"Hegel's Influence on American Political Thought: An Analysis of the American Progressive Movement"

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James Harvey Robinson, Charles Austin Beard, John Dewey, and Herbert Croly are all founding members of the American Progressive Movement. However, a thorough understanding of their philosophy remains incomplete. Thus, this thesis attempts to investigate the intellectual foundations of these scholars by comparing their philosophy to Hegel's. Therefore, the object of this thesis is to demonstrate that Hegel's philosophy plays a major role in the formation of American Progressive thought-- an understanding of Hegel's political thought helps one to better grasp the philosophy of the American Progressive movement. While Robinson, Beard, Dewey, and Croly have many intellectual influences, a close reading of Hegel's works and the writings of the Progressives teases out similarities between the two. However, Hegel's influence on the Progressives is not self-evident or unattenuated-- in most cases Hegel's influence comes to the Progressives through sources other than his texts (e.g., instructors and mentors, readings, and personal relations). Thus, this thesis argues that American Progressive thought represents some variation on Hegelianism.

"L'influence de Hegel sur la pensée politique américaine: Une analyse du mouvement Progressive américain"

James Harvey Robinson, Charles Austin Beard, John Dewey, et Herbert Croly sont parmi les membres fondateurs du mouvement Progressive américain. Cependant, une interprétation approfondie de leur philosophie nous manque toujours. Ainsi, ce mémoire compare les philosophies de ces théoriciens à celle de Hegel afin de'enquêter sur leurs fondations intellectuelles. Donc, le but de ce mémoire est de démontrer que la philosophie de Hegel joue un rôle primordial dans la formation de la pensée Progressive américaine -- une compréhension de la pensée politique de Hegel nous aide de mieux comprendre la philosophie du mouvement Progressive américain. Bien que Robinson, Beard, Dewey, et Croly aient des nombreuses influences, une analyse précise de l'oeuvre de Hegel nous montre les similarités entre les deux. Cependant, l'influence de Hegel sur les Progressives n'est pas évident-- dans le plupart des cas, l'influence de Hegel vient aux Progressives par des sources à part de ses textes, comme par des mentors, des oeuvres intellectuelles, et des rapports personels. Ainsi, ce mémoire soutient que la pensée Progressive américaine représente une variation d'hegelianisme

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In the early 1980s many American scholars focused their attention on the historical roots of contemporary American Liberalism.[1] Some of these scholars found that American Liberalism lost its "historical identity"-- R. Jeffrey Lustig notes that "modern American Liberalism has grown cautious about its historical identity".[2] Likewise, Scott Bowman observes that contemporary American Liberalism is unaware of its origins. Specifically, Bowman suggests American Liberalism underwent a 'reconstruction' in the early twentieth century that is largely ignored by most scholars today.[3]

Lustig and Bowman suggest that in the late 19th and early 20th century the development and rise of the modern corporation changed American Liberalism. During the turn of the century, American Liberalism changed its program in order to respond to the social upheaval created by the large corporation. Bowman says "the reconstruction of American Liberalism grew out of the attempt to devise solutions to the social and political problems posed by the power of the large corporation, including the restructuring of economic and social relationships".[4] When Lustig suggested American Liberalism lost its historical origins this is what he meant; modern American Liberalism in the early twentieth century attempted "both a criticism of and an accommodation to the new corporate order" which today is largely ignored by scholars of American Liberalism.[5]

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[1] Scott R. Bowman, *The Modern Corporation and American Political Thought: Law, Power, and Ideology* (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State UP, 1996); R. Jeffrey Lustig, *Corporate Liberalism: The Origins of Modern American Political Theory, 1890-1920* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982); Martin J. Sklar, *The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890-1916: The Market, The Law, and Politics* (New York: Cambridge UP, 1998).
[2] Lustig, ix.
[3] Bowman, 75-124.
[4] Ibid., 79.
[5] Lustig, 2.

Turn of the century American Liberalism, or Progressivism, attempted to mold the "corporation into a socially responsible institution".[6] However, to use the corporation as a tool of social change an 'ideological revision' took place in American Liberalism.[7] Thus, according to Lustig and Bowman turn of the century American Liberalism became Progressivism.

For scholars like Lustig and Bowman the ideological revision that took place in American Liberalism at the turn of the century has great implications for contemporary American Liberalism. Lustig and Bowman see modern American Liberalism as an extension of the Progressive tradition. Thus, American Liberals are continually attempting to use the corporation's power for socially responsible ends. However, not all scholars agree with Lustig and Bowman's assessment of the liberal tradition in America. Academics like Lustig and Bowman interpret the history of American Liberalism in a radically different way from scholars like John Rawls, Michael Sandel, or Louis Hartz.

Hartz asserts that John Locke's political thought forms the historical backdrop for contemporary American Liberalism.[8] Rawls draws upon a tradition laid out by Kant to construct modern American Liberalism.[9] Similarly, Sandel suggests that contemporary liberalism builds on neutrality, neutrality based in Kant's insistence "on the separateness of persons".[10] Sandel suggests that contemporary liberals import the notion of the autonomous self from Kant-- the individual is "given prior to and independent of

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[6] Bowman, 78.
[7] Ibid., 80.
[8] Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in American* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Co., 1955).
[9] John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1971), 11.

its purposes and ends".[11] As Sandel says "the Kantian self is a choosing self, independent of the desires and ends it may have at any moment".[12] Therefore, in order to preserve the independent self, contemporary liberal political philosophy aims to create a state that does not impose any notion of the 'good' upon its citizens. Thus, contemporary liberalism attempts the creation of a neutral state. In demonstrating this conclusion contemporary American Liberalism draws upon Kant for its historical roots. So, not all scholars agree that contemporary American Liberalism ignores its origins.

Lustig and Bowman see modern American Liberalism as an extension of the Progressive tradition. However, Sandel, Rawls, and Hartz view modern American Liberalism as the completion of a project laid out by more traditional political philosophers such as Locke or Kant. Thus it is not surprising that Lustig and Bowman believe modern American Liberalism ignores its origins-- Lustig and Bowman believe the origins of American Liberalism lie in the Progressive movement and not in the political philosophy of Locke or Kant. Therefore, Bowman and Lustig draw radically different conclusions about contemporary American Liberalism from Rawls, Sandel, and Hartz. This thesis does not attempt to mediate between the traditional approach to American Liberalism used by Rawls, Sandel, and Hartz or the more radically approach used by Bowman and Lustig. However, this thesis does comment on the approach used by Bowman and Lustig. Specifically, the thesis suggests that the approach to contemporary

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[10] Michael J. Sandel, *Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1996), 11.
[11] Ibid., 12.
[12] Ibid.

American Liberalism used by Bowman and Lustig would be improved through an analysis of Hegel's philosophy.

Scholars like Bowman and Lustig tell us that the historical shift in American Liberalism around the turn of the century changes how one views contemporary American Liberalism. However, Bowman and Lustig have written an incomplete history of the American Progressive movement. Specifically, Bowman and Lustig have failed to recognize Hegel's influence on the American Progressive movement. It is important to fully understand the Progressive movement in order to understand the shift that took place in American Liberalism, and thus come to a better understanding of contemporary American Liberalism. So, recognizing Hegel's influence on the Progressive movement may change how one views contemporary American Liberalism.

This thesis suggests that Hegel's philosophy had a strong influence on the American Progressive movement. Therefore, the object of this thesis is to demonstrate that Hegel's philosophy plays a major role in the formation of American Progressive thought-- an understanding of Hegel's political thought helps one to better grasp the philosophy of the American Progressive movement. While Hegel's influence on the American Progressive Movement may not strike an obvious note with most academics, there exists a body of literature that deals with Hegel in America. For example, Loyd D. Easton studied Hegel's influence on American political theorists in the mid-1880s.[13]

[13] Loyd D. Easton, *Hegel's First American Followers: The Ohio Hegelians: John B. Stallo, Peter Kaufmann, Moncure Conway, and August Willich, with Key Writings* (Athens, OH: Ohio UP, 1966).

Likewise, Harvey Townsend Gates notes Hegel's influence on American academics as early as the 1830s.[14]

However, Hegel's relationship to the Progressive movement develops in an obscured way, hidden by time. As Easton notes it is difficult to recognize Hegel's influence on American political thought.[15] Simply, the Progressive scholars never had any direct or easily documented contact with Hegel or his work. Hegel's influence on the Progressives was neither first-hand nor undisturbed. Hegel's influence on American Progressive thought finds itself mediated through intervening scholars, academics, mentors, and literature. Thus, it is not obvious that Hegel's work plays a formative role in Progressive philosophy-- one does not, for example, find Hegel's philosophy transported directly into American Progressive thought. Thus, confusion arose surrounding the relationship of Hegel to the Progressive movement. However, a close reading of Hegel's works and the writings of the Progressives teases out similarities between the two. Thus, this thesis argues that American Progressive thought represents some variation on Hegelianism.

To make the point that an understanding of Hegel's philosophy improves an understanding of Progressive scholarship, this thesis focuses on four different scholars. First, the thesis outlines the 'New History' through the work of James Harvey Robinson and Charles Austin Beard. These two academics are the founders of the 'New History'. The 'New History' was a methodological movement which suggested that contemporary political, social, and economic institutions are found to be rational only through historical

[14] Harvey Gates Townsend, "The Political Philosophy of Hegel in a Frontier Society," in Edward L. Schaub, ed. *William Torrey Harris: 1835-1935* (Open Court Publishing, 1936), 68-80.

analysis. The 'New History' has had lasting implications for the way in which academics make arguments today. In addition, Robinson and Beard play a role in the formation of the New School for Social Research. Thus, they attempted to influence generations of scholars through the structuring of education. Second, the thesis discusses John Dewey's philosophy. Dewey's work influences many contemporary liberal academics. For example, Dewey helped to organize the American Civil Liberties Union, which has figured in the development of American Public Policy. Finally, Herbert Croly's philosophy is analyzed-- Croly's political theory informs the philosophy of academics like Robert Reich.[16] Croly's work was also well received by Theodore Roosevelt as the Bull Moose Party's Presidential nomination. Most importantly the thesis helps to inform the work of scholars like Bowman and Lustig. As this thesis point out above Bowman and Lustig suggest that contemporary American Liberalism has forgotten its past. Bowman and Lustig argue that scholars like Robinson, Beard, Dewey, and Croly form the core of Liberalism's history. Therefore, it is important to study these four scholars to gain an understanding of Bowman and Lustig's reading of American Liberalism. As John G. Gunnell says the motivating assumption behind any work of political history "is that a critical examination of the field requires an appreciation of its genealogy".[17] Thus, this thesis provides a historical appraisal of the argument made by Bowman and Lustig.

In order to show how an understanding of Hegel's philosophy improves one's knowledge of Progressive scholarship, the thesis first reconstructs the Progressives'

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[15] Easton, 20-1.
[16] See, Robert B. Reich, *The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves for 21st Century Capitalism* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991).

experiences. The thesis demonstrates that through academic and personal life Robinson, Beard, Dewey, and Croly encountered and were influenced by Hegel's work. However, each scholar was influenced by and came into Hegel's philosophy in a different way--Robinson, Beard, Dewey, and Croly each appropriated different aspects of Hegel's thought. This is why it is important when evaluating the Progressives' scholarship to keep Hegel's philosophy in mind. Thus, this thesis demonstrates Hegel's influence on the American Progressive movement by showing that Robinson, Beard, Dewey, and Croly all developed their philosophies in the context of Hegelian and German scholarship. Also, the thesis illustrates how each of the scholars' philosophies bears similarities to Hegel's.

[17] John G. Gunnell, *The Descent of Political Theory: The Genealogy of an American Vocation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 1.

James Harvey Robinson

James Harvey Robinson came from a small middle class family in Bloomington, Illinois.[18] Born on June 29, 1863, Robinson's family was greatly interested in academic matters. According to Luther V. Hendricks, Robinson's father and brother, both graduates of Harvard University, accumulated large libraries.[19] While James Harvey Robinson's brother "Benjamin became a famous botanist and headed the Harvard herbarium", Robinson became interested in historical studies.[20] Early on in his academic career Robinson developed an interest in history. So, after a yearlong tour of France, in 1884 Robinson entered Harvard University to pursue a degree in History.[21] After only three years Robinson completed his undergraduate work-- he earned an A.B. in 1887. Staying on for a fourth year Robinson completed a Master's Degree in history-- he finished an A.M. in history at Harvard in 1888.[22] "While at Harvard University, he came under the influence of William James, who developed his interest in pragmatic philosophy".[23] In addition, Robinson studied under Josiah Royce-- Royce began teaching at Harvard University in 1882 on invitation from James.[24] Importantly, scholars note the use of Hegelian concepts in both James and Royce. The thesis now turns to examine some of Robinson's intellectual roots. Importantly, beginning with William James'

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[18] Luther V. Hendricks, *James Harvey Robinson: Teacher of History* (Morningside Heights, New York: King's Crown Press, 1946), 1.
[19] Ibid., 2.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid., 3.
[22] James Friguglietti, "James Harvey Robinson," in *American National Biography* 18, ed. John A. Garraty and Mark C. Carnes (New York: Oxford UP, 1999), 658.
[23] Ibid.

scholarship, the thesis points out the various opportunities Robinson had to encounter Hegel's political and social philosophy.

According to Robinson's students William James "left a significant and permanent impression on him".[25] Significantly, William James' work makes use of some Hegelian concepts. James' Hegelianism comes through William T. Harris. Harris was a strict Hegelian-- he promoted his Hegelian attitudes through a journal he started-the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*.[26] James published frequently in Harris' journal.[27] However, unlike Harris, James was not an orthodox Hegelian. In *A Pluralistic Universe* James scorns Hegel as a 'pernicious influence' on American philosophy.[28] Bernstein says "the picture of Hegel that emerges from *A Pluralistic Universe* is clearly a caricature; Hegelianism represented intellectualism, obscurity (in the name of profundity), loss of contact with the tangled reality of life itself, and commitment to a block universe monism".[29] However, Harris' influence did affect James' work-- the overall approach James took to philosophy and psychology "is much closer to Hegel" than most realize.[30] Specifically, the method that James used to understand human consciousness is thematically similar to Hegel's analysis of consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.[31] "The types of phenomenological descriptions that James developed for the

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[24] Henry A. Pochmann, *German Culture in American: Philosophical and Literary Influences, 1600-1900* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978), 315.
[25] Hendricks, 3.
[26] Edward L. Schaub, "Harris and the Journal of Speculative Philosophy" 51.
[27] Pochmann, *New England Transcendentalism and St. Louis Hegelianism: Phases in the History of American Idealism* (New York: Haskell House Publishers, 1970), 119,
[28] Richard J. Bernstein, *Praxis and Action: Contemporary Philosophies of Human Activity* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), 166.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid., 167.

varieties of experience are very much in the spirit of Hegel's descriptions of the forms of consciousness".[32] James' conception of how consciousness develops draws on Hegel's analysis of the development of consciousness.[33] Although James is not a Hegelian, he does adopt Hegel's phenomenological method. So, Robinson becomes exposed to Hegel's phenomenological method through the work of William James. Thus, James' use of Hegel's phenomenology may have influenced the method Robinson developed to study history. Having linked William James to Hegelian philosophy, the essay turns to examine Josiah Royce, Robinson's other mentor at Harvard University.

Josiah Royce is probably the most famous American Hegelian of the early 1900s.[34] Royce was a student at Johns Hopkins University in 1878 where he studied under Charles Sanders Pierce and George Sylvester Morris.[35] Also, while at Johns Hopkins University Royce came into contact with John Dewey.[36] It is important to point out that Pierce, Morris, and Dewey were heavily influenced by Hegel.

