in society in defining who was a soldier and who was a civilian. More interestingly, my reading of court cases gave the impression that the usage of *beşe* without indicating that the person was from the infantry was more common in cases where the person was affiliated with a guild or a profession. This leads me to think that there was an attempt by the court to distinguish changes in social stratification. Either the person had a *re'aya* background and was able to affiliate himself to one of the janissary regiments, or a janissary who became active in one profession or a guild, and the court perceived his status as rather more civilian than being solely a soldier, and specified it as such.¹¹²

2.4. Residential Patterns

The janissary barracks in Istanbul were built during the reign of Fatih: one near the Şehzade Mosque, called Eski Odalar (Old Barracks, since it was built first), and the second in Aksaray, called Yeni Odalar (New Barracks), the larger of the two.¹¹³ The *ağa bölüks* were established later and were distributed to barracks at either the New or the Old Barracks.¹¹⁴ At the back of the

¹¹² A similarly ambiguous usage of the term *beşe* was detected by Molly Green in the court documents of Candia during the seventeenth century. She argues that *beşe* referred to those individuals who stood midway between the civilian and military populations. Molly Greene, *A Shared World*, 90-91.

¹¹³ *Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan*, 233-234.

¹¹⁴ Uzunçarşılı, *Kapıkulu Ocakları*, vol. 1, 239.

New Barracks were the barracks for the *a'cemi* boys. The New Barracks and *a'cemi* barracks were secluded from the city by seven gates guarded by the janissaries themselves.¹¹⁵ Entered from the Meydan gate, the New Barracks had a big mosque called Orta Mosque, which did not have a dome.¹¹⁶ The Meat Square (Et Meydanı) of the janissaries was there as well. There were 140 *bölük* and *cema'at ortası* divided into 368 rooms in the New Barracks. It also maintained 130 *çardaks* (arbors), 90 *talimhanes* (exercise grounds), 20 *köşk* (pavilions), 4 *tekkes* (lodges), and 158 *ahurs* (stables). 26 *bölüks* and 47 *cema'ats* resided at the Old Barracks, which had 20 *çardaks*, 1 *tekke*, and 26 *ahurs*.¹¹⁷ Every room had a kitchen, storage, laundry room, ward, bench, and an arbor.¹¹⁸

These barracks were made of wood and burned down almost completely in the two major fires of the seventeenth century, in 1633 and in 1660. During the rebuilding of the barracks, the janissaries lived in tents around Yenibahçe. Other barracks were repaired in 1057/1647.¹¹⁹

Although the barracks had been the only location where janissaries were supposed to live, this was not the case in seventeenth century Istanbul. Janissaries owned or rented houses within the city, married and settled down. There is no research as yet that reveals the residence pattern of janissaries in the previous centuries, therefore we have nothing to compare with. It should be noted, however, that in addition to the tendency to reside outside the barracks, the rapid increase in the janissary population during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries might have

¹¹⁵ The gates were: Adet gate, Ağa Bölüğü gate, Solaklar gate, Meydan gate, Çayır gate, Et gate, and Karaköy gate. They were built during the reign of Kanuni. Uzunçarşılı, *Kapıkulu Ocakları*, vol. 1, 239.

¹¹⁶ *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, vol. 1, 125.

¹¹⁷ *Kanunname*, MS. Istanbul, Atıf Efendi Ktp., no. 208b, 1734.

¹¹⁸ Uzunçarşılı, *Kapıkulu Ocakları*, vol. 1, 241.

¹¹⁹ BOA, IE. AS: 29, no. 4.

resulted in further settlement in the city. Certainly a jump in janissary population within fifty years from around 13,000 to around 35,000 must have made the barracks insufficient accommodation. Aziz Efendi, in 1631, when the rapid population increase of the janissaries was at its peak, advised the Sultan that the janissaries had to be housed in the barracks, and only in Istanbul, and they should not be allowed to marry, in accordance with the old law. He stressed the necessity of taking these precautions in order to prevent them from dispersion either across the empire or in the city.¹²⁰ However, the practice of residing outside the barracks seems to have been accepted by the state. Even though we see decrees warning the authorities about janissaries dealing with crafts and trade, or abusing their privileges over the *re'aya*, there are no decrees prohibiting janissaries from residing in the city. This had become an accepted practice.

There were 182 neighborhoods in Istanbul by the end of the reign of Mehmed II, according to Ayverdi.¹²¹ By 1546, the number had risen to 219, according to Istanbul waqf registers.¹²² In the mid-seventeenth century, 277 neighborhoods were recorded.¹²³ I have located janissary residences for 115 out of 173 janissaries in the probate register. Fifteen of these were in the barracks; the residential areas of the other hundred are shown on the map 2.4. This map helps us to obtain some idea of janissary spatial distribution.

The first general pattern the map reveals is the dispersal of janissaries throughout the intramural city. The theory that barracks would segregate the military cadres from civilians was not


¹²⁰ Rhoads Murphey, "Kanun-name-i Sultani Li Aziz Efendi (Aziz Efendi's Book of Sultanlic Laws and Regulations: An Agenda for Reform by a Seventeenth Century Ottoman Statesman)," *Sources of Oriental Languages and Literatures* 9 (1985): 10.

¹²¹ Ayverdi, *Istanbul Mahalleleri* (Ankara: Doğuş, 1958), 84.

¹²² *Istanbul Vakıfları Tahrir Defteri 953 (1546) Tarihli*, eds. Ömer L. Barkan and E.H. Ayverdi (Istanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1970), xii.

¹²³ We still do not know all the neighborhoods of Istanbul for that time. Mantran, *Histoire d'Istanbul*, 229.

Map 2.4: The Distribution of Janissaries in Istanbul in the First Half of the Seventeenth Century



Sources: For the map as a layout: E.H. Ayverdi, *19. Asırda İstanbul Haritası* (Istanbul: İstanbul Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1958). For detecting the neighborhoods: E.H. Ayverdi, *19. Asırda İstanbul Haritası*; Ahmed Neziḥ Galitekin, *Hadikatü'l Cevami* (Istanbul: İşaret yayınları, 2001); Reşat Ekrem Koçu, *İstanbul Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul: Koçu Yayınları, 1971); *Dünden Bugüne İstanbul Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul: Kültür Bakanlığı and Tarih Vakfı, 2003).

actualized.¹²⁴ The janissaries were not segregated from the city in their residential patterns and this enabled considerable interaction with the civilian population. The interaction was sometimes to the extent that the janissaries actually adopted the civic culture of the city, and became an entrenched part of it. Others evolved conversely, to the extent that they committed crimes and tormented the civilians.

In the literature, janissary assaults and abuse of power over civilians are constantly reiterated. The janissaries were responsible for both combatant (*yoldaşlık*) and non-combatant (*hizmetlik*) duties, which were expected to be performed during war-time and peace-time respectively.¹²⁵ The non-combatant tasks included being night watchmen, firemen, and policemen. Plus, the janissary novices (*a'cemi oglans*), who were already doing general labor such as sweeping, carrying or cooking in the city during their training as professional warriors, were always ready to replace the janissaries when they were sent to campaigns. The janissaries also held a special power over the city vis-a-vis their authority to regulate the market.

There is no doubt that abuse of power took place, but the level of physical violence, at least as reflected in the court records, seems to be more limited. Suraiya Faroqhi observes that the majority of crimes recorded were committed in the countryside and crimes among the townsmen were few in number.¹²⁶ Eyal Ginio stresses the lack of reflective data in the court registers for

¹²⁴ This was not specific to Istanbul. The same pattern of living outside the barracks was seen in the urban demography of other cities in the Arab provinces. See Antoine Abdel Nour, *Introduction à l'histoire urbaine de la Syrie ottomane* (Beirut: Librairie Orientale, 1982), 165; Wilkins, *Forging Urban Solidarities: Ottoman Aleppo 1640-1700* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 136-37; André Raymond, "Groups sociaux et Géographie Urbaine à Alep au XVIII^e siècle," in Thomas Philipp ed., *The Syrian Land in the 18th and 19th Century* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1992), 157-160.

¹²⁵ V. L. Menage, "Some Notes on Devşirme," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental African Studies* 29, no.1 (1966): 66-67.

¹²⁶ Suraiya Faroqhi, "The Life and Death of Outlaws in Çorum," in *Coping with the State: Political Conflict and Crime in the Ottoman Empire 1550-1720* (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1995): 145; Idem., in Ingeborg Baldauf, Suraiya

eighteenth-century Salonica.¹²⁷ Marinos Sariyannis, on the other hand, argues that Istanbul had a relatively high crime rate and the cases recorded in the Istanbul court abound.¹²⁸ The number of cases in Istanbul might be relatively high, but the fact that Istanbul was a mega-city with a population over 300,000 means that, per capita, crime-related cases seem to be low. The representativeness of these records becomes an important question to keep in mind while investigating these records. Furthermore, given that the janissaries were not punished by the city courts but by their superiors within the corps, there is a chance that the inhabitants of the city could have seen it as a futile attempt to submit to the court's judgment in crime-related cases involving the military groups.

Despite these factors, janissary involvement in crimes was quite remarkable. Sariyannis's scrutiny of nine court registers from Istanbul, Balat, Ahi Çelebi, Galata, and Tophane from two time spans in the seventeenth century (1021-1025/1610-1617 and 1071-1074/1660-1664), reveals that 24 out of 70 cases of violence crimes were janissaries, *sipahis*, or other military, which represents one-third of all injury or violent crimes.¹²⁹ My investigation of the court cases related solely to the janissaries in the Istanbul court registers, covering the time spans of 1020-1029/1611-1620 and from 1070-1072/1659- 1662, reveals that there were twenty assault cases

Faroghi and Rudolf Vesely eds., *Armağan: Festschrift für Andreas Tietze*. (Prague: Enigma Corporation, 1994): 59-77.

¹²⁷ Out of 184 cases during the period 1153/1740 to 1154/1741 only thirteen were crime-related. Eyal Ginio, "The Administration of Criminal Justice in Ottoman Selanik (Salonica) During the Eighteenth Century," *Turcica* 30 (1998): 187-188.

¹²⁸ Marinos Sariyannis, "'Neglected Trades': Glimpses into the 17th Century Istanbul Underworld," *Turcica* 38 (2006): 156.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 168-171.

that contained physical violence. Eight of them were assaults by janissaries towards janissaries; among the remaining twelve, four victims were janissaries themselves.¹³⁰

There were also rather scarce crime-related cases other than physical violence that give us a glimpse of possible crime gangs in Istanbul involving janissaries. In 1620, a group of counterfeiters were caught. The members of the group claimed that the counterfeiting took place at the house of Cafer Beşe b. Abdullah but the case was dropped since the judge could not find enough evidence.¹³¹ In 1660, eleven men, mostly composed of Orthodox Christians and Armenians, and led by two janissaries, Ahmed Beşe b. Abdullah and Mustafa Beşe b. Abdullah, attacked the butcher Lambo b. Mihali and stole 5,000 *akçe* from him.¹³² In 1604, the Galata inhabitants complained about bandit (*eşkıya*) janissaries who assaulted the inhabitants and kidnapping the arriving merchants.¹³³

However, the janissaries should not be interpreted simplistically as notorious, unruly gangsters who were constantly abusing their power to oppress the civilians. The court registers reveal cases where the janissaries were the oppressed ones. In the winter of 1613, Arslan Beşe b. Abdullah, residing in the neighborhood of Ali Pasha, filed a complaint against his neighbor, Franco veled Angelyor, who was running a tavern for fishermen next door. He expressed his discomfort at the fact that fishermen were looking through his wooden fence and disturbing his family. The court scribe was sent to investigate the situation and agreed that a sizable group of

¹³⁰ IKS 1: 3b, no. 19 (1021/1612); IKS 1: 97a, no. 710 (1023/1613); IKS 3: 5a, no. 35 (1024/1615); IKS 3: 30a, no. 257 (1027/1618); IKS 3: 59b, no. 499 (1027/1618); IKS 3: 69b, no. 581 (1027/1618); IKS 4: 25b, no. 170 (1028/1619); IKS 4: 27a, no. 181 (1028/1619); IKS 7: 13b (1070/1659); IKS 7: 41a (1070/1659); IKS 8: 14b (1071/1660); IKS 8: 36a (1071/1660); IKS 9: 2a, no. 6 (1071/1661); IKS 9: 28a (1070/1661); IKS 9: 45b (1070/1661); IKS 9: 49a (1070/1661); IKS 9: 51a (1070/1661); IKS 9: 58a (1070/1661); IKS 9: 83a (1070/1661); IKS 9: 245b (1070/1662).

¹³¹ IKS 6: 12a (1620/1029).

¹³² IKS 8: 31a (1071/1660); Sariyannis, "Neglected Trades," 162.

¹³³ BOA, MD 75: 31 (1012/1604).

fishermen frequented the tavern next to Franco's place. It was agreed that, as the families of Muslims in the neighborhood could not go to the public bath or other facilities on account of potential or actual molestation, the tavern should be shut down.¹³⁴ As for the janissaries residing in Istanbul neighborhoods, they often used the court to maintain their civic rights and property rights vis-a-vis neighbors. Ömer Beşe b. Bayezid, for example, sued his neighbor el-Hac Ilyas bey b. Ömer for building a stone wall crossing his property and asked inspectors to examine it.¹³⁵

In terms of the residential habits of the janissaries, as can be detected from the property purchase transactions recorded in the court registers, there was a growing tendency to move to *intra muros* Istanbul as the mid-seventeenth century approached. In the 1620s, there were ten transactions showing that janissaries purchased either land or a house. Seven of them were bought in the neighborhoods of Istanbul, one in Iznikmid, and one in the village of Bakacak, connected to Üsküdar.¹³⁶ Among the six properties sold by the janissaries during the same time period, only three of them were within the intramural city. The rest were in Küçükçekmece, Eyüb, and Boluca village.¹³⁷ During the 1660s, there was an increase in the number of buying and selling transactions performed by janissaries. Among the thirteen recorded purchase

¹³⁴ IKS 1: 72a, no. 503 (1021/1613).

¹³⁵ A group of people including a judge, two architects, and a group of Muslims (*muslimin*) IKS 1: 22b, no. 143 (1021/1613).

¹³⁶ IKS 1: 83a, no. 597 (1022/1613); IKS 2: 31a, no. 260 (1025/1616); IKS 4: 35b, no. 271 (1028/1619); IKS 4: 55b, no. 383 (1028/1619); IKS 4: 59a, no. 410 (1028/1619); IKS 5: 5b, no. 47 (1028/1619); IKS 5: 8a, no. 67 (1028/1619); IKS 5: 45b, no. 314 (1029/1620), IKS 5: 77b, no. 547 (1029/1620); IKS 5: 79b, no. 563 (1029/1620).

¹³⁷ IKS 1: 13b, no. 78 (1021/1612); IKS 1: 71a, no. 496 (1021/1613); IKS 1, 76a, no. 538 (1021/1613); IKS 3: 27a, no. 232 (1027/1618); IKS 4: 47b, no. 328 (1028/1619); IKS 5: 45b, no. 314 (1029/1620).

transactions one of them was in Rodoscuk, and one in Eyüb.¹³⁸ Nine properties were sold by janissaries in the same period, all within the city, mostly around the barracks.¹³⁹

The second pattern the map reveals is that, though dispersed throughout the city, the janissaries tended to settle in certain neighborhoods. The neighborhoods around the New Barracks and Old Barracks were the most densely populated by janissaries. The neighborhoods Sofular, Molla Gürani, those close to Saraçhane, such as Dülgerzade, and between the Meat Square and Aksaray, such as Softa Sinan, and Karagöz, were among the most chosen locations. Another area of consolidation was the neighborhood around Yenibahçe. The neighborhoods Hoca Hayreddin, Keçeci Piri, and Karabaş were close to this district. Settling around Yenibahçe was not at all surprising: tents used for janissary accommodation during the period that the barracks were under repair after the fires of the early-seventeenth century had been erected in this area. It was natural for the janissaries to settle in neighborhoods close to their vicinity, where they had established ties. As we will see, the consolidation around the barracks and Yenibahçe tells us that the networks of janissaries in the city were predominantly established through their affiliation with one another in the army, even to the selection of the neighborhoods where they resided.

Remembering that almost half of the young men conscripted in 1603-4 were 18 to 20 years old (see chapter 1), let us consider an *a'cemi* youth conscripted and brought to Istanbul at the age of 18. He would work for 5 years or so in the construction of buildings or ships, or in the gardens of Istanbul, and then be promoted to become a janissary. His ties would be mostly with

¹³⁸ IKS 7: 9a (1070/1659); IKS 7: 19b (1070/1659); IKS 8: 18a (1071/1660); IKS 8: 24a (1071/1660); IKS 8: 28b (1071/1660); IKS 8: 30b (1071/1660); IKS 8: 33b (1071/1660); IKS 9: 49a (1071/1661); IKS 9: 59a (1071/1661); IKS 9: 66a (1071/1661); IKS 9: 140b (1071/1661); IKS 9: 178a (1072/1661); IKS 9: 198b (1072/1662).

¹³⁹ IKS 8: 31b (1071/1660); IKS 8: 33b (1071/1660); IKS 9: 71b (1071/1661); IKS 9: 83a (1071/1661); IKS 9: 92a (1071/1661); IKS 9: 99a (1071/1661); IKS 9: 130a (1072/1661); IKS 9: 198b (1072/1661); IKS 9: 225b (1072/1661).

the group to which he was introduced when he first came to the capital. The highly plausible idea of having limited linguistic skills should be considered as well. The same would apply to a Muslim-youth from Anatolia who enlisted in the janissary army, most likely at a later age than non-Muslim conscripts. Commercial ties among soldiers may also have been a significant factor in explaining this consolidation.

Another pattern derived from the residence map is that of residence in the third favorite location for janissaries, the area around the Hippodrome. They clustered around Kadirga Limanı, Ali Paşa-yı Atik, and to some extent in Soğan Ağa. The immediate reason for this was their proximity to the Hippodrome area. A closer examination shows, however, that the wealthier janissaries preferred neighborhoods that were closer to the palaces where men of status lived.¹⁴⁰ The presence of janissary residences close to the imperial zone lays emphasis on the correlation between economic status and residential preference.

Until the 1960s, the notion of segmented neighborhoods based on religion and ethnicity and lacking civic identity was espoused fully by the followers of the idea of the “Islamic city.” This notion overlooks the economic and political dynamics in cities populated by Muslims and exaggerates the village-like nature of the neighborhoods. Along with the rejection of the “Islamic city” theory, studies on Ottoman Arab cities prove that the wealthy and the elite tended to inhabit the economic and politico-military heart of the city. This characteristic can be traced in Cairo,

¹⁴⁰ Evliya Çelebi describes the mansions of the rich and residences near the palaces near the Hippodrome and St. Sophia, both sides of the Divan yolu, Grand road, in the district of Ahırkapı by the sea, and some around the Süleymaniye, and Şehzade Mosque. This distribution indicates the tendency of men of status to settle close to the dynasty. (Evliya Çelebi quoted in Robert Mantran, *La Vie Quotidienne au Temps de Soliman le Magnifique et de ses Successeurs (XVIe et XVIIe siècles)* [Paris: Librairie Adrien Maisonneuve, 1965], 28). Norbert Elias established that the making of imperial rule was closely related to establishing a physical setting for imperial power at the European royal courts during the early modern era. See Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982), 45. In the Ottoman context, an imperial court zone may also be detected, which corresponds to the mansion zone mentioned by Evliya Çelebi.

Damascus, and Aleppo.¹⁴¹ In ‘Ayntap, a similar pattern is noticed—the *‘askeris* in the city chose their residential areas in relation to their status and power in the city.¹⁴²

It is true that Istanbul districts and quarters were inhabited by concentrated ethnic and religious groups: Greeks along the Golden Horn and Marmara shores, Armenians in Yenikapı, Samatya, and Topkapı; and Jews in the quarters of Balat and Hasköy, having been removed from the Eminönü quarter in 1660s. The religious topography was the main determinant of the compartmentalization of the population. The Patriarchates of the Greek and Armenian communities in Fener and Kumkapı respectively led these ethnic groups to inhabit these quarters. Eyüb remained strictly Muslim since it was a district with strong religious connotations.¹⁴³

It is also clear that no Muslim neighborhood was organized without being centered on a building structure that had either religious, socio-economic, or political importance, i.e., mosque,

¹⁴¹ Janet Abu-Lughod, “The Islamic City: Historic Myth, Islamic Essence, and Contemporary Relevance,” *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 19, no. 2 (1987): 155-176; Jane Hathaway, *The Politics of Household in Ottoman Egypt: The Rise of the Qazdaglis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Raymond, “Islamic City, Arab City: Orientalist Myths and Recent Reviews,” *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 21 (1994): 12-13; Raymond, *The great Arab Cities in the 16th-18th centuries* (New York: New York University Press, 1984); Nelly Hanna, *Habiter au Caire XVIIe-XVIIIe siècles* (Cairo: Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale du Caire, 1991), 184-210; Colette Estabiet and Jean-Paul Pascual, *Familles et Fortunes à Damas* (Damascus: Institut Français de Damas, 1994).

¹⁴² Hülya Canbakal, “Residential Topography and Social Hierarchy in Seventeenth Century ‘Ayntâb,” in Çiğdem Kafesçioğlu, L. T. Şenocak eds., *Essays in Honour of Aptullah Kuran* (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi, 1999), 164.

¹⁴³ Edhem Eldem, “Istanbul: from Imperial to Peripheralized Capital,” in Edhem Eldem, Daniel Goffman, and Bruce Masters eds., *The Ottoman City between East and West: Aleppo, Izmir, and Istanbul* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 152. For Galata, Edhem Eldem investigates the number of mosques and churches through the centuries to search for the correlation between religious buildings and communities in the Ottoman urban setting: The neighborhoods were entities that grew up around a religious core (mosque, church, or synagogue). According to this correlation, it can be understood that Galata was mostly composed of Muslims until the end of eighteenth century. A process of “Frankization” of *Galata* appeared in the nineteenth century connected with the development of foreign trade, that is to say, with its becoming a commercial district. However, the neighborhood did not gain a cosmopolitan appearance through an increase in the number of non-Muslims. By examining the Ottoman Bank’s customer files, which contain information about the ethnicity of its clients, Eldem shows that *Galata* became a “Greek town,” rather than being a melting pot. Edhem Eldem, “A Vision Beyond Nostalgia: The Ethnic Structure of Galata,” *Biannual Istanbul* 1 (1993): 29.

public bath, or fountain; however, the social and physical flexibility of Istanbul neighborhoods is also observed by scholars, and mobility and change was a norm, not an exception.¹⁴⁴

The influence of wealth or political strength as a factor in determining the characteristics of a neighborhood should not be underestimated. Personal affiliations and socio-economic status certainly had an impact on the topography of Istanbul neighborhoods. The correlation between the geographical distribution of the residences of manumitted female palace slaves of the eighteenth century and their status has been established by Betül İpşirli Argıt.¹⁴⁵ Mapping the residential pattern of those females, she proves that the use of space and status were closely interrelated.

In the case of the janissaries, it can be observed that the wealthier the janissary got, and the higher his status was in the army, the more likely it was for him to reside in a neighborhood close to the imperial zone. Ali Agha, who was the head of *mehteran*, with an income of over 100,000 *akçe*, resided in Kadirga Limanı; Ahmed Çorbacı, who left over 200,000 *akçe* as an inheritance to his family, lived in the Üskübi Mehmed Beg neighborhood close to Hagia Sophia; and Şaban Odabaşı, again with a fortune over 200,000 *akçe* and a residence worth 70,000 *akçe*, lived very close to the Hippodrome in the Ali Paşa-yı Atik neighborhood. However, when the probate registers of the janissaries who owned less than 2,000 *akçe* are examined, it is seen that they either lived in barracks or in the surrounding *intra muros* neighborhoods.

The findings on the residential patterns of the janissaries may be summarized by citing three main characteristics: janissaries were not segregated in barracks but scattered throughout the *intra muros* districts of Istanbul, allowing them closer contact with the civil population; they

¹⁴⁴ Cem Behar, *A Neighborhood in Ottoman Istanbul: Fruit Vendors and Civil Servants in the Kasap Ilyas Mahalle* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2003), 9-10.

¹⁴⁵ Betül İpşirli Argıt, "Manumitted Female Slaves of the Ottoman Imperial Harem (*Sarayis*) in Eighteenth-Century Istanbul," Ph.D. diss. (Bogazici University, 2009), Chapter 5.

mostly inhabited the neighborhoods close to the barracks, showing that the janissary identity and the solidarities they established through this were crucial to their existence in the city; and finally, the wealthier ones preferred neighborhoods close to the imperial court area, a preference that helps us to reflect on the concepts of the “Islamic City.”

On a map showing residential patterns, we can draw a line from the northwest of the intramural city starting at Yenibahçe, going down to the neighborhoods between the Fatih mosque and Meat Square, then to the areas around the Old Barracks and Aksaray, and finally reach the more prestigious neighborhoods where palace residences began, i.e. Koska, Soğan Ağa, Ali Paşa-yı Atik, Kadirga, close to the Hippodrome down at the southeast end of the city. This was where the highest density of janissary population can be detected. This line corresponds to the route that the protestors followed during the janissary uprisings. Now, we will take a closer look at the janissary uprisings of the first half of the seventeenth century, which not only left their mark on the history of Istanbul, but also on the history of the Ottoman Empire in general.

Chapter Three

JANISSARY LED-REBELLIONS IN EARLY SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ISTANBUL: MILITARY REVOLTS OR URBAN PROTESTS?

There were six janissary uprisings in the first half of the seventeenth century alone: 1031/1622, 1042/1632, 1057-58/1648, 1061/1651, 1066/1655, and 1066-67/1656. According to many of the written sources of the time, the uprisings were due to the janissaries' incorrigible attitude and ingratitude toward the regime. Many official historians described them as a ruthless mob.¹

Naturally, the official histories tend to side with the sultan and the court. It is my intention here to focus on listening to the voices of the janissaries themselves, and understanding their demands and reasons for the uprisings. The question to be addressed here is how to approach the protests of the janissaries. Is it possible to reinterpret these rebellions? Might the janissary uprisings in Istanbul be considered as part of the generalized urban protests of the early modern era? Failure to use the chronicles critically makes it difficult for scholars to interpret these uprisings as urban popular movements. The one way to overcome this neglect is to examine the possible economic roots of the protests and seek out what the protestors have to say. Another way is to take the janissary uprisings not as isolated events in Ottoman history, but to interpret them in conjunction with other early modern urban protests in Europe.

There are many ways in which the seventeenth century uprisings represent a departure from janissary activism in previous centuries. The uprisings of the fifteenth and sixteenth

¹Koçi Bey, *Koçi Bey Risaleleri*, ed. Seda Çakmakcıoğlu (Istanbul: Kabalcı, 2007), 67 (hereafter cited as *Koçi Bey Risaleleri*); Selaniki Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Selaniki*, ed. Mehmet İpşirli, 2 vols. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1999); Cemal Kafadar, "Janissaries and Other Riffraff of Ottoman Istanbul: Rebels without a Cause?" in Baki Tezcan and Karl K. Barbir eds., *Identity and Identity Formation in the Ottoman World: A Volume of Essays in Honor of Norman İzkowitz* (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2007), 113-115.

centuries were mainly confrontations between the army and the state. Sources do not indicate any civilian participation. Also, the janissary army of this earlier period is generally described by foreign travelers as a distinct and entirely military apparatus – as opposed to being made up of those who were tradesmen and shopkeepers – and was deemed not strong enough to take a political stance against the government.² However, in the seventeenth century, after all the social and political changes I have covered so far, janissary uprisings meant not just simply military resistance, but included a civilian reaction to state policies.

What I will argue is that to properly understand the janissaries' motives and meaning there is a need to think comparatively about protest in pre-modern cities such as London, Paris, Bordeaux, Moscow, Cairo, Damascus, and Istanbul. I will be comparing janissary protests in Istanbul with the protests in early modern Europe and Russia. First, I will lay out the theoretical arguments on what it means to protest in a pre-modern paternalistic systems; when protests happened; how were they legitimized; how they proceeded; and who joined in the protests. Then an effort will be made to analyze the theoretical arguments in the Ottoman context in an attempt to determine if there were any overlapping patterns in the ways early modern Ottomans and Europeans approached the urban protests. The last section will be devoted to the close examination of each janissary uprising of early seventeenth century Istanbul.

² Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, *Turkish Letters of Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq*, trans. Edward Seymour Forster (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), 111-112; Nicolay Nicolas, *Dans L'empire de Soliman le Magnifique* (No publication place: Press du Cnrs. 1989), 156.

3.1. Theory of Protest in Pre-modern Cities

A study of modern political economy, as introduced by Adam Smith – in effect, an interpretation of early modern society through the economic principles of the modern world – has led scholars to relate less closely with the defeated party, i.e., those who were defending their rights in a paternalist economy.³ We need, therefore, to understand the key elements of early modern paternalistic economies, and the established notions of rights and responsibilities within these.

How can we describe the paternalistic economy of the early modern Ottoman Empire? Mehmet Genç defines the principles of the classic Ottoman economy of the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries in this way: provisionalism, traditionalism, and fiscalism. Provisionalism is the principle that shapes economic actions according to the interest of the consumers: meet the needs of the people.⁴ Given the limited resources and productivity of the early modern world, provision of supplies could only be maintained through strong state interference in the economy. The land – the base of productivity in an agricultural society – was under the surveillance of the state to ensure that family farms were not divided into smaller pieces through inheritance, or turned into large farms by investors. The goods produced were first brought into the economy on the local level through guilds. First, the minimum needs of the locals were met. The rest of the production was sent to the capital to meet the needs of the palace and the army. Only after that, if there was any surplus left, was it exported.⁵ Price-control through fixed prices (*narh*) on staple

³ E.P. Thompson, “The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century,” in *Customs in Common* (New York: The New York Press, 1993), 200.

⁴ Mehmed Genç, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Devlet ve Ekonomi* (İstanbul: Ötüken, 2007), 45.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 46.

consumer goods such as bread and meat was achieved through the market police (*muhtesib*), and the *kadi*.⁶

The balance of production and consumption had to be maintained in order to achieve effective provisioning, which brings us to the second principle: traditionalism. Order is the key word in this principle. The number and size of guilds had to be maintained at a certain level, the size of family farms had to be fixed, and mobility within society, such as migration to cities, was supposed to be prevented.⁷ Even by managing all these variables, which could never be fully achieved, one variable lingered on in the system. This uncontrollable factor was nature. Dearth was the biggest fear of pre-industrial economies. Traditionalist measures caused the majority of the population to survive at the level of subsistence, and this applied to the Ottoman economy as well.

The rule of subsistence, however, did not apply to the ruling elite. Fiscalism, the third principle, ensured that the highest profit was earned by the treasury.⁸ A strong organizational power was required to maintain this system, and that power was the state. As a result, the state and those acting in its name kept hold of the largest economic resources. This exacerbated the economic gap between the ruling elite and the *re'aya*. Fiscalism, however, was there to ensure

⁶ Mübahat Küçüköğlu, *Osmanlılarda Narh Müessesesi ve 1640 Tarihli narh Defteri* (Istanbul: Enderun Kitabevi, 1983).

⁷ These should be considered as ideal principles of course. The practice varied from these theoretical assumptions. Ariel Salzmann rightly points out that the privatization of fiscal policies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was processed through revenue contracts (*iltizam*) that rented tax-farms to contractors for life. These tax-farming policies were the knots that tied the fifteenth/sixteenth century centralized empire model to the early-nineteenth century modern state. Ariel Salzmann, "An Ancien Régime Revisited: 'Privatization' and Political Economy in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Empire," *Politics and Society* 21, no. 4 (1993): 393-423. See also, Halil İnalcık, "The Emergence of Big Farms, *Çiftlik*s: State, Landlords and Tennants," *Turcica* 3 (1984): 105-126. On the enlargement of the guild institutions, see Eujung Yi, *Guild Dynamics in Seventeenth-Century Istanbul, Fluidity and Leverage* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2004). On the mobility of the society, see Oktay Özel, "Population Changes in Ottoman Anatolia During the 16th and 17th Centuries: The 'Demographic Crisis' Reconsidered," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 36, no. 2 (2004): 181-205.

⁸ Genç, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Devlet ve Ekonomi*, 69-70.

the presence of a strong institution, and it should not be confused with the profitism of the *laissez-faire* model. In that model, the natural operation of supply and demand in the free market is configured to maximize the satisfaction of all parties. The common good would be achieved when the market was left to regulate itself. This economy might break only when the state or popular prejudice interferes with it.⁹ In the pre-modern paternalistic economy, on the other hand, the state had to gain the highest profit to be able to drive the system, which also necessitated the provisioning of society with goods – especially during in time of dearth – restraining rising prices, and also curtailing certain kinds of profiteering.

In this paternalistic pre-industrial economic world, how can we recognize the needs and demands of the urban protestors? Thompson examined the nature of the riots in his article on “the eighteenth-century hunger riots in England.”¹⁰ This work reached beyond its immediate topic and basically redefined the study of popular protest. Offering an analytical framework, Thompson’s work inspired many others concentrating on various forms of protest about food.¹¹ Thompson outlines some basic principles behind the riots. The most pivotal of all is that riots are based on some legitimizing notion. The protesting crowd believes that they are defending their traditional rights and customs. To put it in another way, there was community consensus behind the crowd’s

⁹ Thompson, “The Moral Economy of the English Crowd,” 201-203.

¹⁰ Ibid., 185-258.

¹¹ R.B. Outhwaite, “Food Crisis in Early Modern England: Patterns of Public Response,” in Michael Walter Flinn ed., *Proceedings of the Seventh International Economic History Congress* (Edinburgh: Edinburg University Press, 1978), 367-374; C. Tilly, *The Contentious French: Four Centuries of Popular Struggle* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987); Buchanan Sharp, “Popular Protest in 17th Century England,” in Barry Reay ed., *Popular Culture in 17th-Century England* (London: Routledge, 1985), 271-309; James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia* (Yale: Yale University Press, 1977); J. Walton and D. Seddon, *Free Markets and Food Riots: the Politics of Global Adjustment* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994); Adrian Randall and Andrew Charlesworth eds., *Moral Economy and Popular Protest: Crowds, Conflict and Authority* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000).

protest.¹² Protests were not made in order to gain the attention or solicit the mercy of the rulers, but were a demand for what was considered the people's rights. At the first stage, this claim to what was believed to belong to them was a complementary aspect to the paternalistic economy of the pre-modern society. In a society where the state was accepted as being responsible for provisioning its subjects, whenever this duty was not met, the people interpreted it as the violation of their rights by the ruler, an act which generated the right to protest. Thompson says that "it is not easy for us to conceive that there may have been a time, within a smaller and more integrated community, when it appeared to be 'unnatural' that any man should profit from the necessities of others, and when it was assumed that, in time of dearth, prices of 'necessities' should remain at a customary level, even though there might be less all around."¹³ The perception that the necessities of the people should be met created "the moral economy of the crowds" in pre-industrial economies.

The lack of sufficient provisioning and the inability to fix prices, especially that of bread, were the main reasons for social unrest in eighteenth century England and France. Thompson underlines the fact that the money spent on bread alone was more than half the income of a low-income inhabitant in London, therefore any changes in the price had tremendous effects on the budgets of the poor. Rudé points out that the importance of the change in wages was central to people being able to afford goods, and was also a reason for popular protest.¹⁴ Of course, in Thompson's narrative, the popular protests of the eighteenth century were also responses to broader changes such as the rise of the autocratic state and capitalism. These were the struggles of a pre-industrial society confronting the burgeoning industrial revolution.

¹² Thompson, "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd," 187-189.

¹³ Ibid., 252-253.

¹⁴ George Rudé, "The London 'Mob' of the Eighteenth Century," *The Historical Journal* 2, no. 1 (1959): 247.

Food riots, however, can be traced back to seventeenth century Europe.¹⁵ William Beik not only describes similar popular rebellions in seventeenth-century France, he also presents related reasons for protest, such as the introduction of a series of new consumer taxes and extra fees which triggered the 1675 rebellion in Bordeaux.¹⁶ It should also be mentioned that urban protest legitimized by the norms of, as Thompson would say, “moral economy” was not unique to Europe per se. In China, food riots, due to grain shortages and high prices, were a common phenomenon during the Qing dynasty (1644-1911).¹⁷ In 1648, Moscow trembled when faced by an angry crowd protesting salt taxes.¹⁸ Popular rebellions against shortages in the food supply or high taxes were an important link in the chain in the moral economy of the masses which cannot be excluded from an understanding of the societies which, up until the modern era, were ruled by paternalistic economies.

Riots were not the spontaneous reactions of “mobs,” “bandits,” or “vagabonds” to generalized disturbances to the status quo, but understandable responses to the increase in prices, lack of employment, and shortage of food.¹⁹ They were, moreover, “a group, community, or class response to a crisis,”²⁰ not individual acts. They were the acts of “hopeful” groups, as

¹⁵ Outhwaite, “Food Crisis in Early Modern England: Patterns of Public Response,” 367-374.

¹⁶ William Beik, *Urban Protest in Seventeenth-Century France: The Culture of Retribution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 146.

¹⁷ R. Bin Wong, “Food Riots in the Qing Dynasty,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 41, no. 4 (1982): 767-788.

¹⁸ Valerie A. Kivelson, “The Devil Stole His Mind: The Tsar and the 1648 Moscow Uprising,” *American Historical Review* 98, no. 3 (1993): 733-756.

¹⁹ E.P. Thompson, “The Moral Economy Reviewed,” in *Customs in Common* (New York: The New York Press, 1991), 265.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 263.

Thompson states, acting in the belief that they had the power to change things.²¹ Clarification of the usage of “mob” for a protesting crowd can help us to understand the nature of the popular riots of the early modern era. If we can detect what constituted a protesting crowd, usually referred as a “mob,” we can obtain a more balanced view of the protestors.

Rudé establishes that contemporaries of the rioters in eighteenth century France called the rioters of their time “banditti,” “desperadoes,” “mob,” “convicts,” or “*canailles* (rabble),”²² just as the janissary rioters were called *güruh* (mob), *zorbas* (ravishers), graspers, ruffians, extortioners.²³ Reflecting more on the usage of the term “mob,” Rudé delineates three main contexts. First, it is used as a term for “lower orders,” “common people;”²⁴ secondly, as referring to a gang hired by a particular political group or faction; and thirdly, to describe the crowds engaged in riots and demonstrations. He rightfully underlines the fact that the last two were very commonly confused, creating a perception of the rioters as being the “passive instruments of outside parties and having no particular motives of their own other than the desire for loot, lucre, free drinks, or the satisfaction of some latent criminal instinct.”²⁵ Rudé warns scholars that questions should go beyond the stereotype and bring a better definition of the people’s reasons for protesting. How large was the crowd, how did it act? Who were the targets of the crowd? What were the consequences of the event? These are the questions to put forward.²⁶

²¹ Ibid.

²² George Rudé, *The Crowd in History, 1730-1848: A Study of Popular Disturbances in France and England* (New York, London, and Sydney: John Wiley & Sons, 1964), 7.

²³ See Mustafa Naima, *Tarih-i Naima*, ed. Mehmet İpşirli, 4 vols. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2007), 513, 604. (hereafter *Tarih-i Naima*)

²⁴ Rudé, “The London ‘Mob’ of the Eighteenth Century,” 1.

²⁵ Ibid., 1-2.

²⁶ Rudé, *The Crowd in History, 1730-1848*, 11.

Examining the London riots of the eighteenth century, he detects some common characteristics of the rioters: (1) they predominantly demonstrated in their local street or parish, so the rioters were mostly not outsiders; (2) even though historians generally depict the rioters as criminal elements, they were mostly wage-earners, craftsmen, or petty employers and traders;²⁷ (3) they came not from among people of standing but from the “inferior set.” There was a clear economic and social difference between rioters and their targets.

Rudé also establishes that even though they exhibited common protest behavior such as house-breaking, setting fire to their victims or their property, hallooing, and slogan-shouting, the rioters were not passive instruments but had social and economic concerns.²⁸ Finally, there was always a popular ideology that stimulated a riot. In the case of London, the impulse was the Englishman’s desire for liberty, the idea that they were free, not slaves. Of course, the author warns us that these riots were not political movements and lacked political principles; however, scholars must develop a more elaborate view of the protestors rather than simply accept the stereotype.

3.2. Theorizing Protest in an Ottoman Context

How can we relate all this to Ottoman history and the janissary rebellions? Was there a notion of protest, and a moment the protest became legitimate in Ottoman society? To begin it is useful to

²⁷ He reaches this data through examining the criminal records of 160 rioters imprisoned after the riot, and finds out that 110 of them reflected the above-mentioned occupational portrait. Rudé, “The London ‘Mob’ of the Eighteenth Century,” 6.

²⁸ Rudé argues that the low wages, high food prices, especially the fluctuation in the price of bread and wheat, and protests against the rich were the predominant factors that stimulated the protests. In these protests, there was also an outburst of anti-Catholic feeling and the fear of war with the Catholic Powers of France and Spain. Rudé, “The London ‘Mob’ of the Eighteenth Century,” 12.

examine the perception of protest in Islamic jurisprudence, where a legitimization method similar to the idea of a “moral economy” can be detected.

Khaled Abou el Fadl stresses that, according to Muslim jurists, there are three main groups of people that should be fought against: (1) apostates (*murtaddun*), (2) brigands (*muharibun*), and (3) rebels (*bugah*). The legal discourse permits apostates to be killed unless they repent; brigands, robbers and such like may be killed, crucified, or banished, or have a hand or foot amputated. Rebels, however, may not be killed, tortured, or even imprisoned, in short cannot be punished. El Fadl concludes that rebellion was not seen as a crime and the treatment of it was relatively moderate.²⁹ There were varying views on the level of treatment and the issue of legality, but as rebellions and civil wars took place in Islamic history, a juristic discourse on rebellion (*ahkam al-bughah*) developed. The constant struggles between the Umayyads and the early Abbasids led to the production of a discourse that accepted the legality of rebels.³⁰ Texts representing the early Hanafi doctrine from the ninth century to the thirteenth century deal with the Fatimid challenge, the Buwayhid threat, and the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century, and generated further discourse focused on the issues of whether the ruler was just, how rebels should be treated, or what happened when rebels took refuge. Abu Hanifa is reported to have argued that those who fight against a *ta'wil* (a different religious interpretation) must be treated differently than “marauding adventurers” who commit crimes for private gain.³¹ Therefore he differentiates between a brigand and a person who fights for his rights. Moreover, he asserts that rebels should not be held responsible for crimes committed during a rebellion because “the rulings [of the loyalists] do not apply to them [in rebel territory] and they [the rebels] would be

²⁹ Khaled Abou el Fadl, *Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 32.

³⁰ For the historical process of this development: *Ibid.*, chapter 3.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 154.

regarded as having been separated [from the Muslims] like the inhabitants of a territory at war.”³² Fadl stresses that this logic was consistent with the Hanafi doctrine of jurisdiction which accepted that Islamic law could only be applied in a Muslim territory. The rebellions were legitimized through considering them to have a separate domain. In short, there was a tendency toward legitimize an uprising in defense of public rights against an unjust ruler.

Ibn Khaldun, who deeply influenced Ottoman political thought, indicated that the state and the *re‘aya* were two inter-dependent powers: they could not exist without each other.³³ He also mentions that there could be a good or bad way of ruling, and that if a ruler was unjust it would devastate the people. Naima, following Ibn Khaldun’s views on the state and justness, and referring to Kınalızade’s circle of justice, claims that the state existed thanks to the soldiers, soldiers could be maintained through property, property was obtained from the *re‘aya*, the *re‘aya* could survive through justice.³⁴ Within the circle of justice, when did the legitimization for protest occur? At what stage did the people believe that the pact of obedience to the ruler was broken?

Urban Civilian protests in the Ottoman context have not yet been studied extensively; however, limited studies on seventeenth century Cairo demonstrate that there were three food riots at the end of the seventeenth century, in 1678, 1687, and 1695, and effective popular

³² The translation and the additions in brackets belong to el Fadl. El Fadl, 146.

³³ Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah*, trans. Franz Rosenthal (Princeton: Princeton University, 1989). For the influence of Ibn Khaldun on Ottoman political thought, see Linda Darling, “Political Change and Political Discourse in the Early Modern Mediterranean World,” *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 38, no. 4 (2008): 511-516; Cornell Fleischer, “Royal Authority, Dynastic Cyclism, and Ibn Khaldunism’ in Sixteenth-Century Ottoman Letters,” *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 18 (1983), 198-220;

³⁴ *Hulasası budur ki mülk ü devlet, asker ve rical iledir. Ve rical mal ile bulunur ve mal reayadan husule gelir, reaya, adl ile muntazam’ül-hal olur*, “In short, it means that property and state could only exist through soldiers and dignitaries. And dignitaries could exist if there is property, property originates from the people, the people could be maintained by justice.” *Tarih-i Naima*, vol. 1, 30.

protests took place in Ottoman Damascus against the administrative corruption, high taxes and prices.³⁵ James Grehan shows that, by the end of the 16th century, people rebelled against the local authorities in Damascus upon the failure to keep prices down. In both cases the “moral economy of the crowds” plays a role as the main motivator. Whenever the public considered food shortage or price increases as a violation of their rights, they protested like their European contemporaries.

