

ULAMA, VILLAGERS AND CHANGE ISLAM IN
CENTRAL MADURA

© Iik Arifin Mansurnoor

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of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

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TITLE OF THESIS: Ulama, Villagers and Change: Islam in Central Madura
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The ulama in Madura are an inseparable part of the local social structure. Their strategic position has given them an excellent opportunity to exercise a leadership role in the local context. The ulama's niche in the social order of the village and the forces that participate in the process of change can be seen through a study of village religion in a historical context. More specifically, this study examines village religion in a contemporary setting, and focuses on the internal structure of the villages and their relations to the outside world. The ulama play an important role in a number of domains, and thus occupy a central position in society. Indeed, their religious leadership has nurtured the emergence of complex networks of followers and colleagues which have, over time, sustained the stability of the ulama's leadership role in the face of social and political vicissitudes.

RESUME

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TITRE DE LA THESE Ulama, villageois et changement: l'Islam dans le
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Les ulama à Madura font partie intégrante de la structure sociale locale. Leur situation stratégique leur a donné une excellente occasion d'exercer un rôle de leadership dans le contexte local. Une approche historique de la religion au niveau des villages révèle la place des ulama dans l'ordre social du village et les forces qui participent au changement. Cette étude se concentre sur la situation contemporaine de la religion villageoise, et analyse la structure interne des villages et leurs relations avec le monde extérieur. Les ulama jouent un rôle important dans plusieurs domaines, et occupent donc une position centrale dans la société. En effet, leur leadership religieux a donné naissance à des réseaux complexes de disciples et collègues qui ont, avec le temps, soutenu la stabilité du rôle de leadership des ulama en face des vicissitudes politiques et sociales.

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
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SPELLING AND TRANSLITERATION

The Madurese and Indonesian names, words, terms and phrases, irrespective of their origin are written according to Indonesian spelling. The Arabic names and words are spelt in accordance with the Indonesian use without diacritical marks, except for quotes from written sources and materials. Thus the Arabic names and words quoted from materials written in Arabic are transliterated with complete diacritics. Moreover, "s" is added to all Madurese and Indonesian nouns in order to indicate a plural form, with the exception of "ulama" (see also Introduction).

The main differences in transliteration from Arabic are

Arabic	Indonesian	English	Arabic	Indonesian	English
ت	ts	th	ح	h	h
ذ	zd	dh	س	sy	sh
ش	sh	s	ص	dl	d
ث	th	t	ظ	dh	z

Foreign words and phrases are italicized generally only the first time they appear in the text.

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INTRODUCTION

Madura is one of the hundreds of islands in the Republic of Indonesia. Until quite recently Madura was treated simply as part of Java in the literature. However, the island is inhabited by people with a language and a culture that are distinct, to a degree, from those of their neighbors. Madura lies toward the northeast of Surabaya (see map), the capital city of the province of East Java. The population is scattered and small patches of cultivation are found in hollows and in the stream valleys. The greatest concentration is on the southern lowlands and on the plain at the west end of the island. The population count of Madura and the surrounding islands was 2,686,923 in 1980 (*Population of East Java* 1982:37-8). No exact statistics are available of the total number of Madurese living outside this group of islands, but it is estimated that they are twice as numerous as the inhabitants of Madura itself. In 1980 Madura had an average of 547 persons per km². Indeed, it is a relatively densely populated area, especially in view of the low agricultural productivity. The Madurese are the largest ethnic group in Indonesia today after the Javanese and the Sundanese.


The Madurese language belongs to the Malayo-Javanese linguistic group. The main dialects of the language are Western and Eastern Madurese (see Stevens 1965). An indigenous Madurese literature has hardly developed, and with today's increasing efforts towards Indonesianization, the cause of the local literature has suffered. Most Madurese writings are translations of Javanese and, to some degree, Islamic literary works.

The setting

Administratively Madura is part of the province of East Java. The chief of the local government in Madura, the Deputy Governor, coordinates the work of the *bupatis* (heads of regencies). Madura is divided into four regencies: Pamekasan (also the capital of Madura where the Deputy Governor resides), Sumenep, Sampang and Bangkalan. The last two were formerly identified as Madura proper (for more on this point

see Chapter 2). The bupati is assisted by several *pembantu bupati* (Deputy Regents) who act as a link between the bupati and the camats. Each regency consists of several sub-districts (*kecamatan*), which are administered by *camats*. Each of the latter controls several *desas* or *kalurahan* (administrative villages within the town). The *desa* and *kalurahan* are the lowest administrative units in the local government and are headed by a *klebun* or *kepala desa* and a *lurah* respectively.

Figure 1.1 The administrative structure of the desa and its relationship with the regional administration



A *desa* consists of several villages (*kampongs*) and wards. A *kampung* is, to some extent, politically defined and led by a minor *desa* official (*apel*). It may constitute between four to fifteen wards. The inhabitants of such a ward are often connected by kinship and marriage. The village administration consists of a *desa* headman and his appointed agents such as the *carik* (secretary), *modin* (formal religious functionary), *kami* (head of security) and several *apels* (assistants) whose number, unlike in Java, depends on the number of *kampongs* and inhabitants of the *desa*. Since the second half of the 1960's a military representative (*Babinsa*) has been sent to each *desa*. He is part of the Armed Forces' package of societal service (*Dwi Fungsi ABRI*). The *desa* head is elected by the villagers officially for eight years but usually remains in

office for life unless he commits a crime, is senile and/or glaringly corrupt. The main tasks of the klebun are the maintenance of order in the villages, the execution of village projects, the collection of land taxes, the issuing of various certificates (*surat keterangan*) for villagers and the administration of the desa wherein he is assisted by the secretary.

The town of Pamekasan is the site of a number of institutions and offices of the central government as well as of the local (*daerah*) administration. Those maintained by the central government include a central post office (*Kantor Pos dan Giro*), two government banks, a hospital, a faculty branch of the IAIN, health centers, markets, schools, a prison, plus directorates of education, information, agriculture, irrigation, veterinarian affairs, religious affairs and family planning. The military and police have headquarters in the town. The local administration is responsible for such matters as the maintenance of standards of human and animal health, the conduct of business transactions including the use of scales in stores and markets, street maintenance, building codes, garbage disposal, bus and taxi terminals, fire protection, the legalization of various certificates, power, water supply and the collection of market taxes and other dues.

In the private sector, the town of Pamekasan is the local center for a number of shops, banks, garages, inns, restaurants, small-scale industries, insurance companies, a university, a press center, transportation services, tobacco and other crop storages, religious centers and the offices of political and social organizations.

Theoretical considerations

A great number of studies have been conducted on the relation and interplay between Islam and local traditions. During the last three decades more detailed and specific studies on social and institutional aspects of Islam have been written. The persistence of traditional leaders such as the *ulama* in a modern world has tempted many scholars of Islam to conduct further researches and to readjust theories of traditional leadership and even to develop totally new approaches.

In recent studies, the ulama are regarded as an elite who play an essential role in society (Lapidus 1967, Bulliet 1972, Christelow 1977, Metcalf 1982). They act as cultural brokers who may eventually become obsolete (Geertz 1960a, Gilmartin 1979). They are popular and traditional leaders who know how to fulfill the expectations of the simple citizen (Green 1978, Eaton 1984). They have also recently been seen as an institution with a complete set of resources, and a specific role, position and interests, who want to serve and defend their followers and themselves (e.g. Binder 1960, Keddie 1972a, Horikoshi 1976).

More specifically, studies of Islam in Indonesia have focused mostly on the so called reformist movements. Following the relatively remarkable performance of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) in the 1955 and, more particularly, the 1971 elections, many scholars have pointed to the gap in the study of the popularly known label of 'traditional Islam.' Indeed, in 1975 Benedict Anderson reminded students of Islam in Indonesia that no Ph.D. thesis on the NU had been written (1977:23). In recent years, however, several studies on the phenomenon of traditional Islam have been completed, even though not necessarily with specific reference to Indonesia. The trend has become stronger particularly following the successful Iranian revolution sponsored by the clergy. Attention has been focused on the pattern of traditional Islamic leadership. In 1976, Hiroko Horikoshi (-Roe) wrote her Ph.D. thesis on Sundanese ulama. This study is, in many respects, unique and pioneering, in an Indonesian context, at least; for it specifically deals with traditional religious leaders,¹ the ulama, who are not formally included in the state bureaucracy. This does not mean that Clifford Geertz's oft-mentioned work, *Religion in Java* can no longer be seen as an important guide and stimulant for any student of Islam in Java. The point is that Horikoshi

¹ Horikoshi distinguishes the use of the terms *kiyayi* and *ulama*. For her the *kiyayi* implies charismatic, transient and, naturally, non-hereditary leadership. On the other hand, the term *ulama* is applied to those minor religious leaders at the village level. Although this distinction might be appropriate in the region studied by Horikoshi, at the broader context the term *ulama* refers to men of learning and religious leaders in general. As I will show, local terms used by the population are more precise in categorizing levels of leadership. At the same time, the term *ulama* is retained in its broader meaning.

was the first scholar who focused a detailed study on the ulama who are in many respects different from what has been depicted in studies on the ulama in the Middle East (see Green 1978:3-16). Most ulama in Indonesia, or at least in modern Indonesia, are not affiliated with the bureaucracy, a situation perhaps comparable to that of South Asian ulama during the post-Mughal period (see Metcalf 1982, 1984). In 1980 Zamakhsyari Dhofier completed his work on the most important aspect of the ulama's world, the *pesantren*² (religious residential school) in Java. Dhofier's study contributes significantly to our better understanding of the ulama's continuing popularity in Javanese society. These ulama, as Dhofier has shown, have developed particular mechanisms ideological, kinship and religio-political, in order to pursue their unity and tradition. Despite, or rather because of, Dhofier's detailed analysis of the ulama and *pesantren*, the latter's position in and relations to particular social settings are assumed, not explained (cf. Kessler 1978, Eickelman 1982).

Ulama continue to exercise an important role in Indonesia. Who are they? How do they preserve their position in society? It is not easy to answer the second question with a straightforward formula, but it will be the theme of this thesis. In Madura and Indonesia generally, the word *ulama* is used, like many other nouns, both as a singular and a plural form. Thus, the grammatical contrast between Arabic forms "*ʿālim*" (singular) and "*ʿulamā*" (plural) is not retained. *Alim* in the Indonesian context means a pious, practicing Muslim. *Alim-ulama* is often used as a plural form of *ulama* in order to denote men of religious learning irrespective of their levels of scholarship and position.

A great deal of literature on ulama, especially in the Middle Eastern and North Afri-

² In today's Indonesia, there are at least three popular terms, excluding the local variants, which are used to denote the traditional educational institution. These include *pesantren* (lit. place for religious students), *pondok* (lit. hut) and *pondok-pesantren*. Throughout our discussion the term *pondok* will be adopted to indicate the religious residential school in Madura; for this has been, as far as I could observe, the more precise term widely used by the villagers. In Madurese "*pondok*" is pronounced "*pondluk*." This is despite the fact that the term *pondok-pesantren* has increasingly become popular among ulama and *santris* since it is officially used in their letters or billboards. The Madurese variant for *pesantren* is *panyantren*.

can contexts, has been focused on the official, bureaucratic ulama (Ottoman, Mamluk, Tunisian, Egyptian and Moroccan). When dealing with non-bureaucratic ulama, scholars tend to categorize them as saints, marabouts, derwishes or Sufis. In 1977 A. Christelow complained about such a dichotomic approach, especially in the North African context. This leads, according to him, to neglecting studies of ulama in areas other than Istanbul, Tunis, Cairo and Morocco (1977 34-6). Of course, Christelow was mainly interested in explaining his findings that in the colonial Algerian context many of the marabouts or their descendants had in fact joined the ulama grouping of contemporary urban Algeria.

In Madura, the word ulama is less widely used than indigenous terms such as *kyai*, *bindara*, or *mak kaeh*. There are two levels of meanings for the term ulama. Among the *santris* (students at the pondok) the word ulama is used to denote religious scholars who have thorough knowledge of the Islamic law (*syari'ah*). Thus, the *santris* put emphasis on scholarly achievement for those who are to be identified as ulama. Hence a dichotomy emerges from this categorization prominent ulama (*ulama raja*) and minor ulama (*ulama nek' kenek*). On the other hand in the society at large the word ulama may be used randomly to refer to *kyai*, *bindara*, *lorah*, *imam* or *mak kaeh*. In this thesis, therefore, the word ulama is used in the latter meaning, but in special cases such classification as higher, lower or minor is attached. We should remember, however, that definitions are only a guide, for as Eric Wolf insists "they are no absolutes but merely aids in analysis" (1969.xiii).

From a national point of view, Madura has perhaps no major significance, economically, politically or strategically. Nor is our aim to collect data and information in order so much to set forth empirical generalization as to penetrate, in the words of C. Geertz, "the forces that shape social action..." (1965 12). In studying the ulama in Madura, attempts are made to locate them within the local and supra-local contexts. Ulama become religious leaders not merely within a religious atmosphere nor do they become so within a social vacuum. Such theories as patronage, brokerage and mediation are, of course, helpful in explaining the ulama as socio-religious leaders in

Madurese society. But a monolithic and rigid application of any one of these theories will not sufficiently explain the persistence of the popularity of the ulama among the Madurese. Horikoshi has suggested that the ulama in West Java cannot be identified as brokers or mediators between the local community and the national system (1976:374). Using the arguments developed by Wolf (1956), Silverman (1965), Bailey (1969) and Bruner (1973), Horikoshi maintains that such traditional leaders as ulama who, in her case, are independent from the political power-holders, often "block channels of communication and forces of change and withhold information in order to prevent the development of direct ties between the two ends, and avoid jeopardizing their own positions" (1976:379-80). Despite her claim, Horikoshi cannot free herself from repeatedly using the mediation and brokerage paradigms in many of her analyses.

Although Horikoshi's approach has been useful to explain the continuance of ulama popularity in West Java, it has certain limitations. Insofar as the ulama are able to preserve their independence economically and socio-culturally, they may refuse any role as mediators or brokers. Yet the continuing government monopoly over the major resources has made its patronage increasingly necessary for many local leaders. Indeed, in analyzing the traditional leaders we cannot ignore the level of their independence from the establishment. Since the relationships between the ulama and villagers on the one hand, and between the ulama and the national system on the other continue to shift and find accommodation in response to change, our approaches to the study of the ulama cannot be static.

Thus, even if mediation theory cannot appropriately explain the contemporary ulama phenomenon, the continuing absorption of local leaders into the all-encompassing national system may necessitate the use of such concepts as cultural broker and mediator (cf. Rassam 1977).

Since the ulama in Madura derive their ideological basis primarily from scriptural Islam, attempts are made to locate local Islam, especially its exemplary bearers, the ulama, in the broader context. In the process the major themes which have been evoked in the study of ulama in other Muslim regions are consulted. Arnold Green

has aptly summarized the studies of ulama in North Africa and the Middle East (1978:3-16). In consulting these themes we should note that most of these studies were concerned with the bureaucratic ulama. Among the direct and obvious results is, first, the difference in terms of the economic resources of the ulama. Unlike the bureaucratic ulama, most ulama in Indonesia stand outside the ruling class. Yet the state continues to exercise significant control over the revenues of the ulama, for the ulama are small landowners. The ulama derive their income mainly from family income, mostly land, gifts and donations. Thus, when the state is financially strong, it may patronize ulama. In Madura, the ulama continue to maintain financial independence, even though they receive occasional government aid. Second, the ulama in Madura, unlike the bureaucratic ulama, do not experience an ambiguous legitimization of religious leadership. They never assume *ulamaship* by virtue of official appointments. A number of ulama who occupied government religious offices have continued to be regarded as religious leaders as long as they maintain their extra official services to the society. Third, a dichotomy of ulama and Sufis never clearly became a significant issue. To use Michael Gilsenan's phrase (in describing such a parallel phenomenon in modern Egypt, 1973:6), "multiple membership" within the two religious entities is the normal feature (cf. Christelow 1977:29-48). Therefore, the common themes which are generally helpful in understanding ulama in Indonesia are their historical background and relations with the political authorities.

In Madura, the ulama have experienced shifting and different positions *vis-à-vis* the power-holders. Although we do not have conclusive historical narratives about the details of *ulama-rato* ties during the pre-colonial period, certain patterns are discernible. The centrality of the *rato* in Madurese politics and cosmology requires his independence and exemplarity. The decline of the *rato*'s position in the face of the colonial intrusion helped many ulama to share the *rato*'s prestige at the local level (cf. Green 1978:3-7; Metcalf 1982; Eaton 1984). The emergence of the ulama as important local leaders is evidenced by the establishment of religious and educational centers which attracted many participants and students. The ulama continue to enjoy

such position and prestige because, among other things, the Madurese countryside was left almost intact both by the colonial régime and the Indonesian government, at least until quite recently. Despite the obvious influence and popularity of the ulama, they were not seen or could not be adopted by diverse authorities as strategic agents in the bureaucracy. Not surprisingly, the ulama in Madura generally remain non-bureaucratic leaders and non-office holders. There are two explanations for this phenomenon. First, the establishment never had any appreciation or understanding about such bucolic leaders as the ulama, prominent though they might be. Of course, the different visions of ethos and lifeways between the ulama and the establishment, colonial or post-independence, has perpetuated such polarity. Second, the ulama never won respect among the newly educated figures who tended to manipulate the strings of power. The fact that the ulama were ignored by the intelligentsia and the authorities did not discourage the ulama from pursuing their social and religious work. Indeed, within the Madurese context the ulama have provided villagers with direct, necessary leadership at different stages of their history when the central power was not very much interested in benefiting from, and improving, the island's meagre resources.

The increasing intrusion of external forces into Madurese villages has put the ulama into a defensive position. In analyzing the position of the ulama during the process of national integration various theories in anthropological studies are undoubtedly necessary and useful. For example, the mediation theory proposed by Eric Wolf (1956) has been used and developed by later anthropologists in describing and analyzing national integration in complex societies (e.g. Geertz 1960a; Silverman 1965; Bailey 1969; Nash 1974; Kessler 1978). More specifically, the studies of Kelantan Islam by Nash (1974) and Kessler (1974, 1978) have amply shown the merit of such an approach. The point is that the ulama's world is not a separate entity operating within a social vacuum. The ulama are not free from the changing context wherein they enjoy influence or even experience the erosion of their popularity. Despite the fact that the ulama, to an extent, maintain a separate network of col-

leagues and followers, their groupings also belong to a society and nation at large. The continuity and stability of such groupings and at the same time the perennial adjustment to the shifting global context require students of local Islam to trace the position of such traditional leaders as ulama and their views, strategies and actions in response to changes within the context of local, supralocal and national levels.

The leadership role of the ulama in villages is perpetuated by their better access to information. In his studies of the *pasar* (bazaar) in Central Java and the *sūq* (bazaar) in Morocco, Clifford Geertz has addressed the centrality of information for the bazaaris (1963b, 1979, cf. Rogers 1969). The "search for information" becomes the main occupation for any participant in these bazaars. The relatively weak access to information makes many bazaar goers often confused and prone to manipulation. In the villages, the population has diverse means of obtaining local information. Since the villagers rarely conduct communication with supravillage figures or institutions, they usually make *ad hoc* arrangements to relate themselves to external entities. Moreover, the events, news and regulations which occasionally affect villagers cannot be easily understood, and thus they particularly need guidance for their response to such phenomena. To make matters even worse, the increasing ties between villages and supravillage entities often result in anxiety and uncertainty. Although modern education, radio, teachers and government officials become more accessible, villagers have little confidence, and perhaps understanding, with respect to them. Not surprisingly, the ulama who have been held to have access to the most valued religious knowledge and in practice also control circulation of information, local and supralocal, continue to enjoy a central position in many aspects of the villagers' daily life. Throughout the thesis this theme, i.e. accessibility to information will occasionally be evoked. In this fashion, it is expected to show that the key factor to the dominant position and central leadership role of the kyais (higher ulama) in the local setting comes primarily from their control of information flow.

Important networks in Madurese villages include religion, kinship, bureaucracy, trade and education. They are often not independent entities and operate without

coalescence or merging. In fact, in some cases religion and trade go hand-in-hand in widening their field of activities. Yet religion and bureaucracy are no longer seen as continua of a network. Kinship, despite its continuing vital role in the local context, does not enjoy the same significance in the wider supralocal communication. But among the ulama, kinship remains indispensable for many of their corporate acts. In his study of capital owners, traders and brokers in East Madura, de Jonge has shown the extensive network of tobacco trade in the region (1984). Since the tobacco is mostly sold to the cigarette factories in Java, extensive communications and ties on the basis of economic interests also develop between segments of Madurese and supralocal individuals and agencies. Education has contributed to the cooperation and ties among diverse segments of villagers. Due to the predominance of religious education, kyais and pondoks have become sources of bonding and networks.

Bureaucracy and religion have been, to different degrees, instrumental in connecting villages with the wider world. Although a massive reorganization of the administrative and bureaucratic structures of Madura was launched by the Dutch during the second half of the nineteenth century (1858 for Pamekasan, 1883 for Sumenep and 1885 for Bangkalan and Sampang, see Chapter 2), the villagers barely experienced direct outside interference. Villages in Madura obviously attracted little interest among planters, developers and officials. This tendency has remained until fairly recently. Yet different central governments were able to maintain their own agents and representatives in the villages. Despite the limited authority enjoyed by these representatives, they have developed sets of ties connecting villages to higher bureaucratic levels. On the other hand, religion has provided the villagers with a link to different levels of supravillage entities in the island, in Java, in Indonesia, and even abroad.

Fieldwork

This study is based on modern works, classical texts and, more importantly, fieldwork conducted from February 1984 until March 1985 in Pamekasan, Madura, Indonesia. In addition, discussions with Dutch and Indonesian scholars, a previous survey carried

out in Madura in September 1975 as well as personal experiences in Java, Middle East and West Malaysia have served as a background to this study.

Until a few days before entering the island I was not sure where I should conduct my fieldwork, even though I had narrowed the location to Sampang and Pamekasan. This consideration was a result of my own perception of Madura as well as the discussions with Touwen-Bouwsma, Niehof, Jordaan, Leunissen, de Jonge, Bafadal, Samsuri and several Madurese scholars in Surabaya. When I got better information from the literature about the ulama, pondoks and socio-cultural settings of the island, I decided to go to Pamekasan. My first guide to the island was a Madurese student, Nurhasan, who lived in Surabaya. I met him just by chance at my former landlady in the city. My affiliation with an equal like Nurhasan gave me more opportunity to maneuver and to see the prospects in many villages. He was very kind to drive me to many locations in Pamekasan that I thought to fit my research design. Basing myself on the information given by the Department of Religious Affairs on religious schools in Madura and on the suggestion by a Dutch scholar who had experienced a hard time in her first few months of fieldwork in the western part of Madura to secure a first connection with the ulama or pondok, I went from one pondok to another. This was done within less than a week. This early observation was cursory, ranging from joining a short ritual at a pondok mosque to long friendly conversations with the ulama and santris. During this period I never spent the night at any pondok, instead I returned to Camplong, 15 km west of Pamekasan proper. I realized that by doing this I had avoided the temptation of succumbing to warmth and hospitality (no Madurese I know lacks this last virtue) which might block my choice of the expected and ideal location.

Before going to Madura I thought that I could find pondoks in the midst of village houses or hamlets, but I was not able to see even one, except in the town. Indeed, this fact has later become an inspiration for me in reading about the social structure of villages in Madura and the relations of the ulama and pondoks to local social order. In the fourth week of February 1984, my second week in Madura, the kyai of Bettet

gave me and my wife permission to carry out research in his pondok and the villages, and I obtained a house to stay in for my fieldwork in the villages.

My earlier communication with the kyai helped me considerably to establish contacts with santris and villagers. After renovating and painting the house, I performed a feast (*selamadan*) in order among other things to introduce myself and to explain the goal of my fieldwork. During this period a number of young men and women, students, santris and others frequently dropped in at our house. Indeed, many of them continued until the end of my research in the villages to be very helpful informants. Although I attempted to talk in the vernacular, these people preferred to converse with me in Indonesian. I thought at that time that they wanted to practice the rarely used national language, at least at the village level, as well as to avoid hearing my improper pronunciation of the Madurese. However, until the end of my fieldwork even when I felt that I spoke Madurese better, they continued to use Indonesian. Only with the older generation and some santris in the pondoks was I able to practice my Madurese. With the companionship of my "brother" and Alihuda, who were to be close and intelligent friends and some of the best informants, I started to visit aged villagers. In addition to introducing myself, I was able to tap their knowledge about the history of the villages. On the other hand, my wife seems to have developed easy communication with female neighbors, friends, village officials' wives and the *dalem* (kyai's household). In a society where there is a strong separation of the sexes, my wife provided me with information on, and a link with, the women's world as well as opportunities to talk to her visitors and friends. Being a sociologist by training, she was very helpful in providing me with various information on women.

My relationship with the ulamas and santris was very cordial. Since my house was only a five-minute walk from the dalem, I was able to be present almost every day in the pondok to observe and talk to ulama and santris. After less than 24 hours in Betet, I was invited by the kyai, who was the chairman of the biggest ulama organization in the regency, to accompany him to a monthly discussion meeting (*bahtsul mas'ail*) among prominent ulama. It should be mentioned in passing that my choice

of the Bettet area was not influenced by the kyai's position, as I did not even know that he was a chairman prior to my stay in the village. Contrary to my plan, I did not start the fieldwork from the village to the pondok, but I did both concurrently. Still this did not hinder my early research from primarily studying the village world and the relations of the pondok to the villages. During my stay in Bettet I often and regularly visited and interviewed villagers, officials and ulama in surrounding villages and desas. Toward the end of my research I also used questionnaires in order to examine specific issues that relate to the background of the santris.

In order to have wider knowledge of Madurese society, during the last three months of my fieldwork (January-March 1985), I moved to the town of Pamekasan. Unlike in Bettet, I stayed with a family whose house was not located in the tanean lanjang but on the side of a straight road. It was close to the town market (*pasar*). Despite this I did not lose contact with the ulama, pondok, my brother and villagers in Bettet and other villagers, as many of them visited me and I regularly went to Bettet and surrounding desas. Although Bettet is only three kilometers from the town, the two are different in many respects. During my stay in Pamekasan I was able to visit and interview higher officials, teachers, scholars, ulama and santris in the town and in different districts. Such opportunities provided me with wider perspectives in using my local data and information, either as a check or as a way of giving legitimacy to non-local settings.

Sources for pre-colonial Madura

In discussing pre-colonial Madura I made extensive use of two manuscripts written in the old Maduro-Javanese with Arabic script. The first, which I call MS-Bagandan, originated from the collection of the descendants of Pangolo Seding Bulengan (d. 1750) an aristocratic ulama at Pamekasan court. I obtained the manuscript from Kyai Hamidin of Pamekasan who had bought it from a descendant of the Pangolo in Bagandan. The identity of the author cannot be established. The second I acquired from the guardian of Kyai Raba's tomb, pondok and mosque in Pamekasan. I identify the manuscript as MS-Raba. The name of the author is not evident in the text. Although the

guardian assured me that the treatise was composed by Kiyai Raba's disciple/s we must be careful in using the text as a historical source. Again, some pages were later added to list the genealogies of important personalities in Madura including their ancestors elsewhere until the second quarter of the nineteenth century.

In addition, I utilized two anthologies of legends and stories written in Madurese and Indonesian respectively. The first anthology, the *Babad Songennep* written in Madurese with Javanese script is a collection of stories, oral and textual, related to the Sumenep dynasties. It was written by two members of the Sumenep aristocracy and bureaucracy in 1914. This book, despite its lack of references, is useful as a story text, it provides the genealogies of the Sumenep nobility and aristocracy, the successive rulers, palace rituals, wars in the region etc. The second, Zaenalfattah's *Sedjarah [History] Tjaranja Pemerintahan di Daerah-Daerah Kepulauan Madura dengan Hubungannya*, is also an important guide in measuring pre-colonial Madura. This work, despite the absence of footnotes and references, is invaluable in looking at classical Madura and its nobility and aristocracy. Written in 1951, the book contains stories and legends popular among the population at the beginning of this century. In addition, Zaenalfattah, as a retired bupati, also used manuscripts (1951:47). The problem, however, is that, *inter alia*, he does not mention his exact sources so that later researchers can locate them and base further studies on them. Since our historical sources are of such a nature, whatever we suggest about periodization and kinship ties should not be taken at face value (cf. Fernea 1970:2-3, Tambiah 1976). My approach to this period, i.e. pre-colonial, is thus mainly interpretive (Geertz 1973, 1980 and 1983). In fact, as I explain later, what matters is that the individuals concerned and their relations to others have been widely and popularly believed to have existed in Madurese history (cf. Waardenburg 1974; Adams 1976, 1985).

PART ONE: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Chapter One

MADURA, PALACE AND ISLAM LOCAL VIEWS ABOUT THE INTRODUCTION
OF ISLAM INTO THE ISLAND OF MADURA

Islam was introduced to Madura from the Islamized port towns on the northern coast of Java. Contemporary historical evidence is scanty, to say the least. But this is a common phenomenon of the history of early Islam in most islands in the archipelago. On the other hand, stories, myths and legends are to be found in abundance. Despite the change and corruption that have occurred in them, these "texts" are invaluable in the understanding of Madura's past. The following is an attempt to reconstruct the process of Islamization of the Madurese.

Background of the Madurese belief system

The belief system of the Madurese is approximately parallel to that held by the Javanese.¹ The Madurese, however, invariably maintain close attachment to Islam in its totality. They profess the centrality of supernatural powers, evil and good. Because human life is responsive to and at the same time dependent upon the higher powers, they construct a core of beliefs and rituals that concentrate primarily, but not necessarily, on formulating and interpreting sacred time and place for purposes of communication. At the lowest level, the Madurese villagers perceive the presence of spirits in their environment. Most of these spirits are more like mediators with the higher powers. The villagers hold that for their own safety, success and salvation, the spirits have to be kept at arm's length by feasts, rituals and celebrations. To achieve this end, therefore, the organization of religious ceremonies and rituals is central in village life. Indeed, for a long time the Madurese have elected religious or ritual leaders. Because of their familiarity with the guardians and mediators (*se areksa*) of higher

¹ For discussions of the variants of Javanese religion see C. Geertz 1960b; Emmerson 1976; Muhammad Slamet 1977; Dhofier 1980; Hefner 1985.

powers, these figures are regarded as possessors of magical powers (*kadigdajan* and *kasaktian*). As evidence for their superiority, these figures usually keep certain formula, weapons, tools or other things which are believed to channel secret powers (Amir Santoso 1980; cf. Jordaan 1985). Such indigenous ideas of power makers undoubtedly have persisted to mark the Madurese's perception of spiritual leaders. The notion of *se areksa* as a concept of relations between the villagers and the supernatural is central to many ritualistic aspects of everyday life in the island.

As seen today and in history, the Madurese are not passive recipients of ideas, customs or tradition. They have been active formulators. All that comes to them and suits them is absorbed and re-modelled in their own style, then domesticated. But this does not mean that ideologies or religions do not inspire the population to a large degree. Islam, for example, has been a moving spirit and a determining factor in Madura. The absorption and actualization of such external traditions are continuing in process. The domestication of a religion is an approximation² and at the same time individuation.³ Despite the on-going process of approximation and individuation, the villagers in general maintain parallel layers of a belief system. With the exception of occasional eccentrics, religious uniformity among the Madurese makes it difficult for us to observe overt representatives of a strange tradition comparable to Javanese *abanganism*. At the present time, all spiritual experts, including the *dukons*, more or less use Islamic idioms and symbols (see Jordaan 1985). This is not to deny, however, that the emphasis on Islamic doctrine varies among them. Although the level of emphasis on Islamic doctrine at times plays a role in what one expects of life and his overt behavior, to use this categorization as a way of analyzing Madurese society is unprofitable. This is true not only because of the obvious influence of the overt bearers of Islam in the island, as I attempt to show in this work, but also

² By approximation I mean the process of approaching, understanding and even practicing religious doctrine and ritual. It is man's conscious attempts to draw himself closer to religion as represented by the scripture as well as the functionaries.

³ By individuation I mean, primarily but not necessarily, the unconscious acceptance and performance of a religion in its totality (cf. Berger 1979:147).

because of the continuing process of approximation to and individuation of Islam by all segments of the population. Yet it is a fact that this process occurs in different degrees and is increasingly even threatened by the universal force of secularization.

Among the Madurese, Islam has been subjected to indigenous analysis and scrutiny, and it has been wedded to indigenous traditions in a harmonious, stable fashion (cf. Ellen 1983, in his analysis of the domestication of Islam in other areas of Southeast Asia). This has happened despite the fact that the classical texts of the theologians, Sufis, astronomers and jurists (*fuqaha*) are widely read in almost all areas. This fact may help us to understand the riddle of crowded *pondoks* (religious educational and residential institutions) and langgars, as well as the concomitant prestige enjoyed by the ulama in the island. The scriptural teaching of Islam has to be advocated continuously if only to secure and accelerate the process of approximation and individuation. While saying all these things, it is nonetheless clear to me that the Madurese are all participants in this process, even if they differ in their degree of identification with Islam.

If we accept such a way of looking at a people's culture, then the analysis of foreign elements in their tradition should not be loaded with prejudice, denigration and mistreatment. More specifically, it is better to perceive such borrowing as a facet of a people's endeavors to pursue a meaningful life and revitalize their culture and tradition *vis-à-vis* ecosystem and change.

Pre-Islamic Madura

The early history of Madura is relatively unknown, as is the case with many other parts of Indonesia. Nevertheless, the scattered historical evidence and anthropological findings show that Madura experienced encounters with foreign religions, cultures and their bearers parallel to what took place in Java. Indeed, pre-Islamic Madura at times played an important role in the political life of some courts of the Siwaite-Buddhist kingdoms in East Java. The role played by Wiraraja of Sumenep in the establishment of Majapahit rule in 1292 is too well-known to be repeated (Pigeaud and de

Graaf 1974). Again, the legend of Raden Sagara and his princess mother tells us the origin of the Madurese and their relation to the mythical Javanese court of Medangkamulan. Despite the relatively limited remains of Indic traditions and monuments in the island, it is clear that the Madurese absorbed many features of the pre-Islamic religions in the area. The langgar which, as we shall see further in Chapter 8, has become an Islamic institution, seems to have its origin in the pattern of the Indic family shrine and temple. This can be seen today, for example, in Bali and mainland Southeast Asian countries. Thus we can speculate that when Islam was brought to the island, it encountered people who maintained layers of indigenous and Indic beliefs, even though not in the sense of their being separate systems (cf. Fraser 1966:86-9, in his analysis of the belief system among the Malays in South Thailand).

The relationships between the early Madurese principalities and the Indic Javanese kingdoms of Singasari and Majapahit seem to have been formalistic and political. Although Madura was under the direct control of the central court, it maintained a certain degree of autonomy invariably led by the local leaders. These loosely structured relationships became more effective when the close members of the king's entourage were sent as representatives to the island. Because of the peripheral nature of the region, most agents who were sent there were either novices pursuing a training opportunity or unwanted figures who had been exiled. Such a tendency is evident, for instance, in Kertanegara's decision to send Wiraraja in the second half of the thirteenth century as a *bupati* (regent) of East Madura (Schrieke 1957). The choice of East Madura as the residence of the bupati of the island was connected with the most valuable product of Madura at the time — salt. Indeed, the nature of these center-periphery relations was bureaucratic. As a result, the upholders of the court culture in the island were limited to the upper bureaucrats of the bupati's palace as well as to those of some other smaller local principalities. So far we do not have evidence, historical or anthropological, that shows the existence of a religious and institutional center which might have propagated ideas similar to those held by the Siwaistic-Buddhist kingdoms of East Java. The Buddhist monastery whose remnants exist in

Talang had nothing to do with the court religion. It was probably affiliated with a minority group of foreign traders who built an enclave there during the later Islamic period.

The identification of the Indic tradition in Madura with the foreign court seems to have worked, contrary to Nicholson's theory of conversion (1965), against the mass acceptance of such a life-style. Such a tendency in fact paved the way for later Muslim teachers to propagate the new religion, new in a sense, as Geertz suggests (1968), with respect to form. It was presented in a way that provided the population with a new identity in the face of the Indic Javanese culture holders. This does not mean, however, that Islam came to Madura where there was an ideological vacuum. From our ethnographic notes as well as textual reading it is increasingly apparent that the indigenous Madurese belief system was more prevalent than any other tradition in the history of Madura. It is true that, as Lombard shows, the gate of the ratos' tomb in Sumenep (Asta Tinggi) was strongly Hindic⁴ in character (*tyandi*) (1972: 272-76). But it was built later in the nineteenth century by a Muslim ruler. If the building ideas or architectural style indeed came from other traditions, this should not be necessarily interpreted to mean that the foreign tradition as a whole or its religion was accepted. Perhaps we should rather identify such a tendency as personal preference and aesthetic taste. Moreover, the scattered remnants of *parimbon* texts, which contain the explanation of cosmic movements and provide guidance for medication, divination, cultivation and works should not be interpreted as Indic (see MS-Bagandan). As suggested by Ricklefs, the texts were an amalgam of popular Islamic and indigenous traditions (Ricklefs 1974:6-7; cf. Jordaan 1985). To sum up, prior to the Islamic period, the Madurese and the Javanese seem to have developed parallel indigenous traditions; however, the Madurese fell behind on the acceptance of Indic tradition and religions. This became a crucial factor in forming their perception of the new faith.

⁴ Some local observers suggested that the architectural style at Asta Tinggi was very much influenced by Chinese models.

Early phase of Islamization in Madura.

Islam was first brought to Madura by individuals, traders, seamen and teachers, both indigenous and foreign. The salt production, sea products and interinsular trade were factors that linked Madura with the outside world. The pride of the coastal population in the bravery and skill of their ancestors in sailing (*abantal ombak*) has been well expressed in Madurese songs, stories and poetry (see Amir Santoso 1980:24). The accessibility of the sea to a large number of people and the limited possibility of cultivation in the island had been factors in enhancing the Madurese's involvement in interinsular, if not international, communication. Such wider involvements of many Madurese seem to have introduced them to the carriers of Islamic beliefs in the port towns of the Malacca Strait and the Java Sea. Although we do not have unequivocal evidence to confirm this, such a development would not be surprising since the Madurese have been migrants and traders to many areas throughout the archipelago (Pires 1944:I, 227-8; cf. Meilink-Roelofs 1962:110-1). There is no theory to suggest that such a pattern took place only after the Islamization of the Madurese. The encounters of the Madurese with Islamic figures thus occurred not only in the island ports but also in the already Islamized enclaves of the port towns in the Java Sea. Such personal contacts, and at a later stage the study and practice of Islam had been in process for decades before the Islamization of Madura took place. Islamization occurred concomitantly with the active participation of many court figures during the second half of the sixteenth century and after, during which time European powers also appeared on the scene.

Interestingly enough, in contrast to what happened in Java, the two waves of conversion did not create a duality of understanding and absorption of Islam into Madurese tradition and vice versa. This does not mean that Islamization in the island, as we suggest above, was complete and perfect. In Madura, with only few exceptions, all spiritual leaders and practitioners claim Islam, more or less, as the basis of their exercises. This is so despite the clear impact of indigenous tradition in their deeds and sayings. The Javanese variant of non-santri traditions never emerged in the

island overtly and individually, let alone philosophically, as an independent layer of thought. Indeed, Islam was perceived by the Madurese so as not to create an imbalance even if one used certain indigenous references for his actions. As said above the most pervasive, and finally the paradigmatic pattern, of many non-Islamic practices in Madura is the presence and power of *se areksa* in the villagers' world.

Palace and Islamization


Although we cannot trace with clarity and conviction the early contacts between the Madurese and Islam, because of the lack of evidence and information, the Islamization process which occurred in the shadow of the *ratos'* conversion is better understood. The responses of the Madurese nobility to the growing number of followers and the influence of Islam in their territories were unanimously positive. The major principalities in the island such as Sumenep, Pamekasan, Pemadekan and Arosbaya were commended for the way they accepted and propagated Islam. Interestingly the cause of their conversion was contacts with the famous, semi-mythical teachers and saints in the late Majapahit period such as Sunan Ampel, Kudus Giri as well as with the Demak court. While there is some exaggeration and anachronism in the accounts aimed at establishing closer relations with great individuals, a process of Islamization in Madura supported by palace figures is undeniable. We know that the decline of Majapahit, the powerful Indic Javanese kingdom in the Java Sea area, was accompanied by the emergence of petty, mostly Islamized, rulers in the coastal towns of Gersik, Tuban, Japara, Demak, Cirebon and Banten (see Meilink-Roelofs 1962; Pigeaud and de Graaf 1974; and Kahane 1984). Madura, which had been loosely attached to the East Javanese courts, fell prey to these emerging principalities which depended on interinsular trade. In addition, its geographical location made cooperation with these newly emerging powers economically sound. As early as the first quarter of the sixteenth century when Majapahit still governed, the Demak ruler, if we can accept the stories (Werdisastro 1914), was able to send his representatives as agents under the sultan's son to East Madura. Marriages with Madurese nobility and aristocracy were then a common practice. A daughter of the last Demak sultan, for instance, was married to

the prince of Pemadekan in Sampang (MS-Bagandan 47a; cf. Fruin-Mess 1920 II, 19, 22-3). In view of the almost complete absence of protracted wars between the Madurese princes and the Demak rulers, the sending of agents to Sumenep by the sultan could not have been an isolated incident. It must have been agreed to on the basis of mutual trust and cooperation. Although we may surmise certain economic and political expediences in this development, the acceptance of Islam by some Madurese might have played an important role in establishing a foundation for negotiation and further relations. When a number of the Madurese, nobles and commoners, had accepted Islam and become its vigorous propagators, and the state had provided an atmosphere of support, the stage was set for a new phase. Furthermore, the prestige acquired by those traders who were able to benefit socially and economically from visits to the Islamized coastal towns on the northern coast of Java was a strong stimulant for others in the island to know more about their backgrounds. The downfall of Majapahit thus only added to the smoothness of the on-going process of Islamization and the improvement of Madurese external relations.

Because of its "inland" and backwater position Pamekasan had different experiences *vis-à-vis* foreign ideologies, powers and religions from those of neighboring principalities such as Sumenep and Arosbaya. Despite the coming of individual preachers from other islands, especially following the Islamization period, Pamekasan adopted the already refined Islam mainly from its neighboring teachers. Abdullah, one of these neighboring teachers, migrated to the area called Teja when the court was still maintaining Siwaltic-Buddhist symbols and rituals. Because of his affiliation with the village, he was popularly known as Modin Teja (religious teacher of Teja, literally, leader of the rainbow). His migration itself is worth analyzing. According to our stories (MS-Raba; MS-Bagandan; cf. Zaenalfattah 1951), he belonged to a branch of the old Sumenep nobility who lost power to the newly emerging Demak dynasty in East Madura (see Figure 1.1). This is an indication that the introduction of Islam into the Sumenep court caused a dynastic dislocation, but it seems that no one overtly clung to the Indic Javanese tradition as a rallying point to stave off the new trend.

Nevertheless, as we shall see shortly, the dislocated dynasty succeeded in making a comeback to the throne. The Modin apparently was popular among the villagers in the surrounding area, however, he did not succeed in attracting any attention of the court. This task was pursued by his son or *santri* (disciple) who later married the Modin's daughter.⁵ The Modin was an example of a real preacher and teacher in Madura. Although at the present time no one in the village continues to maintain his traditional pondok, the ruins of the building are there, local inhabitants continue to trace their descent from him, and legends and stories about him are very much alive.

Figure 1.1: The Nobility of Sumenep and Pamekasan Principalities



⁵ Our sources and stories give two different versions about the origin of this important teacher (Bujuk Raba or Kyai Raba).

The Modin was more popular for his religio-societal activities than for the teaching of Islam per se. He was apparently able to improve a small irrigation project for the neighboring fields by channeling the water of the village river. He also succeeded indirectly in introducing Islam to the population. The nature of his teaching was probably, in the light of the present-day Islam in the villages, rather rustic and eclectic. Only later under his "son" Abdurrahman did a more systematic teaching of Islam take place. As a man of religion with a growing popularity, the Modin wanted his son to be better educated in Islam. Abdurrahman was sent to a popular teacher (*guru*) in Sampang, probably a relative of the Pemadekan ruler. The existence of such an education center at this early period should not be taken to connote a well-developed pondok system (see MS-Raba). Nonetheless, the nucleus of such an institution in the form of a langgar might have been present, as can be observed today among novice first-generation ulama in their new locations. Upon the completion of his studies, Abdurrahman did not stay with his parents in Teja, but made contact with a wider population. Such a tendency is common among santri-graduates from pondoks. His close acquaintance with and knowledge of the society, in addition to his religious training, were important assets for his contact with the Pamekasan court, an endeavor in which his father had failed.

The rato was impressed by Abdurrahman's success in improving agricultural productivity in the southern part of his territory. From this example, it is obvious that indirect non-religious methods were again instrumental in attracting the audience or "acceptors," to use Nicholson's term. Following the initial meeting, as I shall elaborate below, further communications and better relationships were established between the rato and the kyai (Abdurrahman). But the latter continued to stay away from the court. When the kyai's santris grew in number, the rato who had overtly professed Islam provided the kyai with aid to renovate his langgar, and possibly also to build a bucolic pondok in the new location, Raba (MS-Raba). The rato's acceptance of Islam, the foundation of a better education center as well as the growing popularity of Kyai Raba (Abdurrahman) made the process of popular and more systematic Islamization

faster and more successful. Benefiting from his contact with the court, Kyai Raba was able to utilize much of the state apparatus to propagate his faith. His recurrent presence at the palace joined him to a wider network of communication with various segments of the population as represented by the courtiers and local leaders. Moreover, the senior santris of Kyai Raba were sent out either to their homes or to new locations to start organizing religious centers (MS-Raba). Although the theory of "using Islam as a rallying point to oppose foreign powers" might be useful, as suggested by Wertheim and others, for interpreting an aspect of the coastal rulers' acceptance of Islam, it does not apply to Pamekasan, and similar places which lay in the backwaters of trade and geo-political involvement. The main factors, I propose, were the growing and pressing Islamized atmosphere in the surrounding principalities as well as the greater expectations and prospects which the new arrangements posed for them. This does mean, however, that Pamekasan had not been able to pursue its own inter-insular relations via Branta, for example, in the south. Indeed, traffic in such coastal areas existed, but it was not as extensive as along the east and west flanks of the island (cf. van Goor 1978).

Islamic teaching during this period was informal and multi-faceted. At the lowest village level the carriers of Islam, using the traditional channels of kinship ties, local figures and agriculture-oriented activities, were able to establish a network of communication. Since these preachers were not an exclusive self-supporting group but rather individuals who, while pursuing a better life, taught religion, most of their activities were casual and indirect. When some villagers or members of a *tanean lanjang* (extended compound) did accept Islam, intensive instruction on the basic tenets of the religion was conducted. Although a general framework of Islamic doctrine was introduced, this level was mainly concerned with the direct practices of Islam such as pronouncing the *syahadat* (unicity of God and prophethood of Muhammad), daily ritual prayers, reading the Qur'an and others. This instruction was certainly central in providing these villagers with new attributes and a new identity.⁶ At a higher level

⁶ In addition, the author of MS-Raba mentions that the santris of Kyai Raba were

the ulama such as Kyai Raba formed supravillage centers for instruction and communication. We should not expect, however, that these figures were especially venerated or that their institutions were held in particularly high respect. Indeed, their identification with local people and institutions was the main factor in the tranquil and successful process of Islamization in the area. These ulama made themselves available for villagers and other visitors. On the other hand, they organized sessions on religious instruction. The participants in these programs came mostly from among young men who were sent by their respective families who were in need of local instructors in religious teachings and functionaries for the performance of rituals. When these villagers-becoming-santris felt that they had sufficient knowledge of Islam and had secured the *barakah* (blessing) of the kyai, most of them returned home to re-organize local religious instruction. Others who were regarded as highly intelligent and skillful were given special assignments by their kyai. For example, Bungso, who showed dedication and ingenuity, was ordered by Kyai Raba to establish a pondok in Batuampar, Sumenep (MS-Raba 20a-20b, Werdisastro 1914:120-1).⁷

The rato's acceptance of Islam and his close relations with the ulama contributed considerably to the acceleration of the on-going Islamization. The recurrent meetings (*seban*) between the rato and his agents in the palace were an effective means for the rato to relate his religious experiences, even if this was manipulated in order to gain more prestige in terms of magical powers. When the rato was regarded as the personification and guardian of God's power on earth, the authentic *se areksa* (cf. Nicholson 1965; Murtono 1968; Ricklefs 1974), such contacts helped indirectly to popularize Islam among wider audiences. This development undoubtedly provided a favorable psychological ground for further conversion.

The specific interest of the rato in Islam was manifested in his appointment of

required to wear sarongs and jackets of particular design (MS-Raba:19a).

⁷ It is important to note that both in Pamekasan and in Sumenep the name of Batuampar is associated with important Islamic centers. Throughout our discussion, unless specified, Batuampar specifically refers to Batuampar of Pamekasan.

pangolos (religious functionaries) in the court (MS-Raba, Werdisastro 1914). Although such a position was possibly influenced by the Demak or Malay bureaucratic model, and although the latter could be also traced to the idea of the *qādī* (judge), or *muftī* (official juris consult) in the caliphal court, local factors should not be ignored. Primarily because of the image enjoyed by these religious figures even before their assignment to the pangolo post, during this period pangolos represented the highest and most prestigious religious position among the population. Yet the office itself did not connote legitimacy and authority. It was the person who held the position who determined the nature of the prestige. Since the rato was careful in benefiting from and checking the emerging religious leaders, most of the pangolos were either members of the ruling family or popular religious figures. On the other hand, the routinization of the office and the excessive power of the rato at times caused the degradation of the office, particularly in later periods, by the appointment of incapable men (see Werdisastro 1914). The religious figures were not very influential in the shaping of the rato's general policy. But because of their official position they had resources and power to conduct many of the religious activities, using the state machinery and funds. Furthermore, the religious figures might at times provide forces for the rato's campaigns, as can be seen in the participation of Pangolo Seding Bulengan of Bagandan in the campaigns of Adikara IV against Kek Lesap in 1750 (MS-Bagandan, cf. Zaenalfattah 1951:59-60). Again, Kyai Padussan, Nyai Raba and Bindara Bungso in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries contributed armies for the Sumenep rato in order to defend the principality from Balinese attacks (MS-Raba 22a; Werdisastro 1914:79-91). From these examples it is possible to conclude that the ratos wanted to legitimize their fighting under the name of religion. For the participation of religious leaders in such fighting seems to have been a central theme throughout the stories. Moreover, the marriage of Kyai Bungso's son (Bindara Saot), an emerging religious figure, with the princess of Sumenep was an example of the prestige enjoyed by the ulama grouping of the period, particularly if we consider that he was enthroned as a rato in 1752 (Werdisastro 1914:122-4; Zaenalfattah 1951:63-9). The fact that his lineage was traced to the old Sumenep nobility should not imply the

peripheral role of his religious background in bringing him to power.

Religious figures, especially indigenous ulama, during the rato's rule did not yet possess characteristics very distinct from those of the local leaders. It is true that scriptural Islam was introduced, but most of its teachings were concerned with simple rituals, excessive rewards and legendary stories of the great heroes and Sufis. In addition, those who had opportunity to learn were quite few, not only because of the lack of instruction but also because the materials were scarce. The materials which have survived, as can be seen in Bagandan, were edited or copied mostly by local scholars in Arabic. At the court, the pangolo was not an independent figure who could exercise power to change the traditional court lifeways, even though some glaring aspects that contradicted Islamic tenets were, as far as possible, avoided. The ceremonies held at the Sumenep court following the death of Pangeran Lor I were a clear example of this tendency. The pangolo at the time led the ceremonies for forty consecutive days after the burial (Werdisastro 1914:72). At the village level, several ulama who had built isolated settlements and wards were able to found "an Islamic family" of santris and their own kin. However, being in the minority the religious figures in general were subordinate to local culture and social structure, especially since they were interested in attracting followers. The success of Modin Teja, Kyai Raba and Kyai Batuampar, for example, in gathering santris and attracting visitors was due mainly to their local concerns and orientation. As their stories tell us, these men were more social workers than religious preachers (for details see below). This does not mean, however, that they neglected Islamic teaching; rather it was conveyed gradually and indirectly.

Villages under the rato. bases of local Islam

If we accept that Islamization at the popular level was accelerated by the ratos' conversion, the question then may arise about the capacity in which the ratos conducted this activity. To explain this a treatment of the village organization under the rato's rule is necessary. The rato was a total ruler. He possessed in theory whatever existed in his territory. In Pamekasan, village land, and lands generally were divided into

three major divisions. *percaton*, *daleman* and *perdikan*.

Although in theory all land belonged to the rato, *de facto* he possessed only the most productive land. The rato of Pamekasan, for example, claimed all sawah land (wet rice field) in the Teja area in his own name. Without providing whatsoever for the cultivation he demanded that one third of the crops be submitted to the palace (Vleuten 1873 21-2, cf. Werdisastro 1914 133-6, Kuntowijoyo 1980 139). Such land was called the daleman. As in other villages a klebun (headman) was appointed to the daleman village. He was responsible to the *mantri* (palace official) for the cultivation of the land. Moreover, in such matters as security, labor service (*kemit* or *pan-cen*) and other political matters, the klebun was responsible to the district chief (*towed* or *wedana*) (see Figure 1.2, A. Adim Djaingwitjito a, b, cf. Amir Santoso 1980 36, Kuntowijoyo 1980 131). Although daleman land was relatively productive, no palace representative higher than the klebun lived among villagers, let alone in the percaton and perdikan lands. Despite the supposedly strict control of the palace over the villages, the population were thus practically free of direct supervision. This was especially so in the inland territories because of the difficult communications. Nevertheless, the authority of the rato was strongly felt by the villagers. The rato had strong interest in the villagers' attachment to the land; for, as we shall see shortly, agriculture was the major source of the court's income.

The perdikan land was a village which had its own autonomous leadership. It was usually assigned to men of honor, religious or military figures. In Sumenep, for instance, the rato assigned such villages as Sendir, Batuampar and Brangbang to the ulama.⁸ Whether such a gesture was a political decision in order to deter the further ambitions of these influential figures, or an honest appreciation of their efforts by the rato, we are not concerned here to decide, but it is clear that the rato regarded the ulama seriously as important figures in the society. The perdikan village thus was

⁸ In Pamekasan, such perdikan land could be found, for example, in Tampojung and Sumedangan. In the nineteenth century there were 33 perdikan *desas* throughout Madura (see Kuntowijoyo 1980:338, 465).

free from external taxes, and its holder was directly accountable to the rato.

Because of difficult communications, the low productivity of cultivation and a cash shortage, the rato was heavily dependent on the "tribute-paying mode of production," to use Samir Amin's terms, if only to keep the state machinery and palace life functioning (1976:13-6, cf. Kuntowijoyo 1980:105). A large quantity of accessible and cultivable lands was assigned to the nobility and state officials, from the "prime minister" (*patih*) to the *klebun*, in lieu of salary (*percaton*). Princes and higher officials were given the full assignment of a village or cluster of villages. Part of the village products had to be delivered to the palace, but the officials still had plenty to harvest, after assigning half to the cultivators (Werdisastro 1914). Nonetheless, since the palace officials were most of the time away from their *percatons* either in the palace or somewhere else on duty, the cultivation was often sold to tax-farmers. This tendency became more intensive with the growing European influences on the island, as officials spent more money for purchasing greater varieties of imported goods. At times the *percatons* were doubly sold in advance in order to cover a debt or to fulfill pressing needs (see Vleuten, 1873:28-30; Kuntowijoyo 1980:148-50).

Nevertheless, a significant part of the land in Madura was left to be organized by the population at large (*oring dumek* or *oring kenek*), acting either as independent cultivators or as tenants. Although in theory this sounds logical, if we look at the actual situation, the population was left, as independent cultivators, only with unproductive land. In assessing the amount of land organized by the rato, we must therefore bear in mind that the rato was concerned with the then existing cultivable land, and not with frontier or unexploited land. In fact, influential figures in the society might have opened virgin or frontier land for their own benefit. This was done, for instance, by Kyai Raba when he opened up to cultivation some swampy land (*pareb-baan*) in southern Pamekasan (MS-Raba). This land was later, and is still today, regarded as among the best in the region. Yet without a strong link with the palace such land could have been subjected to the rato's classification and even to his ownership. He was the possessor of the land in any case.


Despite weakness of the rato's rule in villages, the Madurese were economically strangled by the rope of the rato's production system. The peasants and villagers generally were kept at the bottom of the social order, as was the case with many other agrarian societies. They were powerless to oppose the exploitation of their meagre resources by the rulers, and accordingly they became dependent on the latter even for occasional relief. This situation was evidenced by the recurrent shows, celebrations and feasts at the houses of high officials and princes as well as the palaces. The fact that it was the villagers who contributed most for holding such occasions perpetuated the impoverishment of the countryside. For instance, when the rato had a wedding party, his domestic aides (*palekats*) were sent to collect funds from the population. This was conducted under the cover of the rato's rights to collect bamboo (*penta perreng*), whereby each household head was required literally to deliver a log of bamboo directly to the palace. Most villagers, however, preferred to pay a certain amount of cash instead to the rato's aides. Again, such higher courtiers as princes, the patih, and head of officials could freely demand services and goods from the inhabitants of their respective percaton villages in order to hold feasts in their own homes.⁹ On the other hand, the palace also had some fun to share with the population. This can be seen in the *Sennen* game (horse riding and fencing) held once a year in the *lon-alan* (palace play ground) following the harvest season. Since the game was the monopoly of the high officials, no outsider was allowed to participate in it. At the same time, no high official was permitted to become a spectator. Indeed, the game was to be watched by the rato in his full dress, lower officials and the population at large, probably including women. (In Madura women are present at non-religious feasts or games side by side with men, as I have observed.) Those high officials who were caught among the spectators but who did not participate in the game could be fined a thousand *ketupaks* (cooked rice in specifically designed coconut leaves). As late as the middle nineteenth century such a game was held in the lon

⁹ For more examples and anecdotes of high official-villager relations, see Werdisastro 1914:135-8.

alon of Sumenep where the rato was fined and ejected from the play for his neglect of putting on the ceremonial dress (*pacara*) (Werdisastro 1914 138-9). Aside from such rare public entertainments, however, the villagers had no effective defence against the will of the rulers and officials. Thus not only had the low productivity of cultivation encouraged some of the population to pursue interinsular trade, migration and sea-faring (Zaenalfattah 1951 56), indeed the complex relationships between the rulers and the ruled had paved the way for many to desert the land.

Villages in Madura had overlapping organizational structures during the rato's rule. In terms of production a village was generally put directly under the authority of percaton holders such as princes, mantris and other bureaucrats. Politically a village was controlled by the klebun who was appointed by and responsible to the district head (towedi or wedana). These bureaucrats and aristocrats were related to the rato through the patih. The latter was the most powerful man in the palace after the rato (see Figure 1.2).

Figure 1.2. The rato, his officials and entourage



Under such conditions the villagers had a very weak chance of being able to resist any high-handed decision of the court and percaton holders, let alone of posing any serious challenge to the establishment. Yet villagers might have peacefully rejected their rulers' will simply by abandoning their land. Moreover, in view of the nature of Madura's ecosystem with its dispersed settlements, villagers hardly found effective means of communication with each other or with outsiders. Therefore in many interior areas the rato's influence was thin, and so was the chance to unite among themselves. In fact, in 1750 the unknown Kek Lesap was able to raise arms against almost all rulers in the island, even though he never established a government and was crushed within less than a year.

External relationship and the process of Islamization in Madura legends and stories

The acceptance of Islam by Madurese rulers was done partly to serve their growing ambition of enhancing their prestige internally as well as to seize new opportunities within the newly Islamized maritime principalities in the archipelago. In Sumenep where the old tradition of the Indic-Javanese world view had been absorbed by the courtiers, powers struggles did erupt between the local princes and the newcomers from the Demak family (Werdisastro 1914). Although the rato in Sumenep had been authoritative and influential among the population, as in other principalities in the island, the dislocation of the indigenous dynasty by outsiders did not, as far as we can observe, create prolonged imbalance and confusion among the villagers. Perhaps this also explains the ambivalent nature of rato-villager relationships. Indeed, later attempts were successfully made by the old nobility to regain the throne peacefully. This achievement resulted mainly from their involvement in the organization of religious teaching and social reforms, and not from their mass agitation against the ruling dynasty. The dynastic changes in Sumenep were evidently made without creating social and ideological rifts among the villagers. More important, they obeyed whoever stayed on top as a rato. If this was the case, then the rato's conversion to Islam might have had a strong impact on the similar decision by the villagers, at least on the popular level of acceptance.

Nevertheless, the outward-looking tendency of many segments of the population, as traders, sea-farers and laborers in the neighboring islands, served as the initial and primary channel of communication with the carriers of Islam in the coastal towns of the Java Sea. The role of these men in improving and maintaining the economic sphere of the Madurese principalities must have induced the rulers to take a look at them. Instead of being transcended or even strangled by these local *homines novi*, the rulers were quick to respond to the changes and prospects posed by their surroundings. In fact, the Madurese *ratos* were able to develop early relationships with the emerging power of the Muslim princes on the north coast of Java. Although this was not a novel nor an independent phenomenon since they had been closely but loosely related to the East Javanese courts, these *ratos* seem to have correctly analyzed the political, economic and religious vicissitudes in the region. Because of the outward-looking nature of the Madurese economy (cf. Schrieke 1919, Zaenalfattah 1951 170-1) as well as its natural relations with the outside world, the *ratos* were well-acquainted with the geopolitical development in the region. At a time when communication was still meagre, the role of Madurese traders, migrants and sea-farers in bringing home the developments and changes in the centers was not insignificant.

The presence of such outside figures as Sunan Padussan in the eastern part of the island by the late fifteenth or early sixteenth century was a clear example of the prospects of Islamization in the region. Following Nicholson's theory, without ignoring the presence of religious conviction and personal sacrifices, the coming of such figures as scholars and preachers to the acceptors' area must have been enhanced by material expectations whether of position, land, business or wealth. This is so especially in view of Padussan's background. His elders such as Malik Ibrahim of Gersik were traders (see Zaenalfattah 1951; Meilink-Roelofs 1962, Pigeaud and de Graaf 1974). Although we do not have contemporary historical evidence to suggest the support of the *ratos* for this migration, it is not an exaggeration to speculate, on the basis of contemporary religious and geopolitical developments as well as later rela-

tionships between the ratos and Muslim princes in the Java Sea states, that the ratos were not against or rather that they were indifferent toward the activities of Muslim teachers and traders in the ratos' territories. Besides, the political struggles among local pretenders to succeed to the throne of the aging Majapahit kingdom were a strong factor in the *laissez faire* attitude of the Madurese ratos toward the central power holders in Java. By considering and judging the prospective victors in the religio-political and economic battles, it must have become clear to them that the coastal princes had developed a new and better role for Madura in the interinsular trade. Again, it should be mentioned that the relative superficiality and elitist nature of Majapahit religious tradition in Madura made the identification of the coastal princes in the Java Sea with Islam a new source of inspiration for the Madurese, particularly the ruling groups, to express their presence in the area more autonomously.

If Sumenep, as we have just mentioned, had a story of the coming of foreign Islamic teachers as well as the dislocation of the local ruler by the Demak prince, the West (Madura proper) and Pamekasan had different stories of the ratos' contacts with the Islamic teachers. In discussing the rulers' contacts with the new religion, it should be borne in mind, that the possibility of earlier contacts by the population is undeniable, as was indeed the case with Pamekasan.

As already observed, Pamekasan has legendary semi-historical stories of conversion. One of them involves the rato and a domestic teacher, or saint if you will. The rato, Ranggasukawati (d. 1624), once had a dream. He was, however, indifferent toward its meaning and structure. But the same dream reappeared, according to the text (Werdisastro 1914:117, cf. MS-Raba'8a-12b; Zaenalfattah 1951:91-2), for seven consecutive nights.¹⁰ Because of this persistence he held a meeting among his ministers and advisors. He told them that for the last seven nights he had had the same dream.

¹⁰ It is clear that number seven has a special meaning in Islamic philosophy; in the Madurese context it perhaps also has a parallel meaning. For example, in the local divination today the seventh day of the lunar month is regarded as a propitious day for undertaking important task. Again, for seven consecutive days after the burial, feasts are held at the home of the dead. Thus historically the repetition of the rato's dreams should not be taken too seriously.

Thus it must have been a pointer to reality and affairs of the state. He saw that a wise man was meditating under the big trees in a swampy area, south of the island. An advisor interpreted the dream and related it to the drought which had befallen the region for the last few months. The rato therefore wanted his assistants to find out what the wise man expected from his contemplation. Surprisingly, during the meeting between the rato's agents and the saint, the real matter at issue was never explicitly discussed by the writer of our text. It rather reveals the wise man's origin and education (MS-Raba). He said that he did all that he had done in order to fulfill his teacher's will (*saking ngereng pakonna guru*) (Werdisastro 1914:118). When he had almost completed his study with Kyai Gunungsari of Sampang, the teacher ordered him to go southeast and take up residence (*aduko*) under the big trees in the swampy area. What is interesting in this context is the absence of direct mention of preaching of Islam or conversion, even though it is implicitly claimed that the population became active participants in religious practices following the event (MS-Raba). Indeed, the worldly affairs were seen as self expressions of human spirituality. In this case, the drought was related to the wise man's endeavor to attract the rato into the new faith. The possible reason for the absence of sufficient explanation, I think, unlike the Arosbaya stories which we shall discuss shortly, was the unnecessary coverage of the rato's pre-Islamic origin which would only create embarrassment, to say the least, among the population. More important, the Islamization of the area, supported by the rato, never encountered serious resistance.

On the other hand, in the western principality of Arosbaya (Madura proper), it was not the rato himself who had dreams of meeting a saint. According to the story, sometime in the last years of the rato's reign (d. 1531), Pratanu, the crown prince reported to his father that he had a dream whereby he saw the famous saint, Sunan Kudus,¹¹ who asked him to embrace Islam. In his response the rato commanded his prime minister (*patih*) to meet the saint in Demak territory and check on the nature

¹¹ Sunan Kudus is one of the nine mythico-historical saints (*wali songo*) who occupy a special place in the early phase of Islamization in Java (see Geertz 1968; Pigeaud and de Graaf 1974).

of his preaching and teaching. Following the meetings and discussions with Sunan Kudus, the details of which we are not told, the patih accepted Islam as his new religion. He then headed home to Madura. Going in the same way as he had come, the patih simply walked on the sea. But this time he almost drowned. He quickly left the coast to express his disappointment and protest to the saint. On his way he thought that his conversion from Siwaitic-Buddhism had endangered his magical power, as was evidenced by the inability to walk on water. He was therefore determined to repent his conversion unless he could retain his power. In response to the patih's complaint, Sunan Kudus explained to him the possibility of acquiring parallel power by practicing Islam. But the two were different in nature. Unlike in non-Islamic traditions, "... a Muslim should not force God (*pangluluh*) to provide him with such a power, but rather ask for God's mercy (*petolong*)" (Zaenalfattah 1951:134-5, cf. van den Broek 1873:249-51). To prove this, according to the story, Sunan Kudus laid a coconut calyx down on the Java Sea and asked the patih to ride on it. Without difficulty the patih used the calyx as a boat to reach Madura island. Upon his meeting with the crown prince, however, the patih was ejected from the palace, for he had converted to Islam before the crown prince did. Again, when the news reached the rato, the patih was ordered to be executed for the same reason. Nevertheless, the patih survived thanks to Pratanu's good will and his conversion to Islam.

The story with all its mythical elements demonstrates among other things the growing popularity of Islam in the area from the early decades of the sixteenth century, the resistance to it and the interest in magical power among the rulers. A syncretic tendency in religious life and a dualistic point of reference among the population were the persistent characteristics of the new religionists. Furthermore, the endurance of the rato in maintaining his original religion, despite the purported claim that he embraced Islam on his deathbed, also indicates the degree of pre-Islamic tradition in the island.

The Islamization of Madurese ratos also brought change in their relations with the Javanese courts. With the end of Majapahit supremacy and the emergence of petty

kingdoms in Java, the Demak princes, due primarily to their identification with Islam and their emphasis on the new economic and political arrangements, were able to exercise influence upon, if not to unify, the princedoms on the southern portion of the Java Sea, including the Madurese principalities. Although the ratos continued to come from the indigenous nobility and to maintain independence, with a few exceptions, they had to secure confirmation (*resto*)¹² for their rulership from whoever assumed power in the political center, including Demak, Pajang and Mataram. The continuous contacts with the sultans strengthened the process of more systematic Islamization in the island. Accordingly, many aspects as well as the style of the rato's rule were shaped on the model of the Javano-Islamic sultanate. The most important innovation in this respect was the inclusion of indigenous religious functionaries, the ulama, as already observed, in Madurese courts. Yet the Javano-Islamic court itself was, on the whole, not very far different from the former Indic-Javanese courts (see Murtono 1968).

The increasing connection of the island trade with growing coastal towns in Java made the passage from and to Madura easier and more attractive. On the religious side, this favorable condition attracted many energetic teachers and preachers to settle in Madura and conversely brought many villagers and other figures to move to Java for study and other purposes. Such tendencies can be seen in the existence of various holy graves as well as dominant religious families in the island. In Pamekasan, for example, there exist tombs and descendants of Batuampar kyais who are widely known. The family claimed descent from a famous preacher in West Java, al-Anggawi (for details see Chapter Eight). Moreover, the famous prince, Trunajaya (d. 1678) was once a santri at Giri under Sunan Prapen, and prince Bugan (d. 1700) of Sumenep was for years a student in Cirebon and later in Giri (see Werdisastro 1914:94-5; Zaenalfattah 1951:49-50).

¹² For example, Babad Songenep mentions the confirmation of the rulership of the Sumenep ratos by the sultan of "Demak" as the latter said "...bi' sengko eangkat..." and also "...bi' sengko atep teppagia ka ..." (Werdisastro 1914:72, 79, 91-2).

The presence of European powers such as the Portuguese, Spanish and later the Dutch in the archipelago increased the volume of interinsular trade and at the same time caused many local rulers, traders and shipowners to lose a considerable market and consequently profit (van Leur 1955, Meilink-Roelofs 1962). Indeed, the European scheme of trade monopoly had a strong impact on the alignment and identification of local interest groups with the growing maritime principalities in the archipelago. The naval expeditions led by the Demak rulers in 1511 against the Portuguese-dominated port of Malacca were one manifestation of local resentments. While better relationships and a *modus vivendi* were achieved during the succeeding years, the rivalry persisted. According to Tomé Pires, who visited coastal towns and ports of Java, Sumatra and Malacca during the period of 1512-1515, Madura was still 'heathen' but it must have been affected by the vicissitudes in the neighboring trade centers. Pires' report on the internal affairs of Madura cannot be taken too seriously since he himself never visited the island (see Pires 1944 I, xxvi; cf. Meilink-Roelofs 1962, Pigeaud and de Graaf 1974, Bausani 1986), still, it has value in showing the Madurese role in the interinsular trade (Pires 1944 I, 227-8). The early Islamization in Madura and developments elsewhere in the region make one thing clear. The identification of Madurese rulers in the early sixteenth century with Islam was propelled by the political and socio-economic vicissitudes in the area, themselves were partly responses to the European presence in the archipelago. Yet, as we have seen, voluntary Muslim teachers and traders had already conducted Islamization in Madura prior to the *ratos'* conversion.

The *ratos'* conversion was an important factor in the improvement of the conditions for Muslim teachers to spread the new religion. The overt acceptance of Islam as an official religion by the *rato* of Pamekasan, for instance, brought popularization and prestige to struggling teachers and preachers. As indicated in MS-Raba, Ranggasukawati's conversion paved the way to observing many Islamic practices and to taking on Islamic identity. Not surprisingly, the collection of alms is mentioned as a prime example. At this period there is nothing strange in the *zakat* (religious taxes) being

submitted to the *rato*.¹³ This is so, especially if we observe how most of the present day villagers deliver the alms. In villages the zakat is not, as Islam requires, distributed to, inter alia, the most needy and poor, it is given instead to religious leaders, *kyafs*, imams and *mak kaehs*. Although many ulama, particularly in recent years, have used such money to build schools, mosques and *pondoks*, direct offering of zakat to those who have rights to it is rarely performed. Thus, the collection of zakat by and for the *rato* might have been the pattern, especially in view of the mode of cultivation and village administration during the period. Under such conditions the religious functionaries at the palace, particularly the *pangolos*, must have benefited in terms of prestige and religious activities. Nevertheless, this tendency might have also alienated many ulama and teachers who attempted to implement the stricter doctrine of the new faith. Accordingly, they preferred to stay away from the court and organized independent institutions, *pondoks* and perhaps various socio-economic activities like manufacturing or cooperative cultivation. Such trends were made possible if we consider that the *rato*, despite his recurrent use of force, had very limited permanent manpower and resources to control the interior where communications were difficult. This is further explained as we observe today that most great *pondoks* are located upriver. Nonetheless, because of the increasing stability and equilibrium in the island within the boundaries of the three major principalities, Madura proper (Bangkalan and Sampang), Pamekasan and Sumenep, as well as the increasing influence of international (Dutch) trade and power, the island experienced rapid changes, as we shall see shortly.

¹³ The Syafi'i scholars, in fact, hold the idea that the ruler (*al-imām*) should collect the zakat but not to consume, nor even have a share in, it. Instead, he should distribute it to the prescribed segments of society. See Al-Nawawī (d. 676H/1277), *Raudlat al-Thālibin*, Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islāmī, n.d., pp. 313-4; also *Minhāj al-Thālibin*, ed. L.W.C. van den Berg, Batavia: Government Press, 1882, pp.264-5.

Chapter Two

PAMEKASAN COLONIAL IMPACT ON VILLAGES

Madura did not experience the extensive and direct impact of the Dutch presence in the archipelago until relatively late. From the very beginning of their appearance in the archipelago the Dutch focused their attention on Java for political and economic reasons. By the fourth quarter of the seventeenth century, Batavia, the present-day Jakarta, was the center of the Dutch East Indies Company, the Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC), in the East. Despite the strong opposition of the ruler of Mataram, the VOC was able to maintain its control of Batavia, later it established its hegemony over Mataram (see Schrieke 1955 61-2; Wertheim 1956 54-5; Ricklefs 1974). During the period of conflict and dynastic strife between the death of the last sultan of Demak and the emergence of Sultan Agung of Mataram (1613-1645) the rulers of Madura seem to have been autonomous. They cooperated with and paid allegiance to various coastal rulers of Java as they saw advantageous. On the other hand, Sultan Agung, who had ambitions to rule over Java and expel the Company from Batavia as well as to break its monopoly, launched campaigns against the independent coastal princes of north and east Java and Madura. In 1624 Madura was conquered after fierce battles in which the Madurese were often outnumbered (Zaenalfattah 1951:46, Schrieke 1955 59-60; Pigeaud and de Graaf 1974:177-8). Following the conquest, however, Madura was united, albeit temporarily, under the rulership of Cakraningrat I of Sampang (d.1668), who became agent of Mataram.

The Dutch East-Indies Company, Mataram and Madurese ratios: the early stage
Although at times Madura was headed by a strong, centralized ruler, each individual principality enjoyed internal autonomy. The authority of the Mataram rulers was strongly felt in Madura. This was clearly demonstrated, for example, when the sultans of Mataram leased one principality after another to the Company in the first half of the eighteenth century (Massink 1888 4-5, Zaenalfattah 1951:54; Vlekke 1959:184,

216; Schrieke 1955). Despite the increasingly intensified and improved relations between the Madurese ratos and the Company due to the latter's aggressive trade and power, the consent of the Mataram sultan was needed if only to legitimize the Company's formal entrance to the island. Nevertheless the Company had independently maneuvered to get the support of the Madurese ratos who were increasingly aware of the internal strife and weakness of the later sultans of Mataram. By the fourth quarter of the seventeenth century, it is clear that the Dutch had succeeded in securing an alliance with the ratos to interfere in Mataram domestic affairs and in the problem of succession (de Jonge 1888 VIII, 46-96, Ricklefs 1974 20, cf. Schrieke 1955 202). Such developments can be interpreted to mean that the ratos wanted to have greater autonomy from the central power. Yet the Company was not without its own ambition in the island. Nonetheless, since the Company was more concerned with monopolizing trade in the archipelago, neutralizing overlords and princes, and centralizing its activities in Batavia, a peripheral region such as Madura was left to run its own affairs. The Company demanded yearly tribute from the ratos, as well as occasional deliveries of certain commodities.

Although the Company was primarily interested in controlling Java, by the early eighteenth century East Madura (i.e. Pamekasan and Sumenep), was listed as its possession (see de Jonge 1888.VIII, 268-9; Resink 1939). This was achieved as a reward for the help the Company had provided the ambitious Pangeran Puger during the war of succession to the throne of Mataram in Pangeran Puger's attempt to succeed to his brother Amangkurat II as sultan of Mataram. The Company's interest in Madura as far as the trade monopoly was concerned was limited to sea products, salt and maritime taxes. Moreover, the policy of exacting compulsory deliveries and contingents on the ratos was generally carried out. However, in view of the low productivity of cultivation, the Company later required cash tribute only. The production of salt as early as the eighteenth century was probably supervised by the Company's officials (*opziëners*), as was the case with the coffee plantation in Priangan (cf. Vleuten 1973 67, Schrieke 1955, Vlekke 1959:198, 289; Kuntowijoyo 1980:386). Thus produc-

tion was planned with the Company's consent in terms of amount, price, labor and delivery. In this way the Company was able to have access to cheap commodities and to impose its monopoly. In addition, the take-over of the port administration in the two principalities (Kuntowijoyo 1980 154-55, 161-2) gave the Company an upper hand not only in collecting duties and taxes but also in controlling the circulation of salt and other local products and commodities. Since the Company made its presence felt only in the coastal areas where salt production and ports existed, its relations with villagers were indirect. As a result the *ratos* continued in general to enjoy internal independence. They were responsible for the collection of the yearly tribute and possibly also for the dispatching of soldiers on occasion.

The "warrior spirit" and, more important the cooperation of the Madurese made them desirable for the Company and later the colonial authorities. Many Madurese served as auxiliary forces to the small number of Dutch military personnel in the archipelago (Touwen-Bouwsma 1977, Kuntowijoyo 1980:143). In attempts to win Madurese support the Company carefully adopted both tough and compromise approaches to the rulers in the island. We saw that in East Madura the Company gained the upper hand over and the support of the *ratos* without much difficulty in the first decade of the eighteenth century. On the other hand, on Western Madura the Company had to wait until almost half a century later before it formally controlled the region, even though previously irregular but important military reinforcements for the Company were provided by the West Madurese *ratos*. This was not primarily because of the strength of the *ratos*, rather the Company seems to have avoided recourse to force as far as possible. As with other local rulers, the reward for such military support was the assignment of new territories or titles. For instance, Rato Jimat of Pamekasan was awarded in 1731 the territories of Besuki and Blambangan in East Java, and Cakraningrat II of West Madura was nominated as *Hoofd Regent* (Head Regent) of Bangwetan (eastern tip of Java) (Zaenalfattah 1951 125, 155). After the short-lived rebellion of Cakraningrat IV in 1743, the Company was able to exercise full overlordship over the whole island of Madura. More important, the succeeding *ratos*,

crowned with the title of Panembahan (a term previously limited to the Mataram sultans) by the Dutch, were loyal to the occupying powers until the very end of Dutch rule. Nearly all of them were involved in one way or another in providing auxiliary forces for the Dutch. Perhaps this loyalist tendency to an outside power was a factor, as we shall see later, that led to the emergence of the ulama as popular local leaders.

Changes in colonial policies: Dutch control over Madura during the nineteenth century

If the East-Indies Company had exercised only marginal, primarily palace-oriented, interference in the internal affairs of the Madurese principalities, the subsequent changes advocated in Batavia by such figures as Daendels, Raffles and early governors general of the post-British interregnum had only an insignificant impact on the island. Even the direct implementation of the notorious Cultuurstelsel (the enforced cultivation system) in Madura was, as I will show, short-lived. The energetic and sometimes high-handed Daendels was able in 1809 to mobilize Javanese forced labor and corvees (*kerja rodi*) to build, within less than a year, a 1000 km highway from Merak in the West to Panarukan in the eastern tip of Java (Schrieke 1957:111, Wertheim 1956:236-7). But no comparable work was ever executed in Madura. Yet in Java, for example, the end of Daendels' rule was marked by agricultural disruption and further suffering of the population (Vlekke 1959:252). If many rulers on Java's north coast became mere regents of Daendels' government, the Madurese *ratos* continued to enjoy autonomy along with their additional military rank (Schrieke 1955:212) and function until the second half of the nineteenth century. This occurred despite the fact that the Company had previously interfered in some important issues such as the succession to the throne and the award of titles. For example, upon the death of Cokroadiningrat V of West Madura in 1770, the Company installed his grandson instead of his son as the new ruler (Schrieke 1955:208). In the final analysis the favorable position enjoyed by the Madurese *ratos* was a result primarily of their important military contribution in the form of auxiliaries to supplement the military power of the Dutch in the archipelago. In addition, it should be borne in mind that the low agricultural productivity of the island, where only salt production and cattle breeding were

profitable (see Kuntowijoyo 1980), must have induced the rulers in Batavia to take advantage instead of the precious resources of services and manpower.

Nevertheless, attempts were made during the Cultuurstelsel era to introduce sugar and, to an extent, coffee and tobacco plantations to Pamekasan. The sugar plantation, fully managed by the Dutch, was conducted from 1835 on the daleman desas of Teja. The Rato, of course, received payment as rent for the land. Benefiting from the nature of the daleman land, the Dutch were able to reduce the cost of labor for sugar cultivation. An average peasant household received a wage of approximately twenty guilders a season (eighteen months), insufficient for a peasant family (see Vleuten 1873 41-5; Kuntowijoyo 1980 343-7). Yet, we are told, they were happy in comparison with their former experiences as unpaid workers (*kemit*) on the Rato's land. In view of the extensive amount of water needed in sugar-cane cultivation, Dutch planters found it hard not only to improve their own production but also to encourage villagers in growing sugar-cane. Surprisingly in the late 1860's the sugar plantation in the Pamekasan area reached 400 ha, a high figure in view of the scarcity of water. On the other hand, the introduction of coffee cultivation in Madura, especially Pamekasan, was a total failure. At the turn of this century thousands of coffee plants were introduced to different areas of the three Madurese principalities. Despite the initial good results in the western part, neither the planters nor the government ever seriously organized coffee plantations in the island. Furthermore, commercialization of the tobacco cultivation in Madura was introduced in 1861 when the Dutch planters opened the tobacco cultivation with a considerable investment in Pamekasan (see Kuntowijoyo 1980:59-64). The Madurese apparently had grown and consumed tobacco much earlier. But tobacco never became a cash crop among the population until the second half of the nineteenth century.

The subordination of the Madurese ratos as mere government officials was formally executed only gradually from 1858. Following the reorganization of the principalities in the island, many features of village life took new turns as the villagers faced the changing world in terms of production, bureaucracy, taxation and mobility.

Indeed, as early as 1804 Pamekasan was headed by an outsider, a member of the Bangkalan (West Madura) nobility, appointed by the Dutch (Zaenalfattah 1951:105) as "autonomous regent" (*zelfstandig bupati*). Yet such an appointment did not change the structure of the local bureaucracy and the system of production, including land tenure. The bureaucratic relations and, to some extent, the internal local administration undoubtedly experienced some changes to suit the requirements of the modern bureaucracy as set up by the Dutch. During this period a committee of Dutch supervisors, later called *kontroleurs*, was attached to the Pamekasan court (Vleuten 1873:67, Kuntowijoyo 1980:165-8). The rato was awarded the title of Panembahan in 1829, as a reward for his valuable military assistance to the colonial regime during the Java War (Resink 1939; Zaenalfattah 1951:106). Furthermore, the Patih, a strong figure second only to the rato, had been for some time appointed by the Dutch. In addition to his *primus inter pares* role between the rato and the courtiers, the Patih was responsible for executing the rato's decisions.

The destructuring of indigenous rule: reorganization of agricultural production. The introduction of direct rule to Pamekasan in 1858, followed by Sumenep in 1883 and Madura proper in 1885, had an enormous impact on the future of the region. The rato, then called *bupati* (regent), gradually lost all his privileges with respect to land and services. His subordinates and assistants were reduced in number and restructured. All officials, including the regent, received a fixed salary. Unemployed members of the rato's family, the princes, and the aristocrats received monthly pensions in lieu of their respective *percaton* (Massink 1888:69-70; Kuntowijoyo 1980:167-8; Leunissen 1982:21-3). Although many new posts in the administration continued to be given to the rato's men, the population at large enjoyed a new atmosphere and opportunity.

The payment of the newly created bureaucracy in cash resulted *inter alia* in a major change in the land tenure and cultivation systems. *Daleman* and *percaton* villages were abolished and assigned generally to those who lived on, or worked the land. Some of the lands which were assigned to village headmen continued to be

maintained as percaton (see Massink 1888:60, Fokkens 1903:61-2). Again, the *Barisan* (standing army) members for the following two decades preserved their rights over their percaton land, which covered almost 970 ha (see Vleuten 1873:66-7).

The impact of the land reform on the life of the villagers in Pamekasan was enormous. If in the past cultivation was not highly valued, primarily because there was not enough land to support the peasants' economic needs, acquisition of full rights over the land lured many to return to cultivation. Although in practice the new system of taxation which amounted to one fifth of the net harvest plus poll-tax (Vleuten 1873:115-6) was not substantially different from the old system of tribute deliveries, the full right to bring all of the harvest home must have been encouraging for villagers. In addition, the difficulties of gaining sufficient funds to cultivate the land and meet daily needs prior to the harvest must have perpetuated the high-handedness of the money lenders. Yet the full opportunity to work on the land induced the villagers to take advantage of the situation by planting secondary crops that provided additional income. Indeed, individual ownership of the land increased the villagers' interest in improving land use. The scarcity of water, however, has continued up to the present day to be the main factor limiting agriculture and traditional cultivations, particularly of corn and rice, in Madura.

While it is impossible to present an accurate review of the average landholding of each village household following the land reform in Pamekasan, it is interesting to study the agricultural sector of a particular village. For this purpose we may consider the village of Bettet, during the post-land reform period. This example will help us greatly to understand present-day villages throughout our discussion. This is particularly true since this discussion will depend upon data and information gathered mainly in Bettet and surrounding villages and desas. Fortunately, some limited information on Bettet shortly following the land reform is available. During the *rato's* rule Bettet was assigned to one of his officials as a percaton village. Shortly before the abolition of the percaton system Bettet became an apanage of Wira Truna (Vleuten 1873:28). Bettet was leased to a tax farmer, primarily because of Wira Truna's

position as one of the rato's guards (*oring truna*) who most of the time had to accompany the rato. During this period the number of households in the desa was no more than forty. The total of agricultural land, including sawah and tegal, reached nearly 160 *baus* (=115 ha, one bau=0,7 ha). This does not include what the villagers call the *tana banyuasrep* (low land suitable for rice cultivation during the rainy season), which later in the 1860's was opened up and reclaimed by the neighboring villagers (Vleuten 1873-72, cf. Kuntowijoyo 1980:338-9). As Vleuten tells us (1873), the villagers grew mostly rice, cassava, corn and diverse tubers. Despite the possibility of growing sugar cane in the village, as was done in neighboring Teja, the sugar planters and villagers did not even try. The river that runs through the village could not be channelled to the village sawah, even though a dam was erected. Instead, the water was utilized to support cultivation in Teja, Jalmak and other downstream villages. Under such conditions agriculture in Bettet was fully dependent on rain. As in other villages, cash crops were not commonly grown; for example tobacco was cultivated only for domestic consumption. The abolition of the apanage status of the desas, in addition to individual rights on the land, freed the villagers from most compulsory services (*pancen*) which were highly valued in view of the low productivity and difficulty of cultivation. Only village services (*desadiensten*) for the headman and village projects were maintained, but they were minor.¹⁴ The reorganization of Pamekasan during the third quarter of the last century thus increased the opportunities and widened the horizon for villagers to improve their lot.

Mobility among villagers. During the post-reorganization period villagers enjoyed more freedom of movement. This freedom was evidenced, for instance, by the reclamation of much virgin and frontier land in Pamekasan including Bettet; villagers from different desas took part in this project. Around this period a member of an old family in Teja who claimed relations to the famous Modin Teja was involved in opening this frontier. He was one of a few participants who settled and continued to live in Bettet, probably as a result of marrying a woman of the village. As a newcomer

¹⁴ In the villages these services were known as *kemit*.

with a recognized religious background he attracted neighbors, especially children, to his langgar for religious instruction. No mosque had been built in the village so that villagers had to go across the river to the town or to Teja to perform Friday prayers. Although religious figures commonly moved from place to place, as we shall discuss below, the newly created atmosphere of change following the reorganization was an important factor in intensifying this tendency.

The new opportunities created by the reorganization, however, could not fulfill the ambitions of many energetic villagers nor provide better economic prospects for some segments of the population. The surplus of man-power, the difficulty and the low productivity of cultivation in the island must have attracted the attention of many European contractors and planters in the newly developed estates in many parts of East Java (see C. Geertz 1963a; Hefner 1985; Mackie 1985). It is true that the traditional Madurese settlements in the eastern tip of Java had for decades or even centuries served as a harbor for many islanders, but the new estates with their specific arrangements (i.e. contracts of labor) enhanced the back and forth movements of the population. Since these semi-migrants left their families in the island, many of them regularly came home. Not only did these people bring home money, but they also enriched the world view of their fellow villagers. Indeed, it was a source of pride and prestige among such semi-migrants to help their fellow-villagers, especially the ulama, build religious centers, langgars, mosques or pondoks. For example, in the village of Sameran, west of Bettet, Pak Modra's langgar was built at the turn of the century mostly from contributions of village migrants to East Java. Moreover, many villagers availed themselves of developments in and news of the supravillage world.

The emergence of local ulama as religious and popular leaders

The economic surplus, albeit small, of some villagers helped the religious leaders to provide more organized and regular religious education. The abolition of various compulsory services for the rato's officials may have contributed to the improvement of domestic and local conditions in the villages since the villagers retained more time for their own work. This is true despite the fact that the poll-tax was included in the

new taxation system in lieu of these compulsory services (see Kuntowijoyo 1980:180). In spite of working on the lands during the rainy season and planting secondary crops during the dry season, as well as running small businesses, villagers still had extra hours of unexploited labor. In the past most of this energy was consumed in building and maintaining the palaces of the royal family and the high officials. After the reorganization of the rāto's rule, such energy was left unexploited, and more important, the villagers lost their confidence in and loyalty to the new régime. Therefore, a group of *homines novi* had to emerge to channel the villagers' unexploited energy, support and loyalty.

The religious figures, especially those directly involved in organizing village religion and education, seem to have won the villagers' sympathy as potential independent leaders. The ulama, as we shall elaborate shortly, had resented the continuing interference of external powers such as the East-Indies Company and the Netherlands-Indies government in the domestic domain (cf. Amir Santoso 1980 49-52). Although the ulama generally never independently raised arms, they succeeded in making themselves the covert internal critics of the unwelcome propagators of the enforced changes. The villagers thus found in the religious leaders forceful personalities and at the same time symbols of independence. Concomitant with the increasing popularity among the Southeast Asian Muslims of Middle Eastern attempts at reforming Islam during the nineteenth century (see Hourani 1970; Keddie 1972b), ulama in Madura also experienced a degree of awakening. Improved economic conditions provided a better opportunity for many villagers to perform the pilgrimage to Mecca. These returning *hajis* were to form an important social layer in the society. Although only a few of these hajis actually learned Islam more systematically, their increasing number strengthened the religious élite groups. Indeed, nineteenth century Madura witnessed the flourishing of a more systematic and literate study of Islam. Old pondoks were enlarged and renovated and new ones were built in different areas. In Pamekasan, the old pondoks of Batuampar, Banyuanyar and Sumberanyar retained their fame during this period. Moreover, these pondoks sent their junior ulama and graduates to open

new religious centers in other villages (for more details see Chapter 8). In spite of the fact that most of the pondoks were financed by and thus belonged privately to their ulama founders, their establishment had been made possible primarily because of the growing number of santris and followers who made greater material contributions. The emergence of the ulama as important local leaders thus was partly a re-channeling of local resources.

During the nineteenth century, the rato continued to enjoy popularity among the population. Many aspects of his policy and actions, however, also served, in the long run, to erode this popularity. The increasing subordination of the rato to the *kafir* (non-Muslim) power of the Dutch disappointed many religious leaders and particularly villagers. This tendency caused disillusionment with respect to their idea of the rato as an independent, exemplary and powerful leader. The villagers' view, however, was formed not only by their symbolic, abstract perception but also by their actual, down-to-earth experiences. Indeed, the rato was no longer powerful enough from their point of view to protect their interests vis-à-vis the outsiders. He became a mere tool of the colonial régime. This, however, did not entail, as history shows us, overt rejection of, let alone rebellion against, the rato. The more the population felt the increasing dependence of their ruler on the external power, as the latter became deeply involved in local affairs, the more the population looked around for others to provide leadership, in a way that satisfied their idealism, and more important, served their interests. If until the closing decade of the eighteenth century the Dutch left the royal establishment, the local bureaucracy and the production system intact and functioning, by the turn of the nineteenth century several limited changes were introduced. In conjunction with the reforms led by Napoleonic figures such as Daendels during the first decade of the century changes were introduced in the administration of justice. In Pamekasan and other principalities in the island, the rato's courts (*kraton*) were deprived of jurisdiction over criminal justice (Massink 1888:45-6, Vlekke 1959:262-3). The kraton courts should deal only with civil and religious jurisdictions, even this was amended in 1868 so that: "...the kraton courts were authorized to han-

de only civil cases among Madurese relating to disputes of below f20 [Dutch guilders]" (Kuntowijoyo 1980:134). This change directly affected the rato's image and the prestige of *pangolos* (religious officials) in the eyes of the population. Although the religious officials, whose court the Dutch called *priesterraad*, under the supervision of the rato continued to administer family law and to deal with religious affairs, this could not compensate for the loss of religious justice as perceived and advocated by the ulama. For them the administration of justice should be fully in the hand of religious leaders including the rato¹⁵ (cf. Murtono 1968). Indeed, following the 1858 reorganization of the Pamekasan regency, the Dutch Resident directly administered such offices as Attorney General, Justice, Finance and Health (Kuntowijoyo 1980:168).

The colonial policy of non-interference in strictly religious matters had not been systematically followed in most parts of the Netherlands Indies until the emergence of Snouck Hurgronje at the end of the last century. In Madura, however, especially during the nineteenth century, the non-official ulama were absolutely free to conduct their social and religious activities. Exceptions did occur, for example, when the ulama's compound in Prajjan was attacked in December 1895 by the colonial forces on the ground that the leading ulama had organized villagers to rebel against the authorities (Kuntowijoyo 1980:319-23). In fact, this incident did not follow the pattern of the colonial religious policy in the island. It seems rather to have served as a milestone and starting point of the growing popularity of the non-official ulama. As we have seen, the previous ratos in the island had enjoyed cordial relations with the prominent ulama. When the ratos became dependent on the external powers and the religious leaders were relegated to insignificance as many supposedly religious domains suffered interference, the ulama became disappointed with the establishment. On the other hand, the overt interference of the colonial authorities in the appointment of the higher local bureaucracy, including the bupati, as well as the upward orientation

¹⁵ Until the third quarter of the nineteenth century, the ratos continued to control the organization of religious justice. Although they were not personally involved in the process of adjudication, they at times became the ultimate reference for crucial decisions (Kuntowijoyo 1980:135-7).

of the new bureaucracy, created a further distance not only between the higher local officials and villagers, but also between the bureaucracy and other traditional leaders, including the ulama.

Despite the fact that colonial interference and the reorganization created better conditions for villagers, especially in terms of mobility, land-ownership, production and cultivation, the villagers could not accept the further subordination of their own leaders. If the rato was no longer able to uphold the villagers' interests and idealism, then other local figures or groups had to replace him and pursue the villagers' expectation. Although the colonial authorities did not consciously attempt to enhance the position of non-bureaucratic ulama, their reforms indirectly created a legitimacy crisis whereby this religious group greatly benefited. This does not mean, as we shall see below, that the ulama occupied the central position in the life of villagers only after the colonial reforms. They had been important local leaders in religious, spiritual and limited social matters, but the continuing decline of the rato's legitimate leadership had to be compensated, and this undoubtedly strengthened the ulama's socio-political role in society.