Morris, a professor of philosophy of at Johns Hopkins University, had a very strong interest in Hegelian philosophy for the entirety of his career. While still a student, Morris collaborated on scholarly work with T. H. Green, a well-known British Hegelian.[37] Green held that the Hegelian dialectic reveals true rationality and

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[32] Ibid., footnote 2.
[33] It is not relevant to this thesis to specifically examine James' use of Hegel's phenomenology. It is enough to point out that James does make use of Hegel's philosophy. For more information see James Edie, "William James and Phenomenology" *The Review of Metaphysics* 23 (March 1970).
[34] Royce's success as a scholar and writer is shown in Pochmann, *German Culture in America*, 315.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Royce was a student of Pierce's and Morris. Dewey was a fellow student. Alan Ryan, *John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), 63.
[37] Some scholars argue that Green owes much more of his intellectual foundations to Kant and Fichte than to Hegel. However Ryan suggests that Green's intellectual foundations lies well within the boundaries of Hegelian philosophy. Ryan, 85, 374 note 4. See also, Pochmann, *German Culture in America*, 314.

universality.[38] Also, Morris studied in German for three years-- he studied with F. A. Trendenlenburg, an important historian of philosophy and Hegel's biographer.[39] Morris' education in Hegelian philosophy led him to publish his own volume on Hegel's philosophy: *Hegel's Philosophy of the State and of History.* Morris held that Hegel's *Philosophy of History* accurately reconstructs the development of the consciousness or spirit of man.[40] Importantly, Morris believed the most important lesson to be taken away from Hegel's *Philosophy of History* was that history tells us how the present developed and why it has meaning for us. That is, Hegel's *Philosophy of History* tells us the importance of history. Thus, Morris utilized Hegel's historicist or phenomenological method. Likewise, Morris' colleague Pierce read and studied Hegel-- he used Hegel's logic to attack the work of Kant.[41] So, Royce studied with many individuals who viewed Hegel's philosophy favorably.[42] Importantly, Royce learned from his instructors that history provides us with an account of what is rational-- Royce was educated in Hegel's historicist method. However, not only did Royce study with Hegelian scholars, he studied at the first 'German style' university in the United States.

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[38] Thomas I. Cook and Arnaud B. Leavelle, "German Idealism and American Theories of the Democratic Community", *Journal of Politics* 5, no.3 (August 1943), 219.
[39] Alan Ryan, *John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), 64.
[40] George Sylvester Morris, *Hegel's Philosophy of the State and of History* (Chicago: S.C. Griggs and Co., 1892), 110-1.
[41] Bernstein, *Praxis and Action*, 166.
[42] The thesis returns, in the section titled "John Dewey", to examine the scholarship of John Dewey and Charles Sanders Pierce. For now it is important to note that Royce was in the company of individuals who all utilized Hegel's philosophy. It appears from biographical sources that Morris had the greatest influence on Royce while at Johns Hopkins University-- Royce was attracted to Morris' idealist and moral philosophy. See, Pochmann, *German Culture in America*, 314-6.

Johns Hopkins University owes its existence to the German University system.[43] Johns Hopkins University along with Columbia University and the University of Chicago were the first schools in America to adopt the German style graduate and fellowship programs. Based on the German *Privatdozent*, Johns Hopkins University among others began granting fellowships to support graduate students in the early 1880s.[44] Many American students prior to the 1880s went to Germany for professional and graduate training-- the need in the United States for individuals with professional degrees was continually growing. Universities, government offices, and academic institutions sough out candidates with graduate training. Thus, rather than force individuals to attend graduate schools abroad, some American universities created graduate schools, and modeled them after German Universities.[45] Johns Hopkins was among the first to create a graduate school in the United States. So, Royce studied in an environment that embodied German scholarship. Importantly, Royce studied with individuals who utilized the Hegel's phenomenological method-- he learned at Johns Hopkins, especially from Morris, how history describes and makes rational society's development. Thus, Robinson's academic mentors at Harvard University, William James and Josiah Royce, were very familiar with German scholarship, especially Hegelian scholarship. The thesis now turns to examine a third source of Robinson's Hegelianism, Robinson's graduate studies.

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[43] Ryan, 62.
[44] Jurgen Herbst, *The German Historical School in American Scholarship: A Study in the Transfer of Culture* (Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1972), 33.
[45] Anna Haddow, *Political Science in American Colleges and Universities: 1636-1900* (New York: Octago Books, 1969), 172.

A third source of Robinson's Hegelianism came from his graduate work in Germany. In 1888 Robinson went to the University of Strasbourg to improve his German.[46] In 1889, Robinson transferred to the University of Freiburg where he met Herman von Holst.[47] Holst was a specialist in American political development and history-- he served as Robinson's doctoral dissertation advisor. While Robinson studied for his Doctorate of Philosophy in History, Holst introduced him to German scholarship and historical studies. Importantly, Holst exposed Robinson to the methodological and ideological tenants of the 'German historical school'-- Hegel as Michael N. Forster suggests is a member of the 'German historical school'.[48] Also, Holst drew on Hegel's *Philosophy of History* to demonstrate that philosophical, political, economic, and sociological debates must incorporate the totality of human history.[49] For example, when making an argument about contemporary political circumstances one must proceed historically according to Holst.[50] So, after Robinson left Germany he took with him the belief that the social sciences were "indeed a historical discipline".[51] Robinson's graduate studies with von Holst again exposed him to German and Hegelian thought. William James, Josiah Royce, and graduate school in German provided Robinson many opportunities to study German and Hegelian philosophy. The thesis now turns to examine Robinson's exposure to Hegel's thought in his professional life.

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[46] Friguglietti

[47] Ibid

[48] Michael N. Forster, *Hegel's Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 366.

[49] Harry Elmer Barnes, *A History of Historical Writing*, (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1937. Reprint, New York: Dover Publications, 1963), 233.

[50] See Herman von Holst, *Constitutional and Political History of the United States*. In this work Holst holds that the struggle over slavery in American history lead to and inspired righteousness and nationalism in the American psyche.

The fourth documented avenue that allowed Robinson to study Hegel's work was at Columbia University. Robinson began teaching at Columbia University in 1895. While at Columbia University Robinson encountered three individuals who helped develop his Hegelian aspects as well as his Progressive attitude: Charles A. Beard, John W. Burgess, and John Dewey. This thesis discusses Beard and Dewey later.[52] For now it is enough to say that both Beard and Dewey helped to develop Robinson's Hegelian approach to history-- as Hendricks points out John Dewey "undoubtedly influenced Robinson".[53] Also, it should be pointed out that Robinson became a very close personal friend of Beard's. In fact, in 1919 Robinson along with Beard and Dewey left Columbia University to form the New School for Social Research with Herbert D. Croly, Thorstein Veblen, and Alvin Johnson. Robinson along with the other founders of the New School for Social Research hoped to free themselves "from intellectual restrictions and annoying regulations" of the bureaucratic university structure.[54] At the New School for Social Research Robinson interacted on an intellectual level with many individuals who respected at least portions of Hegel's work. However, Robinson spent only two years at the New School for Social Research. Thus, Robinson's experience at Columbia University was much more formative than his time at the New School for Social Research.[55]

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[51] Herberst., x.
[52] At Columbia University Dewey was among Robinson's professional academic colleagues. Charles A. Beard was both a student and colleague of Robinson's at Columbia University.
[53] Hendricks, 12-3.
[54] Rae Wahl Rohfeld, "James Harvey Robinson and The New History" (Ph.D. diss., Western Reserve University, June 1965), 9.
[55] In addition, Rohfeld suggests that "Robinson's Columbia years saw the odyssey of his thought to the New History". See, Rohfeld, 10. Also, Robinson himself remarks in his *Ordeal of Civilization* that while

At Columbia University Robinson met with John W. Burgess. Burgess developed the political science program at Columbia University that relied very heavily on a historical approach to the study of political science-- Burgess' program of study taught that political science must be historical. Burgess, teaching Political Science as a historical discipline broke with the empirically oriented outlook of the subject. In designing the political science program at Columbia University as a historical program, Burgess took as its "model the German University".[56] Burgess' historical approach to political science is in no doubt a product of his Hegelianism-- "reflecting the Hegelian influences of his teachers, Burgess developed a theory of the modern state as the progressive realization of human reason through history".[57]

> The basis and point of departure of this principle of the historical development of the state was human nature in which there was found to exist a universal [i.e., rational] and a particular side. The former [i.e., the particular side] was the state subjective. The state made objective in the institutions and laws by the process of history was the realization of the universal.[58]

Thus, history alone produces the universal or rational state-- the state is rational only as a result of a historical process. Burgess then concludes that the purpose of modern Political Science is to recognize the rational historical process and unite the universal and

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at Columbia University he became to understand the depth of historical studies. See, Robinson, *Ordeal of Civilization* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1926), 4; Idem., *The New History*, 134.

[56] James Farr, "John William Burgess," in *American National Biography* 3, ed. John A. Garraty and Mark C. Carnes (New York: Oxford UP, 1999), 940.

[57] Ibid., 941.

[58] Charles Baskervill Robson, "The Influence of German Thought on Political Theory in the United States in the Nineteenth Century" (Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina, 1930), 321.

particular sides of human nature in the state.[59] Robson notes that "it cannot be doubted that Burgess was brought to assume this position through the influence of Hegel's philosophy as it came to him in his reading of Hegel's works and through other publicists who were themselves of the Hegelian School".[60] In fact, Burgess' work and lectures were so influenced by Hegel that his students nicknamed him 'Weltgeist'.[61] However, Burgess' German and Hegelian methods and thought need not surprise us. "From 1871 to 1873 Burgess studied law, history, and political science at the Universities of Gottingen, Leibzig, and Berlin".[62] So, once again Robinson finds himself exposed to some tenants of Hegel's thought. Importantly, Robinson experiences Hegel's historical method-- Robinson learns that what is considered rational develops through history.

It is important to point out that Robinson received Hegel through sources other than Hegel. William James, Josiah Royce, John W Burgess, Herman von Holst, Charles A. Beard, and others all contributed to Robinson's education.[63] Since most of Robinson's instructors and acquaintances had some Hegelian tendencies, Robinson became exposed to Hegelian concepts. However, Hegel's philosophy was changed and transformed when communicated to Robinson. Robinson acknowledges this process-- "we do not, assuredly, owe most of them [i.e., convictions and thoughts] to painful personal excogitation, but inherit them, along with the institutions and social habits of the

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[59] John W. Burgess, *Sovereignty and Liberty*, vol. 1, *Political Science and Constitutional Law* (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1890), 71-2.
[60] Robson, 322.
[61] Herbst, 67.
[62] Farr, 940.
[63] Importantly, those scholars whom expose Robinson to Hegel's work did not necessarily experience Hegel directly-- most of them came to know Hegel through other scholarship rather than just Hegel. For example, Josiah Royce learned Hegel through Morris, Pierce, and others. Thus, Robinson finds himself very removed from Hegel's philosophy.

land in which we live".[64] Robinson admits that his educational environment influences him. So, Robinson absorbed Hegel through his instructors. Thus, Hegel's philosophy, by the time it reaches Robinson, becomes mingled with the philosophies of other theorists, institutions, and social environments.

There is only limited evidence to suggest that Robinson actually read Hegel's original works, and there is no evidence to suggest that Robinson studied Hegel's complete philosophy in a rigorous manner-- there are only two direct references to Hegel in Robinson's master piece, *The New History*. In fact, Robinson makes it clear that he never adopted one philosophy as a system.

> When we speak of Augustinianism, Hegelianism, or Marxism, we do not mean the complete philosophic systems of these writers, but such particularly impressive discoveries, few in number, as stand out in relief against the mass of subtleties with which only the expert will be tempted to reckon.[65]

So, Robinson receives Hegel's philosophy in pieces-- he adopts the useful and striking conclusions of Hegel's philosophy, but Robinson leaves behind those aspects of Hegel's philosophy which prove tangential to his work. Never having studied Hegel's philosophy systematically, we can not expect Robinson to adopt Hegelianism totally. However, as the thesis documents Robinson clearly found himself exposed to Hegel's philosophy. Thus, Robinson's work does not reflect a strict Hegelian philosophy-- as the thesis demonstrates below Robinson at times appropriates Hegel's thought into his work, and at

[64] Robinson, *The New History*, 103.
[65] Ibid., 102.

other times Robinson rejects Hegel's philosophy. Consequently, Robinson's work represents a variation on Hegelianism.[66]

An important theme throughout Robinson's exposure to Hegelianism is the focus on the historical development of consciousness, spirit, rationality, or institutions-- most of Robinson's instructors developed the historicist argument in Hegel's philosophy. James' Hegelianism focused on the phenomenology of consciousness; from Royce and more so from von Holst Robinson learns that arguments about contemporary social, political, and economic conditions are only effective when conducted with historical totality in mind; from Burgess and other individuals at Columbia University and later at the New School for Social Research, Robinson learns again that contemporary institutions receive their validity from history. Thus, Robinson's work reflects the phenomenological or historicist argument made in Hegel's work.

Interestingly the crux of Robinson's approach to history, the 'New History', leans on very specific and controversial interpretation of Hegel's phenomenology- the historicist interpretation of Hegel. Specifically, the purpose and usefulness of history for Robinson is as a history of consciousness. That is, history is useful in so far as it gives an account of how modern institutions developed and why or

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[66] Some would argue that Robinson, along with the other scholars who are analyzed in this thesis, are post-Hegelians. Barrow asserts that the Progressive scholars are post-Hegelians because they in a sense 'turn Hegel on his head'. The Progressive scholars use Hegelian philosophy but not as Hegel intended it to be used. Hegel had different ends and goals from the Progressives, however they both use similar methods. However, as David Harvey points out the idea of what a post-philosophy is, is ultimately left up to the individual. That is, whether a philosophy can be classified as a post or neo, is not prescribed by some academic law, but rather that determination is left up to the individual. Thus, Robinson, and the other Progressive scholars, can be classified as neo or post Hegelians (or neither) depending on who is evaluating them. See, Barrow, "More Then A Historian," 79; Idem., *Critical Theories of the State: Marxist, Neo-Marxist, Post-Marxist* (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1993), 3-12; David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Inquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Press, 1990), 39-65.

why not modern institutions are more rational and useful than past institutions. The usefulness or rationality of modern institutions is determined in relation to history. For example, if one want to determine the rationality or usefulness of the family, one needs to investigate the historical development of the family. It may be determined through historical analysis that the family is not rational because it does not have a rational history.[67] (Importantly, when Robinson speaks of institutions he does not merely mean the political state-- Robinson means social conventions and practices (e.g., the family and civil society). This understanding of an institution mirrors Hegel's use of the word in the *Philosophy of Right*). So, Robinson makes an argument about history that suggests that history tells us how modern institutions developed and how they become infused with rationality or usefulness. Interestingly this argument concerning history and modern institutions mirrors the historicist or phenomenological reading of Hegel supported by several contemporary Hegelian scholars. The thesis now goes on to discuss Robinson's use of Hegel's historicism.

According to Robinson, the philosophical movement of the 'New History' holds as its purpose to explain how present institutional conditions emerged. Robinson's

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[67] Robinson never actually applies his historicist analysis to specific institutions like the family. However, Thorstein Veblen does in *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (New York: Viking Press, 1967; reprint, 1899), 256 (page citations are to reprint edition). Veblen investigates various institutions like sports, balls, and fashion. He determines on a historical analysis that those institutions are not rational. For example, sports represent an earlier stage of development in man. Sports represents the hunt in earlier stages of civilization. Before society farmed, they hunted for food. Glory and honor where commonly heaped upon the successful hunter. However, today since there is no need for hunting, individuals play sports. Successful sport figures receive glory, fame, and wealth today. However, what they do is completely unnecessary, according to Veblen. For example, Kevin Brown, a baseball pitcher for the Los Angles Dodgers, received a contract of 110 million dollars. Veblen would say that this contract is a waste of money and completely irrational. Thus, Veblen says "the addiction to sports, therefore, in a peculiar degree marks an arrested development of the man's moral nature". So, other scholars besides Robinson have used his argument to determine the rationality of institutions based upon a historical analysis. If an

historicist argument is not only that history supplies us with an account of how we got to the present, but also why the present is rational. Robinson says that the purpose of history "is to help us to understand ourselves and our fellows and the problems and prospects of mankind".[68] However, Robinson says that, when he suggests that history enables us to understand ourselves, he does not merely mean history teaches us lessons on how to act or behave.[69] Rather, Robinson means that history supplies and infuses contemporary institutions with meaning and rationality-- history makes the present understandable.

In order to demonstrate this argument Robinson calls our attention to our own understanding of our personal history-- he makes us think about our memories. Robinson suggests that our memories supply us with a rational conception of our present. Robinson makes this point by drawing on an example from an operating room. Imagine you are in need of medical attention that requires a surgeon and an operation. This operation is so technical, expansive, and long that it requires you, the patient, to receive a general anesthetic-- you are rendered unconscious for the duration of the operation. During this period of general anesthesia the patient's sensory functions are removed. Thus, the patient has no memories of the time spent under general anesthesia. Now imagine that you, the patient, suddenly wake. Robinson suggests that you would not be able to comprehend your present situation. A patient waking from general anesthesia lost part of their memory and cannot comprehend their situation, at least momentarily. Thus,

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institution, like sports, does not come from a rational, historical process, then the institutions is determined as irrational.

[68] Robinson, *The New History*, 17.

[69] Ibid., 17-18.