Another common pattern observed is the culture of retribution in these protests. Grehan stresses that the *qadī* of Damascus became a target during the demonstrations, which was an act distinguishing Ottoman crowds from those in the Mamluk period.³⁶ Administrative corruption became factors that turned the *qadīs* into the main targets of the protest. In 1591, a certain *qadī* was considered so unjust and immoral that during the protests crowds gathered outside the courthouse and demanded back all the bribes and loans that he had taken. In 1597, another *qadī* was denounced as the oppressor and attacked even though he himself was the provoker of crowds in a tax revolt. In another protest in 1598, the protestors cried out that the *qadī* turned Damascus into ruins.³⁷

People seeking justice protested against the increase in food prices resulting from bad harvests and famine in Cairo during the seventeenth and eighteenth century. In some food riots this was combined with the monetary measures taken by the government.³⁸ The food riots of Cairo exemplify early modern urban protests in the Ottoman Empire. In Cairo, the crowd

³⁵ James Grehan, “Street Violence and Social Imagination in Late-Mamluk and Ottoman Damascus (ca. 1500-1800),” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 35, no. 2 (2003): 215-236.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 225.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 226.

³⁸ Raymond, “Quartiers et mouvements populaires au Caire au XVIII^{ème} siècle,” in P.M. Holt ed., *Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 112-113.

gathered around the Great Mosque (Al-Azhar) occupied the minarets, and as people began to assemble and walk towards the large courtyard, protestors caused the shops and markets there to be closed. They confronted the sheikhs in front of the gates and demanded to talk with the authorities in order to voice their complaints. The violence factor was clearly there. The crowd stoned their opponents, and, specifically in the food riots, they plundered the grain stores of Rumayla as well as the shops in the neighborhood.³⁹

The culture of retribution is emphasized by William Beik for seventeenth century French towns where crowds punished governors, tax collectors, and other officials who were seen as being responsible for the violation of peoples' rights.⁴⁰ Natalie Zemon Davis shows that urban protests in sixteenth century France used religious rituals in their protests and staged their own heresy trials, and sometimes even conducted their own executions.⁴¹ Millers and bakers became the symbol of oppression in eighteenth century England, and a hunt for millers became a part of the pattern of the protest.⁴²

Retribution had its place in the Ottoman context, as well. The *qadis* becoming the targets and the attacks on grain stores were responses of Ottoman protestors. A similar pattern is observed in the seventeenth century janissary uprisings in Istanbul that demanded the punishment – and even the death penalty – of some officials, especially the grand vizier and the treasurer who were seen as responsible for unwelcome economic policies. Also, when examined closely, it can

³⁹ Rumayla was a relatively poor district of Cairo. Raymond, "Quartiers et mouvements populaires," 113. Gabriel Baer, "Popular Revolt in Cairo," *Der Islam* 54 (1997): 223-224.

⁴⁰ Beik, *Urban Protest in Seventeenth-Century France: The Culture of Retribution*, 146.

⁴¹ Natalie Zemon Davis, "The Rites of Violence," in *Society and Culture in Early Modern France* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1965), 152-188.

⁴² Thompson, "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd," 218-220.

be seen that the pattern of development in the famine protests of Cairo is very similar to that of the janissary rebellions in Istanbul, as we shall see in the following pages.

But first, the term *kul* must be examined since it is not possible to pinpoint when a janissary uprising became a legitimate act without understanding their *kul* status. It was the main determinant of janissary identity and this was what was being expressed in the uprisings. Therefore, we should first establish the varying meanings of *kul* in the Ottoman Empire.

A *devshirme* was a *kul* of the sultan. *Kul*, though generally translated into English as slave, is a multifaceted word. The fundamental problem is in describing the different usages of *kul* so as to produce a more accurate interpretation of Ottoman social structure, that is, one that would presumably defy misleading oppositional categories. In a general sense, *kul* was used for all the subjects of the Sultan, for every person living under the rule of the Ottoman state. In a narrow sense, a *kul* was a servant-officer or soldier of the sultan, whether he was a genuine slave or not. Genuine slave here refers to those who were called '*abd*'. These were people who had been captured during campaigns or purchased on slave markets.⁴³ More specifically, the *kul* group incorporated a third layer — servants of the sultan coming from slave origins, that is, Christian boys reduced to slavery, converted to Islam, involved in patronage networks and socialized into various levels of society, as examined in the first chapter.

Yet, *kul*, even when used to refer to a *devshirme* of slave origin, had a different sense from the term '*abd*', which designated a purchased slave. Purchased slaves can clearly be seen as being in a master-slave relationship. However, the relationship of the *devshirme* involved more dynamic power relations, negotiations, and reconciliations. A *devshirme* has enjoyed the

⁴³ Hakan Erdem, *Slavery in the Ottoman Empire and Its Demise, 1800–1909* (London: Macmillan, 1996), 6.

privilege of being a member of the imperial household.⁴⁴ He was paid a salary, exempted from paying taxes and allowed to own property, including all types of slaves of his own.⁴⁵ As the “servant of the sultan” — the true Ottoman — he earned privileges that distinguished him from the other subjects of the empire.

The servant status was a patron-client relationship rather than one of master and slave, primarily because of its reciprocal nature. Ehud Toledano describes the *devshirme* status as “a continuum of various degrees of bondage rather than a dichotomy between slave and free.”⁴⁶ A *devshirme* was absorbed into the owner’s social group and engaged in the political, economic, and cultural life of Ottoman society according to the power of that group. Therefore, the concept of social alienation, although used when referring to alienation from the society of one’s origin and from that to which one was introduced, does not fully shed light on the *devshirme*’s position in Ottoman society, predominantly because of his excessive involvement in his patron’s social group. The negotiating power of the *devshirme* in his relationship with his patron, the sultan, gave rise to differing linkages and loyalties within the ruling elite.

The patron-client relationship of the *kul* and the sultan had a contractual nature. Roy Mottahedeh, stresses that among the two kinds of *bi’at* (oath of allegiance) in Islamic political

⁴⁴ Households were an important characteristic shaping the Ottoman elite, which reached its full form after the reign of Sultan Süleyman I (1520–66). A household mainly comprised a household head and those under his patronage, regardless of kinship ties. The most important household in Ottoman society was the imperial household. Those who enjoyed the patronage of the sultan were not only the domestic members from the kitchens, gardens, or women’s quarters, but also the military members such as the pages, the students of the training school, and the guards. For more detailed information on households, see Jane Hathaway, *The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt: The Rise of the Qazdaglıs* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 18–19.

⁴⁵ Ehud R. Toledano, “The Concept of Slavery in Ottoman and Other Muslim Societies,” in Miura Toru and John Edward Philips eds. *Slave Elites in the Middle East and Africa: A Comparative Study* (London: Kegan Paul International, 2000), 164; Metin Kunt, “Kulların Kulları,” *Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Dergisi* 3 (1975): 27–42.

⁴⁶ Toledano, “The Concept of Slavery,” 167.

culture.⁴⁷ Kafadar, using the terminology established by Roy Mottahedeh argues that the janissary stood somewhere between these two. The janissary would realize and exploit the power he had over the dynasty, and started bargaining for things in return before swearing to *bi'at*.⁴⁸ Being a *kul* was to be a part of a system of allegiance that was based on *hizmet* and *nim'a* (duties and privileges).⁴⁹ The affirmation of this allegiance was constantly reiterated in the rituals relating to food. Kafadar stresses the highly important position of the *aşçıbaşı*, the cook in the regiments, and the fact that the main shared space within the janissary barracks was called Et Meydanı (the Meat Square) as being the place where the meat for the janissaries was distributed. The clearest expression of the start of a rebellion against the sultan was turning over their pots and refusing to eat soup, the eating of which was an expression of accepting the *ni'ma* provided by the sultan. This was the moment when the alliance broke down.⁵⁰

Uprisings occurred when the janissaries believed that the alliance had been broken. The distribution of a candy called *akide* during the payment of janissary salaries is quite a strong argument for the ritualistic importance of food in the *kul*-sultan relationship. Every payment day, the Grand Vizier and the Janissary Aghas would receive this candy showing the good deeds of the janissaries. The name of the candy *akide* comes from *akid*, meaning contract. Therefore, it

⁴⁷ One form of *bi'at* was a mere private compact. The oath of alliance as a voluntary offering to a ruler describes this earlier form of *bi'at*. The oath given to caliph al-Muqtadir by his army, or the oath given by the officers who killed al-Muqtadir to the future al-Qhir as his successor exemplify this sort of oath described by Roy Mottahedeh. Later *bi'at* was used as a public recognition of an established rule. It becomes a sort of “homage” to an established succession which differs from swearing *bi'ats* to emirs. The Abbasids, the Samanids, and the Buyyids imported this form of *bi'at* from the caliphate to the kingships. In this later form of *bi'at*, soldiers bound themselves with a real obligation but they requested a “customary payment” in return. Without satisfactory payment they sometimes refused commitment. Roy Mottahedeh, *Loyalty and Leadership in an Early Islamic Society* (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2001), 50-54.

⁴⁸ Cemal Kafadar, “Janissaries and Other Riffraff of Ottoman Istanbul,” 130.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 131.

⁵⁰ Kafadar, “Janissaries and Other Riffraff,” 131-132.

can be argued that this candy was used as a symbol of the continuing *bi'at* (oath of alliance between the *kuls* and the sultan).⁵¹ Similar to European urban protests, reaction emerged when the people, in our case the janissaries, thought that the economic and social rights given them in the paternalist system were being violated by the authorities. These were the moments when the contract could be seen as no longer valid. The nature of the contractual relationship was interpreted as being renewable. It had to be established with each new ruler and as a result, the moment of the death of a ruler and the accession to the throne of a new one was a sensitive time when the authorities were on guard against a possible uprising.⁵²

The moment of recognition that the contract between the *kul* and the sultan was void was the point where the popular ideology of the uprising was generated. Similar to the protests of the English “mob” in arguing that they were “free men,” the *kul* cried out against violations of their status and asserted their rights in society, which were different from those of the *re'aya* or slaves.

As mentioned earlier, Rudé notes that the protestors were mistakenly seen as rabble without motive or purpose, and emphasizes that the rioters were, on the contrary, members of the community dealing with petty trade, or working in various fields in the market, mostly representing the urban lower class who had a clear economic and social difference from those whom they were rebelling against.⁵³ This observation applies equally to Istanbul crowds who participated in the janissary rebellions.

Marinos Sariyannis investigates Ottoman social vocabulary used to describe the rebels at the time. Some very important usages among many others were *şehir oğlanları* (city boys), *eşkıya*

⁵¹ İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilatının Kapıkulu Ocakları*, vol. 2 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1943, 421.

⁵² Kafadar, “Janissaries and Other Riffraff,” 132.

⁵³ George Rudé, *The Crowd in History*, 7.

(brigand), *baği* (villain), and *zorba* (rebel, rioter).⁵⁴ Sariyannis underlines that these terms were the part of a “linguistic frame” created by authors from the ruling elite to define the urban lower class. The “city boys,” he argues, were a distinct group of people. They were educated and connected with the lower military and judicial elite, as well as with the lower *‘ilmiye* class.⁵⁵ Sariyannis ascertains the appearance of these descriptions used for both the janissaries and the civilians joined to their protest, and that there was a relationship between the urban population and the military.⁵⁶

The purposeful, deliberate action of the European protests is also observed in the janissary rebellions, which will be seen in the next section as we examine those uprisings occurring during the early seventeenth century.

3.3. Janissary Protests in Istanbul

When we talk about soldiers being part of urban protests, and in many cases the leading participants in the riots, we have to be careful not to romanticize them. It should be established that soldiers actually caused several problems in the seventeenth century world. Soldiers of the enlarged armies of the seventeenth century were engaged in a constant struggle with civilians. Looking at seventeenth-century Europe, Charles Tilly notes that crowded seventeenth-century armies were constantly engaged in long-lasting wars received their payments late, suffered from

⁵⁴ Other vocabulary used for the rioters in Ottoman documents that narrates the uprising were *esafil-i nas* (mob, the scum of mankind); *evbaş* (a low fellow, rable); *cahil* (ignorant); *sefi* (light-minded, ignorantly foolish); *levend* (a handsome, strong youth, a free and easy rough); *maryol* (rogue, cheat); and *kendini bilmez* (who knows not oneself, who knows not one’s limit). Marinos Sariyannis, ““Mob,” “Scamps” and Rebels in Seventeenth-Century Istanbul: Some Remarks on Ottoman Social Vocabulary,” *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 11 (2005): 1-17, esp. 2-3.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 7-11.

insufficient food supplies, and had to live in bad housing conditions. The commanders kept their troops under control with the promise of booty. The soldiers were out looking for bread, meat, wine, sex, labor, and lodging. Often, ordinary people resisted their attempts at plunder.⁵⁷ The same struggle continued in Ottoman lands, as well. The civilians fought back against the soldiers, or more correctly, former soldiers, presently bandits; if they did not they would be forced to migrate.⁵⁸ Mantran indicates, on the other hand, that there were separatist rebellions throughout the empire all through the seventeenth century, especially in Asia Minor and Syria, and some of these rebellions actually joined in the janissary uprisings and created an opposition front to the sultan's authority.⁵⁹ Jane Hathaway mentions military revolts that, by the end of the sixteenth century, were a partial consequence of the *beys'* growing influence and their attempts to increase connections with the soldiers.⁶⁰

Now, let us analyze the janissary uprisings in the first half of the seventeenth century to see if the events that took place match the pattern of urban protests around the world at that time. The first and probably most significant protest that we will examine is the revolt against Osman II in 1031/1622 that ended not only with his murder, but also the accession of a new sultan.

⁵⁷ Charles Tilly, *As Sociology Meets History* (New York, London, and Toronto: Academic Press, 1981), 126-128.

⁵⁸ Mustafa Akdağ, *Türk Halkının Dirlik Kavgası* (Ankara: Barış Basım Yayın, 1999); Karen Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: the Ottoman Route to State Centralization* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994); Oktay Özel, "Population Changes in Ottoman Anatolia During the 16th and 17th Centuries," 181-205.

⁵⁹ Robert Mantran, *Istanbul dans la seconde Moitié du XVII. sié Istanbul dans la seconde moitié: Essai d'histoire institutionnelle, économique et sociale* (Paris: Librairie Adrien Maisonneuve, 1962), 8.

⁶⁰ Jane Hathaway, *The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt, The Rise of the Qazdağlıs* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 33.

The chroniclers tell us that events began upon rumors of Osman II's wish to conscript a new army specifically under the guise of a pilgrimage trip.⁶¹ After going through ambassadorial reports and *mühimmes* and provincial court records, Baki Tezcan concludes that there is no incontrovertible evidence regarding Osman II's intentions.⁶² However, it seemed as though he was planning to create a new army through recruitment in Anatolia and northern Syria to make an alliance with Ibn Ma'n in Lebanon.⁶³ The rumors in Istanbul seem to have had a basis. Even if it was not the case, we understand from the narration of Tuği, who was a chronicler with a janissary background and recorded the entire uprising, that the janissaries believed it to be so.⁶⁴ The rumors were very detailed to the extent that people believed the sultan not only intended to conscript an alternative *sekban* army but that he had already sent Eski Yusuf, a halberdier (*teberdar*) in the Old Palace, to conscript soldiers from Damascus and Aleppo under the pretext of collecting grain.⁶⁵

There is also a story that cannot be verified on a note given to the *altı bölük halkı* (cavalry troops) warning them of the trip the sultan was preparing for, asserting that the sultan would take the treasury along with him and was even planning to burn the *defterhane*, the record house, which would mean the destruction of the records of all salaries, fiefs, and privileges. News of the

⁶¹ Baki Tezcan, "Searching for Osman: A Reassessment of the Deposition of the Ottoman Sultan Osman II (1618-1622)," Ph.D. diss. (Princeton University, 2001).

⁶² Tezcan, "Searching for Osman," 220-225.

⁶³ Tezcan, "Searching for Osman," 227-228.

⁶⁴ Mithad Sertoğlu ed., "Tuğî Tarihi," *Belleten* 11 (1947): 494. (hereafter "Tuğî Tarihi") Baki Tezcan compares Tuğî's text with Peçevi's narration of the events and points out the difference in perspective. Tezcan stresses that Peçevi does not call the soldiers rebels but refers to them using the expression of *fitne ve fesad* (sedition and disorder). Baki Tezcan, "The 1622 Military Rebellion in Istanbul," in Jane Hathaway ed., *Mutiny and Rebellion in the Ottoman Empire* (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin, 2002), 33.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

sultan's intention to abolish the janissary army and even to attack it with the new army he intended to gather during his trip was spread around the barracks at night.⁶⁶

The next morning, when the preparations for the sultan's pilgrimage trip (*hacc*) began, the janissaries, *sipahis*, and civilians gathered at the Süleymaniye mosque, walked to Meat Square near the Yeni Odalar (New Barracks), closing the shops around Aksaray. Then they passed through the neighborhood of Karaman and walked toward the Hippodrome.⁶⁷ Tuği mentions that on the way some bigger crowds joined them. Apart from the *ulema*, he does not specify who those people were.⁶⁸ It is alleged that the soldiers got a *fetva* from the mufti Esad Efendi. This cannot be verified, but the narration indicates that there was an attempt to legitimize their claims and also indicates their reaction when their claims went unheard.⁶⁹

From the Hippodrome, the crowd entered the imperial zone and went to the residence of Ömer Efendi with the intention of asking him to act as an intermediary in passing on their request that the Sultan cancel his pilgrimage trip. When they could not find the addressee, they went to the palace of the grand vizier, Dilaver Pasha, but were attacked.⁷⁰ Here we learn from Naima that not a person in the crowd was armed. On being attacked, they moved to the Cavalry Bazaar (Sipahiler Çarşısı) to buy arms while the shopkeepers, scared by the possibility of pillage, tried to prevent them from entering. It was already evening by the time the crowd dispersed.⁷¹

⁶⁶ Tezcan, "Searching for Osman," 230.

⁶⁷ Karaman is an Armenian neighborhood in the vicinity of Aksaray. Ibid., 231.

⁶⁸ "Tuği Tarihi," 493.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 494.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ *Tarih-i Naima*, vol. 2, 480.

The next day, the protestors gathered at the Hippodrome again. They declared that they wanted a cancelation of the pilgrimage trip and presented a list of the people they wanted sentenced to death. According to Tugi, these were the *dariüssaade aga* Hoca Efendi, the grand vizier Dilaver Pasha, the *kaymakam* Ahmed Pasha, and the *defterdar* Baki Pasha. Naima adds Nasuh Pasha to this list as well.⁷² The treasurer was on the list because he was responsible for the distribution of debased coinage to the janissaries as salary.⁷³ Tugi especially mentions that the *kaymakam* Ahmed Pasha was on the list because, while governing during the absence of Sultan Murad, he did not pay the proper salary to the *oturaks* and *korucus*; he was even stoned as a result of his decision.⁷⁴ Upon the return of the sultan to the city, this Ahmed Pasha made a complaint about the *korucus* and dismissed 2,000 of them.⁷⁵ Naima adds that Nasuh Pasha was on the list because he cooperated with Ahmed Pasha in complaining about the janissaries.⁷⁶ This list, since it included the *defterdar*, and Ahmed and Nasuh Pashas – who were seen as responsible for not paying janissary salaries – reflects the economic basis of the struggle.

Tugi insists that the sultan was not responsive to the requests of the crowd, even though they patiently reiterated their requests; then “the janissaries stepped into the section of the palace where no janissary had stepped since the conquest of Konstantinople” Tugi says.⁷⁷ The line was crossed. This narration clearly reflects Tugi’s intention to legitimize what happened next, since

⁷² Ibid., 481.

⁷³ The problem of debased coinage will be discussed in later sections.

⁷⁴ It should be kept in mind that these groups were the ones highlighted in the chronicles as dealing with trades and crafts in the city. See Chapter 2.

⁷⁵ “Tuği Tarihi,” 496.

⁷⁶ *Tarih-i Naima*, vol. 2, 481.

⁷⁷ “Tuği Tarihi,” 498.

we learn from Naima that the sultan was actually responsive to the requests of the crowd but they were determined to go after him anyway.

Next, Mustafa was taken from the Old Palace and brought to the Orta Mosque of the janissaries. Meanwhile, we find that the common traits of all urban protests took place in this uprising, as well. The criminals in Galata and Istanbul prisons were released, the house of Baki Pasha, and the house of the son of Hoca Ömer Efendi, the preceptor of the sultan, were plundered.⁷⁸ This was a way of confronting the authority physically. Also, this attack on the house of someone from the ruling elite underlines the clear economic differences between the protestors and the victims.⁷⁹ From then on, we read from the sources how the new sultan Mustafa was brought to the Orta Mosque of the janissaries, Osman II was taken to Yedikule prison and killed, and the rest of the pashas and viziers were punished by the protestors. In the diplomatic dispatches, it is mentioned that the soldiers were already in preparation to rise against the sultan even before the protest due to Osman II's decision to cut the janissary retirement salaries, though Tezcan suggests that what made them act so drastically was the news that Osman II was taking the treasury with him on the pilgrimage trip, convincing them that he was planning to recruit a new army.⁸⁰ The janissaries perceived that their existence was under threat.

Ten years later, in 1042/1632, there was another uprising in the streets of Istanbul. This time it was a joint rebellion of janissaries and the timariot *sipahis* who were disturbed by the unexpected inspections of their *timar* holdings. The janissaries' involvement in this rebellion was

⁷⁸ "Tuği Tarihi," 499. Theft took place during the events. A decree mentions that during the events of Osman II an *odabaşı* called Bodur Mehmed, residing in Üsküp, stole a *sorguç*, or crest, from the palace. They traced the *sorguç* and found out that it was first taken to Üsküb and then a Jew called Salomon took it to Venice. The decree orders the return of it. Ahmet Refik Altınay, *Hicri On Birinci Asırda İstanbul Hayatı (1000-1100)* (Istanbul: Enderun Kitabevi, 1988), 52.

⁷⁹ It was a common event in urban protests that the crowd attacked houses in the rich neighborhoods.

⁸⁰ Tezcan, "Searching for Osman," 239.

a reflection of an increase in their holding *timars*.⁸¹ As in the previous uprising, the janissaries gathered at the Hippodrome along with the timariot *sipahis*. They went to the palace three days in a row asking for seventeen men of the sultan to be executed. These included the grand vizier, Hafız Ahmed Pasha, the Şeyhülislam Yahya Efendi, the *defterdar*, Mustafa Pasha, and the Agha of Janissaries, Hasan *Halife*, and *muhasib* Musa *Çelebi*. They were held responsible for selling ammunition and other necessary goods to the soldiers, rather than provisioning the forces in Mosul.⁸² During the protests, shops stayed closed for three days and many people stayed in their homes.⁸³ The protesters' requests were granted and the uprising ended. This rebellion took place during the time of Murad IV. Narrative sources mention janissary gangs as giving civilians a lot of trouble at that time. They stole, blackmailed the rich by threatening to set their houses on fire, drank publicly during Ramadan, and did many other things that Namia felt would be inappropriate to write about in detail.⁸⁴ Just like Osman II, but this time over larger areas and in more cruel ways, Murad IV implemented strict policies against the urban spaces where the janissaries gathered, such as coffeehouses and taverns. As mentioned in chapter 2, he used

⁸¹ Starting from the mid-sixteenth century, some tax-farmers began to be given military positions as reward. Kafadar, "Yeniçeri and Esnaf Relations: Solidarity and Conflict," MA Thesis (McGill University, 1980), 93. Linda Darling, *Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy: Tax Collection and Finance Administration in the Ottoman Empire 1560-1660* (Leiden and New York: Brill, 1996), 149-150. Janissaries and *sipahis* were highly involved in tax-farms, which is a topic excluded from this study. For detailed information see, Linda Darling, *Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy*, 178-185.

⁸² *Eger devletine hayr-hah olsalar biz Musul'da düşman ağzında otururken perakende ettirip bunca mühimmat ve levazım-ı sefer telef olmasına sebep olmazlar idi*. "If they were benevolent for their state, they would not sell the munitions supplies of war while we were fighting with the enemy in Mosoul." *Tarih-i Naima*, vol. 2, 699-701; Cavid Baysun, "Murad IV," 628.

⁸³ The closure of shops happened during urban protests in Damascus as well. Grehan interprets this as a display of anger which was usually followed by a boycott of the Friday prayer in the mosques. The author regards this as an early version of a general strike. Grehan, "Street Violence and Social Imagination," 218.

⁸⁴ *Tarih-i Naima*, vol. 2, 712-715; Mehmed Halife. *Tarih-i Gilmani*, ed. Kamil Su (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1986), 12. (hereafter *Tarih-i Gilmani*).

oppressive measures and killed so many innocent people that the city folk as well as the janissaries were ready to turn against him.

Having looked in some detail at two protests, one obvious characteristic that should be emphasized here is the common gathering location and the way the protest proceeded in both the 1622 and the 1632 rebellions. The janissaries gathered in Meat Square, the square within the barracks, walked through Aksaray, and reached the Hippodrome, which was the most prominent urban public space in Istanbul at the time.⁸⁵ Then they moved toward the New Palace. The same pattern will be seen in the protests that follow in this chapter.

As mentioned in chapter 2, the main area where the protests took place intersected with the residential areas favored by the janissaries, and attacks were always made on the people and residences in the richer neighborhoods surrounding the palace.⁸⁶ This overlap between the residential patterns of janissaries and the route of the protests suggests the local character of the protests, and points to the increased interaction between soldiers and civilians due to the urbanization process of the janissaries.

A further repeated pattern was the drawing up of mass petitions to the authorities after the people had gathered. This was almost always a peaceful protest declaring their wishes and naming, in the main, those whom they considered guilty of violating their rights. Thirdly, common behaviors of the protestors were detected, such as attacking the houses of the rich,

⁸⁵ Emine Sonnur Özcan argues rightfully that the Hippodrome functioned as a form of public space in Istanbul starting from the sixteenth century onwards. It was an open space for the public, which was mostly used for playing and watching *cirit* (the game of jeered). The square was also used for festivals, ceremonials for the reception of foreign dignitaries, and weddings. It was also the place where a street-fight between the janissaries and *sipahis* took place after the circumcision festival of Mehmed III in 1582. Therefore, the square had already been used as a confrontation zone in conflicts between the janissaries and the *sipahis*. Emine Sonnur Özcan, “Osmanlı’nın Atmeydanı ‘Kamusal’ Bir Meydan Mıydı?” *Doğu Batı* 51 (2009-10): 104-132; Mehmed Raif Bey, *Bir Osmanlı Subayının Kaleminden Sultan Ahmed Semti-Sultan Ahmed Parkı ve Asar-ı Atıkası*, eds. H. Ahmed Arslantürk and Adem Korkmaz (Istanbul: Okur Kitaplığı, 2010), 33-35.

⁸⁶ See map 2.4 in Chapter 2.

slogan-shouting, and closing the shops. By the time petitioning began, the civilians had already joined the janissaries. One of the significant groups supporting the protests was the *ulema*.⁸⁷ Apart from physical participation of members of the *ulema* in the rebellions, a legitimizing *fetva* from prominent members of this group was very crucial for the success of a protest.⁸⁸

Here, these overlapping themes are compared with the European urban protests: (1) the overlap between the residence patterns of the janissaries and the route of the protestors suggests the local character of the protestors. They were not segregated from the urban space, but were actually inhabitants of those areas. This concurs with Rudé's stress on the protestors being locals rather than outsiders in urban protests in early modern European cities. (2) The fact that the protestors prepared mass petitions to communicate their problems with the authorities points to the purposive action of the protests. The crowd had an objective more than plundering the houses of the rich. They had a shared awareness of what was right or wrong, and legitimate or not. In this line, the protests began in a self-restrained manner. (3) There was an attempt to legitimize the protest. Once there was a consensus that their rights were violated, they started to protest, and they not only followed a similar pattern of protest but also justified themselves, claiming

⁸⁷ Kafadar argues that even though janissaries had the support of the *ulema* in the 1622 revolt, this was not due to a common ideological commitment to conservatism, and that there was no organic link between these two classes. Kafadar divides these two groups as *ulema* with conservative background, and janissaries with bektashi, even heterodox leanings. This divide might possibly reflect the general ideological/religious tendencies within the two groups; however, the significance of *ulema* support to the uprisings presents itself in the narratives of the chroniclers. Also, as will be seen in the following chapter, there was an increased number of credit and loan transactions between the two groups, which can point to an organic economic relationship between. Kafadar, "Yeniçeri and Esnaf Relations," 90-93; Necmettin Alkan describes the *ulema* as the third complementary social group which took an active role in the classical janissary rebellions, i.e., those which took place before the eighteenth century (the first group being the janissaries and the second being the oppositional statesmen). Alkan, however, presents the oppositional statesmen as the predominant group that promoted the rebellions and depicted the janissaries as the passive instruments of the fictional parties that statesmen generated. Necmettin Alkan, "Osmanlı Modernleşmesi ve Klasik Yeniçeri İsyanlarının Modern Siyasi Darbelere Dönüşmesi," *Doğu Batı* 51 (2009-10): 55-58.

⁸⁸ As mentioned, for the 1622 rebellion a *fetva* was obtained from the *ulema*. Chroniclers also mention that members of the *ulema* were present in the protests. And in the 1651 rebellion, as will be seen below, inability to get the approval of the *ulema* for their cause was the decisive factor in the failure of the rebellion. "Tuğhi Tarihi," 493; *Tarih-i Naima*, vol. 3, 1336.

legitimacy by receiving *fetvas* approving their actions. The vigilantism was also a common factor of the European urban protests as well.⁸⁹

Finally, popular ideology — in the case of janissary uprisings, the belief that the rights of the janissaries, which were described being related to their *kul* of the sultan, were violated — was present in the protests. Thus in 1622, it is observed that the encroachment on the *kul* status of the janissaries in society acted as a trigger and was used to legitimize the protest. Tuği several times mentions that the sultan used to make the rounds of the city at night, checking the taverns frequented by the janissaries and the rooms of the *yasakçıs*, and punished them through *bostancı*s instead of handing them over to their peers, and sending them to work in the stone-quarry galleys. They were punished like *re‘aya* and slaves, an act which transgressed their privileges.

When the protestors took Osman II from the palace to the Orta Mosque on a workhorse, he was publicly humiliated. The narratives quote some of the protestors. One enraged protestor shouted “Osman Çelebi [not sultan] how can you raid the taverns and put the *sipahis* and the janissaries to work in the stone-quarry galleys?” Another asked “Did your ancestors make conquests with *sekban*?”⁹⁰ The *kul* knew what their rights were. Any encroachment on their rights was interpreted as an attack on them. We have seen that at these times, they perceived that the contract between them and the ruler became void. Rebellion began when the *kuls* thought that their legitimate rights were being violated. This gave them the right to interfere, and they were aware of their power. Thompson underlines the fact that the protests were made by a group,

⁸⁹ Grehan, “Street Violence and Social Imagination,” 229.

⁹⁰ *Canım Osman Çelebi, meyhaneleri basup sipah ve yeniçeriyi taş gemisine koymak olur mu?*; “*ecdadın sekban ile mi vilayetler fethedyledi*. “Tuği Tarihi,” 502.

community or a class that believed in their capacity to effect change. One of the protestors yelled at the sultan, “Don’t you know that whenever the *kuls* rise they get what they want!”⁹¹

A very important moment during the protest was overlooked in Tugi’s narration. He does not mention the debates between the protestors and the sultan and his men in the palace. He depicts the sultan as uncooperative, rejecting all the requests of the crowd. Naima, however, stresses that the sultan agreed to cancel the pilgrimage trip and to hand over some of the people demanded by the crowd. At that moment, Naima mentions, the Şeyhülislam preached for an hour to the crowd, saying that the sultan was still on his throne and it was not legitimate to break the *bi’at*.⁹² This was the point when the soldiers, fearing that the call for the protestors to obey the existing *bi’at* (allegiance between the sultan and the janissaries) could break the spirit of the protest, took the sultan to the Old Palace.⁹³ Reaching a consensus on the validity of this contract was crucial in determining the legitimacy of the riot.

My surmise is that these common patterns resembled other urban protests in the early modern era, but beyond that, we can detect economic concerns that triggered the janissary uprisings of the seventeenth century that match their European counterparts. In 1622, the salaries of the janissaries were under threat. During the campaign against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the sultan inspected the army to detect absentees and cut their salaries. In both 1622 and 1632, the anger of the rioters was directed against the authorities responsible for finances and those in charge of paying the janissary salaries.

⁹¹ *Kul taifesi cemiyet ettiklerinde istediklerin alırlar ecdad-ı izamımızdan alagelmışlerdir, mukaddemce olmak evladır. Tarih-i Naima*, vol. 2, 482.

⁹² *Henüz Sultan Osman tahtında oturur. Gayre beyat (bi’at) caiz değildir. Kimi dahi bu meslubü’l-akıldır. Tarih-i Naima*, vol. 2, 484.

⁹³ *Emr-i beyat (bi’at) tamamından sonra mebada bir zarar ırgürmeyeler deyü...* Ibid.

As will be seen in greater detail in chapter 4, not all janissaries enjoyed good living conditions. There were those who depended solely on their salaries and thus their cost of living constantly fluctuated according to the change in the *akçe*'s silver content. Debasement policies and groups of counterfeiters constantly decreased the value of the *akçe*.

Table 3.1: The Silver *Akçe* and Gold *Sultani* 1584-1689

Years	Akçes per 100 dirhams	Akçe in grams	Sultani in grams	Exchange rate akçe/sultani	Calculated gold:silver ratio
1584	450	0.68	3.517	65–70	11.8
1586	800	0.38	3.517	120	11.7
1596	?	?		220–230	
1600	950	0.32	3.517	125	10.3
1612	950	0.32	3.517	125	10.3
1618	1000	0.31	3.517	150	11.8
1621	1000	0.31		150	
1622	?	?		200–230	
1623	?	?		230–300	
1624	?	?		360–460	
1625	1000	0.31	3.517	140	11.1
1628	?	?		210	
1634	?	?		250	
1636	?	?		260	
1640	?	?		300	
1641	1000	0.31	3.517	140	14.7
1650	?	?		180	
1659	1250	0.26	3.490	210	14.1
1669	1400	0.23	3.490	270	16.0
1672	1400	0.23	3.490	270	16.0
1689	1400	0.23	3.490	270	16.0

Sources: Şevket Pamuk, *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 136.

The value of the *akçe* was debased by lowering its silver content in 1623-24 and 1638-40. In the first debasement, the silver content of the *akçe* dropped to about one-third, and in the latter to about half its previous level.⁹⁴ The livelihood of a rank-and-file janissary was by no means stable in the first half of the seventeenth century. Table 3.1 shows how much the value of the *akçe* fluctuated in comparison with the gold *sultani* coin. The *akçe* gained value only after the four *tahsih-i sikkes*, corrections of coinage operations, were carried out in 1600, 1618, 1624, and 1640.

Şevket Pamuk asserts that Mehmed II espoused a consistent debasement policy and maintained a strong central government with long-term fiscal benefits. The debasements were made regularly rather than undertaken when the state had urgent needs for other sources of revenue. They were applied even when there were ample reserves. The state was able to meet its obligations to the janissaries, bureaucrats, and suppliers which were expressed in *akçes* because the reduction of their silver content enabled the minting of more of them. The janissary opposition to these policies was neutralized through the material benefits provided to them after successful military campaigns, including raises in their salaries. The debasements were not intended to solve the problems that arose from fiscal emergencies, and in the long run the debasements built a powerful treasury.⁹⁵

However, according to Pamuk, governments of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries used debasement as a short-term measure — emergency actions taken to meet fiscal

⁹⁴ Şevket Pamuk, *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 140.

⁹⁵ Pamuk, *Monetary History*, 51.

burdens.⁹⁶ Also, in the early seventeenth century, the benefits given to the janissaries could not be maintained; the state had to monitor more carefully the attitude of the janissaries as a result.

Along with the debasement of coinage, there was another attempt to correct fiscal policy during the seventeenth century. Pamuk states that the government had a conscious policy of correcting the coinage in this century, albeit not always successfully. The main reason behind this was the reaction of the janissaries in Istanbul.⁹⁷ During the first half of the seventeenth century, four *tahsih-i sikke* (correction of coinage) operations took place, in 1600, 1618, 1624, and 1640 (see table 3.1: the *akçe* exchange rate increased in these years).⁹⁸ The last three occurred after the accession of a new sultan. Two of these came after the lowering of the silver content of the *akçe*, in 1623-24 and 1638-40. The debasements were always greeted with opposition by the janissaries in Istanbul.⁹⁹ These protests should be interpreted beyond the traditional view that sees janissaries as a problem-making mob that only cared for plundering, stealing, and taking revenge. It was more related to the fact that they were very much affected by the state's economic policies and the decrease in the value of *akçe*, because they were primarily working for a fixed income whose value was constantly fluctuating.

The debasement policies of the state failed to stabilize the value of the currency in the early seventeenth century, especially following the devaluation of 1585-86, which halved the silver content of the *akçe*, leading to widespread criminal activity in Ottoman society, namely,

⁹⁶ Ibid., 142.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 141.

⁹⁸ Şevket Pamuk explains that after each of the correction of currency operations, the state lowered the *narh* (fixed prices) for many goods, which was probably the most important indicator of the effects of the operations. Pamuk, *Monetary History*, 140. For Istanbul we have two registers from the years 1624 and 1640 that show the drop in the prices: M. Kütükoğlu, "1624 Sikke Tashihinin Ardından Hazırlanan Narh Defterleri," *Tarih Dergisi* 34 (1984): 123-182; M. Kütükoğlu, *Osmanlılarda Narh Müessesesi ve 1640 Tarihli Narh Defteri* (Istanbul: Enderun Kitabevi, 1983), 3-56.

⁹⁹ The protest in 1589 ended after the state hanged the *defterdar*. Pamuk, *Monetary History*, 142.

counterfeiting.¹⁰⁰ Coins of different weights were in high demand and there were coins of various standards in the market. Counterfeiters minted poor quality coins which were difficult to distinguish from the regular mints, since many of them were also of poor quality.¹⁰¹

In April 1620, Ali Agha b. Sefer came before the court in Istanbul, claiming that Ali b. Mahmud, known as Topal Ali (lit., Cripple Ali), from the Simkeş neighborhood¹⁰² was minting *akçe* with a low silver content and requested that the court investigate. A judge was sent to the area for inspection and arrested Topal Ali, who was carrying 400 counterfeit *akçes*. It was learned that he had actually purchased the coins half-price from Ismail through a porter, a woman, Kara Selime (lit., Black Selime). Black Selime had been receiving a payment of 25 *akçes* for each 1,000 *akçes* bought from Ismail for her services.¹⁰³ Cripple Ali guided the judge to Black Selime and her son, Ali bin Ilyas, known as Sarı Ali (lit., Blonde Ali). The mother and son were duly questioned and aided the investigator in arresting Ismail. Ismail was caught with copper wire that he used to mint *akçe* and confessed that he was counterfeiting coins at the house of a janissary, Cafer Beşe b. Abdullah, who resided somewhere around Egri Kapı. In his testimony, Cafer Beşe rejected the accusations and somehow convinced the judge that it was the first time he had seen Ismail, which was a good enough reason for the judge to drop the accusations. Unfortunately, the record does not tell us what happened to Ismail.¹⁰⁴ Two other cases against counterfeiters in Ankara and Bursa presented by Suraiya Faroqhi confirm how widespread the organized crime of

¹⁰⁰ Suraiya Faroqhi, "Counterfeiting in Ankara," in *Coping With the State: Political Conflict and Crime in the Ottoman Empire 1550-1720* (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1995), 133-145; Originally published in *The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* 15, no. 2 (1991): 281-292.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 135-136.

¹⁰² I could not locate this neighborhood.

¹⁰³ İkinin bir *akçeye* alırım ve 1000 *akçeden* 25 *akçe* dahı ziyade alıb....İKS 6: 12a, (1029/1620).

¹⁰⁴ İKS 6: 12a (1029/1620).

counterfeiting coins was. Plus, although in these cases the perpetrators were caught, their margin of profit suggests that this could have been a lucrative undertaking during the last decades of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth centuries.¹⁰⁵

Going back to urban protests in general, in 1648 there was a salt riot in Moscow. The government substituted a direct salt tax for previous taxes to create extra income for the treasury, which turned salt into a luxury commodity. On June 1, 1648, Tsar Alexei I, returning from his trip to Troitse-Sergiyeva Monastery, was stopped by the townspeople. The unarmed crowd of Muscovites complained about the tax collectors but were fired upon by soldiers, which triggered a riot.¹⁰⁶ The uprising lasted for almost a week. The rioters protested and set fire to buildings asking for the surrender of the head of government, Leontiy Pleshcheyev, the salt tax initiator, Nazar Chistoy, and the head of the Moscow police department. Hundreds of people died in the fires.¹⁰⁷ Before the protests there had been a series of mass petitions in the name of the military servitors, merchants, musketeers, and townspeople.¹⁰⁸

Another riot, the copper riot of Moscow in 1662, lasted only for a day. The riot began after the government decided to mint large quantities of copper coinage and equate it with the silver coinage. This had been a part of ongoing devaluation policies since 1654. A few days before the riot, a blacklist of officers who seemed to be responsible for the economic crisis was circulating around the city. 10,000 people protested the fiscal policies of the government,

¹⁰⁵ Faroqi, "Counterfeiting in Ankara," 133-135.

¹⁰⁶ Valarie A. Kivelson, "The Devil Stole His Mind," 739.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 735. Kivelson stresses the Muscovite political behavior that accepted the established order, that is to say, there was an allegiance of the people to the ruler. But the same political perception created a logical and theological basis for resistance to the crown. Russian rebellions of the early modern era are an important topic that was tackled by the Marxist historians of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in an attempt to show the roots of class struggle in Muscovy. See Leo Loewenson, "The Moscow Rising of 1648," *Slavonic and East European Review* 27 (1948): 146-156.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 736.

presenting their demands in person and demolishing the houses of the rich. Among the participants were soldiers and guards along with the civilians, similar to the combined soldier-civilian protests in Istanbul during the same period.

In the same year as the Moscow salt riot, in 1057-58/1648, the janissaries rebelled against extra taxes, a tax on fur and one on amber, issued by Ibrahim I. These were taxes imposed on the artisans and the *ulema* to support the luxurious life in the palace. When such demands were made on the janissaries, a popular protest against the sultan, which included civilians, especially artisans and the *ulema*, ended in the dethronement of Ibrahim I, the execution of the grand vizier, and the accession of Mehmed IV.¹⁰⁹

A similar pattern to the previous Ottoman rebellions is seen here, resulting in the dethronement of the sultan. The protestors gathered at the Hippodrome, proceeded to Hagia Sophia, and then to the gates of the palace. Ibrahim I's mother Kösem Sultan attempted to stop the dethronement, saying that it was evil to enthrone the seven-year old Mehmed. The protestors replied by displaying the legal opinion (*fetva*) issued, once again legitimizing their action.¹¹⁰

Soon after the dethronement of Ibrahim I, a Levantine merchant, Robert Bargrave, was looking at Istanbul from a ship on the Golden Horn. There was bloody street-fighting by the *sipahis* and *'acemis* against the janissaries. The city gates were shut but the walls were scaled on every side.¹¹¹ Evliya Çelebi narrates that the *sipahis* and janissaries fought at the Hippodrome and the janissaries threw the bodies of the dead *sipahis* into the sea at Ahırkapı (map 2.2). Evliya Çelebi illustrates the events with exaggeration, saying that there were so many bodies that the

¹⁰⁹ Marc David Baer, *Honored by the Glory of Islam: Conversion and Conquest in Ottoman Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 25-37; *Tarih-i Gülmanî*, 61.

¹¹⁰ Baer, *Honored by the Glory of Islam*, 27.

¹¹¹ Robert Bargrave, *The Travel Diary of Robert Bargrave, Levant Merchant (1647-1656)*, ed. Michael G. Brennan (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1999), 81. This *sipahis* mentioned here are most likely to be *kapıkulu sipahis*.

navy could not enter the harbor and ships sank.¹¹² In this rivalry between the janissaries and the *sipahis*, the former emerged as the dominant power within the *kul* soldiery.

A comparison of the salt and copper riots of 1648 and 1662 in Moscow and the janissary uprisings in Istanbul reveals remarkably common patterns of behavior on the rioters' part. In both contexts the main purpose was to resist economic policies such as introducing new taxes, or substituting taxes that made certain commodities luxurious to the public, or the debasement of coinage that would dramatically affect them. Both soldiers and civilians took part in the protests in both cities. The culture of retribution was present in both the Istanbul and Moscow protests. The rioters had a motive not only of forcing the state to step back from the economic decisions they had taken, but also of punishing the officials who were responsible for those decisions. Lastly, street violence was present in both cases. All these similarities show us that the janissary uprisings in early seventeenth century Istanbul were not isolated cases unique to Ottoman societies, and should not be studied as such. So far, there has not been any study that examined the janissary rebellions in comparison to contemporary urban protests elsewhere, or in a contextual framework. This could deceive us into assuming that the janissary uprisings were solely related to internal political dynamics of the Ottoman Empire alone.

Another uprising in Istanbul started three years after the dethronement of Ibrahim I, in 1061/1651, when the janissary aghas provoked lay people into taking their side. They wanted to

¹¹² *evvela ibtida yevm-i cülusunda sipah ve yeniçeri birbirleriyle at meydanında cengi azim olub sipahileri yeniçeriler münhedim idüb minarelerde kuşluk vaktinde 'müezzinim' diyu ezan okıyan sipahileri ve camii içre tilavet-i kuran idenleri cümle katl edüb leşlerin arabalar ile taşıyup Ahurkapudan deryaya dökünce azimeti hüda derya temevvüce gelüp ol saat Haydar Agazade Muhammed Paşa donanma ile Sarayburnından içeri giremeyüb nice kadırgalar guse guse kenara düşüp pare pare olub bu kadar adem gark oldı. Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnemesi, vol. 1, 117.*

We learn from Naima that the *sipahis* read a declaration protesting the mass killing of their members to an audience of viziers, mufti and *ulema*, janissaries and *sipahis* in front of the Pasha gate in 1649. They declared that the *sipahis* were protesting and asking for bread which should be given to them according to the tradition, but they were being treated as brigands and murderers. They declared that this treatment was not just in so far as their dead were not buried according to Islamic tradition but collected on carts and thrown into the sea. *Tarih-i Naima*, vol. 3, 1222.

avenge the killing of Valide Turhan Sultan.¹¹³ *Tarih-i Gilmani* provides further information to enlighten us as to the real reason for the events. The source names three people who had established a despotic power within the city: the janissary aghas Kara Çavuş and Bektaş Agha, and the *kul kethüdası*.¹¹⁴ They gained full control of the janissaries in the New Barracks.¹¹⁵ Their extreme wealth and power also intimidated the grand vizier, Melek Ahmed Pasha, who yielded to their wishes. The grand vizier declared new taxes, the debasement of the currency, and attempted to retrieve gold coins by trading them for the new mint.¹¹⁶ The artisans of the city and the other civilians went to the palace and complained about the high taxes, and about the domineering aghas. Artisans are generally people that prefer political stability in their city. The currency devaluations affected the guildsmen as much as they did the rank-and-file janissaries since they were pressured to sell their goods at a fixed price (*narh*) that was determined in terms of the debased *akçe*.¹¹⁷

The artisans who took their mass petition to the palace were sent away and asked to come again the next day. That day, anyone who attempted to go outside their house was killed by the

¹¹³ *Tarih-i Naima*, vol. 3, 1335.

