COLLABORATION IN THE SUDAN, 1898-1919.

AN ISLAMIC RESPONSE TO COLONIAL RULE:

COLLABORATION IN THE SUDAN, 1898-1919.

by

Martin W. Daly

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ABSTRACT

Author: Martin W. Daly.

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This thesis attempts to describe the responses of certain groups in the northern Sudan to the imposition of colonial rule during the first two decades of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. The nature of the source materials necessitates limiting its scope to a discussion of Sudanese-British collaboration as seen through British policy and the Sudanese response to it. It is contended that the Sudanese pre-colonial experience was an important factor in determining Sudanese reaction to the Condominium: thus the first two chapters deal with the pre-Condominium period. The third chapter investigates the interaction of Sudanese institutional leadership with the Condominium administration, and speculates as to the motives of Sudanese collaboration.

Auteur: Martin W. Daly

Titre de Thèse: Le réponse islamique au colonialisme:
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Cette thèse tente de décrire la réaction de certains
groupes du Soudan septentrional à l'imposition du gouvernement
colonial pendant les deux premières décennies du régime
anglo-egyptien. La nature du matériel de base de cette étude
nécessite sa limitation à un examen de la collaboration
soudano- britannique telle qu'aperçue à travers le biais de
la politique britannique et la réaction soudanaise à celle-ci.
Nous prétendons que l'expérience pré-coloniale soudanaise
était un facteur important déterminant la réaction soudanaise
au nouveau régime; ainsi, les deux premiers chapitres traitent
de la période pré-coloniale. Le troisième chapitre examine
l'interaction entre la classe dirigeante soudanaise et l'ad-
ministration coloniale et discute de la motivation de la
collaboration soudanaise.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

TRANSLITERATION

The transliteration of Arabic words in the thesis has been modelled after that employed by P.M. Holt in _The Mahdist State In The Sudan_, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1958. Thus, certain words used commonly in English have been left in their conventional forms (Khartoum, Kordofan, _etc._). Personal names appear in classical form (e.g. ꜥUthmān rather than Osmān, _etc._).

INTRODUCTION

A central problem in colonial history has been the nature of the indigenous response to the imposition of colonial rule. The questions of why one society defiantly resisted that imposition and why another collaborated have yet to be answered satisfactorily for all the peoples involved. Despite the opinions of many Africanists, no valid generalization can be made of the qualitative differences and effects of resistance and collaboration. Thus, the sweeping judgement that resistance movements were "romantic, reactionary struggles against the facts"[1] has been successfully challenged in individual case studies.[2] Similarly, the view that collaboration was the certain method of adapting traditional institutions to changed political circumstances is also unacceptable in certain instances.[3] Illustrative of both these points is the situation in the northern Sudan in the first two decades of Condominium rule.

At the outset a working definition of collaboration must be formulated. It is especially important that the idea of collaboration as treachery, a cynical act of self-interest denying the

higher good of one's nation, be discarded. Such a concept is appropriate in dealing, for instance, with the collaborators of World War II. In the early colonial context of the Sudan, however, where the idea of nationhood did not exist, and where the higher good was tribe or religious brotherhood, collaboration clearly had a different meaning. Sudanese nationalism as such was not articulated as a concept before the 1920s, and then only in a form heavily reliant on "Arabness" and Islam. In this study, therefore, collaboration will refer simply to the cooperation of a group or group leader and the government, in order to carry out government policy, but motivated by the interests of the group involved. Thus we cannot speak of collaboration as betrayal of the "national" interest in aid of an enemy. Indeed, it might be more helpful to think of collaboration as it was conceived by those involved, that is, as a tactical alliance.

The periodization, chosen for the paper allows the consideration of a definite phase of Sudanese history, from the inception of Condominium rule until the end of World War I, when changed circumstances in the Sudan began to alter the relationships between the Government and important political groupings. But the student of this period of Sudanese history soon recognizes that the response of the Sudanese to the imposition of colonial rule was conditioned by the experience of the eighty years before it, as were the policies formulated by the British administrators. Sudanese collaboration with the Condominium can-

not be understood without reference to the responses of tribes
and tariqas to the Turco-Egyptian regime, which held power from
1821 until 1885, and their situations during the Mahdia (1881-
1899).The British perception of these responses is equally im-
portant. The Sudanese had known colonial rule long before the
Anglo-Egyptian conquest of 1896-1899. Indeed, the central point
of this thesis is the continuity of modern Sudanese history
and the continuity of collaboration as a relationship between
ruler and ruled. A large part of the thesis therefore deals with
the Turco-Egyptian and Mahdist periods.

In chapter one we will describe the reactions of religious
and tribal leadership to Muhammad CAlī's conquest; the most im-
portant changes effected by the sixty years of Turco-Egyptian
rule; and the emergence, in 1881, of Muhammad Ahmad al-Mahdi,
the agent of the government's downfall.

Chapter two deals with the Mahdist period. Emphasis is
placed on the nature of Mahdist authority, since to gauge the
quality of collaboration with the Condominium and the methods
used by the Government to rule effectively it is essential
to determine whether or not the Mahdia was a "nationalistic"
movement. The state-system of the Mahdi's successor, the Khalifa
CAbdallāhi, is discussed, and the responses of various Sudanese
interest groups to that centralized regime are touched upon.
Finally, there is a discussion of the influences of the Mahdist

experience on subsequent collaboration with the British.

The third chapter deals with collaboration in the first
two decades of Condominium rule. We undertake to point out the
cases in which collaboration was successful (the religious
brotherhoods), and in which it failed (the ^{c}ulamā' and tradi-
tional tribal leadership). Attention is necessarily focussed on
the British view of the factors involved in successful collabo-
ration and on the actual positions taken by the Sudanese interest
groups. More than this, that is, a determination of the under-
lying motives of collaboration based on the structure and tradi-
tional interests of these groups cannot now be achieved. The
serious limitations of the available sources preclude any such
definitive statement. This paper is, therefore, designed to ex-
plain the interaction of the British administration with Sudanese
institutional leadership. It will not involve an attempt to
discern inherent institutional qualities that may have affected
or caused a particular response.

Sources

The present study is necessarily confined and hampered by
the paucity of sources for important areas of Sudanese studies.
Not only has there been no work done on the matter of collabo-
ration itself, but very little has been attempted on the subjects

of Sudanese tribal and religious organization. The conclusions reached in this paper are therefore tentative, and have been based on the little that can be gleaned from general histories and the very few studies of particular Sudanese institutions.

For the Turco-Egyptian period I have relied primarily on Richard Hill's Egypt In The Sudan 1820-1881 (London, Oxford University Press, 1959), the best of the small number of studies on that period. Despite its value it is, however, limited to political history and deals only superficially with tribal and religious organization. H.A. Macmichael's two important works, The Tribes of Northern and Central Kordofan (Cambridge, University Press, 1912), and A History of the Arabs In The Sudan (2 vols., Cambridge, University Press, 1922) are, despite their titles, unfortunately sketchy on the recent histories of the tribes and their leadership. J.L. Burckhardt's venerable Travels in Nubia (London, John Murray, 1819) and Sir Samuel Baker's The Nile Tributaries and the Sword Hunters of the Hamran Arabs (London, Macmillan, 1871) have been of some use, the more so because there is little else written on the matters they investigated. Several studies of individual tribes have been helpful, notably D.C. Cumming's "The History of Kassala And The Province of Taka" (Sudan Notes and Records (SNR), XX, 1, 1937, pp. 1-45; XXIII, 1, 1940, pp. 1-54; XXIII, 2, 1940, pp. 225-269); G.D. Lampen's "The Baqqara Tribes of Darfur" (SNR, XVI, 2, 1933, pp.

97-118); T.R.H. Owen's "The Hadendowa" (SNR, XX, 2, 1937, pp. 183-208); and Talal Asad's "A Note On The History of the Kababish Tribe" (SNR, XLVII, 1966, pp. 79-87).

All of these works, with the exceptions of Burckhardt's and Macmichael's, deal with political and military history. A further problem has been the lack of even brief studies on a number of important tribes. Because of the haphazard collection of tribal histories, the student is given an erroneous impression not only of the nature and mechanics of tribal organization but also of which tribes had significant roles in the history of the period.

The area of religious organization, both of popular Islam and of the ᶜulamā' is likewise flawed by a lack of detailed studies. This is not to say that general works have ignored this all-important subject. Rather, the spade-work of analyzing the organization and economic and social bases of the individual ṭarīqas has simply not been done. While some such work may have escaped my notice, I have in any case seen no critical study of a Sudanese ṭarīqa. I have therefore had to rely on J.S. Trimingham's Islam In The Sudan (London and New York, Oxford University Press, 1949) which, because of the author's clear biases and the lack of any other general work, is a source of only limited value. P.M. Holt's A Modern History of the Sudan (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1961) contains a painfully brief overview of

the subject (pp. 28-32). Two monographic studies by Holt, <u>Holy Families And Islam In The Sudan</u> (Princeton, <u>Princeton Near East Papers</u> No. 4, 1967), and "The Sons of Jabir and Their Kin: A Clan of Sudanese Religious Notables" (<u>Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies</u>, XXX, 1, 1967, pp. 142-157) are very informative and tantalize the reader with the promise of what might result from more such undertakings. Both of these studies rely on the <u>magnum opus</u> of Sudanese biographical literature, the <u>Tabaqat wad Dayfallah</u>, of which the first critical edition, by Yusuf Fadl Hasan, was published only in 1971 (Khartoum, University Press). C.A. Willis's "Religious Confraternities In The Sudan" (<u>SNR</u>, IV, 4, 1921, pp. 175-194) remains useful, despite its sketchiness. On the organization of the ^culamā' under the Turco-Egyptian regime, Trimingham's book (<u>op. cit.</u>) is again the only one dealing at any length with the subject.

Thus, for religious organization as well as for tribal structure and history, the available information is such that its use in determining the background of various Sudanese responses to the Condominium is inevitably hazardous. Both of these areas are also only superficially treated by historians of the Mahdist period. While there now exists one truly great work on the Mahdia, Holt's <u>The Mahdist State in the Sudan</u> (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1958), even it is mostly concerned with administrative history and state organization: there is little information on the history of the <u>tariqas</u> during the period, and tribal

data are also limited. Three contemporary sources for the Mahdia
which until recently were widely used, have been exposed by Holt
in "The Source Materials of the Sudanese Mahdia" (London, St.
Antony's Papers, No. 4: Middle Eastern Affairs, No. 1, Chatto and
Windus, 1958) as essentially works of propaganda emanating from
Wingate, the head of the Egyptian Army's Intelligence Depart-
ment. Those are Wingate's own Mahdiism and the Egyptian Sudan
(London, 2nd ed., Frank Cass, 1968); Father Joseph Ohrwalder's
Ten Years Captivity In The Mahdi's Camp 1882-1892 (London, Samp-
son Low, Marston and Co., 1892) which was published under Win-
gate's name; and Rudolf von Slatin's Fire and Sword in the Sudan
(London, E. Arnold, 1896) which Wingate edited. All of these
works were designed to sway public opinion in Britain toward
accepting the reconquest of the Sudan. Everyday life in the
Sudan during the Mahdist period has yet to be studied in detail.

There has been no shortage of works on the period of the
reconquest. Mekki Shibeika's British Policy In The Sudan 1882-
1902 (London, Oxford University Press, 1952) remains indispen-
sable; it and G.N. Sanderson's England, Europe and the Upper
Nile 1882-1899 (Edinburgh, University Press, 1965), and R. Ro-
binson's and J. Gallagher's Africa and the Victorians (London,
Macmillan, 1965) have provided the necessary diplomatic back-
ground.

Perhaps surprisingly, the early Condominium period itself
has yet to be adequately treated in a critical historical study.
G. Warburg's The Sudan Under Wingate Administration In The Anglo-
Egyptian Sudan 1899-1916 (London, Frank Cass, 1971), however, is
an excellent analysis of British policy in this crucial initial
period. The Reports By His Majesty's Agent And Consul-General
On The Finances, Administration, And Condition of Egypt And The
Soudan (1899-1920) are an important source, but it must be re-
membered that these were heavily edited and designed for public
consumption. Holt's A Modern History (op. cit.) provides an ex-
cellent concise view of Condominium administration.

The same lacunae that hinder the study of the Turco-Egyp-
tian and Mahdist periods exist for the Condominium period. There
is no history of "official" Islam for the era; as was noted
above, there is no critical study of any tarīqa; and the inter-
nal organization, nature, and membership of the Anṣār (the Mahdist
following) has yet to be treated. Because the Khatmīya tarīqa
emerged as the most important order under Condominium, and be-
cause there is rather more information available regarding it, it
will be one of our chief examples in this study. Demographic
data simply do not exist: the first scientific census of the
Sudan occurred only in 1956. There is therefore no way of ascer-
taining tribal or urban populations with any degree of precision.

The implications to the present study of these serious gaps are two-fold: first, the extent of our conclusions on the motivations of Sudanese collaboration are severely limited; second, and perhaps more important, the general information available to us is of a greater extent than was available to the British administrators themselves. This may well help to explain the problems the British faced and the misconceptions that are evident in their formulation of policy regarding the ṭarīqas, Anṣār, ᶜulamā', and tribes.

NOTES

1

  Ronald E. Robinson and John Gallagher, "The partition of Africa",
      The New Cambridge Modern History, Vol.XI, Material Progress
      and World-Wide Problems, 1870-1898, F.H. Hinsley (ed.),
      Cambridge, University Press, 1962, p. 640.

2

  See, for example, T.O. Ranger, "African Reactions To the Im-
      position of Colonial Rule In East and Central Africa",
      Colonialism In Africa 1870-1960, Vol. I, The History And
      Politics of Colonialism 1870-1914, L.H. Gann and Peter
      Duignan (eds.), Cambridge, University Press, 1969, pp.
      293-324.

3

  See, for example, Roland Oliver and J.D. Fage, A Short History
      of Africa, 2nd. ed., Harmondsworth, England, Penguin
      Books, 1966, p. 203.

Chapter 1

THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN PERIOD: (1821-1881)

1. The Turco-Egyptian Conquest; Early Resistance And Collaboration.

The modern state of the Sudan[1] covers an area of almost
one million square miles, and may be divided into four prin-
cipal geographic regions: the northern deserts, stretching from
the Egyptian frontier to Khartoum; the central plain, extending
westward through Kordofan and Darfur; the Red Sea Hills area; and
the forests and sadd of the south.[2] The Nile dominates the coun-
try, both as the chief source of irrigation and, historically, as
the primary road of transport and communication. The area con-
cerning us in this study is that contained by the modern provin-
ces of Kassala, Khartoum, Darfur, Kordofan, Blue Nile, and the
Northern Province.[3]

The northern Sudan is inhabited largely by Arabic speakers,
almost all of whom claim Arab descent and profess Islam. The
islamization of the north was a long and gradual process begun
by the infiltration of nomadic Arab tribes in the late 9th cen-
tury A.D.[4] But as Holt indicates, "the true islamization of the
region was the work of ... individual teachers, who came from,
or had studied in, the older lands of Islam ...".[5] Many of these
fakīs[6], who began to appear in the Sudan as early as the late
14th century A.D., came from the Ḥijāz, or were Sudanese who had
studied in Mecca or Medina. When these holy men came or returned
to the Sudan they became important instruments of islamization
through active proselytizing.[7]

The principal innovations resulting from these relations between the Ḥijāz and the Sudan were the introduction of the religious orders (ṭarīqas) and of the related practice of venerating saints.[8] The fakīs became not only spiritually influential but politically prominent as well, as intermediaries between the people and the rulers, and as advisors to the authorities during the period of the Funj Sultanate.[9]

The influence of the ṭarīqas was felt in two main waves, the first in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when the Shādhilīya and the Qādirīya were introduced[10], the second in the early nineteenth century, during a period of revivalism in many areas of the Islamic world.[11] Among the important figures of the period was Sayyid Aḥmad b. Idrīs al-Fāsī (d. 1837), whose teachings influenced the founder of the Majdhūbīya, Muḥammad al-Majdhūb al-Suqhayr (1796-1832), and the founder of the Khatmīya, Muḥammad ʿUthmān al-Mīrghanī (1793-1853).[12] By the time of the Turco-Egyptian conquest, these and other orders were achieving important political status. The absence of a centralized hierarchy of ʿulamāʾ, combined with the tribal organization of the northern Sudan, resulted in the development of Sudanese Islam in distinctly local forms, further enhancing the importance of the individual fakī. Because the orders themselves were usually only loosely organized above the local level, the ṣūfī shaykh was regarded as an ultimate religious authority.

A few general remarks concerning popular Islam are neces-
sary. The veneration of saints is based on the belief that God
shows his favor (karāma) to certain individuals in two ways: by
their possession of esoteric knowledge and their ability to per-
form miracles. This ability, in turn, depends upon the relative
strength of the individual's baraka, or divine grace.[13] Miracu-
lous traits include the powers of healing; clairvoyance and
metamorphosis of self and others; power over the elements (levi-
tation, etc.); and restoring the dead.[14] Significantly, baraka
is hereditary. Thus, the descendants of saints tend to become
saints.[15] A saint is considered more powerful after his death
than before (when properly, he is not referred to as a saint),
because if his miraculous abilities continue to be evident from
the grave he has proven his worth. The Sudan is dotted with the
tombs of saints, which are the objects of pilgrimages by the
faithful, who believe that contact with the shrines is benefi-
cial.[16]

A ṭarīqa, or ṣūfī brotherhood, often grew up around one
of these saintly persons. Because baraka is hereditary, the head-
ship of the brotherhood almost always falls to a descendant of
the founder. The shaykh, who usually lives near the founder's
tomb, appoints khalīfas (deputies) over regional areas.[17] This
practice has often resulted in the appearance of a new ṭarīqa,
as the disciples of a khalīfa have recognized the efficacy of
his own baraka. Thus, the Ismāᶜīlīya order is an offshoot of the

Khatmīya, the Sammānīya of the Khalwatīya, etc. All of the
tarīqas claim that they are orthodox, and that the Sharīᶜa is
at the beginning of the ṣūfī path. There are many orders in the
Sudan[18], but until this century none was prominent over the en-
tire country. Rather, each was important in a local area. This
often led to rivalries between tarīqas, such as that between the
Khatmīya and the Majdūbīya to which we shall refer throughout
this study. (As was mentioned above, the source materials availa-
ble for detailed study of any order, which would be helpful in
determining an internal propensity to resistance or collabora-
tion, have yet to be explored.)

Political organization was similarly fragmented. There was,
of course, no conception of a Sudanese people; rather, except
for confessional and ethnic identities, the tribal unit was both
the smallest and largest practicable political organization. Be-
cause of this the ṣūfī leaders gained even more authority, as
only they could attract extra-tribal loyalty. More often, how-
ever, a tribe would become associated with one order (such as
the Jaᶜliyīn tribe and the Majdhūbīya)[19], thus further strengthen-
ing inter-tribal and inter-tarīqa rivalries.