Robinson concludes that memories (i.e., history) supply the present with meaning and rationality. Robinson says:

> We are almost entirely dependent upon our memory of our past thoughts and experiences for an understanding of the situation in which we find ourselves at any given moment. To take the nearest example, the reader will have to consult his own history to understand why his eyes are fixed upon this particular page. If he should fall into a sound sleep and be suddenly awakened, his memory might for the moment be paralyzed, and he would gaze in astonishment about the room, with no realization of his whereabouts. The fact that all the familiar objects about his presented themselves plainly to his view would not be sufficient to make him feel at home until his memory had come to his aid and enabled him to recall a certain portion of the past. The momentary suspension of memory's functions as one recovers from a fainting fit or emerges from the effects of an anesthetic is sometimes so distressing as to amount to a sort of intellectually agony. In its normal state the mind selects automatically, from the almost infinite mass of memories, just those things in our past that make us feel at home in the present. It works so easily and efficiently that we are unconscious of what it is doing for us and how dependent we are upon it. It supplies so promptly and so precisely what we need from the past in order to makes the present intelligible that we are beguiled into the mistaken notion that the present is self-explanatory and quite able to take care of itself, and that the past is largely dead and irrelevant, except when we have to make a conscious effort to recall some elusive fact . . . our understanding of existing conditions

> and opinion can only be explained by following more or less carefully the processes that produced them.[70]

So, Robinson clearly suggests that the use of history is as a history of consciousness-- an account of how the present state came about and why it is rational. "History to Robinson was largely, then, an extension of memory . . . [he] compared cultural history to personal history, pointing out that one's daily thoughts and actions depend upon his knowledge of his own history. One would be in a very sorry state if he should forget his own past every night and be compelled to start out fresh every morning".[71] Importantly, Robinson's use of history was influenced by Hegel. The essay now moves on to relate Robinson's account of history to the historicist or phenomenological reading of Hegel.[72]

A historicist reading of Hegel probably first received explicit attention through the work of Georg Lukacs and Herbert Marcuse. According to Shilomo Avineri both Marcuse and Lukacs see in Hegel "the historical realization of the free subject and

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[70] Ibid., 18-19, 24.

[71] Rohfeld, 58.

[72] There is a minimum of two other interpretations of Hegel's account of rationality. The metaphysical, self-actualization, and historicist or phenomenological reading are all dealt with in Alan Patten's *Hegel's Idea of Freedom* (New York: Oxford UP, 1999). The metaphysical account of Hegel's work suggests that God provides the warrant for what counts as rational. For a fuller account of the metaphysical reading see Charles Taylor, *Hegel* (New York: Cambridge UP, 1975). The self-actualization reading of Hegel asserts that institutions count as rational only so far as those institutions provide for the fulfillment of human life, "human self-actualization" (Patten 27). For an exposition of the self-actualization interpretation of Hegel's philosophy see Kenneth Westphal, "The Basic Context and Structure of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*," in Frederick C. Beiser, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel* (New York: Cambridge Up, 1993), 234-69. However, as Allen Wood points out it is possible to combine the various readings of Hegel. See Allen W. Wood *Hegel's Ethical Thought* (New York: Cambridge UP, 1990), 1-35. Wood says "as a normative ethical theory, we have characterized Hegel's theory as a self-actualization theory . . . on the metaethical level, it is a variety of ethical realism . . . a dialectical or historicized naturalism" (Wood 33). Here Wood combines the self-actualization and the historicist reading of Hegel. Wood seems to be saying that what counts as rational for Hegel is defined by whether or not it provides for 'human self-actualization'. However, the realization of 'human self-actualization' is a product of a dialectical, historical process. While all the various interpretations of Hegel's philosophy are interesting, it seems the one reading of Hegel which most enlightens Robinson's work is the historicist reading. Thus, this thesis concerns itself

the various spheres of integration through which consciousness has to pass".[73] Marcuse asserts that the fully rational consciousness, for Hegel, attains meaning historically-- "the meaning of this 'is', namely the meaning of the Being of the historical".[74] Likewise, Lukacs suggests that Hegel's philosophy is about the 'overcoming' of earlier examples of western philosophy-- Lukacs points to Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* for evidence.[75] Hegel's philosophy, according to Lukacs, attempts to historically transcend previous philosophies and achieve a 'totality' or the end of history and development. So, Lukacs and Marcuse read Hegel's philosophy through a historicist lens-- both believe that Hegel's thought suggests that rationality or 'totality' is achieved through history. However, both Lukacs and Marcuse trace the historicist interpretation of Hegel back to work of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels.

Lukacs points out that Marx "took the historical tendency in Hegel to its logical extreme".[76] The reference that Lukacs makes is to Marx's theory of history. For Marx, present institutional conditions resulted from the resolving of the contradictions of previous historical eras. This process of historical development through the resolution of contradiction continues until the end of history-- the end of history is an institutional state described by Marx as communism. Importantly, the end of history receives its makeup and construction from a historical process. Thus, any argument concerning present institutional conditions must be historical. For example, Marx and Engels say that "the

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with the historicist reading of Hegel alone. However, I wish the reader to be aware that other readings of Hegel's philosophy exist.

[73] Shilomo Avineri, "Labor, Alienation, and Social Classes in Hegel's *Realphilosophie*," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 1, no. 1 (Fall 1971), 96-7.

[74] Marcuse, *Hegel's Ontology and the Theory of Historicity*, 1; also, 314-28.

[75] Lukacs, *The Young Hegel*, 449-64.

[76] Idem., *History and Class-Consciousness*, 17.

modern bourgeois society that has sprouted from the ruins of feudal society has not done away with class antagonisms. It has but established new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle in place of the old ones".[77] So, in order to understand modern bourgeois society one must reconstruct the historical era of feudalism-- Marx follows this logic and expands upon it in *Das Kapital*.[78] Therefore Marx carries forward Hegel's historicist program. Significantly, Marx's analysis of history does not escape Robinson.

In a chapter of Robinson's *The New History* titled "The History of History", Robinson mulls over and extols the virtues of Marxist history. Although there is little to no evidence in Robinson's biographies to suggest that he ever read Marx, his work reflects a different story. Robinson tells us that Marx opened up a new way of interpreting history.[79] Marx suggested that history builds itself on the material conditions of a certain historical era-- the social and institutional conditions of a time period give rise to certain events. Thus, "Marx denounced those who discover the birthplace of history in the shifting clouds of heaven", and instead recognized how past conditions gave rise to present institutions and events.[80] Robinson took from Marx that history tells us how the present developed and why it makes sense. Although Robinson disagrees with Marx's insistence that history tracks to the mode of production in society (e.g., the history of contemporary life depends on changes in the industrial mode of production), Marx asked the correct questions about history-- according to Robinson, Marx utilized

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[77] Frederick Engels and Karl Marx, "Manifesto of the Communist Party," in Robert C. Tucker, ed., *The Marx-Engels Reader* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), 473-4.
[78] Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), 873-914.

the correct historical method. So, Robinson recognizes the same historicist reading of Hegel's thought in Marx that Marcuse and Lukacs recognized.

The historicist or phenomenological argument Marcuse and Lukacs raise about Hegel does not escape contemporary philosophers. Most recently the work of Robert Pippin, Terry Pinkard, and Michael N. Forster flesh out a historicist reading of Hegel. Although the historicist reading of Hegel, especially in the case of Pippin, seeks to explain why modern social institutions actualize freedom, the method that the historicist reading adopts is the method that Robinson used. That is, the crux of the historicist reading, (e.g., Pippin, Pinkard, and Forster among other's readings) is to suggest that modern ethical life actualizes freedom.[81] Although Robinson never remarks on the extent that modern ethical life actualize freedom, his argument does bear similarities to that of the historicists'. Specifically, Robinson like Pippin, Pinkard, and Forster holds that the present is "the product of a rational, historical process-- what Pippin terms a 'collective, progressive, self-determination' of spirit".[82]

Pippin, Pinkard, and Forster suggest Hegel believes that meaning is historical-- rationality emerges from historical development. Importantly, Pippin, Pinkard, and Forster all highlight the historicist aspects of Hegel's work. For the scholars who give Hegel a historicist reading "rationality is historical-- if this is taken to mean something about the criteria and standards of rational argument, about the kinds of moves and inferences that are considered legitimate in rational deliberations, its baseline

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[79] Robinson, *The New History*, 51.
[80] Ibid., 52.
[81] Alan Patten, *Hegel's Idea of Freedom* (New York: Oxford UP, 1999), 26.
[82] Ibid., 55.

assumptions, and so forth".[83] Robinson, as the paper outlines above, supports this argument when he suggests that the present receives meaning (i.e., becomes rational) only in light of history. As Pippin suggests "Hegel has proposed a conception of rationality in such reflection that is essentially social and historical, rather than rule governed, or only ideally communal".[84] Pippin believes, like Robinson, that concepts, institutions, and laws attain rationality only as a product of historical development.

> Hegel too tries to show how the attempt at self-determination requires an understanding of oneself as occupying a 'places' within a larger whole, except in his view that the whole is not nature of the cosmos, but the *history* of a collectively self-determining subject. More concretely, it means that Hegel thinks he can show that one never 'determines oneself' simply as a 'person' or agent, but always as a member of a *historical ethical institution*, as a family member, or participant in civil society, or citizen, and that it is only in terms of such concrete institutions that one can formulate some substantive universal end, something concretely relevant to all other such agents.[85]

Thus, Pippin teases out a strain of thought in Hegel that we also see in Robinson. Likewise, Forster suggests that the *Phenomenology of Spirit* represents Hegel's effort to demonstrate how consciousness (i.e., spirit or rationality) developed historically.[86] Both Hegel and Robinson see history to provide meaning to actions and institutions. While the historicist reading of Hegel's philosophy may allow us to better understand Robinson's

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[83] Ibid., 55-6.
[84] Robert B. Pippin, "Hegel, Ethical Reasons, Kantian Rejoinders," *Philosophical Topics* 19, no.2 (Fall 1991), 124-5.
[85] Idem., "Idealism and Modernity," 72.
[86] Forster, *Hegel's Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit*, 291-302.

scholarship, several other interpretations of Hegel's work exist. For example, some suggest that a metaphysical or a 'self-actualization' reading better illustrates Hegel's work. Thus, the paper now turns to examine Hegel's writing to muster support for the historicist reading.

In the preface to the *Philosophy of Right* Hegel makes some suggestions that support the historicist interpretation. Hegel remarks that philosophy does not totally comprehend its own time until it is nearly past-- that is, philosophy cannot decipher the meaning of institutions without the proper historical context or experience. Thus, Hegel seems to say in the quoted section below that meaning and rationality is historical.

> As the *thought* of the world, it [i.e., philosophy] appears only at a time when actuality has gone through its formative process . . . when philosophy paints its grey in grey, a shape of life has grown old, and it cannot be rejuvenated, but only recognized, by the grey in grey of philosophy; the owl of Minerva beings its flight only with the onset of dusk.[87]

As Allen Wood explains, the reference to the 'owl of Minerva' suggests that a historical era only truly understands itself when it is in decline.[88] Thus, Hegel seems to suggest that rational understanding can only develop through historical experience. Only after reflection on contemporary events and institutions from a historical perspective do those contemporary events and institutions attain meaning. Likewise, in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* Hegel develops a history of consciousness or rationality. Hegel describes through the chapters how the final form of consciousness (i.e., absolute knowing) developed from

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[87] Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, Allen W. Wood, ed., trans. H. B. Nisbet (New York: Cambridge UP, 1991), 23.
[88] Ibid., 392 note 31 by Allen W. Wood.

an initial form of immediate consciousness. The concept of absolute knowing develops from immediate consciousness through self-consciousness, reason, spirit, and religion. Importantly, the development of absolute knowing is a historical process where "one Spirit relieved another of its charge and each took over the empire of the world from its predecessor".[89] So, Hegel suggests that absolute knowing springs forth only in reference to a historical process. Therefore, Hegel views history not merely as "the preservation [of events]", but as the scientific comprehension of how certain social institutions succeeded in a certain manner earlier social institutions.[90]

Many scholars suggest that Hegel presents us with a historicist reading--there appears to be some support for this reading of Hegel. However, there remains some doubt about the accuracy of the historicist reading. Hegel says in the *Philosophy of History* that "the history of the world presents us with a rational process . . . It is only an inference from the history of the World, that its development has been a rational process; that the history in question has constituted the rational necessary course of the World-Spirit".[91] Here Hegel does not suggest that rationality results from a historical process, but that rationality emerges from a metaphysically fixed concept, World-Spirit. So, the historicist interpretation does not remain completely consistent with Hegel's philosophy. However, the historicist reading of Hegel does manifest itself in the work of Robinson. Thus, an understanding of Hegel's philosophy helps to illuminate Robinson's work. However, the similarities between Hegel's and Robinson's work does not end with the

[89] Idem., *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Oxford UP, 1977) Par. 808.
[90] Ibid.
[91] Idem., *Philosophy of History*, 9-10.

assertion that rationality is historical. The thesis goes on to discuss other ways in which Hegel helps us to understand Robinson's work.

The assertion that rationality is historical has implications for the study of history. Robinson's work reflects those implications. Importantly, the claim that history gives us rationality changes how the study of history proceeds. First, the study of history must reflect how rationality is historical. Since rationality is the product of a historical process, history must focus on the development of rationality. That is, the proper study of history focuses on how rationality developed, thus viewing all historical events in the development of rationality. For example, one would not study the American Revolutionary War simply as an isolated event, but rather how that war lead to institutional shifts and changes in society. Second, as concepts change over time they represent the social context in which they developed; "thoughts, ideas, concepts, institutions are explicable" within a specific social context.[92] Institutions develop and change as the social context in which they exist change. Third and finally, this second claim has implications for how one studies history. If historical thoughts, concepts, ideas, and institutions represent specific social contexts, then when one studies history one needs to immerse oneself in the social context which one studies. Importantly, if the historian does not become immersed in the social context of the historical era being studied, then the historian threatens to bring the schemes and ideas of one historical era into another. For example, to fully understand Athenian politics one must understand Athenian economics and culture as well. So, the claim that rationality is historical has implications for the study of history. Robinson's work embraces the three implications

outlined above. The thesis goes on to discuss how an understanding of Hegel's philosophy better illuminates those implications.

First, the study of history needs to demonstrate how the present became meaningful according to Robinson. Robinson suggests that historians all too often focus on grand political and military conquests and ignore the more significant institutional shifts-- historians frequently write about exciting events like wars and murders while disregarding seemingly more important historical events like changes in the economic mode of production or shifts in ideas and philosophy. As Barnes says some historians "instead of attempting to grasp and describe the whole current of human progress, they merely seized upon the most conspicuous chip on the surface of the waters and thus obscured and distorted the whole picture of human development".[93] For example, when the common historian studies a revolution, the historian usually presents the more literary and exciting points-- the common history on the French Revolution emphasizes the Reign of Terror as the focal point of the revolution, and ignores "the extent to which general conditions . . . changed".[94]

> Hitherto writers have been prone to deal with events for their own sake; a deeper insight will surely lead us, as time goes on, to reject the anomalous and seemingly accidentally occurrences and dwell rather upon those which illustrate some profound historical truth. And there is a very simple principle by which the relevant and useful may be determined and the irrelevant rejected. Is the fact or occurrence one that will aid the reader to grasp the meaning of any great

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[92] Forster, *Hegel's Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit*, 464.
[93] Barnes, *The New History and the Social Studies* (New York: Century Co. 1925), 7.
[94] Robinson, *The New History*, 13.

> period of human development or the true nature of any momentous institution?[95]

Hegel makes much the same observation-- he suggests that history needs to focus on human development rather than merely exciting events. Likewise, Forster suggests Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* embodies historicism-- "a position based on the recognition that human thought undergoes fundamental changes during the course of history".[96] For example, in the introduction to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel says that the purpose of the work "is, in reality, the detailed history of the formative education of consciousness itself to the standpoint of Science".[97] Likewise, in the *Philosophy of History*, Hegel suggests the histories presented by Herodotus and Thucydides merely tell us about events and deeds-- their histories does not embody the comprehensive expanse of history.[98] So, both Robinson and Hegel suggest that the study of history must take into account the development of institutions. This first observation, that institutions develop and change, leads to a second claim that the thesis now examines.