¹¹⁴ “Officers who were below the *agha* or *re’is* in charge of, e.g., the treasury, the dockyards, the police guard, the janissaries, the taxations registers, the grand vizierate, the imperial pantry, the bodyguard of *çavuşes*, of the artillery corps, etc. The office was conferred by a diploma (*berat*), in which the respect and loyalty of those to be under him was enjoined. Gabriel Baer, “Kethüda,” *EF*², vol. 4 (Leiden: Brill, 1986), 894.

¹¹⁵ *Tarih-i Gilmani*, 36-37. The name of the *kul kethüdası* is not identified in the text.

¹¹⁶ Kafadar, “Yeniçeri and Esnaf Relations,” 96-97. The policies of Defterdar Emir Pasha, under the Grand Vizier Melek Ahmed, in minting counterfeit *akces* was mentioned above. This attempt resulted in an uprising of Istanbul artisans. The Grand Vizier was removed from his post and Defterdar Emir Pasha was hanged. Also, the valide sultan who supported this plan and the janissary aghas were killed. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilatının Kapıkulu Ocakları*, vol. 2, 470.

¹¹⁷ Eujeong Yi, *Guild Dynamics in Seventeenth-Century Istanbul: Fluidity and Leverage* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2004), 36.

guards of the janissary aghas Kara Çavuş and Bektaş Agha, and the *kul kethüdası*.¹¹⁸ It was then that these aghas rebelled, declaring that they wanted revenge for the death of the Valide Sultan. Janissaries from the New Barracks assembled at the Hippodrome. However, even though they appealed for support, the *müfti*, the *kadiasker*, and the Istanbul *Efendisi* (the highest civil magistrate of the city) did not side with these rebels. Naima indicates that town criers were sent by the sultan to all the neighborhoods of Istanbul declaring that whoever went against the order of the sultan and joined with those in the Orta Mosque would be considered rebels (*bağışs*) and would be killed.¹¹⁹

The city folk took sides with the sultan. They poured into the palace, some armed. Naima indicates that within an hour the entire palace was packed with people, spilling over into the squares around Hagia Sophia and the Sultan Ahmed Mosque. All the streets up to Ahırkapı were full of people. At this point, something remarkable happened. The janissaries of the Old Barracks chose to take sides with the civilians. Rather than going to the Orta Mosque, they went to the palace.¹²⁰ This led to the rebellious aghas being caught and killed.

The act of janissaries taking sides with the civilians suggests the close relationship between the soldiers and the civilian Istanbulites to the point that the janissaries went against their officers and acted together with the artisans to protest the currency devaluations. As will be seen in chapter 4, the janissaries were becoming more and more involved in the urban economy through money lending activities, artisanship, and trade in Istanbul during the mid-seventeenth

¹¹⁸ *Tarih-i Gülmani*, 38.

¹¹⁹ *Her kim Müsliman ise zir-i liva-i Rasulallaha gelsin ulü'l-emre itaat etmeyip taraf-ı hilafda bulunanlar Orta cami cemiyetine varanlar bağilerdir. Din ü mezheb ve sünnet ve cemaatten bi-gane olurlar. Katilleri için fetva verilmiştir ve ümmet-i Muhammed'den olan saray-ı padişahiye varıp alem-i şerif sayesi altında bulunsun. Tarih-i Naima*, vol. 3, 1336.

¹²⁰ *Tarih-i Naima*, vol. 3, 1337.

century. This presents the possibility that their interest in economic decisions of the government was moving beyond just the purchasing power of their salary. These considerations perhaps made the janissaries more prone to supporting civilian protests. The protest of artisans might also have been affected by the infiltration of the janissaries into the guilds. As will be discussed in the following chapter, the janissaries were not only becoming members of guilds during the mid-seventeenth century, they were also taking administrative positions in them more and more. One does gain the impression that the janissaries were taking more active roles in the decision-making process of some guilds, at least more than before. It is not possible to know the extent of their influence in the guilds at this point, but their increased presence in Istanbul guilds might play a role in the artisans taking part in the urban protests.

The information we have on the 1655 and 1656 uprisings point to the same economic reasons common to the protests we have examined so far. In 1655, the janissaries rebelled against grand vizier İbşir Pasha due to the rumors that he was planning to recruit *sekbans* from Anatolia to form a new army, similar to the plans of Osman II.¹²¹ İbşir Pasha was not liked by the janissaries, right from the beginning of his appointment to the grand vizierate. He was the governor-general of Aleppo from 1654 to 1655. He had a reputation for injustice and had sided with *sipahis*. The general perception of his appointment was that the position was offered to him with the intention of watching him closely in the capital. He was asked to destroy his powerbase in Aleppo. But on the contrary, he gathered further militia and took four months to come to Istanbul.¹²² Karaçelebizade reports that the Hippodrome was filled with *sipahis*, janissaries, rabbles, armorers, other soldiers, scoundrels, and bandits who protested the new grand vizier, his

¹²¹ Kafadar, “Yeniçeri and Esnaf Relations,” 97.

¹²² Marc David Baer, *Honored by the Glory of Islam*, 47.

army, and the *şeyhülislam*.¹²³ Soon after his arrival, a big protest took place, and ended with the killing of the grand vizier.¹²⁴

Murad Pasha, who was one of the stronger janissary aghas, became a vizier and heavily influenced the new grand vizier Süleyman Pasha. Murad Pasha's three-month term in the post was an economic failure. He recruited many soldiers in a very short time. The treasury was put under strain, and the janissary salaries could not be paid. Eremya Çelebi even claims that there were soldiers returning from the Cretan campaign who claimed that they had not been paid their last five or six quarterly salary installments.¹²⁵ The grand vizier, Süleyman Pasha, following Murad Pasha's orders, issued a new coin called *kızıl akçe*, containing more copper than silver. The salaries were paid with those coins. The value of the *akçe* decreased tremendously.¹²⁶ When the janissaries wanted to use their money in the markets, the artisans refused to take it.¹²⁷ Thereupon the janissaries rose. Eremya Çelebi confirms that the janissaries were paid in low value *akçe* and that in the city, a thousand of these *akçes* were not worth even one hundred normal *akçes*.¹²⁸ Naima notes that a janissary protestor shouted, "We languish in the corners of boarding houses, hungry and impoverished, and our stipends aren't even enough to cover our debts to the landlords." ¹²⁹ Moreover, unsuccessful campaigns against the Venetians also played a

¹²³ Ibid.; Kara Çelebizade Abdülaziz Efendi, *Ravzatü'l-Ebrar Zeyli*, ed. Nevzat Kaya (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2003), 196.

¹²⁴ Baer, *Honored by The Glory of Islam*, 48.

¹²⁵ Eremya Çelebi, "Çınar Vakası," 58.

¹²⁶ Naima, vol. 4, 1644. 1 *guruş* was 80 *akçes*, and 1 *esedi guruş* was 70 *akçes*. Naima also mentions that there was so much coinage in the market with different values that the money was exchanged through weighing rather than counting.

¹²⁷ *Tarih-i Naima*, vol 4, 1649.

¹²⁸ Eremya Çelebi, "Çınar Vakası," *Istanbul Enstitüsü Dergisi* 3 (1957) ed. H. D. Andreasyan: 58.

¹²⁹ The translation from Naima belongs to Leslie Peirce. Leslie Peirce, *The Imperial Harem*, 263.

role in sparking revolts. The Venetian blockade of the Dardanelles and the fear of a dearth of supplies in Istanbul stimulated a series of urban protests that lasted until 1656. The diplomatic strategies of other countries that used the Venetian blockade to their advantage also limited the availability of provisions to Istanbul.¹³⁰

This rebellion was one of the most violent. It is also known as Vaka-i Vakvakiye, named after a legendary huge oak tree, because those who were wanted by the protestors were killed violently and hanged on a huge oak tree until they were dead. After the suppression of this rebellion, there was a lull in uprisings between 1656 and 1683, during the grand vizierate of three successive members of the Köprülü family. It was not because of better living conditions of the masses and janissaries, but rather because of the oppressive and violent measures that the Köprülü viziers did not hesitate to take. During the grand vizierate of Köprülü Mehmed Pasha alone, supposedly 36,000 people, who were considered mutinous elements were executed.¹³¹

In sum, looking into the particular dynamics of the city, alliances during the protests reveal increasing cooperation between the janissaries and the *ulema* in protesting government policies, and a gradual strengthening of solidarity between the artisans and soldiers in the city. Wider observation of the janissary uprisings leads us to conclude that the combined soldier-civilian protests of seventeenth century Istanbul were not much different from those in Europe, Russia, or Asia in general. They could all be read as a reflection of the “moral economy of the crowds” confronting the restrictive monetary measures, low incomes, high taxes, and/or lack of provisioning that violated the rights of the people in the paternalist economic systems of the pre-modern era.

¹³⁰ England pressured Ottomans through diplomatic measures, using the Venetian blockade of the Dardanelles as an advantage and threatening the Ottomans with a cessation of commerce. Mark Charles Fissel and Daniel Goffman, “Viewing the Scaffold from Istanbul: The Bendysh-Hyde Affair, 1647-1651,” *Albion* 22 (1990): 437.

¹³¹ Kafadar, “Yeniçeri and Esnaf Relations,” 98.

Chapter Four

THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRATIFICATION OF THE JANISSARIES:

THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF THE JANISSARY PRESENCE IN THE CITY

Is it possible to talk about an economically homogenous group when we talk about the janissaries in Istanbul? Can we detect worker, artisan, or merchant janissaries in seventeenth-century Istanbul? So far, the entrenchment of the janissaries within their urban space and the solidarities and antagonisms emerging from their interactions with civilians have been analyzed. Now, the concentration will be on investigating the economic background to the dynamics of those interactions.

The seventeenth century displayed a capital formation process in the larger cities of the empire – Istanbul, Bursa, and Edirne – that led to a change in the socio-economic position and status of many people. I will examine the accumulation of capital by the janissaries by exploring the distribution of wealth among them in the early seventeenth century and will look for the sources of this newly derived wealth, and investigate the concentration of fortunes. This new fortune is evident in increased janissary involvement in the city market, the guilds, and mercantile activities. In the last section of the chapter, I will take a closer look at the janissaries' credit relations to observe the social networks and solidarities they built up on an economic level. Further, I will demonstrate how the regiment waqfs (*oda vakfi*) turned into instruments for generating new wealth for janissaries that transformed their regiments into profitable monetary operations, which replicated the function of cash waqfs (*mevkuf-u nukud*) as the institutions used for accumulating cash.

Cash waqfs had become one of the main institutions used for accumulating cash in the seventeenth century. The endowment of these waqfs was in cash, which was given to borrowers for a certain period of time and paid back to the waqf with an extra amount, though this was not explicitly called interest (*ribh*). Among the waqfs newly established between 1546 and 1596, 35 percent were in the form of cash. This was how widespread cash waqfs were on the eve of the seventeenth century. As a reflection of this general trend in society, the regiment waqfs of the janissaries became active as cash waqfs that were used as the means to accumulate cash for a specific regiment.

This chapter is mainly based on registers called '*askeri kassam*', in which the probate inventories (*tereke*) of the '*askeri*' class residing in Istanbul are recorded, and on the *şer'iye sicils* (Sharia court records) of the 1610s and 1660s. In many cases, they are complementary sources that help us to make more precise observations. These records are scrutinized through comparative analysis among and within themselves. The court records of the 1610s and 1660s are systematically investigated in order to compare the varieties of janissary involvement half a century apart.

The probate inventories of the '*askeri*' class residing in Istanbul from 1000/1595 to 1079/1668 have been studied by Said Öztürk.¹ In his book, Öztürk provides raw material on the estates of 1,000 people who belong to '*askeri*' class including cash, movables, real estate, and debts, together with the amount of the total estate of a given person. He presents a series of tables introducing every entry recorded in the given probate register. I have selected from among the data he provides on janissary probate registers to use here. The raw data on 173 people who carried the title of *beşe*, which is a title specifically used for janissaries, and those

¹ Said Öztürk, *İstanbul Tereke Defterleri (Sosyo-Ekonomik Tahlil)* (Istanbul: Osmanlı Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1995).

holding the titles of *çavuş*, agha, beg, and *çelebi* when their affiliation with the janissary army was clearly indicated, were taken from Öztürk's book and analyzed fully in this study.

The table listing the records of 173 janissary can be found in Appendix 3. The first '*askeri kassam*' register consists of the inheritance records of 66 people belonging to the '*askeri*' group between the years 1000/1595 and 1017/1609. The records of each year are not present in the archives — those for 1002/1594, 1007/1599, 1008/1600, 1009/1601, 1012/1604, 1014/ 1606 are lacking. There are only 2 *beşe* inheritances, from the 1013/1604-5 register. The second register has inheritance records for 152 '*askeris*' out of which 9 carry the titles *beşe* and/or *racil*. The time span of this register is 1021/1612 to 1038/1629; the years 1022/1613, 1023/1614, and 1030-1036/1621-1627 are missing. The third register has a rather better representation where 23 out of 131 '*askeris*' are *beşes*. This register records a 10-year period of 1045-1055/1631-1641 though again some years are missing: 1047/1638, 1049/1640, 1051/1642, and 1052/1643. The fourth register has the estate inventories of 124 '*askeris*' who passed away during 1058-1061/1648-1651. 15 '*askeris*' affiliated with janissaries are taken from this register. These first four registers provide us with 49 janissary estate inventories. The first sample group from the first half of the seventeenth century (1000-1059/1595-1649) exists in these first four registers, excluding the last five entries which were the records from 1650 and are included in the second group. Therefore, our first sample group is made up of 44 janissaries.

The last two registers from 1060/1650 to 1079/1668 are chosen as a comparison group. Even though the time period is narrower for this group, it represents a larger group of janissaries. This wider representation is not caused by differences in volume of the registers, which averages to a length of about 200-250 pages. Their sizes are actually quite similar except for the second one, which is 88 pages long, and the fifth one, which is 412 pages long. One reason for having more janissary inheritances in the second group might be that 20

janissaries from Istanbul died in the Cretan campaign. In this group, the wealth of 129 janissaries can be examined. The distribution of these in accordance with the year is as such: the fifth register contains records of 1066/1656 to 1079/1668 with 277 estate inventories. 56 janissary inheritances are recorded in this register. In the last register, covering the years 1667 and 1668, 250 *'askeris* are included, and 68 of them are janissaries. Estate records pertaining to janissaries in the second group are three times more than the first group. Therefore, the difference in the size of the two sample groups will be taken into consideration, and to compensate for the difference on the changes in wealth acquisition, the percentage values from each group will be compared.

There are always methodological problems when studying probate registers. One issue relates to the actual distribution of wealth in society, and the figures arising from the register might be at variance with the real distribution since not everybody notarized their inheritance. Secondly, not having a very large sample might result in a lack of identification of the differences in the wealth of different social groups in relation to one another, e.g., identifying which groups in society were wealthier, or other comparisons. Thirdly, the gaps in the probate registers may prevent us from seeing the complete picture. It is possible, however, to detect some significant characteristics of wealth and tendencies in its evolution, which makes the study of these registers valuable. One observable characteristic is the distribution of wealth.

Given the gaps in the source base, a new set of primary sources becomes crucial. Since the data derived from one type of source cannot be exhaustive, using diverse sources expands our insight into the topic. The information that we obtain from a combination of sources gives a better general picture of janissary economic activities. It is the court records of Istanbul that allow us to make a deeper analysis of the findings from the probate registers –

for example, detecting the money-lending networks that led to cash accumulation as observed in the probate registers.²

The criteria I have used to compose the sample group of janissaries in Istanbul court registers is as such: I have chosen cases where either the plaintiff or the defendant was a *beşe*, and I considered those with other titles if the document mentioned that the person was a janissary. In other words, if the record mentions that the person was *dergah-ı ali yeniçerilerinden* (directly affiliated with the janissary army) and in addition carried the title of beg, *çavuş*, *çorbacı*, *korucu*, *kethüda*, agha, or *çelebi*, rather than *beşe*, he was taken into consideration as a janissary. This was done in order to make sure that our sample group reflects solely those who were definitely affiliated with the janissary army. A beg, or *çavuş*, for example, might be a *sipahi* as well, or a *çelebi* could be anyone who is a man of pen within the '*askeri*' class. It is actually very rare to find a janissary with a *çelebi* title. As a result, people carrying those titles are not taken into consideration unless they were stated to be affiliated by the janissary army. Therefore, these percentages should be considered with the thought that there might be janissaries who were not defined clearly enough in the documents to meet the criteria for our method of detecting a janissary in the documents, i.e., there is a chance that some janissaries with titles other than *beşes* might not have been recorded as *dergah-ı ali yeniçerilerinden*, and are not included in our sample group.

4.1 . Distribution of Wealth and Capital Formation

How to classify economic groups is an important question to handle: Colette Estabiet and Jean-Paul Pascual take an estate of 200-1,000 *guruş esadi* as being representative of individuals with modest means, and 1,000 *guruş esadi* as the threshold marking the

² This data might not be exhaustive; I have not looked at the *muhallefat* (inheritance) registers.

Table 4.1: The exchange rates of European Coins Expressed in *Akçes*, 1584-

Years	Venetian Ducat	Spanish eight-real (riyal gurush)	Dutch lion thaler (esedi gurush)	Polish isolette (zolota)
1584	65–70			
1588	120	80	70	
1600	125	78	68	48
1618	150	100		
1622	180–210	120–150		
1624	330–420	170–320		
1625	120	80	70	50
1628	190	100–110		
1632	220	110	100	70
1640	270	125		
1641	168	80	70	
1646	170	80	80	38
1650	175	90	80	
1655	175	90	90	
1659	190	88	78	48
1668	250	110	100	66
1672	300	110	100	
1676	300	125	120	80
1683	300	130	120	
1691	300–400	120–160	120–160	88–107
1698	300–400	120–160		88
1708	360			
1725	375	181	144	88
1731	385	181	144	88


Source: Şevket Pamuk, *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 144.

wealthy in seventeenth and eighteenth century Damascus.³ These thresholds and the concentrations of fortunes were determined by applying the Gini index – invented by Corrado Gini in 1914 to measure the degree of concentration of wealth and income inequality – to Ottoman society.⁴ The same threshold is used in Hülya Canbakal’s study on seventeenth century ‘Ayntab.⁵

³ Colette Estabiet and Jean-Paul Pasqual, “Damascene Probate Inventories of the 17th and 18th Centuries: Some Preliminary Approaches and Results,” *IJMES* 24, no. 3 (1992): 384. Note that *guruş* was the main coin in circulation during the eighteenth century. Until the mid-seventeenth and even late-seventeenth century, we see the wide-spread usage of *akçe* in Istanbul. It was gradually taken over by *guruş* in the eighteenth century.

⁴ Colette Estabiet, Jean-Paul Pascual, André Raymond, “La mesure de l’inegalite dans la societe ottoman: Utilisation de l’indice de Gini pour Le Caire et Damas vers 1700,” *JESHO* 37, no. 2 (1994): 170-174. Gini Index is a standard economic measure of income inequality based on the Lorenz Curve. A society that has 0.0 in the

Graph 4.1: Net Estate of Janissaries (1013-1079/1604-1668)



Source: Based on Said Öztürk, *İstanbul Tereke Defterleri (Sosyo-Ekonomik Tahlil)* (İstanbul: Osmanlı Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1995), 438-93 (see my Appendix 3).

Canbakal also notes that the pattern of distribution of wealth that emerges from the ‘Ayntab records according to this threshold is very close to the Balkan cities and other early modern European towns.⁶ 200 *guruş esadi* was around 1,800-2,000 *akçes* during the first half

Gini index reflects perfect equality in income distribution. The higher the number gets, the higher the inequality becomes. The score of 1.0 indicates total inequality where only one person has all the income.

⁵ Hülya Canbakal, *Society and Politics in an Ottoman Town: ‘Ayntab in the 17th Century* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2007).

⁶ Ibid., 91. See also, Nikolai Todorov, *The Balkan City, 1400-1900* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1983), 158; Christopher Friedrichs, *The Early Modern City, 1450-1750* (London and New York: Longman, 1995), 150-151.

of the seventeenth century and 1,000 *guruş esadi* was around 70,000-90,000 *akçes*.⁷ In accordance with this information, 100,000 *akçes* marks the threshold of wealth in my study.⁸

Accordingly, the overall percentage of distribution of assets according to net estates is as follows:⁹ Those who possessed less than 1,000 *akçes* were 9 percent. The biggest cluster of janissaries (39%) was concentrated in the 10,000 to 49,999 *akçes* range, which includes those of modest means. (1,000 to 9,999 *akçes* was the second bigger cluster by 27 percent.) 9 percent of janissaries possessed 50,000 to 99,000 *akçes*, and 16 percent were among the richest group in society, possessing 100,000 *akçes* or more. (Graph 4.1)¹⁰ However, these ratios tell us that the janissaries were a rather heterogeneous group in terms of wealth. Assets ranged from a high of 9,403,766.5 *akçes* to a low of simply none. The fortunes of the wealthiest 10 percent of the deceased janissaries during the first half of the seventeenth century that were recorded in the Istanbul *kısmet-i 'askeriye* registers were, on average, twenty times the value of the poorest 10 percent.

A second set of observations arises from a comparison of the probate inventories of janissaries between 1602-1649 and 1650-1668. There is not a time span between the two

⁷ These numbers may vary according to the exchange rates of the time. See the exchange rates in the table 4.1

⁸ The *akçe* was the main monetary unit of account in the capital until the mid-seventeenth and even late-seventeenth century. It was gradually taken over by the *guruş* due to its decreasing value and credibility because of debasement policies. Şevket Pamuk, "Money in the Ottoman Empire," in İnalcık and Quataert eds., *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 964. This can be seen in the probate registers which are recorded in *akçe*, as well as in many other Ottoman documents. Also court registers reveal that it was predominantly used as a means of payment until the mid-seventeenth century. The same threshold is also used in Betül İpşirli-Argıt, "Manumitted Female Slaves of the Ottoman Imperial Harem (*Sarayis*) in Eighteenth-Century Istanbul," Ph.D. diss. (Bogazici University, 2009).


⁹ Net Estate is the amount of wealth a person leaves after all the debts and fees were paid.

¹⁰ These are nominal values. Although a constant devaluation was seen in the first half of the seventeenth century, with the correction of coinage applications the value of the coinage was fluctuating. A major shift such as in 1585-86, or in the early eighteenth century is not seen during this period, therefore the nominal values are not converted to real values in this study. The food price index for the Istanbul region constructed by Barkan reveals that the index was 100 for the base year 1489-90, rose to 142 in 1555-56, 180 in 1573, 182 in 1585-6, 442 in 1595-96, 630 in 1605-06 and then decreased to 504 in 1632-33, 470 in 1648-9 and 462 in 1655-56. Şevket Pamuk, *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 133.

groups in graph 4.2, but even through this comparison we can trace a change in the distribution of janissary wealth. For both groups, the poverty level remains almost the same, and the janissaries living by modest means remains as the biggest group.

The comparison of the two groups gives us a chance to detect a capital formation among the janissaries after 1650. Those who owned more than 100,000 *akçes* rose from 2 percent to 21 percent in this time span. Most of the janissaries who had more than 100,000 *akçes* (reflected within the 16 percent ratio for 1604-1668 (Table 4.2/Graph 4.1)) actually emerged during the mid-seventeenth century. We are looking here at newly emerging wealthy soldiers.

Graph 4.2: Comparative Distribution of Net Estates of Janissaries (1013-1079/1604-1668)



Source: Based on Said Öztürk, *İstanbul Tereke Defterleri (Sosyo-Ekonomik Tahlil)* (İstanbul: Osmanlı Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1995), 438-93. (See my Appendix 3)

By investigating the conditions in Bursa, Istanbul and Edirne, Halil İnalcık concludes that there was a capital formation in these three principal centers during the early modern era.¹¹ Making capital (*mal*) was mainly through interregional trade and the lending of money at interest. Ömer L. Barkan's study on 93 probate registers of members of the '*askeri*' class who died at Edirne between the middle of sixteenth and the middle of the seventeenth centuries confirms the existence of this capital formation.¹² In Edirne, capital was accumulated mainly at the hands of money lenders, merchants trading with distant regions, land owners especially growing wheat and raising livestock, and finally investors making money by lending it out in return for interest, investing, or renting out properties.¹³ The general trend of forming new capital is confirmed by our investigation of the 173 janissary probate registers, and also proves that janissaries were not excluded from money-making endeavours.

If we are to take a closer look at the characteristics of newly derived wealth of janissaries in Istanbul, we can detect what the main sources of their fortunes were, and how they were accumulated. More interestingly, as this chapter will demonstrate, this new wealth was mainly achieved through engaging in economic activities that are similar to those observed in Edirne, which led to new capital formation, i.e., money-lending, trading especially of wheat and livestock, investing, or renting out properties. We should now examine the sources of wealth and the kind of economic activities in which the janissaries were involved in seventeenth century Istanbul.

¹¹ Halil İnalcık, "Capital Formation in the Ottoman Empire," *The Journal of Economic History* 29, no. 1 (1969): 97-140.

¹² Ömer L. Barkan, "Edirne Askeri Kassamına Aid Tereke Defterleri (1545-1659)," *Belgeler* 3, no. 5-6 (1968): 1-479.

¹³ İnalcık, "Capital Formation," 125-126.

4.2. The Social Stratification of Janissaries

4.2.a. The Poor

According to the findings from the probate registers over the sampled period, nine percent of janissaries were living under the poverty line, which we have set at the possession of less than 1,000 *akçes*. Among the 173 probate inventories that were examined, there were those of soldiers who had almost nothing, in fact, who were the poorest of the poor. Some of them owned nothing but clothing and some basic household items. We can assume that those were the ones existing solely on their salaries. Among the poorest 10 janissaries in these registers, three were married and only one had children. The married three, plus a fourth, were living in neighborhoods closer to the walls, such as Derviş Ali, Hüsrev Pasha, Koruk Mahmud, while the rest lived in the janissary barracks. As to the remaining seven janissaries from this group, there is the possibility that those who were single because of youth rather than poverty. What could be the social background of those janissaries who were poor? Were they recent promotees from *acemi* status coming from the *devshirme* system? New arrivals to the city looking for new opportunities? Muslims who enrolled themselves as janissaries? As previously mentioned in chapter 2, during the first half of the seventeenth century, there was an ever-increasing amount of immigration to Istanbul from Anatolia which filed into the janissary regiments as well.

The situation does not change much when examining the poorest 10 percent of the entire set that increases in size by only eighteen people. Apparently, this group still depended predominantly on their salaries. 22 percent were involved in small-scale trade, and the richest one had commercial goods amounting to 2,150 *akçes*.¹⁴ Their possessions did not go beyond basic items. Only two out of eighteen, Mehmed Beşe and Mehmed Beşe b. Abdullah, owned

¹⁴ KA 4: 65a (1060/1650); KA 5: 2b (1066/1656); KA 5: 98b (1071/1660); KA 6: 53a (1078/1667).

their own houses. They had, however, almost nothing else. The former's net estate was only 190 *akçes*, and the latter's 1,000 *akçes*. 33 percent were living in barracks and the rest, 67 percent, in rented accommodation.

This group was not composed only of single youths. Three were also janissaries of higher rank, such as Mehmed Çorbacı b. Mehmed, living in a rented house in the Çıkırıkcı Kemal neighborhood with his wife and a daughter, who died in Iskenderiye, Albania, possessing only 1,790 *akçes*.¹⁵ There were also retired janissaries such as Hasan Beşe, married with no children, who lived in Kasımpaşa, and dealt in small-scale trade. He passed away with an estate of 1,237 *akçes* after all the debts and fees were paid, owning commercial goods worth 2,150 *akçes*.¹⁶ The below average living circumstances of some of the retired comes into clear relief in a court case opened against a retired janissary from the 92nd regiment, Mustafa Çelebi b. Hüseyin by the Ferah Agha waqf. Apparently, he borrowed 8,650 *akçes* from the waqf property but did not pay it back. In his defense, Mustafa Çelebi mentioned that he could not afford to pay it back and that he would pay his debt when he received his salary.¹⁷ The details of how he planned to pay his debt were not provided in the document, unfortunately. As can be seen from these examples, the amount of wealth was not always directly related to the rank of the janissary in the army. Even though the aghas and other janissaries of higher rank tended to be wealthier, the opposite could also be possible. Similarly, a janissary with the title of *beşe* might have possessed a large fortune, as will be seen below. But first, it is worth examining the salary of the relatively poor janissaries so that we might understand their living standards.

¹⁵ KA 6: 158b (1078/1667).

¹⁶ KA 4: 65a (1060/1650).

¹⁷ IKS 9: 137a (1072/1661).

During the reign of Ahmed I, janissaries, *acemis*, and *bostancı*s (those who work in the sultan's gardens), were recorded as receiving 118,762,100 *akçes* a year, which comes to 335,486 *akçes* per day.¹⁸ According to the *masar* salary register of 1033/1623, janissaries, including *korucus*, *tekaiüds*, and *nanhurs*, received 35,507,025, or a rate of 403,488 per day.¹⁹ In the budget of 1064/1654, the janissaries, including *korucus* living in Istanbul, were recorded as being 33,463 individuals receiving a daily sum of 312,228 *akçes*.²⁰ It is seen that the salaries given to janissaries remained stagnant during the first half of the seventeenth century.²¹ However, these figures do not say much about the living conditions of the janissaries.

When we examine the salary register of 1074-75/1663-64, we detect that there were differences in the salaries. A janissary newly promoted from *acemi ocak* for work in the gardens, that is, the *bostancı*s, received 3 *akçes* daily. A more experienced janissary would receive 8-15 *akçes* per day.²² Therefore, on average, a rank-and-file janissary would earn 9 *akçes* per day.

It is useful to compare some figures relating to the daily salary of an unskilled construction worker and that of a skilled construction worker in the seventeenth century: 14.5 *akçes* vs. 23.2 *akçes* in 1617; 15.0 vs. 18.3 in 1629; 15.2 vs. 29.5 in 1649; and 19.9 vs. 30.5 in

¹⁸ According to the 1017/1609-10 budget. See, Mehmet Genç and Erol Özvar ed., *Osmanlı Maliyesi: Kurumlar ve Bütçeler 2* (Istanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Araştırma Merkezi, 2006), 86 (hereafter cited as *Osmanlı Maliyesi*).

¹⁹ İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı 4Devleti Teşkilatında Kapıkulu Ocakları*, vol. 1 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1943), 463.

²⁰ *Osmanlı Maliyesi*, 112.

²¹ When the salary register of 1033/1623 and 1074-75/1663-64 are compared, it is seen that the amounts given to different ranks did not vary either.

²² Uzunçarşılı translates the first pages of the 1074-5/1663-64 register (KK 6599), which is also examined in detail in Chapter 2. Uzunçarşılı, *Kapıkulu Ocakları*, vol.1, 451-452. The *korucus* were among the higher wage-earners with around 29 *akçes* daily among those in Istanbul.

1666.²³ Comparing this data with that for the janissaries suggests that janissary salaries were relatively low, and those whose living depended solely on their salaries had difficulty in making ends meet.²⁴

The most significant variant determining the standard of living for janissaries was the value of the coinage itself. As we recall from the previous chapter (see table 3.1), the purchasing power of janissary salaries varied due to the devaluations and correction of coinage policies of the seventeenth century. Naima mentions that the debased coinage they received (*zuyuf akçe*) as salary was not even accepted in the market and many fights started between the janissaries and the artisans because of that.²⁵ Another observer in the later seventeenth century recorded that their pay was so low that they engaged in other trades.²⁶ Now let us examine those who were involved in the city economy to make a better living for themselves.

²³ It should be remembered, though, that the janissaries were provided some extras such as daily bread and meat, clothing twice a year, and accommodation in the barracks. However, settlement outside the barracks, which meant additional costs, was a gradually increasing trend as discussed in chapter 2. Şevket Pamuk and Süleyman Özmucur demonstrate that the inclusion of rent payments to the cost of living raises the cost of living of lower-income groups more than those of higher-income groups, since it is assumed that the higher-income consumers owned their houses. And the rest of the benefits probably did not mean a lot to those married with children. Şevket Pamuk ed., *İstanbul ve Diğer Kentlerde 500 Yıllık Fiyatlar ve Ücretler 1469-1498 / 500 Hundred Years of Price and Wages in Istanbul and Other Cities* (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics Prime Ministry Republic of Turkey, 2000), 70; Süleyman Özmucur and Şevket Pamuk, "Real Wages and Standards of Living in the Ottoman Empire, 1489-1914," *The Journal of Economic History* 62, no. 2 (2002): 293-321, esp. 303.

²⁴ Fariba Zarinebaf, *Crime and Punishment in Istanbul 1700-1800* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2010), 40.

²⁵ *Neferat-ı asker ehl-i sultan şey alıp bahasını ol akçeden verdiklerinde sukiler almadılar. "Bu akçeyi biz mevacibimizden aldık çil alçeyi kande bulalım" deyip kisesim tahta üzerlerine ser-nigun ederlerdi. Ehl-i hiref ikrahla karıştırıp "Bunda alacak akçe yok" derler idi. Ve askeriden ba'zı gazub ve mütehevvir kimesneler bu hale çak çak olup tahtayı dükkân sahibinin kellesin urup kimi dahi aldığı şeyin bahasını ol akçeden bırakıp şütüm ederek giderdi. Günde yüz yerden ziyade böyle gavgalar zuhura gelirdi. Yeniçeriyân odaların gelip "Bu ne olmayacak haldir, aldığımız ulufe akçesin bizden almıyorlar. Almayanları döğüp sövsek bize meydan edersiz ve sürerler" deyü yer yer güft-ü-gu başlayıp lisan-ı avam şerer-feşan düşnam husam olmakla zuhur-ı na'ire-i fitneye isti'dad-ı tam gelmiş idi. Kaza-i asımani çün zuhur edecek imiş. Mustafa Naima, *Tarih-i Naima*, ed. Mehmed İpşirli, vol. 4 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2007), 1648-1649.*

²⁶ Paul Rycaut, *The History of the Present State of the Ottoman Empire* (London: John Starkey and Henry Brome, 1668), 198.

4.2.b. Production and Trade: Artisans, Merchants, and Wholesalers

Janissaries owning shops in Istanbul bazaars were not unknown before the seventeenth century. There were two janissaries running shops in the Grand Bazaar as early as the late fifteenth century, as is seen in the 1489 waqf register.²⁷ The 1493 register for the *saraçhane* that was built near the Sultan Pazarı in 1470 comprised 110 shops, some belonging to janissaries.²⁸ Cemal Kafadar gives an example of janissaries who leased shops from the Hagia Sophia foundation under Bayezid II, which indicates that janissary entrepreneurialism was permitted by the higher state officials.²⁹ However, in contrast to this, their involvement in certain fields was sometimes seen as harmful to others who were engaged in the same business, and in such cases the janissaries were ordered not to interfere in the market. In 1578, a decree sent to the judge of Bursa asked for the names of the janissaries and *bölük halkı* in the bakery business and reported their presence in this business as being harmful to the Muslims.³⁰ In 1584, it was declared that janissaries, armorers (*cebecis*) and artillerymen (*topçus*) should not work as butchers.³¹

Again, in that same year, a more restrictive decree was issued describing the extent of the involvement of the military cadres in commerce, stressing that janissaries, *bölük halkı*, *acemis*, *cebecis*, and *topcus* were engaged in mercantile activities, working as artisans in the bazaars, and renting shops. The decree points out the problem caused by these cadres taking

²⁷ İnalçık, Halil, "The Hub of the City: The Bedestan of Istanbul," *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 1, no. 1 (1979-80): 8. See also, Osman Ergin, *Fatih İmareti Vakfiyesi* (İstanbul: İstanbul Belediyesi, 1945).

²⁸ İnalçık, "The Hub of the City," 12.

²⁹ Cemal Kafadar, "On the Purity and Corruption of the Janissaries," *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* 15 (spring 1991): 273-80, esp. 275-276.

³⁰ BOA, MD 34: 218, no. 459 (986/1578).

³¹ Ahmet Refik Altınay, *Onuncu Asr-ı Hicride İstanbul Hayatı*, ed. Abdullah Uysal (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, 1987), 143-144.

advantage of their status and making fraudulent transactions as *madrabazes* (“swindlers”).³² They controlled the trade market through buying up mercantile goods such as firewood³³ and fruit from the ships at port, and also in the markets, at a lower price than the fixed price (*narh*) and selling their goods at higher rates, thereby abusing the *re’aya* and farmers. It was mentioned that nobody, not even the *kadı* or market inspector (*muhtesip*), could dare to interfere. For all of these reasons, the decree orders that the military cadres refrain from any trade activities and deal with their original responsibility, which was to train and exercise for combat.³⁴ This evidence that the janissaries were entering the urban economy is also emphasized by Selaniki.³⁵ He warned the authorities about the growing number of soldiers who were dealing with trade in the city.

As Eujung Yi points out, in 1587, the prohibition seems to have been rescinded. The presence of janissaries in the marketplace was accepted as a reality of Istanbul urban life, though methods of making them abide by the rules of the existing guilds were yet to be established.³⁶ A decree issued to resolve conflict within a mixed group of artisans and the military elements in the marketplace reflects how the state approached those soldiers

³² Suraiya Faroqhi translates *madrabaz* as merchant. But this term seems to gain an implication of “swindlers” even in the official documents. Inalcık also notes that terms like *bazırgan* and *madrabaz* were used for merchants in official documents but they gained pejorative implications such as “profiteer” and “trickster” in popular speech to express hostility. Halil Inalcık, “Capital Formation in the Ottoman Empire,” 105.

³³ Apparently, the janissaries and *acemis* buying firewood in the Marmara region for the provisioning of Istanbul at a lower rate and selling it higher than the fixed price was an ongoing problem for the authorities to deal with. Another decree from ten years earlier warns the authorities about the *acemis* who were representing some influential people — *ekabir adamı namına* — purchasing firewood from the ships for 8 *akçe* per *çeki* and through partnerships in the market, selling them in the market for 14-15 *akçe*. BOA, MD 26: 43 no.116 (982/1574).

³⁴ Altınay, *Onuncu Asr-ı Hicride İstanbul*, 196-197.

³⁵ *Bizim yeniçeri askerimiz ise serhad muhafazasında 10.000 adem tayin eylersiz öşri gelür. Ol dahi memleketi zulm u cevır ile yakar ve yıkar. Reayanun nesi var ise elinden alup paymal ider ve gelmeyenler yine yanınızda oturup pazarcılık ve matrabazlık ider. Ulufelerin anda çıkarup alurlar ve bölük-halkı dahi gelüp ne denlû zulm u cevır itmege kadir ise reayayı malından değil canından bizar itdi.* Selaniki Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Selaniki* (971-1003/1563-1595), vol. 2, ed. Mehmet İpşirli (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1999), 588-589.

³⁶ Eujung Yi, *Guild Dynamics in Seventeenth-Century Istanbul: Fluidity and Leverage* (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 137; Altınay, *Onuncu Asr-ı Hicride İstanbul*, 196-197.

engaging in commercial activities. *Çırakçılar* (lamp-makers), *dökmeciler* (metal workers), *hurdacılar* (scrap sellers), *luc* (bronze) workers, *pirinç* (brass) workers, *bakır* (copper) workers complained about the soldiers active in the market who still held on to their tax exemptions. The decision was not to ban them from the market, but to warn them against illicit behaviour. It is seen that there was no problem in accepting new members with military backgrounds into their guilds, as long as they obeyed the rules.

Cases recorded in the court registers point to the same conclusion. In 1029/1620 the *yiğitbaşı* Hasan b. Mustafa and *kethüda*³⁷ Murad b. Ahmed sued Mehmed Beşe b. Abdullah who opened a chicken store without the permission of the chicken-sellers guild. It was decreed that he should desist unless he informed the guild authorities and complied with their regulations. The concern here was not to prevent a janissary from engaging in business or opening a shop, but that he should do it with their knowledge and under their control.³⁸ When a janissary bought or rented a shop according to the regulations, his background was not a concern for the judge. Insikaş sold his shop in the Aksaray suq to the trustee of Murad Pasha-yi Atik waqf, Hafız Mustafa Agha. Mustafa Agha paid 3,000 *akçes* of the price and then sublet it to Mehmed Beşe who paid the remaining amount.³⁹ Similarly, Sini Hatun bt. Mehmed sold a grocery, a butcher, and a *şıra* (grape juice) store to a janissary *sekbān* Ali Beg b. Mustafa for 80,000 *akçes*.⁴⁰ There is nothing in these records that could make us think that they were out-of-the-ordinary transactions. The violation of the established norms of the market or making arrangements to supply goods by exploiting one's military status – in short, the illicit business carried out by janissaries – continued to be mentioned in the documents as

³⁷ *Kethüda* in a guild setting refers to the head of a guild who dealt with the material and administrative aspects of guild life. G. Baer, "Kethüda," *EI*², vol. 4 (Leiden: Brill, 1986), 894.

³⁸ IKS 6: 25b (1029/1620).

³⁹ IKS 3: 21b, no. 184 (1027/1618).

⁴⁰ IKS 5: 81b, no. 577 (1029/1620).

a problem. The issue was the illegality of some of the business practices and not the presence of the janissaries in these businesses, per se.

In my research, as mentioned earlier, I examined the cases of those who had the title of *beşe* and those with other titles such as *agha*, *beg*, and even *çelebi* only when the individual was identified as a janissary in the document by using the expression *dergah-ı ali yeniçerilerinden* (the janissary army of the High Court). Eujeong Yi uses a broader definition of janissary by taking titles such as *agha* and *begs* into consideration even when the documents do not specify whether the *beg* or *agha* was affiliated with the janissary army, noting that janissary is an “umbrella term” for her study. In this case, the spectrum of the database widens. The impression from her investigation of a wide range of crafts and guilds is that the number of janissaries within each craft remained relatively small at the beginning of the century and increased throughout the century. Of 27 guilds appearing in court between 1610 and 1620, only five individuals had military titles (*beşes*, and *begs*). She mentions that in the 1660s, 18 of 37 guilds detected in the registers had members with the title *beşe* and other military titles, which leads her to conclude that there was growth in the number of janissaries who became guild members.⁴¹ Even though I used a narrower criterion for identification of janissaries in the sources, i.e., I took only the people with the title of *beşe*, and excluded those with other military titles unless they were clearly indicated as the members of the janissary army, I came to the same conclusion: there was a higher presence of janissaries in the guilds in the mid-seventeenth century.

This significant increase in the frequency of appearance in court registers of *beşes* as members of guilds may not only be because of janissary infiltration, but also because of the entry of craftsmen into the ranks of the janissary regiments. Just like the janissaries’ struggle

⁴¹ Yi, *Guild Dynamics*, 132-133.

against the unstable value of their salaries due to currency fluctuations, the craftsmen were trying to protect themselves from deteriorating economic conditions by gaining tax exemption through obtaining military rank. This phenomenon of two-way movement between soldiers and artisans was observed in Cairo, Aleppo, and Crete as well.⁴²

As was mentioned in chapter 2, the altered usage of titles in the mid-seventeenth century could be a reflection of this blurred social stratification. Around mid-century, in the 1660s, the phrase *dergah-i ali yeniçerilerinden* (the janissaries of the High Court) began to be used almost systematically, and the regiment to which the janissary was affiliated was recorded more often. On the other hand, while providing specific information about the affiliation of the janissaries became the norm, a further ambiguous use of the title *beşe* emerged. There were many cases where one or both of the litigants were called solely *beşes*, without indicating that they were from the infantry. Moreover, some were recorded as *kimesne...beşe* (a person who was called so-and-so *beşe*), as opposed to being affiliated with specific regiments. In fact, there is not one case that involves a *beşe* who was a member of a specific guild who was stated as being affiliated with the janissary army. This might be a reflection of the ambiguity about who the court perceived as a janissary in origin or by assimilation. One way or the other, whether janissaries became artisans, or artisans joined the janissary corps, there was a certain degree of solidarity between these two groups in the mid-seventeenth century that manifested itself in popular protest. As we can recall from chapter 3, even though we cannot detect any participation by artisans in the earlier seventeenth century janissary uprisings, they had a strong presence in those of 1651 and 1655.

⁴² André Raymond, "Soldiers in Trade: The Case of Ottoman Cairo," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 18, no.1 (1991): 16-37; Charles L. Wilkins, *Forging Urban Solidarities* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2010); Greene, *A Shared World: Christians and Muslims in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000).

The question to be asked here is whether there were specific concentrations of janissaries in certain trades and crafts. In fact, it is understood from the probate registers that janissaries did exist in the market as tradesmen and craftsmen and were present over a broad range of businesses from chicken selling to textile manufacturing, from scrap selling to selling cutlery. Among the 37 janissary probate registers in which the values of commercial goods were detected, 26 janissaries rented shops and three of them owned their shops (table 4.2). This means 78 percent of those who possessed commercial goods located their business in market shops, which suggests that they were established in the market by the seventeenth century. However, there were some guilds in which they were present to a higher extent.

