

Divergent Mobilization: Explaining the Disjuncture Between Social Mobilization and Electoral Success of Islamist Political Parties in Pakistan (1947-2024)



Muhammad Bilal Shakir

A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Political Science

McGill University, Montreal

December, 2024

© Copyright by Bilal Shakir, 2024

Table of Contents

<i>Abstract</i>	<i>vii</i>
<i>Acknowledgements.....</i>	<i>x</i>
<i>List of Figures.....</i>	<i>xiv</i>
<i>List of Tables.....</i>	<i>xv</i>
<i>Glossary</i>	<i>xvii</i>
Chapter 1: Introduction	2
1. Summary	2
1.1. Conceptualizing the Outcome Variable: Divergent Mobilization	7
1.1.1. Comparative Puzzle of Social and Electoral Mobilization.....	8
1.2. The Argument	12
2. Research Design	21
2.1. Case Selection: The Pakistan Paradox of Islamist Mobilization	23
2.1.1. Low Electoral Success of Islamist Parties in Pakistan	25
2.1.2. High Social Mobilization of Islamist Groups in Pakistan	26
2.1.3. The Pakistan Paradox: The Uniqueness of Pakistan as a Case of Islamist Mobilization	28
2.2. Methods of Collecting Data: Types of Materials and Strategies for Acquiring Them.....	30
2.2.1. Types of Materials and Their Relevance for Analyzing Divergent Mobilization	30
2.2.2. In-depth Fieldwork at Multiple Sites in Pakistan.....	34
2.2.3. Documentary Research (Newspapers, Videos, Autobiographies)	39
2.2.4. Quantitative Data: Electoral Mobilization and Social Mobilization	40
2.3. Methods of Analyzing Data	41
2.3.1. Small N-Methods: Process Tracing and Causal Inference.....	42
2.3.2. Large-N Methods: Frequency Analysis, Hypothesis Testing, Statistical Measures	44
3. Dissertation Outline and Chapter Summary.....	48
Chapter 2: The Concept & Theory of Divergent Mobilization.....	53
1. Introduction	53
2. Outcome Variable: Conceptualizing Divergent Mobilization	59
2.1. A Unified Typology of Social and Electoral Mobilization: Divergent, Convergent, Diminished and Vote-Banking.....	59
2.2. Spheres of Mobilization: Social and Electoral Mobilization and the Inclusiveness Assumption	69
3. Scope Conditions of The Theory of Divergent Mobilization	73
3.1. Definitions and Key Terms	73

3.1.1.	Political Mobilization	73
3.1.2.	Islamist Parties, Political Parties	74
3.2.	Other Scope Conditions.....	76
4.	The Limits of Conventional Explanations	78
4.1.	Material Comfort and Social Class, Diverging Numerical Effects	79
4.2.	The Decline of Traditional Cleavage Groups	79
4.2.1.	Size of the Cleavage Group	80
4.2.2.	Secularization	81
4.3.	Sphere-specific Explanations: Electoral Systems and Rules, Founding Nationalism and Timing.....	83
4.3.1.	Electoral Systems and Rules.....	83
4.3.2.	Timing: Friday Prayers	85
4.5.3.	Founding Nationalism.....	86
5.	Theoretical Framework: The Theory of Divergent Mobilization.....	87
5.1.	The Organizational Advantage and the Structural Trap of Mobilization	89
5.1.1.	Organizational Effectiveness: Large Electorate Zealously Committed to Parties and the Mobilization Weapon.....	93
5.1.2.	Structural Fragmentation: Fragmentation Due to Cleavages and the “Frozen” Electoral Parties.....	96
5.1.2.1.	Ideological Fragmentation: High Threshold for Inclusion	99
5.1.2.2.	Ideological Fragmentation: Low Threshold for Exclusion via Ideological Sectarianism	101
5.2.	Political Fragmentation: Lack of Electoral Alliances, Number of Parties and Size of the Cleavage Group	103
5.2.1.	The Structural Trap of Mobilization and Its Implications.....	106
5.3.	The Two Conditions of Divergence: Relative Strength and Aligned Incentives of a State’s Ruling Elite.....	107
5.3.1.	Authoritarian Resilience of a State’s Ruling Elite Using Political Parties: The Case of Islamist Parties in Pakistan	109
6.	<i>Conclusion</i>	111
	<i>Chapter 3: Islamist Parties and Electoral Mobilization in Pakistan (1947-2023)</i>	114
1.	Introduction	114
2.	<i>Describing the Puzzle: Low Electoral Success of Islamist Parties in Pakistan</i>	115
2.1.	What is Low Electoral Success? Successful in Getting Limited Votes but Unsuccessful in Acquiring Mass Appeal	121
3.	<i>Setting the Stage: Measuring Religious Cleavages & Overview of Religious Parties in Pakistan</i>	122
3.1.	Overview of Religious Cleavages in Theory and their Application to Pakistan	122
3.2.	Measuring Religious Cleavages	125

3.3. Overview of Islamist Parties in Pakistan: Pakistan, Masalik and Structural Fragmentation	126
3.3.1. Composition of Pakistan's Muslims: The Main Religious Cleavages in Pakistan	129
3.4. Defining Islamist Parties in Pakistan: "Deeni" And Not "Mazhabi"	132
3.4.1. Major vs Small Islamist Parties	134
3.4.2. Coalitions and Islamist Parties	140
4. <i>Structural Fragmentation: Argument & Evidence</i>	141
3.1. Pathways of Structural Fragmentation: Ideological & Political.....	144
3.1.1. Ideological Fragmentation: High Thresholds for Inclusion & Low Threshold for Exclusion.....	147
4.1.2. Political Fragmentation.....	153
4.2 Robustness: Testing Alternative Explanations	170
4.2.1. Electoral System	170
4.2.2. Interest in Electoral Contestation (Number of Candidates).....	172
5. "Islam's Electoral Disadvantage:" Implications and Future	174
6. <i>Conclusion</i>	177
<i>Chapter 4 Islamist Parties and Social Mobilization in Pakistan (1947-2023)</i>	179
1. <i>Introduction</i>	179
2. <i>Describing the Puzzle: High Social Mobilization of Islamist Parties in Pakistan</i>	180
3. <i>Islamist parties in Pakistan: Small parties, large organizations</i>	183
4. <i>Empirical Evidence: Networks of Religious Organizations and Party Workers</i>	187
4.1. Networks of Ancillary Organizations: Madrassahs, Mosques, Student Wings	187
4.1.1. Deep Linkages Between Madrassahs and Islamist Parties	189
4.1.2. Organizational Density	191
4.2 Large Proportion of Committed Party Workers Relative to Non-Islamist Competitors.....	200
4.2.1 Party Voters Are Often the same as Party Workers.....	201
4.2.2 Ideological Commitment of Party Workers.....	203
4.2.3 Deep Roots in Pakistani Society	205
5 <i>Conclusion</i>	209
<i>Chapter 5: The Establishment and Patterns of Social and Electoral Mobilization of Islamist Parties in Pakistan (1947-2022)</i>	210
1. <i>Introduction</i>	210
2. <i>Periodization of Divergent Mobilization of Islamist Parties in Pakistan (1947-2023)</i>	211

2.1. 1947-1971 Early Statehood: Influencing Politics from Outside the Parliament.....	215
2.2. 1971-1979: Emergence of State Cooptation: Beginning of Parliamentary Politics.....	219
2.3. 1979-2001: Assertive State Cooptation	223
2.3.1. 1979-1987: Assertive State Cooptation: Incorporation into State Agenda ...	223
2.3.2. 1987-2001: Assertive State Cooptation: Establishment's B-Team & Democratic Disorder.....	226
2.4. 2001-2022: Rise of Barelvi Politicization and Demise of the "B" Team ...	229
2.4.1. 2001-2011: Rise of <i>Barelvi</i> Politicization and Demise of the "B" Team: Pivot to <i>Barelvis</i>	230
2.4.2. 2011-2022: Rise of <i>Barelvi</i> Politicization and Demise of the "B" Team: Mainstreaming <i>Barelvi</i> Extremism	233
3. <i>Conclusion</i>	237
<i>Chapter 6: The Military Establishment as a Moderator of Divergent Mobilization of Islamist Parties in Pakistan (1947-2022)</i>	239
1. <i>Introduction</i>	239
2. <i>Pakistan's Military Establishment as a Moderator of Divergent Mobilization of Islamist Parties</i>	243
2.1. Analytical Framework for Two Moderating Conditions: Aligned Incentives and Relative Strength.....	248
2.1.1. First Condition: Relative Strength.....	249
2.1.2. Second Condition: Aligned Incentives	258
3. <i>Causal Pathways for Moderating Divergent Mobilization</i>	266
3.1. The Establishment's Role in the Enlargement of the Electorates of Islamist Parties	267
3.1.1. The Rise of a <i>Madrasah</i> Network	268
3.1.2. Military's Role in Promoting Islamist Student Unions	274
3.2. The Establishment's Role in Contributing to the Political and Ideological Fragmentation of Islamist Parties.....	276
3.3 Moderating Social and Electoral Mobilization Independently of Independent Variables	280
3.3.1. Moderating Electoral Mobilization	281
4. <i>Conclusion</i>	284
<i>Chapter 7 Conclusion</i>	286
1. Summary	286
1.1. Conceptual Framework.....	286
1.2. Explanatory Framework: Constant Causes and Historical Contingency	287
2. Further Agenda and Reflections for Comparative Research.....	290

<i>Bibliography</i>	293
1. Articles, Books, Newspaper Articles and Electronic Sources	293
2. Field Interviews and Focus Groups	311

Abstract

This dissertation analyzes what accounts for variation in the relationship between social mobilization and the electoral success of ideological political parties and groups. It proposes the novel concept of “divergent mobilization” to capture the disjuncture wherein some parties exhibit high levels of social mobilization but low levels of electoral mobilization at the national level. Divergent mobilization provides analytical purchase over a wide range of empirical observations across the world. To analyze divergent mobilization, the study probes two central questions: *why are some ideological parties and groups unable to convert their robust social mobilization into electoral mobilization by transforming into mass electoral machines at the national level, but other parties can? Why can some ideological groups and political parties punch above their electoral weight in facets of social mobilization, such as street protests, but other groups cannot?* The study innovatively proposes that the disjuncture in social and electoral mobilization can be explained by variation along two interconnected dimensions: organizational effectiveness and structural fragmentation. Divergent mobilization can be explained by two key variables that vary along these dimensions: 1) large mobilization cores that are zealously committed to political parties independent of the party’s contingent political oscillations along the dimension of organizational effectiveness, and 2) high levels of ideological and political fragmentation due to constraints imposed by the social structure along the dimension of structural fragmentation. The relationship of these variables with divergent mobilization is moderated by the relative strength and incentives of a state’s ruling elite.

Empirically, this dissertation focuses on Islamist mobilization in Muslim-Majority Countries like Pakistan, a country of 241 million people, where my research finds that the high social mobilization of Islamists has not been matched by strong political parties electorally at the national level. I measure the social and electoral mobilization of Islamist parties in Pakistan through two main approaches. For electoral mobilization, I constructed one of the most comprehensive datasets of Pakistani election results at the aggregate level to date, spanning ten election cycles from 1970-2018. For social mobilization, I used social mobilization data using the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) dataset on protest events in Pakistan (n=77,517). Crucially, the dissertation relied on 11 months of in-depth fieldwork in Pakistan, encompassing 60 semi-structured interviews at the elite level with previously under-accessed informants that included practitioners such as high-ranking former officers of Pakistan’s secretive intelligence agencies, senior bureaucrats, national and local politicians, experts, and two focus groups at the non-elite level that were conducted in two representative administrative units of Pakistan. Ethnographic insights gathered from three different sites that refer to major cities of Pakistan were used as data sources by visiting mosques, Islamic schools, and state facilities. The dissertation also uses newspaper reports and archival sources from the 1940s onwards as data sources.

For analyzing the data, the dissertation utilized a mixed-methods research design that employs rigorous case-analysis methods, principally process tracing and historical periodization, to describe, contextualize and explain the divergent mobilization of Islamist parties in Pakistan. This is complemented with statistical analysis to triangulate the findings and test alternative explanations. The dissertation tempers the optimism of a burgeoning literature in political science that identifies a so-called Islamist political advantage by underlining impediments to the political mobilization of Islamist parties in Pakistan.

Résumé

Cette thèse analyse les facteurs expliquant les variations dans la relation entre mobilisation sociale et succès électoral des partis politiques et groupes idéologiques. Elle propose le concept novateur de « mobilisation divergente » pour conceptualiser les cas où certains partis sont capables de générer des niveaux élevés de mobilisation sociale mais n'obtiennent qu'une faible mobilisation électorale au niveau national. La notion de mobilisation divergente permet de faire sens d'un large échantillon d'observations empiriques à travers le monde. Afin de l'analyser, l'étude explore deux questions centrales : *pourquoi certains partis et groupes à caractère idéologique sont-ils incapables de convertir leur fort taux de mobilisation sociale en mobilisation électorale en se transformant en machine électorale de masse à l'échelle nationale alors que d'autres y parviennent ? Pourquoi certains réussissent-ils à peser davantage en termes de mobilisation sociale, via notamment des manifestations, et d'autres non ?* La contribution centrale de cette étude est de montrer que le décalage entre mobilisation sociale et électorale est lié aux variations de deux dimensions interconnectées : l'efficacité organisationnelle et la fragmentation structurelle. La mobilisation divergente s'explique par deux variables qui évoluent sur ces dimensions : 1) de larges noyaux durs dévoués à ces partis indépendamment de leurs oscillations contingentes en matière d'efficacité organisationnelle, 2) de hauts niveaux de fragmentation politique et idéologique dus aux contraintes imposées par les structures sociales selon la dimension de fragmentation structurelle. La relation entre ces variables et la mobilisation divergente est modérée par la force relative et les motivations de l'élite dirigeante.

Dans sa dimension empirique, la thèse analyse la mobilisation islamiste dans des pays à majorité musulmane comme le Pakistan, un pays de 241 millions d'habitants, où mes recherches montrent que les hauts niveaux de mobilisation sociale générée par les islamistes n'ont pas été convertis en résultats électoraux correspondants au niveau national. J'ai employé deux méthodes principales pour mesurer la mobilisation sociale et électorale des partis islamistes pakistanais. Pour la mobilisation électorale, j'ai constitué l'une des bases de données au niveau national les plus complètes à ce jour couvrant dix cycles électoraux de 1970 à 2018. Pour la mobilisation sociale, j'ai eu recours aux chiffres de mobilisation sociale de la base de données ACLED (Armed Conflict Location and Event Data) concernant les

manifestations au Pakistan (n=77 517). L'étude s'appuie également sur 11 mois de terrain au Pakistan incluant 60 entretiens semi-structurés avec des participants membres de l'élite et jusqu'ici peu accessibles y compris d'anciens officiers de haut rang des services de renseignement, des hauts fonctionnaires, des politiciens nationaux et locaux et des experts, ainsi que deux groupes de discussion (non-élite) menés dans deux unités administratives représentatives du Pakistan. Des éléments ethnographiques provenant de visites dans trois types sites représentatifs des principales villes du Pakistan, des mosquées, des écoles coraniques, et des institutions étatiques ont également été inclus dans l'analyse, ainsi que des articles de journaux et des sources d'archives des années 1940 à aujourd'hui.

L'analyse des données a été faite par méthodes mixtes, avec une analyse de cas rigoureuse reposant sur le process tracing et la périodisation historique pour décrire, contextualiser, et expliquer la mobilisation divergente des partis islamistes au Pakistan complétée par une analyse statistique afin de trianguler les résultats et tester des hypothèses alternatives. La thèse tempère l'optimisme d'une littérature en plein essor en science politique qui met en avant un prétendu avantage politique des partis islamistes en soulignant les obstacles à leur mobilisation politique au Pakistan.

Acknowledgements

First, I would like to extend my heartfelt thanks to my supervisor, Professor Erik Kuhonta. This dissertation would have not been possible if he hadn't taken a chance on me. His belief in my potential, especially during moments when my own confidence wavered, has been instrumental in enabling me to finish this dissertation. I am immensely grateful for the kindness and thoughtfulness reflected in his feedback and for the patience he demonstrated in his pedagogy. I also want to thank him for securing funding sources for me towards the end of my dissertation, where even a small amount can make a big difference. Finally, I am particularly grateful for his understanding and support during times when I faced issues that seemed insurmountable. His steadfast presence has made all the difference.

Second, I would like to extend my gratitude to Professors Narendra Subramanian, Dietlind Stolle, and Vincent Pouliot. I am especially indebted to Professor Subramanian for serving on my supervisory committee and for providing extensive, critical feedback on my chapter drafts and other research materials. I am also thankful to him for agreeing to serve as the internal examiner of this dissertation. His rigorous scrutiny of my writing has undeniably elevated the quality of my work. It has compelled me to think deeper and refine my ideas and writing throughout the writing process.

I wish to express my appreciation to Professors Stolle and Pouliot, whose exemplary facilitation of the POLI 700 research seminars over the past one and a half years had a direct and positive impact on this dissertation. The constructive feedback they provided throughout these seminars has significantly enriched this dissertation. I am especially thankful to Professor Stolle for her generous feedback on my writing, which has greatly contributed to the improvement of my work. The invaluable feedback provided by all three of you has been instrumental in the extension and reformulation of several ideas and the overall scope of my dissertation.

Third, I would like to thank Professors Alexandre Pelletier and Amy Poteete. Both of them have helped me refine my ideas and helped improve this dissertation through their sharp comments. Professor Poteete's critical insights have especially helped me formulate and improve the research design for this dissertation. I also want to thank her for her insights on how to frame this project better. Professor Pelletier helped me improve the framing of the project better. I am also immensely grateful for his feedback on my research materials beyond this dissertation.

I also wish to thank members of my oral defence committee. Thank you so much, Professor Francesco Cavatorta, for agreeing to serve as an external examiner for my dissertation. Your sharp comments and feedback indubitably show your command

over the literature on Islamist parties. They will definitely help me improve future iterations of this project. A big thank you to Professor Khalid Medani for being a member of my oral defense committee and for challenging me at the defence by asking me thought-provoking questions.

I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the role of various professors who, in their administrative capacities, went above and beyond to assist me. This is a large list, and I feel I may never know all of these individuals. But from the ones that I do know, I especially thank Professors Catherine Lu, Juliet Johnson, Dietlind Stolle, and Yves Winter, who offered invaluable support that transcended academic guidance. This type of support can be instrumental in navigating the difficulties that are sometimes a part of doctoral studies. Through your leadership, sound judgment, professionalism, and a high standard of ethics, all of you helped me immensely and I am indebted to you.

I also want to thank three individuals at the Institute for the Study of International Development (ISID). Among these, I especially want to thank Dr. Kazue Takamura for being an overall kind presence at McGill and for generously funding my writing in the last year of writing most of this dissertation. Some of this funding enabled me to participate in conferences, where I met academics who have already left a mark on this dissertation. I cannot emphasize how critical this funding was to my ability to finish my dissertation. I also wish to thank Mr. Iain Blair and Ms. Sheryl Ramasahi from ISID for their interactions and support over the years.

A big thank you to my friends and peers at McGill. Their friendship and solidarity through over all these years helped motivate me. I am incredibly thankful to Rose Chabot for being a wonderful friend and a generous colleague. Thank you, Rose, for your camaraderie and help in all the Ph.D. battles we have waged together. Coursework, comprehensive exams, dissertation chapters, conference panels, funding applications, or issues within and outside McGill: it was easier to do it all thanks to your friendship. The writing retreats to your chalet were a godsend and were critical in providing just the right environment that we needed whenever we started to lag behind in our work.

I also want to thank Adrian D'Souza, Merve Erdilman, Asad Haris, and Yolaine de Saughy for their friendship. Yolaine thank you so much for your in-depth proofreading of two chapters of this dissertation and the French abstract. Your effort to help me has improved this dissertation immensely. I also want to thank Asad for helping me with any statistics related queries or confusion that I asked him. I hope all of you know I am always there for anything. From the pre-COVID-19 days, I wish to thank Aengus, Anne-Gabrielle, Simon, and Zarlacht for being good friends and generous colleagues.

Beyond McGill, I want to thank my friends, who have been a source of constant support. In particular, I want to thank Fateh Uddin Ahmed for listening to all my thoughts and complaints and motivating me whenever I needed it. I also wish to thank Agustin Buero, Zeeshan Hanif, Hassaan Ijaz, Taha Sarfaraz, and Ismail Zahid Umar for being the wonderful friends that they have been all these years. I want to thank Hassaan and Ali Iqbal Bajwa especially, for connecting me with sources in Pakistan that helped me access many under-accessed informants and facilities during fieldwork.

Lastly, I express my profound appreciation to my family. To my late mother, Abida Shakir, who could not see me start and now end the doctoral program even though she was aware of my desire to do a doctorate at some point in my life, I am in the greatest debt. Words escape me in the ways that you helped me achieve my dreams, even if it meant sacrificing your own. To my father, Nasir Ahmad Shakir, who instilled a drive to acquire knowledge in me and all my siblings, thank you. The immense sacrifices you made in the pursuit of getting me and my siblings the best education that you could possibly provide us are directly responsible for enabling me to write this dissertation at a program like McGill. *Abbu*, I am quite happy that you channeled your energies even after retirement and that you will soon be finishing your “Ph.D.” soon. I also wish to thank you for all the innumerable *molvis*, religious experts, and journalists you connected me with during fieldwork.

I wish to thank my siblings, Faizan Shakir, Zaubash Shakir, and Mudassar Raza Shakir. Your encouragement and belief in my dreams have been my strength. The generous support you have extended me has enabled me to pursue my passions. You are indeed my lifeline to turn to when all else fails.

And to my wife, Brett Manzer, thank you. For much of the writing phase of this dissertation, your love, patience, and understanding have not only enriched my life but have also provided me with a big reason to be resilient. You supported me even if it often meant sacrificing our evenings and weekends, our holidays and plans, with each other. I could not have done this without you. And I eagerly look forward to the next chapters of our life, together.

This dissertation is not just a product of my own efforts but also of the collective support and belief of each individual mentioned above. I am immensely grateful for every word of encouragement, every moment of doubt dispelled, and every challenge overcome with all of your support. Thank you.

Bilal Shakir
McGill University, Montreal

Contribution of Authors

All chapters in this dissertation were single-authored and written by me.

List of Figures

FIGURE 1.1: Divergent Mobilization and its Empirical Facets

FIGURE 1.2: A Two-Dimensional Matrix Depicting Islamist Political Mobilization

FIGURE 1.3: Summary of Causal Claims

FIGURE 1.4: Seat Share and Vote Share of Islamist versus Non-Islamist Parties In Pakistan Over Time (1970-2018)

FIGURE 1.5: Total Protest Activity in Pakistan by Political Parties (2010-2023)

FIGURE 2.1: Summary of Theoretical Framework

FIGURE 2.2: A Two-Dimensional Matrix Depicting Islamist Political Mobilization

FIGURE 2.3: Summary of the argument for high social mobilization due to large mobilization cores of political parties and groups

FIGURE 3.1: Seat Share and Vote Share of Islamist versus Non-Islamist Parties in Pakistan Over Time (1970-2018)

FIGURE 3.2: Turnout in Pakistan Elections (1970-2013)

FIGURE 3.3: Actual vs Predicted Seat Share of Islamist Parties in Pakistan under Proportional Representation (1970-2018)

FIGURE 3.4: Total Number of Candidates by Party Type (1970-2008)

FIGURE 4.1: Total Protest Activity in Pakistan by Political Parties (2010-2023)

FIGURE 4.2: Cumulative Protest Activity in Pakistan by Political Parties (2010-2023)

FIGURE 4.3: Summary of the argument for high social mobilization of Islamist parties in Pakistan

FIGURE 4.4: Map of Travel Time and Distance of two Madrassahs to D-Chowk, Islamabad

FIGURE 6.1: Summary of the Chapter's Argument

List of Tables

TABLE 1.1: Unified Typology of Patterns of Social and Electoral Mobilization with Empirical Cases of Islamist Mobilization in Muslim Majority Countries

TABLE 1.2: Sampling Strategy for Semi-Structured Elite Interviews

TABLE 2.1: Unified Typology of Patterns of Social and Electoral Mobilization with Empirical Cases of Islamist Mobilization in Muslim Majority Countries

TABLE 2.2: Summary of Key Features of High Thresholds for Inclusion and Low Thresholds for Exclusion encompassing the Ideological Fragmentation of Political Parties

TABLE 3.1: Turnout in Pakistan By Administrative Units and (1970-2013)

TABLE 3.2: Religious Attitudes in Pakistan, Average Scores, 1990-2020

TABLE 3.3: Pakistan's Religious Demographics Per Official Census Data 2017, 1951

TABLE 3.4: Overview of Main Sunni Religious Cleavages & Political Parties in Pakistan

TABLE 3.5: Thresholds Of Religious Mobilization

TABLE 3.6: Sub-Types of Small Islamist Parties in Pakistan

TABLE 3.7: Prominent Small Islamist Parties in Pakistan

TABLE 3.8: Islamist Parties in National & Provincial Government in Pakistan (1970-2018)

TABLE 3.9: Prominent Electoral Alliances of Islamist Parties in Pakistan (1947-2024)

TABLE 3.10: Electoral Participation of Major Islamist Parties in Pakistan (1970-2024)

TABLE 3.11: Party System Fragmentation Calculation for Islamist and Non-Islamist Parties in Pakistan

TABLE 3.12: Seat-Vote Disproportionality for Islamist Parties in Pakistan (1970-2018)

TABLE 4.1: Change in the number of madrassahs by province from 1947 to 2000

TABLE 4.2: Major Educational Boards (*Awqaf*) of Madrassahs in Pakistan

TABLE 5.1: A Periodization of Pakistan's Establishment and Islamist Divergent Mobilization

TABLE 5.2: Sect-Wise Patterns of Mobilization with reference to the establishment

TABLE 6.1: Two Conditions of Divergent Mobilization and Empirical Instances of the Role Played by the Establishment in Pakistani History

TABLE 6.2: Aligned Incentives of the Military Establishment and Islamist Success in Social Mobilization

TABLE 6.3: Prominent Splits in Major Islamist Parties of Pakistan

TABLE 6.4: Fieldwork Excerpts Substantiating Key Fieldwork Insights

TABLE 6.5: Alternative Explanation: Mullah Military Alliance

Glossary

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ANP	Awami National Party
AT	Allah-o-Akbar Tehreek
COAS	Chief of Armed Staff
COD	Charter of Democracy
ECP	Election Commission of Pakistan
GWOT	Global War on Terror
IJI	Islami Jamhoori Ittehad
IJT	Islami Jamiat Tulaba
INC	Indian National Congress
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence
ITP	Islami Tehreek Pakistan
JI	Jamaat-e-Islami
JTI	Jamiat Talba-e-Islam
JuD	Jamaat-ud-Dawa
JUI	Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam
JUI-F	Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazal-ur-Rahman
JUI-S	Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Sami-ul-Haq
JUP	Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan
JUP-N	Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan Abul Sattar Niazi
KPK	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
LFO	Legal Framework Order
MAS	Bolivian Movement for Socialism
MJUH	Markazi Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith
MMA	Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal
MMC	Muslim-Majority Country
MMCs	Muslim Majority Countries
MNA	Member of National Assembly of Pakistan
MPA	Member of Provincial Assembly
MRD	Movement for the Restoration of Democracy
NFC	National Finance Commission
PAT	Pakistan Awami Tehreek
PAT	Pakistan Awami Tehreek
PEMRA	Pakistan Electronic and Media Regulatory Authority
PM	Prime Minister
PMLN	Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz
PNA	Pakistan National Alliance
PPP	Pakistan People's Party
PTI	Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI)
SCAF	Supreme Council of the Armed Forces)
SS	Sipah-e-Sahaba
SS	Sipah-e-Sahaba
ST	Sunni Tehreek

ST	Sunni Tehreek
SYRIZA	The Coalition of the Radical Left – Progressive Alliance
TJP	Tehreek-e-Jafaria Pakistan
TLP	Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan
TNM	Tehreek-e-Nizam-e-Mustapha
TYLR	Tehreek-e-Labbaik Ya Rasool Allah
ZAB	Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto

Terms

Biraderi: Brotherhood or Identity based social grouping capturing kinship networks in parts of norther South Asia.

Deen: an entire way of life pervading all aspects of life.

Dhamaal: a type of dance common to Punjab in South Asia often practiced at Sufi shrines.

Dharna: Sit-in.

Dushman: Enemy.

Emir: Leader.

gaddi nasheens: Trustee or the successor of a Sufi or Pir and often a descendent of a disciple of a Sufi.

Ghazi: a victorious Muslim warrior, especially against the opponents of Islam.

Hudood: boundaries.

Jagir: a grant of the public revenues of a district in Pakistan.

Jalsas: An assembly or a meeting of a crowd of people

Jihad: a struggle for self-improvement. Often used to refer to taking up arms in the name of Islam.

Khalai makhlooq: Aliens.

Khutbah: Sermon.

Kisan: farmer.

Madrassah (plural: madaris): Islamic schools.

Masjids: Mosques.

Maslaks (plural: masalik): Islamic sects.

Maulvi: Islamic cleric, typically a part of the lower level of the clergy.

Mazaar: Sufi shrines or mausoleum.

Mazhab: a set of beliefs and rituals of worship.

Mujahideen: Muslims who fight on behalf of the faith or the Muslim community (ummah).

Mullahs: Muslim clergy and mosque leaders.

Qawwalis: devotional music of the Sufis, the mystics of the Islamic religion.

Shaheed: a martyr to the Islamic faith.

Ulema (singular: alim): Islamic scholar or custodian of faith.

Waqf (plural: Awqaf): Islamic educational boards overseeing the curriculums of Madrassahs

For my late mother, my *Ammi*, Abida Shakir
And for Faizan Shakir

Chapter 1: Introduction

1. Summary

Across a wide range of democratic and authoritarian regimes in the world, patterns of political mobilization of political parties with strong ideologies take varying relationships characterized by differences in their forms and levels. A key pattern of mobilization under-analyzed in the field involves a sharp disjuncture between the levels of mobilization of political parties on the streets versus their mobilization for elections. Social movements driven by their particular goals are often able to electrify the streets by drawing massive crowds in urban squares, shape discursive norms in a country by capturing national headlines, and sway the policy needle toward their causes within a state, yet often stumble at the gates of electoral success. Such a discord between social influence and the electoral success of political parties defies conventional wisdom. It has been under-analyzed in the extant literature and needs greater attention by analysts and practitioners of political science.

This dissertation explains the variation in the relationship between social mobilization and the electoral success of political parties with strong ideologies. It proposes the novel concept of “divergent mobilization” to capture the puzzling discrepancy wherein political parties exhibit high levels of mobilization in the social sphere but low levels of electoral success. The latter can be observed by focusing on parties’ poor performance at polls at the national level. Divergent mobilization provides analytical purchase over a wide range of contemporary and historical empirical observations from different countries and regions of the world where a puzzling mismatch exists in the levels of social and electoral mobilization of political parties with strong ideologies.

Aspects of divergent mobilization can be observed relatively recently in the recurring and sometimes dramatic social mobilization on environmental issues and

the relatively limited electoral success of “green” parties in most European countries, such as Parties of the Green in Germany (see Kitschelt 2006). It can also be observed in the high levels of social mobilization around anti-austerity during the Eurozone crisis. In Spain, anti-austerity mobilization, such as that by Indignados, influenced public discourse but struggled to achieve comparable electoral success, with the party Podemos gaining a small number of electoral seats and failing to acquire an electoral majority.¹ In North America, divergent mobilization can be observed in the mobilization around racial and Indigenous justice in the United States (US) and Canada and the limited attention to these issues among political parties (see Richez et al. 2020; Thompson 2020).²

More historically, divergent mobilization provides analytical leverage over the political mobilization of the Dixiecrats, or the States’ Rights Democratic Party, in the US. The Dixiecrats emerged in the 1940s as a faction of Southern Democrats opposing civil rights reforms. While they successfully mobilized substantial social support in the South, the Dixiecrats faced significant challenges in translating this influence into sustained national electoral success. They were largely electorally unsuccessful in the 1948 election, and their “dream of capturing one hundred electoral votes had been shattered (Ader 1953: 358).”³

Divergent mobilization is not just limited to the developed countries of the Global North, but its reach extends to more developing contexts in the Global South. It can be observed in Latin America for indigenous movements, where in

¹ In the 2014 General Election for the European Parliament in Spain, Podemos won only 5 out of 54 or 8 percent of the seats. See: <https://sofiaglobe.com/2014/05/25/european-election-2014-running-results-snapshot/> Accessed on 26 July, 2024. In this sense, I disagree with the formulations of Della Porta et al. (2017:51) and Houki (2018), who frame 8 percent of the seats won by Podemos as a story that was “extremely successful,” as their conception of success differs from mine.

² For instance, in the case of Black Lives Matter, social mobilization has led to significant policy changes at local and state levels. However, translating this social power into substantial national electoral gains has been challenging. See Thompson, Debra. “The intersectional politics of black lives matter.” *Turbulent times, transformational possibilities* (2020): 240-257; Richez, Emmanuelle, Vincent Raynauld, Abunya Agi, and Arief B. Kartolo. “Unpacking the political effects of social movements with a strong digital component: The case of #IdleNoMore in Canada.” *Social media+ society* 6, no. 2 (2020): 2056305120915588.

³ In the 1948 presidential election, the Dixiecrats carried four Southern states but did not significantly impact the national electoral outcome.

Ecuador, such movements have been influential in social protests but have had limited success in national elections (see Mijeski and Beck 2011).⁴ Yet, in sharp contrast, other political parties in the same regions and sometimes even countries successfully convert their high social mobilization around the same broader issues into electoral outcomes.

In Latin America, some Indigenous groups, such as the Bolivian Movement for Socialism (MAS), in a clear distinction with Indigenous mobilization in Ecuador, successfully mobilized Indigenous support and translated it into electoral victories by capturing state power, leading to the presidency of Evo Morales (see Anria 2018). Similarly, in Europe, anti-austerity mobilization in Greece led to the electoral rise of The Coalition of the Radical Left–Progressive Alliance (SYRIZA), which won the 2015 general election, unlike Podemos as part of the Ignacados in Spain, which struggled to achieve comparable levels of electoral mobilization. Ultimately, these empirical examples of political parties from across the world underscore the puzzling inability of some parties to transform their significant social influence into electoral success. In contrast, other political parties can convert this social influence into electoral mobilization successfully.

On the other hand, divergent mobilization can also be observed in a mismatch in social and electoral mobilization, wherein some political parties with strong ideologies can punch above their electoral weight in instigating social mobilization. This is observed by the greater social influence of these parties than what their electoral strength would suggest. This disproportionate social influence can be observed, for instance, in the ability of some single-issue parties to punch above their electoral weight in influencing policy, such as in the United Kingdom, where the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) played an outsized role in galvanizing support for Brexit amongst the British masses relative to its electoral success. In this way, in both contemporary politics and historical cases of political mobilization, a paradox emerges wherein some political parties can shape politics

⁴ See <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/06/24/ecuador-indigenous-protests-lasso/> Accessed July 26, 2024.

more than what their electoral vote and seat share in the national parliament would suggest. Conversely, parties that have substantial social influence, for instance, in instigating on the streets or influencing national policy, fail to translate this social influence into electoral success. This dissonance between high social and low electoral mobilization presents puzzling variations that can be meaningfully exploited. Its causes and consequences need to be better analyzed by researchers and practitioners.

While entrenched and emergent studies have tried with varying success to explain political mobilization, they have not articulated a distinct concept like divergent mobilization. Divergent mobilization can help shed light on the mismatch between the spheres of social and electoral mobilization that are at the analytical and methodological thrust of this study. Whereas social and electoral mobilization are subsets of the larger concept of political mobilization. Social mobilization captures political mobilization that occurs in a political party or group's street power (e.g. instigating protests, sit-ins, rallies, demonstrations, etc.), their influence over shaping policy outside of legislating for such policy through elected party representatives in the national parliament, or their influence in shaping discursive norms expressed via salience over national discourse.

On the other hand, electoral mobilization can be divided into the mobilization that occurs before and during polling day. In this study, I primarily focus on electoral mobilization on polling day, which is directly related to electoral outcomes.⁵ In this sense, a bifurcation of political mobilization into its social and electoral spheres helps frame, orient, and advance this project in a way that the extant literature does not. The lack of electoral success of parties underdoing divergent patterns of mobilization refers to their inability to transform themselves into mass electoral machines at the national level despite their high social mobilization. It can be possible for political parties to attract a marginal number of

⁵ This is distinct from political mobilization that happens prior to the polling day during elections, which can involve aspects of clientelism and patronage to actually get to the ballot box. In this study, by electoral mobilization I am largely focusing on mobilization that is geared towards electoral outcomes.

electoral votes in a general election. However, this does not imply that they were successful in transforming themselves into mass electoral machines. Electoral success, thus, entails an electoral outcome that involves the political parties under analysis in capturing state power by acquiring a simple majority in the parliament or being the majority partners as part of a governmental political coalition.

In this way, to analyze divergent mobilization, this dissertation probes two central questions that emerge from the constituent spheres of social and electoral mobilization: first, *why can some political parties with strong ideologies convert robust social mobilization into electoral mobilization by transforming into mass electoral machines, but other parties cannot?* Second, *why can some ideological groups and social movements punch above their electoral weight in arenas of social mobilization, such as street protests, but other groups cannot?* My study innovatively proposes that the disjuncture in social and electoral mobilization can be depicted by variation along two interconnected dimensions: organizational effectiveness and structural fragmentation. Divergent mobilization can be explained by two key variables that vary along these dimensions: 1) large mobilization cores that are zealously committed to political parties independent of the party's contingent political oscillations along the dimension of organizational effectiveness, and 2) high levels of ideological and political fragmentation due to constraints imposed by the social structure. The relationship of these variables with divergent mobilization is moderated by the relative strength and incentives of a state's ruling elite.⁶

Empirically, I focus on the issue of Islamist political mobilization to analyze patterns of divergent mobilization. Crucially, I use the case of Islamist political mobilization in Pakistan as a case of divergent mobilization, where my research finds that the robust social mobilization of Islamist parties has not been matched by strong political parties. In this way, through theoretical innovation, empirical insights, and methodological rigor, this study aims to illuminate the conditions that

⁶ In statistical parlance, moderation occurs when the relationship between two variables depends on a third variable (Cohen et al 2003; Brierly et al. 2019; Schandelmaier et al. 2020). This third variable is referred to as the moderator.

facilitate or hinder the translation of social mobilization into electoral power and, conversely, why some parties can exert a disproportionate influence on politics despite low electoral success.


1.1. Conceptualizing the Outcome Variable: Divergent Mobilization

The critical phenomenon of interest in this study is what I call “divergent mobilization.” It encompasses mobilization that has an empirical disjuncture between two distinct spheres of mobilization or the core manifestations of mobilization. I focus on political mobilization, but I conceive of the encompassing spheres of political mobilization more broadly, such as social, economic, electoral, and violent mobilization (cf. Meecham 2017). Contrary to Meecham (2017), I do not identify political mobilization into three spheres of street protests, violence, and elections, as this trifurcation does not capture, for instance, more recent forms of political mobilization like online protest that are increasingly relevant to the advent of social media and increasing internet usage.

Instead, my approach towards the spheres of political mobilization is broader. In this work, I primarily deal with the spheres of social and electoral mobilization. FIGURE 1.1 below describes divergent mobilization with reference to its social and electoral spheres and empirical manifestations. Within social mobilization, I specifically focus on the empirical facets of street protests, influence over state policy, and national discourse. In contrast, as FIGURE 1.1. showcases, I focus on national elections when it comes to electoral mobilization. In this manner, I divide the broader mystery of divergent mobilization into its essential components. This can allow researchers to better capture empirically observable manifestations of the more general concept of mobilization.

*** space intentionally left blank ***

FIGURE 1.1: Divergent Mobilization and its Empirical Facets



Source: Author's formulation.

1.1.1. Comparative Puzzle of Social and Electoral Mobilization

TABLE 1.1 below offers a unified typology for analyzing the social and electoral mobilization of political parties with strong ideologies. It uses the case of Islamist parties and groups across several Muslim Majority Countries (MMCs) as empirical cases. First, as TABLE 1.1 identifies, divergent mobilization refers to cases where parties can mobilize high levels of street protests, be hyper-vocal in the national discourse, and have relatively strong influence over shaping discursive norms and state policy but have low levels of electoral mobilization. As TABLE 1.1 identifies, Islamist mobilization in Pakistan is a good candidate for analyzing divergent mobilization, given the puzzling performance of Islamist political parties in Pakistan. This pattern of mobilization by Islamists is characterized by robust social movements that have deep roots in society; however, this is not matched with electorally strong parties.

TABLE 1.1: Unified Typology of Patterns of Social and Electoral Mobilization With Empirical Cases of Islamist Mobilization in Muslim Majority Countries

<i>Social Mobilization</i>	<i>Electoral Mobilization</i>	
	<i>High</i>	<i>Low</i>
<i>High</i>	Convergent Mobilization Example: Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, [Indonesia], [Yemen] [When they had partly free elections]	Divergent Mobilization Example: <i>Pakistan</i> [This study seeks to explain this cell]
<i>Low</i>	Vote-Bank Mobilization Example: [Turkey]	Diminished Mobilization Example: Senegal, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates,

Source: Author's typology using various empirical sources, especially (Meecham and Hwang 2014).

Note: The cases written under brackets or "[]" provide weak or qualified empirical examples of MMCs wherein Islamist social and electoral mobilization resembles the criterion of each cell. First, an empirical example of Vote-Bank mobilization using the issue of Islamist political mobilization is difficult. In large part, this is because Islamist parties are challenging to place in the cell with Vote-Bank mobilization as they are often built on social movements, so they usually have high social mobilization. The AKP in Turkey provides some aspects of a vote-bank mobilization pattern. It can be thus considered a weak example of an Islamist-oriented party that has been particularly successful in Turkish electoral politics without engaging in the kind of grassroots mobilization characteristic of parties in cells that score high on social mobilization. Second, a law in Senegal prevents the formal use of religion by political parties, which precludes Islamist parties from competing in elections formally. However, the Senegalese case nevertheless presents low Islamist mobilization. It thus can provide meaningful insights as an example of diminished mobilization.

TABLE 1.1 gives suggestive examples of MMCs that fit the criteria outlined in each cell based on their performance in the spheres of social and electoral mobilization. Within the cells unshaded in TABLE 1.1, the second typology of social and electoral mobilization can be captured through convergent mobilization. It captures a pattern of mobilization wherein political parties have high social and electoral mobilization. Convergent mobilization thus captures instances where the impediments of political mobilization that were present in divergent mobilization are no longer a constraint, and parties with high social mobilization have acquired a relative amount of electoral success by transforming themselves into mass electoral machines. As TABLE 1.1 notes, Algeria (Mecham 2017), Egypt (Wickham 2001, 2013), and Tunisia (Street Protests: Angrist 2013, Electoral Mobilization: Ghannouchi 2016)

can be considered countries with high levels of Islamist protests and electoral mobilization.

Third, a pattern of diminished mobilization is characterized by instances when parties struggle in both robust social and electoral mobilization. Crucially, the typology advanced in TABLE 1.1 helps provide ideal types that allow us to establish a standard to provide differences and deviations from ideal cases and should not be used as law-like prescriptions.⁷ In this sense, parties whose mobilization resembles the pattern of diminished mobilization may have some level of social and electoral mobilization. However, the crucial point is that such mobilization would be persistently low or subdued relative to their competitors. This type of mobilization can be empirically manifested in the Islamist mobilization in MMCs like Senegal (Mecham 2017; Villalon 1995), Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, which are examples of countries with low levels of street protests and electoral mobilization by Islamists. However, it is pertinent to note that for sultanistic regimes like Saudi Arabia and Qatar, low street protests and electoral mobilization levels can primarily result from the type of political regime.⁸

Fourth, vote-bank mobilization is depicted in the lower-left cell of TABLE 1.1. It captures mobilization outcomes wherein political parties exhibit high levels of electoral mobilization but relatively low levels of social mobilization. In some ways, vote-bank mobilization can be considered as the inverse of divergent mobilization. This is because while a divergence between social and electoral mobilization exists in vote-bank mobilization just like it exists in divergent mobilization, however, the spheres where mobilization is high or low are reversed in comparison with divergent mobilization. In other words, while divergent mobilization can be considered low-high with low electoral mobilization but high social mobilization,

⁷ The advantage of a Weberian methodology of ideal types is that “it allows us to establish a standard (an artificial/laboratory) creation with respect to which we can measure differences and deviations due to concrete historical developments (Panebianco 1988:17).”

⁸ For instance, these regimes are repressive, and these countries do not hold regular national elections, which does not make them relevant cases for the theoretical framework advanced in this study. See the scope conditions in the theoretical framework forged in Chapter 2.

vote-bank mobilization captures high-low mobilization, referring to high electoral mobilization but low social mobilization.

Vote-bank mobilization describes a relationship between social and electoral mobilization wherein political parties prioritize electoral efficiency and can mobilize people to ‘get out the vote’ on election day using three main approaches: a) clientelism or patronage, b) machine politics, and c) technocratic efficiency. However, these parties are unable to be as effective in social mobilization. Vote-bank mobilization is especially common in dominant or hegemonic party systems characterized by de facto one-party rule. An empirical example of vote-bank mobilization is difficult to identify for Islamist parties, which are often built on Islamist movements and thus have high social mobilization. As identified in TABLE 1.1, one weak example of vote-bank mobilization from Islamist parties is that of the AKP in Turkey. As well, vote-bank mobilization is of decreased analytical significance in comparison with divergent mobilization due to the low empirical occurrence of vote-bank mobilization, especially for Islamist parties. This is one reason why divergent mobilization is of critical analytical and empirical importance to this study. That said, TABLE 1.1 provides meaningful insights into the varieties of relationships between social and electoral mobilization for analysts and practitioners to orient and focus their analysis.

Crucially, the puzzle of divergent mobilization encompasses two sub-puzzles. First, a dilemma involving the low electoral mobilization of political parties with strong ideologies or the “Mobilization-Representation Paradox.” Second, a paradox of high social mobilization of some ideological groups or “Disproportionate Social Mobilization.” The empirical thrust of this study focuses on explaining the disjuncture between street protests and electoral success. This is because of the increased analytical weightage of street protests over other facets of social mobilization in driving the high social influence of political parties with strong ideologies. For instance, a sizeable amount of the policy influence of Islamists comes from their ability to instigate agitation (see Butt 2016; Wilder 1997; c.f. Nasr 2001).

However, not all the influence of Islamist political parties and social movements over state policy can be explained by street protests alone. That is to say, salience over national discourse and influence over policy formulation need to be included as additional empirical facets within the conceptual and analytical framework of this study. However, since a significant amount of influence from parties exhibiting divergent mobilization over state policy is derived from their street power, street protests remain critical to this study's conceptual framework and research design.

1.2. The Argument


This study advances a unified and empirically falsifiable theory for explaining divergent mobilization. This theory depicts the social and electoral mobilization of political parties with strong ideologies on the two dimensions of organizational effectiveness and structural fragmentation. These two dimensions are summarized in FIGURE 1.2. The first dimension represents the organizational effectiveness of political parties. Parties and organizations that will be further along to the right of the spectrum of organizational competitiveness will have an advantage in social mobilization, which I call “the mobilization weapon.” This organizational advantage is conferred on parties due to the presence of large mobilization cores that are zealously committed to them.⁹ I emphasize that such a large mobilization core with a strong attachment towards parties encompasses two key components: 1) large networks with other ancillary organizations and 2) a more considerable proportion of committed party workers relative to their competitors.

However, this large mobilization core is insufficient to transform these parties into mass electoral machines. It is, however, enough to the extent that these parties and groups can punch above their electoral weight in social mobilization. In this sense, the variable of large mobilization cores does not imply a massive bank of voters if the scope of analysis is general elections and the combined or aggregated

⁹ See Panebianco 1988:25 who uses a large electorate in a similar but not altogether congruent way as this study.

electoral vote of a given country. In other words, while large mobilization cores can be sufficient to create an impact in social mobilization they are often insufficient in swinging an election at the level of an administrative district.

FIGURE 1.2: A Two-Dimensional Matrix Depicting Islamist Political Mobilization



Source: Author's formulation.

Note: The empirical examples of MMCs in parenthesis denoted by “[]” are suggestive and weaker examples that fit the criteria of the two-dimensional matrix. Weaker examples refer to how, at an explanatory level, empirical evidence in this study has not been gathered to substantiate their categorization. Nevertheless, there is some tentative rationale that these examples can fit the theoretical expectations delineated in each quadrant of the matrix. In this way, they attach some empirical flesh to the theoretical expectations of the unified theory of social and electoral mobilization advanced in this work. For Indonesia and Yemen, the brackets have been placed as they are an especially weaker fit for fulfilling the criteria of structural fragmentation. For Senegal, the brackets are there as they are a weaker fit for fulfilling the criteria on the vertical axis or the dimension of organizational effectiveness.

The large mobilization core is “zealously” attached to the party if it has three distinct features: 1) it participates steadfastly in party subculture, 2) it is often involved in a network of associative ties revolving around the party, and 3) its

identification with the party is independent of its contingent political oscillations. I call this the “sufficiency condition.” I developed the idea of a sufficiency condition by borrowing Panenbianco’s insights on political parties and organizations. Specifically, I reformulated his concept of a “large electorate that belong to the party (Panenbianco 1988: 25).

In the case of Islamist parties in Pakistan, the first dimension represents the organizational effectiveness of Sunni Islamist parties. The explanatory variable of large electorates zealously committed to Islamist parties would encompass the strong networks of Islamist parties with other ancillary religious organizations and a more considerable proportion of committed Islamist party workers relative to the non-Islamist competitors of Islamist parties. First, the component of a large network of ancillary religious organizations encompasses the network of Sunni Islamist parties with three empirical facets of this large mobilization core: first, and most importantly, Islamic schools (*madrassahs*), 2) mosques and 3) university student unions of Islamist parties. In this way, the three empirical facets of a large mobilization core are important to emphasize how it can be operationalized within a specific empirical context. These empirical facets confer an organizational advantage to Islamist parties in Pakistan, enabling them to exert disproportionate social influence in the sphere of social mobilization. It allows Islamist parties in Pakistan to act as a “mobilization weapon.”¹⁰

The second dimension in FIGURE 1.2 represents the structural fragmentation that a political party faces. It captures the structural constraints on political parties that prevent it from achieving mass electoral success by acquiring state power through an electoral majority in the national legislative assemblies of a country or a share of votes or seats that allows it to become a majority partner in coalition governments. It encompasses the constraints that impinge on a political party’s agency to, for instance, reorient its electoral strategy by changing its party

¹⁰ This idea will be elaborated in Chapter 2.

positions and creating new cleavages that are more favorable to its electoral fortunes.

The variable that captures this dimension is the fragmentation that arises due to the configuration of the cleavage structure, which diminishes the electoral viability of these parties. An ideological party that is more fragmented due to its cleavage structure makes it more likely to face what I call “the structural trap” of electoral mobilization. This dilemma represents a situation characterized by political parties facing constraints in changing their electoral fortunes at the national level despite their success in social mobilization due to high levels of fragmentation that originate in their fissiparous cleavage structures. In the case of Islamist mobilization in Pakistan, Islamist parties face significant fragmentation, which manifests itself in various ways for Sunni Islamist parties and is a de-facto condition of competition for these organizations (Pelletier 2019: 35).

Structural fragmentation operates along the pathways of ideological and political fragmentation. First, ideological fragmentation increases with greater divergence in the ideologies of political parties, its encompassing practices, visions, and modes for transforming state and society towards parties’ ideals, both between and within parties.¹¹ Second, political fragmentation increases with a lower degree of coordination and cooperation of these parties as a bloc in electoral campaigns and post-electoral politics and with the number of parties in the party system. Political parties located further along the dimension of structural fragmentation represented in FIGURE 1.1 will face more political and ideological constraints that will impinge the ability of an ideological party to achieve mass appeal. Put another way, more ideological and political fragmentation implies higher levels of structural fragmentation. This, in turn, indicates a decreased ability of a political party to acquire mass appeal in national elections.

Structural fragmentation influences electoral outcomes for parties undergoing low electoral mobilization in three specific ways: 1) it constrains

¹¹ Terms such as ideology will be defined and expanded in the next chapter.

political parties by, for instance, preventing them from reorienting their electoral strategies by changing party positions to create new cleavages or prime existing ones; 2) it ruptures their political coalitions and causes party splits; 3) it prevents political parties from cobbling electoral alliances and ensuring that they are sustained over consecutive electoral cycles.¹² In this way, it either splits the vote of like-minded political parties or prevents them from expanding their existing share of voters.

In this sense, structural fragmentation is crucial in the inability of some political parties to acquire mass appeal to become electorally significant at the national level. For Islamist parties, deep-rooted schisms within the cleavage structure of a party system stifle the electoral viability of parties exhibiting divergent forms of mobilization and prevent them from becoming mass electoral machines. These divisions dilute the Islamist parties' potential for broad electoral allure, relegating them to secondary roles within coalitions rather than as vanguards of governance.

The midpoints on the horizontal and vertical axis of the two-dimensional matrix in FIGURE 1.2 capture the "mobilization weapon" and "structural trap of mobilization," respectively. Parties with high organizational competitiveness due to their large mobilization cores that can qualify as mobilization weapons and higher structural fragmentation due to their cleavage structures facing the structural trap of mobilization are more likely to exhibit divergent mobilization. This theoretical expectation is confirmed in the case of Sunni Islamist parties in Pakistan. Conversely, political parties that place differently on the two-dimensional matrix advanced in FIGURE 1.2 would experience non-divergent mobilization. For instance, parties with high organizational effectiveness but low structural fragmentation do not face the structural constraints associated with parties exhibiting divergent forms of mobilization, so their mobilization pattern would be convergent.

¹² Terms such as electoral alliances and political coalitions will be defined in Chapter 2 which provides the theoretical framework.

In contrast with parties exhibiting divergent mobilization, parties with less fragmented cleavage structures might find it easier to convert their social mobilization capacity into electoral victories at the national level. Patterns of mobilization for such parties are thus convergent as these parties can transform themselves into mass electoral machines to some degree. The empirical case of the Freedom and Justice Party (FJD) in Egypt and the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria are both examples of parties that had high levels of organizational effectiveness with deep extensive organization yet low levels of fragmentation due to the cleavage structure.

As FIGURE 1.2 notes, parties placed in the lower-left quadrant face low levels of organizational effectiveness. This would be reflected in their difficulty in instigating street protests and be positively associated with their low social mobilization. However, since parties in the lower-left quadrant of FIGURE 1.2 would also have low structural fragmentation, their electoral mobilization would be relatively more straightforward. This makes their conversion of social influence into electoral success relatively easier. Within such a scenario, vote-bank mobilization patterns are likely characterized by the party being a mass electoral machine despite not doing much social mobilization. The tentative empirical example from an MMC that can provide some insight into this theoretical expectation is that of some cases of Islamist mobilization in Turkey. The example of the AKP in Turkey, for instance, can be thought of as a weak example of vote-bank mobilization. Lastly, low levels of organizational effectiveness and structural fragmentation would lead to diminished mobilization, which, as a tentative example, can be illustrated using the case of Islamist mobilization in Senegal.

The relationship between organizational effectiveness and structural fragmentation with divergent mobilization is moderated by the relative strength of a state's ruling elite versus an oppositional elite and the alignment of their

incentives with divergent mobilization.¹³ In statistical parlance, moderator variables can be considered critical effect modifiers between two variables. This implies that the incentives and relative strength of the state's ruling elite can strengthen, weaken or change the relationship between the explanatory variables and divergent mobilization. Changing the relationship can mean that the explanatory variables' effect on divergent mobilization disappears entirely or changes its direction.

The explanatory variables analyzed in this study refer to the fragmentation due to the cleavage structure that explains the low electoral mobilization of parties exhibiting divergent mobilization. In contrast, large mobilization cores zealously committed to political parties explain the high socialization of groups and parties exhibiting divergent mobilization. Crucially, the moderator variable of the aligned incentives and relative strength of a state's ruling elite emphasizes the importance of historical contingency and context dependency in shaping social and electoral mobilization patterns of like-minded political parties.

Divergent mobilization can be explained if two conditions related to the moderator variable are met: first, the incentives of the state's ruling elite are aligned with the divergent mobilization of some political parties; second, this ruling elite is strong relative to the oppositional elite of a state. By contrast, if these two conditions are not present, the ruling elite dynamics will be unfavorable towards restricting the political parties under analysis electorally, and non-divergent mobilization patterns are likely. The relative strength and aligned incentives of a state's ruling elite specify the direction and magnitude of the relationship of structural fragmentation and organizational effectiveness with divergent or non-divergent patterns of mobilization. In this sense, the two conditions explain the "why" component of the analytical explanation of the state's ruling elite acting as a moderator variable.


¹³ In statistics, moderation occurs when the relationship between two variables depends on a third variable (Cohen et al 2003; Brierly et al. 2019; Schandelmaier et al. 2020). This third variable is referred to as the moderator.

The precise causal pathways of the state's ruling elite are historically contingent. In the empirical context of Islamist mobilization in Pakistan, the state's ruling elite is principally composed of the military and its allies, or what I call "the establishment." It refers to a nexus between the military with other secondary allies like journalists, judges, bureaucrats, and regime allied parties. The establishment is crucial for explaining the variation in Islamist parties' social and electoral mobilization in Pakistan. It can influence the outcomes of social (Y1) and electoral mobilization (Y2) of Islamist parties in Pakistan through two distinct pathways. First, by influencing variation in the large mobilization cores of Islamist parties (X1) and their political and ideological fragmentation, which arises due to the religious cleavage structure in Pakistan (X2). These, in turn, are associated with social and electoral mobilization, respectively, of Islamist parties. Second, by influencing variation in the outcomes of social and electoral mobilization of Islamist parties independent of variation in the independent variables X1 and X2 respectively. In this way, the military establishment in Pakistan helps better account for the context-dependency in the relationship between organizational effectiveness and structural fragmentation with divergent mobilization for Islamist parties in the case of hybrid regimes that are MMCs like Pakistan.

FIGURE 1.3 below summarizes the causal claims advanced in this study and how the analytical framework developed in this study applies to the empirical specificities of Islamist mobilization in Pakistan. It depicts the central explanatory framework of this study, which combines constant causes with a historical explanation to explain divergent mobilization. First, at the level of constant causes, the framework emphasizes the large mobilization cores of political parties and their fragmentation due to the cleavage structure being key variables associated with high social and low electoral mobilization respectively. Second, FIGURE 1.3 also captures that to explain divergent mobilization the relationship of these constant causes is moderated by the state's ruling elite. Apart from this more general theoretical causal argument advanced in this study, FIGURE 1.3 also summarizes

how each empirical chapter of the dissertation buttresses the study's central theoretical argument empirically to the context of Pakistan.

FIGURE 1.3: Summary of Causal Claims



Source: Author's formulation.

Notes: Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 present the operationalization of the explanatory variables as they apply to the empirical context of the case of Islamist parties in Pakistan. Chapter 2 develops the theoretical argument, whereas Chapter 1 is the introduction, so they have not been excluded from the figure as the causal claims developed in them are captured in the first causal claim that summarizes the central theoretical argument advanced in this work. Chapter 7 is the conclusion and does not advance any causal claim that hasn't already been made.

2. Research Design

This study uses a mixed-methods research design that rests principally on three main pillars: 1) systematic case selection, 2) methods of gathering data, and 3) methods of analyzing data to explain divergent mobilization. First, I select the case of Islamist mobilization in Pakistan as a critical example of divergent mobilization of Islamist parties. Systematic case selection enhances the probability of learning from the cases instead of ad-hoc or random selection (Seawright 2016). As well, Goertz and Mahoney (2012: 184) have argued that a good case selection strategy depends on one's research goals. The central goal of this study is to explain divergent mobilization, which necessitates focusing on cases where divergent patterns of mobilization can be observed. In this sense, the main empirical focus of this work is Pakistan, a country of 241 million people and the second-largest Muslim-majority country (MMC) in the world (Census of Pakistan 2023).¹⁴

The second pillar of the research design involved various methods to collect the data for this study. I used four principal methods. First, 11 months of fieldwork data in Pakistan at three different sites that included 60 semi-structured interviews at the elite level. These comprise interviews with former members of Pakistan's premier intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), who have extensively worked with Islamist actors, senior governmental officials such as high-ranking members of the National Security Council of Pakistan, key decision makers such as the incumbent Federal Minister for Interior and former Minister of Religious Affairs, senior leadership of Islamist parties in Pakistan including those that were banned by the Pakistani government at the time of interviewing informants, and experts such as notable journalists and local academics. I also conducted two focus groups at the non-elite level that were conducted in two representative administrative units of Pakistan (Islamabad Capital Territory and Lahore, Punjab).

¹⁴ Based on projected estimates from the US government as of July 24, 2024, this figure is even higher at 250 million people: <https://www.census.gov/popclock/world/pk>.

The second pillar encompasses governmental and local newspaper reports from the 1940s onwards. Third, ethnographic insights were gained from visiting mosques, Islamic schools (madrassahs), and interactions with the leadership of Pakistan's military. These insights were gathered from three different sites, which represent three major cities of Pakistan: Islamabad, Rawalpindi and Lahore. Fourth, mobilization data was gathered using the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) dataset on protest events in Pakistan (n= 77, 517) from 2010 to 2023.¹⁵ Fifth, the most comprehensive electoral dataset of Pakistani election results at the aggregate level to date spanning ten election cycles from 1970-2018 was created using Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) election reports and various election compendiums but principally the Pakistan Election Compendium that was prepared by Church World Services (CWS) for election data from 1970-2008. The electoral outcomes data comprised electoral results and political party data on variables such as the number of candidates fielded per election spanning eleven election cycles from 1970-2018.

The third pillar rests on at least four different methods of analyzing the data that have been gathered as part of the first two pillars of the research design. First, I use process tracing for analyzing within-case variation of Islamist social and electoral mobilization in Pakistan by following causal process observations (CPOs). Second, I use quantitative modelling techniques for analyzing inter-party Islamist fragmentation within the party system of Pakistan. Third, I develop a historical periodization for an overview of the social and electoral mobilization of Islamist parties in Pakistan with reference to the involvement of Pakistan's military establishment. This provides the wellspring for the historical context necessary for the implementation of process tracing approaches in Chapter 6. Fourth, ethnographic insights mentioned earlier for gathering data were also useful for data analysis.

¹⁵ Accessed on 29th October 2023 for Pakistan, Senegal and Indonesia. See <https://acleddata.com/>

In this way, this mixed-methods approach provides not only causal evidence but also substantive descriptions of the mechanisms underlying the causal relationships. Such a research design is not only able to uncover the causal relationship that exists for explaining divergent mobilization but can also be sensitive to the contingency that is part and parcel of this relationship. The research design captures this contingency through the effect modifier of the state's ruling elite and their aligned incentives and relative strength versus an oppositional elite. In the empirical context of Pakistan, the state's ruling elite refers to the military establishment of Pakistan. Thus, the design substantiates various elements of the theory advanced in this work. It foregrounds and analyzes the puzzles of low electoral mobilization and high social mobilization that encompass the broader paradox of divergent mobilization examined in this dissertation.

While rich descriptive data are often reasonably sufficient to rule out alternative explanations when they undermine foundational assumptions, I nevertheless gathered data for testing influential alternative explanations considering the extant literature. As well, the research design relied on in-depth fieldwork, information, data, and perspectives to rule out alternative explanations. Combining small-N and large-N approaches and methods ensures a more robust research design. While the large-N analysis can triangulate the results, the small-N analysis can unpack political mobilization. However, small-N analysis lacks the scale of the large-N mobilization data that I use to empirically verify and demonstrate the validity of the research puzzle in the empirical context of Pakistan. But it also substantiates insights gathered during in-depth in Pakistan. In this way, taken together, large-N and small-N approaches address the limitations of each of the strategies.

2.1. Case Selection: The Pakistan Paradox of Islamist Mobilization

On January 4, 2011, Salman Taseer, then the Governor of Punjab, a province of more than 127 million people in Pakistan, was sprayed with 26 bullets by his security guard. Following Taseer's assassination, the security guard, Mumtaz

Husain Qadri, was found guilty by the Pakistani courts and sentenced to death.¹⁶ Qadri's sentence aroused widespread furor within many sections of Pakistani society that were incensed over the punishment meted out to him. The argument pushed by those sympathetic to Qadri was that his actions were motivated by a desire to protect the "finality" of Prophet Muhammad, which was covered under Article 295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code.¹⁷ Subsequently, the social movement *Tehreek-Rahae Ghazi Mumtaz* (Movement for releasing Ghazi Mumtaz) was born. However, Qadri was hanged by the Pakistani state on February 29, 2016. For supporters of the movement, Qadri turned into a martyr. A direct offshoot of the movement calling for Qadri's release, the *Tehreek-e-Labbaik Ya Rasoolah* (TLYR), experienced vertiginous growth and, within a matter of a few years, transformed itself from being an organization limited to a few mosques in Lahore, Pakistan, to a formidable political force that could instigate protests all over the country. Through its agitation, TLYR was especially effective in bringing life to a virtual standstill in the cities of Rawalpindi and Islamabad. The movement transformed itself into a political party, the Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), in 2015; despite expectations of a good electoral performance based on its ability to mobilize people on the streets, it failed to secure a single seat in the national legislature – winning only two seats at the provincial level in the General Election of Pakistan in 2018.¹⁸

Pakistani history is full of examples of this pattern of "movement parties" that straddle the conceptual space between social movements and political parties (Gunther and Diamond 2003). The country presents an interesting case of Islamist mobilization on the streets without electoral success. Crucially, Islamist movement parties in Pakistan have done "miserably" at the polls, never achieving more than 11 percent of the vote at the national level in a fair election (Lieven 2011:127).

¹⁶ For the latest official Punjab population figures, accessed on 24 July, 2024 see: <https://www.pbs.gov.pk/sites/default/files/population/2023/Punjab.pdf>.

¹⁷ Salman Taseer had been a vocal critic of Pakistan's Blasphemy Laws and commented that they needed to be revised. As per Pakistan's Penal Code's Article 295-C, "use of derogatory remarks against the Prophet [Muhammad]," is a crime punishable by law. The finality of the Prophet refers to the Muslim belief that Muhammad was the last in the line of prophets of God.

¹⁸ Not a single seat was won by the TLP in the general elections of Pakistan in 2018.

There are nearly two dozen “maslaki” (schools of Islamic thought) political parties that are actively involved in electoral politics in Pakistan (Rana 2004).¹⁹ Despite their low electoral viability, these parties are considered to collectively play an outsized role in national political life, especially in their ability to mobilize people on the streets or influence policy (Butt 2016), or in shaping discursive norms (Chacko 2020). This study emphasizes that Islamist mobilization in Pakistan is a crucial example of divergent mobilization. Pakistan is thus an excellent case for empirically analyzing the theoretical expectations developed in this work. To be sure, while the study makes analytical claims about the divergent mobilization of ideological groups and political parties in general, these claims are empirically adjudicated using the case of Islamist parties in Pakistan.

2.1.1. Low Electoral Success of Islamist Parties in Pakistan


Extant literature on Pakistan has discussed the underperformance of Islamist parties in Pakistan in several ways. For instance, Lieven (2011: 127) notes how Islamists have done “miserably” at the polls. He claims Islamist parties have not won more than 11 percent of the vote in any single fair election. Similarly, Mohmand (2019:8) emphasizes that religious parties have not received more than 8 percent of the total vote in the four election cycles from 2002-2018. This leads her to remark that religious parties are marginal to politics despite the “noise” (Mohmand 2019:8) that they create.

FIGURE 1.4 summarizes the electoral returns for Islamist and non-Islamist parties in Pakistan in every general election in Pakistani history from 1970 to 2018. The seat share of Islamist parties has averaged 5.45 percent of the total share of general seats per election. The lowest share of national assembly seats for Islamists was 0.98 percent in 1997. In contrast, the maximum share of seats won by Islamist parties was 16.5 percent in 2002 (cf. Lieven 2011), when all major Islamist parties

¹⁹ Maslaki Derives from the Arabic word *salaka*, which means “to walk” or “to walk on a path.” Maslaki loosely refers to the denominational affiliation or sects of Islamist political parties. I use Islamist parties, religious parties, and maslaki parties interchangeably throughout the text.

in Pakistan campaigned together as an electoral coalition under the banner of the Muttahidda Majlis-e-Amal (MMA). Substantively, the mass appeal of Islamist parties is best captured by their ability to acquire seats in the national legislature, especially if these seats are sufficient to create a winning majority to gain state power. However, FIGURE 1.4 also uses an alternative measure of electoral outcomes for comparison, i.e. vote share. Islamist parties have averaged 6.56 percent of the total vote for this measure. The lowest vote share received by Islamists was 2 percent in the 1988, 1997, and 2008 elections, and the highest was 14 percent in 1970. Overall, Islamist parties have broadly similar trends using either measure of electoral outcomes (seat share or vote share) throughout Pakistani history.

FIGURE 1.4: Seat Share and Vote Share of Islamist versus Non-Islamist Parties In Pakistan Over Time (1970-2018)



Source: Author's figure and dataset using data compiled from Church World Services (CWS) and Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP).


Note: Results from the 1985 election are excluded from this figure as those elections were conducted on a non-party basis.

2.1.2. High Social Mobilization of Islamist Groups in Pakistan

FIGURE 1.5 summarizes the total protest activity for Islamist parties versus other political parties in the Pakistani party system from 2010 to 2023. As the trend for

Islamist total protests in FIGURE 1.5 underlines, the total protest of Islamist parties has comfortably outpaced total protest events for other political parties for much of the period which is captured by the data. This is especially puzzling, seeing that Islamist parties have averaged only 5.45 percent of the total share of general seats per election. Another way to emphasize how puzzling the high protest activity of Islamist parties is that they outperform other parties for much of the trend line in FIGURE 1.5 and are only overtaken by the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) for a brief period starting from 2021 to 2022 and the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) for the period from 2022 onwards. Despite their low electoral success, Islamist parties appear to consistently outperform much more electorally stronger parties in Pakistan in social mobilization on the streets.

FIGURE 1.5: Total Protest Activity in Pakistan by Political Parties (2010-2023)



Source: Author's figure using data provided in the Armed Conflict Location Event Database (ACLED) database.

Note: In total, there were a total of 9852 protest events used to construct FIGURE 1 after cleaning the raw data of 77512 protest events that were extracted from the ACLED website.

It is important to mention that data constraints meant that social mobilization data did not span a comparable period as the electoral mobilization data. ACLED data on protest activity of Pakistani political parties represents one of the most detailed and comprehensive data on social mobilization in Pakistan. However, it covers a period ranging from 2010-2023 whereas the electoral data used in this work spans from

1970-2018. That said, FIGURE 1.5 builds support that Pakistan is a good case for the puzzle of high social mobilization of Islamist parties in Pakistan. FIGURE 1.5, when juxtaposed with FIGURE 1.4, implies that Islamist parties in Pakistan punch above their electoral weight in social mobilization, especially in the empirical facet of street power.