The first claim of Robinson's New History suggests that contemporary institutions are rational, make-sense, only in the light of history. These institutions then tell us about the social environment in which they developed-- this is a second claim of the New History. As Forster says the "general types of thought which have arisen during the course of history belong to and are explicable in terms of their specific social

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[95] Ibid., 15.
[96] Forster, *Hegel's Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit*, 293.
[97] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Par., 78. See also, Forster, *Hegel's Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit*, 300.
[98] Idem., *Philosophy of History*, 1-3.

contexts".[99] Robinson supports this view and demonstrates his support of it through the use of intellectual history. Robinson's suggests that the Ancient Greeks, like Aristotle, did not embody the 'democratic spirit' unlike most contemporary philosophers-- Aristotle supported slavery.[100] Thus, the Ancient Greeks did not care for the common individual in the same way contemporary society does-- today much more respect is afforded to the individual person. Thus, this increased amount of respect for the individual is reflected in our institutions.

> It is this appreciation of the common man which is reflected in our development of social sciences, undreamed of by the Greeks, and in the socializing of older subjects, such as psychology and ethics. Political economy was born in the eighteenth century; in the nineteenth anthropology developed on a large scale, together with the comparative study of religions, sociology, and social psychology.[101]

Robinson believes that institutions reflect the historical era in which they exist. Institutions and philosophies (e.g., the family, or civil society) have social origins, and the importance of discovering the social origins of contemporary philosophy did not escape Robinson. In *The Mind in the Making*, Robinson attempts to discover the social origins of 20th century thought and ideology.[102] Hegel also attempts to root out the social context of thought, ideas, and institutions. In the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel says that "as far as the individual is concerned, each individual is in any case a *child of his time*; thus

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[99] Forster, *Hegel's Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit*, 464.
[100] Robinson, *The New History*, 124.
[101] Ibid., 124.
[102] Idem., *The Mind in the Making: The Relation of Intelligence to Social Reform* (New York: Harper and Row, 1921), 1-14.

philosophy, too, is *its own time comprehended in thoughts*. It is just as foolish to imagine that any philosophy can transcend its contemporary world as that any individual can overleap his own time or leap over Rhodes".[103] Hegel clearly suggests that thought represents the social environment or time period from which it comes. As Hegel suggests, only a Colossus that can straddle the massive harbor of the city of Rhodes can move beyond its own time. Therefore, Robinson's and Hegel's work remains consistent on this second point-- social thought and institutions represents a specific social context. The New History's second point has implications for how one studies history; the thesis now moves onto discuss these implications.

The New History claims that thoughts, ideas, and institutions represent social and historical eras. Importantly, this claim effects the way one studies history. Robinson and Hegel suggest that historians import their own social institutions and idea with them when studying history. That is, it is near impossible to view history objectively or scientifically because contemporary concepts influence the investigation of the past. Robinson remarks on historical analysis suggesting that it "adapted itself to the general outlook of successive periods, and as times changed, it has changed".[104] Hegel makes a very similar claim-- Hegel finds it "difficult to understand and represent past thought . . . without distorting it by reading in one's own alien concepts and beliefs".[105] Hegel says that "we do not need to import standards, or to make use of our own bright ideas and thoughts during the course of the inquiry; it is precisely when we leave these

[103] Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, 21-2.
[104] Robinson, *The New History*, 71-2.
[105] Forster, *Hegel's Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit*, 413.

aside that we succeed in contemplating the matter in hand as it is *in and for itself*".[106] Thus, both Robinson and Hegel warn that history is not always as objective and scientific as it may appear. So, again knowledge of Hegel's philosophy helps illuminate Robinson's work. Hegel's philosophy seems to elucidate Robinson's work on at least four points: rationality is historical; history is the developmental process of institutions and not merely isolated events; events, philosophies, and institutions have social origins, and finally, it is difficult for historians to study the past objectively because one brings one's contemporary values and concepts with them when studying the past. However, the work of Robinson and Hegel differ in some significant ways. Importantly, Robinson explicitly rejects some of Hegel's claims. Thus, the thesis now goes onto discuss how Robinson and Hegel differ.

Robinson actively rejects Hegel's metaphysical aspects. It is important for the reader to recognize that Robinson in some way rejects Hegel because it demonstrates how Robinson is not a simple Hegelian. Specifically, Robinson finds Hegel's concept of the 'end of history' and the working out of God's will or Spirit misguided. Hegel believes that the development of history aims at the "achievement of a final goal or purpose, namely, the emergence of Hegel's own philosophical standpoint in the modern world-- a standpoint which . . . reveals the true nature of Absolute Spirit or the Concept (i.e., God)".[107] Hegel says that "the spirit, as it advances towards its realization, towards self-satisfaction and self-knowledge, is the sole motive force behind all the deeds and aspirations of the nation. Religion, knowledge, the arts, and the destinies and events of

[106] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Par. 84; Forster, *Hegel's Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit*, 414.
[107] Forster, *Hegel's Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit*, 293-4.

history are all aspects of its [i.e., Spirits] evolution".[108] Robinson rejects Hegelian metaphysics and the working out of God's Spirit. Robinson sarcastically calls Hegelian metaphysics 'ingenious'-- "Hegel's extraordinary discovery that it was his own dear German nation in which it had please the *Weltgeist* to assume its highest form . . . hardly [forms] the basis of a new gospel of . . . historical interpretation".[109] So, Robinson rejects the metaphysical aspects of Hegel. It is important to point out that Robinson rejects Hegel's metaphysics because it allows us to see how Robinson is more than a plain Hegelian. While Robinson is not an orthodox Hegelian, his work makes use of certain aspects of Hegel's philosophy. Consequently, it is important to read Robinson's work with Hegel as support.

Charles Austin Beard

Charles A. Beard, like Robinson, came from the mid-west of the United States, Indiana. Being a Quaker, Beard's family sent him to DePauw University-- a traditional Quaker school. Beard became very interested in social theory at DePauw. The work of Marx, Spencer, and Alfread Marshall became very important to him. After graduating from DePauw University in 1898, Beard went to Oxford and studied labor politics, history, and organization. At Oxford University, Beard help to found Ruskin College. The mission of Ruskin College was to educate workers. In addition, Beard produced his first book, *The Industrial Revolution*. *The Industrial Revolution* meant to

[108] Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction*, 56.
[109] Robinson, *History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1908), 11.

review the history of contemporary social and economic conditions-- it sought to provide contemporary institutions with a historical backdrop.[110] However, shortly following the publication of *The Industrial Revolution*, Beard returned to the United States.[111]

In 1902, Beard spent a brief period of time pursuing graduate work at Cornell University. However, he quickly transferred to Columbia University. At Columbia Beard began work on his Doctoral dissertation under the co-supervision of James Harvey Robinson and John W. Burgess.[112] While Beard worked on his dissertation, "The Office of the Justice of the Peace in England", he became very close personal friends with his advisors, Robinson and Burgess. In 1907, Beard began a post teaching as a Regular Professor at Columbia University in Burgess' Political Science Department. During the next ten years at Columbia, Beard became very friendly with a select group of scholars-- most of his close personal and academic friends where of some sort of critical school. That is, Beard mingled with radical scholars. Importantly, Beard associated with a group of individuals who sought to improve society for the working class.[113] Thus, Beard, like Robinson, allied himself with Progressive scholars.

In 1917 Beard left Columbia as a form of political protest.[114] Beard disagreed with university policy concerning the freedom of speech and World War I.

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[110] Charles A. Beard, *The Industrial Revolution* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969. Reprint of 1902, 2nd Edition).
[111] For biographical data on Charles A. Beard see, Barrow, "More Than A Historian: The Political and Economic Thought of Charles A. Beard"; Thomas Bender, "Charles A. Beard," in *American National Biography*, vol. 2, ed. John A. Garraty and Marc C. Carnes (New York: Oxford UP, 1999), 401-6; Ellen A. Nore, *Charles A. Beard: An Intellectual Biography*. Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois UP, 1983); Burleigh J. Wilkins, "Charles A. Beard on the Founding of Ruskin College," *Indiana Magazine of History* 52 (September 1956): 277-84.
[112] Bender, 401.
[113] Ibid., 402.
[114] Ibid.

Columbia censured or fired many professors and staff who openly opposed the war effort. Although Beard's personal opinions on World War I remain obscure, he supported freedom of speech.[115] Thus, when Columbia University restricted the faculty's speech concerning US involvement in World War I it sparked a debate concerning academic freedom of speech, and Beard disappointed by the debate and its outcome left Columbia University. After resigning from Columbia University, Beard helped to establish the New School for Social Research long with John Dewey, James Harvey Robinson, and Herbert Croly.

The years which Beard spent at Columbia University and then later at the New School for Social Research are particularly important years to his philosophical development. Ellen A. Nore remarks that 'striking' developments in Beard's philosophy emerged while he was in New York City.[116] Likewise, Lloyd R. Sorenson says, of Beard's years at Columbia, "together with many of his [i.e., Beard's] contemporary historians, he was soon swept beyond the naive 'scientific history' to what James Harvey Robinson dubbed the New History".[117] Also, Thomas Bender suggests that Beard's philosophy changed while at Columbia-- he began to realize the need for a new historical system.[118] Beard along with Robinson attempted to articulate and define the 'New History'. Undoubtedly, Beard's search for a new historical system was an outgrowth of his experience with Robinson and Burgess.[119] As the thesis points out above both

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[115] Barrow, "More Than A Historian," 25.
[116] Nore, "Charles A. Beard's Act of Faith: Context and Content," *Journal of American History* 66, no. 4 (March 1980), 851.
[117] Lloyd R. Sorenson, "Charles A. Beard and German Historiographical Thought," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 42 (September 1955), 275.
[118] Bender, 403.
[119] Ibid., 404; Sorenson, 274-5.

Robinson and Burgess use Hegel's philosophy in their work. Beard's experience with Robinson and Burgess helped him to embrace a historical method rooted in Hegel. However, Beard had another extremely important influence and mentor who utilized Hegelian thought, Benedetto Croce.

The most significant developments in Beard's historical method came after he left Columbia University and started the New School for Social Research. In the early 1920s Beard organized various history clubs at the New School for Social Research. These history clubs met to discuss current books on history and historiography. During this period Beard came into contact with Benedetto Croce's work. "According to Roy F. Nichols, a graduate student who participated in these study circles, Croce's work was a focus of discussion".[120] Nore notes that Beard read, during the 1920s, Croce's essays--she concludes that Beard "recognized a kindred spirit in the Italian master".[121] Importantly, according to Beard's own account, Croce's *History: Its Theory and Practice* had a particularly strong influence on his philosophy.[122] In fact, Beard admired Croce's work so much that he invited him to the American Historical Association's annual meeting in 1934.

Beard who was president of the American Historical Association in 1934 invited Croce specifically to hear and comment upon his, Beard's, Presidential Address. It is clear that Beard had great admiration for Croce's work. In particular, Croce seems to have influenced Beard's concept of historical relativism. Importantly, as the thesis

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[120] Barrow, "More Than A Historian," 79; Roy F. Nichols, *A Historian's Progress* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), 50-1.
[121] Nore, "Charles A. Beard's Act of Faith", 852.

discusses below, Croce was a noted neo-Hegelian.[123] Thus, an understanding of how Hegel is used by Croce will aid in understanding Beard's concept of historical relativism. So, Beard's Hegelianism comes through at least two sources. His experience at Columbia University exposed him to Hegel's philosophy through figures like Robinson and Burgess. After his time at Columbia, Beard moved to the New School for Social Research where he continued to associate with some of his colleague from Columbia. However, more importantly at the New School for Social Research Beard came into contact with the work of Benedetto Croce-- this constitutes the second source of Beard's Hegelianism. The thesis now goes on to discuss Beard's historical relativism.

Beard's presidential address to the American Historical Association in 1934 titled *Written History As an Act of Faith* was meant to be, in Beard's view, the definitive statement on historical method. That is, Beard attempted to conclude what the 'New History' meant with *Written History as an Act of Faith*. Beard declares that there exists confusion "in contemporary thought which involves nothing less than the fundamentals of historiography".[124] So, *Written History As an Act of Faith* was supposed to clear up this confusion in historiography. Importantly, Croce agreed with Beard-- *Written History As an Act of Faith* did clear up the disagreements in the study of history. In a letter written by Croce to Beard, Croce takes up the subject of Beard's *Written History As an Act of Faith*-- Croce remarks that Beard attempts at "the restoration of health and the progress of one [i.e., historical interpretation] brings with it the restoration

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[122] Malcolm Cowley and Bernard Smith, eds., *Books that Changed our Minds* (New York: Doubleday, Doran, and Co., 1940), 19.
[123] Barrow, "More Than A Historian," 79.

of health and the progress of the other [i.e., intellectual and moral life]".[125] However, *Written History As an Act of Faith* opened a great debate rather than ended one. Contrary to Beard's aspiration to make the definitive statement concerning historical interpretation, Beard's essay ignited a scholarly debate. Barrow says that "in 1934, Charles Beard's presidential address to the American Historical Association (AHA) fanned a simmering controversy among historians and social scientists by embracing the philosophy of historical relativism".[126]

According to Beard, historical relativism defines what history is-- history is "contemporary thought about the past . . . an act of choice, conviction, and interpretation respecting values".[127] History is not a strict scientific study. There is no one set of historical facts that we can know or appeal to for truth or fact, rather history is determined by the historian-- the historian selects from a body of knowledge, the written historical record, to create a history. The selection of knowledge to be called history is determined by the historian's purpose-- the historian acts with a certain frame of reference or ideology and thus conducts history under this veil. Thus, Beard's historical relativism claims that what is defined as history (i.e., the meaning of the past) depends on the ideological frame of reference of the historian. The thesis, having explained Beard's concept of historical relativism, goes on to give an example of what historical relativism is.

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[124] Beard, "Grounds for a Reconsideration," in *Theory and Practice in Historical Study: A Report of the Committee on Historiography*, 5.
[125] Benedetto Croce, "Letter to Charles A. Beard," in *Written History As an Act of Faith*, Charles A. Beard (El Paso, Texas: Texas Western College Press, 1960), 12.
[126] Barrow, "More Than A Historian", 76.

Beard demonstrates his concept of historical relativism in the 1935 introduction to *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States*. Beard makes the claim in *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States* that competing economic classes (i.e., landed wealth vs. commercial, financial, and industrial wealth) struggled and sought to produce a constitution most amicable to their needs. In Beard's analysis landed wealth (e.g., farmers) competed with commercial, financial, and industrial wealth (e.g., bankers, merchants, and manufactures). Thus, Beard claims that at the Constitutional Convention of 1789, there were at least two major financial classes represented by the delegates-- landed wealth like agriculture made up one group of delegates while another group of delegates represented commercial wealth, like bankers and merchants. Each group or class attempted to create a constitution that would provide the framework to further their class' interests. For example, the commercial economic class favored a constitution that provided for a strong national government to regulate trade and economies of scale. Thus, Beard suggests one's economic interests determine one's political opinion concerning the drafting of the US Constitution. However, Beard's method in *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States* was criticized by some as overly deterministic or Marxian-- Beard suggested that the US Constitution was the result of economic interests. Theodore Clarke Smith remarks that "this [Beard's] is the view that American history, like all history can and must be explained in economic terms . . . This idea has its origin,

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[127] Charles A. Beard, *Written History As an Act of Faith* (El Paso, Texas: Texas Western College Press, 1960), 1. Originally published as "Written History as an Act of Faith," *American Historical Review* 39 (January 1934): 219-31.

of course, in the Marxian theories".[128] However, Beard rejects Smith's analysis of his work. Instead Beard claims that an economic interpretation of the US constitution makes sense to him at the time that he wrote *An Economic Interpretation*. That is, at the particular time Beard wrote his history of the US Constitution, an economic interpretation of the Constitution made sense. However, the method of economic interpretation may not always be the best way to explain history-- this is historical relativism. That is, historical relativism allows Beard to embrace an economic interpretation of the US Constitution, while suggesting that other interpretations of the US Constitution, or other historical events and documents, may be just as useful. For example, Beard could use an economic interpretation to explain the US Constitution, but perhaps he may use a cultural analysis to explain some other event, like the American Civil War. Beard says:

> For myself I can say that I have never believed that 'all history' can or must be 'explained' in economic terms, or any other terms. He who really 'explains' history must have the attributes ascribed by the theologians to God. It can be 'explained', no doubt, to the satisfaction of certain mentalities at certain times, but such explanations are not universally accepted and approved. I confess to have hoped in my youth to find 'the cause of things', but I never thought that I had found them. Yet it has seemed to me, and does now, that in the great transformations in society, such as was brought about by the formation and adoption of the Constitution, economic 'forces' are primordial or fundamental, and come nearer 'explaining' events than any other 'forces'

[128] Idem., *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1913. Reprint, New York: The Free Press, 1935), ix.