One advantage of using a wide variety of sources and making a comparative analysis in examining the economic activities of janissaries in Istanbul is that one can detect different dynamics. A comparison of the data from the probate registers with that of the court cases dealing with the commercial activities of the janissaries within Istanbul reveals that janissaries composed an important part of certain trades and crafts. One of the main fields in which the janissaries were engaged is documented in the probate registers: the trade and manufacture of textiles. As can be seen in Table 4.2, janissaries were selling various kinds of fabrics: lining fabric (*bogası*), muslin (*tülbent*), linen (*ketan*), and fustian (*aba*), or textile products such as clothing and underwear (*came*), bath towels and shirts (*hamam havlusu ve gömleği*), embroidered macramé fabrics (*münakkaş makremes*) or were underwear sellers (*doncu*).⁴³

Starting from the beginning of the sixteenth century, the increased demand for textiles in palace circles, especially luxurious textiles such as silk, or cloths woven with gold and

⁴³ *Bogası* was a simple fabric that was used for lining garments and was available in many colors. The regulations of the time indicate that it was also used commonly by Christians and Jews. Also, janissary undergarments were made of *bogası*. Muslin (*tülbent*) was a fine cotton used for headgear. *Aba* was processed to be used for obtaining various kinds of woolen fabrics. Suraiya Faroqhi, *Towns and Townsmen of Ottoman Anatolia: Trade, Crafts and Food Production in an Urban Setting, 1520-1650* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 126-127, 137.

silver, led to the spread of the weaving industry in Bursa and Istanbul.⁴⁴ One of the methods adopted to meet the increased demand was to add lower quality products to silk thread or hiring less skilled workers to work on the looms.⁴⁵ The deteriorating quality was not only limited to textiles but also seen in the manufacture of high-quality leathers, furs, saddles, and horse gear to the extent that, in 1502, regulations for quality controls (*ih̄tisab kanunu*) were issued in Istanbul, Edirne, and Bursa.⁴⁶

Decrees sent to judges in Istanbul also illustrate that the presence of an overabundant number of weaving looms for fabrics was not diminished in the seventeenth century.⁴⁷ As the sources reveal, expansion in this field was also partly due to janissary infiltration, as there were janissaries who engaged in fabric weaving and related fields such as rope weaving. Some rich merchants, for example, Mehmed Beşe b. Abdullah Baghdadi who had a net estate of 239,610 *akçes*, and had amassed commercial goods worth 533,269 *akçes* before his death, had been selling muslin in Istanbul markets. Mehmed Beşe had a shop rented for 300 *akçes* in Istanbul.⁴⁸ On a smaller scale, Cafer Beşe b. Abdullah, who left 57,145 *akçes*, dealt in the muslin trade in his shop that was rented for 150 *akçes*.⁴⁹ We may also observe the case of a janissary, Ahmet Beşe, who consulted the court when he could not obtain payment for muslin he had sold to a certain Osman, a single sale worth 141 *riyal guruş*.⁵⁰ It is also seen in a court

⁴⁴ Oya Sipahioğlu, “Bursa ve İstanbul’da Dokunan ve Giyimde Kullanılan 17. Yüzyıl Saray Kumaşlarının Yozlaşma Nedenleri,” MA Thesis (Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi, 1992), 130-131.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 130-140.

⁴⁶ Hülya Tezcan, “Furs and Skins Owned by the Sultans,” in Suraiya Faroqhi and Christoph K. Neumann eds., *Ottoman Costumes From Textile to Identity* (Istanbul: Eren, 2004), 67; Ömer Lütfi Barkan, “XV. Asrın Sonunda Bazı Büyük Şehirlerde Eşya ve Yiyecek Fiyatlarının Tespit ve Teftişi: Kanunname-i İhtisab-ı Bursa,” *Tarih Dergisi* 7 (1942-43): 30.

⁴⁷ Tezcan, “Furs and Skins Owned by the Sultans,” 136; Altınay, *Onuncu Asr-ı Hicride İstanbul*, 157, 169.

⁴⁸ The document does not indicate if the rent was monthly or not. KA 5: 134b (1077/1666).

⁴⁹ The document does not indicate if the rent was monthly or not. KA 5: 152a (1079/1669).

⁵⁰ 141 *riyal guruş* comes to 14100 *akçe*. IKS 9: 67b (1071/1660).

register where the linen weavers (*kettancıs*) registered their new *kethüda*, that one of the *ihdiyars* (elders, a guild officer) was also a janissary.⁵¹

Going back to the theme of Istanbul as a consumer city dealt with in chapter 2, textiles were one of the important manufactured goods that came to the markets of Istanbul from all parts of the empire. Anatolia was the biggest source of textiles—silk fabrics from Bursa and Bilecik, and cotton from Bolu and Çığa and the Aegean region. From Rumelia, woolen fabrics, especially those from Salonica, were well-known, as were rugs and carpets supplied from Uşak, Selendi, Kula, and Gördes.⁵² A litigation case shows that there were janissaries dealing with rug-selling in Istanbul. Kurd Beşe b. Abdullah sold 7,000 *kilim* (rug) for 3,550 *akçes* to Hüseyin b. Mehmed and then went away. It is not indicated where he went, but it seems that he could not get his money. Hüseyin rejected the claim that he received the given rugs, and claimed that Kurd Beşe had entrusted him with 2,300 rugs which he had returned.⁵³ The case does not provide information on whether or not there was a partnership between the two, but Kurd Beşe's involvement in the market is clear. He was perhaps experiencing the problem of having to leave his business behind because of being recalled to his duties.

Faroghi points out that Istanbul merchants controlled the trade of supplies to Istanbul.⁵⁴ A question that comes to mind is to what extent the janissaries were part of this trade coming into the capital. Since they were relatively more mobile and involved in selling certain goods supplied to the markets of the capital, one may suppose that they took a role in the transportation of these commodities to the capital. No research has yet been done on the

⁵¹ IKS 8: 27b (1071/1660).

⁵² Faroghi, *Towns and Townsmen of Ottoman Anatolia*, 152-155.

⁵³ To *ahar diyar* (a far away land). IKS 4: 46a, no. 320 (1028/1619).

⁵⁴ Suraiya Faroghi, "Crisis and Change, 1590-1699," in Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert eds., *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 496.

role of janissaries in supplying or transporting goods to the capital, though some conflicts during the transportation of these goods recorded in the court records suggest that the janissaries were involved. In relation to the textile trade, a very interesting case reflects the complex network of mercantile activities. Ali Çavuş b. el-Hac Mustafa, residing in the town of Süleymaniye in Bosnia, made a complaint against an old janissary, Muslihiddin Agha b. Abdülmenan. Muslihiddin Agha's deputy in court (*vekil*) was Mehmed Odabaşı b. Isa, who indicated that Muslihiddin Agha's relationship with the corps was still in existence. Ali Çavuş claimed that he had given his brother-in-law, janissary Yusuf b. Kurd, who was on his way to Istanbul from Bosnia, woolen fabric (*çuka*) and silk fabric (*kemha*), worth 16,000 *akçes*. Yusuf b. Kurd was supposed to deliver the fabrics to Ali Çavuş's son in Istanbul; however, he passed away in Edirne during his journey. Muslihiddin Agha seized the janissary's inheritance, part of which was the mentioned fabrics. Having his merchandise seized along with his brother-in-laws inheritance, Ali Çavuş went to the court to reclaim them. He proved that the fabrics belonged to him, but there was a dispute over the value of the merchandise. Ali Çavuş settled for 7,000 *akçes* paid to him by Muslihiddin Agha.⁵⁵ It is seen in this case that the supplier/manufacturer, transporter, and the receiver/artisan had a familial relationship and the janissary: maybe due to his mobility, he had been chosen to be the one transporting the products within this small family business. How the related parties of this family business agreed on sharing the profit was not revealed in the document, but it is likely that the janissary Yusuf b. Kurd was receiving more than a transportation fee. Another example reflecting the existence of supplier janissaries is a case where two janissaries notarized their purchase of a ship (*sefine*). Şaban Beşe b. Mehmed sold half of his share of their ship to his partner Bali Beşe b. Abdullah for 32,100 *akçes*.⁵⁶ It is possible that these partners were involved in some

⁵⁵ IKS 5: 31b, no. 211 (1029/1620).

⁵⁶ IKS 1: 18b, no. 112 (1012/1612).

kind of mercantile activity with their ship, but we do not know what kind, or whether they were working for a supplier or were the merchants themselves.⁵⁷

Other important products needed in Istanbul were fruits and vegetables, and here too the janissaries acted as suppliers. In general, fruits and vegetables were mostly conveyed from the closest villages along the Sea of Marmara. Fresh grapes were provided from the vineyards of Üsküdar. Raisins arrived from the Aegean coast of Anatolia.⁵⁸ There are cases in the court records that show that janissaries were among the merchants supplying fruit, vegetables, and other foodstuffs. Osman Beşe b. Bayram was a janissary who transported grapes from Izmir to Istanbul. He filed a case against a captain Minol v. Todorı who brought from Izmir 1,200 *kantars*⁵⁹ of grapes belonging to Osman Beşe. Minol received 7 *akçes* per *kantar* as the transportation fee – 8,400 *akçes* in total. However, Osman Beşe complained that the delivery was 89 *kantars* short. The captain claimed that he had delivered the rest as vinegar. The janissary was asked to take an oath affirming that he had not received such a product, and his oath was recorded as such.⁶⁰

The trade of food from more distant areas of the empire was not unknown to janissaries either. A captain Ali sued Pehlivan Hasan Beşe b. Hüseyin, claiming that an Iraqi merchant, Ibrahim, had shipped 18 *kantars* of butter (*sadeyağ*) destined for Hasan Çavuş. Pehlivan Hasan Beşe b. Hüseyin was acting as an intermediary in the completion of the transaction. Through him, the merchandise was supposed to be delivered to Hasan Çavuş, but

⁵⁷ Halil İnalcık indicates that wheat, rice, salt meat, oil, fish, honey, and wax were imported by sea to provision Istanbul in the seventeenth century, and that it was usually the wealthy merchants of Istanbul who were either the shipmasters dealing with transportation by their own ships or ship owners who were based in the city market and equipped ships for overseas trade. İnalcık, "Capital Formation," 120.

⁵⁸ Suraiya Faruqi, *Crisis and Change*, 493.

⁵⁹ 1 *kantar* = 56.449 kg. Halil İnalcık, *Sources and Studies on the Ottoman Black Sea*, vol. 1: *The Customs Register of Caffa, 1487-1490*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1996) 177.

⁶⁰ IKS 2: 45b, no. 380 (1025/1616).

at the time he received the merchandise, Hasan Çavuş passed away and the transaction was not completed. As part of the inheritance of the deceased, Hasan Çavuş's son and wife, Ayşe Hatun, the latter requested 18,094 *akçes* from the captain. Faced with this demand, the captain in turn sued Pehlivan Hasan Beşe and asserted that he had delivered the butter to him. It became clear after an investigation that Pehlivan Hasan Beşe had received the merchandise through a helper (*hizmetkar*) of captain Ali.⁶¹

An economic relationship between a janissary and a grocer in Aleppo is also recorded in the court records, although the nature of the relationship is not provided. A market supervisor (*pazarcıbaşı*) of Aleppo who was also a grocer, el-Hac Eminiddin b. Yusuf, sued Süleyman Efendi and Mehmed Agha to get back the 120 *guruş* that he had handed over to them.⁶² The position of the defendants was quite interesting: Süleyman Efendi was an expenditure scribe (*masraf katibi*) to the Pasha of Aleppo, Mehmed Pasha, and a *baş çavuş* in the janissary corps, Mehmed Agha. Since the case was filed in Istanbul it is probable that at least one of the parties was based in Istanbul. In this case it is most probably Mehmed Agha from the janissary corps. Again, one can surmise that the grocer Eminiddin, Süleyman Efendi, and Mehmed Agha had a trade network that facilitated supplying groceries from Aleppo to Istanbul.

Apart from supplying edible products, janissaries also engaged in sales of comestibles in Istanbul markets. In the probate registers, one fruit seller, Mustafa Beşe, is mentioned as being involved in selling watermelons and melons in his shop rented for 735 *akçes*.⁶³ Another one, Ahmed Çorbacı, was given the title of rice seller (*pirinçi*).⁶⁴ In the court registers there

⁶¹ IKS 8: 20b (1071/1660).

⁶² IKS 9: 88b (1071/1660).

⁶³ KA 6: 53a (1078/1667).

⁶⁴ KA 4: 79a (1060/1650).

are also a few cases hinting at janissary involvement in the food market. In 1618, for example, there was a dispute over a transaction between a Mustafa Beşe and a Mustafa Çelebi. Mustafa Beşe argued and proved that he had sold 17 *vukiye*⁶⁵ of butter to Mustafa Çelebi three years prior and was supposed to have been paid 4,972 *akçes* in return.⁶⁶ In another case, Ali Beşe bin Abdullah sold honey (*asel*) worth 1,260 *akçes*, to the grocer Yani v. Yorgi. He received 713 *akçes* and sued Yani to pay him the remaining 547 *akçes*.⁶⁷

A unique *ihtisab* register from 1092/1682 that was the object of a study by Mustafa Ismail Kaya contains valuable information on the significant presence of janissaries in the food market. This register is a 41-page survey of the shops of Istanbul related only to foods. The purpose of preparing such a register was to collect a daily tax called *yevmiye-i dekakin* (“daily [tax] of shops”). The register divided intramural Istanbul into 15 sectors (*kol*)⁶⁸ and lists 3,200 shops, indicating the type of the shop, the owner of the property, the trade run in the shop, and the rate of daily tax. Among the 3,200 shop owners, 189 *beşes* owned shops dealing with food, ran it themselves or rented out to others, comprising 6 percent of all shop owners. The register does not identify who ran the businesses, but only the shop owners. Among the shop owners there were 427 aghas (13%), but only 47 begs (1.5 %). However, it is impossible to detect how many of the aghas and begs were affiliated with the janissary army.⁶⁹ The trade from grain producing areas (mainly in Anatolia) to Istanbul was in the hands of the big

⁶⁵ 1 *vukiye* = 1.28 kg. Halil İnalçık, *Customs Register of Caffa*, 179. Ottoman *okka* also occurs as *vukiye*, *ukiye*, and *kıyye*.

⁶⁶ IKS 3: 16a, no. 135 (1027/1618).

⁶⁷ IKS 2: 36a, no. 300 (1025/1616).

⁶⁸ *Kol* here denotes part, side, or area. The areas listed in this register were: Tahte’l-kal’a, Eksik, Taraklı, Ayasofya, Tavuk Bazarı, Kadiasker, Langa, Yedi Kule, Karaman, Edirne Kapısı, Balat, Un Kapanı, Rah-ı Cedid, Aksaray, Cebe Ali. Mustafa Ismail Kaya, “Shops and Shopkeepers in the Istanbul Ihtisab Register of 1092/1681,” MA Thesis (Bilkent University, 2006), 63-79.

⁶⁹ Kaya, “Shops and Shopkeepers,” appendix, 125-185.

merchants and wholesalers of the capital.⁷⁰ These wholesalers would act in their own name or represent rich buyers in Istanbul; in both cases they bought large amounts of grain. They would deal with the purchase, transport, and storage of wheat and barley. The business of grain wholesalers (*navluncus*) was centered in Unkapanı in Istanbul and inspected by the government.⁷¹ Janissaries were not isolated from this business either.

Mehmed Beşe b. Mustafa who was from the *navluncu ta'ifesi*⁷² bought 542 *kile*⁷³ of wheat from Mehmed Çelebi, the *kethüda* (headman) of Hüseyin Efendi b. Mehmed's farm in the Çubuk village in the Ergene district of Rumeli. Hüseyin Efendi sued Mehmed Beşe to get him to return the merchandise because the *kethüda* had sold the wheat that was to go to Rodoscuk without his permission.⁷⁴ Another grain wholesaler, Halil Beşe b. Ibrahim, sold 200 *kile* of wheat (*bugday*) to el-Hac Ali b. Selam. The value of the wheat was 59 *akçes* per *kile*, and Halil Beşe sold it all for 101,800 *akçes*. Halil Beşe did not receive his money and sued the buyer. They settled for 100,000 *akçes*.⁷⁵

Another wholesaler mentioned in the court registers is the janissary scribe (*yeniçeri katibi*) Nesimi Efendi b. Sipah. The record does not identify the products he sold but simply describes them as various products (*emtia-yı mütenevvia*). The value of the transaction was

⁷⁰ Grain was also brought to Istanbul from Rumelia (especially from Edirne region), Walachia, and Eastern Anatolia. At times when the grain could not be brought from these areas, Istanbul was provisioned from Erzurum, Caffa, Egypt, and Tripoli in Libia, and sometimes from Sivas, Tokat, and Amasya. Mehmet Demirtaş, *Osmanlı'da Fırıncılık: 17. Yüzyıl* (Istanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2008), 84.

⁷¹ Robert Mantran, *Istanbul dans la seconde moitié: Essai d'histoire institutionnelle, économique et sociale* (Paris: Librairie Adrien Maisonneuve, 1962), 37-38.

⁷² *Ta'ife* is used in this context in association with guilds. It is a term used as a marker for the guilds in Ottoman terminology. This title shows us that Mehmed was a janissary who was also a member of the grain wholesaler's guild, however, we cannot know if he was a janissary in origin or by assimilation.

⁷³ 1 *kile* is 25.656 kg for wheat. Halil İnalçık, "Customs Register of Caffa," 177.

⁷⁴ IKS 9: 104b (1071/1660).

⁷⁵ IKS 9: 85b (1071/1660).

very high. Hasan Çelebi b. Mustafa Cündi,⁷⁶ owed 4 *yük akçes*, i.e., 400,000 *akçes* in return for the products he bought from Nesimi Efendi. The case also mentions that Nesimi Efendi also lent large sums of money, 8 *yük akçes*, to another janissary, Malkoç Efendi, who was a scribe of Damascus and Triopli. With this court record it was established that Hasan Çelebi assumed the debt of Malkoç Efendi and it was agreed that he should pay 12 *yük akçes* to Nesimi Efendi. Why Hasan Çelebi assumed the debt of Malkoç Efendi is not provided in the document, but one tends to think that there could be a commercial relationship among them; the large sums of money mentioned in the document suggest that they were involved in the wholesale of grain.⁷⁷

The cases we have examined so far indicate that there were janissaries working as suppliers either on a smaller or larger scale in the fields of manufactured textiles, the food market, and grain trade. Their involvement in the economy as suppliers might partly have been due to their mobility, which allowed them to get into contact with the sellers, and experience in establishing transport networks. It is also shown that it was not only a matter of supplying these products for Istanbul markets; their names also came up as artisans selling these goods in Istanbul markets, or property owners providing shops for the sellers. The presence of several janissary stores selling textiles or food shows that the janissaries were also establishing their economic power within Istanbul. Another field in which the janissaries were involved in a similar way is the meat sector.

Indeed, meat provision was one of the most significant markets in which the janissaries were engaged. The sources show that janissaries were involved in different stages of this business, from the provisioning of flocks to butchering them, from cooking animal

⁷⁶ *cündi* is an honorific title given to *sipahis*, meaning warrior.

⁷⁷ IKS 5: 13b, no. 104 (1029/1620).

parts to making candles from the derived fat. Every year huge amounts of sheep and cattle were brought to the capital.⁷⁸ Mantran indicates that wholesalers from the Rumelian side of the empire were mostly Greeks because the trade route for the flocks was from Macedonia and Thessaly via the Aegean and Marmara Seas where the Greeks were dominant as ship owners and captains. On the trade route from the Asian provinces and from Anatolia, the owners were predominantly Turcomans or Turks. Mantran suggests that the carriers could have been either Turks or Armenians.⁷⁹ Anthony Greenwood also stresses that the Balkans were the primary location suppliers. Only when the supply from this region fell short was the need met from Anatolia.⁸⁰

Faroqhi informs us that the butchers of Istanbul were mostly wealthy men from the provinces appointed against their will to perform this job. The level of wealth of those forcibly appointed was a minimum of 200,000 *akçes* and sometimes 300,000 *akçes*.⁸¹ These appointments were unwanted by the investors since, especially after the mid-sixteenth century, the fixed price (*narh*) for meat was so low that the butchers were not able to meet their expenses, bringing many to the verge of bankruptcy.⁸² These appointments are

⁷⁸ Anthony Greenwood estimates the state-dependent mutton consumption in Istanbul, which includes the consumption of the palaces and the janissary corps, as 40,000-50,000 sheep in the first quarter of the sixteenth century, 90-100,000 sheep in the third quarter, and some 140,000-170,000 at the beginning of the seventeenth century. His calculations for the total sheep consumption of the city is derived from the daily consumption amount given by *Kavanin-i Osmaniye der rabita-yı asitane* (quoted by Robert Mantran in *Istanbul dans la seconde moitié XVIIe siècle*, 196) in the mid-seventeenth century, which was 6,000 sheep a day, but at times of scarcity 2,000 sheep. This would be equal to 2,190,000 sheep in a year, 758,000 sheep at times of scarcity. But it is not certain if state-dependent consumption was included in this. Anthony Greenwood, "Istanbul's Meat Provisioning: A Study of *Celebkeşan* System," Ph.D. diss. (The University of Chicago, 1988), 15-17.

⁷⁹ Mantran, *Istanbul*, 39.

⁸⁰ The Balkan supply was derived from two main areas. The areas from the south of the Danube — Thrace, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Thessaly — were the main locations for Istanbul's supply. During the third decade of the 16th century, the Rumanian Principalities — Wallachia and Moldavia included — to the north of the Danube were also requested to send sheep to Istanbul for sale. Anthony Greenwood, "Istanbul's Meat Provisioning," 21-22.

⁸¹ Faroqhi, *Towns and Townsmen*, 228.

⁸² Suraiya Faroqhi, "16. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Müteşebbislerin Sorunları: Özel Teşebbüsün Sınırları ve Osmanlı Devleti," in Osman Fikri Sertkaya and Cevdet Eralp Alışık eds., *Beşinci Milletlerarası Türkoloji Kongresi-Istanbul, 23-28 Eylül 1985*, vol. 1 (Istanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1985), 212.

interpreted by Faqohi as a form of forced settlement (*sürgün*), since the butchers were obliged to cut their economic ties with their places of origin, sell their belongings, and move to the capital with their families.⁸³ For janissaries, however, the sources do not indicate any forcible measures; on the contrary, janissaries seemed to become butchers quite voluntarily. One author argues that the 82nd *orta* became butchers during the seventeenth century, without providing reference to this information.⁸⁴ Evliya Çelebi notes that there were 999 butcher shops in Istanbul and 1,700 butchers, most of whom were janissaries.⁸⁵ Documentary evidence does not support this claim, but it does suggest that they were not excluded from the sector, and in fact were even more powerful in managing the meat consumed in the barracks.

Janissary butchers were not isolated to the city of Istanbul. Examining the court registers and complaint (*şikayet-i atik*) registers from 1640 to 1707, Charles Wilkins demonstrates that the leadership of the butchers' guild in Aleppo at this time was in the hands of janissaries.⁸⁶ Greenwood proves that the meat provisioning system (*celepkışan*) shifted in the early seventeenth century from an in-kind payment to a money tax, which began to be controlled by the office of the chief butchers (*kasapbaşı*) in the provinces, ensuring that a sufficient number of sheep were brought to the city.⁸⁷ The strong position of the janissaries in Aleppo seems to be related to the changes in the provisioning system.

⁸³ Faroghi, *Towns and Townsmen*, 231.

⁸⁴ Philip Mansel, *Constantinople: City of the World's Desire, 1453-1924* (London: John Murray Publishers, 1995), 223.

⁸⁵ *Bu taife cümle ekseriya yeniçerilerdir.* Evliya Çelebi, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi: Topkapı Sarayı Bağdat 304 Yazmasının Transkripsiyonu-Dizini*, eds. Zekeriya Kurşun, Seyit Ali Kahraman, Yücel Dağlı, vol. 1 (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1999), 241. (hereafter cited as *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*)

⁸⁶ Wilkins, "Households, Guilds, and Neighborhoods : Social Solidarities in Ottoman Aleppo, 1650-1700." Ph.D. diss. (Harvard University, 2005), 195.

⁸⁷ Greenwood, "Istanbul's Meat Provisioning," 40-43.

Two cases of conflict over the transport of livestock to Istanbul confirm that janissaries dealt with the provision of this product to the capital. In 1069/1658, Mehmed Beşe b. Ahmed sued Odnam v. Yahudi since there was an outstanding debt of 67,340 *akçes* payable to him from the sale of 1,140 water buffalo heifers (*su sığırı düvesi*). He claimed that he sold them for 140,640 *akçes* but received only 73,300 *akçes*. Odnam, on the other hand, argues that he purchased 520 water buffalo heifers and 412 cattle heifers (*inek düvesi*) and then got an additional 30 water buffalo heifers. He compromised that he had 36,520 *akçes* outstanding to pay to the janissary.⁸⁸ One year later, Ibrahim Beşe b. Hasan sold 35 sheep to Seyyid Mustafa Çelebi b. Seyyid Idris for 4,900 *akçes* and went to court over the 1,000 *akçes* that he did not receive.⁸⁹

In Istanbul, we can track janissary butchers in the probate registers and court records of the first half of the seventeenth century. Hüseyin Beşe b. Hasan, for example, was a butcher with a relatively cheaply rented shop (45 *akçes*).⁹⁰ In his inheritance record, instruments such as butcher's hook (*kasab çengeli*) and meat-mincing knife (*kıyma bıçağı*) were found, and he had possessions worth 1,166 *akçes*. However, as he passed away with no estate after the payments of debts, he could have become bankrupt, something that Istanbul butchers had to face from time to time.⁹¹ Another janissary, Mustafa Beşe b. Abdullah, is recorded in a litigation case as a member of the butchers' guild. He complained against Ali b. Hüseyin whom he hired to buy horses. Ali b. Hüseyin worked for Mustafa Beşe for two

⁸⁸ IKS 7: 4a, no. 11 (1069/1658).

⁸⁹ IKS 7: 31b (1070/1659).

⁹⁰ The sources do not tell us what time unit these rents were for. If we are to think that the daily tax (*yevmiye-yi dekakin*) was between 1 to 3 *akçes*, it could be reasonable to think that 45 *akçes* was per day. However, as can be seen in table 4.2, 45 *akçes* rent was among the lowest given in the sources. The rents were going up to 500 *akçes*, which would be quite high as per day rates. However, the amounts depended on the location and the size of the shop.

⁹¹ KA 6: 30a (1078/1668).

months at a 800 *akçe* monthly wage. Mustafa Beşe argued that there was a 10,440 *akçe* surplus after buying the horses, and he asked for this money to be returned. Ali rejected the claim that there was any money left after the purchase.⁹² A similar dispute arose between the butcher Ahmed Beşe b. Şaban and the butcher Cavdar. Ahmed Beşe had given him 2,000 *akçes* in cash to buy sheep for him, but Cavdar rejected the claim that he had taken the money.⁹³ In the 1092/1681 *ihtisab* register it is also observed that there were quite a number of janissaries renting their properties to butchers in Istanbul.⁹⁴

When livestock arrived in Istanbul, the butchers first supplied meat to the palace and barracks, and then to the inhabitants of Istanbul.⁹⁵ The provision of meat to janissaries was through daily distribution at Et Meydanı (Meat Square) next to the Yeni Odalar (New Barracks). Greenwood determines that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the number of sheep supplied to janissaries in Istanbul was around 70,000 to 100,000 per year. According to Greenwood, the daily ration of mutton was 50-60 *dirhems* (160 to 190 grams) per janissary. When this is considered, this number of sheep was less than half the amount than would have been required.⁹⁶ However, as was shown in chapter 2, in most years, half of the janissaries were out of Istanbul on campaign, and therefore, his calculation seems reasonable.

Meat for janissaries was brought from the slaughterhouses in Yedikule and Edirnekapısı to butcher shops at the Meat Square (*tomruks*).⁹⁷ According to a court case, it seems that control over these *tomruks* was in the hands of three butchers, one of whom was a

⁹² IKS 8: 25b (1071/1660).

⁹³ IKS 9: 166a (1072/1662).

⁹⁴ Kaya, "Shops and Shopkeepers," appendix, 125-185.

⁹⁵ Yi, *Guild Dynamics*, 179.

⁹⁶ Greenwood, "Istanbul's Meat Provisioning," 15.

⁹⁷ Uzunçarşılı, *Kapıkulu Ocakları*, vol. 1, 246-247, 255

janissary.⁹⁸ In 1661, three butcher partners, Ali Beşe b. Abdullah, the sons of Iskarlet Kosta, and Istadola were recorded as owning a half-share in 8 *tomruks* at Meat Square. The second half belonged to Mustafa Agha who was loaning his half-share to the three partners for 1 *yük akçes* per year. The case was opened to record the outstanding debt the partners owed to Mustafa Agha. Ali Beşe b. Abdullah, Kosta, and Iskarlet were also tenants at the slaughterhouse of Aya Kapısı.⁹⁹ A month before this case, the same butchers were recorded as having another partner, Foti v. Yani. Then they went to the court to register that Kosta owed 1,100 *akçes* to the other partners after the accounts had been calculated.¹⁰⁰ Why the fourth partner, Foti v. Yani, was not recorded in the previous case is not clear. Another document confirms that there was a strong presence of janissaries in the meat market at the beginning of the century as well. In 1619, Mustafa Beşe b. Abdullah lent out 100,000 *akçes* to be paid back with interest of 16,400 *akçes* to 4 butchers at the Meat Square: Yani v. [illegible in the sources], Koca Yani v. Papa Dimitri, Aleks v. Kosta, and Iskerlat v. Parves. Mustafa Beşe went to court demanding his money. The budget of the butchers was tight since they had not yet sold their merchandise. It was indicated that Iskerlat paid his share of 18,000 *akçes*, and the remaining debt of 98,400 *akçes* would be divided among the other three who would pay it when they sold their merchandise. Ibrahim Agha became the guarantor of the butchers.¹⁰¹ As these cases confirm, the janissary butchers were controlling the meat distributed in the janissary barracks, but what, then, was their role in other guilds related to the meat market?¹⁰²

⁹⁸ There were 8 *tomruks*, or butcher shops at Meat Square. Uzunçarşılı indicates that there were 2 non-Muslim butchers and 4 helpers working in each one of these shops who were excluded from *cizye*, head-tax, and other taxes and conscription. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilatında Kapıkulu Ocakları*, vol. 1, 255.

⁹⁹ IKS 9: 60a (1071/1660).

¹⁰⁰ IKS 9: 15a (1071/1660).

¹⁰¹ IKS 4: 19a, no. 127 (1028/1619).

¹⁰² Anthony Greenwood also establishes that the janissary butchers supplied Istanbul-based janissaries. Greenwood, "Istanbul's Meat Provisioning," 12-13.

Yi mentions four *beşes* and two *begs* out of ten members of the cooks of sheep's trotters guild; three *beşes* and one *beg* out of six members of the cook's/kebab seller's guild; and five *beşes* out of eight in the boza-maker's guild.¹⁰³ In my research, I also detected janissaries who were active as candle-makers (*mumcus*), and tanners (*debbağ*).

The candle-makers had a large enterprise. According to Evliya Çelebi, there was a candle-making workshop in Odun Kapısı in Eminönü employing 100 workers in the mid-seventeenth century. It provided candles to all the imperial mosques of Istanbul, the palace, and residences of Ottoman officials. These candles were made from beeswax, making them of the highest quality. Another group of candle-makers who used beeswax were the 55 shops located near Zindan Kapısı. The rest of the candle-makers were using animal fat, producing lower quality candles. Evliya Çelebi mentions that there were 555 such shops where 5,501 artisans and workers were employed. This group was highly dependent on the fat coming from the slaughterhouses.¹⁰⁴ Çelebi mentions the candle-makers providing candles to the janissary barracks under a separate heading of *Esnaf-ı Mumcuyan-ı Atmeydanı*, which was composed of 75 shops selling candles to the janissaries at the fixed price of one *akçe* per three candles.¹⁰⁵ One document indicates that each janissary would buy approximately 15 candles every week. If the value of the candle was more than that, the government would pay the extra amount.¹⁰⁶

In general, it was the non-Muslims who specialized as candle-makers and were organized in a guild, as seen in the decrees sent in reply to a candle-maker's request. One common problem denoted in the decrees was of intruders in their business, as can be seen in

¹⁰³ Yi, *Guild Dynamics*, 139.

¹⁰⁴ Evliya Çelebi *Seyahatnamesi*, vol. 1, 243-244.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 244.

¹⁰⁶ *Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyân*, 203. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilatında Kapıkulu Ocakları*, vol. 1, 246-247.

the examples below. In 1004/1596, candle-makers outside the Edirne Gate indicated that Jews and others outside the guilds were slaughtering sheep and cattle in their houses and using their fat to make candles at home and then sell them. They requested that sheep and cattle only be slaughtered in the designated slaughterhouses and the fat should be given only to the guild members.¹⁰⁷ In 1013/1604, a non-Muslim candle-maker (*mumcu zımmis*) petitioned the court, saying that sheep and cattle fat were given to the candle-maker guild from the slaughterhouses in Yedikule in the past, but now the fat was given to those outside the guild. This should be prevented.¹⁰⁸ Another decree was sent to the *kadı* of Istanbul, upon the complaint of the candle-maker guild members that *matrabazs* and women from the suburbs of Istanbul were buying the animal fat for making candles. Those people, they complained, opened shops or made candles at home, which created a risk of starting a fire. The decree reiterated that only the registered candle-makers could buy and process candle fat on the basis of the right that was given to the candle-maker guild during the reign of Ahmed I.¹⁰⁹ The same problem of intruders making candles without being registered to the guild in Büyük Çekmece and Galata was brought to the attention of the authorities in 1056/1646.¹¹⁰ In short, the common problem concerned those who did their business outside the control of the guild. The documents do not suggest, however, that the candle-maker guild saw any problem in accepting new members into their guilds. It is noted by Yi that new elements such as janissaries, other military personnel, and immigrants from the countryside became the new elements of the guilds in the first half of the seventeenth century, and this became a widespread trend that affected the

¹⁰⁷ Altınay, *Hicri On Birinci Asırda İstanbul Hayatı*, 20-21.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 28-29.

¹⁰⁹ *82 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri*, eds. Hacı Osman Yıldırım, Vahdettin Atik, Murat Cebecioğlu, Ayhan Özyurt, Mustafa Serin, Fuat Yavuz (Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı, 2000) 45, no. 70 (1027/1618).

¹¹⁰ *Mühimme Defteri* 90, ed. Nezih Aykut, Idris Bostan, Feridun Emecen, Yusuf Halaçoğlu, Mehmet İpşirli, İsmet Miroğlu, Abdülkadir Özcan, and İlhan Şahin (İstanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1993), 181, no. 214 (1056/1646); *ibid.*, 390, no. 472 (1056/1646).

order of the existing guilds.¹¹¹ The candle-maker guild was not excluded from this phenomenon.

In a case where permission was given to a candle-maker, Apostol, to sell candles in the grocery of an Armenian Varkan in the Sulumanastır (in Yedikule) neighborhood, it is seen that the *kethüda* of the Istanbul candle-maker guild was Aslan Beşe b. Muharrem, while the *yiğitbaşı* was Hristo v. Manko, and the listed *ihityars* were Tonoş v.¹¹² Andon, Nezir v. Andon, and Andon v. Vimor.¹¹³ As Aslan Beşe b. Muharrem was an appointed *kethüda* to the candle-maker guild, he continued to be active in designating candle-makers to supply candles to designated grocers,¹¹⁴ and deciding on the conditions of sale transactions.¹¹⁵ One case recorded in the registers shows that one problem the candle-maker's *kethüda* had to deal with was that several members of the guild bought fat from the butchers of Meat Square, although that fat was to be given to another *selhane* (slaughterhouse).¹¹⁶ The guild officials made these members swear that they would not buy fat from the janissary butchers again, pointing to a possible relationship between the two factions. Unfortunately, we lack any other source that sheds light on the economic transactions between the janissaries and the candle-makers.

The relationship between the janissaries and the candle-makers had further dynamics. The *çorbacı* of the 10th *ağa bölüğü*, Mustafa b. Ismail, was in close contact with the administrators of the candle-maker guild, sometimes even using them as his personal agents. Mustafa Agha loaned 260,000 *akçes* to the village of Tırnova in Yenişehir so that they could

¹¹¹ Yi, *Guild Dynamics*, 132.

¹¹² "son of"; henceforth "veled-i"

¹¹³ IKS 9: 23b (1071/1661).

¹¹⁴ IKS 9: 12b (1071/1660); IKS 9: 13a (1071/1660); IKS 9: 23b (1071/1660).

¹¹⁵ IKS 9: 254a (1072/1662).

¹¹⁶ IKS 9: 170b (1072/1662).

pay their taxes. The candle-makers Andon v. Dimitri and Tatoş v. Andon and the *yiğitbaşı* of the candle-maker guild, Hristo v. Manko, were the agents of Mustafa Agha who was responsible for collecting the money within 50 months.¹¹⁷ The same candle-makers were again the agents of Çorbacı Mustafa Agha b. Ismail in collecting the head-tax (*cizye*) of the Fenar district in Rumelia.¹¹⁸ We are at a disadvantage, however, because we are unable to determine more precisely the depth of relationship between the janissaries and the candle-maker guild that resulted in a certain form of agency on the artisans' part.

We come across further cases mentioning candle-maker janissaries: in a court case related to the inheritance of janissary Mehmed Beşe, we learn that he was a candle-maker (*mumcu* Mehmed Beşe).¹¹⁹ Also in the inheritance of Osman Beşe, it is seen that one of his heirs was his brother Malkoç's son, the candle-maker Ali Beşe.¹²⁰ Another case where a candle-maker Lambo v. Dimo owed 14,000 *akçes* to Hamza Beşe b. Abdullah, and paid it through another candle-maker, Eryar, makes one think that he could be a merchant buying and selling candles. However, it is hard to say how reflective this case was of the general scene.¹²¹

Enumerations of janissaries in the candle-maker guild, however, still leave a very incomplete picture. Even though there are suggestive documents linking janissaries and the candle-maker guild, the field was mostly dominated by non-Muslims during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.¹²² Having a *kethüda* of the candle-maker guild, who was janissary in

¹¹⁷ IKS 9: 155a (1072/1662).

¹¹⁸ IKS 9: 155a (1072/1662).

¹¹⁹ IKS 9: 191b (1072/1661).

¹²⁰ IKS 9: 197a (1072/1661).

¹²¹ IKS 5: 57b, no. 408 (1029/1620).

¹²² Ayşe Hür, "Mumculuk," *Dünden Bugüne İstanbul Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 5 (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1994), 497.

origin, Aslan Beşe b. Muharrem, is not contradictory with this fact. Yi underlines that there were two ways the leaders of guilds came to office in Istanbul: “internal selection and external appointment by the government.”¹²³ In cases where the *kethüda* was an appointee, the candidates were mostly from the military corps. Yi suggests that this might be because of an intention to control larger guilds and ensure their on-time tax payments, and also because the government wanted to provide a salary to military officers during financial difficulty.¹²⁴ The fact that there is no research done on the candle-maker guild of seventeenth-century Istanbul makes it even harder to establish the involvement of janissaries in the candle-maker guild. As such, the evidence found in the court registers points to a possible connection between the janissaries and the candle-maker guild members, and an involvement of janissaries in this guild to a certain extent.

The tanner’s (*debbağ*) guild was another in which the janissaries played a significant role.¹²⁵ In 1661, the guild administration of the tanners sued tanner Salih. Among the 15 *ihtiyars* of the guild there was one *çorbacı*, el-Hac Mehmed b. Osman, and 2 *beşes*, Mustafa Beşe b. Bayram and Osman Beşe b. Zekeriya.¹²⁶ No other documentation is found concerning the tanner janissaries. Nonetheless it is significant that in this case, not only were janissaries members of the tanners’s guild, they were also active in the offices of the guild administration.

¹²³ Yi, *Guild Dynamics*, 74.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 75.

¹²⁵ 360 tanner’s workshops were established by Memed the Conquerer in Yedikule, and this location remained as the center for tanning. Hasan Yelmen, “Debbağlık,” *Dünden Bugüne İstanbul Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 3 (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1994), 13. According to Evliya Çelebi, there were 700 workshops of tanners in seventeenth-century Istanbul. *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, vol. 1, 283.

¹²⁶ IKS 9: 145b (1072/1661). They argued that all the sheepskin that came from Anatolia and the undried skin of cattle and goats slaughtered in Istanbul was to be distributed to the members of the guild equally. They claimed that Salih bought 448 salted goatskins from the Eminönü slaughterhouse and violated the guild rules by buying more than his share.

Evliya Çelebi mentions that the Grand Vizier Melek Ahmed Pasha lost his vizierate because of an ongoing conflict with the Istanbul tanners.¹²⁷ The event he refers to is the 1651 rebellion which began with the protests of the artisans who had to sell their goods according to the prices set by the government according to the newly debased *akçe*. The protest became bigger with the support of the janissaries and led to the end of Melek Ahmed Pasha's vizierate. If we are to believe Evliya, the political potency and power of the tanner's guild was the highest among the guilds in Istanbul.¹²⁸ Given that the janissaries were effective in this guild at the administrative level, the assumption becomes more probable.

Similarly, the trotter-seller (*paçacı*) guild maintained janissaries in its administrative body. In 1071/1660, a *paçacı* (a sheep trotter cook), Mehmed Beşe – presumably a guild member – sued another member of the cooks of the sheep trotter guild in 1661. He said that he owned a share in a *karhane* (workshop). He argued that it was the custom of the guild that whenever products were distributed, those who owned a share in a *karhane* also got a share of the products. Mehmed Beşe requested the share of goods to which he was entitled from the headman of the guild (*kethüda*), who was a janissary named Ibrahim Beşe b. Hüseyin. The document not only reveals that there were janissaries who had established partnerships with the trotter-sellers, but also that the *kethüda* of the guild was a janissary.¹²⁹ Also, as we may

¹²⁷ Robert Dankoff, trans. and comm., *The Intimate Life of an Ottoman Statesman, Melek Ahmed Pasha (1588-1662) as Portrayed in Evliya Çelebi's Book of Travels*, introduction by Rhoads Murphey (Albany: Suny Press, 1991) 12-14.

¹²⁸ Suraiya Faruqi takes this remark into consideration and also mentions how the tanner's guild's saintly protector was Ahi Evren in Evliya's account, projecting a power that could even be used against the sultan. Suraiya Faruqi, "Urban Space as Disputed Grounds: Territorial Aspects to Artisan Conflict in Sixteenth to Eighteenth Century Istanbul," in *Stories of Ottoman Men and Women: Establishing Status, Establishing Control* (Istanbul: Eren Yayıncılık, 2002), 225.

¹²⁹ IKS 9: 70a (1071/1660).

recall from Yi's study, 6 out of 10 members of the cooks of the sheep trotter guild administration held military titles.¹³⁰

The last guild that will be mentioned here is the group of guilds that dealt with metal work. As already stated, a group of artisans from the lamp-maker (*çırakçılar*) guild, metal workers (*dökmeciler*), scrap-sellers (*hurdacılar*), bronze (*luc*) workers, brass (*pirinç*) workers, and copper (*bakır*) workers petitioned in 1587 for a regulation to be issued that would force the military members to abide by the rules of their guilds. In the seventeenth century, the situation changed significantly as janissaries were, by then, well-established in these fields. The seventeenth-century probate registers that are covered include two scrap-sellers and one brass seller.

The scrap-seller Mustafa Beşe, for example, could be considered a relatively wealthy artisan with a net estate of 95,822 *akçes* while the value of the commercial goods listed in his probate register was worth 36,855 *akçes*.¹³¹ In 1662, the brass worker's guild registered in the Istanbul court that the *yiğitbaşı* Hüseyin Çelebi b. Mehmed, referred to in the document as a janissary, was appointed as the *kethüda* of the guild. Among the eight *ihdiyars* of the guild who registered this appointment, three of them held the title of *beşe*.¹³²

¹³⁰ Yi, *Guild Dynamics*, 139.

¹³¹ KA 3: 6a (1045/1635).

¹³² IKS 9: 249a (1072/1662).

Table 4.2: List of Janissaries Dealing with Trade and Crafts¹³³

Name	Vol/ Page	Year	Net Estate (in <i>Akçe</i>)	Value Commercial Goods	of Occupation	Shop/Rent (<i>icare-i dükkan</i>)
El-Hac Veli Beşe	1/137b	1013/1604	49580	-	-	Shop owner
Yusuf Beşe b. Abdullah	2/17a	1025/1616	19592	-	<i>çamaşırcı</i> (ynderwear seller)	Shop owner
Hüseyin Beşe	2/24b	1026/1617	8392	6278	<i>iplik dokuma</i> (weaver)	-
Ibrahim Beşe b. Oruç	2/60b	1027/1618	20000	10000	-	300
Yusuf Beşe b. Osman	2/11a	1037/1627	87915	25400	not mentioned	
Mustafa Beşe b. Musa	3/6a	1045/1635	95822	36835	<i>hırdavatçı</i> (smallware-seller)	150
Hüseyin Beşe	3/41b	1048/1638	-	9310	<i>ketancı</i> (linen seller)	30
Hasan Beşe b. Abdullah (acemi)	3/47a	1048/1638	3763	3320	<i>sabuncu</i> (soap seller)	50
Mehmed Beşe b. Abdullah (50. bölük)	3/110a	1055/1645	18078	5014	<i>çuvalcı</i> (bag seller)	130

¹³³ The probate registers of janissaries who were involved with trade were selected from the data Said Öztürk provides in his book *İstanbul Tereke Defterleri (Sosyo-Ekonomik Tahlil)* (Istanbul: Osmanlı Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1995). (see my Appendix 3, column on Trade Goods) These selected probate registers were examined to find out what kind of trade the janissaries were involved in.