The new bureaucracy outward leaning

The restructuring of the rato's rule undermined the power and prestige of the royal family and the old aristocracy. It also paved the way for more direct and intensive contact between villagers and different ranks of the colonial bureaucracy. Following the reforms, many princes and members of the old aristocracy continued to serve in the newly created bureaucracy. But most of them were left idle, receiving pensions from the colonial government. If formerly they had been associated with certain villages, drawing harvest or rent, during the post-reorganization period they were cut off from such communication. Moreover, the villagers no longer expected and could not request direct favors from the courtiers in order to get assignments of land or exemption from certain taxes. Since the administration of land tenure and taxation was fully in the hands of the colonial government, villagers were to deal with the new bureaucratic system and personnel, despite the fact that the new bureaucracy

continued to be served primarily by the old figures. Again, the supposedly more rationalistic system of administration must have reduced personal relations. These developments led to the formation of more formalistic relationships between villagers and government officials at a supralocal level. Although in practice most of the villagers did not take advantage of this more open village-town relationship, many did benefit as they communicated with the newly-formed departments and offices in the town and sub/district centers. With the increasing presence of the colonial government in Madura, by the fourth quarter of the nineteenth century power dislocation did occur, as the *parjaji*¹⁶ class became the backbone of the administration, undermining the position of the old aristocracy. The heavy identification of the bureaucracy with the external power indeed deprived it, to some extent, of legitimacy in the eyes of the villagers. This bureaucratic anomaly seems to have pervaded the future relations between the Madurese and the establishment in the island, a point I shall return to below.

When the reorganization started in 1858, Pamekasan as a regency was divided administratively into three districts under the *wedanas* who were directly accountable to the regent (*bupati*) (see Vleuten 1873 3; Massink 1888:79; Kuntowijoyo 1980 133). To supervise the administration as well as to manage *ad hoc* programs the colonial government appointed European administrators (*kontroleurs*) in the regent's office. As the government became increasingly ambitious, certain offices were put directly under the authority of the Dutch resident. In Pamekasan, as in other principalities of the island, military regiments (*Barisan*) had long been established and maintained (Touwen-Bouwsma 1977; Kuntowijoyo 1980:143-7, 258-74). The regiments seem to have been originally the irregular army and guard (*oring truna*) of the *ratos*. The colonial government, like the Company in the earlier period, which had experienced and benefited from the service and vigor of the Madurese regiments started seriously to organize the *Barisan* in the period of 1858-1885.

¹⁶ This is a Madurese equivalence of Javanese *priyayi* group (the newly recruited native members of the colonial bureaucracy) (see Geertz 1960b; Seloemardjan 1962).

The Barisan was generally not needed to maintain security in the island, let alone the regency. But it was occasionally sent to other parts of the archipelago like Coa, Bali, Lombok, West Sumatra, Central Java and Aceh to quell the local rebellions. Its presence in the island, however, was an assurance of the continuing *modus vivendi* and stability. For instance, it was used to attack the pondok and ulama of Prajan as well as to crush the attempt of the Bangkalan aristocracy at assuming full power in the West Island (Zaenalfattah 1951 165-9, Kuntowijoyo 1980 233-8, 440, 448). It is interesting to mention in the context of our discussion of village life that the Barisan, particularly the rank and file members, was not directly affected by the abolition of the apanage system. After the 1858 reorganization the higher officers did receive a monthly cash salary, but the rank and file members continued to be paid mainly by the percaton land. Thus, until the last decade of the nineteenth century the members of the Barisan received their income directly from the percaton land. With the changing nature of the bupati's authority after 1858 the Barisan fell totally outside of his jurisdiction. Instead, the Barisan was directly administered and supervised by the Dutch army. Despite the fact that the average amount of land per capita held by members of the Barisan was relatively higher than that of villagers (Vleuten 1873:66-7), membership in the Barisan did not attract an overwhelming number of villagers.

The establishment of sub-district and district offices in remote areas helped to accelerate the introduction of new policies toward the villages. When colonial government officials came to reside in these new offices, they were able to make the colonial presence directly seen by the villagers. Indeed, this was a great innovation in the region where the rato's aides had formerly crowded into the capital. The diffusion of these government offices increased the effectiveness of village organization. Since villages under the klebuns were administratively managed by the sub-district chief (*camat*) who resided in the area, taxation could be effectively conducted.

The introduction of the taxation system at the same time as the abolition of

apanage holdings and certain compulsory services gave the village headmen authority to collect land taxes. Although during the rano's period the villages were organized as such into desas, the taxation system seems to have created modifications in the definition and boundaries of particular desas. There were several categories for post-land-reform desas: those that did not experience change in definition and boundaries; those which were newly created as a result of separation from the bigger old ones; those that were created by merging a couple or several smaller villages, too small from the stand point of taxation to be identified as desas; and finally those which experienced minor changes, territorial annexation or subtraction. Although territorial and natural markers generally defined the desa boundaries, many examples indicate that other factors also contributed to the definition of a desa. Whether such an arrangement was primarily connected with the aim of organizing taxation more effectively or with kinship ties is open to interpretation.

Consider Bettet and its neighboring desas as an example. To the south of the desa a river (Songe Semajit) might be a convenient marker for the boundaries with neighboring Teja. But, surprisingly, scattered households which were located on the northern bank of the river belonged to Teja, and conversely several households on the southern bank belonged to Bettet. One of many interesting phenomena was the kinship ties between those households and others across the river within a desa to which they belonged. Such a pattern also occurred along the other three cardinal boundaries of Bettet with the neighboring desas (see the map of the Bettet area). If the government did consider the effectiveness of such organization in terms of management and control as well as taxation, then it is possible to surmise that, as our ethnographic notes also corroborate, in many cases land was assigned to a limited kin group that had authority over its members and households. The leader of the family then was responsible to gather taxes or to mobilize manpower for services. Still further consequences emerged since many of the desa officials, especially the apels, came from the strong families in their respective villages (kampong). Insofar as these minor desa officials were directly appointed by the headman, they were more carefully selected,

i.e. in order to pacify opponents, to gain wider loyalty or to perpetuate certain interests. This practice was contrary to that followed in the appointment of a headman on some occasions, as the government simply sent an outsider to the village. For instance, in the closing years of the last century, the government appointed Abdullah, a resident of Pamekasan proper, to the headmanship of Bettet. Although in the long run such an outside figure would have lived as an indigenous villager, the negative impact of such an enforced headmanship continued to be felt in the villages (for details see Chapter 5).

In villages the idea that the headman was a mere tool of a hierarchical bureaucratic order was prevalent. The recognition and revision of the system for electing headmen by the end of the nineteenth century exemplified an attempt to reverse this trend (Fokkens 1903:60-2; Kern 1906:1479-80). Despite the fact that the new system aimed at a more democratic goal, village structure hardly permitted the new election system to be fully realized. As a result, in Madura and particularly in Pamekasan, until the first quarter of this century, many klebuns occupied their position by appointment or inheritance, even though token symbolic elections were probably conducted. As far as taxation was concerned, such arrangements would have better served the government. Without regard to the local conditions and interests, taxes thus were successfully collected (Vleuten 1873:115-20).

Capitalistic enterprises under the colonial aegis: sugar, tobacco and salt

Despite the low productivity of cultivation in the island, agriculture still contributed a considerable income to the government revenues. Yet the colonial administration was more interested, especially in Pamekasan and Sumenep, in controlling and maximizing salt production.

By the fourth quarter of the nineteenth century after approximately four decades of production, the forced cultivation of sugar-cane in Pamekasan was gradually abandoned. The population who formerly served the sugar factory retained the freedom to use their land for growing their own subsistence crops. Sugar-cane cultivation,

however, was to be conducted voluntarily. A few years before the government announced the end of the forced sugar cultivation in 1872, sugar-cane plantations covered 500 baus, occupying almost one tenth of the total sawah land used for padi cultivation in the entire region of Pamekasan (Vleuten 1873 24, 57, 87). Since sugar-cane cultivation dominated the most fertile, but limited, irrigated land in the region, it must have undermined local production of already hard-to-find staples. Indeed, the plantation weakened the peasant subsistence economy, demanding more labor to reclaim the land each time the year-and-half round of sugar-cane cultivation was over. Thus economic factors worked to force the government to end compulsory sugar-cane cultivation in Pamekasan; social and moral considerations were also factors.

The colonial government and the planters attempted to introduce extensive cultivation of other cash crops like tobacco, coffee, peanuts, soya beans, indigo and cotton, but apparently only tobacco and peanuts became popular. In 1870 peanuts and indigo covered a proportion of sawah land almost as great as that covered by sugar-cane. If we accept Vleuten's data (1873 51-6), it is clear that before the end of the Cultuurstelsel, a sizeable proportion of sawah land in Pamekasan experienced intensive cultivation. But as subsequent events indicated, these crops were not widely cultivated, except in the case of tobacco. Perhaps this fact might explain why the colonial régime preferred to concentrate on salt production and its monopoly. This does not mean, however, that government income from land and cultivation was insignificant. In addition, voluntary sugar cultivation evidently survived until 1924, and tobacco plantation increasingly constituted the most important cash crop in the region.

Madura, especially the eastern parts, had enjoyed for centuries the reputation of being the "salt island." Indeed, the salt industry was centered on certain areas along Madura's south coast. Salt production was left in the hands of individual farmers and other villagers. The government was able, however, to exert a monopoly over the purchase of local products as well as to control the processing of salt production. Since the production was fully dependent on the sun's heat and the absence of heavy

rain, it could be carried out only during the dry season (*nemor*) from May to October. Most salt producers, farmers and workers, therefore, had to find work somewhere during the rainy season (*namberek*). Benefiting from the relatively calm water of the strait of Madura all year long, they could go fishing as other coastal inhabitants had done. In order to gain maximum profit the government did not hesitate even to close the local salt production in certain areas. In 1870 all fields of salt production in Pamekasan, including Bänder, were closed, and did not resume production until 1881. Again, when the price was increased during the period of 1861-68 to f10.00 per *koyang* (4,350 pounds) salt was over-produced as farmers were eager to sell more. The following year the government not only reduced the price, but the production was limited and allocated (Kuntowijoyo 1980:186, 382-3). The colonial government undoubtedly amassed huge profits from the almost total monopoly of salt distribution. Although the salt industry provided employment particularly for many coastal inhabitants, the fact remains that most of the salt money went somewhere outside the island, and the industry thus contributed in only a limited way to the welfare of the Madurese, whether producers, carriers or coolies. In fact, in a sense the salt industry, albeit indigenous and old, during the colonial rule became an implanted and encapsulated commercial colony, monopolized by the Dutch. Real re-investment in the local economy, including agriculture, was almost non-existent.

Education: a dichotomy

Western style-elementary education was first introduced to the island when the government founded the Volksschool in Pamekasan in 1862. In the opening year the classes could have admitted more than sixty pupils. Because it was novel and located in the town, hardly any village children had the opportunity to enrol. Indeed, many of the pupils in the school came from diverse strata of society, but they were town dwellers. In addition, children of such higher officials as wedanas and camats who lived in the countryside were given priority to join the school.

The association of this western-style education with the colonial power with all its attributes was often perceived by many segments in Madura, as in many other

Muslim regions, as profane education. Thus many advocated avoidance of such education. Although a significant number of the population did join and benefit from the new education, the majority of the Madurese were left illiterate and even suspicious toward modern schooling. No doubt the limited access to the school, sometimes deliberate, was a primary factor that perpetuated the traditional religious leaders' suspicion toward the western-style education.

The school was attended by students whose age ranged from 11 to 22 years (Kuntowijoyo 1980:193). This was true despite the fact that the education was elementary and lasted for less than a two-year period. Its main purpose was to prepare clerk candidates in the newly created offices, public and private. Children were instructed in reading and writing both Javanese and Roman scripts, in arithmetic and in geography.

Not until the last decades of the nineteenth century could graduates pursue higher education in Java. Although the colonial government seems to have indirectly encouraged the intermingling between the children of commoners and the aristocracy through the education at the Volksschool, as the school attracted more pupils the percentage of aristocratic children at the Volksschool sharply decreased (Kuntowijoyo 1980:195). On the other hand, the government school which was initially opened only for European children gave admission to children of higher officials and princes. Accordingly, the decreasing number of higher officials' children at the Volksschool was compensated for by its increase at the European school. Until the first decade of this century no more than 900 children in Pamekasan and 2,500 children in all Madura had the opportunity to attend school. With a population of approximately 1,550,000 the literate citizens during the period formed only an insignificant percentage of the total adult population (see Kuntowijoyo 1980:82, 416). Yet this small educated group was active in filtering ideas and news of the wider world. They helped the Madurese to join many supralocal movements that emerged around the turn of this century.

Nevertheless, most of the children in the region continued to receive a traditional

religious education at the village langgar and pondok. In a sense a large number of the Madurese, in fact, enjoyed literacy in Arabic. Since a great deal of popular, non-religious literature and government publications were written either in Javanese or Roman scripts, that generation was denied access to such materials. Kuntowijoyo suggests that the langgar education had caused the delay of children's admission to the Volksschool (1980:193), but the fact is that instruction at the langgar was given at a totally different time from the Volksschool. The mak kaeh made himself available to instruct children in the evenings following the Maghrib prayers and/or in the early morning before sunrise directly after the Shubuh prayer. Instead of this duality it is better to seek the cause of the children's late admission to elementary school in the purpose of the educational system itself. Indeed, the system was created to provide modern enterprises and the state machinery with needed clerks, thus the difficulties for graduates to gain higher education.

Concomitant with the introduction of western-style education to Madura, a number of young religious scholars who had studied in Mecca while or after performing the pilgrimage (*ongga aji* or *naik haji*), returned to Madura and reorganized the instruction and the subject materials at their pesantrens. Although Pamekasan by that time did not boast a figure as popular as Kyai Khalil of Bangkalan (d. 1923), several important ulama did start providing more organized and bookish instruction on Islam. For example, Kyai Umrah Zubair of Sumberanyar (d. circa 1890) revived his father's pondok which attracted santris from different areas and even as far as Bondowoso and Panarukan in Java. Again, Kyai 'Abdul Hamid Itsbat of Banyuanyar (d. 1926) reorganized his pondok that provided instruction ranging from Qur'an recitation to the interpretation of Arabo-Islamic texts like al-Nawawī's *Minhāj al-Thālibīn* (Islamic law) and Ibn Mālik's *Alfiyah* (Arabic grammar). The ulama of those pesantrens succeeded in attracting a large number of santris, however, not because of their instruction and scholarship, but because they were reputed to possess great *barakah* which could have multi-faceted meanings such as luck, blessing and inspiration for the population (cf. Rosen 1984). Having said this, it should be borne in mind that many santris did

join a particular pondok because of the intellectual achievement of its ulama.

By the beginning of this century the polarization of education had increasingly marked the relations between the religious leaders and their santri followers on the one hand and the colonial government and their local collaborators on the other. This tendency continued until quite recently, serving to perpetuate the villagers' indifference to and at times suspicion of non-religious education. Indeed, the miscalculated impact of the enforced change often only aggravated the already volatile and uneasy communication between the "donor" and "recipient" of such change.

Modern communications and the filtering down of supralocal ideas

The improvement of the communication system between towns, and to some extent villages, in the island increased the mobility of the population. Although roads and pathways which connected the interior with the coastal towns had been laid down during the ratos' rule, interregional communication was regularly performed by sea lanes. By the end of the last century the mail roads (*postweg*) that joined the towns, especially in the southern part of the island, were completed, and in 1901 the railways started operating over a distance of 200 km between Kamal in the west and Kalianget in the east (Kuntowijoyo 1980:290-1). Being in the middle between the two, Pamekasan greatly benefited from the growth of modern transportation. Prior to the introduction of the automobile and railways, horse and beast-drawn carts (*dokar* and *cikar*) were the main vehicles in Madura. When trains, buses and other motorized vehicles were operated as public transportation between the bigger towns, traditional vehicles were marginalized, of course, but they apparently continued to serve as a means of short distance transportation for a large number of villagers. The railway network's service was established primarily to handle the salt transportation from the eastern regions to Kamal, then Java; however, it also provided some wagons for commuters at a low cost. Furthermore, easier access to Kamal, the closest point to Java, increased the volume of ferry services between Kamal and Surabaya. In response to this development several transportation companies were given permission to operate more ferries. Still, the local small boats (*praus*) formed an important

network of cross-channel transportation (Kuntowijoyo 1980:295-7). Although several points along Madura's south coast such as Branta, Kalianget, Prenduan and Talang operated bigger praus to the coastal towns in the eastern tip of Java (Oost Hoek), Kamal increasingly became the most popular transit point in the island.

The increasing mobility of the population undoubtedly created a greater and faster circulation of supravillage ideas and news among the villagers. Various factors had contributed to the awakening of the inhabitants of the Netherlands Indies around the turn of the century (see e.g. Benda 1958, Noer 1973; and Ricklefs 1981). The Madurese, particularly the town dwellers, participated in the newly created supralocal movements which originated in Java. Interestingly salt production became an important issue that involved the first organized political movement in Madura, the Sarekat Islam/SI (Islamic Union).

During the 1910's and 1920's Madura, like many other parts of the Netherlands Indies, witnessed the growing socio-economic and political activities of the newly educated generation and the religious leaders. Many changes introduced by the colonial administration, inadvertently or by design, linked Madura again with the wider world. The attempts of the SI leaders in Java to protect and pursue the social and economic interests of the indigenous population as well as to maximize the understanding of Islam struck a responsive chord among the educated, the merchants, and the religious leaders in Madura. Although certain religious questions became the theme of the SI in Madura, most of its attention was centered on social and, more particularly, on economic matters. Indeed, a number of SI leaders introduced the new understanding of Islam as advocated by the reformists through lectures and discussions. They succeeded in gaining support among members of the aristocracy, teachers and local bureaucrats. Most religious leaders, however, were indifferent or, to be more precise, uninterested in such innovation. Yet with regard to other issues like the salt monopoly, entrepreneurship and the provision of capital, the SI gained almost unanimous support from the religious leaders, merchants and dislocated nobles and teachers. During the peak of their influence the SI leaders were able to shake, albeit

temporarily, the colonial monopoly of salt. Again, they succeeded in helping a large number of indigenous entrepreneurs and merchants to run independent businesses, including coöperatives and shops (see Kuntowijoyo 1980:458-65, 475-8).

Despite the intensity and widespread nature of the SI movement, its activities like many other similar mass organizations were town-oriented. The SI movement might be symbolically identified, to use Clifford Geertz' terms, as "the curve of a social discourse" in the long journey of the Madurese town-dwellers as they came to face the twentieth century. But the SI hardly changed any of the religious structure in villages and pondoks, even though many of the latter's followers became members of the movement. In fact, the SI in Madura was a manifestation of the anxiety, disappointment and, at the same time, hope of the increasingly awakened middle class and the newly educated segment in towns. The SI in the island remained an urban phenomenon. As in other parts of the Netherlands Indies, by the 1930's the SI in Madura nearly came to oblivion, and was replaced in the political domain by nationalist parties. In addition, the East Java-based ulama organization NU (Nahdlatul Ulama), founded in 1926, succeeded, especially after the 1930's, in attracting into its fold a large number of religious leaders, santris and villagers in Madura. Although the SI continued to attract members, particularly in Pamekasan, the majority of the ulama joined the NU. This is evident, for example, in the general elections of 1955 and 1971 (see Table 7.1).

While the Madurese, like other inhabitants of the archipelago, could not fully enjoy the fruits of their newly exploited resources they indirectly and marginally participated in the newly created state enterprises and societal programs. They received better health service, modernized transportation, education and the like. By 1930 the population of Madura reached 1,953,812. In view of the yearly population increase for a period of more than fifty years at the average rate of 2.7%, we might hypothesize that the Madurese must have enjoyed a better quality of life. But various demographic studies indicate that no direct connection exists between high population increase and prosperity, even at a time when systematic birth control devices were

not known among the population. Again, our demographic knowledge of Madura prior to the twentieth century is at best not very accurate. Still, the high population increase in Madura despite the flow of outward migrants might serve to explain the improvement in health care, including vaccination, during the direct colonial rule.

Rapid political changes / a brief experience of autonomy

When the Japanese occupied Indonesia from 1942 to 1945, Pamekasan continued to serve as the center of the local military government in Madura. The Japanese military régime did not generally alter the administrative structure of the island, except that the Resident was relegated to the position of deputy to the head of the military régime (*Sucokan*), and the names of offices were nipponized. The Japanese occupation left a sad and unpleasant memory for villagers and others in the island. Crop failure, shortage of food and clothing, malnutrition and occasional epidemics all were common features in Madurese villages during the second half of the occupation. Yet, for many young men and santri at pondoks, the Japanese occupation provided an opportunity to participate in military training and to pursue social mobility. Indeed, the highest command of the local militias was assigned to a young ulama, Amin Jakfar of Pamekasan. Although the Japanese, who had claimed to liberate the country from the Dutch occupation, were generally welcomed on their arrival throughout the archipelago, including Madura, the harsh and highhanded manner of the military régime and the impoverishment of the island aroused resentment and contempt. In Pamekasan the bupati was outspoken against the many enforced policies of the military authorities. As a result, he was executed (Abdurachman 1971:61). During the occupation large numbers of villagers migrated to East Java to find better shelter, but the conditions there were not much different. In Madura, as in other parts of Indonesia, the Japanese gave religious leaders an opportunity to play a role in military and civil matters. This tendency becomes clearer if we observe that during the post-Japanese period, many religious leaders and ulama gained important positions in the bureaucracy and, more particularly, the military. But this did not restrain the military régime from carrying out a bloody attack on the ulama's compound of Gar

Tanah in Prayjan. The local ulama and kyais were suspected of organizing the villagers to resist the military occupation. This incident was a reminder of what the Dutch colonial authorities had done against the older ulama of the area (see above). Nevertheless, the Japanese authorities did not generally face any armed resistance from the Madurese.

For more than five weeks following Sukarno's proclamation of Indonesian independence in August 17, 1945, the Japanese authorities continued to hold the island. To many contemporary activists, mostly Japanese trained young militiamen, the absence of the Indonesian flag in Pamekasan during this time was an annoyance and a disappointment. It was this group which later moved to popularize the red-and-white flag and, more important, to take over leadership in the region.

Only on September 25, 1945 did the transfer of power to the local committee of the Republic of Indonesia take place. No major change was made in the administrative structure or the personnel of the local bureaucracy. The Deputy Resident was reappointed to his former position as full Resident. On the military side attempts were made to reorganize both ex-Japanese trained militias and the former Dutch-sponsored Barisan, but the leadership was entrusted to the former. Since the departure of the Japanese military régime from Indonesia was soon to be followed by the return of the Allies-Dutch forces, Madura could not establish better relations with the outside world, particularly Java. The Dutch return to Java was fiercely resisted by the population. In addition, the local leaders, especially the ulama and the military, wanted to mobilize forces against the Dutch. It is important to note in this context that the higher ulama in Madura for the first time organized an interregional meeting at which they issued a "religious sanction to fight" (*fatwa of jihad*) against the Dutch (*Pamekasan "Berjuang" '45* 1984:5). Thus when in August, 1947 the Dutch troops landed in the island, armed resistance was launched. Despite the weakness and sporadic nature of the counterattacks, the Madurese, especially those of Pamekasan, were proud of their persistence and their ability to raise arms against the mighty Dutch army for almost four months. During the resistance the pondoks, which were located mostly in the countryside,

provided important support for the Madurese forces.

Dutch re-occupation of the island was completed by the end of 1947. Negotiations were conducted between the Dutch authorities of East Java under the *Recomba* and the civil administration of the island to make Madura an autonomous state, *Negara Madura*, in the context of the planned United States of Indonesia (*Republik Indonesia Serikat*). In early 1948, following the plebiscites,¹⁷ the ex-resident was nominated as the head (*wali*) of *Negara Madura*. Nonetheless, the final agreement of December, 1949, between the Netherlands and the Indonesian government to transfer full sovereignty to the latter made the formation of such states as *Negara Madura* irrelevant. Local leaders and youth in the island thus demanded that the *Wali Negara* (Head of State) should resign and join the Republic.

Thus, from 1950 Madura became a residency, later *wilayah*, of East Java Province. Pamekasan maintained its former position as seat of the Resident, later the Deputy Governor, of Madura and at the same time the bupati of Pamekasan regency. Despite administrative changes that had occurred in Madura, particularly Pamekasan, since 1858, the villages had been left without considerable investments or serious structural reshaping. Agriculture, except for the increasing spread of tobacco cultivation, was generally stagnant. In 1950, and even to an extent today, the region does not significantly differ from what it was in the rano's era. In the following chapters I shall

¹⁷ In this plebiscite, only male villagers who were over 18 or already married had the right to participate. The participants were given three options: to accept the foundation of *Negara Madura*, to reject it or to abstain from voting. On the afternoon of January 23, 1948 the voters were to gather at the house of their respective *klebun*. Signs which consisted of plants, leaves, fruits or flowers, were erected in the voting location to indicate the three options. Voters who wanted, for example, to reject the foundation of *Negara Madura* could vote simply by standing in front of the designated sign. When each voter had located himself before a proper sign, the local plebiscite committee then counted the voters for each option. From 219,660 eligible voters who participated in the plebiscites, 199,510 supported, 9,923 rejected and 10,230 abstained from altering an opinion on the foundation of *Negara Madura* (*Republik Indonesia: Propinsi Djawa Timur* 1953:99-101; cf. Abdurachman 1971:70-1). It is interesting to observe how village leaders could be manipulated to effect the result of such plebiscites. For instance, who would dare to oppose a local leader who had already supported an option by standing in front of a given sign? Most villagers would simply have lined up behind the prominent, trusted local figures.

examine the conditions of today's villages.

PART TWO. SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF VILLAGES IN PAMEKASAN

Chapter Three

SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF MADURESE VILLAGES

Introduction. Madurese villages are multiform, and hardly two are exactly alike. Yet, villages in Pamekasan evidently possess characteristics that show Madureseness instead of, say, Javanese-, Balinese- or Taiwanese-ness. In his studies of Balinese villages, C. Geertz found that the villages were "extraordinarily diverse," he thus suggests that we "conceptualize such village structure in terms of the intersection of theoretically separable planes of social organization" (Geertz 1959:991). To put it differently a limited number of structural principles, instead of the "lowest common denominator" or "the Middletown approach," is to be developed in order to understand better the village organization. In this chapter, attempts are made to unearth these structural elements from clusters of *desas* that surround Bettet such as Teja, Bugih, Nylabu, Samatan, Sameran and Jungcangrang. Despite their proximity, Bettet and Teja, for instance, are even at first glance different in many respects. Bettet consists of many original villages, and Teja is divided into two administrative *desas*. Bettet has only recently enjoyed very limited irrigation, Teja has extensive and old irrigation. In these villages particular structural principles may be seen to generate the village organization as well as to guide if not construct social relationships among the villagers. They include residential propinquity, bilateral kinship ties, patron-client ties, religious center, social inequality, household organization, administrative and political structure, cooperative activities and voluntary groupings.

These organizational planes exist in various degrees in each of our village clusters. Village social structure is constructed from various expressions and intersections of these principles.

Some degree of variation is found in the realization of each of the structural princi-

ples that constitute a village. For example, a religious center is built in each of the villages in Bettet and the surrounding desas. But the position and scope of influence of each are differently manifested. In Bettet, due primarily to the charisma of the kyai, his mosque at the village level continues to an extent to signify and to serve unity and communication among villagers, even political rivals. This does not mean that by joining the kyai's mosque villagers forget their rivalries and differences. In fact, the mosque becomes a field of interaction and possibly also mediation. On the other hand, in Sameran, as we shall see more below, religious centers epitomize the prevailing and emerging village divisions and rivalries. There are three mosques besides a number of smaller langgars raja. Nonetheless, within its own locality at least, each mosque generates interaction and solidarity. Such variation is also applicable to the other organizational planes. Interestingly however, the variation does not create a strange, exotic if you will, totally different pattern, or as J. Potter puts it

The relative emphasis given these structural elements in different communities make for a richly textured and diverse social life, but everywhere this life is woven into similar patterns from the same strands (1976 150).

Furthermore, in our villages we observe social coalitions of villagers that do not constitute permanent social entities, even though they connote regular and purposive contact between the members. These amorphous quasi-groups are to be found for instance in the *arisan* (capital pooling)¹ groups among women, in the bullrace (*kera-pan*) party, in sports associations among youth, in cooperative labor and among regular participants in the local market. Again, other structural features such as a pondok, supralocal kyai (see below), secondary school or madrasa, cultivators' and crop producers' cooperatives, irrigation grouping and as well glaring class divisions, may be observed in an individual village, but they are peculiar only to certain localities. Each of these features thus may or may not be found in an individual village. For this reason alone it is not appropriate to claim the existence of an average or typical

¹ *Arisan* is a kind of saving and credit system whereby the members agree to put in a certain amount of money at regular intervals while the opportunity to receive credit is arranged on a rotating basis, see also below.

Madurese village. In part this is due to the fact that Madurese villages are part of larger groupings, which may have a more standard structure.

The following is a discussion of the common organizational planes that can be conceptualized as forming village structure. Attempts are also made as far as possible to illustrate the actualization of these principles in the individual village.

Settlement patterns and demography


According to the 1980 census Pamekasan regency has a population density of 693 per km², the highest among the four regencies in Madura. The regency may be classified into three demographic concentrations: the south, the center and the north. The south, where the town of Pamekasan is located, has the highest population density. The center which consists mainly of highlands has an average density, and the north with its hilly land and narrow lowland has the lowest population density. Furthermore, among the densely populated southern *kecamatan*s, Pamekasan (*Kecamatan Kota*) has the highest population density, with 2754 per km². Yet within the *Kecamatan Kota* further distinctions can be made between *kalurahans* (administrative town villages) and *desas* (administrative countryside villages). *Kalurahans*, thanks to their location within the town, have a higher population density than *desas*, as diverse employment opportunities attract more people. Better, where the bulk of information and data for this thesis were gathered, is one of these *desas*.

Unlike *kalurahans*, the *desas* generally are homogeneously ethnic Madurese,² although a small number of non-Madurese are found in some *desas*, who joined by marriage, or as traders, teachers or government employees. Residential mobility in villages is almost absent except through marriage, education (*monduk*) and government employment. Yet the villages surrounding the town have been experiencing an influx of newcomers, mostly government employees, peddlers and entrepreneurs. For

² In the town of Pamekasan there are several non-Madurese ethnic groups including a small number of Chinese and Arabs. Since the 1980 census does not specify ethnicity, we can only find the number of foreigners (*warga negara asing/WNA*) which is 127 males and 97 females.

the last few years Bettet, for instance, has witnessed the building of a real estate project of more than 50 houses in its proximity. Although its inhabitants who mostly work as government employees have not developed regular, meaningful social relationship with villagers, economic interaction is developing.

Figure 3.1: Village settlement, households and neighborhoods in Montor (1984-85)



A village in Madura especially in the hinterland ideally consists of dispersed compounds which are segregated and nucleated. They are separate from each other, but maintain a common religious center. Indeed, the majority of villages in the island approximate this model. The village plan, however, varies considerably. Some villages are ribbon settlements which form in a linear fashion alongside a pathway. In areas where the sawah land is abundant, ribbon settlements in most cases become the main feature. When the sawah land constitutes only a minor part of village land, ribbon settlements tend to be replaced by clusters of houses segregated from each

other but still alongside the footpath. In both cases villages do not form a continuous and united settlement. Some villages are built on the basis of the availability of high ground which is preferred by villagers for house building; accordingly, the compounds are discontinuous. This tendency is also common in hilly areas, which are the backbone of Madura's landscape. In some villages compounds are dispersed so as to be near the fields. The villages where I conducted my extensive fieldwork do not exactly fit these general features. Yet some of them are to be found there. Kampong Montor, for example, has less than 30 ha. of sawah land. As can be seen in Figure 3.1, the majority of houses are located along the desa pathway.

But several settlements (A, E, G and H) were set up away from the paths. Thus if a member of the compound E wants to leave his tanean for the pondok or the town market he will unavoidably passthrough the field and yard of the compound D.

Despite the physical isolation and dispersion, villagers consider that they are members of a particular village (*kampong*). For example, the quasi-religio-social gathering (*kolom* or *kamrat*) widely takes place year-round in villages. The participants in this gathering, as I will show, come from most, but not necessarily all, compounds in the village.

Villagers invariably build a religious center either a *langgar raja* (minor center), mosque (major center), *madrasah* (village religious school) or *pondok* (residential religious school) in their community. For them the presence of religious experts, as we have indicated in Chapter 1, is indispensable in making their life meaningful and secure. In a small village only a langgar raja is established. When a village is densely populated, not only are more langgars raja founded, but a mosque is erected. In a village where the population density is high and the political and social interests, not to mention religious understanding, vary sharply, several mosques can coexist. Although most villagers prefer to affiliate with the village religious center, it is not uncommon, rare though it may be, for those who live at the edge of one village to go to the center of the neighboring village. This can be done for the

sake of practicality but also for religious, social and political reasons. The building of new religious centers is critical. Under normal conditions, the sponsors have to secure an agreement (*resto*) from the ulama of the surrounding old centers, but a new center can be built arbitrarily, although it happens rarely, at least in desa-villages, for some definite religious or political goal despite protest and uproar.

Figure 3.2. Consanguineal and affinal ties of neighborhoods in Gantungan





Figure 3.3. Neighborhoods in Gantungan



The dispersed settlement in villages has a negative impact on communication and cooperation among villagers beyond close kinsmen and neighbors. Relations among neighbors in villages are close. Because of the scattered nature of village settlements, villagers are tied to clusters of neighborhoods which usually consist of several *tanean lanjangs* (clusters of households). In most cases, residential propinquity also implies claimed consanguineal or/and affinal ties. Indeed, a neighborhood is usually, but not necessarily, inhabited by bilateral kin groups. Figures 3.2 and 3.3 indicate the consanguineal and affinal ties of the neighbors in the village of Gantungan. From 22 households that form a cluster of neighborhoods only three families (nos. 20, 21 and 22) do not have kinship ties with other neighbors. Yet the wife of household no. 21 is a sibling of no. 15's wife, both outsiders. The emphasis on kinship ties at times affects the overlapping of neighborhood boundaries.

In an area where the compounds are clustered or linear the daily relations and visits are more intense. But even among dispersed settlements regular communication is maintained. Although the administrative desa, as we will see below, has to some extent augmented relations between villagers and neighbors, the most vital links in cementing ties between neighbors continue to be social, territorial and religious elements.

Neighbors and the neighborhood play an important role in the social life of villagers. Without considering kinship ties (see Figures 3.2 and 3.3) a villager will quickly respond to help neighbors in life crises like birth, serious illness, marriage and funerals. When a household prepares a big feast or builds a house neighbors voluntarily join to help the family whether they are needed or not. The cooperative tendency among neighbors can also be seen in the communal work (*yak-ngajak*) and cooperative labor-exchange (*otosan*) in which villagers engage (for more details see below).

Although with the increasing monetization of village economy labor becomes a commodity, villagers to a degree still maintain voluntary services. For example, in digging a well, installing a water pump and building a lavatory or kitchen, neighbors voluntarily participate in the work (*abanto*). In a sense these places serve the common needs of the neighborhood. In the villages, a well is not to be found in every household. Thus the well of a particular household is a meeting place for neighbors. Many villagers maintain that the building of a well is not a simple matter. The preparation, execution and utilization of well building clearly exemplify patterned social relations among neighbors. In the villages many features of social life, in fact, enhance the patterned relations among neighbors.

Relations among neighbors are also enhanced by religious activities. Each household head is almost automatically member of routine socio-religious meetings (*koloms*) (for a further discussion see Chapter 7).

The *langgar raja*³ where village children are instructed in basic religious knowledge provides a place of socialization and establishing friendship for children in the neighborhoods. Although the parents are not regular participants in the *langgar raja*, they are tied to the *mak kaeh* as they submit their children to be instructed at the time of admission; in addition, they invite or are invited by the *mak kaeh* on occasions.

In villages a neighborhood plays a relatively standard role in establishing patterned relationships among the villagers. In the town proper, of course, cultivation does not form a common occupation of the population; so that the *otosan* or *jak-ngajak* become obsolete. Some town-dwellers in Bugih and Jungcangcang still own and work land. Since they earn money as peddlers, laborers, civil servants or other salaried positions, cultivation is primarily done through sharecropping or hiring workers. Yet such socio-religious activities as *kolom* and *pengajian* (lit. reading texts) among neighbors continue to be performed. The nature of the relationships among town-neighbors is less intense than among village-people. Again, many outsiders such as civil servants,

³ For further discussion of the *langgar raja* see below, Chapter 8.

professionals and teachers who reside in the town neighborhoods are generally indifferent to local religious gatherings, even though formal neighborhood associations (*rukun tetangga*) may be activated.

On the other hand, villagers in Bettet, Teja, Samatan, Sameran and Nylabu as well as segments of villagers of Bugih and Jungcangcang practically follow the patterned relations among neighbors.

Productive activities

The majority of the Madurese population subsists on agriculture, although fishery, salt production and interisular trade are also important economic activities. In addition, fruit and tobacco cultivations are important sources of income in several parts of the island (de Jonge 1984). Animal husbandry is also widespread and contributes considerably to the Madurese economy. Large industries have not arisen in Madura, even though extensive oil surveys are conducted and the building of a cement factory is underway. Home- and small-scale industries like *batik*, handicrafts, the production of tiles, bricks and boats are found in some places. Due, mainly to the shortage of water in large parts of the island, rice can be cultivated only once a year and with a low level of productivity generally on rain-dependent *sawahs* which consist of less than 15 per cent of the total agricultural land in Madura. Accordingly, the majority of the Madurese depend for their diet, in addition to rice, on other staples like maize, cassava, various tubers and nuts which are primarily grown on the *tegal* (higher, dry lands surrounding compounds). The average landholding is small, and the yield is not sufficient to supply the daily needs of the peasant family. Moreover, the high fragmentation of land excludes many villagers from renting and sharecropping. Not surprisingly, many villagers have to look for an income elsewhere as peddlers, out-migrants, wage laborers, government employees, artisans, drivers, brokers, material suppliers and breeders, even though they may maintain an agricultural interest. Wage laborers have only casual assignments in the villages. The work is primarily connected with rice cultivation, tobacco cultivation and processing, house building and renovation. Women contribute significantly to the family economy whether in

cultivation or by petty trading, as well as by selling their labor to wealthier neighbors.

The Madurese who have been famous for migration continue to enrich the multi-ethnic formation of many other towns, cities and areas, particularly in Java. The fierce competition, higher capital provision or skill requirement in the job market undoubtedly have their impact on the quantity and type of the migrants. Still, many villagers try to find opportunity for selling their labor and providing services in cities (see Samsuri 1978, 1979). It is important to note in passing that in recent years many new outsiders other than government civil servants have come to towns in Madura as peddlers, stall owners, mechanics and traders. Thus what we may call "opportunity exchange" has taken place among job seekers.

Division of labor and specialization

Despite the overt sexual division in their social life (see below), women and men work together in the fields. In the religious sphere women occupy a position similar to that of men, on a more limited scale. For example, female ulama restrict their public speeches only to women's gatherings. Women are masters and organizers of domestic life. The kitchen and the house belong to women. Men nearly become guests in their own homes. Men belong to the religious hut, the family langgar, even though they may frequently stay in the house. Men are excluded from cooking. Only on rare occasions, for instance, when one's wife is sick or absent may a man prepare meals. Men prepare firewood and provide fodder for the cattle. They are responsible for the maintenance of the house and its surroundings. Women keep the house and surroundings in order and clean. In agricultural activities, men are expected to plow and prepare the fields. Women participate in sowing seeds and transplanting plants. Women share other agricultural tasks with men. This may be explained by looking at the cultivation of rice, corn and tobacco.

When the field is ready for planting, women take the lead. During rice cultivation more women are seen than men in transplanting, tending, harvesting and at times spreading fertilizer. When the rice is harvested, men may bring the harvest home.

With the spreading use of the sickle instead of the traditional small knife (*raggapan* or *ne-ane*) for harvesting rice men are more involved in cutting rice stems. Women continue to participate in threshing and gathering the rice. During rice cultivation men are responsible for looking after the water supply for the field. This work includes attempts to bring rain water to the field. During corn cultivation women join men in placing seeds into holes and covering them with soil. Again, when the harvest time comes, women pick the corn and collect it. On the other hand, women are not involved in tobacco cultivation until the plants grow and need watering. When the time comes, women join men in watering the tobacco plants. Weeding is also shared by women. During the tobacco harvest, however, only men are involved. Comparing the tobacco harvest with other features of cultivation in which women are active, informants argued, "In the past during their menstruation period, women were prohibited to go to the tobacco field. They could inflict bad harvest." Yet the idea of uncleanness has never been applied to other forms of cultivation. In the processing of tobacco, such activities as *aleppas gaggang* (to separate the stalk from the leaf) and *agulung* (to roll the tobacco leaves for cutting), women are dominant. In production activities women contribute significant labor and cooperation.

A division of labor based on age is not clearly marked. Children are generally assigned minor jobs, especially in recent years, when most village children go to school in the morning or/and in the afternoon. When a villager reaches adolescence (*balleg*), he is expected to participate in most of the work done by adults. The villagers do not have an exact definition for an adolescent. For them as soon as a villager is thought to be able to carry out regular adult work and activities, he is entitled to be given proper training in such matters. He will continue to be treated in this fashion until he gets married. A married villager conceptually has full rights to adulthood, thus, he has opportunities to participate in various adult activities and is expected to perform diverse kinds of work. Villagers pay special respect to elders. All adult villagers, except the very old and weak, are expected to work. Traditionally this means to work the land. Indeed, almost all adult villagers in Bettet including the *kyais*, the *mak*

kaehs, the pegawais and the teachers derive part of their income directly or indirectly from agriculture as landowners, tenants, sharecroppers or laborers (cf. Table 3.4). The old villagers -i.e. 60 and over- are exempted from hard labor. They are expected to stay in the tanean. They may function as guardians for their grandchildren, help the women perform their domestic activities or exercise their skill in light handicrafts.

Table 3.1 Distribution of specialization in four villages

Specialization	Villages			
	Gantungan	Montor	Srabunan	Gar-Bata
Bricklayer	2	5	1	7
Carpenter	1	2	1	8
Peddler	4	4	3	2
Food/coffee seller	2	3	1	1
Tobacco processor	2	2		1
Religious leader	1	5	1	2
Teacher*	3	2		4
Skilled laborer	6	6	5	17
Pegawai	5	6	2	8
Retired		3		4
Pedicab driver	2	7	3	8
Car/Taxi/Truck driver		2		2
Desa official	1	1		1
Tailor	1	1		2
Stallkeeper	2	3	2	4

* Tens of teachers (ustadzes) who live in the Bettet pondok are not included since they are oriented more to their own native villages. They stay in Montor temporarily and regularly visit their parents in the village.

Many villagers have specializations, as is shown in Table 3.1, other than cultivation-oriented skills. Some of the households have more than one member who has a specialization. This phenomenon is common in Gar Bata where many housewives are skilled in cloth dyeing (*batik*), whereas their husbands become carpenters, pedicab drivers or *pegawais*. The village of Srabunan is surrounded by irrigated sawah land. Cultivation is done all year round. As a result, most of its inhabitants continue to be cultivators. The four villages are located within less than four kilometers from the town of Pamekasan. For this reason many of the inhabitants serve as pedicab drivers or secure posts at government offices as *pegawais*. Furthermore, the proximity to the town provides many villagers with opportunity to work as skilled laborers as bakers.

barbers, shopkeepers and tile makers. Each village (kampong) generally has one desa official (*apel*). The village of Srabunan, however, has not had a resident *apel* since 1977. Its present *apel* lives in the neighboring village close to the main road. Only one religious functionary (*mak kaeh*) usually exists in a small village, however, in the village of Montor there are five ulama. This is due primarily to the existence of the mosque and pondok of Bettet, which are run by two kyais (senior and junior). In addition, the girls of the village are taught separately at the *langgar bine* under a female ulama (*nyai*). Boys are instructed by the *mak kaeh* of the original *langgar raja*. The fifth ulama is a well-versed *ustadz* who attracts a number of *santris* who want to improve their knowledge of Islam. Furthermore, the existence of a pondok with a large number of resident *santris* in Montor also stimulates some villagers to operate stalls selling coffee, meals and sundries primarily for those students.

Cooperatives activities

Villagers participate in three kinds of cooperative activities: a- activities based on balanced reciprocity; b- activities based on generalized reciprocity, and c- communal work. The latter is historically identical to and in a sense a continuation of the *pan^{an} cen* required by the *rato* in order to provide public services such as opening pathways, cleaning dikes, maintaining roads and providing labor at royal feasts. If in the past the *rato* and his aides were the main coordinators of public works, in today's villages the local leaders become the initiators and mobilizers of *jak-ngajak* (communal work). The success of communal work and the high participation of the population depend primarily on the position of the initiator among the villagers. Formal leaders such as the *klebun* do not necessarily initiate, let alone guarantee, the performance of *jak ngajak*. In villages where informal leaders have a wide following, any initiative to mobilize villagers for *jak-ngajak* will not succeed without their support. In Bettet, for example, many village projects such as the road, the bridges, the *cahals*, drinking water supply and the religious centers were completed in large part through communal work. In this case the *kyai* was the mobilizer, even though the initiative for a project might have come from somewhere else. The renovation of a small bridge in

the village in 1982 will clarify the issue.

Concomitant with the government plan to hold the desa election in the Bettet area in 1983 a prospective candidate, Sonep, voluntarily sponsored the pavement of part of the village road and the renovation of a small bridge. Since Sonep had only limited funds to complete the work other means had to be found. Yet Sonep thought that he would be unable to mobilize the villagers for the work other than his core kin and neighbors. Benefiting from his close relationship with the kyai, he told the latter about his plan. The kyai supported the idea and even made some suggestions about the construction since he would provide some materials for the planned bridge. When Sonep mentioned the possibility of mobilizing the villagers in the east part of the desa to provide a work force for the project, the kyai agreed to announce the plan during the Friday prayer. The villagers enthusiastically responded to the kyai's call. The work force, which consisted of adult male members of the households, was divided into working groups of 5 to 15 people.

In large desas with segmented, scattered settlements, jak-ngajak among all the inhabitants, such as has just been described, is rare, if not impossible. With the growing tendency of the government to provide funds for several village projects, however, it becomes difficult to call upon jak-ngajak for such projects. It often, however, serves to supplement the work. Indeed, the insufficiency of public funds to maintain order and facilities in villages requires the pursuance of occasional communal works, a point to which I shall return below.

In villages a number of activities and works around the household are executed with the help of neighbors and relatives. Despite the increasing monetization of labor, villagers continue to provide help for their fellows. When a household has a feast or ceremony, neighbors and kinsmen will come to help (*abanto*) spontaneously. They do not calculate their labor nor do they expect that they will immediately receive their retribution. A general understanding, of course, exists among participants that each household may one day require the others' help. The idea that help

for others should be performed without blatant worldly expectation (*ikhlas*) seems to be more dominant among villagers than is the idea of a strict exchange of labor. In general this labor contribution (*bantoan*) is labor on small scale and is mainly related to matters around the household such as feasts, funerals, weddings and minor renovations or repairs. The only exception I noted is the labor contributed during the transplantation of tobacco plants from the nursing beds. Participants in the *bantoan* are provided with special meals, such as are usually arranged during feasts. Again, if a participant is a mother, her household members are supplied with sufficient meals during her absence. On occasions an immediate kinsman or neighbor may be seen helping a villager to cut trees or renovate a stable without a cash payment or direct exchange of labor. Although this has a cooperative aspect, the phenomenon will be discussed separately below as patron-client relationships. On the other hand, a villager from time to time overtly demands help (*nyambat*) from his kinsmen and neighbors in order, for instance, to erect or move his house. According to old informants, when they were young, villagers built their houses with the help of neighbors and kinsmen without ever calling in a wage laborer except for carpentry. At the present time, the brick foundation, the walling and the preparation of the roof frame and ridge-pole are done by professionals. Only during the actual house raising is the help of neighbors called for. In most cases the sambatan labor is performed for one day only. As in the case of bantoan labor, in the sambatan special meals are arranged for the participants.

Many agricultural works are carried out through the *otosan* (coöperative labor exchange) arrangement. It is a form of labor exchange on the basis of balanced reciprocity, in which strict accounting is maintained with respect to work that one provides or owes. Also the repayment is generally immediate. The fragmentation of land, the lack of cash, and formerly the shortage of manpower, as well as the dry cultivation that characterizes most agricultural land in villages make this labor exchange among neighbors practical and effective. When a villager cannot pay cash for the additional labor he needs to cultivate his field, he usually calls upon neighbors to

exchange labor; he will provide labor for the neighbors in their future need. The *otosan* tends to develop regularity of exchange among certain neighbors. But on occasion different neighbors are included, for the work may either require a higher number of laborers or the regular workers may be occupied with their own affairs.

Labor exchange in agriculture is appropriate only for those who own or work the land but do not have enough cash. Landless peasants are automatically excluded from the arrangement, instead they sell their labor. Although the repayment of the *otosan* labor at times is delayed for a season, it usually takes place within a single season.

It should be mentioned, however, that the *élites* of a neighborhood have more liberty than others to participate personally and regularly in the *kolom* and *jak-ngajak*, and that they are naturally excluded from the *otosan*. Villagers explain that the *élites* such as a *kyai* may not be asked to join a *kolom*. To invite a *kyai*, a special arrangement has to be made. In the case of *jak-ngajak*, the villagers never think of asking the *kyai's* direct participation in the work. He is the one who mobilizes the villagers to do public work. Again, villagers state that it would be inappropriate for such a figure to perform physical work. On the question of *otosan*, *kyais* and wealthy villagers would rather hire laborers or rent the land to sharecroppers than involve themselves in labor exchange arrangements. The *kyai* of Bettet, for instance, is not a participant in any village *kolom*, but he regularly invites villagers to the *dalem* (*kyai's* residence).⁴ Despite his wealth and erudition, Pak Puhat of Sameran, a bank clerk, is included in the neighborhood *kolom*. He, like other members in the *kolom*, shows strong interest in the occasion. Certainly village social pressure is too strong for such well-to-do villagers as a clerk not to take part in village solidarity. But despite his ownership of considerable land Pak Puhat does not participate in the *otosan*. In this respect he approximates a town-dweller.

⁴ A hypothesis can be made that being a powerful, influential figure and yet an "outsider" (that is a figure who belongs to a supravillage family, originating elsewhere) a *kyai* is not a member of the neighborhood; for further discussion of this phenomenon, see below.

Economic differentiation

The central position of land as a source of income for villagers makes it an effective yardstick to measure wealth divisions in villages. Despite the recurrent emergence of successful wealthy traders in many villages, the yardstick for wealth among villagers is land and a steady income. Yet because of the severe fragmentation of land in the villages, agriculture generally suffices only to maintain a subsistence economy or to fulfill basic need. In the villages of Montor and Gantungan, as can be seen in Table 3.2, only three household heads who own agricultural land have more than two ha. Two of them are kyais and the other is a desa official.

Table 3.2. Agricultural landholding size in two villages in Bettet as distributed into households (April-December 1984)

Size (in pengkal)*	No. of Household	%
0	29	26.1
below 2	41	37.0
2 - 4	24	21.6
4 - 6	9	8.1
6 - 12	5	4.5
12 and over	3	2.7
Total	111	100

*One hectare = six pengkals

Villagers regard land as a stable source of income, albeit a small one. The fluctuation of trade and of the labor market, of course, has a strong impact on the continuous dependence of peasants on land. Accordingly, this perpetuates the high underemployment in villages, especially since villagers continue to regard their villages as the last refuge for their failure elsewhere.

In addition, three villagers who recently purchased small plots of agricultural land were two government employees (pegawais) and a kyai. Today the pegawais, including the rank and file, enjoy a steady and a sufficient salary and ration at least by village standards. The native pegawais also maintain their interest in and rights over land, either through a sharecropping arrangement, through renting out what they own, or through direct cultivation. The interest of these pegawais in purchasing agricultural land shows the high valuation put by

villagers on agricultural investment as well as the prestige acquired through possession of agricultural land. Being recipients of a regular and sufficient salary, the pegawais are increasingly seen as *oring se nyaman odika* (individuals who live comfortably). The pegawais, however think differently, they invest their extra income to achieve immediate financial goals as well as to support their later retirement. Land is the safest and most readily available investment. Because land is the first and basic refuge for the villagers' sustenance each household attempts to secure access to cultivation, directly or indirectly (see Tables 3.3 and 3.4). Many individuals who cannot have access to cultivation either as tenants,⁵ sharecroppers or laborers, however, have to find sources of income elsewhere as artisans or wage laborers in the town. Yet the small number of villagers who depend for their income purely on agricultural labor indicates that employment in cultivation is unstable and insufficient for fulfilling the basic needs of many villagers. Moreover, many of those who secure a relatively safe subsistence level through agriculture are also finding extra employment as artisans, peddlers, seasonal entrepreneurs or pegawais.

Table 3.3 Cost of a household's basic needs per month
(couple and three children average household)*

Commodity	Price (in rupiah)
1. Rice/corn/cassava	Rp 10,000
2. Fish(juko), beans and peas	Rp 2,500
3. Oil, spices and flavors	Rp 1,000
4. Kerosene (for lighting)	Rp 1,500
Total	Rp 15,000

(Clothing, schooling, travel and selamatan expenses, and firewood are not included)

* This Table is based on the information gathered from the household members of less than 20 taneans in Gantungan through interviews, conversations and observation. Thus, it has no claim of universalism.

⁵ In 1984-1985, one-year usufruct of one pengkal sawah land (i.e. for rice and tobacco cultivations) cost approximately Rp80,000.

Table 3.4 Occupations of household heads** in two villages

Occupation	No. of household head	%
1. Landowning farmer	19	17.1
2. Landowning farmer and also has non-agricultural occupation	37	33.4
3. Landowning farmer and also agricultural laborer	26	23.4
4. Agricultural laborer***	3	2.7
5. Agricultural and non-agricultural laborer	22	19.8
6. Non-agricultural laborer	4	3.6
Total	111	100

** In this table "household head" refers to the most important provider to the household economy, irrespective of his/her actual social position within the family. Thus, for example, in a household which consists of a father and his daughter where as food seller she contributes the greatest income to the family, the daughter is here counted as the household head.

*** An agricultural laborer was paid Rp1,000 a day (six-hour work).

Excluding a small number of big landowners, most petty landowners and landless villagers enter a sharecropping arrangement. During the rice cultivation (rainy season) a smaller number of villagers has access to sharecropping. Most native landowners who own less than one hectare prefer to work the sawah land directly either through their own household labor or with wage laborers. Rice cultivation undoubtedly requires less care and labor than, for instance, tobacco cultivation. Some sharecroppers, however, have to be satisfied to work the tegal land by growing vegetables, corn, cassava or sweet potatoes. Sharecropping for rice cultivation is arranged so that labor provided by the sharecropper is equal in value to the land supplied by the landowner. The costs for fertilizer and pesticide are shared equally. In this case the harvest is evenly divided. On the other hand, during the tobacco season most villagers find a way to grow tobacco since tobacco cultivation demands intensive labor and hard work. Yet the relatively high amount of capital required for tobacco cultivation limits the ability of petty landowners to cultivate more land and also prevents some landless peasants from independently growing tobacco. Accordingly, many have to

enter sharecropping arrangements, if ever available.

In view of the fact that land provides the necessary sustenance for most villagers, big landowners have more opportunity to earn extra income than do the landless and petty landowners. In Bettet a few villagers who succeeded in pursuing an upward economic orientation are three local big landowners. The first is involved in a large tobacco cultivation in different villages, the second runs a truck and a rice mill, and the third lends money and manages a transportation service. The moderate landowners who become pegawais enjoy better housing, consume various supralocal goods, and purchase several signs of wealth like motorcycles, televisions and pressure lamps. The moderate and petty landowners who are involved in artisanal activities or tobacco processing are able to maintain the level of their sustenance more stably and to show some indications of luxury in terms of ceremonies, dress, utensils, furniture and *soguan tamoi* (coffee and a snack for visitors). Petty landowners and the landless who run stalls or cafes, drive pedicabs, peddle, raise cattle or are involved in seasonal migration are trying hard to fulfill their basic needs as well as to repay recurrent debts. Landless villagers who earn only through selling their labor and breeding animals are uncertain about their sustenance. They usually become dependents of better-off families who provide them loans in return for labor, and in certain economic crises demand help from their established kinsmen. Despite the emergence of several village individuals who have been able to accumulate capital for running businesses and the spread of government employment and profitable tobacco cultivation, village economy is still largely sustenance oriented.

Life cycle

The high value of offspring is shown in the rituals and ceremonies related to pregnancy, birth, childhood and child education. This tendency has considerably contributed to the emergence, maintenance and popularity of ritual performers particularly religious leaders.

The family gives special care to a pregnant woman. When pregnancy is known,

the family expresses its gratitude and hope by inviting relatives and neighbors to a ceremony (*nandai*). The form of gathering is not significantly different from the ordinary religious ceremony, where a local *mak kaeh* leads the prayers among the participants. During the pregnancy the husband is expected to be more devoted to his wife, to share the burden and, more important, to pray for the expected child by behaving more correctly according to the religious standard and local norms. (For example, the husband should not kill animals and he should repeatedly recite specific verses or even chapters of the Qur'an. Villagers believe that the unborn child will later reflect the emotions and behavior of his parents during pregnancy). The unborn baby is deemed to have contact with the father. A ceremony may occasionally be held as late as the last month of pregnancy. When the pregnancy reaches the seventh month, an elaborate ceremony (*pellet kandung*) is performed, usually at the full moon. The rituals and articles such as young coconut decorated with *wayang* (shadow puppet) and Maduro-Javanese characters, eggs, chickens, water and flowers derive from local and Indic-Javanese traditions. They express anxiety, hope, and concern for the health and ease of the mother and the coming child. During this ceremony the local midwife (*dukun rembi*) and elders (*oring towa* or *po-seppo*) are the leading organizers. Moreover, the family invites neighbors and relatives to perform prayers. Again, the *mak kaeh* leads the performance, including the recitation of selected chapters of the Qur'an particularly such chapters as Yūsuf and Maryam.

In villages women giving birth are aided by the *dukun rembi*. The latter begins treating her patient early in the pregnancy. She uses nearly no medical device, even though local herbal medication is provided. Her main approach is massage. In the last few years most *dukons rembi* have received some kind of training from the local government clinic (*Puskesmas*) (see Niehof 1985:253). During the delivery the husband should be present beside his wife. As soon as the baby is born, the father is required to say *adzan* (a longer summons prior to Islamic prayers) into the baby's right ear and *iqamat* (a shorter summons) into his left. Some parents independently choose the names of their children; others seek help from the ulama. The naming

ceremony for the baby is highlighted by a selamadan. For those who can afford it, a goat is slaughtered for the ceremony. This takes place on the fifth day after birth. Moreover, several selamadans on the 40th and 120th days after the birth as well as at the beginning of weaning are offered. Today most ceremonies related to pregnancy and birth are performed mainly for the first child of a family. Through these various rites, in fact, a child is introduced to the society and particularly to the religious circles, the ulama.

Growing children enjoy much freedom at home until they reach school age. At this age, children confine their play among mates, mostly siblings and cousins, in the compound. Sex division takes place as girls and boys make separate groupings and play different games. The children are left free to play from morning until afternoon, but the mother is careful that they do not miss their meals. Household members do not eat together, but children are usually given a portion for each in a group somewhere in the kitchen. The father eats at a special table. Adult women, including the mother, have their meal at their own convenience. Grown sons have a special arrangement but different from that of the father.

An important stage in the life of boys is circumcision. Villagers have no unanimous answer for the appropriate time for circumcision, but many villagers think that boys should be circumcised before they go to school or join the pengajian. Some children are circumcised soon after birth, others not until the age of twelve after they complete reading the Qur'an. Girls go through a ceremonial circumcision performed by the dukon rembi or the father. According to my informants, circumcision for a girl does not imply cutting as in the case of boys. The circumcision thus is seen as *kaanggui nepteppi sarat* (to fulfill the ritual formality). In practice the father or dukon rembi rubs the labia majora of an infant girl with a sharp tool to create minor bleeding. The circumcision of boys was formerly performed by the local *dukon sonnat* and in the last few years by a paramedic. Children whose circumcision is delayed become a source of fun and jokes among their age mates. For many families circumcision of the son is still accompanied by a feast where selamadan is offered, even

though it is becoming a popular practice that circumcision is performed privately.

The religious and general education at the langgar raja, madrasah or school widens the worldview and the network of children (for a further discussion see Chapter 10). As early as the age of five or six children, male and female, are sent to the local ulama to learn how to recite and practice rituals. The father accompanies the children who go for the first time to attend the program, as he submits them to the mak kaeh, or the bu nyai in the case of an exclusively langgar for girls, to be taught and treated as the ulama's own offspring. The mak kaeh provides instruction after the sunset and/or before the sunrise. The students vary in terms of age, from five to eighteen. During their stay in the langgar raja from the shalat Maghrib (1800) until shalat Isyak (20.00), the children not only chant, read, memorize the Qur'an, and practice rituals, but they also socialize with each other between intervals of study. In the past, as my older informants recollected, children spent the night at the langgar raja to resume learning the next morning before sunrise. With the introduction and spread of public school into villages, children are required to spend some time during the night to do their home-work and other school assignments.

In villages many children are fully occupied with education. In the morning they go to public school until noon. From two to five o'clock they join religious classes at the madrasah, then before sunset they attend the pengajian at the langgar raja for no less than two hours. Indeed, from the age of six today's children in villages are exposed to a wider variety of education and, to some extent, to diverse mates. The expectation of many parents to raise children in a way parallel to their own experiences seems to meet some difficulties. Nevertheless, primarily because of the parents' total control over resources only a few children are able to pursue their own imagination, ideas and will.

The growing boys and girls remain close to their parents, particularly their mother. Most parents want their children to be around the compound when they are not studying or to help with the family work in the field or look after the cattle. Girls are

more consistent in meeting this expectation. They remain beside the mother to care for their younger siblings or to assist her in cooking. Girls have a close relation with their mother as they chat together in the kitchen or around the compound while doing chores. Because of this close and constant communication, girls have a complete picture about their future role as a wife. Indeed, the mother is more open with her daughters than her sons about general matters that relate to marriage affairs. Growing girls continue to be close to their father, even though the latter develops a more authoritative approach to them. On the other hand, the growing sons become more and more related to their peers since they have ample time to spend outside the tanean. Sons rarely ask help directly from their father, instead they may approach their mother who either makes her own decision or delivers the message to the father. Although sons do not stay close to their mother, they are more willing and comfortable in expressing their views to her than to their father.

The relationship between parents and children persists even after death. The relation between a mother and her children continues to prosper as she becomes older and even eventually dependent on her married children. Moreover, the father modifies much of his imposing and distant relationship with his adult and married sons. They will often be seen involved in open and free discussion, as sons are no longer under pressure not to express their own view in front of their father. Even those sons who have gone away from home may return to visit their father and family regularly. The children attempt within their limits to support parents who have financial problems. Moreover, children from time to time send foods during selamadan or otherwise to their parents, especially if they live in the proximity. In villages the death of a parent creates an emotional upset which at times is greater than that caused by social or economic problems. Since most of the family properties are distributed among the offspring when they marry, the question of inheritance generally becomes irrelevant. Yet the parent is a symbol of unity and a source of guidance for the family. Although an aged villager does not automatically occupy an important position in the society, he is naturally a center of reference for the family. The funeral and post-

funeral ceremonies do not differ markedly between parents and other kin. They last from the time of death until the thousandth day, centering on the first seven days, the 40th, 100th, 354th (*naoni*) and 1000th (*nyebu*) days. The parents' grave receives more visits and prayers from their offspring than any others. This relationship persists as long as the offspring survive.

Relationships between the sexes are clearly defined. Men do not belong to the house (*bəngko*). The house is the woman's world. Children are taught to make friends with members of their own sex. This happens despite the fact that the elementary public school and the *langgar raja* practice co-education. Again, the *madrasah*, as far as possible, opens classes for a certain sex, it thus has *madrasah bine* (for girls) and *madrasah lake* (for boys) at the same level (cf. *Laporan Hasil Penelitian* 1980). To most village ceremonies and feasts, only men are invited. Women gather separately. For instance, they are involved in a marketing network as they sell agricultural products and buy daily necessities. In preparing food and meals for a big feast women call mainly on their kin and close friends and neighbors. In recent years women have been organizing their own various weekly and monthly meetings, religious, vocational and social. Furthermore, since the *kyais* who constitute exemplarity and exercise religious authority strictly practice sex division, villagers who pay homage to them are divided into men who see the *kyais* in the *langgar* or the veranda and women who enter the house (*dalem*) to meet the *nyais* (*kyai's* female household members).

Nevertheless, it should not be thought that romantic relations between men and women are unimportant. A wife helps the man to work in the field. On their way to their parents' house they travel together with or without children. Among the youth, many ceremonies, feasts and markets provide places and opportunities to develop warm and romantic relations. Although some marriages are arranged by parents when their children are very young, the youth pursue their own way of developing some kind of teenage bucolic love. They, of course, have real problems and difficulties of consummating such relations in wedding ceremonies, especially if they were

never married before. But it is indicative that romantic relations do prosper in a seemingly sex-divided society. Indeed, neighbors and friends who secure local confidence may, as informants insisted, "freely and openly communicate" with adult members of the opposite sex.

Although relationships between age groups are not rigid, the Madurese are careful in communicating with different ages. The status division among age groups, not in a sense of age sets but rather age grades can be seen, for instance, in the use of language levels. Spoken Madurese (*Cak Madura*) is divided, like Javanese, generally into four categories (see Stevens 1965). Among close equals, what may be called the standard level is used. Among equals between whom the relations have not yet been regularized and become intimate, the middle level is preferred. Between different ages, especially after maturation, and different positions, *basa alos* (refined level) is adopted (*abasa*). The greater the cleavage the more refined the language level. In the family, children communicate with their parents generally with the standard level. But it seems that the family's prospects of offering economic security to the children plays a central role in determining the qualitative relations, including language level, between them and the parents. Indeed, parents who provide their children with a better education and more capital are more respected by their offspring than those who fail to do so. In the neighborhood or village world generally, immature, mentally handicapped -only a few in the villages- or underage inhabitants are almost totally excluded from formal traditional groupings. It is true that on occasion, an underage boy is seen in the selamatan representing his father, a sort of apprenticeship, in the latter's absence. But under normal conditions formal groupings and ceremonies are attended only by adults. As far as I have observed, no particular village group is strictly based on age sets. On such occasions as sport and music, of course, nearly all members are young villagers. Yet they do not fully amount to what D. Brown calls "corporate forms" (Brown 1976:72).

The elders (*oring towa* or *po-seppo*) in Madura, as generally in Southeast Asia, earn a special position and respect. Despite the centrality of this concept, villagers have no

precise definition for the term elder. The aged villagers are, for example, accustomed to pride themselves on "having inhaled more salt" (*lebbi bannyak ngakan bujah*) that is, they have had diverse and long experience. On the other hand, an educated villager or more particularly a *kyai*, albeit young, is included among the *oring towa*. In the case of a *kyai* villagers generally avoid calling him by a teknonym,⁶ instead they use the honorific title *Bapak* and/or *Kyai* and his given name. The *kyai* never changes name, even following a pilgrimage. What is interesting in the stability of the *kyai*'s name in the context of the term elders is the relative high status of the indigenous naming system for such local elders as *kyai*. In view of the centrality of the *kyai*'s place in the villagers' religious and world views, a point to which I shall return below, the concept of elders among the Madurese seems to have evolved around the idea of guidance and protection. The age per se has no real impact on acquisition of honorific term *oring towa*. This can be seen more clearly in the casual treatment given by village youth and children to the older inhabitants who do not possess wealth, erudition, skill or piety. But this does not apply to their own family, particularly for children and grandchildren who generally have responsibility toward and respect for the elders.

Household organization

The most important social unit in the villages is the household. A household, either part of the *tanean lanjang* or a separate entity, generally consists of a couple and their children with or without grandparents. Variation certainly exists as can be seen in Table 3.5. The simple nuclear form of the household is the preferred one, and it is considered proper. Pak Jamil, for example, moved into his own parents' *tanean* to build a new house after more than ten years with his parents-in-law. Since most men ~~spend~~ the post marital period living uxorilocally, (for details see below) we observe that a considerable number of young couples temporarily join their parents. Twelve out of the thirteen extended family households are currently in this category (Table 3.5). All of the junior couples expect to set up soon their own household in the

⁶ For details on the teknonymy see below.

tanean or elsewhere, particularly if their younger siblings marry and stay with the family. Among fourteen adults who live alone, only one woman has established a totally separate household. The other thirteen are an old man and twelve old women living close to their offspring within the tanean. These twelve households include two old women without children. Moreover, some divorcees, single parents and handicapped villagers live in the household of their siblings or offspring.

Table 3.5 Household composition in three villages in Bettet in 1984

Unit	No. of Household	%
I Nuclear Families		
a. Husband and wife (with children if any, including single adult children)	51	45.9
b. One parent and children (including single adult children)	17	15.4
c. Divorcee/widow/widower (living alone)	14	12.6
Sub-Total	82	73.9
II Stem Families		
a. Husband and wife (with children, if any) and a parent of one spouse	5	4.5
b. Husband and wife (with children, if any) and other adult relative	10	9
Sub-Total	15	13.5
III Extended Families		
a. Husband and wife plus married or divorced children and grandchildren	13	11.7
b. Joint household of married siblings	1	0.9
Sub-Total	14	12.6
Total	111	100

The majority of nuclear family households are made up of young couples with their children. Only one such household has no children, as the latter have settled or migrated elsewhere. Three families out of 17 in the single-parent category live only with a daughter. All these single parent households are headed by the mother. The dominance of the mother in the single-parent category indicates, inter alia, the difficulty for a divorced woman with children to remarry and also the relatively young age of her marriage. Each household is an independent economic unit. When young

married couples set up a household, they are confident that they can manage on their own. The experience of being half dependent during the stay with their parents makes the transformation more manageable. In villages the young couples are in principle provided with land, or cattle or both. The young wife learns to run a separate kitchen a few months after the wedding. Despite their economic independence, young couples are closely tied to their immediate stem family, especially if they live in the *tanean lanjang*.

The cooperative spirit among neighbors, siblings and affines is perpetuated by the tendency among kinsmen to live close to each other. This closeness accordingly supports the recurrent performances of feasts and ceremonies among clustered households, the neighborhood. A household generally acts as a unit. In matters of sex-division activities a household is separately represented. When the children reach adolescence they start exercising a certain independence socially, as they make friends of their own choice.

The family economy is managed jointly by the husband and wife. A wife's *tana asal* (original or inherited land), however, remains in her name. All major agricultural produce and cash are kept at home under the wife's control. Conversely she cannot make any major decision on these matters without the agreement of her husband. Women earn small amounts of cash for daily needs. They collect some products in their houses, yards and elsewhere to be sold in return for small amounts of cash. When the family needs considerable cash for a feast, travel, or sending children to school or finding employment, the husband may sell goats or oxen to the market. In such a case, the woman always checks the amount of money from the sale. This is in contrast to men's indifference toward the daily management of the family economy when women earn small amounts of cash from their dealings. The strong position of the wife in the family economy can also be understood from the practice in divorce settlements. In addition to her *ban giban* or *barang asal* (her own property), the divorced woman has in theory one half share of the joint marital property (*ollena*). Although a divorcee rarely achieves this full right as the popular village concept of

harmony (*se sae*) usually takes precedence over her/his claim, she/he still enjoys a considerable share.

Personal relations within a household vary. It is widely claimed that love and harmony between spouses may develop with time. The husband is seen as guardian and teacher of the family. Since most marriages, as we will see, are arranged without a prior relationship between spouses, married couples are required to resolve their incompatibilities and differences after the wedding. Since they generally live with the bride's parents, a husband has to be careful not to show an overreaction to his wife. This limitation is an important factor that encourages the new couples, especially the husband, to establish an independent household. Because of this restricted atmosphere, the couples often discuss and argue out their differences and problems in the fields or elsewhere outside the compound. The presence of the bride's parents influences the prospect of her marriage negatively or constructively. The birth of a child to a new couple signifies a further step toward proper marriage, as the couple and their parents plan to set up a house for them. During his stay with the in-laws, the man tries to show deference toward the elders, he communicates relatively easily and closely with the younger siblings of his wife. On the other hand, the presence of a son-in-law among the family also creates certain pressures on the parents to act more correctly according to local expectations. Informants insisted that it is not proper for parents to quarrel in front of their son-in-law, otherwise their inability to control their emotions in public would bring a loss of credibility. For villagers an argument between spouses is interpreted as a weakness and a flaw on the part of husband. A proper family is one in which every participant knows his/her own role without its head, the father and husband, ever using force or words.

The conjugal bond is enhanced by the economic cooperation between spouses as well as by the high expectation and investment in their offspring. Villagers perceive children as a source of prestige and support. This is so despite the fact that they must suffer a great deal to raise a big family. Despite the inclusion of many villagers in the family planning program and the fragmentation of village land, families

continue to raise more children or at least to pay a lot of attention to them. In comparing themselves with other villagers who manage well in raising a small family, the villagers with big families often lament that too many children are burdensome, saying: "... The land in our village is highly fragmented, if we continue to have a large number of children, we don't know where they are to stay."

In a society where settlements are scattered and self-defence is thus deemed necessary, male members play a crucial role. Under normal conditions, the sons remain the bearers and protectors of the family image and prestige. The daughter also helps to maintain this expectation as she brings home a spouse. Parents are emotionally and personally closer to their daughters than to their sons. Parents generally expect one of their daughters, especially the youngest, to take care of them in their old days, this is the reason for the continuity of stem families in the villages (see Table 3.5). On the other hand, a son tends to grow more independent and distant from his parents, particularly his father, even though this does not affect their mutual trust and interdependence.


Kinship ties

The descendants of a villager's maternal and paternal grandparents form the most important kinship network. In Madura, as in many other parts of Southeast Asia, a person is tied to both maternal and paternal relatives. Thus the bilateral kinship ties among villagers include the descendants of ego's uncles and aunts and their children through both his father and mother, on both sides of the family.

Kinship terms, as can be seen in Figure 3.4, are specified for collaterals in ego's generation and the immediately ascending and descending generations. Ego's ascending generational collaterals, uncles and aunts are termed as *majadi* while his immediately descending generational collaterals are referred to as *ponakan* (nephews and nieces). These terms are used for reference. Figure 3.5 describes terms of address which establish generational, and in some cases relative seniority distinctions. For example,

ego's parents' younger siblings are called *gutteh* (uncles) and *bibbik*⁷ (aunts), whereas ego's nephews are addressed as *kacong*, similar to his own son, and nieces as *cebbing*, parallel to his daughter. For ego's generation, elder siblings are referred to and addressed as *kakak* for brothers and *embuk* for sisters, younger siblings are termed and called *alek*. Furthermore, cousins are termed by different categories depending on the relative seniority of the connecting parents. Thus, *gutteh's* and *bibbik's* offspring are termed *alek sapopo* (younger first cousin) and addressed as *alek*, whereas *obak's* (parents' older brother's) offspring are termed *kakak sapopo* and referred to as *kakak*.

Figure 3.4 Kinship terms




A villager in Madura traces his descent through both of his parents. The Madurese conceptually distinguish kinsmen into several categories (see Figure 3.6). A villager

⁷ In the town *gutteh* is substituted with *anom* and *bibbik* with *nyannya* (cf. Niehof 1985:94-5).



commonly develops affiliations and conducts activities with the core kinsmen (*bala dalem*) that include his lineals (parents, grandparents, offsprings and grandchildren) and also his most immediate collaterals such as siblings, majadis, first cousins and siblings' offspring. The close kinsmen (*bala dibik*) comprise the grandparents' siblings, first cousins' offspring, second cousins' and siblings' grandchildren. Ego maintains certain ties with the *bala dibik* less regularly than with his core kinsmen but stronger than with the peripheral kinsmen. The latter whom the villagers call *bala jauh*, *sana* or *bala kerabat* include kinsmen beyond the first two categories as far as second and third cousins (*dupopo* and *telopopo*), especially if they live in a particular residential propinquity to ego.

Figure 3.5: Addresses used among kinsmen



The solidarity among core kinsmen is strong, even though individuals may ignore the network at their own choice. Despite the tendency of villagers to be individualistic and self-dependent, they readily recognize and observe the obligations to the core kinsmen. The immediate members of one's family, of course, have stronger attachments and greater priority. But outside the family the core kindred are the next villagers from whom respect, support and cooperation are expected. He is not less attached to the kindred than to neighbors, related or unrelated, let alone to other fellow villagers in general. Frequent visiting takes place between the households of the core kinsmen, even if they live relatively far apart.

Figure 3.6: Categories of kinsmen



core kin/bala dalem



close kin/bala dibik.

The relations with one's kindred are cultivated, renewed and strengthened by visits and help primarily in life crises like funerals, major illnesses, circumcision and marriage. It is not unusual to witness an uncle sending lumber for his nephew who is building a house. When a family member dies, a messenger will be sent outside the neighborhood first to his core kinsmen. Again, on occasions when a larger labor force is needed, an individual villager will ask his immediate kinsmen for help. If he wants to rent out land -selling land is very rare at the present- the offer is presented first to his core kinsmen. It is true that in Pamekasan the *carok* has been decreasing, but in case of a quarrel or fighting it is assumed that in addition to family members the core kinsmen are expected to defend one's honor.

If territorial propinquity plays an important role in forming the neighborhood, it also measures the intensity and quality of kinship ties. Kin who are co-resident will tend to exhibit full kin relations, as "distance increases," to use Manning Nash's word, "kinship tends to decrease" (Nash 1965:66-7). Although spatial closeness does not necessarily reflect cooperation it does have sentimental relationships. Kinsmen who get along with each other or do something in common and/or who do not have outstanding property or personal quarrels, will live together or relatively close to each other.

In villages, bilateral kinship is a significant feature of social organization, and many activities are originally at least based on it. Indeed, it provides the opportunity to develop a role relationship of mutuality and intimate exchange. The system of obligation, however, does not, beyond the *tanean lanjang*, assign any fixed cluster of relations or sets of kin behaviors. The links that pervade among kinsmen are only "background for the unfolding of daily behavior and serve as a sketch, not a map, of social relations" (Nash 1965:62). The personal and other particular circumstances of each individual motivate his intensive ties with certain relatives as well as his aims of such a bond.

Marriage and post-marital residence

Marriage is central for the continuity of local social structure. Since marriage involves the recruitment of a partner to a household, it is specifically managed in order to maintain continuity, homogeneity and the status quo. Arranged marriages thus manifest the village mechanism to preserve its culture and material well-being. The various changes that impinge on villages affect the outlook of many youth toward marriage. But the fact remains that parents continue to have the decision about the prospective marriage partners of their children, particularly daughters. In villages it is not uncommon to observe that to achieve this goal parents arrange the marriage of their children when they are babies. Indeed, in their various manifestations, arranged marriages become the backbone of the marriage pattern in the region. In villages of Montor and Cantungan, only six out of 85 marriages were initiated by the spouses

themselves. Although villagers do not specifically favor cousin marriage, most marriages are contracted between relatives within a village. The ideal age for marriage varies. A man normally marries between the ages of 20 and 25. A woman is expected to start a family life earlier than 17 but no later than 22.

Table 3.6 Marriages in villages choices of spouses

Generation	Between Kinsmen	Between Non-Kinsmen	Within Village	Outside Village
Grandparents	3(42.8%)	4(57.2%)	2(28.5%)	5(71.5%)
Parents	19(52.8%)	17(47.2%)	16(44.5%)	20(55.5%)
Children	24(57.1%)	18(42.9%)	12(29.3%)	30(70.7%)
Total	46(50.9%)	39(49.1%)	30(34.1%)	55(65.9%)

Villagers believe that marriage among kinsmen brings stability. The culturally sanctioned marriage arrangement of *mapolong tolang* (lit. to gather the bones [of kinsmen]) continues to occupy the minds of villagers as they attempt to arrange marriages among their kinsmen. The villagers have several practical reasons for pursuing this idea. Marriage thus is seen as a means to preserve family property, to maintain a larger localized kin and to hold to the continuity of descent. Moreover, the parental choice of one's spouse will facilitate the burden of an individual who has difficulty in finding a mate. Marriages with non-kinsmen may also bring about further alliances. For example, Pak Munir of Montor, who was married to a woman from Propo, later married his nephew and granddaughter to his wife's relatives. Again, such affinal relations have also paved the way for his relatives and neighbors to arrange marriages with parallel individuals in the Propo area and vice versa. This case seems to be indicative that the villagers' primary goal in the marriage arrangement is to make the organization of their foreseeable future more manageable. Of course, kinsmen continue to become the priority for contracting marriages. Since the finding of a prospective spouse among kinsmen is not always easy, alternatives have to be found. In this case, the central idea of relatedness is to be compensated for with familiarity and

reasonable expectation. Indeed, through time, as Table 3.6 shows, many marriages are contracted with non-kinsmen.

Marrying within one's generation is preferred, even though endogamous marriages between ascending and descending generations are common. Thus, the villagers do not object to a marriage between a woman and her second-cousin's son (*ponakan dupopo*), or between a man and his cousin's daughter, as long as the daughter who will look after the parents in their old age does not marry a kinsman with a generational status superior to her parents.

Marriage arrangements in villages have perpetuated the stability of the family's property. The *tanean lanjang* settlement, either virilocal or uxorilocal, works effectively to keep the inheritance portions within the family's control. Among rich families, married children are provided with houses in the *tanean*. The parents spend their old age preferably with their married younger daughter in their original house (*bengko asal* or *ruma tunggu*) which will automatically belong to her following their death. Although the Islamic canon law gives a son twice the portion of a daughter, in villages the parents tend to distribute the property equally and gradually among their children. This is particularly evident for wealthy families as they are able to build a house in the *tanean* for each of their married children as well as to provide capital in the form of agricultural land, cattle and cash to all of them. On the other hand, less wealthy families have difficulties in keeping their children in the *tanean*. Not only do they lack funds to build houses for their children, but they have no means even to keep all of them around. This fact has a tremendous impact on various aspects of the lives of their married children. Since the property to be distributed is too small, the children usually assign it to siblings who remain with and take care of the parents. Many of them join their spouses or move out elsewhere to find employment and to live. It is among these families that exogamous marriage is more often to be found.

In Madura initial uxorilocality is preferred⁸ (cf. Koesnoe 1975). The newly wed villagers spend at least a certain period living with the bride's parents. The couple's economic prospects, however, have a lot to do with the continuation of this uxorilocality. Given the similarity of their economic share in the property of their respective parents, a married couple will most probably live with the wife's parents. Only after years may they expect to establish neolocality. On the other hand, sons of economically better-off families may eventually join their parents after a period of residence with their in-laws. This often takes place when the couple has had several children. The variance of the villagers' post-marital residence from the conceptual pattern, as can be seen in Table 3.7, can be explained mainly by the possibility of finding economic support with both sets of the married couples' parents. Although under normal circumstances a husband will live uxorilocally, he may eventually decide to live permanently elsewhere. Yet in the case of marriage to a youngest daughter, the husband will most probably stay permanently with the in-laws since the parents expect to spend their old age with her. Indeed, during her early socialization a youngest daughter receives a specific treatment from the parents. Accordingly, she is strongly attached to them.

Table 3.7 Post-marital residence among the inhabitants of Kampong Montor

Generation	Uxorilocal	%	Virilocal	%	Neolocal	%
Grandparents	5	71.4	2	28.6	.	.
Parents	17	47.2	14	38.9	5	13.9
Children	13	31.0	17	40.4	12	28.6
Total	35	41.2	33	38.8	17	20.0

The rate of divorce in villages is relatively low. In 1984, out of eight marriages

⁸ Nevertheless, among certain villagers, as Niehof has shown (1985), virilocality becomes the norm.

contracted in that year one ended in divorce. Nevertheless, the divorce rate in Madura during 1981-1982 (19.5% of the total number of marriages in that period) is higher than the general Indonesian (16%) or Javanese average (18%). The divorces in Madura are relatively equal to the divorce rate in East Java (20%) (see Bappeda, Kabupaten Pamekasan 1983, *Statistik Keagamaan* 1982). In most cases divorce occurs among young couples who fail to establish communication. The spouse's family, of course, may use pressure to maintain the marriage. Yet its power is limited without resort to direct sanctions such as withdrawal of financial support. Moreover, in case a bride or groom objects to the proposed marriage, the wedding party is used only to honor the betrothal arrangement initiated by the parents. Sooner or later she or he will end the marriage in divorce. Furthermore, couples who fail to bear children most probably will end with divorce, and establish new marriages. The economic difficulties which follow a husband's migration elsewhere are among factors that facilitate divorce even among couples with children. Although the Islamic canon law does not place an effective restriction on divorce, male villagers do not generally misuse their verdict of divorce. At the present time, regulations restrict divorce, a divorce is valid only if it is argued, deliberated and registered in front of the government religious officials at *Pengadilan Agama* or *KUA*. The most frequent causes of divorce, as registered at the Depag of Pamekasan in 1981-1982, are quarrels among couples and economic irresponsibility on the part of husbands.

Divorce has many different outcomes. The man generally re-marries easily. For a divorced woman who has no child, remarriage is not very problematic. Woman divorcees and widows with children seem to have a tendency to remain unmarried. The divorced women believe that to raise their children is more important than to remarry as this may create difficulties and conflict. Yet their attitude has an implicit indication that the ex-husband and the society impose certain pressures and restrictions on woman divorcees with children not to establish a new family. Divorced women and widows together with their children usually rejoin their parents or live close to their siblings within the tanean.

Polygamy has not been widely practiced. It is limited mainly to some wealthy villagers and absentee husbands. For an average villager the wife will probably seek divorce instead of letting herself become "an old wife" (*bine towa*). In Bettet at the time of my research only one villager officially had two wives. He was a migrant in Malang and occasionally returned to the village. First he married a villager who gave him four children. After his migration to Malang in the late 1960's he married a migrant Madurese in the city, while his first wife and two children have remained in the village. The relation between his two households seems to be harmonious as they visit each other and exchange children to stay in the two households. According to the Pengadilan Agama of Pamekasan, during the period of 1981-82, it issued 61 permits for villagers who wanted to practice polygyny. The government attempts to restrict polygynous marriages by requiring a permit from the court. The applicant is given an opportunity to present his reasons for polygyny. The court makes sure that his reasons are valid according to the law as well as listens to the wife's opinion on the matter. Nevertheless, this regulation seems to have little impact on individuals who want to practice polygyny secretly and unofficially through the sanction of informal leaders such as the *mak kaeh*. In Bettet, for example, a married *apel* was sued by a village woman demanding that he marry her since they had been at times living together like a married couple. The *apel* could not marry her officially without difficulties such as losing his job as a *desa* official. For this reason he married the woman religiously under the guidance of a local *mak kaeh*.

Teknonymy

The villagers in Madura use teknonymy as a means of ordering social relationships. The Madurese, unlike the Balinese, employ only a rudimentary form of teknonymy (see Geertz and Geertz 1964, 1975). The villagers give a teknonym to a couple with their first child living or dead. Once married couples have been addressed as, say, Pak Jum for the husband and Bu Jum for the wife, each will be popularly called by such a name. This teknonymy never changes even after a divorce or the death of the eponymous child. Teknonymy means many things for villagers. At one level it shows the

villagers' appreciation for fertility. Age alone does not automatically imply adulthood. Marriage is a station in the villager's achievement of adulthood, but it has to be signified by fertility, children. This is shown by the fact that childless, usually newly married, couples are not specifically invited to the neighborhood feasts (*selamadans*). Teknonymy may strengthen a marriage bond since it reflects the common reference to a child for both of the spouses. Conversely, barren couples who are automatically denied a teknonymy are threatened with a break up, as they fail to achieve the status of a proper village family.

Nevertheless, certain individuals such as *kyais*, *imams* (mosque functionaries), emerging *ustadzes* (religious scholars) and *hajis* are not called by a teknonym. Prominent ulama in Pamekasan are called by their given names. They, unlike most villagers, do not change their names even after performing the pilgrimage to Mecca, though the title *haji* is added. Besides, several ulama families adopt noble titles such as *raden* or *raden panji*. Thus the senior *kyai* of Bettet is formally called *Kyai Haji Raden Hefni*, and villagers or fellow ulama address him as *Kyai Hefni* or simply *Bapak Kyai*. The minor ulama including important *mak kaehs* and emerging religious scholars are given a religious title of *ustadz* and referred to by their given names. For example, a pondok graduate in Bettet who presently holds advanced religious classes for village adults is addressed by villagers and his *santris* alike as *Ustadz Rosyad*, despite the fact that he has four children. Furthermore, villagers who have already performed the pilgrimage are addressed by their new pilgrim name and the title of *haji*. A *klebu* in the Bettet area has a given name of *Sonep* and teknonym of *Pak Tib*. During his pilgrimage to Mecca in 1978 he got the new name of *'Abdulbari*. Since then he has been referred to as *Haji 'Abdulbari*. The wife of a *haji* who has not herself performed pilgrimage continues to be called by her teknonym. Teknonyms are a basic designation, which is replaced by any higher status designation such as Islamic titles of *kyai*, *ustadz* or *haji*. This replacement seems to have been intended first to enhance the religious leaders' position to the level of the nobles as well as to match the nobles' naming practices at the time when the religious leaders, as I will show, gradually began to gain popularity and influence among the population some fifteen

decades ago.

Patron-client relationships

Patron-client relationships form a strong social bond. In their intensity and elaborate form, the relationships may include a large segment of society. This is what L. Rosen calls "galaxy" or L. Hanks terms 'entourage and circle' (Rosen 1979 Hanks 1975). The grouping, albeit ephemeral and transient, crosscuts the other organizational planes that exist in the villages. Because of this pervasiveness the grouping at times blurs and even weakens the less sentimental social ties such as membership in local voluntary associations. Since the basis of patron-client relationships is mutuality, they need to be constantly guarded and cultivated. An individual, therefore, has full authority to pursue such a relationship if he thinks the alignment to be beneficial, he may also quit the relationship because of mere personal distaste or unprofitability. Although such relations do not always imply concrete goals, individuals who involve themselves in such personalistic and dyadic ties expect the realization of short term results or ad hoc favors. Nonetheless, it should be borne in mind that, as we shall see below, the ulama's nuclear world which is, in a sense, a manifestation of intensified dyadic asymmetrical bonds, also involves long-term investment. In providing the ulama with gifts and other contributions the villagers hope to receive instant prayers and *barakah* (blessing, luck and meaning). But they also consciously believe in the after-life reward. Be that as it may, personalistic affiliation ties require immediate proofs of mutuality, materialistic and/or spiritual, and their manifestation. It may be said that dyadic asymmetrical ties in the form of superior-subordinate or ulama-santri relations create strong relational circles of villagers that overlap the boundaries of other organizational planes of the social groupings of the Madurese.

In villages personal ties take several forms depending on the main basis of the grouping. All villagers are involved in one or several clusters of personal affiliation ties. Every energetic villager who attempts to enlarge his circle of influence must show patronage or protection for wider friendship network. Since each individual villager has his own stable affiliation ties like kinship and neighborhood, those who

promote superior-subordinate relation have to break, not in the sense of terminating but in that of sharing, these stable boundaries of ties and bonds. Each candidate for the foci of the relational circles and each initiator of such relations has to calculate his own resources and energy. A wealthy farmer may build a following by appointing his landless kinsmen or fellow villagers as share-croppers. If he is also an ulama he strengthens and widens the range of his patronage through the provision of teaching and medication. In such a case the man thus becomes the focus of several relational constellations. Let us examine how a particular villager, in this case a klebun, develops his network of relations.

Before formally occupying the headmanship of Teja, Adal had served as acting headman following his father's death in 1974. As a pondok graduate, Adal also taught at the local madrasah. He introduced more regular, organized classes into the school. He was able to do this mainly with the support of the kyai of Bettet who sent a number of the pondok santris as teachers. In addition, he recruited village santris who had studied in the pondoks to participate in organizing the madrasah. When more classes were opened and more pupils joined in, the old madrasah, including the mosque in the vicinity, could no longer accommodate the students. Without hesitation the young klebun invested his own money as preliminary capital for the renovation and enlargement of the madrasah. Realizing the klebun's efforts, the villagers took responsibility for the completion of the madrasah. By showing his religious and societal commitments, the klebun came to be seen by the villagers as protector and guide. As soon as his quasi-religious societal devotion was acknowledged, he started dispensing medication. His expertise is popularly known to be related primarily to curing illness caused by supernatural power.

Within a short period, Adal has become the center of an active relational network. In this case his headmanship only served as an element in his wide social network. He undoubtedly enjoyed formal political power, but this was not sufficient to exercise legitimate leadership in villages. Indeed, through his percaton land the klebun has been able to establish more direct dyadic relations with many villagers. The

share-croppers of this percaton become important followers in his diverse networks of personalized relations. Besides working the land, they are involved in enhancing the klebun's personal image by showing loyalty and spreading his virtues and providing him occasional services during feasts at the klebun's house. Although Adal becomes the most crowded focus and thus the most powerful figure in his locality he also serves as a mere supporter to other wider social constellations. For example, in organizing the madrasah and leading religious activities he was subordinate to the kyai of Bettet.

In personal bonds, specific features such as subordination, domination and at the same time interdependence as well as voluntariness are operative. Since the basis of such interpersonal relationships is centered on the provision of mutual service and offer, they in retrospect maintain and perpetuate mutuality. Despite the superiority of a patron he is in different ways dependent on the loyalty of his followers. In Madurese villages where individuals are proud of egalitarianism and self-reliance, such interdependence, I think, balances the solitariness and isolation of village life. Perhaps the kyai-santri relations will clarify this mutuality. By providing lodging, instruction and guidance the kyai of a pondok has an overwhelming claim over the santris. Under such conditions the santris are perpetuated into a state of indebtedness and obligation to equalize the balance. This can be achieved among other ways by making themselves available for fulfilling the kyai's demands and needs. They are in fact both subordinate to and needed by the kyai. The santris have full rights to get rid of a particular bond, if they see the existing alignment as unproductive, by joining different figures. As a result, the kyai has to be careful in exercising his dominant position. He continuously reckons the balance, cultivates and renews the indebtedness of the santris by making investments and creating dependency. An example from the 1983 desa elections in the Bettet area will clarify the issue.

Giram was a neighbor and in a religious sense superior to Jemani, who ran as a candidate for the elections. When Jemani told Giram that he wanted to run for the

headmanship, Giram was surprised but nonetheless did not discourage him. In the following weeks as other candidates emerged, Giram seems to have calculated his prospects differently by cultivating a new network of wider bonds. Although it is not clear whether Giram felt that Jemani, as a subordinate, should not be a candidate, Giram evidently supported another candidate. He did so despite the fact that in the new constellation he served as a mere follower, though an important and badly needed one. Indeed, under certain conditions when the expectation of participants in the dyadic ties comes short, they can simply quit and build a new circle either as initiator or beneficiary.

With the increasing pressure on villages, socially, demographically and economically, the presence of circles of personal and dyadic bonds becomes pervasive and intensive. Despite the strength and persistence of other stable organizational planes, the patron-client relationships crosscut these diverse boundaries. In the town such relationships and circles are more materialistic in the nature of their underlying link and base. This should not imply, however, that villagers are not aware of economic motives in pursuing personal affiliation ties. The centrality of trade and peddling, besides governmental posts, for the town-dwellers makes the provision of capital or goods and marketing vital for patronage. For example, a shopowner in the town may provide capital for villagers who want to set up a stall in the neighborhood. An interested villager usually deposits a certain percentage of the price of goods he brings home for sale. The recurrent communications between the two often develop into personalized relations as the shopkeeper delivers gifts or *leh-oleh*, for instance, at the birth of his village counterpart's child or provides all material needs at the funeral of his father. On the other hand, the village stall owner may, without request, make himself available for service when the shopkeeper holds, say, a wedding ceremony for his daughter. The dominant pattern in this relation is the cultivation of one's resources to maintain mutuality. The party that wants to be superior has to provide a better offer than does the inferior party.

Table 3.8: Voluntary associations in four villages (August-September 1984)

Groups	Villages			
	Montor (1) (2)	Barak (1) (2)	Gantungan (1) (2)	Tengah (1) (2)
1. Funeral Association (Kompolan Kepatean)	1 49	1 60	1 39	2 94
2. Hadrah (Male Musical Group)	1 17			1 24
3. Samrah (Female Musical Group)				1 25
4. Arisan	1 35		2 67	1 26
5. Samman		1 62		1 40
6. Otosan*				
7. Jak-Ngajak**				
8. Karapan	3 27	2 16		1 12
9. Pigeon Fanciers Group	3 10			4 15
10. Sport Club	2 40	1 18		1 25
11. Tobacco Cutting Group	2 6	3 10		
12. Mother and Child Care (PKK)	1 41			1 73
13. Mustami'an	1 114			1 54
14. Molodan Group	1 42	1 29	1 28	3 53
15. Kolom/Kamrat	2 50	1 29	2 34	3 58
16. Pencak Silat		1 15	1 9	

(1) number of groups

(2) membership

* and ** their distribution is unknown.