> . . . yet it may be that some larger world process is working through each series of historical events; but ultimate causes lie beyond our horizon. If anywhere I have said or written that 'all history' can be 'explained' in economic terms, I was then suffering from an aberration of the mind.[129]

Thus, according to Beard his use of an economic interpretation to expose the purposes of the US Constitution is only one method available to him-- Beard merely suggests that an economic interpretation of the US Constitution is a useful historical method at the particular time the study was conducted. So, historical relativism asserts according to Beard that there are any number of ways to interpret and read history. Historical study depends not on some set of rules or "scientific view of the world".[130] Instead the study of history is contingent on the historians purposes, motives, convictions, and ideology at any given moment. Thus as Croce concludes "true history is the history of the individual in so far as he is universal and of the universal in so far as individual.[131] Beard's historical relativism however does not stand alone in his argument-- the essay now turns to examine the foundation of historical relativism, realistic dialectics.

Beard attempted to clarify historical relativism through an epistemology called realistic dialectics. Realistic dialectics suggests that historical development is organized "as a stormy unfolding of ideas and interests, in conflict and tension, presenting antitheses in thought and experience".[132] Beard believes that history is created

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[129] Ibid., xii.
[130] Sorenson, 277.
[131] Benedetto Croce, *The Theory and History of Historiography* (London: G.C. Harrap, 1921), 107.
[132] Beard, "That Promise of American Life," *New Republic* (February 6, 1935), 350. Beard frequently cited an article published by Kurt Riezler in 1924 as a reference for realistic dialectics, see Charles A. Beard, "Currents of Thought in Historiography," *American Historical Review* 42 (April 1937), 479. Riezler taught at the New School for Social Research during the 1920s where he wrote an article that developed realistic dialectics. Riezler also became a personal friend of Beard's, and came to have an academic affect

through dialectical progression. However, dialectics has many meanings to different scholars and philosophers. In Plato's *Republic* the dialectic referred to a method of argument. By asking a series of questions of his intellectual opponents Socrates, in the *Republic*, comes to know the truth-- by asking questions of his opponents, Socrates exposed contradictions in his opponents argument. However, the use of dialectics that Beard embraces is more in the tradition of Hegel. Thus, before the thesis explains Beard's realistic dialectics, the thesis examines the Hegelian concept of dialectics.

For Hegel, the dialectic is necessary to the progress of society and history-- all history, meaning, development, and advancement comes dialectically. The dialectic represents the method by which Hegel understands philosophy, history, and the development of society.[133] Hegel says that "consciousness itself is the *absolute dialectical unrest*, this medley of sensuous and intellectual representation whose differences coincide, and whose identity is equally again dissolved, for it is itself determinates as contrasted with the non-identical".[134] Thus, Hegel tells us dialectical progression embodies change. However, in the quoted passages Hegel also links dialectics with contradiction, opposition, and overcoming.

Dialectics requires that ideas, concepts, and institutions progress through and overcome contradictions. Hegel suggests that institutions embody contradictions.

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on Beard. Thus, once again demonstrating that Beard was exposed to the German-historical school. The German-historical school, as noted above, is located in the Hegelian philosophical tradition. Thus, Beard found himself exposed to Hegelian thought through Riezler at the New School for Social Research. See, Riezler "Idee und Interesse in de politischen Geschichte," *Die Dioskuren* (Munich) 3 (1924), 1-13. See, Nore, "Charles A. Beard's Act of Faith: Context and Content," footnote 39, 862.

[133] Eric Weil, "The Hegelian Dialectic," in *The Legacy of Hegel: Proceedings of the Marquette Hegel Symposium Held in Milwaukee, Wisconsin 2-5 June 1973*, edited by J.J. O'Malley, K.W. Algozin, H.P. Kainz, and L.C. Rice (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), 59.

[134] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Par. 205.

Thoughts, concepts, and institutions hold contradictions within their philosophical schemes. That is, Hegel asserts that there exists opposites or contradictions within social institutions. A social institution gives rise to contradictions.[135] That is, social institutions generate their own opposites. These contradictions clash with the institutions which created them and drive society forward into a new historical era-- contradiction gives rise to the dialectical progression of society. The result is that the contradiction is overcome and new social institutions develop. For example, Marx suggests that capitalism as an institution generates contradictions. The contradictions created by capitalism may eventually destroy capitalism and create new social and political institutions, socialism. Forster says that the dialectic "is a method of exposition in which each category in turn is shown to be implicitly self-contradictory and to develop necessarily into the next".[136] As Hegel says "the higher dialectic of the concept consists not merely in producing and apprehending the determination as an opposite and limiting factor, but in producing and apprehending the *positive* content and result with it contains; and it is this alone which makes it a *development* and immanent progression".[137] For example, in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* absolute knowing is achieved dialectically. Absolute knowing represents Spirit, the final form of consciousness, or the end of history, "an all-embracing category".[138] Spirit, absolute knowing, emerges only as a result of the contradictions of an earlier level of consciousness. The concept of absolute knowing developed through

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[135] Of course this is true unless the social institution in question represents the end of history. If a social institution does not generate its own contradiction then there is no process of overcoming or development-- if a contradiction is not generated by an institution then history does not change because history is the resolution of contradictions. Thus, the end of history is distinguished because institutions do not generate contradictions.

[136] Forster, "Hegel's Dialectical Method," 132.

[137] Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, Par. 31.

the resolutions of the contradictions present in self-consciousness, reason, spirit, and religion. Hegel says that the development of absolute knowing, or "Spirit that knows itself as Spirit", is a historical process where "one Spirit relieved another of its charge and each took over the empire of the world from its predecessor".[139] So, for Hegel the development of 'Spirit' or absolute knowing came about only through the development of preceding forms of consciousness. Absolute knowing as a social institution overcame and succeeded earlier social institutions like self-consciousness or reason. For example, Reason gives way to Spirit in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*-- thus Spirit overcomes and constructs itself on the contradictions inherent in the category of Reason. Hegel says "the coming-to-be of Spirit was indicated in the immediately preceding movement [i.e., Reason]".[140] Likewise, Hegel claims that Spirit is overcome by Absolute Knowing.[141] So, Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* lays down a method where Absolute Knowing is achieved in a dialectical manner by overcoming earlier stages of consciousness.[142]

Hegel's dialectical understanding of history and development introduces the notion of contradiction or overcoming. As Hegel concludes when thinking about the dialectic one must "think pure change, or *think antithesis within the antithesis itself*, or *contradiction*".[143] Dialectics involves the progression of history through the resolution of contradiction. This contradiction is generated from within institutions and acts to destroy and overcome the institution that created it. Finally, the process culminates in a new

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[138] Forster, "Hegel's Dialectical Method," 132.
[139] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Par. 808.
[140] Ibid., Par. 438.
[141] Ibid., Par. 788.
[142] Frederick C. Beiser, "Hegel's Historicism," in *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel*, ed. Frederick C. Beiser (New York: Cambridge UP, 1993), 285.
[143] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Par. 160.

institution. This new institution is built upon the resolution of the contradictions of earlier institutions. As the thesis notes above, Beard adopts Hegel's dialectical process. However, Beard adopts Hegel's dialectical logic through Croce's work. Thus, the thesis now moves on to discuss Croce's reconstruction of Hegel's dialectical logic.

Croce, as the thesis outlines above, was read, studied, and had a great influence on Beard. In fact, Beard defines history as Croce does-- history is "as Croce says, contemporary thought about the past".[144] So, Beard leans heavily upon Croce's work. Most importantly however "Croce's reconstruction of Hegel's dialectical logic seems to have influenced Beard".[145] In a series of books Croce reconstructed Hegel's dialectical logic.[146] Importantly, it is through Croce that Beard learns about dialectical logic. So in some ways he adopts Croce's reconstruction of Hegel's dialectical logic. Significantly, Croce's reconstruction of Hegel's dialectical logic leads Beard to his notion of realistic dialectics.

Hegel's dialectical logic according to Croce was his most useful contribution to philosophy-- as the thesis outlines above, dialectical logic requires development and transition in the course of history, and Croce suggested that the concept of development and change greatly improves philosophical and historical analysis. However, Hegel's reference in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* to Absolute Knowing as the end of history, is dismissed by Croce-- Hegel's Spirit is nothing more than a

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[144] Beard, *Written History As an Act of Faith*, 1.
[145] Barrow, "More Than A Historian", 80.
[146] Croce published a four volume series with the purpose of reconstructing Hegel's dialectical logic entitled collectively, *Philosophy of Spirit*. The four volumes in sequence are Benedetto Croce, *Logic as the Science of the Pure Concept* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1917); Idem., *Philosophy of the Practical: Economic and Ethic* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1913); Idem., *Aesthetic as Science of Expression Pure*

"cosmological romance" to Croce.[147] Thus, Croce divorces Hegel's dialectical logic from Hegel's conception of the end of history.

Croce severs Hegel's end of history from the dialectical logic by teasing out (what Croce believes to be) an error in Hegel's formulation of dialectical logic. That is, Croce's reading of Hegel suggests that Hegel incorrectly constructed dialectical logic. Consequently, Croce believes he found a mistake in Hegel's dialectical logic that leads to the mistaken concept of Spirit.

> The two abstract elements [i.e., thesis and antithesis], or the opposites taken in and by themselves, he call *moments* . . . the word 'moment' is sometimes also applied to the third term, the synthesis. The relation of the first two to the third is expressed by the world 'solution' or 'overcoming' (*Aufheben*). And that, as Hegel intimates, means that the two moments in the separation are both negated, but preserved in the synthesis . . . [Thus] to speak accurately, in the dialectic triad we do not think *three* concepts, but *one* single concept, which is the concrete universal".[148]

Croce believes that Hegel's mistake in dialectical logic is that he confused the process of contradiction and overcoming. Croce suggests that Hegel posits contradictions as opposites that come from outside of itself. According to Croce Hegel suggests that institutions do not generate their own contradictions, rather contradictions come from some place outside of the institution. However, Croce suggests that contradiction

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Linguistic (London: Macmillan and Co., 1909); Idem., *The Theory and History of Historiography* (London: G. C. Harrap, 1921).

[147] Croce, *The Theory and History of Historiography*, 52, 63.

[148] Idem., *History*, 20-1.

emerges within the concept itself. Barrow calls this the difference between the doctrine of distincts and the doctrine of opposites.[149] "Croce criticizes Hegel's version of the dialectic for confusing the logical doctrine of distincts with the doctrine of opposites. The difference is that distincts emanate from *within* a common original source (i.e., a thesis), whereas opposites *must be opposites*".[150] Croce concludes that Hegel's mistake in dialectical logic requires Hegel to create an opposite-- Hegel requires a metaphysical concept to posit itself as opposed to institutions thus creating an opposition and overcoming of those institutions. "Hegel's dialectical 'solution' or 'overcoming' of opposites must postulate an *a priori* synthesis, i.e., the postulate of a transcendent Spirit culminating in the Absolute Idea; whereas the doctrine of distincts requires no such transcendence, but only immanence".[151] So, Croce believes he strips the metaphysical or Spiritual aspects of Hegel away by correcting dialectical logic and adopting the doctrine of distincts.

As the thesis reconstructs Hegel's dialectics above, Hegel may not be guilty of what Croce suggests. It is the understanding of the author of this thesis that Hegel does embrace the 'doctrine of distincts'-- for Hegel contradiction emerges from within the institutions themselves. However, Croce's criticism of Hegel enjoys much academic popularity-- Karl Marx, James Harvey Robinson, Morton White, Harvey Elmer Barnes, and William James all seem to embrace a similar reading of Hegel's dialectic. Marx asserted that his conception of dialectical logic (i.e., the materialist dialectic) was the 'direct opposite' of Hegel's dialectical logic because Hegel roots contradiction in a

[149] Barrow, "More Than A Historian", 81-91.
[150] Ibid., 91.

metaphysical concept instead of in the material conditions created by the existing institutions. Marx declares that ideas are "nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought".[152] Thus, Hegel's dialectical logic incorrectly looks outside of itself for contradiction. Likewise, Barnes suggests that Hegel's dwelling on *Geist* instead of focusing on more pragmatic notions, like modes of production, reduces the usefulness and rationality of his philosophy.[153] Importantly, Beard accepts Croce's reading of Hegel's dialectic. Beard does not recognize that Croce's reading of Hegel's dialectical logic is not uncontested-- Beard probably does not realize that Croce's reconstruction of Hegel is not exactly accurate because he never read Hegel systematically and rigorously. Instead Beard comes to know Hegel through Croce. In this respect Beard builds upon Croce's reinterpretation of Hegel, Croce's Neo or Post Hegelianism.[154] Thus, Beard adopts Croce's belief that Hegel's dialectical logic uses a metaphysical concept, the transcendental Spirit, as an opposite to generate dialectical progression. Thus, Beard also rejects Hegel's metaphysics. In place of Hegel's metaphysics Beard adopts materialism.

Beard accepts Croce's reconstruction of Hegel's dialectical logic-- he supports the notion that Hegel confused the notion of distincts with opposites. As the thesis points out above, Croce feels that Hegel adopted the notion of opposites that forced him to also adopt a metaphysical concept to provide contradiction, the Transcendental Spirit. However, Beard and Croce instead chose the 'notion of distincts'. Both Croce

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[151] Ibid.
[152] Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1, 25.
[153] Barnes, *The New History and the Social Studies*, 313.

and Beard support the notion that contradictions "emanate from within a common original source". Thus, there is no need for a Transcendental Spirit to produce dialectical progression. In the place of Transcendental Spirit, Beard looks to materialism to generate dialectical progression. Beard criticizes Hegel's system for requiring a *second* substance (i.e., Spirit) to bring to the idea into reality, to drive dialectical progression-- Beard says "ideas, whether imported or locally developed do not alone make history", and thus an *a priori* or metaphysical construction like Transcendental Spirit is not responsible for dialectical logic and progression.[155] Therefore, Beard sought to produce a dialectical logic that looked toward materialism as its engine-- Beard looked to Marx for philosophical support. In fact, Beard reread much Marxist scholarship in the 1930s.[156] However, as Barrow points out Beard did not completely adopt a Marxist approach.[157] Interestingly, Beard criticized "those who still cling to mechanistic determinism, whether theological or materialistic".[158] Thus, Beard rejects the dialectical idealism or metaphysics of Hegel and the dialectical materialism of Marx. To this extent Beard develops what he calls realistic dialectics.

Realistic dialectics attempts to develop a dialectical logic that embraces the work of Hegel, Marx, and Croce. Beard attempts to use both dialectical materialism and dialectical idealism to create realistic dialectics. Beard says realistic dialectics is:

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[154] Barrow refers to Croce as a neo-Hegelian, Barrow, "More Than A Historian", 79; as does David D. Roberts, "Croce in America: Influence, Misunderstanding, and Neglect," *Humanitas* 8, no. 2 (1995), 5.
[155] Beard, "That Promise of American Life", 351.
[156] Daivd Marcell, *Progress and Pragmatism: James, Dewey, Beard, and the American Idea of Progress* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1974), 267.
[157] Barrow, "More Than A Historian," 35.
[158] Beard, *The Open Door at Home: A Trail Philosophy of National Interest* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1934), 21.

> . . . an ideal written history would present certain conditioning realities and forces in their long perspective. It would give the physciographic setting of several nations- sea, river, mountain and valley- rich or poor in natural resources, harsh or mild in climate. On this would be built the great framework of interests in church, state, class, regions, community, and economy, and the clashes of interest arising in the course of time. Running parallel with the movement of interests would be the movement of ideas, always within their realistic setting. To be brief, an ideal written history would portray the drama enacted by the human spirit within the conditioning, but not absolutely determining, framework of the material world.[159]

Beard suggests that realistic dialectics embraces the notion that there is conflict, contradiction, and overcoming. However, the dialectical process is not embedded in an *a priori* notion like Transcendental Spirit as it is with Hegel or in a strictly materialist philosophy as in Marxist thought and Croce's philosophy. Instead dialectical logic consists in a multitude of sources like economics, race, religion, and geography. That is, realistic dialectics suggests that historical interpretation should be rooted in interests that can change and develop over time. As Barrow says, "for Beard under this conception [of realistic dialectics], history is viewed as an assertion of ideas and interests, antagonism to ideas and interests thus asserted, and resolution of the conflict by victory and adjustment.[160] In this way, Beard believed that realistic dialectics provides the philosophical foundation and support for historical relativism. That is, Beard's realistic

[159] Idem., *Nature of the Social Sciences*, 60-1.

dialectics provides the foundation for historical relativism because it allows for the engine of history to be in any number of places. The cause of history can lie in economics in one instance or in race in another because realistic dialectics suggest contradiction, which drives history, emerges from a vague notion of interests.

