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ABSTRACT

It is the thesis of this work that Marcuse has misread and distorted Freudian theory. This distortion leads Marcuse to posit the historical nature of the reality principle upon Freudian concepts, whereas there is little basis for this in Freud. The reality principle, with its ramifications, is the central concept in Marcuse's analysis of advanced capitalism.

The approach of this work is to examine Marcuse's interpretations of Freudian theory, particularly with relationship to instinct theory, the nature and role of repression, the conflict between the individual and civilization and the potentiality of man. Marcuse's breaks with Freud will be emphasized. However, it is not within the scope of this thesis to present a general overview and critique of the theories of Sigmund Freud.

Marcuse's similarities with and divergences from Marx will also be examined, in particular concerning the role of the proletariat and the nature of revolution.

Marcuse's essentially Hegelian view of history and his Marxian conceptualization of social dynamics does not relate well to Freudian principles. Furthermore, Marcuse's attempt to reconcile Hegel, Marx and Freud ends in almost what could be described as a failure and has serious implications for Marcuse's own theories. It is the purpose of this paper to probe these implications.

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HERBERT MARCUSE AND HIS ATTEMPT TO RECONCILE MARX AND FREUD

A Thesis

by

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CHAPTER ONE

MARCUSE'S INTERPRETATION OF THE THEORIES OF FREUD

1. The Confrontation With Freud

How is it that Freudian theory, usually an anathema to Marxists and long associated with political conservatism, came to be used as a framework for Marcuse's theories? Is Marcuse's reading of Freud correct and, if it is, does this constitute a valid basis for his theories?

Marcuse's analysis is heavily dependent upon particular Freudian concepts. These include the nature of repression and the relationship between repression and scarcity, the development of the human mind and, more particularly, the role of the death instinct in that development.

It would be impossible within the limits of this work to explore all of the various meanings that Freud himself ascribed to his own terms. Freudian views have been known to shift on various central issues, including the nature of sexuality in both the infant and the adult and the relationship between the individual and civilization. Marcuse's tendency is to rely primarily upon Freud's later works, including *Civilization and Its Discontents* and *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. Therefore, most of the criticism in this work is within the context of the later Freud and it encompasses concepts which remain fairly constant. Where deemed appropriate, the texts of Freud's earlier writings are cited.

To Marcuse, the central issue in Freud's work is the relationship between repression and scarcity: "According to Freud, the history of man is the history of his repression."[1] In order to expand upon the principles that Marcuse develops from this particular statement that he has extrapolated from Freud, it is first necessary to generally outline the Freudian view of scarcity and repression.[2]

Freud stated that:

> at bottom, society's motive is economic since it has not enough means to support life for its members without work on their part; it must see to it that the number of these members is restricted and their energies dictated away from sexual activities on to their work ... This is the eternal primordial struggle for existence ...[3]

In a discussion of infantile sexuality, Freud noted that education was one of the primary vehicles that society had for establishing a repressive culture. Education was identified with the demands of civilization:

> Infantile sexuality is restrained and confined by education and subject to individual control (itself identical with the demands of society) ... In its own interests, accordingly society would postpone the child's full development until it has attained a certain stage of intellectual inactivity, since educadibility practically ceases with the full onset of the sexual instinct. Without this the instinct would break all bounds and the laboriously erected structure of civilization would be swept away.[4]

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1 Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry Into Freud (New York: Vintage Books, 1955), p. 12.

2 Sigmund Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1922), pp. 248-249. Repression is defined as mental excitations incapable of becoming conscious; it is the preliminary condition for the development of symptoms.

3 Ibid., p. 261.

4 Ibid., p. 262.

It is clear then that Freud believed that civilization was by its very nature repressive, because "it has not enough means to support life", that is, a scarcity factor exists.

It is from this view of Freud's that Marcuse contributes two original principles: surplus-repression and the performance principle.

The development of institutions, Marcuse argues, and the growing restraints of civilization which are necessary for its existence engender the development of the reality principle. The reality principle takes a particular form during periods of advanced capitalism whereby "domination" is effectuated. This form Marcuse terms the performance principle. Surplus-repression is a characteristic of the performance principle defined as the "restrictions necessitated by social domination".[1]

It is the differential between surplus-repression and repression that engenders the performance principle in Marcusian theory. It is also an important element in determining the historical stage of a civilization:

> Within the total structure of the repressed personality, surplus-repression is that portion which is the result of specific societal conditions sustained in the specific interest of domination. The extent of this surplus-repression provides the standard of measurement: the smaller it is, the less repressive is the stage of civilization.[2]

Marcuse thus views surplus-repression as an expression of an historical stage. Indeed, Marcuse notes that within Freud's three sources of

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[1] Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, p. 32.

[2] Ibid., p. 80.

human suffering (the forces of nature, decay from aging and the inadequacy of methods of regulation of human relations), two of them are historical stages:

> Consequently, the necessity of repression and of the suffering derived from it, varies with the maturity of civilization, with the extent of the achieved rational mastery of nature and of society.[1]

The term 'surplus-repression' focuses "discussion on the institutions and relations that constitute the social 'body' of the reality principle", according to Marcuse.[2] The specific form of the reality principle that has governed the origins and growth of contemporary civilization is termed the 'performance principle' by Marcuse "in order to emphasize that under its rule society is stratified according to the competitive economic performances of its members."[3]

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1 Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, p. 80. Marcuse's derivation of the historical nature of the reality principle and the level of repression is from Freud's sources of human suffering. This may appear to be a facile linkage between suffering and repression, especially when such an important principle is derived from it. However, this is precisely what Marcuse does do. Indeed Marcuse is correct concerning the historical nature of the sources of human suffering; however, with respect to repression, he is technically inaccurate. Freud stated that the different mechanisms of repression "have at least one thing in common: a withdrawal of energic cathexis (or of libido, if it is a question of sexual instincts)." ("Repression", pub.1915, in J. Rickman, ed., The Works of Sigmund Freud (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1957), p. 94). This has a bearing upon the discussion of repressive desublimation (see Section 5. of this Chapter) because it appears that, according to the Marcusian definition of this concept, it is a contradiction in terms. Marcuse believes that the release of libidinal energy without a reconciliation with rationality occurs in the process of repressive desublimation. This would be impossible if there were true repression, because repression by definition involves a withdrawal of libido; thus a release of libidinal energy could not occur.

2 Ibid., p. 41.

3 Ibid.

> The performance principle, which is that of an acquisitive and antagonistic society in the process of constant expansion, presupposes a long development during which domination has been increasingly rationalized.[1]

Marcuse posits the terms 'surplus-repression' and 'performance principle' in the context of Freud's "historical" view of man's development. Freud does recognize that the pleasure principle has changed "into the more modest reality".[2] If we examine Freud's concept of suffering upon which Marcuse bases the historical nature of repression, it becomes apparent that Marcuse's argument is weak:

> In the last analysis, all suffering is nothing else than sensation, it only exists in so far as we feel it in consequence of certain ways in which our organism is regulated.[3]

Freud views suffering as being an aspect of sensation. Sensation does not change over time; it is only in so far as history affects the regulation of organisms that it is subject to history. Freud does not speak of history in his description of the sources of human suffering, nor does he say that it is possible to have a qualitative change affecting these sources of suffering. Indeed all suffering is sensation, whereas repression is unconscious mental excitations.

Marcuse's linkage of the historical nature of the reality principle with Freud's sources of human suffering is based upon the proposition that repression changes because suffering changes.

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1 Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, p. 41.

2 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1961), p. 24.

3 Ibid., p. 25.

As we have seen, Freud did not think that this was true because he linked suffering with sensation which was 'timeless' and therefore not subject to history. Furthermore, even if we were to accept Marcuse's argument and assume that Freud said that suffering was subject to qualitative change over time, the argument would still be weak. Suffering and repression are two essentially different forces in Freud, one distinction being that the former is primarily used to describe a conscious state, the latter refers only to "unconscious mental excitations". Although there is a relationship between suffering and repression, they are not close enough in nature to deduce an argument which indicates that a characteristic of one is descriptive of the other. Hence Marcuse's logic on this point is questionable.

2. Authority and Scarcity

A contrast of Marcuse's writings with those of Phillip Rieff helps to clarify Marcuse's views about Freud. Rieff's perspective on Freud is quite different from Marcuse's. For Rieff, authority is the basic issue in Freud:

> Authority is Freud's basic problem, neurosis the occasion for examining its vicissitudes; his therapy attempts to erode the childhood laws by which authority operates.[1]

There are therefore fundamental differences in perceiving the central issue in Freud's psychology: Marcuse's concerning repression, Rieff's concerning authority. Rieff's work is largely based upon Ernest Jones' biography of Freud and historical research. Marcuse's utopian and

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[1] Phillip Rieff, Freud: The Mind of The Moralist (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1961), p. 185.

Marxist perspective tends to overshadow much of Freud's intent, particularly since Freud was opposed to Marxism. "The conservative implications of Freud's psychology are clear: nothing qualitatively different happens in history ... politics becomes an unchanging strife between the generations."[1] If we are to use Rieff's perspective on this point, a fundamental difference results from Marcuse's conclusions. The history of man may be the history of "his repressions" as Marcuse notes that Freud maintains; however, this occurred in a non-historical form (Rieff) and is therefore not subject to qualitative change over time.

Marcuse's own view of authority in Freud does complement Rieff's to some extent. Within his own work he does not wish to abolish authority; rather, he wishes to change the sources of authority and abolish forms of administration. Collective ownership and control are the foundation for Marcuse's ultimate goal: "Socialist solidarity is autonomy: self-determination begins at home -- and that is with every I and the We whom the I chooses."[2] This appears to be highly individualistic; however, the regeneration for this autonomy is dependent upon a specific form of organization within the group. This assumes a rationality which Freud always found wanting:

> We can only be satisfied if we assert that the process of civilization is a modification which the vital processes experience under the influence of the task that is set for it by Eros and instigated by Ananke -- by the exigencies of reality; and that this task is one of uniting separate individuals bound together by libidinal ties.[3]

It is possible, Freud believed, that even in an atmosphere of conformity, inner freedom could exist. Freud would have recognized this possibility in the performance principle -- if he accepted the performance principle.

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[1] Phillip Rieff, Freud: The Mind of The Moralist, p. 261.

[2] Herbert Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1969), p. 88.

[3] Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, p. 86.

Scarcity -- and the exigencies of Ananke -- continue to be problems in a Freudian context, but not in the fundamental sense that Marcuse sees them to be. Freud saw all social relations as expressions of authority, whether a scarcity factor existed or not. Furthermore, the existence of taboo in society always means that there will be rebellion that will create suppression. "Every new permissiveness will be countered by fresh repression", thought Freud.[1] The difference thus appears to be one of degree between Freud and Marcuse. Concerning the questions of repression and scarcity, however, the differences are actually of kind. It is likely that if Freud foresaw a time when the problem of scarcity would be solved, he would still posit a high level of repression.