The motives for Muḥammad ^{C}Alī's conquest of the Sudan are clear. The political fragmentation of the area provided the opportunity for an easy takeover,[20] and control of the Sudan would allow unhindered access to the southern, non-Islamic territories for procuring the slaves Egypt required for agriculture, industry, and the army.[21] That this was the most important single factor in the decision to invade the Sudan was admitted by Muḥammad ^{C}Alī in a communication to the Commander-in-Chief of the Sudan (the sār-i ^{C}askār) dated 23 September 1823:

> You are aware that the end of all our efforts
> and this expense is to procure negroes. Please
> show zeal ... in this capital matter.[22]

The old idea that the Sudan was an El Dorado may well have been a factor in firing the Viceroy's imagination.[23] Another reason for the expedition was Muḥammad ^{C}Alī's desire to destroy once and for all the threat posed by the surviving Mamlūks, who had set up a "bandit State" near Dongola.[24] Completing the catalogue of Egyptian motives was the desire to control the Red Sea, and the prestige to be won by so extensive a territorial acquisition.[25]

The Turco-Egyptian conquest of the northern Sudan was accomplished under the direction of Ismā^{C}īl Pasha, the Viceroy's son, in 1820-1821. Resistance was most fierce among the Shāiqīya tribe; the Ja^{C}līyīn and other sedentary tribes offered little opposition.[26] It was only after the promulgation of a confiscatory tax levy[27] that large-scale resistance was threatened. In October or November of 1822, Ismā^{C}īl Pasha was assas-

sinated by Ja^{c}li tribesmen at Shandī.[28] The Ja^{c}liyīn rose in revolt as did other riverain tribes including the Abdallab and the Danāqla. The ensuing campaign of Muhammad Bey Khusraw, the defterdār, was brutal and decisive. Massacres of Sudanese occurred, and large-scale tribal migrations were undertaken. The mosque of Muhammad al-Majdhūb at El Damer was burned.[29] The tribal balance was shifted: the Rufā^{c}a tribe declined as the Shukrīya took over their lands without government intervention; the lands of the Abdallab around Halfāyat al-Muluk were confiscated and parcelled out to the Shāiqīya, who had entered into the government cavalry after their initial resistance[30], and had remained loyal during the revolt; the Ja^{c}liyīn were especially hard-hit, and their lands were given also to the Shāiqīya.[31]

The history of this brief and disastrous revolt, and, indeed, of the entire Turco-Egyptian regime shows that effective resistance was rendered impossible not simply by the superiority of foreign arms, but by the depth of Sudanese tribal divisions. The Shāiqīya, for instance, initially offered strenuous opposition to the conquerors, but in defeat recognized the benefits of loyalty to the new regime. After generations of a tense balance of tribal power, the opportunity to avenge past wrongs and to gain at the expense of rival tribes was clear, and the method -- cooperation with the new rulers -- was evident. The Shāiqīya theselves were to suffer from the bargain. They had been rewarded for their loyalty with tax concessions and land grants[32], but

Aḥmad Pasha Abū Widān, Governor-General from 1838 to 1843[33], determined to rescind these concessions, with the result that Hamad wad al-Mak, a Shāīqī leader, proceeded to migrate to Abyssinia with his followers. His intentions were duly relayed to the Governor-General by Aḥmad ᶜAwaḍ al-Karīm abū Sinn[34], the Shukrī leader. Eventually an amnesty was granted whereby Hamad returned to his lands but the tax concessions were forfeited.[35] Six months later Hamad was banished to Dongola where he died.[36]

This episode is illustrative of several features of Turco-Egyptian relations with the tribes. First, government favoritism was predicated on the circumstances of a limited situation, and if the government was in a position to cancel concessions or exact more tribute, past loyalty would be discounted. The incident indicates also the effective government exploitation of the tribal system, and of its reliance on individuals as agents, in a society in which the tribal unit was effectively still the largest common denominator and in which tribal leadership was its most important element.

There are numerous other examples of tribes which benefitted from their cooperation with the administration. The ᶜAbābda, who had provided camel transport for the invading Turco-Egyptian armies, were given a monopoly of state transport across the Nubian Desert, as were the Kabābīsh of the routes from the western Sudan to the Nile.[37]

Although these and other tribes capitalized on the opportunities presented by Turco-Egyptian rule to strike against old rivals and to enhance their positions, they never fully favored the alien administration. The relationship of tribal notables with the government was of basic importance. Therefore

> ...the Viceroy (Muhammad [C]Ali) began the practice, continued by his successors, of inviting Sudanese notables to visit him in Egypt. In 1827-8 the malik Kanbal Shawish, the famous commander of the Sha'iqiya irregulars, went to Cairo and saw for himself the splendour of the Viceroy's court. Shaikh Muhammad of the Bishariyin, and Sultan Muhammad Tima al-Kurdufani, a shaikh al-mashayikh, followed him. In 1845 the old Viceroy welcomed two of the most senior shaikhs of the whole Sudan, al-Ardab Muhammad Dafa[C] Allah wad Ahmad and [C]Abd al Qadir wad al-Zain.[38]

Of course, the tribal leaders had very little choice. Barring unified resistance they could cooperate or be deposed. Of the situation in Kassala in 1865 it was written that

> The majority of the sheikhs have a vested interest in conserving the Egyptian regime. They have fixed salaries from the government which are collected at the same time as the ordinary taxes and none of them want to risk a sure position for a state of disorder which might have unpredictable consequences. But in spite of that they are not content. Everyone is tired of the Egyptians, but no one knows by whom to replace them ....The sheikhs want a government strong enough to maintain them vis-a-vis their rivals and their subjects but weak enough to need their support.[39]

2. The Turco-Egyptian Administration And Its Effects.

During the Turco-Egyptian period there were no fewer than twenty-five governors and governors-general at Khartoum.[40] Despite the ebbs and flows of the governorate-general and the similar lack of consistency and continuity at the provincial level, considerable social and economic changes were brought about through the administration's policies.[41] In communications, trade, taxation policy, and religious policy the Turco-Egyptian regime greatly altered the Sudan's traditional society.

With the development of a relatively strong central administration[42] came the exploitation of the Sudan both for tax revenues and for the slave trade. Taxation was erratic, often unjust and burdensome, and always a source of discontent, especially among those tribes which before the conquest had been virtually independent. Extraordinary taxes[43], levied at irregular intervals, were an especial cause for grievance. Taxation was a major factor in the early support of the Mahdi, especially by the Baqqāra, who had only recently been subdued when the Mahdi's revolt began.

The centralization of the administration and the increased commercial activity resulting from its stability stimulated the growth of towns. Commerce was mainly in ivory and slaves. By mid-century slavery was a vital factor in the Sudanese economy.

The trade in slaves, and commerce in general, had motivated the movement of northern riverain tribesmen, the so-called tribesmen "of the dispersion", to the south and west.

The commercial boom was related to an improvement in internal communications, the chief ingredients of which were the steamship and the telegraph.[44] The steamship allowed, notwithstanding the difficulties of Nile navigation, a fast method of shipping goods and of transporting troops, and penetration of areas almost inaccessible before. The telegraph allowed rapid communication with Cairo and more reliable intelligence of Sudanese events. Together these innovations, and the presence of a standing army, were major factors in centralizing administration.[45]

The most significant effect of the Turco-Egyptian regime, after the economic, was religious. The status of the fakīs, who, as has been noted, were religiously preeminent and politically powerful before the conquest, declined because of government policies, one of which was the introduction of a hierarchy of culamā'. Although the Sharīᶜa had played only a minor role in the Sudan[46], these culamā' were given, at least initially, important powers.[47]

> ...the traditional Islam of the Sudan suffered
> two severe blows. Although the new regime on the
> whole maintained friendly relations with the fakis
> and subsidized them (as previous rulers had done),
> it diminished their prestige, created and main-

> tained a formal hiearchy of qadis, muftis
> and other cult officials, and facilitated
> the education of Sudanese ^culama' at al-Azhar.
> Thus the traditional and indigenous Muslim
> leadership was confronted with a rival group,
> more orthodox and alien in its outlook, and more
> directly dependent on the government.[48]

The fakīs remained, however, the focal point of Sudanese Islam, a fact they recognized and exploited in certain cases, and which the government itself used to its advantage. The most notable example of collaboration involving a ṣūfī ṭarīqa is that of the Khatmīya.[49] One incident is especially illustrative: in October of 1864, Sudanese soldiers at Kassala mutinied, and because of his great prestige Sayyid al-Ḥasan al-Mīrghanī was asked by the harried government to intervene. He successfully quelled the dissidents, but another disturbance soon broke out, and as the rebels were about to storm the government munitions stores, a khalīfa of Sayyid al-Ḥasan arrived. He promised the order's assistance in negotiating with the government, and the men disarmed. After the government regained control, however, some two hundred and forty officers and men were executed and buried in graves they had literally dug for themselves. For his efforts, Sayyid al-Ḥasan received a government pension.[50] Munziger, the diplomat, left this impression:

> As for Sayed el Hassan it is difficult to give an
> idea of his real power. A word from him would suf-
> fice to unite all these discordant elements against
> the Egyptians; the Arabs know him alone. The Egyp-
> tians, who sought his help in their hour of danger,
> almost fear him because they know he has small li-
> king for them. They are wrong for Sayed el Hassan

> is too intelligent to change the moral and constant
> power that he now enjoys, for the temporal and
> ephemeral power that was his for the taking....
> It is to be hoped that ... there will always be
> these prophets, venerated and feared, who when
> governments totter in the throes of revolution,
> are there to throw themselves between the com-
> batants, to quieten for the salvation of society
> the passions and hate that are let loose.[51]

This statement is remarkable both for its indication of the
power of ṣūfī shaykhs in the Sudan and for its prophetic irony,
as the same type of moral authority exploited by the government
in this case would inspire its downfall in the Mahdist revolt.

Thus the history of the Turco-Egyptian regime is, in at
least one aspect, the record of how indigenous Sudanese insti-
tutions coped with alien rule. While the government was often
corrupt and short-sighted, it was always demanding, and, as was
to be the case also of the Condominium period, a basic decision
was forced on tribal and religious leadership. Those who con-
tinued to resist were destroyed, those who cooperated often suc-
ceeded in obtaining concessions and enhancing their positions.

3. The Rise of The Mahdi.

Whereas some groups benefitted from their collaboration
(the Khatmīya, the Shāiqīya, et al), the changes in Sudanese
life wrought by the government alienated large segments of the
population at a time when the government's ability to defend it-
self was sharply weakened.[52] Thus the Mahdist revolt may be seen
as a reaction to Turco-Egyptian innovations. Each element of the
Mahdi's supporters had grievances against the regime, and
Muḥammad Aḥmad provided the charismatic leadership around which
tentative unity could at last be achieved. Without debating the
sincerity of the Mahdi's motives, which, in any case, would be
unproductive, it is clear that without considerable material in-
centives the revolt could never have achieved success. These
have already been touched upon, but should be somewhat elabo-
rated.

It is evident that one factor in the spread of the Mahdi's
revolt was the tension between the indigenous religious element
and the government sponsored culamā'. Muḥammad Aḥmad himself
came from a family closely associated with the former group[53],
beginning his religious career in the Sammānīya ṭarīqa.[54] There
was, among his early followers, a sincere belief that the govern-
ment was not founded upon the principles of Islam and was there-
fore unworthy of support.

In the eastern Sudan another type of inter-religious ri-
valry was significant in the early Mahdia. As the Khatmīya had
a history of association with the government, so did the Majdū-
bīya have a tradition of resistance. That ṭarīqa had opposed
the invaders in the twenties, and, as was noted, the founder's
mosque had been destroyed during the defterdār's campaign. Fur-
thermore, a certain ᶜAlī Diqna, an uncle of ᶜUthmān Diqna, the
great Mahdist amīr, had been a khalīfa of Muḥammad al-Majdhūb.[55]
"At the Mahdia the two groups (Mīrghanī/Khatmīya and Majdhūb/
Majdhūbīya) polarized"[56], the former remaining loyal to the
government, the latter welcoming ᶜUthmān Diqna and supporting
the Mahdi. While this particular response by no means illustrates
the reaction of all the ṣūfī ṭarīqas to the revolt, it does in-
dicate yet another of the factors involved in the decision of
whether to support or deny the Mahdi, as well as the serious
disunity still prevalent in Sudanese society.

A second group of supporters consisted of the awlād al-
balad (the riverain sedentaries), whose principal grievance was
the government's increasing pressure to end the slave trade. The
importance of that commerce and the bitterness caused by attempts
to discontinue it are indicated by Shoucair:

> ...the slave trade was a long-established activity
> in the Sudan, practiced by a very large number of
> people, including those with most power and pres-
> tige. And the owning and selling of slaves is not
> forbidden by the religious law of its inhabitants,
> who do not see in it a wrong that should be sup-
> pressed but rather think that its suppression is

> itself wrong.... But the government persisted
> in attempting to suppress slavery forcibly,
> especially during the governorships of Sir
> Samuel Baker and Colonel Gordon.... And the
> interference of Baker, Gordon, Gessi, Giegler,
> and other Christians in the suppression of
> slavery was regarded by the common, ignorant
> people as an attack by Christians on their faith.[57]

Religious and economic motives were thus mixed in this case. The
fact that Christians did, however, occupy high positions with
increasing frequency is undeniable, and was certainly a cause
of dissatisfaction.[58]

The third major group of supporters were the great masses
of Baqqāra tribesmen. During the decade preceding the Mahdi's
rise the Baqqāra had come into closer contact with the govern-
ment as the result of the conquest of Darfur.[59] Their interests
in the Mahdi's revolt were typical of nomadic societies: to lift
the government yoke that forced them to pay taxes and which
otherwise restricted their activities.

Just as the positions of the tribes and _sūfī_ orders under
the Turco-Egyptian regime were in large part determined by
short-term interests and ancient rivalries, so were the respon-
ses of these groups to the Mahdia predicated on similar consi-
derations. The Mahdia was no more nationalistic in motivation
than the revolt of 1822-23, or than the repeated uprisings in
the early Condominium period. It is with this in mind that the
reaction of the Sudanese to the Turco-Egyptian regime should be

seen. The premise holds true of popular response to the Mahdist regime as well, and will be discussed with reference to it in the following chapter.

NOTES

1

The word "Sudan" did not refer to a clearly defineable area
before this century. The name is contracted from "Bilad
al-Sudan" or "land of the blacks", and was not used in
reference to those territories comprising the modern
state until 1866. Even then the "Sudan" was an area ex-
tending as far south as the Great Lakes. The word began to
take on its modern meaning only with the advent of the
Condominium. (See Muddathir Abdel Rahim, "Arabism, Af-
ricanism, And Self-Identification In The Sudan", The
Southern Sudan The Problem of National Integration,
Dunstan M. Wai (ed.), London, Frank Cass, 1973, p. 33.

2

See K.M. Barbour, The Republic Of The Sudan A Regional Geo-
graphy, London, University of London Press, 1961, pp.
128-130; See also J.H.G. Lebon, "Sudan Republic of the",
Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1970, Vol. 21, p. 353; and
Stephen H. Longrigg, The Middle East A Social Geography,
2nd ed., Chicago, Aldine, 1970, pp. 148-149.

3

See maps in P.M. Holt, A Modern History of the Sudan, London,
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1961, pp. 209, 211. In Turco-
Egyptian times this area constituted the provinces of
Dongola (conquered in 1820), Berber (1821), Khartoum
(1821), Sennar (1821), Kordofan (1821), Taka (1840),
Suakin (as of 1865), and Darfur (1874). The provincial
designations will henceforward be those of the period
under discussion.

4

Ibid., pp. 16-17.

5

Ibid., p. 28; See also J.S. Trimingham, Islam In The Sudan,
London, Oxford University Press, 1949, pp. 75-80, 98-104.

6

P.M. Holt, in Holy Families And Islam In The Sudan, Princeton
Near East Papers, No. 4, 1967, p. 4 writes that "the dis-
tinction between the two roles (of religious teacher and
sufi leader) is not always easy to draw in Sudanese Islam....
The colloquial term for a teacher, whether of religion or
Sufism, is faki, a dialect-form of faqih, meaning in stan-
dard Arabic, a jurist. For its plural, however, faki takes
fugara; i.e. fugara', which has the standard meaning of...
members of sufi orders. Again, the colloquial term for a

Qur'anic school is khalwa, meaning in standard Arabic
a Sufi retreat." Holt also contends that in fact as well
as linguistic designation it is often difficult to dif-
ferentiate the two roles. (See A Modern History, p. 30.)

7
Trimingham, Islam, pp. 195-196.

8
Ibid., p. 195.

9
Ibid., pp. 196-198.
    See also Holt, A Modern History, pp. 30-31; H.A. Mac-
    michael, A History of the Arabs In The Sudan, Cambridge,
    University Press, 1922, Vol. 2, pp. 217-272, contains, in
    selections from the Tabaqat wad Dayfallah, some evidence
    of the material wealth and political power of fakis. In
    this regard see also P.M. Holt, "The Sons of Jabir and
    Their Kin: A Clan of Sudanese Religious Notables", Bulletin
    of the School of Oriental and African Studies, XXX, I, 1967,
    pp. 142-157; and Holy Families, pp. 5-6.
        The origins of the Funj Sultanate are obscure. Its
    rule began in 1504-05 A.D. with the founding of its capital
    at Sennar. The Sultanate finally collapsed in 1821 in the
    face of Muḥammad ᶜAli's invasion. See Holt, A Modern His-
    tory, pp. 18-23; and, by the same author, "Funj origins:
    a critique and new evidence", Journal of African History,
    4, 1963, pp. 39-55.

10
Trimingham, Islam, p. 196. The Shādhilīya was founded in
    the thirteenth century, the Qādiriya in the twelfth.
    For details on each see Ibid., pp. 217-224.

11
Ibid., pp. 198-201; See also Holt, A Modern History, pp. 31-
    32; and W.C. Smith, Islam In Modern History, New York,
    Mentor, The New American Library, n.d.

12
Trimingham, Islam, p. 199. Aḥmad b. Idrīs al-Fāsī was a
    Moroccan mystic who lived most of his life in Arabia.
    He was the founder of the Idrīsiya order. Muḥammad ᶜUthmān
    al-Mīrghanī was born at al-Ṭā'if in Arabia and was educated
    at Mecca. He came to the Sudan in 1817. (See Richard Hill,
    A Biographical Dictionary Of The Sudan, 2nd ed., London,
    Frank Cass, 1967, p. 278.

13
Trimingham, Islam, p. 135.

Baraka has been defined as "beneficial force, of divine origin, which causes superabundance in the physical sphere and prosperity and happiness in the psychic order".(G.S. Colin, "Baraka", *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., Vol.I, p. 1032.)

14
Trimingham, *Islam*, pp. 136-138.

15
Ibid., p. 131.

16
Ibid., p. 145.

17
Ibid., pp. 202-203.

18
See *Ibid.*, pp.217-239 for descriptions of the most important orders.

19
Ibid., p. 226.

20
The decadent Funj Sultanate had been moribund for many years before the Turco-Egyptian invasion. Its last forty years were punctuated by "petty wars and all the symptoms of political instability". (Holt, *A Modern History*, p. 22.) See also Richard Hill, *Egypt In The Sudan 1820-1881*, London, Oxford University Press, 1959, p. 7.

21
The shortage of slaves had been aggravated by the instabilty of the Sudanese political situation which had disrupted trade generally. (Holt, *A Modern History*, p. 36.)