2.1.3. The Pakistan Paradox: The Uniqueness of Pakistan as a Case of Islamist Mobilization

The case of Pakistan, the 2nd largest MMC in the world, can provide meaningful insights as it diverges from other cases of political mobilization. The divergent pattern of mobilization exhibited in Pakistan can be thought of as a “Pakistan Paradox,” when it comes to Islamist political mobilization.²⁰ The Pakistani case of Islamist mobilization is unique in at least six important ways. First, Pakistan’s religious demographics are overwhelmingly composed of Muslim adherents, and yet the perplexingly low electoral success of Islamist parties makes it an exceptionally peculiar case for analyzing divergent patterns of mobilization. Based on the official figures from the Census of Pakistan 2017, over 96 percent of Pakistanis are Muslim; based on a poll conducted in 2012, 84 percent of respondents from Pakistan emphasized that they want Shariah law,²¹ and yet despite this high level of religiosity Islamist parties in Pakistan only receive a puzzlingly small share of votes at the national level.

Second, Pakistan’s founding nationalism was based on a demand for a separate country for the Muslims of South Asia from the British (see Devji 2013), which one would expect would empower Islamist mobilization. However, the lack of mass electoral success of Islamist parties in Pakistan is thus an especially puzzling phenomenon for which an adequate explanation has the potential to generate

²⁰ See Jaffrelot 2015 for a different “Pakistan Paradox” concerning Pakistan’s paradoxical instability and resilience.

²¹ The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society, see: <https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2013/04/30/the-worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society-overview/>. Accessed August 14, 2024.

meaningful insights for political science. Islamist mobilization in Pakistan is bifurcated, wherein it is only potent in the sphere of social mobilization but is subdued in the sphere of electoral mobilization. Third, the diversity in Pakistan's social structure, which presents many social and religious cleavages, offers distinctive variation for analyzing divergent mobilization. For instance, Pakistan presents a diverse landscape of Islamist political parties belonging to various Islamic *masalik*.²² The Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) enumerates as many as two dozen Islamist parties in Pakistan that can legally acquire votes from Pakistani citizens (Rana 2004). However, it can be misleading to translate this high number of Islamist organizations enumerated in the ECP as the number of influential Islamist parties in Pakistani electoral politics. Many MMCs, such as those in the Arab Middle East like Tunisia or Egypt, do not have such a large number of Islamist parties operating within them electorally. Despite the overwhelmingly Islamic demographics of Pakistan, this diversity in Islamist parties captures the high levels of intra-sectarian competition in Pakistan. This is different from many other MMCs in the world, where such intra-faith diversity in religious cleavages of Sunni parties is difficult to observe. The diversity in the social structure is also captured by regional, economic, and ethnic divisions that complicate the Islamist parties' efforts to build broad-based electoral coalitions.

Fourth, Islamists in Pakistan did not face similar types and levels of state repression as other MMCs. For instance, in Egypt, where Islamists faced severe state repression, which contributed to the lack of electoral success of Islamist organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood until relatively free elections were held for the first time in 2011. The inability of Islamist parties in Pakistan to transform into mass electoral machines at the national level despite a lack of comparable levels of state repression makes the Pakistani case even more puzzling. In fact, some have argued that Islamists have been aided extensively by the

²² *Masalik* (singular: *maslak*) can be loosely translated as the sects or the interpretation of the religious Islamic thought within the Islamic religious tradition the Islamist parties subscribe to.

Pakistani state more than other ideological groups.²³ Yet, we observe low levels of electoral success of Islamist parties, which necessitates urgent attention from analysts and practitioners.

Fifth, the areas comprising Pakistan have been influential in cultivating some of the oldest Islamist organizations. For instance, Pakistan has been at the center of the emergence of some of the oldest Islamist political parties and thinkers, such as the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), which was founded by Maulana Abu Aala Maudoodi in 1941. As well, Pakistan has one of the oldest networks of Islamic religious organizations in the world in the form of Islamic schools or madrassahs. The operation and activities of madrassah networks within this region were so extensive that they were even identified by the British during the colonial era as an approach to increase colonial penetration into South Asia. This approach revolved around offering patronage to local religious elite in exchange for their cooptation. Pakistan is thus an excellent case for analyzing the ancillary networks of religious organizations and their role in driving divergent mobilization. Sixth, Pakistan's political regime type has often switched from an authoritarian to a democratic regime and vice versa over the course of its political history. This offers sufficient variation in political regime type that can help account for the lack of variation in the pattern of divergent mobilization of Islamist parties in Pakistan. Barring minor variations, the social and electoral mobilization of Islamist parties follows similar trends over the course of Pakistan's entire political history. The variation in regime type in the Pakistani case thus controls for regime type as an explanation as an independent variable for divergent mobilization.

2.2. Methods of Collecting Data: Types of Materials and Strategies for Acquiring Them

2.2.1. Types of Materials and Their Relevance for Analyzing Divergent Mobilization

To analyze the variation in the relationship between the high social mobilization and the low electoral success of Islamist parties in Pakistan, a multifaceted

²³ Interview with Husnul Amin, 2021.

approach to gathering different types of materials is crucial. The broad types of materials that I gathered to conduct this research can be categorized as 1) qualitative and quantitative data, 2) perspectives, and 3) information that included both primary and documentary sources of evidence. These materials were often interconnected; for instance, while fieldwork data for this study was principally used for gathering qualitative perspectives, I have also used it marginally for information gathering and even for some quantitative data collection.

Perspectives

First, when it comes to gathering perspectives, my strategy principally relied on using fieldwork data collection methods. This comprised four separate methods of collecting data: 1) semi-structured elite interviews, 2) non-elite focus groups, 3) primary and secondary sources of documentary research, and 4) ethnographic insights. First, semi-structured elite interviews can give an insight into the decision-making behind Islamist parties, their internal dynamics, and the political calculus behind the actions of Islamist parties and their mobilization strategies. Elites in this study refer to people with relatively high levels of decision-making power or knowledge. Informants within this category include Islamist and non-Islamist party leaders, politicians, former military officials, key bureaucrats, and experts, such as journalists and local academics, as informants for this work.²⁴ These interviews provide a nuanced view of the motivations and constraints faced by Islamist political parties and their leadership, which are seldom captured through documentary sources alone. Second, I used non-elite focus groups to gather the grassroots perspectives and motivations of party members and supporters. The composition of informants for the focus groups especially included individuals who were from the lower economic strata of Pakistan. They included students, business owners, taxi drivers, retired mid-level bureaucrats, Islamist party rank-and-file workers and volunteers, and community leaders from the localities of Pakistan

²⁴ Expert informants, for instance, like local academics, may not have a high level of decision-making power but, given their high level of knowledge, are considered as elite informants.

known for strong Islamist mobilization. The focus groups provided the incorporation of grassroots sentiments. They help in understanding the collective sentiment and grassroots narratives that drive mass mobilization, offering insights that are less visible in elite discourses.

Third, I used primary and secondary sources for documentary research. These include digital archives such as newspaper reports, video footage of Islamist protests, speeches and interviews of Islamist party leaders, and autobiographies of retired military officers, bureaucrats, and party leaders. Documentary research can be a useful complement to fieldwork data for gathering different perspectives and especially for tracing the variation in Islamist party strategies and behavior over time. For instance, it can illuminate the public actions and motivations of Islamist parties and their leadership over time. In this way, this method is especially useful in providing a historical foundation to study mobilization tactics and public discourse over time. It sheds light on the historical underpinnings that may be missed by fieldwork data and insights that have the potential of only capturing perspective as snapshots in time.

Fourth, ethnographic insights were gained by fieldwork conducted at multiple sites in Pakistan. Observations at these sites included visiting local mosques around Pakistan, attending Friday sermons, observing Islamist street protests, interacting with madrassah students, teachers, management, and leadership, conversing with general members of the Pakistani public across different social and economic classes, and visiting state facilities. For instance, visiting state facilities involved conversations with high-ranking in-service military officials who could not participate in the study officially in part due to institutional constraints of their employers. I visited military facilities in Pakistan which are not open to the general public where I was able to observe, first-hand, the exercise of public perception management by the military. My fieldwork also involved discussions with retired military officers, and senior bureaucrats that were heads of key authorities that are directly relevant for the analysis of the social and electoral mobilization of Islamist parties. Some of these strategies for acquiring empirical

materials, such as perspectives, provided insight into the subterranean currents of Pakistani politics. Examining behind-the-scenes features of the political process is crucial in hybrid regimes like Pakistan, where formal institutional rules are often insufficient for analyzing politics. This is especially relevant while studying Islamist mobilization in Pakistan, which has a long and sustained history of being influenced by the Pakistani establishment that often operates in the political process from the shadows.

Data (Quantitative and Qualitative)

The second primary type of material used in this work can be categorized simply as data, including its qualitative and quantitative variants. Data in this study refers to raw, unprocessed facts, figures, or observations that have not yet been analyzed or interpreted. This is in distinction with information that involves some level of processing of these raw data. Data thus becomes information through some level of analysis and interpretation. I principally used four different strategies for acquiring data for this dissertation. First, I created the most comprehensive electoral dataset of Pakistani election results at the aggregate level to date, spanning ten election cycles from 1970-2018 that was created using Election Commission of Pakistan election reports and the Church World Services (CWS) Pakistan Election Compendium for data from 1970-2008. This was crucial for analyzing the low electoral mobilization of Islamist parties. Second, I created a dataset of Islamist mobilization in Pakistan by extracting data from the most comprehensive non-violent mobilization data on Pakistan using the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) dataset that analyzed protest events in Pakistan (n=77, 517). I created a simple coding scheme for filtering this data to do a frequency analysis for the number of protests instigated by Islamist groups versus non-Islamist groups (n=9, 852). This data was helpful in providing evidence of the high social mobilization of Islamist parties in Pakistan.

Creating these two main datasets was complemented with several other strategies for gathering quantitative data, for instance, by analyzing the official

Census of Pakistan Reports, especially those from the first Census of Pakistan in 1951 and the censuses in 1997 and 2017. It also included data in the form of maps that were acquired from Google Maps. Gathering data helped me assess the explanatory framework and also test alternative explanations. Testing alternative explanations was especially relevant for Chapter 3, where I used data from electoral data to rule out alternative explanations. Ultimately, each method in this study is motivated to better analyze the divergent mobilization of Islamist parties in Pakistan. The synergy between qualitative insights from interviews and focus groups and quantitative data from documentary research will provide a robust analytical framework to explain the patterns of social and electoral mobilization of political parties with strong ideologies.

Information

The third main type of material that was used in this work can be categorized as information. Some of the strategies that were used to acquire information for this work included at least four different methods. First, it included internet-based research to access newspaper articles, reports, and electronic books. Second, I also relied on interviews and speeches in digital archives relevant to divergent Islamist mobilization. Internet-based research helped in monitoring developments as they occurred in Pakistan in real-time, digital mobilization efforts of Islamist parties, and the online discourse surrounding Islamist parties. Some of the tools that were used for internet-based research included analyzing the social media of Islamist parties, a content review of Islamist party manifestos published by the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) and a review of political party websites and monitoring online news portals, especially on the digital archives of Dawn.com, Pakistan's leading English daily.

2.2.2. In-depth Fieldwork at Multiple Sites in Pakistan

I conducted fieldwork in Pakistan in two different legs in 2021 (July to December) and 2022 (June to December), which included 60 semi-structured elite interviews

and two focus groups at the non-elite level. In part, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, some of the interviews were conducted online. However, most interviews for this study were conducted in person due to the nature of the informants and the empirical context of Pakistan, where interviewing elites online can be even trickier. All in-person or online interviews as part of my fieldwork were conducted in two broad administrative regions of the Pakistani state: Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT) and Punjab.

I loosely term the sites for conducting the interviews as the cities of Islamabad, Rawalpindi, and Lahore. ICT includes the capital city of Pakistan, Islamabad, whereas Punjab is the largest province of Pakistan in terms of population, with over 127 million residents. In practice, Islamabad is a twin city along with its neighboring city of Rawalpindi, which falls under the administration of the Punjab government. At the same time, Lahore is the capital city of the province of Punjab. I conducted all interviews and focus groups myself. The language used during interviews comprised three different languages: Punjabi, Urdu, and English. Most interviews often switched between different languages, whereas the focus groups were mainly conducted in Urdu or Punjabi to mitigate any concerns around the researchers' positionality since most focus group informants had minimal proficiency in English. I conducted all the translations from the fieldwork that are provided as excerpts in this work from Urdu or Punjabi into English myself.

A strategy of conducting interviews in the cities of Rawalpindi, Islamabad, and Lahore is useful from a research design perspective for two reasons. First, all major Islamist parties have their offices in Islamabad and Rawalpindi, which houses the federal legislative assemblies of Pakistan. This was advantageous in accessing elites that are notoriously difficult to interview for research. Accessing elites, such as Islamist party politicians, can be even more problematic in contexts like Pakistan, where there is limited awareness about the value of participating in a research study. Most national-level politicians from every electoral constituency of Pakistan frequent Islamabad. In combination with the neighboring city of

Rawalpindi, Islamabad is the residence of a significant portion of the Pakistani state's elites, such as top-ranking military officials, national-level journalists, senior bureaucrats, and politicians.

Second, conducting interviews in Lahore allowed for the opportunity to capture any regional variation in the data, for instance, those at the sub-national level. While the city of Rawalpindi also lies in Punjab, its proximity to Islamabad means that including another city like Lahore would better capture any regional variation. Third, Lahore is an excellent candidate for conducting interviews with Islamist leaders, given the city's rich history in critical junctures related to Islamist mobilization. Several Islamist parties have their headquarters based in Lahore, and two out of the three major Islamist parties in Pakistan were founded in Lahore.²⁵ An interviewing strategy of focusing on perspectives from Lahore and Islamabad can thus provide increased validity to the research findings. An approach similar to the elite interviews was followed to choose the sites and composition for the focus groups. One focus group (n=8) was conducted in Islamabad, and a second focus group (n=8) was conducted in Lahore for increased representativeness.

In this manner, my research incorporates elite and non-elite perspectives for its analytical formulations. It primarily employs semi-structured interviews to include elite perspectives, whereas it relies on focus groups to include non-elite perspectives in its formulations. Whereas ethnographic insights help provide both elite and non-elite perspectives. This data-gathering strategy was useful for this project's research goals. For instance, elite informants can provide insights into the approaches used by Islamist parties for their social and electoral mobilization and their political maneuvering and interactions with Pakistan's military establishment. This includes the dynamics of how the military manipulates the political landscape in Pakistan for its goals.

On the other hand, interviewing non-elites in focus groups offers information and perspectives on whether and to what extent the mobilization strategies of

²⁵ Here, I refer to the Jamaat e Islami and the Tehreek e Labbaik. Beyond these two major Islamist parties, the smaller Pakistan Awami Tehreek also had its headquarters in Lahore.

Islamist parties are effective for the rank-and-file and potential party affiliates. It also provides a grassroots view of party dynamics, recruitment strategies, and personal motivations for participating in street-level mobilizations and the lack of electoral success of Islamist parties. Their perspectives help in understanding the mobilization's breadth and depth beyond elite manipulation. In this way, an interviewing strategy that includes both elite and non-elite perspectives enabled me to incorporate robust fieldwork data into the research design of this study.

To be sure, elite interviews are at the centerpiece of my doctoral fieldwork. A key reason for this is that the study's preliminary hypotheses indicated that elites have been central in shaping Islamist mobilization in Pakistan. TABLE 1.2 below provides a breakdown of the background and affiliation of the informants for the semi-structured interviews. The key stakeholders for the interviews can be broadly divided into local academics,²⁶ bureaucrats, journalists, military officials, politicians, experts, and religious party politicians.²⁷ This way, I especially focused on interviewing elites that were especially relevant to issues of Islamist political mobilization in Pakistan. Interviewing them could provide useful insights into the causes and consequences of the 'divergent mobilization' of Islamist parties in Pakistan. In parallel with a systematic selection of key elites that have been closely involved in issues of Islamist mobilization in Pakistan, a snowball sampling technique for interviewing elite informants was applied. A mixed snowball sampling approach with general attention to representativeness by stratifying the sample was used to recruit informants to participate in the focus groups. This helped ensure that the sample represented diverse viewpoints based on characteristics like social class, profession, and educational background.

²⁶ 9 out of the 13 academics interviewed as part of my fieldwork were affiliated with Pakistani educational institutions and 12 were based in Pakistan.

²⁷ By experts, I mean individuals that did not have high decision-making power but who did have knowledge about the research goal, i.e. Islamist political mobilization.

TABLE 1.2: Sampling Strategy For Semi-structured Elite Interviews

S.No.	Informant Category	Total number of interview informants (n)
1	Academic	13
2	Bureaucrat	5
3	Journalist	15
4	Military Officer	4
5	Politician	4
7	Religious Party Politician	9
8	Expert	10
	Total Respondents Interviewed	60

Source: Author's data.

Note: For several informants, it was difficult to assign a particular category as their categories could be considered to overlap with each other. For instance, informants that were serving as administrators in key roles related to Islamist mobilization in Pakistan within the government were also academics.

Some of the elites interviewed as informants for this study included key decision-makers or individuals with knowledge of Islamist mobilization. This included, for instance: 1) decision-makers like the incumbent Federal Minister for Interior at the time of interviewing, Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed, former Minister for Religious Affairs for Pakistan and the son of the military dictator Zia-ul-Haq, Ijaz-ul-Haq, who has frequently been in close alliance with several Islamist parties in the past; 2) it included national broadcasters and journalists like Hamid Mir who was the last journalist to interview Osama bin Laden, or others like Saleem Safi who is one of the most prominent journalists specializing on covering Islamist parties in Pakistan; 3) it included Islamist party leaders like the former Member of National Assembly (MNA) of Pakistan from the NA-48 electoral constituency of Islamabad in 2002, Mian Muhammad Aslam of JI; other notable informants from JI included the daughter of ex-*Ameer* (leader) of JI Qazi Hussain Ahmed and head of JI's women's wing, Dr Samia Raheel Qazi and the regional heads of Islamabad of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazal-Ur-Rehman (JUI-F) Abdul Majeed Hazarvi and TLP Rana Saifi respectively; 4) it included former officers of Pakistan's premier intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) like Lt. Col (Retired) Zaighum Butt; 5) experts such as those on Islamist parties that sometimes included clerics and madrassah

leadership like Khateeb Mustafai or local academics like Dr. Husnul Amin and the Head of Institute of Policy Studies in Pakistan, Dr. Khalid Rahman; 6) it included key bureaucrats such as the incumbent chairman of the Council of Islamic Ideology of Pakistan Dr. Qibla Ayaz at the time of interviewing and administrators that have extensive experience administering Pakistan, especially the provinces of Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkwa (KP) where they worked closely with Islamist actors and mobilization (names withheld for anonymity).

2.2.3. Documentary Research (Newspapers, Videos, Autobiographies)

The second main method of collecting materials and gathering data for this project was using documentary evidence that included newspaper reports, video archives of Islamist leaders' speeches, and books written by retired military officials and bureaucrats. Gathering evidence using documentary sources was critical for constructing an explanatory framework that was attentive to the empirical context of Pakistan. An advantage of including documentary evidence is that it validates or contradicts perspectives obtained from interviews, which helps offer a more comprehensive view of the events than possible if one only relied on interview and focus group data from fieldwork.

I predominantly relied on *Dawn's* digital archives, Pakistan's premier English daily newspaper, to collect relevant stories covering Islamist mobilization. This especially included Islamist protest events, party manifestos, and the composition of political coalitions, and electoral alliances. The goal for this data was triangulation of the data collected from interviews and focus groups to ensure the robustness of the research findings. But it also provided the empirical granularity that was necessary to undergird the analytical framework constructed in this study.

While documentary research was useful across this entire work, it was especially useful in Chapters 5 and 6, which are focused on the role played by Pakistan's military establishment in acting as a moderator variable in the relationship between the explanatory variables and the social and electoral mobilization of Islamist parties. The military in Pakistan has often operated from

the political shadows for much of Pakistani political history. Documentary sources such as books written by retired bureaucrats and high-ranking military officers and their interviews are thus useful for gaining insights into how the military has influenced divergent Islamist mobilization in Pakistan. This is because serving military officers will not divulge this information either due to personal reasons or institutional constraints.

2.2.4. Quantitative Data: Electoral Mobilization and Social Mobilization

I created two primary datasets used in this dissertation: the Islamist electoral mobilization data and the Islamist social mobilization dataset for Pakistan, which were principally used in Chapters 3 and 4. First, the Islamist electoral mobilization dataset for Chapter 3 involved manually entering data from disparate sources but primarily from the CWS's Pakistan Election Compendium Volumes 1, 2, and 3. However, the CWS volumes only publish election results from 1970 to 2008. These data had to be extended beyond these elections using Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) election reports to include the election cycles of 2012 and 2018. For these data, I mainly -- but not exclusively -- relied on the figures provided by Election Pakistan, which compiled the ECP data.²⁸

Second, the Islamist social mobilization dataset for Chapter 4 principally relied on the ACLED data filtered by theoretically motivated event type categories to extract street protest event data for Pakistan from 2010 to 2023. From these data, I analyzed the data using frequency analysis of protest events organized by Islamist actors (n= 9852) to get the data for Islamist protest events. Using this approach allowed me to visualize and compare Islamist protests with those by other actors in Pakistan. The goal of this data was to empirically illustrate the high social mobilization of Islamist parties in Pakistan. To be sure, the data used in this dissertation goes well beyond these two datasets. For instance, I use official census

²⁸ See <https://electionpakistan.com/about-election-pakistan/>

reports and figures published by the Pakistan Board of Statistics. I describe any data whenever it is used in this work.

2.3. Methods of Analyzing Data

This work uses multiple methods of analysis, both qualitative and quantitative, to analyze data. Given the nature of the data collected as part of this work that works on numerous units of observation (political parties, protest events, elite interviews, focus groups, and ethnographic participant observation), it would be challenging to create a merged dataset without losing the multidimensionality of the various types of data. Primarily, this work uses qualitative methods of analyzing the data. A key approach I use is based on causal case study methods of analysis that principally focus on process tracing with attention to causal inference to analyze within-case variation for the case of Islamist parties in Pakistan. I also use historical analysis methods, such as the historical periodization of Pakistani political history, which is developed for Chapter 5. When it comes to more quantitative methods, I use hypothesis testing measures such as Welch's two-sample t-test, frequency analysis, mathematical modeling such as adapting the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) and Laakso and Taguepera (1979)'s Effective Number of Parties (ENEP) to calculate Islamist party fragmentation as an Islamist bloc in Chapter 3.

This work's primary method for analyzing within-case variation relies on within-case process tracing. This approach is preferable as it involves the systematic observation of variables through Causal Process Observations (CPOs) collected through in-depth investigation of a case crucial for a sound research methodology (Collier et. al 2011). CPOs enable researchers to assess whether a specific combination of variables exerts the causal role assigned by a core hypothesis and whether it produces the desired outcome within each case and across all cases (Ljiphart 1971: 683). Such an approach implies the identification of critical variables that can extend beyond the specific case of analysis that would be relevant for a comparative research methodology. An in-depth analysis of one case

could yield insights for explaining the variation across other cases more comparatively.

Following this classic approach, the study developed theoretical expectations that link the independent variables (large mobilization cores that are zealously committed to parties and their political and ideological fragmentation), which explain the outcome of divergent mobilization through a causally related combination of a moderator variable (the incentives and relative strength of the state's ruling elite). The inclusion of the moderator variable was pivotal. Correlation is not causation, not only because correlations offer no direct linkage between explanatory (X) and outcome variables (Y) but also because sometimes, moving from correlation to causation involves specifying the context and conditions that make the causal relationship contingent on certain factors. In this way, a research design that includes the moderator (M) not only supports the inference that X *is* a cause of Y but also demonstrates *how* M can influence Y and the context and conditions under which M can influence Y and its causal role in the relationship between X and Y. The moderator variable thus illustrates the causal pathways through which Pakistan's military establishment influences the variation in the relationship between social mobilization and the electoral success of Islamist groups and parties.

2.3.1. Small N-Methods: Process Tracing and Causal Inference

To understand why and how political parties and ideological groups undergo divergent or non-divergent patterns of mobilization, I use a process-tracing method for drawing causal inferences by breaking down critical variables into causally and contingently connected empirical manifestations of those variables (See Tilly 1995: 1602). In this way, I emphasize that the causality can be inferred through an in-depth and within-case analysis of precisely how a cause is associated with an outcome. Process tracing, therefore, plays a key role in taking an association between a single cause or a combination of causes and an effect by establishing whether the relationship is best categorized as correlational or can be causal (See Checkel 2006). Some have emphasized that the advantage behind an in-depth case

analysis through tracing this process between cause and effect is that it can yield evidence with a high degree of “inferential leverage that is lacking in quantitative analysis (Collier 2011:1.)”

In line with the rationale behind process tracing, then, the study underlines that for divergent mobilization to occur, each of the individual explanatory variables, such as the large electorates of groups and political parties and their fragmentation, need to be present in confluence with the moderator variable of the state’s ruling elite. Using the language of necessary and sufficient conditions, Goertz and Mahoney (2012: 108-109) have argued that each variable in each case is treated as a necessary condition and that a given case would not experience the outcome if all the necessary conditions were not present. Beyond the independent variables, I have included the moderator variable of a state’s ruling elite’s relative strength versus an oppositional elite and aligned interests with divergent mobilization.

In this way, process tracing shows that there are slight variations in which independent variables will influence the outcome and play a central role in the association with divergent mobilization along with the effect modifier. For instance, there can be times when there are slight variations and a narrowing of the level of divergence between the social and electoral mobilization of Islamist parties in Pakistan, which is explained in large part by the independent variables in confluence with the moderator variable of a state’s ruling elite. This helps provide the historical contingency that is a part of the causal analysis. It aids the research design by ensuring that it is robust and can explain the variation in the relationship between social mobilization and the electoral success of Islamist parties.²⁹ To be sure, the research design aims to explain the patterns of social and electoral mobilization and not their levels.

²⁹ See Gary Goertz and James Mahoney (2012: 42) for a similar but not congruent discussion of how the causal weight of each variable in a causal mechanism can be shown to be changed thanks to tools like process tracing.

2.3.2. Large-N Methods: Frequency Analysis, Hypothesis Testing, Statistical Measures

This dissertation uses several large-N methods of analysis for analyzing the data that were principally used in Chapters 1, 3, and 4. Chapter 3 uses a unique way of adapting existing measures of fragmentation and adapts it to the theoretical expectations developed in this work. Crucially, this involved a novel way of using the ENEP and Herfindahl-Hirschman index to calculate party fragmentation. For ENEP, this involved adapting ENEP measures commonly used in the extant literature that calculate the fragmentation of Islamist versus non-Islamist parties as a bloc instead of their fragmentation in the party system on the whole. Similarly, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index was also readapted mathematically so that it measures Islamist fragmentation as a bloc. It also served as a robustness check for the adapted ENEP.

Quantitative methods of analyzing data were also used in testing alternative explanations. Notably, I used Welch's two-stage sample difference of means test following frequency analysis to adjudicate whether there was a systematic difference in the number of candidates nominated by Islamist parties versus their non-Islamist counterparts in Pakistan. The number of candidates nominated by Islamist parties was a proxy to gauge their interest in acquiring power through electoral competition. Moreover, I used statistical modeling techniques for measuring electoral disproportionality in Pakistan.

As well, I tested the alternative explanation of the role played by the electoral system in the low electoral mobilization of Islamist parties in Pakistan. The goal here was to assess whether switching the electoral system from the mixed proportional but mostly First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) system in Pakistan to a simple proportional electoral system would significantly improve the electoral fortunes of Islamist parties. For instance, by enabling Islamist parties to acquire a higher share of their seats and votes in the national parliament. However, the results did not find support for the alternative explanation of the electoral system as being crucial in the low electoral mobilization of Islamist parties in Pakistan, which built

support for the explanatory framework advanced in this work. Chapter 4 focuses on gathering non-violent mobilization data using the ACLED dataset. It used frequency analysis to examine whether and to what extent Islamist parties are able to punch above their electoral weight in social mobilization by focusing on their protest activity versus other political parties in Pakistan.

Contribution

This project's contribution lies across three distinct axes: 1) theoretical innovation, 2) empirical scope and innovation, and 3) policy relevance. First, by proposing the novel concept of divergent mobilization, the study contributes to the extant literature in at least four ways. Notably, the concept of divergent mobilization corrects the severe lack of conceptual tools in political science to advance theoretical inquiries focused on describing and explaining the variation in political mobilization between different spheres of mobilization. This dearth of conceptual tools has hampered the systematic accumulation and analytical advancement of comparative research. To be sure, the systematic accumulation of knowledge that is often at the centerpiece of the scientific and often comparative method is difficult when mobilization is used as an amorphous category that is used to mean a wide range of political and social behavior.

The concept of divergent mobilization, with its identification of the critical puzzle that lies at the analytical and methodological thrust of this project, underlines a disjuncture between social and electoral mobilization for a wide range of empirical phenomena. Moreover, the identification of the empirical facets encompassing social and electoral mobilization can help guide, orient, and advance comparative analysis of the mobilization by political parties. In so doing, the study does not dismiss existing studies that are focused on political mobilization, but it provides the analytical fodder and nomenclature that is useful for studying the variation in the outcomes of social and electoral mobilization. It necessitates a multidimensional analysis that accounts for various forms of political influence beyond electoral success. For instance, the project contributes to the literature on

“movement parties” by underlining that they are not necessarily “transitional phenomena” (Kitschelt 2006:288; Della Porta et al. 2017: 24). It thus reorients the debate focused on the “transitioning into what” question of movement parties to underline, instead, the unsettledness of questions relating to their evolution.

Second, the study shines a light on the link between the social and electoral mobilization of political parties with strong ideologies by proposing a novel typology that categorizes distinct patterns of social and electoral mobilization. This typology provides analytical purchase for a wide range of empirical phenomena worldwide. Divergent mobilization and other patterns of social and electoral mobilization are not restricted in their empirical manifestation to only Muslim Majority Countries (MMCs) or Islamist mobilization but extend beyond MMCs to other religious traditions or ideologies, too.

Third, in its analytical constructions, this dissertation invokes an innovative body of literature on political parties, organizational theory, electoral behavior, and protest politics that has often been under-utilized in analyzing the mobilization of political parties with strong ideologies and other groups such as social movements. Extant studies on political mobilization, especially those focused on Islamist mobilization, have excessively relied on the literature on social movement theory that can be considered a subset of the broader literature that can be categorized under the moniker of contentious politics. Often, extant studies have attempted to focus on studying the link between a facet of social mobilization, such as street protests or salience in national discourse, and electoral mobilization by mainly focusing on the literature on contentious politics. Invoking literature that lies at the intersection of political parties, electoral behavior, and organizational theory departs from extant studies focused on explaining similar phenomena that are the analytical and empirical foci of this work.³⁰ The literature on contentious politics, despite being significant in some ways, has struggled to prioritize the systematic

³⁰ For an excellent study from the literature on political parties focused on the empirical context of Asia, see Hicken and Kuhonta 2015.

accumulation of generalizable theoretical insights at the expense of an over-proliferation of concepts that lie in a morass that lacks analytical parsimony.

This focus on a different body of literature helps in the novelty of the explanation advanced in this study. One of the ways this novelty can be appreciated is by analyzing it from the perspective of a burgeoning literature in comparative politics that identifies a so-called “Islam’s political advantage.” This literature can include studies that emphasize Islam’s political advantages (see Pepinsky 2012; Grewal et al. 2019; Livny 2020) and disadvantages (see Siddiqui 2016). However, the explanation of structural fragmentation advanced in this work challenges extant literature that has identified a so-called advantage for Islamist mobilization either as a heuristic or informational shortcut (see Pepinsky et al. 2012;2018), a version of grievance theory based in material factors such as the provision of social services (see Masoud 2014), or faith-based theory which attributes this advantage primarily to personal piety (see Grewal et al. 2019). Instead, this study offers a vital departure by underlining a potential disadvantage that arises due to more structural factors and focuses on political parties or organizations as the unit of analysis. This is distinct from Siddiqui’s (2016) study that analyzes the political disadvantage of Islam at the individual level. Instead, this work emphasizes fragmentation that arises due to the cleavage structure of Islamist parties.

In a related vein, fourth, the study contributes to the literature on Islam and Politics, especially that of Islamist parties in Pakistan. The study’s focus on political parties as the unit of analysis is a significant contribution, especially because much of the scholarship on Islamist parties relies on the Arabic speaking or Middle Eastern countries of the world. In this way, the focus on analyzing Islamist parties while thinking comparatively on regions beyond the Arab Middle East has an empirical contribution and theoretical payoffs since such a focus can yield insights that the extant literature does not.

The second axis along which this study’s contributions lie can be categorized as the empirical scope of the project. This dissertation contributes in two crucial ways along this axis. First, the extant literature on Islamist parties has mainly

focused on the Arab Middle East. Moreover, few studies have analyzed Islamist parties in Pakistan using a research design that involves their in-depth analysis collectively. Such a research design enables this work to lay the groundwork for future studies to analyze Islamist parties in Pakistan from a comparative perspective, including with other political parties in MMCs that extend beyond Pakistan. Second, by advancing the unified typology of social and electoral mobilization of Islamist parties, this project lays the groundwork for comparison extending outside national and regional boundaries to include under-analyzed yet politically significant regions beyond the Arab Middle East. No study has analyzed Islamist mobilization in Pakistan by systematically analyzing the relationship between their social and electoral mobilization in a theoretically driven manner.

Third, the final axis to which this study contributes is that the findings from this study can have policy implications. The significance of studying divergent mobilization lies not only in its theoretical implications but also in its practical relevance. The findings from this study have the potential to provide insights into developing more inclusive and representative political systems. This is important since an implication of patterns of divergent mobilization is that an organized minority can negatively influence representativeness of a democracy by punching far above its electoral weight. A better account of what contributes to the success and failure of such a minority can provide useful insights for more representative political systems.

3. Dissertation Outline and Chapter Summary

This work features seven chapters. The first chapter encompasses the introduction for this work, summarizes the project, lays out its research design, underscores the study's contributions to the extant literature, and offers a chapter outline. The second chapter of this work introduces the concept of divergent mobilization and develops the theory of divergent mobilization. First, it conceptualizes divergent mobilization and unpacks it as a theoretical concept with empirical manifestations

worldwide. Second, the chapter lays out the scope conditions for a theory of divergent mobilization. It includes defining the key terms and concepts used in the study. Next, the chapter analyzes the extant bodies of literature that can contribute to explaining divergent mobilization. It offers broad areas of agreement and disagreements regarding the project's theoretical framework from the extant literature and underlines the limitations of existing explanations.

Next, I develop my theoretical framework for analyzing divergent mobilization in Chapter 2. The theoretical framework I advance depicts divergent mobilization on two interrelated theoretical dimensions: 1) organizational effectiveness and 2) structural fragmentation. First, parties further along the spectrum of organizational effectiveness have an “organizational advantage” conferred through the presence of large electorates zealously committed to them. Second, parties further along the spectrum of structural fragmentation will find it challenging to transform themselves into mass electoral machines due to the “structural trap of mobilization” that prevents them from becoming a significant electoral force at the national level in a country despite having robust social influence. In addition, two conditions can moderate the relationship between organizational effectiveness and structural fragmentation with divergent mobilization. These two conditions operate through the moderator variable of a state's ruling elite. They include the alignment of the incentives of a state's ruling elite with divergent mobilization and their strength relative to an oppositional elite for a positive association of these conditions with divergent mobilization.

Chapters 3-6 are empirical in nature. They principally focus on the case of Islamist parties in Pakistan. Chapter 3 focuses on explaining the puzzle of low electoral mobilization. It focuses on answering why some political parties with strong ideologies find it difficult to convert their substantial social mobilization capacity into effective electoral mobilization at the national level. The chapter shows that structural fragmentation is a crucial reason behind the inability of Islamist parties to acquire mass electoral appeal at the national level. It underpins that social divisions due to ideological and political differences prevent Islamist

parties in Pakistan from becoming electorally successful at the national level. The chapter analyzes the extant literature on the measurement of religious cleavages and their application to the empirical context of Pakistan. It provides evidence supporting the hypothesis that the low electoral mobilization of Islamist parties in Pakistan is due to their high structural fragmentation.

Crucially, the chapter emphasizes the ideological and political fragmentation of Islamist parties. First, the ideological fragmentation of Islamist parties encompasses their high thresholds for inclusion and low thresholds for exclusion. The high thresholds for inclusion refer to the party subculture of political parties. This party subculture makes it difficult for many Pakistanis to be affiliated with Islamist parties, which impinges on the party's electoral success. Whereas, the low thresholds for exclusion refer to the culture within the party system that excludes many Pakistanis from Islamist party affiliation. Second, political fragmentation refers to the relative inability of Islamist parties in Pakistan to form and sustain electoral alliances and political coalitions among themselves and the large number of Islamist parties in the party system.

Chapter 4 focuses on explaining the puzzle of high social mobilization through the case of Islamist parties in Pakistan. It emphasizes that the high social mobilization of Islamist parties in Pakistan is cemented by their large mobilization cores that are zealously committed to them. These enlarged mobilization cores allow Islamists to punch above their electoral weight in social mobilization. The chapter identifies two central components of this large mobilization core of Islamist parties in Pakistan: 1) an extensive network of ancillary organizations and 2) a greater proportion of party workers than party voters relative to their competitors. More empirically, the network of ancillary organizations for Islamist parties in Pakistan consists of three main drivers: 1) Islamic schools or madrassahs, 2) mosques, and 3) student wings of Islamist parties.

Chapters 5 and 6 focus on empirically analyzing the conditions that can moderate the variation in the relationship between organizational effectiveness and structural fragmentation with divergent mobilization. Chapter 5 principally focuses

on this relationship at the level of a correlation, whereas Chapter 6 moves towards providing evidence that analyzes this relationship at a causal level.

Chapter 5 advances a historical periodization that charts the role of Pakistan's military establishment concerning the outcome of the divergent mobilization of Islamist parties. In so doing, the chapter delineates four broad periods within Pakistani political history. First, the period of early statehood that lasted from 1947 to 1971 and is characterized by a time when Islamist groups largely influenced state policy from outside of the parliament. Islamist groups resembled a pattern of mobilization similar to a pressure group and showed little interest in electoral mobilization. Their influence over state policy was largely achieved through their mobilization on the streets. Second, the period of cooptation by the state lasted from 1971 to 1979 and is characterized by the beginning of formal parliamentary politics and campaigning by Islamist parties. This is true, especially in the context of defending the territoriality of Pakistan in the context of the critical event of the secession of the areas known as the eastern wing of the country into independent Bangladesh in 1971.

Third, the period of assertive state cooptation lasted from 1979 to 2001 and is characterized by the aggressive rise of the establishment's role in Pakistan's politics by influencing Islamist social and electoral mobilization.³¹ Fourth, the period from 2001 to 2022 was characterized by the rise of Barelvi politicization in Pakistan and a shift of the establishment away from the "B" team, or the old Islamist allies. It refers to the time from the start of the Global War on Terror to the ouster of Imran Khan's government in Pakistan by the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM), which was a coalition of political parties in Pakistan that was opposed to Imran Khan and was headed formally by its President Maulana Fazlur Rehman of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI).

Chapter 6 underpins that the incentives and relative strength of Pakistan's establishment can strengthen, weaken, or change (reverse or disappear) the

³¹ Primarily of JI and Deobandi groups.

relationship between the explanatory variables and divergent mobilization. The establishment represents the state's ruling elite in hybrid regimes like Pakistan. It orchestrates Islamist mobilization in Pakistan to strategically maintain a balance that favors its durability. This relationship is not merely coercive but also cooperative, allowing the military to exploit Islamist parties as tools for unleashing democratic disorder. This weakens civilian governments and thwarts any potential challenges to the establishment's authority.

The military's dual approach as both an enabler and a constraint on Islamist mobilization illustrates a sophisticated strategy of cooptation and limited repression. The military establishment leverages Islamist groups to its advantage while ensuring these groups do not ascend to a level of power that could challenge the military's dominance. It ensures that Islamist parties are allowed enough latitude to enhance their street power, but their electoral ambitions are curtailed and prevented from being realized. This tactic dilutes the electoral strength of Islamist parties and keeps the military establishment indispensable as a power broker. The establishments' actions, therefore, are not merely reactive but are part of a broader strategy of governance that utilizes Islamist mobilization as a tool for political maneuvering. Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation by summarizing the key findings of the analysis and the implications it can have for future work on social and electoral mobilization and Islamist parties. It offers insights into the external generalizability of the analytical framework advanced in this work and the possibilities for future research.

Chapter 2: The Concept & Theory of Divergent Mobilization

1. Introduction

What explains the variation in the *relationship* between social mobilization and the electoral success of ideological political parties and groups? Extant studies often face three specific shortfalls: 1) they primarily focus on just one sphere of mobilization (Meecham 2017:15) like street protests (e.g., Butt 2016), violence (Pelletier 2019, 2021) or elections (e.g., Grewal et al. 2019); 2) they do not produce generalizable theoretical insights systematically (e.g., Hwang 2009; Perry & Romer 2020); 3) or they analyze narrow contingencies, such as a specific set of situational dynamics, like post-election revolutionary mobilization (e.g. Ong 2022). In the few cases where attempts at broader theorizing on the relationship between social and electoral mobilization were made, such studies often focused on separate questions (see Ong 2022) or lacked a systematic engagement with the variation in the relationship between spheres of mobilization (e.g., Meecham 2017). This prevented the development of a tight causal theory. In contrast, this study analyzes a broader range of situations. The extant literature on the relationship between social and electoral mobilization is scant, limited to narrow contingencies, and needs to advance a theoretical framework systematically.

This work depicts parties' social and electoral mobilization to vary along two theoretical dimensions: 1) structural fragmentation and 2) organizational effectiveness. First, structural fragmentation emphasizes that political and ideological fragmentation arising due to the cleavage structure is a crucial reason for the inability of some ideological parties to transform themselves into mass electoral machines. This accounts for their low electoral success despite high social mobilization. In this sense, ideological and political fragmentation is positively associated with low electoral mobilization. Second, for the dimension of

organizational effectiveness, this work argues that a large mobilization core that is zealously committed to political parties is a critical variable associated with the ability of some political parties with strong ideologies to exert a disproportionate social influence through their social mobilization. This is because parties further along to the right on the spectrum of organizational effectiveness will be conferred an organizational advantage that aids them in their social mobilization. Put another way, an enlarged mobilization core zealously committed to parties is positively associated with high social mobilization.³²

Moreover, the dissertation locates the state's ruling elite as the critical variable that acts as a moderator in explaining the variation in the causal relationship between the social mobilization and electoral success of political parties with strong ideologies.³³ Two central conditions related to a state's ruling elite influence divergent mobilization: 1) the relative strength of a state's ruling elite versus an oppositional elite, and 2) the aligned incentives of a state's ruling elite with divergent patterns of mobilization. There is a rigid criterion for what meets the conditions of being a moderator variable versus a mediator variable. The moderator must *not* be the causal result of the independent variable.³⁴ For the analytical framework advanced in this work, this criterion is met as the state's ruling elite is not the causal result of the enlarged mobilization core of parties or their ideological and political fragmentation.

Divergent mobilization is the critical phenomenon of interest in this study. It refers to patterns of mobilization wherein the social mobilization of political parties is high but electoral mobilization at the national level is low. In comparison, non-divergent patterns of mobilization refer to one of three configurations of social and electoral mobilization: a) high for both social and electoral mobilization, which I call

³² I emphasize *why* this would happen later in the theory section.

³³ ³³ In statistical parlance, moderation occurs when the relationship between two variables depends on a third variable (Cohen et al 2003; Brierly et al. 2019; Schandelmaier et al. 2020). This third variable is referred to as the moderator.

³⁴ On the other hand, to be a mediator, the mediator variable (state's ruling elite) must be the causal result of the independent variables (large mobilization core and fragmentation due to social cleavages) and causally antecedent to the outcome variables of social and electoral mobilization.

convergent mobilization, b) low for both social and electoral mobilization, which I call diminished mobilization, or c) low for social mobilization and high for electoral mobilization, which I call vote-banking mobilization.³⁵

Crucially, the theory of divergent mobilization put forward in this work speaks to the existing literature on mobilization by focusing on two distinct but interrelated theoretical questions comprising the broader puzzle of divergent mobilization that lies at this project's analytical and methodological thrust. First, *why are some political parties with strong ideologies unable to convert their robust social mobilization into electoral mobilization by transforming into mass electoral machines at the national level, but other parties can do this successfully?* This is the sub-puzzle of the low electoral mobilization or a Mobilization-Representation Paradox. It encompasses a pattern of mobilization where political parties and groups like social movements, despite having high levels of social mobilization, struggle to convert this social influence into electoral success through representation in national parliaments. I define electoral success as the process through which a group, a single political party, or a bloc of ideologically like-minded political parties successfully captures state power at the national level through relatively free elections by either a) forming a government by a simple majority on its own or b) being a majority partner in a coalition government.³⁶

However, the high social mobilization capacity of some organizations and parties relative to their electoral representation in the national parliament is equally puzzling. This beckons analysts and practitioners to explain their high social mobilization despite low electoral mobilization or Disproportionate Social Mobilization. As such, this study focuses on the second question: *why can some ideological groups and social movements punch above their electoral weight in arenas of social mobilization, such as street protests, but other groups cannot?* The puzzle of high social mobilization captures a group or political party's capacity for

³⁵ I will discuss these types of social and electoral mobilization in greater detail in the later sections of this chapter.

³⁶ I use this definition of electoral success interchangeably with high electoral mobilization throughout this work.

social mobilization. Typically, high social mobilization gives the group or party more social influence within a country than a focus on the electoral representation of these parties in the national parliament of these countries would suggest. High social mobilization is expressed in three empirical facets: 1) street power (rallies, demonstrations, sit-ins, protests, etc.); 2) shaping of discursive norms, which is captured by salience in national discourse; and 3) influence over policy formulation, which refers to the ability of these ideological political parties and groups to move the policy needle towards their causes.³⁷

To address these questions, the study identifies structural fragmentation to be positively associated with the low electoral mobilization of political parties. This structural fragmentation has two distinct pathways: political and ideological fragmentation. First, ideological fragmentation occurs due to two mechanisms: high thresholds of inclusion and low thresholds of exclusion. The high thresholds of inclusion can be considered a demand side of ideological fragmentation. It refers to rigorous formal or informal criteria for party membership and broader affiliation and support. In this way, high thresholds of inclusion capture the party subculture that refers to both formal constraints on the party's rank-and-file and affiliates and the more normative aspects of affiliation. This high threshold for the inclusion of potential voters and party affiliates makes it easier for these political organizations to decrease their share of potential voters relative to their competitors. It prevents parties from transforming into mass electoral machines even as they have robust social mobilization capacity.

Second, political fragmentation captures structural constraints that can be represented along more political or partisan loci. Another distinction between these two pathways is that political fragmentation does not simply capture constraints that lead to the exclusion or inclusion of the voters within the organization. Instead, it also considers the features of the party system at the level of the organization and

³⁷ In this work the primary empirical facet of social mobilization that is explained is that of street power of Islamists due to its analytical priority over the rest of the two empirical facets for the case of the empirical case of Islamist mobilization in Pakistan.


how they influence the electoral success of political parties. Political fragmentation thus captures how the organizational features at the party level interact with features of the party system. I identify three features of political fragmentation: 1) the number of like-minded parties in a party system within a bloc, 2) the size of their cleavage group, and crucially, 3) the lack of cooperation and coordination to form and sustain electoral alliances and political coalitions.

On the other hand, the high social mobilization of political parties can be associated with their large mobilization core that are zealously committed to them. This large mobilization core has two components: a large network of ancillary organizations and a larger proportion of party workers than party voters relative to their competitors. It enables some political parties and groups to punch above their weight in social mobilization relative to their electoral mobilization at the national level. It gives political parties a solid organizational foundation that gives them an organizational advantage to “push” in social mobilization. It thus indicates a higher capacity available to parties to agitate on the streets, shape public norms by being vocal in the public discourse, and influence state policy towards their causes.

This chapter has five sections. First, it advances “divergent mobilization” as a concept that provides analytical leverage in understanding key features encompassing the broader concept of political mobilization. This starts with the proposition that social and electoral mobilization are distinct spheres within the broader concept of political mobilization. I advance a unified typology of the patterns of social and electoral mobilization and anchor them with empirical flesh by giving examples from across the world. Second, I delineate the scope conditions of the theory of divergent mobilization by identifying key terms, providing their definitions, and establishing the criteria of the political parties and groups analyzed in this study. Third, I review conventional explanations and show that most studies have tried to explain mobilization without focusing on its constituent spheres or the dynamics linking them. In this way, mobilization has remained a “black box” in comparative politics that needs to be disaggregated into distinct spheres and analyzed further.

Fourth, the study formulates the theory of divergent mobilization, summarized in FIGURE 2.1 below, which makes two interrelated claims that explain divergent mobilization at a causal level. Crucially, the theory combines constant causes with a historical explanation. First, I develop a framework that exists on the level of constant causes. As part of this framework, large mobilization cores that are zealously committed to parties are positively associated with high social mobilization. Whereas political and ideological fragmentation is positively associated with low electoral mobilization. Second, I emphasize the importance of the historical contingency of the state's ruling elite, which acts as a moderator variable in the explanatory framework. In combination with the constant causes, the state's ruling elite explains divergent mobilization. This is captured in FIGURE 2.1, which emphasizes that the two conditions of relative strength and aligned incentives of a state's ruling elite are crucial to explain divergent mobilization in addition to the constant causes. By contrast, non-divergent patterns of mobilization are more likely if a state's ruling elite is weak and incentives are not aligned with divergent mobilization.

FIGURE 2.1: Summary of Theoretical Framework



Source: Author's formulation.

2. Outcome Variable: Conceptualizing Divergent Mobilization

The critical phenomenon of interest in this study is what I call “divergent mobilization.” It encompasses mobilization that has an empirical disjuncture between two distinct spheres of mobilization or the core manifestations of mobilization. Divergent mobilization refers to high social and low electoral mobilization, which encompasses low levels of electoral success at the national level.

2.1. A Unified Typology of Social and Electoral Mobilization: Divergent, Convergent, Diminished and Vote-Banking

However, there can be other patterns of social and electoral mobilization of political parties. To advance a framework for a falsifiable theory of divergent mobilization, it is crucial to identify these non-divergent patterns of mobilization. TABLE 2.1 below advances a unified typology of the variety of relationships of social and electoral mobilization. It uses empirical observations from cases of Islamist political mobilization in Muslim-Majority countries (MMCs) to identify and describe the variety of social and electoral mobilization typologies. Crucially, TABLE 2.1, like any typology, helps provide ideal types that allow us to establish a standard to offer differences and deviations from ideal cases and should not be used as law-like prescriptions.³⁸

*** space intentionally left blank ***

³⁸ The advantage of a Weberian methodology of ideal types is that “it allows us to establish a standard (an artificial/laboratory) creation with respect to which we can measure differences and deviations due to concrete historical developments (Panebianco 1988:17).”

TABLE 2.1: Unified Typology of Patterns of Social and Electoral Mobilization With Empirical Cases of Islamist Mobilization in Muslim Majority Countries

<i>Social Mobilization</i>	<i>Electoral Mobilization</i>	
	<i>High</i>	<i>Low</i>
<i>High</i>	<p>Convergent Mobilization</p> <p>Example: Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, [Indonesia], [Yemen]</p> <p>[When they had partly free elections]</p>	<p>Divergent Mobilization</p> <p>Example: <i>Pakistan</i></p> <p>[This study seeks to explain this cell]</p>
<i>Low</i>	<p>Vote-Bank Mobilization</p> <p>Example: [Turkey]</p>	<p>Diminished Mobilization</p> <p>Example: Senegal, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates,</p>

Source: Author's typology using various empirical sources, especially (Meecham and Hwang 2014).

Note: The cases written under brackets or “[]” provide weak or qualified empirical examples of MMCs wherein Islamist social and electoral mobilization resembles the criterion of each cell. First, an empirical example of Vote-Bank mobilization using the issue of Islamist political mobilization is difficult. This is because Islamist parties are often built on social movements, so they usually have high social mobilization capacity. The AKP in Turkey provides some aspects of a vote-bank mobilization pattern. It can be considered a weak example of an Islamist-oriented party that has been particularly successful in Turkish electoral politics without engaging in the kind of grassroots mobilization characteristic of parties in cells that score high on social mobilization. Second, a law in Senegal prevents the formal use of religion by political parties, which precludes Islamist parties from competing in elections formally. However, the case presents low Islamist mobilization. It thus can provide meaningful insights as an example of diminished mobilization.

TABLE 2.1 gives examples of MMCs that fit the criteria outlined in each cell based on their social and electoral mobilization. Within the cells unshaded in TABLE 2.1, the second typology of social and electoral mobilization is termed convergent mobilization. It captures a pattern of mobilization wherein political parties have high levels of social and electoral mobilization. In contrast with divergent mobilization, convergent mobilization describes phenomena where parties with high social mobilization have also acquired significant electoral success.

As TABLE 2.1 notes, convergent mobilization can be illustrated empirically using several examples of Islamist mobilization across Muslim-Majority Countries (MMCs) worldwide. Algeria (Mecham 2017), Egypt (Wickham 2001, 2013), and

Tunisia (Street Protests: Angrist 2013, Electoral Mobilization: Ghannouchi 2016) can be considered countries with high levels of Islamist protests and electoral mobilization. In the case of Algeria, Islamist parties have been successful in instigating robust social mobilization but, at the same time, were also able to convert their social influence into electoral success. This can be observed when the National Liberation Front (FLN) initiated a gradual liberalization process to end one-party rule in Algeria. Some within the literature have attributed this to how the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) used mosques to propagate its message to evolve into a mass movement that combined electoralism with mass mobilization (Kalyvas 2006:381). FIS's initial electoral success was winning 47.2 percent of the vote and 188 seats (just 28 seats short of a simple majority) in the first round of a two-round parliamentary election scheduled for June and July 1991. It was perceived that in the second round of the election, the FIS "was widely expected to produce a large parliamentary majority (Kalyvas 2000: 382)." However, the Algerian military abruptly halted the election by state intervention four days before the second round. The Algerian army arrested thousands of FIS activists, and the intervention escalated into a violent civil war.

Similarly, in the case of Egypt, Islamist social groups have exhibited high levels of social mobilization through community services, religious activities, youth engagement, and political activism in general. This allowed Egyptian Islamists to build a robust support base and maintain significant influence in Egyptian society despite state repression (Masoud 2014). The only time that free elections were held relatively recently in Egypt was in 2012 when the nominally independent party linked with the Muslim Brotherhood, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), came into power with Mohammed Morsi elected as president of Egypt. In this way, Algeria and Egypt exhibit patterns of convergent mobilization for Islamist mobilization characterized by robust social mobilization matched with electoral success.

Examples of convergent mobilization extend beyond Islamist mobilization in MMCs. For instance, convergent mobilization can be observed in the case of the

Bolivian Movement Towards Socialism (MAS), which was a robust social movement that included Indigenous, peasant, and labor organizations. The MAS mobilized around issues such as land reform, social justice, and Indigenous rights and rode these strong grassroots organizations to win national elections and acquire state power in 2006 (see Anria 2018). In this sense, the MAS provides a clear example of a movement party successfully transforming its robust social mobilization into electoral success, with Evo Morales becoming Bolivia and Latin America's first Indigenous president (Subercaseux and Sierra 2007; Sivak 2010).

Empirical cases of convergent mobilization can also be observed from the developed countries of the Global North, for instance, in the case of anti-austerity mobilization in Greece, which led to the rise of the Radical Left–Progressive Alliance (SYRIZA). Initially, SYRIZA was a coalition of leftist groups mobilized around issues of anti-austerity, social justice, and economic reform in response to the financial crisis in Greece (Douzinas 2017). However, SYRIZA successfully converted its strong social mobilization into electoral success at the national level. It won the 2015 parliamentary elections of Greece by acquiring 36.3 percent of the vote and 149 out of 300 seats, with Alexis Tsipras becoming prime minister (Tsakatika 2016:7, 9).

As TABLE 2.1 identifies, diminished mobilization is the third type of social and electoral mobilization. It captures instances wherein political parties and ideological groups struggle in both social and electoral mobilization. Parties exhibiting diminished mobilization patterns thus present low levels of social mobilization in its various empirical facets, such as protesting on the streets. Similarly, in electoral mobilization, such parties are unable to transform themselves into mass electoral machines. To be sure, political parties whose mobilization resembles diminished mobilization may nevertheless have some capacity for social and electoral mobilization. However, the crucial point is that such mobilization would be persistently low or subdued relative to their competitors and the other types of mobilization identified in TABLE 2.1.

Bearing this in mind, if one focuses on the issue of Islamist political mobilization, diminished mobilization can be empirically observed in MMCs like Senegal (Mecham 2017; Villalon 1995), Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar. However, it is pertinent to note that for sultanistic regimes like Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar, low street protests and electoral mobilization can primarily result from the type of political regime.³⁹ In other words, none of these countries are electoral democracies, so the puzzle of low electoral mobilization is explained in large part by this feature of the political systems of these countries. Diminished mobilization in these countries is thus more about authoritarianism rather than open electoral opportunities that are unfulfilled. This makes analyzing the disjuncture between social and electoral mobilization that is central to divergent mobilization less compelling for these cases.

A second feature that is relevant to discuss for diminished mobilization cases of MMCs like Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar is that some would argue that diminished mobilization is not consistent across different empirical facets of social mobilization. For instance, while the street power of Islamists in these countries is low, they have ostensibly high levels of mobilization over policy formulation and shaping public norms. Such criticism can seem especially relevant to the cases of Saudi Arabia and Qatar, but also to the case of UAE. However, I emphasize that this underestimates the weakness of Islamist groups in these countries. Islamist forces are largely beholden to the writ of the state's ruling elite or the regime in question in these countries. On balance, then, Islamist groups and parties in these countries are largely under the orbit of the state. In this sense, Islamists' overall social mobilization is endogenous to the state's ruling elite. The social influence of Islamist groups only exists at a relatively superficial level in MMCs like Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar.

³⁹ For instance, these regimes are repressive, and these countries do not hold regular national elections, which does not make them relevant cases for the theoretical framework advanced in this study. See the scope conditions in the theoretical framework forged in Chapter 2.

This is in sharp contrast with an MMC like Pakistan, which is placed in the shaded cell in TABLE 2.1 and is a crucial case of divergent mobilization. Islamist parties in Pakistan have high social influence that extends beyond the orbit of the state. Social mobilization of Islamist parties in the case of Pakistan is thus relatively more autonomous than in the case of MMCs like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE.⁴⁰ In this way, social mobilization by Islamists is low in these countries in a substantive sense. Combined with the lack of electoral success of Islamists, MMCs like Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar can be considered cases of diminished mobilization.

The case of recent changes in Saudi Arabia that have impacted Islamist causes can be highlighted to burnish this claim. Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman (MBS) has rapidly started changing Saudi Arabia, which Islamist forces have not managed to oppose or stop effectively. A relatively more effective opposition towards some of these changes by MBS would suggest a higher level of autonomy of Islamists from the state. By extension, it would also underscore a capacity to engage in social mobilization. For instance, MBS vowed to return Saudi Arabia to “moderate Islam,” claiming that Riyadh’s turn towards radicalization occurred due to the Iranian revolution.⁴¹ The claim rested on the notion that Saudi Arabia acted as part of an American desire to counter the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and the Middle East during the Cold War, which pushed it toward radicalization. This vow by MBS complements changes in Saudi Arabia’s domestic policies concerning the relaxation or reversal of some of its anachronistic gender policies, including allowing women to drive, live alone, and travel without a male guardian.

⁴⁰ See <https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-evolving-relationship-between-religion-and-politics-in-saudi-arabia/> Accessed December 15, 2024; I explain the reasons for why this is the case in the theory of divergent mobilization I advance in this work and, more relevantly, to its empirical application for the case of Pakistan in Chapters 3-6.

⁴¹ See <https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-evolving-relationship-between-religion-and-politics-in-saudi-arabia/> Accessed December 15, 2024.

Beyond gender reforms, other changes by MBS that are direct concerns of Islamists include placing limits on the religious police's powers, permitting public entertainment venues such as cinemas and concerts, and cracking down and arresting religious clerics and scholars who are labeled as 'extremists.' MBS also banned the practice of breaking the fast (*iftar*) in mosques for the Islamic holy month of Ramzan in 2023 and 2024, citing hygiene reasons behind the ban.⁴² As well, Saudi Arabia passed a policy banning the *i'tikaf* (Islamic practice consisting of a period of staying in a mosque for a certain number of days) without identification, no use of loudspeakers in mosques, and no prayer broadcast in the country during the holy month of Ramzan.⁴³ All these policy changes and initiatives have occurred in conjunction with the introduction of the Vision 2030 plan by Saudi Arabia, which, in some similarities with the Qatari Vision 2030 plan, aspires to revamp and transform state and society relations in Saudi Arabia.

The inability of Islamist groups to resist these changes suggests the lack of autonomy of Islamist forces in regimes like Saudi Arabia relative to other MMCs like Pakistan. MBS has been able to implement changes that are usually direct concerns of Islamist groups and parties and consolidate his power by eliminating alternative centers of authority to the state, such as religious powers, with relative ease.⁴⁴ On the other hand, Islamist parties in MMCs like Pakistan have vigorously resisted the implementation of policies that were in opposition to their causes over the course of Pakistani history. An example of this includes the blasphemy laws in Pakistan that have been in place since the 1980s. Any attempts to revise, repeal, or even marginally alter the blasphemy laws in Pakistan have been faced with strong opposition from Pakistani Islamists. This underpins the relative weakness of Islamist groups in countries like Saudi Arabia. There is, thus, enough rationale to

⁴² See <https://www.news18.com/world/why-did-saudi-arabia-prince-mohammad-bin-salman-ban-iftar-in-mosques-during-ramadan-8798653.html>. Accessed August 8, 2024.

⁴³ See <https://www.firstpost.com/explainers/no-loudspeakers-no-prayer-broadcasts-why-saudi-arabias-new-ramzan-rules-have-angered-muslims-12273982.html>. Accessed August 8, 2024.

⁴⁴ See <https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-evolving-relationship-between-religion-and-politics-in-saudi-arabia/>. Accessed December 15, 2024.

categorize MMCs like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE as cases of diminished mobilization with reference to the patterns of social and electoral mobilization of Islamist groups in these countries.

The case of Senegal presents a relatively stronger example of diminished mobilization of Islamists compared to MMCs like Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar. While the Constitution of Senegal places prohibitions that prevent Islamist parties from directly acquiring political party status in elections, Senegal is not a regime where the mobilization of Islamist social forces is completely a feature of the authoritarian nature of the political regime. Article 4 of the constitution states, "The political parties and coalitions of political parties...are forbidden to identify themselves to one race, to one ethnicity, to one sex, to one religion, to one sect, to one language or to one part of the territory."⁴⁵ However, despite this legal prohibition in the electoral sphere, the extant literature on Islamist political mobilization has convincingly demonstrated that Senegal is a case of low Islamist mobilization (Meecham 2017, Chapter 4). Some aspects of diminished mobilization were convincing to a limited extent in Mali, too, until the reignition of the dormant Tuareg rebellion in 2012.⁴⁶

Beyond Islamist political mobilization, there are ample cases of diminished mobilization from the Global North to the Global South. For instance, the Libertarian Party in the United States (US) is one such example. Since it was founded in 1971, the Libertarian Party has failed in social mobilization (see Pellegrin 2018). This contrasts with other movements or political parties in the US, such as the Tea Party movement that began within the Republican Party in 2009 and was much more successful. The low social mobilization of the Libertarian party in the US is matched with a dismal record in its electoral success at the federal level. Its mobilization can thus be categorized as diminished mobilization.

⁴⁵ Constitution of Senegal 2016: 4. See https://adsdatabase.ohchr.org/IssueLibrary/SENEGAL_Constitution.pdf. Accessed August 15, 2024.

⁴⁶ See <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-extremism-sahel> Accessed August 15, 2024.

Fourth, the last type of relationship between social and electoral mobilization is depicted in the lower-left cell of TABLE 2.1 and can be termed vote-bank mobilization. This relationship comprises high levels of electoral mobilization and low levels of social mobilization. While divergent mobilization can be considered low-high mobilization with low electoral mobilization but high social mobilization, vote-bank mobilization is high-low mobilization, exhibiting high electoral mobilization but low social mobilization.

Vote-bank mobilization describes a relationship between social and electoral mobilization wherein political parties prioritize electoral efficiency and can mobilize people to ‘get out the vote’ on election day using three main approaches. This pattern of mobilization is common in dominant or hegemonic party systems characterized by de facto one-party rule. There are three main approaches that political parties exhibiting vote-bank patterns of mobilization undertake. First, an approach where some clientelist parties that often do not engage in robust social mobilization nevertheless acquire votes through patrons. Such an approach can give these parties electoral success despite low social mobilization capacity.

Second, another approach that leads to vote-bank mobilization by political parties involves machine politics for electoral mobilization that in popular parlance has also been called “Chicago-style politics” to capture the Chicago machine (see Gosnell 1937). This approach closely resembles clientelist politics and involves using patronage networks and nepotism, where political bosses often in charge of urban areas comprising the political machine mobilize voters on election day. Its difference from clientelist politics is subtle but significant. One way to make this distinction is in their method of operation. Clientelist politics tends to be transactional and ad-hoc relative to machine politics. On the other hand, machine politics is more continuous and sustained. Organizations utilizing this approach include the Tammany Hall in New York City for the Democratic Party, which was effective in mobilizing voter turnout on election day (Golway 2014).

A third approach used for vote-bank mobilization is by technocratic parties. Aspects of the vote-bank mobilization strategy can also be seen in Forza Italia in

Italy. This approach often involves electoral optimization strategies by political parties. For instance, this can be achieved by employing sophisticated data-driven targeting and strategic resource allocation to win elections with minimal social mobilization. To be sure, vote-bank mobilization by parties often involves more than one of these approaches. However, what unites these parties is that they can achieve high levels of electoral success despite low levels of social mobilization.

For the case of Islamist mobilization in MMCs, as TABLE 2.1 notes, identifying an MMC where social and electoral mobilization patterns can be categorized as vote-banking mobilization is challenging to identify empirically. This is mainly because Islamist political parties are often built on social movements, which implies they often have relatively deep roots in society and robust social mobilization capacity through grassroots organizations that penetrate deep into society. In this way, while Islamist parties can have variations in their levels of social mobilization, identifying a case of Islamist parties with high electoral and low social mobilization is difficult. As such, since a scenario wherein electoral mobilization is high but social mobilization is low is less common empirically for Islamist political mobilization, this also has decreased analytical significance.

However, as TABLE 2.1 notes, a weak example of vote-bank mobilization is the case of the AKP in Turkey. The AKP mostly relied on electoral mobilization strategies. The AKP, and by extension, some Islamist mobilization in Turkey, can then be thought of as an example of vote-bank mobilization for two main reasons. First, the AKP is not a movement party like many Islamist political parties. This includes the *Deobandi* parties like the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazal Ur Rehman (JUI-F) or the *Barelvi* parties like the Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP). For some of these parties, such as the JUI-F, their social movements spanned decades of vibrant social mobilization before these organizations became interested in formal electoral politics and started competing in elections. Second, the AKP's commitment to Islam is relatively stronger than that of other parties like the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PMLN). In this way, the AKP differs from some political parties categorized under the moniker of 'Muslim Democrats (see Nasr 2005)." It can be

categorized as following a vote-banking pattern of mobilization. However, unlike the PMLN, the AKP's threshold of invoking Islam for mobilization is higher, so it can be considered a weak example of an Islamist political party that fits the vote-bank pattern of mobilization.⁴⁷

Whereas for the case of the PMLN, there is a perception in Pakistan that the party does not do very well in social mobilization, such as street protests. Yet, its party leader, three-time Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif, is one of the most successful politicians in Pakistani political history. Nawaz Sharif's brother, Mian Shehbaz Sharif, is serving his second term as the Prime Minister of Pakistan in 2024, and his daughter, Maryam Nawaz Sharif, is the Chief Minister of Punjab, the largest province of Pakistan. PMLN's electoral campaigns often have some elements of electoral optimization where its political opponents, such as Sheikh Rashid Ahmed, have remarked that a decisive reason for the PMLN's success in the 2013 General Election of Pakistan was a pre-election survey conducted by the party. This survey helped PMLN optimize its electoral strategies in the rural and urban constituencies of Pakistan before the election and contributed to its victory.

2.2. Spheres of Mobilization: Social and Electoral Mobilization and the Inclusiveness Assumption

This study disaggregates the broad concept of political mobilization by emphasizing the importance of analyzing variation in the relationship between its constituent spheres of social and electoral mobilization. Some insight into the spheres of mobilization can be gained based on existing scholarship on Islamist political mobilization. Based on this literature, Islamist political mobilization occurs in three distinct spheres: elections, street protests, and political violence (see Mecham 2017:15). In this sense, a focus on spheres of mobilization implies that political

⁴⁷ For the case of the definition of the groups and political parties analyzed in this study, I discuss this later in the scope conditions section, where I discuss the definition of Islamist parties as used in this study.

mobilization can be conceptualized as a category with several distinct empirical manifestations.

First, in countries with free and open elections, political mobilization often takes the form of voting for political parties with an ideological agenda, such as Islamist parties and groups. These agendas are diverse in their claims and political prescriptions but united in their direct engagement with state policy (Mecham 2017: 14). In countries with closed political systems, accommodative strategies are often crowded out or confined to attempts at elite influence. Second, political mobilization may also take a second path of street protests in open and relatively closed political systems. Protests in closed systems often lead to violent clashes between protesters and the military, as well as significant prison time (Mecham 2017: 14-15). In contrast, demonstrators in comparatively open systems are less likely to bear these costs. Third, violence can be a third manifestation of political mobilization, including Islamist political mobilization.

Meecham (2017: 15) underlines the “inclusiveness assumption” of Islamist political mobilization that links these three spheres of mobilization. I borrow Meecham’s insights about the inclusiveness assumption but recast them beyond Islamist political mobilization. The inclusiveness assumption emphasizes two crucial points: 1) actors engaged in political violence are a smaller set (and potential subset) of those actors engaged in street protests or demonstrations; 2) actors engaged in street protests are a smaller set and potential subset of those actors who may vote for ideological political parties, such as Islamically oriented parties (see Mecham 2017: 15).

This study does not aim to test the inclusiveness assumption empirically, but it underlines that the assumption may not always be empirically accurate in all contexts, such as Pakistan. However, it agrees with the underlying logic of the inclusiveness assumption, which underscores that “all actors who engage in some form of Islamist mobilization do so to enable state policies that are more reflective of their Islamic vision than the status quo (Mecham 2017:15).” The logic of the inclusiveness assumption provides analytical insights not just for Islamist political

mobilization but also for political mobilization more broadly. In this sense, Islamist actors may pursue different strategies; however, these strategies are all designed to enable pro-Islamic policy change. By identifying divergent mobilization, this work emphasizes street protests or social mobilization are not a subset of electoral mobilization. The study thus disaggregates the different spheres of political mobilization rather than collapse them.

Moreover, there are three specific ways this study diverges from existing frameworks of political mobilization. First, it does not deal with violence as a manifestation of political mobilization. One reason for limiting this scope is that including too many spheres of mobilization is not amenable to developing an analytically parsimonious theory of political mobilization. This work primarily concerns the first two manifestations of political mobilization: social mobilization (or street protest for Meecham) and electoral mobilization (or electoral voting for Meecham). Second, the study does not subscribe to the distinguishing criteria used to formulate the inclusiveness assumption, namely, that what distinguishes actors engaged in different forms of mobilization is the personal cost they are willing to pay to engage in the activity wherein demonstrating exceeds the costs of voting (see Meecham 2017:15-16).