Beard's realistic dialectics and historical relativism finds inspiration in a number of scholars. Marx, Croce, and Hegel, among others, all played a role in the creation of Beard's philosophy. Therefore, while Beard is not a strict Hegelian, his philosophy becomes more meaningful when studied along with Hegel's.

John Dewey

John Dewey was born in Burlington, Vermont on October 20, 1859.[161] The son of a farmer and grocery storeowner, Dewey received a religious education. John Gunther said that Dewey's early education stressed the puritanical and deeply pious nature of "Vermont countryman".[162] Lucian Dewey, Dewey's mother, was an evangelical Protestant. She continually pushed Dewey to study religion. She also encouraged Dewey to proselytize. In fact, Dewey's mother even worked as a religious counselor at the University of Vermont. "She sought, as she put it, to make Burlington a temperate and moral city, a safe clean place for young men, a city of virtuous and happy homes".[163] She encouraged Dewey, as an undergraduate student at the University of Vermont, to become a Sunday school teacher. From 1875 to 1879 Dewey taught at a Congregational church.

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[160] Barrow, "More Than A Historian," 93-4. See, Beard, *The Discussion of Human Affairs* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1936), 116.
[161] George Dykhuizen, *The Life and Mind of John Dewey* (Carbondale Illinois: Southern Illinois UP, 1973), 1.
[162] John Gunther, *Inside U.S.A.* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1947), 493.
[163] Robert B. Westbrook, *John Dewey and American Democracy* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell UP, 1991), 4.

However, Dewey would grow out of his Christianity. Westbrook notes that Dewey faced a "trying personal crisis growing out of the conflict of traditional religious beliefs with opinions that" Dewey could not hold.[164] Marsden also suggests the Dewey's early Christianity gives way to other intellectual pursuits.[165] So, Dewey's early Protestant education would not dominate his thought.

Dewey's early life, the small New England town environment of Burlington and his strong Christian education, might lead one to believe that Dewey's philosophy would embrace a sort of Christian Communitarinism. Gunther suggests that Dewey's philosophy is linked to his roots in a small New England town-- because Dewey grew-up in a small and rural city, he develops an egalitarian philosophy later in life.[166] However, this is not the case. Burlington, at the time of Dewey's birth, was a rapidly changing city. In fact, immigrants made up over 40 percent Burlington's population by 1860.[167] Dewey's contact with immigrants from Ireland and Quebec provided a "liberalizing influence".[168] Also, Burlington began to industrialize during Dewey's childhood. Many factory workers, mostly immigrants, lived and worked in horrible conditions. In 1866, the city health officer observed that the tenements along Lake Champlain were "haunts of dissipation and poverty and abodes of wretchedness and filth".[169] Burlington provided Dewey with his first taste of industrial capitalism. Westbrook suggests Dewey's exposure to modern industry alerts him to the "problems of

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[164] Ibid., 3.
[165] George M. Marsden, *The Soul of the American University: From Protestant Establishment to Established Nonbelief* (New York: Oxford UP, 1994), 174-5.
[166] Gunther, 495.
[167] Westbrook, 1.
[168] Dykhuizen, 3.
[169] Westbrook, 1.

industrial democracy".[170] Although, Dewey's upbringing was of a traditional New England type, in many ways Dewey also experienced an array of social, economic, and cultural realities. Dewey's education and upbringing in Burlington exposed him to realities not normally connected with small New England cities.

Another aspect of Dewey's life in Burlington was his university education. From 1875 to 1879 Dewey attended the University of Vermont.[171] At the time Dewey attended the University of Vermont it was one of the best schools in the country, rivaling similar schools like Amherst College, Columbia University, and Harvard University. The President of the University of Vermont was James Marsh. Marsh was a noted New England Transcendentalist, and he ran the University with this in mind. Marsh appointed his friend and fellow ideologue, Joseph Torrey to chair the department of philosophy in which Dewey studied. Marsh and Torrey introduced Dewey to Kantian and German philosophy.[172] Because the University of Vermont was such a small institution (there were only 18 students in Dewey's class and eight faculty members) Dewey received an intense education.[173] In fact, Dewey remarks that under the direction of Torrey, Kantian philosophy caused a revolution in all his thoughts.[174] So, Dewey's education at the University of Vermont lead him to embrace Kantian philosophy and moved him from the more orthodox Christian outlook of his mother. However, Dewey's experience with Torrey would eventually lead him away from Kantian philosophy.

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[170] Ibid., 2.
[171] Ibid., 7-8.
[172] Ibid., 6.
[173] Neil Coughlan, *Young John Dewey: An Essay in American Intellectual History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), 7.
[174] John Dewey to H.A..P. Torrey, 17 November 1883, George Dykhuizen Papers and Correspondence, University of Vermont. in Dykhuizen, 17.

During Dewey's junior year Torrey introduced Dewey to William Torrey Harris' *Journal of Speculative Philosophy.*[175] According to Dykhuizen the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* was among Dewey's favorite readings while he studied at the University of Vermont.[176] In fact, in May of 1881 Dewey sent a manuscript titled "The Metaphysical Assumption of Materialism" to Harris for publication in the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy.*[177] "The Metaphysical Assumption of Materialism" was published in April of 1882, but more importantly Dewey and Harris developed a correspondence.[178] In a letter of July 1882 Dewey sought help from Harris on Hegel's relation to Kant. In this letter Dewey confesses his scholarly interest in Hegel's interpretation and reading of Kantian philosophy.[179] During the early 1880s Dewey began to move from the Kantian New England Transcendentalist school that Torrey introduced him to, to a philosophy based in Hegel. The thesis, having covered Dewey's early education, now moves on to show how Dewey begins to embrace Hegelian philosophy through an attack on Kant's philosophy.

Dewey felt that Kant's philosophical system did not help to determine how one should act. Specifically, Dewey attacks Kant's notion of the categorical imperative. Dewey suggests Kant's philosophy contains a dualism because of the categorical imperative. According to Dewey Kant's categorical imperative contains as dualism because it attempts to create a universal law of action out of the determinations of

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[175] Ibid., 17.
[176] Ibid., 24.
[177] Dewey submitted the publication after he graduated from the University of Vermont. Dewey was working as a high school teacher in Oil City, Pennsylvania when he started to correspond with Torrey. Westbrook, 8.
[178] Dykhuizen, 24.
[179] Dewey to Harris, 1 July 1882, Hoose Library. Ibid.

individuals. Before the thesis turns to Dewey's attack on Kant's categorical imperative, the thesis reconstructs Kant's categorical imperative to give the reader a frame of reference for Dewey's critique.

In the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* Kant lays out the categorical imperative or a "positive conception of freedom".[180] According to Kant the categorical imperative tells us that we should act so that our reasons for acting could become universal law. Kant tells us that when an individual acts under a universal law or the categorical imperative, then an individual acts according to the principles of morality and freedom.[181] Thus, the categorical imperative supplies the individual with freedom. This according to Kant removes individual contingency and irrational desire from determination, and posits freedom as rational self-determination because the individual is acting universally and rationally to determine their own true will-- it is important to remove individual contingency from the decision making process because when a person acts on desires, not duty, the individual's act has no moral worth or value of freedom because it does not tap into the individual's true will.[182] As Wood summaries, to act freely Kant means that "our will is determined through itself alone, and is not at all determined by alien influences".[183] So, for Kant morality and freedom are determined only by the categorical imperative because the categorical imperative requires individuals

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[180] Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Mary Gregor, ed., (New York: Cambridge UP, 1997), Par. 4:477.
[181] Ibid.
[182] Ibid., Par. 4:399.
[183] Wood, *Hegel's Ethical Thought*, 39. Although, Wood draws a distinction between Kantian autonomy and freedom. Kantian freedom is the potential for autonomy. However, Kantian autonomy is rational self-determination, or actin in accordance with the categorical imperative. So, freedom for Kant is potential autonomy.

to act universally by making their actions a law. Having outlined Kant's categorical imperative the essay moves on the discuss why Dewey holds it to be dualistic.

Dewey attacks Kant's notion of the categorical imperative and freedom. Dewey asserts Kant's philosophy contains a dualism because he believes that Kant's categorical imperative contains both laws of action and individual values of action. That is, Kant's categorical imperative is dualistic because it embraces both universal moral duty and obligation, but it bases the determination of this universal duty and obligation on the individual values of man. To determine what one ought to do one must create a universal law, however this universal law is based upon the values of individuals. Dewey says:

> The fact of duty, the existence of a categorical command to act thus and so, no matter what the pressure of physical surroundings of the incitation of animal inclinations, is as much a fact as the existence of knowledge of the physical worlds. Such a common cannot proceed from nature. What is cannot introduce man to what ought to be, and thus impose its own opposite upon him Nature only enmeshes men in its relentless machine-like movement . . . the moral law, the law of obligation, thus proceeds from a source in man above reason. It is token of his membership as a moral being in a kingdom of absolute ends above nature. But it is also directed to something in man which is equally above nature: it appeals to and demands freedom. Reason is incapable of anything so irrational, so self-contradictory, as imposing a law of action to which no faculty of action corresponds. the freedom of the moral will is the answer to the

> unqualified demand of duty. It is not open to man to accept or reject this truth as he may see fit.[184]

As Dewey points out in the above passage, Kant's categorical imperative does not supply society with laws of obligation. Kant's categorical imperative attempts to reach universal laws through the individual consciousness of humans. According to Dewey this is indeterminate-- Kant's categorical imperative does not supply universal laws because those universal laws are created by individuals who cannot act universally. Ryan suggests that Dewey believed Kant's categorical imperative allows for "the elevation of individual values to [form] a self-centered and apolitical" moral law.[185] Therefore for Dewey, Kant's understanding of what freedom or correct action is allows for too much individual determination. Dewey concludes that moral law must come from a source other than the individual. Thus, Kant's categorical imperative, according to Dewey is dualistic.

According to Dewey, Kant's formulation of universal laws (i.e., the categorical imperative) allows for individual conceptions of action to become universal laws. This allows for German nationalism to take on a universal or transcendental nature. That is, Kant's philosophy allowed for Germany's national goals to become metaphysical law. The German's, according to Dewey, using Kant's categorical imperative simply prescribed universal law according to their nationalistic goals. Dewey says that "Kantianism has helped formulate a sense of national mission and destiny".[186] Likewise, Ryan notes that for Dewey "it was Kant rather than Hegel or Nietzsche who was

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[184] Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1915), 24-5.
[185] Ryan, 191.

supposed to have turned the Germans in a nationalist direction".[187] So, Dewey points to Kant's categorical imperative as the root of German nationalism because it elevates national goals to universal law. A very similar critique of Kant's categorical imperative exists in Hegel's work. Thus, the essay now turns to examine Hegel's analysis of Kant's categorical imperative.

Hegel criticizes Kant's categorical imperative as being indeterminate. Hegel believes that Kant's concept of freedom makes it "possible to justify any wrong or immoral mode of action".[188] However, for Hegel Kant's categorical imperative cannot determine specific actions of subjects because the categorical imperative rejects the distinction between the subjective will of individuals and objective rationality.[189] Kant's categorical imperative does not unite the individual's subjective desires with rationality, or objective universality.[190] That is, the categorical imperative creates objective laws or universality out of subjective desires-- it does not join the two. Kant's concept of freedom based on the categorical imperative, is too abstract to determine the actions and duties of individuals and of the state-- Kant's freedom offers us no way of realizing itself. An example, for Hegel, of Kant's notion of freedom gone awry is the Reign of Terror during the French Revolution. The principles of freedom which guided the French Revolution were indeterminate because they conceived of freedom in an abstract way. During the French Revolution there was positive conception of freedom, but only the

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[186] Ibid., 29.
[187] Ibid., 186.
[188] Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, Par. 135.
[189] Karl Ameriks, "The Hegelian Critique of Kantian Morality," in Bernard den Ouden and Marcia Moen, eds., *New Essays on Kant* (New York: Peter Lang Press, 1987), 179-80.

abstract notion of equality. The notion of freedom that there ought to always be equality is too indeterminate to tell one how to act-- the categorical imperative that everyone ought always to be equal is too vague in its conception to provide the adequate guidance for state and individual action. This notion of equality makes the French Revolution indeterminate. This indeterminacy led to the canceling out of all differences of talents-- the Reign of Terror sought to destroy inequalities of individuals themselves.[191] Hegel says:

> the Reign of Terror in the French Revolution, during which all differences of talents and authority were supposed to be canceled out [*aufgehoben*]. This was a time of trembling and quaking and of intolerance towards everything particular. For fanaticism wills only what is abstract, not what is articulated, so that whenever difference emerge, it finds them incompatible with its own indeterminacy and cancels them [*hebt sie auf*]. This is why the people, during the French Revolution, destroyed once more the institutions they had themselves created, because all institutions are incompatible with the abstract self-consciousness of equality.[192]

During the French Revolution the universal axiom or the categorical imperative of equality led to the Reign of Terror. For Hegel, Kant's indeterminate categorical imperative did not supply reasons for action or universal laws of action. Thus, Kant's categorical imperative remains abstract-- it does not supply laws or reasons.

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[190] Peter G. Stillman, "Partiality and Wholeness: Economic Freedom, Individual Development, and Ethical Institutions in Hegel's Political Thought," in William Maker, ed., *Hegel on Economic Freedom* (Macon, Georgia: Mercer UP, 1987), 89.
[191] Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, Par. 5.

Subsequently, Hegel suggests that Kant's indeterminate categorical imperative allows for such events as the Reign of Terror during the French Revolution. As Hegel clearly points out, "freedom should be actual" according to reason.[193] Only a positive conception of freedom or laws, one which prescribes action, can supply enough determinacy to guard against events like the Reign of Terror.

An understanding of Hegel's criticism of Kant's categorical imperative goes a long way to understanding how Dewey views Kant. Both Dewey and Hegel suggest that Kant's categorical imperative is indeterminate. In Dewey's case Kant's categorical imperative is indeterminate because it creates universal laws out of an individual's conception of just action. Thus, the law cannot be universal since it is based in individuality. Likewise for Hegel, Kant's categorical imperative builds upon the desires of an individual, rather than objective rationality. Specifically, Hegel suggests the categorical imperative builds on the subjective desires of individuals, and never takes into account rationality. Interestingly, Dewey and Hegel suggest that Kant's categorical imperative 'allows any wrong to be justified'. Dewey suggests that German nationalism is the result of Kant's indeterminate categorical imperative, and Hegel points to the French Revolution's Regin of Terror to make the same point. Thus, Dewey's critique of Kant is made more lucid through an understanding of Hegel's critique of Kant.

Dewey embraced a critique of Kant similar to that of Hegel's at the time he was publishing in the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*. Dewey's correspondence with William Torrey Harris probably helped in the transition from his early Kantian

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[192] Ibid.
[193] Ibid., Par. 258.

Transcendentalism to a more Hegelian philosophy. However, Dewey's rollover into Hegelianism also took place while Dewey was making a transition from the University of Vermont to Johns Hopkins University. The essay now goes on to examine Dewey's experience at Johns Hopkins University.

Dewey enrolled in Johns Hopkins University at the age twenty-three in September of 1882. At Johns Hopkins University Dewey took up philosophy and quickly fell under the influence three professors: G. S. Morris, G. S. Hall, and Charles S. Pierce. It is also important to note that Dewey studied with these individuals at Johns Hopkins University. As the thesis points out above Johns Hopkins University was modeled after the German University system. Thus, Dewey's growing interest in German Philosophy and Hegel's scholarship ought not to surprise us. Also, the thesis pointed out above that G. S. Morris was heavily influenced by Hegelian scholarship-- Morris studied in Germany with Trendelenburg, a Hegelian scholar.[194] Morris also studied in Britain with T. H. Green whose academic mentor was Hegel.[195] In addition, as the thesis points out above, Morris wrote a book on Hegel's philosophy of the state and history which contributed to Robinson's philosophy-- it should be recalled that Morris utilized Hegel's historicist method. As Ryan points out Dewey was educated in the Hegelian method while at Johns Hopkins University.[196] In addition, Bernstein notes that "Dewey had learned his Hegel under the guidance of G. S. Morris, his teacher at Johns Hopkins University".[197] Thus, Dewey received much of his Hegelian education through Morris at

[194] Ryan, 64.
[195] Ibid., 85.
[196] Ibid., 73.
[197] Bernstein, *John Dewey*, 13.