Voluntary groupings

The Madurese have various voluntary organizations. These cover different fields of interest including the social, economic and religious. Since the groupings are formed primarily to serve definite interests, they may shift and change in form as well as membership, or even dissolve as soon as the original ends are met. The organizations crosscut other existing village structural planes and perform a balancing role against them. An individual villager may become a member of more than one voluntary grouping at one time. Membership in these organizations ranges from a handful of villagers for labor-exchange groups to more than a hundred in the case of *mustami'an* (public religious lecture). Although there are tens of different voluntary groupings, in our villages they can be categorized into funeral associations, arisan groups, cooperative labor exchanges, musical groups, vocal groups, mystical gatherings, bull race groups (karapan), pigeon fanciers associations, sports clubs, tobacco processing coop-

eratives and ad hoc labor for various village projects, for religious centers and schools or for feasts or ceremonies (see Table 3.8).⁹

Let us first observe groups that overtly use religious symbols as shown in Table 3.8. The most popular and stable group is the funeral association (*kompolan kepa-
tean*) and *kolom*. A funeral group exists in almost all villages, and sometimes a neighborhood or *kolom* group has its own funeral association. Almost all household heads participate. Members contribute fees between Rp25 and Rp50 each time a relative of the members dies. The fund collected is spent to purchase a set of *kafan* (white muslin to cover the dead) and *dingding areh* (a large piece of limestone to cover the buried). In the late 1970's, a local ulama in Sameran was able to recruit 200 (sic) household heads as members in the newly established funeral organization in the *desa*. Each member was to contribute Rp100 per week. The fund would be spent to cover the financial expenses for the burial and the post-funeral ceremonies. His goal was to simplify the ceremonies and to limit expenses. Thus, if a member or his family member died, the committee of the funeral organization would take care of the managing and organization of the funeral and ceremonies. After carrying out the funerals of no more than four members the committee lost nearly 75 per cent of its members. In view of its direct interference into the core of the household rituals and affairs, the committee, as villagers explained, "...reduced the funeral of a family member into a burial of an unrecognized fellow." Other reasons such as heavy fees, distrust and rivalry among village factions cannot be ignored. During 1984-85 the committee has operated like other ordinary funeral groups.

Kolom, as I will show in Chapter 7, is an expression of neighborhood unity and solidarity. It confirms group commitment and maintains communication.

Several groupings that have obvious economic interests like *otosan*, *jak-ngajak*, *ari-san* and tobacco cutting groups tend to tie members effectively but not necessarily permanently. The economic interests that voluntarily bring several villagers together

⁹ For more details on some of these groupings see Chapter 7.

affect the formality of relations among the participants. Only jak-ngajak shows a vague, ambiguous relation among organizers, participants and work since it is performed to serve public facilities and institutions like roads, dikes, canals, schools and religious centers. During my fieldwork, I encountered several occasions of jak-ngajak organized by the klebun, and supported by the kyai, among the desa inhabitants as well as those organized by the kyai and the mak kaeh respectively. The latter mobilized the villagers of Montor to renovate his langgar raja. The jak-ngajak called upon by the kyai to raise the roof of the madrasah was supported by villagers from different desas surrounding Bettet. The quantity of my information on the otosan is thin. Although I consistently checked with my informants about their knowledge of and participation in the otosan, I failed to record its exact distribution in the four villages. As we saw, it continues to attract some peasants to work their land, even though it is no longer widely practiced. The arisan¹⁰ is conducted under the guises of religious gatherings such as *tahlil*, *yaşinan*, *sebelasan*, *Samman*, or *mustami'an*. Except for the arisan among the Samman participants, all are organized by women. The *sebelasan* which recruits 67 female participants from nearly all over the desa is not included in Table 3.8. It does not belong to a particular village. The four arisan groups in the three villages conduct their activities in conjunction with the kolom-patterned gatherings of *tahlilan* or *yaşinan* depending on the demand of the host. Tobacco cutting groups consist of young men, married or not, who work together as cutters during the tobacco season. Although they might at times work within a group of two or four, to judge from what I observed during the 1984 tobacco season, they worked most of the time within a group of three. They work preferably at night.

Voluntary groupings that have a strong link with sports mostly attract young men. Yet in the case of the Madurese bullrace (*karapan*), all age groups may be found. The Madurese regard the *karapan* as the indigenous national sport. The villagers perform it wherever they find an uncultivated field. When the dry season arrives, *karapan* par-

¹⁰ Independently the arisans can be identified as meetings of rotating credit association.

ties are held in villages. They attract karapan bull owners from the surrounding areas. Once a year a national, read Madurese, karapan festival is held in the town stadium of Pamekasan. Each regency sends several pairs for each class. The bulls chosen are the victors in previous races held at different local levels. To prepare the preliminary race at the kecamatan level various parochial local races are organized to select candidates. Since raising a pair of karapan bulls demands a lot of energy and money, only a relatively well-to-do villager can afford to do so. When a villager succeeds in owning karapan bulls, several of his colleagues, mostly relatives and neighbors, join with him to give support prior to and during a race. A pair of karapan bulls may gather between five and fifteen local supporters. Interestingly, karapan is disfavored by the ulama. In fact, at times many karapan bull owners perhaps visit the ulama indirectly asking for prayer and amulet (*jaza'* or *andaru*) to help to win the race.

Self-defence (*pencak* or *silat*) is a popular sport, even though the two old *guru silat* (instructors of self-defence) in the Bettet area complained about the lack of interest among young men to learn silat. In villages, training for silat is conducted at night in the yard of a guru silat. In the old days, my informants said, many of their *murids* (trainees) came from outside the desa. Today only a handful of neighboring boys ask the two gurus for instruction. Yet silat shows are frequently performed in villages. The performance is accompanied by *gulgul* (gong) music. The participants perform the beautiful and quick movements of self-defence, but they do not attempt to defeat the partner. Although silat is learned by diverse segments including the ulama, the latter dislike silat shows. Such shows express pride and self-indulgence.

Villagers enjoy the friendliness and faithfulness of the pigeon. They use the close relation between a pair of pigeons to conduct a race. Males are taken away from their spouses to some distance; then, they are released. The one that first joins its spouse is the winner. During the race, a special rustic music is performed using the gong, flute and *ronjengan* (wood gong). In villages the participants in pigeon races are mostly adolescents and young men.

The most popular sport in villages is volleyball, although in some areas badminton and soccer clubs are occasionally also established. Volleyball is inexpensive to organize in villages. Most participants in the volleyball games are village young men who have a post-elementary educational background. The number of participants in the volleyball indicates, to an extent, the villagers' access to post-elementary education. In the village of Montor the number of volleyball clubs and membership in them are higher due primarily to the participation of the pondok's santri.

Although the contributions of the members are the main source of financial support for these voluntary organizations, not all of them require material contributions. Thus the members of a bullrace group contribute almost nothing to the group, they simply join the patron who provides feasts at his home and raises a pair of trained bulls for the race. Yet in the arisan each member is required to deposit a fixed or floating amount of money, depending on the agreement, each time a meeting is held. *Di-ondi* (drawing lots) is taken each time of the meeting in order to determine who will get an earlier opportunity to receive the pooled capital. All members in the arisan have the obligation to participate in the routine deposit, until each member receives his/her share. Having done so, the arisan group completes its goal. But in most cases many members and new comers renew the contract of arisan. Despite their voluntary nature, these groups have a strong impact on the relational ties among diverse segments of villagers as they regularly gather.

Political organization: administrative and political structures

With the increasing power given to the klebun, the desa as the lowest government administrative unit is slowly but steadily emerging as a strong, familiar entity for villagers. Although the village community or kampong still remains the most effective form of territorial base for extra-neighborhood ties, the desa increasingly makes its presence felt by the villagers. Since all the government agencies and departments use the klebun as the last channel for the implementation of their village programs, the klebun and the desa administration generally become a very important element in government programs at the village level. On the other hand, because in many

instances these agencies, especially lately, provide services and direct material benefit for villagers, the latter are in general supportive to many of such programs. This, of course, increases the klebun's prestige among the villagers. Furthermore, the *desa* red tape that must be endured by villagers who want to gain access to many supra-village institutions makes the klebun more important as a formal official, even though the peasants strongly object to many bureaucratic requirements. The regular meetings and communication between *desa* apels (assistants) and the klebun intensify the flow of two-way information. Benefiting from his parochial leaning, the apel has intimate and direct relations with the residents of his *kampong* or bailiwick, if you will. Support for the unity of the *desa* comes in not insignificant degree from the mosque, where male villagers in most cases gather on Fridays. Again, outsiders' identification of village personalities, schools and other institutions with the *desa* has strong impact on the villagers' sense of belonging to their *desa*. Public schools also enhance the *desa*'s identity. Despite the persistence of many more parochial ties, villagers are increasingly communicating closely within, and in certain ways identifying with, their *desa*.

The villagers' participation in the *desa* elections partly shows their support for the establishment and functioning of the administrative *desa*, including the klebun (for details see Chapter 5). The village headman is elected by the adult members of the administrative *desa*. Although in certain places and on occasions the government sends its own, usually a military, man, -not to be confused with the Babinsa- most of the present klebuns in the region are in one way or another elected according to the old or new system of *desa* elections. Upon his election the klebun has the full right to replace *desa* apels with his own men. Because of the high risk of such a decision, in view of the apels' local connections, the klebun is careful in using his rights in this matter. Yet in order to reward his local campaign organizers the klebun is under obligation to provide them with material gains, including positions in the *desa* administration. For these reasons, the klebun usually dismisses unpopular, weak apels and requests very old ones to retire to be replaced by his own men.

The klebun has duties to maintain law and order in the desa. Minor cases are to be settled locally. In the case of serious crime he has to report to the police. Although the klebun has the power to mobilize villagers to do public works such as the repair and building of pathways, canals and bridges, he is careful to secure the support of other members of the village élite, particularly the ulama. Moreover, he is obliged somehow to provide food for the volunteers. It is customary for villagers to invite the klebun to their wedding parties. Because of the central role of the klebun in issuing various temporary, *ad hoc* certificates, including the certificates of villagers' eligibility for formal marriage sanctioned by the government officer at the local religious office (*Kantor Urusan Agama*), villagers who doubt the maturity of their children for marriage will try hard to win the klebun's favor.

Without undermining the persistence of various local, parochial pulls and ties, the klebun as the lowest government official provides the villagers with the formal network and the perimeter of socially less parochial interaction. Despite his ambivalent position, the klebun is to an extent able to make the desa a greater field for the villagers' identification and frame of reference.

Village factions

The relationships between members of different social ranks are instructive to note. Important village figures such as the kyai, klebun, teacher, healer (*dukun*), haji and wealthy individuals are respected, and their patronage is sought. The dominant feature in this relation is accounted for by what we earlier called patron-client relationships. They foster subordination and dependence. A village mak kaeh, for instance, who has in general no large economic resources to enhance his status and patronage may further his goal by providing advice and medication. In a way this relationship helps to create a factional group within a village. The case of Mak kaeh Mali of Kampong Barak is typical.

Mali (43), who has four children, is a second-generation mak kaeh. Despite his popularity, Mali's house is built mainly of bamboo. For villagers, at least in the

1980's, this is a sign of low income (*tak andi*). Even the langgar raja in his tanean where he conducts his religious instruction has not received any major renovation. It does not have distinctive features characteristic of other well-known langgars raja.

Nevertheless, the mak kaeh has proven on several occasions, and still today, his influence on and popularity among segments of the villagers who are his subordinates. He has successfully led a semi-mystical and vocal group, the Samman (see Chapter 7), which attracts a large number of adult villagers. During the last klebun elections (see Chapter 5), his prediction about the victory of a candidate whom he wholeheartedly supported attracted a considerable following. In this case he was directly involved in challenging the supralocal kyai, who had his own man in the election, an act and decision no villager had ever tried. Despite the inaccuracy of his prediction, at least with respect to the klebun elections, Mali continued to hold his admirers. Indeed, through his more elaborate organization of the Samman, Mali successfully provided his followers with compensation and leeway to regain their expectations about the future turn of events in the desa. The doubts of Mali's subordinates and followers about his acumen were temporarily shelved, if not eliminated.

Although political parties in Madura have not formed constant groupings and although they are active primarily around the time of general elections, village factions are widespread. In Sameran, as I will show, the mosque ulama also function as leaders of village factions which serve as the ulama's entourage and circles. It is difficult to generalize about the number of factions in a desa, but a desa faction harbors several minor village factions that polarize in most cases into two major factions. Since the nature of faction is *ad hoc* and non-corporate, it quickly changes and shifts in form and membership. The main explanation for this tendency is the achievement or failure of the agreed upon mutuality. Villagers constantly evaluate their affiliation with and involvement in their dyadic and personal bonds. Another instance related to the klebun elections in the Bettet area in 1983 exemplifies the changing nature of faction membership.

Muni is a middle-aged carpenter, the son of a pre-Independence klebun. As soon as the date for the 1983 desa elections was announced, Muni declared his candidacy. He failed, however, to enter the race primarily because he had neither a secondary education nor experience as a *pegawai*. Indeed, outside his close kin, Muni did not have a strong, wide basis for gaining votes. Shortly before the elections, when only two candidates remained, Muni openly supported a strong contender, Jemani. He claimed that all his men would vote for Jemani. The elections resulted in the success of Jemani's opponent. Less than eight months after the elections, the newly elected klebun was able to enlist Muni on his side. This occurred at a time when the impact of the elections rivalry was still prevalent, particularly between the two main factions. Muni was given an important position in the Golkar committee in the village. The klebun also used Muni's skill as a carpenter to develop closer ties. Muni is ambitious, and he has been always careful in developing contacts for his own benefit. Although Muni seems to be more materialistic if not opportunistic than many other fellow villagers, the idea of benefit, direct or indirect, is always central in the emergence and survival of a faction.

In the villages, the ulama, especially those who enjoy supralocal fame, capture the legitimacy of leadership in nearly all aspects. Accordingly, the non-ulama parties can hardly gain popularity. This does not mean that non-ulama parties fail to gain votes. Through the power of village officials, votes are acquired. With the injunction of *monoloyalitas* (monolithic allegiance to Golkar) falling upon all government employees and officials, the klebun is expected to campaign for Golkar. This arrangement puts the klebun in a very difficult situation, particularly in areas where the ulama are personally and politically present. Many klebuns in such areas covertly attempt to enlist their assistants, members of the civil service and teachers, if any, as well as their family members as fixed votes (*sowara se dioceng*) for Golkar. As much as possible they avoid real and overt campaigns. Nonetheless, in areas where the ulama's presence is less felt the klebun and teachers openly recruit members for Golkar. From the 1982 elections, it is evident that it was only in some kalurahans and

kecamatan-centered desas, that Golkar gained more than fifty per cent of the votes (see Table 3.9).

Table 3.9 Vote distribution in the 1982 elections* in the villages in the kecamatan of Pamekasan/kota

Administrative Villages	Votes for the parties			Percentage of Golkar votes
	Golkar	PPP	PDI	
1.Barurambat	3025	1163	221	68.7
2.Patemon	1049	491	80	64.7
3.Parteker	1278	884	114	56.1
4.Jalmak	607	262	4	69.5
5.Laden	866	404	17	67.3
6.Kangenan	984	584	20	61.9
7.Gladak Anyar	1714	2341	86	41.3
8.Kolpajung	640	944	16	40.0
9.Bugih	1762	2051	79	45.2
10.Nylabu Daja	232	638	5	26.5
11.Jungcangcang	1143	1351	32	45.2
12.Panempan	188	445	2	29.6
13.Kowel	295	2085	10	12.3
14.Toronan	57	679	2	7.7
15.Nylaby Laok	58	504	4	10.2
16.Bettet	42	1061	2	3.8
17.Teja Temor	190	769	7	19.6
18.Teja Barak	141	1089	3	11.4
Total	14,568	15,635	704	47.5

* In the last three general elections 1971, 1977 and 1982 in the regency of Pamekasan, the votes for Golkar were approximately 25 per cent of votes gained by "the Islamic parties" (see Ward 1974:167; Nishihara 1972; Amir Santoso 1980, also below Table 7.1)

(Source: Bappeda Kabupaten Pamekasan).

The ulama who openly support the government backed-party fail to gain popularity. Since such ulama usually come from the peripheral segments of the ulama's world, they are seen by the villagers as glaring opportunists. "By joining the new party," as one of my informants notes, "they [the ulama] expect to gain access to better position and facilities. They are not *ikhlas* (sincere, honest and simple)." In Madura, only a small number of ulama evidently do not support the ulama's parties.

Yet, among the ulama themselves, factionalism exists. At the higher level, factions evolve around political interests. At the lower level various village and educational factors help nurse the ulama's factions. Thus in villages, political groupings are centered mainly on religious figures and to an extent, also on village officials and teachers. Wealthy villagers, despite their wide economic patronage, usually align themselves with the main factions, preferably religious and in some cases governmental

Social inequality



In Madurese villages, economic inequality is counterbalanced in various ways, for instance by dyadic asymmetrical, personal and religious ties.

Despite the apparently homogeneous housing pattern in villages the Madurese may be classified according to their economic level (cf. Rousseau 1978, 1979, 1980, King 1985). Since the agricultural land is widely distributed and highly fragmented, other factors, besides land, have also to be taken into account as the yardstick for measuring one's position in the socio-economic hierarchy. The klebun and many ulama have access to more than five hectares of cultivable land. But they also have different resources for accumulating wealth and prestige. In Bettet, for instance, the household heads other than the kyais and village officials own on average less than 0.4 hectare of cultivable land. In addition, several household heads, as we saw, are landless (see Table 3.2 and 3.4). Villagers derive their income mostly from agriculture. Since it cannot fulfill their needs, they also attempt through various other means to earn money. Some derive income, primary or additional, by working in non-agricultural sectors (see above). Although only a few succeed in emerging from the village commonality as a new class, general village economic improvement through the cultivation of cash crops like tobacco and oranges provides more chance to produce local nouveaux riches, or at least to generate class differentiation. At the present, economic factors distinguish villagers from each other into a few big landowners, salaried persons -mostly government teachers-, emerging traders, independent producers, sharecroppers and landless service-providers. However, it should be remembered that this differentiation is etc. Villagers distinguish their fellow villagers

only into "big man" (*oring andi*) and "small, ordinary man" (*oring dumek*). Indeed, personal affiliations and dyadic ties cut across such groupings.

Wealth alone does not significantly distinguish a villager's social position from that of others. Being a poor villager does not make one feel socially inferior to his fellow, even though he may wish to live affluently. Other factors such as religious or political position are required for wealthy villagers to achieve a higher status and position among their fellow countrymen. Indeed, each better-off villager attempts to perform a pilgrimage to Mecca. Although the title of haji does not necessarily mean wealth, almost all rich Madurese villagers become hajis. The hierarchization of villagers is clearly shown during the selamatan. For example, the order from the top down is the ulama, hajis, administrative figures and neighbors (see Figure 3.7).

Figure 3.7. Order of seating among selamatan participants at a family langgar



The villagers have a polarized view of inequality. The polarization of the villagers into *oring andi* and *oring dumek* is mainly based on the idea of self-sufficiency and stability. The villagers consider the majority of their fellows as *oring dumek*, only when a villager occupies or achieves an extraordinary *kabadaan* (profile), may he be categorized as *andi*. This extraordinariness is centered on the concept of being powerful (*kowat* or *kenceng*). Although individuals have difficulties to provide indices for this concept, their identification of certain figures as *oring andi* points to some clues. The informants' perception of *oring andi* exemplifies their own bias. For example, a

local ustadz who runs a store thought that *oring andi* or *oring raja* include kyais who come from an ulama family and successfully run a pondok. For him such figures will automatically exercise strong political power and have easy access to economic support. He cited as an example the kyais of Bettet who, according to him, have become influential, powerful figures, primarily because of their position as religious leaders. On the other hand, a carpenter who failed to run for the 1983 desa elections believes that *oring andi* refers to government officials (*pejabat*s). The *pejabat*s, he argues, in addition to political power have a sufficient salary and normally are respected. At a local level the *klebun* is a good example, as he is entitled to legitimate power, large amounts of land and honor. Wealthy persons can be generally classified into two categories: those who have formed established rich families and those who have just recently become wealthy. The latter, unlike those among the established families, have not yet proven their stability. Villagers seem to put most emphasis on continuity and stability in deciding whether *orings dumek* or *orings kenek* have really become *orings andi* or *orings raja*. Only wealthy men of the dynastic families can be classified into *orings andi*. Yet some educated informants include wealthy villagers in the *oring andi* category.

Chapter Four

VILLAGES, THEIR INTERNAL RELATIONS AND THEIR INTERACTION
WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD

Villages in Madura have experienced increasing contact with the outside world. For this reason alone it seems appropriate to see villages and supralocal centers such as town and city as a continuum of multi-faceted interaction. They are not isolated entities, independent of each other, rather they are brought into extensive contact and interaction by nodal points in a relational network. Despite the different orientation of these elements, particularly at a village level, they are involved in constant and unending encounters and to an extent competition (cf. Wolf 1956, Bailey 1969, Fernea 1970; Nash 1974). Indeed, the fulfillment of villagers' understanding and perception about proper life induces the elements in the continuum to confront such a challenge and seek a way out. In Madura these elements manifest themselves in institutions, figures and individuals such as ulama, klebun, administrative desa, teacher, pegawai, organizations, migrants and traders. By looking at the resources, mobility, ideas and continuity of these figures, the process and prospect of internally initiated changes can be carefully examined. This does not mean, however, that external impact is ignored. Since, as we shall see, these figures become the backbone of village-supralocal centers of communication, external impact is introduced, modified and absorbed or totally rejected. In other words, external relations provide models and examples that might be used as ingredients for the on-going search for a *modus-vivendi*. Although in recent years more extensive external models and ideas have been high-handedly introduced to the villages, they evidently encounter various local checks that filter or neutralize those external elements.

One of many interesting features in a developing country like Indonesia is the growing communication between ethnic groups. Yet diverse ethnic origins also pose certain obstacles to national unity. The Madurese as one of these groups have developed a unique approach and contribution to the reality and future of Indonesia as a

nation-state. For years or perhaps centuries many Madurese have migrated to other islands in the archipelago (see Chapter One). Indeed, there are twice as many Madurese outside Madura than there are in the island. Despite many alterations of the overt characteristics or categories, even among Madurese migrants in urban areas the basic general identity is maintained. Since we are concerned with the Madurese in Pamekasan villages, let us examine how these villagers identify themselves. The intensive participation of different village segments in supralocal concerns and activities increases interaction between levels and stimulates the on-going internal conflicts which are conducive to change. The filtering down of supralocal and urban ideas and world views to villages through various segments at once promotes an outward looking tendency and rationalizes the locally pursued conflicts.

Identity

Villagers have a clear perception of others. Uniformity of identification is taken for granted, that is, each individual in a village is expected to know how to behave and adopt an identity. Indeed, village social structure and relational formation provide the Madurese with the given identity. In Madura, Islam is almost inseparable from Madurese-ness (cf. Kessler 1978, Nagata 1984). For this reason, among villagers themselves religion as such does not serve as a basis of classification even though the degree of one's commitment to Islam may be a distinguishing principle

As immediate categories to identify others, the Madurese refer to the origin (*asal*), locality, (*kennengan*) and affiliation of a person. In case these three categories are not defined, the villagers will classify a person into Madurese or non-Madurese.

The realization of these identity categories is closely related to the individual's perception and expectation of the impact they may create. In relating oneself to others the villagers will use the most effective category that may produce meaningful communication (cf. Goodenough 1965:3-7). Thus depending on the circumstances, a villager will enhance, drop or ignore certain identity categories. For example, a villager who pays homage to the *kyai* will enhance his affiliation to a particular *mak kaeh* in

the village whom the kyai knows. Then he will mention his locality. If his family is well-known more probably he will not hesitate to emphasize his family background. On the other hand, when a villager is in contact with the government bureaucracy, he will avoid as much as possible mentioning his socio-religious affiliations. Yet locality and other non-religious affiliations remain indispensable.

To define locality, the degree of familiarity of the interlocutor is taken into account. In the town a villager from Teja will introduce himself as an inhabitant of Teja Barak or Teja Temor. In Bettet he will specify which part of Teja Temor he comes from. When a fellow traveller in Surabaya asks a Tejanese about his origin, he may reply in terms of the broader category of Madura or Pamekasan.

Within the context of inter-ethnic group relations in Indonesia today the Madurese have shown continuity and active participation. The sense of belonging to "the salt island" plays a central role in preserving the continuity and persistence of their identity. Among educated individuals and professionals who move to other areas, this parochial affiliation certainly decreases, if it does not go away. But for most migrants, their Madurese-ness is more or less preserved. Thus it is not surprising to find the concentration into pockets and enclaves of ethnic Madurese who migrate into areas and cities like Surabaya, Malang and Jember (Samsuri 1978, 1979). Although it is not clear whether such concentration into enclaves represents subjectively the idea of a quasi-village or even the island, it provides points of reference for close attachment and identification. On the other hand, as the out-migration of the Madurese indicates, they are not narrowly tied to their own environment and customs. Within their own dynamism and characteristics the Madurese have built links through diverse relational channels with almost all ethnic groups in the surrounding islands, regions, towns and cities. Accordingly, a village in the island, not to mention a town, has increasingly become an active participant in the process of change in Indonesia today. Moreover, the government bureaucracy and administration only strengthen this on-going interplay and interaction.

In addition to the permanent identity categories, Madurese identity, especially in relation with outsiders, is maintained by a number of attributes showing distinctiveness. They include language, religion, custom and history.

Despite the growing popularity of Indonesian as a national language and lingua franca in the region, the majority of the Madurese still rarely use Indonesian in their conversation. Again, for those who master, but only occasionally speak, Indonesian, the local dialect leaves a strong impact on their use of Indonesian. Thus in encounters with, for example, the Balinese, the Madurese can be identified by their language or at least dialect. Moreover, Islam has become a strong marker for the Madurese. Because of the intensity of their identification with Islam, religious symbols at times form part of local customs and vice versa (cf. Jordaan 1985). Indeed, the wearing of the *songkok* and *sarong* for men and *samper* and *kabaya* for women is as much customary as it is Islamic for villagers. Yet in the supravillage context abstention from this attire does not necessarily imply the dropping of identity. Among the educated, civil servants and youth, the wearing of traditional attire is limited to a domestic domain and to religio-ritualistic ceremonies. The adoption of such attributes as language, Islam and custom does not necessarily connote Madurese-ness. Thus authentication is required. This can be done, for example, by affiliation with religious/local leaders or membership in local associations.

The villagers who know other ethnic groups are strongly aware of their identity as *oring Madura*. They are proud of claiming to be "people of frankness, strength and bravery." In comparing themselves with, for instance, the Javanese, they like to banter that the Javanese are "nice in the face and stink in the back," that is, they are pretentious and reserved. Despite the fact that their language has not become the major writing tool even for the local intellectuals and writers, the *oring Madura* believe in the perfection of Madurese. The fact that outsiders have difficulties in pronouncing and speaking Madurese indicates the uniqueness of their language. They contrast this with the ability of Madurese migrants to gain fluency in Javanese.

In a country like Indonesia which thus far has left room for ethnic groups to pursue their local interests and objectives within a much glorified nation (*satu bangsa*), the Madurese seem to have benefited from the close attachment to their ethnic identity. Although the tendency toward separatism does not exist, the Madurese, especially in new localities, have maintained local, parochial associations especially in trade, housing, peddling and other occupations (see Samsuri 1979). Yet, as I will show, various institutions that operate within the island villages as well as Madurese communities outside the island have established links with broader levels of orientation and integration within Indonesia.

In order to understand better the inter-group interaction and competition in Madurese villages, it is instructive to examine the domain of prominent groupings and institutions such as ulama, desa officials, organizations, migrants, traders and education.

Ulama: popular point of reference

Further discussion of the ulama is to be found in Parts Three and Four, but for a general overview in this context let us look closely at some important features of the ulama. The ulama's central position in villages connotes the emergence of a network of followers. In villages the mak kaehs form the lowest religious functionaries. They informally mobilize their neighbors from time to time to pay homage to the higher ulama, whether imams (mosque functionaries) or kyais (pondok ulama). Although a number of ulama supporters may easily shift their allegiance from one figure to another, normally the followers maintain their allegiance for life. This does not necessarily close off the possibility of villagers having more than one ulama as patron or guide. Moreover, wealthy and prominent villagers, primarily because of their better access to supravillage entities, have more religious and social contact with higher ulama than with local imams or mak kaehs. Because a growing number of villagers become literate over time and have various, stronger alternative links to the wider context, local mak kaehs and lower ulama, including mosque imams, lose some direct influence on segments of the population. Yet the personalized relations in villages

deter the abrupt discontinuity of kyai-santri ties. On the other hand, it should not be assumed that the religious figures, even at the village level, are not responsive to what occurs in their surroundings. Within the limits of their belief, values and expectations, they attempt to hold the loyalty of their followers. This can take diverse forms, ranging from adaptation to rejection of any outside ideas, plans and innovations.

The relations within the immediate levels of the ulama's network are personal and direct, and are based on trust. For many villagers the modification of or interference with their regular, routinized daily life is unimaginable. Without the ulama's direct endorsement, the villagers will ignore certain novelties introduced into their domain. Yet the ulama themselves are careful when taking any decision. Benefiting from their direct and extensive contact with the population, the ulama have a better access to public opinion than anyone else in the villages. Conversely, various occasions, social and religious, are used by the ulama to introduce and explain their ideas and plans to their followers. In general, village ulama do not take major decisions, rather, they follow the example and guide of their superiors and patrons, the pondok ulama (kyaïs). For example, Jari, an imam from Teja, did not issue any decision on the question of the bank loan for the 1984 tobacco cultivation until he had consulted with the kyai of Bettet. This happened despite the fact that Jari is the imam of the old village mosque and instructor of regular evening pengajians. During the monthly meeting (*bahtsul masā'il*) among prominent ulama, difficult and urgent contemporary issues and questions are raised and discussed. The decisions are morally and socially binding, particularly if they relate to socio-religious or political matters. With the spread and recurrent holdings of public religious meetings at village or supravillage levels, various views of the ulama on certain issues are easily disseminated. On these occasions, the ulama who master oratory become the spokesmen both for the ulama grouping and the public sentiment. In addition, in order to attract the villagers' attention to religious and social issues the speakers often obliquely criticize and ridicule certain aspects of the government policies in the region.

The ulama have diverse resources for acquiring access to and information about development at supravillage levels. Customarily the higher ulama receive visitors from different areas. On such occasions, the ulama ask their visitors about the condition and issues in their respective villages. With the widespread establishment of modern communication in the rural areas, the ulama have become among the first to enjoy access to world news through radio, television, newspapers and magazines. Although they generally find only minor reference to their world, the ulama have access to more varieties of news that may be delivered to their audience and followers. Since the majority of villagers have not enthusiastically followed the news at the supralocal level, the ulama can use their better knowledge of daily news to improve their image. By relating certain disasters, wars, scientific achievements and odds and bits of information relating to other parts of the world, the ulama may justify or reject current ideas and views as well as confirm particular religious teachings.

Furthermore, various means of intra-group communication such as visits, religious feasts and celebrations, monthly meetings and conferences help circulate important news and current ideas that concern the ulama. The first rank ulama in the region become the center of the news bank. At one extreme, they harbor news, stories, complaints and events that are brought to them by villagers, minor and junior ulama and others; at the other, they relate that information after sifting and reinterpreting it to others, including the lower ulama. Benefiting from the formal socio-religious organizations such as the SI, NU, Muhammadiyah and MDI, many prominent ulama in the region are closely and strongly tied to higher rank ulama in the East Java Province and Jakarta. These organizations, especially the NU and SI, give a specific position for the ulama. Accordingly, at least at the local level, the ulama possess a great power and domination over the organizations' policy internally and externally.

Klebung and administrative desa: the lowest bureaucratic entity

Administrative desas in Madura have been experiencing stronger communications and more interaction internally and externally. The massive government support for the

klebun undoubtedly enhances the desa officials' status, position and prestige. As the lowest officer in the government hierarchy, the klebun is expected to represent the central government's interests in the villages. Concomitant with the government's plan to improve the quality of village life, the klebun is further linked upward into the bureaucracy. Because many villagers do not automatically follow the hierarchical order which might change some of their lifeways and accepted values, norms and routines, the klebun faces a serious problem and dilemma. But such ambivalence is not unique to the headman in Madura. Perhaps the structural overlap and ambiguity of klebunship itself - that is being locally elected and being a government representative - has affected the peculiarity of the institution, the klebun sub culture.

Despite the controversial nature of certain practices and traditions associated with the klebun such as public feasts and games, he and the ulama do not exclude each other. They constitute important elements among the village elite who are at times brought together in order partly to protect their common interests as local leaders (see Chapter 12). Furthermore, their respective followers can easily join any public festivity held by either party. In fact, it is not uncommon to observe a number of santris watch the bull-race (karapan) which is a practice frowned upon by the ulama. The latter regard such an exercise as constituting animal torture and as being a source of evil to the same degree as gambling and the mixing of the sexes. Conversely, on a religious occasion like the *imtihan* (festivities held at a pondok usually around the end of the school year) diverse segments of the population, including the klebun's men, participate, and even listen to the speeches delivered by the ulama.

The headmen in Madura are drawn from among the population. Because the headmanship is contested in the desa election (see the next chapter), it is a well-defined position. That is to say that no village official can move in and fill the vacuum created when there is a vacancy in headmanship. He can do so only as a temporary caretaker. Similarly, the klebun remains in his position since he cannot gain promotion to higher bureaucratic levels.

As a government official, the *klebun* is an important link between the village and supralocal worlds. He attends weekly and other occasional meetings at the Camat's (sub-district chief) office. Following such meetings he will deliver the message received, if any, to other *desa* officials (*apels*) who regularly gather at the *desa* office (*kantor desa*). In addition, government officials from the *kecamatan* and various other departments are sent to villages to provide service directly to villagers or to talk to *desa* officials. Only in respect to matters that need to be executed immediately, are villagers directly informed, in informal gatherings or by word of mouth.

Further bureaucratization of the *desa* officials has so far strengthened the attachment which the bulk of the population have to their religious leaders. Of course, what Benjamin Higgins calls a 'demonstration effect' of new programs and the success of certain bureaucratic projects in villages have steadily reversed this tendency (1977:109). For many villagers, the projects introduced and the changes brought to their areas have not significantly and directly improved their condition. The villagers are not always dogmatically rejectionists. Since most of the government development schemes are general and macroscopic in nature, they do not at times meet the local interests and expectations. For example, the building of a rice storage and a local cooperative (*BUUD*) in a village like Samatan of Proppo, to mention only one, which cannot provide enough rice for even its own inhabitants was clearly not a wise investment. In fact, in areas where the government fund is effectively utilized to improve the local condition, the villagers have enthusiastically supported bureaucratic programs. Thus, regular visits by health officials and nurses to villages are favorably welcomed, and most villagers, including Bettetans, take advantage of their services and programs such as family planning, vaccination, child care and the provision of necessary nutrition for babies. Nonetheless, since most villages do not witness any miracle improvements, they continue to be indifferent, to maintain the status quo and to accept the guidance of the informal leaders, especially the *kyais*. Be that as it may, the bureaucracy has made its presence felt in the villages, from schools to road construction.

The bureaucracy increasingly wins the villagers' perception that it has among other things power, tradition and money. With the continuing attempts on the part of the bureaucracy via the *klebun* seriously and effectively to alleviate village poverty and backwardness (see Chapter 6), the bureaucracy indirectly challenges the religious establishment to respond more objectively and efficiently to the villagers' problems. The on-going process of communication and competition between the religious leaders, the *ulama*, and the bureaucracy, including the *klebun*, seems to be a vital source of a promising future for the villagers.¹¹ Indeed, under such conditions changes may be perceived as phenomena that do not significantly generate illegitimate discontinuities.

Teacher and pegawai (government employees)

The expansion of the government public schools and the extension of various services to rural areas bring more teachers and government employees to villages. Until a few years ago in many villages the government was represented only by the *deśa* officials. The foundation of at least one elementary school (*SD Inpres*) in every *deśa* introduces teachers to villagers, even though only few teachers reside among villagers. Accordingly, not only have children learned from teachers but parents also enjoy personal contact with teachers.

Moreover, government attempts at improving village conditions expose villagers to more contact with governmental agents and officials. The extension of health services, including the *klinik keliling* (mobile clinic) to villages provides an opportunity for villagers to receive medication, vaccination, consultation and information on family planning, sanitation and preventive measures against certain epidemics or illnesses. More important, this contact exposes villagers to new ideas and ways of managing their livelihood. Furthermore, government endeavors at invigorating agricultural activity have made villagers more aware of what others have done to improve crop

¹¹ For this reason and to balance the detailed discussion of the *ulama*, I shall separately examine the impact of national policy on the villages in Chapter 6.

production. Despite the fact that the villagers cannot fully apply these new methods of cultivation, primarily because of the nature of the land and the environment, the contact stimulates in them an awareness to improve their daily life in different ways. Governmental officials and agents who are specifically appointed to deal with village problems and development become the carriers of new ideas to the villages. Although the villagers have their own views and preferences with respect to any ideas and programs from outside, the spread of literacy among villagers and their extensive contact with the bureaucracy have indirectly enhanced the link between villages and the power centers.

Government employment requires a certain level of education. Since only a few of the present adult villagers have completed secondary education, their access to government posts is limited. Most of those who went to the secondary school came from the economically better off families. Accordingly, the villagers who presently join government service as teachers, clerks, soldiers and officials enjoy better economic resources coming both from the government salary and family properties.

In recruiting candidates, the government bases its choice on merit and commitment to the corps. This does not mean that recruitment is free of favoritism and bribery. Only a well-off family, of course, can meet such costs. In 1984 when the Department of Education wanted to hire additional teachers at elementary schools, several youths in the Bettet area registered their names, filled out the application forms, and prepared themselves for the test. One of them was promised an automatic acceptance if he could provide the official with a certain amount of money. He tried to get the money from his parents. He told me that in view of the strong competition, if he could not pay, he would never secure a government position. Excluding such irregularities, the government posts are open to any villager who meets the requirements such as education, age limit and commitment to the corps. In Pamekasan, indigenous teachers and government employees come mostly from the aristocratic families, traders', desa officials', well-off villagers' and pegawais' children. The ulama seem to have been poorly represented in government posts. The reason is

clear; the ulama had for years opted for a different kind of education, not the one required for most of the government posts.

Government employees receive a stable, but relatively small, income. The pegawais who remain in their native village usually enjoy a better economic condition. In addition to their salary they may receive extra income from agriculture. To date the government continues to supply its employees with benefits and rations. The pegawai receives a limited health coverage which includes his wife and his first three children. For an average villager the pegawais, even of the lowest rank, are considered to be well-off (oring cokop), particularly since they are entitled to a pension following retirement. With the ability of the present régime to provide its pegawais with relatively lucrative salaries, a government position is much sought by villagers. In fact, many parents are eager to send their children to higher schools with the expectation that they will eventually secure a government position. On the other hand, the limited access to government positions and the cost of higher education have shown to many of the educated individuals that different sectors of employment have to be created and sought. In a region with very limited economic resources, government employment, like out-migration and trade, will undoubtedly continue to attract energetic and scheming individuals.

Government employees have access to social mobility and promotion. A pegawai, once he has joined the bureaucracy, will remain with it until his retirement, unless he voluntarily quits, commits a serious crime, or becomes insane. By accepting pegawai-ship, one signifies readiness to be transferred to any place in the country. For this reason Pamekasan has many outsiders in its bureaucracy. Moreover, having, until quite recently, a low percentage of literacy, Madura has been a high recipient of teachers and pegawais from other regions. Although promotion involving salary increments is regularly made, most rank-and-file pegawais remain in their old positions. This, of course, is closely related to the lack of training and extra education. Yet the highly educated and energetic pegawais, to some extent, may expect to achieve higher positions. In any case, a camat or bupati eventually has to retire and

be replaced by an experienced candidate, not a fresh graduate from some educational institution. For many *pegawais* in Pamekasan, the incumbent bupati symbolizes a successful civil servant who has experienced upward mobility. The bupati started his *pegawai* career in the early 1950's as a clerk at the sub-district office in Surakarta. He was transferred to Pontianak in West Kalimantan where he worked for many years. Before his nomination as bupati of Pamekasan in 1983, he served as secretary (*sekretaris daerah*) of Jember regency.

In a developing country like Indonesia where the government controls most of the strategic and lucrative resources, the bureaucracy together with other ruling socio-political forces plays a central role in enhancing and perpetuating the state ideology. Indeed, the bureaucracy has become the pillar of the state continuity (cf Jackson 1978, Liddle 1985). Despite the major shift in the image, style and policy of Suharto's régime, the bureaucracy, especially at the regency level, does not significantly differ from the previous era. The persistence of the "*priyayi* culture"¹² is obvious. The policy makers and experts do change. But when the recommendations and decisions reach the lower bureaucratic levels, their execution remains in a feudalistic, *priyayi* way (cf. Legge 1961, Anderson 1972a). The mechanism behind this has been the *pegawai* commitment and loyalty to the corps (*Korpri*): The recurrent meetings and courses that are specifically designed to inculcate the government ideology in the civil servants seem to have worked effectively to create this *esprit de corps*. At the present time the *pegawais*' formal sole allegiance (*monoloyalitas*) to the ruling party has been uniformly applied. This includes the promotion of Pancasila as the only valid ideology. The accessibility of literature, modern communication and reward to *pegawais* has strongly stimulated their creativity. Yet this creativity has to be worked out within the perimeter of *pegawai*-ship.

¹² The Madurese word for *priyayi* is *parjaji*. *Priyayi* is originally associated with the courtiers of Javanese rulers. When the Dutch hired civil servants and employees to support their administration in the Netherlands-Indies, these employees were identified as *priyayis*, in Madura *parjajis* (for further analysis of *priyayi* variant in Java see Geertz 1960b; Selosoemarjan 1962, Emmerson 1976, Muhammad Slamet 1977).

In Pamekasan, the demand for the pegawais, including teachers, to adopt strict allegiance and full commitment to all government programs and ideas has created dilemmas. Since many of the local pegawais are santris who are close to the ulama, such an injunction poses a dilemma. This is so especially if we consider that the ulama parties were locally victorious in the past general elections. Indeed, a large number of pegawais secretly but convincingly maintained a double loyalty. In view of the continuing rivalry and competition between the religious establishment and the bureaucracy in providing the Madurese with a concept and reality of a meaningful and better life, these hybrid pegawais i.e. those who maintain double loyalties seem to have paved the way for more understanding and exchange at least in the villages. This kind of understanding has been strongly needed, even though the competition between the two camps may persist. The continuing debates and exchanges between these two forces of continuity and order *vis-à-vis* the external stimulation for changes may eventually produce a better and more workable *modus vivendi* in the region.

Socio-religious and political organizations

Political parties. Several nationally renowned organizations have established branches in Madurese villages. From the time when political parties were allowed to operate in Indonesia following independence, generally speaking, Madura has been dominated by two political groupings: Islamic and bureaucratic. As can be seen in the results of the first general elections in 1955 (see Table 7.1), the NU, PSII (SI) and Masyumi represented the Islamic parties and the PNI the bureaucrats. In the 1971 general elections the PNI position was "replaced" by Golkar. The latter, as the government-backed party, has since become "the pegawai's party." In addition, it attracts the pegawais' families and other segments of the society. Since the Islamic parties such as the NU, PSII and Parmusi merged in 1973 to form the PPP (see Samson 1978), during the 1977 and 1982 elections, the political rivalries and campaigns centered on the PPP (Islamic) versus Golkar (bureaucratic). Because the NU has recently adopted a new, floating policy toward both Golkar and the PPP it is not clear what the opposing parties will be in the 1987 general elections in Madura, particularly in Pamekasan.

In villages the political parties conduct their main activities only around the time of the general elections. This is primarily due to the prevailing government policy to restrict political activities at all levels, especially in rural areas. Benefiting from its affiliation with the government, Golkar has in many ways kept its party apparatus in tune with political development and is actively involved in government programs and activities. On the other hand, the PPP, which has not formulated an effective ideology for cooperation among its own factions, remains fragmented. Within each faction, the party leaders make contacts, mainly to provide guidelines and subject matter for members of the local assembly. Since the ulama dominate the factions of the PPP, political activities, to some extent, are channelled through the ulama's networks. When the general elections were over, the villagers have been generally indifferent to the political parties and even to their representatives in the assemblies (DPRD) or the parliament (DPR) until the following elections approached.

For many villagers the political party remains a new symbol to be adopted during the rituals of the general elections in order primarily to confirm their traditional bond.¹³ The villagers' role is, therefore, dramatic, fixed and, at the same time, ritualistic. Indeed, the villagers' political participation expresses mainly their acknowledgement of the immediate symbol bearers. They do not perceive an election as an opportunity to pursue their political interests, let alone change their prospects. By voting for the ulama party, as my informants suggested, "they have fulfilled their duties to defend the ulama's cause." It is this immediate aim that occupies the villagers. Again, those who vote for Golkar perceive it as the embodiment of an official symbol that implies power and resources. At the village level, its symbol is closely associated with modern education, village development aid, power and the possession of a steady, lucrative position, including that of civil servant and the *klebun*. This does not mean, however, that no villager uses his vote with a view that his chosen

¹³ It is important to note that the present régime is proud of claiming the general elections as *pesta demokrasi* (rites or celebration of democracy).

party will best serve his interests, expectation and well-being. In fact, many santri who voted for the PPP in the 1977 and 1982 elections believed that the PPP representatives were the only politicians who would fight for the improvement and preservation of education at the pondok and madrasah levels. But most villagers continue to vote for a party because someone they trust, admire and respect votes or asks them to vote for a particular party. Political participation among villagers will continue to be manipulated as long as they are illiterate, misinformed, isolated and economically backward.

Whatever the case may be, the parties contribute to the increasing interaction between villages and urban centers. Since Golkar leaders are automatically pegawais, the party's mechanism in this respect is not far different from that of the bureaucracy. The local PPP on the other hand resembles the ulama's organizations to a large extent as it extensively exploits ulama networks. The PDI, at least at the present time, does not specifically adopt its traditional network (which, of course, has been lost to Golkar) in order to recruit and mobilize members. Consequently, in Madura it only has an insignificant number of followers.

Socio-religious organizations. Non-political organizations (*organisasi massa*) have ample opportunities to conduct their activities (for a further discussion of the socio-religious organizations see Chapter 7). They attract stable supporters. In Pamekasan, a number of national organizations have their branches. The most widely known among them are the NU, SI, Muhammadiyah and MDI. Several associations recruit members from the alumni of certain Java-based pondoks and schools. Despite their importance in filtering ideas and developments that particularly have relevance to their respective pondoks and schools, their members maintain permanent and stable ties with the organisasi massa.

The Muhammadiyah with its vigorous attempts to purify the religious practices and belief system from accretion and superstition according to the concept of the

Qur'an and Hadits" (see Alfian 1969:130-1) has not gained a significant following in the villages. Its small, but well-organized, group of supporters and followers comes mainly from the educated class, civil servants and teachers in the towns (cf. Amir Santoso 1980; and Jordaan 1985:32-6). Because of this character, it has succeeded in establishing several general secondary schools such as SMP, SMA and SPG, which admit any applicant irrespective of his organizational affiliation. The schools, however, have not been very successful in winning ideological converts among students who had no previous commitment to Muhammadiyah. This happened despite the fact that at these schools, Islam is taught according to Muhammadiyah's interpretation and even courses on the organization's ideology (*Kemuhammadiyahan*) are given. Thus the foremost and long term goal that the schools can expect to attain is, as the Head of Education of the local Muhammadiyah reiterated, "...to stimulate a critical view among students against the existing corrupt religious practices and belief around them." In fact in some areas villagers are suspicious of many graduates of Muhammadiyah schools, even though the latter continue to participate in most village activities and rituals. As we saw, the prevailing social and religious structures in the villages hardly tolerate the introduction of beliefs, lifeways and ideas that daringly undermine and contradict the status quo. Societal sanction is still instrumental and effective. With its present aggressive approach, Muhammadiyah seems to remain on the periphery of Madurese villages.

Moreover, in order primarily to gain an image of a party that concerns itself not only with material improvement but also with spiritual well-being, Golkar has included under its aegis several Islamic organizations such as MDI and GUPPI. They are designed to promote Islamic education and teaching. Despite the government's backing and the considerable funds at their disposal, in Pamekasan the MDI and GUPPI attracted, besides pegawais, only a handful of local ulama and their followers. Yet in different ways these organizations were able to channel certain benefits to many local religious and educational institutions, even though they rarely succeeded in delivering new ideas or in securing support and membership among beneficiaries and villagers.

Today the most popular socio-religious organization in villages is the NU. But in some areas, especially the northern part, the SI continues to attract a large following.

The SI has a long and heroic history in Madura. As I have shown in Chapter 2, SI leaders in Madura during the late 1910's and 1920's were able to organize economic cooperatives, and political protests as well as religious activities. In much of the literature the SI is presented as a reformist organization (see Noer 1973, Boland 1971, Kuntowijoyo 1980, 1984, Prasadja 1980).¹⁴ Although this portrayal fits the characteristics of the early SI and to an extent the present general structure of the organization, in Madura today SI leaders and followers do not markedly differ from the conservative NU's. In Pamekasan where the majority of SI supporters and members in the island can be found, the organization is dominated by the pondok ulama.

In terms of resources, mobility and network, the SI does not differ significantly from the NU. The NU attracts the majority of the ulama and villagers not only in Pamekasan but also in Madura. Benefiting from its preservation and promotion of the religious and educational status quo, the NU has been successful in rallying local religious leaders into its fold. The achievement of the NU leaders in attracting the local ulama was enhanced in the past by their common educational background. For example, the founder and chairman of the NU, Hasyim Asy'ari was at one time a santri of a famous kyai in West Madura, Kyai Khalil (see above Chapter 2). The co-founder of the NU Wahab Hasbullah was a colleague of Kyai Siraj of Bettet in Mecca where they spent several years together in the beginning of this century. These personal and collegiate ties helped to ease the process of NU acceptance and to spread the NU organization in Madura. In order to promote his ideas and organization Wahab personally went to Bettet to meet Siraj.

Despite the fact that the NU's conception of Islam remained the main factor that attracted many ulama in the region, personal relations must have smoothed the

¹⁴ In his observation of religious patterns in Central Java in the 1950's, Clifford Geertz has rather unusually remarked that SI followers in the region held religious views close to the NU's (1965 166; cf. 1960b).

actual acceptance. Since the earlier ulama who supported the NU were prominent and supralocal figures, they successfully rallied their colleagues and santris throughout the region. The favorable NU's view toward the four prominent madzhabs (Islamic law schools) and literature at the pondok contributed to the approval of many local ulama. During the 1930's, the national leaders of the SI increasingly identified themselves with the reformist ideology (see Noer 1973). This undoubtedly created confusion and shock among Madurese ulama. Accordingly, many of them crossed over to the NU. The relevance of the NU policy and ideology to the ulama world seems to have kept the descendants, colleagues and santris of the early NU ulama in the organization. This does not mean that the ulama could not free themselves from involvement in these organizations and join other ones. Indeed, several minor ulama, not to mention villagers, did support such socio-religious associations as the Jamus, AKUI and MDI in the recent period.

Financial support for NU programs and activities is derived primarily from contributions. Attempts were made to run enterprises such as a trading corporation, to establish an endowment and to conduct a business which might provide stable financial resources for the organization. The defunct Yamualim corporation of the 1960's is a clear example of an effort toward such a goal. In Madura the support comes from the wealthy members of the NU and the ulama. Each time the NU, including its subdivisions, wants to organize activities such as training sessions, conferences, sending delegates to higher meetings in other cities and festivities, etc., an *ad hoc* committee is formed in order *inter alia* to collect funds. Although in theory the NU members have to pay regular fees such as registration and a monthly subscription, funds rarely materialize. To make the committee job easier, a kyai usually welcomes the NU to host various activities in his pondok compound. In such a case the kyai provides accomodation, meals and other necessary support. Because the financial condition of the NU is such, most of its institutions receive almost no direct funding from the organization per se. Nonetheless, when many figures in the NU secured strategic government posts, patronage was widely used to enhance the situation of its members,

ulama and institutions.

Because of its national scope of recruitment, the NU and other organisasi massa establishes a link between villages and supralocal entities. The NU of Pamekasan, for instance, has for years sent its leaders to represent the organization in the parliament and provincial assembly. When they return to Pamekasan they discuss up-to date issues with the other NU leaders and kyais as well as talk to villagers on various socio-religious occasions such as feasts, mustamfians and festivities. Indeed, speakers and leaders of the NU use many such public gatherings in order to promote their organization. In many of the speeches which I was able to gather, the NU is vividly compared to "a big pondok led smoothly by great ulama." It is thus expected that one should not doubt the goal and dedication of the NU. "Nothing better serves our religious interest now and our goal hereafter than the NU. Why? Because it is wisely guided and patiently led by the ulama," a speaker told the audience at a public gathering held during the 1984 imtihan festivities in the pondok of Bettet. Furthermore, another theme in public speeches is that the NU has national recognition. In order to boost the morale of its members, the NU has been pictured as influential. Prior to the 1984 Congress, the leaders in Pamekasan never failed to mention that the NU had won special recognition from the national leaders. This was evidenced, they claimed with some justification, by the fact that only the NU among large Islamic organizations was allowed by the President of the Republic to hold its congress. This claim undoubtedly served important aims such as the eradication of the popular view, especially among local government officials that the ulama were opponents of the régime. But for the NU members and villagers generally the emphasis was on the individual acumen, popularity and influence of the ulama among the *pejabat*s (higher government officials). Within the context of the village world and understanding, various national issues and events are conveyed by the NU's organizers to Madurese villagers. These leaders have thus been enjoying and dominating the most effective and direct means of communication with the village dwellers.

Traders and migrants

The commercialization of various village products strengthens the networks of traders and merchants. The widespread tobacco cultivation in Pamekasan, for example, has helped the emergence of local seasonal brokers, middlemen and processors. These small entrepreneurs maintain several levels of relations and interactions, and deal with the supralocal financiers and dealers (cf. de Jonge 1984). Benefiting from the relatively large amount of money involved in the business, these individuals enjoy high spatial mobility. Accordingly, they have more access to supravillage news, ideas and experiences.

This translates itself into material acquisitions. Motorcycles, radios, battery powered televisions and more dresses are purchased; the house is restructured according to the town style. When the children grow up, they are sent, after some years of religious instruction and elementary schooling, to a secondary school in the town. From their observation and experience these people believe that their children have to know many things outside the village world which they themselves have had difficulties to grasp. This does not mean that they have become free from the ulama. Indeed, they live in the two domains with relative ease. When a local trader succeeds in accumulating capital and running a steady business, he is categorized by the neighbors as better-off villager (*oring cokop*). In a society where success in business is much admired but can also be suspected of having come about because of manipulating the energies of the spirits (*makhluk alos*) the successful traders and the newly wealthy villagers are inclined to identify themselves as honest and, at least as having the attributes of, religious persons. For this reason, they are less concerned with conciliating their poor, cynical, jealous neighbors than with affiliating themselves with well-known kyais. A number of the present-day local traders started their businesses almost from nothing, as helpers and laborers. In certain areas like Pakong and Prenduan in Sumenep, however, many successful traders belong to dominant families (de Jonge 1984). In other words, the prevailing large entrepreneurs in these areas are descendants or heirs of already established traders.

The traders contribute to the smoothness of many functions and services in the

villages. The close affiliation of many prominent entrepreneurs with the ulama eases the channeling of funds to the latter. As the funds are used in various social and religious projects such as schools, mosques, canals, footpaths, wells and festivities, the villagers benefit from such facilities. Although the villagers place a higher value upon the ability of the ulama to accumulate and then allocate such funds, many traders also indirectly contribute to village life. Indeed, in many ways the traders are among the proponents of the continuity and order that sustain the existing *modus vivendi* in villages. They have benefited from the present village economy as much as from their access to profitable markets outside Madura. They have, however, formed no institution that directly deals with village interests, let alone that carries out such undertakings as providing able village children with scholarships to pursue further studies at higher educational institutions. Nevertheless, in direct economic terms such as employment offers and cash circulation, prominent traders do considerably affect the lives of segments of villagers. Their businesses absorb a large number of workers and assistants, and their domestic life requires regular supplies of certain products and extensive services. Because these successful traders and dealers learn their skills and management techniques from experience in apprenticeship, their successors are their sons, relatives, or even hired assistants. The accumulation of wealth as well as prodigal spending by the traders in many ways helps to stimulate and reinforce various social and economic activities in their surrounding.

Outmigration: a link between villages and cities. Migration, permanent or seasonal, has for a long time become a way of life for many Madurese. The island of Madura, however, remains the symbol of affiliation and identity. For this reason the village migrants endeavor as far as possible to go back to their native village at least once a year. When a villager is able to establish himself in the new location, he will ask, or be requested by, his relatives in the village to join him. Furthermore, correspondence with friends and relatives in the village is maintained. In view of the seemingly monotonous character and plain life of village existence, a question may arise about where the impact of out-migration on the economy and the way of life of

the villagers comes to bear. Indeed, in terms of capital accumulation, the out migration has only meagre inputs to the village economy. Seasonal migrants from villages to the cities like Surabaya, Jakarta and Malang are non-skilled laborers. As a result they have a difficult time to secure stable employment as well as to put aside any considerable sum as savings. In many cases their migration is another means of survival. Yet many migrants are thrifty enough to cling tightly to marginal amounts of cash, this eventually allows them to improve their business and other economic undertakings. Many migrants who have not found a lucrative niche in the cities often invest their savings in village agriculture. Thus it is not surprising to see out migrants spending their dry seasons in villages to grow tobacco. The case of Senan, a 34-year-old migrant villager from Kampong Barak may explain how seasonal migrants spend their time in the native village.

When he was ten years old Senan went to Malang with his parents. Like other village migrants from the area, Senan's parents opened a stall to sell tubers and vegetables in one of the city markets. While living in Malang, the family's property in Kampong Barak was kept intact by entrusting a relative to take care of it. From his childhood Senan was asked from time to time to stay in and run his parents' stall. After some time he was assigned to open his own stall. He initially made considerable profits but later his capital decreased. He then worked elsewhere as *calo* (one who provides intercity taxis with passengers), and at different time as *kuli* (day laborer). The stall was then assigned to his older sister. The family, Senan recalled, usually spent the *Telasan* (celebration at the end of the Ramadhan fasting) in Bettet. In the village they spent some money to renovate the house and help the needy relatives. On their return to Malang they brought some relatives to find jobs in the city. Senan's older sister was married in 1968 to a young *mak kaeh* from Bettet. Later Senan also married a village girl belonging to his immediate kin. Most of the time his wife has been left in the village. He planned for quite some time to settle with her and the children in the city, but he could not support them by his uncertain employment.

For the last three tobacco seasons (1982, 1983 and 1984), Senan like many other village migrants returned to Bettet and cultivated tobacco. With the job uncertain, and high competition in the kind of job that he had in the city, Senan regarded that investment in the village agriculture might bring him a stable income, small though it may be, and village harmony. Together with his brother-in-law and neighbors Senan helped renovate the *langgar raja* in his kampung.

Migrants receive specific treatment during their home visit or return. When a migrant returns to the village, he will show his relatives, neighbors and colleagues that he has achieved many things. Whatever his daily activities and occupation in the city, he will dress nicely, bring sufficient gifts (*leh oleh*), tell tall tale and express his view about cities and different peoples. The relatives and neighbors meet the returning migrants to share their joys and listen to their stories. Conversely, a returning migrant wants to know what has been going on in the village and the neighborhood. Since such meetings are brief and impressionistic, the villagers do not easily accept what a returning migrant tells them. They have their own stereotypic idea concerning the migrants. The tendency to picture life in the city as glamorous but risky, easy to earn but also to spend, is indeed common among migrants. The villagers usually wait for some time in order to form a definite idea about a migrant. My informants like to banter about returning migrants. The first day they arrive they eat only biscuits and smoke only the GG (a brand of expensive cigarettes), after the second night they eat *tenggeng* (cassava) and smoke our cut tobacco."

With their slightly better income, migrants generally enjoy certain advantages in the village, even if they are temporary. They are able to bring valuables to the relatives and neighbors. And at times they help the latter with capital in the form of cattle, rented land or cash. Their experience in peddling, providing services and retailing is a valuable asset once they decide to re-settle in the village or to help relatives

through creating job opportunities. Nevertheless, certain common characteristics among migrants such as high illiteracy, low formal education, lack of vocational training, and in-group oriented housing pattern keep them from smoothly expanding their world view and occupation quality as well as from taking new factors into account. The migrants' best intellectual gift to their fellow-villagers remains their own personal experiences in creating an economic niche for themselves in the urban and other areas.

Education

Until quite recently western-style education has remained peripheral for village children. The newly independent government could not be expected to provide the educational facilities overnight in order to absorb the village children. In addition to the limited number of schools within a reasonable distance, many parents did not see the direct advantage and aim of attending such a public institution. Most of my informants who never experienced study at the public school generally placed the blame for their illiteracy on the lack of motivation on their part. When they grew up they got involved with the village routine and activities such as helping the family to secure its basic needs, joining a religious educational institution, taking part in certain adult social activities, and at the same time attempting to secure economic independence to prepare for marriage. They do not blame anyone nor single out any institution as having created a spirit of indifference to schooling. It was "our way of life" (*kabada'anna oring desa*) at that time, a sawyer told me. On the other hand, several, usually well-off, parents who had a certain relationship with town figures or pegawais did send their children to elementary school. In the Bettet area, since the school was located away from the village in a more populous location, children were not available to help the family for most of the day. Accordingly, the low income parents who had no clear idea about modern schooling kept their children at home to help in house chores. In addition, the children were not encouraged to join the school since it was founded in an unsuitable location and an unfamiliar setting. The situation remained so until quite recently. This was true despite the fact that during the

Sukarno era, the literacy program was vigorously advocated in the whole country, including the island of Madura.

Table 4.1 Enrolment at the Elementary School (SD) and Number of SD in Pamekasan

Year	Number of Pupils	Number of SD	Population
1970	18,963	195	455,362
1971	22,834	195	
1972	26,194	195	
1973	30,489	195	
1974	34,536	195	
1975	36,846	195	
1976	42,027	195	
1977	46,539	231	538,440
1978	51,305	234	
1979	56,273	269	
1980	42,182	308	
1981	72,412	363	
1982	81,648	368	

(Source Bappeda Tk. II Kabupaten Pamekasan, 1983)

The massive increase in elementary public schools during the last few years has been instrumental in the increasing enrollment of school-age children. The high percentage increase of the enrollment, as can be seen in Table 4.1, is not an independent phenomenon. It was not uncommon during the 1970's to find that many of the SD Inpres¹⁵ in certain villages failed to attract pupils. Indeed, many village children preferred to join a local madrasah or to remain out of school. In such a case, the school plan was probably enforced from above without local consent, especially from the religious leaders. The subsequent events indicated that in certain areas where the ulama were dominant, public schools have been established after consultation with them and with their consent. Instead of challenging the public school by opening classes at the madrasah in the morning, parallel to the public school session, the ulama have not objected to holding their elementary religious classes in the afternoon

¹⁵ Elementary schools built on the basis of a special order from the President (*Instruksi Presiden*).

(cf. *Laporan Hasil Penelitian* 1980:41-2; Amir Santoso 1980:144-5). Many village children therefore have had opportunity to go to the public school in the morning and to join religious classes in the afternoon as well as to take part in the evening pengajian at the langgar raja.

Furthermore, in many villages, elementary, non-religious education is also given by private Islamic schools (*MI/Madrasah Ibtida'iyah*) (see Chapter 10). Unlike the regular religious madrasah, the MI provides, besides religious subjects, general instruction parallel to that offered at the public school. As a result the successful graduates can join public secondary schools. The number of the MIs, however, is very limited. There are several reasons for this. Since public schools are already operative in each desa and in some areas the MI faces competition from the neighboring schools, most of the MIs, which cannot match the public school in terms of facilities, teaching staff and sometimes power, are merely surviving. The purely religious classes in the afternoon and evening, however, remain popular in villages.

Formal education relates villagers to the supralocal context. Elementary education, of course, concentrates primarily on providing the three R's. In Madura where the Grade 2 pupils start learning, among other things, the Indonesian language, village children are introduced to extra-village symbols. Moreover, the teaching of geography, national history and the state ideology of Pancasila (*Pendidikan Moral Pancasila*) strongly promotes among village children a sense of being part of a wider world. Unlike their illiterate parents and neighbors, these children generally understand supralocal symbols with coherence and more definite motive and rationale. Take the example of the teaching of Pancasila for village children, for the first time in their lives, these children learn that not all their fellow countrymen are Muslims, and that the Madurese do not even constitute an ethnic majority in Indonesia. On the other hand, these children are taught for years that they are citizens of an independent country and that whatever differences in religion, locality, ethnic background and language may be found in the country, they are expected to cooperate and build the future of a united Indonesia. Furthermore, the relative economic stability of teachers

and pegawais in recent years becomes a source of admiration among older pupils at village schools. Again, the personal approach of many teachers toward their prospective students urging them to pursue higher education has had a strong impact on the children's views about careers and opportunities outside their village world. Although many illiterate parents cannot follow the scientific achievements of their children, they often ask the latter about certain popular national symbols which they have heard of or seen somewhere in public places, at festivals, or on radio or television.

The spread of general education to villages has propelled further mobility, new occupations, more diversified information and novel lifestyles. The wider access to education has permitted an increasing number of villagers to pursue skill oriented occupations outside villages. If previously village migrants consisted primarily of non-skilled workers who eked out a living in urban centers as laborers, peddlers, food sellers and pedicab drivers, in recent years more youth have been absorbed into government posts, the armed forces, professional establishments and teaching positions. Nevertheless, since most of these positions require education higher than elementary level, only a handful of villagers have benefited from the opportunities. Moreover, the coming of outsiders and even non-Madurése to villages as teachers and officials indirectly stimulates the local awareness of wider contexts and challenges. Although at times such external interference creates local resentment, given equal opportunity and wider participation villagers respond positively.

On the other hand, religious education emphasizes symbols that exist beyond the village. Religious instruction in the madrasah and langgar raja concentrates on transmitting correct, even at times ideal, ways of life to the children. It primarily inculcates in them religious duties, symbols of faith, values and a sense of belonging to the Islamic community (*umat*). Using stories about religious figures in the Middle East, Central Asia, other parts of Indonesia and places in Madura, the religious teachers are able to stimulate a wider world view among children. Instead of imposing "unity within diversity," religious education promotes, *inter alia*, a wider, exclusivist brotherhood of coreligionists. Yet to an extent it negates the ethnic inward-looking attitude.

The sources of the religious literature and the centers of Islamic learning which mainly exist outside Madura undoubtedly accelerate among children the feeling of belonging to and at the same time depending on such external entities.

The education network forms a link among different segments of the population. Religious education and its institutions are structured and related to one another within local, supralocal and even in some cases intra- /supra- national networks. For instance, the strong relations among pondok graduates and colleagues as well as between kyais and santris who usually organize educational centers, as we shall see in Chapter 11, perpetuate a long, stable bond. Since they scatter in different regions, including Java, the pondok networks cut across several parochial boundaries. Although the Madurese santris have their own preferences for pondoks and kyais, the latter are in many ways related to their counterparts in Java and elsewhere. Again, the identification of most supporters of these educational institutions with the supralocal socio-religious organizations increases the outward looking perspective of village santris and ulama. On the other hand, the extra curricular activities at the public schools and their hierarchical network improve the supralocal orientation of village students. The various styles of school uniform which have been recommended to the elementary and secondary students provide them with a particular identity. They belong to the same school system, as do other fellow students throughout the country, that is, to the Indonesian government school. Furthermore, the boy-scout movement (*Pramuka*) which is organized at the public schools increases the sense of membership in a supralocal institution. Again, it inculcates symbols of national belonging.

Chapter Five

PATTERNS OF LOCAL AUTHORITY IN MADURESE VILLAGES

Leadership can be 'formal' or 'informal' (Bailey 1969 73-5). Those local leaders who do not derive their authority from governmental institutions are commonly referred to as informal leaders. In Madura the ulama have been regarded as the most influential informal leaders. We have briefly noted a facet of the leadership role of the ulama in the villages, but a more specific treatment of the ulama's authority will be given below. On the other hand, the formal leaders who derive their leadership primarily from governmental investiture have faced certain dilemmas regarding leadership. For quite some time desa elections have been held to elect village headmen (klebuns). In return for the opportunity to participate in the political process of the village, the villagers are expected to accept the legitimate authority of the elected klebun. The fact remains, however, that the klebuns have increasingly been seen as government agents in the villages. In the following discussion, the klebun is not seen within the separate domain of Weber's frequently quoted classification of authority (charismatic, traditional and rational/legal), but rather is regarded as overlapping these categories.

Background of local authority in the villages

The dilemmas and crises of authority faced by a klebun today have their origins in the relations of the village with the political regimes in the center. As we saw, the scattered nature of settlements in the island has had a strong impact on the fragmented nature of village organization. The villagers themselves maintain close ties with their immediate neighbors and kin. One of these kinsmen, usually, but not necessarily, from among the elder generations, is entrusted with leadership, particularly as regards working the land, leading ceremonies, protecting the settlements and conducting exchanges with outsiders.¹⁶ Since a new settlement is an offshoot of older

¹⁶ The popular title of mak kaeh (lit. father's father or grandfather) addressed to the local ulama seems to have origin in its wide use for identifying such local elders.

ones elsewhere, ties between them are maintained and often strengthened through marriage. But the discontinuous settlement patterns perpetuate their autonomy and isolation. In the past, the independence and autonomy of these settlements was a major reason for the fragility of petty rulership in the island. Insofar as emerging rulers could not send permanent agents into the villages, their power remained transient. The difficulty in sending agents to villages was mainly a result of village isolation. When a strong pretender was able to raise a powerful army, he had a better chance of appointing agents who were then responsible for the collection of taxes. As long as the ruler was able to impose his will on the villagers, his agents were able to bring him taxes and other wealth. From being an *ad hoc* representative of the ruler, an agent might eventually be given a permanent position in the village. In a later stage such an agent was labelled a *klebun*. Although the *klebun* might live in the village, because of local settlement patterns he usually formed a separate neighborhood. Once a *klebun* was settled permanently in the village, his descendants were in most cases entitled to inherit the position. However, the *klebun* remained outside the local village structure.

The separateness of the *klebun* was caused not so much by his external origin as by the local settlement pattern. Indeed, the settlement patterns are themselves a consequence of a social decision. The protection of the villages by the established ruler was, of course, an asset to the local inhabitants, as the latter would be willing to submit taxes, tributes and corvees collected by the ruler's agents in the villages (*klebuns*). Since the communication between village settlements was minimal, the *klebuns* only occasionally had the opportunity to renew ties with the local inhabitants. The primary orientation of the *klebun* was limited to his own hamlet. The autonomy of village settlements continued to be significant as endogamous marriages among kinsmen became the norm. Accordingly, a *klebun* continued to be seen as an agent of the ruler. Despite the fact that a *klebun* lived among villagers, he belonged to a separate entity. His real leadership was limited to his own settlement as he occupied a customarily sanctioned elder's position, even though he possessed power to impose the

ruler's demand on the villagers at large. In certain areas where larger communal efforts were needed to maintain order and the economy, the klebuns might be expected to widen their influence by rallying the local inhabitants for such tasks. Nevertheless, the dominant feature of the dry tegal-land in the region strongly disfavored the recurrences of such an opportunity. Tegal-land did not require extensive labor and wide-scale cooperation. In most cases, the well-established klebuns might have conducted alliances with elders in the neighboring settlements through marriages, exchanges of gifts, medication and religious teaching.

Desa elections in Madurese villages

The centripetal orientation of the village settlement continued to be strong even after a stronger ruler (rato) assigned clusters of such village settlements to his courtiers and officials as appanages. As we saw, the 1858 reorganization of Pamekasan resulted in a massive land distribution. Most land was then assigned to individual villagers. Since the new arrangement did not significantly alter the pattern of, and access to, production, village settlements were kept intact. The local elders remained the lone reference for the inhabitants in the settlement. Their authority was recognized and thus legitimized by virtue of their senior status in the local generation levels. This arrangement provided a good opportunity for siblings to maneuver for a position in the local leadership. Indeed, villagers did not favor primogeniture as the youngest child commonly inherited the original house (bengko asal).

Although a klebun continued, in theory at least, to be appointed by the regent, by the late nineteenth century attempts were made to secure popular support for the klebuns. A limited forum for desa elections was introduced at the turn of this century. In Bettet, for example, many villagers still preserve accounts of the shift in desa affairs during this period. Prior to the organization of the desa elections in Bettet, the colonial government made two appointments for the klebunship of Bettet. The klebuns came from the town proper and neighboring Teja. During the first desa election in 1937, a local candidate who had no ties with the previous klebuns won the election. Although this candidate secured support from an influential kyai in the area, his victory was also

due to the extensive consanguineal and affinal ties he had in the village. Indeed, his kinsmen were more numerous than those of any one of the other five candidates who ran for the desa election.

The limited desa election did not significantly modify the klebun's authority. By bringing villagers to the polls, an elected klebun was expected to represent the majority of the villagers. In the past the klebun was merely a government agent at the village level and thus had to compete with different village elders. Following the introduction of the desa elections, the klebun was partly directed to take over the authority of these elders. The government's main aim in this scheme was to establish an effective and popular administrator at the village level. Because voting for village leadership was novel, primordial methods for choosing a candidate remained dominant. A villager cast his vote for a candidate mainly because the latter belonged to groupings corresponding to the former's. Yet the government strengthened the position of the elected klebun by granting him official symbols such as an inauguration, an official seal and power. The unambiguous affiliation of an elected klebun with his parochial groupings continued to create obstacles in the years ahead as regards his assumption of leadership for the whole desa. This is particularly so since the klebun only had very restricted resources and initiatives with which to show his concern over desa development. Apart from his percaton land, the klebun was forced to rely on his traditional means of affiliation and persuasion in order to rally support from the villagers. Nonetheless, through years of klebunship, a headman might build up a certain level of popularity, influence and prestige over the desa inhabitants by virtue of his patronage, official position, recurrent communication and reciprocal services. Indeed, in the process of his leadership, a klebun could maneuver key issues and affairs which directly affected individuals or the desa as a whole. Accordingly, the longer a klebun occupied the desa headship, the stronger and more legitimate his authority and power became. But the fact remains that the centripetal orientation of each village settlement in the desa perpetuated the fragmentation of desa authority into local nuclei.

The patterns of production in the villages strengthened the isolation of settlements from each other. Since each settlement depended heavily on cultivating land in the surrounding fields, its inhabitants had few economic interests in common with their neighboring settlers. More specifically, the dry tegal ecotype did not require any massive cooperative work for irrigation and cultivation among diverse settlements. Such isolation and inward-looking tendencies can still be seen today in the absence of good paths between many settlements. Under such conditions it is not surprising that the klebun had difficulties in stimulating cooperation among the inhabitants of the diverse settlements in his desa and in exercising his authority over the entire administrative desa. In view of the low productivity of agriculture and the economic hardship of the villagers, a klebun could do little to ask them to put aside surplus for village projects which did not correspond directly to the peasant interests. Moreover, the popular image of the klebun as the government agent, tax collector and labor expropriator did not work favorably for his reputation, particularly since the injection of funds for village projects almost never materialized. Indeed, village settlements were left to manage their own affairs and develop on their own, even though their inhabitants were required to pay taxes and perform labor. Only on rare occasions such as vaccination campaigns, the massive mobilization against epidemics and the distribution of famine aid did villagers directly benefit from the bureaucracy, including the klebun. As a result, the klebun was forced to establish personal ties with the local elders if he ever wanted to get more access to villagers in their hamlet. By enlisting as many local elders as possible in the desa administration, the klebun might win some local popularity. Yet the limited resources which were available to absorb such elders continued to alienate many segments of the desa inhabitants as they had no direct link to the klebun.

Unlike the local mak kaeh, the klebun did not have a physical symbol which distinguished him as a formal secular leader. Although a klebun enjoyed a relatively large amount of percaton land, he was left with only insignificant symbols of power in the village except official symbols. His house did not significantly differ structurally from

those of the villagers', even though he might build a bigger one as he accumulated wealth from his percaton land. The idea of a village hall or office did not prevail. Personal matters and official dealings converged, as a klebun's house was given multifaceted functions to receive various segments of society including guests, villagers and officials. The absence of a universal village hall, or the like for the klebun, comparable to the mosque for the local imam, functioning as a popular physical symbol worked unfavorably against the klebun's authority over the desa as a whole. In fact, the villagers, as many older inhabitants in Bettet recalled, kept away from the klebun's house. They did not have a reasonable excuse to drop in casually and chat with the klebun. Only on particular occasions such as getting approval and certification for cattle or land sales did a villager meet the klebun. Furthermore, governmental attempts to compensate for the low income of the klebun from his percaton land by preserving his right over labor (*kemit*) from adult villagers only added to his negative image among the villagers as a power enforcer.

In villages the klebun represents a few inhabitants who have access to lucrative economic resources. Being a member of the bureaucracy, the klebun is given rights to the cultivation (*usufruct*) of relatively large agricultural lands (*tana percaton*, or *tana kongsen*). Indeed, the klebun has various sources of extra income. The *tana percaton* for the klebun varies from one desa to another, depending primarily on the size of the desa population as well as the breadth of the desa territories. But the klebun receives no less than five hectares of agricultural land even in a desa as small as Kodik of Propopo (territory: 93 ha; and population: 605 in 1984). Furthermore, the klebun is entrusted with the collection of desa taxes on land and fees on the transfer of valuable properties. A fraction of this collected fund is assigned to the klebun and his assistants. To this day the klebun has the right to maintain the *kemit* for no more than two days of work annually¹⁷ from each household head in his desa. Although he can employ them in his domestic projects, most *kemits* are organized to execute

¹⁷ For the villagers who prefer to submit cash, they are required to pay an equivalent amount to the cost of two days of work.

public works including the repair and building of the desa footpath, mosque, canal, road or bridge. Being the formal leader in the desa, the klebun receives various gifts from the villagers, particularly during wedding ceremonies. Various forms of certificates including identity cards needed by the villagers provide the klebun with additional cash as villagers pay a certain amount of money in return for the service. On the other hand, government funds which are trickled down to villages through the bureaucracy have enhanced the klebun's prestige and, to an extent, his economy. The klebun has the final say in the allocation of diverse government funds for rural development including the *bantuan desa* (village development aid) and diverse schemes of the *proyek pertanian* (agricultural development plan), even though the plan for funded projects has to be approved by the desa council as well as the camat or other government agencies in certain cases.

Despite the expansion of the desa electoral franchise since independence to include all adult villagers, the klebun's authority did not undergo any major change. Since the villages did not witness any significant improvement in agricultural, economic and social features (see the next chapter), the desa election continued to channel the primordial cleavages and ties in the villages. As the following discussion of the desa election in the Bettet area will illustrate, kinship ties, patronage and personal bonds have been the most important factors in the villagers's support for a particular candidate. Insofar as several candidates emerge to contest the desa election, the elected klebun will face deep political cleavage in the desa, particularly among supporters of these candidates. As a result, the newly elected klebun has, and will have for some time to come, only partial authority over the desa.

The desa election is held following the death or resignation of the klebun. This occurs despite the fact that officially a desa election must take place every eight years (cf. Prasadja 1980, Schulte Nordholt 1982). Although the klebuns have been absorbed into the pegawai corps (Korpri), they are practically immune from age-ceiling retirements. Again, only on rare occasions does a klebun resigns voluntarily or by force. Thus once a klebun is elected he is almost secure in his position particularly if he is

committed to execute official duties and programs. Only the bupati has the power to dismiss a klebun from office. An unpopular klebun will survive as a desa head, insofar as he performs his formal and fundamental functions. Because the desa does not exercise power to replace its own elected leader, local dissatisfaction against a klebun has little effect. The relatively good income enjoyed by a klebun becomes a source of attraction for the competing local élite. Not surprisingly, they do not hesitate to agitate against the klebun, particularly the newly elected one, by raising any issue which may denigrate his reputation. Partly in response to this phenomenon the government often ignores local unrest against the klebun. Unless the klebun glaringly fails to obey rules and to execute essential duties and programs, he will enjoy government support. Accordingly, dissatisfaction against a klebun has to be channelled through higher officials. In the villages where the local leaders have better access to the higher authorities, such dissatisfaction undoubtedly finds effective means of changing the fate of particular klebuns. Nevertheless, villagers rarely witness the dismissal of their klebun. The villagers explained, "once a klebun is involuntarily discharged [i.e. under pressure from some factions in the desa], his desa will experience more, recurrent dismissals of its klebun. As a result, such a desa is more fragmented and disunited than ever. It is not comfortable (*tak nyaman*) to conduct our regular life under such conditions."

Prior to the desa election, the headmanship is assigned to an interim head (*klebun karteker* or *penjabat klebun*). He usually comes from among the local senior desa officials. In certain desas where the government is worried about suspected political unrest, it may appoint a military officer as interim klebun without a definite time limit. In most cases, however, an interim klebun has to prepare the atmosphere and facilities for the desa election, even though he may eventually join the race. Since many klebuns appoint their sons or sons-in-law to positions in the desa administration, such relatives most probably have better chances to assume the interim klebunship. When such persons join the race for the desa election, they undoubtedly have a greater opportunity to win votes, not only because of their experience and accumulated popularity but also because of the villagers' view that office and descent are

closely related.

Although the campaign period for a desa election is limited, prospective candidates unofficially emerge as soon as the desa election is expected to be held. An interesting feature of an individual's claim to legitimacy as regards his candidacy for the desa elections is the self-denial of personal interests. Legitimacy may be manifested in such concepts as descent, popular support, requests by prominent leaders, and having dreams of meeting the deceased klebun or other prominent figures. By securing at least one of these bases of legitimacy, a candidate may thus maximize his prospects for winning popular votes by adopting more practical methods. Because candidacy requires considerable financial support, only well-off villagers can run for the desa elections. Officially a candidate spends cash only to register his name at the kecamatan. But a serious candidate cannot fail to seek supporters through generosity, gifts and good will. This is especially so since the campaign for the desa election is done not through public speeches or debates but through persuasion and manipulation by clients, assistants and mediators (*botohs*). To explain these patterns of the candidacy in the desa election, let us examine closely the emergence of several candidates in the 1983 desa election in the Bettet area.

The desa election in the Bettet area searching for legitimacy

The death of the incumbent klebun, Matis, in late 1981 opened the door for the desa election in a village in the Bettet area. Shortly after his death, the desa secretary (*carik*) was appointed as the interim klebun. As a senior official and outsider, the *carik* was seen by many local leaders as a perfect neutral interim headman. It is important to note in passing that all six sons of the deceased klebun have secured occupations outside the village, four as government teachers and two as migrants to the city. His only son-in-law was nominated as a desa official (*apel*) shortly before his death. Because this son-in-law lacked experience and popularity, he did not qualify for the interim headship.

Candidacies. By late 1982, as the date of the forthcoming desa election

approached, several villagers made legitimate claims for candidacy, including one migrant son of the deceased klebun. As a direct descendant of the klebun, he regarded himself with some justification as a strong contender for the position.¹⁸ Since he had spent most of his adulthood in the city as a student and then as a migrant, he was not well acquainted with village politics. Accordingly, he sought counsel and support from the strong kyai in the area who responded negatively to his plan. The klebun's son immediately withdrew his candidacy and returned to the city. On the other hand, the carik, who then acted as interim headman did not receive popular support. Indeed, being an inhabitant of a neighboring desa, the carik never seriously considered himself as a candidate in the desa election.

When in the early part of 1983 it was officially announced that the desa election would be held in August, the names of several prospective candidates were circulated in the desa. Under such circumstances some villagers seriously or jokingly enticed their fellows to run for the desa election. Indeed, two villagers formally attempted to base their candidacy primarily on the basis of such popular support. Jemani, who was a pegawai, received support mainly from his friends in the kolom gathering. When he had recurrent dreams indicating that the deceased klebun endorsed his candidacy, he started to think seriously about running for the election. More specifically, the support and encouragement demonstrated by several elders convinced Jemani to join the race. Another contender, Muni, who was a carpenter, claimed that many of his kinsmen encouraged him to run for the klebunship. Again, being the son of a former klebun (Matis's predecessor), Muni almost certainly attempted to take advantage of the villagers' belief in the right of descent to the office. Although Muni eventually failed to join the desa election for lack of formal education, he had fought hard to satisfy the official requirements through various means. In his stubborn endeavors, which ended in vain, Muni lost his house and other personal valuables in order to pay the cost of his decision to run for the office.

¹⁸ In three neighboring desas, the sons of the deceased klebuns succeeded their fathers through the desa elections after serving as the cariks and interim headmen.

Two other people claimed that a supralocal kyai, a prominent and influential figure in the region, asked them to run for the desa election. One of them refused to run. Being a relatively young government teacher, he thought that his current position was better and more stable than the klebunship which was officially to be contested every eight years. The kyai then asked Sonep, a retired pegawai and at the same time a close disciple and friend, to run for the klebun's office. The retired pegawai did not accept the kyai's request until the latter had repeated his pleas several times. Being a retired pegawai who had spent most of his time outside the area, he was not sure that he could rally support from the villagers. Moreover, he was one of the few wealthy villagers. Indeed, the purpose of his return to his native village, as he told me, "...was to enjoy old age in the nostalgic atmosphere of the village." Therefore, his legitimacy for the candidacy was primarily due to the kyai's full support. Nonetheless, the kyai's overt and exclusive support for a particular candidate created confusion in the desa even during the period after election of klebun. As will be illustrated below, despite their popularity and influence, the kyais do not possess the power to enforce ideas and choices in secular matters.

By the time the government officially announced the candidacy list for the campaign period leading up to the 1983 desa election, there were only two candidates, Jemani and Sonep. Although neither of the candidates possessed a secondary school certificate, as older pegawais they satisfied the official requirements by virtue of their experience in the government offices as government employees. If Sonep was able to claim his candidacy with the full support of the influential supralocal kyai, Jemani conversely played down such religious backing. A few words should be said, however, about Jemani's contact with the kyai.

Realizing the kyai's influence on villagers, Jemani quite early attempted to secure his support. Prior to the formal registration for the candidacy, Jemani asked a couple of local figures who were close to the kyai to accompany him to meet the kyai. Jemani recalled that the following points were raised during the meeting 1- the

kyai did not object to Jemani's candidacy; 2- the kyai had no right whatsoever to stop any villager to run for the desa election; and 3- although the kyai had supported Sonep, Jemani was welcomed, as the kyai metaphorically alluded that "...a wedding ceremony cannot be held unless we have a bride and groom (*mantan binek ban lakek*).” Jemani was not quite satisfied with the kyai's ambiguous support, therefore he sent his father-in-law to meet the kyai. In addition, shortly afterward a mak kaeh in Jemani's hamlet told him that the kyai fully supported Sonep in the desa election. In response to this statement, Jemani decided to meet the kyai once again in order to withdraw his candidacy. The kyai replied that he could not do anything to approve or reject one's candidacy. "This is outside my authority (*kobasa*);” the kyai reiterated.

Moreover, many villagers in Jemani's neighborhood, some of his kinsmen and several elders who had previously encouraged him to run for the desa election objected to Jemani's withdrawal in front of the kyai. Thus, a delegation under a prominent local mak kaeh was sent to see the kyai in order to explain and show the popular support for Jemani's candidacy. The kyai essentially expressed his consent for Jemani's candidacy and repeated that "...it is inconvenient to hold a wedding party unless we have a bride and groom.” Indeed, this statement was later used by Jemani's supporters during the campaigns that the kyai was neutral in his support for the two candidates.

On the other hand, Sonep's supporters claimed that the kyai was fully behind Sonep. They criticized Jemani's supporters of having been unable to understand the "refined expression" of the kyai.

Campaigns for the desa election. The campaigns for the desa election were energetically launched by the candidates' followers and supporters. All possible means were utilized to gain support. Insofar as most villagers followed their traditional local opinion leaders, the campaigners concentrated their efforts on winning the sympathy and good will of these local leaders. Sonep's campaigners constantly evoked the kyai's support for the former's candidacy by pointing to the inconsistency

showed by Jemani, implying that the latter openly challenged the kyai. But promises and rewards were also widely used by Sonep. For example, in order to win the support of the family of the deceased klebun who lived close to Jemani, Sonep had promised them that, if elected, he would hand the desa office building in their compound over to the family. He also rewarded the leading campaigners who commanded a large following with gifts, cash, and the promise of the usufruct of the percaton land. Again, for a lorah pondok who commanded no less than 300 votes among his santris, Sonep made other daring promises and valuable gifts. Since the total votes for the 1983 election did not exceed 1200, a definite number of secured votes was significant for Sonep's election. Furthermore, Sonep paid wide attention to village development by investing considerable funds to sponsor the improvement of village pathways which connected his settlement to the central village.

On the other hand, Jemani's camp popularized the idea that the kyai did not favor any candidate. They criticized Sonep as arrogant, harsh and unfamiliar with the local problems and priorities. They also warned that if elected, Sonep would dismiss all prevailing desa officials and replace them with his own men. Although Sonep was close to the kyai, Jemani's campaigners reiterated that the kyai wanted the villagers to express their own choice because the elected klebun would be the desa leader, not the kyai's agent. In response to the rumor that Sonep would receive no less than 300 votes from the pondok santris alone, Jemani's camp explained that the effort did not originate from the kyai but from his subordinate, the lorah. They said that since the santris' ultimate obedience was to the kyai, and the kyai remained neutral in the desa election, none could guarantee Sonep's claim. Indeed, by showing the cleavage inside the pondok and by claiming the neutrality of the kyai, Jemani's camp enjoyed moral credibility among many villagers. For, in the final analysis, Jemani did not challenge the kyai's decision and will. Moreover, in order to boost Jemani's popularity, his campaigners claimed that Jemani had received direct support from higher government officials.

Despite the absence of public speeches, the ideas, arguments and promises made

by each candidate and his campaigners were effectively propagated through koloms, street/cafe talk (*geppok talar*), small, casual gatherings, private conversations and visits. Yet in an implicit and discreet fashion, Sonep's camp had a better chance to deliver their message publicly through the weekly female *mustami'an*.

Throughout the campaign, a candidate's chief means of winning the support of the villagers was based, not so much on his programs for village development, as on the merits of his personality and the legitimacy of his claim to leadership. The emphasis was on the rationale and place of a candidate's leadership role within the village status quo. The purported claim that the candidates did not merely follow their own whim, but rather were under pressure from the elders and neighbors to run for the desa election was used to legitimize the candidates' quest for leadership. The ideology behind this attitude was the view that a village leader had to show a commitment to the maintenance of local order and harmony and defend the prevailing relational arrangement. In view of the prevalence of parochial clusters, groupings and factions in the villages, a candidate could not ignore such social segmentation. Insofar as ordinary villagers had to accommodate and embrace such parochial leadership, their direct interests were often subordinated to their immediate grouping's and leader's. By acknowledging and respecting such parochial arrangements, a candidate attempted to win votes and grass-roots legitimacy.

Furthermore, the centrality of such supralocal figures as the *kyai* in enhancing a candidate's prestige was strongly felt. As local inhabitants who had experienced the impact of the *kyai*'s opinion and support of certain issues relative to the villagers at large, the candidates wholeheartedly endeavored to win the *kyai*'s consent, if not endorsement, for their candidacy. As a popular religious figure, the *kyai* wielded strong moral influence in providing a candidate with legitimacy for the latter's claim to local leadership. Because of the villagers' trust in the *kyai*'s ability to comprehend the divine will by virtue of his piety and status, the *kyai*'s support for a candidate represents a morally valid choice. Nevertheless, the manipulation of the *kyai*'s implicit support by both camps during the 1983 desa election failed to create a monolithic

endorsement for a single candidate.

Villagers' voting decisions were very much influenced by reasonable information about a candidate which came through familiar channels. Indeed, their choice of a candidate was not necessarily related to their real knowledge of the candidate but to their familiarity with the information which reached them. The fragmentation of village settlements and the inward looking tendency of each settlement promoted isolation and hindered the wider flow of information and exchanges. When the candidates emerged from among the inhabitants, the villagers, isolated in settlements, were not only perplexed as to which candidate to vote for, they were perplexed by the desa election itself. Under such circumstances the immediate local leaders might become a source of preliminary information and at the same time influence the voting pattern among the villagers. Thus, during the 1983 desa election, the inhabitants of several isolated settlements cast their votes generally in accordance with the choice provided by their respective local elders. Moreover, since the candidates were not directly involved in the campaign, their core campaigners played an important role as brokers. Using all possible and reliable channels of approaching local elders, the core campaigners built the lower network of support. For example, one of Jemani's campaigners won the support of elders in an eastern settlement of the desa primarily because of his affinal ties with one of those elders. Again, Sonép's campaigners were able to list Mak kaeh Haki among their rank because they were colleagues who had studied under the same kyai and teacher.

In settlements where the villagers were influenced by several leaders, individual voters exercised greater personal freedom of choice in the desa elections. Because villagers had better access to different opinions and wider news, they tended to translate their own interests through their support for a particular candidate. Such settlements generally harbored a higher number of inhabitants. Thus, they became an extensive field of activity for the campaigners. Yet, because residential core kinsmen within the tanean lanjang remained closely cooperative, they were often unanimous in picking the same candidate. Despite the dominant position of the senior

household head in external relations, any member of the tanean lanjang might be used as a prospective channel in winning the whole tanean lanjang. In the central village, for example, even members of a kolom supported different candidates. This was partly a result of the receptivity of individuals in the village to campaigners and outsiders. Accordingly, locality did not guarantee support for a particular candidate, even though core kinsmen tended to support the same candidate.

Candidates maintained a large number of campaigners. The campaigners, in an ideal type construct, can be classified into central, mobile and local categories. The local campaigners consisted of prominent local figures in the neighborhood, isolated settlements and hamlets, including elders and mak kaehs. They are primarily entrusted with maintaining unanimous support among their subordinates and members. Mobile campaigners were entrusted to recruit new supporters in the non-committed areas as well as to establish better communications with and among different local campaigners. Because the mobile group was required to be aggressive, persuasive and argumentative, most of its members consisted of middle-aged villagers and the educated young men. Moreover, the central group of campaigners come from the candidates' close relatives, colleagues and patrons. During the campaign, the central group gathered almost daily in the candidate's compound to discuss a plan, receive reports and complaints, and suggest measures to be taken by the candidate. Woman campaigners were dominant particularly in the mobile group. In this case, Sonep's camp was credited with much success because of the role of his wife, a retired pega-wai, in recruiting woman campaigners to win support among members of diverse female associations in the desa. It should be mentioned, however, that in practice there was no such clear-cut distinction in the assignment and role of the campaigners, as each one of them endeavored to rally support for his favored candidate whenever the opportunity emerged. Giram, for instance, who was regarded as a principal advisor for Sonep, often visited colleagues and neighbors in order to convince them about the prospect and legitimacy of Sonep's candidacy.

Bases of support for the candidate. Support for the candidates was built upon

such diverse bases as kinship, personal ties, residential propinquity, material reward and moral credibility. The villagers regarded such bases as familiar and trusted means of channelling their support. Kinship and affinal ties occupied a vital position in the candidate's attempt to rally support. But these ties were limited and at times complicated and surpassed by the other relational bases. This is especially so since villagers often had competing kinship claims. Often a villager was caught in the middle of kinship ties with both candidates, or between village factions. Jemani, who had extensive kinship and affinal ties in Kampong Barak²² was able to win strong support among his relatives in the west part. Yet, because the inhabitants in Kampong Barak, consisted of less than a quarter of the desa population, Jemani still needed the other villagers' support. Again, some of his close and peripheral kinsmen, not to mention non-kinsmen, preferred to support Sonop on more materialistic and non-primordial bases. On the other hand, Sonop, who had few kinsmen and affines could not have relied very much on such primordial bases. Yet his core campaigners included a number of close kinsmen.