3. Qualitative Change and the Individual

Marcuse believes that a qualitative change has occurred because advanced industrial capitalism has structured a repressive organization of sexuality whereby

> under the rule of the performance principle, body and mind are made into instruments of alienated labor; they can function as such instruments only if they renounce the freedom of the subject-object which the human organism primarily is and desires.[2]

It is possible, Marcuse contends, for the dialectic to engender a qualitative change stemming from the one that has already

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[1] Phillip Rieff, op. cit., p. 248.

[2] Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, p. 42

occurred under the rule of the performance principle. The nature of this change and the process of absorption of counter-forces is described in One Dimensional Man. Marcuse hinges his utopianism and his criticism upon one central formulation: the problem of scarcity can now be solved and the potential for elimination of surplus-repression exists. The framework for human happiness now lies within the realm of possibility and the "new, biological man" can emerge.

Freud's thoughts on the relationship between the individual, work and human happiness are quite specific. They also appear to lead to a contradiction with the Marcusian view. Marcuse states:

> Civilization is first of all progress in work -- that is, work for the procurement and augmentation of the necessities of life. This work is normally without satisfaction; to Freud it is unpleasurable, painful. In Freud's metapsychology there is no room for an original "instinct of workmanship", "Mastery instinct", etc.[1]

Marcuse's view of Freud's conception of work is patently wrong. Freud quite clearly believed that it was within the realm of possibility that a worker could find much satisfaction in his job. Freud's description of this is remarkably similar to Marcuse's own vision of non-alienated labor:

> One gains the most if one can sufficiently heighten the yield of pleasure from the sources of psychical and intellectual work.

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[1] Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, p. 74.

> A satisfaction of this kind, such as an artist's joy in creating, in giving his phantasies body, or a scientist's in solving problems ... has a special quality which we shall certainly one day be able to characterize in metapsychological terms.[1]

Freud therefore saw the possibilities of a reconciliation of the instincts with rationality and civilization as late as 1929, a period when most of life was defined by one's work and a period well into the "more modest" reality principle which Freud thought was in effect. Marcuse does not indicate a precise time when he believes that the performance principle became effective; however, he does "presuppose a long development during which domination has been increasingly rationalized" [2] in his definition of the performance principle. If we were to assume that Freud for at least part of his lifetime was writing when the performance principle began to take effect, then it appears doubtful that he would agree with Marcuse that a qualitative change was about to occur because he had a more optimistic view about the societal benefits resulting from technical progress. Furthermore, Freud did not believe that specific forms of economic organization produced a qualitative difference.

Rieff notes that Freud assumed that the interests of society and the individual are always opposed. Although Freud assumed that men must work given scarcity, and Marcuse believes that without scarcity

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[1] Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, p. 26.

[2] Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, p. 41.

it is possible to have non-alienated labor, Freud would still disagree about "remoulding man's instincts" in accord with his fundamental needs. Although Freud recognized "varied instinctual predispositions", Rieff maintains that human nature is not malleable enough, in Freud's view, to remould.[1]

If we assume that Rieff is correct, the implication is that societal aims under the performance principle could not shape man's instinctual make-up as Marcuse believes has already occurred. To some extent, this also indicates Marcuse's historical view as opposed to Freud's non-historical approach. Moreover, Marcuse assumes a certain homogeneity in society which Freud does not see. Freud's non-historical view seems to disallow a basic change in the future of man's basic character. Therefore, the dialectics of qualitative change, an intrinsic part of the Marcusian argument, becomes impossible within this context.[2]

4. Sexuality: Polymorphous Perversity

Perhaps the most illuminating area where Marcuse's differences with Freud are apparent is the area of sexuality.

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1 Rieff, op. cit., p. 269 ff.

2 Certainly it can be argued that Freud did have a historical approach; however this was only within a certain context. This applies primarily to the theory of the primal horde, the development of instinct theory, etc. There is also some question as to whether this is merely metaphor in Freud. Marcuse tends to treat this historical aspect empirically.

Paul Robinson, an observer who generally tends to laud the Marcusian approach, believes that the thrust of Marcuse's argument about sexuality concerns "a particular type of sexuality, namely the secondary or partial drives." Marcuse, Robinson says, "accepts Freud's biological rationale", but "he insisted that the progression was accentuated and permeated by the performance principle."[1] Marcuse's conclusion, according to Robinson, is that "only the resexualized body, the polymorphously perverse body, resisted transformation into an instrument of labor."[2]

This view of sexuality by Marcuse is a result of what Jean LaPlanche terms Marcuse's "great abstraction" of Freud.[3] LaPlanche argues that Marcuse does not deal with clinical psychology (as opposed to Reich) and thereby concerns himself with such abstractions as polymorphous perversity. LaPlanche does however state that Marcuse wants to discuss the philosophy of psychiatry and not psychiatry itself.

LaPlanche sees two phases in Freudian instinct theory. Prior to the writing of Civilization and Its Discontents, LaPlanche says that Freud viewed conflict as a dynamic between instincts and society. Afterwards, it is contended by LaPlanche that conflict was seen as an instinctual dynamic and that there were two qualitative

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1 Paul Robinson, The Freudian Left (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 206.

2 Ibid.

3 Jean LaPlanche, "Notes sur Marcuse et la Psychanalyse", in: La Nef, 36, Marcuse: Cet Inconnu (Paris: Librairie Jules Tallendier, 1969), p. 137.

instincts, that of life (Eros) and that of death (Thanatos). The death instinct was seen as being more potent. Marcuse's misreading of Freud, according to LaPlanche, is that he does not fully recognize this division in Freud. He is imprisoned by Freudian concepts and takes them literally.

As a result of Marcuse's literal reading of Freud, claims LaPlanche, sexuality is used to designate a limited form of activity, namely genitality. Eros is seen as expanded libido in conflict with civilization. However, according to LaPlanche, Freud saw Eros as libido invested in an object and as a civilizing force. Furthermore, it is anti-sexual in the sense of infantile sexuality. Infantile sexuality is polymorphous sexuality denoting the entire body as being erotogenic.

However, since Marcuse sees sexuality as being limited and his end being an expanded sexuality -- that is, a polymorphous sexuality in the mature human being -- he applies his own definition to Eros. Eros becomes a qualitatively broadening libido developing to a state where the entire body becomes a sexual organism. In this sense, Eros is pro-sexual and in conflict with an excessively repressive civilization which seeks limitation upon libido.

LaPlanche also indicates that behind Marcuse's interpretation of Freud is a desire to place biological needs within the context of the Marxian class struggle. However, LaPlanche states, in spite of the historical appearance of needs in Marx, they cannot be confused

with the objective facts of sexual desires.[1] Henri Lefebvre expands on this point concerning Marx and Freud.

According to Marcuse, says Lefebvre, there are immutable elements in Marxism such as the attachment of man to reality in the form of man as producer. In Freud there are dynamic elements, i.e. the creative Eros which is more than narrow sexuality. However, Marcuse does not go far enough in his formulations of Marx and Freud.[2]

These statements by Robinson, LaPlanche and Lefebvre bring forth a number of positions concerning the role of the libido in human development as well as the irrationality which it is said that Marcuse attributes to Freud. All of these observations contain an inherent criticism of Marcuse's notion of the polymorphous perverse body as an end and his idea that this is possible when surplus-repression is diminished.

Freud's own writings tend to support these criticisms of Marcuse. Freud saw men as aggressive creatures

> whose instinctual endowments are to be reckoned a powerful share of aggressiveness ... civilized society is perpetually threatened with disintegration. The interest of work in common would not hold it together; instinctual passions are stronger than reasonable interests.[3]

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1 Jean LaPlanche, op. cit., pp. 111-138.

2 See Chapter III for a discussion of Marcuse's reconciliation of Marx and Freud.

3 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, p. 58.

It is noteworthy that Freud's pessimistic view of man's nature is based upon views of the instincts and not upon social relations. This is contrary to Marx's view that man's character is defined by social relations. This may explain why Marcuse is optimistic about the potential of man, that is, he neglects the Freudian view with respect to this and opts for Marx's.

Freud also implies that these basic conditions concerning man's character exist with or without the necessity to work, whatever the form of organization, and whether labor is alienated or not. Marcuse's call for increased collectivization certainly is not in accord with Freud's conclusions. Indeed, Freud believed that those who called for collectivization had a basically naive view of man and did not recognize man's aggressive nature.[1] Furthermore, Freud calls for greater restraints to keep man in check, not for a lessening of the level of repression.

Marcuse's fundamental concept of polymorphous perversity as an end is in line with his desire to create a "new biological man". This "new man" is an all-inclusive term encompassing "inclinations, behavior patterns and culture" which, through change in social structure, will induce a "more pleasurable organic behavior."[2] Marcuse's belief that character can be changed and that aggressiveness and violence

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1 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, p. 33.

2 Herbert Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, p. 10. See Chapter III for a discussion of Marcuse's concept of the 'new biological man'.

can be reduced in man's nature is an aspect of Marcuse's concept of polymorphous perversity in the mature human being. It is at odds with Freud's concept because Freud believed that: a) polymorphous perversity was only possible in an infantile state, and that b) aggressiveness was instinctual and not subject to qualitative change.

Polymorphous perversity as used by Marcuse is descriptive of a state when man is free of repression and returns to the sexuality of his primal state. Perversions in today's social organization are "practically all its [sexuality's] manifestations which do not serve or prepare for the procreative function."[1]

Marcuse describes Freud's view of perversions as an expression against the procreative order because of Freud's emphasis upon the "exclusive character of the deviations from normality."[2] Marcuse correctly notes that this means that "perversions uphold sexuality as an end in itself."[3]

Freud took care to note that "perversions" as a psychoanalytic term is to be used in the "full sense ... of infantile sexuality."[4]

> If a child has a sexual life at all it must be of a perverted order since apart from a few obscure indications he is lacking in all that transforms sexuality into the reproductive function.[5]

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1 Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, p. 44.

2 Ibid., p. 45.

3 Ibid., p. 46.

4 "The Origin of Psychoanalysis", in J. Rickman, ed., The Works of Sigmund Freud (op. cit.), p. 28.