I do not subscribe to calculative logic as the dominant pattern motivating the behavior of political parties and groups in all cases of political mobilization. For instance, in the case of Islamist political mobilization, this assumption by Meecham (2017) does not hold and can even be reversed for cases of divergent mobilization. Personal costs for protesting over Islamist issues may be less than the costs of voting in contexts where the vote is often supposed to go to the feudal patrons. However, I agree with the broader argument undergirding the inclusiveness assumption that the spheres of mobilization are empirically related to one another. Third, the goal of this study is not to unearth the micro-foundations. Instead, it focuses on behavior at the level of organizations or the “meso” level, such as Islamist political parties.

Fourth, instead of emphasizing street protests as a distinct sphere of political mobilization, I prefer to include them in the broader sphere of social mobilization that also includes other empirical facets that capture social influence. This includes public norms within a country and policy formulation. This allows the conceptual and analytical framework advanced in this study to capture the variation in the spheres of mobilization more accurately than a narrow bifurcation between street protests and electoral outcomes. To be sure, many parties with strong ideologies have sources of social influence that extend beyond street protests.

However, the influence being captured by the sphere of social mobilization is also not overstretched conceptually to the degree that it loses its analytical purchase by being too broad. This is why this influence is ‘social’ and excludes other sources of influence that parties with strong ideologies can leverage to acquire influence over politics, such as violence. The sphere of social mobilization thus provides a useful middle ground for analyzing political mobilization that is neither too narrow by focusing on street protests alone (e.g., Meecham 2017) nor too broad.

Street protests are the primary empirical facet of social mobilization that are the focus of this study. This is because street protests are often a key source of social influence for many political parties that punch above their electoral weight. The literature on Islamist mobilization focused on Pakistan, for instance, has attributed much of the influence of Islamist political parties and groups over national politics to be attributed to the street power of Islamists (see Butt 2016). This street power enables Islamists to strategically “choke” urban centers and paralyze urban life, which is linked with their “shutter power” (Wilder 1998: 105; Butt 2016).

However, not all the social influence of political parties and groups is attributed to street power alone. Other empirical facets contribute to the social influence of groups such as Islamist parties. An example of this would be the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) party in the UK, which punched above its electoral weight in shaping the referendum and influenced state policy far more than its representation in the national parliament. However, UKIP did not draw

the kind of colossal street protests that Islamist parties in Pakistan can attract while agitating on the street.

3. Scope Conditions of The Theory of Divergent Mobilization

The theory of divergent mobilization begins by providing conceptual clarity through definitions of key terms and delineating its scope conditions. This section summarizes some scope conditions I have not already covered. I also define key terms, and the groups and parties analyzed in this study that have not already been defined.

3.1. Definitions and Key Terms

It would be helpful to focus on defining the key terms used in this study. I focus on the terms of political mobilization. Since this work empirically focuses on the issue of Islamist political mobilization to explain divergent mobilization, I also provide brief definitions of political parties in general and of Sunni Islamist parties relevant to the case of Islamist political mobilization in Pakistan. Empirical observations for Islamist mobilization are also often used to clarify the analytical framework in this chapter. This helps define, identify, and delimit the groups analyzed in this study.

3.1.1. Political Mobilization

What do I mean by political mobilization? The literature on Islamist political mobilization helps provide insights into this question. I borrow Quinn Meecham's (2017: 11-12) understanding of Islamist political mobilization as mobilization focusing “specifically on political action designed to engage the state.” In this way, for this study, I am primarily focused on explaining the mobilization of groups and political parties specifically designed to engage the state. For the case of religious mobilization or Islamist mobilization, this excludes faith-based mobilization that occurs more on spiritual grounds or for the reinvigoration of spirituality that does

not have the goal of engagement with the state. For instance, missionary groups or groups that mainly propagate Islam (da'wah), such as the Tablighi Jamaat in South Asia, including those in Pakistan, would be excluded from the scope of this analysis as their activities are primarily geared at spiritual rejuvenation and personal piety.

3.1.2. Islamist Parties, Political Parties

The term "Islamist" is more apt for this analysis than "Islamic," primarily due to the latter's extensive religious implications. "Islamist" encompasses a range of socio-political behaviors self-identified as religiously inspired under individual interpretations of Islam, which may not align with traditional Islamic adjudicators such as the *'ulema* (Mecham 2017: 12).⁴⁸ It does not specify a distinct class of Islamic belief or a category of activists but rather includes a variety of actors and beliefs self-identifying with an Islamic identity (Mecham 2017: 12). Whereas Islamist parties can generally be understood as "parties that find a blueprint for social, moral, political, and economic reform in the teachings of the Islamic faith (Fox and Menchik 2023)." These parties advocate for state enforcement of Islamic law, focusing on areas such as media, family matters, proselytization, and apostasy. However, they can often carry puzzling unpredictability regarding their future commitment to electoral competition, even after attaining electoral victories (Blaydes and Lo 2012).

3.1.2.1. *Political Parties and Islam*

This study mainly but not exclusively examines Islamist organizations, particularly political parties operating within relatively open systems compared with more closed ones like Saudi Arabia. Political parties are "organizations that represent and aggregate citizens' interests so that electoral majorities can be built to govern a country (Mudge and Chen 2014: 309-310)." They compete with other political

⁴⁸ Ulema are scholars of Islamic doctrine and law. They are considered to be the guardians, transmitters and interpreters of religious knowledge in Islam (see Zaman 2010)

parties through electoral contests to gain votes and access to power (Hutter, Kriesi and Lorenzini 2019[2004]). In this sense, fielding election candidates is central to a political party.

Existing literature on movement–election interactions in Western democracies finds that some modern political parties are the outgrowth of social movements (Goldstone 2003: 1–26; Kubik 1998). For instance, this overlap is extensively found in the case of Islamist organizations. Islamist parties often emerge from or have extensive connections with other organizations, especially social movements. However, due to this study's focus on electoral success or mobilization, the role of social movements is only peripherally considered. Instead, the study focuses on groups that also participate in electoral competition.

3.1.2.2. Groups Analyzed in this study

Crucially, then, what are the groups that are analyzed while developing the theory of divergent mobilization? For this study, ideological groups are distinguished along a single general criterion based on the social sphere with which the group's ideology primarily engages. The study focuses on groups with the primary objective of engagement with the state, be it altering state policy, influencing policy formation, or capturing or establishing state power (Mecham 2017: 13). In this sense, for the case of religious or Islamist mobilization, groups primarily fostering individual faith or communal religious norms fall outside this study's scope. This ideological distinction has less to do with religious doctrine and more about the beliefs about the roles and responsibilities of particular actors (Mecham 2017). For example, many Islamic organizations, like Sufi brotherhoods, aim to facilitate believers' personal spiritual growth (Howell 2014). Other organizations emphasize communal goals, like propagating the Islamic faith (*da'wa*), providing social services, enforcing religious norms, or reprimanding non-Muslim groups for perceived transgressions against Islam (Mecham 2017).

While the focus of this work is on politically engaged groups, groups with a dominant communal or individualistic ideology may also mobilize politically when

state actions threaten their central interests, including religious interests (Mecham 2017: 13). They might develop innovative justifications for engaging the state (Mecham 2017: 14), which could either wane following a decrease in state threats or become ingrained in the organization's ideology, thus creating a more "statist" orientation (Mecham 2017). The groups of interest in this study are thus chiefly political organizations like ideological political parties that persistently and deliberately mobilize to modify state policy or seize state power.

3.2. Other Scope Conditions

The theoretical framework I forge operates under certain scope conditions, several of which have been delineated previously. However, additional stipulations merit specification. First, this theory pertains to 'hybrid' regimes, which encapsulate features of both democratic and autocratic countries. These countries are deemed 'hybrid' as their democratic status is undermined when essential components of democracy, such as electoral rules and the respect of certain liberties, are circumvented. Scholars like Cox (1997) and Laver and Schofield (1990) could disregard worries about compliance with constitutional stipulations or electoral outcomes while studying electoral behavior and coalition dynamics in full democracies. Since the end of the Cold War, surviving autocracies have adopted democratic facades, at least in terms of their formal institutions (Diamond 2002; Levitsky and Way 2002; Schedler 2006). However, the lack of a level playing field during elections can mean electoral outcomes are often pre-decided by the ruling elite that possesses overarching power instead of voters (see Svobik 2012:23).⁴⁹

Crucially, the prevalence of elections after the Cold War has steered academic interest towards competitive (Levitsky and Way 2002, 2010), electoral (Diamond 2002; Schedler 2006), and semi-authoritarian regimes (Ottaway 2003). I favor the term 'hybrid regimes,' which is best illuminated by Levitsky and Way's

⁴⁹ Svobik uses the term "brute force" for the ruling elite, presumably to identify that the ruling elite must always possess means of producing violence.

concept of competitive authoritarianism. Subtypes of such autocracies have been classified by Geddes (1999), Gandhi (2008), and Magaloni and Kricheli (2010). Within these autocracies, Geddes (1999) distinguishes among personalist, military, and single-party dictatorships; Gandhi (2008) among civilian, military, and monarchical dictatorships; and Magaloni and Kricheli (2010) among military, monarchic, single-party, and dominant-party authoritarian regimes. This work mainly focuses on military regimes.

Third, the theoretical formulation of this work pertains to countries with Muslims as their dominant citizens, irrespective of their constitutional status. Thus, the theory is designed for Muslim-majority countries (MMCs). Fourth, this analysis focuses on multi-party electoral systems instead of single-party structures. Additionally, the party system is conceptualized as a bloc of Islamist parties within a country rather than the entire political party system, enabling the analysis of the Islamist party system as a unique component within MMCs.

Regarding the generalizability of my framework, divergent political mobilization extends beyond Islamist organizations in MMCs, with aspects of divergent patterns of mobilization in other empirical contexts as well. It can be observed in the recurring and sometimes dramatic social mobilization on environmental issues and the relatively limited electoral success of “green” parties in most countries, such as Parties of the Green in Germany (see Kitschelt 2006),” or in mobilization around racial and indigenous justice in the US and Canada and the limited attention to these issues among political parties. It can also be observed in the ability of some ideological parties to punch above their electoral weight in influencing policy, such as in the UK, where the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) party played an outsized role in galvanizing support for Brexit amongst the British masses relative to its electoral success or in the Dixiecrats in the United States in 1948. However, the theoretical framework presented in this work focuses on Islamist parties, and given this focus, it makes sense only to provide examples from MMCs in the core analysis.

4. The Limits of Conventional Explanations

Existing literature provides several explanatory frameworks for divergent mobilization, which can be grouped based on their scope. I evaluate influential theories and sort them according to their breadth in addressing divergent mobilization's various components. Some approaches satisfactorily explain high social mobilization coupled with low electoral mobilization, while others offer partial insight into either social or electoral mobilization. As this work centers on Islamist organizations like political parties, I chiefly scrutinize explanations at the 'meso' level, nestled between the 'macro' structural and 'micro' individual levels.

First, I consider theories emphasizing aspects of social structure as pivotal to mobilization. These primarily involve social class or cleavage dimensions. Connected to this is the explanation regarding how the same number of protesters versus voters can have a distinctly different impact on the performance of political parties' social and electoral outcomes. Second, I focus on theories stressing the significance of extensive structural shifts, such as industrialization and modernization, in contributing to traditional cleavage groups' decline in size. This encompasses changes in prevailing ideologies and belief systems, such as secularization, and their interplay with religious cleavages and cleavage salience. In particular, I evaluate alternate theories positing social cleavages as a critical driver for divergent mobilization patterns, considering the central role of cleavages in my theoretical framework.

Third, I analyze theories suggesting an association between repression and an organization's social and electoral mobilization success. Moreover, given the structural focus of this work's theoretical framework, the three primary alternative explanations I focus on are structurally oriented, offering further falsifiability to the theory proposed. In the next section, I discuss approaches that provide explanatory leverage over social or electoral mobilization and merit discussion.

4.1. Material Comfort and Social Class, Diverging Numerical Effects

First, some perspectives that focus primarily on the individual level nevertheless can provide insight into alternative explanations for the divergence between the success of political parties in social mobilization, such as protests versus elections. These explanations emphasize that variations in people's attitudes are crucial and can influence divergent mobilization. One explanation from this camp can be attributed to Maslow's hierarchy of needs and subsequent research (Maslow 1943; Norris and Inglehart 2011). Based on this perspective, voters prioritize ideologies such as religion only after their material necessities like food, water, security, and shelter are met. So, for ideologies like Islamist mobilization, religious behaviors, and beliefs tend to have more influence among the economically secure when it comes to voting.

The implication is that in low literacy and high poverty contexts, such as in developing MMCs, the lower and working classes will be larger. People's material needs often go unfulfilled, so more people will vote based on their material needs rather than religious concerns. In contrast, prevailing grievances in society, such as those arising from economic problems, can drive people towards protesting, contributing to divergent mobilization patterns.

4.2. The Decline of Traditional Cleavage Groups

One body of literature that can provide alternative explanations to divergent mobilization at the aggregate or political party, rather than the explanation advanced in this study, can be categorized as studies that emphasize a decline in traditional cleavage groups. These explanations can be especially furnished from the literature on electoral behavior, political parties, and social organization. There are three specific explanations within perspectives that emphasize the decline of traditional cleavage groups: 1) studies that emphasize the importance of the cleavage size, especially studies that emphasize secularization to be crucial in

influencing electoral outcomes; 2) studies that emphasize variation in cleavage groups' ideological commitment, such as the secularization theory for the case of religious mobilization which is also useful for analyzing Islamist mobilization, and 3) a perspective that emphasizes cleavage formation to be crucial to explaining the variation in the relationship between social and electoral mobilization.

4.2.1. Size of the Cleavage Group

First, one possible explanation for divergent mobilization can be inferred from the literature on electoral cleavages. Studies within the existing literature on the determinants of aggregate electoral behavior emphasize that changes in the size of traditional cleavage groups can dramatically affect their relevance for party vote shares (Best 2011: 284). In other words, the electoral relevance of a party is based on the size of the social cleavages. For instance, the literature focused on Western Europe focuses on the declining electoral relevance of traditional cleavage groups by focusing on working class and religious citizens, which underlines that this decline in electoral relevance can arise due to a growing service sector, increases in white-collar employment, decreases in industrial labor, and increased secularism that have reduced the numbers of working-class or religious voters in Western societies (Heath et al. 1985; Kitschelt 1993; Pontusson 1995; Broughton and ten Napel 2000; Dogan 2001; Knutsen 2004; Norris and Inglehart 2004).

The alternative explanation for divergent mobilization, then, would be that there has been a decline in the traditional cleavage group size of political parties that exhibit divergent mobilization, wherein these parties are still able to punch above their electoral weight in the social arena. However, they struggle to stay electorally relevant at the national level. Due to a decline in the traditional cleavage group size, the electoral relevance of such political parties has withered away, exhibiting divergent mobilization patterns characterized by low electoral success.

However, such explanations struggle to account for the parties' ongoing and persistent failure to transform themselves into mass electoral machines. In the case of countries like Pakistan, for instance, where, despite some slight variations

marked by slight increases in the vote and seat shares of Islamist parties, the overall pattern of electoral mobilization of Islamist parties has been abysmally low. In these MMCs, Islamist parties have never been electorally successful. Explanations emphasizing a decline in traditional cleavage group size of political parties would thus have been more convincing if significant within-case variation occurred in the electoral fortunes of political parties marked by parties that once used to be electorally successful then stopped being as electorally relevant. Such explanations thus struggle to provide currency beyond electoral outcomes in Western Europe, such as in the case of Islamist mobilization in Pakistan.

4.2.2. Secularization

An influential source of such a change in the size of a traditional cleavage group of a political party that exhibits divergent mobilization for the case of religious parties can emphasize the role played by secularization in driving low electoral mobilization and concomitantly explaining divergent mobilization of some ideological political parties, especially religious political parties like Islamist parties. Secularization is generally understood to be “the process by which sectors of society and culture are removed from the domination of religious institutions and symbols (Berger 2011:125).” It can occur from the bottom-up or the top down. Studies emphasizing a bottom-up perspective note that religious practice and affiliation have diminished over the past five decades in Western electorates (Bruce 2002; Halman & Draulans 2006; Jagodzinski & Dobbelaere 1995). On the other hand, others have emphasized secularization to be a top-down process with political parties modifying their organizational structures and policies in response to the dwindling religious voter base. For instance, parties have sometimes merged to preserve resources on campaigning (De Graaf et al. 2001) or reduced their links with religious and social organizations for the appearance of cleavage voting have weakened (see Bellucci & Heath 2012).

Notably, changes like secularization can impact the electoral mobilization of religious parties and their social mobilization. For instance, changes in the

organizational structures of parties can influence political parties' voting behavior and social mobilization. Existing literature emphasizes that voters are more likely to vote for parties whose candidates share their religious traits and beliefs (see, e.g., Campbell et al. 2011; Castle et al. 2017; McDermott 2009). This argument suggests that the stronger parties' links with religious organizations from which candidates sharing their supporters' religious traits and beliefs can be recruited, the stronger the effects of religious identities and beliefs on voting behavior will be. As the ties between these organizations and political parties weaken due to secularization, the impact of religious cleavages on voting behavior should weaken.

One such version in which the secularization perspective can explain divergent mobilization can be given for the case of Islamist mobilization in Pakistan. Some have emphasized that Muslims in some MMCs, such as Pakistan, are secular in a certain way, wherein they are deeply religious in their personal lives and accept the centrality of Islam for guidance when it comes to aspects related to social institutions such as family and marriage. However, they do not support the interference of religion in their lives to the degree that they would elect outrightly Islamist parties in mass elections (Nadeem 1995, 2008). The broader logic underlying such arguments is that voters can be more concerned with developmental concerns even if the same people are deeply religious in their personal lives. In this way, a country can have high levels of personal piety while having low salience of religious cleavages in elections. These perspectives thus help explain the poor electoral performance of Islamist parties in Pakistan, which nevertheless can attract people to mobilize on the streets.

However, there are two critical limitations of studies emphasizing secularization as the driver behind divergent mobilization: 1) the poor internal validity of these studies and 2) the uniqueness of the Western historical experience. First, the validity of these theories is contested due to a lack of empirical support in these studies. Empirical support for perspectives emphasizing the selective secularity of people in some countries, such as Pakistan, is not based on rigorous empirical evidence. In this way, there is not sufficient evidence to conclude whether

some ideological political parties, such as Islamists, do not perform some of the same developmental functions involved with governance, such as those of patronage and clientelist politics, when they come to power (see Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). Second, secularization theory often derives excessively from the unique historical trajectories of regions and countries of Western Europe. In contrast, extending some of the propositions emerging from secularization theory may not travel beyond Western Europe to MMCs such as Pakistan. Second, such approaches do not travel well to other empirical contexts, such as the MMCs, where religion continues to be a potent and significant force in people's individual and public lives.

4.3. Sphere-specific Explanations: Electoral Systems and Rules, Founding Nationalism and Timing

Then, there are sets of explanations influential in only providing partial answers to the puzzle of divergent mobilization. These sets of explanations can be broadly divided into explanations that provide some explanatory leverage on the puzzle of low electoral mobilization and those that provide explanatory leverage over the puzzle of high social mobilization of political parties and groups exhibiting divergent mobilization patterns. From the literature providing explanatory leverage over the low electoral mobilization of parties exhibiting divergent mobilization, an influential answer emphasizes the importance of electoral systems and rules. On the other hand, from the literature that provides leverage over high social mobilization, two notable answers can be identified: 1) the importance of timing and 2) the importance of founding nationalism towards being crucial towards the high social mobilization of some groups and political parties.

4.3.1. Electoral Systems and Rules

First, an explanation for the low electoral mobilization of some political parties is provided by an influential literature in political science that can be categorized as emphasizing electoral systems and rules as crucial in shaping the electoral mobilization or electoral success of political parties. Studies from this literature are

especially influential in explaining the low electoral mobilization of political parties that are undergoing divergent patterns of mobilization. The broader argument emphasized by studies within this camp emphasizes the type of electoral system or laws governing elections to be crucial in influencing electoral mobilization. It may not be inaccurate to state that the electoral system is one of the most studied institutional arrangements that affect the features of party systems in hybrid regimes and advanced democracies. The influence of the electoral system in the extant literature can be surmised from political scientist Giovanni Sartori's (1968: 273) statement, which characterized electoral systems as “the most specific manipulative instrument of politics.”

The three broad families of electoral systems are 1) plurality/majority, 2) proportional representation, and 3) mixed systems (Reynolds et al., 2005: 27). The crucial difference between these systems is how proportional they are in terms of the “votes-to-seats relationship” (Reynolds et al., 2005: 27). For the plurality or majority formula, also known as First-Past-the-Post (FPTP), only one candidate in a single-member district is elected (Ishiyama 2012; Kisin 2014; Lijphart 1999). Variations of this formula produce other systems, including the Block Vote, Party Block Vote, and Alternative Vote (Reynolds et al., 2005: 28). On the other hand, Proportional Representation (PR) allows multiple candidates to be elected from a district to ensure that parties receive a share of seats in the legislature proportional to the vote share the party attains (Ishiyama 2012; Lijphart 1999).

The expectation for explanations underscoring the significance of electoral systems to divergent mobilization would then lead one to expect that an FPTP system will be more likely to produce effects where an ideological political party with robust social mobilization cannot translate this social success electorally at the national level (see Lijphart 1986: 113; Riker 1986). A key reason behind this is that the plurality/majority formula can favor a broad integrative two-party system⁵⁰ and discourages the growth of many parties within the party system (Duverger 1954).

⁵⁰ Though this effect does not occur necessarily.

Such a scenario can urge party candidates to appeal to a more general electorate beyond their narrow support bases (Duverger 1954). This system often results in fewer participating parties (Duverger 1954: 217, 226; Lijphart 1999: 157). This reductive effect occurs because voters “realize that their votes are wasted if they continue to give them to the third party,” and hence, “their tendency will be to transfer their vote to the less evil of its two adversaries (Duverger 1954: 217, 226; Lijphart 1999: 157).” Crucially, it implies that if a political party is an emergent and not an entrenched major political player within the party system, even if it has robust social mobilization, an FPTP system can contribute to their low electoral mobilization.

In contrast, a Proportional Representation (PR) system permits the rise of multiple parties and allows political cleavages to be expressed as separate parties (Lijphart 1999). According to Lijphart (1999), PR systems are more inclusive of minority groups and promote long-term political stability. Such an expectation implies that if political parties are not well-established, then they may have a higher likelihood of translating their social mobilization success into national electoral victories in a PR system.

4.3.2. Timing: Friday Prayers

Existing literature indicates that the timing of the protest can be crucial in explaining the variation in its levels. Protesting at opportune times can thus help explain high levels of social mobilization of groups and parties that exhibit divergent mobilization. In the case of Islamist mobilization, some have argued that a critical reason for Islamist Street power lies in Friday prayers which aid Islamist mobilization (Butt 2016). The argument advanced relating to Friday Prayers is that “Friday sermons” in mosques on Friday are a critical filtering and coordination tool for Islamist protests (Butt 2016:1, 5, 11). They act as tactical “choke” points in urban neighborhoods and as incitement through the religious leaders’ sermons. The argument favoring Friday sermons as an explanation for street mobilization of Islamist parties emphasizes that the first and arguably most challenging part of the

job — getting a mass of people in one physical location — is easier, nigh on automatic, for Islamists (Butt 2016:6).

However, there are limitations to Friday prayers as an explanation of Islamist Street power in Pakistan. First, the language barrier, with sermons primarily in Arabic, challenges this idea, particularly given Pakistanis' limited understanding of Arabic, despite national education policies encouraging Arabic learning (Pakistan's National Education Policy 2017, article 3.7.4).⁵¹ As such, Butt's (2016) claims that the Friday sermon acts to suffuse an issue with religious importance have limited explanatory leverage in explaining street mobilization in Pakistan. Second, Friday is a holiday in the religious Islamic schools (madrassas), primarily housed in the same complex as the mosque. So, the primary mechanism behind Friday protests could be that it is a holiday for students and teachers in madrassahs who show up for demonstrations. Thus, the importance of Friday prayers for mobilization might be overstated compared to the role of Islamic school holidays. Ultimately, these theoretical insufficiencies undermine the validity of Friday prayers to explain the street power of Islamist parties. They further blunt the explanatory utility of timing as an explanation of divergent mobilization as it was already only a partial explanation of divergent mobilization. This currency is even more limited, where Friday prayers struggle to explain even the high social mobilization of Islamist parties convincingly.

4.5.3. Founding Nationalism

A second partial explanation that has received some currency in the extant literature, which can provide some explanatory leverage over the high social mobilization of some ideological groups and political parties, has to do with the religious nature of the founding nationalism of a country. A key reason is that the space in which non-state actors such as religious parties interact also possesses a symbolic dimension, i.e., 'the cultural side of opportunity' (Gamson and Mayer 1996:

⁵¹ See Arabic a popular language not spoken in Pakistan
<https://www.arabnews.com/node/1557966/pakistan>

279). By this logic, if a country's founding nationalism is deeply attuned to the ideology of a group or political party, it can uniquely empower these parties to mobilize people socially on the streets. For example, countries like Pakistan were founded based on the "Two-Nation" theory, premised on the idea that the Muslims and Hindus of South Asia were two distinct nations. Due to this, Islamist parties can effectively mobilize people on the streets or in elections (Butt 2016; Javed 2018; Jaffrelot 2002). Invoking religion can be a potent strategy to obviate collective action problems and sustain street protests, providing religious organizations with a unique advantage (Jaffrelot 2002). In contrast, Islamist parties in countries that have more secular underpinnings in their founding national identity or at least countries that lack an explicit religious founding nationalism, as is present in countries like Pakistan, will not have such a mobilization advantage.

However, explanations emphasizing founding nationalism do not explain time-related or intra-party variation in mobilization very well.⁵² For instance, the mobilization strength of Islamist parties in Pakistan has generally waxed over time across parties as a bloc since the country's foundation. Some parties, like the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), have seen a decline in their street power, while others, such as the Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), have seen an increase.

5. Theoretical Framework: The Theory of Divergent Mobilization

This work proposes a theory that specifies the conditions under which, on the one hand, some political parties and groups with robust social mobilization struggle to convert this social influence into electoral success by capturing state power by winning majorities in the national parliament or by acting as majority partners in coalition governments. On the other hand, the same groups and parties can simultaneously punch above their electoral weight in social mobilization characterized by wielding colossal street power and salience in national discourse

⁵² See "Pathways to capitulation" Dawn News <https://www.dawn.com/news/1432008>

by capturing headlines or influencing state policy. This theory is built on two interrelated arguments. First, I advance a formulation of social and electoral mobilization by depicting it along two distinct dimensions of organizational and structural fragmentation. The interplay of variation between these two dimensions directly influences the variation in the relationship between social and electoral mobilization.

The argument emphasizes how, paradoxically, the very social structure that aids the social mobilization of political parties and groups by conferring an organizational advantage on them in the form of a large mobilization core zealously committed to these groups and parties can place these parties in a structural trap of mobilization. The large mobilization core is actively engaged in party activities and supports them independently of the party's contingent political oscillations. Because of its devotion, it can be readily mobilized to agitate on the streets or shape national discourse and influence policy. But at the same time, what proves to be a blessing for these parties in social mobilization turns into a curse in the electoral arena. The intense commitment of the mobilization core attached to the party imposes constraints on the party that make it take narrow party positions or otherwise set thresholds that maintain the ideological purity and effectiveness of the core but fragment the vote of the political parties. It thus creates barriers for these parties to reshape existing cleavages and attract new voters, making it difficult for them to cooperate with other like-minded parties within the party system. All of these pressures further impinge on the electoral success of these political parties. In this way, the road to electoral triumph for parties exhibiting divergent mobilization is obstructed by the very social structure and ideologies that galvanize their street strength.

Second, to explain divergent mobilization causally, I combine a historical explanation with the aforementioned relationship that operates at the level of constant causes. I argue that the state's ruling elite acts as a key moderator variable in influencing the relationship between the constant causes with divergent


mobilization. This aspect of the argument captures the historical contingency of social and electoral mobilization patterns. In this way, the work advances a falsifiable theory of what explains divergent mobilization.

5.1. The Organizational Advantage and the Structural Trap of Mobilization

This work advances a theory to explain the variation in the relationship between social and electoral mobilization of political parties represented along a two-dimensional matrix in FIGURE 2.2. It advances a tentative explanatory framework for divergent versus non-divergent mobilization patterns. The first theoretical dimension represents the organizational effectiveness of political parties and groups. Political parties further along the spectrum of organizational competitiveness have an “organizational advantage” in social mobilization. This organizational advantage is conferred on parties due to a large mobilization core that is zealously committed to these parties. An enlarged mobilization core has two components: 1) a strong network with other ancillary organizations and 2) a more considerable proportion of committed party workers relative to their competitors in the party system. In this way, parties with a solid organizational foundation characterized by robust networks with like-minded auxiliary organizations and numerous dedicated party workers possess an organizational advantage in this large mobilization core that gives them an advantage to “push” in social mobilization. A large mobilization core thus increases the ability of groups and parties to mobilize on the streets, shape discursive norms by being salient in the national discourse, and influence state policy.

*** space intentionally left blank ***

FIGURE 2.2: A Two-Dimensional Matrix Depicting Islamist Political Mobilization



Source: Author's formulation.

Note: The empirical examples of MMCs in parenthesis denoted by “[]” are suggestive and weaker examples that fit the criteria of the two-dimensional matrix. Weaker examples refer to how, at an explanatory level, empirical evidence in this study has not been gathered to substantiate their categorization. Nevertheless, there is some tentative rationale that these examples can fit the theoretical expectations delineated in each quadrant of the matrix. In this way, they provide suggestive illustrations that attach some empirical flesh to the theoretical expectations of the unified theory of social and electoral mobilization advanced in this work. For Indonesia and Yemen, the brackets have been placed as they are an especially weaker fit for fulfilling the criteria of structural fragmentation. For Senegal, the brackets are especially there as they are a weaker fit for fulfilling the criteria on the vertical axis or the dimension of organizational effectiveness.

The second dimension in FIGURE 2.2 represents the structural fragmentation that a political party faces in its operations that “pulls” it away from achieving mass electoral success and acquiring state power by occupying either a) a majority in the national legislative assemblies of a country or b) enough seats and vote share wherein they become a majority partner in coalition governments. It encompasses the constraints that impinge on a party's agency to, for instance, reorient its electoral strategy by changing its party positions and creating new cleavages that are more favorable to its electoral fortunes. The variable that captures this

dimension is the ideological or political fragmentation that arises due to the cleavage structure.

Increased fragmentation due to the cleavage structure makes a political party more likely to face what I call “the structural trap” of electoral mobilization. In other words, higher fragmentation increases the likelihood of a party facing the structural trap of electoral mobilization. This trap represents a paradox characterized by political parties facing constraints in changing their electoral fortunes in securing a higher number of seats at the national level despite their success in social mobilization. It exists mainly due to high levels of fragmentation that originate in the fissiparous cleavage structures of political parties with strong ideologies. In the case of Islamist mobilization in Pakistan, Islamist parties face significant fragmentation, which manifests itself in various ways. Some have emphasized that for Sunni Islamist parties, this fragmentation is a de facto condition of competition for these organizations (Pelletier 2019: 35). It largely arises due to the cleavage structures of Sunni Islamist parties and their association with electoral mobilization.

The "organizational advantage" and "structural trap" can thus be located at the mid-points on the horizontal and vertical axes of FIGURE 2.2, respectively. Political parties with strong ideologies with high organizational effectiveness can be said to possess an organizational advantage. Parties lying in the top two quadrants in FIGURE 2.2. would have such an organizational advantage. However, if these parties have high levels of fragmentation, they will face the structural trap of mobilization. Crucially, if parties face both these conditions, political parties will likely exhibit divergent mobilization. In contrast, parties and groups with different configurations of organizational and structural fragmentation levels will exhibit non-divergent patterns mobilization as captured in the remaining quadrants on the two-by-two matrix in FIGURE 2.2.

In this way, beyond divergent mobilization, FIGURE 2.2 also provides tentative theoretical expectations for the three types of non-divergent mobilization: 1) convergent mobilization, 2) diminished mobilization, and 3) vote-bank

mobilization. First, parties with high organizational competitiveness and low fragmentation in the upper-left quadrant of FIGURE 2.2 will experience convergent mobilization. This reflects the ability of these parties to successfully transform into mass electoral machines by converting their robust social mobilization into electoral success at the national level. These parties can thus capture state power while engaging in robust social mobilization that can be manifested by an incredible ability to mobilize on the streets. Using the case of Islamist mobilization in MMCs, the cases of Islamists in Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, and, to a limited extent, Indonesia provide examples of this alternative outcome to divergent mobilization.

Second, parties in the lower-left quadrant of FIGURE 2.2. with low organizational effectiveness and structural fragmentation will exhibit vote-bank mobilization. These parties do not have large mobilization cores that are intensely committed to them. However, they do not face similar levels of structural barriers to their electoral success due to the cleavage structure in the party system in which they operate. This allows these parties to be electorally efficient, wherein they can acquire electoral success at the national level through vote-bank patterns of mobilization. These parties either engage in a clientelist exchange involving giving patronage to get out the vote on election day, machine politics, or technocratic efficiency without the kind of mobilization and organization that would be characteristic of parties with high organizational effectiveness. Empirical examples of parties that fit this criterion are harder to find in the case of Islamist mobilization in MMC. However, as noted earlier, the example of the AKP in Turkey provides a weak instance of an Islamically oriented-party that exhibits patterns of vote-bank mobilization.

Third, political parties and groups in the lower-right quadrant have low levels of organizational effectiveness and high levels of structural fragmentation and will thus exhibit diminished mobilization. At the level of explanatory variables, first, these parties have small mobilization cores relative to their competitors in the party system or political parties placed in the cases in the upper quadrants of FIGURE 2.2. Second, these parties have high levels of fragmentation due to the

cleavages and their structure within the party system, which prevents them and their groups from becoming mass electoral machines. As an empirical illustration from the theme of Islamist mobilization in MMCs, Senegal provides a weak and suggestive example where there are various social cleavages of Islamist parties such as the *mourides* with its center in Touba, Tijaniyya which is especially influential in Dakar, Layene in the Cap-Vert Peninsula including in Dakar and the Qadiriyya (see Villalon 1995; Meecham 2017). Senegal also presents relatively smaller networks of ancillary organizations, such as Islamic schools (madrassahs), compared to other MMCs, such as Pakistan or even Nigeria. This is why Islamists in Senegal also have low social mobilization, where they have not managed to attract the kind of revolutionary instigation on the streets that political parties and groups in Egypt or Algeria have managed to attract, nor have they successfully transformed into mass electoral machines.

5.1.1. Organizational Effectiveness: Large Electorate Zealously Committed to Parties and the Mobilization Weapon

To explain high social mobilization, I identify two vital components of the large mobilization cores zealously committed to political parties and groups exhibiting divergent mobilization. These two components include a) networks of ancillary organizations and b) a greater proportion of party workers than party voters relative to the non-Islamist competitors of Islamist parties. Insights into how an enlarged mobilization core zealously committed to parties positively associates with high social mobilization can be gained from the literature on organizational theory and political parties. Crucially, Angelo Panebianco's idea of a "large electorate that belong to the party (Panebianco 1988:25)" provides useful analytical leverage from this literature. Borrowing from Panebianco's insights, I emphasize that a large mobilization core would be zealously committed to a party if it meets what I call the "sufficiency condition."

A party's large mobilization core would have met the sufficiency condition of being zealously committed to a political party if it has three distinct features: 1) it

participates steadfastly in party subculture, 2) it is often involved in a network of associative ties revolving around the party, and 3) its identification with the party is independent of its contingent political oscillations (Panenbianco 1988:25). If the sufficiency condition is met, then the large mobilization core can explain the puzzle of high social mobilization of political parties and groups. Together, the two components of a network of a large mobilization core, namely, ancillary organizations and a greater proportion of party workers than party voters provide the empirical manifestations of the large mobilization cores of political parties.


In this way, the large mobilization cores of political parties exhibiting divergent mobilization speak to the literature on contentious politics. It is especially relevant for the literature on resource mobilization theory, as these parties have mobilizing structures that are a form of “collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action (McAdam et al., 1996: 3).” These vehicles, like NGOs, clubs, churches, and informal networks, facilitate collective action. Moreover, these resources are part of self-regenerating processes where protests and collective sites provide opportunities to build rapport and informal networks, fueling continuous mobilization. To be sure, rally participation can become a highly charged emotional experience that fosters a sense of camaraderie among protesters. The nature of social movements – as conflictual processes usually in confrontation with those in high political office – promote interpersonal bonds and coalitional networks (Diani & Bison 2004).

FIGURE 2.3 below provides a summary of the argument for the high social mobilization of parties and groups due to large mobilization cores that are zealously committed to them. Apart from the two components that comprise a large mobilization core, FIGURE 2.3 also identifies the properties associated with each component of a large mobilization core. First, the component of large networks of ancillary organizations of political parties has two specific properties: high organizational density and deep linkages between networks of ancillary organizations and parties. First, high organizational density captures the large number and proliferation of the network of ancillary organizations of political

parties.⁵³ A large network of ancillary organizations means a larger number of individual ancillary organizations or, using the language of network analysis, nodes with political parties. This will lead to a denser network of ancillary organizations. Organizational density will thus help explain why a large mobilization core confers an organizational advantage on some political parties and groups exhibiting divergent mobilization. This implies that a dense network will be associated with higher social mobilization.

Second, the property of deep linkages between these ancillary organizations and political parties captures the extent to which these ancillary organizations are under the orbit of political parties and the strength of their linkages. A deeper linkage between political parties and their ancillary organizations will be associated with higher social mobilization, as a political party would be more effective in using these organizations since they are directly under the party's influence. In this way, the properties of organizational density and deep linkages between parties and their ancillary organizations combine to create a substantial organizational core that provides a firm bedrock for street agitation, shaping public norms and influencing state policy.

FIGURE 2.3: Summary of the argument for high social mobilization due to large mobilization cores of political parties and gro



Source: Author's formulation.

⁵³ I define organizational density in much the same way as the extant literature, which largely understands them as the expansion and proliferation of formal and informal institutions or organizations in the international system. The assumption is that increasing organizational density is especially useful as it has made the international system more complex over time (Clarke 2017).

As FIGURE 2.3 underlines, the second component of the large mobilization core zealously committed to political parties exhibiting divergent mobilization is the high proportion of party workers. FIGURE 2.3 notes three critical properties through which the component of a large proportion of party workers of Islamist parties aids their social mobilization. First, these workers often overlap with the ideological party's voter base in a far greater proportion than their competitors. Second, the high ideological commitment of these supporters further boosts their ability to instigate agitation. Third, the workers also give these ideological parties deep societal roots, further aiding their social mobilization. In this manner, the networks of ancillary organizations of parties exhibiting divergent mobilization and their numerous party workers form a significant chunk of these parties.

5.1.2. Structural Fragmentation: Fragmentation Due to Cleavages and the “Frozen” Electoral Parties

The inability of some political parties with strong ideologies to convert their substantial social mobilization capacity into electoral success by transforming into mass electoral machines can be explained by the fragmentation arising from the cleavages and their structure in the party system in which these parties operate. The fragmentation arising from these constraints due to the social structure can operate along two causal pathways that can be said to have ideological or political sources of fragmentation.

First, ideological fragmentation increases with greater divergence in the ideologies of political parties and groups, its encompassing practices, visions, and modes for transforming state and society towards parties' ideals, both between and within parties. In other words, ideological fragmentation increases with greater differences in the ideologies of political parties and groups between and within them. Ideology in this work is defined as “a set of ideas, beliefs and attitudes, consciously or unconsciously held, which reflects or shapes understandings or misconceptions of the social and political world. It serves to recommend, justify or

endorse collective action aimed at preserving or changing political practices and institutions (Freeden 1998).”⁵⁴

Second, political fragmentation increases based on two components: 1) with lower levels of coordination and cooperation between like-minded ideological political parties as a bloc during electoral campaigns and in post-electoral coalition politics, and 2) the number of parties in the party system. The first component influencing political fragmentation encompasses party dynamics, whereas the second components captures features of the party system. Lower levels of coordination and cooperation between like-minded parties mean that such political parties will have difficulty uniting together as a bloc in electoral alliances and governing under political coalitions. Political coalitions include coalition governments that refer to “executive institutions that comprise (cabinet) members from two or more political parties and whose leaders have agreed to co-govern for the duration of a legislative period on a shared policy agenda (Cavatorta and Kraetzschmar 2023).” In that sense, political coalitions are conceptually distinct from electoral alliances that “emerge prior to an election (Cavatorta and Kraetzschmar 2023),” and involve coordination and cooperation in electoral campaigning under a shared electoral agenda. A large number of parties with lower levels of coordination and cooperation among like-minded parties can diminish their prospects of electoral success.

Higher fragmentation that operates through ideological and political pathways implies that political parties have a decreased ability to influence electoral mobilization and are merely reacting to changes in the cleavage structure (Enyedi 2005; Raymond & Felth 2014). This argument adds nuance to the question of whether parties can freely create cleavages, referred to as a top-down perspective

⁵⁴ In this sense, ideology holds a certain impetus involving a transformation of state and society based on the ideological interpretation of political parties and groups. As Freedon observes for a camp of analysts, “...ideology injects specific politically value-laden meanings into conceptualizations of the social world which are inevitably indeterminate and is consequently a means of constructing rather than reflecting that world. This also applies to interpretations undertaken by the analysts of ideology themselves (Freedon 1998).”

(see Kirchheimer 1966), or are more constrained by their social structure (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). The argument advanced in this work does not eliminate the possibility that a top-down view of cleavage formation is generally valid; however, it tempers the optimism of studies emphasizing such a perspective (e.g., Torcal & Mainwaring 2003). To see evidence of the importance of parties' positions on the appearance or absence of cleavages, one need only look to countries where parties compete across rather than within cleavage lines to see the effect that party agency can have on the degree to which religion impacts voting behavior (Raymond 2014).

In this way, structural fragmentation positively associates with the low electoral mobilization of political parties in three crucial ways: 1) it constrains political parties by, for instance, preventing them from reorienting their electoral strategies by changing party positions to create new cleavages or prime existing ones; 2) it ruptures their alliances and causes party splits; 3) it prevents political parties from cobbling together a pre-electoral alliance and ensuring they are sustained over consecutive electoral cycles.

Ideological fragmentation encompasses two mechanisms that negatively influence the electoral success or mobilization of political parties: the high thresholds for inclusion to be affiliated with a political party and the low thresholds for exclusion to be affiliated with a party. First, the high inclusion threshold refers to rigorous formal or informal criteria for party membership and for broader affiliation and support of some parties. It thus captures both formal constraints on the party's rank-and-file and affiliates and the more normative aspects of affiliation with a political party that can also be called the party subculture. These constraints on party members and affiliates can ultimately dissuade potential supporters from identifying with or voting for these parties. On the other hand, the low threshold of exclusion makes it easier for some parties with strong ideologies to exclude large chunks of voters from identifying or being affiliated with these parties. The high inclusion and low exclusion thresholds preclude the transformation of parties with high social mobilization from acquiring mass appeal in national electoral contests.

These thresholds are thus vital mechanisms of the low electoral mobilization of political parties.

5.1.2.1. Ideological Fragmentation: High Threshold for Inclusion

I identify four key features that encompass high thresholds for inclusion into a political party that are summarized in TABLE 2.2: 1) selective membership and affiliates, 2) intense ideological commitment, 3) active engagement, 4) organizational discipline, and 5) everyday lifestyle demands. First, parties with high thresholds for inclusion have selective membership and affiliates. This can come either in the form of strict formal criteria or more informal ones, wherein the high thresholds for affiliation are not formally restrictive, but more informally, they are too exacting for large chunks of voters. This selectiveness fosters divisions as potential voters who might agree with the broader goals of the political party but not with every specific demand are excluded from being affiliated with the party.

Second, high thresholds for inclusion capture the intense ideological commitment of identifying with the party. Such a requirement for deep and unwavering ideological commitment can lead to splits within the party as different factions interpret the ideology differently. It also alienates potential supporters with slightly divergent views and thus makes it difficult for large chunks of voters to identify with the party. Third, as TABLE 2.2 notes, a high threshold for inclusion requires active engagement, which entails a substantial commitment and involvement in party activities. This limits the party's electoral appeal as it makes the party less appealing to voters who cannot commit the time and resources for party's activities. It thus promotes the concentration of power in the party among a small, highly dedicated core group of supporters and thus excludes supporters who might offer the party broader appeal at a mass level.

*** space intentionally left blank ***

TABLE 2.2: Summary of Key Features of High Thresholds for Inclusion and Low Thresholds for Exclusion encompassing the Ideological Fragmentation of Political Parties

High Thresholds for Inclusion	Low Thresholds for Exclusion
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Selective Membership and Affiliates • Intense Ideological Commitment • Active Engagement • Organizational Discipline • Everyday Lifestyle Demands 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ideological Rigidity • Sharp Cleavages • Narrow Party Positions

Source: Author's Formulation.

Fourth, organizational discipline is also a common feature encompassing high thresholds for inclusion into the party. On the one hand, such strict internal discipline and commitment to the party ensures ideological purity. On the other hand, it also dissuades potential supporters from joining the party due to exacting demands imposed by the party. It can also lead to factionalism. Fifth, as TABLE 2.2 underlines, exacting demands in everyday life and the behavior of party affiliates and members is another crucial feature of a high threshold for inclusion. The party's expectations often require significant changes in personal behavior and lifestyle, deterring broader support. This might include adhering to specific dress codes, dietary restrictions, or daily practices that align with the party's ideology.

High thresholds for inclusion imply that due to the demands placed on members and supporters, these parties tend to mobilize a smaller but highly committed base of supporters. These thresholds of inclusion thus help reinforce the large organizational core to meet the sufficiency condition so that it is zealously committed to political parties. A dedicated mobilization core can be highly effective in achieving specific political goals and sustaining long-term activism in social mobilization. On the one hand, they help parties foster strong internal cohesion and commitment. It can ensure the ideological purity of the organization, which confers an organizational advantage on the party by giving it access to a large mobilization core that can be instigated at any time for social mobilization. However, it can also preclude electoral success and prevent these parties from transforming into mass electoral machines, leading to divergent patterns of social and electoral mobilization. The high demands for inclusion into a party can limit its appeal and

ability to attract a diverse and broad supporter base at a mass level. The requirement for deep and unwavering ideological commitment can lead to splits within the party as different factions interpret the party's ideology in various ways. Insisting on a single interpretation of ideology can alienate those with slightly divergent views. In this way, a high threshold for inclusion hurts the electoral success of parties.

5.1.2.2. Ideological Fragmentation: Low Threshold for Exclusion via Ideological Sectarianism

As TABLE 2.2 delineates, low thresholds for exclusion encompass three features: ideological rigidity, sharp cleavages, and narrow party positions. These features mutually reinforce each other and contribute to the overall ideological fragmentation of the party, which, in turn, leads to their low electoral mobilization. First, rigid ideological positions can negatively influence electoral mobilization. They are based on a party's strict interpretation of its ideology that does not have room for maneuvering and creates a narrow focus, alienating those with differing views. Second, sharp cleavages emanating from deep ideological fault lines of such like-minded parties can exclude those who do not share the same ideological intensity or interpretation. Third, narrow party positions indicate how simple and often unattainable programmatic agendas drive these parties. In some cases, even these parties themselves know that their party positions are unattainable in actual practice (see Kitschelt 2006).

Some theoretical insight into how these features can impede the electoral vote of parties with low exclusion thresholds wherein each party driven by rigid ideologies focuses on its distinct identity and the resulting limitations are reminiscent of the challenges some like-minded parties, like ethnic parties, face due to being "unique" organizations, as highlighted by Gunther and Diamond (2003). Some ethnic parties have sharp cleavages and narrow party positions that do not always seek integration into broader national identities but cater to specific religious Islamic constituencies (Ishiyama 2009; Kitschelt 2001). Such a cleavage

design characterized by sharp cleavages and narrow positions draws clear boundaries between "friends" and "foes" (Ishiyama 2009; Kitschelt 2001). The party's policies and positions are thus designed to attract only a specific subset of voters, making it unappealing to a broader audience.

The confluence of these three features of a low exclusion threshold can cause the party ideology to fuse more strongly with party affiliation than their competitors for some political parties, potentially impacting voting behaviour (Campbell, Converse, Miller & Stokes 1960). This contrasts Lipset & Rokkan's (1967: 4) argument that parties often serve as "agencies of mobilization," helping to integrate local communities into the broader federation. Instead, parties with low exclusion thresholds can limit their appeal to a specific cleavage. For example, this is the case for single-issue parties such as UKIP, whose party affiliation greatly overlapped with their specific voter base to influence the leave vote in the UK's referendum on leaving the European Union.

In a multi-party system, the rigid interpretation of each party's ideology and narrow party positions can become closely tied to its partisan identity. This impacts the voting behaviours of these parties in ways that classic studies focused on psycho-sociological factors in voting behaviour, such as Campbell, Converse, Miller & Stokes (1960), have emphasized. The party's ideology thus interacts with partisanship or party identification, which is considered one of the most influential variables in shaping individual vote choice (e.g., Campbell, Converse, Miller & Stokes 1960). Ultimately, much like a high inclusion threshold, the low exclusion threshold of parties creates a scenario of ideological sectarianism wherein such a high commitment to ideological cleavages that translate into the party's programmatic positions excludes a significant portion of potential supporters and voters. Some of those who are excluded may even agree with some of a party's goals.

*** space intentionally left blank ***

5.2. Political Fragmentation: Lack of Electoral Alliances, Number of Parties and Size of the Cleavage Group

Apart from ideological fissures that constrain the behavior of some parties to achieve mass appeal, their structural constraints can also be represented along relatively more political or partisan loci. A critical distinction between the causal pathway of political fragmentation and ideological fragmentation is that the sources of structural fragmentation along this pathway are not sourced primarily due to normative or ideational causes at the organizational level. A second distinction is that the pathway of political fragmentation does not just capture the impact of organizational features of political parties on the exclusion or inclusion of voters directly.

Political fragmentation increases positively due to variation in three components: 1) the degree of coordination and cooperation of political parties with other like-minded parties as a bloc in electoral alliances or political coalitions and 2) the number of like-minded parties in the party system. The first component influencing political fragmentation encompasses party dynamics, whereas the second two components capture more structural features of the party system.

Lack of Coherent Electoral Alliances and Political Coalitions

First, a critical feature that contributes to the political fragmentation of some political parties is their lack of coherent electoral alliances and political coalitions. Some of the reasons why this occurs are in combination with ideological fragmentation. So, in that sense, this feature of political fragmentation is distinct from the two other features in its high interrelatedness with ideological fragmentation. Features of low thresholds for exclusion in the causal pathway of ideological fragmentation, such as rigid ideological positions and narrow party positions combined with a high number of parties within a bloc of like-minded ideologies parties, can contribute to structural pressure on the parties and can limit their agency to influence these constraints. The result is an environment where

each party within the ideological bloc in the party system has its unique cleavage instead of having an encompassing cleavage that captures the identity of the bloc overall, making it difficult for such parties to gain votes collectively. This is best illustrated by way of example. Using the case of Islamist parties, it can be possible that each Islamist party within a party system has its unique ideology to which it rigidly adheres and consequently has narrow party positions that emerge from this ideology and only appeal to a small base of voters instead of the masses. In such a scenario, the “Islamist” bloc vote would get split among competing Islamist parties in the party system, contributing to their low electoral mobilization. In this way, I employ ideology and partisanship to explain voting behavior at an aggregate level despite the extant literature primarily emphasizing them to explain electoral outcomes at the individual level.

This same ideological diversity along rigid ideological lines can restrict the party's ability to modify its electoral strategy and results in confusing voters, thereby reducing the pool of potential voters. Combined with a high level of competitive fragmentation, where parties do not act as a bloc and run on a unified electoral platform, this can further dilute the vote of like-minded parties, such as Islamist parties, and diminish their electoral mobilization. In contrast, a less ideologically fragmented party system of like-minded parties, such as an Islamist party system that has high thresholds for inclusion with fewer parties competing, can lead to an increased ability of a party to appeal to a broader base of voters and be electorally successful at the national level. A homogenous electorate not divided by sharp ideological cleavages that have fused with partisan identities can enable parties exhibiting divergent mobilization due to structural constraints to reorient their electoral strategies more effectively and potentially escape the structural trap of mobilization, achieving significant electoral success.

Increases in political fragmentation interact with the relatively more structural mechanisms of the party system, namely the number of parties. There are two main structural ways in which structural fragmentation operates along its political pathway. It increases structural constraints insofar as the fragmentation of

the party system and the effect of the cleavage group size on political parties. How these structural constraints affect the outcome of low electoral mobilization is captured by the coordination and cooperation mechanism of some parties as a bloc during elections to *form* and sustain electoral alliances and political coalitions. The mechanism of political fragmentation influences a situation wherein ideology and political sources of fragmentation combine to make it difficult for some political parties to coordinate and cooperate their political activities with each other versus those of their competitors in the party system.

Number of Parties

Second, political fragmentation can increase with the number of parties in a party system. The number of parties in a system and their degree of polarization are crucial factors in understanding fragmentation in party systems or comparing them across time and space, as noted by Enyedi and Bertoa (2020) and emphasized in Sartori's seminal work on political parties (Sartori 1976). Existing literature underscores that fragmentation arising due to the number and strength of competing actors can significantly impact electoral outcomes because it influences the range of ideological differences, power concentration, interaction possibilities, election decisiveness, optimal party strategies, and government formation possibilities (Sartori 1976). In broader terms, fragmentation can hamper government formation and stability as it presents more alternatives to the existing status quo. Excessive fragmentation is often associated with instability and can be detrimental to the consolidation of party politics (Mainwaring & Shugart 1997). This can encourage ideological parties to explore other venues of political participation, as acquiring power through government formation electorally is inherently difficult and unstable. Examples of such alternative sources of power can, for instance, lie in instigating on the streets in the sphere of social mobilization. Such a feature would thus make divergent patterns of mobilization of political parties more likely.

5.2.1. The Structural Trap of Mobilization and Its Implications

Existing research suggests that changes in cleavage structure—size, loyalty, turnout—impact electoral convergence (Best 2011). If changes in electoral behaviour like loyalty and turnout cause declines in cleavage group relevance, political actors like political parties can influence future cleavage politics by changing their electoral strategies (see Elff 2007). However, declines due to more structural changes like alterations in cleavage structure or group size are not easily remedied (Best 2011:286).

A similar perspective encapsulates the structural trap of electoral mobilization. Even if some ideological parties have a large mobilization core zealously committed to them to aid them in social mobilization, structural obstacles emerging from their variegated cleavages may be challenging to alter through party strategies. In such a situation, structural constraints supersede agentic assets of parties, suggesting low electoral mobilization due to factors like fragmentation cannot be easily counteracted by changes in party strategies. In such a scenario, there can be little incentive or opportunities for parties to employ electoral strategies that encourage a shift from existing patterns of cleavage voting that can increase the chance of their electoral success (see for a similar argument: Best 2011:297). Conversely, structural constraints from the fragmentation of the ideological bloc of political parties in a party system are less significant when the cleavage structure is not excessively divisive. In such a case, political parties competing in elections have a higher net pool of voters to attract due to the religious cleavage of an MMC, incentivizing parties to reorient their electoral strategies (Best 2011).

Two primary perspectives—bottom-up and top-down—dominate the literature on cleavage formation. The bottom-up view suggests cleavages originate at the mass level, causing the formation of representative political parties (Raymond 2018; Kriesi 1998; Lipset & Rokkan 1967). Because the bottom-up perspective holds that cleavages “freeze” after they emerge, political parties do not have agency as they have to accept the impact that changes in the social structure

have on their electoral viability (see Lipset & Rokkan 1967). Conversely, the top-down perspective argues that cleavages start from party elites and filter down to the electorate (see Kirchheimer 1966; Torcal & Mainwaring 2003). Within this perspective, some emphasize that parties are free to create cleavages as they see fit (Torcal & Mainwaring 2003), while others argue they are more constrained, merely reacting to changes in the cleavage structure (e.g., Enyedi 2005; Raymond & Feltch 2014). While helpful in explaining the change, the top-down view does not effectively explain the persistence of some parties that consistently exhibit divergent mobilization patterns. This can be observed, for instance, in the case of Islamist mobilization in Pakistan.

This study adopts a middle-ground approach, arguing that while elites can change party positions, systemic forces, like ruling elites, may restrict this change. Understanding the relationship between political parties and voters is crucial when examining the evolution of religious influence on voting behaviour (Raymond 2018). Both bottom-up and top-down forces play a part, and their understanding is essential to analyze the potential sources of change and assess their impact on voting behaviour over time.

5.3. The Two Conditions of Divergence: Relative Strength and Aligned Incentives of a State's Ruling Elite

The two conditions of divergence of a state's ruling elite act as a key moderator influencing the social and electoral mobilization of political parties and groups. This moderation by the state's ruling elite can occur through the drivers of organizational effectiveness and structural fragmentation and also beyond them. Like any critical effect modifiers, they are vital for explaining divergent and non-divergent mobilization patterns. Empirically, the state's ruling elite depends on the empirical context. For instance, in the case of hybrid regimes with military authoritarianism, such as Pakistan, the state's ruling elite consists of a nexus between the military, judiciary members, journalists, bureaucrats, and regime-backing political parties. I call this nexus "the establishment." The variable of a

state's ruling elite is historically contingent and dependent on the empirical context, such as the type of political regime. Because of this, I will focus on the ruling elites in the form of military regimes in hybrid regimes under military rule, such as Pakistan, to better illustrate my argument (for military dictatorships, see Nordlinger 1977; Perlmutter 1977). In this case, the ruling elite primarily constitutes the military, while the oppositional elite includes the incumbent civilian government.

The term ruling elite draws from the literature on autocracies, focusing on the ruling coalition supporting dictators. A ruling coalition refers to “a set of individuals who support a dictator and, jointly with him, hold enough power to guarantee a regime's survival (Svolik 2012:6).” Its semantic counterpart is inspired by Soviet politics, wherein Stalin's inner circle came to be known as the “select group,” the “close circle,” or – most commonly – the “ruling group (Svolik 2012: 6).”

In the empirical context of Islamist mobilization in Pakistan, the state's ruling elite is principally composed of a nexus of high-ranking military officers, a bureaucratic elite, and judges in cahoots with an autocratic military regime in hybrid regimes and regime-affiliated political parties. I instead use the term “the establishment,” which captures a similar conceptual target to a ruling coalition but refers to the state's ruling elite. Whereas Svolik's framework focuses on dictatorships, this study applies to broader types of regimes, including hybrid regimes and thus provides more analytical leverage for the project.

The establishment is crucial for explaining the variation in Islamist parties' social and electoral mobilization. It can influence the outcomes of social (Y1) and electoral mobilization (Y2) of Islamist parties in Pakistan through two distinct pathways: first, by influencing variation in the large electorates of Islamist parties (X1) and their political and ideological fragmentation, which arises due to the religious cleavage structure in Pakistan (X2) which, in turn, are associated with social and electoral mobilization respectively; second, by influencing variation in the outcomes of social and electoral mobilization of Islamist parties independent of variation in the independent variables X1 and X2 respectively. In this way, the

military establishment in Pakistan helps better contextualize the relationship between the dimensions of organizational effectiveness and structural fragmentation with divergent mobilization for Islamist parties in the case of hybrid regimes that are MMCs like Pakistan.

Since the variation captured by the moderator of a state's ruling elite is dependent on the empirical context, the precise mechanism that influences the variation in the relationship between social and electoral mobilization for the case of the state's ruling elite will be historically contingent on key factors such as the political regime type of a country. Using this insight, I provide theoretical insight into how a state's ruling elite would influence variation in the empirical context of hybrid regimes that are MMCs, such as Pakistan, to explain the divergent mobilization of Islamist political parties.

5.3.1. Authoritarian Resilience of a State's Ruling Elite Using Political Parties: The Case of Islamist Parties in Pakistan

Political parties such as Islamist parties can aid the establishment in resolving the problem of authoritarian control, ensuring authoritarian persistence. The problem of authoritarian control refers to the conflict between the authoritarian elites in power and the masses excluded from power (Svolik 2012: 9). Two central choices are available to an authoritarian ruling elite to deal with this problem: 1) repression and 2) cooptation. This can also refer to "sticks" and "carrots" approaches available to a state's ruling elite. Repression here is self-explanatory, whereas cooptation encompasses positive incentives for compliance (Svolik 2012), though it is not necessarily limited to them. I underline how a ruling elite uses these two mechanisms with reference to the puzzles of social and electoral mobilization. These two choices capture "how" the establishment influences the patterns of social and electoral mobilization of Islamist parties in Pakistan.

But what explains the conditions that would explain why a state's ruling elite, such as the establishment, would influence Islamist political mobilization by acting as a moderator? The two conditions of divergence highlighted above provide

an answer. A state's ruling elite, such as the military in military authoritarian regimes, can coopt Islamist organizations, including Islamist parties, through various approaches, including in exchange for patronage. First, the relative strength of a ruling elite versus an oppositional elite is often crucial in influencing whether it can influence social and electoral mobilization. Second, the aligned incentives of a ruling elite will determine whether divergent mobilization or non-divergent mobilization patterns will be influenced by a state's ruling elite, such as the establishment of Islamist parties in Pakistan. In this sense, the two conditions of divergence can specify the direction and magnitude of whether and to what extent the dimensions of organizational effectiveness and structural fragmentation will causally influence social and electoral mobilization patterns. This helps explain divergent vs. non-divergent mobilization within a given empirical context such as Pakistan. So if the state's ruling elite has relative strength and its interests are aligned with divergent mobilization, it coopts and strategically uses political parties, such as Islamist parties in Pakistan. This is done to advance the state ruling elite's perceived interests by enabling and promoting social mobilization in certain facets, especially on the streets, to undermine and weaken oppositional elites such as a civilian government in the empirical context of Pakistan.

Contrary to existing theories of street mobilization, mass demonstrations make the civilian government look weak and cause some of the oppositional elite to defect and join the ruling elite. These social movements further united anti-civilian government forces and fostered collaboration between civil society and the ruling elite (cf. Bunce & Wolchik 2010; Trejo 2014). This action can be motivated if the ruling elite, for instance, perceives the civilian government as a threat or just as a longer-term strategy to ensure that an oppositional elite in the form of a civilian government stays weak and subservient to the ruling elite. But at the same time, the ruling elites, such as the military, also want to ensure that the social forces in the form of Islamist parties do not galvanize enough support that they end up challenging the military's authority itself. The establishment systematically

restricts Islamist mobilization to the facet of social mobilization by undermining their success in electoral mobilization, which ultimately favours its persistence.

The ruling elite can influence electoral outcomes through several approaches, including controlling electoral rules and manipulating institutions to preclude fair competition (Diamond 2002; Levitsky & Way 2002), which is characteristic of hybrid regimes like Pakistan. In this way, the autocratic ruling elite in hybrid regimes can tilt the playing field by, for example, buying votes (Blaydes 2010; Lust-Okar 2006), co-opting elites and societal groups like political parties (Boix & Svobik 2007; Magaloni 2006), systematically encouraging party splits, controlling media resources, and gerrymandering electoral districts to give greater representation to supporters (Lust-Okar 2005; Malesky 2009). Such actions can take place against Islamist parties if the relative strength and aligned incentives of the ruling elite lead them to do so, which can ultimately explain their low electoral mobilization.

In this way, divergent mobilization can be explained by the relative strength and aligned interests of the ruling elite. The ruling elite follows a 'dual strategy' that allows and encourages high social mobilization, especially on the streets, but punctures the ability of this social mobilization to extend and attain more mass appeal through success in national elections. Ultimately, this dual strategy that involves both the cooptation of some political parties and their limited repression involves a classic divide-and-rule tactic by the ruling elite. Such a divide-and-rule approach ensures that the main political actors within the party system stay weak, and no individual actor becomes strong enough to challenge the military, ensuring autocratic persistence.

6. Conclusion

This work advanced a conceptual and theoretical framework to analyze the variation in the relationship between social and electoral mobilization. It proposed the novel concept of divergent mobilization that captures a mismatch in mobilization levels of political parties characterized by high social mobilization and low electoral mobilization. It provides analytical purchase over a wide range of

empirical phenomena across the world. As part of constructing this conceptual framework, the chapter advanced a unified typology that identifies the varieties of social and electoral mobilization. Advancing this typology provides researchers and practitioners with a framework for analyzing the variation between levels and types of mobilization of social movements and political parties.

Two comparative questions were central to this inquiry: 1) why are some like-minded parties unable to transform their robust social mobilization into electoral success at the national level, but other parties can do this successfully? 2) why can some political parties punch above their electoral weight in social mobilization, such as street power, salience in national discourse, and policy influence, but others cannot? I developed an empirically falsifiable theory of divergent mobilization that explains divergent mobilization and provides the theoretical expectations for non-divergent patterns of mobilization.

Moreover, I showed the limits of influential explanations of divergent mobilization in the extant literature. These perspectives often superimpose explanations derived from the historical experience of Western Europe to non-European contexts. For instance, secularization theory does not travel well in non-European regional contexts, such as those in MMCs where religion continues to be a potent force for mobilization. The chapter also analyzed the limitations of more specific explanations drawing on either the puzzle of high social mobilization or low electoral mobilization that are subsets of the broader puzzle of divergent mobilization.

I developed two interrelated causal arguments. First, I argued that an interplay between the dimensions of organizational effectiveness and structural fragmentation influences the variation in the relationship between social and electoral mobilization. The puzzle of low electoral mobilization can be explained by the high structural fragmentation that parties face. This structural fragmentation varies with ideological and political fragmentation due to cleavages within a party system. It is positively associated with the low electoral success of political parties. High fragmentation due to fissiparous cleavages can cut across the votes of other

like-minded parties and make it difficult for a political party to increase its electoral seats despite high success in social mobilization. By contrast, low levels of structural fragmentation do not diminish the electoral share of parties. Lower structural fragmentation entails parties having more agency to reorient their electoral strategies by, for instance, creating new cleavages.

Whereas the puzzle of high social mobilization can primarily be explained by variation along the dimension of organizational effectiveness. Crucially, large mobilization cores zealously attached to these political parties are positively associated with political parties. This large electorate primarily encompasses a network of ancillary organizations and a higher proportion of party workers to party voters than their competitors. In contrast, the lack of such a large mobilization core committed to these parties will result in a lower capacity for social mobilization.

The second component of the explanatory framework captures the historical contingency as part of the explanatory framework for divergent mobilization. I underline that the state's ruling elite is a key moderator in the relationship between the explanatory variables and divergent mobilization. Two central conditions of relative strength and aligned incentives of a state's ruling elite with divergent are identified that influence the relationship of the explanatory variables with divergent mobilization. First, if a state's ruling elite is strong relative to an oppositional elite, it can act on its preferences. Second, if the ruling elite's interests are aligned with divergent patterns, then it will positively covary with divergent mobilization. In contrast, a relatively weak ruling elite that does not have aligned interests with the divergent mobilization of like-minded political parties in the party system will lead to non-divergent mobilization patterns.

Chapter 3: Islamist Parties and Electoral Mobilization in Pakistan (1947-2023)

1. Introduction

Why are some political parties with strong ideologies unable to convert their robust social mobilization into electoral mobilization by transforming into mass electoral machines at the national level, but other parties can? This central question is the main analytical concern of the puzzle of low electoral mobilization identified in Chapter 2, which encompasses the broader puzzle of divergent mobilization analyzed in this work. I analyze this puzzle empirically using the case of Islamist parties in Pakistan.

The chapter postulates that the persistent low electoral performance of Islamist parties in Pakistan can be explained by the high structural fragmentation that Islamist parties face, which impinges on their ability to achieve “mass appeal” by winning national elections and forming a governing majority at the national level. The key sources of this structural fragmentation are deep-seated schisms within the social structure, and they can be empirically captured by focusing on the fragmentation arising from religious cleavages in the party system. These divisions dilute the Islamist parties’ potential for broad electoral allure, relegating them to secondary roles within coalitions rather than as vanguards of governance. In other words, higher levels of fragmentation are a crucial reason for the inability of Islamist parties in Pakistan to acquire mass electoral appeal beyond acting as minority partners as part of a governing political coalition throughout Pakistani political history.

The chapter unfolds in four parts. First, it charts the trend of low electoral success of Islamist parties in Pakistan to provide evidence for their underperformance. This substantiates the puzzle of low electoral mobilization at this chapter's analytical and methodological thrust. Second, it gives an overview of the Islamist party system in Pakistan, briefly delineating the scope conditions of the

chapter's analytical framework and outlining the measurement strategy for analyzing religious cleavages for the empirical case of Islamist parties in Pakistan. Third, the chapter anchors its arguments on a bedrock of empirical data gathered through two principal sources. First, I conducted 11 months of in-depth fieldwork in Pakistan, including 60 semi-structured elite interviews and two non-elite focus groups undertaken in two legs in 2021 and 2022. Second, I constructed and analyzed the most comprehensive dataset on Islamist parties in Pakistan at the aggregate level to date, comprising electoral results and political party data on variables such as the number of candidates fielded per election, spanning eleven election cycles from 1970-2018. In this way, the chapter provides insights from several sources, from elite-level perspectives and grassroots voices to electoral data, as evidence to buttress its claims. It identifies the pathways of political and ideological fragmentation. For ideological fragmentation, this comprises high thresholds for inclusion and low thresholds for exclusion of Islamist parties in Pakistan. For political fragmentation, it refers to their inability to cooperate and coordinate with each other as a bloc to form electoral coalitions. This is reinforced by the large number of Islamist parties within the Pakistani party system. Next, I briefly test alternative explanations. The fourth section concludes.


2. Describing the Puzzle: Low Electoral Success of Islamist Parties in Pakistan

Extant literature has discussed the underperformance of Islamist parties in Pakistan in several ways. For instance, Lieven (2011: 127) notes how Islamists have done “miserably” at the polls. There has not been a single fair election in Pakistani history in which Islamist parties have acquired more than 11 percent of the vote share. Similarly, Mohmand (2019:8) emphasizes that religious parties have not received more than 8 percent of the total vote in the four election cycles from 2002-2018 (. This leads her to remark that they are marginal to politics despite the “noise” (Mohmand 2019:8) they create.

FIGURE 3.1 summarizes the electoral returns for Islamist and non-Islamist parties in Pakistan in every general election in Pakistani history from 1970 to 2018. The seat share of Islamist parties has averaged 5.45 percent of the total share of general seats per election. The lowest share of national assembly seats for Islamists was 0.98 percent in 1997. In contrast, the maximum share of seats won by Islamist parties was 16.5 percent in 2002 (cf. Lieven 2011), when all major Islamist parties in Pakistan campaigned together as an electoral coalition under the banner of the Muttahidda Majlis-e-Amal (MMA). Substantively, the mass appeal of Islamist parties is best captured by their ability to acquire seats in the national legislature, especially if these seats are sufficient to create a winning majority to gain state power in a hybrid regime that is a Muslim Majority Country (MMC) like Pakistan. However, FIGURE 3.1 also uses an alternative measure of electoral outcomes for comparison, i.e. vote share. Islamist parties have averaged acquiring 6.56 percent of the total vote for this measure. The lowest vote share received by Islamists was 2 percent in the 1988, 1997 and 2008 elections, and the highest was 14 percent in 1970. In this way, FIGURE 3.1 shows that Islamist parties have broadly similar trends using either measure of electoral outcomes (seat share or vote share) throughout Pakistani history.