The neighborhood provided the candidates with an important basis of support. Due to the intensive communication between neighbors, as epitomized in the regular kolom gathering and langgar raja, a candidate received much of his early support from his neighbors. As we saw, Jemani had much confidence in his candidacy after his colleagues and neighbors in the local kolom urged him to run for the election. Without solid and extensive support in the neighborhood, a candidate could have difficulty in explaining his virtuous claim to village leadership to other fellow villagers. The overlapping of socio-religious associations and other ties in a neighborhood, however, had a negative impact on the unanimity of its support. This predicament can clearly be seen in the role played by the mustami'an and the Samman in rallying support among their respective members for a particular candidate. It is necessary to note that the chairman of the mustami'an was a die-hard supporter of Sonop, and that the head of the Samman was Jemani's mentor. In Sonop's native village, the majority of his neighbors overtly supported his candidacy. Yet several households

and tanean lanjangs in the hamlet, whose many members had joined the Samman, preferred to pay their allegiance to Jemani. Although there are other structural and delicate factors which were responsible for such a choice, membership in the Samman at times eroded neighborhood ties, resulting in the split of local votes. Moreover, the mustami'an, to an extent, helped Sonep's camp to attract many villagers in Jemani's hamlet into its fold. Despite the fact that the neighborhood and especially the kolom created strong emotional ties among neighbors, several villagers who had joined supra-neighborhood associations such as the mustami'an and the Samman enjoyed different levels of affiliation. Not surprisingly, under such circumstances an individual was pressed to decide where his major interest and expectation lay.

Personal ties were utilized by the candidates to build wider support. In the process of socialization, education, and social and economic activities, the villagers developed friendship and bonds with various individuals outside of descent groups and neighborhoods. As I will show in Chapter 8, village children experienced extensive interaction and communication during their early socialization and religious studies at the langgar raja. At a higher level, they went together to the village public school or madrasah. For others still, the ties were often intensified and broadened at the pondok where santris from different areas lived and studied together. During the 1983 desa election, the fraternity and ulama-santri bonds were used by each candidate's camp in order to recruit popular support. In explaining the kyai's promotion of Sonep's candidacy, the latter reiterated that he won confidence from the kyai mainly because of their old friendship, and also because the two had been classmates in the village school and madrasah. When the kyai replaced his older brother as head of the pondok, Sonep maintained close relations with the kyai, even though he increasingly modified his station in the relational network into the lower rank as a mere disciple (santri). Indeed, prior to the desa election, Sonep was actively involved in organizing many development projects launched by the kyai. In Jemani's camp, Mak kaeh Dewa, who lived far away from Jemani, was an important supporter in the eastern part of the desa. Explaining his support for Jemani, Pak Dewa told me that their long friend-

ship was a fundamental factor in his preference. In fact, they were among the few village children who had gone to a public school in the neighboring desa. In addition, as we have just seen, ties which developed with colleagues through involvement in socio-religious associations provided the candidates and their campaigners with a strategic base to cultivate wider support.

Non-primordial factors in voting patterns. During the desa election, material rewards and economic benefits provided by the candidates played as important a role as social ties in winning votes and support. Since the two candidates did not have major investments or large agricultural lands in the desa, they did not command a high number of clients, sharecroppers or tenants. This does not mean, however, that as senior pegawais and relatively educated individuals, they did not have subordinates who regularly asked for guidance and help. Indeed, by virtue of their experience they attracted neighbors to their compound. These individuals were vital in maintaining the image and prestige of both candidates, at least at a hamlet level. As both a prospective recipient of relatively large amounts of percaton land and a distributor of offices, a candidate commanded sufficient resources to promise rewards to his key campaigners and supporters. But such promises were not sufficient to win wider, popular support. In order to build active and dedicated campaigners each candidate provided them with regular tips and refreshments. During the formal campaign period, the candidates held several receptions for important supporters and campaigners. Gifts and small cash amounts were distributed to convey to the recipients the candidate's gratitude for his ability to participate in the desa election as well as to express to them his greetings. Nevertheless, the campaigners were generally careful not to present these rewards to villagers who obviously were not expected to side with the former's candidate. Although some villagers might not have been influenced by material rewards and gifts, many believed that the mere acceptance of such gifts created an obligation on their part to cast a vote for the candidate.

The experience and erudition of the candidates were not as vital as their personality in attracting the villagers' support. The villagers paid special attention to the

honesty of leading figures and their commitment to local causes. As a result, the villagers concentrated on evaluating the candidates' past and paid less attention to their campaign promises. Informants emphasized that they loved to have an experienced and educated klebun, but they were quick to note that since the villagers were generally ignorant and simple, a klebun of this sort might use his knowledge and erudition to manipulate them and take advantage of their simplicity (*kaanggui menteri kamlaradanna ban kabuduanna oring desa*). Therefore they believed that the best klebun for them was one whose experience had proved beneficial for villagers whatever his level of erudition. In view of the increasing government interference with village affairs, the villagers wanted a klebun to promote and defend their interests.

Unlike what Schulte Nordholt observed during the desa elections in the northern parts of Central Java (1982), in the Bettet area political parties and religion did not play a significant role (cf. Geertz 1965). In the first place the Madurese villagers are all Muslims who formally follow the teaching of the ulama with emphasis on popular religious practices. Unlike in Java, the difference between villagers in Madura is predicated upon the level of one's knowledge and practice of Islam. The variance in Java between abangan and santri Muslims,¹⁹ not to mention the *Islam statistik* (nominal Muslims), does not play a central role in the religious life of the Madurese. The reformist-literalist movement led by Muhammadiyah has attracted supporters in the towns among segments of the pegawais, descendants of Arabs and from among the educated and former aristocratic families. But in the villages it has not gained a stronghold. Thus village Islam has been virtually monolithic. In the Bettet area, where one political party was dominant, candidates had little opportunity to use a political party as an effective means of winning the election. Indeed, being pegawais the two candidates who ran for the 1983 election both belonged to Golkar. Their party affiliation, however, was not a hindrance, even though the villagers for the last two national elections had almost unanimously voted for Golkar's rival, the PPP. More

¹⁹ For discussion on the variance of religious adherence in Java see C. Geertz 1960b, Emmerson 1976; Nakamura 1976; Dhofier 1980.

important, insofar as a klebuŋ was bound to join Korpri/Golkar, no party other than Golkar formally attempted to have a hand in the desa election. On the other hand, in other villages of Madura, where the population is divided, more evenly, between parties or socio-religious organizations, this division would play an important role in desa elections, but this is not the case in the Bettet area.

During the 1983 desa election in the Bettet area, the kyai's endorsement of Sonep's candidacy upset the balance of original support obtained by each candidate. Prior to the election day, Jemani was favored by local observers to win the election by a significant margin. They believed that his opponent was unpopular among most villagers in all parts of the desa, even though Sonep would have received no less than a quarter of the total votes from the pondok santris. A number of Sonep's core supporters did recognize the unpopularity of their candidate, but they expected that the kyai's support would eliminate the suspicions of many villagers about the legitimacy of Sonep's candidacy and that as a result they would cast their votes for Sonep. According to the leading campaigners in Sonep's camp, the strategy used to bring Sonep in an impressive manner to the balloting station was highly fruitful. They planned that Sonep should arrive at the election booths later than Jemani in order to show Jemani's supporters and the undecided voters in particular the prestige and support which Sonep enjoyed. During that particular morning, Sonep, along with his campaigners and leading supporters, gathered in the pondok compound to join the lorah and hundreds of his santris before they marched together to the election booths in the central village. Jemani's camp was surprised to see that the pondok was demonstrating its support of Sonep, even though the kyai himself never appeared at the balloting station. Some of Jemani's campaigners told me that the lorah's demonstrative support for Sonep created much confusion in the minds of the villagers who had been expected to vote for Jemani. Only then did they recognize the importance of the santris' votes for Sonep. They argued that such definite votes strongly discouraged many villagers from casting their ballots for Jemani, in spite of his popularity. Indeed, Jemani obtained 38% of the total votes, despite the fact that the santris voted

en bloc for Sonep. His extensive kinship, affinal ties, personal relations, locality and associational membership remained the backbone of Jemani's support. Eight months following the election day, the leading supporters in the two camps unanimously acknowledged that the pondok support had strongly influenced Sonep's victory as klebun.

The elected klebun. Despite the fact that Sonep was formally elected as klebun, he had a difficult time in exercising authority over the whole desa. Jemani's camp remained aloof from the klebun. They thought that Jemani's defeat was unfair. In fact, during the post-desa election period, the desa witnessed deepening cleavages between the existing groupings as supporters of both candidates expressed their rivalry through social and religious means.²⁰ Although no formal protest against Sonep's klebunship was raised, as often occurs in post-desa elections periods, Sonep could ask little from Jemani's supporters. Even the execution of development programs in the desa would be too much to ask. As I will show in Chapter 12, when the klebun wanted to resume the construction of the desa bridge in July 1984, in order to mobilize labor from the villagers, he was forced to request the kyai's support. The klebun's authority was undermined by dispersion of settlements, village factions and post election fever.

Sonep officially assumed the headship after the inauguration ceremony (*upacara pelantikan*) chaired by the bupati less than two months following election day. Since the desa did not have at that time a village hall, the ceremony was held in Sonep's compound, where a new office had just been completed. A few villagers were invited to the occasion, in contrast to his victory feast, to which all his supporters were invited. The ceremony was significant in giving the klebun official recognition. While during the election day the camat and other government officials explained the status, position and role of the klebun in the desa, and the rights and duties of the villag-

²⁰ Interestingly, Jemani has so far avoided joining any program at the kyai's compound. The villagers easily explained ~~the~~ decision as an expression of shame (*todus*), not anger.

ers, the main emphasis of the officials' speeches during the pelantikan was the desa development program and the klebun-bureaucracy ties. It is not fortuitous that the theme of such speeches signified the admission of the klebun into the bureaucracy.

In view of the persistent desa cleavages which resulted from the election campaigns, the official backing provided the klebun with enough power and prestige to silence his opponents. The defeat of such a strong popular candidate as Jemani, however, was responsible for an increasingly felt sense of humiliation. Because desa elections are not held regularly, the defeated camp is not able easily to make good its losses through the development of new strategies and new expectations. Indeed, the rivalry and competition that had culminated during the campaign left deep hostility among certain prominent figures in both camps. Insofar as such men exercised a wide following among segments of the population, the klebun continued to be identified with, and dependent on, desa factions. Although Sonop did not replace any desa official with his own man, a large portion of his newly acquired percaton land was assigned to his main supporters and campaigners. In fact, a fifth of the land was allotted to one important desa figure who had played a key role in winning the desa election for Sonop.

The desa election has been intended to invest popular authority in the klebun. Since parochial affiliation and interests remain dominant in village politics, the desa election has not always succeeded in transcending such parochialities. Furthermore, the government's direct interest in having effective agents in the desa has resulted in absorbing the klebun almost fully into the bureaucracy. In a desa where the elected klebun cannot secure a majority of the votes, he faces mounting challenges from the opposing candidates and their factions against his authority over the desa inhabitants at large.

In the next chapter, our discussion will focus on the impact of the government's policy on the villages. Special attention is paid to this policy in view of the government's control over major resources and facilities.

Chapter Six

THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL POLICY ON VILLAGES

Villages in the island of Madura have been exposed to diverse contacts with various régimes and governments in the archipelago. As already observed in Chapter 2, it was not until the reorganization of the political system and the land reform during the second half of the nineteenth century that villages in Pamekasan had more direct contact with the central government. As long as the rato remained autonomous in his own domain, villages were spared extensive direct interference. The end of the rato's power thus opened a new era of village reorganization on micro and, more significantly, macro bases. Villages in Pamekasan were often seen as the lowest domain of the national bureaucracy. As a result, village administration was gradually absorbed into a national administration. Yet the central government endeavored to preserve the legitimacy of the village administration in the eyes of the local inhabitants by holding desa elections. Insofar as the village administration, especially the klebun, became more and more tied to the upper hierarchy, it lost the greater part of its communal and emotional ties with the local inhabitants. The lack of government sponsorship and subsidies for development in villages added to the villagers' negative view about the village administration, as the latter represented the central government in gathering taxes. Furthermore, the individual rights of villagers over their land set a new pattern for the flourishing of less structured contact with the local authorities. This is despite the fact that villagers continued to deliver their taxes to a government representative at the village level.

Since Indonesia gained independence, villages have increasingly witnessed diverse programs introduced by the central government for the purpose of national development. The question of national unity has continued to be a serious issue long after the transfer of power to the indigenous government. Indeed, the central government had to fight hard against parochialism by improving its control and authority over the whole country. Among measures taken in this direction was the political

mobilization of the villagers, who were now given the opportunity for political participation. Nonetheless, the central government also exerted considerable effort in improving village conditions through many other channels. In order to have a wider perspective about the relationship between the villages and the central government, it is necessary to divide the following discussion into several sections: political, economic, agricultural, social, and administrative. Although attention will be paid to the national programs which have been formulated to improve village conditions, our main focus is on the programs that have been implemented in the area.

Political context

The concentration of the majority of the population in rural areas, especially villages, has been influential in the policy making of the political forces and governments in Indonesia. Occupied by the growing threat of local revolts and separatism in the 1950's, the newly independent country fought hard to maintain unity. Among the significant measures taken by the central government in this respect were the appointment of effective village representatives or agents and the improvement of village administration. Concomitant with the nation's enthusiasm for the newly gained independence, political parties were founded. In addition, villages became the field of extensive rivalry between political parties as they tried to win local support.

Although the Indonesian government generally pursued village organization in accordance with Dutch policies, attempts have been made to improve the effectiveness and status of village administration. Because the government was aware of the strength of the indigenous institutions, the application of its village policy was to be accommodated within the local context. In Madura, village headmen (klebuns) who had occupied the office prior to independence were generally maintained. Nevertheless, a new system of desa election was introduced, as general suffrage was given to adult villagers. Unlike the previous system, it included all adults (over 18 years old) as well as younger married individuals. The widening of the electoral base improved individual awareness in desa affairs and provided individual villagers with a new status as full citizens.

In view of the fragmentation of desa units in Madura, attempts to improve the effectiveness and popularity of the desa officials have not been very successful. In 1984 desa officials still complained about the difficulties in collecting land taxes from the villagers (cf. *Rakerda* 1984 II, 21-2). The reasons for this were undoubtedly multifarious, but the inability of the desa officials to choose the right time in order to collect taxes indicates their lack of concern for local conditions. Indeed, the increasing absorption of the klebun into the bureaucracy has perpetuated the unpopularity of the desa institutions in Madura.

The post-independence era was marked by the spread of political parties. The enthusiasm to build a just, prosperous and democratic Indonesia was expressed in the support for political parties even in villages with a very low level of literacy. In Madura several nationally known-political parties were able during the first general elections in 1955 to recruit members and supporters. Among the big four parties, only the Communist party (PKI) did not gain considerable support in Madura (see Table 7.1). Interestingly, many voters in Pamekasan cast their ballots for the AKUI (Movement for Islamic Unity), a locally based party (see Marle 1956, Feith 1957:58-61, Amir Santoso 1980:118). The AKUI, like the NU, benefited considerably from the support of the ulama in winning votes. The PNI (National Party) which had greater support among the pegawais did not amass votes comparable to Golkar in the later elections. This was due in part to the freedom of choice for the pegawais and desa officials to vote for and support any political party.

During the late 1950's and early 1960's, villages in Pamekasan did not escape the intense political atmosphere found in other parts of the country. Older villagers today still remember how they learnt by heart the contemporary government slogan of the *Manipol-Usdek*,²¹ not so much its content as its symbolic expression. For them the

²¹ Manipol-Usdek is an acronym of *Manifesto Politik: Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, Sosialisme ala Indonesia, Demokrasi Terpimpin, Ekonomi Terpimpin dan Kepribadian Indonesia*, that is Political Manifesto: the 1945 Constitution, Indonesian Socialism, Guided Democracy, Guided Economy and Indonesian Culture (see

period was marked by tension, economic hardship (high inflation), political rivalry and recurrent popular rallies. Since the Madurese have been loyal to their kyais and, to an extent, to Islamic parties, the political tension was not as intense as in many parts of Java. More important, the inability of the PKI to attract a considerable following in Madura shows the strength of the established socio-political élite. The communal tension which developed in villages throughout East Java, for example, was ignited by the supporters of the PKI and the followers of the Islamic groupings (see Wertheim 1974) and not strictly on a class basis. Nonetheless, the idea that their religion was being threatened by the leftists was, according to older villagers, "quite real and frightening." This was particularly true in view of the control of the public pulpit by the kyais and the lower ulama. Indeed, the political and socio-religious organizations formed paramilitary corps such as the Banser of the NU and the Banra of the PNI. Moreover, the formation of the *Fron Nasional* (National Front, a coalition of all political parties) in the region did not significantly undermine the local political status quo because of the dominance of the NU and AKUI (later SI) in most villages. Yet the National Front succeeded at times in mobilizing villagers as party members to join rallies, ceremonies and celebrations held by the pejabats at supravillage levels. The primary goal of the National Front was to rally the population in support for government programs and decisions, however, villagers in Pamekasan remained indifferent. In the Bettet area, for instance, attempts were made by the PKI activists to form a peasant body (*Barisan Tani Indonesia /BTI*) in order to implement the land reform program. Given the already fragmented nature of the land holdings in the area, together with the fact that those kyais with larger holdings tended to have close ties with the villagers, it is not surprising that the agitation did not strike a responsive chord.

The major change in the national leadership during the period of 1965-1967 had a marked impact on the villages. A purge against PKI members and their sympathizers was launched, and many of them were detained (see Report from East Java, *Indonesia*

McVey 1969; Ricklefs 1981).

1986). But the mass killings which occurred in parts of Java did not take place in Madura, mainly because PKI members were less numerous and kept a low profile. Nevertheless, the confusion and tension among the villagers created by the events of the period only enhanced the role of the local leaders, especially the kyais. Indeed, the crisis was a precious opportunity for many of the local leaders to provide services for the confused villagers and thus to enhance their leadership role. On the other hand, the government took several measures to insure security and stability in the villages. Several klebuns who had been suspected of leftist sympathies were temporarily replaced by appointed agents (*karteker*). In addition, military officers (*Babinsa*) were sent to most *desas* in order primarily to help *desa* officials keep order in their villages and surrounding areas.

The atmosphere created by the New Order stimulated new hope in the villages among kyais and santris. The special place and role given by the new régime to Islamic groups in Indonesia created optimism among Muslim politicians and villagers. Many educated villagers believed that Muslim leaders would become partners of the new régime.

Nevertheless, government measures prior to the 1971 general elections disturbed, if not destroyed, such euphoria. The enhancement of a small and obscure organization, Golkar, into one of the nine political parties allowed to contest the 1971 general elections became an unequivocal indication for many local politicians concerning the government's interests and goals.²² More significantly, the sole allegiance to Golkar (*monoloyalitas*) required from the *pegawais* alarmed Muslim parties entering politics. As the general elections approached, Islamic parties were induced to compete against the bureaucratic networks in the villages. Indeed, the identification of the *desa* officials with Golkar only perpetuated their closer attachment to the bureaucracy despite the popular nature of the *klebun's* office. Thus, in the villages the *klebun* automatically became the leading figure in Golkar by virtue of his membership in the

²² For discussion of Golkar and the campaigns and results of the 1971 general elections see Nishihara 1972; Ward 1974).

bureaucracy (Korpri). Insofar as the ulama parties remained strong and popular in a village, the klebun generally conducted a low profile campaign for Golkar by enlisting pegawais, teachers and their relatives into its fold. Yet the enthusiastic endeavor of the higher party leaders and officials to amass votes among villagers did not prevent stiff competition and tension from surfacing among rival political parties. Indeed, Golkar gained a considerable number of votes in the 1971 general elections in Madura, including Pamekasan (see Table 7.1).

The government has been successful in bringing desa officials more closely into its bureaucratic structure. But this has not been without further political implications. Since a klebun and his assistants have become agents of the government rather than representatives of their fellow villagers, political mobilization in the villages remains partisan and ambiguous. Not only is a klebun seen as an external agent, his automatic patronage of Golkar also identifies him as a segmental leader, even though he has been popularly elected by villagers. Such a development is significant for the administrative desa in view of the fragmentation of Madurese villages. In other words, the political identification of the klebun with the ruling party does not always improve the effectiveness of the administrative desa, especially in the eyes of his fellow villagers. Insofar as the klebun is elected by the villagers and the ulama parties remain popular in villages, the upward outlook of the klebun will perpetuate the low level of local political mobilization.

Economic changes

From the very beginning of independence, the government has vowed to improve the village economy. The most popular slogan was the promise to lower taxes. Unlike the colonial taxation of villages, after independence only an insignificant amount of tax was extracted from villages. In Pamekasan, most villagers paid only land tax. Furthermore, the village economy did not experience significant change, as food production remained low and uncertain. Tobacco cultivation had not acquired wide acceptance, as the demand for local varieties was low. In view of the weak financial capacity of the government, little could be done to stimulate the local economy, even

though the salt production in the island continued to provide the government with a significant income. The fact that the local food production did not suffice for domestic consumption forced the government to ease the burden of the population by bringing in more grain. Because Java itself was for a long time not self-sufficient in the production of staples, the government had to import staples. Indeed, the food supply in Madura was badly managed until a few years ago.

The foundation of the village consumer cooperatives in the late fifties and early sixties provided the villagers with limited inexpensive goods such as sugar, oil, kerosene, soap and textiles. Since such cooperatives were heavily dependent on government subsidies, they hardly stimulated local entrepreneurship. Worse still, the central government had only meagre and dwindling resources which were not able to finance stable subsidies for such cooperatives. Again, a considerable amount of goods which should have been channeled through these cooperatives with subsidized prices were diverted to be sold in the black market at higher prices. Indeed, consumers, especially in villages, suffered from time to time from scarcity of most commodities and from rising prices. When the government purse could no longer sustain the consumer cooperatives, the latter soon collapsed. The government's goal to mobilize local capital in order to support such co-ops did not work smoothly. In view of the limited economic resources in the villages, the funds collected by the cooperatives could not sustain the co-ops as self-supporting bodies.

The New Order government has regarded economic development a priority from the outset. Among many of its gigantic development programs is the solidification of the rural economy. Benefiting from the oil boom and its close relations with many industrialized countries, the present government, unlike its predecessor, has been able to channel considerable funds to stimulate the village economy, especially agriculture and small entrepreneurship. In this section, I will discuss government policy in the non-agricultural sectors of the village economy; agriculture will be discussed below.

Because of the scarcity of economic resources in the villages, attempts were made

to stimulate the local economy by channelling funds down to the local level. The government has been aware of the inadequacy of the infra-structure for the improvement of the village economy. Its financial packages, such as village aid (*bantuan desa*), were therefore directed into helping the villagers build urgently needed facilities such as canals, footpaths through the fields, drinking water, dams and bridges. Although the package itself was not considerable, it was designed to stimulate local participation, cooperation and initiative in village development. Villages with abundant resources and outward looking inhabitants undoubtedly responded positively to such a scheme. However, in the Bettet area government funds had little success in attracting local initiative mainly because of the scarcity of local resources and village fragmentation. Primarily because of the active participation of the supralocal kyais in the area, many village development programs have been achieved (see below). Within the limits of the prevailing village economy and its resources, villagers still have difficulties in mobilizing local funds even for their own village development.

In order to stimulate entrepreneurship among villagers, the government provided them, as individuals or as members of a cooperative, with various credit schemes. The emphasis was placed on villagers who had managed productive economic activities with some success but who needed more funds to expand. Accordingly, the funds, excluding strictly cultivation-oriented credits, were made available to a small number of relatively well-off villagers. In the Bettet area, considerable funds were received by batik producers, taxi, truck and shop owners, and tobacco traders. With a one per cent monthly interest, which is considerably less than the commercial interest rate (which ranges between 19-24 per cent per annum), many borrowers were able to make a marginal profit. Yet the payment of the interest, not to mention the repayment of original capital, was not satisfactory. Because of the fluctuation of the market, lack of a broad marketing area and accumulation of interests, only a few entrepreneurs have survived and prospered.

Home industry also received special attention. In most cases women were seen as dominant contributors to home industry. As a result, various government schemes

for the improvement of family economy were channelled through the women's association, *PKK* (Education for Family Welfare). By providing the local *PKK* with funds, the government expected to improve skills and productivity among village women. In Gar-Bata, for example, where house wives and women were active in cloth dyeing, attempts were made to provide muslin, waxes and other basic materials. Furthermore, in order to improve the quality of production and marketing, special training was given by an agency of the Department of Industry. It is striking that many economic activities led by *PKK* committees have been relatively prosperous.

Under the overall scheme of channelling down funds, many villagers have indirectly benefited from it as new jobs are created. Some villagers have been formally recruited to occupy new positions and occupations in offices, schools and agencies. In addition, the higher circulation of cash increases the demand for certain local produce such as fruits and vegetables. Although villagers have traditionally exchanged such products for non-village commodities, today they can bargain for better prices for their produce because of the increasing demand in the town and other urban centers. On the other hand, the mechanization of local transportation and some production units has deprived many villagers from their occupation and extra income. With the introduction of powered corn mills into villages, for example, a household head now has to put aside a certain amount of money for grinding corn, while the unexploited family labor remains idle. Without undermining the generally positive impact of power tools upon villages, poor villagers continue to suffer, perhaps even more, from the haphazard introduction of technology.

The improved production of staples, especially rice, in Indonesia as a whole, and the stable price of most basic commodities have brought considerable relief to villages in the region (see Quarterly Economic Review of Indonesia 1984 and 1985). Insofar as cultivation in the region remains heavily dependent on rain water, villagers do not produce enough food for their needs. Despite their varied consumption patterns, including a basic diet of rice, cassava, sweet potatoes and corn, villagers have to purchase more staples from the external market in order to survive. In view of the

availability of staples throughout the year, many villagers attempt to reduce their purchase of staples as much as possible by relying on whatever they produce locally. Undoubtedly the villagers' limited power to exchange or to purchase in the market has strongly motivated their maximum utilization of local produce as well as their willingness to leave villages for work elsewhere. To illustrate the villagers' strategy and practice of coping with their basic needs it will be worthwhile to describe a particular household in Montor.

Sahar (46) derives his income mainly from agriculture. With two and half pengkals of agricultural land he supports two children, his wife and his mother. Yet more than half of the land is acquired through sharecropping arrangements. Because the land is scattered in three distinct plots, Sahar has different methods of cultivation. Only one pengkal of the land can be worked throughout the year with three different crops, rice, tobacco and corn, for it has access to running water. Another pengkal is limited to rice and tobacco cultivation. The remaining half which is located around the compound is suitable for vegetables, cassava and diverse tubers.

In the 1984 rice harvest (April) Sahar was able to bring home approximately 300 kilograms of husked rice. In order to fulfill the basic needs of the family, Sahar sold almost half of the rice to purchase corn. Since one kg. of rice could be exchanged for more than two kg. of corn, Sahar thus obtained more food through exchange. Although a small part of the rice was exchanged for miscellaneous daily needs, it served mostly to provide the staple.

By selling vegetables, banana leaves and fruits, Sahar's wife and mother contribute a considerable income for the purchase of supplementary foods, coffee, kerosene and diverse family needs. When the tobacco harvest came in August, a considerable amount was spent on corn to fill Sahar's empty granary. During the 1984-1985 rainy season (November to March), Sahar supplemented his basic foods with cassava, sweet potatoes and corn, produced in part on his land. Because the price of rice and especially corn, has been stable even during the hard time of the rainy season, villagers

such as Sahar are able to exchange their produce for, or to purchase, basic staples.

Agricultural features

The Indonesian government has placed high priority on the provision of sufficient inexpensive and nutritional foodstuffs (*murah pangan*). Within the context of national economic planning, the government well understood the importance of agriculture even prior to the much desired take-off phase of industrialization (see GBHN 1983). The fact that a large quantity of staples, particularly rice, for a long time had to be imported was a burden for the government. This was especially so since the economy of the country was agricultural and the import of rice depleted a considerable amount of the government's foreign exchange and reserves. From an early period after independence, therefore, the domestic production of staples became an important program for the government. In view of the high population growth, the stagnant domestic production of staples could not provide the population with sufficient food (Geertz 1963a). For quite some time the government had introduced diverse innovations in staple cultivation. But the family planning program, designed to lower the population growth, was never adopted as national policy until the 1960's. Concomitant with the major shift in the national leadership in the late 1960's, the agricultural program has been projected within the context of demographic planning. In order to build a healthy economic foundation in conjunction with industrialization, the government has opted to propagate three fundamental programs family planning, resettlement of people from the heavily populated areas such as Java, Madura and Bali to outer islands and agricultural development. I will show below the realization of the family planning and outmigration programs in the villages in Pamekasan, in this section I shall discuss the impact of the government's agricultural policy on these villages.

The government has conducted a comprehensive agricultural policy. Under the successive *Repelitas* (five-year development plans), agriculture has received special attention. By providing sufficient inputs, infra-structures and better marketing and distribution systems, the domestic production of staples has been successful in

meeting the national need for foodstuffs. In order to improve the cultivation of staples per se the government has repeatedly reintroduced symbolic slogans such as the "five agricultural principles" (*Panca Usaha Tani*). These include the introduction of miracle seeds, use of sufficient fertilizers and pesticides, improvement of cultivation methods, irrigation and betterment of cultivation tools. During the late 1960's and early 1970's the government had directly provided the cultivators with a certain amount of cash as well as fertilizers, pesticides and miracle seeds in return for part of the harvest, equivalent to the input plus one per cent interest per month. Information on new cultivation method has been delivered by the agents of the agricultural development program (*petugas penyuluh pertanian*) directly to peasants and cultivator groupings in the villages through lectures and discussions (*kontak tani*) (cf Leunissen 1982). In addition, the government has used modern mass media, such as the radio, to explain its agricultural program and inform villagers about local developments and new findings in agriculture and cultivation systems. Concomitant with the provision of the cultivation input and capital the government improved segments of the infra-structures in the villages.

Although the villagers are eager to improve their agricultural yield, they encounter difficulties in implementing various schemes of agricultural development. Since the major emphasis is upon rice production, a dry area such as Madura, with its tegal eco-type, has not been able to participate fully in the government program. The popularity of corn as a staple has made rice cultivation marginal in the overall staple production in the island. In response to such local characteristics, the government has introduced a special scheme for corn cultivation (*Bimas jagung*). Yet the peripheral nature of such a project does not favor a major breakthrough in corn production. For example, new varieties of corn which had been proven to bring higher yields were not widely adopted. The villagers in the Bettet area argued that their traditional corn varieties have a better chance to survive occasional delays of rain.

The government continues to provide loans for groups of cultivators who request

financial assistance (see *Rakerda* 1984; cf. Mackie 1985). Such a loan is usually proposed by the klebun via the camat. Because of the uncertainty of the harvest in the villages, due mainly to high dependency on rainfall, villagers have difficulties in repaying their loans. To make matters even worse, at times the loan reaches villagers well after the cultivation has begun. In view of the meagre infra-structure of agriculture in villages, particularly irrigation and water supply, staple cultivation has not improved much. Furthermore, the uncertainty of cultivation in the tegal land, which forms the majority of the agricultural land, has discouraged investors from injecting funds into the local production of staples. Likewise, the villagers evidently have a difficult time in improving the production of such land. Nevertheless, the channelling of loans, funds and new cultivation methods to the villages has been significant in helping villagers fulfill their subsistence needs.

Government attempts to improve the village infra-structure have been manifested in the opening of new pathways, the renovation of roads, the construction of water reservoirs, dams, canals, as well as the promotion of land reservation and reforestation (*penghijauan*). Although higher amounts of underground and spring water have been made accessible it is primarily intended to provide the inhabitants of particular settlement concentrations with clean water for domestic consumption. Thus agriculture has not significantly improved its share of stable water and irrigation. Nevertheless, the building and improvement of pathways and roads have considerably reduced the isolation of many villages in the hinterland. Accordingly, villagers have better access to new economic opportunities which are not strictly tied to cultivation.

The marketing and distribution of staple produce receive special treatment in the overall scheme of the agricultural program. In the wider context, the government has applied strict control over the pricing and provision of the so-called "nine basic commodities" (*sembilan bahan pokok*), namely rice, corn, sugar, salt, kerosene, cooking oil, soybean, soap and basic textiles. In the villages the government has encouraged the establishment of local co-ops such as BUUD and KUD which, among other things, are to purchase the local harvest of staples at a reasonable price. These co-ops receive

funds from the government. As long as the government has sufficient funds to absorb the staple produce, the price of staples can be stably maintained. This is so since the price gap between the harvest season and other periods of the year can be reduced or even eliminated. For the last few years, however, as rice production has surpassed the domestic need, the government has faced the problem of absorbing new harvests. Without being able to redistribute and liquidate its rice, the government suffers higher losses. Accordingly, it finds itself not able fully to purchase new harvests (see *Tempo* April 1985, Quarterly Economic Review of Indonesia 1985, 1). This development, however, is irrelevant to staple production in Madura, even though a higher surplus of staple produce in other parts of the country will be beneficial for villagers in Madura as prices remain relatively low and stable.

The government has encouraged villagers to sustain the local economy by improving the cultivation of cash crops such as tobacco, fruits and vegetables as well as by breeding cattle. Tobacco cultivation remains the most important source of income for many villagers, although it is economically risky. The government has placed emphasis on helping villagers to grow tobacco. Attempts have been made to improve the marketing of the tobacco harvest in order to avoid high price fluctuations during the harvest season. In Pamekasan, the regional government is studying the possibility of establishing cooperatives, parallel to local co-ops for rice in Java, in order to absorb local tobacco production with reasonable prices. Such co-ops are expected to organize the tobacco marketing passing the crop from the small producers directly to the cigarette factories in Java. So far, however, the tobacco harvest has to pass through several hands before it reaches the factory (see de Jonge 1984). The complicated method of sorting tobacco and the fragmentation of tobacco production make such government attempts difficult if not impossible.

Social aspects

Villages in Madura were left on their own until the end of the ratio's era. Since only minor changes were introduced to improve the livelihood of the villagers, until quite recently villagers have received few social services offered by the central government.

During the second half of the last century, as already observed, the Dutch had introduced to Madura western-style education on a limited basis, as well as modern transportation and vaccination. Better transportation facilities furthered mobility and out-migration among the Madurese, particularly with the opening of estates in East Java (see Massink 1888, Geertz 1963b, Kuntowijoyo 1980, Hefner 1985, and Mackie 1985). The Dutch never fully implemented a special welfare plan for Madura, although a proposal was made shortly before the coming of the Japanese in 1942 (see Niehof 1985 25). When the Indonesian government fully assumed authority over Madura in 1950, it largely maintained the social services which had been initiated by the Dutch. In view of the limited resources at its disposal, the government could do little to improve the prevailing services. For example, new elementary schools, often located in local houses, were established in some remote *desas*, vaccination against smallpox and cholera was widely conducted in villages, and sanitation and adult literacy campaigns were launched. In the early 1960's the government, in cooperation with UNICEF and other agencies, succeeded in the eradication of malaria in Indonesia including Madura. This was the first major use of insecticides in villages. Many adult villagers regarded the efforts as successful but expensive, their owls and cats died because of the effect of the spraying. Such a massive national program underlined the importance of services provided by the central government for villagers. Conversely such services symbolize the ties between the two mutually interdependent entities, the villages and the center.

With the better centripetalization of power and resources, following the shift of national leadership in the second half of the 1960's, social services for villagers have been much improved. In Madura, massive programs in education, health services, family planning, communication, transportation and resettlement have been promoted. The immediate impact of such programs on participation and mobility, socially and spatially, among villagers is significant.

Health services. Health services have been expanded to cover more villagers. By the early seventies the government launched its massive health program in the rural

areas. Among the most noted works was the building of health centers and clinics in the kecamatan and highly populated areas. While villagers in Pamekasan previously had to go to the town in order to get modern medical services (from a hospital or general practitioners), the spread of health centers into the countryside has reduced the villagers' spending on medication. More significantly, the presence of such modern services near the villagers has had a positive impact on the former's sense of belonging to the local domain. The proximity of the center, in fact, eases the process of channelling information to the villagers and bridging the communication gap. Again, the sending of mobile health units into villages in order to provide vaccination, child care and general health guidance effectively familiarizes larger segments of the population with modern health services. Although modern health services in Madura are under-used (Jordaan 1985 295-9), an increasing number of villagers has enjoyed the services.

Among non-cultural factors which keep many villagers from using facilities of the health services is low income. Although many services are subsidized and thus inexpensive, villagers can still hardly afford the payment. Since the villagers usually go to the medical center only when they have serious illnesses, medication cannot be given at once. This means that villagers have to spend more money for their recurrent visits. Furthermore, the prescription given by the physicians is often extremely expensive for the villagers. Insofar as modern medication lies beyond the financial capacity of the villagers, only the well-off inhabitants will benefit from the services, despite the fact that such services are increasingly seen as indispensable by the villagers.

Attempts have been made to improve sanitation, nutrition and the general health environment of the villages. Various schemes have been carried out by the government agencies to improve health conditions. The concern over drinking water and better nutrition has been paramount. Through the village development agency (*Bangdes*), several artesian wells, pump wells and rain water containers have been built in villages. Since the popularization of this program in the 1970's, in Bettet eleven pump wells and several natural wells have been constructed in the

neighborhoods. The pump and other building materials were provided by the agency. Because many villages like Bettet have access to higher water table, such arrangements have been effective in providing villagers with clean water. In higher areas in the north and coastal region, however, such simple technology is not adequate to draw water for villagers. In most cases, containers have been built to accumulate rain water. Again, in coastal areas clean water often has to be channelled from elsewhere through pipes. This latter arrangement, of course, requires considerable funds and careful maintenance. Not surprisingly, the building of running water arrangements is undertaken only in economically developed areas such as Pamekasan proper, Tlanakan, Tanjung and Candi. Moreover, the campaign for nutrition and a better health environment has been characterized by the support for improving home economy, planting trees, maximizing the use of the tegal land and diversifying the diet. Although in some areas, many pilot projects for village latrines have been introduced, most villagers have not paid special attention to this issue. Excretion is performed at best into a deep earth pit, or failing that, a shallow pit or out in the open. The most typical explanation among villagers for their neglect of sanitation is the shortage of water.

Public education. The fact that until 1972 illiteracy in Madura reached 70 per cent shows the acute problem of education in the island relative to many other parts of Indonesia (*Laporan Hasil Penelitian* 1976). Despite the introduction of western-style education to the island since the 1860's, the majority of villagers have not had access to school education. Indeed, until 1974, the number of religious educational institutions (pondok and madrasah combined) in Madura was higher than the number of public schools (*Laporan Hasil Penelitian* 1980, cf. Amir Santoso 1980). This means that more village children were enrolled in religious institutions than in public schools. Since these educational centers absorbed only some of the school age children, attempts have been made to provide more educational facilities. From the beginning of independence, the Indonesian government, primarily for lack of resources, has encouraged the participation of non-government institutions and indi-

viduals in opening schools. In Pamekasan, this policy has perpetuated the prosperity and popularity of religious education among villagers.

The increasing availability of education has been a constant policy of the central government. Confronted with extremely high illiteracy, the post-independence government launched campaigns for adult literacy. Although in some areas limited illiteracy eradication programs were implemented, adult literacy education was stagnant. The claims during the early 1960's that some regions were free of illiteracy were empty slogans (cf. Myrdal 1968 1685-6). Today attempts are being made to introduce an educational package to adult villagers through local committees (*Kejar Pendidikan Dasar*). The aim of this program is to introduce literacy, mastery of the Indonesian language and acquisition of basic, general knowledge. The indifference of villagers toward such a program is persistent, even though financial stimulation has been given to willing participants. In Proppo each participant is provided with a cultivation fund of Rp5,000 each season until he completes the program (see *Rakerda* 1984 iv, 54). Among the main problems of the scheme, as expressed by the local workers, were the difficulty in finding a suitable regular timetable both for villagers and instructors, and the irrelevance of the program to the daily life of the peasants. Indeed, many adult villagers who had learnt how to write their own name. I found, could not prove their ability, for they rarely, if ever, signed any document but the identity card issued once every four years.

Moreover, in conjunction with the government policy to improve the village economy, vocational and skill training programs have been organized in the villages. Although these programs have been relatively successful in teaching the villagers basic skills, the villagers themselves have failed to improve upon these, either because the requisite materials for further vocational advancement are simply not to be found locally, or because the advantage gained through special training is lost as too many villagers become involved in the same kind of productive activities. For instance, the improved production of batik in the Bettet area will illustrate some of these features.

In Klampar, batik production has become an occupation for many villagers. The skill is acquired through apprenticeship and direct learning. Realizing the potential of the batik industry in Klampar, in the late 1970's the government offered training for local manufacturers. The main emphasis of the training was on the improvement of the style and design. In addition, the government provided the manufacturers who belong to a local cooperative with access to basic materials such as muslin, waxes and dyes. Indeed, the cooperative members were able to amass profits and dominate the local market for batik during the late 1970's and sometime in 1980. Yet the unimproved style and design of their batik for those years have significantly reduced their share in the increasingly competitive market. To make matters even worse, many other local batik manufacturers were able to produce the same style and design. And the market is further flooded by the products of the giant national companies which can claim superiority in quality, style and design. The absence of local initiative to invent new styles and designs as well as the lack of vigor and inadequate knowledge of marketing were the main cause for the stagnation of the local batik manufacturing industry. More important in this context, the incomplete training program adds little to the betterment of villagers scientifically, vocationally and economically.

The government policy for improving education has been intended to pave the way for compulsory elementary education (*wajib belajar*).²³ In villages the most noted signs for the implementation of the program have been the construction of special elementary school buildings (*SD Inpres*). And in certain isolated areas, attempts were made to establish informal schools for local children (*SD Pamong/Kecil*). As a result each desa has at least an elementary school. In many villages, the problem today is no longer where to accommodate school age children, but rather how to keep all of them in school. In Bettet, for example, all children, with the exception of the mentally and physically handicapped, have experienced schooling, even though

²³ The 1984-1985 session was declared as the beginning of the *wajib belajar* in the country (see the President's speech during the celebration of the National Education Day, May 20, 1984).

the drop-out rate is still high. The government decision to start the campaign for the *wajib belajar* in 1984 is thus logistically justified even if it will not be easily accomplished. Furthermore, the increasing number of graduates at the lower levels of education has increased the demand for seats at higher levels. In response to such development the government has organized junior secondary schools at the *kecamatan* level. Ironically, many such schools have no building to themselves. The classes are opened in the afternoon in one of the local elementary school buildings. Nevertheless, many village children are able to enjoy higher education thanks to the school's proximity to their villages.

The formal education in villages has a special mission in addition to the goal of providing basic knowledge. It inculcates religion, *Pancasila* and the Indonesian language. Religious instruction is given at all levels of education (for details see Chapter 10). Moreover, the aggressive promotion of *Pancasila* as the sole ideology (*asas tunggal*) for the nation has been implemented in the elementary school curriculum and is popularly known as the PMP (*Pendidikan Moral Pancasila*). Nationally the teaching of *Pancasila* is intended, among other things, to promote unity, harmony and cooperation among diverse religious and ethnic groups. Relevant to such goals is the popularization of the Indonesian language as the *lingua franca* and national language. In villages, Indonesian is very rarely used. The school thus is the only center where Indonesian is regularly practiced. Pupils are taught Indonesian as soon as they join Grade 2. Primarily because of the lack of practice and opportunity of Indonesianization, not until their later years in the six-year elementary school program are village pupils able to master Indonesian.

Despite the government's claims to support private participation in education and the centrality of religion in nation building, religious educational institutions and leaders have not been significantly included in the overall-education scheme. As a result, the polarization of education remains a dominant feature of social life in villages, even though in recent years most children have experienced formal schooling. The major social and political segmentation has affected, and at the same time been

accentuated by, this dualistic educational orientation. As long as the political alliance continues to be based on traditional symbols and slogans, the polarization of education will remain meaningful and relevant to the villagers. Moreover, the perception of religious educational institutions as bastions of Islam and their continuing popularity among the villagers only add to the exclusiveness of these institutions. To make matters even worse, the widespread feeling among religious leaders of being threatened and isolated has been a growing theme that exacerbates the social and political cleavages in the society. Nonetheless, the fact that an increasing amount of general education and a growing number of classes have been introduced into ulama compounds and pondoks may, in the long run, reverse the polarized nature of education in Madurese villages, a point to which we shall return below.

Mass media and transportation. The introduction of modern communication systems and transportation facilities had only a marginal effect on villagers. The modern mass media have not spread effectively in the villages. Despite the availability of modern mass media in the country, villagers know and enjoy radio and television to only a very limited extent. Indeed, newspapers, magazines and pamphlets are read only occasionally by a small number of educated individuals.

For a long time the radio has been used by the government as a means of informing villagers about its programs and policies as well as a way of educating the population. In the past, radio stations were fully controlled by the government (*Radio Republik Indonesia / RRI*). Although vernaculars, including Madurese, had been used in special programs, most radio broadcasts were in Indonesian. For this reason, the radio was seen primarily as a source of entertainment. Villagers listened to the radio for songs, popular and traditional dramas and comedies. The late 1960's witnessed the proliferation of amateur radio stations. Most of these stations were locally constructed. The programs were strongly oriented to local, parochial interests, particularly since the stations had only a limited range of transmission. Only during the time of the national newscasts were such stations obliged to relay the broadcasts of the national network. Prior to the 1971 general elections, however, the government

eradicated most non-RRI stations, especially at the regional level. To maintain the local sentiment, the regency government has developed local stations (RKPD). In Pamekasan, villagers can listen to various radio stations such as RRIs (Jakarta, Surabaya, Sumenep and others), local RKPDs, private and foreign stations such as VOA, ABC and BBC and a special agricultural radio station in Surabaya.

The few battery-powered televisions in villages are a source of recreation. It is not uncommon to observe that a television screen in a household attracts a large number of neighbors. Because villagers can follow television programs without necessarily understanding the spoken language, television seems to attract all segments of the village population. Further observation and study, however, are required before we can determine the effect it has on the villagers' lifeways and world view. But from my general observations and experience in the Bettet area, television has a tremendous impact on village viewers since it provides them with clear, visible and direct pictures of many events and phenomena which they have often never before seen in their lives.

Nevertheless, the village social structure makes traditional means of communication persistent and effective. In part this explains the continuing popularity of local leaders in society. This is true especially of the ulama. Their domination over various feasts, ceremonies and celebrations in villages provides such leaders with the most effective and direct communication. Not surprisingly, formal meetings initiated by officials have not been successful in attracting villagers. For this reason, the present regent of Pamekasan has often been seen participating in diverse religious gatherings, primarily in order to have access to this kind of traditional and effective communication.

Despite the vigorous effort to improve roads and add to the volume of traffic on the island, many villagers have not experienced such facilities. In recent years more and more public vehicles have been introduced to the countryside owing to the improved quality of the roads. Yet because settlements are scattered all over the

island, which does not possess extensive hard surfaced roads, many villages are not easily accessible to motorists. Accordingly, inland villagers continue to depend on locally available transportation such as animal-drawn carts, bicycles and motorcycles to reach major roads. Still many prefer to walk, even for long distances.

The relatively inexpensive rate and high volume of intertown transportation, however, contributes to the increasing spatial mobility among villagers as traders, job-seekers, travellers, pilgrims and students. The direct impact of such easier mobility is seen socially and economically in villages, for example, in the opening of shops and stalls which sell commodities and sundries at prices not significantly different from those in the town. Because villagers have better access to information concerning markets and prices due to their recurrent visits to the town, they inadvertently help establish more honest dealings and new spirit in the village economy and life in general. Villagers were and have been a field of intensive activities for various peddlers, particularly during the successful tobacco season. Customarily these peddlers expect to amass profits by selling utensils, equipment and dresses at higher prices to uninformed villagers. In recent years only by bringing in some exotic goods have peddlers been able to find gullible buyers in villages. Although not comparable to the North Americans who watch and participate in the "Price Is Right" television program, villagers have benefited from more extensive access to markets and towns with multi-faceted advantages, including wider access to information.

Resettlement (transmigrasi) and family planning. The national policy on population growth and the reduction of the high concentration of population settlement in certain regions is manifested in the campaign for family planning and guided out-migration.

Despite the high volume of voluntary emigration among the Madurese, the government program of resettlement has not gained popularity among villagers. The main scheme of the government-sponsored emigration of people has been the resettlement of villagers from highly populated islands such as Java, Bali and Madura, to the newly opened regions in Sumatra, Kalimantan, West Irian and Sulawesi (see GBHN 1983). In

recent years the government has attempted to arrange better facilities for the preparation and resettlement of the migrants. For example, the office of the Department of Resettlement (Transmigrasi) in Pamekasan gives agricultural training and general instructions regarding the new conditions to the candidates. It provides them with agricultural tools, housing and funds for the following two consecutive years in the new settlement. Each household is assigned two hectares of cleared land and one hectare of virgin land. In view of the hard life in villages, one would think that such a promising opportunity would be attractive to villagers, however, only a few villagers have participated in the program. In light of the massive emigration of the Madurese to the east corner of East Java during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the reticence to emigrate is a little surprising. The relatively meagre advantages of such guided migration have strongly discouraged villagers from joining the program. Unlike migration to the cities which brings quick results, migration to the outer islands does not offer obvious immediate advantages since it involves remoteness, monotony and a venture into the unknown. In fact, the younger kyai of Bettet was highly praised by the authorities for his leading role in recruiting a large number of santris and villagers to be included in the guided outmigration to South Kalimantan in 1983 (see Chapter 9). In the period of 1984-1985 he once again contacted many santris and villagers and proposed that they participate in the resettlement program. But by the beginning of 1985, only two candidates had registered for the program. The previously held idea that in the new location the santris could conduct the teaching and preaching of Islam was no longer valid. The santris realized that in the jungle no one wanted to listen to their teaching and preaching except their own community members who themselves came from Madura.

Primarily in order to maintain a balance between resources and population growth the government has vigorously advocated a family planning program. Although in Madura, unlike Java and Bali, one rarely encounters the popular V sign, which means that two children are enough for a married couple, the campaigns for family planning are widely carried out (Niehof 1985). Using all available local support, the program

has been increasingly winning participants. Besides the relentless persuasion by the family planning officers and desa officials, the near absence of rhetorical and religious arguments by the ulama and public speakers against the program has significantly contributed to the acceptance of family planning by many villagers. Even though many ulama do not personally participate in family planning, their consent has been for long sought by the authorities. In the last few years, such consent has been indirectly gained. For example, during a 1983 television interview which concentrated on the village education, pondoks and development, the kyai of Bettet was heard to give a favorable response to a question on family planning in his area. His favorable response was regarded by the officials and villagers as acceptance of the program, notwithstanding his oblique reference to the position of the program in Islamic law.

Youth. The government attempts to accommodate village youth in more non parochial bodies have not been always successful. Many village youth have been involved in diverse, locally organized, groupings. Although most such groupings are founded on the basis of locality, some attract members from different segments of the villages, as is the case of the Samman and pencak silat. The introduction of novel associations such as the *Karang Taruna* (youth club) and the *Pramuka* (boy scouts) therefore, has not always been widely accepted. More important, the emphasis of such associations on introducing new sports activities and other novelties requires certain levels of education and sophistication. Since villagers generally lack the capacity and erudition to follow the activities within an association, they tend to regard it as a place for the educated only. Insofar as the organization and leadership of these associations are assigned to a few educated villagers, their activities tend to reflect school and urban biases. In the Bettet area, the Karang Taruna's activities have typically been related to extra-curricular activities such as volleyball and badminton, modern poetry readings, popular music and writing skills. From the outset it is obvious that village youth who lack both experience and higher schooling at the supra-village level will hesitate to join. Moreover, the tendency for the better educated villagers to belong to relatively better-off families further diminishes wide participation.

Administrative domain

The administrative desa represents the lowest territorial organization of the government. By organizing desa officials into a uniformed corps (Korpri) which is structurally part of Golkar, the government has effectively secured their loyalty. This has happened despite the fact the klebun receives his income mainly from local sources, including the percaton, kemit, and a certain percentage of the land taxes. On the other hand, the government attempts to balance the centripetalization of the desa official into the bureaucracy by reviving and encouraging local consultative bodies. The foundation of such bodies, however, has not been effective in monitoring local interests, opinions and grievances. The tendency to appoint the pegawais and the educated to such bodies continues to work against the expected popularity of their position among villagers. Since the klebun represents the lowest level of the bureaucracy, he has extensive contacts with the various government agencies which conduct village programs.

The specific attention devoted by the government to village development has improved the coordination of the desa administration necessary for effective planning. The recent absorption of several town-desas (*kalurahans*) into the bureaucracy is clear evidence of the government's need to control the village administration better. Since the officials of the kalurahans are directly appointed by the regent (bupati) and paid with fixed salaries, they become full government employees. Although most villages continue to be organized under administrative desas led by the elected klebuns, the latter have been increasingly tied to the bureaucracy. Vigorous programs for village development have forced the government to create effective and loyal administrators at the village level. Again, the political strength of the present government has led to the execution of bureaucratic policies in the villages. In view of the popularity of the non-government backed party in Madurese villages, the desa officials face serious dilemmas. To make matters even worse, the klebun, though elected, has not developed effective mechanisms for desa authority (see Chapter 5). As a result, the klebun is left with two choices, either to pursue development programs with regard

to his own parochial grouping, or to conciliate informal leaders in order to get wider desa support (see below). The encapsulation of the desa officials is successful so far as the implementation of financially supported programs is concerned. But it fails to stimulate locally initiated programs which, after all, remain the key factor for village development.

In order to accomodate local ideas and views about village affairs, consultative bodies such as *Lembaga Musyawarah Desa* (LMD) and *Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa* (LKMD) have been formed in the desas. The consultative body (LMD) consists of informal village leaders, activists, functionaries, and teachers. By bringing these diverse village personalities together, a more constructive understanding of village problems and prospects is expected. More specifically, the aim of the LMD is to assist the desa officials in executing the government's village programs. In this respect, it possesses the vital power to examine the desa program as proposed by the klebun. Indeed, the spending of government aid funds for a village development program has to be ratified by the LMD members. Nevertheless, in view of the strong fragmentation of village settlements, the LMD often represents the village factions and individuals who constitute a klebun's supporters. Put differently, its members are generally recruited from among the klebun's men. When some non-loyalist figures are included in the LMD, they are usually left behind. Moreover, the LMD members find it difficult to hold general meetings. In the Bettet area, the klebuns told me that in most cases it was the klebun who had to initiate a LMD meeting in order to discuss desa programs. In one instance, I witnessed a klebun who came to the LMD chairman to get the latter's signature for the approval of a desa project. In such a case deliberation was to no avail since the chairman's signature was sufficient, as far as the klebun was concerned, to secure the higher officials' consent.

Furthermore, the LKMD (Committee for Village Improvement) has been designed to guide local initiatives in various fields such as youth, family planning, agriculture, literacy programs, entrepreneurship and general education. The LKMD is run on a part-time and voluntary basis. Its committee members come mostly from among the

educated segments in the desa. They are either government employees or students. Accordingly, many programs are oriented toward introducing novelties to the villages, however, many villagers remain aloof from such programs. Because the committee members maintain occupations outside the community they have less opportunity to communicate with other villagers. Indeed, the education gap has also had a major impact on the low degree of interaction.

PART THREE: THE ULAMA AND SOCIETY

Chapter Seven

RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES AND INSTITUTIONS IN VILLAGES

The villagers' attachment to Islam is shown most conspicuously in their participation in various socio-religious activities rather than in purely Islamic rituals. The continuity of these activities has been maintained by the popularity of local institutions such as the *kolom*, *pengajian*, *yasinan*,¹ *sebelasan*,² *selamadan*, *rasulan*,³ *mustamian*, Islamic calendrical celebrations and religio-musical groups.

The regularity of these socio-religious gatherings strongly affects communication and groupings among villagers within their own neighborhood and in some cases within a larger village context. Although on certain occasions such as the *yasinan* and *sebelasan*, the participants obviously recite religious texts and prayers, the actual attraction and central feature of such gatherings are more social in substance. This is shown not only by the inclusion of the *arisan* (saving and credit system) in the programs, but also by the special meals prepared for such occasions. Furthermore, if such occasions were intended only for the purpose of gaining divine reward (*gan-jaran*) from Qur'anic recitation, then more benefits would be gained by doing it at home. Indeed, the performance of such activities answers the villagers' need for recreation, communication and cooperation. This does not mean that religious aspects are absent. Religious coloring is attached to many activities giving sense and relevance to the villagers' world view and values. This tendency may be better understood if we examine the organization of public religious lectures (*mustami'an*) in

¹ *Yasinan* is a religious gathering which is specifically arranged to recite a special chapter of the Qur'an, *Yāsin*.

² *Sebelasan* is a religious gathering held on the eleventh day of the lunar month, see Appendix V.

³ *Rasulan* is an *ad hoc* feast which is held to express one's gratitude for his achievements. It is thus different from the regular *selamadan* which is generally related to life-cycle feasts.

Bettet and the surrounding villages.

Before the 1960's the mustami'an was unknown among villagers in Pamekasan, even though occasional public religious meetings attended by popular speakers and ulama had been often held in different places. Benefiting from the availability of religious experts in the area, a government employee at the local office of the Depag initiated the mustami'an. His encounters with diverse personalities and figures in the town, as he acknowledged, provided him with the idea of organizing regular public lectures. He was moved by the idea and believed in the positive impact of such lectures on villagers.⁴ He and other organizers of the mustami'an insisted that since most older villagers have no opportunity to improve their basic knowledge of Islam beyond the langgar raja level, the public lectures through the mustami'an, would be effective in this respect. In Bettet proper the mustami'an first attracted only women. Informants explained that this was primarily caused by the division of men's prevailing groupings and activities. Still now only the speakers are predominantly male.

During the last few years, the mustami'an has gained popularity in many villages. Since it requires the provision of public speakers with broad knowledge of scriptural Islam, only villages that have their own religious scholars or maintain close affiliation with pondoks or kyais may organize a mustamian. It may be organized according to, or regardless of, sex division. It is held at members' tanean, one after another. In order to attract members and maintain regularity and participation, especially among women, the arisan (credit and saving system) is organized prior to speeches. Membership is not limited to household heads or to members of the village. Indeed, the female mustami'an of Montor, for example, has many members who come from neighboring Gar Bata, Gantungan and Tambengan. Because the speeches are aired through loudspeakers, many non-members who live around the house where a mustami'an is held can follow the lectures and perhaps poke jokes at some speakers.

⁴ Nevertheless, we should not negate the vicissitudes of the socio-political climate in Indonesia generally during the 1960's on the religious activism of many Muslims, including the Madurese.

Despite the stated religious aim of the mustami'an, it has been routinized and made multi-functional. It has no systematic way of providing cumulative information about Islam. Every speaker pursues his own interests and leanings. Accordingly, the topics are by and large repeated time and time again. Indeed, the mustami'an is best seen as an attempt to make sense of the villagers' anxiety, uncertainty and common emotional problems. Moreover, the membership in such a gathering expresses one's association with a particular grouping. Thus, the mustami'an in Bettet has been seen by the villagers as an expression of local social and, to an extent as we shall see shortly, also political groupings. Although in some villages such a religious gathering serves to strengthen village cooperation and unity, in many it perpetuates, and even functions as a channel of, local factions.

Religious activities at the village level

Except for the standard gatherings³ (kolom) among neighbors, most of these village activities are occasional. The elaborate preparation, including the financial support, for the performance of certain activities of course becomes the main factor for the survival of such activities. During my stay in the area only the female mustami'an was able to hold its program regularly once a week for the whole twelve months. Many others such as the musical groups (samrah and hadrah), Samman (religio-mystical association), male mustami'an and arisan-oriented activities were at a standstill during the greatest part of the rainy season. This is usually a hard economic period for the villagers. When the harvest season arrives, most activities are revived.

In the case of the kolom, this is relatively easily managed, first because of the limited number of participants, further they are close neighbors who are involved in and are aware of the reality of their fellows' daily lives. Finally it requires only a minor degree of expenditure. Thus during certain periods of the year when economic life in villages is more burdensome and difficult, kolom participants may receive only coffee and sometimes a snack. Unless the neighborhood has more urgent matters or plans a bigger feast, a kolom should ideally be maintained and performed.

Each kolom group decides the timing of the meeting. It is usually held once a week around sunset on Thursdays or Mondays, moving from one house to another, depending on the participants' turn, or in some cases, request. During the meeting, usually at the family langgar, formal religious ceremonies such as Qur'an recitation, *tahlil* (solicitous prayers, see Appendix VI), or *shalawat nariyah* (solicitous prayers, see Appendix II) are performed. The host decides, by consulting and telling the local religious expert (*mak kaeh*), what kind of prayers should be conducted. Before the ceremonies, coffee and, not uncommonly, small snacks are provided. While waiting for other members or the *mak kaeh*, the participants chat, talk and gossip with each other. For important persons in the neighborhood the occasion is used to renew and improve their prestige by providing new information and news as well as, if necessary, proposing actions and positions to be taken in confronting new developments. In an implicit way, a kolom expresses the hierarchization of villagers (see Chapter 3). The female members of the household are busy preparing foods. Generally no outsider works in the kitchen on this occasion, even though a close member of the family may be present. After the end of the ceremonies, a plate of rice with a piece of fish, meat, egg or chicken, depending on the host's economic level, and a few vegetables is served to the participants. Their number ranges from 10 to 30 depending on the size of the neighborhood. But they do not generally bring home foods (*takir* or *berkat*). A member who cannot participate is expected to send a message directly to the host or via neighbors. When the kolom is over, the host will deliver the food to those who are absent through the closest member who lives in their proximity. Such arrangements enhance the reciprocity among and dependence of the participants on the group as a whole.

Since most religious activities in villages are based on the kolom pattern, their emergence seems to reflect the villagers' attempt to adapt their institutions to the changing environment and external challenges. They may be called, in Pierre Bourdieu's terms, a form of socio-ritual "reproduction" (Bourdieu 1972; cf. Eickelman 1978, Hefner 1985). This tendency is clearly shown, as we will see, in the recent

introduction of the mustami'an, various arisan-oriented gatherings and some new musical groups.

The religious activities of these groupings are centered on repeating request prayers and certain Qur'anic verses or chapters. The mustami'an, however, is an exception since it provides participants with miscellaneous social and religious information. In terms of performance these activities may be classified into prayers, music, biographical recital, mystical and Qur'anic recitation.

Activities that extensively use prayers include the tahlilan, tsarwah,⁵ shalawat nariyyah and sebelasan. These prayers are in Arabic. Adult villagers generally learn them by heart as a result of frequent participation. A number of villagers recite the prayer formula performed in the selamatan with slightly different pronunciations to the point that, at times, the prayer loses its meaning. They do not care about pronunciation or lexical meaning of their recitation since their concern is to support the message evoked by the ceremony's leader, the ulama. The latter thus is expected to know the content, context, and efficacy of the prayers. An example from Better perhaps will suffice to show the centrality of the ulama's knowledge.

I was invited to a gathering intended by the host to express his gratitude (*rasulan*) for the successful tobacco harvest. The local mak kaeh, however, could not accept the invitation because he had a headache. His adolescent son was sent instead. When all expected participants were present, the host did not ask the oldest participant nor the mak kaeh's son to lead the prayers and the ceremony, rather he asked a well-versed villager who was a young santri. At first he refused, but when the participants urged him, he accepted. When he asked the host about the prayer to be performed, most participants spontaneously replied 'of course the shalawat nariyyah' (see Appendix II). Indeed, the villagers knew well what prayer should be recited on certain occasions, even though they never expected to lead the ceremony. As far as I could

⁵ The tahlilan and tsarwah are religious gatherings which are held usually in the family langgar to recite the tahlil. These gatherings are specifically designed to help the dead.

see the young santri did the job smoothly, even if the host was a little disappointed over the absence of the mak kaeh who might with confidence guarantee the efficacy of the prayers.

Musical groups in villages such as the samrah and hadrah or kratangan use religious themes extensively in their songs. Only in the samrah are popular songs performed. The hadrah or kratangan is a male musical group relying on several small tamborines and the recital of panegyrics to the Prophet. It is performed alternatively from one member's compound to another, even though it can be performed elsewhere upon request on the occasion of rites of passage. Membership consists of young men, married or not. The two groups that exist in Bettet are currently under the leadership of the local mak kaehs.

On the other hand, the Samrah (female musical group), which uses small different sized tamborines and adopts religious and popular songs, has become a controversial issue. During my stay in the area, the village Samrah performed only two open shows, but it attracted a large number of spectators comparable to an open air film show occasionally held in the villages. According to the chief organizer, a mak kaeh and at the same time a pegawai, the show could not be straightforwardly organized because of strong criticism by several religious figures and other villagers. The latter claimed that girls should not expose themselves on the stage playing music and singing. In many neighboring areas like Sameran, Masaran, Jenangkah and Bagandan, where general education has deeper roots, the Samrah regularly presents shows, in spite of criticism by certain figures.

The eulogistic biography of the Prophet which is illustrated in such collections of poems as the Barzanjī, Burdah, Isrā'-Mi'rāj and Dzība' is popularly recited in various gatherings in villages including the rajaban,⁶ molodan⁷ and Thursday night

⁶ The rajaban ceremony which is held in the Hijri month of Rajab is intended to celebrate the Prophet's night journey from Mecca to Jerusalem as well as his ascension to heaven. In this occasion, Isrā'-Mi'rāj poems are usually recited.

⁷ The molodan is one of the most elaborate popular ceremonies in the villages. It is

ceremonies. They are performed in diverse kinds of rhythm in accordance with the sophistication of the participants.

On many calendrical Islamic holidays such as New Year (*Sora*), fasting month (*Pasa*), *Telasan* (Idulfitri feast) and rajaban, villagers prepare and exchange special food and perform rituals. However, on the celebration of the birthday of the Prophet in villages, special ceremonies are performed. In the Bettet area the molodan is organized according to the pattern of the existing kolom arrangement or by merging two koloms temporarily into one group. It is performed nightly during the Hijri month of Rabi'ul Awwal and, if necessary, Rabi'ul-Akhir in the members' house one after another. During the ceremony, the story of the Prophet's birth and related events are recited. Each time a reciter finishes a couplet the participants chant a phrase praising and glorifying the Prophet. The end of the ceremony, before the meal time, is marked by a light dance, spreading flowers and perfume and chanting in unison.

In some areas, the performers of the Isrā'-Mi'rāj recital consist of well-trained singers, mostly older villagers, who are invited to different villages. Since the recital requires reading the classical text (*maca layang*) written mostly in the Maduro-Javanese language, it hardly attracts new comers among the younger generation. In the Bettet area only one group is active. It recruits members from different *desas*. All performers are above the age of sixty, and are considered quite old.

Popular mystical activities are seen in the Samman.⁸ Samman is a multi-faceted

intended to celebrate the birthday of the Prophet which is held to have occurred in Hijri month of Rabi'ul-Awwal.

⁸ During his observation on the social and religious life of the Acehnese during the second half of the nineteenth century, Snouck Hurgronje noted the performance of the Samman among the population. The performance was locally called the *ratib*, *dzikir* or *wirid* Samman (1906:217, cf. Schrieke 1919; and Prasodjo 1974:207). According to F. de Jong, the Samman, or rather Sammānīyah, was founded by a certain Muhammad 'Abd al-Karīm al-Sammān (d.1775) sometime in the first half of the eighteenth century. Primarily because al-Sammān had been a member of the Khalwātīyah order before leading his own *tharīqah*, de Jong suggests that the Sammānīyah was an offshoot of the Khalwātīyah (de Jong 1978:38). Since the second half of the eighteenth century, the Sammānīyah had attracted a large following in Egypt. But, as Snouck Hurgronje told us, the center of the order was Medina.

group. It has religio-mystical, vocal and economic elements. Using sufi *dzikir* or *wirid* (praises) the participants express their artistic talent and exhibit their beautiful voices by chanting in unison, interrupted by the solo vocals of the leaders. At a certain stage, many of the participants seem to become ecstatic -closing their eyes, dancing around in circles, chanting and shouting. Prior to the ceremony, each member participates in the capital pooling (*arisan*) (see Chapter 3). The Samman is performed in one house or another either weekly or bi-weekly. The members may come from outside the village. For example, many members of the Samman in Kampong Barak come from Gantungan and Sameran

In the Samman the participants seem to be more involved in the process through their communal singing, shouting and dancing than through contemplative meditation. The most often repeated word in the ceremony is God (*Allah, Huwa, Hu*) and "No god 'but Allah" (*La ilaha illa Allah*). A solemn mystical gathering held under an authoritative guide (*syeh* or *mursyid*) takes place only in the latter's compound. Most ulama in Madura claim to follow certain tarekat orders like the Naqshbandiyah or Qadiriyyah. In the Bettet area only one ulama holds regular mystical gatherings. But his order, as we will see shortly, is suspected by most *kyais* in the region. Despite the small number of his transient and permanent disciples, the *syeh* continues to hold sessions from time to time, depending primarily on demand and the participation of his disciples.

Qur'anic recitation remains popular. This should not be confused with child training at the *langgar raja*. Adult villagers often include Qur'anic recitation in their koloms, either in unison or individually. The recitation of the Yasin (*yasinan*), for example, is done collectively. On other occasions, each participant gets his turn to recite part of the Qur'an and to check the recitation of his fellows. An elaborate style of chanting the Qur'an similar to the fashion which is contested nationally and internationally every year attracts a small number of youths in the villages.

Participation and membership. The participation in such diverse activities

enhances attachment not only to one's fellow villagers but also to a sense of religious belonging. Indeed, the mere routinized knowledge of ritualistic formulae in the activities provides participants with spiritual satisfaction, meaning, hope and security (*kaselamedan*). This being said, village social pressure in the neighborhood is a significant factor that keeps many local activities functional and surviving.

Village religious institutions experience constant change as the number of participants decreases and as villagers establish new ones or modify the existing activities. The regular kolom, of course, is taken for granted since household heads automatically take part. The extra-kolom activities provide many villagers with fields of participation.

Villagers who have not had rights to join the kolom, as well as those who are not satisfied with the monotony of the kolom, attempt to found or support alternate activities. Villagers introduce to their domain only activities which have been accepted elsewhere in the region. Since the initiator of new activities usually comes from among ambitious, but peripheral, villagers the introduction of new activities always creates new, or enhances ongoing, village cleavages. The reason for such individuals to pursue novelty is undoubtedly an attempt to fight against isolation and to promote friendship and popularity, if not patronage. In fact, the leading figures in the introduction of the mustami'an and the samrah to Bettet are peripheral figures, notwithstanding their erudition. Since the established activities and institutions remain under the control of particular families, villagers who exhibit potential and erudition seek opportunities elsewhere to pursue their ambitions. Thanks to the continuing access of villagers to the wider world through modern communication, education and transportation, many of them, particularly young men, become less interested in many of the old village activities and gatherings. Yet the dominance of parents and elders in the performance of most village gatherings reduces the chance of novelty being introduced consciously to the villages. Furthermore, the attraction of modern recreation, cassette recorders, radio and television has a strong impact on the low participation of many village youths in local activities as well as their part in organizing

new ones. Be that as it may, the close relation among neighbors, especially one's compound members (tanean lanjang), keeps most adults within the pole of local expectation. An ordinary married villager thus will join the kolom and one or more other local gatherings.

Although religious institutions and activities obviously create some kind of cooperation, integration and communication among villagers, they are prone to becoming a medium of village factionalism. At the lowest level we saw that the kolom with its various religious ceremonies is able to bring members of the neighborhood together and to promote solidarity among them. Membership in the kolom does mean a lot of things internally, although it is at times taken for granted. In other words, to belong to a local kolom group is natural and does not imply factional political leaning. Nevertheless, since a neighborhood is brought together through diverse networks of ties including kinship, cooperation and religious activities, it can be seen as a strong social unit. This does not mean that an individual cannot pursue his own initiative in relating himself to outsiders, but the group pressure heavily checks this tendency. On the other hand, several village activities which attract members from wider and more diverse segments are affected by cooperative and factional pulls. Since these activities cut across village boundaries, they automatically challenge the local figures. If arrangements can be worked out with these men, support may be secured from them and naturally from their local following. In reality, however, it is not always easy to conduct such maneuvering in the villages. In addition, initiators of novel activities, as already noted, usually come from among unpopular individuals. This tendency of course negates their bargaining power, if they ever attempt to introduce novelties. The classic example for this phenomenon is the organization of the mustami'an in the Bettet area.

After some years of operation it attracted members from different villages. Prior to the foundation of the mustami'an, the Samman gathering had been regularly performed. Although the two activities recruited different and at times factional village members, they did not oppose each other until the 1983 desa election. The

organizers of the two activities were divided in supporting candidates for the headmanship. The bitterness of this rivalry forced many to ask their family members to drop their membership in rival gatherings. If previously they easily avoided holding their activities on the same day, today they tend to enjoy showing which gathering is stronger, better and more popular, by at times having performances concomitantly.

Membership in many village associations reflects an individual's desire for variety. The kolom, however, remains a standard and neutral gathering as it recruits members at random in the neighborhood. The voluntariness of the membership in supra-hamlet socio-religious associations such as the mustami'an, Samman and samrah provides villagers with some kind of freedom of choice. For example, in Bettet, the female sebelasan gathering organized by the klebun's wife attracts desa-women who participate in the government family planning program. And the Samman group in Kampong Barak recruits members among villagers who have a tendency to follow religious practices with little basis in the scriptural concept of Islam. This feature may explain the reason why the Samman group has developed into a camp opposing the mustami'an which is an expression of the proponents of the scriptural teaching of Islam. Moreover, the samrah group which encourages girls to perform musical shows is supported by villagers who have more access to secular, or rather general, education.

Tanean: the cradle and manifestation of the village religion

The Madurese housing pattern has significantly enhanced the centrality of religion in the family. To an extent, the household compound (tanean) is a religious institution. This can be seen in various religious features such as the existence of a family langgar within the center of the compound, regular and occasional religious performances and ceremonies at one's tanean, and the instruction of children in the basic religious rituals by family members shortly before joining the langgar raja. We saw that a family langgar has multi-faceted functions as a religious center, a male domain, a place of rest and, sometimes even, storage. Although not all households construct a langgar, each settlement concentration (tanean lanjang) generally has one (cf. Niehof

1985:80-1). At the present time, out of 111 households in Montor, only 14 have no private langgar. Since most of these households (12) belong to their respective tanean lanjang, they share the langgar within it. The remaining two households belong to newly settled couples who planned to have a langgar as soon as they could secure funds. "To raise a family without a langgar," one of them said, "is incomplete."

Villagers highly value the establishment of a langgar in their compound, even though in practice they may use it only occasionally as a purely religious place. This seems to imply an important understanding of the villagers' religiosity. Villagers are very conscious about conforming to the general, public religious standard even if they do not follow strict religious practices. The spread of langgars into compounds is seen by villagers as proof that the Madurese are religiously committed and active. "The attention paid by a household head in erecting a langgar in his tanean," my informants claimed, "shows the degree of his commitment to Islam." To elaborate this, villagers pointed to new houses built along the main road, separate from the village. Most of these newcomers have occupations in the town as pegawais, traders or peddlers. Although villagers do not have direct information about these neighbors' religious life, the mere absence of the langgar in the latter's compounds and their different lifestyles are seen as religiously negligent. Indeed, failure to conform to the villagers' expectation is seen as abnormal, and religion is for the villagers among the more obvious and easy means to categorize differences.

The regular and recurrent performances of rituals and ceremonies in the family compound provide members with a strong religious atmosphere. The adult's daily practice of the ritual prayers (*shalat* or *bajang*) sets an example for children. Despite the presence of the langgar in the compound, rarely does a family use it as place to perform collective prayers (*shalat jama'ah*). Each member performs his own prayers at his convenience. At home, children are generally given independence in practicing rituals, even though they are expected to participate regularly in the Qur'anic session in the langgar raja. This emphasis might explain why the contrary ideas of conformity and individual freedom have worked out well in village religious life. What is

regarded as normative is public rituals such as the sending of children to the langgar raja, participation in the Friday prayers at the mosque as well as joining the kolom. The five daily prayers, which in most cases are performed individually, are looked upon as a private matter. Villagers avoid evaluating one's religiosity from such perspectives.

On the other hand, the recurrent observance of feasts, including the selamadan and kolom, in the compound increases the intensity of the religious motivation among the family members. During the holding of the selamadan, for example, all family members, including older children, take part in the preparation of the occasion. When the ceremony is in process, all male members in the family join the gathering. Indeed, such occasions enhance the centrality of rituals in the family as well as provide the family members with religious symbols and practices. In other words, family members are involved in communal religious participation. The symbolic aspects of ceremonies seem to have a significant impact on a family's religious attachment and social identity. At a higher level certainly religious ideas become more important for villagers, but such experiences and participation remain the primary elements of village religion.

Before going to the langgar raja, children are instructed by their parents, usually the mother, in the basic rituals and are taught to memorize fragments of the Qur'an. Despite the casualness of this level of instruction, the family is successful in making itself a source of reference for children's early religious education. Since almost all villagers have a basic knowledge of Islam, this early instruction is done smoothly by the parents. As a unit, thus, the family is a quasi-religious institution. This tendency is accentuated by the household head's participation in various ceremonies as well as his holding of such ceremonies in his own compound. Rituals thus continuously intrude on village children's atmosphere and surroundings.

Religious centers

The mosque and its functionary (*imam*) generally become symbols of village unity

and a center of communication, particularly among village inhabitants at large. At a lower level, the langgar raja with its mak kaeh in a hamlet or *kampung* serves as a point of reference for villagers' immediate religious concerns (for details on langgar raja see Chapter 8).

Village mosque: the symbolic unity of a village. The village mosque consists of a quadrangular building with an interior that is the mosque proper and a veranda, with a separate well and washroom. Ritual prayers are performed inside as much as possible. When the participants (*jama'ah*) grow in number, it is not uncommon to find that they pray even in the mosque yard. In *desas* this feature is rare. Villagers seem to have built mosques which are large enough to harbor the *jama'ah*; and, more important, because their number is relatively low. The mosque veranda is used by the imam to provide religious instruction. Villagers also use the veranda to talk to each other and to discuss various matters. On Fridays when adult males are expected to perform midday prayers, the mosque is crowded. Children, of course, regard the occasion as an opportunity to entertain themselves by playing with friends and dressing up since they wear the traditional black cap and sarong. Although in some town mosques women are given a separate location, women are excluded from the village mosque. In the Bettet area, during the last few years only one local imam has assigned a place for the female *jama'ah* in the mosque. Nevertheless, women compensate for this exclusion by founding, for instance, their own weekly or monthly religious gatherings such as the *yasinan*, *sebelasan*, *shalawat nariyah* or *mustami'an*.

The village mosque symbolizes the unity of the village. The centrality of a mosque, however, very much depends on the imam's personality, initiative and erudition. To achieve these attributes an imam may among other things organize a *madrasah* and dispense medication. At the village level, the *madrasah* seems to have significantly elevated the imam's prestige. For more ambitious figures who aim at supravillage influence, different sets of requirements such as effective medication and a *pondok* have to be achieved (see below). What a local figure, as I will show in the next chapter, lacks for the achievement of supravillage popularity is ascribed status.

Whatever the case may be, the mosque constitutes the highest village religious institution. In villages, the mosque also represents the most graceful and eminent building.

Village imams who have received extensive pondok training may open sessions for adult villagers. Such sessions, as we shall see in Chapter 10, are often offered in response to the demand of a number of villagers.

In crowded areas where more than one mosque is found, rivalry between mosque imams is not uncommon. In Pamekasan a desa generally has at least one mosque. Since segments of the population live in dispersed areas, many villagers have to walk some distance to the mosque. This significantly affects the frequency of their attendance at the mosque. When a village or desa has a single mosque, this fact indicates that religion has not become a major channel of political maneuvering. In other words, village conflict and rivalry are less intense, and if rivalries emerge, they are located and dealt with in different arenas and settings. Indeed, the imam of such a mosque is, at least religiously, recognized by all the members of the desa. On the other hand, in a desa that harbors a couple of mosques or more, it is easy to discern that villagers are in many ways divided. It should be borne in mind, however, that in certain cases, the establishment of additional mosques in a locality does not create an imbalance if the new mosques maintain a subordinate position relative to the older mosque. This can be worked out by the new mosques through securing the approval of the older one, and through maintaining good communication with the established imams in the surroundings.

Since spatial distance is the main factor to be considered, the establishment of a new mosque in an isolated location is generally welcome. In Sameran where three mosques are found, conflict and cooperation among the imams are noticed. In the central village, rivalry is strongly felt even by casual observers. There are two mosques which are spatially close. The old one was built during the post-Independence period; another was opened in the late 1950's. During Sukarno's era, the imam of the new mosque joined the wing of the National Party called *Jamus* (Jam'iyatul Musli-

min). Many older villagers regarded the imam as religiously unqualified. Indeed, he was suspected of dispensing obscure medication and, more important, of propagating leftist political slogans. Because the imam of the old mosque had proved his excellence in the villagers' eyes by, for instance, showing his bravery against criminals and trouble makers, he enjoyed wide support. The new mosque, therefore, did not pose a serious challenge to him, as the majority of villagers affiliated with his mosque. Today changes have occurred. The old mosque is led by the old imam's son. The new mosque is patronized by the imam's son-in-law, a member of the Army. The two young ulama have been pitched in a bitter rivalry, to the extent that affiliating with another mosque is suspected, so to speak. When the first mak kaeh joined the government-backed Golkar in the late 1970's, most of his pupils deserted his mosque and madrasah.⁹ The military imam, despite his government affiliation, attracted most of those deserters. Attempts were made by both imams to improve their respective positions in the face of changing circumstances and perspectives. Certainly it is interesting to observe why villagers distinguish the first imam's recent identification with the government-backed party from the military imam's natural affiliation with the régime, but we shall discuss such topics on another occasion. In fact, villagers were critical toward their leader's decision to introduce change including village ulama. Was it opportunism? Or was it for the advantage of the villagers at large?

On the other hand, the newest mosque built in 1983 does not create any opposition. The imam, a simple, old peasant, was careful to secure the understanding of the neighboring imams and mak kaehs. On the basis of its relative distance and isolation from the surrounding mosques, he did not face any protest. More important, the initiative was supported by such supravillage ulama as the kyais of Bettet and Sumberanom.

Dukon: a multi-faceted upholder of the indigenous culture

In a society where magical practices are acknowledged and maintained the dukon

⁹ Further discussion of regular classes at village madrasah see Chapter 10.

(magical practitioner or simply healer) enjoys popularity and, to a degree, influence among the population. In Madura a dukon is originally associated with the ability to communicate with the unseen world.¹⁰ Thus the dukon is in a position to tame, directly or as mediator, evil spirits that disturb fellow villagers. Unlike the ulama, the dukon mainly depends on indigenous formulae in his practices. For example, a dukon claims to have assistants in the forms of spirits of the deceased great figures. Upon request, usually obliged by the inducement of a state of trance, the spirits will appear and speak directly to the audience using the dukon's tongue (cf. Firth 1974).

The villagers believe that illness is caused by either or both of two factors: physical conditions or an evil spirit. When a villager has an illness, practical treatment is sought. Only after the failure of medication, local or modern if one can afford it, will villagers relate an illness or accident to the action of an evil spirit. The borderline between physical illness and supernaturally caused abnormality is, however, blurred. Indeed, any anomaly and irregularity in the family's fortunes may easily be related to supernatural wrath. The inaccessibility of cheap, effective modern medication to villagers undoubtedly has perpetuated this tendency.

In order primarily to mitigate the identification of their practices with non-Islamic sources the dukons often include in their business certain Islamic symbols such as the recitation of *basmalah*, the invocations of well-known Islamic figures and references to Allah. Despite the opposition and resentment on the part of the ulama, as I will show, the dukons continue to attract a large number of cure-seeking villagers (cf. Jordaan 1985:170-1). Since the dukons still provide an alternative explanation, if not a direct cure to the villagers' complex problems and illnesses, their expertise continues to be relied upon. Only when practical and modern medication is made easily available and accessible to villagers will the dukons' role shift or be eroded. One interesting feature of the dukons' approach is the promotion of harmony with the universe and the preservation of the environment. This can be seen in their basic assumption

¹⁰ In certain Madurese localities, there are several different terms that distinguish the expertise of particular dukons from the others (see Jordaan 1985).

that man's problems are related to his own mistakes and faults in dealing with the supernatural, thus, he is in constant need of keeping in harmony with the unseen, including preserving the environment where the *se areksa* usually reside.

A dukon generally comes from among the villagers. A family to whom a dukon belongs, of course, has more chance of producing dukons. Although the dukons at times justify their expertise by citing an authoritative source, the most effective proof for their claim is a convincing and satisfying performance in front of their clients. In fact, a dukon has diverse sources of authority which are claimed through inheritance, dream, sudden possession and meditation. The villagers do not specifically heed the dukon's authority. Since the dukon extensively exploits the face-to-face communication with his audience, his effective means of satisfying the latter is use of rhetoric and dramatic performance. Furthermore, the audience's preconceived notions of their problems as having been caused by the unseen automatically pave the way for the dukon's manipulation of their psychic consciousness and expectations. The real impact of the dukon's formulae on the illness or problem is, of course, important for the villagers. But the drama that he can successfully perform during the mediation process is a primary factor that brings him fame and authority.

The villagers' view that dukon-ship is a given talent places its practitioners in a fixed station. When a dukon is perceived by the villagers to have reached a certain level, he will stay there for life or even fall in status if he fails to maintain the villagers' confidence in himself. The dukons do not have a network and are, therefore, individual practitioners. Despite their poor access to supralocal ideas, the dukons attract diverse segments of supravillage clients who have known the dukons through neighbors, friends or hearsay. Thus in terms of financial resources, the dukons primarily depend on the gifts of their visitors. It is not uncommon, however, to find that a famous dukon suddenly becomes a wealthy villager, as certain of his clients present him a house, oxen, or a large cash gift upon his successful performance and/or the curing of a disease.

The dukons' relation with the ulama is quite an uneasy one. This is true despite the fact that both attempt to symbolize village harmony, continuity and order. Indeed, each maintains a different orientation and point of reference. Although the dukons do not have a network and stable organized followers, they represent an important village segment which is in constant conflict and friction with the ulama. And outwardly within limits they form an alternative channel for the external attempt to introduce changes to villages. This is evidenced, for example, by the fact that the dukons have been more susceptible to joining a political party that has been opposed by the ulama. Yet because many changes in health care and education directly affect the dukons' domain, the latter, too, have strong reasons to oppose external efforts to restructure living conditions in the villages.

Formal socio-religious organization

The Madurese are brought into contact with supravillage religious circles through socio-religious organizations like the NU, SI, Muhammadiyah or MDI. This phenomenon has already been noted in Chapter 4, but let us here briefly examine these organizations as found in the villages. As can be seen in the result of the 1955 and 1971 general elections in Pamekasan, until 1973 the NU was the biggest party in Pamekasan as in Madura as a whole (see Table 7.1). But since 1973 the NU has ceased to be a political party, resuming its former socio-religious role. Yet the fact remains that many members of the local assembly have come from the NU. The SI of Pamekasan is the strongest SI camp not only in Madura but also in East Java as a whole. Most of the SI followers come from the central and northern parts of the regency (cf. Jordaan 1985:59-60). In the Bettet area there are very few SI followers, even though the organization's most outspoken leader and kyai lives in the area and runs a pondok and a mosque.

Because of the dominant position of old organizations like the SI and NU in the villages, the government-backed MDI and Muhammadiyah have not succeeded in recruiting a large following there. Although officially the MDI has offices in the villages, members are recruited by the klebun among desa officials, teachers and government

employees. In the Bettet area two village ulama have joined the MDI. One of them is a desa official, and the other is a retired pegawai. The latter enthusiastically campaigned for Golkar during the 1982 general elections. Furthermore, Muhammadiyah with its aggressive and puritanical doctrine has not succeeded in setting its roots in villages, in spite of the fact that in the town it has relatively well-established educational institutions and prominent personalities. In the villages some individuals who have access to outside information show a leaning toward Muhammadiyah doctrine, but they are too frightened of local criticism to proclaim membership in Muhammadiyah.¹¹

Despite the continuing popularity of the NU and SI, the villagers are increasingly exposed to different brands of religious institutions and organizations. Most villagers remain firmly behind the religious leaders, the ulama. Yet in the case of the MDI certain segments of the villagers have been evidently included in its fold. Sooner or later, such activities will help nurture new features of village religious organizations. It should be borne in mind, however, that such a development, or rather curve of a social discourse, very much depends on the availability of a fund provider and program enforcer. Moreover, insofar as the village world view, education and economy do not undergo major change, novelties, especially in religious organization, will remain peripheral and at best become part of a splinter group's identity. Put differently, super-imposed organizations will be maintained by office holders as part of the formalities of their offices and as bureaucratic measures without any serious attempt to implement their program and goals. As soon as the *raison d'être* of an organization is lost because of political change at the upper level, another form of mechanism may be introduced. The latter may either create new half-hearted support groups or recruit the ex-supporters of the previous parallel organization. Nevertheless, the erosion, albeit slow and almost unseen, of the existing, operating values and the continuing influx of new ideas and innovations into villages will determine not only the pros-

¹¹ For some illustrations of rivalries between Muhammadiyah followers and other local groups in the north coast of Madura see Jordaan 1985:53-5; cf. Amir Santoso 1980.

pects of the prevailing religious organizations in villages but also the villagers' view of themselves and the external forces.

Table 7.1. The results of the 1955 and 1971 general elections in Pamekasan and Madura

PAMEKASAN						
Participants	1955	%	1971	%	1977	%
NU	90,046	-	113,557	48.7	-	-
PNI	10,033	-	1,209	0.5	-	-
PKI	743	-	-	-	-	-
Masyumi	15,188	-	-	-	-	-
Parmusi	-	-	5,258	2.3	-	-
PSII/SI	-*	-	43,132	18.5	-	-
Golkar	-	-	66,864	28.7	65,062	24.4
PPP	-	-	-	-	199,482	74.8
PDI	-	-	-	-	1,982	0.8
Others	-	-	3,047	1.3	-	-
Total	-**	-	233,067	100	266,526	100

MADURA						
Participants	1955	%	1971	%	1977	%
NU	560,817	-	760,191	66.8	-	-
PNI	84,321	-	5,495	0.5	-	-
PKI	3,453	-	-	-	-	-
Masyumi	121,110	-	-	-	-	-
Parmusi	-	-	23,040	2.0	-	-
PSII/SI	-**	-	55,187	4.8	-	-
Golkar	-	-	288,048	25.3	407,197	31.1
PPP	-	-	-	-	892,112	68.2
PDI	-	-	-	-	8,521	0.7
Others	-	-	6,222	0.6	-	-
Total	-**	-	1,138,183	100	1,307,830	100

* The leaders and ulama who later supported the SI (PSII) in the 1971 election had established their own independent party AKUI under K.H. Baqir of Banyuwang (Feith 1957:59; Ward 1974, Amir Santoso 1980:133).


** The figure is not available

(Sources Bappeda Tk. II Pamekasan, Feith 1957; Ward 1974)

Because of the dominant position of the ulama in Islamic organizations and activities, all religious organizations in villages channel their activities primarily through the ulama establishment and network (see Chapter 11). In the Bettet area this phenomenon can be clearly shown in the context of the NU.

The NU hierarchy has been formed as a parallel to the state organization. Thus the hierarchy as a whole has central, provincial, branch, sub-branch and village levels (see Figure 7.1). Although at the regency level the NU is able to establish several sub-organizations (*nevens*) such as the Ansor (youth), Muslimat (woman), Fatayat (younger woman), and IP/PNU (student), in the villages only Muslimat usually has a separate committee.

Figure 7.1 Hierarchical structure of the NU compared to the state organization



Prior to the Golkarization of government employees, the NU had openly and popularly sponsored many village feasts and ceremonies. The pledge of sole allegiance (*monoloyalitas*) of the village officials to Golkar, of course, has prevented their overt

support to an organization such as the NU. Accordingly, many public occasions have been held neutrally in the name of ad hoc committees. For example, the hadrah and mustami'an in Bettet were for some time organized on behalf of the local NU committee. By the mid 1970's, since some key members of the committee, being pegawais, had to declare their monoloyalitas to Golkar, these activities have been declared neutral local initiatives. In the content and management of the activities no significant changes were introduced except in name. The intensive political activities around the time of the last general elections forced the NU to be less demonstrative about its ubiquity in villages. Despite its pronouncement of leaving politics the NU evidently was involved in maintaining its dominance in the PPP.¹² This of course furthered the government's suspicion of many of its activities. In villages this uneasy relation was manifested in the government limitation imposed on NU social activities. During that period the NU was almost equivalent to the PPP, which in Madura has been the strongest rival to Golkar. To avoid embarrassment, almost not a single NU sign, let alone bill board, was posted in front of any NU office or leader's home in the villages. Nonetheless, since the 1982 general elections, the central committee of the NU has maneuvered to break all structural links with the PPP as manifested officially in the 1984 NU Congress in Situbondo, East Java.¹³ As a result, NU members in the villages

¹² Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party) is a political party established in 1973 in response to the contemporary simplification of the party system in Indonesia. It was sponsored by the major prevailing Islamic parties such as the NU, Parmusi, PSII/SI and Perti (see Samson 1978).

¹³ During the 1982 general elections, many NU leaders protested against government refusal, as implemented by a special committee of the PPP, to include many of NU leading figures as candidates in the election. The 1982 elections provided the NU with less position in the PPP and parliament. Disappointment became acute among certain circles of the NU especially the ulama. As a result the NU was divided into two strong camps: the so-called Cipete group (ruling NU politicians) and Situbondo group (disappointed politicians and ulama). The Cipete camp wanted to maintain the status quo in the PPP; whereas the Situbondo group regarded such a position as too weak, particularly in view of its contribution to and popularity within the PPP. By the second half of 1984, the Situbondo group seems to have gained support from the government as well as won the internal political battle, as the NU's congress was held in Situbondo, East Java in December 1984. The exact location of the congress clearly showed the leading role of the ulama in the NU as it was held in the midst of the pondok belongs to a Pamekasan-born kyai in the eastern tip of Java. The congress was regarded as a compromise between the two opposing camps, even though its decision undoubtedly shows Situbondo camp domination. Among important decisions in the congress

have shown their hand by organizing public meetings, ceremonies and activities on NU's behalf.

In villages the NU is run² and managed by local ulama. Since local ulama remain popular figures in villages, they are usually elected as chairmen. Again, the management of the NU's administration is assigned to lay villagers who have knowledge about the bureaucracy and a background of secular education. In Bettet the NU's chairmanship has been assigned to a local ulama, an ustadz who runs a pengajian and a langgar raja. He is assisted in running the NU's administration primarily by a lay villager, a retired government employee. Because of his knowledge about government agencies, this assistant significantly contributes to the smooth running of the NU's administration in the desa.

The supralocal organizations like the NU bring together some segmented groups in villages. However, the inability of such organizations to implement their own concept of participation and mobilization has forced them to rely on local supporters and followers. In the case of the NU, with its reliance on the ulama's network (see below Chapter 11), the organization has been successful in mobilizing the ulama followers into a more united force. This is evident in the recurrent meetings and communication among different ulama. In the villages, the local mak kaebs are occasionally brought together to be made more aware about the wider desa context and to discuss some of its socio-religious problems. Yet in some villages where local factions have support from the ulama, the NU may only add fuel to the ongoing village rivalry. The NU can be manipulated by each faction to seek external support in order to enhance the faction's own aims and interests. My notes on the implementation of the NU's programs to re-register its members in Bettet may explain this tendency.

Shortly before the 1984 NU Congress in Situbondo, the NU leadership in Pamekasan

were: to accept Pancasila as the ideological basis/foundation (*asas tunggal*) of the NU, to give the ulama-dominated body (the Syuriyah) the highest power in the NU and to end any structural link and ties with the PPP (for details see *Tempo* December 1984; *Kompas* December 1984; *Memorandum* December 1984).

wanted to revive socio-religious activities in villages by registering its members. In response to this program, in Bettet a new local committee of the NU was appointed. The committee soon decided that identity cards would be issued for each NU member. For this purpose the committee planned to take photographs of the NU members. Although all members of the committee had agreed on this matter, certain difficulties arose as a local mak kaeh, himself a member of the committee, prohibited his followers in his hamlet and surrounding neighborhoods from having their pictures taken. The mak kaeh argued that during the previous formal meeting this matter had not been discussed. Accordingly, only a handful of the NU members in his hamlet had their pictures taken. Indeed, the mak kaeh was disappointed by the fact that the organizers of the photograph-taking program in the hamlet were his arch-enemy's children. The latter rejected holding the photograph-taking in the tanean of one of the mak kaeh's supporters. In protest over this incident the mak kaeh reported the matters to the NU leadership in the town. When I left Pamekasan in late March 1985 the NU members in Bettet had not received the NU's identity card and the dispute between the local leaders of the NU was not settled.

This episode shows the negative impact of a supralocal organization in villages, even within its own fold. Certainly there are many other examples that prove, as we saw in Chapter 4, the positive contribution of supralocal organizations in enhancing village cooperation and relations with the town and beyond.