Name	Vol/ Page	Year	Net Estate (in <i>Akçe</i>)	Value Commercial Goods	of Occupation	Shop/Rent (<i>icare-i dükkan</i>)
Hamza Beşe b. Hasan	3/113b	1055/1645	71771	42699	<i>doncu</i> (underwear seller)	160
Mehmed Beşe (49. Cemaat)	4/72b	1060/1650	39613	6385	<i>hırdavatçı</i> (scrap seller)	
Ahmed Çorbacı	4/79a	1060/1650	223473	116000	<i>pirinççi</i> (rice seller)	
Fazli Beşe	5/2b	1066/1656	1668	905	not mentioned	30
Yusuf Beşe		1071/1660	42329	2976	<i>berber</i> (barber)	200
Bıçakçı Hüseyin Beşe b. Abdullah	5/98b	1071/1660	860	350	<i>bıçakçı</i> (knife-seller)	150
Mehmed Beşe b. Abdullah	5/120b	1072/ 1661	12120	1029	<i>munakkaş makreme</i> (textile)	300
Mustafa Beşe	5/131b	1077/1666	48540	13612	-	400
Mehmed Beşe b. Abdullah Bagdadi	5/134b	1077/1666	239610	533269	<i>dülbendci</i> (muslin seller)	300
Bayezid Beşe b. Abdullah	6/13a	1077/1666	35771	13626	<i>bogası satıcı</i> (lining seller)	
El-Hac Ibrahim Beşe b. Hasan	6/31a	1077/1666	841755	287645	textile for public-baths	60000 owner
Hüseyin Beşe b. Hasan	6/30a	1078/1667	-	1166	<i>kasab</i> (butcher)	45

Name	Vol/ Page	Year	Net Estate (in <i>Akçe</i>)	Value Commercial Goods	of Occupation	Shop/Rent (<i>icare-i dükkan</i>)
Hasan Bölükbaşı bin Abdullah	6/34b	1078/1667	30946	4085	not mentioned	
Mustafa Beşe	6/53a	1078/1667	1335	1824	<i>meyve satıcı</i> (fruit seller)	735
Ömer Beşe el-Acemi	6/58a	1078/1667	2204	2705	<i>aba satıcı</i> (woolen cloth seller)	131
Mehmed b. Abdullah (racil)	6/73a	1078/1667	7177	6762	<i>ayakkabıcı</i> (shoe maker/seller)	100
Musli b. Abdullah (racil)	6/80a	1078/1667	44883	6540	<i>kumaş dokuma</i> (cloth weaver)	125
Ibrahim Beşe	6/110a	1078/1668	26695	20941	<i>bıçakçı</i> (knife-seller)	17
Osman Beşe b. Pervane	6/151b	1078/1668	3502	3780	not mentioned	100
Berber Ali Beşe	6/153a	1078/1668	4319	2975	<i>berber</i> (barber)	100
Nalband el-hac Receb Beşe	6/163b	1078/1668	13757	4000	<i>nalband</i> (blacksmith)	120
Cafer Beşe b. Abdullah	5/152a	1079/1668	57145	11936	<i>dülbendci</i> (muslin seller)	150
Ibrahim Beşe b. Ömer	5/159a	1079/1668	10068	5541	-	121

Name	Vol/ Page	Year	Net Estate (in <i>Akçe</i>)	Value Commercial Goods	of Occupation	Shop/Rent (<i>icare-i dükkan</i>)
Ibrahim Beşe b. Abdullah	5/167a	1079/1668	7278	5355	<i>berber</i> (barber)	90
Ibrahim Beşe b. Abdullah	5/173a	1079/1668	1386	2200	<i>attar</i> (perfume/ herbalist)	270
Halil Beşe b. Abdullah	5/174a	1079/1668	18786	850	<i>pazarcı</i>	500
Mehmed Beşe b. Abdullah	5/184b	1079/1668	1181	2891	not mentioned	19
Ibrahim Beşe	5/198a	1079/1668	7226	10194	-	15

Source: KA 1-9 (1000-79/1595-1668).

So far we have dealt with janissaries who were fabric or cloth sellers, weavers, fruit and vegetable sellers and other food merchants provisioning Istanbul, such as grain wholesalers, or butchers, or those in other trades — candle-makers, tanners, cooks, and metal workers. Documents reflecting their involvement in these fields also confirm that not only were they members of these guilds, but were also quite powerful, i.e., as wealthy wholesalers dealing with huge amounts of product, or members of the upper echelons of the guilds affiliated with their fields. Other guilds in which the janissaries were members of the administration were the *tabanca kilit* (gunlock) makers, *kettancılar* (linen-weavers/sellers), *etmekçiler* (bakers), *bıçakçılar* (cutlers),¹³⁴ *hurdacılar* (scrap-sellers), *şerbetçiler* (sherbet-makers), *keçeciler* (felt-makers), *çörekçiler* (round-cake makers), *çameşuylar* (launderers), *nişastacılar* (starch-makers), *şırugancılar* (oil-pressers), *kebabcılar-aşçıları* (kebab-makers and cooks), *nal'çacılar* (shoe-stud-makers), and *kavukçular* (turban-makers).¹³⁵ On the basis of the data provided so far, it is definitely possible to say that by the mid-seventeenth century, janissaries were entrenched in many fields of trade and craft. We can also surmise that janissaries started to work in these fields long before the mid-seventeenth century, and had been becoming more and more powerful in the market and the guilds.

Now, as a final consideration, we will investigate two final janissary occupations — coffeehouse owners and barbers. Scholars have established a connection between the janissaries and the coffeehouses. Kafadar argues that with the importation of coffee after the mid-sixteenth century, and tobacco at the beginning of the seventeenth century, a new social life centered around coffeehouses began. The janissaries were known to be significant elements in this culture. Kafadar refers to the *aşık*, or poet janissaries, to illustrate their role in

¹³⁴ Note that there were also knife-maker janissaries whose probate registers were detected in the *kismet-i askeriye* registers of Istanbul for the second half of the seventeenth century: KA 5: 98b (1071/1660); KA 6: 110a (1078/1667).

¹³⁵ Yi, *Guild Dynamics* 139.

the development of this kind of literary endeavor occurring mainly at coffeehouses.¹³⁶ Even though janissary involvement with the coffeehouses is not reflected in the sources I examined for seventeenth century Istanbul, the widespread ownership of coffeehouses in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries may hint at the possible beginning of such a relationship in the seventeenth century.¹³⁷

Why are coffeehouses important for this study? And what does janissary involvement in these spaces mean? In a society which lacked modern mass media such as newspapers, journals, and so forth, an oral communication network was the most important means of disseminating news and generating public opinion. In other words, gossip and rumor on social, political, and economic issues played an important role in shaping public opinion. As we recall from the previous chapter, the gossip in the janissary barracks that Osman II was planning to go on a disguised “pilgrimage trip” in order to conscript new soldiers from Anatolia for a new army triggered the uprising that brought his demise. Consider the news that the Venetians blocked the Dardanelles in 1648 that led the public to protest against the sultan and call him to return to his duties. Şerif Mardin delineates a common pattern by which popular rebellions in the early modern Ottoman Empire were started by gossip, mainly concerning inappropriate behavior or decisions of the sultan or the officials. Such gossip gained a more formal imprimatur if it was conveyed to the people through sermons in the mosques. Typically, the janissaries would then join a rebellion supported by religious students

¹³⁶ Kafadar, “Esnaf-Yeniceri Relations,” 92. For examples of janissary *aşık* literature see Fuad Köprülü, *Türk Saz Şairleri*, vol. 1, (Ankara: Milli Kültür Yayınları, 1964), 9-49.

¹³⁷ Ali Çaksu, “Janissary Coffee Houses in Late Eighteenth-Century Istanbul” in Dana Sajdi ed., *Ottoman Tulips, Ottoman Coffee: Leisure and Lifestyle in the Eighteenth Century* (London: Tauris, 2007), 117-132. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, there were approximately 1,000 coffeehouses at the neighborhoods of Eyüp and Hasköy, and another 1,000 on the European side of the Bosphorus. According to the artisan inspector register (*esnaf yoklama defteri*) (the exact date of the register is unknown but it is thought by the author that it is from the first quarter of the nineteenth century), one shop out of seven was a coffeehouse. One out of three coffeehouses belonged to a janissary. Moreover, one out of two janissaries who dealt with small businesses ran a coffeehouse. Cengiz Kırılı, *The Struggle Over Space: Coffeehouses of Ottoman Istanbul, 1780-1845* Ph.D. diss. (Binghamton University, 2000), 77, 112-113.

and merchants of the city bazaars.¹³⁸ It was very likely, however, that janissaries mingling with the bazaar population and their active presence at the coffeehouses, which were public spaces from whence gossip was disseminated, made them more important figures than Mardin suggests. Murad IV's famous incognito patrols of the capital were certainly centered on closing the coffeehouses in Istanbul – which may be also a reason for janissary coffeehouse owners going unnoticed during the first half of the seventeenth century. Naima explains this ban by indicating that coffeehouses were assembly places where the people met to criticize men of rank and spread rumors about state affairs.¹³⁹ Therefore, even though we cannot detect documents pointing to janissary ownership of coffeehouses, at least we have circumstantial evidence for their presence in these public spaces. In addition to the coffeehouses, we see that barber shops were other important spaces where information was discussed and then disseminated.¹⁴⁰

It is asserted in the literature that barbers started to work at the corners of the coffeehouses when coffee became a widely consumed beverage during the reign of Süleyman the Magnificent.¹⁴¹ As we know, coffee and alcohol consumption – and locations selling these items – were banned during the reign of Murad IV. As a result, most of the barbers lost their venues and became itinerant workers. Although janissary coffeehouse-owners have not been found in the seventeenth-century probate registers of Istanbul, barber janissaries can be found

¹³⁸ Şerif Mardin, "Freedom in an Ottoman Perspective," in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin ed., *State, Democracy and the Military Turkey in the 1980s* (Berlin, New York: Wde G., 1988), 30.

¹³⁹ *Ol esnada duhan ve kahve sebebi ile mutlaka cem'iyyet edip kahvehanelerde ve berber dükkânlarında ve ba'zı nasın hanesinde kî Daru'n-nedve'ye mümasıl mevazî' idi, bir alay nekbeti bir yere gelip ekabir ü hükkâmın zem ü mesavisine meşgul olup umur-ı devlete ve azl ü nasba ve fetk u rekta müte'allik levazım-ı saltanatdan dem urup nice eracıf ü ekazib ihdas ederler idiç Bu kaziye bizzat kendiler şehri gezip leyl ü mehar devr edip gecelerde şeb-revlik eden bi-pervalara şerbet-i fena içirirdi.* Naima, vol. 2, 757.

¹⁴⁰ Dana Sajdi, "A Room of His Own: the 'History' of the Barber of Damascus (fl. 1762)," *The MIT Electronic Journal of Middle East Studies* 4 (2004): 19-35.

¹⁴¹ Burçak Evren, *Ottoman Craftsmen and Their Guilds* (Istanbul: Doğan Kitap, 1999), 46.

there. An investigation of the probate registers of janissaries in the *kismet-i 'askeriye* registers shows that out of 37 detected janissaries who were employed in certain kinds of trade or craft, three of them were barbers.¹⁴² Given that we have almost no repetition of occupations within our list of 37 janissaries (Table 4.2), three barbers is not an insignificant number. It is known that with the abolition of the janissary corps in 1826, all the coffeehouses were also closed down, most of them being along the Bosphorus due to the janissary predominance in these during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Lütü Efendi mentions that due to the closing or demolition of the coffeehouses in the following year of the abolition of the janissary corps, the Department of Imperial Estates had to distribute new barber licenses, enabling some of the coffeehouses to be reopened as barber shops.¹⁴³ The strong relationship between the coffeehouses and the barbers at this period suggests that it could have started earlier, of which we see the clues in the seventeenth century documents.

We can easily conclude from the findings mentioned that janissaries were a normal part of everyday urban economic life. Their involvement was not limited to specific fields, but they were very active in every part of guild life, from the rank-and-file to the top administration, as well as in various fields of production and trade. The janissaries' attempts to engage in other trades went beyond compensating for shortfalls due to their low salaries. Instead they started accumulating capital through mercantile activities and wholesaling. Capital formation was more pronounced among those dealing with credit relations.


¹⁴² KA 5: 38b (1071.1660); KA 5: 167a (1079/1668); KA 6: 153a (1078/1667).

¹⁴³ Evren, *Ottoman Craftsmen*, 46.

4.2.c. The Formation of New Wealth: The Credit Economy

The wealth distribution of all the *'askeris* in the *kassam* registers shows that the general tendency in wealth accumulation was through saving cash.¹⁴⁴ This was echoed in the case of the janissaries. 56 percent of the janissaries had cash as part of their possessions. The tendency for janissaries to accumulate cash even increased during the mid-seventeenth century.

Graph 4.3: Accumulation of Cash during the Seventeenth Century



Source: Based on Said Öztürk, *İstanbul Tereke Defterleri (Sosyo-Ekonomik Tahlil)* (İstanbul: Osmanlı Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1995), 438-493. (See my Appendix 3)

¹⁴⁴ Öztürk, *İstanbul Tereke Defterleri*, 147.

As graph 4.3 shows, the number of janissaries who possessed between 50,000 and 99,000 *akçes* increased from six percent to ten percent, and, more interestingly, those who possessed more than 100,000 *akçes* in cash increased from zero to 19 percent by the mid-seventeenth century.¹⁴⁵ There were newly rich janissaries in Istanbul whose wealth was mainly based on the accumulation of cash.¹⁴⁶ Half of those who possessed more than 100,000 *akçes* were from the higher ranks in the army such as aghas, *halifes*, *kethüdayiris*, and *çorbacıs*.¹⁴⁷ Information in the probate registers reveals that among this same group, only one janissary had commercial goods set down in his inheritance.¹⁴⁸ Therefore, we should assume that the source of the cash they owned must be other than trade.

The probate register of Osman Agha, the head of *mehteran-ı hassa*, sheds light on the type of monetary dealings he was engaged in. He lent 10,000 *akçes* to Ahmed Agha, borrowed 30,000 *akçes* from another Ahmed Agha who was the treasurer (*hazinedar*) of the Grand Vizier, 10,000 from Hasan Agha, 75,000 from the chief physician (*hekimbaşı*), 3,000 from the regiment waqf of the 2nd *oda*, 5,000 from the regiment waqf of the 4th *oda*, 31,000 from Ahmed Pasha, 3,300 from Mustafa Beşe, 20,000 from Yusuf Beg, 10,000 from Ahmed Beg, 4,500 from Mehmed Çelebi, and 4,400 from an unnamed person. The amount he borrowed was in sum 196,200 *akçes*. He had 1,060,600 *akçes* in cash as part of his inheritance, and his net estate was worth 1,704,515 *akçes*.¹⁴⁹ Osman Agha owned a house

¹⁴⁵ The numbers of janissaries in both margin groups are as follows, respectively: For 0-999 *akçes*, 2 to 5 janissaries; for 1000-9,999 *akçes*, 6 to 25 janissaries; for 10,000 to 49,000 *akçes* 9 to 27 janissaries; for 50,000 to 99,999 *akçes* 1 to 8 janissaries; and for 100,000 *akçes* and more 0 to 18 janissaries. The total number of janissaries that possessed cash according to the probate registers was 98.

¹⁴⁶ For detailed information on the exact amount of cash each janissary left in their probate registers, see Appendix 3.

¹⁴⁷ KA 5: 94b (1071/1660); KA 6: 44a (1078/1667); KA 6: 58a (1078/1667); KA 6: 84b (1078/1667); KA 6: 100b (1078/1667); KA 6: 136b (1078/1667); KA 5: 158b (1079/1668); KA 5: 175b (1079/1668).

¹⁴⁸ Among the janissaries who owned more than 100,000 *akçes*, only Musli b. Abdullah owned commercial goods worth 6,540 *akçes*, and the amount of cash he recorded to have left was 219,150 *akçes*. KA 6: 80a (1078/1667).

¹⁴⁹ KA 5: 94b (1071/1661).

worth 770,000 *akçes* in the neighborhood of Yekta close to Kadirga Limanı, one of the wealthy neighborhoods of Istanbul, and a garden worth 100,000 *akçes*; with the addition of other immovables, the total reached 1,323,831 *akçes*. The rest of his inheritance was the sum of the debt he owed and other expenses. This picture basically shows us that the major income of Osman Agha was through credit dealings with the rest of the *'askeri* class and the janissary regiment waqfs. He had no commercial goods or any property that could be used as an investment but 1,060,600 *akçes* of cash out of which only 37,800 *akçes* was borrowed. Therefore it is very likely that he used his money to make his fortune.

Another example, Mehmed Agha, a *kethüda yeri*, who died in the Cretan campaign, had 1,712,801 *akçes* in cash as his inheritance. Some of this may have been derived from the mill he possessed, but it is also evident that 200,000 *akçes* that he had had in Crete was brought to Istanbul after his death. Obviously, he had engaged in monetary transactions in Crete, as well.¹⁵⁰ Another janissary, Mustafa Halife b. Ahmed, owned 9,054,530 *akçes* when he died during the Cretan campaign. Some money was found in his house, 907,443 *akçes* of it was handed over by his *kethüda* Zulkadir Bey, and 200,000 *akçes* was brought from Crete by Abdülkerim Agha. He had also been involved in exchange of credit within Istanbul. Among the sums he owed, there was 5,500 *akçes icare-i şerif* (rent money) that he had to pay back to an unidentified waqf. This sum was probably part of the payment for a loan taken from that waqf, or simply the rent for an unidentified place.¹⁵¹ Also, a rent of 3,000 *akçes* for a shop

¹⁵⁰ KA 6: 44a (1078/1668).

¹⁵¹ The *icare-i şerif* mentioned here could be part of a loan transaction that is called *bey' li'l-istiğlal*. Most of the credits were not overtly indicated as loans with interest. There were three main methods of lending money: in *muamele-i şeriye* the lender gives a certain amount of money to the debtor with 10-15 % interest. But in return for this 10-15 %, the debtor gives a certain product to the lender, let us say a *kaftan*, outfit. This surplus is usually referred to as *çuha bahası*, cost of a fabric, in the transactions. The second method is called *bey bi'l-vefa*, purchase with a guarantee. In these transactions, the condition that the buyer will sell the product back to the initial owner within a determined time is settled. The payment term in these transactions is generally six months or a year. The last method, *bey' li'l-istiğlal*, is a purchase transaction done with a condition that the seller will rent the good he is selling. The purchased item in these cases is primarily a property — a house or land — and it is rented by the original owner for mostly a year. Within this time period, the debtor pays the interest of the sum he took from the lender under the rent. For more detailed information see: Tahsin Özcan, *Osmanlı Para*

implies that he was involved in some kind of business; however, Mustafa Halife did not own any commercial goods as part of his inheritance.¹⁵² The last two examples point to one source of income that emerged from the janissaries' geographical mobility, i.e., profiting while on campaign. Besides the traditional sources of booty, such as bringing slaves back from the war zones,¹⁵³ it is seen that the janissaries found other ways of accumulating cash while on campaign. Molly Greene gives an example of a similar case where a janissary appears as an investor who lent money to a merchant. Ali Beşe b. Ali from Istanbul had his partnership with Poulēmenos, formerly from Athens and now from Chania, in 1069/1659. Ali Beşe gave him 80,000 *akçes*, most likely to trade with. They agreed to check their accounts every March, to split the profits equally, and that Ali Beşe could withdraw his money at any time.¹⁵⁴ Green also mentions janissaries that settled in Crete and became active in the economic life of the island. For example, a Cretan merchant janissary, Hacı Musli Beşe b. Ahmed, was recorded as loading raisins, olive oil, and honey onto a French ship and sailing to Alexandria, in 1106/1694.¹⁵⁵ There were also janissaries who bought shops for themselves in Candia. They were especially involved in the buying and selling of real estate.¹⁵⁶

Vakıfları- Kanuni Dönemi Üsküdar Örneği (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2003); İsmail Kurt, *Para Vakıfları Nazariyat ve Tatbikat* (İstanbul: Ensar Neşriyat, 1996).

¹⁵² KA 6: 84b (1078/1668).

¹⁵³ "Slaves constitute the main source of gain to the Turkish soldiers. If he brings back with him from a campaign nothing but one or two slaves, he has done well and is amply rewarded for his toil; for an ordinary slave is valued at forty or fifty crowns, while, if the slave has the additional recommendation of youth or beauty or skill in craftsmanship, he is worth twice as much. From this, I think, it is obvious what an enormous sum is made when five or six thousand prisoners are brought in from a campaign, and how profitable to the Turks such raids are..." Ogier de Busbeq, *Turkish Letters* (Oxford: Sickle Moon Books, 2001), 70.

¹⁵⁴ Molly Greene, *A Shared World*, 147.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 135.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 89. Greene also indicates that the janissaries controlled rural tax farming and the capital city Candia's tax farms as well. All important customs tax farms, including urban taxes, were under imperial janissary control – those coming from Istanbul. The author stresses that the tax farmers were either janissaries or merchants identified as janissaries in the customs tax farming contracts by the end of the seventeenth century. The janissaries in Candia also dominated the salt trade. Plus, they controlled the waqf endowments of the city both as founders and administrators. Molly Greene, *A Shared World*, 101-103.

The last janissary we should look at is Ahmed Beşe b. Mustafa, a *bayraktar* in the 47th *ağa bölük*. He had a relatively small fortune of 206,713 *akçes*, compared to the previous examples, but he was still wealthy. 110,950 *akçes* in cash composed more than half of his fortune. 97,500 *akçes* was collected from his five debtors after his death, four of them being other janissaries with the title of *beşe* who owed 72,500 *akçes*.¹⁵⁷ The fact that debts owed by other janissaries composed the majority of his inheritance reflects the general pattern of credit relationships among janissaries in the seventeenth century as the Istanbul court records reveal (table 4.3).

Of the 415 cases in the Istanbul court registers involving janissaries that I examined, 107 cases were loan transactions. 51 cases were from the 1610s and 56 cases were from the 1660s. Table 4.3 specifies to whom the janissaries lent money between 1020-1029/1611-1620 and 1069-1072/1659-1662. The high number of credit and loan transactions recorded in the Istanbul court records enables us to conclude that janissaries were actively involved in the money-lending networks of the city, and helps us to detect patterns in the loan activities of janissaries. It is noticeable that the groups to whom janissaries were lending money varied over this fifty-year period. There are two main findings derived from this observation: (1) a shift from *zimmis* to Muslims as debtors, and (2) a growing solidarity among the janissaries through capital formation at an institutional level.

First, let us look at the shift from *zimmis* to Muslims as debtors: 53 percent of the credits were given to *zimmis* at the beginning of the century. This percentage fell to 22 percent in the 1660s, whereas the percentage of Muslims who borrowed from the janissaries rose from

¹⁵⁷ KA 5: 175a (1079/1669).

Table 4.3: Numbers and Proportions of Different Social Groups Engaged in Loan Taking from Janissaries and Janissary Regiment Waqfs¹⁵⁸

Borrowers	1020-29/ 1611-1620 ¹⁵⁹	percentage of total	1069-72/ 1659- 1662 ¹⁶⁰	percentage of total
Janissaries	7	18	14	38
<i>Zımmis</i>	20	53	8	22
Muslims (exc. janissaries)	6	16	10	27
Women	5	13	5	13
TOTAL	38	100	37	100

Source: Istanbul *Şer'i Sicils*, 1020-1072/1611-1662.

16 percent to 27 percent. What makes this shift more interesting is that among the 53 percent of *zımmi* debtors in the 1610s, 25 percent carried titles of either *papa* or *episkopos* and these non-Muslim clerics decreased slightly in the 1660s.¹⁶¹ On the other hand, while no Muslim clerics (the *ulema*) were borrowing money from the janissaries at the beginning of the century, they became more liable to request credit in the 1660s. The religious titles they were carrying were *molla*, *şeyh*, or *seyyid*, and one of the borrowers was the wife of the former *şeyhülislam*.

¹⁵⁸ Some expressions that were used for regiment waqfs were: *oda vakfı*, *mevkuf nukud*. The loans taken from the regiment waqfs were registered in the Istanbul court registers during the seventeenth century as loans taken from a janissary, usually the *odabaşı*, who was the trustee (*mütevelli*) of the waqf. For example, the loan was taken from 57. *ağa bölüğüne mahsus oda ahalisi için mevkuf nukudun mütevellisi Mahmud Beşe b. Hasan*, or 16. *ağa bölüğüne mahsus odanın odabaşısı olan ve odaya ait nukuda mütevelli olan Mustafa nam râcil*.

¹⁵⁹ See Appendix 4.

¹⁶⁰ See Appendix 6.

¹⁶¹ Loans given to *zımmis* with religious titles were, for example: Mehmed Beşe b. Ali lent 52,000 *akçes* to Piskopos Ezgori v. Papa Nifori. IKS 2: 26a, no. 217 (1024/1615); Derviş Çavuş b. Abdülmennan lent 10,000 *akçes* to Papa Nikdar v. Yani, and sued against his guarantor Papa Nikola v. Polimno when the loan was not returned on time. IKS 2: 34a, no. 285, 286 (1025/1616). Hüseyin Beşe b. Yusuf lent 31,500 *akçes* to Papa Franko v. Nikola the same year. IKS 2: 52b, no. 434 (1025/1616); İbrahim Beşe b. Abdullah lent 10,000 *akçes* to Papa Istavrek. IKS 3: 63a, no. 525 (1027/1618).

These loan transactions should be interpreted as part of the fisco-political transitions of the early seventeenth century.¹⁶² In this period, the traditional source of state revenue shifted from agricultural yields (*timars*) to cash levies due on both peasant and urban households.¹⁶³ Other agrarian taxes were changed into lump-sum cash payments (*maktu*) paid to the fiscal agents, or tax farmers (*mültezims*). It had already been a practice to farm out some urban taxes, but during the early seventeenth century, tax farming extended to extraordinary levies (*avarız*), and the poll tax (*cizye*).¹⁶⁴ The tax collectors took this debt owed as grants that were given out on ad hoc basis. They were three-year contracts but not given on a lifetime basis, as would be seen towards the end of the seventeenth century under a system defined as *malikane* (lifetime revenue tax farm). With the application of lump-sum cash payments, some communities were forced to start borrowing in order to pay these taxes, which resulted in an increase in money-lending activities. Often money owed as taxes would be listed as loans where the salary of the tax collector covered the interest.

The Islamic poll tax (*cizye*) was one of these taxes that was converted into lump-sum payments.¹⁶⁵ To pay this tax, the non-Muslim clerics often took out loans on behalf of the community.¹⁶⁶ The loan transactions detected in the Istanbul court registers could reflect these types of transactions, illustrating the transformative period of the early seventeenth century of short-term tax farming (the norm being three years) , where the tax farm was given to a

¹⁶² Ariel Salzmann, "An Ancien Régime Revisited: "Privatization" and Political Economy in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Empire," *Politics and Society* 21, no.4 (1993): 398-399.

¹⁶³ Douglas Howard, "The Ottoman Timar System and Its Transformation, 1563-1656," Ph.D. diss. (University of Indiana, 1987), Chapter 5.

¹⁶⁴ Linda Darling, *Revenue-Raising & Legitimacy Tax Collection & Finance Administration in the Ottoman Empire, 1560-1660* (Leiden, New York, and London: Brill, 1996), 47.

¹⁶⁵ Halil İnalcık, "Cizye," *DİA*, vol. 8 (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1988), 46; Bernard Lewis, "Notes and Documents from the Turkish Archives: A Contribution to the History of the Jews in the Ottoman Empire," *Oriental Notes and Studies* 3 (1952): 1-52; Daniel S. Goffman, "The Maktu' System and the Jewish Community of Sixteenth-Century Safed: A Study of Two Documents from the Ottoman Archives," *Osmanlı Araştırmaları* 3 (1982): 81-90.

¹⁶⁶ Darling, *Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy*, 104.

janissary on a short-term basis to pay his salary. The most impressive loan transaction evidenced for such a short-term tax farm agreement was recorded in 1024/1615, due to the high amount of money lent compared to other amounts given to *zimmis* mentioned in the loan transactions. The *episkopos* of [illegible in the sources] in Rumelia, *episkopos* Ezgori v. Papa Nifori, took a 42,000 *akçe* loan from a janissary. He also agreed to pay 5,000 *akçes* in clothing costs (*çuha bahası*) and a 5,000 *akçe* cost of the *kul* (*ücret-i kul*), which were hidden interest charges, to cover his debt to the janissary.¹⁶⁷ The total debt of 52,000 *akçes* was witnessed by two other *episkoposes* from [illegible in the sources] and Albanian Belgrade (Belgrad). They also witnessed that he paid 37,140 *akçes* of his debt in Ohri when they were present. The court agreed that the amount mentioned was given to the janissary and the rest of the debt should be paid as well. We do not see the continuation of such loans to non-Muslim clerics in the 1660s which could indicate the shift from short-term tax farms that became instruments for paying taxes to lifetime tax farms (*malikane mukata'a*).

Once again in the 1660s, we see an increase in the loans given to the Muslims and the emergence of Muslim clerics in loan transactions with the janissaries. There were five recorded cases of credit relationships between the janissaries and the *ulema* in the 1660s, 3 where the *ulema* borrowed from the janissaries, and 2 cases vice versa, whereas there was no record of such transactions in the 1610s. In three of these cases the janissaries were the lenders. Although the number of documents may not look impressive, all three cases point to significant relationships between high-ranking janissaries and elite *ulema*. Ahmed Beşe b. Abdullah, a *kethüdayeri*, lent 26,000 *akçes* to the wife of the former *şeyhülislam*.¹⁶⁸ The *baş korucu* of the 8th *ağa bölük*, Rıdvan Beşe b. Abdullah, gave a loan of 12,000 *akçes* to the *şeyh*

¹⁶⁷ Clothing costs (*çuha bahası*) and the cost of a *kul* (*ücret-i kul*) are the expressions used for indicating the interest that would be given to the lender in the loan transactions.

¹⁶⁸ IKS 8: 36b (1071/1660).

of Aşık Paşa Zaviye, es-Seyyid Mahmud Efendi b. es-Seyyid Mustafa.¹⁶⁹ The third case was not directly a loan transaction, but a sales transaction with a payment agreement with interest within a term of 6 months. The Çorbacı Halil Agha b. Mehmed of the 37th *ağa bölük* sold two horses, one jeweled rifle, one set of silver horse trappings, and one silver *küre* (ball) for 600,000 *akçes* to Molla Mustafa Efendi.¹⁷⁰ The amount of 6 *yük akçes* was supposed to be paid back with an interest of 2 *yük akçes* within 180 days. The interest rate of this transaction is 33 percent for 6 months, 66 percent over a year. The interest rate applied to the cash waqfs of Bursa during the seventeenth century was 10 percent, and the market rate in Istanbul was 20-25 percent maximum.¹⁷¹ 33 percent interest for a half-year term that Halil Agha charged Molla Mustafa Efendi was significantly higher even than the rate Istanbul *sarrafs* used. This case is noteworthy due to the application of such a high interest rate. It is even more remarkable on account of the large sums of money that are mentioned. The luxury goods that the *molla* bought were worth 600,000 *akçes*, and the interest paid only on the credit for these, 200,000 *akçes*, doubles the 100,000 *akçes* threshold marking the wealthy in seventeenth-century Ottoman society. These two facts leave us with several questions that we cannot fully answer by looking at this case alone: Was the agha a money-lender? Could the *molla* not have paid the full purchase price at the time of the transaction and so avoid paying such a high interest? Why did the *molla* agree to such a high interest rate? Was this a method of paying the outstanding sum of 200,000 *akçes* to the agha for some other service? Was this a kind of bribe? And above all, what would a *molla* do with these luxury items?

¹⁶⁹ IKS 9: 21b (1071/1660).

¹⁷⁰ IKS 9: 15a (1071/1660) was indicated as 40,000 *akçe* in the document.

¹⁷¹ Murat Çizakça, "Cash Waqfs of Bursa 1555-1823," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 38 (1995): 347-348. See his table 10. One of the French documents that the author refers to indicates that the *sarrafs* profited by acquiring capital at 12-13% interest and then lending money to "the members of French nation" at at least 20% interest, based on a 1698 document from the Archives of the Chamber of Commerce of Marseille, J 183. Also, the study by Jennings on credit relations in the Anatolian town of Kayseri reveals that the interest rate for individual credit and loans was up to 20%. Ronald Jennings, "Loans and Credit in Early 17th Century Ottoman Judicial Records: The Sharia Court of Anatolian Kayseri," *JESHO* 16, no 2/3 (1973): 191.

How can we explain the newly emerging money network between the janissaries and other Muslims, including *ulemas*? Marc Baer argues that there was a conscious conversion policy of the government during the seventeenth century, which led to the conversion of a non-Muslim space, the neighborhood of Eminönü, into a Muslim sacred space, which was a process enhanced by the construction of the Valide Sultan Mosque immediately following the great fire of 1660.¹⁷² The Jewish residents and artisans of Eminönü were transferred to Hasköy, being forced to sell their property to Muslims.¹⁷³ Building the mosque at Eminönü was not simply a religious act. The commercial advantage of the waterfront site was also a motivation.¹⁷⁴ One outcome of Islamicizing this densely populated commercial district was to make the economic centre of the city very much more accessible to the Muslim population. It is not hard to see that there would be Muslim merchants, investors, artisans and the like who were willing to locate themselves in the main commercial zone of Istanbul, and become more active in the urban economy. This change might have included people from among the *ulema*, considering that the *ulema* was also affected by the remarkable increase in social mobility during the seventeenth century.¹⁷⁵ There might be at least a segment of the janissary army

¹⁷² Marc David Baer, *Honored by the Glory of Islam: Conversion and Conquest in Ottoman Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 85-91.

¹⁷³ The document was a sales transaction of a house that belonged to a Jew in this neighborhood but was confiscated by the treasurer (*defterdar*) Hüseyin Pasha and auctioned. In the auction a janissary from the 31st *cemaat*, *odabaşı* Mahmud b. Haydar bought it for 22,000 *akçes*. This case gave reference to a decree that orders Jews in this area to sell their properties and donate the waqf properties to Muslims: *Hocapaşa etrafında vaki mahallatda mütemekkin yehud taifesinin bin altmış ziil-ka'desinin onuncu gününde vaki'a olan harikde müteharrik olan hanelerinin mülk olanı müslimine bey' ve vakf olani müslimine takvis etmeleri beyan-i ferman-i ala sadır olmagın* IKS 9: 178a (1072/1661).

¹⁷⁴ Lucienne Thys-Şenocak, "The Yeni Valide Mosque Complex at Eminonu," *Muqarnas* 15 (1998): 61.

¹⁷⁵ Another question that should be investigated is how the remarkable increase in social mobility, which had been blurring the boundaries between the ruling elite and the *reaya* during the seventeenth century, affected the *ulema*. Zilfi mentions that mobility was observed in the entry of new men into the circles of the *ulema* elite as well. She highlights the fact that three of the nineteen Şeyhülislam members between 1650 and 1703 were the sons of merchants, and that even though the number was limited, this was significant because the presence of Şeyhülislams of merchant origin was only observed during this period, not before or after. Madeline Zilfi, *The Politics of Piety The Ottoman Ulema in the Postclassical Age (1600-1800)* (Minneapolis, Bibliotheca Islamica, 1988), 93- 96. Another study by Ali Uğur shows that of 735 *ulema* members from the seventeenth century, 17 of them had commercial backgrounds. Ali Uğur, *The Ottoman Ulema in the Mid-Seventeenth Century* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1986). Hülya Canbakal also illustrates that in seventeenth century 'Ayntab, there was

who wanted to benefit from this shift in the urban economy by becoming lenders for the Muslims in Istanbul, including the *ulema*, who became more confident in expressing their presence due to government support of Islamic conservatism, and thus gaining an economic advantage.¹⁷⁶

It should not be forgotten that a heterodox lifestyle and a tendency towards Bektashism rather than towards orthodox Islam was more prevalent in the janissary identity, since they received their formal training according to Bektashi principles.¹⁷⁷ Moreover, the locations for janissary social gatherings were mainly at places such as coffeehouses and taverns which also became public spaces where opposition ideas were disseminated, and so were constantly raided by Kadızadelis and government officials during the seventeenth century.¹⁷⁸ Therefore, one should not jump to conclusions until the relationship between the janissaries and the *ulema* has been established more solidly. Even a cursory examination of the Istanbul court records, however, reveals that there were cases pointing to a loan relationship between the upper levels of both groups that may lead us to ask questions about a possible economic connection between a segment of the janissaries and the *ulema*. This

high social mobility towards the *askeri* class in the city, and a slight increase in the number of *seyyids*. Canbakal, *Society and Politics in an Ottoman Town*, 67-71.

The transformation of the *ulema* was observed not only in the newly included members, but also in the method of rise in their careers. Two examples that Zilfi provides from the early seventeenth century are exemplary as cases of bribery, extraordinary favoritism, and unconventional promotions: *Mulakkab* Musliheddin (d. 1648) and Cinci Hüseyin (d. 1648). Both of them managed through strategic bribing of viziers to get higher posts even though they were junior in rank. These two examples were only the tip of an iceberg of the rising problems of favoritism and bribery among the *askeri* class. Zilfi, *The Politics of Piety*, 97-99; Halil İnalcık, "Tax Collection, Embezzlement and Bribery in Ottoman Finances," *The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* 15, no. 2 (1991): 327-346.

¹⁷⁶ See chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion of the Kadızadeli movement.

¹⁷⁷ John Kingsley Birge, *The Bektashi Order of Dervishes* (London: Luzac Oriental, 1994), 75; Suraiya Faroqhi, *Anadolu'da Bektaşilik* (Istanbul: Simurg Kitabevi, 2003) 139-40; Gulay Yilmaz, "Becoming a *Devşirme*: The Trainin of Conscripted Children in the Ottoman Empire," in Gwyn Campbell, Suzanne Miers, and Joseph C. Miller ed., *Children in Slavery Through the Ages* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2009), 124-125; Cemal Kafadar, "Janissaries and Other Riffraff of Ottoman Istanbul: Rebels without a Cause?" in Baki Tezcan and Karl K. Barbir eds., *Identity and Identity Formation in the Ottoman World: A Volume of Essays in Honor of Norman Izkowitz* (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2007), 125-1.

¹⁷⁸ Kafadar, "Janissaries and Other Riffraff," 120-121.

finding might shed light on the solidarity established between the janissaries and the *ulema* during the uprisings discussed in the previous chapter. Even if no organic political connection was established between the two groups, there seems to have been common economic concerns that caused them to unite in protest.

The second important observation derived from table 4.3 is the enlarged loan activities among the janissaries. The number of janissaries giving credit to each other increased from 18 percent to 38 percent from the 1610s to the 1660s — this percentage also includes the regiment waqfs of the janissaries which will be examined below. Increased money-lending to other janissaries denotes rising exclusive economic connections among the janissaries themselves.

The ratio of janissaries who were *beşes* lending money was 76 percent in the 1610s. 22 percent of the remainder was composed of janissaries with other titles, i.e., *beg*, *çavuş*, *çorbacı*, *korucu*, *kethüda*, *agha*, and *celebi*, and 2 percent were the janissaries representing the regiment waqf. By the 1660s, the proportion of janissary lenders carrying titles other than *beşe* was essentially at the same level — 24 percent. However, an increase in *agha* involvement in loan relations from 3 percent to 15 percent is significant. Most interestingly, the proportion of *beşes* dropped to 46 percent thanks the steep rise, from 2 to 30 percent, in the number of loans granted by the regiment waqfs, in the name of their respective regiment, that is, by the *odabaşıs* of the *cema'ats* or the *çorbacıs* of the *ağa bölüks* who were responsible for processing these transactions as trustees of the waqf.

The economic connections among the janissaries shift from being on an individual basis to an institutional basis due to the usage of the regiment waqfs in new forms. The regiment waqfs were old institutions to which every single janissary had to make payment from their salaries. They gained new forms by lending out money in the seventeenth century.

Operating money as the property of the regiment waqf, they formed a capital from the surplus. This new development corresponds with the capital formation trend of the increased number of cash waqfs in the same period.

Table 4.4: The Numbers and Proportions of Janissary Lenders with Different Titles

Lender Janissaries	1020-29/ 1611-1620	percentage of total	1069-72/ 1659-1662	percentage of total
<i>Beşe</i>	29	76	17	46
Beg	4	10	1	2,5
<i>Çavuş</i>	1	3	0	0
<i>Çorbacı</i>	0	0	1	2,5
<i>Korucu</i>	0	0	1	2,5
<i>Kethüda</i>	1	3	1	2,5
Agha	1	3	5	14
<i>Çelebi</i>	1	3	0	0
Regiment waqf	1	2	11	30
TOTAL	38	100	37	100

Source: Istanbul *Şer'i Sicils*, 1020-1072/1611-1662.

Previous scholarship has not focused exclusively on the function and role of the *oda vakfı/sandığı*, or regiment waqfs. The present study does not focus on these waqfs, but I would like to present here some new findings that may contribute to the study of this topic. As far as we can learn from *Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan*, every member of the regiment had to give a certain percentage of his salary to the waqf of his regiment. This money, deducted regularly as suggested in the janissary regulations, was used to support those in need, such as the families of deceased janissaries.¹⁷⁹ During Ramadan, wealthier janissaries would donate food, candles, and firewood to the regiments to support the poorer ones. This solidarity was also maintained

¹⁷⁹ *Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan*, 178-180.

through cash donations to the regiment waqfs.¹⁸⁰ Scholars emphasize that the function of these waqfs was to help janissaries, janissary orphans in need, and other benevolent activities; however, their role and importance as cash waqfs that accumulated cash through interest is often overlooked.¹⁸¹ In order to grasp the function of the regiment waqfs as money-lenders we should have a brief look at what a cash waqf was in Ottoman society, and how the regiment waqfs compared with other cash waqfs.

Tahsin Özcan, in his extensive study of the cash waqfs in Üsküdar during the reign of Süleyman I, clearly defines the regiment waqfs as a form of cash waqf.¹⁸² These waqfs perceived money as the property of the waqf and accumulated cash through interest on the sum loaned. The cash waqf has been a debated issue among Muslim jurists. Although the origin of it is not clearly known, it has been accepted that the cash waqf was invented by the Ottomans.¹⁸³ Before the Ottomans, the immediate requirement in establishing a pious endowment was to donate solely immovable property, and the property endowed would be available forever. Since currency is movable wealth it is obviously harder to maintain in the long term, therefore monetary wealth or precious metals were exempt from both the *zakat* and waqf system.¹⁸⁴ Discussions among Hanefi jurists, however, created a literature on which the cash waqfs established themselves. The writings of Ahmed b. Hanbal (d. 241/855) accepted movable wealth, including cash, as a form of *zakat*. Although he did not approve cash waqfs, his recognition of cash as *zakat* formed the basis for the debates that legitimize the usage of

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Uzunçarşılı, *Kapıkulu Ocakları*, vol. 1, 311; Ömer L. Barkan and E. H. Ayverdi, *Istanbul Vakıflar Tahrir Defteri: 953 (1546) Tarihli* (Istanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1970), xxxvii; Özcan, *Osmanlı Para Vakıfları*, 85-86.

¹⁸² Özcan, *Osmanlı Para Vakıfları*, 85-86.

¹⁸³ Jon E. Mandaville, "Usurious Piety: Cash Waqf Controversy in the Ottoman Empire," *IJMES* 10 (1979): 289-308, esp. 289; Cemal Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds: the Construction of the Ottoman State* (Berkeley: University of California, 1995), 153; Özcan, *Osmanlı Para Vakıfları*, 10.

¹⁸⁴ Timur Kuran, "The Provision of Public Goods under Islamic Law: Origins, Impact, and Limitations of the Waqf System," *Law and Society Review* 36, no. 4 (2001): 846.

cash as benevolence under cash waqfs.¹⁸⁵ There were, however, also Ottoman jurists who opposed to the presence of the cash waqfs, regarding them as a form of usury. The debates among the two parties were vigorous.¹⁸⁶

The earliest record we have of an Ottoman cash waqf is from 826/1423 for the cash waqf of Hacı Muslihiddin b. Halil.¹⁸⁷ Also among the records of cash waqfs from the reign of Mehmed II, there is even one founded by the sultan himself for the support of butchers provisioning Istanbul, indicating that cash waqfs were legitimate to the extent that the sultan founded one as well, even though it was intensely debated among jurists.¹⁸⁸ During the sixteenth century, it is observed that the number of cash waqfs greatly increased. According to the Istanbul waqf register of 1546, 1,150 cash waqfs were registered between 1456 and 1546.¹⁸⁹ However, as Mehmet Canatar mentions, in the last two waqf *tahrir* registers for Istanbul, cash waqfs were excluded. Therefore, we do not have information on the pervasiveness of these waqfs for the seventeenth century.¹⁹⁰ Özcan's elaborations on Barkan's and Ayverdi's study on Istanbul waqf registers of the sixteenth century reveal that 15 to 16 percent of the waqfs during that period were either cash waqfs or an endowment with a combination of cash and income-generating property. Among the waqfs newly established

¹⁸⁵ Kuran, "The Provision of Public Goods," 844-848; For a detailed information on the legal debates see Jon E. Mandaville, "Usurious Piety," 298-306; Kurt, *Para Vakıfları Nazariyat ve Tatbikat*, 10-35.

¹⁸⁶ Such as Çivizade and Birgivi. Özcan, *Osmanlı Para Vakıfları*, 36-38, 47-50.