*** space intentionally left blank ***

FIGURE 3.1: Seat Share and Vote Share of Islamist versus Non-Islamist Parties in Pakistan Over Time (1970-2018)



Source: Author's figure and dataset using data compiled from Church World Services (CWS) and Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP).

Note: Results from the 1985 election are excluded from this figure as that election was conducted on a non-party basis.

Contrary to the low electoral share of Islamist parties showcased in FIGURE 3.1, the extant literature, preliminary data from sources such as the Census of Pakistan, and polling data lead one to expect that Islamist parties in Pakistan will be significantly more successful in electoral mobilization. For instance, 97 percent of Muslims in Pakistan identify as theists (2017 Census of Pakistan). A 2013 PEW public opinion poll found that 84 percent of Pakistan wants shariah law.⁵⁵ For the sphere of social mobilization, a study analyzing a dataset of 4123 protest events and rallies in Pakistan from 2005 to 2010 found that Islamists organized and participated in 581 protest events wherein they comfortably outpaced their “secular” rivals, which included political parties such as the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the Muttahidda Qaumi Movement (MQM) (Butt 2016:4-5). In this way, the electoral underperformance of Pakistan’s Islamist parties is a notably puzzling phenomenon which needs to be analyzed.

⁵⁵ Pew Research Center 2013

FIGURE 3.1 does not include the seats and votes acquired by Islamist parties as part of non-Islamist electoral alliances for two specific reasons: 1) the vote share of Islamist parties in these electoral alliances was marginal versus more significant electoral partners, and 2) the alliances were composed of ideologically disparate political parties that were united only based on an immediate political goal. For the first criterion for exclusion, the conservative alliance Islami Jamhoori Ittihad (IJI) offers an illustrative example. The Islamist party, Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan (JI), was a member of the IJI. Under its banner, it competed in the 1988 general election, during which IJI acquired significant electoral success. However, since 80 percent of the electoral seats gained by IJI in the 1988 election went to candidates of the non-Islamist parties like the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) headed by Nawaz Sharif (65 percent) and the National People's Party (NPP) headed by Ghulam Mustafa Jataoi (15 percent), it would be inaccurate to categorize IJI's electoral results in the Islamist seat and vote share.⁵⁶


For the second exclusion criterion, the case of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) from the same election year (1988) can be elucidative. MRD was an electoral alliance under which the Islamist party Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) participated in the 1988 election. MRD won the 1988 election and formed a government with PPP as the majority partner. However, imputing the MRD's electoral success to Islamist electoral outcomes would be misleading. For instance, it was composed mainly of non-Islamist socialist or "left-wing" parties. Five out of the six parties of the MRD had an expressly socialist agenda. These parties were united under MRD only to end Zia-ul-Haq's military dictatorship since the alliance was formed in 1981. Beyond that, their composition reflected little ideological agreement and the MRD's electoral share is categorized as non-Islamist in FIGURE 3.1. At the same time, an electoral alliance such as MMA, given its expressly Islamist composition and programmatic agenda, is classified as Islamist. It represents arguably the first and only instance where Islamist parties overcame

⁵⁶ For figures of the seat share allocation for the parties comprising IJI can be see Malik 2014: 192-193

their ideological and political differences and campaigned together for a general election under a united Islamist banner.

More descriptively for the analytical framework in this work, FIGURE 3.2 below describes the turnout in Pakistani Elections. It captures the data for all Pakistani elections for which party-wise data at the constituency level is available from 1970-2013. The 1970 election captures the time when the turnout for the Pakistani General election was at the highest after which it fell progressively until the 1997 elections which has started to rise but had not reached its initial levels in the election of 1970 as of the General Election in 2013. This trend is also captured in TABLE 3.1 below, which represents some descriptive statistics about the Turnout in Pakistani Elections in tabular format.

FIGURE 3.2: Turnout in Pakistan Elections (1970-2013)



Source: Author's calculation using Election Commission of Pakistan data in Church World Services "The Pakistan Election Compendium"

Note: Non-Muslims used to have a separate electorate for the elections starting from the military dictator Zia Ul Haq's regime in 1985 until 2002, when they were abolished under the elections held during the regime of the military dictator General Pervez Musharraf.

TABLE 3.1: Turnout in Pakistan By Administrative Units and (1970-2013)

Unit	Average Turnout (%)	Maximum Turnout (%)	Maximum Turnout Year	Min Turnout (%)	Minimum Turnout Year
Balochistan	31.3	40.6	1970	23.1	1997
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	38.3	48.4	1970	29.5	1997
Non-Muslims	34.0	42.5	1985	27.9	1997
Punjab	53.4	68.7	1970	40.5	1997
Sindh	41.8	60.1	1970	20.6	1993
Pakistan	47.7	59.8	1970	36.1	1997

Source: Author's calculation using Election Commission of Pakistan data in Church World Services's, "The Pakistan Election Compendium."

Existing indicators of religious attitudes at the individual level not only provide evidence that Pakistan is an overwhelmingly religious country but also provide suggestive evidence that the people of Pakistan have religious attitudes that are opposed to Islamists entering public office electorally, building further support to analyze the puzzle of the inability of Islamist parties to acquire mass appeal.

TABLE 3.2, for example, summarizes polling data from five waves of the World Values Survey (WVS) between 1990 and 2012. The data present averages from all waves in which respondents in Pakistan were asked questions. Some questions, such as belief in God, were asked in all waves. Others were asked only once, such as whether respondents want more religious people in public office. This makes it difficult to assess trends over time. However, as TABLE 3.2 underlines, 93.1 percent of respondents identified as religious, and 99.4 percent believed or strongly believed in God. Bearing this in mind, a puzzling 13 percent of respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed that religious leaders should not influence votes, and only 16.4 percent of respondents indicated that it would be better if there were more religious people in public office. Even though these data are indicative of public attitudes at a more micro (individual) level instead of the meso (political party) level, which is the central analytical focus of this study, they do provide some evidence to support the central puzzle underpinning the this chapter's analytical and empirical focus: even though Pakistan is a deeply religious country, it does not exhibit significant support for Islamists to hold public office through electoral contests.

TABLE 3.2: Religious Attitudes in Pakistan, Average Scores, 1990-2020

	Average (%)
Attend religious services weekly or more often	49.7
Pray outside services daily	74.3
Believe in God	99.4
Religious person	93.1
Confidence in churches	90.4
Religious leaders should not influence votes*	13
Better if more religious people in public office	16.4
Nonbelievers are unfit for public office	95

Source: World Values Survey data, available at <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp>.

*Respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed.

2.1. What is Low Electoral Success? Successful in Getting Limited Votes but Unsuccessful in Acquiring Mass Appeal

As FIGURE 3.1 underlines, the low electoral performance of Islamist parties in Pakistan does not imply that they do not gain any votes or seats in the national legislature. Islamist parties have a certain appeal, and they can acquire a limited number of votes in constituencies spread across Pakistan and win a few seats in specific areas of Pakistan to the National Assembly (NA) of Pakistan.⁵⁷ This provides suggestive evidence of a particular vote-bank of Islamist parties they have been successful in mobilizing. However, Islamist parties in Pakistan have never acquired “mass appeal” that manifests itself empirically in electoral victories that result in them, for instance, gaining state power by forming a national government without being a minority partner in a political coalition. As FIGURE 3.1 illuminates, this broader trend of a lack of mass appeal of Islamist parties has remained consistent throughout Pakistani history. Even when there have been slight variations in Islamists' vote and seat share per election cycle, these variations

⁵⁷ Interview with Iftikhar Mashwani, 2021.

have been minor. The extant literature and trends in the data thus lead one to characterize the share of Islamic electoral results as low and puzzling.

3. Setting the Stage: Measuring Religious Cleavages & Overview of Religious Parties in Pakistan

3.1. Overview of Religious Cleavages in Theory and their Application to Pakistan

It is helpful to briefly shed light on some of the classic theoretical debates underpinning religious cleavages and their measurement in the existing literature on comparative politics to devise an empirical specification for analyzing Pakistan's Islamist parties. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) identify two primary types of religious cleavages which both arose out of the National Revolution in Europe, which led to the formation of the modern nation-state: 1) the center-periphery cleavage, and 2) the religious-secular cleavage. First, the center-periphery cleavage divided religious groups from one another. Those belonging to the groups closest to the centers of power enjoyed privileges over groups more peripheral to the central authority. The second religious cleavage, the religious-secular cleavage, divided supporters of the church from those supporting the secular state and its leaders' attempts to place the church under the state's authority. It split religious adherents, who sought to preserve a role in society for religious authorities to shape policy relating to morality, from secularists, who wished to limit the authority of churches over secular affairs and law (Raymond 2018).

Much like many of the dominant party system theories and concepts originating from the literature focused on the emergence of political parties in Europe, such an understanding of religious cleavages does not travel well to political parties in Asia (see Hicken and Kuhonta 2015), including Islamist parties in Pakistan. For the Pakistani context, the center-periphery cleavage works relatively better insofar as ideological lines between Pakistani Islamist parties are distinct and rigid, and intra-Islamist competition for access to state resources exists. These rigid ideological lines contribute to the structural fragmentation of

Islamist parties, ultimately leading to divergent mobilization. In this sense, the center-periphery cleavage is thus a source of structural fragmentation of the Islamist parties of Pakistan. It contributes to their low electoral performance by preventing them from acquiring mass appeal.

Meanwhile, the second approach of measuring religious cleavages, the religious-secular cleavage, does not work well for Islamist parties as such a cleavage did not emerge clearly and powerfully in Pakistan. Three specific factors contributed to this outcome. First, Pakistan lacked an emergent religious-secular cleavage at its foundation that neatly bifurcated political parties into “Islamist” versus “secular” within the party system by creating deep rifts in the social structure between these two camps. Second, even after Pakistan’s founding, Islamists never acted as the critical oppositional parties for most of Pakistani history, barring a very short period in the 1960s when the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) was a significant force against the government of Ayub Khan. However, even then, Islamist parties, overall, were mostly fragmented, with most siding with the state while it was mostly JI against the state as an Islamist political group.

Third, the Pakistani state instituted a series of policies, starting from the Objectives resolution passed in 1949 right after the founding of Pakistan, affirming the sovereignty of God to the ‘Islamization’ policies carried under the military dictator Zia-ul-Haq, that incorporated many demands of Islamist groups as part of state policy and national identity. In this way, most parties within the party system were subsumed into a deeply religious environment. This may explain religion’s salience in electoral contests further decreasing. A robust religious-secular cleavage was thus never salient for much of Pakistani political history, which contributes significantly to the lack of electoral success of Islamist parties in the Pakistani context. Given that many non-Islamist parties in the Pakistani party system also regularly use appeals and references to Islam for political mobilization, the potency of religious messaging as an electoral strategy was potentially blunted.

That said, modern religious cleavages can be mainly understood in terms of these two approaches developed by Lipset and Rokkan, even in the Pakistani

context. However, there are differences in how they apply and significant changes in insights compared to studies primarily focusing on European experiences of party formation. For instance, in the Pakistani context, contemporary center and periphery cleavages between religious groups do not take a significantly prominent division in the form of divisions over questions of privileges enjoyed by the church (see Raymond 2018). However, they can take limited form over divisions over questions of discrimination against certain religious groups or inter-Islamic competition for state patronage and resources by Islamist groups belonging to different Islamic sects or sub-groups. For instance, Sunnis can compete with Shias, or within Sunni Islam, the Deobandi school of thought can compete with adherents of the Bareilvi school of thought and try to compete for greater access to state resources and patronage.

However, in the European context, religious groups are divided over issues rooted in center-periphery cleavages regarding the ability to practice freely and without discrimination (by both the state and private groups). In the Pakistani context, Islamist parties often similarly claim in their rhetoric that they should be able to practice Islam freely and without discrimination. Most Islamist claims of this nature focus on emphasizing that they should be able to practice “true” Islam, conforming to their interpretation of the Islamic religious tradition. Even so, substantively, there is little merit to such a framing of discrimination beyond religious rhetoric, given the overwhelmingly religious environment in which Islamists operate in Pakistan. To be sure, while the two types of religious cleavages identified by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) do not travel in a perfect one-to-one manner on the Pakistani case, they do provide the basis for the analytical fodder developed and substantiated empirically in this chapter. These religious cleavages are crucial to empirically analyzing and explaining the inability of Islamist parties to acquire mass appeal in Pakistan.

3.2. Measuring Religious Cleavages

Extant literature on measuring religious cleavages has focused chiefly on the individual level. Nevertheless, it is helpful to devise a measurement strategy for cleavages at the aggregate level. Most of this research focuses on one or a combination of three sets of variables, religion's three “Bs”: belonging, behaving and believing (Raymond 2018). Much of the theoretical framework I developed in Chapter 2 targets explaining the middle B of behavior in terms of explaining the outcome of the low electoral performance of Islamist parties in Pakistan despite their high social success. The empirical evidence I present in this chapter focuses on a combination of belonging that manifests in the fragmentation arising from belonging to different Islamist groups and believing, which captures the rigid ideologies of Islamist parties. In this fashion, the explanation invokes the first and last B of religion to explain the middle B of behavior.

There are three pivotal features of this measurement strategy for the Pakistani case. First, religious belonging is measured as the religious group or denomination one identifies with. Belonging in this sense reflects center-periphery cleavages between different religious faiths and denominations over issues like differential treatment by the state (e.g., access to state funding or different levels of recognition or legal treatment) and society (e.g., preferred majority religions vs. discriminated and disadvantaged minority religions), among others (Raymond 2018). For Islamist parties, religious belonging is captured principally by the *masalik* (singular: *maslak*)⁵⁸ or sects of Islamist parties. However, some Islamist parties can claim to be unaffiliated with any *maslak*. In these cases, the religio-political identity of the party forms a socio-political group that operates like a *maslak* in practice. Second, where different faiths compete in electoral politics, one might control for the differences between Christians, Muslims, Jews, etc. (e.g., Chhibber & Petrocik 1989; Norris & Inglehart 2011). However, there are very low

⁵⁸ Arabic word derived from *Salaka*, which means to walk together. It loosely refers to the sects of Islam.

levels of inter-faith competition in Pakistan. It thus makes more sense to focus on intra-faith competition by comparing variation within a particular faith, such as Islam.

Third, in a similar fashion to the existing literature comparing the behavior of specific denominations, for instance, dividing Christians into Protestants and Catholics (e.g., Brooks et al. 2006; Knutsen 2004; Minkenberg 2010), one can similarly focus on analyzing the *masalik* of Islam in Pakistan, in contexts where the differences are even more specific, like studies controlling for differences in particular denominations (e.g., comparing mainline Protestant congregations -- Anglicans or Methodists -- with more conservative traditions -- Pentecostals or evangelicals (see Guth & Fraser 2001; Kellstedt & Green 1993; Regnerus et al. 1999).

Crucially, there can be further sub-divisions within a particular *maslak*, which can be associated with that *maslak*'s political behavior. For example, the Deobandi *maslak* in Pakistan can be further subdivided into two camps: 1) the group following the teachings of Ashraf Ali Thanvi, and 2) the group following the teachings of Hussain Ahmed Madani. The Thanvi camp tends to have a more pro-state policy and is closer to elements of the Pakistani state. On the other hand, the Madani group tends to take a more anti-status quo position and has mostly opposed state policy.⁵⁹ Considering these measurement approaches, measuring intra-faith competition in electoral politics within Sunni Islam is more relevant for the case of Islamist parties in Pakistan; it is thus the focus of this chapter.

3.3. Overview of Islamist Parties in Pakistan: Pakistan, *Masalik* and Structural Fragmentation

Based on the official data from the Census of Pakistan in 2017, Pakistan has a population of 207 684 000, of which 96.45 percent are Muslim, making Pakistan the second largest MMC in the world. More recent estimates put the figure even higher,

⁵⁹ Interview with Dr. Aamer Abdullah, 2021.

where Pakistan's population is estimated to be 243 189 255 people.⁶⁰ In terms of its religious demographics, the majority of Pakistanis are Sunni (estimated at 85-90 percent), with an estimated 10-15 percent Shia based on unofficial estimates ().⁶¹ However, the Census of Pakistan does not gather sect-wise data on Muslims in Pakistan; it only lumps respondents identifying as adherents of Islam into a broad "Muslim" category that does not, for instance, include Ahmadis, a group that claims to be Islamic and has been emphasized by Ahmadi leaders as being a *maslak* of Hanafi school of thought within Sunni Islam.⁶² Pakistan officially rejects this claim, and Ahmadis were legally declared *kuffar* (singular: *kaafir*) or infidels, as per the Second Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan in 1974.

TABLE 3.3 summarizes Pakistan's religious demographics per the latest Census of Pakistan conducted in 2017 and provides the figures for comparison with the first recorded Census of Pakistan in 1951. As no official sect-wise data are recorded to estimate the number or proportion of different *masalik* within Muslim respondents, little insight can be gained into measuring and calculating sect-wise religious demographics using official data. This makes measuring and estimating sources and effects of religious fragmentation in Pakistan a complicated and complex exercise. That said, several meaningful insights are gained from TABLE 3.3. First, the percentage of Muslims as a proportion of the total population has not changed significantly over the years to the extent that Muslims have always been an overwhelming majority throughout Pakistan's history. The census figures of 1951 in TABLE 3.3 indicate that the relative share of Muslims as a total of Pakistan's population has remained similar since the country's founding. We can thus plausibly assume that the broad trend presented by the latest census figures holds true for much of Pakistan's political history and there is no significant need to

⁶⁰ As of Friday, January 26, 2024, based on Worldometer elaboration of the latest United Nations data. See <https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/pakistan-population/>.

⁶¹ See Department of State 2022: 2 <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/pakistan/>. Accessed 12 August 2024.

⁶² See Religion Media Center 2019 <https://religionmediacentre.org.uk/factsheets/ahmadiyya/#:~:text=Ahmadis%20follow%20the%20same%20five,Hanafi%20school%20of%20Islamic%20law.> Accessed 12 August 2024.

account for variation in the religious composition of Pakistan over time between Muslims and adherents of other religions in my analysis.

TABLE 3.3: Pakistan's Religious Demographics Per Official Census Data 2017, 1951

Religion	Population (2017)	Percentage of Total Population (2017)	Population (1951)*	Percentage of Total Population (1951) *
Muslims	200, 352, 754	96.47%	32 732 000	97.1
Hindus	4, 444, 437	2.14%	531 000	1.6**
Christians	2, 637, 586	1.27%	434 000	1.3
Others (including Sikhs, Zoroastrians)	20, 767	0.01%	7000	0.1
Total	207, 684, 000	100	33,704, 000	100

Source: Census of Pakistan 2017 (released on 19 May 2021) and Census of Pakistan 1951: Census Bulletin No. 2: Population According to Religion (TABLE 6)

Note: * For areas comprising West Pakistan. **Including Caste Hindu & Schedule Caste Hindu at 0.5 & 1.1 percent, respectively.

As TABLE 3.3 notes, Pakistan's population was 1.6 percent Hindu, 1.6 percent Christian, 0.2 percent Ahmadi Muslim and 0.3 percent others, including Baha'i, Sikh, and Zoroastrian, in 2017. This is roughly similar to the population of 2.14 percent Hindu and 1.27 percent Christian in 2017. However, several minority rights advocacy groups dispute the results of the 2017 census and say the numbers underrepresent their actual population and political influence because minority seat allocation in the national and provincial parliaments is based on census figures.⁶³ Despite these shortcomings, the broad picture nevertheless stays the same: 1) Pakistan's share of the Muslim population is an overwhelming majority, and 2) Most of these Muslims subscribe to the Sunni school of thought in Islam.

⁶³ See <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/pakistan/>; Moreover, another example is the Zikri Muslim community, located in Balochistan, who, based on a US Department of State report, range between 500,000 and 800,000 individuals. Furthermore, the latest census figures do not represent the Ahmadi boycott of the official census, and community sources put the number of Ahmadi Muslims at approximately 500,000 to 600,000 (US State Department 2022).

3.3.1. Composition of Pakistan's Muslims: The Main Religious Cleavages in Pakistan

Neither the official census data on the religious demographics of Pakistan nor many unofficial estimates accurately capture the internal diversity of the Islamic religious tradition and its empirical manifestation within Pakistani religious demographics. As identified in Chapter 2, Sunni Islam is crucial for analyzing divergent mobilization for the case of Islamist parties. Accordingly, this chapter focuses on Sunni Islamic parties in Pakistan. However, it is critical to capture the further subdivisions within Sunni Islamic parties for this study. The masalik within Sunni Islam can capture a large part of these sub-divisions. There are four main branches of Sunni Islam in Pakistan: 1) Barelvi maslak, 2) Deobandi maslak, 3) Ahl-e-Hadis maslak, and 4) followers of Maulana Maudoodi and his political party, the JI.

TABLE 3.4 summarizes the main Sunni masalik in Pakistan, their associated Islamist parties, and estimates of their religious demographics out of Pakistan's total population, along with the names of notable leaders from each political party below. First, the Barelvis and Deobandis are numerically significantly larger among Pakistan's four main Sunni masalik by number of adherents (Binder 1961).⁶⁴ Most estimates suggest that Barelvis comprise some 50 percent of the Sunni population of Pakistan, whereas Deobandis represent 40 percent. Third, the Ahl-e-Hadith maslak represents an interpretation of Sunni Islam, which is closer to its belief and practice in Saudi Arabia. While it has grown in recent years, mainly since the late 1970s in Pakistan, in large part due to efforts by the Saudi government to finance and promote this brand of Islam for various geopolitical and religious reasons, it is still numerically relatively small in Pakistan. Their composition does not exceed more than 6 percent of Pakistan's Sunni Muslims.

⁶⁴ Interview with Ilyas Chaudhri, 2021.

TABLE 3.4: Overview of Main Sunni Religious Cleavages & Political Parties in Pakistan

Maslak	Political Party	Notable Leaders	Composition of Population (Percentage)
Barelvi	Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP)	Shah Ahmed Noorani (1972 – 2003)	50
	Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP)	Khadim Hussain Rizvi (2015-2020)	
		Saad Hussain Rizvi (2020-Present)	
Deobandi	Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI)	Mufti Mahmood (1968-1980)	40
		Maulana Fazlur Rehman (1980-Present)	
Jamaat-e-Islami	Jamaat-e-Islami (JI)	Maulana Abu Ala Maoodoodi (1941-1972)	4
		Qazi Hussain Ahmed (1987-2009)	
		Siraj-ul-Haq (2014-Present)	
Ahl-e-Hadis	Markazi Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith (MJUH)	Sajid Mir (1987-Present)	6

Source: Author using various sources.

Moreover, the Ahl-e-Hadith maslak has no major Islamist party and has only been represented by smaller parties. In part due to these reasons, it is less electorally significant of the four major Sunni masalik. The fourth maslak of the adherents of JI is more expressly political and numerically smaller but also politically very well organized. While JI officially claims to be a sect-free party and does not officially subscribe to any Sunni maslak, it can nevertheless be conceived as a maslak insofar as it is a political Islamist group based on the teachings of Maudoodi. Most experts emphasize that JI's beliefs and practices are close to the Deobandi maslak (Amin 2021).

Each maslak has distinct patterns of political mobilization. First, the Barelvi school is generally considered more moderate (see White 2012). The literature attributes Barelvis placing an emphasis on channelling their inner spirituality in Islamic beliefs and practice (White 2012; Zaman 2002; Binder 1961). Politically, as TABLE 3.4 notes, the Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP) and more recently, the Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), are two notable political parties primarily comprised of Barelvi leadership and often represent Barelvi interests in Pakistan. They also have a rank-and-file whose composition is mainly Barelvi. Second, the

Deobandi school has historically emphasized a more conservative and puritanical interpretation of Islam than the Barelvī (White 2012). Political parties associated with this school include the JUI and its various factions. Relatedly, the Taliban (in both Pakistan and Afghanistan) also follow the Deobandi interpretation of Islam (Zaman 2002). Deobandis have arguably been more organized than Barelvīs out of the two main Sunni masalīk by the number of adherents in Pakistan. Deobandis have also been the most politically active maslak for most of Pakistani history and have managed to leverage this political expediency to gain patronage from the state by penetrating state bureaucracy and accessing state resources.⁶⁵

Third, JI has arguably been even more politically organized than Deobandis in Pakistani history. However, various reasons have led to a relative waning in its influence in the spheres of social and electoral mobilization in Pakistan, principally a lack of a similar level of political expediency and a smaller number of adherents than the Deobandi political parties. Fourth, the Ahl-e-Hadith reject traditional Islamic legal schools,⁶⁶ emphasizing a return to the original practices of Islam (Ahmad 2009). The Ahl-e-Hadith do not have a significant Islamist political party; however, they have had various smaller Islamist parties, most notably the Markazi Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith (MJAH), which Sajid Mir heads.

Except for the Ahl-e-Hadith maslak, there is a major Sunni Islamist party for each of the four main Sunni masalīk practiced in Pakistan. However, this does not necessarily imply that there is a perfect one-to-one function between Islamic masalīk and Islamist parties in Pakistan. For instance, the TLP officially insists that it is not a sect-based party, as it is a party whose main goal is the preservation of the sanctity of the prophet Muhammad and is open to other sects as well. Nevertheless, the extant literature and fieldwork data support that its composition is mainly from the Barelvī maslak, and its ideology is close to the teachings of the Barelvī maslak's interpretation of Islam.

⁶⁵ Interview with Husnul Amin 2021.

⁶⁶ Traditional here refers to religious schools such as Barelvīs which emphasize more syncretic and spiritual ritual practices such as Sufi practices influenced by both local customs inspired by Hinduism in the case of South Asia

3.4. Defining Islamist Parties in Pakistan: “Deeni” And Not “Mazhabi”

Empirical evidence is mixed in terms of which criteria can distinguish Islamist parties in Pakistan from their non-Islamist counterparts. Extant categorizations and typologies of Islamist parties can be understood as a spectrum of how rigorous one wants to be in the thresholds of religious mobilization of political parties, as described in TABLE 3.5. This study focuses on parties exhibiting high levels of religious mobilization along the dimensions of identity, doctrine and association developed by Mantilla (2021). As TABLE 3.5 underlines, this implies that for these political parties, local voters widely regard such organizations as religious, they have well-reported ties to religious associations and religious doctrines play an important part in justifying their policies (Mantilla 2021).⁶⁷

TABLE 3.5: Thresholds Of Religious Mobilization

Religious mobilization	Characteristics	Examples
Low (limited, partial)	Secondary religious mobilization along at least one dimension	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • True Path Party (Turkey) • National Liberation Front (Algeria)
Medium (substantial)	Secondary religious mobilization along all dimensions or primary religious mobilization along at least one dimension	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Muslim League-Nawaz (Pakistan)
High (robust, assertive)	Primary religious mobilization along all three dimensions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Freedom and Justice Party (Egypt)

Source: Mantilla (2021)

In this way, the study adopts a stricter threshold of what constitutes religious mobilization by focusing on what is traditionally known as *deeni* (religious) parties in Pakistan rather than clustering parties that the existing literature on Islamist parties has identified as “Muslim Democrats (see Nasr 2005),”⁶⁸ such as the

⁶⁷ As TABLE 3.5 notes, examples of such parties outside of Pakistan include the Egyptian Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), which has robust ties to religious movements, appeals to voters mainly on religious grounds and incorporates substantial elements of religious doctrine into its manifesto and policy proposals (Mantilla 2021).

⁶⁸ <https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-rise-of-muslim-democracy/>

Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PMLN). These parties may be Islamic but are not Islamist. By focusing on deeni parties, I include parties with high levels of religious mobilization described in TABLE 3.5, which includes maslaki (sect-based) parties as well as the parties that reject such labels, such as the JI or those that officially claim to be open to all sects, such as the TLP.

A strict definition of Islamists is preferable to a broader definition for several reasons. First, fieldwork evidence and secondary data analysis overwhelmingly emphasize that all major political parties in Pakistan invoke religion in their social and electoral mobilization. As one observer remarked, “There is no secular or liberal party in Pakistan in a pure sense. Even the most secular religious parties, such as ethnic nationalist parties like the MQM and ANP, have ample evidence of invoking Islam for politics, leading one to question whether they have not used religion for their politics.”⁶⁹

One can observe this from the actions of leaders of one of the most purportedly secular-leaning parties of Pakistan, the Awami National Party (ANP). In 2012, the ANP’s, leader Haji Ghulam Ahmed Bilour, the incumbent Minister of Railways at the time, openly announced a reward of one thousand dollars for anyone who killed Koula Bassel Kopula, the director of the “Innocence of Muslims,” a film condemned for its blasphemous content by Muslims all over the world.⁷⁰ This underlines that often, even Pakistani parties considered closest to being secular in their orientation exhibit tendencies to invoke Islam in their politics. Adopting a broad definition of what constitutes an Islamist party in the context of Pakistan is thus misleading, providing limited analytical leverage for the phenomenon of interest for this study and poor precision, stretching the empirical target of what constitutes an Islamist party beyond meaningful insights.

Given the measurement strategy outlined earlier for the deeply Islamic political environment of Pakistan, where religion pervades all aspects of public life and is integral to the state and society, it is unsurprising that Islam is vital for the

⁶⁹ Interview with Aizaz Syed 2021.

⁷⁰ See <https://www.dawn.com/news/754402/mind-this-mindset>

mobilization instigated by political parties. This makes it important to distinguish what constitutes an Islamist party within this political environment, and this distinction can be captured using the Arabic terms *deen* vs *mazhab*. *Mazhab* is a term used for a set of beliefs and rituals of worship. On the other hand, *deen* refers to an entire way of life pervading all aspects of life. The target of analysis in this study is thus *deeni* and, in that sense, “Islamist” parties. In contrast, *mazhabi* parties can be a much broader concept applicable to most political parties in Pakistan.

3.4.1. Major vs Small Islamist Parties

The study broadly divides *deeni* parties operating in Pakistan into major and small parties by their influence in national politics and size. Since the 2018 election, major Islamist parties in Pakistan have compromised three main parties: 1) JI, 2) JUI, and 3) TLP. Parties comprising major and small Islamist parties have mainly remained the same over time, except that the JUP from the Barelvi *maslak* could be considered a major Islamist party for some periods of Pakistani political history, mainly before the death of one of its key leaders, Shah Ahmed Noorani, in 2003. More recently, TLP has replaced JUP as the major party from the Barelvi *maslak*, especially after TLP contested its first election in 2018 after formally registering as a political party with the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) in 2017. However, barring a few elections, especially the 1970 election, JUP did not achieve the kind of appeal that the TLP has possessed since the late 2010s or as parties from other *masalik* such as the JI and JUI. The broader trend has been the Barelvi *maslak* not being as politically organized around a political party before the formation of TLP and its emergence into Pakistan’s national politics.

Apart from these major parties, some two dozen Islamist parties are registered with the ECP (Rana 2004). The precise number of such parties has varied over time by election cycle. Smaller *deeni* parties in Pakistan can broadly be subdivided into three sub-types summarized in TABLE 3.6. First are parties that

represent masalik that are not represented within the major parties. These include, for instance, the MJAH, which represents the Ahl-e-Hadis maslak. It also includes Shia political parties like the Muslim Wahdatul Muslameen (MWM), falling outside the scope of this study. Second, some Islamist parties are splinter groups that have emerged after splitting from a major deeni party or are extensions of a particular camp within that specific maslak that emerged due to political disagreements or interpretive differences over the Islamic religious tradition. Examples of such parties that have existed at various points in Pakistani history include the faction of the JUI led by Sami-ul-Haq that broke away from JUI over political differences in 1980 to form Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Sami-ul-Haq (JUI-S). The parent JUI was then called the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazal-ur-Rehman (JUI-F).⁷¹

Third are parties that are the political wings of violent or sectarian Islamist groups, such as the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), which was renamed the Allah-o-Akbar Tehreek (AAT) in the 2018 election in the face of international pressure. This pattern of renaming different groups of political wings of violent Islamist groups is especially common as they are frequently banned due to domestic or international pressure. Electorally, the influence of smaller Islamist parties is marginal. However, they nevertheless hold an outsized influence in Pakistan's politics due to their influence on social and violent mobilization.

*** space intentionally left blank ***

⁷¹ Though in 2018, after the death of Sami-ul-Haq, this party was again aggregated into JUI-F, which then assumed the name of JUI under ECP records.

TABLE 3.6: Sub-Types of Small Islamist Parties in Pakistan

Party Type	Characteristics	Examples
Maslaki	Parties whose maslak is not captured in Major Parties	• Markazi Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith (MJUH), Pakistan Awami Tehreek (PAT), Islami Tehreek Pakistan (ITP)
	Shia parties that fall outside the scope of this project	• Muslim Wahdat-ul-Muslimeen (MWM), Tehreek-e-Jafaria Pakistan (TJP)
Splinter Groups	Secondary religious mobilization along all dimensions or primary religious mobilization along at least one dimension	• Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Sami-ul-Haq (JUI-S), Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan Abul Sattar Niazi (JUP-N)
Political Wings	Political wings of more violent and extremist Islamist organizations in Pakistan	• Allah-o-Akbar Tehreek, Sipah-e-Sahaba (SS), Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), Sunni Tehreek (ST)

Source: Author's formulation.

The decision itself to classify parties as Islamist or not generates meaningful insights supporting the fragmentation of Islamist parties based on fieldwork data. One such insight is that the party system of Pakistan is mainly occupied by what can be termed religiously oriented parties that are, at the same time, not Islamist. In this way, the religious-secular cleavage has not formed properly in Pakistan and is not salient in elections as all parties invoke religion to a considerable extent. This was underlined by the leader of JI's Women Wing and the daughter of the late *Ameer* (leader) of JI, Qazi Hussain Ahmed, Dr. Samia Raheel, who noted that "All these parties [not just Islamist parties] are right-wing parties. So, from an electoral point of view, Islamist stances don't work, and only right-wing stances work in Pakistan."⁷²

There is also subtle but perceptible inter-party variation among Islamist parties in Pakistan. For instance, in terms of ideology, JI is considered to have the

⁷² Interview with Samia Raheel Qazi, 2021.

most coherent and comprehensive ideological framework undergirding its political behaviour. The rest of the parties mainly represent their particular sect based on a specific interpretation of Islam with its distinct vision of transforming the state and society using Islamic principles. This builds support and suggestive evidence of the fragmentation of Islamist parties. As Mian Aslam, a senior leader of JI who has served as a member of the National Assembly of Pakistan, noted,

As far as ideology is concerned, there is only one religious [deeni] party in Pakistan. The rest of the parties are not religious but are maslaki (sectarian). If there is any party that is based on some prejudice, that will spread anarchy. If you have a party based on linguistics, geographics, ethnicity, and sects, then that will tear up the public. Our Quran is not mazhab but deen.⁷³

3.4.2.1. Major Parties: JI, JUI (Deobandi), JUP and TLP (Barelvi)

First, JI was a significant oppositional party in Pakistani politics during the 1960s. Its influence waxed during the government of General Zia-ul-Haq, who included JI members as part of his cabinet. However, barring some periods of relevance when JI was headed by Qazi Hussain Ahmed from 1986 to 2008, JI's influence has waned recently concerning social and electoral mobilization. Electorally, some of this loss of influence can be attributed to strategic mistakes committed by JI that are largely informed by its ideological commitment. It is an example of a party so committed to its ideology that it has led some experts to remark that this commitment and inflexibility have contributed to JI's loss of influence.⁷⁴ For instance, it decided to boycott the 1988, 1997 and 2013 elections, leaving the party without access to state resources that its competitors used to grow and strengthen themselves, in addition to losing valuable experience in electoral campaigning.

Second, JUI is the Islamist party that has consistently been the most influential in its social and electoral mobilization relative to other Islamist parties. Its trajectory is marked by a steady increase in social and electoral influence until the three most recent election cycles (2013, 2018, 2024), wherein it did exceptionally

⁷³ Interview with Mian Aslam, 2021.

⁷⁴ Interview with Talat Hussain, 2021.

poorly on the electoral front. JUI is also the largest party representing the Deobandi maslak. In some ways, JUI's electoral strategy has been the opposite of JI's, wherein it has compromised its religious and ideological goals for pragmatic considerations to acquire power to some degree. Political coalition building has been JUI's primary strategy to acquire state power by being a part of the national assembly or provincial assemblies, where it is especially relevant for the provincial assemblies of the Pashtun majority province Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and in the heavily Pashtun populated areas of Balochistan.

Third, Islamist parties primarily representing the Barelvi maslak have been relatively disorganized. Barelvis were predominantly viewed as under-influential and less interested in Pakistani politics, barring a few key issues about the finality of the prophet Muhammad, which they have always been quite active in mobilizing. However, this phenomenon started to change in 2000-2005. Some emphasize that as early as the administration of General Pervez Musharraf, the Pakistani deep state realized that it had leaned heavily in favor of Deobandis and JI due to its ambitions and adventures on Pakistan's eastern and western fronts and that it would now be strategically advantageous to lean towards providing patronage to the Barelvis instead to counterbalance past trends. In the early to middle years of Pakistani history, JUP was the major voice representing the Barelvi sect within the Pakistani party system. It achieved limited success, notably in the 1970 election, in priming the Barelvi vote. However, JUP faced rifts in its electoral influence due to party splits. It split into two main factions: one led by Abdus Sattar Khan Niazi and the other led by Shah Ahmed Noorani. Consequently, JUP's social and electoral influence was split, hurting its electoral prospects. This split created a major vacuum in the Barelvi vote in Pakistan, which figures like Tahir-ul-Qadri tried to fill through the Pakistan Awami Tehreek (PAT). However, he was largely unsuccessful in electorally carving a space for himself in Pakistan's politics.

More recently, the TLP tried to capture the Barelvi vote and its rise from a small Islamist party to a major religious party has been rapid. However, while TLP is generally considered a Barelvi party, several TLP leaders emphasize that TLP is

not a sect-based party because it welcomes people from other masalik. This can be observed in the remarks of TLP leader Saifi, who stressed that,

Other masalik formed their political parties based on their maslak. However, when the TLP was made, it was a party of the Barelvi fiqah; that does not mean we do not welcome people from other firqaahs. Because our founder neither raised his own slogan nor that of any maslak, but the slogan of Prophet Muhammad.⁷⁵

3.4.2.2. *Small Parties*

Apart from the major Islamist parties, small Islamist parties also compete in Pakistani elections. However, the electoral share of Islamist parties remains marginal even by the standards of Islamist parties in Pakistan. A common mobilization pattern of smaller Islamist parties is that they typically leverage their influence in a non-electoral sphere (e.g. social or violent mobilization) to achieve their policy and electoral goals. A vital way smaller Islamist parties do this is by acting as ancillary organizations for other Islamist parties or latching onto larger parties and forming a coalition with them to enhance their mobilization capabilities. One example of this is the maslaki small Islamist party Markazi Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadis (MJAH), which represents the Ahl-e-Hadis community. It is headed by Sajid Mir, who extends support to the PMLN and receives a nomination to the Senate of Pakistan from PMLN in exchange. For instance, this pattern can be observed in the elections of the Senate of Pakistan in 2009 and 2015. TABLE 3.7 lists some of Pakistan's prominent small Islamist parties and their notable leaders and masalik.

*** space intentionally left blank ***

⁷⁵ Interview with Rana Saifi, 2021.

TABLE 3.7: Prominent Small Islamist Parties in Pakistan

Political Party	Maslak	Notable Leaders
Pakistan Awami Tehreek	Barelvi	Tahir-ul-Qadri (1990-Present)
Sunni Tehreek		Muhammad Saleem Qadri (1990-2001)
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam	Deobandi	Sami-ul-Haq (1980-2018)
Sami-ul-Haq		
Sipah-e-Sahaba		Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, Azam Tariq
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi		Malik Ishaq
Milli Muslim League	Ahl-e-Hadith	Hafiz Muhammad Saeed
Allah-o-Akbar Tehreek		Dr. Mian Ihsan Bari
Lashkar-e-Taiba		Hafiz Muhammad Saeed

Source: Author using various sources.

3.4.2. Coalitions and Islamist Parties

TABLE 3.8 showcases that one or two major Islamist parties (JI and JUI) have been a part of practically every government as a coalition since the 1970s. Nelson (2021) uses this point to emphasize Islamist parties' ability to join national and provincial governments, summarized in TABLE 3.8 below. However, it is misleading to associate political coalitions between JI and JUI with evidence of Islamist parties' ability to *form* governments. Using such a low threshold for electoral relevancy is misleading as it does not take into account: 1) merely one or two of the Islamist parties are not enough to make a comment about Islamist parties in Pakistan as they are not a monolithic entity that the alliance of one or two Islamist parties allows one to definitively comment on the trends of Islamist parties in a substantive sense, 2) political coalitions nevertheless do not explain why Islamist parties have been unable to acquire electoral success in a significant manner by way of forming

their government or even winning a sizeable number of seats in the parliament, barring being minority members of political coalitions.

TABLE 3.8: Islamist Parties in National & Provincial Government in Pakistan (1970-2018)

Year	Legislative Forum	Political Parties
1970-71	NWFP Provincial Assembly	JUI
1977	Advisory Cabinet	JI + JUI
1985	-	-
1988	Balochistan Provincial Assembly Punjab Provincial Assembly	JUI-F IJI*
1990	National Assembly Punjab Provincial Assembly Balochistan Provincial Assembly	JUI-F + IJI IJI* IJI*
1993	National Assembly	JUI-F
1997	-	
2002	National Assembly NWFP Provincial Assembly Balochistan Provincial Assembly	MMA** MMA** MMA**
2008	National Assembly Balochistan Provincial Assembly	JUI-F JUI-F
2013	National Assembly	JUI-F
	NWFP (renamed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa now) Provincial Assembly	JI
2018	-	-

Source: Author's table using data provided by Nelson (2021)

Note: (*) Within the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) religious parties did not hold cabinet posts; (**) Within the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), the JUI-F held cabinet posts in Balochistan and, together with the JI, in NWFP (renamed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2012).

4. Structural Fragmentation: Argument & Evidence

This chapter argues that the structural fragmentation of Islamist parties in Pakistan is a key reason they are unable to acquire mass appeal in national-level electoral contests and overcome the structural trap of mobilization I described in Chapter 2 to become electorally powerful. This fragmentation operates along two distinct pathways: 1) ideological, which increases with greater divergences in the

ideologies of political parties and groups between and within them; 2) political, which increases with lower degree of coordination and cooperation of Islamist parties as a bloc in electoral campaigns and post-electoral politics. In this sense, ideological fragmentation will be more if Islamist parties disagree more in their interpretation of the content and implementation of Islamist goals and ideals. It encompasses the distinctions between Islamist parties in the interpretation of the Islamic tradition, its encompassing practices, vision and mode for the transformation of state and society towards Islamist ideals between and within Islamist parties.

Whereas political fragmentation will be more if there is decreased coordination between Islamist parties in electoral politics. Political fragmentation has an additional component wherein it is influenced by the number of parties within the party system. The further Islamist parties are located along these pathways, the more structural constraints impinge on the ability of an Islamist party to achieve mass appeal. Put another way, more ideological and political fragmentation implies higher levels of structural fragmentation, which indicates a decreased ability of an Islamist party to acquire mass appeal in electoral contests.

Structural fragmentation influences Islamists' electoral outcomes in three specific ways: 1) it constrains Islamist parties by, for instance, preventing them from reorienting their electoral strategies by changing party positions to create new cleavages or prime existing ones, 2) it ruptures their political coalitions and causes party splits, and 3) it prevents Islamist parties from cobbling together electoral alliances and ensuring that they are sustained over consecutive electoral cycles. In this way, these drivers either split the Islamist vote or prevent Islamist parties from expanding their existing share of voters.

More empirically, the central argument advanced in this chapter was underlined by the incumbent Federal Minister of Interior of Pakistan in 2021, Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed, who observed during an interview, "In Pakistan, there are many religious parties of each maslak. For some parties, there are militant wings as well. And we have banned some 78 groups. However, the vote of these parties is

deeply divided.”⁷⁶ The minister emphasized, “Because of this division, these parties lack an electoral force as they are divided based on sects [masalik]...Even within the sect, there are many sects, so their voting strength is less than their street strength.”⁷⁷

The fragmented and fissiparous environment in which Islamist parties in Pakistan operate makes it difficult for them to coalesce around common causes, partly due to their rigid political stances and deep ideological cleavages, which make it difficult for them to form and sustain an electoral alliance with other Islamist parties and compete as a bloc in elections. This decreases their likelihood of priming the religious-secular cleavage in elections and prevents Islam from becoming a salient issue for Pakistani voters. Priming the religious-secular cleavage can potentially allow Islamist parties to form their government electorally rather than merely act as minority partners in coalition governments. This was emphasized by several informants who underlined the fragmentation of Islamist parties. As one journalist noted, “A big obstacle to the Islamic system [the stated goal of Islamist parties] in Pakistan is that while there are many obstacles, one of the key obstacles is religious parties themselves. These parties get divided by small [competing] incentives, groups, factions, and sects [masalik].”⁷⁸

Structural fragmentation is a crucial reason for the inability of Islamist parties in Pakistan to acquire mass electoral appeal. If Islamist parties overcome the divisions amongst each other and unite under a common Islamist bloc, their electoral fortunes can be significantly improved. In this way, this study emphasizes that what is crucial is collaboration among Islamist social forces instead of collaboration between Islamist and so-called secular forces.⁷⁹ For instance, religious party expert and journalist Ali Sher emphasized the importance of electoral

⁷⁶ Interview with Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed, 2021.

⁷⁷ Interview with Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed, 2021.

⁷⁸ Interview with Ali Sher, 2021.

⁷⁹ A body of literature emphasizes that collaboration between Islamist and so-called secular forces is very difficult (see Wegner and Cavatorta 2019: 559). For a strand of studies within this literature, collaboration is often used as an indicator of Islamist ideological moderation (Cavatorta 2009; Clark 2006; Schwedler 2009)

alliances for the mass appeal of Islamist parties. He noted that under the MMA when six Islamist parties combined to run the election under a united electoral alliance, early signs of this reversal in electoral fortunes were evident. This is captured in Sher's remarks emphasizing the popularity of the MMA due to the unity of Islamist parties, which inspired confidence in voters:

I know personally that Asfandiyar Wali [an established political leader of Pakistan at the time] was defeated in the 2002 election by Maulana Shuja-ul-Mulk even though he [Shuja] had spent a total of 3500 rupees [less than 58 United States Dollars at the time] on his electoral campaign and conducted it on a bicycle. People saw an alliance, and people saw hope, which is why people voted for MMA.⁸⁰

However, after Islamist parties received the historically high seat share of 16.5 percent under the banner of MMA in 2002, the alliance quickly disintegrated by the next election, which Islamist parties decided to contest independently. Islamist party expert Dr. Waqar Ahmed emphasizes that this was a cardinal mistake and that if Islamist parties had competed in the election under the banner of the MMA, they would have fared significantly better (Ahmed 2008). In this way, fieldwork evidence builds support for structural fragmentation to influence the underperformance of Islamist parties in Pakistan.

3.1. Pathways of Structural Fragmentation: Ideological & Political

Historical evidence and fieldwork identify the pathways of structural fragmentation for Islamist parties in Pakistan and their significance in driving electoral underperformance in three distinct ways. First, the ideological fault lines of Islamist parties in Pakistan can be sharp and rigid between Islamist parties and diminish their electoral success by, for instance, splitting their vote. Evidence of the sharp ideological differences between Islamists and their impact on public attitudes and behavior can be gauged from the remarks made by the leader of the TLP at the time, Allama Khadim Rizvi, who said before the 2018 election,

⁸⁰ Interview with Ali Sher, 2021.

They [people from other masalik] say that Barelvīs can only eat *halvah* [a type of sweet dish that is viewed to be especially popular among Islamic mullahs] and recite *naats* [devotional commemoration of Prophet Muhammad of Islam]. We will show them what we can do.⁸¹

Second, however, ideological coherence is insufficient to acquire mass electoral appeal if this clarity fragments the party within the party system. This is illustrated by the example of JI, which is arguably one of Pakistan's most ideologically committed parties. Yet, it has been unable to become a significant electoral player by acquiring mass appeal. As one religious party expert observed, “If any party has a clear ideology and a vision in Pakistan, then it is religious parties, especially JI and the teachings of Maudoodi. Basically, he [Maulana Maudoodi] produced ideological people [in Pakistan].”⁸² Third, similar to ideological clarity, organizational structure is insufficient to acquire mass electoral appeal. JI is a highly well-organized party, and its organizational structure has been well documented in the extant literature, which has emphasized that JI’s organizational infrastructure is based on Bolshevik parties and can be considered as an “organizational weapon (See Nasr 1994, Selznick 2014 [1952]).”

However, neither the ideological coherence of JI nor its organizational structure translates into mass electoral success for two distinct reasons. First, JI’s ideological clarity is often not well attuned to political realities. Fieldwork evidence indicates that Islamist parties themselves privately admit that the “common man” does not figure into their electoral strategies and party politics, as informed by a local academic expert on Islamist parties who shared that as part of his data gathering for research on Islamist parties, “key leaders of powerful religious [Islamist] parties admitted that the common voter does not figure into their politics.”⁸³ Similarly, during interviews with members of the JI leadership, some informants for this study candidly admitted under anonymity that JI had

⁸¹ Rizvi, as narrated by Muhammad Malick, 2021.

⁸² Interview with Khurshid Ahmed Nadeem, 2021.

⁸³ Interview with Anonymous Respondent E, 2021.

been unsuccessful in achieving mass electoral appeal. Two informants even conceded that JI has failed even by its own ideological standards while hinting at JI's inability to adapt to changing ground realities in politics. For instance, one senior JI leader shared,

The ideology of change for the transformation of the society of JI is that we will influence the critical mass of society, and then the creative minority will be influenced. But we have been unsuccessful even at that. Even though JI used to be a big intellectual movement once [for instance, while Maudoodi was alive], even then, we couldn't influence the big intellectuals at the time.⁸⁴

Second, JI's excessive ideological rigidity can act as a divisive force. A key issue faced by Islamist parties is that the small number of people forming its core and committed base of supporters will not be able to overturn an election beyond certain pockets where their numbers are sizeable enough to do so. In this way, this will impinge on the ability of Islamist parties like JI to become mass electoral machines. As Islamist party expert Khurshid Ahmed Nadeem noted, "JUI in Punjab will not be able to generate significant voters. There might be some based on *maslaik* [sect], based on *biraderi* [kinship networks] and so forth, but not at a larger scale. There are pockets of Islamist support, such as JUI's pockets in NWFP [renamed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa]. For instance, in Balochistan, they are based on other factors like ethnicity."⁸⁵ This clarifies that neither levels of ideological commitment nor organizational depth alone are the answer to achieving mass electoral success, even though these factors are critical in conferring an advantage on Islamist parties in social mobilization, as shown in Chapter 3. The lack of coordination and high levels of ideological distance between Islamist parties is a key source of their structural fragmentation.

The third way in which the pathways of structural fragmentation are discerned is by focusing on their inability to cooperate and coordinate their politics for mutual benefit, which encompasses the pathways of political fragmentation. For instance, the schisms of Islamist parties can prevent them

⁸⁴ Interview with Anonymous Respondent I, 2021.

⁸⁵ Interview with Khurshid Ahmed Nadeem, 2021.

from conducting their politics as a bloc and forming and sustaining Islamist electoral alliances over sustained electoral cycles. Moreover, Islamist parties in Pakistan have even under-coordinated and under-cooperated with each other relative to their non-Islamist counterparts over issues they mutually agree on. For instance, there have been few, if any, All Parties Conference (APC) organized by Islamist parties over the course of Pakistani history in the same way that other non-Islamist parties of Pakistan have come together at various points in Pakistan's political history. As Ali Sher points out,

The Finality of Muhammad as a prophet of Islam, the prohibition of collecting interest [in finance], the recommendations made by CCI [Pakistan's Council of Islamic Ideology] are all issues on which these religious parties are united, from party workers to leaders. However, they lack a vision to unite and coalesce together. This is why I have never seen religious parties organize an All-Parties Conference on these three issues in my 20 years of journalism.⁸⁶

3.1.1. Ideological Fragmentation: High Thresholds for Inclusion & Low Threshold for Exclusion

There are two distinct modalities of the ideological fragmentation of Islamist parties in Pakistan: 1) their high thresholds for inclusion, and 2) their low thresholds for exclusion, which often include rising sectarianism. These drivers are how the ideological fragmentation of Islamist parties in Pakistan manifests itself empirically. The role of intense ideological fault lines and their impact on the electoral performance of Islamist parties was emphasized by one journalist when he underscored,

There are different schools of thought [masalik] when it comes to Islam, so their [Islamist parties'] vote gets divided. When Islamist parties came together, MMA was created, and they formed a government in KP [Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province of Pakistan]. The issue is that our Islamist parties are not united.⁸⁷

⁸⁶ Interview with Ali Sher, 2021.

⁸⁷ Interview with Iftikhar Mashwani, 2021.

3.1.1.1. : High Threshold for Inclusion (Party Subculture)

Islamist parties often have high thresholds for inclusion, which require a high level of ideological commitment from party workers that negatively influences voters to vote for these parties. It prevents Islamist parties from becoming mass electoral machines and makes it difficult for them to reorient existing cleavages and expand their extant base of voters. The issue is captured quite well in the comments made by senior journalist and broadcaster Talat Hussain,

For JI, they say that they are non-sectarian. But their religious discipline has been so strict in the past that people who are mildly religious but still want to create a democratic space for themselves will not be able to do that...This is why they [Islamist parties] are unable to get out of their 'catchment area,' so if you want to be associated with JUI, you need first to have a certain ideological point of view; otherwise, JUI will not allow you the space you need.⁸⁸

This phenomenon can be unpacked in greater depth by illustrating the case of JI. Several JI leaders emphasized the detrimental effects of ideological fragmentation by highlighting the dangers of sect-based ideologies. They underlined that this is why JI is a sect (maslak)-neutral party. Importantly, this is why JI and other Islamist parties emphasized the importance of ideology for their voters. As Dr. Samia Raheel Qazi emphasized, "In JI, only ideology works. JI does not have any branding. JI is the name of an ideology, and based on that ideology, we make JI's voters."⁸⁹ She quoted Maudoodi, who emphasized in his writing that to bring about an Islamic revolution, one must start at the top; however, the revolution would not be complete until it reached the masses. At the same time, she conceded, "We have not been able to reach the public at that mass level."⁹⁰

This does not imply that Islamist parties such as JI have not attempted to mitigate and possibly rectify this issue by lowering their threshold for inclusion. For instance, religious party expert Dr. Aamer Abdullah highlighted that JI had tried

⁸⁸ Interview with Talat Hussain, 2021.

⁸⁹ Interview with Dr. Samia Raheel Qazi, 2021.

⁹⁰ Interview with Dr. Samia Raheel Qazi, 2021.

unsuccessfully to mitigate this issue at various points but was unsuccessful, and its high threshold for inclusion were significant in preventing it from achieving mass electoral success. He remarked,

JI tried to rid itself of this problem, especially Qazi Hussain Ahmed, who formed the Pakistan Islamic Front in the 1993 elections. However, this effort was also unsuccessful, as an average person cannot even become a member of JI. If you go to any other political party, if you say you want to become a member, the party will give you a form, and you become a member. Meanwhile, you must have years of training to become a member of JI. You can become a *rafiq* [intimate friend] or a *hamdard* [sympathizer], but you cannot become a card-carrying member of JI. This has damaged JI a lot. So even though their ideological core remained very strong, which they could mobilize at any time, their broader appeal to voters was deficient, which they tried to make up for through their manifesto and broader slogans, but this is just not enough.⁹¹

Similarly, speaking about the high thresholds for inclusion of Islamist parties, journalist and broadcaster Amir Mateen emphasized that Islamist parties have exacting demands from their rank and file to follow the parties' vision of Islam in their everyday behavior. For instance, even at the level of physical appearance, men typically need a beard to be influential in most Islamist parties. This is even though this may not exist as a requirement to be a card-carrying member of Islamist parties.⁹² He gave the example of JUI and its then Senator to the NA Talha Mehmood, who was considered a vital party financier. Even though Mehmood did not have a beard before, he now does and even though it may not be a style of beard fulfilling Islamic injunctions, it is nevertheless an example of an attempt by a leader to conform to ideals that are closer to the party subculture.⁹³

4.2.1.1: Low Thresholds for Exclusion (Sectarianism)

The second mode through which ideological fragmentation operates for Islamist parties are their low thresholds for exclusion. A low threshold for exclusion refers to

⁹¹ Interview with Dr. Aamer Abdullah, 2021.

⁹² Interview with Amir Mateen, 2021.

⁹³ Interview with Amir Mateen, 2021.

how the ideology of Islamist parties, captured through their rigid religious cleavages, makes it easier for them to exclude many voters from their electoral campaigns relative to their non-Islamist counterparts. The implication is that Islamist parties will have narrow ideologies and party positions that are only viable to attract smaller groups or sets of voters.

A critical empirical manifestation of the low thresholds for exclusion of Islamist parties in Pakistan is the sectarianism characteristic of their politics. Even if Islamist parties do not have an explicitly sect-based (*maslaki*) vision underpinning their ideology, they nevertheless have their distinct and narrow interpretations of Islam, which impinge their ability to acquire mass appeal. A senior bureaucrat and religious party expert described how Islamists have marginalized so many groups within Pakistan and promoted a sectarian mindset, which ultimately hurts their electoral prospects,

You declared them [Ahmadis, in this case] non-Muslims. Fair enough, now you do not even let them live. Are they citizens or not? For whom have you created Pakistan? For Muslims. Which Muslims? Deobandis say Bareilvis are not Muslim. Shia say Sunnis are not Muslims. Sunnis say Shia are not Muslim. So, where are the Muslims? This question of division and polarization that people have felt now makes them feel there is too much of this religious card. [It makes them think] Enough with these [Islamist] political parties.⁹⁴

Moreover, a low threshold for exclusion has contributed to party splits that have further divided the existing vote-bank of Islamist parties. For instance, sectarian differences have contributed to many factions within religious parties.⁹⁵ One such example was when JUI split into the Sami-ul-Haq and Fazl-ur-Rehman factions in 1980. Similarly, JUP used to have some degree of popularity during the 1970s. However, it also suffered due to party splits, with the two main factions being led by Abdul Sattar Khan Niazi and Shah Ahmed Noorani. In this way, the narrow ideologies characterized by sect-focused politics of Islamist parties prevent them from acquiring mass electoral appeal. As one informant emphasized,

⁹⁴ Anonymous E Respondent B, 2021

⁹⁵ Interview with Iftikhar Mashwani, 2021.

They [Islamist parties] have sectarian power, and their reputation is such that they cannot be transcendent organizational entities. Other [non-Islamist] parties have a bigger umbrella: PMLN might ally with JI, with JUI in difficult times, and even ANP will ally with PDM. So basically, their [non-Islamist parties'] ideological mold and organizational structure are not so rigid that they cannot be trans-provincial or trans-ideological entities.⁹⁶

One way the thresholds for inclusion and exclusion combine to affect the electoral vote share of Islamist parties in Pakistan is by the high degree of fusion of religious and party identities of Islamist parties. The critical issue leading to the high levels of fusion between religious and partisan identities of Islamist parties is that due to Islamists politicizing the *maslak*, they have drawn rigid boundaries on who is in or out of the party. This lack of malleability in the Islamist parties' cleavage structure creates sharp boundaries between who the targeted voters of Islamist parties are or not.

Most informants interviewed during fieldwork or focus groups for this study identified either ideology or party affiliation as the key variables driving vote choice. However, analyzing the fieldwork data further reveals the religious ideology of Islamist parties is fusing with their party affiliation significantly more than their non-Islamist competitors. This fragments the electoral vote of the Islamist parties and prevents them from acquiring mass appeal by, for instance, creating new cleavages by changing party positions. Because Islamist parties subscribe to their narrow and existing bases, they cannot acquire mass appeal. One informant tellingly emphasized the overlap between ideology and partisanship for Islamist parties,

If you understand it [ideology] broadly as Islamist, then all these religious parties would be the same. However, if you look more closely, then ideology gets divided. Any Islamic system that is supposed to be imposed on Pakistan gets changed where JI has its version, JUI its own, JUP its own and so on...The Islam of JI is basically why people follow JI. The vote for JI is based on the teachings of Islam that JI propagates. This is why ideology and

⁹⁶ Interview with Talat Hussain, 2021.

partisanship blend greatly for Islamist parties [than their non-Islamist counterparts].⁹⁷

There is evidence that ideology alone is not a sufficient variable, even though is not a numerically salient response by experts. For instance, a Ph.D. study on Islamist electoral choice in Pakistan involving a survey (n = 1200) at the micro-level found that partisanship driven by motivators such as early socialization was the critical driver in predicting electoral choice (see Rashid 2022). Similarly, at the level of party elites, Islamist party candidates emphasized the importance of partisanship as crucial to electoral choice. As TLP leader Saifi underlined, “We performed very well; in any case, the vote we received was on the party base – 90 percent of it.”⁹⁸

However, upon further elaboration on how he understood this partisanship, the fusion between partisanship and ideology was quite clear in his remarks, and he expanded, “The only reason that I am affiliated with TLP is because of [its version] of Islam.” This unique version of Islam being crucial for party affiliation of Islamist parties was repeatedly emphasized by Islamist leaders. It builds support for ideology and party affiliation being greatly fused for Islamist parties, such as TLP, and their leadership, reflecting the perception and understanding of their electorate. For instance, in the same interview, Saifi tellingly exclaimed,

100 percent of the vote we received was ideologically motivated. In fact, TLP does not even have a clear policy! Our founder basically said just one thing: we will bring *Rasool*’s [messengers of God, in this case referring to Prophet Muhammad of Islam] *deen* into power. One hundred percent of the vote we received and the support we are getting, material and personal, is based on this ideology.⁹⁹

⁹⁷ Interview with Dr. Waqar Ahmed, 2021.

⁹⁸ Interview with Rana Saifi 2021, NA-52 candidate from TLP

⁹⁹ Interview with Rana Saifi, 2021.

4.1.2. Political Fragmentation

4.1.2.1. Lack of Coordination to Form Electoral Alliances and Political Coalitions

Apart from ideological fissures that constrain Islamist parties from achieving mass appeal, their structural constraints can also be represented along more political or partisan loci. Political fragmentation is characterized by the lack of coordination and cooperation of Islamist parties as a bloc during elections to form electoral alliances and after elections to form political coalitions. Crucially, for Islamist parties in Pakistan, the relative lack of electoral campaigning under a joint electoral partnership united under an Islamist banner hurts the credibility of Islamist parties. As one religious party expert noted,

[the voters wonder] If it is Islam and shariah you are fighting for, why do not you put your heads together and synergize for this common cause? Why are you declaring each other infidels? Who is right and wrong? So instead of unifying, they [Islamist parties] are increasingly divisive and polarizing. Based on my study, where I interviewed Islamist party leaders, they admitted that when we go to the people, they [voters at large] question our credibility by saying, “If Islam is your objective, then why couldn’t you work together in this cause” They say it is something else that you are after in the guise of Islam.¹⁰⁰

TABLE 3.9 below summarizes the major electoral alliances Islamist parties have participated in throughout Pakistani electoral history. It details their composition and the year they contested elections and briefly comments on their ideological and political behavior. As TABLE 3.9 notes, there have been at least ten major electoral alliances in which one or more Islamist party has participated in Pakistani history. In this way, Islamist parties in Pakistan have often participated in electoral alliances and have cooperated with other political parties to form electoral blocs. But why does forming these blocs not lead to electoral success?

¹⁰⁰ Interview with Respondent B, 2022.

TABLE 3.9: Prominent Electoral Alliances of Islamist Parties in Pakistan (1947-2024)

Electoral Alliance	Elections Contested	Composition of Allied Parties*	Comments/Ideology
Pakistan National Alliance**	1977	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Jamaat-e-Islami 2. Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam - Mufti Mahmood 3. Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan 4. National Democratic Party 5. Balochistan National Party 6. Muslim League (Qayyum) 7. Muslim League (Functional) 8. Pakistan Democratic Party 9. Tehreek-e-Istaqlal 	Right-wing but not Islamist overall formed to counter Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's PPP
Movement for the Restoration of Democracy	Boycotted in 1985, Participated in 1988	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Fazal-ur-Rehman) 2. Qaumi Awami Tehreek 3. Pakistan People's Party 4. Communist Party of Pakistan 	Mostly left of center barring the Islamist party in it
Islami Jamhoori Ittehad*	1988, 1990	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Jamaat-e-Islami 2. Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Darkhwasty Group) 3. Nizam-e-Mustafa Group 4. Markazi Jamiat Ahle Hadith (Lakhvi Group) 5. Jamaat-ul-Mashaikh (Sahebzada Fazle Haq Group) 6. Hizbullah Jihad (expelled due to collusion with opposition parties) 7. Pakistan Muslim League 8. National People's Party (left on 5 May 1992) 9. Azad Group 	<p><i>(JI Left in protest over the government's support of the Mujahidin government in Kabul, Afghanistan)</i></p> <p>Right-of-center conservative alliance formed to counter PPP.</p> <p>Evidence it was formed through the encouragement of Pakistan's security agency ISI.</p> <p>PML accounts for 80% of IJI's electoral candidates</p>
Pakistan Democratic Alliance	1990	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Shia Tahrik-i-Nifaz-i-Faqh-I Jafariyyah** 2. Pakistan People's Party 3. Tehreek-e-Istaqlal 4. Pakistan Muslim League Qasim 	
Muttahidda Deeni Mahaz	1993	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Sami-ul-Haq) 2. National Democratic Party (NDP) 	Mostly Islamist comprising small Islamist parties
National Democratic Alliance	1993	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Pakistan Democratic Party 2. National People's Party 3. Jamhoori Watan Party 4. Pakistan National Party (Abdul Hafeez Pirzada) 	

		5. AJP (Miraj Muhammad Khan) 6. Mazdoor Kissan Party (Fatehyab Ali Khan)	
Islami Jamhoori Mahaz	1993	1. Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (Noorani) 2. Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Fazal Ur Rehman)	Only alliance that managed to get four seats
Pakistan Islamic Front	1993	1. Jamaat-e-Islami**	(This alliance was mostly only composed of the JI after it had broken away from IJI in 1992); Islamist
Muttahidda Majlis-e-Amal	2002	1. Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Fazal Ur Rehman) (JUI-F) 2. Jamaat-e-Islami 3. Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Sami-ul-Haq) 4. Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan-Noorani 5. Jamiat Ahle Hadith 6. Tehreek-e-Islami	Islamist, they emerged as the third largest parliamentary group in the NA for the first time
Mutthidda Deeni Mahaz***	2013	1. Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Samiul-haq 2. Jamiat Ulema e Islami (Noorani) 3. Pakistan Rah-e-Haq Party 4. Jamiat Ahle Hadees 5. Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat 6. Jamiat Ulema Pakistan (JUP)	Islamist, composed primarily of small Islamist parties Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat used to be Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakista

Source: Author's database compiled using various archival and newspaper sources, including the online version of the Dawn newspaper at Dawn.com, Business Recorder Pakistan and declassified CIA documents such as <https://bhutto.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/CIA-Report-Zias-Divided-Opposition-23-Feb-84.pdf> (Accessed December 10, 2024).

Note: * Islamist parties within this are emboldened.

** Alternative source using DAWN.com (<https://www.dawn.com/news/1024556/few-election-alliances-this-time>) lists the names of two of the allied partners as Khaksar Tehreek and Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference.

*Translated as Islamic Democratic Alliance (IDA) in English.

** This is an Islamist party, but since it is a Shia Islamist party, it is excluded from analysis in this study

*** The composition for the allied parties of MDM comes from the Business Recorder article (<https://fp.brecorder.com/2013/02/201302101152521/>)

A large part of the answer can be inferred by juxtaposing TABLE 3.9 with TABLE 3.10, which summarizes the electoral participation of the major Islamist parties throughout Pakistan's political history. It provides several trends supporting the role of structural fragmentation of Islamist parties in Pakistan as crucial to their inability to acquire mass appeal. First, TABLE 3.10 reveals that while there have been several instances of Islamist parties forming alliances with other political parties, there have been relatively fewer instances of 1) Islamist parties joining forces together under a united Islamist banner, and 2) the composition of electoral alliances including all or most of the major Islamist parties in the party system.

*** space intentionally left blank ***

TABLE 3.10: Electoral Participation of Major Islamist Parties In Pakistan (1970-2024) *

Party Name	Election Year	Contested	Electoral Alliance	Governmental Coalition	Islamist Coalition
Jamaat-e-Islami (JI)	1970	✓	✓	×	×
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI)	1970	✓	✓	×	×
Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan	1970	✓	✓	×	×
Jamaat-e-Islami (JI)	1977	✓	✓	×	×
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI)	1977	✓	✓	×	×
Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP)	1977	✓	✓	×	×
Jamaat-e-Islami (JI)	1988	×	✓	✓	×
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI)	1988	×	✓	×	×
Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP)	1988	✓	×	×	×
Jamaat-e-Islami (JI)	1990	✓	✓	×	×
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI)	1990	✓	✓	×	×
Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan	1990	✓	×	×	×
Jamaat-e-Islami (JI)	1993	✓	✓	×	✓
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI)	1993	✓	✓	✓	×
Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP)	1993	✓	✓	✓	×
Jamaat-e-Islami (JI)	1997	×	×	×	×
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI)	1997	✓	×	×	×
Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP)	1997	✓	×	×	×
Jamaat-e-Islami (JI)	2002	✓	✓	✓	✓
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI)	2002	✓	✓	✓	✓
Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP)	2002	✓	✓	✓	✓
Jamaat-e-Islami (JI)	2008	×	×	×	×
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI)	2008	✓	×	✓	×
Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP)	2008	✓	×	×	×
Jamaat-e-Islami (JI)	2013	✓	×	×	×
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI)	2013	✓	×	×	×
Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP)	2013	✓	×	×	×
Jamaat-e-Islami (JI)	2018	✓	✓**	×	✓
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI)	2018	✓	✓**	×	✓
Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP)	2018	✓	×	×	×
Jamaat-e-Islami (JI)	2024	✓	×	×	×
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI)	2024	✓	×	×	×
Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP)	2024	✓	×	×	×

Source: Author using various archival sources and newspaper articles.

Note: * Observations for the 1985 election were excluded as these elections were non-party based; **As MMA. However, the 2018 MMA coalition quickly dissolved in 2019.

Of the ten electoral alliances enumerated in TABLE 3.9 in which one or more Islamist parties were members, only half or five can be classified as based on an Islamist manifesto: Mutahidda Deeni Mahaz (MDM) in 1993 and again in 2013, Islami Jamhoori Mahaz (IJM) in 1993, Pakistan Islamist Front (PIF) coalition in 1993 and MMA in 2002. At several points, different Islamist parties were competing

against each other in elections. Moreover, not only were Islamists competing against each other as part of electoral alliances, they were also in alliances in contradistinction with their Islamist ideologies. A notable example was in 1988 when JI was a part of the MRD alliance with other right-wing parties. JUI decided to join the IJI even though it meant supporting the left-leaning and, according to some accounts, secular Pakistan People's Party (PPP) led by Benazir Bhutto. This opposed the position taken by JI and several smaller Islamist parties that a female could not be the leader of a country under Islamic principles.