The NU decision to freeze its structural relations and ties with the PPP and to become a fully socio-religious organization has been applied in the local context with some difficulties and confusion. In Madura, the PPP is almost identical with the NU. Although the NU has not shown its political leanings, its plan for neutrality and pragmatism is difficult and perplexing for villagers to understand. The public statements of the NU leaders giving their votes to parties which list favorable candidates at each level of the three representative bodies (parliament, provincial assembly and local council) seem to be too theoretical as a basis for political participation in the villages. It will be perplexing for an ordinary NU member in the village to cast his votes in

three different forms, that is, to vote for the PPP at the local level, the PDI at the provincial level and Golkar at the national level. Putting aside the possible negative impact of such a policy on the PPP and the NU, especially on the ulama, such neutrality and pragmatism, taken at face value, will increase the villagers' positive view of the political process and participation. Nonetheless, more interesting than this technical aspect of directing the villagers' votes is the impact of the NU leaders' shifting policies among the villagers and the rank-and-file ulama in Madura and the villagers' perception of the NU as an ulama-led supralocal organization.¹⁴ For the moment we shall put such issues aside, waiting for further developments and research. Up to now, the NU ulama in Pamekasan seem to have managed the new policy smoothly.

Tarekat order (tharīqah): a facet of village piety

Although many features of Sufi and tarekat rituals are performed in villages, only a small number of villagers associate themselves with well-known tarekat establishments such as the Naqsybandiyah, Qadiriyyah or Qadiriyyah wan-Nāqsybandiyah. The Samman which is popularly performed in many villages is in many ways an expression of the central Sufi practice of *dzikir* (litany). In fact, the word God (*Allah, Hu* or *Huwa*) is the most dominant feature of all Sufi *dzikirs*. Moreover, diverse forms of request prayers such as the *shalawat nariyah* (see Appendix II), *tahlil* and *tsarwah* (see Appendix VI) which are recited during the *selamadan* in villages are derived from such Sufi practices. In the text-reading sessions (*pengajians*) among adults in the

¹⁴ The neutrality of voting decision among the NU mass following in the next general elections, if ever such occur, thus will be made as far as possible reasonable and acceptable to avoid upsetting the balance and the relations between the ulama and villagers. In fact, in the past, especially during Sukarno's era, the NU was closely associated with the régime. Historically, the Madurese ulama experienced, as already observed in Chapter 2, different positions and attitudes toward the political establishment. The present representation system, indeed, provides the ulama with a symbolic recognition for their leading role in the society. The victories in the local elections are unerring proofs for their influence and popularity. On the other hand, the government with its continuing and total control over the executive body and the bureaucracy continues to have almost full freedom to make and execute its own plans and programs. As far as its decisions and acts do not interfere with the ulama's interests or with vital religious symbols, issues and goals, the ulama evidently do little against the establishment (cf. Geertz 1960a, Binder 1960; Green 1978). In order to preserve its status quo the NU has to work out a means to preserve and insure the ulama's image and the society's expectations from its religious leaders.

mosque and pondok, the ulama often explore such Sufi texts as *al-Hikam*,¹⁵ *Jauharat al-Tauhīd*,¹⁶ *Hidāyat al-Adzkiyā' ila Tharīq al-Awliyā'*,¹⁷ *Tuhfat al-Ashfiyā'*,¹⁸ *Tuhfat al-Murīd 'alā Jauharat al-Tauhīd*,¹⁹ and *Bidāyat al-Hidāyah*.²⁰

Villagers who strictly follow a particular tarekat order (tharīqah) regularly meet the tarekat guide (syeh or mursyid) usually a famous kyai, either to renew the pledge or to conduct collective meditation and prayers. At their own homes, they are expected to conduct regular daily contemplation by repeating special Sufi dzikirs.²¹ Since such activities require funds and leisure time, only a few relatively older well off villagers can afford to associate with a tarekat syeh or mursyid. The present mursyid of the Qadiri wan-Naqsybandi order in the region is a prestigious kyai of Sampang. The office of guide is not bequeathed from father to son but transferred from a mursyid to particular colleagues or disciples. The present mursyid, for example, received his authority (*ijazah*) from a well-know mursyid of Ambunten in Sumenep (K.H. Aliwafa, who died in the late 1970's). For the last few decades the participants of the Qadiri wan-Naqsybandi order in Pamekasan have had to meet their mursyid outside the regency. In Bettet only two couples and a husband are currently associated with the

¹⁵ It was written by Abū al-Fadl Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Iskandarī (d. 709H), see Hājī Khalīfah 1941:675.

¹⁶ The author of the book is Ibrāhīm ibn al-Luqānī (d. 1041H), see H. Khalīfah 1941:619.

¹⁷ This book is popularly known in Madura and Java as *Kitāb al-Adzkiyā'*. It was written by Abū Yahyā Zainuddīn al-Maḥarī (d. 928H), see van den Berg 1886:551-3; Sarkīs 1931:1763.

¹⁸ The author of this book is Kyai 'Abd al-Jalīl of Central Java, Semarang Toha Putra, 1963.


¹⁹ It was written by Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad al-Bājūrī (d. 1276H), see H. Khalīfah 1941:258.

²⁰ Since the book is an abridged form of the famous *Ihyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn*, it is claimed that the author of the *Bidāyah* is Abū Ḥamid al-Ghazālī (d. 505H/1111), see H. Khalīfah 1941:227.

²¹ For example, the recitation of special prayers (*al-kalimah al-thayyibah*) such as *Subhān Allāh wa bi-hamdih, subhān Allāh al-'adhīm, astaghfir Allāh* (Oh Lord, the purest! Praise be to Him. Oh God, the purest, the almighty! I beg Your forgiveness) for 100 times.

Qadiri wan-Naqsybandi mursyid. Another couple who had been active have stopped all tarekat rituals because of new job assignments. They told me, however, that they wanted to resume their tarekat activities when they have enough time to concentrate on the dzikir.

Figure 7.2: Overlapping membership among participants of village socio-religious associations: the Bettet area



In the Bettet area a local mak kaeh has been leading a rather new but unpopular order, the 'Ulwiyah. This tarekat was established a few decades ago by an ulama of Malang in East Java. The mak kaeh is the only authorized 'Ulwiyah mursyid in Madura who may grant admission and conduct collective meditation and exercises. Although he is suspected by local villagers of leading a misguided order (*tarekat kasasar* or *al-tharīqah ghair al-mu'tabarah*) he attracts some disciples from other desas. According to informants, until a few years ago most neighbors in his hamlet had participated in some kind of mystical gatherings to chant the dzikirs. Among features that the villagers strongly objected to were such practices as putting out the

light during the rituals and regarding non-participants as "dirty Muslims" (*Islammarakarad*). Because of this opposition the mak kaeh has become very careful in talking about his activities unless one is already committed to being his disciple. His teaching, the mak kaeh told me, "can be passed on only to those who want to join the order" by devoting some time in contemplation. This contemplation includes staying in the mak kaeh's langgar (*khalwat*) for some days and obeying his orders. After a period of contemplation he will inform the participants on an individual basis whether or not they have crossed the lower border of purity from profanity. But in general, the mursyid explained, one needs less than two weeks of intensive contemplation to achieve this stage. Because of such expensive demands as leaving one's home for a period, monetary expenses, and regular visits to the mursyid, the average villager can hardly afford to join a tarekat order.

Summary

The holding of various religious activities and the establishment of several socio-religious associations and organizations in villages provide inhabitants with opportunities to widen their fields of orientation and communication. From several examples in the Bettet area, it is evident that many new, wider associations have been established by peripheral but ambitious villagers. Indeed, these supra-kolom activities offer villagers some alternative to monotonous activities in the villages. More specifically, the associations and activities provide some of the dislocated, disappointed but energetic villagers with an alternate ladder in order to find a new niche and/or pursue wider aims and interests. Although in some cases membership in an association does not allow a member to join another activity, a villager can generally join as many associations as he wishes. Accordingly, villagers gain resources and protection from certain social pressures through membership in one or the other of their community levels (see Figure 7.2). Someone who is not favorably treated within his kolom may intensify his membership in the mustami'an, for example. Indeed, in Kampong Barak the family of Pak Nawi was isolated by the local mak kaeh. The family was suspected of organizing a rival pengajian for children in the hamlet. Because of his influence, the mak

kaeh was able to exclude Pak Nawi from any invitation to the local kolom. Since Pak Nawi has been active in the mustami'an for years, he seems to have ignored the isolation by increasing his participation in many supra-kolom activities including mustami'an and the NU. Despite the intensive relation among hamlet members, villagers possess means to broaden their area of communication and association beyond the hamlet and kampong. In the next chapter I shall trace the historical background and development of the two most important institutions at local and supravillage contexts, i.e. langgar and pondok.

Chapter Eight

THE ULAMA'S BACKGROUND LOCAL HISTORIES, LANGGAR AND PONDOK

The ulama in Madura have been very influential. This is due primarily to the ulama's strategic position in the Madurese village structure. They play an important role, contextually or conceptually, in the individual's salvation and the society's survival. As I have shown in Chapters 1 and 2, the ulama have a long history of hard work before they assumed leadership to serve the Madurese need of mediator and guide in relation to the immanent supernatural power (*se areksa*). Despite their successful maneuvering to enter the village social structure, the ulama did not exercise popular influence, let alone power, until they succeeded in becoming the villagers' genuine spokesmen. While the royal families in the island were still autonomous and powerful, the ulama served as important religious functionaries. The increasing presence of the colonial power and bureaucracy in Madura strongly eroded the prestige and hegemony of the royal families. Due to the ulama's low profile and their village orientation, they were not harassed by the colonial authorities. In fact, the ulama succeeded in building closer relationships with villagers and in organizing educational institutions which attracted young village men.

At a lower level the reshaping of a native religious center of proto-langgar into the present langgar was an important innovation that brought positive results for the absorption of the ulama into the village domain. Moreover, the proliferation of higher educational centers like pondoks, first through court support and later, through the wider participation of the population, enabled many ulama independently to found pondoks away from the palace, both spatially and socially.

Langgar: an indigenous religious center

The absorption of the native religious center into an Islamic institution helped smooth the process of the villagers' adaptation to Islam and maintained the position of the religious functionaries in villages. Although we do not have historical proof to

show that the langgar had been a part of the structural housing pattern in pre-Islamic Madura, evidence from non-Islamized regions in Southeast Asia, such as Bali and the mainland suggest that the langgar is an indigenous religious center.²² In Bali, for example, most Hindu households have a family temple which has a closely parallel role to that of the langgar in Madura (Geertz 1959, Geertz and Geertz 1975, Lansing 1983). In Thailand and Burma Buddhist families maintain a chapel in their compound (Potter 1976, Nash 1965). The survival of such an institution in the Islamic situation helps explain the smooth process of changing the mode of certain rituals among villagers. In addition, the Madurese did not give up all their forms of worship. Accordingly, local religious functionaries might have maintained their position by modifying particular forms of their customary prayers and ritual in order to accommodate Islamic form. Even today after centuries of intensive scripturalization a Saudi sheikh will be shocked to witness the Madurese performance of a funeral and its aftermath. He may think that Madurese villagers are practicing non-Islamic rituals. Indeed, the absence of a violent dislocation of village religious functionaries have paved the way for the survival of many local religious features as well as eased the job of the Muslim preachers to conduct "islamization"²³ in the villages. In the process of growing religious sophistication, of course, changes of orientation grew steadily as many religious functionaries looked outward to Islamic centers for guidance. Although the scriptural forms of Islam were increasingly introduced to villages, they were transmitted fundamentally through a hearsay process. Only a small number of villagers had the opportunity to study the religious texts under the supralocal ulama.

The villagers' need for experts in ceremony and ritual made the mak kaeh's presence in villages indispensable. The minimal introduction of foreign rituals within

²² It is worth noting that the term langgar or *langar* is popularly used in the Punjab to indicate the public kitchen located in the shrine compound, see Eaton 1984; Gilmartin 1979, 1984.

²³ Throughout the text the term "islamization" with the lowercase "i" in "islam" is used in order to denote the process of scripturalization of village Islam as well as of approximation toward the ulama's concept of Islam. Thus islamization is a further step within the greater "Islamization" with uppercase "I".

local ceremonies seems even to have added value to such rituals and enhanced the ulama's prestige. The use of Arabic in several new request prayers (*do'as*) have been exploited, or rather manipulated, to fulfill the local needs of medication, invincibility and divination. In this atmosphere village parents would have favored sending their younger children to learn from the ulama and bringing themselves closer to these religious experts. The favorable popular view toward the ulama was followed by attempts to induce them to reside in the villages, primarily through marriage. The case of Barnadi in the past and Pak Wafi in recent years may clarify our argument

As we have seen in Chapter 2, Barnadi was the first learned individual who conducted religious instruction in Bettet. Bettet was a small and isolated settlement. It depended religiously on services provided by the ulama in neighboring Teja. Like many other men in his neighborhood, Barnadi married out of his natal hamlet. Although he did not belong to the core kin of the ulama in Teja, Barnadi had better access to village religious instruction and claim of affiliation and identity with prestigious Modin Teja. Indeed, until the beginning of this century, Teja, particularly Gar Bata, was a highly reputed village with a strong Islamic atmosphere. Accordingly, many villagers from Teja who married exogamously into other areas became the founders of local religious centers.

Upon his marriage to a woman from Bettet, Barnadi was able to conduct religious instruction for the neighboring children, even though he never specifically studied religion in the pondok. Most of his religious studies were conducted at the local mosque. Since he was not expected to teach advanced learning Barnadi did not face any difficulty in gradually assuming the *mak kaehship* in Bettet. In addition to instructing children and leading ceremonies, he provided services for child circumcision (*dukon sonat*). The availability of a large amount of uncultivated land in Bettet eased the economic support for such a new family as Barnadi's. Nevertheless, Barnadi did not build a new religious center, instead he utilized the langgar in the family compound. In view of the small number of households in Bettet during the period, Barnadi naturally did not require a large langgar to accommodate the village children. As his

teaching sessions attracted more village children, Barnadi was also given the honor to lead local religious ceremonies. Indeed, he introduced some new forms of standard request prayers performed during such ceremonies. The present hadrah group in the village is the successor to the one founded by Barnadi during his early career.

Today in spite of the increase in the number of local religious experts, a certain level of equilibrium has been achieved in the proportion of religious centers and their functionaries in the villages. Thus, most religious centers are run by descendants of the founders. Yet the growing size of the population, followed by the building of new settlements, requires the services of more village religious functionaries such as mak kaehs and imams. I have shown in the previous chapter that a third mosque was established in Sameran when the population grew larger, the new settlements forming almost an independent entity. Again, in Kampong Tengah of Bettet, where the population concentration is high, the emergence of a new mak kaeh is inevitable.

Indeed, during the last few years Pak Wapi has been able to attract more and more children to his langgar which becomes the biggest langgar raja in the village. Pak Wapi married a local woman following his graduation from the pondok of Bettet in the early 1960's. A well-versed ustadz in scriptural Islam, Pak Wapi was involved in various teaching activities in the area. Furthermore, his expertise in religious music has made him a popular figure in the surrounding villages. He organized diverse musical groups in different settings and times. Although during the afternoons he was occupied with his teaching assignment at the neighboring madrasah, Pak Wapi continued to work at night to instruct children, lead ceremonies, receive visitors and organize musical groups.

These examples indicate several factors that make the emergence of a new local ulama possible, namely population growth, increased religious erudition, and personal attraction of religious figures as well as resources to run village religious and recreational programs such as pengajian, hadrah, Samman, silat and samrah. One's origin seems to contribute to innovations introduced into villages. For instance, Barnadi and

Pak Wapi, being newcomers, were able to introduce new forms of rituals and recreational activities. Pak Wapi tried hard to get recognition from villagers in Kampong Tengah by performing rigorous and novel activities. When he secured limited recognition, he gradually attracted parents to send their children for instruction. Today Pak Wapi's langgar raja is the liveliest religious center, with the largest number of pupils in the village. His increasing popularity, however, has created resentment among the native mak kaeh and other religious experts. His opponents endeavor to undermine Pak Wapi's integrity by criticizing his sponsorship of a female musical group. Since each figure has certain core supporters, village religious institutions such as the langgars raja continue to be operated side by side relatively smoothly.

Langgar raja: village religion and children. The langgar raja particularly serves the direct concerns of the villagers' religious understanding and ceremonies. The mak kaeh achieves his position primarily by providing basic religious instruction for village children. The mak kaeh obviously does not have regular, strong relations with adult villagers. However, since the children will soon become household heads, the mak kaeh becomes an important point of religious reference for the villagers. In addition, the mak kaeh is continuously needed to lead religious ceremonies at family feasts. Several mak kaehs in a desa, as I will show, form nodes and networks for the mosque imam and also for supralocal kyais. On Fridays the kyai often receives some or all of them on his mosque veranda, or in his langgar or house to chat, gossip and discuss various topics such as new developments in the villages, trade, politics and education. The mak kaeh does not charge any fee to the children. The parents rather prevent the mak kaeh from spending his own money for lighting the langgar raja by providing kerosene and a lamp. Again, at the end of the fasting month (Ramadhan) they submit their alms to him in the form of rice or corn. Perhaps the mak kaeh himself does not expect these relatively small contributions since he is generally better-off than most of the givers. Yet he evidently acquires a distinct religious status as teacher and religious functionary. The sending of children to the langgar raja in order to receive basic religious instruction from the village ulama (mak kaeh) creates a

long-lasting teacher-pupil bond (ulama-santri) (for a further discussion see below).

The structure of village religious instruction and ceremonies reinforces the mak kaeh's position in the local setting. Despite the fact that a mak kaeh possesses only elementary knowledge of scriptural Islam, he secures the trust of his fellow villagers to lead ceremonies. The mak kaeh is invited to diverse neighborhood ceremonies and feasts (selamadan), where he performs special prayers in accordance with the host's request. During the occasion, as we have observed in Chapter 3, he is given a special place in the inner, western part of the family langgar which is the direction (*kiblat*) for any Muslim performing prayers. Moreover, in a selamadan each participant seems to know his own place and role. Accordingly, when a mak kaeh explains the goal of the selamadan and requests the participants to perform certain prayers under his guidance, the process is done smoothly, almost parallel to the performance of a well-organized orchestra. Although some mak kaehs may achieve recognition of their religious knowledge and medical expertise, villagers expect a mak kaeh primarily to provide them with the basic religious teaching for their children and to lead ceremonies and feasts in their tanean.

Pondok: the foundation of supralocal religious centers

Personal virtues become indispensable assets for ulama popularity. We saw that Barnadi succeeded in occupying the local mak-kaehship through his family and religious background and his expertise in medication including circumcision. Pak Wapi, using his skill in religious music in conjunction with his broad knowledge of scriptural Islam, has been successful in running the langgar raja. Despite the fact that internal mobility occurs among the ulama, it is limited to the village level; functionaries at village mosques and langgars raja may originate from non-ulama families. As I will show, the expansion of the pondok, however, has been conducted primarily by the established ulama families.

Since the foundation of a pondok requires considerable funds, and a large number of skillful assistants and long work hours, only a well-to-do religious figure can

manage to found such an institution. Moreover, the villagers' view of the hereditary standing (*toronan* or *darajat*) of higher religious leaders negatively affects the prospect of certain lay individuals who want to run supravillage institutions such as *pondoks*. When an ordinary village *mak kaeh* opens regular classes, he may attract a large number of local children. If he wishes to have a supralocal *pondok*, he will attract hardly any children from other areas, he lacks the necessary resources to run such an institution. More important, however, he has no access to the extensive network of the higher *ulama* in order to exalt his institution to outsiders. The villagers' typical comment about such a person is that he is "*bennik toronan kyai*" or "*tak kowak darajat*" (he does not possess a solid background of religious leadership). An example from Sameran on the ambitious efforts by a local imam to build supralocal religious centers will explain how resources and public opinion about the *toronan* became central factors in running a supralocal institution.

Bintang, a second-generation *ulama*, pursued what his father had achieved. In addition to running a mosque and an elementary *madrasah* he planned to found a *pondok* and open classes at the secondary level. Since he had a very limited number of family members who might be recruited to conduct higher religious education and a *pondok*, he formed a committee from among villagers. Most of them, however, had been already involved in teaching at other schools. Accordingly, they could not fully participate in Bintang's project. On the other hand, many villagers regarded such a move as an attempt by the imam to show his virtues prematurely. They believed that it was not a genuine contribution to local educational development. One could not run a *pondok* unless one belonged to an *ulama* family. Although for villagers this has become a dogma, as Bintang's case shows, his failure was primarily technical.

Bintang did not have enough resources, including a network and family members, to pursue his plan. Despite difficulties and delays, Bintang remained enthusiastic about running a *pondok* and other institutions such as an agricultural project and orphanage. Since he could not secure enough funds from his own savings and from villagers to finance his program, he requested assistance from government agencies.

This initiative, however, was, at least locally, damaging to his image. By this aid he was able to enlarge the mosque, build adequate class-rooms and manage farming and agricultural projects. Nevertheless, such achievements were not sufficient to sustain village institutions. Bintang failed to convince the villagers about the quality of services and education he could muster.

On the other hand, an ulama who belongs to a kyai family has more possibility of success in opening a pondok. In many cases such a figure is given opportunity and facilities to open a pondok either by invitation, marriage or family support. When a particular kyai family grows in numbers with children and grandchildren and the compound becomes overcrowded, attempts are made to send some of them out to open a new pondok. Since most kyai's children are married endogamously among kinsmen, a married young ulama who wants to run a pondok is supported by two families. If he is not expected to join the established pondoks of his parents or parents-in law, he may be given facilities to open a pondok of his own. In view of the high expenses for such an enterprise, only the well-established ulama families can afford such an undertaking. Among the great ulama families in Pamekasan such as those of Sumberanyar, Batuampar, Banyuanyar, Panyeppen, Larangan Daja and Bettet, this pattern is not uncommon. Indeed, among Siraj's descendants in Bettet a quasi-convention has been developed that only the youngest child should remain in the *pondok asal* (original pondok).²⁴ A long time before Siraj's death in 1959, his oldest child, a daughter, moved out to join her husband who ran a pondok in another area. His oldest son was requested by a wealthy migrant farmer to run a pondok in the eastern part of East Java. His second son, Fadlali, was prepared to lead a newly opened pondok in the eastern part of Pamekasan. When Siraj died, his youngest son was not ready to take over the leadership in the pondok asal. Therefore, Fadlali remained for some years in Bettet to lead the pondok until his youngest brother finished the studies in Pondok Sidogiri in East Java. (This pondok is very popular among

²⁴ It is instructive to note in passing that the MS-Raba offers an illustration how the successors of the pondok of Raba came from the youngest sons (24b-26a).

the established ulama in Madura.) Thus when Fadlali moved out into his own pondok in 1962 he did not have much difficulty in running a new pondok by himself. From Bettet he brought with him not only family and equipment but also teachers and santri. Although family background clearly has a lot to do with support and smoothness in pondok management, Fadlali's success in running a new pondok is based on a large investment of funds and educational facilities, especially teachers

Primarily because of the practices of endogamous marriage among pondok ulama (kyaïs) of Pamekasan, in the last few decades hardly any kyaïs have married women from non-ulama families. Therefore, if a wealthy villager wants to give part of his land and funds as an endowment for opening a pondok, he will request a prominent kyai to send one of his married children to the area.²⁵ Some Bettet ulama have such experiences. Siraj, who built the pondok of Bettet in the beginning of this century, as I shall show shortly, was indirectly invited by Barnadi's son to set up a religious center in the village. Siraj's oldest son was sent to East Java, as we just saw, at the request of a wealthy Madurese migrant who wanted to bestow land and funds as an endowment for a pondok establishment. Furthermore, one of the few higher ulama in Pamekasan who has recently opened general secondary classes (SMP/SMA) in his pondok system moved to his present residence upon invitation of a wealthy merchant. The strong tendency toward endogamous marriages among ulama families seems to express the high value the ulama place on their position. Endogamy becomes an effective mechanism to confront the decreasing market for the ulama's educational services since a newly married couple receives support and facilities from their respective ulama families. Again, it shows their uncompromising approach against inward and outward mobility as well as evidences their attempts to preserve continuity of the leadership.

The first generation of higher ulama families came from outside the locality. The

²⁵ In other areas, some wealthy villagers married their daughters to sons of ulama in order to run religious centers or simply to enhance prestige (cf. Horikoshi 1976; Dhofier 1980).

achievement of the first-generation is usually sufficient to guarantee the prospects of the following generations, even though each individual's actual fame depends very much on his own personal quality, energy and resources. As has been noted by some scholars the outside origin of the first-generation ulama markedly contributes to their acceptability in the local leadership (e.g. Ahmed 1983, Nagata 1984, Eickelman 1985, in their discussions of ulama in different areas North Pakistan, West Malaysia and Morocco respectively). Their exalted, often untraceable, background provides them with room to maneuver in their own interest as they wish. In Pamekasan, most higher ulama claim to be related to a royal family or to have aristocratic Arab descent. The present generations, however, have difficulties in precisely relating their kinship ties to such families. As a result certain ulama groupings, in spite of their claim to a common ancestor, have dissimilar statements about their genealogy. Nevertheless, a prominent figure of the Pamekasan aristocratic families (himself a non-ulama) recognized in his writing the kinship ties between certain ulama families and the palace. According to him, the ulama of Banyuwang and Sumberwang are descendants of a wandering Mataram prince (born around the first half of the eighteenth century) who married different local women (Zaenalfattah 1951:176).²⁶ If we put aside the question of the genuineness of such a claim, it is evident that the claimant to royal descent was an outsider. The people's acceptance of his royal claim undoubtedly enhanced his position in the society. Once such a claim was acknowledged, his successors and descendants could have been easily addressed with royal titles. On the other hand, the Batuampar ulama of Pamekasan trace their origin to a wandering aristocratic Arab saint, Anggawi. According to family narratives widely accepted by the present generations, Anggawi reached Pamekasan on his flight to seek refuge from the oppression of a despotic ruler elsewhere in Java. Two of his brothers established religious centers in West Java and Sumenep respectively. Since we are in no position to accept or reject such genealogical claims, we can only sur-

²⁶ In general the claim of the ulama themselves can be divided into two categories first those who claim kinship ties with a Pamekasan royal family and second those who claim descent from West Madurese prince.

mise that the acceptance of the claims by the population was a great asset to the emergence and popularity of Batuampar and other kyais of Pamekasan. These established ulama families have been sending their descendants to other villages and regions to set up new religious centers and pondoks. Not surprisingly, later generations have identified themselves relatively smoothly with such glorified titles as Kyai Raden or Kyai Tuan.

Pondok, kyai and villagers: multifarious ties. The villagers' regard for the higher ulama families is central to the success of the latter's institutions and personalities. Despite the obvious charismatic elements in traditional leaders such as ulama, they are not free from dependence upon their admirers. Their popularity and position are unstable. Various performances and services are thus required from the ulama to maintain their prestige among followers and villagers

Relevant to their status is the fact that the ulama provide the villagers and their followers with religious services, advice, education and sometimes even material benefits. Most first generation ulama in the region had certain social expertise in addition to their religious knowledge. The founder of the Batuampar ulama family, for example, was believed, as I shall show shortly, to have had high expertise in medication. Because of this talent he attracted a large number of visitors, followers and santri. Today visitors to the Batuampar families and tomb consist of villagers who are not interested particularly in religious questions but rather in other matters such as medication, invincibility and blessings (barakah). Indeed, Batuampar pondoks remain famous for their non-religious services, even though in recent years a number of their younger ulama have started organizing more advanced religious instruction.

The main attraction of the higher ulama derives from their counselling services. The informality and open-door attitudes of the ulama significantly ease the meeting arrangements for impromptu visitors. Since villagers come to see the ulama whenever a problem, crisis or even surprise arises and when funds and time allow, a formal and structured time schedule would be awkward. Yet the ulama's daily time-table for

teaching santris and leading prayers becomes the defining and practical factor in receiving visitors. In welcoming visitors the kyais usually use the langgar. The gathering of visitors from different parts of the region adds to the prestige of a kyai and also brings in more detailed news and information about different villages. Indeed, because of their recurrent encounters with diverse santris and villagers, the ulama have a better picture of the society at large. For this reason visitors feel comfortable and at ease in communicating with the kyais. Only after a long intimate conversation will a kyai ask his visitors about their primary concern (*perlona ban hajata*). A visitor who has nothing to hide with regard to his visit will talk to the kyai in front of other visitors. Those who feel that their affairs should be kept secret may wait until they have a solitary moment to talk with the kyai. Since at times more than one visitor has the same intention, the kyai will ask them to talk in a specific inner location. Such treatment undoubtedly increases the sense of meaningfulness among the troubled visitors. The spread of modern medicine has induced many ulama and kyais to forego dispensing medication for obvious physical ailments and illnesses such as injuries, tuberculosis, typhoid and malaria. But most family problems which are social and psychological continue to be dealt with and given solutions. The flow of visitors who usually submit funds²⁷ for the kyai enables him to establish and enlarge his pondok, which is itself an invaluable symbol of prestige.

The main formula used by the kyais to alleviate their visitors' problems are request prayers (*do'as*) and amulets. In practice, however, the personal approach, life-style, and face-to-face discussion followed by the kyais significantly soothe their visitors' anxieties and problems. Through radio, television, newspapers and magazines, the kyais have better access to supralocal news and diverse up-to-date topics such as natural disasters, wars and technological inventions. Hence they are able to use such topics in creating more anxiety and at the same time in balancing the visitors' apprehensiveness. For example, the threat of a nuclear war that would destroy human

²⁷ The visitors end their consultation with the kyai by shaking hands and usually submitting some amounts of cash. Hence the gift is popularly called *salam tem-pel* ("shaking hands with money").

existence is interpreted as the probable cause of the promised last day (*are kiamat*). Such sophisticated knowledge clearly adds weight to the kyais' talk and advice. At a certain stage, a kyai may request his visitors to say *Amin* for his do'as. Participation in prayers enhances the visitors' commitment and awareness in relation to the kyai's ideas. At the individual level the kyai treats each visitor in accordance with the latter's complaint. At the time of the consultation the kyai will provide his patient with a prayer formula to be used at specific times and in certain numbers every day. The main material of this do'a is taken from verses of the Qur'an. Since most villagers, albeit illiterate, learn diverse forms of prayers by heart, they easily follow the recipe given by the kyai. Furthermore, the kyai hands out amulets (*raja*, *jaza'* or *hizib*)²⁸ to particular visitors. The visitors' appearance, commitment and of course problem have a lot to do with the kind of amulets given. A casual visitor who does not reciprocate the kyai's offer in an acceptable manner by showing disinterest, expressing some kind of criticism or giving no donation, most probably will not get an amulet or its equivalent. On receiving such amulets the visitors are requested to perform certain rituals and abstain from particular activities.

Financial sources of a pondok. The accumulation of wealth by the kyais enables them to sponsor many public feasts, to support village projects and provide educational facilities. Many kyais in Pamekasan are active entrepreneurs. Besides holding several hectares of agricultural land they may own taxis, trucks and rice mills, or they conduct trade in tobacco or act as brokers for employment outside Madura (for details see the next chapter).

Despite the relative wealth of the higher ulama, the villagers' contributions still form a considerable income for them. Such irregular but significant sources of funds consist of visitors' donations, religious alms (*zakat*), special presents and gifts (*syukuran*) and yearly contributions at the *imtihan* (festivity at the end of educational ses-

²⁸ The kyais of Batuampar, for instance, are reputed to deliver efficacious amulets and prayers which are classified into different names with specific functions, such as *tasek miring*, *songe raja*, *bianggolan* and *kaju raja*.

sion in the pondok). A large number of visitors adds prestige to the kyai while providing him with financial support.

Many forms of zakat are submitted directly to the kyais. This happens despite the unambiguous Islamic injunction, included in the kyais' religious texts, that the zakat should be distributed primarily to the poor and needy. There are eight segments of society that have rights to receive part of the zakat; they include the poor, the needy, the indebted, the collectors and organizers of the zakat, the strivers in the way of God, the sympathizers in the faith, the wayfarers and the captives (Qur'an 9:60). Yet the Qur'an itself on another occasion has assigned twenty per cent of "certain state income" (*khumus*) to God and His messenger (Qur'an 8:41). The Syafi'i school to which the Madurese are formally attached never explicitly elevates the ulama to such a position, even though in public speeches the *muballighs* (preachers or speakers) often cite that "the ulama are the prophets' inheritors."²⁹ But it is difficult to conclude that such a claim has been accepted. As we saw in Chapter 1, when the rato was still at the pinnacle of the regional power structure, the zakat was delivered to the palace. This was apparently a continuation of a yearly traditional tribute submitted to the rato. When the ulama became stronger and more popular leaders as the rato fell increasingly under colonial pressure, it can be surmised that the population rechanneled their religious contributions, including the zakat, to the ulama (MS-Raba:12a). Although the submission of alms to rulers or leaders is obviously indigenous, this tendency is common in many other Muslim regions. Indeed, popular ulama in most Muslim areas evidently have become recipients of religious charities (see Gellner 1969; Green 1978; Kessler 1978; Metcalf 1982; Nagata 1984). Therefore the reason should be sought in the context of the Islamic law schools (*madzhabs*) (see Chapter 1). Whatever the reasons, it is clear that the ulama have been regarded as among "those who strive in the way of God" (*jāhadū fī sabīl Allāh* or *jāhadū li 'lā'i kalimat Allāh*). Thus the ulama deserve to receive religious taxes.

²⁹ This saying is often claimed to have come from the Prophet, see Bukhārī, *Shahīh al-Bukhārī*. Bāb al-'Ilm #10.

In villages the zakat is left to be distributed by individuals. Accordingly, it serves to enhance the personal relation between the giver and the ulama or between the giver and poor neighbors. At times villagers think that their own achievement and success in life should be acknowledged and appreciated by expressing gratitude to the well-known ulama. The latter are believed to have a role in paving the way for such villagers by virtue of the ulama's closer access to the divine. For example, after securing the kyai's resto (blessing) to apply for a teaching position in the government school, a young villager will come back to the kyai bringing a gift as an expression of gratitude for his successful application. Again, a successful tobacco grower in the 1984 season (from neighboring Sameran) expressed his gratitude by submitting a portion of his harvest to the kyai of Bettet. The villager had previously requested the kyai to bless his cultivation. In general many villagers will pay visits to the kyai if they experience a stroke of good fortune in order to deliver presents and share the joy. Almost all pondoks have a major annual feast (imtihan or ikhtibar) held at the kyai's compound. On this occasion, the kyai's followers, the santris, graduate santris and colleagues pay homage to the kyai by giving contributions in cash and in kind.

Festivities in the pondok: maximizing ties. The kyais are required to provide religious and educational services. Supralocal ulama are renowned for their high scholarship. This reputation is manifested in the establishment of a pondok which attracts a large number of santris from different areas (see Chapter 10).

Moreover, the kyais are entitled to hold big feasts and festivals which attract wide participation. In villages such feasts are closely associated with religious performances which reach their peak in the presentation of popular public speakers during the imtihan. "*Imtihan*" (*m-h-n*) is an Arabic word which means examination, trial, ordeal or strife. Since the pondok did not originally hold any examination, the imtihan as such might have been related to the idea of ordeal; that is, it signified the joys of ending the year-long struggle of the pondok students. Even with the introduction of more regular classes into the pondok and the holding of exams, the imtihans are

organized independently from the actual exams which generally take place prior to the fasting month of Ramadhan. Pondok schedule their imtihans at different times to avoid conflict. Despite the pervasive power of the pondok owners over their religious institutions, they have tended in recent years to set up committees among senior santri to handle the imtahan arrangements. In order to attract more participants, the committee distributes written invitations signed by the kyai to the population at large. At the internal level, the imtahan is an occasion for santri to hold various sport and art competitions (see Chapter 10). Furthermore, the santri attempt to renovate and decorate their dwellings and pondok buildings. Since many santri dwellings have been built by different santri, the occasion is used to show to their parents and fellow-villagers that the latter's financial contribution has been used in the pondok building.

Thus the imtahan and other feasts held at a pondok express the ulama's concern over the public religious and recreational interests; they are also a public occasion to witness the pondok's achievements or failures. It also shows the level of popularity and public recognition expressed toward the pondok owner, the kyai. In conformity with their popularity, the kyais are morally obliged to provide help for villagers. Because of their access to public contributions and their personal wealth, the kyais have the increased ability to support many village projects such as the construction and renovation of roads, canals, wells, religious centers and school buildings. Although such support is closely related to the idea of ulama patronage for villagers, it rechannels some funds accumulated by the kyai into projects of public interest. Indeed, the kyai has been the only significant village figure who has the authority to absorb the limited material surplus, excluding taxes for the government, in the rural areas.

Background of the kyai: local histories

The kyais strongly emphasize their high family origin as claimants to kinship ties either with the early incoming preachers or with the royal families. In Pamekasan, the higher ulama families of Banyuanyar and Sumberanyar claim kinship ties with the

royal families; whereas the Batuampar ulama are descendants of an early saintly preacher in the region. In view of the dominance and influence of the rato among the population during the previous centuries, the super-imposed affiliation of the ulama with prominent families was understandable. It is the more so when we observe that the ulama assumed an increasingly significant position in society once the rato had lost much his popularity among his subjects. As is the case with kinship claims elsewhere, it is pointless to try to establish the validity of this local genealogical claim. But the claim is, nonetheless, a social fact. The family founders of the Banyuanyar and Batuampar ulama groupings are claimed to have married ordinary village women and to have resided with their parents-in-law in the countryside. As I will show shortly, these first-generation ulama started their religious services as village religious functionaries. Although these men were probably successful in attracting contemporaries to their cause, they had no resources on which to build elaborate religious and educational centers. Moreover, the expertise of these first-generation ulama has been pursued by their descendants. For example, the present generation of the Batuampar ulama are famous for their skill in medicine and divination, whereas Banyuanyar descendants are renowned as religious teachers and active community leaders.

Batuampar kyais. The Batuampar religious center was founded by a travelling young scholar some time in the eighteenth century. According to local and family legend the young man, Anggawi, was discovered by villagers on top of a tree, performing meditation. The villagers found him covered by weeds and shrubs, almost comparable to Sunan Kalijaga, the famous saint of the Javanese-Islamic legend (see Geertz 1968; also above Chapter 1). He was unconscious and weak from the excessive length of his meditation. Eventually a local couple brought him home until he recovered from fatigue and starvation. The reason for his stay on the top of the tree, he told his rescuers, was to avoid the persecution of the rulers. As an active missionary he had encountered resistance from certain local leaders. Anggawi was able to attract followers when he cured the illness of his host's daughter whom he later married. Anggawi seems to have enjoyed the local atmosphere as he settled in the barren

hilly village and opened a religious center. Like many other legends, this one is more concerned with glorifying the hero's origin and greatness than with describing his real contribution to the local setting. Despite this great legend, Anggawi apparently remained a local figure. He did not exercise supralocal fame.

The foundation of such an early center greatly enhanced the prestige of Anggawi's descendants. The expertise and reputation attributed to Anggawi, particularly in respect to divination, medication and invincibility, seem to have been successfully followed and used by his descendants up to the present day. Only two generations following Anggawi, the Batuampar ulama under Bujuk Tompeng achieved wide recognition among the population in the region. Interestingly, their main attraction was not particularly related to purely religious scholarship and educational sophistication as they never built an elaborate educational center. Yet the ulama's identification with religious symbols such as rituals, the mosque and prayers, perpetuated their followers' interest in religious teaching. The generality of religious knowledge and instruction during the period seems to have worked favorably for easy affiliation and smooth transformation among the population. Indeed, the role of such populist figures in bringing the villagers into the fold of Islam is undeniable, even though its exact nature remains difficult to assess. The popularization of the use of certain *do'a*s (request prayers) in medication and village rituals induced the villagers to relate to and become dependent upon the ulama. The assignment of *ad hoc* rituals and prayers to be performed in the treatment of certain illnesses and on other occasions became the primary source of villager-ulama ties. Since villagers continued to maintain most of their belief systems and customs, the need for the renewal of their attachment to the ulama persisted. It is impossible, however, to picture with precision how local dukons (traditional healers) were slowly pushed into the background by such ulama as Bujuk Tompeng. At a period when communication was meagre and the countryside was not fully controlled by the *rato*, independent ulama undoubtedly had opportunity to exercise local authority. In addition, their growing share in medication and counselling increased their popularity.

Claiming to be descendants of Arab aristocrats (*sayyids*), the Batuampar ulama succeeded in making themselves religiously authoritative guides. It is difficult to pinpoint when such a claim became popularly accepted; possibly it was in reaction to the palace-ulama who used their ties with the *rato* to enhance their position. Yet we should not ignore the centrality of the royal family itself among the population. In other words, an aristocratic background was a great asset for one's position in society. Although personality, erudition and charisma generally played an important role in the emergence of *kyais*, the Batuampar *kyais* relied solely on their charisma and personality. Their religious educational center remained peripheral, in spite of its importance in providing them with an Islamic identity.

Nevertheless, the growing number of members of the family and the increasing erudition of the religious figures in the region induced many members of the Batuampar ulama to move out and organize educational institutions elsewhere. The original center at Batuampar proper never developed into an advanced educational center, even though it gradually became the most popular place of pilgrimage in the region.³⁰ The tombs of Bujuk Tompeng, his son Letong and, surprisingly in a lesser degree, Anggawi have been viewed by many villagers, visitors and pilgrims as a source of *barakah* (blessing). Accordingly, their descendants who remained in Batuampar grew stronger as funds were generated. Because of the transient nature of the visit to Batuampar, the resident ulama could not organize a permanent, elaborate center for religious education. More important, the visitors were less interested in learning about religion than in gaining *barakah* from the tombs and the ulama. In fact, the centrality of the tomb in the minds of visitors significantly reduced attention to other activities within the center, as can still be clearly observed today.

Furthermore, certain members of the Batuampar ulama established new centers elsewhere. For example, around the turn of the last century Jazuli opened a mosque

³⁰ In fact, many pilgrims going to Batuampar consist of diverse segments of society. They come from as far as Bogor in West Java and Pontianak in Kalimantan. Tourist buses full of pilgrims are seen daily parking in the hill of Batuampar.

in nearby Tattangoh (cf. Schrieke 1919). Thanks to its strategic and favorable location, the Tattangoh family branch grew faster and larger than the original center at Batuampar proper. Unlike the ulama in the original center, Jazuli vigorously organized religious sessions and led a tarekat brotherhood (Qadiriyyah). Although his educational sessions seldom developed into advanced religious classes, Jazuli was active in providing religious instruction for villagers and santris. The free and individual form of instruction has been maintained by Jazuli's descendants. Thus, not only did the santris have the freedom to attend and request instruction, but each individual kyai organized his own independent sessions, irrespective of what had been done by his family members around him. Primarily because of this individualistic orientation, the Batuampar kyais failed to organize a larger advanced educational center, even though they continued to attract large numbers of visitors who sought medication, prayers, resto, invincibility and barakah. Perhaps we should bear in mind that the higher status of the Batuampar family has influenced most of its members to pursue individual interests and fame. Indeed, the Tattangoh ulama sent their descendants to open religious centers in other areas like Toket, Duwak Poteh and Lenteng. Although villagers continued to associate the last two centers with the original attributes of the Batuampar dynasty, the kyais of Lenteng and Duwak Poteh have been active in providing better and more regular education for villagers and resident students.

Banyuanyar kyais: attempts at the scripturalization of village religion.

Unlike the Batuampar ulama, the Banyuanyar kyais were known for their religious education. According to Zaenalfattah, as already observed, the Banyuanyar ulama's claim to the aristocratic title of raden can be traced back to the sultan (susuhunan) of Surakarta, Pakubuwono II (died 1749) (1951:176; cf. Ricklefs 1974:88, 108, 286). One of Pakubuwono II's descendants, Abdullah, took as his second wife a village woman of Larangan Badung, north of Pamekasan. One of their children was later widely known as Kyai Agung (or Bujuk Agung) Toronan. Unlike his father who left the village to marry another woman, Bujuk Agung stayed and improved the existing religious center in the village. Relevant to the political development and religious educational level

during the eighteenth century in the region, Bujuk Agung seems to have enjoyed popularity among the local population. His aristocratic background undoubtedly enhanced his position among the villagers and the rulers alike. Yet he continued to stay away from the palace. The political vicissitudes in the region were aggravated, as I have shown in Chapter I, by the rebellion of Kek Lesap. Indeed, the eighteenth century was characterized by the resentment of many local figures against the ratos for their declining prestige under pressure from the Dutch company (VOC) and later the colonial power. Thus the emergence of independent aristocratic ulama such as Bujuk Agung might have been a crucial point in the increasing popularity of the religious leaders vis-à-vis the Dutch-controlled palace. Despite this popularity, Bujuk Agung, unlike Tompeng of Batuampar, was able to develop a more organized educational center-cum-residential school (pondok). In view of his simple knowledge of scriptural Islam, his pondok did not differ significantly from its contemporaries in other locations. Nevertheless, his aristocratic background helped him facilitate better access to information and religious knowledge from the town ulama. This seems to have been the primary factor that distinguished Bujuk Agung's descendants from the Batuampar ulama, as the latter were more interested in attracting villagers through popular practices than teaching them scriptural Islam.

Bujuk Agung's attention to religious education was pursued by his descendants as they built religious centers in other villages. In the early part of the nineteenth century one of his great grandsons, Itsbat, founded Banyuanyar pondok. Before moving to Banyuanyar, then an empty space, Itsbat helped his father organize a pondok in the nearby village of Pakis. Due primarily to the steady water spring found in the new location, Itsbat was able to attract some santris and villagers from the surrounding hamlets. Despite his simple life-style and general knowledge of Islam Itsbat sent two of his children to Mecca for the pilgrimage and study. Until the return of his two sons from Mecca Itsbat continued to perform mainly as a local religious functionary. Seen in broader perspective, the impact of Meccan pilgrims³¹ and students on

³¹ For more details on Indonesian pilgrims to Mecca see Vredenburg 1962.


nineteenth century Madura is phenomenal. Previously a number of Madurese, like many other Southeast Asians, had studied in Mecca; the later part of the nineteenth century was marked by the invigoration of learning in the pondok (cf. van den Berg 1888; Snouck Hurgronje 1931, Dhofier 1980). The name of Kyai Khalil of Bangkalan (died 1923) remains central among the proponents of pondok education in Madura and even East Java. This is primarily due to Khalil's erudition and the growing standardization of the religious syllabus at the pondok. Khalil himself was a student of several Meccan scholars. Thus the return of Itsbat's sons brought considerable prestige to Banyuanyar. When Banyuanyar grew and attracted more santri from other areas, the elder son Nasruddin was sent to another village, Panyeppe, to open a new religious center. After Itsbat's death (fourth quarter of the nineteenth century) Banyuanyar was led by his youngest son 'Abdulhamid.

The most important contribution of these Meccan graduates to the local religious education was the introduction of various texts previously unavailable in the region. It is important to note that the defence against Muhammad 'Abduh's ideas and Wahhabism must have been influential in the development and perspective of the Shafi'i school (madzhab) in Mecca (see Snouck Hurgronje 1931; Voll 1978, Peters 1979). Accordingly, many Madurese scholars such as Khalil, Nasruddin and 'Abdulhamid acquired sophisticated instruction from their Meccan teachers. Nonetheless, at the local level 'Abdulhamid's prestige was derived mainly from his eloquence in reading and explaining Arabic texts. Indeed, villagers were less concerned with an elaborate doctrine than with the variety of the kyai's texts and the knowledge he claimed. As the Banyuanyar family became larger some of them moved out to open new religious centers in other villages and areas such as neighboring Ta-Bata, Kalibaru in Banyuwangi and Gondanglegi in Malang.

The industriousness of the Banyuanyar kyais in building new religious centers resulted in the spread of their members and the establishment of an effective network (see Figure 8.1). Although the opening of new centers was the logical means for kyais to pursue their practice, certain families clustered in one original location, either

working together to run the original center or pursuing their own personal interests. In the case of the Banyuanyar family, most of its members established centers elsewhere. Nasruddin, who founded a pondok in Panyeppen, succeeded in attracting neighboring villagers and santris from other areas. Since Panyeppen was close to Banyuanyar, it is possible that the santris could have been easily transferred from one pondok to another. Only when Nasruddin's descendants took the leadership did the relationship become less intensive as each pondok sought its own prestige and fame. Having experienced the benefit and prestige gained from studies in Mecca, Nasruddin and Abdulhamid sent their own sons to Mecca. They did not bring home innovations and renewal, but the mere fact of their having lived and having studied in Mecca was a great asset for the religious center. One of Nasruddin's sons, Siraj, who had studied in Mecca became the founder of the pondok of Bettet. Again, other Panyeppen kyais moved out to open religious centers in other localities. At the present time, the kecamatan of Palengaan has more than thirty pondoks, all their kyais and ulama claim kinship ties with Bujuk Agung Toronan. Yet the unity of the pondok tradition and the kinship ties have not been powerful and effective enough to unite them under the pressures of individual interests, supralocal politics and national organizations (for details see Chapter 11).

Figure 8.1: The Banyuanyar pondok and its offshoots



A fuller account of the foundation of the pondok in Bettet is valuable in

understanding the relative ease and success of the many ulama families in opening religious centers in new locations.

Siraj had gained a reputation before actually founding a pondok in Bettet in 1912. As son of a kyar he had been engaged to a paternal cousin from Banyuanyar. The girl apparently was able to influence her parents not to marry her to Siraj. Embarrassed by the refusal, Siraj left home for more than six years to study first under Kyai Khalil of Bangkalan, then under several kyais of Sidogiri (East Java), and eventually under well-known Netherlands Indies teachers in Mecca such as Mahfudz Termasi (d. 1918), 'Abd al-Syakur and Ahmad Khatib (b. 1855).³² Upon his return to Panyeppe Siraj was married to a relative from Sumberanom. As a form of cultural convention among Madurese ulama, and villagers generally, as we saw in Chapter 3, the youngest child should remain in the pondok asal (cf. MS-Raba.24a-26a). Thus Siraj as an oldest son had to move out to open a new pondok. According to family narratives, before deciding to settle in Bettet Siraj had engaged in serious meditation (*istikharah*) in three different places in order to get direct divine guidance. Like other santris, Siraj believed that the performance of an *istikharah* was indispensable before making any decision about major undertakings (see the following chapter) such as finding a suitable place for organizing a pondok. Among these places, the narratives assert, only Bettet indicated a bright prospect, even though at the time the location was regarded by the inhabitants as waste land (*alas*) full of evil spirits. On the other hand, Siraj seems to have also secured support from local notables especially the Barnadi family. According to Barnadi's descendants Siraj was a colleague of Barnadi's son, Tanjung, when they were santris in Palengaan. In addition, Tanjung provided Siraj with the land to build the initial pondok and mosque. Despite the purported transcendental claim for Siraj's choice of Bettet, it is possible that practical measures were also taken seriously into consideration when he opened the pondok. Nevertheless, his decision to settle in unsafe land was an important asset for his prestige among the villagers.

³² For more information on these scholars see Snouck Hurgronje 1931 257-90, Noer 1973, Dhofier 1980.

The coming of higher ulama such as Siraj to new locations facilitates the process of generating prestige. For the local population the mere fact of settlement in a dangerous location (*kennengan berrik* or *kennengan kero*) indicated Siraj's special gift. Many old villagers still believe that during his lifetime Siraj had command over diverse spirits, especially *jins*, as he often led rituals among these unseen creatures. Such mastery (*khelaf* or *majdzub*), or rather idiosyncrasy if you will, was viewed favorably as a virtue in the mediating process between the villagers and the *se areksa* or even God. Despite his simplicity, Siraj commanded a high reputation. In fact, his pondok attracted only a small number of resident santris. Yet he had good access to supralocal information as he later introduced regular classes into the pondok as well as founded the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) branch in Pamekasan. His study in Mecca had introduced him to many prospective scholars in Java. When the ulama founded the NU in 1926, Siraj was contacted by its leading figure Wahab Hasbullah to establish an NU branch in Pamekasan. The communication among these ulama was open because of their friendship during their stay in Mecca. Siraj was personally active in the management of the NU through its executive and later through its advisory bodies. In response to the development in the field of religious education elsewhere, Siraj sent a couple of his senior santris, including his eldest son, to learn a new system of religious instruction (*madrasah* pattern) in the town. In the second half of the 1930's regular classes for elementary religious education were opened in Siraj's pondok. Furthermore, his reputation was strengthened when a wealthy migrant in Lumajang, East Java, requested Siraj to organize a pondok branch in the former's area. In response, as already observed, Siraj sent his oldest son to manage the project.

Nonetheless, Siraj could not have provided the villagers with direct material advantage. The village did not benefit from any new infrastructure other than footpaths that linked Bettet to the nearest paved road. In view of his pioneering career, simplicity and limited wealth, Siraj was not in a solid position to initiate village development. Again, the contemporary world view might not have put an emphasis upon village improvement as is the case today when land is becoming

more fragmented and communication with supralocal centers has been considerably improved.

At the religious level, however, Siraj achieved tremendous success. First of all his strong personal connection with leaders of the NU enhanced his already prestigious family background. As chairman of the NU, Siraj became the center of a strong ulama grouping in the region. Although the local NU branch in Pamekasan primarily accommodated and activated the prevailing networks among the ulama in the area, it provided the ulama with better local organization and a stronger link with supralocal centers. Through these newly acquired facilities and bases, Siraj was able to emerge as a prominent religious figure by the late 1930's. His pondok gradually attracted more santri from other regions, even though the regular classes in the pondok were limited to the elementary level. The ulama's position was considerably improved during the 1940's as indigenous authorities and local administration were, as I have shown in Chapter 2, weakened, and in some cases displaced, following the Japanese occupation (1942-1945) and the ensuing armed struggle against the returning Dutch power. Benefiting from their upriver, hinterland location, the ulama successfully pursued their intimate relations with the villagers without serious disruption and recurrent harassment from the existing military authorities in the town. Within this context Siraj effectively maintained solidarity and communication with his fellow ulama. Yet his stronger commitment to religious teaching prevented him from taking an active role in the armed resistance against the returning Dutch power in the region. This does not mean, however, that Siraj did not offer protection, aid and advice to the local fighters (*pejoang rakyat*) and activist ulama. Indeed, the family has been proud of showing that the pondok became a transitory harbor for many important persons who were sought by the occupying authorities. For example, a member of the Pamekasan royal family who died during his flight was buried in the kyai's compound. Despite the active participation of some kyais and ulama in the armed resistance, the pondoks in Pamekasan generally maintained their religious and educational activities. Accordingly, the ulama could safely conduct most of their services for the

population.

Siraj's achievement has been pursued by his children in various ways. On his death in 1957, one of his sons established a prosperous pondok in Lumajang. Like many other migrant ulama, this son maintained strong relations with ulama in Pamekasan as well as with Madurese migrants and population in the area. This can be seen in the marriage of his daughter to a close relative in Pamekasan who has succeeded him as kyai of the pondok and in recurrent exchanges of visits between family members and santri on occasions and feasts held at each of the family pondoks. In Bettet Siraj was succeeded temporarily by his second son, Fadlali (died 1980). Since the latter was more occupied in building a pondok for himself in another locality, the pondok of Bettet did not experience major improvements during his leadership. Yet Fadlali was given an important position in the NU, notwithstanding his relatively young age. A few years later, in fact, he occupied the same position that Siraj had once secured as chairman of the advisory body (the Syuriyah) of the NU of Pamekasan. The nomination of Fadlali to the position indicates the NU kyais' acceptance of his family prestige. At his new pondok which was formally opened in 1962, Fadlali did not introduce any controversial innovations. Most activities such as regular classes, services for the community by the santri and subjects of studies were conducted in line with the programs at the pondok of Bettet.

Concomitant with the intensified conflict between rival political groups and socio-religious patterns (*alirans*) during the 1960's in the country (see Liddle 1970, Geertz 1973, Wertheim 1974), the ulama in Pamekasan were able to exert further influence on the masses. For instance, Siraj's third and youngest son, Hefni (died September 1984) attracted villagers from different areas to come to him to acquire prayers and amulets which were believed to bring invincibility held to be important for self-defence. Thanks to the large financial contributions for the kyai, he was able to put aside part of the funds to build various village and religious projects such as a bridge, canals, roads, madrasah and pondok buildings. These development projects only furthered Hefni's prestige in the eyes of villagers, fellow kyais and the local government.

Domestically Hefni renovated the mosque, constructed a large two-storey building for the madrasah, and opened a secondary level religious school. Furthermore, despite his wholehearted support for the NU and later the PPP, Hefni was able to attract the attention of the national government in Jakarta. In 1975 the then strong Minister of Home Affairs visited Bettet and donated considerable funds for the pondok. Although this act could not be easily dismissed as political maneuvering by the authorities to conciliate the high ranking kyais in the region, it is clear that Hefni was seen by different segments as a strong figure.

Despite the fact that family background is pivotal to the kiai's prospects, his wide popularity depends largely on the continuing propagation, maintenance and renewal of his prestige and image. From our discussion of the two great ulama families in Pamekasan, it is clear that the prestige enjoyed by the present generation has been a result of accumulated virtues worked out through generations. In fact, a kiai's position is generational and cumulative. This may explain why an unknown villager cannot achieve kiai status. Yet the ulama family's hereditary prestige needs to be developed by individual members who desire to achieve a higher popularity level or who want only to hold the status quo. This phenomenon can be further explained by the fact that many members of the higher ulama families remain undistinguished and enjoy hardly any popularity. Hefni evidently had initiated several projects and led many novel activities in order to make his name more prestigious and his pondok more attractive. Likewise, Kyai Araki of Duwak Poteh, who belonged to the Batuampar family, introduced regular advanced classes to his pondok instead of fully following the family tradition in dispensing medication, making amulets and issuing special prayers for his visitors. Yet through his educational innovations Araki was able to maintain his prestige among the kyais and villagers in the area.

Chapter Nine

THE ULAMA AS AN INSTITUTION

Despite the importance of the personal disposition of an ulama, he is supported by a cluster of attributes, or an institution if you will, indispensable for his leadership role. Ulamaship has been the domain of a few well-known families, in spite of the fact that religion does not restrict access to ulamaship.

In Madura, as in many other Islamic regions, ulamaship has almost become the exclusive preserve of limited families (see Gibb and Bowen 1958, Keddie 1972a, Green 1978, Metcalf 1982). Indeed, the Qur'an does not specifically endorse one's origin as a criterion for leadership. Again, priesthood is formally rejected in Islam. Marriage, as far as possible, contracted within the ulama families, particularly if one is expected to pursue a religious career. Indeed, ulamaship is closely connected with the provision of socio-religious services and education. Yet the ulama increasingly witness the involution of their market and field. This has been caused primarily by the high increase in the percentage of the ulama candidates and also by sharing of the field with other institutions. Thus the effective restriction of higher ulamaship by certain families becomes the rationale for their survival and the maintenance of exclusivity. At the village level, it is possible that an enthusiastic individual should assume makkaehship by founding a langgar raja. When his followers become more numerous and desire to have their own mosque in the village, the mak kaeh may lead the project and hold the imamship of the newly founded mosque. In addition, he may also open a formal religious school (madrasah) for the village children. Yet without an explicit claim of kinship ties to an established ulama family, such a local ulama cannot generally, without accumulating prestige over generations and making a unique effort, advance to a higher rank of ulamaship, the kyaiship. How far such gradual, parochial and limited mobility has helped the emergence of the prevailing higher ulama families is a question worth discussing.

Despite the popular acceptance of certain ulama families as the only legal inheritors of religious leadership, villagers and ulama alike have not been static in holding such a view. They are no less pragmatic and realistic in embracing certain individuals as ulama. As we saw, the Banyuanyar families have achieved the ulamaship through long cumulative history and tradition. Yet each individual in the family is not automatically elevated to become a popular figure, even though he is given access to such a position. In order to explain this phenomenon I believe that ulamaship should be looked at as an institution in the sense of a cluster of attributes. It consists of the personal holder of the position and an indispensable set of characteristics such as family background, resources, religious centers and a network of followers.

As bearers of standard Islam at least at the local level, the ulama should preserve continuity and have well-reputed family origin. How far has the transmission system (*isnad*) in the Islamic hadits tradition and/or the Sufi *silsilah*³³ encouraged such a heavy emphasis on the chain of family origin? Despite the fact that emphasis on family background is sociological, in view of the personalistic nature of the method of instruction among ulama families the idea of family origin might also have an ideological aspect. Put differently, particular families are seen as having acquired legitimate key knowledge of Islam which accordingly is transmitted only through particular descent lines. The special position of the family inheritors thus is achieved through their access to private, or secret if you will, knowledge. For example, to show that the ulama of Bettet have inherited covert, special knowledge directly from their original teachers in Mecca, the kyai explained to me the process and chain of the transmission. Although the explanation indicates that Meccan teachers did not restrict even their secret knowledge such as the invincibility formula only to their descendants, the kyai emphasized the inseparability of the transmission and family blood ties when it came to the kyais of Bettet. His father, Siraj, taught all his four children, but not others, the secret knowledge that he had learned from well-known Syeh Mahfudz Ter-

³³ Thanks to Dr. Charles J. Adams for his remark on the possibility of relating the Sufi *silsilah* to the centrality of authoritative transmission of knowledge.

masi in Mecca. The kyai himself had transmitted this knowledge to his adult children and sons-in-law (themselves ZDS and FBSS respectively). Furthermore, the emphasis among the ulama on the necessity of an authoritative interpretation of the religious texts undoubtedly perpetuates the succession of ulama/kyais as teachers within well-known families. This happens despite the fact that formal knowledge is accessible to every student. Nevertheless, the centrality of an individual kyai in transmitting religious knowledge has a strong impact on the continuity of certain families in occupying the ulamaship.

Since the children of ulama are obviously in close contact with their parents, the former have extensive access to knowledge and tradition developed in the family. This does not mean, however, that children of ulama are instructed only by their parents. In most cases, they are sent to famous educational centers following elementary instruction with their parents.

Being spiritual guides, the ulama are under an inherent pressure to show sincerity by avoiding naked personal ambition and to engage in non-profitable activities. The ulama should respect each other's autonomy and independence. At the same time they are by profession expected to give themselves to the pursuit of islamization. The ulama are related to each other in a network while internally maintaining non interference. Since each individual ulama has a semi-territorial base which is known and recognized by other fellow ulama, interference is, as far as possible, avoided, particularly among equals. Higher ulama, however, may ignore the local mak kaehs in response to villagers' requests for the former's services. Such an exception is not applicable to mak kaehs who pay allegiance to different kyais (higher ulama), for this can be seen as a breach of their original network.

The tendency towards non-interference is an expression of the ulama's sincerity. By keeping their service within the limits of well-known authoritative boundaries, kyais are credited with successfully avoiding ambition. Again, their emphasis on responding to villagers' demands reflects the kyais' concern for the validity of their

services. In fact, by carefully avoiding interference in one another's domains kyais are in a better position to check the possibility of opportunism on the part of individual villagers who request their services. Since on occasion a villager may be dissatisfied with the ruling of the local ulama and thus seek help from neighboring ulama, the latter are careful not to trespass upon or interfere especially with questions that have obvious socio-religious implications such as inheritance, marriage, or the establishment of a new mosque. For example, when a local ustadz from a neighboring village asked the kyai of Bettet to support his plan to found a second mosque in the desa, the kyai rejected the plea. He argued that one mosque was sufficient for such a small desa. On one occasion the kyai explained the reason of his rejection to me, saying that the ustadz had been involved in quarrels with the imam of the prevailing village mosque. It was not wise to add fuel to a local rivalry, especially since both had been santris at the pondok of Bettet. On the other hand, the reaction of a local ulama who feels himself being interfered with is directed first towards his constituents. The latter undoubtedly will deliver the message to the proper address. When one of the mosque imams in Sameran distributed the zakat he had collected to some inhabitants in the neighboring desas, an ulama in the neighboring desa of Lenteng protested. The latter asked villagers in his desa who had received a share of the zakat to send it back to Sameran. According to him the outward distribution was unlawful. By quoting certain verses of a fiqhī text,³⁴ he successfully challenged the imam of Sameran. Not only was the latter religiously discredited, but he was regarded by many as too ambitious and as insincere. According to the imam of Sameran, most villagers who had received the zakat distribution did not return it, as they felt that they had committed no fault in receiving such religious alms. Be that as it may, the ulama clearly possess a territorial base of authority.

The ulama's emphasis on independence is related to their position as the

³⁴ al-Nawawī (d. 676H), *Raudlat al-Thālibīn* (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islāmī, n.d.), 2.331-332 "... it is forbidden to send out [portion of the zakat to other locality while local recipients exist]. The obligation of paying the zakat thus remains. There is no distinction whether the sending out is to a far away location or to a nearby place..."

custodians and interpreters of religion and as the exemplary figures for the local population. By showing their independence, the ulama prove that they are directly responsible only to the transcendental God. On many occasions the ulama remind their followers that all efforts and deeds should be focused only to glorify and seek the word of God (*li 'i'la'i kalimatillah* or *libtigha'i wajhillah*). By claiming themselves to be free from self-interest and by holding only God before them, the ulama successfully gain their followers' trust. On the other hand, the independence of the ulama is significant locally since they are the enforcers of religious regulations. So long as an ulama is strong and independent, he will continue to be trusted as a local leader. Such an ulama, the villagers claim, "will not easily compromise our religious principles either through pressure or persuasion." Not all the ulama are able to maintain their independence since it requires careful maneuvering, sufficient resources, a strong background and sophistication.

Personal background of the kyai: childhood and education

Before discussing the ulama as a cluster of attributes it is necessary to state that as a local leader a kyai is first of all a dignified figure. Being a religious leader a kyai should have a good background in religion. Since a kyai is generally associated with traditional Islam, he cannot dispense with seeking advanced religious education at the pondok. Contrary to Horikoshi's observation that among the Sundanese, prominent kyais as popular figures tend to come from those who have no regular pondok attendance (Horikoshi 1976), in Madura higher ulama have been closely associated with famous religious educational centers such as Bangkalan (in the past), Sidogiri, Mecca and Tebuireng; these centers provide a kyai with prestige. Thus the family's choice of places to send their children for religious instruction is a crucial decision. Although a small number of ulama have sent their children to non-traditional educational institutions, ulama candidates continue to be sent to well-known centers. In Pamekasan and West Madura generally the pondok of Sidogiri of East Java has been a favored place for advanced training; many great ulama have spent some time in Sidogiri. This certainly helps to create a common set of ideas and understandings as well as to estab-

lish better communication among the ulama. Like other village children, however, the children of ulama are strongly attached to the household compound (*tanean*)

When the children of ulama finish elementary school, they receive specific training and attention. The offspring of ulama, girls and boys, like their local counterparts, are sent to the elementary school. Although a *kyai's* children already occupy a special place among their playmates, the children, unlike their parents, intermingle relatively easily and play together. Even at this stage, however, special treatment is given to the children of ulama. The *kyai's* son is addressed by the title of *lorah* or *rah* and a *mak kaeh's* or *imam's* son as *bindara* or *dara*, whereas a *kyai's* daughter is referred to as *nyi*. How far this range of socialization has an impact on either the ulama candidates or village children is not easy to assess on the basis of the limited information which I was able to gather from a one-year research period. But from our observations it is clear that such socialization has a strong influence on their relationship during adulthood. Indeed, a *kyai's* children experience tremendous moral enhancement from their fellows. The latter, on the other hand, become used to respecting the ulama even as children. For instance, many older villagers who had once been classmates of the *kyai* of Bettet liked to tell stories and anecdotes of events during their school years. They realized that from that period they had maintained respect for the *kyai*. After the completion of elementary education, a *kyai's* children are given intensive training. The girls are sent to a women's *pondok* in other areas. The boys in most cases spend some time at home to learn from their elders.³⁵

Like regular *santris*, the sons of ulama join educational sessions in the *pondok*. They attend regular classes held at the *madrasah* as well as *pengajians* (text-reading sessions) led by the senior ulama and *ustadz*es. In addition, they are given special sessions by their elders either in the form of regular text-reading or of special assignments. Again, they are urged to study special knowledge under particular *kyais* in the region. This fact also exemplifies that, despite the wide-ranging nature of ulama erudition:

³⁵ Nevertheless, this arrangement is reversed if the family runs a women's *pondok*, as the girls are then trained at home.

they acknowledge the expertise of individual kyais. Indeed, certain kyais are reputed as having mastered Arabic literature, others the prophetic tradition and Quranic exegesis, Sufism or logic. As religious leaders, the ulama's knowledge on Islamic law and jurisprudence (*fekih* or *fiqh*) is taken for granted. For this reason, sessions on the *fekih* occupy most of the timetable in the *pondok pengajians*. Despite such careful training for the ulama's children many barely manage to comprehend the basic texts. For the ulama's children possess more freedom than ordinary *santris* to pursue their own whims. If the children cannot be disciplined and trained by the family, they are usually sent to famous kyais. Such a decision carries no guarantee that the children will learn, however, under pressure of colleagues, teachers, society and family, the children of ulama find ways to maintain their family prestige.

Benefiting from their optimism and confidence, ulama children easily assume teaching positions and leadership in the *pondok*. It has become a standard maxim in the studies of Muslim societies that young Muslim men are highly mobile because of their desire to acquire knowledge (see Gibb and Bowen 1957, Geertz 1960a, Horikoshi 1976, Green 1978, Voll 1979, Metcalf 1982, Eickelman 1985). Looking at the Madura context, we see that in the past the *santris* travelled from one place to another to obtain instruction from particular kyais and to gain access to diverse experiences. In view of the shortage of religious texts and books, face-to-face encounters were undoubtedly the most effective means of learning. When the local institutions became more sophisticated as scholars were better trained, various books became available and classes were well-managed, more and more *santris* became less travel-oriented. If we look at the educational background of the kyais of Bettet, intensity of travel and experience lessens as we come to the younger generations. The founder of the *pondok*, Siraj, had travelled extensively in Bangkalan, East Java and Saudi Arabia. His successors and sons, Fadlali and Hefni had studied outside Pamekasan only in the *pondok* of Sidogiri. The incumbent kiai never spent time in studying (*monduk*) outside Pamekasan, even though he travels extensively in the country for social, economic and religious purposes. Since not all the kyais outshine their ordinary class-

mates, the latter have a number of stories about the intellectual weaknesses of certain kyais. Yet these classmates are prudent enough to tell such stories and anecdotes to other villagers, since they believe that the ulama have a certain ability to improve such shortcomings owing to their family's piety and greatness. In the words of one of the leading public speakers in the region "... the ulama's children have easier access to knowledge by virtue of the piety and societal dedication of their parents." Furthermore, in view of the holistic role of a kyai, he has many resources to alleviate his deficiencies in intellectual fields. For example, by limiting instruction only to texts that he has mastered and at the same time involving himself in other fields of activities, a kyai can remain a focus of admiration in the eyes of followers and villagers.

The special position of a kyai's children among santris induces pride and confidence in these children. By the time a lorah reaches adulthood and completes several pengajian sessions, he experiences increasing respect. In fact, junior santris show particular deference to the lorahs. The latter are more often seen in communication with senior, older santris and ustadzes. The lorahs may from time to time ask individual santris to serve their personal interests by running errands, doing favors or keeping them company. This deference derives from both ideological and sociological factors. Ideologically, santris hold the opinion that a kyai's children will become ulama. Such a view is so imbedded among santris that they hardly distinguish between the incumbent kyai and his offspring. Indeed, the relatively close ties during this formative period are highly valued as they may be utilized later when the lorahs assume full kyaiship. Many of Kyai Hefni's key assistants, for instance, had been his classmates when they were at elementary and secondary educational levels. Sociologically, santris have become a kyai's clients since they join his pondok. By providing almost free shelter, guidance and religious instruction, a kyai is seen by santris and their parents as a patron. The kyai's provision of services is highly valued by villagers and santris. Since societal participation originates from a kyai and his family, it helps enhance all members of a kyai's circle. More importantly, a kyai's children are the prospective inheritors of his achievements. For this reason, it is not surprising to observe that

each lorah has a core of santri associates who are neutral towards other lorahs. Such special relations usually last for a lifetime since core santris remain such even after marriage. They become the nodes of the network for their favored lorah. Despite the fact that not all santris can build such close ties with a lorah, they do their best to be recognized as good santris. The santris' purported understanding that the ulama family remains vital in making the villagers' lives meaningful and their own future brighter and more manageable perpetuates the continual respect for a kyai's descendants.

Although women of Madurese ulama's families have not enjoyed public recognition to the same extent as their male counterparts, they are indispensable in the survival of the institution. Like ulama sons, daughters are provided with intensive religious instruction. After finishing the available local pengajians, they are sent to higher institutions which specialize in accommodating female santris. In Pamekasan only a few ulama run women's pondoks, side by side with, but in many senses separate from, the male pondoks. When I asked prominent kyais about this low number, they attributed the cause to the heavy moral pressure and responsibility for supervising and educating adolescent girls. In addition, they cited the need for woman instructors and specific accommodation in accordance with the local standard of sex division. Unless a kyai has an energetic and knowledgeable wife or a close woman relative, opening a pondok for girls is out of the question, particularly in view of the presence of male santris. Since each sex group needs separate facilities, to open a pondok for girls means almost to run two pondoks at once. On the other hand, the low number of pondoks for girls may be due to the low enrollment among ordinary villagers. In fact, most female santris, as I was told, come from among ulama families.

In a society where a division of the sexes is upheld, the women of a kyai's household play a major role in serving women visitors and audiences. Women are led by a nyai (kyai's wife). When a couple pay a visit to a kyai, the wife will separately see the nyai. In the case of women who request advice or other services from a kyai, they should deliver their problems to the nyai who may settle the questions by herself or

report them to the kyai for a solution. The flow of visitors, the burden of a big family, provision of food for workers, special guests and others, require hard and intensive labor from the women of a kyai's household. Despite the presence of woman volunteers in the family, a nyai still needs her daughters and/or relatives to assist her in meeting visitors and managing the household and kitchen. Thus, without a good background in religion, a kyai's daughters cannot be expected to function smoothly within his household which is, ideally, an exemplar for villagers.

Marriage

Since the range of ulama activities in the region has increasingly become narrowed, marriage has come to serve as a strategic means to pursue the survival of the ulama family. There are three obvious reasons for the restriction of new fields for ulama activities. First, religious educational centers have been established in almost every village, second, the declining number of santris relative to the increase in the number of school children, third, the increasing diversification of educational choices among villagers as general education becomes increasingly popular among parents and pupils. These three factors have negatively affected the possibilities of founding new centers in the region as well as of attracting more santris or even of maintaining the present number of santris in the well-known pondoks. On the other hand, intermarriage is effective in providing the necessary work force and cadres for the families and in keeping ulama families closed and limited.³⁶ Accordingly, the dominant ulama families continue to prosper even if the actual great centers may shift from one branch to another.

Arranged marriages remain a common feature among ulama families. A kyai's children are usually engaged to relatives when they are still very young or even babies, unlike what Horikoshi found among Sundanese ulama's families (Horikoshi 1976). The Madurese ulama have no difficulty in finding spouses for their daughters. On the other hand, a kyai's sons are married relatively late in comparison with their

³⁶ So far no detailed study has been done to investigate the impact of such inbreeding on the biological condition of ulama offspring.

ordinary santri counterparts as a result of the prolonged period of education and apprenticeship. Most engagements are concluded without prior acquaintance of the involved parties. Engagements, however, in most cases lead to marriage. They are broken off in specific cases, including serious illness, prolonged absence in another area, or if the prospective groom finds another spouse on his own. During my research a lorah who was engaged to a daughter of the top kyai in Pamekasan was discovered to have married another woman during his long study period in a big city. Despite the close kinship ties, the two families were estranged, as the kyai's family accused the lorah's family of protecting an illegal action and of inability to supervise their son in a proper way. Only serious illness is conventionally seen as a justifiable and acceptable reason for cancelling an engagement. Indeed, the cancellation of an engagement without a reasonable and proper excuse can generate a breach between the two contracting families.

In view of the endogamy of ulama families, the decision to marry is taken primarily on the basis of family prospects. Thus the idea of an equivalent match (*kufu*) in the marriage contract is satisfied mainly by the family's status which should be unquestionable and publicly known. Because all members of the ulama families remain closely tied to religious and educational activities, marriage arrangements among them are conducted at random on the basis of availability of candidates.

Endogamous arrangements help the ulama families to preserve their institutional continuity more effectively. Since not all ulama give birth to a son who may pursue the family profession, endogamous marriages among kin strategically compensate for such a shortcoming. Like other newly weds among villagers, in terms of post-marital residence, an ulama groom is expected at least temporarily to join the bride's parents. This has two advantages. In cases where the bride's parents need an assistant in managing their pondok because they have no male offspring or because their sons are still minors, the incoming son-in-law with an ulama background and training may serve the purpose. Nevertheless, unless the bride is a single child or the youngest child, such an assistantship or, in the case of the death of her father, even the

leadership, is only temporary until a legitimate heir emerges. Again, the joining of his bride's parents provides a young ulama (lorah) with an apprenticeship, irrespective of whether he plans to return to his parents to inherit the kyaiship or to open a new institution elsewhere. On the other hand, a new trend of marriage pattern among ulama may emerge, comparable to what is occurring in their surroundings (see Chapter 3). This is the more true in view of the flux of ulama business in the region caused by the dwindling field of their activities and by the intensified competition among themselves. Moreover, the growing tendency among certain ulama families to diversify the education of their children as well as to open secular classes in their compounds will undoubtedly affect marriage patterns. But it is too early to comment on such perspectives.

Unlike what Dhofier observed among great kyais of Java (Dhofier 1980), kyais in Pamekasan avoided marriage contracts with unrelated ulama families (see below Figure 11.2). Some marriages did occur between ulama families of Pamekasan and those of the eastern part of East Java, but these matches are still within the close range of kin. Despite their claim to a common local ancestor, the Sumberanyar and Banyuanyar families hardly ever contracted marriages. This was, as my informants explained, "... intended to preserve the purity of the family." It is difficult to see at present whether the meaning of "purity" may one day be modified in order to accommodate new circumstances that impinge upon ulama families.

Marriage has not been used effectively to conciliate rivalries among ulama factions. The culturally sanctioned idea of *mapolong tolong* (marrying relatives) (see Chapter 3) has certain limitations. Marriages usually take place between close relatives, even though some families contract marriages beyond the close kin (*bala dibik*). Yet this latter form is restrained by factional or political interests. Since kyais are generally divided into the SI and NU groups on an organizational basis, a family of the NU camp is hindered in contracting marriage with another in the SI group and vice versa. The fact that the leading figures in both camps come from Banyuanyar family branches has not paved the way for realizing the cultural maxim

of "bringing the bones together through marriage" (*mapolong tolang*). Indeed, during the early seventies, attempts were made to arrange a marriage between a daughter of the Bettet kyai and a lorah of Ta-Bata (an SI bastion), but it never materialized. The kyai of Bettet, a prominent leader in the NU, refused to accept the marriage request as a result of, what he claimed to be, "... no positive sign from our special request prayers (*istikharah*).". Whatever the reason for the refusal, it is clear that such a marriage proposal, apart from an attempt at fulfilling the popular *mapolong tolang* convention, was designed to improve relations among the ulama families. This is true especially if we observe that the 1973 fusion of Islamic political parties in Indonesia, including the SI and NU, into the PPP, brought local religious leaders in the two parties closer to each other, at least temporarily. In such an atmosphere the gesture of the Ta-Bata family in making a marriage proposal can be better understood.

As is the general practice of their fellow villagers, kyais usually have monogamous marriages. The relative economic stability of the kyais seems not to have induced them to keep an extra wife, at least officially. If in other areas, particularly in the past, polygynous practices were popular among travelling and mobile ulama, primarily for practical reasons such as accommodation, local support and convenience (Dhofier 1980, Horikoshi 1976), in the case of Madurese ulama this practice has not been widely followed. Yet, as we saw in the last chapter, the ancestor of the Banyuwangur ulama did practice polygyny. But it is difficult to delineate, with our present knowledge, whether such polygynous marriages were commonly practiced among his contemporaries. However, among the royal families in the region polygyny was well-known. In view of the relatively small size of the island as well as the dispersion of the population settlements, polygyny was probably practiced only by the earliest travelling ulama and teachers (see MS-Raba 4b, 20b-21b, 24a-26a) as they carried with them the practice and experience of ulama in other areas including Java, the Malay world, India and the Middle East. By the time the Islamic communities and centers were established, the travelling ulama became marginal and reduced their spatial mobility. This was followed, hypothetically, by the weakening trend to

polygyny.

Furthermore, the emergence of the ulama as popular leaders gradually replacing the ratos had brought certain practices that distinguished the ulama from the ratos. Among these practices, I assume, was monogamy which was the popular type of marriage among villagers. It is plausible³⁷ thus to say that ulama in Pamekasan have for a long time tended to be monogamous. Be that as it may, it is important to emphasize the structural position of the ulama and especially the low agricultural productivity of the island in restricting the ability of the ulama to practice polygamous marriage. Having championed the popular cause by posing themselves as simple folk leaders, the ulama in the region were restrained from indulging themselves in polygyny. Economically and ecologically ulama as popular religious leaders residing close to and among the villagers must have realized the impracticability of polygyny despite the temptation and some religious justification. When such a tendency increasingly became a virtue and at the same time characteristic of popular leaders, the ulama would have adopted monogamy as a way of life. Ironically, at the time when the government and many women's groups are presently attempting to limit polygamous practices by putting several conditions and restrictions on the activity, some ulama have become the illegal officiating agents of the rare polygynous marriages in villages.

Internal organization

The daily life in the ulama's compound (dalem) is quite busy.³⁷ Although the pondok committee³⁸ is in charge of the regular educational affairs which thus are not part of the kyai's household responsibilities, the participation of the ulama's family in the provision of instruction is indispensable. Indeed, the kyai's reputation is in great part

³⁷ Most information used in this section was gathered at the pondok of Bettet.

³⁸ Members of the pondok committee are directly appointed by the kyai. They consist of prominent senior santris (ustadztes). Chairmanship is usually held by a junior ulama (lorah). Meetings are organized to deal with emerging problems and other routine pondok matters. Although the committee does not have the final decision concerning the pondok affairs and the santris, its members are enthusiastic and outspoken in discussing any item of the meeting agenda. Its decisions are taken by acclamation. A decision becomes valid only after being ratified by the kyai.

achieved and maintained through his teaching. The opening of regular classes at the pondok helps to ease the kyai's burden. Classes are manned primarily by senior santris (ustadztes), even though junior members of the ulama's family are also involved. The kyai himself does not teach in these classes, instead he delivers advanced sessions for senior santris and special lectures for the public on certain days (for details on pondok education see the next chapter).

The kyai starts his day around five in the morning. All inhabitants of the pondok first perform the morning prayers (shalat Shubuh). The kyai prepares his plan for the day and checks the arrangement of family businesses and pondok affairs. Under the nyai's supervision female members of the household work in the kitchen, tend the children and perform other assignments. If the kyai plans to hold a feast or to receive special guests, he informs the nyai in advance so that she can prepare the necessary hospitality. But even on ordinary days, the nyai's kitchen is very busy not only for the preparation of food for the family and its entourage, but also for serving impromptu visitors with coffee and snacks. Moreover, the household always has workers either constructing new buildings, renovating the old houses, working the land, harvesting the crops, tending and storing the produce, or keeping the compound in shape. The kyai is directly involved in planning and executing the construction projects; whereas the nyai is responsible for providing meals for workers, as well as managing and directing most of the agricultural work. The household also has trustees consisting mostly of senior santris who act as executives on particular work projects. The Better kyai's household has no less than eight male senior santris who are attached to it. Two are assigned as private chauffeurs, two others serve as mechanics for the electric generators, and the remaining four are associated with agricultural activities.

The kyai's household. In the dalem the nyai is assisted by several women helpers, including her daughters, in managing what is locally regarded as female work (*lorosan binek*). Most of these helpers are sent by their parents to serve the kyai's family and at the same time to get religious instruction. Some of them are divorcees. It is

popularly held among the santris, however, that these woman counterparts are sent to the kyai primarily to be married to willing and suitable santris. On regular days, most adult members of the kyai's household, especially women, remain busy until the evening since visitors from nearby villages prefer to see the kyai following the late evening prayers (shalat Isya').

In addition to the above routine the nyai is responsible for preparing food for special guests and feasts. In order to prepare special menus the nyai will not hesitate to invite special cooks from the town (in a different context cf. de Jonge 1984:168-9). Despite the modesty of ulama life, the nyai's daily menu is at a totally different level from that of the average villagers. As we saw, villagers rarely have meat in their daily menu, whereas the nyai constantly prepares a variety of meat dishes in her kitchen. For her such an arrangement is not intended for self-enjoyment, but rather to keep the kitchen always ready at anytime the kyai wants to provide his visitors with meals. The nyai rarely leaves the dalem except to visit other ulama families. Shopping is entrusted to younger family members and assistants. The nyai also receives regular gifts of food from fellow nyais and villagers who perform feasts and rites of passage. Villagers send such gifts only when they have a large and special feast, thus foods are well-prepared.

Furthermore, the nyai is also occupied with religious instruction. For example, although the kyai of Bettet has not (by early 1985) as yet founded a formal pondok for girls, the institution has attracted several resident female santris to study directly under the nyai. (But the kyai, as I will show in the next chapter, has maintained a madrasah for girls for almost two decades.) The girls come mostly from the surrounding neighborhood after having completed classes at the local madrasah. The nyai delivers the instruction in the evenings. Thus the girls spend the night in the women's sector of the dalem. As a result many female santris who primarily assist the nyai have an opportunity to study religious texts during the sessions. The girls who come from the surrounding neighborhoods spend the day outside the dalem either in helping their parents or going to secondary schools in the town.

Public relations. In receiving visitors, the kyai is assisted by junior ulama and senior santris. Since visitors are central to the prestige of a kyai, the welcome is entrusted to a key figure in the pondok, usually a lorah, who is a close relative of the family. This is purposively arranged not only in pleasing and entertaining the visitors while they await the kyai's appearance but also in representing the family when all male ulama are out of the pondok (*miyos*). Most visitors are given a reception by the kyai, even though certain individuals may decide to see junior ulama. The latter have their own location for receiving such guests. Such opportunities, of course, serve as a training period for the junior ulama. Interestingly, such ulama develop their own expertise and fame. For example, a junior ulama of Bettet has become increasingly renowned for assisting villagers who opt for trade, desa elections and cultivation. Furthermore, the kyai has a private aide (*khadam*) to fulfill his specific daily needs and to serve coffee to visitors. Despite the routine and hardship, this position is much sought by santris. Being personally close to the kyai is a great advantage. The santris believe that such relations bring greater luck and barakah. In reality a khadam, and others like him, have good access to various information related to the kyai as well as the opportunity to observe personalities and interactions in the kyai's guest room. Again, such personal relation provides a khadam with mobility, as he may be assigned to lead a religious center elsewhere or be married to a daughter of a better-off family.

On certain occasions when important government officials or supralocal figures visit the pondok, the kyai carefully arranges the reception. He will call his educated colleagues who thoroughly understand the government bureaucrats, the proper formalities and questions of national development. They are invited to the pondok before the actual reception in order to discuss the best way of dealing with and welcoming such important guests. The kyai is occupied with maintaining his own independence and image and at the same time with showing respect and a warm welcome to his guests. This attitude can be seen in the welcoming ceremony for the vice-commander of the East Javanese police force who visited the pondok of Bettet in

July 1984. Besides a warm reception, he was given special treatment when the kyai surprisingly read the Friday sermon in the vernacular. During my 13-month fieldwork in the area, the kyai of Bettet only twice read the Friday sermon partially in Arabic, one of these two occasions was during this visit of the police chief. Furthermore, when a Meccan scholar visited the pondok, the kyai called his important close associates and senior santris to welcome the guest and his entourage. By doing this, the kyai gained several advantages. Indeed, the kyai was less burdened by the need to provide the travelling scholar with funds when the kyai's men presented cash (*salam tempel*) to the Meccan scholar. On the other hand, the welcome of the members of the Regional Assembly (DPRD I) from Lampung (Sumatra) in December 1984 was brief but unique. These assembly members were given a reception in the hall of the two-storey madrasah building. The welcome speech, an excerpt of the pondok's history, achievement and plans, was delivered by the kyai's friend who was seen locally as one of the best educated politicians. Since their visit was accompanied by members of the local assembly, such a presentation could have been interpreted as a political statement on the part of the kyai.

Mobilization of manpower. Since the ulama need assistants and successors to maintain and pursue their position in the society, they carefully prepare and mobilize the manpower in the family. Following the completion of advanced religious training and education, a kyai's children are assigned to lead the educational programs and societal activities. Most of them serve as teachers in the formal madrasah and instructors for text-reading sessions organized at different levels and times in the pondok. Those individuals who have skills in oratory are encouraged to deliver public speeches either within the pondok or in the villages. With the increasing popularity of public lectures because of the mustami'ans, the calendrical Islamic holiday celebrations and the pondok festivals (*imtihans*), the demand for public speakers is quite high. Among the Bettet ulama, one *lorah* has enjoyed growing popularity for his flowing and informative speeches. Although oratory is not central in the enhancement of a kyai's prestige, it contributes to his popularity as a supralocal figure.

Among ulama families which lack members who can master the techniques of public speaking, skilled santris are recruited to present a popular image of the family and their religious institution on public occasions.

The introduction of regular classes and some general subjects into the pondok has had a tremendous impact on increasing communication between the ulama and diverse external institutions. Some ulama children thus have been sent to further general schooling or at least to learn new approaches to religious instruction. In view of the growing numbers in a formal grade-school system (*sistem sekolah*) organized in the pondok and other limited, but increasing, numbers of ulama children enrolled in secular schools,³⁹ the ulama in Madura experience a challenge to their isolation and uniformity.

Despite the fact that the pondok has been described by many observers and scholars as an indigenous facility which prepares students by imparting ideas of self-reliance, entrepreneurship and modesty (Geertz 1960b; Prasodjo 1974; Horikoshi 1976, Dhofier 1980; Wahid 1980), its owners and leaders, the kyais, do not themselves do manual work. Due primarily to the religious orientation of educational instruction at the pondok, it does not provide the graduates with direct employment opportunities. Some graduates who secure positions as local ulama have to support themselves financially, even though in the process of their religious practices they may receive contributions from villagers. For this reason santris who come from less well-off families attempt from an early period of their studies to secure income through petty trade, brokerage, farming or the labor market. On the other hand, benefiting from their wealth and prestige, the kyais easily attract santris and clients to perform labor and services for the dalem even though there is little material reward. This is why higher ulama never work with their own hands. The kyais do not participate in the actual execution of work or projects, not because they wish to maintain purity and cleanliness, but because of the division of labor. The santris believe that the kyar is

³⁹ A prominent kyal in the Bettet area has sent two of his sons to the prestigious University of Indonesia in Jakarta to study medicine and law respectively.

burdened with various functions and activities as leader and teacher, and therefore, should be freed from other manual works which can be performed by santris and villagers.

Economic resources

Ulama need large sums to hold their position. Yet by virtue of their position they are prevented from conspicuously using their institution to attract money for profit. The fact that ulamaship is a religious institution and not an economic enterprise is an important factor that makes it almost impossible for non-ulama families to assume the position.

Once an ulama family has been established, however, its members have ample chance to enjoy family support and aid from society. In fact, a kyai who enjoys supralocal fame has no serious problem in financing his religious activities and educational projects. As villagers put it succinctly, "While we all seek money, money seeks the kyai" (*Mon kaula kabbih ngawula pessek, pessek ngawula ka kyai*). An established kyai needs a large sum to construct such religious facilities as a mosque, pondoks proper (residential buildings for santris) and madrasah buildings as well as to prepare his offspring as religious experts, to provide villagers with religious instruction and services, and to maintain an exemplary household. Even local ulama who run smaller centers need relatively generous funds to maintain routine services such as lighting mats and battery-powered loudspeaker systems. Without a steady and sufficient income and, of course, religious knowledge, villagers cannot assume the religious functions of local ulama; and without a family background local ulama have difficulties in acquiring the higher status of kyaiship. Since kyais are required to spend considerable time in their religious and educational functions, they have little opportunity to perform direct menial occupations such as cultivation. As a result kyais need workers and assistants to cultivate their land and to pursue other sources of income. Because of their rural association and residence, most kyais own land, even though they have been quick to capture other economic opportunities such as trade (in tobacco, oranges and fertilizer), transportation and small industry. The ability to

respond to new business opportunities is primarily due to the kyais' relative wealth, their wide network and their supralocal connections.

Agriculture. Ulama in Pamekasan derive their basic income from agriculture. As funds are accumulated, they buy more land and take advantage of market opportunities. Most kyais start their religio-educational practices in a modest way except for those who succeed their elders in an already well-known pondok. In view of the low productivity of the land, the ulama, like other villagers, are active in seeking other economic opportunities. Yet the land remains an important source of income for fulfilling their basic needs. Thus when a kyai opens a religious center, he will secure a piece of agricultural land, either through purchase, inheritance or gift. Since he attracts not only neighboring villagers but also supravillage santris, economic support flows from various sources. The unpredictability and the fluctuations of such contributions, however, make cultivation or other economic activities indispensable for the ulama.

Unlike village ulama (mak kaehs), the kyais have access to the labor of their santris. In recent years, few kyais ask their santris to work in their businesses without material compensation. In certain pondoks, however, some kyais still demand work from their santris in order to cultivate their land. Until the 1960's the santris in the pondok of Bettet were involved directly in the cultivation of the kyai's land. When rice cultivation started during the 1984-1985 season, the kyai of Bettet reminded his santris how better-off contemporary santris were in comparison with their predecessors prior to the 1960's who had to help the kyai to work the land. Yet such an arrangement, he insisted, was conducive to the emergence of prominent kyais in Pamekasan such as so and so. The kyai said this as he asked the santris to cut and bring home logs from the fields in preparation for constructing the new madrasah and pondok buildings. Although the kyai praised the value of such work, the santris in Bettet were not directly involved in the cultivation of the kyai's land. During the harvest time, however, they participated in threshing and drying the agricultural produce. Such a labor contribution undoubtedly adds value to the harvest and eases

the kyai's burden.

In view of the scarcity and fragmentation of the land, many kyais still own, by local standards, much land. In most parts of Pamekasan the value of agricultural land has increased significantly since the spread of tobacco cultivation to villages. As a result, villagers become more attached to their land. Land sales are rare.

Nevertheless, the ulama have many ways to acquire agricultural land. Being a religious leader, a kyai often receives land as an endowment (*wakaf*) from the faithful (cf. *Laporan Hasil Penelitian* 1980). In Pamekasan and Madura generally, such endowments are submitted directly to the kyai in person. In some cases, they are specified for use either to finance a mosque, a pondok or a madrasah. In the latter cases, such land is indivisible. It is attached to the institution and remains under the management of the resident kyai. Such an arrangement is effective in ensuring the survival of the original institution since it has a permanent financial resource. Because the benefactors may come from different segments of the population, some kyais have to manage scattered plots of land. For example, the kyai of Ta-Bata holds plots of estates as endowment in Probolinggo, East Java. These lands were endowed by Madurese migrants in the region. And the kyai of Bettet keeps some wakaf lands in several *desas* distant from Bettet. Moreover, the accumulation of wealth by the kyai through gifts and business activities enables him at times to close deals with land sellers. Although villagers prefer to sell their land to their immediate kinsmen, kyais are seen as next to the kinsmen. As public figures, kyais are easy to approach and talk with, even to deal with land sales. This is true despite the fact that villagers have little bargaining power, due primarily to the prestige conferred by the kyais' religious position. The practical reason for this tendency, as villagers told me, is the kyais' fair and honest practices and the instant cash payment provided by kyais in their business deals. Again, the ambition of the Madurese villagers to fulfill their fifth and last religious obligation, the pilgrimage to Mecca (*ongga aji* or *naik haji*) has become a perennial source of land sales. The kyais' familiarity with, and in some cases their

involvement in, pilgrimage affairs bring villagers to depend on kyais for making travel arrangements. Therefore, prior to the pilgrimage season, some villagers will submit sufficient funds to a kyai and others may request him to provide additional funds which will be repaid upon the following harvest, still others, although rarely, may depend totally on the kyai for funds in return for a parcel of their land. In this way, the kyai has good access to capital accumulation including land.

The kyais' possession of land inherited from their parents remains an important asset at least for their early career. By showing themselves to be independent economically as well as otherwise, kyais have a better chance to attract villagers, especially since the latter believe that they should submit their gifts to the stronger kyais; for their barakah and resto are more effective and efficacious.