5 Sigmund Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, p. 266.

Freud's criterion for perversion is therefore the degree to which sexual aim is departed from reproduction. However, the Freudian concept of "sexuality" includes the concept of perversity and the sexual life of children. Children develop a polymorphous sexual life which is also perverted. This is because their sexual life is a) erotogenic and b) not concerned with reproduction. Freud noted that as a child seeks nourishment, various parts of his body become erotogenic. These include the mouth and the lips. Freud then makes a connection between the satisfaction of "great organic needs", which are for nourishment, and infantile sexuality. The satisfaction of these organic needs must be divided from the sexual function and other sources of sexual satisfaction must be found. This is because civilization demands productive work (and thus work becomes a primary source of sublimation) for there is not enough means to support life. Infantile sexuality thus becomes confined and restricted by the demands of civilization and the polymorphous body becomes one of genitality.

It is from this point that Marcuse's interpretation of perversion or polymorphous perversion (referring to the entire body as being erotogenic) is at odds with Freud's.

Freud had a very clear notion of what the normal sexual function was. Perversions and neuroses were "bearers of the complexes and creators of symptoms."[1] Neuroses were worked out from the unconscious,

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[1] "The Origin of Psychoanalysis", in J. Rickman, ed., The Works of Sigmund Freud (op. cit.), p. 27.

perversions from the conscious life. During human development, repressions occur and if there is interference with the sexual life of the adult, this repression breaks through "at just that point at which the infantile fixation took place."[1]

Even if we were to use a Marcusian framework, the only conclusion possible -- given Freud's view of perversions and neuroses -- is that perversions occur not as an aspect of the performance principle exclusively, whether in rebellion or not, but under whatever form the reality principle is in. Marcuse would argue that 'perversions' and 'neuroses' occur primarily under the performance principle and indeed are defined by that principle.

Marcuse's concept of the polymorphously perverse body involves a "transformation of the libido: from sexuality constrained under genital supremacy to erotization of the entire personality."[2] Marcuse states specifically that this transformation is one which is outside the boundaries of the performance principle.

Although Marcuse uses Freud as a justification for the possibilities of polymorphous perversion in view of the historical character of the reality principle, we have seen that this is not tenable because Freud did not believe that the concept of time was applicable to this principle. Furthermore, Marcuse's idea of polymorphous perversity contradicts the Freudian notion of associating

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1 "The Origin of Psychoanalysis", in J. Rickman, ed., The Works of Sigmund Freud (op. cit.), p. 27.

2 Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, p. 184.

this concept with infantile sexuality and the maturation of the human being.

In Freudian terms, polymorphous perversity is the channelling of all of Eros into the sexual function. This is only possible, Freud believed, in infantile sexuality. The mature life is one of sublimation, that is, the diversion of sexuality into constructive and creative channels, including art and work.

Marcuse believes that the Freudian idea of polymorphous perversity is tenable if there is a lessening of repression in the mature human being. Marcuse adds two qualifications to this: a) the problem of the organization of scarcity will have to be solved for this to occur; and b) polymorphous perversity involves a merger of reason and the Id.

However, as previously explained, Freud viewed all social relations as expressions of authority, whether a scarcity factor existed or not, and he believed that rebellion will always occur because of the existence of taboo. Furthermore, if the factor of reason is added to the Freudian unstructured Id, the Id is given form -- which is,by definition, a restriction. This appears to be a contradiction of the original Freudian concept of polymorphous perversity, whereby the unstructured Id was free excepting for libidinal drive which became autogenic. A rational existence is thus not possible in the Freudian state of polymorphous perversity as Marcuse does contend.

Marcuse only calls for a lessening of the level of repression, he does not call for an end to it. This is in concordance with the Freudian belief that a certain level of repression must exist for civilization to survive. Freud also recognized that at any level of repression there must be a degree of restrictions upon polymorphous sexuality and infantile sexuality. Marcuse, on the contrary, would have to call for almost the complete absence of repression if he were to posit a Freudian polymorphous perversity in the mature adult. This he is wise enough not to do. However, in view of Freud's aforementioned beliefs, which Marcuse does use for support, it appears that polymorphous perversity is therefore untenable, given any level of repression in a developed civilization.

Although Marcuse has not gone as far as Norman O. Brown in envisioning polymorphous perversity as an end, that is, by resorting to poetry and myth and by emphasizing the initial trauma of separation, he still quite clearly sees perversions as a rebellion against the performance principle engendered by the form of organization responsible for its creation -- advanced capitalism. Marcuse has also stated that Brown does not recognize differences between the sexes in his ultimate vision. Marcuse is opposed to this. Furthermore, Brown's vision encompasses the end of the dialectic, for even sexuality is negated and there is nowhere else to move on his continuum. Marcuse is obviously opposed to this.[1]

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[1] Discussion with Herbert Marcuse, McGill University (June 12, 1970).

Rieff explains that Freud intended "sex to mean more than genitality."[1] However, Rieff also notes that there is an ambiguous shifting between "primary and secondary sexuality" in Freud. It is this ambiguity that Marcuse bases much of his discussion of sexuality upon. Moreover, Freud had a definite idea of maturity which involved the inhibition of the sexual aim and a "general suppression of earlier erotic zones so that the genital zone has predominance."[2] Marcuse's concept of polymorphous perversity is therefore in opposition to Freud's view of the sexual human being in the mature state; for indeed Freud argued for genitality.

5. The Dynamics of the Death Instinct: Repressive Desublimation

Marcuse's call for a "non-repressive" sublimation based upon a new relationship between instinct and reason appears to be doubtful within a Freudian context in the light of the preceding discussion. "Non-repressive sublimation", according to Marcuse, occurs only when there is a reduction in the strength of the performance principle and a subsequent lessening of surplus-repression.

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1 Phillip Rieff, op. cit., p. 166.

2 Ibid., p. 172.

Work still exists in a state of non-repressive sublimation; however, in a non-alienated form and in concordance with man's 'basic needs'. These needs are not created from those induced by a culture which creates the opposite of non-repressive sublimation, i.e. "repressive desublimation".

Repressive desublimation is the subordination of the libido to the death instincts in a form which allows libidinal gratification and the promotion of the production principle. Repressive desublimation allows the release of libidinal energy without a reconciliation with rationality. As such, it provides gratification only within the boundaries of the performance principle. Sexuality becomes "liberated in socially constructive forms":

> It appears that such repressive desublimation is indeed operative in the sexual sphere, and here, as in the desublimation of higher culture, it operates as the by-product of the social controls of technological reality, which extend liberty while intensifying domination.[1]

A manifestation of repressive desublimation is "a localization and contraction of libido, the reduction of the erotic to sexual experience and satisfaction."[2]

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1 Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man; Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1964),p.72.

2 Ibid., p. 73.

In Freudian theory, sublimation is a positive motivational force for there is a constructive deflection of sexual aim. Marcuse de-emphasizes the possibilities of positive sublimation under the performance principle, because such sublimation can only be within the boundaries that have been set by the interests of domination. It is therefore impossible to have a repressed life that at the same moment is healthy. There can be no full sexual life in the Marcusian sense, that is, a complete erotization of the entire personality. Sexuality must remain within limits.

Marcuse's use of the term 'repressive desublimation' is valid only if the performance principle and surplus-repression, as concepts, are considered tenable within a Freudian context, because it is only within that framework that Marcuse defines his own terms. As previously stated, this is highly questionable. Repressive desublimation is contradictory to the whole thrust of the Freudian concept of sublimation. Sublimation, for Freud, was a process whereby

> the energy of infantile wish-excitations ... remains capable of excitation, instead of becoming useless, a higher, eventually no longer sexual goal is set up ... We probably owe the highest achievements of our culture to energy which has been liberated in this way.[1]

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[1] Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1959), p. 50.

In the Marcusian view, these "high achievements of culture" no longer exist because they are anti-sexual. It is difficult to tell if the "high achievements" that Freud speaks of would have been included in the "long process of rationalization" which led to the development of the performance principle by Marcuse. Advanced capitalism in the Marcusian framework has stripped the higher functions of all power. This is reflected in expressions of culture such as art,which no longer retains a critical function. The beautiful and the sexual become merged in objective form, thus breaking the patterns of classical design. The aesthetic dimension becomes one of technology.

The Bauhaus movement identified 'form' as a "follower" of 'function'. Today, form and function have become integrated and unidimensional. Contemporary design, particularly architecture, demonstrates this. Marcuse believes that the identification of the beautiful with the sexual is nowhere more true than with sex itself. Libidinal gratification is solely from genitality in today's society, at the sacrifice of the whole body. Marcuse notes that the genitals themselves have never been considered beautiful objects. It is his point that we have gone beyond sublimation and into genital symbolism of a nature which imbues narrow genital sex. Although, as previously mentioned, the argument for a wider sexuality cannot be based upon Freud when the adult is

in the mature state, Marcuse's call for a wider sexuality is well within the context of his own framework. As the performance principle intensifies, so does repressive desublimation. The death instinct is triumphant within repressive desublimation by definition. Polymorphous perversity, that is, the resexualization of the body, is consistent with the hope for a decreasing repressive desublimation.

Marcuse recognizes that the death instinct is of major importance in the relationship between instinct and reason. However, he never successfully speaks to Freud's contention that the death instinct represented the strongest argument against a free civilization. Freud was quite explicit about the death instinct, although he realized that he had not done much research in that area. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, he states: "no substitutive or reactive formations and no sublimations will suffice to remove the repressive instincts persisting tension ... "[1] Even when the pleasure principle is dominant, Freud believed, it "itself has no more escaped the process of taming ..."[2]

It is quite possible that the inducement of a high degree of repression will engender a withdrawal of the libido and the development of reaction-formations, which may even form the basis for culture.[3] However, it is unlikely, Freud thought, that by lessening the degree of repression aggressiveness and the death instinct would be dealt a great blow.

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1 Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, p. 77.

2 Ibid., p. 109.

3 "Repression", in The Works of Sigmund Freud (op.cit.)., p. 97.

CHAPTER TWO

MARCUSE AND MARX

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the relevance of Marxian concepts to those of Herbert Marcuse. How does Marcuse view Hegelian thought in relationship to that of Marx, and is this relevant to Marcuse's Marxism? How has Marcuse applied Marxian categories to his analysis of advanced capitalism?

It is the thesis of this chapter that Marcuse has chosen to emphasize the conception of reason in Hegel, rather than the traditional Hegelian dichotomies, because it is that concept, in Marcuse's view, which ultimately leads to revolution. Furthermore, Marcuse has shifted the locus of the Marxian frameworks of superstructure and base, thus giving them a new relevance.

It is to these ideas which we now turn.