4.2.2.1. Electoral Alliances

Analyzing the five electoral alliances Islamist parties participated in (identified in 3. 9) yields meaningful insights. First, MDM only consisted of small Islamist parties, which were electorally marginal. To have a notable degree of electoral teeth, MDM needed to include at least a few of the major Islamist parties to become an effective vote-seeking machine. Second, the PIF was essentially an electoral coalition in name only. Its composition principally consisted of JI as the only appreciable political force within it after it had broken away from the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) faction after rifts started to develop between JI's leader Qazi Hussain Ahmed and Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz Sharif (PMLN)'s leadership. In this way, while PIF was an electoral alliance *de jure*, its substantive composition did not have any other notable Islamist party apart from JI. Third, the IJM received four national assembly seats when a major Islamist party, JUI-F, joined forces with JUP Noorani. While the number of seats it won was relatively low, so was the number of parties that were a part of the electoral alliance. JUP, by this time, had also lost some of the power it had possessed in the 1970s, partly due to party splits where it had been split into different factors.¹⁰¹ This also contributed to blunting

¹⁰¹ The two main factions are JUP Shah Ahmed Noorani's faction, named after its leader, and the JUP's faction headed by Abdul Sattar Khan Niazi.

the potential gains of competing under an Islamist electoral alliance for member parties of the IJM.

Fourth, and crucially, the MMA in 2002 represents the only example of an electoral alliance in which Islamist parties competed under a united Islamist banner, which included all major Islamist parties of the time. It led to the highest seat share (16.5) acquired by Islamist parties in Pakistani history. It emerged as the third largest electoral bloc in the country, leading to the only instance where Islamist parties could form their provincial government with a simple majority in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (then Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan). For the first time, a leader of an Islamist party was the head of the opposition in the lower house of the national parliament in Pakistan. The MMA provides further evidence that decreasing structural fragmentation by competing in electoral alliances can improve the electoral prospects of Islamist parties in Pakistan. Indeed, some analysts emphasize that if it were for strategic mistakes by Islamist parties in the 2008 election, most notably disintegrating the alliance and deciding to run as independent parties, Islamist parties would have done significantly better in the 2008 election. As Dr. Waqar Ahmed states,

If Islamist parties had gone into the next election under the MMA symbol, then, at least in KP, they would have given their competitors a tough time. For example, on 23 seats, JI was the runner-up or opposition. So, if JI hadn't boycotted the election, then they may have even won 20 seats out of 23, and they would have emerged as the winners in the KP provincial election at the very least.¹⁰²

Second, even when there have been instances of Islamist parties coming together on issues they agree on, these electoral alliances quickly broke down. TABLES 3.9 and 3.10 illustrate this. These breakdowns occurred before momentum could be generated in the masses in favor of Islamists for improved electoral outcomes. For example, if the MMA had not disintegrated within one electoral cycle and Islamists

¹⁰² Interview with Dr Waqar Ahmed, 2021.

participated in the next election under its banner, their electoral outcomes could have been significantly improved.

The lack of Islamist electoral coalition-making prevents a more secular-church type of cleavage from being primed in electoral contests in Pakistan. It confuses voters who become skeptical of claims by Islamist parties, contributing to the lack of salience of Islam during national elections for large swaths of the voters. Islamist parties can sometimes work with each other as a pressure group on specific Islamist causes relevant for social mobilization by agitating on the streets together and putting their organizational resources behind a common Islamist cause. However, they have difficulty tolerating each other politically in a sustained manner. As a local academic shared,

The religious parties sometimes work together. But during the electoral campaign, they often start issuing fatwas against each other. So people [voters] say that you make alliances with them [other Islamist parties], but when the time comes for your own politics, you compromise and make alliances with them. So why are you telling us not to vote for them? Based on this confusion, people reject them [Islamists] as well.¹⁰³

This implies that Islamist parties underutilize their collective bargaining and electoral mobilization potential by advancing a more concerted effort to overcome their schisms in electoral alliances. One piece of evidence for this is the lack of similarity to a united All Parties Conference (APC) of all significant Islamist parties in Pakistan on issues they already agree with each other on to advance their visibility and influence in the country's national politics.

4.1.2.2. Large Number of Cleavages Within the Party System

The number of cleavages captures the most commonly used measure of party system fragmentation in the extant literature, the number of parties. Many parties within the party system indicate high levels of fragmentation. Similarly, a large number of cleavages can indicate high levels of fragmentation. The cleavages within the social structure cutting across the electoral vote of Islamist parties in Pakistan

¹⁰³ Interview with Muhammad Rashid, 2021.

can be divided into two main types: 1) non-religious and 2) religious cleavages. Noted broadcaster Muhammad Malick captures this when he emphasizes that when it comes to elections, “Pakistan is a very peculiar nation with a lot of ethnic, linguistic, religious, political fault lines, and we have a lot of regional influences” (Malick 2021).

First, for non-religious cleavages, the social fabric of Pakistan, with its high levels of diversity captured through categories of social stratification within the party system, impinges on the electoral success of Islamist parties. Non-religious identities of social stratification, such as kinship-based networks based on caste and tribe (*biraderism*) and clientelism, are quite prominent.¹⁰⁴ The causal weight of these factors in influencing the outcome of electoral choice interacts with variables such as geography. For instance, in Punjab, Islamist parties find it difficult to achieve significant electoral success as they often lack the support of patrons who are influential in their area or from a land-owning caste like the Chaudry in the rural areas; when it comes to urban areas, Islamist parties lack the support of traders or real estate tycoons.¹⁰⁵ Similarly, in Sindh, Islamist parties lack the support of feudal landlords (*waderas*) crucial for winning votes.¹⁰⁶

Second, regarding religious cleavages, Islamist parties have to compete across several lines of religious conflict, which impinges their ability to acquire mass appeal in national polls. There are some 12 notable religious parties in Pakistan, which is quite large compared to many MMCs with Islamist parties. Moreover, many of these Islamist parties are from distinct *masalik*, contributing to further splitting their vote. This implies that Islamist parties compete for an ever-contracting share of voters in elections. This was captured by religious party expert Dr. Abdullah Aamer, who, when asked to explain the underperformance of Islamist parties in national elections, replied,

The simple reason is arithmetic. There are so many religious parties; if you go to Egypt, there would be 2-3 religious parties. When you go to Tunisia, you will

¹⁰⁴ Interview with Muhammad Rashid, 2021.

¹⁰⁵ Interviews with Muhammad Rashid 2021 and Dr. Qibla Ayaz 2021.

¹⁰⁶ Interview with Muhammad Rashid 2021.

see 2-3 religious parties. But in Pakistan, there is so much fragmentation of religious parties. There are some 12 religious parties, so it becomes practically impossible to gather a large vote-bank meaningfully in any constituency.¹⁰⁷

Third, the fragmentation of Islamist parties is pronounced, as there are also religious groups associated with a party's sect that make it difficult for these parties to acquire mass electoral appeal. Instead, they further increase their ideological and political fragmentation. Religious divisions between Islamist parties were often stoked by religious groups affiliated with the *maslaks* of Islamist parties, even if they were not formally members of the Islamist parties themselves. For instance, by giving the example of the Barelvi *maslak*, journalist Nasrullah Malik emphasizes,

There is much religious division in Pakistan. In the past, when Shah Ahmad Noorani was part of JUP, many *mashaikh* [Islamic scholars] and *gaddi nasheens* [holders and occupiers of seats belonging to certain Sufi saints that are revered by people, especially relevant for the Barelvi *maslak* in Pakistan] were against him. So, the Barelvi sect particularly has faced this issue, and this division has been quite strong. In Pakistan, all the *mashaikh* and the *pirs* have their own identity. They are not ready to unite and coalesce under a political party...Similarly, when Tahir-ul-Qadri tried to form PAT and wanted to be active in elections, he faced the same challenge, and many *pirs* were against him. Even TLP's leader, Khadim Rizvi, said that some *Pirs* are worried about their own business and are not supporting us as a Barelvi political party."¹⁰⁸

Number of Cleavages & Limits of Micro-level Explanations

We can also use more conventional measures to calculate the fragmentation of Islamist parties, using the number of parties as the basis for estimates of fragmentation. One of the most commonly used measures for party system fragmentation is the Effective Number of Political Parties (ENEP) developed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979). However, the theoretical expectations developed in Chapter 2 point more to the fragmentation of Islamist parties in Pakistan as a bloc, whereas the conventional formula for ENEP simply calculates the effective number

¹⁰⁷ Interview with Dr. Aamer Abdullah, 2021.

¹⁰⁸ Interview with Nasrullah Malik, 2021.

of parties competing during the entire election. To leverage the number of parties as they apply for the structural fragmentation of Islamist parties, it is crucial to adapt the ENEP formula by party type. In other words, the effective number of Islamist parties per election cycle would be compared with other Islamist parties in subsequent cycles; the same would be the case for non-Islamist parties. Crucially, combining or merging Islamist and non-Islamist parties using a traditional ENEP formula does not work as the expectation is that Islamist parties have a core ideology of Islamism and if there are multiple parties, there are multiple splits within this core ideology, which represents fragmentation. The converse is not true, as for non-Islamist parties, these ideologies are separate and unique and are not subsumed under a ‘non-Islamist’ core.

TABLE 3.11 below calculates the ENEP by Party Type (Islamist vs. Non-Islamist) for ten election cycles for which party-wise elections were held in Pakistan from 1970 to 2018. As TABLE 3.11 indicates, if one uses seat share as the basis for calculation, Pakistan’s ENEP for Islamist parties has ranged from 3.789474 (highest) in the 1993 election to 1 (lowest) in the 1988, 1997, 2002, 2008 and 2018 elections. For greater robustness, I also adapted a version of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index to calculate the fragmentation in the seat and vote share of Islamist and non-Islamist parties in Pakistan as a bloc using an alternative measure. However, as TABLE 3.11 indicates, the adapted Herfindahl Index estimates follow the same pattern as the adapted ENEP.

*** space intentionally left blank *

TABLE 3.11: Party System Fragmentation Calculation for Islamist and Non-Islamist Parties in Pakistan

Election Year	Party Type	Seat Share by Party Type	Vote Share by Party Type	Seat ENEP by Party Type	Vote Share ENEP by Party Type	Herfindahl Index using seat share (Party Type)	Herfindahl Index using Vote Share (Party Type)
1970	Islamist	6	14	2.842105	2.882353	0.6481481	0.6530612
1988	Islamist	3.4313725	2	1	1	0	0
1990	Islamist	4.36	5	1.8	2.272727	0.4444444	0.56
1993	Islamist	5.7971014	9	3.789474	3.521739	0.7361111	0.7160494
1997	Islamist	0.9661836	2	1	1	0	0
2002	Islamist	16.5441176	11	1	1	0	0
2008	Islamist	2.2058823	2	1	1	0	0
2013	Islamist	5.1470588	5	1.507692	1.923077	0.3367347	0.48
2018	Islamist	4.4117647	9	1	1.97561	0	0.4938272
1970	Non-Islamist	93	79	2.424425	3.185809	0.587531	0.686108
1977	Non-Islamist	100	99	1.575672	2.04742	0.36535	0.5115805
1988	Non-Islamist	95.1690821	96	2.856333	3.286733	0.6499008	0.6957465
1990	Non-Islamist	95.1690821	98	2.787002	3.262228	0.6411915	0.6934611
1993	Non-Islamist	92.2705314	91	2.690141	2.660135	0.6282723	0.6240792
1997	Non-Islamist	96.1352657	95	2.002174	3.190173	0.5005429	0.6865374
2002	Non-Islamist	79.7794118	84	4.121575	4.371747	0.7573743	0.7712585
2008	Non-Islamist	97.0588236	96	4.442631	4.45648	0.7749082	0.7756076
2013	Non-Islamist	89.3382353	89	3.106044	4.373827	0.678047	0.7713673
2018	Non-Islamist	91.5441176	86	3.158965	3.892632	0.6834406	0.7431044

Source: Author's calculations using data compiled by the Church World Services (CWS) and the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) election reports.

To deepen the analysis, it is crucial to look at which external factors may have contributed to the shifts in ENEP values over time, such as changes in the political context which influenced the structure and dynamics of Islamist party politics. However, these ENEP measures provided limited insight into the structural fragmentation of Islamist parties, which I have developed for two specific reasons. First, given the multi-member first-past-the-post rules (FPTP) majoritarian system in which national assembly elections in Pakistan are conducted, a high ENEP for the case of Islamist parties suggests stable preferences. It indicates that Islamist parties have a consistent chunk of the electorate supporting them, and they get this seat share per election. However, it does not address why this share of votes is so small in the first place. Second, the low value of ENEP by Party Type suggests there is a one-party or dominant party system per election cycle, which suggests there is one party that ultimately continues getting the seat share in every election. Historically, for several election cycles, this has been JUIF for the case of the Islamist party system in Pakistan.

In the ENEP for the 1993 elections, Islamist parties were extensively used by Pakistan's deep state in the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal in Afghanistan and the collapse of the Soviet Union. More generally, the 1990s in particular are characterized as a period of high instability in Pakistani electoral politics, with Islamist parties being extensively used by the deep state. Ultimately, given Pakistan's political setting and context, where elections are hardly fair even when they are free, this provides suggestive evidence that party fragmentation is endogenous to other factors, such as being close to the military establishment of Pakistan, which will be discussed later in this work (Chapters 5 and 6).

Political fragmentation in the context of Pakistan due to the large number of Islamist parties positively associates with their low electoral success. Features of the structure of the party system that encompass political fragmentation include how the size of the Islamist cleavage is too small to tip an election in their favor. There are three principal ways the small size of the cleavage group impinges upon the Islamist vote share, making it difficult for Islamist parties to become mass

electoral machines. First, the impact of the religious cleavage is asymmetric on its two sides, wherein the Islamic side is heavily fragmented and not salient when it comes to electoral contests, as many intra-maslaki cleavages differ over whether to participate in what they view to be electoral politics in the first place. In other words, some religious groups do not consider electoral campaigning a viable and preferable form of conduct in light of the teachings of Islam and the empirical realities of Pakistan.

For instance, some Bareilvi religious groups, such as the Dawat-e-Islami, do not actively take an interest in national politics and do not have links with political parties. Similarly for the Deobandi sect, the Tablighi Jamaat focuses more on refining the inner spirituality and piety of Muslims rather than their state, even as it has been vehemently criticized by other political Islamist groups such as the Hizbul Tahrir and JI.¹⁰⁹ This means that the catchment area available for Islamist parties is decreased, which they otherwise would have tried to prime for elections. As the former Media Spokesperson of the largest Deobandi madrassah curriculum board of Pakistan emphasized,

Campaigning for votes was typically only done by a few [Islamist] groups within all these religious elements [in Pakistan]...Others don't even consider getting votes to be permissible. They do not even believe in democracy, they say; how come someone who is not pious and is an alcoholic also has the same vote as someone who is pious and is a *Shaikh-ul-Hadis* [a type of learned Islamic scholar]?¹¹⁰

Second, much of the evidence gathered from fieldwork points to the Islamist vote-bank being too geographically dispersed, barring a few constituencies, for Islamist parties to have a meaningful impact in elections. Put another way, not only is the vote of Islamist parties geographically dispersed across Pakistan, the average per constituency size of the vote, barring a few constituencies, is not enough to create a

¹⁰⁹ See "The misunderstood missionary – the story of the Tablighi Jamaat" <https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/the-misunderstood-missionary-the-story-of-the-tablighi-jamaat-37657?fbclid=IwAR2FGjfwYxMuSozDhrfFZw42HoGu6KQM7W7pTDYcVTNOv4WAaVPcMDN9T4>. Accessed 12 August, 2024

¹¹⁰ Interview with Abdul Qadoos Muhammadi 2021.

significant impact in terms of winning an electoral majority at the national level in an election. Sect-wise data on the religious demographics of Pakistan are challenging to estimate, which precludes several quantitative approaches that could have been used to measure and test our hypotheses. Since the census of Pakistan does not collect data on intra-faith religious demographics for the different Sunni masalik of Pakistan, one must only rely on more qualitative evidence from the field.

One such example can be evidenced by the remarks made by the Federal Minister for Interior of Pakistan in 2021, who, when asked about the electoral prospects of the TLP, observed, “TLP has emerged after the killing of Mumtaz Qadri in Punjab and Karachi. But except for a few constituencies, there isn’t an area where they have a vote-bank...I mean, they have a vote-bank, but it is not decisive enough to make an impact.”¹¹¹ The crucial issue is Islamist parties have small pockets of support in most of the constituencies of Pakistan, and they are successful in getting this vote to them; however, many of the informants interviewed emphasized that, “I do not think religious parties don’t have enough of a vote-bank that they can win in a constituency in any position. They definitely have small pockets of support that get cast in elections.”¹¹² Islamist parties, in this sense, have a sizeable minority in many electoral constituencies of Pakistan. However, the electoral constituency as it is currently primed and politicized is far too small to lead to a national majority so Islamist parties can form a government and acquire mass appeal.

In part due to this, the fragmentation leading to the structural barrier to the electoral mobilization of Islamist parties is a crucial issue that needs to be addressed by Islamist parties if they are to change their electoral fortunes and become a significant electoral force in Pakistan. This was made evident by the General Secretary of the Islamabad region of the Barelvi party JUP, Ahmad Raza Bhatti, who emphasized that there was a numerical majority of Barelvis in numerous electoral constituencies in Pakistan. However, to prime this Barelvi voter

¹¹¹ Interview with Sheikh Rashid Ahmed, 2021.

¹¹² Interview with Nasrullah Malik, 2021.

so that Islamist identity becomes salient in elections, it is crucial that the Islamist parties from the Bareilvi maslak overcome their intra-maslaki fragmentation. He cited the example of the 2018 election where the TLP secured 27 hundred thousand votes and was the third-largest party by the number of votes cast. Yet it could not win a single seat in the national parliament in the general election as the vote was split and fragmented. This insight into the structural barriers that masalik imposes to divide the electoral vote of Islamist parties in Pakistan can be observed when Bhatti stated that, “It is essential, even more than running the election itself, is that the 169 Bareilvi parties stick together and run as a coalition in the elections. Otherwise, we will not succeed.”¹¹³

Third, for some of the small Islamist parties in Pakistan, the *modus operandi* can be more distinct in the sense that their cleavage size is so small that they do not even attempt to acquire mass electoral appeal. Instead, they prefer to operate as pressure groups influencing social mobilization, their primary pathway to achieving organizational goals and objectives. Within the electoral sphere, these small Islamist parties often follow a *modus operandi* of latching onto a larger Islamist or non-Islamist party for electoral mobilization in exchange for supporting the larger party in social mobilization. Leaders of many such parties often compete in elections. However, they do not build the necessary organizational or ideational infrastructure for their parties to become competitive in electoral contests, much less to acquire mass electoral appeal.

This is distinct from the religious groups that do not try to compete in elections for theological reasons, which is why they reject them altogether. For small parties, this relatively minor cleavage group is critical; it prevents them from becoming a major electoral force, as there have been charismatic leaders from maslaks such as the Ahl-e-Hadith. One such example is Allama Ehsan Ullah Zaheer from the Ahl-e-Hadith, who was an excellent orator, an accomplished and influential scholar, and materially successful, so he had the resources to be active in

¹¹³ Interview with Ahsan Raza Bhatti, 2021.

Pakistani politics and compete in elections. However, a large reason he was unable to form a political party or act as an influential political party leader was that “the issue was that the number of Ahl-e-Hadith in Pakistan was quite small.”¹¹⁴

4.2 Robustness: Testing Alternative Explanations

Several tests were conducted to verify the robustness of the fundamental explanation of structural fragmentation advanced in this chapter against alternative explanations. Two influential alternative explanations focus on the electoral system of Pakistan and the disinterest in electoral contestation by Islamist parties.

4.2.1. Electoral System

First, a critical alternative explanation is that the mass appeal of Islamist parties in Pakistan is endogenous to the electoral system of the country. Pakistan has an FPTT electoral system in which the elections for the lower house of the national legislature are conducted. To analyze whether an electoral system may make an impact, first, I analyze the data to see if there is any disproportionality in the seat share and vote share of Islamist parties, which is reported in TABLE 3.12. The disproportionality is calculated using a simple subtraction of the vote share that a party acquires in an election versus its corresponding seat share. Based on TABLE 3.12, we can see a disproportionality in 18 out of 20 observations (90 percent). Out of the observations with disproportionality, 13 out of 18 (72 percent) have a positive proportionality direction. This suggests the possibility that Islamist parties might expect to acquire more votes under a proportional system of representation.

¹¹⁴ Interview with Aizaz Syed, 2021.

TABLE 3.12: Seat-Vote Disproportionality for Islamist Parties in Pakistan (1970-2018)


Party Name	Election Year	Vote Share	Seat Share	Disproportionality
Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan	1970	6 %	1.3333333 %	4.6666667
Markazi Jamiat-ul-Ulema Pakistan	1970	4 %	2.3333333 %	1.6666667
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (West Pakistan)	1970	4 %	2.3333333 %	1.6666667
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Hazarvi)	1977	0 %	0 %	0
Tahafuz-e-Islam	1977	0 %	0 %	0
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Fazal Ur Rehman)	1988	2 %	3.4313725 %	-1.4313725
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Fazal Ur Rehman)	1990	3 %	2.9126214 %	0.0873786
Jamiat Ulma-e-Pakistan (Noorani)	1990	1 %	1.4563107	-0.4563107
Pakistan Awami Tehreek	1990	1 %	0 %	1
Pakistan Islamic Front	1993	3 %	1.4851485 %	1.5148515
Islami Jamhoori Mahaz	1993	2 %	1.980198 %	0.019802
Mutahida Deena Mahaz	1993	1 %	0.990099 %	0.009901
Pakistan Islamic Front	1993	3 %	1.4851485 %	1.5148515
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Fazal Ur Rehman)	1997	2 %	0.9803922 %	1.0196078
Muttahidda Majlis-e-Amal Pakistan	2002	11 %	16.5441176 %	-5.5441176
Muttahidda Majlis-e-Amal Pakistan	2008	2 %	2.2058824 %	-0.2058824
Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan	2013	2 %	1.1029412 %	0.8970588
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Fazal Ur Rehman)	2013	3 %	4.0441176 %	-1.0441176
Muttahidda Majlis-e-Amal Pakistan	2018	5 %	4.4117647 %	0.5882353
Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan	2018	4 %	0 %	4

Source: Author's calculation using his own dataset.

I test the hypothesis that the seat share of Islamist parties would increase if the electoral system of Pakistan was switched to a simple proportional representation system and report the results in FIGURE 3.3 below. The predicted seats of Islamists were calculated by multiplying the proportion of the seat share of Islamist parties in an election year with the number of general seats open for electoral contestation in that given General Election in Pakistan. Contrary to our expectation from TABLE 3.12, the predicted values reported in FIGURE 3.3 suggest that there is no significant difference even if the electoral system of Pakistan is changed to a simple proportional system. The general trend is that for most election years, there will be only a slight jump in the seat share of Islamist parties, which will be insignificant for them to turn into mass electoral machines. In fact, the most considerable change in FIGURE 3.3 is observed for the 2002 election, where the predicted seat share of Islamist parties decreased by approximately 5 percent below the actual seat share of Islamist parties. In this way, there appears to be little

evidence that switching the electoral system of Pakistan would lead to Islamist parties becoming mass electoral machines, building support for my theory of structural fragmentation.

FIGURE 3.3: Actual vs Predicted Seat Share of Islamist Parties in Pakistan under Proportional Representation (1970-2018)



Source: Author's calculation using his own data.


4.2.2. Interest in Electoral Contestation (Number of Candidates)

The second alternative explanation necessary to analyze is that the source of influence for Islamist parties is fundamentally different from the electoral sphere. Hence, they are disinterested in electoral contestation. The implication here is that Islamist parties do not wish to turn into mass electoral machines in the first place. This willingness of Islamist parties in elections versus their non-electoral competitors can be measured by the number of candidates fielded by each group (Islamist vs Non-Islamist) for general election seats in a given election year within the party system.

To test this hypothesis, I constructed a dataset of the number of candidates fielded by each political party participating in the general elections of Pakistan from 1970 to 2008, for which data were available ($n = 273$). Next, each party that fielded

candidates for national assembly seats in an election year was coded into an “Islamist” versus a “Non-Islamist” group. FIGURE 3.4 shows a simple bar graph reporting the number of candidates nominated by each group.

FIGURE 3.4: Total Number of Candidates by Party Type (1970-2008)



Source: Author’s calculation using Election Commission of Pakistan’s data compiled in Church World Services (CWS)’s “The Pakistan Election Compendium”

Note: Some observations of independent candidates had to be removed. Others that were removed due to them being categorized as “Not Available” in the CWS data.

I used a simple difference of means test to compare whether there was a systematic difference between the number of candidates fielded by Islamist parties versus non-Islamist parties in Pakistani general elections at the national level. A Welch’s Two Sample t-test results are reported in TABLE 3.13 below, which shows a statistically significant difference between the number of candidates fielded for national assembly seats for Islamist and non-Islamist parties, with Islamist parties nominating fewer candidates on average. As TABLE 3.13 demonstrates, the low p-value confirms the statistical significance and the confidence interval does not overlap zero, further supporting a true difference in means between the two groups.

The degree of freedom and the large number of observations indicate that some of the conditions are sufficient for conducting a t-test.

TABLE 3.13: Welch's Two Sample T-Test Between the Number Of National Assembly Candidates Fielded By Islamist Versus Non-Islamist Parties In Pakistan (1970-2008)

	Statistic	p-Value	Degrees of Freedom	95% Confidence Interval Lower	95% Confidence Interval Upper
t	-4.753	0.001	8.818	-729.088	-257.841

Source: Author's calculation and data.

Note: The sample estimate mean for Islamist parties was 169.285, whereas the mean for non-Islamist parties was 662.7500. The alternative hypothesis is that the true difference in means between Islamist parties and non-Islamist parties is not equal to 0.

These results are inconsistent with fieldwork insights, which heavily suggested that major Islamist parties were especially interested in winning elections. One example was given by a JI leader who quoted Maudoodi to build this point, “[Maudoodi said] Until your message reaches Arabs, tens of millions of people would be influenced by you [adherents of JI], hundreds of thousands will be willing to sacrifice their lives for you, only then can we bring a revolution or change.”¹¹⁵ In other words, becoming a mass party is embedded in JI's ideological vision and basis. Ultimately, the results from the measures of party system fragmentation in the ENEP figures calculated per election year and then the difference of means test comparing the average number of candidates suggests that further probing of these results and data is necessary to unearth the conditions contributing to the failure of Islamist parties to acquire mass electoral machines in Pakistan. I will turn to these dynamics in the next chapter.

5. “Islam’s Electoral Disadvantage:” Implications and Future

The empirical setting of Pakistan indicates that contrary to a much-discussed “Islam’s Political Advantage (see Pepinsky 2012; Grewal et al. 2021),” emphasized in recent comparative politics literature, invoking Islam for electoral mobilization to

¹¹⁵ Interview with Dr. Samia Raheel Qazi 2021.

the degree invoked by Islamist parties in Pakistan confers an electoral *disadvantage*. There is also contestation over whether Islamist parties can reorient their electoral strategies by, for instance, creating new social cleavages. This is crucial, as some have emphasized that unless Islamists reorient their electoral strategies, they can see their share of votes and seats shrink further.

The implications for Islamist parties going forward are varied and contested. Views on the future of Islamist parties escaping “Islam’s Electoral Disadvantage” in Pakistan can be divided into skeptics and optimists. First, for those who are more skeptical, overcoming structural fragmentation by Islamist parties will be difficult for two fundamental reasons. This fragmentation arises since Islamist parties are mostly sect-focused *maslaki* religious groups, so they cannot and do not want to be organized as political parties.¹¹⁶ Second, and relatedly, their social base was not earned through a political struggle involving programmatic linkages that political parties often must develop to gain workers.¹¹⁷ As religious party expert Ammar Khan Nasir emphasized, “In some areas of Pakistan, like Balochistan, where the cleavage structure between a Pashtun and Baloch ethnic identity is salient, a Pashtun or Deobandi identity makes JUI-F a natural ally for some people. However, this is not a political following similar to [non-Islamist parties] like PPP, PMLN or PTI.”¹¹⁸ In other words, the following is not based on the partisan or political struggle of JUI-F but merely represents its religious constituency or *masalik*, which they have used to garner their support.

However, this explanation has several shortcomings. One key shortcoming, for instance, is that it does not fit the pattern of all *deeni* parties in Pakistan. For instance, JI did try to create its constituency, party workers, and leaders. Some proponents of the pessimistic camp, like Ammar Khan Nasir, themselves agree with this. In this way, the pessimist camp does not explain why JI is unable to acquire mass electoral appeal. Voices from this camp emphasize that there is little reason to

¹¹⁶ Interview with Ammar Khan Nasir, 2021.

¹¹⁷ Interview with Ammar Khan Nasir, 2021.

¹¹⁸ Interview with Ammar Khan Nasir, 2021.

be optimistic about Islamist electoral prospects in Pakistan. They are either unable or unwilling to change their electoral strategies to mitigate the impact of structural fragmentation, which impedes their electoral progress. Nasrullah Malik, for instance, falls within people who are more skeptical of the overturning of electoral fortunes of Islamist parties in Pakistan when he remarks, "...I don't think religious parties are going to go in this direction [of changing their electoral strategies and creating new cleavages by, for instance, focusing more on developmental concerns of voters]. This is because they themselves have fiercely bifurcated religious and worldly concerns in the past. And to try to change this position is going to take some time."¹¹⁹

Others, like a senior bureaucrat and religious party expert, on the other hand, are more hopeful. While acknowledging that Islamist parties in Pakistan are torn apart by structural fragmentation and infighting, focusing the analytic spotlight elsewhere offers some mechanisms for achieving success. One set of voices, particularly including informants affiliated with political parties, such as party leaders or office holders, cited the example of neighboring Afghanistan, where Islamist groups in the form of the Taliban have taken state power. However, this power was not achieved electorally. Nevertheless, the argument is that Islamist forces in Afghanistan represented a large portion of the national psyche of the Afghan public, helping their mobilization. The Taliban's governance of the Afghan state since then indicates that Islamist parties can govern- a harbinger of good news for Islamist groups in Pakistan as well.¹²⁰ Others pointed to examples such as the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey or Rached Ghannouchi's Ennahda party in Tunisia as evidence that mass electoral success was possible in theory for Islamists of Pakistan as well. This can be observed in the remarks of a religious party expert,

I am not completely hopeless of Islamists [electoral success], but if they continue with idealistic sloganeering, [emphasis on] Islamic revolutions, iqamat-e-deen [articles of faith in Islam] and shahadat-e-haq [martyrdom in

¹¹⁹ Interview with Nasrullah Malik, 2021.

¹²⁰ Interview with Abdul Qadoos Muhammadi, 2021.

the struggle for Islamic righteousness], then this is not possible. If they adopt a strategy like Recep Erdogan or Ghannouchi in Tunisia, they still have a chance. This is because their [Islamist parties in Pakistan's] leadership is relatively honest, and they have a coherent and well-structured organizational capital...They also have a very strong and committed workforce. With all these strengths, I think any political party should be able to gain ground in electoral politics.¹²¹

For now, the situation is best described by the incumbent Federal Minister for Interior at the time of this interview, Sheikh Rasheed Ahmad, who emphasized that there was little chance of Islamist electoral success and that any electoral success in the future hinges on their ability to decrease their fragmentation arising out of their religious cleavages when he said that, "I disagree [that Islamist parties can be electorally successful in the future]. I think if religious parties get united and an Islamic group is formed in the future election where different parties transcend their sectarian maslaki divides then, maybe."¹²²

6. Conclusion

This chapter aimed to explain the low electoral mobilization of political parties that encompasses the broader puzzle of divergent mobilization. At the heart of this analysis lies explaining the perplexingly lackluster electoral achievements of Islamist parties in Pakistan despite their high social mobilization capability. The chapter shows that structural fragmentation is a crucial reason behind the inability of Islamist political parties to acquire mass electoral appeal to become more significant electoral players at the national level. In this way, deep-rooted religious schisms stifle the electoral allure of Islamist parties in Pakistan and prevent them from becoming successful mass electoral machines. It identified trends in patterns of electoral mobilization of Sunni Islamist political parties in Pakistan and specified a strategy for measuring their religious cleavages. Ultimately, it is the religious

¹²¹ Interview with Respondent E, 2021.

¹²² Interview with Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed, 2021.

cleavages of Sunni Islamist parties in Pakistan that cause rifts in their political mobilization.

By delving into a rich repository of data garnered from fieldwork insights and the most comprehensive dataset of electoral returns at the aggregate level for political parties in Pakistan to date, the empirical evidence examined in this chapter lends evidence for the pathways along which the structural fragmentation of Islamist parties influences the low electoral viability of Islamist parties and the mechanisms driving this outcome. The pathways in which structural fragmentation manifests can be ideological, which refers to the divergence in the interpretation of Islamist ideals and goals and how to achieve them by Islamist parties, or political, which captures the lack of coordination and cooperation of Islamist parties to compete in elections as an electoral alliance under a united Islamist banner. All these factors prevent Islamist parties in Pakistan from acquiring mass electoral appeal. To some degree, the chapter postulates that the road to electoral triumph for Islamist parties in Pakistan is obstructed by the very social structure and ideologies that galvanize their street strength. In this way, the divergent mobilization of Islamist parties is a tale of political paradox, where fervent belief and intense activism clash with the cold calculus of electoral mechanics.

Chapter 4 Islamist Parties and Social Mobilization in Pakistan (1947-2023)

1. Introduction

In this chapter, I argue that large mobilization cores zealously committed to Islamist parties are a key variable explaining the high social mobilization of Islamist parties in Pakistan. The puzzle of high social mobilization or Disproportional Social Mobilization refers to the high levels of social mobilization in the empirical facets of street power (protests, sit-ins, rallies, demonstrations, etc.), salience in the national discourse, and influence over state policy wielded by Islamist parties despite their low electoral representation in the national parliament. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, the main empirical facet of social mobilization that is of analytical significance in this work is the street power of political parties and groups exhibiting divergent mobilization, such as Islamist parties in Pakistan.

I argue that the large mobilization cores zealously committed to Islamist parties in Pakistan give them the ability to punch above their electoral weight in the sphere of social mobilization. Islamist parties in Pakistan thus have high levels of street power, hyper vocality in the national discourse that allow them to shape discursive norms, and a disproportionate ability to move the policy needle in Pakistan towards Islamist causes relative to their electoral representation in the national parliament. Large mobilization cores zealously committed to Islamist parties of Pakistan thus explain why they can punch above their electoral weight in Pakistani society in the arena of street protests, salience in national discourse and influence over policy formulation.

I build this argument in four key steps, each comprising a distinct section of this chapter. First, I describe the puzzle of high social mobilization and build evidence that Islamist parties in Pakistan really do punch above their electoral weight in social mobilization. The second section focuses on unpacking the central


argument of this chapter. Third, I focus on empirically illustrating this argument using evidence from Islamist parties in Pakistan. Crucially, the evidence used in this section establishes two specific claims central to advancing the chapter's thesis. First, it showcases that Islamist parties in Pakistan have large mobilization cores zealously committed to them. Second, it underlines precisely why these large mobilization cores explain the puzzle of high social mobilization. I identify two vital components of the large mobilization cores of Islamist parties in Pakistan: 1) large networks of ancillary organizations, principally Islamic schools (*madrassahs*) and 2) a greater proportion of party workers than party voters relative to the non-Islamist competitors of Islamist parties. Together, these components explain the puzzle of the high mobilization of Islamist parties in Pakistan. The fourth section concludes.

2. Describing the Puzzle: High Social Mobilization of Islamist Parties in Pakistan

FIGURE 4.1 summarizes the total protest activity for Islamist parties versus other political parties in the Pakistani party system from 2010 to 2023. The trend for total Islamist protests in FIGURE 4.1 underlines that Islamists comfortably outpace the total protest events for other political parties for much of the period from 2010-2023. This is especially puzzling, seeing that Islamist parties have averaged only 5.45 percent of the total share of general seats per election in ten election cycles from 1970 to 2018. Islamist parties are only overtaken by the PPP for a brief period starting from 2021 to 2022 and PTI for the period from 2022 onwards. This is contrary to other political parties that have struggled to agitate at similar levels as Islamists in Pakistan. Islamist parties have never won more than 11 percent of the vote in any election in Pakistan. However, they seem to consistently outperform more electorally significant parties in Pakistan when it comes to social mobilization on the streets. FIGURE 4.1 thus builds support for the puzzle of high social mobilization that Islamist parties in Pakistan punch above their electoral weight in social mobilization, especially in its empirical facet of street power. Another way to

emphasize the high social mobilization is how the vote share of Islamists in the elections.

FIGURE 4.1: Total Protest Activity in Pakistan by Political Parties (2010-2023)



Source: Author's figure using data provided in the Armed Conflict Location Event Database (ACLED) database.

To construct the dataset that was used to visualize the trends captured in FIGURE 4.1, I filtered the ACLED database by protest events in Pakistan by focusing on a range of event types that are theoretically relevant to the project. This gave a dataset of some 77 5512 protest events that were focused on Pakistan. I then extracted textual information from a set of variables in the ACLED data, especially based on the actor variables (actor1, assoc_actor_1, notes) and then created a keyword list to identify Islamist protests.¹²³ I split the “assoc_actor_1” variable to then focus on actors listed under single abbreviations only. The rationale behind this was to arrive at organizations that were conducting political protests rather than associations and groups that are not central to the analysis of this study.¹²⁴ This yielded a dataset of 17 688 protest events in Pakistan from 2010 to 2023.


¹²³ I used a simple list of keywords to identify Islamist protests from the data after subsetting and filtering it for which information on actor types was available: "Islam", "Islamic", "Sunni", "Shia", "JI", "IJT", "JUI", "Islami", "islam", "islami", "islamic", "sunni", "shia", "shiite", "Shiite", "Nabuwat", "Sunnat", "sunnat", "Quran", "Labbaik", "Dawa", "Jamaat").

¹²⁴ From the single abbreviation data the follow abbreviations were used to construct the Islamist protest variable: "JI", "JUI-F", "TLP", "MWM", "ASWJ", "JUD", "IJT", "MMA", "ISO", "JUP", "TLYRA", "JUP-N", "JAH", "JUI-S", "JUI-N", "SIC", "JTI", "TJP", "SSP")

I then aggregated the data and created a simple dataset of Islamist versus other political parties in the ACLED data. There were a total of 9852 protest events used to construct FIGURE 4.1 after cleaning the raw data from ACLED.

Frequency analysis can be conducted further to analyze the ACLED data. This can build more confidence in the empirical soundness of the puzzle of the high social mobilization of Islamist parties in Pakistan. FIGURE 4.2 below represents the cumulative protest activity in Pakistan. As FIGURE 4.2 shows, Islamist parties comfortably outpace the protests by other political parties in cumulative terms, too. In fact, this measure provides even stronger confidence in the high social mobilization of Islamist parties. Previous studies in the literature have used older data with fewer data points than this study for its reporting and emphasis on how Islamist Street power exceeds that of rival groups and parties (see Butt 2016).

FIGURE 4.2: Cumulative Protest Activity in Pakistan by Political Parties (2010-2023)



Source: Author's figure using data provided in the Armed Conflict Location Event Database (ACLED).

3. Islamist parties in Pakistan: Small parties, large organizations


I argue that Islamist parties in Pakistan have large mobilization cores zealously committed to them. The large mobilization cores can be understood with reference to Angelo Panenbianco's idea of a "large electorate that belongs to the party (Panenbianco 1988:25)." The large mobilization core is zealously committed to Islamist parties if it satisfies what I call the sufficiency condition that was discussed in Chapter 2. If the sufficiency condition is met, then the large mobilization core can explain the puzzle of high social mobilization of political parties and groups. It thus plays an important role in explaining divergent mobilization.

This large mobilization core helps Islamist parties in Pakistan mobilize street protests, capture national headlines and influence policy formulation in Pakistan, but not so much in electoral voting. Crucially, I emphasize that the enlarged mobilization core of Islamist parties in Pakistan meets the sufficiency condition, which is crucial for these mobilization cores to be "zealously" committed to political parties. This means the large mobilization cores of Islamist parties in Pakistan: 1) participate steadfastly in party subculture, 2) are often involved in a network of associative ties revolving around the party, and 3) their identification with the party is independent of its contingent political oscillations. The analytical framework in this chapter is advanced in three steps. First, it emphasizes that Islamist parties in Pakistan have large mobilization cores. Second, this mobilization core satisfies the sufficiency condition and thus is "zealously" committed to Islamist parties. Third, the large mobilization cores of Islamist parties help explain divergent mobilization in Pakistan.

Crucially, the chapter underlines two critical components of a large mobilization core of Islamist parties that can explain divergent Islamist mobilization: 1) a large network of ancillary organizations such as Islamic schools (*madrassahs*) that are intricately linked with Islamist parties, 2) a greater proportion of party workers than party voters relative to their non-Islamist

competitors in Pakistan. Together, these two components provide the empirical manifestations of the large mobilization core of Islamist parties through which the explanatory power of these large mobilization cores in driving high social mobilization as part of the puzzle of divergent mobilization can be explained. This argument is summarized in FIGURE 4.3 below.

FIGURE 4.3: Summary of the argument for high social mobilization of Islamist parties in Pakistan



Source: Author's formulation.

More empirically, the first component of a large mobilization core of Islamist parties in Pakistan, namely, a large network of ancillary religious organizations, consists of extended horizontal and – in some instances – vertical ties of Islamist social movements with ancillary Islamic organizations & institutions. Islamist parties in Pakistan have three empirical drivers that satisfy the properties of having a high organizational density and deep linkages with Islamist parties, as discussed in Chapter 2, as the two properties of a large mobilization core zealously committed to parties. As identified in FIGURE 4.3, these three empirical drivers are mosques, madrassahs, and student unions.

For example, Islamist parties such as the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) have extended linkages with Deobandi¹²⁵ Islamic schools (“*madrassahs*”) in Pakistan (White 2008) that provide JUI with the organizational resources needed to engage in street protests in the form of the human capital of madrasah students who can participate in street agitation organized by Islamists. Links with mosques, madrassahs, or student organizations by Islamist parties in Pakistan are thus a crucial component of the large mobilization core of Islamist parties in Pakistan. This large mobilization core aids Islamist groups and parties in punching above their electoral weight by conferring an organizational advantage on Islamist parties, which increases their capacity to engage in social mobilization and decreases the costs associated with such social mobilization, like agitating on the street. This organizational advantage of Islamist parties and groups increases their street power (e.g., demonstrations, rallies, and sit-ins in Pakistan) and enables them to protest on the streets, be hyper-vocal in national discourse and sway state policy towards their causes disproportionately more than their electoral representation in national parliaments.

However, while this mobilization core of Islamist parties is large enough to be numerically sufficient to strategically “choke” urban life through street protests, giving Islamist parties and other groups linked with Islamists their “shutter power” (see Wilder 1998: 105) which contributes to their ability to influence state policy (Butt 2016; Javed 2017, 2018), it is not large enough to tip an election in favour of Islamists parties at the level of the electoral constituency.¹²⁶ It also helps underline why Islamist parties often do relatively better at local or lower-tier elections than national ones in some contexts (see Ullah 2013).

Crucially, I emphasize that the features of Islamist parties in Pakistan imply that there is analytical utility in considering Islamist parties in Pakistan as small parties but large organizations. Islamist parties in Pakistan are small if one considers their low share of seats in the national legislature of Pakistan; however,

¹²⁵ A prominent *maslak* in Pakistan.

¹²⁶ Interview with Lt Col (Retired) Zaighum Butt, 2021.

Islamist parties are nevertheless large organizations given their deep roots in society due to their large mobilization cores, which allow them to have an outsized influence in Pakistani society in large part due to the street power of Islamist parties, their hyper vocality in the national discourse, and their influence over policy in the Pakistani state. The large mobilization cores of Islamist parties in Pakistan are thus central in explaining their high social mobilization.

In this study, the large mobilization cores of Islamist parties to explain the puzzle of high social mobilization contribute to advancing the extant knowledge within comparative politics on two distinct dimensions. First, it illuminates the key drivers that explain *how* Islamist parties can be classified as small parties but as large organizations. Such an analysis is crucial to explaining *why* some social groups can have an outsized social influence in democracies and hybrid regimes. Second, the chapter offers implications for studying democracy in cases where divergent mobilization exists. It underlines how some ideologically committed social groups that are numerically small can have an outsized influence in shaping democratic principles and procedures in a country relative to their electoral representation in national parliaments. Such a phenomenon can create three general challenges that can weaken democracy in a substantive sense in a country: 1) representational challenges, 2) policy gridlock or 3) increased threats to democratic stability. First, representational challenges can arise as the interests of a minor, organized minority are given greater weight than those of the more significant, less organized majority. Ultimately, such a process can hinder principles of democratic representation and accountability, especially in weakly democratized contexts.

Second, policy gridlock refers to a scenario wherein parties with low electoral success, such as Islamist parties in Pakistan, can act as ‘veto’ points by mobilizing on the streets and thus define the success of what gets passed at the policy level in the legislatures. In this sense, an organized minority can challenge governments and undermine their ability to address public issues effectively. Ultimately, such a scenario where a minority has an outsized influence within a country can lead to

frustration and disillusionment among citizens about democracy, its process, institutions, and ideals. Third, small parties with significant organizational capacity can mobilize people on the streets and engage in disruptive behavior. Often, this leads to the state capitulating to the demands of a numerically small social group and undermines the rule of law in a country, fueling further distrust of democratic political infrastructure.

4. Empirical Evidence: Networks of Religious Organizations and Party Workers

In this section, I provide empirical evidence substantiating how Islamist parties in Pakistan have large mobilization cores. To achieve this goal, I underline precisely how the analytical framework proposed in this chapter explains the high social mobilization of Islamist parties in Pakistan. Crucially, I focus on illustrating the association between large mobilization cores and high social mobilization of Islamist parties through two of its key components: networks of ancillary religious organizations such as *madrassahs* that are linked with Islamist parties and a larger proportion of party voters that are also members of Islamist political parties relative to their non-Islamist competitors.

4.1. Networks of Ancillary Organizations: Madrasahs, Mosques, Student Wings

Almost all Islamist political parties in Pakistan were born out of vibrant social movements, and most Islamist parties frequently rely on ancillary religious organizations as part of their political activities. These ancillary organizations can either have horizontal or vertical ties with Islamist parties. Notably, they encompass mosques, student wings of Islamist parties, and Islamic schools (*madrassahs*) where Islamic education is propagated to students. Out of these three central empirical drivers comprising broader networks of ancillary religious organizations of Islamist political parties, *madrassah* networks are especially

central to explaining divergent Islamist mobilization. For this reason, this chapter primarily focuses on madrassahs in its core analysis.

Madrassahs can be broadly understood as religious schools principally concerned with imparting and propagating Islamic education, including Islamic theology and law. Although madrassahs are present across the Muslim world, they have significantly shaped socio-political outcomes in South Asia since colonial times. I use the term ‘madrassah networks’ to refer to madrassahs as the central elements of the broader component of networks of ancillary organizations that encompass the large mobilization cores which are zealously committed to Islamist parties in Pakistan. In this sense, madrassahs are not just limited to the physical sites of the religious schools where Islam is taught to students but also include the affiliated religious and educational organizations such as the governing boards “*waqfs* (plural: *awqaf*)” that oversee curriculum development and academic instruction that is provided by these madrassahs.¹²⁷ The depth of organizational linkages between a madrassah and its *waqf* varies by the Islamic sect that is under analysis. Differences in the types and forms of institutional linkages of madrassahs and the *awqaf* have implications for shaping outcomes of Islamist mobilization.

My analytical framework underscores that madrassahs are crucial in explaining divergent Islamist mobilization in Pakistan. But that does not imply that the centrality of madrassahs as empirical drivers behind high social mobilization is not contested. For instance, some have argued that madrassah networks formed because of formal and informal links between Islamist parties and madrassahs are crucial for explaining divergent Islamic mobilization and formulating any systematic explanation of Islamist party behaviour in Pakistan. As one expert underlined, “You cannot understand religious parties without understanding madrassahs. They are intricately linked and often not

¹²⁷ The term of other religious organizations apart from the religious schools themselves is necessary as there are also waqaf’s (boards) that are governing and part and parcel of entire madrassah networks that, with varying levels of directness, help in designing the curriculum of the madrassah for some of the more advanced certificates that are conferred upon students that are studying at the madrassah. This point will be discussed and become more apparent later.

organizationally distinct.”¹²⁸ Others, on the other hand, assigned a relatively lower explanatory weightage to madrassah networks by, for instance, remarking that “madrassahs are just one reason behind the different aspects of Islamist parties in Pakistan which give them their mobilization power.”¹²⁹

4.1.1. Deep Linkages Between Madrassahs and Islamist Parties

To be sure, almost all Islamist parties in Pakistan have formal or informal ties with madrassah networks. Both madrassahs and Islamist political parties in Pakistan can be categorized by the sect or *maslak* to which they subscribe. Usually, an Islamist party will have ties with madrassah networks that share its *maslak*. Madrassahs typically share a common ideological outlook and the shared significance of Islamic principles and values in public life with Islamist parties. However, the intensity or strength of the ties that Islamist parties have with madrassah networks varies and is influenced by two distinct factors: 1) the total number of madrassahs within a madrassah network and 2) the degree of control exercised by a *waqf* or educational board over the madrassahs that it oversees.

These two empirical features of madrassahs of Islamist parties in Pakistan capture the two properties of a large network of ancillary organizations that were developed in Chapter 2. First, the total number of madrassahs captures the property of organizational density. Second, the degree of control an educational board exerts over its madrassahs captures the property of linkages of madrassahs over Islamist parties that were discussed in the theoretical framework of this work in Chapter 2. Generally, the ties between madrassas and other religious organizations with Islamist political parties are horizontal but, in some cases, can also be vertical.¹³⁰

¹²⁸ Interview with Anonymous Respondent A 2021. Senior bureaucrat with academic expertise in the madrassahs of Pakistan and their impact on public policy.

¹²⁹ Interview with national broadcaster and journalist who is especially considered as an expert on Islamist parties of Pakistan, Saleem Safi 2021.

¹³⁰ An example of vertical ties is those of the Islami Jamiat Tuleba (IJT), which is the student wing of the JI. These two organizations are hierarchically linked. Whereas an example of horizontal ties

The linkages between madrassah networks and Islamist parties can be evidenced through several indicators. Indeed, except for Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), almost all Islamist parties in Pakistan do not have dedicated, systematically distributed party offices. Instead, the only physical space that can be called the de facto party office of Islamist parties in Pakistan will usually be a big madrassah with an adjacent mosque attached to it.¹³¹ Part of the madrassah's physical complex will include a residential campus for the owners or managers, usually called *muftis* (religious scholars) or *molvis* (local religious leaders). It will also serve as the political office or the party.¹³² This is an observation that holds for several Islamist parties, including Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazal Ur Rehman (JUI-F), Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Siraj-ul-Haq faction (JUI-S), Majlis-e-Wahdat-ul-Muslimeen (MWM), and the now banned Sipah-e-Sahaba (SS).

This cements the argument for deep-rooted and intricate linkages between Islamist parties and madrassah networks and builds evidence that analyzing madrassahs is crucial while analyzing the high social mobilization of Islamist parties. However, there is inter-party variation in the intensity and number of madrassahs that an Islamist party can draw upon for help in mobilizing for Islamist causes. For instance, JUI-F can be an example of a large Islamist party that banks upon its network of Deobandi madrassahs to mobilize people as part of its political activities.¹³³ In contrast, JI has a relatively lower number of madrassahs as part of its network of ancillary organizations that it can bank upon.

*** space intentionally left blank ***

would include the extended networks of Deobandi maslaki parties, such as the JUI with its madrassah networks.

¹³¹ Interview with Respondent A 2021.

¹³² During my fieldwork in Pakistan, I met with several religious party politicians or experts in the madrassah they were running (e.g. Mufti Abdul Majeed Hazarvi of JUI-F, Abdul Qadoos Muhammadi who was formerly the Spokesperson for the Wafaq-ul-Madaris educational board of madrassahs).

¹³³ Interview with journalist and broadcaster Nasrullah Malik, 2021.

4.1.2. Organizational Density

4.1.1.2 *Madrassah Students*

Madrassahs provide the bedrock on which the social mobilization power of Islamists stands. One senior bureaucrat in the Pakistani bureaucracy who has written a doctoral dissertation on Madrassahs in Pakistan remarked,

The street power of Islamist parties are the *madaris* [singular: *madrassah*], which is like a regimented unit. You blow a whistle, and thousands of them [madrassah students] will be on the streets. Whenever a big religious leader like Maulana Fazlur Rehman [leader of the JUI-F] visits a city, they don't go to a house or office of the party. Instead, they go straight to the madrassahs linked to their party. All their [Islamist party politician's] meetings, organization, lodging, and boarding occur there. Madrassahs are thus the pivot on which all political activities of Islamist parties occur.¹³⁴

Other evidence builds support for this view. For instance, whenever the leader of JUI-F, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, visits the city of Multan, instead of visiting any houses of influential families or offices, he almost always stays at Jamia Khair-Ul-Madaris, the largest Deobandi Madrassah in the city of Multan (Bilal 2018).

Islamization and street power are a phenomenon that is especially relevant to urban areas of Pakistan (Javed 2018; Butt 2016). The urban design of the madrassahs is such that they provide a ready way to strategically choke a city as part of their agitation (Butt 2016). Consider, for example, how the presence of a large network of ancillary madrassahs available to Islamist parties provides Islamists with their street power by analyzing the city of Islamabad in Pakistan. Islamabad is the capital city of Pakistan and has a population of some 1.128 million people and 227 registered madrassahs (DGRE 2024).¹³⁵ Even if we focus on just two

¹³⁴ Interview with Anonymous Respondent A, 2021.

¹³⁵ The population of Islamabad Capital Territory is 2,003,368, based on the last official census in 2017 (Census of Pakistan 2017). More recent official estimates by the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics as part of the Census of Pakistan 2023, however, put the figure closer to 2.4 million. However, estimates for the *city* of Islamabad's population are closer to 1.128 million if one excludes the rural population of ICT (see Khan 2023: <https://www.dawn.com/news/1768626>. Accessed 10 August 2024.); For the madrassah figures, see Directorate General of Registered Education's figures published by the Ministry of Federal Education and Professional Training:

out of 227 registered madrassahs, we can better understand the street power these madrassahs provide for Islamist parties in Pakistan.¹³⁶


For example, two of the larger madrassahs that we can pick as an illustration of Madrassahs' role in providing street power for Islamists in the capital city of Pakistan, Islamabad, are *Jamia Faridia*, which has some six to six and a half thousand students enrolled within it and *Jamia Muhammadiya* which has some three and half thousand students.¹³⁷ FIGURE 4.4 below provides a map of the two madrassahs and the shortest route to the protest site of D-Chowk. Traveling for students from these two madrassahs to D-Chowk, or any other protest site in Islamabad, is not complicated nor demanding. As FIGURE 4.4 shows, D-Chowk is merely a distance of some 6.3 kilometers from *Jamia Faridiya* and 3.4 kilometers from *Jamia Muhammadiya*. Students can easily take public transportation buses to reach the protest site and, assuming the Islamist party or madrassah provides private transportation in the form of organizing buses to students for making the trip to the protest. Students from *Jamia Faridiya* can reach D-chowk in merely nine minutes, and *Jamia Muhammadiya* can get in seven minutes, assuming regular traffic. What is more, students within these madrassahs don't need to be convinced that they need to go to the protests or the demonstrations (Crisis Group 2011). This means that whenever a call is issued to mobilize, madrassah students will take public transportation buses and participate in any protests organized by the Islamists. The implication here is that Islamist parties linked with these two Madrassahs can organize a street protest within half an hour.¹³⁸

<http://www.dgre.gov.pk/Detail/ZWE2YmVlZmEtMGMzZS00NmRhLTg2YjYtNjRmMjcxYzFhM2Nk>. Accessed 10 August 2024.

¹³⁶ It is worth noting here that the figure of 227 under-reports the actual number of madrassahs as it only includes madrassahs that are registered. In the context of Pakistan and the city of Islamabad, many more madrassahs are likely to be unregistered by the Pakistani state.

¹³⁷ Interview with Sabookh Syed 2021.

¹³⁸ Interview with Sabookh Syed 2021.

FIGURE 4.4: Map of Travel Time and Distance of two Madrassahs to D-Chowk, Islamabad

Jamia Muhammadiya to D-Chowk

Jamia Faridia to D-Chowk

Source: Google Maps, Accessed 25 March 2023.

In comparison, if any of the competitors of Islamist parties in Pakistan want to organize a street protest on a scale similar to or even smaller than the protest scenario outlined earlier, they would have to bear significantly higher costs and expend more resources than Islamist parties. For example, to organize a protest of even 2000 participants, most non-Islamist parties in Pakistan would have to mobilize and arrange for participants to attend the rally. Moreover, they would have to arrange transportation for potential protestors, which will be difficult as it is unlikely that such a large number of protest participants will be concentrated geographically, as was in the case of Islamist parties and madrassah students. To organize and mobilize the protest campaign, the party would have to make slogans and songs to attract participants; these are all steps most non-Islamist competitors of Islamist parties would need to take before mobilizing people for a demonstration, sit-in, or rally. Such a process requires significant resources, especially time and money. A protest of merely 2000 participants party will need some five crore rupees for a non-Islamist party.¹³⁹ In contrast, Islamist parties can organize the same or an even larger protest by providing just five buses.¹⁴⁰ Madrassah students thus confer a strategic organizational advantage on Islamist political parties by decreasing the costs of protesting and increasing their capacity for social mobilization.

¹³⁹ Interview with Sabookh Syed, 2021; A crore is a denomination used in South Asia and signifies a quantity of 10 million.

¹⁴⁰ Interview with Sabookh Syed, 2021.

While the scenario presented above uses two madrassahs within Islamabad as examples, it applies to most urban centers of Pakistan. These students do not need to be convinced why they need to attend a protest, and whenever a call is issued, they can take buses to any protest site, be it D-chowk in Islamabad or the tomb of Jinnah in Karachi.¹⁴¹ It also helps that some madrassah students will be available throughout the year in large madrassahs in major urban centers like Multan, Faisalabad, Lahore, and Karachi.¹⁴²

Crucially, the institutional culture within madrassahs further enhances the organizational advantage of social mobilization for Islamists. Madrassah networks are thus central empirical drivers behind the street power of Islamist political parties. So much so that a scholar observed that “much of the political activism of the four major religio-political parties in Pakistan [is] integrally linked with and draws strength from the madrasas affiliated with their respective schools of theological thought (Ahmed 2000:135).” The madrassa networks of JUI are particularly pertinent to mention here, as JUI-F has the largest network of madrassahs in Pakistan. One report indicates that the madrassah networks affiliated with JUI-F and the now disbanded JUI-S together account for over 65 percent of madrassahs in Pakistan as of 2012 (Crisis Group 2011).

The culture within these madrassahs is highly hierarchical, and blind obedience toward instructors is encouraged and expected. Students often kiss instructors’ hands, follow their instructions blindly, and, as in many Pakistani public and private schools, do not question the veracity of what they are taught (Crisis Group 2011). They generally live highly confined lives without newspapers or permission to watch television (Crisis Group 2011). Although there can be an extensive library within a madrassah, it is typically off-limits to students. Sami-ul-Haq, the now-deceased leader of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Sami-ul-Haq (JUI-S) and the manager of one of the largest madrassahs in Pakistan has been quoted as saying, “Young minds are not for thinking. We catch them for the madrasas when

¹⁴¹ Interview with Sabookh Syed, 2021.

¹⁴² Interview with Sabookh Syed, 2021.

they are young, and by the time they are old enough to think, they know what to think (Crisis Group 2011).” It is not exceptionally surprising, then, that surveys conducted on madrassah students find that they are Pakistan’s most intolerant student group (Ramadan 2004).

The hierarchical nature of educational instruction within Madrassahs and the submissive attitude of students to their instructors make them excellent assets for Islamist parties that can be used for instigating agitation. As Saleem Safi, a prominent journalist who is an expert on religious parties of Pakistan, said that while madrassahs are not the only factor behind the social mobilization capacity of religious parties in Pakistan, he nonetheless recognized that madrassahs could become quite pertinent, in part, due to the hierarchical culture that is prevalent within a madrassah. Or, as he remarked, “If the chief of the madrassah is affiliated with a political party and decides to offer the day off to its students and provides or directs them with transportation to reach the protest sites, madrassah students can easily reach processions and demonstrations organized by Islamist political parties.”¹⁴³ In this sense, madrassah students and graduates can be good candidates for instigating street protests that require deference to the calls of religious party leaders to agitate on the streets.

Madrassah networks provide an unmistakable organizational advantage to Islamist parties by decreasing the costs associated with mobilizing protests in the urban centers of Pakistan. This allows Islamists to strategically choke urban life and move the state policy towards Islamist causes (Butt 2016). The reduced cost for mobilizing protests for Islamist parties is monetary and includes temporal factors wherein Islamists can organize protests quickly. This means that their competitors must be strategic about not saying anything that Islamist parties might capitalize on, as the Islamist protests can be organized rapidly. Moreover, ideologically rigid and attitudinally submissive students’ subculture within madrassahs makes them excellent candidates for being “zealously” committed to Islamist parties as they

¹⁴³ Interview with Saleem Safi, 2021.

would satisfy the sufficiency condition since their commitment to the party would be independent of its contingent political oscillations. In part, due to this reason, there is some empirical evidence showcasing that, in some cases, Islamist protestors do not even have a clear idea about why they are at the protest site except for a general notion about Islam being in danger and that they are fulfilling their duty to protect Islam.¹⁴⁴ The implication is that madrassahs and madrassah students are politically valuable organizational assets for Islamist political parties in Pakistan that allow Islamists to agitate on the streets rapidly at the beck and call of Islamist parties.

4.1.1.3 Growth in the number of Madrassahs in Pakistan over time

Crucially, madrassahs have grown exponentially in Pakistan in recent decades. This growth has increased their ability to shape social and political outcomes within Pakistan. When juxtaposed with the links madrassah networks have with Islamist political parties, madrassah become instrumental in increasing the social penetration of Islamist parties in Pakistan to which they are linked. The existing literature on social movements and political parties underlines that roots in society are a crucial indicator of party institutionalization in Asia. In this sense, madrassahs act as conduits for Islamist party influence and shape social outcomes among ordinary citizens. They provide the bedrock for the mobilization power of Islamist parties on the streets and in influencing public policy.

Historical trends indicate exponential growth in the number of Madrassahs in Pakistan, especially since the late 1970s. This growth went into overdrive in the 1980s as Pakistan experienced a wave of Islamic revivalism and foreign funding for madrassas from Gulf countries. TABLE 4.1 below traces the growth of Madrassahs in Pakistan over time. From an estimate of around 250 Madrassahs at the time of Pakistan's creation in 1947 (Fair 2008), there are now 32,000 madrassahs in Pakistan attended by some 2.5 million students studying in these madrassahs

¹⁴⁴ For instance, consider this video of an Islamist protestor who is asked by a journalist why he is protesting, and the protestor has no answer:

(Abbas 2019). However, it must be noted that the decentralized and informal nature of the madrassa system in Pakistan that is not tightly regulated by the Pakistani state means that the exact estimates of the number of madrassahs in the country at this time and their growth over time remains difficult to verify and varies by methodology and sources used.

TABLE 4.1: Change in the number of madrassahs by province from 1947 to 2000

Province/Area	1947	1960	1980	1988	2000
Punjab	121	195	1,012	1,320	3,153
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	59	87	426	678	1,281
Sindh	21	87	380	291	905
Balochistan	28	70	135	347	692
Azad Kashmir	4	8	29	76	151
Islamabad	N/A	1	N/A	47	94
Northern Areas	12	16	47	102	185
FATA	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	300
Total	245	464	2,056	2,861	6,741

Source: Christine C. Fair, *The Madrassah Challenge: Militancy and Religious Education in Pakistan*, Washington, DC, United States Institute of Peace Press, 2008.

Moreover, it is worth reiterating that madrassahs are crucial to the broader network of ancillary religious organizations available to Islamist political parties. Madrassah networks do not simply refer to the physical site of the madrassahs where Islamic education occurs but also encompass the central boards that oversee the educational instruction and curriculum development to varying levels of influence within the madrassah. For instance, this is done by the central boards (*awqaf*) of different madrassah networks. These *awqaf* design the curriculum of madrassah that falls under their authority and set the exams that madrassah students need for acquiring religious certifications. Much like Islamist parties, madrassah boards can be divided by the Islamic *maslak* to which they subscribe. However, unlike the Islamist parties, there is also a supra-institutional board that comprises representatives of all the madrassah boards called the *Tanzimat-ul-*

Madaris, which acts as a collective voice of these different madrasah boards on matters of mutual importance.

Out of the main madrassah networks in Pakistan, five madrassah networks are governed by central boards divided along sectarian lines: *Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia* (Deobandi); *Tanzeem Al Madaris* (Barelvi); *Wafaq Al Madaris Salfia* (Ahle Hadith); *Tanzeem Shia Wafaq Al Madaris* (Shia); and *Rabata-ul Madaris* (Jamaat-e-Islami). Since the analytical focus of this study is on the politics of Pakistan's Sunni Islamist parties, especially the major Sunni parties, this will also be the focus for analyzing the madrassah networks of these major parties in detail. Details about the central boards of madrassa networks are summarized in TABLE 4.2 below.

TABLE 4.2: Major Educational Boards (*Awqaf*) of Madrassahs in Pakistan

Name	Sect (Maslak)	Head office	Date Established
Wafaq ul Madaris	Deobandi	Multan	1959
Tanzim ul Madaris	Barelvi	Lahore	1960
Wafaq ul Madaris (Shia) Pakistan	Shia	Lahore	1959
Wafaq-ul-Madaris- al-Salafia	Ahl-e-Hadith	Faisalabad	1955
Raabta-ul-Madaris	Jamaat-e-Islami	Lahore	1983

Source: Tariq Ramadan 2000

Comparative differences exist between different Islamist political parties and the degree to which Madrassahs provide the bedrock for their social mobilization capacity. JUI, for instance, has the largest network of madrassahs out of the Islamist political parties in Pakistan. Other religious parties, such as the JI, also have a madrassah network, but it is less extensive than the JUI. JI's madrassah network, the Jamiat Talaba Arabia (JTA), was established in 1975. It receives support and guidance from the parent party (Crisis Group 2011: 32). The JTA is structured similarly to the JI, with a president (*Muntazim-e-Aala*), a secretary general, *shura* (central council), and yearly elections. Its membership tiers are the same as JI's student wing, the IJT's. The precise number of Jamaat-affiliated madrasas is unclear but is thought to be approximately 850, most of which are in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Crisis Group 2011). Unlike Deobandi madrassahs, JI's

madrassahs permit members of any religious *fiqh* to attend and emphasize the need for Muslims to unite and refrain from divisional politics.

Despite the evidence underlining the centrality of madrassahs as providing the basis for the street power of Islamist parties, religious party politicians belonging to Islamist parties with many madrassahs as part of their madrassah networks generally denied this claim. Abdul Majeed Hazarvi, the chief of JUI-F's Islamabad wing who also runs his own madrassah, denies that madrassah students have anything to do with the street power of JUI-F. Instead, he emphasized that our students "are prevented from participating in any political activity."¹⁴⁵ The JUI-F leader further categorically denied that there was not even one madrassah where JUI-F allowed madrassah students to participate in political rallies during the Azaadi March, a protest march led by Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman, the president of JUI-F against the government of Prime Minister Imran Khan in 2019. While Hazarvi insisted that he and other madrassah staff tell students that their primary task is studying instead of doing politics, however, he added, "students that have graduated from madrassahs and entered practical life are our street power in addition to common Muslims."¹⁴⁶

That said, given the rise in the number of madrassahs, the number of students graduating from these madrassahs is also quite numerous. This means that even if the students that are not actively enrolled and studying in madrassahs at a given moment in time contribute towards creating a large mobilization core zealously committed to Islamist parties through madrassah graduates. These graduates are sympathetic to the Islamist party, which represents the *maslaks* of their madrassah. In this way, madrassahs can act as nurseries of Islamization of Pakistani society and graduates from these madrassahs provide Islamist parties with human capital in the form of religious party members that help contribute to their social mobilization capacity. So even if one accepts the statements of figures

¹⁴⁵ Interview with Abdul Majeed Hazarvi, 2021.

¹⁴⁶ Interview with Abdul Majeed Hazarvi, Head of JUI-F, Islamabad chapter.

like Hazarvi *prima facie* who disagree that madrassahs are true, this does not reject the explanation of madrassahs as a driver in religious protests.

While the growth in the number of madrassahs can be traced to a variety of structural and historical factors that are explored in a separate work, it is useful to briefly mention that madrassah students are taught that creating more madrassahs is one of the single most beneficial endeavors they can achieve in life. One respondent who has written a doctoral dissertation on madrassahs of Pakistan shared that,

I used to ask the leader or manager of every madrassah [during my time as a district administrator in Punjab and as part of my survey on madrassahs in Islamabad], “Who is the most talented student for you?” The answer I almost always received was that “our most talented student is the one that starts and manages their own madrassah after graduating. If a student does not start a new madrassah, that student would be a failure.” I was told usually that, thus, when our students would graduate, they would either move to one of the urban centers of Pakistan or invariably go to Karachi.¹⁴⁷

The above remarks reflect the mindset inculcated within madrassah students, which is one of the reasons behind their exponential growth. Madrassahs act as nurseries of Islamization by promoting Islamist ideals and visions in Pakistani society that we have observed in recent years. Contrary to some of the extant literature, the reasons behind this Islamization are not just driven by the elite ruling class, such as military dictators that used religion to acquire legitimacy, but also have more bottom-up reasons that are rooted more in society and social cleavages and are more organic (cf. Nasr 1994, 1996).

4.2 Large Proportion of Committed Party Workers Relative to Non-Islamist Competitors

Madrassah networks, or, more broadly, networks of ancillary organizations of Islamist parties, are not the only components of a large mobilization core zealously committed to Islamist parties. The second key element is that Islamist parties have

¹⁴⁷ Interview with Respondent A, 2021.

a larger proportion of committed party workers versus party voters relative to their non-Islamist competitors. Features specific to this mobilization core's structure, ideological commitment, and penetration into society make it a crucial factor driving the divergent mobilization of Islamist parties in Pakistan.