The diversification of economic resources among kyais makes their agricultural produce an invaluable source of income. Indeed, large quantities of the harvest from their land can be sold as to provide the necessary capital to finance business or other projects. A considerable amount of staple produce is, of course, consumed domestically. The successful harvest and the villagers' contributions in kind, however, provide a surplus that can be exchanged for cash. Thus when the price is more favorable for their agricultural produce or the family needs a major amount of cash, the nyai will sell the produce to the merchants in the town. (It is interesting to note in passing that most villagers dare not ask the nyai to lend them staples primarily because they may get them without charge as charity or a gift. Such a gesture only aggravates their balance of indebtedness to the dalem.) The cultivation of cash crops such as tobacco, oranges or chilis provides the ulama with more cash. Given the high demand for such crops, larger landowners including kyais accrue considerable profit, particularly because of their capital and easy access to labor. The kyai of Bettet, for example, has vigorously cultivated tobacco on a large scale since he was a lorah. In the 1984 tobacco season, he had eight hectares with approximately 200,000 tobacco plants, an enormous amount by local standards. Less than half of this cultivation was carried out on his own land; the remaining portion was cultivated on rented land in

the nearby villages. Cultivation on his own land was assigned to hired labours. The rented land was cultivated by sharecropping and by hired laborers. Although the 1984 season was affected by early heavy rains, the kyai still made a profit.

Entrepreneurship: capital, creativity and new economic opportunities. The kyais are innovative in improving cultivation. Benefiting from their supralocal connections and knowledge, kyais are quick to adopt new techniques in economic enterprises including cultivation. Their eagerness to utilize new crops, and try new cultivation methods, fertilizer and miracle seeds, is related strongly to the kyais' economic stability. In other words, the kyais, unlike ordinary villagers, do not fear the risk of cultivation failure (cf. Foster 1965, Rogers 1969, Scott 1976, Popkin 1979). Such a tendency was aptly expressed by a villager stating that he did not need miracle seeds because they could not withstand drought. For ordinary villagers, new investment and experimentation are too risky to undertake. But for the kyais who have diverse sources of income, new opportunities are seized, particularly if they have proven successful elsewhere. For example, the kyai of Bettet was the first to introduce large scale cultivation of tobacco into the area in the early 1960's. It has proven to be highly profitable. Yet not all his enterprises are successful and enduring. In the early 1970's the kyai introduced the cultivation of onions into the village, but it failed. Nevertheless, as seen in his attempts to bring regular water to parts of Bettet's fields, the kyai has paid special attention to improving village cultivation.

Trade has been a popular occupation among ulama. The spread of Islam into many parts of the Southeast Asian archipelago including Madura, as we saw in Chapter 1, has been closely associated with interinsular trade. The close ties of many Islamic centers in Java with trade brought Clifford Geertz to conclude that "It was around this market network that the social institutions of Islam grew up in Indonesia, around it and out of it that an Islamic community in the proper sense of the term, an *umma*, crystallized" (Geertz 1968:42). In spite of the emerging evidence which suggests that in parts of Java Islam was adopted and propagated by peasants (Horikoshi 1976:135), the kyais in Madura thanks to their supralocal influence, their wider net of

communications and their strategic niche in the local economic structure, have been active in trade. It is certainly significant that the Prophet is claimed to have regarded trade as the best occupation for his followers.⁴⁰ Although such religious motivation may be influential among the Madurese kyais, their religious status and the local economic structure seem to have been the important factors in the close ties between the kyais and trade. In the past, as is often said among pondok inhabitants and santri, when the ulama conducted their travelling instruction and lectures, they also carried goods to be traded. The high mobility among today's kyais has been utilized by some to improve their economic condition. For example, the kiai of Panyeppe, who has been involved in organizing local pilgrims going to Mecca, uses the opportunity to carry local batik to be sold elsewhere in Jakarta and Saudi Arabia. On his return to the pondok he brings various manufactured and imported goods to be sold primarily among his santri and followers. Again, his close association with religious texts has induced him to open a book-store in the town.

Nevertheless, the identification of a kiai with religious and spiritual symbols does not permit him to conduct full-time business activities, especially if he expects to exercise wide popularity and gain a larger following. A prominent kiai who runs a big pondok in Palengaan is losing santri because he has travelled extensively outside the island. In the eyes of villagers, his neglect of the pondok's affairs was a strong reason to suspect his seriousness about religion and education. His recurrent, long absences from the pondok seriously disturbed its internal organization, as the subordinates and santri had no strong guidance in running the pondok's affairs and implementing its rules. As such, a kiai's pursuance of trade is ambiguous and restricted (cf. de Jonge 1984:233-63). Put differently, he conducts trade and other economic activities only to provide his sustenance, not to finance all the expenditures of his institution, unless he opts to lessen his affiliation with the kyaiship.

⁴⁰ Ibn al-Hajar al-'Asqalānī, *Bulūgh al-Marām*, Cairo: al-Maktabah al-Tijāriyah al-Kubrā, n.d., 158; When asked about the best occupation, the Prophet said "One's work with his own hand and every valid transaction! (*bai' mabrūr*)."

The ulama are quick to grasp new economic opportunities. The economic trickle-down to villages in the last few years has provided many local well-to-do persons and entrepreneurs, including kyais, with new economic enterprises. The improvement of roads in Madura during the early 1970's has stimulated many local capital owners to run transportation businesses. Higher ulama who had sufficient capital bought vans and trucks for transport of passengers and goods. Although in the last few years this business has become overcrowded, some kyais continue to profit from the transportation business. In running such a business as transportation a kyai benefits from the seriousness and honesty of his drivers and workers. Most of the kyais assistants are afraid of embezzling funds or ignoring car maintenance, because santris usually believe that kyais possess extraordinary powers to know of wrongdoing and punish wrongdoers, particularly those who transgress the kyais' rights.

The kyais effectively tap the cooperation and labor of their santris to pursue economic interests. Some kyais even try to provide their needy santris with job opportunities. For instance, the kyai of Banyuwangi founded a construction firm which recruited its labor primarily among santris. Such an arrangement seems to benefit both parties as the santris are able to remain attached to the pondok and the kyai is assured of hard work and a higher commitment from his labor. Furthermore, some kyais take advantage of their knowledge and contact with the Middle East by arranging local workers to be employed in Saudi Arabia. Indeed, the ulama have acted as brokers who recruited manpower in their own communities then sent them to agencies in Jakarta for employment abroad. Although the ulama had no voice in the final allocation of the manpower, many villagers especially the job-seekers were impressed by the ulama's effort. Since villagers highly respect and trust their kyais, the latter's announcement of job opportunities easily attracts a large number of participants. This tendency was also evident when the kyai of Bettet led a resettlement program (transmigrasi) to South Kalimantan. The Madurese are mobile since they seek job opportunities (*ongga, kalowar* or *merantau*) far away from their island. Yet they are not very supportive of the government-backed programs of organized, mass migra-

tion to the outer islands. Realizing the pivotal role of the ulama in the society and without undermining any political desire to win ulama to its camp, the local government persuaded the ulama to support its outmigration program. The junior kyai of Bettet accepted the offer. He succeeded in recruiting villagers and some santris to be included in the outmigration package to South Kalimantan. The main theme of the kyai's justification for the transmigrasi was religious. He argued that outmigration is an effective way for the preaching of Islam (*kaanggui dakwah Islam*). By remaining in crowded, Islamized Madura, he said, "little can be done to propagate Islam to a wider population. Transmigrasi to Kalimantan is a good opportunity to teach others about Islam, to start a better life and to establish a healthier community." In return for his achievement in bringing hundreds of villagers to participate in the outmigration scheme the kyai was awarded several hectares of land in the new settlement.

Since not all higher ulama have enough capital to pursue new economic opportunities, many have to adopt a moderate life style. Indeed, many kyais in Pamekasan are fighting for survival through small cultivation and public donations. Several factors affect the inability and sometimes unwillingness of particular kyais to accumulate wealth. Like other fellow villagers some kyais fail to achieve solid scholarship, to dispense effective medication or to acquire wide recognition in magic (*ilmu laduni*). And others may prefer to live as ascetics maintaining only a meagre sustenance.

The ulama's failure to fulfill the villagers' expectation and their failure to address the latter's diverse concerns brings about the unpopularity of such religious figures. This situation has further impact on the character and life style of an individual ulama as well as on his societal activities. Having grown up in the strong pondok environment, a kyai's children, as we saw, are almost automatically absorbed into the ulama profession. Yet individual capacity and inclination often predominate over the family's expectation, especially if the latter's support and prospects are limited. Not surprisingly, thus, some kyais maintain the *status quo* without seriously pursuing an ulama career. For example, many kyais of the Tattangoh ulama family who live together in a nucleated settlement take advantage of the family's prestige without

seriously attempting to establish an organized educational system for villagers. Although the family has been renowned for its ilmu laduni and medication, not all members are able to share the same fame. As a result some of them who fail to attract larger numbers of visitors have to find income elsewhere as traders, brokers or taxi owners. Indeed, their low degree of involvement in education makes them relatively mobile and able to choose other careers, while maintaining their identity as kyai by providing prayers, medicines and amulets.

On the other hand, the ulama families who have derived their religious authority through spiritual-religious guidance and educational services have different prospects. Their members who fail to master religious knowledge and follow standard piety may remain purely local religious figures throughout their lives. Their attachment to ulamaship restrains them from pursuing purely non-religious careers unless they migrate somewhere and become ordinary citizens.

The success of some kyais in pursuing extra-religious activities such as trade, entrepreneurship and investment is strongly related to their reputations in the religious field. For ulama who fail to attract a large number of visitors and santris, funds seem to be meagre. As a result they have to be satisfied with the support of the local followers and santris. Kyai Karam of Pademawu, for instance, is a creative and energetic kyai, even though he has failed to secure wide recognition in religious scholarship. Probably for this reason he established a secondary religious school (*madrasah tsanawiyah*) which was later taken over by the government. The reason for this decision, he acknowledged, was lack of funds to operate the madrasah. After the madrasah came under government control and management, the kyai was also given a formal position as a government teacher. His acceptance of such a position arose from his failure to attract mass support for the madrasah organization. Since he does not possess any formal certificate which might have promoted him to a higher rank, he remains an ordinary government teacher. Although the kyai still maintains leadership of the local mosque and his newly established educational institution, he has not succeeded in attracting a wide following. To finance his new school he thus cannot

depend on contributions and donations, but has to look for the cooperation of supralocal organizations and the government as well as to charge considerable fees to students and resident santris. Moreover, Kyai Karam's moderate popularity discourages his sons from remaining in the area and pursuing careers there. Indeed, they migrate to the cities to find other employment as teachers, civil servants and entrepreneurs.

Ulama and wealthy villagers. Kyais derive a significant portion of their income from wealthy santris and friends. This does not mean that gifts and contributions from villagers at large are insignificant. The visits by villagers help considerably to reinvigorate a kyai's prestige. The regularity and continuity of such visits support the kyai financially and socially. Visitors to a kyai almost never fail to submit gifts (*leh-oleh*) irrespective of whether they have come to solve personal problems, to get advice and medicine, or just to renew their ties with the kyai. Although most visitors are concerned with their own affairs vis-à-vis the kyai, their acceptance of a particular kyai as a close ally and leader contributes to the emergence of quasi-groupings of the segmented Madurese villagers with the kyai at the pinnacle. Since a large number of the kyais are related to each other ideologically and socially, the kyais remain invaluable nodes of village homogeneity.

There are several categories of a kyai's wealthy friends (a) those who have developed friendship during a study period at the pondok; (b) those who maintain personal ties on the basis of a teacher-student association and (c) those who have developed friendship through the kyai-follower contact. Among the three categories the latter are more concerned with friendship since they need religious legitimization for the wealth they have accumulated, seemingly at the expense of their fellow villagers, a point which I shall return to in Chapter 11. A kyai's friends who base their relation on their common pondok experience seem to uphold more the idea of *esprit de corps*. Furthermore, being santris, the second category of friends need not acquire extra-religious identity. Ideologically santris have been taught that each individual should work and strive only to serve God (*li ya'buduni, libtigha'i wajhih, li 'izzil Islam, or li mardlatillah*). Again, santris who become wealthy but do not directly manage

any religious center compensate for this shortcoming in upholding religion by supporting their teacher and his family. It is clear that these ulama's students (santris proper) are less concerned with the animosity of their fellow villagers than with their personal involvement in the process of islamization. Many of them, in fact, regard their worldly achievement as deriving from the kyai's barakah, prayers and resto. Their support for the kyai, therefore, is an automatic expression of their gratitude. In order to have a better understanding of the centrality of the villagers' support for the kyai's projects, let us observe how the kyai of Bettet mobilized friends, villagers, santris and others to erect a madrasah building for senior secondary students.

The mobilization and spending of funds. The kyai of Bettet has been successful during his two-decade kyaiship in mobilizing local funds and energies in order to erect buildings and construct other pondok infra-structures. His works started in the late 1960's with the construction of bridges and canals, then houses, a mosque, a two-storey madrasah building, a girls' madrasah and roads, and ended in 1984 with the renovation of the canals and the construction of a madrasah building for senior secondary students. Among his diverse works only the mosque was partly built by government funds. Other works and the greater part of the mosque project were completed through the funds collected by the kyai from his friends, santris and villagers.

Before the kyai started the work, the plan for the secondary madrasah building had been widely circulated. It was suggested that part of the funds should be acquired through special donations (*infaqs*), that is by selling coupons or other materials to villagers above their market value. The idea was suggested in view of the fact that the santris would return to their homes for the Ramadhan holidays, and are therefore desirable to undertake the infaq circulation, at least in their respective villages. Since during that time most villagers were still in a difficult economic period as they waited for the tobacco harvest, the kyai advised some senior santris to conduct a special

prayer (*istikharah*).⁴¹ In response, a number of senior santris first performed the shalat rituals in the mosque, then the leader opened the Qur'an at random. From the two newly opened pages, the santris counted the number of occurrences of the letter "kh" which means *khair*/good on the right page and the letter "sy" which means *syarr*/bad on the left one. Since the number of occurrences of the letter "kh" was lower than those of the letter "sy", the santris decided that the infaq plan should not be undertaken. Upon receiving the result of the santris' *istikharah*, the kyai ordered the cancellation of the infaq circulation. Despite this negative decision, the news about the kyai's plan quickly spread to the villages and reached his friends and followers. The first response to the kyai's plan came from one of his wealthy friends in the town (a lumber and chili dealer) who sent him a truck-load of lumber. Another wealthy client lent his van to transport light materials. Shortly before the classes ended, students were mobilized to help load the trucks and van with materials given by villagers in some remote areas. When the necessary building materials were gathered, the work started shortly after the classes ended. Thus the major work was performed during the fasting month of Ramadhan. Although the kyai hired several carpenters and bricklayers, most of the labor was done by volunteers, santris and villagers.

Unlike the building of the village bridges and canals (see Chapter 12), however, the kyai did not ask villagers to participate in the work. This is significant in explaining the way a kyai perceives and regards works undertaken in his pondok. Indeed, a kyai is concerned with keeping his independence. By avoiding an overt request for the villagers' participation and contribution, the kyai was able to show his self-sufficiency.

⁴¹ This prayer is popularly performed by santris and ulama when they are making crucial decisions. But it is not uncommon that an *istikharah* is performed whenever a santri wants to undertake a task. In Bettet, for example, many santris perform a simple form of the *istikharah* when they want to go shopping to the town market. They read a special formula of Arabic prayers, then throw their beads (*tasbeih*) into the air and on receiving the rosary they count it, according to a Muhammad, Abu Bakr and Abu Jahl series, starting from the first bead they captured at random until the border end of that 99-bead rosary. If the counting ends with Muhammad or Abu Bakr, they regard the decision should be pursued, and if with Abu Jahl the plan should be cancelled. During the *istikharah* for undertaking the infaq, however, a more elaborate form was undertaken.

The pondok belonged to him personally, even though he would not refuse unsolicited contributions from individual villagers.

In preparing and executing the plan, the kyai is assisted by clients who know construction well. Since the kyai maintains several buildings and harbors santri and students, he is almost in constant need of carpenters and bricklayers to renovate and erect buildings. These artisans enjoy two obvious advantages. They secure a stable assignment, even though they have to be satisfied with whatever the kyai pays them. Again, they are in a better position to claim expertise and a high quality of work as proved by their association with the kyai. Nevertheless, for important projects such as the madrasah building the kyai will ask well-known builders to arrange and supervise the plan. In erecting the madrasah, the kyai invited his old friend, a local builder, who had been closely associated with the kyai's projects in the past, in order to estimate the funds, materials, labor and time for the completion of the building. The builder was given authority to instruct and supervise the workers who consisted mainly of santri. Since carpentry requires a certain skill and experience, it was done strictly by carpenters. The other work was performed by volunteers under the direct supervision of the builder and other bricklayers.

The construction of the six-room madrasah required only a limited number of workers. Sufficient labor was furnished by tens of senior santri who stayed in the pondok during the Ramadhan holidays. Even they had to be scheduled. A group of approximately a dozen santri was assigned per day to assist the bricklayers. In order to respond to volunteers among villagers the kyai assigned them the task of widening the path towards the family's graveyard (*asta*) which was located behind the madrasah building. Indeed, when the hired carpenters could not complete the roof work before the end of Ramadhan, the kyai requested volunteer carpenters from the surrounding villages to participate in the completion. For two consecutive days tens of carpenters worked together to complete the roof. Although the kyai offered to pay these carpenters, they refused to accept money. They argued that at last the madrasah would accommodate their children and other villagers who wanted to study under

the kyai. To show his gratitude the kyai invited them to the dalem for special meals together with other villagers and santris. During the construction of the madrasah, all workers were provided with meals. Since it was a fasting month, the workers received meals once a day after sunset.

The new building was formally opened on the occasion of the pondok festival (*imtihan*). The madrasah was completed within less than forty days. Although the building was modest, its quick completion was impressive. My santri informants explained that the kyai's ability to erect such a building on time was due to his access to many sources of labor and material. He had no problem in acquiring funding either from his own savings or directly from his followers and friends. But as I have shown, the kyai was careful in demanding contributions from his friends and followers. Indeed, the building of this madrasah has a particular meaning which is vital for showing the public that the kyai has spent a lot of his own money to run the pondok. Given such an image villagers are more eager to support the kyai and to contribute funds to lessen his burden or to further his plan. The opening ceremony of the madrasah held concomitant with the pondok festival, to which government officials, fellow kyais, friends, mak kaehs and villagers were invited, successfully showed the public that the kyai had done a lot for education and the society. Under such conditions the kyai's position and status as religious leader were renewed, confirmed and enhanced.

In the following sections I will show how the ulama perform their roles and activate their institutions as religious functionaries, educators and value carriers.

Chapter Ten

THE ULAMA AND EDUCATION

Despite the all-encompassing virtues of the ulama in the eyes of villagers, the ulama's main attribute is knowledge. Each ulama has certain fields of knowledge which are the source of his attraction among the villagers. Being the standard bearers of religious values and goals, the ulama are required to instruct villagers. In playing such a role the ulama use all possible means within their reach and capacity. Thus in Madura the ulama are involved in providing instruction through langgars, social gatherings, feasts, madrasah education, visits, pondok and public meetings. In view of the hierarchical structure of the ulama, each individual ulama has limits in pursuing his institutional function. Thus, a local ulama (mak kaeh) is not involved in running pondok education, whereas a kyai is exempted from instructing children in basic religious teachings. Nevertheless, the ulama attempt to use all media and facilities available to them in order to reach their audience and followers. They justify their activities on the basis of a religious dictum, that is that all deeds should be focused on upholding the word of God (*li 'ila'i kalimatillah*).

Customary religious education

Mak kaeh. At the lowest level, the local ulama (mak kaehs) provide village children with basic religious teaching in their langgar rajas. Although the mak kaehs are trusted to lead recurrent feasts and calendrical ceremonies in the neighborhood, their daily religious function is to instruct children. For village parents this basic instruction is vital since many of their children will never have access to higher regular education. In addition, those who expect to pursue higher religious education have to master their langgar instruction. In instructing the children, a mak kaeh is usually assisted by his family members. Since at times he has to lead religious ceremonies and feasts elsewhere in the neighborhood, these assistants become indispensable. More specifically, they are needed to prepare the facilities for the religious session (pengajian) by, for example, turning on the lamps, arranging mats and cleaning the

floor. Since the instruction is performed under a rote-learning system, a mak kaeh is not expected to have high religious erudition. Yet the regularity of the instruction requires patience, dedication and experience. This is especially true if we observe that most local mak kaehs in the Bettet area are successors to their parents. In view of the prestige enjoyed by such local figures this hereditary pattern is not surprising.

The program is focused on instructing children how to read the Qur'an and practice basic religious rituals. Children gather in the langgar Taja at sunset. While waiting for the appearance of the mak kaeh the children chant in unison casually. When the mak kaeh makes a sign to start the ritual prayer, everyone stops chanting. Following the prayers, children are generally divided into senior and junior groups. Each group forms a circle as participants sit on the floor. The mak kaeh directly supervises the junior group which consists mainly of beginners. One santri after another presents himself in front of the mak kaeh to receive instruction and further assignment of Qur'anic recitation. A mak kaeh usually has several assistants to help the novice in reading the Arabic script and studying the assignment. Thus when a participant finishes presenting his assignment in front of the mak kaeh, the former will either receive the new assignment or repeat the old one. The assistants are ready to help him in this matter. When his turn comes he will again see the mak kaeh, and so on as time allows. In instructing the children the mak kaeh is casual and relaxed, leaning his back to the wall or pole, or sitting beside his pupils. Moreover, the senior group is expected to run its own session under the leadership of an appointed senior pupil. Each participant is a performer and examiner. Thus each one in his turn recites certain verses of the Qur'an under the examination of all other participants. If he makes a mistake, his colleagues will remind and correct him. When the mak kaeh regards that every junior participant has sufficient instruction for the day he will make a sign to stop the session (*pengajian*). The sleepy and tired children happily respond and lie on the floor to wait for the collective late evening prayers (*shalat 'Isya'*). After the prayers the junior participants are instructed in performing rituals such as the ablution (*wudlu*) and prayers proper. The whole session lasts for no less

than two hours. Such an intensive session, six days per week, strongly affects the nature of the relationship between the religious teacher and his pupils in villages.

Mak kaehs have a strong impact on children's beliefs about supernatural beings. Using an Islamic vocabulary, a mak kaeh is capable of absorbing and incorporating the local belief system. In the first place the ulama address God as the source of all creation. Between mankind and God, the ulama believe in the existence of diverse unseen agents (*makhluk alos*) including angels (*malaekat*), devils (*syetans*), "demons" (*jins*) and other spirits. Within this framework the popular belief in the *se areksa*, *lamdahur*, *din-dadin* and *mugut* is adapted, being explained in the Islamic vocabularies. The villagers believe that these spirits can be generally classified into evil and good agents. *Se-areksa*, for example, is originally the protector and guardian of a locality. Yet at times it may become a threatening agent if it does not get its share of respect and sacrifices. The *se-areksa* originally came from heaven and are not ancestral spirits (cf. Hefner 1985). The *lamdahur* are older ancestors spirits. They can be harmful or friendly depending on the attitude of individual human beings toward them. Among children the *din-dadin* are symbols of frightening spirits. They live in certain places such as big trees, isolated locations and rivers. The spirits of the newly dead are believed to come to life occasionally from the grave in the form of *mugut* which may frighten villagers without creating serious harm. For this reason, the graveyard is traditionally seen as a frightening place. But, as also described by Jordaan (1985:97), villagers believe that particular parts of the body of those who die on particular days possess special power which can be acquired by the living. Hence the graves of such people are guarded for seven days after burial in order to prevent corpse thieves.

In explaining such spirits within a scriptural context, the ulama, for instance, credit the *syetans* with all evil influence upon human beings. Evil spirits are identified with *syetans* or are at least under their control. The soul of the dead remains for some time prone to the *syetan's* influence depending on his previous deeds, as well as the prayers of the descendants and friends. The soul of a prominent religious figure; dead

or living, of course, has a special role in communicating between the faithful and God. It has a strong capacity to defeat the syetans by virtue of his wisdom, piety and good deeds. Moreover, jins are unique in the belief system of the ulama. Unlike human being, jins are unseen, except on certain occasions and they are physically more powerful. But like mankind, jins can be made friends and not rarely they force particular individuals to be their colleagues. Indeed, some of them adopt Islam. Villagers who want to have friends among Muslim jins can follow guidance of the ulama. But the ulama cannot monopolize the access to jins since non-Muslim jins can be approached through diverse means. In the villages, jins (Muslim or not) at times interfere with sick individuals in order to gain their friendship. Upon their recovery, the persons can exercise control over their friendly jins for various purposes, especially medication, healing, divination and fortune telling. Although villagers continue to maintain several features of the indigenous belief system in spirits, the ulama absorb it into the Islamic fold.

Mak kaehs also lead recurrent feasts and ceremonies in the neighborhood. Adult villagers do not normally perform even their evening prayers in the langgar raja with a mak kaeh. One obvious reason is their participation in the kolom gatherings widely held in the neighborhood. This does not mean that the villagers are negligent of their daily prayers, as I first suspected. Some villagers regretted that they failed to join the langgar raja to perform congregational prayers as recommended by the prophetic traditions. Indeed, partly to compensate for their shortcoming, villagers are persistent in sending their children to a local mak kaeh. This same tendency, however, seems to restrain adults from joining together with their children. Their total trust in the mak kaeh to instruct their children prevents parents from showing themselves in the langgar raja where the children are instructed. They do not want to interfere with the mak kaeh's teaching activities. Accordingly, the villagers' contact with the mak kaeh is achieved primarily through feasts and ceremonies in village households. The central position of a mak kaeh in such ceremonies undoubtedly has a strong impact in providing parents and adults with religious symbols and values. Again, villagers

spend time with the mak kaeh to talk about everything, from their village to religious questions. Such conversations usually take place in the evening when the children have finished their session.

Mosque imam. Local ulama who run mosques have more direct occasions to instruct adult villagers. Being higher religious figures at the local level, mosque imams are supposed to have a better educational background. For this reason instruction for children in basic religious knowledge is commonly assigned to other family members. More specifically, they may run elementary madrasahs for children. Thus mosque imams concentrate on instructing adult villagers.

Basing his teaching more closely on the texts than does a mak kaeh, a mosque imam in a sense scripturalizes and islamizes many local beliefs and practices. In the domain of belief in God and the afterlife, the imams exhort the centrality of the unicity of God (*tauhid*) and religious practices (*syari'ah*). The only way for man to achieve eternal salvation is to follow the divine revelation received by Muḥammad. Since Islamic doctrines and practices have been formulated in such a straightforward manner, villagers are required to follow the teachings of the local ulama. Imams in Madurese villages, like their counterparts elsewhere, including West Java and Kelantan (see Horikoshi 1976, Nash 1974), stress the belief in the unicity of God (*tauhid*), besides belief in his angels, scriptures, messengers, the day of resurrection and predestination (*taqdir*).

In most cases, the imams conduct the *pengajian* (reading of religious texts) in the evening, usually following the late evening prayers on certain days of the week. The texts are mainly related to the basic belief system (*'aqā'id*) and religious ritual and law (*fiqh/fiqh*). In the villages, the ulama commonly use the *Sullam al-Taufiq*⁴² or *Safinat al-Najāh*⁴³ as a text. For, as imam Gatı of Bagandan explained, the main

⁴² The *Sullam al-Taufiq* is composed by 'Abd Allāh ibn Husain ibn Thāhir al-Hadrami (d. 1271H/1855). The small text contains the basic religious doctrine and rituals.

⁴³ The *Safinat al-Najāh* provides a brief description of and notes on the five pillars

religious concern of the villagers is the right conduct of rituals. Although the participants are few, they consist of diverse groups of villagers. The atmosphere of the session is relaxed as participants scatter over the mosque veranda at their own convenience. Interruptions are tolerated. This mitigates the monotonous style of strict translation of the text. Because participants come irregularly, the session is not a place to conduct an organized and graded instruction. For years the mosque imams have continued to repeat reading the same text. Only participants who have basic knowledge of Arabic hold their own text to check and copy carefully the translation and interpretation of the imam. Others who do not know Arabic learn by listening. Because of his erudition an imam may attract a wider audience from neighboring villages. In this case he has a good chance to improve his status among the villagers. But, as we saw in Chapter 7, he is not free from the prevailing structure of local religious leadership.

Furthermore, mosque imams have other opportunities to deliver messages and lectures. Generally Friday sermons which are read in Arabic do not provide villagers with clear ideas about Islamic teachings, though they may transmit religious symbols and glorify their religion. Yet on occasions mosque imams speak on what concerns them and the villagers shortly before the Friday sermons. Again, the use of loudspeakers in most village mosques stimulates ulama to deliver religious lectures and other addresses usually around the time of congregational prayers. The major themes in such speeches center on exhorting villagers to perform good deeds and avoid evil (*al-amr bil-ma'ruf wan-nahy 'anil-munkar*). This is usually related to the perfection of one's performance of detailed rituals. In the last few years a mosque imam in Samarang regularly delivered the morning lectures (*kuliah Shubuh*) twice a week through loudspeakers. Although this is atypical, it can be seen as a beginning in the light of what has taken place in many other regions in Indonesia.

Religious teacher: ustadz. Since some lay villagers enjoy higher religious

of Islamic worship (*arkān al-Islām*). The author of the book is, Sālim ibn 'Abd Allāh ibn Sumair al-Hadrami (d. 1270H/1854) (cf. van den Berg 1886:526-8).

education at the pondok, certain individuals have a reputation for religious scholarship even if they do not run a private religious institution. These individuals are known as *ustadz*es. Although many *ustadz*es are commonly associated with the regular instruction at a village school or madrasah, some are involved in the provision of religious sessions for adults.

An *ustadz* may open sessions by reading certain religious texts, primarily at the request of the participants. Because of the higher level of instruction, there are very few participants. Yet such activities often lead toward the enhancement of the *ustadz* as many villagers listen to his lectures and seek his opinion on various subjects. The location of the *ustadz*'s residence, however, determines his prospect of running a permanent local religious center, either a langgar raja or a mosque. Again, it is not uncommon that such emerging religious figures are given a chance to marry daughters of local ulama. Under such circumstances, the *ustadz*es have better and legitimate chances to pursue their religious practices. Without such affinal ties, emerging *ustadz*es have to find a free location elsewhere, if they refuse to be subordinate in their own locality under the incumbent local ulama. In most cases such *ustadz*es remain in their village either pursuing their own practice or working together with local ulama.

In terms of religious ideas, such *ustadz*es introduce more scriptural understanding of Islam to villages because of their orientation to the text. Moreover, because of their wide connection with kyais and santris through supravillage education, such *ustadz*es may bring many novelties to villages. Not surprisingly, many of them become sources of internal change since they are rivals to the established local ulama. For example, in order to build their religious centers such *ustadz*es may seek aid from external sources, governmental or private. Such a decision is controversial in villages, especially when a religious figure receives funds from the government. The continuous debates and rivalries between such local figures, as noted in Chapter 4, remain vital in the evolutionary change in villages.

Local gatherings. In the villages, public gatherings are effective in keeping villagers aware of religious sentiment and symbols. The recurrent ceremonies and feasts held in the tanean illustrate the religious character of the village, in spite of the persistence of the popular practices. The appearance of a local ulama (mak kaeh) on these occasions as officiating leader shows the strength of the villagers' attachment to the religious symbols. Although speeches are not normally delivered, informal conversation and exchange during the gathering enhance the centrality of a mak kaeh in a local setting. He imposes certain values and ideas. The conformity to the village religious norms and activities seems to be crucial in the routinization of religious practices and vice versa.

On the other hand, the occasional presentations of supralocal speakers (*muballighs*) during mustami'ans, festivals, celebration of calendrical Islamic holidays and imtihans provide villagers with refreshed views and understanding toward their routinized religion. Since speeches are centered on informing villagers about scriptural Islam and bringing them into contact with the supravillage world, villagers are to a degree stimulated to rethink their religious practices. Although they do not reach the state of critically examining these practices, such encounters arouse their pride and more specifically make sense of their almost unconscious religious routines. Not surprisingly, public speaking continues to be the monopoly of prominent figures from supravillage religious centers such as the Islamic organizations and pondoks. For instance, the mustami'ans held in villages throughout Kecamatan Proppo have been supplied with speakers from the pondok of Bettet. At a higher level, when an imtihan or public meeting is held, popular speakers from the town and pondok ulama are invited.

Formal religious education in the villages: madrasah

So far we have discussed informal religious education in villages. Formal religious education for children has been organized in the madrasah. In addition, the government schools provide regular classes of religious instruction. In Madurese villages, older pupils at the elementary school (SD) are instructed about Islam for at least two hours a week. Each school usually has one religious teacher. Parents who belong to

other religions have the right to prevent their children from participating in religious sessions given at school. According to local teachers, however, few parents did so. In the Bettet area, the religious instruction at the public school was regarded by the pupils as too easy. Since most pupils at the school went to the afternoon madrasah, their knowledge of the basic tenets of Islam was quite detailed. As a result, religious instruction at the school was not taken seriously. Yet because the presentation of religious instruction was different from that given at the madrasah, as it was delivered partly in Indonesian, and dealt with themes presented within a broader context, the pupils learned something new from the religious sessions.

Religious instruction in public schools has been for years conducted by teachers of the Department of Religious Affairs (Depag). Most of these teachers are permanent government employees of the Depag. In recent years the government has reorganized the provision of religious teachers at public schools by giving the Department of Education, to which the public schools belong, the right to hire its own religious teachers. As a result many teachers who belong to the Depag have been reassigned to teach at other educational institutions, private or public, which fall under the Depag's authority. In the period prior to the 1970's, many religious teachers who were hired by the Depag came from among *santris* who did not possess a teaching certificate. They were popularly known as UGA teachers (*Ujian Guru Agama*). They were newly hired religious teachers who had undergone *ad hoc* training which provided them with basic teaching skills at the elementary level. At present candidates for religious teaching posts at the elementary schools are required to have at least a teaching certificate from the PGA (Vocational Training for Religious Teachers).

On the other hand, in villages, there are madrasahs which specifically provide children with primary religious instruction. Village madrasahs are founded by local ulama, individually or in cooperation with higher ulama. Unlike mosque and langgar sessions, instruction at the madrasah is divided into classes. If at the langgar raja children are taught the basic beliefs, practical rituals and recitation of the Qur'an, at the madrasah they learn to write the Arabic alphabet, to read religious texts and to

memorize prayers, formulae and doctrines. Although Arabic is taught, pupils are not expected to speak it. Arabic grammar becomes a major subject from a very early stage of study. It is widely held that sufficient knowledge of Arabic grammar is indispensable for santri to study religious texts. In the first two years of their six-year program children are instructed in writing, ritual and basic doctrine. The language of instruction is Madurese. Their notes are written in the Arabic alphabet. Children are introduced into the legends of the prophets, Islamic heroes and the Prophet Muhammad. Using narrative stories, the teachers instill in the children the various doctrines relating to God, celestial bodies, eschatology, prophethood, barakah and piety. In some cases such doctrines are presented in simple poems (*sajak*), so that children can memorize them comfortably in a rhythmic tone. The teaching dealing with the belief system is almost completed within these two introductory years. For the following years pupils are taught primarily to master *ilmu alat* such as Arabic grammar with its branches and logic in order to pave the way for their study of various texts of Islamic law (*fekih*). Although other subjects such as tafsir, Sufism, hadits and Islamic history are taught, they do not occupy as much time and emphasis as *fekih*.

In many villages, children join both the public school and the madrasah. Until quite recently, the madrasah was the only educational institution available for children in certain villages. The centrality of the madrasah for many villagers was such that it provided them with a self-image and self-esteem. Therefore, not surprisingly, opposition was raised in some areas against the government plan to open public schools in their villages. In some cases when public schools were high-handedly opened, they failed to attract pupils being kept away by their parents who preferred them to attend the madrasah. Different methods then were adopted by the authorities to overcome the problem. It was not uncommon to find that the authorities forced some parents to send their children to, and induced the madrasah to share pupils with, the public schools. When the ulama who run the madrasahs were influential, persuasion was carried out in order to win their support for the public school. Confronted by such developments, a few madrasahs which formerly opened in the

morning have added to their curriculum a list of general subjects in order to retain those children who want to gain access to general instruction. In Pamekasan such novel madrasahs (*Madrasah Ibtidaiyah* or *MI*) have been unable to compete effectively with the public schools. Yet their religious instruction has been regarded as insufficient since a great part of their schedule is arranged to provide instruction in general subjects.⁴⁴ The majority of madrasahs, however, have maintained their original religious curriculum. Since these madrasahs open their classes in the afternoon, accommodation for the public schools has been easily managed. With the spread of the public schools to villages children may attend school in the morning and go to the madrasah in the afternoon.

The organization of village madrasahs is sponsored by local religious leaders. When a langgar, independent or attached to a mosque, attracts more children, the mak kaeh or imam attempts to accommodate them in a more reasonable place. The langgar is renovated and enlarged. Ulama who have long educational experience in the pondok may open regular classes for children in their langgar and tanean. Parents who observe the ulama's effort will willingly support the construction of a permanent building for the madrasah. Yet an ulama will never give up his exclusive rights over the madrasah establishment and organization. As we saw in Chapter 9, this independence is partly achieved by the ulama when he overtly avoids requesting direct help from villagers. Since villagers' contributions are never formally called for, and thus are voluntary in origin, the ulama appears to be autonomous, and yet needed, in the local setting. Indeed, in cases when labor is needed, the ulama is conventionally justified in accordance with the village principle of *jak-ngajak*. The religious conviction of the high value of a contribution (*'amal shalih* or *shadaqah jariyah*) for individual salvation is widely held. The ulama never fail to hail an Islamic tradition addressed to the Prophet Muhammad which stresses this point.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ For a further discussion about the dilemmas faced by such educational institutions as the MI in the broader context see my article (Mansurnoor in press).

⁴⁵ See Muslim, *Shahih Muslim*, Bāb al-washīyah #14, the Prophet said, "When a man dies all his deeds are terminated [in terms of reward] except three aspects a

Nevertheless, we should not ignore the subtle mode of communication between villagers and ulama. In other words, although the ulama avoid overt requests, villagers readily understand that they are expected to make individual efforts to help the ulama. In order to convince his fellow villagers a local ulama thus has to prove his commitment to the public interest, including religious guidance and education, as well as his capacity to provide facilities, at least in embryonic form, for such purposes. I have shown how a mosque imam in Teja was able to open a secondary madrasah with full support of the population (see Chapter 3). Not surprisingly, an ambitious village ulama who wants to run a madrasah comes from among better-off villagers.

The teachers at village madrasahs are recruited from the village ulama's associates. Since a madrasah is generally an offshoot of the mosque or langgar raja, the village ulama remains the archetypal and permanent teacher. He is often seen teaching children from more than one class concomitantly, particularly in the period of the early foundation of regular classes. A village ulama can no longer ask his assistants in the langgar to teach children in the madrasah. He has to find some villagers who have some pondok background. His ability to rally mass support for the madrasah foundation is itself an indication of his popularity, irrespective of whether he is an imam of the village mosque or not. Interestingly, those non-mosque ulama (i.e. mak kaehs) who succeed in building madrasahs emerge to rival the established mosque imams.

Teachers are first recruited among young mak kaehs in the village. When they are not available, pondok graduates are included. Such an arrangement is sociologically significant. The mak kaeh or imam is able to show to his followers the extent of his authority over other fellow mak kaehs. The arrangement also widens the attraction of his madrasah. Furthermore, the scarcity of funds to maintain the organization of

beneficial offer (*shadaqah jāriyah*), knowledge which has positive impact or a good-mannered child who prays for him [the dead parent]. Cairo: M.A. Shabih wa aulāduh, n.d., 573.

and instruction in the madrasah has perpetuated such an arrangement. Since the imams, mak kaehs and pondok graduates generally secure sufficient income elsewhere, their teaching in the madrasah is done more to enhance their prestige and to fulfill public expectation than to earn additional income. They receive a limited monthly payment as a token. Most of the sum is acquired from small tuition fees paid by the pupils. In villages a pupil pays between Rp50 to Rp150 per month, depending on the local economic situation. But when villagers submit their annual religious alms (zakat) to the village ulama who owns the madrasah, a portion of this amount is distributed to the madrasah teachers. In view of the meagre financial reward for madrasah teachers, they seem to have compensation in terms of social respect and religious expectation. Indirectly this helps them to pursue many of their personal interests. For instance, a madrasah teacher who opens a shop will easily attract neighbors and other villagers.

When a village ulama cannot find enough teachers in his locality he may contact a pondok kyai, usually a former teacher, to ask for help. If the madrasah is not far from the pondok, the kyai will send some senior santris to teach, but they continue to live in the pondok, whereas if the madrasah is located in distant area, the kyai will carefully assign santris who have studied in the pondok for years to go to the village. In order to provide such santris with prospects in the village, marriage with local women is commonly arranged for them. Nonetheless, the madrasahs, which include at least 70% of general subjects in their curriculum in accordance with the government's guidance, may apply for teaching assistance from the Department of Religious Affairs. In the last few years, the Depag in cooperation with UNICEF have allocated funds and aid in order to improve the facilities and instruction for a number of such madrasahs (MIs) in Madura. Yet the present minister of the Depag has discouraged the MI in favor of regular madrasahs. For, as he claims, the dwindling number of religious experts in the society can be stopped only by reviving the original madrasahs (personal communication; cf. *Pelita* January 17 1986 viii).

Graduates of the madrasah are not equipped to join the public school. However,

since village children who join the madrasah also go to the elementary school in the morning, a few continue their higher study in the public school by virtue of education at the elementary school (SD). Children who finish their education at the madrasah have an adequate background for joining a pondok. Since most parents cannot support their children to pursue higher education either at a pondok or a public school, only a few can afford to go to the pondok. Children who receive religious instruction at village madrasahs have certain advantages upon joining the pondok. They are given tests to determine at which level they may join in the pondok regular classes. Most pondoks do not formally recognize certificates issued by village madrasahs. Each santri who wants to join a regular class at a pondok has to show satisfactory results for his educational level. The admission thus is strictly based on individual competence.

On the other hand, the general madrasahs (MIs) which are recognized by the Depag are able to send graduates to secondary public school, even though the government recently issued a new regulation that requires such graduates to take specific exams if they want to be considered equal with SD graduates. Moreover, the Depag also gives the opportunity for pupils at any madrasah to get the formal certificate which allows them to go to some government school or to secure a public position through specific general examinations. Since the exams include subjects that have never been taught at the regular madrasah, not surprisingly only a few pass the exams. For example, during the government exams held for elementary madrasah pupils in Bettet in 1984 only six out of 16 pupils passed the exams. Indeed, prior to their study at the pondok, these six had joined the SD or MI in their respective villages, but they never finished. In the past, particularly during the 1960's, many madrasah and pondok graduates were recruited as religious teachers (guru UGA) at the SD and other elementary educational institutions.

The main attraction of the village madrasah, however, comes from its provision of necessary religious knowledge, values, guidance and general religious doctrine for average villagers. The centrality of fekih (Islamic law) as a subject at the madrasah

shows the degree of attention given to graduate pupils who are expected to know how to behave in a ritually correct manner. Despite the fact that pupils study Arabic texts from a quite early stage of their six-year program, they are expected to be able to read only the texts they are taught. There are two obvious reasons for this. First, the text is directly translated into the vernacular in a word by word process by continuously noting its syntactic significance. Second, pupils are taught that transmission of religious knowledge, especially the reading of a text, should be guided directly by authoritative scholars/kyais. Without such a guide, they may go astray or get confused. Thus an authorized ulama should supervise the reading of both new and already familiar texts (cf. Masud 1984, in his analysis of the mufti in South Asia). Indeed, the madrasah perpetuates the inward-looking orientation as it grooms individuals who respect well-known religious authorities, regardless of boundaries and even nationalities. Yet such allegiance also undermines, to an extent, the villagers' parochial view of social and political spheres.

Pondok education

Higher ulama provide santris with advanced religious education at the pondok. Yet as locally based religious functionaries, kyais also open classes at the elementary level. It should be remembered, however, that no correlation necessarily exists between the foundation of a pondok and the organization of an elementary madrasah. A brief note is needed to show the interdependence between locally based ulama and elementary education.

Elementary level. The provision of elementary education for local children is indispensable for the position of a mak kaeh. Ideologically, such education is central in the maintenance of a religious tradition which fits with the mak kaeh's and the society's vision. Instructed under such a fixed system, children are expected to accept the religious status quo. Indeed, village children, like their parents, remain the backbone of a mak kaeh's followers. Sociologically, the religious education for villagers perpetuates the interdependence between villagers and local ulama. Because they instruct children in religion which becomes a way of life and the hope for salvation, the ulama

are seen as guides and protectors of the local population. Since local villagers are the closest neighbors and followers of a mak kaeh, both parties are continuously brought together through exchange and services including education. Unlike transient outsiders and santris who study at the pondok, most village children will remain in the neighboring villages. Thus education for local children is a necessary investment for the survival of mak kaehs.

On the other hand, higher ulama (kyaïs) who attract supralocal santris into their pondoks are less dependent on such local following. Indeed, many higher ulama fully depend on the support of supralocal santris and followers. Such kyaïs either deliver advanced text-reading sessions (*pengajian kitabs*), open regular classes at the secondary level, or provide visitors with advice, amulets for invincibility and medicines. Because of the advanced nature of education and the wider scope of attraction, most of the local children, santris and villagers are not able to take full advantage of the higher religious education. More specifically, to have access to such higher ulama and their institutions requires courage, preparation and material support. This does not mean that no higher ulama are directly involved and concerned with their immediate neighbors and villagers. Evidently, a large number of higher ulama or kyaïs who succeed their parents in running religious institutions are closely tied with a local setting as they open religious services and education for neighboring villagers. And the first-generation kyaïs concentrate on attracting supravillage santris instead of providing local children with elementary religious education. This can be seen in the newly established pondoks led by the newly settled kyaïs such as Syarki of Panempan, Husni of Bermanis and Karrar of Lenteng. Unlike local mak kaehs, kyaïs have a strong outward-looking worldview, as they expect a diverse and wide following. Yet when kyaïs achieve supralocal fame, they soon realize that they are part of the local setting. For this reason second-generation kyaïs and their successors also assume the position of local religious leaders both as functionaries and educators. In addition, it is also possible that the newly settled, first-generation, kyaïs intentionally avoid the competition of local ulama by not admitting the latter's pupils at least at a preliminary stage.

Nevertheless, regular classes for children at the pondok are designed to prepare children to pursue higher religious education. Unlike the village madrasah, a pondok madrasah is staffed mainly by senior santris who reside in the pondok. This has a strong impact on the orientation of the instruction within the pondok madrasah. The easy access of such teachers to the madrasah location results in more regular and better organized classes. Since the teachers are selected by the kyai from among first-class senior santris, they enjoy a good reputation among the pupils and villagers. Again, the presence of such a strong figure as a kyai imposes certain moral pressure on the teachers to do their job as best they can. Unlike classes at the village madrasahs, classes at the pondok are generally taught according to a strict schedule. In fact, the easy availability of teaching staff at the pondok creates a strong competition among incumbent teachers, even though they do not enjoy direct material reward. Furthermore, the identification of a pondok with advanced religious study and text reading (*pengajian kitab*) exerts a strong bias upon the education it offers. Rote learning remains a central feature of education at the pondok, particularly in the first two years of elementary madrasah. But the fact remains that from quite an early stage pupils are requested to understand an Arabic text through a unique pondok style of translation.⁴⁶ In a pondok, including its madrasahs, this endeavor is pursued by direct reading of Arabic texts and by mastering Arabic grammar, which is again taught in Arabic.

The learning of the Arabic language proper is not seriously attempted and not much appreciated.⁴⁷ This is especially true since the manuals for learning Arabic are

⁴⁶ The text is directly translated into the vernacular in a word by word process (see below). The uniqueness of pondok education in Java has been described in detail by Z. Dhofier (1980; see also Geertz 1960b; Prasodjo *et al* 1974; and cf. Eickelman 1978, 1985, in his analysis of traditional religious education in Morocco). Pondok in Madura use a similar style; however, instead of Javanese, Madurese is adopted as the vernacular language of translation and instruction.

⁴⁷ In the last few years two pondoks in the eastern part of Madura have organized classes which teach santris how to speak, read and write Arabic and even English actively parallel to what has taken place in several pondoks in other parts of Indonesia such as Gontor, Bangil and Padang Panjang. Moreover, it should be mentioned in passing that two pondoks in the eastern part of Madura

generally unrelated to religious subjects, let alone the *fekih*. Among pupils at the *madrasah*, the study of Arabic grammar is regarded as the most difficult task. This is not surprising since pupils who hardly understand Arabic phrases are taught to learn by heart and understand usages and rules of Arabic grammar as it appears in the dense rhymed forms such as are found in the *Ajrūmīyah*, *Imritī* or *Alfiyah* of Ibn Mālik.⁴⁸ Yet the strict transmission of the meaning of the Arabic texts perpetuates the uniformity of the understanding and the religious view. It is possible that the difficult and complicated way of studying Arabic grammar has served as an alternative field of inquiry for some innovative pupils to pursue their intellectual quest. For this reason pupils who complete a six-year program at the *pondok-madrasah* remain illiterate in respect of Arabic texts, even though they know much about ritual and law as well as learn by heart diverse prayers, Qur'anic verses and the rules of Arabic grammar. To understand the difficult adaptation of regular classes into the *pondok* structure, it is instructive to observe the introduction of such classes into the *pondok*.

In Pamekasan regular classes were introduced into the *pondok* around the late 1930's. This was achieved, as we saw in Chapter 8, in conjunction with the foundation of NU branches in the area. In response to the call of NU leaders who were occupied with improving their countrified image (*golongan kolot*) by reorganizing their religious education, NU supporters in Pamekasan opened a *madrasah* in the town. The director was chosen from among teachers at the NU bastion, Tebuireng *pondok*, in East Java. Many sons of *ulama* were sent to the *madrasah*. Upon the completion of their courses at the *madrasah*, some of them introduced regular classes into their *pondoks*. Again, many *ulama* were interested in bringing novelty to their institutions. Because of the lack of full information about the organization of and instruction

have opened sessions for tertiary religious education.

⁴⁸ *Kitāb al-Ajrūmīyah* is composed by Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Dāwud al-Shanhājī (d. 723H/1321).

The author of *Kitāb al-Imritī* or *al-Durrah al-Bahīyah* is Syaraf ibn Yahya ibn Abī al-Khair al-Anshārī al-Imritī (written in 976H/1569). It is a collection of glosses about and a commentary on *Kitāb al-Ajrūmīyah*.

Alfiyah was written by Abū 'Abdillāh Muḥammad ibn 'Abdullāh al-Thā'ī, popularly known as Ibn Mālik (d. 672H/1273) (see van den Berg 1886:533-5).

within such madrasahs, many ulama simply opened madrasahs without actually changing the instruction at their pondok. This was achieved, according to my informants, as senior santris were formally assigned to read basic texts for junior santris on a more regular basis and within organized groups. These early pondok-madrasahs, therefore, did not accommodate village children who had not completed basic religious instruction at the langgar raja. Again, the association of learning with close attachment to the persons of kyais required students to reside within the pondok. The epithet of santri was given specifically to those who studied and lived with the kyai. Neighboring villagers who had studied under the kyai but failed to live in the pondok were regarded as incomplete disciples (*santri nyolok*).

With the popularity of public schools in many villages, particularly after independence, and the continuing reform of pondok instruction, however, the pondok-madrasah has gradually admitted village children into its classes. The rationale behind such a development was probably the search for accommodation between the domain of the local mak kaehs and the pondok's interference in local affairs resulting from its renewal. Once the mak kaehs were assured of their share of child education at their langgars, the absorption of children into the madrasah for higher levels of religious education seems to have been achieved without a serious crisis. Such a delicate arrangement was central in maintaining the independence and at the same time the cooperation among religious leaders in villages, even among different ranks. Since madrasahs at the pondok have such a tradition and origin, they generally continue to reflect the degree of their owner's sophistication, erudition and outward-looking disposition. Different ministers of the Depag have attempted to stimulate the pondok owners to improve, if not reform, the educational system at their pondoks. In response, many pondoks did absorb many facets of the new program. But they have been superficially adopted without replacing the old pattern of curriculum and instruction.

Table 10.1: Distribution of male students by grades and origin in the pondok-madrasah in Bettet (elementary level) for 1984-1985 session


Grade	No. of Resident santris	%	No. of Village pupils	%	Total
I	4	3,3	116	96,7	120
II	12	11,3	94	88,7	106
III	54	43,5	70	56,5	124
IV	77	64,7	42	35,3	119
V	58	65,2	31	34,8	89
VI	85	87,6	12	12,4	97
Total	290	44.2	365	55.8	655

The pondok-madrasah attracts fewer village children as its classes go higher. As can be seen in Table 10.1, the percentage of residential santris at Bettet madrasah increases steadily at higher classes. Several factors have brought about such a phenomenon. Indeed, a large number of village children drop from the madrasah as they finish Grade 3, because they have to help their families. The withdrawal from the madrasah is relatively easily done because the instruction becomes irrelevant to the villagers' simple, popular understanding of Islam. Again, the heavy demand for concentration and for meeting assignments put most village children in a difficult position especially since they have very limited time to review their lessons at home. Village children's occupation with the family's work and with schooling and religious sessions at the langgar raja prevent them from having enough time to prepare themselves for the madrasah classes (cf. Eickelman 1985, particularly 161-71, on his analysis of nearly the same phenomenon in the Moroccan context). On the other hand, the santris have ample opportunity to study. They are free from the family's affairs, and most of them do not attend the public school. Moreover, the santris are in a better position since they have easy access to a tutor and can have extra sessions to improve their knowledge of Arabic texts. The family's support and the santri's expectation of pondok education enhance the latter's opportunity of pursuing higher education at the pondok. Not surprisingly, village children are fewer in the higher classes of the pondok-madrasah as instruction is designed more to prepare santris to pursue a higher level of religious education at the pondok proper.

The organization of a pondok-madrasah is formally assigned to a board of senior santri, but in practice major decisions are made by the kyai. For instance, the kyai has the final decision about the opening and ending of the school year, the inclusion of new texts/subjects into the classes and the allocation of funds derived from tuition fees. Most pondok-madrasahs start the school year in the month of Syawwal directly after the fasting month of Ramadhan. Since they are in many respects independent from the public schools which start the school year in July, such an arrangement does not create a serious problem in terms of transfer from or to such schools. Yet the growing popularity and spread of public schools in villages with their morning session limits the opening of the madrasah to afternoons. Interestingly village children who want to attend the elementary classes at the pondok-madrasah can take care of themselves without being accompanied by their parents. Unlike the instruction in the langgar raja, parents are not required to submit their children personally to the kyai or ustadz of the madrasah. Thus a child usually joins the madrasah in the company of senior neighbors who have already studied in the madrasah.⁴⁹ The class teacher is thus responsible to register his new students. Insignificant monthly fees are submitted to the class teacher. The fees are collected by the treasurer of the pondok-madrasah. The greater part of the fees is used to provide the teachers with a token monthly reward. The treasurer is responsible to the kyai as the former reports monthly to the kyai about the balance of his account. When the treasurer secures a considerable surplus, it may be requested by the kyai to be used for various pondok projects such as renovation, a new building or equipment. The routine supplies for the office and madrasah such as chalk, books, papers, pens and coffee are funded by the collected fees.

⁴⁹ For students who want to stay in a pondok, however, their registration and submission by their parents or guardians in front of the pondok owner (the kyai) is indispensable. Perhaps the fact that a santri becomes a full resident in the pondok induces the parents to request the kyai's explicit readiness to instruct their children with complete education religiously and socially.

Figure 10.1 Levels of education at the pondok in comparison with the public school and other religious educational institutions



Secondary level. The kyais have resources to open secondary-level madrasahs. The original design of religious education at the pondok is closer to the character of a secondary madrasah (see Figure 10.1). For this reason a secondary madrasah at the pondok often accommodates the greater part of the kyai's kitab sessions. In other words, the secondary madrasah is designed to instruct junior santris who traditionally join the kyai's session without having enough background to follow the instruction. The secondary madrasah, to some extent, improves the quality of instruction, provides santris with more sessions, systematizes the level of education, and gives the kyai ample time to pursue diverse activities as he limits his sessions only to a group of senior santris (see below). More specifically, the secondary madrasah is an ideal place for a limited number of senior santris and junior ulama to practice their future profession by teaching.

The kyais obviously have no major problem in supplying the secondary madrasah with religious teachers. In Pamekasan the introduction of a secondary madrasah to

the pondok, however, never materialized until the 1960's. One possible explanation, as expressed by the kyai of Bettet, is that the pondoks were until that period intended to serve villagers in learning the basic teaching of Islam. A graded system of education was never seen as relevant to such a scheme. When government demand for religious teachers increased as the government's institutions specifically designed for this task fell short of expectations, many kyais responded by opening graded madrasahs at the pondoks, so that santris could finish their instruction in a limited period of time as well as secure a certificate. Indeed, the foundation of government schools for religious teacher training (PGA) and other graded schools, and the value and necessity of certificates for securing diverse jobs induced religious leaders to reorganize their educational institutions.

The kyais, however, have been faced with the dilemma of how to bring general subjects into the pondok. Not only did they not have teachers for such subjects, they have ignored many such studies. Even when such general studies were introduced to the pondok, they were superficially taught. The santris regarded them as unimportant in the context of pondok education, a point which I shall elaborate shortly. A kyai, of course, had an important role to play under such conditions. His indifference toward the issue perpetuated the inadequacy of the instruction in general subjects at the pondok. This attitude is one expression of the kyai's attempt to preserve his independence. Without having his own men to teach the subjects, a kyai may feel uneasy about succumbing to unknown outsiders. The admission of external teachers to the pondok thus has to be controlled. They are allowed to teach, but santris are not expected to give them much importance. Thus, the graded education system at the pondok had problems from its very foundation, notwithstanding its spread and popularity.

Secondary madrasahs at the pondok are still experiencing a transformation. They have been developing, looking for an acceptable, yet popular form. The strong identification of the madrasah with the pondok system has had a negative impact on its quick adaptation to new trends elsewhere. Since a local certificate is not recognized

by any public institution, secondary pondok-madrasahs, as private institutions, have to send their students to sit for government exams in order to acquire the official certificate. In view of the superficial instruction in the general subjects, madrasah students encounter a difficult time attempting the exams on these subjects, even though they excel in most religious subjects. Yet many santris do not care whether they secure a certificate or not. They argue that in their villages they will not be asked to show certificates to provide services for the population. The most important requirements to serve the society, they claim, are religious knowledge and moral credibility.

On the other hand, some santris are interested in joining public institutions. Without proper instruction in the general sciences, however, they have little chance to attain their goal. Indeed, the enticement of increasingly lucrative and stable government jobs has a strong influence on santris' critical view of their own educational achievement, albeit narrowly understood. This development is novel in the pondok tradition (see Appendix I, especially on the section which discourages association with the power holder, the *sulthān*. Cf. Gilmartin 1979, Robinson 1980, and Metcalf 1982, on their discussion of the men of learning in South Asia). Santris have not been specifically prepared to find an occupation. A job has been seen as a reward for one's perseverance, dedication, knowledge and piety. Although some kyais, as we shall see, have accepted the modern challenge by adopting the new educational system, most kyais in Pamekasan still believe that their future depends primarily on their original institution, the pondok system. This does not mean that change has not been brought into the pondoks. Several changes have been introduced, but they are kept to a level that suits the society's understanding and expectation and that does not create imbalance in the independent image of the kyais. Moreover, the kyais have avoided imposing instruction in certain subjects on the santris, as santris were originally free to join any session they prefer. This freedom of choice seems to be a vital feature of pondok tradition which explains the difficulty of introducing general subjects into the pondok system. Let us examine how the secondary madrasah at Bettet pondok is managed.

The secondary madrasah at Bettet remains a show-case institution for the real pondok. The secondary madrasah was opened in 1964. Since then the students have been drawn from resident santris at the pondok. This indicates that the madrasah was designed primarily to accomodate the santris. The heavy emphasis on the study of Arabic texts naturally excludes any applicant who lacks intensive pondok training. The madrasah has received government aid in the form of teachers, equipment and training. In return, it formally has adopted the main syllabus prepared by the Depag, which is used in government Islamic schools such as PGA and MTs. Generally speaking one half of each class session is devoted to general subjects. The four teachers provided by the government are assigned to instruct in these subjects.

Santris continue to pay little attention to the general subjects. Several factors seem to have perpetuated such a tendency. In view of the teachers' lack of sophistication in the subjects, their instruction is inadequate. The external background of the teachers who went to non-pondok institutions has been a strong factor in disqualifying them as teachers in the pondok. More important, the santris believe that general subjects have nothing to do with the religious goal. Not surprisingly, they hold these subjects in very low esteem, if not implicit disdain. Again, the leaders of the pondok show no unambiguous support for the dissemination of general sciences in their compounds. Nevertheless, the increasing availability of domestic senior santris who finish higher public education may modify the peripheral position of general sciences at the pondok. These educated senior santris, in the first place, secure legitimacy to teach their fellow santris by virtue of their religious knowledge and affiliation with the pondok. Having grown up in the same atmosphere, such educated santris know better how to deliver instruction and what aspects and topics of the general sciences may be taught to their fellows. The problems remain, however, that the material and presentation of non-religious subjects are dull for students. The material is not arranged in such a way as to make the subjects interesting and relevant to the santris and their world.

On the other hand, the teaching of religious subjects follows the pattern of the original pondok system (see below). The focus is on preparing students to master the accepted way of understanding religious texts. Unlike the pondok system, the santris are seated at desks, take exams, and follow a strict schedule. Thus the madrasah system is a more effective means of producing religious experts. Yet the monotonous style of instruction in which a text is read and translated with occasional interpretations is so influential on students that they cannot appreciate the other methods commonly used by teachers of general subjects. Indeed, the pondok maintains a textual approach to study with emphasis on memorization and repetition as opposed to a new approach with emphasis on comprehension and discussion. The idea that the authorized religious texts (*kitab koneng*) are the only source of legitimate and true knowledge has a negative impact on the students' view of lessons, especially general subjects, delivered through lectures and exercises. Despite the obvious changes of curriculum, organized classes, a definite schedule and adequate school buildings, the secondary madrasah connected with a pondok remains an expansion of the original pondok system.

Classes at the secondary madrasah are instructed by different teachers according to their specialties. This is in contrast with elementary classes where permanent teachers (*guru kelas*) provide the pupils with all assigned subjects. The total study period per day is five hours including breaks. The classes start at 7 00 and end at 12 00. The madrasah is open six days a week from Saturday to Thursday. At present, the chairman of the secondary madrasah in Bettet is one of the four government teachers sent by the Depag. But he has little say in the actual organization of the madrasah, even though his appointment represents a significant gesture from the kyais toward the government, a point to which I shall return in Chapter 13. Two of the four government teachers are graduates of the State Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN), majoring in religious education. One of them is also a senior santri in Bettet. The remaining teachers come from the junior ulama and selected senior santris, some of whom have already settled elsewhere with their families. Interestingly two of

these senior santris (ustadztes) have become successful entrepreneurs dealing with tobacco and oranges. Their teaching in Bettet thus is more a matter of dedication and prestige than a profession, particularly in view of the inadequacy of their monthly salaries even to buy gasoline for their cars. Again, one of the ustadztes is an IAIN graduate.

Table 10.2 Origin and background of students at the Secondary Madrasah in Bettet for 1984-1985 session

Place of origin	No	%	Parent's Occupation	No	%	Background	No	%
Surrounding villages	9	6.1	Ordinary peasant	96	64.8	Lay villager	74	50.0
Areas in Pamekasan	58	39.2	Trader/Peddler	45	30.4	Mak kaeh/imam	28	18.9
Outside Pamekasan	49	33.1	Government employee	6	4.1	Haji	34	23.0
Outside the island	32	21.6	Army	1	0.7	Kyai	12	8.1
Total	148	100		148	100		148	100

Table 10.3 Origin and background of the new santris in the pondok of Bettet in the beginning of 1984-1985 session (the month of Syawwal 1404)

Place of origin	No.	Age	No	Parent's occupation	No	Background	No
Surrounding villages	2	10-13	18	Ordinary peasant	54	Lay villager	58
Areas in Pamekasan	40	13-16	42	Trader/peddler	22	Mak kaeh/imam	9
Outside Pamekasan	21	16-18	17	Government employee	1	Haji	8
Outside the island	14			Army	-	Kyai	2
Total	77		77		77		77

Students at the secondary madrasah come from different regions. They live in the

pondok. A few students who come from the surrounding villages also join the pondok as resident santris. As can be seen in Table 10.2, the secondary students for the 1984-1985 session come from diverse family backgrounds. Only a few are actually expected to succeed their parents as religious functionaries. Santris who come from cities like Surabaya, Malang and Jakarta are sons of Madurese migrants who are involved in purely economic activities. The sending of their sons to a pondok in Pamekasan is related more to cultivating and maintaining prestige, tradition and religion as well as to securing cheap but safe education, than to preparing their sons as religious functionaries in the city. This is especially so if we observe that upon their return to the city the santris continue the occupation of the family. But their strong religious background is an important asset for their reputation in the community. As we saw in Table 10.1, the percentage of the pupils from the neighboring villages decreases at the elementary madrasah as the classes go higher, whereas at the secondary madrasah their number is very low. Only two students come from Bettet proper. Evidently villagers who want to pursue higher education prefer to go to public schools. As already observed in Chapter 6, the easy access to the elementary public school in the villages encourages many to pursue general education. More important, the prospect of finding better employment for public school graduates increasingly becomes influential among villagers.

In view of the diverse origins of the santris (Tables 10.2 and 10.3), it is no wonder the secondary madrasah still gathers a significant number of students. But it is clear that the ratio of students per village is low. Although we cannot claim that santris have been declining in real numbers, in view of the strong attraction of secondary public schools even in rural locations it is possible that the percentage of santris relative to students of all secondary schools is declining. This becomes clearer if we discern that the age of santris at the secondary madrasah is between 15 and 26, too old for the average secondary student (Figure 10.1). Because many candidates have to repeat the elementary education at the pondok-madrasah, they spend a longer time to complete their education. For santris who decide to pursue a religious career their extended stay in the pondok

does not bother them. Anyway they cannot perform their religious role unless they are mature. Again, being a senior santri is a good situation in which to get an offer for marrying a woman from a well-off family. For others who have been engaged to a girl (*abakalan*), studying at the pondok is a period of waiting and maturing.

General classes at the pondok

In the last few years a number of kyais have opened general classes congruent with secondary public schools (SMP/SMA) in their pondoks. The spread of new elementary public schools into villages since the second half of the 1970's has created graduates who have to be accommodated. Since many of them are not interested in furthering religious study at the madrasah while at the same time their parents cannot afford to send them to the town, they remain idle at home.

In response to such developments a number of kyais have planned to open general secondary schools. These schools admit primarily graduates of the elementary public school (SD) and the Madrasah Ibtidaiyah (MI). The school prepares students to join higher educational institutions, colleges or universities. The first secondary school in a pondok was established by Kyai Mudasir of Panyeppe in 1980. Since he had no available santri who could adequately teach general subjects, he secured the cooperation of a nationalist educational foundation in the town which had agreed to supply teachers. Mudasir's decision was controversial as he introduced glaring novelty into the pondok and cooperated with a well-known secular organization, other kyais did criticize his innovation. At the opening of the school no less than 30 students were enrolled. More than half came from among resident santris. Since the santris came mostly from other areas, the school, in fact, failed to attract a high number of neighboring children. The reasons, as many senior santris suggested, were the failure of the school to maintain stable and well-structured instruction, the foundation of a government secondary school (SMP) in the area as well as the low interest among villagers in sending their children for higher education. Despite the unpopularity of the school, it continues to operate and to attract between 20 and 30 new students every

year. Furthermore, Mudasir's controversial initiative has inspired many other fellow kyais such as Husni Amir, Karim and Fadali to open general classes in their respective pondoks. In fact, within their own vision of change and challenge the ulama possess a way to approach the unfolding momentum. More significantly, the whole phenomenon induced the biggest ulama organization in the region, the NU, to open for the first time a senior secondary school (SMA) in the town.

The peripheral position of the lay politicians and organizers in the NU has affected its limited ability to show its presence in the town. As the organization with the largest following in the region, the NU has not independently run schools, hospitals or orphanages. Indeed, the preoccupation of its leaders, mostly ulama, with their own domestic affairs as local religious functionaries and pondok owners has absorbed most of their capacity and energy, weakening their support for any common program in the town or elsewhere. Furthermore, we cannot ignore the fact that most NU members have been satisfied with such a program and style of leadership. Nevertheless, since many villagers want to pursue higher levels of non-religious education, the NU leaders, particularly the non-ulama, want to respond to this trend by providing general, government-patterned schools. Starting from the 1985-1986 school year, the NU is organizing a senior secondary school (SMA) in the town of Pamekasan. In comparison with the smaller locally unpopular organizations such as Muhammadiyah, as I will show shortly, the NU is retarded and slow in this respect.

In Pamekasan Muhammadiyah has been far ahead of other Islamic organizations in organizing general classes, even though Muhammadiyah is not popular in the villages. The key success of Muhammadiyah has been its possession of sufficient and capable teachers. Because of its original reformist-literalist character it attracts urban followers, including the educated and teachers. Its criticism against total obedience towards the ulama has induced its leaders and organizers, especially in Pamekasan, to provide an alternative to well-imbedded pondok education. Muhammadiyah has run highly reputed junior secondary schools (SMPs) and a college of education for elementary school teachers (SPG) for quite some time. Its senior secondary school (SMA),

however, has remained undistinguished. Nonetheless, like many other private educational institutions in Indonesia, Muhammadiyah schools are challenged by the financially strong government institutions. Most qualified teachers prefer to become government employees (*pegawai negeri*) since the government provides them, at least during the last several years, with a stable and relatively high salary. Thus most private schools receive only extra services from such teachers, even though the opportunity gives them additional income. The schedule in private schools is arranged in order to give willing government teachers possibilities of teaching in their classes. Under such circumstances, not surprisingly, private schools have a hard time to achieve a reputation.

Be that as it may, private schools continue to provide many enthusiastic students with learning opportunities whatever their quality of instruction. It is difficult to foresee what the prospects of private schools opened by the kyais or Muhammadiyah will be, but their position seems to depend on the degree of the government monopoly over resources and educational policies. Given a better opportunity to hire qualified teachers and to acquire adequate facilities, such private schools will contribute a lot to the betterment of new village generations and to the healthy and competitive nature of education in Indonesia. This is particularly so if we consider that such development will undermine the increasingly popular tendency among the school graduates to serve as *pegawai negeri*.

Advanced study at the pondok

The higher ulama are closely related to pondoks. During the nomination of the general chairman (*ra'is 'am*) of the consultative body (*Syuriyah*) of the central NU in 1981, for example, a leading religious figure was disqualified from candidacy primarily because he did not own a pondok (Machfoedz 1983:272). For an organization which overtly accepts the ulama as its leaders and guides, this event is significant, irrespective its political context, since it mirrors the popular view about the strong ties between the pondok and ulama/kyai. Indeed, the relation with a pondok becomes an explicit factor that distinguishes the kyai from the lower ulama (imam,

ustadz and mak kaeh). In order to explain this relationship I will discuss the role of the pondok in providing the kyai with the prestige which is central for his religious and social position among villagers.

The kyai provides the resident santris with advanced instruction at the pondok. This service clearly exalts the kyai above the village ulama. Although at times it is more the person of a kyai than his actual religious instruction and erudition that attracts supralocal followers, a kyai's sophistication in teaching remains generally vital for his organization of the pondok. Obviously some kyais use their pondoks as camps for Sufi adepts and as centers for dispensing medication or delivering amulets and formulae of invincibility, but generally a pondok is used to instruct santris in advanced religious studies. In Pamekasan, the kyais hold text-reading sessions (*pengajian kitabs*) specifically for senior resident santris. On certain occasions, the kyais deliver religious sessions either for a general audience or for particular participants, usually non-resident santris, who request the kyais to instruct them in specific texts. For instance, the kyai of Bettet provided the public with a morning session each Friday and Tuesday, whereas a group of senior santris from Bettet went out once a week to get instruction in logic (*manthiq*) and rhetoric (*balāghah*) from the kyai of Panempun and, previously, instruction in Sufism (*tashawwuf*) from the kyai of Garsempal in Sampang. Although mobile santris emerge from time to time, the kyais are surrounded by resident students.

Santris at the pondok. Living in a place away from the family, the santris are expected to manage their daily life on their own. They ideally do their own cooking, washing, and cleaning by themselves. Although santris live in a pondok room within a group of three to as many as twenty, depending on the capacity of the room, daily house cleaning is almost left to individual good will. In many cases the rooms are only places for santris to keep their belongings as they study, sleep and chat elsewhere in the pondok. In recent years most pondoks have semi-cafetarias which provide santris with meals and coffee. In areas where a pondok is located close to village settlements, villagers also sell food for santris. As a result, many santris do not cook

for themselves, even though at times they may join their colleagues who prepare food at the pondok.

The participation of santris in various pondok activities such as regular prayers, classes, kitab sessions and discussions requires them to be disciplined and regular. Although the senior santris continue to function as guides, santris in general experience a certain freedom to manage themselves within the limited context of the pondok's life. Since all santris have similar duties in the pondok, they exercise the same responsibility to manage themselves. Such responsibility creates among them the view of a mature person, as they conduct relations among fellows and pondok institutions on their own account. This aspect of santris' life seems to be central in the confidence they have in themselves as independent persons and in the continuing attraction of the pondok itself for santris. A pondok is an ideal place for village children to assume independence and gain confidence.

In a pondok, santris live together with their acquaintances. They are generally housed in accordance with their place of origin. In small pondoks which attract santris from surrounding villages, the santris may live together among their fellow villagers. In bigger pondoks where santris come from different areas and cities, the santris settle together with their parochial fellows. In Bettet, for example, the santris who come from Surabaya live together in Building C and those from Sampang in Building B, even though there are several other santris from different regions who have settled in their proximity. Santris who come as a minority group may join the prevailing groupings of their choice. In fact, a couple of santris who come from Jember live together with santris from East Pamekasan. Such an arrangement is a result of the historical development of the pondok buildings.

Although the kyai is the owner of the pondok, many residential buildings in the pondok are built by the santris through their own efforts and often their own funds. In some cases santris who come from the same area raise funds from their fellow villagers to erect a building in the pondok. They, of course, have to get permission from

the kyai. For instance, santris who come from West Kalimantan built the most elegant edifice in the pondok of Kacok. The building is occupied by santris from that region. This local initiative undoubtedly encourages others to join the pondok. Yet even the original santris have no claim over the building, as they have to accommodate other santris when needed. After the arrival of new generations of santris, such a historical connection may be ignored, especially if santris who come from the same area as the pondok builders are insignificant in number. Since the pondok in reality belongs to the kyai, a novel justification can be easily made by the new occupants in order to acquire quasi-rights to stay in the building. This became evident when santris from Surabaya and Proppo in the pondok of Bettet renovated Building C shortly before the imtihan festival in 1984. Historically the modest pondok was built in the early 1960's by santris from the northern part of Pamekasan. In recent years the latter's number is declining, the building thus has been dominated by santris from Surabaya and Proppo. The renovation which was locally seen as expensive (Rp400,000) was able to legitimize the occupation and domination of santris from the two regions. Nevertheless, a few kyais prefer to mobilize funds in order to build permanent, uniform buildings for accommodating santris, as can be seen in the pondoks of Panyuppen, Ta-Bata and Panempan.

Study sessions at the pondok. The kyai delivers his lectures in the mosque or langgar. Despite the availability of classrooms in the madrasah, the kyai maintains the old style of instruction. He sits casually on the floor whereas the santris sit around him in order of scholarly achievement and seniority. Senior santris sit close to him. The kyai follows the *weton* system⁵⁰ as he reads, translates, and explains the text to the santris who check and mark their own texts. The reading of a text is carefully done according to a strict method of translation. Such a serious session is

⁵⁰ In the pondok there are generally two systems for reading texts: *weton* or *bandungan* and *sorogan*. The *weton* is adopted by a kyai to deliver his advanced lessons, in which he translates the text word by word and occasionally explains the sentences or contexts. Meanwhile each participant holds his own copy, and writes down the meaning of certain words and the kyai's glosses. The *sorogan* is used to instruct junior santris. The instructor reads the text and summarizes the meaning which is copied by santris.

occasionally broken by a smile and often laughter as the kyai cites topical daily examples in the santri world and the society in general to elaborate particular points. Santris do not raise any question during the session. Those who want to ask for explanations may see the kyai when the session is over.

The kyai provides the santris with regular text-reading sessions (*pengajian kitab*s). Most kyais in Pamekasan are well-versed in the Islamic law (*fekih*). The most widely taught texts are *Qurrat 'Ain*,⁵¹ *I'ānat al-Thālibīn*,⁵² and *Fath al-Wahhāb*.⁵³ A kyai usually holds his session in the morning or/and the evening except on Monday and Thursday nights and Fridays and Tuesdays.⁵⁴ On certain occasions a kyai may cancel a session (*pot*) on short notice, often when the santris have gathered in the *pengajian* location. A cancellation may be related to the coming of important visitors, family affairs and appointments.

In instructing the santris, the kyai uses certain texts for an indefinite period of time as he repeatedly completes the reading of the same texts. Yet many santris may attend such monotonous sessions for years. The rationale behind this is technical and ideological. Since the santris who attend the sessions are never formally evaluated, they never re-study the text unless they are interested in finding answers in the text related to particular problems or questions they encounter. Most santris open their text only during the session. Again, the weak mastery of Arabic forces the santris to attend repetitious sessions for years. Indeed, such sessions are the characteristic of the pondok method for familiarizing santris with Arabic, even though the *fekih* content remains the primary goal. Moreover, we should not neglect the centrality of the

⁵¹ It was written in 982H/1564 by Zainuddin ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz al-Malabari.

⁵² *I'ānat al-Thālibīn* is a commentary on *Qurrat 'Ain*. It was composed by Abū Bakr Syattā al-Dimyāthī, and was published in 1883 (see Snouck Hurgronje 1931:146, 188-9).

⁵³ *Fath al-Wahhāb* is a commentary on al-Rāfi'i's *al-Muharrar* written by Abū Zakariyā bin Muḥammad al-Anshārī (d. 926H/1521).

⁵⁴ The pattern of weekly breaks as followed by Madurese kyais is not much different from what Snouck Hurgronje observed at the Haram mosque of Mecca in the later part of the last century (Snouck Hurgronje 1931:180-1).

authorized transmission of religious knowledge among the ulama. They are proud and jealous of the correct teaching of Islam. As a result, santris regard their repetitive attendance at a kyai's sessions as a way to know exactly what the text means. The popular association of a kyai with barakah (blessing, power, or/and luck) induces many santris to stay longer in the pondok and to follow his sessions until the barakah, if possible, really materializes (see also Appendix I). For instance, a well-known senior santri who was offered marriage to a daughter of a wealthy Meccan pilgrim (haji) told me that such a match had been a realization of the kyai's barakah.

Since most santris cannot participate in the kyai's advanced sessions, outside their formal schooling the santris are assigned to other activities. The day at the pondok starts quite early in the morning before sunrise as the santris perform congregational prayers in the mosque.

In Bettet, for example, the santris prepare themselves to go to morning classes either at the pondok or elsewhere. A few santris who go to schools elsewhere wear trousers without a headcap. This is in contrast to their customary dress of *sarong* and *songkok* (black cap) in the pondok. Some junior santris who go only to afternoon classes remain in the pondok. Since senior santris do not attend the kyai's morning session until shortly before noon, they may assist some junior santris in certain subjects.

When the time for noon prayers arrives, all santris except those who go to schools outside the pondok have to gather in the mosque to perform collective prayers. Those who fail to comply, as with other pondok rules, face penalties ranging from beating to fines. Forty senior santris (ustadzes) are assigned to teach elementary classes at the madrasahs for girls and boys in the afternoon. Some are sent to teach at the madrasahs in the neighboring villages.

Following sunset santris gather in the mosque to perform Maghrib prayers collectively. This is compulsory for all santris. Following the prayers, they stay in the mosque to read the Qur'an for about an hour except for those senior santris who attend the kyai's evening session. Two senior santris supervise the Qur'anic reading.

especially to keep order since many young santri often use the occasion to talk among themselves, to take a nap or to make jokes. Most santri have their supper following this program. Although late evening prayers are led by the kyai at the mosque, santri are not obliged to attend. Less than half regularly participate in this occasion. The santri who join the kyai's prayers will never leave their seat until the kyai disappears from the mosque to enter his special room (*badunan*)⁵⁵ in the right (north) wing of the mosque. After the last prayers of the day, santri have to go to their class either to restudy their lessons or to get extra instruction. For less than two hours santri stay in their classes under the supervision of senior santri (*ustadzes*). The latter are assigned to help santri improve their knowledge and understand their lessons. Some young santri often spend most of their time on this occasion sleeping, although the supervisors wake them up from time to time. Those who get additional instruction, however, attentively follow the session. When the bell rings at 10 p.m. to indicate the end of the day's programs, santri cheer and run away from the classes.

The end of the formal program for the day in the pondok is also signified by turning off the generator which provides electricity for the pondok complex. Many santri spend their time together until late at night. To keep order and security a number of santri are appointed nightly as guards in three entrance spots around the pondok, and they ring the bell each hour from 12 p.m. until the time of the morning prayer (*Shubuh*).

Extra-curricular activities at the pondok. Despite the routine and seemingly monotonous life at the pondok, santri have their own ways to enjoy their days during breaks. Classes are closed on Fridays, and no religious session (*pengajian*) is offered on Thursday and Monday nights. Although santri have to secure formal permission from the pondok committee or from the kyai if they want to spend the night outside the pondok, santri may leave the pondok for some time so long as they fulfill their duties at the pondok. During market days (Sunday and Thursday) in the

⁵⁵ This room is used by the kyai to perform a variety of litanies and recommended prayers (*shalat sunnat*) prior or after the collective obligatory prayers (*shalat jama'ah*).

town, santris shop there. After the afternoon classes are over at around 5 p.m., some santris play sports such as volleyball, soccer or softball, others may go to the cross-roads nearby the pondok to take a walk and look at the traffic. After sunset santris are forbidden to wander except for those who have their supper at neighboring households. Watching movies at a theater is prohibited. When I talked to the ulama about this matter, they explained that movies *per se* were neutral, but to allow santris to spend their limited funds to go to a movie theater was dangerous. In addition, they said, certain movies had a negative influence on young santris. But with formal permission santris can join and watch religious feasts at other pondoks or neighboring areas. On Monday and Thursday nights when formal activities are reduced, santris may join voluntary groups which specialize in such activities as artistic recitation of the Qur'an (*seni baca al-Qur'an*), oratory (*pidato*) and vocational training (such as tailoring and typing). Musical groups are unknown in most pondoks in the region, even though individual ulama or santris may play musical instruments or even join musical groups outside the pondok. Radios, tape recorders and television are not allowed to be played in the complex. Yet some santris get access to such recreation at neighboring houses when they have their meals. In Bettet senior santris have their own afternoon resorts at a neighboring tanean where they can have meals and coffee and take rest. In some pondoks santris are strictly forbidden to eat or sleep at neighboring taneans. Since most pondoks in Pamekasan are isolated from village settlements, santris have limited access to neighboring villagers.

Before the end of the school year, santris organize a festivity (minor imtihan) which provides them with opportunity to compete among themselves in various fields including sports, oratory, Qur'anic recitation, reading texts and other intellectual exercises. Most competitions are organized on the basis of the santris' residential groupings (*daerah*) in the pondok. Put differently, individuals or groups are elected to represent their particular daerah in the pondok. I was surprised first when I saw individuals compete to show their ability to read and interpret certain texts according to the standard way. But when the ustadzes told me that such individuals were

1 elected by their own daerah to represent it, I accepted that this was still in accord with the *esprit de corps* (*jama'ah*) among santris. It is hard to imagine that individual santris would want to compete, for example, in reading texts on an individual basis. Yet when one is appointed or elected to represent his group, he willingly does his best. For days santris organize such a festival which attracts all the inhabitants of the pondok and the neighboring villagers. The classes and other regular sessions are formally closed before the fasting month of Ramadhan. Most junior santris spend their holidays with their parents, whereas, senior santris and a handful of other santris stay behind in the pondok primarily to study certain texts under the kyai and junior ulama.

PART FOUR. THE ULAMA AS LEADERS

Chapter Eleven

THE ULAMA'S NETWORK

The higher ulama derive their popularity and prominence among the Madurese from their network of colleagues, close supporters and assistants. In the past, when some kyais were closely associated with the *rato*, they established a formal religious network supported by the state, but their organization and network were never comparable to the closely knit hierarchical ulama of the Ottoman empire (Gibb and Bowen 1957; Inalcik 1964; Baer 1971, Repp 1972), nor to the well organized ulama of nineteenth century Tunisia (see Green 1978).

For quite some time the kyais in Madura have developed their own network of associates and supporters with great success. Horizontally¹ the kyais develop and maintain ties with colleagues and relatives through association, fraternity and kinship. Despite the threat of conflict because of parallel interests among themselves, such horizontal ties originally regulate quite well the field of one's activity zone. Vertically the kyais relate to supralocal figures and their subordinates primarily through personal acquaintance.

In recent years the various socio-religious organizations increasingly become an important channel for uniting the kyais' networks into a formal body; yet in practice the personal character of the relationship among kyais and other ulama pervades such a formal form since those organizations have sprung from the kyais' traditional network. We should keep in mind, however, that the ulama's network is informal and unstable. It demands continuous maintenance and renewal. This is so especially because the ulama's claim to superiority is due to their religious learning and moral conduct. In fact, the establishment of regular classes in the *pondok* contributes to stabilizing, if

¹ The term horizontal, as complementary to vertical, ties is used in this chapter to categorize relationships among the ulama who occupy *an equal hierarchical station*. Thus, for example, a kyai and his son-in-law who is also a kyai maintain horizontal ties of *ulamaship*.

not to eternalizing, such a foundation. Since the kyais occupy their position within the wide-ranging framework of the ideal and exemplary person, such regular learning may only serve as part of the mechanism to generate the kyais' network and position.

Ties among colleagues' horizontal networks among ulama

Among the kyais personal relations and institutional interests play an important role in furthering cooperation and accordingly in constructing networks. Unlike local mak kaebs, higher ulama are closely related just as they are horizontally organized. The high mobility, relative spatial living distance and common interest in religion and education among them induce cooperation and at the same time competition. The spread of the ulama into different areas requires the maintenance of stable relationships with colleagues and kin since they are free from local rivalry and in need of wider solidarity. Furthermore, the outward-looking inclination and advanced learning attributes are indispensable for the kyais' supralocal image. Since higher ulama attract a supralocal following, they are almost free from rivalry among their neighboring colleagues. Indeed, the proximity of the kyais' residences and pondoks to each other, as observed in many parts of Pamekasan, do not create a serious crisis since each one avoids recruiting the local following of his counterpart. This is possible because most of them attract supralocal santri, and only a limited number organize classes designed specifically for local children.² Such understanding is central in making cooperation and solidarity among higher ulama more stable.

The bases of cooperation and ties among kyais center on fraternity, kinship and

² Higher ulama who provide elementary education are common among those who succeed their parents as both local and supralocal ulama (see Chapter 10). Therefore, even if a kyai runs an elementary madrasah which attracts local children, he has legitimacy which automatically prevents others from interfering in his activities. In other words, as noted previously in our discussion of ulama independence (Chapter 9), other kyais will not challenge him by founding elementary madrasahs which attract his local santri, but they may still organize advanced classes and other religious educational sessions (pengajians) that are intended for supralocal santri.

Islamization. Higher ulama form a pivotal link in holding vertical groupings intact. Since each vertical grouping is centered on a kyai (higher ulama), the latter becomes a focus which relates the group to others horizontally and vice versa.

Kinship as a base of the horizontal network. Kinship ties remain the essential element of the kyai's horizontal network.³ In Pamekasan kyais cooperate closely among relatives, even though kinship at times fails to bring them together. The prestige of a kyai's family becomes the focus of a common goal. Despite the strong tendency of each individual kyai to achieve popularity and influence, he is no less concerned with the prospects of his close kinsmen who strive for ulamaship. The rationale behind this is, of course, the maintenance of the family's reputation. Among core, and to an extent close, kinsmen (see Chapter 3), kyais exchange visits which are not necessarily related to family or pondok affairs. Such visits provide the kyais with opportunities to confirm cooperation. The successful kyais may help their kin with resources and guidance; whereas the less successful ones confirm their support for their counterparts. For example, the kyai of Bettet as a prominent ulama in


³ For details on the centrality of kinship for the kyais see Chapter 8, but let us briefly state the role of kinship in furthering ties among the ulama.

Pamekasan is active in showing his support for many of his relatives who run pondoks. Although he is not a strong public speaker, he is frequently seen in the imti-hans and other public occasions organized by his relatives. By showing himself on such important public occasions, the kyai lends his crucial support for the prestige of the relatives among their followers. In return the kyai has confirmed the link which binds him and such relatives. Despite the informality of this high level network, it gives significant motivation to the kyais' respective followings. Put differently, the superiority of a certain kyai is recognized when the link with his fellow kyais is expressed publicly. This does not mean that an individual villager cannot conduct his own direct relations with a certain kyai, but such an endeavor remains private. The strong ties among related ulama ease the mobility of their followers and santri, as the ulama strive for the strength of their networks.

The durability and effectiveness of kinship ties as a horizontal network among kyais are maintained by endogamous marriages. I have discussed marriages among the ulama at some length in Chapter 9, but let us here briefly pinpoint the significance of marriage in enhancing the ulama's horizontal networks. Among ulama, as among villagers generally, social relationship weakens as kinship distance increases. To revive and energize the ties among the kyais, the popular concept of mapolong tolang among close and peripheral kinsmen is always evoked. The arrangement becomes extremely meaningful as kyais tend to move out and migrate. Affinal ties thus emerge as an important element for the maintenance of kinship. In addition, these ties add strength to the horizontal network among ulama. Since kyais consistently contract endogamous marriages, affinal ties do not create a totally new alliance. But rather affinal ties emphasize the heavy dependence of the ulama on the core network. The centrality of kinship in the marriage arrangement among ulama often undermines such factors as a family's wealth, prestige and power. As a result, affinal ties at times revive an ineffective network which exists between the two parties, even though affinal ties are commonly intended to preserve the prevailing network. Because a marriage arrangement is the sole domain of parents, affinal ties are

most directly felt by the initiators. When the initiators pass away, affinal ties may take a different form. The prospects of each family has much to do with determining the upcoming quality of the network. Nevertheless, affinal ties strengthen the loosely developed kinship ties as a new generation grows and takes advantage of such relational bases. The affinal ties acquired by the first kyai of Bettet, for instance, (see Figure 11.1) have been a source of various marriage matches among his relatives and descendants. In addition to providing certain parties with necessary ulama candidates, such affinal ties form a strong and durable network.

Figure 11.1: Kinship and affinal ties among Bettet ulama



Collegiate friendship as a base of the network. The friendship which develops among santri at the pondok becomes an invaluable element of a kyai's network. Prospective kyais derive their religious instruction through senior kyais at pondoks. Although at present some kyais keep their children within their own pondoks, friendship still develops among fellow santri who come from the ulama families. As we saw, at the pondok santri are trained to live independently and self-supportingly. Yet they are close to each other and cooperate to achieve common purposes. Senior

santris have the obligation to guide the novices, but since the novices will soon have seniority, they are in turn required to provide new comers with advice and guidance. Friendship among santris is widely, but intensively, developed. Moreover, we should not ignore the special position of the lorahs (santris who come from the ulama families) among the santris. The lorahs enjoy certain privileges in the pondok as they are respected and addressed by the title of *rah* or *lorah*, and they have easier access than others to the *dalem*. The lorahs, like many other sub-divisions in the pondok, form their own core of associates, consisting mostly of senior santris and ulama relatives. Such a sub-group is kept close to one another through common residence, sharing food and spending their leisure time among themselves. Due to the fact that all of the lorahs are not of the same age, many of them establish relationships with their fellow santris who are in the same age group. In such cases, the lorahs prefer the santris of well-off families, even though they may have clients from among ordinary santris. The latter serve certain lorahs in return for favors either material or of prestige. The lorahs who study together in a pondok will form a new network of higher ulama or strengthen and widen the already established network since they have an excellent opportunity to gather together through their association with the pondok where they study.

The network among higher ulama which emerges from their friendships in the pondok may survive the death of their teacher. Although the teacher forms a focus for their friendship, they gradually produce their own leading figure to serve as the center of their network. The latter is usually subordinate to the teacher during his lifetime. The emergence of such a leading figure is central in the survival and strength of the network. Since fellow ulama have a major role in producing such a figure, each ambitious kiai has to be industrious in cultivating the horizontal network. They cultivate opportunities to meet socially and to visit one another. During the *imtihan* at one's pondok the owner will never fail to invite his former fellow santris. Such an occasion serves to show his network to the villagers as well as to confirm his membership in the network and exhibits ability to maneuver his importance with-

in it. Other factors such as scholarship, wealth, background and achievement undoubtedly form important criteria for one's prospects to be a network center. But the fact remains that each higher ulama has the opportunity to pursue leadership through his horizontal network. Since the network center of the kyais is occupied for life, the competition among a particular generation of kyais is limited. When a kyai succeeds in occupying the network center, his colleagues have to be satisfied as nodes of the network. Only when such colleagues survive the occupant of the center do they have a good chance to succeed him.

This relative internal mobility may partly explain the decline and even the sidelining of certain pondoks and at the same time the reinvigoration and emergence of others. Indeed, the strong emphasis on the personal virtues of a kyai and the expectation that he will possess them negate the domination of leadership within a single family. The death of Kyai Hefni of Bettet in September 1984, for example, provided an opportunity for kyais of his generation to emerge as a network center. This is especially true since Hefni died relatively early (54) and his descendants or in-laws had not achieved prominence. Despite the fact that the ulamaship in Pamekasan is, to an extent, an ascribed status, the actual hierarchical station of a particular kyai is achieved and attained as his fellow ulama and villagers recognize his qualities and attribute that status to him, a point which I shall return to below.

The ulama have benefited from the better communication system of recent times to enhance their horizontal networks. Since many ulama have gone to pondoks in other regions, they are often included in a wider network of supralocal ulama. In fact, such networks are the backbone in the strength and success of the ulama organizations such as the NU. Although emotionally such a wider network is less intense than a parochial or regional one, the former often becomes an effective channel for innovation which may be formally regarded as unacceptable. For instance, Kyai Husni, who became a strong proponent of general education at the pondok in Pamekasan, had derived his idea mainly from his participation in the wider network of collegial ulama who were associated with a prominent pondok in the east corner of East Java. The

success of the pondok in establishing general classes attracted the attention of its ex-santris including Husni. He decided to open such classes in his own pondok only after being urged and shown by his fellow ulama who belong to the wider network that general classes are indispensable for the future of pondok education and the young generation. Husni's general classes, as noted in the last chapter, are not the first of their kind in Pamekasan, but his acceptance of the idea is among the earliest in the region. Because participation in the wider network entails a higher cost and more effort, only well-established kyais can afford to participate. A kyai's participation in such a network undoubtedly enhances his local image and widens his outlook even though it brings no direct result.

Islamization as a means of strengthening the network. The most common interest that brings ulama within a network is the idea of islamization and vice-versa. ("Islamization" with the lower case "i" is here used to refer to a means of calling people to follow the guidance of the ulama, see Chapter 8.) In general terms, the ulama often identify their work and dedication as being "to honour the word of God", "to please God" or "to acquire God's consent." In practice, the ulama focus their endeavors on guiding the people religiously within the framework of the *ahlus-sunnah wal-jamā'ah* (literally "the people of the tradition and the [orthodox] grouping"). In the Indonesian context this expression is designed to categorize the Muslims who follow the Asy'arī⁴ or Māturīdī⁵ in theology and who follow one of the four well-known schools of law (*madzhabs*) in ritual (see Dhofier 1980:295-307). Such an idea of islamization becomes a popular slogan which legitimizes other parochial and limited aspects of the ulama's works and the cooperation among them. For this reason, islamization remains indispensable for the maintenance of an ulama network.

Islamization universalizes the narrow, primordial motives and orientation of the

⁴ The founder of this school of thought is Abū al-Hasan 'Alī ibn Ismā'īl al-Asy'arī (d. 324H/935).

⁵ They are the followers of Abū Manshūr Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Maḥmūd al-Māturīdī al-Samarqandī (d. 333H/944).

ulama's works and actions, as Islam in its highest form often serves as a cover for the ulama's limited goals expressed within its public domain (cf. Kessler 1974, in his discussion of Islamic symbols evoked by Malay politicians in Kelantan, also Siegel 1969). The common goal of islamization, indeed, forms another strong element in the horizontal network among higher ulama.