1. Marcuse's Interpretation of Reason and Freedom in Hegelian Thought

Reason and Revolution is an exposition of Hegelian ideas concerning reason and freedom, particularly in connection with political structures. To Marcuse, what is "real" in Hegel's system is that which exists in a "form concordant with the standards

of reason ... i.e. the state becomes a reality only when it corresponds to the given potentialities of men and permits their full development."[1]

It is possible for a society to have a social structure which is not in relationship to social conditions because historical perceptions of the real may be incorrect, according to Marcuse's reading of Hegel. Reason is thus the central concept in Hegel's writings for Marcuse because it undermines what bourgeois historians perceive as the real, thereby establishing a framework for future "objective" conditions. Philosophy in the nineteenth century was an example of this incongruity of perception, particularly in Germany. The Restoration there did contain elements of modernity, although it is interesting to note that this occurred without a revolution. Hegel was particularly attuned to the role of philosophy in determining historical perceptions.

Marcuse brings this question up-to-date. It is through these particular Hegelian lenses that he exposes the lapses between structure and historical conditions, and develops Hegel's

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[1] Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1960), p. 11.

notion of reason which is intricately connected with freedom.[1] Marcuse's concept of revolution and the "biological dimension", which is an important aspect of his idea of freedom, will be discussed in Chapter III. What is essential to note at this point is that, although Marcuse does recognize conservative elements within Hegel's philosophy of the state, it is what he considers the revolutionary aspects which he chooses to emphasize. Furthermore, for Marcuse the nature of reason itself in the Hegelian framework contains a revolutionary element. He sees reason in Hegel as the unfolding of the development of freedom in history.

It is from this context that Marcuse asserts Hegel's belief in the direct connection between freedom and reason. It is only through freedom that the end of history is unfolded:

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[1] Freedom in Hegel is defined by Marcuse as "the power to act in accordance with knowledge of the truth, the power to shape reality in line with its potentialities." The ability to reason is a power which only men have, that is, "to be a self-determining subject in all processes of becoming, for he alone has an understanding of potentialities and a knowledge of 'notions'. Freedom, in turn, presupposes reason, for it is comprehending knowledge alone that enables the subject to gain and to wield this power." (Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, p. 9).

> Freedom is the innermost dynamic of existence, and the process of existence in an unfree world is the continuous negation of that which threatens to deny freedom ... For the history of mankind, this means attainment of a state of the world in which the individual persists in inseparable harmony from the whole.[1]

The "inseparable harmony from the whole" in which "the individual persists" is reminiscent of the search for reconciliation of man with his natural environment, a basic theme throughout the Phenomenology. Hegel's goal was to achieve this reconciliation in a mediated way, that is, through reason. Reason is the mediating factor in man's quest for freedom. It is through history that the harmony of life was to be obtained -- and in Hegel's view, nature was the material content of history. History was seen as a succession of changing conceptual structures within Hegel's system of categories. It is a process of reintegration, the unification of infinite and finite forms, which characterizes the progressive development of history.

A comparison of Hegelian concepts of history with the Platonic conception of Eros elucidates the Marcusian view of history and freedom. To Plato, Eros is the principal force in

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[1] Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, p. ix.

man's striving towards happiness and knowledge. Harmony is seen as the good and the beautiful. At the end of the process of striving, Eros is transcended and Logos is realized. Hegel historicized this process: he speaks of the world spirit, whereas Plato confined himself to the individual psyche. Human culture and environment are decisive factors in Hegel's system, therefore the individual is no longer in isolation. This, in a sense, is a strict rejection of utopianism, because in Hegel's system the end was realizable and immanent. Nature must exist in inter-dependence, as a "component of reality". Thus Logos is only immanent in the empirical world.

Marcuse, like Hegel, also believes that 'Logos' -- or more precisely, in his more individual terms, 'realizing potentiality' -- is only possible in the empirical world, despite his speculations concerning phantasy. However, at this juncture in history -- or, for that matter, as far into the future as he can see -- this goal is neither realizable nor imminent.

Marcuse sees his notion of reason as being much the same as Hegel's conception of reason. In Marcuse's terms, Hegel's conception therefore has a distinctly "critical and polemical character".[1] The gap, according to Marcuse, between freedom and

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[1] Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, p. 11.

man's present state still exists. Within the Marcusian (and Hegelian) frameworks, man's present condition has not been shaped by reason, therefore it is not rational. The new element of 'non-reason' is a central aspect engendered by Marcuse's analysis of advanced capitalism.

Marcuse enters into a direct confrontation with Hegel in a discussion of the Hegelian political framework.[1] Hegel's identification of Napoleon with the "soul of the world" and the elevation of the Church along with other political occurrences between 1800 and 1815 which Hegel approved of, Marcuse calls a "strange attitude".[2] Marcuse criticizes the political attitudes of the later Hegel because he believes they are inconsistent with Hegel's prior teachings.

> He [Hegel] is guilty not so much of being servile as of betraying his highest philosophical ideals ... The dialectical analysis of society has concluded that society was not capable of establishing reason and freedom of its own accord.[3]

It is noteworthy that Marcuse never recognizes the

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1 Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, Chapter 6, Part I.

2 Ibid., p. 171.

3 Ibid., p. 218.

possibility that Hegel's interconnection between freedom and reason might necessarily lead to a strong state (the basis of Marcuse's political criticisms), because of Hegel's dialectical analysis. Hegel's philosophical system is accepted as valid; it is his political conclusions that are false, argues Marcuse. The possibility that the Hegelian idea of dialectics may be incorrect is never put forward, nor is the relationship between political necessity and philosophical truth explored.

The acceptance of the Hegelian Absolute and of the dialectical method of analysis, with the rejection of the Hegelian notion of politics, does not indicate Marcuse's own idea of absolute truth. This is true throughout his works, for in his rejection of positivism and empiricism Marcuse only infers what he believes to be real and true. In order for one to ascertain Marcuse's conception of the real, one must go back to the Hegelian notion of reason and freedom. Marcuse's sole criterion in determining what is real is "that which is reasonable". However, his lack of precision on this point is extraordinary because, unlike Hegel, he presents no categories.

Marcuse is thus guilty of his own criticism of Hegel, that is, of "engaging in polemics" concerning the concept of reason.

Marcuse's criticism is directed particularly to that section of Hegel where he defines the state as being a reality only when it corresponds to man's potentialities.[1] Marcuse believes that Hegel thought that the state was not capable of establishing freedom and reason in society without coercion. To this end, therefore, Hegel tried to reconcile a strong state with the idea of freedom. This, in Marcuse's view, is why Hegel believed in monarchy, albeit with a strong "constitutional flavoring".

Marcuse is thus accusing Hegel of placing his bias before his conclusion, thus departing from the logic of dialectics. This is "polemical" in Marcuse's view. However, it should be noted that Marcuse is also guilty of this form of polemics with respect to the concept of reason. Marcuse is an anti-statist. To that end, through his positing of 'the real' as "that which is reasonable" without categories and without precision, he can, as Hegel did, use 'reason' to support his view. Indeed, this is primarily why he accepts the Hegelian definition of 'reason'.

2. Marcuse's view of Reason as a political force in Hegel: The transition to Marx

It is important to trace Marcuse's line of argument

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[1] Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, p. 11.

in discussing his interpretation of Hegel. To him, reason is essentially a political term in Hegel's writings. By viewing reason in this light, he develops the groundwork for declaring that there is a direct relationship between the thought of Marx and that of Hegel.

Marx, as a critic of the young Hegelians, focussed upon the concepts of alienation, labor and man's essence in Hegel's works. Marx was concerned with the lack of empirical reality contained in the abstractions of the young Hegelians. It is this which leads him to use Feuerbach's transformative method. Since Marcuse sees "reason" as a political term in Hegel's writings, and since Marcuse views Marx as having politicized Hegelian conceptions (alienation, labor, etc.), Marcuse's transition from Hegel to Marx presents little difficulty. This is precisely because of Marcuse's view of the politicization of Hegelian concepts by Marx. Philosophical differences become secondary.

The transition from Hegel to Marx "is not to be interpreted in terms of philosophy ... because all the philosophical concepts of Marxian theory are social and economic categories, whereas Hegel's social and economic categories are all philosophical concepts."[1]

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[1] Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, p. 258.

Because he believes they present two fundamentally different notions about the nature of man, Marcuse notes numerous distinctions between Hegel and Marx, particularly in his interpretation of the role of consciousness in Marx as a force in the determination of history; nevertheless, he believes that Marx and Hegel are in the same stream.

Jean Hyppolite and Sidney Hook believe that there is a greater degree of difference between the thought of Hegel and Marx than does Marcuse.[1] Hyppolite, in particular, stresses the differences between Subject and Predicate in the two theorists, and emphasizes Marx's view of man as a social being as a result of this. Hegel, Hyppolite notes,

> ... located the Idea in an existential drama of history, whereas Marx finds the real counterpart of the Hegelian Idea in the end of the historical drama, in its effective reconciliation or positive synthesis.[2]

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[1] Sidney Hook, From Hegel to Marx: Studies in the Intellectual Development of Karl Marx (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1936); and Jean Hyppolite, Hegel and Marx (Paris: Philosophical Library, 1955).

[2] Jean Hyppolite, Ibid., p. 117. Hyppolite's concept of Geist in Hegel is cosmic and not in any sense anthropocentric. Thus the split between Hegel and Marx is a wide one in Hyppolite's framework because the Marxian subject is man who can fulfill himself within terrestrial limits, that is, in the "historical drama". The interpretations on this question are too numerous to discuss within the limits of this study; however, to illustrate a position which is perhaps closer to Marcuse, we shall turn to Avineri. He sees a 'middle position' in Marx's 'epistemology' between "classical materialism and classical idealism." Avineri believes that this epistemology transcends the "classic dichotomy between subject and object." See Shlomo Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx (Cambridge: University Press, 1968), p. 69. See also p. 58 below.

Although Marcuse's own position is somewhere between the two differences that Hyppolite describes, that is, between reconciliation and the existential drama itself, he nevertheless believes that he is on the Hegel-Marx continuum.

3. Hegel and Marx on Bureaucracy and the Universal Class: Marcuse's break with orthodox Marxism

There are two areas of criticism which Marx explores in his Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right which are particularly interesting to note because they trace themes found in Hegel, Marx and Marcuse himself. The questions of the universal class and the nature of true democracy link all three philosophers in showing similarities and differences.

To Hegel, the bureaucracy represented the universal class. A universal class was one which mediated needs between the classes of civil society. The bureaucracy fitted this function because it had a universalistic goal.[1] Furthermore, if a universalistic class did not exist, Hegel's idea of the state as an empirical entity could not exist.