4.2.1 Party Voters Are Often the same as Party Workers

Crucially, this mobilization core is more extensive in proportion than that of the non-Islamist competitors of Islamist parties.¹⁴⁸ Evidence supporting the larger proportion of party workers of Islamists was shared with me, for instance, by a senior print and electronic media journalist in Pakistan who specializes in the politics of Pakistani Islamist parties. He expressed that Islamist parties can punch above their electoral weight in street protests since,

For [non-Islamist] parties, the party worker is usually separate from the party voter. However, for Islamist parties, it is common for their party voter to be their political worker and stay united with their party. For instance, in the case of the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PMLN), its party workers are numerically a lot less than their party workers. This means a party like PMLN cannot translate its electoral strength into social mobilization capacity through street power.¹⁴⁹

Specific evidence attesting to a large number of party members of Islamist parties was underlined during my interviews with religious party elites as part of the fieldwork conducted for this study. One leader from JUI-F, which arguably has the largest mobilization cores of Islamist parties in terms of the size of networks of ancillary organizations, revealed that in their last five-year membership drive that was conducted in the year 2018, the number of people who filled out membership forms for their party across Pakistan and paid the registration fee of 20 Pakistani rupees to become card-carrying members of JUI exceeded 3.5 million.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁸ This is something that came up during interviews again and again. It was generally framed as underlining how religious parties have an abundance of committed party workers that are unavailable to their competitors (e.g., Interview with Mustafai, 2021).

¹⁴⁹ Interview with Saleem Safi, 2021.

¹⁵⁰ Interview with Abdul Majeed Hazarvi, 2021.

Interestingly, this impressive number does not include the number of ordinary voters or sympathizers of the party but actual party workers.¹⁵¹

For comparison, it should be mentioned that in the 2018 General Election of Pakistan, JUI-F contested as part of a five-member alliance of religious parties called the Muttahidda Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), which consisted of Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith, Islami Tehreek, JUP, JUI-F, and JI. Even though the membership drive for JUI-F elicited 3.5 million members, the total number of voters that voted for the entire MMA in the national assembly elections was 2 573 939 or 4.85% of the electoral vote. This indicates that JUI-F, and by extension, other Islamist parties, have a large mobilization core, including party workers and members, that is higher in proportion to their voters than other mainstream parties.

Similarly, interviews with other elites revealed a similar story for the case of JI where, at least in the province of Punjab, in an estimated 80 to 90 percent of the cases, JI party voters will also be JI party workers.¹⁵² While it is possible that in other provinces, specifically Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Balochistan, there might be a greater share of people who are just voters of JI and JUI-F and not necessarily workers, there are nonetheless indications that religious parties in Pakistan have a large proportion of workers relative to their voters which makes it easier for them to punch above their electoral weight in the arena of street protests. In this sense, the overlap between party workers and party voters or, framed differently, the higher proportion of party workers than party voters of Islamist parties relative to other political parties as part of the large mobilization core of Islamists is a crucial reason behind their success in the sphere of social mobilization.

¹⁵¹ Interview with Abdul Majeed Hazarvi, 2021.

¹⁵² Note that this estimate is unlikely to apply for other parts of Pakistan especially Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as there is greater electoral support by virtue of seat share for Islamist parties in these regions. I will analyze urban vs rural trends in mobilization in a separate chapter in this work; Interview with Saleem Safi, 2021

4.2.2 Ideological Commitment of Party Workers

Second, not only is a large number of political workers a key reason behind their success in social mobilization, but also so is their ideological commitment. Their larger proportion of rank-and-file party members is more ideologically ingrained with the movement's goals, which drives the street power of Islamist parties.¹⁵³ Islamist party workers' ideological commitment means they support their leaders politically and believe their politics will provide them access to heaven in the afterlife.¹⁵⁴ Part of this reward of the hereafter means that Islamist party workers are more ideologically committed than the supporters of their non-Islamist competitors. Prominent leaders of Islamist parties often underline that the ideological commitment of their rank-and-file party workers gives them an edge over non-Islamist parties in their street power. For instance, this point was mentioned by prominent leaders belonging to JI, such as Dr. Samia Raheel Qazi, who explicitly said, "The basic reason behind the street power of JI is that our workers are committed and aren't overly attached to more material concerns [like the workers of other political parties]. So, the dedication of our workers is why the street power of JI keeps getting stronger."¹⁵⁵

Other JI leaders, such as Inayatullah Khan, who served as a provincial minister in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa twice, explicitly identified that since JI's worker is ideologically trained and has been through much training, they are ready to make any sacrifices for the party. In this sense, the ideological commitment of party workers of Islamist parties such as the JI means that they satisfy the sufficiency condition of a large mobilization core zealously committed to parties that is a crucial variable behind an explanation of Islamists' ability to punch above their electoral weight in the sphere of social mobilization.

¹⁵³ Interview with Umair Javed, 2021.

¹⁵⁴ Interview with Sabookh Syed, 2021.

¹⁵⁵ Interview with Dr. Samia Raheel Qazi 2021, head of JI's women's wing, daughter of former JI Ameer Qazi Hussain Ahmed.

It should be noted that the driver of having a relatively large proportion of committed party workers is valid for most religious parties in Pakistan except for the TLP. Much like madrassahs, TLP leadership denied their street power had any organizational basis, whether in the form of their large party workers or organizational structure.¹⁵⁶ However, analyzing the interview data and the overall sample of interview respondents gave mixed results. Some claimed that TLP had a highly hierarchical organizational structure modelled on the Bolshevik Party in Russia.¹⁵⁷ In contrast, the TLP leadership denied these claims and insisted that the strength of the street power of TLP had more to do with the strength of the message of TLP that was rooted in the true principles and spirit of Islam. It thus resonated with the Pakistani public, and their support had an emotional and ideological basis.

TLP leadership in interviews expressed several insights that build support for large mobilization cores zealously committed to the TLP, being a salient explanation behind their mobilization as well. For instance, when Rana Saifi, the head of TLP's Islamabad chapter, was recounting his unsuccessful electoral campaign for the TLP in his constituency, he shared that during his campaign, TLP leadership held regular meetings that were well attended by thousands of party members when he said, "there were 700, 800, 1000s of people in just our meetings." Crucially, he goes on to underline that he would even boast how the people showing up for the TLP rallies had a large mobilization core, which is something that he mentioned when he said,

In fact, we spoke to those [non-Islamist] members of the public that would show up at our rallies during the electoral campaign that forget your leaders, the way I am contesting the election, then I challenge you to examine the election in this same manner and get the gathering of people that we get. You can't. Because the people you have are on rent, they are here because of money and your influence, but the people here for TLP are here for no greed and no material basis and have only one belief: their love for Allah and his Prophet."¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁶ Rana Saifi 2021; Raja Amir, TLP leader and community organizer, 2021. He was one of the key figures representing TLP's case following the Pakistani state's decision to ban TLP in 2021.

¹⁵⁷ Interview with journalist and national broadcaster Hamid Mir 2021, who has expertise on Islamist issues and was the last person to interview Osama Bin Laden.

¹⁵⁸ Interview with Rana Saifi 2021, head of TLP for the Islamabad-Rawalpindi region.

4.2.3 Deep Roots in Pakistani Society

Third, there are various ways that Islamist parties have large mobilization cores belonging to them, which helps increase their levels of social penetration in Pakistani society, which is geographically dispersed through madrassah networks and Islamist party workers in both the urban and rural areas of Pakistan. Because of this, Islamist parties in Pakistan have deep roots in society, which aids them in mobilizing people and influencing policy by building grassroots support towards Islamist causes. Roots in society have been argued to be an indicator of the institutionalization of political parties and contribute to Islamist parties in Pakistan having a large mobilization core, even if they are tiny from an electoral point of view (see Hicken and Kuhonta).

One can elucidate this by looking at the example of JI, arguably the most hierarchically organized of Pakistan's main Islamist parties. Senior leaders from JI confirmed the insights from existing literature analyzing their party that JI is essentially a cadre-based party (see Iqtidar 2011).¹⁵⁹ JI leadership emphasized that their party focuses on cultivating its cadres. This aids their large mobilization core in passing the sufficiency condition and ensuring that their mobilization core truly “belongs” to them. To achieve this goal, JI employs several approaches.

First, it engages in “character building” exercises that ultimately indoctrinate party workers into JI’s vision and ideology, giving them high ideological commitment.¹⁶⁰ JI’s vision is one where they believe that when our workers interact with others within society, this character disseminates into the broader community. The party workers embody JI’s political and religious vision. So in this manner, the enlarged mobilization core in the form of cadres takes centre-stage for JI, and their

¹⁵⁹ Interview with Respondent C, 2021.

¹⁶⁰ Interview with Mian Aslam 2021. Senior leader of JI and former Member of National Assembly of Pakistan from NA-48 constituency of Islamabad.

vision and practices are such that they rely on party organization to advance their political vision.

Jl's encompassing Islamic and social vision provides the recipe for its cadres to act as torchbearers with deep societal roots. A senior leader of Jl, Mian Aslam, who had previously served as a member of the National Assembly of Pakistan, emphasized that Jl did not just believe in a narrow understanding of Islam that merely involved checking off a list of boxes but a complete and total guide for how to lead one's life. Jl encourages its cadres to socialize into the party subculture to canvass others and invite them into Jl. If they accept the invitation, they are rigorously trained by the party in Jl's Islamic vision.¹⁶¹ The depth and social reach of Islamist organizations encompassing Jl's mobilization core range from those at the top to the very bottom of society and across all sectors to promote Islamist reform per Jl's ideology. As Aslam emphasized, the foundation behind Jl's vision is embedded with the organization and reform of society that will eventually yield high dividends. There were some 200 office-bearing leaders of the Jl in different levels of the administering the Pakistani state ranging from MNAs, MPA, Senators, and District Mayors (*Nazims*).

In this manner, Jl has penetrated all classes and segments of society. Each such segment has a dedicated organization to disseminate its message. For students, Jl has its students wing (*Islami Jamiat-e-Talaba* or IJT); for madrassahs, it has its waqf (*Jamiat Taliba Arabiya*); for engaging with labour, it has a labour wing (National Labour Federation); for social provision of services, it has a welfare wing (Al-Khidmat Foundation), a branch for farmers (Jl Kissan), medical doctors (Beema), engineers (engineers forum), and even a club for reaching books called *Tehreek-e-Mehnat* (Movement for Hardwork).¹⁶² In addition to these formal organizational bodies that Jl has created, it also cultivates its mobilization core through study circles that propagate and educate its party workers into Jl's ideology and, basically, in every aspect for every individual across all walks of life

¹⁶¹ Interview with Mian Aslam, 2021.

¹⁶² Interview with Mian Aslam, 2021.

are invited into JI through their party workers and the Islamist literature written by authors such as Maulana Abu Ala Maudoodi (JI's founder), Amin Ahsan Islahi, Syed Qutab and Hasan Al Banna is shared among potential recruits. Through this literature, even if our formal speeches are of a few minutes, we hope to permanently change the minds of individuals and convert them into JI workers.¹⁶³

Ultimately, this ideological training of cadres contributes to creating a very ideologically rigid Islamist organization. This ideological rigidity of the mobilization core of Islamist parties also has a more material and structural basis. Much of the Islamist party mobilization core consists of students, local clerics (*molvis*), or Islamic scholars (*ulema*). These individuals rely on the goodwill of the people, such as the larger populace or the elites within an area, instead of for many of their expenses. People donate to their madrassah or mosque, and this shields them, to a degree, from more material considerations and allows them to be more ideologically inflexible than what otherwise would have been the case if material considerations would constrain them to be more pragmatic in their political positions. Evidence supporting this idea came up during interviews. For instance, one Islamist party expert underlined this dynamic by highlighting that,

The ulema or cleric doesn't have to buy household items such as sugar himself; he doesn't have to pay for electricity or gas used by his household; he doesn't have to pay for the doctor as the neighbourhood's doctor also does his medical checkup for free; he doesn't have to pay the school fee of his children, he doesn't have to pay for the pharmacy as the samples of the medicines by the district healthcare officers are given to him for free; so ultimately this cushions the ulema to remain unaffected by material pressures such as inflation can continue with their emotional and idealistic appeals.¹⁶⁴

Second, the party focuses on expanding this large mobilization core by promoting regular intra-party activities that ensure that party workers are regularly exposed to the party sub-cultures. In the case of JI, for instance, its emphasis on democracy

¹⁶³ Interview with Mian Aslam, 2021.

¹⁶⁴ Interview with Sabookh Syed, 2021.

is emphasized through regular elections within the party, unlike any other major political party in Pakistan. As one senior JI leader shared,

“JI is the kind of party that come what may, we will always have elections, and they happen regularly. And democracy exists at the grassroots level. Every year we have elections, even at the ward level and every day, there is a ballot paper that I have to cast. And since women have to vote twice in JI, other female party members of JI and I are voting almost every day. Within a given month, there will sometimes be an election at the federal and provincial levels. So, democracy and democratic principles are inculcated deeply within JI and its party workers. But we ensure this democracy is subservient to Islamic principles expressed in the Quran and Sunnah.”¹⁶⁵

Third, the literature often incorrectly states that using a gender lens, Islamist street protests and activities are only restricted to men. However, some of the fieldwork in this study did not support this. Instead, there was inter-party variation within Islamists on the degree of gender inclusivity in their mobilization cores. This point covered the typologies and inter-party variation between Islamist political sections in more detail. However, briefly, if one focuses on the evidence using our running example of JI, then there is evidence supporting the notion that JI has the most organized women’s wing of any of the rest of the Islamist parties. A senior female leader from JI emphasized the contribution and vibrancy of the women’s wing of JI by saying,

“people incorrectly quote that Maudoodi was against women's political participation in politics. However, they disregard that towards the end of his life had changed his opinions. And through his endorsement, JI’s women's wing participates very actively, and we do much work in health and free and fair elections. Our political cell works on various themes relevant to JI's national and international politics. Our women's wing does all the work that our men’s wing, and our women participate very actively in any street protests organized by the party.”¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁵ Interview with Dr. Samia Raheel Qazi 2021.

¹⁶⁶ Interview with Dr. Samia Raheel Qazi 2021.

5 Conclusion:

In this chapter, I have argued that the large mobilization cores zealously committed to Islamist parties in Pakistan are a crucial reason explaining their high social mobilization in Pakistan. I advanced an analytical framework identifying large networks of ancillary organizations of Islamist parties and a larger proportion of party workers than party voters relative to non-Islamist competitors to the critical components behind the outsized influence of Islamists in social mobilization in Pakistan relative to their electoral weight. First, within ancillary networks of Islamist organizations, I especially emphasized the significance of madrassah networks to be vital as an empirical driver in giving Islamist parties their street power. These madrassah networks fulfill the conditions of high organizational density and deep linkages with political parties in the form of their exponential rise over the course of recent Pakistani history and their linkages with Islamist parties. Second, for the large proportion of party workers component of the mobilization core, I showcased how the distinctive overlap of party workers with party voters for Islamist parties, their intense ideological commitment and deep roots in society help aid social mobilization. The general implication of Islamist parties in Pakistan has been simple: they have been relatively successful as pressure groups in the Pakistani state, partly because they are large organizations, even if they may be weak political parties.

Chapter 5: The Establishment and Patterns of Social and Electoral Mobilization of Islamist Parties in Pakistan (1947-2022)

“There are NAB [National Accountability Bureau] cases on politicians throughout Pakistan. Nawaz Sharif is facing corruption cases, Maryam Nawaz is facing these cases, Hamza Shehbaz is facing these cases, Zardari is in jail, and Benazir Bhutto faced [sic] NAB cases. Everyone is involved in these cases except for one person: Maulana Fazlur Rehman. Every time NAB calls him, he says I will not go; I will give a dharna [sit-in] in front of the NAB office...Tell me, if it were not for state patronage and support, then how could they do all this thuggery?” – Sabookh Syed, 2021

1. Introduction

This chapter advances a historical periodization for the social and electoral mobilization of Islamist parties in Pakistan. It underlines that a key reason driving divergent mobilization is the state’s ruling elite, which refers to the establishment in the context of Pakistan. The establishment can “divide and rule” different political actors, such as Islamist parties, within the party system by aiding them in the arena of social mobilization to weaken civilian governments but curtailing their mobilization in national elections so that they do not acquire excessive power to become a challenge to the establishment. The establishment does this through two specific mechanisms that capture the pattern through which the military establishment influences divergent patterns of mobilization of Islamist parties: 1) the pattern of cooptation and limited repression of Islamist parties and 2) a pattern resembling political control by Pakistan’s ruling elite.¹⁶⁷ In this sense, these two mechanisms encompass the “how” component of the analytical framework forged in this chapter.

The patterns of cooptation and limited repression and political control underscore a dual strategy in the way the military establishment of Pakistan

¹⁶⁷ See Svoblik 2012: 9-11 for more on cooptation and limited repression, and political control.

moderates the divergent mobilization of Islamist parties. It entails that while the establishment facilitates and sometimes even fosters the social mobilization of Islamist parties in Pakistan, principally by positively influencing the street power of Islamist groups, it simultaneously curtails their political ascent to ensure that no group becomes powerful enough to alter the balance of power between the establishment and other political actors fundamentally. Crucially, the military can often use Islamist parties in Pakistan as tools for creating “democratic disorder” by enhancing their social mobilization while preventing them from becoming mass electoral machines. The military establishment-influenced disorder that Islamist parties can instigate is often at the expense of the civilian government in power and favours the military establishment. In this way, the establishment’s dual strategy of fostering and limiting Islamist parties highlights its enduring influence over the observed and subterranean currents of Pakistani politics.

The chapter provides a historical periodization of Pakistani political history concerning the outcomes of Islamist parties' social and electoral mobilization and the role played by the military establishment. This helps orient the chapter by giving an overview of the context necessary to forge the analytical framework for this chapter. It also illuminates the patterns in which the military establishment engaged with Islamist parties and provides suggestive evidence for how it influenced Islamist social and electoral mobilization. In this sense, the section briefly charts the historical trajectory of the relationship between the establishment and Islamist social and electoral mobilization.

2. Periodization of Divergent Mobilization of Islamist Parties in Pakistan (1947-2023)

First, it is important to define the state’s ruling elite in the context of Pakistan. The term ruling elite draws from the literature on autocracies, focusing on the ruling coalition supporting dictators (see Svobik 2012:6). Its semantic counterpart is inspired by Soviet politics, wherein Stalin’s inner circle came to be known as the “select group,” the “close circle,” or – most commonly – the “ruling group (Svobik

2012: 6).” However, I use the term “the establishment,” which captures a similar conceptual target to a ruling coalition but refers to the state’s ruling elite, which includes high-ranking military officers, bureaucratic elites, regime-backed political parties and judges in cahoots with an autocratic military regime in the empirical context of hybrid regimes like Pakistan. However, “the establishment” refers principally to the Pakistani military, along with a close circle of state allies.

Second, a related implication of using the establishment as a term instead of the military is to emphasize that there is a general and systematic interference of Pakistan’s military in her politics. Terms such as “the establishment” are often used by the Pakistani public, analysts and practitioners, presumably to avoid state repression. Several other similar terms and references are also used that avoid outrightly naming the armed forces such as “*khalai makhlooq*” (aliens) or “Mr. X,” though establishment is the most common. In this sense, the military’s pervasive involvement in politics is an open secret of which the Pakistani public, analysts, and practitioners are well aware. At different periods in history, the military has done little to contribute towards dispelling this perception. For instance, Pakistan’s army has often flouted the Pakistani constitution and the oath of non-interference in Pakistani politics that military officers take. Interference by Pakistan’s military has been direct, in the form of the imposition of military coups, and indirect, in its covert involvement in the day-to-day politics of Pakistan.

Third, and crucially, the military establishment also plays a pivotal role when it comes to the social and electoral mobilization of Islamist parties. In anonymous conversations, some active and former officers of the Pakistani Army confirmed the role played by its military in Pakistan’s politics. As Lt. Colonel (retired) Zaighum Butt, who has extensive experience dealing with Islamist actors as an ex-officer of Pakistan’s premier intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), in the 1990s and 2000s emphasized,

The first thing to understand is that a developing country like ours has always had a role for the military [in politics], and this role will stay there...it

wouldn't be wrong to say that this role would never be finished. Isn't it there in the US?...We [the Pakistan military] talk to everyone¹⁶⁸.

TABLE 5.1 summarizes the temporal variation in the social and electoral mobilization of Islamist parties and the involvement of Pakistan's military establishment. As TABLE 5.1 delineates, there are four broad periods within Pakistani political history: 1) early statehood, 2) emergence of cooptation by the state, 3) assertive state cooptation,¹⁶⁹ and 4) rise of *Barelvi* politicization and demise of the "B" team. Out of these four periods, two periods can be further subdivided for increased granularity and analytical leverage. First, the period from 1979 to 2001 can be divided into a sub-period from 1979 to 1987 that marked the regime of the military dictator Zia-ul-Haq and was characterized by the assertive cooptation of Islamist groups by the establishment and the incorporation of their causes into state policy. It can also be divided into the period lasting from the death of Zia in 1987 till the start of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) under the military regime of General Pervez Musharraf in 2001. This period is best described as a period when several Islamist parties were known as the military establishments' "B team" in Pakistan to capture the high levels of cooptation of Islamist parties and the establishment.

Second, the period "Rise of *Barelvi* Politicization and Demise of the "B" team" from 2001-2012 is characterized by the rise of *Barelvi* politicization and the gradual move towards the demise of the military's cooptation of its older Islamist allies, such as the *Deobandi* groups and JI. The period from 2001-2011 marks the pivot by the establishment towards *Barelvi* politicization, whereas the period from 2011 to 2022 marks a time when *Barelvi* politicization coalesced and became mainstream and was characterized by rising extremism that was often channelled into social mobilization. The period thus captures a switch away from relying on older Islamist allies such as *Deobandi* groups and JI by the military establishment of Pakistan to

¹⁶⁸ Interview with Lt. Col. (retired) Zaighum Butt, 2021.

¹⁶⁹ Primarily of JI and Deobandi groups.

newer Islamist political parties that were primarily *Barelvi* in their composition, such as the TLP.

TABLE 5.1: A Periodization of Pakistan's Establishment and Islamist Divergent Mobilization

Years	Period	Patterns of Divergent Mobilization	
		Pattern of Social Mobilization	Pattern of Electoral Mobilization
1947-1971	Early Statehood	Mostly Oppositional*	Pressure Group with little electoral mobilization
1971-1979	Emergence of State Co-optation & Patronage	Periodic Cooptation**	Start of significant electoral interest
1979-1987	Assertive State Cooptation: State patronage	Assertive Cooptation	Limited National Success But Some Success at the Local Level
1987-2001	Assertive State Cooptation: Establishment's B team	Assertive Cooptation	Used Extensively in Alliances and Coalition Politics
2001- 2011	Rise of <i>Barelvi</i> Politicization and Demise of the "B" team: Emergence of <i>Barelvi</i> Politicization	Cooptation	Cooptation and Limited Repression
2011-2022	Rise of <i>Barelvi</i> Politicization and Demise of the "B" Team: The Mainstreaming of <i>Barelvi</i> Extremism	Cooptation	Vote Splitting as Challenger Parties

Source: Author's formulation.

Note:*An exception to this would be the Lahore riots of 1954, which the Munir Report (1954) clarifies were instigated partly by the state's cognizance and culpability.** At all times, some maslaks were pro, whereas other groups were anti-establishment. The patterns capture the dominant form of the type of relationship. In this period, PNA parties were mostly against the civilian government of Bhutto, and some suggestive evidence indicates that they were, to a limited degree, pro-establishment.

However, seeing that Islamist parties in Pakistan are not monolithic entities and have high levels of fragmentation, analyzing these patterns more precisely necessitates disaggregating Islamist parties by their sects or *masalik*. For this purpose, it is analytically significant to focus on the major Islamist parties instead of the smaller ones to discern the subtle variation in their mobilization patterns. TABLE 5.2 below identifies the patterns of mobilization of major Islamist parties over the course of Pakistani political history. It offers a deeper account of the relationship of the Pakistani establishment with the various Islamist political parties and groups. In this way, TABLE 5.2 helps capture inter-sectoral and inter-

party variation in the mobilization patterns of Islamists with reference to the Pakistani establishment.

TABLE 5.2: Sect-Wise Patterns of Mobilization with reference to the establishment

Time-Period	Political Party (and Maslak)	Relationship with the Establishment
1947-1971	JI	Oppositional
1947-1971	JUI (Deobandi)	JUI Mufti Mahmud Group: oppositional Shabbir Ahmed Usmani Group: Pro-state
1947-1971	JUP/Barelvi Groups	Largely non-political and pro-state
1971	JI	Pro-establishment
1971	JUI (Deobandi)	Mufti Mahmud Group: Anti-establishment Shabbir Ahmed Usman/Pro Group: Pro-establishment
1971	JUP/Barelvi Groups	Pro-establishment
1971-1979	JI	Pro-establishment
1971-1979	JUI (Deobandi)	Pro-establishment
1971-1979	JUP/Barelvi Groups	Pro-establishment
1979-1989	JI	Pro-establishment
1979-1989	JUI (Deobandi)	Mixed
1979-1989	JUP/Barelvi Groups	Pro-establishment
1989-2001	JI	Pro-establishment
1989-2001	JUI (Deobandi)	Pro-establishment
1989-2001	JUP/Barelvi Groups	Pro-establishment
2001-2011	JI	Pro-establishment
2001-2011	JUI (Deobandi)	Pro-establishment
2001-2011	JUP/Barelvi Groups	Pro-establishment
2011-2022	JI	Oppositional
2011-2022	JUI (Deobandi)	Oppositional
2011-2022	JUP/Barelvi Groups	Limited Repression
2011-2022	JI	Oppositional
2011-2022	JUI (Deobandi)	2011-2018: Pro-establishment 2018: Oppositional
2011-2022	JUP/Barelvi Groups	Pro-establishment

Source: Author's formulation.

2.1. 1947-1971 Early Statehood: Influencing Politics from Outside the Parliament

As TABLE 5.1 shows, the first period involves Islamist mobilization during the years of early statehood of Pakistan. For much of the initial years after the formation of Pakistan in 1947, Islamist parties primarily acted as a pressure group that was largely disinterested in mobilizing electorally under the banner of a political party in an organized manner. However, even in these years, Islamist

groups played a crucial role in social mobilization at several key events, such as through their street agitation.¹⁷⁰ For instance, a key example is the role of Islamist parties in instigating the Lahore riots in 1953, under which martial law had to be imposed in the city to contain street agitation. The riots were instigated due to the public outrage that was led by Islamist groups over controversial comments made by the then Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Zafrullah Khan, who was an *Ahmadiyyah* Muslim (Ahmadi).¹⁷¹ Protestors demanded that Khan be removed from office and agitated on the streets. However, the state did not capitulate to the demands of protestors.

After the first decade of statehood, the military establishment of Pakistan increasingly started to play a role in coopting Islamist mobilization, especially after the imposition of the second martial law in the country and the regime of Field Marshal Ayub Khan, which started in 1958 (see Fair 2014). While the state was trying to coopt Islamist groups, it was largely trying to do this by becoming a custodian of Islamic authority and religious interpretation by fusing the state with Islamic religious authority. This was being done by Ayub to try to claw back some of the power of the *ulema*, who are regarded as the custodians of religious authority in Islam (Zaman 2002). Ayub felt the state had to be safeguarded against the power of the *ulema*. Some of this can be surmised as per an Op-ed article Ayub wrote in *Foreign Affairs* in 1960. He seems to define Pakistan's ideology, and under him, "the army arrogated to itself the task of protecting Pakistan's ideological as well as physical frontiers (Fair 2014: 73)." As Cohen notes, "[under Ayub] Pakistan began the process of official myth-creation in earnest. A large central bureaucracy was created to manufacture an ideology for Pakistan, one that glorified the army as the state's key institution (Cohen 2004: 67)." Some of the aspirations of Ayub's vision can be observed from his *Foreign Affairs* article in which he says,

¹⁷⁰ Interview with Farhatullah Babar, 2021.

¹⁷¹ Ahmadis are a group of people who claim to be a sect of Islam. However, this claim is contested by other Muslims who emphasize that, among other things, since Ahmadis do not believe Muhammad to be the last prophet of God they do not fulfill the requirements to be a Muslim; Interview with Hamid Mir, 2021.

The State from the Islamic standpoint is an endeavour to transform these ideals into space-time forces, an aspiration to realize them in a definite human organization.” It is this sort of human organization which Pakistan aspires to become and *one of my endeavours is to clear at least a part of the way by liberating the basic concept of our ideology from the dust of vagueness and ambiguities it has accumulated over the years* (Khan 1960: 547-548, emphasis added).

Some evidence of Islamists acting as a pressure group and an oppositional force against Ayub can be gauged by one of the justifications provided by Ayub Khan for the imposition of martial law on 7 October 1958 by President Iskandar Mirza, whom Ayub soon exiled to England with the support of other senior military officers. Ayub emphasized that he wanted to save Pakistan from religious and extremist forces (see White 2008). Moreover, Ayub adopted a range of policies during his regime, which underlines the establishment’s efforts to curb Islamist groups and bring them within the orbit of the state. Some of these include: 1) Under Ayub, “Islamic” was dropped from the official state name of Pakistan, which had previously been called the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in the first constitution of Pakistan in 1956 (Ziring 1984: 935);¹⁷² 2) Ayub created the Central Institute for Islamic Research of Pakistan in 1963 that was headed by the modernist Islamic scholar and philosopher Fazlur Rehman Malik¹⁷³ who was criticized by conservative Islamists as being too liberal (Tonn 1995);¹⁷⁴ 3) Ayub’s government passed the controversial family law ordinance in 1961 which restricted some level of polygamy and provided more rights for women even though the ordinance was opposed by all major and most small Islamist parties at the time, and to this day, has never been repealed despite agreement among Islamist parties to oppose it (see Ziring 1984), and 4) perhaps most famously, Ayub imprisoned the founder and leader of the main Islamist party at the time, Maulana Maudoodi of JI, who was placed under murder charges though

¹⁷² Though this was reversed due to pressure from the country’s opinion leaders via a constitutional Amendment (Ziring 1984:935).

¹⁷³ Who taught Islamic Studies at McGill until 1961.

¹⁷⁴ See Sonn, Tamara. (1995). "Rahman, Fazlur". In John L. Esposito. The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

these were later dropped (see Ullah 2013).¹⁷⁵ In this way, many of the policies undertaken by Ayub's regime were part of his vision of using Islam for the fashioning of an Islamic identity by the state, ultimately decreasing the authority of the religious elite like the *ulema* and empowering the Pakistani establishment.

For much of this period, Pakistan's Army was only beginning to take a more aggressive role in Pakistan's domestic politics.¹⁷⁶ The establishments' penetration into the Pakistani state was not as deep as it became over time. However, even during this period, there were instances that point towards the establishment's involvement in the social mobilization of Islamist parties. For instance, some, like Dr. Imran Shehzad, have emphasized that the Ahmadi Riot in 1954, which occurred principally in Punjab, had some level of involvement of the Pakistani as per the findings of the commission that was formed to investigate the riots with its findings published in what is now popularly known as the Munir Report in 1954.¹⁷⁷

On balance, there is suggestive evidence that the military establishment was weakly involved in Islamist social mobilization even during this early period in Pakistani political history. However, the dominant feature of Islamist mobilization during the initial two decades after the creation of Pakistan is its influence in decision-making from the outside and not inside the parliament. Even when there were instances when Islamist parties had opportunities to become part of electoral politics in a mainstream manner, such as those in 1957 and 1962-69 in the case of hybrid democracy, Islamist parties did not fare better.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁵ Maudoodi, however, was released in 1964. His murder charges were dropped. See: <https://www.nytimes.com/1979/09/23/archives/maulana-abdul-ala-maududi-76-a-pakistani-islamic-party-leader.html>. Accessed August 11, 2024.

¹⁷⁶ Interview with Aizaz Syed, 2021.

¹⁷⁷ Interview with Dr. Imran Shehzad, 2021. For the Munir Report, The Report of the Court of Inquiry into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953 (Lahore: Government Printing Press, 1954), pp. 200–220, 231–232. The Report was called the Munir Report after the name of the senior presiding judge Muhammad Munir for the commission.

¹⁷⁸ Interview with Farhat Ullah Babar, 2021.

2.2. 1971-1979: Emergence of State Cooptation: Beginning of Parliamentary Politics

The next period of Islamist political mobilization can be characterized as the emergence of state cooptation, which corresponds to the beginning of formal parliamentary politics and electoral campaigning by Islamist parties. In this period, Islamist groups increasingly realized the importance of contesting elections while continuing to engage in social mobilization, such as agitating on the streets. While the reasons for this are difficult to generalize, one rationale is emphasized by former Senator and ex-journalist Farhatullah Babar, who emphasizes:

Once religious parties saw they could influence state policies even from outside the parliament, they realized they would be able to influence state policies by being inside the parliament after winning elections. For instance, JI, prior to the 1970 elections, thought that they would sweep the general election because of their ability to influence state policies [through social mobilization]; however, the result was the complete opposite.¹⁷⁹

The secession of East Pakistan into independent Bangladesh in 1971 was a key event that left an indelible mark on patterns of Islamist political mobilization in Pakistan. During this time, the most organized Islamist political party at the time, JI, which was opposed to the Pakistani establishment prior to the events leading to 1971, was greatly coopted by the Pakistani establishment and aided it in persecuting East Pakistani citizens in a variety of ways. This included JI members being a part of armed militias as well as acting through its affiliated university student union, the *Islami Jamiat Tulaba* (IJT) (Nasr 1996). During the elections of 1970, JI decided to support the military dictator Yahya Khan and organized street processions to support him.¹⁸⁰ Sher Ali Khan Pataudi, who was the Federal Information Minister for Broadcasting and National Affairs at the time, was an active supporter of JI and used religious rhetoric in his politics and thus contributed

¹⁷⁹ Interview with Farhatullah Babar, 2021.

¹⁸⁰ Interview with Hamid Mir, 2021.

to how the national identity of Pakistan became embedded with Islam more deeply.¹⁸¹

Crucially, the Pakistani establishment adopted a pattern of cooptation and limited repression of Islamist parties in this period that repeats over much of subsequent Pakistani political history. Elements within the Pakistani establishment realized that Islamist groups could be useful in their quest for legitimacy (see Nasr 2001) as well as advancing its other geostrategic goals. Islamist party leaders, such as Samia Raheel Qazi of JI, agree and insist that JI played a crucial role in defending the territoriality of Pakistan during key events in Pakistani political history. She emphasizes,

We have always believed Pakistan to be part of our blood, whether it is the 1965 war or 1971. When Bangladesh was being formed [sic]. JI fully believes that we are supposed to act as the protectors of the territorial and ideological integrity of Pakistan. I have seen my own father [the deceased *Emir* of JI, Qazi Hussain Ahmed], who was very opposed to Zia-ul-Haq, and during Musharraf's time, he had the distinct honour of being the first political prisoner. Similarly, my dad had many conflicts with Zia-ul-Haq from the very start, so what I have seen is that politically, we are very opposed to them [the Pakistani establishment], but when it comes to crucial moments, religious parties have always sided with Pakistan¹⁸²

From the point of view of electoral mobilization, JI, which had been opposed to the establishment for much of the Ayub years, supported the military dictator Yahya Khan in the general election of 1970. The public gave the mandate to the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and Sheikh Mujibur Rehman's Awami League (AL) that year, which was the first general election in Pakistan. It not only established that there were key differences between the desires and aspirations of the areas that once comprised the two wings of Pakistan (East and West Pakistan)¹⁸³, but it also demonstrated that the voters of either part of the country were not swayed by the

¹⁸¹ Interview with Hamid Mir, 2021.

¹⁸² Interview with Dr. Samia Raheel Qazi, 2021.

¹⁸³ Pakistan, for much of Ayub's time, comprised the areas that now compromise Bangladesh, which can be called East Pakistan, and the areas that now compromise Pakistan, which can be called West Pakistan. Though Yahya Khan had abolished the One Unit scheme after mounting public pressure and resentment in June 1970 and the 1970 election was not held under the one unit scheme

campaigns of Islamist parties.¹⁸⁴ Arshad Sami Khan writes that the military establishment thought that JI and the pro-establishment Muslim League (Daulatana Group) would get a majority in the elections and also disbursed money in support of these parties (Khan 2008). Similarly, other practitioners have also written that in the 1970 election, JI was given state patronage in the form of funds by the establishment (Siddiqui 1996). What these episodes suggest is that Islamist parties have a history of opposition to the popular civilian leadership of Pakistan, sometimes with support from the Pakistani establishment.¹⁸⁵

From 1971 to 1979, Islamist parties played a crucial role in opposing the civilian government during the government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (ZAB). They agitated on the streets and pressured ZAB to pass legislation declaring Ahmadis non-Muslims under the constitution. Islamists were also instrumental in driving the *Tehreek-e-Nizam-e-Mustapha* (TNM), which was a populist political alliance consisting of nine political parties, against ZAB in 1977. The backbone for the street agitation instigated by TNM was provided by Islamist parties such as the Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP), JI, and JUI. During this time, the Bareilvi JUP was led by Shah Ahmed Noorani, the Deobandi JUI was led by Mufti Mahmud and JI was led by Mian Tufail Mohammad.

In the general elections of 1977, religious parties once again did not receive a number of seats in the national and provincial legislature that would have been proportional to their street power.¹⁸⁶ This poor electoral performance by Islamist parties occurred even though Islamist parties at this time had launched TNM, which was a movement that was predicated on, among other things, the protection of the finality of Prophet Muhammad in the legal and policy framework of Pakistan (Nasr 1996). In some ways, this was the first instance of a street protest movement at a national level in Pakistan that was instigated by Islamist parties. Two religious

¹⁸⁴ For instance, JUI got just seven seats from West Pakistan.

¹⁸⁵ Or for the case of pre-independence legacies under the British colonial raj, most Islamist parties, especially those from the Deobandi camp and JI, had sided with the INC and were opposed to the creation of Pakistan.

¹⁸⁶ However, the electoral integrity of this election is widely questioned even by Pakistani standards.

parties, the JI in Lahore and Central Punjab and the JUP in Karachi, were instrumental in staging these protests.¹⁸⁷

Some observers have noted that it is possible that opposition to the civilian government of ZAB was encouraged and aided by circles within the Pakistani establishment¹⁸⁸. For instance, the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA)'s activities immediately after the imposition of martial law by the military dictator, Zia-ul-Haq, provide suggestive evidence that the establishment was supportive of the PNA movement towards the end of the Bhutto regime. Moreover, some insight supporting the establishment's involvement in PNA's agitation against ZAB towards the end of his tenure can be found in the use of language and allegations usually associated with the establishment by PNA as attacks against ZAB is a sign that there might have been some collusion between them. For instance, it was alleged that ZAB was a "liberal, secular and Pakistan *dushman* [anti-Pakistan, or Pakistan's enemy].¹⁸⁹ The use of language like *dushman* was an allegation that the establishment had often used against communists in Pakistan and democratic challengers to quash opposition and dissidents historically, especially in the 1960s.

Finally, and perhaps most tellingly, when Zia removed ZAB unconstitutionally, the PNA endorsed this decision. This action by PNA strongly indicates that the establishment was also opposed to the Bhutto government, especially after the debacle of the 1977 elections. This was even more ironic since the PNA fashioned itself as a democratic movement that was composed of political parties that were opposing ZAB's policies and ended up supporting undemocratic and unconstitutional ends to remove Bhutto from power. Given most Islamist parties at the time were members of PNA and were providing much of the street power behind the movement's agitation, a link between PNA's actions and Islamist links with the Pakistani establishment can be inferred.¹⁹⁰ It builds support for the view that the Pakistani establishment was co-opting Islamist parties and

¹⁸⁷ Interview with Ahsan Bhatti, 2021.

¹⁸⁸ Interview with Nasrullah Malik, 2021.

¹⁸⁹ Interview with Nasrullah Malik, 2021.

¹⁹⁰ Interview with Ali Raza, 2021.

influencing their level of social mobilization, especially following the events around 1970-71 and the secession of Bangladesh. As one journalist noted, PNA's support for the removal of Bhutto and the imposition of martial law "basically proved that the establishment wanted to get rid of Bhutto"¹⁹¹

2.3. 1979-2001: Assertive State Cooptation

The period from 1979 to 2001 is characterized as a time when Pakistan's establishment started influencing the social and electoral mobilization of Islamist parties more assertively. This time saw a greater degree of patronage by the Pakistani establishment to Islamist parties and their causes. These parties were now increasingly involved in the state's policy formulation and were given public offices. This period can be further subdivided into at least two sub-periods. First, the period during which the country was ruled by the longest-ruling military dictator in Pakistani history, Zia-ul-Haq, who remained in power from 1979 to 1987. Second, the period following Zia's death in 1987 and ending right at the start of the Global War on Terror in 2001.

2.3.1. 1979-1987: Assertive State Cooptation: Incorporation into State Agenda

The period from 1979 to 1987 marks the extensive use of Islamist parties and groups by the military establishment. This period marks the first time that Islamist parties started occupying official state offices and executive posts in significant numbers during the regime of the military dictator Zia-ul-Haq. Zia used various tactics and approaches that involved influencing Islamist social and political mobilization. This helped him acquire legitimacy in the eyes of the domestic Pakistani public and international audiences (Nasr 2001). This period is also set apart by the growing influence that Islamist forces had acquired on their own after years of mobilization since the creation of Pakistan, principally, for instance,

¹⁹¹ Interview with Nasrullah Malik, 2021.

through their influence in social mobilization such as street protests (See Butt 2016).

Some approaches used by Zia for coopting Islamist parties included his policy of “Islamization” in Pakistan, which became the centerpiece of the domestic policy of Zia’s government. Key components of Islamization included: 1) the passing of Anti-Ahmadi or Blasphemy legislation that introduced measures that had the de-facto effect of making it easier to persecute minorities such as Ahmadis; 2) the introduction of the Hudood ordinance that related to personal and family law and introduced especially draconian measures curtailing women’s rights and liberties; 3) the establishment of legislation and policies covering issues related to Islamic finance where the banking industry was made more Islamic by banning interest payments for bank accounts;¹⁹² 4) the adoption of measures revising the educational curriculum to make it more “Islamic,” and 5) the creation of separate Shariat judicial courts and court benches to judge legal cases using Islamic doctrine (Butt 2016; Nasr 2001; see Kennedy 1988).

The extant literature emphasizes either top-down (Nasr 2001) or bottom-up (Butt 2016) factors as driving Zia’s Islamization. This work instead shows that both were salient, with social mobilization being crucial in moving the policy needle towards Islamist causes (see Chapter 4) and a lot of it being imposed from the top via the military establishment of Pakistan (see Chapter 5; this chapter). This chapter especially unearths how the military establishment was crucial in advancing some Islamist causes like Islamization but not others like ending its support for the Global War On Terror. Support for how the establishment started to use Islamist forces for its ends can be found in the remarks by Islamist party expert Khurshid Ahmad Nadeem, who opines,

The state or establishment has driven these Islamic changes. It was not just the religious parties that were doing this [Islamist mobilization]. From Kashmir to Afghanistan, religion was used by the state; similarly, against Benazir, the establishment used the religion card. However, as awareness is

¹⁹² The automatic deduction and banning of interest was later reversed by Zia due to opposition and social mobilization principally by Shia Islamist parties (Talbot 1998).

increasing among people, the state apparatus is finding it harder to use the religion card.¹⁹³

However, as TABLE 5.2 implies, to better capture party-wise dynamics and variation with reference to the role played by the Pakistani establishment in driving the social and electoral mobilization of Islamist parties, it is helpful to disaggregate the Islamist party system. On the one hand, JI was part of the provisional cabinet that was created by Zia. This alliance quickly broke down, and JI, then led by Mian Tufail, who had originally acceded to Zia's demands, was now recalcitrant and turned against Zia. Some observers have noted how Zia easily convinced Tufail, who decided to support him "over a cup of tea."¹⁹⁴ Similarly, when it comes to electoral mobilization, Zia banned party-based general elections. His regime was characterized by devolution of power to the local level to bypass political power at the provincial level. This weakened the civilian opposition by weakening political parties competing in the party system. After six years of rule, the general elections that were held under Zia's government in 1985 were contested on a non-party basis. This allowed the emergence of figures from JI to occupy public offices and become more prominent in Pakistani politics, such as Dr. Farid Ahmad Piracha and Liaquat Baloch (Mir 2021).

On the other hand, JUI (Fazal-ur-Rahman), which was part of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), was formed in opposition to Zia-ul-Haq's autocratic rule and was an alliance of oppositional parties to Zia. Even though the MRD was comprised primarily of non-Islamist and even leftist political parties, JUI-F, which is a major *Deobandi* party, was in contradistinction with the rest of pro-Zia Sunni Islamist parties at the time. In this way, disaggregating the position of major Islamist parties towards the Pakistani establishment, as underlined by TABLE 2, provides meaningful insights for analyzing their patterns of social and electoral mobilization.

¹⁹³ Interview with Khurshid Ahmed Nadeem, 2021.

¹⁹⁴ Interview with Ali Sher, 2021.

It should be mentioned, though, that contemporary JI leaders dispute their complicity and underplay the aggrandizement by Zia and the role played by JI in allowing Zia and the Pakistani establishment at the time to achieve their ends. For instance, two-time former provincial minister of JI Inayatullah Khan insists that views ascribing complicity to JI to be close to Zia are exaggerated and underplays them to insist that JI has never been close to the Pakistani establishment and was never used by him to the degree that has been attributed in some circles (see for example Nasr 1994; Nasr 2001). Instead, he points out that JI simply had a “convergence of interests” with Zia and the cause of the Mujahideen given JI’s firm anti-communist stance, which has promoted a perception that JI was close to the Pakistani establishment during the Zia years. In response to JI being cultivated and rewarded by Zia, Khan notes,

This is a misconception. If you remember, four JI ministers from PNA's party became part of Zia’s cabinet. And four months afterwards, they resigned from Zia’s cabinet within four months like the rest of PNA. Officially, there was no *Jamaat-e-Islami* member on Zia’s team. What happened was that there were links between Zia and *Jamaat-e-Islami* in the context of the Afghan Jihad. JI was anti-communist, and there was a convergence of interests. This is why people have this misconception. If Zia had wanted to promote *Jamaat-e-Islami*, then it would have been very easy for him. In 1985, there were non-party elections. Zia could have elected a large number of JI candidates in that election. Then he made *Majlis-e-Shoora*, and the people who became part of *Majlis-e-Shoora* also became part of the provincial assemblies later. Couldn’t Zia have made the JI people part of *Majlis e Shoora*? The truth is that Zia...and JI had a convergence of interest in Afghanistan. There was an ideological convergence, which is why people have this misconception. Otherwise, during Zia’s era, our student wing was persecuted the most.¹⁹⁵

2.3.2. 1987-2001: Assertive State Cooptation: Establishment’s B-Team & Democratic Disorder

1987-2001 is a murky period in Pakistan’s political history. It is characterized by extensive meddling by the Pakistani establishment in the domestic and international politics of Pakistan, which often involved co-opting Islamist parties to

¹⁹⁵ Interview with Inayatullah Khan, 2021.

pursue the military establishment's goals. For instance, for much of this period, JI was instrumental for the military establishment when it came to aiding Pakistan's premier intelligence agency, the ISI, in its adventures in proxy warfare on the eastern front in Kashmir after Islamist groups had achieved considerable success from the ISI's perspective on the western front in the form of the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989. JI and other Islamist forces were extensively used by the establishment to counter the PPP's new leader, Benazir Bhutto, who was the daughter of ZAB. A crucial way in which this was done was that the Pakistani establishment cobbled together the alliance of the *Islami Jamhoori Ittehad* (IJI), which primarily consisted of right-wing parties and included JI and other Islamic parties at the time.¹⁹⁶

IJI even consisted of the same number of political parties as the anti-PPP or anti-ZAB nine-member PNA that was formed to counter the PPP leader ZAB's administration and had disbanded after the imposition of martial law and ZAB's eventual hanging after a sham trial in 1978-79. IJI consisted of some nine parties, six of which were outrightly Islamist parties, and all nine were religiously conservative parties that had galvanized together under the slogan "*noun sitaray bhai bhai, Bhutto teri shamat ayi*" (nine stars are brothers together, Bhutto your time has come).¹⁹⁷ This composition of most of the mainstream Islamist parties against the PPP, which at the time opposed the establishment, suggests once more that the Pakistani establishment has influenced the social and electoral mobilization of Islamist parties.

This period marks the first time that the "*dharna*" (sit-in) was used in a mainstream manner as a tactic of social mobilization by Islamist parties in the street politics of Pakistan. Crucially, sit-ins would be extensively used by Islamist parties as a tactic to move the policy needle towards Islamist causes and paralyze urban life later on. Arguably the first leader to use sit-ins as a tactic of social

¹⁹⁶ See "Hamid Gul accepts responsibility for creating IJI" <https://www.dawn.com/news/760219/hamidgul-accepts-responsibility-for-creating-igi>. Accessed August 15, 2024. General Hamid Gul was the Director General of the ISI from 1987 to 1989.

¹⁹⁷ See <https://herald.dawn.com/news/1398628>.

mobilization in a mainstream manner in Pakistani politics was the leader of the Islamist party JI, Qazi Hussain Ahmed, who launched a sit-in in 1999 to protest the visit of the then-Prime Minister of India Atal Bihari Vajpayee who was visiting Pakistan for the normalization of relations between India and Pakistan.¹⁹⁸ JI had “a complicated but generally supportive relationship with [sic] Pakistan army” and engaged in large protests throughout Lahore during Vajpayee’s visit to the city.¹⁹⁹ Qazi Hussain Ahmed even called the Prime Minister of Pakistan at the time, Nawaz Sharif, a traitor for negotiating with Vajpayee.²⁰⁰ There is speculation that some of this democratic disorder was being orchestrated or, at the very least, encouraged by elements within the military establishment of Pakistan at the time, which was not happy with the way Nawaz Sharif was dealing with India.²⁰¹ Instead, it wanted to use this opportunity to escalate tensions with India.

The rift between the civilian government and the military establishment reached its climax with the Kargil War in 1999, which was a debacle for the Pakistan military. The prime minister of Pakistan at the time, Nawaz Sharif, was not aware of the military’s plan and was not informed about it prior to the Pakistan army engaging with India (Zehra 2018). After some palace intrigue, the Chief of Armed Staff (COAS) General Pervez Musharraf, who had been appointed by Nawaz Sharif, imposed martial law on October 12, 1999, after Nawaz Sharif tried to strip him of power. The agitation on the streets by JI led by Qazi Hussain Ahmed against Vajpayee’s visit to Pakistan from December 1998 to January 1999, prior to the imposition of martial law by Musharraf and the Kargil War, thus can be read as potentially having some involvement of the establishment, seeing that JI was perceived as the “B team” of the establishment for the purpose of the establishment’s domestic and international goals.²⁰² In this sense, JI was acting as

¹⁹⁸ See <https://tribune.com.pk/story/86623/the-politics-of-dharnas> ; For the Atal Bihari Vajpayee visit see: <https://www.dawn.com/news/1125851>.

¹⁹⁹ Associated Press, “Pakistan: Muslim Militants Clash with Police,” February 20, 1999

²⁰⁰ Associated Press, “Pakistan: Muslim Militants Clash with Police,” February 20, 1999

²⁰¹ Interview with Nasrullah Malik, 2021.

²⁰² Interviews with Nasrullah Malik and Imran Shehzad, 2021. In other words, JI used to be seen as very close to the establishment for much of the 80s and 90s due to the overlap between many of the

a “mobilizer” (see Svolik 2012: 169) for the establishment at the time, as identified in Chapter 2 of this work.

Over the course of the 1990s, we see a general pattern consisting of the Islamist parties being used by the military establishment to promote “democratic disorder” through their political mobilization.²⁰³ This democratic disorder encompassed using the social mobilization capacity of Islamist parties, such as their street power, to weaken the civilian government in power in Pakistan. It also features the extensive use of coalition politics and political engineering by the Pakistani establishment, where Islamist parties were often used to make or break governmental coalitions and ultimately check the power of civilian governments in power. The 1990s have thus been termed as being a decade of “ping pong democracy,” which refers to frequent changes in the government or dismissals of the government from power prior to the end of their constitutionally mandated five-year terms, after which point elections are mandated by law in the Pakistani constitution. In this way, the military establishment of Pakistan was coopting the Islamist parties’ social mobilization and street protests and using them to aid its autocratic durability by preventing one political party with mass appeal, be it the PPP or PMLN, from becoming strong enough to challenge the military establishment during this period.

2.4. 2001-2022: Rise of Bareilvi Politicization and Demise of the “B” Team

Finally, the last period in the periodization of Islamist divergent mobilization traced in this chapter refers to the period starting in 2001 and the US-led Global War on Terror and ending in 2022. This period can be divided into two sub-periods: first, the 2001-2011 period, which can be referred to as the pivot to *Bareilvi* Politicization

establishment’s goals and JI’s involvement in aiding these adventures. Crucially, it included JI’s support for the mujahideen on Pakistan’s eastern front against the Soviet incursion and on the eastern front in supporting the insurgency in Kashmir when it comes to international events. Domestically, JI was involved in promoting “democratic disorder.”

²⁰³ Though, as I noted earlier, some of this general pattern can be traced back to the PNA movement in the 70s or even the Lahore riots in 1954. However, the pattern of promoting democratic disorder became especially significant around this time.

in the Global War On Terror; second, the 2011-2022 period, which can be referred to as the period during which *Barelvi* politicization started becoming mainstream.

2.4.1. 2001-2011: Rise of *Barelvi* Politicization and Demise of the “B” Team: Pivot to *Barelvis*

First, the period from 2001 to 2011 is marked by the US-led Global War on Terror in which Pakistan and its establishment and Islamist parties were involved extensively. It is characterized by Pakistan’s military establishment’s extensive involvement in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism activities against violent mobilization from Islamist groups with varying levels of efficacy. Since the Soviet incursion in Afghanistan in 1979 through the 90s, the military establishment of Pakistan had increasingly relied on coopting *Deobandi* groups by influencing their non-violent and violent political mobilization. The other main Sunni maslak of Pakistan, the *Barelvis*, had largely been relatively under-politicized. Barring a brief period when Shah Ahmed Noorani’s JUP was a major Islamist party in Pakistan, *Barelvis* lacked the kind of political organization that other Sunni groups in Pakistan, especially *Deobandis*, had.

However, sometime after the start of the Global War On Terror following the invasion of Afghanistan by the US in 2001, some observers noted there were elements within the Pakistani establishment that started thinking that the infrastructure in which non-*Barelvi* elements dominated (*Deobandis*, *Ji*, *Ahl-e-Hadith*) was not needed anymore.²⁰⁴ A need was felt to promote a counter-narrative to end the hardline *Deobandi*-Salafi narrative that was creating issues for the Pakistani state in the form of rampant terrorism that prevailed in Pakistan at this time. As part of General Pervez Musharraf’s vision around his approach of ‘enlightened moderation,’ there were efforts by the establishment led by Musharraf himself to emphasize a softer, less militant side of Islam.²⁰⁵ For instance, Musharraf brought his favourite Islamic scholar from *Madrassah-e-Haqqania*, Javed Ahmed

²⁰⁴ Interview with Talat Hussain 2021.

²⁰⁵ Interview with Talat Hussain 2021.

Ghamidi, to increased public attention.²⁰⁶ Ghamidi, despite being a fundamentalist in his approach to being an exegetist of the Koran, arrives at conclusions that would be considered to be modernist and progressive based on Western political thinking. The establishment's approach in this early period included giving airtime on television to voices that would promote a softer side of Islam, like Ghamidi, to try to soften and erode the hard-line *Deobandi* and Wahabi narrative that had been prevailing since the time of the *mujahideen* during Zia's regime.²⁰⁷

Another piece of evidence supporting this pivot towards *Barelvi* cooptation can be found in a WikiLeaks cable that was captured that noted that *Barelvis* should be used as a potential counterpunch to the *Deobandi* and Salafi power that had accumulated in Pakistan over the years in a significant way.²⁰⁸ Some emphasize that after the rise of hard-line ISIS a few years after 9/11, Pakistan's establishment, along with Western international powers such as some elements within the US, felt that there needed to be a global counter to Salafi militancy. In large part, *Barelvi* politicization was also driven by these concerns²⁰⁹, a notion that the Wikileaks cable supports as well.²¹⁰ So, at this stage, attempts were made to coopt and cultivate the *Barelvi* voters and supporters in Pakistan, who are numerically the most numerous but politically were not as salient as the *Deobandis* or *Ahl-e-Hadith* had been.

On the other hand, during this same period, there was growing resentment among *Deobandi* groups and JI (who are very close to *Deobandi* maslak, as I explain in Chapter 4) towards the military establishment of Pakistan. Deobandis perceived that they were mistreated, especially in the electoral arena, despite their extensive

²⁰⁶ Interview with Talat Hussain 2021.

²⁰⁷ Some of these steps included giving Barelvis more public posts and beginning a process of tacitly promoting Barelvis in the bureaucracy of the country (Interview with Talat Hussain 2021).

²⁰⁸ Interview with Aizaz Syed 2021.

²⁰⁹ Interview with Talat Hussain 2021.

²¹⁰ "Fast forward to the last couple of years, hard-end Jihadis formed ISIS, and as such, we need to create a global parallel to that. So, in Pakistan, we saw the world sanctions regime. What you saw while abiding by that, how did you do religious catharsis can be done via whom? Barelvis has mosques, which are more numerous; their network is more, their masjids, and there is a Gaddi. After every 15 km in most areas of Pakistan, there is funding." (Interview with Talat Hussain 2021)

involvement and sacrifices for furthering the establishment's adventures in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Figures within JUI that were of this mindset include Maulana Muhammad Khan Sherani, who became the Chairman of the Council of Islamic Ideology from 2010 to 2016 and was opposed to Islamist assistance in the proxy warfare of the establishment on Pakistan's eastern and western fronts.²¹¹

Similarly, when it comes to JI then Qazi Hussain Ahmed, who was considered to be the leader of the "B team" of the military establishment of Pakistan, turned against the establishment and famously stated in reference to the military elite of Pakistan that "they aren't core commanders but are crore commanders" (*core commander nahin crore commander hain*) to emphasize corruption amongst the highest officers of Pakistan military.²¹² One expert noted that it was in this context that Ahmed faced threats to his life, including a suicide attack.²¹³ It also led to JI's demonstration in Peshawar being attacked by terrorists, which led to seven deaths, and the casualties included the informant's brother.²¹⁴

In this way, the 2008 period marks a kind of separation of JI from being the establishment's "B team" and the end of its coopted status as there was growing resentment amongst JI and also some *Deobandi* groups toward the establishment's policy of cooptation and limited repression towards Islamist parties. As one informant emphasized, referring to the shift in JI's relationship with the establishment during this period, "there was a kind of parting of the ways after 2008, especially after the Lal Masjid incident...this was further cemented by the continued drone attacks and Pakistan's collaboration with ISAF and US forces in Afghanistan. And then the rising militancy in Pakistan, which really reached a climax in 2008-2010"²¹⁵ Ultimately, it was in this context that the electoral alliance of Islamist parties, the MMA, which had achieved some limited success by Pakistani standards in electoral contestation in the elections of 2002, ruptured and

²¹¹ Interview with Anonymous Respondent E 2021.

²¹² A crore denotes ten million in the Indian/South Asian numbering system.

²¹³ Interview with Anonymous Respondent E 2021.

²¹⁴ This refers to Anonymous Respondent E 2021

²¹⁵ Interview with Anonymous Respondent E 2021.

broke down. Subsequently, Islamist parties conducted elections independently in the general election of 2013.

2.4.2. 2011-2022: Rise of *Barelvi* Politicization and Demise of the “B” Team: Mainstreaming *Barelvi* Extremism

This period is characterized by the beginning of mainstream *Barelvi* extremism, which was spurred by one event that can be characterized as a type of critical juncture: the assassination of Salman Taseer, who was then the governor of Punjab, by his security guard Mumtaz Qadri, who sprayed him with 28 bullets in 2011. Following Taseer’s assassination, there was a public furore calling for the release of Qadri, and a movement was formed called the *Tehreek Rahae Ghazi Mumtaz Qadri* (Movement for the release of Mumtaz Qadri). The movement was led by and composed primarily of *Barelvi* figures and adherents, which was in line with instances in Pakistani history in the past when *Barelvis* were especially active in mobilizing for protecting the “finality” of Prophet Muhammad of Islam and the anti-blasphemy issue in Pakistan.²¹⁶ However, Qadri was hanged by the Pakistani state despite intense public pressure and social mobilization in 2016.

In this period, by 2013, even figures such as Munawar Hasan, who was elected as the new emir of JI in 2009 and was considered to be relatively mild-mannered and weak, were stridently opposed to the establishment’s policies. This was also the case for Maulana Fazlur Rehman of JUI-F, the largest Islamist party in the *Deobandi* Maslak. The establishment was looking for other Islamist allies that it could rely upon due to the erosion of the traditional alliance between the *Deobandi*, Ahl-e-Hadith and JI groups and the establishment and also because of the establishment’s more “positive” or agentic realization that compelled it to seek alternatives. This can be considered the start of a period when most major Islamist parties were opposed to the establishment rather than aligned with it. For instance, one journalist speaking primarily of *Deobandi*, Ahl-e-Hadith and JI parties active in

²¹⁶ Interview with Ahsan Bhatti, 2021; Interview with Talat Hussain, 2021.

Pakistani politics in 2021 said, “This is the first time after 1996 that religious parties have been on a different page than the establishment.”²¹⁷

Potential alternatives for the Pakistani establishment came from Tahir-ul-Qadri (TuQ) of the *Pakistan Awami Tehreek* (PAT). Qadri resigned from the National Assembly (NA) of Pakistan in 2003 and moved to Toronto, Canada, for seven years, where he was largely occupied with his scholarly activities and preaching until he suddenly returned to Pakistan in December 2012. Qadri declared he would launch a protest against the government’s corruption. Subsequently, after several events that antagonized the PAT’s social base, Qadri was involved in agitating in the largest street protest in Pakistani political history where for 126 days, Qadri, along with the leader of *Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf* (PTI)’s Imran Khan, staged a sit-in outside the parliament of Pakistan and demanded the resignation of then prime minister Nawaz Sharif over charges of electoral rigging in the 2013 election and corruption.

Concurrently, following the massive social mobilization after the killing of Mumtaz Qadri, there was a realization among the military establishment that the mobilization capacity of *Barelvis* could be utilized for its own ends. *Barelvi* leaders themselves came to the same conclusion, as they were now aware of their social mobilization capacity. As one source mentions, “This was the first time that *Barelvi* leaders realized the extreme power they could command on the streets.”²¹⁸ In such a context, where several factors were converging, the military establishment of Pakistan at the time thought it might be prudent to utilize this mobilization potential of the *Barelvis* to weaken the civilian government of Nawaz Sharif, as the military establishment’s interests had started to diverge from his. Capturing what was happening at the time against the civilian government of Nawaz Sharif, journalist Talat Hussain underlines, “The establishment harnessed this mobilization against Nawaz Sharif.”²¹⁹

²¹⁷ Interview with Ashraf Malkham, 2021.

²¹⁸ Interview with Talat Hussain, 2021.

²¹⁹ Interview with Talat Hussain, 2021.

Rise of the TLP and Barelvi Nexus with the State

Following the creation of the *Tehreek Rahae Ghazi Mumtaz*, a collection of *Barelvi* groups united and formed the *Tehreek-e-Labbaik Ya Rasool Allah* (TLYR). This coalition consisted of four *Barelvi* groups: *Tehreek-e-Sirat-e-Mustaqeem* led by Ashraf Asif Jalali, *Aalami Tanzeem Ahl-e-Sunnat* led by Pir Afzal Qadri, *Sunni Tehreek* headed by Sarwat Ejaz Qadri, and *Anjuman-e-Fidayan-e-Khatam-e-Nabuwat* led by Allama Khadim Hussain Rizvi.²²⁰ The TLYR, however, could not remain united, and Ashraf Asif Jalali parted ways with it after developing differences with other leaders.

Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) was created as a political party that was registered with the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP). The street protest and social mobilization capacity wielded by TLP was massive. The fissures between *Deobandis*, *Ahl-e-Hadis* and *JI* became increasingly deeper during the GWOT, and this created opportunities for other actors, such as the *Barelvis*, to emerge as an alternative to the military establishment's adventures for which it used to previously rely on *Deobandis* and *JI*. One prominent Pakistani journalist with expertise on Islamist parties, Aizaz Syed, framed this as how the rise of *Barelvis* was contingent on the demise of the older guard of Pakistan's ideological frontiers in the Islamist arena, such as the *Deobandis* and *ahl-e-hadith*:

“The rise of *Barelvis* was one of the reasons for the downfall of the *Deobandis* and *Ahl-e-hadith*. The war on terror was fought against *Deobandis* and *Ahl-e-hadith*. If you look at the WikiLeaks cable, then a consulate general of the US in Lahore had written that you should support the *Barelvis*, who is counter to the *Deobandis*.”²²¹

Over time, however, the rapid *Barelvi* social mobilization led by TLP's Khadim Hussain Rizvi, which was spurred in large part by the trial and hanging of Mumtaz Qadri, reached such a high point that it became difficult for the Pakistani

²²⁰ https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Atlantic-Council_TLP-Essay_Roohan-Ahmed.pdf

²²¹ Interview with Aizaz Syed, 2021.

government to control it. This marked a sharp contrast away from the past, wherein some have commented about a vacuum in *Barelvi* representation and a leadership crisis, especially after the death of JUP's Shah Ahmed Noorani.²²² This was on top of a perception among *Barelvis* that despite being numerically the dominant sect of Islam in Pakistan (Sher 2021), they were not commensurately given state patronage or recognition in favour of *Deobandis*.²²³ A key success of TLP's anti-blasphemy mobilization and street strength was the way in which it managed to capture the lower and middle-class *Barelvi* followers. Even when it came to more upper-class *Barelvis*, such as the "*gaddi nasheens*" (descendants of Sufi saints or custodians of Sufi shrines) that occupied seats of Sufi shrines, especially in rural parts of Pakistan, the TLP was relatively successful in ensuring that they wouldn't challenge it.²²⁴

In essence, the confluence of the military establishment's role and the social mobilization capacity of the *Barelvis* meant that the TLP's rise in Pakistani politics was meteoric. Even though some of the groundwork leading up to the *Barelvi* mobilization had occurred in earlier years, starting from the 2000s, the 2010s is when the switch for their mainstream social mobilization was turned on completely, which was found principally with the hanging of Mumtaz Qadri. As broadcaster and journalist Talat Hussain remarks,

In Pakistan's political history, you will not find a parallel in which an organization was allowed to come up and was nurtured in such a short span of time because, to me, they were already nurtured; they only needed that crack which sprouted and gained strength, they found an ally in the [deep] state, and they found themselves afoul of the same state. Normally, this would take decades; however, in this case, the state suddenly realized that this was a power that could be turned against them.²²⁵

²²² Interviews with Ahsan Bhatti and Ali Sher, 2021.

²²³ Interview with Ali Sher, 2021.

²²⁴ Interviews with Nasrullah Malik and Ali Sher, 2021.

²²⁵ Interview with Talat Hussain, 2021.

3. Conclusion:

This chapter has developed a historical periodization to describe and contextualize the military establishment's engagement with the patterns of social and electoral mobilization of Islamist parties in Pakistan. Islamist parties initially resembled a pressure group that influenced politics from outside formal institutional politics through their social mobilization. This was the first period of early Pakistani statehood from 1947 to 1970. However, over time, they became more interested in electoral participation. Starting from the first general election in Pakistan in 1970 marked a period when Islamist parties were starting to be coopted by the Pakistani establishment. This period of the emergence of state cooptation of Islamist parties lasts from 1970 to 1979. After the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in 1979, the cooptation of Islamist parties by the establishment started to take more assertive characteristics. Zia-ul-Haq courted and used Islamist parties vigorously as part of his Islamization reforms.

The period from 1979 until Zia's death in 1987 is thus characterized by the incorporation of Islamist agendas by the Pakistani state. From 1987 to 2001, the assertive cooptation of Islamist parties increasingly exhibits a pattern where Islamist parties are used extensively by the establishment, so much so that parties such as JI are called the "B" team of the establishment, given how closely allied the two are on key issues. The establishment uses Islamist parties to unleash "democratic disorder" through social mobilization, especially on the streets, that weakens the civilian government. For much of the 1990s, we observed successive weak civilian governments come to power before being dismissed. Islamist social mobilization was a key instrument through which the establishment weakened the civilian government and ensured its autocratic durability.

The last major historical period traced in this chapter lasts from 2001 to 2022. It started with the Global War on Terror after the 9/11 attacks. It ended with the ouster of Imran Khan of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf by the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) alliance of opposition parties that removed Khan

from the premiership in a successful vote of no condition. This period marks a pivot away from the old allies or the “B” team that comprised *Deobandi*, *JI* and *Ahl-e-Hadith* groups. Instead, *Barelvis* are now increasingly seen by the establishment as a counterpunch to the mobilization of principally *Deobandis*, which was getting difficult to manage. Starting from 2011, this period marks the mainstreaming of *Barelvi* politicization who otherwise, until this point, had been relatively inactive politically in comparison with *Deobandis*, *JI* and *Ahl-e-hadith* groups and political parties.

Chapter 6: The Military Establishment as a Moderator of Divergent Mobilization of Islamist Parties in Pakistan (1947-2022)

“I don’t think religious parties have ever been powerful in Pakistani history. It has either been the establishment that is powerful or those who are under the establishment...Only those people have been powerful. Here [in Pakistan], there have not even been free and fair elections, and the true representatives of Pakistan have never been allowed to rule.”²²⁶

“Street power was developed for these parties as their nuisance value developed.”²²⁷

1. Introduction

This chapter argues that the incentives of a state’s ruling elite and their relative strength versus an oppositional elite act as key moderators in the causal relationship between the dimensions of organizational effectiveness and structural fragmentation that are crucial for explaining the outcome of divergent mobilization.²²⁸ In other words, the incentives and relative strength of the state’s ruling elite can strengthen, weaken or change the relationship between the explanatory variables and the outcome of divergent mobilization, which is at this work’s analytical and methodological thrust. The explanatory variables analyzed in this study refer to two disaggregated outcome variables encompassing the broader outcome of divergent mobilization: social and electoral mobilization.

The chapter argues that the military establishment of Pakistan acts as a critical effect modifier in the divergent mobilization of Islamist parties in Pakistan,


²²⁶ Interview with Samia Raheel Qazi, 2021

²²⁷ Interview with Zaighum Butt, 2021.

²²⁸ In statistical parlance, moderation occurs when the relationship between two variables depends on a third variable (Cohen et al 2003; Brierly et al. 2019; Schandelmaier et al. 2020). This third variable is referred to as the moderator. A key reason why the military establishment is a moderator and, say, not a mediator is because the military establishment is not the causal result of the independent variables of the large electorate of Islamist parties or the fragmentation arising due to religious cleavages.

as summarized in TABLE 6.1 below. It thus focuses on the case of the social and electoral mobilization of Islamist parties in the case of Pakistan, the second-largest Muslim-Majority Country (MMC) in the world. The state's ruling elite in the empirical context of Pakistan is principally composed of what I call "the establishment." The establishment is crucial for explaining the variation in Islamist parties' social and electoral mobilization. It can influence the outcomes of social (Y1) and electoral mobilization (Y2) of Islamist parties in Pakistan through two distinct pathways: first, by influencing variation in the large electorates of Islamist parties (X1) and their political and ideological fragmentation, which arises due to the religious cleavage structure in Pakistan (X2) which, in turn, are associated with social and electoral mobilization respectively; second, by influencing variation in the outcomes of social and electoral mobilization of Islamist parties independent of variation in the independent variables X1 and X2 respectively. In this way, the military establishment in Pakistan helps better contextualize the relationship between the dimensions of organizational effectiveness and structural fragmentation with divergent mobilization for Islamist parties in the case of hybrid regimes that are MMCs like Pakistan.