22
Hill, *Egypt*, pp. 13, 13n. While Hill gives this date, and states that the letter was to the *sar-i ᶜaskār*, Holt (*A Modern History*, p. 33) gives the date as 23 September 1825, and states that it was addressed to the *defterdar* (the keeper of the lands registrar). Holt's data are probably erroneous, since the Viceroy's command would more logically be directed to the *sar-i ᶜaskār* than to the *defterdar*.

23
Hill, *Egypt*, p. 7. The expectation that vast wealth was to be found In the Sudan survived even into the Condominium period. The Sudan Territories Exploration Syndicate was formed in 1901 and employed Rudolf von Slatin, whose prospecting tour was a total failure. (Richard Hill, *Slatin*

Pasha, London, Oxford University Press, 1965, pp. 63-66.

24
Hill, Egypt, pp. 7-8; Holt, A Modern History, pp. 35-36. Holt considers this a most important motive for the conquest, indicating that there was a continuing concern, since 1811, with the possibility of renewed hostilities with the refugee Mamluks.

25
Hill, Egypt, p. 8.

26
A leader of the Ja^cliyin, Mak Nimr of Shandī, had given refuge to the surviving Mamluks after the invaders had taken the Mamluk stronghold of New Dongola. (Holt, A Modern History, pp. 36, 38-40.)

27
Holt, A Modern History, p. 43. Holt states that "Confiscation rather than revenue was indeed probably the real intent".

28
Ibid., p. 44.

29
Hill, Egypt, p. 17.

30
Ibid., pp. 17-18.

31
Holt, A Modern History, pp. 44-46, 50.

32
Ibid., p. 50; Hill, Egypt, pp. 17-18.

33
Richard Hill, "Rulers of the Sudan", SNR, XXXII, 1951, p. 86; Hill, A Biographical Dictionary, pp. 41-42.

34
Aḥmad ^cAwaḍ al-Karīm abū Sinn was appointed shaykh, then bey, and was governor of Khartoum (1860-1870). He was entertained by the Khedive Ismā^cīl in Cairo, and died there in 1870. (Hill, A Biographical Dictionary, p. 30.) A contemporary estimation of this famous tribal leader is to be found in Sir Samuel Baker's The Nile Tributaries and the Sword Hunters of the Hamran Arabs, London, Macmillan, 1871, pp. 75-80ff. See also Macmichael, A History of the Arabs, p. 252.

35
Hill, _Egypt_, p. 70; Holt, _A Modern History_, pp. 55-56.

36
Hill, _A Biographical Dictionary_, p. 146.

37
For the ͨAbābda, see Holt, _A Modern History_, p. 38; for the
ͨAbābda and the Kabābīsh, see P.M. Holt, _The Mahdist State
in the Sudan 1881-1898_, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1958, p. 6;
Macmichael, in _A History of the Arabs_, p. 315, states that
the Kabābīsh too were later treated harshly by the regime,
even though their leader, Ṣāliḥ Faḍlallāh, had met with
Muhammad ͨAlī in 1838-1839 and had obtained concessions.
See also Talal Asad, "A Note On The History of the Kaba-
bish Tribe", _SNR_, XLVII, 1966, pp. 79-87.

38
Hill, _Egypt_, p. 46. (Both the reliance on key individuals and
even the symbolic visits were to be echoed in the Condo-
minium period.)

39
D.C. Cumming, "The History of Kassala and the Province of
Taka", _SNR_, XXIII, 1, 1940, p. 49. Cumming also discusses
the case of the Hadendowa, whose leader, Muhammad Dīn, sub-
mitted to the government in 1840, only to be taken away
in chains to Khartoum where he died the following year.
Shaykh Muhammad Ila of the Halanga, a parvenu who needed
government support, actively aided the government campaigns
against Muhammad Dīn.

40
Holt, _The Mahdist State_, p. 14. See also Hill, "Rulers of the
Sudan", p. 86. Even this figure (twenty-five governors and
governors-general) is misleading, as the governorate-general
was abolished between 1856 and 1862 and again from 1871
to 1873. Three governors-general served for more than five
years, many served fewer than two years, some for less than
a year. This rapid turnover was due to Cairo's apparent
fear of centering too much power in any one man, and is also
a reflection of the low quality of the personnel involved.

41
See Hill, "Rulers of the Sudan", pp. 87-95; Holt, _The Mahdist
State_, pp. 8-16; Holt, _A Modern History_, p. 58; and Hill,
Egypt, pp. 35-37, 95-97.

42

The head of the administration throughout most of the Turco-
Egyptian period was the governor-general, or ḥukumdār
(Hill, Egypt, p. 22). At the fall of the regime, the ad-
ministration was in one of its periodic "decentralized"
forms, and the provinces were arranged into three ḥukum-
dāriyas, each under a governor or ḥukumdār, who answered
to Cairo. Each province had a governor with the title of
mudīr or mudir ᶜumūmī. Each province was in turn divided
into districts called either ma'mūriyat, which were super-
vised by ma'mūrs, who were Turkish or Egyptian, or qism,
each under a Sudanese nāẓir. Finally, the districts were
divided into khuṭts, each under the direction of a local
ḥākim. The local shaykh was thereby a government agent.
(Holt, The Mahdist State, p. 9.)

43

These were called firda. (N. Shoucair, Tarīkh al-Sūdān, Cairo,
1903, Vol. III, pp. 110-112, quoted in The Economic History
of the Middle East 1800-1914, Charles Issawi (ed.), Chicago,
1966, p. 486.)

44

P.M. Holt, "Modernization and Reaction in the Nineteenth Cen-
tury Sudan", Beginnings of Modernization In The Middle
East, The Nineteenth Century, W.R. Polk and R.L. Chambers
(eds.), Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press,
1968, p. 407.

45

Ibid.

46

Holt, The Mahdist State, p. 21. The Turco- Egyptian regime
introduced the Hanafi madhhab as the official code, though
the Sudanese were attached to the Maliki madhhab. (Triming-
ham, Islam, pp. 120-121.) Until this time it was often im-
possible to distinguish an ᶜalim from a fakī or ṣūfī. The
conflict between ṣūfis and ᶜulamā' began only with the im-
portation of these Azharite Egyptian ᶜulamā'. (See Tri-
mingham, Islam, p. 116.)

47

Holt, "Modernization and Reaction", p. 408. While most of the
ᶜulamā' were imported from Egypt, a cause of complaint it-
self, there were, however, orthodox Sudanese notables, who,
in Hill's words, "took their seats with the imported
ᶜulama' and formed a class invariably friendly to estab-
lished order". (Hill, Egypt, p. 43.)

48

Holt, "Modernization and Reaction", p. 407.

49

The rise of the order was widely associated with the arrival
of the Turco-Egyptian invaders. "Ahmad b. Idrīs al-Fāsī
is reported by a Sudanese chronicler to have said that
what befell the Sudan was because its people insulted
Muhammad ᶜUthmān". (Holt, Holy Families, p. 8.) Muhammad
ᶜUthmān, it will be remembered, was the founder of the
Khatmiya in the Sudan.

      Adding to the impression of a connection between
the order's arrival and the invasion was the enrollment
of loyal Shaiqiya troops in the Khatmiya. The order was
originally popular with the government because of its con-
nections with Mecca, whence Muhammad ᶜUthmān came to the
Sudan. (Holt, Holy Families, p.8.)

50

Cumming, "The History of Kassala", pp. 44-52.

51

Ibid., pp. 49-50, citing Munzinger, Affaires étrangères, Cor-
    resp. consul., Massawa, from Kassala, 12 August 1866.
    Munzinger was French consul at Massawa from 1864 to 1870.
    (See Hill, A Biographical Dictionary, p. 282.)

52

Holt, A Modern History, p. 76. Egypt was at this time in the
    throes of the ᶜUrabi rebellion.

53

The family of Muhammad Ahmad had long claimed Sharīfī descent,
    and "Traditions survive of a pious and holy man, six ge-
    nerations before Muhammad Ahmad". (Holt, Holy Families,
    p. 10.)

54

Trimingham, Islam, pp. 93, 227.

55

Ibid., pp. 225-226.

56

Holt, Holy Families, p. 12. We may only speculate as to the
    exact reasons for these opposite reactions to the Mahdi.
    Certainly the competition of the two tariqas for member-
    ship was the basis of their rivalry. The Majdhubiya had
    enjoyed considerable political power around its headquar-
    ters at El Damer (see J.L. Burckhardt, Travels in Nubia,
    London, John Murray, 1819, p. 266) and must have felt
    threatened by the increasing influence of the Khatmiya.
    As the Khatmiya came to be associated with the government,
    the leaders of the Majdhubiya must have seen the Mahdist

revolt as the means of securing its position by destroying the rival order. For their part, the Khatmīya leadership surely recognized the rift between the Majdhūbīya and the government and saw the advantage in collaborating.

[57]

Shoucair in Issawi, The Economic History, p. 487.

[58]

Gordon was Governor-General from 1877 to 1880, and from 1884 until the fall of Khartoum in 1885. Giegler Pasha served as acting Governor-General in 1879, 1880, and 1881-1882. H.W.R. deCoetlogon Pasha was acting Governor-General in 1884. Romolo Gessi Pasha served as governor of the Bahr al-Ghazāl (1879-1880), and was succeeded by Frank Lupton Bey (1880-1883). Darfur's governors included C.-F. Rosset Pasha (1879); G.B. Messedaglia Bey (1879-1880); and Rudolf von Slatin Bey (later Pasha)(1881-1883). Dāra had four Christian European governors: Charles Rigolet (1878-1879); Messedaglia (1879); F. Emiliani dei Danzigar Bey (1880-1882)(as sub-governor); and Slatin (1881). Rigolet was governor of Shakkā in 1879. The Equatorial Province's governors included Sir Samuel Baker Pasha (1869-1873); Gordon (1874-1876); Alexander M. Mason Bey (1876-1877); Henry G. Prout Bey (1876-1878); and E.C. Schnitzer (Emin Pasha)(1878-1889). Ernst Marno Bey served as governor of Fazughli (1881-1883), and had previously held the post in Qallābāt (1878). J.A.W. Munzinger Pasha was governor of Massawa (1871-1873), as was Mason Bey (1884-1885). The Red Sea Littoral Province's governors included Munzinger (1873-1875); Sir William N.W. Hewett (1884); Sir Cromer Ashburnham (1884); and Sir Herbert C. Chermside Bey (1884-1886). (Hill, "Rulers of the Sudan", and notices from A Biographical Dictionary.)
    It is worth noting in this context that the appointment of Arakil Bey, an Armenian Christian, to the governorship of Khartoum in 1856 had almost precipitated a revolt of the Shukriya. (Holt, A Modern History, p. 60.)

[59]

Holt, A Modern History, p. 79.

Chapter II

THE MAHDIST PERIOD: (1881-1899)

1. Introductory.

Our discussion of the Mahdia will be limited to aspects
pertinent to a subsequent analysis of the Condominium. It should
be noted at the outset that despite the revolutionary character
of the Mahdia, the period, seen in the proper perspective, was
not a lacuna in Sudanese history. Rather, the eighteen years of
its existence (1881-1899) witnessed the continuation of many of
the trends evident in Turco-Egyptian times, just as the Mahdist
regime itself relied heavily on the administrative machinery
introduced by its predecessor. Above all, it is no longer justi-
fiable (if, indeed, it ever was) to describe the period as a bar-
baric episode between two phases of development (the Turco-
Egyptian period and the Condominium), as the propagandists in
Cairo (Wingate, et al) represented it. Indeed, in many ways the
Mahdist regime was a bridge between the two.[1] A discussion of the
Mahdia is necessary for an understanding of Sudanese responses
to the Condominium. The fact that the Mahdia did not end tribal
and religious rivalries greatly limited the ability of the Su-
danese to confront the British as a viable unit.

2. The Nature of Mahdist Authority.

To understand the evolution of the Mahdist state under the Khalīfa ᶜAbdallāhi, the Mahdi's successor, it is essential to grasp the nature of the Mahdi's authority itself, and the problems it engendered for his successor as leader of the nascent state.

In the Turco-Egyptian period, we have seen that internal divisions were a crucial factor in the failure to mount an effective Sudanese resistance, and in the ability of the conquerors to govern. How then did Muḥammad Aḥmad, a man with no legitimate claim to political authority, succeed in rallying such diverse elements to his cause? We have indicated already that material motives were important: the dissatisfaction of the tribes of the dispersion with the anti-slavery policy of the government; the grievances of the newly-conquered Baqqāra; etc. But these problems would have remained insoluble without a universally accepted leadership, of which there was none in a society rent by religious and tribal divisions. Nor do material grievances explain why it was Muḥammad Aḥmad who assumed that leadership. Some claim to extraordinary authority, then, was essential.

It is justifiable, I believe, to attempt an explanation using Weber's elucidation of the concept of charisma to interpret the Mahdi's appeal. While it is beyond the scope of this

study to fully compare the Mahdist case with Weber's model, some mention of the concept of charismatic authority will serve to clarify the problems posed by the nature of Mahdist rule. Charismatic authority, in its ideal formalization, refers to

> a rule over men, whether predominantly external or predominantly internal, to which the governed submit because of their belief in the extraordinary quality of the specific person.... the legitimacy of charismatic rule ... rests upon the belief in magical powers, revelations and hero worship. The source of these beliefs is the 'proving' of the charismatic quality through miracles, through victories and other successes, that is, through the welfare of the governed.[2]

Shortly after Muḥammad Aḥmad's announcement of his divinely appointed mission, the miraculous event occurred which was to lead to his broader acceptance. A government force of two companies was sent to Abā Island to arrest the Mahdi, but was routed by a Mahdist band armed only with sticks, spears, and swords.[3] Every subsequent Mahdist victory lent credence to his claims and augmented his force of believers; for certainly, the defeat of trained government troops by ill-armed men was a tremendous achievement. Again, in Weber's words,

> The charismatic leader gains and maintains authority solely by proving his strength in life. If he wants to be a prophet, he must perform miracles.... Above all ... his divine mission must 'prove' itself in that those who faithfully surrender to him must fare well. If they do not fare well, he is obviously not the master sent by the gods.[4]

Now any charismatic leader must appeal to the special psychological and cultural susceptibilities of his would-be supporters, that is, to their subjective interpretation of

"the extraordinary quality". Christ, for example, could hardly have presented his message successfully to any society other than that to which he preached. Similarly, in the Sudanese case, the charismatic leader had to be possessed of qualities and characteristics which, while extraordinary, fell within the range of Sudanese understanding and beliefs. This "traditional sanction" (for want of a better term) was embodied in the meaning and the trappings of the messianic concept of al-Mahdi: he who will come to guide the people on the correct path, and to wipe out the injustices of the world.[5] This was a concept familiar to the Sudanese and, in basis, is analogous to other Sudanese traditions: sainthood; the underlying principles of the ṣūfī ṭarīqa; and the idea of the Mahdi all have in common the belief that the way to God is to be achieved through certain individuals who are blessed with extraordinary powers (baraka, see above, page 14). In discussing the phenomenon of the prophet, Weber wrote that there is a link between prophets and teachers of ethics. Specifically,

> Such a teacher, full of a new or recovered understanding of ancient wisdom, gathers disciples about him ... and purports to mold ethical ways of life.....the bond between the teacher ... and his disciple is uncommonly strong and is regulated in an authoritarian fashion....[6]

The relevance of this exposition to the case of the Sudanese Mahdi is two-fold. It describes the nature of his crucial initial support (as a ṣūfī -- see above page 24) and further supports the argument that a Mahdist call had elemental similarities to established social relationships within Sudanese Islam.

Muḥammad Aḥmad's family, while obscure, claimed Sharīfī descent[7], a further point of popular identification.

If we therefore disregard the material motives of various interest groups, which, in any case, cannot exclusively explain the devotion of the Mahdi's early followers, there remains a tenable explanation of Muḥammad Aḥmad's success relying on concepts basic to Islamic thought and especially familiar to Sudanese Islam. It is contended that an elucidation of the Mahdist period must take into account the irrational nature of the Mahdi's appeal and authority. This is important for an understanding of the difficulties encountered by the Mahdi's successor and of the social particularism evident in the Condominium period. Simply put, the loyalty of Muḥammad Aḥmad's followers was intensely personal and not directed toward any broader concept of nation or state. The unity imposed by a pro-Mahdist consensus could be expected to evaporate after the death of the charismatic hero, or at least to encounter serious difficulties when an attempt was made to institutionalize the charismatic authority. It should also be recognized that the Mahdi's call was explicitly revolutionary, as he would admit no worldly authority over his own, and he called for the overthrow of the government by means of the jihād.[8] The Mahdist propaganda, itself an essential element in the movement's growth, stressed the government's irreligiousness and rejected both tribal loyalties and ṣūfī affinities.[9] As we shall shortly see, traditional loyalties

were suppressed by the Mahdi's personal authority, but were, at his death, to cause considerable difficulties for his successor.

3. The Mahdist State Under ^CAbdallāhi.

The Mahdi died on 22 June 1885, soon after the fall of
Khartoum, at the height of his success. His death brought the
internal divisions of the movement immediately to the fore. The
Khalīfa ^CAbdallāhi enjoyed the advantage of having his Black
Flag Division concentrated at Omdurman, and his accession was
assured by the support of the Khalīfa ^CAlī b. Muḥammad Ḥilū,
the leader of the pietists.[10]

The immediate problem for ^CAbdallāhi was legitimizing his
position. He was unquestionably preeminent in the Mahdist ranks:
his chief rivals, the Ashrāf (the kin of the Mahdi, led by the
Khalīfa Muḥammad Sharīf) had been publicly criticized by the
Mahdi shortly before his death.[11] That they considered them-
selves the heirs to the Mahdi's authority is not surprising,
given the character of tribal and religious organization in the
Sudan, as mentioned above.[12] Further, ^CAbdallāhi had somehow to
routinize the charismatic authority of the Mahdi, that is, to
legitimize his claim to leadership within the Mahdist framework.
He also had to contend with an enormous military establishment
at a time when the Mahdist state had almost reached the limits
of its expansion. Therefore the Khalīfa sought to justify his
position both by reference to his having been chosen by the
Mahdi[13], and on the basis of his own divine inspirations.[14] But
as Holt points out,

> To base a claim to sovereignty on an as-
> sertion of divine inspiration is politi-
> cally dangerous since it tends to be imi-
> tated and adopted by malcontents and pre-
> tenders. The classical example in Muslim
> history is the group of 'false prophets'
> who arose on the death of Muhammad and
> seriously endangered the infant community
> of Islam.[15]

The Khalīfa therefore instituted two related policies to ensure his rule: the replacement of important office-holders (usually of riverain tribal origin) with Baqqāra, especially of his own family; and the "calling-in" of the nomadic tribes from the west to Omdurman. The first policy fanned the fires of anger already burning in the Ashrāf in particular and the awlād al-balad in general. Many of the chief officers under the Mahdi had been members of this group, and their patrons, the Ashrāf, felt that ᶜAbdallāhi was a usurper who was denying their right-fully privileged status.[16]

4. <u>Resistance To Mahdist Rule.</u>

The calling-in of the tribes further aggravated the <u>awlād</u> <u>al-balad</u>, as they were forced to provide food for the new-comers, and were thereby eventually ruined. By effecting this policy the Khalīfa sacrificed long-term economic and political stability for his concern of the moment -- neutralizing his opposition.[17] His conflict with the <u>Ashrāf</u> culminated in their abortive revolt of 1891[18], and they were thereafter of little political significance. The western tribes were called in to Omdurman as much to be kept in check themselves as to guard the Khalīfa's position. The Ta^caisha, the Khalīfa's own tribe, resisted the call. ^cAbdallāhi was not the tribe's hereditary leader, and although the son of a religious notable, had no rightful claim to tribal leadership.[19] Al-Ghazzālī Aḥmad Khawwaf, the hereditary <u>shaykh</u> of the Ta^caisha, undoubtedly feared the loss of his own authority should he comply with the order to migrate. He therefore killed the messengers sent by ^cAbdallāhi, but was ordered deposed by the Khalīfa, and upon the ultimate threat of anhiliation, the Ta^caisha finally and reluctantly obeyed the Khalīfa's summons.