Marx saw a gap between what Hegel claimed to be existing and what really existed. This was because the bureaucracy claimed

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[1] Shlomo Avineri, Lecture delivered at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem (November 1969).

to be something different than what, in actual fact, it was. It was only the bureaucracy, out of all classes, which did not maintain a claim to a legitimate pursuit of its own ends. Hegel called this "universalistic altruism". Marx believed that this was an aspect of the mystification of the state, and believed that this "mystification" was always in the form of a universalistic façade. However, he never abandoned his search for universalism: Marx wanted to achieve in socialism a form of universalism which Hegel saw as a possibility within the bourgeois state. The proletariat replaces Hegel's bureaucratic class in Marxian theory, and becomes the universal class for Marx. To accomplish this, all classes would merge in the proletariat.

The pretext for the abolition of private property stems from Marx's desire for universalism. Marx's premise is to universalize conditions already existing within society and to deprive them of their negative content. Therefore, in the Marxian view, the end of private property is derived from philosophical categories. This is in opposition to Marcuse's belief that all of Marx's categories are economic.[1]

Marcuse now presents us with an interesting problem for someone who considers himself to be on the Hegel-Marx continuum.

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[1] Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, p. 258.

He does not speak of creating a universal class, as did Hegel, nor of creating a class which will absorb all other classes after a revolution, as did Marx. Further still from Marx does he seem in that he finds no hope with those classes which have a direct relationship to the means of production. Instead, he looks to those classes which stand precisely outside the framework of the productive processes: the blacks, "hippies", the New Left and a coalition of certain intellectuals.[1] It is this view which appears to be a break with orthodox Marxism.

In his recent works, Marcuse discloses antagonisms between and within the aforementioned groups ("hippies", etc.) and claims that political consciousness has developed within them. Moreover, he appears to be shifting ground in that he states that the objective revolutionary base of an industrial working class still remains.[2] However, he is pessimistic, for although the character of the working class is changing, he does not believe that there is much chance for them to attain a high level of political consciousness. The key point is his quite non-Marxian position that the class-political consciousness of these "outside groups" developed in spite of the lack of any direct connection to the means of production.

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1 Herbert Marcuse, "Liberation from the Affluent Society", in: D. Cooper, ed., The Dialectics of Liberation (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1968), pp. 180-186.

2 Herbert Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, pp. 49-78.

Is it possible to form a revolutionary base from a stratum of the population that is not related to the means of production? Throughout Marcuse's works, there is a degree of ambivalence on this question. Recently, speaking on this point, he has clearly stated that he refers to the New Left, etc., as "catalysts" in the process of revolutionary change. According to him, there also seems to be reason for believing that the younger workers have developed some degree of revolutionary class consciousness. The older workers, to use Rosa Luxemburg's phrase, have "bourgeois class consciousness". Marcuse believes that they are under the rule of the unions in an ideological sense, in other words, they are counter-revolutionary. Marcuse's greatest hope is with the new professional and technical classes who have recently indicated their desire for structural change. He therefore believes that there is little potential for a revolutionary movement among most of the working class at the present time, although there are segments of this class which display a radical potential. This potential will be developed by "catalysts" because the working class is still a necessary component in a revolutionary movement.[1]

It is the Marxian concept of man which Marcuse professes to use although, as we shall see, there is a basic conflict between this and the Freudian view. Marx's notion of man's essence stems from the inversion of the subject-object relationship. In Hegel, Marcuse

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[1] Discussion with Herbert Marcuse, McGill University (June 12, 1970).

notes, the Idea was the subject and man's social relationship played a secondary role. Marx reverses this and Marcuse accepts it as such.

Marx's discussion about the nature of true democracy is relevant to this reversal of a Hegelian concept, because it is here that Marx declares that man has a "communist essence". This "communist essence" is so essential to Marx that it has primacy in his view of the world. Man is seen only in relationship to other men: without other men, man has no definition. Indeed Marx used this argument to declare that the political sphere should not be dependent upon property but upon man's social relations. This was used in Marx's discussion to justify universal suffrage.

Marcuse is thus a Marxist in the tradition of Hegel as opposed to positivistic Marxism, which is often seen as beginning with Engels. He sees history as a resolution of irrational contradictions. Marcuse views these contradictions of "reality" and establishes a linkage with the unfolding of freedom. This, too, he owes to Hegel.

4. Aron's Typology

Marcuse presents us with new categories which apply specifically to the twentieth century. These include his con-

ception of the material base and the role of the working class. This is not to say that Marxist analysis is irrelevant. Indeed it only points out the eternal verities of Marxist thought, especially with respect to that all-encompassing factor which Marcuse has called a new mode of production in itself: technology.

Marxist thought in relationship to the advanced stage of capitalism which Marcuse describes will now be examined. The typology of Raymond Aron was found to be especially useful for this task because it encompasses the wide range of Marxian categories in a schematic form which allows a lucid comparison with Marcuse.

Marcusian concepts, as opposed to those of Karl Marx, may be seen in the context of each of the following seven basic themes within Marxist thought, as delineated by Raymond Aron:

1) Men enter into definite relationships that are independent of their will.
2) In every society there can be distinguished an economic base consisting of the infrastructure and the superstructure.
3) Historical change is a process of contradictory movements between the forces and relations of production.

4) The contradictions between the forces and relations of production result in a class struggle.

5) The dialectic of the forces and relations of production implies a theory of revolution.

6) Marx opposes social reality to consciousness.

7) There are basically four stages to human history, each of them characterized by their modes of production: Asiatic, oriental, feudal and bourgeois.[1]

a) Social Relations and Production Relations

Beginning with the first theme, that of men entering into relationships that are independent of their will, one notes that this concept is implicit in Marcuse's analysis. It is the role of critical theory, says Marcuse, to present alternatives and it is the role of social theory to be "concerned with historical alternatives which haunt the established society as subversive tendencies and forces ..."[2] Thus, in Marxist terms, it is the structures which characterize a particular mode of production

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1 Raymond Aron, Main Currents in Sociological Thought (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1968), pp. 121-123.

2 Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man (London: Sphere Books, 1968), p. 11.

that formulate the way men think. It is social relations which determine priorities and not the expressions of individual wills.

The normative element in Marcusian thought stems from Marcuse's judgement that the a priori of all social theory is that life ought to be made worth living, and that at the present time systems and structures are engaged in a process of repression which results in a process of "systematic dehumanization". Thus Marcuse is able to relate the Freudian concept of ego repression to sexuality and the level of economic abundance.[1] Social systems are therefore a result of production relations and forces, which in turn produce various levels of repression. It follows from this that certain modes of production engender a greater degree of repression than others. However, all modes are instrumental in determining personality.

b) The Material Base

Marx states that all societies develop an infrastructure and a superstructure which characterize their economic base. Marcuse, in looking at post-industrial technological capitalism,

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[1] See Chapter I for a discussion of this.

clearly delineates what he sees as this economic base. Marcuse acknowledges his debt to C. Wright Mills to the extent that the elitist interlocking directorates of Mills' military-industrial complex are almost an implicit given in his analysis.[1] However, it is the characteristics which Mills describes in institutional terms which have, in Marcuse's opinion, created an infrastructure which transcends traditional categories. Basically, the material base which Marcuse sees as the ground for his dismissal of traditional categories is constituted of:

i) The growing productivity of labour (technical progress);

ii) The rise in the birth rate of the underlying population;

iii) The permanent defence economy;

iv) The economic and political integration of the "developed" countries and the growing relationship between these countries and "the underdeveloped areas".[2]

The advent of post-Keynesian economics, which is designed

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1 See C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (Oxford: University Press, 1956). Mills speaks of educational training grounds which determine status and power within an international corporate structure tending towards oligopoly; the role of the military, inextricably linked to an economy geared to the preservation of the defense apparatus, etc.

2 Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man (Sphere Books, op.cit.), p. 43.

to prevent a depression, is essentially a manipulative device using the power of government to obstruct the normal workings of the market. It has proven to be highly effective through the use of monetary and fiscal controls which result not only in loosening or tightening of the economy and of the amount of money in circulation, but also of the level of employment. Marx's reserve army of the unemployed has not brought a decrease in the wage rate because unions have set up barriers to entry into the labour market: this has had a "spillover" effect on the unorganized sector. It simply means that union rates have a tendency to set a standard in non-organized areas.

Furthermore, governments have seen it as beneficial to maintain a certain level of unemployment, thus redefining full employment as a certain percentage of those working. The rest must remain unemployed as a check on spending and inflation.

To Marcuse, the crucial factor affecting labour productivity is automation. He describes it as the "catalyst of advanced industrial society".[1] Marcuse is not opposed to automation *per se*; indeed he states that a society must first "create the wealth before being able to distribute it *according to the freely developed needs of the individual*".[2] Automation

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1 Herbert Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man* (Sphere Books, *op.cit.*), p.44. See also: Herbert Marcuse, "Socialization in the Developed Countries", in: *International Socialist Journal*, Vol. II, No. 8 (April 1965).

2 *Ibid.*, p. 46.

is a transcendent form of labour power which has the potential to free man from the machine. It also has the ability to provide the necessary goods for each worker and his family and to yield a satisfactory standard of living; however, there must be a correct organizational structure for this to occur.

Indeed it is this faith in the benign potential of automation which permits Marcuse to see the transition to socialism within advanced industrial capitalism. Marcuse, as did Marx, believes that the transition is only possible in an industrial context. Automation and economic abundance greatly enhance the possibilities of having a non-alienated work force in a socialist society.[1]

c) Imperialism at the Highest Stage of Capitalism

The economies of "underdeveloped" nations are inextricably linked with the materialist base of highly developed capitalist countries.

Paul Sweezy, in an analysis of the future of capitalism, notes that the capitalist states exist as a minority of the world's

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[1] Discussion with Herbert Marcuse, McGill University (June 12, 1970).

economies, and that the advanced capitalist countries comprise about twenty per cent of the world's population and produce approximately sixty per cent of the world's output; "whereas the centrally planned, non-capitalist countries ... account for around twenty percent of the population ... " This leaves the 'Third World' "with something like fifty percent of the world's population and only ten percent of the world's output".[1]

It is Sweezy's point that in order for "developed" countries to get richer, "underdeveloped" countries must get poorer. All systems of "aid" are designed to maintain whatever trade equilibrium has already been established between the recipient and donor. Export-import price controls are inherently biased against the "primary exporting countries", and the system of exchange of manufactured goods and raw materials tends to perpetuate itself, so that there is little development in the countries supplying raw materials.[2]

Marcuse adds to this argument by noting that pre-capitalist traditions offer a strong hindrance to development. Furthermore,

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1 Paul Sweezy, "The Future of Capitalism", in: Cooper, D., ed., The Dialectics of Liberation (op.cit.), p. 96.