FIGURE 6.1: Summary of the Chapter's Argument



Source: Author's formulation.

Divergence can be explained if two conditions are met: first, the incentives of the ruling elite are aligned with the divergent mobilization of Islamists; second, the ruling elite is strong relative to the oppositional elite of a state. By contrast, if these two conditions are not present, the ruling elite dynamics will be unfavorable towards restricting Islamist parties electorally, and aligned mobilization patterns are likely, with Islamists being successful in acquiring mass electoral appeal in electoral contests at the national level. The establishment's relative strength and aligned incentives specify the direction and magnitude of whether and to what extent structural fragmentation influences convergent or divergent patterns of mobilization of Islamist parties in the empirical context of Pakistan. In this sense, the two conditions explain the “why” component of the analytical framework advanced in this chapter.

A key reason driving divergent mobilization is that the military establishment can “divide and rule” different political actors, such as Islamist parties, within the party system by aiding them in the arena of social mobilization to weaken civilian governments but curtailing their mobilization in national elections so that they do not acquire excessive power to become a challenge to the establishment. The establishment does this through two specific mechanisms that capture the pattern through which the military establishment influences divergent patterns of mobilization of Islamist parties: 1) the pattern of cooptation and limited repression of Islamist parties and 2) a pattern resembling political control by Pakistan's ruling elite.²²⁹ These two mechanisms encompass the “how” component of the analytical framework forged in this chapter.

The patterns of cooptation and limited repression and political control underscore a dual strategy in the way the military establishment of Pakistan moderates the divergent mobilization of Islamist parties. It entails that while the establishment facilitates and sometimes even fosters the social mobilization of Islamist parties in Pakistan, principally by positively influencing the street power

²²⁹ See Svobik 2012:9-11 for more on cooptation and limited repression and political control.

of Islamist groups, it simultaneously curtails their political ascent to ensure that no group becomes powerful enough to alter the balance of power between the establishment and other political actors fundamentally. Crucially, the military can often use Islamist parties in Pakistan as tools for creating “democratic disorder” by enhancing their social mobilization while preventing them from becoming mass electoral machines. The military establishment-influenced disorder that Islamist parties can instigate is often at the expense of the civilian government in power and favours the military establishment. In this way, the establishment’s dual strategy of fostering and limiting Islamist parties highlights its enduring influence over the observed and subterranean currents of Pakistani politics.

I develop the argument of this chapter in four key steps. First, forge the analytical framework that provides the bedrock for this chapter’s causal claims by specifying the two conditions of divergence through which the establishment moderates the relationship between this study’s independent variables and the outcome of divergent mobilization. For the first condition of the relative strength of the establishment versus the civilian government of the time, the chapter demonstrates the military establishment’s relative weakness following the signing of the charter of democracy by the two main political parties in Pakistan in 2006. It highlights how it has been using Islamist parties’ social mobilization to weaken the civilian governments and regain some of the power it had lost. This empirical example also underlines how new Islamist parties, such as the Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), were used by the establishment to split the vote of mainstream political parties in Pakistan to enhance its authoritarian durability.

For the second condition of aligned incentives, the chapter uses the example of the sit-ins staged by the TLP over the blasphemy issue and the different ways in which the military establishment of Pakistan was able to influence the social and electoral mobilization of Islamist parties in 2017-2019 when it allowed the fostering of democratic disorder to weaken the civilian government. This is contrasted with 2019 when the establishment clamped down on the TLP in a national crackdown and managed to neutralize the sit-in and the agitation of TLP and its protestors due

to the alignment of interests (with the civilian government?) in curtailing its social mobilization.

Third, the chapter underscores how the military establishment of Pakistan acts as a critical moderator in the relationship with divergent mobilization in three specific causal pathways. First, the establishment influences variation in social mobilization by influencing variation in the independent variables of the large electorates of Islamist parties. Second, the establishment influences variation in Islamist electoral mobilization by influencing the political and ideological fragmentation of Islamist parties emanating from the religious cleavages in Pakistan. Third, the establishment influences the social and electoral mobilization of Islamist parties independent of influencing variation in the variables of the large electorates of Islamist parties or their political and ideological fragmentation. The fourth section concludes.

2. Pakistan's Military Establishment as a Moderator of Divergent Mobilization of Islamist Parties

The key argument advanced in this chapter is that the military establishment acts as a critical moderator for the divergent mobilization of Islamist parties in Pakistan. Two distinct conditions moderate the relationship with divergent mobilization: 1) the incentives of the state's ruling elite are aligned with divergent mobilization; 2) this ruling elite is strong relative to the oppositional elite of a state. In this sense, the chapter advances two critical claims relating to the conditions for divergence in Pakistan: 1) these two conditions are present in the Pakistani case, and 2) they are instrumental in moderating the relationship between the large electorates of Islamist parties and their political and ideological fragmentation due to the religious structure with divergent patterns of mobilization. In this sense, the two conditions of divergence explain the context in which divergent patterns of mobilization can take place by elucidating the role played by Pakistan's

establishment in the moderation of divergent mobilization of Islamist political parties.

This moderation rests on two fundamental mechanisms that capture the variety of ways Pakistan's establishment influences divergent mobilization of Islamist parties: 1) cooptation and limited repression and 2) political control. Cooptation and limited repressions refer to how the establishment uses Islamist parties as mobilizers for its causes and aids and enhances their mobilization but, at the same time, does not want them to acquire excessive power and mass appeal. As such, the establishment also engages in limited repression of Islamist parties that entails deploying a variety of tactics to contain its mobilization, especially in the electoral arena. Evidence supporting this mechanism can be captured in the remarks by Dr. Waqar Ahmed, who underlined,

So, the relationship between religious parties and the establishment is delicate. They neither wipe out religious parties completely nor do they give them incumbency by supporting them. How much of a grip do parties have on power corridors? But that is only possible if you are inside power corridors. They got this chance once in the form of MMA, but even before they [the electoral alliance] was formed, the establishment had planned how to dismantle the MMA.²³⁰

Analytically, cooptation and limited repression are two of the central choices available to an authoritarian ruling elite to deal with the problem of autocratic durability or authoritarian control. They can also be considered “sticks” and “carrots” approaches available to a state's ruling elite. Repression here is self-explanatory, whereas cooptation encompasses positive incentives for compliance (Svolik 2012), though it is not necessarily limited to them. On the other hand, political control refers to more direct control of Islamist parties by the establishment, wherein these are only used for the express purpose of sowing democratic disorder but not for gaining a significant number of electoral offices. In this way, the two conditions that moderate the variation of organizational effectiveness and structural fragmentation with divergent mobilization of Islamist

²³⁰ Interview with Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed, 2021.

parties by Pakistan's establishment capture the context under which the military establishment can act as an effect modifier and specify the potential outcomes associated with each context. In contrast, the two mechanisms of cooptation, limited repression and political control of Islamist parties, clarify how the establishment influences the divergent mobilization of Islamist parties in Pakistan.

Political control refers to those aspects of party activity aimed primarily at the general population, such as political communication, mobilization, and maintenance of political discipline (see, e.g., Friedrich and Brzezinski 1965; Huntington 1968). Smith (2005), for instance, identifies the ability of authoritarian parties to mobilize their constituencies in times of crisis as a critical aspect of party "strength," Levitsky and Way (2010) claim that parties' "organizational power" helps authoritarian incumbents resist pressures for democratization after the end of the Cold War, and Magaloni (2008: 723) and Wintrobe (1998: 65) emphasize that long-lasting parties are essential for effective co-optation. For all these reasons, Islamist parties are ideal vehicles for the establishment to co-opt to preserve and extend their influence.

This analysis implies that the establishment's engagement in Pakistan's politics while moderating divergent mobilization is aimed at maintaining a balance where Islamist parties can be used as tools for social mobilization without posing a risk of gaining substantive electoral power. This approach allows the military to project itself as a stabilizing force necessary to contain potential threats from radical elements, thereby justifying its political and economic privileges and enhancing its autocratic durability. It underscores how the divergent mobilization of Islamist parties has been a critical approach that the military establishment of Pakistan has used to subvert the democratic process and ensure its hegemony within the Pakistani political system.

Like any effect modifier in statistics, the role played by the Pakistani military establishment expressed via the two moderating conditions of divergent mobilization can influence the relationship of the large electorates of Islamist parties and their political and ideological fragmentation due to the religious

cleavage structure with the outcome of divergent mobilization of Islamist parties in Pakistan in three specific ways: 1) it enhances the divergence between social and electoral mobilization, 2) it diminishes the divergence between social and electoral mobilization, and 3) it changes the relationship between the independent variables and the outcome altogether.²³¹

We do not observe evidence of substantial variation toward non-divergent mobilization of Islamist parties in the Pakistani context. However, there are instances, such as the 2002 election, where there was a slight increase in electoral mobilization of Islamist parties, and they acquired 11 percent of the vote share. For the outcome of social mobilization, the Ahmadi Riots in 1953, where the state clamped down on Islamist social mobilization and was successful overall, presents some evidence of the high social mobilization of Islamist parties being curtailed by the state. Overall, there have been periods of slight variation toward narrowing the divergence between the social and electoral mobilization of Islamist parties. However, this narrowing has only been minor and does not qualitatively change the pattern of Islamist mobilization in Pakistan from divergent to non-divergent types.

The chapter thus underscores that the Pakistani establishment enhances the divergent mobilization of Islamist parties and can diminish their social and electoral mobilization in isolation.²³² Put another way, the causal claim advanced in this chapter is that as a moderator, the state's ruling elite would either increase or decrease divergence or lead toward non-divergent mobilization. In the Pakistani case, more specifically, we see two general trends in light of the empirical evidence: 1) on balance, an increase in the divergence of social and electoral mobilization of Islamist parties over time, and 2) the establishment's capability to decrease or

²³¹ See Hair, J.F., Hult, G.T.M., Ringle, C.M., Sarstedt, M., Danks, N.P., Ray, S. (2021). Moderation Analysis. In: Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) Using R. Classroom Companion: Business. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-80519-7_8

²³² By the word "isolation," I mean that while the case of Islamist parties in Pakistan does not provide evidence that the military establishment can switch the effect of the independent variables and divergent mobilization to convergent patterns of mobilization, it does provide evidence that the military establishment can decrease both social and electoral mobilization of Islamist parties that encompass divergent mobilization.

contain the social and electoral mobilization of Islamist parties in Pakistan in isolation.

There is a rigid criterion of what meets the conditions to be a moderator variable versus a mediator variable, which is satisfied for the case of the role played by the Pakistani establishment in influencing divergent patterns of mobilization of Islamist parties in Pakistan. A key condition of satisfying the criterion for a moderator variable versus a mediator variable is that the moderator must *not* be the causal result of the independent variable.²³³ For the analytical framework advanced in this work, this criterion is met as the state's ruling elite is not the causal result of the dimensions of organizational effectiveness or structural fragmentation. More empirically, for the case of the empirical context of Pakistan that is analyzed in this chapter, this criterion is satisfied as the conditions for divergence related to the role played by Pakistan's establishment are not the causal result of the large electorates of Islamist parties that influence their low social mobilization or the political and ideological fragmentation emerging out of the religious cleavages in the social structure that diminish their inability to acquire mass appeal in national elections.

From a methodological point of view, the moderator variable of the Pakistani establishment explains some of the variations in the large electorates of Islamist parties and negligible variation in their political and ideological fragmentation arising due to the religious cleavage structure. It also explains the outcome variable of a divergent variable. However, this issue of multicollinearity does not nullify the military establishment as a moderator variable on divergent mobilization. This is because the establishment can significantly modify the effect of the dimensions of organizational effectiveness and structural fragmentation on the outcomes of social and electoral mobilization beyond the causal pathway via the independent variables identified in the analytical framework of this work. I provide evidence for this in the

²³³ On the other hand, to be a mediator, the mediator variable (the military establishment in Pakistan) must be the causal result of the independent variables and causally antecedent to the outcome variables of social and electoral mobilization.

chapter by showcasing how the military establishment can influence divergent mobilization in three empirical ways: 1) by having an association with the enlargement of the electorates of Islamist parties in Pakistan, 2) by having an association with their fragmentation and 3) by having an association with their divergent mobilization without influencing their electorates of fragmentation due to religious cleavages. Put another way, the Pakistani establishment can influence the variation in the outcomes of social and electoral mobilization of Islamist parties without influencing variation in the large electorates of Islamist parties and their fragmentation arising due to religious cleavages. In this sense, the concerns around this multicollinearity regarding the military establishment explaining the variation in the independent and outcome variables do not obviate the military establishment as a critical moderator in the relationship between the explanatory and outcome variables. Endogeneity concerns are only partial, and the empirical specification captures the relationship well without invalidating the results.

2.1. Analytical Framework for Two Moderating Conditions: Aligned Incentives and Relative Strength

The ruling elite, such as Pakistan's military establishment, can coopt Islamist organizations, such as political parties, through various approaches, including exchange for patronage (see Svobik 2012). If the two conditions for divergent mobilization outlined above favour divergent mobilization patterns, the state's ruling elite, in the form of the military establishment, coopts Islamist parties to advance its own perceived interests by enabling and promoting Islamist mobilization in certain arenas, specifically in social mobilization on the streets, to undermine and weaken oppositional elites such as a civilian government. Contrary to existing theories of street mobilization, mass demonstrations make the civilian government look weak and cause some of the oppositional elite to defect and join the ruling elite. In this way, these social movements further united antigovernment

forces²³⁴ and fostered collaboration between the Islamic civil society and the state's ruling elite (cf. Bunce & Wolchik 2010; Trejo 2014). This action can be motivated if the ruling elite, for instance, perceives the civilian government as a threat or just as a longer-term strategy to ensure that an oppositional elite in the form of a civilian government stays weak and subservient to the ruling elite.

For the second condition of aligned interests, I will use the case study of the *Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan* (TLP) to underpin how it was used as a vehicle to sow disorder on the streets by the establishment. The establishment strategically promoted and then did not intervene to stop TLP's social mobilization until it acquired power of its own and challenged the establishment to a degree. A national-level crackdown was launched against the TLP, which was stripped down of its power when the military felt it was getting out of control, as was the TLP leadership.

TABLE 6.1: Two Conditions of Divergent Mobilization and Empirical Instances of the Role Played by the Establishment in Pakistani History

Conditions	Event or Time-Period	Analytical Utility
Relative Strength	1. Charter of Democracy in 2006 and the Emergence of a Democratic Consensus	The military establishment moved from a relatively weak position in 2006/2008 to a relatively strong position with the start of the "hybrid regime" with PTI's government in 2018, with Islamist mobilization being central in this change
Aligned Incentives	1. <i>Faizabad Dharna 1</i> (Aligned) and <i>Faizabad Dharna 2</i> (Not Aligned) 2. Zia-ul-Haq (Aligned)	The Military establishment diminished Islamist Social Mobilization in <i>Faizabad Dharna 1</i> but diminished it in <i>Faizabad Dharna 2</i> . The establishment assertively coo-opted Islamist parties for its ends but did not help them turn into mass electoral machines.

Source: Author's formulation.

2.1.1. First Condition: Relative Strength

The first condition of divergent mobilization by the state's ruling elite is that the relative strength of the ruling elite versus the oppositional elite needs to be strong. This condition is satisfied in the empirical context of Pakistan, where the establishment has been more potent than the civilian government for much of

²³⁴ Antigovernmental here refers to anti-civilian government and not anti-establishment.

Pakistani political history. When the military establishment is strong and the civilian government is weak, the military can exert greater influence over the political mobilization of Islamist political parties by manipulating their social and electoral mobilization. A power imbalance enables the establishment to shape political outcomes in its interest, often at the expense of democratic ideals and processes. It allows the establishment to manipulate the social and electoral mobilization of Islamist groups so that it achieves its strategic objectives without allowing Islamist parties significant electoral success. Conversely, a relatively weaker establishment versus a stronger civilian government can curtail the military establishment's ability to use Islamist groups as political tools, potentially leading to convergent mobilization outcomes.

The rationale for this condition can be found in the literature on the balance of power theory within political science, which suggests that when one entity (in this case, the military) dominates the political landscape, it can shape the policies and political dynamics to its favor (see Paul et al. 2004 for an overview).²³⁵ In Pakistan, the military establishment has often been the dominant force, using Islamist parties as instruments to undermine civilian governments and maintain hegemony.²³⁶ This approach hinges on the establishment's ability to keep these parties within the bounds of controlled mobilization -- potent enough to challenge rivals and act as an instrument of promoting "democratic disorder" but too fragmented to coalesce into a formidable governing force with mass electoral appeal.

I empirically illustrate the salience of the first condition of divergence in influencing the divergent mobilization of Islamist parties in Pakistan by analyzing the period following the signing of the Charter of Democracy between Pakistan

²³⁵ One of the first definitions of balance of power comes from the literature on international relations, which states that balance of power can refer to the distribution of power, an equilibrium of power, hegemony, stability and peace, instability and war, power politics in general, a universal law of history, and as a system and guide to policymaking (Haas 1953).

²³⁶ In this sense, I do not use balance of power theories as they are used in the literature on international relations, where they are often used to analyze the conditions of war and peace. Instead, I only focus on the aspect of the balance of power theories that suggest that a powerful entity can manipulate conditions in its favour.

People's Party Parliamentarians (PPPP or also PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PMLN) in 2006.²³⁷ The signing of the Charter of Democracy led to the emergence of a relative democratic consensus in Pakistan among the major political parties of the time in the context of the relative weakness of the Pakistani establishment in the face of an ascendant civilian government. I must emphasize that I only use the example of the COD and the emergence of a democratic consensus in Pakistan in the context of the *relative* weakness of the Pakistani establishment, not only in reference to civilian government in other parts of the world but also relative to Pakistani political history. To be sure, the military continues to be the dominant and most powerful actor in the political system of Pakistan, and even in the context of the emergence of a democratic consensus post-COD, this has stayed the same. Nevertheless, the example underlines how the establishment essentially intervened in the political process to regain some of its strength through Islamist mobilization and reversed some of the balance of power it had lost to the civilian government or the oppositional elites. In this way, the COD and the emergence of the democratic consensus showcase two things: 1) periods of the relative weakness of the establishment can curtail its ability to interfere in the political process, whereas periods of relative strength can enhance it, and 2) this ability to influence is linked with Islamist mobilization that are vital tools that are and have been used by the military establishment of Pakistan in interfering in Pakistan's politics over the course of its political history and ensuring their autocratic durability.

²³⁷ The Charter of Democracy refers to the signing and affirmation of an agreement between the leaders of Pakistan Peoples' Party Parliamentarians, Benazir Bhutto, and Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz, Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, in London in 2006 that upheld principles of democracy and condemned military rule that Pakistan had faced historically with military dictators and also more immediately in the form of the rule of President Pervez Musharraf who had assumed power after the imposition of a martial law that ended the democratically elected government of Nawaz Sharif in 1999. PPPP and PPP are used interchangeably at different points in this work.

2.1.1.1. Charter of Democracy in 2006 and Democratic Consensus

The Emergence of a Democratic Consensus and Relative Civilian Ascendancy

Empirical evidence supporting the relative strength of the Pakistani establishment versus the civilian government in being crucial in driving the divergent mobilization of Islamist parties in Pakistan can provide comparative lessons and meaningful insights about the underlying rationale and its implications for autocratic durability in hybrid regimes that are MMCs like Pakistan. Some have noted that following the COD, a democratic consensus started developing among major political parties in Pakistan that the country was to be governed by civilian governments irrespective of political rivalries.²³⁸ There are several empirical observations that can be used to support the emergence of a democratic consensus; I list four such examples. First, for the first time in Pakistan's political history, there was a successful transfer of power between one civilian government that completed its five-year term for the first time and the next civilian government when the coalition led by the PPP's government transferred its power to the coalition government of the PMLN in June 2013. This is important in the context of Pakistan, where, to date, there has not been a single prime minister who has completed the five years that the Constitution of Pakistan allows as the maximum number of years for which an individual can hold the position of the Prime Minister of Pakistan without holding a general election.²³⁹ For these reasons, in a country with this historical context, a successful transfer of power and the parliament completing its five-year constitutional limit was significant.

Second, another example of a democratic consensus emerging in Pakistan following the COD is that in the context of Pakistan's acrimonious party politics, it was significant, at least at a symbolic level, when the chairman of the PPP at the

²³⁸ Interview with Farhatullah Babar 2021.

²³⁹ There have been 18 occasions when prime ministers of Pakistan have been removed under a variety of circumstances, including corruption charges, direct military coups and forced resignations. The year 1993 was interesting, with three different changes in the office of Prime Ministership. See: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/9/factbox-no-pakistani-prime-minister-has-completed-a-full-tenure>

time, Asif Ali Zardari, administered the oath as the outgoing President of Pakistan in 2013 to its bitter rival of the past, the leader of the PMLN, Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, who was the incoming Prime Minister of Pakistan.²⁴⁰ Similarly, Zardari was given a guard of honor as the outgoing President of Pakistan. This marked a sharp contrast from the political acrimony of the two parties in the past, which was often exploited by the establishment for democratic subversion by playing the major political parties against each other. For instance, the messy political history of the 1990s was characterized by frequent changes in civilian governments, with 1993 seeing three different changes in the office of the Prime Minister. Instead, a semblance of a democratic consensus emerged between the main political parties of Pakistan, the PPP, and the PMLN, to put aside personal acrimony and political rivalries to some degree and allow the democratic process to unfold.²⁴¹

Third, the relative relaxation in civil and press freedoms also buttresses the claim of the emergence of a relative democratic consensus in Pakistan. Fieldwork evidence conducted for this study strongly suggests that the period following the signing of the charter of democracy, especially starting with the civilian government of the PPP in 2008, was the freest in terms of press freedoms in Pakistani political history. However, international quantitative indicators like the Press Freedom Index published by Reporters without Borders are not aligned with this claim. This disparity may be rooted in measuring the Press Freedom Index, which does not account for more qualitative assessments of press freedoms in its formulations. Evidence for the relaxation and relative freedom in the press and media of Pakistan was emphasized, for instance, by senior journalist and reporter Aizaz Syed, when he argued that,

“Charter of democracy, when it was conceived in 2006, then PPP came to power in 2008. Then, from 2008 to 2013, then [sic] was the era of the ideal situation for the freedom of expression in Pakistan until the new election. That was the time the establishment was in a weak position such that the elected

²⁴⁰ Interview with Farhatullah Babar, 2021.

²⁴¹ Interviews with Farhat Ullah Babar and Ali Raza, 2021.

PM [Yousaf Raza Gilani]... gave a speech and said that they were asking us where we got the visas, and we asked them where Osama Bin Laden got a visa [of Pakistan].”²⁴²

Syed was referring to when the PM at the time, Yousaf Raza Gilani of the PPP, gave a public statement in the midst of rising tensions between the civilian government and the military establishment. Gilani claimed that his government was in danger of being toppled, and the military was considering instigating a coup. His pointed criticism of the establishment can be gleaned from his statement, which is emphasized by Syed, in which Gilani emphasized the interference of the military establishment in Pakistan's policies. Gilani remarked, “But I want to ask how was (bin Laden) living here for the past six years? On what type of visa was he living here? Why was security not taken care of if he entered Pakistan without a visa? (Yousaf Raza Gilani quoted in Al Jazeera 2011).”²⁴³

Fourth, and significantly uncharacteristic of Pakistani political history, the civilian leader at the time, Yousaf Raza Gilani of the PPP, dismissed the Secretary of Defense, Lt. General (Retired) Naeem Khalid Lodhi, who was considered to be more powerful than the defence minister at the time due to Lodhi's links with the establishment.²⁴⁴ Gilani released a public statement that Lodhi was involved in “gross misconduct and illegal action which created misunderstanding” between state institutions. This was a clear reference to how Lodhi was involved in creating a rift between the civilian government and the military establishment led by the Chief of Armed Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani at the time.

The dismissal of Lt. Gen (Retired) Naeem Khalid Lodhi stands in sharp contrast with examples from Pakistani political history in the past, where civil-military rifts would often lead to the President's dismissal of the civilian

²⁴² Interview with Aizaz Syed, 2021.

²⁴³ See <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2011/12/23/pakistan-pm-fears-plot-against-his-government>.

²⁴⁴ See <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2012/1/12/pakistan-defence-chief-sacked-amid-tensions>.

government during the 1990s.²⁴⁵ In this way, figures that were close to the establishment would often eclipse democratically elected civilian leaders. One such example is how Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismissed the governments of both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in 1993 and 1990, respectively, by invoking the 58 2B clause of the Constitution of Pakistan. Evidence, for instance, that by the former Intelligence Bureau (IB) chief Brigadier (retired) Imtiaz that the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) launched “Operation Midnight Jackal,” which involved giving bribes and intimidation to discourage national assembly members from voting for the PPP.²⁴⁶

Fifth, in part due to this history of the 58 2-B and the way the Constitution was designed in Pakistan, several constitutional measures were initiated under the 18th Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan that were voted on unanimously by all the major political parties of the time which further point to the emergence of a democratic consensus. Two salient features of the 18th Constitutional Amendment include the revised National Finance Commission Formula (NFC) and repealing the 58 2-B clause of the Constitution of Pakistan. First, the revised NFC formula was significant as it limited the ability of the army to insert its hand into the national exchequer and withdraw as much money as it wanted. This is because, as per the revised NFC formula, while the provinces' share could be increased, it could not be decreased. Ultimately, this empowered the provinces, which the establishment would often bypass in favour of the local bodies would be empowered to weaken the political parties at the time and to increase the establishments' authoritarian durability. This is why it comes as no surprise that all four of the devolution and decentralization reforms in Pakistani history have been conducted by military dictators (Lieven 2011), in large part because they wanted to by-pass provincial

²⁴⁵ As Farhatullah Babar notes, “... under Article 58-2B [of the Constitution of Pakistan], the establishment used to be able to dissolve the assemblies under the President” (Interview with Farhat Ullah Babar, 2021.)

²⁴⁶ See https://web.archive.org/web/20090905132623/http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009%5C08%5C28%5Cstory_28-8-2009_pg1_4

parties and national political parties in the political system to increase their autocratic durability. Moreover, as noted earlier, another example attests to the revised NFC formula limiting the ability of the military establishment of Pakistan to withdraw as much money as it wanted from Pakistan's budget in the 1980s under Zia.

Second, the repealing of 58 2-B is significant as the President at the time, Asif Zardari, gave up his constitutionally enshrined powers to dismiss the assemblies. He, therefore, stands in sharp contrast with the usual politics of Pakistan, such as in the 90s when the establishment would often use the 58 2-B clause in the Constitution to stifle democracy. Farhatullah Babar summarizes some of the significance of the Eighteenth Amendment well when he notes,

...the Constitution was changed unanimously by all parties. The ability of the Army to insert its hand into the national kitty and withdraw as much money as it wanted from it was stopped. Because the National Finance Commission formula came, under which the provinces' share was increased, it was made clear that while the province's share can be increased, it cannot be decreased.²⁴⁷

After some time, Gilani was dismissed from the office of the PM and was disqualified by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in 2011. Some observers like Farhat Ullah Babar have remarked that Gilani's disqualification was linked to taking a more assertive stance against the military establishment of²⁴⁸. However, he was ultimately replaced by another civilian PM, Raja Pervez Ashraf, from the same party (PPP). This same pattern is observed in the case of Nawaz Sharif, who was disqualified over corruption charges by the Supreme Court of Pakistan and replaced by Shahid Khaqan Abbasi in 2017. In this sense, this builds support for the notion that even though the military was far more powerful than the civilian governments, a democratic consensus emerged between the two main parties of PPP and PMLN in Pakistan following the signing of the COD in 2006. In this way, the restoration of democracy in 2008 following the 9-year rule by the military dictator Pervez

²⁴⁷ Interview with Farhatullah Babar, 2021.

²⁴⁸ Interview with Farhatullah Babar, 2021.

Musharraf and the subsequent civilian rule marked a period of relative weakness for the military in direct governance. The PPP, and later the PML-N governments, while not entirely free from military influence, exhibited limited increase in authority in curtailing Islamist parties' disruptive potential, particularly evident in their resilience in the face of sit-ins and protests that challenged state authority.

The Establishment Strikes Back

Amid this cementing of democratic ideals and procedures by the leading political parties, the Pakistani establishment felt action had to be taken to restore and consolidate its power against the oppositional elite of the state²⁴⁹. There is a perception among some analysts and practitioners of Pakistani politics that the establishment at this time felt that it had to break the hold of the traditional parties and weaken them by bringing in a third major force in politics. This was done with the introduction of the *Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf* (PTI) being aggressively promoted and supported by the military establishment since roughly 2011 and even more so in 2013 until sometime before the end of Imran Khan's regime in 2022.

A critical approach that the establishment used at this time was to aggressively pivot towards *Barelvi* Islam and support *Barelvi* political groups, which would end up weakening the civilian governments of the PMLN. Islamist parties were also used as a force to fragment the vote of the civilian government parties that were seen as a threat to the civilian government. From the point of electoral mobilization of Islamist parties, two Islamist parties, the newly formed TLP and the Milli Muslim League, competed for the first time in the general election of 2018. Many observers have noted that this entry of the TLP and the Milli Muslim League ended up hurting the electoral share of the anti-establishment PMLN rather than the pro-establishment PTI in Punjab in the 2018 elections. However, empirical evidence on this is, at best, mixed or contradictory (see Sabat et al. 2021).

²⁴⁹ Interview with Farhatullah Babar 2021.

2.1.2. Second Condition: Aligned Incentives

Second, the incentives of the ruling elite, such as Pakistan's establishment, should be aligned to encourage the divergent mobilization of Islamist parties. In other words, the incentives of Pakistan's military need to favor high street protests but low electoral mobilization of Islamist parties. This allows the establishment to justify its role as a stabilizing force necessary to counteract disorder and unrest, giving it the pretense necessary to continue interfering in the political process and secure its position at the top of the political hierarchy. By allowing Islamist parties to excel in street mobilization but not in electoral arenas, the military effectively uses these parties as tools to justify its interference in the political process as being necessary for maintaining stability and security. This strategy serves a dual purpose: it keeps civilian governance weak and perpetuates the military's image as an indispensable guardian of political order. Moreover, allowing Islamist parties certain freedoms to mobilize publicly creates a democratic façade which provides an illusion of political diversity, electoral fairness, and vibrancy that can be important for international audiences and, domestically, mitigate the potential for the oppositional elite to coalesce by decreasing their incentives to consolidate. It ensures that no political entity grows strong enough to challenge the military's authority.

Islamist parties have often played the role of being critical mobilizers for the establishment over the course of Pakistani political history. This mobilization has principally been in the social arena, where Islamists have mobilized on the streets, influenced policy formulation, and achieved high visibility in the national discourse. By acting as mobilizers for the autocratic establishment, Islamist parties have often provided legitimacy to military dictators that have leaned on Islam for their autocratic resilience (see Nasr 2001). As senior political expert and former senator of Pakistan, Farhatullah Babar, observes,

The military establishment of Pakistan has thought it necessary to lean on the religio-political parties to gain some acceptability. The military rulers seek their legitimacy, and the first thing that they do is to be a part of local bodies

[elections], or they lean on religious parties. Over a period of time, their leaning on religious parties has been called the Military-Mullah alliance.²⁵⁰

2.1.2.1. The Case of the Tehreek-e-Labbaik: Faizabad Dharnas and Crackdown by the Establishment

More recently, the *Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan* (TLP), known for its street power and ability to mobilize massive protests, has been a case study of how the military establishment of Pakistan moderates the divergent mobilization of Islamist groups. While the TLP has shown the capacity for significant disruption and mobilization, their political journey remains curtailed, unable to transform street momentum into electoral success. This is indicative of the military's continuing strategy to harness and simultaneously hobble Islamist forces. This dual approach can be observed with the change in the establishment's response towards the *Faizabad Dharna 1* and *Faizabad Dharna 2*, which occurred during the administrations of two different civilian governments of Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz and Pakistan *Tehreek-e-Insaf* respectively.

Crucially, during *Faizabad Dharna 1*, the military establishment chose not to intervene to disperse the protestors for a long time until a narrative had already built of the civilian government's ineptitude or of its complicity in the allegations over which the protestors were protesting. On the other hand, when it came to *Faizabad Dharna 2*, and especially after the TLP leadership started to go awry, the military establishment, in conjunction with civilian security agencies of Pakistan like the police force, launched a nationwide crackdown on the TLP leadership, most of which was imprisoned and the protests or the sit-in was called off right away and the demands of the protestors were not met. The social mobilization of Islamist parties was thus heavily blunted and curtailed in *Faizabad Dharna 2*; however, in *Faizabad Dharna 1*, there was no such curtailment, and if anything, there is evidence of tacit encouragement and complicity. The reason for these different outcomes is the military establishment's interest in *Faizabad Dharna 1* being

²⁵⁰ Interview with Farhatullah Babar 2021.

aligned with enhancing social mobilization, whereas, in *Faizabad Dharna 2*, they were aligned with impeding social mobilization. This situation is described below.

TABLE 6.2: Aligned Incentives of the Military Establishment and Islamist Success in Social Mobilization

Event	Military's Establishment's Interests Alignment with Islamist Parties	Outcome: Social Mobilization
<i>Faizabad Sit-in 1</i>	Aligned	Successful
<i>Faizabad Sit-in 2</i>	Not Aligned	Unsuccessful

Source: Author's formulation.

First, *Faizabad Dharna 1* occurred from 8 November 2017 to 18 December 2017 when TLP and its supporters started a protest by setting up camp at the Faizabad interchange in Islamabad/Rawalpindi in Pakistan. The protesting issue was contesting changes in the Elections Bill 2017, in which the word oath was changed to declaration. TLP viewed this as an attack and a significant dilution of the finality of Prophet Muhammad of Islam that was enshrined within the Constitution of Pakistan under section 295-c and demanded the resignation of the law minister Zahid Hamid to, “protect the identity of the country.”²⁵¹

TLP was successful as Zahid Hamid stepped down on 27 November 2017, and the government version of the story stated that the change was due to a clerical error. However, the protest continued for some twenty days, and the civilian government appeared weak and helpless in countering the protest. Urban life in the twin cities of Islamabad and Rawalpindi, in particular, was paralyzed, causing significant inconvenience to the residents. A good portion of the media coverage in the news and electronic media similarly portrayed the civilian government of Pakistan as appearing to capitulate to the Islamist demands. On the other hand, for people sympathetic to the TLP, the *dharna* was evidence of a government that did not take the finality of the prophet Muhammad of Islam seriously.

The military establishment at the time was not aligned with the civilian government of Shahid Khaqan Abbasi for various reasons. Abbasi had stepped in to

²⁵¹ See <https://arynews.tv/faizabad-inquiry-commission-report-reveals-new-details/> Accessed August 12, 2024.

replace Nawaz Sharif as the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Sharif, who was the leader of the PMLN, had been disqualified from the post of PM over corruption charges that stemmed from the Panama Papers. The case in which he was ultimately found guilty was failing to declare a non-withdrawn salary he received from his son's company that was registered in Qatar. The legal basis that was used to disqualify him from office was that Sharif cannot be perceived as "*Sadiq aur Ameen*" (Truthful and Trustworthy) and was disqualified from the post of Prime Minister for life.²⁵² Under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution of Pakistan, a person cannot be qualified as a member of the national or provincial legislatures if he is not 'Sadiq and Ameen' – truthful and trustworthy.

Second, on the other hand, when it comes to *Faizabad Dharna 2*, the military establishments' interests aligned with the civilian government at the time. This is in part related to how, in the post-charter of democracy context, the military establishment had aggressively supported the PTI, which, in turn, mainly represented the military establishment's interests. After coming to power at the federal level in 2017, Imran Khan's regime was often called a "hybrid regime" by Pakistani analysts, practitioners and even large sections of the public, given the degree of fusion between the military establishment's interests and those of the civilian government during much of this time.

However, the TLP leadership, emboldened by its ability to mobilize people on the streets, made remarks that directly challenged the military establishment, such as those by the TLP leader Pir Afzal Qadri, who declared the three Supreme Court judges who acquitted Aasia Bibi as *wajib-ul-qatal* (liable to be killed), that Prime Minister Imran was a Zionist agent, and that the COAS Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa's orders should not be accepted by the army's rank-and-file and the Pakistani public at large.²⁵³ In this way, TLP's leadership went directly against the military establishment and even encouraged an insurrection within the Pakistan Army.

²⁵² See Constitution of Pakistan https://na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1333523681_951.pdf Accessed August 15, 2024.

²⁵³ See <https://www.dawn.com/news/1480837>. Accessed December 16, 2024.

Things changed rapidly, however, after this crescendo in social mobilization in the case of the TLP. The party was now in direct conflict with the military establishment's interests. On November 23, 2018, a crackdown was launched on TLP leaders who, including Khadim Rizvi and Afzal Qadri, were taken into "protective custody" after they had announced holding a rally in Islamabad. This was an important moment, as "that's when the army felt that a red line had been crossed, their DNA had changed, and everyone was picked up."²⁵⁴ Following the crackdown on TLP leadership, sedition cases were filed against TLP leaders. Aasia Bibi's case verdict was upheld, and she was quietly spirited away from Pakistan on political asylum and humanitarian grounds. And, as noted, the TLP was prevented from mobilizing on the streets despite its call.

The repeated confrontations initiated by TLP against the government, often under the pretext of defending religious laws, have led to national crises, putting civilian governments in precarious positions. These crises serve the military's interests by painting the civilian leadership as inept and incapable of maintaining order, thereby rationalizing the military's role as an indispensable arbitrator and guardian of stability. TLP's actions align with the military's broader objectives of keeping the civilian authorities in check, showcasing a pattern of orchestrated chaos used to justify military supremacy in the political and public domains. However, crucially, we see that the military establishment can modify the effect on the political mobilization of Islamic parties contingent on the alignment or misalignment of its interests. In *Faizabad Dharna 1*, the military establishment's interests were aligned with enhancing the social mobilization of Islamist parties as it could weaken the oppositional elite in the form of the civilian opposition at the time. By contrast, in *Faizabad Dharna 2*, we see that the military establishment blunted the mobilization of Islamist parties like the TLP and ensured that it was not successful. Ultimately, this builds evidence that aligning interests is a crucial

²⁵⁴ Interview with Muhammad Malick, 2021.

condition that moderates the military establishments' role in influencing Islamist political mobilization.

2.1.2.2. Zia-ul-Haq Regime: Islamization and Pushback against Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

The alignment of the establishment's interests and some of the Islamist causes have enduring legacies in Pakistan's political history. Empirical instances from Pakistani political history can be found when the military establishment's interests were aligned with divergent mobilization and when they were relatively less aligned. However, the less aligned aspect of this empirical observation is not very robust in the Pakistani case, seeing that divergent patterns of mobilization of Islamist parties have been relatively similar throughout Pakistani history. A critical period when the overlap between Pakistan's establishment interests and the divergent mobilization of Islamists started to become quite prominent was during the regime of the military dictator Zia-ul-Haq, who ruled Pakistan from 1979 to his death in a bomb blast aboard his plane in 1988. During this time, even the motto of the Pakistan Army was changed by the military dictator Zia-ul-Haq to "*Iman, Taqwa, Jihad Fi Sabeel Allah*" (faith, piety and Jihad for the sake of Allah). However, this motto was quietly abandoned after Zia's death.²⁵⁵

In other words, as the extant literature on Islamist mobilization in Pakistan underlines, Islamist groups have often been used by military dictators in Pakistani political history, like Zia-ul-Haq, to acquire political legitimacy (see Nasr 2001). This need for legitimacy was even more pronounced as Zia needed the support of Islamist parties to fight against the Soviets after they invaded Afghanistan in 1979. In this way, Zia capitalized on the geostrategic conflict in the region to consolidate his power, prolong his rule and advance strategic short-term gains for Pakistan. Zia was able to use Islamist parties as mobilizers, with Islamist groups being involved in the proxy warfare to aid in the cause of the "*mujahideen*," as this ultimately

²⁵⁵ Interview with Farhatullah Babar, 2021.

allowed Zia to benefit from Cold War era aid and largesse that he disbursed within the Pakistan army. It is no wonder that during the 1980s, the military proportion of Pakistan's budget was a staggering 60 percent of the GDP (Lieven 2011:166).

Zia's rule also marks a time when Pakistan's premier intelligence agency, the ISI, was exponentially expanded and became deeply involved in the domestic political process of Pakistan. Zia's decisions aided this expansion. For example, Zia insisted that Pakistan would disburse the US aid that was being injected into Pakistan itself, often via the ISI to fight against the Soviet invasion as a condition for Pakistani assistance instead of the US attempting to disburse this aid to the *mujahideen* directly (Coll 2004, 2018). It thus placed the ISI and, by extension, the Pakistani establishment in direct control of the US funds that were designated to help the cause of the *mujahideen* (Coll 2004, 2018). Such actions increased the clout of the military establishment in Pakistan's domestic and international politics.

Such was the degree to which Zia was able to coopt Islamist parties that many *madaris* were used for the strategic purpose of creating strategic depth and fighting the Soviet Union through proxy war and militancy on Pakistan's eastern flank. Senator Babar emphasized how even the syllabi that were taught at the *madaris* reflected this geopolitical and strategic goal of the Pakistani army, to use Islamic militants as a front against further Soviet incursion into Asia. As Farhatullah Babar emphasized,

I have seen the pages of the syllabi that were taught to these students that were reportedly drawn by the CIA.²⁵⁶ If it was A for Allah, then it was *Bey* for Bandoor (rifle), *Tey* for top (cannon), *Jeem* for *Jannat* (heaven), *Jahannam* (hell), and *Jihad*, *Kaaf* for Kabul and Kashmir. So, this military mullah alliance went to the extent that an entire generation of Pakistanis was indoctrinated.²⁵⁷

Before this, the establishment was able to court Islamist parties such as the JI, which have had a mixed relationship with the establishment that was often marked

²⁵⁶ This point came up repeatedly during interviews. For instance, it was also emphasized by Inayatullah Khan, 2021.

²⁵⁷ Interview with Farhatullah Babar 2021, Urdu transliterated alphabets in italics.

by periods of animosity. Some observers have commented that while Islamist parties benefited from gaining access to public offices,²⁵⁸ others have noted that Zia was able to bypass giving genuine political power in the form of mass appeal to Islamist parties, including JI. As one journalist noted, the leader of JI at the time, Mian Tufail, agreed to all of Zia's demands and compromised on the Islamist principles of JI "over a cup of tea."²⁵⁹

At the same time, this does not mean that Islamists have always negotiated their demands successfully, and there are instances where their mobilization has failed to lead toward policy success. As the case of the Islamist mobilization in opposition to the Global War on Terror (GWOT) shows, anti-West Islamist mobilization in Pakistan was largely ignored by the establishment during the administration of Pervez Musharraf, who was publicly firmly allied with the West over the GWOT despite many protests from Islamist parties. In this way, a lack of aligned interests by the establishment with Islamist causes thus helps explain the variation in their success or not.

In this way, the alignment of Pakistan's military establishment with the social and electoral mobilization of Islamist parties in Pakistan highlights a pattern of cooptation and limited repression. It emphasizes how these incentives are crucial in determining the extent and pattern of Islamist parties' mobilization, serving the establishment's strategic and political interests. The Zia regime period elucidates the theoretical underpinnings but also provides empirical evidence of the establishment's overarching influence in shaping the divergent mobilization of Islamist political parties. The establishment's engagement with Islamist parties is contingent upon its shifting strategic goals that ultimately help increase its autocratic durability, reflecting its deep entrenchment in Pakistan's political fabric.

²⁵⁸ E.g., Interview with Husnul Amin, 2021.

²⁵⁹ Interview with Ali Sher, 2021.

3. Causal Pathways for Moderating Divergent Mobilization

Pakistan's establishment can act as a key moderator of divergent mobilization of Islamist parties by influencing three pivotal causal pathways that are relevant to their social and electoral mobilization: 1) it can influence variation in Islamist social mobilization via varying the large electorates of Islamist parties, 2) it can influence variation in Islamist electoral mobilization via varying the political and ideological fragmentation of Islamist parties, and 3) it can influence variation in the social and electoral mobilization of Islamist parties independently of influencing variation in the independent variables of the large electorates or the political and ideological fragmentation of Islamist parties.

First, when it comes to social mobilization, Pakistan's establishment has directly and indirectly been involved in the enlargement of the electorates of Islamist parties. This is principally due to its involvement in the growth of *madrassahs* in Pakistan over time but also due to involvement in mosque proliferation and Islamist student organizations in universities. This enlargement in the electorates of Islamist parties has contributed to the rise in Islamist social mobilization and street power over time. Second, for the outcome of electoral mobilization, Pakistan's military establishment has influenced the fragmentation of Islamist parties through the pathways of ideological and political fragmentation. For the empirical case of Islamist parties, Pakistan's establishment increased ideological sources of fragmentation by influencing the modality of the low exclusion criteria of Islamist parties by intensifying sectarianism in the country through its actions and policies that were identified in Chapter 4 [Elections Chapter]. Whereas when it comes to the pathway of political fragmentation, Pakistan's establishment has engaged extensively in political engineering strategies that have influenced the level of coordination of Islamist parties and ruptured their electoral alliances.

Third, when it comes to influencing variation in the outcome of social and electoral mobilization of Islamist parties without influencing variation in the independent variables of this work, the military establishment can influence both

social and electoral mobilization. When it comes to social mobilization, the military establishment can adopt two main approaches that influence Islamist social mobilization: 1) providing tacit consent that the urban arteries that are necessary to “choke” urban life via protesting for Islamists are not blocked or acted upon, 2) it can contribute to policies that ensure that Islamists messaging gets amplified or reaches its audience instead of blocking it. When it comes to electoral mobilization, the military has used several measures that have prevented Islamist parties from acquiring mass electoral appeal. For instance, through pre-electoral rigging, ballot day rigging, and post-electoral rigging.

3.1. The Establishment’s Role in the Enlargement of the Electorates of Islamist Parties

The establishment aids the social mobilization of Islamists strategically to preserve and enhance its own power. In this regard, first, Islamist parties aid the establishment of the co-optation of the masses, which has been underlined to be crucial in existing scholarship (Blaydes 2010; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006, 2007; Gandhi 2008; Malesky and Schuler 2010). Second, Islamist parties aid the authoritarian establishment not so much with repression (cf. Svolik 2012) but with sowing what I have called “democratic disorder” and creating changes in the balance of power between civilian and military governments in favour of the establishment. Third, Islamist parties are an excellent choice for the establishment as vehicles that can be co-opted.

Pakistan’s military has played a key role in the proliferation of the large electorate of Islamist parties that “belong” to them, which is a key variable that influences the social mobilization of Islamist parties and a critical component explaining their divergent mobilization. Islamist parties have, on balance, seen the enlargement of their electorates over the course of Pakistani political history since achieving independence from Britain in 1947. This enlargement has occurred principally due to the establishments’ influence in increasing the size and scale of the network of ancillary organizations of Islamist parties in Pakistan. This

encompasses three specific empirical drivers in descending order of analytical weightage: 1) increasing the number of *madrassahs* in Pakistan that are linked with political parties, 2) a proliferation of mosques around Pakistan, and 3) Islamist student organizations at university and educational campuses. The enlargement of the electorate of Islamist parties is captured by journalist and national broadcaster Muhammad Malick, who emphasizes the increase in the street power of Islamist parties and the overall intensification of the social mobilization capacity of Islamists in Pakistan. He highlights the enlargement of a network of *madrassahs* where he observes a shift from a more spiritual and inner dimension of Islam that used to be prevalent in South Asia and the areas comprising Pakistan to a much more political and Islamist version that is practiced in most *madrassahs* when he remarks that,

I remember there used to be a lot of *mazaars* [shrines] and the pattern was that there used to be a big *mazaar* and there used to be a small mosque in the corner. We saw during Zia-ul-Haq's time that the *mazaars* started to get smaller, and the mosques started to get bigger. Earlier, the *mazaars* had *urs* [death anniversary of Sufi saint], *dhamaal* [a type of Sufi whirling to honour Sufi saints], music, *qawwalis* [a form of Sufi practice of Islam in South Asia], but then the music started going out, and it became a very quiet place, and the mosque and *maulvi* [cleric] became bigger.²⁶⁰

3.1.1. The Rise of a *Madrassah* Network

First, the principal way in which the military establishment of Pakistan was able to contribute to the exponential rise in the network of *madrassahs* in Pakistan was primarily through the patronage that *madrassahs* received from the establishment. Some of the roots of the cultivation of the *madrassahs* in the areas around Pakistan were rooted in colonial times when the British thought that these educational institutions were a great way to increase their influence and reach into the regions comprising Punjab within Pakistan.²⁶¹ Historically, this has often come in the form of land grants. Over time, the state allowed and, at certain points, even encouraged the lack of accountability of *madrassahs* that were encroaching on state land. A

²⁶⁰ Interview with Muhammad Malick 2021, translations in brackets made by the author.

²⁶¹ Interview with Anonymous Respondent T, 2021.

senior retired bureaucrat and trained academic with extensive experience in the administration of Pakistan summarized this well when he emphasized,

“There was a very subtle state patronage towards these *madrassahs*. Historically, educational institutions got what kind of patronage from the state? Land grants. The land in Islamabad is even more expensive than Manhattan. The most expensive land area in Pakistan is in E-7, and right in front of it, there are 100 kanals [1 kanal = 5445 square foot] of *Jamia Ashrafia* in an ecological zone [constructions are illegal in an ecological zone]. That land itself is worth hundreds of millions of dollars. In the Blue area, a yard is for almost 100 thousand dollars; after every block, you have a *madrassah* or *masjid*. The greatest patronage that the government gave was that *madrassahs* were given land wherever they liked them, and nobody would demolish that *madrassah*. And rather, during the Zia era, there was a subtle patronage that you wouldn’t say anything to them²⁶²

Second, the military establishment was also able to contribute to the enlargement of the electorate of Islamist parties through several policies that were either directly instituted by military dictators ruling Pakistan or were encouraged by the establishment to be passed through the civilian government. One of the critical approaches was that there was a time when the degrees of the *madaris* were equated to a university degree.²⁶³ The educational boards of the Islamic schools or *awqaf* were treated as graduate schools and their graduates were eligible to apply for government jobs. Other such policies instituted by the establishment included those during the time of Zia-ul-Haq, who, under his larger policy of Islamization, created two Arabic jobs in every government.²⁶⁴ This policy contributed to a significant enlargement of the electorate of Islamist parties as overnight, there were thousands of government jobs created for *madrassah* graduates, which created more of an impetus for new *madrassahs* to emerge and for an increase in their enrolment. It also marked a more stable link between the state and the *madrassahs* as these *madrassah* graduates got access to state largesse and started to join the state’s

²⁶² Interview with Anonymous Respondent T, 2021.

²⁶³ Interview with Anonymous Respondent T, 2021. See From Spotlight to Backstage: the MMA’s decline into obscurity <https://www.dawn.com/news/1420425>. Accessed 12 August 2024.

²⁶⁴ Interview with Anonymous Respondent T, 2021.

payroll.²⁶⁵ This significantly helped increase the penetration of the ancillary networks of Islamist parties deep into the state and extend beyond the urban centers.

Third, and similarly, during the regime of another military dictator, General Pervez Musharraf, electoral laws were changed in such a way that at least a graduate degree was required to become a legislator and stand for the position of member of the National Assembly of Pakistan (MNA). A *madrasah* degree was granted the same status as a graduate degree. This and a variety of other factors contributed to the Islamist six-party alliance, the *Muttahidda Majlis-e-Amal* (MMA), forming governments in two provinces of Pakistan: *Khyber Pakhtunkhwa* (then called Northwest Frontier Province) and Balochistan. Thanks, in part, to the policy implemented by Musharraf and, by extension, Pakistan's establishment, "half of the cabinet were *madrasah* graduates, and they themselves were managers of *madrasahs*."²⁶⁶

During the Global War on Terror (GWOT), due to several incidents of terrorism in the West, such as the 7th of July bombings in the UK in 2005, there was pressure to start officially registering *madaris*. The larger *madrasahs* were already registered under the Societies Act.²⁶⁷ However, this registration was largely ineffective as a policy device to bring the *madaris* under greater state regulation, and they continued to retain their autonomous power.²⁶⁸

Fourth, external funding was injected into the proliferation of *madrasahs* due to geostrategic reasons and Pakistan's foreign policy pivots by the establishment, which also contributed to the enlargement of the electorate of Islamist parties. For instance, the regime of Zia-ul-Haq and the soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 created an opportunity for *madrasahs* to proliferate. As an ex-

²⁶⁵ Several studies note that there is a link between *madrasah* graduates and sectarianism. As one informant emphasized, due to this policy, "there was now a conduit between *madrasah* graduates and government schools (Dr T Anonymous Respondent 2021)."

²⁶⁶ Interview with Anonymous Respondent T, 2021.

²⁶⁷ Interview with Anonymous Respondent T, 2021.

²⁶⁸ Interview with Anonymous Respondent T, 2021.

ISI officer emphasized, “Pakistan was holding the ground and shared a 2600 km border with Afghanistan. So whatever had to happen had to happen via Pakistan.”²⁶⁹ In this context, “the religious forces saw an opportunity” and thought, “We can get money from this. So, let’s open madrassahs.”²⁷⁰ What was remarkable was the candid response from the former ISI officer who, on record, went on to note how the Pakistani establishment as a strategy went to acquire funding from Western allies. As Lt Col Zaighum Butt said, “Our belief is that life and death is in the hands of Allah, but the money is in the hands of the US and Russia. So, if you die, you will be a martyr (*Shaheed*). If you survive, then you will be a champion (*ghazi*). Your expenses will be taken care of.”

Ultimately, external funding by the Western and Gulf allies like Saudi Arabia due to prevailing Cold War dynamics was utilized well by the Pakistani establishment for its own benefit, and some of this money was disbursed to empower *madrassah* growth. Consequently, Pakistan saw a mushrooming growth in the number of *madrassahs* following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, as evidenced by the evidence assembled by various studies, including some that are underlined in Chapter 4 on social mobilization of Islamist parties. As Lt. Col. (Retired) Zaighum Butt notes,

Before that there used to be a handful of parties of Sunni *Barelvis* or *Ahl e Hadis*. Then, parties such as *Sunni Tehreek*, TJPP, *Tehreek-e-Jafaria*, and *Sipah-e-Sahaba*. All the *maulvis* took their share of training and all of them were getting funding from Saudi Arabia or UAE. But that funding was coming for the *Jihad*, and when the Americans went, then this became a bloody headache for us. So this period from 1980-1993 was the period where these *jihadi* parties mushroomed.²⁷¹

Ultimately, the establishment played a crucial role in mediating the organizational effectiveness of Islamist parties. They started to be increasingly used by the ISI as weapons of democratic disorder. The role of the establishment

²⁶⁹ Interview with Lt. Col. (retired) Zaighum Butt, 2021.

²⁷⁰ Interview with Lt. Col. (retired) Zaighum Butt, 2021.

²⁷¹ Interview with Lt. Col. (retired) Zaighum Butt, 2021.

and the instrumental value of these Islamist parties as instruments of democratic disorder which facilitated their social mobilization capacity in the arena of street power, was captured by Lt. Col. (Retired) Zaighum Butt when he remarked that, “Street power was developed for these parties as their nuisance value developed.”²⁷²

In this way, the military's encouragement and fostering of *madrassahs* that are deeply linked with Islamist parties has contributed to the enlargement of the electorates of Islamist parties.²⁷³ By influencing the variation in the organizational effectiveness of Islamist parties, Pakistan's establishment thus acts as a key moderator between the social mobilization of Islamist parties and their organizational effectiveness. More empirically, the establishment's involvement in this process started to become assertive during the Zia-ul-Haq era when the state, under military dictatorship, actively promoted the establishment of *madrassahs* as part of its broader Islamization policy. These institutions have provided Islamist parties with a steady supply of ideologically driven individuals ready to participate in political processes and protests, thereby enhancing these parties' street power.²⁷⁴

i. Military's Role in the Proliferation of Mosques: The Military Mosque Alliance

Pakistan's establishment played an instrumental role in enhancing the organizational effectiveness of Islamist parties by contributing to the proliferation of mosques that acted as ancillary networks of Islamist parties and contributed to their street power. This influence increased in the number of mosques around Pakistan, which has been especially helpful and has contributed to the rise of *Barelvi* street power and social mobilization capacity in recent years. A critical empirical driver through which some of this increase was achieved was the

²⁷² Interview with Lt. Col. (retired) Zaighum Butt, 2021.

²⁷³ See chapter 4 social mobilization of Islamist parties of this work

²⁷⁴ This does not imply that there haven't been instances of the establishment's involvement in the pre-Zia era or post-Zia.

deliberate non-enforcement of laws regarding mosque construction on prime, often illegally occupied, urban land.

Central to the *Barelvi* movement's growth has been the unchecked proliferation of mosques across urban centers in Pakistan, a development subtly supported by the military's strategic interests. Mosques serve not only as religious centers but also as community rallying points and bases for political mobilization. This is in subtle contradistinction with the arguments advanced by Butt 2016 who emphasizes the Friday sermon to be crucial to providing the bedrock behind the street power of Islamist parties. I advance instead that it is not the Friday sermon but the mosque itself that provides better analytical leverage in explaining the high levels of street power of Islamist parties, including the Islamist parties in Pakistan.

The Pakistani establishment's role in contributing to the proliferation of mosque construction has occurred in tacit and direct ways. More tacit, for instance, has been the establishment's passive stance on illegal mosque constructions—particularly those that spring up overnight on valuable urban plots, which has effectively bolstered Islamist groups and especially *Barelvi* groups' local influence and network capacity. This lax enforcement is seen by some analysts as a calculated move by the military to cultivate grassroots bases that can be mobilized for street power as needed.²⁷⁵

By allowing mosques to remain on illegally occupied lands, the military establishment of Pakistan indirectly facilitates an infrastructure of mobilization for *Barelvi* groups. These mosques become entrenched parts of the urban landscape, often immune to legal action, thereby solidly embedding the *Barelvi* presence within key locales. This strategy has dual benefits for the military: it keeps the *Barelvi* groups indebted and loyal while also ensuring that any potential civilian government would find it challenging to dislodge these religious entities without facing significant public backlash.

²⁷⁵ Interview with Anonymous Respondent H, 2021.

In this way, the relationship between Pakistan's military and the *Barelvi* sect highlights a broader strategy of indirect control and influence over religious groups within Pakistan. By facilitating the growth of *Barelvi* institutions through passive legal oversight, the military secures a pivotal ally capable of significant street-level mobilization. This dynamic illustrates a complex layer of military strategy in managing religious factions, showcasing a pragmatic blend of cooptation and limited repression and political control that characterizes the military establishment's engagement with religious politics in Pakistan.

3.1.2. Military's Role in Promoting Islamist Student Unions

Jamaat-e-Islami (JI)'s influence, mainly through its student wing, the *Islami Jamiat-e-Talaba* (IJT), exemplifies the military's role in facilitating the organizational network of Islamist parties. The IJT has been instrumental in organizing protests and political activities, often with the covert support of military factions interested in using these movements to counteract secular and liberal opposition. This relationship was notably visible during the 1970s and 1980s when the military sought to consolidate power by aligning with Islamist groups that could mobilize public support through university campuses and urban centers.

Islamist student unions in Pakistan, most notably the *Islami Jamiat-e-Talaba* (IJT), have been critical in shaping political discourse within academic institutions. These groups emerged as crucial players during periods of political upheaval, with their development intertwined with the strategic interests of Pakistan's military regimes (Nasr 1994). The military's involvement in promoting these groups was partly driven by its desire to counteract leftist ideologies during the Cold War, aligning with broader regional strategies influenced by global powers. The student wing of JI gained prominence by filling the void left by weak civil institutions. The military, during various regimes, saw these groups as both a tool and a potential ally in countering leftist sentiments and secular student organizations that were perceived as threats to the state's ideological and political stability.

This support for student unions enabling these groups to establish a strong presence in universities.²⁷⁶ Ultimately, the military establishment's political engineering that involved tacit alliances with these groups served dual purposes: maintaining control within educational institutions and fostering a generation ideologically aligned with the military's political objectives. The unions acted as recruitment grounds for future party cadres, significantly boosting the parties' ability to mobilize for political and social causes (see Nasr 1996). They also helped in the ideological dissemination of Islamist ideals and principles, which helped with their social mobilization regarding national discourse salience. This is because continuous engagement in educational institutions ensured the propagation of Islamist ideologies, expanding the parties' influence among the youth.

In terms of Islamist parties, JI's use of its student union *Islami Jamiat Tuleba* (IJT) and JUI's *Jamiat Talba-e-Islam* (JTI) are the most analytically significant Islamist party student unions in Pakistan. JI's use of IJT for political gains provides a clear example of this dynamic. The IJT has been instrumental in orchestrating political campaigns and managing Jamaat's public engagements, effectively acting as the party's youth wing. Their activities have ranged from organizing protests to influencing university policies, which have had broad implications for the social mobilization of JI and have been instrumental in the street power of the party. IJT has been instrumental in enforcing ideological conformity in universities, often engaging in violent clashes with secular or nationalist student groups. This has not only bolstered Jamaat-e-Islami's position as a defender of Islamic values but also increased its visibility and influence in Pakistan's socio-political landscape. The IJT's activities, often allegedly with the tacit approval or direct support of the military, have included organizing massive rallies, influencing university policies, and controlling student admissions and faculty appointments. Such activities have ensured that Islamist narratives remain central in educational discussions and political discourses.

²⁷⁶ See <https://www.dawn.com/news/742642/bleeding-green-the-rise-and-fall-of-the-ijt> Accessed December 11, 2024; <https://www.dawn.com/news/1116782> Accessed December 11, 2024.

In this way, the Pakistani establishment's role in mediating the social mobilization of student unions of Islamist parties has left an enduring impact on their social mobilization capacity. It highlights the dual role of Islamist parties as agents of both political fervor and tools of broader strategic gamesmanship. A focus on the Pakistani establishment is thus important as it plays an important part in mediating the social and electoral mobilization of Islamist parties.

3.2. The Establishment's Role in Contributing to the Political and Ideological Fragmentation of Islamist Parties

Pakistan's military has long served as a subtle yet profound moderator in the political landscape, especially in moulding the electoral performance of Islamist parties. Central to understanding this dynamic is the military's role in moderating the extent and nature of fragmentation within Islamist factions, directly impacting their electoral outcomes. The main way in which Pakistan's establishment influences the structural fragmentation of Islamist parties that impinges on their electoral performance is by inducing internal party splits, increasing intra-party factionalism and creating challenger parties along with breakdown of electoral alliances and political coalitions.

The military establishment's actions are rooted in a desire to maintain a controlled political landscape where Islamist groups can be managed. Theoretically, this approach is aligned with the establishment's broader goals of autocratic durability, where a divided Islamist opposition cannot mount an effective or successful challenge to the military establishment's influence or for the military's goal of empowering or weakening the civilian governments it supports at the time. This fragmentation is evident in the multiple splinter groups that often contest elections separately, diluting their overall vote share (Haqqani 2005). It is compounded by the military's preference for a weak civilian government, which aligns with its historical pattern of undermining strong political movements that could shift the balance of power.

3.2.1. Variation in Political Fragmentation: Inducing Party Splits & Political Engineering

Fragmentation is exacerbated by the military's strategy to sow discord within Islamist ranks. By covertly instigating and exacerbating internal conflicts, the military fosters splits in Islamist parties that negatively influence the parties' electoral mobilization capability by, for instance, diluting the parties' resources. This internal disarray is often public and messy, leading to a weakened collective electoral front and diminishing the parties' appeal to broader voter bases. Examples that support this fragmentation by Pakistan's military are numerous. First, they include how the Islamist electoral alliance, the *Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal* (MMA), was used by the military dictator General Pervez Musharraf for his own authoritarian durability and the Islamist parties that were member parties of the MMA endorsed several actions of Musharraf even as they were opposed to Musharraf's support for the US-led GWOT. The leader of the opposition was from the MMA, and the leaders of two non-Islamist political parties that had spent time governing Pakistan for much of the 90s (Benazir Bhutto of PPP and Nawaz Sharif of PMLN) were in self-imposed exile from Pakistan. This allowed Musharraf to play to the emaciated opposition by providing some "carrots" to the MMA by allowing some level of access to state largesse and validating them as parliamentary forces but also engaged in their limited repression to ensure that the MMA was never able to acquire mass appeal in national elections.

Second, an example of a key party split that was mediated by the military's role in politics was the split between JUI into its two factions of JUI-S and JUI-F. During the 1980s, the JUI supported many of the policies of General Zia-ul-Haq. This included supporting the removal of Bhutto as a PNA member and, crucially, support for the ant-Soviet *Jihad* in Afghanistan. Ultimately, the injection of financial support and patronage of Pakistani establishment in the emergence of *madrasahs* during the Zia years allowed JI to build thousands of new *madrasahs* or to expand existing ones all over Pakistan. This emergence of the *madrasah*

network was especially concentrated in the areas where the *mujahideen* were most active on the eastern frontier of Pakistan that borders Afghanistan and later became instrumental in the formation of the Taliban.

However, there were high levels of inter-party fragmentation within Islamist parties at the time. JUI was distrustful of Zia's close ties with JI and joined the anti-Zia political coalition Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) (International Crisis Group: 11).²⁷⁷ After the death of Mufti Mahmud in 1980, who was the leader of JUI since 1968, the dual relationship of Islamist groups with Zia's regime led to differences within the JUI and the party split into two factions: JUI (F) headed by Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman, and the JUI-S headed by Sami-ul-Haq, who supported Zia and was a member in his parliament, the *Majlis-e-Shura*.²⁷⁸ The separation of JUI-S and JUI-F groups was thus marked by differing stances on cooperation with the military establishment and its policies, where Sami-ul-Haq represented the pro-establishment camp whereas Fazal-ur-Rehman supported the Benazir Bhutto government (see Behuria 2007). In this way, the military has exploited internal disagreements between Islamist parties and regional dynamics to encourage the factionalism of Islamist parties.

TABLE 6.3 below summarizes some of the prominent splits of Islamist parties, and invariably, the Pakistani establishment played a role in these party splits. However, not all of the factions of Islamist parties that split from the party competed in elections or registered with the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP). Nevertheless, TABLE 6.3 shows how the Pakistani establishment has been able to mediate the fragmentation of Islamist parties.

*** space intentionally left blank ***

²⁷⁷ See page 11 <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/pakistan/islamic-parties-pakistan>.

²⁷⁸ See <https://www.senate.gov.pk/en/profile.php?uid=755> Accessed December 11, 2024.

TABLE 6.3: Prominent Splits in Major Islamist Parties of Pakistan

Party Name	Factions
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI)	1. Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazal-ur-Rehman (JUI-F) 2. Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Sami-ul-Haq (JUI-S) 3. Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Sherani
Jamiat Ulema-e Pakistan (JUP)	1. Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan Noorani (JUP-IN) 2. Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan Abdul Sattar Niazi (JUP-N)
Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP)	1. Tehreek-e-Labbaik (TLP) 2. Tehreek-e-Labbaik Jalali Group 3. Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pir Afzal Qadri Group (TLP-Qadri)

Source: Author's formulation using various sources.

Third, the military's strategy to undermine Islamist parties often involves the deliberate fracturing of political coalitions and inducing splits within these parties. This approach ensures that the Islamist vote is divided, making it difficult for any single party to garner enough support to challenge the status quo or the military's preferred political arrangements. A key example where Pakistan's military establishment influenced such an example was how Musharraf used the MMA to endorse the second Legal Framework Order (LFO) that he passed in 2002. It was politically expedient for Musharraf to consolidate and prolong his autocratic rule at the time, and he was then able to make his autocratic legislation more palatable by putting a democratic façade on it through the validation of the MMA. Actions such as this hurt the MMA electorally in the eyes of the voters, so much so that some leaders of the member parties of the MMA had to publicly apologize for their support of the Musharraf regime. One example of this is when the leader of JI, Qazi Hussain Ahmed, had to publicly apologize at the Karachi Press Club for supporting Musharraf's LFO.²⁷⁹ JUP's leader, Shah Ahmed Noorani, also apologized. On the other hand, Maulana Fazal-Ur-Rehman of JUI-F did not apologize and instead asked why he should apologize when asked about his decision to support Musharraf.²⁸⁰ In this way, this instance shows how sometimes the military establishment's role in using Islamist parties to influence their structural

²⁷⁹ Interview with Sabookh Syed, 2021.

²⁸⁰ Interview with Sabookh Syed, 2021.

fragmentation has influenced their electoral mobilization as, ultimately, MMA broke down due to disagreements among members. This breakdown of the electoral alliance of the MMA was thus influenced by the Pakistani establishment's role, and led to its eventual fall into disarray.

3.3 Moderating Social and Electoral Mobilization Independently of Independent Variables

So far, the pathways that have been discussed have largely captured how the establishment moderates divergent mobilization by influencing variation along the dimensions of organizational effectiveness and structural fragmentation. However, not all the influence of the moderator flows along these dimensions alone and, like most effect modifiers, the Pakistani establishment can influence the outcomes of social and electoral mobilization of Islamist parties independent of these dimensions. With regards to electoral mobilization, based on insights derived from the extant literature in political science a state's ruling elite, such as the Pakistani establishment, can influence electoral outcomes through several approaches, including controlling electoral rules and manipulating institutions to preclude fair competition (Diamond 2002; Levitsky & Way 2002), which are characteristic of hybrid regimes. In this way, the autocratic ruling elite in hybrid regimes can tilt the playing field by, for example, 1) buying votes (Blaydes 2010; Lust-Okar 2006), 2) co-opting elites and societal groups like political parties (Boix & Svolik 2007; 3) systematically encouraging party splits, 4) controlling media resources, and 5) gerrymandering electoral districts to give greater representation to supporters (Lust-Okar 2005; Malesky 2009).

Such actions can take place against Islamist parties if the conditions for divergence, namely, relative strength and the aligned interests of the establishment, influence it to act in a way that impedes the electoral mobilization of Islamist parties. In this sense, at a more empirical level in the Pakistani context, the crucial ways in which the military establishment of Pakistan can influence the inability of Islamist parties to acquire mass electoral appeal is by electoral rigging

before, during, and after polling. It can also influence candidate selection of Islamist parties which can yield negative electoral outcomes for them and lead to party defections, which ultimately prevents them from becoming mass electoral machines as they do not get a hold of “electable” candidates that have a higher likelihood of winning in their constituency.

With regard to the outcome of social mobilization, the key pathway through which the Pakistani establishment operates beyond influencing variation in organizational effectiveness of Islamist parties is 1) by its tacit approval and inaction to curtail street protests that can weaken the civilian government and 2) by lack of accountability of those involved in any crimes belonging to Islamist forces in the context of a weakly institutionalized hybrid regime where the civilian institutions often lack the capacity to implicate and prosecute strong individuals on their own and the establishment sometimes even interferes and prevents civilian governments from prosecuting these individuals.