The Hawāzma tribe likewise refused the order, and was therefore branded by the Khalīfa as "ghanīmah to the Muslims"[21], and thus liable to the confiscation of all its goods and animals. The tribe itself was forcibly brought in to Omdurman. The resistance of the Rizayqat tribe brought about the death of its

leader, Madibbū, at the hands of Ḥamdān Abū ᶜAnja, the famous Taᶜaīshī amīr.[22] The Shukrīya, Kababīsh, Jaᶜliyīn, and other tribes were all dealt with in a similarly firm, and, when necessary, drastic manner.[23] The consequent rapid decline of tribal authority, already advanced during the Turco-Egyptian era, was to prove irreversible.

The motives of the resistant tribes are understandable: once freed from the domination of the Turco-Egyptian government they were unwilling to acknowledge another in its place. The death of the Mahdi released even the completely pro-Mahdist groups from what they considered a personal bond of allegiance, a fact which undoubtedly explains the Khalīfa's concern to keep the Baqqāra under his watchful eye at Omdurman. The conflicts between ᶜAbdallāhi and the tribes raise another significant point in understanding the Mahdist regime: that is, that after the death of the Mahdi, and, indeed, to a lesser extent before, tribal responses to the Mahdia, as to the Turco-Egyptian regime, were often determined by local concerns and tribal rivalries. In his conduct of tribal affairs the Khalīfa exploited those rivalries as the previous regime had, and as the Condominium was to do.

As was noted above (page 42), the Khalīfa's reliance on divine inspiration to justify his accession was likely to lead to similar, religiously-inspired risings. The most serious of

these was that of Abū Jummayza, who claimed the third khalīfal office (left vacant after its refusal by the head of the Sanū-sīya tarīqa) and gathered a considerable force behind him.[24] As could be expected, his premature death led to the defeat and disintegration of his rebellion, but even its failure indicated the tenuous nature of the Khalīfa's claim to legitimacy, and was, like the tribal risings, a portent of things to come in the early Condominium.

The relations of the Mahdist regime with the sufī tarīqas were, like tribal relations, dependent upon the pre-Mahdist po-sition of each order. The Mahdist revolt was a threat to those tarīqas that had prospered from the Turco-Egyptian occupation, and an opportunity for those who had suffered from it. Thus, the head of the Khatmīya, Muḥammad ʿUthmān al-Mīrghanī, whose family, as we have seen, had always been closely associated with the government, fled to Egypt after failing to stem the Mahdist tide around Kassala, the tarīqa's strongest area. Other sufī leaders, such as al-Ṭāhir al-Ṭayyib al-Majdhūb, of the Majdhūbīya, and al-Makkī Ismaʿīl al-Walī, the head of the Ismaʿīlīya, supported the revolt. The same rivalries that had pitted these orders on different sides throughout the history of the Turco-Egyptian regime, determined their responses to the Mahdia.[25] The para-mount goal of ridding the Sudan of the current government is all the more obvious if it is remembered that Mahdist doctrine re-jected the very existence of sufī tarīqas. Thus, while indivi-

dual ṣūfīs had parts to play in the Mahdia, the ṭarīqas as such had little apparent influence.

The situation of the ᶜulamā' was desperate. As a class they had everything to lose if the Mahdist revolt succeeded, committed as they were to the government, and dependent on it for their survival. As early as 1881, a council of ᶜulamā' had condemned the Mahdi and "agreed that the arrest of Muḥammad Aḥmad was necessary to prevent the spread of false doctrine".[26] The Mahdi and the ᶜulamā' were mutually unintelligible, each side being convinced that the other was heretical, apostatical, or simply deluded.[27] It is fair to generalize from the sources that both the ṣūfī orders and the ᶜulamā' receded into the background during the Mahdia, though, importantly, the Mahdist judicial system continued to depend on the personnel of the previous regime.[29]

5. The Composition of the Mahdist Administration.

That some judges continued to serve under the Mahdist regime raises another point relevant to Mahdist administration. That is, although revolutionary in ideology, the Mahdist state under ^{C}Abdallāhi depended for technical expertise on servants of the previous government. While the leading military figures were Sudanese, and usually Baqqāra, the civil service was not. A list of employees completed after the Anglo-Egyptian conquest showed that of some one hundred and fifty persons listed, sixty-three were Egyptians, Copts, or muwallads (half-Egyptian, half-Sudanese), thirty-eight were of riverain Sudanese origin, and thirty-two were southerners. Only eight were from Kordofan and Darfur. In the General Treasury, four clerks were Copts, and the Treasurer and his deputy were Ja^{C}liyīn. The production of ammunition, which would undoubtedly be entrusted only to those considered above suspicion, was almost entirely in the hands of Egyptians and muwallads. At least nine of twelve telegraphists were Egyptians or muwallads who had all served the previous administration[30] (by then defunct for over fourteen years). Even these figures do not fully represent the degree to which civil servants of the Turco-Egyptian regime continued in office. The significance of the data is in their giving the lie to the supposition that the Mahdist state constituted a definite break with the administrative framework of its predecessor. The statistics further point out that loyalty to the Turco-Egyptian regime did not preclude serving its successor-state (a fact of interest in

an analysis of Sudanese reactions to the Condominium). Above all,
these figures disprove the idea that the Mahdist state was ruled
by blood-thirsty and primitive fanatics. In fact, the bureau-
cracy continued largely intact.

6. The Legacy of the Mahdia.

In summary, several salient features of the Mahdist period are of importance to the general discussion. First, despite the forced immigration of. tribes, the non-recognition, indeed, emasculation of tribal authority[31], and the growth of tribally-mixed communities (most notably Omdurman), the Mahdia did not succeed in merging the tribes of the northern Sudan. Though the Khalīfa ᶜAbdallāhi attempted during the latter years of his reign to conciliate his opposition among the riverain tribes[32], he never succeeded in establishing a non-tribal base for the state. Indeed, the strongest evidence against the hypothesis that would portray the Mahdia as nationalistic is ᶜAbdallāhi's increasing reliance on his own kinsmen, the Taᶜaisha, who by the end of the Mahdia were the dominant tribe of the Sudan. They constituted, in Holt's words, "The Taᶜaishī Autocracy".[33] In other words, despite attempts to view the Mahdia as a period in which tribal distinctions were swept away, the period saw in fact the hegemony of one tribe above all others, and the continuation (and increased hostility) of tribal rivalries. It is important, rather, to recognize that the effect of ᶜAbdallāhi's tribal policies was to so weaken the positions of tribal leadership that these could never regain their former significance. Thus, at the reconquest there was, as before the Mahdia, no universally accepted indigenous. authority, nor was there the general acceptance even of the tainted tribal leadership. Admittedly, in this context it

is surprising that the Khalīfa was able to muster large forces
at Omdurman and Umm Diwaykarāt, but to what extent the Mahdist
loyalists were committed to a nascent Sudanese nation is sus-
pect. Indeed, personal loyalty to the Khalīfa, continued devo-
tion to the memory of the Mahdi, hope of personal gain, and
simply the lack of alternatives (especially for the Ta^{c}aīsha)
must not be dismissed as explanations.

Another important aspect of the Mahdia is the evident con-
tinuation of socio-political trends established in the Turco-
Egyptian period. Massive demographic shifts, the accelerated
breakdown of the legitimacy of tribal authority, and urbaniza-
tion continued, in large measure as results of Mahdist policies.
In the area of administration, Holt has described the preoccu-
pation of the Khalīfa with centralizing the government and his
methods of controlling the provincial and military governors.[34]

Lastly, in order to better understand reactions to the
Condominium, an attempt should be made to determine to what ex-
tent the elements of the original Mahdist following actually
achieved their ends during the Mahdia. The immediate concern of
the Danāqla, the Ja^{c}liyīn, and the other tribes involved in com-
merce to stop the anti-slavery drive had been satisfied. But
these tribes were to suffer greater economic reverses under the
Khalīfa due to the massive, forced migrations of the westerners
and ironically, due also to the regime's taxation policies,

which were hardly more bearable than those of the Turco-Egyptian government, and which discriminated heavily against the awlād al-balad.[35] In Holt's words, ᶜAbdallāhi's

> tribal feeling, conspicuous even when he was
> most enraged with the Taᶜāïsha, suggested to
> him a comparatively easy way of building up
> the military support he needed and in the
> end the calling-in of the Baqqāra upset the
> tribal and economic balance of the country
> and lost him the loyalty of the riverain
> peoples....[36]

The pietists had, by the time of the Anglo-Egyptian invasion, been bereft of their leader for a decade. Their charismatic attachment to the Mahdist ideal must have been seriously shaken by the series of reverses during the period of the reconquest. Their patron, however, the Khalīfa ᶜAlī b. Muhammad Hilū, remained loyal to the end.[37] In any case, this group was of little military or political significance in the latter stages of the regime's history, but would be of major concern to the British officials of the Condominium.

The Baqqāra had emerged from the Mahdist campaigns as the mainstay of the regime. But by the reconquest they were resented and scorned by the riverain peoples. It was the Baqqāra who composed the largest element of the Mahdist forces in the final battles, and they who had the most to lose.

In short, the underlying tremendous strains in the Mahdist state were only exacerbated under the Khalīfa's rule. Rivalries

remained intense. Loyalty to the Khalīfa was shallow. By 1898
the country was devastated, the population greatly reduced by
war, famine, and disease[38], and the future bleak. While the in-
vading armies were met with fierce opposition, that resistance
was hopeless, desperate, and rooted in the personal attachment
of the soldiers to their leader. There had been, in fact, serious
defections, a subject to be taken up in the next chapter.

At his accession, CAbdallāhi had faced problems similar to
those the Turco-Egyptian regime had encountered: the administra-
tion of a vast area neither ethnically nor socially homogeneous.
He had little choice but to rely on the military threat of the
Baqqāra and thereby preclude the possibility, however remote, of
forging a genuine Sudanese unity. These problems would, after the
final collapse of the Mahdist regime, be left to its successor-
state. But despite this failure,

> there survived the national memory of an
> indigenous government....As such and with
> all its faults the reign of the Khalīfa
> CAbdallāhi played an important part in the
> origins of the modern Sudanese state.[39]

NOTES

1

P.M. Holt, The Personal Rule of the Khalīfah ^cAbdallāhi, Cambridge University, Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 1956, p. 249.

2

Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays In Sociology, H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills (trans. and eds.), London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1947, pp. 295-296.
    In dealing with the problem of the Mahdi's rise, most historians concentrate on the concept of the Mahdiship in Islam and the susceptibility of the Sudanese to a Mahdist appeal, without attempting a broader identification of the nature of that appeal. One such attempt, "Charismatic Leadership In Islam: The Mahdi of the Sudan", Comparative Studies in Society and History, 14, 1972, pp. 193-214, by R.H. Dekmejian and M.J. Wyszomirski itself fails to deal adequately with the problem, notably in its understanding of the Sudanese historical background. The article does, however, show that this is an important area of inquiry.
    The classical conception of the Mahdi is provided by Ibn Khaldūn:
    "It has been well known ... by the Muslims in every epoch that at the end of time a man from the family(of the Prophet) will without fail make his appearance, one who will strengthen the religion and make justice triumph. The Muslims will follow him, and he will gain domination over the Muslim realm. He will be called the Mahdi." The Muqaddimah, Franz Rosenthal (trans.), London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958, Vol. 2, p. 156.
    Apparently the Shi^ci theory of the Mahdi has not penetrated the Sudan. Thus, Wingate's statement that Muḥammad Aḥmad was the "mysterious and long-hidden twelfth Imam" is totally erroneous. (See Wingate, Mahdiism And The Egyptian Sudan, London, Frank Cass, 2nd ed., 1968, p. 5.)

3

Holt, The Mahdist State, pp. 47-48. Neither Holt, in The Mahdist State, nor A.B. Theobald, in The Mahdīya, London, Longmans, Green, 1951, mentions the exact number of government troops engaged at Aba. Wingate, in Mahdiism, p. 16, states that the force numbered two hundred.

4

Weber, From Max Weber, p. 249.

5
See D.B. Macdonald, "al-Mahdi", _Encyclopaedia of Islam_, 1st
ed., Vol. I, pp. 111-115.

6
Max Weber, _Max Weber On Charisma and Institution Building_,
S.N. Eisenstadt (ed.), Chicago, University of Chicago Press,
1968, p. 259.

7
Sharīfī descent refers to descent from the Prophet Muḥammad.
See Holt, _Holy Families_.

8
Holt, _The Mahdist State_, p. 33; Holt, _Holy Families_, p. 12.

9
Holt, _The Mahdist State_, pp. 98-100.

10
Ibid., pp. 120-121.

11
Ibid., pp. 121, 121n.

12
See _Holy Families_, and above, pp. 12-14.

13
See Holt, _The Personal Rule_, pp. 31-34; Holt, _The Mahdist
State_, p. 120.

14
Holt, _The Mahdist State_, pp. 122-124.

15
Holt, _The Personal Rule_, p. 55.

16
Among those systematically removed were Muḥammad al-Khayr
ᶜAbdallāh Khūjalī, governor of Dongola, Berber, and the
Jaᶜliyīn, who was replaced by ᶜUthmān al-Dikaym, a relative
of the Khalīfa, and Muḥammad Khālid Zuqal, governor of
Darfur, who was imprisoned. (See Holt, _The Mahdist State_,
pp. 125-131.

17
Holt, _The Personal Rule_, p. 64.

18
Holt, _The Mahdist State_, pp. 180-182.

[19]
See Hill, A Biographical Dictionary, pp. 5-6.

[20]
Holt, The Mahdist State, pp. 142-145.

[21]
Holt, The Personal Rule, p. 168.

[22]
See Hill, A Biographical Dictionary, pp. 222, 147-148.

[23]
The Shukrī leader, ᶜAwād al-Karīm abū Sinn (the son of the famous Aḥmad Bey abū Sinn -- see above, pp. 18, and 31, note 34) -- was imprisoned at Omdurman in December, 1886. The tribe's camels and horses were confiscated. (Holt, The Mahdist State, p. 133n.) The Kabābīsh similarly ignored the Khalīfal summons: ᶜAbdallāhi ordered that they be boycotted. Their leader, Ṣāliḥ Faḍlallāh Sālim was captured and executed in May, 1887. It is not surprising that among the forces arrayed against the Kabābīsh by the Khalīfa was the tribe of Dār Ḥāmid, "ancient rivals" of the Kabābīsh. (Holt, The Mahdist State, p. 136). See also A.B. Theobald, "The Khalīfa ᶜAbdallāhi", SNR, XXXI, 2, 1950, p. 257. This rivalry was typical, and had its most recent impetus in the fact that the father of the Dār Ḥāmid chief had been killed by Ṣāliḥ's father. (Holt, The Mahdist State, p. 136n.)
　　　　See also H.A. Macmichael, The Tribes of Northern and Central Kordofan, Cambridge, University Press, 1912: for the Zaghāwa, pp. 110-111; the Jimiᶜ, pp. 83-84; the Misirīya, pp. 142-143.

[24]
See Hill, A Biographical Dictionary, p. 34. In conscious imitation of early Islam, the Mahdi was to have four khalīfas as successors to the four Rightly-Guided Caliphs: Abū Bakr, ᶜUthmān, ᶜUmar, and ᶜAlī. The third khalīfal office was offered by the Mahdi to the head of the Sanūsīya, Muḥammad al-Mahdi b. al-Sanūsi, who refused it.

[25]
Trimingham, Islam, p. 233; Hill, A Biographical Dictionary, pp. 228, 278-279, 353; Holt, The Mahdist State, p. 18.

[26]
Holt, The Mahdist State, p. 47; See also Theobald, The Mahdiya, p. 33.

27

The appendices to Gordon's Khartoum diaries exemplify the
depths of the ᶜulamā' mystification with the Mahdi. (C.G.
Gordon, The Journals of Major-Gen. C.G. Gordon, C.B., At
Khartoum, London, Kegan Paul, Trench, 1885.)

28

For example, ᶜAbdallāhi Aḥmad abū Jallāba wad Ibrāhīm, who
served as a qāḍi under the Turco-Egyptian, Mahdist, and
Condominium governments. (Hill, A Biographical Dictionary,
p. 3.)

29

See Holt, The Personal Rule, p. 112.

30

Ibid., pp. 106-109; Holt, The Mahdist State, pp. 233-235.

31

See Holt, The Mahdist State, pp. 141-146.

32

Ibid., pp. 185-187.

33

Ibid., Chapter title (XI).

34

Ibid., p. 229.

35

Holt, The Personal Rule, pp. 72-73.

36

Holt, The Mahdist State, pp. 246-247.

37

See Hill, A Biographical Dictionary, p. 47.

38

It is impossible to determine or accurately estimate the Suda-
nese population to show Mahdist losses. Condominium of-
ficials undoubtedly exaggerated, either purposely or other-
wise, when they estimated that seventy-five percent of the
Sudan's population had died of disease or in battle under
Mahdist rule.(Report By His Majesty's Agent And Consul-
General On The Finances, Administration, And Condition of
Egypt And The Soudan (GGR): 1903, p. 79) Cromer, the
Consul-General, claimed that the Sudan's population fell
from 8.5 million before the Mahdia to 1.75 million at the
reconquest. (Modern Egypt, London, Macmillan, 1908, p. 545)
How he obtained this informatio he does not say.