2 Ibid., p. 104.

in the newly politically independent countries, the leap to rapid industrialization, regardless of the availability of requisites, is seen as a necessity to maintain political viability.

Marx foresaw socialism as a product of revolution brought about by increasing polarization between classes. It is part of a historical movement whereby a certain level of abundance must be reached before a socialist form of distribution can occur. At the present time, this is hardly likely in underdeveloped areas as long as they bear a close attachment to capitalist and other developed areas of exchange.

d) The technological apparatus and the working class

How, then, does the polarization occur that Marx predicted, that is, the ultimate revelation of the antagonisms between the two basic classes: proletariat and capitalist? Marcuse's answer is that it does not occur at all.

It is in the nature of a highly developed technological society to have a great ability to absorb all contradicting elements. This society can thus instrumentalize subjects as well

as objects and, in effect, justify overproduction, high productivity, waste, etc., in the name of comfort and "progress". The staggering effect of this numbs the imagination. For the capacity to contain and manipulate "subversive imagination and effort is an integral part of the given society". Those whose life "is the hell of the affluent society are kept in line by a brutality which revives medieval and early modern practices."[1]

Marxian theory calls for a maintenance of the technological apparatus after the revolution. Significant revolutionary change must be political in character.[2] To this, Marcuse adds the dimension of the technological apparatus which he says has an inherently political character. This political character cannot be eradicated by a transfer of power alone, because the political nature of technology has been infused into the proletariat. This infusion has been an ongoing process because:

i) The high level of mechanization has reduced the level of physical energy expended by labor;

ii) The trend towards "white collar" work has increased; there

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1 Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man (Sphere Books, op.cit.), p. 35.

2 Ibid., p. 38.

is now a greater percentage of the labor force classified as "white collar", as opposed to "blue collar" workers in the United States and Sweden.

Marcuse is saying that mechanization and the trend towards white collar work places severe curtailment upon the possibilities of machines becoming instruments of human production. Men in a sense become objectified by machines. Indeed, in a poetic sense, machines determine the rate of production. Marcuse notes that it is getting difficult to measure individual human output; the key factor has become "equipment utilization".[1]

The effect of these aspects of a technological society is to raise the focus from the individual level to the group level within the context of the work world. Furthermore,

> ... the individual derives his world view socially in very much the same way that he derives his roles and his identity ... his emotions and his interpretations like his actions are predefined for him by society, and so is his cognitive approaches to the universe that surrounds him.[2]

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[1] Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man (Sphere Books, op.cit.), p. 38.

[2] Peter Berger, Invitation to Sociology: A Humanistic Perspective (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1966), p. 136.

Marcuse therefore speaks of qualitative change, by which, indeed, revolution is defined and not by a change of regime per se. Revolution can still end in repressions; another system of domination can be imposed. This is an intrinsic part of what he terms the "dialectics of liberation"[1] which involves the development of a society directly in line with man's instinctual needs.

The normative aspect again is that Marcuse is dealing with what ought to be. He states: "I believe that in Marx too socialism ought to be. This 'ought' belongs to the very essence of scientific socialism. It ought to be; it is we may almost say a biological, sociological and political necessity."[2]

However, at this juncture in history the possibility of changing the entire system lacks a major prerequisite found in Marx: it lacks a mass base. Modern post-industrial technology has repressed all antagonisms to a minimum.

The working class is thus no longer the agent of historical change because it is no longer a majority of the population and because it is no longer "free from the repressive and aggressive competitive needs of capitalist society ... "[3]

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1 Herbert Marcuse, "Liberation from the Affluent Society", in David Cooper, ed., The Dialectics of Liberation (op.cit.), p.176.

2 Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man (Sphere Books, op.cit.), p.38.

3 Herbert Marcuse, "Liberation from the Affluent Society", Ibid.,p.178.

Marcuse uses the Marxist definition of working class: the industrial proletariat. The shift to white collar clerical and technical jobs brings in turn a shift towards administration - which is another aspect of the totality of domination.

The antagonisms of society have been repressed "firstly, by virtue of the actual satisfaction of needs and secondly, by a massive scientific manipulation and administration of needs - that is by a systematic social control not only of the consciousness, but also of the unconscious of man."[1]

Manipulation, needs administration, the shifting in the labor force towards new types of work which are instrumental in perpetuating the technological apparatus of advanced capitalism, etc. have "bought off" the working class, according to Marcuse. They are actively engaged in perpetuating imperialism and exploitation. This means that the entire concept of the Marxian superstructure must be rewritten to apply to advanced capitalism, because the process of absorption has become total in affecting thought processes. Since a new structure of character has also been formulated which indicates that there will have to be a rebellion against the present biology, this also indicates that the old Marxian categories are no longer adequate to Marcuse.

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[1] Herbert Marcuse, "Liberation from the Affluent Society", op.cit., p. 182.

This systematic control of the "unconscious of man" has brought the Marcusian analysis full cycle , back to the Freudian conflict between Eros and Thanatos, whereby post-industrial systems have developed surplus-repression and a denial of Eros. To accomplish this, society has had to engage in waste, planned obsolescence, exploitation of "underdeveloped" areas and, concurrently, in the maintenance of a sector of the population in poverty.

e) Marcuse within the framework of Aron's Typology

Posing Marcusian theory in the context of Aron's seven Marxian conceptualizations, we note that:

1. Marcuse also views man as entering into relations that are independent of his will, that is, social relations are engendered by social structure which, in turn, is engendered by the mode of production.
2. The relations of production have become blurred in the Marcusian framework. The infrastructure is no longer clearly delineated from the superstructure, because the production principle has become ideological, affecting not only economics but legal and political institutions as well.

3. Historical change has been stultified by technological post-industrial society. Relations of property have become diffused through working class "ownership", i.e. ownership of stock, union pension fund holdings of corporate interests, etc. Income distribution has no longer become a goal of the proletariat, only an increase in absolute terms has captured their imagination.

4. Capitalism has managed to absorb and suppress its inherently antagonistic nature. The class struggle has been obliterated because the proletariat has become co-opted. This has occurred through a belief in capitalist mythology infused through media, schools, etc., a rise in the standard of living so that the workers have a stake in the system, and through economic, psychological and political manipulation.

5. Marcuse believes in revolution, however, in a most utopian sense. It is not a product of historical evolution; on the contrary, it is a result of capitalism's inability to cope with those who have not become co-opted. These include Blacks, intellectuals, and students. However, this does not constitute a mass movement. Marcuse is also pessimistic about its possibility: "I do not believe that in the near future we will see such a mass movement."[1]

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[1] Herbert Marcuse, "Liberation from the Affluent Society", in David Cooper, ed., The Dialectics of Liberation, p. 191.

Furthermore, the Marcusian conception of revolution is more than just the transition to socialism. It is a complete qualitative change that is in line with man's instinctual needs. Part of these needs is a return to the importance of play, the role of the body. He does not condemn the "hippies" nor the New Left as being counterrevolutionary, because they "have an inherent political element ... there is a new sensibility against efficient and insane reasonableness, and they are united in a non-aggressive form of life."[1] Although these groups are not exactly what Marcuse means when he is speaking of the new biological man, it is apparent that they may come closer to him than anyone else. It is irrelevant that they may be deflecting from the revolution by turning to sensuality and not system change. Marcuse does not see them as a product of absorption in a society with a high level of toleration, nor does he see them as a product of the "one dimensionality" which characterizes their parents.

6. Marcuse, like Marx, opposed social reality to consciousness and believes that the "developed" areas have created a rationality of their own.

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[1] Herbert Marcuse, "Liberation from the Affluent Society", op.cit., p. 190.

7. Marcuse adds a new regime to Marx's four: that of a post-industrial technological society. Although this is fundamentally an economic categorization, it does transcend pure capitalism because of its psychological implications. The creation of overabundance or a high level of affluence inherently leads to surplus repression and functional domination through administration. Implicit in the Marcusian ideal is a lowering of the level of abundance. Thus quantitative change has to occur also; indeed, it is a prime requisite for qualitative change.[1]

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[1] An interesting view on the Marcusian framework was posited in the London Times. When an orthodox Marxist is confronted with Marcuse's analytical model of "technological determinism", he detects a model indistinguishable from the analysis of modern society developed by the "theorists of the extreme Right: Hans Freyer, Helmut Schelsky and Arnold Gehlen". The common factor is the conviction that modern science and technology must fatally result in the "establishment of a technocratic order which perpetuates the alienation of man, disintegrates the substance of political democracy and consigns socialism to the attic." (Literary Supplement, London Times (London: June 5, 1969), p. 3.

CHAPTER THREE

MARCUSE'S ATTEMPT TO RECONCILE FREUD AND MARX

The attempt to reconcile Marx and Freud is the basic Marcusian strategy. Marcuse's approach towards this reconciliation and his Hegelian view of history are expressed in an examination of the idea of alienation. The Marcusian view of alienation is therefore a synthesis of his interpretation of Hegel, Marx and Freud.

The further attempt to solve the problem of alienation is inherent in Marcuse's concept of the "new biological man", itself a Marcusian synthesis of Marx and Freud. An examination of this concept brings forth the many discrepancies previously noted between Marcuse and his view of Freud and Marx. It is these discrepancies which lead Marcuse to a less than successful reconciliation.

1. Alienation

It is difficult to posit with precision the Hegelian

and Freudian concepts of alienation. Particularly with reference to Hegel, the task becomes especially arduous. This is because there is a tendency to oversimplify his position and to vulgarize it. There is a great deal of debate on the Hegelian idea of alienation.

In the Hegelian system, consciousness is dissociated from Nature. In a perhaps oversimplified statement which, however, does allow a valid comparison with Marx, Bottomore and Rubel state:

> It followed from Hegel's conception of labour as 'spiritual labor', and of alienation as a purely spiritual phenomenon, that the dialectical process of sublimation, by which alienation was overcome, took place only on the level of abstract thought and left unchanged the existing social institutions.[1]

Alienation can be viewed as the objectification of Geist. It is a positive force in Hegel, according to Lefebvre, because alienated life is the true life in that the negation of the negation "is not therefore the assertion of man's true essence by the imagination of his imaginary essence. On the contrary, it abolishes the concrete essence and transforms it into a subject, the false objectivity or abstraction: pure thought ... without an object."[2]

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[1] T.B. Bottomore and M. Rubel, eds., Karl Marx: Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1963), p. 21.

[2] Henri Lefebvre, Dialectical Materialism (London: Jonathan Cape Press, 1968), p. 62.

Hegel "sees an alienation in what man realizes, the world of objective products or things created by man" [1], concludes Lefebvre.[2]

The Marxist concept of alienation is a modification of the Hegelian idea. It is through what is often termed the transformative method of Feuerbach that the Marxist concept is posited; however, Feuerbach is only an intermediary between Hegelian and Marxist thought. He is a transitional figure for Marx.