3.3.1. Moderating Electoral Mobilization

The electoral rigging of Pakistani elections has always been an issue discussed in scholarly and policy circles. There are varying accounts of the electoral rigging of Pakistani elections and given the competitive authoritarian nature of the Pakistani regime even in periods when elections were held they were hardly fair. That said there is some variation, with some electoral cycles being relatively free and transparent whereas others are not. The establishment’s role in electoral rigging is an open secret in Pakistani politics, though some of the rigging can happen through the civilian government too. Almost all Islamist parties, be they major or smaller, question the electoral integrity of Pakistani elections, which happens overwhelmingly to their electoral disadvantage. As the leader of JUI-F Abdul Majeed Hazarvi noted, his party believes that except for the first election that was conducted in 1970 all subsequent elections have been rigged,

We believe that with the exception of the 1970 election, there hasn’t been any election which was fair. We are prevented from acquiring seats. In the KPK,

for instance, we had some 22 seats, where in every other seats that in some seats sometimes 25, sometimes 50, sometimes 100 seats we were not allowed to seat”. All the media reports during the elections were saying that Maulana Fazal-Ur-Rehman would win both the electoral seats that he was contesting; however, he lost. If we ever had any fair election, we can't speak for other places, but for at least KPK and Balochistan, JUI-F would win²⁸¹

Abdul Majeed Hazarvi from JUI-F was not alone in noting the electoral rigging in Pakistani elections against Islamist parties. As the head of the Islamabad chapter of TLP, Rana Saifi, noted regarding the poor performance of TLP in the 2018 election, “The votes that we received didn’t get shown.”²⁸² Political analysts agree: the former media spokesperson for the Wifaq-ul-Madaris al-Arabia, the educational curriculum board for *Deobandi madrassahs* in Pakistan, the largest of its kind, said that,

“...elections in Pakistan have always been ‘controlled’, and the establishment, which we can’t even take their name of, has been complicit in this. In addition, there is a big reason that the mainstream political parties those people have ‘electables’ and can win elections – they have *biraderi*, goons, and funds – to get an electoral seat in Pakistan. Religious political party candidates either don’t or don’t want to do any of these things.”²⁸³

One of the key ways in which pre-electoral rigging is conducted by the establishment is by influencing the process of candidate selection, where popular leaders in the districts of Pakistan are given offers or sometimes outright told to switch parties to those that are within the establishments’ preferences. This often means that Islamist parties are electorally marginalized, which contributes to their inability to convert themselves into mass electoral machines. Dr. Waqar Ahmed, who is a local academic specializing in Islamist parties in Pakistan, shared his views with me regarding pre-electoral rigging in Pakistani election and how it influences the low electoral mobilization of Islamists via candidate selection in the following words:

²⁸¹ Interview with Abdul Majeed Hazarvi, 2021.

²⁸² Interview with Rana Saifi, 2021.

²⁸³ Interview with Abdul Qadoos Muhammadi, 2021.

“...I belong to district Swat. The headquarters of district Swat is Mingora. The Pakistan K seat in Mingora was won by the MMA government by a JI candidate named Muhammad Amin. After that, in 2008, JI boycotted the election. In 2013, he [Amin] was again the popular candidate. But when the result came, PTI won, but PTI people were also surprised how they won. In 2018, again, he lost, but the PTI people candidate won the second time. But even now, Muhammad Amin is the only person [in Mingora] who can challenge him [the PTI candidate]. Before the 2018 election, my cousin was someone very close to him. Approximately three months before the election, he was called by someone from the establishment. He was told that we had to discuss a few things regarding the election, so come and meet us. Amin said that if you want to discuss anything with me, then why don't you come visit me instead...so the establishment people visited him. He [Amin] was given a straight-up offer that if you leave JI and become a part of PTI. We will decide right now what is going to be your ministry, then the second thing is that in the election, your votes are going to be 12, 000 of your own 28, 000 we will get for you. So there will be 40, 000 votes in total, and you will become an MPA [Member of Provincial Assembly] and go to a ministry that we decide. He didn't agree, and they said that if I left once, then this offer wasn't going to come again. Amin said my commitment is with the party [JI].²⁸⁴

There are other ways in which the Pakistani establishment influences candidate selection as well. For instance, it can downright bar certain candidates and disqualify them from running for office. Dr Waqar gave the example of a known politician from PMLN who could have had a strong chance to challenge the pro-establishment candidate of PTI in his electoral district but was disbarred through judicial activism and interference. Dr Waqar notes,

Just look at the example of Hanif Abbasi. I spent as a judicial advisor with an organization for four years...I have never seen something like this where someone's date in a case is set as 10th August, and then they take a *suo moto* action by themselves and push the date earlier to July 23rd, and they make a decision that you are not suitable for the office. So there are many such examples, and the establishment is a big factor in Pakistan.²⁸⁵

When it comes to rigging on polling day, this can refer to violations of the code that the Election Commission of Pakistan has come up with. It can range from outright

²⁸⁴ Interview with Dr Waqar Ahmed, 2021.

²⁸⁵ Interview with Dr Waqar Ahmed, 2021

ballot stuffing to more sophisticated approaches that unfairly advantage one candidate over another. Post-polling rigging can also encompass several features. Most recently, this has included the fact that the system used by the ECP to collect its data in the 2018 election, the Results Transmission System (RTS), supposedly malfunctioned for days, and the results for several electoral constituencies were changed. During the 2024 election, while there was not an issue like the RTS there were widespread allegations of lack of electoral integrity in the election. A key issue in the 2024 general election with regards to electoral integrity were disparities between the Form-45 (Provisional Statement of the Count) and Form-47. In other words, the military establishment has several ways in which it can influence electoral mobilization through pre-poll, polling day, and post-poll rigging tactics.

Specifically concerning the establishment and Islamist electoral mobilization, in the 2018 general elections, TLP surprisingly garnered a substantial vote share, though it did not translate into significant electoral success. This performance underlined the military's strategy of using Islamist parties to split the religious vote, thereby weakening mainstream political parties that pose a challenge to military interests. This tactic of electoral manipulation highlights how the military fosters Islamist groups to dilute the electoral strength of its adversaries without allowing these groups to gain genuine political power.

4. Conclusion

This chapter has argued that the military establishment of Pakistan acts as a critical moderator in the relationship between the dimensions of organizational effectiveness and structural fragmentation with the outcome of divergent mobilization of Islamist parties. The establishment, as the predominant element of the state's ruling elite in countries like Pakistan, orchestrates the social and electoral realms of Islamist groups to maintain a balance that favours its enduring dominance. Central to this analysis is the identification of two key conditions: the alignment of the military's incentives with specific political outcomes and its relative strength against civilian governments. The empirical analysis within this

chapter has revealed that the military's ability to influence Islamist parties hinges significantly on these factors. This relationship is not merely coercive but also facilitative, allowing the military to exploit Islamist parties as tools for fostering democratic disorder when convenient, thus weakening civilian governance structures and thwarting any potential challenges to military authority.

The military's dual approach as both an enabler and a constraint on Islamist mobilization illustrates a sophisticated strategy of cooptation and limited repression that leverages Islamist groups to the establishment's advantage while ensuring these groups do not ascend to a power that could challenge the military establishment's supremacy. It ensures that Islamist parties are allowed enough latitude to enhance their street power, but their electoral ambitions are curtailed and prevented from being realized. This tactic dilutes the electoral strength of Islamist parties and keeps the military establishment indispensable as a power broker. The establishments' actions, therefore, are not merely reactive but are deeply embedded in a broader strategy of governance that utilizes Islamist mobilization as a tool for political maneuvering.

Chapter 7 Conclusion

1. Summary

1.1. Conceptual Framework

This study focuses on an under-analyzed puzzle in political science: what accounts for the variation in the relationship between social and electoral mobilization of political parties and groups? At the core of this analysis lies explaining the divergent mobilization versus other types of relationships between the spheres of social and electoral mobilization. Explaining divergent mobilization thus drives the analytical and methodological thrust of this work, which involves the advancement of the unified typology of patterns of social and electoral mobilization. This unified typology involved the identification and analysis of divergent and non-divergent forms of mobilization. Such an approach was necessary not only to unpack the concept of divergent mobilization but also to lay the groundwork for an empirically falsifiable theory of divergent mobilization that can explain divergent mobilization.

Divergent mobilization is a phenomenon where some ideological parties and groups exhibit a mismatch in their levels of mobilization, characterized by high levels of social mobilization and low levels of electoral success. This can be empirically manifested in situations where like-minded political parties demonstrate significant capacity to mobilize supporters on the streets, influence public discourse, and shape state policy yet fail to translate this into equivalent electoral power. Conversely, it can also be observed in the ability of some groups and political parties to exert disproportionate social influence despite limited electoral success.

Divergent mobilization thus consists of two analytical puzzles. First, it is a puzzle where some political parties and movements exhibit significant social mobilization but struggle to translate this influence into electoral success. I call this the puzzle of low electoral mobilization or the Mobilization Representation Paradox. Second, it is a puzzle where some political parties and groups punch above their

weight in social mobilization, even with low electoral success. I call this the puzzle of high social mobilization or Disproportionate Social Mobilization.

More empirically, the concept of divergent mobilization offers analytical leverage over a wide range of empirical phenomena by capturing the disjuncture in the social and electoral mobilization of some like-minded parties and groups. The unified typology identified in this work can anchor theoretical inquiries onto distinct analytical scenarios and configurations of the variation in the relationship of social and electoral mobilization of political parties and groups. Non-divergent mobilization consists of three different scenarios: convergent mobilization, diminished mobilization, and vote-bank mobilization. Convergent mobilization captures high social mobilization and high electoral mobilization. Diminished mobilization represents both low social and low electoral mobilization. Whereas vote-bank mobilization captures low social yet high electoral mobilization.

1.2. Explanatory Framework: Constant Causes and Historical Contingency

To explain divergent mobilization, this study proposes an explanatory framework that operates on two distinct levels: constant causes and historical contingency. First, at the level of constant causes, this work identifies divergent mobilizations to be influenced by variation along the dimensions of structural fragmentation and organizational effectiveness. Structural fragmentation refers to the fragmentation arising out of the social cleavages and the structure of the party system between political parties. In this way, structural fragmentation can arise from ideological and political sources of fragmentation. I call these the pathways of ideological and political fragmentation. These divisions significantly hinder a party's ability to expand its appeal beyond its core supporters, preventing it from achieving mass electoral success. High structural fragmentation, in large part, explains why some parties, despite their organizational effectiveness, struggle to convert their social mobilization into electoral success. Cleavages create barriers to cooperation, coalition-building, and broad-based appeal, leading to a scenario where parties are powerful on the streets but weak at the ballot box. Empirically, this was explained

using the case of Islamist parties in Pakistan. For the case of Islamist mobilization in Pakistan, my research found that while Islamists in Pakistan have robust social mobilization, this was not matched by strong political parties.

Organizational effectiveness is crucial for analyzing the variation in the disproportionately high social mobilization of some political parties and groups. Variation along the dimension of organizational effectiveness explains the high social mobilization of political parties and groups exhibiting high social mobilization despite low electoral representation in national parliaments. This high social mobilization can be explained by the variable of enlarged mobilization cores zealously committed to political parties and groups exhibiting divergent mobilization. A large mobilization core enables groups and political parties to mobilize these core supporters and sustain their social mobilization easily. This large mobilization core consists of two components: a large network of ancillary organizations that are beholden to the political party and a greater proportion of party workers than party voters relative to their competitors. Such an enlarged mobilization core is thus positively associated with divergent mobilization. Effective political parties and organizations with a large mobilization core can maintain strong internal cohesion and leverage their resources to create significant social influence. However, this organizational effectiveness alone does not guarantee electoral success, particularly when structural fragmentation is high.

While these constant causes provide a robust framework for understanding the conditions under which divergent mobilization occurs, they do not fully explain the variation in outcomes across all empirical contexts. This is where the second level of explanation — historical contingency — is crucial. The historically contingent role of a state's ruling elite acts as a key moderator variable that combines with the constant causes to ensure a truly causal explanation. The ruling elite's actions are contingent on political and historical contexts. Like any moderator variable, a state's ruling elite can modify the effect of the two constant causes on the outcome of divergent mobilization. This means that the state's ruling elite can modify the effect of fragmentation arising due to cleavages and their

structure and an enlarged mobilization core zealously committed to parties identified in the explanatory framework. As an effect modifier, the state's ruling elite can enhance, diminish or reverse the effect of the independent variables (large mobilization core and ideological and political fragmentation) on the outcome of divergent mobilization.

Two central conditions influence the direction of the effect of the state's ruling elite on divergent mobilization: aligned incentives and the relative strength of a state's ruling elite. I call these the two conditions of divergence. The relative strength of a state's ruling elite versus an oppositional elite enables the elite to act in accordance with its preferences. On the other hand, an alignment in the incentives of a state's ruling elite with divergent mobilization positively influences the ruling elite to contribute to making divergent mobilization more likely. Conversely, non-divergent patterns of mobilization are likely if the state's ruling elite is relatively weak and its interests are not aligned with divergent mobilization.

In the empirical context of military authoritarian hybrid regimes, such as Pakistan, a state's ruling elite principally comprises its military but also secondarily includes its key allies, which include members of the judiciary, media, bureaucracy and regime-allied political parties. I call this 'the establishment.' The establishment orchestrates the social and electoral mobilization of Islamist parties in Pakistan. The empirical analysis in this work revealed that the establishment's ability to influence Islamist parties hinges significantly on these factors. This relationship is not merely coercive but also facilitative, allowing the military to exploit Islamist parties as tools for fostering "democratic disorder" when convenient. In this way, the establishment thus weakens civilian governance structures and thwarts any potential challenges to military authority.

The military's dual approach as both an enabler and a constraint on Islamist mobilization illustrates a sophisticated strategy of cooptation and limited repression that leverages Islamist groups to the establishment's advantage while ensuring these groups do not ascend to a power that could challenge the military establishment's supremacy. It ensures that Islamist parties are allowed enough

latitude to enhance their street power, but their electoral ambitions are curtailed and prevented from being realized. This tactic dilutes the electoral strength of Islamist parties and keeps the military establishment indispensable as a power broker. The establishments' actions, therefore, are not merely reactive but are deeply embedded in a broader strategy of governance that utilizes Islamist mobilization as a tool for political maneuvering.

When aligned incentives and a strong ruling elite coexist with high organizational effectiveness and low structural fragmentation, the patterns of divergent mobilization occur at a causal level. In such contexts, parties may achieve significant social mobilization but struggle to convert this into electoral success due to the interplay of structural constraints imposed by cleavages and the strategic moderation by the state's ruling elite. The combination of constant causes and historical contingency forged in this explanatory framework thus provides a comprehensive and causal explanation for divergent mobilization.

2. Further Agenda and Reflections for Comparative Research

The analytical and empirical findings of this study raise questions for future comparative research and reflections on the extant literature. Three crucial reflections are discussed. First, by focusing on political parties as the unit of analysis and examining the interplay between social and electoral mobilization, this work challenges existing frameworks that have often treated these domains in isolation. In part due to this analytical focus, this study's empirical focus on Pakistan offers can yield meaningful insights and theoretical innovations to the extant literature that has excessively focused on the Arab Middle East. There is thus a need to focus on regions beyond the Arab Middle East in the study of Islamist parties. This empirical focus on regions beyond the Arab Middle East has theoretical significance. It can lead to the enrichment of theoretical inquiries focused on Islamist parties.

Second, this work contributes to a literature that can be categorized under the moniker of Islam and Politics. Among contemporary global religions, Islam is often singled out as uniquely conducive to the emergence of assertive religious parties (Tibi 2002; Kepel 2002). The emergence of robust political parties invoking the language, ideology and practices underlined within the Islamic religious tradition has been emphasized as critical in advancing their politics and shaping outcomes worldwide. A burgeoning literature in comparative politics uses a version of this argument by calling it “Islam’s political advantage (see Pepinsky et al. 2012; Grewal et al. 2019).” However, analyzing cases such as Pakistan, where Islamist parties have, at best, been partially successful, can provide meaningful correctives to this literature. The study thus draws out crucial variations among cases of Islamist parties that the extant literature does not. This variation is significant for two principal reasons: 1) the public tends to think of the Islamic world as a homogenous entity, and 2) patterns of political development vary across regions immensely.

In this way, the study tempers the excessive optimism in the extant literature on the so-called Islamist political or electoral advantage. It overturns existing formulations that single out a complex and diverse religious tradition like Islam by imputing something that is inherently conducive within it to the emergence of assertive political parties. Notions such as a so-called Islamist advantage of Islam can promote the danger of and can be traced to the outmoded and orientalist literature that views Muslims and MMCs to be uniquely beholden to Islam, which drives much of the behavior in MMCs (see Grewal et al. 2019:1873). The analytical framework that is advanced in this study instead emphasizes analytical abstraction while also being attentive to context sensitivity. Prevailing ideas about a so-called Islamist advantage provide little currency for what appears to be an electoral disadvantage in the case of Islamist mobilization in Pakistan. This underlines the importance of accounting for regional variation in analytical formulations. In this way, this work nods to an emergent literature on comparative area studies (see Ahram et al. 2018).

Third, contrary to the prevailing literature on Islamist parties, especially the literature focused on Pakistan, this work emphasizes the importance of analyzing the link between Islamist parties, wherein the study emphasizes uncovering *why* Islamist parties have high social mobilization while *also* having low electoral mobilization. Similarly, it addresses *why* they are unable to transform themselves into mass electoral machines when they are successful in social mobilization. This emphasis is distinct from the extant literature that has only analyzed street protests or electoral mobilization in isolation (e.g., street protests: Butt 2016; electoral outcomes: Siddiqui 2016) or has generally lacked the development of more systematic theory building or analysis (e.g. Chacko 2020, Chacko 2022).

Bibliography

1. Articles, Books, Newspaper Articles and Electronic Sources

- Ader, Emile B. "Why the Dixiecrats Failed." *The Journal of Politics* 15, no. 3 (1953): 356–69. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2126102>.
- Afridi, Manzoor Khan, Tabi Ullah, and Uzma Gul. 2016. "Electoral Politics of Jamat-e-Islami Pakistan (1987-2009)." *Global Social Sciences Review* 1 (1): 58–76.
- Ahmad, I. (2009). *The Rise of Ahle Hadith Fundamentalism*. In *Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia*. New Delhi: Manohar Publishers.
- Ahmad, Mumtaz. 2000. "Continuity and Change in the Traditional System of Islamic Education: The Case of Pakistan." *Pakistan*, 182–94.
- Ahram, Ariel Ira, Patrick Köllner, and Rudra Sil, eds. *Comparative Area Studies: Methodological Rationales and Cross-Regional Applications*. Oxford University Press, 2018.
- Akbaba, Yasemin. "Protest and Religion: An Overview." In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*, 2019. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.989>.
- Alik-Lagrange, Arthur, Sarah K. Dreier, Milli Lake, and Alesha Porisky. "Social Protection and State–Society Relations in Environments of Low and Uneven State Capacity." *Annual Review of Political Science* 24, no. 1 (2021): 151–74. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-041719-101929>.
- Angrist, Michele Penner. "Understanding the Success of Mass Civic Protest in Tunisia." *Middle East Journal* 67, no. 4 (2013): 547–64.
- Anria, Santiago. *When Movements Become Parties: The Bolivian MAS in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge University Press, 2018.
- Aspinall, Edward, and Gerry van Klinken, eds. *The State and Illegality in Indonesia*. Brill, 2010. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1163/j.ctt1w8h1mz>.
- Aspinall, Edward. "Democratization and Ethnic Politics in Indonesia: Nine Theses." *Journal of East Asian Studies* 11, no. 2 (August 2011): 289–319. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1598240800007190>.
- Balaggan, Zabeeh Ullah, Pakistani Siyasat Main Mazhabi Jamaatoun ka Kirdar (The Role of Religious Parties in Pakistani Politics). Lahore: Nigarshaat Publishers, 2019.
- Bartolini, Stefano, and Peter Mair. "Policy Competition, Spatial Distance and Electoral Instability." *West European Politics* 13, no. 4 (October 1, 1990): 1–16. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402389008424816>.
- Basedau, Matthias, and Anika Moroff. "Parties in Chains: Do Ethnic Party Bans in Africa Promote Peace?" *Party Politics* 17 (February 24, 2011): 205–22. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068810391148>.
- Bashir, Mohsin, and Shoaib Ul-Haq. 2019a. "Why Madrassah Education Reforms Don't Work in Pakistan." *Third World Quarterly* 40 (3): 595–611. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2019.1570820>.

Bassam, Tibi. *Political Islam, World Politics and Europe: Democratic Peace and Euro-Islam versus Global Jihad*. Routledge, 2008.

Beinin, Joel, and Joe Stork. *Political Islam: Essays from Middle East Report*. Univ of California Press, 1997.

Bellucci, Paolo, and Oliver Heath. "The structure of party-organization linkages and the electoral strength of cleavages in Italy, 1963–2008." *British Journal of Political Science* 42, no. 1 (2012): 107–135. Accessed July 14, 2023.

Benoit, Kenneth. "Electoral Laws as Political Consequences: Explaining the Origins and Change of Electoral Institutions." *Annual Review of Political Science* 10, no. 1 (2007): 363–90. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.072805.101608>.

Berger, Peter L. *The sacred canopy: Elements of a sociological theory of religion*. Open Road Media, 2011. Accessed August 4, 2023.
https://books.google.ca/books?hl=en&lr=&id=WcC-AYOq6Q4C&oi=fnd&pg=PT8&dq=Peter+Berger+2011&ots=cjlzlk6prB&sig=giUrknzb9m9aibvSpCxO91K27bs&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=Peter%20Berger%202011&f=false.

Bermeo, Nancy, and Deborah J. Yashar. *Parties, Movements, and Democracy in the Developing World*. Cambridge University Press, 2016.

Best, Robin E. "The Declining Electoral Relevance of Traditional Cleavage Groups." *European Political Science Review* 3, no. 2 (July 2011): 279–300.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773910000366>.

Binder, Leonard. *Religion and politics in Pakistan*. University of California Press, 1961.

Blaydes, Lisa, and James Lo. "One man, one vote, one time? A model of democratization in the Middle East." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 24, no. 1 (2012): 110–146. Accessed August 4, 2023.
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0951629811423121?casa_token=JoooK4DYcncAAAAA:vTht-5NbdZdu8QSxFc6qAXIOSgZDB-lCM9fPLY9vxpfFKqOavWy1PiIhg0nHvSbk1Q_exaWZw.

Blaydes, Lisa. 2010. *Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt*. Cambridge University Press.

Blaydes, Lisa. *Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt*. Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Boix, Carles, and Milan W. Svolik. "The foundations of limited authoritarian government: Institutions, commitment, and power-sharing in dictatorships." *the Journal of Politics* 75, no. 2 (2013): 300–316.
https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1017/S0022381613000029?casa_token=HG6rwI5x0_EAAAAA%3Adzb2jjnRk0-8X8zj1k6mgzL7iVUMRSWcZixft7D_1qGh52lU335sCx3874ydaPSjL0ttIb11.

Brancati, Dawn. "Democratic Authoritarianism: Origins and Effects." *Annual Review of Political Science* 17, no. 1 (2014): 313–26. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-052013-115248>.

Brierley, Sarah, Eric Kramon, and George Kwaku Ofori. 2020. "The Moderating Effect of Debates on Political Attitudes." *American Journal of Political Science* 64 (1): 19–37.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12458>.

Perry, Andre M. and Carl Romer. Brookings. "Protesting Is as Important as Voting." Accessed July 29, 2023. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/protesting-is-as-important-as-voting/>.

Brooks, Clem, Paul Nieuwbeerta, and Jeff Manza. "Cleavage-based voting behavior in cross-national perspective: Evidence from six postwar democracies." *Social Science Research* 35, no. 1 (2006): 88-128. Accessed July 14, 2023. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0049089X0400081X?casa_token=o0gF86X3jQsAAAAA:-A_rrn5tT8M2lGcKWihFBghGm863W3TNAkJNG0hGg-SA womooQ9Bjqy89A84P_8UOSxZfd0.

Brooks, Clem, Paul Nieuwbeerta, and Jeff Manza. "Cleavage-based voting behavior in cross-national perspective: Evidence from six postwar democracies." *Social Science Research* 35, no. 1 (2006): 88-128.

Broughton, David, and Hans-Martien ten Napel. *Religion and Mass Electoral Behaviour in Europe*. Routledge, 2000.

Bruce, Steve. "Praying Alone? Church-Going in Britain and the Putnam Thesis." *Journal of Contemporary Religion* 17, no. 3 (October 2002): 317–28. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1353790022000008244>.

Bunce, Valerie J., and Sharon L. Wolchik. "Defeating dictators: Electoral change and stability in competitive authoritarian regimes." *World Politics* 62, no. 1 (2010): 43-86. Accessed August 4, 2023. <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/world-politics/article/abs/defeating-dictators-electoral-change-and-stability-in-competitive-authoritarian-regimes/3DEB8511BBE435612A8250F03662CFEE>.

Bunce, Valerie J., and Sharon L. Wolchik. 2010. "Defeating Dictators: Electoral Change and Stability in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes." *World Politics* 62 (1): 43–86.

Bünthe, Marco. "Myanmar: civil–military relations in a tutelary regime." In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*. 2021. Accessed May 23, 2023.

Butt, Ahsan I. "Street power: Friday prayers, Islamist protests, and Islamization in Pakistan." *Politics and Religion* 9, no. 1 (2016): 1-28. Accessed July 12, 2023. <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/politics-and-religion/article/abs/street-power-friday-prayers-islamist-protests-and-islamization-in-pakistan/D145186EBBF69013479A1E95906CF9D2>.

Cammett, Melani, and Pauline Jones Luong. "Is There an Islamist Political Advantage?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 17, no. 1 (2014): 187–206. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-071112-221207>.

Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. *The American Voter*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980. <https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/A/bo24047989.html>.

Carpenter, Daniel. "Agenda Democracy." *Annual Review of Political Science* 26, no. 1 (2023): null. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051921-102533>.

Cavatorta, Francesco, and Hendrik Kraetzschmar. "Multiparty Coalition Governments in the Arab World: An Introduction", *Middle East Law and Governance* 15, 3 (2023): 255-263, doi: <https://doi.org/10.1163/18763375-15030002>.

Cavatorta, Francesco. 2009. "Divided They Stand, Divided They Fail": Opposition Politics in Morocco." *Democratization* 16 (1): 137–56. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340802575882>.

Chacko, Johann, "Religious Parties." In M. Mufti, N. Siddiqui, and S. Shafqat (eds), *Pakistan's political parties: Surviving between dictatorship and democracy* (2020): 105-121.

Chacko, Johann. "In the Province of Faith: Disaggregating Pakistani Religious Parties' Electoral Performance at the Sub-national and Denominational Levels." *The Review of Faith & International Affairs* 21, no. 3 (2023): 103-123.

Checkel, Jeffrey T. "Tracing Causal Mechanisms." *International Studies Review* 8, no. 2 (June 2006): 362-370.

Cheema, Moeen H. "Beyond Beliefs: Deconstructing the Dominant Narratives of the Islamization of Pakistan's Law." *The American Journal of Comparative Law* 60, no. 4 (2012): 875–917. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41721691>.

Chhibber, Pradeep K., and John R. Petrocik. "The puzzle of Indian politics: social cleavages and the Indian party system." *British Journal of Political Science* 19, no. 2 (1989): 191-210.

Clark, Janine A. *Islam, Charity, and Activism: Middle-Class Networks and Social Welfare in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen*. Indiana University Press, 2004.

Clark, Janine. "Social Movement Theory and Patron-Clientelism: Islamic Social Institutions and the Middle Class in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen." *Comparative Political Studies* 37, no. 8 (2004): 941–68.

Cohen, Jacob, Patricia Cohen, Stephen G. West, and Leona S. Aiken. 2002. *Applied Multiple Regression/Correlation Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences*. 3rd ed. New York: Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203774441>.

Cohen, Jacob, Patricia Cohen, Stephen G. West, and Leona S. Aiken. 2002. *Applied Multiple Regression/Correlation Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences*. 3rd ed. New York: Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203774441>.

Coll, Steve. *Directorate S: the CIA and America's secret wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan*. Penguin, 2018 Accessed June 19, 2024. <https://www.penguinrandomhouse.ca/books/529288/directorate-s-by-steve-coll/9780143132509>.

Coll, Steve. *Ghost wars: The secret history of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden*. Penguin UK, 2005. <https://www.penguinrandomhouse.ca/books/292947/ghost-wars-by-steve-coll/9780143034667>.

Collier, David, Henry E. Brady, and Jason Seawright. "A Sea Change in Political Methodology." *Newsletter of the American Political Science Association* 9, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 1-20.

Collier, David. "Understanding Process Tracing." *Political Science and Politics* 44, no. 4 (October 2011): 823-830.

Condra, Luke N., Mohammad Isaqzadeh, and Sera Linardi. "Clerics and Scriptures: Experimentally Disentangling the Influence of Religious Authority in Afghanistan." *British Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 2 (April 2019): 401–19. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123416000569>.

Cox, Gary W. *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems*. Cambridge University Press, 1997.

De Graaf, Nan Dirk, Anthony Heath, and Ariana Need. "Declining Cleavages and Political Choices: The Interplay of Social and Political Factors in the Netherlands." *Electoral Studies* 20, no. 1 (March 1, 2001): 1–15. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0261-3794\(99\)00061-X](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0261-3794(99)00061-X).

Della Porta, Donatella, Joseba Fernández, Hara Kouki, and Lorenzo Mosca. *Movement Parties against Austerity*. John Wiley & Sons, 2017.

Della Porta, Donatella, Mario Diani, Dieter Rucht, and Simon Teune. *Social Movements in Times of Austerity: Bringing Capitalism Back Into Protest Analysis*. Polity Press, 2017.

Devji, Faisal. *Muslim Zion: Pakistan as a Political Idea*. Harvard University Press, 2013.

Diamond, Larry. "Thinking about Hybrid Regimes Elections without Democracy." *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 2 (2002): 21–35.

Diamond, Larry. *Democracy in East Asia*. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013. <https://doi.org/10.1353/book.72091>.

Diani, Mario, and Ivano Bison. "Organizations, Coalitions, and Movements." *Theory and Society* 33, no. 3 (June 1, 2004): 281–309. <https://doi.org/10.1023/B:RYSO.0000038610.00045.07>.

Dobbelaere, Karel, Wolfgang Jagodzinski, Jan W. van Deth, and Elinor Scarbrough. "Religious Cognitions and Beliefs" 4 (January 1, 1995): 197–217. <https://doi.org/10.1093/0198294751.003.0007>.

Dogan, Mattei. "Accelerated Decline of Religious Beliefs in Europe." *Comparative Sociology* 1, no. 2 (January 1, 2002): 127–49. <https://doi.org/10.1163/156913302100418466>.

Duverger, Maurice. *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*. Metheun & Co. Ltd., 1959.

Eickelman, Dale F., and James Piscatori. *Muslim Politics*. Princeton University Press, 2018.

Elff, Martin. "Social Structure and Electoral Behavior in Comparative Perspective: The Decline of Social Cleavages in Western Europe Revisited." *Perspectives on Politics* 5, no. 2 (2007): 277–94. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592707070788>.

Enyedi, Zsolt, and Fernando Casal Bértoa. "Party Systems: Types, Dimensions, and Explanations." In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*, 2020. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1754>.

Enyedi, Zsolt. "The role of agency in cleavage formation." *European Journal of Political Research* 44, no. 5 (2005): 697–720. Accessed July 12, 2023. https://ejpr.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2005.00244.x?casa_token=Qq3PFE8p0E4AAAAA%3AonD_KW_5Tj8VdQNo_wxXp2NiL5OH7OZV_foODiHPsggNsl0_sIgrV9K_51H7_M5EiFgm7iBNJK0.

Esping-Andersen, Gosta. "Changing Classes: Stratification and Mobility in Post-Industrial Societies." *Changing Classes*, 1993, 1–272.

Esposito, John L., Voll Esposito, and John Obert Voll. *Islam and Democracy*. Oxford University Press on Demand, 1996.

Fair, C. 2015. "Explaining Support for Sectarian Terrorism in Pakistan: Piety, Maslak and Sharia." *Religions* 6 (4): 1137–67. <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel6041137>.

Fair, C. C., Malhotra, N., & Shapiro, J. N. (2011). Democratic Values and Support for Militant Politics: Evidence from a National Survey of Pakistan. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 55(5), 725–754.

Fair, C. Christine. 2007. "Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: A New Look at the Militancy-Madrasah Connection." *Asia Policy* 1 (1): 107–34. <https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2007.0006>.

Fair, Christine. 2014. *Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War*. Oxford University Press, USA.

Fair, Christine. 2018. "The Milli Muslim League: The Domestic Politics of Pakistan's Lashkar-E-Taiba." *SSRN Electronic Journal*. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3184243>.

Fox, Colm A., and Jeremy Menchik. "Islamic political parties and election campaigns in Indonesia." *Party Politics* 29, no. 4 (2023): 622–635.

Fox, Colm A., and Jeremy Menchik. "Islamic political parties and election campaigns in Indonesia." *Party Politics* 29, no. 4 (2023): 622–635. Accessed August 4, 2023. <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/13540688221091656>.

Frantz, Erica, and Andrea Kendall-Taylor. "A Dictator's Toolkit: Understanding How Co-Optation Affects Repression in Autocracies." *Journal of Peace Research* 51, no. 3 (2014): 332–46.

Freeden, Michael. Ideology, 1998, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-S030-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis, <https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/ideology/v-1>.

Friedrich, C. J., and Z. Brzezinski. 1969. "The General Characteristics of Totalitarian Dictatorship." In *Comparative Government: A Reader*, edited by J. Blondel, 187–99. London: Macmillan Education UK. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-15318-3_22.

Friedrich, Carl Joachim, and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski. *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy: Second Edition, Revised by Carl J. Friedrich*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965.

Gamson, William A., and David S. Meyer. "Framing Political Opportunity." edited by Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, 1st ed., 275–90. Cambridge University Press, 1996. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511803987.014>.

Gandhi, Jennifer, and Adam Przeworski. "Authoritarian institutions and the survival of autocrats." *Comparative political studies* 40, no. 11 (2007): 1279–1301.

Gandhi, Jennifer, and Adam Przeworski. "Cooperation, cooptation, and rebellion under dictatorships." *Economics & Politics* 18, no. 1 (2006): 1–26. Accessed August 4, 2023. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2006.00160.x>.

Gandhi, Jennifer, and Adam Przeworski. 2007. "Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats." *Comparative Political Studies* 40 (11): 1279–1301. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414007305817>.

Gandhi, Jennifer, and Ellen Lust-Okar. "Elections Under Authoritarianism." *Annual Review of Political Science* 12, no. 1 (2009): 403–22. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.060106.095434>.

Gandhi, Jennifer. *Political Institutions under Dictatorship*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Accessed August 4, 2023. <https://www.cambridge.org/core/bo/Gandhi,Jennifer.PoliticalInstitutionsunderDictatorship>. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. <https://www.cambridge.org/core/bo/Gandhi,Jennifer.PoliticalInstitutionsunderDictatorship/6E5AE062B796609E2AC72EE5AB5F9DA0>.

Ganguly, Sumit. "India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh: Civil-Military Relations." In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*, 2020.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1926>.

Geddes, Barbara, Erica Frantz, and Joseph G. Wright. "Military Rule." *Annual Review of Political Science* 17, no. 1 (2014): 147–62. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-032211-213418>.

Ghannouchi, Rached. "From Political Islam to Muslim Democracy." *Foreign Affairs*, August 19, 2016. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/tunisia/political-islam-muslim-democracy>.

Ghazali, Abdus Sattar. 1996. *Islamic Pakistan, Illusions & Reality*. National Book Club.

Gillion, Daniel Q., and Sarah A. Soule. "The impact of protest on elections in the United States." *Social Science Quarterly* 99, no. 5 (2018): 1649-1664. Accessed August 4, 2023.
<https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/ssqu.12527>.

Giovanni, Sartori. "Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis." Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

Goertz, Gary, and James Mahoney. *A Tale of Two Cultures: Qualitative and Quantitative Research in the Social Sciences*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012.

Goldstone, Jack A. *States, Parties, and Social Movements*. Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Golway, Terry. *Machine made: Tammany Hall and the creation of modern American politics*. WW Norton & Company, 2014.

Gosnell, Harold F. *Machine Politics: Chicago Model*. 2d ed.: With a foreword by Theodore J. Lowi and a postscript by the author. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968.

Grewal, Sharan, Amaney A. Jamal, Tarek Masoud, and Elizabeth R. Nugent. "Poverty and divine rewards: The electoral advantage of Islamist political parties." *American Journal of Political Science* 63, no. 4 (2019): 859-874.

Grewal, Sharanbir, Erik Lin-Greenberg, and Jacob N. Shapiro. "Islamist Political Mobilization and Support for Electoral Violence." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63, no. 4 (2019): 1035-1063.

Grofman, Bernard, and Arend Lijphart. *Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences*. Algora Publishing, 1986.

Grzymala-Busse, Anna. "Why Comparative Politics Should Take Religion (More) Seriously." *Annual Review of Political Science* 15, no. 1 (2012): 421–42.
<https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-033110-130442>.

Gunther, R., & Diamond, L. (2003). Species of Political Parties: A New Typology. *Party Politics*, 9(2), 167-199. <https://doi.org/10.1177/13540688030092003>.

Gunther, Richard, and Larry Diamond. "Species of Political Parties: A New Typology." *Party Politics* 9, no. 2 (2003): 167-199.

Guth, James L., and Cleveland R. Fraser. "Religion and partisanship in Canada." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 40, no. 1 (2001): 51-64.

Hafez, Mohammed M. *Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003.

Hair, J.F., Hult, G.T.M., Ringle, C.M., Sarstedt, M., Danks, N.P., Ray, S. (2021). Moderation Analysis. In: *Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM)*

Using R. Classroom Companion: Business. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-80519-7_8.

Halman, Loek, and Veerle Draulans. "How Secular Is Europe?" *The British Journal of Sociology* 57, no. 2 (2006): 263–88. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-4446.2006.00109.x>.

Handbook of Contemporary Pakistan. Routledge.

Heath, A. F. (Anthony Francis). "How Britain Votes." (*No Title*). Accessed August 4, 2023. <https://cir.nii.ac.jp/crid/1130000796430818688>.

Hicken, Allen, and Erik Martinez Kuhonta, eds. *Party system institutionalization in Asia: democracies, autocracies, and the shadows of the past*. Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Ho, Ming-sho, and Chun-hao Huang. "Movement Parties in Taiwan, 1987–2016: A Political Opportunity Explanation." *Asian Survey* 57, no. 2 (2017): 343–67.

Hojnacki, Marie, David C. Kimball, Frank R. Baumgartner, Jeffrey M. Berry, and Beth L. Leech. "Studying Organizational Advocacy and Influence: Reexamining Interest Group Research." *Annual Review of Political Science* 15, no. 1 (2012): 379–99. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-070910-104051>.

Horowitz, Donald L. "Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley, CA: Univ." *Of California Press* 697 (1985): 27–45. <https://doi.org/10.7208/9780226384702>.

Huntington, Samuel P. 2006. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. Yale University Press. https://books.google.ca/books?hl=en&lr=&id=-XiwT0xC_0C&oi=fnd&pg=PR10&dq=samuel+Huntington+1968+political+order&ots=RBY-tyMxNH&sig=O0YMcw8yryNkiENrBi5y28EF0B8.

Huntington, Samuel P. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.

Hutter, Swen, and Hanspeter Kriesi, eds. *European Party Politics in Times of Crisis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108652780>.

in Indonesia." Ph.D., Canada: University of Toronto (Canada). Accessed May 30, 2022.

International Crisis Group, *A New Era of Sectarian Violence in Pakistan*. International Crisis Group: Islamabad/Brussels, 2022. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/327/asia/south-asia/pakistan/new-era-sectarian-violence-pakistan>.

International Crisis Group, *Islamic Parties in Pakistan*. International Crisis Group: Islamabad/Brussels, 2011.

Iqtidar, Humeira. *Secularizing Islamists?: Jama'at-e-Islami and Jama'at-Ud-Da'wa in Urban Pakistan*. South Asia Across the Disciplines. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2014. <https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/S/bo11017672.html>.

Ishiyama, John T. "Electoral Systems." In *Comparative Politics: Principles of Democracy and Democratization*, 157–76. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011. <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444397130.ch7>.

Ishiyama, John, and Anna Batta. "The emergence of dominant political party systems in unrecognized states." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 45, no. 1-2 (2012): 123-130. Accessed July 14, 2023. <https://online.ucpress.edu/cpcs/article-abstract/45/1-2/123/216/The-emergence-of-dominant-political-party-systems>.

Ishiyama, John. "Do ethnic parties promote minority ethnic conflict?." *Nationalism and ethnic politics* 15, no. 1 (2009): 56-83. Accessed August 4, 2023. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13537110802672388>.

- Ishiyama, John. "Political Parties and Democratization." In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*, 2021. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1974>.
- Iversen, Torben, and Max Goplerud. "Redistribution Without a Median Voter: Models of Multidimensional Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 21, no. 1 (2018): 295–317. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-031016-011009>.
- Jaffrelot, Christophe. *Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation*. Zed Books, 2002.
- Jaffrelot, Christophe. *The Pakistan Paradox: Instability and Resilience*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
- Jalal, Ayesha. 1994. *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan*. Reprint edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Javed, Umair. "Pathways to Capitulation." DAWN.COM, 06:04:56+05:00. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1432008>.
- Javed, Umair. "Profit, Piety, and Patronage: Bazaar Traders and Politics in Urban Pakistan," PhD diss., (London School of Economics 2018). <http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/3843/>.
- Johnston, William A. "Social Divisions and Ideological Fragmentation." *The Canadian Journal of Sociology / Cahiers Canadiens de Sociologie* 12, no. 4 (1987): 315–29. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3340940>.
- Jou, Willy, and Russell J. Dalton. "Left-Right Orientations and Voting Behavior." In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*, 2017. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.581>.
- Juergensmeyer, Mark. *Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State*. Oxford University Press, 1993.
- Kalin, Michael, and Niloufer Siddiqui. "Islam's Political Disadvantage: Corruption and Religiosity in Quetta, Pakistan." *Politics and Religion* 9, no. 3 (2016): 456–480.
- Kellstedt, L. A., & Green, J. C. (1993). Knowing God's many people: Denominational preference and political behaviour. In D. C. Leege & L. A. Kellstedt (Eds.), *Rediscovering the religious factor in American politics* (pp. 53–71). New York, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
- Kepel, Gilles. *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*. Harvard University Press, 2002.
- Khan, Arshad Sami. 2008. *Three Presidents and an Aide*. New Delhi: Pentagon Press.
- Khan, Rais A. 1979. "Religion, Race, and Arab Nationalism." *International Journal* 34 (3): 353–68.
- Kirchheimer, Otto. "6. The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems." In *6. The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems*, 177–200. Princeton University Press, 2015. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400875337-007>.
- Kisin, Tatyana Tuba Kelman. "Electoral Rules, Political Parties, and Peace Duration in Postconflict States." Ph.D., University of North Texas. Accessed July 14, 2023. <https://www.proquest.com/docview/1720153765/abstract/213B4FF8A6E04C7DPQ/1>.
- Kitschelt, Herbert. "Class structure and social democratic party strategy." *British Journal of Political Science* 23, no. 3 (1993): 299–337. Accessed July 14, 2023. <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/british-journal-of-political-science/article/abs/class-structure-and-social-democratic-party-strategy/7BCEB445D8182A29AB93BE64EAC98E5B>.
- Kitschelt, Herbert. "Movement parties." *Handbook of party politics* 1 (2006): 278–290.

Kitschelt, Herbert. "Partisan Competition and Welfare State Retrenchment." *The New Politics of the Welfare State*, April 5, 2001, 265–302. <https://doi.org/10.1093/0198297564.003.0010>.

Kitschelt, Herbert. "Party Families and Political Ideologies." In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*, 2018. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.626>.

Kitschelt, Herbert. "Social Movements, Political Parties, and Democratic Theory." *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 528, no. 1 (July 1, 1993): 13–29. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716293528001002>.

Knutsen, O. (2004). Religious Denomination and Party Choice in Western Europe: A Comparative Longitudinal Study from Eight Countries, 1970–97. *International Political Science Review*, 25(1), 97–128. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512104038169>.

Knutsen, O. *Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe: A Comparative Longitudinal Study*. Springer, 2004.

Knutsen, Oddbjørn. "Religious denomination and party choice in Western Europe: A comparative longitudinal study from eight countries, 1970–97." *International Political Science Review* 25, no. 1 (2004): 97–128.

Knutsen, Oddbjørn. *Social structure and party choice in Western Europe: A comparative longitudinal study*. Springer, 2004.

Kriesi, Hanspeter. "The Transformation of Cleavage Politics The 1997 Stein Rokkan Lecture." *European Journal of Political Research* 33, no. 2 (March 1, 1998): 165–85. <https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1006861430369>.

Kristín Birnir, Jóhanna. "Divergence in Diversity? The Dissimilar Effects of Cleavages on Electoral Politics in New Democracies." *American Journal of Political Science* 51, no. 3 (2007): 602–19. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00270.x>.

Kurzman, Charles, and Didem Türkoğlu. 2015. "After the Arab Spring: Do Muslims Vote Islamic Now?"

Kurzman, Charles, and Ijlal Naqvi. "Do Muslims Vote Islamic?" *Journal of Democracy* 21, no. 2 (2010): 50–63.

Laakso, Markku, and Rein Taagepera. "Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe." *Comparative Political Studies* 12, no. 1 (1979): 3–27.

Lachat, Romain. *A Heterogeneous Electorate*. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, 2007. <https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845204895>.

Laver, Michael, and Norman Schofield. *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*. University of Michigan Press, 1998.

Laver, Michael, and Norman Schofield. *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*. Oxford University Press, 1990.

Layman, Geoffrey. *The Great Divide: Religious and Cultural Conflict in American Party Politics*. Columbia University Press, 2001.

Le Maux, Benoît, Yvon Rocaboy, and Timothy Goodspeed. "Political Fragmentation, Party Ideology and Public Expenditures." *Public Choice* 147, no. 1/2 (2011): 43–6.

Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. "Elections without democracy: The rise of competitive authoritarianism." *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 2 (2002): 51–65. Accessed August 4, 2023. <https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/elections-without-democracy-the-rise-of-competitive-authoritarianism/>.

- Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan Way. "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism." *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 2 (2002): 51–65. <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2002.0026>
- Levitsky, Steven, and Luncan Way. 2010. *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War*. Cambridge University Press.
- Lieven, Anatol. *Pakistan: A Hard Country*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2011.
- Lijphart, Arend, and Professor of Political Science Arend Lijphart. *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*. Yale University Press, 1999.
- Lijphart, Arend. "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method." *The American Political Science Review* 65, no. 3 (September 1971): 682-693.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin. "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments. Lipset." *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*, 1967, 3–64.
- Lipset." *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*, 1967, 3–64.
- Livny, Avital. 2020. *Trust and the Islamic Advantage: Religious-Based Movements in Turkey and the Muslim World*. Cambridge University Press.
- <https://scholar.google.com/scholar?cluster=14493888981569999256&hl=en&oi=scholar>.
- Lust-Okar, Ellen. *Structuring Conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Opponents, and Institutions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491009>.
- Magaloni, Beatriz, and Ruth Kricheli. "Political order and one-party rule." *Annual review of political science* 13, no. 1 (2010): 123-143.
- https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.polisci.031908.220529?casa_token=r706K1OiihcAAAAA:IMkDB2nX0a_TrVFE7sToFzOP7HUuD5p_XxwIYpfOYVfxTbn5TVAC-4-h8AS5cEp6LRxUTmoiug.
- Magaloni, Beatriz. "Credible power-sharing and the longevity of authoritarian rule." *Comparative Political Studies* 41, no. 4-5 (2008): 715-741. Accessed August 4, 2023.
- <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0010414007313124>.
- Magaloni, Beatriz. *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico*. of *Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Magaloni, Beatriz. 2008. "Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule." *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (4–5): 715–41.
- <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414007313124>.
- Mainwaring, Scott, and Matthew S. Shugart. "Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy: A Critical Appraisal." *Comparative Politics* 29, no. 4 (1997): 449–71.
- <https://doi.org/10.2307/422014>.
- Mainwaring, Scott. "Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America." *Cambridge University Press* (1997).
- Mair, Peter. "Electoral Volatility and the Dutch Party System: A Comparative Perspective." *Acta Politica* 43, no. 2 (July 1, 2008): 235–53. <https://doi.org/10.1057/ap.2008.1>.
- Malesky, Edmund J. "Gerrymandering – Vietnamese Style: Escaping the Partial Reform Equilibrium in a Nondemocratic Regime." SSRN Scholarly Paper. Rochester, NY, January 31, 2009. <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1669616>.

Malesky, Edmund, and Paul Schuler. "Nodding or needling: Analyzing delegate responsiveness in an authoritarian parliament." *American Political Science Review* 104, no. 3 (2010): 482-502. Accessed August 4, 2023.

Mantilla, Luis Felipe. *How political parties mobilize religion: lessons from Mexico and Turkey*. Temple University Press, 2021.

Mares, Isabela, and Lauren Young. "Buying, Expropriating, and Stealing Votes." *Annual Review of Political Science* 19, no. 1 (2016): 267-88. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-060514-120923>.

Maslow, A. H. "A Theory of Human Motivation." *Psychological Review* 50, no. 4 (1943): 370-96. <https://doi.org/10.1037/h0054346>.

Masoud, Tarek. *Counting Islam: Religion, Class, and Elections in Egypt*. Cambridge University Press, 2014.

Maurice, Duverger. "Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State." *Great Britain: University Printing House, Cambridge (Methuen & Co Ltd)*, 1954.

McAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds. *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511803987>.

McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. "To Map Contentious Politics." *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 1, no. 1 (February 21, 2006): 17-34. <https://doi.org/10.17813/maiq.1.1.y3p544u2j1l536u9>.

McAllister, Ian. "Candidates and voting choice." In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*. 2016. Accessed May 23, 2023. <https://oxfordre-com.proxy3.library.mcgill.ca/politics/display/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-73?rskey=MIG9gi&result=4>.

McDonald, Michael D., and Robin Best. "Equilibria and Restoring Forces in Models of Vote Dynamics." *Political Analysis* 14, no. 4 (October 2006): 369-92. <https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpj008>.

Mecham, Quinn, and Julie Chernov Hwang, eds. *Islamist parties and political normalization in the Muslim world*. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014.

Mecham, Quinn. *Institutional Origins of Islamist Political Mobilization*. Cambridge University Press, 2017.

Medina, Luis Fernando. "The Analytical Foundations of Collective Action Theory: A Survey of Some Recent Developments." *Annual Review of Political Science* 16, no. 1 (2013): 259-83. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-032311-110742>.

Meijer, Roel. "Taking the Islamist movement seriously: Social movement theory and the Islamist movement." *International Review of Social History* 50, no. 2 (2005): 279-291.

Meyer, David S., and Sidney Tarrow. *The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997.

Mijeski, Kenneth J., and Scott H. Beck. *Pachakutik and the Rise and Decline of the Ecuadorian Indigenous Movement*. 1st ed. Ohio University Press, 2011. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1j7x68c>.

Minkenberg, Michael. "Party politics, religion and elections in Western democracies." *Comparative European Politics* 8 (2010): 385-414.

Mitchell, Richard Paul. 1993. *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*. Oxford University Press, USA.

Mohmand, Shandana Khan. *Crafty Oligarchs, Savvy Voters: Democracy under Inequality in Rural Pakistan*. Cambridge University Press, 2019.

Morgenstern, Scott, and Javier Vázquez-D'Elía. "Electoral Laws, Parties, and Party Systems in Latin America." *Annual Review of Political Science* 10, no. 1 (2007): 143–68. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.081205.094050>.

Muchlinski, David. "The Politics and Effects of Religious Grievance." In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*, 2019. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.783>.

Mudge, Stephanie L., and Anthony S. Chen. "Political Parties and the Sociological Imagination: Past, Present, and Future Directions." *Annual Review of Sociology* 40 (2014): 305–30.

Muirhead, Russell, and Nancy L. Rosenblum. "The Political Theory of Parties and Partisanship: Catching Up." *Annual Review of Political Science* 23, no. 1 (2020): 95–110. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-041916-020727>.

Munson, Ziad. "Protest and Religion: The U.S. Pro-Life Movement." In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*, 2019. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.684>. n.d. Accessed May 30, 2022.

<https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0010414010361343>.

Nadeem, Khurshid Ahmed. "Islam Aur Pakistan" (Islam and Pakistan), Al Mawrid, Lahore, 1995.

Naím, Moisés. "What Has a Bigger Impact, Elections or Street Protests?" Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Accessed August 4, 2023. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/06/19/what-has-bigger-impact-elections-or-street-protests-pub-79339>.

Nandong, Gaetan Tchakounte. "Cooptation or Repression: A Dynamic Model of Opposition Politics Under Dictatorships," n.d.

Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza. 1994. *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama'at-i Islami of Pakistan*. 19. University of California Press.

Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza. *Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power*. Oxford University Press, 2001.

Nathan, Noah L., and Melissa L. Sands. "Context and Contact: Unifying the Study of Environmental Effects on Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 26, no. 1 (2023): null. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051421-012551>.

Neiheisel, Jacob R. "Political Participation and Religion: An Overview." In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*, 2019. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.786>.

Nelson, Matthew J. "Islamic Law in an Islamic State: What Role for Parliament?." (2017): 235-264.

Nordlinger, Eric A. 1977. *Soldiers in Politics : Military Coups and Governments*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart. *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide*. Cambridge Studies in Social Theory, Religion and Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511791017>.

Oesch, D. *Redrawing the Class Map: Stratification and Institutions in Britain, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland*. Springer, 2006.

Oesch, Daniel. "Coming to grips with a changing class structure: An analysis of employment stratification in Britain, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland." *International Sociology* 21, no. 2 (2006): 263-288. Accessed July 14, 2023.

Ong, Lynette H. *The Street and the Ballot Box: Interactions Between Social Movements and Electoral Politics in Authoritarian Contexts*. Cambridge University Press, 2022. Accessed July 29, 2023. <https://www.cambridge.org/core/elements/abs/street-and-the-ballot-box/984D9821A42E634531F41C1130A58738>.

Panebianco, Angelo. *Political Parties: Organization and Power*. Cambridge University Press Archive, 1988.

Paquin-Pelletier, Alexandre. *Radical Leaders: Status, Competition, and Violent Islamic Mobilization in Indonesia*. PhD diss, University of Toronto (Canada), 2019.

Parsons, Talcott. "Illness and the Role of the Physician: A Sociological Perspective." *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry* 21, no. 3 (1951): 452–60. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1939-0025.1951.tb00003.x>.

Paul, Thazha Varkey, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann. 2004. *Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century*. Stanford University Press. <https://books.google.ca/books?hl=en&lr=&id=9jy28vBqscQC&oi=fnd&pg=PR5&dq=TV+Paul+et+al.+2004+&ots=1iocGg9cuv&sig=XEHWSrSGd-PmYAqYpcPUTEnsKdg>.

Pellegrin, Karen L. *The Libertarian Party Struggles to Market Freedom*. SAGE Publications: SAGE Business Cases Originals, 2018.

Pepinsky, Thomas B., R. William Liddle, and Saiful Mujani. "Testing Islam's Political Advantage: Evidence from Indonesia." *American Journal of Political Science* 56, no. 3 (2012): 584-600.

Pepinsky, Thomas B., R. William Liddle, and Saiful Mujani. *Piety and Public Opinion: Understanding Indonesian Islam*. Oxford University Press, 2018.

Perlmutter, Amos. *The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers*. Yale University Press, 1977.

Philpott, Daniel. "Has the Study of Global Politics Found Religion?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 12, no. 1 (2009): 183–202. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.12.053006.125448>.

Piscatori, James P. *Islamic Fundamentalisms and the Gulf Crisis*. Fundamentalism Project, 1991. *Politics and Religion* 9 (1): 1–28.

Pontusson, Jonas. "Explaining the Decline of European Social Democracy: The Role of Structural Economic Change." *World Politics* 47, no. 4 (July 1995): 495–533. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887100015197>.

Przeworski, A., and J. Sprague. "Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism. Chicago: Univ." Chicago Press, 1986.

Qasmi, Ali Usman. 2010. "God's Kingdom on Earth? Politics of Islam in Pakistan, 1947–1969." Modern Quid Pro Books.

Rahman, Khalid. 2009. "Madrassas in Pakistan: Role and Emerging Trends." Islam and Politics. Stimson Center. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10936.10>.

Raleigh, Clionadh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre, and Joakim Karlsen. "Introducing ACLED: An Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset." *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 5 (2010): 651–60. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20798933>.

Rana, Muhammad Amir. *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan*. Lahore: Mashal Books, 2004.

Rashid, Muhammad. "General Voting trend in Khyber Pakhtun Khwa, A study of voting pattern in Districts of Dir." PhD diss. International Islamic University, Islamabad, 2022. <https://prh.hec.gov.pk/jspui/handle/123456789/21733>.

Raymond, Christopher D. "Electoral choice and religion: an overview." *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics* (2018).

Raymond, Christopher D. "Electoral Choice and Religion: An Overview." In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*, 2018. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.672>.

Raymond, Christopher, and Brian M. Barros Feltch. "Parties, cleavages and issue evolution: The case of the religious–secular cleavage in Chile." *Party Politics* 20, no. 3 (2014): 429–443. Accessed July 12, 2023.

Raymond, Christopher. "Party agency and the religious—Secular cleavage in post-communist countries: The case of Romania." *Political Studies* 62, no. 2 (2014): 292–308. Accessed July 12, 2023.

Regnerus, Mark D., David Sikkink, and Christian Smith. "Voting with the Christian Right: Contextual and individual patterns of electoral influence." *Social Forces* 77, no. 4 (1999): 1375–1401.

Reilly, Benjamin. "Political Engineering and Party Politics in Conflict-Prone Societies." *Democratization* 13, no. 5 (December 1, 2006): 811–27. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340601010719>. Reprint edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Reilly, Benjamin. "Political Parties and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding." *Civil Wars* 15, no. sup1 (December 4, 2013): 88–104. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2013.850883>.

Reilly, Benjamin. "Political Reform in Papua New Guinea: Testing the Evidence." *Pacific Economic Bulletin* 21, no. 1 (2006): 187–94.

Reuter, Ora John. "Why Is Party-Based Autocracy More Durable? Examining the Role of Elite Institutions and Mass Organization." *Democratization* 29, no. 6 (August 18, 2022): 1014–34. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2021.2024166>.

Reynolds, Andrew. "The Curious Case of Afghanistan Electoral Systems Today." *Journal of Democracy* 17, no. 2 (2006): 104–17.

Riker, W. H. "The First Power Index." *Social Choice and Welfare* 3, no. 4 (1986): 293–95.

Rodden, Jonathan. "The Geographic Distribution of Political Preferences." *Annual Review of Political Science* 13, no. 1 (2010): 321–40.

<https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.12.031607.092945>.

Routledge & CRC Press. "The Social System." Accessed August 4, 2023. <https://www.routledge.com/The-Social-System/Parsons/p/book/9780415060554>.

Roy, Olivier. *The Failure of Political Islam*. Harvard University Press, 1994.

Rubongoya, Joshua B. "Hegemonic Political Regimes in Africa." In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*, 2019. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1325>.

Sabat, Ahmad, Muhammad Shoaib, and Abdul Qadar. "Religious populism in Pakistani Punjab: How Khadim Rizvi's Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan emerged." *International Area Studies Review* 23, no. 4 (2020): 365-381.

Salih, M. A. Mohamed, and Abdullahi Osman El-Tom. "Introduction." In *Interpreting Islamic Political Parties*, edited by M. A. Mohamed Salih, 1–27. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230100770_1.

Sanyal, U. (1998). *Devotional Islam and Politics in British India*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Sartori, Giovanni. *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*. ECPR Press, 2005.

Schandelmaier, Stefan, Matthias Briel, Ravi Varadhan, Christopher H. Schmid, Niveditha Devasenapathy, Rodney A. Hayward, Joel Gagnier, et al. 2020. "Development of the Instrument to Assess the Credibility of Effect Modification Analyses (ICEMAN) in Randomized Controlled Trials and Meta-Analyses." *CMAJ: Canadian Medical Association Journal* 192 (32): E901–6. <https://doi.org/10.1503/cmaj.200077>.

Schedler, Andreas, ed. *Electoral authoritarianism: The dynamics of unfree competition*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006. Accessed August 4, 2023. <https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9781685857479/html>.

Seawright, JW 2016, Case Selection in Small-N Research. in *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*.

Selznick, Philip. 2014. *The Organizational Weapon: A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics*. Vol. 18.

Selznick, Philip. *The organizational weapon: A study of Bolshevik strategy and tactics*. Vol. 18. Quid Pro Books, 2014.

Shafqat, Saeed, Philip Jones, Tabinda M. Khan, Tahir Naqvi, Anushay Malik, Johann Chacko, Asad

Shah, Aqil. "Pakistan: Persistent Praetorianism." In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*, 2021. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1842>.

Shaikh, Farzana. 2018. *Making Sense of Pakistan*. Oxford University Press.

Siddiqi, Maryam, and Husnul Amin. 2019. "Evaluating Public Policy within a Framework: The Case of Madrassa Reforms in General Zia Era (1977-1988)." *Pakistan Journal of Islamic Research* 20 (2): 23–32.

Siddiqui, Brig (Retd) A R. *The Military in Pakistan: Image and Reality*. Vanguard Books, 1996.

Siddiqui, Niloufer. "Strategic Violence Among Religious Parties in Pakistan." In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*, 2019. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.842>.

Slater, Dan, and Erica Simmons. "Informative regress: Critical antecedents in comparative politics." *Comparative Political Studies* 43, no. 7 (2010): 886-91.

Smith, Benjamin. 2005. "Life of the Party: The Origins of Regime Breakdown and Persistence under Single-Party Rule." *World Politics* 57 (3): 421–51.

Sullivan, Denis Joseph, and Sana Abed-Kotob. 1999. *Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society vs. the*

Svolik, Milan W. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Talbot, Ian. *Pakistan: A modern history*. Hurst, 2009.

Tarrow, Sidney. *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*. 2nd ed. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511813245>.

Tibi, Bassam. *Conflict and War in the Middle East: From Interstate War to New Security*. Springer, 1998.

Tibi, Bassam. *Islam And The Cultural Accommodation Of Social Change*. Avalon Publishing, 1990.

Tilly, Charles. "To Explain Political Processes." *American Journal of Sociology* 100, no. 6 (1995): 1594-1610.

Tomsa, Dirk. "Islamism and Party Politics in Indonesia." In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*, 2019. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1157>.

Torcal, Mariano, and Scott Mainwaring. "The Political Recrafting of Social Bases of Party Competition: Chile, 1973–95." *British Journal of Political Science* 33, no. 1 (January 2003): 55–84. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123403000036>.

Trejo, Guillermo. "The Ballot and the Street: An Electoral Theory of Social Protest in Autocracies." *Perspectives on Politics* 12, no. 2 (June 2014): 332–52. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592714000863>.

Trejo, Guillermo. 2014. "The Ballot and the Street: An Electoral Theory of Social Protest in Autocracies." *Perspectives on Politics* 12 (2): 332–52.

Ullah, Haroon K. *Vying for Allah's Vote: Understanding Islamic Parties, Political Violence, and Extremism in Pakistan*. Georgetown University Press, 2013.

Van Holsteyn, Joop J.M., and Galen A. Irwin. "The bells toll no more: The declining influence of religion on voting behaviour in the Netherlands." In *Religion and Mass Electoral Behaviour in Europe*, edited by David Broughton, and Hans-Martien ten Napel, 75-96. Routledge: London and New York, 2005.

Voll, John O., and John L. Esposito. 1994. "Islam's Democratic Essence." *Middle East Quarterly*.

Wang, Ye, and Stan Hok-Wui Wong. "Electoral impacts of a failed uprising: Evidence from Hong Kong's Umbrella Movement." *Electoral Studies* 71 (2021): 102336.

Waseem, Mohammad, and Mariam Mufti. 2009. *Religions, Politics and Governance in Pakistan*. Religions and Development Working Paper 27. Birmingham: International Development Dept., University of Birmingham.

Wegner, Eva, and Francesco Cavatorta. "Revisiting the Islamist–Secular divide: Parties and voters in the Arab world." *International Political Science Review* 40, no. 4 (2019): 558–575.

Weinbaum, Marvin G. 1991. "Pakistan and Afghanistan: The Strategic Relationship." *Asian Survey* 31 (6): 496–511. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2645079>.

Wendt, Alexander. *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Wendt, Alexander. *Social theory of international politics*. Vol. 67. Cambridge University Press, 1999. Accessed August 4, 2023. <https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/social-theory-of-international-politics/0346E6FDC74FECEF6D2CDD7EFB003CF2>.

White, Joshua T. "Beyond moderation: dynamics of political Islam in Pakistan." In *Pakistan in National and Regional Change*, pp. 7-22. Routledge, 2016.

White, Joshua T. 2008. *Pakistan's Islamist Frontier: Islamic Politics and U.S. Policy in Pakistan's North-West Frontier*. Religion & Security Monograph Series, no. 1. Arlington, VA: Center on Faith & International Affairs.

White, Joshua T. *Pakistan's Islamist Frontier: Islamic Politics and U.S. Policy in Pakistan's North-West Frontier*. Religion & Security Monograph Series, no. 1. Arlington, VA: Center on Faith & International Affairs, 2008.

Wickham, Carrie Rosefsky. 2002. *Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt*. Columbia University Press.

Wiktorowicz, Quintan, and John Kaltner. "Killing in the Name of Islam: Al-Qaeda's Justification for September 11." *Middle East Policy* 10, no. 2 (2003): 76–92.

Wiktorowicz, Quintan. *The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan*. SUNY Press, 2001.

Wilder, Andrew R. "The Pakistani Voter, Electoral Politics and Voting Behaviour in the Punjab." (No Title). Accessed August 4, 2023. <https://cir.nii.ac.jp/crid/1130000794539659008>.

Wilder, Andrew. 1999. *The Pakistani Voter, Electoral Politics and Voting Behaviour in Punjab*. Oxford University Press.

Wintrobe, Ronald. *The political economy of dictatorship*. Cambridge University Press, 2000. Accessed August 4, 2023. <https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/political-economy-of-dictatorship/C996D9753F9631FAE3F1D2BAFA2EC3C1>.

Yadav, Vineeta. 2021. *Religious Parties and the Politics of Civil Liberties*. Oxford University Press, USA.

Zaman, Muhammad Qasim. *The ulama in contemporary Islam: custodians of change*. Princeton University Press, 2010.

Zaman, Muhammad Qasim. *The ulama in contemporary Islam: custodians of change*. Princeton University Press, 2010.

Ziring, Lawrence. 1984. "From Islamic Republic to Islamic State in Pakistan." *Asian Survey* 24 (9): 931–46. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2644>.

2. Field Interviews and Focus Groups

- Abdullah, Aamer. Interview by Muhammad Bilal Shakir. In-person Interview. Islamabad, 2021.
- Ahmed, Sheikh Rasheed. Interview by Muhammad Bilal Shakir. In-person Interview. Islamabad, 2021.
- Ahmed, Waqar. Interview by Muhammad Bilal Shakir. In-person Interview. Rawalpindi, 2021.
- Amin, Husnul. Interview by Muhammad Bilal Shakir. In-person Interview. Islamabad, 2021.
- Amir, Raja. Interview by Muhammad Bilal Shakir. In-person Interview. Islamabad, 2021.
- Aslam, Mian. Interview by Muhammad Bilal Shakir. In-person Interview. Islamabad, 2021.
- Ayaz, Qibla. Interview by Muhammad Bilal Shakir. In-person Interview. Islamabad, 2021.
- Babar, Farhatullah. Interview by Muhammad Bilal Shakir. In-person Interview. Islamabad, 2021.
- Bhatti, Ahmed Raza. Interview by Muhammad Bilal Shakir. In-person Interview. Islamabad, 2021.
- Butt, Zaighum. Interview by Muhammad Bilal Shakir. In-person Interview. Islamabad, 2021.
- Hazarvi, Abdul Majeed. Interview by Muhammad Bilal Shakir. In-person Interview. Rawalpindi, 2021.
- Husain, Talat. Interview by Muhammad Bilal Shakir. In-person Interview. Islamabad, 2021.
- Hussain, Zahid. Interview by Muhammad Bilal Shakir. Online. 2021.
- Ijaz-ul-Haq. Interview by Muhammad Bilal Shakir. In-person Interview. Rawalpindi, 2021.
- Javed, Umair. Interview by Muhammad Bilal Shakir. Online Interview. 2021.
- Madani, Israr Ahmed. Interview by Muhammad Bilal Shakir. In-person Interview. Islamabad, 2021.
- Malick, Muhammad. Interview by Muhammad Bilal Shakir. In-person Interview. Islamabad, 2021.
- Malik, Nasrullah. Interview by Muhammad Bilal Shakir. Online Interview. 2021.
- Malkham, Ashraf. Interview by Muhammad Bilal Shakir. In-person Interview. Islamabad, 2021.
- Mashwani, Iftikhar. Interview by Muhammad Bilal Shakir. In-person Interview. Islamabad, 2021.
- Mateen, Amir. Interview by Muhammad Bilal Shakir. In-person Interview. Islamabad, 2021.
- Mir, Hamid. Interview by Muhammad Bilal Shakir. Online Interview. 2021.
- Muhammadi, Abdul Qudoos. Interview by Muhammad Bilal Shakir. In-person Interview. Rawalpindi, 2021.
- Mustafai, Khateeb Mufti. Interview by Muhammad Bilal Shakir. In-person Interview. Rawalpindi, 2021.
- Nadeem, Khurshid Ahmed. Interview by Muhammad Bilal Shakir. In-person Interview. Islamabad, 2021.
- Naeemi, Gulzar Mufti. Interview by Muhammad Bilal Shakir. In-person Interview. Islamabad, 2021.
- Nasir, Ammar Khan. Interview by Muhammad Bilal Shakir. Online Interview. 2021.
- Qasmi, Ali Usman. Interview by Muhammad Bilal Shakir. Online Interview. 2021.
- Qazi, Samia Raheel. Interview by Muhammad Bilal Shakir. Online Interview. Islamabad, 2021.
- Rashid, Muhammad. Interview by Muhammad Bilal Shakir. Online Interview. Islamabad, 2021.
- Raza, Ali. Interview by Muhammad Bilal Shakir. Online Interview. Islamabad, 2021.

Respondent A (REB Anonymized). Interview by Muhammad Bilal Shakir. In-person Interview. Islamabad, 2021.

Respondent B (REB Anonymized). Interview by Muhammad Bilal Shakir. In-person Interview. Islamabad, 2021.

Respondent E (REB Anonymized). Interview by Muhammad Bilal Shakir. In-person Interview. Islamabad, 2021.

Respondent T (REB Anonymized). Interview by Muhammad Bilal Shakir. In-person Interview. Islamabad, 2021.

Safi, Saleem. Interview by Muhammad Bilal Shakir. In-person Interview. Islamabad, 2021.

Saifi, Rana. Interview by Muhammad Bilal Shakir. In-person Interview. Rawalpindi, 2021.

Shah, Israr Shah. Interview by Muhammad Bilal Shakir. In-person Interview. Islamabad, 2021.

Shehzad, Imran. Interview by Muhammad Bilal Shakir. In-person Interview. Islamabad, 2021.

Sher, Ali. Interview by Muhammad Bilal Shakir. In-person Interview. Islamabad, 2021.

Syed, Aizaz. Interview by Muhammad Bilal Shakir. In-person Interview. Islamabad, 2021.

Syed, Sabookh. Interview by Muhammad Bilal Shakir. In-person Interview. Islamabad, 2021.