39 Holt, <u>The Personal Rule</u>, p. 251.

Chapter III

COLLABORATION DURING THE CONDOMINIUM: (1898-1919)

1. <u>The Motives For Reconquest.</u>

The British had adopted as policy the abandonment of the
Sudan long before the Mahdi's victory at Khartoum. Indeed, Gor-
don's mission had been the evacuation of the country. After his
death, Her Majesty's Government took a "wait and see" attitude
that was to last ten years.[1] But British policy throughout that
period remained committed against the encroachment of a European
Power into the lands of the Upper Nile Valley.[2] It was still
thought that the presence of a European Power would gravely endan-
ger Egypt, dependent as she was (and is) on the waters of the
Nile -- a worry endured throughout history by Egypt's rulers, and
one probably needless even in the 1890s.[3] As early as 1889, Sa-
lisbury, the Conservative Prime Minister, had

> decided at Baring's prompting that if they
> were to hold Egypt, they could not afford
> to let any other European Power obtain a
> hold over any part of the Nile Valley.[4]

The real impetus for the reconquest came, not from a desire
to avenge the death of Gordon (though public opinion toward the
campaign was greatly swayed by this) but from the European poli-
tical situation and the scramble for Africa. Italy's disastrous
defeat by the Abyssinians at Adowa on 1 March 1896 was the im-
mediate cause of British direct involvement. In Holt's view, the
British reaction was a gesture to the Italians in order to dis-

tract the Mahdists, who were threatening the Italians at Kas-
sala.[5] There also existed the fear that the Mahdists and the Abys-
sinians would join forces, and that the Abyssinians, in turn,
were merely a decoy for French ambitions in the Upper Nile.[6]

A great many other explanations have been offered for the
reconquest, none of which, however, was of the overriding impor-
tance of controlling the Nile. One theory proposes that the Bri-
tish takeovers of Kenya, Uganda, and the Sudan were "an inciden-
tal result" of a British shift in focus from the Straits to Egypt
as the keystone of Indian defense.[7] Another sees the Sudan as stra-
tegically important in the event of a British pullout from Egypt,
its reconquest thus preventing an Egyptian-Sudanese merger which
might threaten Britain's Mediterranean interests.[8] Altruism
cannot be completely discounted as a British motivation: the
Wingate propaganda had been enormously successful in focusing
public attention on the Sudan, and the British public came to
consider the Khalifa's regime as savage and barbaric, and that it
was their duty to rescue the wretched Sudanese from it.[9] There is
some evidence of British economic interest, both specifically in
the Sudan, and with the Sudan as a base for protecting interests
elsewhere. One scholar has suggested that a major concern was
Britain's desire for independence of American cotton producers.[10]
None of these theories, however, explains the timing of the Bri-
tish advance. The desire to control the Nile and protect their
position in Egypt was the primary British motive.

2. The Condominium Agreement.

The international political situation that determined the sudden British advance in the Sudan also dictated the invention of the Condominium form of government. Annexation was impossible because of the financial responsibilities it entailed, as well as the objections which would certainly be raised by France, and by the Ottoman Sultan, whose possession the Sudan technically remained.[11] The British were likewise unwilling to allow annexation to Egypt[12], as was noted above. The solution was found in Condominium, the euphemistic name given to the next half cen-tury of British rule.

While the Condominium Agreement (see Appendix) signed by Butras Ghali and Cromer in January, 1899 gave joint control to the signatory states, Britain in fact intended to allow little Egyptian interfence. Salisbury explained the British position to Cromer in this way:

> In view of the substantial military and
> financial co-operation which has been af-
> forded by Her Majesty's Government to the
> Government of the Khedive, Her Majesty's
> Government have decided that at Khartoum
> the British and Egyptian flags should be
> hoisted side by side.... You will ... ex-
> plain to the Khedive and to his Ministers
> that the procedure I have indicated is in-
> tended to emphasize that Her Majesty's
> Government consider that they have a pre-
> dominant voice in all matters connected
> with the Soudan, and that they expect that
> any advice that they may think fit to ten-
> der to the Egyptian Government, in respect
> to Soudan affairs, will be followed.[13]

This meant simply that Britain would rule the Sudan and that
Egypt would pay for it.[14] Thus, when we speak of Condominium
policy, we speak of British policy.

As a perusal of the Condominium Agreement shows (see Ap-
pendix, articles III and IV), the Governorate-General of the Su-
dan was an extremely powerful position. That this was the case
was of real benefit when Wingate took over the Government on 23
December 1899[15], but was disastrous before then, during the ab-
breviated primacy of Kitchener. Kitchener was a soldier who was
incapable of mastering what seemed the inconsequential matters of
administration. He lacked both the patience to learn and the
ability to use the diplomacy required to rule effectively. He
destroyed the Mahdi's tomb, shocking British opinion[16]; he squan-
dered the energy and paltry wealth of the country on the re-
building of Khartoum, shocking his subordinates[17]; and worse, he
deliberately allowed unknown numbers of Sudanese to starve to
death, telling the horrified Cromer that "famine conditions
suited his policy well because they would assist the hunt by de-
priving the Khalifa (who was still at large) of local support".[18]
Kitchener admitted plainly that he was anxious to leave the
Sudan[19], and was not missed when he was appointed chief of staff
to Lord Roberts in South Africa.

3. Wingate As Governor-General.

Kitchener was succeeded by Wingate. His tenure witnessed the real laying of the foundations of the Condominium Government's policies, and through his personal ability and choices of subordinates he managed to effect a good deal of progress. As Head of the Egyptian Army's Intelligence Department, Wingate had been responsible for keeping the British in Egypt informed of internal conditions and developments in the Sudan during the Mahdist rule, and, as we have seen, was greatly responsible for turning the tide of public opinion in Britain toward favoring the reconquest. He was thus well-suited both for focussing his own attention on tribal and religious affairs, and for maintaining good relations with the Egyptian, British, and other governments.

Despite the provisions of the Condominium Agreement, however, Wingate did not have a free hand in the Sudan. His career there was a period in which a new relationship, established but not formalized during Kitchener's term, had to be worked out between the Condominium Government and the British Consul in Cairo. This meant that Wingate had to deal with Cromer, who took an active interest in Sudanese affairs. In his draft for the Condominium Agreement, Cromer had included the stipulation that all proclamations of the Governor-General of the Sudan must be issued only with the consent of the Khedive, who was to be "advised" by the British Consul.[20] This requirement was not included in the

final agreement. Cromer began in 1902 to prepare the annual report for the Sudan, stating in its preface that

> Sir Reginald Wingate's time is so fully
> occupied that I suggested to him that,
> instead of himself writing a General Report ..., he should send the material to
> me and that I should undertake the work. [21]

He continued in these reports to allow the impression that it was he who determined the broad lines of policy.

Cromer always considered events in the Sudan in terms of their effect on Egypt, in line with his oft-repeated reasoning for the reconquest. In 1905 he maintained that

> The main utility of the Soudan, in so far
> ... as Egypt is concerned, does not ...
> depend on its capacity for local development. It is derived from the fact that the
> Nile runs through the country.... [22]

Remarks of this kind, together with occasional opinions on specific policies, and, of course, his control of the Egyptian budget and its annual subvention to the Sudan[23], were the limits of Cromer's direct Sudanese involvement. Wingate recognized this. His concern remained that Egypt should help the Sudan financially, but have the minimum amount of real influence there.

Wingate's attitude toward Egyptian involvement in the Sudan was expressed in his policies toward Egyptian nationals there and toward what he considered the poison of Egyptian nationalistic ideas. His suspicions were understandable: in 1900 a mutiny of Egyptian and Sudanese troops occurred, which Wingate

believed to have been due entirely to Egyptian incitement. The troops involved were not ex-Mahdists, but belonged to the anti-Mahdist Khatmīya, or to no _tarīqa_ at all.[24] Kitchener had ceased payment of the army's field allowance[25], and the Egyptian troops were resentful of the newly-instituted Condominium[26], which they correctly viewed as a sham and an impediment to Egyptian-Sudanese merger. From that time Wingate (who had always felt that the outbreak of the Mahdist revolt was due to Egyptian misrule) did his utmost to lessen and exclude Egyptian influences. When, for example, the Government wished to reward someone for his services, he was given a robe of honor or a religious robe rather than be nominated for Egyptian decorations, which were controlled by the Khedive.[27]

Replacement of Egyptians in the police forces with Sudanese was begun as early as 1903[28], long before such a policy was inaugurated in the civil service. Sudanese students were refused permission to study at Al-Azhar, for fear they might return from Cairo with radical ideas.[29] This attitude was not Wingate's alone: on the contrary, he was not only acting in the interest of the regime, but was attempting by his actions to win popular support. He quoted Sayyid ᶜAlī al-Mīrghanī, head of the Khatmīya as saying:

> Why should you English people be surprised
> at the thoroughly disloyal attitude of the
> Egyptians? -- They are a race of slaves and
> never will be anything better....[30]

4. <u>Educational Policy As An Area of Collaboration.</u>

The Government's concern with dangerous ideas was reflected in its educational policy. In the <u>Report</u> for 1900 Wingate[31] outlined "the present educational needs" of the Sudan as follows:

1. The creation of a native artisan class.
2. A diffusion amongst the masses of the people of education sufficient to enable them to understand the merest elements of the machinery of government.
3. The creation of a small native administrative class who will ultimately fill many minor posts.[32]

These were the aims set out by Currie[33], the director of education, as well. They point out explicitly that education was to be a tool of administration. In 1903 Cromer reported that there were five schools in the Sudan conducted in English, from which it was planned "to supply the subordinate employes of the Government".[34] In 1906 there were three hundred and forty students in government schools <u>in the whole country</u>.[35] By 1909 the total enrollment in the five primary schools was eight hundred and ninety-nine.[36] The next year, Gorst could report that "every capable boy who completes his school course soon finds himself absorbed in one or another of the Government Services".[37] And in 1914, reacting to the waiting lists for most of the higher primary schools, Kitchener (who succeeded Gorst in 1911) opined that the service should be expanded but that funds should be "devoted as they become available to the dissemination of industrial, vernacular, and technical education."[38] These state-

ments reflect the Government's justification for its education
policy: that education was desireable insofar as it allowed com-
prehension of Government pronouncements and helped to fill minor
Government posts.

There was, however, a political aspect of this policy,
quite apart from the desire to suppress Egyptian influences. It
is evident that the Government recognized educational policy
as an area in which it could conciliate an important element of
the population to gain the acceptance of Sudanese opinion. The
Government schools were seen as competition for the khalwa, or
traditional religious school of the Sudan. The Government there-
fore tried to prove its professed policy of non-intervention
in religious affairs through support of the khalwas and by li-
miting the number of its own "secular" schools.[39] In this it
attempted to avoid the intense suspicions caused by the Turco-
Egyptian regime's importation of official ʿulamāʾ.

The Government also took steps to strictly limit missio-
nary activities, again because of the fears that unrestricted
activity would precipitate a violent reaction. Therefore, mis-
sionary schools were closely supervised to ease the minds of the
local population. Active proselytizing was, in fact, forbidden
in the northern Sudan, and with varying degrees of success con-
fined to the non-Islamic areas of the south.[40]

5. Economic Policy As An Area of Collaboration.

In the economic sphere, the Government tried to win over the landowners by contrasting its activities as much as possible with those of the Mahdist regime. The riverain tribesmen, whose interests had suffered enormously during the Mahdia, were the beneficiaries of policies instituted to attract cultivators to neglected lands and to resume quickly the former activities of the region. Agricultural loans were made available; cheap grain and seeds were provided; and newcomers were exempted from taxation for a year.[41] All of these policies, among others,

> were geared to associate the new rulers in the minds of the population with economic viability. With the Mahdist regime fresh in their minds, the Sudanese landowners could compare their present prosperity with years of near-starvation under the Khalifa.[42]

This liberal attitude towards the cultivators was effective, but not nearly so drastic a concession as the stunning Government attitude towards slavery. The Turco-Egyptian campaign against the slave trade in the mid-nineteenth century had been, as we have seen, a major factor contributing to the discontent of the Sudanese and the support of the Mahdi's revolt; Gordon's career in the Sudan had been dedicated to its absolute uprootal; Wingate's propaganda had stressed its evils; Britain's reconquest was seen, at least at a popular level, as being directed against it, and as the completion of Gordon's work. But far from

abolishing slavery altogether, the Government actively encouraged its continuance. Both Cromer's original draft and the finalized version of the Condominium Agreement forbade only the importing and exporting of slaves. No mention was made of their continuance in service, or of their sale. In his <u>Memorandum to Mudirs</u>, Kitchener stated that

> As long as service is willingly rendered by servants to Masters it is unnecessary to interfere in the conditions existing between them.[43]

In 1926, a Report on slavery in the Sudan stated that runaway slaves who were unemployed were either to return to their masters or be sent to jail.[44] Every major official of the Government agreed with this view, which was based on the understanding that the Sudanese economy depended on it, and that its abolition would cause severe economic upset and likely provoke "renewed religious upheavals similar to the Mahdist revolt".[45]

While this pragmatic attitude was espoused as the rationale for the slavery policy, it should be noted that the Sudan had a great shortage of labor at this time, so much so that the Government encouraged immigration.[46] Slatin, the Inspector-General of the Sudan, expressed his reasoning less subtly. His experience in the Sudan had certainly informed him of the economic and social effects of forced emancipation[47], yet his words cast a shadow on the motives of the Government's formulation of policy. In a letter to Queen Victoria he wrote:

> I am sure that Her Majesty cannot be ignorant
> of the inherent bad qualities of those negro
> races who we seek in vain to raise to our own
> level. These godforsaken Swine do not deserve
> to be treated like free and independent men....[48]

The Governor of Kordofan held a similar view:

> personally I am not a great admirer of the
> black man at his home and am certain that you
> see him at his best as a slave or soldier.[49]

The provincial governors, afraid of the consequences of emancipation to the agricultural economy, aided the slave-owners, by inducing slaves "to remain in their provinces".[50]

All of these high Government officials were correct in their judgement that sudden emancipation would create problems. Wingate, for example, thought that "any attempt on the part of the slavery department[51] to interfere (in domestic slavery) ...will provide hundreds of Abdel Kaders[52] before long...".[53] Yet officially, Government policy was to discourage slavery and gradually eliminate it. But with the danger of insurrection always in mind, the Government's actual treatment of the slavery issue was a significant attempt to conciliate the slave-owners, and thus was a part of the Government's bargain in collaboration.

6. Collaboration: The ^cUlamā'.

One central concern permeated the philosophy and policies
of the Condominium Government in its first twenty years. That was
that the Sudanese were a superstitious people, prone to attach
themselves to wild-eyed sūfīs, as they had done before, and that
the spark always existed, even in a seemingly trivial incident,
that could ignite another Mahdist-style uprising. There was, in-
deed, a great number of minor revolts during the period, many
of them inspired by little-known religious leaders. To counter
the appeal of the sūfīs and control their activities, the Go-
vernment early decided to set up an orthodox hierarchy, as the
Turco-Egyptian regime had done before it. The relationship be-
tween the ^culamā' and the Government was, of course, to be of
mutual benefit: the ^culamā' could be counted on to support Go-
vernment objectives, and the Government, for its part, did all
it could to propagate orthodox Islam. The authority of the
^culamā was extremely limited: even in the last phase of Condomi-
nium rule, in the late 1940s, the influence of the ^culamā' class
was limited to the towns, the agricultural and nomadic popula-
tions being governed primarily by customary law.[54]

Throughout the period the Government undertook to build
mosques in the principal towns. In 1910 alone, eight public
mosques were opened in Berber, Dongola, Kassala, Kordofan, and

the Upper Nile Province.[55] Slatin had control of a special fund
used to help local committees in building mosques. The money
was, it was considered, well spent for the political gains it
returned.[56] Further, if the Government education policy was mi-
serly, it did allow for the support of Qur'ānic teaching in
kuttābs.[57] The ḥajj (pilgrimage to Mecca), which had been banned
by the Mahdists, was reinstated with Government support, as it
was recognized that such a step would have a beneficial effect on
public opinion.[58] Government support of orthodox Islam was most
clearly indicated by the decision to reserve all legal matters
dealing with personal status (marriage, inheritance, etc.) to
the Sharīᶜa Courts it set up through the Sudan Mohammedan Law
Courts Ordinance of 1902.[59] The post of Chief Qāḍī (qāḍī al-
quḍāt) was held by Egyptians until after World War II[60], but the
Government moved soon after its inception to provide indigenous
court officials, whose authority, while limited, was nonetheless
a measure of the Government's desire to avoid the appearance of
intervention in religious affairs. Kitchener wrote in the Report
for 1913 that

> the Courts have reached a highly creditable
> state of efficiency. This satisfactory state
> of things is due partly to the education and
> training in the Gordon College Sheikh's School,
> from which the staff of the Law Courts is now
> recruited. [61]

Of course, the qāḍīs did not function simply out of zeal for
maintaining Islamic norms: all qāḍīs and their clerks were, in
fact, paid monthly salaries by the Government.[62]

The British, then, kept their part of the bargain with the orthodox hierarchy: the qāḍīs retained some authority and were assured of a government income; the hājj was encouraged and those who performed it were supported at Government expense; mosques were financed out of Government funds; and, of course, the very policy of trying to limit the appeal of the sūfī orders was seen as a benefit to the ᶜulamā', their rivals for influence.

The ᶜulamā' side of the bargain became clear in 1901, when the Government established what became known as the Board of ᶜUlamā'. In instituting this body Wingate hoped to counter the ṭarīqas and to obtain a formal religious sanction for actions taken against them and others.[63] The Board consisted in approximately ten ᶜulamā' who, like the qāḍīs, were paid Government employees.[64] An indication of the purpose of the Board is given by the fact that among its members were several of Slatin's closest friends, with whom he maintained close contact.[65]

In theory,

> All government decisions on matters regarding
> Islam were henceforth to require the sanction
> of the board.[66]

But in the eyes of the Sudanese, and no doubt in the eyes of the ᶜulamā' themselves, this was an extremely broad grant of authority, as almost anything could be interpreted as a matter regarding Islam. In practice, however, the Board's deliberations were

restricted to sanctifying Government actions against fakīs and
other trouble makers, and to insignificant administrative tasks.

Just as the ᶜulamā' under the Turco-Egyptian regime had
supported the Government against the Mahdi, so they were called
upon to condemn "heretics" by the British. A proclamation by the
Government that regulated private meetings and was used to limit
ṭarīqa activities was approved by the Board as "in accordance
with the principles of the Mohammadan religion."[67]

More typical of the Board's day to day functioning was its
issuing of the first "Regulations for teaching Islamic Religious
knowledge in the Maahad El Mashikha El Alma in Omdurman and
Khartoum and in the mosques of Provinces and Districts", which
were themselves only promulgated after the approval of the Gover-
nor-General. Furthermore, the "Maahad" itself eventually came
under Government control, and its teachers became simply paid
Government employees.[68] Wingate's true opinion of these Sudanese
worthies may be drawn from a comment he made when in the process
of constituting the Governor-General's Council[69]:

> there are no such people in the Soudan suitable
> to occupy a seat on the Council;...The Sudanese
> themselves are mere children...[70]

It is obvious, then, that the Board of ᶜUlamā' was con-
trived by the Government to legitimize the latter's activities,

and to lend some importance to the leaders of orthodox Islam.
In the words of one student of the matter,

> The government succeeded in associating
> the landowners, the ^culama and the qadis
> with the new administration. Their eco-
> nomic well-being and their religious be-
> liefs were secured by the government's
> policy.[71]

But because the influence of the ^culamā' was felt only in the
towns, and even there was minimized by their status as govern-
ment functionaries, they could never fulfill the function the
Government desired of them, that is, the neutralizing if not the
erosion of ṭarīqa power.

7. The Failure Of ᶜUlamā' Collaboration: Renewed Religious
Risings.

Upon the establishment of the Board of ᶜUlamā', Wingate
wrote to Cromer that he hoped to use the Board to control un-
othodox Islamic activities.[72] Wingate's tenure in office was to
witness a number of outbreaks of religiously-inspired revolt
with which the Board was supposed to deal, but had no power to
control. The Board, of course, was more than willing to cooperate
with the Government in such matters:

> In February 1902 Wingate noted in his diary
> his opinion that Mahdiism was again resurgent
> though he felt that those pillars of loyalty,
> 'Sidi' ᶜAli al Mirghani and Shaykh Muhammad
> al-Bedawi, the president of the board of Is-
> lamic notables, were perhaps a little alarmist
> in their talk.