Marx's goal was to realize the true in the concrete; "philosophical abstractions have hardly any actual effect."[3] He postulated "the individuality of man as an end which can be attained only in society liberated from material and spiritual constraints."[4] Man was essentially a victim of the class nature of social relations which resulted in the reification of his

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1 Henri Lefebvre, Dialectical Materialism, p. 62.

2 Another view of this is held by Leszek Kolakowski: "For Hegel, nature is the alienation of the consciousness, in view of the conquering of the very 'object-ness' of the object; yet for Hegel, it is not the 'definiteness' of the object that creates the alienation, but its property of being an object." ("Karl Marx and the Classical Definition of Truth", in: Toward a Marxist Humanism: Essays on the Left Today (New York: Grove Press, 1968), p.43). Avineri concludes, partly from his reading of Kolakowski, that the Marxist view of alienation retains characteristics of the subject-object dichotomy, so that Marx's epistemology "is sometimes divided against itself: it is both a description of consciousness and a vision of the future." (p. 69). The problem is indeed complex. A basic outline of alienation in Marx and Hegel is thus used in this study, so as to explain the Marcusian view.

3 Henri Lefebvre, Ibid., p. 72.

4 T.B. Bottomore and M. Rubel, eds., op.cit., p. 33.

activities. This was a "social" and "internal" fact.[1] The Marxist conception of history posits universalism as an end, the overcoming of reification and the privatization of individuals and hence, alienation.

Erich Fromm specifies three forms of alienation in the writings of Marx. The forms that are most relevant to this discussion concern man's alienation from himself and from his work. Alienation in Marx, according to Fromm, is: "a mode of experience in which the person experiences himself as an alien. He has become ... estranged from himself."[2]

To Marx, industrial capitalism brought about the most intensive form of alienation whereby his "own act becomes to him [the worker] an alien power standing over and against him, instead of being ruled by him."[3] Thus the worker becomes "estranged from his self", work becomes objectified and bears no relationship to whatever creative power the worker may have. Furthermore, all forms of control are external, not only through machines which regulate production, but also through bureaucratic administration.

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1 Henri Lefebvre, Dialectical Materialism, p. 78.

2 Erich Fromm, The Sane Society (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1956), p. 120.

3 Ibid., p. 121.

Man's relation "to nature is reduced to instrumental and efficiency values, social relations to those of master and slave ..."[1]

Freud, Marcuse notes, expresses all of history as "organized domination".[2] All of human history is inured with repression, this is the reality principle, a necessity for the perpetuation of humanity. Marcuse's modification is that he is saying that Freud is assuming the factor of scarcity. As previously discussed, this appears to be a misreading of Freud's intentions.

If we were to posit a Freudian form of alienation so as to bring Freud within the Marxian perspective, alienation would be a self-misunderstanding brought on through repression. It is somewhat analogous with the Marxian idea of "false consciousness", which is the consciousness of individuals in a state of alienation. An aspect of this is the denial of the pleasure principle. Marcuse notes that by definition the pleasure principle does not exist when there is surplus-repression, that is, when work becomes "general". This is alienation in the Marcusian sense.[3]

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1 Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, Character and Social Structure: The Psychology of Social Institutions (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1954), p. 383.

2 Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud (London: Sphere Books, 1968), p. 44.

3 Ibid., p. 44 ff.

Marcuse's own account of alienation and "industrial society" follows from the Marxian contention that human potentiality can only be realized in a society free from material and spiritual constraints. Marcuse states that industrial society can transform the "metaphysical into the physical" because this is the nature of the new form of the reality principle, the performance principle. It is only through Marcuse's re-interpretation of the Freudian reality principle that alienation can be overcome in the Marcusian sense. This is because the pleasure principle, according to Marcuse, can be totally affirmed and that it is possible to lower the level of repression.

It is interesting that Marcuse's concept of alienation is primarily defined in terms of industrial society and the work place. This is the Marxian context. To this, Marcuse adds the Freudian dimension, almost as if it were a well-placed afterthought:

> ... labor time, which is the largest part of the individual's lifetime, is painful time, for alienated labor is absence of gratification, negation of the pleasure principle. Libido is diverted for socially useful performances ... [1]

Marcuse thus enriches the Marxian notion of alienation and extends the concept of reification by adding the psychological dimension in a state where work has become 'general'. He has thus broadened the Marxian idea of alienation and at the same moment, significantly changed it. This change occurs not by way of definition of terms primarily,

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[1] Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization (Vintage, op.cit.), p. 41.

but by usage. Alienation, to Marcuse, is the primary cause as to why the system functions the way it does and why it cannot be transcended within present structures. Alienation is a determinant of character in the post-industrial age, according to Marcuse, and because of this a new structure of character has developed. Thus character in itself has changed, stifling systemic change.

Marcuse has therefore attached a Freudian concept to the Marxian structures of production and produced a complete psychological theory. The problem is that this is not properly grounded in Marx, because Marx did not postulate a structure of capitalism that would become almost intranscendable. Although there are psychological implications to the Marxian concepts of alienation and reification, including false consciousness, these can be effected by a change in the nature of their cause, that is, social and production structures. The psychological implications of social structures under advanced capitalism, according to Marcuse, are so acute that they actually present a hindrance to system change <u>in themselves</u>.

Thus by enriching Marxian theory with the addition of the Freudian dimension to the concept of alienation, Marcuse has contradicted the essence of Marx. This is because Marcuse's new structure of character has become a bulwark to dialectical change. This is a development that Marx never envisioned when he postulated his concepts of alienation and reification.[1]

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[1] See footnote 1 on p. 72 below.

2. The Biological Dimension

Marcuse's concept of true liberation involves the creation of a new biological basis for man and a rebellion against the present biology. Freedom thus has an instinctual basis within the character of man. By opting for a new biology, Marcuse is positing a structure of character. He notes that advanced capitalism has developed its own structure of sexuality, an important aspect of character.

Marcuse's use of the word 'biological' is not specifically phylogenetic as it is in Freud. Freud distinguished between the biological and the real. The biological is essentially a technical term denoting the active-passive polarity, specifically as applied to the reversal of an instinct into its opposite, i.e. sadism, masochism, etc. The real concerns the relationship between the ego and the external world.[1] As for 'biology', Marcuse uses the word

> not in the sense of the scientific discipline, but in order to designate the process and the dimension in which inclinations, behavior patterns, and aspirations become vital needs which, if not satisfied, would cause disfunction of the organism ... We could then speak of the biological need for freedom ... This usage of the term 'biological' does not imply or assume anything as to the way in which needs are physiologically expressed and transmitted.[2]

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1 Sigmund Freud, "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes", pub. 1915, in: The Works of Sigmund Freud, op.cit.

2 Herbert Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, p. 10.

Marcuse believes in what has come to be looked upon as the trite concept that human nature is fundamentally malleable and that much of man's character has "historical" roots.[1] However, it is to the degree that the previous statement is true that the possibility for the development of a new biological man exists.[2]

Freud did not believe in a fundamentally malleable human character. With respect to the first two of the three sources that he sees as a basis for human suffering (and upon which Marcuse bases much of his arguments), he stated that "our judgement cannot hesitate long ... It forces us to acknowledge these sources of suffering and submit to the inevitable."[3] There are therefore certain static elements in Freud's view which cannot be altered (decay and the forces of nature). The third source of human misery, the inadequacy of methods of regulation of human relations could be changed. However, the degree to which these regulative forces affect man's instinctual nature is a moot point in Freud. He did say that the forces of civilization place a

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1 Herbert Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, p. 10.

2 Ibid.

3 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, p. 33.

restriction "upon sexual life" which is unavoidable. He does not believe that a basic instinctual character change has occurred (in the Marcusian sense) and he is more pessimistic than Marcuse about the power of the death instinct:

> ... I adopt the standpoint that the inclination to aggression is an original self-subsisting instinctual disposition in man, and I return to my view that it constitutes the greatest impediment to civilization.[1]

Marcuse, by positing a biological liberation for man wishes to designate the type of transformation that will occur in the move to socialism. Biological needs "are defined as those which must be satisfied and for which no adequate substitute can be provided ... certain cultural needs can 'sink down' into the biology of man ... "[2] The transformation to a more humanistic socialism occurs when "the active minorities, mainly among the young middle-class intelligentsia and among the ghetto populations" develop a "biological" need for liberation.[3] At certain economic levels, society develops the capability to develop patterns of "behavior and aspiration as part of the responses of its people ..."[4] This, Marcuse notes, was not considered by Marx in his consideration of the development of socialism -- the "biological dimension".[5]

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1 Herbert Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, p. 10.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid., p. 51.

4 Ibid., p. 11.

5 Ibid., p. 16.

Perhaps Marcuse should consider that Marx did not recognize the 'biological dimension' because he would have found it contradictory to much of his theory. It is the Marxian idea that needs are subject to change throughout history. However, by declaring that these needs "sink down" into the biology of man and become compatible with Freud's postulates, that is, that they become instinctual and changeless, all qualitative movement therefore becomes blocked.

Marcuse's aim of reconciling Marx and Freud in the 'biological dimension' thus produces an analysis of contemporary man who has a structure of character which is an impediment to qualitative change. In effect, alienation has become 'instinctual', according to Marcuse; however, as we have seen, Marxian alienation was an effect of social structure, not a cause.

The biological dimension will, in the end, encompass a new "type of man" which Marcuse describes only in the most vague and general terms. However, he does state that this is a man incapable of violence and aggression. Furthermore, the creation of this new "type" must be the product of technology in order to become "free" and also to "develop". Marcuse thus hinges freedom on "technical progress and the advancement of science", in a state whereby the goals of "science and technology" are changed to meet the "demands of the life instinct".[1]

Marcuse wishes to make work compatible with the body instincts of man, which include play. According to Marcuse, Marx rejects this: "work never becomes play", he says.[2] Therein, Marx makes a classic distinction between labor and leisure and labor and freedom, because of

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1 Herbert Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, p. 19.

2 Ibid., p. 21.

the "realm of necessity".[1] Marcuse rejects this.

Avineri notes quite accurately, in contradiction to Marcuse's interpretation, that Marx sought to unite the realm of consciousness and being in the Marxian tract, The Holy Family, where he states:

> They [the workers] know that property, capital, money, wage-labor, and the like are not ideal figments of the brain, but very practical, very objective sources of their self-alienation and that they must be abolished in a practical, objective manner for man to become man not only in thinking, in consciousness, but also in being, in life.[2]

Thus, a new type of man is exactly what Marx is describing, not the "hunting, fishing" man, close to nature that Marcuse says Marx is speaking of, where the realm of necessity and freedom are not reconciled, but a man who can bridge the gap between necessity and freedom. This man is, according to Avineri, a "human being who needs his fellow-men", where sociability becomes an "end in itself" and it explains Marx's desire for "workers associations".[3] This is where the reconciliation can begin and, most important, it is a development related to work.