Johns Hopkins University. Importantly, Dewey's other mentors at Johns Hopkins University, Pierce and Hall, also demonstrate Hegelian tendencies. Having reviewed the Hegelian nature of Morris' philosophy and the German nature of Johns Hopkins University, the essay goes on to discuss Pierce's Hegelian influence on Dewey.

Charles Sanders Pierce, 1839-1914, influenced many important American scholars, such as William James and Josiah Royce.[198] Although most of Pierce's work is considered to be Neo-Kantian, he does adapt certain Hegelian tendencies. As Pochmann says "contrary to the impression conveyed by certain remarks of his in condemnation of Hegel, Pierce on the whole, and especially in his later writings, did not remain entirely uninfluenced by the German".[199] Importantly, Pierce held that the end of history was indeed a useful and attainable theoretical concept. Pierce took from Hegel the idea that the end of history rested in the "final harmony of all reality in an absolute".[200] So, unlike Robinson, Croce, or Beard, Pierce does not reject Hegelian metaphysics-- Pierce embraces the end of history. Pierce's idealist historical vision is reflected in Dewey's thought while he is at Johns Hopkins University. Dewey embraces the concept of an end of history, but he embraces the end of history while suggesting, like the 'New History', that rationality is historical. So, Dewey's philosophy of history finds inspiration in Morris (e.g., rationality is historical) and Pierce (e.g., the end of history). The thesis now goes on to discuss Dewey's philosophy of history.

While at Johns Hopkins University Dewey began to publish on several philosophical topics. Among Dewey's earlier publications are works on the meaning of

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[198] Pochmann, *German Philosophy and Literature*, 313.
[199] Ibid., 314.

history. Dewey's early Hegelian influences led him to search for a method of philosophical analysis-- this method was historical. As Dewey says he has:

> long felt that the construction of a logic, that is a method of effective inquiry, which would apply without abrupt breach of continuity to the fields designated by both of these words, is at once our needed theoretical solvent and the supply of our greatest practical want.[201]

Ryan suggests that Dewey's 'search for a method' was fostered by his Hegelianism and his relationship with Morris.[202] Dewey was dedicated to solving contemporary philosophical and political problems historically. That is, for Dewey history provides the contemporary environment with meaning-- like Robinson and Beard, Dewey draws on Hegel to suggest that rationality has a historical aspect. Dewey notes that one's understanding of history redefines one's understanding of the present and future. Dewey says that "in using what has come to them as an inheritance from the past [i.e., history] they are compelled to modify it to meet their own needs, and this process creates a new present in which the process continues".[203] History helps one make sense of the present. Also, one of Dewey's last books, *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, asserts that the present is made rational by history. Dewey says:

> if any one will commence without mental reservations to the study of the history of philosophy not as an isolated thing but as a chapter in the development of civilizations and culture; if one will connect the story of

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[200] Ibid., 314.
[201] Dewey, "From Absolutism to Experimentalism", in *John Dewey: The Early Works, 1882-1989: 1893-1894*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, vol. 4 (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois UP, 1971), 156-7.
[202] Ryan, 73.
[203] Dewey, "Historical Judgments," in *The Philosophy of History in Our Time: An Anthology*, ed. Hans Meyerhoff (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959), 172.

> philosophy with a study of anthropology, primitive life, the history of religion, literature and social institutions, it is confidently asserted that he will reach his own independent judgment as to the worth of the account which has been presented today. Considered in this way, the history of philosophy will take on a new significance.[204]

Thus, rationality is the product of a historical process-- the present has meaning only as the product of historical development. As Dewey suggests in the above passages, how one views the past changes how one views the present. Thus, Dewey's view on history resembles that of the 'New History'. Consequently, as a reading of Hegel's philosophy aided in interpreting the 'New History, a reading of Hegel aids in interpreting Dewey. However, Dewey take's Hegel's notion of historical development a step farther than the 'New History' does. The thesis points out above that the 'New History' does not embrace Hegel's notion of an absolute or an end of history. Dewey does embrace Hegel's end of history. Thus, the essay moves on to discuss Dewey's Hegelian metaphysics.

Dewey suggests that there is a determinable end of history. Although Dewey embraces the historical or phenomenological method of the 'New History', he also adopts from Pierce a sense that history has an internal logic. History not only tells us why the present is rational, but history is also developing toward some point or end. Ryan says that Dewey who was "educated in the Hegelian mode [had] the old Hegelian wish for a logic that would display the real movement of the concept".[205] Dewey suggests

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[204] Idem., *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1920. Reprint, Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), 25.
[205] Ryan, 73.

that history unfolds toward some absolute end. Specifically, Dewey claims that the democratic state represents the end of history. Importantly, the democratic state is the end of history because "democracy is the agency of religious truth".[206] Dewey says in "Christianity and Democracy" that:

> Democracy thus appears as the means by which the revelation of truth is carried on. It is in democracy, as the means by which the revelation of truth is carried on. It is in democracy, the community of ideas and interest through community action, that the incarnation of God in man (man, that is to say, as organ of universal truth) becomes a living present thing, having its ordinary and natural sense. This truth is brought down to life; its segregation removed; it is made a common truth enacted in all departments of action, not in one isolated sphere called religious".[207]

So, Dewey suggests that democracy demonstrates the working out God's will or Spirit. Democracy is the representation of God and truth. Thus, a democratic state represents the absolute end of history. Importantly, a reading of Hegel's philosophy aids in understanding Dewey's idea that a democratic state being the end of history represents the culmination of God's will.

When Dewey suggests that democracy is the representation of truth and Spirit he points to Hegel as his intellectual inspiration. In *German Philosophy and Politics*, Dewey say that Hegel provides the notion that "the State has more, not less, objective reality than physical nature, for it is a realization of Absolute spirit in the realm

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[206] Ibid., 100.
[207] Dewey, "Christianity and Democracy", in *John Dewey: The Early Works, 1882-1898: 1893-1894*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, vol. 4 (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois UP, 1971), 9.

of consciousness . . . the State is God on Earth".[208] Dewey does not say much more on this point however. As Ryan suggests "Hegel's philosophy was only some two-thirds known to Dewey's generation [and] that Hegel was Americanized" by Dewey to some extent.[209] This is the result of learning Hegel through other scholars like Morris and Pierce. Also, Dewey never really attempted a systematic study of Hegel's philosophy. However, Hegel's work clearly does influence Dewey. Thus, one needs to reexamine Hegel's philosophy to fill in the blanks that Dewey's work leaves. That is, Dewey's thoughts on how the democratic state represent the absolute end of history and God are only made intelligible through a reading of Hegel's philosophy. For example, if one examines certain passages in Hegel's *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History* or *Phenomenology of Spirit*, one harnesses a better understanding of Dewey's philosophy. Hegel suggests at the end of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* that the history of States is the working out of God's truth. Hegel says that history forms "the Cavalry of absolute Spirit, the actuality, truth, and certainty of his throne, without which he would be lifeless and alone. Only 'from the chalice of this realm of spirits/ foams forth for Him his own infinitude' ".[210] So, Hegel says that only in the history of society and states is God's will worked out. That is, the State represents God's will for Hegel, much like it does for Dewey. Likewise, Hegel says that a nation embodies the Idea, and that "the Idea is the eternal inner life of God".[211] Also, Hegel declares that "the state is the spiritual Idea".[212] The state, according to Hegel, is the working out God's consciousness. Thus, Dewey's

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[208] Idem., *German Philosophy and Politics*, 110-1.
[209] Ryan, 95-6.
[210] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Par. 808. Quote within, Adaptation of Schiller's *Die Freundschaft, ad fin.*

claim that the democratic state is the absolute end of history and the representation of God on Earth, appears to draw upon Hegel's philosophy. However, an understanding of Hegel's philosophy only takes one so far in understanding Dewey's philosophy. In fact, it is Dewey's use of Hegelian metaphysics that would eventually lead Dewey to reject Hegel's philosophy. The thesis now turns to examine how Dewey moves away from Hegelian scholarship.

As Dewey advanced in his scholarly studies he would eventually leave behind Hegelian scholarship. Ryan notes that "Dewey was not an uncritical follower of Hegel. Little by little he came to see that what he had gained from [Hegel] could survive the repudiation of [his] metaphysics".[213] Additionally, Marsden suggests that Dewey's Hegelianism only lasted as long as his Christianity. Marsden says that Dewy, "who was abandoning the Hegelianism that had sustained his theism, took the occasion to allow his church membership to lapse".[214] The roots of Dewey's turn against Hegel where laid at Johns Hopkins University. Dewey's third mentor at Johns Hopkins University, G. Stanley Hall, is responsible for planting the seed of doubt concerning Hegel's work in Dewey's mind. The essay now turns to examine Dewey's third mentor Hall.

G. Stanley Hall was another of Dewey's professors at Johns Hopkins University. Hall also demonstrated Hegelian tendencies in his early philosophy. Interestingly, Hall, a friend of Morris', studied in Berlin with Trendelenburg. Hall's

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[211] Idem., *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, 76-7.
[212] Ibid., 120.
[213] Ryan, 96.
[214] Marsden, 250.

close friendship with Morris helped to bring him to Berlin.[215] Hall also met Karl Michelet while in Germany. Michelet was a strict Hegelian and Hall spent much time with him before his return to the United States. Once Hall returned to the United States he went to St. Louis to work with William Torrey Harris. However, Hall did not get along with Harris. So Hall left St. Louis and enrolled in Harvard University. He immediately began work on a Ph.D. in psychology with William James. Hall received the first Ph.D. in psychology granted in the United States. While at Harvard Hall picked up James' experimental nature-- Hall held that physical experiments yield the only worthwhile knowledge. In fact, while working with William James after his falling out with Harris, Hall suggested that "Hegel's philosophy was merely obscurantist and an obstacle to clear thinking and scientific progress".[216] Thus, by the time Hall is a professor of Dewey's at Johns Hopkins University, Hall has rejected Hegelian scholarship and embraced what he considered a more 'scientific philosophical method'. "Hall was deeply suspicious of what he took to be Hegelian dogma".[217] However, Hall's anti-Hegelianism did not initially affect Dewey. Dewey believed that his Hegelian philosophy was not in conflict with the experimental science proposed by Hall. In a work titled "The New Psychology", Dewey asserts that empirical psychology demonstrates the rationality and truth of Hegelian philosophy.[218] Dewey says the New Psychology is built upon:

> the unity and solidarity of psychical life against abstract theories which would break it up into atomic elements or independent powers. It lays large stress upon the will; not as an abstract power of unmotivated

[215] Ryan, 67.
[216] Ibid., 69.
[217] Bernstein, *John Dewey*, 14.

> choice, nor as an executive power to obey the behests of the understanding, the legislative branch of the psychical government, but as a living bond connecting and conditioning all mental activity. It emphasizes the teleological element, not in any mechanical or external sense, but regarding life as an organism in which immanent ideas of purposes are realizing themselves through the development of experience . . . it [the New Psychology] finds no insuperable obstacle in the relations of faith and reason, for it can discover in its investigations no reason which is not based upon faith, and no faith which is not rational in its origin and tendency.[219]

So, Dewey's theory of the 'New Psychology' recognizes the Hegelian suggestion that society is somehow the working out of God or some Absolute consciousness. Somehow psychology needs to recognizes how rationality is a metaphysical substance, the working out of the Spirit's will. However, this realization of God's will is attained through scientific investigation.

Morton White notes that Dewey's 'New Psychology' merged two strains of thought-- Hegelian metaphysics and empirical science came together in Dewey's "The New Psychology". Furthermore, White suggests like Ryan and Bernstein above, that "the Hegelian theory of organic relations was, Dewey thought, confirmed by the organismic direction of biology [i.e., empirical science]".[220] Finally, Ryan notes that "Dewey's philosophy ended by setting a Hegelian vision of the world atop a flatly empirical,

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[218] Ryan, 74; Bernstein, *John Dewey*, 14-5.
[219] Dewey, "The New Psychology", in *John Dewey: The Early Works, 1882-1898: 1893-1894*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, vol. 1 (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois UP, 1969), 60.
[220] White, *The Origin of Dewey's Instrumentalism* (New York: Octagon Books, 1977), 39-40.

nonmetaphysical base".[221] After his experience with Hall, Dewey's Hegelianism changed and mixed with an empirical scientific approach. So, Dewey's experience with Hall changed his Hegelian philosophy-- Morris and Pierce both imprinted upon Dewey a Hegelian method and philosophy, however Hall's influence changed that. Although, Hall did not contribute to the development Dewey's Hegelianism, Hall did help build Dewey's belief in the empirical and scientific method. As the thesis demonstrates below Dewey would eventually reject Hegelian scholarship in favor of a so-called empirical method. Dewey's move from a Hegelian philosophy to a scientific method is perhaps due in part to Hall's influence. However, Dewey's acceptance of the scientific method does not completely emerge until his tenure at the University of Chicago. Having reviewed Dewey's years at Johns Hopkins University, the thesis moves on to discuss Dewey's time at the University of Chicago.

After Dewey left Johns Hopkins University he followed G. S. Morris to the University of Michigan for a very brief time. Following his stay at the University of Michigan, Dewey became the Department Chair of Philosophy and Psychology at the University of Chicago where he taught from 1894 to 1904. (In 1905, Dewey would leave the University of Chicago for Columbia University).[222] Importantly, Dewey's rejection of

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[221] Ryan, 112.

[222] At Columbia University Dewey would reverse his rejection of Hegelian philosophy which developed under Hall and flourished at the University of Chicago. Although, Dewey would never embrace Hegelian metaphysics and never again assert that the Democratic State is the working out of God, he would return to the historical method. Dewey would give up his use of empirical scientific data to explain phenomena in favor of historical interpretations and explanations while at Columbia University. This is probably due in part to the large amount of scholars at Columbia University who favored Hegelian and historical interpretations and explanations-- James Harvey Robinson, Charles A. Beard, and John W. Burgess are just a few scholars who favored such interpretations.

Hegelianism and Christianity did not fully develop until he joined the faculty at the University of Chicago.

Dewey's tenure at the University of Chicago only drove home Hall's earlier empirical influence. While at the University of Chicago Dewey became very interested in logical theory.[223] Teaching a course in Hegelian Logic, Dewey attempted to reconstruct Hegel's system-- however Dewey's attempt to change Hegel's logic was unsuccessful. Dewey says that "there was a period extending into my earlier years at Chicago when, in connection with a seminar in Hegel's Logic, I tried reinterpreting his categories in terms of 'readjustment' and 'reconstruction'. Gradually I came to realize that what the principle actually stood for could be better understood and stated when completely emancipated from Hegelian garb".[224] George Dykhuizen asserts that Dewey's move to cut Hegel out of his philosophical system was in part a result of his surroundings.[225]

The University of Chicago was a particularly empirically oriented university. Set-up, organized, and run by John D. Rockefeller in 1890, the University of Chicago quickly became the leading academic institution in the Mid-Western United States. However, Rockefeller controlled the ideological nature of the University very tightly. As Dykhuizen points out the University of Chicago encouraged both scientific methods and "conservative social thought".[226] In fact, Frederick T. Gates, Rockefeller's

[223] Dykhuizen, 82.
[224] Ibid.
[225] Ibid., 80.
[226] Ibid., 102.

personal secretary, monitored the university's scholarly output.[227] Gates required of all academic work that it did not attack the conservative politics of Rockefeller. Thus, Dewey's attitude to Hegelian and socially liberal scholarship changed. However, by 1900 the social environment of Chicago had taken a toll on Dewey-- massive worker riots and strikes and brutal police action taken against striking workers forced Dewey to join a group of socially and politically liberal scholars at the University of Chicago. Along with Thorstein Veblen and Albion Small, Dewey led a mini revolt at the University of Chicago. Albion Small called the group the 'Spirit of New Humanity'.[228] However, by 1904 it became clear that the 'Spirit of New Humanity' had failed and the members of the movement resigned from the University of Chicago. Dewey said in a letter to W. T. Harris that he left the University of Chicago because he could no longer "work harmoniously under the conditions which the President's methods of conducting affairs created and imposed".[229] Dewey's resignation from the University of Chicago marked an important return to Hegelian philosophy.