¹⁸⁷ M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, *XV-XVI. Asırlarda Edirne ve Paşa Livası Vakıflar-Mülkler-Mukataalar* (Istanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi, 1952), 272-273.

¹⁸⁸ Özcan, *Osmanlı Para Vakıfları*, 11.

¹⁸⁹ Barkan, Ömer L. and E. H. Ayverdi eds., *Istanbul Vakıflar Tahrir Defteri: 953 (1546) Tarihli* (Istanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1970).

¹⁹⁰ Mehmed Canatar, *Istanbul Vakıfları Tahrir Defteri 1009 (1600) Tarihli* (Istanbul: İstanbul Fetih Cemiyeti, 2004), xvii.

between 1546 and 1596, 35 percent were in the form of cash waqfs.¹⁹¹ This was how widespread the cash waqfs were on the eve of the seventeenth century.¹⁹²

The importance of cash waqfs goes beyond their pious function in the sense that cash waqfs had the specific function of accumulating cash. The endowed capital of the waqf was given to borrowers for a certain period of time and paid back to the waqf with an extra amount, that was not explicitly called interest (*ribh*), but was rather referred to as *çuha bahası* (cloth money) or *kul akçesi* (money for the *kul*), due to the legal concerns and restrictions applied with regard to interest. Murat Çizakça correctly highlights the fact that these were important endowments that provided money for the people and injected capital into the economy.¹⁹³ In a way, they helped fulfill the need for cash in a society where there were no banks. In a similar vein, we see that regiment waqfs, which were solely cash waqfs, belonged to the same type of institution that fulfilled the credit needs of society in Istanbul.

Cash waqfs contributed to the process of capital accumulation. Not only did the users accumulate cash by managing the loans they had obtained from the cash waqfs, but also the waqf that was lending the money enlarged its capital through the interest returned.¹⁹⁴ Regiment waqfs worked with the same mentality.

Once we recall that there was only one record of loan transactions performed through regiment waqfs in the 1610s, and that within fifty years' time this rose to become 30 percent

¹⁹¹ Özcan, *Osmanlı Para Vakıfları*, 14.

¹⁹² For cash waqfs in Anatolia, and the Arab provinces see Feridun Emecen, *XVI. Asırda Manisa Kazası* (Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 1989); Gökbilgin, *Edirne ve Paşa Livası*; Ronald Jennings, "Loans and Credit in Early 17th Century Ottoman Judicial Records," 168-216; Abdul-Karim Rafeq, "The Syrian Ulama, Ottoman Law and Islamic Sharia," *Turcica* 26 (1994): 9-32; Bruce Masters, *The Origins of Western Economic Dominance in the Middle East* (New York, Albany: State University of New York, 1988).

¹⁹³ Çizakça, "Cash Waqfs of Bursa 1555-1823," 333-336.

¹⁹⁴ Çizakça examined 1,563 cash waqfs in Bursa during 963/1555-1239/1823. He ensured that the cash waqfs, even though applying an interest rate less than the market rate, all produced returns of 9-12%, except from 4 of them. Çizakça, "Cash Waqfs of Bursa 1555-1823," 331.

of all the observed loan records, it may be considered that there was a gradual increase of cash accumulating through the waqfs and this may point to the emergence of a body of janissaries who were bound to each other economically within their regiments. This turns the regiments into groups with common economic interests. Cash accumulation occurred not only at the individual level, but also at the institutional level, which must have fostered additional solidarity within the regiment. The lending of money was becoming institutionalized. We do not have enough information on how the surplus money from lending activities was spent; however, it seems that the observed accumulation of cash by janissaries in the mid-seventeenth century was also true for the janissary regiment waqfs. If the account registers of these waqfs could be located in the Prime Ministry Archives they could reveal valuable information on the usage of the surplus. Unfortunately, my attempts to find them proved futile.

If we move from the lender janissaries to the borrowers, the answer to the question of who lent money to the janissaries confirms that the regiment waqf was also an institution that regulated the credit networks among janissaries in the mid-seventeenth century (Table 4.5). The regiment waqfs, which indicated the institutionalization of janissary money-lending activities, became one of the important institutions to which janissaries could turn for money. It is seen that use of this system became seven times more common than in the 1610s. Moreover, we can conclude that there was a shift of lending from civilian waqfs to regiment waqfs, as well as a shift from personal janissary lenders to regiment waqfs. Borrowing from individual janissaries dropped from 39 percent to 16 percent, as there was a distinct rise in the borrowing from regiment waqfs.

The use of regiment waqfs by the janissaries can also be detected in the probate registers. 11 percent of the janissaries were recorded as having passed away with an outstanding debt to regiment waqfs.

Table 4.5: The Numbers and Proportions of Different Social Groups Gave Credits to the Janissaries

Lenders to Janissaries	1020-29/ 1611-1620 ¹⁹⁵	percentage of total	1069-72/ 1662 ¹⁹⁶	1659- percentage of total
Janissaries	7	39	6	21
<i>Zimmis</i>	1	5.5	2	7
Muslim (exc. janissaries)	3	16.5	7	25
Women	1	5.5	3	11
Waqf	5	28	3	11
Regiment waqf	1	5.5	11	25
TOTAL	18	100	28	100

Source: Istanbul *Şer'i Sicils*, 1020-1073/1611-1662.

Once again, these were not taken out only by janissaries in economic need but even by those who possessed big fortunes. We can recall Osman Agha from *mehteran-ı hassa* who had a fortune of 1,704,515 *akçes* and owed 3,000 to the regiment waqf of the 2nd *oda*, and 5,000 to the regiment waqf of the 4th *oda*.¹⁹⁷ Another agha, Muhzir Ahmed Agha b. Ali, whose fortune was predominantly based on cash and credit relations, owed 37,500 *akçes* to a regiment waqf. His net estate was 496,252 *akçes*, of which 441,276 *akçes* was in cash.¹⁹⁸ The third agha who based his fortune on credit relations was Hasan Agha b. Oruç. He was killed on pilgrimage and left 468,356 *akçes* net estate. He owed 30,000 *akçes* to a regiment waqf at the time of his death.¹⁹⁹ Not only wealthy janissaries used regiment waqfs for their credit

¹⁹⁵ See Appendix 5.

¹⁹⁶ See Appendix 7.

¹⁹⁷ KA 5: 94b (1071/1661).

¹⁹⁸ KA 6: 136b (1078/1667).

¹⁹⁹ KA 6: 53b (1078/1667).

needs. Ahmed Beşe b. Ferhad possessed wealth based solely on cash activities as far as his probate register indicates. He passed away with cash to the amount of 15,260 *akçes*; however, he had obtained a loan of 1,060 *akçe* from his regiment waqf. His net estate was 14,195 *akçes*, with the deduction of some basic fees from his probate register.²⁰⁰ Mustafa Beşe b. Abdullah, who possessed a net estate of 5,341 *akçes*, owed 7,800 *akçes* to his regiment's waqf.²⁰¹ These examples prove that the function of the regiment waqfs surpassed the goal of helping janissaries in need and became an institution that gave loans with interest. If we were to speculate we would see the regiment waqfs as institutions that supplied the fiscal needs of janissary investors. However, this did not mean that regiment waqfs gave credit exclusively to janissaries.

The comparative study of probate registers and court records enables us to see that the regiment waqfs served as an institution that met the needs of people looking for credit and that, indeed, most – but not all – were janissaries. Out of 11 loans recorded as being given by the waqfs of various regiments recorded in the court registers, 6 of them were to janissaries, 3 of them were to *zimmis*, and one of them to a woman.²⁰²

Now let us look into the general outlook of the lenders to the janissaries, and the other conclusions the data from the court registers disclose. Table 4.5 reflects that when we examine the first half of the seventeenth century, although *zimmis* were the majority who borrowed money from the janissaries, they were not strong lenders to the janissaries. 5.5 percent of the janissary debt was to *zimmis* and that rose only to 7 percent in the mid-seventeenth century. Another group of lenders was the waqfs established by Muslims, and

²⁰⁰ KA 3: 35a (1048/1638).

²⁰¹ KA 5: 121a (1072/1661).

²⁰² Loans given to janissaries: IKS 9: 4a, no. 22 (1071/1660); IKS 9: 48a (1071/1660), IKS 9: 82b (1071/1660); IKS 9: 169a (1072/1661); IKS 9: 180a (1072/1661); IKS 9: 227a (1072/662). To *zimmis*: IKS 7: 7a, no. 43 (1070/1659); IKS 9: 41b (1071/1660); IKS 9: 46b (1071/1660). To a woman: IKS 9: 33b (1071/1660).

individual Muslims; their ratio being 28 percent and 16.5 percent, respectively. However, if we consider the Muslims and the individual waqfs established by Muslims as one source from which money was borrowed (44.5 %), they appear to be the majority of lenders to the janissaries in the first half of the seventeenth century. In the 1660s, this percentage decreases to 36 percent in total.

When we compare the ratios of lenders to janissaries from 1611-1620 to the ratios of those from 1659-1662, the percentage of Muslims lending money to the janissaries rose from 16.5 to 25 percent. This rise also includes two cases with the *ulema*. Therefore, in the 1660s we find not only *ulema* debtors but also lenders to the janissaries. Even though the number of cases was limited to two, they could point to a lending relationship which was probably at a primitive level during the mid-seventeenth century. Among the cases that were examined, Şaban Agha, a janissary *beytülmal emini* (an officer dealing with the distribution of inheritances), borrowed 1,206 *akçes* from *müezzinbaşı* (the chief preacher) Mustafa Agha b. Zülfikar.²⁰³ Ahmed Beşe b. Memi from the 43rd *yayabaşıs* (regiment of foot soldiers) borrowed 250 *riyal gurus* from Ahmed Efendi b. Hüseyin el-imam in 1662.²⁰⁴ Therefore, the monetary relationship between janissaries and the *ulema* was working in the opposite direction, as well.

As was mentioned, there was a capital formation in the seventeenth century, mainly through interregional trade, money-lending, growing wheat and raising livestock and trading them, and through using money under cash waqfs in order to accumulate cash. This chapter has revealed that the economic dealings in which the janissaries were involved during the early seventeenth century reflected this trend.

²⁰³ IKS 9: 194a (1072/1661).

²⁰⁴ IKS 9: 256a (1072/1662). The exchange rate of *riyal gurus* to *akçe* in around 1662 was 88 to 110.

Predominantly due to the debasement of coinage, janissary salaries turned out to be limited incomes that pushed the janissaries to live in more difficult conditions in the seventeenth century. When we examined the distribution of wealth among janissaries during the early seventeenth century, it was seen that there were janissaries living in poverty. Some of the rest took the initiative and engaged in trade in various fields. Their involvement took place within a broad spectrum. The janissaries were most prominent in the textile industry, trade in food supplies and selling them in Istanbul markets, grain wholesale, and the meat sector. In the meat sector they were quite prevalent as butchers, and were also involved in meat provisioning, candle-making, tanning, and cooking animal parts. Finally, they were in the market as coffeehouse owners and barbers.

The new wealth, however, was formed largely through the credit economy. The investigation of the janissaries' loan relations as reflected in the Istanbul court registers and the probate registers of janissaries in the '*askeri kassam* registers, reveals that (1) saving cash was the main method of accumulating wealth among janissaries, similar to the general pattern among the '*askeri*, and (2) whether they were lenders or debtors, there was an increase in the loan transactions involving janissaries in the mid-seventeenth century. The credit relations in which they were engaged illustrate that these activities took place mostly among themselves, indicating a likely class solidarity. This solidarity took an institutional form when the regiment waqfs became more prevalent in monetary transactions in the name of each regiment, in the same fashion as cash waqfs. This transformed the military regiments into common economic interest groups.

CONCLUSION

This dissertation does not present a snapshot in time of the life of janissaries, but tries to reconstruct the experience of the janissaries in the first half of seventeenth century Istanbul through a study of various aspects of their involvement in city life. To learn daily practices and hear authentic voices of the janissaries, various sources were used comparatively, primarily court records and probate, salary, and conscription registers. Their experiences in this particular period were very different, in specific ways, than in earlier centuries due to some major changes in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. The most important transformations that had direct impact on the way janissaries existed in Istanbul were changing techniques of warfare after the military revolution in Europe, and the changes in the fiscal workings of the Ottoman state.

The *devshirme* system was directly influenced by the military revolution of the time. This system can be interpreted as an assimilative institution which educated “others” of the empire to turn into “us.” The *devshirme* system loosened during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century. As this research proves older boys began to be accepted into the system and the practice of placement in a Muslim family in nearby Turkish villages was dropped, which had been the first major step in teaching conscripted boys Turkish and Islamic practices. It is also known that the Ottoman state started to enlist the Muslim *re‘aya*, or commoners who were tax-paying Muslim subjects, into the janissary army during this period. Therefore, Muslim boys became new human resources for the janissary army in addition to the Christian levies. The significance of tracing the modification of the *devshirme* system and the introduction of other methods of conscription in studying the janissaries in their urban context is that it informs us on the shift in the profiles of janissaries in Istanbul compared to those in previous centuries. The novice janissaries of this period were older boys with less

language skills who were directly placed as laborers in Istanbul and its surroundings, or those who were of Muslim *re'aya* origin.

It is important to stress that through the *devshirme* system a conscripted boy had an opportunity for upward mobility and that based on the merit system one could potentially carve out a career. In contrast to the existence of nobility in Europe this system has been interpreted as an advantage for the people. The less stressed are other functions of the *devshirme* system in Ottoman society. The stories of the rest of the *devshirmes* who could not make it to the palace are usually seen less important, however, the effects of the *devshirme* system are better understood when those who were introduced to Ottoman society through the system and stayed in the lower echelons are studied. This study highlights the function of the *devshirme* system as an institution organizing unfree labor. The conscripted boys were used as laborers in state enterprises such as state workshops and warehouses, mines, ships, and various artisanal fields. The obligatory service in these fields continued after they were promoted as janissaries as well. It is important to see that the experience gained as unfree labor was most likely to pave the way for the janissary involvement in the city's economic life.

Various cities, especially the provincial centers, were affected by the expansion of the janissary army. Studies done on cities such as Cairo, Aleppo, or Candia show that an increased number of janissaries, who were eager to settle in the cities and acquire a share of the economic resources of the city, began to intermingle with the locals. New power struggles and conflicts between the wealthy local elites and recently arrived janissaries generated new local elites that became institutionalized under the office of the Head Notable (*re'isü'l-a'yan*) in the eighteenth century. In the meantime, seventeenth century civilian-soldier interactions transformed the civic institutions in the cities, which make the study of military strata in the

urban space a legitimate research agenda. Istanbul was one of the most effected cities since the janissary population skyrocketed in Istanbul during the first half of the seventeenth century. The number of people affiliated with the janissary army in Istanbul was almost twenty percent of the city population, excluding their households.

This study addresses the elements of civic society in Istanbul in relation to the residential neighborhoods and guilds. The residential patterns of the janissaries outside the barracks indicate that the janissaries were not segregated from the city population at large, but were dispersed throughout the intramural city, which fostered further interaction with civilians. But more importantly, there were areas of consolidation in their residential patterns. One of the neighborhoods of consolidation was Yenibahçe, which was a neighborhood used as a settlement place after the two big fires of the seventeenth century, in 1633 and 1660, while the barracks were under repair. The second area was the neighborhoods around Meat Square, the old and new janissary barracks, and Aksaray. The last area was concentrated in the more prestigious neighborhoods closer to the Hippodrome. Higher economic status of the janissaries who resided in the neighborhoods closer to the politico-military center of the city indicates that the socio-topography of the city was not only determined by the ethno-religious differentiations as was suggested by the Weberian “Islamic city” model that established a contrast between the “Oriental cities” and the European “Burgher cities”; the economic factors were also a determinant in the divisions between neighborhoods.¹

Guilds were also subject to transformation due to the urbanization of the janissaries during the seventeenth century. Examination of around 400 cases confirms that janissaries

¹ Weber, *The City*, Don Martindale and Gertrud Neuwirth trans. and ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1966), 111-12. Bryan Turner, *Islam: Islam, State, and Politics* (London: Routledge, 1974), 100-103. See also Bryan Turner, *Weber and Islam: A Critical Study* (London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974); H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952); Ira Lapidus, *Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Harvard, 1967). It should be noted that Lapidus proposes a more nuanced interpretation of “Islamic city” which emphasizes a social process rather than an established form.

were present in a broad range of occupations, and were even quite powerful in a few of them, such as the textile industry, trade in food supplies, wholesale grain, and the meat sector. In the meat sector they were quite predominant as butchers, but were also involved in meat provisioning, candle-making, tanning, and cooking animal parts. The documents also reveal that as we reach the mid-seventeenth century, there was a significant increase in the frequency of janissary appearances in court as members of various guilds. This is interpreted as a manifestation of a two-way movement between the soldiers and artisans. The increased artisanal activity among the janissaries was not only due to the janissary infiltration of the guilds but also because of the entry of artisans into the ranks of janissary regiments. The material benefits and privileges accruing to the janissary class became more appealing to the artisans who also tried to protect themselves from deteriorating economic conditions and rising taxes. The blurring of social boundaries was also reflected in the combined soldier-civilian uprisings, where artisans and janissaries were supporting each other.

The seventeenth century represented a period of transition in fiscal policies, where the source of state revenue shifted from agricultural yields (*timars*) to lump-sum cash levies. Urban and agrarian taxes such as the extraordinary levies and the poll tax began to be farmed out to tax-collectors more often. Short-term tax-farming became a new method of collecting taxes from urban and agrarian communities which marked a transition to the life-time tax-farming (*malikane*) system of the eighteenth century. Not only did state revenue shift from agricultural yields to cash levies during the early seventeenth century, but it also was redistributed. The janissaries were among those who received tax-farms as grants in return for their salaries which the state was unable to pay. In the case of Istanbul this transformation was reflected in the loan transactions recorded in the court records. It is observed that non-Muslim communities started taking out loans from janissaries to pay the taxes due on them.

The active involvement of janissaries in loan transactions was also reflective of the evolution of a capital formation process in the early modern Ottoman society that was mainly through interregional trade, money-lending, growing wheat and raising livestock and trading in both of them, and through employing money under cash waqfs in order to accumulate cash. This trend was occurred in the larger cities of the Ottoman Empire such as Istanbul, Bursa, and Edirne, and the present study reveals that some janissaries were part of it.

Judging from a survey of Istanbul court registers and probate registers, new wealth was formed largely through a credit economy, and saving cash was the main method of accumulating wealth among janissaries, similar to the general pattern among the *'askeri*. There was an increase in loan transactions of the janissaries in the mid-seventeenth century. They were shown to be regularly lending money to other urban social groups, indicating the degree to which they had become integrated into urban economy.

Even though the dispersed residence patterns, as well as increased artisanal activities and intensive money-lending to other urban social groups suggest their integration into the urban economy, this did not mean that the janissaries' internal bonds dissolved. The data on the credit relations that they were engaged in demonstrates that these activities took place mostly among themselves indicating that a kind of class consciousness emerged among them. It is observed that this consciousness turned into a solidarity that took an institutional form when the regiment waqfs became more active in managing money in the name of each regiment. This was again the reflection of a general trend in society where cash waqfs had already been used as the instruments of accumulating cash, since the regiment waqfs were operated with the same logic. The emergence of regiment waqfs as a new way of accumulating cash in the hands of the regiments allowed them to preserve their identity as an interest group and even strengthen them through transforming this bond into an institutionalized economic activity.

These developments necessitate revisiting the debates on slavery and the extent of loyalty of the janissaries to the sultan. As discussed before, the ruling classes of the Ottoman Empire which were *devshirme* in origin until the late sixteenth century had already an ambivalent slave status mainly because of the privileges given to them, most importantly having the right to maintain their own households. After the civilianization process in the seventeenth century new alignments in and outside the regimental system created a certain autonomy for the janissaries. Establishing closer relationships with the artisans and to a certain extent with the *ulema*, and turning regiments into economic interest groups most likely broke their solidarity to the state and its fighting force in general, and altered their view of the sultan. This shift was reflected in the janissary revolts of the seventeenth century, which enables us to interpret them not as mutinies within the army, but more as popular urban protests that comprised civilians as well.

Popular revolts of various kinds in Europe and Asia were a reality of the early modern era. In the century of “crisis and change,” the changing role of the state in the economy and failures in meeting its responsibilities to its subjects that were defined in a paternalistic economy caused protests. Urban protests in many early modern cities such as London, Paris, Moscow, Cairo, and Damascus were primarily triggered by economic reasons. People protested the shortage of food, lack of employment, and increased taxes. The reactions of the protestors should be read, this study argues, as the struggles of people who were familiar with the rules and notions of a paternalistic economy as they were confronted with new fiscal practices. The rules of paternalistic economy gave the masses the right to protest whenever their rights within the system were violated.

The janissary-led urban protests in Istanbul in the first half of the seventeenth century had common features with urban protests of other major early modern cities. Their main

purpose was to resist economic policies such as the introduction of new taxes, low wages, delayed salary payments, or the debasement of coinage, all of which affected them closely. In almost all of the janissary protests in Istanbul during the first half of the seventeenth century, the anger of the protestors was mainly directed against the authorities responsible for finances and those in charge of paying the janissary salaries. It is also shown in this study that the civilian population of Istanbul also participated in these protests sharing some common concerns with the soldiers.

This study examined the ways in which the janissaries established their ties with urban society during the social and political transformations of the Ottoman Empire in the first half of the seventeenth century. The case of Istanbul illustrates that, in the broader trajectory of Ottoman history, the general patterns of enlargement of early modern armies, along with the changes in the fiscal policies of the Ottoman state affected the interactions of urban social groups with each other. The janissaries became part of this urban scene during the first half of the seventeenth century and their interactions with civic culture transformed both them as a social group as well as the urban culture of Istanbul as a whole.

APPENDIX 1

DISTRIBUTION OF JANISSARIES IN FORTRESSES IN 1663-64 ACCORDING TO KK 6599

Bölük	Bagdad	Van	Uyvar	Crete	Midilli/ Movalak	Acem/ Iran	T	Kerkuk	Hania	Bosnia	Damascus	Other Places	Total in Fortress	Remaining In Istanbul	Absent	Total No
1. Ağa Bölüğü	5		3		2	2						2	14	733	63	747
2. Ağa Bölüğü	174			13	5							6	198	18		216
3. Ağa Bölüğü	4	6		9								4	23	170	40	193
4. Ağa Bölüğü	137			4	19							3	163	25		188
5. Ağa Bölüğü	8	27	2	3	3	5		4				6	58	482	67	540
6. Ağa Bölüğü	8	2		6	7							16	39	171	34	210
7. Ağa Bölüğü	21	20	1	14	1	2						8	67	325	57	392
8. Ağa Bölüğü	2			11	1					8		0	22	266	50	288

Bölük	Bagdad	Van	Uyvar	Crete	Midilli/ Movalak	Acem/ Iran	T	Kerkuk	Hania	Bosnia	Damascus	Other Places	Total in Fortress	Remaining In Istanbul	Absent	Total No
9. Ağa Bölüğü	127			2	1							1	131	32		163
10. Ağa Bölüğü	2			3	2		153					20	180	35		215
11. Ağa Bölüğü	1	2		3	1	5						14	26	195	38	221
12. Ağa Bölüğü	2			26		2						1	31	146	39	177
13. Ağa Bölüğü	12	4		3								0	19	191		210
14. Ağa Bölüğü	10	2	6	10	2	5		2				19	56	221	51	277
15. Ağa Bölüğü	12	4		11	1								28	277	50	305
16. Ağa Bölüğü				1		4	211			11		12	239	35		274
17. Ağa Bölüğü	1	6		14	3	1						5	30	332	49	362
18. Ağa Bölüğü	7	4	209	15		5							240	52	40	292

Bölük	Bagdad	Van	Uyvar	Crete	Midilli/ Movalak	Acem/ Iran	T	Kerkuk	Hania	Bosnia	Damascus	Other Places	Total in Fortress	Remaining In Istanbul	Absent	Total No
19. Ağa Bölüğü	3	1			4	6			175				189	23		212
20. Ağa Bölüğü	27	1	4		3	6	146						187	67		254
21. Ağa Bölüğü	245			5	2	5				4			261	43		304
22. Ağa Bölüğü	8	3	6	4									21	203	56	224
23. Ağa Bölüğü	12	3	169	11	2	4	14			6		10	231	74		305
24. Ağa Bölüğü	5	2		13		5				8		3	36	311	1	347
25. Ağa Bölüğü	3			8	4	2							17	311	48	328
26. Ağa Bölüğü	16	2			7	3				3		7	38	238		276
27. Ağa Bölüğü	8	4		10	4	2						6	34	187	30	221
28. Ağa Bölüğü	6	4		6	11	9							36	263	38	299

Bölük	Bagdad	Van	Uyvar	Crete	Midilli/ Movalak	Acem/ Iran	T	Kerkuk	Hania	Bosnia	Damascus	Other Places	Total in Fortress	Remaining In Istanbul	Absent	Total No
29. Ağa Bölüğü	9	2	1	234	1					2		3	252	37		289
30. Ağa Bölüğü	15	7	1	4	3	4							34	231	53	265
31. Ağa Bölüğü	22	1		17		3					15	10	68	429	61	497
32. Ağa Bölüğü	2			5		14					3	5	29	166	15	195
33. Ağa Bölüğü	5	4		99	1					2			111	17		128
34. Ağa Bölüğü	10	6		7	15	15						4	57	450	84	507
35. Ağa Bölüğü	3			146		2					1	1	153	27		180
36. Ağa Bölüğü	9			108		1						6	124	17	4	141
37. Ağa Bölüğü	1	2	1	2		3	3						12	368	73	380
38. Ağa Bölüğü	71			10	4	1				1			87	132		219

Bölük	Bagdad	Van	Uyvar	Crete	Midilli/ Movalak	Acem/ Iran	T	Kerkuk	Hania	Bosnia	Damascus	Other Places	Total in Fortress	Remaining In Istanbul	Absent	Total No
39. Ağa Bölüğü	3		222	7	2	2						8	244	42		286
40. Ağa Bölüğü	19			2								1	22	137	57	159
41. Ağa Bölüğü	3			1	5	4						6	19	216	51	235
42. Ağa Bölüğü	1			7	2	1							11	234	48	245
43. Ağa Bölüğü	30			3		1						7	41	168	42	209
44. Ağa Bölüğü	8	1		232						2		2	245	53		298
45. Ağa Bölüğü		2		15	1	6				4		18	46	267	62	313
46. Ağa Bölüğü	168			6	2								176	39		215
47. Ağa Bölüğü	15			15	1	3						1	35	150	48	185
48. Ağa Bölüğü	10	3		4	2							5	24	195	45	219

Bölük	Bagdad	Van	Uyvar	Crete	Midilli/ Movalak	Acem/ Iran	T	Kerkuk	Hania	Bosnia	Damascus	Other Places	Total in Fortress	Remaining In Istanbul	Absent	Total No
49. Ağa Bölüğü	5	6		126	1	2						3	143	15		158
50. Ağa Bölüğü	3	3	1	16	1	2							26	212	28	238
51. Ağa Bölüğü	12	3	1	11	1	4			4				36	380	55	416
52. Ağa Bölüğü				144	1	1						5	151	30		181
53. Ağa Bölüğü	5	134		3								3	145	62	40	228
54. Ağa Bölüğü	21	10		157	1	1			1			4	195	406		601
55. Ağa Bölüğü	3	4	189	14	2	2						4	218	36		257
56. Ağa Bölüğü	27	22		19	7	6						7	88	198	73	544
57. Ağa Bölüğü	213			4	1	2			1	1			222	64		286
58. Ağa Bölüğü	11	6	172	4	5	5							203	21		224

Bölük	Bagdad	Van	Uyvar	Crete	Midilli/ Movalak	Acem/ Iran	T	Kerkuk	Hania	Bosnia	Damascus	Other Places	Total in Fortress	Remaining In Istanbul	Absent	Total No
59. Ağa Bölüğü	5	11			1	10							27	20	47	267
60. Ağa Bölüğü	7	2		6	5	4						13	37	268	48	305
61. Ağa Bölüğü	6			125		1							132	55		187
Bölüks Sum	1588	326	988	1758	150	173	527	6	181	52	19	259	6027	10568	1685	17097

Cemaat	Bagdad	Van	Uyvar	Crete	Midilli/ Movalak	Acem/ Iran	T	Kerkuk	Hania	Bosnia	Damascus	Other Places	Total in Fortress	Remaining in Istanbul	Absent	Total No
1. Cemaat	3			2		2					202	1	210	19		229
2. Cemaat	1	1		80	7	2							91	23		114
3. Cemaat	4	2		84		1					1	4	96	84		180
4. Cemaat	29	3	5	20	1	1							59	379	62	438
5. Cemaat	5	1							181			3	190	17		207
6. Cemaat	3	1		155		2						2	163	24		187
7. Cemaat	120			7								2	129	1		130
8. Cemaat	4	3		6	3					1		6	23	95		118

Cemaat	Bagdad	Van	Uyvar	Crete	Midilli/ Movalak	Acem/ Iran	T	Kerkuk	Hania	Bosnia	Damascus	Other Places	Total in Fortress	Remaining in Istanbul	Absent	Total No
9. Cemaat	6	1		85	2	1						5	100	24		124
10. Cemaat	90			4	1								95	12		107
11. Cemaat	125			7		1						2	135	19		154
12. Cemaat	97			6				1		1		3	108	16		114
13. Cemaat	6	1		8	1	2				1		4	23	135		158
14. Cemaat	7	10		2								3	22	269	56	291
15. Cemaat	2	6				10							18	27		183
16. Cemaat	13	3		4	1	1						1	23	106		129
17. Cemaat	91			2	2			1					96	13		109
18. Cemaat	1			7		1				1		178	188	24		212
19. Cemaat	3		2			4				3		137	149	19		168
20. Cemaat	126	1		2	3								132	11		143
21. Cemaat				4								87	91	14		105
22. Cemaat	2	2		113						2		2	121	9		132
23. Cemaat	5	1		115	1	1						5	128	26		154
24. Cemaat	8				3				139	2			152	23		175
25. Cemaat				3		1							4	102		106
26. Cemaat	104			6	2	1							113	16		129
27. Cemaat	15	1	1	12	1	1							31	249	57	280
28. Cemaat	118	1		14		1		2		1			137	32		169
29. Cemaat			130	5	1	1						2	139	59	33	198

Cemaat	Bagdad	Van	Uyvar	Crete	Midilli/ Movalak	Acem/ Iran	T	Kerkuk	Hania	Bosnia	Damascus	Other Places	Total in Fortress	Remaining in Istanbul	Absent	Total No
30. Cemaat	8	4			1								13	190	39	203
31. Cemaat	1		179	1		5							186	36	44	222
32. Cemaat	2	1		4	4	165						2	178	11		189
33. Cemaat	2			2								4	8	122		130
34. Cemaat	2	2		95	1	4						3	107	16		123
35. Cemaat	101	1		9	1					1			113	6		119
36. Cemaat	86	1		7								3	97	22		119
37. Cemaat	5			9	114								128	23		151
38. Cemaat	207	1		5	3	1				1		15	233	35		268
39. Cemaat	15			5	10			1		165		1	197	31		228
40. Cemaat	135			2						2			139	16		155
41. Cemaat	4	2							91			9	106	21		127
42. Cemaat				122		3						6	131	18		149
43. Cemaat	5	3		7		3							18	212	39	250
44. Cemaat			164	2	8	15			1			12	202	28		230
45. Cemaat	1			5	2				1			98	107	13		120
46. cemaat	1	1		95		1				1			99	36		137
47. Cemaat	1			9		2		130					142	23		165
48. Cemaat	8	1										3	12	245	21	257
49. Cemaat	3	1		7		6							17	231		248
50. Cemaat	2	2		5	4							109	122	24		146

Cemaat	Bagdad	Van	Uyvar	Crete	Midilli/ Movalak	Acem/ Iran	T	Kerkuk	Hania	Bosnia	Damascus	Other Places	Total in Fortress	Remaining in Istanbul	Absent	Total No
51. Cemaat		3			1	1			142	5		6	158	42		200
52. Cemaat	2	1				3				2		176	184	22		207
53. Cemaat	125					1						1	127	25		152
54. Cemaat	3	92		2		1						2	100	21		121
55. Cemaat	11			115		2						2	130	36		166
56. Cemaat	11	1				1	135					3	151	47		198
57. Cemaat	6	3				3						2	14	184	28	255
58. Cemaat	6			100	2	3						8	119	9		128
59. Cemaat	8			3	3	2					11		27	263	44	290
60. Cemaat (Sekbans)	3	5		13	5	21			1			12	60	294		359
61. Cemaat (Sekbans)	13	13		13	4	20						2	65	316		382
62. Cemaat (Sekbans)	9	7		54	6							6	82	256		338
63. Cemaat (Sekbans)	3	2		10	10	11				3		6	45	313		358
64. Cemaat (zAğarcı)	4	2		16	2	12						4	40	383	59	423
65. Cemaat (Sekbans)													0	45		45

Cemaat	Bagdad	Van	Uyvar	Crete	Midilli/ Movalak	Acem/ Iran	T	Kerkuk	Hania	Bosnia	Damascus	Other Places	Total in Fortress	Remaining in Istanbul	Absent	Total No
65/1. Bölük (Sekbans)									66				66	11		77
65/2. Bölük (Sekbans)	37												37	14		51
65/3. Bölük (Sekbans)		2			1				67			1	71	5		76
65/4. Bölük (Sekbans)						1			63				64	7		71
65/5. Bölük (Sekbans)		1			1				40				42	5		47
65/6. Bölük (Sekbans)						1							1	57		58
65/7. Bölük (Sekbans)	40				3				2				45	13		53
65/8. Bölük (Sekbans)						56							56	3		59
65/9. Bölük (Sekbans)		1				188			1			1	191	9		200
65/10. Bölük (Sekbans)	2				64				3	1			70	10		80

Cemaat	Bagdad	Van	Uyvar	Crete	Midilli/ Movalak	Acem/ Iran	T	Kerkuk	Hania	Bosnia	Damascus	Other Places	Total in Fortress	Remaining in Istanbul	Absent	Total No
65/11. Bölük (Sekbans)	50								2			1	53	8		61
65/12. Bölük (Sekbans)	1								69			2	72	6		78
65/13. Bölük (Sekbans)						2			48			2	52	9		61
65/14. Bölük (Sekbans)	47	5						1	1				54	9		63
65/15. Bölük (Sekbans)													0	67		67
65/16. Bölük (Sekbans)	1								1				2	61		63
65/17. Bölük (Sekbans)									78	1		1	80	7		87
65/18. Bölük (Sekbans)	5				2				99	2		7	115	23		138

Cemaat	Bagdad	Van	Uyvar	Crete	Midilli/ Movalak	Acem/ Iran	T	Kerkuk	Hania	Bosnia	Damascus	Other Places	Total in Fortress	Remaining in Istanbul	Absent	Total No
65/19. Bölük (Sekbans)		55											55	6		61
65/20. Bölük (Sekbans)	1				1	1			60				63	7		70
65/21. Bölük (Sekbans)	2	37										1	40	3		43
65/22. Bölük (Sekbans)	2	1			1	64							68	49		177
65/23. Bölük (Sekbans)		1			40				6				47	0		47
65/24. Bölük (Sekbans)		93			1	1						1	96	26		122
65/25. Bölük (Sekbans)	1	4							68			1	74	4		78
65/26. Bölük (Sekbans)				1		1			4		2		8	62		152

Cemaat	Bagdad	Van	Uyvar	Crete	Midilli/ Movalak	Acem/ Iran	T	Kerkuk	Hania	Bosnia	Damascus	Other Places	Total in Fortress	Remaining in Istanbul	Absent	Total No
65/27. Bölük (Sekbans)					1	1			1			61	64	6		70
65/28. Bölük (Sekbans)		66							3				69	47		74
65/29. Bölük (Sekbans)				2					2			104	108	18		116
65/30. Bölük (Sekbans)	42								3				45	7		52
65/31. Bölük (Sekbans)	1								96			4	101	51		110
65/32. Bölük (Sekbans)						45							45	94		152
65/33. Bölük (Sekbans)													0	139		139

Cemaat	Bagdad	Van	Uyvar	Crete	Midilli/ Movalak	Acem/ Iran	T	Kerkuk	Hania	Bosnia	Damascus	Other Places	Total in Fortress	Remaining in Istanbul	Absent	Total No
65/34. Bölük (Sekbans)										1		84	85	0		85
66. Cemaat	282			3								3	288	53		341
67. Cemaat	2	1	300							1		1	305	36		330
68. Cemaat	9			403	1	1						9	423	45		468
69. Cemaat	4			1					93			6	104	14		118
70. Cemaat	84			1		1					2	4	92	14		106
71. Cemaat	35	27		10	15	7						5	99	432	69	531
72. Cemaat	6	1		121		1				1		1	131	10		141
73. Cemaat		1		123		1						3	128	13		147
74. Cemaat	3	6			1	1			197			4	212	15		227
75. Cemaat	3	2		1		1							7	238	27	245
76. Cemaat	13			6		1						3	23	128	46	151
77. Cemaat	2	5		5								2	14	153	30	167
78. Cemaat				1	1							2	4	134	43	142
79. Cemaat	7			104	2							4	117	21		138
80. Cemaat	88			3	1							2	94	11		105
81. cemaat	2	1		98								2	103	10		113
82. Cemaat	2		9	3	1	1	166			1		10	193	47		240
83. Cemaat	104			5	1			1		2			113	5		118

Cemaat	Bagdad	Van	Uyvar	Crete	Midilli/ Movalak	Acem/ Iran	T	Kerkuk	Hania	Bosnia	Damascus	Other Places	Total in Fortress	Remaining in Istanbul	Absent	Total No
103. Cemaat														43		43
Cemaats Sum	2820	658	793	2878	374	1340	301	138	1633	203	218	1906	13262	8938	858	22474
SUM	4408	484	1781	4636	524	1513	828	144	1854	255	237	2165	19460	19506	2543	39571

APPENDIX 2

THE NUMBER OF AFFILIATED MEMBERS TO EACH CEMAAT AND AĞA BÖLÜK IN THE JANISSARY ARMY IN 1663-4 ACCORDING TO KK 6599

Bölük	Janissaries (incl. guards)	Korucus (guards)	Tekaiüds (retired)	Nanhoran (orphans)
1. Ağa bölüğü	747	29	190	34
2. Ağa bölüğü	216	11	72	14
3. Ağa bölüğü	193	1	40	12
4. Ağa bölüğü	188	5	34	12
5. Ağa bölüğü	540	15	73	26
6. Ağa bölüğü	210	4	53	16
7. Ağa bölüğü	392	24	133	12
8. Ağa bölüğü	288	13	65	19
9. Ağa bölüğü	163	10	29	15
10. Ağa bölüğü	215	13	45	13
11. Ağa bölüğü	221	17	61	12
12. Ağa bölüğü	177	4	43	14
13. Ağa bölüğü	210	14	35	11
14. Ağa bölüğü	277	7	82	13
15. Ağa bölüğü	305	8	38	12
16. Ağa bölüğü	274	7	42	12
17. Ağa bölüğü	362	15	81	18
18. Ağa bölüğü	292	18	91	15
19. Ağa bölüğü	212	3	37	13
20. Ağa bölüğü	254	5	36	14
21. Ağa bölüğü	304	16	91	14
22. Ağa bölüğü	224	5	32	14
23. Ağa bölüğü	305	11	68	23
24. Ağa bölüğü	347	18	88	18
25. Ağa bölüğü	328	12	99	13
26. Ağa bölüğü	276	13	77	12
27. Ağa bölüğü	221	8	45	15
28. Ağa bölüğü	299	15	89	14
29. Ağa bölüğü	289	8	54	11
30. Ağa bölüğü	265	12	66	13
31. Ağa bölüğü	497	31	111	13
32. Ağa bölüğü	195	5	45	12
33. Ağa bölüğü	128	3	42	11
34. Ağa bölüğü	507	17	84	17
35. Ağa bölüğü	180	7	47	15

Bölük	Janissaries (incl. guards)	Korucus (guards)	Tekaiids (retired)	Nanhoran (orphans)
36. Ağa bölüğü	141	8	58	15
37. Ağa bölüğü	380	25	134	13
38. Ağa bölüğü	219	13	72	11
39. Ağa bölüğü	286	15	70	16
40. Ağa bölüğü	159	5	38	12
41. Ağa bölüğü	235	5	58	13
42. Ağa bölüğü	245	18	67	11
43. Ağa bölüğü	209	2	40	11
44. Ağa bölüğü	298	16	62	13
45. Ağa bölüğü	313	14	71	12
46. Ağa bölüğü	215	11	63	13
47. Ağa bölüğü	185	7	32	12
48. Ağa bölüğü	219	3	62	14
49. Ağa bölüğü	158	5	40	12
50. Ağa bölüğü	238	10	53	11
51. Ağa bölüğü	416	21	103	13
52. Ağa bölüğü	181	5	43	13
53. Ağa bölüğü	228	17	46	22
54. Ağa bölüğü	601	8	60	15
55. Ağa bölüğü	257	12	65	14
56. Ağa bölüğü	544	21	135	18
57. Ağa bölüğü	286	14	83	24
58. Ağa bölüğü	224	8	37	12
59. Ağa bölüğü	267	10	63	11
60. Ağa bölüğü	305	5	75	15
61. Ağa bölüğü	187	8	47	14
Bölüks Sum	17097	690	3995	882

Cemaat	Janissaries (incl. guards)	Korucus (guards)	Tekaiids (retired)	Nanhoran (orphans)
1. Cemaat	229	7	41	21
2. Cemaat	114	7	39	19
3. Cemaat	180	3	31	21
4. Cemaat	438	9	59	19
5. Cemaat	207	4	46	24
6. Cemaat	187	2	39	18
7. Cemaat	130	2	13	17
8. Cemaat	118	2	34	19
9. Cemaat	124	5	41	16

Cemaat	Janissaries (incl. guards)	Korucus (guards)	Tekaiids (retired)	Nanhoran (orphans)
10. Cemaat	107	4	19	15
11. Cemaat	154	5	33	21
12. Cemaat	114	4	29	19
13. Cemaat	158	2	36	20
14. Cemaat	291	6	39	20
15. Cemaat	183	6	43	18
16. Cemaat	129	10	37	20
17. Cemaat	109	3	34	18
18. Cemaat	212	2	38	16
19. Cemaat	168	7	38	19
20. Cemaat	143	2	38	18
21. Cemaat	105	4	19	19
22. Cemaat	132	3	33	16
23. Cemaat	154	7	56	18
24. Cemaat	175	7	49	16
25. Cemaat	106	3	39	18
26. Cemaat	129	4	41	18
27. Cemaat	280	14	73	17
28. Cemaat	169	9	31	16
29. Cemaat	198	4	40	16
30. Cemaat	203	5	36	18
31. Cemaat	222	5	51	18
32. Cemaat	189	4	35	17
33. Cemaat	130	3	36	16
34. Cemaat	123	4	43	20
35. Cemaat	119	2	33	18
36. Cemaat	119	7	31	16
37. Cemaat	151	7	34	17
38. Cemaat	268	5	51	21
39. Cemaat	228	7	43	16
40. Cemaat	155	4	41	18
41. Cemaat	127	2	38	18
42. Cemaat	149	5	36	18
43. Cemaat	250	9	63	18
44. Cemaat	230	6	47	17
45. Cemaat	120	3	39	16
46. cemaat	137	4	33	25
47. Cemaat	165	11	33	17
48. Cemaat	257	4	34	20
49. Cemaat	248	16	46	18
50. Cemaat	146	6	37	18

Cemaat	Janissaries (incl. guards)	Korucus (guards)	Tekaiids (retired)	Nanhoran (orphans)
51. Cemaat	200	9	47	18
52. Cemaat	207	9	19	18
53. Cemaat	152	4	35	16
54. Cemaat	121	5	49	17
55. Cemaat	166	6	41	17
56. Cemaat	198	3	55	18
57. Cemaat	255	8	61	18
58. Cemaat	128	1	31	17
59. Cemaat	290	5	58	13
60. Cemaat (Sekbans)	359	36	115	40
61. Cemaat (Sekbans)	382	32	114	45
62. Cemaat (Sekbans)	338	19	61	44
63. Cemaat (Sekbans)	358	29	122	41
64. Cemaat (zAğarcı)	423	19	75	33
65. Cemaat (Sekbans)	45			6
65/1. bölük (Sekbans)	77	3	34	5
65/2. bölük (Sekbans)	51	2	14	5
65/3. bölük (Sekbans)	76		13	6
65/4. bölük (Sekbans)	71	3	15	10
65/5. bölük (Sekbans)	47	2	13	6
65/6. bölük (Sekbans)	58	1	13	9
65/7. bölük (Sekbans)	53	1	9	5
65/8. bölük (Sekbans)	59	3	7	7
65/9. bölük (Sekbans)	200		23	8
65/10. bölük (Sekbans)	80	1	11	8

Cemaat	Janissaries (incl. guards)	Korucus (guards)	Tekaiids (retired)	Nanhoran (orphans)
65/11. bölük (Sekbans)	61	1	11	5
65/12. bölük (Sekbans)	78	3	12	7
65/13. bölük (Sekbans)	61	3	22	6
65/14. bölük (Sekbans)	63	1	31	6
65/15. bölük (Sekbans)	67		10	5
65/16. bölük (Sekbans)	63	1	15	6
65/17. bölük (Sekbans)	87		13	6
65/18. bölük (Sekbans)	138	3	40	17
65/19. bölük (Sekbans)	61		13	6
65/20. bölük (Sekbans)	70		13	6
65/21. bölük (Sekbans)	43		15	8
65/22. bölük (Sekbans)	177	1	7	5
65/23. bölük (Sekbans)	47		14	5
65/24. bölük (Sekbans)	122	6	28	8
65/25. bölük (Sekbans)	78		23	6
65/26. bölük (Sekbans)	152	7	25	6
65/27. bölük (Sekbans)	70	4	23	6
65/28. bölük (Sekbans)	74		13	5
65/29. bölük (Sekbans)	116	3	25	5
65/30. bölük (Sekbans)	52	1	8	7

Cemaat	Janissaries (incl. guards)	Korucus (guards)	Tekaiids (retired)	Nanhoran (orphans)
65/31. bölük (Sekbans)	110	2	15	6
65/32. bölük (Sekbans)	152	1	20	5
65/33. bölük (Sekbans)	139	1	27	6
65/34. bölük (Sekbans)	85		27	5
66. Cemaat	341	19	48	20
67. Cemaat	330	5	61	18
68. Cemaat	468	14	72	19
69. Cemaat	118	2	27	16
70. Cemaat	106		19	19
71. Cemaat	531	13	110	22
72. Cemaat	141	1	35	16
73. Cemaat	147	4	26	18
74. Cemaat	227	2	34	17
75. Cemaat	245	9		
76. Cemaat	151	4	30	16
77. Cemaat	167	3	26	15
78. Cemaat	142	5	30	18
79. Cemaat	138	7	37	18
80. Cemaat	105	1	27	17
81. cemaat	113	1	43	17
82. Cemaat	240	13	58	24
83. Cemaat	118		20	16
84. Cemaat	137		33	20
85. Cemaat	133	7	47	16
86. Cemaat	131		26	18
87. Cemaat	163	7	38	17
89. Cemaat	303	7	49	15
90. Cemaat	154	6	58	16
91. Cemaat	348	8	54	20
92. Cemaat	120	2	30	15
93. Cemaat	192	2	28	16
94. Cemaat	361	12	122	15
95. Cemaat	181	1	39	20
96. Cemaat	130	5	23	18
97. Cemaat	145	4	31	15
98. Cemaat	217	9	49	16
99. Cemaat	194	3	43	18

Cemaat	Janissaries (incl. guards)	<i>Korucus</i> (guards)	<i>Tekaiids</i> (retired)	<i>Nanhoran</i> (orphans)
100. Cemaat	174	2	28	18
101. Cemaat	113		24	18
Cemaat-i Ağayan	25			
Cemaat-i	43			
Cemaats Sum	22474	690	4894	2649
SUM	39571	1380	8889	3531

3. SOME POSSESSIONS OF THE JANISSARIES ACCORDING TO THE PROBATE REGISTERS¹

No.	Vol./ Page	Year of Registration	Name	Residence ²	Place of Death	Gross Estate	Net Estate ³	Real Estate	Real Estate Value	Cash (<i>akçes</i>) ⁴	Items of Trade ⁵	Money Owed to Him	Debt to Regi- ment Waqfs ⁶
1	1/137 b	1013/1604	Hüseyin Beşe b. Abdullah	Ali Paşa		49840	14285	room	3000	-		5000	
2	1/137 b	1013/1604	El-Hac Veli Beşe	Arabacı Bayezid		5002	49580	house (4000) shop	44000				
3	2/3b	1021/1612	Ali b. ...(<i>racil</i>)	Molla Hüsrev		31211	26691			31211			
4	2/17a	1025/1616	Yusuf Beşe b. Abdullah	Ermeni		17585	19592	shop	10000				deyn li oda
5	2/21a	1025/1616	Murad Beşe b. Abdullah	Hacı Evliya		24507	21593	house	12000				
6	2/24b	1026/1617	Hüseyin Beşe	Yarhisar	Tire	97018	83920			3000	6278		
7	2/48b	1027/1618	Ahmed Beşe b. Abdullah	Seferikoz		57056	46375			29000			
8	2/60b	1027/1618	Ibrahim Beşe b. Oruç	Seferikoz		23712	20000			10000	10000		

¹ This table is based on Appendix 12 of Said Öztürk, *İstanbul Tereke Defterleri (Sosyo-Ekonomik Tahlil)* (Istanbul: Osmanlı Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1995). Öztürk provides some other possession not included here (slaves, draught or riding animals, household goods, clothes, textiles, jewelry and luxury items, kitchen wares, weapons, horse tack, tools, miscellaneous, writing tools, books, foodstuff). I have only included items featured in the dissertation, be it the main or the tables and graphs.