While the "pillars of loyalty" were indeed alarmist, the Govern-
ment nonetheless used the utmost force and drastic punishments
in its attempt to suppress these revolts. Perhaps in his anxiety
that the administration (and, by extension, he himself) should
impress the Government in London, Cromer continually played
down the concern with which these risings were viewed. The Re-
port for 1900 showed that Wingate too had no desire to publi-
cize such events, for in it he wrote that "during the past year
complete tranquility has prevailed throughout the districts' ad-
ministered by the Soudan Government".[74] Yet in that very year
at least three disconcerting incidents occurred: one involving
"a small remnant of the Dervish force" which was raiding in

Dar Kara[75]; and another of which was precipitated by a group in Omdurman that was expecting the appearance of the Prophet Jesus. These last were condemned by the ᶜulamā' and deported.[76]

In 1901 similar incidents occurred. In the Gezira, religious notables were arrested on suspicion of reviving Mahdism;[77] the "remnant of the Dervish force" referred to in the previous Report was still at large and living "by plundering and brigandage";[78] a man claiming to be the Mahdi appeared at Khartoum and was duly removed to Ḥalfā;[79] and the ᶜulamā' were again assigned to the case of a shaykh suspected of disloyalty.[80]

By 1903 the Government's patience had begun to wear thin. "A dangerous fanatic" in Kordofan who claimed to be acting upon divine inspiration, was executed at El-Obeid. Cromer upheld this judgement, stating that he considered "that this prompt action will serve as a salutory lesson to all persons who claim divine inspiration in order to override Government. authority".[81] Similar action was taken against another Prophet. Jesus in 1904, who in Sennar was killed by Government police, two of his followers being soon afterwards executed.[82]

Accounts of uprisings and executions alternated with misleading comments on the "tranquility" of the Sudan in Government reports. But the most serious of the risings was given due

attention. In 1908 a former retainer of the Khalīfa ^cAbdallāhi, ^cAbd al-Qādir Muḥammad wad Imām (called Wad Habūba) rose up against the Government. Wad Habūba had been cheated out of some property by his brother, whose claims had been upheld by the Government.[83]In his first clash with a Government force, two officers and fifteen soldiers were killed. Soon after this Wad Habūba was captured and with ten of his followers condemned to death. After some controversy among Government officials, only Wad Habūba himself was executed, with both British officers and the <u>^culamā'</u> protesting the commutations.[84] Always conscious of the importance of British public opinion, and obviously afraid of the effects upon it of a series of public executions, Wingate wrote privately to Gorst:

> in the present political situation both in Egypt and at home, I think the less said in official reports about burning insurgents' houses, putting them in chains, etc., the better.[85]

While the Wad Habūba rising does not in itself mark a turning point in the Government's relations with Sudanese religious leadership, it was, however, another step toward recognition that the <u>^culamā'</u>, while eager to serve, did not have control over their co-religionists.The events of the years between 1908 and the outbreak of World War I were to confirm this. In 1909 two of Wad Habūba's followers were caught and executed. In 1910 the appearance of Halley's Comet inspired the manifestation

of another Prophet Jesus (who, with his son, was killed)[86];
a _fakī_ and his three sons were charged with murder and religious
fanaticism and sentenced to the ultimate penalty[87]; and yet
another Mahdi proclaimed himself in the Blue Nile Province.[88]
In 1912 a Tunisian pilgrim claimed Mahdi-ship and was shot dead
with seven of his adherents.[89] To list all such incidents would
be exhausting: they occurred with startling frequency every year
and were no doubt greatly responsible for the Government's
changed attitude, during the War, toward the _sūfī_ shaykhs.[90]

It should be noted, however, before passing to a discus-
sion of the _tarīqas_, that all of the religiously-inspired revolts
were ultimately failures, and that this was due in part to a lack
of popular support. This view, stated in the Government Reports
at the time[91], is upheld by more recent critiques.[92] A probable
explanation of this non-support can be based simply upon the
recent experience of the Mahdia, and the disasters that had fol-
lowed the accession of the Khalīfa ͨAbdallāhi, as well as to
the extreme harshness with which the Government dealt with such
dissent.

The failure of the ͨulamā' to lend the sanctity of reli-
gion to the Government meant their eventual demise as a viable
repository of leadership. The Government's entire Islamic poli-
cy, formulated by Wingate and Slatin, and carried out through all

of the government departments, had been based on the support
of orthodox Islam as a counterbalance to popular Islam. The
^{c}ulamā', and, more specifically, the Board of ^{c}Ulamā', were cen-
tral to this policy. Their obvious impotence to sway the mass
of Sudanese forced the Government to seek an alternate partner.
This is did by recognizing the obvious: that the great sufi
leaders maintained perhaps a stronger hold than ever before on
the large majority of the population. Thus, at the outbreak of
World War I, when officers and troops had to be removed to the
front and the Government was dangerously ill-manned, the sufi
shaykhs lost the stigma of fanaticism and were themselves co-
opted. This process was to lead also to the stunning recoup of
Mahdist fortunes. But before examining in more detail government-
tarīqa cooperation, a brief exposition of the tarīqas' progress
during the period is necessary.

8. Government-Tariqa Collaboration.

In his celebrated Memorandum to Mudirs, Kitchener set out in brief the Islamic policy that was to be followed until World War I. He wrote that

> Fikis teaching différent Tarikhs ... should not be allowed to resume their former trade. In old days, these Fikis, who lived on the superstitious ignorance of the people, were one of the curses of the Soudan, and were responsible in a great measure for the rebellion.... Mosques in the principal towns will be rebuilt; but private mosques, takias, zawiyas, sheikhs' tombs, etc., cannot be allowed to be re-established, as they generally formed centres of unorthodox fanaticism.... [93]

We have seen that Wingate subscribed to this view, and that he therefore depended on the Board of ^cUlamā' to check the apprehended growth of the ṭarīqas.[94] Slatin, whose influence in Islamic affairs was paramount because of his position as Inspector General, was even more deeply suspicious of the religious orders. He wrote, for instance, to Wingate in 1913:

> 'My dear old Rex,
>   I am expelling 3 fikhis from the Yemen and the Hejaz who were preaching Rott (sic) and Nonsence (sic)!'[95]

Slatin's antipathy carried over to Sayyid ^cAlī al-Mīrghanī of the Khātmīya, whom he strongly opposed when the Sayyid asked Wingate to deport a leader of the rival Majdhūbīya order.[96] Slatin was similarly upset when the governor of Kordofan gave what was, in effect, official recognition to the Isma^cīlīya order by appointing a leader of the order at El-Obeid.[97]

The provincial officials who had to deal with the ṭarīqas appear to have had little understanding of the rituals or role of these important organizations. One inspector wrote that " ...It is when one sees such men (ṣūfīs) that one realizes the difficulty of any truce with Islam...".[98] Everyone recalled that the Mahdi had been a member of the Sammānīya order. But the Government's imperfect comprehension of Sudanese Islam did not include distinctions between ṣūfīs and ex-ṣūfīs, or, in this case, a ṣūfī leader and one who advocated the abolition of the ṭarīqas, as the Mahdi had. The Government could not trust what it neither knew nor understood, and adopted/a policy designed to weaken the ṭarīqas'hold on the people.

We have seen, for example, how the Government used a proclamation limiting private meetings to control ṣūfī gatherings. The Board of ᶜUlamā' was, of course, a major tool against the orders. Also, by simply not officially recognizing the existence of the ṭarīqas, the Government naively tried to limit their bargaining power.

It should be noted that despite the official policy of non-recognition of the ṣūfī ṭarīqas, the Khatmīya, because of its record of cooperation during the Turco-Egyptian regime, and its long opposition to Mahdism, was always considered a special case, if not by Slatin, then by the Government as a whole:

Sayyid ^CAli al-Mirghani was awarded the C.M.G.
(Companion of the Order of St. Michael and St.
George) in 1900, thus becoming the first and
only notable of the Sudan to receive a British
decoration until the First World War. Further-
more, the central mosque of the Khatmiyya which
was destroyed during the Mahdia was rebuilt by
the government in the Khatmiyya quarter of Kassala
despite the official policy not to assist sufi
zawiya....In 1912 ...Wingate wrote a letter to
Sayyid ^CAli, which granted him semi-official re-
cognition as head of his family.... When Cecil[99]
in 1916 suggested that their subsidy should be
stopped, Wingate objected strongly, stating that
they were '...amongst the few who are genuinely
and entirely on our side....[100]

Further, the Khatmiya consistently upheld Wingate's policy of
reducing Egyptian influence: we have already noted Sayyid ^CAli's
reference to the Egyptians as "a race of slaves"; and the Khat-
miya feared the competition of other tariqas, especially the
Majdhubiya, its long-time rival, and consequently informed
against them.[101]

There are, of course, other examples of tariqa collabora-
tion with the Government, although the Khatmiya is treated more
extensively in the sources, and, in any case appears to be the
only important tariqa to have a history of government coopera-
tion. The Idrisiya order helped the Intelligence Department
in its communications with the Sanusiya[102]; and the Shaykh of
the Sanusiya himself was reported in 1913 as showing "a disposi-
tion to assist the authorities in preventing any disturbance."[103]
As early as 1903, Wingate had suggested leniency for the son of
Sayyid Isma^Cil al-Makki (head of the Isma^Ciliya tariqa in Kordo-
fan), who had been imprisoned for slave-raiding. Wingate wrote

that he thought "it would be good policy to let the man out on account of his father's services...".[104] It is significant, however, that the cooperation between tariqa and Government followed the same pattern as it had during the Turco-Egyptian period, that is, that the continuing rivalries between orders induced such cooperation. (One sign that the old rivalries remained was a violent clash in Omdurman in 1902 between the followers of Sayyid cAlī and those of Sayyid al-Makkī Ismācīl.)[105] By favoring the culamā' throughout the early years of the Condominium, and by failing to make distinctions among the orders (except in the case of the Khatmīya), the Government inadvertently forced the sufī orders into the position of competing for government favor in order to sustain their own positions. The loyalty of the Khatmīya should not be seen as complete approval of the new regime (any more than its collaboration with the Turco-Egyptian government), but rather in the same light as culamā' collaboration: a means of protecting and enhancing its position.

The situation of the tariqas changed drastically after 1914, and this change will be taken up after a brief discussion of the Ansār's position during the Condominium's first decade.

9. The Anṣār.

The final defeat of Mahdism did not, as evidenced by the repeated risings described above, mark the end of Mahdism as a force in the Sudan. On the contrary, despite the Mahdi's opposition to the ṭarīqas, the Anṣār rapidly evolved into what was, and is, in effect, a powerful religious fraternity, with a social and political role similar to that of a ṣūfī brotherhood.[106] The Government had hoped, at its inception, to neutralize prominent Anṣār: as early as 1900 it was reported that many of the pupils in the new primary school at Omdurman were "the sons of former Dervish Emirs".[107] One such student was Yehia, the son of the Khalīfa ᶜAbdallāhi, who was described in 1908 as having "learnt a trade" and planning to "be employed in the Khartoum Government workshops", while his brother, ᶜUmar, had been "sent to Gordon College".[108] These naive attempts to stem Mahdist influence by coopting those who were considered natural Mahdist leaders were quickly to be proven failures. It is likely, in fact, that the training of ex-Mahdists' children was undertaken at least partly for the benefit of British public opinion, to show that the Government was gaining the acceptance of even its most vociferous opponents.

This, of course, was not true. It was a constant source of embarassment that the most important Mahdists had to be kept

in prison because of their refusal to recant.[109] Attention was focussed on them through reports in the Egyptian press (and subsequent questions in Parliament) about their alleged mistreatment. The prisoners' welfare was thereafter considered sufficiently important to be mentioned in several Reports.[110] The influential Mahdist leaders who were not in jail were carefully watched by the Government, and their movements restricted.[111]

Just as it was realized that the $\underline{tariqas}$ still constituted more prestigious religious leadership than the $^{c}\underline{ulama'}$, so too the Government came to accept the Ansār as a similar repository of mass respect. The Ansār remained especially strong in the Gezira and in Kordofan and Darfur. The Government therefore acted to maintain cordial relations with the surviving mambers of the Mahdi's family, especially his posthumous son, Sayyid ^{c}Abd al-Rahmān al-Mahdi, who emerged as the leader of the Ansar. He was eventually allowed to live on Abā Island, the cradle of Mahdism, and there to consolidate his and his sect's economic positions.[112]

The cooperation of Sayyid ^{c}Abd al-Rahmān with the British should not be overly surprising. The Mahdists were first and foremost anti-Egyptian, and blamed the Egyptians for bringing the British into the Sudan in order to reestablish their own rule there in the future.[113] Since the Ansār felt that the British would someday have to leave the Sudan, an alliance with

them would at least prevent renewed Egyptian interference.[114]
Further, the Ansār leadership properly viewed itself as vying
with the Khatmīya for the leadership of Sudanese opinion.[115]
This rivalry, in turn, was exploited by the British to win the
cooperation of each side. An emerging sentiment in the Sudan
toward merger with Egypt cemented the Government-Ansār relation-
ship, as Sayyid ^CAbd al-Rahmān and other important religious
leaders supported eventual Sudanese independence rather than the
merger.[116]

10. World War I: The Success Of Collaboration.

The outbreak of the Great War posed serious problems for the Condominium Government. The war effort in Europe required lessening the concentrations of troops in the Sudan, and the transfer of many senior officers. Religiously-inspired revolts had not ceased, and there was an understandable if poorly-founded belief that the Sudanese would rise in support of the Muslim Ottoman Empire, an ally of the Central Powers. These fears caused the Government to alter its policy toward the Sudanese religious elite. As we have seen, the fact that the tariqas and the Anṣār remained preferential to the Sudanese had been recognized already, but during the war years they came to completely overshadow the ᶜulamā'.

One Government action of considerable foresight was the heavy importation of millet from India in 1914, a year in which famine conditions existed in the northern and central regions of the country due to poor rainfall and a low Nile. When hostilities began in Europe in late 1914, the Government was therefore able to distribute grain to the affected areas. It was reported that "this step made a great impression on the natives, which was not without its effect during the critical time of the war".[117]

The fear that the Sudanese would feel a bond of religious loyalty to the Turks was groundless. Antipathy toward the old Turco-Egyptian regime remained strong, and the issues of the war were, of course, only vaguely understood in the Sudan. Sir Lee Stack, who was Governor-General at the end of the war (Wingate having left office on 1 January 1917) reported that

> Those religious and tribal leaders who were capable of appreciating the issues involved offered expressions of loyalty and confidence....[118]

The Government also acted to stem the flow and effects of pan-Islamic propaganda. Censorship was established; key garrisons were strengthened; a more vigorous system of patrols was introduced; martial law was upheld; and new laws were promulgated granting emergency powers to the Government.[119]

The Government moved to allay its fears of trouble by more serious attempts to win over the brotherhoods. The Khatmīya, of course, was considered safe. And the Ansār were soon to prove their willingness to cooperate, as Wingate, discussing a religious uprising at Jabal Qadīr in 1915, wrote:

> I am glad we knocked out the Gedir Fiki -- (private) the man who informed against him was Abderrahman the late Mahdi's son -- rather satisfactory....[120]

Further, in an action reminiscent of the Khalifa's concern over loyalty oaths, the "Sudan Book of Loyalty" was created, and was signed by five hundred religious and tribal notables, who pledged

"their full support for Great Britain and her allies during the war".[121]

The collaboration of the $\underline{sufi}$ orders and the Anṣār with the Government in preventing the outbreak of pro-Turkish sympathies proved successful and ensured the acceptance of these institutions of popular Islam. Even the tribal revolt in Arabia in 1916 failed to stir the Sudanese, who, in Stack's words,

> were interested and sympathetic, but did
> not seem specially concerned, looking on
> the Holy Places of the Hedjaz as being
> religious rather than political centres.[122]

The extent of the rise to prominence of the popular Islamic leadership is evidenced well enough by their and the Government's actions immediately after the war. Like those Sudanese worthies who had journeyed to the court of Muḥammad CAlī a century before, a delegation of notables travelled to London in 1919 to offer their congratulations to King George V on the successful completion of the war. Among them were Sayyid CAbd al-Raḥmān and Sayyid CAlī al-Mīrghanī, and other $\underline{sufi}$ leaders.[123] This delegation was warmly received by the King in July, at which time Sayyid CAbd al-Raḥmān offered the sword of his father, the Mahdi, to His Britannic Majesty, who graciously refused it.[124] But

> The most important business of the occasion
> was, no doubt, the confirmation both by 'H.M.
> The King and the High Officials of Government

of the policy adopted ever since the re-
conquest of the Sudan in 1898-99 -- namely,
that Egypt would never again be allowed to
rule the country.[125]

Interestingly, and again reminiscent of Turco-Egyptian times,

the Royal Family also visted the Sudan. The King and Queen came

in January, 1912. During the war, visits were paid by the Prince

of Wales in 1916 and the Duke of Connaught in 1917. It was felt

that these visits would impress the Sudanese, and aid in keeping

the country calm during the war.[126]

Another factor involved in the Government's shift in at-

titude toward the popular Islamic leadership was the outbreak

of revolution in Egypt in 1919.[127] Five months before the Su-

danese delegation went to London, the Government had refused

permission to Sayyid ᶜAlī, Sayyid ᶜAbd al-Raḥmān, and Sharīf

Yūsuf al-Hindi[128] to propagandize among the Sudanese in order

to increase support for the Government, fearing that such ac-

tivity would be offensive to the Egyptians, who were in-

censed by Condominium in name only. After the outbreak of the

revolt in Egypt, however, they were allowed to publish the first

political newspaper in the Sudan, the Hadarat al-Sudan, under

the direction of Sayyid ᶜAbd al-Raḥmān's nephew, Sayyid Ḥusayn

Sharīf.[129]

World War I, and the fears of British officials in the

Sudan caused by its outbreak, precipitated the completion of

the Government's shift from reliance on the ᶜulamā' to the leaders of popular Islam. It is probable that this move would have been made anyway, as the Government became more educated in the realities of Sudanese Islam. At war's end, Stack credited the calmness of the country to "the loyal co-operation of the (religious) Sheikhs and Chiefs of tribes".[130] We shall see in the next section that the British inadvertently aided the growth of the brotherhoods' influence by continuing the trends of the previous regimes in lessening the power of traditional tribal authority. The resultant loss of that leadership's prestige and the concomitant insecurity of the tribal population caused the increased popularity of the brotherhoods which were, on the one hand, identified with anti-colonial sentiments, and, on the other hand, with successful dealings with the alien regime. The discrediting of the tribal leadership and the total subjection and limited appeal of the ᶜulamā' led inevitably to the emergence of the ṭarīqas and the Anṣār as the natural voice of Sudanese aspirations.

11. <u>The Failure Of Tribal Collaboration.</u>

While the popular Islamic religious elite had been recog-
nized by the 1920s as the most influential leaders of Sudanese
opinion, the British had originally based many of their hopes
on the winning-over of tribal leadership. Because of the enor-
mous area of the Sudan, the lack of good communications, the in-
adequate manpower available to the Government, and the preva-
lence of nomadism over much of the country, it was impossible
to control the tribal population without the cooperation of its
traditional leadership.