The ties among higher ulama are renewed and intensified through public meetings and religious discussions (*bahtsul masā'il*). At least once a year a kyai invites his fellow ulama to join a festival held at his compound. The gathering of different religious figures on such an occasion is significant in keeping and reviving the solidarity among certain kyais. Moreover, the diverse religious discussions held at different levels and in different circles bring ulama into closer contact in a more open atmosphere as they answer and solve questions as well as argue for their respective views. The *bahtsul masā'il* is, in fact, a public expression of the ulama's ideological domain and of their vision of a proper societal setting.

By virtue of their profession, the ulama cooperate with one another, even though they are jealous of guarding their independence as well as maintaining non-interference in others' domain. Yet not all ulama in a particular region can be brought together into one network through kinship and affinal ties, fraternity or pondok associations. The common goal of islamization thus provides many participants in a network with popular justification. In fact, the ulama are morally required to suppress their personal and immediate interests in favor of the universal goal which is relevant to their mission as religious leaders. Nevertheless, this general worldview at times carries ambiguity and problems when individual kyais attempt to achieve their own aims by using the universal slogans in a narrow way. This dilemma makes any network or association based merely on such a slogan doomed to factional groupings. Accordingly, individual kyais may easily shift their allegiance which is based primarily on the islamization goal alone from one association to another. But because of the fact that most kyais in Pamekasan are entangled in a web of diverse ties, including kinship and affinal ties and fraternity at the pondok,

they cannot conveniently free themselves from such primordial attachments. At the same time, the islamization slogan remains indispensable for enhancing the position of the ulama among the masses, and hence the *raison d'être* and effectiveness of the ulama's network. As I shall show in the next section, the effort of islamization is more effectively carried out by the ulama through their leadership and participation in wider Islamic organizations and associations.

Socio-religious organization as a base of the ulama's network

Most ulama in Pamekasan have strongly identified and associated with both of the nation-wide Islamic organizations, NU and SI. As already noted in Chapter 7, other Islamic organizations such as Muhammadiyah and the MDI have been established in the region, but their activities have not succeeded in attracting the majority of the ulama. Such an attitude is not difficult to understand since Muhammadiyah represents a reformist-literalist facet of Islam which has not favorably viewed many religious practices of villagers and kyais. Again, because the MDI is strongly identified with the government, they remain suspect, not because of the government's role *per se* but because of the intention and aim of such associations. Until new associations are able to identify their programs with real local interests and idiom, they may remain peripheral.

Sarekat Islam (SI). The division of the ulama and villagers in Pamekasan into the NU and SI is puzzling. In his recent study on folk medicine in Madura, Roy Jordaan suggests, on the basis of his observation of the local religious rivalry in the northern part of Madura, that such a division might have been affected more by the villagers' "alliance with particular kiyai" than by ideological differences (Jordaan 1985:60). But let us briefly examine the local historical development of the SI. Most ulama in the region joined the SI when it was recruiting members and conducting an intensive campaign during the second half of the 1910's. By the late 1920's the SI came almost to oblivion as other national parties and socio-religious organizations emerged. In Madura the majority of SI leaders then joined the NU, and a small number of them supported Muhammadiyah (Kuntowijoyo 1980:503-6; Amir Santoso 1980:46-9; above

Chapter 2). Nevertheless, a prominent kyai in Madura and many of his colleagues and subordinates remained in the SI fold. This figure was head of the biggest and oldest pondok in Pamekasan, the Banyuanyar pondok. Interestingly this pondok has attracted santris and followers from the northern parts of Pamekasan. At the same time the SI supporters tend to come from among the population in the north. This coincidence seems to have been affected primarily by the preference of the northerners for the personal style and leadership of the kyai of Banyuanyar. This is so especially if we consider that the rituals, accommodations, teaching and books provided in the pondok do not significantly differ from those in other pondoks that are led by NU ulama. Yet it should be mentioned that from time to time, some SI ulama have been very critical toward the establishment, especially the government. They include Kyai 'Abdulmajid (d. 1955), Kyai Baqir (d. 1980) and Kyai Khazin. The SI continues to prosper in Pamekasan.

In view of the same religious tradition, ritual and education espoused by the two local organizations, ideological differences *per se* do not play any role in the division of the NU and SI in Pamekasan. At the national level, the ideological difference between the NU and SI is not difficult to appreciate (see Alfian 1969, Noer 1973, Kuntowijoyo 1980 503-6, 1984, Prasadja 1980 81-93). As I have shown, a horizontal network among ulama consists of several elements, each of which needs to be maintained and cultivated. Evidently the prominent leaders of the two organizations are related by kinship (Panyeppen, Sumberanom and Bettet of the NU, and Banyuanyar and Ta-Bata of the SI); they belong to the well-known ulama dynasty of Banyuanyar. Again, many of them have studied at the same pondok (Sidogiri in East Java). Since the NU is a late comer to Pamekasan, it might have functioned to give its leaders opportunity to activate their own traditional network. It is plausible in the light of the process and operation of the ulama networks as well as the emergence of network centers to suggest that the NU provided some kyais in Pamekasan with a rationalization for their central position in the existing networks. Put differently, the NU with its clear confirmation of the religious *status quo* serves the ulama in the region

quite well in terms of ideology and tradition. On the other hand, the SI offers the ulama only an organizational framework since it has an official conception of the interpretation of Islam dissimilar from the one held by the local ulama. By maintaining their independence and their allegiance to a particular version of Islam, SI ulama have been able to maintain their central position in their regionally established network.

SI ulama in Pamekasan face a dilemma, they are torn between allegiance to the formal ideology of the organization and their own, especially religious, views and interests. Since the ulama are closely related to their followers, they regard the SI as 'a mere point of attachment' (*tak lebbi dari settong badda kaanggui nggalang ukhuwah*) without any ideological implication whatsoever. Not surprisingly, to belong to the SI can become crucial, even if many followers of SI kyais do not quite understand what distinguishes it from the NU. What they clearly understand is that the SI has become the symbol of their ulama, irrespective of what the SI officially preaches. Almost the same argument can be applied to most of NU followers. Indeed, among crucial factors which perpetuate the villagers' allegiance to their kyais as well as the ulama associations are the inter- and intra-networks among the ulama. This interpersonal relation that becomes the backbone of the kyais' popularity and influence in a society such as that of Madura.

Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). Organizations such as the NU provide the ulama with a bigger and more sophisticated network. The NU in Pamekasan reflects the existing local networks among the ulama. Indeed, despite the casual administration and lack of formal activities at the NU headquarters, it continues to have popular support. As an organization, the NU in Pamekasan does not have much direct link with and effective role in the society. The individual ulama continue to be centers of loyalty and guidance. Yet at times the NU is able to transcend the prevailing parochial blocks and relate them to higher levels.

Despite the structural division of powers in the NU, the ulama in Pamekasan exer-

cise full control over both the executive (*Tanfidziyah*) and the consultative (*Syuriyah*) bodies of the organization. Ideally as practiced in the central committee, the executive body consists of lay politicians and organizers whereas the *Syuriyah* consists of the ulama. In Pamekasan, although lay politicians are extensively recruited to the NU *Tanfidziyah*, key positions are occupied by the ulama. Yet these lay politicians and organizers are needed to run the management of the organization. This is particularly true in view of the fact that the kyais are tied to their own pondoks and other parochial institutions, they have little time directly to manage the daily affairs of the NU unless they have trusted assistants to replace them at their own institutions from time to time. Since internally the ulama have their own wide and effective network for mobilizing supporters, they rarely need extra help. But the need of the NU to carry on communication with external institutions and the government establishment as well as to participate in the formal political process has made the lay politicians and organizers vital and indispensable in presenting the NU as a sophisticated organization and not a mere macro-pondok. For this reason it is understandable that despite its simple, formal organization the NU has attracted a large following in Madura, including Pamekasan.

Although these lay organizers are required to obey the guidance of the kyais, they have an opportunity to pursue their own ideas and interests. As *de facto* managers of an organization, these lay organizers understand better the prospects and limits of the NU in wider contexts. Since the kyais in Pamekasan have been able to appoint their own fellows and santri to manage the NU (cf. Amir Santoso 1980:107-8), the crisis of leadership which occurred a few years ago at the national level is unlikely to emerge in the region. The homogeneity of the NU leadership in Pamekasan keeps the internal competition in check. Its chairman always comes from the most crowded focus of the ulama's networks, and key leaders are elected on the basis of their actual position in the network.⁶ Such a mechanism eases the transfer of and succession to

⁶ Nevertheless, we should remember that at times competition between top kyais is so serious as to create rivalry and dissension. Moreover, no clear cut criterion can be used to decide the most influential kyai in society. For example, the establish-

leadership. Yet it obviously perpetuates the *status quo* and at the same time limits the prospects of the NU as a supralocal organization in implementing its own goals and programs.

Despite its effectiveness in channeling local sentiment, the NU in Pamekasan, as an organization, continued to be underemployed by the kyais. The NU was used mainly as a show-case for the kyais' interests in wider issues, a modern organization and a sophisticated image. It has not been successful in mobilizing energies and resources to conduct common projects. Yet it fulfills the sentiment of its participants as well as shows how the ulama may manage a modern form of network. In addition, it succeeds at times in uniting a large number of fragmented villagers and ulama in Pamekasan, even Madura. Since the NU attracts prominent ulama who are centers of effective local networks, horizontally and vertically, it easily rallies the people through such networks. As long as the ulama are able to maintain their network, they will remain indispensable figures for any plan to rally the masses. Although the horizontal network of the kyais may remain stable as each individual kyai moves carefully and gradually in agreement with others, their vertical network, as I will show shortly, may become very sensitive to changes that occur among villagers. When changes disturb this vertical network perhaps formal organizations such as the SI, Golkar, NU and MDI will play a greater role in the actual mobilization of villagers.

The NU has become an important means of promoting broader ulama interests. Because a kyai is occupied by the routine and the management of his own pondok, the NU increasingly becomes an important network for such a religious figure to consolidate his ties with other kyais and to relate himself to wider world. Yet, despite its popularity in the region, the NU still has to prove its effectiveness as a modern organization. Until 1985, it has failed to establish its own general school (see Chapter 10). The ulama's tendency to have private pondoks and to seek personal prestige goes

ment of the AKUI by Kyai Baqir prior to the 1955 elections was mainly due to his dissatisfaction to a position assigned to him by NU leaders (Amir Santoso 1980:118).

against the foundation of such a school. Realizing the stagnant, if not decreasing, enrollment at the pondoks in the face of the spread of elementary public schools to all desas, the ulama seem to have attempted to find some way of response. In this respect the NU has presently become more relevant for the ulama, particularly as a way of stimulating cooperation on a wider scale. Its commitment to pay more attention to education and to social problems fits very well with the ulama's quest for a meaningful change in their religious institutions. At the national level, the ulama appointed a young, energetic thinker and writer as chairman of the NU executive body during the NU national congress in December 1984. This choice was not surprising, especially if we consider the evolutionary changes which have been wrought within the NU (cf. Jones 1984). Indeed, the ulama have been exposed to rapid changes in their surroundings. What makes the present developments different from the past, the ulama maintain, is that today they have to play their role under mounting external pressure and not according to their own way. Despite the growing tendency among the ulama, especially the younger generation, to use the NU more effectively, the ulama continue to cling to their own private institutions.

The SI and NU provide the ulama with social and political leverage. Many members of the NU and SI have occupied seats in the local assembly or even the parliament. Their experience in these posts and their encounters with diverse individuals and ideas become a source of discussion with their fellows in the organization. More specifically, such participation gives a clearer meaning to the interests of the kyais and their following. Indeed, the organizations have the capacity to lessen parochial differences and to channel local energies into wider and outward contexts. Yet the introduction of various organizations into villages also transforms the old, primordial differences into new varieties and bodies. Using their network, the kyais were successful during the past elections in amassing votes for the party they associate with (see Table 7.1). Although such political mobilization is transient and casual, it reinforces the villagers' attachment to the kyais through their local network.

The ulama and the newly established Islamic organizations. The pressure of associates and attachment to the ulama network discourage individual kyais from initiating unorthodox moves. This tendency may explain why various government-sponsored Islamic associations have a difficult time in attracting well-established kyais. The kyais are extremely concerned at being alienated and isolated from their colleagues and associates as isolation affects their reputation negatively among their subordinates and followers. Benefiting from their extensive network, the kyais are well-informed about controversial actions and decisions by their counterparts elsewhere. In the recurrent region-wide religious gatherings, ulama speakers never fail to ridicule and at times to slander their colleagues who act in an unorthodox way by neglecting their cooperation and association with many others. Indeed, the reluctance of most ulama, not to mention kyais, to join the newly established Islamic organizations such as MDI and Jam'iyyatul Muslimin has been caused primarily by such pressure. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the moral question that many ulama raise against the goals and intentions of such organizations.

The ulama have the impression that such organizations are not independently managed, but rather are formed to serve the interests of the régime and politicians. We have two assessments of this phenomenon. First, in any stable political system a religious élite such as the kyais may serve as partners of the political régime. Second, when the central power loses its grip on the periphery or lacks political legitimacy, the kyais in alliance with other regional groups may form an autonomous entity (cf. Gellner 1969, 1981; Green 1978 3-7; Metcalf 1982, 1984:17-8, Gilmartin 1984). In the context of present day Indonesia, the ulama generally can be placed in the first category.

But in Madura such a generalization cannot be fully applied, primarily because the ulama remain outside the formal state power structure. For this reason the ulama are jealous of losing their influence over the population, and at the same time they do not oppose the government *per se*. In other words the ulama want to be seen as full partners of the political régime and at the same time they covet autonomy to enjoy influence over the society. By charging the government-backed Islamic organizations

with being mere political tools for *ad hoc* interests, the ulama enhance themselves as popular and spiritually universal leaders. Again, the opposition to such organizations shows the ulama's perception of the possible dislocation of their position either as religious leaders or as representatives of the local population.

The importance of the horizontal network manifests itself in *kyai* solidarity. The in-group attachment creates some kind of tendency to condemn any individual who uses the institution for personal gain, even though each individual has full freedom to act outside the institutional context. The *kyais* who manipulate their institutions for particular vested interests, for example by joining Golkar, are cynically nicknamed by the *santris* "the second-hand ones" (*musta'mal*) or "tigers kept in the zoo."⁷ Most government-initiated Islamic organizations have been manned by civil servants, government teachers and a few ulama. Since such organizations constitute part of the bureaucratic scheme for mobilizing the masses for new socio-economic programs, they are founded in conjunction with the formal administrative structure down to the *desa*. Most *desas* obviously have a committee of the MDI or P2A (Committee for Religious Guidance). But this formal structure has its own weakness. The organizations are suspected by the established ulama of being mere tools for *ad hoc* purposes. Not surprisingly, therefore, the ulama attach themselves to and mobilize their networks all the more vigorously vis-à-vis such a perceived onslaught.

The ulama, women and other segments of society. The higher ulama are mostly male. Yet women comprise at least half of the ulama's followers. Formally, women are affiliated with female associations which belong to the ulama organizations. In the case of the NU, for instance, women join the Muslimat and Fatayat. The chairwomen come from ulama families. Structurally because such women's associations become part of the religious male-dominated organization, they have been

⁷ According to the villagers and *santris*, when a tiger is kept within the zoo nobody is afraid of it, even children; for its movement and power are already constrained by fence and cage. In the villagers' words, "*Ulama ban masyarakat paneka akanta macan abareng alas, mon macan kaloar dari alas, elang kabebaanna.*" Ulama and society are metaphorically like tigers and jungle; if a tiger is taken out from the jungle, it loses the hegemony.

induced to manage their activities and coordinate themselves within the ulama's framework. In view of the dominant position of men in conducting various supra-ta-nean affairs, women depend heavily on their men when they join an association. Yet women evidently have their own public gatherings, public speakers, educational centers and leaders. Because most female religious gatherings and activities are led by individuals who to a large extent become nodes of the ulama's network, women's associations such as Muslimat and Fatayat serve as an important facet of the ulama's network. The Muslimat public gathering held in Proppo in November 1984 which was part of the monthly pengajian organized by the Muslimat sub-district branch may throw some light on women's participation in strengthening the ulama's network.

Such a female public gathering (*pengajian umum Muslimat*) is planned to be held once a month in Proppo. The place for the gathering moves from one desa to another according to convenience. Although the program was exclusively for women, many men attended as companions of their women or as mere listeners. Men who accompanied their women mostly sat close to the stage in the yard of the village mosque. They are separated from the women by a low curtain. It served more as symbolic border-line to separate the two sexes than to prevent one part from looking at another. Yet outside this formal stage sex division was not strictly followed.

During the pengajian, three women speakers including two well-known nyais delivered their messages for four hours. (Like most religious meetings, prior to the speeches the recitations of part of the Qur'an and the tahlil were performed, see Appendix VI). All three speakers reminded the audience that they have to thank the kyais for their guidance, non-vested interest and sincerity (*kaikhlasan*) in leading the *umat* (Muslim community). The second speaker who was chairwoman of the Fatayat went even further by saying: "Look, how nice and secure it is to be the followers of the righteous and sincere ulama. Why [is it so]? Look, how much money do we have to spend if the ulama and kyais need a salary? The ulama work for us and lead for the betterment in this world and happiness in the hereafter without ever asking a single

rupiah." Then she asked the audience to pray for the ulama and kyais who planned to hold their national congress in early December 1984. But since the congress needed a lot of funds, she urged the villagers to assist the committee with material assistance in cash or in kind. By mentioning that the President of the Republic, high-ranking generals and other ministers would attend and deliver speeches in the congress she claimed that the Fatayat and Muslimat members should never be timid to support the ulama activities overtly. The ulama were not against the government

The kyais have structural and practical ties with many local youth organizations. Like women, young men have their own sectional associations. In the past, Islamic youth organizations such as Hizbullah and Ansar were popular in the villages. The Ansar was an important agent of the NU, especially the ulama. During a period of crisis such an organization is effective in mobilizing support and providing protection for local figures like the kyais. Although the government never banned such Islamic youth organizations, various socio-political situations in the villages have worked against the continuing activities of these organizations. The most obvious were the unification of the boy-scout movements under the Pramuka body and the restriction of marching bands in villages from the late 1960's until the 1970's. Indeed, many Islamic youth organizations in villages lost their *raison d'être*, especially after security was fully established by the government. In response to this situation the government encourages the foundation of different youth movements which better serve the national interests.

Nevertheless, in the town where many educated young men remain well-organized in several Muslim student organizations such as IPNU, PII, PMII and HMI, the kyais still enjoy an effective network. Since the HMI and, to some extent, PII have closer ties with the reformist-literalist organizations, they are not structurally related to the ulama's network. On the other hand, the IPNU which attracts students of secondary schools has remained close to the ulama. Since it is an offshoot of the NU, IPNU continues to follow NU policy. Although most secondary school students are busy with their own intra-school associations such as Pramuka and the OSIS (student body),

some students still have time to keep the IPNU functional. By attracting and enlisting the pondok santos into its membership, the IPNU of Pamekasan has achieved a wide-spread following. Despite its limited activities, the IPNU provides the kyais with a network to relate themselves to the educated youth who will eventually form active nodes of the ulama network elsewhere.

Furthermore, the PMII, a student body which accomodates tertiary level students, has proclaimed itself as an independent Muslim student organization since 1974. Until then it had a direct structural link with the NU. In Pamekasan the PMII has become a melting pot for students from NU and SI backgrounds. It attracts a large number of students from the IAIN and some from the University of Madura in the town. The leadership of the PMII has been in the hands of students who come from the pondok. For this reason it has a very cordial relationship with the kyais, as can be seen in the fact that it holds its conferences and training sessions at the pondoks.

When a kyai welcomes such a conference or training session to his pondok, he will bear all costs for the participants' accomodation. The PMII usually organizes a conference and training session for new members around the middle of the academic year. In the 1984-1985 session, the conference was held at the pondok of Kyai Maksum of East Pamekasan. There were seventy student participants, mostly new members. The male students were accomodated in the madrasah building where the lectures and discussions were also held. Since there were 15 woman participants, they were given accomodation at the dalem close to the nyai. In such an atmosphere the students were brought closer to the ulama world. Indeed, the occasion served both sides positively. The kyai was able to show and cultivate his broader network among students, whereas the latter could execute their activities within a limited budget and renew their alliance with the ulama.

Vertical network


The higher ulama derive most of their local support and influence through the vertical network of followers. The vertically upward network of the kyais, as we saw,

manifests itself in their affiliation with socio-religious organizations and their supralocal teachers. In Pamekasan almost all kyais, in an ideal type construct, can be seen as the pinnacle of local ulama networks. Below them come residential santris, village religious teachers, mosque imams and mak kaebs. At the lowest level, of course, emerge lay followers. The network is constructed on the basis of the pondok education (kiai-santri relations), socio-religious advice and guidance and islamization. The vertical network consists of leaders and followers (kiai-santri), and thus it has strong emotional ties. It is most often activated to serve parochial purposes such as feasts, construction projects, and religious activities. As a pinnacle of the network, a kiai becomes a focus of diverse dyadic asymmetrical relationships and the core of concentric circles. Relationships become more impersonal as ranks diverge from one another. Because of the strong personalistic aspect of ties at an immediate level, a higher hierarchical rank does not necessarily imply a closer relation to the kiai.

Let us take the example of Haji Goma, who never studied at Bettet and has no kinship or affinal ties there, but is nonetheless very close to the kiai. Although Goma is related to the kiai of Bettet as an ordinary, though wealthy, villager only by virtue of access to religious guidance and islamization, he enjoys a very intimate personal relationship with the kiai. This is evident, for instance, in the recurrent requests by the kiai to borrow Goma's car or truck as well as in the latter's frequent visits to the dalem. Goma's wealth and his contribution to the kiai undoubtedly serve as primary means to build such personal ties.

We should remember when analyzing this vertical network that villagers, even with no religious office, who enjoy political, economic or social power may serve as immediate links to the network center, bypassing the religious hierarchical network (see Figure 11.2). Let us thus examine how the vertical network of a kiai is formed.

Figure 11.2-Kyai as focus and core of vertical religious networks



Teacher-disciple ties. The kyai-santri (teacher-disciple) ties which develop through pondok or madrasah education last for life. Such ties become the backbone of the kyai's influence and popularity among the population. Life in the pondok for the santris is sharply limited to association among themselves. Yet the excessive, deliberate distance maintained between kyai and santri promotes an enhanced aura for the aloof kyai. The more obscure and difficult it is for santris to understand their kyai's personality the more dignified the latter appears to them. For example, a kyai who stays away from the santris and villagers during a certain period of the day may be publicly rumored to be leading an ascetic life and observing rituals, even though he may spend his time with his family. Santris avoid talking negatively about their kyai. They believe in his ability to deprive santris who undermine his prestige, even surreptitiously, of any favor or barakah. Such a perception does not necessarily originate from the kyai's sayings but from senior santris who have close relationships with the kyai.

The small circle of senior santris around the kyai thus forms an intellectual body that rationalizes and explains the kyai's acts and virtues in the santris' language. In their interpretation, the senior santris have been provided with materials found in

their texts and pengajian lectures. This can be seen in the study of the prophetic traditions illustrated in a semi-Sufi text, *Kitāb al-Mawā'idh al-'Ushfūriyah*⁸ in the pondok of Bettet. The kyai provides the senior santris with the opportunity to read this collection of the prophetic traditions during the special sessions in the month of Ramadhan. Throughout the book the author cites diverse miracles performed by well-known Sufis such as al-Saqthī, al-Kurkhī, Junaid and Bisthāmī in order to elaborate the relationship between one's piety and religiousness on the one hand and his ability to perform miracles and interpret the unseen on the other. Although we cannot generalize the actual influence, if any, of such study sessions on the minds of the santris, in view of the normative aspect of the kyai's teaching such readings must have a tremendous impact on the religious understanding of the santris. (The details about the ideological basis for the normativeness of a kyai's teachings can be seen in the text widely read among pondok santris, *Ta'lim al-Muta'allim Tharīq al-Ta'allum* see Appendix I for brief quotation and translation; cf. Dhofier 1980.) Indeed, the distance that governs relations between a kyai and his santris works for the sacralization of the kyai's personality. Yet other practical aspects also help promote the kyai-santri ties.

The style of instruction in the pondok places a teacher (guru) in a very central position. The use of Arabic texts in the pondok first of all makes a kyai an indispensable guide. Since the method of learning Arabic directly is not well-developed and is not seriously managed, santris spend a long period of study to master the language. The kyais have deep social and religious concern in keeping students dependent upon them. The kyais are jealous of maintaining the accepted teaching of Islām in such a manner that almost every point of the authorized texts has to be understood in a definite meaning (cf. Metcalf 1982:100-110, Eickelman 1985:57-65, 87-94). In view of the flowing style of writing in most of these texts, in fact there is nothing to create serious differences of understanding about the meaning of the text. Yet the imposition of the guru's authority in understanding any religious text perpetuates the limitation

⁸ The author of *al-Mawā'idh al-'Ushfūriyah* is al-Syaikh Muhammad ibn Abī Bakr, popularly known as 'Ushfūrī. The books used in the pondoks are published by Ahmad Sa'd ibn Nabhān and Sons, Surabaya, n.d.

of the santris' access to diverse literatures. Thus among the kyais in Pamekasan the religious texts for santris are defined and uniform (see Chapter 10). They are not much dissimilar from what L. van den Berg found in many pondoks throughout Java and Madura during the second half of the last century (1886:524-53). When the goal of instruction is clearly limited as such, santris become less energetic in achieving free understanding of their subject matter. They accept completely whatever their kyai delivers.

The rigorous method of reading the text adds to the sense of dependence and inadequacy on the part of the santris. Moreover, the tendency of higher ulama to deliver advanced instruction only for a limited number of senior santris increases the value of the instruction in the eyes of other santris as well as adds prestige to the senior santris. The pengajians delivered by the kyai of Bettet illustrate the prestige of the kyai's session and personality.

Five times a week following the first evening prayers (shalat Maghrib) the kyai delivers his evening pengajian sessions for the senior santris. The session is performed at the kyai's langgar, located between the house and the mosque. The santris are seated according to their seniority with the kyai at the center. Since the langgar proper cannot accommodate all participants, many have to sit on the ground below and outside the langgar. Every participant arrives before the kyai. In waiting the kyai's arrival, some santris chat, others discuss some key issues found in the previous sessions and still others try to figure out the passages to be read. When the kyai appears, the santris abruptly become silent. While looking for the text and the exact passages to be delivered, the kyai recites the opening request prayers. Although the kyai leaves his texts in the langgar, he rarely misses the exact passage to be read next. It is clear that the kyai intends to give the impression that he knows what he delivers quite well even without any *ad hoc* preparation. He usually closes today's pengajian at the completion of a particular topic. In ending the session the kyai recites another short request prayer, and the santris quickly leave the langgar, except those who want to consult him and whom the kyai asks to stay behind.

The idea that a pondok belongs personally to the kyai creates a certain indebtedness on the part of the santris. The fact that santris stay with a kyai and receive instruction and guidance shows their dependence on the kyai. A kyai's ability to mobilize funds for his projects is sufficient to credit him with personal achievement. On the other hand, the scattered and fragmented nature of villagers' contributions negates any possibility of counter-claims over the kyai's rights over his pondok. More specifically, the kyai has the upper-hand by virtue of his initial service to villagers and santris, the beneficiaries. The support and contribution given by the latter to the kyai thus are repayment and reciprocity. Since the kyai is able to provide services in unbroken, daily fashion, he is always in the creditor position. The inability of most villagers and santris to reciprocate the kyai's contribution regularly places them under constant pressure of indebtedness. The effective and legitimate means to alleviate such an imbalance is to respect the kyai and support his projects, including education. Not surprisingly, santris are strongly tied to, and in a way dependent upon, their teacher and kyai, even after graduation, partly in order to improve their balance of exchanges vis-à-vis the kyai (cf. Horikoshi 1976, Eaton 1984, in their analysis of religious leaders in West Java and Punjab respectively).

On the other hand, the kyai cannot free himself from santris and followers. The diverse activities initiated by a kyai show his need for supporters. In fact, the centrality of followers in the emergence and survival of a kyai induces the latter to attract santris and villagers by offering education, guidance and services. For this reason it is not uncommon to find that kyais who fail to maintain services and preserve the expected image are deserted by their santris and followers, even though they possess religious and educational facilities as well as a strong ulama background. A kyai cannot allow himself to be idle even after achieving fame and influence. Since a kyai is perceived by his following as a unique and superior figure, he is obliged to respond to such a perception either by deeds (abilities) or campaigns (attributes and qualities) (cf. Horikoshi 1976:344-8, especially in her discussion of charisma; also Gellner

1969-74-80, Tambiah 1983, Geertz 1983 [21-46]). At a time of crisis, for instance, kyais are challenged to provide guidance and protection for their followers. In fact, kyais who succeed in their special way in bringing peace and solutions to problems to the population acquire greater trust and much enhanced prestige. During a peaceful period, kyais generally follow conventional, more objective means in order to maintain and cultivate support. They may improve the educational facilities in their *pondok* in response to changes in their surroundings. Some attempt to glorify the tomb of their ancestors by addressing them as performers of miracles and providers of *barakah*. Others may remain functional as pseudo-psychologists and healers who treat their remedy-seeking visitors.

In a society where advertisement and modern mass media are still largely out of the reach of ulama and villagers, the vertical personal network becomes indispensable for the ulama in order to create a favorable image for themselves and to attract followers. Although a kyai does not specifically form such a network, he indirectly stimulates its growth. Having benefited from the kyai's instruction, santri propagate the uniqueness and the image of their kyai among the population. Such an activity is, of course, primarily intended to justify one's own affiliation with a particular kyai. Yet it also enhances the prestige of the kyai. Because the knowledge acquired by a santri has to be validated not only through practice and teaching but also through an indication of its source, a santri continues to make reference to and maintain ties with his guru (teacher), the kyai.

Since the majority of a kyai's santri come from non-kyai families (see Table 10.2 and 10.3), on their return to the society the santri for the most part run village religious institutions as *mak kae*hs, *ustadzes* or simply learned villagers.⁹ In view of the

⁹ Nevertheless, a kyai's sons who have been sent to study under his colleague may eventually become nodal points of the latter's horizontal network since such santri have a better opportunity than others to pursue position parallel to that of their guru. Although they are santri to such a guru (kyai), by inheritance they have the capacity to become equal to the position of their guru. But the characteristic of the kyai-santri relationship undoubtedly remains dominant in their participation in and maintenance of the horizontal network.

strong kinship ties in the villages, a santri brings his core kinsmen close to his kyai. Accordingly, certain villages become exclusive grounds for a particular kyai's followers and santris led by the local mosque imam. Moreover, the presence of local imams and mak kaehs who relate upwardly to the kyai and downwardly to the villagers preserves the vertical network of the kyai, and ensures its stability. Since not all villagers send their children to the same pondok or kyai, villagers may follow and exalt different figures. Insofar as these kyais maintain good internal relationships and solidarity among themselves, for example, by joining the same religious organization, villagers and their mak kaehs are relatively united. In villages where mak kaehs follow different religious organizations, as we saw in Chapter 7, their affiliation to kyais and pondoks becomes at the same time a source of rivalry.

Santris generally maintain ties with their pondok even after their kyai's death. It is popularly held that the guru-santri relationship lasts for seven generations (*pettok toronan*). Indeed, a kyai's (guru's) successors are usually assured of such continual allegiance, even though its quality and intensity will depend very much on the successors' activity. Yet the santris help each other establish themselves in their respective locations and stations. Since some of their fellows who belong to a kyai family have the prospect of assuming kyaiship, they readily support such fellow santris by building a local network for the emerging kyais, especially if they live within a single locality. In so doing they do not neglect their support and allegiance for the original pondok. Thus a santri may occupy more than one station in the networks of different kyais. His stronger attachment to particular figures will depend very much on his own expectation and benefit, material or spiritual, from such a figure. But the fact remains that among fellow santris such a promising individual as a kyai's son has an opportunity to become the centripetal point of concentric circles and the pinnacle of vertical networks which consist mainly of his fellow santris.

Furthermore, at the village level friendship at the pondok does not have very much impact on the strong parochial ties, primarily because the local religious functionaries are directly involved in daily face-to-face interactions with other villagers. Again, local

religious institutions have a limited scope of attraction and services. Only mosque imams have a good opportunity to rally local mak kaehs by virtue of their organization of Friday prayers for the whole of the village's inhabitants. The similarity of pondok background, of course, enhances the cooperation among such local religious functionaries. In Sameran, for instance, a mosque imam vigorously attempts to rally the local mak kaehs by giving them the chance to deliver Friday sermons and lead the prayers. In this case the mosque imam has been successful in making himself a local node for a vertical network. But his achievement is not complete since some mak kaehs do not follow his upward affiliation, instead they choose their own kyai.

Kyai-follower ties. A no less important element in the formation of a kyai's network comes from beneficiaries of the kyai's non-educational services. Not all followers of a kyai are santri. Indeed, the number of santri who join a kyai's educational institution is only an expression and realization of the extent of his popularity and influence. Again, among certain kyais, their main attraction has been non-educational facilities and services which absorb villagers who seek medication, advice, and invincibility. These villagers never expect to be residential santri in the kyai's dalem. They are transient visitors. Even kyais who run pondoks must provide non-educational services for needy villagers. The two different kinds of services go hand in hand in enhancing and maintaining their prestige and position. The provision of education remains a secure source of kyais' prestige, particularly when stability, real or perceived, characterizes society. Moreover, non-educational services given by the kyais have fluctuated depending on the general condition of the population and on their personal security in the face of uncertainty, anxiety and change.

Despite the transient nature of the visitors who seek assistance and guidance from a kyai, they continue to facilitate the strength of the ulama's network in villages. Whether a kyai's formulae succeed or not in helping those concerned, the kyai continues to be looked upon as a guide. Both kyais and villagers alike hold certain reservations of excuses or justifications which are relevant to explaining the result of a certain formula. When villagers regard a kyai's formulae as being beneficial for their

expectations, further communication and ties are cultivated. In fact, some supralocal santri in the pondoks are sent by their parents who have benefited from the kyai's non-educational services. Such services are vital in maintaining and cultivating a kyai's network in villages.

Some external factors, however, run counter to the centrality of a kyai's non educational and religious services. The limited access to information and services by villagers has induced them during times of crisis to seek help from members of the local elite including the ulama. Irrespective of the kind of illness from which they may suffer, some villagers bring the problem to kyais for medication. The kyais have also served villagers who look for guidance and advice in conducting business and other undertakings. When individuals feel insecure because of threat, they will ask a specific formula from a kyai to acquire invincibility. More specifically, during a time of upheaval or unrest the population will seek protection of the kyais. Yet the end of village isolation through the betterment of communications and education, accessibility to mass media and medical facilities, the activities of various agencies, and the growth of security and stability have increasingly limited the number of a kyai's visitors who seek such non-educational and religious services.

The most important factor that generates the decline is the perceived socio-political stability in the country. The increasing government control over the country's security reduces threats of robbery, street brigandage and murder. Although general elections create unrest and suspicion in villages, they provide an occasion for a certain degree of political expression. More specifically, they are short-lived and less threatening than *coup d'états*, rebellions and armed struggles such as those which occurred in the 1940's, 1950's and 1960's. The relatively stable political condition clearly eliminates massive groups of villagers who seek help from the kyais. My informants vividly pictured how villagers from different areas flocked in groups to Bettet in the early 1960's in order to acquire invincibility from the incumbent kyai through amulets and prayers. Insofar as such political upheavals have been successfully dealt with, the nature of visits to a kyai will become more personal.

This does not mean, however, that kyais have lost the majority of such visitors. Indeed, the persistence and popularity of the shared ideas and accepted values among villagers are so overwhelming that these ideological bases will continue to sustain the ulama's importance among villagers. Perhaps the only significant decline in the pattern of visits to a kyai is in the area of health care. Yet modern medication is still too expensive for the average villager if it is available in his locality; or, as Roy Jordaan suggests, if its nature is understood by simple villagers (Jordaan 1985:295-6). Visitors to a kyai who look for amulets, guidance, advice, luck and personal satisfaction seem not to have declined. They, therefore, continue to serve as supporting elements for the kyai's network in their respective communities.

Ideological bases. The spirit of islamization among villagers constitutes an important aspect in the strength and prosperity of the religious establishment and educational institutions in Madurese villages. The villagers' attachment to religion is so central that it has to be recurrently evoked and maintained. In pursuing such a goal, villagers depend on the guidance and leadership of the ulama. As I have shown in Chapter 7, villagers cannot dispense with a mak kaeh to lead their routine kolom. Again, they ask a mak kaeh's help to instruct their children in basic religious knowledge and ritual.

On the other hand, the ulama continuously look for opportunities and ideas to create fields for the villagers' participation in the process of islamization. In Pamekasan, kyais regularly hold big feasts and festivals such as the imtihan which strengthen and cultivate the ties between kyais and villagers. During such festivities not only do santri and their relatives participate, but diverse segments of villagers also join them in their own ways. Formal invitations are usually sent to well-known followers who accordingly gather their local supporters to participate in the imtihan festival. The kyai also uses the opportunity to show and explain to his visitors the development he has achieved and planned, so that villagers may understand how the kyai manages their contributions and donations. Although some visitors may regard their contributions as tokens for personal interest, the ideal and claimed goal of such cooperation is

islamization. Furthermore, the holding of public lectures at the climax of the *imtihan* when guest speakers are invited attracts wide participation as well as diverse vendors, peddlers and stall-owners. Despite the casualness of this mass participation, the occasion is a popular means used by the *kyai* to attract marginal and uncommitted followers. In this way a *kyai* builds the supporting elements for his already-established network, as well as shows to his ardent followers the extent of his influence and popularity in the society at large.

Villagers often need a *kyai*'s help in pursuing some religious project in their own community. Since not all villagers have a *pondok* education, those who organize village religious education at times ask assistance from a spatially and socially close *kyai*. In establishing such a relationship regular ties soon develop as the villagers become nodes of the local network for the *kyai*. The organization of the *mustami'an* in Teja is a typical example.

Sahid (57), an active local *mak kaeh*, planned in 1983 to reorganize his small religious gathering (*pengajian*) into a popular *mustami'an* for the whole *desa*. His idea was supported by the *klebun* who promised the *mak kaeh* that the *klebun* would ask the *desa* officials to mobilize villagers to participate in the *mustami'an*. When the formal procedure was settled and no less than 120 members supported the plan, Sahid requested the *kyai* of Bettet to send public speakers to the weekly *mustami'an*. Upon Sahid's explanation that the *mustami'an* would not be used by any political party, the *kyai* agreed to send the speakers to Teja, even though the details of the arrangement had to be made through the *kyai*'s special assistant (*lorah pondok*). Until the end of my fieldwork in the area, the *mustami'an* continued to prosper, the *kyai* even regularly sent his son-in-law, regarded as a talented public speaker, to Teja. Despite the fact that Sahid had never been a *santri* in Bettet, his concern about islamization brought him into close ties with the *kyai*. During the *imtihan* in 1984 and the renovation of the canal in Bettet, Sahid became a local organizer who sent workers and participants.

The wealthy villagers attempt to lower their materialistic profile by aligning

themselves closely with kyais. Wealth *per se* in the teaching of the ulama is a highly recommended achievement.¹⁰ But those who accumulate wealth have the responsibility to share their bounty with poor villagers through generosity and more specifically through the offering of alms. Indeed, the villagers regard wealth as vital for fulfilling religious obligations. In Madura, for example, the pilgrimage to Mecca is a popular goal for every villager. On the other hand, the few villagers who have become wealthy are conspicuous and envied. This is true despite the fact that wealth is not derived and accumulated through inheritance and gift so much as through individual enterprise and business-like performance. Because of the intensive relations among villagers, especially at the kolom level, wealthy individuals remain closely affiliated with their neighbors. They take advantage from various public occasions to renew their solidarity. More specifically, wealthy villagers have a good opportunity to build patronage vis-a-vis neighbors through land cultivation, business-related works and domestic services. But such limited public concern serves only to enhance the personal interests, social and economic, of the wealthy. How then do the wealthy protect themselves more effectively against the envy and criticism of their poor fellow villagers?

Instead of delivering the greater part of their contributions and alms directly to the poor, wealthy villagers submit their gifts to their close kyais. When a kyai needs funds to execute his religious, educational or social plans, his wealthy followers and friends will be among the first to respond to him by providing material and cash. Moreover, on different occasions particularly when wealthy villagers make a fortune, they never fail to share it with the kyais. In this way the wealthy attempt to alleviate their overt pursuance of material reward, self-enrichment and lack of spiritual involvement. Indeed, the wealthy are serious about being popularly known as close allies and clients of a prominent kyai. Such an image certainly protects the wealthy from social and religious criticisms. Any overt negative attitude toward a kyai's wealthy

¹⁰ The Qur'an clearly warns the Muslim that wealth is, like children, a test (*fitnah*). "And know that your wealth (*amwāl*) and your children are a test and that with God is immense reward" (Qur'an 8:28). Cf. Appendix I.

friends thus indirectly could be understood to undermine the kyai's interests. In addition, the wealthy cannot dispense with the kyai's blessings (*resto* and *barakah*) when undertaking major decisions in their businesses.

The wealthy form an important element in the kyai's network. The two parties evidently need each other's support and good will. Although the wealthy have only a very limited number of followers, they have resources which are necessary for the smoothness of the ulama's work and projects. Since the wealthy do not have an extensive network of followers except through their business partners and close kinsmen, the kyai is more interested in their material contribution than in their command over subordinates. On the other hand, the wealthy, by virtue of their financial power, have the capacity to build diverse ties with several prominent kyais if they wish. This is so especially since the wealthy can easily bypass the local mak kaehs in order to contact the kyai of their own choice. For this reason, the wealthy receive especially friendly treatment from the kyais in order to keep the former within the kyais' networks.

Chapter Twelve

THE ULAMA AS RURAL RELIGIOUS LEADERS

From our previous discussion of the ulama in Madurese villages, it is evident that the ulama have their own internal hierarchy. At the lowest level we find the mak kaeh of the langgar raja, next the imam of the village mosque, then the kyai of a minor pondok and at the top the kyai of a larger pondok. In discussing the ulama and their role in the village leadership, I classify the ulama into local mak kaehs and supralocal kyais. By doing this I am able to focus more on the characteristics of village mak kaehs as purely local leaders, in contrast to kyais who extend their leadership to the supravillage domain, than on the ulama hierarchy per se. Although the ulama are exclusively known as religious leaders, their relations with villagers are multi-faceted, and include social, educational, political and often economic features.

I have indirectly and implicitly indicated above the centrality of the family background in one's assumption to the ulamaship, particularly to kyai status. It is necessary to explain this phenomenon briefly. Is ulama status ascribed or achieved? First, let us look at the village mak kaeh. In Bettet, for instance, six out of eight practicing local mak kaehs are children of resident mak kaehs (cf. Jordaan 1985:43). Of the remaining two mak kaehs, one is a non-resident mak kaeh's son who married a local woman, and another is an outsider who took a Bettet woman as his spouse. Villagers believe that the youngest child of an established mak kaeh, especially a son, has an obligation to assume the mak-kaehship after his parents. But in reality the practicing mak kaeh has a strong hand in grooming a successor among his children. Thus the mak-kaehship at a langgar raja is neither a purely achieved nor a purely ascribed status, even though being the child of a practicing mak kaeh one has a better chance to assume the status. Indeed, the villagers' consent is a key factor in the attribution of mak-kaehship to someone. Moreover, the mosque ulama do not significantly differ from the local mak kaehs in the assumption of ulama status. The limited chance of establishing a new mosque, however, significantly reduces the opportunity for

non-mosque ulama families to assume this status. But as I have shown, an ordinary local mak kaeh in Sameran succeeded in assuming the mosque ulamaship by establishing a new mosque in his isolated village. Because a mosque has a greater religious sanctity than a langgar raja, as all the inhabitants of a village are expected to perform their Friday prayers in the mosque, its organization requires wider village consent and more extensive deliberation from many parties involved, including neighboring mosque ulama and pondok kyais. In an established mosque, the imam comes from among the sons or in-laws of the incumbent ulama. Yet all sons of a mosque ulama, unlike the sons of a langgar ulama, are addressed by the honorific title of *bindara/dara*. But unlike a kyai's sons they are not generally sent elsewhere to open new mosques, let alone pondoks. Although ideally the youngest son/in-law should succeed his father as a mosque ulama, other factors often upset this culturally sanctioned strategy. Thus when an incumbent mosque ulama dies and his youngest son is not yet ready to assume the duties of an ulama any one of the sons who has religious experience and receives support from the family and the villagers may replace his father temporarily, and in some cases permanently.

Kyaiship, on the other hand, is very much an ascribed status. Ideologically nothing prevents any well-versed individual from running a pondok and assuming the role of ulama. But as I have shown, even an established village ulama has a difficult time in appropriating the higher status of a pondok ulama, a kyai. Since the running of a pondok requires sufficient resources and tradition, a newcomer to the field faces tremendous pressure in terms of qualified institutional background in his attempts to attract public attention. The close association of a pondok with moral and religious education, however, prevents a pondok organizer from conspicuously using his institution as an economic enterprise (Chapter 9). This limitation makes the enterprise unattractive for rich villagers who have sufficient power to establish a pondok building and good opportunities to hire well-versed teachers. More important, the output of pondok education does not correspond to a profit making enterprise since the graduates are prepared primarily to serve the spiritual well-being and conscience of

the society. For many villagers and santri, the kyaiship is a dignified position. They aspire to its ideals by approximating it as best they can through sending their children to the pondok, establishing a village religious center, and associating themselves with the kyai. Furthermore, the limited number of santri who join a pondok has a negative impact on the prospect of establishing new pondoks. Not unlike American universities, the well-established pondoks and kyais achieve wide popularity among parents and students alike, even though well-established pondoks are often replaced by pondoks which branch from them because of lack of capable ulama successors in the original pondoks. The great advantage of ulama families in assuming kyai status and leading pondoks can be seen among other things in the title given to a kyai's children. Sons are addressed by the title of lorah/rah and daughters by nyai/nyi. As soon as a lorah establishes himself by opening a pondok or any religious center he will be referred to as kyai. Despite the popular claim that a "kyai" is an honorific title given to a dedicated and successful religious leader, in Pamekasan "kyai" refers to a specific, ascribed, status.

Religious leadership at the village level

Many features of a village settlement, such as koloms, family langgars and mak kaehs, strengthen the inward-looking tendency among the inhabitants in addition to the isolation of the settlement. A mak kaeh occupies status as an elder in today's village. The term mak kaeh consists of two Madurese words *emmak* (father or older brother) and *kaeh* (father) which mean grandfather. In Bettet, for example, all the native mak kaehs claim kinship ties to the early generation of the settlers, even though they do not necessarily belong to the older generational rank (cf. Horikoshi 1976 42-5). Since the bengko asal is ideally assigned to the youngest child, the idea of elders in villages is not strictly tied to high generational rank. Furthermore, in practice a mak kaeh assumes the position when young. In the case of the sudden death of a mak kaeh who leaves no ready successor, a temporary replacement is worked out before his son can assume the permanent mak-kaehship. In assuming the mak-kaehship an occupant does not pass through a specific ritual. In fact, in the process of teaching and leading rituals, a mak kaeh from time to time asks his trusted assistants to replace

him, and when a real opportunity comes, such assistants automatically fill the position either temporarily or permanently. The centrality of the mak kaeh in the village is shown in the leading role he takes in local ceremonies and feasts. Before we proceed to discuss mak kaeh-villager relations, it is important to know the background of the mak kaeh.

Relevant to his position in the village leadership structure, is the mak kaeh's knowledge of popular Islam. At a village where the mak kaeh leads the langgar raja, an apel (desa official) is usually found. But the latter is directly appointed by the klebun. Although an apel has clear administrative power, he is not given a special niche in the village social structure other than that based upon his original family background. A mak kaeh thus virtually becomes the center of local solidarity. His direct participation in the daily life of villagers makes his relations and communication with neighbors intimate, warm and egalitarian. A mak kaeh is usually a peasant or a small farmer. In recent years, with the increasing number of villagers who secure government employment as teachers and clerks, a small number of mak kaehs have derived income from salaries. Because a mak kaeh is routinely occupied with village ceremonies and religious instruction he has limited time to leave his village. He is, therefore, barred from some occupations. In Bettet, among eight practicing local mak kaehs only one secured a non-agricultural occupation as an employee at the local religious office (KUA); two of them spent more than three years at the pondok studying religious texts and joining the kyais in providing labor. Since most of them (six) succeeded their parents as mak kaehs, they were trained directly as apprentices to lead the pengajian and ceremonies. This partly explains why most of them never studied religious texts extensively. A mak kaeh's knowledge of Islam and supravillage development is limited.

Unlike the higher ulama who exercise wider religious authority, a mak kaeh's religious function is well-defined. In villages, a mak kaeh perpetuates local and popular rituals. By assuming the position of educator, guide and officiant for village rituals and ceremonies, a mak kaeh becomes indispensable in the village world. His


centrality is not so much associated with his expertise in religion as with his natural and hereditary place and supposed inherent familiarity with the supernatural.

Thus a mak kaeh is closely related to village life from birth to death. He provides village children with a basic belief system, values, norms and other religious practices and rituals. By inculcating in the minds of children basic teachings dealing with subjects such as God, paradise and hell, a mak kaeh is able to retain his central position as a guide and teacher. Moreover, a mak kaeh teaches children how to acquire merit in order to achieve God's blessing and salvation. In villages, religious merit is primarily associated with the recitation of certain formulae taken from Qur'anic verses and other Arabic prayers. Because the recitation is closely associated with the holding of a feast, a mak kaeh is needed to lead the ritual. Religious obligations per se are taken for granted in that they are routinely performed without much excitement and expectation of gaining extra merits. For this reason Madurese villagers, unlike the Sundanese (Horikoshi 1976:233-4), are less concerned with gathering at the langgar raja or the mosque to pray than with performing ceremonies and feasts in their taneans. Yet a mak kaeh continues to occupy a pivotal role in mediating between villagers and the supernatural. Even though villagers know well that a mak kaeh hardly understands the meaning of many Arabic prayers, it is nevertheless believed that he knows the context and precise nature of prayers and God's will. In the context of attaining merit, villagers believe strongly in the efficacy of good deeds, special prayers and generosity for one's well-being and salvation. By showing virtues and attaining merit through feasts and ceremonies, the goal of the villager is to please God through the mediation of the mak kaeh, and thus to obtain God's rewards and His assent of the villager's untold expectation.

The centrality of the mak kaeh in leading most village religious activities strongly motivates the ties which link the ulama and the villagers in a meaningful relationship. Villagers are socialized in a milieu where the religious functionary is indispensable in their village life. Open communication and interpersonal relationships are maintained between him and the villagers. Furthermore, the mak kaeh's intensive relationship

with village children through his instruction in Qur'anic recitation and religious rituals perpetuates the importance and centrality of the mak kaeh in villages. Since most of these children will soon become important members in the village households, the continuity of interdependence, as can be seen in Figure 12.1, is maintained.

Figure 12.1 Relationship between local ulama and villagers at the village level from one generation to another



Although a mak kaeh has strong moral authority, he exercises relatively little power over villagers. Because a mak kaeh does not possess considerable wealth he is unable to establish extensive patronage over his fellow villagers. In fact, he receives simple contributions from his neighbors. Since a mak kaeh provides only elementary religious and educational services, villagers reward him with only a minimum of gifts. Indeed, a mak kaeh enjoys social and religious prestige more than anything else. The limited contributions accumulated by a mak kaeh are insufficient to enhance his economic condition. A number of local mak kaehs who have succeeded in enhancing their position have done so through maximizing villagers' participation in various socio-religious gatherings. A mak kaeh, however, remains only an effective channel of communication with little power to command outside his moral and religious authority. He does not possess a political office nor does he command considerable economic resources.

Patterns of mak kaeh leadership

In order to have a clearer picture of a local mak kaehs' leadership, I will show two Bettet mak kaehs who exercise relatively different ranges of influence: first, Pak Dewa, who belongs to a hamlet with extremely dispersed settlements and second, Mali, who comes from more nucleated neighborhood. Both have inherited their respective position.

An ordinary mak kaeh. Pak Dewa (52) has occupied his position as mak kaeh since the death of his father in 1962. He is the youngest son of the family. Although he succeeded his father, the original house (bengko asal) is occupied by his younger sister who has been active in organizing religious activities among village women. Pak Dewa received his early religious instruction directly from his father, by participating in the pengajians in the family langgar raja. During the Japanese occupation, he went to the public school in the neighboring desa together with a few village children. Pak Dewa never lived in the pondok as a residential santri, even though he regularly joined educational sessions (pengajian kitab) held by the kyais in the area, including Bettet and Jumanis. He thought that with his present basic religious knowledge he would never encounter difficulties in responding to villagers' questions and solving local socio-religious problems.

Pak Dewa derives his income primarily from agriculture. His land has been mostly inherited from his parents. In addition, his wife contributes a small inherited plot. Since Pak Dewa has four dependent children, the land which amounts to two pengkals cannot fully support the family. Pak Dewa gains additional income by growing oranges in his yard and selling labor to certain kyais. One of his sons has spent several years in the city as a migrant worker, but in early 1985 went home to work for the kyal of Bettet. Insofar as his economic resources are limited, a mak kaeh such as Pak Dewa cannot exercise authority through economic patronage. Pak Dewa has been seen as an important religious leader in the village, even though he has no power over villagers. Except for the renovation of his langgar raja in the early 1970's, Pak Dewa

never initiated any village development program; even the difficult, narrow footpath to his isolated settlement has remained unimproved.

As a local religious functionary, Pak Dewa has a busy weekly schedule. In addition to his routine daily assignment of instructing children at his langgar raja, Pak Dewa actively leads three adult religious gatherings in the neighborhood and surrounding hamlets. Two of the gatherings are basically variant expressions of the kolom organized on a neighborhood basis. Most of the participants in these gatherings send their children to Pak Dewa's langgar. He believes that the division is necessary in order to ease participation in the gatherings by clustered inhabitants. The main theme of the rituals in these gatherings is the glorification of God by following Pak Dewa in the recitation in unison of the Yasin (a chapter of the Qur'an), the tahlil, or shalawāt nariyah (see Appendices II and VI). As in many other village rituals, the emphasis in this case is more on pleasing God than on achieving spiritual refinement or in fulfilling one's quest for intellectual satisfaction. Furthermore, Pak Dewa actively organizes a male mustami'an in the village, even though he does not deliver any lecture or respond to questions during the discourse of the mustami'an. In fact, for him the mustami'an is an opportunity to improve his religious knowledge and to widen his worldly view as local religious experts (ustadztes) explain and express their opinion on diverse social and religious issues. The recurrent family rites and feasts also require Pak Dewa's services to officiate at the religious rituals requested by the hosts. Pak Dewa has clearly shown his central position in the religious life of villagers.

Nevertheless, Pak Dewa has very little to do with the material condition of the village and the daily life of its inhabitants. At present several hectares of the sawah land in his village have good access to semi-irrigation. But the work on the canal have nothing to do with Pak Dewa. Instead he was used by the initiator (in this case a kyai) as a mobilizer of local labor for the construction of the canal. Again, during the last 1983 desa election, Pak Dewa served only as a local campaigner for his favored candidate who had been a classmate in the elementary school during the Japanese occupation. In February 1985, the klebun proposed an extension of a pathway from

the central village through Pak Dewa's neighborhood and sawah land to the town market. Even though the klebun was careful in getting local support for his plan, he did not specifically persuade Pak Dewa. Since the pathway would have taken considerable land from the owners, the klebun took direct measures to secure their support. The klebun believed that a better and larger pathway would be beneficial not only for the surrounding inhabitants, but also for the desa at large, including town-market goers, pupils and peddlers. Most amounts of the land taken over for the pathway belonged to the kyal of Bettet. After getting permission from the kyai, the klebun told me that he had secured a strong basis for asking the other villagers' consent. What is significant in this context is that local mak kaehs such as Pak Dewa play little part in village development.

Pak Dewa has not witnessed remarkable change in his local setting. Although a few villagers derive their main income from non-agricultural sectors outside the village as carpenters, bricklayers, pedicab drivers, laborers and vendors, none has secured a bureaucratic position or professional occupation. No villager has attended secondary public school. At present, all of the approximately forty children who join Pak Dewa's langgar either have completed or are studying at the elementary school. Pak Dewa believes that today's children have wider knowledge than his contemporaries, but that they do not create any kind of problem or idiosyncrasy which might disturb religious education, values and local norms. He also claims that all household heads in his neighborhoods regularly attend one or more of the religious gatherings he has organized. Nonetheless, he is concerned about the idleness of many youth who follow the manners of the urban population. "They have to be encouraged," he said, "to organize a self-defence club, hadrah and Samman, or to join the mustami'an in order to learn more about religion." In fact, many young men in the village have some experience in finding jobs elsewhere; they return to Bettet either because they failed to secure sufficient income or to stay temporarily with their families. Some villagers have shown a certain diversity in their economic resources and preference of housing styles. However, they continue to participate in the village religious activities

led by the mak kaeh.

An ambitious mak kaeh. In order to have a broader perspective on local mak kaehs, we need to compare Pak Dewa as the mak kaeh of isolated and scattered settlements with Mali as the mak kaeh of relatively larger nucleated settlements.

Mak kaeh Mali (43) succeeded his brother in 1968 as mak kaeh of a small, newly established langgar raja. When his father died in 1959, the mak-kaehship was temporarily assumed by Mali's older brother.¹¹ Before moving to his present location, Mali's langgar attracted only a few neighbors around his small nucleated settlement. Indeed, his father had to share the mak-kaehship in the village with a well-established mak kaeh in another settlement. But the largest population concentration lies outside the settlements of the two mak kaehs. Thus, Mali provided instruction only for children in his neighborhood, and acted as an assistant mak kaeh in the village kolom as well as led the Samman group which had been founded by his father. The two mak kaehs were involved in a covert competition for greater local religious leadership. They attempted to attract children of the larger neighboring settlement into their respective langgars and to command socio-religious authority over villagers at large. Yet they were able to maintain cooperation in organizing the sole village kolom. Only when Mali moved with his family and langgar in late 1981 to the main settlement and accordingly absorbed the majority of children, did the village kolom become divided into two groups. Since then the two mak kaehs have not been seen together in village religious gatherings. In fact, Mali's rival has failed to attract village children to his langgar other than a few relatives.

Mali is young and only a second-generation mak kaeh, but he has extensive kinship

¹¹ As the younger son in the family, Mali has culturally a strong claim over the original house (bengko asal). He thus automatically inherits the leadership of the langgar raja. According to Mali, his father had bequeathed the leadership of the langgar to him. Moreover, his older brother explained that he gave up the mak-kaehship mainly because he migrated to East Java during the late 1960's. On his return to Bettes, he found that Mali has been running the langgar smoothly; therefore, he had no reason to take over the mak kaehship. Indeed, before his death in November 1984, Mali's older brother had attracted a number of neighboring children into his langgar in the new location.

ties in the larger settlement. His rival is a grandson of a well-known mak kaeh but has no roots in the village, as his grandfather moved out from Bettet to settle in neighboring Sameran. Mali's rival moved into his present tanean in order to revive the family tradition, and has easily gained support from the neighboring villagers. On the other hand, benefiting primarily from his kinship ties with most inhabitants in the larger settlement, Mali was able to discredit his rival as a high-handed teacher. According to Mali, his own move to settle in the larger settlement was a response to the demand of many village parents. They wanted him to be easily available in the neighborhood. Since he has actively led religious activities in the larger settlement, he claimed that many villagers who previously neglected religious practices have become more active. It was the obligation of guiding kinsmen which prompted Mali to assume religious leadership in the village.

Like Pak Dewa, Mali never became a resident santri at a pondok. He received his early religious instruction from his father at the langgar. As the youngest son, his father gave him special attention in order that he might succeed the father as a mak kaeh. Mali insisted that he received authorization from his father to lead the Samman club. Since his father had only rudimentary knowledge of Islamic doctrine, Mali was asked to join the religious sessions given by a mosque ulama in neighboring Sameran. After achieving some familiarity with the basic religious texts in the late 1950's and early 1960's, Mali occasionally participated in the pengajians held by the kyai at the pondok of Bettet as a non-resident santri (*santri nyolok*). But Mali, unlike Pak Dewa, never went to the public school. Moreover, his close association with the langgar raja prevented Mali from leaving the village to migrate elsewhere. Although he was married to a daughter of migrant villagers in Malang, Mali never joined his in-laws in the city. Interestingly, Mali has sent his oldest son to a public secondary school (SMP) as he believes that the younger generation should be given better opportunities for wider careers. This is especially so since life in the village has become harder and harder. "Our land is increasingly divided into tiny plots", he said, "and many new couples cannot even secure a piece." Yet the traditional migration to cities can no

longer provide a stable occupation for many villagers because they cannot compete in the job market which often requires skill, experience and education.

Although Mali is active in trading in tobacco as a local middleman (*blantik*) during the harvest season, he derives most of his income from agriculture. His two pengkals of agricultural land have been acquired mostly through inheritance. In 1980 he purchased a parcel from a relative who badly needed funds for medication. Mali, like Pak Dewa and other villagers, cultivates by himself. Since his unmarried children are not yet able to assist him in cultivation, Mali receives assistance mostly from his wife and occasionally from his son-in-law. He has never requested labor from his students or their parents to work on his land. But he believes that if he asked, they would definitely comply. Mali holds the idea that the scarcity of water in the area is the cause of the low production of staples, particularly corn and rice. When he received bank credit for rice cultivation in the 1970's, he used the funds mostly to grow other crops such as beans. In this way, he, unlike many other fellow villagers, was able to profit and repay the bank credit. Since his agricultural land cannot support even his basic needs, Mali has been active in taking advantage of the tobacco season. He is involved in the local group of tobacco cutters (*tokang rajjang*), and he also acts as a local middleman in purchasing tobacco leaves.¹² Although he does not always make a profit, he maintains that tobacco trading provides him the opportunity to get additional income.

As a mak kaeh, Mali is occupied with various religious programs in the village. Since Mali's move to his present residence, his langgar has attracted most of the children in the village. In 1984-1985 fifty boys and girls attended his langgar for religious instruction. He is assisted by his wife and two other young assistants. Although several participants in his evening sessions are adolescent boys and girls, Mali does not provide them with text-reading sessions (*pengajian kitab*). Unlike Pak Dewa, Mali

¹² Such a local middleman, however, is much smaller in activity scale than *bandol* whom Huub de Jonge discusses in his study of the tobacco trade in the higher context (de Jonge 1984).

remains nightly at home except on Saturday nights when he leads the Samman performance. The koloms in his village are performed in the afternoon before sunset. Because of his regular stays at home, Mali attracts some adult villagers to his tanean after the religious instruction for children is over. He once complained that the availability of television sets in the neighborhood has reduced the number of his visitors. Yet Mali evidently continues to have evening company. On these occasions, villagers converse with him on anything from cultivation to village spirits.

Mali has increasingly enjoyed public recognition through his organization of the Samman. As we saw, the Samman led by Mali attracts a large number of villagers in Kampong Barak. Popularly organized, the Samman fulfills the various needs of idle villagers. The participants are involved in mystical religious experience which includes entertaining themselves with chanting and dancing. The Samman performance is not a static, contemplative ritual; it is rather a public and attractive ritual which breaks the monotony of village life. Unlike the mustami'an, the Samman provides its members with an opportunity both to participate and to play a direct role in the performance. Each participant chants and dances. Using the loudspeaker system, the Samman performance keeps the village alive until midnight and sometimes beyond. Under such circumstances, Mali as chairman of the Samman emerges as a religious leader and popular figure in the village.

Mali's growing popularity encourages him to involve himself in village affairs. Since the removal of his langgar into the larger settlement, the langgar has become the sole public place for religious instruction in the village. The crisis of leadership in the desa as a whole arose when the incumbent klebun (Matis) fell sick in late 1980 and within two months died. Mali was close to the klebun both as a mak kaeh and a close relative (FEBSSS /ponakan dupopo). When the klebun was sent to a hospital in Malang for medication, he asked Mali to accompany him. Mali advised the klebun's sons to bring the sick man home to Bettet, because, according to Mali, modern medicine had failed to treat the klebun's illness satisfactorily. Mali never expressed an interest in succeeding his relative as a headman, but he played a key role in encourag-

ing one of the klebun's sons to become temporary headman until the desa election. Having failed to achieve the plan (see Chapter 5), Mali supported his own candidate for the klebunship. Although we cannot easily dismiss the notion that Mali's action was outcome of his personal background and kinship ties with the deceased klebun, it is nevertheless interesting to examine this attitude within the context of his location in village religious leadership. Unlike Pak Dewa's followers, Mali's are concentrated in more nucleated settlements. Accordingly, Mali enjoys a higher degree of personal interaction with many inhabitants than does Pak Dewa, despite the fact that the two kampongs have almost a similar pattern of education and employment. Indeed, the only obvious difference is the higher general education achieved by the klebun's sons. But only one son remains in the village as a government teacher at the village school. As a local religious leader, Mali favors his secular counterpart, the klebun, to come from among his own followers.

Mali attempted to take advantage of the leadership crisis to improve his growing popularity. By rallying local support for particular individuals of whom he approved, Mali exercised his hold over the population. His claim that his candidate for the 1983 desa election had shown signs of strong leadership was advocated to demonstrate Mali's closeness to the supernatural. Again, Mali used his heirloom weapon (*keris*) as a guarantee for the victory of his candidate. Although the result of the 1983 desa election worked against Mali's expectations, Mali did skillfully manipulate the existing crisis to improve his religious prestige. As I have shown in Chapter 5, Mali's candidate (Jemani) for headmanship was defeated by Sonep, who gained support from a supralocal ulama. The fact that Mali, as local mak kaeh, failed to challenge higher ulama needs no further comment, but the phenomenon has some significance. The emerging ulama use any opportunity available to achieve higher prestige. Yet for local ulama/mak kaehs, their chance of assuming a broad-based leadership is checked and limited by the authority of their superiors, the kyais who have direct interest in the locality. Nevertheless, Mali has proved the possibility of challenging higher ulama with relatively good performance, if not success.

The mosque imam: an intermediary level in village religion

Unlike mak kaehs, mosque imams have authority over other local mak kaehs. Because an imam leads the weekly Friday prayers for the whole village, he exercises a wider religious authority than does a mak kaeh. Ideally, as I have demonstrated, a desa has only one mosque. Within each cluster of village settlements (kampong) there is one langgar raja or more under the mak kaeh. Insofar as the mosque becomes indispensable for the performance of Friday prayers, all local mak kaehs have to attend the existing desa mosque. More importantly, the ties between mosque ulama and mak kaehs are strengthened by the ideological base. According to the ulama, only one mosque should be erected within a village. As followers of the Syafi'i school of law, the ulama maintain the necessity of having at least forty participants for Friday prayers at the mosque. But the ulama have difficulties defining a "village" in Madura. Some argue that a new mosque cannot be built if the call to prayer (*adzan*) from a neighboring settlement can still be heard. Whatever the reason, a local mak kaeh cannot easily construct a mosque without popular support from his fellow mak kaehs.

As a center of village religious activities, the mosque has a more elaborate set of religious services and presentations than does the langgar raja. The fact that an ulama is able to lead a mosque congregation is indicative of his religious authority over the village and his knowledge. A mosque ulama is the immediate authority for solving religious questions arising among local mak kaehs and villagers.

In a practical manner, the imams teach the villagers about basic rituals such as five daily prayers, fasting during the month of Ramadhan, alms giving (*zakat*) and pilgrimage to Mecca. If a man fails to follow these doctrines and practices, he is faced with severe punishment in hell. Nevertheless, for an individual who fully accepts the unity of God (*tauhid*), the imams attempt to offer reassurance and give hope even if he fails to fulfill the required practices. In fact, the imams encourage such an individual to undertake certain tasks such as feasting, visiting certain tombs and meeting promi-

nent kyais in order to compensate for his past ignorance and negligence. In the light of this teaching, we can better understand the centrality of the local ulama among villagers as well as the less intense association of the villagers with the mosque or langgar in the performance of rituals. The Madurese are not grossly pessimistic about their salvation. Instead of devoting all their efforts to worship and prayers, the Madurese also rely on the higher religious authority, living or dead, to mediate in achieving their eternal salvation. The higher ulama (kyais) by virtue of their barakah and spiritual power enjoy the trust of the villagers. Since mosque ulama do not possess barakah as efficacious as that possessed by prominent kyais, the mosque ulama function as advocates for the cause of particular kyais. Yet they participate also in small, local events such as leading various prayers and invocations among the villagers.

Socio-religious aspects of the mosque. Although a mosque imam has popular religious authority over the whole village, his actual socio-religious leadership is limited by his daily religious activities and services for the community. Indeed, an imam, like the local mak kaeh, needs to attract immediate followers by providing basic religious services. As I have previously shown, benefiting from his spacious and well built mosque, an imam may organize different educational sessions for children and villagers. In this way, an imam is directly involved with facets of the daily affairs of his neighbors. Furthermore, the mosque is also a place for adult villagers to perform collectively some of their prayers, especially in the evening, under the leadership of the mosque imam. Despite his ability to provide higher instruction, an imam can attract only so many of the neighborhood children for basic instruction, lest he interfere with the practice of the neighboring mak kaehs. By honoring the domain of other imams and mak kaehs, a mosque ulama may expect their respect, cooperation and support. In villages such relational principles are vital for the survival of the village ulama. In order to maintain solidarity among the local mak kaehs, an imam may, for example, give each one of them an opportunity to deliver the Friday sermon and to teach at his madrasah, or he may organize a casual weekly meeting with them in his compound.

The limits of the socio-religious leadership of an imam are clearly shown in his place at village ceremonies and feasts. Except at the rituals which surround burial, a mosque ulama is not normally seen at any feast outside his immediate domain.

As the most magnificent building constructed by the villagers themselves, the mosque is a convenient place for many to gather. Until quite recently, as old villagers recalled, the village mosque was one of the few brick-walled buildings in the village. With the construction of government schools in the villages, of course, the mosque is no longer the only magnificent edifice in rural areas. A mosque symbolizes pride and the village's attachment to religion. It is also an indication of the ability of the local imams and mak kaehs to mobilize local support and generate funds. A mosque is, in a sense, a public place; it is therefore quite permissible for villagers to drop in any time. In the evening mosques become gathering spots, not only for those wishing to perform their prayers and engage in religious educational activities, but for young men who come to meet their friends as well. Often they spend the night at the mosque, an easily justifiable activity which provides them with a ready excuse to spend more time away from their parents. Informal gatherings of this kind also provide the youth with an opportunity to plan their recreational activities. Although the imam himself has little to do with these informal functions provided by the mosque, he is nevertheless aware of the need to keep the activities of the youth within the expected norms and behavior. In order to explain the actual functioning of a mosque ulama in village life, I will use the example of an ulama from Teja, Imam Jari.

Jari (45) succeeded his older brother in 1970 as the mosque ulama. His father wanted him to become imam. The house which he presently occupies together with his wife and three children was inherited from his parents. Apart from three pengkals of agricultural land which Jari and his wife received from their respective inheritance shares, Jari has not purchased any land. Although he is purely a cultivator, a considerable part of the family's income is derived from his wife's contribution through cloth dyeing. Because the upkeep of the mosque and its maintenance fall mainly under the common responsibility of the village participants (*jama'ah*), Jari is almost free from

any routine financial obligation toward his mosque. But he remains a central figure in organizing funds and mobilizing labor for the maintenance of the mosque programs and the building. In spite of the fact that the mosque is old, it has no significant endowment which can sufficiently support its operation. Unlike the langgar raja, the mosque has a loudspeaker system, a well, washrooms and pressure lamps. Accordingly, it requires a considerable budget for its operation. Jari wants one of his sons to succeed him as a permanent mosque ulama, even though he has not yet nominated anyone for this purpose. None of his children attends secondary public school.

Before assuming the imamship of the village mosque Jari spent a number of years in the pondok. He received his early religious education from his father. For some years he joined the local madrasah before going to Bettet. But Jari never became a residential santri at the pondok of Bettet. He did not complete elementary school. He said that since he was not interested in joining the public service or a governmental post, it was sufficient for him to be able to read and write the latin alphabet. Therefore he quit school early to join a pondok in neighboring Sumberanyar where he stayed until 1957. For the next eleven years he spent his time in Banyuwangi, East Java, to study under a local kiai. His affiliation with the pondok, however, did not prevent him from peddling and selling his labor. Indeed, on his return to Pamekasan he owned enough capital to start a family and renovate both his inherited house and the mosque. Despite his long stay at the pondok, Jari did not achieve any kind of advanced scholarship, because, as he explained, he was not fully and regularly engaged in studying religious texts.

Upon his return to Teja, Jari revived educational activities at the village mosque. First he assisted his older brother, the incumbent imam, in instructing children in reading the Qur'an and basic texts. Because most children had a difficult time in following the text-reading sessions, Jari gave up the idea. A few years later, after assuming full leadership of the local mosque, Jari revived his attempts to provide villagers with regular text-reading sessions at the mosque. He did so because the madrasah in the village had been removed to another area in 1966 when Jari was still in the

pondok. The sessions were designed for older children who had completed the reading of the Qur'an. For this reason he expected that the children were familiar with the Arabic text, even though they did not directly understand what they read. The sessions were held following the late evening prayers. During Ramadhan, the month of fasting, the sessions were held daily in the afternoons. Having seen some success in the program, Jari was requested by the villagers to open the pengajians to adults. By organizing the pengajians on the kolom pattern, Jari led text-reading sessions for adult villagers once a week. Although the texts used in these sessions have not changed, the pengajians continue to attract participants. "We will never be satisfied with our knowledge of the fekih," as one participant explained, "because it continuously evokes our sense of inappropriateness in following the religion. By participating in the text-reading sessions we expect to improve and correct our performance of worship and ritual."

Despite his prominent position in the village as mosque imam, Jari has a limited role in the extra religious and educational activities in Teja. Unlike the energetic mosque ulama of neighboring Sameran, Jari has never initiated a significant societal program in the village. We should remember, however, that Jari lives in a village surrounded by popular figures and well-established institutions. In the village itself the klebun enjoys popularity primarily by virtue of his family origin, having succeeded his father as klebun in the early 1960's. Again, the village has been a government center for agricultural experimentation. Not surprisingly, Jari has little opportunity to lead non-religious programs. He was disappointed to realize that the madrasah in his neighborhood was removed to another village. But he is not optimistic about the prospects of opening a new one since there have been two giant madrasahs built just a short distance to the west and to the north from his mosque. In most cases, Jari prefers to become a subordinate node in the network of the neighboring supralocal kyal by mobilizing local villagers to support the kyal's societal and educational programs. He keeps a low profile vis-à-vis the klebun in desa affairs, even though Jari has won the klebun's support in conducting the weekly mustami'an in the area. Fur-

thermore, his vision of the future remains strongly oriented toward religion as he wants all his children to master, not general education, but religious, particularly pondok, training. Jari believes that religious education is the best way to achieve a good quality of life now and happiness in the hereafter. More specifically, religious education inculcates honesty, piety and morality, and suppresses arrogance, selfishness and materialism. In fact, Jari's strong attachment to his imamship and his limited field of non-religious activities have perpetuated his dependence on the survival of the mosque.

A supralocal ulama, the kyai: a centripetal point in villages

The kyai lives amid the villagers, but he belongs to society at large. In Part 3 we saw that kyais in Pamekasan are new-comers. The first-generation kyais moved into the villages supported by a well-established reputation in knowledge. They do not develop their reputation from scratch as local imams and mak kaehs do, but rather coordinate fragmented elements of religious leadership on the basis of their acquired prestige and ascribed status. Although in the long run a kyai identifies himself with his newly acquired residence and becomes a focus of village pride, as I have shown in Chapter 8, he is in many ways detached from the local village structure. In this capacity a kyai exercises broader religious authority than his fellow local mak kaehs. As a religious functionary and educator, however, a kyai cannot fail to exert an extra religious leadership role in the villages as well. In this section I will show how a kyai as a religious leader helps villagers to develop their socio-economic interests as well as to deter moral laxity in the society.

Since a kyai becomes a unifying symbol of larger Muslim groupings, his relation with villagers at large is impersonal. The relations that a kyai maintains with his immediate assistants, close friends and clients, of course, are more direct and personal. The distance that a kyai keeps from the villagers is intended, according to the kyai of Bettet, "to avoid embarrassing fellow villagers" (*kaanggui ngelaki karepotan dak oring kampong*). Indeed, an encounter with a kyai is not an easy matter for villagers. If a villager wants to consult a kyai, the villager has to prepare himself well

mentally and materially, as he must arrange his questions and present them in a formal way and bring valuable gifts or cash. Informally, an encounter with a kyai is an unpleasant experience for villagers. For example, when the kyai of Bettet drove his car through the village road, any villager who encountered him would step to one side of the road or even retreat to someone's compound and stare at the ground. Again, those who rode bicycles would stop on the road and show respect to the kyai by lowering their gaze. Therefore, in order not to embarrass the villagers, the kyai argued that he was restrained from joining local activities and intermingling with the villagers. Seen in a broader context, indeed, the kyai aims at cultivating and sustaining a desirable image.

Ideologically a kyai needs prestige in order to command influence over a large following. Being a spiritual leader, a kyai cannot depend solely on scriptural knowledge to gain popularity. The centrality of being perceived as a strong and dignified figure requires that a kyai evoke public expectation and hope. Accordingly, a kyai allows himself to be addressed with a cluster of attributes which reinforce his symbolic power and knowledge. As previously observed, such an image can be effectively spread through the works and campaigns of assistants and santris.

Sociologically, the distance between a kyai and the villagers creates a favorable atmosphere for manipulation. In the villages a leader is closely associated with generosity, prowess, bravery (*kabengalan*), self-control and independence. A kyai, as a religious figure, is not exempted from assuming such virtues. Since an opportunity to prove these attributes is not always easily available, a kyai has to find ways to compensate for this lack. In addition to his attempts to show signs of his virtues, a kyai continues to build the expected image through attribution. Without overtly or even consciously asking a subordinate to propagate a kyai's achievements and perceived virtues, by using the cultural ethos and benefiting from the local social structure, a kyai acts in such a way as to produce the expected image before his immediate followers. The latter then convey the meaning and attributes to wider circles among the villagers. For example, during the 1984 tobacco season, the junior ulama of Bettet set

up a huge wind propeller in the pondok compound. It produced an eery sound. He told me that the propeller was intended for self entertainment as well as threats against evil spirits. But the santris understood it differently as they told the visitors and villagers that the propeller was erected in order specifically to counteract tobacco pests.

The kyai's leadership remains primarily spiritual. The fact that a kyai is an important focus which brings the fragmented villages into more unified, though discontinuous, segments has made him crucial in any village program in Madura. The centrality of a kyai's religious authority is evident in the religious sanction he exercises over the wider population. Moreover, the overlapping boundaries of village life often induce a kyai to assume extra-religious leadership. But a kyai bases all his societal activities on religious grounds. It is the congeniality of one's acts to the religious and local norms that, as I will demonstrate shortly, forms the kyai's justification for his programs. The following relates two episodes in which the kyai of Bettet was involved in activities in the villages that were not purely religious or educational.

The kyai and village development. The kyai of Bettet has been active in improving village infrastructure. He built canals, roads and bridges. In the late 1970's Bettet received government aid to build a concrete bridge, replacing the old one built by the kyai in 1967. Since the funds were not sufficient to complete the bridge, desa officials attempted to get the kyai's support. The kyai did not give his full endorsement. First, he wanted the old bridge maintained until the new one was completed. He argued that since the old bridge was an inseparable part of the existing canal construction, efforts should be made to sustain the water supply to the village by temporarily preserving the old bridge and constructing a new canal within the newly planned-bridge structure. Yet the kyai showed overt support as he encouraged villagers to take part in constructing the new bridge. When all the government funds were spent, only three concrete pillars of the bridge had been erected. For the following five years (until 1984) no attempt was made to revive the construction. As far as the kyai is concerned, the whole affair indicates his central position in conducting village


development. By leaving the bridge construction unfinished, the kyai was able to show to the public that his contribution, financial and moral, was indispensable even in the construction of a village bridge.

In 1984 the kyai announced that he wanted to pursue the bridge construction and move the canal to the new bridge site. Concomitant with the kyai's plan to erect a madrasah building, he arranged a package for village development with the klebun. After providing materials and funds, the kyai announced the beginning of the work. During Friday prayers in May 1984, the kyai asked villagers to participate in the construction project. After explaining the benefits of a canal and bridge for village development and well-being, the kyai emphasized the divine reward for those who worked for the betterment of the society. He reminded the villagers that the work should be done voluntarily without any compulsion and fear of the kyai or klebun. "We have to start the work with sincerity (*ikhlas*)," the kyai reiterated, "in order to propagate the word of God (*li 'la'li kalimatillah*)." The execution of the plan was organized by the klebun. In each kampong, the desa official was asked alternately to list ten villagers per day to work in the construction. Through this arrangement the labor was better managed as the klebun had a sufficient labor force to execute the program on a regular basis.

The construction of the canal attracted the attention of the local government. The latter was, of course, interested in the cooperation between ulama and officials in stimulating village initiatives for the development program. Since the canal was planned to be built along the planned bridge, the kyai also resumed work on the completion of the bridge structure. After completing the digging and the terracing of the new one-kilometer canal, attempts were made to open pathways to the planned bridge on both sides of the river bank. Apart from the skilled workers required for the terracing, all the work was done voluntarily by the villagers. In the meantime the klebun used the kyai's successful initiatives as a basis to apply for special government funds in order to complete the construction of the bridge. The kyai and the klebun had an audience with the bupati requesting the latter's help. However, it was

revealed that by early 1985 that the government had decided to complete the construction of the bridge through a public tender. It refused to deposit the funds directly with the desa officials, even though it provided the latter with pipes for the canal, arguing that the construction of such a concrete bridge required special technical skills not available in Bettet. By inviting tenders, the government insisted, the bridge could be completed within a defined time, within the budget and be of a known quality, as bidders were expected to compete for the project. But until March, 1985 the running water to Bettet continued to be channelled through the old canal since the new one was not completed due primarily to the delay in the construction of the bridge (see Figure 12.2). The kyai was now less enthusiastic in pursuing the construction of the bridge since it had obviously become a government project. He would gain little recognition for his participation in completing the construction. As

Figure 12.2: Village projects Initiated by the kyai of Bettet



far as social prestige was concerned, the kyai had succeeded in winning popular recognition for his initiatives in reviving the construction of the bridge by pursuing his own direct interests in bringing water to his pondok and village land.

The kyai paid special attention to the maintenance of his independent leadership. The central preoccupation of the kyai's societal activity was to redefine and reinterpret the meaning and role of his institution. He was jealous in guarding his perceived independence as a religious leader. As can be seen in the completion of the bridge construction, the kyai did not fully participate in its execution, because he enjoyed little benefit from such a heavily government-financed project. On the other hand, although the kyai received some government aid to construct the canal, as had been the case with his mosque, he could still claim full recognition for the work; for, in the final analysis, the kyai was both the fund raiser and organizer.

The execution of the kyai's village program is carried out in cooperation with the officials. Despite the ability of the kyai to mobilize villagers, he has little knowledge about the management of labor among villagers. Yet desa officials are able to enlist large numbers of villagers for village work because of the kyai's call and support. Again, desa officials are important in organizing enough village labor to complete the project. Interestingly enough, higher ulama are more open and sometimes more aggressive than their local counterparts in initiating contact with government officials (cf. Horikoshi 1976:371-2). The prestige and popularity enjoyed by the higher ulama provide them with confidence and bargaining power to establish cooperation with outsiders. This is not the case with the local ulama since they are easily prone to losing their independence in the process of cooperation with the establishment. For example, as I have demonstrated, Imam Bintang of Samaran was deserted by his followers partly because of his unreserved affiliation with a government-supported organization. His acceptance of various government aid packages was seen by the villagers as a sign of his diminishing independence and glaring opportunism. Being a little known local imam, he was not trusted, nor even expected, to exercise influence over such a strong power as the government establishment. The kyai of Bettet by vir-

tue of his wide influence and supralocal ties has little trouble in cooperating with and receiving aid from the government. But the kyai is strongly aware of the danger in playing such a sensitive role. As a result, he carefully examines any move toward outsiders so as not to jeopardize his perceived independence and leadership among the followers and supporters in the villages.

The kyai as arbitrator in village disputes. Kyais are credited with the power to deter moral laxity among villagers. When a villager is involved in a dispute, quarrel or fight, he may ask help from a kyai to support his cause. In response to such a plea, a kyai will examine the sources of the problem and advise the villager to be non-aggressive by giving him particular formulae and amulets. In cases of inheritance disputes which were brought to the kyai of Bettet, the latter always established pre-conditions that if the parties involved would agree to abide by Islamic law, he would consider their cases. Since villagers in general are potential followers of a kyai, he is careful not to place his prestige in jeopardy because of petty, local affairs. Indeed, such a decision, as I shall show, is part of a kyai's strategy in cultivating and preserving his leadership role in the society.

In summer 1984, the leadership of the kyai of Bettet was overtly tested when he was requested to deter an impending *carok*¹³ in neighboring Sameran. Fighting erupted in Sameran during the month of fasting (Ramadhan) of 1984 between groups of village youth. It started when Muja (21) harshly ordered a villager not to continue to collect grass in a field that bordered on the former's agricultural land (*galengan*).¹⁴ The villager (Barlekeh) protested that none could claim a monopoly over the

¹³ In Madurese villages, the *carok* is a culturally sanctioned form of violence to settle accounts. It can involve the entire core of kinsmen. When a villager feels that his honor, popularly associated with family and in particular women, and public reputation are transgressed (*todus*), he will at times alone or together with his kinsmen kill the violator. Likewise the relatives of the victim may take revenge against anyone of the killer's core kin, especially if the bases for the earlier killing are ambiguous. For more detailed examples of *caroks* in Madura see Samsuri 1979, 1982; also Touwen-Bouwsma 1983.

¹⁴ An informant (local teacher) told me that the event was not an isolated case. The two opposing families had been for a long time involved in some kind of rivalry and factional dispute.

galengan, and any villager should be allowed to cut grass from such neutral land. Using an implicit threat, Muja urged Barlekeh to leave the place. The latter eventually left the field to meet his relatives and friends. Without delay they headed to the field and punished Muja with blows and a beating. Muja's brother who came to help was kept back by Barlekeh's gang so that the fighting ended with Muja's defeat. The following day, which coincided with the Telasan (celebration day at the end of the fasting month of Ramadan), Muja accompanied by his father met the kyai of Bettet. The kyai had been well-informed about what had happened with Muja, particularly since the latter was an ex-santri at the pondok of Bettet. In front of the kyai Muja complained about the humiliation he had suffered and insisted that the kyai should provide him with formulae to retain his confidence. This was, of course, a difficult matter for the kyai to make a decision about since customarily Muja had the right to make good the humiliation which had been heaped upon him. The kyai agreed to bless Muja but issued his ultimate warning of excommunication from his realm (*besto*) against Muja if he should decide to take revenge (*carok*) against Barlekeh or any of his relatives. In Sameran the tension was very high since all the core kinsmen of Muja and Barlekeh had prepared to face any possible threat. Although the kyai's threat of the *besto* against Muja was known by the desa officials, local imams, mak kaebs and other villagers, attempts were also made by local leaders to arrange a truce between the two conflicting families. Witnessed by the klebun and a local imam, the leading figures in both families agreed to end the hostility and forgive each other. For weeks tension remained high but no fighting occurred. A retired soldier who lived in Sameran told me one day that it was almost impossible to prevent a humiliated person or family (*todus/epatodus*) in the villages from committing *carok*, but an influential kyai remained an effective deterrent for some villagers. He then cited the threat of the *besto* issued by the kyai of Bettet against Muja as an example.

For more than ten weeks the kyai's threat against Muja succeeded in preventing the impending *carok*. Then the kyai suffered a serious stroke from which he never recovered. He eventually died in September 1984. During the kyai's absence for

treatment in Surabaya, Muja and his core kinsmen attacked those of Barlekeh killing two and seriously injuring a third. It is not clear whether the carok was based upon Muja's belief that the kyai could no longer execute his own *besto* against Muja. (Following the carok Muja and a number of other suspects were detained by the police. Six months later when I left Pamekasan, Muja and his brother were still in detention awaiting trial.) Interestingly, Muja's family continued to maintain close ties with the pondok of Bettet, but the latter was no longer represented by the senior kyai. Indeed, Muja's father requested protection and guidance from the emerging new kyai of Bettet in order to ease the pressure on the family and to lessen the possible long jail term for Muja and his brother. The new kyai responded positively by giving implicit recognition of his ties with Muja's family as well as providing the family with certain formulae to be recited regularly. The villagers in Sameran knew about the kyai's decision. In return during the tobacco season shortly after the carok, Muja's father sent a portion of his tobacco harvest to the dalem in Bettet. The new kyai justified his decision on the basis of providing necessary help for Muja's family since the crime *per se* had been handled by the police. Yet in view of the pressure and threats suffered by Muja's family, the kyai seems to have manipulated the situation for his own advantage, even by ignoring the *besto* issued by his predecessor. Although the senior kyai was able temporarily to prevent Muja from instigating the carok, the sanctions eventually broke down when the kyai was unable to execute his *besto*. Moreover, the different and inconsistent policies pursued by the new kyai towards Muja show the precariousness and ambivalence of the kyai's direct action vis-à-vis the villagers.

Chapter Thirteen

THE ULAMA AND THE ESTABLISHMENT

As local religious leaders, the ulama experience tremendous challenges in the face of increasing government control over villages, as well as growing ties between center and periphery. Clifford Geertz has suggested that religious leaders in Java (kyaïs), can be seen as cultural brokers who mediate between the local, parochial communities and the national system. In the process of modernization, the kyaïs will be more and more absorbed into the wider system, detached from their own original grouping (C. Geertz 1960a).¹⁵

Since the ulama are aware of their strategic link with the local population, they carefully maneuver such ties to relate to the outside world and the government. By maintaining and institutionalizing the ties between the local level and the higher authorities under a desirable order, the ulama play a meaningful role in the changing Madurese villages. As long as the government lacks the power to interfere in local affairs, the ulama have a better chance to maneuver with respect to their position and role in the society.

The ulama in Madura were relatively dominant in the local setting. With the increasing ability of the Indonesian government to promote village development schemes and trickle funds down to the villages, the ulama are experiencing new situations which confront their leadership. Many fields which were previously the sole domain of the ulama have been infringed upon and shared by the new government agencies and establishment. But the ulama do not necessarily pose themselves as opponents of the government, even if they are presently witnessing a mounting challenge to their leadership. Since the ulama regard themselves as guides for the local population they are continuously being forced to adjust to the new situation in order

¹⁵ E. Wolf (1956) and L. Faller (1955) have addressed a comparable phenomenon in their discussion of brokers in Mexico and chiefs in Uganda respectively, see also Introduction.

to maintain their position. Formally the ulama pay overt allegiance to authorities, even though they are not interested in involving themselves in governing matters per se. Under this basic general characteristic, the relationship between ulama and the establishment in Madura will be examined.

Mak.kaehs: the lowest religious functionaries at the village level

The increasing presence, at least physically, of the government at the village level has forced local ulama (mak kaehs) to adjust their relationship with the officials. Vigorous village programs implemented in the last few years have added significant prestige to the village officials. Since the klebuns have been generally regarded as the lowest government representatives, they often function as distributors of government loans and welfare programs. Such additional power enhances a klebun's position in the desa. The ability to bring material rewards into the villages has diminished the stereotypical image of the klebun as tax collector and service beneficiary among the villagers. Local ulama who generally do not distinguish themselves, economically, from their fellow villagers thus share in and benefit from such economic and welfare programs. More specifically, village religious centers receive financial support from the government. Since the delivery of such funds is usually supervised by local officials, a new form of relations between mak kaehs and officials has emerged. The klebun undoubtedly gains a better popular image by administering such local religious projects.

Although government aid for religious programs remains suspect among villagers, many local ulama did receive various government funds. The increasing physical presence of the government in villages as evidenced by the building of public schools, roads and desa offices shows that local religious leaders are no longer the sole owners of elaborate public places such as mosques. Since the government also provides religious institutions with development aid, funds are made available for particular religious projects in the villages. Some of these funds are allocated by government agencies, especially the Depag. Village committees and local ulama are given the opportunity to apply for special funds in order to renovate religious centers or to

promote religious educational programs. In view of the centrality of information and knowledge about bureaucratic requirements in order to qualify for such funds, only certain village ulama attempt to get government aid. Any application for such funds must be authorized by the desa and higher government officials including the klebun and camat. The direct support of these officials is indispensable if the religious and educational projects are to receive the attention necessary for approval since they have direct access to the decision makers at the regency (kabupaten) level. On the other hand, several madrasahs which have received financial support from the government evidently have included general subjects as the major schedule in their teaching curriculum. In other words, preference in funding is given to those institutions which have adopted the official guidance for religious education. Yet many ordinary village madrasahs enjoy government support in the form of teaching staff paid by the government as pegawai negeri.

The semi-official management of parts of the zakat (religious taxes) creates new ties between the government agencies and the village ulama. For the last few years, the government has encouraged Indonesian Muslims to improve the organization and collection of the zakat. At a national level, the President is the honorary head of the central committee for zakat management. He allocates the zakat to the Islamic institutions in different regions of the country. At the regency level, the allocation of these funds is conducted through the local bureaucracy. In this way local government officials have a good opportunity to support the funding of religious programs and the renovation of religious centers in the villages. The fact that village religious centers are usually personally owned by local ulama induces the officials to build a better relationship with the ulama and vice versa. Insofar as the ulama are unwilling to cooperate or request funds, no external authority can interfere with the local religious institutions. It is this independence, perceived or real, probably mixed with what George Foster calls "peasant pride," that local ulama jealously guard and strive for (1965; cf. Rogers 1969). But the perennial financial difficulties encountered in attempts to improve religious programs and renovate the buildings often induce such

local figures to look for external assistance. To make matters even worse, the increasing improvement of school buildings, desa offices and local houses makes the renovation of religious buildings and the establishment of elaborate religious programs indispensable. Since government aid for such religious programs is casual and discontinuous, many local ulama in fact need not sacrifice their independence when they receive official support. Furthermore, a smaller scale of zakat, particularly the *zakat fitrah*, is collected, especially from the pegawais, yearly prior to the end of Ramadhan (fasting month) by the local officials of each government body and agency. Since the amount of such zakat is not enormous, it meets to the needs of only a limited number of particularly needy villagers. In 1984, the greater part of this zakat was assigned to several village mak kaehs and imams, who were favorably looked upon by the government, to be distributed to local villagers. I have shown in Chapter 9 how such zakat was allocated by Bintang of Sameran. In that year Bintang received no less than three different packages of the zakat from the police, the local office of the Department of Education and the Women's Association (Dharma Wanita). Although such a gesture can be easily identified as political maneuvering, it indicates the importance of village ulama at the local level from the government perspective.

In the villages no mosque or langgar ulama receives a government salary as a religious functionary. Although some local ulama are pegawais, they receive governmental salaries for their non-ecclesiastical positions. For instance, Pak Wari of Sameran receives a monthly salary as an Army officer, not as mosque imam; again, Putran of Proppo became a pegawai not because of his religious function at the langgar raja but because of his position as a teacher at the village madrasah.

Since the government has become an important channel for the distribution of funds, local officials exercise greater power in ratifying applications for religious funds. If supralocal kyais may relatively easily secure access to funds from their wealthy followers, local ulama have difficulties in raising funds. This is not so much the result of local poverty as of the popular tendency to submit contributions to those who are held to possess more efficacious barakah. Consequently, local ulama

either keep a low profile or attempt to gain access to other sources of support. In the latter case, government assistance becomes a stronger alternative. Let us examine how mak kaeh Sapan of Naguan endeavored to secure government aid to renovate his langgar and improve educational services for village children.

Sapan (54) has run his langgar raja for more than two decades. Since the number of pupils grew steadily, the langgar became overcrowded, particularly during the evening sessions when children gathered to get religious instruction. Accordingly, the mak kaeh planned to renovate the langgar building as well as improve the instruction by founding a kindergarten. Although Sapan had received contributions from the villagers, the renovation of the langgar could not be completed. Yet the unfinished building continued to be occupied as a place of worship and education. Under the suggestion of his oldest son who lived in Probolinggo as a government teacher, Sapan formed a local committee for the completion of the langgar building. This committee included diverse figures in the kampong and was headed by Sapan's second son. In early 1984, the committee applied for special funds from the regency office. Since the application did not get full support from the local klebun and the camat, the committee never received a favorable reply from the office. Thus, attempts were made to secure the local officials' support and endorsement for the renovation plan. Indeed, by January 1985 the local klebun forwarded the application for funds to higher officials in the Kabupaten.