Contemporary post-industrial systems, in Marcuse's view, demand that present organizational structures maintain their viability and survive, including those structures engendered by technology itself. Workers cannot expect to be "free" of the

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1 Herbert Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, p. 22.

2 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Holy Family. Translated by R. Dixon (Moscow, 1964), p. 73. (As quoted by Avineri, op.cit., p. 138).

3 Shlomo Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, p. 142.

machine nor can a shift to white collar work reduce repression. Capitalism seeks to sustain itself and perhaps for the first time in history, according to Marcuse, change may be working only within -- and potentially restricted to -- a given framework. In the short run:

> ... dominant interests will gradually and hesitatingly accept these requirements (increased central control to meet the needs of the "Welfare State") and entrust their prerogatives to a more effective power.[1]

Marcuse asks the question: "is liberation from the affluent society identical with the transition from capitalism to socialism?". His answer is far too romantic to be considered Marxist: "only if socialism is defined in its most utopian terms ..."[2]

Marcuse's utopian terms include the break to a complete qualitative, instinctual, organic and biological change whereby

> ... creative imagination and not only the rationality of the performance principle, would become a productive force applied to the transformation of the social and rational universe.[3]

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1 Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man (Sphere Books, op.cit.), p.46.

2 Herbert Marcuse, "Liberation from the Affluent Society", op.cit., p. 184.

3 Ibid., p. 185.

Revolution is to Marcuse the conjunction of qualitative and quantitative change, "where the quantitative change in the conditions and institutions can become a qualitative change affecting all human existence."[1] This is a society in which the "new biological man" is created who, as previously described, is incapable of violence and aggression.

Marcuse is thus attempting to reconcile Marx and Freud by posing a new structure of character and relating it to the material base.[2] Marcuse notes that the "new man" is a historical being and can thus be placed in a Marxian context. As Avineri observes:

> ... to Marx socialism will not emancipate man as he is from external limitations, but will bridge the gap between existing man and the potentialities inherent in his activity as an historical being.[3]

However, Marcuse does not look to history, as did Marx, to affirm his belief in his particular view of man's potentiality. He instead looks to Freudian theory and believes that, given a historical view of the Freudian reality principle, which has been shown not to be accepted by Freud, one can totally affirm the pleasure principle. Furthermore, as previously explained, Freud's

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1 Herbert Marcuse, "Liberation from the Affluent Society", op.cit., p. 179.

2 See section on Alienation in this Chapter for a discussion of how this new structure of character relates to Freud and Marx.

3 Shlomo Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, p. 237.

own belief in the potential of man was very negative. Moreover, if there was to be a greater affirmation of the pleasure principle, restraints in civilization would have to be lessened to a far greater degree than Marcuse envisions (indeed he is very vague on this question). This would, in the Freudian view, destroy civilization.

Marx was not a utopian. He had a soundly constructed logical conception of history which Marcuse does his best to avoid. The Marxian dialectical movement is superimposed upon the conflicts of Eros and rationality which leads to questions of social analysis in Marcuse, according to Henri Lefebvre.[1] This, in turn, leads to the Marxian formulation that the rational is coincidental with the domination of nature and the appropriation by the human being of his own nature. However, Lefebvre states, the modern world does not verify this, and in fact Marcuse rejects some aspects of this idea because of his formulation of the "new rationality", which does not coincide with man's appropriation of his own nature. It is in this sense that Marcuse is not entirely logical within the Marxian context, in that he accepts those parts of Marx's analysis which he feels have bearing, and rejects what may be the entire thrust of the Marxian logic. Marcuse's biological

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[1] Henri Lefebvre, "Eros et Logos", in: La Nef, 36, Marcuse: Cet Inconnu (op.cit.), pp. 59-66.

man is an example of this: he cannot bridge the gap between scarcity and freedom unless the problem of scarcity has been solved, and there is some doubt if he can even do it then. Marx did not have this as a precondition, although both he and Marcuse do believe that this can only occur in an industrial society.[1] The Marxian man bridges this gap and achieves reconciliation through work and his relationships with other men. The Marcusian man must totally affirm the pleasure principle in order to achieve reconciliation, a doubtful possibility, which even Freud rejects. The Marxian man is within the realm of man's potentiality, if we view man as a "historical being". The Marcusian man is therefore a utopian vision and thus contradictory to Marx's (and Freud's) formulations.

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[1] Gajo Petrovic, a Yugoslav Marxist, notes that in Marx "it is possible to create a social system that would enable and even stimulate the development of de-alienated individuals, but it is not possible to organize a society that would automatically produce such individuals. A non-alienated individual ... fulfills himself as a free and creative being of praxis ... An individual can become free and creative through his own activity." (Gajo Petrovic, Marx in the Mid-Twentieth Century. Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1967, p. 152).

There are two major points in this quotation from Petrovic that bring forth Marcuse's contradiction of Marx which was developed by his attempt to enrich him: a) Marcuse does not adequately concern himself with the complex Marxian idea of praxis which, as explained in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, denotes conscious life activity, and b) this activity of the self allows man to attain freedom. Marcuse's idea in effect is that this conscious life activity has been denied by external forces which are irreconcilable with man's freedom, potentiality and qualitative change. Therefore, the Marxist quest for freedom through praxis has been severely undermined by the proposition that structures of production under capitalism have produced a new structure of character and that the way to overcome this is through a biological revolution.

3. Conclusion: A View of Marcuse's Attempt to reconcile Marx and Freud

George Kateb, in a recent article, congratulates Marcuse on the way in which he uses psychological arguments. However, he asks: "But how true is it?" His answer is mainly in opposition to Marcuse's findings: "As long as men must labor, frustration and aggressiveness are inevitable ..."[1]

Marcuse would reply that it is the present organization of labor which exacerbates man's aggressiveness. Perhaps this is true. However, he does not present an alternative that will satisfy the problem in terms of organization. He speaks of solidarity and community, but he does not show how this can be implemented while still maintaining a high level of abundance which he believes is required for qualitative change.

Of course, the problem is too complex for patent solutions. Marcuse himself says that collectivism is not the complete answer. The quandary is that his analysis does provide adequate description, but has little heuristic value in terms of solutions. Marcuse's own thinking about this quandary is perhaps the most enlightening. He points to the French Revolution and notes that there were no "plans" or "grand strategy" for the structure of society after the accession to power. Qualitative change is a product of revolution and at the same time defines revolution. It is only in the process of revolution and in the accession to power that a true plan engaging qualitative change will be brought to fruition.[2]

Marcuse has achieved in his analysis of capitalism what Paul Baran said that Freud tried to do about human behavior:

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1 George Kateb, "The Political Thought of Herbert Marcuse", in: Commentary (January 1970).

2 Discussion with Herbert Marcuse, McGill University (June 12, 1970).

> ... Freud directed most of his life's efforts to an attempt at a rational understanding of irrational motivations. Far from considering irrationality to be an elemental phenomenon inaccessible to scientific analysis, Freud sought to develop a comprehensive theory providing a rational explanation of irrational drives.[1]

The dependence of Marcusian thought upon Freudian theory could not possibly expand the scope of Marcuse's utopianism to a significant dimension, if this dependence was completely accurate. Marcuse must turn to Marx, that is, leave the realm of unconscious, non-historic and instinctual analysis and proceed to causative factors which man can control.

The problem of reconciling Marx with Freud is not a happy task. Much of the ambivalence in Marcuse's thought can be traced to this; however, he himself does not seem to recognize this problem. Consider the problem of the ending, that is, the ultimate fulfilment of man's potentiality.

Marx and Freud held fundamentally different notions of man, the former being salutary, the latter's engaged in shadows. Reconciliations with "reality" must flow from such a view. Thus we are left with irreconcilable visions.

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[1] Paul Baran, "Marxism and Psychoanalysis", in: Monthly Review (October 1959).

A revision must occur for Marcuse to become coherent. He could opt for either thinker: he chooses both. Marx made very straightforward predictions about the possibilities for socialism in various European nations. The accuracy of these predictions is irrelevant. What they do show is a notion of a particular social structure which could be related to various stages of economic and historical development. Conceptually, the social structure that Marx desired was not utopian, but logical and consistent within his system. Indeed, it was also a most happy ending.

Freud was quite different. Civilization and Its Discontents is an exposition of the dark side of man. "The history of man is the history of his repressions", said Freud, and in all probability this history would get worse, given the nature of man's instinctual make-up. Auschwitz and Dachau are not aberrations; indeed they too are logical and consistent given the primacy of the death instinct. Marcuse is well aware of this.

A Freudian base is posed within the Marxian superstructure and a radical revision of both philosophers occurs. This is Marcuse's solution. Furthermore, Marcuse does not fully accept those Freudian concepts which occur solely on an individual level,

and he places the conflicts he does accept on too high a level of abstraction. Freudian concepts become generalized to the societal level, where they are not entirely applicable; however, generalization does allow Marcuse to draw interesting parallels with Marx.

Marxian 'reification' becomes a psychological term because of the Marcusian process of absorption and the subsequent shifts in man's psyche, given the historical form of the reality principle. Character becomes merely reflection; modes of production are reified. This new notion of reification is closer to Marx than it is to Freudian principles; however, the schools of Lukacs and Mannheim are closer to the source on this than Marcuse.

Marcuse is a utopian, and hence Freud can be, at best, an underbase for Marcuse's Marxian analysis. Once analysis has been exhausted, the use of Freud disallows concrete Marxist options.

This places Marcuse in an embarrassing position because the most he can do is infer suggestions for concrete alternatives. If he follows through, even partially, the answer becomes some form of elitism. Plato's Republic would be consistent with this. In one of his minor works, Repressive Tolerance, Marcuse does go

in that direction. However, that work is generally against the thrust of his other contributions.

Marcuse's reconciliation thus becomes one of distortion, doing an injustice to Freud, Marx and Marcuse himself. This distortion is most acute concerning Freud, particularly with respect to the key concepts of a) the reality principle, and b) polymorphous perversity. Marcuse's interpretation of Marx, as previously noted, serves as a framework for his Freudian theory and thus some redefinition of Marx does occur. It is this failure of reconciliation by Marcuse, and Marcuse's subsequent dependence upon the principles posited from this attempt at synthesis, which leave the reader with much embarrassing ambiguity.

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