In 1904 when Dewey took a position at Columbia University it appears that he returned to Hegel's historical method-- Dewey revisited the Hegelian attitude he embraced while at Johns Hopkins University. Dewey's return to historical method was facilitated by his colleagues at Columbia University, Charles A. Beard, John W. Burgess, and James Harvey Robinson. "Contact with the ideas of these men helped Dewey"

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[227] Ibid., 102.
[228] Ibid., 103.
[229] Dewey to Harris, 25 April 1904, Hoose Library, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA. Ibid., 114.

reformulate his philosophical position.[230] While at Columbia University, Dewey taught classes in Moral and Political Philosophy where he stressed the importance of the historical process, according to Dykhuizen.[231] However, Dewey once again found the political conditions at the university intolerable. Along with Beard, Robinson, and others, Dewey left Columbia University over the censorship of faculty opinions concerning WWI. Although Dewey's academic career was drawing to a close, he found himself at the center of another university. The thesis now goes on to examine Dewey's role in the founding of the New School for Social Research.

By 1919 Dewey along with Beard and Robinson left Columbia University to set up the New School for Social Research. Along with Herbert Croly, Thorstein Veblen, Beard, Robinson and others, Dewey decided to organize a university dedicated to the preservation of academic freedom. The New School for Social Research with the nickname of 'University-in-Exile' was conceived out of the idea that scholars should "pursue their studies without interference from government" and university bureaucracies.[232] As a sort of legal arm or spin-off from the New School for Social Research, the faculty members organized the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). The ACLU's mission was to protect the freedom of speech, action, and expression of any individual from government or any other interference. Dewey was a founding member of the New School and the ACLU. While at the New School Dewey gave many classes and lectures which where very popular among the student body.[233] In fact, Dewey reaffirmed

[230] Ibid., 123.
[231] Ibid., 123-34.
[232] Ibid., 269.
[233] Ryan, 169.

his commitment to Hegel's work while at the New School. Dewey taught philosophy classes through a historical or phenomenological approach.[234] Dewey returned to a sort of Hegelian method. He suggested in his seminars that the present state of philosophy can only be understood as a development of the past-- rationality is historical. While at the New School for Social Research, Dewey encountered many scholars who were German historicists and Hegelian philosophers. However, the impact of Hall and his tenure at the University of Chicago would never completely disappear. Dewey felt that German idealism was "more or less out of step with American life".[235] So, Dewey's early use of Hegel while at Johns Hopkins University never totally reemerges in his work.

Nevertheless, Dewey does revisit Hegel. After a period of 'scientific analysis' at the University of Chicago, Dewey returned to the Hegelian method. The Hegelian friendly faculty at Columbia University and the New School (e.g., Burgess, Beard, and Robinson), placed Dewey in an environment rich in Hegelian scholarship. Thus, Dewey reexamined Hegel's work. However, Dewey never fully embraces Hegel. So, Dewey is not a Hegelian, but rather Dewey's work uses some Hegelian concepts. Consequently, Dewey's scholarship and philosophy becomes more illuminated when read along with Hegel's philosophy.

Herbert D. Croly

Herbert David Croly (1869-1930) was most famous for his role as the editor and co-founder of the political journal *New Republic*. Also, Croly's book *The*

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[234] Ibid., 252.

[235] Dewey to Bentley, 20 March 1940, in *John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley: A Philosophical Correspondence, 1932-1951*, ed. Sidney Ratner, Jules Altman, and James E. Wheeler (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1964), 74, quoted in Dykhuizen, 270.

Promise of American Life received wide acclaim in the mass media. More importantly, *The Promise of American Life* was read and admired by Theodore Roosevelt. In Theodore Roosevelt's 1912 camping for president, Roosevelt often quote Croly's *The Promise of American.*[236] Theodore Roosevelt also used Croly's concept of 'New Nationalism'. Croly's work influenced a popular audience. Consequently, "the political theory of *The Promise of American Life* was launched into national politics".[237] Croly's work, unlike that of Robinson, Beard, and Dewey, influenced a wide and not exclusively academic audience. Thus, the lasting importance of Croly's philosophy is not an academia but on the public policy and political theory of state bureaucracies.

Croly's early education was supervised by his father, David Goodman Croly. David Croly "was an experienced newspaper man, a writer of unorthodox views, and a follower of the French thinker Auguste Comte".[238] In fact, David Croly wrote a work titled *A Positivist Primer* in 1871 which Americanized Comte.[239] According to Edward A. Stettner, David Croly's influence on his son Herbert's philosophical mind led him to study at Harvard University.[240]

Herbert Croly entered Harvard University's philosophy department in the fall of 1886.[241] His father, David Croly apparently begged him to enter Johns Hopkins University instead-- David Croly suggested that Harvard University's political and philosophical orientation was antiquated and tedious when compared to Johns Hopkins

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[236] Edward A. Stettner, *Shaping Modern Liberalism: Herbert Croly and Progressive Thought* (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1993), 76.
[237] Ibid., 76.
[238] David W. Levy, "Herbert David Croly," in *American National Biography* 5, ed. John A. Garraty and Mark C. Carnes (New York: Oxford UP, 1999), 757.
[239] Stettner, 15.
[240] Ibid., 17.

University.[242] However, Herbert Croly felt that his father was trying to persuade him to take up the study of Comte at Johns Hopkins University, and Herbert Croly did not appreciate his father's interest in Comte, and so he chose to attend Harvard University. In the philosophy department at Harvard University Croly studied with William James and Joshia Royce.[243] As the thesis points out above both Royce and James exhibited Hegelian tendencies along with many of their students. Croly did not escape the Hegelian influence of his professors. Royce's Hegelian philosophy is one of the influences found in *The Promise of American Life* according to Stettner.[244] However, Herbert Croly's academic career at Harvard University was less than impressive. After nearly six years of undergraduate study Croly had not yet graduated. Thus, Croly took a leave of absence from Harvard. In 1895 Croly returned to the philosophy department with hopes of completing a degree by 1898. However, Croly once again left Harvard University in 1899 after a mental breakdown just prior to exams.[245] So, Croly never received a degree.

After Croly gave up on Harvard University he went to New York City as the editor of *Architectural Record.* While in New York City, Croly's interest in economic and political thought grew. In fact, he sought out the company of several scholars at Columbia University. Specifically, Croly became close to John Dewey, Charles A. Beard, and James Harvey Robinson-- in October of 1917, Croly and his academic friends would set up the New School for Social Research. More importantly, when Dewey

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[241] Levy, 757.
[242] Stettner, 18.
[243] Ibid., 20-2.
[244] Ibid., 51.

created the *New Republic* in November of 1914, John Dewey and Charles Beard would become staple writers of the journal.[246] Croly surely had numerous encounters with Dewey and Beard's social, economic, and political thought. Thus, Croly was exposed to the Hegelian scholarship through the arguments of several different scholars.

Herbert Croly, like all the Progressive scholars above, embraces the Hegelian method. That is, Croly's arguments concerning economic, social, and political problems proceed historically. However, because Croly is more concerned with addressing a popular audience and affecting mass political change he does not concern himself with many theoretical and methodological arguments. For example, Herbert Croly's *The Promise of American Life* never addresses the theoretical underpinnings of the historical method in the way the works of Robinson, Beard, or Dewey may do. As Stettner says "in Croly's view, a 'promise' has to be realized in action, and to be realized it has to be infused with an 'ideal' to organize and inspire its followers".[247] Thus, Croly's work must leave some of the more academic and terse arguments up to other scholars. However, Croly's philosophy does embrace the historical method utilized by the 'New History'. Croly suggests that only through a historical analysis of American political thought will the contemporary political environment make sense-- the present is only rational when viewed historically. Thus, for Croly like Robinson, Beard, and Dewey, what is defined as rational is determined historically. Therefore, a historicist reading of Hegel, as laid out by scholars like Pippin, Pinkard, and Forster will aid in an understanding of Croly's philosophy. Although Croly never discusses historical method

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[245] Levy, 757.
[246] Ryan, 189.

and rationality in the way Pippin, Pinkard, and Forster do, Croly demonstrates that he makes use of the historicist elements in Hegel's philosophy. However, before going on to outline Croly's historicism the thesis discusses Croly's dialectical approach to political thought.

Croly's dialectical scheme is intertwined with his historicism. For Croly, American political history is the result of a dialectic. American political history is a dialectic between two groups. Importantly, according to Croly an understanding of the American dialectical political history makes the contemporary political environment rational. The dialectical history of American politics makes the present rational. For Croly, rationality only emerges after a reconstruction and understanding the dialectic in American political history. Thus, in order to make sense of Croly's historicism one must first understand Croly's dialectics.

Croly believes that American political history is a dialectical process between the Jeffersonians and Hamiltonians-- American history is the dialectic between the political thought of Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton's political thought is classified as Federalist and Jefferson's political thought is Republican. As Bowman says "Croly identified two major traditions within democratic theory and practice: the Republican or Jeffersonian, and the Federalist or Hamiltonian".[248] According to Croly, neither tradition ever fully realizes itself in American political thought or history. The Hamiltonians desired a strong central government marked by scientific control and corporate organization. The Federalist political program was to

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[247] Stettner, 34.
[248] Bowman, 83.

organize control of trade, business, finance, manufacture, transportation, and legislation in one primary political institution. Although the Hamiltonians did not desire state institutional control of corporations and businesses, they encouraged a strong and uniform economic policy to help guide the development and growth of commerce. For example, when Hamilton was Secretary of the Treasure in 1790 he published the first ever "Report on Manufactures". In Hamilton's "Report on Manufactures" he suggests that manufacturing and trade must be organized to produce the maximum economic benefit.[249] Hamiltonians were "the spokesman of a nationalist principle and centralized control".[250] As Croly suggests Hamiltonian political thought is expressed in the United States Constitution. It was the Federalist movement "which prepared the way, not only for the adoption of the Constitution, but for the loyalty it subsequently inspired in the average American".[251] Thus, the Hamiltonians left a mark on American political history through the Constitution. It is through the Constitution that the Hamiltonians are able to speak to individual Americans. Consequently, Hamiltonian political thought still lords over the American public through the Constitution. However, Federalist political though is not the only influence on the American public. The essay now turns to examine Jeffersonian political thought.

Jeffersonian or Republican political though stresses individualism. Republicans favor a decentralized and weak state. Jefferson equated the ideals of liberty

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[249] Alexander Hamilton, "Report on Manufactures," in Jacob E. Cooke, ed., *The Reports of Alexander Hamilton* (New York: Harper Press, 1964), 119.
[250] Bowman, 83.
[251] Croly, *The Promise of American Life* (Boston: Northeastern UP, 1909), 32.

and equality.[252] Republican political thought asserts that the more liberty an individual is allowed the more equality each individual will have. Jefferson "attempts to gain essentially egalitarian result through individualist means".[253] So, the Republican tradition favors a small and weak government. Essentially, the state would have no other duties than to provide for a national defense. Even the idea of a national defense was narrowly viewed by the Jeffersonians. Most Republicans would not accept much more than a standing Navy and definitely ruled out the existence of a permanent Army. The rationale behind this was that a Navy could not exert much power over political institutions because it was physically restricted to the sea. However, an Army can literally take over the seat of government thus threatening a stable political system. Thus, an ideal Republican society would be an agrarian society where individuals are self-sufficient and physically isolated by distance-- an agrarian society of isolated individuals. So, there are two nearly opposite strains of thought guiding American political development.

Croly concludes from his discussion of Federalism and Republicanism that American political thought is a combination of the two. He says that the Hamiltonians and the Jeffersonians struggled and competed with one another producing the current political environment. However, the struggle between the two political systems did not result in a decisive victory for either. The purity of Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian political thought has been disrupted by political realities. In order to achieve certain goals each side changed its political program slightly-- in a dialectical process as one political system attempted to strengthen its hold on the American public, the other

[252] Ibid., 44.
[253] Bowman, 83.

political system changed as well. As Hamiltonians attempted to build public support for their program, the Jeffersonians would respond by changing their political system in order to counter the Hamiltonian's move. For example, the Hamiltonians lobbied extensively in Virginia, Massachusetts, and New York to ensure the Constitution's ratification. In fact, three Federalist politicians, John Jay, James Madison, and Alexander Hamilton, wrote a series of essays appearing in New York City newspapers supporting the ratification of the Constitution-- those essays are now organized into a book titled, *The Federalists*. However, the Jeffersonians did not sit idly by, as they did not support the ratification of the Constitution. Although, the Jeffersonians where never able to gather enough support to defeat the ratification of the Constitutions, they where able to seriously change it. The Jeffersonians where able to gather enough support to require that the Bill of Rights be amended to the Constitution as a condition of ratification. Republican political theory changed to accommodate the Constitution, however not before changing Federalist political thought. Croly suggests that contemporary political ideas represent a combination of Federalism and Republicanism.[254] The Federalist and Republican political traditions struggled against one another and developed into something new. Thus, there exists in American political history a dialectic between the Federalists and Republicans. Although, Croly never highlights exactly how the dialectic works itself out in a theoretical way, he does suggest that American political thought developed dialectically. Consequently, an understanding of Hegel's dialectic would greatly improve Croly's analysis of American political history. Above the thesis discusses Hegel's dialectic, and when an analysis of Hegel's dialectic is read alongside

[254] Croly, *The Promise of American Life*, 51.

Croly's discussion of the Federalists and Republicans one's understanding of Croly's thought greatly improves. In addition, Croly's dialectic develops into a historicism.

Croly uses an argument similar to Hegel's historicism. In a certain reading of Hegel it seems that Hegel views the present as rational only by virtue of being a product of a rational historical process. The present is understood and made rational only by reference to history. The thesis outlines the historicist approach to Hegel above. Importantly, Croly embraces Hegel's historicist analysis. Like Robinson, Beard, and Dewey before him, Croly suggests that rationality depends on history. Thus, like some other Progressive scholars, Croly's work proceeds historically. It is the historicist understanding of rationality which leads Croly to reconstruct American political history as a dialectic between the Federalists and Republicans. However, unlike his fellow Progressive scholars, Croly does not approach historicism from a theoretical perspective. Thus, Croly's use of the historicist method can be seen in his analysis of American political history. For example, Croly contends that without an understanding of the Federalist/Republican dialectic, contemporary American political thought would be completely incomprehensible. Croly says that in order to construct a useful political theory or public policy for the contemporary United States, one must understand the political and economic history.[255] However, for Croly the need to understand the past is not to respect it or preserve it, but instead to give meaning to contemporary political institutions. For example, if one interprets the US Constitution as a document written by the God graced 'Founding Fathers' or as the result of competing economic interests one's perspective on modern politics will vary. Thus, how one acts towards or attempts to

change or not change political institutions depends on the history one uses. So, contemporary political thought can only be understood, made rational, through a historical and dialectical understanding of American political thought.

So, reading Hegel's dialectic along side Croly's *The Promise of American Life* would improve one's understanding of Croly's work. However, Croly is not a straight Hegelian. For example, the way Croly came to understand Hegel was probably influenced and changed by his professors, William James and Josiah Royce. Therefore, while Hegel is only one of a number of influences on Croly, reading Hegel's philosophy helps to elucidate Croly's work. So, the way in which Hegel influences Croly mirrors the way in which Hegel influenced the Progressives analyzed above.

As the thesis demonstrates most Progressive scholars did not completely adopt a Hegelian method or philosophy. Robinson, Beard, Dewey, and Croly were of course susceptible to their surroundings. The influence of academic, economic, social, and political conditions changed how these Progressives worked and what they wrote. So, we cannot expect their work to represent a clear-cut application of Hegel to American public policy or political thought. Thus, the Progressives' cannot be classified as Hegelian. However, the work of Robinson, Beard, Dewey, and Croly is definitely made more understandable in the light of Hegel's philosophy.

According to Bowman and Lustig's contemporary American Liberalism lost its historical identity. They suggest this because scholars like Rawls, Sandel, and Hartz ignore the importance of the American Progressive movement. Bowman and Lustig believe that the American Progressive movement is responsible for many

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[255] Ibid., 27.

developments in contemporary American Public Policy. Thus, a reevaluation of the American Progressives became necessary to provide a more complete understanding of Bowman and Lustig's claim. This reevaluation illustrated that Hegel's social and political philosophy had a strong impact on the American Progressive movement. While most scholars of American Political Thought would ignore Hegel, it is clear that Hegel plays a strong role in the formation of American Political Theory. There are two main way of supporting the claim that Hegel influenced American Progressive scholars. First, by examining the context under which the American Progressives developed their philosophies. Second, by reading Hegel's texts alongside the works of American Progressives. As this thesis points out above, for example, Beard developed his philosophical scheme while under the instruction of a Hegelian: John W. Burgess. Also, Beard's use of realistic dialectics borrows heavily from Croce's understanding of Hegelian dialectics. Thus, it is clear that an understanding of Hegel's philosophy improves an understanding of the American Progressive movement, because Hegel's philosophy plays a part in the formation of American Progressive philosophy.

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