The propagation and establishment of various government programs in the villages often involve the participation of the local mak kaehs. For example, with the opening of local branches of the government-supported MDI, desa officials need the support of local mak kaehs. Concomitant with government attempts to balance the physical and technological development with spiritual motivation as well as to promote official plans, the government has sponsored various religious programs in the villages. In view of the close association of such programs with the ruling party, local mak kaehs were generally unenthusiastic about taking part in them. Yet a klebun, as a native villager, has resources and knows how to win the support of at least one of

the local mak kaehs. Insofar as the local support for such religious programs is half-hearted, little can be done through government-backed organizations such as MDI. At most, the MDI becomes a convenient reason for desa officials to recruit local mak kaehs and some of their followers into the official organizations. Moreover, the presence of government religious teachers in the villages is effectively manipulated to support the foundation of such official organizations. Despite the unpopularity of the MDI in the villages, it enjoys firm, albeit surreptitious, membership among a few village mak kaehs.

The inclusion of a *modin* (religious functionary) in the desa administration forms the lowest link between village Islam and the government. But in Madurese villages, modins face certain dilemmas, because, unlike other desa officials, a modin has no fixed source of income (cf. van den Berg 1882:30; Oost-Java met Madoera 1917:192-6; Leunissen 1982:27). Instead of being given the usufruct of the percaton land and a fraction of the land taxes, a modin has to collect a contribution directly from the villagers while leading particular ceremonies such as marriages, funerals and other rites of passages. Since the assumption of modinship does not provide its holder with a good income, nor does it significantly enhance his prestige, a modin will most likely retain his position as a local mak kaeh. Insofar as local ulama are easily available in villages, a modin is not as much sought after by the population as required by the bureaucracy, to register marriages, divorces and deaths in a desa. According to some desa officials, the dispossession of the modin from the percaton land was a result of the fact that from the very beginning religious functions in the villages have been performed voluntarily by local mak kaehs. Thus, there was no need to put aside percaton land for the modin. Furthermore, the fact that many religious services, including funerals and family feasts, are generally officiated over by a local mak kaeh places the modinship in an awkward position in the village religious leadership. Nonetheless, the official need for the registration of births, marriages, divorces and deaths perpetuates the maintenance of the modinship. In conjunction with stricter government supervision over marriage practices, a modin plays an important role in

establishing the validity (in terms of age limit and number of marriages) of a prospective marriage. Although a modin cannot act alone in this respect, he has direct access to the klebun (who issues various certificates) and to the local office of the Depag, the KUA (which officially registers and legitimizes marriage contracts and divorces). In villages modins may be conveniently identified as brokers and guides who arrange for the necessary requirements of the officials as well as fulfill the villagers' needs in order that the latter may conduct their religious affairs in accordance with official regulations. In return for such guidance, the modins are rewarded. The irregularity of income and the awkwardness of their position, especially in villages with abundant mak kaehs, often leave the modinship unoccupied or subject to recurrent resignations. In Bettet during the last thirteen years the modinship was transferred four times back and forth among three mak kaehs. In 1984 the klebun, a haji, assumed the modinship.

The inward-looking tendency among mak kaehs prevents them from assuming a key role in relating villagers to the higher government establishment. In view of the local orientation and limited background of village mak kaehs, their main concern remains local religion and village harmony. Although some mak kaehs may have extensive experience in supralocal affairs, their close association with langgar and religious leadership in the villages induces them to pursue the established norms and accepted values. Mak kaehs' conformity to a local religious standard is furthered by their location in the relational network of higher ulama and kyais. Insofar as a mak kaeh receives his religious education from the established kyais in the region, he is almost automatically subservient to such supralocal figures in many facets of religious, social and political decisions. A number of mak kaehs who supported the government-backed party during the last elections, for instance, came from those who had received their religious education from centers and figures outside the region. Since these mak kaehs had lesser emotional ties with, and weaker commitment to, the established kyais in the region, the former enjoyed freedom to exercise their own religio-political will by joining Golkar. Furthermore, the limited economic resources

which keep local mak kaehs barely distinguishable from their fellow villagers constrain the mak kaehs from making independent initiatives to contact the higher establishment or from attracting outside agents to take advantage of such local religious figures.

Mosque functionaries

Due to the wider leadership that a mosque ulama (imam) enjoys, he has stronger authority to represent his followers in relations with external agents and the establishment. As we saw, mosque imams attract a wider following than mak kaehs mainly because of their control over village mosques. A mosque becomes a place for officials to show their commitment to local religious and moral standards; and for the imam, a mosque signifies the implicit recognition of his religious leadership by villagers, desa officials and notables through the latter's participation in mosque activities. During the Friday prayer, desa officials such as the klebun become mere participants in the religious ritual led by the imam. In a society where public conformity to a religious standard is important, adult villagers, particularly the prominent figures, cannot fail to participate in such important rituals as Friday prayers. On the other hand, an imam is greatly enhanced by the participation of village notables and officials in his mosque. Not surprisingly, an imam has, to a degree, similar interests to the desa officials in maintaining the village social structure.

The centrality of the mosque in the village context attracts a wide participation. Until quite recently a village mosque was the only significant center for the whole village or desa. For their respective reasons desa officials and local ulama shared interests in maintaining the village mosque. Insofar as the mosque was privately owned by a local imam, any contribution to the mosque had to be freed from any pre-condition. With the foundation of elementary schools and other government institutions in the villages, desa officials have enjoyed increasing popularity due to their commitment to local affairs. Although desa officials have no direct access to the internal organization of elementary public schools, their cooperation is vital, especially in the early stages of the schools' operations. Thus, the official status of the school is

usually identified with the desa administration. However, the popular identification of a klebun with the village school, which indirectly erodes the domination of local ulama over education, often creates friction between the two village elite groups.

Mosque imams have better access to funds than do local mak kaehs. Since a mosque functionary enjoys strong bargaining power to deal with desa officials, he has better opportunities to gain access to official information about village development programs. On the other hand, imams have regular contacts with adult villagers. For this reason, a klebun is careful to prevent any of his opponents from aligning with the mosque imam, and at the same time tries to maintain a cordial relationship with him. With the increasing ability of a klebun to realize government development schemes in, and bring funds to, villages, he is in a better position to show his patronage to a village mosque. The klebun of Gro'om, for example, attempted to win popular support by *inter alia* building closer ties with local ulama.

The incumbent headman of Gro'om (48) succeeded his predecessor in 1981 by virtue of government appointment. As an experienced government employee, the klebun performed his official duties quite well. Moreover, he cultivated his ties with village ulama as can be seen in his active participation in the local imam's endeavors to derive funds for the mosque renovation as well as the klebun's offer to a rising young ustadz to marry the former's daughter. As an acting klebun, he knew that eventually he would face a desa election. From quite an early phase of his headmanship, the klebun was opposed by a faction in the desa led by a wealthy villager. Having secured key support from prominent local mak kaehs, the klebun did not face a serious challenge to his leadership. When the government decided in early 1985 to hold an election in the desa, the acting headman, among others, re-activated his ties with local ulama, especially the mosque imam. Although he attempted to win popular votes by securing support from a supralocal kyal who exercised strong influence on local religious figures, the acting headman intensively cultivated his ties with the imam and mak kaehs in the desa. In fact, his maneuvers brought him good results as he won the 1985 desa election with the majority votes.

Nevertheless, in the villages where the klebuns are well-established, mosque ulama often suffer interference and subordination. Well-established klebuns enjoy various sources of popular support which enhance their position in their respective desas. Under such conditions a klebun may rally local mak kaehs to strengthen his position, suppress opponents or execute desa plans. In the Bettet area, in late 1984 the klebun of Tlangoh surprisingly forced the mosque imam in his desa to bar an ustadz from delivering sermons and teaching in the mosque. This episode, however, was not an isolated incident. The klebun was enraged by the ustadz' agitation against his headmanship, when he had been away in South Kalimantan. Indeed, the agitation never won official endorsement, but the klebun felt that the ustadz had inflicted serious damage to his reputation. Although the imam and ustadz had been involved in an overt competition over the leadership of the mosque and religious education in the village, the klebun's daring initiative which struck a responsive chord among the leading mosque functionaries was quite phenomenal. Furthermore, the expelled ustadz was prevented from establishing a new mosque in his neighborhood. When he insisted on rallying support for his plan, the klebun warned him about an impending carok against his family. In fact, one of his sons was accused of having illicit sexual relations with the wife of a local inhabitant. Thus, the degree of popularity enjoyed by the desa officials and the local ulama among the village inhabitants determines the balance of power between the klebun and the ulama at the village level.

The organization of regular classes for religious education at village madrasahs enhances the significance of local imams who usually become the sponsors of such religious educational institutions. Until quite recently religious education was the only instruction available in some villages. Since the government had been unable to fill the need for general education, via the Depag it contributed teachers and literature to the madrasah. The similar religio-political leanings of most village ulama and officials of the Depag at the time was undoubtedly conducive to such cooperation. Vigorous attempts by the government during the 1970's to establish public schools in all

the villages, as we saw, were not always favorably welcomed by the local ulama. For many villagers and ulama, general education had no direct relevance in their local settings. Yet the public school has become a reality in village life due to strong (local and national) government support as well as a lack of religious justification to oppose public schools. In fact, no prominent kyais in the region openly voiced an objection to elementary public schools in the villages. At present, a modus operandi has been worked out as the two institutions organize their respective educational activities without any serious conflict. Despite the modifications and adjustment, most village madrasahs continue to enjoy government support.

The need of local madrasahs for better teaching staff and more adequate facilities compels their organizers to seek government assistance. As already indicated, village madrasahs face a tremendous problem in financing their buildings and especially their operations. A local mosque imam, who usually runs such a madrasah, has little barakah which would enable him to keep a large voluntary teaching staff. And financially he does not have much to offer. The government thus logically becomes the last resort for help and assistance. Yet the local religio-political tendency to keep aloof from the régime puts such imams and makkaehs in a dilemma when they wish to pursue such an endeavor as a madrasah. Being unwilling to be identified with a locally unpopular régime, local ulama have to find a method, often delicate and surreptitious, in order to acquire government assistance. In this way local ulama zealously present themselves to the villagers as not mere agents and puppets (*kancaks*) of a non-religious establishment, even the régime. Since such an attitude is changing in accordance with the popular view toward the régime, the local perception of independence can be symbolized in different ways. For instance, during the early 1960's when the strong ulama group in the region was closely associated with the government, those who gained access to government patronage did not suffer popular criticism. It was an acceptable undertaking even from the public point of view. The ability of many local ulama to bring benefits to the villages with full orientation toward the local context was favorably welcomed by the villagers. Commenting on the legal-

ity of past cooperation of the ulama with the régime, a local imam in Teja explained, "... In the past, government assistance for our religious programs (*da'wahs*) placed no restriction on our affiliation with any *kyai*." Thus, relations between the local ulama and the government are not fixed and static. They are affected by, and influence, the current ideology adopted by higher ulama as a group. After a period of indifference and distrust during the 1970's and early 1980's, ulama in Pamekasan, as I will show shortly, have restored their close ties with the government and its agencies. For example, during a conference of all sub-branch committees of the NU in late 1984, many instructors in the fields of land tenure, taxation, government bureaucracy and the judicial system were recruited from among the higher civil servants and officers in the region.

Mosque imams deliver public sermons once a week. The sermons, however, do not normally discuss current issues. The Friday sermon is much more an inseparable part of a strictly congregational prayer than an opportunity to deliver messages. Although a mosque is an effective center for disseminating news and ideas, most non-religious activities at the village mosque are conducted informally. For instance, the response of Imam Jari of Teja toward government loans for tobacco cultivation in the 1984 season was not put forward in the sermon, despite the strong religious flavor of his argument. Instead, Jari casually suggested his religious opinion during the post-prayer conversation with his fellow villagers on the mosque veranda and at other gatherings, a practice which was an indirect result of related factors, religio-ideological and political. As a local imam, Jari did not know how to express publicly his opposition to official programs in the village. An overt rejection was almost unthinkable for him. Yet he had to deliver his views to his followers. Moreover, the prevailing belief in the sacredness of the Friday sermon prevented Jari from imposing his interpretation of village affairs such as the government loan scheme. Despite the relative sophistication of mosque imams, in terms of their religious knowledge and general world view, they, unlike higher ulama, are constrained by a close attachment to the local setting. Accordingly, mosque imams have limited power to conduct indepen-

dent bargaining with external agencies. This does not mean that the establishment cannot benefit from having ties with mosque functionaries as evidenced, for instance, by developments in Samaran (see above Chapter 9).

With the increasing importance of *desa* officials in representing villages vis-à-vis the establishment, local figures, including imams have little room to conduct direct institutional communication with supravillage agencies. Since a village mosque is privately owned and run, it has no structural link with the government establishment. In the last few years, however, the government has encouraged the foundation of Mosque Committees (*Dewan Masjid*) at the *kecamatan* level and higher. Although such bodies will be independently run by the local religious figures for the benefit of the mosques and their congregations, the government undoubtedly has a strong interest in this particular arrangement. More important, the committees exercise authority, vague though it may be, over local mosques. For example, a local committee can communicate to the government its priorities with regard to religious development plans, which are locally deemed crucial. Again, the government's suspicion of Muslim activism is compensated for by the establishment of popular religious bodies which have direct contact with local ⁴ulama. Nevertheless, the mosque committee lacks concrete ideas and popular symbols to attract wide participation of imams and other local ulama. Furthermore, the dominance of Islamic organizations such as the SI and NU in the region undermines the preponderance of the Mosque Committee which shares their fields of activities. Be that as it may, the mere formation of a Mosque Committee in a particular area shows the local need for new channels to pursue mosque interests.

The local ulama are closely attached to the village structure. They cannot pursue their own wishes without negating their existing relations with the villagers. Therefore, despite the multi-faceted pressure on local imams to join various government-sponsored religious associations, only a few have done so. Concomitant with the changing political attitude of the NU national leaders vis-à-vis the prevailing political parties, it is interesting to see how ulama in Madura, especially Pamekasan, readjust

their relationship with the establishment. But since such changes have just occurred, it is too early to comment on such phenomena. What is more important as far as our discussion in this section is concerned, and what we shall look at now, are the higher ulama, the kyais, and their views toward, and relations with the establishment.

The kyai: balancing authority in villages

Kyais who enjoy supravillage influence have a stronger base than lower ulama from which to bargain with various agents of the government establishment. In Madura, kyais have generally conducted their religio-social activities independent of the political establishment, at least since the first half of the nineteenth century. By founding religious educational centers in the hinterland, such religious figures were able to attract devout followers and santri. Since various régimes could not establish firm control over the countryside, kyais continued to dominate village life. A few of them were recruited by the régimes to serve government offices in the towns. The failure of the régimes to show their concern and presence in the villages only perpetuated the close affiliation between villagers and such local figures as kyais. Until recently, the kyais formed clusters of religious followings which at times conducted relations with external agents as corporate groups namely pondoks and santris. Although the present régime has been vigorously propagating village programs and trickling down funds to desas, it cannot easily ignore the influence of the kyais on the villagers. Indeed, the relational web which connect the villagers to the kyais forms a neutralizing entity against any external intrusion into the villages. In a socio-religious sense, thus, a kyai stands representative to defend local interests.

A kyai's perception of leadership and independence measure, to some extent, his relation with the authorities. Unlike mak kachs and imams, kyais are characterized as having solid knowledge of Islam. The kyais are propagators of scriptural Islam. Since the expression of scriptural Islam requires a territory or locale in the villages, a kyai cannot ignore any limitations on his religious conduct and leadership. Closely related to such an idea is the notion of correctness in worship and practice. Without the imposition, even if only publicly, of the scriptural teaching, a kyai may lose his *raison*

d'être in the villages. Not surprisingly, kyais jealously guard their religious territory vis-à-vis any other authority. But under a strong, popular government, kyais are forced to relinquish a segment of their field of activities in order to achieve a *modus vivendi*. In today's villages, the inhabitants increasingly become a market where the two most prominent dealers, the government and kyais, vigorously, in different ways, sell their commodities: hope and well-being.

The perceived autonomy enjoyed by kyais is the key to their close ties with the establishment. In the past, when villages were left almost autonomous, the kyais, and at times other figures, emerged as quasi-local rulers. With the increase of national control over villages, the kyais can no longer fully maintain their multi-faceted role and their semi-autonomy among the inhabitants. But the fact that kyais continue to be seen by many segments of the population as guides and teachers in many aspects of village life and that the government has not been able to replace all aspects of the kyais' leadership perpetuate the ties among government, villagers and kyais. During the last thirty years, as I shall show, the kyais in Madura have experienced shifting attitudes toward, and ties with, the government.

A tentative alliance (1956-1971)

During the late 1950's and early 1960's, when President Sukarno implemented his political concepts of Guided Democracy and particularly *Nasakom* (a multi-party alliance) (see McVey 1969), most kyais in Madura as supporters of the NU maintained cordial ties with the government. In return, they enjoyed much socio-religious autonomy in the local context and dominated the governing bodies of religious offices. For example, the regional office of the *Depag* in Pamekasan was headed by prominent kyais such as Aliurido.

Furthermore, the limited introduction of government programs in the villages favorably encouraged the proliferation of the kyais' influence and authority. This was especially so since the recruitment of some kyais into the *Depag* did not create a dualism in the prevailing structure of the religious leadership. The non-bureaucratic

kyais even benefited from the direct relationship with their official colleagues. Insofar as the government had little energy and interest in pursuing village development programs such an arrangement would have been sufficient to maintain its popular support. More specifically, the preservation of the local status quo was advantageous for the still weak national government. Such an advantage was not achieved without a cost however. For example, national policies had to be filtered through, and compromised by, local figures, as the latter were formally given positions or unofficially stood as mediators. Indeed, for quite some time during the period the regent of Pamekasan had to take decisions under pressure from prominent kyais (Amir Santoso 1980 123). In 1961 the town market was removed from its original site in the central town because it had interfered with the holding of prayers at the nearby *jami* mosque. The removal was largely made possible by the fact that the majority of the local legislative members (DPRD) belonged to the ulama grouping. The kyais thus formed a powerful quasi-lobbying group which directly delivered messages and opinions to the regent. The increasingly consolidated power of the kyais on the one hand, and the lack of ability on the part of the national agents to promote local development and trickle down funds on the other, discouraged the government from initiating programs. ?

The failure of the September 30, 1965 movement was overwhelmingly applauded in Pamekasan. Initiatives to purge and arrest PKI (Communist Party) leaders and sympathizers were advocated first by the kyais. Popularly it was felt, as contemporary activists recalled, that the kyais would take over the machinery of local, and even higher-level, governing bodies. They were confident that the time had come for locally popular figures to be nominated to key leadership positions in the local government. At the village level, as already demonstrated, the young emerging kiai of Bettet, for instance, attracted a large number of visitors who wanted to acquire blessing and invulnerability. It is surprising that in such areas as Pamekasan where leftist groups were not conspicuous, the need to defend oneself against an impending leftist onslaught was strongly felt. Yet, it is important to keep in mind that Madura was

closely attached to centers such as Surabaya which were experiencing serious crises at the time. The uncertainty and confusion among many higher and local officials induced particular groups to seek support from the local anti-leftist units. In Pamekasan the kyais were vital in providing moral and physical support for the eradication of the leftists in the region (cf. Report from East Java, in *Indonesia* 1986). If in the past few years the kyais had been close to the régime, the 1965 crisis demonstrated that they were an indispensable partner in maintaining the desired order. For the kyais and their followers, the event proved that the religious leaders were masters in their own house. The local expectation for more favorable positions for the kyai grouping, at least in the regional government, continued to run high. This phenomenon, of course, was not an isolated development during the post 1965 crisis. But the fact that the master of the events had its own definite goal, often quite contradictory to that of the kyais, did not satisfy this expectation.

The honey-moon is over (1971-1982)

In Madura, the waning of cordial relations between the kyais and the régime was highlighted by the 1971 general elections. Concomitant with the régime's much popularized master plan of accelerated development, a new organization which did not have a direct link with the old political parties had to be promoted. This policy undoubtedly discredited the primordial associations of the kyais. It became clearer to the kyais in Pamekasan that the new political scene had located them in a defensive corner. Instead of gaining a better niche in the structural decision making bodies, the kyais were no longer regarded as indispensable collaborators. Indeed, the last three elections in Madura have been marked by competition between the kyai grouping and the government-backed party. Although in the polls the kyais continued to secure the majority of votes, they were relegated into the background, away from the governing bodies. On the political plane this period is marked by the overt opposition of the kyais toward the régime.

It soon became apparent, however, that without the endorsement of the kyais many village programs such as family planning, general education and agricultural

loans could not be executed smoothly (see above).

The government remained committed to pursuing its development aim. *Ad hoc* measures were taken to gain the support of particular kyais. As we saw, the further absorption of the desa officials and the trickling down of funds were essential to the government's scheme for village programs. Since many kyais resided in the villages, they were directly affected by the programs. Due to the kyais' popularity and influence, desa officials could do little against the former's opposition to certain official plans. Basing his arguments on religious grounds and local sentiment, a kyai had ample opportunities to propagate his ideas vis-a-vis government policies in the villages. But the kyais were careful not to put themselves in danger, for example, by avoiding overt public criticism of the régime. The kyais effectively disseminated ideas through their extensive networks. In response to such a phenomenon, high-level government officials were often sent to pondoks in order to win the good will of leading ulama. In fact, many prominent kyais in Pamekasan were rewarded with government help which was usually provided by the regent, the governor, or even ministers from Jakarta. For instance, in 1975 the strong minister of Home Affairs, Amir Mahmud, visited the kyai of Bettet and delivered a large amount of funds; and in 1977 another prominent general (Admiral), Sudomo (current head of the powerful national security command *Kopkamtib*) paid a homage call on Kyai Baqir of Banyuanyar. Although such visits did not produce any written pact of cooperation, let alone support for Golkar, they clearly sent a message of good will and the government's desire for a *modus vivendi*. Despite the haphazardness of such maneuvering, we should not underestimate its impact on the fermentation of kyai-government ties in the region. Being the recipients of aid, unconditional though it may have been, these kyais were culturally seen as being in debt. Thus, when the government insisted on implementing such programs as family planning, general education and agricultural loans, the kyais indirectly paid their dues by at least showing indifference to the programs. By so doing a kyai was not handicapped from supporting the popular sentiment which he had previously instigated. Furthermore, the villagers possessed specific methods to interpret

positively the deeds, actions and sayings of their kyais. On public occasions where government officials were present, any gesture or statement by the kyais would not be taken at face value any more than on other occasions.¹⁶ Accordingly, the links between a kyai and his followers continued to remain stable, insofar as he was able to maintain his network among his colleagues.

During this period, the kyais as a grouping continued to maintain their distance from the government. Not surprisingly, they were bypassed either as direct agents or mediators of government programs. In order to win recognition for its concern with Islam and execute parts of its programs, the government recruited graduates of the Islamic institutes as well as willing ulama into its fold. The local office of the Depag, for instance, is dominated by such graduates. No kyai was left in any top position. In addition, the promotion of various government-backed religious associations and programs was assigned to Muslim intellectuals in the town and to minor ulama at the village level. In Pamekasan the MDI is chaired by an IAIN graduate. During the campaigns for the general elections, a number of such religious homines novi were included in the campaign team (*jurkam*) of Golkar. Since these figures had only a peripheral following in the villages, such new developments could not compensate for the prevailing gap between the kyais and the government. Indeed, these newly emerging religious figures became a convenient target for mockery by the established ulama and villagers. They were popularly ridiculed as second-hand religious leaders (*musta'mal*). From the government point of view, the inclusion of such unpopular religious figures conveniently served its practical, local goal since they became fully dependent. But in reality, the kyais firmly held their followers, the majority of villagers, by manipulating their common religious symbols and sentiments. On the other hand, by the time of the last general election the kyais seemed to have grown tired of losing direct government patronage. The post-1982 election thus marked a new

¹⁶ In his discussion of rituals among the Tenggerese of East Java, Robert Hefner extensively analyzes the gap between "public" and "ecclesiastical" meanings of local "Indic" rituals. He points to the aggressive external pressures, religious and otherwise, upon the Tenggerese society as the main cause for the ambiguity of ritual meaning (1985).

phase in the kyai-government ties in the region and perhaps nationally. Nonetheless, before discussing the third phase of the the relationship between the government and kyais, we should look briefly at a genre of religious homines novi that the government has propped up. Quo vadis?

The increasing interference of Dutch power into the rato's domain, as we saw, was an important factor for the emergence of Madurese ulama as local leaders. Today the official elevation of a group of religious experts has not succeeded in gaining popular recognition. The central issues of independence, autonomy and folk-orientation seem to have been influential in the persistence of popular views toward the government-supported religious groups as second-hand religious leaders. Burdened by a novel ideology for justifying accelerated development within the religious context such figures faced enormous challenges. In the town proper, they symbolized a front line of newly emerging religious experts for a segment of the educated, government employees and others. Among these people, religious figures who could elaborate upon and make sense out of the continuing shift of life among townspeople were certainly needed. But in villages where ideological changes barely affected daily life, such religious figures were easily associated with intruders. With the increasing shifts of various features of village life, such homines novi might have a better chance to gain access to the villages. Yet the kyais are not static. The future of village religious leadership will experience change, but who will be able to harness the resultant opportunities cannot be ventured from our present knowledge.

The pendulum swings again (1982-1985)

The position enjoyed by Muslim politicians in the national capital reflects to some degree local views about Islamic parties and, as well, it influences the pattern of political allegiance among kyais in such areas as Madura. The persistence of the kyais in the last four elections in supporting the Islamic parties on the one hand, and the continuing ability of the government to pursue its development scheme on the other, have had a negative impact on the kyais' access to state patronage. In the kyais' language this phenomenon was expressed in the following terms: "... their involvement in

politik praktis (practical politics)¹⁷ left their social, religious and educational programs stranded. Put differently, the stagnation of many of the kyais' societal programs was caused mainly by their pursuance of their own vested interests in the political field which was often narrowly defined as membership in the legislative bodies. In fact, many politicians who were associated with the ulama's party were accused of trying to get legislative seats for the sake of power alone but not with the intention of using that power to improve Muslim educational and social institutions. Such attitudes and self-criticisms reflect the disappointment of many kyais with respect to decreasing state patronage for, and government attention toward, the kyais. The peak of the kyais' resentment was manifested in the bizarre affairs which occurred during the post-1982 election period when kyais and Muslim politicians fought for the genuine leadership of the NU. The kyai group led by a Pamekasan-born kyai wanted the NU to avoid meddling in practical politics by withdrawing its automatic political allegiance to the PPP and becoming neutral. Since the theme of their dissent was to retain the actual leadership of the NU for the ulama, kyais in Madura, including in Pamekasan, willingly supported the idea of these high ranking NU ulama. By the end of 1983 when the NU Consultative Body (Syuriyah) held its special national meeting (*Munas*) in Situbondo, kyais from Madura participated in it. In response to the possibility of adopting Pancasila as the ideological foundation of the organization, however, Madurese kyais were quoted as having issued statements which rejected the proposal (*Tempo* December 24, 1983:15). They withdrew this suggestion during the *Munas*, following Kyai Siddiq's dramatic and eloquent exposition of the religious basis for the acceptance of Pancasila as the ideological foundation of the NU as well as the plea and persuasion of other prominent ulama. The post-1983 *Munas* period has been marked with rapid rapprochement between the government and the kyais.


In Pamekasan the unofficial shift of the kyais' political allegiance coincided with the appointment of a new regent (a senior career civil servant) who came from a

¹⁷ This includes the pursuance of personal over organizational interests in order to retain or gain access to seats in the legislative body, see public speeches delivered by three prominent kyais on September 25, 1984 in Dasok.

great ulama family. For quite some time, direct communication between the previous regent and the kyais was almost absent, except when he accompanied ministers and other higher officials visiting pondoks. Indeed, the old regent had proposed regular meetings between government officials led by the regent and prominent local figures, especially kyais. Having discovered that the first meeting was conspicuously used by the regent to launch an attack on the kyais' leadership and participation in a political party, the kyais boycotted the following meetings and refused invitations (Amir Santoso 1980:137). On the other hand, the new regent won local sympathy as he visited kyais, delivered speeches in the mosques, and sent favorable messages to religious leaders. Among the surprising moves which he initiated was the holding of the Islamic calendrical celebration (*Peringatan Nuzulul Qur'an*) in June 1984. The occasion itself was not a novelty for the local government; but the opportunity given to a rising kyai-orator to deliver the main talk was a rather unique occurrence in comparison with the preceding few years. The celebration was, in fact, declared by the regent as the "first marriage between the kyais and the government" (*perkawinan pertama antara ulama dan umaro*). Again, during the closing ceremony of the much-celebrated *imtihan* festivities in Bettet (July 1984) the regent was given an equivalent opportunity with two other national kyai speakers to deliver a talk. In order better to appreciate the regent's views about the kyais, it is instructive to cite part of his speech which directly touches on the issue:¹⁸

... Indonesia today is launching a total development plan which covers spiritual, physical and technological aspects of our nation. It is nation building in its totality. My own experiences as a government employee and member of an ulama family have taught me that religious values which I learned from my parents and teachers in the pondok form an indispensable guide for me as a person and an official. Such virtues as a moderate way of life and honesty which are strongly emphasized in the life of santris are proven helpful and positive for the conduct of man either in society, army or office... The officials and ulama alike have the obligation to promote good and prevent evil. Only by implementing this mission, will our goal of total nation building be realized. For this reason, as I have emphasized time and again, the government program of

¹⁸ After opening his speech with a fluent salutation (*salam*), the regent recited the popular introductory prayer. It is interesting to note that the santris, in the Geertzian sense i.e. practicing Muslims, are critical toward speakers who cannot pronounce such an introductory remark correctly. Failure to do so is a clear indication of the low level of one's commitment to religious practices and rituals.



development cannot be accomplished or even executed without cooperation among the population, ulama and officials... We were witnesses tonight in Bettet, when the Kyai opened a new school building for senior secondary education. This is only one example of his many important contributions to the betterment of our society. How much money and how much energy if all programs in our society have to be funded by the government. It is impossible... We have to work together, to cooperate. As the bupati in this area I am only an organizer and motivator.

Local government officials and kyais attempted to take advantage of the increasingly improved relationship during the period of 1984-1985. Ironically, the period was marked by a less vigorous rural development program as the government budget experienced a decline due mainly to the decrease in oil revenue. Apprehensive because of the intensified protests and unrest sponsored by groups of Muslim activists during the second half of 1984, the government launched various campaigns to insure the support of the kyais. For example, high ranking generals paid homage to prominent ulama in their pondoks. Meetings brought together kyais, higher officials and generals. On the other hand, the increasingly frustrated kyai group in the NU attempted to win government support for insuring its leadership in the organization. The positive response from the government toward such endeavors was manifested in its full support of the rapprochement between the Situbondo and Cipete groups within the NU (see Chapter 7), and its support of the NU's plan of holding the latter's XXVII National Conference (*Muktamar*) by December 1984. Indeed, the *Muktamar* was officially inaugurated by the President, and many top military officers and ministers were invited to deliver papers. In Pamekasan, many prominent kyais were invited to attend a dialogue between the generals under Benny Murdani (head of the armed forces) and East Javanese kyais at the pondok of Lirboyo in Kediri. Again, the pondok of Bettet was visited by the commander of the regional police force. Such events were exceptional, but they demonstrated one facet of the relational patterns which existed between the kyais and the régime.

In an effort to maintain its neutral political stand, the NU has forbidden its core leaders at all levels, including pondok kyais, from assuming key positions in any political party or from leading campaigns for any party during the coming elections. In

Pamekasan, where the ulama's party had won all past elections, the decision was clearly a favorable gesture toward the régime. Although there was no guarantee that in the 1987 election the kyais would encourage their followers to vote for Golkar, their floating policy toward the voting pattern did much harm to the PPP. This is especially true since in the past the PPP received votes mainly by virtue of the kyais' full endorsement to insure their followers' votes for it (PPP). Today without supposedly being burdened by any political stigma, the kyais and NU leaders in general expected to concentrate on religious and educational programs in a more amenable atmosphere. The establishment of an ulama-sponsored senior high school in 1985 in Pamekasan was among the first maneuvers by the kyai grouping in the region to win the support of not only the educated, but also of the government. Indeed, many of the teachers for the school were recruited from the teaching staff at the local government schools. Despite the fact that a government teacher might have taught at the new school on his own initiative (that is, without official endorsement), the kyais' new, neutral political stand significantly diminished hindrance from any government employee to support openly for the kyais' educational programs.

Kyais have shown different stands vis-à-vis the establishment. Yet, as the previous discussion attempts to show, the kyais in Pamekasan have used their concept of "independence" and "territory" to construct such changing attitudes. Since the kyais' concept is applied to respond toward continuously shifting human conscience and action, it exhibits adaptation and reinterpretations, despite the kyais' purported claim of continuity and stability. This adaptation, therefore, is carried out in such a fashion as to preserve the perceived continuity and legitimacy, or to use Edward Shils' terms:

The given [cultural tradition] must be propitious to efforts to change some parts of it... Thus even the most rational of human understandings depend for its effectiveness on the "appropriateness" of the available tradition. The past must have reached a certain point in its "unfolding" before the reasoning mind can go forward from it... The pastness of a model of action or belief may be an object of reverence. Not givenness, and not convenience, but its sheer pastness may commend the performance of an action or the acceptance of a belief. The past might be viewed as a model for the active reconstruction of the present... The concern to be in contact with the symbols of the past is probably greater... among those of religious sensibility than it is among those who are less responsive to sacred things (1981:199, 206, 209, 211-12).

CONCLUSION

This study has shown a variety of ulama leadership patterns. The ulama in modern Indonesia, more specifically Madura, are not part of the bureaucratic establishment. Being popular leaders, the ulama reside in the countryside. This tendency shows three things; first, the town proper is seen as the realm of political authorities who do not enjoy popularity among the villagers. Second, the spread of religious centers into the villages fits into the settlement patterns of villages. Third, the ulama are able to cultivate, preserve and actively exploit their strategic position and leadership role in the villages. The ulama in Madura have emerged as genuine local leaders in the absence of potential competitors. During the colonial period, the prominence of the ulama was enhanced by the foreign nature of the government and its neglect of the countryside. The colonial régime and the relative disinterest on the part of the diverse central governments in Madura's internal affairs enhanced the leadership role of the ulama among the Madurese. Indeed, the emergence of more organized advanced educational centers led by supralocal ulama corresponded to the declining power and prestige of the indigenous rulers. After independence, so long as the central government was unable to prove its concern for the villages, the ulama were free to maintain their leadership role. In the past, the government ignored the ulama by minimizing its challenge to ulama leadership in local communities or perhaps it was unable to challenge them. In the process of national integration in complex societies such as Indonesia, local leaders, including the ulama, play an important role in the bargaining stage between the newly proclaimed national leaders and the local population. In Madura, by leaving the ulama in their own domain of local and religious leadership, the government successfully achieved a limited control in the region. When the government decided to exercise more power in local affairs, the ulama mobilized their colleagues and followers to maintain the status quo.

Having become imbedded in the village social structure and enjoying popular leadership, the ulama attempt to preserve their position. The ulama enjoy legitimacy and

leadership by virtue of socio-religious services to the villagers. Insofar as the local setting is undisturbed by external forces, the ulama face few difficulties in maintaining their position, in spite of the continuing competition that persists among local élites and leaders. On the other hand, the introduction of modern communications and more recently the campaign for national integration have infringed more and more upon the ulama's domain, and their wide-ranging role has been, to some extent, eroded.

The nature of the external penetration determines the kind and style of local response. First, a weak and discontinuous impact of external forces necessitates collaboration with local leaders such as the ulama in order to win local support. Accordingly, the ulama remain indisputable leaders in the local context. Second, badly planned penetration often leads to a negative response spearheaded by the ulama. Using the local sentiment and disappointment with respect to haphazard programs, the ulama are able to rally popular support, and also, perhaps more important, enhance their prestige by injecting a religious dimension in order to oppose external infringement. Third, effective programs supported by a multitude of resources and firm patronage increasingly win popular support which is central in conciliating the ulama, and rendering them at least indifferent, or even supportive, towards such programs. In saying this, we should not ignore the fact that the ulama derive their leadership from the local population. Thus, the ulama's ability to attract followers, and to make the latter dependent upon their educational and religious services is determined by the villagers' perception of religious leaders. In the final analysis, the villagers will decide the fate of local leaders, including the ulama. The further the villagers become detached from village religion the more weakly will the ulama exercise authority over the population.

By the same token, the popularity of traditional religious instruction in villages becomes a guarantee for the ulama's central position in the local context. Although the government has succeeded in opening public schools in almost every village, religious education continues to prosper side by side with general education. In Madura the growth and proliferation of religious education resulted partly from the

neglect and later failure of the various central governments to introduce comprehensive, easily accessible public education. Although the ulama do not wholeheartedly impede the introduction of general education, they endeavor to retain their control over religious education. As long as the religious education provided by the ulama continues to be attractive for villagers, the ulama will not experience a major decline in their leadership. Moreover, since the aspirants for new prospects tend to leave the village as students, migrants, intellectuals, civil servants and teachers, the villages rarely experience access to conspicuous native propagators of new ideas and change. The limited native resources undoubtedly fail to attract vigorous investors, and likewise fail to keep many newly educated local sons at home. On the other hand, the strength of the central government in implementing its development program in the villages may upset the multi-faceted role of the ulama inasmuch as the program brings positive, direct results. Yet the ulama are aware of any threat to their strategic position in the local setting. Accordingly, the ulama will rally their followers in order to oppose certain programs. Insofar as the vocabulary used by the ulama corresponds to the world view and collective representation of the villagers, any attempt to intrude on the village domain will very much depend on the ulama's good will.

The ulama's access to the most strategic network of communication at the local level perpetuates their leadership. The prevailing village social structure and norms are all conducive to the maintenance of religious functionaries. The most effective mechanism for the continuance of the phenomenon is the ulama's control over village religious education. Yet the increasing accessibility of the villagers to diverse sources of trusted information which does not come from the ulama will erode certain fields of ulama leadership. The most systematic and powerful elements which infringe upon the villages are represented by well-planned government-supported programs.

Today the ulama continue to oversee the appropriateness of religious symbols and meanings for the majority of the villagers. Since moral values and religious sanctions remain meaningful and indispensable in justifying or rejecting certain changes,


decisions and opinions are constantly sought from the ulama. How far the ulama can maintain the balance between their attachment to the local setting and religious doctrine on the one hand, and increasing secularization and external pressure on the other, depends upon how effective and meaningful an alternative world view and the betterment of village life prove to be. It is clear, however, that certain fields of the ulama's leadership have been eroded and that their activities have been circumscribed. The fact that the ulama are keepers of the public conscience *vis-à-vis* political authority and are upholders of the ethical standards of the Muslim community prevents them from any revolutionary undertaking, if only to preserve their leadership role. Their apprehensive and slow steps in response to the changing milieu, of course, provide other power-seekers and ideology sellers with opportunities to amass fresh followers. As far as religious leadership is concerned, literalist and reformist proponents are among the competitive candidates who have been waiting in the wings to take advantage in the transitional stage of village religious leadership.

Nevertheless, the ulama have responded to the literalist and reformist challenge by reorganizing their camp. Public lectures, socio-religious discussions and publication of leaflets are carried out. Attempts are made to present religion in a more scriptural form, adopting common sense, practical reason and rhetorical-dialectical means (e.g. Chapter 10). So far the ulama's elaboration of certain doctrines and world views has kept a few village dissidents within their fold or has at least restrained them from openly proclaiming their opposition. Indeed, village social structure allows little exercise of socio-religious novelties and innovations. Within such a context, the ulama do not perform the role of catalysts but that of guides or points of reference. The process of scripturalization is not uni-directional, but rather contextual and not rarely reversible.

The stability of the ulama's leadership role depends on the structural ties with the villagers as well as upon the extent of actual change in the local level (see Figure II.1). Since the ulama in the region have derived their religious and moral authority from the population, and not from the political authorities, they carefully preserve this pub-

lic trust. In fact, the ulama's direct ties with the local setting guarantee their niche within it. The popular perception of ulama leadership limits the ulama's choice to act as agents of external forces, particularly those which are regarded as a threat to local interests. But the fact that the ulama have also pursued broader interests through supralocal channels balances the impact of external change on the local setting and

Figure II.1: Forces of stability and change in the villages



the ulama's actual location therein. The more the ulama become alienated, or are being alienated, from the local context, the more prospect will the villagers have of enjoying access to diverse power centers. Indeed, the increasing access of direct ties between villagers and the outside world and the uprooting of a growing number of villagers because of job opportunities, migration, modern communications, education and government service on the one hand and the ulama's pursuance of broader supralocal aims will in the long run erode multi-faceted ulama-villager relationships. Not surprisingly, different forces will increase their influence in the local context. Yet

the new hopes among the uprooted which cannot be fully materialized and which even frustrate many aspirants may only strengthen the villagers' attachment to the ulama. The fact that the village economy has barely experienced change is conducive toward the maintenance of the status quo. Insofar as the village social order does not experience any major disruption, the ulama's guidance and leadership will continue to occupy an important place in the villagers' life.

This being said, we should not underestimate the cumulative impact of change, however small, on the village's social and economic order. The acceptance of modern birth control methods by a large number of villagers, for example, will undoubtedly modify the villagers' views about non-indigenous values and programs aimed at improving their own local conditions. On the other hand, the ulama are not static. Aware of their strategic location in the village structure and knowledgeable about diverse forces impinging upon the society, the ulama, especially the prominent figures among them, carefully move to adapt to the new situation by using contemporary, widely accepted methods.

The ulama continue to maintain defensive strategies in preserving their niche. The fact that the ulama fit well into the local social structure restricts their initiative to upset the status quo. This predicament perhaps explain what Dale Eickelman calls, in a different context, "a highly restricted sense of social responsibility" among men of religious learning (1985:166; cf. Kessler 1978). Not until the flood of irresistible change besets their domain will some ulama adopt the new language of the contemporary challenge. With the continuing process of mobility, urbanization, modern education and secularization, the ulama have no other alternative but to deal with the challenges. In the Maduran context, there is no single, unitary pattern of response to change. What is obvious is the correspondence between the perception and understanding of challenge and change on the one hand and the nature of response on the other. The more informed the ulama are about a particular change, the more favorably will they react to it. As the case of education in Madura shows, any initiative to introduce novelty into a less-integrated society needs to be presented in a locally

meaningful and realistic fashion. However noble the aim of certain imposed programs, without proper consideration of local views, interests and social relationships, such programs may perpetuate isolation and suffering for the greater number of people.

Although the ulama have been successful in dealing with different political forces and vicissitudes, their defence against the universal force of increasing secularization remains to be seen. The process of diminishing village isolation in Madura is still at the very early stage, and therefore further observation and research are needed to explain more sufficiently the different attitudes and responses given by the ulama in the face of total change when patterns are more discernable and data are abundant. The majority of ulama slowly respond to change; however, some do positively accept the challenge and work out solutions accordingly. It will be interesting to study further the factors, indigenous and external, which encourage the different modes of response. As a basis for this enterprise I suggest the research can be focused on three categories of ulama in changing societies: conservative, adaptive and progressive. Group affiliation, background, access to diverse supra-village ideas and mobility all influence an individual ulama's leaning toward any one of the three views. Ulama who have weak ties with the local ulama groupings tend to initiate progressive steps in response to external forces. Again, the ulama who come from a prestigious family have more opportunity to enhance their sophistication and carry out innovations in their religious and educational domains. Yet the ulama's close association with religion and leadership requires an overt identification with and an exclusive defence of religious symbols and institutions. As long as their local leadership is left undisturbed, the ulama may be recruited as partners by the political élite and by the authorities.

The political régime in Indonesia has no valid reason to be suspicious of the ulama. Indeed, the continuing attachment of the population in such areas as Madura to the ulama has created the need on the part of the power holders to include them, or at least to solicit their opinions, in the policy making process. On the other hand, the ulama as popular trusted local leaders have an undeniable mission to provide a better

atmosphere for their followers and supporters in which they may adapt to changing conditions and face challenges with the contemporary language and means. The ulama's long involvement in the educational field, for example, is an area which no government can ignore if the universal aim of bringing villagers into a wider world is to be achieved. Without a thorough dialogue designed to reach mutual understanding in this respect, any enforced educational policy will continue to polarize the society into diametrically opposed and unequal entities, rather than bringing the various social elements into a positive complementary setting. Although the ulama's involvement in the changing process will not necessarily guarantee their traditional niche, this participation is the best available means in order for them to safeguard some of their interests as well to improve their followers' share in the changing social order.

APPENDICES

Appendix One

TA'LIM AL-MUTA'ALLIM TARIQ AL-TA'ALLUM

(TEACHING THE STUDENT: THE METHOD OF LEARNING)

By al-Shaykh Burhān al-Dīn al-Zarnūjī (d. circa 600H/1203). Reprint 1372H/1953. Surabaya: al-Maktabah al-'Asriyah.

Chapter 3

CHOICE OF KNOWLEDGE, TEACHER AND FRIEND
ATTACHMENT TO KNOWLEDGE

It is important for a seeker of knowledge to choose the best branches of knowledge, that is what is relevant to his religious life in this world as well as what is needed in the hereafter.² A seeker of knowledge should also give priority to 'ilm al-Tawhīd (knowledge about the unicity of God) and should believe in Allah with conviction and proof (*dalīl*) because the belief of an imitator (*muqallid*) even if correct, in our opinion, is sinful due to the abandonment of reasoning (*istidlāl*).

Moreover, a seeker of knowledge should choose the established (*al-'atīq*) [knowledge] over the innovative (*al-muhdathāt*) as [the wise men] have said: "Take the established and stay away from the innovative." You should not indulge in dispute/controversy (*jadal*) which emerges after the passing of prominent scholars since it prevents a student from understanding (*al-fiqh*), wastes energy and creates rudeness and enmity. As cited in the tradition, "It [*jadal*] is an indicator of the [closeness to] the Day of Resurrection and a sign of weakness of knowledge and jurisprudence."

The choice of a teacher

It is important to choose the most knowledgeable, the most virtuous and pious (*al-aura*) and the oldest as Abu Hanīfah chose Hammād ibn Abī Sulaiman [as a teacher] only after deliberation and examination. Abu Hanīfah said "I saw him as an old man, modest, gentle and forbearing." He [Abū Hanīfah] said that he remained with Hammād ibn Abī Sulaiman until he grew up. He said "I heard a wise man (*hakīm*) of Samarqand said, "A seeker of knowledge once consulted me on learning (*talab al-'ilm*)." He [the wise man] urged him to

¹ There are 13 chapters in the text; but only Chapters 3, 4 and 11 are provided here. I thought these three chapters relevant to our discussion of teacher-disciple ties. I have translated this portion generally in accordance with the meaning given by the ulama of Bettel.

All Arabic words and phrases in this section are transliterated and spelled in accordance with the system of transliteration followed by the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University.

² For a slightly different, but complete, version of translation see Grunebaum, G.E. von and Theodora M. Abel, tr., *Az-Zarnūjī, Ta'līm al-Muta'allim Tariq al-Ta'allum*. New York: King's Crown Press, 1947.

go to Bukhara for learning." Thus, it is important to exchange opinions in every matter, [it is particularly so since] Allah the Most Highest commanded his Prophet to carry out the exchange of opinions (*mushāwarah*) in all matters. Although no one was more intelligent than he [the Prophet], still he was commanded to exchange opinions. Indeed, the Prophet exchanged opinions with his Companions in all matters even household affairs. 'Alī said, "One will not suffer because of exchange of opinions." It is held that [there are three categories of men]: a full man, a half man and a nonsense man (*lā shay*). A full man is one who has correct opinions and exchanges opinions [with others]; a half man is one who has correct opinions but he avoids the exchange of opinion, and even if he exchanges he does not suggest an opinion; and a nonsense man is one who has no opinion and does not consult others. Ja'far al-Sādiq said to Sufyān al-Thawrī "Discuss your affairs with those who fear God."

The quest of knowledge is the most honorable but difficult task. Thus, exchange of opinions during the period of study is more pressing and mandatory. The wise man [of Samarqand] said "If you go to Bukhara do not rush to change teachers (*a'immah*), stay for some two months [with each] until you understand [them] and only then choose a [definite] teacher. Because if you come to a teacher (*'ālim*) and you hastily join his [teaching] (*al-sabq 'indah*) perhaps you will never be impressed by his knowledge and expertise. Hence you will end up in deserting him and joining another. Indeed, he will not bless (*lā yubārīk lak*) your learning. Therefore, think for some two months before making a decision to choose a teacher and consult others in order to avoid deserting and leaving him [later]. Accordingly, you will remain with him and your study will be blessed (*mubārak*). You will, thus, abundantly benefit from your knowledge." You should know that patience and devotion (*thabāt*) are important sources of all matters but they are rarely realized, as expressed in a poem: "Each attempts to achieve glory, but most men lack devotion." It is said [on the virtue of patience] that "Bravery is a moment of patience." It is, therefore, important for a seeker of knowledge to devote himself to and remain with a teacher, with a book until he masters it, with a branch of knowledge (*fann*) without trying another branch until he successfully masters the first one, as well as with a town without moving to another except in emergency. Indeed, all those cases confuse matters, bother the mind, waste time and insult the teacher.

It is important [for a seeker of knowledge] to control the whims of his ego (*nafs*) and his passion. A poet said: "Passion is denigration in itself; the defeat of passion is thus the defeat of denigration." [It is important] to be steadfast in the face of challenges and difficulties. It is said that "The treasury of [one's] goals is located in the arches of miseries." I shall recite a poem which is addressed to 'Alī ibn Abī Tālib, "Be informed that knowledge can be achieved only through six [virtues]; I shall explain clearly all their components: Ingenuity, ambition, patience, financial self-sufficiency (*bulghah*), guidance of the teacher and long contemplation."

The choice of friends

It is important to choose dedicated, religiously-minded, good mannered, and intelligent colleagues. [A seeker of knowledge] should avoid the lazy, the idle, the talkative, the evil doers and the trouble-makers. It is stated, "[If you want to know] a person do not ask [him directly] but observe his fellows; in fact, a fellow resembles his acquaintances. If he has bad character, stay away from him; but if he has excellent conduct make him a friend, you may find guidance." Again, it is said, "Do not make friends among indolent persons; how many good mannered persons degenerate. For the impact of the inept is so strong on the intelligent individuals; as is fire thrown on ashes, it is quickly extinguished." The Prophet said, "Every baby is born in a state of religious innocence (*fitrah*) indeed, his parents raise him as a Jew, a Christian or a Zoroastrian ..." A Persian proverb says, "A bad friend is worse and more dangerous than a poisonous snake. By God, indeed the evil doer leads you to the site of Hell; therefore have a virtuous friend because you will find through him gardens of

happiness." It is also said, "If you seek knowledge from an expert or from a witness who tells [you] about [a place] unknown, you have to identify the country from its reputation, like you identify a person with his acquaintances."

Chapter 4

RESPECT FOR KNOWLEDGE AND ITS BEARERS

Be informed that a seeker of knowledge cannot acquire knowledge and cannot benefit from it except by respecting the knowledge and its bearers as well as honoring and admiring the teacher. It is said, "One acquires great achievements only because of his deference; and one suffers denigration only because of lack of respect and admiration." It is also stated, "Respect is more important than obedience. Is it not obvious that a person does not disbelieve because of disobedience (*ma'siyah*)? In fact, he disbelieves because of refraining from respect." Glorifying knowledge includes holding the teacher in esteem. 'Alī ibn Abī Tālib said, "I am a slave of whoever taught me even a single letter. He [my teacher] has a right to sell me, to free me or to enslave me." In this context I shall compose a verse, I thought the strongest right is that of a teacher (*mu'allim*), and it is the most obligatory on every Muslim to preserve it. Therefore, [a Muslim] is obliged to show respect to [his teacher] by providing him one thousand *dirhams* in return for his teaching of each single letter. One who taught you a letter of great importance in your religion is your father in religion (*abūka fi al-dīn*). Our teacher, Shaykh Imām Sadīd al-dīn al-Shirāzī said, "Our great teachers stated that whoever wants his son to be an expert [in religious law/fiqh] (*'ālim*) should look for supralocal religious experts (*fuqahā*), respect them, ask their counsel and present them with some gifts. In fact, if no one of his sons becomes a religious expert, one of his grandchildren will be a knowledgeable person [religious expert]."

Respect for a teacher [is manifested in] the avoidance of walking in front of him, occupying his seat, initiating exchanges with him without his permission, conducting a long conversation with him, questioning him while he is fatigued, paying less attention to his schedule and knocking at his door; but rather [a student] should be patient waiting until he [the teacher] comes out. In summary, [a student] should seek his teacher's satisfaction (*ridā*) and avoid his disappointment; he should also obey his command as far as it does not contradict God's [command]. In fact, no obedience is to be paid to the creature at the expense of disobeying the creator (*al-khālīq*).

The respect for a teacher includes respect for his children and all his relatives (*wa-man yata'allaq bih*). Our teacher Shaykh al-Islām Burhān al-dīn [the author of] *al-Hidāyah* told us that a leading scholar in Bukhārā often rose up from time to time while leading his lecture sessions. When the students asked him about [the matter] he replied, "One of my teacher's sons was playing with other children in the street, when I saw him I stood up in respect for my teacher." Qādī Imām Fakhr al-Dīn al-Arsabandī was the head of religious scholars (*a'imma*) in Merv. The sultan highly respected [al-Arsabandī]. The qādī said, "I achieved this rank because of respect for my teachers. I served my teacher, Qādī Abū Yazīd al-Dabūsī, and prepared his meals but I never ate anything from it." Shaykh Imām Shams al-Dīn al-Hulwānī left Bukhārā and settled in a village for some time because of an incident that befell him. All his students visited him except Shaykh Imām Qādī Abū Bakr al-Zaranjī. Later al-Hulwānī asked Abū Bakr "Why did you not visit me?" The latter replied "I was busy with serving my old mother." Al-Hulwānī said, "You may earn long life but you cannot achieve the glamour of teaching." Since Abū Bakr remained in the village he was unable to deliver regular lectures. Whosoever has slighted his teacher, he is prohibited from the blessing of knowledge (*barakat al-ilm*), he can benefit only little from it. "Teacher and physician will never counsel [you] if they are not respected. Be persevering with your illness if you

annoy the physician; and be satisfied with your stupidity (*jahl*) if you annoy a teacher." It is related that Caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd sent his son to al-Asma'ī to be instructed in knowledge and art/morality (*adab*). Then one day the caliph saw al-Asma'ī making ablution and washing his feet while the caliph's son poured water on al-Asma'ī's feet, the caliph shouted at al-Asma'ī about the incident and said, "I sent [my son] to you in order to be instructed and guided (*tu'addibah*). Why did you not ask him to pour water with his left hand and wash your feet with the other?"

[Respect for books]

Respect for knowledge includes respect for books. It is important that a student should not touch a book without having the religiously sanctioned purity (*tahārah*). It is related that Shaykh Imām Shams al-A'immah al-Hulwānī said "I received this knowledge through respect [for the books]. I never touch a scroll without having purity." And Shaykh Imām Shams al-A'immah al-Sarakhsī, who suffered stomach ache, repeated his readings time and again every night; he had to renew his ablutions for seventeen times at one night alone, for he never repeated [his readings] except with a renewed ablution. This is especially so since knowledge is light (*nūr*) and ablution is light; therefore the light of knowledge will be gratified by the light of ablution."

For respect, it is obligatory that one should not overstep a book. One should locate books of [Qur'anic] exegesis (*al-tafsīr*) on top of any other books as an expression of respect. One should not put anything upon a book. Our teacher, Burhān al-Dīn related a story about a teacher: one day a religious scholar (*faqīh*) put an inkwell upon a book. His teacher said "You will not benefit [from this book]." Our teacher Great Qādī, Fakhr al-Islām known as Qasikhān, said "If it [putting an inkwell on the book] is not intended to belittle [the book], it is all right; but the best is to avoid such an undertaking."

Respect [for a book] includes excellent writing down of the book by avoiding unintelligibility and not making notes in the margin except when it is necessary. When Abū Hanīfah once saw a writer scribbling out a document, he said "Do not make your writing unintelligible, because if you live longer you will regret and if you die you will be slandered," meaning, if you become older and your sight is weaker you will regret what you have written. Shaykh Imām Muhammad Majd al-Dīn al-Ṣarhākī said, "We regretted what we had written unintelligibly and we regretted what we had shortened (summarized) and we also regretted our neglect in comparing [the authenticity of our writings with others]."

The book should be cut in a quadrangular shape; for it is a style preferred by Abū Hanīfah. This style eases the carrying, locating and reading. It is important that the book should not be marked with red color since it is the characteristic/invention (*sanī'*) of the philosophers and not the characteristic of the renowned past generation (*al-ṣalaf*). Many of our teachers disliked to use the red mixture (*al-murakkab al-ahmar*) [for their writing].

Respect for [your] colleagues and for anyone who teaches [you] is part of respect for knowledge. Although adulation (*tamalluq*) is not virtuous, it is nonetheless required in the process of seeking knowledge. It is important for a student to be affectionate to his teacher and his colleagues in order to benefit from them. Again, it is recommended that a student should attend to knowledge (*al-'ilm*) and wise learning (*al-hikmah*) with respect and admiration, even if he listens to the same topic and the same sentence for a thousand times. It is said, "Anyone who does not have a similar degree of respect for his thousandth attendance to his first one does not belong to the people of knowledge (*laisa bi-ahl al-'ilm*)."

It is instructive that a seeker of knowledge should not decide the subject of his study (*naw' 'ilm*) by himself. He should, however, refer his affairs to the teacher; because the [latter] has diverse experience about [knowledge] and he knows well what suits an individual as well as what befits one's skill/preference (*ṭabī'ah*). Shaykh al-Islām Burhān al-Haq wa

al-Dīn said "Seekers of knowledge in the previous era (*al-zamān al-awwal*) referred their educational matters to their teacher. Indeed, they achieved their goal and plan/intention. But today [seekers of knowledge] decide for themselves; [therefore it is not surprising that] they fail to achieve their aim of mastering knowledge and jurisprudence (*al-fiqh*).² It is related that when Muhammad ibn Ismā'īl al-Bukhārī began to learn a chapter on prayer from Muhammad ibn al-Hasan, the latter said "Leave me and study the science of the tradition (*'ilm al-hadīth*) [from other teachers]." [Ibn al-Hasan] did so because he thought it was more congenial with [al-Bukhārī's] ability. In fact, [al-Bukhārī] studied the science of the tradition until he became the most prominent among all experts of the tradition.

It is necessary that a seeker of knowledge should not sit close to the teacher during the learning session except [at the time when this position is] necessary. A student should keep a distance of about a bow (*qadr al-qaws*) [approximately two yards] from his teacher in order to show respect.

It is essential for a seeker of knowledge to stay away from improper conduct (*al-akhlāq al-dhamīmah*) since it is parallel to "figurative dogs" (*kilāb ma'nawiyah*). The Prophet said "The angels never enter a house which has a picture or a dog." Indeed, human beings learn through the aid of the angels. Improper conduct is explained in *The Book of Conduct*. Our book, this one, does not explain this matter, especially about arrogance. Arrogance is a hindrance to knowledge. It is said that knowledge is an enemy of a haughty person, just as a flood is an enemy of the high places. It is also said "Through power [of God] not through hard work success [is achieved]. Is power without hard work a success? How many slaves occupy the status of free men? and how many free men occupy the status of slaves?"

Chapter 11

AVOIDANCE OF VICES DURING STUDY

A group [of religious experts] related a tradition on this topic from the Prophet, who said, "Whoever does not stay away from vices (*lam yatawarra*) during his study period, God will punish him in either one of three ways: He will end his life during his youth, He will locate him in isolated areas [among the ignorant] (*al-rasā'il*) or He will punish him by associating him with the power holder (*al-sultān*).³ Insofar as a seeker of knowledge is more virtuous, his knowledge will be more beneficial, his learning process will be smoother and his knowledge will bring greater result.

Among signs of virtuous conduct are the avoidance of overeating (*al-shab*), prolonged sleeping, talking on unimportant matters and consuming food [sold] in the market (*ta'am al-sūq*) whenever possible. For food of the market is more prone to uncleanness and impurity and therefore prevents [one] from remembering God. It is, in fact, indicative of silliness (*al-ghaflah*). Moreover, [this is so] because the needy see [food of the market] but they are unable to buy it. Indeed, they suffer more from this. Hence its efficacy (*barakah*) is lost. It is related that during his study period, Shaykh Imām Muhammad ibn al-Faḍl never ate food from the market. Once his father, who lived in the countryside, prepared a meal for his [son]. On a Friday [the father] visited [Ibn Faḍl's] home where the former saw a loaf of bread from the market. He refused to speak to [his son] in order to express his displeasure, but [Ibn Faḍl] apologized saying "I did not buy it, and I did not concede to the idea; my colleague bought it." The father replied, "If you are careful and virtuous enough (*tatawarra*) your colleague would not dare do that." Indeed, [these men of learning] avoided vices (*yatawarra*). Therefore it is not surprising that they became expert in knowledge and publication/writing. Their names will continue [to be remembered] until the Day of Resurrection. A person among the pious scholars (*zuhhād al-fuqahā*) once advised a seeker of

knowledge. "You should refrain from backbiting, and from accompanying gossipers/chatterers, [because]," he said, "those who talk a lot steal from your life and waste your time."

Among signs of virtuous conduct are the avoidance of the evil doers, the immoral and the idle; because having companionship [with them] undoubtedly will have a tremendously negative impact. Again, one should sit [during the learning process] facing Mecca, and behave according to the tradition of the Prophet, as well as secure the prayer of the virtuous people and refrain from inciting the curse of those who have been unjustly treated (*yataharraz 'an da'wat al-mazlūmīn*). It is related that "two men left to study in the western region/ abroad. They were both participants in [the acquisition of] knowledge. After several years of study they returned to their country. One became a legist (*faqīh*), while the other achieved nothing. The scholars in the area were surprised. Thus, they tried to get information about [the two men's] learning behavior and their style of reading and sitting posture. They were informed that during the study session, the sitting mode of the one who became a legist was facing Mecca (*mustaqbil al-qiblah*) and the town (*al-misr*) where he had received knowledge. The other man, instead, was turning his back towards Mecca (*mustadbir al-qiblah*) and his face was not in the direction of the town." The scholars and jurists (*al-'ulamā' wa al-fuqahā'*) agreed that the [above] legist achieved his status by the efficacy of facing Mecca since it is recommended (*sunnah*) during the sitting except in case of emergency, as well as by efficacy of Muslims' prayers [in the town]. [This is especially so] because the town was never free from worshippers and people of virtues. It is obvious that [at least] a worshipper prayed for him during the night.

It behooves a seeker of knowledge not to be frivolous in matters of ethics (*al-ādāb*) and the traditions (*al-sunan*), for whoever takes ethics casually will be away from the traditions; and whoever takes the traditions trivially will neglect the religious obligations (*al-farā'id*), and whoever neglects the religious obligation will not be given (*hurrīma*) [reward in] the hereafter. Some [scholars] believed that the [above] is the saying of the Prophet (*hadīth*). It is important that [a seeker of knowledge] should perform extra prayers and should pray in accordance with the way of the pious; because this will help him to achieve his goal and knowledge. I shall recite a poem composed by Shaykh Najm al-Dīn 'Umar ibn Muhammad al-Nasafi, "You should preserve the commands and prohibitions [of Islam]. You should maintain and observe the prayers. Seek religious knowledge, study seriously and ask for help [from God] through good deeds, you shall become a dedicated legist (*faqīh hāfiz*). Pray to God to preserve your achievement, hoping for His mercy since God is the best protector/preserver." Al-Nasafi added, "Obey [God], work hard do not be lazy; you will return to your God. Do not [prolong your] sleep since great figures only sleep briefly during the night."

It is essential for [a seeker of knowledge] to make a notebook his companion at all time in order to study it. It is said, "Whoever does not keep his notebook in his sleeve (*kumm*), wisdom (*hikmah*) will never stay in his mind." A seeker of knowledge should leave blank spaces (*bayād*) in his text and bring an inkwell in order to copy what is being lectured about...

Appendix Two

SHALAWAT NARIYAH

Oh God! Send abundant bounties upon our prophet Muhammad and bless him with comprehensive blessing.³ [He is God] who facilitates the disentanglement from bondage, the soothing of bitterness, the fulfillment of needs, the achievement of goals and a happy end as well as whose bright face helps to draw rain [of wealth]. Oh God the most merciful! Send your bounties upon [the Prophet's] family, and his companions every moment of eye-opening and breath-taking and as much bounty as the magnitude of your knowledge.

³ *Shalawat Nariyah* literally means "fiery prayers." This version was collected in Better through participation in local ceremonies. They are frequently recited in the occasion of promoting one's enterprise, health and any personal betterment and also during the *sebelesan*. The prayers are read 4444 times. The original recitation is in Arabic. I have translated the prayers after consulting the opinions of the two local *mak kaehs*.

Appendix Three

SOLICITOUS PRAYERS FOLLOWING THE COLLECTIVE PRAYER

In the name of God the beneficent, the merciful.⁴ Praise be to God the lord of the universe as much praise as "corresponds to his bounties and resembles his unsurpassability (*mazīd*). Our Lord! You deserve praise which is compatible with the greatness of your existence and the mightiness of your power. Peace and blessing be upon our prophet Muhammad, the blessing whereby you may save us from terrors (*al-ahwāh*), and banes (*al-āfāt*) and whereby you may fulfill all our needs and you may protect us from evils and you may exalt us into the highest rank among your favored ones, and you may facilitate us to achieve the farthest goal of all, good things in this world and the world after, oh God!

Oh God! Guide our hearts parallel to the guidance [which you have provided] the knowledgeable figures (*al-ʿarifīn*) with, and enlighten our hearts with the light (*nūr*) of your guidance as you have continually enlightened the earth by sunlight. Oh God! Put us in a safe position in every matter and protect us from every disgrace (*khizy*) in this world and punishment in the hereafter. Our Lord! We request you [to provide us with] beneficial knowledge and acceptable conduct, and bestow upon us abundant wealth which is sound and lawful.

Oh God! Forgive us, our parents, all our fathers, our mothers, our grandfathers, our grandmothers, our maternal uncles, our maternal aunts, our paternal uncles, our paternal aunts, our brothers, our sisters, our teachers, teachers of our teachers, our religious leaders (*masyāyikh*), all those who do favors for us and love us, as well as all those who have rights over us, and those whom we have rights over. Our Lord! We petition from you forgiveness, unbroken health, gratitude for [our present] health, freedom from human beings, unrelenting obedience (*taqwā*), continuity [in doing good], and a happy end (*husn al-khātimah*).

Oh God! Make us, our children, our descendants and our students (*talāmīdz*) men of learning (*al-ʿulamā*) who are virtuous, energetic, intelligent, knowledgeable on the sciences of the religion (*ʿulūm al-syarīʿah*), wealthy, moderate, practicing (*al-ʿāmilīn*), forbearing and having a happy end. Our Lord! Render their hearts affectionate and make the ties among them intimate under the best conduct (*ahsan al-akhilāq*).

Oh God! Save us from fruitless knowledge (*ʿilm lā yanfa*) and unbridled passion. Oh God! Provide us with a means for, and ease our access to, performing [the pilgrimage] to Mecca and Medina, cities of messengers and prophets, [and make our pilgrimage] safe and valid by the truth (*haqq*) of [our belief that] "There is no god save Allah and Muhammad is a messenger of God," may God bless him.

Our Lord! Let the last word of our speech during our deathbed be the saying of "There is no God save Allah and Muhammad is a messenger of God." Oh God! Show us and them the straight path, the path of those whom you have favored, not the path of those who earn your anger, nor of those who go astray. Oh God the most merciful! Do not create enmity among us and between us, and do not give a chance to enemies to control us because of our sin. Our Lord! Do not abandon our hearts to deceit after you have guided us. Oh God!

⁴ The original recitation is in Arabic, led by the imām. The translation is made by consulting the kyai of Bettet and other ulama and ustadztes. This version was collected in the pondok of Bettet. Many other kyais and local ulama also recite the version fully or partly. Analytical examination of this passage will undoubtedly provide us with ideas about the ulama's immediate and long term occupations in leading their followers.

Grant us [bounties], in fact, you are the most beneficent.

Oh God! Grant us a virtuous life in this world and a rewarding position in the hereafter, and save us from the hell fire. May God bless our prophet Muḥammad, his family and his companions and may God grant them peace.

Our Lord! Endorse our supplication by [virtue of] the secret meaning (*al-sirr*) of the Introductory chapter (*al-Fātiḥah*) [of the Qur'an].

Appendix Four

SEMI-POETICAL HYMN

Oh the one who sees and hears what is within the heart!⁵
 You are the all-knowing over what is expected to occur.

Oh the one to whom we ask help from all sufferings!
 Oh the one whom we appeal to and we take refuge in!

Oh the one whose abundant wealth lies in His saying of "Be" (*kun*)!
 Grant us bounties! In fact, all good things belong to you

I have no [access to] an intermediary save my dependence upon you.
 Thus, through my dependence upon you I present my want.

I have no other choice except knocking at your door
 If you reject [my request] which door can I knock?

And whom should I request and which name should I call,
 if your bounty is prevented from your poor servant?

It is impossible that your generosity might satisfy a transgressor (*'āsī*).
 But your bounties are greater and your blessings are more abundant.

⁵ This solicitous prayer is usually recited in chorus by the santris following each collective prayer. This version is gathered in the mosque of Bettet. Original recitation is in Arabic. I have translated this prayer freely.

Appendix Five

REQUEST PRAYERS DURING THE SEBELASAN

1. Recitation of the Introductory chapter of the Qur'an. (once)⁶ (The leader of the ceremony mentions that "the recitation is specifically addressed to the Prophet Muhammad, may God bless him and grant peace to him, his family, his wives, his descendants, his companions, and also to all messengers, prophets and Syaikh 'Abdulqādir al-Jilānī, and generally sent to the deceased male and female Muslims and believers as well as the souls of all the inhabitants of the grave (*jami' ahl al-qubūr*).")

2. "Oh God! Bless our prophet Muhammad and grant him and his family peace." (41 times)

3. "Blessing and peace be upon you, oh the messenger of God!" (41 times)

4. "Oh God! You are the guide, the all-knowing, the all-wise, the almighty." (100 times)

5. (The solicitous prayers proper are led by the leader of the ceremony.) "In the name of Allah the beneficent, the merciful. Praise be to God, the Lord of the universe. Blessing and peace be to our prophet Muhammad, his family and his companions. Oh God! Grant us abundant wealth which is lawful and sound without any envy, suffering, loss and difficulty. Indeed, you are the omnipotent. Our Lord! Bestow upon us virtuous lives in this world and a rewarding position in the hereafter, and save us from the hell fire. Oh God! Grant us, your slaves, straight and affectionate hearts. May God bless our prophet Muhammad, his family and his companions and may God grant them peace."

⁶ The sebelasan is a feast held by the villagers at every eleventh day of the lunar month to commemorate the death of Syaikh 'Abdulqādir al-Jilānī (d.561H/1165). Original recitation is in Arabic. I have translated the prayers freely.

Appendix Six

TAHLIL

1. Recitation of the Introductory chapter of the Qur'an. (once)⁷ (The leader of the ceremony mentions that "the recitation is specifically addressed to the Prophet Muhammad, may God bless him and grant peace to him; his family, his wives, his descendants, his companions, also all messengers, prophets and Syaikh 'Abdulqādir al-Jīlānī and generally sent to the deceased male and female Muslims and believers and to the souls of all the people of the grave.")

2. Recitation of the Qur'anic chapter, the Sincerity (al-Ikhlāsh).
"Say! He is Allah, the one. Allah, the eternally besought of all. He begets not nor was begotten. And there is none comparable to Him" (three times) Each time followed by "God is the greatest. There is no god save Allah, he is God the almighty. Praise be to God!"

3. Recitation of the Qur'anic chapter, the Daybreak (al-Falaq).
"Say! I seek refuge in the Lord of Daybreak. From the evil of that which He created. From the evil of the darkness when it is intense. And from the evil of "malignant witchcraft" And from the evil of the envious one when he envies." (once) Followed by "God is the greatest. There is no god save Allah, he is God the almighty. Praise be to God!"

4. Recitation of the Qur'anic chapter, Mankind (al-Nās).
"Say! I seek refuge in the Lord of mankind, the king of mankind, the God of mankind. From the evil of the sneaking whisperer, who whispers in the hearts of mankind, of jin and mankind." (once) Followed by "God is the greatest. There is no God save Allah, he is God the almighty. Praise be to God!"

5. Recitation of the Introductory chapter of the Qur'an. (once)

6. "Alif, Lām, Mīm."⁸ This is the Scripture wherein there is, no doubt, a guidance for those who ward off evil. Who believe in the unseen, and establish worship, and spend of that we have bestowed upon them. And who believe in that which is revealed into you [Muhammad] and that which was revealed before you, and are certain of the hereafter. These depend on guidance from their Lord. These are the successful." (once; The Cow/al-Baqarah 1-5)

7. "Allah. There is no God save Him; the alive, the eternal. Neither slumber nor sleep overtakes Him. Unto Him belongs whatsoever is in the heavens and whatsoever in the earth. Who is he that intercedes with Him save by His leave? He knows that which is in front of them and that which is behind them, while they encompass nothing of His knowledge save what He will. His throne includes the heavens and the earth, and He is never weary of preserving them. He is the sublime, the tremendous." (once; The Throne verse/ The Cow 255)

⁷ The tahlil is a solicitous prayer, and in a sense dzikir, which is performed after the collective prayer or concomitant with feasts which are held during the post-funeral ceremony. The original recitation is in Arabic. I have translated the non-Qur'anic passages by consulting two mak kaahs and two ustadztes in Bettet.

⁸ The following translation of some Qur'anic verses is mainly adapted from M.M. Pickthall, *The Meaning of the Glorious Qur'an*. Reprint 1977. New York: Rabita. Pickthall's translation is similar to the one given by the local ulama.

8. "The messenger believed in that which had been revealed to him from his Lord and so do the believers. Each one believed in Allah and His angels and His scriptures and his messengers, we make no distinction between any of His messengers. And they say, We hear and we obey. Our Lord! Grant us your forgiveness. To you is the journeying. Allah does not task a soul beyond its scope. For it is only that which it had earned, and against it only that which it had deserved. Our Lord! Condemn us not if we forget, or err. Our Lord! Lay not on us such a burden as you did lay on those before us. Our Lord! Impose not on us that which we do not have the strength to bear. Pardon us and absolve us..." (once, the remaining a few words of the verse are not recited; The Cow 285-286)

9. "Oh the most merciful! Have mercy on us." (seven times)

10. "Oh you who believe in God! Pray for the Prophet and recite peace for him. Oh God! Bless the best of your creature, the morning sun, our Prophet Muhammad as many times as the breadth of your knowledge and as much as the length of your word and as often as the mentioning of your name and as recurrent as the neglect of praising you by the careless people." (three times)

11. "Peace be [upon the Prophet]. May God be pleased with him. We surrender to God, the most secure refuge, the greatest Lord, the best helper. There is no energy and no power save from God, the highest, the almighty." (once)

12. "I beg forgiveness from God the almighty." (three times)

13. (The leader of the ceremony recites "The best remembrance (*al-dzikr*) is, in fact, There is no god save Allah.") "There is no god save Allah." (99 times)⁹

14. "There is no god save Allah and Muhammad is a messenger of God." (three times)

15. "There is no god save Allah." (three times)

16. "Oh God! Bless our prophet Muhammad. Our Lord! Bless him and grant him peace." (three times)

17. "Oh God the purest! Praise be to God." (three times)

18. "Oh God! Bless your beloved, our prophet Muhammad, his family and his companions, and grant them peace." (once)

19. "Oh God! Bless your beloved, our prophet Muhammad, his family and his companions. Oh God! bless them and grant all of them peace." (once)

20. Request prayers proper led by the leader of the ceremony (usually either quoted from the request prayers proper used in the *sebelasan* [see Appendix V] or from those which are invoked after the collective prayer [see Appendix Three]).

⁹ During a more elaborate performance of the *tahli*, the recitation of "There is no god save Allah" is repeated for 7,000 times. This is called the *Tsarwah*.

GLOSSARY AND LIST OF ACRONYMS

- abakalan: engaged to marry; see also bakal
 abanto: to help others; see also bantoan
 adzan: longer summons for prayers
 AKUI (Angkatan Umat Islam): Movement for Islamic Unity
 alas: jungle; waste land
 alek: younger sibling; term of address for a younger person
 alim: a pious individual, learned man
 aliran: socio-religious or ideological pattern (lit. current)
 Amin: Oh God, respond to our request
 andaru: amulet
 andi: to possess, to have; see also oring andi
 anom: term of address for parents' younger siblings
 apel: village official
 'aqa'id: belief system
 are kiamat: the promised last day; Doomsday
 arisan: saving and credit system whereby the members agree to put in a certain amount of money at regular intervals while the opportunity to receive credit is arranged on a rotating basis (di-on di)
 asal: origin
 nyambat: see sambatan
 asas: basis; ideological foundation
 asta: graveyard; tomb; shrine
 Babinsa (Bintara Bina Desa): Military representative in the desa
 badana: the rato's agent at the district level; see also wedana
 badda: container; body
 badunan: a special room used by the kyai to conduct private prayers
 bajang (sombajang): ritual prayer; see also shalat
 bakal: fiancée/fiancé
 bala: kinsmen
 bala dalem: core kinsmen
 bala dibik: close kinsmen
 bala jaoh: peripheral kinsmen
 bala keraba: kin and affines
 balaghah: rhetoric
 balleg: adolescent
 bandungan: a system of instruction in the pondok
 Bangdes (Pembangunan Desa): Village Development (Agency)
 ban giban: original property of a spouse, see also barang asal
 bantoan: voluntary help for neighbors or kinsmen
 bantoan desa: government package for village development
 barang asal: original property of a spouse, see also ban giban
 Bapak/Pak: Mr.; Your honor; father of...
 Bappeda (Badan Perencana Pembangunan Daerah): Governmental Body for Regional Development Planning
 Barisan: military regiments re-organized by the Dutch in Madura
 Barzanji: collection of Arabic poems that depict Muhammad's virtues and glories
 barakah: blessing, luck, and inspiration associated with the ulama
 basmalah: a verse of the Qur'an often recited in starting any undertaking
 batik: locally dyed cloth
 bau: one bau is equal to 0.7 hectare
 bengko: house
 bengko asal: house that belongs to and is built by parents

berkat: foods taken home after selamatan; see also takir
 besto: excommunication from a kyai's domain
 bianggolan: name of a formula for invincibility (lit. the prominent one)
 bibbik: term of address to aunt; see also nyennyah
 bidan: professional mid-wife
 Bimas: (Bimbingan Masa) government program for agricultural development
 Bimas jagung: special program for maize cultivation
 bindara/dara: a title addressed to a son of village ulama
 binek: female; wife
 binek ngoda: second wife
 binek towa: first wife
 blantik: small middleman
 botoh: mediator between a candidate for the desa election and the voters
 BTI (Barisan Tani Indonesia): Front of Indonesian Peasants (a PKI's peasant organization)
 Bu: Mrs.; mother of...
 bupati: regent
 Burdah: eulogy, poems for the Prophet
 BUUD (Badan Usaha Unit Desa): primary village cooperative; see also KUD
 cebbing: term of address for daughter or nieces
 calo: middleman; who provides intercity taxis with passengers
 camat: head of the sub-district administration; see also kecamatan
 carok: killing through murder or show-down
 daerah: territory; residential grouping of the santris in the pondok
 dalem: a kyai's residence
 daleman: land exploited directly by the rato
 darajat: social status
 tak kowat darajat: having no origin and prospect to achieve higher status
 da'wah: teaching and preaching, religious program
 Depag (Departemen Agama): Department of Religious Affairs
 Departemen: government department
 desa(disa): administrative village
 Dharma Wanita: Women's Association
 dingding areh: a large piece of limestone or board used for burial
 di-ondi: drawing lots by members of an arisan group in order to assign their share
 do'a: request prayer
 dukon: curer, diviner, magician and/or exorcizer
 dukon rembi: village midwife
 dukon sonat: an expert in circumcising boys
 dumek: see oring dumek
 dupopo: second cousin
 dzikir: special composition of praises and prayers read during mystical/sufi ceremony
 emmak: father
 Fatayat: Young Women's Association within the NU
 fekih (or fiqh): Islamic law
 Fron Nasional: National Front
 galengan: a narrow field that borders on the agricultural land
 ganjaran: (divine) reward
 GBHN (Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara): the Guidelines of State Policy
 geppok talar: communication by word of mouth
 Golkar (Golongan Karya): Government-backed party that has won the last three general elections in Indonesia
 golongan kolot: conservative group; old-fashioned generation
 gulgul: gong
 GUPPI (Gabungan Usaha Perbaikan Pendidikan Islam): Union for the Improvement of

Islamic Education

- guru: teacher; local instructor
 guru kelas: permanent teacher for a class at the elementary school
 guru silat: instructor in the art of self-defence, see also silat
 hadrah: male musical group; see also kratangan
 haji: title for a person having performed pilgrimage to Mecca; see also onga, ajji and naik haji
 hizib: amulet; see also rajah and jaza'
 HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam): Union for Muslim University Students
 IAIN (Institut Agama Islam Negeri): State Institute of Islamic Studies, tertiary educational institution sponsored by the government
 Idulfitri: celebration at the end of the month of fasting (Ramadhan); see also Telasan
 ikhlas: sincere, true and selfless
 ikhtibar: see imtihan
 ilmu laduni: knowledge and expertise in magic
 imam: mosque functionary; prayer leader in the mosque
 imtihan: festivities held in the pondok at the end of educational session; see also ikhtibar
 infaq: special donation for religious institution
 IPNU (Ikatan Pelajar Nahdlatul Ulama): Student Union of the NU
 iqamat: a shorter call prior to Muslim prayer
 Islamma akarad: Muslims who have not achieved Sufi purity
 Islam statistik: nominal Muslims
 istikharah: special prayers performed before undertaking a major decision
 ITR: (Intensifikasi Tembakau Rakyat) a government scheme for tobacco cultivation
 jak-ngajak: communal labor
 jama'ah: participants in the collective prayers (shalat jama'ah); esprit de corps, group
 jami': large mosque (usually at the regency level)
 jamo: local herbal medicine
 Jamus (Jam'iyatul Muslimin): the Islamic wing of the PNI
 jaza': amulet; see also rajah and hizib
 jeragan: boss; fund provider
 juko: fish; any supplement to basic meal
 jurkam (juru kampanye): professional campaigners
 kabadaan: condition; profile
 kabajan: messenger at the rato's court
 kabengalan: bravery, frankness
 kabupaten: an administrative unit (regency)
 kacong: term of address for son or at times nephew
 kaeh: father
 kafan: white muslin to cover the dead for burial
 kalkhlasan: non-vested interest; honesty
 kaju raja: name of a formula for self-defence (lit. big tree)
 kakak: older brother; term of address for older fellow
 kalowar: to migrate; to go out
 kalurahan: administrative town village
 kamrat: religio-social gathering among neighbors
 kampung: village; hamlet
 kancan: friend, collaborator
 kantor: office
 kantor desa: office of an administrative desa
 Karang Taruna: formal youth association
 karapan: bull race
 karteker: interim; temporary; acting
 kaselamatan (selamet): security, salvation
 kaula: I; we

- kecamatan: an administrative unit (sub-district)
- Kejar (Kelompok Belajar) Pendidikan Dasar: special program designed to improve the knowledge of and eradicate illiteracy among villagers
- kemit: formerly corvée for ruler; labor or money for the klebun as part of his salary
- kenceng: powerful; straight
- kenek: small; see also oring kenek
- kennengan: locality
- kennengan berrik: dangerous location; mysterious location
- kennengan keró: unsafe location
- keris: local weapon; heirloom
- ketupak: cooked rice in specifically designed coconut leaves
- khadam: a kyai's page or assistant
- khair: good; better
- khelaf: exceptional behavior or activity shown by certain ulama; see also majdzub
- kiblat: the direction in which a Muslim faces while performing prayers (Mecca)
- kitab: religious book
- kitab koneng: the authorized religious texts for advanced students in the pondok
- klebun: village headman
- klinik keliling: mobile clinic
- kobasa: authority; power
- kolom: see kamrat
- kontak tani: lectures and discussions among cultivators association
- Kopkamtib: National for Restoration of Security and Order
- Koramil (Komando Distrik Militer): Military command at the kecamatan level
- Korpri: (Korp Pegawai Negeri) Association of Government Employees
- kowat: powerful; see also kenceng
- kratangan: male musical group; see also hadrah
- kraton: palace, court; see also rato
- koyang: one koyang is equal to 4350 pounds
- KUA (Kantor Urusan Agama): Depag office at the kecamatan level
- KUD (Koperasi Unit Desa): secondary village cooperative; see also BUUD
- kufu: equal match in a marriage union
- kuli: day laborer
- kuliah Shubuh: lectures delivered following the morning prayers
- kyai: higher religious leader; see also ulama; mak kaeh and imam
- Kyai Raden: title for aristocratic ulama
- Kyai Tuan: title for Arab aristocratic ulama
- langgar: religious center at the compound
- langgar bine: religious center for women and girls
- langgar raja: religious center at the village level
- leh oleh: gift
- li'tigha'l wajhih: to please God
- li 'la' i kalimatillah: to strive in the way of God
- li 'izzil Islam: to propagate religion
- li mardiatillah: to please God
- liya'buduni: to worship God
- LKMD (Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa): Committee for Village Development
- LMD (Lembaga Musyawarah Desa): Desa Consultative Body
- lon-alon: palace play ground
- lorah: term of address for sons of a kyai
- lorah pondok: a kyai's special assistant
- lurah: head of an administrative town village (kalurahan), or head of the lowest administrative unit in the urban area; a lurah is comparable to a klebun of the desa
- MDI (Majlis Da'wah Islamiyah): Council of Islamic Mission (a government-sponsored

association)

-maca layang: recitation of classical (Maduro-Javanese) texts

madrasah: religious school (elementary and secondary)

madrasah bine: madrasah for girls

Madrasah Ibtid'iyah: the elementary madrasah which emphasizes on providing instruction on general subject

madrasah lake: madrasah for boys

madu: (lit. honey); second wife see also binek ngoda

madzhab: Islamic school of law

majadi: parents' siblings

majdzub: exceptional behavior and activities of certain ulama, see also khelaf

mak kaeh: village religious leader who leads a langgar raja: grandfather

makhluk alus: spirits

malaekat: angels

Manipol-Usdek (Manifesto Politik: Undang2 Dasar 1945, Sosialisme ala Indonesia, Demokrasi Terpimpin, Ekonomi Terpimpin, Kebudayaan Indonesia): Sukarno's political slogan

manthiq: logic

mantri: the rato's official

māntri-kakase: head of the rato's officials

maparoh: sharing arrangement (cultivation or farming)

mapolong tolang: to gather bones, i.e. to marry a relative

merantau: to migrate for job opportunities or studies

miyos: to go out (used for notable individuals such as kyais)

modin: formal religious official at the village level

Molodan: ceremony to celebrate Muhammad's birthday

mondok: to stay away from one's household for study or work; see also pondok (ponduk)

monoloyalitas: (government employees') sole political allegiance to Golkar

MTQ (Musabaqah Tiliwatil Qur'an): competition for artistic recitation of the Qur'an

MTs (Madrasah Tsanawiyah): Religious Secondary School

muballigh: preacher, public speaker

mufti: religious advisor at the court

muktamar: congress

Muhammadiyah: Islamic organization founded in 1911

Munas (Musyawarah Nasional): National Conference

murah pangan: abundant foodstuffs

murid: disciple; pupil

mursyid: religious, Sufi-guide

Muslimat: women's association of the NU

musta'mal: second-hand (religious leaders)

mustami'an: religious gathering with speeches

naik haji: to perform pilgrimage to Mecca; see also onggaj

namberek: west monsoon; rainy season

nandai: celebration to mark the beginning of pregnancy

naoni: to hold the hundred-day feast for the dead

Naqsybandiyah: Sufi order, brotherhood

Nasakom (Nasional, Agama, Komunis): Sukarno's concept of a multi-party alliance of the Nationalists, Religionists and Communists

neven: sub-group within the social organization or political party

ngawula: worship, follow

nggalang: unite, rally, organize

NU: (Nahdlatul Ulama) Islamic organization founded in 1926

nyai: wife of a kyai; female ulama or her daughter; (or nyi) term of address for female ulama and her daughter

nyebu: to hold the thousand-day feast for the dead

nyennya: term of address for aunt; see also bibbik

ollena: property acquired by married couples
 onggga: to migrate for job opportunity (lit. to climb)
 onggga ajji: to perform pilgrimage to Mecca; see also naik haji
 organisasi massa (Ormas): mass organization
 oring andi: big, rich man
 oring cokop: well-off individual
 oring dumek: ordinary man (close to Sukarno's concept of marhen)
 oring kenek: small man
 oring raja: big man
 oring towa: lit. old man, i.e. prominent individual
 oring truna: the rato's guard
 orosan binek: female work
 OSIS (Organisasi Siswa): Formal Student Body
 otosan: cooperative labor exchange
 PA (Pengadilan Agama): Religious Court
 Pak: Mr.; father of...
 palekat: the rato's domestic helper
 Pancasila: Five Principles (state philosophy formulated by Sukarno in 1945)
 panca usaha tani: five agricultural principles
 pancen: labor service for rulers
 pangolo: religious expert; former religious official at the court
 panyantren: residential religious school; see also santri
 parimbon: divination manual
 Pasa: fasting; the month of fasting (Ramadhan)
 patih: prime minister (during the rato's era)
 PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia): a political party that originally accomodates many nation-
 alists and Christians
 pegawai (pegawai negeri): government employee
 pejabat: government official
 pejoang rakyat: local fighters against the occupying power
 Pembantu Gubernur: Deputy Governor
 Pemda (Pemerintah Daerah): Regional Government
 pencak: self-defence
 pengajian: religious study
 pengajian kitab: text-reading session
 penghijauan: reforestation
 pengkal: one sixth of a hectare
 penjabat: acting, temporary (office holder)
 percaton: apanage; land (classical); usufruct over village land given to the desa officials
 perdikan: desa which has special administrative arrangements
 peringatan: celebration
 perkawinan pertama: first marriage
 pesantren: residential religious school, see also santri
 pessek: money
 pettok toronan: seven generations of one's descendants
 petugas penyuluh pertanian: government agent for agricultural development information
 PGA (Pendidikan Guru Agama): Vocational Training for Religious Teachers; college of religious education
 pidato: oratory
 PII (Pelajar Islam Indonesia): Muslim Student Movement
 PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia): Communist Party of Indonesia
 PKK (Pendidikan Kesejahteraan Keluarga): Education for Family Welfare
 PMII (Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia): Movement for Muslim University Students
 PMP (Pendidikan Moral Pancasila): Teaching of Pancasila Ethic
 PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia): Indonesian National Party

politik praktis: practical politics, opportunism
 ponakan: first cousin's offspring
 pondok (ponduk): residential religious school, see also monduk
 pondok asal: original pondok built by a first-generation kyai
 po seppo see oring towa
 pot: missing, (the cancellation of a session in the pondok)
 P2A (Proyek Pembinaan Mental Agama): Program for Religious Guidance
 PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan): a political party that originally accomodates many
 proponents of Islamic organizations
 Pramuka: boy scout movement
 PSII (Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia) Islamic Union Party; see also SI (Sarekat Islam)
 Puskesmas (Pusat Kesehatan Masyarakat): government clinic
 Qadiriyyah: a Sufi brotherhood
 raden: aristocratic title (general term)
 raden panji: aristocratic title for the rato's military men
 rah: term of address for a kyai's son, see also lorah
 ra'is 'am: general chairman (of NU Syuriyah)
 Rajaban: ceremony to celebrate the Prophet Muhammad's ascension to heaven
 raja: big see also oring raja
 rajah: amulet; see also hizib and jaza'
 Ramadhan: the month of fasting; see also Pasa
 rasulan: special feast
 rato: former ruler in Madurese principalities
 Repelita (Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun): Five-Year Development Plan
 resto: acceptance, agreement, blessing and support
 RKPD (Radio Khusus Pemerintah Daerah): Radio Station of the Regency Government
 Rp (rupiah): Indonesian currency (in 1984-1985 one US dollar was exchanged for more or
 less Rp1000.00
 RRI (Radio Republik Indonesia): Government radio stations
 rukun tetangga: formal neighborhood association
 ruma tunggu see bengko asal
 Samman: socio-religious and mystical gathering
 sambatan: asking for help from neighbors or kinsmen
 sajak: simple poem
 salam: greeting, salutation
 salam tempel: shaking hand accompanied with money
 samper: traditional dress for women
 samrah: female musical group
 sana see bala
 santri: residential student at pondok
 santri nyolok: non-resident student of the pondok
 sapopo: first cousins
 sarong: loose garment, sarong
 satu bangsa: one nation (a national slogan)
 sawah: flat agricultural land, irrigated or rain-dependent
 sayyid: Arab aristocracy
 SD (Sekolah Dasar): Primary School
 SD Inpres (Instruksi Presiden): the newly founded elementary schools
 SD Kecil/Pamong: informal elementary schools opened in some remote, isolated villages
 se areksa: the protector, guardian (associated with the invisible beings); spirit
 seban: the meetings between the rato and his officials and others
 sebelasan: religious gathering held on the eleventh day of the lunar month, see Appendix V
 Sekretaris Daerah: the secretary of the regency administration
 selamatan: communal meal; socio-religious feast
 seni baca al-Qur'an: artistic recitation of the Qur'an

- se sae: a village concept of harmony (lit. what is good and safe)
 settong: one
 shalat: ritual prayers; see also bajang
 shalat jama'ah: collective prayers
 shalat sunnat: recommended prayers
 shalawat nariyah: special prayer read at religious gathering, see Appendix II
 SI (Sarekat Islam): Islamic Union, national Islamic organization; see also PSII
 silat see pencak
 sistem sekolah: formal grade school system
 SMA (Sekolah Menengah Atas): Senior Secondary School
 SMP (Sekolah Menengah Pertama): Junior Secondary School
 songe raja: name of a formula for self-defence (lit. large river)
 songkok: customary black cap
 Sora: the first month of Hijri in local calendar (Muharram)
 sorogan: a system of instruction for junior santri in the pondok
 SPG (Sekolah Pendidikan Guru): College of Education for Elementary School Teachers; vocational training for teachers
 susuhunan: ruler of Surakarta principality
 syari'ah: religious law, Islamic practices
 syarr: bad
 syeh: a prominent religious leader, Sufi guide
 syetan: devil
 syokoran: an expression of one's gratitude by holding a feast or distributing gifts
 Syuriyah: the consultative body of the NU
 tahlil: special prayers read on religious gatherings, see Appendix 6
 takir: banana-leaf packet of rice specifically prepared for religious feast
 tak nyaman: inconvenient
 tana asal: inherited land
 tana banyuastip: the newly reclaimed sawah land
 tanean: household yard
 tanean lanjang: long yard, compound
 Tanfidziyah: the executive body of the NU
 taqdir: predestination
 tarekat (tharīqah): Sufi brotherhood/order
 tasbeh: beads, rosary
 tasek miring: name of a particular formula for invincibility (lit. the leaning sea)
 tashawwuf: Sufism
 tauhid: the unicity of God, monotheism, fundamental doctrine
 tegal: dry land; land surrounding the compound
 Telasan: celebration at the end of the fasting month; see also Idulfitri
 tingkat (Tk.): level
 todus (epatodus): shame, humiliated
 tokang tebas: tobacco broker
 tokang rajang: tobacco cutter
 toronan: descent
 bennik toronan kyai: religious experts who come from non-ulama family
 towedi: the rato's agent for the sub-district
 transmigrasi: resettlement program sponsored by the government, out-migration
 tsarwah: an elaborate form of tahlil
 UGA (Ujian Guru Agama): exams for candidates of the religious teachers at the elementary school
 ukhuwah: Islamic brotherhood

ulama: originally '*ulamā*' a plural form of Arabic '*ʿālim*', but in Madura and in Indonesia generally it is used both as singular and plural to refer to religious scholars and leaders
umat: Muslim community at large
ustadz: erudite religious teacher
wajib belajar: compulsory education (elementary)
wakaf: religious endowment
wayang: shadow puppet
wedana: the rāto's agent for a district
weton: a system of instruction for advanced santri in the pondok
Yasinan: a religious gathering which is specifically arranged to read a part of the Qur'an (surat Yaṣin)
zakat: religious taxes, legal alms
zakat fitrah: special zakat collected prior to the end of the fasting month (Ramadhan)

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