² See Map 2.4

³ After deduction of debts and fees.

⁴ See Graph 4.3

⁵ See Table 4.2.

⁶ On regiment waqfs see Ch. 4.2.c.

No	Vol/ Page	Year of Registration	Name	Residence	Place of Death	Gross Estate	Net Estate	Real Estate	Real Estate Value	Cash	Items of Trade	Money Owed to Him	Debt to Regi- ment Waqfs
9	2/65b	1028/1619	Mahmud b. Abdullah (<i>racil</i>)	Kırkçeşme		380351	24880			30049			
10	2/84a	1034/1625	Ahmed Beşe b. Abdullah (<i>racil</i>)	Bezzazu'l- cedid		25160	21795			6400			
11	2/111 a	1037/1628	Yusuf Beşe b. Osman (<i>racil</i>)	Hoca Hayreddin		12131	87915	house	60000		25400	780	
12	3/3a	1045/1635	El-Hac Abdi Beşe		kala-yı Azak Rumeli	38800	37970					1080	
13	3/6a	1045/1635	Mustafa Beşe b. Musa	Hoca Büzürk	medine-yi Reşid (Mısır)	121875	95822	house	50000		36835	30400	
14	3/23b	1046/1636	Ali Beşe	Mesih Paşa		12692	10061						
15	3/33b	1048/1638	Osman Beşe b. Abdullah	62. cemaat <i>racil</i> hücreden		1662	1131						
16	3/33b	1048/1638	Yusuf Beşe b. Abdullah	30. bölük <i>racil</i> hücreleri		425	425						
17	3/35a	1048/1638	Ahmed Beşe b. Ferhad	Softa Sinan		25559	14195			15260			hücre nukud vakfı
18	3/41b	1048/1638	Hüseyin Beşe	Hace Hatun		14868	-				9310		2370 odabaşı
19	3/43a	1048/1638	Mehmed Beşe (<i>racil</i> , Beşe)	Keçeci Piri	kasaba-yı Kastamonu	15400	12937			6000			
20	3/46b	1048/1638	Ebubekir Beşe	Kaliceci el-hac Hasan		71037	38090			8500		31580	

No	Vol/ Page	Year of Registration	Name	Residence	Place of Death	Gross Estate	Net Estate	Real Estate	Real Estate Value	Cash	Items of Trade	Money Owed to Him	Debt to Regi- ment Waqfs
21	3/47a	1048/1638	Hasan Beşe b. Abdullah	Rüstem Paşa Odaları	Tahtakale (lost)	6376	3763				3320		
22	3/63b	1048/1638	Ali Beşe (<i>racil</i> , beşe)	Şehzade Sultan Mehmed Han	Bahr-ı Esved	3566	2186						
23	3/68b	1048/1638	Mehmed Beşe b. Abdullah		Sefer-i Şark	9350	7990	house	7500				
24	3/65b	1048/1638	Derviş Aga (Turnacıbaşı)		Ordu-yu hümayun (killed)	1021146	878000	house (445000) garden (50000) vineyard (50000) farm(50000)	625000				
25	3/90a	1053/1643	Mehmed Beşe (<i>racil</i> , Beşe)	Derviş Ali		1697	657						
26	3/92a	1053/1643	Hasan Beşe	Piyale Paşa	on the way to pilgrimage	31390	16650	vineyard	3000	13000			
27	3/93b	1054/1644	Mehmed Beşe b. Abdullah	Kızıлтаş		4434	1976			215		1360	
28	3/95b	1054/1644	Ismail Beşe (<i>racil</i>)	Mustafa Beg		8490	7960	house	6500				
29	3/96a	1055 (?)/1645	Cafer Beşe b. Abdullah	Paşa Ilyas, Baba Ilyas		2331	1444						
30	3/97b	1054/1645	Korucu Mehmed Beşe	Murad Paşa		15156	8577			10470			

No	Vol/ Page	Year of Registration	Name	Residence	Place of Death	Gross Estate	Net Estate	Real Estate	Real Estate Value	Cash	Items of Trade	Money Owed to Him	Debt to Regi- ment Waqfs
31	3/110 a	1055/1645	Mehmed Beşe b. Abdullah		coming back from Crete campaign	21414	18078			16400	5014		
32	3/113 b	1055/1645	Hamza Beşe b. Hasan	Yakub Aga		123975	71771	house	70000	150	42699		
33	3/115 b	1056/1646	Veli Beşe b. El- hac Bayram	Mufti Ali Çelebi		7805	2410						
34	3/118 a	1055/1646	Cafer Beşe b. Abdullah	Hüsrev Paşa		7479	1073						
35	4/4a	1058/1648	Mustafa Aga b. Piyale	Sofular		82007	24685	house	67500				4000 oda vakfına
36	4/8a	1058/1648	Mustafa Çorbacı b. Mehmed Çelebi	Hoca Hayreddin		111890	99899			84000		15200	
37	4/15b	1058/1648	Veli Beşe b. Ahmed	Ali Paşa el- atik		7909	3411			2317		600	
38	4/33a	1059/1649	Mustafa Beşe b. Abdullah	Kemal Hayreddin		1840	1550						
39	4/39a	1059/1649	Ali bölükbaşı b. Abdullah (<i>racil</i>)	Hasköy Kızıl Mescid	Vilayet-i Rumeli	4090	70						
40	4/50b	1059/1649	El-hac Hasan Beşe b. Abdullah	Eregli-Ist		40522	37662			28960			
41	4/56b	1059/1649	Muzaffer Beşe b. Abdullah	Haydarhane		100887	96.888	house	84.000				
42	4/62b	1059/1649	Ilyas Beşe b. Abdullah	Efdalzade		9020	5900						

No	Vol/ Page	Year of Registration	Name	Residence	Place of Death	Gross Estate	Net Estate	Real Estate	Real Estate Value	Cash	Items of Trade	Money Owed to Him	Debt to Regi- ment Waqfs
43	4/64b	1059/1649	Hasan Beşe	Eregli		11753	5612			1180			
44	4/65a	1060/1650	Hasan Beşe saray-ı atik, mütekaid	KasımPaşa el- cezeri		3181	1237				2150		
45	4/70a	1060/1650	Kenan Beşe b. Abdullah	Kaliceci Hüseyin		23330	67754			29600			
46	4/72b	1060/1650	Mehmed Beşe 49. Cemaatten	Hace Hatun		58162	39613	house	13000	3650	6385	19152	
47	4/79a	1060/1650	Ahmed Çorbacı	Üskübi Mehmed Beg		398880	223473			3000	116000	232000	
48	4/80b	1060/1650	Ahmed Beşe	Kızılbaş Fırın-ı Koaska kurbu		27630	12287	house	20000				1000
49	4/100 b	1061/1651	Mehmed Beşe	Manastır		8760	190	house	6500				
50	5/2b	1066/1656	Fazlı Beşe		Süleymani ye	2425	1668			1100	905		
51	5/12a	1070/1660	Hasan Beşe b. Abdullah	Ali Paşa-yı Atik		38930	35970					27000	
52	5/17b	1070/1660+C 69	Mehmed Beşe b. Abdullah	Neslisah Sultan		5000	1000	house	5000				
53	5/32a	1070/1660	Mehmed odabaşı ibnü'l-merhum Abdurrahman Efendi			129017	132400	house	40000	8000		49000	2000
54	5/37a	1071/1661	Ömer Beşe b. Abdullah	Müftü Ali Çelebi		128210	124520	house	110000				
55	5/38b	1071/1661	Yusuf Beşe	Tercüman Yunus			42329	house	25000	3570	2976		

No	Vol/ Page	Year of Registration	Name	Residence	Place of Death	Gross Estate	Net Estate	Real Estate	Real Estate Value	Cash	Items of Trade	Money Owed to Him	Debt to Regi- ment Waqfs
56	5/53a	1071/1661	Musa Beşe	Kürk Mahmud			512168	house	55000	406600		22450	
57	5/65a	1071/1661	Mehmed Beşe b. Durmus	Molla Gürani		432890	383400	house	120000	294000			
58	5/68a	1070 (?)/1660	Hasan Beşe	Nuri Dede		36711	-	house	10000				5000
59	5/76a	1071/1661	Ali Beşe b. Mustafa	Öksüz		1615	-						
60	5/78b	1071/1661	Mehmed Beşe b. Abdullah	Molla Gürani		39995	32204			23070			
61	5/78a	1071/1661	Ali Odabaşı	Debbag Yunus		151363	106155	house	130000				
62	5/94b	1071/1661	Osman Aga ser mehteranı hassa	Yekta (Kadırga limanı kurbu)		2152431	1704515	house (770000) garden (100000)	870000	1060600		10000	8000
63	5/98b	1071/1661	Bıçakçı Hüseyin Beşe b. Abdullah	Süleymaniye		2285	860				350		
64	5/100 a	1071/1661	Maden Beşe	Yakub Aga	drown in the sea	100715	63190			9715		8000	
65	5/102 a	1071/1661	Ali Beşe b. Abdullah	El-Hac Muhyiddin		22800	13800			20000			
66	5/102 b	1071/1661	Mercani Mehmed Beşe b. Abdullah	Deniz Abdal		62975	36320		1680	43625		5600	
67	5/120 b	1072/1662	Mehmed Beşe b. Abdullah			17141	12120			10100	1029		
68	5/121 a	1072/1662	Mustafa Beşe b. Abdullah	Karagöz		4673	5341						7800
69	5/131 b	1077/1666	Mustafa Beşe	Kasab Ilyas		87538	48540			13900	13612	2000	

No	Vol/ Page	Year of Registration	Name	Residence	Place of Death	Gross Estate	Net Estate	Real Estate	Real Estate Value	Cash	Items of Trade	Money Owed to Him	Debt to Regi- ment Waqfs
70	5/132 a	1077/1666+C 88	Kurd Beşe b. Abdullah	Abdullah Aga m. Aksaray Kurbunda		40441	30678		15000	8000			
71	5/133 b	1077/1666	Mahmud Beşe b. Abdullah	Bali Paşa hücresi		3953	289						
72	5/133 b	1077/1666	Ahmed Beşe b. Abdulgaffar	Katırhanı	Katırhanı	284	227						
73	5/133 b	1077/1666	Mehmed Beşe b. Abdülvennan		ordu-yu hümayun	3953	3317						
74	5/134 b	1077/1666	Mehmed Beşe b. Abdullah Bagdadi			644229	239610			10425	533269	80000	
75	6/3a	1077/1666	Şaban Odabaşı b. Mehmed	Ali Paşa el- atik		32606	210123	house (70000) garden (90000)	160000	2250			19850
76	6/12b	1077/1666	Sinan Beşe	Şekerci Odaları		46409	40720	house	10000	28000		2500	
77	6/13a	1077/1666	Bayezid Beşe b. Abdullah			63953	35771				13626		
78	6/31a	1077/1666	El-Hac Ibrahim Beşe b. Hasan	Bekir Abdal		993778	841755	house (270000) shop (60000) land (18000)	348000	52000	287645	183865	12150
79	6/14a	1078/1667	Hüseyin Beşe	Sekbanbaşı Yakub Aga	medine-yi Balçık	20145	19245			17450			
80	6/16a	1078/1667	Mehmed Beşe		drown in the sea	7396	6526			:			

No	Vol/ Page	Year of Registration	Name	Residence	Place of Death	Gross Estate	Net Estate	Real Estate	Real Estate Value	Cash	Items of Trade	Money Owed to Him	Debt to Regi- ment Waqfs
81	6/21b	1078/1667	Hasan Beşe	Kepenekci	Ezine kazası	26100	25450			15000		5000	
82	6/23a	1078/1667	Ramazan b. Abdullah	Mirahur		9289	5358			4000			
83	6/30a	1078/1667	Hüseyin Beşe	Karabas		4274	-				1166		
84	6/34b	1078/1667	Hasan bölükbaşı bin Abdullah	Şeyh Muhyiddin Ivazi		80861	30946	house	30000		4085		oda vakfina
85	6/42a	1078/1667	Mehmed Aga (Çorbacı, giridde)		Cezire-yi Girid martyr	18025	15719						
86	6/43b	1078/1667	Mehmed Beşe b. El-Hac Yusuf	Tarakli Borlu kasabası (Anadolu)	Kili kasabası (was there for trade) (Rumeli)	218350	210450			213800			
86	6/44a	1078/1667	Mehmed Aga (Yeniçeri Kethüdayeri)		Cezire-yi Girid martyr	2447921	2315701	house (510000) mill (50000)	560000	1712801			
87	6/48a	1078/1667	Sinan Beşe		Cezire-yi Girid martyr	14927	12038						
88	6/49a	1078/1667	Mehmed Beşe b. Ali		Cezire-yi Girid martyr	225070	195172			205525			
89	6/53a	1078/1667	Mustafa Beşe	Gureba Hüseyin		6720	1335			2270	1824		

No	Vol/ Page	Year of Registration	Name	Residence	Place of Death	Gross Estate	Net Estate	Real Estate	Real Estate Value	Cash	Items of Trade	Money Owed to Him	Debt to Regi- ment Waqfs
90	6/53a	1078/1667	Gastar b. Yusuf Beşe	89. Cemaat Odası	Cezire-yi Girid martyr	8989	45010						
91	6/53b	1078/1667	Hasan Aga b. Oruç	Kalenderhane	mekke (killed)	658356	468356		190000	31000		37000	30000
92	6/56a	1078/1667	Ömer Beşe b. Ali	Üskübi		23145	13475						
93	6/56a	1078/1667	Hasan Beşe el- Acemi	Hadice Hatun		8396	4596			2400			
94	6/56b	1078/1667	Hasan b. Arslan (<i>racil</i>)		Küçük vezir hanı (misafiren)	9383	6598			5950			
95	6/58a	1078/1667	Ömer Beşe el- Acemi	Galata		2705	2204				2705		
96	6/58a	1078/1667	Şaban Bey b. İbrahim (Çadırcılar Kethüdası, <i>Racil</i>)	Esirci Kemal	on the way to pilgrimage	189100	181900			189100			
97	6/60a	1078/1667	Mehmed Beşe b. Osman			64353	54715			51720			
98	6/63a	1078/1667	Halife b. Mustafa Yeniçeri (9. cemaatten)	Kol Camii	Rumeli ... kasabası	145840	107517			145300			5000
99	6/64a	1078/1667	Mehmed Aga b. Arslan (aga, Çorbacı)	Dügerzade	Ceziye-yi Girid	50000	42500	house	50000				
100	6/69b	1078/1667	Hasan b. Abdullah	Çıragcı Hasan Beşe		42010	14000			10000			

No	Vol/ Page	Year of Registration	Name	Residence	Place of Death	Gross Estate	Net Estate	Real Estate	Real Estate Value	Cash	Items of Trade	Money Owed to Him	Debt to Regi- ment Waqfs
101	6/70a	1078/1667	Sinan Beşe	Hamam-i CerrahPaşa		7898	6087			5700			
102	6/70a	1078/1667	Derviş b. Abdullah (<i>racil</i>)		Rumelide maktulen	17925	15449			14060			
103	6/73a	1078/1667	Mehmed b. Abdullah (<i>racil</i>)	Haseki Odaları		14939	7177			5151	6762		
104	6/74a	1078/1667	El-hac Hasan Beşe b. Abdullah	Havuzlu Mescid	On the way to Cairo		207800						
105	6/80a	1078/1667	Musli b. Abdullah (<i>racil</i> , gidirde)			230180	44883			219150	6540		
106	6/81a	1078/1667	Şaban Beşe	Molla Gürani		47247	27306			4000		25000	
107	6/82a	1078/1667	Mustafa Beşe	Abdullah Aga		40050	24150	land (20000) vineyard (8000)	28000	10000			
108	6/83b	1078/1667	Ali Aga (aga, <i>racil</i>)		Cezire-yi Girid (killed)	116850	70090			69850			
109	6/84b	1078/1667	Mustafa Halife b. Ahmed (Yeniçeri halifesi)	Kadiasker Mehmed Efendi	Cezire-yi Girid	9659838	9403766,5	house	300000	9054530		32368, 5	
110	6/94a	1078/1667	Mustafa Beşe		Galata (lost)	63131	54508			56100			
111	6/95b	1078/1667	Kuloglu Mustafa Beşe b. El-hac Mehmed	Izmir	Pertev Paşa Hamı (while visiting)	20250	16530			18500			

No	Vol/ Page	Year of Registration	Name	Residence	Place of Death	Gross Estate	Net Estate	Real Estate	Real Estate Value	Cash	Items of Trade	Money Owed to Him	Debt to Regi- ment Waqfs
112	6/96a	1078/1667	Kuloglu Yusuf Beşe b. Mehmed (Beşe, Celeb taifesinden)		Yedikule haricinde (while visiting)	59831	50703			58280			
113	6/99a	1078/1667	Ali Beşe	Odalar		26367	20404			1229			
114	6/100 a	1078/1667	Mahmud Beşe b. Mustafa	Cukurbostan		5699	3924			50		2030	
115	6/100 b	1078/1667	Selim Beşe		Cezire-yi Girid martyr	25438	20410			12500			
116	6/100 b	1078/1667	Hasan Aga, Çorbacı		Cezire-yi Girid martyr	145634	110263			108000			
117	6/102 b	1078/1667	Süleyman Beşe	Defterdar Ahmed Paşa		61625	44774	house	25000	12860			
118	6/104 a	1078/1667	Mustafa Beşe		Küçük Sipahi Hanı (visiting)	38285	28840						
119	6- 110a	1078/1667	Ibrahim Beşe		Oda-yı Atik	31988	26695			1565	20941		
120	6/117 a	1078/1667	Ali Beşe b. Abdullah	Sofular		7050	4880						
121	6/118 b	1078/1667	El-Hac Ahmed Beşe b. Abdullah	Sarı Musa		25940	23340			11000		13700	

No	Vol/ Page	Year of Registration	Name	Residence	Place of Death	Gross Estate	Net Estate	Real Estate	Real Estate Value	Cash	Items of Trade	Money Owed to Him	Debt to Regi- ment Waqfs
122	6/119 a	1078/1667	Abdülkadir Beşe b. Abdullah	Katip Muslihiddin Altın mermer kurbunda			42130	house	14000				
123	6/120 b	1078/1667	Osman Beşe		Pertev Paşa Hanı	3975	2656			1700			
124	6/121 a	1078/1667	Köse Ömer (<i>racil</i>)				4585						
125	6/121 a	1078/1667	Mehmed Beşe	Çadırcı Ahmed			26554						
126	6/121 b	1078/1667	Sarrac Yusuf Beşe b. Abdullah	Sancakdar Hayreddin		61341	51860	house	15000	35765			
127	6/125 a	1078/1667	Ali Beşe	El-hac		15469	6662	house	4000				
128	6/127 b	1078/1667	Ibrahim Beşe b. Abdullah	Elvanzade Unkapanı kurbunda		195816	174215			95000		87150	
129	6/129 b	1078/1667	Mehmed Beşe b. Receb	Beyşehir Rumeli	Küçük Sipahi Hanı	13131	6361			12000			
130	6/136 b	1078/1667	Muhzır Ahmed Aga b. Ali	Sofular	Cezire-yi Girid martyr	644153	496252			4441276			odabaşı 37500
131	6/144 a	1078/1667	Ali Aga (Aga mehter başı)	Çadırcı Ahmed (Kadırga limanı kurbu)	Girid	141450	137650			98500			
132	6/151 b	1078/1667	Osman Beşe b. Pervane	Mollafenari		12825	3502				3780		

No	Vol/ Page	Year of Registration	Name	Residence	Place of Death	Gross Estate	Net Estate	Real Estate	Real Estate Value	Cash	Items of Trade	Money Owed to Him	Debt to Regi- ment Waqfs
133	6/153 a	1078/1667	Berber Ali Beşe	KasımPaşa el- cezeri		6674	4319			412	2975		
134	6/154 b	1078/1667	Salih Beşe	Hanaba Hüseyin Aga		44459	37000			17700			
135	6/155 b	1078/1667	Osman Aga b. Ali Çelebi	El-hac Isa		444164		house	140000	3418			22140 to the 99th regiment waqf
136	6/158 b	1078/1667	Mehmed Çorbacı b. Mehmed	Çıkırıkçı Kemal	Arnavut Iskender kalası	12360	1790						
137	6/163 b	1078/1667	Nalband el-hac Receb Beşe	Manisalı Çelebi-At Bazarı Kurbu		15692	13757				4000	1700	
138	6/164 b	1078/1667	Ebubekir Bey b. Mustafa (Yeniçeri agası)		Girid	50000	47900			50000			
139	6/166 b	1078/1667	Mustafa Beşe b. İbrahim	Dizdariye Giridde vefat	Girid	19676	12836			2000			
140	6/177 b	1078/1667	Mehmed Beşe	Tarsus		33324	25497	house	27000				
141	6/175 a	1078/1667	Mahmud Beşe	33. Sekbanlar Odası		9152	6517			829			
142	5/150 a	1079/1668	Mustafa çavuş		Edirne	31725	16227			30950			
143	5/152 a	1079/1668	Cafer Beşe b. Abdullah		Cezire-yi Girid	65670	57145			16740	11936	19577	

No	Vol/ Page	Year of Registration	Name	Residence	Place of Death	Gross Estate	Net Estate	Real Estate	Real Estate Value	Cash	Items of Trade	Money Owed to Him	Debt to Regi- ment Waqfs
144	5/153 a	1079/1668	Mehmed Beşe b. Abdullah	Hubyar		21446	8911			1600			
145	5/156 b	1079/1668	Mehmed Aga b. Abdullah (orta çavuş)	Molla Seref	Cezire-yi Girid Kandiye kalası	45640	41119	house	10000				
146	5/158 a	1079/1668	Şaban Aga b. Abdullah (Çorbacı)		Cezire-yi Girid Kandiye kalası	167776	137645			116000			
147	5/159 a	1079/1668	Ibrahim Beşe b. Ömer			11793	10068			3856	5541		
148	5/161 a	1079/1668	El-Hac Mustafa Beşe b. Ahmed	Kürkcu Paşa (başı)		42258	29749	house	18000	10000		4000	
149	5/162 a	1079/1668	Mustafa Beşe b. Abdullah			9705	7145						
150	5/166 a	1079/1668	Mustafa Beşe b. Abdullah	Borulu Minare	Girid Ceziresi	5625	5450						
151	5/166 a	1079/1668	Abidin odabaşı bin Abdulgennan	Emin Beg	Girid Ceziresi	81440	53970		50000				
152	5/167 a	1079/1668	Ibrahim Beşe b. Abdullah	Katır Hanı		9053	7278			200	5355		
153	5/167 a	1079/1668	Ahmed Beşe b. Abdullah			1399	895						
154	5/167 b	1079/1668	Süleyman Beşe b. Abdullah	Yeniçeri 46. bölük Odası		3151	2693			1500			

No	Vol/ Page	Year of Registration	Name	Residence	Place of Death	Gross Estate	Net Estate	Real Estate	Real Estate Value	Cash	Items of Trade	Money Owed to Him	Debt to Regi- ment Waqfs
155	5/169 b	1079/1668	Mustafa Beşe b. Abdullah (odabaşı)		Kandiye kalası	13282	12272						
156	5/172 a	1079/1668	Mustafa Beşe	Keçeci Piri		56858	50000	house	15000			11000	
157	5/173 a	1079/1668	Ibrahim Beşe b. Abdullah	Molla Aski		11899	1386			984	2200		700 regiment waqf
158	5/174 a	1079/1668	Halil Beşe b. Abdullah	Hızır Beg		33567	18786		15700		850	8000	2700 regiment waqf
159	5/175 a	1079/1668	Ahmed Beşe (aga bolugunde bayraktar)	47. Oda		247623	206713			110950		97500	
160	5/182 a	1079/1668	Mustafa Beşe b. Hasan	Merkez Efendi		10926	9616		8000				
161	5/184 a	1079/1668	Halil Beşe b. Abdullah	Kok Mahmud		7663	762						
162	5/184 b	1079/1668	Ali Beşe b. Mustafa	Manisalı Çelebi (giritde)	cezire-yi Girid	47085	44135			12575		30000	
163	5/184 b	1079/1668	Hüseyin Beşe b. Abdullah	49. bölük Odası	Kandiye kalası	903	758						
164	5/184 b	1079/1668	Mehmed Beşe b. Abdullah	54. bölük Odası		29211	1.181				2.891	8.600	
165	5/190 b	1079/1668	Lütfullah Beşe	Samanviran Hocagice Odaları		200825	176325			32100		140	

No	Vol/ Page	Year of Registration	Name	Residence	Place of Death	Gross Estate	Net Estate	Real Estate	Real Estate Value	Cash	Items of Trade	Money Owed to Him	Debt to Regi- ment Waqfs
166	5/193 a	1079/1668	Derviş Beşe b. Maksud	Çadırcı Ahmed Çelebi		32403	28480	house	20000				
167	5/194 a	1079/1668	Ali Beşe b. Abdullah		Kandiye kalası	266857	250692			251150			
168	5/195 a	1079/1668	Mehmed Beşe b. Ali	Bayezid Aga		34956	31135	house	15000				
169	5/197 b	1079/1668	Hasan Beşe b. Abdullah	Sofular		32660	343230			15804			
170	5/197 b	1079/1668	Hüseyin Beşe b. Abdullah	54. Cemaat Odaları		10517	30188			7568			
171	5/198 a	1079/1668	Ibrahim Beşe	Hüseyin Aga		10194	7226			4600	3595		
172	5/206 b	1079/1668	El-Hac Ömer Beşe b. Süleyman	Üskübi		26446	23286						

APPENDIX 4

LOANS GIVEN BY THE JANISSARIES DURING 1610s

Vol/Pg	Date	Lender	Borrower	Army Affiliation	Neighborhood	Amount	Payment Term	Loan Type
1/18b, no. 114	28 Cemaziyyelahir 1021 25 August 1612	Ahmed Çelebi b. Yusuf	Alem bt. Mustafa			7000	6 years	karz-ı şer'i
1/18b, no. 115	Cemaziyyelahir 1021 August 1612	Mustafa Beşe b. Ali	Fatima bt. Mustafa		Kefelü	11 flori	3 days	
1/ 45a, no. 292	?	Hasan Beşe b. Abdullah	Andreya veled..., Yani veled Yorgi, Yorgi veled Aleksi	5. Ağa bölüğü	Abdi Subaşı			
1/54a	15 Şevval 1021 8 December 1612	Kasım Beg b. Abdulah	Dimo veled Milo and Simo veled Angelo	38. Cemaat	Edirne kapusu	36000	1 year	karz-ı şer'i
1/57b	26 Şevval 1021 19 December 1612	Yakub Beşe b. Abdullah el- acemi	Azad veled Belil el-ermenî			950 gurus?		karz-ı şer'i ?
1/67b	26 Zilkade 1021 17 January 1613	Arslan Beşe b. Abdullah	Mihail veled Nikola			1000 dirhem osmani		karz-ı şer'i

Vol/Pg	Date	Lender	Borrower	Army Affiliation	Neighborhood	Amount	Payment Term	Loan Type
1/83b	24 Muharrem 1023 5 March 1614	Hüseyin Beşe b. Abdulah	Fatima bt. Karagoz		Kasım Aga	40000 dirhem	8 years	istiglal
1/89a, no. 646	1 Safer 1023 3 September 1614	Sefer Beşe b. Musa	Nikola veled Aristo		Ohri?	20000	1 year	
1/97a, no. 708	29 Safer 1023 9 September 1614	Mehmed Beg b. Abdullah	Ömer Beşe b. Mehmed		Egin	100 dinar		karz-ı şer'i
2/13a	24 Şevval 1024 15 November 1615	Mehmed Beşe b. Abdullah		Anatolia Arabgir sancak	10000 flori		karz-ı şer'i
2/26a	16 Zilhicce 1024 5 January 1616	Mehmed b. Ali	Piskopos Ezgori veled Papa Nifori			52000 akce		karz-ı şer'i
2/27a, no. 222	19 Zilhicce 1024 8 January 1616	Arslan Beşe b. Abdullah, trustee	Emzeyon veled Mihal		Büyük Çekmece	1000	within a year in 3 paymen ts	
2/27a, no. 223	22 Zilhicce 1024 11 January 1616	Arslan Beşe b. Abdullah	Avyorno veled Dimitri, tailor		Kuzguncuk	3800 dirhem		karz-ı şer'i
2/34a, no. 285	Evasıt Muharrem 1025 early February 1616	Derviş Çavuş b. Abdulmenan	Papa Nikdar veled Yani, priest			10000		
2/34a, no. 286	Evasıt Muharrem 1025 Early February 1616	Derviş Çavuş b. Abdulgennan	Papa Nikola veled Polimno			10000		

Vol/Pg	Date	Lender	Borrower	Army Affiliation	Neighborhood	Amount	Payment Term	Loan Type
2/52b	Evasıt Safer 1025 Early March 1616	Hüseyin Beşe b. Yusuf	Papa Franko veled Nikola		Abdi Subaşı			
3/10b, no. 91	Evahir Rebiyyülevvel 1027 End of March 1628	Sinan Beşe b. Yusuf?	Koyishyan veled Kosta			700		karz-ı şer'i
3/18b, no 157	25 Rebiyyülevvel 1027 21 March 1628	Şaban Beşe b. Abdullah	Hasan b. Mehmed			8300	1 year	
3/19a, no 164	3 Rebiyyülahir 1027 29 March 1628	Mehmed Aga b. Bali	Fatima Hatun bt. Bedreddin		Haramci Hacı Muhyiddin	39000		karz-ı şer'iyye
3/p. 60b	Receb 1027 July 1618	Mehmed Beşe b. Ali	Dimo veled Nikola, Istati veled Yani			35.000	1 year	karz-ı şer'i
3/63a	12 Receb 1027 4 July 1618	Yeniçeri Ibrahim Beşe b. Abdullah	Papa Istavrek			10000		karz-ı şer'i
4/16a, no. 103	Rebiyyülevvel 1028 February 1619	Yakub Beşe b. Ibrahim	Mustafa Beg b. Abdullah, Yeniçeri		Uzun Yusuf	140.000		
4/19a, no. 125	Rebiyyülevvel 1028 February 1619	Hüseyin Beşe b. Abdullah	Abdülhamza Efendi b. Ibrahimin Çukadarı			14,000		karz-ı şer'i

Vol/Pg	Date	Lender	Borrower	Army Affiliation	Neighborhood	Amount	Payment Term	Loan Type
4/19a, no. 127	Evahir Rebiyyülahir 1028 April 1619	Mustafa Beşe b. Abdullah	Yani veled, Koca Yani veled Papa Dimitri, Aleks veled Kosta, Iskerlat veled Parves (Butchers in Meat Square)			116.400		karz-1 şer'i
4/20b	Rebiyyülahir 1028 April 1619	Selim b. Ahmed	Fahri b. Ahmed		...Ali	4000		karz-1 şer'i
4/21a	4 Rebiyyülahir 1028 20 March 1619	Mehmed Beşe b. Abdülnaci	Yusuf b. Süleyman			1500		karz-1 şer'i
4/35a, no. 243	Cemaziyyevvel 1028 April 1619	Mehmed Beşe b. Kasım and Ayşe Hatun (<i>ibnet-i harem-i hümayun</i>)	Kamile hatun bt. Abdullah		Şemseddin	19,000 ?		istiglal
4/51a, no. 360	Evasıt Cemaziyyelahir 1028 Early June 1619	Mahmud Beşe b.	Zadin veled Nevab	11. Ağa bölüğü		8000		
5/36b	26 Cemaziyyelahir 1029 31 May 1620	Ömer Beg b. Haydar Cündi and Yeniçeri Şaban b. Abdullah	Jews Ezrole Şimoyil and İsak v. Pardo		Seferhoz mah	36,000		karz-1 şer'i

Vol/Pg	Date	Lender	Borrower	Army Affiliation	Neighborhood	Amount	Payment Term	Loan Type
5/51b	15 Receb 1029 15 June 1620	Ali Beşe b. Abdullah racil	Yani v. Kondu	18. Ağa bölüğü		15,000		
5/73a	20 Şaban 1029 20 July 1620	Osman Beşe b. Hamza	Mehmed Ağa b. Ahmed	18. Yayabaşı korucusu	Rumeli-Nigbolu kazası	48,000		
5/95b	Evasıt Ramazan 1029 mid August 1620	Yusuf Beşe b. Abdullah	Yusuf b. Emrullah			23,000		
5/99b, no 702	20 Ramazan 1029 18 August 1620	Yeniçeri çavuşu Ahmed Çavuş b. Mustafa (trustee of Yeniçeriler kethüdası Ahmed Aga b. Mustafa)	Bahşi Beşe ibn Abdullah	53. Ağa bölüğü				
6/13b	Evahir Rebiyyülahir 1029 End of August 1620	Osman Beşe b. Ahmed	Salih b. Mahmud			104,000		
6/20a	1029 1620	Yayabaşı Ali Beşe b. Abdullah	Karagoz veled Manol nam zimmi	42. Yayabaşı bölüğü		36,000		
6/ 26a	9 Cemaziyyelahir 1029 11 May 1620	Mustafa Beşe b. Abdullah	Eskerlet veled Bar...		Sultan	115,000		
6/34a	10 Cemaziyyelahir 1029 12 May 1620	Mehmed Beşe b. Abdullah	Sefer b. Mehmed and Mustafa b. Abdullah					

Vol/Pg	Date	Lender	Borrower	Army Affiliation	Neighborhood	Amount	Payment Term	Loan Type
3/ 10a		Turhan b. Ebu Hızır, for regiment waqf	Odabaşı Yunus Beşe b. Abdullah	30. Cemaat	Bıçakçı Alaaddin		10 months ?	istiglal

APPENDIX 5

LOANS TAKEN BY THE JANISSARIES DURING 1610s

Vol/Page	Date	Borrower	Lender	Army Affiliation	Neighborhood	Amount	Payment Term	Loan Type
1/ 97a, no. 708	29 Safer 1023 9 April 1614	Mehmed Beg bn. Abdullah	Ömer Beşe bn. Mehmed		Egin	100 dinar		karz-ı şer'i
2/7b, no 64	24 Receb 1024 18 August 1615	Iskender Beşe bn. Abdullah	Hema bt. Abdullah (his wife)		Avcı Beg	8000	1 year	istiglal
2/29b	4 Muharrem 1025 22 January 1616	Mehmed Beşe bn. Hüseyin	Mehmed bn. Yunus		Mehmed Aga	890 dirhem		karz-ı şer'i
2/43b	23 Safer 1025 11 March 1616	Mehmed Beşe bn. Süleyman	Mehmed bn. Yusuf		Kogacı?	6000		istiglal
3/10a		Turhan bn. Ebu Hızır, for regiment waqf	Odabaşı Yunus Beşe bn. Abdullah	30. Cemaat	Bıçakçı Alaaddin		10 months?	istiglal
3/19a, no 163	3 Rebiyyülahir 1027 29 March 1618	Hasan b. Abdullah, yeniçeri, sekban	Sekban Ocagı waqf, Odabaşı Hasan bn. Aliö trustee				1 year	istiglal
3/69b, no. 580	2 Şaban 1027 24 July 1618	Ahmed Beşe b. Osman	Şemail veled. Azer		Defterdar Ahmed Çelebi	50,000	90 days	Beg'i-bi'l-vefa/istiglal

Vol/Page	Date	Borrower	Lender	Army Affiliation	Neighborhood	Amount	Payment Term	Loan Type
4/16a, no. 103	Rebiyyülevvel 1028 February 1619	Yakub Beşe bn. Ibrahim	Mustafa Beg bn. Abdullah, yeniçeri		Uzun Yusuf	140.000		
4/19a, no. 125	Rebiyyülevvel 1028 February 1619	Hüseyin Beşe bn. Abdullah	Abdulhamza Efendi bn. Ibrahim Çukadarı			14,000		karz-ı şer'i
4/24a, no. 160	Rebiyyülahir 1028 March 1619	Ahmed Çelebi bn. Cafer, janissary	Yeniçeri Mustafa Beg waqf, Mehmed Efendi bn. Zeynullah, trustee		Öksüz		6 months	
4/32b	6 Cemaziyelevvel 1028 20 April 1619	Mehmed Beşe bn. Ahmed	Hasan Beg bn. Ahmed (bevvab-i sultan) son of Ali Efendi bn. Abdullah, kadı		Keçeci Piri	6,000		
4/39a, no. 271	14 Cemaziyelevvel 1028 28 April 1619	Ali Beşe bn. Ahmed	Mahmud Efendi waqf, Çakır Beg bn. Abdullah, trustee			50,000	1 year	istiglal
4/48a, no. 331	10 Cemaziyelahir 1028 24 May 1619	Piyale Beşe bn. Abdullah	Ayşe Hatun waqf, Mehmed Subaşı bn. Abdullah, trustee	34. sekban 65th Orta of the Janissary army	Bergos Iskelesi	11.000	1 year	istiglal

Vol/Page	Date	Borrower	Lender	Army Affiliation	Neighborhood	Amount	Payment Term	Loan Type
4/48a, no. 333	7 Cemaziyelahir 1028 21 May 1619	Mehmed Beşe bn. Kasım, zevceti Ayşe Hatun bt.	Osman Aga waqf, Mehmed bn. Ali. Trustee		Akşemseddin	12,000	1	istiglal
4/48b, no. 337	Evail Cemaziyelahir 1028 End of May 1619	Mahmud Beşe bn. Mehmed	Kamer Hatun waqf, Ali bn. ..., trustee		Murad Paşa-yı Atik	3200		istiglal
5/73a	20 Şaban 1029 20 July 1620	Osman Beşe b. Hamza	Mehmed Aga b. Ahmed	18. Yayabaşı korucusu	Rumeli-Nigbolu kazası	48,000		
5/99b, no 702	20 Ramazan 1029 18 August 1620	Bahşi Beşe ibn Abdullah	Yeniçeriler çavuşu Ahmed Çavuş ibn Mustafa, trustee of Yeniçeriler kethüdası Ahmed Aga ibn Mustafa	53. Ağa bölüğü		2750 altın		
5/99b, no. 703	Evasıt Ramazan 1029 Mid-August 1620	Ali Beşe ibn Abdullah	Mahmud Beg bn. Muharrem		Yeni Oda	25,000		

APPENDIX 6

LOANS GIVEN BY THE JANISSARIES DURING 1660s

Vol/Page	Date	Lenders	Borrowers	Army Affiliation	Neighborhood	Amount	Payment Term	Loan Type
7/7a, no. 43	12 Muharrem 1070 28 September 1659	Hassa Bostancıs regiment waqf, Sefer Beg b. Tavas and Oruç Beg b. Ibrahim, trustee	Papa Yorgi v. Nikola, Kiryadi v. Yorgi, Istamad v. Papa Tanas, Anastasya v. Yorgi, Yorgi v. Arabacı, Yani v. Dimitri v. Nikola ve Miho v. Benli		kaza- Silivri Kanad village	575 esedi guruş, 230 rişali guruş		muamele-i řer'iyye
7/22a	9 Rebiyyülevvel 1070 23 November 1659	Emrullah Beşe b. Nurullah Ali Efendi	Ali Efendi b. Mehmed	57. Cemaat	Sarı Musa	760 guruş		
7/24b	Evasıt Rebiyyülevvel 1070 End of November 1659	Mehmed Beşe bn. Şaban	Alton, Armenian		el-hac Ferhad-Kasımpaşa, Galata	8000		
7/31a	5 Rebiyyülahir 1070 19 December 1659	Ahmed Beşe b. Mustafa Mehmed Beşe	Mehmed Beşe b. Abdullah	16. Bölük	el-hac	100 rişali guruş		istiglal

Vol/Page	Date	Lenders	Borrowers	Army Affiliation	Neighborhood	Amount	Payment Term	Loan Type
8/9b	Şevval 1071 June 1661	Ahmed Beşe bn. Bayezid	Hadice hatun bt. Mehmed			1009? Esadi/riya li guruşa	1 year	istiglal
8/22b	19 Rebiyyülevvel 1071 21 November 1660	Mehmed Beşe bn. Mahmud	Ramazan			2500		karz-1 şer'i
8/36b	7 Muharrem 1071 11 Sebtember 1660	Ahmed Beşe bn. Abdullah, Kapu Kethüdası	Koniye bt. Peraşkun? Wife of Şeyhülislam		Sultan Begazid, Galata	26000		karz-1 şer'i
8/45b	22 Rebiyyülahir 1071 24 December 1660	Mehmed Beşe bn. Ahmed	Musa Reis bn. Abdi		Kapucuoglu canibi	509 riyal guruş, 500 esedi guruş		karz-1 şer'i
9/4a, no. 22	15 Şevval 1071 12 June 1661	Regiment waqf of 59. Cemaat, Ömer Beşe bn. Ali, trustee	Süleyman Beşe bn. Abdullah, trustee of a former Çavuş in the janissary army Ali Aga bn. İlyas	59. Cemaat	Müneccimbaşı Mahallesi	1000 esedi guruş		istiglal
9/15a	17 Şevval 1071 14 June 1661	Çorbacı Halil Aga bn. Mehmed	Molla Mustafa Efendi	37. Ağa bölüğü	Havarlar?	8 yük akçe		karz-1 şer'i