> Several motives combined to make this policy
> especially acceptable to the British. Among
> these was the tradition of colonial self-
> government in the earlier 'white' colonies;
> the extensiveness of the new 'coloured' em-
> pire; its distant and scattered distribution;
> and the cost and difficulty of extending
> sufficient British staff to establish 'direct'
> relations with tens of millions of new subjects.[131]

Lord Lugard himself warned that 'as little Government interfer-
ence as possible should be allowed, as the constant involvement
of the Government in tribal affairs would create insurmountable
difficulties for a chief whose authority rested solely upon his
legitimacy in the eyes of his fellow tribesmen.[132] Despite its
repeated intentions in this respect, however, the Condominium
Government precluded any possibility of a revival of tribal
authority. The British experience in Egypt, where "advisors"
were attached to the Egyptian Government Ministries and even-

tually became the effective rulers, went unheeded in Sudanese

tribal relations. In Egypt the British had attempted to set in

power a class loyal to British interests. But

> The Pashas had proved themselves helpless and
> hopeless for the British purpose. Beneath them,
> the sheikhs, village elders and minor officials
> seemed to be even worse. [133]

The search for tribal leaders in the Sudan who were loyal but

at the same time effective would be equally fruitless.

Tribal collaboration with the British began long before

the final defeat of the Khalīfa ^CAbdallāhi. Indeed, as we have

seen, resistance against the Khalīfa's regime, such as that of

the Kabābīsh, was assisted by the British.[134] In 1896, letters

were sent by the Egyptian Army's Intelligence Department (Win-

gate) to a number of tribes and individuals offering clemency

in return for their abandoning the Mahdist cause.[135] During the

Dongola campaign of 1896-1897, "some of the riverain tribes,

especially the Ja^Caliyyin, raised tribal levies who participated

in the final stages of the advance on Khartoum".[136] Theobald

relates the story of a "treacherous Shaikh", who, after sur-

rendering to the British, spread rumors of an impending British

march on Dongola, which resulted in the Mahdists' abandoning

their positions and pulling back to defend their families.[137]

Many requests for clemency were received. A certain ^CAbd

al-Rahīm abū Daqal, a Mahdist amīr, was granted amnesty by Slatin

in 1898, and was later rewarded with the nazirship of a branch

of the Hamar tribe.[138]

Great concern was taken in the early days of the Condominium to conciliate the tribes. In typically euphemistic phrases, it was reported in 1901 that the Government had decided

> to abolish certain taxes, and reduce, or suspend the collection of others which proved premature, and would have pressed unduly on the inhabitants and mitigated against the prosperity and good Government of the country. [139]

The same report, however, mentioned Slatin's suggestion of requiring "small payments" from the nomadic tribes, by way of tribute[140], an idea that became policy the following year.[141]

As in religious affairs, Slatin's position with regard to nomadic tribal affairs was paramount. But his mandate was sufficiently broad, and the distinctions between nomadic and sedentary tribes sufficiently obscure, that he supervised, in fact, all matters pertaining to the tribes.[142] He demanded absolute obedience from them, and fought as diligently to reward it as he did to punish any indications of insubordination. Armed patrols actively assisted Government authority wherever it was threatened.[143] As he had at the institution of the Board of ^cUlamā', he saw that personal acquaintances were installed in key posts. The Sudan's Intelligence Department, which he headed, employed several important ex-Mahdists, and included many men of local prominence.[144] Patrols helped to enforce the payment of

Government fines and the laying down of illegal arms. The Government continued, however, to supply firearms to select shaykhs as rewards for services rendered.[145]

The use of patrols had the effect, of course, of further eroding the authority of tribal leadership. The crux of the problem was the Government's feeling that tribal shaykhs were simply agents of the central administration and were to be treated as such.[146] The rebuilding of tribal authority was paid little attention, and even those policies designed to aid the collaboration of shaykhs, such as paying Government salaries to them, lessened their credibility as independent representatives of tribal sentiment. Slatin was as responsible for this misguided policy as anyone: he seemed

> to have regarded the pro-Mahdist Sudanese
> society as an ideal which should serve as
> a model for the new administration.... He
> tried to restore the tribes to their posi-
> tion in pre-Mahdist times. This applied to
> tribal customs as well as to the choice of
> personnel. Slatin appointed nazirs and shaykhs
> whom he had known personally rather than the
> men favoured by the local British officials.[147]

This predilection of Slatin's for choosing personal acquaintances led to the application of the term "Slatin's nāzirs" to them.[148] While in the short-run these appointments helped to pacify turbulent tribes, the long-term effect was to render meaningless the traditional role of tribal shaykh.

The very duties assigned to the chiefs demeaned them.
Aside from the functions of dispensing justice (in limited si-
tuations), the shaykh was charged with digging wells, building
roads, guarding communications, reporting deaths, and collecting
taxes.[149] Specifically because of the constant threat of re-
moval from office, and the tenuous nature of the shaykhs' au-
thority in general, tribal leadership became not a viable arm
of government but merely an economical device dependent on the
military power of the regime. In those cases where the tribe
itself chose its shaykh, the Government reserved the right,
which it exercised, to overrule the choice. Consequently, those
Government-appointed shaykhs became known as "Kelab al-Hukuma"
(dogs of the Government).[150]

With insubordinate tribes and tribal leaders Slatin dealt
harshly. Collective punishment was inflicted until the tribe
paid its fine, martial law imposed if necessary.[151] The nomadic
tribes presented more serious problems than the sedentaries. The
latter were more willing to report crimes to the Government, and
tended to pay their tribute on time.[152] One attempt by a dis-
sident nomad to assume tribal leadership resulted in the im-
mediate arrest of the man and his principal supporters.[153] But

> There were certain exceptions to this policy,
> notably amongst the camel owning tribes of
> Kordofan. [C]Ali Wad al-Tom, the nazir of the
> Kababish throughout the period, enjoyed a large
> measure of autonomy.... The Kababish, many of
> whom had been staunch opponents of the Khalifa,
> had to be rewarded by the British authorities....[154]

Another area in which tribal authority was whittled away by Government intervention was in tribal vengeance. In one such case, involving the Hadendowa, the tribes agreed that

> the tribes of the murdered man and the mur-
> derer are not to fight. The tribe of the
> murdered man may kill the murderer where-
> ever they find him, and his fellow tribesmen
> must afford him no assistance.[155]

When the provincial governor learned of this pact he forbade its implementation, causing the offended tribe to complain of the Government's "unwarranted interference with their rights and duties".[156] Slatin, consistent in his belief in maintaining tribal customs, favored the payment of blood money, and in one case showed his disgust with a governor who had under-assessed the payment due to the relations of a dead man.[157]

In short, Slatin's romantic hope of returning the Su-danese tribes to their pre-Mahdist status went unrealized. The Turco-Egyptian and Mahdist regimes had so diluted tribal au-thority that it could hardly be revitalized, even with Govern-ment tolerance. But the constant interference of the Government made impossible the independent functioning of even those tribes that had retained a semblance of their traditional modus operandi. Despite Slatin's efforts, and the pronouncements of the Govern-ment that the tribes would govern themselves, Willis, a director of intelligence from 1906 to 1919 summed up the view of the tribes when he said:

It is not surprising if the natives could
detect but little difference between the
old Turkish, the Dervishes and the Sudan
Government. They all raided, but the last
was not interested in slaves but took cattle
only and was possibly more efficient in the
methods of getting them.[158]

The failure of tribal authority to reassert itself con-
trasts sharply with the remarkable surge in the power of the
brotherhoods during the first two decades of Condominium rule.
The two cases do, in fact, illustrate the gamble involved in
collaboration. Neither the brotherhoods nor the tribal leaders
had any choice but to accommodate themselves somehow to alien
rule. Yet the former, by retaining its popular appeal and
steering a middle course between resistance and outright depen-
dence, were able to benefit from it. The tribal shaykhs, how-
ever, depended upon a reputation of unhindered independence to
maintain their authority: they could not exist side by side
a strong central regime and retain that authority. In addition
to the pressure of the Government, the tribes also had to con-
tend with continued urbanization, centralization, and the ra-
pidly changing economy of the Sudan, as well as with the allure
of the Anṣār and the ṭarīqas as alternatives to the tribal re-
lationship. The seeds of nationalism had been sown, and their
cultivation left little ground on which tribal authority could
survive.

NOTES

1

Muddathir Abdel Rahim, Imperialism And Nationalism In The
Sudan, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1969, pp. 22-23.

2

Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher with Alice Denny, Africa
And The Victorians, London, Macmillan, 1965, p. 286.

3

It is doubtful that France possessed the technological resour-
ces to dam the Nile, and more doubtful that she would have
risked war in such a way. The British were certain that
the Mahdists lacked this capability. (See Ibid, p. 285.)

4

Ibid., p. 283.

5

Holt, A Modern History, p. 103.

6

Mekki Shibeika, British Policy In The Sudan 1882-1902, London,
Oxford University Press, 1952, p. 352; Robinson and Gal-
lagher, Africa, p. 346.
        The French had already begun their drive toward the
Upper Nile, which was to end at Fashoda. The final ap-
proval of Marchand's mission, in fact, was seen by the
French as "a race towards the Upper Nile between them and
the British". (Shibeika, British Policy, p. 358.)

7

Robinson and Gallagher, Africa, p. 255.

8

L.A. Fabunmi, The Sudan In Anglo-Egyptian Relations A Case
Study In Power Politics 1800-1956, London, Longmans, 1960,
p. 199.

9

Ibid., p. 200; Robinson and Gallagher, Africa, p. 1.

10

Fabunmi, The Sudan, p. 177.

11

See Shibeika, British Policy, pp. 407, 409.

12
  Abdel Rahim, Imperialism, pp. 30-31.

13
  Robinson and Gallagher, Africa, p. 368.

14
  The Sudan received a large subvention from Egypt annually un-
      til 1913.

15
  Gabriel Warburg, The Sudan Under Wingate Administration in
      the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan 1899-1916, London, Frank Cass,
      1971, p. 7.

16
  Ibid., p. 6.

17
  Philip Magnus, Kitchener Portrait Of An Imperialist, London,
      John Murray, 1964, p. 148.

18
  Ibid., p. 151. Cromer told Salisbury that Kitchener "did not
      see with sufficient clearness the difference between
      governing a country and commanding a regiment". (Ibid.)

19
  Ibid.

20
  Abdel Rahim, Imperialism, p. 230.

21
  G.G.R.: 1900, p. 56. The Report for the Sudan continued to be
      written throughout the period by the Consul-General in
      Cairo.

22
  G.G.R.: 1904, p. 118. Gorst, who succeeded Cromer in 1907
      (Cromer having retired) agreed: "It should always be borne
      in mind", he wrote, "that for the money spent in the
      Soudan, Egypt has acquired a peaceful southern frontier
      and an assured water supply. By this undoubtedly remunera-
      tive investment she has secured for herself a sound and
      inexpensive insurance policy." (G.G.R.: 1910, p. 74)

23
  The Sudan budget was worked out in meetings every year in
      Cairo and Britain. The control of the Consul-General over
      budgetary matters constituted his greatest leverage in
      Sudanese affairs.

24

   Muddathir Abdel Rahim "Early Sudanese Nationalism: 1900-
      1938", _SNR_, XLVII, 1966, p. 40.

25

  Warburg, _The Sudan_, p. 3.

26

  Abdel Rahim, "Early Sudanese Nationalism", p. 41.

27

  Warburg, _The Sudan_, p. 92.

28

  Ibid., p. 84; See also G.A.V. Keays Bey, "A Note on The History
      of The Camel Corps", _SNR_, XXII, 1939, 1, p. 105.

29

  Warburg, _The Sudan_, p. 20.

30

  Ibid., p.19.

31

  Kitchener disdained to write the Report, and had Wingate write
      it in his (Kitchener's) name. (_Ibid._, pp. 4-5.)

32

  _G.G.R._: 1900, p. 76.

33

  Mohamed Omer Beshir, _Educational Development In The Sudan_
      _1898-1956_, Oxford, Clarendon Press, pp. 28-29.
          Currie joined the Sudan Government in 1900 as its
    first Director of Education, and served in that capacity
    until 1914 (Hill, _A Biographical Dictionary_, pp. 106-107.)

34

  _G.G.R._: 1903, p. 94.

35

  _G.G.R._: 1906, p. 71.

36

  _G.G.R._: 1909, p. 74.

37

  _G.G.R._: 1910, p. 91.

38

  _G.G.R._: 1913, p. 66.

39

  See Mohamed Omer Beshir, _Educational Development_, pp. 35-36.

40

  See Warburg, The Sudan, pp. 108-118.

41

  Ibid., p. 142.

42

  Ibid., p. 184.

43

  Abdel Rahim, Imperialism, p. 238.

44

  Sudan Government, "Confidential" Circular Memorandum No. 22,
    "Regulations as to Sudanese who leave their Masters",
    CMD 2650.

45

  Warburg, The Sudan, p. 175. Lord Lugard, the great administra-
    tor, addressed himself to this point: "it is clear", he
    wrote, "that sudden emancipation would dislocate the whole
    social fabric. Men ... would be thrown on the streets to
    fend for themselves. Slave concubines would become pros-
    titutes. Masters ... would be ruined; industry would be at
    a standstill; and plantations would be wrecked...." (Lord
    Lugard, The Dual Mandate In British Tropical Africa, Lon-
    don, Frank Cass, 5th ed., 1965, p. 367.)

46

  In the Report for 1903 Cromer wrote: "A suggestion has been
    put forward ... that negroes should be brought in from
    the United States. It is quite impossible to say before-
    hand how a bold experiment of this sort would answer. I
    see, however, no reason why it should not be tried on a
    small scale." (G.G.R.: 1903, p. 80.)

47

  Hill, Slatin Pasha, p. 104.

48

  Ibid., p. 55.

49

  Warburg, The Sudan, p. 176.

50

  Ibid., p. 178.

51

  The department to suppress slavery was, until 1910, an arm
    of the Egyptian Government. (See Warburg, The Sudan, p. 170)

[52] cAbd al-Qadīr was a religious fanatic.

[53] Warburg, The Sudan, p. 173.

[54] Trimingham, Islam, p. 122.

[55] G.G.R.: 1910, p. 90.

[56] Hill, Slatin Pasha, p. 82.

[57] Warburg, The Sudan, p. 96.

[58] Ibid., pp. 97-98. At Suakin, the point of departure of the pilgrims from the Sudan, the Government constructed villages in which indigent pilgrims were maintained at Government expense. The Government also paid the quarantine fees for these people. The subsidy allotted to the pilgrimage averaged £E. 3,000 in the years 1911-1913, an amount several times higher than the contribution of the pilgrims themselves. (Warburg, The Sudan, p. 98.)

[59] Ibid., pp. 96, 129.

[60] Hill, Slatin Pasha, p. 81. Although the Grand Qādī and the provincial qādis were all at first Egyptians, by 1912 twelve district qādis and twenty-two assistant qādis were Sudanese graduates of Gordon College and this number continued to grow as the Government sought to eliminate Egyptian personnel. (Warburg, The Sudan, p. 132.)

[61] G.G.R.: 1913, p. 67.

[62] G.G.R.: 1901, p. 66.

[63] Abdel Rahim, "Early Sudanese Nationalism", p. 40.

[64] Beshir, Educational Development, p. 47.

[65] Warburg, The Sudan, p. 96.

66

    Ibid. See also John O. Voll, "The British, The ^culamā, And Popular Islam In The Early Anglo-Egyptian Sudan", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 2, 1971, p. 213.

67

    Voll, "The British", p. 215.

68

    Beshir, Educational Development, pp. 48-49.

69

    The Governor-General's Council was established in 1910. It operated largely to allow the formal exchange of opinion among the various department heads, and any of its decisions could be overruled by the Governor-General. (Warburg, The Sudan, pp. 74-77)

70

    Ibid., p. 75. Cromer's judgement was less paternal. He wrote in 1905 that "the majority of the remaining inhabitants (outside the south) of the Soudan, though they can scarcely be called utter savages ... are in so backward a condition of civilization as to be but slightly removed from savagery". (G.G.R.: 1904, p. 109.)

71

    Warburg, The Sudan, p. 184.

72

    Abdel Rahim, "Early Sudanese Nationalism", p. 40.

73

    Hill, Slatin Pasha, p. 89.

74

    G.G.R.: 1900, p. 67.

75

    Ibid.

76

    Holt, A Modern History, p. 113; Warburg, The Sudan, p. 100.

77

    Warburg, The Sudan, p. 100.

78

    G.G.R.: 1901, p. 58.

79

    Ibid., p. 71.

80
Warburg, The Sudan, p. 100.

81
G.G.R.: 1903, p. 98.

82
G.G.R.: 1904, p. 115.

83
G.G.R.: 1908, pp. 55-57; Warburg, The Sudan, p. 90.

84
Warburg, The Sudan, p. 102.

85
Abdel Rahim, "Early Sudanese Nationalism", p. 39. After the
    Wad Habuba rising, the villages of his supporters were,
    in fact, burned.

86
G.G.R.: 1910, pp. 74-75; Warburg, The Sudan, p. 103. A comet
    had appeared before the manifestation of Muhammad Ahmad,
    the Mahdi, as well. (G.G.R.: 1910, p. 75.)

87
G.G.R.: 1910, pp. 74-75; Warburg, The Sudan, p. 103.

88
Warburg, The Sudan, p. 104.

89
Ibid.

90
In the Report for 1914-1919 (combined because of the war)
    Stack made the observation that "local disturbances"
    during that period "may have been instigated or encouraged
    by intrigue of enemy origin". (G.G.R.: 1914-19, p. 95.)

91
See, for example, the G.G.R. for 1908, p. 56.

92
See, for example, Warburg, The Sudan, p. 104.

93
Ibid., p. 95; See also Magnus, Kitchener, p. 150.

94
While the influence of local fakīs seemed to be declining,
they were, however, becoming associated with the larger
brotherhoods. (Voll, "The British", p. 216.)

95
Hill, Slatin Pasha, p. 93.

96
Warburg, The Sudan, p. 49; See also Hill, Slatin Pasha, pp.
86-87.

97
Hill, Slatin Pasha, p. 87. Hill contends that the leader in
question, Shaykh Ibrāhīm al-Mīrghanī, was a leader of the
Khatmīya, while Warburg (The Sudan, p.100) states that the
Shaykh was of the IsmaCilĪya. Hill's version cites no re-
ference.
The IsmaCilĪya order should not be confused with the
IsmaCili sect of ShiCism. The order derives its name from
its founder, IsmaCil al-Wali b. CAbd Allāh al-Kordofāni
(1793-1863), and is an offshoot of the Khatmīya. (Tri-
mingham, Islam, p. 235.)

98
Warburg, The Sudan, p. 99.

99
Lord Edward Herbert Gascoyne Cecil was Agent-General of the
Sudan Government at Cairo (1904-1905) and High Commissioner
for Egypt (1914-1915). (Hill, A Biographical Dictionary,
p. 98.)

100
Warburg, The Sudan, pp. 98-99.

101
Ibid.

102
Ibid., p. 107.

103
G.G.R.: 1912, p. 57.

104
Warburg, The Sudan, p. 174.

105
Hill, Slatin Pasha, p. 88.

106
Ibid.

107
  G.G.R.: 1900, p. 76.

108
  G.G.R.: 1907, p. 59. One of the children of the ex-Mahdists,
    Ḥasan Sharīf, son of the late Khalīfa Muḥammad Sharīf,
    was exiled in 1915 after becoming involved in a conspi-
    racy at Omdurman. (Warburg, The Sudan, pp. 105-106.)