Vol/Page	Date	Lenders	Borrowers	Army Affiliation	Neighborhood	Amount	Payment Term	Loan Type
9/20b	28 Şevval 1071 25 June 1661	Korucu Rıdvan Beşe bn. Abdullah	şeyh of Aşık Paşa Zaviyesi, es-Seyyid Mahmud Efendi bn. es-Seyyid Mustafa	8. Ağa bölüğü		12,000		
9/21b	12 Şevval 1071 9 June 1660	Baş Korucu Rıdvan Beşe bn. Abdullah	Merhum Aşık Paşa Zaviyesi Şeyhi es- Seyyid Mahmud Efendi bn. es-Seyyid Mustafa	28. Ağa bölüğü				
9/28b	28 Şevval 1071 25 June 1661	Yeniçeri Beytülmal Emini Ahmed Aga bn. Mahmud	Patrik Baritnos veledi Samo			820 riyalı guruş		
9/31b	Zilkade 1071 July 1661	Mehmed Beşe b. Hasan	Mustafa Beşe b. Muharrem	88. Cemaat		3,600		ipotek
9/33b	6 Şevval 1071 3 June 1661	Regiment waqf of 37. Cemaat, Mehmed Beşe b. Haydar, trustee	Siyavuş Hatun bt. Abdullah	37. Cemaat	Tuti Latif	6,000		istiglal
9/38a	11 Zilkade 1071 7 July 1661	Mustafa Beşe b. Ibrahim	Osman Reis b. Ahmed	13. Cemaat		870 riyalı guruş		
9/41b	3 Zilkade 1071 29 June 1661	Regiment waqf of 71. Cemaat, Mehmed Beşe b. Hızır, proxy of the trustee	Todori v. Vasel. Todori ö tailor	71. Cemaat- Samsoncular		32,000		karz-ı şer'i

Vol/Page	Date	Lenders	Borrowers	Army Affiliation	Neighborhood	Amount	Payment Term	Loan Type
9/46b	5 Zilkade 1071 1 July 1661	Regiment waqf of 71. Cemaat, Mehmed Beşe b. Hızır proxy of the trustee İlyas Odabaşı	Todori v. Vasel. Todori	71. Samsoncular odası		32,000		
9/48a	5 Zilkade 1071 1 July 1661	Regiment waqf of 57. Ağa bölüğü, Mahmud Beşe b. Hasan, trustee	Ahmed Efendi ve Mehmed Beşe	57. Ağa bölüğü		50 rişali gurus?		
9/49b	16 Zilkade 1071 12 July 1661	Receb Beşe bn. Abdullah	Pedros v. Virtek, Armenian		Beşe	1400		karz-ı şer'i
9/52b	15 Zilkade 1071 11 July 1661	Mehmed Beşe b. Ahmed	Ahmed Çelebi b. Halil		Ali Paşa-yı Atik	3000		istiglal
9/82b	16 Zilhicce 1071 11 August 1661	Regiment waqf of 49. Cemaat, Mehmed Efendi b. Hüseyin, trustee	Sefer Beşe b. Abdullah.	49. Cemaat		6000		
9/89b	19 Zilhicce 1071 14 August 1661	Hüseyin Beşe bn. Osman	Meleki bt. Esvader		Şeyh Ferhad	22,500		karz-ı şer'i
9/131b	23 Muharrem 1072 17 Sebtember 1661	Mehmed Beşe b. Bayram	Aişe Hatun bt. Hasan	33. Ağa bölüğü	Zal Paşa	160 rişali gurus		

Vol/Page	Date	Lenders	Borrowers	Army Affiliation	Neighborhood	Amount	Payment Term	Loan Type
9/144b	4 Muharrem 1072 29 August 1661	Mehmed Beşe b. Veli racil	Veli Beşe b. Hasan racil		Fındıklı, Galata	25 riyal gurus		
9/148a	8 Safer 1072 2 October 1661	Veli Beşe b. Mehmed	Ayni Hatun bn. el-hac Süleyman	39. Ağa bölüğü	Kiti (close to Tekfur Palace)	1,400		
9/152a	13 Safer 1072 7 October 1661	Mehmed Beşe b. Mustafa	Ramazan Beşe b. Mehmed	24. Cemaat	Rumeli- Nigbolu, Kalyekon? Village	20 riyali gurus		
9/155a	1072 1662	Çorbacı Mustafa bn. İsmail	Foti? veled-i Kosta, Yorga veled-i Yani, ... veled-i Danyel, Maverdi veled-i Yani	10. Ağa bölüğü	Rumeli-Yenişehir kazası, Tırnova village	2 yük 60,000 akçe		karz-ı şer'i
9/169a	29 Safer 1072 23 October 1661	Odabaşı Mustafa Beşe bn. Hasan	Hüseyin Beşe bn. Hasan	30. Ağa bölüğü	Fethiye kurbu	7000		from oda waqf
9/175b	7 Rebiyyülevvel 1072 30 October 1661	49. Oda Cemaati, Derviş Beşe bn. Ahmed	49. Oda Cemaati Odabaşı Ramazan Beşe bn. Abdullah	49. Cemaat				karz-ı şer'i
9/180a	13 Rebiyyülevvel 1072 5 November 1661	Regiment waqf of 16. Ağa bölüğü, Odabaşı Mustafa, trustee	Hüseyin Beşe bn. Seyid	16. Ağa bölüğü				

Vol/Page	Date	Lenders	Borrowers	Army Affiliation	Neighborhood	Amount	Payment Term	Loan Type
9/192b	27 Rebiyyülevvel 1072 19 November 1661	Regiment waqf of 28. Cemaate, Odabaşı Yakub Beşe bn. Piri, trustee	Osman Beşe	28. Cemaat	28. Cemaat	2545		
9/198b	3 Rebiyyülahir 1072 25 November 1661	The scribe of Hanya Agası Mehmed Aga bn. Ahmed, Mehmed Çelebi bn. el hac Hal, and the kethüda of Aga Mahmud Beşe bn. Osman	42. Aga bölüğü Mehmed Beşe bn. İsa	42. Ağa bölüğü	Molla Hüsrev	140,000		
9/219b	24 Rebiyyülahir 1072 16 December 1661	Himmat Beşe bn. Mehmed	Ibrahim bn. Mustafa		Sarı Musa	10,500		
9/221b	3 Cemaziyyelevvel 1072 24 December 1661	Çorbacı Ibrahim Aga bn. Ali	Kazer veled-i Yakob nam ermeni	58. Ağa bölüğü	Şeyh Feryad	1000 riyali gurus	360 gun	istiglal

Vol/Page	Date	Lenders	Borrowers	Army Affiliation	Neighborhood	Amount	Payment Term	Loan Type
9/226b	9 Cemaziyyelebbe 1 1072 30 December 1661	Regiment waqf of 71. Cemaat, Hasan Beşe bn. Osman, trustee	Ahmed Beşe bn. Ibrahim	71. Seksoncu Cemaat	Mürteza neighborhood-Tire			
9/272b	1 Receb 1072/19 February 1662	mütesellim Ibrahim Beşe bn. Abdullah (of former Pasha of Balıkesir Mustafa Pasha)	Münakkaşzade Ahmed Aga bn. Ömer Efendi	88. Cemaat	Ahmed Paşa mahallesi-Topkapı	600 riyal guruş		

APPENDIX 7

7. LOANS TAKEN BY THE JANISSARIES DURING 1660s

Vol/Page	Date	Borrowers	Lenders	Army Affiliation	Neighborhood	Amount	Payment Term	Loan Type
7/31a	5 Rebiyülahir 1070 19 December 1659	Mehmed Beşe b. Abdullah	Ahmed Beşe b. Mustafa Mehmed Beşe	16. bölük	el-hac			istiglal
7/35b	6 Rebiyyülahir 1070 20 December 1659	Receb Beşe b. Abdullah	Katip Muslihiddin Waqf Halil Çelebi b. İbrahim Receb Beşe, trustee		Katip Muslihiddin	100 riyal guruş	1 year	
8/10a	2 Rebiyyülevvel 1071 4 November 1660	Hasan Beşe bn. Mehmed	Kapazade? Mamud Çavuş waqf, Mustafa Efendi bn. İbrahim, trustee			10,900		istiglal
8/10a	5 Rebiyyülevvel 1071 7 November 1660	İbrahim Beşe bn. Hasan	Abdülkerim Efendi bn. İbrahim		Sinan Paşa	3600?? riyal guruş	300 days	
8/31a	6 Rebiyyülahir 1071 8 December 1660	Ahmed Beşe bn. Abdullah	Labno veled Mihal, butcher		Sultan Camii			

Vol/Page	Date	Borrowers	Lenders	Army Affiliation	Neighborhood	Amount	Payment Term	Loan Type
9/4a, no. 22	15 Şevval 1071 12 June 1660	Çavuş olan Ali Aga bn. İlyas	Regiment waqf 59. Cemaat, Ömer Beşe bn. Ali, trustee	59. Cemaat	Müneccimbaşı			istiglal
9/11a	23 Şevval 1071 20 June 1661	Ramazan Beşe bn. Mustafa	Kostantin veled-i Todori	30. bölük	Bağ Kapanı, Galata	19,200		karz-ı şer'i
9/31b	1071 1661	88. Cemaat Mehmed Beşe b. Hasan	Mustafa Beşe b. Muharrem.	88. Cemaat		3,600		
9/48a	5 Zilkade 1071 1 July 1661	Ahmed Efendi ve Mehmed Beşe	Regiment waqf of 57. Ağa bölüğü, Mahmud Beşe b. Hasan, trustee	57. Ağa bölüğü		50 riya li gurus?		
9/49b	16 Zilkade 1071 12 June 1661	Çorbacı Osman Aga b. Receb	Fatima Hatun	97. Cemaat	Haydarhane	40,000		karz-ı şer'i
9/62b	26 Zilkade 1071 22 June 1661	Çukadar of Bektaş Aga, Kenan Beşe b. Abdullah	Sefer Efendi b. Hamza		Yeni Mahalle, Üsküdar	250 riya li gurus		karz-ı şer'i
9/82b	16 Zilhicce 1071 11 August 1661	Sefer Beşe b. Abdullah.	Regiment waqf of 49. Cemaat, Mehmed Efendi b. Hüseyin, trustee	49. Cemaat		6000		

Vol/Page	Date	Borrowers	Lenders	Army Affiliation	Neighborhood	Amount	Payment Term	Loan Type
9/137a	7 Muharrem 1072 1 September 1661	Mustafa Çelebi b. Hüseyin, retired from 92. Cemaat	Ferah Aga Waqf, Ali bn. Abdullah, trustee	92. Cemaat		8,650		
9/144b	4 Muharrem 1072 29 August 1661	Mehmed Beşe b. Veli racil	Veli Beşe b. Hasan racil		Fındıklı, Galata			
9/152a	13 Safer 1072 7 October 1662	Mehmed Beşe b. Mustafa	Ramazan Beşe b. Mehmed (24. Cemaatine)	24. Cemaat	Rumeli-Nigbolu, Kalyekon? Village	20 riyali gurus		
9/163b	27 Safer 1072 31 October 1660	Mustafa Beşe bn. Mahmud	Rahime bt. Hayati		Hoca Hayreddin	3000		karz-ı şer'i
9/169a	29 Safer 1072 23 October 1661	Hüseyin Beşe bn. Hasan	Odabaşı Mustafa Beşe bn. Hasan	30. Ağa bölüğü	Fethiye kurbu	7000		from oda waqf
9/171b	29 Safer 1072 23 October 1661	Ali Beşe bn. Mehmed	Mahmud bn. Abdullah			1680		karz-ı şer'i
9/175b	7 Rebiyyülevvel 1072 30 October 1661	49. Cemaat Derviş Beşe bn. Ahmed	49. Cemaat, Odabaşı Ramazan Beşe bn. Abdullah	49. Cemaat				karz-ı şer'i

Vol/Page	Date	Borrowers	Lenders	Army Affiliation	Neighborhood	Amount	Payment Term	Loan Type
9/179a	13 Rebiyyülevvel 1072 3 January 1662	Hüseyin Beşe bn. Seyyidin vasisi	Regiment waqf of 16. Aga bölüğü, Odabaşı Mustafa	16. Ağa bölüğü				
9/192b	27 Rebiyyülevvel 1072 19 November 1661	Osman Beşe	Regiment waqf of 28. Cemaat, Odabaşı Yakub Beşe bn. Piri, trustee	28. Cemaat		2545		
9/193b	25 Rebiyyülevvel 1072 17 November 1661	Yeniçeri Beytülmal Emini Şaban Aga bn.	Müezzinbaşı Mustafa Aga bn. Zülfikar			1206		
9/194b	10 Rebiyyülevvel 1072 2 November 1661	Yeniçeri Beytülmal emini Şaban Aga	Musalli Efendi bn. Musa		Abdi Çelebi			

Vol/Page	Date	Borrowers	Lenders	Army Affiliation	Neighborhood	Amount	Payment Term	Loan Type
9/198b	3 Rebiyyülahir 1072 25 November 1661	42. Aga bölüğü Mehmed Beşe bn. İsa	The scribe of Hanya Agası Mehmed Aga bn. Ahmed, Mehmed Çelebi bn. el hac Hal, and the kethüda the Aga Mahmud Beşe bn. Osman	42. Ağa bölüğü	Molla Hüsrev	140,000		
9/202a	Rebiyyülahir 1072 November 1661	Mehmed Beşe bn. Abdullah	Ümmühan bt. Hızır Hatun		Birinci? Mahallesi	50 riyal guruş		
9/228a	3 Cemaziyelevvel 1072 23 January 1662	Osman Beşe bn. Abdullah	el-Hac Ahmed bn.	28. Cemaat		8400		
9/255b	11 Cemaziyelahir 1072 31 January 1662	Zelfi Hatun bt. Abdullah, proxy: Ahmed Beşe bn. Memi	Ahmed Efendi bn. Hüseyin el-imam	43. Yayabaşı Cemaat	Yarhisar	250 riyal guruş		

Vol/Page	Date	Borrowers	Lenders	Army Affiliation	Neighborhood	Amount	Payment Term	Loan Type
9/226b	9 Cemaziyyevvel 1072 30 December 1661	Ahmed Beşe bn. Ibrahim	Regiment waqf of 71. Seksoncı Cemaat, Hasan Beşe bn. Osman, trustee	71. Seksoncı Cemaat	Mürteza,Tire			

APPENDIX 8

The Probate Register of Mustafa Halife b. Ahmed

Mahmiye-i İstanbul'da Kadiasker Mehmed Efendi Mahallesi ahalisinden olup bundan akdem Yeniçeri halifelerinden iken cezire-i Girid'de misafir [iken]¹ vefat eden Mustafa Halife ibn Ahmed'in varisi zevce-i metrûkesi Rabia Hatun ibnet-i Abdullah ile evlad-ı sığârı Ahmed Çelebi ve Mehmed Çelebi ve İbrahim Çelebi ve Fatıma'ya münhasıra olduğu şer'an mütehakkık oldukdan sonra müteveffâ-yı mezbûrun muhallelâtı tahrîr beyne'l-veresetü'l-mezbûr taksîm olunan defter budur ki zikr olunur fi'l-yevmi't-tasi min cemâziye'l-ahir lisene seman ve sebîn ve elf.

Mushaf-ı şerîf		Kıymet: 950
Sim kılıç	[Aded] 2	Kıymet: 3450
Kılıç Demiri	[Aded] 3	Kıymet: 625
Mısırî seccade	[Aded] 1	Kıymet:1030
Def'a seccade	[Aded] 1	600
Köhne didek		220
Yemeni-i cîr	[Aded] 6	669
Tire peşkiri	[Aded]2	310
Al makdem	[Aded] 1	300
Tüfek ma'a silah	[Aded] 2	3000
Kara Kılıç		930
Köhne ...? ² seccade	[Aded] 2	380
Sedefî devat		155
Sarı velence		270
Yeşil çuka ferace		1405
Tüfek	[Aded] 2	1210
Kara kürde	[Aded] 2	505
Süsenî alaca	[Aded] 306?	2580
Vezne kutusu	[Aded] 1	20

¹ Included by the author.

² Parts that could not be read.

Yeşil çuka ferace	1	1405
Beyaz --- ³		615
Munakkaş uçkur	10	500
Tüfek ma'a silah	1	1310
Süsenî alaca	5	2050
Alaca mukavva devat	1	625
Munakkaş atlas kaftan	1	625
Mor çuka ferace ba-post? ...?	1	13.550
Def'a tüfek		1325
Mısri seccade	2	450
Cîr	5	590
Kırmızı saye çuka	[aded]: 9 zira 570	5130
Seccade-i Uşak	[aded]: 2	720
Sim adare?	1	910
Kürde	2	1305
Mai göynek	3	300
Yemeni makad	1	160
Köhne keçe seccade	3	100
Sim kılıç	3	3520
Sim raht		5450
Capkın rahtı	1	1730
Mor çuka ...	1	6500
Tabancalı tüfek	3	450
Harir makad	2	700
Yemeni cîr	5	550
Beyaz makdem	3	1281
Tabancalı tüfek	3	560
Sim raht	1	1710
Yemenî cîr		1100
Havlu makreme	2	210
Sim balta	3	450

³ Indicates that it is not seen in the document

Harir makad	2	3500
Yemeni cîr	10	1100
Beyaz makdem	2	600
Sim gönlek	2	600
Balta	1	555
Harir makad	3	620
Yemeni cîr	10	1300
Beyaz makdem	3	550
Sim kılıç	1	3105
Def'a kılıç		750
Harir makad		500
Yemeni cîr		1200
Beyaz makdem	3	505
Sim kılıç	1	1055
Def 'a sim kılıç	1	1900
Seccade	2	675
Yemeni cîr	5	575
Def 'a yemeni cîr	7	660
Def 'a cîr	10	1110
Beyaz nim makdem	3	305
Köhne bohça	3	930
Elvân makdem	3	1100
Tire ---	3	93
Beyaz makdem	2	655
Dülbent	1	400
Def 'a dülbent	1	400
Örtü keçesi	1	1600
Gömlek	3	575
Munakkaş makreme	12	600
Serakçe? Peşkiri	1	230
Bohça köhne	1	100
Gömlek ma'a don	1	360
Serakçe? peşkiri	1	260

--- ---		165
Havlu makreme	2	280
Beyaz makdem	1	425
Cedid dülbent	2	800
Kırmızı ...? don	1	555
Gömlek ma'a don	3	550
Kahve makremesi	3	270
Yemeni Bürde	1	160
Kırmızı ban velencesi	1	675
Sarı velence	1	615
Beyaz makdem	2	860
Bürüncük bez	1	250
Saat kesesi	2	175
Akçe kesesi	1	105
Munakkaş makreme	5	260
Sim üsküf	1	1920
...?	2	300
Hamam rahtı	1	360
Gömlek ma'a don	1	360
Munakkaş makreme	6	450
Uçkur	5	330
--- ---	2	210
Dülbend başa	1	700
Havlu makreme	1	205
Kırmızı makdem	1	660
Tire makremesi	3	100
Havlu makreme	5	350
Gömlek ma 'a don	2	660
Munakkaş makreme	4	320
Uçkur	4	160
Munakkaş bohça	3	320
Yeşil Keşmirî (kaşmir) şal	1	910
---		450

Havlu makreme	2	180
beyaz şal	2	605
Havlu makreme	2	180
Beyaz makdem	2	705
At Çulu	1	85
Kırmızı velence	1	450
Al makdem	1	305
Munakkaş uçkur	4	161
Munakkaş makreme	8	585
Tire makremesi	3	100
Gömlek ma'a don	2	350
Al makdem	1	560
Beyaz makdem	1	600
Köse dülbend	4	1620
Al kutni	1	820
Alaca?		350
Def'a alaca	1	360
Serakçe? Peşkiri	1	265
Beyaz makdem	1	380
Dülbend başa	2	900
Mor cellabi	1	300
Gömlek ma'a don	13	840
---	1	200
Makreme	6	330
Gömlek don	2	285
Uçkur-ı peşkir		60
Siyah peştamal	3	496
Köse dülbend	1	320
Sim makreme	2	450
Yeşil makdem bohça	1	285
Yemeni makreme	1	40
Gömlek	2	350
Al makdem	1	1000

Beyaz ---	2	155
Sarı kutni	1	305
Gümunî kutni	1	305
Kahve makremesi	2	135
Dülbent	2	550
Kırmızı makdem	2	330
Havlu makreme	2	350
Havlu makreme Tire makremesi	6	500
Başa dülbend	5	2000
Köse dülbend	5	2500
Havlu makreme	2	354
Başa dülbend	5	1800
Nal? Keçesi	1	195
Mai göynek	2	195
Havlu makreme	5	235
Def'a makreme	5	311
Hamam rahtı	1	1000
Köse dülbend	5	2300
Mai ban velencesi	2	650
Sarı velence	1	200
Yemeni ---		200
---		---
Keşmiri şal	1	925
Havlu makreme	2	280
Def'a makreme	2	181
Bürüncük bez	1	250
Yemeni pare		100
Köhne centiyan	1	145
Beyaz makdem	2	865
Tire peşkiri	1	175
Tur? Kuşak	2	310
Hamam rahtı	2	1100

---		---
Def'a dlbent	2	600
Saat kesesi	9	745
Tur? uękur kese	1	150
Munakkař uękur	2	80
Havlu makreme		25
Beyaz makdem	2	770
Tire makremesi	1	40
Sim makdem	1	255
Gmlek	1	170
Dlbend		815
Yeřil ...? keřmiri	1	505
Makreme-i uękur	1	126
Kenarlı bez	1	260
Havlu makreme	3	200
Def'a kenarlı bez	1	190
Hamam rahtı	1	765
Nim makdem	2	400
Brnck Bez	1	162
Al makdem	1	540
Gmlek	1	---
Yeřil makdem	1	540
Elvan atlas	50 zira 165	6250
Kahve makremesi	3	410
Nim makdem	1	150
Munakkař makreme	8	315
Saat kesesi	3	150
Mercan tesbih	1	505
Sim dirhem	127	585
Sagır ---		650
Atlas zira	4	450
Sagır mařraba	1	290
Def'a sim	17,5 * dirhem 5	80

Ud	120 * dirhem 13	960
Def'a ud	70 * dirhem 13	910
Def'a ud	10 * dirhem 8	80
Havlu döşeme	1	160
Beyaz makdem	1	455
...? yasdık		100
Tire makremesi	1	40
Havlu makreme	1	36
Uçkur	2	60
Sarı kutni	1	565
Tencere 10 kapak 6		1300
Leğen ma'a ibrik	2	800
Kahve ibriği	1	100
Def'a kahve ibriği		100
Hamam rahtı	1	1240
---	1	410?
Kırmızı bigi	10 zira 55	850
Yıldızlı tas	2	250
Def'a tas	3	200
Sağır maşraba	3	120
Elvan atlas	50 zira 175	6250
Ve dal saat kesesi	1	80
Misk	Miskal 10	900
Hamam ---		1100?
havlu makreme		240
Bogasi	3	200
Köse dülbent	1	600
Tire makremesi	2	40
Sim buhurdan	82 dirhem 102?	856
Güllabdan buhurdan	215 tas 8	1720
Kırmızı makdem	2	830
Beyaz peştemal	3	600
Kahve makremesi	2	100

Sim makdem	3	380
Halep atlası	63,5 zira 67	2454
Mai peşkir	1	800
Sarı kutni	2	1010
Al sof	1	560
Sarı keşmiri şal	1	1050
Kahve makremesi	3	115
Kutni	2	510
Yeşil şal	17	150
Tur uçkur	1	80
Munakkaş makreme	5	300
Maşraba	5	355
Tas tepsi	1	100
Gülgûni atlas	27,5 zira 70	1897
Alaca meşin	3	133
Derse?		25
Leğen ma ‘a ibrik	1	800
Elvan ---	3	1255
Beyaz kahve makremesi	1	290
...? ...? atlas	5 zira 41	2050
İskemle	1	25
Kırmızı atlas	10 zira 120	1200
Gümûnî hare	1	800
Yeşil kemha	10 zira 50	500
Gümunî atlas	86,5 zira 67	5795
Elvan ...?	3	2115
Elvan	5 hire 611	3055
Cedid dikdik?	3	930
Seccade	1	140
Yeşil ...? atlas	1	460
Alaca atlas	1	460
Havlu döşeme	1	160
Bogasi banesi?	2	100

Elvan	5 hire 55	3750
Hamam rastı	1	680
Yeşil hare	1	400
Elvanî kutni	5	1300
Sedefî devat	1	200
Alaca kutni	1	420
...?	9	40
Tas	1	80
Tas tepsi	1	320
Hamam? Tas	6	220
Mor havlu	1	400
Köhne şal	1	200
Al diba	10 zira 380	3800
Elvanî hire	3	1800
Tire makremesi	1	70
Yemeni cir	1	125
Alaca peşkir	3	400
Bogasi	2	220
Terkeş	1	450
Elvan	5 hirre 550	2750
Yemeni banesi	1	25
Şam dikdiği	3	3150
Sarı kutni	1	680
Kitab	5	1300
Def'a kitab	4	450
Meşin akaid	1	240
Netayic-i fûnun	1	120
Falname-i kitab	1	80
Sarı ---	4	800
Kırmızı velence	5	1000
Mai velence	5	1000
Köhne Bursa yastık	15	3500
Kaliçe	1	3500

Minder	2	200
Sinciye	2	600
Altun bıçak	1	800
Mai tüfek kese	3	900
Açık? Ocak? makremesi		200
Köhne çuka yastık	9	500
Örtü keçesi	1	1500
Acemî çukası	24	3150
Mor saye çuka	42 zira 300	1350
Yeşil çuka	42 zira 300	1350
Munakkaş çuka	42 zira 300	1350
...? çuka	5	1000
Sagir kaliçe	2	400
...? çuka	37	6920
Menzili der-mahalle-i mezbure		30000
Yekun muhallefat ve menzil		569020
Müteveffa-yı mezbur Sultan Mehmed cami-i şerifinde emanet vaz' idüp tahrîr olunan meblağdır zikr olunur		
Riyal guruş 15 kise * 500		750000
Esedi guruş 14 kise * 500		700000
Def'a guruş 5 kise * 400		200000
Def'a riyalı guruş 7 kise * 500		350000
Yekun		2000000
Müteveffa-yı mezbur Yeni bezistanda emanet vaz' idüp tahrir olunan nukudumdur ki zikr olunur		
Sikke	3994 * hisse? 325	898650
Frengi altun	3900 * 250	975000
Müddi dirhem	6 riyalı * kise 500	300000
Hurda akçe	5 kise * 50000	250000

Def'a hurda	4 kise * 40000	160000
Def'a hurda akçe kese	1	30000
Semen-i kebir	2 kise * 500	100000
Def'a semen-i kebir	2 kese * 43400	86800
Yekun		2800450
Müteveffa-yı mezburun menzilde mevcut olup tahrir olunan nukud bedeli zikr olunur.		
Semen	9 kise * 500	450000
Esedî gurus	11 kese * 500	550000
Riyali gurus	10 kise * 500	500000
Hurda akçe	8 kese * 50000	400000
Def'a semen	6 kese * 500	300000
Def'a esedî gurus	2 kese * 500	100000
Def'a riyalî	3 kese * 500	150000
Def'a esedî	5 kese * 500	250000
Def'a riyalî gurus	3 kise * 500	150000
Def'a 1 kise * 300		30000
Altı dirhem gurus	1 kise * 500	50000
Semen-i kebir	2 kese * 500	100000
Müddî dirhem	1 gurus * 195	19500
Dökme	210 gurus * 100	21000
Mısri badesi	1800 * 3	45000
Pare 515		1541
Haml? akçe		2300
...? akçe		11000
Yekun		3139345

Müteveffa-yı mezbur kethüdası Zülfikar Bey'e havale idüp mezbur Zülfikar Bey cem'-i tahsil idüp ba'd vefat verese-i mezburdan teslim eylediği meblağ 907443. Sığâr-ı mezburunun

tesviye-i umuriyye kıbel-i şer‘den mansûb-ı vasîleri olan Abdülkerim Ağa yediyle cezire-i Girid’den gelüp tahrir olunan meblağ kıymet 200000 Yenişehir’den getirdiği meblağ kıymet 6640

Cem‘-i yekun: 9622898

Minha el-ihracat?

Mihri... el-zevcetü'l-mezbure kıymet 5000

Resm-i adi kıymet 235000

Dellaliye kıymet 4000

Ücret-i dükkan kıymet 3.000

Müteveffa-yı mezburun vakf eylediği icra-i şerif kıymet 5.500

Yekun: 251.500

Sahhe'l-baki et-Taksîm-i sehm

Meblağ: 9.371.398

Hissetü'z-zevce	1.133.924 0037500
Hissetü'l-ibn	2.267.848 0075000
Hissetü'l-ibn	2.267.848 0075000
Hissetü'l-ibn	2.267.848 0075000
Hissetü'l-bint	1.133.964 0037500
Müteveffa-yı mezburun zimem-i nâsda olan meblağdır ale'l-esami zikr olunur	
Der zimmet-i Siyavüş Ağa	Guruş kıymet 2000
Def‘a der-zimmet-i Siyavüş Ağa	Guruş 1200
Der-zimmet-i Halil Ağa bera-yı has ...?	Guruş kıymet 4700
Def‘a der-zimmet-i Halil Ağa bera-yı avarız Manastır	Guruş kıymet 5296
Der-zimmet-i Hasan Çavuş karz	Guruş kıymet 23
Der-zimmet-i Halil Ağa bera-yı ...? Ohri	Guruş kıymet 6400
Der-zimmet-i Ali Beşe ...	Karz guruş kıymet 100

Der-zimmet-i Abdüllatif Halife	Karz gurus kıymet 168
Der-zimmet-i Ebubekir Ağa bera-yı ...? ...? ...?	Gurus kıymet 705
Der-zimmet-i Abdi Beşe karz	Gurus kıymet 240
Der-zimmet-i Mehmed Ağa karz	Gurus kıymet 886,5
Der-zimmet-i merhum Osman Ağa ...	Gurus kıymet 230
Der-zimmet-i kasap	Karz gurus kıymet 1000
Der-zimmet-i Nasuh Ağa Ağa-yı Bağdad ...	Karz kıymet 500
Der-zimmet-i merhum Ömer Paşa	Karz gurus kıymet 2500
Der-zimmet-i ...	Karz gurus 20
Der-zimmet-i Mehmed Efendi el-kadı beşer? akçe ...?	Karz gurus kıymet 100
Der-zimmet-i Recep Ağa bera-yı Karaferye	Gurus kıymet 6300
Yekun cem'an	32368,5
Hissetü'z-zevce	4046
Hissetü'l-ibn	8092
Hissetü'l-ibn	8092
Hissetü'l-ibn	8092
Hissetü'l-bint	4046

APPENDIX 9

The Probate Register of Hüseyn Beşe bn. Hasan

Muhallefat

El-merhum Hüseyn Beşe ibn Hasan mate min kabl sakinen Mahalleti Karabaş -----

Aişe bt. Mahmud ve ebnân-ı med'uvvân Mustafa Beşe ve Mehmed Beşe ve binten -----

vak'a't-tahrir ve't-taksim fi'l-yevmi'l-hadi aşer min şehr-i Saferü'l-hayr. Lisene semani ve seb'in? --- ve elf.

Köhne yelek	Aded 1	Kıymet 450
Mai Londra çukadan cedit bir serhaddî	Aded 1	Kıymet 477
Mai Londra çukadan cedit yelek	Aded 1	Kıymet 520
---	Aded ---	Kıymet ---
Köhne-i nısıf dülbend	Aded 2	Kıymet 80
Mai beylik çukadan köhne yelek	Aded 1	Kıymet 40
Mai beylik çukadan köhne anteri	Aded 1	Kıymet 40
Nefti bogasiden köhne anteri	Aded 1	Kıymet 40
Gömlek	Aded 1	Kıymet ---
Köhne siyah kuzu bedre kürkü	Aded 1	Kıymet 15
Mai beylik çukadan hardani?	Aded 1	Kıymet 170
Zeytün ağacından tesbih	Aded 1	Kıymet 9
Yeşil çukadan köhne kavuk	Aded 1	Kıymet 15
Köhne işleme makreme	Aded 1	Kıymet 25
Köhne yemeni ve köhne kumaş parelerden bohça	Aded 3	Kıymet 39
Mai bogasiden köhne zıbın	Aded 1	Kıymet 19
Mısri köhne peştamal	Aded 2	Kıymet 37
Kara bıçak ma'a masad	Aded 1	Kıymet 80

Dirhem veznesi kutusuyla ve dirhemiyle		Kıymet 57
Sim hatem	Aded 2	Kıymet 40
Beyaz abadan köhne ...?	Aded 2	Kıymet 20
Def'a kara bıçak	Aded 3	Kıymet 20
Köseleden köhne cüzdan	Aded 1	Kıymet 5
Kayıklı bakrac-ı kebir	Aded 1	Kıymet 100
Kayıklı bakrac-ı sagir	Aded 1	Kıymet 65
Kahve tepsisi	Aded 1	Kıymet 25
Küçük lenger	Aded 1	Kıymet 15
Küçük sagir tas	Aded 1	Kıymet 24
Kara kılıç	Aded 1	Kıymet 60
Çakmaklı el tüfenk	Aded 1	Kıymet 90
Külünk	Aded 1	Kıymet 12
Kır ibriği	Aded 1	Kıymet 25
Acem fincanı ma'a ...? kutusuyla	Aded 5	Kıymet 150
Köhne sepet sandığı	Aded 1	Kıymet 23
Tahtadan köhne sandığı	Aded 2	Kıymet 103
Yeniçeri baltası	Aded 1	Kıymet 20
Odun baltası	Aded 1	Kıymet 15
Kasap ...?	Aded 1	Kıymet 10
Temur vakye?	Aded 3,5	Kıymet 30
Keser	Aded 1	Kıymet 5
Destere	Aded 1	Kıymet 8
Kasap çengeli	Aded 7	Kıymet 15
Güdek	Aded 1	Kıymet 5
Köhne müstamel kırmızı babuç	Aded 2	Kıymet 45
Kıyma satırı	Aded 1	Kıymet 20
Balmumu	Aded 1	Kıymet 10
Müstamel gönlek	Aded 2	Kıymet 90
Müstamel ton	Aded 2	Kıymet 38

Köhne ir heybesi	Aded 1	Kıymet 10
Sim kasap masadı	Aded 1	Kıymet 500
Cedid hurda		Meblağ 394
Def ‘a hurda		Meblağ 100
Ağaç sini	Aded 1	Kıymet 7
Yekun		4383
Minha		
Techiz ve tekfin		Meblağ 900
Resm-i adi		Meblağ 100
Kalemiyye		Meblağ 50
İhzariyye		Meblağ 20
Dellaliye		Meblağ 80
Hammaliye		Meblağ 16
İcare-i dükkan		Meblağ 45
Yekun		1211
Sahhe’l-baki gurema		3174
Mehr-i müsbet ez-zevcetü Aişe el-mezbur		Meblağ 500
Ve hissetü'l-gurema		Meblağ 388
Deyn-i müsbet an-vakf-ı Saliha Hatun bt. Abdullah		Meblağ 5000
Hissetü'l-gurema		Meblağ 3885
Hissetü'l-gurema		Meblağ? 1

APPENDIX 10

The Probate Register of Osman Beşe b. Abdullah

Muhallefat-ı el-merhum Osman Beşe b. Abdullah el-müteveffa an kıbel-i fi'l-hücreti'l-ma'rûfe yetmiş ikinci cemaat-i min ... er-racil kostantiniyyeti'l-mahmiyyeti'l-mazbut muhallefat ... fi'l-a'yân Mehemd Ağa ibn Mustafa el-ümmi ... beytü'l-mal el-mahsus ... racil. Bi'l-hamiyyeti'l-mezbûr ve'l-ademe vârisi ma'rûf mine'z-zâhir Vak 'a't-tahrîr fi'l-yevmi's-sabi aşer Muharremü'l-Haram lisene seman ve erbain ve elfin

Siyah bogasi came köhne	Kıymet 100
Esi ma'a üzengi	275
...? kılıç	361
Dülbend-i müstamel	190
...? ...? Londra	35
Yeşil Londra ferace ...? siyah kurgan	800
Beyaz ...? kisesi [aded] 1	43
...? velence	160
Bıçak-ı sagir	17
Makreme-i sagir	30
Kırmızı koton? [aded] 1	12
Yekun	2022
Minha el-ihracât	
Resm-i adi	49
...?	8
Katib-i ihzariye	8
Ücret-i dükkân	10
Hammaliye	16
Techiz ve tekfin	800
Yekun	891
...? el-mezbur	1131

GLOSSARY

<i>‘Askeri</i>	Tax-exempt service nobility of the Ottoman Empire.
<i>A‘cemi oġlan</i>	The conscription Christian boys (<i>devshirmes</i>) who were hired out to Turkish families in Anatolia or Rumelia by the army — in return for payment — for approximately three to eight years. After the boys were taken away from their host families and placed in the barracks, the second phase of the training began. At this stage of training the <i>acemi oġlans</i> served as a major labor force used in various tasks. There were approximately 7,500 <i>acemi oġlans</i> in the mid-sixteenth century. At the beginning of the seventeenth century their numbers increased to 10,982. Yerasimos, <i>Süleymaniye</i> , 67; Uzunçarşılı <i>Kapıkulu Ocakları</i> , vol. 1, 79-80.
<i>Aġa bölüğü</i>	A company of Ottoman janissary troops.
<i>Aġa çırağı</i>	Hand-picked recruits in the personal service of the commander of the janissaries used for tasks such as water carrier, or attendant of the janissary pack animals during campaign, as distinct from <i>devshirme</i> recruits who were promoted to regiments only after a long period of training as novices. Rhoads Murphey, <i>Kanun-name-i Sultani Li Aziz Efendi</i> , 54.
<i>Akçe</i>	“Asper,” a small silver coin which served as a common coin of account in Ottoman currency. In the first half of the seventeenth century it went through periods of drastic devaluation and its rates fluctuated widely. Gerber, “Monetary System of the Ottoman Empire,” <i>JESHO</i> 25 (1982): 308-324.
<i>Altı bölük halkı</i>	cavalry troops of the janissary corps.
<i>Becayeş</i>	The practice whereby a corrupt official permitted a new recruit to serve in a janissary company under a false name by the use of a deceased soldier’s pay-ticket. Rhoads Murphey, <i>Kanun-name-i Sultani Li Aziz Efendi</i> , 54.
<i>Beççe</i>	“Small child,” a male aged from 3 to 8.
<i>Beşe</i>	“brother.” Honorific title used by rank-and-file-janissaries.
<i>Beyat</i>	same as <i>bi’at</i> .
<i>Bi’at</i>	The oath of allegiance. public recognition of an established rule. It becomes a sort of “homage” to an established succession which differs from swearing <i>bi’ats</i> to emirs. The Abbasids, the Samanids, and the

Buyyids imported this form of *bi'at* from the caliphate to the kingships. In this later form of *bi'at*, soldiers bound themselves with a real obligation but they requested a “customary payment” in return. Without satisfactory payment they sometimes refused commitment. Roy Mottahedeh, *Loyalty and Leadership in an Early Islamic Society*, 50-54.

<i>Bostancı</i>	“Gardener,” Ottoman imperial guard, part of the palace service; among the duties were guarding the shores and waters of Istanbul and the Bosphorus; they were also used as an urban police force and to carry out important executions.
<i>Cemaat</i>	A regiment of Ottoman janissary troops.
<i>Cizye</i>	A canonical tax levied on non-Muslim households. The word comes from the root word <i>ceza</i> , meaning punishment.
<i>Çorbacı</i>	a janissary officer, comparable to a colonel in rank.
<i>Defterdar</i>	“Keeper of the register,” a chief of a department of the Ottoman fiscal service. The chief for the whole empire was called the <i>baş defterdar</i> .
<i>Devşirme</i>	The forcible removal of the children of the Christian subjects from their ethnic, religious, and cultural environment and their transplantation into the Turkish-Islamic environment with the aim of employing them in the service of the Palace, the army, and the state, whereby they were to serve the sultan as slaves or freemen and to form a part of the ruling class of the state. V. L. Menage, “Some Notes on Devshirme,” 64.
<i>Ekrebiyet</i>	The method of seniority. A sultan’s next sibling succeeds him, not his children.
<i>Ferzend-i sipahi</i>	Sons of members of the Six Cavalry regiments (<i>altı bölük halkı</i>) who laid claim to membership in the imperial regiments. Halil Inalcık, “Ghureba,” <i>EF</i> ² , vol. 2, 1097-1098.
<i>Gulam</i>	“Child who reached puberty.” The age range of 12 to 15 as <i>gulams</i> seems logical and matches the legal applications accepting the age of 15 for the onset of puberty. The conscripted Christian boys as <i>devshirmes</i> were called <i>gulams</i> . Margaret L. Meriwether, “The Rights of Children and the Responsibilities of Women, Women as Wasis in Ottoman Aleppo, 1770-1840,” in Amira El Azh Sonbol ed., <i>Women, the Family, and Divorce Laws in Islamic History</i> , 225.
<i>Gulamçe</i>	“Child,” from 8 to 12 years old.
<i>Harac</i>	Land-tax taken from <i>zimmis</i> .

<i>İç oğlan</i>	The conscripted Christian boys who were selected for palace service. They were placed in one of four palaces: Iskender Çelebi, Galatasaray, Edirne, or Ibrahim Paşa, taught Turkish and Islamic practices, the sciences, and were given military training. Every three to seven years, the most talented few were selected to continue their education in the Enderun and the rest were sent to the <i>kapıkulu</i> corps to become soldiers. Uzunçarşılı, <i>Kapıkulu Ocakları</i> , vol. 1, 2-4.
<i>İспенç</i>	The tax that the Muslim land-holders taking as rent from Christian tenants, 25 <i>akçe</i> .
<i>Kadı</i>	“Judge,” Ottoman judicial and administrative official in charge of a <i>kaza</i> ; responsible for executing orders of the central government and certifying and keeping copies of all official records pertaining to his district that are called <i>şer‘iyye sicils</i> , or <i>kadı sicils</i> .
<i>Kal‘a</i>	A fortress.
<i>Kapıkulu</i>	“Servants of the Porte,” a servant of the sultan employed in the palace, government, or in an elite military unit (the latter includes janissaries, <i>cebecis</i> , <i>topcus</i> , and <i>kapıkulu sipahis</i>); also collective term for these units.
<i>Kaza</i>	a territorial subdivision of a <i>sancak</i> administered by a <i>kadı</i> .
<i>Kethüda</i>	In a guild setting refers to the head of a guild who dealt with the material and administrative aspects of guild life. G. Baer, “Kethüda,” <i>EI</i> ² , vol. 4, 894.
<i>Korucu</i>	“Guard.” Those who were the elderly soldiers who were not yet retired from the janissary army.
<i>mehteran-ı hassa</i>	Military imperial band.
<i>Mu‘af</i>	“Exempt,” a member of the <i>re‘aya</i> holding an exemption for all or certain taxes, usually in exchange for some regular service or services. The exemption might include being exempt from giving children away as <i>devshirmes</i> .
<i>Mühimme Defteri</i>	“important, urgent affairs.” Registers containing copies of decrees issued by the Ottoman imperial divan sent to Ottoman officials in various parts of the empire.
<i>Mütevelli</i>	The trustee of a pious foundation.
<i>Nanhuregan</i>	The orphan’s of the janissaries.
<i>Narh</i>	fixed-price applications.

<i>Oda</i>	Janissary barracks.
<i>Oda vakfı</i>	Regiment waqf. Cash endowments of the janissary regiments. Some expressions that were used for regiment waqfs were: <i>oda vakfı</i> , <i>mevkuf nukud</i> . The loans taken from the regiment waqfs were registered in the Istanbul court registers during the seventeenth century as loans taken from a janissary, usually the <i>odabaşı</i> of a certain regiment, who was also the trustee (<i>mütevelli</i>) of the waqf. For example, the loan was taken from 57. <i>ağa bölüğüne mahsus oda ahalisi için mevkuf nukudun mütevellisi Mahmud Beşe b. Hasan</i> , or 16. <i>ağa bölüğüne mahsus odanın odabaşısı olan ve odaya ait nukuda mütevelli olan Mustafa nam râcil</i> .
<i>Odabaşı</i>	The janissary regiment commanders.
<i>Pençik</i>	lit. meaning “one-fifth” in Persian. Taking one-fifth of the war captives (destined for the slave market, or the <i>devshirme</i> system) as a human booty for the sultan.
<i>Poturogulları</i>	Bosnian Muslim boys who were conscripted for the janissary corps. It is a term given to the Bosnian Christians who converted to Islam in Bosnia. This term is taken and used in the Ottoman documents as well. İsmail H. Uzunçarşılı, <i>Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilatında Kapıkulu Ocakları</i> , vol. 2, 18.
<i>Racil</i>	infantry.
<i>Re‘aya</i>	Tax-paying subjects of the Ottoman Empire.
<i>Şeyhülislam</i>	Chief mufti of Istanbul, the head of religious and legal establishment in the Ottoman state and sat in the imperial <i>divan</i> ; as chief mufti, he was qualified to pass judgement even on the actions of the sultan if they impinged on Islamic law.
<i>Sipahi</i>	A cavalryman compensated for military services by a <i>timar</i> -grant and responsible for bringing on campaign retinue the size of which was to be in proportion to the size of his <i>timar</i> -holdings; also refers to members of a <i>kapıkulu</i> cavalry formation which, similar to other <i>kapıkulu</i> units, was based in the capital and received a regular cash wage.
<i>Şirhor</i>	A male from new-born to the age of 3. The word comes from <i>şirhare</i> meaning nursing baby.
<i>Subaşı</i>	Police, superintendent.
<i>Sürü</i>	“Herds, batches” The groups of conscripted Christian boys. They were organized into groups of one hundred, one hundred and fifty, or two

hundred for transport to the capital to become *devshirmes*. They were dressed in *kızıl aba* (red clothing) and *külah* (a conical shaped hat) in order to prevent any escapes or kidnappings during the transfer.

Uzunçarşılı, *Kapıkulu Ocakları*, vol. 1, 21.

Tekaiüd

Those who retired from the janissary army.

Turnacıbaşı

The chief of the 73rd regiment of the janissary army.

Yayabaşı

The head of the foot soldiers in the janissary army.

Zımmi

Non-Muslims living under the authority and supremacy of the Islamic state.

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