109
  See G.G.R.: 1906, p. 132. In his Report for 1906 Cromer
    quoted Major Coutts, head of the Sudan prisons depart-
    ment as saying that "At Suakin I spoke to two or three
    prisoners -- very old men -- confined on account of their
    stirring up religious factions, but I was unable to do
    anything for them, as they still maintain their absolute
    belief in the Mahdi, in which belief nothing seems able
    to shake them. I notice that the Governor of Halfa found
    the same with others at Halfa...". (G.G.R.: 1906, p. 132.)

110
  G.G.R.: 1907, p. 58; 1908, p. 67; 1909, p. 77.

111
  Hill, Slatin Pasha, p. 88.

112
  Abdel Rahim, "Early Sudanese Nationalism", p. 43.

113
  See Abdel Rahim, Imperialism, p. 96; Warburg, The Sudan,
    p. 108.

114
  Abdel Rahim, "Early Sudanese Nationalism", p. 43.

115
  The Mīrghanīs feared that Sudanese independence might lead
    to the establishment of a Mahdist monarchy. (Fabunmi,
    The Sudan, p. 332.)

116
  Ibid., pp. 332-333.

117
  G.G.R.: 1914-1919, p. 94; Warburg, The Sudan, p. 107.

118
  G.G.R.: 1914-1919, p. 94.

119
  Ibid.

120

Warburg, The Sudan, p. 107.

121

Ibid.

122

G.G.R.: 1914-1919, p. 95.

123

Ibid., p. 96; Warburg, The Sudan, p. 108.

124

Abdel Rahim, Imperialism, p. 99.

125

Abdel Rahim, "Early Sudanese Nationalism", p. 46.

126

G.G.R.: 1911, p. 51; 1914-1919, p. 95.

127

The revolt was sparked by the deportation of a leader of the nationalist movement. Riots broke out throughout Egypt against the continuation of the British Protectorate. It was feared that these events might inspire the Sudanese to rebel.

128

Yūsuf Muḥammad al-Hindi (c. 1865-1942) was the founder of the Hindiya, an offshoot of the Sammāniya. (Hill, A Biographical Dictionary, pp. 386-387.)

129

Abdel Rahim, "Early Sudanese Nationalism", p. 46.

130

G.G.R.: 1914-1919, p. 115.

131

Margery Perham, writing in the introduction to Lugard's The Dual Mandate, p. xxxix.

132

Lugard, The Dual Mandate, p. 213.

133

Robinson and Gallagher, Africa, pp. 278-279.

134

Hill, Slatin Pasha, p. 27.

135
Warburg, The Sudan, p. 138.

136
Ibid.

137
Theobald, The Mahdiya, pp. 205-206.

138
Warburg, The Sudan, p. 53.

139
G.G.R.: 1900, p. 68.

140
Ibid., p. 82.

141
G.G.R.: 1901, p. 60.

142
Warburg, The Sudan, pp. 47, 52.

143
Ibid., p. 147.

144
Ibid., p. 61.

145
G.G.R.: 1911, p. 64.

146
Warburg, The Sudan, p. 143.

147
Ibid., p. 53.

148
Among these friends were Shaykh ^cAlī Julla, nāzir ^cumūm
(head shaykh) of the Misiriya tribe; Hasan Bey Umm Kadok,
shaykh of the northern Berti tribes; and Harod Bey Fatin,
nāzir of a branch of the Hamar tribe. (Hill, Slatin
Pasha, p. 26.)

149
Warburg, The Sudan, pp. 145-146.

150
   Nadia Khalaf, British Policy Regarding The Administration
      Of The Northern Sudan, 1899-1951, Unpublished Ph.D.
      thesis, Duke University, 1965, p. 56.

151
   Warburg, The Sudan, p. 53.

152
   G.G.R.: 1901, p. 60; 1904, p. 130.

153
   G.G.R.: 1908, p. 58.

154
   Warburg, The Sudan, p. 145. K.D.D. Henderson, who had a long
      career of government service in the Sudan, described
      Ali al-Tom as the "beau ideal of a nomad shaikh under the
      Condominium". (K.D.D. Henderson, Sudan Republic, London,
      Benn, 1965, p. 22.)

155
   G.G.R.: 1910, pp. 89-90.

156
   Ibid.

157
   Hill, Slatin Pasha, p. 83.

158
   Warburg, The Sudan, pp. 153-154.

CONCLUSION

Throughout this study we have attempted to deal with Sudanese collaboration in the early years of Condominium not simply as a phenomenon of twentieth century colonial rule, but as a process that has very definite and identifiable roots in the whole course of modern Sudanese history. One of the more striking generalizations to be made of this span is its essential continuity, which is as evident in an analysis of collaboration as in the common tendencies and problems of the Turco-Egyptian, Mahdist, and Condominium regimes. It remains now to conclude with some observations on this history of collaboration and some thoughts on its relative success.

The Sudan, unlike most African countries confronting European imperialsim in the late nineteenth century, already had a lengthy experience in dealing with an alien government. The Turco-Egyptian regime, although the child of Ottoman Egypt, did, however, introduce to the Sudan modern European military, political, and economic organization. Its policy of centralization, while fitful, was definite, and began the gradual erosion of the traditional tribal structure that was to continue into the Condominium period. Similarly, the regime greatly altered Sudanese economic life, first through the growing importance of the slave trade, and then, in the last decades of its rule, through its attempts to halt that trade. In religious affairs, the regime introduced its own orthodox hierarchy of ^culama' which failed to assume a position of real influence and suc-

ceeded only in disaffecting many powerful leaders of popular
Islam.

This nineteenth century colonial experience was too per-
vasive to be erased by the Mahdia, which, despite its revolu-
tionary ideology, adopted many of its predecessor's policies and
methods of governing. Tribal authority continued to be under-
mined. Indeed, we have seen that rather than weld the tribes
into a national unit, the Khalīfa ^CAbdallāhi, to ensure his position,
tion, raised his own tribe, the Ta^Cāisha, to a dominant role.

The Mahdist regime ostensibly sought to supplant both
the orthodox institution (the ^Culamā') and the ṭarīqas with the
charismatic, divinely-appointed order of its leader. This, ul-
timately, it failed to do: the Sudan remained a tribal society,
with all the divisions implicit in tribalism. The very nature
of the Mahdi's authority, based on a combination of traditional
qualifications and charismatic appeal, was antithetical to mo-
dern state-formation. The authority of the Mahdi was personal:
it existed on a one to one basis between master and disciple;
it neither depended on nor did it elicit feelings of "national"
Sudanese loyalty. Thus the Sudanese emerged from the Mahdia with
both traditional and revolutionary loci of authority severely
questioned. The Condominium regime, therefore, began at a time
when internecine rivalries were as intense as always and when
previously accepted bases of social relationships had been
seriously weakened.

The first two decades of Condominium rule bear many simi-
larities to the Turco-Egyptian period. Tribal relations were
difficult for both governments, and both exploited the rivalries
and disunity that plagued the tribes. Both regimes relied heavily
on tribal shaykhs, whom they paid as agents of government. Both
severely punished insubordination and rewarded loyal service.
Even something as seemingly trivial as the visits of tribal lea-
ders to the Imperial courts, while itself only a superficial
similarity, nonetheless testifies to both governments' recogni-
tion of the necessity of collaboration with tribal leaders.
Indeed, many of the principal Sudanese collaborators served both
regimes. Finally, in both cases, all of these policies, while
designed to control the tribes through their traditional lea-
dership, succeeded instead in weakening that leadership in the
eyes of the tribal population.

More significantly, in religious policy, both the Turco-
Egyptian and Condominium governments sought to build up the
influence of the ᶜulamā' at the expense on the leaders of popu-
lar Islam. But while the ᶜulamā' depended upon the government
for its very existence, the ṣūfī leaders, and, in the case of
the Condominium, Sayyid ᶜAbd al-Rahmān al-Mahdi as well, held
authority not by virtue of government policy but by their in-
herited baraka. Indeed, an explanation of the resurrection of
Mahdist fortunes towards the end of the period can be put for-
ward with reference to that history. Holt sees the descendants

of the Mahdi as the last in a series of important Sudanese holy families, with the essential difference in the Mahdi's case of the "covertly political aspect and the extensive scope of his aims".[1] The disastrous defeat of the Mahdi's forces by the British failed to destroy the belief in the Mahdi's claims, or the corporate identity of his followers. The very facts that the Mahdi had defeated European-led armies and that the Mahdist regime had remained in power as long as it had, gave the Anṣār a claim to Sudanese loyalties unequalled by tribe or ṯarīqa. This success in past dealings with Europeans leads to a conclusion that the Mahdist resurgence was based on it. This should be qualified to the extent that such a reputation can not be separated out from the totality of ᶜAbd al-Raḥmān's baraka.

While our sources for the tribes are sketchy, it would appear that the experience of the previous eighty years was a chief determinant of the decision to collaborate. Tribal disunity clearly precluded concerted resistance and would, in any case, have meant certain defeat in the face of superior Government resources. Just as clearly, tribal rivalries demanded competition for Government favor in order to maintain the tribal balance. No tribe was strong enough alone to wring concessions from the Government solely by threatening revolt.

Two of the tribes we have mentioned are illustrative of this continuity in tribal reaction to alien regimes. The

Shāiqīya, after initial resistance to the Turco-Egyptian regime, became its loyal servants, opposed the Mahdia, and during the Condominium enlisted in the camel-corps, infantry, and police forces.[2] The Shukrīya, whose leader during much of the Turco-Egyptian period, Aḥmad ᶜAwad al-Karīm abū Sinn, was an important supporter of the Government, similarly withheld support from the Mahdists, and regained its wealth and importance during the Condominium.[3] Collaboration, however, could only maintain the long-established process of tribal authority's degeneration.

For the ᶜulamā' the situation was similar. Independent of the Government they had no base of support. Allied with it they had only the illusory power that the Government delegated to them. With a history of servitude to the unloved Turco-Egyptian regime, and no traditional backing or reverance by the Sudanese, their response to colonial rule had no alternative.

The ṣūfī shaykhs, on the other hand, had long been the most influential politico-religious figures in Sudanese life. They and their forbears had been in great measure responsible for the introduction of Islam into the Sudan, had acted as teachers, and had served as intermediaries between the authorities and their subjects. Most importantly, they had a claim to the absolute personal loyalty of their disciples. During the Turco-Egyptian period the Khatmīya emerged as the leading ṭarīqa, and associated itself with the Government, having re-

cognized that resistance was fraught with dangers and that the
Government's unpopularity demanded concessions to those ṭarīqas
that cooperated. Government favor was necessary because of the
intense rivalry among the ṭarīqas for membership.

During the Mahdia the Khatmīya leadership was forced to
live in exile. Its cooperation was rewarded by the Condominium
as it soon regained a place of preeminence and pursued the same
policy as it had under the Turco-Egyptian regime, again in the
face of competition from other ṭarīqas. The benefits of the
Khatmīya's collaboration are not difficult to assess. Its large
membership made its cooperation essential to the undermanned and
paranoid Government. By collaborating it could maintain its
favored status and use it to counter the Anṣār.

The prime motivation of Anṣār collaboration was the fear
of the renewed direct involvement of Egypt in the Sudan. The
sophistication of Sayyid ͨAbd al-Raḥmān al-Mahdi, especially in
his aiding the Government during World War I, must be admired.
Government policy toward the Anṣār to that point had been based
on suspicion of their intentions and fear of their influence.
The readiness of Sayyid ͨAbd al-Raḥmān to collaborate, the re-
newed vigor of the Anṣār, and the coincidental failure of the
ͨulamā'to influence opinion cleared the way for the re-emergence
of the Mahdist movement as a political force.

One element of the Sudanese that we have neglected in
this study deserves at least mention in these closing remarks.
That is the tiny educated elite fostered from the beginning of
the Condominium to fill minor governmental and teaching posi-
tions. This group has not figured in the discussion because it
was not until late in the period that it began to assume any
significance. Further, because of its contacts with Egyptians
through the lower echelons of civil service and the schools, it
was deeply mistrusted by the Government. From this group a
fledgling nationalism developed. This development is outside
the scope of our study. Of concern, however, is the fact that
the relations between the Sudanese educated elite and Egyptian
nationalists worked in favor of traditional authority. The
Egyptian revolution of 1919 and the assassination of Sir Lee
Stack in Cairo in 1924 completed the breach between the Govern-
ment and the educated group. Increasingly, the Government
turned to policies that came to be known as "Native Administra-
tion", or rule through the chiefs of tribes.[4]

With the educated elite under suspicion, the extent to
which popular Islam was still the premier force in Sudanese
life was indicated in the subsequent development of political
movements. It was around the persons of the two great religious
leaders, Sayyid ʿAbd al-Raḥmān and Sayyid ʿAlī al-Mīrghanī that
the first two political parties were formed in the 1940s.
Sayyid ʿAbd al-Raḥmān became the patron of the Umma Party,

which demanded in its program the eventual independence of the
Sudan, while Sayyid ^cAlī, because of his fears of a Mahdist
monarchy in an independent Sudan, patronized the Ashiqqā'
Party, which called for a merger of the Sudan and Egypt, the
so-called "Unity of the Nile Valley".[5]

In an essay on the general problems posed by resistance
and collaboration, T.O. Ranger has written that

> A historian has indeed a difficult task in
> deciding whether a specific society should
> be described as 'resistant' or as 'colla-
> borative' over any given period of time. Many
> societies began in one camp and ended in the
> other.[6]

This problem is evident in the Sudan. Both the Anṣār and the
Khatmīya, our two chief examples, were able to make collabora-
tion work only because of their apprehended power to offer
dangerous resistance. This is more easily appreciated with re-
ference to the tribes, who individually posed no threat to Go-
vernment authority and therefore could benefit from collabora-
tion only insofar as they might slow the steady erosion of their
authority. Collaboration, therefore, would be misunderstood as
the treachery of one group against the national good, just as
resistance by a tribe or tarīqa could be termed a defense of
that good. On the contrary, collaboration was a response to
colonial rule that recognized not only the superiority of the
Government but the considerable ability of at least some indi-

genous organizations to challenge it. To those groups posses-
sed of that ability collaboration was the most sensible and
beneficial response, and one that promised greater power and
opportunity; to those without it, collaboration was a losing
attempt to maintain the status quo.

NOTES

1
Holt, Holy Families, p. 12.

2
Macmichael, History of the Arabs, pp. 218-219.

3
Ibid., p. 252.

4
Abdel Rahim, Imperialism, p. 67.

5
Holt, A Modern History, p. 143.

6
T.O. Ranger, "African Reactions To The Imposition of Colonial
    Rule In East And Central Africa", Colonialism In Africa
    1870-1960, Vol. I, The History And Politics of Colonialism
    1870-1914, L.H. Gann and Peter Duignan (eds.), Cambridge,
    University Press, 1969, p. 304.

APPENDIX

The Condominium Agreement[1]

Agreement between Her Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of His Highness the Khedive of Egypt, relative to the future administration of the Sudan.

WHEREAS certain provinces in the Sudan which were in rebellion against the authority of His Highness have now been reconquered by the joint military and financial efforts of Her Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of His Highness the Khedive; and WHEREAS it has become necessary to decide upon a system for the administration of and for the making of laws for the said reconquered provinces, under which due allowance may be made for the backward and unsettled condition of large portions thereof, and for the varying requirements of different localities; and WHEREAS it is desired to give effect to the claims which have accrued to Her Britannic Majesty's Government, by right of conquest, to share in the present settlement and future working and development of the said system of administration and legislation; and WHEREAS it is conceived that for many purposes Wadi Halfa and Suakin may be most effectively administered in conjunction with the reconquered provinces to which they are respectively adjacent:

NOW IT IS HEREBY AGREED AND DECLARED by and between the undersigned, duly authorized for that purpose as follows:

ARTICLE I

The word 'Sudan' in this agreement means all the territories south of the 22nd parallel of latitude, which:

1. Have never been evacuated by Egyptian troops since the year 1882; or

2. Which, having before the late rebellion been administered by the Government of His Highness the Khedive, were temporarily lost to Egypt, and have been reconquered by Her Majesty's Government and the Egyptian Government, acting in concert; or

3. Which may be hereafter reconquered by the two Governments acting in concert.

ARTICLE II

The British and Egyptian flags shall be used together, both on land and water, throughout the Sudan, except in the town of Suakin, in which locality the Egyptian flag alone shall be used.

ARTICLE III

The supreme military and civil command of the Sudan shall be vested in one officer, termed the 'Governor-General of the Sudan'. He shall be appointed by Khedivial Decree on the recommendation of Her Britannic Majesty's Government and shall be removed only by Khedivial Decree, with the consent of Her Bri-

tannic Majesty's Government.

ARTICLE IV

Laws, as also orders and regulations with the full force of law, for the good government of the Sudan, and for regulating the holding, disposal, and devolution of property of every kind therein situate, may from time to time be made, altered, or abrogated by Proclamation of the Governor-General. Such laws, orders, and regulations may apply to the whole or any named part of the Sudan, and may, either explicitly or by necessary implication, alter or abrogate any existing law or regulation.

All such proclamations shall be forthwith notified to Her Britannic Majesty's Agent and Consul-General in Cairo, and to the President of the Council of Ministers of His Highness the Khedive.

ARTICLE V

No Egyptian law, decree, ministerial arrete, or other enactment hereafter to be made or promulgated shall apply to the Sudan or any part thereof, save in so far as the same shall be applied by Proclamation of the Governor-General in manner hereinbefore provided.

ARTICLE VI

In the definition by Proclamation of the conditions under which Europeans, of whatever nationality, shall be at liberty to trade with or reside in the Sudan, or to hold property within its limits, no special privileges shall be accorded to the

subjects of any one or more Power.

ARTICLE VII

Import duties on entering the Sudan shall not be payable on goods coming from Egyptian territory. Such duties may however be levied on goods coming from elsewhere than Egyptian territory, but in the case of goods entering the Sudan at Suakin or any other port on the Red Sea littoral, they shall not exceed the corresponding duties for the time being leviable on goods entering Egypt from abroad. Duties may be levied on goods leaving the Sudan, at such rates as may from time to time be prescribed by Proclamation.

ARTICLE VIII

The jurisdiction of the Mixed Tribunals shall not extend, nor be recognized for any purpose whatsoever, in any part of the Sudan, except in the town of Suakin.

ARTICLE IX

Until, and save so far as it shall otherwise be determined by Proclamation, the Sudan, with the exception of the town of Suakin, shall be and remain under martial law.

ARTICLE X

No Consuls, Vice-Consuls, or Consular Agents shall be accredited in respect of nor allowed to reside in the Sudan, without the previous consent of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.

ARTICLE XI

The importation of slaves into the Sudan, as also their exportation, is absolutely prohibited. Provision shall be made by Proclamation for the enforcement of this Regulation.

ARTICLE XII

It is agreed between the two Governments that special attention shall be paid to the enforcement of the Brussels Act of the 2nd July 1890 in respect of the import, sale, and manufacture of firearms and their munitions, and distilled or spirituous liquors.

Done in Cairo, the 19th January 1899.

1
Taken from Muddathir Abdel Rahim, Imperialism And Nationalism
In The Sudan, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1969, pp. 233-235.

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1907: Cd. 3966.
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